4/4/83

Memorandum for: President's Commission Members and Senior Counselors

From: R. James Woolsey

Enclosed is a draft incorporating the changes that were agreed upon in the meetings last Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Telephone calls between Brent and various players have produced one or two further changes since then; these are included as well. Also enclosed is the draft Executive Summary and my re-work of Marv Atkins' glossary.

Please telephone final comments -- now only on major policy questions that can be accommodated by one-word changes that will be unanimously and instantly accepted by all other players -- to Brent tomorrow, Tuesday, April 5. His office number is (202) 861-0006; home number is (301) 229-1928.

[Lc]

# GLOSSARY

(NOTE: These explanations of some technical terms used in strategic analysis are provided for quick reference and do not necessarily have legal or official standing in international negotiations.)

**Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)** - See Ballistic Missile Defense.

**Arms Control** - The process of limiting or reducing arms to lessen the risk of conflict and to reduce the consequences of a conflict should it occur. The purpose of arms control is to increase our national security.

**Ballistic Missile** - A missile whose propulsion system consists of rockets which burn early in the flight of the missile. After the rockets burn out, the payload coasts on to the target on a "ballistic trajectory" like a bullet fired from a rifle.

**Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)** - A defensive system which destroys incoming ballistic missiles or their warheads. Up to this time, the greatest amount of work has been done on BMD approaches which use interceptor missiles armed with small nuclear warheads. The Soviets actually have such a system deployed in limited numbers around Moscow. BMD developments in the future could center around very different concepts such as non-nuclear homing warheads or lasers. The term "Anti-Ballistic Missile System" or "ABM" is often used interchangeably.

**Command, Control, and Communications (C3)** - The complete set of hardware, people, and procedures used by the national leadership and commanders at all levels to direct and monitor the operation of military forces in the conduct of their day-to-day activities and wartime missions.

[LC]

Glossary

Page 2

**Cruise Missiles** - Small, unmanned airplanes carrying nuclear or high explosive warheads. They can be launched from airplanes, trucks, ships, or submarines.

**Deterrence** - A condition in which a strategic power is dissuaded from attack because he believes the potential victim could retaliate.

**Fractionation** - Replacing the warheads on a MIRV missile (See Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle) with a larger number of smaller warheads.

**Guidance** - The equipment on board a missile (or other piece of moving equipment) which measures the position, speed, and direction and directs the missile toward its desired destination. Two types of guidance equipment of particular relevance to this report are:

**Inertial Guidance**, in which gyroscopes and other instruments guide the missile without any communication between missile and ground in either direction after the moment of launch. Inertial guidance is in virtually universal use on ICBMs and SLBMs at this time.

**Terminal Guidance**, in which the missile or its reentry vehicle "looks" at the ground near the target and homes in. Terminal guidance is used on cruise missiles and the Pershing II medium-range missile, but its application to long-range ballistic missiles will be a challenging problem.

**Hardness** - The resistance of a possible target to the effects of enemy nuclear weapons. The often-discussed hardness of missile silos is usually measured in pounds-per-square-inch (psi) of blast pressure.

[LC]

Glossary

Page 3

**Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)** - A long-range missile based on the continental United States which has sufficient range to attack most or all of the Soviet Union, or a Soviet missile with corresponding capability. See also **Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)**.

**Launcher** - The equipment required to launch a missile. ICBM launchers can be either fixed or mobile.

**Launch on Warning** - This phrase is now usually, but not universally, used to mean launch of missiles after one side received electrical signals from radars, infra-red satellites, or other sensors that enemy missiles are on the way, but before there have been nuclear detonations on its territory. "Launch under attack" is sometimes used interchangeably with "launch on warning" and sometimes used to designate a launch after more confirmation has been received, such as indications that detonations have occurred.

**Launch Under Attack** - See "Launch on Warning."

**Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) System** - A missile capable of carrying two or more reentry vehicles which can be directed individually toward separate targets. The targets for a single missile can be spread over a wide area which is often called the "footprint" of the missile, depending on the range to which the missile is targeted. The SALT II agreement limits the number of reentry vehicles on ICBMs to ten.

**Payload** - The total weight of the reentry vehicles carried by a single missile. See also throw-weight.

**Penetration Aids** - Equipment, such as decoys, carried along as part of a missile's throw-weight, specifically to assist the reentry vehicle to get through ballistic missile defenses.

[L]

Glossary

Page 4

PBV - Post Boost Vehicle (often called "bus") - the section of a MIRV ballistic missile which fits between the main rocket stages and the reentry vehicles. It carries the reentry vehicles and directs each one toward its individual target.

Reentry Vehicle (RV) - The shell around a warhead, generally in the shape of a cone or modified cone, which protects the missile warhead during its reentry through the earth's atmosphere. When the weight of a reentry vehicle is discussed, it usually means the total weight of the warhead, protective shell, and any other equipment carried inside that shell.

Stability - The condition which exists when no strategic power believes it can significantly improve its situation by attacking first in a crisis or when it does not feel compelled to launch its strategic weapons in order to avoid losing them.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) - A ballistic missile launched from a nuclear submarine. While they fundamentally operate in a similar manner, in practice ICBMs and SLBMs have many features that are different in important ways because of the different engineering problems in land and sea basing. Until the advent of our new Trident SLBM system (and a roughly similar Soviet system), SLBMs also had substantially shorter ranges than ICBMs.

Throw-weight - The useful weight which a ballistic missile can place on a trajectory toward its target by the boost or main propulsion stages of the missile. It includes such items as reentry vehicles, post-boost vehicles or similar targeting devices, and penetration aids and their release devices.

[c]

Glossary

**Triad** - A shorthand expression often used to express the concept that the U.S. has three separate, and in some ways roughly equal, types of strategic nuclear forces -- land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, and bombers.

**Verification** - The total process of determining compliance with treaty obligations in the context of safeguarding national security. The word "monitoring" is often used to mean the technical process of determining, for example, how many ICBM silos the Soviets have built.

**Warhead** - The part of a military system that explodes and causes damage to the target.

**Warning** - Indications from any of a wide variety of sources that another nation intends to start hostilities. The term "strategic warning" is often used to mean indications hours or days in advance that attack is definitely planned, while "tactical warning" means evidence (usually from radar or other electronic systems) that enemy warheads are actually on the way and will arrive in a matter of minutes. Military historians have pointed out many instances, including Pearl Harbor, when a nation had strategic warning but for a variety of reasons failed to take appropriate action.

[lc]

DRAFT

Report of the President's Commission
On Strategic Forces

I. Deterrence and Arms Control

The responsibility given to this Commission is to review the purpose, character, size, and composition of the strategic forces of the United States. The members of the Commission fully understand not only the purposes for which this nation maintains its deterrent, but also the devastating nature of nuclear warfare, should deterrence fail. The Commission believes that effective arms control is an essential element in diminishing the risk of nuclear war -- while preserving our liberties and those of like-minded nations. At the same time the Commission is persuaded that as we consider the threat of mass destruction we must consider simultaneously the threat of aggressive totalitarianism. Both are central to the political dilemmas of our age. For the United States and its allies the essential dual task of statecraft is, and must be, to avoid the first and contain the second.

It is only by addressing these two issues together that we can begin to understand how to preserve both liberty and peace. Although the United States and the Soviet Union hold fundamentally incompatible views of history, of the nature of society, and of the individual's place in it, the existence of nuclear weapons imbues that rivalry with peril unprecedented in human history. The temptation is sometimes great to simplify -- or oversimplify -- the difficult problems that result, either by blinking at the devastating

- 2 -

nature of modern full-scale war or by refusing to acknowledge the emptiness of
life under modern totalitarianism. But it is naive, false, and dangerous to
assume that either of these, today, can be ignored and the other dealt with in
isolation. We cannot cope with the efforts of the Soviet Union to extend its
power without giving thought to the way nuclear weapons have sharply raised
the stakes and changed the nature of warfare. Nor can we struggle against
nuclear war or the arms race in some abstract sense without keeping before us
the Soviet Union's appetite for expansion, which is what makes those struggles
so difficult.

We should face both problems directly.

Our words, policies, and actions should all make clear the American
conviction that nuclear war, involving few or many nuclear weapons, would be a
tragedy of unparalleled scope for humanity. It is wrong to pretend or suggest
otherwise. Neither the American people, our allies, nor the Soviets should
doubt our abhorrence of nuclear war in any form.

By the same token, however, our task as a nation cannot be
understood from a position of moral neutrality toward the differences between
liberty and totalitarianism. These differences proceed from conflicting views
regarding the rights of individuals and the nature of society. It is only if
Americans believe that it is worth a sustained effort over the years to
preserve liberty in the face of challenge by a system that is the antithesis
of liberal values that our task can be seen as a just and worthy one in spite
of its dangers.

We do have many strengths in such an effort. Over the long run, the
strengths lent by liberty itself are our greatest -- our abilities to adapt
peacefully to political change, to improve social justice, to innovate with

[LC]

- 3 -

technology, to produce what our people need to live and prosper. What we have most to fear is that confusion and internal divisions -- sometimes byproducts of the vigorous play of our free politics -- will lead us to lose purpose, hope, and resolve.

We have good reason to maintain all three. Neither time nor history is on the side of large, centralized, autocratic systems that seek to achieve and maintain control over all aspects of the lives of many diverse peoples. We should, with calm persistence, limit the expansion of today's version of this sort of totalitarian state, the Soviet Union. We should persuade its leaders that they cannot successfully divert attention from internal problems by resorting to political blackmail, expansion, and militarism -- rationalized by alleged threats posed by us or our allies. We should also be ready to encourage the Soviets to begin to settle differences between us, through equitable arms control agreements and other measures. But moral neutrality and indifference or acquiescence in the face of Soviet efforts to expand their military and political power do not hasten such settlements -- they delay them, make them less likely, and ultimately increase the risk of war.

Deterrence is central to the calm persistence we must demonstrate in order to reduce these risks. American strategic forces exist to deter attack on the United States or its allies -- and the blackmail that would be possible if the public or decisionmakers believed that the Soviets might be able to launch a successful attack. Such a policy of deterrence, like the security policy of the West itself, is essentially defensive in nature. The strategic forces that are necessary in order to support such a policy by their very existence help to convince the Soviet Union's leaders: that the West has the military strength and political will to resist aggression; and that, if they

[Lc]

- 4 -

should ever choose to attack, they should have no doubt that we can and will respond until we have so damaged the power of the Soviet state that they will unmistakably be far worse off than if they had never begun.

There can be no doubt that the very scope of the possible tragedy of modern nuclear war, and the increased destruction made possible by modern non-nuclear technology, have changed the nature of war itself. This is not only because massive conventional war with modern weapons could be horrendously destructive -- some fifty million people died in "conventional" World War II before the advent of nuclear weapons -- but also because conventional war between the world's major power blocs is the most likely way for nuclear war itself to develop. The problem of deterring the threat of nuclear war, in short, cannot be segregated from the overall power balance between East and West. Simply put, it is war that must concern us, not nuclear war alone.

Thus we must maintain a balance between our nuclear and conventional forces and we must demonstrate to the Soviets our cohesion and our will. And we must understand that weakness in any one of these areas puts a dangerous burden on the others as well as on overall deterrence.

Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff. In order for deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able and, if necessary, prepared to use them effectively against the key elements of Soviet power. Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror image of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs about our capabilities and our will that, at the crucial time, is in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own values and attitudes. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis -- not to

[L]

- 5 -

determine what would deter us.

Our military forces must be able to deter war even if the Soviets are unwilling to participate with us in equitable and reasonable arms control agreements. But various types of agreements can, when the Soviets prove willing, accomplish critical objectives. Arms control can: reduce the risk of war; help limit the spread of nuclear weapons; remove or reduce the risk of misunderstanding of particular events or accidents; seal off wasteful, dangerous, or unhelpful lines of technical development before either side gets too committed to them; help channel modernization into stabilizing rather than destabilizing paths; reduce misunderstanding about the purpose of weapons developments and thus reduce the need to over-insure against worst-case projections; and help make arsenals less destructive and costly. To achieve part or all of these positive and useful goals, we must keep in mind the importance of compliance and adequate verification -- difficult problems in light of the nature of the Soviet state -- and the consequent importance of patience in order to reach fair and reasonable agreements.

This is a vital and challenging agenda. In some of these areas of arms control our interests coincide closely with those of the Soviets. In others, their efforts to undermine the effectiveness of our deterrent will make negotiations difficult.

But whether the Soviets prove willing or not, stability should be the objective of both the modernization of our strategic forces and of our arms control proposals. Our arms control proposals and our strategic arms programs should thus be integrated and should be mutually reinforcing. They should work together to permit us, and encourage the Soviets, to move in directions that reduce or eliminate the advantage of aggression and also

[lc]

- 6 -

reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. As we try to enhance stability in this sense, the Commission believes that other objectives should be subordinated to the overall goal of permitting the United States to move -- over time -- toward more stable strategic deployments, and giving the Soviets the strong incentive to do the same. Consequently it believes, for the reasons set forth below, that it is important to move toward reducing the value and importance of individual strategic targets.

## II. Soviet Objectives and Programs

Effective deterrence and effective arms control have both been made significantly more difficult by Soviet conduct and Soviet weapons progams in recent years. The overall military balance, including the nuclear balance, provides the backdrop for Soviet decisions about the manner in which they will try to advance their interests. This is central to our understanding of how to deter war, how to frustrate Soviet efforts at blackmail, and how to deal with the Soviets' day-to-day conduct of international affairs. The Soviets have shown by word and deed that they regard military power, including nuclear weapons, as a useful tool in the projection of their national influence. In the Soviet strategic view, nuclear weapons are closely related to, and are integrated with, their other military and political instruments as a means of advancing Soviet interests. They have concentrated enormous effort on the development and modernization of nuclear weapons, obviously seeking to achieve what they regard as important advantages in certain areas of nuclear weaponry.

Historically the Soviets have not been noted for taking large risks. But one need not take the view that their leaders are eager to launch

[LC]

- 8 -

force. Only the 550 MIRVed Minuteman III missiles in the U.S. force have relatively good accuracy, but the combination of accuracy and yield of their 3 warheads is inadequate to put at serious risk more than a small share of the many hardened targets in the Soviet Union. Most Soviet hardened targets -- of which ICBM silos are only a portion -- could withstand attacks by our other strategic missiles.

The Soviet ballistic missile submarine force currently consists of 62 modern submarines; these are armed with 950 missiles, with a total of almost 2,000 nuclear warheads. The U.S. has fewer such submarines (34) and missiles (568), but more warheads (about 5,000), in its submarine force. Our submarines, moreover, are quieter than those of the Soviets. Recent Soviet ballistic missile submarine building programs have been vigorous: four times that of the U.S. rate. While the U.S. has a substantial present advantage in the overall capability of its ballistic missile submarine force, this gap is narrowing. The U.S. also has a present advantage in anti-submarine warfare and submarine quietness, but the Soviets appear to be giving high priority to these areas.

Soviet heavy strategic bombers (not including the Backfire) now number about 150, around half equipped with air-to-surface missiles. This force is considerably less capable than the total active U.S. bomber force, which numbers about 270 B52 G and H bombers and about 60 FB-111 bombers. The U.S. bomber force has just begun to be equipped with long-range cruise missiles. Both U.S. and Soviet bombers have carried short-range missiles for many years. A new Soviet intercontinental bomber (the Blackjack) is now being flight-tested. It is similar in appearance to, but larger than, the U.S. B-1B now in production. The Blackjack will probably begin to enter service during

- 9 -

the mid-to-late 1980s.

Soviet strategic defenses are extensive, consisting of a dense nationwide air defense network and a limited ballistic missile defense at Moscow. Both are undergoing modernization. Their vigorous research and development programs on ballistic missile defense provide a potential, however, for a rapid expansion of Soviet ABM defenses, should they choose to withdraw from or violate the ABM treaty. Such a potential is enhanced by the continued deployment of modern and capable Soviet air defense missile systems. At least one new Soviet defensive system is designed to have capability against short-range ballistic missiles; it could perhaps be upgraded for use against the re-entry vehicles of some submarine-launched missiles and even ICBMs. Proliferation of such Soviet air defense missile systems thus creates a need for us to have enough throw-weight to carry sufficient numbers of warheads, and penetration aids such as decoys, in order to be assured of maintaining a deterrent. The U.S. has dismantled its ABM system and has minimal continental air defenses.

These Soviet programs do not necessarily indicate plans to initiate nuclear attacks. But they do confirm the value that Soviet leaders place on military programs across the board both to provide an essential backdrop for their political purposes and -- should circumstances dictate -- to give them the capability to fight successfully. They also understand that the success of their efforts depends upon the outside world's perception. If comparative military trends were to point toward their becoming superior to the West in each of a number of military areas, they might consider themselves able to raise the risks in a crisis in a manner that could not be matched.

In a world in which the balance of strategic nuclear forces could be

[wc]

- 10 -

isolated and kept distinctly set apart from all other calculations about relations between nations and the credibility of conventional military power, a nuclear imbalance would have little importance unless it were so massive as to tempt an aggressor to launch nuclear war. But the world in which we must live with the Soviets is, sadly, one in which their own assessments of these trends, and hence their calculations of overall advantage, influence heavily the vigor with which they exercise their power.

### III. Preventing Soviet Exploitation of Their Military Programs

In our effort to make a strategy of deterrence and arms control effective in preventing the Soviets from political or military use of their strategic forces, we must keep several things in mind.

The Soviets must continue to believe what has been NATO's doctrine for three decades: that if we or our allies should be attacked -- by massive conventional means or otherwise -- the United States has the will and the means to defend with the full range of American power. This by no means excludes the need to make improvements in our conventional forces in order to have increased confidence in our ability to defend effectively at the conventional level in many more situations, and thus to raise the nuclear threshold. Certainly mutual arms control agreements to reduce both sides' reliance on nuclear weapons should be pursued. But effective deterrence requires that early in any Soviet consideration of attack, or threat of attack, with conventional forces or chemical or biological weapons, Soviet leaders must understand that they risk an American nuclear response.

Similarly, effective deterrence requires that the Soviets be

- 11 -

[Lc]

convinced that they could not credibly threaten us or our allies with a
limited use of nuclear weapons against military targets, in one country or
many. Such a course of action by them would be even more likely to result in
full-scale nuclear war than would a massive conventional attack. But we
cannot discount the possibility that the Soviets would implicitly or
explicitly threaten such a step in some future crisis if they believed that we
were unprepared or unwilling to respond. Indeed lack of preparation or
resolve on our part would make such blackmail distinctly more probable.

In order to deter such Soviet threats and blackmail we must be able
to put at risk those types of Soviet targets -- including hardened ones such
as military command facilities, missile silos, nuclear weapons and other
storage, bunkers for military and Party leaders, and the rest -- which the
Soviet leaders have given every indication by their actions they value most,
and which constitute their tools of control and power. We cannot afford the
delusion that Soviet leaders -- human though they are and cautious though we
hope they will be -- are going to be deterred by exactly the same concerns
that would persuade us. Effective deterrence of the Soviet leaders requires
them to be convinced in their own minds that there could be no case in which
they could benefit by initiating war.

Effective deterrence of any Soviet temptation to threaten or launch
a massive conventional or a limited nuclear war thus requires us to have a
comparable ability to destroy Soviet military targets, hardened and
otherwise. If there were ever a case to be made that the Soviets would
unilaterally stop their strategic deployments at a level short of the ability
seriously to threaten our forces, that argument vanished with the deployment
of their SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. A one-sided strategic condition in which the

- 12 -

[Lc]

Soviet Union could effectively destroy the whole range of strategic targets in the United States, but we could not effectively destroy a similar range of targets in the Soviet Union, would be extremely unstable over the long run. Such a situation could tempt the Soviets, in a crisis, to feel they could successfully threaten or even undertake conventional or limited nuclear aggression in the hope that the United States would lack a fully effective response. A one-sided condition of this sort would clearly not serve the cause of peace.

In order, then, to pursue successfully a policy of deterrence and verifiable, stabilizing arms control we must have a strong and militarily effective nuclear deterrent. Consequently our strategic forces must be modernized, as necessary, to enhance to an adequate degree their overall survivability and to enable them to engage effectively the targets that Soviet leaders most value.

Also, as described below, we should seek to use arms control agreements to reduce instabilities and to channel both sides' strategic modernization toward stabilizing developments, deployments, and reductions. Regardless of what we are able to accomplish with arms control agreements, however, two aspects of deterrence are crucial. The problems of maintaining an effective deterrent and of reaching stabilizing and verifiable arms control agreements cannot be addressed coherently without keeping in mind the nature of Soviet expansionism. Second, the deterrent effect of our strategic forces is not something separate and apart from the ability of those forces to be used against the tools by which the Soviet leaders maintain their power. Deterrence, on the contrary, requires military effectiveness.

- 13 -

[Lc]

# IV. U.S. Strategic Forces and Trends

## A. Strategic Forces As A Whole

The development of the components of our strategic forces -- the multiplicity of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bombers -- was in part the result of an historical evolution. This triad of forces, however, serves several important purposes.

First, the existence of several strategic forces requires the Soviets to solve a number of different problems in their efforts to plan how they might try to overcome them. Our objective, after all, is to make their planning of any such attack as difficult as we can. If it were possible for the Soviets to concentrate their research and development efforts on putting only one or two components of U.S. strategic forces at risk -- e.g., by an intensive effort at anti-submarine warfare to attempt to threaten our ballistic missile submarines -- both their incentive to do so and their potential gains would be sharply increased. Thus, the existence of several components of our strategic forces permits each to function as a hedge against possible Soviet successes in endangering any of the others. For example, at earlier times uncertainties about the vulnerability of our bomber force were alleviated by our confidence in the survivability of our ICBMs. And although the survivability of our ICBMs is today a matter of concern (especially when that problem is viewed in isolation) it would be far more serious if we did not have a force of ballistic missile submarines at sea and a bomber force. By the same token, over the long run it would be unwise to rely so heavily on

[L]

- 14 -

submarines as our only ballistic missile force that a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare could not be offset by other strategic systems.

Second, the different components of our strategic forces would force the Soviets, if they were to contemplate an all-out attack, to make choices which would lead them to reduce significantly their effectiveness against one component in order to attack another. For example, if Soviet war planners should decide to attack our bomber and submarine bases and our ICBM silos with simultaneous detonations -- by delaying missile launches from close-in submarines so that such missiles would arrive at our bomber bases at the same time the Soviet ICBM warheads (with their longer time of flight) would arrive at our ICBM silos -- then a very high proportion of our alert bombers would have escaped before their bases were struck. This is because we would have been able to, and would have, ordered our bombers to take off from their bases within moments after the launch of the first Soviet ICBMs. If the Soviets, on the other hand, chose rather to launch their ICBM and SLBM attacks at the same moment (hoping to destroy a higher proportion of our bombers with SLBMs having a short time of flight), there would be a period of over a quarter of an hour after nuclear detonations had occurred on U.S. bomber bases but before our ICBMs had been struck. In such a case the Soviets should have no confidence that we would refrain from launching our ICBMs during that interval after we had been hit. It is important to appreciate that this would not be a "launch-on-warning", or even a "launch under attack", but rather a launch after attack -- after massive nuclear detonations had already occurred on U.S. soil.

Thus our bombers and ICBMs are more survivable together against Soviet attack than either would be alone. This illustrates that the different components of our strategic forces should be assessed collectively and not in

- 15 -

isolation. It also suggests that whereas it is highly desirable that a component of the strategic forces be survivable when it is viewed separately, it makes a major contribution to deterrence even if its survivability depends in substantial measure on the existence of one of the other components of the force.

The third purpose served by having multiple components in our strategic forces is that each component has unique properties not present in the others. Nuclear submarines have the advantage of being able to stay submerged and hidden for months at a time, and thus the missiles they carry may reasonably be held in reserve rather than being used early in the event of attack. Bombers may be launched from their bases on warning without irretrievably committing them to an attack; also, their weapons, though they arrive in hours, not minutes, have excellent accuracy against a range of possible targets. ICBMs have advantages in command and control, in the ability to be retargeted readily, and in accuracy. This means that ICBMs are especially effective in deterring Soviet threats of massive conventional or limited nuclear attacks, because they could most credibly respond promptly and controllably against specific military targets and thereby promptly disrupt an attack on us or our allies.

## B. Technological Trends for Strategic Forces

### 1. Accuracy

The accuracy of strategic weapons in the foreseeable future will continue to increase. There are lower limits, perhaps a few hundred feet, to

[Lc]

- 16 -

the accuracy of strategic weapons that do not rely on some kind of terminal guidance. For weapons using terminal guidance, accuracy should be even better. Accuracy is most advanced today in the ICBM forces, but in the 1990s SLBMs should have sufficient accuracy seriously to threaten hardened targets. Nevertheless, ICBM accuracy should remain somewhat better than that for submarine-launched missiles.

These accuracy developments and the ability of an attacker to use more than one warhead to attack each fixed target on the other side increasingly put at risk targets of high value such as fixed launchers for MIRVed ICBMs. Although such fixed targets will retain some survivability for a number of years -- because of problems of operational accuracies, planning uncertainties (as discussed at Section V.E. below), and the previously described need to co-ordinate ICBM and SLBM attacks -- their survivability will nevertheless become more questionable in time. Thus reasonable survivability of fixed targets, such as ICBM silos, may not outlast this century, even when one considers them together with the rest of our strategic forces. In time, even non-nuclear weapons with excellent accuracy may be able to attack effectively some fixed targets previously thought to be vulnerable only to nuclear weapons.

## 2. Superhardening

New concepts and developments in hardening are quite promising. They could lead to the capability to harden such targets as ICBM silos far in excess of what was thought possible only a short time ago. Eventually the survival of even the hardest such targets would be doubtful in light of the

[LC]

- 17 -

accuracy improvements described above. Nonetheless increased hardness would raise the weapons requirements and the risk of attack for some years. Hardening will also be able to postpone vulnerability to, and therefore the probability of, attack by submarine-launched ballistic missiles (in the absence of effective terminal guidance).

### 3. Mobility

New techniques in guidance, miniaturization of electronic components, hardening against nuclear effects, and solid fuels will continue to make mobile strategic systems more feasible. Strategically useful hardening of land-based mobile launchers appears more feasible than in the past.

### 4. Anti-submarine Warfare

The problem of conducting open-ocean search for submarines is likely to continue to be sufficiently difficult that ballistic missile submarine forces will have a high degree of survivability for a long time. Nevertheless, the prospect of concentrating all of the submarine-launched missiles at sea in a few very large submarines raises some concern. Communication links with submarines, while likely to improve, will still offer problems not present for land-based systems.

- 18 -

[Lc]

## 5. Ballistic Missile Defense

Substantial progress has been made in the last decade in the development of both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric ABM defenses. However, projections of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century. An easier task is to provide ABM defense for fixed hardened targets, such as ICBM silos. However even this will be a difficult feat if an attacker can use a large number of warheads against each defended target. The effectiveness of such a defense could be enhanced by some types of bunching and close spacing of the defended targets, in order to reduce the number of ABM systems required. It could also be enhanced by having multiple shelters for each missile and preferentially defending only the shelter containing the missile while facing an attacker with the need to attack all shelters.

Improvements in Soviet air defense systems -- to give them some capability against some submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads, and even against some warheads fired by ICBMs -- are likely to continue as such air defenses are made capable of dealing with modern aircraft, cruise missiles, and shorter-range ballistic missiles. The 1972 ABM treaty, however, has provisions prohibiting the testing of air defense systems as ABMs.

## V. Strategic Modernization Programs

Although there is room for improvement and adjustments in the several strategic programs discussed below, the Commission noted that these programs are -- in the main -- proceeding reasonably well. Therefore this

[LC]

- 20 -

ballistic missile submarine force. Given the increased importance of that force, both programs are essential. The D-5 missile's greater accuracy will also enable it to be used to put some portion of Soviet hard targets at risk, a task for which the current Trident I (C-4) missile is not sufficiently accurate. The Commission also stresses the importance of the command, control, and communication improvements of particular relevance to the submarine force -- namely the ELF communication system, the ECX aircraft, and the MILSTAR satellite.

The Commission does not recommend the development and deployment of a system for the launch of ballistic missiles from surface ships. Such a system appears to have no net advantage over submarine basing and would have vulnerabilities that submarines do not possess.

For the reasons stated in section IV.A., above, the Commission recommends strongly against adopting a strategic force posture relying solely on submarines and bombers to the exclusion of ICBM modernization; it recognizes, however, the increasing importance of the ballistic missile submarine force.

## 2. Research

The Commission notes that -- although it believes that the ballistic missile submarine force will have a high degree of survivability for a long time -- a submarine force ultimately consisting solely of a relatively few large submarines at sea, each carrying on the order of 200 warheads, presents a small number of valuable targets to the Soviets. Vigorous pursuit of the longstanding program to avoid technological surprise by the Soviets in anti-

[LC]

- 21 -

submarine warfare is of thus vital importance.

Consistent with the long-term program recommended for the ICBM force, below, to reduce the value of individual targets, the Commission recommends that research begin now on smaller ballistic-missile carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident, as a potential follow-on to the Trident submarine force. The objective of such research should be to design a submarine and missile system that would, as much as possible, reduce the value of each platform and also present radically different problems to a Soviet attacker than does the Trident submarine force. This work should proceed in such a way that a decision to construct and deploy such a submarine force could be rapidly implemented should arms reduction agreements or Soviet progress in anti-submarine warfare so dictate.

### C. Bomber and Air-Launched Cruise Missile Programs

Our bomber and air-launched cruise missile force is of vital importance to the maintenance of an effective deterrent. As long as its ability to survive and penetrate Soviet defenses can be maintained, it provides unique advantages of its own as a strategic system. It also provides mutual support to the survivability of the ICBM force, as discussed in Section IV.A., above. Furthermore the Commission bases its other recommendations on the assumption that a strong bomber and cruise missile program is continued. The Commission is unanimous in these views although it recognizes that there are legitimate differences about the best and least expensive way to provide for the necessary modernization of the bomber and cruise missile force. Since these modernization decisions, although not wholly independent of other

[Lc]

- 22 -

strategic force decisions, may reasonably be considered within their own
framework, the Commission -- having concentrated its efforts on the ballistic
missile forces and related issues -- has no changes to recommend in these
bomber and cruise missile programs.

D. <u>Ballistic Missile Defense</u>

Vigorous research and development on ABM technologies -- including,
in particular, ways to sharpen the effectiveness of treaty-limited ABM systems
with new types of nuclear systems and also ways to use non-nuclear systems --
are imperative to avoid technological surprise from the Soviets. Such a
vigorous program on our part also decreases any Soviet incentive -- based on
an attempt to achieve unilateral advantage -- to abrogate the ABM treaty. At
this time, however, the Commission believes that no ABM technologies appear to
combine practicality, survivability, low cost, and technical effectiveness
sufficiently to justify proceeding beyond the stage of technology development.

Of particular importance, however, is the ability to counter any
improvement in Soviet ABM capability by being able to maintain the
effectiveness of our offensive systems. The possibility of either a sudden
breakthrough in ABM technology, a rapid Soviet breakout from the ABM treaty by
a quick further deployment of their current ABM systems, or the deployment of
air defense systems also having some capability against strategic ballistic
missiles all point to the need for us to be able to penetrate some level of
ABM defense. This dictates continued attention to having sufficient throw-
weight for adequate numbers of warheads and of decoys and other penetration
aids.

- 23 -

E. ICBM Programs.

The problem that led to the establishment of this Commission is the
same one that has been at the heart of much of the controversy concerning
strategic forces and arms control for over a decade -- the future of our ICBM
force. As described above (Section IV.A.) our ICBM force has three main
strategic purposes: (1) serving as a hedge against possible vulnerabilities
in our submarine force; (2) introducing complexity and uncertainty into any
plan of Soviet attack, because of the different types of attacks that would
have to be launched against our ICBMs and our bombers; and (3) helping to
deter Soviet threats of massive conventional or limited nuclear attacks by the
ability to respond promptly and controllably against hardened military
targets.

ICBM modernization is also particularly important now in order to
encourage the Soviets to reach stabilizing arms control agreements and to
redress perceived U.S. disadvantages in strategic capability.

The Commission believes that, because of changing technology, arms
control negotiations, and our own domestic political process, this issue --
the future of our ICBM force -- has come to be miscast in recent years.

To many the problem has become: "How can a force consisting of
relatively large, accurate land-based ICBMs be deployed quickly and be made
survivable, even when it is viewed in isolation from the rest of our strategic
forces, in the face of increasingly accurate threatened attacks by large
numbers of warheads -- and how can such be done under arms control agreements
that limit or reduce launcher numbers?" It is this complex problem that many,

[Lc]

- 24 -

inside and outside the government, have sought to solve for a variety of reasons. These reasons fall into five main groups.

First, in order to serve one of the necessary purposes of a strategic force -- namely to hedge against possible failure by the others, such as would be caused by a Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare -- many have felt that any new ICBM deployment should be almost totally survivable, over the long term, even when viewed in isolation from our bomber force and the rest of our strategic forces. The threat now posed by accurate Soviet ICBMs to the Minuteman force, viewed in isolation, has led many to argue that this particular survivability problem has to be solved quickly.

Second, the overall perception of strategic imbalance caused by the Soviets' ability to destroy hardened land-based targets -- with more than 600 newly-deployed SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs -- while the U.S. is clearly not able to do so with its existing ballistic missile force, has been reasonably regarded as destabilizing and as a weakness in the overall fabric of deterrence. In particular, since the ICBM force helps to deter massive conventional or limited nuclear attack against us or our allies, this has led many to believe that the gap between U.S. and Soviet capabilities should be closed quickly in the overall interest of the alliance.

Third, arms control agreements, in order to be verifiable without resort to the sorts of co-operative measures such as on-site inspection typically opposed by the Soviets, have concentrated in significant part on limiting or reducing strategic missile launchers rather than warheads. This has in some measure been because launchers are more easily counted by satellite reconnaissance than are other ICBM characteristics and since launcher numbers provide relatively unambiguous terms for a treaty. Launcher

[lc]

- 25 -

or missile limits have the indirect effect, however, of encouraging both sides to build large ICBMs with many warheads.

Fourth, if one sets aside survivability, basing, and other cost considerations and looks solely at the cost of the missiles themselves, it is cheaper to deploy a given number of warheads in a few relatively large missiles than to deploy the same number of warheads on a larger number of smaller missiles.

Finally, for almost two decades our Minuteman ICBM force had virtually all of the positive characteristics desirable for any strategic system. It was survivable, even when an attack on it was viewed in isolation, because Soviet accuracies were not good enough to threaten silos. Command and control was comparatively easy. ICBMs were more accurate than submarine-based missiles and could reach their targets faster than bombers. And, when compared to either submarine-based missiles or bombers, silo-based ICBMs had strikingly low annual operating costs; once purchased, ICBMs had little effect on annual operating budgets. This history has led many to continue to seek to replicate those two decades of Minuteman history, and in so doing to try not only to meet these objectives, but to do so with a single way of basing a single type of ICBM that would have all of these desirable characteristics.

These five sets of considerations, different ones of them of greater importance to different decision-makers at different times, have led us as a nation in recent years to try to re-create all of the desirable characteristics that Minuteman possessed during the sixties and much of the seventies. We have tried to do so by deploying a few relatively large missiles as quickly as possible, in a single mode, on land, under arms control agreements limiting or reducing launcher numbers, in the face of a threat of

[LC]

- 26 -

attack by increasingly accurate and numerous warheads -- and to do so in a
manner that seeks to preserve ICBM survivability for the long term, even when
the ICBM force is viewed in isolation. But by trying to solve all ICBM tasks
with a single weapon and a single basing mode in the face of the trends in
technology, we have made the problem of modernizing the ICBM force so complex
as to be virtually insoluble.

In arriving at its recommendations regarding ICBM programs, the
Commission was mindful of the following criteria. For the near term, it would
concentrate on possible deployments and basing modes that appeared to have
straightforward and achievable technical and military value. For the long
term, compatibility of ICBM programs with the need for flexibility and
innovation in responding to possible Soviet actions would be of great
importance. Economic cost would be considered carefully. The Commission
would not insist on seeking a single solution to all the problems -- near-term
and long-term -- with which the ICBM force must cope. Finally, and of great
importance, our ICBM programs should support pursuit of a stable regime of
arms control agreements.

The Commission has concluded that, given these trends in technology,
the preferred approach for modernizing our ICBM force seems rather to be a
two-part one: initiating development of a single-warhead small ICBM, to
permit flexibility in basing for better long-term survivability; and deploying
MX missiles in existing silos now to satisfy the immediate needs of our ICBM
force and to aid that transition.

A more stable structure of ICBM deployments would exist if both
sides moved toward more survivable methods of basing than is possible with
large launchers and missiles. Thus from the point of view of enhancing such

stability, the Commission believes that there is considerable merit for both sides to move toward an ICBM force structure in which each potential target is of comparatively low value -- a missile containing only one warhead. A single-warhead ICBM, suitably based, inherently denies an attacker the opportunity to destroy more than one warhead with one attacking warhead. The need to have basing flexibility, and particularly the need to keep open the option for different types of mobile basing, also suggests a missile of small size. If force survivability can be additionally increased by arms control agreements which lead both sides toward more survivable modes of basing than is possible with large launchers and missiles, the increase in stability would be further enhanced.

In the meantime, however, deployment of MX is essential in order to remove the Soviet advantage in ICBM capability and to help deter the threat of conventional or limited nuclear attacks on the alliance. Such deployment is also necessary to encourage the Soviets to move toward a more stable regime of deployments and arms control. Thus it would, through helping to establish such a regime, contribute to the survivability of the small missile force.

The Commission stresses that these two aspects of ICBM modernization are integrally related. They point toward the same objective -- permitting the U.S. and encouraging the Soviets to move toward more stable ICBM deployments over time in a way that is consistent with arms control agreements having the objective of reducing the risk of war. The Commission is unanimous that neither part of the proposed program can accomplish this alone.

[Lc]

1. ICBM Long-term Survivability: Toward the Small, Single-Warhead ICBM

The Commission believes that a single-warhead missile weighing about fifteen tons (rather than the nearly 100 tons of MX) may offer greater flexibility in the long-run effort to obtain an ICBM force that is highly survivable, even when viewed in isolation, and that can consequently serve as a hedge against potential threats to the submarine force.

The Commission thus recommends beginning engineering design of such an ICBM, leading to the initiation of full-scale development in 1986 and an initial operating capability in the early 1990s. The design of such a missile can be achieved with current technology; appropriate hardening against nuclear effects and sufficient accuracy to put Soviet hardened military targets at risk should be achievable within this schedule. During that period an approach toward arms control, consistent with such deployments, should also seek to encourage the Soviets to move toward a more stable ICBM force structure at levels which would obviate the need to deploy very large numbers of such missiles. The development effort for such a missile need not and should not be burdened with the uncertainties accompanying a crash program; thus its timing can be such that competitive development is feasible.

Decisions about such a small missile and its basing will be influenced by several potential developments: the evolution of Soviet strategic programs, the path of arms control negotiations and agreements, general trends in technology, the cost of the program, operational considerations, and the results of our own research on specific basing modes. Although the small missile program should be pursued vigorously, the

- 29 -

way these uncertainties are resolved will inevitably influence the size,
nature, and desirability of the program. We should keep in mind, however,
that having several different modes of deployment may serve our objective of
stability. The objective for the United States should be to have an overall
program that will so confound, complicate, and frustrate the efforts of Soviet
strategic war planners that, even in moments of weak rationality, they could
not believe that they could attack our ICBM forces effectively.

Different ICBM deployment modes by the U.S. would require different
types of planned Soviet attacks. Deployment in hardened silos would require
the Soviets to plan to use warheads that are large, accurate, or both.
Moreover, for those silos or shelters holding a missile with only one warhead,
each would present a far less attractive target than would be the case for a
large missile with many MIRVs. Mobile deployments would require them to try
to barrage large areas using a number of warheads for each of our warheads at
risk, to develop very sophisticated intelligence systems, or both. In this
context, deployment of a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened mobile
launchers is of particular interest because it could permit deployment in
peacetime in limited areas such as military reservations. Land-mobile
deployments without hard launchers could be threatened by a relatively small
attack -- in the absence of an appropriate arms control agreement -- unless
our own missiles were distributed widely across the country in peacetime. The
key advantages of a small single-warhead missile are that it would reduce the
value of each strategic target and that it is also compatible with either
fixed or mobile deployments, or with combinations of the two.

As discussed below (Section VI), deployment of such small missiles
would be compatible with arms control agreements reducing the number of

[L.C]

- 30 -

warheads, in which case only a small number of such missiles would probably need to be deployed. If the Soviets proved unwilling to reach such agreements, however, the U.S. could deploy whatever number of small missiles were required -- in whatever mix of basing modes -- to maintain an adequate overall deterrent.

## 2. Immediate ICBM Modernization: Limited Deployment of the MX Missile

### a. The MX in Minuteman Silos

As noted above, there are important needs on several grounds for ICBM modernization earlier than that which could be provided by a small, single-warhead ICBM.

First, arms control negotiations -- in particular the Soviets' willingness to enter agreements that will enhance stability -- are heavily influenced by ongoing programs. The ABM Treaty of 1972, for example, came about only because the United States maintained an ongoing ABM program and indeed made a decision to make a limited deployment. It is illusory to believe that we could obtain a satisfactory agreement with the Soviets limiting ICBM deployments if we unilaterally terminated the only new U.S. ICBM program that could lead to deployment in this decade. Such a termination would effectively communicate to the Soviets that we could not neutralize their advantage in multiple-warhead ICBMs. Abandoning the MX at this time in search of a substitute would jeopardize, not enhance, the likelihood of reaching a stabilizing and equitable agreement. It would also undermine the

[Lc]

- 31 -

incentives to the Soviets to change the nature of their own ICBM force and thus the environment most conducive to the deployment of a small missile.

Second, effective deterrence is in no small measure a question of the Soviets' perception of our national will and cohesion. Cancelling the MX, when it is ready for flight testing, when over $5 billion have already been spent on it, and when its importance has been stressed by the last four Presidents, does not communicate to the Soviets that we have the will essential to effective deterrence. Quite the opposite.

Third, the strategic imbalance and weakened deterrence, caused by the Soviets' significant ability to destroy hardened land-based military targets with their ballistic missile force while the U.S. cannot, must be corrected promptly. Our ability to assure our allies that we have the capability and will to stand with them if the alliance is threatened by massive conventional, chemical or biological, or limited nuclear attack is in question as long as this imbalance exists. Even before the Soviet leaders, in a grave crisis, considered using the first tank regiment or the first SS-20 missile against NATO, they must be required to face what war would mean to them. In order to augment what we would hope would be an inherent sense of conservatism and caution on their part, we must have a credible capability to destroy hard targets ourselves, and the President must have the clear ability to control such weapons. This capability casts a shadow over the calculus of Soviet risk-taking at any level of confrontation with the West. Consequently, in the interest of the alliance as a whole, we cannot safely permit a situation to continue wherein the Soviets have the capability promptly to destroy a range of hardened military targets and we do not.

Fourth, our current ICBM force is aging significantly. The Titan II

[L.C.]

- 32 -

force is being retired for this reason and extensive Minuteman rehabilitation
programs are planned to keep those missiles operational.

The existence of a production program for an ICBM of approximately
100 tons 1/ is important for two additional reasons. As Soviet ABM
modernization and modern surface-to-air missile development and deployment
proceed -- even within the limitations of the ABM treaty -- it is important to
be able to match any possible Soviet breakout from that treaty with strategic
forces that have the throw-weight to carry sufficient numbers of decoys and
other penetration aids; these may be necessary in order to penetrate the
Soviet defenses which such a breakout could provide before other compensating
steps could be taken. Having in production a missile that could effectively
counter such a Soviet step should help deter them from taking it. Moreover,
in view of our coming reliance on only four or five space shuttle orbiters as
the sole method of deploying satellites for reconnaissance and communications,
it would be prudent to have in production a booster, such as MX, that is of
sufficient size to place in orbit at least some of our most important
satellites.

These objectives can all be accomplished, at reasonable cost, by
deploying MX missiles in current Minuteman silos.

In the judgment of the Commission, the vulnerability of such silos
in the near term, viewed in isolation, is not a sufficiently dominant part of
the overall problem of ICBM modernization to warrant other immediate steps

1/ MX weights 195,000 pounds. Thus it is a "light ICBM" under the terminology of SALT II, approximately the same size as the 330 newly-deployed Soviet SS-19 ICBMs. The MX is well under half the dimensions of the much larger 308 newly-deployed SS-18s; the latter are designated as "modern heavy ICBMs" under SALT II.

[lc]

- 33 -

being taken such as closely-spacing new silos or ABM defense of those silos. This is because of the mutual survivability shared by the ICBM force and the bomber force in view of the different types of attacks that would need to be launched at each, as explained above (Section IV.A.). In any circumstances other than that of a surprise attack on the U.S. by the Soviet Union -- in which thousands of warheads were targetted at our ICBM fields _and_ there were _no_ early detonations on our bomber bases from attacks by Soviet submarines -- Soviet planners would have to account for the possibility that MX missiles in Minuteman silos would be available for use, and thus they would help deter such attacks. To deter such surprise attacks we can reasonably rely both on our other strategic forces and on the range of operational uncertainties that the Soviets would have to consider in planning such aggression -- as long as we have underway a program for long-term ICBM survivability such as that for the small, single warhead ICBM to hedge against long-term vulnerability for the rest of our forces.

Neither the short-term need for ICBM force modernization nor the need to give the Soviets an incentive -- by having an ongoing U.S. program -- to negotiate seriously on arms control agreements would be met by deploying any missile other than the MX.

The Commission examined the concept of a common missile to serve the function of both the Trident II (D-5) missile, now under development for the Trident submarine, and of MX. At this point such a common missile would essentially be a modified Trident II. But deployment of that missile as an ICBM would not only lag several years behind the MX, its payload at the full ICBM range would be reduced. Sufficiently more Trident II missiles would need to be deployed in order to deploy the same number of warheads as MX that there

- 34 -

would be no cost savings.

The Commission also assessed the possibility of improving the guidance on the Minuteman ICBM to the level of accuracy being developed for the MX. Such a step, however, also would not achieve the early capability possible with MX; it would take some two to three years longer. The wisdom of placing new guidance systems on the front ends of 1960s-era missiles with aging propulsion systems is highly questionable. Moreover, shifting to such a program at this point would not provide the increased throw-weight needed to hedge either against Soviet ABM improvements or against the need to launch satellites in an emergency. Most importantly, a Minuteman modification program would not provide the incentive to the Soviets to negotiate that would be provided by production of the MX.

A program of deploying on the order of 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos would on the other hand accomplish the objectives set forth in this section and it would do so without threatening stability. The throw-weight and megatonnage carried by the 100 MX missiles is about the same as that of the 54 large Titan missiles now being retired plus that of the 100 Minuteman III missiles that the MXs would replace. Such a deployment would thus represent a replacement and modernization of part of our ICBM force. It would provide a means of controlled limited attack on hardened targets but not a sufficient number of warheads to be able credibly to attack all hardened Soviet ICBMs, much less all of the many hardened command posts and other hardened military targets in the Soviet Union. Thus it would not match the overall capability of the recent Soviet deployment of over 600 modern ICBMs of MX size or larger. But a large deployment of several hundred MX missiles should be unnecessary for the limited but very important purposes set forth

[LC]

- 35 -

above. Should the Soviets refuse to engage in stabilizing arms control and engage instead in major new deployments, reconsideration of this and other conclusions would be necessary.

b. **Other Possible MX Basing Modes**

The Commission assessed several basing modes for the MX missile as a way of solving the problem of long-term ICBM survivability.

Deploying the MX missile in Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) meets the need of long-term survivability reasonably well. It would have a similar advantage to the deployment of small, single-warhead missiles in silos or shelters -- namely it would force an attacker to plan to deal with a multiplicity of targets. It would not, however, have the advantage of being able to move, in the event of an attack, outside its basing complex -- a capability that is potentially available in some types of small missile deployments. The basing complex required for MPS necessarily affects a land area sufficiently large that local political opposition to it has been significant. There is also a possibility that, over the long run, even if the SALT II Agreement were ratified, a Soviet abrogation or refusal to renew the limits on ICBM launchers or on the number of warheads per missile contained therein could create difficulties for MPS basing. It could lead to the need either to add shelters (and not clearly at a lower cost than the Soviets' cost of adding warheads) or the need to defend the MPS basing complex with an ABM deployment in excess of that permitted under the ABM treaty.

Another alternative MX deployment that has some attractiveness for long-run survivability is closely-spaced basing (CSB). Such a deployment --

- 36 -

e.g. 100 missiles in 100 new closely-spaced silos -- would sharply reduce the land area required by the MPS system and could cause significant difficulties for some types of planned Soviet attacks by forcing the attacker to take account of the circumstances under which one of his attacking warheads would destroy others ("fratricide"). This basing scheme would require newly-developed techniques for hardening silos in order to avoid the possibility that one attacking warhead could destroy more than one silo. It would also, by its close spacing, make several potential types of ABM defense of the ICBM deployment more feasible. Some of these ABM defenses, countering some potential types of Soviet attacks, could be deployed within the numerical limits of the 1972 ABM treaty, but other more generally effective ones could not. The effectiveness of a CSB deployment in preserving the survivability of the ICBM force over the long run would depend significantly upon advances in hardening silos; the effectiveness of this is yet to be demonstrated and the cost is as yet uncertain. It also would depend upon fratricide effects that are not fully understood.

These uncertainties would not be eliminated by adding multiple hardened shelters for each missile to a CSB deployment to permit deceptive basing -- a combination of MPS and CSB. Beginning a hardened shelter deployment immediately would be a concurrent program, involving a commitment to construction before new hardening techniques are fully understood or developed. In addition, although a greater number of shelters could improve survivability, constructing a number of very hard shelters would be expensive. Each shelter would be considerably more costly than the shelters in the original MPS system. Since more shelters would be needed than in the original CSB proposal, the total program would also be more costly than CSB

[LC]

- 37 -

basing.

Other basing modes for a large missile involve longer delays than those for MPS or CSB deployment (or a hybrid of the two). Thus, the improvement in survivability that might be offered by, for example, basing MX in continuous patrol aircraft or in deep underground deployments -- given the time it would now require to design and develop these basing modes -- would not permit deployment in this decade. Moreover, the large size of the MX missile could complicate these and other longer-term deployments.

### c. Research and Development Work on ICBM Basing

The Commission recognizes that a series of phased decisions involving both the Executive branch and the Congress will be necessary in order to determine the future shape of our ICBM force. Not all decisions can or should be made in 1983. The Commission believes, however, that it is important to pursue the following research and development programs now in order to allow the U.S. government to make intelligent future decisions about ICBM basing.

The Commission believes that the work done to date (much of it in connection with designing CSB) is impressive on the technology for dramatic improvements in hardening ICBM silos or shelters. It thus recommends that vigorous research should proceed on new techniques for hardening silos and shelters generally. A specific program to resolve the uncertainties regarding hardness should be undertaken under the leadership of the Defense Nuclear Agency, and with the co-operation of the Air Force and of those Department of Energy laboratories with expertise in the relevant technology. In the event

- 38 -

that such hardening proves sufficiently effective and affordable it may later
prove useful for some or all of the silos containing MX to be hardened
appropriately. In any case, such hardening techniques could prove useful for
small missile deployments in the 1990s. Research on the circumstances in
which there could be mutual destruction by attacking warheads of one another
(fratricide) should be continued.

Vigorous investigation should proceed on different types of land-
based vehicles and launchers, including hardened vehicles, for mobile
deployment of small ICBMs. Depending on the hardening level achievable for
such mobile launchers, it may be possible, for example, to obtain adequate
survivability by deploying small ICBMs on military facilities in vehicles
alone or in vehicles in simple shelters, with the added advantages of wider
mobility if there is warning of an attack. This would avoid the need to
disperse the missiles beyond such areas in normal peacetime conditions. For
the longer run, other types of mobile basing should also be explored.

The above ICBM programs should contribute to stability and point
toward -- and be compatible with -- a responsible set of arms control
principles that can be sustained over the years during negotiations and new
agreements.

[LC]

- 39 -

# F. Summary of Modernization Recommendations

## 1. Strategic Forces other than ICBMs

a. As first priority, vigorous programs should continue to improve the ability of the President to command, control, and communicate with the strategic forces under conditions of severe stress or actual attack.

b. The Trident submarine construction program and the Trident II (D-5) ballistic missile development program should continue with high priority; the work recommended on small submarines to accommodate arms reduction goals and avoid technological surprise in anti-submarine warfare should begin now.

c. No changes are recommended in the bomber and air-launched cruise missile programs.

d. Vigorous research and technology development on ABM should be pursued. The development of decoys and other penetration aids for our ballistic missiles is also recommended.

## 2. ICBM Programs

a. Engineering design should be initiated, now, of a single-warhead ICBM weighing about fifteen tons; this program should lead to the initiation of full-scale development in 1986 and an initial operating capability in the early 1990s. Deploying such a missile in more than one mode would serve stability. Hardened silos or shelters and hardened mobile launchers should be investigated now.

b. One hundred MX missiles should be deployed promptly in existing Minuteman silos as a replacement and modernization of those 100 Minuteman and of the Titan II ICBMs now being decommissioned.

c. A specific program to resolve the uncertainties regarding silo or shelter hardness should be undertaken, leading to later decisions about hardening MX in silos and deploying a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened silos or shelters. Vigorous investigation should proceed on different types of land-based vehicles and launchers, including particularly hardened vehicles.

d. Costs

The long-term costs of major programs are necessarily subject to uncertainty. Moreover, the standard of comparison is not clear in this case because, in order to compare costs, one should assess programs of equal effectiveness. Effectiveness of various types of ICBM deployments, especially with regard to long-term survivability, is precisely the issue which is most in controversy. For comparative purposes, the Commission has considered only evolutionary expansions of CSB basing of MX under which there would be some effort, in light of possible Soviet reactions, to preserve long-term ICBM force survivability.

In comparing the costs of the program that it recommends to other possible strategic programs, the Commission concentrated on costs during the next five years, during the Five Year Defense Program (FY 1984-88).

The comparison, displayed in the following table, shows that the recommended program is about $1 billion per year less than the CSB program for each of the next four years, and that the total net savings during the five-year period is about $3 billion.

- 41 -

There will be significant costs incurred by the Commission's recommended program beyond these five years, but the exact amount would depend heavily on: the type of basing modes chosen for the small, single-warhead ICBM; the number of U.S. ICBMs deployed; whether the silos in which MX missiles are deployed are hardened, and to what degree; the evolution of the Soviet threat; and the terms of any arms control agreement at that time. For those programs which the Commission considered as viable alternatives, such as the further evolution of ABM defenses or multiple shelters for CSB of MX, there would similarly be significant additional costs beyond the five-year period; the magnitude of these would be affected by similar uncertainties.

[L]

- 43 -

likely and by reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. The strategic modernization program recommended herein and the arms control considerations contained in this report are consistent with one important aspect of such stability. In light of the developments in technology set forth at in Section IV.B. above, they seek to move both sides, in the long term, toward strategic deployments in which individual targets are of lower value, thereby enhancing survivability. The recommended strategic program proposes an evolution for the U.S. ICBM force and, if necessary, the sea-based force in which a given number of ballistic missile warheads would, over time, be spread over a larger number of launching platforms (ICBM launchers and ballistic missile submarines) than would otherwise be the case.

This evolution is important for long-term strategic stability, but it is not without its costs. Spreading a given number of ICBM warheads, whatever the number, over greater numbers of ICBM launchers would normally mean added operating costs, for example. But in the judgment of the Commission, permitting our forces to evolve in this direction and encouraging the Soviets to do likewise is worth such costs. Moreover, if such programs can lead to agreed lower levels of warhead deployments in time, then ultimately the net cost may be less.

Such an evolution marks a sound principle to guide our own long-term strategic force modernization and arms control proposals, but it is neither necessary nor wise to move precipitously in that direction. In part this is because time is required to develop such new systems properly, in part it is because continued efforts on our current strategic programs are needed to encourage the Soviets to move in a similar direction. Absent such encouragement there is no realistic hope that the Soviets will join such an

[Lc]

- 44 -

evolution and forego the current advantages they have in the ability to attack
hard targets and to barrage large areas with their preponderance in throw-
weight.

Over the long run, stability would be fostered by a dual approach
toward arms control and ICBM deployments which moves toward encouraging small,
single-warhead ICBMs. This requires that arms control limitations and
reductions be couched, not in terms of warheads, but in terms of equal levels
of warheads of roughly equivalent yield. Such an approach could be made
consistent with fixed or mobile small ICBM deployments. It could also permit
relatively simple agreements, using appropriate counting rules, that exert
pressure to reduce the overall number and destructive power of nuclear weapons
and at the same time give each side an incentive to move toward more stable
and less vulnerable deployments.

Arms control agreements of this sort -- simple and flexible enough
to permit stabilizing development and modernization programs, while imposing
quantitative limits and reductions -- can make an important contribution to
the stability of the strategic balance. An agreement that permitted
modernization of forces and also provided an incentive to reduce while
modernizing in ways that would enhance stability would be highly desirable.
It would have the considerable benefit of capping both sides' strategic forces
at levels that, over time, would be considerably lower than they would
otherwise reach. It would also recognize, realistically, that each side will
naturally desire to configure its own strategic forces. Simple aggregate
limits of this sort are likely to be more practical, stabilizing, and lasting
than either attempts to halt all modernization or elaborate, detailed
limitations on force structure and modernization whose ultimate consequences

[Lc]

- 45 -

cannot be confidently anticipated.

Encouraging stability by giving incentives to move toward less vulnerable deployments is more important than quickly reducing the absolute number of warheads deployed. Reductions in warhead numbers, while desirable for long-term reasons of limiting the cost of strategic systems, are of less pressing importance than influencing the characteristics of strategic deployments. For example, warhead reductions, while desirable, should not be proposed or undertaken at a rate that leads us to limit the number of launching platforms to such low levels that their survivability is made more questionable.

For a variety of historical, technical, and verification reasons, both the SALT II unratified treaty and the current START proposal contain proposals to limit or reduce the number of ICBM launchers or missiles. Unfortunately this has helped produce the tendency to identify arms control with launcher or missile limits, and to lead some to identify successful arms control with low or reduced launcher or missile limits. This has, in turn, led to an incentive to build launchers and missiles as large as possible and to put as many warheads as possible into each missile. Such an incentive has been augmented by the cost savings involved in putting a given number of warheads on a few large missiles rather than on a number of smaller ones. For example, the fewer the missiles purchased for a given number of warheads, the fewer expensive guidance systems are required. Although reasonable efforts have been made to constrain warheads through arms control (e.g. by the payload fractionation limits in the negotiated SALT II treaty), these types of limits have still not produced an incentive mutually to move away from large land-based missiles. They will not do so as long as launcher or missile

[Lc]

- 46 -

limitations are seen, in and of themselves, as primary arms control objectives.

We will have for some time strategic forces in which the number of launchers on one side are outnumbered many times over by the number of warheads on the other. Under such circumstances, it is not stabilizing to use arms control to require mutual reductions in the number of launching platforms (submarines or ICBM launchers) or missiles, in and of themselves. It further increases the ratio of warheads to targets. It does not promote deterrence and reduce the risk of war for the Soviets to have many more times the number of accurate warheads capable of destroying hard targets than the U.S. has ICBM launchers.

In time we should try to promote an evolution toward forces in which -- with an equal number of warheads -- each side is encouraged to see to the survivability of its own forces in a way that does not threaten the other. But if the Soviet Union chooses to retain a large force of large missiles, each with many warheads, the U.S. must be free to match this by the sort of deployment it chooses. Any arms control agreement equating SS-18s and small single-warhead ICBMs because each was one missile or because each was on one launcher would be destabilizing in the extreme.

The approach toward arms control suggested by the Commission, however, is not incompatible with the objectives and direction of several other current arms control proposals.

For example, the negotiated SALT II treaty indirectly limited warheads by its limits on launchers and on the fractionation of payloads. It also barred deployments of new large ICBMs or the construction of additional fixed launchers. And it pointed toward further reductions in a follow-on

- 47 -

SALT III agreement. These broad purposes of SALT II are wholly compatible with the arms control approach suggested here. However, it should be noted that, as a method of restricting ICBM modernization, the negotiated SALT II Treaty, which would have expired in 1985, would have prohibited testing of more than one new ICBM. The two-part ICBM modernization program suggested by the Commission would not violate that negotiated agreement because testing of a small, single-warhead ICBM could not begin before this expiration date. Of more long-term importance, however, the approach toward arms control and force modernization suggested here is fundamentally compatible with the sort of stability that SALT II sought to achieve. SALT II specifically contemplated the negotiation of extension agreements with improved terms, and there is no reason to doubt that future extension agreements would have allowed the testing and deployment of a second new ICBM missile with the stabilizing potential of a small, single-warhead ICBM. Moreover, the Soviets have tested two new or modified ICBMs since October 1982.

The current Administration's START proposal is centered on warhead limitations and reductions, with some attention to throw-weight limitations. These are consistent with the Commission's recommended program. It also contains a proposed limit on launchers that the Commission believes should not be pursued.

Some current arms control proposals in Congress concentrate on warhead limitations in which reductions are forced in warhead numbers as a price of modernization; others seek explicitly to encourage movement toward small, single-warhead ICBMs on both sides. These general directions are also consistent with the approach suggested in this report.

The Commission urges the continuation of vigorous pursuit of arms

[Lc]

- 48 -

control; it is not appropriate for the Commission, however, to recommend the
development of specific arms control proposals, including the size of
numerical limits and the pace and scope of reductions.

Of course any arms control proposal must be carefully designed with
a view to compliance and verification -- often particularly difficult
questions in agreements with the Soviets. Some proposals may require
innovation in verification techniques.

Finally, the Commission is particularly mindful of the importance of
achieving a greater degree of national consensus with respect to our strategic
deployments and arms control. For the last decade, each successive
Administration has made proposals for arms control of strategic offensive
forces that have become embroiled in political controversy between the
Executive branch and Congress and between political parties. None has
produced a ratified treaty or a politically sustainable strategic
modernization program for the U.S. ICBM force. Such a performance, as a
nation, has produced neither agreement among ourselves, nor restraint by the
Soviets, nor lasting mutual limitations on strategic offensive weapons.

The Commission realizes that its recommendations will not fully
satisfy any one of the many contending groups and collections of individuals,
inside and outside government, that have staked out claims to particular
approaches to strategic modernization or arms control. In the interest of
producing a national consensus on these two large issues, however, the
Commission has instead developed an approach that is different in kind from
what has gone before.

The Commission believes that all of the difficult issues discussed
in this report -- including the devastating nature of modern war and the

[LC]

- 49 -

totalitarian and expansive character of the Soviet system -- must be considered fairly in trying to reach a national consensus about a broad approach to strategic force modernization and arms control that can set a general direction for a number of years. Clearly there will be, and should be, many different views about specific elements in that approach. But the Commission unanimously believes that such a new consensus -- requiring a spirit of compromise by all of us -- is essential if we are to move toward greater stability and toward reducing the risk of war. If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in a long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, our perspectives may become clearer.

[LC]

4/4/83

DRAFT

Executive Summary Report of the
President's Commission on Strategic Forces

Improving strategic stability and reducing risk of war should be at the center of our national objectives. Our strategic modernization programs and arms control proposals should work together to permit us and encourage the Soviets to take steps toward such enhanced stability. We must make such efforts in full awareness of both the devastating nature of modern warfare and the expansionist nature of the Soviet system -- and the leverage which the Soviets hope to obtain from any military advantages.

In this context, the multiple structure of our strategic forces -- consisting of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers with cruise missiles -- is important for three main reasons: (1) the existence of each is a hedge over the long term against any failures of, or Soviet breakthroughs endangering, the others; (2) any planned Soviet attack would be significantly more complex and less effective because of the different type of attack needed against each part of our forces; and (3) each part has unique capabilities.

The preponderance of our submarines, bombers, and ballistic missiles were deployed in the 1960s or early 1970s. As the Commission considered the most appropriate way of modernizing these forces, it kept four broad issues in mind: opportunities for stabilizing arms control; developments in Soviet strategic programs; economic cost; and trends in technology.

Technological trends alone have changed the situation dramatically since the 1960s. Accuracy of weapons has steadily increased since then, and

- 2 -

continues to do so. Thus, in spite of new concepts and developments in hardening fixed targets such as ICBM silos or shelters, it will not be likely that even the hardest such targets will be able to withstand destruction in the long term. Mobility is becoming more feasible for strategic systems. Open-ocean search for submarines and anti-ballistic missile defense of land targets will both continue to be extremely difficult, but Soviet efforts in these fields must be watched carefully. In light of these trends: modernization should continue for our strategic command, control and communications; construction of Trident submarines should proceed, as should the program for development and deployment of the Trident II (D-5) missile; and modernization of the bomber and cruise missile force should continue. Although the task of ABM defense remains very challenging, vigorous research in this area is worthy of support. Similarly, research on a smaller ballistic missile submarine would be prudent.

Modernization of our ICBM force, and fitting that modernization into the context of stabilizing arms control, has presented a major challenge for the last decade. In the Commission's view, this problem has come to be miscast over recent years, in part because of the implicit judgment that all of the immediate and the future needs of our ICBM force could be satisfied promptly and by a single missile based in a single way. In the Commission's view a three-part approach is preferable: development of a small, single-warhead ICBM; an arms control approach to improve stability; and deployment now of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos.

For the long term, survivability of the ICBM force -- and hence its role as a hedge against any possible Soviet breakthrough in anti-submarine

[Lc]

- 3 -

warfare -- would best be provided by moving toward a small, single-warhead ICBM. A force consisting of such ICBMs would inherently deny to an attacker the ability to destroy more than one warhead with one attacking warhead and would also offer more flexibility in basing. Engineering design of such a missile should begin now, with a view toward initial deployment in the early 1990s. Basing in more than one mode would be advisable. Hardened mobile launchers and hardened silos or shelters are worthy of vigorous investigation.

Over the long run, stability -- i.e. reduction in the risk of war -- would best be fostered by an approach toward arms control that permits the U.S. and encourages the Soviet Union to move toward ICBM forces consisting primarily of such small, single-warhead missiles. This requires that arms control limitations and reductions be couched, not in terms of launchers or missiles, but in terms of equal levels of warheads of roughly equivalent yield.

The prompt deployment of the MX missile is necessary in order to encourage the Soviets to move toward more stabilizing ICBM deployments and to be willing to engage in arms control agreements that can enhance stability. It is also necessary in order to match, in part, Soviet capabilities to destroy hardened targets and to support the NATO alliance's overall deterrent. Primarily because of operational complexities that the Soviets would face in trying to attack our bombers and ICBMs simultaneously, a deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos should have adequate survivability for these purposes for a number of years if the ICBM force is not viewed in isolation. Research on hardening of silos may also reveal ways to contribute to MX survivability.

[L.C.]

- 4 -

Finally, the Commission unanimously believes that a new spirit of compromise by all of us is essential if the many contending groups that have staked out claims to particular approaches to strategic modernization or arms control are ever to come together in a broad national consensus on these questions. Only such a consensus can hope to reverse the highly divisive record of executive-legislative and partisan strife of the last decade on the issues of arms control and ICBM modernization. Our recent approaches and attitudes have produced, collectively, neither agreement among ourselves, nor restraint by the Soviets, nor lasting mutual ratified limitations on strategic offensive weapons.

The stakes are high. Effective deterrence and stabilizing arms control are possible with such a consensus. Without it, it seems likely that there will be a continuation of the last decade's divisiveness and lack of progress. If we can begin to see ourselves, in dealing with these issues, not as political partisans or as crusaders for one specific solution to a part of this complex set of problems, but rather as citizens of a great nation with the humbling obligation to persevere in a long-run task of preserving both peace and liberty for the world, our perspectives may become clearer.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 24, 1983

NOV 1 1983

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Upon assuming the Presidency, I made a solemn pledge to build
a stable and secure peace to last for generations.

In carrying out that pledge, my Administration has steadfastly
pursued meaningful arms reductions agreements with the Soviet
Union. Our goal has been to reduce nuclear arsenals and
achieve stability, pure and simple. In the last round of nego-
tiations with the Soviets, we proposed several new initiatives
that were consistent with the recommendations of the Scowcroft
Commission, supportive of our basic goals, and responsive to
Soviet concerns. In spite of our flexibility, there was no
significant positive response from the Soviet Government.

In a sincere attempt to break this logjam, I recently dispatched
Ambassador Rowny with major new initiatives incorporating the
build-down concept into the basic U.S. negotiating position in
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Our proposal includes a
provision calling for a guaranteed build-down of the total number
of ballistic missile warheads using variable ratios, designed to
encourage stability and a parallel build-down for bombers. In
addition, we have offered to limit the size and capability of air-
launched cruise missiles and bomber forces in exchange for
reciprocal Soviet flexibility. We have already proposed in the
Geneva talks that a U.S.-Soviet build-down working group be
established.

Make no mistake, there will have to be trade-offs between areas
of U.S. interest and areas of Soviet interest. We are prepared
to make them, so long as the result is a more stable balance of
forces.

[LC]

2

A strong bipartisan effort has helped to forge our overall arms reduction effort, and there is now bipartisan consensus behind it. That same consensus, sustained in the future, is crucial if we are to help keep America secure by achieving successful arms reductions.

The ongoing strategic modernization program provides an important impetus for these arms reduction efforts. Moving ahead with the MX Peacekeeper is essential if we are to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent; it also provides the Soviets with an incentive to negotiate seriously at Geneva. If, after more than ten years of effort, we as a Nation fail to support an essential modernization of the land-based leg of our triad, the chances for achieving meaningful arms reductions will be set back severely.

To continue our dual-track effort of modernization and vigorous pursuit of arms reductions, I urge you to support Peacekeeper production funding when it comes to a vote this week. By doing so, you will help us move a step closer to a lasting peace.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

[LC]

September 19, 1983

General Brent Scowcroft (USAFret.)
Chairman
The President's Commission on Strategic Forces
Room 348
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

NOV 1 1983

Dear General Scowcroft:

The extension of the Commission's mandate gave it the task of reviewing progress in nuclear arms control and exploring worthwhile options for the President to pursue in that area. In the hope that it may prove helpful to your work, we are forwarding with this letter some detailed arms control recommendations.

The recent Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner was a horrifying event and an impediment to the arms control process. But history may provide a useful lesson in this regard. Tensions generated by the Cuban missile crisis did not prevent, and may have actually helped bring about, the Limited Test Ban Treaty and Hotline Agreement. Renewed determination in the aftermath of the Korean airliner tragedy could have a similar positive effect.

The resumption of START and INF negotiations represents an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to narrow differences and reach agreement on nuclear arms control. The difficulties in so doing will be compounded if the scheduled deployments of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) begin in December.

Failure to reach an INF agreement soon will result in serious political and military consequences. Although agreement at a later date will still be possible, it will be much more difficult and time-consuming. Support for essential U.S. and NATO defense programs will erode and allied cohesion will be adversely affected. The divisive debate in Western Europe and North America that has resulted from both the large Soviet deployment of SS-20s and the NATO decision to deploy Pershing IIs and GLCMs will continue. With renewed vigor, citizens here and in Europe will protest the inability of political leaders to do something to bring the arms race under control.

The Soviet leadership has reiterated its intention to respond to the U.S. deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the negotiations do not succeed. They have also stated that they will withdraw their current proposals and possibly walk out of the talks. While we cannot allow threats to intimidate us, it would be unwise to assume that the Soviets are bluffing. They can be expected to proceed with a full range of new weapons deployments if the U.S. does so. The result will be a significant reduction in the security of both sides.

-2-

[L]

It is now clear, after many months of talks on START and INF, that the proposals which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have tabled remain at odds on fundamental issues. They have little chance of becoming the basis for agreement. To improve the likelihood of agreement resulting from either negotiation, both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. must adjust their positions.

If the talks are to avoid further deterioration into polemics, it is important that the U.S. have realistic goals at START and INF. To offer a prospect of success, such goals must meet the following criteria: they must be equitable, negotiable, verifiable and mutually beneficial.

As observers of the nuclear arms negotiating process, we have reviewed available public information on the state of the current negotiations and offer in the attached paper outlines for proposed agreements on START and INF. They are not intended as opening negotiating positions but as the outcome of serious bargaining. We believe that these arrangements would meet the above criteria. They would require significant concessions by both sides.

While we have attempted to keep the arrangements simple, by building on previous accomplishments so that they could be implemented promptly, they are ambitious in their requirement for substantial reductions. The SALT agreements of the 1970's were essential first steps, but it is now necessary to move toward additional quantitative and qualitative constraints.

We recognize the need for prudent modernization of U.S. forces even if reductions take place. While we propose the cancellation or deferment of some U.S. programs in return for reductions in Soviet forces, we realize that it will be necessary for the U.S. to carry out further modernization of its nuclear forces if equitable arrangements are rejected by the Soviets.

Finally, because of the trade-offs that will have to be made across the spectrum of intermediate- and intercontinental-range systems in order to reach agreement, we believe it is important that the President appoint one special representative to seek breakthroughs in both the START and INF negotiations. The appointment of a special representative should demand the President's immediate attention.

We would be pleased to discuss our proposals with you or any member of the Commission. We wish the Commission success.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

Gerard C. Smith

[LC]

# A FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

## PHASE I - INITIAL AGREEMENTS TO REDUCE THE LEVELS OF INTERCONTINENTAL- AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

While the INF talks are politically important for our NATO allies, the START talks are critical from a strategic and military perspective. We believe that the two negotiations should be urgently addressed in parallel, and recommend that the U.S. seek initial Phase I agreements at both. This parallel approach would be succeeded in Phase II by a combined negotiation which would attempt to place comprehensive limits on the aggregate of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces as well as seek additional reductions.

### Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

In Phase I, the Soviets would reduce their number of SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) warheads, (wherever based) to 600. This is approximately the level they maintained in 1977 prior to the start of SS-20 deployments.

The U.S. would cancel further production, testing and any deployment of Pershing II missiles and defer deployment of GLCMs until Phase II. Development and testing of GLCMs could continue. British and French nuclear forces would not be constrained by the Phase I agreements.

Medium-range bombers on each side would be limited to current levels and bases for each type. For the Soviets, this limit would apply to all Backfire bombers, whether deployed with the Air Force or Naval Aviation, and all Badger and Blinder bombers deployed with the Air Force and equipped for bombing missions. For the U.S., it would apply to FB-111 and F-111 bombers.

Any increase in the number of nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers would be prohibited. The replacement of existing Soviet and Warsaw Pact SCALEBOARD missiles with SS-22s and SCUD missiles with SS-23s would be permitted on a one-for-one basis. Any additional construction of sites for any of these types would be banned. No change in the basing locations of these types would be permitted. Qualitative improvements to the SS-22 and SS-23 - such as greater range or MIRVing - would be prohibited.

The Phase I INF agreement would remain in effect for ten years unless replaced earlier by the comprehensive, Phase II agreement. Dismantling or destruction of excess or prohibited systems would be under procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission and would be completed within one year.

-2-

[LC]

Strategic Nuclear Forces

At START, the objective for Phase I would be to build on the positive accomplishments of SALT but achieve greater reductions. Substantial lowering of the SALT II limits could be achieved if there were more equitable provisions than is the case with the current proposals of both sides.

While the Phase I START agreement would retain most of the SALT II framework, there would be cuts in the SALT II aggregate limits on a) strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, b) MIRVed systems, and c) heavy missiles:

- The aggregate limit on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, ASBMS and heavy bombers) would be reduced from 2,400 to 1,800.

- The limit on MIRVed missile launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry ALCMs would drop from 1,320 to 1,000.

- The limit on MIRVed missile launchers would be reduced from 1,200 to 880.

- The limit of 820 on MIRVed ICBM launchers would be reduced to 410.

- Soviet "heavy" missiles would be reduced from 308 to 150.

- Added to the SALT II framework would be a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on MIRVed ICBM and SLBM launchers.

While these ceilings would require significant reductions in warheads and missile launchers by the Soviet Union, they should prove more acceptable than the current U.S. START proposal for several reasons. They allow more "freedom to mix" between systems. The U.S.S.R. would not have to make as drastic a readjustment of its nuclear force structure. Significant concessions by the United States would also be required.

While we believe that ballistic missile throw weight is not the most important criterion in measuring strategic nuclear capability, its reduction is a stated goal of the Administration. The START arrangement we propose would not directly limit throw weight, but a significant reduction would result. It is our estimate that Soviet ballistic missile throw weight would drop from the present level of 12.3 million pounds (according to the U.S. Department of Defense) to approximately 7.9 million pounds. It might also result in a slight reduction in U.S. ballistic missile throw weight.

We have added a ceiling in Phase I of 6,000 MIRVed ballistic missile warheads to the SALT II structure. Such a limit addresses the Commission's suggestion that agreements should directly limit warheads and not only launchers. Reducing MIRVed missile warheads would enhance stability and corresponds to the Commission's recommendation that arms control seek to redirect U.S. and Soviet forces away from MIRVed systems.

[LC]

-3-

After these reductions took place, the Soviets would maintain a reduced lead in ICBM warheads and the U.S. a reduced lead in SLBM warheads. The U.S. would continue to have a lead in heavy bombers, particularly after the deployment of 100 B-1B bombers and a combination of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and advanced cruise missiles (ACMs). The U.S. would also retain a lead in aggregate strategic nuclear weapons (warheads and bombs).

There would be a ban on flight testing and deployment of any new type of MIRVed ICBM. This ban would include both the MX and the new Soviet missile, the SS-X-24, (which would otherwise be their first operational, solid-fueled, MIRVed ICBM). The initial agreement would permit development, testing, and deployment in existing silos of one new type of small ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. The issue of whether or not the PL-5 should be counted as a new type for the U.S.S.R. would require prior resolution. We believe that it should be considered as the one new type of small, single-RV ICBM for the Soviets that our proposed agreement permits.

We recognize that, in its initial report, the Commission recommended deployment of 100 MX missiles in existing silos. This was offered, in part, as an inducement to the Soviet Union to reduce reliance on MIRVed ICBMs. A ban on the flight testing and deployment of MX would be justified if traded for a ban on the SS-X-24 and large reductions in Soviet ICBMs, (including over half of their SS-18s). The Soviets cannot be expected to accept deep cuts in their ICBMs if the U.S. is not prepared, at a minimum, to negotiate about MX.

The Phase I START agreement would also remain in effect for ten years, unless replaced by the comprehensive Phase II agreement. Dismantling or destruction of existing systems in excess of or prohibited by Phase I limits would be conducted under procedures agreed to in the Standing Consultative Commission and would be completed within three years.

## OTHER MATTERS FOR INCLUSION IN PHASE I

### Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)

Limiting sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) remains a formidable challenge. The difficulties are increased by differences in the deployments and capabilities of existing U.S. and Soviet cruise missiles. Yet, failure to deal with these weapons will make the conclusion of either a START or INF agreement extremely difficult if not impossible. Below is one option for addressing the most critical matters related to SLCM deployments.

- There would be a ban on the testing and deployment of any SLCMs aboard submarines. This would apply to the Soviet SS-N-3, SS-N-9, SS-N-12, SS-N-19, and SS-NX-21 and the U.S. Tomahawk and Harpoon.

4-

[LC]

- Long-range (above 600 kilometers) SLCMs on surface ships would be banned.

- Short-range (less than 600 kilometers) SLCMs on surface ships would be allowed, provided their launchers were clearly identifiable, by national technical means, as dedicated SLCM launchers.

## Telemetry Encryption

The denial of data through encryption of or failure to transmit telemetry during the flight testing of ballistic or cruise missiles would be banned.

## Modifying Existing Missile Types

There would be precise limitations on permitted modifications to existing types of missiles. Tight limits would help ensure that neither side could introduce prohibited new missiles under the guise of modifications to existing types.

## PHASE II: COMBINED CEILINGS ON INTERCONTINENTAL- AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The principal goals of the Phase II negotiations would be to continue to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons on each side and to move both sides further away from destabilizing systems.

To provide the necessary negotiating trade-offs, Phase II would be a single negotiation on INF and START. It would combine intercontinental- and intermediate-range nuclear forces under common ceilings from which reductions would take place.

The nuclear weapons themselves, as opposed to their missile launchers, would become the principal unit of account. While the details of any Phase II agreement would be subject to negotiation, a useful beginning would be to establish a single aggregate limit of 9,000 on the number of nuclear weapons (missile warheads and bombs) in each nation's intercontinental- and intermediate-range forces. No more than 6,000 of these could be ballistic missile warheads. These aggregates would be reduced at regular stages.

In order to enhance strategic stability, it is necessary for both sides to move further away from MIRVed systems and to constrain certain qualitative advances. Phase II would retain the Phase I limits on MIRVed missile launchers, but they would be reduced at regular intervals. Further qualitative constraints on nuclear systems, such as a ban on the deployment of new types of MIRVed SLBMs, a continuation of the ban on mobile ICBMs, and a ban on GLCMs would also be considered.

-7-

[LC]

APPENDIX B: continued

<table><tr><td><u>BOMBERS</u></td><td>63 FB-111 (all based in CONUS)</td><td>200 Backfire (130 opposite Europe)</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>288 F-111 (161 E/F types forward deployed)</td><td>455 Badger/Blinder (325 opposite Europe)</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td><u>Bomber Force</u></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><u>Loadings</u></td><td>1,400 weapons</td><td>1,600 weapons</td></tr><tr><td><u>MISSILES</u></td><td>0</td><td>200 SS-20 (600 weapons)</td></tr><tr><td><u>TOTAL INF</u></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td><u>WEAPONS</u></td><td>1,400</td><td>2,200</td></tr></table>

TOTAL WEAPONS (Combined strategic and INF at end of Phase I)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>UNITED STATES</th><th>SOVIET UNION</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>On ballistic missiles</td><td>6,122</td><td>7,430</td></tr><tr><td>On medium and heavy bombers</td><td>6,040</td><td>2,500</td></tr><tr><td>Total:</td><td>12,162</td><td>9,930</td></tr></tbody></table>

-8-

[LC]

# APPENDIX C: IMPACT OF PHASE I AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R.

## For the U.S.S.R., it would require:

- Dismantling 158 SS-18 launchers and missiles (1580 warheads)

- Dismantling 70 SS-19 launchers and missiles (420 warheads)

- Dismantling 150 SS-17 launchers and missiles (600 warheads)

- Dismantling 60 SS-11 launchers and missiles (60 warheads)

- Dismantling 238 SS-4 and 5 launchers and missiles (238 warheads)

- Dismantling 160 SS-20 launchers and missiles (480 warheads)

- Dismantling 400 SS-N-6, SS-N-8, and SS-N-17 launchers and missiles (400 warheads)

- Removing from submarines all SS-N-3A, SS-N-7, SS-N-9, SS-N-12, and SS-N-19 SLCMs

- No deployment of SS-X-24 ICBM, SS-NX-21 SLCM, or SSX-4 GLCM

- No further production of Backfire, Badger or Blinder bombers

## It would permit the U.S.S.R. to:

- Deploy 16 additional SS-N-18 missiles on 1 Delta III sub (112 warheads)

- Deploy 120 additional SS-N-20 missiles on 6 Typhoon subs (1,080 warheads)

- Deploy 30+ Blackjack bombers and long-range ALCM (300 warheads)

- Replace existing SCALEBOARD and SCUD missiles with SS-22 and SS-23

- Develop a small, single RV ICBM (PL-5?)

## For the U.S., it would require:

- Dismantling 142 Minuteman III launchers and missiles (426 warheads)

- Dismantling 192 C-3 Poseidon launchers and missiles (2,688 warheads)

- No production or deployment of MX, Pershing II, or long-range SLCM

- No deployment of GLCM

- No further production or deployment of FB-111 or F-111

## It would permit the U.S. to:

- Deploy 100 B-1B bombers (1,000 warheads)

- Deploy 96 additional C-4 missiles (768 warheads) and 4 additional Trident subs

- Complete the deployment of ALCMs and ACMs on B-52G/H (several thousand warheads)

- Develop and deploy a small ICBM (SICBM)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION AND
RELEASE AT 2:30 PM EDT

October 4, 1983

The President today announced the appointment of R. James
Woolsey, to be Member-at-Large of the United States Delegation to
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Previous Members-at-Large
have been former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (during SALT I
and II) and ACDA Director George Seignious (during SALT II).

Mr. Woolsey is currently serving as a member of the President's
Commission on Strategic Forces. He served as Under Secretary of
the Navy from 1977-79. He is a partner in the Washington law
firm of Shea and Gardner.

Mr. Woolsey was graduated from Stanford University, was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University and holds a law degree from Yale University. He was born September 21, 1941. He is married to the former Suzanne Haley and they have three sons.

# # # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

[Lc]

For Immediate Release

October 4, 1983

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
ON THE START PROPOSALS

NOV 1 1983

The Rose Garden

2:22 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, later today Ambassador Ed Rowny and the other members of the START delegation will depart for Geneva for the opening of the fifth round of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. They will carry with them a new set of instructions. From the first day of these negotiations our highest goal has been to achieve a stable balance at reduced levels of nuclear arsenals. We want to reduce the weapons of war, pure and simple.

All of our efforts in both the START and the INF negotiations continue to be guided by that objective. Just this morning I repeated this commitment to President Carstens of The Federal Republic of Germany. As I pledged to the United Nations, the United States will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We want significant reductions, and that pledge stands.

In the last round of negotiations we proposed a number of new initiatives which where in harmony with the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces and which provided additional flexibility to our negotiations. Those initiatives supported our basic goals and they also responded to a number of Soviet concerns.

I deeply regret that the Soviet Union has yet to give any significant response. Throughout the negotiating process it's the United States who's had to push, pull, probe, and prod in an effort to achieve any progress. The heartfelt desire shared by people everywhere for an historic agreement dramatically reducing nuclear weapons could and, indeed, will be achieved, provided one condition changes; the Soviet Government must start negotiating in good faith.

And let me emphasize that the United States has gone the extra mile. We've removed the dividing line between the two phases of our original proposal; everything is on the table. We're still most concerned about limits on the fast-flying, most dangerous systems, but we're also prepared to negotiate limits on bomber and air-launch cruise missile limits below Salt II levels. We've shown great flexibility in dealing with the destructive capability of ballistic missiles, including their throwweight.

We've also relaxed our limits on the number of ballistic missiles. We've gone a very long way to address Soviet concerns but the Soviets have yet to take their first meaningful step to address ours, particularly in the INF talks, but also in START they've been stonewalling our proposals. When we proposed confidence-building measures that could be agreed to right now, they said wait. Apparently they believe that time is on their side, that they can exploit one democracy against another, and that their uncompromising attitude and delay will ultimately win out.

Well, we'll prove them wrong. The diversity of our democracies is a source of strength, not weakness. From free discussion among free people comes unity and commitment. The sooner this is understood, the sooner we'll reach an agreement in the interests of both sides. We'll continue to press Moscow for an equitable, fair, and verifiable agreement.

When the START negotiations resume tomorrow, the United States delegation will again have sustained flexibility. Within the framework of the basic principles that have guided us throughout the negotiations, I am directing Ambassador Rowny to offer the following

MORE

[Lc]

new initiatives. We're incorporating into START a series of build-
down proposals. The United States will introduce a proposal for a
mutual, guaranteed build-down designed to encourage stabilizing
systems. The proposal will include specific provisions for building
down ballistic warheads and, concurrently, for addressing a parallel
build-down on bombers.

To discuss these major new initiatives, we will also
propose the establishment of a U.S.-Soviet build-down working group
in the Geneva talks. On another front, and in our effort, again, to
be absolutely as flexible as possible, we will be willing to explore
ways to further limit the size and capability of air-launch cruise
missile forces in exchange for reciprocal Soviet flexibility on items
of concern to us.

We seek limits on the destructive capability of missiles
and recognize that the Soviet Union would seek limits on bombers in
return. There will have to be trade offs and the United States is
prepared to make them, so long as they result in a more stable balance
of forces. The Soviet Union should not doubt the bipartisan support
for our efforts.

During our review process I looked for ways to broaden
America's bipartisan approach to our overall arms control effort. We've
consulted with many members of the Congress and again with the
Commission headed by Brent Scowcroft. Their counsel has been in-
valuable and I want to thank them for their tireless efforts and
helpful advice. A solid, national, bipartisan consensus sustained
from year to year and from Administration to Administration is crucial
if we are to keep America safe and secure and if we're to achieve
successful arms reductions.

Therefore, I have decided to take a number of new steps.
Among these are to designate a member of the Scowcroft Commission,
James Woolsey, as a member-at-large to our START negotiations. These
actions reflect America's democratic process at its best.

Ambassador Rowny, as you and your team depart for Geneva,
you go with the certain knowledge that you're negotiating with the
full support of the American people. Our bipartisan support is
stronger than ever before and you carry with you fair, equitable
proposals that are in the interest of both nations and all humankind.

It's fitting today to repeat what I said last week. The
door to an agreement is open. All the world is waiting for the Soviet
Union to walk through. Should the Soviet leadership decide to join us
now in our good faith effort, the fifth round of these negotiations
will be the one in which, finally, a breakthrough was made, and
finally the world began to breathe a bit easier.

So, to the entire START delegation, Ambassador Rowny, good
luck and Godspeed. (Applause.)

END

2:30 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

[LC]

FOR RELEASE AT 02:00 P.M. EST

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1983

Fact Sheet

Presidential Statement

October 4, 1983

NOV 1 1983

Today the President dispatched Ambassador Rowny and the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva. In doing so, he revealed that the U.S. will propose a major initiative which incorporates the build-down concept into the basic U.S. negotiating position. The next round of START, Round V, will begin in Geneva tomorrow, Wednesday, October 5.

## Continuing U.S. Flexibility in START

In remarks made on the occasion of his final meeting with the U.S. START negotiating team prior to the team's departure for Geneva, the President observed that the United States made a number of important initiatives during the last negotiating round to incorporate the major recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces (the Scowcroft Commission) and to increase Ambassador Rowny's flexibility in achieving U.S. objectives.

These initiatives, taken during Round IV of START, included:

- a relaxing of the proposal to limit the total number of ballistic missiles on each side to 850;

- a shift from an approach which envisioned two phases of negotiation, with the initial emphasis on ballistic missiles, to an approach embodied in a single phase agreement, with everything on the table;

- the proposal of limits on the number of bombers on each side and limits on the number of cruise missiles permitted to be carried on each bomber which are below SALT II levels;

- an offer to explore alternative approaches to limiting the destructive capability of ballistic missiles.

In addition, the United States increased its efforts to negotiate a number of confidence building measures involving the notification of ballistic missile launches and other activities that could be misinterpreted in times of crisis.

- more -

2

[Lc]

The President noted that the Soviet Union has not responded to these U.S. initiatives in a manner that would permit progress to be made on the central issues that separate the U.S. and Soviet positions. He announced that the U.S. will continue to press for progress towards an agreement in the interest of both parties. The President directed that in Round V, the U.S. Delegation seek a more positive response to the additional flexibility demonstrated by the United States in the last negotiating round.

## Build-Down Initiative

The President has instructed the U.S. Delegation to propose a number of new initiatives in START, specifically including a proposal for a mutual, guaranteed build-down designed to encourage stabilizing systems.

The build-down proposal will include:

- a provision which links reductions to modernization using variable ratios which identify how many existing nuclear warheads must be withdrawn as new warheads of various types are deployed;

- a provision calling for a guaranteed annual percentage build-down (an approximately 5% mandatory build-down per year);

- a provision that ensures that the reductions would be paced by whichever above rule produces the greatest reductions.

In addition, the U.S. delegation will be prepared to:

- address concurrently the build-down of bombers;

- discuss additional limitations on the air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) carried by U.S. bombers;

- negotiate trade-offs, taking into account Soviet advantages in missiles and U.S. advantages in bombers, in ways that provide each side maximum flexibility consistent with movement towards a more stable balance of forces;

- propose the establishment of a working group in START to discuss the U.S. build-down initiative in Round V.

- more -

1

MR. KALB: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is Senator Sam Nunn, of Georgia, ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee and a member of the Intelligence Committee. He is considered an authority on military policy and a man whose opinions on that subject count heavily with his colleagues.

Our reporters today are Walter Mossberg, of *The Wall Street Journal*; Rowland Evans, of the *Chicago Sun-Times*; Mary Lord, of *Newsweek*; and to open the questioning for Bill Monroe, who's off today, John Dancy, of NBC News.

MR. DANCY: Senator, the Senate begins debate tomorrow on the War Powers Resolution. Given the fact that the Administration in hearings last week was unwilling to commit to what happens at the end of the 18-month time period specified in the Resolution, doesn't this amount to another Gulf of Tonkin Resolution?

SENATOR NUNN: Let me say first I think there are two questions. Number one: Are we in hostilities that should trigger the War Powers Act? And I think the answer to that is clearly yes.

The second question is what do we do about the Congressional role in deliberating U.S. policy in Lebanon? And that Resolution, in my view, is not satisfactory in terms of answering the Congressional role. I think the Resolution as it's now drafted takes a mission that is ill-defined and gives it restrictions that virtually convert an open-ended mission into a mission that is very difficult to conceive how it would conclude.

MR. DANCY: Should there be a time limit and what should it be?

[c]

2

SENATOR NUNN: I do not believe we ought to be debating a time limit. I think we ought to be debating our role in Lebanon. I think the Congress should require that the Administration come up and define our mission in a term that -- in terms that we can understand and in terms that the American people can understand.

MR. DANCY: What should that mission be?

SENATOR NUNN: I don't have the answer to that. I believe the original mission to keep the peace, we have to ask the question whether there's any peace to keep at this point in time. I also think it's important for us to realize that we had a lot more leverage when the Marines went in there to begin with because the Israelis were holding firm and we could use that Israeli withdrawal as leverage on the Syrians and the PLO. We no longer have that kind of leverage.

MR. KALB: Thank you, Senator. We'll be back with more questions for Senator Sam Nunn.

(Announcements.)

MR. KALB: Our guest on MEET THE PRESS, Senator Sam Nunn.
Ms. Lord?

MS. LORD: Three years ago you wrote, "Unless we are prepared to drastically/our treaty obligations and redefine our vital interests, the volunteer force must be given a decent, but prompt burial." Today, we find our men are under fire in Lebanon and in Latin America. We have exercises going on / three continents and seemingly stretched very thin. My question is where would we pare down our commitments and how would you manage to sell that to the American people?

[1c]

3

SENATOR NUNN: Well, first let me say that the volunteer force is doing much better now than it was at the time I wrote that. I still have the same long-term view. I believe if we're going to keep our commitments around the world that have considerably expanded under both President Carter and President Reagan, then we have to go back to some form of compulsion. If we're not willing -- in terms of manpower, if we're not willing to do that, then I think we have to scale back our commitments over time.

The reason the volunteer force is doing better now is primarily high youth unemployment and very high -- compared to the recent past, high benefits in pay. Now in terms of scaling down our commitments, I think that takes a national debate. I'm not advocating that we declare that Europe's not in our national security, or northeast Asia, or even the Persian Gulf. I do believe we have to redefine America's military role. I think we have to have our allies doing much more. And I would start by a vigorous debate in NATO about who would carry out what functions under the strategy we call "forward defense."

That is a strategy that involves a huge commitment by American forces, a huge commitment to heavy forces, to airlift and sealift in an emergency, and I think it also does not give us the kind of flexibility that we may need to move elsewhere in the world.

MS. LORD: Are we stretched too thin, in your opinion, in Europe or any other part of the world?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I think we're stretched too thin all over the world. I think we've taken on too many commitments. We aren't doing a very good job right at the moment of debating what's

[L]

4

in our vital interest. For instance, is Lebanon in our vital interest?
We certainly want peace there. We want to play a diplomatic role, but
is Lebanon part of America's vital interests. The President, I don't
think, has ever said that, nor has the Secretary of State. If they
have said it, it's been very subtle and I think we in the Congress
need to ask that question.

MR. KALB: Mr. Evans?

MR. EVANS: Senator, as the leading Democratic voice on
defense in the U.S. Congress you made a remarkable statement just now.
You told Mr. Dancy you don't know what the U.S. mission is or what
the Marine mission is in Lebanon. Why don't you?

SENATOR NUNN: I don't think the Administration knows. If
they do, they haven't told the Congress.

MR. EVANS: Do you think, Senator, this is the right war,
at the right place, against the right enemy?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I hope we don't get in a war. We went
in there to keep the peace, but we have to give our Marines whatever
authority they need to defend themselves. Right now they're sitting
ducks. They don't have a defense position that any military commander
would ever advocate.

MR. EVANS: If the Marine casualties increase, and we're
getting more everyday, can you see any reason, any rationale for pro-
posing a quick withdrawal of the U.S. Marines under fire?

SENATOR NUNN: I believe if there's a ceasefire we ought to
take advantage of that to --

MR. EVANS: I mean if there is no ceasefire.

5

[LC]

SENATOR NUNN: If there's no ceasefire I certainly think that we -- we need to debate the mission anyway. We need to define at what point we can declare success. Certainly we know that the original goals of the Administration, to clear all foreign forces out of Lebanon, to have a government there that can exercise sovereignty over all Lebanese territory, those missions are not going to be completed anytime soon.

Now if we're going to keep the Marines there until those missions described or goals described by the Administration are completed, they may be there for a long number of years. We need to define success. What is the role of the Marines and when will they be permitted to withdraw?

Now the Administration needs to answer that and Congress needs to ask the question. That's the role I think Congress has to play under the war powers. Simply defining 18 months, or even 12 months, as an exit point, to me is not the appropriate Congressional role.

MR. KALB: Mr. Mossberg?

MR. MOSSBERG: Senator, I'd like to follow-up on that theme for a moment. I thought you were about to say something. Were you about to say that when there is a ceasefire that would be an appropriate moment to withdraw the U.S. Marines?

SENATOR NUNN: No, I was about to say we ought to take advantage of the ceasefire to review the mission, to discuss it with our allies -- Britain, France and Italy, the other members of the multinational force -- and to come to a consensus here in Congress.

[c]

6

I'd like to see certain things spelled out in the War Powers Resolution, not in terms of limiting the force. I think the danger is we will end up with an open-ended commitment with no exit point, with no clearly defined mission, but with a Congressional resolution that basically limits the amount of military force we can use to perform that mission. That's the worst of all worlds.

MR. MOSSBERG: Senator, let me switch to the topic of arms control, in which you've been quite active. You said this summer that you thought there was a fairly good chance for an arms control treaty, either on strategic weapons or on the missiles that are in Europe by next spring. Has the Korean airliner shooting down by the Soviets changed all that in your mind?

SENATOR NUNN: I think it certainly changed it in the short term because the environment is not very conducive now for high level meetings that will be necessary to conclude any kind of even interim agreement. We're going to have to have the Secretary of State involved. He's going to have to meet with his counterpart. We may even have to have the President involved in some kind of meeting with Andropov. So the climate has turned for the worse. I still believe that over the next few months we're going to have some real opportunity for meaningful arms control, if our NATO Alliance stands firm on deploying the Pershing IIs and ground-launched Cruise missiles absent an arms control agreement. That is the crucial, big factor now and we'll know in the next two or three months. I'm rather optimistic on that.

7

[Lc]

MR. KALB: Senator, I want to go back to Lebanon for a minute. Did you -- You've been skirting around the issue of whether or not Lebanon is in the "vital interest of the United States," whether the United States should have "a commitment to Lebanon." I'm using deliberately the buzz words of our time. Do you think it is?

SENATOR NUNN: A military commitment. There's a difference between a military commitment and a diplomatic commitment. We've had that diplomatic commitment for a long time, but when you inject as a superpower your own military forces in a region the question is can you any longer play the peacekeeping role. What is your leverage?

MR. KALB: Well, presumably you put the forces in there because you've already defined the country to be in your vital interests. Is it?

SENATOR NUNN: That would be the logical order, but I do not believe that's been followed. I don't think the decision to put Marines in Lebanon the second time had very much analytical, or even intellectual, thinking behind it.

MR. KALB: No. But I'm trying to get your view. Do you think it's in the vital interest of the United States?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, at this point in time, I think the President has the ball. He has to tell us why it is and if it is. I'm not going to make that decision until the President comes forth. He's got the State Department. He's got the Pentagon. He's got the experts. I will make my decision after he makes his.

MR. KALB: Okie-doke. Mr. Dancy?

MR. DANCY: Well, should we, for example, Senator, be

[lc]

8

supporting the Lebanese Army? Should we be in there, in effect,
supporting the Lebanese Government?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I think, Mr. Dancy, that we need to give our Marines all the authority they need to defend themselves and if that includes protecting the higher ground when the Lebanese Army's fighting for it, then I would support that.

MR. DANCY: Would you allow the Marines, for example, to move out of their position around Beirut Airport and to move up into the high ground in order to take that and hold it?

SENATOR NUNN: I would not advocate that. I think it would be something that would be a rather dangerous escalation. But I would want to first of all define their mission. If they do that, then the original mission to keep the peace may be so obscured that we have to -- we have to re-examine it.

MR. DANCY: Do you find -- Do you find similarities to Vietnam in all of this?

SENATOR NUNN: I think it's a totally different part of the world, in some ways more dangerous. For the first time we have the superpowers really with military forces right there in Lebanon in the Middle East. Of course, the Soviets are right in Syria and we're in Lebanon. So in some ways it's much more dangerous than Vietnam. In other ways there are similarities.

I don't think we thought through the long-term when we got into Vietnam. I don't think we thought through the long-term here.

MR. KALB: Ms. Lord?

MS. LORD: Yes, I'd like to return to arms control for a