(1)

New York,

April 23, 1932

Several things have happened within the past month or two which I want to record. One is that at a dinner which Cleveland Dodge gave us he took me aside after dinner and said he hoped some thing might be done to bring about a <u>REMEMBERATION</u> resumption of the relations which formerly existed between President Wilson and myself. He remarked three distinct times "I know you are the ag-grieved party, nevertheless, he is sick and I hope you will make another effort to get in touch with him."

I then told him of what I had done in that direction, which seemed to surprise him and which I think satisfied him that I could not move any further in the direction he desired.

Paderewski came to see me today and told me the following interesting story.

In 1919 after the Peace Conference had adjourned and he was still Prime Minister of Poland, he sent some radical Poles to Russia to get in touch with the Soviet Government and to find what could be done toward peace between Poland and Russia. They brought back a definite proposal from Russia in which it was agreed that Poland should have practically all the territory east they claimed or desired, and in addition they were willing to recognize financial indebtedness to the Allies.

Paderewski took this proposal to President Pilsudski who refused to consider it, declaring he would make peace at Moscow. Paderewski then went to Paris where the Supreme Council was sitting. He saw Lloyd George in the presence of Bonar Law, Winston

(2)

Churchill, Maurice Hankey and several others and told him of the proposal, urging George to bring through the Supreme Council sufficient pressure upon Pilsudski to make him accept the Russian proposal. George was rather sympathetic to the idea but Churchill opposed it. The conference adjourned to meet the next day and Paderewski was invited to meet the Supreme Council and discuss the matter.

At this meeting, Clemenceau broke forth with this: "Peace with Bolshevik Russia, never, never." George, much to Paderewski's surprise, also declined to consider the proposal, telling him that the thing to do was to hold their own and let matters remain as they were.

We all know what followed and how WERK near Poland came to being submerged by the Bolshevik flood, which would have also carried with it Germany, Holland, Switzerland and Italy. George today is trying at Geneva to bring about peace with Russia, after three years have passed, and after so much ghastly suffering has been endured, upon practically the same lines offered by the Russians to Paderewski. Paderewski had the wisdom and the vision which was lacking in the others, and it is a pity that the people cannot differentiate better between their would be masters.

Paris, France.

June 10, 1933.

We sailed from New York May 30th on the S. S. Resolute, and after a pleasant voyage we disembarked at Boulogne the night of June 7th. The French authorities kindly cleared the ship after eleven at night and we came to Paris on the 8th.

I called upon Clemenceau this morning and we talked for

(3)

an hour. I told him there was something about which I had been thinking during the winter and about which I was puzzled. I asked if he remembered after the Armistice and Wilson's tentative intention to attend the peace Conference was mentioned, that he and Lloyd George were both opposed to his sitting in at the Conference.

He remembered this quite well and took occasion to remark that it was a pity that Wilson ever came, and that I would recollect that he thought at the time it was a mistake.

I brushed that discussion aside and asked him what induced him to change his mind as to the desirability of the President sitting in at the Conference. I then went further and asked if he was far-sighted enough to feel that if the President ceased to be "the god on the mountain" and became as common clay by wrangling day by day with the other delegates at the Conference, he would lose his high position and be more or less on an equal with himself and George.

Clemenceau said it was a long time to go back for his motives but he felt sure that the thing that caused him to change his mind was that he found George after the Armistice constantly opposing France. He thought if Wilson as President of the United States sat in the Conference it would strengthen the French position because he felt confident that Wilson would be fair when matters relating to France appeared. He said the results justified this faith, for while Wilson was ignorant of European affairs and of the many questions coming before the Conference, still he tried to be open minded. Clemenceau cited the Saar Valley as a case in point. When he first took that subject up George declared that he would never consent to France taking over that territo-

(4)

ry even temporarily, and he said in a very positive manner that
his conclusion was final and that there was no need to argue. Wilson interrupted George and declared that while he had something of his feeling, still he thought the matter should be looked into and a decision arrived at later. The result was that Wilson finally supported a modified French claims which went through.

Another instance he gave was the fifteen year occupation of the Rhine. George demanded that it should be two years and Wilson maintained that fifteen years had been promised, therefore, fifteen years must stand. Clemenceau said while he was in England recently he asked Lloyd George why it was that he had steadily opposed France since the Armistice. George replied that he was merely following the traditional English foreign policy. To this Clemenceau said, "You seem to have forgotten that the French and English have been allies in this great war and it might therefore be expected that the traditional policy would be modified."

He said at one time during the Conference, Wilson said to him somewhat in anger, "Suppose I wire my ship and go home". To this Clemenceau made answer, "I will go down and see you off".

(5)

Much to my surprise, Clemenceau wanted to know my opinion as to the desirability of his making a visit to the United States. He wished to go if he could serve France, but not other wise. He pledged me to secrecy, saying he had not expressed even a hint of his willingness to take such a trip to anyone, not even to Tardieu, and asked me to be equally silent as to his intentions&

At this point, from what I later learned, he was really not in the habit of speaking to me, and I was not allowed to enter into any conversation with him.

We discussed it at great length and I formulated a program which seemed to meet his approval. He does not wish to make the trip at the expense of any society or institution. I thought he need not stay longer than two weeks, but he said he was willing to remain a month and we planned the trip on that basis.

I also told him that he could pay for the trip if he would allow me to make arrangements with some newspaper syndicate for a few articles. This, I thought, would serve his purpose in

(6)

helping France and, incidentally, pay the cost of his journey.

He was willing for me to do this. The itinerary we outlined covered Washington, Chicago, Indianapolis, Cleveland and Boston.

In going to Washington I advised accepting no invitations excepting a dinner invitation from the President and possibly one from the Secretary of State. I urged him not to cheapen himself as Foch, Joffre and other distinguished Europeans had done. I thought the opposite policy would conserve his strength and make our people think more, rather than less, of him. Besides, I thought it would cause the newspapers to exploit everything he had to say when he did say something in a way which would bring his remarks directly before all our people.

I even went into the arguments he should use showing how France had been treated by Great Britain and America in refusing to ratify the Anglo-American and Franco-American Treaties regarding the protection of France, and how we permitted the Versailles Peace Conference to adjourn without giving France a chance to ratify this wrong.

Loulie and I are going with Clemenceau to the country to-morrow to lunch at his small villa near Paris. He wanted to start at eight o'clock but I indicated nine would be about as early as Loulie could be ready.

June 11, 1922.

Clemenceau came around to the hotel at nine o'clock this morning in his beautiful Rolls Royce car which some friends gave him last year, and took us to his country place at Barnouville. The weather was perfect and we had a delightful time from start

(7)

to finish. After lunch he drove us over to the artist, Monet's
in order to *show* his beautiful garden. After looking at the gar-
dens and water lillies in the river and lake, we went to Monet's
studio to see his pictures. We did not get back to Paris until
after six o'clock this evening.

I had an unusual opportunity to get Clemenceau's estimate
of men. He said Foch was "merely a picture and had but little
ability". Wiegand was the brains that directed the campaign for
which Foch got the credit, but Wiegand he thought " was not
a good man". Just what he meant by this I do not know, but I
think he considers him dishonest and untrustworthy.

He said Petain was a brilliant military scholar and a great
organizer, but lacked initiative. I supplemented this by calling
attention to the brilliant work Weigand did in Poland a year ago.

Joffre, he said, was "an educated ass" and yet he accom-
plished one of the most important things of the war, which was to
let the Germans press the Allies back until they had reached Paris
before a decided attempt was made to turn them.

He gave Gallieni the credit for this thought and manoeuvre,

He spoke of Joffre as a man of high character and good in-
tentions. He likes Marshal Haig but considers him that he had but
little ability. He thought the English were badly officered but
the soldiers were admirable. He thought the same of our troops,
and declared that it was well Pershing was stubborn because it hid
a multitude of incompetencies.

We both agreed on Allenby and that he was the ablest man
the British produced.

I got him talking of Napoleon. He concedes his superla-

(8)

tive genius but thought he had done France immeasurable harm. When
Napoleon assumed direction of France she had more territory than
when he was deposed. His greatest crime, however was that after
the Revolution the mass of people in every country loved France
for the struggle she had made for liberty and happiness, and Na-
poleon changed this sentiment and made France generally hated
throughout Europe.

He spoke of Lloyd George and Wilson time and again but
said nothing different from what I have often heard him say be-
fore. He regards George as a clever politician but not a states-
man.

London, August 25, 1922.

I spent the day yesterday with Lord Grey at Fallodon. It has been a long time since I have had such a delightful experience. His re-built house is not yet finished and he is living in the servant's quarters. We walked through the old gardens which were rather tangled and not very well kept, which to me gave them a certain charm. A part of the stream, which runs through the place, is damned so as to make a lake in which there are wild ducks and water fowls of all sorts. These he feeds twice a day. They were somewhat shy because of my presence, but I was astonished to see so many of them come out of the water and eat the bits of bread from Grey's hands. He spends a half hour a day feeding and taming them.

We had long and intimate talks not only of present day politics but of the war and of his youth. Among other things he told me of his talks, before the war, with the Kaiser and Crown Prince of Germany. In one of these the Crown Prince suggested that since Great Britain and Germany had respectively the largest navy and army in the world they might "divide the world between us". Grey @xay replied "We do not want to divide the world". The Crown Prince meant too that Great Britain wanted the world for herself. Grey, of course, meant quite another thing.

In his talks with the Kaiser the latter was constantly making suggestions about state affairs which Grey knew he had no power to carry out. Cecil Rhodes told @xay the Kaiser at one time that he, Rhodes, favored a policy by which Great Britain should be given a free hand in Africa, and Germany a free hand in Asia Minor. The Kaiser was impressed with this but made no progress in that direction with Grey. Grey attaches no importance to his conversations with either the Kaiser or the Crown Prince. One he considered a fool and the other he knew had no power to carry out his own suggestions.

In speaking of the matter of the Bagdad Railway and the Portuguese Colo-

(2)

nies, the agreement between Germany and Great Britain had advanced so far when the war broke out that it had been initiated by Grey and the Germans really needed nothing further except the official signature. In this agreement, it was proposed that if Portugal wanted to sell her colonies, Great Britain should buy those in East Africa and Germany those in West Africa. Grey wanted to publish the agreement but the Germans objected. Grey said that since Great Britain had a treaty of alliance with Portugal, he wished to act in the open so that the rumors which were certain to distort the actual facts, would be killed.

He also spoke of my promise in 1916, both by word of mouth and by letter, that the United States would make in certain circumstances, force Germany to make a just peace or we would enter the war against her. He tells me he left a memorandum of this in the Foreign Office. He also took it up with France before he relinquished office, but they were afraid that if peace was made then, it would not give France Alsace and Lorraine.

Grey, in speaking of the making of peace even as early as 1916, thinks now that the world would have been better off if it had been made then. Germany would probably have overthrown the Kaiser and become democratic, and would have remained strong enough to maintain it. She would have seen her military plans fail and the lesson would have been sufficient without the terrible destruction wrought after '16.

He spoke without reserve concerning the Prime Minister. He considers it a great misfortune that Great Britain should be represented at so critical a period by such a man.

He talked of his personal affairs and told me of his income and from whence it was derived. Although his estate at Fallodon consists of some 2000 acres and the gross income is nearly eight thousand pounds, the net income after all the expenses, taxes etc. are met, is only two thousand pounds. He obtains

["(3)", "about three hundred and fifty pounds a year from his directorship of the North\neastern Railway, and he has sufficient outside income from other sources to make\nit about what mine is, some fifteen to twenty thousand dollars a year.", "I was struck by the simplicity of the way in which he lives. While\nhe has a cook and two maids the lunch and dinner were placed on the main table and\nthe side table and we served ourselves as we pleased. He asked the maid to\nlight the fire but she misunderstood and went out without doing so. He then got\ndown on the hearth and did it himself, and later lighted one in his study down-\nstairs. His house is only a few hundred yards from the station and when I\nleft that night at around ten o'clock, he tramped along with me in the rain and\nat the station insisted upon carrying my very heavy bag and putting it on the\ntrain for me, not calling upon the station master for help. I wish there were\nmore Greys in the world and that they were in power during these troublous times.", "August 28, 1922.", "We spent the better part of two delightful days, yesterday and the day\nbefore, at Hinchinbrooke. St Loe Strachey and his wife were the only other\nguests. In looking over some of the notable pictures in the gallery, Sandwich\nshowed us one of a Marquès of Anglesley, one of his famous ancestors, and he told\nthis story of him.", "who had been with him 46 years\n\nAnglesley ordered his bukkar x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x

London, August 29, 1922.

I have seldom been harder pressed in London than since my return
from Scotland and Fallodon last Friday morning.

Governor Cox of Ohio was my first caller after my arrival. He had been
trying to reach me during my absence, and came to see me within two hours after I
reached our hotel. He wished to know what I thought of his making a statement
to the effect that President Harding would do well to let Hoover come over and
sit on the Reparations Committee and ask practically as arbitrator. Cox was
good enough to say that there only two Americans in whom the Europeans would have
sufficient confidence for such a task, Hoover being one and I being the other.
Since there was no possibility of Harding appointing me, he thought Hoover should
be named.

I approved the suggestion, and when Cox came to dinner with us in the
evening, he submitted his statement. I made some slight changes and would have
made more if I had known him better. The statement has been well received through
out Europe, particularly, in Great Britain, most of the papers writing leaders
about it.

Lord Robert Cecil call to see me Sunday afternoon and we discussed League
matters. He left for Geneva yesterday. We discussed the ways and means for
helping the League and bringing to it prestige and strength. We also discussed
the necessity of France having security against unwarranted invasion from Germany
and we came to the conclusion, since there was no possibility of the Franco-Amer-
ican and Anglo-French Treaties being ratified, that the best thing, in the cir-
cumstances and perhaps the best in any circumstances, would be for the members of
the League of Nations to particularly guarantee France under that clause of the
Covenant which assures one member that the other members will come to its aid in
the event of unwarranted invasion.

Cecil is to press this upon the French and urge them to bring the

(2)

Germans into the League and into this guarantee.

I have a letter from Jusserand, who is now in France and to whom I shall
probably write outlining the suggestion that he urge Poincaré to accept such a
guarantee and to further it.

It seemed yesterday as if all the newspaper men in London were on my
trail. Up to now they have not known I was here, and I have had time to see
my friends and those whom I thought it needful to see.

I breakfasted with the Prime Minister this morning and had a very interest-
ing talk for an hour and a half. He had no one else present so our talk was in-
timate and entirely satisfactory from my point of view. I wanted to put two
things in his mind, one was the substance of what Cecil and I had agreed upon as
being wise in regard to the protection of France and generals disarmament, and
the other was to get him to propose, at this critical juncture, that the bankers
be called together again and with a wider powers than they had at Paris. There,
they were not prepared to consider the matter of reparations. My suggestion to
George was that they should be given the widest range for their activities so
they could include reparations and all kindred questions. I thought it was fu-
tile to ask for a loan for Germany without going into the fundamentals of the
situation and revamping it from the very foundations. This could be done if
the bankers had broad enough powers, not to act, but to make recommendations. It
would give assurances to the world that something worth while would be done, and
would quiet the uneasy feeling prevailing everywhere.

As I favored this thought as against having Hoover come over as arbi-
trator, for the bankers have the power to carry into effect their recommendations
while Hoover could not do more than recommend. George argued this point with
me for quite awhile, saying the French would not agree to it. I urged him to
make the proposal in any event and place the French on the defensive.

(3)

He also said the proposal regarding the League would not meet Poincaré's views, that he had already offered to give a special British guarantee to France against invasion and accompanied with a loan, but that too Poincaré declined. He spoke of Poincaré as being a narrow, partisan statesman, something of the order of Wilson. I combatted this by saying that he was not in Wilson's class intellectually, which George admitted. He said he merely meant that he had a narrow view of things and was prejudiced as, indeed, he considered Wilson.

When I left he said he would talk to Sir John Bradbury, British Member of the Reparations Commission, as soon as he returned from Berlin and would discuss my proposal with him. He also said he would keep the League matter in the back of his mind and rather intimated that at the right time he would use it. I enlarged upon the fact of his unusual power for good. I said that the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain were the two most powerful voices in the world, but the President of the United States had elected not to use his, therefore, I hoped he, George, would see the things and do the things needful in this critical hour.

We discussed in detail what the French had in their minds. I thought Foch was backing the Poincaré program and would rather welcome going to the Left Bank of the Rhine, just as he wanted to do in '19. George thought that neither Poincaré or Foch would dare take such a step. On the contrary, I called his attention to the fact that France was getting into an impossible financial condition and that it was a question how long they could maintain their army. They could go to the Rhine now, or anywhere else in Europe, but would they be able to do it next year or within five years? I told him that France was not immediately afraid of Germany but she was afraid of putting Germany in a position where she could soon become a formidable opponent.

George admitted this and said it was certain that Germany would become a

(4)

formidable antagonist in the future, and especially because of her treatment at
the hands of France. He spoke kindly of Clemenceau, but much more warmly of
Briand. He thought Briand made a mistake in taking the Government when he did.
He should have permitted Poincaré to come in first and then succeeded him with a
much clearer field for himself than he had when he was last in office.

He spoke kindly of Wilson too, expressing his sorrow at his physical in-
firmities, and wondered why he thought it necessary, through the Baker book, to
reflect discredit upon his colleagues in Paris. He said if Wilson had died when
he first had his stroke he would have become almost as much an American hero as
Lincoln. I combatted this, making my usual statement that he would have been the
Lincoln of the world, and that he would have been perhaps the foremost man in
history.

his
George was surprised to hear me say that Pasteur had done his most impor-
tant work after he had had a severe stroke, and he wondered whether Wilson had
enough resilience to come back. I thought not. I thought that his temperament
was strongly against him. He hated with much intensity and did not keep himself
in that philosophical and equable frame of mind necessary to complete recovery.

I asked George if he would accept the invitation of the American Legion
to come to the United States in October to attend their meeting at New Orleans.
He seemed surprised that I knew of the invitation and discussed it at length. I
advised against his coming on the eve of our elections, and in this he heartily
aquiesced. I suggested April as being a suitable month. He preferred coming
when he was out of office but wondered whether his voice would be as potential
then as now. I thought not. We outlined the character of speeches he should
make when he came, and I found no cause to object to what he had in mind to say.
I urged him to be bold and to be frank and to tell our people the truth as he
saw it.

(5)

We then discussed English politics, and I gathered that he has in the back to of his head some day assume the leadership of the Labor Party. He does not think they will win a majority at the next election, but he does believe they will surprise the country by the strength they will develop. He thinks it would be a bad thing for them to win now because they have no leaders able to carry out a constructive policy. What they need, he thought, was a bold forceful man to direct. Here again, he indicated himself.

Altogether we had a delightful and satisfactory talk and I wish he was the type of man to make one feel more confidence in his carrying out the views he expressed this morning.

Of his book he said that it would treat of the war and not of the Peace Conference; that later he might write a book about that, or have one written, but at present he merely contemplated telling of the war and of its horrors and of some of the stirring incidents connected with his administration of it as Prime Minister.

On Board S. S. Tyrhenia,

September 7, 1922.

We embarked yesterday for home after a delightful and somewhat
remarkable visit in London.

I had no dream of seeing as many people in England or that I would
have such an interesting experience. I have chronicled my conversation
with Lloyd George and I shall tell of my talk with Edward Grey at Fallodon.
I saw many other important men and I hope my visit was conducive to some
good.

Sir William Tyrrell told me the last day I was in London that his
friend Grigg, who is now the Prime Minister's chief secretary, had said
that Lloyd George was contemplating going to Geneva to make an address be-
fore the League of Nations and along the lines advised by me when I took
breakfast with him. Tyrrell was afraid the Prime Minister would make the
speech without regard to the French or without first giving them an oppor-
tunity to acquiesce in his proposals. I asked Tyrrell to convey to the
Prime Minister, through Grigg, my opinion that it would be a mistake not to
try to first get the acquiescence of the French Government. This was in the
plan I outlined to George at our conference but, according to Grigg, he had
overlooked that part of the advice and

I also asked Tyrrell to say to the Prime Minister through Grigg that
it was the greatest opportunity that had presented itself to him for a long
while and that I hoped he would take advantage of it.

Tyrrell seemed to have mixed feelings. He thought well of the plan
and believed it was the right solution for the present critical situation
but he was afraid it would give the P. M. sufficient kudos, in the event of
its success, to keep him on the crest of the wave.

Tyrrell, at the moment, is practically directing foreign affairs since
Curzon is ill and Balfour and Eyre Crowe are away. After messing up the

(2)

Turco-Greek situation until the whole Mohamedan East is in revolt, George sent Tyrrell word that he would leave that delicate and critical problem to the Foreign Office for settlement. Tyrrell remarked, and some other people say, that Lloyd George is not a humorist.

Another person I saw who is always full of interest was Sir Horace Plunkett who came from Ireland for two days before we left. He gave a summary of what was going on in that unhappy isle, but the most important and interesting thing, as far as I am concerned, was that the Free State authorities were again seriously considering me as a possible arbitrator between themselves and the Irreconcilables. Sir Horace told me this in the gravest confidence, declaring that he had gotten it direct and not second-hand. Michael Collins came to see him only a few days before he was killed, and Plunkett thinks that his death was an even more serious blow to Ireland that the untimely death of Arthur Griffith. He thinks that Collins combined a fighting man with something of the statesman's outlook, and what the situation needs at the moment is strong and vigorous personality. He said he was surprised at the breadth of Collins' outlook and he was satisfied if he had lived he would have grown into the man Ireland needs at this time.

Tyrrell and some of the other Liberals very much wanted me to see Asquith before leaving England. Since Asquith had invited us down to The Wharf to visit them, I concluded, busy as I was, that I had best go for at least a day, provided I could have a serious talk with him. Tyrrell promised and did arrange this through Sir Bonham Carter, Asquith's son-in-law. I had a long and intimate talk with him but did not touch upon the Liberal leadership which is a burning question in the minds of most of the Liberals. They desire Asquith to relinquish the leadership to Grey. Grey might seize it if he cared to, but he is too indifferent to power and too loyal to his former Chief to do so.

(3)

The drift of sentiment in Liberal circles is away from Labor and in the direction of a coalition with the Conservatives with Grey as Prime Minister.

I found Asquith in his study writing on his book in which he is to answer the forthcoming book of the Kaiser. I knew what the Kaiser had said through the publishers, therefore we did not enter into that but merely discussed the answer that should be made. In my opinion, Asquith would make a mistake to take the Kaiser too seriously since his charges are absurd and can be easily refuted. I advised him to merely use the Kaiser's book to write a vivid account of the war as it related to the part the British Government took under his leadership. I thought he could brush his accusations away in a few pages and could then go as far afield as he desired.

This led us into a discussion of the war and of its conduct and brought us up, among other things, against Galkin & Co. Gallipoli. We agreed that it was a brilliant conception, and Asquith attributed its failure, first, to the non-aggressive action of the British Fleet, which was sent there to force the Straits, and later to the commander of the army itself. He did not mention General Sir Ian Hamilton by name but he evidently had him in mind. As far as the fleet went, he said it was one opportunity to do a daring thing, and there was but one ship sent there, the Queen Elizabeth, whose destruction would have mattered. We concluded that it was the most brilliant conception of the war on either side and that it would have probably brought the war to a finish a long time before America had time to enter.

We talked of the Balfour Note sent to France but meant for the United States. The whole of England has been discussing this note since it was sent and the opinion is almost unanimous that it was a mistake. As a matter of fact, Tyrrell told me, and he gets it from actual facts, that Balfour very much favored it. So also did the Prime Minister, Chamberlain and Horne were against it. Unfortunately, Geddes had just come from the United States and

(4)

while he at first advised against lending such a note, after it was written and
he found George and Balfour in favor of it, he reversed his position and approv-
ed it. This was the final influence which caused them to send the note.

I had much talk with Margot and Elizabeth Bibesco, who was there visiting.

I saw a great deal of Governor Cox while he was in London. He lunch-
ed and dined with us, and many of my friends had us both in for dinners. One of
the most delightful was that given by Sydney Brooks at Brook's Club. I had the
pleasure there of talking with Reginald McKenna, who told me about Rothermere
and the Northcliffe will and the distribution of his property.

And this reminds me that Campbell Stuart gave me an the inside story of
Northcliffe's affairs and of the will, particularly as it related to the London
Times. [maxxings]

At no time have I been more pursued by reporters or people desiring to see
me than upon this visit. I cannot quite fathom it. I gave the London Times
a final statement which was published on the fifth, the day we left London, and
around which they wrote their leading editorial.

My discussions with public men whom I met largely centered about the
Balfour Note and Reparations. One evening I invited my friend Dannie Heineman,
the Belgian-American financier, Sir George Paish, Henry Morganthau and Massing-
ham of the Nation to dinner. They remained until nearly midnight and the con-
versation was interesting and I hope may produce results. Heineman is in clos-
er touch with German-French-Belgian and English financiers than almost any man
I know, and his acute mind and unusual vision will probably make itself felt be-
fore a final settlement is made. It was Heineman who was the main instrument in
bringing Rathenau and Loucheux together which produced such favorable results.

Lloyd George's letter which was sent to Cabourg and returned to London
is a part of the record. The letter is in answer to one I wrote him from Ca-
bourg about his speech at the Non Conformist luncheon.

Hotel Connaught,
London, W.

June 11th, 1923.

Since our arrival a week ago I have seen many interesting people and have had some important conferences regarding the Franco-German situation.

The first night of our arrival we dined with Commander and Mrs. Hilton Young. Dr. Steffenson was the only other guest.

On Monday we dined with Sir Arthur and Lady Colfax to meet Mr. Lord Balfour but unhappily he was sick and not able to be present. Among the guests I met Rudyard Kipling, John Sargent, Lytton Strachey, Lord Hugh Cecil and others. I was agreeably surprised with Kipling since it was the first time I have met him. I do not know whether he was particularly pleasant to me but there was certainly nothing in his manner to indicate the reputation he has for brusqueness and plain-speaking. He said he had seen me before in 1919 when I was pointed out while motoring in Sussex.

I have met Sargent before but only casually. He was the most pronounced Englishman I talked with that evening both in his speech and looks. He occupied an inconspicuous place at the table though, in my opinion, he was the most notable guest and the one whose name will live longest not even excepting Kipling.

Tuesday we went to Lord and Lady Astor's where I met many acquaintances among them Mr. and Mrs. Philip Snowdon with whom I had considerable talk. It was a queer medley of wealth, aristocracy, socialists and poverty. Some of the guests had on ordinary working clothes, tan shoes etc. If I were asked the most conspic-

(3)

with him for all time and so, I think, are the Asquith-Grey Liberals.
As for the Labor Party, they thoroughly distrust him, though in an
emergency, they might turn to him. My experience has been that
there comes a time in the career of public men where the lack of
character becomes fatal to success.

George made an exceedingly clever analysis of Poincaré which
met my own opinion of him.

After leaving the House of Commons we went to Derby
House to a reception and dance. I merely passed through the rooms
shaking hands with Lord and Lady Derby and various friends who were
there. Loulie remained after I left as she was invited to sit at
the royal table for supper and the Austen Chamberlains brought her
home.

The most interesting event of the week was D. N. Heineman's
arrival from Brussels. He had just come from Berlin where Chan-
cellor Cuno had invited him in order to advise concerning the last
German note. My correspondence with Heineman during the last few
months indicates the advice I have given him and my insistence that
he use his knowledge and acquaintance in Germany, France, Belgium
and Great Britain to help bring about a settlement of the repara-
tions difficulties. The Chancellor asked him to bring the note to
me and get my opinion of it. I have indicated my views in an in-
terview in the London Times of Saturday June 9th which is attached.

I told Heineman I was sorry not to have arrived in Europe a
few days earlier for I should have advised coupling the note with
assurances of safety for France, for after all, that is the crux
of the situation. France is talking reparations and, indeed,

(4)

desires them, but it is the fear of Germany that is causing her to
act in the way to unsettle the entire world.

I advised Heineman to return to Berlin when I indicated
the time was opportune and ask Cuno to also give some sort of as-
surance of security to France as this note gives of reparations.
I doubt whether anything can be done as long as the Poincaré Gov-
ernment lasts but if the cards are played adroitly by Germany,
Great Britain and France, it may be that Poincaré will be over-
thrown and one more susceptible to fair-play and reason will re-
place him.

Thursday evening we dined with Dr. Steffenson and went to
the play.

On Friday morning the 8th, Mr. Shakespeare, Lloyd George's
secretary, came to bring the various invitations which the ex-
Prime Minister has received from America. We talked the matter
out at length but came to no satisfactory conclusion. My talk with
him hardened my determination to touch lightly on the arrangements
for George's forthcoming visit to the United States.

We lunched at Dudley House with Mrs. Whitelaw Reid and her
daughter Lady Ward. Dean Carnegie and his wife, the former Mrs.
Joseph Chamberlain, were the only other guests.

In the afternoon I saw a good many people among them a
representative of the London Times to whom I gave an interview.
My purpose in doing this was to express my approval of the
German note. I felt it was due the Chancellor in view of my con-
nection with it.

Judge Robert Bingham of the Louisville Courier Journal who

(5)

came in later read the interview and cabled it in toto to his paper

Friday evening we dined with Mr. and Mrs. Reginald McKenna. The
only other guests were Heineman and Dudley Docker. The dinner was
for the purpose of discussing the German note and the attitude the
British Government should take toward it. I strongly advised the
Government to do nothing at the moment but to let public opinion
be formed both in America and here through the newspapers. I was
certain this opinion would be favorable and I was also sure that if
the British Government were precipitate in their approval, it would
harden French opinion against it. McKenna, who becomes Chancellor
of the Exchequer next month, told me that Keynes actually wrote the
note. He did not know as I did that Heineman also advised as to
its terms.

McKenna feels that Belgium is the deciding factor in the sit-
uation and if Great Britain could win her over, a settlement could
be brought about. It has been suggested that I go to Belgium,
meet the King and see the Cabinet in an informal way and try to
influence them toward reason. I should ostensibly go on a visit
and incidentally do the other work. I have no liking for this
plan for I do not see that anything could be accomplished by me or
anyone else. Belgium is hopelessly tied to France whether or
no, and she must follow French policy as long as France has the
dominating hand in Continental Europe.

McKenna told me that he thought the British settlement
of the debt was unfair to Great Britain and he believes he might
have secured better terms by showing that the United States was

(6)

getting more than she paid out.

Lord Robert Cecil called on Saturday but I was out. He telephoned later and made an engagement for Wednesday the 13th. On Sunday we lunched with Lord and Lady Grey. It is always a joy to be with Grey and to talk with him about public affairs. We discussed principally the German note and he was in entire agreement with the interview I gave to the London Times. He had thought of saying something in the House of Lords but I suggested that it might be best not to question the Government but to let them take their time to consider the note and state their position.

Grey lunched with the Prime Minister Friday, meeting him for the first time I think. He wishes to arrange a dinner for me to meet him, but since I am to see Baldwin on the afternoon of the 13th, this will not be necessary.

After lunch Grey and I walked for nearly an hour in Green Park talking of matters in general.

Before going to the Grey's for lunch we attended service at the Wellington Barracks. Lady Stratford gave us tickets and called by to take us. The military band and drum corps furnished the music and the service impressed one with the ancient customs of the English people. As long as they keep these traditions and customs alive there is not much danger of any such radical upheaval as has happened in Russia or in France during her revolution.

Dr. Steffenson came at five o'clock to enlist my aid in getting the British Government to take over Wrangle (Wrangel) Island which lies about one hundred miles north of Siberia. He