ROOM 5600
30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

June 7, 1957

Dear Henry:

I can't tell you how delighted I
was to get a copy of your book, particularly
with the thoughtful inscription. I am
looking forward with tremendous interest to
reading it.

This book will always bring back
memories of your extraordinary sense of
purpose as evidenced by your willingness to
take on our study when you had the commitment
to write it. I will never know how you were
able to handle both so successfully.

With many thanks and best wishes,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York 20, N. Y.

Room 5600

December 31, 1956

Dear Henry:

Your letter of the twenty-seventh meant a great
deal to me. The thoughts you develop are most interesting
and bring into sharp focus perhaps the most basic factors
essential to the success of our study project.

I have been enjoying over the week end the wonder-
ful book which you sent over, THE MUSES ARE HEARD. Having
been in on the Washington end of this project at two OCB
meetings, it is particularly interesting and delightful from
my point of view.

With many thanks and very best wishes to you both
for the New Year,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

February 24, 1961

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Nelson:

I have given some thought to the question of political
organization in the years ahead. Even though what follows repeats
our conversation in Albany of some weeks ago, I thought it might
be helpful if I summed up my views in a more systematic manner.

In many respects 1964 is far away. It may be that you will
not choose to contest the Presidency at that time, either because
Kennedy is carrying out policies with which you essentially agree or
because any Republican candidate might be simply a sacrificial lamb.

I do not think we can decide now whether you will be per-
forming a service in 1964 by running for the Presidency. My strong
guess is that we may well be in the middle of a crisis in which your
contribution will be desperately needed. If the international situation
deteriorates, your role may well be to offer a constructive alternative
rather than permit the most backward, shortsighted and reactionary
elements to contest the issues and to aggravate our problems.

Where in 1960 you could have sparked a new surge of creativity,
in 1964 you may be the only national leader with the courage and moral
credit to carry out the hard, perhaps even thankless, measures which

credit to carry out the hard, perhaps even thankless, measures which
in 1964 you may be the only national leader with the courage and moral
where in 1960 you could have sparked a new surge of creativity.

elements to contact the issues and to aggravate our problems.
rather than permit the most backward, short-sighted and resolutely
deteriorates, your role may well be to offer a constructive alternative
contribution will be deliberately needed. If the international situation
guess is that we may well be in the middle of a crisis in which your
taking a service in 1964 by running for the Presidency. My strong
I do not think we can decide now whether you will be ber-
because any Republican candidate might be simply a authoritarian
Keaney is carrying out policies with which you essentially agree or
not choose to contest the Presidency at that time, either because

In many respects 1964 is far away. It may be that you will
be helpful if I ammed my views in a more academic manner.
our conversation in Vivaay of some weeks ago. I thought it might
organisation in the years ahead. Even though what follows repeats
I have given some thought to the question of political

Dear Nelson:

New York 10, New York
33 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

February 24, 1961

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller -2- February 24, 1961

will then be required to assure our survival.

Of course, you would prefer for this national disaster to be avoided. But whatever the course of events, you should be in a position where you are not prevented from making your contribution by lack of organization. Indeed, I would argue that the stronger your organization, the longer you can delay making a final decision about the Presidency.

Your difficulties in 1959 were due in large part to a largely unavoidable lack of preparation and planning. As a result, you had only a choice among evils--of either trying to enlist support and making yourself vulnerable to the charge of neglecting New York State, or else of sitting tight and letting the nomination go by default. Although you have been much criticized for the course you finally adopted, it is well to keep in mind that *any* other action would have been subject to different and equally strong criticisms. This situation was unavoidable in 1959. It need not recur in 1963-64 if we act now.

Of course, a great deal depends on the election in 1962 and I will be writing you separately about that. Nevertheless, even success in 1962--which I am taking for granted--will probably not solve all the problems on the national level. At the least, the wise course is to give yourself a maximum number of options. Heretofore, organizational problems have forced you into exposed positions which you were obliged to defend almost alone as soon as they came under attack. It seems to me essential that when you next act on

under attack. It seems to me essential that when you next act on
which you were added to defend almost alone as soon as they came
here, organizational problems have forced you into exposed positions
wise course is to give yourself a maximum number of options. Here-
solve all the problems on the national level. At the least, the
success in 1963--which I am taking for granted--will probably not
and I will be writing you separately upon that. Nevertheless, even
Of course, a great deal depends on the election in 1965
by if we act now.

This situation was unavoidable in 1929. It need not recur in 1963-
would have been subject to different and equally strong criticisms.
timely adopted, it is well to keep in mind that any other action
taken. Although you have been much criticized for the course you
state, or else at sitting tight and letting the nomination go by de-
and making yourself vulnerable to the charge of reflecting New York
you had only a choice among eviда--or either trying to suit itself about
largely unavoidable lack of preparation and blamning. As a result,
your difficulties in 1929 were due in large part to a
the President.

Organization, the longer you can delay making a final decision upon
lack of organization. Indeed, I would argue that the stronger your
position where you are not prevented from making your contribution by
be avoided. But whatever the course of events, you should be in a
Of course, you would prefer for this national disaster to
will then be required to assure our survival.

The Honorary Nelson V. Rockettler -3- February 24, 1967

-3-

February 24, 1961

the national scene you have your reserves ready. When you make
major national pronouncements you should be in a position to have
a nation-wide follow-up and to have allies who bring pressure on
your opponents.

On the national level, it seems to me that you have
essentially two choices:

(1) You can hope that after a sweeping victory in New York State the existing Republican organization and the present personnel will conclude that you are the only realistic hope and support you.

(2) The second course is to develop a group of people loyal to you, dedicated to your principles and prepared to fight for them. This group could be used to bring pressure on the existing organization and in time to change it. At the least this would make the present leadership of the Republican Party more cautious in fighting you.

I would recommend the latter course for the following reasons: I do not think that you can rely on the present Republican leadership for enthusiastic support. They may accept you, but the Hallecks, Dirksens, Bridges, et al, will never feel warmly about you. Many of those who are now making overtures may prove unreliable allies in times of crisis. Avid Nixon supporters who have switched within the space of two months from Nixon to you have proved that they are capable of changing their loyalties very rapidly and without too much regard for principle.

much regard for principle.

cabable of changing their loyalties very rapidly and without too
time. space of two months from Nixon to you have proved that they are
in times of crisis. Valid Nixon authors once who have switched within
many of those who are now making overtures may prove unreliable allies
Halleck's, Dikens', Bridges', et al., will never feel personally about you.
leadership for enthusiastic authors. They may accept you, but the
reasons: I do not think that you can rely on the present Republican
I would recommend the latter course for the following
in fighting you.

make the present leadership of the Republican party more cautious
organization and in time to change it. At the least this would
for them. This group could be used to bring pressure on the existing
leave to you, dedicated to your principles and prepared to fight
(3) The second course is to develop a group of people
authorities.

Nixon will conclude that you are the only realistic node and
York State the existing Republican organization and the present per-
(i) You can hope that after a sweeping victory in New
essentially two choices:

On the national level, it seems to me that you have
your obstacles.

a nation-wide follow-up and to have allies who bring pressure on
major national pronouncements you should be in a position to have
the national scene you have your reserves ready. When you make

February 24, 1961

-4-

February 24, 1961

These people can and should be used. Their support should be welcomed. You cannot, however, it seems to me, build your organization or your strategy on them.

The natural recruits for your organization are young people, seeking meaning for their lives; the type of middle-class person now living in suburbs; and indeed all those concerned with national and international affairs. They could be rallied under the banner of creative conservatism or any concept which couples progress and purpose with responsibility.

This organization can then be used to support the regular Republican leadership if it should adhere to your principles. And it can be used as a means of pressure on the existing organization if the Republicans should follow an isolationist, arch-conservative program.

I consider it quite possible that you may have to fight for the nomination in 1964, and if you do, you may have to maneuver the existing leadership into a position where if you are excluded, the nomination may not be worth having. This would give you at least a veto over the platform and indeed over the nominee.

I am not suggesting that this organization be set up immediately or on a formal basis. It does seem to me, however, that it cannot be set up in 1963 unless we do the research as to personnel and lay the groundwork as to issues this year.

This is the most relaxed year you are likely to have over

This is the most relaxed year you are likely to have over
and lay the groundwork as to issues this year.

cannot be set up in 1963 unless we do the research as to personnel
adequately or on a formal basis. It does seem to me, however, that it
is not suggesting that this organization be set up immediately.

a veto over the platform and indeed over the agenda.

the nomination may not be worth having. This would give you at least
the existing leadership into a position where it you are excluded,
for the nomination in 1964, and it you do, you may have to maneuver
I consider it quite possible that you may have to fight
program.

it the Republicans should follow an isolationist, anti-conservative
it can be used as a means of pressure on the existing organization
Republican leadership if it should adhere to your principles. And
this organization can then be used to support the regular

party with reasonability.

creative conservatism or any concept which completes progress and but-
internationalstry. They could be raffled under the banner of
living in suburbs; and indeed all those concerned with national and
seeking meaning for their lives: the type of middle-class between now

The natural recruitment for your organization are homing people,
action or your strategy on them.

be welcomed. You cannot, however, it seems to me, build your organi-
These people can and should be used. Their suboptimum

The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

February 24, 1961

-5-

February 24, 1961

the next three, strange as this statement may appear to you. In
1962 you will be in the middle of the State campaign. In 1963 you
will be at the focus of national affairs, whatever your ultimate
decision. We should therefore use this year to make a census on
a nation-wide basis of the groups and individuals who might serve as
the nucleus for your organization.

We should take all the preparatory steps now, so that we
can move quickly whenever you give the word. To this end, responsi-
bility should be assigned to a member of your staff to make a national
survey to identify the following groups:

(a) Individuals with whom you should be in constant contact.
This group of necessity will be small. It includes such people as
Luce, Cowles, Hobby, Percy.

(b) Individuals with whom you make the initial contact
but for whom the follow-up is assigned to a member of your staff or
to someone in the ECC group. This group can be somewhat larger than
(a).

(c) Individuals whom we ought to get to know and who ought
to be familiarized with your thinking but whom you need not see
personally.

(d) A group of people who are in key positions but to whom
for various reasons no approach need be made for the next two years,
but whom we should keep in mind for 1963.

After the initial assignment of responsibility has been
made, a procedure should be established both for the original contact

-6-

February 24, 1961

and the follow-up. For example, with respect to the first group--
those with whom you will stay in touch directly--a master chart,
approved by you, would be kept by Happy. This would indicate the
recommended frequency of meeting. If, for example, Harry Luce has not
been seen for two or three months Happy would automatically arrange
a meeting or at least a telephone call.

Adaptations of this procedure would be followed in each of
the other categories. As for the group which is not to be approached
until later, we would simply identify key people and decide the order
and method of contacting them.

I know much of this is schematic. However, the difference
between success and failure is often a question of nuance. If the
assignment of responsibility I am recommending is made, we would have
a concept for future organization. And you could have confidence that
no improvisation will be necessary.

At the same time, organization is not enough. Without doctrine
or concepts or beliefs, it becomes sterile, indeed inhuman--witness
Dewey's efforts. Even more important than structure is to elaborate a
basic philosophy. The framework for this can perhaps be found in the
Godkin lectures. I will, in any case, deal with this question separately.

With warm regards.

May 3, 1961

Dear Nelson:

It was very good to see you and I deeply appreciated
all the kindnesses you showed me. I am particularly happy that
we had an opportunity to agree on the role you might play over
the next few months, as I had no doubt we would do once we had
a chance to talk.

Needless to say, I will do whatever is necessary to
help you. I am enclosing some notes on Communist strategy of
which a copy of also going to Hugh Morrow and I will be sending
him additional material over the next few weeks.

Before my departure for Europe, I would like to put before you
some thoughts about what we discussed for your consideration. I
think some declaration from you about the gravity of our situation,
the nature of our challenge and the need to speak frankly to the
people would be a major national service. If the Administration under-
stands its problems and has the courage to face them, it could draw
from this declaration the strength to do what is necessary. If

from this declaration the strength to do what is necessary. It stands its problems and passes the courage to face them, it could draw people would be a major national service. If the Administration under-the nature of our challenge and the need to abase Frankly to the think some declaration from you about the gravity of our situation, some thoughts about what we discussed for your consideration. I

Before my departure for Europe, I would like to but before you him additional material over the next few weeks.

which a copy of also going to Hugh Morrow and I will be sending
you. I am enclosing some notes on Communist strategy of
Needless to say, I will do whatever is necessary to
a chance to talk.

the next few months, as I had no doubt we would do once we had
we had an opportunity to agree on the role you might play over
all the kindnesses you showed me. I am particularly happy that
It was very good to see you and I deeply appreciated

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
23 West 23rd Street

Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler

May 3, 1961

-2-

May 3, 1961

the Administration fails in this task, you can then rally the
American people yourself.

In thinking about what you might say, it has occurred
to me that your original instinct was the correct one. A speech
should not be a criticism of what has been done in terms of speci-
fic policies, but rather an analysis of the overall situation. Its
theme should be that a democratic country cannot survive if its
leaders are not willing to confront the people with the tasks that
have to be performed. The implication should be that this has
been our national weakness for a long time.

You would be calling for not so much a change in this or
that policy, but for a new attitude. The statement would be
a serious admonition to both parties, though perhaps not stated
in quite that form. It then could be illustrated by some of the
examples we discussed, dealing with the question of survival, in-
cluding the role of nuclear weapons, the question of morality and
foreign policy, and concluding with an appeal of the general purposes
we should strive to realize.

I think the description should be very specific. I also
believe you should avoid getting into a position where you are
debating specific remedies with the governmental bureaucracy. We
do not lack good ideas but conceptions and criteria for choosing
among them and for establishing priorities. It is to this level that
your speech should be addressed.

among them and for establishing priorities. It is to this level that
we should strive to realize.

foreign policy, and concluding with an appeal to the General Assembly
including the role of nuclear weapons, the duration of war and
examples we discussed, dealing with the question of survival, in-
cluding that form. It then could be illustrated by some of the
a serious admission to both battles, though perhaps not stated
that policy, put for a new attitude. The statement would be

you would be calling for not so much a change in this or
been our national weakness for a long time.

have to be bettered. The implication should be that this has
leaders are not willing to confront the people with the tasks that
these should be that a democratic country cannot survive if its
tie policies, put rather an analysis of the overall situation. Its
should not be a criticism of what has been done in terms of speci-
to me that your original instinct was the correct one. A speech
In thinking about what you might say, it has occurred
American people themselves.

-3-

May 2, 1961

-3-

May 3, 1961

I do not believe your speech ought to be an opening salvo
for a long series of statements on the model of last year. At this
stage, your most useful role is to serve as the conscience of the
nation. You may be too humble to claim this--but the times are too
serious for us not to face this fact. This does not require you
to have a prescription for every conceivable policy problem. Indeed,
to attempt to offer that kind of advice may reduce your moral in-
fluence.

If you make too many statements you may again find your-
self in the position of last June, where the substance of your state-
ments were submerged in a lot of extraneous considerations. Your
basic posture should be that of a national leader who would prefer
at the moment to devote himself to state problems, but who will
speak out from time to time on matters of grave import. I would
therefore think that no more than one major speech on foreign policy
(in addition to the one we are discussing) should be planned before
the Godkin Lectures.

As for the timing of this particular speech, I think it
might be kept flexible until we can see a little more clearly what
interm tional developments will be over the next two weeks. I would
not exclude waiting until the Governors' Conference. I am reasonably
sure that you should not speak about nuclear weapons at the Governors'
Conference. You have done so at two previous meetings and you could
not say anything very much different at this point.

["not say anything very much different at this point.", "Conference. You have done so at two previous meetings and you could\nsure that you should not break apart unless someone at the Governor's\nnot exclude sitting until the Governor's Conference. I am reasonably\ninternational developments will be over the next two weeks. I would\nmight be kept flexible until we can see a little more clearly what", "As for the timing of this particular speech, I think it", "the Geckin Lectures.", "(In addition to the one we are discussing) should be planned before\nto be done before that no more than one major speech on foreign policy\nshould be out from time to time on matters of grave import. I would\nat the moment to devote myself to state problems, but who will\nbe at the moment to devote himself to state problems, but who will\nbe at the moment to devote

May 3, 1961

Henry V. Kietinger

With warm personal regards and all best wishes.

Europe.

I will call you office as soon as I return from

NOTES ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY

The Statement of the conference of 81 Communist Parties held in Moscow last November and Khrushchev's Report on that conference on January 6, 1961 constitute together a statement of the basic Communist theoretical-political line for the next immediate period. Every indication is that the November meeting was in effect the second Congress of the new form the Communist International has assumed (the first was held in 1957); that the Statement of the 81 Parties is equivalent to the Resolutions adopted by the seven Congresses of the Communist International; and that Khrushchev's Report is equivalent in political weight and authoritativeness to the major Reports of these Congresses. Therefore, this Report must be taken in the context of the major Communist documents of the last ten years: the main Reports to the 20th and 21st Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the material of the meeting of the international Communist Parties in Moscow in 1957.

Communist documents cannot be considered as *ad hoc* reactions to current situations, but only as the continuing development of a major medium-term line—established for "the period"—in the light of the particular development of events. Interpretations of the recent Statement and Report which regard them as primarily reactions to possible Sino-Soviet strains, or to changes in the immediate technological-military situation, or to inner conflicts in the Kremlin, inevitably miss the point as that point is understood by the Communists for whose guidance the documents are issued and as they are understood as guides to action by the ruling circles of the Communist world.

ments are issued and as they are understood as guides to action by the
as that point is understood by the Communists for whose guidance the doc-
lication, or to inner conflicts in the Kremlin, inevitably arise the point
Sino-Soviet strains, or to change in the immediate technological-military
ment and Report which regard them as primarily reactions to possible
particular development of events. Interprettations of the recent State-
medium-term line—applied for a time—“in the light of the
current situation, put only as the continuing development of a major
Communist documents cannot be considered as ad hoc reactions to
of the international Communist Parties in Moscow in 1927.

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the material of the meeting
the last ten years: the main Reports to the 20th and 21st Congresses of
Report must be taken in the context of the major Communist documents of
ritualiness to the major Reports of these Congresses. Therefore, this
and that Khrushchev's Report is admissible in political weight and autho-
cions adopted by the seven Congresses of the Communist International;
1927); that the statement of the 81 Parties is admissible to the Reasin-
new form the Communist International has assumed (the first was held in
is that the November meeting was in effect the second Congress of the
retical-political line for the next immediate period. Every indication
narily of 1961 constitute together a statement of the basic Communist theo-
Moscow last November and Khrushchev's Report on that conference on Jan-


The statement of the conference of 81 Communist Parties held in

NOTES ON COMMUNIST STRATEGY

- 2

## Communist Strategy

From 1917 until approximately the end of World War II, the continuing Communist strategical position was founded upon a strategic estimate of the situation summed up in the phrase "capitalist encirclement of the socialist world." They considered themselves the smaller segment of the world, the less powerful segment of the world, totally surrounded by those whom they wished to conquer. On the basis of that estimate, the determining strategy was a **defensive strategy**: to consolidate forces and strengthen the position of Communism, and to work by every means of subversion, conspiracy and diplomacy to secure the material base (the Soviet Union . . . the doctrine of "socialism in one country") from which to move forward.

The years since World War II have constituted, from the Communist point of view, a new strategical period, a period of **offensive strategy**. It is not possible to date the origin of this new strategy too closely. Essentially it begins with the moment that the victory of World War II was assured. The major outlines of the new strategical estimate and the offensive strategy based upon it were contained in Stalin's last major work, **Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR**, written shortly before his death. With the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, what had been developing in the Communist consciousness was crystallized—sharply and clearly stated—as the guiding analysis for the period ahead:

> "The second phase has begun, the phase of socialist encirclement, the period in which the power of Communism is moving forward ever faster, in which those who resist are in retreat and on the defensive. This is the phase of strategic attack, of the strategic offensive."

offensive." This is the phase of strategic attack of the strategic
war, in which those who resist are in retreat and on the detem-
ning the period in which the power of Communism is moving forward ever
"The second phase has begun," the phase of socialist encroachment,
period ahead;

tallied—sharply and clearly stated—as the guiding analysis for the
Union, what had been developing in the Communist consciousness was cry-
out his death. With the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet
work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U2S*, written shortly before
offensive strategy passed upon it were contained in Stalin's last major
was announced. The major outlines of the new strategic estimate and the
Essentially it begins with the moment that the victory of World War II
It is not possible to date the origin of this new strategy too closely.
point of view, a new strategical period, a period of *offensive strategy*.
The years since World War II have constituted, from the Communist
move forward.

Union . . . the doctrine of "socialism in one country") from which to
eration, conspiracy and diplomacy to secure the material base (the Soviet
atlength the position of Communism, and to work p& every means of and-
mining strategy was a *defensive strategy*: to consolidate forces and
whom they wished to condure. On the basis of that estimate, the deter-
world? the less powerful segment of the world, totally surrounded by those
socialist world." They considered themselves the smaller segment of the
the situation assumed up in the phase "capitalist encroachment of the
Communist strategical position was founded upon a strategic estimate of
From 1945 until approximately the end of World War II, the continuing
*Communist Strategy*

[A]

- 3 -

- 3

The Communists have, in their view, entered the final phase of the struggle for world domination.

## Communist Tactics

While Communist tactics and methods of action vary from day to day and from hour to hour, depending upon the immediate situation, the fundamental direction of their tactics is always derived from their strategy.

During the first strategic phase, the phase of "capitalist encirclement" and of the **strategic defensive**, Communists relied primarily on **offensive tactics**—like a boxer who senses that his opponent is stronger and attempts to hold him off with jabs and footwork, to keep him off balance as much as possible. During this period the tone, the attitude, the public directives, the very mode of existence of Communism was primarily offensive. Their stance bristled with constant emphasis upon the irreconcilability of Communism with Western society.

As they have moved over to the **strategic offensive**, however, the tactical emphasis has reversed. In this period the **strategic offensive** demands **defensive tactics**, and for a very good reason. There is only one development that in the Communist view can interfere with the continuing forward march of Communism: the consolidation in the West (which means primarily in the United States) of an understanding of the totality of the Communist threat; the consolidation in the West of a force dedicated to the destruction of Communism; the emergence in the West of a will which places the defeat of Communism as decisive. The mode of their advance in this period of their strategic offensive demands that we sleep.

Therefore, the **defensive tactics** (pointed up from time to time with

Therefore, the <u>defensive tactics</u> (pointed up from time to time with
of their strategic offensive demands that we sleep).

defeat of Communism as decisive. The mode of their advance in this period
of Communism: the emergence in the West of a will which places the
course; the consolidation in the West of a force dedicated to the defense-
in the United States) of an understanding of the totality of the Communist
march of Communism: the consolidation in the West (which means primarily
ment that in the Communist view can interfere with the continuing forward
defensive tactics, and for a very good reason. There is only one develop-
mental emphasize has reversed. In this period the strategic offensive demands
As they have moved over to the strategic offensive, however, the tact-
Communism with Western society.

Their stancepracticed with constant emphasis upon the irreconcilability of
directives, the very mode of existence of Communism was primarily offensive.
as much as possible. During this period the tone, the attitude, the public
attempts to hold him off with jabs and footwork, to keep him off balance
defensive tactics—like a poker who senses that his opponent is stronger and
ment, and of the strategic defences, Communists relied primarily on of-
During the first strategic phase, the phase of "capitalist encirc-
mental direction of their tactics is always derived from their strategy.
and from him to him, depending upon the immediate situation, the funds-
While Communist tactics and methods of action vary from day to day to day

Communist tactics

for world domination.

The Communist phase, in their view, entered the final phase of the struggle

- 3 -

- 4

threats and blackmail and *demarches* which they feel will not be seriously
resisted) are dictated as modes of immobilizing and disarming us. The
fundamental concept of these tactics is the *concept of coexistence*, a con-
cept which is central to all operations of the Communist movement today,
to be achieved by every possible method—by propaganda, by diplomacy, by
cultural exchange, by infiltration, and above all by influencing opinion
in the West so that our clarity of vision and our will to resist will be
paralyzed. The tactic of coexistence is an absolutely necessary corollary
of the strategy of "socialist encirclement."

It is in the light of this strategical and tactical general line that
the Statement of the 81 Parties and the Khrushchev Report can be understood
for what it is. This was not an emergency meeting called because of some
intensification of the struggle between Russian and Chinese Communists. It
was the second full Congress of the new Communist International, and it
reaffirmed and carried forward the general line of world Communism as devel-
oped over the past decade.

It is true that certain differences of emphasis undoubtedly existed
between Khrushchev's position and the "left" tendencies represented not
only by the Chinese Party but by elements throughout the Communist Parties,
including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is equally true,
although less attention has been paid to it, that differences existed be-
tween Khrushchev's position and "revisionist" positions, for which Tito
was made the whipping boy, but which would not have received the attention
they did were they not reflected in more "legitimate" circles. But those
disagreements were resolved and absorbed into the main line of the Statement,

disagreements were resolved and apart from into the main line of the Statement, they did not reflect the more "deliberate" circles. But those was made the whipping stick but which would not have received the attention tween Khrushchev's position and "revisitation" positions, for which Tito although less attention was paid to it, that differences existed pe-
including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is equally true,
only by the Chinese party put by elements throughout the Communist parties,
between Khrushchev's position and the "left" tendency represented not
It is true that certain differences of emphasis undoubtedly existed
obey over the beat decade.

restored and carried toward the General line of world Communism as de-
was the second full Congress of the new Communist International, and it
intensification of the struggle between Khrushchev and Chinese Communists. It
for what it is. This was not an emergency meeting called because of some
the statement of the 81 parties and the Khrushchev Report can be understood
It is in the light of this strategic and tactical General line that
of the strategy of "socialist encirclement."

balsált. The tactic of coexistence is an especially necessary corollary
in the West so that our clarity of vision and our will to resist will be
enlighten exchange, p. infiltration, and above all p. influencing opinion
to be achieved p. every possible method—p. propaganda, p. propaganda, p.
coût which is central to all operations of the Communist movement today,
undamental concept of these tactics is the concept of coexistence, a con-
tratated) are dictated as modes of immobilizing and disarming us. The
critics and blackmail and demarcates which they feel will not be seriously

-4

- 5

Khrushchev's line, on the basis of reaffirmation of the policy of strategic offensive, tactical offensive.

The first, the doctrine of the strategic offensive, is contained in the analysis of "the balance of forces" in the world and the continued vaunting of Communist superiority; in the sharply stated aggressive position on Berlin and Germany; in the aggressive statement of policy for Cuba and Latin America; and in the assertion of a profound contrast between "local wars" and "wars of national liberation."

The second, the doctrine of defensive tactics, is contained in the placing of coexistence, the prevention of general war, and disarmament as the major line of the Communist movement.

It is made perfectly clear that the errors of the "revisionist Right" consist in the transformation of tactical doctrine into strategical doctrine, namely dependence on "coexistence" and "peaceful transformation" to bring about automatically victory for Communism; it is made equally clear that the errors of the "left" consist in the failure to understand that the tactic of coexistence is vital to success in a strategically offensive phase, and therefore to put dangerously aggressive tactics, which run the risk of awakening the West, in the place of the necessary masking tactics of coexistence and disarmament.

The concrete program which embodied the resolution of the different emphases (not a "compromise" of them, as it has been called) is expressed in four major points: (a) to further the widest possible movement throughout the world for "coexistence" and Western disarmament; (b) to threaten to transform any local war carried out by the West in its own defense into a general war (a new tactic—Communist "deterrence"); (c) to proclaim

["a General war (a new tactic—Communist "decernence"); (c) to transform\nthe world for \"coexistence\" and Western disunment; (d) to threaten\nin tomorrow points: (a) to further the widest possible movement through\nemphasize (not a \"combustion\" of them, as it has been called) is expressed\nThe concrete program which embodied the resolution of the different\nof coexistence and disunment.", "Risk of awakening the West, in the face of the necessarily making tactics\nbureaus, and therefore to put generally aggressive tactics, which run the\ntactic of coexistence is vital to success in a strategically offensive\nthe errors of the \"left\" couple in the failure to understand that the\napost automatically victory for Communism; it is made adroitly clear that\nnaturally dependence on \"coexistence\" and \"positive transformation\" to print\ncouple in the transformation of tactical doctrine into strategical doctrine.\nIt is made perfectly clear that the errors of the \"reversalist right\"\nthe major line of the Communist movement.", "The second, the doctrine of defensive tactics, is contained in the\n\"local war\" and \"war of national liberation.\"", "and Latin America; and in the assertion of a broadened contrast between\ntion on Berlin and Germany; in the aggressive statement of policy for Cops\nassuming of Communist anberrity; in the sharply stated aggressive posi-\ntive analysis of \"the balance of forces\" in the world and the continued\nThe first, the doctrine of the strategic offensive, is contained in\nthe offensive, tactical offensive.", "Kurkdaghavan's line, on the part of reorganization of the policy of attrac-", "- 2 -"]

- 6

all-out support for all "wars of national liberation," that is, for
aggressive local wars against the West; (d) to consolidate the balance
of power in the Eurasian continent and decisively disrupt the Western
alliance by carrying out under the umbrella of coexistence a determined
campaign for the capture of Berlin and the neutralization of West Germany.

On the basis of the theoretical analysis of the strategical and
tactical situation and by the promulgation of a practical program based on
that analysis, a unified policy for the international Communist movement
was hewn out; the ideological authority of Nikita Khrushchev as the leader
of international Communism in all respects was confirmed; and a clearly
directed if flexible program for the immediate future was laid down. That
program, which is being carried out before our eyes, can be translated
succinctly into: press the Communist advance in Asia, Africa, the Middle
East and Latin America through "national revolutionary" movements and drive
towards the neutralization first of Germany, then of Europe, while divert-
ing the attention of the West--above all, of the United States--by a
world-wide campaign for "coexistence" and disarmament.

["world-wide campaign for coexistence and disarmament.\n\ning the attention of the West—above all, of the United States—by a\ntook the neutralization first of Germany, then of Europe, while divert-\ning the German and Latin America through \"national revolutionarily\" movements and drive\nanxiety into: press the Communist advance in Java, Africa, the Middle\nProgram, which is being carried out before our eyes, can be translated\ndirected to flexible programs for the immediate future was laid down. That\nof international Communism in all respects was confirmed; and a clearly\nwas done out; the ideological authority of Nikita Khrushchev as the leader\nthat analysis, a unified policy for the international Communist movement\ntactical situation and by the broomuplication of a practical program based on\nOn the basis of the theoretical analysis of the strategic and\n\ncampaign for the capture of Berlin and the neutralization of West Germany.\n\nalliance by carrying out under the umbrella of coexistence a determined\nof power in the European continent and decisively disrupt the Western\n\nunrelenting local war against the West; (q) to consolidate the balance\n\nall-out and apart for all "wars of national liberation," that is, for\n\n- 2 -", "[D]"]

June 1, 1961

Dear Nelson:

I have gone over Hugh Morrow's draft for the Governors'
Conference. I think it is a very sensitive summary of our discussion.
However, on further reflection, I have come to the conclusion that
it may be best to focus your talk on this occasion more specifi-
cally on a subject germaine to the Governor's Conference. I think
it would be unfortunate, however good the talk, if your opponents
could charge you with seeking the limelight and using the Conference
merely as an excuse for publicity.

For this reason, I believe that the best course would
be as follows:

(1) To keep the first third of the speech, dealing with
Communist strategy.

(2) To make a transition to the problem of civil defense
and nuclear weapons. The theme of this part could be that no matter
how repugnant the theme of nuclear war is, we must keep in mind two
considerations: (a) that nuclear weapons have maintained the freedom

considerations: (a) that nuclear weapons have maintained the freedom
now rebrungent the theme of nuclear war is, we must keep in mind two
and nuclear weapons. The theme of this part could be that no matter
(b) To make a transition to the problem of civil defense
Communist exactly.

(1) To keep the first third of the speech, dealing with
be as follows:

For this reason, I believe that the best course would
merely as an excuse for hypocrisies.

It could charge you with seeking the limelight and using the Conference
it would be unmerciful, however good the talk, it your opponents
clearly on a subject germs to the Government Conference. I think
it may be best to focus your talk on this occasion more specifically.

However, on further reflection, I have come to the conclusion that
Conference. I think it is a very sensitive summary of our discussion.

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
33 West 32nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller

June 1, 1961

-2-

June 1, 1961

of the world until now; (b) that with nuclear weapons in the
arsenals of the major powers, it is the duty of all public
officials to do as much as they can to assure the safety of
the populations in their charge.

This would lead into a discussion of your views on
civil defense and your motive for pressing for it. You could
then also point out that the great problem of the West is
a peace which preserves our values. We can also have peace by
surrendering, of course. In order to preserve our values,
however, we may have to face a seeming paradox. We must do
everything we honorably can to avoid war. At the same time,
we must not stigmatize nuclear weapons to the point where we
create the conditions for Communist nuclear blackmail.

You could then reserve a full-dress discussion of
the problem of leadership in a democracy with special reference
to foreign policy for the Godkin Lectures.

I will send you an outline of these thoughts early
next week.

With warm regards and all good wishes.

XXXXXXXXX

July 25, 1961

Dear Nelson:

As you know, I have been conducting a program for leaders from all over the world at Harvard each summer called the Harvard International Seminar. So many of our participants have indicated an interest in knowing something about you that I am writing on the off-chance that you might be willing to stop here for a few hours on the way to or from Maine to meet informally with them. Although the afternoons of Monday, August 14th or Thursday, August 17th would be good for us, our schedule can be arranged to suit you on any day that is convenient.

To refresh your memory, let me give you a little of the background of the Seminar. It originated in 1951 in the belief that existing exchange programs failed to provide an opportunity for the group of individuals who were on the verge of reaching positions of leadership in their own countries and many of whom were too active to leave their countries for extended periods of time. In the most crucial period of their development, these people find themselves so overwhelmed by the pressures of day-to-day concerns that they hardly have the opportunity to gain perspective with respect to the purpose of these activities.

Moreover, international tensions and the confusion connected with new-found independence have led to a situation in which, though communication

-2-

July 25, 1961

has never been easier technically, the ablest and most active people have become more and more isolated from colleagues in other countries. The result, as you know only too well, has been either extreme nationalism or a sterile incantation of ideological stereotypes.

With this in mind, we have been inviting thirty-five participants from twenty-five countries to spend about seven weeks at Harvard during the summer. These include a number of editors, legislators, government officials, labor leaders, writers, academicians, and artists. I am enclosing a list of participants in this year's seminar.

If you found it possible to stop here, it would not be necessary to give a formal talk; quite the contrary. Fifteen or twenty minutes of informal comments on any subject of your choice--perhaps your New York State program--and then thirty to forty minutes of questions and answers would be the most desirable arrangement. There is never any press coverage, and we have never had any publicity of any sort.

I am very eager for the Seminar participants to know you, not only for whatever you may say to them, but also so that they can meet a great American in whom I know they would feel strong human confidence.

On the other hand, having urged you very often not to overload yourself, I would more than understand if you found it impossible to come. Indeed, the only circumstance under which I could justify this imposition on your schedule would be if you were going to Maine and were to stop here on your way up or down.

July 25, 1961

Dear Nelson:

knew independence have led to a extraction in which, though communication
Moreover, international tensions and the competition connected with new-
to gain her perspective with respect to the purpose of these activities.
breaches of qah-to-qay concerns that they hardly have the opportunity
their development, these people find themselves so overwhelmed by the
countries for extended periods of time. In the most crucial period of
their own countries and many of whom were too active to leave their
countries who were on the verge of resuming positions of leadership in
change programs tailed to provide an opportunity for the growth of individual
of the Seminar. It originated in 1921 in the belief that existing ex-
To retire your memory, let me give you a little of the background
arranged to suit you on any qah that is convenient.

14th or Thursday, August 14th would be good for us, our schedule can be
met informally with them. Although the afternoons of Monday, August
be willing to stop here for a few hours on the way to or from Maine to
something about you that I am writing on the off-chance that you might
Seminar. So many of our participants have indicated an interest in knowing
over the world at Harvard each summer called the Harvard International
As you know, I have been conducting a program for leaders from all

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
32 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

July 22, 1967

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockfeller

-2-

July 25, 1961

With this in mind, we have been inviting thirty-five participants from twenty-five countries to spend about seven weeks at Harvard during the summer. These include a number of editors, legislators, government officials, labor leaders, writers, academicians, and artists. I am enclosing a list of participants in this year's Seminar.

7 August 1961

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Foreign affairs research program

Rod Perkins and I met together recently and agreed on a
program for the conduct of foreign affairs research.

Under my over-all guidance a foreign affairs research
program is being carried out by June Goldthwait and two researchers
working under her direction, Ann Garfield and Pamela Abel.

The research section will prepare for your information
bi-monthly summaries on the following subjects:

Defense Berlin Latin America
Civil defense NATO Iran
Foreign aid Arms control South Viet-Nam

The summaries will outline the policies and actions of
the Kennedy administration on these issues, Republican and Democratic
Congressional views, and editorial comment or statements by influen-
tial groups or persons. Each summary will have two parts, a cover-
ing one- or two-page memorandum containing the highlights of the
paper, and the more detailed discussion of the paper itself.

If there are critical situations, such as Berlin, or ques-
tions on which you may wish to be particularly closely informed,
summaries will be sent to you more often.

I will keep in touch with this research work, and anything
sent to you will have been seen and approved by me.

Topics for Analyses

Agriculture

Arms Control

Civil Defense

Civil Rights

Congressional Procedures (i.e. rules)

Defense: Organization, Military Programs and Budget

Depressed Areas

Education

Foreign Economic Policies (including trade and tariff policy, foreign aid /Military Assistance/ balance of payments and common markets)

General Economic Policies (including Budget, taxation, economic growth, recession management, inflation)

Government Organization (non-defense)

Health

Housing and Metropolitan Areas

Labor

NATO

Natural Resources

Social Security and Welfare (including Medical Care to the Aged)

Transportation

Western Hemisphere

Iran

South Viet Nam

August 14, 1961

Dear Nelson:

I am sure you are being deluged with invitations for your stay at Harvard during the Godkin Lectures and I certainly do not want to add to your burden. However, I wanted you to know that Anne and I would be delighted if you would consider our home as a refuge while you are here. We would love to have you for a meal, or to meet some people after one of the lectures, or to meet some of the local faculty on some topic in which you are particularly interested. Or perhaps you would just like to escape for a little while. I have just built a study over my garage which is away from everything.

The main point I want to make is that we are completely at your disposal. Happy as Anne and I would be to have you, however, we would fully understand if your schedule did not permit it.

Every good wish.

August 15, 1961

Dear Nelson:

This is in reply to your letter of July 31st about
Ellis Johnson's proposal. I think well of the idea of a
non-profit research organization dealing with questions of
national policy. In a sense this is what you tried to do
with the Special Studies Project on an ad hoc basis and it is
one of the needs of our society. My concern is that the State
Department, in its present demoralized state and with its present
personnel, does not seem to me an ideal sponsoring agency. Also,
the limiting condition on creative thought these days is not
another research organization, but the availability of first class
personnel. Finally, I do not believe the operations research
techniques are the best tools for the solution of problems out-
side the strategy field.

On the other hand, I have had occasion to talk with
Dana Creel about my concern with the sloppiness of thinking in the
social sciences on questions of national policy. There is something
to be accomplished, perhaps not too different from what the Rocke-
feller Foundation did in the medical sciences before the First World
War. Maybe rather than supporting Ellis Johnson's proposal, the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund should make a study of this particular
problem.

Warm regards.

October 3, 1961

Dear Nelson:

I am being told from all sides about your visit here in February, and just wanted to let you know again that Anne and I would be happy for any time you can spare for us. On the other hand, we would fully understand if your schedule did not permit it. Perhaps we could get together for lunch, or after one of your lectures, or at any other time convenient for you. Of course, our home is open to you if you want a place simply to relax.

I would ask you to speak to one of my seminars, but I think the best thing I can do for you is to remove at least one of the pressures on you during your visit.

With kind regards.

Henry V. Kiebler

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

one of the treasures on your touching your visit.

put I think the best thing I can do for you is to remove at least

I would ask you to ask to one of my seminars,

simply to relax.

for you. Of course, our home is open to you if you want a place
or after one of your lectures, or at any other time convenient
did not permit it. Perhaps we could get together for lunch,
On the other hand, we would fully understand it your schedule
Vonne and I would be happy for any time you can have for us.
Here in February, and just wanted to let you know again that

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
33 West 22nd Street

October 3, 1961

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards as always.

of freedom meaningful.

structure of the free world and measures to make the concept
memorandum we discussed dealing with the problem of the political
By the middle of November I will send you the two
the victim of a situation I had created.

my moral problem has meant to me--all the more so as you were
interval. I want you to know how much your understanding of
It was good to see you yesterday after too long an

Dear Nelson:

New York 13, New York
33 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

CONFIDENTIAL

October 30, 1961

December 19, 1961

Dear Nelson:

I am enclosing the paper about the nature of freedom
which we discussed the other day. It ought to be followed with
a concrete talk on the political conclusions you draw from it.
After that, you might consider turning again to strategic ques-
tions.

I think that in addition to these outlines, it might
be extremely helpful to have a talk which related them to an
overall program for you.

With kind regards and every good wish.

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards as always.

You will be able to accept.

make a constructive speech on the Central European situation, and I hope
I think this would be an excellent opportunity for you to
ceremonies commemorating the East German and East Berlin uprisings.
Concort on Germany and the German Consul General to you to speak at the
I have been asked to support the invitation from the American

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
22 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

April 19, 1965

May 25, 1962

Dear Sims:

Thank you for your letter of April thirtieth, which I am sorry to have been so slow in answering.

Unfortunately, it will not be possible for me to meet with Mrs. Labin, but would like to suggest that she get in touch with Henry Kissinger whom I believe she already knows. I appreciate your bringing Mrs. Labin to my attention, and am only sorry not to be able to see her.

With best wishes,

Mr. Sims McGrath
123 Newbury Street
Boston 16, Massachusetts

LAB: det

CC: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Center for International Affairs
w/photo of incoming letter

SIMS McGRATH
123 Newbury St.
Boston 10 Mass.

April 30, 1962

The Hon. Nelson Rockefeller
State House
Albany
New York

Dear Nelson:

The enclosed letter will explain my purpose in writing to you.

Edouard Labin is an engineer and President of a company called AERO in Paris. Laboratory for Electronics, Inc. has had business relations with him and his company over a period of ten years or so and I think highly of him.

I have not met his wife, Suzanne, and am not familiar with her political activities. Vance Holdam, however, has met her several times and says she is attractive and brilliant. (You may remember that Vance was, with me, one of the founders of LFE.)

I do not know whether or not a meeting with Suzanne Labin would be of interest to you, but pass on the request for what it may be worth. If you are unable or do not wish to meet her and would like me to send Mr. Labin that information, I will be glad to do so. If you are interested in the possibility of a meeting I would think your office could best make arrangements directly with Labin.

With kind regards,

COMITÉ D'INVITATION

AUTRICHE

Oscar HELMER
Ex Minister des Inneren

BELGIQUE

Paul Van ZEELAND
Ancien Président du Conseil

CANADA

Augustin BRASSARD
Member of Parliament

ESPAGNE

Salvador de MADARIAGA
Writer Ex Ambassador of Spanish
Republic.

ÉTATS-UNIS

Thomas J. DODD
Senator for Connecticut Former
Attorney General
at the Nuremberg Trial

Paul DOUGLAS
Senator for Illinois

James O. EASTLAND
Senator for Mississippi Chairman
of Judiciary and interi-
Security Committees.

Christopher EMMETT
Chairman of the American Friends
of Captive Nations

Sydney HERLONG
Representative of Florida

Walter JUDD
Representative of Minnesota
Chairman of the House Committee
of Foreign Relations

Kenneth B. KEATING
Senator of New York

Walter S. ROBERTSON
Ex-Under-Secretary of State

Robert STRAUSZ-HUPE
Director of the Foreign Policy Institute
of the University of Pennsylvania

FRANCE

General BÉTHOUART
Senator, Président de la Conférence
Parlementaire de l'OTAN

Leon BOUTBIEN
Membre du Bureau du Parti Socialiste

Arthur CONTE
Député Ancien Ministre

Paul COSTE-FLORET
Député Ancien Ministre

Maurice FAURE
Député Ancien Ministre Président
de l'Assemblée Parlementaire
Européenne

Suzanne LABIN
Écrivain politique Prix de la Liberté

Cyrille MAKINSKY
Délegué Général de l'Association
France États-Unis

Edmond MICHELET
Ministre de la Justice

Antoine PINAY
Ancien Président du Conseil

Rena PLEVEN
Ancien Président du Conseil

Jacques RAPHAËL-LEYGUES
Député Vice-Président de la
Commission des Affaires Etrangères

Émile ROCHE
Président du Conseil National
Economique

Maurice SCHUMANN
Député Ancien Ministre Président de
la Commission des Affaires Etrangères

Jacqueline THOME-PATENOTRE
Vice-Présidente de l'Assemblée
Nationale

GRANDE-BRETAGNE

Major General W S BEDDALL
Chairman of Fighting Fund for
Freedom.

Lord BIRDWOOD
Member of Royal Institute of
International Affairs.

Sir Tom O'BRIEN
Secretary General of the Union
of Kine and Theatrical Workers

John EPOWSON
Secretary General of the Atlantic
Treaty Association.

Richard GOOLD ADAMS
Writer Chairman of the British
Atlantic Committee.

Mr Sims MAC GRATH
Mac Lead Road
TOPSFIELD (Mass)

Président Rapporteur Général : Suzanne LABIN

Secrétaire Général : Dr. Paul SCHMIERER

3, Rue Thiers, PARIS-16e - Tél. : KLEber 74-09

Paris, April 12,1962

Dear Mr Mac Grath,

Mr Harding, whom I met out of business during one
of his business visits to Paris, after having told me
that you retired from L.F.E., advised me to write you
about the following :

I don't know whether you are aware of the political
activities of my wife Suzanne. The enclosed curriculum
will give you some idea of these. She has risen to
quite a leading figure in the international fight against
Communism. Some personalities, such as your Senator
Thomas Dodd, call her the "Joan of Arc" of that impor-
tant cause.

But her endeavours - which I help with all my
strength in my free time - are terribly difficult and
in spite of many successes ( like the International
Conferences she organised in Paris and in Rome, atten-
ded by 500 persons from 40 countries) we cannot yet
give to the effort a scope which could really match
the tremendous magnitude of the Soviet apparatus.

Now it happens that Suzanne, after a Congress in
Seoul, South Korea, (from May 10 to May 20), will go
to the States where she is invited to make a report to
a Symposium of the "National Freedom Education Center"
in New York. (She will be in New York, Hotel COMMOORE
from June 6 to 20 and in Washington, from June 20 to
30). The problem I come to submit to you is that she
would like very much to have a thorough talk on the
problems of political warfare of the Soviets which is
the true and entirely neglected menace - with Governor
Nelson Rockefeller who is well known to be tough and
clearsighted on this issue.

I am asking you to kindly give us your precious
support, as I know how much yourself are dedicated to
this Cause. Do you think you could manage such an
interview ? It would be very important indeed. I
may assure you that the Governor will not lose his over
loaded time and will be deeply interested. In order,
for you, to better locate and appreciate Suzanne's
action, I am sending you some samples of her work under
separate cover, by surface mail.

Could you please be kind enough to let me know at
your earliest convenience, whether this project seems
feasible.

Thanking you in advance, With best regards,

ITALIE

Sincerely yours
Edouard Labin

RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE ALLEMANDE

Giuseppe BETTIOLI
Député Ancien Ministre
Ivan Matteo LOMARDO
Ancien Ministre Président
de l'Association du Traite Atlantique

Randoitó PACCIAKI
Député Ancien Ministre

Richard JÄGER
Vice-Président du Bundestag.

Prof. Gerhardt MOBUS
Directeur des Etudes Politiques
à l'Ecole de la Bundeswehr.

Prof. Georg STADTMÖLLER
à l'Université de Munich.

PAYE-GE

PERSONAL NOTICE

Suzanne LABIN : Born in Paris, French nationality

Address : 3 rue Thiers, Paris 16 (Phone: KLEber 74-09)

Studies : Master of Science at the University of Paris - Graduate of the "Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales et Internationales " of Paris.

1/ **BOOKS** published :

"STALINE DE TERRIBLE" (STALIN'S RUSSIA)

in French : by Self, Paris 1948, 578 pages

in Spanish : by Huarpes in Buenos-Aires

in English : by Gollancz, preface by Arthur Koestler

in Italian : by Garzanti, Milan

in Portuguese: by A.G.I.R. Rio

in Chinese : Taipei (Formosse)

"DEFENSE OF LA DEMOCRACIA" (THE SECRET OF DEMOCRACY)

in French : Edition de Flore, Paris 1954

in English : Vanguard Press, New York 1956

in English : Collins Edition, London 1957

in Spanish : Editiones Populares Argentinas, Buenos-Aires

"DEFENSA DE LA RAZON Y EL HEDONISMO"

in Spanish : Edition Sudamericana, Buenos-Aires, 1947

"LES ENTRETIENS DE ST-GERMAIN - LIBERTE AUX LIBERTICIDES"

in French : Editions Spartacus - Paris 1957 (3 reeditions)
Rewarded by the **PRIX DE LA LIBERTE 1957**

"LA CONDITION HUMAINE EN CHINE COMMUNISTE" (THE ANTHILL)

in French : Edition de "la Table Ronde", Octobre 1959

in English : Edition Praeger, New York

in English : Edition Colliers, London

"IL EST MOINS CINQ - PROPAGANDE ET INFILTRATION SOVIETIQUES"

in French : Ed. Berger-Levrault, Paris 1960, 120 pages.

"LA FAIT EN CHINE"

in French : Paris, 1961

"VIE OU MORT DU MONDE LIBRE"

in French : La Table Ronde, Paris 1961

2/ **NUMEROUS ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN LEADING REVIEWS & NEWSPAPERS**

in France - Argentina - Belgium - Switzerland - Brazil - U.S.A.
**Africa**

3/ **NUMEROUS LECTURES - BROADCAST & TELEVISION SPEECHES**

in Europe - Asia - America : delivered in French, English & Spanish

4/ **MEMBER OF LITERARY JURIES** : of "Prix de la Liberté" and of "Prix Atlantic" - Member of the "Pen Club"

5/ **In the NEW FRENCH CONSTITUTION** : has originated ARTICLE IV imposing on all political parties, the obligation of having democratic aims and structures (which renders the French Communist Party unconstitutional).

6/ **PRESIDENT & RAPPORTEUR GENERAL** of the **International Conference on the Political Warfare of the Soviets.**

**POLITICAL ORIENTATION** : Member of the **French Socialist Party**
(Guy Mollet tendency)

National

Research and Development

Corporation

15 Sixteenth Street at Peachtree, Atlanta 9, Georgia

TRInity 3-2536

MAY 28, 1962

HONORABLE NELSON ROCKEFELLER
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK
STATE CAPITOL
ALBANY, NEW YORK

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

Original to WLR

Info Photo to WLR

Wm. Snell

Wm. Sjogd

Wm. Douglas

MAY I SAY THAT IT WAS INDEED AN HONOR TO HAVE THE PRIVILEGE OF MEETING AND TALKING WITH YOU AT THE RECEPTION PRIOR TO THE BANQUET IN SEATTLE ON MAY 10.

I HAVE OBSERVED YOUR LEADERSHIP CAPABILITIES VIA MEDIA FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND OUR PERSONAL CHAT FURTHER CONFIRMS MY EXTREME CONFIDENCE IN SAME.

DR. VON BRAUN AND I HAVE BEEN VERY CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS FOR YEARS, AND IN FURTHER CONVERSATIONS AFTER THE BANQUET, WE EARNESTLY CONCURED THAT THE ABSENCE OF YOUR LEADERSHIP ON A NATIONAL LEVEL WOULD BE A GRIEVOUS LOSS TO THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY. I WOULD INDEED CONSIDER IT A PRIVILEGE AND A SERVICE TO MY COUNTRY TO BE OF ANY ASSISTANCE POSSIBLE, IN THE NEAR OR DISTANT FUTURE, IN EFFECTING THE NATIONAL UTILIZATION OF YOUR WISDOM AND GUIDANCE.

I BELIEVE A YOUNG MAN BY THE NAME OF VINCENT INTRODUCED DR. VON BRAUN AND ME TO YOU AT THE RECEPTION, AND I UNDERSTAND FURTHER THAT HE PERSONALLY HAS SOME ASSOCIATION WITH THE PROPOSED NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR. INASMUCH AS OUR COMPANY IS INTERESTED IN THE POSSIBILITY OF PLACING AN EXHIBIT AT THE NEW YORK FAIR, I WOULD BE MOST APPRECIATIVE IF YOU WOULD HAVE YOUR SECRETARY FORWARD ME HIS FULL NAME AND ADDRESS SO THAT WE MAY CONTACT HIM REGARDING SAME.

MAY I REITERATE THAT I FOUND OUR CONVERSATIONS IN SEATTLE MOST STIMULATING; AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO THE PLEASURE OF MEETING YOU AGAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE IN ATLANTA, SHOULD YOU FIND THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT OUR STATE, OR IN NEW YORK, SHOULD ONE OF OUR VISITS OCCUR AT A TIME CONVENIENT TO YOUR BUSY SCHEDULE.

WITH WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS, I REMAIN

MOST SINCERELY YOURS,

CARSBIE C. ADAMS, PRESIDENT
NATIONAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT CORPORATION

CCA/MS

June 21, 1962

Dear Nelson:

If Brazilians could vote in our elections, you could save
yourself from campaigning this fall. I want to tell you how exciting
it was for me to find the respect and affection with which you are
held by leading Brazilians of all political views. Walther Moreira
Salles in particular asked me to convey his affection to you.

I found the short-term prospects in Brazil rather discouraging.
What is most frustrating is to reflect how easy it would have been
if only a fraction of your ideas had been followed in the early '50's.

I will call your office within the next few days for an
appointment.

With warm regards as always.

Henry A. Klaasiger

With warm regards as always.

Aboutment.

I will call your office within the next few days for an
it only a fraction of your ideas had been followed in the early '30's.
What is most frustrating is to reflect how easy it would have been

Sales inattentive asked me to convey pie affection to you.
I was for me to find the respect and affection with which you are
yourself from campaigning this fall. I want to tell you how exciting
It Brazilians could vote in our elections, you could save

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
33 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

June 31, 1963

August 3, 1962

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
Governor of the State of New York
Pocantico Hills
Tarrytown, New York

Dear Nelson:

I am enclosing the draft of a statement or speech on nuclear testing. It will of course require a great deal of rewriting and polishing, but it contains the essential idea. Edward Teller has sent you separately a statement on which I worked with him over the weekend. However, I think it is too technical. In fact, I believe that you should avoid all technical discussions, since you will simply be answered by a number of senior scientists on grounds which are not the key issues. I think you are much safer in asserting that you have doubts about the inspection system and letting it go at that.

I have included some of Edward Teller's material in the enclosed draft, but would suggest that you omit all of the material in Paragraphs 16 and 17, except for the first sentence of Paragraph 16.

I have asked the research staff to pull together the concessions we have made since the beginning of the test ban negotiations. Some of this material can of course be added to your statement.

It was good to see you last week. The combination of the traditional and the modern in your home is really enormously impressive. I hope that after all these years of turmoil, you will be able to find some peace there.

Warm regards as always.

STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
GOVERNOR

August 22, 1962

Dear Henry:

Please forgive me for not having written to express my very deep appreciation for all you have done in connection with the statement on testing. Again let me say that it was one of the finest statements on this subject that I have ever seen and I think, despite the fears on many people's parts, it came out extremely well.

It seemed to me that it might be useful to follow up both the Foster letter and the editorial in the Washington Post, which gives a wonderful opportunity to again present forcefully the position which the editorial evaded.

I am deeply grateful to you, and hope to see you soon.

With very best wishes,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

September 25, 1962

The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

Dear Nelson:

I am enclosing a revised version of what you might say on
Cuba, if you are pressed. My strong recommendation is to stay out
of the foreign field until November.

I will not ask for any appointment during the campaign but, of
course, I am at your disposal if you wish to see me.

With every good wish and warm regards,

Enclosure

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Governor

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

1. The situation in Cuba today must be of the greatest concern to all Americans.

2. The day-to-day responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs belongs, of course, to the President. Outsiders should not attempt to suggest tactical expedients. However, it is important that all Americans understand the gravity of the issue raised by the transformation of Cuba into a Communist state maintained by Soviet arms. We owe it to ourselves not to confuse the situation by soothing pronouncements.

3. The establishment of a Communist state and a Communist military base in the Western Hemisphere is a violation of the provision of the Monroe Doctrine to the effect that "the United States will consider . . . any attempt by European powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

4. The Monroe Doctrine did not limit the threat to our safety to the importation of offensive weapons. Rather it defined the extension of a foreign system into the Western Hemisphere as inherently dangerous. It cannot be doubted that Soviet Russia has made such an extension in Cuba.

5. The political danger of the existence of a Communist government propped up by Soviet military support in the Western Hemisphere transcends the purely military danger. It also marks the deterioration of an international position. In 1954 a Communist-dominated government in Guatemala could be overthrown without anyone suggesting Soviet reprisals elsewhere or without serious repercussions in the Western Hemisphere. Today--according to the President--this is no longer the case.

serious rekonstruções in the Western Hemispheres. Today--according to the
overthrow without anyone suggesting Soviet reprisals elsewhere or without
boots on. In 1934 a Communist-dominated government in Guatemala could be
bureaucratically dangerous. It also makes the deterioration of an international
broked up by Soviet military subversion in the Western Hemisphere transmits the
3. The political danger of the existence of a Communist government
beught that Soviet Russia has made such an extension in Cops.

foreign system into the Western Hemisphere as inherently dangerous. It cannot
importation of offensive weapons. Rather it defined the extension of a
4. The Monroe Doctrine did not limit the threat to our safety to the
as dangerous to our peace and safety."

by European powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere
by the effect that "the United States will consider . . . any attempt
decals in the Western Hemisphere is a violation of the provocation of the Monroe
3. The establishment of a Communist state and a Communist military
situation by arming pronouncements.

state maintained by Soviet arms. We owe it to ourselves not to confuse the
the gravity of the issue raised by the transformation of Cops into a Communist
tactical expebients. However, it is important that all Americans understand
pension of course, to the President. Outsiders should not attempt to suggest
3. The day-to-day reasonableness for the conduct of foreign affairs
Americans.

1. The situation in Cops today must be of the greatest concern to all

FROM: Henry V. Klaarner
TO: The Governor

MEMORANDUM

6. The Cuban problem demonstrates above all the deterioration of Western Hemispheric solidarity. Existing inter-American treaties are adequate to deal with the Cuban problem. Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947 provides that:

> If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

7. There has been lacking, however, sufficient solidarity to use these instruments. The United States faces no more urgent a task than to restore the vitality of the Western Hemisphere question. For the peril is not only Communism in a relatively small island in the Caribbean but chaos in the Western Hemisphere.

September 25, 1962

HAK:mrl

December 7, 1962

PERSONAL

Dear Nelson:

It was good as always to have a chance to talk with
you.

I am enclosing a memorandum for your approval outlining
my understanding of the steps you wish me to take in the inter-
national field. After you approve it, I shall work out the
details with Mrs. Boyer.

I am also preparing the memorandum you requested
about the general posture you might adopt over the next two years.

With warm regards.

Henry V. Kipfinger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

apost the General because you might be about the next two years.

I am also grateful the memorandum you requested
details with Mr. Boxer.

national field. After you approve it, I shall work out the
understanding of the state you wish me to take in the future.
I am enclosing a memorandum for your approval outlining
you.

Dear Nelson:

New York 19th, New York
22 West 22nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockettler

FERGUSON

December 3, 1963

T. Mellon and Sons

Mellon Square
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

November 12, 1962

The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

Your victory in New York last week was most impressive, and ever so welcome and I send you my warm congratulations.

The Atlantic Community continues uppermost in my mind and I hope that at some time convenient to you we might be able to discuss it thoroughly and at length.

My advices are that Norstad and the NATO Council have been having most serious problems with the ultimate decisions regarding the nuclear deterrent. If not resolved, these difficulties may break up NATO or seriously impair its effectiveness. The Atlantic Institute has been requested at the highest authority to do a study on the future structure of NATO, with particular attention to control of the strategic deterrent. I leave for Paris on November 30 to attend a Policy Committee meeting of the Atlantic Institute in which the feasibility of undertaking this study as well as others will be determined.

Now that the Trade Expansion Bill has been passed by both Senate and House by surprising majorities and signed into law, Christian Herter, as Chairman, has been authorized by the Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council of the United States to request the Administration and the Department of State to appoint the Special Governmental Commission called for by the Declaration of Paris to begin work on the treaties which may bring into being "an Atlantic Community suitably organized to meet the political, military and economic challenges of this era." I am sure Mr. Herter will be faced with procrastination, divergencies and counter suggestions.

As the vote on the Trade Expansion Bill indicated, I think the American people are far ahead of their political leaders in these matters and are crying for and will follow bold and intelligent leadership in the complex international sphere. What is needed is a clear, strong voice of leadership, which can explain to the people the need for political forms which can begin to produce common policies and common decisions in the Atlantic area. With your clear understanding of the federal principle, I am hopeful this voice may be yours.

AWS:pgm

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

reinforces this belief.

he represents and my knowledge of them

Dr. Pilkauk. I am familiar with the group

worthwhile to debate with a person like

I do not think it is

Dear Nelson:

New York 19, New York
22 West 52nd Street
Governor of the State of New York
The Honorable Nelson V. Rockefeller

December 28, 1962

December 28, 1962

To: Diane Van Wie

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I am returning Dr. Marc
Pilisuk's letter of December 4th to the
Governor with my suggestion for a reply.

Governor with my suggestion for a reply.
Biliank's letter of December 4th to the

I am returning Dr. Marc

From: Henry V. Kieinger
To: Diane Van Wier

December 28, 1963