37th Munich Conference on Security Policy

Horst Teltschik (ed.)

Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Global Challenges in the New Century

February 2-4, 2001

Growing Stronger through Change:
The Outlook for Transatlantic Co-operation in the 21st Century

Transatlantic Relations and European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

Russia's Role in World Politics:

- Global and Regional Security at the Beginning of the 21st Century

- Shaping Common European Security with Russia

- Bilateral Relations with Russia from the Asian Point of View

BERLIN VERLAG
Arno Spitz GmbH

In February 2001, Conference Chairman Dr. h.c. Horst Teltschik invited, for the third time, leading defense and security policy-makers and military experts to attend the 37th International Conference on Security Policy in Munich. More than 250 distinguished participants from 36 countries, including 32 foreign and defense ministers, 60 parliamentarians and, once again, an impressive delegation from both houses of the US Congress, met at this unique international event in Munich.

The Conference on the theme of "Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Global Challenges in the New Century" focused on three main topics:

* The Outlook for Transatlantic Co-operation in the 21st Century, Transatlantic Relations and European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), Russia's Role in World Politics.

The 19 speeches and 11 statements that were made by government members and other high-ranking policy-makers from Europe, North America and Asia are assembled in this publication. They reflect the range of opinions and political trends that emerged during the conference. Thus, the volume provides a realistic picture of the discussion on global security policy at the beginning of the new decade.

ISBN 3-8305-0247-8

John McCain

fundamental to the strategic and moral objectives of the Alliance. I would suggest four principles for US policy toward Russia: realism, reform, reciprocity, and resolve. Our policy must be predicated upon Russian actions. Moscow's motives remain, in many respects, as opaque as during the era of Communist rule. US and European views of Russia should also be shaped by the extent to which it carries out genuine economic and political reform. Economic and political corruption remain pervasive in Russia, and until reforms are implemented, Russia's neighbors cannot be faulted for questioning its intentions. Reciprocity refers to development of a relationship wherein mutual interests are manifested in concrete action. Finally, we should feel no reluctance to stand up to Russian leaders when they challenge our interests and values.

The cohesiveness NATO represents remains a bulwark against the kind of conflict that ravaged Europe throughout its history. But its attributes should not be taken for granted, and its future not assumed. The problems that confront us today require sober reflection on all of our part.

28

Henry Kissinger

I will make a few observations about the Atlantic relationship as I see it. I am in a somewhat complicated position here because I am not in the Congress, and I am also not in the new administration as many old friends of mine whose views I have known and respected and generally shared over a long period. But I speak for myself. Obviously Secretary Rumsfeld speaks for the Administration. So I will keep my remarks on a more general and philosophical level.

I would like to stress one point. Everybody here this morning affirmed the importance of the Atlantic relationship, and everybody agrees that the Atlantic Alliance is central to both sides of the Atlantic. But there have been fundamental and objective changes in the situation: the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the consequent fact that domestic politics have become safer to apply to the exercise of foreign policy, and the emergence of a European identity. These are the objective changes in the overall situation that inevitably are translated into foreign policy.

In terms of the domestic politics of Europe, one can now criticize the United States and appeal to historic doubts about the United States with a greater freedom of maneuver. The danger is not isolationism but a certain indifference towards foreign policy in general. Meantime, in America, we have now had three successive presidential campaigns in which foreign policy was not a significant issue - in fact, was barely discussed. This does not mean that the American public will not support an American president in the exercise of foreign policy, but it does mean that some of the issues that are being discussed here are not general subjects of conversation in the United States.

Now, it seems to me that the fundamental problem that the Atlantic Alliance confronts is this: There is no doubt in the sincerity of everybody who affirms the importance of the Atlantic relationship. But the key question is: Is the Atlantic relationship considered a safety net which puts a floor under risks within which everybody is then free to pursue his own national interest, even at the expense of other allies? Or is it an institution that is jointly attempting to pursue common objectives?

29

Henry Kissinger

In the United States - insofar as foreign policy is even noticed - one cannot fail to note the succession of European leaders who visit Iran or who, on visits to Moscow, are attacking policies which the United States has affirmed as being fundamental policies. I am not saying that European leaders should not criticize American policies, if that is what they feel, but not side by side with Russian leaders, which has become fairly common in recent years. My generation as well as the people now coming into office within the Bush Administration really were brought up believing that the Atlantic Alliance is not just a safety net but a set of common purposes that must find some common expression. Therefore, I would strongly support all the suggestions that have been made this morning about a dialogue that should take place on a number of the issues I will begin to address now.

But I would also emphasize the importance of the spirit within which this dialogue should be conducted. Since I am not connected with any institution, I can say things that can be disavowed freely. But I have the impression when I listen to some of the discussion about the National Missile Defense (NMD) that this dialogue is being approached like a visit to the dentist. It is something extremely disagreeable that has to be done and through which one hopes to stagger with a minimum of damage to one's domestic position. But with that attitude, it will be very difficult to come to a constructive conclusion.

Let me next make a few historical points about missile defense. It is crucial to remember that missile defense has been a policy of every American administration since President Johnson, not just since President Reagan. In fact, President Johnson invented it. President Nixon took it over. And in this connection, a brief history of the ABM treaty may be of some interest because I was responsible in part for the negotiation of it.

President Nixon began by taking over the Johnson ABM proposal which required twelve defense sites around the United States. That passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice President's. But in subsequent appropriations, the twelve sites were reduced to two, at which point the program made no sense any more. President Nixon then decided to freeze the programs of both sides, so that the Soviet Union was not unconstrained. I make this point only so that this treaty is not elevated into some mystic

30

realms of historic strategic profundity but viewed as an acceptance of the necessity that was imposed on us. It was then picked up again by President Reagan, and again by President Clinton - not with great enthusiasm, if I must say, in Clinton's case.

As a program, missile defense was carried out either under domestic pressure, in the case of President Clinton, or by conviction, in the case of others, and it represents at least this important concern: The alternative to it is a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) that would require for basic deterrence the possible annihilation of tens of millions of people as a settled policy of the democracies. It is one thing to devise this in an academic arms control seminar. It is another to ask a President of the United States or, I would say, a Chancellor of Germany or any other democratic leader to commit him to carrying out the destruction of civilized life as his only strategy. Once you accept this principle, there must be an alternative to Mutual Assured Destruction for strategic reasons, for moral reasons and for political reasons because one cannot be credible before one's own population with such a strategy. At that point, one enters the realm of how one can mitigate the danger. Therefore, every President and Secretary of Defense who has addressed the problem has tried to come up with a concept of missile defense.

In this, they have faced an unvarying opposition of people with strong moral views based on three propositions. One - it won't work; two - it will work so well that it will destabilize the situation; and three - a much better system will come along in ten years. Therefore, you are wasting a lot of money. But therefore also you can never proceed with it at any one point in time. And when people say "dialogue," they sometimes are really saying that they mean endless deferral.

Secondly, I would like to differ from the accepted view about the purpose of missile defense. The conventional wisdom says that NMD is not directed against Russia and China and that it is only directed against Iran and North Korea and similar rogue countries. But this immediately raises the questions of how dangerous these countries really are and whether it makes any sense.

I would say, of course, that any system that has a reasonable capability should also have a capability against anybody. China, Russia, India - I do not know wherever the capacity to attack the democracies exists. For

31

Henry Kissinger

example, nobody in America has been more dedicated or remains more dedicated to cooperative relations with China, and for that matter with Russia, too, than I. But I start from the premise that no country can ask us to remain totally vulnerable when one thermonuclear weapon aimed against an American city could destroy millions of people. I do not see how any American president can explain, after such a catastrophe, why he chose inaction when a technology exists to do something. I take very seriously Russian or Chinese concerns that the missile defense, if it develops, should be of a nature that does not aim at giving us a first-strike capability or depriving them of any retaliatory capabilities. But if it can achieve a certain level of defense, which technical people would have to determine, that would prevent accidents, unauthorized launches and rogue countries progress will have been made.

I hope very much that, when the debate about NMD takes place, it will focus on real issues. For example, when people say it will lead to proliferation, what kind of proliferation? Who is going to do the proliferating? Certainly what we call rogue countries, are at the limit of their capabilities already. Russia has more nuclear weapons than it can maintain. So, we are talking about China. And if we are talking about China, it is a problem that can be handled as part of a negotiation regarding stability in East Asia.

I am not here to answer all these questions. My point is that I hope the dialogue that has been urged by everybody this morning will not confine itself to slogans and not try to press us into reassurances that we may all come to regret a few years from now and that asks our country for denials nobody can reasonably expect from us. And I would say it is not unreasonable of the United States, nor would it be unreasonable of Europe or anyone else, to affirm that total vulnerability is not a price one should be asked to pay.

On the Euro force, I sympathize with those Europeans who want to create a European identity. I think it is not healthy for the United States, even though this is not the American intention, to be the only mega power in the world. Hegemony turns every problem into a domestic issue and creates a distorted view of one's capabilities. At the same time, it is worrisome when European identity is defined in such a way that Europe expresses its identity only, or even primarily, by opposing the

32

United States. European identity must leave room for cooperation across the Atlantic. And when I read that a strong partner is good for the United States, with which I agree, then the question is: Will that strengthen the partnership? Then one has to ask, in what way? What does the strong partner do? Will there be more cooperation? Will it be a way to withhold cooperation? Or will it be a way to take autonomous or independent action? And then the question is: Where and with what forces? That is already being discussed, but it raises one other question. It is the question of the mechanism by which the common purposes of Europe and America are to be achieved.

Now, in NATO there is a clear consultative mechanism. But, as between the European Union and the United States, there is a very confused mechanism because Europe is neither a state nor is it a collection of individual countries. So the kind of coherent dialogue that would be needed to make the Euro force work requires the creation of appropriate institutions, which do not now exist. It cannot be based on general assurances that a strong partner automatically creates greater cohesion. It creates greater cohesion only when expressed in appropriate institutions.

I would like to make one final point concerning relations with Russia. There is no doubt that relations with Russia are important, not just for Europeans but also for the United States and that the history of Russia is one of enormous complexity. There are parts of Russian history that are connected with Europe and parts of Russian history that are not. There are parts of Russian history in which the freedom of Europe and, in the Second World War, the freedom of the world, is owed extraordinarily to Russian heroism. But there are also periods in which the stability of Europe was disturbed by Russian expansionism or the Russian definition of its own security. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been considerable changes and achievements within Russia and progress in relations with Russia. But there has also been - and again I want to stress that I speak as an individual - too much of a tendency to treat Russia as if it were a psychiatric problem and not a political problem, as if strenuous reassurance and personal relationships were the key. This applies to certain Americans, and you will know to what Europeans, if any, it refers.

Whenever I see discussions of NATO enlargement and NMD, one is always told that the Russians do not like it. Well, that they are not liking

33

Henry Kissinger

it may also be part of the problem. If one looks at the history of the last
50 years, there are many things that happened that Russia opposed
strenuously, vocally and persistently that led to very constructive nego-
tiations when they were carried out. The creation of NATO and inter-
mediate-range missiles created the basis for negotiations. I have the
sense that NMD and aspects of NATO expansion can also find a frame-
work within which Russia will not only be accommodated but in which
Russia will become a participant in the construction of an international
system.

I do not happen to believe that NATO is the right instrument for making
Russia a partner. I agree with those who think that the OSCE is a much
better instrument for consistent negotiation with Russia. Therefore, I
strongly favor a dialogue with Russia but not a dialogue that is defined
in advance as to whether Russia is pleased with whatever is being done;
rather one in which we try to define what is a reasonable common ob-
jective. With respect to NATO enlargement, I sympathize with Russian
concerns not to have NATO enlargement create a basis for offensive op-
erations against Russia. But structures which provide guarantees to
threatened countries that themselves have no capability of any offensive
action but are deeply worried about their own futures are something that
should be compatible with friendly and close relations with Russia.

And that gets me to a final point. The European Union is composed of
NATO members and of non-NATO members. And NATO includes
countries that are not members of the European Union. When we talk
about expansion, this has to be brought into some relationship with each
other. Is it true - and I believe it is - that the European Union cannot
permit an attack on any of its members without responding? I would
hate to imagine that the European Union would say it is permitted to at-
tack another European Union member without there being a requirement
for defense. For this would mean that the NATO members of the Euro-
pean Union are defending non-NATO members of the European Union.
And at what point, regardless of what Article Five says, can the United
States tolerate the defeat of NATO members who are defending non-
NATO members as the result of an obligation they undertook that is not
part of NATO? So I would say that when we talk about NATO enlarge-
ment - and this is an issue that is never discussed but will require urgent

34

consideration - that is a good place to use the European Force in the de-
fense of non-NATO European members.

I would like to conclude with two or three points. One, this new Ameri-
can administration is composed of people who saw the growth of the
Atlantic Alliance and who are all deeply committed and were actually
part of the unification process here and, therefore, had to face all the
questions that I am mentioning. And they are also bringing in the post-
Vietnam generation of Americans who do not have this experience but
who also do not have the guilt feelings of the Vietnam generation. So
one should look at this new administration not as the visit to the dentist I
mentioned earlier but as a great opportunity. And it is also an obligation
for the United States.

This is not just a lecture to Europeans. We, too, have an obligation to ask ourselves how we participate in constructing an international system that has no permanent enemy and has an emerging Europe bound to be stronger and more self-assertive. So this is the big challenge before us.

35

Henry Kissinger

In terms of the domestic politics of Europe, one can now criticize the United States and appeal
to historic doubts about the United States with a greater freedom of maneuver. The danger is
not isolationism but a certain indifference towards foreign policy in general. Meantime, in
America, we have now had three successive presidential campaigns in which foreign policy
was not a significant issue – in fact, was barely discussed. This does not mean that the
American public will not support an American president in the exercise of foreign policy, but
it does mean that some of the issues that are being discussed here are not general subjects of
conversation in the United States.

In the United States – insofar as foreign policy is even noticed – one cannot fail to note the succession of European leaders who visit Iran or who, on visits to Moscow, are attacking policies which the United States has affirmed as being fundamental policies. I am not saying that European leaders should not criticize American policies, if that is what they feel, but not side by side with Russian leaders, which has become fairly common in recent years. My generation as well as the people now coming into office within the Bush Administration really were brought up believing that the Atlantic Alliance is not just a safety net but a set of common purposes that must find some common expression. Therefore, I would strongly support all the suggestions that have been made this morning about a dialogue that should take place on a number of the issues I will begin to address now.

President Nixon began by taking over the Johnson ABM proposal which required twelve defense sites around the United States. That passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice President's. But in subsequent appropriations, the twelve sites were reduced to two, at which point the program made no sense any more. President Nixon then decided to freeze the programs of both sides, so that the Soviet Union was not unconstrained. I make this point only so that this treaty is not elevated into some mystic realm of historic strategic profundity but viewed as an acceptance of the necessity that was imposed on us. It was then picked up again by President Reagan, and again by President Clinton – not with great enthusiasm, if I must say, in Clinton's case.

As a program, missile defence was carried out either under domestic pressure, in the case of
President Clinton, or by conviction, in the case of others, and it represents at least this
important concern: The alternative to it is a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)
that would require for basic deterrence the possible annihilation of tens of millions of people
as a settled policy of the democracies. It is one thing to devise this in an academic arms
control seminar. It is another to ask a President of the United States or, I would say, a
Chancellor of Germany or any other democratic leader to commit him to carrying out the
destruction of civilized life as his only strategy. Once you accept this principle, there must be
an alternative to Mutual Assured Destruction for strategic reasons, for moral reasons and for
political reasons because one cannot be credible before one's own population with such a
strategy. At that point, one enters the realm of how one can mitigate the danger. Therefore,
every President and Secretary of Defense who has addressed the problem has tried to come up
with a concept of missile defense.

In this, they have faced an unvarying opposition of people with strong moral views based on
three propositions. One - it won't work; two - it will work so well that it will destabilize the
situation; and three - a much better system will come along in ten years. Therefore, you are
wasting a lot of money. But therefore also you can never proceed with it at any one point in
time. And when people say "dialogue, " they sometimes are really saying that they mean
endless deferral.

I would say, of course, that any system that has a reasonable capability should also have a
capability against anybody. China, Russia, India - I do not know wherever the capacity to
attack the democracies exists. For example, nobody in America has been more dedicated or
remains more dedicated to cooperative relations with China, and for that matter with Russia,
too, than I. But I start from the premise that no country can ask us to remain totally vulnerable
when one thermonuclear weapon aimed against an American city could destroy millions of
people. I do not see how any American president can explain, after such a catastrophe, why he

3

On the Euro force, I sympathize with those Europeans who want to create a European identity. I think it is not healthy for the United States, even though this is not the American intention, to be the only mega power in the world. Hegemony turns every problem into a domestic issue and creates a distorted view of one's capabilities. At the same time, it is worrisome when European identity is defined in such a way that Europe expresses its identity only, or even primarily, by opposing the United States. European identity must leave room for cooperation across the Atlantic. And when I read that a strong partner is good for the United States, with which I agree, then the question is: Will that strengthen the partnership? Then one has to ask, in what way? What does the strong partner do? Will there be more cooperation? Will it be a way to withhold cooperation? Or will it be a way to take autonomous or independent action? And then the question is: Where and with what forces? That is already being discussed, but it raises one other question. It is the question of the mechanism by which the common purposes of Europe and America are to be achieved.

4

I would like to make one final point concerning relations with Russia. There is no doubt that relations with Russia are important, not just for Europeans but also for the United States and that the history of Russia is one of enormous complexity. There are parts of Russian history that are connected with Europe and parts of Russian history that are not. There are parts of Russian history in which the freedom of Europe and, in the Second World War, the freedom of the world, is owed extraordinarily to Russian heroism. But there are also periods in which the stability of Europe was disturbed by Russian expansionism or the Russian definition of its own security. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been considerable changes and achievements within Russia and progress in relations with Russia. But there has also been — and again I want to stress that I speak as an individual — too much of a tendency to treat Russia as if it were a psychiatric problem and not a political problem, as if strenuous reassurance and personal relationships were the key. This applies to certain Americans, and you will know to what Europeans, if any, it refers.

Whenever I see discussions of NATO enlargement and NMD, one is always told that the Russians do not like it. Well, that they are not liking it may also be part of the problem. If one looks at the history of the last 50 years, there are many things that happened that Russia opposed strenuously, vocally and persistently that led to very constructive negotiations when they were carried out. The creation of NATO and intermediate-range missiles created the basis for negotiations. I have the sense that NMD and aspects of NATO expansion can also find a framework within which Russia will not only be accommodated but in which Russia will become a participant in the construction of an international system.

5

negotiation with Russia. Therefore, I strongly favor a dialogue with Russia but not a dialogue that is defined in advance as to whether Russia is pleased with whatever is being done; rather one in which we try to define what is a reasonable common objective. With respect to NATO enlargement, I sympathize with Russian concerns not to have NATO enlargement create a basis for offensive operations against Russia. But structures which provide guarantees to threatened countries that themselves have no capability of any offensive action but are deeply worried about their own futures are something that should be compatible with friendly and close relations with Russia.

And that gets me to a final point. The European Union is composed of NATO members and of non-NATO members. And NATO includes countries that are not members of the European Union. When we talk about expansion, this has to be brought into some relationship with each other. Is it true – and I believe it is – that the European Union cannot permit an attack on any of its members without responding? I would hate to imagine that the European Union would say it is permitted to attack another European Union member without there being a requirement for defense. For this would mean that the NATO members of the European Union are defending non-NATO members of the European Union. And at what point, regardless of what Article Five says, can the United States tolerate the defeat of NATO members who are defending non-NATO members as the result of an obligation they undertook that is not part of NATO? So I would say that when we talk about NATO enlargement – and this is an issue that is never discussed but will require urgent consideration – that is a good place to use the European Force in the defense of non-NATO European members.

I would like to conclude with two or three points. One, this new American administration is composed of people who saw the growth of the Atlantic Alliance and who are all deeply committed and were actually part of the unification process here and, therefore, had to face all the questions that I am mentioning. And they are also bringing in the post-Vietnam generation of Americans who do not have this experience but who also do not have the guilt feelings of the Vietnam generation. So one should look at this new administration not as the visit to the dentist I mentioned earlier but as a great opportunity. And it is also an obligation for the United States.

Remarks by Dr. Henry Kissinger
Munich Security Conference

February 3, 2001

It is really exciting to see so many distinguished people who are concerned with these issues assembled in one place. I will make a few observations about the Atlantic relationship as I see it. I am in a somewhat complicated position here because I am not in the Congress, and I am also not in the new administration [Band 2, Ende Seite A]

[Band 2, Anfang Seite B]

...many old friends of mine whose views I have known and respected and generally shared over a long period. But I speak for myself. Obviously Secretary Rumsfeld speaks for the Administration. So I will keep my remarks on a more general and philosophical level. I would like to stress one point. Everybody here this morning affirmed the importance of the Atlantic relationship, and everybody agrees that the Atlantic Alliance is central to both sides of the Atlantic. But there have been fundamental and objective changes in the situation: the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the consequent fact that domestic politics have become safer to apply to the exercise of foreign policy, and the emergence of a European identity. These are the objective changes in the overall situation that inevitably are translated into foreign policy.

Meantime, in America, we have now had three successive presidential campaigns in which foreign policy was not a significant issue -in fact, was barely discussed. This does not mean

Now, it seems to me that the fundamental problem that the Atlantic Alliance confronts
is this: There is no doubt in the sincerity of everybody who affirms the importance of the
Atlantic relationship. But the key question is: Is the Atlantic relationship considered a safety
net which puts a floor under risks within which everybody is then free to pursue his own
national interest, even at the expense of other allies? Or is it an institution that is jointly
attempting to pursue common objectives? In the United States - insofar as foreign policy is
even noticed - one cannot fail to note the succession of European leaders who visit Iran or
who, on visits to Moscow, are attacking policies which the United States has affirmed as
being fundamental policies. I am not saying that European leaders should not criticize
American policies, if that is what they feel, but not side by side with Russian leaders, which
has become fairly common in recent years. My generation as well as the people now coming
into office within the Bush Administration really were brought up believing that the Atlantic
Alliance is not just a safety net but a set of common purposes that must find some common
expression. Therefore, I would strongly support all the suggestions that have been made this
morning about a dialogue that should take place on a number of the issues I will begin to
address now. But I would also emphasize the importance of the spirit within which this
dialogue should be conducted. Since I am not connected with any institution, I can say things
that can be disavowed freely. But I have the impression when I listen to some of the
discussion about the NMD that this dialogue is being approached like a visit to the dentist. It
is something extremely disagreeable that has to be done and through which one hopes to
stagger with a minimum of damage to one's domestic position. But with that attitude, it will
be very difficult to come to a constructive conclusion.

President Nixon began by taking over the Johnson ABM proposal which required
twelve defense sites around the United States. That passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice
President's. But in subsequent appropriations, the twelve sites were reduced to two, at which
point the program made no sense any more. President Nixon then decided to freeze the
programs of both sides, so that the Soviet Union was not unconstrained. I make this point
only so that this treaty is not elevated into some mystic realm of historic strategic profundity
but viewed as an acceptance of the necessity that was imposed on us. It was then picked up
again by President Reagan, and again by President Clinton - not with great enthusiasm, if I
must say, in Clinton's case. As a program, it was carried out either under domestic pressure,
in the case of President Clinton, or by conviction, in the case of others, and it represents at
least this important concern: The alternative to missile defense is a strategy of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) that would require for basic deterrence the possible annihilation
of tens of millions of people as a settled policy of the democracies. It is one thing to devise
this in an academic arms control seminar. It is another to ask a President of the United States
or, I would say, a Chancellor of Germany or any other democratic leader to commit himself
to carrying out the destruction of civilized life as his only strategy. Once you accept this
principle, there must be an alternative to Mutual Assured Destruction for strategic reasons, for
moral reasons and for political reasons because one cannot be credible before one's own
population with such a strategy. At that point, one enters the realm of how one can mitigate

Secondly, I would like to differ from the accepted view about the purpose of missile
defense. The conventional wisdom says that NMD is not directed against Russia and China
and that it is only directed against Iran and North Korea and similar rogue countries. But this
immediately raises the questions of how dangerous these countries really are and whether it
makes any sense. I would say, of course, that any system that has a reasonable capability
should also have a capability against anybody. China, Russia, India - I do not know wherever
the capacity to attack the democracies exists. For example, nobody in America has been more
dedicated or remains more dedicated to cooperative relations with China, and for that matter
with Russia, too, than I. But I start from the premise that no country can ask us to remain
totally vulnerable when one thermonuclear weapon aimed against an American city could
destroy millions of people. I do not see how any American president can explain, after such a
catastrophe, why he chose inaction when a technology exists to do something. I take very
seriously Russian or Chinese concerns that the missile defense, if it develops, should be of a
nature that does not aim at giving us a first-strike capability or depriving them of any
retaliatory capabilities. But if it can achieve a certain level of defense, which technical people
would have to determine, that would prevent accidents, unauthorized launches and rogue

Let me make one or two points on other issues, and then let us have a discussion. On the Euroforce, I sympathize with those Europeans who want to create a European identity. I think it is not healthy for the United States, even though this is not the American intention, to be the only megapower in the world. Hegemony turns every problem into a domestic issue and creates a distorted view of one's capabilities. At the same time, it is worrisome when European identity is defined in such a way that Europe expresses its identity only, or even primarily, by opposing the United States. European identity must leave room for cooperation across the Atlantic. And when I read that a strong partner is good for the United States, with which I agree, then the question is: Will that strengthen the partnership? Then one has to ask, in what way? What does the strong partner do? Will there be more cooperation? Will it be a way to withhold cooperation? Or will it be a way to take autonomous or independent action?

Now, in NATO there is a clear consultative mechanism. But, as between the European Union and the United States, there is a very confused mechanism because Europe is neither a state nor is it a collection of individual countries. So the kind of coherent dialogue that would be needed to make the Euroforce work requires the creation of appropriate institutions, which do not now exist. It cannot be based on general assurances that a strong partner automatically creates greater cohesion. It creates greater cohesion only when expressed in appropriate institutions.

I would like to make one final point concerning relations with Russia. There is no doubt that relations with Russia are important, not just for Europeans but also for the United States and that the history of Russia is one of enormous complexity. There are parts of Russian history that are connected with Europe and parts of Russian history that are not. There are parts of Russian history in which the freedom of Europe and, in the Second World War, the freedom of the world, is owed extraordinarily to Russian heroism. But there are also periods in which the stability of Europe was disturbed by Russian expansionism or the Russian definition of its own security. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been considerable changes and achievements within Russia and progress in relations with Russia. But there has also been – and again I want to stress that I speak as an individual – too much of a tendency to treat Russia as if it were a psychiatric problem and not a political problem, as if strenuous reassurance and personal relationships were the key. This applies to certain Americans, and you will know to what Europeans, if any, it refers. Whenever I see discussions of NATO enlargement and NMD, one is always told that the Russians do not like

it. Well, that they are not liking it may also be part of the problem. If one looks at the history
of the last 50 years, there are many things that happened that Russia opposed strenuously,
vocally and persistently that led to very constructive negotiations when they were carried out.
The creation of NATO and intermediate-range missiles created the basis for negotiations. I
have the sense that NMD and aspects of NATO expansion can also find a framework within
which Russia will not only be accommodated but in which Russia will become a participant in
the construction of an international system. I do not happen to believe that NATO is the right
instrument for making Russia a partner. I agree with those who think that the OSCE is a much
better instrument for consistent negotiation with Russia. Therefore, I strongly favor a dialogue
with Russia but not a dialogue that is defined in advance as to whether Russia is pleased with
whatever is being done; rather one in which we try to define what is a reasonable common
objective. With respect to NATO enlargement, I sympathize with Russian concerns not to
have NATO enlargement create a basis for offensive operations against Russia. But structures
which provide guarantees to threatened countries that themselves have no capability of any
offensive action but are deeply worried about their own futures are something that should be
compatible with friendly and close relations with Russia.

members who are defending non-NATO members as the result of an obligation they
undertook that is not part of NATO? So I would say that when we talk about NATO
enlargement - and this is an issue that is never discussed but will require urgent consideration
- that is a good place to use the European Force in the defense of non-NATO European
members.

I would like to conclude with two or three points. One, this new American
administration is composed of people who saw the growth of the Atlantic Alliance and who
are all deeply committed and were actually part of the unification process here and, therefore,
had to face all the questions that I am mentioning. And they are also bringing in the post-
Vietnam generation of Americans who do not have this experience but who also do not have
the guilt feelings of the Vietnam generation. So one should look at this new administration not
as the visit to the dentist I mentioned earlier but as a great opportunity. And it is also an
obligation for the United States.

This is not just a lecture to Europeans. We, too, have an obligation to ask ourselves
how we participate in constructing an international system that has no permanent enemy and
has an emerging Europe bound to be stronger and more self-assertive. So this is the big
challenge before us. This is why I thank you, Horst, for giving me this opportunity to speak as
an irresponsible individual. Thank you all very much.

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:48

GOLDHAN, NICK

FAX NO. 501 745 0338

T. 02

Rede von Henry Kissinger

... and friend. It is really exciting to see so many distinguished people who are concerned with these issues assembled in one place. I will make a few observations about the Atlantic Relationship as I see it. I am in a somewhat complicated position here, because I am not in the Congress, and I am also not in the new administration [Band 2, Ende Seite A]

[Band 2, Anfang Seite B] ... many old friends of mine whose views I have known and respected and generally shared over a long period. But I speak for myself. Secretary Lansfeld speaks obviously for the Administration. So I will keep my remarks on a more general and philosophical level. I would like to stress one point. Obviously everybody here this morning affirmed the importance of the Atlantic Relationship and everybody agrees that the Atlantic Alliance is central to both sides of the Atlantic. But there have been fundamental objective changes in the situation. The end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the consequent fact that domestic politics have become safer for the exercise of foreign policy. In terms of the objective changes in the situation which inevitably are translated into foreign policy, in terms of the United States and appeal to historic doubts about the United States with a greater freedom of manoeuvre, the danger is not isolationism, but a certain amount of indifference towards foreign policy in general. And we have now had three successive

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:48

GOLDHAHNER

FRA NO. 5017450350

F. 03

presidential campaigns in which foreign policy was not a significant issue and, in fact, was barely discussed. This does not mean that the American public will not support an American president in the exercise of foreign policy, but it does mean that some of the issues that are being discussed here are not general subjects of conversation in the United States.

Now, it seems to me that the fundamental problem that the Atlantic Alliance confronts is this: There is no doubt in the sincerity of everybody who affirms the importance of the Atlantic Relationship, ~~but the question is: Is the Atlantic~~ Relationship considered a safety net which puts a floor under risks within which ~~then everybody is~~ free to pursue his own national interest even at the expense of ~~instituting~~ other allies? Or is it an ~~organisation that is jointly attempting to pursue common~~ objectives? ~~And that is really the key question before us. In the United States – in~~ so far as foreign policy is noticed – one cannot fail to note the succession of ~~unit, sole master~~ European leaders who appear in Iran or in Russia or with Russian leaders ~~are~~ policies which ~~are being~~ attacking policies that the United States has affirmed as fundamental policies. I am not saying that European leaders should not criticise American policies, if that is what they feel, ~~but to do it side by side with Russian leaders, which has become~~ fairly common in recent years, ~~or in Iran or with respect to Iraq or with respect to~~ Cuba, ~~which is something that makes it much harder for the Congress to believe in the~~ positive purposes of an Atlantic Relationship. And people of my generation and ~~as well as~~ of the people who are now coming into office with the Bush Administration really were brought up believing that the Atlantic Alliance is not just a safety net, but

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:49

GOLDHANIMER

FHA NO. 5017450358

T. 04

that the Alliance represents an expression of common purposes that must find
some common expression. Therefore, I would strongly support all the suggestions
that have been made this morning about a dialogue that should take place on a
number of these issues which I will begin to address now. But I would also
emphasize the importance of the spirit within which this dialogue should be
conducted. Since I am not connected with any institution, I can say things that
can be disavowed freely. But I have the impression when I listen to some of the
discussion about the NMD that this dialogue is being approached like a visit to
the dentist. It is something extremely disagreeable that has to be done and
through which one hopes to stagger with a minimum of damage to one's domestic
position. And with that attitude it will be very difficult to come to a constructive
conclusion.

And so let me make a few historical points. The first point to remember is that
missile defence has been a policy of every American administration since
President Johnson, not just since President Reagan. President Johnson invented it.
President Nixon took it over. And in this connection, a brief history of the ABM
treaty may be of some interest, because I was responsible in part for the
negotiation of it. President Nixon began by taking over the Johnson ABM
proposal which required twelve defence sites around the United States. That
passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice President's. And in subsequent
appropriations the twelve sites were reduced to two, at which point the
programme made no sense any more. President Nixon then decided to freeze the

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:49

GOLDHINER

FHA NO. 5017450358

F. 05

programme of both sides, so that the Soviet Union was not unconstrained, since they were building I make this point only so that this treaty is not elevated into a mystic quality of historic strategic profundity has an acceptance of necessity that was imposed on us. It was then picked up again by President Reagan and again by President Clinton, if, I must say, not with great enthusiasm, but in Clinton's case, nevertheless, it was a programme that was carried out either under domestic pressure, in the case of President Clinton or by conviction in the case of others, and represents at least this important concern: The alternative to missile defence is a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction and it would require basic deterrence on the annihilation of tens of millions of people as a settled policy of the democracies. It is one thing to device this in an academic arms controls seminar.

It is another to ask a President of the United States or, I would say, a Chancellor of Germany or any other leader to commit himself to carrying out the destruction of civilized life as his only strategy. Once you accept this principle there must be an alternative to Mutual Assured Destruction for strategic reasons, for moral reasons and for political reasons, because one cannot be credible to one's own population with such a strategy. Then one is in the realm of how one can mitigate the danger. Therefore, every President and Secretary of Defence who has addressed the problem has tried to come up with a concept of missile defence.

Now they have faced an unvarying opposition of people with strong moral views, which is based on three propositions. One - it won't work. Two - it will work so well that it will destabilize the situation. And three - a much better system will

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:50

GOLDHANIMER

RHA NO. 301/430300

R.00

come along in ten years and, therefore, you are wasting a lot of money. But also, at any one point in time, there is a chance that you can never proceed with it. And when people say dialogue they really mean endless verbal conflict. Sometimes are saying they will drag the discussion into that level. The decision to do one has to make is, whether there is any point at which one starts knowing that it will not be perfect.

Secondly, I would like to make a point which is different from the accepted view, that conventional wisdom says, this is not directed against Russia and China, if it is only directed against Iran and North Korea and similar states, then it immediately raises the question of how dangerous are these really are, whether that is true, and does it make any sense. I would say, of course, any system that has a reasonable capability should also have a capability against anybody. China, over the capability to attack the民主力量, events in Russia, India - I do not know where it is coming from. For example, nobody in America has been more dedicated and remains more dedicated to cooperative relations with China, and for that matter, Russia, too, than I. But I start from the premise that no country can ask us to remain totally vulnerable, so that one nuclear arm can destroy five million people. I do not see how an American President and how institutions can survive this when one knows that perhaps one could have done something. Now, other countries have rights too, and should ask us to conduct our deployments of offensive as well as defensive weapons in such a way that they do not threaten the survival of other countries. I take very seriously Russian concerns or Chinese concerns that the missile defence, if it develops, should be of a nature that does not aim at giving us a first

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:51

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 501/450358

P. 08

with those Europeans who want to create a European identity. And I think it is not healthy for the United States, even though this is not American intention, to be the only mega power in the world, because it turns every problem into a domestic issue and creates a distorted view of one's capabilities. At the same time, if we talk about a common destiny, it is worrisome when European identity is defined in such a way that one sometimes thinks Europe expresses its identity only or primarily even by opposing the United States. European identity must be the common denominator of cooperation across the Atlantic. And when I read that a strong partner is good for the United States, with which I agree, then the question is: Will that strengthen the partnership? Then one has to ask in what way? What does the strong partner do? Will there be more cooperation? Or will it be a way to withhold cooperation? Or will it be a way to take autonomous or independent action? And then the question is: Where and with what forces? And that is already being discussed, but it raises one other question. There is the question of the mechanism by which the common purposes of Europe and America are achieved. It has to be achieved.

Now, in NATO there is a clear consultative mechanism. But as between the European Union and the United States there is a very confused mechanism, because Europe is neither a state nor is it a collection of individual countries, so the kind of coherent dialogue that would be needed to make the Euro force work still requires the creation of appropriate institutions, which do not now exist. It cannot be simply put into general assurances that a strong partner automatically creates greater cohesion. It does not automatically create greater cohesion, but in

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:51

GOLDHAMMER

PHX NO. 5617450358

P. 09

I would like to make one final point concerning relations with Russia. There is
absolutely no doubt that relations with Russia are crucial not just for Europeans
but also for the United States, and that the history of Russia is one of enormous
complexity, because there are parts of Russian history that are connected with
Europe and parts of Russian history that are not. There are parts of Russian
history in which the freedom of Europe and in the Second World War the
freedom of the world is owed extraordinarily to Russian heroism. But there are
also periods in which the stability of Europe was disturbed by Russian
expansionism or Russian definition of its own security. Now and the last, since
the end of the Cold War there have been considerable changes and achievements
within Russia and progress in relations with Russia. But there has also been - and
again I speak as an individual, I want to stress - too much of a tendency to treat
Russia as if it were a psychiatric problem and not a political problem, as if
strenuous reassurance and personal relationships were the key. And this applies
to the Americans and you will know to what Europeans, if any. It certainly
applies importantly to certain aspects, especially when I see discussions of NATO
enlargement and NMD, one is always told the Russians do not like it. Well, that
they are not liking it may also be part of the problem. If one looks at the history
of the last 50 years, there are many things that happened that Russia opposed
strenuously, vocally and persistently that led to very constructive negotiations
when they were carried out. The creation of NATO, the intermediate range missiles

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:52

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

created the basis for negotiations. I have the sense that NMD and aspects of NATO expansion can also find a framework within which Russia not only will be accommodated but in which Russia will become a partner in the construction of an international system. I do not happen to believe that NATO is the right instrument for making Russia a partner. I agree with those who think that the OSCE is a much better instrument for consistent negotiation with Russia. And, therefore, I strongly favour a dialogue with Russia, but not a dialogue that is defined in advance as to whether Russia is pleased with whatever is being done, but rather in which we try to define what is a reasonable common objective. With respect to NATO enlargement I sympathize with Russian concerns not to have NATO enlargement create a basis for offensive operations against Russia. But structures which provide guarantees to threatened countries that themselves have no capability of any offensive action, but are deeply worried about their own future, are something that should be compatible with friendly and close relations with Russia.

And that gets me to a final point on this. The European Union is composed of NATO members and of non-NATO members. And NATO includes countries that are not members of the European Union. When we talk about expansion this has to be brought into some relationship with each other. Is it true that, and I believe it is - the European Union cannot permit an attack on any of its members without responding. Well I would hate to imagine that the European Union would say it is permitted to attack a European Union member without a requirement for defence.

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:52

GOLDHAINTER

PHX NO. 5017450358

But this would mean that the NATO members of the European Union are defending non-NATO members of the European Union. And at what point, regardless of what article five says, can the United States tolerate the defeat of NATO members who are defending non-NATO members as the result of an obligation they undertook that is not part of NATO? And so I would say when we talk about NATO enlargement, this is an issue that is never discussed, it will require urgent consideration - that is a good place to use the European Force in the defence of non-NATO European members.

All I am saying is, I would like to conclude with two or three points. One is, this new administration is composed of people who saw the growth of the Atlantic Alliance and who are all deeply committed and we were actually part of the unification process here and, therefore, had to face all the questions that I am mentioning. And they are also bringing in the post-Vietnam generation of Americans who do not have this experience, but also do not have the guilt feelings of the Vietnam generation. So, one should look at this new administration not as an act of war, but as a visit to the dentist, but as a great opportunity. And it is an obligation also for the United States. This is not just a lecture to Europeans. We, too, have an obligation to ask ourselves how we participate in constructing an international system that has no permanent enemy, and has an emerging Europe that is bound to be stronger and more self-assertive. And this is the big challenge before us.

This is why I thank you, Horst, for giving me this opportunity to speak as an all responsible individual. Thank you very much.

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:48

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

P. 02

Rede von Henry Kissinger

... and friend. It is really exciting to see so many distinguished people who are concerned with these issues assembled in one place. I will make a few observations about the Atlantic ~~Relationship~~ as I see it. I am in a somewhat complicated position here, because I am not in the Congress, and I am also not in the new administration [Band 2, Ende Seite A]

[Band 2, Anfang Seite B] ... many old friends of mine whose views I have known and respected and generally shared over a long period. But I speak for myself. Secretary Lansfeld speaks obviously for the Administration. So I will keep my remarks on a more general and philosophical level. I would like to stress one point. Obviously everybody here this morning affirmed the importance of the Atlantic ~~Relationship~~ and everybody agrees that the Atlantic Alliance is central to both sides of the Atlantic. But there have been fundamental objective changes in the situation: The end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the consequent fact that domestic politics have become safer for the exercise of foreign policy expressions, and the emergence of a European identity. These are the overall ~~that~~ to apply to objective changes in the situation which inevitably are translated into foreign policy! Domestic politics in Europe - one can now criticize the United States and appeal to historic doubts about the United States with a greater freedom of manoeuvre - the danger is not isolationism, but a certain amount of indifference towards foreign policy in general. And we have now had three successive

["FEB-18-01 SUN 23:48", "GOLDHAMMER", "FAX NO. 5617450358", "presidential campaigns in which foreign policy was not a significant issue and, in fact, was barely discussed. This does not mean that the American public will not support an American president in the exercise of foreign policy, but it does mean that some of the issues that are being discussed here are not general subjects of conversation in the United States.", "Now, it seems to me that the fundamental problem that the Atlantic Alliance confronts is this: There is no doubt in the sincerity of everybody who affirms the importance of the Atlantic Relationship, but the question is: Is the Atlantic Relationship considered a safety net which puts a floor under risks within which then everybody is free to pursue his own national interest even at the expense of other allies? Or is it an organisation that is jointly attempting to pursue common objectives? And that is really the key question before us. In the United States – in so far as foreign policy is noticed – one cannot fail to note the succession of European leaders who appear in Iran or in Russia or with Russian leaders attacking policies which are being pursued not by the United States but by their allies, and not by the United States themselves, but by the United States as a whole, and not by the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States, each of which has its own policies to pursue, and not by the United States as a whole, but by the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States, but by the individual states of the United States as a whole, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a whole, but by the individual states of the United States as a nation, and not by the individual states of the United States as a nation

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:49

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

that the Alliance represents an expression of common purposes that must find
some common expression. Therefore, I would strongly support all the suggestions
that have been made this morning about a dialogue that should take place on a
number of the issues which I will begin to address now. But I would also
emphasize the importance of the spirit within which this dialogue should be
conducted. Since I am not connected with any institution, I can say things that
can be disavowed freely. But I have the impression when I listen to some of the
discussion about the NMD that this dialogue is being approached like a visit to
the dentist. It is something extremely disagreeable that has to be done and
through which one hopes to stagger with a minimum of damage to one's domestic
position. And with that attitude it will be very difficult to come to a constructive
conclusion.

And so let me make a few historical points. The first point to remember is that
missile defence has been a policy of every American administration since
President Johnson, not just since President Reagan. President Johnson invented it.
President Nixon took it over. And in this connection a brief history of the ABM
treaty may be of some interest, because I was responsible in part for the
negotiation of it. President Nixon began by taking over the Johnson ABM
proposal which required twelve defence sites around the United States. That
passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice President's. And in subsequent
appropriations the twelve sites were reduced to two, at which point the
programme made no sense any more. President Nixon then decided to freeze the

["FEB-18-01 SUN 23:49", "GOLDHAMMER", "FAX NO. 5617450358", "programme of both sides, so that the Soviet Union was not unconstrained, since they were building ... I make this point only so that this treaty is not elevated into a mystic quality of historic strategic profundity, but viewed as an acceptance of necessity that was imposed on us. It was then picked up again by President Reagan and again by President Clinton, if, I must say, not with great enthusiasm, but nevertheless, it has been a programme that was carried out either under domestic pressure, in the case of President Clinton, or by conviction in the case of others, and represents at least this important concern: The alternative to missile defence is a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction and it would require basic deterrence on the annihilation of tens of millions of people as a settled policy of the democracies. It is one thing to devise this in an academic arms controls seminar.", "It is another to ask a President of the United States or, I would say, a Chancellor of Germany or any other leader to commit himself to carrying out the destruction of civilized life as his only strategy. Once you accept this principle there must be an alternative to Mutual Assured Destruction for strategic reasons, for moral reasons and for political reasons, because one cannot be credible to one's own population with such a strategy, then one must be in the realm of how one can mitigate the danger. Therefore, every President and Secretary of Defence who has addressed the problem has tried to come up with a concept of missile defence.", "In this In this In this In this In this

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:50

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FAX NO. 5617450358

P. 06

come along in ten years and, therefore, you are wasting a lot of money. But
also
Therefore, you can never proceed with it. And when people say dialogue they
really ~~that~~
sometimes are saying they will drag the discussion into that level. The decision
one has to make is, whether there is any point at which one starts knowing that it
can will not be perfect.

Secondly, I would like to make a point which is different from the accepted view, and it is The that
which is this: The conventional wisdom says this thing is not directed against
and that
Russia and China, if it is only directed against Iran and North Korea and similar
countries, but this that raises the question of how dangerous are these
really are, whether that
countries and does it make any sense. I would say, of course, any system that has
a reasonable capability should also have a capability against anybody. China,
Russia, India - I do not know where it is coming from. For example nobody in
America has been more dedicated or remains more dedicated to cooperative
relations with China, and for that matter Russia, too, than I. But I start from the
premise that no country can ask us to remain totally vulnerable so that one nuclear
army can exist, or
weapon on an American city could destroy five million people. I do not see how
an American President and how institution can survive this, when one knows
that perhaps one could have done something. Now, other countries have rights too
and should ask us to conduct our deployments of offensive as well as defensive
weap
these
 weapons in such a way that they do not threaten the survival of other countries. I
take very seriously Russian concerns or Chinese concerns that the missile
defence, if it develops, should be of a nature that does not aim at giving us a first

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:50

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

P. 07

strike capability or depriving them of any retaliatory capabilities. But if it can
achieve a certain level of defence, whatever that is, which technical people would
have to determine, it would prevent accidents, unauthorized launches and rogue
countries. And then one would not have to define which rogue countries one is
talking about. And I hope very much that when this discussion takes place, it
will focus on real issues. For example, when people say it will lead to
proliferation, what kind of proliferation? Who is going to do the proliferating?
Certainly what we call rogue countries are at the limit of their capabilities
already. Russia has more nuclear weapons than it can maintain. So, we are
talking about China. And if we are talking about China, it is a problem that can be
handled as part of a general arms control negotiation.

I am not here to answer all these questions. My point is that I hope that the
dialogue that has been urged by everybody this morning - and widely urged by
everybody this morning will not confine itself to slogans and not try to press us into
reassurances that we may all come to regret three, four, five years down the road;
but that we look at what it is that our country has that other countries can
reasonably expect from us. And I would say it is not unreasonable of the United
States nor would it be unreasonable of Europe or anyone else to say that total
vulnerability is not a price one should be asked to pay.

Let me make one or two similar points on other issues and one point about
relations with Russia and then have a discussion. On the Euro force, I sympathize

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:51

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

P. 08

with those Europeans who want to create a European identity. And I think it is not healthy for the United States, even though this is not American intention, to be the only mega power in the world, because it turns every problem into a domestic issue and creates a distorted view of one's capabilities. At the same time, if we talk about a common destiny it is worrisome when European identity is defined in such a way that one sometimes thinks Europe expresses its identity even or primarily by opposing the United States. European identity must permit that cooperation across the Atlantic. And when I read a strong partner is good for the United States, with which I agree, then the question is: Will that strengthen the partnership? Then one has to ask in what way? What does the strong partner do? Will there be more cooperation? Or will it be a way to withhold cooperation? Or will it be a way to take autonomous or independent action? And then the question is: Where and with what forces? And that is already being discussed, but it raises one other question. There is the question of the mechanism by which the common purposes of Europe and America are achieved. It has to be

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:51

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

principle ...

I would like to make one final point concerning relations with Russia. There is absolutely no doubt that relations with Russia are crucial not just for Europeans but also for the United States, and that the history of Russia is one of enormous complexity, because there are parts of Russian history that are connected with Europe and parts of Russian history that are not. There are parts of Russian history in which the freedom of Europe and in the Second World War the freedom of the world is owed extraordinarily to Russian heroism. But there are also periods in which the stability of Europe was disturbed by Russian expansionism or Russian definition of its own security. Now and the last, since the end of the Cold War there have been considerable changes and achievements within Russia and progress in relations with Russia. But there has also been - and again I speak as an individual, I want to stress - too much of a tendency to treat Russia as if it were a psychiatric problem and not a political problem, as if strenuous reassurance and personal relationships were the key. And this applies to the Americans and you will know to what Europeans, if any. It certainly applies importantly to certain aspects, And when I see discussions of NATO enlargement and NMD one is always told the Russians do not like it. Well, that they are not liking it may also be part of the problem. If one looks at the history of the last 50 years, there are many things that happened that Russia opposed strenuously, vocally and persistently that led to very constructive negotiations when they were carried out. The creation of NATO, the intermediate range missiles

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:52

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

created the basis for negotiations. I have the sense that NMD and aspects of NATO expansion can also find a framework within which Russia not only will be accommodated but in which Russia will become a partner in the construction of an international system. I do not happen to believe that NATO is the right instrument to make Russia a partner. I agree with those who think that the OSCE is a much better instrument for consistent negotiation with Russia. And, therefore, I strongly favour a dialogue with Russia, but not a dialogue that is defined in advance as whether Russia is pleased with whatever is being done, but rather in which we try to define what is a reasonable common objective. With respect to NATO enlargement, I sympathize with Russian concerns not to have NATO enlargement create a basis for offensive operations against Russia. But structures which provide guarantees to threatened countries that themselves have no capability of any offensive action, but are deeply worried about their own future, are something that should be compatible with friendly and close relations with Russia.

And that gets me to a final point on this. The European Union is composed of NATO members and of non-NATO members. And NATO includes countries that are not members of the European Union. When we talk about expansion this has to be brought into some relationship with each other. Is it true that – and I believe it is – the European Union cannot permit an attack on any of its members without responding. Well I would hate to imagine that the European Union would say it is permitted to attack a European Union member without a requirement for defence.

FEB-18-01 SUN 23:52

GOLDHAMMER

FAX NO. 5617450358

But this would mean that the NATO members of the European Union are defending non-NATO members of the European Union. And at what point, regardless of what Article 5 says, can the United States tolerate the defeat of NATO members who are defending non-NATO members as the result of an obligation they undertook that is not part of NATO? And so I would say when we talk about NATO enlargement, this is an issue that is never discussed, and will require urgent consideration, that is a good place to use the European Force in the defence of non-NATO European members.

All I am saying is, I would like to conclude with two or three points. One is, this new administration is composed of people who saw the growth of the Atlantic Alliance and who are all deeply committed and we were actually part of the unification process here and, therefore, had to face all the questions that I am mentioning. And they are also bringing in the post-Vietnam generation of Americans who do not have this experience, but who do not have the guilt feelings of the Vietnam generation. So, one should look at this new administration not as an act of war, but as a visit to the dentist, but as a great opportunity. And it is an obligation also for the United States. This is not just a lecture to Europeans. We, too, have an obligation to ask ourselves how we participate in constructing an international system that has no permanent enemy, and that has an emerging Europe that is bound to be stronger and more self-assertive. And this is the big challenge before us.

Rede von Henry Kissinger

[Band 2, Anfang Seite B] ... many old friends of mine whose views I have known and respected and generally shared over a long period. But I speak for myself. Secretary Lansfeld speaks obviously for the Administration. So I will keep my remarks on a more general and philosophical level. I would like to stress one point. Obviously everybody here this morning affirmed the importance of the Atlantic Relationship and everybody agrees that the Atlantic Alliance is central to both sides of the Atlantic. But there have been fundamental objective changes in the situation. The end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the consequent fact that domestic politics have become safer for the exercise of foreign policy expressions, and the emergence of a European identity. These are objective changes in the situation which inevitably are translated into foreign policy. Domestic politics in Europe - one can now criticize the United States and appeal to historic doubts about the United States with a greater freedom of manoeuvre - the danger is not isolationism, but a certain amount of indifference towards foreign policy in general. And we have now had three successive presidential campaigns in which foreign policy was not a significant issue and, in fact, was barely discussed. This does not mean that the American public will not support an American president in the exercise of foreign policy, but it does mean that some of the issues that are being discussed here are not general subjects of conversation in the United States.

Now, it seems to me that the fundamental problem that the Atlantic Alliance confronts is this: There is no doubt in the sincerity of everybody who affirms the importance of the Atlantic Relationship, but the question is: Is the Atlantic Relationship considered a safety net which puts a floor under risks within which then everybody is free to pursue his own national interest even at the expense of other allies? Or is it an organisation that is jointly attempting to pursue common objectives? And that is really the key question before us. In the United States - in so far as foreign policy is noticed - one cannot fail to note the succession of European leaders who appear in Iran or in Russia or with Russian leaders attacking polities that the United States has affirmed as fundamental policies. I am not saying that European leaders should not criticise American policies, if that is what they feel, but to do it side by side with Russian leaders, which has become fairly common in recent years or in Iran or with respect to Iraq or with respect to Cuba is something that makes it much harder for the Congress to believe in the positive purposes of an Atlantic Relationship. And people of my generation and of the people who are now coming into office with the Bush Administration really were brought up in believing that the Atlantic Alliance is not just a safety net, but that the Alliance represents an expression of common purposes that must find some common expression. Therefore, I would strongly support all the suggestions that have been made this morning about a dialogue that should take place on a number of these issues, which I will begin to address now. But I would also emphasize the importance of the spirit within which this dialogue should be conducted. Since I am not connected with any institution, I can say things that can be disavowed freely. But I have the impression when I listen to some of the discussion about the NMD that this dialogue is being approached like a visit to the dentist. It is something extremely disagreeable that has to be done and through which one hopes to stagger with a minimum of damage to one's domestic position. And with that attitude it will be very difficult to come to a constructive conclusion.

And so let me make a few historical points. The first point to remember is that missile defence has been a policy of every American administration since President Johnson, not just since President Reagan. President Johnson invented it. President Nixon took it over. And in this connection a brief history of the ABM treaty may be of some interest, because I was responsible in part for the negotiation of it. President Nixon began by taking over the Johnson ABM proposal which required twelve defence sites around the United States. That passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice President's. And in subsequent appropriations the twelve sites were reduced to two, at which point the programme made no sense any more. President Nixon then decided to freeze the programme of both sides, so that the Soviet Union was not unconstrained, since they were building ... I make this point only so that this treaty is not elevated into a mystic quality of historic strategic profundity. It was an acceptance of necessity that was imposed on us. It was then picked up again by President Reagan and again by President Clinton, if, I must say, not with great enthusiasm, but, nevertheless, it has ... been a programme that was carried out either under domestic pressure in the case of President Clinton or by conviction in the case of others, and represents at least this important concern: The alternative to missile defence is a strategy of mutual assured destruction and it would require basic deterrence on the annihilation of tens of millions of people as a settled policy of democracies. It is one thing to device this in an academic arms controls seminar. It is another to ask a President of the United States or, I would say, a Chancellor of Germany or any other leader to commit himself to carrying out the destruction of civilized life as his only strategy. Once you accept this principle there must be an alternative to mutual assured destruction for strategic reasons, for moral reasons and for political reasons, because one cannot be credible to one's own population with such a strategy. Then one is in the realm of how one can mitigate the danger. Therefore, every President and Secretary of Defence who has

Now they have faced an unvarying opposition of people with strong moral views, which is based on three propositions. One - it won't work Two - it will work so well that it will destabilize the situation. And three - a much better system will come along in ten years and, therefore, you are wasting a lot of money.

Therefore, you can never proceed with it. And when people say dialogue they sometimes are saying they will drag the discussion into that level. The decision one has to make is, whether there is any point at which one starts knowing that it will not be perfect.

Secondly I would like to make a point which is different from the accepted view, which is this: It is conventional wisdom to say this thing is not directed against Russia and China, it is only directed against Iran and North Korea and similar countries, which immediately then raises the question of how dangerous are these countries, and does it make any sense. I would say, of course, any system that has a reasonable capability should also have a capability against anybody. China, Russia, India - I do not know where it is coming from. For example nobody in America has been more dedicated and remains more dedicated to cooperative relations with China, and for that matter Russia, too, than I. But I start from the premise that no country can ask us to remain totally vulnerable, so that one nuclear weapon on an American city could destroy five million people. I do not see how an American President and how institutions can survive this, when one knows that perhaps one could have done something. Now, other countries have a right and should ask us to conduct our deployments of offensive as well as defensive weapons in such a way that they do not threaten the survival of other countries. I take very seriously Russian concerns or Chinese concerns that the missile defence, if it develops, should be of a nature that does not aim at giving us a first strike capability or depriving them of any retaliatory capabilities. But if it can

achieve a certain level of defence, whatever that is, which technical people would
have to determine, it would prevent accidents, unauthorized launches and rogue
countries. And then one would not have to define which rogue countries one is
talking about. And so I hope very much, that when this discussion takes place, it
will focus on real issues. For example, when people say it will lead to
proliferation, what kind of proliferation? Who is going to do the proliferating?
Certainly what we call rogue countries are at the limit of their capabilities
already. Russia has more nuclear weapons than it can maintain. So, we are
talking about China. And if we are talking about China, it is a problem that can be
handled as part of a general arms control negotiation.

I am not here to answer all these questions. My point is that I hope that the
dialogue that has been urged by everybody this morning - and widely urged by
everybody this morning - not confine itself to slogans and not try to press us into
reassurances that we may all come to regret three, four, five years down the road,
but that we look at what it is that a country has that other countries can
reasonably expect from us. And I would say it is not unreasonable of the United
States nor would it be unreasonable of Europe or anyone else to say that total
vulnerability is not a price one should be asked to pay.

Let me make one or two similar points on other issues and one point about
relations with Russia and then have a discussion. On the euro force. I sympathize
with those Europeans who want to create a European identity. And I think it is
not healthy for the United States, even though this is not American intention, to
be the only mega power in the world, because it turns every problem into a
domestic issue and creates a distorted view of one's capabilities. At the same
time, if we talk about a common destiny it is worrisome when European identity
is defined in such a way that one sometimes thinks Europe expresses its identity
only or primarily by opposing the United States. European identity must permit

cooperation across the Atlantic. And when I read: a strong partner is good for the United States, with which I agree, then the question is: will that strengthen the partnership? Then one has to ask in what way? What does the strong partner do? Will there be more cooperation? Or will it be a way to withhold cooperation? Or will it be a way to take autonomous or independent action? And then the question is: where and with what forces? And that is already being discussed, but it raises one other question. There is the question of the mechanism by which the common purposes of Europe and America are achieved.

Now, in Nato there is a clear consultative mechanism. But as between the European Union and the United States there is a very confused mechanism, because Europe is neither a state nor is it a collection of individual countries, so the kind of coherent dialogue that would be needed to make the euro force work still requires the creation of appropriate institutions, which do not now exist. It cannot be simply put into general assurances that a strong partner automatically creates greater cohesion. It does not automatically create greater cohesion, but in principle ...

I would like to make one final point concerning relations with Russia. There is absolutely no doubt that relations with Russia are crucial not just for Europeans but also for the United States, and that the history of Russia is one of enormous complexity, because there are parts of Russian history that are connected with Europe and parts of Russian history that are not. There are parts of Russian history in which the freedom of Europe and in the Second World War the freedom of the world is owed extraordinarily to Russian heroism. But there are also periods in which the stability of Europe was disturbed by Russian expansionism or Russian definition of its own security. Now and the last, since the end of the Cold War there had been considerable changes and achievements within Russia and progress in relations with Russia. But there has also been - and

again I speak as an individual, I want to stress - too much of a tendency to treat
Russia as if it were a psychiatric problem and not a political problem, as if
strenuous reassurance and personal relationships were the key. And this applies
to the Americans and you will know to what Europeans, if any. It certainly
applies importantly to certain aspects. And when I see discussions of Nato
enlargement and NMD one is always told the Russians do not like it. Well, that
they are not liking it may also be part of the problem. If one looks at the history
of the last 50 years, there are many things that happened that Russia opposed
strenuously, vocally and persistently that led to very constructive negotiations
when they were carried out. The creation of Nato, the intermediate range missiles
created the basis for negotiations. I have the sense that NMD and aspects of Nato
expansion can also find a framework within which Russia not only will be
accommodated but in which Russia will become a partner in the construction of
an international system. I do not happen to believe that Nato is the right
instrument to make Russia a partner. I agree with those who think that the OSCE
is a much better instrument for consistent negotiation with Russia. And, therefore,
I strongly favour a dialogue with Russia, but not a dialogue that is defined in
advance as whether Russia is pleased with whatever is being done, but rather in
which we try to define what is a reasonable common objective. With respect to
Nato enlargement I sympathize with Russian concerns not to have Nato
enlargement create a basis for offensive operations against Russia. But structures
which provide guarantees to threatened countries that themselves have no
capability of any offensive action, but are deeply worried about their own future,
I think, are something that should be compatible with friendly and close
relationships with Russia.

And that gets me to a final point on this. The European Union is composed of
Nato members and of non-Nato members. And Nato includes countries that are
not members of the European Union. When we talk about expansion this has to

be brought into some relationship with each other. Is it true that – and I believe it
is – the European Union cannot permit an attack on any of its members without
responding. Well I would hate to imagine that the European Union would say it is
permitted to attack a European Union member without a requirement for defence.
But this would mean that the Nato members of the European Union are
defending non-Nato members of the European Union. And at what point,
regardless of what article five says, can the United States tolerate the defeat of
Nato members who are defending non-Nato members as the result of an
obligation they undertook that is not part of Nato? And so I would say when we
talk about Nato enlargement, this is an issue that is never discussed, that will
require urgent consideration - ... that is a good place to use the European Force in
the defence of non-Nato European members.

All I am saying is, I would like to conclude with two or three points. One is, this
new administration is composed of people who saw the growth of the Atlantic
Alliance and who are all deeply committed and who all were actually part of the
unification process here and, therefore, had to face all the questions that I am
mentioning. And they are also bringing in the post Vietnam generation of
Americans that do not have this experience, but also do not have the guilt feelings
of the Vietnam generation. So, one should look at this new administration not as,
as I said, the visit to the dentist, but as a great opportunity. And it is an obligation
also for the United States. This is not just a lecture to Europeans. We, too, have
an obligation to ask ourselves how we participate in constructing an international
system that has no permanent enemy, that has an emerging Europe that is bound
to be stronger and more self-assertive. And this is the big challenge before us.
This is why I thank you, Horst, for giving me this opportunity to speak as an
irresponsible individual. Thank you very much.