JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN RELATIONS
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 13, 1958

Professor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor:

Ted Sorensen has reported to me on his meeting with you and your willingness to be of help to this office in developing public policy, ideas and legislation of pertinence to your areas of talent and interest. I want to tell you again how grateful I am for your willingness to be of help, and how important I think this cooperative effort could be.

I hope that, from time to time, we will have an opportunity to get together in person to discuss these issues, either in Massachusetts or in Washington, and that, as issues arise, you will get in touch with Ted or myself or be available when we contact you. In addition, however, I like the suggestion which was made that in certain fields it would be well to give some thought now as to what long-range problems and positions ought to be worked out during the next several months. I would appreciate your giving some attention to this during the next few weeks, and letting me know a list of one or more such topics which you feel are most in need of examination and on which you would be willing to work up the material. It seems to me that one such topic of prime importance is going to be the defense budget -- and particularly this question of weapons reevaluation, the deemphasis on intermediate range ballistic missiles and overseas bases, etc.

I would be particularly interested if you thought you could be of assistance in this area.

With every good wish.

JFK:glس

January 30, 1959

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator:

Thank you for your letters
of January 19th and 21st, which I found
upon my return from Europe.

I am planning to attend the
luncheon on February 15th, and will look
forward to meeting you then.

With kind regards.

JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 19, 1959

Henry A. Kissinger, Associate Director
Harvard University Center for
International Affairs
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

This will acknowledge and thank you for your very
kind letter of December 23rd.

A preliminary luncheon meeting was held on January 12th, which at the last minute I was unable to attend because of the rules vote here in the Senate. However, if you would let either me or Ted Sorensen know when you plan to be in Washington again, we will be glad to make arrangements at that time.

Hope your trip to Europe was a pleasant one and with
every good wish, I remain

JFK:hjl

February 13, 1959

Senator John F. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator:

The paper you were good enough to send me is an interesting statement of the deterrence problem with which I am in general agreement. I do have a few comments, some of detail and some connected with the general approach.

Page 2 seems to me to jumble a lot of different things together. I think the only significance of the kind of fuel that is used in missiles is in the reaction time and that is less of a problem for the aggressor than for the defender. The impact on the deterrence question therefore depends on the vulnerability of the defending forces primarily.

Also I have some question in Note 1 about the figure of 20,000 missiles. Such totals do not seem to be very helpful unless they explain the kind of missiles and in any case I doubt seriously that the figure is correct. These however are minor disagreements.

The major point which I take to be that a fleet of Polaris submarines could accomplish our whole deterrent mission seems to me to press a good argument too far. It is true that Polaris submarines are mobile and that they are difficult to detect. On the other hand their range is only a thousand miles and the possible areas from which they can reach the 70 or so targets which are considered essential for 100% deterrence (a concept which I question on other grounds) are finite. If the Soviets wanted to launch a surprise attack against the United States they might concentrate their entire anti-submarine effort in those areas.

I do not maintain that this is a conclusive argument. It does seem to me however that we are not in a position at this moment to place all our eggs in one basket. I would however concur completely with the argument that a fleet of 30 Polaris submarines would add immeasurably to our deterrent posture and represent a very good bet to reduce the missile gap. But to say at this particular time that 3 billion dollars could solve the deterrence problem seems to

Senator John F. Kennedy

2

February 13, 1959

me to play into the hands of the predominant trends which
work in the direction of trying to get more and more security
for less and less effort.

I concur entirely with the arguments about a
nuclear test ban. As now conceived the negotiations at
Geneva seem to me to be a boobytrap with the risks incomen-
surate with the advantages. My own thought of a feasible ban
is to renounce all tests which include fall-out and therefore
conducting our tests either in outer space or underground.
Rather than go into my reasoning here, I am enclosing a reprint
of an article which appeared in the October Foreign Affairs.
My specific proposal is to be found on pages 15 - 17.

May 15, 1959

Mr. Theodore Sorenson
Office of Senator Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sorenson:

Deirdre Henderson has given me the working paper for Senator Kennedy's speech on Germany. Since I think there is less chance of misunderstanding if I write you directly, I am taking the liberty of dropping you this note. As you know, I had talked to Earl Latham at some length; many of the ideas parallel my own. On the other hand, it seems to me that in its present form the document lacks a point of view and some of the points in it do not strike me as particularly helpful.

To begin with, I am not at all sure that this is a particularly propitious time for making a speech on Germany. Much of what is in the outline is in the Western "package;" what is not will seem as criticism in the middle of a deliberate negotiation. It seems to me that the Senator would leave himself open to the charge that he is hampering the conference. It would seem to me much better to talk on European security between the foreign ministers and the summit conference, perhaps on the theme of what stand we should take at the summit.

On substance, my major criticism is the fact that the paper as it stands now contains a great many disparate ideas which do not seem to be adequately related to a central theme. For example, the proposal of an EDC for nuclear weapons -- an idea I approve and in fact urged Earl to include in his paper -- is not really directly related to negotiations on Germany. It is much more germane to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers which is an important topic but one that is worth a separate speech.

As for the rest, I take strong exception to the first page. Is the argument there that we can stand firm only if the Russians are bluffing? Or that if the Russians are not bluffing we cannot take a stand? This cannot be meant.

Mr. Theodore Sorenson

-2-

May 15, 1959

As for the proposal to make all of Berlin a free city, under the particular scheme developed in the paper, the Senator ought to be prepared to answer an enormous range of questions. For example: Where exactly are the Western forces to be stationed? What will happen when the East Germans start bringing pressure on Berlin, creating a general climate of insecurity? What will be the relation of Soviet to Western forces? What for example if Soviet forces move into Berlin one day to "protect its freedom?" After all, Khrushchev told Montgomery rather cynically that if the West was worried about the East Germans, the Russians would be glad to put troops in Berlin to protect Berlin against the East Germans. Moreover, what is meant by UN control? Will the Soviet Union have a veto over any security measures?

I also have some questions about some of the strategic points, but they are reasonably minor. While it is true that we do not require Germany as a missile base, it is not true that for this reason Germany does not need fairly substantial defense forces. I do not exclude however a withdrawal if German unification can be achieved this way.

As for the Rapacki Plan, again I do not believe that it is correct to say that most people in Europe want it. The only people who are passionately in favor of it is the British Labour Party. The German Social Democrats seem to me to be most unconvinced and some of them like Brandt are opposed to it. Above all, I would prefer the tone of such a talk to be much more confident and purposeful and much less tactical.

Altogether, I am of the opinion that this talk at this particular time is not wise either from the political or from the international point of view. I have taken the liberty of writing you so frankly because it seemed to me that this would be of most use to you.

All good wishes.

2.

My major criticism is the fact that the paper *ix* as it stands on substance, now contains a great many disparate ideas which do not seem to be *is* a main point, he adequately related to a central theme, particularly related to any program on Germany. For example, the proposal of an EDC for nuclear weapons -- an idea I approve and in fact urged Earl to include in his paper -- is not really directly related to negotiations on Germany. It is much more germane to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons to other powers which is an important topic but one that is worth a separate speech.

Is the argument there that we can stand firm only if the Russians *will* are bluffing? That is, that if the Russians are not bluffing we cannot take a stand? This cannot be meant.

As for the proposal to make all of Berlin a free city, under the particular *xx* scheme developed in the paper, the Senator ought to be prepared to answer an enormous range of questions, *and* a sample,

3.

Where exactly are the Western forces to be stationed? What will happen when the East Germans start bringing pressure on Berlin *other* than *military* by simply creating a general climate of insecurity? What will be the relation of Soviet to Western forces? What for example if Soviet forces move into Berlin one day to "protect its freedom?" After all, Khrushchev told Montgomery rather cynically that if the Weet was worried about the East Germans, the Russians would be glad to put troops in Berlin to protect Berlin against the East Germans. Moreover, what is meant by UN control? Will the Soviet Union have a veto over any security measures?

As for the proposal to relate free elections to troop withdrawal, I am generally in favor, but I strongly object to the formulation that the troops might interfere with the conduct of elections on the Western side. I do not think it is necessary to lean over quite *xx* this far backward to be fair.

Then I would not link Euratom and the Common Market to the deterrent problem because it seems to me to give fuel for Soviet propaganda.

4

[M]

As for the Rapacki Plan, again I do not believe that it is correct to say that most people in Europe want it. The only people who are passionately in favor of it is the British Labour Party, The German Social Democrats seem to me to be most unconvinced and some of them like Brandt are ~~most~~ opposed to it. Above all, I would prefer the tone of a talk to be given man confident and painful, and must be factual.

Altogether, I am of the opinion that this talk is at this particular time not wise either from the political or from the international point of view. I have taken the liberty of writing you so frankly because it seemed to me that this would be most use to you.

All good wishes.

11/14/60

Dear Senator Kennedy:

Abe Chayes has transmitted a request that I place before you my
views as to possible appointees for the Office of Secretary of State. Before
I do so I would like to sketch the nature of the foreign policy challenge which
your Administration will, in my judgment, face. For it determines to a con-
siderable extent my recommendation for Secretary of State.

I believe that your Administration may well witness some of the most
serious foreign policy crises in the history of the Republic. During this
period the nation will have to pay the bill for the fatuousness of the Eisenhower
period. There will be a crisis over Berlin. Countries like Iran could collapse any
day. The emergence of new nations in Africa will not be completed without new
upheavals. Even with the best efforts, Castroism may spread in Latin America.
Relations with Western Europe have to be placed on a new foundation. A long over-
due adjustment of our China policy will fall into that period. However necessary,
it will bring with it a series of other adjustments in Asia.

Though not all these crises need happen simultaneously. Some can be

11/14/60

avoided by a dynamic and wise United States foreign policy. It is even possible
that by the end of your Administration a dramatic psychological change will
have taken place in America's relations with the rest of the world. But in contrast
to most of my colleagues at Harvard, I believe this to be infinitely more complex than
to apply the maxims of the New Deal on a world scale. In America in the 1930's
the political framework was essentially stable. The danger arose because of
the economic dislocation produced by the depression. Economic and social programs
by removing discontent also permitted the political order to be reinforced with
new vitality. But in major parts of the world economic and social dislocations
are coupled with the absence of any political framework. At issue is not
only the problem of economic progress but the nature of political legitimacy.

In the task of constructing a new set of political relationships--
which is necessary even in our relations with Europe--we are handicapped by the
fact that some of the most constructive actions will be long-term in their
effect. Chaos can be produced rapidly. The achievement of international order
is slow and painful. To get through this period of transition we will not be
able to count on universal approbation. We may have to undertake many lonely

11/14/60

measures.

We therefore require two contradictory qualities: A willingness to chart new roads with the realization that embarking on the unfamiliar is always a lonely endeavor. But we can do so effectively only if we inspire confidence abroad. Those who disagree with our actions must have faith in our purposes. The invocation of peace, justice and human freedom must be more than a public relations slogan.

This superficial and rapid survey may explain why I have come to the conclusion that the most effective Secretary of State would be Adlai Stevenson, particularly if his Undersecretary were someone like David Bruce or Paul Nitze.

I have come to this conclusion reluctantly. For many months I was strongly opposed to any major executive responsibility for Adlai Stevenson despite my admiration for his human and intellectual qualities. Because my *tacit knowledge* recommendation is so qualified and because it differs from the assessment of some of Mr. Stevenson's Cambridge partisans it may be useful to summarize both my objections to Mr. Stevenson and the *tacit knowledge* reason

11/14/60

why I have changed my mind.

a. It seemed to me dangerous to put into high executive office a person who had aspired to the Presidency himself and who still has many backers for that position.

b. I had serious doubts about Mr. Stevenson's views on policy--
particularly with respect to Europe.

c. I had serious doubts not so much about Mr. S<sub>t</sub>evenson's indecisiveness as about his ability to see the alternatives clearly.

Though I retain some of these misgivings, I have changed my mind about
suitability
Mr. Stevenson's indecisiveness for Secretary of State for the following
reasons:

r
a. No Cabinet office/is really in a position to compete with the
President. Appointment of Adlai Stevenson would be a sign of strength.

Moreover, I believe that the searing impact of two defeats and of eight
year in the wilderness will make Mr. Stevenson grateful for this opportunity
and eager to be a supporter of the President, rather than a rival.

b. I believe that the basic policy direction will be supplied by the
President. I would have confidence that the tendencies of Mr. Stevenson

p. I believe that the basic policy direction will be subordinated by the
and eager to be a supporter of the President, rather than a rival.

year in the wilderness will make Mr. Stevenson successful for this opportunity
Moreover, I believe that the bearing impact of two defeats and of eight
President. Appointment of Adair Stevenson would be a sign of strength.

a. No Cabinet office is really in a position to compete with the
x
reasons:

Mr. Stevenson's indecisiveness for Secretary of State for the following
autocracy

Though I retain some of these misgivings, I have changed my mind about
about his ability to see the alternatives clearly.

c. I had serious doubts not so much about Mr. Stevenson's indecisiveness as
particularly with respect to Europe.

p. I had serious doubts about Mr. Stevenson's views on policy--
for that position.

person who had abided to the President himself and who still has many packers
a. It seemed to me dangerous to put into high executive office a
why I have changed my mind.

11/14/80

11/14/60

which worry me would not find support in the White House.

c. In these circumstances, Mr. Stevenson could become extremely useful as a moral symbol both at home and abroad. No other candidate for the post could so effectively rally public opinion in the West should there be a crisis over Berlin. Nobody else could command so much confidence in the underdeveloped regions of the world. The problem of a certain abstractness of mind can be largely neutralized by firm leadership from the White House and by the appointment as Undersecretary of a man with wide experience in the State Department, such as David Bruce or Paul Nitze.

There remains an imponderable which I cannot judge. Ultimately, the Secretary of State must be someone with whom the President can work intimately. Personality factors are crucial in this regard. But my advice would be meaningless in this aspect of the matter.

I would like to take this opportunity to send you my warm wishes for the future.

S.Y.

B.Y.

for the future.

I would like to take this opportunity to send you my warm wishes my advice would be meaningless in this aspect of the matter.

intimately. Personality factors are crucial in this regard. But Secretary of State must be someone with whom the President can work

There remains an imponderable which I cannot judge. Ultimately, the in the State Department, such as David Bruce or Paul Nitze.

House and by the appointment as Undersecretary of a man with wide experience use of mind can be largely neutralized by firm leadership from the White in the underdeveloped regions of the world. The problem of a certain abstract- there be a crisis over Berlin. Nobody else could command so much confidence for the boat could so effectively rally public opinion in the West should useful as a moral symbol both at home and abroad. No other candidate c. In these circumstances, Mr. Stevenson could become extremely which worry me would not find support in the White House.

11/14/60

-2-

February 8, 1961

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
President of the United States
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to tell you how honored I feel to be
invited to join an Administration whose tone, appointments and
actions have impressed me profoundly. I am convinced that in
the field which concerns me most--that of foreign and national
security policy--the next four years will be decisive for the
future of the country and perhaps of the democratic idea. I
would consider it a privilege to be of service in some capacity.

It was most generous of you to suggest a part-time
relationship if other commitments precluded my joining up on
a full-time basis at this time. I do have responsibilities at
Harvard which would make any abrupt departure impossible. And
I would like to give some thought in general to the context in
which I can make the most effective contribution.

I will make a final decision within a week, and will
then be in touch with Mr. Bundy. I would like you to know, however,
that on my part the primary question concerns the mode and not the
fact of my participation.

With all good wishes and kind regards.

DRAFT

It was most generous of you to suggest a part-time relationship if other
commitments precluded my joining up on a full-time basis at this time. I do
have responsibilities at Harvard which would make any abrupt departure impossible.
And I would like to give some thought in general A% to the context in which I can
the
make my most effective contribution.

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President

I would like to tell you how honored I feel to be invited to join
an Administration whose tone, appointments and actions have impressed me deeply.

I am convinced that in the field which concerns me most--that of foreign and
national security policy--the next four years will be decisive for the future
of the country and perhaps of the democratic idea. I would consider it a privi-
lege to be of service in some capacity.

There is also the consideration that some of those who are assisting you in
the important and delicate task you have suggested can perhaps be most effective if
a carefully drawn independent advantage can be used.

~~They can see an independent advantage in this, too.~~

their advice stems from a context different from that of day-to-day operations.

This would also give you the greatest latitude in adjusting responsibilities
in the light of experience.

I would therefore like to give further thought to the question of whether it may
not be wise to begin our association--for an interim period at least--with an
arrangement which permits you and your staff to request advice at regular intervals
and me to offer it when appropriate rather than to define immediately a full-time

d/fall

position.

I will make a final decision within a week, and will be in touch with Mr. Bundy. I would like you to know, however, that on my part the primary question concerns the mode and not the fact of my participation.

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President

There is also the consideration that some of those who are assisting you in
the important and delicate task you have suggested can perhaps be most effective if
their advice stems from a context different from that of day-to-day operations.

I will make a final decision within a week, and will be intouch with Mr.

position.

4/4/77

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to tell you how honored I feel to be invited to
join an Administration whose tone, appointments and actions have impressed
me deeply. I am convinced that in the field which concerns me most--that
of foreign and national security policy--the next four years will be decisive
for the future of the country and perhaps of the democratic idea. I would
consider it a privilege to be of service in some capacity.

It was most generous of you to suggest a part-time relationship
joining up with a
if other commitments precluded my accepting a full-time exact basis at this
time. I do have responsibilities at Harvard which make any abrupt departure
impossible. There is also the consideration that the important and delicate
task you have suggested may not prove most effectively carried out from an
independent vantage point with a perspective different from that of day-to-
day operations. This would also give the greatest latitude to rearranging
responsibilities in the light of experience.

I would therefore like to give further thought to the question of
whether it may not be wise to begin our association--for an interim period
at least--with an arrangement which permits you and your staff to request
advice at regular intervals and me to offer it when appropriate rather than
to define immediately a full-time position. This would also give you a
maximum degree of freedom in rearranging your advisory staff in the light of experience.

DRAFT

Dear Mr. President:

It was most generous of you to suggest a part-time relationship
if other commitments precluded my moving to Washington at this time. I
would like to give further thought to the question whether it may not be
wise on other grounds as well to begin our association -for an interim period
at least--on a basis in which you and your staff would feel free to request
advice at regular intervals and I to offer it when appropriate rather than
to define immediately a full-time position.

With all good wishes and kind regards,

primary question concerns the mode and not the form of my participation.

with Mr. Bandy. I would like you to know, however, that on my part the

I will make a final decision within a week, and will be in touch
to define immediately a full-time position.

advice at regular intervals and I to offer it when appropriate rather than
at least--on a scale in which you and your staff would feel free to request
wise on other subjects as well to begin our association - for an interim period
would like to give further thought to the question whether it may not be
it other commitments preceded my moving to Washington at this time. I

It was most generous of you to suggest a part-time relationship
in some capacity.

the democratic idea. I would consider it a privilege to be of service
besides will be decisive for the future of the country and perhaps of
me most--that of foreign and national security policy--the next four
impressed me deeply. I am convinced that in the field which concerns
to join an Administration whose tone, appointments and actions have

Dear Mr. President:

DRAFT

Dear MR5 President:

It was most generous of you to suggest that a part-time relationship would be
ideal if my other commitments precluded my accepting a full-time position at
Moving to Washington
do not be wiser--for an interim period at least--to begin my association on a basis
in which you and your staff would feel free to request advice at regular intervals
and I to offer it when appropriate rather than to define immediately a full-time
position. (Any advisor always runs the risk of losing perspective.)

I will make a final decision within a week, and will be in touch
with Mr. Bundy. I want you to know, however that on my part the primary question
concerns the mode and not the fact of my participation.

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to tell you how honored I feel to be invited to join an Administration
whose tone, appointments and actions have impressed me deeply.
I am convinced that
in the field which concerns me most--that of foreign and national security policy--
the next four years will be decisive for the future of the country and perhaps of
the democratic idea. I would consider it a privilege to be of service in some capacity.

The decision as to the allocation of my time will depend in part on my commitments at Harvard, in part on some further reflection about how an advisory relationship can prove most useful. It has been my conviction that any advisor faces a delicate problem of not putting himself into a position where he loses perspective to a degree that his advice becomes a justification for his existence and where his management becomes an additional burden to those whose load he is supposed to ease. This determination I will make within a week. I want you to know now, however, that as far as I am concerned the primary question remaining concerns the mode and not the fact of my participation.

cipation.

primary question remaining concerns the mode and not the fact of my part-
way a week. I want you to know now, however, that as far as I am concerned the
whose load he is supposed to bear. This determination I will make within
his existence and where his management becomes an additional burden to those
he loses perspective to a degree that his advice becomes a justification for
vigor faces a delicate problem of not putting himself into a position where
relationship can prove most useful. It has been my conviction that any ad-
ments at Harvard, in part on some further reflection about how an advisory
The decision as to the allocation of my time will depend in part on my commit-
city.

the democratic idea. I would consider it a privilege to be of service in some capa-
t the next four years will be decisive for the future of the country and hence of
in the field which concerns me most--that of foreign and national security policy--
whose tone, appointments and actions have impressed me deeply. I am convinced that
I would like to tell you how honored I feel to be invited to join an Administration

Dear Mr. President,

December 5, 1963

Memo to: The Political Science Section

From: Daniel Lerner

Re: Kennedy Fellowship in Science and Public Policy

Our Section has decided to initiate action leading to the creation of a "Kennedy Fellowship in Science and Public Policy" at M.I.T. This seems to us a singularly appropriate way for MIT to honor the memory of the late President. We wish to initiate this action by making our own substantial contribution to the Fellowship.

If the contribution made by our own Section--along with our colleagues in Economics, Psychology, and CENIS--is large enough to justify this, we shall invite our colleagues in other parts of M.I.T. to make this an Institute-wide action.

Our Section must therefore act rapidly, so that this major decision may be reached before the end of 1963. The reason for quick action is that all contributions are tax-deductible. By making an initial contribution this month (1963), it will be easier for most of us who desire to make an equal contribution anytime after January 1, 1964. In effect, by acting now, we may be able to double the size of our individual--hence our collective--contributions to the Kennedy Fellowship.

Since our people will want to have some idea of what is needed, I have drawn up a scale that suggests the magnitudes involved in this action:

Full Professors $50.00
Associate Professors 40.00
Assistant Professors 30.00
Instructors 20.00
Lecturers 20.00 - 50.00
Staff 2.00 - 10.00
Students 2.00 - 10.00

As Chairman, I feel obliged to state that this scale is very intuitional--hence, probably very far from the real life situation of many individuals. I want no person in this Section to feel compelled to give more than he or she wants to give. This applies particularly to Staff and Students. A person who cannot afford to give anything at all in 1963 or 1964 for this purpose should not feel compelled to do so.

As colleague, I wish to add that no person who wants to contribute more should be constrained by this suggested scale. Those of us who receive consultant fees from government might well consider the feasibility of contributing one such fee entire to the Kennedy Fellowship. My own next fee, in Decem-

Political Science Section

-2-

December 5, 1963

ber of 1963, will be 174.00. I shall contribute this amount
in 1963--and again in 1964--making a total contribution of
$348.00. This personal note is addressed particularly to
the senior members of our Section.

The essential point is that this be a voluntary action
by each of us. Accordingly, all Section contributions should
be handed or mailed to Mrs. Cindy Harkness, our Section Secre-
tary, in Room 14N-208 at M.I.T. On December 18th, I shall
ask her to report to me the total Section contribution (with-
out mentioning any individuals). On this basis, we shall
decide whether to make this an Institute-wide action. I am
sending copies of this memo to other people at M.I.T. and
elsewhere, so that they will know what we are proposing to
do.

I consider it proper that we should permit our own
families and friends to contribute as they wish. We are not
launching a "public appeal". This would require a wholly
different strategy--and, in my judgment, a wholly wrong
perspective at this time. When I speak of "families and
friends", I refer only to those near-and-dear who are
extensions of ourselves and who would want to contribute
to the Kennedy Fellowship if they were given a chance. It
is proper that we give them the chance. I am sending copies
of this memo to seven of my own "families and friends" out
of a sense that it would make them happy to be permitted
to contribute for this purpose.

We are engaged in a new enterprise. Those who have
been educated are contributing their own money to the educa-
tion of future generations. Education is an underpaid pro-
fession in America--but we at M.I.T. have less to complain
about than most of our academic colleagues elsewhere in our
country. Let us, therefore, highly resolve to do the best
we can do in behalf of the "Kennedy Fellowship in Science
and Public Policy at M.I.T."

December 12, 1963

Dear Colleague:

You will be interested to know that the first few days of
our appeal for support for the Kennedy Fellowship in Science and
Public Policy has produced over $1,000 as a result of your con-
tributions. I am now confident that, with good cooperation, we
can create something permanent and valuable.

I want to answer three questions that have been brought
to my attention: (1) this is a one-time contribution in the sense
that you will not be expected to contribute again in the future.
My suggestion that your single contribution be divided into a
1963 half and a 1964 half was intended only to make it easier
for income-tax purposes, to make one large, single contribution;
(2) checks should be made payable to: "M.I.T. (Kennedy Fellow-
ship)"; (3) while we shall have to decide by Christmas whether or
not to make this an Institute wide action, your contributions will
be welcome at any time until further notice.

The correct mailing address is:

Mrs. Cindy Harkness, Secretary
Political Science Section
14N-208
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts (02139)

JOHN F. KENNEDY-INSTITUT FÜR AMERIKASTUDIEN

ABTEILUNG FÜR GESCHICHTE

FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

1 BERLIN 33, LANSSTRASSE 5-9

Ruf: Direktwahl 76 90 24 74

(Universitätszentrale: 76 901)

October 1964

Dear Professor Kinniger,

The German Association of American Studies has devoted its annual meeting in Frankfurt/Main in June, 1964, to the contribution of German and Austrian refugee scholars on American scholarship after 1933. At this meeting papers were presented by Professor Louise W. Holborn on German Scholars in the United States after 1933, by Professor Albert Wellek (Mainz) on contributions in the field of Psychology, by Professor Herbert Marcuse (Brandeis University) on Philosophy and Sociology, and by myself on History and Political Science.

In connection with the topic of this Conference, the Historical Division of the John F. Kennedy-Institute of the Free University is engaged in compiling a bibliography of scholars of German and Austrian origin in the United States in the fields of History and Political Science. According to the framework of the papers presented at the meeting of the German Association of American Studies, this bibliography is limited to those scholars who left Europe in the years 1933 to 1945 under the pressure of Nazism. It is meant to include also that younger generation of scholars who having left Europe due to Nazi pressure, received their university training in the United States.

I should be most grateful to you if you could let us kindly know your scholarly publications (books and/or articles with the exception of book reviews) which have been published in the United States in the period 1933-1963.

This bibliography will be published, together with the papers presented in Frankfurt last June, in the 1965 volume of the *Jahrbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Amerikastudien*.

Thanking you very much for your help, I remain