# The Quemoy Lesson

## I.

The Quemoy affair is not yet over, but each international crisis as it comes along teaches us something about the nature of international politics in our times. It is not the object of this essay to discuss the future of the Quemoy question. Rather it is to examine the Quemoy case to determine what can be inferred from it for the future course of East-West relations.

The reaction in the United States, and in the free world generally, to the policy of the United States government regarding Quemoy must have been very discouraging to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. The policy which they pursued was in their own minds the only honorable and practical course which they could follow. The United States possessed the only military force in the world capable of insuring that the Communist states would encounter resistance if they sought to extend their power and influence by military means. If any Communist state sought to do so, even in an area of no strategic consequence, and the US failed to respond in some kind of effective way to the use of force, the consequences might be disastrous. The Communist powers would be encouraged to use the same methods in other cases; the free world would lose confidence in America's resolution and reliability; America's military power, still superior to that of the Communist states, would have been disarmed as a decisive factor in maintaining international order and the security of smaller states. Moreover, these smaller states - even though some of them were following a policy of non-involvement in the great power contest - were free to adapt such a policy only because the US stood as a counter-weight to Sino-Soviet power and policy.

Despite these very good reasons for the US policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek's regime, a policy clearly enunciated as a refusal to bow before the use of force or the threat of force, the vast majority of the free world's governments and peoples disapproved of US policy and clearly dissociated themselves from it.

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Even in the United States, the direct appeal of the President to the people for popular understanding and support failed to halt the criticism or reduce the unpopularity of the policy. The reaction of the Administration was quite naturally one of hurt annoyance. How could the free world hope to preserve its freedom if it had not the courage and understanding to stand behind a policy of firmness - the only kind of policy which would be effective against a revolutionary force which feeds upon disunity, moral weakness, and intellectual confusion?

The reasons why so many peoples here and abroad disapproved of US policy were, first, that the issue was not posed in their minds with the same clarity and sharpness as in that of the US leadership, and second, that much of the free world generally shrunk from the consequences of US policy - especially if it failed and even if it succeeded. In these respects, the case of Quemoy is not unique; it is merely the latest of a series of situations and crises in which US policy has been similarly, though perhaps not so widely and vociferously, criticized. The same reservations about US policy developed over the US landings in Lebanon, over US support of Turkish pressure on Syria, and over the possibilities of direct US intervention in Indo-China in 1954. On the other hand, the US intervention in Greece and the military guarantees extended to Turkey seven years earlier did not encounter criticism; when the North Koreans invaded South Korea in 1950, virtually the entire free world supported and aided the US intervention. What are the circumstances that distinguish these cases and have led to these different reactions?

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II.

The sharpness with which the issue is presented is not the whole story, but it is part of it. To a very considerable extent the question of how sharply the issue is presented lies within Communist control. In Korea the attack was a sudden, open, and unequivocal use of military force with the obvious purpose of destroying a government which appeared to have considerable popular support and to be making efforts to create a viable democratic state. In Greece, there seemed to be little question about the fact that a small Communist minority was using terrorist methods and outside arms to overthrow a regime which - though not greatly loved or commanding wide positive loyalty - nevertheless had a legitimate constitutional character. In the case of Turkey, the USSR was quite obviously engaging in threats designed to acquire territory and to alter international agreements (i.e., relating to the Dardenelles), which it had little legal or historical right to make. Moreover, in both the cases of Greece and Turkey, the USSR was issuing challenges close to the concerns of the Western European powers.

In recent years the Soviet and Chinese challenges have been issued in much more ambiguous terms, and the US has regarded certain developing situations as challenges to the Western position, even though the role of the Sino-Soviet powers was peripheral or highly elusive. In the case of Indo-China the Communist forces involved were largely indigenous; these Communists, initially at least, were supported by non-Communist nationalists, and the struggle which these combined nationalist-communist forces had for years been carrying on was identified in the minds of many people throughout the world as/fight against an arrogant French colonialism. Thus, while there could be little doubt that the Indochinese Communists were receiving Chinese Communist aid and controlling the rebellion and that a

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Communist victory would pose problems for neighboring areas, it was far from clear that there was in fact an attempt to impose a Communist regime from the outside, that a Communist success would vitally affect the future of the free world, or that open Western military support to the French would fundamentally improve the political situation in the area.

Similarly in the Middle East, the fundamental facts were that a nationalist revolution was in progress, that this revolution inevitably involved emotion-ally-motivated and political action against the former colonial masters, and that the radical Arab nationalists were receiving diplomatic and material support from the USSR. The fact that the radical Arab nationalists were receiving Soviet help has made the situation worse for the West, since it has encouraged the radical nationalists to accelerate and intensify their claims to speak for all the Arab peoples and has also made them vulnerable to Soviet pressures and responsive to Soviet interests. What the radical Arab nationalists have been doing coincides with Soviet interests of the moment. Nevertheless, to conclude that they are doing these things at Soviet behest and in the Soviet interest is going far beyond ascertainable fact. Thus, by taking up positions in opposition to the radical Arab nationalists and suggesting that these people are tools of the USSR, Western governments not only failed to act upon a persuasive set of facts, but they created the impression that they were using the Communist threat as a cover for the retention or reestablish-ment of colonial-like influence and authority. There can be no doubt that there is a danger of Communist expansion into the Middle East, but it is not so clear and so immediate as to justify - in the minds of many people, especially in the newer states - military intervention.

In the case of Quemoy the ambiguity of the threat is presented in a different form. There is no question about the Communist use of force and threat of force; the question is whether Chiang Kai-shek has adequate justification for being in [LC]

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Quemoy in the first place and whether the US ought to be intervening on his behalf.
In short, many people are wondering whether it is not a case of the pot calling
the kettle black; they find it difficult to get excited over a Chinese Communist
attempt to acquire some territory which they doubt the Chinese Nationalists have
a legitimate claim to. Moreover, few people in the world have much confidence in
the Nationalist regime; unlike most of the other nationalists in Asia and Africa,
these "nationalists" have domonstrated little genuine interest in trying to build
a better society; they have lost the confidence and loyalty of their own country-
men as well as that of the world. Thus, the case of Quemoy has seemed to be a
rather poor place upon which to take a stand against Communist encroachment.

III.

Statesmen who make the decision to intervene or to support groups and governments under attack obviously do not do so lightly or capriciously. They are quite aware that there will be criticism and disapproval at home and abroad. They often tell themselves that not only are the reasons for doing so persuasive but that the chances of success are very high. They believe that by their adhering clearly and firmly to their position the enemy will be obliged to retire and that those more faint-hearted ones who fear and falter and object will - once the enemy has retired - become convinced of the correctness of the firm policy. In so thinking these statesmen may be right; in the past the USSR has retired when it has encountered firm opposition.

Yet, there is always an element of risk in these decisions to intervene,
to support, or to stand firm. The risk arises from the possibility that this time
the Communists will not retire or that they have become so committed that they can-
not do so without an unacceptable loss of prestige, from the possibility that in a

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situation of high tension warfare might be set off accidentally, from the possibility that the local conflict - if it actually involves fighting - might be enlarged into a general conflict. Most of the Western nations and even many of the uncommitted nations are proposed to assume some risks on behalf of international order, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the rights of small nations. However, the willingness to assume risk is a function, not only of the cause for which the risk is assumed, but also of the amount of danger which is involved. Thus, the more clearly they see the issue posed and the more righteous they view the cause, the higher the risk nations and peoples have the propensity to assume. On the other hand, the more serious the dangers which are inherent in a given situation, the more is this propensity to assume risks reduced.

The difficulty in our times is that the dangers inherent in most situations are believed to be so high that few countries or peoples are willing to take risks unless they see a clear and present link to their national survival. This is due primarily to the fact that both the US and the USSR possess high-yield nuclear weapons the use of which would threaten the existence of victor and vanquished, combatant and non-combatant, belligerent and non-belligerent alike, and to the fact that the US and USSR so profoundly distrust each other. Thus, in many of the situations which have occurred since the USSR has acquired a substantial nuclear capability, the amount of danger believed to be inherent in a clash of interests between the US and the USSR tends to go up to highest order - i.e. danger of total destruction. There have been far too many occasions in which the US has encouraged this by its own rattling of the atomic bomb, and in this way has frightened its friends at least as much as it has frightened the USSR. Likewise, the USSR has made use of its own growing capabilities to help create the spectre of total nuclear war. The difficulty is that, however much one may discuss

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limited war as a realistic and useful concept, governments and peoples have not yet been led to realize that this is possible only if one clearly limits the objectives, the area of combat, and the weapons. Consequently, even if one recognizes that it would be sensible to keep a conflict limited, it is easier to think of how it might become expanded than to formulate and execute the rules and policies for keeping it limited.

As a consequence of this fear of unlimited war, the degree of risk which people and nations are willing to assume tends to be determined largely by their judgment of the righteousness of the cause. So long as the Sino-Soviet bloc continues as it is doing now to prevent its challenges in ambiguous terms, in places where the Western political foundations are weak, then the willingness to assume risks on the part of the most of the free world -- including the US itself -- is going to be low.

However, it is not only the fear that these dangers may materialize which discourages people from adopting positions of firmness and from supporting military intervention. There is also a tendency to think that the policy of firmness or intervention has positive disadvantages which detract from its value even when it succeeds in forcing the Sino-Soviet powers to retire. This tendency is greatest when the issue is nuclear. One of the most interesting developments of the twentieth century has been the rising tendency -- to a very considerable extent encouraged by US policy -- to look at questions of international relations in moral terms. Aggression is bad, nationalism is good, self-determination is good, militarism is bad, power politics are bad, etc. There is, therefore, a tendency to examine each issue on its merits, rather than simply to assume that whatever the USSR or Communist China propose or desire is bad and must be opposed.¹

¹ The writer is not arguing the validity of this proposition. He believes generally that the Communist powers do not propose or desire anything unless it is good for them.

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Thus, the policy of the US, which has always made much of the moralistic basis of its foreign policy, tends to be examined in moral terms. If the US appears to be acting in a way which disregards the merits of a case, to be acting on the basis of power politics or to be overriding the principles of self-determination which it has supported in the past, then the US loses stature and prestige because it is thought to have turned its back upon the very principles which it has urged as the basis of international order and world progress. Consequently, while the US might win a battle against the Communist powers, and thus make a contribution toward international order, it might also lose a battle for international order because it has appeared to be playing what it has encouraged people to regard as the dangerous and reprehensible game of power politics.

## IV.

Is there no escape from this dilemma? Must we be judged by a different standard from the USSR and Communist China and so lose the battles regardless of what we do? Indeed, it is a pretty pickle. The worst of it is that there are so many ambiguous situations which the Communist powers have yet to exploit, which they can create or which may develop. Old territorial disputes can be revived, claims can be advanced on the basis of ethnic and historical associations, efforts can be made to free colonial areas from foreign control, etc. A large number of specific areas suggest themselves - Hong Kong, Vietnam, Laos, West New Guinea, Kashmir, Kurdistan, Macedonia, Thrace, Berlin, Fennmark, Austria -- to say nothing of areas where insurrections and revolts against present governments exist or might occur spontaneously or might be instigated by Communist subversive activity, or where wars and conflicts between smaller nations might be utilized to gain influence -- as in the Middle East or perhaps -- in the future -- in Africa.

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The problem is developing some general principles which do honor to those precepts which the US has sponsored in the past, which will meet the moral and political standard set for the US, but which at the same time will not set up an endless series of retreats or force the US into crises where it is confronted with hopeless dilemmas.

Much has been said from time to time of regaining the "strategic initiative." This is often thought of in terms of pushing the Communists back, eliminating their influence from areas where they have gained it, and reestablishing independent regimes in areas now under Communist control. Some of the means involved are thought to be anti-Communist propaganda, the support of anti-Communist groups in Communist countries, and the relentless pursuit of Communist and pro-Communist elements in free countries. These types of activities might more properly be described as "counterattacks."

The strategic initiative is something quite different. It most properly involves shifting the principal arena of conflict with the USSR from the present plane of Soviet challenge and Western response to a plane in which the USSR and Communist China must reply in terms chosen by the West to challenges issued by the West. How does one get the conflict to this new plane?

V.

The first step is to make it clear to ourselves and to the rest of the world that we stand on pluralistic principles. There is too much tendency in America to regard everyone who is not for us as against us. There is too much tendency to divide the world neatly in "Communist" and "Free World" sectors and to believe that everyone in the second sector ought to be anti-Communist, democratic, and consecrated to free enterprise. These tendencies have frequently produced policies of trying to encourage people into the ideological mold we have set for them by

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applying diplomatic pressure and by deepening economic and military aid with appropriate strings attached. If we made it clear in words and deeds that we stood only for the right of individual peoples to develop the kinds of societies they want for themselves, then we would lift much of the distrust and suspicion which some of our policies have engendered.

The second step in regaining the initiative is to take a forthright stand on all the major moral issues of the day, and not merely on the immorality of Communism. For many, if not an actual majority, of the world's population, Communism does not appear so much as an immoral political philosophy as a promising economic method. The great moral issues are racial equality, foreign domination, and the right to modernization. Few people expect America to wave the magic wand and to provide these things for them, but they would like to see that America believed in them. They would like to see some positive action which suggested that even though there were obstacles and difficulties - the US government was at least in the fight. Responsible leaders among the colored majority of the world population do not expect the US to solve its race problems overnight, but they cannot understand why only the US Supreme Court seems to be taking a hand in it. Responsible leaders do not expect the US to solve the Arab refugee problem, but they cannot understand why this problem is virtually ignored when the US moved with so much spirit and energy to solve the Hungarian refugee problem. They do not expect the US to win independence for Algeria, but they cannot understand why US arms are being used against the Algerian rebels. They do not expect the US to impoverish itself so that they can build dams and steel mills, but they do not understand why the US finds so many of their schemes for industrialization to be economically infeasible.

To regain the initiative means to recognize that the great revolution of the second half of the twentieth century is not the counter-revolution against Communism but the political arrival of the colored peoples. If the West, and the

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US in particular, wants to insure its future, it must succeed in identifying itself with these peoples. It need not lead them, but it must be prepared to help them and to defend them, and above all it must make their cause its own cause.

The third step in regaining the initiative is to disengage from the Communist world whenever Western political foundations are weak. Unless this is done, the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders will continue to make their ambiguous challenges, and the US will be obliged to reply. The problem is to reduce our open military and political commitments to those points where a Soviet and Chinese Communist attempt to challenge would need to be so brazen and unequivocal as to guarantee that the rest of the world would be prepared to support their defense. This will involve difficult choices and probably some diplomatic strain. It could not be successfully accomplished - indeed it should not be attempted - unless the US had moved ahead with steps one and two.

If the West were disengaged from open and well-known political and military commitments, the Soviet and Chinese Communist governments would not be so attractive. It is not the drive for territory, but the drive for influence and the effort to inflict political defeats which lies behind so many of the Communist campaigns and initiatives. Moreover, if the West was not clearly involved in a particular area, then any Communist challenge would obviously be made, not against the West, but against the local government. A challenge thus attempted would tend to unite the smaller countries behind the intended victim, rather than send them scurrying for cover. If the West then came to the diplomatic and military defense of the victim, it would be doing so as a result of an open request and in the interest of a plural world society rather than as part of an anti-Communist crusade.

Such a policy of disengagement would require the military capability to come quickly to the defense of an intended victim, not with the nuclear weapons which would discourage coalescence behind the victim, but with highly mobile

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conventionally-armed forces capable of establishing an effective defense. This
would then force upon the aggressor the responsibility for raising the stakes.
The chances are good that, under such circumstances, the challenge would not be
made at all or it would soon evaporate in a flurry of self-righteous propaganda.

VI.

Changing the plane of international combat with the USSR to one of com-
petitive coexistence is what the Soviet leaders say they too want to do. This
certainly makes sense for them if for no other reason than that any other policy
is a very dangerous one. But when the Russians talk of competitive coexistence, they
mean that they will use every means at their disposal to weaken the physical, political,
and spiritual integrity of the rest of the world. One major flaw in their premise
is their conviction of victory, their belief in the historical inevitability of a
Communist world. The object of the West should be to make this belief, which is a
flaw because it has no intellectual justification -- a fatal weakness. This can
best be done by demonstrating what is a fact, namely, that Communism is little else
than a technique of political and economic development which has no monopoly of
virtue, but is unique only as a new form of imperialism.

Certainly a good way to help expose Communism as imperialism is not to
look like imperialists ourselves. Another way is to demonstrate that we are
virtuous, and that we can support and espouse forms of economic and political
development equally as effective as the Communist method. This probably does mean
some rather large-scale departures from the principles of private capital and free
enterprise. It probably means living with some military dictators and some other
people who are not very much to our liking. But the test to be applied is not
whether these people are using methods which we like, but where they are going.

[LC]

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If they seem to be responsive to the aspirations of their own peoples for a better society and a national identity, if they give some promise of creating states where the individual will have a better chance to develop his potentialities, then they are leaders with whom we can share the responsibility for world leadership, rather than leaders to challenge and berate for not sharing our own preoccupations.

The precepts outlined above may be said to be more responsive to Western man's ethical sense than to a realistic appraisal of the problem. They are not intended to be an exposition of the Sermon on the Mount. Insofar as they coincide with it, so much the better for the Gospel according to St. Matthew. They are designed to take account of the world the way it is, and if the world is concerned with moral problems perhaps it is because so much of the Christian civilization of the West has been exported or perhaps because this is the way people behave regardless of their religious indoctrination. If we cannot offer people a group of principles which is worthy of loyalty, then we deliver them into the hands of those who seek safety by accommodating to the most powerful. That is a game we could lose.

[LC]

That is a game we have been trying to play and not succeeding. The USSR and Communist China have been demonstrating an enormous amount of power. They have impressed the world with their scientific and industrial achievements. Most of their immediate objectives lie in the Eastern Hemisphere, where nations live constantly in the shadow of their power. Some of these nations have already concluded that it would be wise not to antagonize the great Communist powers. We are finding it more and more difficult to convince the world that we can and will project our power in a way which will enhance rather than destroy their physical security. In this time we reexamined our fundamental assumptions, and developed a more realistic usage of both power and morals.

The lesson of Quemoy is that, unless we can project our power in a way which appeals to men's sense of justice, the victors won may prove superficial and unenduring.