DECEMBER 13
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

K

By CEC NARA, Dale 5/21

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
10:00 am 1/30/70

K: I was just talking to the President and he is outraged by the Beecher story. And we are keeping the ACDA people out of meetings.

L: I don't talk much about what goes on. I have a group of people I meet with once a week on Friday. Something came up that bothers me and I don't no how to deal with it. I think I must let the President know. Gerry was here and the substance of what he said is that we should be selling arms and going out with submarines and never mind ABM. And he will sell it until he is told to shut up. We will have a tough time in Congress. Now, I think, we will be defeated on ABM project. We don't need any more trouble. I will go ahead with arms but

K: If you go ahead with arms he will do away with the Minute Man

L: There have been no leaks here. That's what's being done around town.

K: He is really something. To whom would he say this?

L: The group consisted of the CIA, my NRO guy, etc. It's the regular Friday morning meeting. Intelligence resources people. Today we invited in Gerry to give the intelligence people an ida of the need for information. He did the talking and we just listened. This is a very confidential thing.

K: But it concerns the President.

L: I fight we are going to have.

K: The President was raging on some ten minutes with me. He wanted to fire people and exclude them from the meetings.

L: I have to do the testifying.

K: You will be out on the firing line. You know what they are doing. They are talking now about area defense but they have reports on the Minute Man. They will show these after area defense is taken care of.

L: I understand. The idea is to get this tied up with defensive ____.

K: It is my job to get the arguements before the President. If they said we are against ABM and then have to sell something that they don't want, that's one thing, but they may it's going, they will be killed.

L: The Soviet Union is gaining from these talks. They are building.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

Laird/Kissinger

10:00 am 1/30/70

-2-

K: And they will kill the talks too
They

L: We are building now and we will be further behind.

K: I agree and the President agrees

L: And when Bryce tells me I am going to get beaten and I tell him I will make a good fight.

K: The President was outraged.

L: I am sure Gerry did not do that but someone in his shop.

K: I will tell it to the President and no one else. But they leaked the toxins report this week.

L: I have another problem. I have a contractor here on non-compliance. Douglas aircraft has no one in their head office that is black and we cannot stop the F-4 now because of that.

K: Would you get the note on the B-1 aviation.

L: We will and we are trying to do a good job. As far as this thing on the McDonald-Douglas is concerned, it will surface because of the non-compliance.

K: Will it be brought up at the press conference?

L: It might

K: Will you send over a Q&A?

L: OK just so that the President doesn't get caught.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCON

N Rockefeller/Kissinger

1:00 pm 1/20/70

R: ... Fulbright .... I think we are in good shape with them. I think they are ready to go on concurrent bill on Latin America. Fulbright said that we only have to watch we don't build expectations that don't happen. They are very interested in trade proposition. We could prepare something based on this conversation from the WH to Congress. To shape concurrent resolution. Excuse me for taking these initiatives.

K: Our people aren't killing themselves

R: On trade they are very interested and based on what they said I will get something to you next week. The basis of the approach they will -- Church and Fulbright liked the whole report leaving out the military.

K: Isn't that interesting?

R: He is all for it. I can't see arguing the military. I have drafted out something helpful but I'm not making public speeches. It won't help me get re-elected in NY. They were very sympathetic to the F-1 resolution. We have been working with [insert], Our friend in the House, Trezall, has already bought it. So, two sides are ready to come together so we want to be sure [insert] the President will send us something that will show this [insert] is not just a gesture.

K: On trade?

R: Yes. He likes trade better than aid. It would open up a channel of communication which would get you and these fellows together.

K: Thank you for everything.

R: How are you otherwise?

K: We are dug in here but it is interesting and a great opportunity.

R: I think you will be coming out well with the public.

K: The President is. He is very skillful. There is always more going on then meets the eye.

R: I have to go back or I would come to see you.

K: Will you be here next week?

R: I have to be here for the briefing. Fulbright isn't sure the President is sincere about getting out of VN.

By Cc

NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM

Shakespeare/Kissinger

2:25 pm

1/30/70

S: Two Things. First, we have inspection teams that go to posts for two or three weeks and make analyses. Two or three man teams. I am adopting the practice of adding one public citizen to help us. They are uncluttered by the government. We are sending one team into the Soviet Union this spring. The public man -- someone you think might be useful. He would be in Moscow then to Novsk or Baku. He would travel around to get an impression on the VOA broadcasts there. It would be an opportunity to get an general impression of what we are doing there and an also a unique opportunity to poke around. We have one man in mind. I forget his name but I will get it for you. If that doesn't work I want your ideas. Second, I went to Latin American and talked to some people. If you are interested, and it were convenient, I would share this with you.

K: I would like that

S: Breakfast

K: Tuesday

S: What time

K: 8:00

S: At the White House

K: Yes

S: And if you have any thoughts on a man for the Soviet Union let me know then. I need someone whose judgement is of use to us.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 3/27

Telecon
The President
1/30/70 4:55 p.m.

P: One brief question: what is this business about the press in Saigon? Some government agents infiltrating.

K: They assigned 4 government agents to the press corps to find out about black market operations.

P: Oh, not spying on the press?

K: No, I don't think so--let me check.

P: No don't tell me, I don't have the time.

K: It was not to spy on the press.

P: That's too bad. It should have been. Don't tell the press we're not going to spy on them. But it's nothing we've known about though?

K: No, we had nothing to do with it.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Vice Mayor Aurelio
1/30/70 5:00 p.m.

A: I'm calling officially. We have been surveying the possibility or potential of what will happen in President Pompidou's visit to New York.

K: Yes.

A: On the basis of a collection of information we are deeply concerned about it. I wanted to communicate to you the Mayor's concern-- he tried to reach Bill Rogers today, but he was not able to. He asked me to call so you would have the information we have. Everybody knows the feeling and how intense it is in the Jewish community. But we have been told about what they are planning to do. They are calling out Jewish teachers and pupils in public and private schools. They are going to demonstrate in rather creative ways. The impact and it's totality are rather serious. I wanted to tell you. I know it's a rather delicate problem for you and State, but K it's impossible to make his visit to New York hospitable. Given what we know is going to happen; even the responsible Jewish groups--the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress--are pledging cooperation to participate in this. We think it is our responsibility to let you know it is not going to be a hospitable visit.

K: I will pass that on.

A: We hate to affrong or insult or hurt the United States or State Department or embarrass us. But it seems unwise to come to New York during this period. That's the Mayor's view. The police department has met with us and given us their intelligence. They think it is a very hairy situation. Far worse than the Faisel situation in terms of emotion and intensity. A lot of it is being generated for obvious purposes, but our suggestion is that it can't do anything but embarrass us. If there were any way of not having him come here it would save a tremendous headache.

K: I'll pass this on. I'm not very optimistic, but I'll pass it on.

A: Okay, Thank you very much.

By NARA, Dalo 5/27

Telecon
Bryce Harlow
1/30/70 5:25 p.m.

H: Hello doctor.

K: Hello judge.

H: There's a man named Pompidou. He's coming to United States late February. He has been invited by our Secretary of State to speak before a joing session of Congress.

K: Don't tell me your problems; I've got enough of my own. Just tell every Jewish member to absent himself.

H: Congressional procedure is to ask unanimous consent. In the light of the sale of those aircraft the Speaker is going to have difficulty getting consent. I want to tell him the P would like him to do it. Otherwise he won't move.

K: You are correct in saying that. And if we are going to have any influence with them, they have got to do this. It won't help to do this.

H: The P feels it would be a very bad thing if this doesn't take place? If it doesn't happen he'd consider it an insult?

K: He probably wouldn't come. By the way I'm having breakfast with Elliot Richardson tomorrow on the Mathias resolution. If you would like to come, and promise not to speak...

H: Okay, I'll be there, and keep very quiet--just like at the NSC meeting.

K: We are in trouble on that. Everybody is knifing everybody else. I think we are going to have more trouble than last year.

H: We don't need any more. We're starting off dead. We're starting off a vote behind. I've gotta use a blowtorch to have any movement. Okay, I'll see you at 8:00 unless I oversleep.

K: I hope to see you.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
1/30/70; 7:05 p.m.

K: I guess Dave (Packard?) told you about the meeting this afternoon. The President sort of preempted some of this in his press conference. He was so mad. Tie everyone down until we make a formal announcement of what it is going to be.

L: I told them I will present full program on the 18th of February as I appear before the Senate Armed Services Committee. We are going to stay with that line.

K: Just say that and we will discuss rate then.

L: On the irreversibility -- he tied himself up on that. We should say something along the lines that we will always have security forces there to protect our troops -- phase 2. We are way ahead of Clark Clifford's goal. I don't like getting tied up with Clark Clifford's goal.

K: We ought to downplay that. We are on our own schedule.

L: Clifford's schedule had nothing to do with support forces, air force, etc. and some day I am going to explain it to the President.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Gerard Smith
1/30/70; 7:10 p.m.

K: I had no idea what the President was going to say in the press conference. The advice to him was to avoid this sort of question. He was so mad and he decided he was not going to be pressured. We can still proceed with the decision along the lines of our discussion this afternoon. We can still define what we mean by area defense that will be conducive to your objectives. You can help by getting your people quieted down over there. Any result of a public brawl will drive the President in the other direction. I called Laird to tell him to stop his people.

S: I assure you my people are not participating in any extracurricular activities. I suggest that you get the FBI working to see who has been doing this.

K: Anything we can do -- I am repeating what I said to Mel -- to quiet down any friends any of us have that are not directly working for us will help. I really think if we get a debate started now it will lock people in positions that will not help anyone. I think we should place it in such a way that it is most negotiable with the Soviets.

S: I am the strongest man for an ABM program in town. I don't want any defeats.

K: I worked out with Laird that he keep quiet and he will announce the program on the 18th.

I have to go, I have the President on the other line.

By C.C. NARA, Dalo 5/27

Telecon

The President
1/30/70 7:12 p. m.

K: I thought it was very effective, Mr. P.

P: Wasn't the first question something. I like Doug C______, but he always asked the most stupid <u>WHY AREN'T</u> questions.

K: He doesn't mean any harm.

P: No, but he's just dumb. This conference required . . . I only got through 18. Well only! The questions were so complicated!

K: And now that you've stated your fundamentals, they are getting into the esoterics of it. The ABM answer is going to give us trouble with the fanatics. I've talked with Laird and Smith and told them to pipe down.

d

P: It's done. That's all there is to it.

K: I said there is to be no further discussion until the 18th when Laird begins to testify.

P: It had to be answered this way. The principle is now established. I want everyone to know that when I decide something, it's decided.

K: Also the Middle East thing, I liked it very much when you said you weren't pro-Arab and you weren't pro-Israeli, you were pro-peace.

P: And on China, I said we are doing it to avoid the possibility . . . we are trying to open communications.

K: What you said on Vietnam was very strong. And on the Clifford thing . . .

P: That's always going to come up.

K: Yes, I noticed that Brinkley was making something of the fact that this means all combat troops will be out by next year.

P: Well, it has to be fuzzed up in the announcements. They asked if it's to be used in support of air forces--you and I know they are, but we don't admit it.

K: Well, Bob thought it was enormously effective, and the rest I thought to did too.

By CEC NARA, Dated 5/27

Telecon
The President
1/30/70 7:12 p. m.
page 2

P: I tried to ______ a few bullets, and on ABM--there's going to
have to be some discipline, or we may have to fire somebody. If he
doesn't want to play ball, out with him. I may put in Dewey.

[K laughed.]

P: I'm serious. He'd run a tight ship. Smith is just plain disloyal.

K: Smith is a lobbyist for one point of view.

P: I said we had examined it and should go forward.

K: I think it was important to state your policy, and it should stop
that wailing. Smith has that advisory panel in town--they were going to
make another resolution on ______.

P: With regard to ______, this is unanswerable isn't it? I said
to this fellow we are not talking about Vietnam and Laos; we are talking
about 10 years from now. The point is with regard to China, unless you have
that China could blackmail any country in the Far East.

K: The reasoning is unanswerable. And if India and other countries
are going to get nuclear weapons 15 years from now, we wouldn't want to be at
the mercy of some of these madmen.

P: You might follow with a backgrounder on the Chinese. Say ;the P
is not going to allow a billion Chinese with nuclear weapons and no commun-
ication--that communication part will worry the hell out of the Russians.

K: Elliot Richardson had lunch with Dobrynin--he said he is not
worried about area defense.

P: Two things: one, we are going ahead with ABM--I want no more
discussion, and two, with regard to the China problem, we decided what
we are going to do, and we are just going forward with it.

K: I agree.

P: There were five questions out of 18 on ABM.

K: They're cranking up a big campaign.

P: Smith and Rogers will say 'why didn't you say you were taking into
account the peach negotiations . . . ' Bull!

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
The President
1/30/70 7:12 p.m.

page 3

K: Well, we can still say that.

P: You say it; I'm not going to.

a

K: I thought it was/very effective press conference and so did everyone else.

P: The questions were so long and complicated. Julie told me there were 18--about 5 more than any other P has answered.

K: Every press conference has its purpose. This press conference showed you are in command and had mastery.

P: I couldn't just say yes or no.

K: You had to explain. Most people don't know what area defense is. You had to explain, or most of the viewing audience would have been lost. But the answers didn't seem wordy. John and Bob thought it was good.

P: All right.

K: Congratulations, Mr. President.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Mr. Ziegler
1/30/70; 7:25 p. m.

Z: What did you think?

K: (Jokingly) We are going for area defense of Biafra.

Z: Wasn't that a stupid question on trying to relate Vietnam to ABM?

K: I thought it was B+. I did not like the Clifford answer at all. The troop withdrawal thing is so boring that I don't think anyone is paying much attention to it. I think we now have to call Defense and State and tell them to shut up on the official position. These are the principles the President will follow. I just spoke to him. The rate and location of the sites will be announced on February 18. They will take into consideration all items including arms control -- SALT talks.

Z: What do I say on background?

K: This is background -- I don't want you to read anything. The President stated the principles.

Z: I say the President outlined the principles. What do you mean by rate?

K: Over what period of time they will be put up -- the proportion of area to minuteman defense in any one year. They will be announced in the program which will be announced by Secretary Laird on February 18. No, don't say the 18th -- just say in the middle of February. I don't want Laird to testify on the day we put out the foreign policy report.

Z: What is the President's mood?

K: He seems a little uncertain.

Z: I thought it was flatter than usual but not because of the President. What did he say?

K: He was looking for reassurance.

Z: And you gave it to him.

K: I told him that it was handled with great ability and confidence -- it showed him in command of the situation.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By

NARA, Date 5/27

Z: No foreign policy problems? How about the Laos thing?

K: He handled it very well.

Z: What do I say? -- we feel that we have the capability with ARVN and our forces to deal with anything? ?

K: We will deal with it appropriately. And if they want to know what we will do, let them hit us and they will find out.

Z: Does this mean we will increase the number of troops going in?

K: Probably we will hit the North.

Z: I'm serious.

K: Listen -- I may be telling you the truth. At any rate, your answer is the correct one.

By: NARA, Date: 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Stans
1/30/70 7:34 p.m.

S: I talked to Watts about our problem--did he talk to you?

K: Yes.

S: I'm rather concerned about it. All of the agencies are against it except Laird. He said he had technical objections still because of NSSM 15, and until that changed he couldn't be influenced by the new law. He said he expected he'd be overruled and it didn't bother him.

K: When I write my memoirs . . . There are more guys going in one direction, and then saying they don't mean them. I don't count you among them.

S: I try not to be.

K: I'm going to make Laird put in black and white what he wants. We've nowgot these different versions.

S: He sent me a memo saying he had no instructions from the P to NSSM 15, and also he says despite my explanation of the new law he feels that under the circumstances he must put national security ahead of foreign availability

K: I've got a memo right here: "I've received your memo on the above subject. You will recall the Department of Defense had strong reservations. . ." I think this has to go to the P.

S: The ______ part of paragraph 3. That's what he made a point of to me over the phone. State called him this afternoon. They are quite concerned about meeting the new law and the reaction in Congress if we fail to follow it.

K: When do you need an answer?

S: The order expires tomorrow.

K: What time do you need the answer tomorrow?

S: in time to give it to the Russians.

K: I have to talk to the P.

S: If we don't, we are just giving a lot of business to the Swiss.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird
1/30/70 7:48 p.m.

K: A number of problems: I, I talked to the P again--he feels we shouldn't say anything now until you testify. We have stated the principles, but should hold on the proportions, and other considerations which will be stated when you testify. When do you testify.

L: Start on the 18th of February and goes 10 straight days.

K: The P wanted to come out with the State of the World speech on the 18th. Could you put your testifying off for 1 day?

L: Well, I've got Stennis on the 18th, and Rivers on the 19th.
Stennis feels I should go to him before Rivers, and the 19th is Rivers.

K: See if you could . . .

L: I'd like to slip them both one day. I don't get back from Vietnam till the 16th. I will. I want the P to go first; he's got to go first. I have to; I'll do it.

K: I want the P to go first.

K: You're not going to release your posture statement, or are you?

L: The review of Defense will be on the 18th. It would be better to do it on the 19th, following the P's. We have a draft of an overall posture statement. The day I leave for Vietnam I'll have signed off on it. You will have it 4 or 5 days before that.

K: It's not going to conflict with ours, is it?

L: No. I want you to look it over. I'm trying to get input from the White House and from Rogers. Rogers wants to go early.

K: He can't. He's been prohibited.

L: He said he would the day before he left for Africa.

K: If he does, he'll be violating a Presidential directive.

L: You saw that game plan we sent over?

K: Yes. On the Gleason ball-bearing case. I saw your memo, and that's your view?

L: Yes.

*

By NARA, Date 5/27

page 2

H. Stans says you are for it, and he is for it, and I said if I get overruled, okay. But according to the Decision Memorandum I have got to live with it.

K: I haven't got a view. I'm trying to find out what everyone thinks.

L: I still stand where I am.

K: Why?

L: I can't justify to Congress that trucks are not important to national security, particularly the way the Soviets operate.

K: I'm going to take it up with the P tomorrow.

L: I got a paper at 5:00. Maury Stans told me this is not the policy anymore. I said maybe it isn't, but this is where I stand.

K: The next thing they said is that you want to be overruled.

L: Maury says it will look bad for a fellow cabinet member to be overruled. I said I expect to be overruled by the P when I'm wrong. It doesn't bother me if the P says I'm wrong. They are trying to draw a unified position, and I don't believe the P wants it that way.

K: You heard him in front of Wilson.

L: Yes. I'm not going to pout. I'll tell you when I'm going to pout. I told Horton when he called that I'd feel a hell of a lot different if he had voted with us on that veto.

By NARA, Dale S/27

Telcon
Secy Laird
1/30/70; 8:10 p.m.

L: We are going to try to work out slipping of the schedule. Is that pretty firm on the President because if it isn't old Stennis will raise hell. Will he go on the 18th? The problem is that Stennis is really upset about delaying our appearance. He wanted me the first week in February.

K: No, that has to be firm. In fact, I may move it up a day or two.

L: I get back here on the 16th from Vietnam. I think that is good. I can have a meeting with the President and give him a report on Vietnam.

K: That's all set.

L: Then if he follows on the 18th and I go the 19th that will work out well.

K: We may move it up to the 17th, but at any rate it won't be later.

L: Thank you, Henry.

ms

By CCO

NARA, Dated 5/27

Kadecon

Ehrlichman

1/30/70 9:45 p.m.

K: You have me worried now.

E: What for?

K: You mentioned you called me all day.

E: I was calling about Mr. Laird and the volunteer army.

K: I'm against both of them.

E: For different reasons. I needed an answer for the press conference, which I got. Can we get him back on the track?

K: What did he say?

E: He said it will cost too much, will be too hard to do and he didn't think it was going to happen.

K: Yes, we'll get him back aboard. I personally am not in favor of it, but we'll get him back aboard.

E: The commission is going to come in with their decision next week and I wonder if we could get him lined up.

K: Yes. How did you think he did?

E: Quite well. I was pleased with the national questions.

K: It was not the superb crispness he usually has--it was B+ compared to his usually A performance.

E: Yes, he was off today. The preparation was ragged. But we've now done one. By the time the budget is out it will be old business.

K: He bought himself a major row about a week before he needed to on Safeguard, but on the whole it was a good performance.

E: Are you going to be around in the morning?

K: Yes.

E: I think there are a few bugs in the preparation system which account for his performance.

K: That may be true in your field. My field was operating as superbly as usual.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCOM
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger
morning 1/30/70

K: I am beginning to think that kabuki play is beginning to focus.

J: Did you see that thing this morning?

K: Yes. The fact that we are getting irritated seems to be across.

K: It is

K: He promised to get it done by the end of the year.

J: It's on the road and we don't need to do anything further. We can relax for the moment.

K: When you write your diplomatic ______ I hope you will give us a footnote.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
The Vice President
1/31/70 11:20 a.m.

V: The only thing I called about--I wanted to have a clear feeling in my mind on general questions about foreign policy activities in the Senate. What does the Constitution say? What is the division on foreign policy between the President and the Senate.

K: The Senate advises and consents to nominations of Presidential appointments: like Ambassadors and the Secretary of State. It ratifies treaties, and it declares war. Some military actions have been taken under executive authority when we have not declared war.

V: You mean under the Tonkin Resolution?

K: No Constitutional scholar takes the position that we needed the Tonkin Resolution to declare war. In the Mathias Resolution this is one of the issues at stake. We don't want to give the impression that if these things are repealed we have no authority.

V: How do we know what is and what isn't a war?

K: That's the part that I'd admit is fuzzy.

V: What in the Vietnam conflagration is there we could do if there was a war that we don't do now.

K: Technically nothing. Presumably we could go more all-out. But that is dubious.

V: What does the Constitution say the President can do after the declaration of war?

K: Nothing.

V: We want to take the position that the Presidential powers are derived from the Constitution and not from any resolution.

K: That's right, and from his power as commander-in-chief.

V: It's generally considered that the President concucts the foreign policy of the country.

K: Yes, under executive prerogative. Not even Fulbright would object to that.

By NARA, Date 5/27

V: Okay, I just wanted to run over that.

K: There's one thing I wanted to discuss with you. Your speech on February 5--my only concern about that is the President is coming out around the 14th or the 15th with his review of foreign policy.

V: My February 5 speech in California is not considering general foreign policy--my speech is on Asian policy from my trip.

K: Oh, okay, I have no problems with that.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telcon
Secy Packard
1/31/70; 12:40 p.m.

P: ...discussing about whether the President should commit himself to area defense for nothing.

K: This Smith will not understand that when I speak I know what the President is thinking. If these guys had stopped trying to drive him off his position he wouldn't have said it. It was that press story plus the advisory committee that made him do it.

P: I wanted to check what Bob Moot would say about the budget meeting this afternoon. Did you see the paper?

K: The only thing I suggest that he add something to effect that SALT concerns have been considered. That Smith was part of all the deliberations in the review, and something about the proportions between various components of the system will be apparent when the program is released.

P: I would just as soon not get into too much detail. We can get part about SALT considerations all right.

K: I don't think we should get into a big debate about area defense before we are ready.

P: I don't either. I want to backstop it because we will make a detailed report after he gets back from Vietnam. I talked to Mel about it last night.

K: Where is Mel.

P: His wife's father is ill. He went out to Indianapolis over the weekend. Do you want to get in touch with him?

K: No, I was envying him because I was going to go away and I have strong advice I have to go to the wedding this afternoon. So I am jealous of him.

P: I think we ought to keep our statement down to the very minimum.

By NARA, Date 3/27

- 2 -

K: I have seen it and I have phoned over a few of the changes.

P: I will double check it.

K: Dave, can we do the Washington side? Can we consider it against the opposition of Scoop?

P: I think so. I talked to Scoop originally and he raised no objections. He would stand by and help us and he could take the heat if he had to. He has made a big campaign and big push to try to get us off that side. The last word I had was that he did not like it. He would like to get out from under that, but he would support us.

K: I think the Washington Community is going to get into a lot of trouble. I don't care as between options 1 and 2.

P: I don't really care. I think option 1 is probably as good a plan as any and we should stay with that. This delay in announcing the details is good, but it may cause some troubles if we hold it off as long as 30 days. I want to talk to Mel. It might be desirable to come out with the details a little sooner, but we will have time to give that some consideration.

ms

By CCO NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon
Elliot Richardson
1/31/70 12:58 p.m.

K: I've talked to Sonnenfeldt about a number of our problems and on Safeguard he thinks . . . he's worried that some of your people and Jerry Smith's people think I got to the President after the DPRC and put him up to making that.

R: I just talked to Jerry and he doesn't think so. He is worried that it will be felt that he's been putting up the advisory committee to call into question the whole Chinese threat rationale. I think the idea that he could control that group is over-drawn. I read over the memcon of the President's meeting with them. I would think there would be greater concern that they were had. I think they're supposed to be coming to a conclusion on this.

K: Did he ask them to study the Chinese threat?

R: Yes, they had a hearing on this yesterday. Jerry told me they were in town. They talked to Cushman, Cline, Wheeler.

K: They were not supposed to do that. That is not their job. We want their disarmament views, not their views on strategic adequacy. I was very much aboard with the argument that whatever we do we should do so on other grounds.

R: I think we should still do that and develop a rationale. If I hear anybody who thinks you did it I'll hit it.

K: The New York Times story is what got the President into an intransigent frame of mind.

R: Too bad.

By NARA, Dale

TELECON

The Vice President
8:00 p.m., January 31, 1970

VP: I wanted to ask you one question about the language in one of
these answers -- "we will perform our commitments commensurate
with our interests." By "commitments," you are not referring to
treaty obligations?

K: We wanted to say that the whole debate is if obligations around
the world stem from legal obligations, it is wrong.

VP: Would it be accurate to say, "we will live up to our obligations
and maintain them so long as they reflect our interests"?

K: That implies we won't live up to them if we decide they aren't.
It makes people worry. We have to get across that any obligations
this Administration makes reflect our interests. I would fudge it some.

VP: I'll do that. I think I know how to handle it.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Secretary Rogers

9:20 p.m., January 31, 1970

K: I'm sorry to take you away from your dinner (Rogers was at a post-wedding dinner at the Jockey Club). We had a call from Dobrynin 1-1/2 hours ago who said he had a personal message from Kosygin. He asked if he could see the President. I told him he was at David. He asked if he could bring it by to me -- which has been done. It is a message about the Middle East; its major points are: the Israelis have resumed in effect military action against the Arab states. If it continues, consequences will be risked. The USSR will be forced to see to it that the Arabs have the means at their disposal to rebuff the Israelis. If the Israelis withdraw, other things will fall into place. The message is somewhat moderate, but it has that threat in it. The President has given me some of his thoughts. Would you agree if I gave them to Sisco and he could work out an answer with you?

R: Does it call for an answer soon?

K: When Dobrynin called, he asked if he could have an answer by
Monday. I said "no." He said, "Tuesday?" I told him I couldn't
accept a deadline. There may be some urgency in our getting to Sisco.
The message said that similar letters have gone to Wilson and Pompidou.

R: I feel we should downplay its importance -- we can't let them give us these ultimatums.

K: The President thinks so too. It would be unfortunate if outside
powers got themselves involved directly or indirectly. I think we should
say we have put our proposal down, and we have stated what we think
of withdrawal.

R: I took a hard line with ______ yesterday.

K: I will call Sisco now.

R: I will get it from Sisco then.

lds

DECEMBER 3, 1970
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Ambassador Freeman

10:30 p.m., January 31, 1970

K: I wanted you to know that the President has had a letter from Kosygin on the Middle East situation. We are supposed to hold this very closely, and are telling only a very few people in our bureaucracy. I understand a similar letter is being sent to your Prime Minister. I wanted you to know that when we have an outline of our reply, Sisco will discuss it with you.

F: Do you think our chap has his letter already?

K: I got ours around 8:00 this evening. Perhaps because of the time differential, you won't get yours for a few hours yet. The letter said similar letters were being sent to Prime Minister Wilson and President Pompidou. In effect, it is moderately threatening -- or threateningly moderate better describes it. It complains about violation of the ceasefire; says the Four Powers have the ability to compel a settlement; and if attacks don't stop, the USSR will have to see to it that the Arabs have the means to rebuff the Israelis. We will take a rather strong stand on the threat and stand entirely on our October 28 proposal.

F: You have made that very clear.

K: You will be told what the main lines of thinking and response are.

F: I may be instructed to come tell you about our thoughts when we have our letter.

K: On another subject, you and I must have a talk next week about the organization of the U. S. Government so your people don't run to the wrong people.

F: Do you have a particular case in mind?

not

K: The conversations in the Oval Office/were/intended to be played back quite the way they were.

F: You better have a candid talk with me. If you tell me specifically what occurred, I think I can deal with it.

K: I'm not complaining about the Prime Minister. I understand that some of your Embassy personnel have been going back to some

By: NARA, Date: 5/27

of our people with some things in meetings at which I was allegedly present.

F: If you will give me chapter and verse, I will deal with it.

K: It makes it hard to do the sort of thing we have to do. I don't mean that I think it was intentional. But it makes it impossible for us here to deal separately.

F: Thanks very much for what you have just told me about the message.

K: We will be meticulous in letting you know our thinking. If you have any thoughts from your side, we will be happy to have them.

lds