DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon

Brian McDonnell

1/21/71 9:20 a.m.

[Missed first sentence]

M: Talked to them and they thought your schedule was the most
taxed. But under these circumstances they accept it. The only thing
they asked is that . . . Tom Davison; I gave you his name. He didn't
call you but his brother might have. Margie Shumar (sp?), and B__ Bell.

K: Are any of them indicted?

M: No.

K: Okay. This may take a week or two to set it up. You are coming
with them?

M: They thought it best for me to.

K: I'd love to be delighted.

M: I'd feel better myself.

K: I still don't have a ruling on what they think. I don't know if the
Secret Service will want to search them, which I would deplore.

M: I would deplore that too. The subject of the discussion would
be non-violence. I mean they are not going to be asking you to intervene
or anything like that.

K: I couldn't. I don't know enough about it to. But I want to do it
and I think I can get it done.

M: Okay. But I have told them and I give you my word, this is
neither a plot to sit in or a plut to get publicity.

K: Okay. We'll get together.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

McGeorge Bundy/Kissinger

1/12/71 9:30 a.m.

B: I've got a couple of questions, one of which I need some constructive judgment on. I hope to come and see you otherwise when you are back.

K: I'd love to see you. I planned to call you on Friday to see when.

B: I've got to come down next week or the one after.

K: You want to have lunch next week?

B: I think I could do that.

K: I think I could do it on Monday or Thursday.

B: While my secretary is bringing my calendar let me talk with you for a minute. I had a talk with Matthew Meselson and he and I are wondering whether there's a chance to getting people to look at the ecological restoration program, rather than an exchange of bad tempers as to how it happened. He has a special concern with the Geneva Convention. oh well, that can wait till lunch [The "he" probably refers to someone else]. I akked what we could do philosophically. He said have a program not to say what happened at this or that, but what is the ecological, constructive future. He found some very good Vietnamese scientists. What I need to know from you is where the most grown-up input point is, where there ought to be a listening point. He says he is not going to Goheen(?).

K: He's good on that and that office is going to take a major interest in it and David at OST is our best contact point.

B: I have great personal regard for Meselson...

K: He is a fine human being and I always use him as a sample of how concerned scientists can solve a problem. The only problem I have on this is that it doesn't surface in a way that's just pointing out moral ineptitude...

B: He is very sensitive to that. This kind of casual use of the preferred (?) weapon is one thing we don't seem able to control in American beligerency.

K: If the war in Vietnam were over and this were seen as a means of disciplining further use of it I would think it essential. We have banned the use of it now. It will be phased out by May. It is being stopped now.

B: Why not sooner?

Telecon
Bundy/Kissinger

1/12/71 9:30 a.m. page 2

NARA, Date 5/26

K: It's a bureaucratic thing. It is not in practice being used now in any substantial way. It was easier to get it done that way and I don't know all the details.

B: One of the things I would like to do is to know who to talk to so this could be part of a reconstruction and not a judgment of the past. Is this something I should call on Mel Laird about?

K: Or J____.

B: Or should we talk about it at lunch? If you could get two sentences about it from the _________. My main thing is that if Meselson is half-way right the government of Vietnam and some scientists are doing some constructive things there. I don't think the President is locked on this.

K: No, he has a good record on it.

B: If he were to say, without anything in the past . . . this is a good thing to say. So why don't you get a sniff of that and we'll discuss it further at lunch. Now what day? Thursday, is that workable?

K: Yes, that's workable.

B: Good. See you then. We'll check on it later next week.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Sisco/Kissinger
1/21/71 10:00 a.m.

S: I keep reading about me and you in the newspapers.

K: I know, but you and I know they aren't true.

S: Why don't you attack me one of these days. Maybe that would help.

K: If you keep up your practices of the last three weeks that's coming.

S: You made one mistake at the last Review Meeting.

K: What was that?

S: You said let Sisco run the tactics and that's what I'm doing.

K: I'm just biding my time.

S: Henry, all the changes in the Sadat letter are good except one. Do you remember on page 6 . . . you don't need to have it in front of you. . .

K: I remember it.

S: When we said "We stand on our past statements of what is contained in that last . . ." There are things involved here -- it's absence will be noted and this is a more general way to put it.

K: But the Israelis have asked us not to do that. They have specifically asked. If this surfaces we'll have a row.

S: They have been trying to get us to back off for three months. We cannot and we will not do that.

K: I'm not asking us to. The letter you sent to Riad as a so-called "personal" letter last week stands. I just don't see why we have to tie the President to that also.

S: That's the point. I don't feel this holds him down and I think you have got a serious problem in reference to that point . . . It really convinces the Egyptians that there is one policy in here and another in the White House.

K: But you people have been putting that out anyway.

S: No we haven't Henry. I don't accept that. Now let's get serious for a minute. That's not true and you know that.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By NARA, Date 5/26", "Telecon\nSisco/Kissinger", "1/21/71 10:00 a.m. page 2", "K: No I don't. You know what's being put out; let's not kid ourselves.", "S: But look at how general this is: \"We continue to give 24x or full support and stand by our past statement . . .\" Here's a change that will further water it down. Have it read just as the Secretary has written Riad. Just say we stand by our past statement . . .\"", "K: That I can go along with.", "S: It hurts me to suggest that but it's a compromise.", "K: Let me think about it but it sounds okay. How is it going?", "S: These people have exchanged substantive positions.", "K: By the way, we have not gotten those memos we asked for on where we stand.", "S: You have gotten some and will have more probably tonight.", "K: Okay. What next?", "S: Next we are convincing Jarring to put out a report to note progress, to obviate the need for a Security Council meeting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
H. J. Heinz II/Kissinger
1/21/71 Noon

H: I mentioned to you the Bilderberg this coming spring. I wanted to confirm your colleagues Rockefeller, George Ball . . . want to extend an invitation. It's in April in Woodstock Vermont.

K: That will make it a lot easier.

H: I will have Joe send you the agenda. One items of particular interest to you: the possible change in relationships around the world in the light of the Nixon Doctrine and how it will affect the Europeans. You think that there's a chance of your doing it?

K: It's probably certain unless some crisis I can't foresee occurs.

H: Of course. Good. I'll be in Washington Monday. Any chance of a drink or dinner or is that a tough day?

K: Every day is tough. Why don't we aim for a drink. Where? How about the Metropolitan Club?

H: Okay, I'm sorry I don't belong to a club in Washington.

K: No, this is good.

H: Okay, what time?

K: 6:30 - 7:00.

H: That would be lovely.

K: Let's say 7:00.

H: Good, that's easier for you. That was a nice piece in the Times.

K: Except every time you get praised you make 75 enemies.

By NARA, Date

5/27

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/HAK

January 21, 1974/12:11 p.m.

K: Anatol

D: How are you? Welcome back. Well, well...

K: The Middle East. We'll gladly let you handle everything from now on.

D: (laughter) Well, You arrived today in the morning but because I have a telegram from Minister, today, that's why I decided to bother you.

K: Not at all.

D: The question is about he asked me to ask you about his proposal (Brezhnev) about meeting with him, Mr. Gromyko and you in Geneva 7th - 8th of February. This could wait until tomorrow but I haven't....

K: I haven't had a chance to talk to the President about it in detail. I think it is going to be technically very tough for me because we have that energy conference and I wanted to take a vacation that week.

D: Is that already an answer or...

K: Give me until tonight. It's almost certainly going to be that it's not a good idea.

D: I understand. I don't want to specifically press you this evening but if you could give me more... an answer really.

K: It looks as if this will be the answer.

D: But should I pass that on now or...

K: Can you wait until tonight?

D: But today yes.

K: Today. I just want to talk to the President once more about it.

D: OK Henry.

K: And then you and I. I have a meeting with Congressional leaders all morning. But I want you to know that the President said to these leaders and I said to these leaders that we maintain the position of joint work with the Soviet Union in that area. That the Soviet Union has vital interests and this is our position and we said that to all of these leaders.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Packard/Kissinger

12:16 p.m.

1/21/71

K: Who is that genious General who kept the President from precipitous action in the M. E. ? I've heard that a couple of times. The President wants to know so we can get his advice more often. Where do you think that came from?

P: REEXXX Probably somewhere around here. Beecher is our fellow.

K: The President asked me to ask you.

P: Tell him I will look into it. I called about the DPRC meeting -- we want to postpone it until next week. Two - three alternatives on what the Congress's reaction might be. If we had the reaction we would know more firmly what we should do. It's what Shultz wants.

K: Monday or Tuesday?

P: Yeah and I will get another document to you.

K: That's fair.

By. C. NARA, Date

5/26

TELECON

Gerard Smith/Mr. Kissinger

12:29 p.m., January 21, 1971

K: Jerry, how are you?

S: Are you calling me?

K: I'm returning your call. You wanted to come over about the budget?

S: I want to send a letter to the President, but I wanted to talk to you first. It's substantially broader than the budget question.

K: If you are living up to the traditions of the Cabinet, can I read it in the STAR today? What is it about?

S: Safeguard, SALT, and the necessity for some high-level statement on the negotiations. We are handicapped by the Soviet position being known and ours not. I want to propose that the President say something.

K: Can it wait until the State of the World report the end of February? I believe the President is going to cover it in that.

S: I think it can wait until then. It will take a lot of work beforehand, and I don't want to staff it until I know for sure.

K: I want to discuss with you two ideas the President has -- on a personal basis. How about 6:00 tonight? I also want to discuss the procedure for handling Safeguard at the NSC meeting. Do you think we need another Verification meeting before that?

S: Not if you can really schedule 1-1/2 hours at the NSC level.

K: Why don't I run over with you the issues to be presented at the NSC meeting -- a statement of the issues which is essentially what we summed up at the last meeting. At another Verification meeting, we can only state our perplexities.

S: If you could get DOD to state...

K: Let me also get a feel for what you have. See you at 6:00.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Max Frankel/Kissinger

2:55 p. m.

1/21/71

K: Al Haig told me that Terrence Smith called yesterday to say you are dealing with the wrap up. I know you won't write on my wishes but I am not interested in scoring points and I just as soon leave matters alix alone. If I have managed to get you to check with me on allegations, I have acheived my purpose.

F: I have one paragraph of the episode which puts it in more accurate framework but it's an aside.

K: Other thinks there are no need to discuss at all. I did that only to --

F: I appreciate that. Absolutely.

K: Two years from now no one will remember who said what but what we did.

F: And you will even survive the NYTimes.

K: May I tell you one thing? When you are told I won or lost a bureaucratic battle you must assume they are wrong because no one knows my position because I take the dark devil's advocate position. To be sure ideas are sound. So that A recommends this and done over the opposition of B is not true. Over all your pieces are thoughtful.

F: I don't know if you know about the request from Rosenthal. I understand it's a bad week. Abe came down once before and we couldn't do it but he is going to VN.

K: I will see him. Next week is bad. But I want to see him on his merits. It will be worked out.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Packard/Kissinger

3:15 p.m.

1/21/71

K: I have been trying to reach Mel and I have to go to the President. We are having a WSAG at 4:00. I understand that Alex Johnson sent you a cable this morning which came out of a meeting with you yesterday.

P: Gen. Hughes sent it over to me now.

K: A copy has gone to the President. He bumped it back to me and he doesn't want cables to go to him. He wants it handled in the WSAG.

P: We have trouble with the wording.

K: No, but we want to discuss it. It may not go. You are not wedded to sending a cable?

P: I talked to Alex and how we will get it there on a secure basis.

K: We want to discuss whether any cable should go.

P: I will be prepared to do so.

K: We just want various alternatives.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. 1/21/71

L: I understand you are trying to get in touch with me. I am meeting with XXXX senior colleagues in the Senate and House. 50 senators and several hundred congressmen.

K: Did you quiet them down?

L: Fulbright and Church are loaded for bear. We are coming out OK. Will be a hell of a flack because these guys are being interviewed and our guys shy away because they don't want to be in the forefront. We will win it.

K: The President asked me to tell you how much he liked your press conference and when he needs a strong xxx right arm you are there.

L: I thought I wouldn't go on the news shows Sunday. I have gone far enough. They wanted to bump Reagan. I thought I should lay low.

K: We want it quited down. He also felt if we go on making TV statements if we could in addition make the point of what he said that if other side steps up infiltration, we will take other steps. He said it on June 3.

L: I have that.

K: If they do that step up rate of infiltration we will step up flow of supplies and more and that's what we are doing.

L: What's happening -- I talked to Long and Stennis. They feel that the President gave them too much assurance and he didn't have to go that far. I know how that goes.

K: That was a mistake. A number of us had doubts then.

L: We will come out OK. I was there when he talked with Albert. I offered to step out but he told the President I was there. Carl feels all right. He will be helpful.

K: Two other things -- the President is operating on the assumption that you are for what we are planning. What we discussed Monday. We have mumblings from State --

L: You have that -- they take that -- I sent it to you and the President. I gave it to you and Bill Rogers and asked it to be confidential. Thieu raised the point that he thought Souvanna would run on us.

K: They sent over a cable today that they tried to get directly to the President.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. 1/21/71

L: They only quote --

K: They want to be sure it's in that you are opposed to it.

L: They say they have in mind Laird's conversation with Thieu and ______ is to be conducted. Bunker called me and said if it gets into State it will not be approved. He said I want you to know that because it will raise the hackles You will have a hell of a time and I hope you don't have to go through channels.

K: the President wants to be sure you are back of him.

L: I recommended it.

K: And that we handle the proposals. Because we get proposals from State and we have to say where you stand. We are counting on you to help us.

L: I will help you.

K: He isn't really eager to get the cable out. The more warning the more opportunity for leaks.

L: I told Packard it will leak before the operation. I said you must hold it close.

K: They insisted on Green and Sullivan. I probably should have vetoed it but they will say we kept their experts out.

L: You don't have to worry about Bundker.

K: We are getting Godley first. The President didn't approve that.

L: Bunker will be helpful to you.

K: We don't want cable traffic started.

L: On the withdrawal they are not even using cable traffic.

K: You have been a great sport and the President is counting on you. We will take heat on this.

L: I called him about the Russell family.

K: He hasn't had a chance to return it yet, has he?

L: I just want him to know what we are doing and we are handling it and we are taking care as best we can.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. 1/21/71

K: When is the funeral?

L: Monday.

K: He was a great man. They drop and the SOBs stay around. Interesting that Kennedy lost.

L: I was over there. I had breakfast with Long. They put the candidates up to calling Long and he wanted to screw Kennedy (this wasn't clear because Laird was laughing). They did a private vote which was 31-44. If it had been roll-call Kennedy would have won.

K: That's something. They should have done it in the Republican caucus.

L: No, it would have been the same. There's not the jockeying going on there. It's interesting.

K: Fascinating. We will be in close touch.

L: I am going to -- on the Hill we are all right. They will give us hell in the Senate tomorrow. Seven guys who are going -- Church leads off with Fulbright.

K: Should we give a briefing on what we are doing?

L: We have a briefing and Vogt is ready to go. They are set up for Monday. I hoped we could do it beforehand. They feel that tomorrow is so screwed up they wanted to wait until Monday but with the funeral they will probably wait until Tues. Johnny will do it.

K: Let's get Green along too. You shouldn't take all the heat.

L: That's right.

K: With ??_?

L: Those guys are okay. Stennis and I had a good visit. He wanted me to know he supported what I said yesterday.

K: He should say it publicly.

L: They get shell-shocked over there. I told him that.

K: They better get into their trenches. There's more coming.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E12368
By NARA Date 051001

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

1/21/71 6:05 p.m.

K: Welcome back.

D: How are you? Why are you travelling around so much?

K: I have to go to Chicago. A year ago I agreed to speak at the meeting of associated Harvard clubs as one of Harvard's distinguished professors. Now I am not a professor any longer.

D: I don't know whether to congratulate you or not.

K: I just hope you'll remember me when I'm teaching at some small school somewhere.

D: Oh I will, I will.

K: My son was very pleased with the book you gave him.

D: Good. Could you send me one of his paintings when he paints something interesting?

K: Yes.

D: But you will be out all day tomorrow?

K: I am leaving at 7:45 in the morning and will come back just before the State of the Union.

D: What about Saturday morning at 10:00.

K: Fine.

D: And I'll come to you.

K: Yes.

D: at the usual place, yes?

K: Yes.

D: 10:00 on Saturday.

K: Good, and good to know you are back.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: Welcome back.

D: Oh I will, I will.

K: Yes.

K: Fine.

D: And I'll come to you.

K: Yes.

D: at the usual place, yes?

K: Yes.

D: 10:00 on Saturday.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Dr. Seaborg
1/21/71; 6:20 p.m.

S: I have been talking to John Ansler (?) about the difficult personnel clearance case involving AEC and I thought I should discuss it with you and Bill Rogers and finally perhaps the four of us could get together. I arranged to see Bill Rogers tomorrow and was hoping we could get together.

K: I will be out of town. How about Saturday?

S: That will be fine but I was planning to go to New York.

K: Well then let's do it Monday and we will call you office with the time.

S: That would be fine. Okay and we will have our girls get together on a time.

feg

NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ron Ziegler
1/21/71; 7:00 p.m.

Z: I talked to the Secretary of Defense today and told him how well he did on TV. I told him I hoped there were no problems. (K put on the laughing box) What is that? my

K: I have just flipped lid. It is just getting to me.

Z: What is it? Where did you get that? What is that?

K: Next time Dobrynin calls me I will say all I have to say is this and put it on.

Z: Where did you get that. What is it? Is that on a tape recorder?

K: Okay, now what do you have to say? It's a little machine.

Z: I want to get one.

K: It gives people confidence about their security advisor. Now when anybody asks if you are really the second most powerful man all you have to do is use this.

Z: We talked about the Nixon Doctrine and so forth and Ineedled him a little about Jerry Green. Said it was a PR goof and certainly was not policy. In any event he said he did not feel inclined to testify on the Hill until after the President's foreign policy message went up. But I heard on TV that Rogers is inclined to testify. It doesn't make a damn bit of difference to me. It seems it would be better off to testify than not.

K: Look, we are going to take so much heat in the next few weeks it really doesn't matter.

Z: Why does Laird always want to play it so cute?

K: Because he is a little boy. He must have been the cutest little boy in Lawrence or wherever he is from.

Z: Was he upset with me?

K: The key to Laird is he bitches one morning and then he goes on to something else. If Rogers bitches he keeps it up.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

-2-

K: Laird bitched to me Wednesday morning and then he has not said anything more. I would not worry about him. I think you are in a strong <u>PRAX</u> position.

Z: I think if Committees call us to testify we should do it right away.

K: I think that is right. One point that the President keeps making is in his June 3 speech he said if they step up infiltrations we will do what is necessary and he said that we should hit on that when we have an opportunity.

<u>is not (?)</u>

K: <u>Times</u> is going to write a separate story on the year end ________.
They are going to have one short paragraph in the wrap up of Frankel (?)
He may say relations are so awful they may be a major menace.

feg

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Prof. Hoffman
1/22/71; 10:00 p.m.

H: Nice of you to call me back.

K: It was good to see you the other day.

H: I must say I don't think our colleagues were at their best.

K: They were 100 percent predictable.

H: It was also slightly too large a group. You will be seeing Guido
tomorrow?

K: It turns out I have to go with the President to Georgia -- something
for Russell.

H: Much to my annoyance and indignation one of the students has
finally spoken to the _Crimson_. Actually it is of no great interest.
It was the girl who started stammering, and I gather she has been
under pressure from other students. The others have been quite
annoyed over it.

K: Is it a nasty piece?

H: A silly piece, yes. Very stupid. Were her own feelings. When
I asked here why she did it she ddid it because of what has been
happening in Cambodia, etc.

K: What the hell do they think is happening in Cambodia? You know
there are only about 20,000 South Vietnamese involved and the
____ of air operations is ridiculous.

H: I know. I want to apologize for the group and I hope it won't make
it difficult for other groups.

K: No. It is unfortunate. What it probably means is some journalist
doing an assassination piece will probably pick that up. But if he wants
to do it he will find something else anyhow. As soon as I get off the
world report I would love to have you come down and have a chat.

H: And when you come up please let me know.

feg

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
HAK-President
1/24/71
2:30 p.m.

This is just the tail end of the conversation.

K: What I will do is keep this thing going forward and keep the others committed to it and then you cancel it if you agree as your decision and not as a result of anybody's pressure on you.

P: ... I think we want to go the summit route and risk the fact that we may not have one or ... The best legacy we could leave is to kick the hell out of Vietnam. ?? Before 1972.

K: We should think beyond 1972.

P: We've got to think in terms of the fact that every day we are here we've got to do those things that no one else will do. ?????

K: I dictated a conversation I had yesterday and I think you will find it significant. In the meantime I'll keep planning on going forward with the clear understanding that final orders will not be given for another 10 days.

P: In terms of the announcement I think you are absolutely right. Let that come naturally. My own view is that if we do choose the summit route, once we have done the Cambodian thing then in our interest it is better to get the announcement a little earlier than a little later.

K: When -- about the middle of March?

P: Yes, March 15. March 15 gives us a ride on it. April 15 troop thing is going to be a dud. I am not going to make it.

K: With the other announcement, you don't really need it. I think we can do it around March 15 and by that time we should have shown enough progress in the two areas we discussed and of course you can have launched the Vienna talks. By that time the basis will be in place or they will never be in place.

P: Let's see what these options are: We will discuss them at very top level -- only among ourselves, first. Moorer I have great confidence in. You, Haig, myself and Moorer will kick the thing around. Then we will go the Laird and the others.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Gen. Clay/Kissinger

1/25/71 9:05 a.m.

C: Thank you for calling.

K: My schedule got all screwed up. I should have called you during
the weekend.

C: That's all right. I called you regarding the investigation of Radio
Free Europe but then I found out the White House already knew about it and
had tried to stop it.

K: We knew about it too late. The bureaucracy knew about it for six
weeks and told us 24 hours before.

C: That's criminal.

K: It's an outrage.

C: It really is, and I didn't think Case was that kind of fellow.

K: No. But we were not told till 24 hours before and for six weeks
State and CIA had been flapping around about it without telling us.

C: Well, that's what I was calling about. But by the time I got the
call through I was reading about it in the papers so it was too late. But I've
been a supporter of Case for a long time and that he would do this without
even telling anyone really makes me burn. One other question Henry: Did
that Acheson statement take you by surprise.

K: Totally.

C: That's what I thought.

] K: And it wasn't set up for that purpose.

C: I know, that's why it's such a shock to me.

K: The value of this group is so the President can let down his hair
with them.

C: And it only arouses enmity in this country and challenges Brandt in
his own country.

K: We did not know about it or authorize it; we would have
it had we known about it. And for him to blast the Secretary of State didn't help
either. I will keep you posted.

NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELCOM
V. P. /Kissinger
10:20 a. m. 1/25/71

VP: I am fine. I say I am. It makes no difference.

K: It makes a difference to me.

VP: I have a cold. Senators, President and Reagan and I met with John Mitchell. In the course of the meeting the President asked me to get in touch with you to arrange a trip to Japan for Reagan the latter this year. Also Korea and a couple of other countries. I don't know the details but he asked me to call.

K: I will talk to you later. Are you in town this week?

VP: I am here today but out of town on revenue sharing this week.

K: Today I am swamped. But I would like to get in touch to see you to catch up.

VP: I would like that. (coughs).

K: You really do have a cold.

VP: The first in a year and a half and it's a (bute?). (He questions his staff re seeing HAK tomorrow morning). Tomorrow is impossible.

K: When will you be back?

VP: Friday afternoon.

K: I will be out of town.

VP: How about Sat.?

K: I am taking my children to Cape Kennedy.

VP: I will be there too.

K: Will you be there Sat. night?

VP: No, I am not going until Sunday. I haven't made my decision.

K: Let's do it early next week. Did my Harvard colleagues come after you on fund raiding?

VP: Yes. I don't know when there will be. I think an appointment is in process.

K: It shows that greed is more important than principle.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Dr. Low/Kissinger
10:28 a.m. 1/25/71

L: I wanted to report to you on some excellent discussions in Moscow between the Soviet Union and ourselves. We were well recieved and the results exceeded my hopes. We have an initial agreement covering essentially all areas we discussed before I sent. They were willing to discuss freely with us. Time will tell whether they will follow through. We will work in working groups and meet in 6 mos. to a year. First inidcations are good. I took up the possibility of a joint docking experiment with us. Their reaction was positive. They would like to think about it. They asked that we not discuss it publicly.

K: That doesn't give us trouble.

L: I was pleased with his reaction.

K: I am delighted.

L: As far as public statements are concerned, I talked with Peter Flanigan Saturday. He thought the President might want to say something about the general xxx tone now. But since we released a communique on the general tone I wonder if it wouldn't be more appropriate for the President to wait until the 60 days are up when we can release the entire document.

K: Yes and the President is putting out a document at the end of next month on our relations with several countries. Why don't you do a memo to me on what the President can say about this.

L: A memo to you I have done and where things stand now and also saying that I have a commitment tomorrow to talk with the House Committee of Astronautics and Science (?). I intend to go into this but not beyond what we have in the communique.

K: I haven't seen the contents.

L: It was general and released in both countries.

Would

K: Fine. Do you draft a few pages on what the President can say on space cooperation?

L: I will have it in a few days.

K: See you this weekend.

L: Delighted you are coming down.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:33 a.m. 1/25/71

D: I received the following reply. The reply goes like follows: the name of the representative who might handle this matter from your side as well as from our side was not mentioned and will not be mentioned. This is for sure. For your personal information, the boss of that man and himself were generally informed of the possibility of a letter of the subject. They warned to handle information with extreme care.

K: I appreciate this. I will proceed as discussed and make an appointment latter this week.

D: When do you expect this man?

K: I will let you know when we meet. I talk to the President on Sat. and his response was positive.

D: We will meet this week.

K: Godd.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

KELCON
V. P. /Kissinger
12:05 p. m. 1/25/71

VP: My manifest is for the Cape shot shows you and two children and two guests.

K: No.

VP: You are doing the night before?

K: Yes and no guests.

VP: Thank you.

K: You are terribly nice. I may want to come back with you with my children. You are terribly nice.

By

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON

Secretary Packard/Mr. Kissinger

1:53 p.m., January 25, 1971

K: What is that intelligence unit doing charting my staff?

P: I didn't see anything on that.

K: I sent a note to Mel concerning the SA intelligence unit of DIA which was assigned to chart Kissinger's staff; they gave it up because it was too complicated. I told Mel in the next Review Group we could wash that one out.

P: I didn't know about it.

K: I was just kiddinging Mel.

P: This manpower thing -- after asking to put off the DPRC last week, we have now a time element. I think the issues are pretty well defined now -- we are down to $4 billion for the all-volunteer force concept. BOB wanted to put more money into II Category. We wanted to keep a fair amount out so we could do some experimentation. We have moved along a lot closer to their position and can allocate more after talking to people on the Hill. But we have to go further. It's a question of whether the draft can be extended two years or more and there's a question on student deferments.

K: We have a meeting scheduled for Wednesday.

P: I think it's Thursday. But if you have trouble scheduling it, maybe the working people can get together and get essential agreement. Mel has to go up the first of February before the main Committee and talk about manpower. Flanigan is concerned that we get an agreed position soonest.

K: Maybe I can move the meeting to tomorrow.

P: If you can't, maybe we can work it out at the staff level.

K: The issues you raised I am not so concerned about working at the staff level. But I would like the longer range issues discussed in the DPRC meeting. I will let you know.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/24

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

2:15 p.m., January 25, 1971

K: How are you, Mel?

L: Did you have a pleasant weekend? I had one or two things to check with you on. (1) I got the memo on slipping the Foreign Policy report another week. I'm going up this afternoon and speak to those Committees to get those appearances delayed. They have me scheduled for the 3rd and 4th of March.

K: If they can move it to the 17th, all right.

L: If they put up a stink, I may be coming back at you and work it out for the 7th and 8th of March.

K: Your posture statement isn't the big problem we have.

L: The only problem I have here is trying to get... The Armed Services Committee think we are their friends and they can't understand...

K: See if you can get a week out of them.

L: I thought I should keep you informed. Mahon and Stennis will try to cooperate, but WAK when I tell them two weeks, they will bitch.

(2) On the work we are doing on the posture statement, I understood we would get a copy of the rough draft of the Foreign Policy statement.

K: We will send you the strategic chapters -- which you are mainly concerned with. We will send you everything we have ready starting today.

L: I want to tie in our thrust with yours.

K: We got behind. But we will send it today or tomorrow.

L: I will put Bill Baroody on it.

K: Could I ask you not to let it bounce all over your building. You are not our problem anyway, but we would appreciate it.

L: (3) They evidently have gone public because I didn't approve those trucks for China.

K: God damn it; I know it.

L: I just said no.

By.

NARA, Date. 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

2:15 p.m., January 25, 1971

K: You did what you were supposed to.

L: I said no. This idea of my dragging my feet on a decision. I am going to be asked publicly. At the hearings, I will have to say I oppose it. If I am going to be overruled, I don't care. I can't take another position right now.

K: You won't be overruled by us.

L: (4) I have been having a quiet visit with one of the fine leaders from the Marine Corps -- Chapman. We had a long talk this morning. I told him I would go along with Cushman for Deputy at the time Chapman retires. Here is the problem within the Marine Corps which I think should be understood by you and the President. If Cushman had not been at CIA, he would have been forced to retire one year ago. He is senior to Chapman. I wonder whether we shouldn't put the people to work to make Cushman a four-star general at CIA?

K: I will have to consider it and will talk to the President. It's certainly a possibility.

L: We wouldn't have to wait for Chapman's retirement. We have forced four Generals to retire, including Chapman, as they come up with... We have stuck to that policy in the Marine Corps. If he had not been at CIA, we would have had to retire him one year ago. They consider him out of the Marine Corps, so the law didn't apply to him.

K: Let me talk to the President. This is a real problem. We don't want stories that we rammed it down their throats.

L: I think we should look at it. Chapman thinks it will be a morale problem because they forced four others to retire this year. Should I send that Davis thing over for Deputy?

K: Hold it for a day or two while I clear the whole thing up.

L: Hughes went and told Cushman, and Cushman talked to Helms.

K: The whole thing is a mess now.

L: I thought I would have to have Cushman come over to talk today or tomorrow.

K: Let me talk to the President about the four-star possibility. If the President insists on the Deputy, you could still bring him over.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

2:15 p.m., January 25, 1971

L: I won't talk to Cushman for a while. (5) The President called me Friday about a few of these operations -- the commando-type things. I told him the plans are lined up. I told him not to put them on the platter just-now. We can look them over. There are several things that can be done. When I was talking to him, I told him about a section I had in my report. He said he didn't have my trip report yet.

K: I'm sure it's in his bag.

L: I said I was sure it went over.

K: I have a copy and I am sure he has. It must be a clerical mix-up.

L: I locked myself up for two days to do that report.

K: I will check on it and call you back. He usually reads these things over the weekend, and I'm sure he had it with his weekend reading.

L: Okay, Henry. Thank you. Good-bye.

K: Good-bye.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Irwin
1/25/71; 7:30 p.m.

K: On that cable you brought me, we would like to change the thing in two ways. I have already discussed it with Bill. Rather than make it a telegram from the President we would like to have Godley do it and saying Administration believes (?). Secondly, we would like it phrased in such a way -- No, that's alright all of this is considering -- otherwise it is fine. You look at it to make sure he is not saying definitely he will do it. You might say that this is pending his reaction.

I: I did not have a chance to talk with you, Henry. I would like to talk it over with you.

K: The President has addressed this great lengths so we can't go too far away from it. I will arrange a meeting so that the President can exchange his views on Wednesday. Are you against it?

I: I didn't want to see the President. I have apprehensions about it. Are we lunching on Wednesday?

K: Yes. We can talk about it on Wednesday. We have to get Souvanna's reaction on this.

I: I agree. We have to move quickly on that.

K: We will not give the final okay until the weekend.

I: I will look forward to Wednesday.

K: If when you read the messageover you feel it promises it absolutely flatly ...

I: I think that one paragraph makes it very clear but I will check it. Fine, Henry, the only other question I have is these annual reports. Maybe we can talk again on Wednesday.

K: But we sent some of the material over, We sent four chapters over this morning.

I: Well, I asked this morning. I guess we got them after I asked.

K: Now something will come over everyday. If we could read comments somewhere else besides the newspaper . . . I know where they come from.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

I: We can argue on that.

K: I know everything on the world report comes from State. Max Frankel said that yesterday -- the fact that State was elbowed out of it, etc. You ought to talk to Richardson about it.

I: Okay.

K: But at any rate you have four chapters and you //will be getting more everyday.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
John Roche
8:50 p.m., 1/25/71

K: My, God. I tell you you are not honorable anymore in the circle from which I come. Here we all love you but among the academicians your name is going to sink into oblivion next to mine. In this building everybody loved that article.

R: I got a letter from Dean Rusk. He said the only thing I neglected to point out was that he fired Hillen ______ (?)

K: Except for one or two White House assistants that see the President daily no one really knows what the hell the President is thinking. Presidents get to be Presidents by not telling everybody what they are thinking. I don't even know 1/10th of it in domestic affairs and I don't even know everything in foreign policy. I don't even know who the Under Secretary of the Air Force is.

R: Neither did Lyndon Johnson. I got a call from President Johnson and he asked who is this Hoppies (?). I am going stir crazy. With the exception of Bill Bundy and a couple of others there is nobody to talk with. I am going to be coming down to Washington tomorrow and will stay a few days. If don't know what you schedule is -- is it possible to get together for lunch?

K: Lunch is impossible but why don't you call my office to see if we can get together. I will make some time for you.

R: The Cambodia thing is starting to get absurd.

K: We had 15 air support missions a day and they make it sound as if we were bombing Hamburg.

R: I know! I have been there. Alright, I will be staying at Watergate and I will give you a ring tomorrow afternoon. I don't want to sound deprecatory. I don't think the state of the world will be altered that much.

K: We need it for internal reasons. We have State plus leadership problems.

R: You know what they said about Katzenbach. I once offered the option of making me Under Secretary of State and I would be there for six months and then they could have an EXECUTIVE execution but in the intervening six months I would through out all of those bums.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
John Roche
1/25/71; 8:50 p.m.

-2-

K: Somebody has to do that sometime.

R: I still think you ought to get Graham Martin back in there. He is a tough guy. He really has the wammie on those guys. They can't impeach his credentials because he is an insider. I disagree with him basically, but he is first-rate.

K: Give me a call tomorrow and congratulations.

R: Thank you.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Hill/Kissinger

10:15 a.m. 1/26/71

K: I just talked to the President and he thought it would be nice if you sat in on the m-eting with Juan Carlos. Just you and the Spanish Amb. but not the FonMin. Will you arrange that? And could you give me a memo?

H: I will give you a memo of conversation.

K: The President is goosy about distributing that so let me do that from here.

H: I will send you one copy.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Gerard Smith

1/26/71 11:05 a.m.

S: Since the burden of what I would say if asked to say something is contained in a letter of the 21st, I assume the President has seen it.

K: Right.

S: One pther point. You recall at Helsinki we proposed that the SAM upgrade question be given ______ and we agreed in the interim on the membership and terms of reference for the working group. The Sov- iets said that sounded good, but said they would like a month to respond. Well, one month has passed. I would like to talk with Dobrynin and get an answer. I generally lunch with him once in these periods. I wanted to see if you had any problem with my asking about that.

K: I see none.

S: Okay.

K: I would like for you to confine your comments to the part of your letter relevant to the Safeguard decision.

S: Right.

K: The letter is on his desk. I cannot swear to you that he has read it. But I will make sure if he hasn't already that he has read it by the time the meeting takes place.

S: Okay. Thank you.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Frank Shakespeare
1/26/71 11:15 a.m.

S: Are you returning my call?

K: Yes.

S: I called because I am back. I have spent three weeks in the Middle East and thought we might talk about it.

K: I am writing the world report so this is a horrible week, but let me set something up within next week.

S: Okay.

K: How are you?

S: I am fine. This was the most wearing but enlightening trip I have ever taken, particularly in the area around the Gulf. But I'll fill you in on it. What's new here? Anything specific?

K: Nothing but bureaucratic wrangles.

S: That Radio Free Europe thing I found disturbing.

K: The bureaucracy is in a state of acute rebellion. And it will get worse as '72 approaches.

S: I'll talk with you about that when I see you.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 p.m., January 26, 1971

K: I just wanted to touch base with you. Re that cable from Godley, we should make Godley tell Souvanna a little more so that he has no misconceptions of what is involved.

R: I don't know why Godley didn't do it. I think he has to tell him exactly what we have in mind. If he has objections and claims duplicity, it would be a KXXX catastrophe.

K: He should know what we are doing. The President agreed in principle. Also tomorrow at that meeting, for your information I will see to it that I raise some questions so that we get it before the President and have a free discussion about it.

R: Bill Sullivan said you mentioned something about Stennis.

K: He said something to me. I don't think we should talk to Senators before we have made -- or are very close to -- an irrevocable decision.

R: In the case of Stennis, I read the colloquy he engaged in with Ellender and Javits. Javits described exactly what we have in mind. Stennis indicated that maybe 'in and out' would be all right. He acquiesced to what Javits described. Javits was almost prophetic. I think we would have to be sure Stennis was on board. If there is a diplomatic upheaval, we have to get Stennis.

K: My judgment is we have to make sure Stennis would come along. But I would not do that without making sure the President has talked to him. We have no right to assume that.

R: If we get on the verge of going ahead, I think the President should talk to him and lay it on the line.

K: That is what we did on Cambodia with Stennis, and Stennis agreed with it. I think it's a little premature now.

R: I do, too.

K: ... before the President makes the final decision to go ahead.

NARA, Date 5/26

3:30 p.m., January 26, 1971

R: We are in accord.

K: I just wanted to check with you about your feelings about the Godley cable. I asked Bill Sullivan to lay it on the line and tell them exactly what we have in mind. I don't think we should pretend something else. We shouldn't say it's just a raid. We should say what we have in mind.

K: I think we have to give some feel for the length. That assessment the President had makes the specific point that if it is short, it will not be very effective. Therefore, I think if we go in there, we should go in with the determination to stay through the better part of the dry season.

R: There's no point in doing it unless you do.

K: The heat won't get any less.

R:] It will get greater.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Irwin/Kissinger

6:30 p.m. 1/26/71

I: On the telegram. I showed it to the Secy. and his point of concern is the point of 6 weeks. He feels it's just dissembling (?) that ~~ everything based on season. That's what went in~~ the earlier cable. He had to leave to dress for a dinner and he called Packard and after talking to him said it was agreeable to Dave. Leaves dry season in and added at the end % of the phrase "if this is not acceptable to him and a shorter period would be acceptable, please advise for our consideration."

K: I would say during much of the dry season.

I: You mean in the earlier part?

K: They would expect to stay in place during much of the dry season. The President wants it to be as easy as possible for Souvanna.

I: The Secy's point is --

K: I understand.

I: Your thought is during much of the dry season unless forced to withdraw or ____. Please advise for our consideration.
Marshall just walked in and wanted to say something. Marshall said shorter period but no less than 6 weeks.

K: Let me go back to the President on this. ~~He didn't~~
so forbidding to them.

I: The Secy. is -- no use repeating -- feels strongly and sorry he couldn't talk to you.

K: Would he settle for much of the dry season?

I: He would prefer not to ~~PM~~ but I think he would settle.

K: Tell him if he does that we don't have to go back to the President
Also the President wants Souvanna asked if he feels he must protest couldn't he ask for the withdrawal of both North and South Vietnam forces.

I: I thought that was in the other cable.

K: He wants it reiterated.

I: OK.

K: Could you raise the sentence and call me?

I: Going back to the other earlier one about notifing someone.