UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE

TO THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

APO New York 09667

November 26, 1968

Mr. William R. Kintner
Deputy Director
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Room 102 - 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Dear Bill:

Your letter of November 22 prompts me to add a few
observations growing out of the events of last week.
I am convinced, but more importantly a number of key
Europeans are convinced, that some major readjustments
are in process within Europe and potentially between
Europe and the United States. It is still too early
to do more than suggest the lines of evolution but
several ingredients seem reasonably clear. First,
the post-de Gaulle period comes closer. Second, some
extremely interesting questions are posed about the
position and role of Germany, how she sees herself and
how others see her.

There can be little doubt of the diminishment of French
authority in Europe, which was given a major push forward
in May and June, accelerated by the Czechoslovakian
affair; but with only a slight erosion of the French
determination to continue to obstruct European
developments. On the other hand, other European states
may be more ready in the face of French obstructionism
to move ahead either within the European Community or
NATO or outside these institutions where France is
resistent or passive. It is just conceivable that there
may be some break on the pervasive issue of U.K. entry
into Europe. I would suspect, however, that before
making any substantive concession the French will first
exhaust every tactical device -- the so-called "commercial
arrangement" would be a case in point.

-2-

You are aware of the rumors floating about, some of which are undoubtedly set in motion by Paris, about the possibilities of U.K.-French nuclear cooperation, with the vague suggestion that this might be one of the prices for France's retreating from her veto of British entry. Ted Heath is said to be thinking along these lines. I suspect that as economic and political power erodes France will be even more determined to maintain her military nuclear position; just as Wilson's government has done.

All of this leads to the need for a serious evaluation of what this flow of events might imply for Germany and for us. In studying this question, it is necessary to factor in the increased reliance by Western forces on nuclear weapons. The military strength of the Soviet Union and her satellites, the obvious willingness to use force, and the at best only partial improvement of Western conventional forces leads one inevitably to the foregoing conclusion.

A further factor is, of course, the German new-found sense of power arising out of their economic preeminence and the fact that for the first time they have been prepared to stand alone -- and prevail -- against the arrayed forces of their Western allies. The failure of this onslaught, in fact, may very well cause the French to seek to counter-balance their loss of power by using their military nuclear position (in my view, at best a political-psychological and not a significant military entity) to work out some special arrangements with Britian or possibly to attempt to revive the 1958 proposal. I heard today that de Gaulle has been putting pressure on Bonn to sign the NPT, a switch in French tactics.

If this speculation has any validity, then it could sharpen to a dangerous extent discrimination against Germany and an even sharper resentment of this discrimination on the part of the Germans at a time when they feel strong economically, but highly vulnerable politically, a target as well of relentless Soviet attack.

While this line of speculation seems to me highly plausible, I am struck by the unwillingness of practically everyone, American or European, to think systematically and seriously about the nuclear problem just posed. You know as well as anyone how the NPT makes difficult the development of a European regional nuclear arrangement, perhaps the only tolerable way of dealing with this fundamental problem of discrimination. We also all unhappily live in the backwash of the MLF affair. (If you have not seen it, I commend to you a recent issue of *The New Leader* which carries not only Neustadt's little essay for Johnson but a typical Socialist diatribe on the nuclear problem, more particularly, of the MLF itself.)

The purpose of this note is to outline briefly these speculations and to suggest the advantages of some hard, non-governmental thinking on this range of subjects. One of the unique benefits of a change of Administration is to allow people to stand back from the contemporary scene and existing policies and to see if some new approaches are not only desirable but essential. As you realize from my previous letter, I am most apprehensive that in this period of flux we avoid the temptation to make policy the easy way, which would be to dust off past approaches and attempt to apply them to new situations. Specifically, I am even more convinced that we will be faced by the temptation to revive Franco-American bilateral arrangements, the same may be true of the American-British "special arrangement", or even of some trilateral British-French-American hegemony. I am convinced that each and all of these courses of action would fail and that the heart of our policy must be to use our influence subtly and tenaciously in order to move the Europeans toward a greater degree of unity, within the framework of some sort of two pillar Atlantic relationship.

To lighten your day, and bearing in mind all the talk about a European caucus in NATO, I commend to you the attached quotation from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.

With best wishes,

Enclosure: As stated

[LC]

# QUOTATIONS FROM ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND*

## Quotations from Chapter III: "A Caucus Race and a Long Tale"

"They were indeed a queer-looking party that assembled on the bank ... all dripping wet, cross, and uncomfortable. The first question of course was, how to get dry again; they had a consultation about this ... "

"...It doesn't seem to dry me at all. In that case ... I move that the meeting adjourn for the immediate adoption of more energetic remedies'."

"...The best thing to get us dry would be a Caucus race'."

"'What _is_ a Caucus race?'...."

"...The best way to explain it is to do it'."

"...They began running when they liked and left off when they liked, so that it was not easy to know when the race was over. However, when they had been running half an hour or so, and were quite dry again, the Dodo suddenly called out, 'The race is over!', and they all crowded round it, panting, and asking 'But who has won?'"

"At last the Dodo said, 'Everybody has won, and all must have prizes'."

"Alice thought the whole thing very absurd, but they all looked so grave that she did not dare to laugh ..."

* Lewis Carroll, Grosset & Dunlap, 1946.

The subject assigned to me for this presentation is "An ABM System. Yes or No." I prefer to present it as "ABM System. Yes."

How do you want to live?

Does living under a balance of terror excite and please you?

Are you willing to accept, for all times, a national strategy which means living in fear of the Soviets, not just for today and tomorrow but for the rest of your natural life?

Do you want actions of our government colored primarily by Soviet actions rather than actions based upon a reasoned analysis of what is in the best interest of our country and the best interests of our trusting allies?

Do you want small and insignificant nations seizing our ships upon the high seas?

If these are the things you like, then you must have reveled in the tense situation and fear of impending doom brought about by the Cuban missile crisis, as described by the late Senator Robert Kennedy.

You must have been excited by the seizure of the U.S. Ship Pueblo and waited impatiently for the next act of the drama.

I am not critical of our reactions to these crises; these were trials we had to endure. These were phases in our development, the results of the invention and deployment of new weapons. These new weapons brought about the "Balance of Terror," resulting in the strategy of "Assured Destruction," THE ONLY possible strategy for the present and the immediate future.

2

My plea is that we do not accept, as a permanent thing, a strategy which will lead to more and bolder confrontations, either directly or by proxy, with the Soviets as they match or exceed our nuclear offensive capability. Such a strategy could lead to the subjugation or destruction of our nation if the Soviets should develop an effective strategic defensive force, while, at the same time, we were led to believe that a nuclear balance still existed.

When we accept this strategy of "Assured Destruction" or "The Balance of Terror," we mean that we must have the capability to destroy the Soviet Union as a viable nation even after suffering a surprise first strike.

Only since the early 50's have we ever believed that we must have the forces in being to totally destroy a potential enemy. Prior to that time the planners held that we had to have sufficient forces in being to defend our country while greater forces were created in order to carry the war to the enemy.

Even under those circumstances we have never insisted that our forces had to be sufficient to devastate, or lay waste, to an entire country. The objective has always been to have sufficient strength to destroy or defeat the enemy forces or destroy his war-making potential. The objective has been that he sue for peace, surrender, and accept defeat. Once we had accomplished this and victory was ours, we did not continue to destroy his country, rather we gave moral and physical assistance to him in rebuilding and resuming his place in the family of nations. We pride ourselves on being builders, not destroyers.

When our most knowledgeable authorities, those charged with the defense of our country, can say that out Strategic Offensive and Defensive

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Forces have the capability to blunt any enemy attack, keep the damage to our country to an acceptable level and permit us to continue as a viable nation — we can change from a strategy of "Assured Destruction" to one of "Measured Damage." It would no longer be essential to destroy all of the industry and population of the enemy; no longer essential to destroy him as a viable nation. It would be necessary to inflict only sufficient damage to insure that he recognized that the employment of armed force against us was not rewarding and not the best way to settle international disputes.

Weapons change and each spectacular advance leads to the idea of changes in the basic principles of war. However, the pendulum swings, although sometimes slowly, and the old laws of force and counterforce, of action and reaction, hold — the offense outstrips the defense — intensive defensive efforts are applied, the defense is soon back in the picture.

When the nuclear bomb was first exploded it dwarfed man's thinking and momentarily made him believe that the ultimate weapon had arrived. When the bomb was placed upon the end of a ballistic missile, many were convinced that the ultimate weapon was really here. However, there soon was talk of defenses against the simple missile. Decoys and penetration aids were added to missiles to assure that they could penetrate defenses. Defensive missiles also made advances. The knowledge gained in making improvements in offensive missiles has been applied to improving the defensive missiles. Thus the never ending battle between the offense and the defense has continued.

This is not a battle, however, which means that as we install defenses there is no net gain. As the defensive forces attain the capability to protect the offensive missiles, the numbers of missiles required to perform the

4

offensive role will be reduced by the numbers of weapons calculated to be
saved from destruction before launch by the defense.

The "Assured Destruction" strategy has worked as well as it has
because we have had the preponderance of Strategic Offensive force. An
examination of our strength versus the Soviets shows there have been
changes made.

Let us look at both the U. S. and the Soviet Forces. We do know that
within the last three years the Soviets have greatly increased their Offen-
sive Missile Force and we do know that there has been a sharp change in
Soviet policy or at least our interpretation of that policy. In the spring
of 1965 our Secretary of Defense stated that:

> The Soviet leaders "have decided that they
> have lost the quantitative race; and they are
> not seeking to engage in that contest." 1/

At that particular time the Soviets had less than 340 ICBMs, or were given
credit for about that number.

That a change has taken place is shown by an article appearing in the
Washington Post, October 26, 1968, wherein the Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Clifford, gave figures showing the U. S. with 1054 ICBMs and the Soviets
with 900 ICBMs.

A check of the reports released over the past two years shows that
a new ICBM has been added to the Soviet inventory approximately every
second day.

Any knowledgeable person examining the figures must see that we are
now operating under the "Balance of Terror."

1/ U.S. News and World Report, April 12, 1965.

5

While the figures quoted refer to Soviet Strategic Offensive weapons, we have the testimony of Secretary of Defense McNamara before the Congressional Committees early in 1968, which stated that we know that the Soviets have installed an ABM system around Moscow and we must ....
"plan our Forces on the assumption that they will have deployed some sort of an ABM system around their major cities by in early 1970's." 2/

That the Soviets have a different outlook on ABMs than our authorities have had is shown by statements made by Mr. Kosygin, in London in February 1967 according to reports.

"Kosygin distinguished between defensive and offensive weapons and said the latter were less likely to increase international tensions. He admitted that the ABM system was more expensive, but said cost could not be a criterion for this decision." 3/

Should the Soviets have the ABM system around Moscow and an ABM system around their major cities in the early 70's, such a condition could be exceedingly destabilizing. Certainly we would not test those defenses. Should the Soviets believe, even though mistakenly, that their defenses could blunt an attack of ours it would be almost as bad for us as if it were true. Should they believe they could blunt an attack, with acceptable losses, and so announce to the world, the world would be prone to believe. It could be expected that many U.S. citizens would believe also, and the uproar could be much worse than the cry of "missile gap" in 1960. The six years lost, the lead time to build and install a defensive system, could not be recovered. We would have to live subject to Soviet blackmail.

2/ Secretary McNamara before Senate Armed Services Committee, February 1, 1968.

3/ Washington Post, February 10, 1967.

6

Let us assume that we will continue to operate under an "Assured Destruction" strategy. I have set forth below the arguments for and against this strategy.

The arguments for the "Assured Destruction" strategy are:

1. It should deter a nuclear attack upon the U.S. as long as the Soviets believe they will be destroyed by retaliation to such an attack, or until they are convinced the U.S. is about to launch an attack upon them.

2. It should permit the U.S. to pursue its foreign policy up to the point of direct confrontation with the Soviets.

3. It should reduce the reasons for an arms race and help to hold within bounds the cost of strategic forces if both sides are convinced that assured destruction can always be maintained.

The arguments against this strategy are:

1. It is not a war waging strategy and provides no war termination capability. Should deterrence fail and general nuclear war develop it can be expected to result in the destruction of the U.S. as a viable nation.

2. It makes it essential that the U.S. consider most carefully Soviet vital interests and avoid transgressing them, recognizing, all the while, that it is impossible to know exactly what the Soviets consider such interests.

3. As the U.S. Strategic Offensive Forces have little coercive value and have little value except for deterrence of general nuclear war, other major forces must be provided or lack of such forces must be accepted as a very important limitation on national policy.

7

4. It is not a strategy which encourages other nations to ally themselves with the U.S. because it is impossible for them to believe that the U.S. would support, defend and save them, regardless of what commitments had been given, if it meant the assured destruction of the U.S.

Because of the importance of this element, I repeat, that it is a strategy which could fail if the Soviets ever believe they have sufficient defensive capability to blunt or make acceptable the damage which a U.S. attack could inflict upon them. Confronted with a Soviet which had a major damage limiting capability it could result in an unbalanced view of relative deterrence. This could lead to more aggressive actions on the part of the Soviets, and a reduced willingness to negotiate over misunderstandings. The U.S., possessing no important damage limiting capability for itself would be under great restraints in all its actions and subject to nuclear blackmail. And finally, it is a reactive and not a forcing strategy; the security of the U.S. and the future of our people and society would be almost completely dependent upon the Soviet Union and to a lesser extent upon Communist China.

Having examined the arguments for and against present strategy, let us see what the results of adding an effective Ballistic Missile Defense to our Offensive Strategic Forces could likely be.

The arguments for such a strategy are:

1. It would deter Soviet nuclear attack upon the U.S. unless the Soviets became convinced the U.S. was about to launch an all-out attack upon them.

2. It should produce a war-waging posture which should permit war termination under conditions favorable to the U.S.

8

3. It would permit the U.S. to pursue its foreign policy with forthrightness and with consideration, but not compelling fear of Soviet reactions.

4. It should permit the U.S. to use general purpose forces in limited situations with more freedom of action than does the present policy. The Soviets would have to act with more care in supporting wars of national liberation and in pushing world revolution, or in employing direct conventional military pressure.

5. Should overall deterrence fail, it would give the President the option of flexible response rather than a spasm response, as the nation would not lie naked to the Soviet attack. Our weapons and our control systems would have more chance of survival for use as needed.

6. It might lead the Soviets to a more reasonable attitude toward meaningful arms control measures because the greater relative wealth and economic capability of the U.S., when applied to the task of developing a greater security position for the U.S., might convince the Soviet leaders of the folly of further challenging the U.S. in the arms race and cause them to turn their attention to less threatening forms of competition.

1. It may be that it is not technologically attainable at the moment, however, it is certain that it could reduce the damage which the U.S. might suffer. It should be able to provide National Entity survival even in the period before it attains its goal of drastic reduction in casualties.

9

2. It might engage the U.S. in an all-out arms race with the Soviets which could be expensive both in dollars and talent. However, it is a race which the U.S. should be able to win if we realize in time that we are engaged in such a race. In fact, it may already be in progress.

The world situation has not stood still. The Soviets by their increased activities in the Middle East; the Mediterranean; their repressive actions in Czechoslovakia appear to be serving notice upon us that they consider that a new day has dawned. It appears that they are less concerned with Western reactions, they move when they believe it to their advantage.

According to the New York Times of October 29, 1968, General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has said that the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia was a "complete tactical surprise" and tipped the European power balance in favor of the Communist countries.

Admiral McCain, the recent American Naval Commander in Europe, warned, rather recently, that the Soviet Navy is building up a very strong naval capability in the Mediterranean.

The Los Angeles Times, November 12, 1968, quoted from the official Government newspaper, Izvestia,

> " 'The Mediterranean should be turned into "a sea of peace." This can be achieved only by active struggle against American imperialism whose political and military system in the Mediterranean Sea should be liquidated.'

and added,

> "Izvestia criticized plans for the creation of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization naval force with headquarters in Naples."

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These seem to be examples of Soviet restlessness and an eagerness to let the world know they have interests in all of the world's areas.

Our capacity for "Assured Destruction" seems to have little value of discussion when moves are contemplated, the results of which could have a decided disadvantage to our national interests.

The world's technical and scientific capability has not reached a plateau. If our scientists can build the weapons to penetrate enemy defenses, they can build weapons to stop enemy weapons from penetrating our defenses.

Too much is at stake to do less.

When the official military publications of the Soviet Union, edited by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, contain such preposterous statements as:

> "Imperialist countries openly proclaim their mad plans to liquidate the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries through a new world war."

and use such statements to justify:

> "Taking this into account.... the party is taking all steps to strengthen the defensive powers of our Motherland and to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces."

it must be apparent how little we understand each other. Until there is a better understanding and a meeting of the minds, our military posture must be one of strength across the board. Our military posture cannot be complete until a defense against missiles is established.

11

It is time to recall that a strategy based on self-interest includes, ipso facto, the defense of population, regardless of the other side's statements, intentions or reactions. Failure to realize this will in the long run be tremendously constraining, destabilizing and costly to our foreign policy and could cause the death of our great country.

Finally, we would hope that both the Soviets and ourselves will continue to operate under a policy of "Deterrence", long after our weapons, of offense and defense, have been retired for old age. However, this deterrence does not mean a U.S. helpless in the face of Soviet Nuclear blackmail, but, as Richard Foster, Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute, says -

> A deterrence which permits the continuance of the unhindered access to other free nations. A deterrence which permits the fundamental rights of freedom of the seas, international airways, and inner, as well as, outer space.

I am convinced that the "Deterrence of assured destruction" does not satisfy the requirements for a U.S. Strategy. The capability for the mutual destruction of the U.S. and the U.S. S. R., a destruction I never expect to see take place, leaves us at a distinct disadvantage for day-to-day operations because of the accident of geography and the fact that we have commitments and alliances around the World. Operating within the framework of our present strategy we can be inhibited from taking the actions and using the weapons which might be most effective or which might become essential to restore a balance in our favor. This is because we do not want to risk escalation to a level which might get out of control.

In the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the President was terribly afraid of a nuclear holocaust from, at that time, a vastly inferior U. S. S. R. Consider the situation now with near parity in ICBMs. Dr. Wiesner has spoken of the long leadtime to build a new offensive system--such as a new bomber--he recognizes also that to build an ABM system would require at least 7 years.

It is known that in 1965, the then Secretary of Defense, stated openly that the Soviets had lost the ICBM race with us and would not try to compete. We can only assume that he had the best intelligence available in this country. Yet one year later the Soviets began turning out ICBMs at such a rate that they have been averaging one new missile in their strategic forces about every two days. Should we wait until they are one year from an effective ABM system, we will be six years behind them or six years open to nuclear blackmail.

As I stressed last night, I do not believe that the Soviets have to
have a completely reliable ABM system. It is only necessary for them to
believe they have one. If they let the world know, there will be many
who will think the U.S. helpless. What would happen to our allies and
friends? How good would be our assurances that the system could be
overpowered? Who would test it? Remember deterrence is a state of
mind.

Let us not get caught, let's make it national policy that living under
a "balance of terror" is not good enough. Let's set our goal as a U.S.
which has closed all known avenues of approach to an aggressor.

On October 31st, President-elect Richard M. Nixon charged that Democratic leadership had presented the United States with "a gravely serious security gap." Where do we and the Soviets stand in strategic competition? A report on the status of U.S. Strategic Power by the Subcommittee on Preparedness Investigation, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, of September 27, 1968, *inter alia*, stated:

> The Soviets are approaching parity with us in this field [strategic power] . . . the Subcommittee took a long, hard look at our research and development capability as compared with that of the USSR. We found the view sobering . . . This report expresses our concern about the adequacy of our presently approved level of strategic nuclear forces . . . it would be the height of imprudence for us to assume that the Soviets would not follow an even more aggressive policy and undertake an even more extensive and dangerous range of risks if they attained nuclear superiority or even parity.

## Policies Leading to the Security Gap

Weapons decisions made by former Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara from 1961 to 1968 determined the present U.S. strategic posture. Because of the long time it takes to design, build and deploy new strategic weapons, McNamara's strategy will be reversed only with difficulty by an Administration headed by Mr. Nixon. McNamara's recent book, *The Essence of Security*, provides "the rationale for the impending strategic arms limitations talks, the most momentous Soviet-American negotiations in a half-century."

...2...

Mr. McNamara's long and passionate identification with
arms control is well established. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.,
from first-hand observation, wrote of him as follows:

> Next to the President, McNamara . . . probably
did more than anyone else to sustain the dis-
armament drive. With his sense of the horror
of nuclear conflict, his understanding of the
adequacy of existing stockpiles, his fear of
nuclear proliferation, his analytic command of
the weapons problem and his managerial instinct
to do something about an irrational situation,
he forever sought new ways of controlling the
arms race.*

After years of silence on the sustained build-up in
Soviet ICBMs and the Soviet deployment of an ABM system,
Mr. McNamara surprisingly conceded both developments in
November 1966. He held, however, that the appropriate U.S.
response was not to counter with its own ABM defense but to
negotiate with the Soviets for a mutual freeze on ABM deploy-
ments. But it was not until after the signing of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968, that concrete arrange-
ments for talks were made -- only to be put in abeyance by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

During the 1967 Glassboro Summit, Mr. McNamara told
Premier Kosygin that it was in the mutual interests of the

*_A Thousand Days_ (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p.504.

...

United States to halt and then turn back the strategic nuclear arms race. McNamara rested his case on three propositions: 1) any ABM can be easily defeated by offensive missiles costing much less than defensive systems; 2) military superiority between the superpowers has lost all meaning; and 3) strategic nuclear weapons deployments by either power will invariably trigger a responsive building-up by the other. These ideas, accepted as gospel by the Johnson Administration, have led to a rapid decline in our relative strategic advantage over the Soviet Union. In his "security gap" speech, Mr. Nixon argued that "for us deliberately to let a weaker but basically expansionist nation achieve parity indicates an erosion of our commitment and will."

Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that this is what happened under Mr. McNamara's defense stewardship. Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, testifying in April 1968 before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, elaborated the salient aspects of the Pentagon's strategic thought:

> There are '... different missions which could be assigned to our strategic forces.

1. Assured destruction: In order to deter a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies,

...4...

we believe our forces must have an assured destruction capability. By this we mean the unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor -- even after a surprise attack on the United States ...

**3. Damage limiting:** The purpose of this mission would be to limit damage to the United States and its allies by significant amounts, should deterrence fail and the Soviets start a war ...

any attempt we might make to achieve more than a fully adequate assured destruction capability must be considered in light of probable Soviet reactions. I believe that part of the Soviets' strategic policy is the maintenance of an assured destruction capability. The Soviets clearly have the means to maintain this capability. Thus, the Soviets *can* and *would* react to any steps we might take to achieve a full first-strike capability or to limit damage to ourselves significantly. Hence, forces bought for this mission would contribute little to our national security, and they would push the arms race one step further. Thus, we and the Soviets *should* accept a state of mutual deterrence.
(Emphasis Added)

Implicit in the foregoing statement is the assumption that the dialectically trained Soviet leaders think as we do and, too, want parity.

Dr. Enthoven continued:

Thus, while "nuclear superiority" appears to be an attractive concept, we do not know how to take advantage of it in order to achieve our national security objectives. In other words, since the Soviet Union has an assured destruction capability against the United States, it is not clear at all how our superior nuclear forces might be converted into real political power. Nevertheless, we now have "nuclear superiority," and we expect to keep it.