# Washington Calls New Energy Conference

From News Dispatches

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has issued an invitation to the foreign and finance ministers of the major non-Communist industrial nations to meet informally in Washington later this month to discuss their common energy problems caused by Arab oil price rises, State Department officials said yesterday.

Stress was laid here on the informality of the gathering, in contrast to the full-dress energy conference that Kissinger hosted in February. That meeting turned into a confrontation between France and the United States, with the French saying that Washington was unnecessarily seeking a conflict with the Arabs.

The first news of the Kissinger invitation leaked yesterday from British government sources in London.

Those stories seemed to portray the coming Washington meeting as a more elaborate affair than the Americans later suggested it would be.

The London leak coincided with a decision in Brussels by the nine nations of the European Common Market to work out a common energy policy by the end of the year. Britain had initially objected to the Brussels agreement, but withdrew its objections to the

French favored European approach.

French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues, who chaired the Brussels session, said the agreement expressed "the political will of the European Community to draw up and put into operation a community energy policy."

Washington's insistence on the unprogrammed nature of its invitation is designed to leave the door open for French attendance, U.S. sources indicated. But the leak from London seemed designed to show that Britain does not want to be identified with a French approach that could be seen in Washington as an anti-American ploy.

Meanwhile, in London, Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Zaki Yamani repeated his call, made earlier this year at the United Nations, for preparations for world talks on oil problems.

The representative of the world's leading oil-exporting nation proposed a ministerial-level meeting to draw up an agenda for a subsequent full-scale meeting at which every country could be represented.

With the world's economic well-being at stake, Yamani said, confusion and uncertainty about the future had to be avoided at all costs. "Since

oil represents the all-important life blood of the world's economies, neither producers nor consumers can afford to postpone dialogue for much longer," he said in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The meeting in Washington is expected to include foreign and financial ministers of the Common Market countries, the United States, Canada and Japan.

Although no date has been set for the meeting, the timing is expected to coincide with the presence in the United

States of the foreign ministers for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly and the finance ministers for meetings later this month of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In Brussels, in an unusually brief and business like session the Common Market foreign ministers adopted with one small amendment the energy strategy text which Britain had been blocking since July.

Progress on this point was the first tangible sign of an improved atmosphere in the EEC following Saturday's pri-

vate talks in Paris between the nine nations' leaders.

The 10-point resolution commits the EEC to holding a special meeting on energy problems before the end of this year.

A major aim of the meeting will be to fix energy production and consumption figures for the EEC over the next decade.

The energy resolution expressed agreement on the following points:

* A community energy policy means drawing up common target figures which will serve as guidelines for national energy policies and as important indicators for community energy producers and consumers.

* A common energy policy, aimed at guaranteeing safe and lasting energy supplies at reasonable prices, implies close coordination of member states positions, allowing the community to progressively adopt a joint stance on energy problems.

* The worldwide aspects of energy problems make cooperation necessary among consumer countries on the one hand and between consumers and producers on the other.

* Growth in energy consumption can be reduced by rational economic measures,

provided these do not endanger economic and social development.

On guaranteeing energy supplies, the council looked, among other things, to the development of nuclear energy, the community's own hydrocarbon and solid fuel resources and diversified supplies from outside the EEC. It also backed research into different sources of energy.

The council called on member states to take account of the community energy target figures which it plans to decide upon when they work out their national energy supply policies.

The only change in the document from the one that Britain blocked two months ago was the deletion of the part that said a common energy policy would allow the community to increasingly speak with one voice on energy matters.

## Lake Garda Cleanup

Agence France-Presse

TRENTO, Italy, Sept. 17.—A $24 million project to clean up pollution in Lake Garda so that beaches in some 15 localities can be reopened for the 1975 tourist season is being studied by authorities.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
... informal gathering

SHEIKH ZAKI YAMANI
... time for dialogue

Dobryssinger

9-16-74

NY Times

[LC]

ESSAY

By William Safire

WASHINGTON—"Anatoly, I have the bottle of brandy you sent," said Henry Kissinger to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the telephone a couple of years ago. "The Secret Service is going over it now for hidden microphones."

After some more friendly banter of that sort, the two men got down to business, which on that day was the quick and quiet exchange of captured spies. Together, they formed a unique international force: Dobryssinger.

These days, Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger, men so alike in reach of intellect and grasp of power coming from nations at such variance in the tradition of freedom, are working closely on a plan to change Soviet emigration policy in exchange for trade concessions.

The good idea is to induce the Soviet Union to stop discriminating against people, particularly Jews, who want to emigrate, by ending the U.S. policy of discriminating against the Soviet Union on matters of trade.

The Russians are now willing to go for this deal on a grand scale, which proves that Senator Henry Jackson has been right all along, and Secretary Kissinger has been underestimating the power of positive pressuring. The Soviet Union is far more willing than Dobryssinger ever indicated to set aside objections to "interference with its internal affairs" so as to advance its economic interests.

But the way the arrangement is

being made uses a false notion of practicalities to put over a fundamental change in the method of conducting United States foreign policy.

As it stands now, Dobryssinger has come to an understanding, but no agreement is to be written down between the two countries. Instead, our idea of the understanding is to take the form of a letter from the President of the United States to several individual Senators who have been insisting on an emigration quid pro quo before passing a trade bill. The United States would have an unwritten agreement with the Soviet Union, and the President would have a letter-treaty about it with the U.S. Senate.

What's going on here? Our Secretary of State is supposed to represent the whole United States Government in foreign policy dealings, not the executive branch; he is not the middleman between certain U.S. interests and certain Soviet interests. The U.S. Senate is supposed to advise and consent on treaties made by the President, not to enter into treaties with the President about its understanding of unwritten understandings with foreign powers.

Undoubtedly, this warping of the American foreign policy process is rationalized as a necessary device to make a humanitarian deal work, to help the Soviets save face. It also flatters the Senators, who can brandish a document with their names on it to voters.

But that excuse is only what Dobryssinger gives us today. Three months ago, word from the amalgam to Senators Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits was that the Soviet Union was reportedly ready to make a written agreement;

three years ago, Dobryssinger was saying that even the mention of emigration put détente and arms control in serious jeopardy.

In fact, when the Soviets decide on the substance of a deal, the form is not all that significant. They have been denying the harassment of would-be emigrants all along; in a controlled press, it would hardly be humiliating for the Soviet Union to issue a pronunciamento condemning harassment as contrary to Soviet law.

At stake here is not the substance of an agreement—a deal is in the works because it is clearly in the interests of both superpowers—at stake is a tradition of U.S. foreign policy.

Will policy be set by a supernatural force called Dobryssinger, thinking of itself as acting in the interest of world survival, dickering with what it considers militaristic or moralistic elements in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., treating the essential conflict as being within each system rather than between the two systems?

Or will we return to those simplistic days of yore, ("I'm the American Secretary of State and I'm on our side"), when the President's principal agent for foreign policy would hammer out our national position and then negotiate with a foreign power for an agreement to be signed and published?

The Dobryssinger amalgam is intoxicated by its mountaintop juggler's role; the Senate preens with its new and extraconstitutional power; moral men are excited by the prospect of using economic muscle to contribute to human freedom. And nobody notices what a wrench to our system is in the works.

Shirah, Alisa, Daniel and Michael Liben, Alisa and Jessica Gabriel, and Jonathan and Judith Rosenberg. Interment took place at Sanhedria, Jerusalem on September 15.

ELMAN—Simon, beloved husband of Goldie, devoted father of Dr. Earl and Martin, loving grandfather of Lisa, Lee, David, Eric and Beth, dear brother of Reuben, Henry, Sophie Hershlag, Betty Friedman and Dr. Jack. Services Monday 1:30 P.M., Schwartz Brothers "Forest Park Chapels," Queens Blvd., and 76th Road, Forest Hills.

GOLDSMITH—Herman. The Officers, Executive Board and general membership of the Display Fixture Workers Union, Local 2682, U.B. of C. extend condolences to the Goldsmith family on the death of Herman Goldsmith, former President of M. Goldsmith & Company.

The Chapel Sun, evening, 5 P.M. to 9:30 P.M.

LISTER—Ralph D. of Scarsdale, N.Y., on Sept. 14, 1974, husband of the late Elizabeth Lister, father of Mrs. Dorothy Alcock, also survived by 4 grandchildren. Funeral service to be held at the Bennett Funeral Home, 824 Scarsdale Ave., Scarsdale, Tuesday at 2 P.M.

MAYERSON—Rose, loving wife of the late Henry, devoted mother of Saul, Burton, Dorothy and Charlotte, beloved grandmother of Holly, Fred, Robert and dear sister. Services 10 A.M. Monday Temple Memorial, 134-35 Northern Blvd., Flushing.

MELODY—Dorothy. On Sept. 14, 1974, Dear daughter of the late William E. and Henriette Melody, Services at Moadinser Funeral Parlor, 1120 Flatbush Ave, Brooklyn, Tuesday 2 P.M. Interment Lutheran Cemetery.

REBHUN—Bertha. The Rebhun Family Circle mourns the passing of its Charter Member and Life Chairwoman of the Sunshine Committee, Mrs. Bertha Rebhun, beloved wife of Nathan Rebhun, sister-in-law of William and Sam Rebhun and Esther Adams and the late Max and Sol Rebhun. Cherished mother of Lenny and Deena Rebhun, loving grandmother of Paula and Barry Bokow, Jill and Normant Gopin, Mitchell and Sharon, all members of the Circle. Services and Interment were observed yesterday.

Rebhun Family Circle
Jerome Rebhun, President

REBHUN—Bertha. Congregation Kneseth Israel, Far Rockaway, extends heartfelt condolences to its esteemed member of their Board of Directors. Leonard Rebhun, upon the passing of his beloved mother.

Ralph Pelcovitz, Rabbi

Louis E. Newman, President

Susan Davis, Sisterhood President.

Jim Hall, great-aunt of Debra Hall. Private services were held.

## In Memoriam

KLEPPER, Malvina. Always in my thoughts and in my heart. Lucr.

LISSMAN—Rev. Dr. Edward, beloved memory, darling grandfather, for the Jewish High Holy Days, Rosh Hashonah and Yom Kippur. First Jewish Fire Chaplain of the New York Fire Dept., Founder of the Naer Tormid Society and Franklin Delano Roosevelt Medal for the New York Fire Dept., Chaplain of the Jewish War Veterans, Honorary Chaplain of the Jewish Postal Workers. You are always in my thoughts on these High Holy Days and Always.

SUSAN ROENSTIEL.

## US SERVICES

9800

### JEWISH

Rodeph Sholom

7 WEST 83rd ST.

Gunter Hirschberg, Rabbi
Ephraim Biran, Cantor
Peter Weintraub, Assistant to the Rabbi

Rosh Hashanah Services

Tonight Mon. Eve., Sept. 16th at 8:00
Tom'w, Tues. Morn., Sept. 17th at 9:45

Rabbi Hirschberg

will speak at the Services in the Main Sanctuary

Rabbi Paul Joseph

will speak at the Services in the
Marcus Loew Auditorium

Cantor Loth will conduct the musical Liturgy

Children's Services

in the Sixth Floor Auditorium at 11:30
conducted by

Rabbi Weintraub

Please contact the Temple Office (EN 2-800) regarding Membership, Seats, and Religious, Nursery or Day School registration.

Knesset Israel

GARMENT CENTER SYNAGOGUE

205 W 40 St (Cor 7 Av) 564-4540

ABRAHAM L. HARTSTEIN, Rabbi

JACOB ELMAN, Cantor

A VERY HAPPY,
HEALTHY AND PEACEFUL
NEW YEAR TO ALL

In the Heart of New York City
Services Daily Throughout the Year
ALL WELCOME

### JEWISH

SWES

STEPHEN WISE FREE
SYNAGOGUE

HIGH HOLYDAY SERVICES

ROSH HASHANAH EVE

Tonight 8 PM

ROSH HASHANAH

Tomorrow 10 AM

RABBI EDWARD E. KLEIN

in the Hall of Worship

RABBI SALLY PRIESAND

in the Synagogue Auditorium

Ilana Rubenfeld, Music Director

Arrangements for Synagogue Membership, Religious School enrollment, or High Holyday seating for non-members may be made in person at the Synagogue office today 9 AM to 3 PM. For information Call 877-4050.

STEPHEN WISE FREE SYNAGOGUE

30 West 68th Street, at Lincoln Square

Let us care with you...

IN NEW YORK:

188-11 HILLSIDE AVE., HOLLIS, L.I.
1283 CONEY ISLAND AVE., B'KLYN.
212/776-8100

an affiliate of
INTERNATIONAL FUNERAL SERVICES, INC.

JEFFER
FUNERAL HOMES, INC.

Chapels available in all communities in New York and throughout the Miami, W. Palm Beach areas.

IN FLORIDA:

13385 W. DIXIE HWY., MIAMI
625 S. OLIVE AVE., W. PALM BEACH

305/947-1185

Represented by: Sonny Levitt

A family chapel at the hub of New York; adjacent to all transportation at the corner of 52nd St. and Lexington Avenue.

UNIVERSAL

UNIVERSAL FUNERAL CHAPEL, inc.

PL 3-5300

Serving New York families for over 80 years.

Tom Braden

Secretary Kissinger and Cyprus

In common with most Americans it
seemed to Henry Kissinger that what
the Turks did on the island of Cyprus
was morally wrong.

But Kissinger refuses to go along
with the breathless suggestions that
what the Turks did represents a fail-
ure for the United States or for Henry
Kissinger or that it threatens the fu-
ture of the Atlantic Alliance.

Unfortunately calling an action morally wrong doesn't settle an argument unless force is available as sanction. The Turks can argue that it was morally wrong not to kick the Greeks out of Cyprus back in 1922 when thanks to the British mandate the overseas Greeks remained there though the Turks had pushed them out of other eastern Mediterranean territory.

So the moral argument about Cy-
prus is like the moral argument about
Israel. The Arabs say that in 1948 and
thereafter the Israelis took territory
which Arabs had owned for hundreds
of years. The Israelis asked who
owned it before that. The argument
gets nowhere and rapidly detours into
more significant questions such as
which side has the better tanks.

The fighting on Cyprus did not in-
volve the national interests of the
United States nor pose a confrontation
with the Soviet Union. It is hard to see
how the substitution of control over
the island by one NATO member for
control by another represents a break-
down of NATO or a threat to its fu-

ture. It's true the Greeks have with-
drawn. For how long? It will be more
difficult for the Russians to try to pick
up the Greek marbles than it would
have been for them to pick up the
Turkish.

And surely Henry Kissinger behaved
throughout this affair in about the way
we might have expected him to be-
have. He is a frank exponent of power
politics. The Turks had the power and

the proximity with which to bring
power quickly to bear. The Greeks did
not.

Therefore, the only way in which
Kissinger could have stopped Turkey
was by a threat of force. Would any-
body seriously suggest that if the
Turks had refused to back down under
such a threat, the United States should
or would have attacked Turkey?

The Turks were wrong. Kissinger

told them he thought so. He has now
said that he will try to persuade them
to right at least some of the wrong.
What else can he do?

Suggestions were made that the Sec-
retary of State was arrogant in asking
the Greeks and the Turks to meet with
him in Washington. If he could shuttle
back and forth for a month between
Damascus and Jerusalem, his critics
said, why couldn't he make a similar
effort between Ankara and Athens?

The answer is that the United States
was endangered by the war between
Syria and Israel. Kissinger thought it
essential to prevent confrontation with
Russia. The United States was not in-
volved in the war between Greece and
Turkey and no confrontation loomed.

Kissinger was disappointed that the
British could not persuade the Turks
to stay at the conference table. If we
needed one more reminder of Britain's
lack of authority in the world, Cyprus
—where British troops were stationed
and where Britain claims a measure of
authority—was that reminder.

But the notion that the American
Secretary of State should go flying off
to every trouble spot, bringing the
United States into situations where the
United States is not involved, is a ri-
diculous notion. What happened and
didn't happen on Cyprus is a reminder
that there are limits to the interests of
this country even in the Western
world.

© 1974, Los Angeles Times

Announcing
the only
flip-open box
with extra
coolness inside.

Your last KOOL cigarette
will stay as firm as the first in
the New KOOL Flip-open Box.

So come up to KOOL for
the taste of extra coolness.

Come up to KOOL.
America's *1 Selling Menthol.

18 mg. "tar," 1.3 mg. nicotine, av. per cigarette, by FTC method.

©B&WTCO.

<table><tr><td>Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.</td></tr></table>

9-17-74

THE WASHINGTON POST,

Joseph Kraft

# Questioning Haig's Role

Coming in the wake of the bungled pardon, the nomination of Gen. Alexander Haig, the White House Chief of Staff to be commander of NATO poses serious problems. For circumstantial evidence connects General Haig with a mountain of dirty work—including a doctored White House memo served up to the congressional impeachment inquiry.

But the President—and this is a principal lesson of the pardon—is not in a good position to deal with the Nixonite Old Guard. So it is essential that General Haig be subjected to a thorough going congressional scrutiny before being allowed to resume military duties.

General Haig's over-all difficulty is best expressed by General Haig himself. According to the Wall Street Journal, he told an interviewer that, "It's only a soldier who can respect and admire a politician." Politics, he said, is "a field where a man lays everything on the line to win or lose . . . When one doesn't win, the results are fatal."

It is hard to think of a more wrong-headed notion. The quintessential genius of American democracy, the basic premise of representative government, is that it is not fatal to lose. Those who go down don't get wiped out. On the contrary, they live to fight—and even win—another day. That's what elections are about.

But General Haig, for all the half-baked talk about being a soldier-statesman, doesn't understand that. He is a bureaucratic general, a highly effective pusher of buttons on behalf of his boss. If the boss plays a clean

game, then Haig will play clean. But if the boss plays a dirty game, Haig will play dirty.

It is not exactly a secret that the Nixon White House played an exceptionally dirty game. Nor that General Haig played the game with zest and skill in a way which brought him rapid promotion. Nor that he was involved in a suspicious number of smelly transactions.

As deputy to Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council, he managed the wiretap program. As White House chief of staff, in 1973 and 1974, he presided over the Watergate cover-up. That is how he happened to be in a position—a totally inappropriate position for a military man—to make the final arrangements for Mr. Nixon's resignation.

But while the broad outlines of Haig's operations are known, the details are obscure and full of question marks. What exactly was Haig's role in the Saturday night massacre of the Watergate special prosecutor, Archibald Cox, in the fall of 1973? Didn't Haig think something was fishy when Lt. General Robert Pursely, a distinguished officer serving as military aide to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, was subjected to wiretapping? What was Haig's role in the "Pentagon Spy Ring" and the White House "plumbers"? How about the 18½ minutes missing from the most critical White House tape?

Then there is the strange episode of the doctored Butterfield memo. When wiretaps picked up the information that Clark Clifford, a leading Democratic adviser, was preparing an

article critical of President Nixon's Vietnam policy in 1970, Jeb Magruder of the White House staff was detailed to prepare a response. He asked Alexander Butterfield, the former Nixon aide who later revealed the existence of the White House tapes, for advice. Butterfield spoke of organizing a "counter-attack," and said, in a memorandum to Magruder, "Al Haig can get you squared away on at least a preliminary scheme."

But when the Magruder memo was turned over by the White House to the Congress, it had been badly doctored. The sentence about Haig setting up a "preliminary scheme" was missing. Haig was White House chief of staff at the time of the doctoring, which protected him. Did he know about it? If not, how come? Wasn't he on the distribution list for the original memo?

The Ford White House staff cannot possibly explore such questions. If nothing else, as the pardon blunder indicates, Mr. Ford and his staff are too decent to deal effectively with the Nixon gang. But the Senate, through rigorous confirmation hearings, could handle the Haig problem.

Confirmation hearings would settle the doubts many entertain. They would allow Haig to talk to the truly vital question of whether it is appropriate for a military man to take on the broad political responsibilities he assumed for Mr. Nixon. And they would ease the suspicion generated by the pardon, that the President is lavishly rewarding those who figured in the Nixon resignation, no matter what else they may have done.

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

Is Out Coalition

ain. Unlike the Pentagon, the Ministry of Defense here is not able to hand out large contracts quickly to rescue an all-but-defunct military supplier.

The Department of Trade, however, has assured Ferranti and its bankers that some government help is on the way and negotiations over this have begun.

What worries industrialists here is this: if a firm as technologically advanced as Ferranti needs government help, there must be scores of conventional companies in deep trouble.

Ferranti's plight gave an already depressed stock market the jitters today. The Financial Times index of industrial shares fell nearly 5 per cent or 9.6 points to 204.1.

By coincidence, the Bank of England today painted a gloomy picture for industry in its quarterly bulletin. It warned that many companies face "increasing financial difficulty" because their profits prospects are so grim.

It warned that investment in new facilities has already slowed down and could slump. Just as in the United States, companies are not raising capital in the stock market because prices are low. They must turn to banks that impose stiff and rising interest charges.

TEMPLE MICAH
600 M STREET, SOUTHWEST

A contemporary, reform congregation serving urban Washington from the new Southwest

Bernard H. Mehlman, Rabbi

HIGH HOLY DAY SERVICES
YOM KIPPUR

• Wed., Sept. 22, 8:30 p.m.

• Thur., Sept. 23, 10:30 a.m.

(Children's Service—3:00 p.m.)

For information about seating, membership and religious school

Please call Temple Micah, 554-3099

Baby sitting available for children over 3

SCHOOL UNDER WAY—REGISTRATION CONTINUING

ECK FREE!

A20

TUESDAY, SEP

The Washington Post
AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

‘Next Step’ in the Mideast

THE HIGH-LEVEL consultations which both serve diplomacy and substitute for diplomacy in the Mideast have now brought responsible officials from Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria to Washington. Such is the difficulty of getting all the pieces of the puzzle in place, however, that it remains undisclosed—and perhaps also unsettled —just what the long-awaited “next step” will be. The earlier troop-disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria did not so much establish momentum as ex-haust the easy possibilities. The hard ones are now here.

When the October war ended last year, optimists hoped that the rough Arab-Israeli stalemate which resulted could be translated by stages into a political settlement. But since then that stalemate of mutual exhaustion has given way to a new and untested relationship based on the massive rearming of both sides. This rearmament is not only the basis of the recurrent war scares which sweep through the region. It turns the attention of both Arabs and Israelis away from negotiating. If the United States and the Soviet Union—the chief arms suppliers—could have agreed on maintaining a certain balance, this surely would have made negotiations more likely. But the great powers have not agreed. This increases the burden on the local states.

In general, the Arabs wish to wait to take the “next step” until they better coordinate their position among themselves, and the Israelis wish to wait until they have put their relationship with the United States on a firmer long-term basis. Yet the degree of Arab coordination and the degree of American support of Israel will never be great enough to stifle the two sides’ respective apprehensions. Negotiations cannot be put off indefinitely. For

each side to wait for a “better” time is to risk losing control of events to accident, to new pressures, or to the desperate acts of others, particularly the Palestinians. Time, we suspect, helps no one.

In Washington last week, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin disclosed Israel was considering a further withdrawal into the Sinai desert in exchange for Egyptian pledges to end economic and diplomatic “belligerency.” The proposal fits Israel’s fundamental proposition that it should play its territorial card not merely for a piece of paper such as a treaty but for a new relationship with its neighbors —a relationship that will substitute contacts and a process of trust-building for the old blank-wall negativism that has contributed already to the onset of four wars.

Whether the next step in the Mideast should involve Egypt rather than Jordan is, of course, debatable; everything in the region is. It seems to us, however, that Mr. Rabin is entirely right in suggesting that Arab and Israeli negotiators — and publics — should begin to consider jointly the kind of relationship they wish to produce by the negotiation process. A map with agreed boundaries is, after all, only one component of peace, although for many Arabs it has long been regarded as the essential one, if not the only one. The other component of peace is the nature of the relationship between the states on either side of the boundary lines. In practical terms, the size of Israeli concessions in terms of territory is likely to reflect quite precisely the size of Arab concessions in terms of the quality of their relationship with Israel. This cuts both ways; each side, that is, has the deepest self-interest in satisfying the other. The “next step” in the Mideast, no matter which countries join in it, is going to have to reflect this basic requirement.

Victor Zorza

# Europe's Coalitions

PARIS—The Communists are on the march across southern Europe, not to the revolutionary barricades but into government coalitions that could give them a share of power in a wide Mediterranean belt stretching from Greece through Italy, France and Spain into Portugal.

The overthrow of the dictatorships has already given the Communists an important role in the Portuguese coalition and a potential role in Greece, where the party is emerging from the underground. In Spain, the impending demise of the Franco regime has made the Communists open their arms wide for a coalition embrace.

In France, the Communists next month will hold an "extraordinary" congress to give them an image that would convert the 49 per cent of the vote which the Socialist-Communist alliance won in the last election into a majority of votes in the next.

In Italy, the Communists are beginning to talk as if they were willing to make a deal with Washington, to assure that they would do no harm to the cohesion of NATO, in exchange for U.S. acquiescence in the Communist Party's participation in the coalition.

In all these countries the Communist drive to power is taking place against a background of social and political instability that Europe has not seen for a long time. The closest parallel is with the aftermath of World War II, when the Communists did get into coalition governments in France and Italy—and into a civil war in Greece. Now the corrosive effects of inflation, the structural weaknesses uncovered by the energy crisis, the impact of labor unrest and of balance of payments problems are imposing on the political system new strains which could lead to the realignment of forces within it.

What this could do to the balance of power in Europe, and in the world, is a cause of considerable alarm among military strategists. One thing they fear, for instance, is that the inclusion of Communists in the governments of the Mediterranean belt could deprive the U.S. Navy of the bases and the commanding position it now occupies in the area. The Polaris submarines with missiles trained on some key Soviet targets, and the Sixth Fleet, which checks Soviet designs on the Mideast, might no longer have the freedom they now enjoy.

But the feelers put out by the Italian Communists suggest that such changes could be avoided. The readiness they now express to "act within the framework of a specific international, geographic and political reality" seems to mean that they would not only accept

formally Italy's membership of NATO, but would also endorse the strategic and political purposes that go with it.

But it only seems to mean that. The hint has aroused some interest in the foreign capitals for which it was intended, but until the Italian Communists find a way to express themselves more clearly and to provide some assurance that they would indeed act in a coalition government in the way they hint they might, no one is going to take them very seriously. This is a pity, because the Italian Communists' implied promise to work for the restoration of political stability could be very important for Europe in the difficult times that lie ahead.

Different as the conditions are in each of the five countries of the Mediterranean belt, the participation of Italian Communists in a successful coalition government bent on internal reform and working for the gradual adjustment of external alliances would show the other Communist parties what can be done. The French Communist Party, which for so many years looked askance at the Italian comrades' opportunist ways, has gradually changed many of its policies in ways first explored by the Italians. The draft program for next month's French congress provides emphatic evidence of this.

But the distance which the west European Communist parties are putting between themselves and the Soviet model of socialism is gaining them increasing respect in the eyes of the electorate. Moscow has accused the Spanish Communist Party of seeking an independent European alternative under which western Communist parties would sever their links with the Soviet union and its allies. The Spaniards replied that they were only using a formula favored by the Italians and endorsed by a number of other conference in Brussels earlier this year.

What the prospect of coalition is doing for the Communist parties of the Mediterranean belt is to concentrate their minds on the attractions—and responsibilities—of political power. They are beginning to recognize the need for political alliances that would be both lasting and credible, which means that they have to adjust their own policies to what their alliance partners, and the voters of their countries, would find acceptable.

The indications are that this adjustment is proceeding apace, though at different rates in different countries, and that its rewards will not be long in coming.

© 1974, Victor Zorza

New York to
1 hr. 5½

r 1, the U. S. Air Force's SR-71 broke the transatlantic
New York to London.

Major James V. Sullivan with Major Noel F. Widdifield as
cols officer, the Lockheed-built plane cruised at an average
While covering 3,470 statute miles at an average height

was not just for the record, which is not yet official. It was
ning flight conducted by the Strategic Air Command en
ough Air Show in Britain, where the SR-71 was on display,
rd-breaking planes is nothing new to Lockheed. Besides
fastest plane, we've built the quietest and most comfort-

Lockheed Aircra

EVANS-NOVAK POLITICAL REPORT

WHAT'S HAPPENING . . . WHO'S AHEAD . . . IN POLITICS TODAY

1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W. • Room 1312 • Washington, D.C. 20006 • 202-298-7850

September 18, 1974 - No. 202

To: Our Subscribers

From: Evans-Novak

The decline in the new Ford Administration set off by the pardon of ex-President Richard M. Nixon has accelerated badly during the last week. Six weeks after assuming office, President Gerald R. Ford is obviously in real trouble and needs to get off dead center. Not even during the depths of Water-gate have we perceived in Washington (among Republicans and Democrats alike) so much despondency about the future.

Mr. Ford's Cabinet and White House staffing problems are multiplying, with no solutions in sight. Decisions are simply not being made on key economic policy questions or energy policy and personnel matters. The same old Nixonian crowd seems very much in the saddle: i.e. ex-CEA Chairman Paul McCracken has been put in overall charge of the Economic Summit. Decisions continue to be made in the Oval Office rather than in the Departments.

The Republican Party is disheartened and disillusioned. GOP election prospects, which seemed to be brightening after Nixon's resignation, seem darker than ever, with large losses apparently inevitable. This will create a terrible test for Mr. Ford and may gloss over deep Democratic divisions. Thus, we are now taking more seriously GOP conservative criticism that we previously discounted as (California Gov. Ronald) Reaganite carping.

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION

**The President:** Seldom has one act so quickly and thoroughly deflated a President as the Nixon pardon has leveled Mr. Ford. It has not only demoralized Republican officials within the Administration and around the country, but it has obviously shaken the President's own spirits. His press conference Monday night obviously did nothing to restore them.

**White House Staff:** Gen. Alexander Haig's overdue departure provides Mr. Ford with the opportunity to put his own stamp on his Administration, but the Nixon holdovers continue to dominate. Even more than in RMN's last days, policy is being made in the White House, and papers are being bootlegged out in order for Cabinet members to see them.

Old Ford friend, ex-Rep. Jack Marsh (D-Va.) looks to be a probable choice to replace Haig, but without his great power. Thaddeus Beal (a William Scranton selection) is slated to be the top personnel scout. But recruitment -since the Nixon pardon - is not easy.

**Cabinet:** Despite all rumors of his imminent departure, Treasury Sec. William Simon is now expected to stay on. But the Big Two - Sec. of State Henry Kissinger and Defense Sec. James Schlesinger - are on a collision course. Mr. Ford has apparently rejected private recommendations that Kissinger be cut down to size by naming a new National Security adviser, but sentiment is now running

heavily against Kissinger, particularly in the wake of the CIA-Chile revelations. Ultimately, the President must choose between the two men as well as between their substantive differences.

Both Interior Sec. Rogers Morton and HUD Sec. James Lynn are candidates for White House jobs, with Lynn possibly replacing OMB Director Roy Ash, but as of now the rest of the Nixon Cabinet looks locked in place.

**The Economy:** The President clearly has not used these first weeks of his Administration either to do anything substantively or to instill national confidence. Mr. Ford appears to be gearing everything to the outcome of the Economic Summit conferences, which we - and many others - think is dangerous and politically inexplicable.

1) The President has yet to make *any* decision as to who is making economic policy.

2) His speech for the September 27-28 summit conference is being written by Sidney Jones, aide to ex-economic counselor Kenneth Rush and author of RMN's last "old-time religion" speech. So far, the same old team.

3) The enormous effort to the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1975 to $300 billion or under is *not* working. Congressional resistance to cutting pork barrel in an election year is growing. Further, there is growing doubt on the revenue side. Profits are going to slide in the next nine months, but no one knows how much.

4) Simon's tax program is stalled in the bureaucracy and by White House indecision. The CEA is moving toward acceptance of a capacity-increasing fast write-off scheme, but whether it reaches House Ways & Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills (who wants it) this year remains uncertain.

5) Capital spending now looks as if it will actually *decline* next year.

6) Inventory panic sets in. Some major retailers, including Sears, are now turning back shipments from some wholesalers.

7) With the general slowdown turning into a recession, we feel that 6% unemployment by year's end may turn out to be optimistic. Inflation won't dip below 10%. The 1975 prospects are worse, at least for the first quarter.

**Energy:** Far from dealing with the problem of what to do with the latest OPEC price increases, Mr. Ford has not yet done anything about setting up a policy machinery. He has not chosen among Morton, Simon and FEA chief John Sawhill. He has an alternative proposal of turning the new Energy Research and Development Agency into a nucleus for the energy program.

**Foreign Policy:** Top State Department experts now see a better than 50-50 chance of a new war between Israel and Syria within eight months if there isn't a negotiating break very soon. But worse, we see much better odds in favor of a new Arab oil boycott before then. If another war does start, the prospect of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. clash increases gravely.

**Amnesty:** What seemed a month ago like a political masterstroke to win the middle is causing more and more trouble - thanks, we believe, to the Nixon pardon. By comparing the conditional Vietnam amnesty with the unconditional Nixon pardon, the Left is able to attack Ford. In his present weakened condition, he is also liable to more sniping from the Right.

## GOP

The post-pardon anti-Ford plunge has been deep and continues to deepen. We find anti-Ford feeling even in areas, like the South, where Nixon was never perceived as a devil. Elsewhere the pardon has had a severe impact:

1) In Oregon, a state-wide door-to-door canvass by candidates for the state legislature has been called off, when candidates found that the voters wanted only to talk about the pardon.

2) In Ohio and New Jersey, two Congressional candidates pulled back their

campaign literature in order to excise Ford-oriented material.

3) Everywhere, GOP politicians are furious about the plush jobs now being awarded to Nixonites - Haig to NATO, <u>Peter Flanigan</u> to Spain, an aborted proposal to send <u>Pat Buchanan</u> to South Africa.

4) We also hear criticism from all quarters of Ford for being taken in by RMN's real and alleged health problems.

5) The conservative rebellion is spreading. The anti-amnesty sentiment on the Hill among conservative Republicans was heightened by the selection of ex-Sen. <u>Charles Goodell</u> to head the amnesty commission, including a bitter impromptu speech by Sen. <u>Barry Goldwater</u>. Some GOP National Committee members also complain about Goodell.

6) The Republican chances as the campaign gets underway in earnest are grim, looking almost as bad today as before the Nixon resignation. Estimates just three weeks ago that House losses could be contained at approximately 20 seats have now been adjusted upward - possibly far up if Ford cannot regain the initiative. Prospects for Democratic takeovers in the governorships of California and New York are good, and some GOP incumbent Governors thought to be safe, <u>Francis Sargent</u> (Mass.) and <u>William Milliken</u> (Mich.), may now be heading for trouble.

7) The Republican National Committee meeting here last week was funereal. The Ford appointment of <u>Mary Louise Smith</u> as the new National Chairman went over badly, as did the appointment of <u>Dean Burch</u> as White House emissary. The feeling among RNC members was that Mr. Ford doesn't really focus on politics. The Ford-proposed resolution praising the Nixon Administration record was an ill-conceived fiasco.

8) Vice-President designate <u>Nelson Rockefeller</u> is telling his closest political intimates that he will downplay any disagreements with the Right, do exactly what Ford tells him to do and keep out of trouble. This adds up to one thing: Rocky still seems a faint possibility for the Presidency.

## DEMOCRATS

The Ford decline is mirrored by the continuing deterioration of the Democratic Party nationally. We see the potential makings of a big Democratic sweep this November - but another disaster in 1976. The Party, as of now, appears to have no viable Presidential candidate as the amazing decline of Sen. <u>Edward M. Kennedy</u> continues.

Kennedy's trip to California over the weekend was - incredibly - a complete failure. Candidates from Gubernatorial nominee <u>Jerry Brown</u> down to the state legislative level ran away from EMK, refusing to campaign with him and avoiding picture taking sessions. At the fund raising and other campaign appearances, crowds were disappointing and the take slim. Further, there was press criticism of the sudden appearance of his ill wife Joan on one platform for viewing purposes. And in Ohio, on the way to California, Kennedy was ignored by Democratic Senatorial nominee <u>John Glenn</u>.

EMK's new advanced timetable for announcing his '76 Presidential intentions by mid-'75 at the latest is clear recognition of three factors:

1) Chappaquiddick is not going to go away by itself.

2) The Ford-Rockefeller ticket no longer looks unassailable.

3) Pressure from <u>all Democrats</u>: If you're not going to run, say so early. Our own feelings: any prediction about whether or not Kennedy is going to run is totally and unprovably premature, but the timetable change - and the refusal of Chappaquiddick to go away - proves he is less likely to run than he was before the Nixon resignation. Mark it down as a shade under 50-50, not because he doesn't want to but because the climate is more hostile.

SENATE '74

We begin our Senatorial round up in this issue. Our present assessment is much bleaker than our previous forecasts. If the election were held today, we believe that five Republican seats would go Democratic and that there would be no GOP gains - increasing the present 58-42 Democratic margin to 63-37. Additionally, there are very few possible GOP pickups but some Democratic possibilities. This is a low point in the GOP Senatorial picture, but there is no sign that it will improve.

Sure Democratic Retentions: James Allen (Ala.), unopposed; Gov. Dale Bumpers (Ark.); Alan Cranston (Calif.); Abe Ribicoff (Conn.); Herman Talmadge (Ga.); Daniel Inouye (Hawaii); Adlai Stevenson (Ill.); Russell Long (La.), unopposed; Thomas Eagleton (Mo.); John Glenn (Ohio); Ernest Hollings (S.C.); Warren Magnuson (Wash.); Gaylord Nelson (Wis.).

Sure Republican Retentions: Sen. Barry Goldwater (Ariz.).

That leaves the following contests:

Alaska: Sen. Mike Gravel (D) is so weak that even John Bircher State Sen. C.R. Lewis (R) has a fighting chance. Possible Democratic Retention.

Colorado: All polls have shown that Sen. Peter Dominick (R) is well ahead.

But Dominick's continuing health problem, his poor organization, the fact that the Democrats finally have a nominee and the fact that the nominee, ex-McGovern campaign manager Gary Hart, had edged into the middle a bit, all smell trouble. We now call it a Possible Democratic Takeover, dependent upon whether Hart can keep a centrist image. A close one.

Florida: Millionaire Jack Eckerd (R) is a severe underdog against the winner of the October 1 Democratic runoff, either Sec. of State Dick Stone or Rep. Bill Gunter. Probable Democratic Takeover.

Indiana: A disastrous debate has hurt Indianapolis Mayor Richard Lugar (R), but he still is within hailing distance of Sen. Birch Bayh (D). Possible Democratic Retention.

Iowa: Rep. John Culver (D) narrowly leads State Sen. David Stanley (R). A possible GOP takeover, but we call it a Possible Democratic Retention.

Kansas: He's come up a long way but Sen. Robert Dole (R) trails Rep. William Roy (D) narrowly. Possible Democratic Takeover.

Kentucky: Sen. Marlow Cook (R) is closing the gap rapidly but is still behind Gov. Wendell Ford (D). Possible Democratic Takeover.

Maryland: Only the comatose condition of the GOP in Maryland prevents us from calling Sen. Charles Mathias (R) a sure thing against Barbara Mikulski (D). Probable GOP Retention.

Nevada: This had been one of the highest GOP hopes for a takeover, but polls put Lt. Gov. Harry Reid (D) narrowly ahead of ex-Gov. Paul Laxalt (R). A squeaker. Possible Democratic Retention.

New Hampshire: A sizable lead by Rep. Louis Wyman (R) against John Durkin (D). Probable GOP Retention.

New York: It seems ridiculous that Ramsey Clark (D) could possibly upset seemingly invincible Sen. Jacob Javits (R), but it is now just barely conceivable. Probable GOP Retention.

North Carolina: Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan (D) has a big lead over State Rep. William Stevens (R). Probable Democratic Retention.

This Report is copyrighted and prepared for the confidential information of our clients.

Reproduction or quotation without specific permission is prohibited.

["# Debate over Haig NATO appointment", "## Although some cite command inexperience, European reaction seems generally favorable", "By **Guy Halverson**\nStaff correspondent of\nThe Christian Science Monitor", "Washington", "Despite some NATO objections to the appointment, the new NATO commander, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., is expected to strengthen ties between the U.S. and its European defense partners.", "General Haig is seen here as having closer access to the Ford Administration — both as NATO commander and commander of U.S. forces in Europe — than the man he replaced Dec. 15, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. This is despite objections to the appointment by the Dutch, and lesser concern by the British.", "General Haig, appointed White House chief of staff by Richard Nixon", "in May, 1973, stayed on briefly in that same post under President Ford.", "Whether Mr. Haig — whose appointment as supreme commander will not have to be approved by the Senate — will introduce major structural or operational changes in NATO is yet unknown. But it is expected that General Haig's method of operation will differ somewhat from that of General Goodpaster, who came from a command, as opposed to administrative, background.", "The top NATO post is considered crucial, given the rupture on NATO's southern flank between Greece and Turkey. It is in this light that Mr. Haig's appointment is seen as a plus by some Pentagon officials.", "The only expressed misgivings by British officials concern the timing of Mr. Haig's appointment and the pre-", "mature departure of General Goodpaster, who is widely considered to have been an outstanding military commander.", "Unlike the Dutch, the British have not been in the forefront of opposition to Mr. Haig, and insist that they are not victims of \"arm twisting\" by the U.S. Indeed, they claim they supported the Haig idea since first broached by the White House several weeks back.", "The Dutch, by comparison, are known to believe that General Haig's \"political\" background, as an aide to two U.S. Presidents, as well as his basically administrative background in the U.S. military, is inadequate for a difficult assignment that could involve actual combat defense of western Europe.", "## Political motivation seen", "To the Dutch, and other European officials, and some American political officials as well, the motivation behind the appointment of General Haig is seen more as solving a domestic political problem for Mr. Ford — i.e., what to do with Mr. Nixon's former White House chief of staff — than made for actual military reasons.", "As NATO commander, General Haig's role would be threefold:", "* Planning for NATO forces in event of armed combat, and ensuring NATO combat readiness.", "* Heading NATO land, sea, and air forces in event of combat.", "* Working with NATO's Defense Planning Committee — the top-level strategic body made up of NATO's ambassadors.", "It is the latter role — in many respects a \"political\" one — in which Mr. Haig is considered by some U.S. officials to have important advantages. One question, however, is the effect any diminishing influence in the administration for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would have — General Haig was Mr. Kissinger's assistant on the national security council before becoming Mr. Nixon's chief of staff.", "## Never commanded a division", "General Haig, a tall, soft-spoken man of dignity and personal charm, has never commanded a division.", "The son of a Philadelphia attorney who passed on when Mr. Haig was a young boy, he attended Notre Dame for a year before his appointment to West Point during World War II. He later earned a master's degree in international affairs from Georgetown University.", "Mr. Haig's only combat command experience was in 1966-1967, during", "the Vietnam war, when, as a lieutenant colonel he commanded a battalion, and then a brigade. During the Korean War, he had served on the staff of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.", "In 1969 Mr. Haig was still a colonel. He was nominated to jump to a four-star general while serving on the Kissinger National Security Council staff in 1972. In early 1973 he was appointed vice chief of staff of the Army. As a trouble shooter for both Mr. Kissinger and President Nixon, General Haig played an important role in negotiations leading up to the Vietnam cease-fire accord in January, 1973.", "## THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR", "Marca Registrada ®", "An International Daily Newspaper", "FOUNDED IN 1908 BY MARY BAKER EDDY", "BOARD OF TRUSTEES", "Glenn A. Evans", "Eric Boie", "Robert G. Walker", "EDITOR", "John Hughes", "MANAGER", "Zadie Hatfield", "MANAGING EDITOR", "Earl W. Foell", "CHIEF EDITORIAL WRITER", "Charlotte Saikowski", "OVERSEAS NEWS EDITOR", "Geoffrey Godsell", "AMERICAN NEWS EDITOR", "David K. Willis", "CIRCULATION DIRECTOR", "Kenneth D. Sumner", "ADVERTISING DIRECTOR", "Alexander H. Swan", "ADV. BUSINESS MANAGER", "Warren D. Silvernail", "RETAIL ADV. MANAGER", "Derek J. Holmes", "EDITOR EMERITUS", "Erwin D. Canham", "AP photo", "Haig's Nixon ties trigger some NATO criticism", "NEWS BUREAU CHIEFS", "ATLANTA", "John Dillin", "CHICAGO", "Judith K. Frutger", "LOS ANGELES", "Curtis J. Sitomer", "NEW ENGLAND", "Leon W. Lindsay", "NEW YORK", "George Moneyhun", "SAN FRANCISCO", "Frederic A. Moritz", "WASHINGTON, D.C.", "Godfrey Sperling Jr.", "BEIRUT", "John K. Cooley", "HONG KONG", "Daniel Southerland", "LATIN AMERICA", "James Nelson Goodsell", "LONDON", "Takashi Oka", "MOSCOW", "Elizabeth Pond", "NAIROBI", "Henry S. Hayward", "PARIS", "Takashi Oka", "UNITED NATIONS", "David Anable", "BRANCH ADVERTISING OFFICES\nCHICAGO", "Donald F. Taylor", "332 N. Michigan Avenue 60601", "CLEVELAND", "Anne P. Fraser", "1110 Euclid Avenue 44115", "DETROIT", "Robert D. Arlen", "5-252 General Motors Bldg\n48202", "LOS ANGELES", "Charles Caviness", "3600 Wishire Blvd 90010", "NEW ENGLAND", "Hope Jersey", "One Norway Street", "Boston Mass. 02115", "NEW YORK", "Harold Michael", "588 Fifth Ave. 10036", "SAN FRANCISCO", "Charles Caviness", {"bbox": [

To 20 percent savings below day-coach fares.

* First-class seating at day-coach rates.

* Generally smoother flying and on-time arrival at uncongested airports.

* And, for flight crew personnel laid off during fuel crisis cutbacks, a welcome opportunity to get back to work.

These, and other advantages, make the "midnight specials" the most popular way to fly these days. Only airline managers, who see these flights siphoning off daytime business, have serious second thoughts about them. However, passengers do have to put up with some inconvenience.

After three nights of flying some of the most popular routes along the East Coast, I find that night fliers should be prepared to carry their own luggage, to go without eating, and to try to catch as much sleep as possible on the planes.

Even at the major airports, the night staffs, except for the security force and ground crews, are at minimum strength from midnight to 7 a.m. Baggagemen and taxis are quickly overwhelmed when a full planeload arrives. Limousine and bus services are drastically reduced. Hotels with free limo services are usually full. Auto rental firms, on the other hand, are either staffed through the night or have a night phone.

No meals are served in night coach, and only snack bars are open at the larger airports.

Airports are well lighted throughout the night, and passengers should feel as safe there as during the day. However, facilities to help those in trouble are limited.

For example at Atlanta airport, at 3:15 a.m., a young woman reported that her money and identification cards had been stolen from her purse in the washroom. While the security force tried to phone someone in the area who could help her at that hour, no one could be reached. She had to wait until Traveler's Aid reopened at 8 a.m.

In spite of the inconveniences, spot interviews show wide interest in night flying.

Two businessmen on a flight from New York to Atlanta: "We fly night-coach first class because we have been used to flying first class. The company recently ordered a cutback in such frills. But since first-class night coach is the same price as day coach, the company has approved our night flights. Besides it avoids travel time during business hours, which can be spent in making contacts."

*Please turn to Page 4

By Gregg Morris

Watercolors capture summer's last days

## Auto anti-pollution devices may cut fuel bills 20%

By Robert M. Press

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Chicago

Use of anti-pollution devices required on many 1975 model cars about to go on sale may save drivers 20 percent on their gasoline bills, new federal tests show. But the devices may add $150 to new-car bills.

A 7 percent savings on gasoline bills, previously estimated by the Environmental Protection Agency, was "too conservative," EPA chief Russell E. Train said here Tuesday.

Estimated miles-per-gallon performance, to be given in writing to prospective buyers of cars equipped with the new devices, will be announced later this week — probably on Friday, Mr. Train said.

A spokesman for American Motors in Detroit agreed with Mr. Train's general estimate of fuel savings with the converters, but said the savings would depend on the model of car and the way it is driven.

### Hazard hint

There may be a "potential health hazard" in using the new anti-pollution devices, known as catalytic converters, Mr. Train said before addressing the annual meeting of the American Automobile Association.

But such a risk must be balanced

against the known fact that the converters will remove each year "millions of tons" of pollution, said to be harmful, from automobile exhaust. The EPA will continue roadside tests in Los Angeles to determine the "health effect" of the 37,000 tons annually of sulfur particulates that will be emitted using the converters.

Sulfur already is a part of gasoline and is emitted whether converters are used or not. But the converters speed up the normal oxidation process of sulfur. The EPA wants to know what effect this speedup may have, especially in congested areas.

### Unleaded gas needed

Cars using the converters, which will be standard equipment on more than 60 percent of the 1975 model cars, must use unleaded gasoline. Mr. Train estimates that such gasoline now is available at more than half the nation's stations. Use of unleaded gasoline, he added, may result in motor-maintenance savings of up to $45 per car each year.

Converters themselves offer no gasoline savings. But their use does, as it allows car manufacturers to eliminate anti-pollution "hardware" in the motor and tune the motor for better performance, since the converter handles the entire exhaust-purifying process.

*Please turn to Page 4

Reporters overheard that he has questions about Dr. Kissinger's "credibility," said he had communicated this view to two other close associates of the President, former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and Rep. John J. Rhodes of Arizona.

"Ford ought to surround himself with people who have credibility,"

## Reagan waits as Republicans

If Ford should falter politically ...

By Curtis J. Sitomer

Los Angeles

Gov. Ronald Reagan, who sees himself as the best voice of conservatism in the United States today, is ready and willing to pick up the pieces if President Ford's popularity continues to fall.

The California Governor, who has chosen to retire as Governor this year after two terms, still has his eyes fixed on a bid for the White House in 1976.

In his just-completed, cross-country trip on behalf of Republican congressional candidates this year, the Governor spoke to enthusiastic audiences — even as Mr. Ford encountered the first concerted public criticism of his administration over the pardon of

*Please turn to Page 8

## Styling Soviet

Just as in the West, it's

By Elizabeth Pond

Moscow

Lev Nestorovich Kutarba is a rugged-faced, sideburned native of the Soviet Georgian Republic who has succeeded handsomely in fulfilling the dreams of his youth.

He is one of the most sought-after hair stylists in Moscow. So sought after, in fact, that he is not always at his post. Part of the time he is off training the Soviet team for a hair-dressing competition of Communist countries in Prague.

It wasn't a straight line for Mr. Kutarba. Only after several years of

September 18, 1974

"is the ultimate aphrodisiac." In politics the pleasures such an aphrodisiac stimulates are many: grovelling minions, honor guards, black limousines, jet diplomacy. Surpassing all these, however, is the pleasure of forcing an opponent to submit. The militarist does this by the application of force; the diplomat by the hint of force and by his talents of persuasion.

The Kissinger-Nixon diplomacy has rested on the twin pillars of confrontations and personal deals. Often they are used in tandem: first the mailed fist and then the sympathetic ear. Thus the Christmas terror bombing of North Vietnam and then the settlement; the decision to let the Arabs and the Jews kill each other awhile, and then the Cairo-Jerusalem shuttle extravaganza; the mining of Haiphong harbor followed by Nixon's public relations descent upon Moscow.

Like Nixon, Kissinger has often been hypnotized by what John F. Kennedy used to call the shadow rather than the substance of power. When the Russians put up the Berlin Wall in 1961, he demanded that the United States tear it down to demonstrate its "credibility" to Bonn. When the Pakistanis were killing thousands in Bangladesh, he sent an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal to intimidate the Indians from intervening. When during the Yom Kippur war the Russians suggested that a joint Soviet-American force be sent to Egypt, he called a full-scale nuclear alert.

Kissinger's temptation to brandish the Bomb—first elaborated in *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*—is sometimes irresistible. The nuclear alert of October, 1973, was his own decision. Nixon, who was preoccupied with the Saturday Night Massacre at the time, casually made Kissinger Commander in Chief while he tended to more important matters, such as firing Archibald Cox. Kissinger, characteristically, tried to keep the alert a secret from the American people, although presumably not from the Russians, and was furious the next morning to find it reported in the news. Although he solemnly promised that he would explain the reasons for that thrilling display of military might, Kissinger has never done so. Even the Kalbs, who have trouble wiping the starard from their eyes in viewing their hero, consider that episode one of his less illustrious moments.

Yet to assume that the nuclear alert was simply an overreaction on Kissinger's part is to miss the point. Its purpose was to signal the Russians that they could not tip the balance in Egypt's favor. Similarly, sending the carrier to the Bay of Bengal was to show China, which Kissinger was busy wooing at the time, that the United States would not allow Pakistan, Pecking's erstwhile ally, to be dismembered by a Russian-supported India. Kissinger's muscle-flexing was, of course, a fiasco. Bangladesh gained its independence, India became even more dependent on the Soviet Union, and the United States was left holding the hand of the collapsing Yahya Khan regime. Locked into his visions of global power balances, Kissinger lost track of the real issues.

Kissinger also hauled out the big stick in 1970, when the Russians seemed to be building a submarine base in Cuba. Assembling the press for a high-level leak, he warned of a "grave

confrontation" with Russia unless the base was dismantled, and told an astonished Soviet ambassador that another "missile crisis" was in the making. William Rogers, who was then filling the office, if not exercising the powers, of Secretary of State, and whose functions were being steadily devoured by Kissinger, complained that this "crisis" was all a tempest in a teapot and accused his White House rival of "engaging in cold war rhetoric."

While in many ways a master of subtlety, Kissinger is remarkably crude in his approach to power politics. It is the strong opponent who counts, and every event is judged by its relation to the current struggle for dominance among the great powers. Just as the revolt of the Bengalis and the thirty-years war in Vietnam were seen as part of the cold war, so in the Middle East it was Moscow's "penetration" of the area that troubled Kissinger, not the tiresome quarrel between Arabs and Jews.

How Kissinger's obsession with *Realpolitik* can unhinge his touch with reality has been dramatized most recently in Cyprus. There he winked at the overthrow of Makarios—whom he reportedly considered “the Castro of the eastern Mediterranean”—and casually accepted the installation by the military junta in Athens of their henchman Nikos Sampson. He did nothing to dissuade the Turks from invading the island, despite the ploys of the fragile Caramanis government in Greece, and then had the arrogance to complain that “a foreign government must not expect that every time there is a crisis the secretary of state will come rushing into the area and spend all his time settling that particular crisis”—as if anyone had asked him to compound his meddling. Kissinger's “tilt” toward Turkey, like his support of the Greek colonels during their long dictatorship and his hostility toward Makarios, has nothing to do with the ancient enmity between Greeks and Turks. Rather he sees Cyprus only as the cockpit of a cold war struggle between Russia and America for influence in the eastern Mediterranean. In that struggle a strong Turkey is a better ally than a weak and no longer militarized Greece; a partitioned Cyprus offers safer shores for the roaming Sixth Fleet than a republic unified in neutrality.

Liberals view Kissinger's politics as immoral, although for him they are merely amoral. "I have no fixed opinions. I have never been a doctrinaire," Bismarck said a century ago in words that his admirer would approve. "Liberal, reactionary, conservative—those I confess seem to me luxuries." But even on their own terms, Kissinger's policies are often short-sighted and self-defeating. A Cyprus partitioned and torn by civil strife hardly represents a trump card in the Mediterranean power game with Russia. A government of Greek colonels detested by its own people and dependent on American support was hardly a reliable ally. And if Turkey welcomes American aid in dividing Cyprus it is also capable of throwing out lines to Moscow, as it has done in the past. A policy that consciously accepts the humiliation of a democratic ally, the devastation of an unarmed people, and tacit support for the dismemberment of a land whose independence was formally guar-

In a beautiful clothbound volume, hundreds of illustrations...

# The Twilight of The Medici

Late Baroque Art in Florence. 1670-1743
The Detroit Institute of Arts/The Palazzo Pitti. Florence.

The exhibit that was covered extensively in *The New York Times, Time Magazine*, on the *Today* show and in all major national and international media—and seen only at the Detroit Institute of Arts and at the Palazzo Pitti in Florence. Italy—was accompanied by a catalog which will stand as the major statement on late Florentine art for decades to come.

"A compelling portrait of the period in all its visual forms...the catalog—like the exhibition, carried out with the aid of an international roster of scholars—is a pioneering attempt to give the subject both a new visibility and a persuasive intellectual coherence... (It) is an essential item for any library of Italian art. —Hilton Kramer, *The New York Times*.

Preface by Harold Acton. Contributors: Klaus Lankheit, Gerhard Ewald, Jennifer Montagu. Kirsten Aschengreen Piacenti. Marco Chiarini. Alvar Gonzales-Palacios. Barbara Grohs. Giuseppe Chiglioni.

Clothbound edition available in a limited quantity only $15.00 each. 447 illustrations. 26 color plates. To order, mail coupon below.

## Machiavelli and the Art of Renaissance History

By Peter F. Bondanelle

"Explores a dimension sometimes forgotten in Machiavelli's historical work: the literary aspect...illuminating...Choice. 'Contributor(s) much to the enrichment of literature on the Renaissance.'—History Reviews of Books, 186 pages. $10.95.

To: Wayne State University Press/Detroit, Michigan 48202

Please send ______ copy/ies of *Medici* catalog @ $15.00 ea. ______ copy/ies of *Machiavelli* @ $10.95.

Name
Address
City State Zip

Please enclose check or money order. WSU Press will pay postage and handling charges.

## TALKING PICTURES

Screenwriters in the American Cinema by Richard Corliss
Preface by Andrew Sarris

A radical revision of the view of film held for the last decade, charting new ground in film thinking. A brilliant young critic's extraordinary reference work revises the *auteur* theory which credits the Hollywood director as sole artist...and identifies the *screenwriter* as the crucial missing link in the creation of American movies. An examination of 100 Hollywood films by 38 major screenwriters. $15.00

### THE RADETZKY MARCH

by Joseph Roth

A classic work, this novel evokes the death pangs of the legendary Hapsburg era. The minutely detailed story of men whose lives are bound in the iron tradition of service. $8.95

### THE ERA OF GERMAN EXPRESSIONISM

Edited by Paul Raabe

An initial documentation of the period by its participants, filling in a great gap in the understanding of this cultural ferment. $15.00

### THE OVERLOOK PRESS
Lewis Hollow Road
Woodstock, New York

September 19, 1974

25

# The Germans
by Erich Kahler

Edited by Robert and Rita Kimber

Searching for the key to the German character, Erich Kahler—philosopher, historian, and humanist—draws upon a lifetime of research and reflection on German history for this remarkable portrait of a people. “Here we have a sweeping insight from a cultural historian whose grasp of European developments, and of Germany’s place within them, is rare and outstanding.”—Arno J. Mayer

“One is amazed at how much vital history and cogent analysis and interpretation are packed into this very valuable book.”—Charles Lam Markmann, SR/World $13.50

# Afghanistan
by Louis Dupree

“An anthropologist’s comprehensive survey of everything from geography and folklore to the latest revolution but one. A true treasure trove from an author who has had a long and intimate acquaintance with the country.”—Foreign Affairs
“Unrivalled for the comprehensive-ness of its coverage.”—Perspective
784 pages, 103 illustrations, 20 maps, 31 charts, 6 diagrams
$22.50

PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

# Visions of Yesterday

JEFFREY RICHARDS

A book to delight the cineast and social historian alike. Taking three examples — American Populism, British Imperialism and German Nazism — a historian looks at cinema as social documentation. “A wonderfully researched book that should be standard and indispensable reading for Cinema Studies of the future.”

—ARTHUR MARSHALL, New Statesman

246 photographs, $17.25

# Rise Up, Women!

The Militant Campaign of the Women's Social and Political Union, 1903-14

ANDREW ROSEN

The suffragette movement shattered the domestic tranquillity of Edwardian England. In this history of the WSPU, the formidable organization which led the campaign, Andrew Rosen writes neither with condescension nor as an uncritical apologist for militant feminism. 8 pp illustrations, $21.75

# Sociology and the Demystification of the Modern World

JOHN REX

In his controversial new book, Professor Rex deplores much of what now passes for sociology, and maintains that sociologists must “eliminate the unnecessary difficulties which the arcane languages of the most recent sociologies have placed in the way of anyone seeking to achieve a real understanding of the world.” *New Society* describes the book as “a clarion call for the revitalisation of sociology.”
*International Library of Sociology* $14.00

## Routledge

9 Park Street, Boston, Mass. 02108 Tel 617/742-5863

anted by three of its allies is not only ruthless politics but bad *Realpolitik*. It marks the triumph of abstract logic over reality.

This is where Kissinger's greatest weakness lies. Although he is a superb negotiator—tactful, imaginative, indefatigable, and sensitive to nuance—his approach to politics is rigid and unimaginative. His talent is as a dealer, not as an innovator. Credit for the innovations in American foreign policy over the past half-dozen years—the opening to Peking, the expanded détente with Moscow, the withdrawal from Vietnam, the limitation on defensive missiles—properly belongs to Nixon. As the Kalbs point out, Nixon advocated a new approach to China before he was elected; as a conservative Republican, he was the first president since Eisenhower in a strong political position to bring it off.

With his penchant for abstract theorizing, Kissinger speaks a good deal about “conceptualizations.” But some of his concepts—such as the so-called “pentagonal balance of power” and the “linkage” of seemingly unrelated issues in negotiation—are of dubious value. What five great powers are in equal balance? Where, for that matter, is the “realism” in playing gunboat diplomacy in the Bay of Bengal and the eastern Mediterranean while the world monetary and trading system approaches a breakdown? A *Realpolitik* that is bored by anything less than nuclear confrontation is not one that inspires confidence.

As a game player and a dealer, Kissinger naturally finds adversaries more interesting than allies, negotiating with the former and issuing diktats to the latter, as he has to Japan and the Europeans. Allies are tiresome necessities, but adversaries pose a challenge that can be capped with the sweet triumph of a hard-bargained deal. Even if they later turn out to be ephemeral—such as the so-called “settlement” in Vietnam, the Middle East “truce,” and the stalled SALT II talks—it is the initial deal that the world remembers. Politicians like Brezhnev and Chou make good bargaining partners, for they are shrewd players of the power game. The problem comes with ideologues who resist both intimidation and promises, such as the Cubans and the North Vietnamese, or with independent characters like Makarios who are hard to buy off. Stymied by those who would not deal, Nixon and Kissinger sought an elusive “victory” in Vietnam, and stubbornly persisted in maintaining the embargo on trade with Cuba.

In Kissinger's view of foreign policy, the objective is often less important than the manner in which it is pursued. “Others judge us—and set their own course—by the steadiness of our performance as well as the merit of our ideas,” he declared in 1971. Nowhere was this approach more disastrous than in Vietnam, where the war was prolonged for four years, at enormous cost in lives and money, in pursuit of a settlement that would presumably leave national “prestige” intact. The importance of Vietnam was not strategic, for the domino theory had long been abandoned by Nixon. Rather it was symbolic, a pawn in the global struggle for power.

Kissinger could have worked out a settlement in Vietnam in 1969, had he

and Nixon was willing to cut loose from the generals in Saigon. They could have had an agreement on their own terms in October, 1972, when Hanoi dropped its demand that Thieu be ousted. Indeed they could probably have reached the same compromise much earlier than Kissinger had waited until the spring of 1972 formally to withdraw his insistence that North Vietnamese troops be evacuated from the South (although he hinted to the Russians that he was willing to do so in 1970). And they certainly could have had an accord in December, 1972, before the terrible Christmas bombings—as Tad Szulc has demonstrated in his fascinating reconstruction⁵ of the cease-fire agreement—had Kissinger not overestimated his ability to manipulate Thieu into acceptance.

It was clear from the time of the first bombing halt in 1968 that Hanoi would never pull its troops out of the South. Therefore, except as a cover for Vietnamization, as Szulc observed, “there is no satisfactory reason for Kissinger to have refused to recognize reality for three years.” The inescapable conclusion of that sorry record—the Nobel Peace Prize notwithstanding—is that Vietnamese and American lives were needlessly sacrificed so that the Nixon administration could emerge from the war with “honor.” The price of that strategy was 15,000 Americans dead, 110,000 wounded, $50 billion spent, and 600,000 South Vietnamese civilians dead and wounded, not to mention even greater casualties for North Vietnam and the Viet Cong.

It all culminated, as we know, in the Christmas terror bombing of the North after a settlement was reached and the world duly informed that “peace is at hand.” The purpose of that pitiless action, we have learned from Szulc’s investigation, was to force Hanoi to make marginal concessions, thus placating Thieu, who was outraged at the accord with Le Duc Tho that Kissinger had presented to him as a *fait accompli*. When Thieu refused to go along with it, Kissinger had to cancel his secret plan to sign the settlement in Hanoi on October 31. The North Vietnamese, suspecting that Washington had reneged on the agreement, made a dramatic revelation of the secret negotiations.

Contemptuous of Thieu, Kissinger had failed to keep Saigon informed of his secrecy-shrouded talks, or to take its anxieties seriously. While surreptitiously negotiating a settlement that would leave North Vietnamese troops in the South, he continued to string Thieu along with outlandish hints of American support for an invasion of the North. When Thieu refused to sign what he called the “prefabricated package” worked out for him between his American allies and his North Vietnamese enemies, Kissinger exploded in rage. “This is the greatest failure of my career!” he thundered. “I’m sorry about that,” Thieu’s diplomatic adviser replied, “but we have a country to defend.”

Although telling his journalist friends that he opposed the bombing, Kissinger actually supported it because his own obsession with secret diplomacy had led to the breakdown of negotiations. It was indeed one of the greatest failures of his

⁵“Behind the Cease-Fire Agreement,” *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1974.

The New York Review.

26

All About Henry

Kissinger

by Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb.
Little, Brown. 577 pp., $12.50

Ronald Steel

Diplomacy may be, as is often said, a liar's game. But to play that game well, a semblance of sincerity is essential. As a master of the art, Henry Kissinger has always understood this. "Sincerity has meaning only in reference to a standard of truth of conduct," he once wrote in an admiring analysis¹ of the German master of power politics. "It was not that Bismarck lied, but that he was finely attuned to the subtlest currents of any environment and produced measures precisely adjusted to the need to prevail. The key to Bismarck's success was that he was always sincere."

This was a lesson Kissinger learned well. "I attach great importance to being believed," he told an interviewer.² "When one persuades or congers someone, one musn't deceive them." Those who have been subjected to Kissinger's charm, logic, and persistence have often felt that he sincerely understands and sympathizes with their point of view. This is what has made him such a superb negotiator and catapulted him to international popularity.

Kissinger has hoisted himself to the top by a combination of fine tuning, sensitivity to the currents of power, favors from influential protectors, and judicious switches when new opportunities arose. One of the few holdovers from the Nixon administration to emerge with his reputation relatively unscathed, he may become as indispensable to Gerald Ford as he was to Nixon.

The story of the Jewish refugee's rise to fame, if not yet fortune, has taken on the qualities of a morality tale. Men on the make have always had a special place in the hearts of Americans. Their success confirms a national mythology, and their fall is seen as high tragedy. So it has been with Richard Nixon, and so it may yet be for Kissinger, who, like so many others less brilliant and less skillful, rode a politician's chariot to power.

Kissinger's odyssey from Nazi persecution to world adulation is now an old story, told in loving detail by Marvin and Bernard Kalb in their bloated chronicle, *Kissinger*. Perhaps less well known, however, are some of the people who helped him on his way. First there was Fritz Kraemer, now a "special adviser for politico-military affairs" in the Pentagon, and given, according to the Kalbs, to "walks in the countryside around Washington with a sheathed sword hidden in his sleeve." In 1943, however, Kraemer was a thirty- e-year-old German refugee who lectured American soldiers on Nazism. In the audience was another refugee, twenty-year-old Henry Kissinger, who wrote Kraemer a fan letter offering his services. The older man was so impressed by the admiring GI, in whom he saw what he later described as a "historical musicality," that he recommended

young Kissinger for the job of German interpreter in division headquarters.

Six years later, armed with a BA from Harvard and immersed in the academic politics of graduate school, Kissinger found another protector in William Yandell Elliott. A brilliant eccentric whose early promise had withered into pompous crankiness, Elliott was a rigid conservative and cold warrior. But he remained a powerful figure at Harvard, not least because of his contacts in Washington, to which he commuted regularly. With his solid lines to the conservatives in Congress, the State Department, and Wall Street, Elliott had connections that Kissinger appreciated.

In view of Kissinger's interest in philosophy and history it might have seemed logical for him to seek out Carl Friedrich, the renowned political theorist of the government department, rather than the flamboyant cold war-

rior who liked to be called "Wild Bill," and who, because of his military-industrial contacts, was also referred to as "Mr. Missileman." In fact, Kissinger originally chose Friedrich as his tutor, but soon switched, telling him, as Friedrich recalls: "I am interested in the practical politics of international relations, and you are interested in philosophy and scholarship."³

Elliott proved to be a wise choice. He obtained scholarships for his discipline, and later rewarded Kissinger by putting him in charge of the Harvard International Seminar, which brought upwardly mobile young foreigners to Cambridge for a summer of bull sessions. Whatever the intellectual value of those many hours exchanging "points of view," they did provide Kissinger with contacts that later

proved immensely useful.

The seminar, as it turned out, was not nearly so high-minded as it appeared. In 1967 it was revealed to be a CIA front, funded through the Rockefeller and other foundations, which obligingly laundered the agency's subsidiary. It was all part of the good struggle against communism to which Elliott, and many other intellectuals at Harvard and elsewhere, were dedicated. Kissinger denied that he knew the CIA was involved. But when the story broke, his first reaction was anxiety over what might be said about his participation. "Oh my God, this is terrible," Kissinger said. "People are going to say I'm working for the CIA."⁴

Like virtually every other graduate student at Harvard, Kissinger wanted to stay on once he had completed his degree. But the university was reluctant to grant him tenure. To enhance his bargaining power, he applied for a

job then open as managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, the quarterly journal of the Council on Foreign Relations. As the watering-ground of the Eastern liberal foreign policy establishment, the Council was an ideal place for a man of Kissinger's ambitions. Although he was turned down for the job, he was offered a short-term post as study director for a panel on cold war military strategy with participants drawn from Wall Street and Washington. Kissinger gratefully accepted the offer, "not only because it seems directed in the main line of my own thought," he told the directors, "but also because the Council seems to furnish a human environment I find attractive."

Among the attractions of that environment was the opportunity to meet the lawyers and financiers who exerted powerful influence on American foreign policy. While at the Council Kissinger attached himself to Nelson

³As related by Ralph Blumenthal in his biographical series for the *New York Post*, "Henry Kissinger: The Private and Public Story," June 8, 1974.

⁴Ibid.

Rockefeller, whom he had met at a panel on military security that Rockefeller had set up at Quantico, Virginia. Duly impressed by the young academician's hard-headed approach to the cold war, Rockefeller took him on as director of a family-financed project on national security. Its reports, prepared by Kissinger and released by the Rockefellers in 1958, concluded that "the willingness to engage in nuclear war when necessary is part of the price of our freedom."

It was this seemingly casual approach to nuclear war that made Kissinger the model for Dr. Strange-love. He had elaborated his views in greater detail a year earlier in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which emerged from the Council study and was published under its auspices. Kissinger's argument for a strategy including limited nuclear war obviously responded to the anxieties of the times. The book, to Kissinger's and the Council's astonishment, became a best seller, and its author one of the scarier figures of the military-industrial-academic complex. Because or perhaps in spite of its success, Harvard swallowed its doubts and invited Kissinger to return with tenure.

With a firm base of operations in Cambridge, with access to Rockefeller, and with other useful ties to the world of finance and government nurtured during his stint at the Council, Kissinger joined the select band of cold war intellectuals who shuttled between Cambridge and Washington. But unlike many of his Harvard colleagues, he never found a place in Camelot and was gradually eased out by those, such as McGeorge Bundy, whose influence, though not ambitions, were greater than his own. While in the wilderness he wrote a few more books, one of which, *The Troubled Partnership*, with its condemnation of America's wish to dominate its European allies, makes wry reading today. Faithful to the hand that subsidized him, he served as foreign policy adviser to Nelson Rockefeller, whose recommendations during the Fifties included a bomb shelter in every back yard.

Having allied himself so firmly with Rockefeller, and having failed to make much of an impression upon Kennedy or Johnson, Kissinger was unprepared for Nixon's tap on the shoulder in December, 1968. But while surprising, the choice was not illogical. Nixon needed someone with ties to the Eastern liberal establishment, who was not sullied by intimate association with the Democrats, who had no independent political base, and who shared his cold war views. That such a man could also be snatched away from his archrival, Rockefeller, increased Kissinger's desirability. Nixon would have his own Harvard brains trust.

Thus fine tuning had brought Kissinger to the threshold of the most powerful office in the world. Flattering his master. faithfully carrying out his policies, and remaining conspicuously loyal, Kissinger soon became indispensable to Nixon. Whatever differences there may have been between them were over methods, not objectives. Both had freed themselves from a preoccupation with ideology, both revealed in the exercise of power, and both relished a politics of confrontation.

"Power," Kissinger once confessed in a sentiment clearly shared by Nixon,

¹"The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus*, Summer, 1968.

²Oriana Fallaci, *The New Republic*, November 4, 1972.

24

1974 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS

THE NEW YORK REVIEW

25

ISAAC
BABEL

RUSSIAN MASTER
OF THE SHORT STORY

By James E. Falen

"The book succeeds in placing Babel in a particular literary and human situation, while bringing to bear on the reading of the stories a wealth of mythic and symbolic material. It is obviously a labor of great love; no aspect of Babel is left unilluminated."

—Edward J. Brown
296 pp., $9.75

from your bookstore, or

THE UNIVERSITY
OF TENNESSEE PRESS
Knoxville 37916

The Lolita of Envirobooks--

Cy A. Adler's

ECOLOGICAL FANTASIES:
DEATH FROM
FALLING WATERMELONS

"Out of the ordinary."

-Amer. Assn. Univ. Women

"Should he read and taught."

ABEL WOLMAN, Johns Hopkins U.

"Authoritative...it's funny, too."

-Science Digest

" Refreshing...clever...amusing."

—IRVING S. SHAPIRO
Chairman, DuPont Corp.

"Lucid...stimulating, entertaining read."

—ROBERT RICKLES

350 pp. -- $9.95
Green Eagle Press
95 Nassau St.
N.Y.C. 10038

WRITERS: WHY WAIT?

PUBLISH
YOUR BOOK
IN 90 DAYS

and get expert editing, design, manufacture, publicity, promotion and advertising—all under one roof at low costs. Two free books and literature give details and success stories. Write or call Dept. 153C

EXPOSITION PRESS, INC.

Jericho, N.Y. 11753 516 997-9050

Running Out of Food

In the Human Interest:
A Strategy to Stabilize
World Population

by Lester R. Brown.

Norton, 190 pp., $6.95

Emma Rothschild

One year ago, the director of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, Dr. A. Boerma, wrote that the world had become dangerously dependent on current harvests, and therefore on the weather. Cereal stocks were at the lowest level in twenty years. "The world food situation," Boerma wrote, "is more difficult than at any time since the years immediately following the devastation of the Second World War."

All this year, Boerma and others have warned again and again that food prices and supplies would be determined in 1974 by floods and persistence and drought. Listening this spring to officials of the UN World Food Conference I heard, again and again, hopes and prayers for good weather. US government experts agreed on the importance of this year's American corn and wheat harvest, but they predicted record crops for what Agriculture Secretary Butz described in April as our "virtually disaster proof" agriculture.

In May Dr. Boerma came to New York and spoke again of the memory of 1945. Later that month I talked with an administrator of the UN's relief agency, a man who had directed food relief programs during and after the Second World War. This man spoke of the food situation in 1945, and in 1974, and of the seventy days that it would take, in an emergency, for food supplies to reach Calcutta from Galveston. World food prospects, he said, were fearsomely dependent upon the Indian monsoon that was expected to start in June.

As I write, in late summer, the natural conditions for food shortages have been met. Certain, perhaps many, of the disorders that Boerma feared have come about. In the United States, corn and soybean crops have been damaged by a drought lasting through July. Corn farmers will need at least $1 billion in disaster assistance; the Department of Agriculture, which earlier this year expected a harvest of 6.4 billion bushels of corn, now estimates a crop of 4.97 billion bushels.

The July midwestern drought was the most serious of the natural misfortunes this year in the main grain-exporting countries: from spring floods in Iowa and Nebraska and Canada (the worst in twenty-five years), to the worst insect plague in thirty years in the wheat regions of South Australia, with an "explosion" of locust hatchings and red-legged earth mites.

The quality of the Indian monsoon, and thus of the wet season harvest, will not be known before October—in the words of a World Bank official, "not before it's over." The monsoon rains did not come in June as expected. In July they fell into the southern Indian Ocean. Then they fell in Calcutta, but not in some important food-producing regions. Then floods washed away crops in the east of India and in Bangladesh, while certain central provinces were still dry. In Bangladesh, now, it is estimated by The New York Times that the floods destroyed

80 percent of the summer crop and many of that winter's seedlings—40 percent, perhaps, of the year's food crop.

These climatic disorders by no means constitute a natural disaster on the scale of the Indian drought of 1972 or the Bangladesh floods of 1970. Wheat crops both in the US and in India were largely secure before the summer drought; the weather has been good in most other parts of the world. Yet it is certain, at the least, that grain reserves will not easily be rebuilt before next summer.

The consequences of the droughts and floods, meanwhile, have been made immensely worse by routine economic activity, by human unreason in the face of natural misfortune. Grain prices, including futures prices, have been relatively high this summer,

most serious consequences in the next weeks and months. US consumers can expect much higher food prices as the scarce, expensive corn is fed to successive generations of chickens, pigs, and cows; poor nations, such as India, will compete in an increasingly bloated world grain market. The Ford Administration is already considering restrictions on US grain exports, after the model of last year's soybean embargo; the crop outlook has reduced prospects both for increasing foreign aid and for stores of grain being held available in Galveston against present and future natural disasters. In a dreadful circle, the difficult grain situation has served, finally, to strengthen opposition in Congress and in agencies such as the Office of Management and Budget to proposals for establishing internationally financed grain reserves.

Lester Brown's new book is about the prospects for world population and

nourished by poor weather reports and by the unstable reserve situation; a futures trader told me in July that gloomy news bulletins from Indian weather stations had sustained a "temporary firming pattern in the market."

When the US Department of Agriculture in August released its new, low estimate of corn crops, the price of corn futures rose by the allowed limit on commodity exchanges. Speculators then bought other commodities—wheat, copper, pork bellies—in random panic. US corn, which is used largely to feed animals, is the world's largest cereal crop, and an increasingly important US export; last December, an Agriculture Department official claimed that "the world's food economy is running increasingly on US corn and soybeans." In the days after the new crop estimate was released, America's foreign customers scrambled to secure supplies: Japanese buyers placed orders for more corn than they had bought in the last many months.

This turmoil—these workings of the present food economy—will have the

world resources in the next ten years. But it has much to say about the present food situation. Brown, an economist who works for the Overseas Development Council, argues that the contemporary insecurity in world food supplies is a sign that "we have entered an era" of food scarcity, where demand for food "has begun to outrun" the capacity for producing food. He presents several important ideas about world food—ideas of which he has been for some years a persuasive exponent.

Brown describes the reduction of grain reserves over many years, to their current level of less than one month's supply, and the inflationary effect of this reduction on food prices. He also argues that the "modern version of famine" has become less dramatic and photogenic than it was in West Bengal in 1943 or in Ireland in 1847, and more a matter of rising death rates. A study prepared for the World Food Conference estimates that half of all child deaths are "in some way attributable to malnutrition," that 200 mil-

The New York Review

18

Not only were the Kalbs on Kissinger's approved list, but Marvin Kalb was granted the ultimate honor of an exclusive television interview. They give credit where it is due, beginning their page of acknowledgments with this offer of appreciation: "Our thanks go first to Henry A. Kissinger, who, as an historian as well as a statesman, understands the critical importance of primary sourcing. He has been generous with his time and his knowledge." It can fairly be said that his generosity has been rewarded.

The enormous, but uncritical and often fawning, book which the brothers Kalb have produced is a Washington insider's account, redolent with gossip, detail, and self-serving quotations which could have come only from the subject himself and his most sycophantic aides. Unable to view their subject dispassionately, the Kalbs too often take him at his own word and gloss over events that reflect badly on him. They not only fail to examine adequately the failures in Kissinger's record—we are told, for example, that he "did not have time" to deal with the Pakistani repression in Bangladesh, and that he was so busy concentrating on "linkage" that he failed to notice the boondoggle of the Russian wheat deal—but put the blame on Nixon, the Pentagon, or the "bureaucracy" for the more ruthless aspects of US diplomacy during the Kissinger years. This is a pity, for the Kalbs are capable of something more searching, and Kissinger's accomplishments are real enough to stand full scrutiny.

But even through this laundered account one gets a glimpse of the complex man who is something less than the Miracle Worker. One sees his hypersensitivity to criticism, his insistence on personalizing any disagreement, his self-pity and much-advertised paranoia, his lack of self-confidence (which may explain his fear of appearing "soft" and his hard-line position on military policy), his insensitivity to those serving under him, and his obsequiousness toward those of higher standing. These are not unique traits, and are not more contemptible than those of many great men. But they are important if we are to understand the person Kissinger is.

The Kalbs barely hint at the flaws in Kissinger's character, although at one point they comment that "he has always been a political chameleon, able to take on the coloration of his environment." It is a tantalizing observation which, if explored, might have told us a good deal about the way he has operated within the bureaucracy and how the critical decisions over war and peace were really made—not in the jets that obviously impressed the Kalbs and other newsmen, or in the endless rounds of toasts from Peking to Riyadh, but in the struggles over men and money, over power and influence within the administration that Kissinger served.

It might also have told us something about his great success as a negotiator. Being "finely attuned" to personalities and power situations has indeed helped Kissinger's rise to the top. It was through a combination of flattery and apparent sincerity that he was able to move from Kraemer to Elliott to Rockefeller to Nixon. At the critical moment he gave Nixon a gentle shove toward resignation and attached him-

self to Gerald Ford. The same qualities that brought the ambitious refugee from the Bronx to Washington have also helped him to persuade Arabs, Israelis, Russians, and Chinese that he really understands their points of view and has their own best interests at heart.

His distaste for ideology of any kind and his contempt for Wilsonian idealism no doubt have helped him in dealing with commissars and potentiates who find his cynical *Realpolitik* a welcome change from the self-righteous moralizing they have come to expect from American officials. Kissinger has always known how to sell himself, and often gained what he wanted by offering the right payoff at the crucial moment. Although he was reportedly taken aback when President Ford referred to him as a "horse trader," the description is apt.

Kissinger's bargains are impressive: the Middle East cease-fire, the opening to China, the expanding détente with Russia. Some of these, perhaps all, would have been achieved without him, but probably not so soon, nor with so much public support. Nor can he take full credit for them, for the policies he negotiated are Nixon's. Whether the deals will endure is another matter: the Palestinian question could lead to another Arab-Israeli war, the line to Peking depends on continued enmity between Russia and China, the new coziness with Moscow has done nothing to slow down the arms race, and in Vietnam the war continues with American-supplied proxies.

Meanwhile, the bills are coming due from Kissinger's failures: his inability to reach an accord with Moscow on offensive missiles, mounting friction with Europe over trade and politics, deteriorating relations with Japan as a result of deliberate affronts, and a short-sighted disregard for the world economic crisis, which, if unchecked, could sweep away prosperity and democratic governments as well.

Kissinger's diplomacy is praised for its lack of ideology (although a distaste for ideology is often, as in his case, a thinly disguised preference for the status quo). It is also indifferent to human rights, as his silence in the face of the repression of Soviet dissidents and Chilean and Greek democrats clearly shows. But what is most dangerous is that *Realpolitik* has become a goal in its own right, obscuring the purposes for which it is ostensibly being exercised. Power has indeed been Kissinger's aphrodisiac. This is why he was able to operate so successfully within Nixon's White House.

With no clear standards and no discernible concept of the national interest other than the insatiable quest for power and prestige, Kissinger's diplomacy is not a foundation on which to build what he calls a "structure of peace." Rather it is a series of feats—brilliantly engineered, dazzlingly choreographed, and lovingly reported by the press. These feats are already proving to be ephemeral because they are personal deals that have left deeper economic and political conflicts unresolved. So widely admired today for his unquestioned intelligence, style, and negotiating prowess, Henry Kissinger is more likely to be remembered as an agile manipulator than as a great architect. ☐

## social research

### AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

#### VOLUME 41 NUMBER 2 SUMMER 1974

#### RELIGION

TALCOTT PARSONS, RELIGION IN POSTINDUSTRIAL AMERICA

ANDREW M. GREELEY, RELIGION IN A SECULAR SOCIETY

MARTIN E. MARTY, RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR: ITS SOCIAL DIMENSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY

GABRIEL VAHANIAN, FROM KARL BARTH TO THEOLOGY

WILLIAM F. MAY, TERRORISM AS STRATEGY AND ECSTASY

ROY WALLIS, IDEOLOGY, AUTHORITY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTIC MOVEMENTS

RICHARD LOURIE, THE PROPHET AND THE MARRANO

LOUIS SCHNEIDER, THE SCOPE OF "THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR" AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION

DONALD CAPPS, CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

A publication of the Graduate Faculty,
New School for Social Research

Arien Mack, EDITOR

Social Research
66 West 12th Street, N.Y. 10011

☐ Please enter my subscription for one year of "Social Research." I enclose a check for $10.00.

☐ Please send me a copy of the Summer 1974 issue of "Social Research." Enclosed is a check for $3.00.

Name

Address

City State Zip

September 19, 1974

This image does not contain any text. It is a logo.

29

career. As early as 1969, after his first secret meetings with the North Vietnamese, he said that a negotiated settlement could be reached only after a final paroxysm of battle. The brief but terrible bombing of Christmas, 1972, served as that final paroxysm, inducing Hanoi to make the minor concessions that the Administration's prestige and Thieu's sensitivities demanded. If the method seemed brutal for those who suffered it, it was presumably for Hanoi's own good. "A lasting peace," Kissinger told the delegates at a conference on the Middle East the following year, is often an "agonizing" task. He illustrated this with a revealing quotation:

> Pain that cannot forget
> falls drop by drop
> upon the heart,
> until in our despair
> there comes wisdom,
> through the awful
> grace of God.

Kissinger's technique, like that of Theodore Roosevelt, whom he and Nixon so much admire, and whom they praised so fulsomly in their speeches, evidently rests on the big deal and the

in the Yom Kippur war, when a scenario was arranged with the Pentagon to explain why the Israelis were not getting the military deliveries they wanted. According to the Kalbs, Kissinger was furious over the deliberate "stalling" on these deliveries by his bureaucratic rival, the Secretary of Defense. "We must put the fear of God into Schlesinger," the omnipresent Kalbs report Kissinger fuming to his faithful deputy, Alexander Haig. "They are working against Presidential orders." Nixon, we are told, was so distressed when he heard of the slowdown that he "exploded" to Kissinger at a White House meeting: "Get the supplies there with American military planes! . . . Get moving!"

This, at any rate, is Kissinger's version as told to the Kalbs. Others involved in the decision, however, tell a different story. The supposed "feud" between Kissinger and Schlesinger was apparently carefully arranged to camouflage an Administration decision to let the Arabs and the Israelis bleed for a while so that they would be more amenable to a compromise settlement—those "drops" of "pain" that lead to "wisdom." Kissinger's role was to play the good guy in discussions with the

big stick. But a good many of the world's problems are not susceptible to personal charm or to confrontation diplomacy. Brezhnev may back down when Kissinger calls a nuclear alert, and Sadat may purr when told he is the greatest Arab leader since Saladin. But who is there to flatter or intimidate in the face of the collapse of the world monetary system, or the growing gap between the rich and poor nations, or the spread of famine, or the mounting inflation that is undermining democratic government?

Nobody, alas, which is why Kissinger has been so ineffectual in dealing with these problems. Economics bores him not because the problems are unreal, but because they are not subject to carrot-and-stick diplomacy. These issues, which in the long run are far more important than who rules in Saigon or how many Soviet ships there are in the Indian Ocean, are shunted aside. For Kissinger economics is interesting only as a bludgeon-cutting off credits to Allende's Chile, an economic blockade of Cuba—or as a pay-off for a political deal-atomic reactors to Egypt and grain shipments and most-favored nation status for the Soviet Union. Otherwise it interests him about as much as the fate of the Italian lira concerned Nixon.

In Nixon he found a perfect partner for his game of *Realpolitik*. It was often played with considerable skill; as

pleading Israeli ambassador, blaming the trickery of American supplies on Schlesinger. This served to deflect pressure from the Jewish community—which was quietly assured by the Israelis that Kissinger was doing everything he could—while retaining a semblance of impartiality with the moderate Arab states. After the Kalbs' account appeared, Kissinger and Schlesinger denied there was any rift between them, and admitted that Nixon did not even attend the meeting where he presumably "exploded" at the Secretary of Defense.

This strategy, as an exercise in power politics, was a shrewd one and may even have helped to bring about the Middle East disengagement, which is one of Kissinger's more impressive accomplishments. Here one can say that the Middle East was spared further killing, unlike Vietnam where his "settlement" has kept the war going as bloodyly as before. But the Kalbs give only the version of the story that makes Kissinger look good to his liberal constituency. Since their book is based on privileged access to their subject, and even on privileged leaks, the source of their information can be readily guessed.

In their effort to make Kissinger appear the good guy in a corrupt administration, "Lancelot among the brigands," in their phrase, the Kalbs

September 19, 1974

## HARPER PAPERBACKS

### Irene Claremont de Castillejo
# KNOWING WOMAN

*A Feminine Psychology*

"I love the book. It is very wise and very pertinent for women today. Irene Claremont de Castillejo was right about so many themes and interpretations. I agreed with her subtlety and balance, her quiet lucidity and quiet wisdom."
—Anaïs Nin
CN/349 $2.45

Simone de Beauvoir
Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter

### Simone de Beauvoir
# MEMOIRS OF A
## DUTIFUL DAUGHTER

"It is a book that will leave no one indifferent, and no one affected in quite the same way."
—Elizabeth Janeway, *New York Times*

"This is perhaps the best piece of writing Mile de Beauvoir has yet done." —Germaine Bree, *Saturday Review*
CN/351 $3.95

For a complete
catalog, write
Harper & Row

Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

## ROCKSPRING
### A NOVEL BY
#### R.G.Vliet

"Vliet is the poet-novelist at his best, gliding through the simple beauty of youthful emotion to its mournful end.... *Rockspring* is an enchanting composition." —CIVIA COHEN, *Chicago Sun-Times* Showcase

"A brilliant, exciting novel... a writer of the highest promise."

—FREDERICK MORGAN, Editor,
Hudson Review

"An earthy slice of frontier life... a bracing antidote to ritualized doses of nostalgia."

—Publishers Weekly

"Simply beautiful."

—WILLIAM COLE, Saturday Review/World

"A lovely novella."

—MALCOLM COWLEY

$5.95

THE VIKING PRESS
625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

27

Kissinger Outlines Shift

# Delay Asked on Aid Bill Vote

By Dan Morgan

Washington Post Staff Writer

In a strategy shift reflect-
ing deep administration con-
cern over restrictions on its
foreign aid program, Secre-
tary of State Henry A. Kiss-
singer yesterday told sena-
tors that he preferred delay-
ing a congressional vote on
the aid measure at this time.

According to several
sources, Kissinger outlined
the shift in a meeting with
Democratic senators that
also produced clashes over
the administration's refusal
to cut off military aid to
Turkey.

Following the secretary's
meeting with both the Dem-
ocratic and Republican
Senate caucuses, the Senate
approved, 64 to 27, stopping
the Turkish assistance on
grounds that Turkey ille-
gally used American weap-
ons in its invasion of Cy-
prus.

Several sources reported
Kissinger told the Demo-
cratic caucus that he would
rather have Congress con-
tinue the old foreign aid leg-
islation for at least a few
months, instead of voting on
a bill which the administra-
tion feels is laden with crip-

pling restrictions on execu-
tive authority.

One source said senators
had the impression the sec-
retary was opposed to the
bill in its present form.

Kissinger's strategy was
especially significant be-
cause a new foreign aid au-
thorization bill reported out
of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee includes
several key administration
proposals. The bill is still in
committee in the House.

One of these key propos-
als is $100 million for a spe-

See AID, A23, Col. 1

# The Haig Appointment

TO THE QUESTION of why President Ford chose to grant Richard Nixon a full pardon when he did, another question may now be added. It is: Why did President Ford appoint Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., Mr. Nixon's principal aide in the later cover-up years, commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in Europe and thus Supreme Allied Commander in Europe? For what reason were these august honors and responsibilities bestowed upon Gen. Haig? It is interesting to note that when you put these questions to knowledgeable people around town there are certain answers you don't get. Few people seriously argue, for example, that Gen. Haig, whose spectacular rise to the rank of four-star general came as a consequence of his White House staff service, is uniquely qualified for the job. It is generally conceded that there are military men better qualified for it than he.

How, then, did the appointment come about? This is among the questions the Senate Armed Services Committee would do well to look into. Evidently there are some contradictions and ambiguities in the statutes covering this particular appointment, the result being that it can be claimed that no confirmation process is required. (Indeed, the absence of such a clear requirement for Senate confirmation hearings is widely alleged to be one reason Gen. Haig chose the NATO post, rather than try for that of Chief of Staff of the Army which does require Senate confirmation.) But even if the weight of the law does not mandate an inquiry by the Senate, it seems to us that the legislators have a keen and legitimate interest in getting a few things con-

cerning the general on the record, if not an actual obligation to do so. And it also seems to us that Gen. Haig should be eager to give Congress the courtesy of responding fully and freely to any questions it might have. This, after all, we are repeatedly told, is a new day so far as the exercise of congressional responsibility is concerned. And the accountability of the executive branch for its actions has also come into a new and highly welcome vogue.

So we see no reason why the Senate Armed Services Committee should not set about to answer to its own and the public's satisfaction those questions that are most troublesome or puzzling or both about the sudden elevation of Gen. Haig to the top NATO military post. And these, we would add, have to do with much more than the implications for the Army of Gen. Haig's leapfrogging success or his particular suitability as a soldier and diplomat for the job. To be blunt about it, they have to do with Gen. Haig's involvement in the clandestine, involuted and deceptive politics of the White House over the past several years.

We say "several years" advisedly, since Gen. Haig's involvement in the mess generally known as Watergate predates his 1973 return to the White House to become Mr. Nixon's chief of staff: Gen. Haig was immediately involved in the profligate and unsavory wiretapping activities that marked the early Nixon years. What was his precise role and responsibility in that? The questions only begin there, for upon his return to the White House and despite professions that he would be engaged in relatively antiseptic, apolitical managerial duties, he quickly enmeshed himself in Richard Nixon's campaign for survival at any cost. A certain amount of conniving, enemy-smearing and duplicity seemed to go with the job. When Gen. Haig presented Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott with some very misleading material concerning Richard Nixon's alleged innocence and John Dean's alleged unreliability as a witness, for example, did he know that the material was misleading? Did he set out to dupe Sen. Scott, that is, or was he duped himself? What part precisely did he play in developing the tactics of ousting Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox and, consequently, Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus? How did it come about that the subpoenaed White House tapes under his jurisdiction as chief of staff were subject to so many mishaps and disappearances? How was it possible that he could be so close to Mr. Nixon and the evidence of Mr. Nixon's wrongdoing and yet not be aware that anything was gravely wrong until early August of 1974?

At the very least, the acuity of this man now scheduled to take on one of the most sensitive and powerful and important jobs in the world is called into question. A step beyond that one reaches questions concerning his judgment and sense of priorities and values. All this still remains one step short of an opinion on his motives and good faith throughout his ill-starred White House service. It is true that Gen. Haig's promotion to four-star general was approved by the Senate a couple of years ago. But it is hard to think of a public official who has enjoyed a richer, fuller intervening two years than he—two years of activity that seems to us to demand exploration before he can be pronounced the right man for the job he has just been given. If Congress fails to undertake that exploration, with a view to resolving—one way or the other—the doubts people have about his fitness for this job, it will have said a great deal about its own seriousness of intent in the matter of reasserting its neglected prerogatives.

"The acuity of this man now scheduled to take on one of the most sensitive and powerful and important jobs in the world is called into question."