OFFICE OF THE VICE PREMIER

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

May 7, 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
U. S. A.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I write to say that I enjoyed immensely my
discussions with you on matters of mutual interest
during my recent visit to the United States. I
sincerely believe they have contributed to a better
understanding between our two countries.

Though my visit in Washington was a short
one, I had an excellent opportunity to hear the
views of your government leaders and also to
bare my thoughts to them. For me this last
visit to the United States was both rewarding
and enjoyable.

I hope all goes well with you and that I may
have the pleasure of seeing you again in the not
too distant future.

With warm regards,

KISSINGER, HENRY

MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION
Office of the Director, Overseas Cooperation
Seoul, Korea

June 17, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your very kind letter of May 31, 1971. I am most grateful to you for your thoughtful try to see me despite the great work load of global importance.

Since "Ping pong diplomacy" and follow-up U.S. China policy, Korea has been feeling uncertain as for her future at this juncture of history. The U.S.-USSR, U.S.-China, USSR-China, and U.S.-China-Japan relations are not clear to Korean eyes and even more vague as to their future developments which unfortunately will determine Korea's future in terms of national security. "Gradual U.S. Forces withdrawal" out of Korea in compliance with Nixon doctrine has brought forth great problem of protecting her own future. North Korean bellicosity has not been changed so far. Korean peninsula is situated between two incompatible giants, China and Japan.

Bearing the above in mind, Korean people will somewhat be relieved psychologically, if not substantially, should General Bonesteel's wisdom, his Korean experiences and tremendous local popularity become again available to Korea for our two countries. He has unusual connections with Korea ever since the emergence of 38th parallel across the Korean peninsula.

I would have done much better than this in explaining my thoughts if I had been a better student of yours at Harvard. However, I am a life-time student of yours.

With very best wishes for your continued success in your future endeavors for the mankind.

THE LAW FIRM OF

REEVES & HARRISON

ANNOUNCES THAT
MURRAY M. CHOTINER

RECENTLY
SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES
AND FORMERLY
GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
IS NOW COUNSEL TO THE FIRM
MARION EDWYN HARRISON, ERNEST GENE REEVES,
ROBERT F. SAGLE AND MYRON SOLTER
PARTNERS

SUITE 500
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
202-298-9030 CABLE "REEVLAW"
TELEX 440376 CRDK

Columbia University in the City of New York

New York, N.Y. 10027

SOUTHERN ASIAN INSTITUTE

International Affairs Building
420 West 118th Street

23 February 1973

Dr. Henry Kissinger
President's Assistant on
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Would you kindly allow me to address you the following lines:

I had the privilege of meeting you in Lahore in August 1969 when President Nixon paid a 22-hour visit to Pakistan; I was a member of the Pakistan Cabinet until February 1971--just six weeks before the crisis on Bangladesh began. I also sent you a copy of my book, *Pakistan's Relations with India* (Praeger, 1968) and you were kind to acknowledge it in a cordial letter.

Since the disintegration of my country, Pakistan, I have been living in London, working at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, as a Research Fellow. At present I am giving a course on South Asian Foreign Policy at Columbia University, New York, which is my alma mater. My assignment here will end on 2 May 1973.

By birth and origin, I belong to former East Pakistan but I could not support the movement for Bangladesh which was a child nursed and groomed by New Delhi with the Kremlin's active support. Of course, being a Bengali, I could neither support the stupid policy of the military junta in West Pakistan, so I left my homeland with heavy heart and am now leading a political refugee's life in London.

I am writing a book *On The Last Days of United Pakistan*; it is already accepted for publication by a British publisher. There is much misconception, if not deliberate misinterpretation of the US policy during the crisis on Bangladesh. I am sorry to note that many of the American South Asian experts also suffer from this type of misconception. I have just contributed a chapter to the forthcoming *Year Book of World Affairs* (1973), published by the London Institute of World Affairs. I enclose a few pages from the galley proofs of my chapter; these pages deal with the US policy in South Asia in 1971-72. You may, if your valuable time permits, glance at these pages. I tried to put the US policy, particularly President Nixon's stand in correct perspective.

YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS

— GALLEY 128

When the war finally broke out as a result of Indian military intervention to "liberate" Bangla Desh, China no doubt supported Pakistan in the Security Council but her support was confined to verbal support and her real wrath was expressed against the Soviet Union rather than Bangla Desh. China's role during the war revealed the bitter rivalry between the two Communist giants in South Asia. China was bitter over the success of Soviet diplomacy in the area, but not at seeing the emergence of a new nation in the sub-continent. China's policy over Bangla Desh was a source of disappointment and puzzlement to many, particularly those who see China as a revolutionary Power urging on revolutionary forces all over the Third World. But one must remember that in *Realpolitik* ideology is not the sole factor in guiding the foreign policy of a great Power, and China is no exception. Her policy on Bangla Desh is to be judged in the context of so many factors in the South Asian Triangle as mentioned above.

### (c) The role of the United States

"Few if any post-war American policy ventures have brought forth as immediate and widespread opposition as the Nixon Administration's policy toward the Indian sub-continent during 1971"—thus observed a United States expert on South Asia.²¹ Yet no great Power has shown such consistent and sympathetic interest and concern in the welfare of the people of East Bengal as the United States. The Pakistan intelligence services, both civil and military, were never tired of "discovering" the "grand American designs" to encourage secession in East Pakistan. Almost every American visitor including intellectuals were harrassed, if not sometimes humiliated by the stupid Pakistani intelligence service on the grounds that they were "agents" of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and almost every Bengali including intellectuals were haunted if they had any honest dialogue with an American visitor.

This writer, who lived in Pakistan's capital for four years (1967-71) as a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and subsequently as a member of the Yahya Cabinet, was harassed whenever any United States visitor, including an American scholar, visited him. The American economists who were associated with the Pakistan Planning Commission were constantly watched for their objective and honest concern about economic conditions in East Pakistan; if their recommendations to remove the economic grievances of the Bengalis had been listened to, the tragedy of 1971 might have been averted. On March 26, 1971, the *New York Times* reported from Rawalpindi that "in Pakistan, United States is villain"; it further wrote: American Ambassador Farland "is regularly portrayed as CIA agent subverting Pakistan's interests—often in favour of India."²² His predecessor Mr. Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., who advocated military support for Pakistan during the war in December 1971, was vilified by the Pakistani press in a similar way.

It is rather tragic that the United States policy, like that of China, was mixed up with a number of immediate factors prevailing in the area and with the President's new China policy, and—as such—became a subject of criticism and disappointment both inside the United States and outside. But an impartial analysis of the United States role, even of President Nixon's personal inclination, will prove that it neither condoned Pakistan's military atrocities in East Bengal

nor opposed the aspiration of the Bengali nationalists. The United
States did not support the Pakistan junta's plan to impose a military
solution of the crisis nor could it support the war-solution of the
Indians backed by the Soviet military and diplomatic support. This
writer can vouch that as a result of President Nixon's active inter-
vention, Sheikh Mujib's life was saved when the hawkish Pakistani
generals backed by Mr. Bhutto were planning to execute him in
August—September 1971. Mr. Bhutto told this writer in September
1971 that President Yahya should execute Sheikh Mujib before he
went to Tehran in October to attend the 2,000 years anniversary of
the Iranian monarchy to which President Nixon was also invited by
the Shah of Iran. President Yahya was put to severe pressure to do
this which he could overcome only through President Nixon's
strongest pleas to resist such a course.

Similarly, President Nixon was putting the utmost pressure on
President Yahya to make a political settlement with the Awami
League leaders who were in exile in India. President Yahya agreed
to this suggestion. It is not possible to say with certainty that
President Nixon's efforts for a political settlement were successful,
but those who know the inside story as this writer had the chance to
know it during his private visit to Rawalpindi in September 1971,
state that the Nixon Administration was doing its best to avert a war
between India and Pakistan: to achieve the goal of the Bengali
nationalists without a war in the shortest possible period.

By September or October 1971, President Yahya himself realised
that his bankrupt government could little longer afford the costly
military operations in East Pakistan. On September 6, 1971, in an
exclusive interview with the Pakistani President, this writer could
appreciate that he was anxious to get out of the mess in East Bengal;
as his troops' position became most unstable, he looked to President
Nixon and the Shah of Iran to find a way of escape. He said to this
this writer: "If the Americans cannot continue the Vietnam war,
how can Pakistan whose exchequer is empty carry on this costly
operation?" He bitterly attacked India for not allowing time to
reach a political settlement through the good offices of President
Nixon and the Shah of Iran. In an unexpected visit to Tehran, he
discussed a political settlement with the Shah of Iran; the Shah was
acting in perfect understanding with Washington.

President Nixon who was noted for his sympathy for Pakistan
was, no doubt, not inclined to see the dismemberment of the country
by the Indian forces backed by the military strength of the Soviet
Union. He therefore applied himself sincerely to work out an
honourable settlement of the problem to the satisfaction of both the
Bengalis and the West Pakistanis. The climate in Rawalpindi and
in Calcutta where the exiled Bangla Desh Government was function-
ing was not unresponsive to these United States efforts. President
Nixon's China policy, apart from his sympathy for Pakistan, was
another important consideration in his bid for a political settlement
and for avoiding a war between India and Pakistan. When Mrs.
Gandhi visited Washington in November and had a meeting with
President Nixon, she was informed of his efforts and was asked for a
little time to achieve the objective of the Bengali nationalists without
resorting to war. Mrs. Gandhi was reported to have given hints
that she was prepared to give President Nixon a chance. But within
a week of her return to India, her troops began to cross the borders
of East Pakistan on the pleas of "self-interest" or "self-defence"—
a dangerous doctrine if it is applied in international relations. It
denies the territorial integrity of any smaller country and is a negation
of every principle and premise of the United Nations Charter.

²¹ William J. Barnds, "India and Pakistan and Nixon and China and Russia" in 32, *Christianity and Crisis*, Nr. 1, June 12, 1972.

²² The *New York Times*, March 26, 1971.

YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS

— GALLEY 129

President Nixon gave a full account of his country's role during the crisis on Bangla Desh in 1971 in his Report to the United States Congress on February 9, 1972. He said: "The United States did not support or condone this action" (that is, Pakistan's military atrocities in East Pakistan). He added: "Immediately in early April, we ceased issuing and renewing licences for military shipment to Pakistan, we put a hold on arms that had been committed the year before and we ceased new commitments for economic development loan. This shut off $35 million worth of arms. Less than $5 million worth of spare parts, already in the pipeline under earlier licences, was shipped before the pipeline dried up completely by the beginning of November."²³ There were cries of protest in India as well as in the British press over the alleged continued United States military and economic assistance to Pakistan, but President Nixon's report has revealed the true picture.

One may also recall that the United States gave categorical assurances to Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s to come to her rescue if she was the victim of aggression from any quarter, including India. These assurances fall into two categories: first, public commitments made under bilateral agreements of 1954 and 1959 and under SEATO and CENTO; these commitments related to the Communist aggression. Secondly, there was a set of commitments, not yet made public but made by the State Department and the White House, including a secret letter from President Kennedy to President Ayub on January 26, 1962, assuring Pakistan of unqualified support in the case of aggression. An unpublished article by a former United States Ambassador revealed that an aide memoire was issued by the United States Ambassador in Pakistan to the effect: "Under instruction from the White House and Department of State acknowledging positively and without equivocation that our formal agreement to assist Pakistan in the event of aggression, even with our own armies, was not limited to Communist countries but specifically includes India"²⁴ (italics added).

If President Nixon's policy during India's military intervention was tipped in favour of Pakistan, as claimed in Mr. Jack Anderson's papers on the United States role in the Indo-Pakistan war, should not one take note of these categorical assurances given by President Nixon's predecessors? If it is safe to assume that the immediate cause for President Nixon's reaction in describing Indian action as "aggression" was a sense of betrayal by Mrs. Gandhi, he felt, and not without justification, that—given a chance—he could settle the crisis in a peaceful manner; but neither India nor the Soviet Union was willing to give up its sure diplomatic gains in South Asia. If the President's efforts had been successful, it would have been a "Tashkent type" victory for him which neither the Soviet Union nor India was prepared to cede. On the contrary, by taking military action, India and the Soviet Union have been regarded as "liberators" by 70 million Bengalis.

In the broader context of the South Asian Realpolitik, the Soviet Union scored a big triumph over not only the United States but also on China. The bitter and acrimonious debate in the Security Council between the three major Powers—China, the Soviet Union and the United States—had very little to do with the merits of the creation of Bangla Desh which, by that time had become an inevitability, not only in New Delhi and Moscow, but also in Washington and Peking and even in Rawalpindi. The debate in the Security

Council; the movement of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Bay of Bengal; the Chinese threats to India in Bhutan areas were all part of the big Power politics in South Asia. Bangla Desh and West Pakistan were merely pawns in the power politics of China, the Soviet Union and the United States.

In fact, the war caused great destruction in Bangla Desh; it shattered its economy; the means of communication, already damaged during the civil war in the preceding nine months, were further damaged.

The economic maladies of Bangla Desh were aggravated by ruthless destruction during the war. More important, the social fabric of the new nation is in a chaotic condition as a result of the war. If President Nixon's efforts had been successful, even if it had meant a delay of a year or so, the net loss to Bangla Desh would perhaps have been much less—but it might not have given Moscow or New Delhi the designation: "liberators of the Bengalis." Such is the fate of small Powers when they are involved in big power politics.

One may conclude that the United States policy was not basically wrong or unjustified; its tone and contents might have offended many liberals and friends of democracy. Apparently, it looked as if the United States was opposing the forces of democracy as against militarism. But that is a short-sighted analysis. Those who know the inner story, or who take note of the *Realpolitik* prevailing in the sub-continent in 1971, will see President Nixon's policy in a better light.

A major Power, the Soviet Union, was bent on expanding its influence and power, no matter what was the cost in terms of human lives and suffering because the Bangla Desh crisis provided her with a unique opportunity to weaken and humiliate China and also to further her global interest vis-à-vis the United States. As observed earlier, the crisis was not confined to the righteousness of the Bengali nationalists' cause as against the barbaric atrocities of the ruling junta of West Pakistan. It was interrelated with the Sino-Soviet conflict, the twenty-five-year-old Indo-Pakistan conflict, and global competition between the two super-Powers.

It is not true that President Nixon "watched this tragedy [the Bangla Desh crisis] in silence," as Senator Edward Kennedy alleged in the United States Senate.²⁵ Nor is it correct to allege that he paid a "smuggler's debt to Pakistan" (referring to Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking via Rawalpindi). A correct statement of the position is that the United States Government, despite public assertions to the contrary, was seeking discreetly to bring pressure on the military régime in West Pakistan and that, as a result of his good relations with President Nixon, President Yahya Khan was responsive to United States suggestions and recommendations.

If the Soviet Union had not added fuel to the flames of regional tension between India and Pakistan, the tragic war over Bangla Desh could have been avoided. When the full story of the disintegration of Pakistan and the role of the three major Powers and India are revealed, neither the policy of China nor that of the United States will look so bad; but the policies of the Soviet Union and India will not appear so innocent or benevolent. Neither China nor the United States opposed the aspirations of the Bengali nationalists or condoned the military atrocities of the Pakistanis. By the same token, it may safely be stated that neither India nor the Soviet Union was *solely* governed by consideration for the fate of suffering humanity in East Bengal or motivated *merely* by the desire to create a new State of Bangla Desh.

²³ President Richard Nixon's Report to the United States Congress on February 9, 1972, pp. 48-51.

²⁴ B. H. Oehlert (Jr.), "How to Lose Allies" an unpublished paper dated May 19, 1970.

²⁵ *The Observer Foreign News Service*, December 10, 1971.

YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS

GALLEY 139

The crisis in Bangla Desh was an important episode in the South Asian Triangle where China, the Soviet Union, the United States, India and Pakistan were "joking and jostling with each other in a confused pattern of inter-relationship."²⁸ None of these Powers was entirely the villain or angel during the crisis on Bangla Desh, but one may fairly agree with President Nixon when he said: "Soviet policy, I regret to say, seemed to show the same tendency we have witnessed before in the 1967 Middle East war and the 1970 Jordanian crisis—to allow events to boil up toward crisis in the hope of political gain."²⁷

### III—THE EMERGING PATTERN OF RELATIONSHIP IN SOUTH ASIA
The Soviet Union has scored a big diplomatic gain in South Asia as a result of her role in the Bangla Desh crisis. The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, called the "tragic events on the Indian sub-continent" one of the major disappointments for United States foreign policy in 1971.²⁸ Neither could the Chinese conceal their sense of disappointment; they denounced the Government of Bangla Desh as a "puppet régime" set up by the Indian Government, Moscow viewed the Indian success "as a slap in the face for America and to a lesser extent, China."²⁹ The Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, thanked the Soviet Union for her help to India during the war. Soviet hopes were centred on India, but it would be a mistake to conclude that India will be lost to Soviet influence. Mrs. Gandhi is not likely to give up her independent role or policy of non-alignment as a price for the Soviet military and diplomatic support in the war.

The most important fact of South Asian politics after the disintegration of Pakistan is the emergence of India as a major Power in its own right. India has always been the more important, bigger and more stable country in the region. But the dismemberment of Pakistan has made India the dominating Power in South Asia. At this hour of greatest triumph, India is not likely to dance "to strings pulled in Moscow." Instead, "Indians appeared to think more of their national pride, their history, their sense of destiny as a great nation than of the dictates of other powers, whether friendly or critical."²⁹ Neither would it be wise to ignore the growing friendship between Moscow and New Delhi. No other foreign Power is more respected, listened to, and has a more important say in India's major problems than the Soviet Union. Indo-Soviet friendship has now a history of about seventeen years behind it. This *entente* was beneficial to both countries, with the Soviet Union capitalising on the friendship in its dealings with non-aligned Afro-Asian countries and also in the context of its disputes with China, and with India receiving Soviet diplomatic, economic and subsequently military support. The events of 1971 will strengthen the *entente*, provided Mr. Brezhnev does not entertain any hope of eventually making India a member of his "socialist Commonwealth."

Unstable Bangla Desh and frustrated West Pakistan are more vulnerable to Soviet pressure and penetration. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, soon after the creation of Bangla Desh, proclaimed that his new country would be a "Switzerland of Asia," but a reading of the joint communiqué after his visit to Moscow in March 1971 made

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

The Boston Globe

BOSTON, MASS. 02107

January 5, 1972

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

For a long while I have wanted to do
a special feature syndicated story
on you and am writing at this time to
request an interview.

This would be for the Boston Globe and
105 other papers coast-to-coast through
United Feature Syndicate in New York.

I would need about a half hour with you --
you can talk on anything you wish -- and
no photographers would be present.

I realize your busy schedule, but would
be willing to come to Washington anytime
at your convenience.

Please have your office contact me or
my assistant, Sally Robinson, 617-288-8000,
to let me know if a meeting is feasible.
I look forward to your earliest reply.

Dr. Henry Kissinger

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

April 27, 1971

Dear John:

It is always difficult for me to bid farewell to a staff member whose service has earned such respect and appreciation not only from me but also from his colleagues on the staff. We all have been impressed by the energy and skill which you have brought to your job. Your contribution to the overall quality of our endeavor has been valued and will be remembered.

I regret your departure and you will be missed. But I also can appreciate what motivates you to enter into the practice of law. Please accept my best wishes for professional success and personal happiness, and my gratitude for your outstanding service on my staff.

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. W. John Clancy
2203 42nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20007

RECEIVED
APR 28 1971

CENTRAL FILES

OFFICIAL

Type of Request & Date

CLARK

(Last name and pending date)

EXECUTIVE

Name: Bronson Clark; Executive Director of American Friends Society

KISSINGER, HARRY A/C

Request: A request for a license to ship $90 thousand d of heart surgery equipment to Hanoi hospital which has been approved by State and Defense and is now with the WH for approval ($70 thousand is with Commerce and $20 thousand from Treasury). They have done similar things in the past, sending medical supplies to the same hospital that they want to send to this time. They have also sent supplies to the SVN and have worked in conjunction with the Saigon govt., who knows of their activities in NVN. They have supplied artificial limbs to the SVN. They have visited NVN prisoners of war being held by our Navy, with the authorization of the Navy and State Depts. He feels that by explaining all of the above to HAK, including the fact that they have had two previous licenses, that HAK would quickly release the license.

DRH's Recommendation:

215/LO3-9372

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Checked Holdridge HAK

approved license. Has to go on
To Commerce & Treasury. Called
& spoted w/ Mr. Edwards. Sold Li
Not WH has approved but it sties
Has bureaucratic slippage & they will
probably be leaving from some one else.

Resolution:

WORLD FEDERALISTS, USA

2029 K Street, N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone: (202) 659-4191

February 18, 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Executive Office of the President
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

With the SALT talks about to begin in Vienna, I feel very strongly that continued development of MIRV is both dangerous and unwise.

It is my strong conviction that the administration should support, or at least not oppose, Senator Brooke's resolution calling for a mutual moratorium of MIRV testing. I believe such a halt would be a strong gesture of good will as we approach the SALT talks, while continued development of MIRV could jeopardize the current talks or even make any resultant agreement meaningless. I don't think there is any doubt that these talks could be our best--and perhaps last--chance to significantly retard and reverse the insane arms race.

I would appreciate your letting us know as soon as possible how you feel regarding this very critical matter.

In conclusion, I want to commend you and the administration for your recent decision banning the production and use of toxins. I believe this to be yet another important step toward a world of trust and peace.

My best wishes.

ru

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

March 23, 1971

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Dave Halperin

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Joe Clark, 3:00 p.m.,
Wednesday, March 24, 1971

Last week, Senator Clark wrote asking for the opportunity to meet with you to discuss "such controversial subjects as the size of the military budget, our attitude toward the SALT talks, our posture at the UN, and the validity of the President's belief in the 'worst case' philosophy."

He will be accompanied by Sanford Gottlieb, Executive Director of SANE, and Mr. Scoville, formerly General Counsel for ACDA. Senator Clark's office has been informed that the call will be approximately 45 minutes.

KISSINGER, HENRY F.

North American Rockwell

Washington Office
1629 "K" Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
(202) 296-6900

William L. Clark
Staff Vice President

April 6, 1972

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am writing to you as chairman of this year's Central YMCA Partner-Member enrollment drive.

As you know, the YMCA provides over a dozen constructive programs to the young men of this city and depends on the community for continued support. A part of any funds which may be collected in this drive goes to the support of YMCA activities all over the United States, and around the world. The enclosed pamphlet gives a thumb-nail review of "Y" programs and activities.

However, this letter is not for the purpose of soliciting a cash donation. I am asking for about an hour of your time sometime during the next few weeks for participation in a publicity program which will serve as a backdrop for the drive.

We are asking various prominent citizens of Washington to participate in a ping-pong tournament. The worse you play the better. It would help us greatly and perhaps even be some fun for you.

Someone from the staff of the "Y" will be calling you to arrange a specific time to play, of course at your convenience. I sincerely hope that you can find time to contribute to this worthwhile effort.

Enclosure

JUN 3 1972

CENTRAL FILES

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND
VICE PRESIDENT

399 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022

February 2, 1972

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

RE: Jan H. Kalicki

Dear Henry:

I am writing to introduce Jan Kalicki, who has expressed to me an interest in your organization. Jan is married to my brother Harlan's daughter and so I have had a good chance to get to know him in recent years.

Jan was partly educated in France and New York and did his main graduate work and doctor's degree at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

His special field is U. S. -China relations and, on the functional side, the analysis of international crises.

Despite his youth, he has an extraordinarily mature and solid mind, brilliant too, but above all, common-sensical and down-to-earth. I have found him one of the most interesting people I know in conversation about world politics in general and China and the Soviet Union in particular. No doubt I am distinctly prejudiced in his favor but I do feel that there is here a first-class mind joined with political insight and a capacity for very hard work, all of which should produce in a few year's time, a really distinguished scholar or official in his chosen field.

I can see him as a most useful cog in your efficient machine, should there be a place available.

# PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH

## SWIMMING

Life Saving - Water Safety - Learn to Swim Lessons thru the nationally recognized YMCA Aquatic Program - Acquire skills in swimming, diving, safety and water sports. The program is graded for all ages and skills.

The YMCA Aquatic Program is designed to encourage the beginning swimmer to advance from one skill level to the next; and on to leadership and competitive swimming if he so desires.

## GRA-Y CLUBS

Gra-Y means YMCA Clubs for boys and girls age 9 to 12. Under trained Christian leaders the clubs have regular meetings, discussions, teams, sports, outdoor activities and camping trips.

## TRI-HI-Y AND JR-TRI-HI-Y CLUBS

"Tri-Hi-Y" means High School YMCA Clubs for girls. This group of teenage girls as are the boys' High School Clubs are devoted to the development of high ideals and training in Christian Leadership in School and Community.

# PROGRAMS OF SERVICE AND INFORMATION

## YMCA WORLD SERVICE

The YMCA World Service Program provides the leadership for teaching people in other lands to establish, finance, and manage their own YMCAs. Also provides for a world wide exchange of ideas and understanding of Christian principles and objectives of world peace.

## SERVICE PROGRAMS IN AREAS OF NEED

Programs to deal with problems of the INNER CITY have been growing in recent years. The use of DETACHED WORKERS in city neighborhoods; college students and others as TUTORS for disadvantaged youth has proved productive. Help is given in locating JOB OPPORTUNITIES.

YMCA PUBLIC AFFAIRS FORUMS

Regular sessions with informed and able speakers give members a chance to keep abreast of the times. Opportunities for questions and discussions are a regular part of the program.

CONFERENCES

LEADERSHIP CLINICS

LABORATORIES IN GROUP DYNAMICS

PERSONALITY AND MANAGEMENT TRAINING

The many conferences and training resources provided by the YMCA offer both youth and adults great opportunities for training and self improvement.

Speech delivered by Clark M. Clifford
at Annual Meeting of American Paper Institute
Waldorf Hotel, New York, N. Y., February 17, 1969

# The Promise and Problems of United States - Soviet Talks on Limitation of Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Baldwin, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen:

No one can leave the job of Secretary of Defense without being acutely conscious of a staggering amount of unfinished business. The business of national security, which is the responsibility of our Defense establishment, of course, never can be finished.

There are inevitably, however, some particular items that a Secretary in leaving cannot help but wish he had been able to bring further along, if not to complete. It is hard, and perhaps impossible, to remember always that these items are no longer uniquely your own business and that the laying down of responsibility should entail a certain amount of laying low -- and even of laying off.

But at the same time, all of us as citizens share some part of the responsibility for the national security. Such comments as I may feel impelled to make with respect to particular issues, I would hope, will therefore be accepted as motivated solely by the national interest of our country.

I was deeply impressed by the clear realization during my tenure as Secretary, that the Department of Defense is notably non-political. I am sure that it will continue to be. The considerations involved in the development and deployment of our resources to ensure our maximum

safety, and the greatest advance in our national objectives, are far
too important to be obscured by political considerations.

The same, of course, is true of the Department of State. As
President Nixon recently noted, the State and Defense Departments
together constitute the American Department of Peace. And it was in
recognition of this role, and its overriding importance, that President
Johnson specifically directed Secretary Rusk and me to remain completely
apart from any participation in the Presidential election campaign of
last summer and fall.

Accordingly, it is in our collective self-interest that we all do
what we can to assist the current Secretary of State and the new Secretary
of Defense in the performance of their difficult tasks. It is my intention
that any public pronouncements I may make will be in furtherance of this
objective.

Among the items which my former colleagues and I were compelled
to leave unfinished are those involving our overall relations with the
Soviet Union. In his speech accepting the nomination, President Nixon
noted that we were moving from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation.
As a hope, this sentiment is one that all reasonable men must share. But
while we strive to understand the Soviets, and work toward improving our
relations with them, we must face the fact that they are extremely difficult.

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As an illustration: Last August, after months and months of the most painstaking effort, we were ready to make a joint announcement with Moscow that agreement had been reached for the start of talks on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons.

The night before such announcement was to be made, the Soviet Union, without warning, marched into Czechoslovakia.

This represented a tragedy not only for the Czech people but also for all the peoples of the world, because it set back, and delayed, the beginning of talks that could make progress toward the lessening of the menace of nuclear devastation.

Our strategic nuclear weapons today consist of 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 656 submarine launched missiles and 646 intercontinental bombers that can deliver a nuclear device. The Soviets also possess weapons in all three categories, but in lesser numbers.

After years of effort, President Johnson had been able to bring events to a point where the Soviet leaders were prepared to discuss with us ways in which the costly and dangerous nuclear arms race could be suspended and even perhaps reversed.

Obviously, the unprovoked and unjustified occupation of Czechoslovakia prevented our proceeding to negotiations with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms limitation. For us to have done so would have been tacitly to condone this Soviet violation of national Sovereignty. We would have been seen to have accepted the curious concept that the Soviet Union has some intrinsic right

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to intervene in the internal affairs of another country because that
country had either adopted a communist system or had one imposed on it.

The situation of other nations of Eastern Europe, to which we cannot
be indifferent, and the security of the Western European nations, which we
are committed to protect by military force, could have been jeopardized by
our apparent acceptance of renewed Russian adventurism. The collective
security system that has served us so well in the years since World War II
could not be expected to survive if we were thus to suggest to our Allies
that their interests might be sacrificed in our haste to find common interests
with the Soviets.

The fact that the era of confrontation is far from over is shown not
only by Czechoslovakia but also by situations in other parts of the world.
Hanoi's aggression in Southeast Asia is largely financed and fueled by
Soviet assistance. Although there have been indications of Russian
recognition that continuation of the conflict in Vietnam is not in their interest,
they certainly have not done all they could to bring the death and destruction
to an end. So the confrontation in Southeast Asia continues.

In the Middle East, similarly, Soviet influence has been used to
fan rather than to dampen down the inflammatory state of affairs. Russian
resupply of aircraft and other equipment lost by the Arab combatants in the
war of June, 1967, has helped perpetuate and intensify the crisis. Their
extensive shipment of new and even more sophisticated aircraft led to the

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decision of the US to supply F-4 Phantom fighters to Israel in an effort
to preserve the balance and deter a renewal of overt hostilities.

Some indications of the last few months allow us to hope that the
Soviet leaders now recognize the dire potential of a new war in the Middle
East. The Soviet Union seems to have warned its Arab clients not to expect
military support for any attack on Israel. There is some chance that their
aid can be enlisted in the support of the mission given Ambassador Jarring
by the United Nations to endeavor to work out an Arab/Israel settlement.

But Russian arms continue to flow into the Middle East and hence here,
too, there is a continuation of confrontation.

If there are to be long-range solutions in Southeast Asia, in the
Middle East and, indeed, in a divided Europe, the best hope resides in
some accommodation of the competing interests of the United States and
the Soviet Union. The prospects for achieving some workable resolution of
these major political issues depend largely upon the development in the
Soviet leadership of an attitude less defensive and suspicious and more
flexible and responsive.

But this kind of political evolution, while it is something that we
can encourage, is not something that we can force or even do much to hasten.
The circumstances under which we can count on cooperation in finding mutual
solutions, in recognizing mutual interests and in accommodating respective
national objectives, are not now at hand. For us to pretend that they are would

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sacrifice our own security, and demoralize our Allies, while ignoring too much in the way of hard evidence. Although cautious efforts should continue, and although world peace in the final analysis will rest on our ability to find mutually acceptable solutions we cannot expect a ready solution to all the vexing issues that currently divide us from the Soviet Union.

In the light of the continuing confrontation, and in view of the fact that six months have now elapsed since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the inevitable questions arise as to whether we can now achieve anything satisfactory from talks on the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. Admittedly, some inconsistency exists in the idea that, while our men face Soviet arms in Southeast Asia, we may be able to talk about control of our respective nuclear armaments.

Perhaps this apparent inconsistency underlies the position that talks with the Soviets on nuclear weapons control can be withheld and used to reward them for progress on resolution of key political issues in certain parts of the world. In my view, however, there is no real inconsistency in talking about strategic arms limitation even though we may remain at a political impasse in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Our political problems with the Soviets reflect continuing differences in ideology and in the means by which we seek to promote our respective national objectives. We must not anticipate that much progress can be made in the foreseeable future in the political field.

But what we and the Soviets can easily agree upon are the burdensome costs and deadly risks inherent in the expansion and refinement of our nuclear

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inventories. We don't have to like one another -- or even to hope that
confrontation can ever be replaced by cooperation -- before attempting
to reach agreement on reducing the enormous cost of the nuclear race and
to cut down on the risk of mutual annihilation.

What we can do, and do now, is to begin the process of closing the
parameters of the US-Soviet strategic confrontation. We can accomplish
this because of the common interests both nations have in reducing the
consequences, costs and risks in the preparation for nuclear war. We
can also seek to prevent or moderate conflicts around the world that could
erupt into a Soviet-US nuclear confrontation. But some such difficulties are
likely to continue to occur. In many, it will be difficult or even impossible
to perceive a commonality of interest between ourselves and the Soviet
Union. Many will remain more complicated and less amenable to solution
than the nuclear arms race. To condition strategic talks on the resolution
of these other political issues would be to deny ourselves strategic advantages
without clear compensation elsewhere. Indeed, the initiation of strategic
talks could very possibly help create the kind of climate in which constructive
progress on US-Soviet political problems could be made.

Our strategic nuclear weapons buy for us only one thing -- the ability
to deter a Russian strategic nuclear strike. They know that we could, in
retaliation, inflict tremendous population losses on the Soviet Union and
destroy that country as a modern society. But our strategic might gives us no
political leverage in the situations in various parts of the world that currently
plague us and the nations friendly to us. Nor would our strategic missiles

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permit us, even if we were willing to contemplate their use for that
purpose, to launch a preemptive strike that would deprive the Soviet Union
of their ability to respond in a fashion that would kill a sizable proportion
of our population and devastate our society.

The resulting situation of mutual deterrence has been described as
two scorpions in a bottle. Ours is somewhat the larger scorpion, but the
Russian one is of a size sufficient to keep ours on its good behavior.
And if each could be proportionately reduced, along with its food bill, the
situation of mutual deterrence would continue unchanged.

Pending a determination of the possibility of making some progress on
political matters, we surely cannot abandon our strategy of nuclear
deterrence. Nor can we expect the Soviet leadership voluntarily to
restore a situation in which we possess the equivalent of a nuclear monopoly.
Suspicion of one another's motives is too time honored and too intense for
us to anticipate dramatic changes in a short period of time.

But experience has indicated that we do have a common recognition of
some of the realities of the nuclear age. We have, despite the war in Vietnam
and, more recently, despite the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia,
continued to work together for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have been
able to agree that neither of us will benefit -- and the world generally will
suffer -- if new countries begin to acquire or produce nuclear weapons.

We should be able also to agree, whatever the differences that continue
to divide us, that neither country has any real chance of securing a decisive

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advantage in nuclear strike capability. Neither, however much it might
spend on an anti-ballistic missile system, can hope to stay ahead of an
offensive strike capability that could penetrate any defense that can now
be deployed.

But the inexorable pressures to amplify and refine nuclear weapons,
and the cold necessity for keeping pace with a potential adversary that
could otherwise gain a decisive advantage, will continue unless we act
now. The hard fact is that we may never again expect to be in as favorable a
position as we now enjoy for entry into talks about a freeze in strategic
nuclear armaments. The Soviet Union continues to produce and perfect its
nuclear missiles. Technological developments may well make any arms
limitation agreement more difficult to develop and enforce a year from now,
or six months from now, than it is today.

We cannot as yet know whether or when we will be able to find, through
talks with the Soviet leaders, a way to adjust our conflicting views in the
various world arenas where we now compete for influence. We do, however,
have every reason to believe that practical considerations can lead at least
to the beginnings of agreement on the control of nuclear weapons.

If the leaders of the Soviet Union were to say to us that they had changed
their ideology and philosophy, and that as a result they were now ready to
discuss nuclear arms limitation, I would run quickly for cover.

But when they say, instead, that there are economic pressures operating

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within their country, and that they are deeply concerned at the possibility
of a new, and infinitely more expensive, upward spiral in the deadly race,
I can understand that, and I can accept it.

I accept it because the very same situation exists in our own country.
The billions of dollars that would go into another round could be used here
for education, health, urban problems and in meeting our other pressing
domestic crises,

The message I bring is one of hope. A hope that is realistic because
it is based upon the enlightened self-interest of both countries involved.

With an agreement, the risks, costs, and consequences of the nuclear
race can be reduced. A well-designed and verified agreement limiting
offensive and defensive systems can lead to increased stability, while
maintaining our relative deterrent posture.

A unique opportunity awaits our Government today. The fulfillment of
our hopes for agreement in this field can be one of the great accomplishments
of this decade.

The American people must be united behind our country's leaders as
they embark upon this all-important task. I hope I speak for all of us when
I say that with them go our hopes, our aspirations, and our prayers.

I thank you.

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