NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS

777 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA, NEW YORK, NY 10017-3521 (212) 922-1385 FAX: (212) 557-8258

CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) was founded in 1949 under the patronage of Zhou Enlai to develop contacts with other countries through the exchange of statesmen and politicians (both incumbent and retired), policy-makers, and academics and to conduct research on the international situation and foreign policy issues. It has very close ties to China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CPIFA has been in the forefront of senior-level exchanges between the United States and China since the days of "Ping Pong Diplomacy." It has hosted almost every Congressional delegation to China -- from Senators Mansfield and Scott and Congressmen Ford and Boggs through to the most recent groups that went this summer, as well as all of the Congressional staff delegations, beginning in 1976. It also has hosted almost all of the American governors and mayors since the first visit arranged by the White House in 1976; and it has been the Chinese sponsor of all the delegations of Chinese mayors and governors that have come to the United States.

The Institute also serves as the host for distinguished "political" visitors to China from around the world such as former heads of state or foreign ministers, members of parliaments, leaders of political parties, and leaders of certain countries that have not as yet established formal diplomatic relations with China.

As host of the National Committee's first delegation of Board members to China in 1972, CPIFA is our oldest counterpart organization, and takes on responsibility for most of the "political" or policy-related delegations that the Committee sends to China.

CPIFA sends several delegations to various countries every year (most of those that come to the United States are hosted by the National Committee), as well as publishing a quarterly, *Foreign Affairs Journal*.

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION on the CPIFA DELEGATION

Mr. Liu Shuqing -- President

Liu Shuqing has had a long career in public service. Born in Jiangsu Province in 1925, Mr. Liu spent seven years in the army (1939-1946) and then attended the People's University of China where he studied diplomacy.

In his diplomatic career, Mr. Liu served in succession as section chief, division chief and commissioner at the Department of the USSR and East European Affairs of the Foreign Ministry; as counsellor for political affairs at the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union; and as Ambassador to Poland (1972-1977), Norway (1977-1980), and Bangladesh (1980-1982). He served concurrently as assistant foreign minister and director of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry from 1982 to 1984; vice foreign minister from 1984 to 1989; secretary-general of the Foreign Affairs Leading Group of the CPC Central Committee, as well as director of the Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council from 1989 to 1991. He became president of CPIFA in August 1991.

Mr. Zhu Manli -- Secretary-General

Born on October 17, 1941, in Zhejiang Province, Ms. Zhu graduated from the Foreign Languages Institute of Beijing and joined the Foreign Ministry in 1965. She served in the Chinese Embassy in London from 1973 to 1978 and joined CPIFA in 1978. she was a fellow at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, from 1981 to 1982 and a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) from 1982 to 1983. She has served successively as division chief of the North American Division, deputy secretary-general, and secretary-general of CPIFA since 1984.

Mr. Zhang Pengxiang -- Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. Zhang was born March 2, 1939 in Shanxi Province. He graduated from the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages' Department of English Language in 1964 and from the same Institute as a research student majoring in international affairs in 1967. From 1967 to 1979, Mr. Zhang worked in the Beijing Diplomatic Personnel Service Bureau. His diplomatic career began in 1979 as third and second secretary in the Chinese Embassy in Moscow; in 1984, he became first secretary in the American and Oceanian Department of the Foreign Ministry, and in 1988 he was appointed consul at the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles. His present position at CPIFA began in 1993.

Ms. Lin Hong -- Deputy Division Chief

Born on in Beijing on August 25, 1969, Ms. Lin graduated from the Department of International Relations at Zhengzhou University in 1982. From 1982 to 1986, she worked at the International Studies Institute in Chengdu, Sichuan and then moved to CPIFA.

Mr. You Botao -- Staff Member

Mr. You was born on October 31, 1965, in Jiangsu Province. He received a B.A. from Suzhou University in 1987 and a U.N. diploma from the United Nations Language Training Program at the Beijing University of Foreign Studies in 1989. Since 1990, he has been working as a translator at CPIFA.

Delegation from the
CHINESE PEOPLE'S INSTITUTE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
October 15 - 30

## Delegation Leader

Ambassador Liu Shuqing
President, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA)

## Delegation Members

Madame Zhu Manli
Secretary General, CPIFA

Mr. Zhang Pengxiang
Deputy Secretary General, CPIFA

Ms. Lin Hong
Staff Member, Division of American and Oceanian Affairs, CPIFA

Mr. You Botao
Staff Member, Division of American and Oceanian Affairs, CPIFA

## Escorts

Dr. David M. Lampton
President, National Committee on United States-China Relations (NCUSCR)
(New York and Washington only)

Ms. Jan Berris
Vice President, NCUSCR; Trip Coordinator

Ms. June Mei
Interpreter, NCUSCR (New York and Washington)

Mr. Lu Xiaobo
Interpreter (Los Angeles and San Francisco)

P840153-1082

RJ.A.3.A.5

GSS SENSITIVE EUROPE
(S/S-7406895)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NOTICE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Polit Bureau
of the CPSU Central Committee, and Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the US

Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General
Secretary

Georgi M. Korniyanenko, Member of the Collegium
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Chief,
USA Department

Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief,
Near East Department

Viktor Sukhodrov, USA Department (Interpreter)

Oleg Solchov, USA Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs

Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Advisor, State Department

William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, State Department

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-designate
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE: Tuesday, March 26, 1974 - 5:09-9:43 p.m.

PLACE: Brezhnev's Office, Council of Ministers Building Krenlin

SUBJECTS: Other Arms Control; CSCE; MBFR; Economic Relations

COPY AVAILABLE

<table><tr><td>REVIEWED By</td><td>10/15/74</td></tr><tr><td>Cal. I.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Cal. C.</td><td></td></tr></table>

SECRET/NOTICE

From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

IS/FC/CDR

Date. 4/27/74

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

CLASSIFY
EXEMISE
DENY
DELEGATE
FOR EXEMPTIONS
Non-Responsive Info
P. A. 345
Exemptions

( ) DECLASSIFY
EXEMISE
( ) DECLASSIFY
IN PART
( ) DELETE
P.O. Box 13456

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-2-

**Brezhnev:** I just got a code message from President Nixon. He is very displease with you.

**Kissinger:** It happens every Tuesday afternoon.

**Brezhnev:** So it is nothing out of the ordinary? I was so pleased. I thought it was something new.

**Kissinger:** Did you go behind my back and complain to him?

**Brezhnev:** No, I didn't complain. It must be something you told him. He must have taken an objective view of the situation.

**What do we do?** Should we turn to something new? Or return to the Middle East?

**Kissinger:** I leave it to the General Secretary.

**Brezhnev:** All right.

OTHER ACHIEFS CONTROL

On ending underground nuclear tests -- could we do something?

**Kissinger:** Mr. General Secretary, there are two separate problems. One question is whether you and we want to agree to end the tests at some future time. For example, January 1, 1976, as you proposed. The second problem is whether we should make it in the form of an appeal to other nations and feel free to resume if they test. Since we know that other countries will test after January 1, (1976), that second proposition just means we will find another reason to test after January 1, and it has the objective consequence of embarrassing those other countries.

We could study the question -- we have never examined it -- of some date in the future, say 2-3 years from now, at which there would be a moratorium. That we could study. The other is difficult.

**Gromyko:** What is the second proposal you mean?

**Kissinger:** You have one proposal, but it has the objective consequence of leaving both free to test but with a new excuse.

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-3-

**Gromyko:** But the substance of our proposal is that we two agree to stop underground testing as of January 1, [1976]. At the same time we appeal to others to stop.

**Kissinger:** But if they don't, we are free to resume. Since we know . . .

**Gromyko:** But we would not resume testing immediately. We would wait for a couple of years after we would agree to stop. Our own agreement would be effective January 1. For a certain period we two could wait and see what other countries do, and then the agreement itself could contain a clause saying the two would observe the situation for say 1 or 2 years and then consult together to see what to do next, to see what others do.

**Brezhnev:** Neither you nor we stand to lose anything from that. But we would therefore show the desire of our two countries to proceed along the path of detente and that our line is aimed at furthering detente. So it contains no danger to our two countries.

**Kissinger:** No, I understand the proposal. As I said, it has two difficulties. One is the problem of verification, because below a certain threshold we don't know whether tests are being carried on. That, for a limited period, one could consider.

**Brezhnev:** I think we could give some thought to giving a certain threshold on tests and discontinue the rest.

**Kissinger:** That would be something we could study. The second difficulty we have is to make it in the form of an appeal to third countries.

**Brezhnev:** But that is what we contemplate.

**Kissinger:** Because this will provoke major disputes with our allies to the East and your allies to the East. Our allies to our East and yours to your East -- they're not the same countries.

**Brezhnev:** God be with them. We would be entering into an agreement with you. I don't see anything wrong.

**Kissinger:** We can have a serious discussion about a test ban with a threshold. Whether to couple it with an appeal to others would be more difficult.

SECRET/NODIS

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And of course, there are detailed issues to be considered, such as peaceful nuclear explosions and how to deal with them. But those are not issues of principle.

**Brezhnev:** That would be the subject of a special study.

**Kissinger:** That we could solve.

I think we could find a solution on the basis of a threshhold test ban.

**Brezhnev:** Very well.

**Kissinger:** And we could start discussions to that effect. I don't think we should discuss here how to establish a threshhold, or peaceful nuclear explosions.

**Brezhnev:** Very well. I take it then we have reached an understanding in principle.

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Brezhnev:** Good.

What about the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of nuclear submarines and other nuclear-bearing craft. Did we reach an agreement?

**Kissinger:** Not completely.

**Gromyko:** We had the impression we agreed on everything.

**Kissinger:** I know. When I use professorial language, it is very complicated.

**Gromyko:** That is a tragedy.

**Kissinger:** I thought we were talking about the Black Sea and Baltic.

**Gromyko:** It is a peaceful lake.

**Kissinger:** I think that will create great difficulties for us. Especially as it applies to aircraft carriers.

SECRET/NODIS

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-5-

**Brezhnev:** I really don't see any difference of principle between submarines and aircraft carriers. Both are capable of shooting at each other. Why should we be there?

**Kissinger:** Because, as I explained yesterday, carriers have many uses. [They smile.]

**Brezhnev:** You mean many political uses or many technical uses?

**Kissinger:** Both. But especially technical uses.

**Brezhnev:** Then I guess we will have to add some of our missile-carrying warships to effect a balance.

**Kissinger:** Our Chief of Naval Operations thinks there is already more than a balance.

**Brezhnev:** That is what our naval chiefs say but the other way around.

**Kissinger:** That is the tragedy.

**Brezhnev:** Yes, but surely you and I know how many submarines we have. You know how many we do, and we know how many you do. Because they roam about in a friendly manner, not far from each other.

**Kissinger:** That is in the spirit of cooperation.

**Gromyko:** The whole secret is they both watch each other openly.

**Kissinger:** As I said, missile-carrying submarines are somewhat easier to deal with than carriers.

**Brezhnev:** And when do you think that question could lend itself to a solution?

**Kissinger:** Missile-carrying submarines?

**Brezhnev:** Yes, in the Mediterranean.

**Kissinger:** First, it would depend on what framework. I've never examined that question, to be quite candid.

SECRET/NODIS

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-6-

**Brezhnev:** I can present a full report on the general picture.

**Kissinger:** Do you know whether we have missile-carrying submarines in the Mediterranean?

**Brezhnev:** Certainly, I know the full picture.

**Gromyko:** Should we give the United States some information on that score? Confidential!

**Kissinger:** We should exchange information about each other's submarines.

**Gromyko:** We can give you information about yours.

**Kissinger:** And we about yours.

**Gromyko:** Probably so.

**Brezhnev:** Nowadays these types of submarines circle the globe.

**Kissinger:** I must tell you honestly I have never studied the question about Polaris submarines. I am prepared to study it and give our views to your Ambassador.

**Brezhnev:** Okay, then we will postpone it until tomorrow.

**Kissinger:** Tomorrow I can give it to you: I don't have to give it to your Ambassador. But I don't think I'll have any conclusive answer tomorrow.

**Brezhnev:** Well, at least an approximate answer.

If we go further on, can I re-refer to the banning of chemical weapons?

**Kissinger:** We can agree to banning the use of chemical weapons.

[The Soviet side confers.]

**Brezhnev:** Yesterday we read out to you our piece of paper on banning chemical weapons.

**Kissinger:** Do you want to read it out to me again?

SECRET/NODIS

P840153-1088

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-7-

**Sukhodrev (reads):** "Attaching great importance to the achievement in cooperation with other countries of an agreement, excluding from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass annihilation as chemical weapons, the USSR and the USA have agreed to come out with a joint initiative on this issue. Accordingly, they intend to table in the Committee on Disarmament a draft of an international convention which would prohibit the development and production of the most dangerous, lethal types of chemical weapons of warfare on the understanding that discussions on the question of prohibiting the remaining types of chemical weapons will be continued."

**Kissinger:** As I have pointed out in the past, we've found no solution to how to assure each other of the ban on production. If we can find a solution to that, we would be prepared to consider it. But we are prepared...

**Brezhnev:** Yes, but if you pose the matter in such a way, you could erect difficult obstacles in the way of other treaties. If you enter into a treaty, you enter into it in a spirit of confidence.

**Kissinger:** Not in the case of lethal weapons. If you have them, it means you don't have total confidence. But I repeat, we are prepared to ban the use of chemical weapons.

## CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

**Brezhnev:** On the European Security Conference, we seem to have reached an understanding on our joint mode of action.

**Kissinger:** My impression is, on the European Security Conference we have reached an understanding both on substance and on procedure. That is my impression.

**Gromyko:** The important thing, however, is to implement that understanding in practice.

**Kissinger:** Of course. But we have implemented understandings in the past; it is not the first time we have carried out an understanding.

**Brezhnev:** But the Conference has been dragging out three years. There is no end to the Conference.

**Kissinger:** Up to now the issues have not been reduced to such a small number, with such a precise understanding.

SECRET/NODIS

P840153-1089

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-8-

**Gromyko:** You mentioned the possibility of the Conference ending some time in July. Do you see any way we can have it end before President Nixon's visit?

**Kissinger:** I think it would be very difficult.

**Gromyko:** What if we tried to prepare all the documents and have them initialed, and leave until afterwards only the signing? That is, have the documents prepared in substance?

**Kissinger:** I knew the Foreign Minister for years before I discovered his passion for initialing.

**Gromyko:** It is a very good thing.

**Kissinger:** That is more nearly conceivable. That I do not exclude.

**Gromyko:** Because of the substance of our opinion, and the General Secretary's opinion too, if President Nixon's visit is on and the substance of the Conference is still in mid-air, our public opinion won't understand that.

**Kissinger:** Of course, the visit of President Nixon has to be seen as in the mutual interest, and we can't accept it as being conditional on anything.

**Gromyko:** Yes, but it is a matter of atmosphere.

I have fresh information. During the lunch interval, I heard from our delegation at Geneva on the first item, inviolability of frontiers. This refers to the study they are undertaking, that we mentioned, on peaceful change of frontiers. You and we reached a fundamental understanding that the mention of this should not be in the context of the clause on inviolability of frontiers.

**Kissinger:** That is right.

**Gromyko:** What they are discussing now is a bare reference.

**Kissinger:** Right.

**Gromyko:** The question of where to put it is not yet decided. If you could give your delegation instructions in line with what we agreed. You know best how to work with your allies.

SECRET/NODIS

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-9-

**Kissinger:** I've not exactly proven I know best how to work with our allies! Nevertheless, you correctly understood our discussion yesterday, and we will work in that sense. We already had a preliminary discussion with the Germans in that sense before I came here, and we will work with others after I leave. You can count on that.

In seriousness, we have agreed on this question, and we will proceed along the lines of our understanding.

**Gromyko:** Good. And during the interval I again looked into the situation regarding so-called "military détente." The situation is confused to the utmost, and it has been confused deliberately.

When it came to light that some of the Western countries were putting forward impossible proposals, suddenly they put forward new ones putting the whole of the European USSR under control. This proposal is not yet withdrawn. Belgium, Holland, are putting out these ideas.

**Kissinger:** I have told you we will not support that proposal.

**Gromyko:** We appreciate that, but could we have an understanding to act more vigorously to eliminate all these?

**Kissinger:** Yes; this issue will take a little more time, but you have our assurance. I will discuss it in London on my way through.

**Gromyko:** Very good. Very good.

**Kissinger:** This may be a good way of proceeding.

**Gromyko:** Because it is the British who are acting as the motive force behind all this.

**Kissinger:** That is why I suggest it.

SECRET/NODIS

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-10-

**Gromyko:** We thought the new Labour Government would see it differently, but the law of inertia was applying.

Generally speaking we like your attitude to this question of military detente and these measures. As you know, the matter has three elements: One is the exchange of observers -- that is no problem. Second is presentation of information about maneuvers. The third is the presentation of information about troop movements. We share your view of the third, that is, to send it back for further study.

**Kissinger:** That is correct. We can weaken these proposals substantially. Basically we should talk about large units or substantial units on maneuvers, not about movement of all military units.

**Gromyko:** That would certainly facilitate the situation, because one of the complicated elements would be eliminated.

**Kissinger:** We will talk about this in London in that spirit and see if we can reach a common position.

**Gromyko:** That is a page in British history that has been turned over.

On Basket III, I don't know whether you have seen the pile of documents they have piled on. If you take this pile here [shows stack of documents] you can multiply it by 10, most of it wastepaper.

**Kissinger:** I've never examined those papers. Because I don't think the Soviet system will be changed by the opening of a Dutch cabaret in Moscow [Laughter]

SECRET/NODIS

P840153-1092

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-11-

**Gromyko:** Cabaret! I made myself go through the whole basket. If you clear away the rubbish, the real sense boils down to three items: borders; respect for sovereignty, noninterference; and the third is what we just discussed -- matters of military detente. In fact, the third one, until recently, wasn't there at all. At Helsinki, it was decided merely to give some thought to it. I think it would be a good thing if you could look into this, because you will see a lot of those matters don't relate at all to the problem of security.

**Kissinger:** I understand your point about Basket III. It has two aspects: One is to relate it to the principles, and the second is to give it some content. Some of the Europeans think that for domestic reasons they have to give some content to Basket III. You and I discussed once that if we can establish a relationship to domestic legislation, you could consider some content for Basket III. I think that with goodwill on both sides, this is a soluble problem. The United States will use its influence not to embarrass the Soviet Union or raise provocative issues.

I have not seen any of the papers. I must be frank. I have not studied them. The United States has not put forward one concrete idea.

I will put forward one -- compulsory visits by the United States Secretary of State to Leningrad.

**Gromyko:** We will be agreeable, if not in the document, but at least in a footnote. It should be bilateral, because I don't think the French would sign it.

**Kissinger:** We should initial it. But we should be able to solve it and you will have no difficulty with the United States.

**Gromyko:** The others have, though you haven't. But we agree the crux of the matter is something about domestic legislation. But as for what you say about us being prepared to insert substance into Basket III, it has been said on many occasions, as in the statement by Comrade Brezhnev, that we are in favor of a broad expansion of cultural ties provided they are consistent with domestic legislation. We are in favor of a wide range of human questions provided they are consistent with respect for domestic legislation.

**Kissinger:** We are prepared for substance. But I haven't studied any of the papers on substance. Because I have assumed we would work it out in practice.

SECRET/NODIS

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-12-

**Brezhnev:** Dr. Kissinger, I have derived great pleasure hearing the two Foreign Ministers talk at length with each other, and I keep thinking "How are they able to do this?" My conclusion is that I can never be a Foreign Minister. I would have to set aside a couple of years to study the most complicated words from every encyclopedia in the world and insert them one after the other in each phrase. I will set aside a couple of years and maybe then I will be up to it.

My second conclusion is that Foreign Ministers speak in such an interesting way but resolve nothing.

**Kissinger:** That gives them job security.

**Brezhnev:** I am really thinking of volunteering for one of these commissions in Vienna. It will be a school of practical study.

**Gromyko:** But not on Basket III.

**Brezhnev:** The other day I phoned Comrade Gromyko and I said "My deeply respected Andrey Andreyevich -- "

**Kissinger:** The President never says that to me -- but then I am not in office as long as he.

**Brezhnev:** And I said, "I was quite convinced that as soon as I telephoned, you would raise your phone and reciprocate. And I was so impressed I ventured never to forget that. I was impressed by your gesture for me, and you can be assured of my feelings for you for many years. And availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to know how you feel and at the same time inquire about the health of Lydia Dmitrievna, your spouse, and please pass on to her my best wishes, and please let me express my hope that the forthcoming telephone conversation will give you the greatest pleasure and bring forth no problems. Because my many years of experience give me every confidence you are directing every effort toward these goals that I and my colleagues are seeking, and I am sure our conversation will be a success. Now I will say a few words -- but I forget one thing." But he then broke into conversation saying, "I entirely reciprocate your feelings." And I said, "Andrey Andreyevich, if I were not assured of your feelings I would not have called."

**Kissinger:** He would say to me, "I essentially reciprocate your feelings."

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-13-

**Brezhnev:** My call was to find out when your plane was coming. [Laughter]
He said, "It is coming one hour late." We talked twenty-two minutes. But
I wanted to hear the two Foreign Ministers talk to each other.

**Kissinger:** But I am a new Foreign Minister . . .

**Brezhnev:** I have one shortcoming: I like a precise discussion. But we
talked for twenty minutes about our mutual respect and admiration, and we
concentrate on the last word. So I listened to you most attentively. You
agreed to inform each other. I will inform President Nixon, Korniyenko,
Sonnenfeldt.

**Kissinger:** I know Sonnenfeldt was communicating with somebody, because
he is not communicating with me.

**Brezhnev:** I haven't even been able to suspect Sonnenfeldt of ever engaging
in clandestine activity. The only thing I can guess is that he writes you
notes and tells you "Don't agree to anything they say."

**Kissinger:** What really happens is, I move my lips and he speaks.

When I speak to your Foreign Minister, he never says, "I entirely agree."
The most I get is, "I essentially agree with you."

**Brezhnev:** As I see it, that is again a case of his reciprocating your words.

"Thank you, Mr. Kissinger, for thanking me for my gratitude. I am deeply
indebted to you. Thank you for my hearing of these words so pleasant to
my soul."

That is what is called a respite or disengagement.

**Kissinger:** I don't think I would achieve this felicity of phrase . . .

**Brezhnev:** [referring to Rodman] What is he writing this for?

**Kissinger:** We need this for our diplomatic language training.

**Gromyko:** I don't know what he is writing.

**Kissinger:** We will initial it. We will introduce it into our Foreign Service
charm course.

SECRET/NODIS

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-14-

Brezhnev: I'm quite sure you and all your assistants, and President Nixon, understand fully well the significance and meaning of the All-European Conference and are familiar with all the details to date. I know your so-called allies regularly inform you of all the details of what they are going to do. We don't refer to our East European colleagues as allies but we get reports from them.

We would now like to hear precise firm words, not on details but on the principle. We want to know whether we can bring the Conference to an end in the next one or two months or whether it goes on and on. It is left a bit vague. I am a practical man and I wanted to know the facts. I have to report back to the members of the Politburo on what is going to happen. We hear about "efforts will be made with allies."

The situation is like this: Countries like Belgium want to set up a theatre here under their own control without the Soviet administration. You say your allies have put forward this or that proposal that is just to let it go on endlessly. We can speak our mind. We can say the subject matter is European-security, not a matter of organs or stations in each other's country. If the United States isn't interested in that, then I will take that into account, and that is another question.

When there is a question of who should participate, whether it is just the nuclear powers or others, I said, "No, it should be all European countries." This was the correct view. Luxembourg, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, should all participate.

This is why we are against all attempts to give evasive answers, which only creates unpleasantness in our minds.

We are not putting forward the question of the withdrawal of United States forces from Europe. That is a separate question altogether. Nor do we link it with your "allied commitments." But in spite of our straightforward approach, others are putting obstacles in the way and trying to gain certain advantages over the Soviet Union.

You know the United States publishes a magazine, "America," in this country, and we reciprocally publish, "Soviet Union" in the United States. [Brezhnev gets up and fetches a copy of "Soviet Union" and shows it to Dr. Kissinger.] I personally read "America" in my house, and my wife reads it too. So there is no problem about that publication in this country. But now there is a new demand, to set up a printing house in the USSR. Surely that would contradict the principle of noninterference in other countries' affairs and respect for sovereignty.

SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

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-15-

So all references to alliances are nothing but attempts to evade the question. What alliance can there be with a country like Holland on setting up restaurants in the USSR? Tell them straight out that it runs counter to the spirit of the Conference. You keep saying you have to consult with your allies.

But I want to be completely objective, Dr. Kissinger, and I appreciate the fact that you've made two serious statements. One is that you have the intention to make a serious effort to complete the documents and effect the signing as soon as possible, and second, that you will do everything in your power to ensure the signing of those documents at the highest level. If that is your intention, I certainly welcome it and we can end the conversation on that note.

What is your view on those last words?

**Kissinger:** My opinion is, we have agreed to use our efforts to bring about an acceptable document, and that in that case conditions will be considered right for signing it on the highest level, as far as the United States is concerned.

**Brezhnev:** I agree. And I trust you agree in principle that if it were at all possible to achieve it before President Nixon's visit, that would be very good. Politically it would confirm the ideas President Nixon set out in his last letter to me. You will naturally recall the words in that letter -- "that we have gone through difficulties but we remain true to the policy we have set, and that there is indeed no alternative to coexistence." Surely the final document of the European Security Conference would be very important in that respect.

**Kissinger:** I have said we will act in that direction and I am sure we will achieve it. But I have pointed out that I don't believe it will be completed before the President's trip. But we have no fixed view on that subject; it is my estimate. But we can certainly finish it, if not before, then shortly afterward. But you have our assurance we will act in the sense that I have described.

**Brezhnev:** Good. When we were preparing for our discussions with you, we listed 15 questions we thought were important and of benefit to our two countries. Of those 15 questions, I felt the most important ones, on which results would be the most significant, were the following:

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1. Soviet-American relations.

2. Further steps in the field of strategic arms limitation.

3. Middle East.

4. Trade, economic and scientific and technical cooperation between our two countries.

As I say, there are other matters, but these would seem to be the main ones, and they are fully in line with the President's thinking and with the goals we set for the President's visit.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Then we can consider our general assessment of Soviet-American relations is a favorable one and we have not come up against any differing view.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: And we feel that gradually -- not as fast as we wish but nevertheless - we are moving in that direction.

Kissinger: On Soviet-American relations?

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: We are not in a position of confrontation. On the contrary, we are here exchanging views.

Kissinger: That is the meaning of detente.

Brezhnev: We make no attempt to interfere or inject our presence in the domestic affairs of the United States. That is entirely the concern of President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger. So whatever adverse processes are felt in the United States, there are no adverse processes between us.

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In the past period, there have been increasing contacts between business circles and our people, and I have had occasions to receive them.

**Kissinger:** We strongly support that.

**Brezhnev:** And at various suggestions made by American companies, people from here have been going over to study the possibility of new deals. And so on this issue we can both state that our assessment is a positive one.

**Brezhnev:** As I say, I list these matters first because I think this is in line with President Nixon's thinking, and not to give any impression we want to dodge any of the issues involved.

Then there is the question of the Middle East. Regardless of what number you give it, that is a very complex one. We have had a long conversation, and you and Foreign Minister Gromyko have on this subject. And I would not like to resume the conversation on this tonight. Perhaps we might find occasion to talk some more, or you could with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

**Kissinger:** As you wish. I am prepared.

**Brezhnev:** On strategic arms limitation, incidentally, just today we received a report -- and I can probably show you tomorrow -- that you carried out a test of a new missile, it seems successfully, on one of your islands, and the missile was equipped with five warheads, not three.

**Kissinger:** If it is Minuteman, that is impossible. If it is the Poseidon, it could be anything up to ten. But if it is the Minuteman, it cannot be anything but three.

**Brezhnev:** Let me be more specific tomorrow, because I was informed of this at the very last minute.

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Other Arms Control

On ABM, it is my impression we have reached an understanding.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: On the basis of leaving each side one area and ending all work on other areas.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: On ending underground tests, the question remains about the threshold.

Kissinger: We should begin technical discussions on that subject.

Brezhnev: That is, there is an understanding of the question.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Brezhnev: The understanding being that we can continue testing until January 1, 1976 and then call upon others to follow suit.

Kissinger: No, first of all, discontinuation applies to a threshold.

Gromyko: We said that.

Kissinger: Calling upon others, in our view, is not an essential element of this.

Gromyko: We understand you emphasized the need for that question to be resolved.

Kissinger: I think I expressed myself in the manner caricatured by the General Secretary. I consider it an obstacle to agreement. Also we must have technical discussions about the threshold before we can give an absolutely final answer.

[They confer.]

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**Brezhnev:** I think, Dr. Kissinger, we could reach an agreement on that on a bilateral basis, that is, we could agree that we would discontinue testing, say two years, and at the end of that period, review the situation to see where we stand.

**Gromyko:** Without including a formal proposal in the agreement.

**Kissinger:** That is a possibility. But we should have technical discussions about the threshold. We are prepared to have them either in Washington or Moscow.

**Brezhnev:** We agree.

**Kissinger:** Then we should form an opinion, but in principle.

**Brezhnev:** Good.

Now, what about the question then of reduction of forces in Central Europe?

**Kissinger:** I think we should discuss that.

Can we take a 10-minute break? And bring our technical expert in?

**Brezhnev:** Certainly.

**Kissinger:** We are prepared.

[There was a break from 7:05 to 7:30. Mr. Lodal came in. Brezhnev roughed up Lodal's hair and commented that he needed a haircut; Kissinger agreed. Dobrynin pointed out that Lodal's hair was not long by American standards. On his way back to his seat, Brezhnev picked up Mr. Rodman's case containing Dr. Kissinger's briefing books and walked off into the next room. Mr. Rodman followed him. Brezhnev turned around and came back. Mr. Rodman retrieved the case. Mr. Gromyko affirmed that it was a joke. The meeting then resumed.]

MBFR

**Brezhnev:** I would like to say a couple of words on this question.

**Kissinger:** Please.

FOREIGN NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

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Brezhnev: On the question of reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe.

We were gratified at the start of the negotiations in Vienna on the substance of this important problem. And we discerned in them the joint desire of our countries, together with the other European states concerned, to continue the process of strengthening European security and to complement political detente in that continent with measures of military detente. It is only too natural that negotiations should be conducted not for the sake of the negotiations themselves, but to achieve concrete practical results. We have to note, however, that so far there have been no such results. And in fact, people now are speaking of the deadlock that has taken form at the Vienna talks.

And it is becoming obvious that our Western partners have come to Vienna with clearly exaggerated demands. The approach they are suggesting means nothing short of a desire to alter or amend in their favor the correlation of forces in Central Europe that has taken shape over many years. They start talking about some kind of ceiling or of reduction only of the Soviet-and American forces, and also they are calling for a reduction of Soviet forces in a proportion of two-to-one, or even more, compared to American forces. They speak only about the reduction of infantry forces without talking of other types of forces and armaments.

You will realize that if that approach is taken, the talks are bound to end in deadlock. And it is quite obvious that no reasonable or acceptable solution can result from such an approach.

So, therefore, if there is a genuine desire to reach agreement on this problem, it is necessary to take a more realistic view of the situation. I don't believe you and I can here and now finally resolve this problem, and I have merely described in principle what is happening, emphasizing those things that cannot lead to real results, and I would be happy to hear from you some observations on this score. And then, depending on how you see things, we could decide either to issue our delegations with new instructions or to discuss the matter at a higher level, or take other appropriate steps.

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**Kissinger:** The negotiations on MBFR have, as you pointed out, Mr. General Secretary, many complexities. One is the geographic disparity of the location of the United States as opposed to the Soviet Union. Any Soviet forces would withdraw a few hundred miles, while America's forces would withdraw a few thousand miles. Secondly, we start from a base which is disparate: According to our estimates, the forces of the Warsaw Pact are larger than those of NATO, and the forces of the Soviet Union are larger than those of the United States. And there are some disparities also in individual equipment.

On the other hand, we understand the Soviet concern that as a result of this effort there not just be a substitution of other forces for those of the United States -- in other words, that if we withdraw a certain percentage of our forces, the other allies not just increase theirs by the same percentage. And we also understand there should not be a change in the relative weight of the various allies as a result of these negotiations.

So we understand the Soviet desire to have some clarity about the process that would be started.

[Food is brought in.]

**Kissinger:** It's about time I was getting hungry.

**Brezhnev:** When I get home last night, my wife showed me a picture in Love this. She said, Dr. Kissinger has lost weight. I said no, it is something in the photograph.

**Kissinger:** Your wife is a great diplomat.

**Brezhnev:** She usually takes no interest in the talks.

**Gromm:** Did you tell her Dr. Kissinger was bringing great pressure to bear? [Laughter]

**Kissinger:** So, we understand that the discussions that have taken place in Vienna may have had some of the attributes that the General Secretary pointed out.

We wonder, therefore, what the General Secretary thinks now of the idea he discussed with President Nixon -- of, for example, a cut

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of 5% of U. S. and Soviet forces, without equipment. In other words, this is a change in our position. With a ceiling to be put on allied forces so they cannot be increased to compensate for this. And with an agreement to move within a specified period to further discussions which would involve also forces of other countries, of all of the participants of the Conference.

Brezhnev: I did talk about this with President Nixon, and I spoke of it to Chancellor Brandt and to President Pompidou. I did indeed suggest that we agree on certain reductions in size of forces, perhaps in the initial stage symbolic reductions, and then let us wait and see several years, with talks continuing in the meantime, and then everybody concerned -- the United States, the peoples of Europe, everybody -- will see it is possible to live in Europe with a smaller number of armed forces. That would be just one first step.

Brezhnev: But I feel at this time we can limit ourselves to just an exchange of views.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Without, however, losing interest in this activity.

Gromyko: And let the talks in Vienna continue.

Brezhnev: And perhaps after we both thought things over, we could agree to both give our delegations new directives. I've been hearing it said that the UEC, which is of course not only a commercial but also a political union, feels one could contemplate a Western Europe

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without boundaries. This was said to me by certain politicians.

B.I.A.S

**Kissinger:** That might be one result of the current tendencies.

**Brezhnev:** You are proposing an Atlantic Charter, which again makes us think. Some kind of Atlantic Charter instead of NATO. Then there is this Europe of Nine, a kind of union within an alliance. The normal number of teeth is 32: now people are trying to fit 33 into their mouth. Not being a dentist, I have to give some serious thought to what it means.

I know the Atlantic Charter is one of Kissinger's ideas, and the Nine is one of France's ideas. Which is why you and Jobert like each other.

**Brezhnev:** That is a question that does arise. And in general, various events are occurring in France which certainly give food for thought. I am sure you are familiar with the situation in France. I personally have nothing against Mr. Pompidou -- we were the first to sign principles, the agreement on consultations. These were not simple documents. Our trade turnover has increased. This time, at Pitsouda, we spoke least of all on economic issues, on the specifics involved. Generally, France indicated her desire to increase trade and economic cooperation. We took a positive view of this. We could see Pompidou was deliberately avoiding reference to specifics, and, as it were, referring those matters to the relevant departments.

As I saw it, this was one of the effects of the terms imposed by the Nine. I didn't want to importune him.

That is basically what I want to say. Unless Gromyko wants to say something.

**Gromyko:** The substance has been set out.

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We make no attempt to interfere with independent policies, and the ultimate independence and freedom of action of a country depend on its specific weight, not its declarations. You have experience with that with friends on your side of the line.

So we have always treated such phenomena as on a tactical level, so I wouldn't attach too much importance to them when they apply to France and the United States.

As for the Nine, it is our understanding they are thinking of forming a defense community, and a political union.

Breakthrough: That is my information too.

Dr. Kissinger, I was reminded here. This is one part of the [Pitsunda] talks I want to read to you. It relates to the U.S. -Soviet talks on SALT. "Pompidou said that France welcomed these talks and would be happy if they led to a halt in the arms race between the two powers, because it is dangerous. At the same time, France was happy not to be a participant in these talks because she didn't want their consequences in any way to touch upon France."

Another of his suggestions was that the next working meeting like Pitsunda be held in Paris. We didn't discuss any dates. I invited him to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union, but again, we didn't discuss dates. I informed you.

Kissinger: We appreciate this. We are not concerned with France's policy, and these were all consistent with our expectations. But we

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appreciated the exchanges we have had on the subject and your
informing us.

**Brezhnev:** So perhaps, returning to the subject of troop reductions in Central Europe, we could then agree the conference itself should continue to work. And in the meantime, say at the Ministerial level or other level, we could think of ways to give new impetus to the work and bring rapid results.

**Kissinger:** So as I understand it, the ideas you discussed with President Nixon last year are in abeyance?

**Brezhnev:** No, why? But for the time being, no practical solution has been found to that problem.

**Kissinger:** Including that idea advanced by the General Secretary?

**Brezhnev:** Yes. Because the suggestion is that only a certain percentage of land forces be withdrawn, which would violate the balance, a balance which has been in existence for 30 years. So obviously there is a need to dig a little deeper into this whole matter.

**Gromyko:** When Douglas-Home, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, was in Moscow discussing this subject, he said it was best to reduce land forces first, especially the number of tanks. When we asked why, he said, "Because the Warsaw Pact has more tanks." That is not a good reason.

**Kissinger:** I have never heard a NATO Minister who disagreed. That is very convincing to NATO people!

The question is how serious we are in promoting these negotiations. If each side wants to freeze the superiority it has, there will never be an agreement.

**Gromyko:** Then let the other participants take a more objective view instead of saying, "Reduce tanks because the other side has more tanks." Because all forces and armaments should be reduced. It should be a cross-section of all forces in Europe, including nuclear forces. So it is certainly expedient to give further study, but it is also necessary for the Western powers to take an objective view.

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**Kissinger:** So you think at the Summit no understanding can be reached.

**Gromyko:** Perhaps as a result of further thought, something could be agreed. Let us agree to think this over. You may want to exchange views with your allies. This is certainly one of the topics we list as for the Summit.

**Kissinger:** But our experience is that unless there is a preliminary agreement before the Summit, it is very hard to reach an agreement at the Summit.

**Gromyko:** True, but surely there can be an additional exchange of views between now and the Summit.

**Kissinger:** I just told Sonnenfeldt I don't have the impression we will achieve a breakthrough on this subject today. But I don't want to be hasty; that is why I asked Sonnenfeldt.

**Gromyko:** A breakthrough today, maybe not. But between now and the Summit...

**Kissinger:** Because I would have offered to split the difference, if I knew what your position is.

**Gromyko:** Could you tell your position?

**Kissinger:** I already told you. A cut of 5% in U.S. and Soviet forces, to be followed by further reductions of other forces.

**Gromyko:** Yes, but we said that involved additional forces. What about air forces and other arms? We can't do as Home said.

**Kissinger:** But in that stage tanks would not be included, only personnel.

**Gromyko:** But that is not our proposal. When Conrade Brezhnev put his proposal, he said armed forces, not just personnel. Otherwise it is just counting heads.

**Kissinger:** By air forces, do you mean personnel, or aircraft too?

**Gromyko:** Those too.

**Brezhnev:** Because air forces include arms and not just personnel.

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**Gromov:** The question now in the discussion in Vienna is the question of reductions of armed forces and armaments.

**Brezhnev:** I am sure Dr. Kissinger is aware that that kind of approach is groundless.

**Kissinger:** Can I also, just for my education, Mr. Foreign Minister, ask about the content of your 20,000 symbolic cut put forward at Vienna? Is that personnel or equipment?

**Gromov:** We named that as an example but we have never divorced the question of personnel from that of arms, and we have always said cuts should include air forces and nuclear weapons.

**Brezhnev:** That is what we wrote.

**Kissinger:** My quick impression is reinforced; I don't think we will find a solution this evening.

**Brezhnev:** I agree with you. But we should give thought to today's discussion. [Kissinger nods yes.] So let the Conference go on working, and we should give whatever help we can. [Kissinger nods yes.]

**Gromov:** [Picks up a briefing paper] This is our proposal: "The Soviet Union and other participants in the talks suggest a reduction of 20,000 with appropriate materiel and equipment." That is in paragraph 2. This is something that applies to both of us.

And in fact, in the past, Western countries themselves never attempted to disunite personnel and arms. Only very recently this question cropped up. It seems they switch positions whenever it is to their advantage.

**Kissinger:** We are prepared to discuss cuts that move in the direction of equality. But we should consider the consequences if we fail to make progress in any of the fields of limitation of armaments. If armaments on both sides continue to grow while we declare we are in a period of détente... So this is not a question to be settled tonight, but it will have a serious influence.

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**Gromyko:** We are in favor of continuing to give thought to this. Certainly it is quite possible we will have opportunities to make progress.

[Kissinger and Stoessel discuss the Soviet-proposed text of the daily press announcement.]

**Kissinger:** [to Gromyko] We suggest that if we omit the phrase we had yesterday about the talks being constructive and businesslike, it would have a political significance. Add whatever we had yesterday.

**Gromyko:** We will include it.

[Gromyko confers with Brezhnev.]

**Brezhnev:** Good.

**Gromyko:** Accepted.

**Kissinger:** [referring to Dohrynin] Is he going to be like his Chinese colleague in Washington, whom we haven't seen in four months?

**Brezhnev:** Good. It is quiet.

## Economic Relations

**Brezhnev:** Could we now go over to trade and economic matters?

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Brezhnev:** If we sum up what we have achieved in the last two years, we can see the significant advance in economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. As comparing 1972 and 1973, trade between the two has doubled and reached $1.5 billion. There have been several agreements concluded between Soviet organizations and American companies, including with an American bank. A representative organization has been set up to promote economic ties.

But at the same time, we have to note that not everything agreed upon has been carried out, and in the first instance, one has to mention here that the cardinal and fundamental issue of eliminating discrimination against the Soviet Union in trade has not been resolved, and also

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the question of granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation treatment. From what we know and what you have told us, we are familiar with your domestic difficulties in this regard. Only too naturally we hope a solution will be achieved as soon as possible. I hardly need to say a lack of solution to this question gives rise to quite a few difficulties. And lack of such a solution, for one thing, prevents me and President Nixon from discussing larger-scale arrangements that are possible in the field of economic ties. This applies to the question of credits.

Although I was gratified to hear that the temporary restrictions imposed on the Export-Import Bank were lifted. A few days ago, I was pleased to read your statement where you very convincingly and reasonably argued the case for granting most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union. It has now become possible to proceed further in the question of building a United States trade center in Moscow. But all of this process of first freezing, then unfreezing, impedes this process of developing economic ties.

One significant step along this road could be the signing of a long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technological cooperation. I think last October we handed to you a draft of an appropriate economic agreement.

Kissinger: We have given you a draft.

Brezhnev: We handed it to Secretary Shultz in Moscow.

Kissinger: But we gave you a draft.

Brezhnev: Yes. So it would therefore seem that preparation of such an agreement has assumed a practical shape. My colleagues and I believe the signing of such an agreement could be an important element in the long-term economic relationship outlined by President Nixon in his conversation with Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. And I believe this question could be one of the important matters taken up at the Summit meeting.

Frankly speaking, I personally have not had much chance to look into the details of the draft you have given us. However, our people reported to me there was a great difference between your draft and ours. Your draft emphasizes not the main question of developing

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ties between our two countries, but questions which, though requiring solutions, are in effect of secondary significance -- for example, exchanging information in the field of trade, improving conditions for the work of trade companies and organizations. So it remains for us but to voice our hope and desire that we can get down to business-like effort to agree on the text of an agreement. And that your representatives and ours receive appropriate instructions without delay, so they can get down to business promptly.

There are quite a few negotiations presently under way, for example, on Yakutsk gas and other primary products. All these talks can run their course. If the United States is interested in principle in such long-term agreements, the experts will undoubtedly be able to calculate the economic benefits for both sides. So we have to elaborate the common, mutually acceptable and optimum treaty agreement.

Let me say, by way of illustration, that it seemed at first that the United States was interested in receiving energy from the Soviet Union, in the form of oil and gas. On the other hand, we felt that some representatives of American business circles took President Nixon's statement about U.S. independence in the field of energy as signifying a loss of interest in Soviet oil and gas deposits. So there is some specific issue on which it is necessary to have some clarity. Then the specific issue will be seen in its true light. It is also a fact that not only American companies but also European and Japanese companies are approaching us with inquiries about our deposits of oil and gas. Yesterday I met with two prominent Japanese economists and businessmen. They both expressed their great interest in cooperation in these fields, as they had in conversations with Comrade Kosygin. They were very appreciative when I told them our willingness to supply them with a part of our national wealth. Chancellor Brandt, President Pompidou, and Italy are all equally interested in these projects; not to mention the Eastern European socialist countries.

Or, to take another example, the talks going on now between our Aviation Ministry and the American companies Lockheed, Boeing, and Douglas, for technical cooperation. But those American companies say that so far they have not had a sign of the favorable attitude of the American Administration to this kind of cooperation.

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On the other hand, we couldn't fail to take note of the very fine statement by President Nixon to the American Trade and Economic Council when he said that economic relations should cement very friendly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. So we see friendly statements not reinforced by appropriate actions.

We entered into fairly large-scale deals with Japan, for example, on timber, and at present we are on the threshold of a new agreement with the Japanese on timber resources. And the Japanese I met yesterday told me they were interested in continued Japanese-Soviet cooperation in various projects, including projects on the basis of compensation. And we confirmed our agreement to supply them with 25 million tons of oil.

[Brezhnev looks for a map in his folder of maps, and can't find it.]

Do you know of the speech I made recently at Alma-Ata?

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: In that speech I made public what has already been decided on by us -- adopted by the Central Committee and now included in the Plan.

[He finds the map he wants and puts it before the Secretary. They both get up to inspect it closely.]

That is Lake Baikal, and you see the existing railroad [the Trans-Siberian]. It is one hundred years old. The country has grown immensely in the meantime. It is very hard to ship materials to Vladivostok by railroad. The whole trans-Baikal area is a virgin area, which holds enormous reserves of gold, tin, and so on. So we have decided to build a new railroad. Part is already built, from Taysiет to Ust-Kut. That is what the Japanese are interested in. And we will build a new railroad. We won't ask any credits for that; we will build it by ourselves. This will mean that an enormous new industrial area will be added to the country's industrial centers. There will be two special engineering corps; the Komsomol will send 20,000-30,000 young people to work on the railroad. And we will build east and west from there [points to a spot in the center]. Then in 5-6 years we will be taking an entirely different language. The

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Japanese were very happy about this -- to build major towns and cities in the area, and plants.

[Both sit down.]

I merely say this to show the error of old views about the Soviet Union, that we are backward or poorly developed. Maybe we lag behind the United States in some areas, but we are not backward. One year is just nothing. In the overall balance one year can be in favor of one country; the next year in favor of another. So we have to define the major issue, Dr. Kissinger, to define clearly the U.S. attitude and the attitude of President Nixon to this entire question. If that is clearly defined as positive, then we can indeed say, as the President did, that economic cooperation can cement our friendship. Because it is not a flexible policy to say that today we freeze something and tomorrow we unfreeze it.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have had many talks on economic matters.

Brezhnev: We should do our best to remove all obstacles placed in the way of this by ill-wishers. It is one thing to criticize; it is another to look at how someone comes to power and acts. It is one thing to criticize, and another to plan and organize things.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have talked about this problem in this room many times. You ask our attitude. Our attitude has been described by President Nixon at the dinner for your Minister [Patolichev, Feb. 26]. It has been stated publicly by President Nixon and stated publicly by me, and has been stated to the Senate Finance Committee. We believe very strongly in the general improvement in our political relations, and we believe a general improvement in economic relations is an essential component of that relationship. We are encouraging both public and private investment in the Soviet Union. We have always considered your long-range economic plans and plans for long-range economic ties between the United States and the Soviet Union an example of far-sighted statesmanship on the General Secretary's part. We are prepared to cooperate with this.

We have, as you know, encountered a number of domestic obstacles, some of a highly irresponsible nature. You must be aware of the fact that the President and I have worked uneasily to overcome them. And we will continue to do this.

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In short, we agree with the perspectives that have been described by the General Secretary.

**Brezhnev:** I never heard you ask for our help in building the B-1.

**Kissinger:** Perhaps at the Summit in 1975 we can agree on the B-2. Then both sides will have the same airplane, and that will simplify many things.

**Brezhnev:** It is an excellent idea, and we will suggest cooperating on the I-2. [Laughter]

**Kissinger:** But our most immediate objective is to get the trade legislation passed, which we hope to achieve in June or July. We believe that long-term trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is of mutual benefit and we will do our utmost to encourage it. It is not a unilateral thing we do for the Soviet Union, and we have never looked at it that way.

**Brezhnev:** What are the real prospects? Do you have a strong conviction that something can be done by June?

**Kissinger:** Speaking frankly, I believe if our political relations remain good -- as I believe they will -- and if we can do something on the problems I discussed with Ambassador Dobrynin, that we now have the possibility in the Senate to bring about a compromise that will lead to the granting of MFN. Many Senators told me before I left for the Soviet Union that they were eager to work for a compromise -- Senators that have supported Senator Jackson. So this is the immediate problem I shall have when I return.

**Brezhnev:** I recently was told there was one Senator who deep down is against Jackson -- and there are many Senators of that kind -- but for the time being they are apprehensive about saying so.

**Kissinger:** They must be given some excuse for doing it, but they are ready to do it. And we now have support from some groups who were behind this program. I had a meeting with Senator Ribicoff and Senator Jackson, and later with Senator Javits. And I believe it will be possible to bring about a solution. Not so much with Jackson but with the others.

SECRET/NODIS

P840153 1:15

SECRET/NODIS

35

**Brezhnev:** As you know, Jackson is linking this matter with something that bears no relation to this entire matter.

**Kissinger:** I agree.

**Brezhnev:** Relating it to such questions of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Later I will give you an official communication on that score. I give you this not by way of accounting to anyone, but as gentlemen. I gave President Nixon assurances and I will give him official information.

**Kissinger:** We don't consider this a proper subject of inquiry by the United States Government.

**Brezhnev:** We talked about that; it would indeed be tantamount to interference in our internal affairs. You remember I saw the Senators and read out official data. These were true figures that have been given. And I can now give you official figures relating to the true situation as of March 1 of this year.

Our Patolichev has been a little unwell recently. But I trust our others -- Alkhimov, Semenchastny -- will do the work.

I can tell you -- [to Rodman] this is not necessary for the record -- at a recent meeting, my colleagues asked, "Are we interested in any change in our line toward the United States, economically or politically?" And the trade experts were there. And the unanimous judgment was no. I am charged with these negotiations and I can tell you we stand firmly by the line we have stated.

**Kissinger:** I can tell you President Nixon has no higher goal than to establish firmly the course we have taken, including especially in the economic sphere.

**Brezhnev:** I feel he is certainly quite right. So I trust by 1975 I will be in Washington again, unless you change policies.

**Kissinger:** We won't change policies.

**Brezhnev:** Then we should give earnest thought not only to this Summit but also to 1975. Because, I like to repeat, to govern means to foresee.

SECRET/NODIS

P890173 1:11:16

SECRET/NODIS

36

**Kissinger:** In fact, when the General Secretary comes next time, we hope he will travel around the United States.

**Brezhnev:** With pleasure.

Perhaps we can finish for today.

**Kissinger:** All right.

**Brezhnev:** I feel we are setting aside quite some time for discussions every day.

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Brezhnev:** Our Defense Minister Grechko just returned from a trip. In the two days I have been discussing with you, I haven't met any of my own colleagues, even though I am home. So I would like to set aside a half hour, an hour, tomorrow morning to meet with them. I have to tell them about the critical remarks I have addressed to you.

**Kissinger:** Maybe they will disagree with the critical remarks.

**Brezhnev:** So, 11:00.

**Kissinger:** At 11:00? It is up to you.

**Brezhnev:** If by any chance there are any changes, I'll inform you.

**Kissinger:** And we will discuss primarily strategic questions? Or what else?

**Brezhnev:** According to my list: energy, the Four-Power agreement in West Berlin, which is not a big question.

**Kissinger:** Yes, I agree we should discuss it.

**Brezhnev:** And scientific and technical cooperation.

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Brezhnev:** And perhaps we might have to return to some of the questions we have already discussed but agreed to think over. Maybe the Middle

SECRET/NODIS

P040153-1117

SECRET/NODIS

37

East, strategic arms; those are two items to which we might return.

**Kissinger:** If we want to conclude an agreement on strategic arms at the Summit, we have to reach a decision fairly soon.

**Brennley:** Of course. As I see it, it is indeed a fundamental issue. President Nixon singles it out for special attention in his message.

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Brennley:** And it is certainly in the focus of public attention.

And congratulations to your daughter tomorrow [on her 15th birthday]. Where are they?

**Kissinger:** At the ballet.

**Brennley:** Well, have a good rest.

**Kissinger:** Thank you.

[The meeting thereupon concluded.]

SECRET/NODIS

MAR 25 1993

To Celebrate

The Tenth Anniversary and New Year of Nepal

America-Nepal Friendship Society
requests the pleasure of your company at a
Buffet Dinner & Cultural Show

On Saturday, April 17, 1993 at six p.m.

Please respond
718-591-2377
212-556-8143

Mary Lindley School
210 East 33rd Street
New York City

1914-03-23

17:02

CHESH NOSSA ST MORITZ

082 3 18 89

P.03

St. Moritz, 23rd March 1993

Dear Dr. Stark,

Here is the history of my eyes:

1/ November 1st, 1989 - Cataract operation by Dr. Calvin Roberts at the New York Hospital. During this operation, some serious complications with the anaesthesia made the operation last much longer, and eventually I was sent to the recovery room. Time elapsed from leaving my room to return : 5 hours. This was on my right eye; Operation was successful and in two weeks' time, visibility was normal;

2/ December 9th, 1989 - Early morning, while going to the toilet, getting out of bed without putting the light on, I bumped into the edge of the television set, seriously damaging my right eye. I was rushed to the New York Hospital, where Dr. Roberts performed an operation which lasted 7 hours, again on my right eye. Understand that the dispute between the Doctors was whether the retina of the right eye was detached or not. End of this unfortunate episode was that I was told that I would have to undergo a further operation a few days later so that the retina could be attached again, otherwise it would be impossible for me to see again with the right eye. I was exhausted from the first 7-hour operation and I therefore refused a second operation.

3/ In a month's time, when the blood in my right eye was absorbed, I could see quite a bit already, and eventually the reading of the damaged eye was 20/20; this proves the retina was not Since November 1990, the visibility on the right eye detached; has started falling off and now I practically cannot see altogether with that eye. My Doctor tells me that the

4/ Now the problem is that the left eye has developed a cataract and I believe that before doing anything with the cornea, I should operate on this so that when I do the cornea, I will have one good eye. Understand that recovery from a cornea operation takes about one year.

/ ...

1914-03-23 17:02

CHESA NOSSA ST MORITZ

082 3 18 89

The conclusion is I wonder if you can fly over here this week-end, to give me your opinion. I have all the necessary instruments which are needed to examine me.

Of course, I am prepared to give you the honorarium which you will decide.

You can fly overnight to Zurich, when I will have my plane fetch you to fly you to St. Moritz (approx. 30 mins).

By the way, I hear you are fond of skiing. Suggest you bring your skis with you and you could spend the week-end here.

My sister, Mrs Mary Dracopoulous, tells me that the operation you performed on her has been very successful.

Best regards,

Stavros S. NIARCHOS

TOTAL P.04

HAK:

Nitze's book is titled TENSION BETWEEN OPPOSITES: REFLECTIONS ON THE PRACTICE & THEORY OF POLITICS.

He devotes chapters to:

- Political theory & value systems

- An ethical framework

- Russia, the Soviet Union & value systems

- Truman

- Forrestal

- Will Clayton

- George Kennan

- Dean Acheson

- George Marshall

- "George Shultz & Loyalty"

- The US and the future practice of politics once

You are mentioned only twice:/in a chapter on arms control negotiations and his Soviet counterpart, Alexander Shchukin, Nitze writes:

"At one point, Henry Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin, representing Nixon and Brezhnev, attempted to simplify our task by agreeing that we should concentrate on arriving at a definitive ABM treaty while concurrently putting some manner of freeze on the rapid expansion of new starts of additional offensive weapons."

The only other reference is:

(Speaking of George Kennan) "He disapproved of the ideas advanced in Henry Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons & Foreign Policy*, which I also had criticized."

DRAFT JACKET BLURB

"Paul Nitze is one of America's great public servants, someone who has made vast contributions to US foreign policy for more than five decades. In this sensitive and insightful memoir, he reflects upon his long involvement with the people and events which have shaped the modern world and offers his perspectives on what should be the future course of America's strategic policy."

OK as edited

As sent

SJM

04/06 '93 14:46

NIAR Monaco

VENUS SHIPPING COMPANY, S. A.

PANAMA (R. OF P.)

VILLA RIJOU - 19. AVENUE DE LA COSTA
MONTE-CARLO - MC 98000 MONACO

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS: VENMON TELEPHONE 93.50.67.21 (8 LINES) TELECOPIER 93.50.67.22 TELEX VENM 469929 MC

OUR REF. :

YOUR REF. :

MONTE-CARLO

Our Telefax Number : (93) 50 67 73

TO KISSINGER ASSOCIATES - New York

ATTENTION : Suzanne McFARLANE

FROM : CHRISTIANE

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES SENT : 1

(including this page)

FOR ANY QUERIES PHONE : CHRISTIANE

MSG N° : DATE : 04/06/93

Dear Suzanne,

Further to our telcon today, hereunder is the mailing
address for Mr NIARCHOS, in Greece, where we should be for
approx. 2 months.

All best regards,

greece address

8009
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS S.A.
VASSILEOS GEORGIOU 47
SYNGROU HALANDRI
ATHENS
GREECE

Feb 24.93 10:58 No.007 P.02

TEL NO.714-995-5075

NATION'S THE ONE

via fax 2127597919

FEB 25 1993

February 24, 1993

Dear Henry,

Suzanne delivered your message very clearly. I hear you and am appropriately contrite. We want to have one nationally, even internationally noted conference a year and thought that your acceptance for a dinner afforded us the opportunity to build our 1993 conclave, *Fragile Friendship*, on a foundation built by you -- which would be the strongest foundation possible. Still, we *should've* asked you first, and shouldn't have assumed that your busy schedule would necessarily permit you to work on a major new address on a specific issue.

That being said, we are honored you will be with us and hope that the conference proves to be worth your efforts. I look forward to the personal pleasure of telling RN you will be staying for his address at lunch on the 21st.

There will be three panel discussions: General Scowcroft's on security issues, Stephen Bosworth's on trade, and Steve Clemons's on politics and culture. The four set speeches will be yours, RN's, and those by Clinton and Japanese government representatives who are to be named later. RN will be in LA fresh from a visit to Tokyo, Beijing, and possibly Seoul. While I haven't talked to him about it, I imagine that he will allude to his travels and then speak about Japan and Asia in the context of overall U.S. foreign policy -- in other words that he will want to use his time to continue to stress the Russian aid issue. That leaves the way clear for a single, transcendent statement on the Japan relationship from our keynoter. What is the new justification for close U.S.-Japan ties? Is our historic affinity based on shared democratic ideals going to wane as it becomes clear that we were bound together by a common adversary rather than a common philosophy? What is the future of our military alliance? The analogy our co-sponsor, Steve Clemons, uses is to George Kennan's "Mr. X" article about containment. In a nutshell, what does "Dr. K" think should be the guiding word or phrase for our relations with Japan in the next generation?

If you would like more thoughts directly from Steve or any other support at all as you ponder this further, please let me know. And thank you again for your friendship to this place.

William E. Simon

P. O. Box 1913
310 South Street
Morristown, New Jersey 07962-1913
(201) 898-0290

January 28, 1993

The Honorable Chester A. Crocker
Chairman, Board of Directors
United States Institute of Peace
1550 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Mr. Crocker:

I was not familiar with the work of the United States Institute of Peace until I read your recent press release announcing that former presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan had been awarded the Spark Matsunaga Medal of Peace for their contributions to peace among peoples and nations of the world. It is certainly fitting and proper for the Institute of Peace to honor these achievements through such awards.

While I do not wish to disparage the achievements of Presidents Carter and Reagan, I wonder if your selection panels considered the historic accomplishments of President Richard Nixon in the area of world peace. I am convinced that a, fair-minded evaluation would rank President Nixon well ahead of Presidents Carter and Reagan in terms of their contributions to world peace.

During his five and one-half years in the White House, President Nixon, through a combination of persistence and vision, advanced the cause of peace in several crucial areas. He brought the war in Vietnam to a close in 1973 on terms that would have preserved peace and freedom in that country had those terms been enforced when they were later violated by North Vietnam. In an historic departure from previous U.S. policy, he opened the door to peaceful relations with China, which we have now maintained for more than two decades. He established a new <u>detente</u> with the Soviet Union, thus laying the basis for the SALT I Treaty limiting strategic nuclear weapons and beginning the dialogue that led to the Helsinki accords in 1975. These accords, significantly, established the principles of human rights as basic standards of conduct among nations.

Finally, President Nixon initiated the Middle East peace process following the Yom Kippur war in 1973. That process eventually led to the Camp David accords which were completed by President Carter in 1977. While President Carter deserves great credit for bringing the process to this conclusion, it is important to remember that the chain of events leading to this result was initiated by Richard Nixon.

Page Two.

January 28, 1993

All of these were truly historic accomplishments, which paved the way for further developments for peace, and permitted other presidents to build on the momentum President Nixon set in motion. The opening to China, for example, not only established diplomatic relations between the U.S.A. and China, but I believe it created the conditions for the development of free market institutions in that important country. The Middle East peace process, of course, is still continuing, and has led to several important breakthroughs for peace in the region. President Nixon's initiatives with the Soviet Union, and his insistence that human rights should be recognized as part of this process, eventually led to the fall of Communism, and the end of the Cold War.

The fall of Communism was one of the decisive events of the Twentieth Century, and we ought not to overlook President Nixon's role in bringing this about. Very early in his career he sounded the alarm about the dangers of Soviet expansion, and helped to lay the groundwork for American strategic policy during the four decades of the Cold War. During his eight years as Vice-President, he worked intensively to strengthen the American commitment to this policy, while searching for opportunities to reduce tensions between the great powers and to strengthen democratic institutions in other parts of the world. He persisted in these efforts, which have now been vindicated by events, in the face of hostile criticism from political opponents and from some quarters of the press. What he fought for over so many years, and against so much opposition, has now been achieved. While others, who came late to the struggle, have lined up to receive the credit, Richard Nixon's critical contributions have been curiously overlooked.

It is also worth mentioning that President Nixon came into office at a time of great flux in the international trading system, when the Bretton Woods agreements were beginning to break down and when strong pressures for protectionism were being exerted around the world. Trading conflicts of this kind are always a potential irritant to a free and prosperous world order, and President Nixon was mindful of the threat they could pose to world peace. He thus kicked off the Tokyo Round of international trade negotiations, which led in time to a set of agreements promoting a system of free trade and fair trade between the United States and her trading partners. These discussions, and the eventual agreements, moved the leading economic powers in the direction of free trade, and away from protectionism, and thus laid the basis for peaceful economic competition among Western nations.

Page Three.

January 28, 1993

These are some of his achievements for peace during his years in public office as a member of the House and Senate, as Vice-President, and finally as President. But what has he done on behalf of peace since he left office?

During his years in his private life, President Nixon has embarked on a new career as a writer and commentator on world affairs, using his talents to explain to the public and to our leaders what we need to do to create a safer, more prosperous, and peaceful world. He has published seven best-selling books on international affairs since 1980, most recently, *Seize the Moment* (1992), which made a strong case for active American policy in assisting the states of the former Soviet Union to establish free political and economic institutions. Last March he made an important speech in Washington on precisely this issue which was widely credited for encouraging the Bush administration to move forward with assistance to those countries. He continues to write op-ed articles in major newspapers on this and related subjects, and I have no doubt that he will produce another book with his active pen before much more time passes.

Richard Nixon recently celebrated his 80th birthday, and I know that he looks back on his long public career with pride and satisfaction on all that he was able to accomplish. As a member of his cabinet, and as one who has kept in close contact with him over the years, I know that President Nixon does not crave public recognition. For a statesman, such satisfaction in a job well done is a sufficient reward. But, for an organization like the United States Institute of Peace, whose purpose is to promote the cause of peace and to honor those who have championed its cause, it would be very much in order to have recognized his historically unmatched achievements.

WES/kz

MAR 15 1993

ORANGES & LEMONS

Orange County Register March 2, 1993

# Modern fairy tales: A good wolf and 'JFK'

My younger daughter is being introduced to the concept of revisionism before being given the opportunity to grapple with the concept of history. More alarmingly, because of visually gripping and totally corrupt films such as "JFK" and "Hoffa," the same is true of slightly older Americans. Although ours has been called a post-ideological era, in part because of the failure of the century's most fashionable ideology, our popular culture remains lousy with cant. One reason may be that it's easier to believe than to think.

But we were talking about my 4-year-old. The other night at bedtime she asked me to read her a story called *The True Story of the Three Little Pigs*, by Jon Sieszka and Lane Smith (Scholastic, Inc.). "I don't know how this whole Big Bad Wolf thing got started," says the story's mild-manner protagonist, the bespeckled Alexander T. Wolf, "but it's all wrong." It seems Alexander, who had a cold and only wanted to borrow a cup of sugar so he could bake a birthday cake for his grandmother, happened to sneeze violently while standing outside the door of a neighboring pig who'd been silly enough to build his house of straw. Thus commences a series of regrettable misunderstandings that the press, ever-hungry for cartoon villains, blows completely out of proportion.

My first thought was that the story's charm was its very implausibility. Indeed, interviewed by her concerned father after the reading, my daughter said she still knew that the big bad wolf was bad. But then I was surprised to find that my 8-year-old was swayed by Alexander's apologia. Didn't she know the real story? I asked. The older child's reply was difficult to dispute: "How do you know which story's true?"

True, I wasn't there, but myths, honey, are concocted to make a point. Given the facts, a case for the wolf is bound to be pure sophistry. Still, much depends upon how the story is told, and also to whom. Under laboratory conditions, owners of large, misunderstood brown dogs might tend to side with *canis lupus*, while habitual rooters for the little guy are going to pick those pigs every time.

Such predispositions frequently guide people's conclusions about current events as well. In the mid-1980s, any room full of construction workers was bound to contain more supporters of aid to the Nicaraguan

## John Taylor

### The issue

Popular culture has developed an unwelcome tendency to celebrate opinion over fact, prejudice over judgment, and vulgarity over the once-estimable qualities of Western culture.

### The writer

Mr. Taylor is director of the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace in Yorba Linda. He is writing in place of Sir Eldon Griffiths, who is on vacation.

contras than one containing associate professors of literature. Perhaps one group would have been naturally more discerning. Then again, it might have been that opinions were being arrived at in both rooms according to criteria other than the economic and political conditions in Nicaragua. It is only by a study of how best to improve them that decisions about the Nicaraguan people should have been made. But who really knew anything about them? It is always easier to be informed by attitudes toward revolutionaries or Republicans, and wolves and pigs, rather than by information, which can be exasperatingly random.

In America, we don't just tolerate facile opinion; we exalt it. The NBC-Wall Street Journal poll asks us whether we believed Mrs. Clinton should use her maiden name. What business was it of ours? The original Rodney King jurors were more qualified to judge the defendants than the outraged thousands asked their opinions by Gallup after the verdict. But public opinion, amplified by the media, ruled the jury to have been wrong, and it seems to be in our nature in such cases to give vox populi more weight, although trial by jury is as venerable a democratic ideal as any other.

Similarly, only Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill know what passed between them. During his confirmation hearings, polls showed more people believed he was innocent than guilty of sexual harassment. Today, the majority believes Hill, which proves, commentators say, that our society's awareness of sexual harassment has increased. But why must this breakthrough be accomplished on the backs of two people caught in a personal tragedy? The facts did not change in a year, nor did

our capacity to know them. Only our opinions did. What if we are wrong? Wouldn't our new appreciation of this social ill be ignificantly won?

A 217-year-old democracy should be able to refine itself without turning real situations, with all their nuances and mixed motives, into simplistic, bloodless object lessons.

While it is understandable, if unfortunate, when we give in to emotionalism and prejudice when the facts of a matter are unclear, it is appalling that we do so, as sometimes happens, when the facts are obvious, or when people's increasing tendency to be oblivious to them is exploited to make modern-day myths out of real-life events.

Director Oliver Stone didn't like the war in Vietnam and doesn't trust the United States government, and so in "JFK" the United States government kills the president because he was planning to withdraw from Vietnam. "JFK" is a dreadful and foul lie. Stone has enjoyed a large audience for a whole series of obsessive spams disguised as films because he is technically proficient and also because his blase dovetail neatly with the anti-corporate Weltanschauung of the aging Vietnam generation. Similarly, the hagiographic "Hoffa," directed by Danny DeVito, who admits he didn't know much about the corrupt labor leader when he began the project, is shown by a Sean Wilentz essay in The New Republic to be a whitewash originated by Hoffa's family and friends.

I can just hear some doubledome saying that as the artist applies his singular vision, using hypothesis and conjecture to rearrange seemingly familiar historical personages and events, the intelligible viewer can appreciate the new perspective without losing sight of what really happened.

The problem is that part about intelligent viewers. Millions of youngsters who don't have the least idea what really happened are going to these films and coming away believing that they are true. Neither Stone nor DeVito is responsible for the digital state of education nor for the growing primacy of opinions over fact, prejudice over judgment, and vulgarity over the once estimable qualities of Western culture. But if you ever see either of their names in lights over a movie called "The Wolf Forgiven," you'd better watch out

I thought you might find this to be of interest. No reply is necessary.

--John H. Taylor

MAR 22 '93 11:27

MCGRAW HILL BUSINESS WEEK NYC

Business Week Magazine
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

John W. Patten
Publisher

March 21, 1993

President Richard M. Nixon
The Office of Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, NJ 07675

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of *Business Week* I would like to extend an invitation to appear as the keynote speaker at The 1993 Business Week Symposium of Chief Executive Officers, October 20-22, 1993, at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C.

Your recent commentary on landmark international issues and their effects on American interests is unequalled. As foreign policy's elder statesman, you are uniquely qualified to help redefine America's role in a rapidly transforming world.

*Business Week* will gather more than 100 of North America's most successful corporate Chief Executive Officers and challenge them to *Reinvent America* at the symposium. We would be honored if you would address this audience on the international aspects of that challenge; your vision of the proper international role of the post cold-war United States.

I invite you to deliver the keynote address at dinner either on Wednesday, October 20, or Thursday, October 21; or as the Symposium's closing speaker late Friday morning, October 22; whichever is most convenient.

The meeting will receive global media attention via a special four-page report in *Business Week* that will highlight the key speakers and present their conclusions to the magazine's worldwide readership of over seven million.

An editorial concept document, list of advisory board members, and the program booklet from the 1992 Symposium are enclosed. As the 1992 program booklet indicates, *Business Week* promises a Symposium of the highest caliber.

We hope you will accept this opportunity to address and exchange ideas with America's corporate elite. Your office may forward response to this invitation, along with any questions, directly to Ms. Kim Gantz, the editorial director of The 1993 *Business Week* Symposium of Chief Executive Officers, by phone (212-512-4892) or fax (212-512-6909).

I look forward to seeing you in Washington and thank you for your kind consideration.

97%

HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 12, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

RAND is at work on a new initiative to help the post-Soviet governments manage the radical social, economic, and political changes they now face. As part of this initiative, RAND has already signed a memorandum of agreement with the Russian government to establish a joint program of research, analysis, education, and training.

At a recent meeting of the advisory board for RAND's Center on Russian and Eurasian Studies, I was briefed on the progress of the initiative. It occurred to me that this effort might engage your interest and that you could give RAND some suggestions on how to proceed. I am impressed by how receptive the Russian government has been so far.

I've suggested that Jim Thomson, RAND's president and chief executive officer, call your office to see if a meeting between the two of you is desirable at this point.

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, NJ 07675

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

DRAFT LETTER TO RICHARD NIXON FROM HENRY KISSINGER

Date

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake NJ 07675

Dear Mr. President:

HAK:

cc: Jim Thomson

LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT THE REAL PAT — THE
PAT I KNEW AND LOVED FOR OVER HALF A CENTURY.

SHE WAS BEAUTIFUL AND INTELLIGENT AND WISE.

SHE LOVED HER FAMILY. SHE LOVED PEOPLE. NOT JUST
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BUT THE THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE
SHE MET IN OUR TRAVELS TO ASIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA
AND EUROPE OVER THE PAST FORTY YEARS.

SHE LOVED A GOOD TIME. SHE KNEW HOW TO MAKE US
LAUGH. SHE ALWAYS BROUGHT SUNSHINE INTO A ROOM.

ABOVE ALL, SHE WAS STRONG. JUST
BEFORE GOING ON T.V. FOR THE FUND BROADCAST IN 1952, I
TURNED TO HER AND SAID, "I DON'T THINK I CAN DO THIS ONE."
SHE GRASPED MY HAND FIRMLY AND SAID, "YES YOU CAN." AND
I DID.

IN 1974, WHEN I WENT INTO SHOCK AFTER AN ALMOST FATAL OPERATION, THE FIRST PERSON I SAW WHEN I FINALLY OPENED MY EYES WAS PAT. SHE HAD BEEN SITTING BY THE BED FOR HOURS. I WAS PROFOUNDLY DEPRESSED. I SAID, "I DON'T THINK I'M GOING TO MAKE IT." AS SHE HAD TWENTY-TWO YEARS BEFORE, SHE TOOK MY HAND AND SAID "YES YOU CAN," AND I DID.

HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR PAT, I WOULD NOT HAVE MADE IT POLITICALLY OR PHYSICALLY.

SHE NEVER GAVE UP. AFTER HER STROKE IN 1976, HER LEFT ARM WAS PARALYZED. SOME SAID SHE WOULD NEVER RECOVER ITS USE. THEY DID NOT KNOW HER. I CAN SEE HER NOW, ON THE PATIO OF CASA PACIFICA IN THE EARLY MORNING HOURS, TURNING AN EXERCISE WHEEL AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN. SHE COMPLETELY RECOVERED. IF YOU HAD SEEN HER IN LATER YEARS, YOU WOULD NEVER HAVE KNOWN

SHE HAD SUFFERED A STROKE. SHE HEALED HERSELF. NO ONE
DID IT FOR HER.

IN THE FINAL, AND AT TIMES EXCRUCIATINGLY PAINFUL,
LAST TWO MONTHS OF HER LIFE, SHE NEVER GAVE UP. SHE
REFUSED TO USE A WHEELCHAIR. SHE KEPT SAYING OVER AND
OVER AGAIN, "I DON'T WANT TO BE A BURDEN. I HAVE TO TRY TO
WALK. I MUST TRY TO GET WELL."

SHE ALWAYS THOUGHT OF OTHERS, NOT HERSELF. ONE OF HER CLOSEST FRIENDS WAS STUNNED WHEN SHE GOT THE NEWS ON TUESDAY. SHE SAID THAT SHE HAD TALKED TO PAT ON THE PHONE ON THE FRIDAY BEFORE THE END, AND THAT PAT WAS UPBEAT AND CHEERFUL, THAT THEY HAD HAD SOME GOOD LAUGHS TOGETHER. INSTEAD OF TALKING ABOUT HERSELF, SHE KEPT ASKING HER FRIEND ABOUT HOW SHE FELT.

[10]

TRICIA AND JULIE ARE SPLENDID EXAMPLES OF A MOTHER AND HER CHILDREN. THEY ARE SPLENDID EXAMPLES OF A FINE MOTHER. SHE WAS A REMARKABLE GRANDMOTHER. WHEN JENNIE, WHO WILL BE FIFTEEN IN AUGUST, WAS OLD ENOUGH TO TALK, SHE ASKED PAT WHAT SHE SHOULD CALL HER. PAT THOUGHT "GRANDMOTHER" SOUNDED TOO OLD AND FORMAL.

SHE SAID, "CALL ME MA." WHEN JENNIE ASKED ME, I SAID, "ANYTHING WOULD BE OKAY." AFTER ALL, I HAVE BEEN CALLED EVERYTHING! SO SHE CALLED ME "BA." AND SO IT WAS THAT JENNIE, CHRISTOPHER, ALEX AND MELANIE CALLED US "MA AND BA." WE WERE THEIR CLOSE FRIENDS, NOT DISTANT GRANDPARENTS.

HOW WOULD PAT LIKE TO BE REMEMBERED?
SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO IN THAT LITTLE HOUSE HERE IN

WHICH I WAS BORN IN 1913, I USED TO HEAR THE TRAIN WHISTLE IN THE NIGHT AND DREAM OF PLACES FAR AWAY I HOPED TO VISIT SOMEDAY.

I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FASCINATED BY TRAINS. 1952 WAS MY FAVORITE CAMPAIGN. IT WAS THE LAST WHISTLE-STOP CAMPAIGN. AS THE TRAIN PULLED INTO THE STATION, JACK DROWN WOULD PUT A RECORDING OF THE CAMPAIGN SONG ON THE PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM. SOME OF YOU MAY REMEMBER THE LYRICS — 'I LIKE THE SUNSHINE OF YOUR SMILE.'

I HOPE YOU WILL REMEMBER THIS DAY — THE SPECTACULAR BEAUTY OF THE FLOWERS, THE SUPERB MUSIC, THE ELOQUENCE OF THE EULOGIES.

BUT ABOVE ALL, WHEN YOU THINK OF PAT, I HOPE YOU WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER — THE SUNSHINE OF HER SMILE.

SHE WOULD LIKE THAT.

HAK:

John Taylor is hoping to find a time when
he can see you to discuss matters of the
Nixon Library. He says Nixon wants him to
call on you. I have explained the diffi-
culty of your fall schedule, but he says
any time before the end of the year will be
fine.

I'm afraid he won't go away!

Find a half-hour in December ______

Prefer __________

ssm

HK: I note Suzanne already raised w/
you a request from Taylor to get
together & you said you'd see him
either here or in LA.

Shall I draft a note to that
effect to RN?

Please ✓

Not necessary ____

jody