2120 WORDS

KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 3/19/02

The reappearance of an active American diplomacy in the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the parties' rage is in the process of being balanced by exhaustion; trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be in many respects incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo; of Palestinians for a process leading to the imposition on Israel of terms reducing Israel to the '67 borders and facilitating the eventual destruction of the Jewish state; of Europeans for an outcome very similar to the Arab plan, albeit guaranteed internationally, that would reconcile the Islamic world with the West; of America for a "compromise" reconciling the parties and ending tensions.

Many who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and who are quick to add obliviousness to their advice to the catalogue of America's derelictions) are joining the widespread chorus for the United States to play

2

a more active role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia offering normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. And Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, has been reshaped by his Arab hosts into an incentive for an American initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the past 30 years, American diplomacy has been the catalyst of practically all the progress that has been made. But it is all too easy in the explosive politics of the region to overestimate what is possible. In 2000 the impetuous attempt to settle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

3

A principal reason for the near unanimity urging an American role is the hope that, in the end, America will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical with the Abdullah plan.

A comparison of the positions of the parties demonstrates the impossibility of a negotiated final solution in present conditions. The only formal position adopted by an Israeli government regarding a final settlement was made by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, which offered over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) but retained about 70% of the settlements, for which the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state).

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat, preferred the Intifada.

The most forthcoming Arab position is Crown Prince Abdullah's.

According to its impressive outline, Israel is to return to the dividing lines in

4

Palestine of 1967 in return for the normalization of its relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply the abandonment by Israel of all its settlements and Arab control of the old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return - though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation.

Welcome as the Saudi offer of normalization is, the Abdullah plan, unless modified, represents a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The 1967 line - unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with Israel - was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or

5

chief of staff - and I have known them all - who considered the '67 borders
defensible, and especially so if coupled with an abandonment of a security
position along the Jordan river. And the position makes sense. The '67
borders leave a corridor only eight miles wide between Israel's major cities of
Haifa and Tel Aviv and put the border of Israel at the edge of Israel's
international airport. Moreover, Israel would have to give up settlements
containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost 5% of the Jewish population of
Israel). In return, it would achieve diplomatic relations with its neighbors. But
in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for
granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies the
legal non-existence of the other state, which, in Middle East conditions,
merges with the intent to destroy it. And once granted, recognition can
always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized
diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization recognize much else: the

6

peace agreement with Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in the way of
economic or cultural normalization other than an exchange of ambassadors
who are rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons, the Crown Prince's proposal is no breakthrough.
The call for America to impose it is not simply an issue of diplomatic
preference; it goes to the heart of Israel's ability to survive.

The precariousness of Israel's position is paradoxical. Israel has never
been more powerful and at the same time never more vulnerable. Israel is
militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to
inflict disproportionate losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has
evolved into a middle class advanced society and, as such, the strain of
guerrilla warfare is psychologically draining. As a result, the Intifada has
generated a strange ambivalence in Israeli society. On the one hand, prior to
the Oslo agreement the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with

7

the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would
be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable.
But since the Intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in
reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is a growing sense of despair over the
seeming futility of the enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli casualties to
that of the guerrillas going up, and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a
certain point will not be tolerated by the United States (witness the American
insistence on Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory prior to the Zinni
mission), a sense of resignation is spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on
their tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a quest for peace at any
price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic specter of guerrilla warfare as it has
come to be established for two generations now. The guerrillas not only do

8

not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it because a
violent, emotional - and to the bystanders - excessive retaliation serves their
purpose of triggering intervention by the international community. In the
process, sanctuaries are established - however dubious their basis in
international law - that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the
defending forces to get to the root of the guerrilla challenge. Tunisia played
that role during the Algerian war; Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam
war; the pattern is now recurring with respect to Zone A and the refugee
camps in the West Bank.

The chief difference is that France in Algeria and America in Vietnam
were fighting on distant territories; they had the ultimate - albeit painful -
option to withdraw. For Israel, survival is at stake, not colonies or geopolitical
interests.

9

Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of
emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into ambivalent rigidity.
The other day, I asked a high-ranking Israeli army officer what immediate
strategy he advocated for the current struggle. He replied, an all-out attack
on the Palestinian authority. When asked what ultimate outcome he
expected, he said the imposition of some version of the '67 borders.

This progressive demoralization will not be solved by the imposition of
the indefensible '67 borders. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know
- as the rest of the world should - that the real division among Palestinians is
not between those who want peace in the Western and Israeli eschatological
sense - as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a
consciousness of reconciliation (the number of Palestinian leaders holding
this view is minuscule); but between those who want to bring about the
destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle and those who

10

believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for a renewed struggle later on. They will be reinforced in this sense of futility by the democracies' response to the Intifada, directed more against the target, not the perpetrators, of terrorism.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be replaced by radical successors. A peace agreement will not quell [but] may stimulate the intransigence of Hammas and of radical states. If, as is said, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are more the adjective than the substance.

11

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of marginal utility in overcoming this problem. Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against the ambiguous challenges that are most likely. The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against invasion from neighboring states. Aside from raising profound domestic questions in the United States, this would bring with it an American veto of Israeli retaliation against less than all-out attack and be almost impossible to apply to the resumption of guerrilla warfare.

What, then, are the alternatives? The beginning of wisdom is to recognize the impossibility of a final settlement under current conditions. Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable goals that are also irresponsible will foster a general climate of irresponsibility.

12

A reason why a responsible mediation may have some prospects is that the status quo is becoming increasingly intolerable for all the parties. The Palestinians have fought with dedication and ferocity and produced the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare - that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able for domestic reasons to support an [attainable] overall settlement.

Two broad choices present themselves: to let the conflict in Palestine play itself out unless one or both of the parties are willing to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American role in pursuit of more limited objectives. The former course is difficult to sustain in the face of

13

pressures from allies and from friends in the Arab sphere. The course of an
interim agreement has so far lacked an operational definition. In the present
situation, the Palestinians will not stop because they believe they are
winning; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence,
especially if the outcome rewards terrorism. Only the United States has a
chance, however slight, to bridge that gap. It must urge Israel toward a
[secure?] peace program; it must insist with its Arab friends on the limits of
achievable concessions.

Israel cannot sustain its military actions internationally - or, in the long
run, even in America - without a peace program; the Palestinians cannot
achieve their maximum program except at the risk of destroying their own
society. A possible interim agreement would envisage establishing a secure
border, including the removal of outlying settlements, the creation of a
Palestinian state with contiguous territory and the elaboration of a code of

14

coexistence between the two states. Issues such as the holy places and refugees would be left to a later negotiation. The United States should play a major role in generating such an outcome provided it can achieve Arab agreement to the strategy implied. So long as the United States appears to be gradually veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it tempts continuation of the conflict. And such an outcome would also validate terrorism as a form of warfare.

If America is to contribute to genuine progress, it must help dispel the mirages of current diplomacy. It must back a program respectful of Arab dignity and concerns limited by Israeli necessities for survival. Drifting is no longer an option.

2120 WORDS

2

Many who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and
who are quick to add obliviousness to their advice to the catalogue
of America's derelictions) are joining the widespread chorus for
the United States to play a more active role. These pleas have been
given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia offering normalization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. And Vice

3

4

5

The most forthcoming Arab position is Crown Prince Abdullah's. According to its impressive outline, Israel is to return to the dividing lines in Palestine of 1967 in return for the normalization of its relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply the abandonment by Israel of all its settlements and Arab control of the old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by

6

7

that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never
encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff - and I have
known them all - who considered the '67 borders defensible, and
especially so if coupled with an abandonment of a security position
along the Jordan river. And the position makes sense. The '67
borders leave a corridor only eight miles wide between Israel's
major cities of Haifa and Tel Aviv and put the border of Israel at
the edge of Israel's international airport. Moreover, Israel would
have to give up settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost
5% of the Jewish population of Israel). In return, it would achieve

8

diplomatic relations with its neighbors. But in almost all other
negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted,
not treated as a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies the
legal non-existence of the other state, which, in Middle East
conditions, merges with the intent to destroy it. And once granted,
recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations
is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization
recognize much else: the peace agreement with Egypt of 20 years
ago has brought little in the way of economic or cultural

9

10

Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle class
advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the Intifada has generated a
strange ambivalence in Israeli society. On the one hand, prior to
the Oslo agreement the Israeli peace movement viewed
reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of
psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even
though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the
Intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in

11

12

Israel finds itself facing the classic specter of guerrilla
warfare as it has come to be established for two generations now.
The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an
egregious form of it because a violent, emotional - and to the
bystanders - excessive retaliation serves their purpose of triggering
intervention by the international community. In the process,
sanctuaries are established - however dubious their basis in
international law - that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the

13

14

15

- that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western and Israeli eschatological sense - as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation (the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule); but between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for a renewed struggle later on. They will be reinforced in this sense of futility by the democracies'

16

17

18

19

20

to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American
role in pursuit of more limited objectives. The former course is
difficult to sustain in the face of pressures from allies and from
friends in the Arab sphere. The course of an interim agreement has
so far lacked an operational definition. In the present situation, the
Palestinians will not stop because they believe they are winning;
the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence,
especially if the outcome rewards terrorism. Only the United States
has a chance, however slight, to bridge that gap. It must urge

21

Israel cannot sustain its military actions internationally - or,
in the long run, even in America - without a peace program; the
Palestinians cannot achieve their maximum program except at the
risk of destroying their own society. A possible interim agreement
would envisage establishing a secure border, including the removal
of outlying settlements, the creation of a Palestinian state with
contiguous territory and the elaboration of a code of coexistence
between the two states. Issues such as the holy places and refugees

22

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5617450358

NR. 6078

2

Many who generally deprecate America's foreign policy (and
who are quick to add obliviousness to their advice to the catalogue
of America's derelictions) are joining the widespread chorus for
the United States to play a more active role. These pleas have been
given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of
Saudi Arabia offering normalization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. And Vice
President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East has added to

MF19. MAR. 20021 14:27

GST REGIS GRAND +39 0647473078 NO. 5617450358

NR. 6078

5617450358

4

imposition on Israel as a settlement essentially identical with the Abdullah plan.

A comparison of the positions of the parties demonstrates that the goal of achieving their incompatibility, Israel asks for an end to the Latifada but the responsibility of a negated final solution is present herein. offers no program of what it is prepared to do in return. The only formal position adopted by an Israeli government regarding a final settlement was made by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, which offered over 90% of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) but retained about 70% of the settlements, for which the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into

M19. MAR. 2002N 14:273

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NR. 6078

P. 606

5617450358

Prince 5 Shemon discovered this proposal.

Israel proper (though free to do so to the Palestinian state) Yasir Arafat, insisting on the 1967 line, preferred to start the Intifada rather than accept this proposal.

fartlemy and in many ways most generous

The most authoritative Arab position is Crown Prince Abdullah's.

imperial

Abdullah's. According to its vague outline, Israel is to return to the dividing lines in Palestine of 1967 in return for normalization with

the normalization

of relations with the Arab states

the Arab world. Literally, this would imply the abandonment by

MA19. MAR. 2002 14:28

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NR. 6078 P. 737

issues as the right of refugees to return - certain to emerge in the -

be viewed in an actual negotiation.
course of an actual negotiation.

offer of normalization
Welcome as the Saudi Agreement is, the Abdullah
plan unless

Though the Abdullah plan has been warmly greeted, it is - in

modified requirements |
its present form - a restatement of a position that has produced the
existing deadlock. The 1967 line - unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or

Jordanian frontier[s] with Israel - was never an international
frontier but a ceasefire line at the end of the 1948 [war]. It was
never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and
has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet
recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an

MAR-18-02 MON 21:14

GOLDHAMMER

5617450358

FAX NO. 5617450358

coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the
~~Israel's~~ border with ~~Israel's~~ Jordan river. ~~To bring them about, Israel is to give up territories,~~
~~and leave a corner only slightly wide~~
~~or more~~
including settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (almost 5% of
the Jewish population of Israel), and control over its holy places. ~~In~~
~~it would seem~~
return for diplomatic relations. But in almost all other negotiations,
mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as
a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies refusal to recognize~~ the legal status~~
--legitimacy of the other state.
the legitimacy of the existence of the negotiating partner, which, in

NR. 6080 P. 8

ST REGIS GRAND +39 064747307

19. MAR. 2002 14:38

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8

Middle East conditions, moves toward the intent to destroy it. And even once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor is the normalizing recognition needed. The prospect of other than diplomatic relations bright: the peace

agreement with Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in the way of normalization other than an exchange of ambassadors who are rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons the Crown Prince, On the face of it, negotiations for a final peace on existing proposal is no breakthrough, terms are therefore certain to deadlock. The persistent call for them America wants it is not simply an issue is based either on illusions or the determination to have America as a party to a peace of diplomatic preference,

Mar. 19, 2002 14:28

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5617450358

9

impose it. This raises profound questions, not simply in terms of a
it has to be seen as Israel's ability to remain
long-standing American commitment not to go the route of

imposition but of the ability of Israel to survive such a process.

The precariousness of Israel's position is paradoxical. Israel
has never been stronger and at the same time never more
vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab
adversary; it is clearly able to suffer disproportionate losses on
Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle class
advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the second intifada has

MA19.MAR.2002 14:29

GIST REGIS GRAND +39 064747307X NO. 5617450358
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NR. 6078

P. 10

10

viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily as a problem in letters

and would be begun traded for peace even though

the Arab guest per guest would be inevitable!

of psychological reassurance, But since the Intifada, the vast

time, there is a growing sense of despair caused over the seeming

that of the guerrillas going up, and the fact that Israel's methods of responding will not be tolerated by the United States

beyond a certain point

MAR-18-02 MON 21:16

GOLDHAMMER

5617450358

FAX NO. 5617450358

11

(witness the American insistence on Israeli withdrawal from Palmdale)

Korailon prior to the Zanai moment, a sense of resignation is
spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on their tormentors is
beginning to get off by
coupled with the first signs of a quest for peace at any price - Israel
finds itself facing the classic specter of guerrilla warfare as it has
come to be established for two generations now. The guerrillas not
only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of
it because a violent, emotional - and to the bystanders - excessive
retaliation serves their purpose of triggering intervention by the
international community. In the process, sanctuaries are established

NR. 6080 P. 12

ST REGIS GRAND +39 064747307

19. MAR. 2002 14:39

A19, MAR. 2002 14:29

NR. 6078

P. 11

12

The chief difference is that France in Algeria and America in Vietnam were fighting on distant territories; they had the ultimate - albeit painful - option to withdraw. (Israel is on its home soil, at stake in its existence, not its possessions or geopolitical interests.)

MF19.MAR.2002I 14:29

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14

- that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western and Israeli eschatological sense - as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation (the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule); but between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for a renewed struggle later on. They will be reinforced in this sense of importance by their experience?

[with] the attitude of the democracies toward their reactions

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15

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be replaced by radical successors. If, as is said, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are more the adjective than the substance.

MA19, MAR. 2002 14:30

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P. 152

16

domestic questions in the United States, this would imply an
American veto of Israeli retaliation against less than all-out attack
and be almost impossible to apply to the resumption of guerrilla
warfare.

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P. 163

17

Stevens A reason for only a responsible
This is the case even though the status quo for all parties is
becoming increasingly intolerable. The Arab side has fought with
dedication and ferocity toward producing the classic paradigm of
asymmetrical warfare - that the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.

Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war
exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the society they are seeking to
establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the

MI 19. MAR. 2002 14:301

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5617450358

18

~~for domestically to support what overall settlement, is attainable~~

Two broad choices present themselves: to let the conflict in Palestine play itself out unless one or both of the parties are willing to adjust their position; the other is for a more active American role in pursuit of more limited objectives. The former course is difficult to sustain in the face of pressures from allies and from friends in the Arab sphere. The course of an interim agreement has so far lacked an operational definition. In the present situation, the

19 MAR. 2002 14:31

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NR. 6078

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P. 1806

19

Palestinians will not stop because they believe they ~~would~~ be able to remove any Israeli incentive to make concessions; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence, especially if the outcome ~~is to~~ reward terrorism. Only the United States has a chance, however slight, to bridge that gap. It must urge Israel to~~[sign]~~ toward a peace program; it must insist with its Arab friends [on] the limits of achievable concessions.

Israel cannot sustain its military actions internationally ~~in the long run~~ without a peace program; the Palestinians cannot achieve their maximum program except at the risk of destroying their own

TH 19. MAR. 2002 14:31

NR. 6078

P. 203

21

2050 WORDS

KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 3/18/02

The possible reappearance of an American mediator [in the Middle East] has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the parties' rage is being balanced by exhaustion; trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be in many respects incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is essentially the legitimization of the status quo; of the Palestinians it is the beginning of a process leading to the imposition on Israel of terms facilitating the eventual destruction of the Jewish state; of the Europeans for a guaranteed diplomatic solution that would