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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The primary purpose of this meeting, ladies and gentlemen, is to explain to you why the foreign policy of the United States has been so brilliantly conducted in recent months -- (Laughter) -- and how all alternatives have been considered, and the best possible course has been chosen. And that only people who really are not very well informed would presume to ask questions. (Laughter)

With this as a background, I suggest that I will speak for about ten minutes, and then the courageous ones among you can ask questions. (Laughter)

The reason I have been put last on this program is the conviction of my associates that the only way that I could work in this building is in my present position, since I am really not eligible for the Foreign Service. And so they wanted to make sure that all the inside information has been imparted to you before I do any damage here. (Laughter)

But let me make a few general observations and

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then rather than for me to go through the usual
repertory of items, you ask me some specific questions
about an area or a problem, and I will do my best to
answer it as candidly as I can.

The last time I spoke in this room, or in a
comparable room, I was going happily along when I suddenly
realized that the press was there, and I got great
credit for a carefully planned provocation of the Europeans.
There is no press here. And this is off the record.

Let me make a few general observations.

When President Nixon took over in 1969 he did so
at a period in which a fundamental change in American
policy was really imposed on us by events. It was not
that the previous policies had been wrong, but in many
respects that the success of the previous policies had
created conditions in which a new approach became
inevitable.

The basic structure of the foreign policy in the
period from the Marshall Plan onward was based on the
assumption of the monolithic communist bloc, of an
imminent military threat, of an American technological
superiority that would enable us to overcome any

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military threat by the superior mobilization of our
technology. It was based on the fact that the United
States was in a position of leadership within its alliances,
and that our allies were really conducting foreign policy
in the form of lobbying within the American decision-making
process about those events or those things that affected
their own future.

With respect to the under-developed world, we
saw that mostly as an economic problem, or largely as a
problem of development. And many of the issues that we
now see, for example, in the oil crisis, were totally
inconceivable in the fifties and I daresay even in the
sixties.

Indeed, there was an approach to foreign policy
in which much of what we did was considered the outward
projection of the New Deal, and to do in the world what
had been domestically in the United States in the
thirties and forties -- a form of social engineering
around the globe.

Now, all of these conditions had fundamentally
changed by the time the Nixon administration came into
office. And the policy that he carried out and that
in its fundamentals is being continued by President Ford

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had to take account of this change.

For example, far from being monolithic, the
Communist world appeared more and more as one that
contained within it perhaps the most severe, in many
ways the most irremediable split in the world today.
The confrontation or the conflict between the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China was one of the
fundamental realities of the world of the late 1960s
and the one to which enormous attention had to be paid
and which could be used to serve American purposes, and
that was done.

Secondly, the whole military situation had
importantly altered. In the forties and fifties, and
even in the early part of the sixties, even most of the
sixties, the United States could count on an overwhelming
nuclear superiority. And we could assume that we could
substitute our overwhelming strategic power for any
challenges in the local areas of the world.

It is a root fact of the contemporary period
that whoever may be ahead in numbers here and there,
nuclear strategic power becomes more and more difficult
to relate to political objectives. This is a fact
that is hard to accept, but that is absolutely central.

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There is a lot of talk, which quite frankly I
consider seriously irresponsible, that alleges we are
falling behind, or at some point the Soviet Union will
gain an overwhelming superiority. I consider it irresponsible
because, first, by every index of reasonable power, we
are ahead. And with any reasonable effort, we can stay
ahead. The problem is not staying ahead. The problem is
whether it means anything.

In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis,
the Soviet Union had 80 intercontinental missiles, and
the United States had something like 1200 to 1500 that it
could use against the Soviet Union. And yet if you read
the deliberations of the decision-makers at the time, it
is obvious that they considered even ten nuclear weapons
falling on the United States as an almost intolerable burden
on the social fabric of this country. And I don't say
this as a criticism -- because ten weapons on our large
cities would kill thirty million Americans. Under no
conceivable hypothesis, with no margin of superiority
that we can even dream of, will it be possible to
reduce a Soviet counter-blow on the United States today
to ten weapons, or even to two hundred weapons. So we are

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both sides not only want to be equal, they want to be perceived
to be equal, and you get many discussions of what happens when
one side is slightly behind, or even somewhat behind, and you
ask what are you going to do with these weapons? The answer
then is diplomatic.

I would have to say that if each side keeps multiplying
its weapon systems the consequences which I have foretold are
very probably, that each side will have to justify its military
outlays by the perception that the other side is trying to
threaten its national survival with its arms programs. That
in turn makes cooperative projects appear to be absurd and
the argument is inevitable that there is no sense having
economic relations with a country that at the same time is
building military capabilities whose only purpose can be to
threaten your national survival.

Therefore, I believe that the answer to your question is
best brought about through negotiated agreements in which both
sides put first a ceiling on their forces, then agree on
reductions so that the perceptions work in favor of the arms
limitations.

The difficulty with unilateral limitations is that they
then deprive the other side of any incentive to agree to these
negotiated restraints. But in general we ought to look at
our strategic programs with great thoughtfulness, both in terms
of their impact on the overall environment and in terms of

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whether they are the best military use of a limited defense budget.

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Senator Muskie. I would like to ask one other question.

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The Chairman. Your time is up.

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The senator from New York.

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Senator Javits. I apologize for being late, but I have a slight distraction in New York these days that required my presence there this morning.

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Mr. Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you.

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I have thumbed through your statement. I did not hear your testimony, hence if any question that I ask is duplicative or represents something in which you may have changed a meaning by your oral testimony, please help me by correcting me.

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Mr. Secretary, I notice in a very quick review--very understandable omission here -- it does not seem to deal very much with Europe. For example, I notice a reference on page 13 to the fact that President Ford as assigned the highest priority to maintaining the vitality of our partnerships in Europe, Asia and Latin America, and then as I went through it I hardly saw anything about Western Europe, which you and the President have characterized as our primary allies.

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Now, I am sure that does not represent any change in our policy and I ask the question so that you may highlight for us where you see Western Europe fitting into the broad effort

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to arrive at what is called detente with the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger. Well, actually, Senator Javits, in order to prevent some of our European friends from feeling neglected, again we have dealt with Europe later in the statement on pages 41 and 42, in which the point is made that we consider the relationship between Europe and the United States an absolutely essential ingredient to detente and that moreover, we think that in the relationship between Europe and the United States there should develop a commitment that prevents East-West religions from appearing to the public on all sides as the dramatic element of foreign policy, rather that the relationships in the Atlantic and for that matter with Japan as well should have the constructive -- should be perceived to be, and in fact be creative and adequate to the future.

So we consider our relationship with Europe absolutely central. We will give it a great deal of attention and we will also remember what happened when we were too importuned,

Senator Javits. The other line of questioning I would like to engage in with you is the matter of the so-called Jackson amendment.

Now I notice to me rather an interesting statement on page 22 in which you say "This sudden expo facto form of linkage raises serious questions, and that worries me because it sort of goes back to what we call Square 1.

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Is it not a fact that you are well on the way to a resolution of the Jackson amendment?

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct.

The first part of the statement, Senator Javits, deals with the history of the relationship. Then the second part of the statement deals with where we are going from here.

As I have testified before the committee, I believe we are within sight of settlement of this issue and, in fact, in the statement on page 44 I indicate this.

I hope that within the very near future we can come to a conclusion on this. I agree with you that we are very close.

Senator Javits. I call that to your attention because one would not wish a signal to go up that there is some change of course on the Jackson amendment, because I could take very grave issue with you, which I do not think would be productive in terms of what we are heading toward, upon some of the conclusions which are stated here.

For example, you say "I recognize the detrimental validity of the moral concerns expressed by those who oppose or put conditions on expanded trade with the USSR, but a sense of proportion must be maintained about the leverage our economic relations give us with the USSR."

It is just as broad as it is long, is it not, Mr. Secretary, if our economic relations do not give us much leverage in detente and they may not be worth kicking out the window

532

-- we cannot have it both ways.

Secretary Kissinger. Well, the argument for beginning
these economic relations is to establish a set of commitments
on both sides which will create vested interests in a restrained
international behavior.

The issue of the most favored nations treatment of the
Soviet Union I think by general agreement will not lead to
a very substantial expansion of trade, most people estimate
that will not exceed 15 percent. However, it is of political
significance in the sense that it is an element of discrimi-
nation and, therefore, has a political and symbolic signifi-
cance transcending its intrinsic importance.

Senator Javits. So that if it got an MFN, the important
thing to the Soviet Union is a certain sense of respectability,
equality with a hundred other nations?

Secretary Kissinger. That is right.

Senator Javits. So have we not a right to equate respectability with morality in terms of what they are doing to a lot of their people in the Soviet Union? They do not hesitate to kick us around and have not for 50 years about how we treat the blacks in the United States, or Japanese or other ethnic groups.

Secretary Kissinger. Senator Javits, as you know, the
intent of this Administration has been to promote some of the
objectives which concern you.

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After all, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union went from 400 in 1969 to well over 20,000 in 1972 before this debate ever started. So it cannot be said that we were in-different to the issue.

Senator Javits. But is it not true that since the Soviets have turned the petcock the other way, as it easily can, it is now down to between 12 and 15,000 from 35 in the preceding year --

Secretary Kissinger. That is correct, and then one would have to debate what the causes of that turndown are.

I personally believe, Senator, that given the fact that we are fairly close to an agreement, that it would probably produce more acrimony if we debate the responsibility for the turndown from 35,000 which existed and which was guaranteed to a lower figure and the attempts that are now being made to increase it.

Senator Javits. Well, I agree with the Secretary, and that is why I was rather taken aback by the strength of the point, I will not even call it an attack, for the reasons the Secretary has explained on page 22. But I am perfectly satisfied, but I did not the record to show that this is not as one-sided a case as it looked from the earlier part of your statement by a long sight.

Secretary Kissinger. If I could call attention of the senator to a statement on page 44 which states that I believe

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that both the Executive and the Congress, each playing its
proper role, has been effective with respect to the emigration
issue, and I might also point out that the original date for
these hearings was August 8.

Senator Javits. Also, Mr. Secretary, I would like to
note that we will depend very heavily upon the Secretary and
the President in respect of whatever is agreed to, and there-
fore, I have no desire to break down the relat ionship but
I was disturbed a bit by the statement which I note.

Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Senator Humphrey?

Senator Humphrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you have been here a long time and you
are supposed to appear before our party caucus very shortly,
so I will try to get right at what I have.

Secretary Kissinger. Your party.

(Laughter.)

Senator Humphrey. Of our party. We welcome you. You
might find yourselves in more happy circumstances there than
where you have been.

The former Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, in testifying
here, as noted by our Chairman in his opening statement,
indicated that, I quote him, "Detente is not a condition in
which all problems are solved, but a process by which points
in dispute are resolved and potential crises are anticipated

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and avoided.

I think that is a very pertinent and constructive definition of what we mean by detente. I think it is important to emphasize it because what I sense here is that we expect, just by merely saying that we are pursuing detente, that all at once everything falls in place, that this expectation is greater than what the long period of difficulties in the cold war and before that might have brought about.

But, having said that, there are some things that you would like to see carried out.

For example, I will take a few that are very minor but I think they are indicative of the problems that you face and that we face.

I have a story here of September 6 that says U. S. experts drop Soviet grain survey.

Now there surely is not anything of great political dynamite in a team of agricultural experts looking into the grain production of the Soviet Union. In light of our experience with the Soviet Union, and in light of the fact that they could step into the American market tomorrow morning and buy up 500 million bushels of wheat before we even batted an eye, this country would be in an economic tailspin.

Now that, by the way, still is not understood by the American public, but it is a fact of law and it could happen.

Why is not the Soviet Union following its agreement with

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us that was signed over here on the agricultural information,
statistical information, crop reporting? This is a vitally
important day, Mr. Secretary, because the time bomb on
President Ford's desk is not some of the things that were
asked in the last press conference, one question on the
economy out of 22; the time bomb is inflation.

The biggest item of inflation that is today beyond the
comprehension of the American people is food. We are going to
keep at this in every hearing. I have been dead right for
two years. We are going to get somebody around this town
interested in it before it is too late.

Why is not the Soviet Union willing to open up?

Secretary Kissinger. First, Senator, you have me interested in the problem. It is a new subject for me so it has taken me some time to learn.

As you saw in the President's speech yesterday, and as
you will see I hope to your satisfaction at the World Food
Conference which we have supported, we will put before the
World Community our conception of what is, I agree with you,
one of the fundamental problems that the world faces today.

In this respect, we believe that cooperation by the Soviet
Union is extremely important when you talk about reserves,
when you talk about needs of the least developed, and we will
make our view with respect to that very clear before the
Conference and at the Conference.

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I hope in fact to have the benefit of some discussions with you before we all go to this in Geneva in our relations with the Soviet Union. I do not want to be here for apologies for every Soviet action. We are dealing with a system that has a long history of keeping its information very secret.

It considers, wrongly in my view, reports about its agricultural conditions affecting its national security and we, therefore, have had great difficulty, first, getting agreement to exchange crop reports at all, and then getting this; then we ran into this particular difficulty. It was caused in part by the fact that our group came really at the time earlier than the Soviets wanted them and probably wanted to see some things that would have shown certain weaknesses in the agricultural production this year, particularly in the Virgin Islands, which they wanted to visit.

This does not excuse the action. We thought it was unfortunate and we would expect that as detente develops that such things as exchanges of information about crops would not be considered an aspect of foreign policy but an aspect of how to deal with a world problem on a common basis. We have not yet reached that point.

Senator Humphrey. I thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I do not want to sound like an old saw in this business, but I know that the newsmen that are here are much more interested in the number of nuclear weapons, but they are apt

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not to be used, we hope, but I can tell you the Soviets are
the largest wheat-producing country in the world. If we do
not know what their crop statistics are and we permit our
markets to be free and open, this country stands the chance
of being in an economic catastrophe and I just have to bear
down.

As a public servant, I have spent 20 years of my life
in this field, and I can tell you information that we are
not getting is of critical importance because we have no way
of judging what we can afford to ship abroad until we know
what the crop conditions are in at least the Soviet Union
and possibly in the PRC, but more so the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kissinger. I agree with you that a common
world food policy is one of the imperatives before the world
today, and we are working very hard to develop an adequate
American response and, as you know, this is a subject which
is new to us also as a country, but I agree that the Soviet
Union must be in one way or another related to this or it
becomes very difficult to implement.

Senator Humphrey. Mr. Secretary, again looking at the
process of pursuing, which I fully support, the process of
detente, the East Germans slowed down traffic some time ago,
as you may recall, in West Germany, between East and West
Berlin. Our government I understand withheld diplomatic
recognition for a while. Were the Soviets of any help at

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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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all in reconciling those differences that seemed to crop up
there?

Secretary Kissinger. Well, I think that the harassment
on access routes, which was actually very minor but to which
we strongly objected because we resisted the principle, was
triggered in part by the establishment of the Environmental
Office in West Berlin. Now it is our view, we support the
position of the Federal Republic that it has the right to
establish such offices. I cannot honestly say the Soviet
Union was of much help.

It is hard to judge what the role of the Soviet Union
in this was. It never escalated to the point of acute crisis
in which one was able to judge exactly what the role of the
Soviet Union was.

Senator Humphrey. There is a feeling, and I share it,
I am not sure I fully support it, in reference to the Ex-Im
Bank loans to the Soviet Union. Here is the scenario. The
Soviet Union can borrow from us and also from our private
banks, at rates that are substantially less than what domestic
borrowers can get, but this permits the Soviets to divert
capital that they could use in their own domestic economy to
their military, and that in turn, of course, permits those
who want to see our military expand to say we have to catch
up with the Soviets, so that we in turn then have to plow in,
or ask the Congress to plow in more money into the Pentagon

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appropriations and expenditures.

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It is a complex way of saying we are financing their
military expansion and ours.

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There may be some merit to this, and I have been concerned about it.

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Secretary Kissinger. Well --

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Senator Humphrey. What is your observation?

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Secretary Kissinger. Well, in an economy of the complexity and the size of the Soviet Union it would be wrong to say that resources that are freed by one activity cannot be used for another activity.

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On the other hand, my impression is that the Soviets, if you look at Soviet history, even when there was no trade at all, the Soviet military budget was at very substantial levels and they seemed to determine what they think they need and set that aside for military purposes, and then devote the remainder to the civilian economy. So probably the primary impact of the credit we give is to ease the life of the Soviet citizens which may or may not have an impact on the political situation.

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So I would not on the whole believe that there are major diversions for military programs that would not be undertaken except for the American assistance.

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At the same time I must say that it will be very difficult for us to give substantial credits to the Soviet Union

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under conditions of unrestrained arms race because, whether or not there are diversions, iutis not easy to explain why they could not divert the other way, if they want to help their civilian population, why they should not cut their military programs, and this is why I believe that for us to be able to exercise both the restraining influence on political tensions and achieve the beneficial effects of trade, a ceiling and then a turndown of the arms race is absolutely essential.

Senator Humphrey. Well, I would have others, but you have to go and I want to say to you, Mr. Secretary, it is no easy task to balance off all of these conflicting interests of senators and nations.

Senator Javits. May I make a request?

The request I was going to make is this: I had in mind questioning the Secretary about the relation of Russian shipments and armaments into the Middle East and the seeming intractibility of the OPEC nations. That is a very sensitive subject.

May I ask, Mr. Chairman, through the Chair, whether the Secretary might not feel disposed to give us an executive session on that?

Secretary Kissinger. I would be glad to. I would like to discuss this whole subject.

Senator Humphrey. I want to join on that. I had that

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question but I felt it would take more time than we had today
and I believe it is terribly important.

Secretary Kissinger. Maybe next week, if that suits the
Chairman.

Senator Javits. I hope nothing I have said, Mr. Secretary, makes the Secretary feel that we have any deep differences about the Jackson amendment, I hope.

Secretary Kissinger. No.

Senator Javits. It is going to go the proper way.

Secretary Kissinger. Quite candidly, part of this was
written at a time when progress was less noticeable.

The Chairman. I do not know if it is proper. I wanted to
ask one question in this connection because it has already
been mentioned, the accelerating arms race on both sides, and
there seems to be no progress in diplomatic areas.

Why has this program stopped since the disengagement
agreement? There is a feeling that the momentum which you so
ably created has stopped.

Secretary Kissinger. In the Middle East.

The Chairman. Can you give us any assessment of this?

Secretary Kissinger. No. I think, Mr. Chairman, that it
was always expected that after the Syrian disengagement,
particularly in light of the fact that a new government was
taking over in Israel, that there would be some interval to
permit the disengagement to be carried out to permit active

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consultations to take place, and basically we are about on
the schedule that had always been expected.

In the process, the tensions in the press at least be-
tween Syria and Israel have caught public attention. On the
other hand, I must say when the various Arab leaders were
here their expressions were rather moderate and we had talks,
which we considered constructive, in the direction of negoti-
ations, with the Israeli Minister when he was here.

As you know, I am planning to take a quick trip to the
Middle East in October and we do not feel that a stalemate
exists or that the momentum has been lost. We are now shift-
ing from a phase of disengagement to a phase where we are
beginning to construct the peace settlement. What happens
now is less under the impact of military operations and more
geared to achieving the permanent solutions that must be our
ultimate aim. So we had to have rather extensive consultations
which so far seem to us to be on course.

After this trip to the Middle East, we will be in better
position to judge what the realistic prospects may be, but
right now we do not feel a stalemate exists.

The Chairman. You do not think there are any obstacles
to proceeding to the negotiation of further agreements?

Secretary Kissinger. No.

The Chairman. At the present time?

Secretary Kissinger. No, sir.

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The Chairman. Is there anything that the Congress can
do or is not doing or is doing that would in any way con-
tribute to that?

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Secretary Kissinger. Well, we have the sense, which I
think is correct, that the Congress is in general support of
the effort to foster these negotiations and recognizes the
difficulties that exist on all sides, and to the extent the
Congress let's this be known, it is helpful, but I believe
that a wide consensus exists on that.

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The Chairman. Is it still our policy to try to bring
about a diplomatic settlement there on the basis of the reso-
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Secretary Kissinger. We support the implementation of
Resolution 242 and 339.

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The Chairman. That is generally understood by all parties?

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Secretary Kissinger. I think it is understood by all
parties and I think all parties also understand that this has
to proceed step-by-step, and this was in fact the purpose of
the consultations in August, to make sure that all parties
understood the general approach that would be used.

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The Chairman. Is it not probable that if this settle-
ment can be made that the lowering of the price that has
been negotiated, especially with Saudi Arabia, have they not
indicated that that would be their policy?

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Secretary Kissinger. Certainly the opposite is likely,

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that if there is another flare-up in the Middle East, that the
impact of this on prices or even more on supplies could be
very serious.

The Chairman. But you do not think --

Secretary Kissinger. Well --

The Chairman. It will be the other way?

Secretary Kissinger. No, it is also true that as we
are making progress towards peace, the attitude of at least
some of the oil producers has become more moderate. If you
compare the position of Saudi Arabia last year at this time
with the position they took at the recent OPEC meeting, one
has to say that there is a correlation between the political
conditions in the Middle East and the attitude of some of the
big oil supplies toward the whole question.

The Chairman. That was my understanding, if it could
be brought about there was at least an opportunity for negoti-
ating more reasonable prices, and particularly with regard
to the Saudis, because they being the largest producer and
traditionally the most favorable to the Americans; is that not
true?

Secretary Kissinger. Certainly, Saudi Arabia has a pre-
disposition to be favorable to the United States. I think, as
I pointed out, as we make progress toward peace the economic
issues become easier to deal with too.

I do not think it has to wait for the final accomplishment

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1 or peace.

2 The Chairman. No, but with assurance that it can be
3 done, that is what is so important about the momentum being
4 maintained.

5 So you feel fairly confident that when you go out you
can at least give us some further evidence it has resumed?

7 Secretary Kissinger. Well, the difficulty in the Middle
8 East is that in almost any other negotiations, as you begin
to make progress it gets easier. In the Middle East, as you
9 begin to make progress it gets more difficult.

11 The Chairman. Why is that?

12 Secretary Kissinger. Well, that is because you approach
13 more and more complicated issues in which the feelings of
14 both sides run deeper and deeper.

15 Nevertheless, to answer your basic question, I am hopeful
16 that we can make progress. It will be complicated but I have
17 now talked to all of the parties. I believe that progress
18 can be made and I think that after I have been in the Middle
19 East we can form a --

20 The Chairman. One last question.

21 There was a column in yesterday's paper that I personally
22 do not know about, but I think it is misleading, that the
23 request for $4 billion in one year was made recently by
24 the Prime Minister of Israel. Is that correct or incorrect?

25 Secretary Kissinger. I see these speculations and

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sometimes they confuse estimates of national budgets with
what is going to be asked of the United States. The fact
of the matter is that any substantial request would obviously
have to be submitted to Congress, and we are not going to
submit any such request to this session of Congress. And
we will have to look at this whole problem again in the light
of conditions that may exist in the new Congress, but this
sum was based on a confusion.

The Chairman. Well, that is what I thought it was.
That was in the Evans column yesterday.

Secretary Kissinger. I am afraid to read his column
these days.

(Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee adjourned,
subject to call.)

NEWS
RELEASE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Department of State
Office of Media Services

Speech Text:
MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM
TOWARD PEACE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 23, 1974

Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Before the 29th Session of the U.N. General
Assembly, New York, N.Y., September 23, 1974.

Mr. President [Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs],
Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Last year, in my first address as Secretary of State, I spoke to this Assembly about American purposes. I said that the United States seeks a comprehensive, institutionalized peace, not an armistice. I asked other nations to join us in moving the world from detente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.

In the year that has passed some progress has been made in dealing with particular crises. But many fundamental issues persist and new issues threaten the very structure of world stability.

Our deepest problem -- going far beyond the items on our agenda -- is whether our vision can keep pace with our challenges. Will history recall the 20th century as a time of mounting global conflict or as the beginning of a global conception? Will our age of interdependence spur joint progress or common disaster?

The answer is not yet clear. New realities have not yet overcome old patterns of thought and action. Traditional concepts -- of national sovereignty, social struggle, and the relation between the old and the new nations -- too often guide our course. And so we have managed but not advanced; we have endured but not prospered; and we have continued the luxury of political contention.

This condition has been dramatized in the brief period since last fall's regular session. War has ravaged the Middle East and Cyprus. The technology of nuclear explosives has resumed its dangerous spread. Inflation and the threat of global decline hang over the economies of rich and poor alike.

We cannot permit this trend to continue. Conflict between nations once devastated continents; the struggle between blocs may destroy humanity. Ideologies and doctrines drawn from the last century do not even address, let alone solve, the unprecedented problems of today. As a result, events challenge habits; a gulf grows between rhetoric and reality.

The world has dealt with local conflicts as if they were perpetually manageable. We have permitted too many of the underlying causes to fester unattended, until the parties believed that their only recourse was war. And because each crisis ultimately has been contained we have remained complacent. But tolerance of local conflict tempts world holocaust. We have no guarantee that some local crisis -- perhaps the next -- will not explode beyond control.

The world has dealt with nuclear weapons as if restraint were automatic. Their very awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have helped to keep constant for a decade the number of states who possess them. Now -- as was quite foreseeable -- political inhibitions are in danger of crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible -- whether through design or miscalculation; accident, theft, or blackmail.

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The world has dealt with the economy as if its constant advance were inexorable. While postwar growth has been uneven and some parts of the world have lagged, our attention was focused on how to increase participation in a general advance. We continue to deal with economic issues on a national, regional, or bloc basis at the precise moment that our interdependence is multiplying. Strains on the fabric and institutions of the world economy threaten to engulf us all in a general depression.

The delicate structure of international cooperation, so laboriously constructed over the last quarter century, can hardly survive -- and certainly cannot be strengthened -- if it is continually subjected to the shocks of political conflict, war, and economic crisis.

The time has come, then, for the nations assembled here to act together on the recognition that continued reliance on old slogans and traditional rivalries will lead us toward:

- A world ever more torn between rich and poor, East and West, producer and consumer;

- A world where local crises threaten global confrontation and where the spreading atom threatens global peril;

- A world of rising costs and dwindling supplies, of growing populations and declining production.

## Building a More Cooperative World

There is another course. Last week before this Assembly President Ford dedicated our country to a cooperative, open approach to build a more secure and more prosperous world. The United States will assume the obligations that our values and strength impose upon us.

But the building of a cooperative world is beyond the grasp of any one nation. An interdependent world requires not merely the resources but the vision and creativity of us all. Nations cannot simultaneously confront and cooperate with one another.

We must recognize that the common interest is the only valid test of the national interest.

It is in the common interest, and thus in the interest of each nation:

- That local conflicts be resolved short of force and their root causes removed by political means;

- That the spread of nuclear technology be achieved without the spread of nuclear weapons;

- That growing economic interdependence lift all nations and not drag them down together.

We will not solve these problems during this session, or any one session, of the General Assembly.

But we must at least begin:

- To remedy problems, not just manage them;

- To shape events, rather than endure them;

- To confront our challenges instead of one another.

## THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

The urgent political responsibility of our era is to resolve conflicts without war. History is replete with examples of the tragedy that sweeps nations when

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ancient enmities and the inertia of habit freeze the scope for decision. Equally, history is marked by brief moments when an old order is giving way to a pattern new and unforeseen; these are times of potential disorder and danger but also of opportunity for fresh creation.

We face such a moment today. Together let us face its realities:

**First**, a certain momentum toward peace has been created -- in East-West relations and in certain regional conflicts. It must be maintained. But we are only at the beginning of the process. If we do not continue to advance, we will slip back.

**Second**, progress in negotiation of difficult issues comes only through patience, perseverance, and recognition of the tolerable limits of the other side. Peace is a process, not a condition. It can only be reached in steps.

**Third**, failure to recognize and grasp the attainable will prevent the achievement of the ideal. Attempts to resolve all issues at one time are a certain prescription for stagnation. Progress toward peace can be thwarted by asking too much as surely as by asking too little.

**Fourth**, the world community can help resolve chronic conflicts, but exaggerated expectations will prevent essential accommodation among the parties. This Assembly can help or hinder the negotiating process. It can seek a scapegoat or a solution. It can offer the parties an excuse to escape reality or sturdy support in search of a compromise. It can decide on propaganda or contribute to realistic approaches that are responsive to man's yearning for peace.

## Middle East

The Middle East starkly demonstrates these considerations. In the past year we have witnessed both the fourth Arab-Israeli war in a generation and the hopeful beginnings of a political process toward a lasting and just peace.

We have achieved the respite of a cease-fire and of two disengagement agreements, but the shadow of war remains. The legacy of hatred and suffering, the sense of irreconcilability, have begun to yield -- however haltingly -- to the process of negotiation. But we still have a long road ahead.

One side seeks the recovery of territory and justice for a displaced people. The other side seeks security and recognition by its neighbors of its legitimacy as a nation. In the end, the common goal of peace surely is broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

Let us be realistic about what must be done. The art of negotiation is to set goals that can be achieved at a given time and to reach them with determination. Each step forward modifies old perceptions and brings about a new situation that improves the chances of a comprehensive settlement.

Because these principles were followed in the Middle East, agreements have been reached in the past year which many thought impossible. They were achieved, above all, because of the wisdom of the leaders of the Middle East who decided that there had been enough stalemate and war; that more might be gained by testing each other in negotiation than by testing each other on the battlefield.

The members of this body, both collectively and individually, have a solemn responsibility to encourage and support the parties in the Middle East on their present course. We have as well an obligation to give our support to the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and elsewhere. The United States applauds their indispensable role, as well as the outstanding contribution of Secretary General Waldheim in the cause of peace.

During the past year my country has made a major effort to promote peace in the Middle East. President Ford has asked me to reaffirm today that we are determined to press forward with these efforts. We will work closely with the parties and we will cooperate with all interested countries within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

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## Cyprus

The tormented island of Cyprus is another area where peace requires a spirit of compromise, accommodation, and justice. The United States is convinced that the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be maintained. It will be up to the parties to decide on the form of government they believe best suited to the particular conditions of Cyprus. They must reach accommodation on the areas to be administered by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as on the conditions under which refugees can return to their homes and reside in safety. Finally, no lasting peace is possible unless provisions are agreed upon which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of armed forces and armaments and other war materiel.

The United States is prepared to play an even more active role than in the past in helping the parties find a solution to the centuries-old problem of Cyprus. We will do all we can, but it is those most directly concerned whose effort is most crucial. Third parties should not be asked to produce miraculous outcomes not anchored in reality. Third parties can encourage those directly involved to perceive their broader interests; they can assist in the search for elements of agreement by interpreting each side's views and motives to the other. But no mediator can succeed unless the parties genuinely want mediation and are ready to make the difficult decisions needed for a settlement.

The United States is already making a major contribution to help relieve the human suffering of the people of Cyprus. We urge the international community to continue and, if possible, to increase its own humanitarian relief effort.

## Africa

The United States notes with particular satisfaction the continuing process of change in Africa. We welcome the positive demonstration of cooperation between the old rulers and the new free. The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity.

### THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION

The second new dimension on our agenda concerns the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today, technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.

In a world where many nations possess nuclear weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability among a large number of nuclear powers. Local wars would take on a new dimension. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into regions where political conflict remains intense and the parties consider their vital interests overwhelmingly involved. There would, as well, be a vastly heightened risk of direct involvement of the major nuclear powers.

This problem does not concern one country, one region, or one bloc alone. No nation can be indifferent to the spread of nuclear technology; every nation's security is directly affected.

The challenge before the world is to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them.

### The Need for Restraint

As a major nuclear power, the United States recognizes its special responsibility. We realize that we cannot expect others to show restraint if we do not ourselves.

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practice restraint. Together with the Soviet Union we are seeking to negotiate new quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. Last week our delegations reconvened in Geneva, and we intend to pursue these negotiations with the seriousness of purpose they deserve. The United States has no higher priority than controlling and reducing the levels of nuclear arms.

Beyond the relations of the nuclear powers to each other lies the need to curb the spread of nuclear explosives. We must take into account that plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear explosives and that in the immediate future the amount of plutonium generated by peaceful nuclear reactors will be multiplied many times. Heretofore, the United States and a number of other countries have widely supplied nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials in order to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This policy cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives. Sales of these materials can no longer be treated by anyone as a purely commercial competitive enterprise.

The world community, therefore, must work urgently toward a system of effective international safeguards against the diversion of plutonium or its byproducts. The United States is prepared to join with others in a comprehensive effort.

## Program for Nuclear Safeguards

Let us together agree on the practical steps which must be taken to assure the benefits of nuclear energy free of its terrors:

- The United States will shortly offer specific proposals to strengthen safeguards to the other principal supplier countries.

- We shall intensify our efforts to gain the broadest possible acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards, to establish practical controls on the transfer of nuclear materials, and to ensure the effectiveness of these procedures.

- The United States will urge the IAEA to draft an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material. Such a convention should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer.

- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which this Assembly has endorsed, warrants continuing support. The treaty contains not only a broad commitment to limit the spread of nuclear explosives, but specific obligations to accept and implement IAEA safeguards and to control the transfer of nuclear materials.

Mr. President, whatever advantages seem to accrue from the acquisition of nuclear explosive technology will prove to be ephemeral. When Pandora's box has been opened no country will be the beneficiary and all mankind will have lost. This is not inevitable. If we act decisively now, we can still control the future.

## THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION

Lord Keynes wrote, "the power to become habituated to his surroundings is a marked characteristic of mankind. Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization."

The economic history of the postwar period has been one of sustained growth -- for developing as well as developed nations. The universal expectation of our peoples, the foundation of our political institutions, and the assumption underlying the evolving structure of peace are all based on the belief that this growth will continue.

But will it? The increasingly open and cooperative global economic system that we have come to take for granted is now under unprecedented attack. The world is poised on the brink of a return to the unrestrained economic nationalism which accompanied the collapse of economic order in the thirties. And should that occur, all would suffer -- poor as well as rich, producer as well as consumer.

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So let us no longer fear to confront in public the facts which have come to
dominate our private discussions and concerns.

## Economic Crisis Threatens

The early warning signs of a major economic crisis are evident. Rates of inflation unprecedented in the past quarter century are sweeping developing and developed nations alike. The world's financial institutions are staggering under the most massive and rapid movements of reserves in history. And profound questions have arisen about meeting man's most fundamental needs for energy and food.

While the present situation threatens every individual and nation, it is the poor who suffer the most. While the wealthier adjust their living standards, the poor see the hopes of a lifetime collapse around them. While others tighten their belts, the poor starve. While others can hope for a better future, the poor see only despair ahead.

It can be in the interest of no country or group of countries to base policies on a test of strength, for a policy of confrontation would end in disaster for all. Meeting man's basic needs for energy and food and assuring economic growth, while mastering inflation, require international cooperation to an unprecedented degree.

## The Energy Problem

Let us apply these principles first to the energy situation.

-- Oil producers seek a better life for their peoples and a just return for their diminishing resources.

-- The developing nations less well-endowed by nature face the disintegration of the results of decades of striving for development as the result of a price policy over which they have no control.

-- The developed nations find the industrial civilization built over centuries in jeopardy.

Both producers and consumers have legitimate claims. The problem is to reconcile them for the common good.

The United States is working closely with several oil producers to help diversify their economies. We have established commissions to facilitate the transfer of technology and to assist with industrialization. We are prepared to accept substantial investments in the United States and we welcome a greater role for the oil producers in the management of international economic institutions.

The investment of surplus oil revenues presents a great challenge. The countries which most need these revenues are generally the least likely to receive them. The world's financial institutions have coped thus far, but ways must be found to assure assistance for those countries most in need of it. And the full brunt of the surplus revenues is yet to come.

Despite our best efforts to meet the oil producers' legitimate needs and to channel their resources into constructive uses, the world cannot sustain even the present level of prices, much less continuing increases. The prices of other commodities will inevitably rise in a never-ending inflationary spiral. Nobody will benefit. The oil producers will be forced to spend more for their own imports. Many nations will not be able to withstand the pace and the poorer could be overwhelmed. The complex, fragile structure of global economic cooperation required to sustain national economic growth stands in danger of being shattered.

The United States will work with other consuming nations on means of conservation and on ways to cushion the impact of massive investments from abroad. The preliminary agreement on a program of solidarity and cooperation signed a few days ago in Brussels by the major consumer countries is an encouraging first step.

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But the long-range solution requires a new understanding between consumers and producers. Unlike food prices, the high cost of oil is not the result of economic factors, of an actual shortage of capacity, or of the free play of supply and demand. Rather it is caused by deliberate decisions to restrict production and maintain an artificial price level. We recognize that the producers should have a fair share; the fact remains that the present price level even threatens the economic well-being of producers. Ultimately they depend upon the vitality of the world economy for the security of their markets and their investments. And it cannot be in the interest of any nation to magnify the despair of the least developed who are uniquely vulnerable to exorbitant prices and who have no recourse but to pay. What has gone up by political decision can be reduced by political decision.

## Adequate World Food Supplies

Last week President Ford called upon the oil producers to join with consumers in defining a strategy which will meet the world's long-term need for both energy and food at reasonable prices. He set forth the principles which should guide such a policy. And he announced to this Assembly America's determination to meet our responsibilities to help alleviate another grim reality -- world hunger.

At a time of universal concern for justice and in an age of advanced technology, it is intolerable that millions are starving and hundreds of millions remain undernourished.

The magnitude of the long-term problem is clear. At present rates of population growth, world food production must double by the end of this century to maintain even the present inadequate dietary level. And an adequate diet for all would require that we triple world production. If we are true to our principles, we have an obligation to strive for an adequate supply of food to every man, woman, and child in the world. This is a technical possibility, a political necessity, and a moral imperative.

The United States is prepared to join with all nations at the World Food Conference in Rome [November 5-16, 1974] to launch the truly massive effort which is required. We will present a number of specific proposals:

- To help developing nations. They have the lowest yields and the largest amounts of unused land and water; their potential in food production must be made to match their growing need.

- To increase substantially global fertilizer production. We must end once and for all the world's chronic fertilizer shortage.

- To expand international, regional, and national research programs. Scientific and technical resources must be mobilized now to meet the demands of the year 2000 and beyond.

- To rebuild the world's food reserves. Our capacity for dealing with famine must be freed from the vagaries of weather.

- To provide a substantial level of concessionary food aid.

The United States will in the coming year increase the value of our own food aid shipments to countries in need. We make this commitment despite great pressures on our economy and at a time when we are seeking to cut our own government budget because we realize the dimensions of the tragedy with which we are faced. All of us here have a common obligation to prevent the poorest nations from being overwhelmed and enable them to build the social, economic, and political base for self-sufficiency.

The hopes of every nation for a life of peace and plenty rest on an effective international resolution of the crises of inflation, fuel, and food. We must act now and we must act together.

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## THE HUMAN DIMENSION

Mr. President, let us never forget that all of our political endeavors are ultimately judged by one standard -- to translate our actions into human concerns.

The United States will never be satisfied with a world where man's fears over shadow his hopes. We support the United Nations efforts in the fields of international law and human rights. We approve of the activities of the United Nations in social, economic, and humanitarian realms around the world. The United States considers the United Nations World Population Conference last month, the World Food Conference a month from now, and the continuing Law of the Sea Conference of fundamental importance to our common future.

In coming months the United States will make specific proposals for the United Nations to initiate: A major international effort to prohibit torture; a concerted campaign to control the disease which afflicts and debilitates over 200 million people in 70 countries -- schistosomiasis; and a substantial strengthening of the world's capacity to deal with natural disaster -- especially the improvement of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization.

## CONCLUSION

Mr. President, we have long lived in a world where the consequences of our failures were manageable -- a world where local conflicts were contained, nuclear weapons threatened primarily those nations which possessed them, and the cycle of economic growth and decline seemed principally a national concern.

But this is no longer the case. It is no longer possible to imagine that conflicts, weapons, and recession will not spread.

We must now decide. The problems we face will be with us the greater part of the century. But will they be with us as challenges to be overcome or as adversaries that have vanquished us?

It is easy to agree to yet another set of principles or to actions other nations should take. But the needs of the poor will not be met by slogans, the needs of an expanding global economy will not be met by new restrictions, the search for peace cannot be conducted on the basis of confrontation. So each nation must ask what *it* can do, what contribution *it* is finally prepared to make to the common good.

Mr. President, beyond peace, beyond prosperity, lie man's deepest aspirations for a life of dignity and justice. And beyond our pride, beyond our concern for the national purpose we are called upon to serve, there must be a concern for the betterment of the human condition. While we cannot, in the brief span allowed to each of us, undo the accumulated problems of centuries, we dare not do less than try. So let us now get on with our task.

Let us act in the spirit of Thucydides that "the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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[L.C.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 26, 1974

No. 378

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY GIOVANNI LEONE
PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC
AT A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
THE PAN AMERICAN UNION
SEPTEMBER 25, 1974

Secretary Kissinger

Mrs. Leone, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I speak here with some nervousness, not only because of the natural timidity which you all so frequently have seen in me, but also because I know I'm going to be followed by one of the great orators that I am familiar with. So if I prolong my remarks, it is to postpone the moment of truth. [Laughter]

Mr. President, you are here at a time when many American institutions are under attack. But there is one American institution that seems to survive all trials, and that is your Ambassador to the United States. [Laughter]

I have had occasion at the lunch you so kindly arranged for me at the Quirinale to see whether my requirement to report to him could be reduced from twice a week to once a week, and I want to say that of course I'm delighted to report to him regularly but I wonder whether it is really required that he gives a grade to my secretary as he leaves the office. [Laughter]

Mr. President and Mrs. Leone, it is always a great joy to meet with you. You represent a country that has grown wise with many battles fought on its soil and skeptical with many ideas that proved to be not all that were presented -- but also grown profound by the knowledge that ultimately everything depends on the quality of human relations. So we deal with you not only as political but as personal friends.

We have often spoken about the interdependence of the modern world. There is no country in Europe and few countries in the world which have experienced at such close hand the difficulties and the opportunities of the contemporary period. Italy is a country which has prospered enormously since the war, despite the absence of natural resources, because of the

For further information contact:

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diligence of its population and the inventiveness of its leadership. In
recent months, as a result of circumstances outside the control of Italy,
many of these conditions have changed and Italy faces economic difficulty.
When Italy's friends, therefore, attempt to work out cooperative arrange-
ments, it is not something that they do for Italy; it is something they do
for themselves and for the structure of the modern world. It is no longer
possible to conduct affairs on a national basis. It is a duty for all
nations to attempt to face the fact that we are living in a period of
enormous transformations of the nature of the economy, of the nature of
political relations; and we in the West cannot possibly cope with our
problems unless we develop a new feeling of creativity and a new spirit of
cooperation.

That spirit always has existed in the relationship between Italy and
the United States, and in all the great issues that confront us we have
seen matters very much alike. We have supported Italy's participation in a
united Europe because we in turn knew that Italy's attitude toward the United
States would make such a Europe -- if it depended on Italy -- a partner and
a friend of the United States. Our guest today has played a very noble role
in these efforts.

Beyond all the political and economic matters that concern us, there is
a very important gift that Italy has bestowed on all of its friends. We
hear so much much about the danger of conformity in the modern world and
the loss of individualism. But who can speak of a lack of individualism
in Italy? And whatever problems Italy has, conformity happily isn't one
of them.

And so we welcome you, Mr. President and Mrs. Leone, as old associates,
as friends in the field of politics, and as personal friends. I'd like to
propose a toast to President and Mrs. Leone, to the friendship of Italy and
the United States.

[Applause]

President Leone [As Interpreted]

Dr. Kissinger has set a trap for me. He sent me a beautiful speech
in which he even quoted Cicero, in the hope that I would follow the written
outline that he'd prepared. And that is what we call in English a dirty
trick; in Neopolitan we say "priest's trick." [Laughter] So I'm going to
counter that by setting aside my written speech; and, fully respecting the
political outline, the political policy and guidelines of the Italian
Government which is authoritatively represented here by its Foreign Minister,
Senor Moro, I shall now ad lib.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I should like to thank you very much for
the cordial invitation that you extended to me to come to this luncheon
which is attended by exponents of the US political, economic and journalistic
worlds and also by my delegation and by some outstanding Italian representa-
tives of the press. I should like to take this opportunity to thank you very

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much for your words of praise for our Ambassador, Senor Ortona. You had
already told me how much you appreciated him in Rome, and I'm only sorry
that I cannot vote on the retirement law now. I would like to do it at
once so as to have Mr. Ortona at home.

Also, on behalf of the Foreign Minister of Italy, I would like to
say how much we appreciate the work that has been done by your Ambassador,
Mr. Volpe, who succeeds in combining a complete and untiring dedication
to the interests of the United States with his affection for the country
that his family came from originally. So I want to salute him here as a
servant of the United States in his capital city and to thank him for
what he does to further Italian-American relations.

Mr. Secretary, I agree with all that you have just said. First of all,
I share your global view of the economic drama that is being enacted on the
world stage now and that we might consider to be a Biblical scourge that
has hit humanity. There is, as you said, even more than ever before a
great need for international cooperation and solidarity shown to the weaker
nations by those nations that are privileged either because of their geo-
graphical position or because of their natural resources. Italy's most
vital interests are at stake.

But it is not only of that that I want to speak now but also of the
human solidarity that you are displaying. We have a poet in Italy who
said that the life of man is mystery and only he who aids his brothers
makes no mistake. This human solidarity, this realization, this under-
standing of the need for global cooperation was expressed not only by you,
Mr. Secretary, but by the President of the United States. I am happy to
turn my thoughts to him now.

In any global vision of human affairs, there are certain details,
some more particular aspects that must be considered and which we are
here to emphasize before you. They need your understanding, and it is
in that spirit that we have come here. We have come here to reassert a
century-old friendship with your country. We have only looked at each
other in emnity across the ocean once in the course of history in the
cause of the war that the Italian nation neither wanted nor decided. Our
friendship was then reconfirmed in the Atlantic alliance, which was then
reasserted in the Ottawa declaration. As I said this morning, we consider
that alliance to be an instrument of security, detente and peace.

But there is a second aspect involved in the Atlantic alliance, and
that is solidarity from the economic point of view. As I said this morning
to President Ford, we in Italy are well aware of the need for European
unity to foster the well-being of the peoples of Europe, many of which
provided you with many of your ancestors. You here who have originated
from Europe, many of you, represent a seed of culture and civilization
which must be safeguarded. The Ottawa declaration showed that European
unity can be complementary to the Atlantic alliance.

We have also come here, Mr. Secretary, to show you the true face of
Italy. We thank you for saying so openly, so unreservedly, that you recog-
nize that our problems were not generated entirely by ourselves. After all,

PR #378

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Italy is a country which only 25 years ago lived on an outmoded and obsolete form of agriculture. A hundred years ago our best people used to come to the United States, seeking for jobs. Then there was the economic miracle, but we hardly dare speak of that nowadays; that's all over because Italy has been affected by the economic hurricane that has swept through the world. Now we recognize, of course, that we have made mistakes, that there are shortcomings on our part and we must be the first to put our house in order. We have taken at home what many considered to be extremely stringent measures to try and do that.

But Italy is here to say to you that it does not want to hide its difficulties, and through its President it wants to say to you that it feels its difficulties can be overcome if Italy can be certain of the staunch support of the great nations of this world.

You said, Mr. Secretary, that the USA, this great and generous country, is prepared to look with sympathy on our problems. And so I say to you, we shall overcome. I should like to express to you here, Mr. Secretary, my personal friendship and also for Mrs. Kissinger. Unfortunately, I shall be away when you come to Rome, but one of these days I hope to welcome you there again.

I should like now to thank all of the American guests who are here for having attended this luncheon. I give you the toast to the President of the United States, the wellbeing of your country and the friendship between the United States of America and Italy.

[Applause]

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September 30, 1974

No. 383

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY JEAN SAUVAGNARGUES
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
AT A DINNER AT THE NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART
SEPTEMBER 27, 1974

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Foreign Minister, Madame Sauvagnargues, Ladies and Gentlemen:

My staff had prepared some remarks for me of really devastating profundity, but impossible to read by candlelight. So I will have to improvise a few remarks. [Laughter]

As I was sitting at the table I thought of a reception I attended this afternoon. I was invited to a retirement party, and having read the *New York Times* for the last few weeks, I thought perhaps something had happened that I hadn't been officially informed of yet. So on the one hand I was reassured when I came to the reception to find out it was a retirement for Senator Fulbright. But on the other [hand] I was extremely sad. And I reflected about the special role that Senator Fulbright has played in our national life. It occurred to me that the relationship that France has had with the United States has some similarity to the relationship that Senator Fulbright has had with the State Department. [Laughter] There have been occasional criticisms. all the more irritating because they usually turned out to be right. But there also has been at the basis of the relationship an understanding that real friends are meaningful only if they have opinions of their own.

The great problem of our contemporary world is to know how much unity we need and how much diversity we can stand. In a period of great revolutionary change, there is the great danger on the one hand that the danger, that one may not be able to find the basis for cooperative effort. In the last year the United States and France have had some different perspectives. But on our side -- and I know on the side of France as well -- we have always understood that we belong to the same family and that we have common interests. We respect France's efforts to build Europe as a contribution to the cooperation on a larger scale that is an inevitable requirement of the present world. And we

PR #383

understand, too, that the insistence on achieving ones own identity can
in the long run provide the basis for the best form of cooperation.

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues and I have known each other only
for a few months. In that period, I believe I can say that many of
the misunderstandings have been worked out and also that we are meet-
ing tomorrow to look at one of the deepest problems that faces the
world today, the problem of achieving a cooperative approach to the
big alteration in economic relationships that threatens to engulf us all.
On our side, we are confident that France, in the position of leadership of Europe
to which its history entitles it and in cooperation with the United
States, will continue to play the role of a good friend, occasional
critic, but always a steady partner.

We are delighted that we can welcome Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues and Madame Sauvagnargues on her first visit to Washington. I would like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister and to the friendship between the United States and France.

[Applause]

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am, of course, rather overwhelmed by this grand reception by this
gathering of what's best in Washington [in] politics, science, arts,
press and even outer space. I can hardly find words, so I choose English
because I've found in my experience that when you are at a loss to say
anything you must choose English. That doesn't mean that I won't say
anything now; I'll try, although I just read [in] the *Herald Tribune* a
nice anecdote about the head of government who suddenly found he had
nothing to say to the United Nations and so said he would renounce his
address, and of course the Foreign Minister had to speak for him.
[Laughter] This doesn't mean that Foreign Ministers don't have anything
to say, because the Secretary of State just told us fundamental things
about the relations between the United States and France. And he told
them with the simple words, without high-flown rhetoric, without any
rhetoric as is apt to that kind of subject. That is also the lesson
which is taught us by another messenger from France, the picture of
the Magdalene de la Tour -- a picture, I think, which we shall see
a few minutes from now.

Of course the relations between France and the United States is
something that, when you talk about them you tend to invoke Lafayette,
two-centuries old traditions, etc. This is true, but it's also sort of
engrained habit, and it's sort of family sentiment -- a sort of belong-
ing together, a sort of deeply engrained trust and confidence in each
other, which permits big fights and big quarrels as in families where

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quarrels are at their bitterest and yet the feeling of togetherness is not touched. In our relations we had and we may still have -- although if it's up to Secretary of State Kissinger and myself it won't happen -- artificial quarrels. Thank God, they have been disposed of and now we are faced with the real problems and these real problems are bad enough. They are bad enough. We are facing, as you said, Mr. Secretary, revolutionary times; the balance of the world has been deeply disturbed and disturbed for a long time to come. We will have to adjust to a new set of things, to this reshuffle of cards, where the industrialized nations will have to live up to the fact that they got poorer and they'll have to tighten their belts somehow. So that speaks for certainly for solidarity even if it doesn't speak for confrontation, and on that I know you are in full agreement, Mr. Secretary, contrary to what the New York Times had to report yesterday or the day before yesterday.

But let's not attack the press, because the press is a very important power in this country and also in mine. Let's only wish that the press could now make news of the very important news, which is that the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of France are not fighting with each other. [Laughter]

Well, I won't go on much longer on that. I'm convinced that the working relationship we have established, Mr. Secretary, will enable our governments to work together more closely as they should and deal with the very complex problems that are facing us. And I trust that this mutual effort will lead to a good result.

I again want to express the thanks and the gratitude of my wife for this grand reception. It's really the first time since I became Foreign Minister of France that I do feel not only the burden of this office but also its honor and its advantages, its joys. I understand this is one of the first occasions where dinner is given in this National Gallery. I knew very well 20 years ago in Washington -- I haven't been here to 20 years, you see; it's like Alexander Dumas remarked: *vingt ans après.* But this is really, truly a grand occasion. I want to thank the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger for that. We will cherish that memory.

I want to raise my glass to the Secretary of State and his wife.

[Applause]

* * * * * * *

[LC]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 1, 1974

No. 388

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS
BETWEEN
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND HIS EXCELLENCY AMBASSADOR FU-AD NAFFA'
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
AT A DINNER FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK

SEPTEMBER 30, 1974

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Secretary General, Excellencies, Friends:

I first of all want to make clear that this is not the beginning of a confrontation about oil prices [laughter and applause] -- especially as long as you all outnumber me here. [Laughter]

I tried -- I've seen so many of you over the past year so many times; in fact, I've seen more Arab leaders than any other part of the world -- that I tried to promote my participation at the Arab Summit later this month. [Laughter]

I must say the Foreign Minister of Morocco, who is very elegant and very subtle, did not speak English when the subject was raised. [Laughter and applause] So maybe next year.

But we met here -- many of us -- about this time last year, and I had the impression that one or two of you had some slight reservations about my appointment as Secretary of State. And it is true, leaving aside any particular individuals, that for a period of many years the situation in the Middle East had become frozen.

I spoke to my friend Omar two weeks before the October War began, and I told him that we would try to make a major diplomatic effort in order to promote peace in the Middle East. And then there was the war, and since then we have had an opportunity to talk together about many problems.

I think great changes have occurred in the Middle East. I think the peoples in the Middle East have realized that they should make a very serious effort to move towards peace which is based on the recognition of the rights of all peoples in the area. And the United States has understood that a conditional stalemate in the Middle East creates a constant source of tensions, and the economic consequences that flowed from this war have taught the whole world what was probably not intended -- for instance, that our global economy is interdependent in a way that few of us had realized and that producers and consumers -- consumers

PR #388

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among you gentlemen — depend on an understanding of each other's necessi-
ties that has made the world a global community.

We have had the opportunity to meet many of you and to understand the aspirations for peace that exist in the area, and a beginning has been made towards a just and lasting peace. We recognize that it is only beginning. And in my speech to the General Assembly, I expressed the determination of the United States to use all its influence to continue the process that was started on a basis that takes care of the aspirations of all of the countries in the area and that encompasses the concerns of the parties.

I will be going to the Middle East next week to see whether this negotiating process can be started, and we will spare no effort. With your understanding, your support, I am confident that we will make progress.

That, at any rate, is what we have dedicated ourselves to.

We also have started, as you all know, a discussion on the nature of the interdependence of the global economy. This is not the place to go into it. And my friend Omar has already told me that he has prepared a crushing reply to be made public very soon. [Laughter]

I want to say that as far as the United States is concerned, we are not going to enter these discussions in a spirit of confrontation. It is our profound conviction that what we are trying to convey to all of our friends is that it is impossible to achieve unilateral benefit, and that it's peculiarly a situation where what is in the common benefit is also for the individual gain of everybody.

How that will be worked out in time depends on many discussions, but on our side we approach these discussions in a spirit of goodwill and with the certainty that a reasonable solution that is just to all can be found.

I want to take this opportunity on a personal basis to express my gratitude, the gratitude of the United States Government, to all of you who have welcomed my colleagues and me over the past year, on our many travels, with the proverbial Arab hospitality.

We are engaged in a very difficult process — all of us together — and I have appreciated our understanding of your friendship. And I am confident that the problems before us will be solved in a manner that all of us in this room can be proud to have worked together.

In this spirit I'd like to propose a toast to the friendship between the Arab peoples and the people of the United States.

[Applause]

Ambassador Naffa!

Mr. Secretary of State:

I will thank you first because you didn't want to make confrontation with Arabs here about the oil problem, because — as you said — it's not here that we can discuss it; and, on the other hand, it would have been a little difficult for me, with my weak English, to discuss this problem. [Laughter and applause]

PR #388

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Anyway, we conceive interdependence of the nations and the economies as a global community, but we conceive that in the global community right and justice will have their word to say and to be applied.

About your participation at the conference — the Summit Conference — we cannot decide it here too. [Laughter] You have to apply [laughter and applause] and to see who will sponsor your application. [Laughter] Maybe I will.

Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to express to you on my behalf and on that of my colleagues, the Foreign Ministers of the other Arab states, our thanks and appreciation for your gesture of inviting us this evening. We find this gesture an expression of your desire to establish friendly relations with us on a personal level, to continue the dialogue, and to strengthen the relations between the United States and our countries.

I would like to assure you that we welcome this gesture very much, for we all are open to dialogue, desirous to strengthen the good relations between us and to exchange views in honesty and frankness. Our hope is to be able to develop friendly relations with your country on the basis of understanding and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual confidence, and that these relations would serve real peace which is founded on the respect of the principle of right and justice.

I am confident that I am expressing the opinion of all my colleagues when I praise the great efforts which you have made during the past few months and the positive results which you have been able to achieve. I am also expressing their belief when I say that the present circumstances require intensification of these efforts, for the stage which we have reached today in cooperation with you has been necessary and useful.

However, it is not sufficient to achieve peace. It is only a preliminary stage which has opened the door, provided that the intentions are sincere, to implement the basic requirements of achieving peace.

You know these requirements very well, Mr. Secretary of State, and you also undoubtedly know that the real chance for peace depends to a great extent on the position which the United States takes in the next few months because of the great influence which she enjoys and the big potentials she has in her possession.

For this reason, I can say that our expectations from you are as great as the responsibilities which you share.

I raise my glass to wish you health and prosperity.

[Applause]

*****