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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: Officers' Club
Bolling Air Force Base
Washington, D. C.

18 November 1971 - 1:00 p. m.

PARTICIPANTS: 850 Wives of military personnel stationed in the Washington area: Among the American VIP Wives were:

Mrs. John D. Ryan, (wife of the Chief of Staff, USAF)

Mrs. Richard J. Borda (wife of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs)

Mrs. Spencer J. Schedler (wife of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management)

Mrs. Vernon R. Turner (President of the Air Force Officers' Wives Club)

Mrs. Bernard L. Weiss (Program Chairman of the Air Force Officers' Wives Clubs)

Persons attending the luncheon included the wives of military attaches from some 28 countries.

Coleman Hicks, notetaker

[Dr. Kissinger was introduced by Mrs. Weiss].

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) Mrs. Weiss; ladies; and I see we have one other gentleman here (nodding to Coleman Hicks, notetaker). I asked myself today, "What should I talk about?" Sometimes people suggest that I talk about what I do during my day. But I understand you've had Maxine Cheshire here recently, and you are pretty well informed on that subject. (Laughter) And in any case, why should I ruin my reputation by letting you know what I really do. (Laughter) Another suggestion I get is to describe my job, but actually I am rather afraid to face that. (Laughter) I always say about my job that it consists of transferring to the President alternative policy choices. But I know that there is a certain view in the State Department that what I transmit to the President are the broad policy choices from A to B.

Let me make some general remarks, though, and then take questions from the floor on what I have said, and on any other subject that interests you. I accepted the invitation to appear at this lunch today despite the

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fact that I generally avoid making public appearances. I accepted
because I want you ladies to know that this Administration fully under-
stands that without the sacrifices of the men and families in the
military community, without the dedication of those men and families,
we could not pursue our foreign policy. In our search for peace, we
must have a basis of military strength; and because of that, we in the
White House will do all we can to keep this nation strong and to keep
the Armed Services in the positions of respect that they deserve.

Let me turn now to a problem that has been with us from the
beginning of our Administration: the difficult problem of the war in
Vietnam. I know that this problem is close to your hearts, and to the
hearts of your families. Many of you have had relatives who have
served in Vietnam, and all of you have known people who have so
served. Let me give you our position. By the way, I am going to
meet later today with the Board of Directors of the Leauge of POW
Families (I don't know the exact name). I said to the President at one
point, "Don't emphasize, in talking about Vietnam, how we got into
this war; just let's concern ourselves with where we are going from
here." The President stressed, though, that we had an obligation not
only to those serving in Vietnam then, and to those who would so serve
in the future, but also to those who had previously suffered in Vietnam.
It is this obligation which requires us to end the war in a way consistent
with those sacrifices, and with the dignity of our nation. We feel that
the people in this country have a right to ask more of their leaders than
that those leaders take a short-term gain when the long-term conse-
quences of such action would be catastrophic. You ladies well know
that in 1938, Chamberlain was wildly popular in England when he returned
from Munich. A year-and-a-half later, he was the most discredited man
imaginable. In 1968, if Richard Nixon had said that in two and a half
years, he would reduce by 400,000 the number of men in Vietnam,
reduce weekly casualties from 300 to 5, and improve the domestic situation
in Vietnam to the point where, as today, roads would be open and civil
administration functioning well, he would have been accused of a huge
credibility gap. But as you ladies well know, he has hardly received
any wild approbation for his achievements in Vietnam.

Let me emphasize again, that this Administration seeks an honor-
able end to the war. There is only one thing that we have refused to do
in working toward an end to the war: to ally ourselves with our enemy
against the very people who, relying on our words, have taken our
bombs to defend themselves for 10 years. You are all well aware of

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notions one reads in the press that liken Vietnam diplomacy to a
detective story. You know the routine: one side is supposed to
reveal a proposal; then the other side tries to guess what the proposal
really means, while constantly running the risk that the person who
made the proposal will be offended by the nature of the guessing.
Well, this characterization of diplomacy in the Vietnam area is simply
all wrong. There is one real issue in the Vietnam negotiation and
that is the question whether we will cooperate with the enemy, and
destroy our friends. This is the only thing that we have been un-
willing to do. We will not overthrow the very people whom we have
supported. This we will never do. It would betray the dignity of the
American commitment, and betray the dignity of those Americans who
have suffered and died in Vietnam.

When this Administration came to office, we had foreign policy
problems other than those in Vietnam though the war there was clearly
our most physical difficulty. A more fundamental problem, though,
related to enormous changes that had taken place in the post war world.
In the 40's, 50's and 60's, defense of, and economic progress in the
Free World depended almost exclusively on the United States. Now
Japan and European nations have grown powerful themselves, and
must begin gradually to assume a responsible role in international
affairs. We cannot pursue a policy of assuming the burdens of other
nations. Each nation must take on its shoulder its own burdens.
This is the focus of the Nixon doctrine. It is a difficult period of
adjustment that we are currently in, but it is a period of difficulties
that I hope we can master.

The changes in the post-war world have included dramatic
developments in the communist world. In the post-war era, we were
prone to characterize the communist world as monolithic. That view
of communism has, of course, been destroyed. We must now adjust
to nationalistic developments in the communist world. This doesn't
mean that our policy is to use national differences to split apart the
communist nations. We must deal with each nation on its own terms
and judge each nation on the nature of its conduct of international
affairs.

What is required in this period of adjustment in foreign affairs?
First of all, we must avoid the old practice of waiting for crises and
then reacting to them. We are looking for positive directions, not
merely the ability to react. Additionally, in these positive directions,
we are attempting to build a structure for peace. That structure
requires other nations to participate in the international order and

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share the burdens of that order with the United States.

This period of adjustment in international affairs has occurred
at a time when domestic debate in the United States has been rampant
and bitter. This Administration has continually faced the addition of
crippling amendments to crucial bills in the Congress. The funda-
mental basis of our foreign policy is challenged day after day. When
the history of this period is written, though, I hope that the emphasis
will not be on the fact that we brought an honorable end to the Vietnam
war (and that, I think, you will find we will do), but rather on the fact
that this Administration began to lead the world toward an interna-
tional structure in which peace could be more effectively secured. I
emphasize again, ladies, that this secure peace and this international
order cannot exist if the military community in the United States
confronts a degrading atmosphere. I want you and your husbands
to know that in the White House you have friends who depend on your
loyalty and sacrifices for the conduct of diplomacy.

Now let me take questions on what I have said, or on any other
subject matter that may interest you.

Question: Did the timing of your trip add to the likelihood of Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations.

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) No. Let me put my second trip into per-
spective. To be fully candid, I must say that I do believe that my
first trip did affect the status of Taiwan in the United Nations. It
did so because it implied that it was permissible for a nation to open
various types of relationships with the Chinese. Nobody, of course,
wanted to be last, and there ensued something like a competition in
making advances to the Chinese. But let me turn to the second trip,
and point out that the facts are that the second trip was agreed to
during the first meetings in July. The actual date of the second trip
was set as early as August. Our view of the vote in the United Nations
was that it could not come before the middle of November. Under no
circumstance had the vote on China in the United Nations ever occurred
before the 8th of November. The average was about the 15th. It think it
occurred on the 28th of November last year. We assumed that I would
be back from China by the time of the UN vote. Contrary to what is
said about our prejudicing the status of Taiwan, it would be just as
easy to argue we proved it possible for nations to oppose China in the
United Nations and yet deal with them constructively in other areas.

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Well, after the date of the trip had been set, you must agree that it would have been difficult to change it. How could we go to the Chinese and say that we would like to change the date because such a change would aid us in defeating the proposal that they be represented at the United Nations? (Laughter) Even as I left for the trip to China, our view was that November the second was the earliest date that the China vote could occur; that was one week after my scheduled return. For a series of reasons too complicated to go into, the whole procedure in the United Nations was accelerated. But even accepting that acceleration, and I, of course, have given a great deal of thought to this problem, if one goes over the list of the nations and how they voted in the United Nations, I cannot find a single country whose vote I believe to have been affected by the second trip. The first trip, yes. But the second trip, no. I don't say this to excuse nations who voted against us on that issue, but I do not want to emphasize that in no sense was there any UN deal made with the Chinese.

**Question:** Can you say anything encouraging for POW and MIA wives? Some POW's, I think as many as five, are in China. Does the China initiative have any potential influence on possible release for these prisoners?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I always meet with the Board of Directors of the League of POW Families. It is a very painful thing for me to do. It is painful because I can feel the suffering of the people with whom I meet, and because I operate under a severe handicap in such a meeting. Other people can say with conviction that if X, Y and Z happen, our POW's will be released. I am in a situation where I cannot talk about what we are doing. We aren't interested, ladies, in winning banner headlines in the Washington Post and the New York Times. What we are interested in is getting our prisoners of war back. (Applause) We must sit by while charges are made that if X occurs, the prisoners will automatically be released, when we know for a fact that if X did occur, the prisoners would not be released. Let me say this: as soon as we have concluded that our POW efforts are at an end (if they are successful, of course, you will know; but if we have failed) I pledge to you that we will put our record first before the wives of the POW's and ask them if there is anything they see that we should have done differently. Our reticence today, ladies, is not designed to cover up inaction on our part--what it shows is that we are still working. So much for the prisoner problem in Vietnam.

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Let me turn now to China. There, I know of only two prisoners of war. Let me say that the prisoner issue in China is raised in every substantive discussion we have. I cannot say any more on that subject at this time. This is the only responsible answer that I am capable of giving.

**Question:** I would like to ask about the foreign aid bill. Did it come as that much of a shock to the Administration? Wasn't there any advance feeling about the way things were in the Senate that would have lead the Administration to understand what was coming?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You know, my reputation is made by my saying that everything that has happened was foreseen by me; but unfortunately, it is not true in this case. Bills like the appropriations bills constantly come up in the Congress with crippling amendments attached. You know, on this amendment issue, it has gotten so bad now that I have come to believe that Cooper-Church is a hyphenated name. (Laughter) On the foreign aid bill, we had fought successfully against a whole series of crippling amendments. We fight these amendments, especially those which involve a proposed terminal date to the war for the obvious reason that we want ambiguity about the end of the war at this stage. We could set such a date at any time if what we wanted was big headlines. But what we want is a negotiating position. As long as there is ambiguity about the end point of American military involvement in Vietnam, there is hope that we can succeed in negotiations on some issue like the prisoner issue.

Let me return now to the problem of the foreign aid bill. We defeated the amendments, yes. But we did then believe it inconceivable that after 8 months of work the Senate would kill the whole bill. We thought it would pass--as usual, by a close margin, yes; but still pass. Now we are hearing shouts about the need for a proposal to restructure foreign aid. We sent a proposal to restructure foreign aid to the Congress in April. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee to this date has not seen fit to hold hearings on those proposals. So, in short, we were very surprised. But let me say that I believe after the smoke has settled, the Congress will pass a foreign aid bill which provides aid sufficient for us to progress in our foreign policy.

**Question:** In the previous foreign policy period, our policy was often characterized as one of "containment." In contrast to this old notion of "containment," what is our foreign policy for the next decade?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You know, we will only be here another term. (Laughter) "Containment" was an idea which assumed certain things. It assumed a monolithic view of the Communist world, and that there was a constant threat to the integrity of defined borders from organized military units with the United States as the sole defender of the Free World. Now the notion of organized communist military units from crossing a defined border and confronting American troops is about the least likely possibility of international conflict we can imagine. Military and diplomatic moves in the coming decade will be far more ambiguous and sophisticated than those that we saw in the era of "containment". Also, the tragedy of nuclear war is now obvious to all nations (both our friends and enemies included). In the years ahead we must remain committed to the world; we must recognize that the world order has changed, and that other nations must join us in bearing the burdens of preserving peace. The Nixon Doctrine, as the President has said time and again, is not a way to avoid our commitments to the world; it is a way for us to remain committed to the world, but to remain committed under circumstances which accurately reflect the realities of a new era of international affairs. Our challenge is to unite diplomatic and military policy in a more sophisticated manner. That is at least a brief sketch of what I see ahead.

**Question:** Will you comment on the United States' relationship with Japan in light of the President's trip to China?

**Answer:** Our relationship with Japan was one which faced an inevitable transformation whether or not the President scheduled a trip to Peking. A nation like Japan with its high national pride and tremendous economic growth was inevitably headed toward a more autonomous international status. It is the third largest economic power in the world and far and away the strongest economic force in Asia. The President's trip to Peking has accelerated developments in our relationships with Japan but, I view those developments themselves as having been inevitable. Speculation that the United States will shift the focus of its foreign policy from Tokyo to Peking is ridiculous. Japan is our ally and will remain our ally. Peking is our opponent, and we have no reason to believe that Peking will become anything other than our opponent. This was adequately reflected, I think, in the United Nations speech in New York. What we want with the Chinese is a dialogue of communication. We realize the full differences between the United States and China, but want to isolate areas where our policies do not disagree from those where they do disagree. This will provide a basis upon which each

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nation can rely in dealing with the other. This China policy will
be conducted with the knowledge, you can rest assured, that nothing
would be more fatal to us that the betraying of our old friends.
I think it will be evident in the coming year that our initiative
to Peking in no way has implied a sacrifice of the Japanese.

Question: [Question was inaudible]

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) Once the Vietnam war is behind us, I personally think we may enter a period in international affairs in which we will confront considerably reduced threats of direct international military conflict. The biggest threats to peace in the world today come in areas like South Asia (India and Pakistan) where developing nations are contesting one another and trying to line up the great powers on one side or the other. This is a curious reversal of form! In the 50's and 60's, we were trying to get the developing nations to commit themselves to us, and they wouldn't go along. Now, as they develop, they are trying to get us lined up in one way or another. I feel, though, that the coming years may be freer of tension and more susceptible to continued peace than those of the last two decades. This view, though, presupposes that the United States will continue to maintain its military dignity and strength.

Question: What percent of the House and Senate members have ever been in combat?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) I don't know, I really don't know.

Question: I understand the need to have time to restructure the foreign aid package, but wouldn't it make more sense to decrease aid than to increase tariffs? Didn't our experience in the 1930's show this to be a better policy?

Answer: (Dr. Kissinger) First, on our aid package, we had the President of the World Bank, Rudolph Peterson, head a commission to study foreign aid. That commission submitted proposals for restructuring foreign aid in April. To this day, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has not had hearings on them. Those proposals included a reduction in amount of foreign aid, but the aid would have been repackaged in a way that would have made it clear what aid was military aid, what was short term, what was long term, and so forth.

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It is very hard, now, to develop a master plan in three weeks.

As to the question relating to foreign aid and tarrifs: at the
time the surcharge was levied, we did decrease foreign aid by 10%.
On the surcharge, though, let me leave purely economic matters
aside for a moment. By the time the surcharge was imposed, it
had become evident that the international monetary system was
unsatisfactory. The system led inevitably from one crisis to another
and, in fact, the United States ended up paying twice. We paid first
because we supplied military aid abroad, and second because other
nations were always able to fix their exchange rate to discriminate
against our trade. For over two years now we have made proposals
about restructuring the international monetary system. But the other
nations, realizing that such a restructuring would lead to additional
burdens on their part, refused to accept our proposals. What has
happened with the surcharge is painful; but the reality is that we
are now demonstrating to the other nations of the world that we mean
business about ending the imbalance in current international monetary
situation.

We have been accused of being uncooperative; what in the world
does that mean? We have laid on the surcharge and asked for proposals
from the other nations. The other nations cannot agree on a proposal
to put before us. Yet they still attempt to blame us for being uncooper-
ative. We know, ladies, that in the long run we will be judged not by
the surtax itself, but by the new monetary system that follows it. We
realize that a functioning international monetary system requires willing
participation of the member nations. You can rest assured we will
cooperate closely with other nations to develop and maintain that order.
But those other nations must begin to share a proper portion of the
responsibilities and burdens of that system. The coming months, I
think, will show a constructive direction in international economics.

[At this point, Dr. Kissinger's remarks ended and he left the room.]