APR. 5, 1970,

Kissinger's
last year?

(Continued from page 1)

ment when he addressed the con-
vention Saturday night. It wasn't
until committee members leaked
the comment to the press that it
became known. Even then most
delegates were unaware of it.

The comment has caused a con-
siderable stir back in Washington.
Today Ford's press secretary,
Ronald Nessen, rejected any sug-
gestion that Kissinger is being
eased out of the Ford administra-
tion and gave Kissinger a renewed
vote of confidence.

Nessen said that Ford said on
Saturday, the same day Morton
was predicting Kissinger's depar-
ture, that he intends to keep Kis-
singer.

"I would like Henry Kissinger to be secretary of state as long as I am president," Ford said at a public forum in Green Bay, Wis. "You don't throw away a winning player; you keep him."

Morton will be informed of that
statement, Nessen said, adding
that every member of the admin-
istration "should know his
(Ford's) views and take the same
line."

Kissinger was obviously a
source of extreme irritation
among delegates at the CRA con-
vention. At the Saturday night
banquet, Rep. Philip Crane,
speaking on behalf of Reagan.
was given the biggest ovation of
the evening when he denounced
Ford for removing James Schle-
singer as secretary of defense.

"If Ronald Reagan had been
president," Crane said, "I'm sure
it would have been Henry Kiss-
singer who would have been fired,
and he would have moved Schle-
singer into Kissinger's job.

"Henry Kissinger has not only
ill-served the cause of peace
world-wide, he has ill served it
domestically."

state and its Labor grass roots
while encouraging private enter-
prise as well.

The task he faces is to pull Britain out of an economic slide that has inflation at 18 per cent, unemployment at 1.25 million and the pound sterling hovering at record low levels, at $1.872.

His previous experience with
economic affairs, as chancellor of
the exchequer, ended with his res-
ignation from the job in 1967
when the pound was devalued
from $2.80 to $2.40. It took years
for Callaghan to overcome what
he considered the personal set-
back.

back
verdict

-That Congress should have
been compelled to release confi-
dential information for use in his
trial just as former President
Nixon was required to do in the
Watergate scandal.

Calley has been living as a civil-
an in Columbus, Ga., since his
conviction was overturned on
Sept. 25, 1974, by U.S. District
Judge J. Robert Elliott of Colum-
bus.

Although the circuit court re-
versed this decision the Army re-
leased Calley on bail in 1974 and
has said it does not plan to return
him to prison.

Calley was accused of killing
102 Vietnamese civilians in a
sweep through My Lai. He was
convicted of murdering at least 22
and was sentenced to a life term.
Subsequent appeals reduced the
term to 10 years before he was
freed on bail.

J. Houston Gordon of Covington, Tenn., Calley's attorney, told the justices that Congress denied Calley his constitution

THE PLAIN DEALER

April 11, 1976

# Politicians should lay off Kissinger

By Thomas Vail

Some presidential aspirants must have lost all sense of perspective when they started trying to make Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a campaign issue.

One wonders what constructive result can come from attacking one of the most brilliant and accomplished secretaries of state in this nation's history. By his superhuman effort, superb diplomatic knowledge and scholarly understanding, our perfectionist secretary of state has done more for this country than we could have hoped for in foreign policy.

The opening to China and the building of bridges in the Middle East are just two major accomplishments in which Kissinger played a major role.

In a changing world, Kissinger sees brilliantly that Europe is less important and Asia is more important; that the free industrialized western democracies are weaker and that communism is rampant by comparison. As secretary of state he must deal with the world as it is.

Continuity of U.S. foreign policy has been maintained these last few years against an American political background as unstable and precarious as any in this country's history. To have survived the political upheavals and maintained the fabric of an American foreign policy has been a major achievement in itself. That achievement belongs more to Henry Kissinger than to anyone else.

In the Middle East Secretary Kissinger sees new realities the world must contend with. While the Jewish lobby presses the Jewish secretary of state for "assurances," it is implying policies that may ruin Israel if carried too far.

Publisher's
Column

The United States is more than ever dependent on oil from Arab countries. When this Arab oil was shut off in 1973, the United States learned in a hurry that Europe and Japan were not our allies when it came to oil and Israel.

So Kissinger and Anwar Sadat moved an inch and there exists a precarious bridge in the Middle East. Without these bridges and if oil is cut off again, the United States will simply lose its allies and Israel will lose many of its friends here and abroad. Kissinger, always the realist, knows this and tries to avoid the showdown that can only hurt Israel.

The presidential politicians and even the President's own campaign manager talk about how Henry Kissinger will not be kept on as secretary of state even if President Ford wins election this fall. Whoever is elected president will be lucky if he can persuade anyone half as good as Henry Kissinger to be secretary of state.

There are other reasons not to make a secretary of state a factor in a political election. Foreign policy is seldom a factor in a national election in the United States unless war is an issue. Foreign policy is not a major factor in the 1976 election.

Economics is the main election issue this year, with foreign policy near the bottom of voter concern.

One wonders what foreign countries think of the United States when presidential candidates go

after the personality of the secretary of state but fail to offer any constructive ways to improve our foreign policy. If they don't like detente, or the situation in the Middle East, what do these politicians suggest as an alternative? The truth is that none of the presidential contenders knows a damn thing about foreign policy or has ever had anything to do with it.

This is to say nothing about what some congressmen have done to please their constituents, get their names in the media and emasculate U.S. foreign policy. Angola, the Turkish bases, Cuban exporting of revolution, are only a few cases where Congress has exposed and weakened the U.S. presence abroad.

Meanwhile the communists gain everywhere — in Italy, France, Germany, England, Africa, Portugal and you name it. Even some of the media and some congressional investigating committees seem to be on a "get Kissinger" kick.

Henry Kissinger is one of our most effective and brilliant public servants. Who cares whether Kissinger thinks of himself as Germany's Bismarck or Austria's Metternich? Those who do care may remember that after Metternich and Bismarck left their posts, chaos and war were not far behind.

When Henry Kissinger becomes a political issue, no wonder most of the voting public is apathetic about the presidential contest.

The presidential contenders should stop talking about one of the few pluses in our government and tell us more specifically what they would do about some of the country's domestic problems, which are the main concern of the voting public anyway.

JIMMY CARTER
Presidential Campaign

ISRAEL and
MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Governor Carter's Speech to Jewish Leaders

New York City - April 1, 1976

I am happy to be here this morning and for the opportunity
to speak on a subject of intense personal concern to me, and of
importance to all the world's people.

The land of Israel has always meant a great deal to me,
personally and spiritually. As a boy, I read of its prophets
and martyrs in the Bible. As the owner of a farm, I watched with
admiration as its barren deserts were renewed with productive
agriculture. As an American, I appreciated how the State of
Israel, like the United States, opened its doors to the homeless
and the victims of oppression.

I have had the privilege of traveling in Israel, stopping
in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and Haifa, visiting the Holy Places,
meeting with Mrs. Meier and Prime Minister Rabin and other lead-
ers and talking to its people. I found - as I am sure many of
you found - Israel to be a land of contrasts and inspiration.
So much danger and so much optimism. So much joy and so much
suffering. The ruins of many civilizations lie beneath the soil
of Israel. The people of Israel have justly determined that
theirs, at last, will be the one that survives, some 2,000 years
after the destruction of the Second Temple left the Jewish people
scattered throughout the four corners of the world.

NEW YORK CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR JIMMY CARTER

Suite 307 / 730 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019 / (212) 757-3010
R. J. Lipschulz, Treasurer

2

When I announced for the Presidency, almost 16 months ago, I said that the time for American intervention in all the problems of the world is over. But, I said that we cannot retreat into isolationism; the ties of friendship and cooperation with our friends and neighbors must be strengthened. I stressed that the integrity of Israel had to be preserved.

Two weeks ago, in Chicago, in a major foreign policy speech, I said that balance of power politics should be replaced by a new effort to join with other nations to build a just and stable world order. I criticized the fact that our foreign policy is being made and executed by just one man, the Secretary of State. I said the American people should be consulted in making foreign policy, because that policy ought to be as open and honest and decent and compassionate as our own people.

Thomas Jefferson once wrote to John Adams that "The flames kindled on the Fourth of July, 1776, have spread over too much of the globe to be extinguished by the feeble energies of despotism". The great moments of our country's foreign policy--President Wilson's League of Nations, President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms, President Truman's Marshall Plan, President Kennedy's Peace Corps--have reaffirmed that faith. Once we Americans lose this idealism--once we come to accept international terrorism, or international bribery, or the spread of nuclear weapons, or the squeezing of small nations by large neighbors--we lose a precious part of our inheritance. Unless we stand by our ideals, unless we are as willing to work for them in peace as to fight for them in war, we shall not be true--either to the goals of the founders, or to our character as a nation.

I would like to speak about how some of these principles apply to the situation today in the Middle East. This region has experienced a sustained resurgence of the tension and conflict which have been its unhappy lot for decades and, indeed, centuries. Since 1948, four wars have been fought. Countless diplomatic initiatives have been launched. Yet peace seems no closer today than it was in 1948, and the possibility of the Middle East touching off a global war is still with us.

The burden of arms and economic sacrifice hangs over every nation in the region. The explosion of terrorist bombs has spread from Zion Square in Jerusalem to Rome and to other cities. In the fallout of hatred, thousands of innocent people have been needlessly killed--soldiers and civilians, farmers and children, young Olympic athletes at Munich and businessmen in London.

It is long past time for permanent peace in the Middle East, based on genuine reconciliation and mutual respect between those who live as neighbors. And in this effort, the American people, as well as those of Israel and the Arab lands, look to the United States government to lead the way.

3

We have a unique opportunity to contribute to the solution of this conflict if we can maintain the trust of all sides. But America can contribute to a lasting peace in the Middle East only through a policy which is moral, decent, fair and consistent - and which reflects the basic ideals of our people and our nation.

More than a year ago, the Secretary of State outlined what he considered to be America's national interests in the Middle East. They were:

- The survival and security of Israel.

- The maintenance of good relations with 140 million Arabs.

- The steady supply of crude oil to ourselves and our allies.

- The avoidance of another Arab-Israel war and

- The avoidance of a major power confrontation over the area.

The Secretary said all these concerns were of equal importance. He even underlined the world "all" in his speech to make his meaning clear.

But can we really accomplish all these things at the same time? Should we rate them as equal in importance? Is the survival of the people of Israel only equal to the supply of oil? Should maintenance of good relations with the Arabs be at the risk of sacrificing a progressive, advanced, democratic nation which is our friend? Obviously not. Each of the Secretary's goals are important. But to equate all of them is an example of the amoral arithmetic of balance of power politics.

I do not believe the Middle East is the place for the United States, or any great power, to engage in this kind of politics. As long as nations are played off against one another, there will be no peace. There will only be periods of uneasy truce, punctuated by border raids and terrorism, while each side builds up forces for another conflict. In October of 1973, while Israelis were praying in their Synagogues on the holiest day of the Jewish religion, hostile forces were moving in an attempt to bring about their nation's destruction. The Arab forces attempted to turn the Day of Atonement into a day of infamy and annihilation. The Israelis withstood the attack but not without fearful loss of life. This must not be allowed to happen again.

A lasting peace must be based on the absolute assurance of Israel's survival and security. I would never yield on that point, and it is very important for us to make this clear to the rest of the world. The survival of Israel is a significant moral principle for the people of the United States. We share democracy in a time when few nations are free. We both enjoy a free press and freedom of expression. We are both nations of immigrants.

We share cultural and artistic values. We are friends who admire and respect each other. This country was the first nation to recognize Israel's existence as a country and we must remain the first country to which Israel can turn with assurance.

For all these reasons, as long as I am President, the American people will never sacrifice the security or survival of Israel for barbles of oil. Even if every other nation were forced by thirst for oil to desert Israel, we in this country, with our resources, our power, and our sense of decency can and will stand fast.

The people of Israel have sacrificed heavily to defend themselves. They have sought peace with their neighbors from the moment of their nation's birth. They, like all peoples, are entitled to live in peace, free from threats and boycotts and the curshing burden of defense spending--almost half their national income. They have much more to offer the world than military might and a nation bearing arms--and so do their Arab neighbors.

If America's foreign policy is clear about our commitment to the preservation of Israel, it should also be clear about our commitment to genuine Arab-Israeli negotiations. Only face-to-face communication can build the turst and nurture the accommodations that will be needed. By insisting on these kinds of talks, by demonstrating the seriousness of our commitment to real peace, we can use our influence to prepare all sides for the best way out of this tragic conflict.

There are those who say that peace will come only as Israel falls back from all of the territories which it gained in the 1967 conflict. But those same people never ask what Israel is to receive in return. Peace in the Middle East depends far more upon a change in attitudes than on any transfer of real estate. It is not the details of line-drawing on a map which is the critical question; Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist is the key ingredient to peace.

While we work toward a future peace, we must acknowledge the lessons of past wars. Progress toward peace requires that Israel remain strong enough that it can neither be overrun militarily nor isolated in the international community. Israel has never sought American soldiers and never will. It asks us only for the tools to assure its own defense. We should continue to supply them. And we should continue to aid her economy, which has been strained to the utmost by the burdens of defense.

I do not believe that a firm commitment to Israel of this nature will interfere either with our ability to retain the trust of Arab states, or to help mediate the conflict. We can do much to encourage moderation and moderation in both Israel and the Arab world. There are strong links of trade and friendship between us and the Arab countries. These links have developed over many years. The process of peace will be best served if these relations deepen--but not at the expense of Israel, and not as the result of oil blackmail.

5

We have developed close ties of investment and economic aid with many Arab countries. This shows that economic interdependence can also be a foundation of peace. I would hope the Arab peoples are no less tired of war than Israel, no less weary of its burdens and waste, no less mournful of their dead. Some Arab states have set goals for economic development and education which are worthy of great respect, as well as our aid and participation. But their dreams, like the dreams of Israel, will come true only if there is a lasting peace in the Middle East.

This is why it is not possible to encourage both Arab moderation and Arab militarism at the same time. I do not believe arms sales buy lasting friends. I am concerned with the way in which our country, as well as the Soviet Union, Britain and France, have poured arms into certain Arab countries far beyond their legitimate needs for defense--five or six times more than Israel receives. This headlong rush for weapons increases the chance of war. It postpones peace negotiations. It defers development. It erodes security.

That is why it would not be wise at this time to supply strike weapons to Egypt, despite that nation's recent signs of friendship for the United States. With its vast population and deep poverty, Egypt needs housing and jobs and health care far more than offensive weapons such as tanks and planes and missiles. Investment in Egypt's economic development is an investment in peace--and this country should willingly make it. The shipment of arms is full of risk and peril. We should show other Arab nations the benefits that come from friendship with the United States. But there are far better ways to do that than by loading Egypt with instruments of death.

In face-to-face negotiations, it would be most desirable to focus on elements of an eventual settlement instead of more immediate issues. By raising our sights, we can focus the discussion on what peace would really be like. We could then work through stages to its implementation.

Unless there is peace in the area, it is almost inevitable that the Arab nations will become more radicalized, more militant, and more susceptible to Soviet re-entry, both politically and militarily. The cumulative effect would be that Israel would eventually be confronted with even a graver threat.

Peace in the Middle East involves difficult and emotional issues. In face-to-face negotiations, with a maximum desire for fairness, and a modicum of good will, questions of boundary lines and the status of the palestinians can be resolved.

6

Within the complexities of the Palestinian problem, there is a humanitarian core which has been neglected far too long. Too many human beings, denied a sense of hope for the future, live in makeshift and crowded camps where gunslinging demagogues feed on ignorance and despair. But we must not permit our sympathy for their plight to lead us to recognize the existence of brutal terrorists who masquerade as their representatives in the world forum. Those Arab states that allow would-be Palestinian leaders to wage war on Israel, and who permit the very concept of Israel's nationhood to be attacked, undermine their own best interests and delay the day of peace.

Whatever the plight of the Palestinians and whatever may be their hopes for the future, they cannot dictate their agenda by terrorism or war.

We all want to see a Middle East, dedicated to human progress rather than sterile hate. We want to see the desert bloom on both sides of the River Jordan, and along the Nile, and everywhere that human beings hope for better lives for themselves and their children.

We must work toward these goals through international organizations, as well as negotiations. This is a difficult time for Israel in the international arena, primarily because of the importance of oil to the world's developing nations. I deplore the actions taken recently in the United Nations. I reject utterly the charge that Zionism is a form of racism. Indeed, Zionism was a response to racism against the Jewish people. The concept of a state of Israel was born out of centuries of persecution of human beings because they practiced a different religion.

For those 2000 years, the Jewish people in century after century, in country after country, had to withstand propaganda, attempt at forced conversion, discrimination, pogroms, and death, until the ultimate horror of the holocaust. Surely the Jewish people are entitled to one place on this earth where they can have their own state, one given to them from time immemorial.

For years, a vision of Israel has embodied the dream that there could be at least one place on this earth where racism could never exist. Now that dream has come true. As a country founded upon religious freedom and dedicated to brotherhood, America has a special responsibility, not only to oppose this baseless charge wherever it appears, but to keep that dream alive.

Finally, I want to say that there have been far too many secret undertakings, covert assurances, contradictory promises, and diplomatic sleights of hand. Maneuvers of this type are bound to produce--as they have produced--both failure in negotiation and suspicion among its participants. The recent disclosure by President Sadat of alleged previously undisclosed

7

assurances by our Secretary of State exemplifies all that is
wrong with the presentation of our foreign policy.

American policy toward the Middle East--and toward every
other part of the world--should be shaped with the knowledge of
the Congress, from the outset, on a bipartisan basis. It should
emerge from broad and well-informed public debate. Indeed, this
is a necessity. In every foreign venture that has failed--whether
it was Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Angola or in the excesses of
the CIA, our government operated secretly, and forged ahead
without consulting the American people. It did things that were
contrary to our basic character.

Public understanding and support today are as vital to
successful foreign policies as they are to any domestic program.
No one can make our foreign policy for us as well as we can make
it for ourselves. It should be based not just on military might
or economic power or political pressure, but also on truth,
justice, equality, and a true representation of the moral character
and compassion of our people. A policy of that kind will reflect
the best in all of us and it can succeed.

Peace in the Middle East is not the impossible dream. It
can be a concrete possibility.

I would like to leave you by quoting a portion of a modern
Jewish prayer, which reflects, I believe, the attitude of the
American people and the people of Israel.

"We cannot merely pray to You, O Lord, to end war;
For You have made the world in such a way
That man must find his own path to peace
Within himself and with his neighbor.
We cannot merely pray to You, O Lord,
To root out prejudice,
For You have already given us eyes
With which to see the good in all men
If we would only use them wisely.
Therefore, we pray to You instead, O Lord,
For strength, determination and will-power,
To do instead of just to pray,
To become instead of merely to weigh,
For Your sake and for ours,
Speedily and soon,
That our land may be safe,
And, that our lives may be blessed."

As your President, I shall work hard with you to make
America an agent of that peace in the Middle East and
elsewhere--in keeping with the teaching of the Scriptures, in
our own best tradition, and in fulfillment of the highest hopes
of all mankind.

The
Economist

April 17, 1976

# O, my America

Three-quarters of the abuse that is now flying about Mr Henry Kissinger's ears is unjustified and undeserved. The belatedly published official summary of those famous "remarks" Mr Kissinger addressed to a group of American ambassadors in London last December—which he must now wish he had made public long ago—shows that clearly enough. The starting point of Mr Kissinger's policy towards the Soviet Union is entirely sensible. The Russians have now moved into the superpower stage of Soviet history, and there is very little the United States could have done to prevent that happening; so the aim of American policy is to find the best way of containing this growing Soviet power. The three-quarters of the criticism aimed at Mr Kissinger which really consists of baffled American fury about the expansion of Soviet strength is pointed at the wrong target.

It is the other quarter of the criticism which is starting to tell. This is the part which says that Mr Kissinger has not managed the containment of Soviet power as well as he claims to have done, and that he is now sunk in a global gloom which makes it unlikely that he can lead the necessary containment operation of the future.

## The penalties that never penalised

This serious quarter of the attack on Mr Kissinger consists of three specific charges. The first is against his belief that it was going to be possible to bind the Soviet Union into a network of agreements with the west which would discourage it from throwing its weight about: Mr Kissinger's "Gulliverisation" theory, as *The Economist* has called it. The obvious weakness of this theory was that it always seemed unlikely that any such network of agreements between Russia and the west could ever be tight enough to have much effect on the Russians. After all, the immensely complicated spider's web of trade, investment and culture that linked Germany to its western neighbours in 1914 and 1939 was not enough to stop the Germans throwing their weight about then; and it is hard to imagine the communist superpower ever letting itself become as entangled with the capitalist world as the various capitalist countries were with each other in 1914 and 1939.

On top of this, it now emerges that Mr Kissinger and his colleagues had never quite worked out what to do if this network of "incentives and penalties" failed to make the Russians behave. Would the Americans then cancel their agreements with Russia? When the Russians intervened in Angola, President Ford declined to cancel his grain deal with them; the "penalty" for Angola turns out to be nothing more frightening than the postponement of the next Russian-American chat about three very minor items of business. Or was the hope that in the long run the Russians would start to enjoy their co-operation with America so much that they would stop doing things like Angola? The trouble is that in the long run there can be a lot of Angolas; and if none of them causes the Russians to lose any of their deals with America, they may reasonably conclude that they can have their "detente" and their Angolas too.

This is the central flaw in the Gulliverisation theory. It is why, in the end, it does not matter much whether Russia or America is getting more out of any particular exchange of information about agriculture, or space research, or whatever. Mr Arthur Hartman, Mr Kissinger's assistant for European affairs, recently made a speech gallantly arguing that the 150 different projects of this kind between America and Russia are of considerable benefit to the United States. No doubt some of them are. It is difficult to believe the majority are, because on the whole the American economy and American technology are more efficient than Russia's, and expertise is going to flow, like water, from the higher level to the lower. In any event, even if the balance of advantage were exact (which is improbable), this network of agreements would not be doing its main intended job unless it was having a calming effect on the general course of Soviet policy. The first complaint against Mr Kissinger is that it isn't, and was never likely to.

The second complaint is that Mr Kissinger's detente policy never seems to have included an attempt to make the Russians agree about the rules of the balance of power in Europe. Mr Kissinger is alarmed at the prospect

12

THE ECONOMIST APRIL 17, 1976

of the Communist party entering the government of Italy; anyone inclined to suspect him of being "soft on communism" should read his remarks on the subject to those ambassadors last December. He is worried that a Communist success in Italy may encourage a Communist success in France; that American public opinion will not understand why it should help to defend a partly Communist Italy and France; and that the Italian and French Communists' claim to be good democrats now is by no means as foolproof as the optimists think (in which he may well be right, see page 14). But the new respectability of the Communists in western Europe is partly a by-product of detente, which made the Soviet Union itself seem more respectable. The detente policy should therefore have included a clear understanding with Russia about the east-west political competition in the two halves of Europe.

### Change in neither—or both

Such an understanding would have had to take one of two forms. There might, in very hypothetical theory, have been an agreement by the west to regard eastern Europe as permanently communist in return for a Russian agreement to regard western Europe as permanently non-communist. But the Russians would certainly have said that they cannot control western Europe's Communist parties nowadays, which may or may not be true but is hard to disprove. Anyway, the west's own belief in pluralism requires it to accept that Communists can legitimately be elected to power if they claim to have accepted the rules of democracy. That was probably a non-starter. The alternative was therefore to tell the Russians that if they were looking forward to radical political changes in western Europe they would have to accept the possibility of change in eastern Europe too. The competition would have to be a two-way process.

This is where Mr Helmut Sonnenfeldt, the counsellor at Mr Kissinger's state department, comes into the argument. Now that the summary of Mr Sonnenfeldt's own talk to those American ambassadors last December has been published, it is clear that he was not washing America's hands of all interest in the future of eastern Europe. On the contrary, he said that the Americans should respond to the east Europeans' hopes of a "more autonomous existence"; which is the polite way of saying more independence from Russia. The trouble is that the American policy-makers still seem to be telling the east Europeans that their best hope of more independence is the relaxing effect detente ought to be having on Russia (but detente does not in fact seem to be making Russia relax at all); and that they should be careful not to stare Russia too boldly in the eye (but why advise them to keep their eyes down?).

The west could and should be urging a different course on the Russian-dominated countries of eastern Europe. This would not amount to an invitation to them to revolt. If the west was not prepared to help Hungary in 1956, nor to help Czechoslovakia in 1968, it is unlikely to intervene on behalf of a democratic rebellion now, when Russia is militarily stronger than it was then. But the west could be saying to the Communist governments of eastern Europe that, if they want more independence from Russia, they should look at what Hungary has done to make its economy rather different from Russia's,

and Rumania its foreign policy, and Poland its treatment of intellectuals. And then add them up.

If an east European country tried to marry for its own purposes the combined independence of, say, Hungary and Rumania, would Russia really send its army in to stop the nonsense—and risk a plummeting of Communist votes in Italy and France? It seems unlikely: the Communist governments in eastern Europe can risk being a bit more assertive. The west should also be saying to the people who live under those governments that it does not regard monolithic single-party Communist rule as their permanent and inevitable lot. Most east Europeans would like a wider range of choice, as the Czechoslovaks showed in 1968; and the west should be encouraging them to press their rulers to give them rather more choice—at first, for instance, by allowing different factions to compete within the Communist parties. It is Mr Kissinger's failure to urge the need for change in eastern Europe vigorously enough that is the second count against him.

The third is that he no longer seems to have the old Kissinger bounce. To be sure, he has every reason to be tired and dispirited. For seven long years he has been running the most centralised foreign policy operation since John Foster Dulles's. For the past two years the American congress's attempt to get in on the act has produced one confusion after another—Soviet emigration, the arms ban on Turkey, the Angola mess—which congress has then left Mr Kissinger to try to clear up. The old idea that the government's men might occasionally have things they would like to chat about in private has virtually collapsed under the enthusiasm of American journalists for publishing any document a piqued official gives to them. Mr Kissinger's Middle East policy has run into a sand dune; his Soviet policy has gone skidding on the icy surface of the Russian will to power. It is enough to make any secretary of state feel depressed.

But Mr Kissinger's dispiritedness seems to go deeper than this. He sometimes sounds as if he no longer believed that congress and administration can co-operate enough to run a coherent foreign policy, or that American public opinion is prepared to carry the weight of America's position in the world. He has been accused of being resigned to accepting second place for America, behind Russia; it is probably truer to say that he fears America is resigned to it.

### The resilience is there

If he does, he is almost certainly wrong. The main lesson so far from this year's presidential campaign is the groundswell of support for a more vigorous assertion of the American role in the world. There is no reason why the American people, with all their economic and technological power and vitality, cannot insist on military equality with Russia, and recover some of the ground lost in the past few years. There is no reason, on this year's evidence, why American opinion cannot be rallied to support an intelligent defence of western interests. But the effort will have to be led by a man resilient enough to understand America's own capacity for resilience. Perhaps this German-born secretary of state could escape from his apparent *Weltschmerz* if he remembered that he is, after all, an American now.

WASHINGTON

# Henry In the Lion's Den

By James Reston

WASHINGTON, April 13—The scene was a luncheon dungeon in the Shore-haunt Hotel, which rises at this time of year out of a blaze of azalea and dogwood blossoms on a steep bank above Rock Creek Park in Washington. The audience was the American Society of Newspaper Editors, whose papers have lately been giving Secretary of State Kissinger a hard time. The speaker: Henry Kissinger.

It was an amiable confrontation, a reminder to the editors of the basic change that has taken place in the capital in the last couple of years. The same old struggles over power and ideology go on, especially in a Presidential election year, but the savage bitterness of recent years is gone.

Mr. Kissinger dramatized the point. He is actually more concerned about the American editors than they are about him, but in public he laughs about the conflict to keep from crying. He has the gift of self-mockery, of saying serious things in a light-hearted way, and disarming his critics by exaggerating their criticisms.

He complained with bogus solemnity that the editors had restricted his freedom of speech under the First Amendment to five minutes. It was not easy, he said, for him to relate his "humility" to his "brilliance" in such a short time. He poked fun at his "distinguished presumptive successors," particularly at Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Polish scholar at Columbia University, who has been writing Jimmy Carter's foreign policy speeches.

It was difficult, Mr. Kissinger observed, for him to understand people who spoke with an "accent" and he said he reminded Mr. Brzezinski that the U.S. Constitution did not insist that the Secretary of State be "foreign born."

These in-house jokes mask a serious purpose. Mr. Kissinger is now in transi-

tion from official to private life, and before he goes, he is obviously trying to set the public record straight, so that what he said and did as a public servant he can defend later on as a historian.

The other night, he went to a little private celebration here, at the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, for Peter Lisagor of The Chicago Daily News, just because he respected Pete, but in the process he said some things the American editors here assembled may want to think about.

"First," he said, "skepticism and scrutiny of public policies and public men are clearly the business of the press. . . . We have passed through a destructive and divisive war, and through this nation's greatest constitutional crisis since the Civil War. But just as armies are demobilized when a war is won, is it not now time to ask whether we can demobilize some of the attitudes, assumptions and techniques that proved so indispensable during Vietnam and Watergate?"

"Skepticism is healthy," he continued, "and condemnation often deserved, but no free nation can long exist if its people lack faith in its essential justice. In an imperfect world, one cannot demand perfection as the price of confidence. . . . Have we perhaps fallen into the malaise of retired generals, endlessly re-fighting the battles of wars long past—battles whose lessons may ill prepare us for future conflicts?"

"I do not claim that the press can or should create faith in government where there is no reason for that faith. But I believe we must recognize that decisions of public officials, in the real world, are often made in circumstances where the facts at hand are ambiguous. . . . Unless there is, at some level, in the public debate, some minimal degree of understanding —yes, compassion—of the complexities of the issues and of the uncertainties about projecting the future in decision making, we risk bringing to life Cardinal Richelieu's dictum: 'Give me six lines written by an honest man, and I will find something in it with which to hang him.'"

Okay, you can argue it either way, but the main thing about Mr. Kissinger is that he does take on the argument. The editors may scald him, and some may even call for his resignation, but he accepts their invitation to the Shoreham and submits to their questions.

Why, he asks, should the Government be assumed to be guilty if it cannot prove its innocence, when this is not the principle and order of the nation? Why should the press ignore his most careful public definitions of American foreign policy in public speeches, and then turn over its front pages to less important and often misleading documents, just because they were "leaked" out of the "secret files"?

Fortunately for Mr. Kissinger, however, he has not only intelligence and information but physical energy. When the editors ask the President to defend his policies, he is out to lunch. But Mr. Kissinger takes on his detractors, and shows up to pay his respects to wonderful old troopers like Pete Lisagor, and somehow manages to laugh at his tormentors.

The editors in that luncheon dungeon here this week got the point. Many of them probably came prepared to condemn and even to sneer at him, but they gave an ovation at the end. He made them laugh and think, and nobody has produced that combination around here for quite a long time.

NYTimes
Wed April 14, 1976
New York Edition