NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON SQUARE
NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK

VICE PRESIDENT

Original to NAR

Info Photo to
B. J. Davis
President

May 6, 1963

Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller
State Capitol
Albany, New York

Dear Governor Rockefeller:

The New York Times April 26 issue had excerpts from
your excellent talk on the subject of the European
Nuclear Force. This makes sense to me. DeGaulle
makes sense too. It seems to me that we often urge
our allies to stand on their own feet and then ob-
ject to it when they do.

The arguments in favor of integrating different
troops are worse than silly. I had a long talk
with the former German Minister of Defense Dr.
Blank when there was much talk given to having a
European army with squads broken down to include
various nationalities. Such squads would have
musical comedy possibilities but little military
value. Later I talked with DeGaulle and French
military leaders. They favored national cooperation
with NATO but scoffed at complete integration of
nationalities in operating units.

I hope you will continue to make your views on inter-
national affairs known to the American people.

May 24, 1963

TO: Research Staff

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Work Allocation Reports

In order to establish priorities more intelligently as
the work pressures increase, I would like to try the
system of recording time which we use in our law firm.
If you would begin to keep a daily log of the alloca-
tion of your time, starting May 29, it will be extremely
helpful to John, Henry, and me.

We want to make this procedure easy for you, and please
make suggestions from time to time to help keep it so.

Simply because I am used to it, I would like to adopt
the hours and tenths of hours system which we use at
the law firm, e.g. 0.5 = ½ hour and 0.1 = 6 minutes.
While this suggests a degree of precision that is non-
existent and unnecessary in your kind of work, it is
an easy method of recording time.

Debby will provide mimeographed forms per the example
attached on which I have put in some sample notations.
Use abbreviations wherever you can, such as:

cnf = conference
t/cnf = telephone conference
R = research
P = preparation
R&P = research and preparation
rvn = revision
prf = proofreading

Please put the sheets in your outgoing box daily, rout-
ing them to Debby. Thanks!

ing them to Depp. Thanks!

Please but the sheets in your outgoing box daily, rout-

brl - proofreading
run - revitator
r&P - research and preparation
B - preparation
K - research
t\crl - telephone conference
crl - conference

Use abbreviations wherever you can, such as:
attached on which I have but in some sample notations.
Deppy will provide mimmographed forms per the example

an easy method of recording time.
existent and unnecessary in your kind of work, it is
While this suggests a degree of preciation that is non-
the law firm, e.g. 0.2 - ½ hour and 0.1 - 6 minutes.
the hours and tenths of hours system which we use at
Simply because I am used to it, I would like to adopt

make suggestions from time to time to help keep it so.
We want to make this procedure easy for you, and please

Of your time, starting May 29, it will be extremely
If you would begin to keep a daily log of the alloc-
system of recording time which we use in our law firm,
the work pressures increase, I would like to try the
In order to establish priorities more intelligently as

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

TO: Research Staff

May 24, 1963

August 23, 1963

TO: Research Unit Staff

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: "Policy Statements"

This memo is simply to record a discussion JDD, RN, and I had today. I have not had a chance to discuss it with HAK, and do not know whether it has application in the foreign affairs field.

Basically, we have decided to place major emphasis, so far as format of materials is concerned, on "policy statements" which would represent *boiled-down* versions of the consultant papers, in that they would have the following major headings:

I. THE PROBLEMS IN THE FIELD TODAY

II. THE JFK RECORD

III. THE NAR PROGRAM

They would use more succinct and direct phraseology than consultant papers, and emphasize charts over text in presentation of facts.

They would represent the same basic material as the current
positions papers, but reversing the NAR Program and JFK Record,
and preceding both with a statement of the facts that are essen-
tial background to the ultimate conclusions. In this sense, the
policy statements are merely reverse-order current positions pa-
pers (and, indeed, not much longer than some of the recent long
CPP's), with the addition of the fact section suggested at our
last staff meeting and with charts.

Another way of viewing these papers is to think of them as
the substantive basis for a half-hour TV show presentation which
the Governor might give, with liberal use of charts.

The foregoing does not represent any great change in approach.
In a sense, it simply means by-passing the step of editing and
rewriting the full-length consultant paper (which is what we did
in agriculture). It reflects my feeling that we now have time
only to focus on a document which is fairly close to the end-use
product. An example of an end-use product which is very similar
in concept is the October 13, 1958, Policy Statement on Housing,
issued in the 1958 gubernatorial campaign. (Debby has copies of
this.)

September 6, 1963

TO: The Governor

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Follow-up on September 3 Luncheon Requests

A few comments on requests you made at lunch on September 3:

(1) Joseph S. Farland, former Ambassador to Panama

Benjie Franklin was away, but his secretary is sure he does not know Farland; and the Director of Meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Harry Boardman, is going to Washington this week to check on Farland, with the thought of inviting him to speak at CFR shortly. He will call me on his return to report as to what he has found out about Farland, and who knows him. (A clipping from *Time* about Farland is attached.)

(2) Goldwater Record as GOP Senate Campaign Chairman

The information you received about the loss of Senate seats is inaccurate.

Goldwater served as GOP Senate Campaign Chairman for a year, from January of 1955 to February of 1956; and then became Chairman again in January of 1959, after his own re-election to the Senate. Thus, there was nearly a 3-year hiatus in his service.

Assuming one disregards the nearly 3-year hiatus, we can say the number of GOP Senators has declined from 47 to 32 since Goldwater first became Chairman in 1955 -- a net loss of 15 seats, or nearly a decline of one third.

(3) Evidence of Political Activity of Birch Society

We are informed by Bruce Chapman of Advance that he has
the names of a number of Birchers at the YR Convention, which we
will obtain.

We are also getting from Bruce a draft article on the
"radical right," which will include material on the political
activity of the Birch Society.

(4) Enforcement of Supreme Court School Desegregation Decision

I am contacting our Civil Rights consultant for help in
developing a detailed statement as to how, if President, you would
go about further enforcement of the school desegregation decisions.

However, the basic fact is that in your Buffalo speech
of June 17, 1960, over three years ago, you made two recommendations
for legislative action, which are still completely valid today.
You said:

"The Justice Department should utilize vigorously, as needed, the powers granted under the 1960 law to obtain court injunctions against persons obstructing or interfering with a school desegregation order issued by a Federal court.

"The Congress should, in my view, authorize the Attorney General to initiate school desegregation suits as an effective counter to efforts in some "hard core" states to evade compliance with the Supreme Court decision of 1954. This authorization should apply in those limited situations wherein private litigation cannot be effective.

"The Congress should authorize the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to provide technical and financial aid to states and localities meeting difficulties and incurring special expenses in connection with the development of policies and programs looking to desegregation in their public schools. An obviously sound Administration proposal taking steps in this direction was blocked by the Democrats in Congress this year."

-J-

The first of these proposals, (authorization to the Attorney General to initiate school desegregation suit), was contained in both the Democratic and Republican platforms in 1960, but was not proposed by Kennedy to Congress until his message of June 19, 1963. So you can say that 3 years and 2 days after you made this proposal, Kennedy got around to making it to Congress!

The second of these proposals, (Federal technical and financial assistance to school districts which are desegregating), was also in both the Democratic and Republican platforms, but was not proposed by Kennedy to Congress until his message of February 28, 1963.

In your June 17, 1960, speech you also said:

"The Federal government should take the initiative in promoting inter-group conferences among those who, in their communities, are earnestly seeking solutions to the complex problems of school desegregation -- to the end that closed channels of communication may be opened, tensions eased, and a cooperative solution of local problems may be sought."

Kennedy in effect adopted this proposal over three years later in his June 19, 1963, message when he called for a Federal Community Relations Service. He said:

"... This agency, by enabling all concerned to sit down and reason together, can play a major role in achieving peaceful progress in civil rights."

It should be noted that Kennedy's Community Relations Service would cover a territory broader than school desegregation, but the concept is the same as proposed by you.

22 WEST 55TH STREET

September 12 1963

To: HAK

FROM: RBP

Are the girls keeping quasi-political materials which give ideas for speeches?
Attached is an example.

AN ADVANCE SUPPLEMENT

Our Obstructive Strategy

Why the U.S. Is Failing
In Europe

by George F. Gilder

In July Advance attacked the new American defense strategy announced in June by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in a speech at the University of Michigan. Advance contended that the no-city, counterforce doctrine McNamara proposed would require "a stringency of command and control for which there is no precedent in military experience . . . It depends too much on the cool rationality—and the predictability—of both sides amid the chaos of war." This article suggests that the President's attempt to have the McNamara strategy adopted by NATO is embarrassing the State Department and weakening the Alliance. Advance concludes that recent American relations with Europe indicate a grave weakness in decision-making procedures of the Administration.

No member of the Kennedy administration other than the President himself bears as great a responsibility for its successes and failures as Robert Strange McNamara, the gifted and dedicated Secretary of Defense. Inside reports on the deliberations of the Cuban crisis indicate that McNamara was the most consistent and articulate proponent of the course the President finally chose. McNamara's achievements in bringing order to the bureaucratic labyrinth of the Pentagon, partly the result of the implicit confidence of the President in his Secretary's judgment, have been astounding to those aware of the long frustrations of his predecessors. Yet though it might seem desirable to have such a talented man in such an influential role, the commanding authority of the Secretary of Defense may also have had undesirable effects, which may be more important in the long run than the miracle in the Pentagon or the triumph in Cuba.

THE McNAMARA IMBALANCE

For not only is McNamara a brilliant and persuasive man, as Secretary of Defense he is also the proponent of the distinct and somewhat parochial viewpoint of a single department of government. Moreover, within the Pentagon he represents a controversial school of strategic thought. Though his viewpoint should receive attention in the high councils of national policy making, it should not receive preeminent, almost exclusive, attention. In particular the viewpoint of the Secretary of Defense cannot consistently eclipse or overshadow that of the Secretary of State without ultimate damage to American foreign relations.

There is considerable evidence that through the force of his personality, McNamara is causing this kind of imbalance in the decision making processes of the Administration in foreign policy. This imbalance has been accentuated by the limited perspective of the McNamara brilliance. The result has been one of the greatest failures of the Administration to date—the failure to develop a defense

strategy which is both militarily feasible, and politically and diplomatically acceptable. The current McNamara strategy, based on the counterforce, "no-city" doctrine for exclusion of nuclear war from city targets, has foundered on the hard realities of European politics. He has still to develop an alternative which meets the minimal European demands. Thus though he has concentrated more on strategy than any of his predecessors, he begins his third year in office strategically adrift, unable to carry out the policy he favors, unwilling to adjust his course to the manifest political realities. On the outcome of this conflict between McNamara's doctrine and its political opposition hangs the cohesion and effectiveness of the Western alliance.

Yet the Secretary has failed to even find a way to communicate to his European opponents. He continues to answer in terms of technical utility and strategic theory questions which spring from deep political anxieties or grand historical aspirations. The result is that the United States is losing its position of leadership in the formulation of military policy for the Alliance, and NATO faces the Soviet Union divided, uncertain, and vulnerable, despite the fact that the balance of power is now more favorable to the West than at any time since the Soviet Union first developed the intercontinental missile.

THE McNAMARA STRATEGY

McNamara's strategy is the triumph and the failure of the approach developed at the Rand Corporation and other foundations for the study of strategic problems. These organizations depend greatly in their researches on computer determinations of the results of military strategies. From these tabulations it is possible to decide on an optimal strategic doctrine. The problem is that it is difficult to program many of the most crucial elements on the computers: such factors as Senator Russell's instincts, General DeGaulle's sense of grandeur, Prime Minister Macmillan's precarious hold on power in

3

LC

England, Premier Khrushchev's reaction to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany, the psychological breaking point of General Officers under the stress of nuclear war, the lifespan of Prime Minister Adenauer. Yet one intractable or unforeseen element can upset a strategy like McNamara's which requires scrupulous planning and control. As the operations researchers soon discovered in World War II, war is hell on scientific prediction. McNamara's experience has shown that politics is hell on scientific war planning.

Secretary McNamara said in his commencement address at Ann Arbor in June that the United States had arrived at an optimal strategy, that not only "minimizes the danger of nuclear war", but makes it possible "to preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur." The policy he went on to delineate, his counterforce or "no-city" strategy, is based on the assumption that if the United States spares Soviet cities in its first nuclear strike but retains the capacity to destroy them in a later strike, the Soviet Union is likely to spare Western cities in its attacks. According to this theory, if the United States should destroy Soviet cities, the Soviet Union would lose any incentive to restrain its attacks on American cities. But in order to spare Soviet cities, or to have any close control over the nature or intensity of a nuclear war, Western striking forces must be subject to the most stringent command and control. Since the effective execution of the strategy would depend on an immediate response, carried out with exquisitely accurate timing, crisis consultations among the Allies would be prohibited. The McNamara strategy in effect, therefore, meant complete American command of all the nuclear forces of the Alliance. This American control, according to the Secretary, afforded the greatest likelihood that the damage of a nuclear war could be limited since it would make possible the limitation of a Western nuclear response to specific military objectives in the Soviet Union or elsewhere.

## DeGAULLE WAS NOT INTERESTED

Theoretically feasible, the strategy does appear to offer the United States a chance of reducing damage and increasing the possibility for victory in a nuclear war. McNamara's other claim, that the strategy also "minimizes the danger of nuclear war", though tenable, has been strenuously debated by many authorities. His contention, however, that it obviates the need for independent nuclear forces is technically true but irrelevant. The reasons for the French determination to acquire an independent nuclear force, the British desire to retain its own, and the German desire for equal NATO participation were not technical but political. De Gaulle is just not interested in an "optimal strategy" if it necessitates the perpetual subordination of France to the United States on the question of defense. Adenauer is not interested if it means the permanent division of Germany and its relegation to permanent second class status in the Alliance; Macmillan is not interested if it means he will lose the next election to Labor; and the American government as leader of an Alliance, not dictator of an empire, should not be interested if Messrs. De Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan are not interested.

Thus the American strategy could not be carried out unless the United States could find a role for the European countries that would satisfy their political aspirations. Yet the American concept of their role was dictated not by political considerations but by

McNamara's own controversial view of the technical military needs of the Alliance. McNamara urged that the European countries abandon their attempts to acquire independent nuclear forces and concentrate their efforts on increasing the conventional forces on the European front. Though this also would be eminently desirable, this proposal too ignored the political realities. It gave the Europeans the unenviable job of fighting a conventional war in Europe, while retaining for the United States the weapons which could be ultimately decisive. Thus the proposal seemed to indicate both that the United States might not fight a nuclear war for the defense of Europe (why otherwise would increased conventional forces be necessary?); and that the United States would not allow the Europeans to use nuclear weapons in their own defense, or to deter attack on themselves, until the increased conventional capability was achieved. The European nations, growing daily more affluent and powerful, thus were being asked to subject themselves entirely to the caprice of the United States on the issue of their very survival.

## AN ALLY IS SKYBOLTED

Because of these essentially political considerations, and despite the fact that the Europeans were as impressed by McNamara as the Americans were, none of the McNamara proposals were adopted. De Gaulle was fortified in his determination to acquire nuclear weapons. Germany grew more restive. Great Britain, though willing to integrate its nuclear forces under the American plan, was unwilling to increase its contributions to the conventional defense of Europe. Thus Europe went its own way, ignoring the McNamara prescriptions and undermining them in their military policies. Yet the United States showed no indication of abandoning its strategy or developing a new one. When a crisis occurred the Administration administered palliatives. These failed on two counts. While bypassing the basic political problems, they still contributed to the nullification of the McNamara strategy. Finally the Skybolt Affair and the proposals improvised in response have eliminated almost all possibility of the strategy's implementation. Still the political problems of the Alliance remain acute and the counterforce plan remains in nominal effect.

The sudden decision of the United States to abandon the development of Skybolt missile brought into play a number of the conflicting political forces ignored by McNamara. The British two years ago gave up their expensive attempt to construct an intermediate range ballistic missile on the grounds that they could prolong the effectiveness of their fine Vulcan bomber series by acquisition of Skybolt air to ground missiles, then under development in the United States. Although no specific agreements were made, it was understood that the United States would be willing to provide the weapons. At the time, the Labor opposition attacked the Macmillan government for committing its whole defense strategy to a weapons system which did not exist. When the Government strongly defended its decision, Skybolt became a major political issue, with the prestige of the Macmillan government importantly engaged in the availability of the missile. The strong support of the United States for British entry in the Common Market, opposed by Labor, gives the Administration an important interest in the prestige of the Tories as the critical negotiations begin. Yet when McNamara's comparative sys-

4

tems analysis indicated that the Skybolt was more
expensive than its alternatives, it was summarily
dropped without any warning to Great Britain, or
the State Department. So engrossed was the Penta-
gon in the purely technical consequences of the de-
cision that the resulting furore was unanticipated.
We read in the January 14 *Christian Science Mon-
itor* that Pentagon officials indicate they would not
be unhappy should the Labor party come to power
in Britain. Though one hesitates to entertain the
idea that the Pentagon would deliberately em-
barrass an allied government, it would have had
trouble finding a better way to damage the Tories
than jettisoning Skybolt. The British, understand-
ably, were bitterly resentful.

POLARIS FOR CHRISTMAS

This resentment induced an American response which showed all the political negligence of the original Skybolt decision. Having undercut the policies of the British, the Administration went on to undercut the policies of the United States. In his proposals to appease Macmillan in the meeting at Nasau, Kennedy managed to get in the way of most of the established American policies toward Europe. The key demarche was an ambiguous and conditional offer of Polaris missiles to Britain and France to be committed to NATO, except in instances where "supreme national interests are at stake."

Since it is difficult to imagine instances where
nuclear weapons might be used when supreme na-
tional interests are not at stake, the Nassau pro-
posal seems to be a complete surrender to the advo-
cates of independent national deterrents. But it is
worse than that. For the United States stipulated
that it would be up to the British and the French
to provide the submarines and warheads for the
missiles. Both countries are far from developing
these necessary components. To do so will cost
enormous sums of money which might otherwise
have gone to fulfill the other prescription of the
McNamara strategy: the provision of more con-
ventional forces to provide an alternative to sui-
cidal nuclear war for the defense of Europe. Thus
under the Nassau proposals Europe would be in-
duced to make renewed and intensified efforts to
acquire the independent nuclear forces which the
Administration opposes. But these same efforts would
make less likely the provision of the increased con-
ventional forces which the Administration advocates.
Moreover the European desire for increased military
independence would also be undercut. The lack of
sufficient conventional forces would make the Eu-
ropeans even more dependent for their defense on
the American threat of a nuclear war which would
destroy Europe. To boot, the chances for limitation
of the arms race would be reduced. To maintain the
credibility of the American threat to fight a nuclear
war in defense of Europe, we will have to continue
our enormous expenditures for first-strike prepon-
derance over the Soviet Union.

GERMANY AFFECTED

Not only Britain and France are affected by the
Nassau proposals. Indirectly the problem of the
German role in the Alliance was exacerbated. By
acquiescing in the French and British demands for
independent deterrents, the United States implied
that they might in fact need them if "supreme na-
tional interests were at stake". Yet if any na-
tion's supreme interests are likely to be at stake in

an attack on Europe, Germany's are likely to be.
Why then should the Germans not have a few mis-
siles of their own, for "independent" use when their
own "supreme national interests" are threatened?

The reason, of course, is that the United States has
another policy, which conflicts directly with the
Nassau agreement. That policy is to limit the dis-
persion of nuclear weapons, most importantly to
Germany because of the professed Soviet fears of
German revanchism. So far this policy has not
seemed invidious to West Germany largely because
we have scrupulously maintained our policy against
helping other countries to acquire independent nu-
clear forces. The British exception was plausibly
rationalized on the grounds of the essential British
contributions to the development of the Atomic
bomb during World War II. The Nassau pro-
posals, however, with their "supreme national inter-
ests" clause, violate this policy against independent
deterrents. Henceforth it will be more difficult for
us to maintain the impression that Germany is not
considered an untrustworthy special case, whose su-
preme national interests are less important than
those of France and Britain. It is ironic that one
reason for Germany's lesser position appears to be
that unlike the British and the French, the Germans
have cooperated with McNamara; they have in-
creased their conventional forces in NATO, and have
refrained from acquiring their own little arsenal of
nuclear weapons. This object lesson will not be lost
on German political parties. The Nassau proposals
thus may bring urgent new German demands for
nuclear weapons, which if satisfied may provoke a
dangerous reaction from the Soviet Union, and if
unsatisfied may induce dangerous anti-NATO politi-
cal pressures in Germany.

If the past is indicative, the United States will im-
provise again, attempt again to patch up the weak-
ening fabric of the Alliance. But though patch-
work might give a passing impression of unity, there
comes a time when the patched up fabric will no
longer hold up under stress. This curious "supreme
national interests" clause would seem to provide for
a breakdown of the Alliance whenever a concerted
front is needed. Whenever an individual country's
supreme national interests are threatened it pre-
sumably could act alone, beginning a war which
necessarily would threaten the supreme national in-
terests of all the participants, justifying presumably
the withdrawal of all their forces from the Alliance
also.

MORE IMPROMPTU POLICY

Perhaps it is unfair to reduce this combina-
tion of the worst strategic possibilities to the ab-
surdity of its implications. Predictably, it was not
accepted by France. And the Administration has
been feverishly backpedalling ever since its lost
weekend in Nassau. Suddenly it has started to do
some of the things it should have done years before
to make possible an autonomous NATO nuclear
force. It is even discussing the possibility of changes
in the Atomic Energy Act to permit establishment
of a NATO deterrent which is not in reality under
complete, independent American control. Of course
this belated activity will appear in Europe as a
hasty response to European initiatives. The Ad-
ministration still has not met the basic strategic
problems. This is unfortunate, but there is little else
to do but improvise when one waits until the last
moment. However there were many things to do
two years ago, when it first became clear that De

ξ

Gaulle was unshakably determined to acquire nuclear weapons.

First of all it should have been understood that this determination was a reality which could not be ignored in the development of an American strategy. This reality should have been accorded as much importance as the conflicting reality: That the best strategy for the West requires both centralized command and control of the deterrent, and increased conventional forces to provide an alternative to a self-defeating nuclear strategy in Europe. Since it was impossible to achieve both these objectives in view of the French determination to acquire an independent deterrent, the United States should have provided nuclear weapons for NATO in exchange for a larger contribution of conventional forces. At this point we might have insisted that these weapons be placed under some form of joint command, probably under plenipotentiaries of the three nuclear powers and West Germany. By deferring the offer until it was extorted out of us, we failed to acquire any concessions at all from the Europeans in exchange for the ostensible sacrifice of both our principal military objectives in Europe: The prevention of the spread of independent national nuclear forces, and the strengthening of NATO conventional forces to the point where the Soviet Union could not expect to defeat them without using nuclear weapons.

Crucial to any solution of European military problems is a solution of the extremely intractable problem of command and control. Though McNamara prefers complete American control and has adopted a strategy which seems to make it necessary, it has become clear that the Europeans will not accept this easy way out. This is too bad, but it is a political fact which must be taken into consideration in the development of a strategy. The problem is that though the Europeans will not trust the United States in complete command, even less will they trust one of themselves. It would appear therefore that unitary command is unacceptable, and so therefore are strategies like our counterforce, "no-city," which require it. By pressing further for the adoption of this strategy, the United States will exacerbate Alliance divisions, jeopardizing the paramount American political interest in NATO solidarity.

The reasons for the failure to anticipate European reaction to our European defense proposals can only be speculated in the absence of knowledge of exactly how the final decisions were made. Suggestive evidence is available, however. For one thing, most press reports on the elevated catfights and polite power struggles within the inner circles of the Administration indicate (1) that McNamara has been rising in the President's favor ever since the two men met, and (2) that the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, the only man high in the Administration with wide diplomatic experience, is now valued less as a foreign policy adviser than Brother Bob. Though it is a mistake to jump to conclusions, these speculations seem to be confirmed by the President's decision to take McNamara to the Nassau meeting with Macmillan, and leave Rusk behind despite an agenda reported to include non-military matters. In combination with the testimony of the decisions themselves, which show no evidence of State Department influence, these newspaper reports seem to indicate a general depreciation in the high councils of the Administration of the considerations which an experienced Secretary of State would be expected to

emphasize. Certainly the decision to drop the Skybolt would not have been made so summarily if the American Ambassador in Britain had been consulted and if the Secretary of State had been granted an opportunity to assert his objections.

## NEVER UNDER IKE

Though the personal relationships involved are probably important, the decision-making failures were facilitated by Kennedy's procedural approach. Among the President's most important departures from the practice of the Eisenhower Administration has been his down-grading of the importance of committee deliberations in the decision making process. As a Senator he wrote an article in *The Reporter* criticizing Eisenhower for an alleged failure to provide decisive leadership. Hans Morgenthau and other critics of Eisenhower's policy making procedures attributed his failures to a tendency to leave decision making to committees composed of representatives of the divergent interests of the various bureaus of government. In order to get a decision approved, it was necessary to acquire the assent of all the departments of government which might be affected. Thus the committee reports were said to be couched in abstract generalities concealing rather than resolving the basic conflicts; the action which followed was often designed more to propitiate the various interests concerned than to achieve some specific policy objective. But though this system prevented as definitive expression of policy as is possible with more independent executive decision making, it did have the important virtue of engaging all the interests which would be affected by a decision before rather than after it was made.

Thus in the Eisenhower administration, McNamara's strategy, and the decisions he made in prosecuting it, would have been subjected to the scrutiny of the Cabinet and National Security Council. A decision to drop Skybolt without informing the British could never have been made, because the State Department would have asserted its interests. Moreover, McNamara's strategy as a whole probably would have been compromised in committee rather than undercut in Europe. For whatever the deficiencies of the committee system, it does to some degree reproduce the political conditions under which a strategy must be carried out.

Though the President and the Secretary of Defense are more or less omnipotent in the Pentagon and in the privacy of their own capacious minds, they are far from omnipotent in the international arena where American foreign policy must operate. The problem under the Kennedy Administration has been that the criteria for the adoption of a policy—its internal consistency, the cogency and personality of its proponent, its political appeal—have been different from the criteria for its successful execution—its external consistency, its consistency with other policies of the Alliance, its political feasibility. The result ever since the inaugural, has been eloquent and definitive declarations of policy, often followed by embarrassment, compromise and frustration at the hands of political reality.

## REPRINTS

Copies of this *Advance Notice* supplement can be obtained from *Advance* for 10 cents each, 12 for $1, Box 8278, Washington 24, D. C.

Subscriptions to *Advance* are still only $2 a year.

6

Current Positions Notebook

Revised September 16, 1963

# BUDGET AND FISCAL POLICY

## A. NAR General Position

*1. Our fundamental and continuing goal must be a balanced budget over the course of the business cycle.

*2. "To Govern is to Choose"

* (a) In order to achieve a balanced budget, we must recognize that there are **limits** to the amount of resources which can at any one time be devoted to the public sector of our economy.

* (b) We must therefore be willing to make the hard choices necessary to ensure that available Federal revenues are devoted to public needs of the **highest priority**.

* (c) As part of this continuing process of choice, the following tests must be applied to proposals affecting new or existing federal spending programs:

  - How does this proposal rate on the scale of national priorities?

  - Can it be handled by state or local governments, or by private action (perhaps with some form of governmental assistance)?

  - Finally, if a federal program is the best and most appropriate course of action, we must determine whether it can be carried out immediately (without interfering with other programs which have higher priorities) or whether existing lower-priority programs have to be cut back in order to provide the necessary funds.

*3. The Kennedy Administration has **failed to control spending**, and has completely abandoned its announced objective of a balanced budget over the business cycle.

[Lc]

- 2 -

*4. The American public will accept <u>necessary temporary deficits</u>, (as in the case of NAR 1963 Federal tax reduction proposals to stimulate long-term economic growth) but they will be deeply disturbed -- and should be -- at indications that fiscal responsibility is regarded by their government as <u>old-fashioned and outmoded</u>. (NAR Milwaukee Statement, March 9, 1963)

*5. The issue is not one of ignoring human needs in order to balance the budget. The issue is that of establishing priorities and meeting expanding requirements out of economic growth rather than at the expense of growth. (NAR Cincinnati Statement, April 29, 1963)

*6. Failure to adhere in the long-run to a policy of fiscal responsibility can have serious repercussions, such as:

*(a) If government funds are provided through deficit financing with a persistence that <u>undermines</u> confidence, this can <u>inhibit private investment</u> to a degree more than offsetting the impact of increased spending.

*(b) Protracted deficit financing leads to an ever-increasing requirement for funds that must be used for <u>debt service</u>, rather than to meet current needs for public facilities and services. (NAR Omaha Statement, April 6, 1963)

(c) Prolonged deficit financing of the magnitude planned by the Administration could prove to be a significant <u>inflationary force</u>.

**NOTE:** In 1962 the consumer price index continued its moderate, but steady upward movement -- rising by 1.2%. At the present time, potential inflationary pressures exist, which in addition to protracted deficit financing, could become serious.

(d) As the debt increases and the Government's responsibility for selling bonds to manage the debt becomes greater, our ability to carry out effective <u>monetary policy</u> (using changes in interest rates to stimulate or restrain investment) is restricted.

- 3 -

B. <u>NAR Specific Positions</u>

*1. <u>Tax Cut Requires Expenditure Control</u>

* (a) If we are to have a tax reduction in 1963 to stimulate long-term economic growth, we must hold federal spending down to at least the fiscal 1963 level by cutting back sharply on low-priority programs. (Milwaukee)

* (b) Our goal -- through resultant economic growth and restraint on spending -- should be a balanced cash budget in FY '65. (Milwaukee)

* (c) After the budget has been balanced, it will then be possible to reduce the debt and to finance essential new or expanded government programs from rising receipts. (Milwaukee)

2. <u>Clear Statement of Government Fiscal Objectives Required</u>

The American people must be informed about the basic dimensions of fiscal policies. The President and his chief economic advisors must clearly state:

(a) their analysis of major areas of public need indicating the relative importance of competing uses for public funds;

(b) their assessment of the adequacy of current tax sources to meet future needs essential to the national interest; and

(c) their position on the long-run goal of fiscal policy (i.e. whether it is -- or is not -- desirable to balance the budget, either on an annual basis or over the course of the business cycle).

3. Recognizing the necessity for making <u>choices</u> among spending alternatives, I propose the adoption of the following institutional reforms to strengthen the basic decision-making machinery of the budget process:

(a) <u>Proposals for Facilitating Expenditure Control in the Executive Branch:</u>

- 4 -

\* (1) A new Office of _Executive Management_ should be established in the White House under the direction of a special _Presidential Assistant for Management_. (NAR Proposal, 1960)

-- The _Presidential Assistant for Management_ should be given the legal authority and the stature to effectively organize the budgetary process.

-- The five bureaus of the Office of Executive Management would be:

Bureau of the Budget;
Bureau of Legislative Coordination;
Bureau of Program and Planning;
Bureau of Organization and Management; and
Bureau of Personnel Management.

(2) Added stature should be given to the Bureau of the Budget as the primary operating agency in the Office of Executive Management.

The Budget Bureau is the single most important instrument for establishing a scale of national priorities. It is the one point in the governmental process where the activities of the government are subjected to _comprehensive_ analysis.

(3) The Bureau of the Budget should present _Quarterly_ Budget Reviews -- instead of the present system of _Mid-year_ Budget Reviews -- making it possible to more frequently assess the condition of federal finances.

(4) A major effort must be undertaken to make the budget document _shorter_ and _easier to read_ and _understand_.

(5) Procedures should be established so that the President and the Budget Bureau present the Congress a separate report (along with the annual budget) covering the _long-term spending implications_ of _existing_ Federal spending programs as well as the major areas of _future_ public need and how they should be met.

- 5 -

[L.C]

(6) With increasing attention being focused today on _spending for space_, a special _ad hoc_ committee (similar to the Clay Committee on foreign aid) should be set up _immediately_ to make an unbiased, non-partisan examination of the costs, objectives and priorities of the space program.

(7) The President should be given the _item veto_ power to eliminate "pork barrel" riders to appropriation bills.

(b) Proposals for Facilitating Expenditure Control in the Congress:

(1) Complementing these institutional reforms in the Executive Branch, a _Joint Committee on the Budget_ should be established by Congress to analyze the budget in its entirety and to perform essentially the same function in the Congress performed in the Executive Branch by the Office of Executive Management and a strengthened Budget Bureau.

(2) "Backdoor spending" (authorizations to expend Federal funds directly from the Treasury without Congressional approval) should be strictly curtailed, except under those conditions where it is absolutely necessary in the interest of national security or in the case of clearly defined essential domestic programs which could not otherwise be undertaken.

- 8 -

[c]

natural resources and commerce and transportation. Cuts in expenditures to offset these increases are to be achieved by:

- a $1 billion proposed cut for agriculture;

- cutting postal service costs as a result of 1962-enacted postal rate increases;

- reducing costs for veterans' programs; and
  substituting private for public credit (which is not the same thing as cutting spending).

4. Budget Implications for the Future -- "Decade of Deficits" Likely if Spending Increases Continue

There are clear indications that the Administration's future program plans will produce large increases in the budget again next year and in ensuing years.

(a) The President has sent over a dozen messages to Congress this year. Eight propose new domestic programs involving sizeable increases in spending.

Added together, these new program requests (accepting Administration cost estimates) total $20 billion ($5 billion per year) in new spending for the 4 fiscal years beginning with FY '65.

(b) Arthur Burns predicts (on the basis of Administration budget figures) that the budget will not balance again until 1972. In arriving at this conclusion, Burns made the assumption that spending for all purposes (including defense and space) will increase by $5 billion a year and we will have 6% growth.

The figures above indicating a $5 billion annual increase in new domestic spending alone for the next four years suggest that Burns' assumption on the spending side is too conservative.

On the other hand, his assumption of 6% growth is too optimistic. If spending goes up faster than $5 billion a year or growth falls below 6%, deficits, says Burns, will continue significantly beyond 1972.

- 9 -

D. <ins>NAR Position on Kennedy '64 Budget and Current Fiscal Policies</ins>

*1. The Administration's new tax program fails to recognize that the control of federal spending is essential if action on the tax front is to be effective. (Milwaukee)

*(a) It is the height of fiscal irresponsibility to propose a tax cut in an upswing phase of the business cycle along with a $5 3/4 billion increase in cash spending and proposed new programs that would require at least a $5 billion annual increase in Federal expenditures for an indeterminate future period.

*(b) The dictates of fiscal responsibility call for Federal spending to be controlled by a determined effort to cut expenditures for all but essential needs, deferring programs of lower national priority.

*(c) As presented, the Administration's program places overwhelming reliance on the theory that direct government action to increase spending will automatically raise the economy's overall growth rate. It ignores completely the fact that if it is done in a way that undermines confidence, such stimulus as it provides can be more than offset by cutbacks that take place in the private sector that account for 3/4 of all expenditures for goods and services.

*2. A deficit in fiscal 1964 is inevitable. But with an adequate increase in the rate of growth as a result of effective tax cuts coupled with restraint on spending, the goal of a balanced budget by 1965 is entirely reasonable. (NAR Omaha Statement, April 6, 1963)

E. Current Legislative Status

1. <ins>Congressional Action</ins>

(a) House Republicans claimed in March that cuts between $10 billion and $15 billion could be made in spending authorizations. They estimated this would mean a reduction of between $4 billion and $6 billion in the FY '64 deficit.

- 10 -

-- Biggest cuts in authorizations proposed were $3 billion for **defense** and $2 billion for **space**.

-- **Maurice Stans** (former Eisenhower Budget Director) is working with House Republicans under Rep. Frank Bow of Ohio.

(b) With NAR support, House Republicans tried and **failed** to reduce the appropriation of $450 million in additional funds for **emergency public works** (April, 1963).

(c) In the House, the big test on spending is likely to be the Byrnes amendment. (Memo sent to NAR, September 13, 1963 on Byrnes Amendment.)

(d) The Senate, which has generally been in the position of having to restore unrealistic House cuts, has begun to take a stronger stand on spending.

- 11 -

Table on Amounts Cut From Administration Requests As of August 1,
1963

(millions of dollars)

| Bill | House | Senate | Enacted |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1963 Supplemental | -100 | -164 | -184 |
| Interior | -100 | -42 | -184 |
| Treasury-Post Office | -149 | -76 | -101 |
| Labor - HEW | -309 |  |  |
| Agriculture | -309 |  |  |
| Legislative Branch (excludes Senate) | -9 |  |  |
| State, Justice, Commerce, Judiciary | -308 |  |  |
| Defense | -1,900 |  |  |

Grand total of reductions on August 1 on portions of
budget processed through regular appropriations bills:

-$3,245 million

This reduction is based on the partial consideration of
3/4's of the total in NOA requested by the Administration
this year. This figure is not final as the Senate has
only acted on 2 of the 7 bills listed above -- and most
importantly has not acted on the Defense Appropriation
which accounts for 2/3's of the total.*

Source: House Appropriations Committee

3. Administration Reaction to Demands for Cuts

(a) In light of strong sentiment for expenditure control, Kennedy has proposed several reductions to Congress in his 1964 budget -- chief of which was his recommendation of a $500 million cut in his original request for foreign aid.

(b) On September 14, the President (obviously reacting to pressure behind the Byrnes amendment) issued an order placing a blanket restriction on all but essential new programs for FY '65 -- the budget to be submitted next January.

*Appropriations on which the House had not voted as of June 27:
Public Works-AEC, Foreign Aid, Military Construction, District
of Columbia, and Independent Offices.

MEMORANDUM

October 1, 1963

TO: Henry A. Kissinger

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Civilian Space Budget

Please note the attached clipping.

Especially with NAR advocating a hold-the-line
policy on the budget, he may well get asked for his position
in response to a question like this:

"Q. Do you approve the cut by the House
Appropriations Subcommittee in the
President's civilian space budget?"

In this connection, recall that the Governor's
balance of payments statement or some other recent statement
of NAR's, questioned the race-to-the moon.

We need this quickly.

I suggest the proposed answer for NAR be sent
to him with a short briefing memo. I am asking June to
give me a draft briefing memo.

cc: Stacy May
June Goldthwait
Bill Ronan
Hugh Morrow
Bob McManus

October 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: *Your Memorandum dated September 30, 1963*

The difference between the Governor's past record on the test ban and his recent advocacy of ratification is as follows.

(1) The opposition to the test ban in the past had been based on the Governor's doubts that underground testing was inspectable. Most of the Governor's statements in the past have included a phrase to the effect that he would go along with a test ban on explosions that produced fall-out.

(2) The highest military and political officials had testified that the test ban as it now stands does not jeopardize our security.

(3) The real concerns are not what the test ban prohibits but how energetically the Administration will act in carrying out the actions which are permitted under it. The purpose of the Governor's statement was to point out the Administration's responsibility in this vital area. In this respect, I agree with a speech made by Senator Jackson which I am enclosing.

(4) The test ban had already been signed by fifty-five nations. Thus the loss to American prestige and influence of failure to ratify would have been extreme.

failure to resist would have been extreme.

(4) The test pan had already been signed by fifth-tive with a speech made by Senator Jackson which I am enclosing.

reasonability in this vital area. In this respect, I agree
the Governor's statement was to point out the Administration's
our the actions which are permitted under it. The purpose of
but now energetically the Administration will act in carrying

(3) The real concerns are not what the test pan proh Lights

our security.

(2) The highest military and political officials had
testified that the test pan as it now stands does not jeopardize

along with a test pan on explosions that produced fall-out.

Test pan had included a phrase to the effect that he would go
was inspectable. Most of the Governor's statements in the
been based on the Governor's doubts that underground testing

follows.

The difference between the Governor's test record on
the test pan and his recent advocacy of ratification is as

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum dated September 30, 1963

FROM: Henry A. Klaasen

October 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM

October 1, 1963

TO: Stacy May

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: East-West Trade

The wheat sale furor, about which I have
written you separately, seems to me to be a springboard
for NAR updating and remaking his statement of several
years ago on East-West trade.

I think this would be an effective issue to
talk on at this time -- enabling him to demonstrate

(1) NAR's tough and realistic attitude toward the Communist bloc; and

(2) His positive and constructive ideas.

How long do you think it would take you to
update the old speech?

Attached is some incoming material in this
area.

R.B.P.

cc: William F. Butler
Henry A. Kissinger
George L. Hinson
Bill Ronan
Hugh Morrow
Bob McManus

October 27, 1963

TO: Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson
Jerry Danzig
Lloyd Free
George L. Hinman
Henry A. Kissinger
Robert McManus
Hugh Morrow
Harry O'Donnell
William J. Ronan

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Circulation of Memos.

It is vitally important that we get copies of
important memos around to everyone who should be informed.

Just so you will know to whom the Research Unit
sends copies, I am attaching the list I use. On most memos,
I use List B. (On a few, I have omitted Malcolm so as not
to overload him with working papers and Lloyd and Harry
because of their offices being out-of-town. That is List A.)

I suggest you have your secretaries make up a
standard list. Please include both myself and John D. Deardourff,
if you can do so - otherwise just myself.

I count on Bob Douglass seeing George Hinman's
material and Ed Kresky, as needed, seeing Bill Ronan's material.

As yet we have not covered Public Relations. This,
I hope will be corrected soon.

R.B.P.

Attachment

cc: Louise A. Boyer

LIST A--

Jerry Danzig

George L. Hinman

Henry A. Kissinger

Robert McManus

Hugh Morrow

William J. Ronan

LIST B--

Lt. Gov. Malcolm Wilson

Jerry Danzig

Lloyd Free

George L. Hinman

Henry A. Kissinger

Robert McManus

Hugh Morrow

Harry O'Donnell

William J. Ronan

October 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM

In a press quote from California, the Governor is reported
to have said that Goldwater's call for a debate is no more divisive
than the pickets outside his hotel saying: "Rocky, go home."

It seems to me that the two things should not be put on the
same level. The call for a debate should be presented as a means of
unifying the party and focusing it on some common principles. The
pickets, on the other hand, are in the same category as the refusal
to debate: they are an attempt to suppress democratic discussion. I
think we should be on the offensive with respect to the debate issue,
as well as the picket issue.

cc. Jerry Danzig
George L. Hinman
Robert McManus
Hugh Morrow
William J. Ronan

William T. Ronan
Hugh Morrow
Robert McManus
George F. Hinnern
cc. Jerry Damsig

as well as the ticket issue.

think we should be on the offensive with respect to the debate issues, to debate: they are an attempt to address democratic discussion. I back tickets, on the other hand, are in the same category as the refusal matching the party and focusing it on some common principles. The same level. The call for a debate should be presented as a means of it seems to me that the two things should not be but on the than the tickets outside the hotel saying: "Rocky, So home."

TO: Henry V. Kießinger
TO: Howell B. Berkner

MEMORANDUM

October 30, 1963

October 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

One of our papers reported that the Governor stated in New Hampshire that he could afford to take so much time from New York State because he had such a good Lieutenant Governor, and such an efficient State Administration.

It seems to me that statements like this will be murder in the campaign in '66. Also I do not think it will do him much good in New Hampshire and it may create an impression of neglect of duty.

The correct line would seem to me to be to state that of course New York State has top priority. The Governor will do most of his campaigning on weekends and devote to it the hours usually set aside for rest. Any emergencies that might arise in his absence could be initially handled by his Lieutenant Governor.

cc. Danzig
Hinman
McManus
Morrow
Ronan

blind copy to: Goldthwait
Bailey

plind cody to: Coldhwait
Barley

Benson
Norton
Mellman
Hunten
cc. Donny

could be initially handled by the Lieutenant Governor.
act aside for rest. And emergencies that might arise in the absence
of his complement or resources and devote to it the best usually
concern New York State public priority. The Governor will do best
The correct line would seem to me to be to state that of
at duty.
Good in New Hampshire and it may create an impression of neglect
in the combatants in '63. Vice I do not think it will do him any
It seems to me that statements like this will be under
and such an efficient State Administration.
New York State because he had such a good Lieutenant Governor,
New Hampshire that he could afford to take so much time from
One of our bests before reported that the Governor stated in
October 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUB: Henry V. Kietzgerx
TO: Rameil B. Rensink

October 30, 1963

October 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

cc. -Banzig
Hinman
Melmanus-
Morrow-
Ronan

Bassett
Horace
Hillman
cc. Baxley

could be initially handled by pie Lieutenant Governor.

not large for rest. Any emergencies that might arise in pie absence
of pie combatting on weekends and weekends to it the hours namely
course New York State has job priority. The Governor will do most

of qutly.

Good in New Hampshire and it may create an impression of neglect
in the campaign in '60. Vice I do not think it will do him much

It seems to me that statements like this will be more

and such an efficient state administration.

One of our bakers reported that the Governor stated in

FROM: Henry V. Klaussler
TO: Roaneil B. Perkin

MEMORANDUM

October 30, 1963

November 13, 1963

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Proposed meeting between The Governor and Kistiakowsky
Proposed meeting between The Governor and Millikan

1) I have spoken with Kistiakowsky about meeting with The Governor on our space program. He is willing to do it.

2) I have asked Max Millikan to do a paper on foreign aid.
Since he is on the Advisory Committee of the AID Agency, he would like
to think it over. However, he is willing to meet with the Governor
and brief him on the situation.

I suggest that we arrange both of these appointments if at all
possible.

possible.

Since he is on the Advisory Committee of the VID Agency, he would like to think it over. However, he is willing to meet with the Governor and brief him on the situation.

1) I have spoken with Klatankowaty about meeting with The

Proposed meeting between The Governor and Millikan
SUBJECT: Proposed meeting between The Governor and Klatankowaty

FROM: Henry V. Klaasinger
TO: Roswell B. Perkins

November 12, 1962

November 14, 1963

Mr. Roswell B. Perkins
22 West 55th Street
New York, New York

Dear Rod:

I am enclosing my latest version of the Vietnam Statement. I have sought to reduce what has been called the "moral component" to the absolute minimum. I have also attempted to make clear that we are not backing the Diem regime.

Over the last two days I have had the opportunity to discuss the situation with two people who have every reason to know it extremely well. I am satisfied that I possess sufficient facts to back up the statement.

Of course, others with access to the same facts have drawn different conclusions or we would not be in the position we are.

My recommendation is to release the statement by November 20th when Rusk, Bundy, Taylor and Lodge are meeting in Hawaii.

It finally comes down to a question of which judgment is to prevail. I believe this statement keeps up the offensive, and I see no political loss. Above all, I believe it will be vindicated by events.

Enclosure

Vietnam statement

Nevertheless, whatever the morality or effectiveness of the Diem government, I regret that the Administration permitted a situation to arise in which it thought its only remedy was to set in motion events which resulted in the assassination of two men whom the United States was instrumental in putting in power in 1955 and to whom it made a formal pledge of support as late as December 1961. And I am uneasy about the refusal of the United States to grant asylum to a third Ngo brother at the Consulate in Hue, particularly after the U.S. Embassy in Saigon had sheltered two Buddhist leaders of the anti-Diem revolt for eight weeks.

Even if a dissociation from the Diem regime had become necessary, it is important to recognize that the manner in which it was brought about involved considerable costs.

The overthrow of the Diem regime following less than two years on the abandonment of a pro-Western government in Laos must cause other threatened leaders in South East Asia to wonder about the constancy of U.S. support or the consequences of a U.S. presence. They may decide that

U.S. airports or the consequences of a U.S. invasion. They may decide that restricted airports in South East Asia to number about the same as the abroad airports of a hot-Western government in East Asia that causes other

The constitution of the Berlin regime following less than two years on
involved considerable costs.

It is important to recognize that the number in which it was brought upon
Even if a disassociation from the Berlin regime had become necessary,
challenged two Muhammadleelees of the anti-Diem revolt for eight months.

Conclude in Mac, basically after the U.S. independently in Berlin put
retinal of the United States to start salary to a strict U.S. premier at the
beginning of support as late as December 1961. And I am sure about the
instruments in building in power in 1972 and so on when it made a formal
arrest reaction in the concentration of two men whom the United States was
said in which it thought its only remedy was to cut in motion events
Government. I regret that the Administration permitted a situation to
happen that the mortality of electrictiveness of the Berlin

Mussolini, whatever the mortality of electrictiveness of the Berlin

Victim statement

page 5

Draft No. 5

Thursday morning, November 14, 1963

# VIEINAN STATEMENT

MATTERS OF CONCERN

In the next few days top officials of the United States government
will meet in Hawaii to review American policy in Vietnam. This conference
should be used for a serious reassessment of American policy in that
unhappy country.

The crucial importance of this review has been underlined by the
sober events of recent weeks. The government of an allied country has been
overthrown by a military coup encouraged by our government. Its leaders
have been assassinated. A military junta has taken power.

These events have been justified with the argument that the Diem govern-
ment was losing the war against the Communists and was losing popular support.
Without access to all relevant information, I do not challenge these assertions,
though they run counter to most official public statements of the past two
years. There is no doubt that in the last few months the Diem regime engaged in
many actions which were extremely ill-advised. And there is no excuse for
the tactless statements of members of the Ngo family.

Vietnam statement

fighting. The Administration has shown an inadequate understanding
of the objective difficulties of guerrilla war and has therefore mounted
an entirely insufficient effort.

1. The Neutralization of Laos.

In 1961 when the present Administration took office, the United
States was backing a pro-Western government in Laos. The Communist
Pathet Lao controlled only one-fifth of the area. On March 23, 1961,
in the face of a Communist advance, President Kennedy announced that the
"safety (of Laos) runs with the safety of us all." U.S. troops moved into
the Gulf of Siam.

When the Communists continued their advance, despite our "show
of strength," we came up with a scheme for the "neutralization" of Laos.
We abandoned our support for the pro-Western government and insisted on a
coalition government in which the Communists play an increasingly powerful
part. Today the Communist Pathet Lao control over half of Laos including
the entire area contiguous to the Vietnamese border, extending over 260

the entire area concerned to the Aviation forces, increasing over 300
battalions. Today the Committee Budget Force control over half of forces including
coalition government in which the Committee has an increasingly beneficial
role. We abandoned our support for the pro-Western Government and instated on a
of strength," we came up with a scheme for the "neutralization" of force.

When the Committee continued their advance, despite our "show
the Gulf of Suez."

"Safety (of force) runs with the safety of our men." U.S. troops moved into
the face of a Communist advance, President Kennedy announced that the
Budget Force controlled only one-fifth of the area. On March 23, 1961,
States were packing a pro-Western Government in force. The Committee

In 1961 when the present Administration took office, the United
1. The Neutralization of Iraq.

an entirely insufficient effort.
of the objective difficulties of guerrilla war and has therefore promised
good luck. The Administration has shown an inadequate understanding

Aerial statement

M

Vietnam statement

miles, thus opening up a new supply line and a sanctuary for the Communist guerrillas in Vietnam.

In December, 1961, while Laos was being "neutralized," the United States formally committed itself to a major effort to defeat the Vietcong guerrillas. Over ten thousand U.S. military personnel were sent to Vietnam as instructors. Military assistance was stepped up. It was announced that Vietnam was "different" from Laos.

The "neutralization" of Laos was inconsistent with our Vietnam policy on two counts: Psychologically, it spurred on the Vietcong (Communist guerrillas) and demoralized our friends. It set the precedent that we were capable of sacrificing a government we had been instrumental in establishing. It thus must have created the hope in some and the fear in others that if the war in Vietnam was sufficiently prolonged, we would tire of it as we had in Laos.

Vietnam statement

Militarily, the so-called "neutralization" of Laos opened up the entire frontier between Laos and Vietnam to guerrilla infiltration and enabled the Communists to establish sanctuaries in Laos, and new supply lines into Vietnam.

Those supply lines have strengthened the Vietcong in their unending war of harassment.

## 2. The "News Management" of the Administration.

Having made the struggle in Vietnam inescalably more difficult as a result of its Laoian policy, the Administration has repeatedly sought to assure the American people that the situation in Vietnam was getting better.

Thus:

- On July 24, 1962, Secretary of Defense McNamara said that the South Vietnamese were "beginning to hit the Vietcong insurgents where it hurts most -- in winning the people to the side of the government."

- On December 12, 1962, President Kennedy said that the situation in Vietnam was "in some ways lighter" than it had been a year before.

- On April 12, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk said that "an important corner has been turned" in the war in Vietnam.

indefinite corner that has been made" in the war in Vietnam.

On April 12, 1963, Secretary of State Dulles said that "no
prejudice" in Vietnam was "in some way lighter" than it had been a year
on December 12, 1962, when Secretary Kennedy said that the situation

the state of the Government,"
immature where it parte mot -- in aiming the people to
the South. Aresenese made "beginning to hit the Vietcong"
-- On July 24, 1963, Secretary of Defense McNamara said that

Time:

to ensure the American people that the situation in Vietnam was getting better.
a result of its location directly, the Administration has repeatedly sought

Having made the struggle in Vietnam increasingly more difficult as
far as possible, the Administration has repeatedly sought

war of parley.

Those superbly fine men have strengthened the Aresense in their ascending
line into Vietnam.

ensured the Committee to accept sanctions in Korea, and now ambly
cutre truster between Korea and Vietnam to guerilla infiltration and

Military, the so-called "guerilla infiltration" of Korea based on the

Vietnam statement

page 6

Vietnam statement

-- On September 25, 1963, Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester said that military events in Vietnam were "getting better and better" and that reports showed that the government was "rapidly approaching" militarily the point where "the goals set will be reached relatively shortly."

-- On October 2 a White House announcement stated that the war was going so well that 1,000 U.S. military personnel could be withdrawn before the end of this year and most of the remainder before the end of 1965.

-- On October 31, 1963, the day before the overthrow of the Diem regime, General Harkins, the Commander of our forces in Vietnam, said that victory, in the sense it applied to this kind of war, was only months away.

In other words, either President Diem was winning the war or our official statements were untrue. On the very eve of the coup, our top military representative was either misleading the American people or else the justification for the coup in terms of winning the war is hollow.

These statements were bound to delude the American people as to the extent of the commitment which is needed.

### 3. Underestimating the Inherent Difficulties of Guerrilla War.

The Administration has consistently underestimated the extent of the challenge in Vietnam. As a result our effort has been too little and too late. We must recognize the following facts:

Vietnam statement

-- The Vietcong are trained and supported from outside the country. From such a privileged sanctuary, guerrilla action can be indefinitely maintained.

-- The guerrillas have a telling advantage over the government forces in that they need fight only where they are superior, whereas the government forces cannot be strong everywhere.

-- Many South Vietnamese, threatened with death by the guerrillas, are compelled to offer them support, whatever their real sympathies may be.

-- The morale and the efficiency of the existing Administration is one of the chief targets of any guerrilla movement. Through assassination or blackmail they eliminate or drive many of the most competent civil servants from office.

On the basis of these elements of our policy, the Administration must accept major responsibility for the military deadlock in Vietnam.

There is no escape -- deceased or living -- to whom this Administration will be able to point -- now or in the future.

## THE ROAD AHEAD

We can do nothing about the past. As for the future, the Administration is now fully responsible for what may happen in Vietnam. The prestige and good faith of the U.S. is irrevocably engaged. The test of our policy will be two-fold:

be two-fold:

Good faith of the U.S. to internationally engaged. The fact of our policy will
be non fully reasonable for what may happen in Vietnam. The breathe and

We can do nothing about the best. As for the future, the Administration

THE ROAD AHEAD

There is no agreement -- deceased or living -- to whom the Administration
must accept major responsibility for the militarily dead or in Vietnam.

many of the most competent civil servants from offices
through sequestration or placement in the limelight or give
it one of the chief targets of any South Vietnamese movement.

-- The morale and the efficiency of the existing Administration
undermine may be.

-- Many South Vietnamese, threatened with death by the Southvilles,

whereas the Government forces cannot be strong everywhere.

-- The Southvilles have a ceiling advantage over the Government
action can be indefinitely maintained.

-- The Vietcong are trained and supported from outside the
  country. From each a privileged intelligence, Southvilles

Aretum statement

page 8

M

Vietnam statement

page 9

a) Whether a new government, responsive to popular needs and aspirations, can be established.

b) Whether the war against the Communist guerrillas can be won.

Both tasks require major efforts which the Administration has so far refused to face.

The new Vietnamese government can be expected to face a period of considerable domestic instability. Pressures for the neutralization of Vietnam on the Laotian model may multiply. Whatever may be thought of the methods by which the coup was accomplished, the new government will require a wise and patient U.S. support.

I do not believe that the effort now being mounted in Vietnam is adequate. In its unwillingness to tell the American people the full extent of the challenge, the Administration courts the danger of having U.S. troops bogged down indefinitely in a war with no issue.

The elements of a new policy are dictated in part by the errors of the past.

November 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Edward Teller's forthcoming visit to the University of New Hampshire and his possible assistance to The Governor.

As I told you on the telephone, on my visit to California I discussed with Edward Teller his forthcoming visit to the University of New Hampshire on December 5th. After some hesitation, he indicated that he would do what he could to support Nelson while in New Hampshire.

He plans now to give a speech stressing the gravity of the international situation. He would then appreciate some questions from the audience which would enable him to mention Nelson's name.

The three questions we thought of are as follows:

1) If the situation is as grave as you say, could we afford to change the Administration in 1964 and put the country into the hands of inexperienced leaders?

This question would give Teller a chance to speak about Nelson's foreign affairs experience.

2) What do you think about the state of the Atlantic Alliance and what can be done to promote Atlantic unity?

Edward would be able to speak favorably on Nelson's statements on that issue.

3) What do you think of the open skies proposal?

Finally, would it be possible to put Edward on the mailing list for any statements on foreign and defense policy that the Governor may make.

I will assume that unless I hear from you to the contrary, these questions will be planted in the audience, and I will tell Edward accordingly.

cc. John Deardourff
John Wells

John Wells
cc. John Desbordes

descriptions will be blunted in the audience, and I will tell Edward accordingly.
I will assume that unless I hear from you to the contrary, these
any statements on foreign and defense policy that the Governor may make.

Finlayson, would it be possible to put Edward on the selling flat for
these statements on foreign and defense policy that the Governor may make.

2) What do you think of the open skies proposal?

on that issue.

Edward would be able to ask favorably on Nelson's statements

3) What do you think about the state of the Atlantic Alliance

foreign affairs experience.

This question would give Teller a chance to ask about Nelson's

afford to change the Administration in 1964 and but

1) If the administration is as grave as you say, could we

the audience which would enable him to mention Nelson's name.
international situation. He would then appreciate some questions from
theiane now to give a speech attacking the gravity of the

that he would do what he could to support Nelson while in New Hampshire.
of New Hampshire on December 2nd. After some restatement, he indicated
I discussed with Edward Teller his forthcoming visit to the University
As I told you on the telephone, on my visit to California

New Hampshire and his possible assistance to the Governor.
SUBJECT: Edward Teller's forthcoming visit to the University of

FROM: Henry V. Klaasen
TO: Roswell B. Perkin

MEMORANDUM

November 31, 1962

November 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Cuba Current Position Paper Memorandum of November 20, 1963

I think a meeting with Berle and Radford might be useful, although I have talked to Berle about the basic ideas contained in the paper and will see him again on December 4th. Still it might be useful to set something up.

useful to set something up.

the paper and will see him again on December 4th. Still it might be
although I have talked to Berle about the past ideas contained in
I think a meeting with Berle and Redford might be useful.

SUBJECT: Cops Current Position Paper Memorandum of November 20, 1963

FROM: Henry V. KrasAGER

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

MEMORANDUM

November 22, 1963

December 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Roswell B. Perkins

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: NAR Press Conference of November 7, 1963

There are a number of inaccuracies in the Press Conference which I think we should call to the Governor's attention.

1. On page 7 the Governor said that he believed that the wheat deal negotiations had ended. This was incorrect on November 7th and still remains incorrect.

2. On page 10 the Governor spoke of cloture being voted by a majority. This technically is not wrong. However, the majority required is a two-thirds majority.

I also noticed on page 6 that he spoke of making a full statement on Vietnam soon. Is he prepared to do that? For what it is worth, I am now opposed to making a Vietnam statement. I see no way of making one which would not be taken as a veiled attack on Lodge.

one which would not be taken as a violated attack on Lodge.
I am now opposed to making a Vietnam statement. I see no way of making
on Vietnam soon. Is he prepared to do that? For what it is worth.

I also noticed on page e that he spoke of making a full statement

two-thirds majority.

wrong. However, the majority required is a
voted by a majority. This technically is not

S. On page 10 the Governor spoke of cloture being

remains incorrect.

This was incorrect on November 7th and still
that the wheat deal negotiations had ended.

I. On page 7 the Governor said that he believed

SUBJECT: NVR Press Conference of November 7, 1962

FROM: Henry V. Knausiger
TO: Roawell B. Perkins

MEMORANDUM

December 11, 1962

December 16, 1963

TO: Stacy May

FROM: Roswell B. Perkins

SUBJECT: Notes on Foreign Aid

My notes on foreign aid from NAR indicate these
points:

1. He wanted "Havana Resolutions." (We're trying to locate these.)

2. He insists we try to cast the foreign aid program in a broader framework of what kind of world we are moving toward.

3. He sees 3 broad categories of aid (I won't repeat because I gather you're familiar with these.)

4. He wants the Institute of American Affairs approach (?)

bcc: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger ✓
Doug Bailey
June Goldthwait

June Goldthwaite

Doug Bailey

bcc: Dr. Henry A. Krasinger

moving toward.

2. He initiates we try to start the foreign aid program

these.)

1. He wanted "Havans Resolutions." (We're trying to locate
points:

SUBJECT: Notes on Foreign Aid

FROM: Roawell B. Perkins

TO: Stacy May

December 16, 1963