Sadat, Nixon at the pyramids: Under a blazing sun, a respite from Watergate

Newsweek

A royal welcome: Mr. Nixon

## ‘NIX-ON, WELCOME!’

They packed the dusty streets of Cairo twenty deep, screaming “Nix-on, Nix-on, Nix-on ... Welcome, welcome.” Under a blazing sun, the Presidents of the United States and Egypt stood in the back of an open limousine, waving to frenzied crowds and beaming with delight. In a triumphant processional that swept all the way down the Nile from Cairo to Alexandria, millions of Egyptians surged forward last week, beating the air with palm fronds, trilling the haunting ululation of joy that graces Arab weddings and strewing rose petals in the path of Richard Nixon. In the Red Sea port of Jidda, he was given a stately Islamic welcome by feudal Saudi Arabian princes in flowing black robes. In the ancient capital of Damascus, hundreds of uniformed troops stood

at stiff attention under fluttering American flags. And in Jerusalem, a luxurious hotel was emptied of its 600 occupants to receive the American guest of honor.

No modern Chief of State had ever received a more impressive welcome outside his own country. And though Mr. Nixon's passage to the Middle East was little more than a nine-day hegira from the torment of Watergate, it buoyed him perhaps even more than his historic trips to Moscow and Peking. The visit, he said expansively, "could well be remembered centuries from now as one of those great turning points which affect mankind for the better."

Whether the trip would significantly improve Mr. Nixon's own prospects was another matter. The reception he received in the Middle East seemed

genuine enough—though it had been carefully and expensively orchestrated (page 23)—and boosted Mr. Nixon's image as a peace President. But the hoopla was not loud enough to stifle the drumroll of Watergate back home. In Washington, the Supreme Court agreed to rule on whether the grand jury was within its authority in naming him an unindicted co-conspirator in the Watergate cover-up. New evidence leaked into print suggesting that the White House transcripts of the Watergate tapes made public by Mr. Nixon in April had been edited to blur the President's role in the cover-up (page 29).

There was cold comfort in the latest polls: though the Gallup poll reported that the percentage of Americans who think the President should be compelled to leave office had declined since early May from 48 to 44 per cent, the Louis Harris poll showed that for the first time most Americans (52 per cent in all) now believe that Congress should impeach Mr. Nixon—and remove him from office.

The grand tour had hardly begun when Mr. Nixon was jolted by a political bombshell unexpectedly detonated by his own Secretary of State. In Salzburg, where the Nixon party paused for a 36-hour rest stop before flying to the Middle East, Henry Kissinger, his voice quivering with anger and his eyes dewy with tears, summoned a press conference and vowed to resign if his own innocence of any wrongdoing in a wiretapping controversy weren't established once and

18

AP

makes the rounds in Saudi Arabia

for all (page 24). Kissinger had not warned Mr. Nixon that he planned such a threat—and his outburst left a chill between the two men for days. The President, said one topsider, was “furious.”

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee seemed reluctant to open a potentially ticklish investigation into reports that Kissinger, during his confirmation hearings last year, had been less than candid when he denied that he had ordered wiretaps on newsmen and his own aides. However the affair is resolved, Kissinger's performance in Salzburg last week revealed a flaw in his diplomatic suit of armor—his thin skin. “The damned fool,” snapped Vermont's Sen. George Aiken. “Can't he take it? Why, that's part of the business—being criticized.”

With Kissinger lingering in the background, Mr. Nixon was required to carry on his diplomatic mission largely alone. The main purpose of his trek to the Middle East was to symbolize a new turnabout in relations between the U.S. and the Arab world, where suspicion of America has been festering ever since the foundation of Israel 26 years ago. The President clearly hoped for more sightseeing than substance along the way. But away from the crowds and banquet halls, his Arab hosts chose to press for a solution to the grievances of the Palestinians—the last major obstacle to peace. And Mr. Nixon, who prefers to prepare meticulously for his adventures in summitry, wound up negotiating on the road—and stalling for time.

UPI photos

Kissinger does a super burn: The President was 'furious'

The dealing was high-stakes nonetheless. Mr. Nixon promised Egypt's President Anwar Sadat a nuclear power plant for peaceful uses—an offer that brought forth a jittery outburst of criticism in both Jerusalem and Washington. “If you looked for an area to put a nuclear plant to create as much trouble as possible,” said Democratic Sen. Henry Jackson, “the Middle East would be selected.”

## A POPULAR GLOBE-TROTTER

The President also urged the other Arab leaders on his list (Saudi Arabia's King Faisal, Syria's President Hafez Asad and Jordan's King Hussein) to accept U.S. aid, technological help and private investments in return for friendship—and oil. But his largesse only rattled some normally sober Israelis. “I hope we can trust America,” sniped ex-Denfense Minister Moshe Dayan.

Palestinian extremists, for their part, demonstrated their opposition to any form of reasonable compromise by stag-

ing a murderous—and suicidal—attack on an Israeli kibbutz atop the Golan Heights. The mission left three women and four guerrillas dead. Its purpose, crowed one terrorist chief in Beirut, was “to mar any attempt to beautify the ugly American face.”

Through the worst of times, Mr. Nixon has believed that his standing as a popular globe-trotter and inventive diplomat would outweigh the scandals that have swirled around him at home, thereby tilting the balance in his favor when Congress votes on impeachment. Foreign policy thus plays a vital role in Mr. Nixon's bid to prevent the unmaking of his Presidency. This week Kissinger is scheduled to attend a NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Ottawa where he hopes to iron out the last wrinkles in an expected statement of principles aimed at shoring up the Atlantic alliance. Then the President will stop off in Brussels next week for a signing ceremony before flying on to Moscow for his third summit meeting

June 24, 1974

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NATIONAL AFFAIRS

with Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev.

Brezhnev came to Mr. Nixon's aid last week by announcing that the Soviet Union was ready "right now" to agree to a timetable for stopping underground nuclear tests. But that was far from the comprehensive agreement on limiting nuclear arms that Mr. Kissinger and the President had once hoped for. And the prospects for any major breakthroughs in Moscow appeared even dimmer last week after Democrat Paul H. Nitze, a five-year veteran of the U.S. SALT negotiating team, resigned to protest the paralyzing effect of Watergate on the talks. "It would be illusory," he wrote in a Dear Mr. President letter, "to attempt to ignore or wish away the depressing reality of the traumatic events now unfolding in our nation's capital."

For Mr. Nixon, getting away from Washington even for a few days must have been a merciful reprieve. With 28

2 million cheered the two leaders through a grand march that made Aida look like an off-Broadway revue.

After an opening round of sparring over political and economic issues, Sadat threw an evening banquet al fresco on the grounds of the palace. Rich Oriental carpets were laid on the spreading lawns for the 400 guests. Clusters of red, yellow, blue and green lights twinkled from the palms and shrubbery. Turbaned waiters served a dinner that featured oxtail soup, moussaka, cucumber-and-yogurt salad and ices. Cairo's two most celebrated belly dancers undulated before the President, Pat Nixon and Kissinger—who finally managed to grin. And Sadat presented the President with the Collar of the Nile—Egypt's highest civilian honor. He also made Pat a member of the Order of the Kamal (perfection)—the greatest tribute that Egypt can offer to a woman.

UPI

Moment of delight in Damascus: A glad hand came from an old foe

countries and 137,500 miles behind him, he is the world's most experienced flying President, and he bounced cheerfully down the ramp at Cairo airport, flinching only slightly in the 100-degree heat as the first volley of a 21-gun salute greeted him. "It's a great day for us," beamed Sadat, who briskly pumped the President's hand—though he always kisses his "Arab brother" Henry Kissinger.

## A GRAND MARCH

Sadat and the President stood side by side in an open limousine for the 7.2-mile ride from the airport to the Qubba Palace, a 200-acre seraglio favored by the late King Farouk and spruced up for Mr. Nixon's visit. Jamming the curbsides along the way, hanging from balloons and rooftops, waving banners, banging on drums, tooting whistles and bellowing "Ahlan"—welcome—a crowd estimated by the Egyptians at more than

But the toasts turned serious. After delivering a blistering indictment of Israel, Sadat warned his guest that Washington's only hope of achieving a true rapprochement with the Arabs was to come up with a solution to the grievances of the Palestinians. Mr. Nixon offered a diplomatic double negative to get off the hook. "I would be less than candid," he conceded, "if I were not to say ... that I did not come ... with ready-made solutions for complex problems."

The President came up with a defter answer the next day during a whistle-stop train ride from Cairo to the Mediterranean resort of Alexandria. Bumping along through the fertile Nile Delta in a 1900-vintage, gingerbread-Gothic parlor car, he held a joint press conference with Sadat. They reported that they had agreed to postpone the Geneva peace conference until bilateral talks among all the parties concerned produced a better

chance for a final peace settlement. As a preliminary move, Sadat said, he would hold a small Arab summit meeting to thrash out differences among the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria and Egypt. The package failed to establish the U.S. as the leader for the next move toward peace—with Henry Kissinger acting as the broker between the Arabs and the Israelis. But it gave Mr. Nixon some breathing room. A final accord, he observed, depended on "a step-by-step approach—not because we want to go slow, but because we want to get there."

## A GOING-AWAY PRESENT

In Alexandria, Sadat put the Nixons up in the Ras el Tin Palace, another pleasure dome once owned by Farouk. There Mr. Nixon returned the Egyptian leader's hospitality with an American banquet replete with Alaska snow crab, roast beef, strawberry mousse and a Cabernet Sauvignon from California's Napa Valley. The political fare for the remainder of the trip was equally simple. Mr. Nixon invited Sadat and his wife, Jihan, to visit the United States—an offer the Egyptian President quickly accepted. And as a going-away present, Mr. Nixon promised Egypt a 600-megawatt nuclear reactor—a gift that brought cries of protest from Israelis, who feared Egypt might use the 200 kilograms of plutonium such a plant produces each year to build an atomic bomb.

Atomic-energy experts in the United States dismissed the threat. They argued that international inspection and additional U.S. controls would make it impossible for Egypt to follow India's example and use the plutonium from the plant's nuclear wastes to fashion an atomic bomb. Among the safeguards in the U.S.-Egyptian agreement, one provision will require Cairo to seal its processed plutonium and ship it back to the U.S. or to reprocessing plants in Europe.

U.S. officials defended the gift of the nuclear plant as an opening move in a long-range U.S. strategy of encouraging technological progress and economic growth in Egypt as a force for moderation. The Shah of Iran has already pledged to help Sadat with an extensive plan of investments—reportedly after a prod from Washington. And U.S. officials hoped that other conservative Arab states would also divert their oil riches into Egypt. "A lot of Arab money is available," one Egyptian official told NEWSWEEK's Nicholas C. Proffitt. "But we need help from the U.S. for climate. If conservative Arabs can channel their money through something like Chase Manhattan, they will know it is safe."

In a final communiqué, Mr. Nixon re-

> The President whistle-stops through the Nile Delta. In Alexandria, a motorcade arch reading: "Welcome Leader and his Great Guest."

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BEHIND ALL THE HOOPLA

For sheer human effort, Egypt hadn't seen anything like it since the construction of the Suez Canal. During the final hours before President Nixon touched down at the Cairo airport last week, tens of thousands of workers, officials and police labored to perfect the most elaborate arrangements ever provided for a touring U.S. President. In a scene that was re-enacted in each of the other four capitals on Mr. Nixon's itinerary, the Egyptians emptied hotels to make room for an unprecedented delegation of 650 Americans, searched every inch of road along Mr. Nixon's route and decked the streets with festive bunting and welcome signs. At the same time, hundreds of U.S. advance men installed hardware for everything from Mr. Nixon's Kremlin hot line to a communications-satellite ground station-a feat that appeared to amaze the Egyptians. Said one Cairo official: "It would have taken us three years to set up a station like that."

The biggest challenge was security. Despite the ever-present threat from fanatic terrorists, Mr. Nixon deliberately chose to appear before large crowds without a bulletproof shield. Though security experts were appalled, they were left with no alternative but to bow to the President's wish-and take precautions. "We are worried about that one bullet-that Kennedy bullet," an Egyptian confessed. To avoid such a bullet, authorities rounded up a hundred suspected agitators before Mr. Nixon's arrival in Cairo and covered his public appearances with an um-

brella of armed helicopters.

Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan showed similar concern. And in Jerusalem, the Israeli Government installed sharpshooters on the tower of a YMCA across from the King David Hotel, where Mr. Nixon stayed. In case of any mishap, sophisticated medical aid was never more than a few yards from the President. During his train trip from Cairo to Alexandria, for example, one rail car carried a surgical operating room-staffed with both American and Egyptian doctors.

Not all the preparations were that grim. Along the Nixons' route from the airport to the city of Cairo, teams of laborers erected triumphant arches and straightened the highway with bulldozers. House painters splashed brushes over the miles of walls surrounding the Qubba Palace, an overnight stop for the President and his wife, and a new helipad was built to facilitate their sight-seeing tour of the pyramids. The Saudi Arabians weren't to be outdone. In Jidda, King Faisal punctuated the Nixons' path with gleaming marble fountains.

As a final fillip, Mideast leaders saw to it that public enthusiasm for the Presidential visit was vocal-and highly visible. Israel spent more than $60,000 for flags alone, and in Egypt, where workers were given time off

to greet Mr. Nixon, officials provided them with professionally printed signs proclaiming YOU HAVE OUR CONFIDENCE. In all, the greeting that the Middle East nations laid on for President Nixon and his party may well have cost their economies more than $5 million. "But we consider the money extremely well spent," commented one Egyptian official. "And perhaps we'll get it back in the form of American aid."

Wally McNamee—Newsweek
Security in Cairo: 'That one bullet'

ported that an American-backed project to clear and modernize the Suez Canal -as well as other private investment schemes now in the works-would pump $2 billion into the Egyptian economy. He also announced that he would dispatch Treasury Secretary William Simon to Cairo to study further economic cooperation with Egypt. But he carefully skirted any broad promises of aid that required approval by Congress.

After a brisk tourist's pilgrimage to the great pyramids at Giza, Mr. Nixon shuttled across the Red Sea to the Saudi Arabian port of Jidda where King Faisal offered a more restrained welcome. Three small brass cannons fired off a

halting, 21-gun salute when the President arrived. A royal guard of Bedouin tribesmen armed with ancient single-shot rifles, crossed bandoliers and gold daggers that glinted in the sunlight flanked the King. He embraced Mr. Nixon, and then whisked the President off to the Al Hamra Palace, overlooking the Red Sea. In tribute to Faisal's Islamic fundamentalism, the crowds in Saudi Arabia were sparse and the state dinner was a stag affair-Pat ate with the King's wife in the royal household.

At the banquet, Mr. Nixon received Saudi Arabia's supreme decoration, the Highest Order of King Abdel Aziz al Saud, established just a year ago. After the soup and the fish, the lamb pot and the artichokes, Faisal got down to business. He is keeper of the holy Muslim shrines of Mecca and Medina and has said publicly that he intends to pray in the holy Mosque of Omar in Old Jerusalem before he dies-but only when the Arabs regain their section of the city from Israel. "We believe that there will

never be a real and lasting peace in the area unless Jerusalem is liberated," he warned Mr. Nixon. The President called for a gradual approach rather than an "instant formula." And he even managed a wan joke. "After this visit we, of course, will need oil to carry us to our next stop," he told his host. "And, Your Majesty, I just want to make clear that we will pay the world price."

The next stop was Damascus, where Kissinger's recent success in untangling the armies of Syria and Israel gained Mr. Nixon entry into the capital of a once implacable enemy. There was one minor hitch nonetheless. On approaching Damascus, the pilot of Mr. Nixon's plane was astonished to discover four Soviet-built MIG's heading his way. He threw the Spirit of '76 into a steep turn to evade the unidentified jets-only to learn from the control tower at Damascus airport that they were an honor guard that had been sent to escort the President into the Syrian capital. "I've been here fourteen times," noted Kissinger. "And

At a state banquet in Cairo, a belly dancer gyrates before Secretary of State Kissinger, the Sadats and the Nixons. Sadat presents the First Lady with the Order of the Kamal. The two Presidents confer in the Qubba Palace.

Newsweek, June 24, 1974

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this has never happened before.”

A new atmosphere of budding cooperation was evident around the modest three-story palace where Syrian President Hafez Assad met with his guest. Damascus also rumbled with rumors that Syria would reopen diplomatic relations with the United States as a friendly send-off for the President. The price: a gentleman's agreement from the American visitor to maintain pressure on Israel for further territorial concessions.

In Jerusalem, Israeli officials watched the President's progress through the capitals of the Arab world with understandable anxiety. Although the U.S. had no intention of abandoning its role as Israel's military guarantor, there was also no doubt that a quarter-century-long special relationship between Washington and Jerusalem was being diluted by America's new ties with the Arabs. Still, Israel prepared a warm welcome for the President—and laid on the tightest security measures in its history. The entire 30-mile motorcade route from Ben Gurion Airport to Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was combed for mines, and the President's 40-car procession was programed to whiz by at 75 miles per hour.

Mr. Nixon budgeted 30 hours for his Israel stop, squeezing a round of meetings with the country's new Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, between a call on retiring Prime Minister Golda Meir, a state banquet in the Knesset dining hall and a visit to the Yad Vashem memorial to Jews who died in the holocaust. Rabin was expected to ask for—and get a U.S. pledge of some $5.2 billion in arms over the next four to five years. Mr. Nixon also matched his generosity to Egypt with a promise to ship enriched uranium to Israel and help it build nuclear reactors for electric power.

## A DIPLOMATIC TRUMP CARD

Back in Washington, some of the President's critics questioned whether the trip was really necessary. Strictly speaking, it probably wasn't. Mr. Nixon had exposed himself to considerable physical risks, he had violated his own principle of never negotiating on the fly and—after all the effort—the diplomatic gains seemed intangible. "He's getting a lot of space with all those cheering Egyptians," shrugged one Midwestern Republican, "but his skill in foreign policy isn't the issue. We always knew he could handle that." Others charged that under the accumulating pressures of Watergate, Mr. Nixon was overcompensating in foreign affairs simply to improve his image.

Still, Mr. Nixon wasn't the first President who had played a diplomatic trump card in the game of domestic politics. And whatever his personal destiny in the Watergate affair, he deserved credit for his Mideast mission. He had, after all, stood before the pyramids and created a new and more hopeful atmosphere in an area of the world that has recently known only war and suffering. For that alone, his trip seemed worthwhile.

# Kissinger Blows His Cool

I do not believe it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States... when the character and credibility of the Secretary of State is at issue. And if it is not cleared up, I will resign.

With those bleak words, Henry Kissinger played out what was easily the most bizarre scene in his spectacular career. Only two weeks before, with his achievement of the landmark Middle East accord, he had been acclaimed the hero of modern diplomacy, darling of

to pack up his diplomatic bag of wonders and quit.

The problem was a trickle of leaked evidence that Kissinger was more intimately involved than he had let on in the White House campaign of wiretaps and surveillance of government officials and newsmen in Mr. Nixon's first term—and that he may have been less than candid about his role when testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last fall. But serious as the charges were, Kissinger's emotion-packed response in Salzburg seemed an exercise in overkill.

With his threat to resign and his demand for a review of his wiretap testimony, Kissinger opened a rift that could prove unbridgeable between himself and his President. Not only had he briefly upstaged Mr. Nixon's triumphal journey to the Mideast, he had undercut the one remaining solid pillar of the Presidency by sounding a note of jittery instability in his hitherto masterful conduct of his job. And whatever the outcome, he had irretrievably lost the sheen of magic that had helped him through so many tortuous talks: after Salzburg, Henry Kissinger was marked as mortal.

## 'TREATED LIKE A CRIMINAL'

The dramatic performance may also have altered the delicate equation of impeachment—though its precise impact was hard to gauge. Kissinger's declaration that he could not function under the shadow of scandal was in sharp and unflattering contrast to the President's insistence that Watergate has in no way impaired his own effectiveness. On the other hand, the Secretary of State's attack on the media and the leaky House Judiciary Committee (page 29) seemed likely to bolster the White House contention that the "jackals" in the press and on Capitol Hill would stop at nothing to bring the Nixon Administration down.

Should Kissinger actually up and quit, said columnist Joseph Alsop, "the enormous, Watergate-induced self-importance of the American press will be to blame ... He was treated like a common criminal." But his actual departure might also cut both ways in terms of impeachment: while it would remove the last image of solid achievement in Mr. Nixon's Administration, it would also cast some fresh doubts on the pros-

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

## With Ziegler: Exercise in overkill?

the press and, according to the polls, far and away the most popular man in the beleaguered Nixon Administration. But last week, in Salzburg's ornate Kavalierhaus Schlosshotel, Super K suddenly came down to earth-tinged like nearly all his Administration colleagues by the all-pervasive White House scandals. His voice faltering, his hands shaking, his eyes glistening with tears, Kissinger stood before the stunned newsmen railing at the attacks against him, demanding that his name be cleared, and threatening

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press secretary Ronald Ziegler quoted Mr. Nixon as saying: "Well, I can understand why he wanted to do it." But privately, the President was said to be "furious" at Kissinger. "Henry broke two cardinal rules," said one official. "He didn't tell the President what he was up to. And then he aired his dirty linen in public—on foreign soil no less."

The President's wrath and the Secretary of State's sullen mood were both painfully evident when the Nixon party moved on to the Middle East. While Mr. Nixon celebrated Kissinger's negotiating triumph in Egypt, Kissinger stayed in the background. Some observers suggested that he simply wanted to yield the limelight to his boss, but his almost total withdrawal seemed far beyond mere modesty. When Air Force One

Drawn especially for Newsweek by Joe Orlando © 1974 National Periodical Publications, Inc.

**Would you believe Clark Kent?**

landed in Cairo, Kissinger emerged in his usual second place just behind the President, but he quickly disappeared—avoiding the official reception line. When other officials appeared behind Mr. Nixon and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in the exchange of formal greetings at the Qubba Palace, Kissinger was missing. And when Mr. Nixon sat down with Sadat for their serious conversations, Kissinger—who had been a fixture in Mr. Nixon's talks with Mao Tse-tung, Leonid Brezhnev and a host of other leaders—was nowhere to be found.

Even on the triumphant Presidential train ride from Cairo to Alexandria, Kissinger sat silently for most of the trip staring down at his shoes. By the weekend, he began showing up at official ceremonies and seemed to perk up a

pects for a Gerald Ford Administration.

Across the nation, the first reaction to Kissinger's outburst was heavily in his favor. Mail at the State Department was running 10 to 1 for him. Editorial comments, too, generally gave him the benefit of the doubt. And on Capitol Hill, 52 senators joined in supporting a resolution hailing Kissinger's "veracity" and "integrity." Yet no matter how impressive, the early returns may not turn out to be conclusive. Kissinger had laid out his own testing ground by insisting on reviving the inquiry on his role in the wiretap case before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and it would be all but impossible to gloss over the discrepancies in his past testimony. "I just can't understand why Henry didn't leave well enough alone," said one of his friends. "Now he's compelled the Senate to review everything in public."

## THE NEW PARTY LINE

Given the far-reaching repercussions, nobody could figure out for sure why Kissinger had blown his cool. Some cynics suggested that he was trying to set a backfire to counteract new and damaging disclosures in the wiretap story; others speculated that he might be deliberately offering himself as a target for criticism to lend credence to the notion of an anti-Administration vendetta. "It's obvious, it's the new party line," said a Democratic National Committee staffer. "Save the President by blaming the media for picking on Kissinger."

But it seemed likeliest that Kissinger simply let his emotions get the best of him. Returning from his month of Mid-east shuttle diplomacy two weeks ago, Kissinger expected hosannas; instead, he was confronted at his first Washington press conference with what he called a "cross-examination" on the taps (NEWSWEEK, June 17). Immediately, say his friends, he became depressed. "Did you see what happened to me?" he stormed to one friend. "More than 50 per cent of the questions were about wiretapping. I just can't go on like this—I'm going to resign." Soothing by Senators Mike Mansfield and J. William Fulbright failed to cool him off. And by the time he left for Austria, his mind was all but made up to meet the press head-on. Said another friend: "He was exhausted, dead tired, and he was picking a fight."

And that was the way he came on. Grim and determined, he stalked into the hall and, with none of his usual banter, launched into his remarks. He told of asking the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to review the case, and blasted those who "selectively leak" documents "without benefit of any explanation." Above all, in a lengthy review of his role in the wiretapping, he said he stood by his previous sworn testimony. It might be possible, Kissinger declared, "to find this or that nuance and to engage once again in the process of defaming public officials, but I know for a fact that the testimony I have given was

truthful to the best of my recollection." Later, with tears welling up, he said of his career: "I would rather like to think that when the record is written, one may remember that perhaps some lives were saved and that perhaps some mothers can rest more at ease. But I leave that to history. What I will not leave to history is a discussion of my public honor."

Kissinger's Salzburg performance took

Mike Lane—Baltimore Evening Sun

Super K: Grounded

© 1974 Herblock—Washington Post

'Oops, Oop, and Away'

most of the Presidential entourage by surprise—including the President. Kissinger had told Mr. Nixon in advance of his plans to talk about the wiretap case with the press, Administration sources said, but he did not mention his bombshell resignation threat except to chief of staff Alexander M. Haig Jr., his one-time aide. For the record, White House

June 24, 1974

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THE LEGION OF THE TAPPED: WHO'S WHO

The targets of the White House wiretaps ranged from some of Henry Kissinger's top national-security staffers to a White House underling whose specialty was domestic political patronage, from liberal journalists to White House speechwriter (now New York Times columnist) William Safire, who had always fancied himself on the President's side.

Most of the National Security Council staffers who were tapped were alumni of previous Democratic Administrations whose retention by Kissinger had drawn early praise from Nixon critics. Cigar-puffing Helmut Sonnenfeldt, for example, had worked his way up from State Department

went on to become foreign-policy adviser in the Muskie Presidential campaign and now heads International Voluntary Services, a private-sector Peace Corps. Lord, who accompanied his boss on many trips to Moscow and Peking, now serves as director of planning and coordination at State.

**Right-Hand Men:** The State Department officials tapped were experienced Foreign Service officers. Richard L. Sneider went on to handle delicate negotiations over the return of Okinawa to the Japanese and subsequently was named Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs. William H. Sullivan, ambassador to Laos under LBJ,

Washington. There was Henry Bran-
don, Czech-born correspondent for
The Sunday Times of London, who
has won the confidence of Presidents
and Cabinet secretaries since 1950;
CBS News diplomatic correspondent
Marvin Kalb (later included on the
White House "enemies list"), and
New York Times reporters Hedrick
Smith, now in Moscow, and William
Beecher, whose wiretapping was fol-
lowed by his appointment as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for
public affairs.

The tapped officials also included three White House men who had no direct access to national-security material. At the time of the tapping,

Counselor Sonnenfeldt

Photos by Wally McNamara and Robert R. McElroy—Newsweek

CBS reporter Kalb: Also on the 'enemies list'

Columnist Safire and ex-prof Halperin

clerk to top analyst in the field of
Soviet and Eastern European affairs;
when Kissinger later was named Sec-
retary of State, he brought Sonnen-
feldt over to the prestigious post of
departmental counselor. The other
NSC men also had made impressive
records: Morton Halperin, a former
Harvard professor and Defense De-
partment planning expert; Daniel I.
Davidson, at 32 the youngest member
of the U.S. team sent to Paris for
the Vietnam peace talks by Lyndon
Johnson; Richard Moose, a veteran of
the NSC under Johnson whose re-
ports for the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee now keep both
White House and State on their toes.

Two younger staffers, Winston
Lord and Anthony Lake, quickly rose
to prominence under Kissinger. Lake

worked closely with Kissinger on the
Vietnam peace talks in Paris and is
now ambassador to the Philippines.
Richard F. Pedersen, who spent six-
teen years with the U.S. mission to the
United Nations and then became
right-hand man to Secretary of State
William Rogers, is serving as ambas-
sador to Hungary. The other right-
hand man who came in for tapping
was Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert E.
Pursley, then senior military assistant
to Defense Secretary Melvin Laird
and now retired and serving as vice
president of the International Silver
Co. in Connecticut.

For every leaker, of course, there
must be a leaker—a journalist who
will print the confidential information
—and the taps were made on some
of the hardest-digging reporters in

Beecher: On to the Pentagon

James W. McLane was a staffer on the White House Domestic Council, concerned with problems of revenue-sharing, inflation and the aged; more recently he was the man in charge of the Nixon price freeze. Similarly, veteran Nixon campaign aide John P. Sears was a deputy Presidential counsel involved with matters of patronage and relations with local Republican leaders. Sears also maintained his long-standing contacts with political reporters around Washington, as did speechwriter Safire, who came as close as he ever has to splitting with the President after he found that he himself had been tapped. "'National security,' my eye," said Safire in his New York Times column.

**Damages:** Safire is not alone in his
indignation. But a few loyalists re-
main. "God," says one of them, "I
hope this doesn't bring Henry down.
He's the only guy keeping us afloat."
Halperin and Lake have filed suits
against the Secretary of State, among
others, demanding damages of $100 a
day for the duration of their illegal
wiretaps. Davidson in particular re-
mains both angry and resentful at Kis-
singer. "He was the man who held
himself out to be my friend," he told
NEWSWEEK's Thomas DeFrank. "But
to invade my privacy and my wife's
privacy and then to talk about moral
vindication, is outrageous."

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bit. But it was doubtful that his rift with Mr. Nixon had been any more than pandered over.

The case that sparked Kissinger's troubles dates back a full five years—and is one of the most complex episodes in the whole range of White House scandals. No sooner had Mr. Nixon taken office in 1969 when newspaper stories began to appear sketching U.S. foreign-policy plans for the Middle East and Vietnam; the White House, increasingly irritated, was outraged in early May when William Beecher, then Pentagon correspondent for The New York Times, broke the story of the secret American bombing of Cambodia. Ironically, former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird told NEWSWEEK's Lloyd H. Norman last week that Beecher's original source hadn't been a leak, but a story in The Times of London by a reporter who had seen bomb craters

occur to me to question the judgment of these two individuals.” His only role, he testified, was that “my office was required to submit the names of those officials that had access to the information that had leaked.”

The record remains murky at best, but in recent weeks, more and more evidence has appeared that seems to cast Kissinger in a far more activist role—one that he was deliberately downplaying in retrospect. The House Judiciary Committee has heard an unexpurgated version of a tape of a Feb. 28, 1973, White House conversation between President Nixon and John W. Dean III in which the President says of the wiretapping, in somewhat garbled fashion: “I know that I know that he [Kissinger] asked that it be done. And I assume that it was.”

What's more, the committee has a batch of FBI documents that appear to

Colonel Haig.” All told, said Pennsylvania Democrat Joshua Eilberg, what the Judiciary Committee had was “proof” that Kissinger had “lied” about his role—and Texas Democrat Jack Brooks said later, “When the taps are made public, the country will know he is guilty.”

## 'A CHOICE HAD TO BE MADE'

Those judgments prompted furious denunciations from Kissinger's defenders—and thus far, at least, the evidence clearly did not make a case of perjury. But it did raise disturbing questions about Kissinger's candor, and prompted him to make subtle changes in his story. In Washington two weeks ago, he said he did not “make a direct recommendation” for taps. Later, in Salzburg, he acknowledged that in submitting names “we knew that an investigation was certain and that a wiretap was probable.” Look-

AP

David Young of the Plumbers, FBI Director Hoover: 'National security'—or political paranoia?

in Cambodia. But at the time, top officials were convinced that national security was in danger—and Kissinger was then director of the National Security Council. The FBI carried out an intensive wiretapping campaign to uncover the source of the stories, and over the next 21 months, thirteen government officials and four newsmen (page 26) had their telephones tapped.

## A NEWCOMER TO POWER

The key question is, just who ordered the taps? From the moment the wiretapping campaign came to light a little more than a year ago, Kissinger has insisted that he didn't initiate the program. At his original confirmation hearings last fall, he pictured himself as a newcomer to power who did not object when the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and former Attorney General John N. Mitchell told Mr. Nixon that wiretaps would be the best way to root out the leaks. “I must say,” Kissinger testified, “it did not

label Kissinger as the man who asked for at least some of the taps. One, a memo from Hoover, said Kissinger urged the investigation on and told Hoover he would “destroy” anyone caught leaking to the press. Another, a fifteen-page summary of the tap program produced by the FBI last year, said that “specific requests” for the taps came “from either” Kissinger or Haig, who was then his military aide at the NSC.

Such records, of course, can be misleading, reflecting either the FBI's well-known propensity for avoiding responsibility or the mere tyranny of forms that have to be filled out with names as a matter of routine. But Kissinger was also pictured in the FBI records as having been sent 37 separate reports on the wiretaps—including at least one six months later than he testified they stopped—and, according to The Washington Post, he remarked after reading them: “It is clear that I don't have anybody in my office that I can trust except

ing back, he told newsmen, “I would have to say I undoubtedly contributed by my description of the security problem... I did not recommend the program as such, though this does not mean that I disagreed with it. I find wiretapping distasteful. I find leaks distasteful, and therefore a choice had to be made.”

Yet even as Kissinger was reasserting the “national-security” rationale for the wiretaps, others were charging that the motive was more nearly political paranoia. Morton H. Halperin, a former NSC staffer who was tapped and is now suing Kissinger for violating his civil rights, has argued that of the first four officials tapped only one had access to material that had leaked—but all of them were politically suspect as Democrats.

Judiciary Committee members who have seen the FBI wiretap logs confirmed that most of the information turned up by the intelligence operation was mere gossip. (In one case, the FBI summaries reportedly noted that one of-

June 24, 1974

27

Fred Maroon—Louis Mercier

With Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman and Mr. Nixon in 1971: Walking a tightrope

ficial visited a porno shop, while another official was said to have been “seen” with a woman when his wife was away.) And one key Administration official told NEWSWEEK’s Nicholas Horrock that at least two of the taps were purely political: one on James W. McLane, who was handling White House policy on the aging, revenue sharing and inflation, and another on John P. Sears, a White House deputy counsel. It was John Mitchell who instigated the tap on Sears, the source said, and “I think he ordered it up after he found out how easy it was.”

A NOISY RIDE

Whatever the outcome of the wiretapping inquiry, Kissinger faces another knotty problem in the case of the super-secret White House “plumbers.” It was his aide David R. Young Jr. who was picked by the White House in mid-1971 to help set up the undercover unit, but Kissinger has testified under oath that he didn’t even know that Young was “concerned with internal-security matters.” Six months ago, however, it was disclosed that Kissinger had listened to a tape of Young’s interrogation of a Navy liaison officer in the White House who was suspected of funneling unauthorized NSC documents to the Pentagon. More recently, former White House aides have said in affidavits that Kissinger had been in on a helicopter-ride meeting when the President decided that Young should be assigned to the plumbers. In Salzburg, Kissinger stood by his earlier testimony to the senators—and said of the meeting: “I leave open the possibility that given the noise of a helicopter ride there may have been some misunderstanding.”

In the best possible light, Kissinger's wavery public record shows him trying to diminish his personal involvement in the controversy—on occasion at the ex-

pense of the facts. Barring startling new disclosures, his liability to perjury charges seem minuscule. "Kissinger will have some uncomfortable moments in a new round of hearings," observed one congressman. "But it will be very difficult for anyone to 'prove' that he lied under oath." Perhaps the most intriguing question was why he felt any need to massage the facts at all. Many legal experts maintain that such wiretapping was not outlawed by the Supreme Court until 1972—and Kissinger himself said he had been told taps were used by Presidents at least as far back as Franklin Roosevelt. "He could easily have come out strongly, pounded his fist on the table and said 'our national security demanded these wiretaps and by God I ordered them'." observed one former Administration official. "And frankly, I'm mystified why he didn't."

The likeliest explanation, as Washington saw it, was that Kissinger had been delicately walking a tightrope, trying to please both the hard-liners in the White House and his friends on the outside. As NEWSWEEK'S White House correspondent Henry L. Trewitt reported last week: "Throughout the whole affair, Kissinger has left the distinct impression that he was attempting to have it both ways—to enforce security by wiretapping, while preserving his credentials with intellectuals and newsmen who found wiretapping repugnant."

Ultimately, it will be up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to sort out the facts, shaded testimony and allegations. The senators are not looking forward to the job. "This guy is the most popular man in government today," complained one liberal member. "We have to be damned careful how we handle him. Maybe the moral question is whether he told the truth. But the real political question is how we handle this thing."

The committee worked out an agreement last week with the Justice Department to obtain FBI documents related to the wiretapping. But even now, some members seem to have made up their minds. Of the seventeen committee members, seven co-sponsored the Senate resolution backing Kissinger, and others are already forecasting that the panel will turn up nothing new. In fact, said chairman J. William Fulbright a bit testily, so many minds seemed to be made up that he wondered whether it would be worthwhile to hold hearings at all. "What this boils down to," said another senator, "is an argument between Kissinger and a dead FBI director. There is just no way it can be resolved satisfactorily."

No matter what the committee decides, the possibility remains that Kissinger's Salzburg outburst may have set the stage for his eventual departure from the Administration—either at Mr. Nixon's request or on his own initiative. Kissinger's anger at seeing his name besmirched was genuine; his concern over his future credibility with the press, the public and foreign governments was no charade. And even if he should get a clean bill from the Foreign Relations Committee, Kissinger might well feel so hamstrung and diminished that he would have no choice but to resign.

AN INDELIBLE MARK

On the whole, however, the betting was that Kissinger would neither quit nor be fired. There was little enthusiasm either on Capitol Hill or in the press last week for pushing the perjury inquiry too far, and foreigners were plainly shocked that Kissinger would even think of walking out. "His resignation would be far more alarming to the world than that of Mr. Nixon," The Times of London said editorially. Kissinger's own mood was born partly of exhaustion and couldn't have been helped by the illness of his wife, Nancy, who was hospitalized with ulcers last week; he might well soften his terms for staying in office once back in Washington among friends. As for the President's anger, it seemed destined to fade—if only of necessity. For Mr. Nixon to force out Kissinger would be to strip his crumbling Administration of its only hero, to undermine its only substantive strong suit and, in all likelihood, to trigger its ultimate collapse.

Even if Kissinger prevails, the wiretapping affair will have left an indelible mark. For the Secretary of State, the furor over his role was an old nightmare come true: the intrusion of the domestic trauma of Watergate into the realm of foreign affairs. For Kissinger watchers, his emotional display in Salzburg was an equally significant event: a drastic diminishing of his public image. After four and a half years as Super K, the unflappable diplomatic miracle worker, Kissinger had retreated at last to his phone booth—and had come out a far different, far more human figure.

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# Making a Federal Case of It

The U.S. Supreme Court has always been chary of wandering into what one alumnus called the political thicket. But last week, the Court moved a step deeper than it might have wished into the Watergate case—and a step closer to what could be a decisive role in determining the fate of Richard Nixon.

The Justices agonized over their course well past their normal Friday afternoon quitting time, then announced on a lazy June Saturday noonday that they would decide whether or not a Federal grand jury had acted legally when it named Mr. Nixon an unindicted co-conspirator in the Watergate cover-up. The question will be argued and resolved in a rare summer session along with the issue of whether the President can lawfully withhold evidence in the Watergate crimes. However it rules, one constitutional lawyer guessed, “the

Court will have settled the ball game.”

The ball game was going badly enough for Mr. Nixon, even given his triumphal tour of the Middle East and his modest uptick in one late poll. The President was said to believe that he had touched bottom with the publication of 1,308 devastatingly unflattering pages of readings from his secret Watergate tapes. But last week a leaked series of House Judiciary Committee staff memos lent powerful support to a suspicion that has haunted Washington from the first: that the conversations involved were even worse for Mr. Nixon than they looked in the transcripts—and that they had been cut, altered and blue-penciled in the White House to blur the picture of his active involvement in the cover-up.

The Watergate grand jury was satisfied from the evidence that he was involved; it stopped short of indicting him

on the advice of special prosecutor Leon Jaworski instead naming him an unindicted co-conspirator. The finding, if allowed to stand, could be ruinous to Mr. Nixon's defense against impeachment—a direct signal to the House that the case against him was strong enough to warrant prosecution except for the single fact that he is a sitting President. His defender-in-chief James St. Clair accordingly hurried to both Judge John J. Sirica and the High Court last week in an effort to have the accusation expunged as improper under the Constitution and inconsistent with the evidence.

The Court had had mixed feelings from the outset about getting into Watergate; at least some members had hoped that the case would stop short of their docket. But they agreed last month to run their session overtime into July and settle whether Jaworski could or couldn't subpoena tapes or other records of 64 more Watergate conversations, and last week the Court agreed to

## LEAKS: TORRENT OF CRITICISM

From the beginning, House Judiciary chairman Peter Rodino and majority counsel John Doar have wrestled with the problem of keeping their impeachment inquiry leak-free. There were even jokes around the office about “sequestering” the committee like an ordinary jury until the closed-door portion of the proceedings was complete. But despite a security plan as rigorous as any recently imposed on Capitol Hill, occasional trickles of information have found their way into the headlines. And two weeks of leaks about Henry Kissinger—plus those concerning the discrepancies between White House tapes and transcripts—have drawn some of the most serious criticism the committee has yet received.

Presidential counselor Dean Burch charged last week that Rodino had “lost control” of his panel, and Vice President Gerald Ford saw in the pattern of the leaks the ulterior motives of Democrats who wanted to impeach the President. Rodino struck back at what he saw as ulterior motives at the White House, declaring: “We are not going to be diverted by this attempt from various individuals to discredit the committee.” But at a hastily summoned caucus of Judiciary's Democratic members, the chairman warned that further leaks could seriously jeopardize the process of impeachment. “We need to do better,” one member recalled Rodino saying, “to protect the integrity of the committee.”

Some forms of leakage have become almost routine. After each closed-door session of the committee, for example, the pack of reporters stationed outside Room 2141 of the Rayburn Building walks along the corridor with those members

likelyst to tell about the latest evidence and their reaction to it. Some congressmen meet privately in their offices with newsmen for a fuller updating on committee progress, and the best sources seem to be those most committed to or against impeachment. Democrats Jerome Waldie of California and Robert Drinan of Massachusetts are suspected of leaking some of the items most embarrassing to the President; Republican Delbert Latta of Ohio, on the other hand, appeared outside the committee door one day with whole paragraphs of what he regarded as exculpatory comments by Mr. Nixon.

**Hometown:** The biggest leak of documentary evidence thus far involved the transcript of a Sept. 15, 1972, Oval Office meeting, first published by The Washington Post and The Boston Globe (Drinan's hometown newspaper). After that, Rodino and Doar redoubled security measures and prevented committee members from taking tape transcripts out

out of the hearing room. Indeed, the reason last week's memos on White House transcripts got out was that they were not really part of the formal impeachment evidence. They were produced at Waldie's request by veteran Judiciary aide William Dixon, who is not on the special impeachment staff. Then they were circulated among Democratic members without the knowledge of Rodino, Doar and their tight-lipped crew.

The chairman's mild-mannered warning was not likely to end the problem. Only hours after his lecture, an unidentified source met a Los Angeles Times reporter in the Rayburn Building garage and handed over two more memos on face-saving deletions in the White House transcripts. And Rodino's fears about the adverse impact of such leaks seemed borne out by the cheerful reaction of a top White House aide. “From our perspective,” he said, “this has been a pretty good leak—or week, as the case may be.”

Photos by Wally McNamee—Newsweek

Democrats Waldie (above) and Drinan: Next, sequester the committee?

June 24, 1974

29

George Tames-New York Times

Slogging on: Rodino and Rep. Delbert Latta

take up the grand-jury finding at the same time. On the motion of St. Clair and Jaworski, the Justices agreed to make public the jury's declaration that "Richard M. Nixon ... was a member of the conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice." On St. Clair's plea, they docketed a hearing for July 8 on whether the grand jury had trespassed on the powers of Congress by accusing a President of complicity in crime.

**'High Risk'**: The White House conceded that going to court was, as one aide put it, a "high risk" gambit. It stood to gain valuable psychic points if the Court should rule the grand jury out of bounds. But an adverse decision would "sort of sanctify the evidence," the White House source said, and would accordingly weigh against the President in the House deliberations. More perilous still was the prospect of a double defeat, on the subpoena as well as the grand-jury matter. To disobey a Supreme Court order that he yield the evidence, said one law scholar, "would be clear grounds for impeaching the President—and I trust he would be impeached overnight."

The more immediate problem was the disclosure that the President's tape transcripts had been subtly but meaningfully edited. The White House has in the past written off any anomalies in its version as

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

innocent and inconsequential—the result of giving a small stenographic pool too many lo-fi tapes to type up in too short a time. But the memos drawn by Judiciary staffer William Dixon for some Democratic members sketched a far more suggestive pattern in the discrepancies between what the White House published and what committee investigators heard on the few actual tapes they have. The differences noted in the Dixon papers tended regularly and conspicuously to favor the President, toning down some unflattering passages, scissoring others out entirely, gauzing over what Mr. Nixon knew and when he knew it, and minimizing his role in what one memo called "the cover-up of the cover-up."

Among the discrepancies:
■ Several passages indicating Mr. Nixon's early and strong concern for keeping the lid on were obtrusively missing from the White House transcripts. One noted by Dixon had the President fretting aloud to John Dean on March 17, 1973—four days before he says he caught on to the cover-up—about whether the multiplying inquiries might reach his inner circle. "We've got to cut that off," Mr. Nixon said in Judiciary's version.

"We can't have that go to [H.R.] Haldeman." Likewise lost from his transcripts was a whole conversation on the 22nd, in which the President told sometime Attorney General John Mitchell: "I don't give a s--- what happens. I want you to [unintelligible] stonewall it, plead the Fifth Amendment ..." And later: "Even up to this point, the whole theory has been containment, as you know, John." And later still: "That's the thing I was concerned with—we're going to protect our people if we can."

■ The Nixon edition of the critical conversation of March 21 softened one Presidential remark apparently approving hush money for Watergate spy E. Howard Hunt, and attributed another incorrectly to John Dean. The White House version says it was Dean who suggested to Mr. Nixon that Hunt's blackmail demands were "worth buying time on." But Judiciary's reading was that the President spoke first—"I mean, that's worth it, at the moment"—and Dean was merely echoing his agreement. Later, according to the White House transcript, Mr. Nixon told Haldeman that although Hunt's asking price was high, "at least we can buy the time on that." As Judiciary heard it, however, the operative word was "should" instead of "can"—"At least, uh, we should, we should buy the

time on that"—and the observation accordingly sounded at least a shade more like an order.

■ Several more passages altered or missing in the White House transcripts strengthen the suspicion that Mr. Nixon ordered up Dean's celebrated Camp David report in an effort to sustain the cover-up—not to stop it. The President has insisted that he responded to Dean's "cancer-on-the-Presidency" revelations of the 21st by sending him to the Catoctins to put it all down in publishable form. But Mr. Nixon's instructions, heavily bowdlerized in his edition, suggested in the committee's version that what he really wanted was a safely generalized clean bill for his people. "Understand I don't want it that God-damned specific," Judiciary's transcript quotes him as having told Dean on the 21st, and next day he elaborated: "It's a negative setting course ... that based on all of your considerations, uh, all of your analysis and so forth ... you have found and very carefully put down that this individual, that individual, that individual, were not involved in any [unintelligible]."

Judiciary's reconstruction of the conversation filled in several outright deletions in these talks, and raised substantial further doubts as to whether the whole truth was in fact what the President had in mind. At one point, on the 21st, his man John Ehrlichman suggested straight out that Dean limit his report to the Watergate burglary itself, not the cover-up, and return a finding that nobody in the White House had been involved in plotting it. "That's what we could say," offered Ehrlichman, "and it happens to be true—as for that transaction." The Dixon papers, but not the White House transcripts, record that the President laughed and answered: "Sure, as for that transaction."

**Paper**: The more compelling purpose suggested by the memos was to have Dean cobble up a tactical paper that Mr. Nixon could use to justify both his own inaction and his resistance to letting his top hands appear before the Senate Watergate committee. "We can't have a complete cave and have the people go up there and testify," he said in a passage scissored out of his March 22 transcript. First Mitchell, then Ehrlichman agreed that a Dean report would help —that, as Ehrlichman put it, the White House could then tell the committee, "Here ... This is everything we know, Mr. Senator." Replied Mr. Nixon: "That's what I was preparing to say. 'This is everything we know, I know nothing more.' This is the whole purpose [of the report] in that sense."

The memos were only the latest in a spill of leaks from the impeachment inquiry (page 29); they embarrassed the committee and gave Mr. Nixon's defenders ample ammunition for a counterattack on chairman Peter W. Rodino for letting his people get out of hand. But Rodino refused to be diverted from the main business before him, flogging the

30

Newsweek, June 24, 1974

committee through its laborious and at
points soporific closed-door rehearsal of
the case against the President.

That review finished up the file on the White House plumbers last week, then moved on to the offer of the FBI directorship to the judge in the Daniel Ellsberg trial and White House attempts to sick the Internal Revenue Service on the President's political enemies. Rodino hoped to wind up this week with the last of the Watergate cover-up, then-have staff lawyers John Doar and Albert Jenner sum up and lay out their "laundry list" of possible impeachable offenses.

**The Line:** The President and his lawyers in the meantime continued their all-fronts effort to slow down and stalemate the inquiry. Just before his departure for the Middle East, Mr. Nixon placed himself in open defiance of a fourth committee subpoena—this one for tapes or other records of 45 more Watergate conversations—and in the process stated his case for resisting in the most magisterial terms yet. “... There would be no end unless a line were drawn somewhere by someone,” said the President. “Since it is clear that the committee will not draw such a line, I have done so.”

In his absence, his defense team carried on its skirmishing in several courtrooms at once.* His people, in unlikely alliance with Jaworski, headed off a potentially bloody showdown with Federal Judge Gerhard Gesell over Mr. Nixon's resistance to giving Ehrlichman free access to evidence he says he needs for the upcoming Ellsberg burglary trial. Gesell had talked successively of throwing the case out of court, starting contempt proceedings against the President and splitting off Ehrlichman's trial to some point in the indefinite future. But some modest White House concessions brought him back from the brink, and he docketed the case for next week. Ehrlichman still had cards to play. At the weekend it was disclosed that he had subpoenaed the President himself along with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and White House chief of staff Alexander Haig to testify as defense witnesses.

The controlling strategy underlying all the maneuvering remained diversion and delay, and the President's men have lately experienced a surge of optimism about the outcome. Mr. Nixon himself was said to have anticipated the hiding he took over the transcripts and to have predicted at the time that "things would start to turn" thereafter; his people have begun to believe that he was right. But the leaks from the Judiciary Committee last week were reminder enough that he has not yet lived down what his tapes told about him—and the Supreme Court's intervention set the stage for what could be a momentous constitutional confrontation a very few weeks away.

*The effort produced one casualty during the week: Presidential counsel J. Fred Buzhardt, 50, suffered severe chest pains after a near all-night search through the Watergate files and was checked into a Fairfax, Va., hospital with what doctors diagnosed as a serious heart attack.

The Loyalists

They called themselves the National Citizens' Committee for Fairness to the Presidency, and they assembled 1,400 strong in Washington last week to challenge what their improbable leader—a Taunton, Mass., rabbi named Baruch Korff—called “the lynching psychosis” in Congress and the media. They waved posters and flew flags; they pinned on chrome buttons that said SUPPORT THE PRESIDENCY; they roared and booed and shook their fists as speaker after speaker denounced the press as a pack of wolves or worse. And when the man they had come to rescue appeared briefly before them, vowing that he would not leave until his appointed time in 1977, the room fairly rang with their chanting: “God bless Nixon! God bless Nixon! God bless Nixon!”

The assembly came out of the last bedrock bastions of support for Richard Nixon—that one-fourth to one-third of the electorate who, according to the polls, still revere the President after two full

years of Watergate. They are more numerous in the South and the small towns of the American heartland than in the big cities; they range from personal fans to party loyalists, from sophisticates who value Mr. Nixon's achievements in foreign policy to hardhats who credit him with having quieted the campuses and slowed down school busing. But they are united in their support of Richard Nixon against those they perceive as his enemies, the media foremost among them. And they are no longer shy about expressing their allegiance; they have become an increasingly visible and vocal minority, placing ads, writing letters, circulating petitions, even marching on Washington to keep Mr. Nixon in the White House.

The solid Nixon South of 1972 remains his strongest single center of sup-

Korff, Nixon at rally

AP

Bernard Gotfryd—Newsweek

Wilfred Dalton (center) and club members: Laying it on the liberals

At the core: The fewer, the harder

Gerald Martineau—Washington Post

Newsweek, June 24, 1974

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UPI
Humphrey: A $100,000 red face

THE OFFICIAL GIFT OF HINDSIGHT

It was embarrassing enough when Maxine Cheshire, the enterprising columnist for The Washington Post, disclosed a month ago that Patricia Nixon and her two daughters had accepted lavish gifts of jewelry from the royal family of Saudi Arabia—including a $52,400 set of diamonds and emeralds (NEWSWEEK, May 27). But the news prompted uneasy second thoughts in other official and formerly official heads, and it developed last week that several similar gifts have been belatedly turned in under the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966. The recipients included Mr. and Mrs. Spiro T. Agnew, the wives of Sen. J. William Fulbright and former Secretary of State William Rogers, and former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey.

Humphrey's bauble, an 8-carat diamond valued at $100,000, seemed to set a record for sheer opulence. A gift from the President of the Congo Republic (now Zaïre) in 1968, it was

turned over to the State Department's chief of protocol last week—and Humphrey explained a bit lamely that it had been a personal gift to his wife, Muriel. "I did not realize at the time that [the law] covered members of my family," he said. In fact, State Department officials say, the law is vague, ambiguous and unenforceable. Rogers, for one, said he had thought the rubies and diamonds given his wife by the Emir of Kuwait in 1972 had been properly registered all along and said he wanted to return other gifts of furniture and clothing.

Whatever the technicalities, however, officials who have taken such gifts find them difficult to explain—and there may be more red faces to come. After Cheshire's latest disclosure, the General Accounting Office broadened its inquiry into the recording of gifts to U.S. officials. The probe could go on for a year, said one GAO aide, and “we're having a lot of fun finding out what turns up.”

port. The animus against the press runs particularly high in Dixie, the residue of the way Northern journalism reported the Southern civil-rights struggles of the 1960s. "If the news media is attacking the President," said one Georgia GOP chairman, "we feel he must be doing something right." But Mr. Nixon's support in the old Confederacy rests at least equally on its deep and ancient vein of God-and-country patriotism. "We were taught that once we had chosen a sheriff or President, he's it," said James C. Hill, a prominent Atlanta lawyer, "and that it's the duty of all citizens to rally around him and not to question it."

Mr. Nixon's backing in the South is bipartisan; much of his support in the West and Midwest comes, by contrast, from long-time Grand Old Party-liners who, according to one Illinois leader, "would

react to an attack on any Republican President." Wilfred Dalton, 64, president of New York's old-line Richmond Hill Republican Club, is a case in point. His support for Mr. Nixon springs for the most part from an abiding distrust of the liberals. Back twenty years ago, he said, "they were encouraging poor Negroes to come up here and endorsing fornication and supporting illegitimate children. And Patty Hearst! She's a product of a liberal environment."

**Belief:** Arguments for Mr. Nixon's survival run the range—sometimes in the same breath—from genuine concern with national security to a simple belief in the man himself. "He has good reasons for withholding information," maintains New York housewife Betty Carubia, a member of Dalton's club and a longtime local committeewoman. "It must be some for-

eign policy thing. And besides," she added, "he has too much respect for his family to do something like this."

Others are more cynical, defending this President on the ground that Lyndon Johnson, John Kennedy and Harry Tru- man, to name three, had got away with worse sins than Watergate. Daniel Goodykoontz, 66, of Houston, who claims he personally burglarized Communist Party campaign headquarters for FDR during a World War II stint in naval in- telligence, says he learned that lesson the hard way in one of his own five un- successful races for local office. The can- didates, as he recounted it, met with a preacher who told them straight out: "I have 800 votes in my flock, and I can dictate how they vote. How much do you want to donate to the church?" Says Goodykoontz: "I would like to clean up elections, but I don't want to have this one guy picked out."

Still others fear that removal of a President would be traumatic for the country and dangerous in the extreme as a precedent—a first step toward the volatile government-of-the-month politics they associate with Latin America and some nations in Europe. Beverly Acker, 41, of Concord, Calif., co-founded the local Committee to Support President Nixon for just that reason. "Things like this have been going on in our government for a long time," she says, "but we have to change them through the electoral process. This whole thing is weakening the Presidency and our democratic form of government."

**Rewards:** Out of all these concerns has emerged a loose-knit citizens' movement, bent, so it says, on saving the Presidency—not this particular President. But Mr. Nixon has embraced the loyalists as his own, receiving their deputations and their petitions, rewarding them with handshakes and thank-you notes and souvenirs, posing for pictures with them. ("It's real good of him," mused Jean Leschober, 62, of Leesburg, Ga., when he saw his snapshot, "but lousy of me—I blinked.") And they in turn plainly cheer the President; his staff good-news man, Bruce Herschensohn, fits them regularly into Mr. Nixon's appointment calendar.

Their direct political effect on the impeachment process thus far has been marginal, but they see their struggle in the most apocalyptic terms. "We are at the brink of disaster," Rabbi Korff told 150 wealthy suburbanites at a posh Michigan hunt club last week. "I have been under the hammer and sickle, I have been under the swastika and I plead with you, whatever the outcome, to get involved in this struggle." Nor has the rabbi any intention of giving up the fight, no matter how long the odds or how reduced the ranks of the Nixonians; he is already laying plans for phase two of the Citizens' Committee's summer offensive—a caravan to the Capitol in mid-July to fight what he calls "the seditious environment" in which men dare speak of depositing Richard Nixon.

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Newsweek, June 24, 1974

The New York Times Magazine | June 23, 1974

Kissinger's triumph began in trauma

Twenty days
in October

The part called for someone taller, slimmer, more adept at reviewing Arab honor guards, more traditional in his diplomatic style, a connoisseur of couscous and Casbah conventions, a WASP. No producer had ever dreamed of Henry of Arabia!

And yet, eight short months after the Yom Kippur war—a war that left the United States at the wrong end of an Arab oil embargo and in a weakened strategic position throughout the Arab world—Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has become the hero of the Middle East. After six whirlwind trips through the area (the last as tour guide for a wounded President eager to recapture his image as a statesman), Kissinger has been hailed by the Arabs as a “superman” and “mediator of peace.” Ironically, at the same time, he was being subjected to renewed criticism at home—over his controversial role in the Nixon Administration’s wiretapping of public officials and newsmen—criticism that led him angrily to threaten to resign.

Against stiff odds, Kissinger, in November, 1973, launched an extraordinary diplomatic peace effort: He pushed for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory, but within the context of Israeli security; encouraged the re-emergence of Arab pride, but within the context of realism and responsibility; sought to build up the stature of the moderates

within the Arab world, starting with Sadat of Egypt; tried to rebuild America's strategic position in a critical part of the world, gently elbowing Russia out of her prewar pre-eminence; attempted to persuade the oil-producing Arab states to lift their embargo against the United States; and, last but not least, hoped that he would be able to inject a

revolutionary goal in the Middle East—that Arab and Israeli alike could begin to believe in the possibility of a peaceful accommodation.

Within a few months, his “shuttle diplomacy” began to work. He coaxed and charmed Egypt into concluding a historic agreement with Israel, persuaded King Faisal and his friends to lift their oil embargo, and, late last month, capped a photo-finish diplomatic extravaganza—33 days of shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem—by bringing these two old enemies into an agreement to disengage their military forces along the hot Golan front. The disengagement is scheduled to be completed next week.

The Secretary needs no experts to tell him now that a good part of the new look in Arab policy is based on the premise that he will continue to help the Egyptians and the Syrians obtain a further pull-back of Israeli troops, and that delicate diplomacy will still be needed. Nevertheless, his performance thus far has indeed been a personal tour de force, an achievement that rose from the very ashes of the October war. And those dark days did not look even remotely promising then, as a new Secretary of State moved into Foggy Bottom only to find himself confronted by what he soon perceived as a “murderously dangerous” situation—M.K; B.K.

After the cease-fire: Kissinger with Sadat in Cairo.

By Marvin Kalb
and Bernard Kalb

By 9 P.M. on Friday, Oct. 5, 1973, Ray Cline, then head of the U. S. State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, had reviewed his latest information, and he concluded that war would break out in the Middle East the following day, or even sooner. Others at the State Department shared his alarm, but somehow, they couldn't communicate it to Henry Kissinger; no one wanted to take the responsibility for disturbing the Secretary of State at the Waldorf Towers on a Friday evening after hours. He was in New York attending a United Nations meeting.

Marvin Kalb is a diplomatic correspondent and Bernard Kalb a Washington correspondent for CBS. This article is adapted from the Kalb brothers' forthcoming book, "Kissinger."

Actually, there had been a steady flow of intelligence for several weeks indicating that an Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel was imminent; and yet Kissinger and most other political leaders in both Israel and the United States misread the evidence. Most of them still believed there would be no war.

The next day, Oct. 6, was a very special day. For Moslems, it was the 1,350th anniversary of the Battle of Badr, which launched Mohammed's entry into Mecca. For Jews, it was Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. For Kissinger, it was more than simply the end of his second week in office; it was also the beginning of a 20-day baptism of fire—the start of the fourth Arab-Israeli war in one generation.

At 6 A.M., he was awakened in suite 35A at the Waldorf Towers and presented a telegram from the American Ambassador to Israel, Kenneth Keating. Keating had been summoned two hours earlier in Jerusalem to an urgent meeting with then Prime Minister Golda Meir, who told him she had just received word that Egypt and Syria were in the final hours of a countdown for war. She urged the United States to use all its influence to try to head them off, suggesting appeals to Egypt, Syria and the So-

viet Union, and she assured Keating that Israel would not launch a pre-emptive attack.

Kissinger called President Nixon, who was at Key Biscayne, with the disturbing news, and, after hearing the Secretary's report, the President told him to telephone the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel to urge "restraint." Kissinger called and exhorted them to "avoid undermining . . . the cease-fire." To Israel's Abba Eban he also repeated the warning he had made many times during the previous months: "Don't pre-empt."

The Secretary of State then converted his hotel suite into a command post, and summoned his top aides. In quick order, Kissinger called Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in Washington and urged him to do what he could to prevent the outbreak of war. The Russian envoy said he would try to help. Kissinger cabled King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and King Hussein of Jordan, two of the friendlier Arab leaders, and asked them to "use their good offices." And Kissinger called U. N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, alerting him to the danger. The Secretary then asked for the latest intelligence. It revealed that the Egyptian and Syrian Armies had in fact swung into offensive forma-

Copyright © 1974 by Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb from "Kissinger: Used by permission of Little, Brown and Company, Inc.

The well-coordinated Arab assault (an Egyptian bridgehead on the Suez Canal) shook Kissinger's assumption that the spirit of détente would encourage the Soviet Union to use its influence to head off the war. Instead, the Russians contributed directly to the initial Arab success by shipping massive quantities of ammunition.

tions, but that Israeli military units of both fronts had reacted to this clear-cut threat in an odd way. For the most part, they remained in static positions. Kissinger assumed, despite Mrs. Meir's messages, that Israel was really seeking to lull her Arab neighbors into a false sense of security and then, at just the right moment, planned to deal them a punishing pre-emptive blow.

At 7 A.M., there was more bad news. The Situation Room at the White House had monitored a garbled report from Israel, which was interpreted as meaning that the Jewish state planned to launch a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and Syria "in six hours." Kissinger, puzzled by the crisscrossing signals, angrily called Mordechai Shalev, Israel's Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, and warned once again against any pre-emptive action. As a double check, he instructed Keating to repeat the warning to Mrs. Meir, saying, in effect that if Israel struck first, then the United States would feel no moral obligation to help. Israel would be alone.

As it turned out, Keating's warning was unnecessary. Mrs. Meir at just that moment was convening her "Kitchen Cabinet," which really met in her kitchen. She conferred with Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Minister Without Portfolio Israel Galili. She re-

jected the urgent pleading of her military Chief of Staff, Gen. David Elazar, who argued for a pre-emptive strike to disrupt what he now regarded as a certainty—an Arab attack. The Prime Minister decided that Israel would accept the first blows.

Her decision proved historic. By reversing 25 years of Israeli strategy—a strategy based on quick, bold surprises that invariably carried the battle to the enemy—she placed Israel on the defensive. She assumed, as did so many others, that Israel, even if attacked first, could rapidly repulse and rout the enemy. Mrs. Meir instructed Elazar to alert some units, but she refused to put the country on full alert. She refused even to call up the reserves. She didn't want to disrupt Yom Kippur; she didn't want to provoke the Arabs; she didn't want to spend $11-million, which a full alert would have cost (there had been two expensive false alarms earlier in the year); but, perhaps most important, she didn't want to go against Kissinger's injunctions.

Keating informed Kissinger about Mrs. Meir's decision. Kissinger informed Egypt's Foreign Minister Mohammed el-Zayyat and Dobrynin. Then he called Shalev one more time, apparently even then harboring some doubts about Mrs. Meir's assurances. "We took the responsibility upon ourselves," he told the Israeli diplomat, (Continued on Page 42)

The Soviet airlift and an alert changed Kissinger's attitude about Israel's capacity to win a quick victory. He determined to open a massive airlift of American military supplies to Israel. (Evacuating Israeli wounded in the Sinai.)

The New York Times Magazine/June 23, 1974 11

Thousands have
signed a document that says, in effect:
'If I'm terminally ill, pull the plug.'

# The Living Will—
and the will to live

By David Dempsey

A few years ago, at a conference on death and dying at Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, I sat next to an attractive young woman whose name tag read, "Hi! I'm Betty L—." During the coffee break, as we talked, she showed me a "Living Will" requesting that doctors take responsibility for doing what she herself would be unable to do if she became hopelessly ill—terminate her life. Although the will was not binding, she hoped that when "her time came" they would take it seriously.

Addressed to "My family, my physician, my clergyman, my lawyer," this legal-looking document expressed the wish that "if there is no reasonable expectation of my recovery from physical or mental disability, I, Betty L—, be allowed to die and not be kept alive by artificial means or heroic measures ... I ask that drugs be mercifully administered to me for terminal suffering even if they hasten the moment of death."

It was hard to visualize that vivacious woman hooked up to the awesome machinery of intensive care—the catheters, respirators, monitors, bottles and intravenous tubes by which a dying person can be kept alive. But her fear of this possibility, I found out, is not unusual. At least 300,000 model wills have been distributed by churches, doctors and even schools, and no one knows how many people have written their own. When Abigail Van Buren described the will in her widely syndicated "Dear Abby" column, the Euthanasia Educational Council—prime supplier of the document—received 50,000 requests representing every state in the union.

"Right to Die" educational kits are supplied by the Euthanasia Council to schools throughout the country, down to grade seven; and for $55, a 56-minute "Right to Die" film, in color, can be rented by organizations. Bills to legalize voluntary euthanasia have been introduced in a number of state legislatures (none, however, have been approved); and although doctors in general are wary of committing themselves in public, many admittedly "pull the plug"—or have the nurse trip over it—when there is no hope of recovery. Dr. Walter W. Sackett Jr., a Miami, Fla., general practitioner—if not the

Semmelweiss of geriatric medicine, at least its Billy Mitchell—boasts that he has allowed "hundreds of patients" to die by withholding treatment, and sees no other satisfactory answer to the problem of prolonged terminal illness.

The right to die hardly competes with Women's Lib for public attention, nor is it as controversial as abortion; to many people, however, it represents one of the last unresolved issues in the battle for human rights. Many civil libertarians, for example, contending that everyone is entitled to control over his own body, assert that one's mode of dying should be as privileged a part of one's life-style as long hair, clothes and sex. Under the Constitution, they argue, the right to die is as inalienable as the right to live.

The slogan of the movement, "Death with Dignity," implies a rejection of the paraphernalia by which a terminal patient is kept alive, usually at great cost to his family and in isolation from them. Such "intensive care"—so the argument goes—is often less for the patient's benefit than the physician's; it reduces the person to an object, prolongs dying (rather than living) and, for many people, needlessly makes death a psychologically, if not physically, anguishing experience.

This upsurge of interest in death with dignity, however, has obscured an undercurrent of doubt, and even outright opposition, on the part of clergymen, doctors and legal experts who question whether dying is quite that simple, or that it is a "right" that can be isolated from society's right to protect human life. Some of the movement's earliest ideologists are also beginning to have second thoughts about specific directions the movement is taking.

"The Living Will is hard for me to swallow," says Dr. Austin H. Kutscher, a professor of dentistry at Columbia Presbyterian Medical School and president of the Foundation of Thanatology, a New York-based educational and research organization that promotes a broader understanding of the "new" dying among both professionals and laymen. "An individual signs it under circumstances when he is not concerned with his own death. It becomes operative at a time when he is 100 per cent involved. There's no provision for canceling out." (Mindful of this criticism, the Euthanasia Council has since amended its will by suggesting that signers redate it once a year if their wishes are unchanged).

For Dr. Robert Kastenbaum, a research psychologist and gerontologist who has written widely

on the subject of dying, promoting the right to die is a "cop-out" that gives the medical profession an excuse to limit, rather than improve, care of the dying. "It's much easier to talk about mercy killing," he says, "than to try to add comfort and value to a terminal life."

Critics of the right to die admit there are times when human life is so meaningless that death may be preferable. A man or woman with irreversible brain damage who remains hostage to a heart-lung machine can hardly be said to "live" at all. Similarly, the moribund old person is psychologically, if not physically, dead, although it is unlikely that he suffers. For these patients, "pulling the plug" may be the only solution. A matter of medical judgment, often performed with the family's consent, it is a perfectly legal as well as merciful way of letting "natural" death take over from the machines. It does not, however, expedite what otherwise would not have occurred.

Such clear-cut instances, however, represent a small number of problem deaths and, in any case, medicine already handles them with discretion and mercy. The real danger, these opponents point out, lies in an overly simplistic attitude toward dying in general, primarily the view that a "good" death is something that can be anticipated and managed. What may appear to be an individual right, moreover, is actually entwined in a number of social relationships. Before a verdict can be rendered, they say, at least four crucial aspects of the problem need to be examined:

(1) Does a person, in fact, have a constitutional right to die? If so, is the right always in his best interests?

(2) Does death by choice represent medicine's best answer to the admittedly difficult question of incurable and/or terminal illness?

(3) Does society have an investment in human life—and the concept of its sacredness—that over rides the individual, if not legally, at least morally? (Conversely, does the notion of "easy death" give society a dangerous weapon to regulate population in a world burdened with too many unproductive people?)

(4) Does the right to die, in effect, sanction unconscious, self-destructive impulses in people? Is

David Dempsey, a frequent contributor to this Magazine, is alive and well and living in Rye, N. Y.

A patient in an iron lung watches TV by means of a mirror overhead. "Intensive care is not always the chamber of horrors death-with-dignity enthusiasts accuse it of being."

12

more military supplies to Is-
rael—Jackson taking the lead
—and Dinitz wondered if it
was this pressure that had
produced the Presidential de-
cision.

At 8:45 P.M., Kissinger called Dinitz to say that Schlesinger would be available on Wednesday to discuss logistical details. Apparently there had been some Presidential arm-twisting.

By dawn, Wednesday, Oct. 10, American and Israeli intelligence picked up the first clear signals of a Soviet airlift into Damascus and Cairo. Its full dimensions were not yet known.

At 10:45 A.M., Kissinger called Dinitz to discuss it. Both diplomats were obviously concerned: Kissinger, because the airlift was hardly an example of Soviet "restraint"; Dinitz, because his enemies had no trouble getting help, while he, as he put it, had to spend his time

Nixon exploded at Schlesinger: 'To hell with the charters! Get the supplies there! Get moving!'

"painting Jewish stars off Israeli planes." The Secretary switched subjects. How was the war going? He was beginning to question his own rosy assumptions. On the Golan front, the Syrians had been stopped, but there was still heavy fighting. Israel was sustaining heavy tank losses, largely because Syria had been equipped with an unusually effective antitank missile, the latest in the Soviet arsenal. On the Sinai front, Dinitz said, the Egyptians had smashed or encircled the Bar-Lev Line of Israeli defense on the east bank of the canal. More than 20,000 Egyptian troops, 400 tanks and other armored vehicles had crossed

the canal, and they were digging in. Again, Israeli losses were heavy, in men and materiel. Elazar's promised counteroffensive could not get rolling, and one major reason was the dwindling ordnance. What about supplies?

Kissinger called Schlesinger and asked him to organize civilian charters to carry American military aid to Israel as quickly as possible. The Defense Secretary showed little enthusiasm, but he offered no opposition. Kissinger wasn't sure, at that point, if Kissinger intended to help.

At the Pentagon, Kissinger was well aware that Dinitz wanted to see him to discuss military supplies for

Israel. A tentative noontime date had been set. At the last minute, the Defense chief canceled the meeting. His deputy, William P. Clements Jr., a wealthy Texas drilling contractor with close ties to the oil industry, had apparently persuaded him that he needed more information about American inventories before he could provide the Israelis with an exact timetable for deliveries. No new appointment with Dinitz was set.

At the White House, Nixon and Kissinger briefed 10 Senators and 9 Congressmen. Senator Mike Mansfield, before the hour-and-a-half meeting, told reporters that the United States must not get in-

volved in the war. "I want no more Vietnams," he said.

From Beirut, there were reports that Brezhnev was exporting all Arab leaders to join the fight against Israel. Jordan decided to send a limited force.

That afternoon, the Administration's attention was suddenly absorbed by still another major political crisis. Spiro Agnew resigned as Vice President, pleading no contest to a charge of tax evasion in Maryland, his home state. His resignation, on top of the growing Watergate scandal, weakened the Administration even more. Its effect was to increase the pressure on Kissinger to avoid a foreign-policy disaster that could end up toppling the President.

Dinitz returned to the White House at 3:30, and it was a scene of frantic activity. Kissinger was in the Oval Office. Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger's deputy

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on the National Security Council, told Dinitz that the Russians had just switched tactics on a U. N. cease-fire. U. N. Ambassador John Scali reported that Moscow was now proposing an immediate end to the fighting. The Russian move was clearly an attempt to freeze the battlefield situation at a point at which the Arabs had the initiative and the Israelis had not yet been able to mount a counteroffensive. Dinitz angrily rejected the proposal. Israel, he said, would never accept a cease-fire until Syrian and Egyptian forces had been driven back to the prewar lines. He urged the United States to open an immediate airlift of supplies to Israel to match the Soviet airlift. Scowcroft promised to convey his appeal to Kissinger.

Late that afternoon, the National Security Agency, which specializes in electronic intelligence, and the C.I.A. received urgent reports from the Middle East that Russia's largest transport plane—the Antønov-22—was spearheading the Soviet airlift and that these lumbering giants were coming into Damascus and Cairo at fairly regular intervals, suggesting the airlift was becoming “massive.” When these reports reached Kissinger's attention, he quickly called Dinitz. Could the Israeli Ambassador come to the White House at 8 P.M.?

The meeting that evening lasted for an hour and 15 minutes. It focused on Russia's call for a cease-fire. Dinitz repeated his opposition. "The Russians are hardly in a position to appear as the pacificists," the Israeli Ambassador stated, with some annoyance. "They are the ones who caused the war. They knew of the impending attack and didn't warn you and didn't prevent it. Now they are coaxing other Arab Governments to join the fight against Israel, and they are sending a big airlift. And, after all this, they dare to ask to freeze the situation!" Kissinger did not argue. He had been making the same points to himself. After Dinitz left, Kissinger called Dobrynin and persuaded him to delay his cease-fire call.

Late that night, Kissinger received more disturbing intelligence. The C.I.A. had learned that three Soviet airborne divisions in Eastern Europe had been put on alert. Why? Russia's clients were fighting well; better than anyone had anticipated, in fact. And direct Soviet intervention could only trigger American counteraction, which could spiral into a nuclear war. It

was, as Kissinger would later put it, "a murderously dangerous situation, much worse, much more dangerous than the 1970 Jordan crisis." He called Dinitz and recommended a 7:45 meeting on Thursday morning. He did not tell him about the Soviet alert.

Dinitz's car pulled into the circular drive at the diplomatic entrance of the State Department at 7:40 A.M. The Ambassador and Chargé d'Affaires Shalev, both bleary-eyed from fatigue, hurried through the quiet lobby, past the giant, rotating globe and a few reporters too surprised to get in a question. Then, for over an hour, Dinitz and Kissinger focused on one problem—getting the Pentagon to supply Israel with planes, tanks and electronic equipment on an emergency basis.

During the night, Kissinger had reached a major decision: Russia had to be stopped—not only to save Israel, but also, in his mind, to spare the world the possibility of a big-power confrontation. The Soviet airlift and alert had changed his attitude about Israel's capacity to win a quick victory. Just as he had misjudged prewar intelligence, so too had he misjudged the will and capability of the Arabs and the duplicity of the Russians. He was now determined to open a massive airlift of American military supplies to Israel.

"We tried to talk in the first week," Kissinger later explained. "When that didn't work, we said, fine, we'll start pouring in equipment until we create a new reality."

Kissinger told Dinitz to see Schlesinger. In the afternoon, Kissinger himself again urged Schlesinger to charter 20 American transport planes to fly supplies and again Schlesinger resisted, warning of a possible oil embargo. Their argument was resolved only after Kissinger had won the President to his point of view. Nixon ordered Schlesinger to charter the 20 planes; but by the end of the day Dinitz still had heard nothing of the airlift, and Israel, meanwhile, was still suffering heavy losses.

At 6 P.M., Friday, Dinitz, accompanied by Gen. Mordechai Gur, then Israeli Defense Attaché, finally got his meeting with Pentagon leaders. Dinitz reviewed the massive Soviet contribution to the Arab cause and then lamented the "unbelievably slow response of the Americans." Schlesinger did not dispute the Ambassador's rundown.

(Continued on Page 52)

Food: Summer soups

By Craig Claiborne with Pierre Franey

Some like them cold

Cold soups were a rarity in this country until the late Louis Diat came up with vichysoisse in the kitchen of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel about three decades ago. Today, cold soups of all persuasions help make sultry summers palatable. Three extraordinarily good ones are offered below.

Cucumber, tomato
and avocado soup

4 tablespoons butter

1 cup chopped onion

4 tablespoons flour

4 cups peeled, cubed tomatoes, pref-
erably fresh although canned may
be used

4 cups peeled, cubed cucumbers
Salt and freshly ground pepper

4 cups chicken broth

1 ripe, unblemished avocado

1 cup heavy cream.

1. Melt the butter in a deep sauce-pan or kettle and add the onion. Cook, stirring, until wilted and sprinkle with flour. Add the tomatoes, stirring rapidly with a whisk. Add the cucumbers, salt and pepper to taste. When blended, stir in the broth.

2. Simmer 25 minutes. Pour the mixture, a few ladlefuls at a time, into the container of an electric blender. Blend well. Strain the soup into a bowl if it is to be served cold and chill. If it is to be served hot, return it to the stove and heat thoroughly.

3. Peel the avocado and remove the pulp. Chop the flesh finely and add it to the soup, stirring rapidly with a whisk. Stir in the cream. Serve very cold or piping hot.

Yield: Eight servings.

Gazpacho with corn
and zucchini

2 to 4 ears corn on the cob

2 pounds fresh, red, ripe tomatoes

1 onion, preferably a red onion,
coarsely chopped

2 cloves garlic, finely minced

2 cups peeled, coarsely chopped
cucumber

1 1/2 cups tomato juice
Salt and freshly ground pepper

1/4 cup olive oil

1/4 cup red wine vinegar

1/2 small zucchini, peeled

1 cup finely diced cucumber

3 tablespoons finely minced fresh
basil or 1 teaspoon dried.

1. Drop the shucked corn into boiling water to cover. Cover and when

Bradley Olman

the water returns to the boil, remove
it immediately from the heat. Let stand
five minutes, no longer. Drain. Let the
corn cool. Cut off the kernels. There
should be about one cup.

2. Drop the tomatoes into boiling water to cover. Let stand 12 seconds

and drain immediately. Pull the peel
from the tomatoes, using a paring
knife. Cut away and discard the core.
Coarsely chop the tomatoes. There
should be about four cups.

3. Put the tomatoes into the con-
tainer of an electric blender. It may

be necessary to do this in two or three
steps. Add the onion, garlic, the
coarsely chopped cucumber and toma-
to juice. Blend thoroughly in one or
two steps, depending on the blender.
Add salt and pepper to taste.

4. Pour the mixture into a bowl and add the olive oil and vinegar.

5. Cut the zucchini into fine dice and add it. Add the corn. Add the diced cucumber and basil. Add more salt and pepper to taste. Chill thoroughly.

Yield: Six to eight servings.

Cream of carrot soup

1 pound carrots (8 to 10)

1 pound potatoes (3 to 5)

2 tablespoons butter

1/2 cup coarsely chopped onion

6 cups rich chicken broth

2 springs fresh thyme or 1/2 teaspoon
dried

1 bay leaf

1 cup heavy cream

1/8 teaspoon Tabasco sauce, or
more to taste

1/2 teaspoon Worcestershire sauce

1/2 teaspoon sugar
Salt and freshly ground pepper

1 cup cold milk.

1. Trim off the ends of the carrots. Peel the carrots and potatoes with a swivel-bladed vegetable scraper. Cut the carrots into rounds. Cube the potatoes. Set aside.

2. Heat the butter in a kettle and add the onion. Cook briefly, stirring. Add the carrots, potatoes and broth and bring to the boil. Add the thyme and bay leaf. Bring to the boil and simmer 30 to 40 minutes until the carrots and potatoes are tender.

3. Put the mixture through a food mill and let it cool. Put it into the container of an electric blender and blend. This may have to be done in two stages. If the soup is to be served hot, bring it to the boil and add the remaining ingredients. When the soup returns to the boil, serve it piping hot. If it is to be served cold, add remaining ingredients to blended mixture, stir well and pour into a bowl and chill thoroughly. Serve very cold.

Yield: Six to eight servings.

51

its feet. Yes, Scowcroft nodded, but added that the charter problem had been and remained "real enough." Kissinger became very angry. He quickly got Schlesinger on the phone and warned that the President would "blow his top" when he learned about the delays. Kissinger described the charters as a "matter of urgent national security." "Every morning I come in and ask, 'What about the charters?' and I'm told everything is all right," Kissinger said. "But in the evening, I'm told nothing has moved. Now what

Kissinger called Alexander Haig. 'We must put the fear of God in Schlesinger and Clements,' he was quoted as saying. 'They are working against Presidential orders.'

is going on?" Schlesinger tried to refute the Secretary's charges, but Kissinger interrupted him with an order to get busy implementing the President's policy.

When Kissinger finished talking, he immediately called White House aide Alexander Haig. "We must put the fear of God in Schlesinger and Clements," he was quoted as saying. "They are working against Presidential orders." Kissinger demanded that the problem of Israeli "resupply" be solved "urgently." Haig was surprised to learn that the charter problem still had not been solved. He suggested that Scowcroft be put in personal charge of it.

Deputy Defense Secretary Clements, for his part, has denied that he was even aware of a problem with charters or that he was in any way sabotaging U. S. policy. On the contrary, he has maintained that he followed White House orders during the crisis. But a high Defense official said that because of "poor communications" between Kissinger and the Pentagon—"he was five miles away, across the river, and we couldn't read his mind"—he often did not know exactly what Kissinger was going to do next. Another Pentagon official was less charitable. "Henry tried running the Government by telephone that

week," he said, "and it can't be done that way." The Pentagon defense, in short, was that Kissinger was attempting to run the war out of his vest pocket, controlling the flow of information even to the top civilian managers of the Pentagon, and that he never fully explained his tactics or strategy. The Pentagon maintained that the strain across the Potomac existed only during the first week of the war and then cooperation between the State and Defense Departments improved considerably.

Later Friday night, Kissinger asked Haig to arrange a meeting with Nixon. Kissinger reviewed the day's developments with the President, and it would have been extraordinary if he did not lay particular stress on the Pentagon's obstructionist tactics. Nixon took immediate action. He instructed Haig to order Schlesinger to send 10 C-130 transport planes, loaded with military supplies, to the Azores at once; then to fly 20 C-130's directly to Israel; and finally to facilitate a quick Israeli pickup of the cargo left in the Azores. When Kissinger informed Dinitz about the President's latest order, aimed at breaking through all bureaucratic roadblocks, the Israel envoy expressed his gratitude but asked if it was possible for all of the American planes to fly directly to Israel. He explained that Israeli pilots were needed for combat duty.

At 1:45 A.M. Saturday morning, Kissinger called again. The President, he said, had issued still another order to Schlesinger: to make absolutely certain that 10 Phantoms reached Israel by midnight Sunday. Nixon was aware of the danger of a strong Arab reaction, but he was equally aware of the danger of a Soviet miscalculation of American intentions. He felt he had to make a strong, visible show of support for Israel. Dinitz thanked Kissinger but warned that Israel needed more than 10 Phantoms. The war had cut deeply into Israel's air force.

At 10:30, the President summoned all his top advisers to an emergency meeting at the White House. Kissinger had alerted Nixon to the need for an unambiguous Presidential order launching an American airlift of supplies for Israel. Kissinger, in his dual capacity as national security adviser and Secretary of State, joined Schlesinger, Moorer, Haig, Colby and other officials. They heard the President ask one key question: Why had there been a delay

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By 3:30 P.M. Dinitz was informed that a fleet of larger C-5's had just left the United States for Israel. The Ambassador cabled Mrs. Meir that "a massive American airlift" had begun. Kissinger had won what one of his aides later called the "Battle of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue."

Within a few days, as one C-5 after another rumbled into Tel Aviv, each one a signal of U. S. determination, the Kissinger strategy began to affect both the military and diplomatic sides of the war. In the dead of night on Oct. 15, Israeli commandos, their faces darkened to avoid detection, crossed over on rafts to the western bank of the Suez Canal just north of Great Bitter Lake. On Oct. 16, Israeli armored units drove an iron wedge through Egyptian lines on the east bank and then built a pontoon bridge across the canal to the west bank— to “Africa,” as the Israelis called it. Hundreds of Israeli troops and dozens of tanks and other armored vehicles crossed into “Africa” in a dramatic move that turned the tide of battle on the Suez front.

This cross-canal operation had been under intensive study since the fourth day of the war, but it had been put temporarily on a back burner. Defense Minister Moshe Danyan and General Elazar, worried about a growing shortage of ammunition and equipment, had restrained General Ariel Sharon, commander of Israeli forces in the Sinai, from launching this daring mission. Only when Dinitz's cable announcing the airlift reached Mrs. Meir's desk on Saturday night did final preparations begin.

At first, the Egyptians tried to destroy the Israeli bridgehead; instead, it was widened and deepened, and Sadat began to realize that his armies on the east bank could be cut off from supplies and devastated. The Israelis, after 72 hours in “Africa,” were already 40 miles west of the

canal and but 50 miles east of Cairo.

The airlift, as Kissinger had expected, stimulated activity on the diplomatic front, too. On Oct. 16, Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin flew secretly into Cairo for three days of urgent consultations with Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. He carried a four-point “peace” proposal, obviously conceived before the Israelis crossed the canal: (1) a cease-fire in place; (2) Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries, after some minor changes; (3) an international peace conference, at which the final agreement would be negotiated and ratified; and (4) most important, a “guarantee” by the Soviet Union and the United States of the entire agreement, including the cease-fire.

From the moment Kosygin arrived in the Egyptian capital, it was clear that the Russians wanted the conflict to come to an end. Kissinger would later note that they did not press their call for a cease-fire when their allies were on the offensive and they were the only ones running an air and sea lift of supplies into the war zone; but once the United States opened its own airlift and the Israelis suddenly went on the attack, they began energetically to press for a cease-fire. During the last of Kosygin's long and occasionally bitter talks with Sadat, the reluctant Egyptian leader raised a crucially important question: What would happen if Cairo agreed to a cease-fire in place and Israel didn't, or, even worse, if Israel agreed to a cease-fire, and then massively violated it? Kosygin, according to Egyptian sources, told Sadat that the Soviet Union stood ready to help enforce the cease-fire—alone, if necessary.

In Washington, on the night of Oct. 18, Dobrynin gave Kissinger the draft of a Soviet proposal for a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire. The Secretary was puzzled by its extreme demands, including a call for a total Israeli withdrawal from “all” occupied Arab lands, including the Old City of Jerusalem. It was such an obvious “nonstarter” that Kissinger quickly rejected it.

The following morning, at 10 A.M., Dobrynin presented an invitation to the Secretary from Brezhnev asking him to fly to Moscow for “urgent consultations on the Middle East.” The Soviet party chief, after considering Kosygin's report, had

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cluded that Sadat's forces were in bad trouble, and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad's were in worse shape. In his judgment they needed an immediate cease-fire. If Kissinger had refused to accept his invitation, he would have been prepared to dispatch Gromyko to Washington. Time was critical. The Israelis were advancing on Damascus. Their big guns were little more than 20 miles away, within firing range of the outskirts of the city. In the south, uue Israelis were continuing to expand their bridgehead in the very heartland of Egypt, building up their fighting force there to more than 300 tanks and 13,000 troops.

Kissinger spent very little time de-
bating whether to snap up Brezhnev's
invitation—for a number of reasons.
First, he thought a rejection would
probably force the Russians to go di-
rectly to the U.N. Security Council
and propose a cease-fire. He believed
that such a proposal would have been
adopted unanimously. Next, by going
to Moscow, Kissinger purchased an ad-
ditional 72 hours for Israel to improve
her military position; Kissinger also

The Israeli Ambassador
cabled home that ‘a
massive American air-
lift’ had begun.
Kissinger had won
the ‘Battle of 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue.’

wanted to be in personal charge of
the negotiations. Despite his assur-
ances, less than a month old, that as
Secretary of State he was going to "in-
stitutionalize policy," he could not
shake his style of playing a command-
ing role in every negotiation, particu-
larly in a crisis. And finally, perhaps
most important, Kissinger believed, ac-
cording to one close aide, "that the
Russians were getting very anxious
and very upset" and might even be
considering "unilateral military action
to stop the fighting." The Secretary
considered the over-all situation "mur-
derously dangerous," an assessment
he was to repeat time and again. After
checking with Nixon, he told Dobrynin
that he would leave for Moscow that
night.

While he prepared for his journey,
the President was sending a signal to
Moscow—and to the Arab states, too.
In a special message to Capitol Hill,
Nixon asked Congress for $2.2-billion
in emergency military aid for Israel.
For the first time in many years, the
United States proposed giving, rather
than selling, this military equipment
to the Jewish state. "The magnitude
of the current conflict, coupled with
the scale of Soviet supply activities,"
Nixon said, "has created needs which
exceed Israel's capacity." Noting that

the Middle East had become "a flash
point for potential world conflict,"
the President added: "The United States is
making every effort to bring this con-
flict to a very swift and honorable
conclusion, measured in days, not
weeks. But prudent planning also re-
quires us to prepare for a longer strug-
gle." The President's message seemed
packaged to enhance Kissinger's bar-
gaining position in Moscow.

Kissinger's plane landed at Vnukovo
Airport, Moscow, at 7:30 P.M., Satur-
day, Oct. 20. While he was airborne,
the Secretary received two signals.
One came from the White House; the
other from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The
signal from the White House was high-
ly unusual. The President flashed Kis-
singer what amounted to a "power of
attorney" to sign any agreement in
Moscow in his name. Nixon knew that
Kissinger was planning to bring any
agreement reached in Moscow back to
Washington for Presidential perusal
and approval: that was the standard
operating procedure. The President,
who was about to fire Archibald Cox,
the first Watergate Special Prosecutor
—an action that would also force the
resignation of Elliot Richardson and
William Ruckelshaus from the two top
jobs at the Justice Department, in
what became known as the Saturday
Night Massacre—was either too pre-
occupied with his political problems
to think about urgent diplomatic mat-
ters or so worried about the possibil-
ity of a world conflagration that he
decided to dispense with normal dip-
lomatic procedure and give Kissinger
the power to take immediate, binding
action in his name. The Secretary
was surprised by the White House
signal but didn't question it.

The second signal, from Riyadh, had
the impact of an economic H-bomb,
but Kissinger was too absorbed with
the problems of war and cease-fire in
the Middle-East to give it more than
a passing thought. The supposedly
pro-American Government of Saudi
Arabia, denouncing the United States
airlift of arms to Israel and the Presi-
dent's special aid message to Congress,
slapped a punishing oil embargo on
the United States. For months Faisal
had warned that he would use his oil
weapon in the Arab struggle against
Israel; besides, he had committed him-
self to use this weapon in secret pre-
war negotiations with Sadat. On Oct.
17, the oil-producing states had voted
to reduce their production by 10 per
cent. On Oct. 18, Abu Dhabi had im-
posed an oil embargo on the United
States. On Oct. 19, Libya had acted.

On Oct. 20, it was Saudi Arabia's
turn, and the following day Algeria
and Kuwait followed suit. In the
months ahead, the oil embargo was
to have damaging impact on the Amer-
ican economy and way of life. It would
eventually force Kissinger to acceler-
ate his diplomatic peacemaking efforts
but that weekend in Moscow, Kissinger
had a more immediate aim: to exploit
Russia's nervousness about the Israeli
offensive.

Less than two hours after his arrival
in the Soviet capital, Kissinger was es-
corted into Brezhnev's Kremlin office,

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word to the Russians. Now
the Russians could suspect
Kissinger of duplicity, which
could have a detrimental ef-
fect on his role as a middle-
man. Dinitz argued that it was
not Israel, but Egypt, that had
broken the cease-fire. Kissin-
ger urged Dinitz in the
strongest terms to tell Mrs.
Meir that the United States
expected Israel to live up to
the terms of the cease-fire—
"scrupulously," he added.

The Secretary then checked
with his own intelligence ex-
perts. They confirmed the es-
sence of Dinitz's account but
added one important fact—
that the Israelis had taken full
advantage of the initial Egyp-
tian violation to extend their
lines on the west bank of the
canal. Apparently what hap-
pened was that the command-
er of the Egyptian Third
Corps, trapped on the east
bank of the canal opposite the
Egyptian city of Suez, ignored
specific cease-fire orders from
Cairo and attempted to break
out of Israeli encirclement.
The Israelis, still smarting
over Egypt's original aggres-
sion, beat back that attempt
and then intensified their mili-
tary pressure on both sides of
the canal. On the west bank,
in particular, the Israelis kept
edging toward the strategic
prize of Suez itself. If the city
fell under Israeli control, then
there would be no way for the
Egyptians to resupply the
Third Corps. After only a
short while, the Israelis would
be in a position to destroy
the best fighting force in the
Egyptian Army.

Kissinger resolved that he
would stop the Israelis and
save the Third Corps and thus
guarantee a military stale-
mate. The Israelis would be
on the west bank, the Egyp-
tians on the east bank, and
each side would have leverage
over the other. From the
earliest days of the war, it had
never been Kissinger's policy
to encourage the Israelis to
win another decisive victory,
such as they had won in 1967.
Such a victory would not buy
peace, but rather create ten-
sions that would trigger still
another war. Besides, Kissin-
ger believed that in the cur-
rent diplomatic climate, a
clear-cut Israeli victory would
contribute to a further isola-
tion of Israel, and, given
America's close ties to the
Jewish state, encourage a new
wave of anti-Americanism in
the Middle East. The oil em-
bargo might then become a
permanent feature of Arab
policy, rather than a tactical
weapon. Finally, if Kissinger

was able to gain acceptance
as a go-between in the Middle
East, as was his aim, he would
have to demonstrate his im-
partiality. Saving the Third
Corps would be such a test—
for him and his policy.

In a series of talks with
Dinitz, Kissinger cajaled,
pressured, urged, implored,
warned, threatened and
pleaded with the Israeli en-
voy to understand his logic
and accept his policy. At the
same time, he told Dobrynin
that he expected the Soviet
Union to restrain the Egyp-
tians. Stating the obvious, the
Secretary said that continued
violations on either side could
only end up hurting both
sides—and the cause of
détente.

By dusk, the number of
violations had gone down, but
Kissinger's anxieties had gone
up. He postponed a visit to
China after his intelligence ex-
perts alerted him to two sud-
den developments. They had
detected a sharp and sudden
drop-off in the number of So-
viet planes carrying military
supplies to Egypt and Syria—
from about 70 flights a day
down to half a dozen. In ad-
dition, they had picked up sig-
nals from the Ukraine indicat-
ing that a number of Soviet
Army and logistical units had
been put on alert.

That night, Kissinger and
Dobrynin worked behind the
scenes to arrange a second
U.N. call for a cease-fire. The
Security Council met in al-
most continuous session.

By 1 A.M., Washington
time, Wednesday, Oct. 24, the
second cease-fire went into
effect; but, moments before
the guns were ordered si-
lenced for the second time in
48 hours, the Israelis an-
nounced that their forces had
reached the outskirts of Suez
and the Third Corps was ef-
fectively surrounded. When
Kissinger got the news, he
was furious. This time, when
he called Dinitz, his voice did
not boom, as it often did; he
spoke softly, very softly, and
Dinitz knew he was seriously
worried. He warned the Is-
raeli diplomat that the cease-
fire would have to be re-
spected, and he urged Dinitz
to allow humanitarian con-
voys—food, water, medical
supplies—to reach the Third
Corps.

Later Wednesday morning,
after further talks with Dinitz
and Dobrynin, Kissinger at-
tended a high-level meeting
at the White House, where he
learned about a series of So-
viet military moves. Four
more divisions of Soviet air-
borne troops had been put
on alert, bringing the total to
seven divisions, or roughly
50,000 troops. Five or six
Soviet transport ships had
crossed into the Mediter-
ranean, raising the Russian
naval presence in that area
to an unprecedented 85 ships.
About a dozen Antonov-22
planes had been spotted fly-
ing toward Cairo. The analysts
wondered if they might be
carrying some of those air-
borne troops. An airborne
command post had been estab-
lished in southern Russia.
And, finally, special military
orders had been intercepted,
suggesting the Russians might
be preparing to intervene in
the Middle East.

Kissinger and Dobrynin ex-
changed urgent calls. The Sec-
retary wanted to see if Dobry-
nin had hardened his bargain-

ing position. He detected no
such sign.

At 3 P.M., Sadat radioed an
urgent appeal to Brezhnev
and Nixon to send a joint
Soviet-American peace-keep-
ing force to the Middle East,
basically to police the Suez
cease-fire. He accused Israel
of continuing violations. Kis-
singer rejected his appeal. He
opposed the idea of sending
big-power troops to a volatile
area, believing that their pres-
ence would only exacerbate
existing tensions.

At 4:15 P.M., Dobrynin ar-
rived at Kissinger's State De-
partment office to discuss the
organization of a Geneva
peace conference following a
cease-fire. In the course of
their talk, Scali called twice
from the U.N.: first, to inform
the Secretary that the Secu-
riity Council would be called
into session that evening; and
second, to say that the "non-
aligned nations" had begun to
echo Sadat's appeal. Kissinger
immediately warned Dobrynin
that the United States op-
posed a joint Soviet-American
peace-keeping force. The Rus-
sian diplomat said that, so far
as he knew, his colleague,
U.N. Ambassador Yakov Malik,
had no instruction to support
such a force. Dobrynin left.

A little while later, at 7:05
P.M., Dobrynin called. He had
unintentionally misled Kissin-
ger, he said; Malik did have

Kissinger's press conference on the morning of the U.S. alert. When Marvin Kalb (front, fifth from right) asked . . .

Kissinger believed that a decisive
Israeli victory would not buy peace,
but rather create tensions that
would trigger still another war.

60

... if it had been called because of Watergate, he said no: "The President had no other choice as a responsible leader."

instructions to support a non-
aligned nation proposal for a
big-power police force. Kissin-
ger suspected that the Rus-
sians were actively encourag-
ing such a proposal, and, in
fairly blunt language, he urged
Dobrynin to tell Moscow that
the United States vigorously
opposed the idea.

Kissinger then informed the
President that the Russians
seemed to be switching sig-
nals. Nixon reiterated his per-
sonal opposition to a big-
power peace-keeping force.

At 7:25 P.M., Kissinger
called Dobrynin, principally to
convey the President's views
on the subject. The Soviet
Ambassador then added a dis-
quieting new note. He said
that Malik might not wait for
the nonaligned nations to in-
troduce the proposal for a big-
power force; he might intro-
duce it himself. Dobrynin ar-
gued that the Israelis were
continuing to violate the
cease-fire, and that Russia and
America were responsible for
maintaining it. Kissinger re-
peated his opposition to the
proposal and warned that
their countries might be head-
ing for trouble.

At 9:25 P.M., Dobrynin
called Kissinger with a "very
urgent" message from Brezh-
nev to Nixon. The message
was, within hours, to bring
the two superpowers into di-

rect confrontation. Normally
Dobrynin would not have
read the message on the phone
but, this time, he said it was
"so urgent" that he would
make an exception. Slowly he
dictated the message to Kis-
singer; a secretary, listening
in on an extension, took down
the four-paragraph text in
shorthand.

The message began with an
unusually cool salutation —
"Mr. President," rather than
with the usual Brezhnev open-
er, "My dear Mr. President"—
and its tone was unmistakably
tough. Brezhnev denounced Is-
rael for "brazenly challenging
both the Soviet Union and the
United States" and for "dras-
tically" violating the cease-
fire. Then, echoing Sadat's
line, the Soviet party chief
said: "Let us together . . . ur-
gently dispatch Soviet and
American contingents to
Egypt." The cease-fire had to
be observed "without delay."
Brezhnev then dropped his
diplomatic bombshell. "I will
say it straight," he said, "that
if you find it impossible to
act together with us in this
matter, we should be faced
with the necessity urgently to
consider the question of tak-
ing appropriate steps unilater-
ally. Israel cannot be allowed
to get away with the vio-
lations."

Kissinger could see the
hedge: "consider the ques-

tion. ..." But he suspected
Brezhnev meant business. The
Russian leader had extracted
Sadat's agreement to a cease-
fire, linked to direct talks with
Israel, only on condition that
the two superpowers—or Rus-
sia alone—would guarantee
the cease-fire. He had received
Kissinger's word that Israel
would respect the cease-fire.
Now, four days later, Israel
had blocked access to Suez
city, effectively encircled the
Third Corps, and threatened
to destroy the cream of the
Egyptian Army and perhaps
topple the Sadat regime in the
process. Kissinger believed
that Brezhnev could not "tol-
erate" another decisive Israeli
victory over Egypt. Kissinger
also knew that the United
States could not tolerate un-
ilateral Soviet intervention.
The United States and the
U.S.S.R. were on a collision
course.

Ten minutes later, just to
double check, Kissinger called
Dobrynin and read the text
of the Brezhnev note back to
him. "Is it correct?" Kissinger
asked. "It is correct," Dobryn-
in answered. The Russian
added that he had to have an
immediate response. The Sec-
retary advised him respect-
fully not to "press" the United
States.

Kissinger immediately called
Nixon. The President at that
time was upstairs at the
White House. The Secretary
gave him a complete fill-in
and stated that the United
States might have to alert its
military forces as one way to
deter any unilateral Soviet
move. The President concurred
and empowered Kissinger to
take charge of the American re-
sponse. He added that if there
were any problems, he would
be available immediately.

Kissinger hastily assem-
bled three panels of experts
—at the White House, the
State Department and the
United Nations—and, while
they quickly reviewed the ac-
cumulated intelligence, Kissin-
ger, in his capacity as na-
tional security adviser, sum-
moned an emergency meeting
of the President's top advis-
ers, a rump N.S.C. gathering
of Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer,
Haig and Scowcroft. They met
at the White House at 11 P.M.

By that time, Kissinger had
the opinion of the experts.
There was, in their view, a
"high probability" of some
kind of "unilateral Soviet
move." He informed the Presi-
dent's top advisers about the
experts' opinion. Then he dis-
tributed copies of all re-
cent Brezhnev communica-
tions, plus the latest note, and

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reached Egypt earlier in the year. The experts had no definitive information on whether the radioactive material had actually been unloaded. The C.I.A. report tended to harden Kissinger's judgment that the Russians were going to send airborne troops to Egypt. Nuclear weapons could serve as backup protection for a sizable Soviet force. On the other hand, Kissinger could not dismiss the possibility that the Russians were moving nuclear weapons into Egypt because they believed that the Israelis had nuclear weapons and intended to use them against Egypt. In the United States Government, there was no hard intelligence that the Israelis had nuclear weapons. Kissinger immediately ordered a study of Israeli nuclear capabilities.

With the President and Haig, Kissinger reviewed the military and diplomatic situation. After a few hours, they reached several conclusions: first, that the United States would continue its efforts at the U.N. to set up a peacekeeping force that excluded the major powers (early that morning, the Security Council had considered a resolution that, while not including the major powers, did not exclude them either); second, that Israel would have to be persuaded to observe the ceasefire; third, that the American airlift of supplies to Israel would continue until all of her losses were replaced; and finally, that Kissinger would hold a news conference to explain the alert and Nixon would postpone, for at least one day, the news conference he had scheduled to explain his firing of Cox.

When America went to work that morning, it was aware from news reports that United States nuclear forces, on a worldwide basis, had been put on standby alert, apparently in a dramatic move to dissuade Russia from taking "unilateral action" in the Middle East. The news of the alert came like a bolt of lightning out of a sky darkened by Watergate suspicion and upheaval. For many people, still stunned by the Saturday Night Massacre, it was impossible not to connect the alert to Watergate. After all, only one day before, spokesmen had asserted that the number of violations was dropping and the crisis seemed to be passing. There was instant speculation on Capitol Hill, in news offices and at political party headquarters — both Republican and Democratic — that the alert must have been caused,

at least to some degree, by the President's desire to deflect attention from Watergate and talk of impeachment.

Kissinger has always claimed that the Watergate connection never entered his mind as he planned and ordered the alert; that only the urgent requirements of diplomacy governed his actions. That was why his news con-

> With the benefit of hindsight, not even Kissinger has given Kissinger a straight A for crisis management.

ference so shocked him. One of the first questions focused on Watergate.

"Mr. Secretary," the question began, "could you tell us whether the United States received a specific warning from the Soviet Union that it would send its forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do you have intelligence that the Russians are preparing for such an action? The reason I raise these questions — as you know, there has been some line of speculation this morning that the American alert might have been prompted as much perhaps by American domestic requirements as by the real requirements of diplomacy in the Middle East. And I wonder if you could provide some additional information on that."

Kissinger answered slowly — as columnist Elizabeth Drew later put it—"in a tone" that was "more in sorrow." "Marvin," he said, "we are attempting to conduct the foreign policy of the United States with regard for what we owe not just to the electorate but to future generations. And it is a symptom of what is happening to our country that it could even be suggested that the United States would alert its forces for domestic reasons. We do not think it is wise at this moment to go into the details of the diplomatic exchanges that prompted this decision. Upon the conclusion of the present diplomatic efforts, one way or the other, we will make the record available, and

we will be able to go into greater detail. And I am absolutely confident that it will be seen that the President had no other choice as a responsible national leader."

The news conference ran from noon to 1 o'clock, during which time the Secretary tried to be tough and conciliatory at the same time. Having confirmed the American alert, he warned the Russians not to send their troops into the Middle East and not to expect the United States to join them in a Big Two peace-keeping force. Such an arrangement would only "transplant the great-power rivalry into the Middle East"—to him, an "incantable" proposition that could lead to a nuclear clash. He said, "We possess, each of us, nuclear arsenals capable of annihilating humanity...." The remarks were classic Kissinger. "We need a combination of extreme toughness, when we're challenged," he once said of the Russians, but with enough flexibility "to give them the option of going to a more responsible course" without losing face. "It's in their nature" to probe any soft spot, but the United States "must be willing to face them down when they step across the line."

The news conference was being carried live on nationwide TV and radio, and U.N. delegates paused to listen, delaying Security Council deliberations still longer. The delay gave Malik extra time to call Moscow for new instructions, which became evident almost immediately. Persuaded, no doubt, that the influence game in the Middle East was getting too expensive for the Soviet Union, Brezhnev sought a face-saving compromise at the U.N. He told Malik to stop pushing for the inclusion of the superpowers in the peace-keeping force and instead to yield to American insistence that they be specifically excluded. Malik told Scali. Scali told Kissinger. Kissinger told the President. Although there was not yet any sign that Russian airborne units had been returned to their prealert status, Kissinger interpreted Malik's message as a signal that Russia had abandoned its go-alone tactic. The 15-hour crisis then eased considerably. The Security Council, swayed by Kissinger's warnings and apprised of the Soviet switch, passed Resolution 340, setting up a U.N. emergency force "composed of personnel drawn from states members of the United Nations except permanent members of the Security Council." The vote

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"vital" to American security and that it was not prompted by Watergate. In his opinion, "if we had not reacted violently," the Russians would almost certainly have put their airborne troops into Egypt "to force the Israelis back to the Oct. 22 line," thus liberating the trapped Third Corps and saving the Sadat regime from humiliation and a likely coup d'état. Kissinger assumed that if the Russians had managed to establish themselves in the Middle East as the saviors of the Arabs, it would have been very difficult to get them out. Their influence over future oil shipments would have increased. The United States could have survived, but Western Europe and Japan could not have gotten along without an expanding flow of oil. At his most pessimistic, Kissinger could imagine a situation in which Soviet domination of the Middle East might lead to the communization of Western Europe and Japan in 5 to 10 years.

The alert was clearly not Kissinger's finest hour, but he has insisted that it was one of those necessary exercises in big-power politics, which firmed up the United States position in the Middle East and opened the door to a direct American role in mediating the dangerous Arab-Israeli conflict. As he saw it, the cease-fire imposed by the two superpowers produced a military stalemate. The alert produced the crisis atmosphere so necessary in the Secretary's scenario to scare the belligerents off dead center. The timing—always a crucial element—seemed right, at long last, for Kissinger, as Secretary of State, to plunge into the politics of the Middle East. As Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, had remarked the week before: "We think the man who could solve the Vietnam war . . . can easily play a good role . . . in our area."

# U.S. Aides Deny Kissinger
Made Secret Arms Deals

New York Times 6-24-74

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 23 — Secretary of State Kissinger made no secret arrangements with Soviet leaders about the missile-limitation agreement of 1972, but he also did not inform Congress of several aspects of it that may have led to confusion over the agreements, according to high Administration officials.

These officials, giving their version of the controversy today, said that the story of the negotiations on the agreement was more complicated than originally reported.

They said that the controversy evolved from a misunderstanding over what appeared to be an ambiguity in one of the protocols to the agreement and from a "prediction" Mr. Kissinger had made about the number of United States missile launchers aboard submarines.

The New York Times, in an article printed yesterday, quoted Administrative sources as having said that Mr. Kissinger had reached two secret arrangements with Soviet leaders regarding the agreement, which limits, the number of offensive nuclear missile launchers the

United States and the Soviet Union can have.

According to the sources quoted in the article, Mr. Kissinger had given private assurances to Soviet officials that the United States did not intend to build the maximum number of submarine missile launchers permitted. At the same time, the article said, he agreed that the Russians, by modernizing old submarines, could exceed their limit on the number of missile launchers. The article said that Congress had not been informed of either arrangement.

Yesterday Mr. Kissinger is-

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

Fool Report, AFL, enroute Moscow from Brussels, 6.27.74

President departed U.S. Amb residence on schedule at 9:40 a.m., with usual escort (motorcycle cops, etc.). Small knots of people at intersections along way, some waving. In car with Mr. and Mrs. Nixon were Amb. and Mrs. Firestone. At airport (motorcade drove across airport runways to get to AFL), President went through departure line after speaking with King briefly. Takeoff at 10:08 a.m.

On board, Ziegler gave names of Russian navigator and radio operator, Yuri Pozdnovski and Mikhail Vorotynov, respectively. They came aboard in Brussels. They are same team as in 1972 summit flight into Moscow.

"A senior official" came back shortly after take off and answered questions, mostly on Salt. Asked about the Soviet proposal given Kissinger in March, he said: "It would give us a slight advantage in mirv-ed launchers," but they wanted an advantage in total number of launchers. This is not acceptable because "the gap isn't big enough."

In MiRV category. The soviets can't install mirvs on present missiles, and they have to modify their silos to fit the mirved missiles into them. The existing salt agreement allows each side to change a silo by 15 per cent. There was much debate subsequently on how to measure 15 per cent -- i.e., diameter or whatever other dimension -- and conclusion is that figure relates to total volume of the silo. This was one of the main reasons that the standing consultative commission has not taken up.

By 1981, if the soviets mirv all their missiles, they have a slight advantage over the u.s. at present levels -- that is, if the u.s. does nothing in interim.

Asked about Kissinger's press conference comment that soviet mirv decisions will be irrevocable in about a year and a half, the official said during this period the soviets would begin modifying the silos. By 1977, when the interim offensive agreement expires, "the mirv race will be out of control."

Asked about Brezhnev's stake in detente, he said: It is bound to affect his prestige enormously if detente failed, as it would any leader who hadn't pursued a policy for four years and it failed.

* * *

Kissinger said his wife is "getting better. There were encouraging x-rays yesterday. She's coming along nicely and will be discharged from the hospital tomorrow." Her stomach ulcer "developed at the end of my last trip (the mideast negotiation, april-may) and after we got back," he said. Mrs. K went with him on that trip.

toth/shearer/boyd

*The official added: "If we continue to build moreucle, there is no way they can catch up in numbers in the next decade."

over the outcome.

The President's visit to Moscow served as a reminder that the United States, unlike its European allies, has broad, global interests. Yet many of those larger issues that Nixon and Brezhnev discussed—nuclear arms, *detente*, the Middle East—are of major concern to the Europeans.

## Nixon Promise

The Europeans never have been as sanguine about East-West detente as have Nixon and Kissinger. They fear that in his quest for "a generation of peace," Nixon will make deals with Moscow at Europe's expense, leaving Europe subject to Soviet political domination.

American reassurances about continuing military support for Europe never seem to dispel these fears. At Brussels Nixon delivered another of those reassurances, promising that the United States would maintain its forces in Europe and would "never sacrifice the interests of our allies to achieve

large supply of oil to Egypt and Syria, and the United States responded with supplies to Israel. Portugal was the only American ally that allowed American supply planes to use its airfields for refueling stops. The Americans complained about the lack of European co-operation; the Europeans complained that Washington was not keeping Europe sufficiently informed about U.S. policy and plans in the Middle East.

The dispute worsened when Nixon, fearing Soviet military intervention in the Middle East, ordered a worldwide alert of U.S. military forces, including those based in Europe. The Europeans this time grumbled more loudly about a lack of consultation, fearful that Soviet-American differences over an area outside the NATO sphere could involve Europe in war.

## Siding with the Arabs

The Arab oil embargo further split the allies. The Europeans, whose economies were vitally dependent up

4-F

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Wash Post 8-29-74

# SALT: The Dangers in Deadlock

MOSCOW—Behind plush outward signs of cordiality greeting President Nixon here Thursday, there is no evidence of a break in the dangerous deadlock between the weakened President and the high-riding Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on the crucial nuclear weapons question.

Indeed, it will take something close to a miracle for Mr. Nixon and his beleaguered Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to dent, much less break, the strategic weapons impasse now confronting the United States with a military-psychological threat unmatched in post-war history.

That threat was clearly spelled out in Kissinger's detailed presentation to Mr. Nixon and the National Security Council (NSC) in the White House last Thursday.

Using charts to show the potential explosion in numbers of Soviet long-range missile warheads starting in 1975, Kissinger's top-secret briefing posed this deadly threat: If Moscow moves ahead full speed to maximize production and deployment of its newly-tested cluster missiles (capable of carrying between 3 and 8 individually-targeted warheads or MIRVs on a

single missile), the United States could find itself on the short end of a 6 to 1 Soviet lead in simultaneously launchable intercontinental warheads.

Any such frightening Soviet decision to "de-stabilize" the balance of offensive nuclear power agreed to in the 1972 "interim agreement" might conceivably mean its abrogating the agreement itself in 1975, two years before it runs out. That prospect, admittedly remote, has nevertheless been discussed within the U.S. government as a further hypothetical hazard.

Accordingly, the immense political and psychological advantages that would accrue to Moscow if it did decide to maximize its new technology by deploying its giant MIRV-able missiles (the SS-17, 18 and 19) as fast as possible are causing deepest concern.

Moreover, Kissinger's strenuous efforts to convince Brezhnev & Co. that the mere threat of this potential imbalance is unacceptable to the United States have failed. Although Kissinger told the NSC that Brezhnev may now be "intellectually prepared" to understand the absolute necessity of a ceiling on MIRV deployment, there is no guarantee Moscow will play along.

The very minimum deal, according to high American officials, would be agreement by Moscow limiting deployment of the giant new missiles to a maximum of 70 to 80 launchers a year, starting next year. As computed by Pentagon strategists, the maximum deployment rate could run higher than 200 a year. These would, of course, replace the existing generation of Soviet launchers with their single warheads.

The arithmetic is staggering. At maximum production and deployment rates, the Russians could deploy no fewer than 23,000 warheads or RVs (re-entry vehicles) on MIRVed missiles if each warhead were arbitrarily limited to an explosive force of 40 kilotons. At the same 40-kiloton payload, the United States by contrast would have only 4,500 warheads on its own, far less powerful MIRVed missiles. And this could be accomplished without breaking the 1972 "interim" agreement.

Yet the "conceptual" breakthrough and the hard negotiating on ceilings on RVs that Mr. Nixon is striving for may be far off. If so, the President will go to Congress on his return to warn that immediate escalation of U.S. strategic weapons programs is essential.

Slippage in the negotiating process since the strategic arms limitations agreement (SALT) was signed two years ago, including the interim offensive agreement, hints at intentional Soviet policy of continued deadlock.

It has been forgotten, for example that the June 1973 Washington summit produced the "basic principles of negotiations on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms." Explaining it, Kissinger said then that "it states a deadline for the completion of the agreement in 1974."

"The two leaders would not have made this formal statement," Kissinger said then, "if they did not believe that this goal was . . . attainable."

In fact, it is clearly not "attainable." Instead, the American objective has been drastically scaled down: persuading the Russians to grasp the point that the U.S. cannot accept the de-stabilizing impact of all-out Soviet deployment of MIRVed missiles. But Brezhnev may calculate that the scandal-weakened American President is too eager to avoid a setback in detente, his main defense against impeachment, to risk the showdown that seems to be so essential here,

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

Associated Press

EHRLICHMAN, From A1

there are other copies," Ehrlichman, according to Merrill, answered: "We'll have to take our chance."

Young had made copies of the documents and later turned them over to the Watergate prosecutors as part of his agreement with the government for immunity.

The March 27, 1973, meeting was one of several meetings and supporting documents outlined by Merrill in his opening statement as part of its case against the four men on civil rights conspiracy changes. Ehrlichman also is charged with four perjury counts.

Merrill said the break-in at the Beverly Hills office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist, violated "one of our most cherished rights"—that against illegal search and seizure.

He described the break-in as "the willful, arrogant act of men who took the law into their own hands because they thought they were above the law."

He said the events leading up to the break-in began with the hiring of ex-CIA agent E. Howard Hunt Jr. as a White

Merrill said. Young sent the profile to Ehrlichman with a covering memorandum with a place for Ehrlichmann to approve or disapprove a covert operation to get Ellsberg's medical records.

Ehrlichman initiated his approval and added in his handwriting, "As long as it is not traceable," Merrill told the jury.

"The stage was set for the entry," Merrill said.

Hunt then began his recruitment efforts that ended with the location of Barker, Martínez and Felipe DeDiego, a former defendant in the case against whom charges have been dismissed by the judge.

Hunt and Liddy took a trip to California to perform a reconnaissance mission on the office building of Ellsberg's psychiatrist, and took pictures for use in planning the actual break-in, Merrill said. They were even caught in the building by a cleaning person, but Hunt told her, "I'm a doctor, don't worry" and escaped detection as to his intentions.

The $5,000 requested for the break-in was raised by Colson, Merrill continued, and produced in cash so it would not be traceable to the White House.

Meanwhile, Young and

told Ehrlichman what had happened, and Ehrlichman was upset for the same reason, Merrill added.

Hunt and Liddy then suggested another break-in at Fielding's home, but Krogh, Young and Ehrlichman overruled them, Merrill added.

Ehrlichman's attorneys, on the other hand, made it clear yesterday that one of their key strategies will be to question the credibility and motivation of government witnesses, especially former National Security Council aide David R. Young.

That was one of the points stressed by Ehrlichman attorney Henry Jones in his 25-minute opening statement. He said he intends to show that Young directed the part of the operation leading to the break-in and "when he found the game was up, he tried to remove files. Young tried to save his own neck."

Jones stood solemnly at the defense table, Ehrlichman seated at his side, as he addressed the jury. He reminded the jurors of the presumption that a defendant is innocent, until proven guilty, then plunged into the defense theory of the case.

A main element in that theory is Ehrlichman's leaning

complained about Hunt's possibly exceeding his authority, but that Ehrlichman said, "I will restrain him . . . I will stop him."

They said any authority for the break-in did not come as a result of Ehrlichman's giving approval, but "because of the flow of authority from someone else."

Liddy's attorney, Peter Maroulis, said his client should be found innocent because he "reasonably believed that he was authorized to do that which was done. He did not have any intent to do wrong." Maroulis' opening statement was the shortest, lasting about five minutes.

Schultz, the attorney for Barker and Martinez, detailed the past involvement of his clients with the CIA and their backgrounds in Cuba. He said his clients became "caught up in this" because of their past relationship with Hunt in the Bay of Pigs invasion and that they had participated "out of loyalty" to him and to the United States.'

The prosecution's presentation of evidence then opened slowly yesterday afternoon, with the first three witnesses the same type as those that would be presented in a normal burglary trial—two Bev-

Saturday, June 29, 1974

THE WASHINGTON POST

# Medicare Architect
Designs Health Plan

BACK TO WORK—Members of the California Nurses Association pick up their ballots before the 4,000 members of the group voted to ratify a new contract raising their

salaries $100 to $1,135 a month
staffing decisions. The nurses
weeks against 41 Northern Cal

nance Committee Chairman
Russell B. Long (D-La.) to an-
nounce: "But they said the
time wasn't right," he said.

Nevertheless, Cohen said his
talks with both Republican
and Democratic congressmen
have convinced him that they
would like to pass some form
of national health insurance
before Congress adjourns in
the fall.

Moreover, President Nixon
was made health insurance his
to. 1 domestic priority, and
was offered to compromise
with Congress to get a bill
passed.

"I'm more convinced now
than I was weeks ago that
health insurance can pass,"
Cohen said.

"Congress feels that the financial impact of catastrophic illness is one of the overwhelming anxieties of the American people," he said.

Catastrophic coverage is in-
cluded in most health insur-
ance bills, but is the corner-
one of one sponsored by
Long and Sen. Abraham A. Ri-
coff (D-Conn.).

Cohen yesterday said cata-
strophic coverage alone "does
not address the problems of
the average worker, whose
present health insurance does
not provide adequate basic
coverage.

"If Congress settles for only
the catastrophic approach
to" he continued, "the next
eeps toward a comprehensive
program would be too long de-
ved."

Cohen advised phasing in
national health insurance over
five years, starting in April,
1976, with an extension of Me-
care benefits for home
health care and outpatient
services to all Americans.
Three months later he would
add coverage for all doctors
and hospital bills.

This step-by-step approach,
said, "would give reason-
able assurances that a compre-
sive health insurance pro-
gram would be administra-
tively feasible in light of pres-
ent manpower, administrative
competence, computer ability
and public acceptance."

Both Ribicoff and also

2d Conflict of Interest Seen
By GAO in U.S. Energy Office

By Morton Mintz
Washington Post Staff Writer

For the second time in less
than a month, Congress' Gen-
eral Accounting Office has re-
ferred to the Justice Depart-
ment a conflict-of-interest re-
port on an employee of the
Federal Energy Administra-
tion.

The new report concerns
Edmond R. Western, who
came to Washington on a
year's leave from Sun Oil Co.,
where he was natural gas co-
ordinator.

At the FEA, his work in-
cludes analyzing supply and
demand for natural gas and
making recommendations on
the basis of his analyses, the

ployment within the next
month or two," the GAO
noted.

Although Gill said he was
uncertain whether Western
had made recommendations
on legislation, "Our review of
Mr. Western's files indicated
that he had commented at
least once on both legislation
and regulations," the GAO
said.

Western drafted replies for
FEA officials to inquiries
from small oil companies as
well as replies to congresmen
inquiring about allocations and
other problems, the GAO said.

Gill acknowledged that "he
did not specifically discuss po-
tential conflicts of interest

an oil industry executive "in
any agency exercising a regu-
latory-type responsibility over
the activities of the very com-
pany to which the individual
involved will return."

President Johnson, on his fi-
nal day in office in 1969, cre-
ated the interchange program
by executive order. Its pur-
pose is to swap executives be-
tween the government and the
private sector for a year at a
time. Bowen returned to Phil-
lips in May.

The program suffered an ap-
parently fatal blow on the
House floor recently at the
hands of Rep. Vanik, who had
requested the GAO investiga-
tions and who for months has

Under the Summit

By William Safire

MOSCOW, June 26—The most delicate and profound negotiations over the past six years, passing another milestone here at the third U.S.-Soviet summit, have not been the dealings between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev. They have been the negotiations between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, whose differences in approach have rarely surfaced but which may explain some of what has happened in the past month and much of what will happen next week.

President Nixon, a graduate of the John Foster Dulles school of international affairs, carried a hardliner's suspicion of long-range Soviet intentions into his planning for a structure of peace. His goal as he came into office was for a limited peace, with power centers cooperating to keep out of war, but with the ideological struggle continuing until, in some far distant future, forms of democracy would persevere over forms of Communism.

Henry Kissinger's policy, from the start, had a different emphasis: His approach was to wage total peace, setting aside considerations of rectitude or the furtherance of human freedom in the interests of making certain of human survival. Such a survival-first concern in a nuclear age presents a practical argument, although it was hardly the stuff of Patrick Henry slogans.

When the two men began to work together, their fundamental approaches greatly overlapped, since détente was

ESSAY

the first order of business for both. But anyone who worked on foreign policy speeches for Mr. Nixon knew how carefully the President re-shaped the drafts submitted by Mr. Kissinger so as to impose his own philosophy, to the intense irritation of his national security adviser, who despised what he termed "that cold-war rhetoric."

Nixon-Kissinger negotiations became especially intense prior to summit meetings, when the President — after all the spadework had been done — would suddenly and cruelly freeze out his advance agent, to cut him down to size. "A week ago, he was on his knees," Henry used to rage, "and now I can't even get past Haldeman."

Came Watergate, and the unsullied superstar of the Nixon Administration exacted his revenge. The price of his loyalty was absolute capitulation on the Nixon-Kissinger negotiations. Ideological struggle was dead.

Thus it was that the President, sounding like a brain-washed Rubashov at a show trial, earlier this month read a détente-first speech completely crafted by the agent he once thought he could control. "We cannot gear our foreign policy to the transformation of other societies," he read, making any struggle useless by exaggerating its goal.

And then the President passed along Mr. Kissinger's threat: "What price in terms of renewed conflict are we willing to pay to bring pressure to bear for humane causes?"

The victory of amorality was underscored by the ventriloquist plaintive apology: "Peace between nations with totally different systems is also a high moral objective."

Then came Mr. Kissinger's public tantrum at Salzburg, the sudden revelation of Mr. Nice Guy as Mr. Tough Guy, and his identification with the wiretap origins of Watergate. The Nixon-Kissinger negotiations were promptly reopened.

That is why Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, who in 1968 wrote a position paper on national security that was too hawkish for Candidate Nixon, has found it possible to assert a note of caution in developing the latest U.S. position on arms control.

That is why Senator Jackson, who was Mr. Nixon's first choice for Defense Secretary and who shares the President's submerged instincts toward ultimately coming out ahead in an ideological struggle, has taken heart and taken on the Secretary of State.

As a result, the President comes to Moscow with sloppy erasures all over his position papers but in a curiously strong position. Thanks to Mr. Kissinger's superb Middle Eastern diplomacy, Mr. Nixon once again enters Moscow on a note of triumph; thanks to Mr. Kissinger's over-reaction at Salzburg, the President once again is at least partially in control of the philosophy behind U.S. foreign policy. He will wave the plume of détente in Eastern windows, but is less likely to act as if the struggle nought availeth.

FRANK F. SHULOCK

Frank F. Shulock, a textile
broker and specialist in the
sale of surplus fabrics, died in
his office Monday, apparently
of a heart attack. He was 71
years old and lived at 425 West
23d Street.

He was a former president
of the Textile Square Club.

He is survived by his widow,
Gertrude; a son, Hugh, and five
grandchildren.

'Gypsy Cab' Driver Shot

Lloyd Saunders, 67 years old,
the driver of a "gypsy cab," of
324 Powers Avenue in the
South Bronx, was shot in the
head and right shoulder by five
males who robbed him early
yesterday at 127th Street and
Third Avenue, the police of the
East 118th Street station re-
ported. The wounded driver,
taken to the Hospital for Joint
Diseases, was reported in seri-
ous condition.

Howa, chairman of the Black Cricket Board of Control, for a pass-port to attend a meeting of the International Cricket As-sociation in London.

Mr. Howa, listed as "col-
ored" under South Africa's
race laws, is a proponent of
multiracial cricket in South
Africa.

Interior Minister Connie
the cabinet, after considering
"all the political and admin-
istrative implications," had
unanimously turned down Mr.
Howa's request.

Mulder said in a statement that

Man Slain in Harlem Club

A man identified only as
Neno was fatally shot early yes-
terday in an East Harlem social
club at 327 East 108th Street.
The eleged assailant, Jose Rol-
dan, who gave the club as his
address, was charged with
homicide.

bud, sister of Rosine Stewart Kaufmann,
Reposing Walter B. Cooke Funeral Home,
1 West 190 Street, Bronx. Service Saturday
10:30 A.M. Interment Woodlawn Cemetery.

HARRISON—Gertrude Leverich, age 86, on June 25, 1974. Beloved wife of the late John Triplett Harrison, Sr. Devoted mother of Virginia H. Whitridge, Floyd H. Winslow, John T. Harrison, Jr. and the late Charles Duncan Leverich Harrison. Funeral services 10:00 A.M., Saturday, June 29, at Trinity Episcopal Church. Southport, Connecticut. In lieu of flowers contributions may be sent to Trinity Episcopal Church Memorial Fund.

HAYES—Thomas. Devoted brother of Richard. Brother-in-law of Margaret. Fond uncle of Amy and Daniel. Reposing at Cusimano & Russo Inc., 230 Court Street, Saturday until 9 A.M.

HEIL—Joseph. On June 25, 1974. Friends may call at Frank E. Campbell, Madison on 81 St. on Wednesday and Thursday 8-10 P.M. Service on Friday 11 A.M. Please omit flowers.

HIRSH—Hedwig. Members of Hebrew Congregation of Somers and the Sisterhood mourn the passing of an esteemed member. Rabbis S. SALTZMAN, JACK LEFKOWITZ, President IDA LASHER, Pres. Sisterhood

HYMAN—Joseph (On June 25, 1974). Beloved husband of Rae (nee Bloom). Loving and devoted father of Gertrude (Elson), Vivian, Greenberg and Gloria Arenos. Adored grandfather and great-grandfather. Services today 10 A.M. at Neiberg's Midland Chapel, 1625 Coney Island Ave. (Ave. M) Brooklyn.

LANGMAN—Martin. Beloved brother of Pearl. Devoted uncle of Dr. Daniel Rubin and Judith Schlossman. Services "Park West," 115 W. 79 St., Thursday, June 27 at 10 A.M.

LEIBNER—Lillian. Beloved wife of the late Joseph M. Devoted mother of Rose Noble, Mildred. Jaffe, Taube Fogin and Wallace. Adored grandmother and great-grandmother. Services Thursday, 12:30 P.M. at "The Riverside," Brooklyn, Ocean Parkway at Prospect Park.

LENGSFELDER—Walter. On June 25 In Palm Desert, California. Beloved husband of Muriel, Devoted father of Nicole Robinson and Jean Wilson. Brother of Claire Lowenstein and Hans Lengsfelder. Grandfather of Kenneth, Jeffrey and Peter Robinson and Caleb Wilson. Services at Frank E. Campbell, Madison Ave. at 81 St. on Sunday June 30 at 11:30 A.M. In lieu of flowers contributions to the Heart Fund would be appreciated. Interment private.

LENGSFELDER—Walter. On June 25. The Colleagues, friends and management of U.O.P. Fragrances mourn the death of the Founder and ex-President of Fleuroma U.O.P. We will deeply and sincerely miss him.

FRED L. VAN AALST, President

LEWIS—Jack (Levinson). In Miami Beach, Florida, on Tuesday, June 26. Beloved husband of Mary. Devoted father of Mrs. Norman (Myrna) Young. Loving grandfather. Friends may call at Frank E. Campbell, Madison Ave., at 81 St. Thursday 7-10 P.M. Service Friday 11:30 A.M.

LINDNER—Mildred. Loving wife of Morris. Adored mother of Maxine Reiner and Jerry. Dear sister of Sylvia Schiller and Albert Rieder. Grandmother of Michael, Douglas and Melissa. Services Thursday, 1:30 P.M., at "The Riverside" Bklyn., Ocean Pkwy at Prospect Park.

WEINBERG—Marcella on June 29, 1974. loving mother of Louise Carter, Catherine O'Gorman and Clifford Weinberg. Fond sister of Bossie Browne, Gertrude Auwerda, Florence Sweeney and Mae Opman. Also survived by 15 grandchildren and 1 great-grandchild. Friends may call after 7 P.M. Thursday at the Thomas F. Dalton Funeral Home, 29 Atlantic Ave. (at RR Plaza) 9:45 A.M. at Our Lady of Victory R.C.C. Church. Interment L.I., National Cemetery.

WHALEY—Frederick C., of Syosset, L.I., suddenly, on June 24th, 1974, in Othave, Canada, husband of Emma Helen (Licht), father of Mrs. Thomas M. Hearn, Madison Harry L. Smith, Mrs. Walter M. Cusack and Frederick C., Jr. Reposing at the Bethany Funeral Home, Inc., 79 Berry Hill Road, Syosset, L.I. Mass of the Christian Burial at Holy Name of Jesus R.C. Church, Woodbury, L.I., Friday, 10:30 A.M. Interment Memorial Cemetery, Cold Spring Harbor, L.I., Visiting hours Thursday, 7:30 to 9:30 P.M.

YACHNIN—Mollie. Widow of Morris, the best of mothers to Phyllis Greenspan, a son of Claire Weiss and cherished grandmother of Gary, Dori, Ellen, Matsha and Barbara. Services Thursday 10 A.M. Malverne Jewish Center, 1 Norwood Ave., Malverne, N.Y.

YACHNIN—Mollie. The Rabbi, Officiating Board of Trustees and Congregation express their deepest sympathy to Phyllis Greenspan and Claire Weiss on the loss of their beloved mother and our esteemed member. May God grant them His blessing of healing consolation.

Malverne Jewish Center

THEODORE STEINBERG, Rabbi

ARTHUR J. KLEIN, President

YACHNIN—Mollie. It is with extreme sorrow that we record the loss of our best esteemed and beloved Honorary Treasurers. A true woman of valor, her wisdom and dignity will be with us always.

Judy Goldstein,

Goldie Bernstein, President

Sisterhood Malverne Jewish Center

YACHNIN—Mollie. The Sisterhood of the Laurenton Jewish Center expresses deep sorrow at the untimely death of our best President, Mollie Yachnin.

HELENE PONEMON, President

ZUPKO—Lillian B. (nee Cosner) of Bronxville, on June 26. Beloved wife of Dr. Arthur G. Devoted mother of Arthur Maynard Zupko. Sister of Mrs. Jane Donnell & Charles Cosner. Reposing at Whalen Funeral Home Inc., 168 Park Ave., Yonkers. Services at West Center Congregational Church, Pondfield Rd., West, Bronxville, on Saturday, June 29 at 10 A.M. Interment St. Mary's Cemetery, Visiting hours 2-4 & 7-9 P.M.

Announcements of deaths, may be telephoned to: Oxford 5-3311, until 11 P.M. In Regional offices 9:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. Monday through Friday New Jersey (201) Market 3-5900; Wadchester Co. and Northern New York State Counties (914) White Plains 9-5300; Nassau Co. (516) 717-0800; Suffolk Co. (516) 669-1800; Connectout (203) 348-7767.

Frank E. Campbell
THE Funeral Chapel

Madison Avenue at 81st Street, BU 8-3500

BALTIMORE SUN 27 JUNE 74 Pg. 1

# Kissinger hopes to slow MIRV race

By ADAM CLYMER
Sun Staff Correspondent

Brussels—The Soviet Union is “nearly ready” to begin deploying multi-warhead missiles, and some deployment “is inevitable,” Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, said last night on the eve of the Moscow summit talks.

While “the rate of deployment is still subject to negotiation,” he said, in 18 months “the decisions will be irrevocable”, and agreement becomes harder all the time.

The secretary delivered this concretized version of his frequently stated warning that in nuclear arms “technology develops a momentum of its own” in a press conference.

He generally restated the predictions for President Nixon's third summit meeting with Soviet leaders that he has made in recent days, including Tuesday's statement that, a new permanent strategic arms agreement would be “impossible” to achieve during the seven-day visit to the Soviet Union that begins today.

Dr. Kissinger sought once again to spread reassurance that he and Mr. Nixon will seek improved conditions for Soviet Jews, but without being specific.

He conceded that Senate pressure on the subject had had some effect, and said that among the senators and the

(See MIRV, Pg. 3)

over him, and despite the certain American controversy over the question.

"It is his duty," Kissinger said, "to move ahead in the direction which he believes to be in the long-term national interest, keeping in mind the views of all of his senior advisers, but if necessary choosing among them, and realizing that in the present climate, if anything is achieved, a fundamental debate is inevitable."

The sharp controversy that Kissinger had with Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) just be fore leaving Washington—over whether Kissinger had left a "loophole" in the 1972 summit accords that could al low the Russians more submarine missiles than intended—erupted again in tonight's press conference.

Kissinger has been indignantly referring to the controversy since he left Washington Tuesday morning. A White House press spokesman unintentionally disclosed at a public briefing today that Kissinger was the "White House official" who complained about the "loophole" dispute to newsmen while crossing the Atlantic with the President.

The secretary went over the subject tonight at length, adding some new elements, because, he said, "I believe public confidence is involved if, prior to a summit meeting, one is accused of either deliberately deceiving the public about the true numbers or having made errors of a magnitude that might have had that result."

Kissinger's manner was more restrained than in his extraordinary press conference at Salzburg, Austria, earlier this month, when he threatened to resign over questions about his role in the 1969-1971 telephone wiretap

MIRV ... CONTINUED

administration there is no dif-
ference as to objectives.

"But," he said, "no useful
purpose is served by my spell-
ing out numbers and details,
because my doing so might
prevent the achievement of the
results."

Dr. Kissinger also conceded
that Watergate, impeachment
and the President's various do-
mestic problems were a prob-
lem for the summit talks, al-
though he insisted "the Presi-
dent will not be inhibited. He
will negotiate in what he con-
siders to be the national inter-
est.

"The decisions will not be on
the basis of domestic necessi-
ties, but on the basis of our
judgment that the pace of
technology will not wait for
our domestic situation to clar-
ify."

He conceded that there
would be problems in winning
public support of controversial
decisions in the current Ameri-
can atmosphere, and also ob-
served that there was some,
unmeasurable effect of the do-
mestic situation on the Soviet
summit talks:

"What more could have been
achieved, no one will ever
know."

Dr. Kissinger devoted much
of the press conference to an
earnest defense against charges
that the basic 1972 five-year
strategic arms agreement con-
tained a potential "loophole"
allowing the Soviet Union to
put new nuclear missiles on

old submarines. He called the
idea a "shyster" argument.

And, he sought to dismiss
arguments that there were sig-
nificant differences of opinion
about nuclear arms agree-
ments within the administra-
tion. He said he had never
been led to believe that James
R. Schlesinger, the Secretary of
Defense, holds different views
on nuclear strategy.

Dr. Kissinger was pessimis-
tic on the possibilities of
achieving much progress.

The secretary spoke skepti-
cally about the chances of
achieving major progress on
the multi-warhead issue at the
upcoming summit talks. al-
though his language was not
categorical.

Substantial agreement on
multiple warheads. he said,
probably will not be fully
achieved at the summit talks.

Without such substantial
agreement, he said, the in-
terim five-year pact on offen-
sive missiles agreed to in 1972
—and, according to an agree-
ment at last year's summit
meeting, to be replaced by a
permanent pact this year—will
not be extended, he said.

Asked about Soviet multiple
independently targeted vehi-

cates, MIRV's, the secretary
said:

"We think that on some cate-
gories of missiles the Soviet
Union is nearly ready to de-
ploy MIRV's. At what rate
they will delay them, it is
not yet fully possible to fore-
tell.

"We have had estimates of
what the rate will be, with an
upper and lower limit, and
obviously it would be our in-
tention—if an arms agreement
were to be meaningful—to
have the ceiling that is lower
than the estimate of what we
think they're going to build.
Otherwise the ceiling will not
have any meaning.

"But ... I would say we
have about a year and a half
altogether before the decisions
will be irrevocable, but it be-
comes harder with every pass-
ing six months ... It is inevi-
table that some MIRV's will be
deployed. The rate of deploy-
ment is still subject to negotia-
tion."

His words suggested to some
observers that negotiation
about the rate of deployment
might concentrate on which
specific missiles might be
equipped with the multi-war-
heads.

document: "Most people would now acknowledge that above all, the President needs a major foreign policy initiative to counter the domestic issues that threaten to engulf him.

"This in turn increases the suspicion of his critics that he will seek a major agreement with the Soviet Union that will have more to do with domestic prestige than the long-term foreign policy interests of the country."

In one report, the latest U.S. doctrine that "nuclear attack would be met by whatever scale of launch the circumstances demanded" is described as a "dangerous development."

This permits "a theoretical approach to nuclear weapons which is out of touch with political reality," the document charges. "It implies the possibility of waging limited nuclear war and the expression of such a possibility is a regressive step."

Not only do NATO leaders look with apprehension on the edge which President Nixon has already given the Soviet Union in missile numbers and pay-

They killed Creo A. Noel, Jr., the American ambassador to the Sudan; George C. Moore, another American diplomat, and a Belgian diplomat, in the basement of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum in March, 1973.

"We cannot accept the virtual release of confessedMurderers as adequate punishment," the department said Tuesday in reaction to the Sudanese decision to commute life sentences given the men after a trial and to hand them over to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

American officials are worried that the guerrillas' trans-

load, but the NATO partners are also concerned about the balance of troops and equipment in Europe.

The Soviet satellites, according to one report, could unleash a force of 925,000 men, 15,500 tanks and 2,800 aircraft "with very little warning." As a defense, the NATO nations have only 770,000 men, 6,000 tanks and 2,700 aircraft.

virtually unanimous adoption of a resolution calling for realignment of government under priorities.

The new president of the reference Mayor Joseph L. Nix to of San Francisco, appointed to the President to the "a domestic detente" urban America.

The essence of detente is willingness of the most reactable party to yield a halt and then make certain concessions," Mr. Alioto, a democrat, said in a prepared acceptance speech.

We ask the administration to yield on the point that our cities are the vital heartbeat of American life and worth saving," Mr. Alioto said.

fer to Cairo may mean that Egypt has decided to grant them safe haven—an act that would be regarded as another Arab slap in the American face.

Part of the reason for the public stoicism shown here about the new development was explained by some officials as tactical. The hope, they said, is that the Egyptians have not, in fact, offered the guerrillas permanent refuge.

The Americans hope that some intensive private discussion with the Egyptians can impress the strength of American feeling on the subject sufficiently to persuade Cairo not to make such a promise.

That's acutely Nixon, alrea-

4

# Nixon Gets NATO Backing

PRESIDENT, From A1

domestic challenges hanging
over him, and despite the cer-
tain American controversy over
the question.

over whether Kissinger had
left a "loophole" in the 1972
summit accords that could al-
low the Russians more subma-
rine missiles than intended—
erupted again in tonight's
press conference.

Kissinger has been indig-
nantly referring to the contro-
versy since he left Washington
Tuesday morning. A White
House press spokesman unin-
tentionally disclosed at a pub-
lic briefing today that Kis-
singer was the "White House
official" who complained
about the "loophole" dispute
to newsmen while crossing the
Atlantic with the President.

The secretary went over the
subject tonight at length, add-
ing some new elements, be-

cause, he said, "I believe pub-
lic confidence is involved if,
prior to a summit meeting,
one is accused of either delib-
erately deceiving the public
about the true numbers or
having made errors of a mag-
nitude that might have had
that result."

Kissinger's manner was
more restrained than in his
extraordinary press confer-
ence at Salzberg, Austria, ear-
lier this month, when he
threatened to resign over
questions about his role in the
1969-1971 telephone wiretap
ping of 17 officials and news-
men.

But he pursued the newer
"loophole" controversy with

caustic new denials, describ-
ing it as an "esoteric, prepos-
terous interpretation" that he
admitted for the first time was
a subject of continuing contro-
versy "at the middle level" of
the Nixon administration.

This post-1972 summit con-
troversy developed solely in-
side the United States govern-
ment, Kissinger said bluntly,
because "The Russians never
claimed that there was a loop-
hole."

"Nevertheless," Kissinger
said acidly, "the Department
of Defense and the JCS (Joint
Chiefs of Staff) claimed that a
loophole existed. I may say
that this never reached my
level.

"The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council consistently maintained, and the commissioner of the United States on the (American Soviet) Standing Consultative Commission constantly maintained that there was no loophole..."

This dispute "was negoti-
ated for six months," said Ki-
singer, because "As somebody
claimed there was a problem
even though there wasn't the
slightest evidence for it, we
unanimously decided to let
him go ahead to do it" as "a
refinement of language."

Kissinger said this is one of
"about eight or nine issues"

Brezhnev to Get
Silver Chevrolet

United Press International

President Nixon will give Soviet Communist Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev another automobile during his Moscow visit, General Motors Corp. said yesterday.

Brezhnev is an automo-
bile collector. In 1972,
when Mr. 'Nixon was in
Moscow, he gave Brezh-
nev a Cadillac. When
Brezhnev later visited the
United States, Mr. Nixon
gave him a Lincoln.

This time, GM said, the
gift will be a sporty 1974
Chevrolet Monte Carlo
with a silver-colored body
and a white vinyl roof.

on "dismantling, replacement
(of weapons) and so forth, that
we are going to sign in Mos-
cow, each of which has as its
specific purpose the more pre-
cise definition of more genera-
clau sing than the existing
agreement."

"The Soviet Union," said
Kissinger, "has asked us to
keep those provisions secret
because . . . to make them pub-
lic goes into the characteris-
tics of the weapons, but they
will be put before the appro-
priate congressional commi-
tees."

Kissinger said, "There are
500 disputes like this in the
government at any moment in
time, and if everyone takes his
case to a congressional com-
mittee, there will be no end of
investigations."