3501

FINAL DRAFT

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

13 October 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Peter W. Rodman PWR

SUBJECT: Survey of N. Y. Times Editorials on U.S. Viet-Nam Policy, Jan. 1968 - Oct. 1969.

Attached is a revised version of the survey and analysis you wanted of New York Times editorials on U.S. Viet-Nam policy. I decided to cover the last two years in order to see how the Times has behaved since the beginning of the trend of U.S. concessions.

For the period January 1968 - January 1969, I have relied mostly on the summaries of editorials as given by the N. Y. Times Index, but for the period of the Nixon Administration I have quoted from the editorials themselves in all their splendor.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President enclosing the two tabs.

Attachments:

Analytical Summary (Tab A)

Survey (Tab B)

(Peter Rodman:sr:10-13-69)

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 14, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Survey of New York Times Editorial Policy on
Vietnam from January 1968 to October 1969

At Tab A is an analytical summary of The New York Times editorial policy during the period of U. S. concessions on Vietnam. At Tab B are extracts from editorials which demonstrate the growth of demands for concessions, beginning with the call for a bombing halt in June 1968 and extending to present demands for a stand-still ceasefire.

The survey indicates that in every aspect of U. S. policy where limited concessions have been made, The New York Times has first welcomed the move and then pressed the President for a greater concession along the same lines. The general pattern has been as follows:

- A U. S. concession is urged and it is implied that Hanoi will respond favorably.

- The U. S. concession is applauded immediately after it occurs.

- After a month or so further concessions are urged. Lack of progress is blamed on Washington or Saigon. The earlier concession is disparaged, or the U. S. is accused of having hardened its position, or Hanoi is said to have already reciprocated.

The following are some specific examples:

- The partial bombing halt was applauded, but The New York Times pressed for a total halt 3-1/2 months later.

- Two and a half months after the total bombing halt began, the Times pressed for troop withdrawals.

CONFIDENTIAL

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-- After first calling for mutual troop withdrawals, *The New York Times* demanded withdrawals regardless of Hanoi's response.

-- In April 1969 the *Times* praised a cutback in B-52 raids but at the same time called for a reduction in search and destroy missions. On July 25 a reduction in these missions was reported, but within two weeks the *Times* had called for a stand-still ceasefire.

-- Although a May 1969 editorial referred to anticipated cutbacks of 50-100, 000 men as "substantial" the paper subsequently complained that the withdrawal of 60, 000 was "timid" and not "significant."

-- In May 1969 a coalition commission to supervise free elections in South Vietnam was recommended, but by June agreement to an "interim coalition" was urged.

In 1969 *The New York Times* has kept some unsatisfied demand for greater concessions before the public at all times. Significant concessions have only been met by calls by the editors of *The New York Times* for further concessions. In addition, criticism of the President has intensified. For example, a July editorial commented on the "forward looking proposals from Washington and Saigon," while an October editorial attacked the President for "not [having] brought any significant new ideas to the Viet-Nam problem."

Attachments

SURVEY OF N. Y. TIMES EDITORIALS ON U.S. VIET-NAM POLICY,

JANUARY 1968 -- OCTOBER 1969

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

**Introductory Note:** The footnotes below give the full documentation of the general conclusions stated in the summary. The dates in the footnotes refer to dates of editorials which are summarized or quoted in the full Survey (at Tab B).

A. <u>Overall Pattern</u>

The survey of N. Y. Times editorials in 1968-69 on U.S. policy in
Viet-Nam reveals the following overall pattern:

The editorial writer advises the President that a particular U.S.
concession will be the key to peace, and that the only way to get negotiations
moving is for the U.S. to take the initiative and make that concession. ¹
Often there is an explicit assurance in the editorial that Hanoi will respond
favorably;² more often there is an implication that a U.S. concession will
bear fruit as a test of Hanoi's intentions.³ Immediately after the U.S. has

1. E.g., Jan. 5, 1968, Feb. 25, 1968 (bombing halt); May 12, 1968 (ceasefire); July 13, 1968, Aug. 8, 1968 (total bombing halt); Dec. 26, 1968, Jan. 19, 1969 (mutual troop withdrawal); Jan. 30, 1969 (U.S. troop withdrawal); Apr. 3, 1969 (reduction of search-&-destroy missions; U.S. troop withdrawal); May 14, 1969, May 15, 1969, June 10, 1969 (coalition electoral commission); May 18, 1969 (U.S. troop withdrawal); May 31, 1969 (timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal); Aug. 5, 1969, Aug. 16, 1969, Aug. 30, 1969 (cutback of offensive operations; standstill cease-fire); Sept. 7, 1969 (cease-fire for Ho's funeral).

2. E.g., Jan. 5, 1968, Feb. 25, 1968 (bombing halt); May 31, 1969 (U.S. troop withdrawal).

3. E.g., Aug 8, 1968 (total bombing halt); Mar. 21, 1969 (U.S. troop withdrawal); Aug 31, 1969 (cease-fire); Sept. 7, 1969 (Ho funeral truce).

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made the recommended concession, the editorial writer applauds it, and
says that, indeed, it is now time for Hanoi to respond.⁴ But, after a few
weeks or months go by without significant progress toward peace, the
editorial writer, as a rule, begins to urge a further U.S. concession,⁵ on
the ground that the lack of progress is the fault of the United States or
Saigon.⁷ He either disparages the importance of the earlier U.S. concession,⁸

4. E.g., Apr. 1, 1968, Apr. 2, 1968 (partial bombing halt); Oct. 21, 1968, Nov. 1, 1968 (total bombing halt); July 28, 1969 (U.S. troop withdrawal).

5. E.g., May 12, 1968 (cease-fire, after partial bombing halt); May 15, 1968 (freeze on external forces, after partial bombing halt); Jan. 19, 1969, Jan. 30, 1969 (troop withdrawal, after bombing halt); Apr. 3, 1969 (reduction of search-&-destroy missions, after B-52 cutback); May 15, 1969 (coalition electoral commission, after May 14 speech); May 18, 1969 (unilateral troop withdrawal, after May 14 speech); June 10, 1969 (interim coalition, after June withdrawal announcement); Aug. 5, 1969, Aug. 16, 1969, Aug. 30, 1969 (cease-fire, defensive ground tactics, after June withdrawal announcement); Oct. 2, 1969 (after Sept. withdrawal announcement).

6. E.g., May 12, 1968, July 13, 1968 (stepped-up military activity); Aug. 2, 1968 (stiffened terms); May 5, 1969 (continued pursuit of military victory); May 17, 1969 (failure to slow down offensive operations; delay in withdrawing troops); Aug. 16, 1969 (failure to propose cease-fire or de-escalation); Aug. 25, 1969 (delay in withdrawing troops); Aug. 31, 1969 (continued military pressure; ignoring lull; delay in withdrawing troops); Oct. 2, 1969 (aggressive ground tactics; tokenism of withdrawals, ignoring Ho funeral truce).

7. E.g., May 8, 1968 (should broaden its base); Dec. 26, 1968 (refusal to negotiate with NLF); May 5, 1969 (jailing of opponents; procrastination with land reform); May 17, 1969 (jailing of opponents); Aug. 25, 1969 (replacement of Premier); Sept. 12, 1969 (balking at Ho funeral truce).

8. E.g., May 5, 1968 (partial bombing halt); Nov. 1, 1968, Mar. 1, 1969 (total bombing halt); May 15, 1969, May 17, 1969 (May 14 Speech); Aug. 16, 1969, Oct. 2, 1969 (troop withdrawal, etc.).

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or argues that Hanoi has in fact reciprocated,⁹ or accuses the United
States of hardening its own position in the meantime.¹⁰

B. <u>Particular Patterns</u>

The following particular patterns recur:

1. <u>Continual concessions.</u> The <u>Times</u> editorial writer urges a U.S. concession on occasions when the other side seems conciliatory (in order to seize the opportunity for peace),¹¹ and also on occasions when the other side seems to be intensifying the war (because this is proof that our military effort alone will not be enough to bring peace).¹² This somewhat one-track approach (continual calls for U.S. concessions) is justified according to a variety of premises: (a) the key to peace is to prove our good faith to the

9. E.g., Apr. 11, 1968 (lifting the siege of Khesanh); May 4, 1968 (start of Paris talks); July 13, 1968, Aug. 8, 1968 (lulls in fighting); Mar. 1, 1969 (easing of Communist attacks); May 9, 1969 (Front's 10 Points); May 18, 1969 (initial response to May 14 Speech); July 28, 1969, Aug. 25, 1969, Aug. 31, 1969 (lulls); Aug. 16, 1969 (virtual cessation of infiltration).

10. E.g., May 5, 1968 (U.S. language after opening of Paris talks); July 13, 1968 (U.S. expansion of war); Aug. 2, 1968 (demand for explicit Hanoi promise); Mar. 9, 1969, May 5, 1969 (step-up in allied attacks); Aug. 25, 1969, Aug. 31, 1969 (lull in fighting).

11. E.g., July 13, 1968, Aug. 8, 1968 (lull in fighting); Jan. 19, 1969, Mar. 1, 1969 (opening of expanded talks); May 18, 1969 (initial response to May 14 Speech); June 10, 1969 (Front's 10 Points); July 28, 1969, Aug. 25, 1969, Aug. 31, 1969 (lull in fighting).

12. E.g., Feb. 1, 1968, Feb. 4, 1968 (Tet offensive); May 8, 1968, May 12, 1968 (enemy "second wave"); Mar. 9, 1969 (spring offensive); July 28, 1969 (stalled talks); Aug. 16, 1969 (enemy attacks).

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other side, and to abandon all efforts for military victory; 13 (b) the prospect of U.S. withdrawal is the best way to bring pressure on Saigon to adopt the necessary conciliatory posture; 14 and (c) the policy of Vietnamization is an effective way to put pressure on Hanoi. 15

2. **Progression of concessions.** In every aspect of Viet-Nam policy in which the United States has made a limited concession, the _Times_ has first welcomed the concession and then pressed the President for a further concession along the same lines: (a) For example, the _Times_ applauded President Johnson's partial bombing halt of March 31, 1968, but three and one half months later began pressing for a total bombing halt. 16 The _Times_ was optimistic about Hanoi's responsiveness to a total bombing halt, once that occurred, but soon began pressing for troop withdrawal. 17 (b) The call

13. E.g., Apr. 3, 1969 (cutback of search-&-destroy missions); May 5, 1969, May 17, 1969 (defensive posture, U.S. withdrawal); May 18, 1969 (U.S. withdrawal); June 10, 1969 (interim coalition); Sept. 5, 1969 (Ho Chi Minh funeral truce).

15 E.g., Dec. 26, 1968 (mutual withdrawal); Mar. 21, 1969 (U.S. withdrawal); May 31, 1969 (timetable for U.S. withdrawal); July 28, 1969 (further U.S. withdrawal).

14 E.g., Dec. 26, 1968 (mutual withdrawal); May 5, 1969, May 17, 1969 (defensive posture, U.S. withdrawal); May 31, 1969 (timetable for withdrawal); Aug. 30, 1969 (major U.S. withdrawal, defensive posture, cease-fire); Sept. 17, 1969 (quicker withdrawal).

16. April 1, 1968, Apr. 2, 1968 (praise of partial bombing halt); July 13, 1968 (call for total bombing halt).

17. Nov. 1, 1968 (optimism after total bombing halt); Jan. 19, 1969 (call for troop withdrawals).

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for troop withdrawal began as a call for mutual troop withdrawals, but this soon developed into a call for U.S. initiation of the process of mutual withdrawal, then escalated to a demand for U.S. troop withdrawals regardless of Hanoi's response, and then to a demand for a timetable of such U.S. withdrawals.¹⁸

(c) As for the scale of U.S. withdrawals, the _Times_ originally called for the U.S. simply to "initiate" or "begin" such withdrawal. (An editorial in May referred to anticipated U.S. cutbacks of 50-100,000 men as "substantial".)¹⁹ After U.S. withdrawal began to occur, the _Times_ first welcomed this as "a step toward disengagement," but later began to grumble that the withdrawal of 60,000 was "timid" and "token," and not "significant" or "adequate".²⁰

(d) In May 1969, the _Times_ called for a "coalition electoral commission" to supervise free elections in South Viet-Nam. But by June -- a month before Saigon offered to establish such a joint commission -- the _Times_ was calling for the negotiation of "an agreement... on the future government of South Viet-Nam," i.e., an "interim coalition."²¹

18. Jan. 19, 1969 (mutual withdrawal); Jan. 30, 1969, Mar. 21, 1969, (U.S. initiation); May 18, 1969 (unilateral withdrawal); May 31, 1969 (timetable for U.S. withdrawals).

19. Jan. 30, 1969 ("initiate"); Mar. 21, 1969 ("begin"); May 31, 1969 (50-100,000 as "substantial").

20. June 10, 1969 ("a step"); Sept. 17, 1969 ("timid," not "significant"); Sept. 27, 1969 (not "adequate"); Oct. 2, 1969 ("token").

21. May 14, 1969 (coalition electoral commission); June 10, 1969 (interim coalition).

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(e) The _Times_ began calling for a cutback of search-&-destroy missions in April 1969. The _Times'_ own news columns on July 25 reported that such a reduction had taken place. Within two weeks, the _Times_ was calling for a standstill cease-fire. 22

3. Acceleration of concessions. As suggested above, most major U.S. concessions have been applauded (or at least "welcomed") by the _Times_ at the time they occurred. But the length of the "grace period" between this applause and the launching of the editorial campaign for the next major concession has steadily shrunk: The _Times_ waited 3 1/2 months after the partial bombing halt before calling for a total bombing halt;²³ it waited over 2 1/2 months after the total bombing halt before raising the call for troop withdrawals.²⁴ But in 1969 there has never been a moment in which some _Times_ recommendation of a concession has not been outstanding and unsatisfied. Whenever the President has announced some U.S. concession that the _Times_ had been urging upon him, the _Times_ has simply taken up recommending another concession. In some cases, this other concession is a brand new one.²⁵ In other cases it is one that the editorial writer had

22. Apr. 3, 1969 (call for cutback); Aug. 5, 1969 (call for cease-fire).

23. Apr. 1, 1968 (approval of partial bombing halt); July 13, 1968 (call for total bombing halt).

24. Nov. 1, 1968 (approval of total bombing halt); Jan. 19, 1969 (call for troop withdrawals).

25. E.g., Aug 5, 1969 (call for cease-fire, after July 25 report of search-&-destroy cutback).

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recommended earlier, along with his recommendation of the concession actually made;²⁶ he simply raises it to the status of a primary recommendation in order to "take up the slack" left by the U.S. Government's announced ~~concession~~.

### C. <u>Unexplained Loss of Confidence in the President</u>

At this writing (mid-October), the _Times_' confidence in the Nixon Administration is at a low point, and it is not clear why. As recently as the end of July and the beginning of August, the _Times_ was undisturbed by, and even complimentary to, the President's Viet-Nam policy. The fall from grace seems to have occurred gradually over the month of August.

The distance one can plummet in the fall from grace is illustrated by the comparison between the editorials of July 23, 1969, and October 2, 1969 (both of which are quoted in full in the Survey at Tab B). The editorial of July 28 noted the "forward-looking proposals from Washington and Saigon," and agreed with the President that the burden was on Hanoi to respond. The editorial of October 2 attacked him for "not [having] brought any significant new ideas to the Viet-Nam problem."

One can only conclude that (a) new ideas can grow old in two months, or that (b) the _Times_ has a short memory, or, more generally, that (c) the _Times'_ opinion of the President has nothing to do with what he actually does.

26. E.g., preceding the June 8 Midway announcement of U.S. troop withdrawal, the _Times_ had already begun calling for a cutback of search-&-destroy missions (Apr. 3, 1969), for a coalition electoral commission (May 14, 1969), and for a timetable for U.S. withdrawal (May 31, 1969).

SURVEY

A. The Call for a Bombing Halt, January - May, 1968.

The editorial of January 5, 1968, took note of the recent North Viet-
namese statement that they "will" talk (instead of "would" talk) after the
United States halts its bombing of the North. It is time for President
Johnson to make a move to open peace talks, the editorial said, and a
beginning should be made through a cessation of the bombing.

An editorial on January 21, 1968, declared that the Johnson Admini-
stration's charge that its critics failed to put forward realistic alternatives
to the current U. S. policy "is even less true now than before." The
editorial discussed the series of proposals that had been made in recent
days for defusing the war (de-escalation in the South, cessation of the
bombing of the North, recognition of the N. L. F.), and said that, while
none of the proposals are new, perhaps never before have they been put
forth by so many distinguished advocates at one time.

On January 24, 1968, the editorial writer was more sympathetic: He noted Hanoi's harsh public response to the Johnson stand on peace talks and said that Washington's position may have been more flexible in private contacts with North Viet-Nam. If these reports are true, he wrote, North Viet-Nam may not really be interested in peace talks; he noted U Thant's charge that both sides have been guilty of "simplistic" demands.

The Communist Tet offensive was launched January 30-31, 1968. The editorial of February 1, 1968, declared that the enemy's offensive "offers painful proof of the limitations of American power in Asia." The editorial stated that the raids undermined the optimism about the course of the war voiced recently in Saigon and Washington. If such is their aim, it continued, the Communists have chosen a bloody road to peace; as a "last massive push to improve their bargaining position in anticipation of a bid toward peace," the current battles could conceivably mark a preliminary step toward negotiations. The editorial of February 4, 1968, noting President Johnson's optimistic reaction to the Tet offensive, said that if the offensive proves anything it is that the bombing of the North has failed in its purpose.

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The editorial of February 25, 1968, noted the reports of a possible U.S. troop increase and declared that "the time has come for the United States to realize that escalation is illogical." The column urged a halt to the bombing, citing the statement of U Thant that if the United States unconditionally ended the bombing of the North, the United States could reasonably assume that North Viet-Nam would deal in "good faith" with the issue of the ground fighting.

On March 24, 1968, the editorial writer called for a new U.S. strategy on the ground. He stated that the transfer of Gen. Westmoreland could mark a basic turning point in the war, but only if it is accompanied by a change in strategy; he backed the idea of defending populated areas, and stated that the futility of allied-initiated escalation has long been evident.

On March 31, 1968, President Johnson ordered a partial halt to the bombing of the North. The editorial of April 1, 1968, was sympathetic: The President's decision not to seek re-election, it said, reflects the profound malaise that Americans are experiencing as a direct result of the war. It said that the President might be back in the running if his peace proposals succeed. The President's order to curtail the bombing, it concluded, "leaves the next move up to North Vietnam." The editorial of April 2, 1968, declared that The President's offer "is a peace overture that Hanoi and its allies can refuse to recognize only at a tragic cost to themselves and to the world." Hanoi and Moscow must realize, the column continued, that the President "goes as far as any American leader can be expected to go"; it concluded that "the possibilities for a negotiated settlement will never be better than they are now."

The editorial of April 11, 1968, pointed to the enemy's withdrawal from the area of Khesanh as a possible sign of enemy restraint that Secretary Rusk apparently did not see when he complained of the lack of enemy response.

On April 11, 1968, Secretary of Defense Clifford announced that the United States was imposing a ceiling of 549,500 on the number of its troops in Viet-Nam. The editorial of April 14, 1968, approved, differentiating between a "cease-fire" in the air war over North Viet-Nam and a cease-fire in the ground action in the South. The editorial stated that "it should be possible" to arrange a complete cease-fire over North Viet-Nam, but noted the difficulty of achieving a cease-fire in the South.

The agreement on Paris as the site for peace talks was announced on May 3, 1968. The editorial of May 4, 1968, said that the accord on the site "marks a major diplomatic breakthrough," and declared that Washington's patient search has been gratifyingly rewarded. The editorial concluded that "concern over the genuineness of Hanoi's interest in talking has been greatly eased."

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An editorial one day later, on May 5, 1968, declared that the talks should mean the beginning of the end of the war, and warned against the U.S. 's digging a trap for itself by making confusing statements. It would be a tragedy, the column continued, if the United States stiffens its terms for a settlement now. The editorial stressed that there would be no justification in delaying the talks by exaggerating the value of the bombing of the North. On May 8, 1968, the editorial noted the current enemy assaults and stated that they could have an unsettling effect on the allied political position. The Saigon regime should be moving now to broaden its base, the column continued.

The editorial of May 12, 1968, noted that the opening of talks was taking place against the "unpromising background of stepped-up military activity on both sides," and stated that "no settlement can be reached until a cease-fire is agreed upon." The editorial foresaw lengthy negotiations, but opposed a rigid United States position.

The substantive talks opened on May 13, 1968. An editorial on May 15, 1968, noted the demands and stands of both sides and urged that the parties discuss a freeze of all external forces in South Viet-Nam at their present levels, after all bombing of North Viet-Nam is halted.

## B. The Call for a Total Bombing Halt, July - December, 1968.

On July 13, 1968, the editorial pointed out that the Paris talks had been stalemated for two months because Hanoi continued to insist on a complete bombing halt before moving to substantive discussions. It is not clear that the U.S. has reduced the level of hostilities, the column suggested, listing the indications of a U.S. expansion of the war (increases in the number of U.S. air missions over the North and in the number of troops in the South). The editorial noted the lull in the fighting in the South and queried if the situation was not a sign of enemy restraint. Finally, the column urged a cessation of the bombing, on the ground that possible signals opening the way to peace should not be allowed to go untested.

The editorial of August 2, 1968, criticized Secretary Rusk's demand -- that North Viet-Nam go on record with a commitment to reduce its war effort before the U.S. could stop the bombing -- as "impossible." The editorial noted the tougher conditions set by Johnson and Rusk in the days preceding, and the continuing build-up and aggressive action by U.S. troops in South Viet-Nam, and pointed to the lull in the fighting as a ground for concluding that North Viet-Nam had met the requirements originally set

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by the President. An editorial on August 8, 1968, noting political developments in the United States and the lull in the ground fighting, declared that "the time is ripe to test Hanoi's intentions" with a total bombing halt.

The United States announced the cessation of all bombing of the North on October 31, 1968. In an editorial on October 21, 1968, the *Times* welcomed what were by then reliable signs that the bombing was about to be halted. The editorial noted that the preceding five months had seen far more ground covered than was generally realized, and pointed out a shift in North Viet-Nam's attitude on some principles essential to ultimate agreement. The next move, it said, is up to Hanoi.

On the morning after the announcement of the bombing halt, the editorial of November 1, 1968, declared that the search for a political settlement could now begin. It stated that most of the principles of settlement expounded by both sides were similar, but that the nature of the future government of South Viet-Nam would not be a simple matter to resolve. It cautioned that there was no "contract" with North Viet-Nam for military restraint. What is important, the column concluded, is that a policy that failed has been put aside; the future prospect of peace can now be discerned.

### C. The Call for Mutual Troop Withdrawals, December 1968 - May 1969

An editorial on December 26, 1968, noting the Christmas cease-fire and Saigon's and the N. L. F.'s reluctance to negotiate with each other, queried how long the United States and North Viet-Nam would let the maneuvers of their allies set the pace of talks. The editorial said that the answer to the temptation of Saigon and the N. L. F. to continue the struggle rather than face the political risks of peace is pointed out by Clifford and Kissinger, who both recommend the withdrawal of foreign troops in order to maximize the incentive for the contending forces in South Viet-Nam to work out a political settlement. The pivotal element, the column concluded, is the Kissinger proposal, backed by Clifford, for secret bilateral talks between the United States and North Viet-Nam.

The editorial of January 19, 1969, hailed the procedural accord that enabled the expanded talks to begin, and stated that the opportunity to move toward early settlement must be urgently probed. The first objective, the editorial declared, should be mutual troop withdrawal.

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On January 30, 1969, the *Times* editorial had kind words for Ambassador Lodge's presentation before the Paris meeting. Lodge's proposals, the editorial noted, simplified the Johnson Administration's longer agenda of proposals. The column said that the critical question was when to seek agreement on the partial withdrawal of external troops, and urged the U.S. to initiate the first phase of mutual troop withdrawals soon.

A wave of Communist attacks began in South Viet-Nam in late February. The editorial of March 1, 1969, noted that the easing of these Communist attacks gave hope of ending a crisis that might have endangered the Paris talks and led to full-scale resumption of the war. The editorial urged the Nixon Administration to "clear up the ambiguity" surrounding the bombing-halt understanding of the previous October 31. The *Times* declared that this ambiguity served the Johnson Administration as a means of veiling from American public opinion its diplomatic retreat on the bombing issue, but that the Nixon Administration had much to lose by keeping alive the myth that North Viet-Nam had entered into an agreement not to attack South Vietnamese cities. An editorial on March 9, 1969, noting the President's press conference warnings against continued Communist attacks, stated that the challenge confronting Mr. Nixon was to resist the Johnson tendency to react "as if his manhood were at stake." The column argued against a resumption of the bombing. Pointing out the increases in allied attacks in late 1968, the editorial said that the U.S. cannot demand the right to press the fighting while charging a double-cross whenever the Communists do the same. Military victory is impossible, the editorial concluded; the only real hope lies in the peace talks.

The editorial of March 21, 1969, declared that the President's announcement of his intention to begin American force reductions this year offers the best method of putting pressure on Hanoi to do likewise, and the best hope of breaking the stalemate in the Paris peace talks.

An editorial on April 3, 1969, praised the Administration for taking a "welcome and overdue step toward de-escalating the war" with its announcement of a cut-back of B-52 raids, but queried why Secretary Laird felt obliged to deny that the reduction represented a deliberate bid to lower the combat level. The column continued: "The Administration, committed to the energetic pursuit of the Paris peace talks, should now underscore its readiness to move more rapidly from war to peace by taking additional steps to scale down the fighting. One such measure could be a reduction in the search-and-destroy missions which the American command has pressed with increased vigor since the bombing halt of last Nov. 1. If there is a response from the other side, withdrawals of some American forces could

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be started in a further effort to set reciprocal disengagement in motion
while a political settlement is negotiated." The editorial writer pointed
out that "a climate of de-escalation encourages the kind of negotiation
that alone can restore peace."

An editorial on May 5, 1969, said that tentative signs of new movement
in the Paris talks tempered but could not wholly allay some doubts about
U.S. policy; it noted some aspects of allied behavior that provoked doubts
about American determination to bring the war to a speedy end: "The
American military command continues to press the fight as though still in
pursuit of a military victory. A defensive posture would be more conducive
to peace. It would also facilitate the withdrawal of some American troops."
"On the political front," the editorial went on, "some of President Thieu's
recent actions at home have been inconsistent with his stated willingness to
move toward settlement." The column noted Thieu's "harsh crackdown on
all who dare hint at compromise with the Communists," and the fact that
Thieu "continues to procrastinate on long-promised land reform."

An editorial on May 9, 1969, declared that the N. L. F.'s 10-Point
program was a significant step toward a settlement: The program's
significance "lies more in its timing and manner than in the plan itself,
though it does contain some new elements that could clear the way for speeding
an end to this dismal war. Most encouraging is that, by failing this time to
insist that its program is the only basis for settlement, the Front appears to
be setting the stage for substantive negotiations." The editorial continued:
"The seriousness of this intent will be measured by the Front's willingness
now to move into private discussions with Saigon's representatives on the
details of its proposals and the counterproposals the Thieu regime must lose
no time in putting forward. A heavy responsibility rests on Saigon to demonstrate
the sincerity of its desire for swift movement in private talks."

D. The Call for a Joint Electoral Commission, May 1969.

An editorial on May 14, 1969, anticipating the Presidential speech
scheduled for that evening, declared that the central political issue in
Viet-Nam was the nature of the interim body that would supervise the
election of a new national assembly. The editorial backed the proposal
put forth by Clark Kerr's group for a coalition Electoral Commission to
control the elections in South Viet-Nam.

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The editorial the next day, May 15, 1969, stated that the President's speech "contains no major advances," but admitted that it clarified some ambiguities in earlier American proposals. The column emphasized, however, that "what is mainly missing" is some response to the enemy's proposal for an interim coalition government to conduct elections in South Viet-Nam. The editorial renewed its recommendation of a coalition Electoral Commission to conduct elections.

A further editorial on the President's speech, a few days later on May 17, 1969, pointed to the fact that the Paris talks were one year old, and blamed both sides for the lack of progress: The Administration justly criticized the Communists, the editorial stated, for coupling their recent peace initiatives with widespread attacks. "But the United States similarly compromises its diplomacy with a persisting policy of military aggressiveness. It is time both sides pulled back to defensive postures."

The same editorial continued:

"President Nixon's failure to slow down offensive operations and his delay in recalling some American troops -- in spite of 'excellent' progress in strengthening South Vietnamese forces -- indicate his reluctance to 'take some risks for peace.' Nor, despite his 'close relationship with Saigon,' has he indirectly succeeded in greatly advancing the American objective of a truly representative South Vietnamese Government. President Thieu continues to jail non-Communist South Vietnamese who speak out for compromise.

"The time has come indeed for initiatives that should be demonstrated with deeds as well as words."

E. <u>The Call for Unilateral Troop Withdrawal, May - July, 1969.</u>

A further editorial on the President's May 14 speech, on May 18, 1969, stated that the most useful single element in the Nixon program was its accent on flexibility. The editorial cited the North Vietnamese and N. L. F. assurances that they do intend to negotiate seriously on the Nixon program as well as on their own program, and labeled this initial Communist response "moderately encouraging." The best way to get action on the Nixon troop-withdrawal proposal, the column concluded, was for the U.S. to start sending home troops.

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The editorial of May 31, 1969, urged the Administration to announce a timetable for US withdrawal, as "the only way for President Nixon to bring home both to Mr. Thieu and to his political backers the seriousness of the American intention to end the war." The column noted that: "The impression has been given that substantial cutbacks -- of 50,000 to 100,000 men -- would be set in motion before the end of the year." It cited Ambassador Harriman's belief that "Hanoi would respond to American reductions with withdrawals of its own, and that a degree of tacit disengagement would be achieved. But beyond this hope [the column went on], there are indications that Hanoi is anxious to achieve a political settlement by agreement with the U.S. before American withdrawal. Most important, Hanoi fears that American troop reductions would reduce pressure in the United States for total American withdrawal and, in effect, permit the United States to stay in South Vietnam longer."

An editorial immediately following the Midway announcement of the first U.S. troop reduction recommended an "interim coalition" for South Viet-Nam. The Midway decision, the editorial of June 10, 1969, conceded, is "a step toward American disengagement." The column noted that "two other decisions taken at Midway [on land reform, and on a new election proposal] may prove ultimately to be of importance. But not enough is known about them yet for a judgment to be made." The editorial stated:

"The political future of South Vietnam is what the war is all about. Mutual withdrawal of external forces -- which could be brought about tacitly by American troop cuts -- can begin but it cannot be completed until an agreement can be negotiated on the future government of South Vietnam.

"The ten points advanced by the National Liberation Front and Mr. Nixon's eight points coincide to a considerable degree, as both sides have acknowledged. But it is un likely that Hanoi and the N. L. F. can be enticed into serious private talks until the central point of disagreement -- an interim coalition -- is opened for negotiations as well."

On July 11, Saigon and Washington announced our proposals for a joint electoral commission. A *Times* news column on July 25 quoted U.S. officials as saying that the Pentagon had revised its guidelines for U.S. commanders in the field in such a way as to reduce search-and-destroy missions. These two major U.S. concessions in July did not go unnoticed in the *Times* editorial pages: On July 28, 1969, the editorial complimented the President for his "forward-looking proposals" and lamented the absence of a Communist response. This editorial is worth quoting in full, for purposes of comparison with what comes later:

9

The editorial of July 28, 1969, went as follows:

The Withdrawal Strategy

"The continuing delay by Hanoi and the National Liberation Front in opening serious private peace negotiations in Paris leaves the United States with no choice but to proceed with an alternative strategy, Vietnamization of the war.

"The Paris talks of course will go on. The United States halted the bombing of North Vietnam on assurances -- from the Russians, among others -- that there would be serious negotiations. But if negotiations remain stalled, if forward-looking proposals from Washington and Saigon are unanswered, then other means of achieving American disengagement must be pursued.

"The withdrawal of 25,000 American troops and President Nixon's statement that he hoped to bring home most of the remaining ground combat forces before the end of next year marked the first stage of this alternative strategy. It is a strategy based on strengthening and modernizing the South Vietnamese Army and, starting immediately, turning over to it progressively the major combat responsibilities.

"The rate of American withdrawal naturally will also be affected by the degree of North Vietnamese withdrawal. If the slowdown in reinforcement of North Vietnamese forces continues -- leading to a gradual reduction of Hanoi's troops in South Vietnam -- American troops can be brought home at a relatively rapid pace. A continuation of the present military lull, which increasingly calls for a reciprocal American gesture of de-escalation, might even permit the withdrawal of American troops to be speeded up. Most military men agree that the South Vietnamese can be prepared to take over all but helicopter combat operations -- with perhaps, some American logistical and continuing air support -- in less than eighteen months.

"There is always the possibility that South Vietnam's army will be defeated in battle. But that would force the United States to remain longer, and it is unlikely that Hanoi would want to run that risk by testing Saigon's military prowess at this time -- although there might well be such a test after a unilateral American withdrawal was completed.

"Does unilateral American withdrawal encourage Hanoi to block negotiations in Paris and keep its troops in South Vietnam? The reverse is probably true. Hanoi's refusal to negotiate means continued warfare with the South Vietnamese armed forces of a million

10

men -- aided by American logistical and air support, which would
still have to be negotiated out of the country one day. And that negotiation,
at a time when American ground combat forces and casualties had been
reduced to a minimum, would take place under conditions more favorable to
the Administration in Washington.

"Hanoi's choice is between a negotiated peace -- which means early, speedy and complete American withdrawal, plus an important political role in South Vietnam for the N. L. F. -- and a continued war with unforeseeable consequences. But whether Hanoi chooses peace or war, the American disengagement policy now is unlikely to be altered except as to the withdrawal rate."

F. The Call for a Stand-still Cease-Fire, August --

The editorial of August 5, 1969, commented on the occasion of the
President's return from his Asian tour and his restatements of traditional
American policy, declaring that the time had come for a policy recognizing
the military stalemate and accepting the status quo. The editorial called
for a standstill cease-fire, and for a political proposal recognizing the
existing partition of South Viet-Nam into regions controlled by Communists
or Saigon, as steps toward a permanent political settlement.

The editorial of August 16, 1969, after the enemy's 2-month lull in
ground fighting had been interrupted by two days of attacks on August 11-12,
noted that this increased level of enemy attacks "complicates" the President's
decision on the next U.S. troop withdrawal. "But," the column commented,
"it is evident that an opportunity was lost to test this de-escalation strategy."
The editorial continued:

"The question now is what the proper American reaction should be. North Vietnamese troop infiltration has virtually ceased, suggesting a Hanoi intention of tapering off the level of its forces in the south, if not their activity. The United States has proposed neither a cease-fire nor reciprocal de-escalation. It cannot logically expect the other side to stop fighting because it announces a 5 per cent reduction in forces.

"The policy of American troop reductions is sound, but it needs bulwarking
by de-escalation and cease-fire proposals."

11

On August 25, 1969, the editorial complained that the President's
decision to defer another withdrawal announcement, and Thieu's choice
of a general to replace a civilian as Premier, "are poor auguries for
peace." The President should have strengthened his policy of phased
unilateral withdrawal and Vietnamization, the column said. "Instead,
"he gives the impression of becoming an instrument of the Saigon regime
... and of the shifting military tactics of Hanoi." The editorial stated
that enemy-initiated military action had remained below normal, despite
the brief upsurge of August 11-12, and concluded: "What is needed now is
not a halt in American troop withdrawals but their continuation, linked with
proposals for de-escalation of fighting, and negotiation of a standstill
cease-fire."

The editorial of August 30, 1969, stated that the United States "has
plenty of latitude for ordering major reductions without endangering the
allied military position." Such reductions must be pushed vigorously, the
editorial writer affirmed, "if Thieu is to be encouraged to broaden his
appeal and seek accommodation with the Viet Cong in Paris." The column
urged the United States to "assume -- in the absence of specific contrary
evidence -- that the lull is a political signal," and to shift U.S. forces over
to defensive tactics. The editorial repeated the recommendation of a
standstill cease-fire.

By August 31, 1969, the *Times* had concluded that President Nixon
"seems to be slipping toward the same quagmire that seized and finally
submerged President Johnson." "Mr. Nixon's fundamental error from
the first has been the assumption that he has time for intricate maneuvers
in diplomacy, psychological warfare and military tactics -- maneuvers
that might enable him to gain at the conference table what American military
power has been unable to wrest from the Communists on the ground."
The editorial cited the orders to Gen. Abrams to "maintain maximum
pressure," and complained that the battlefield lull was "first ignored, then
met with a minimum response." "Worse still," the column went on, "after
a brief two-day upsurge in Communist operations occurred Aug. 11 and 12
-- and in the face of a swift acknowledgment by Secretary of State Rogers that
'activity is back to what it was prior to that time' -- Mr. Nixon decided to
delay the major American withdrawal he had been scheduled to announce."
The whole Nixon strategy for ending the war, if strategy there is, could be
vitiated by this maneuver." The editorial concluded by saying that "North
Vietnam has gone far to disengage itself from dependence on China by sending
home Chinese labor battalions, and the Viet Cong in Paris have offered to de-
escalate the war if the United States takes the lead," and again urged a cease-
fire.

12

On September 5, 1969, the *Times* urged the President to declare a truce for the occasion of Ho Chi Minh's funeral, in the hope that it could become the basis of an extended cease-fire. The column urged the gesture as an "immediate demonstration of goodwill and incentive to compromise."

The editorial of September 7, 1969, enlarged upon this theme, and suggested that moderates among the new leadership in Hanoi might well respond to such a U.S. initiative: "Ho's successors might be receptive to a persuasive allied overture," the editorial stated, and quoted Douglas Pike's speculation that the new leaders "may see in Ho Chi Minh's death a chance to graciously turn the page of history" to a peaceful settlement. "The great test for the allies is to do all they can to encourage such a transition in Hanoi .... Like Ho, they [the new leaders] are deeply suspicious of the West. But, given a convincing demonstration of the genuineness of the will to peace in Washington and Saigon, they may well seize the opportunity to end the costly conflict ...."

On September 12, 1969, the editorial criticized the President for the U.S. handling of the Ho Chi Minh truce:

"Events of the past week in the wake of Ho Chi Minh's death have been particularly damaging to the credibility of Mr. Nixon's 'strategy for peace.' The President's tardy response to a Communist truce proposal, the contradictory statements on the ceasefire issued in Saigon, the refusal of South Vietnam to honor the stepdown which it had accepted and the failure of the allies to seek an extended truce betray lack of imagination, purpose, coordination and will to take risks for peace."

On September 16, the President announced a further reduction of the ceiling on U.S. troop strength in South Viet-Nam. The *Times* editorial of the next day, September 17, 1969, reacted with scorn:

"Although it is another timid move in the right direction, Mr. Nixon's decision to withdraw an additional 35,000 troops is hardly likely to impress the enemy abroad or critics at home as the 'significant' step toward peace the President says it is. Nor can this modest reduction in American strength be expected to jolt the reluctant Saigon regime into more vigorous cooperation in the essential joint effort to negotiate a compromise settlement.

"The more significant figure is not the 60,000 Americans who are to be withdrawn from Vietnam but the 484,000 who will still be in the field a year after Mr. Nixon was elected on a promise to bring the war

13

to a speedy conclusion. This is certainly many more troops than
would be needed to conduct holding operations while a political
settlement is negotiated. It is far more than should be required if
the uncompromising South Vietnamese Government were really
prepared to fight its own battles.

"Once more Mr. Nixon has forfeited an opportunity to make a bold move toward peace. He has apparently yielded to the unreconstructed generals in Saigon -- American and Vietnamese -- who would still pursue the futile goal of military victory."

The editorial of September 27, 1969, responded to the President's press conference of the previous day with skepticism:

"Many question whether the Administration's withdrawal of 60,000 American troops -- by mid-December -- is really an adequate response to the two-thirds drop in North Vietnamese infiltration over the past nine months that the President himself reports. If, as Mr. Nixon acknowledges, there has been no enemy summer offensive and there is little prospect of a fall offensive, it is difficult to justify the heavy military pressure still being maintained by allied forces."

The *Times* editorial writer pondered a few more days over the President's calls for national unity, and then declared that the President had not earned the unity and support that he sought. The editorial of October 2, 1969, is herein quoted in full:

"Shortly before Election Day last year, candidate Richard Nixon said that the American people needed 'new ideas, new men and new leadership . . . to bring an end to the war.' The American people agreed and gave the Republican challenger a clear mandate to do the job.

"Nearly a year later, and more than eight months after Mr. Nixon's inauguration, the Paris peace talks are stalemated, the war grinds on and more than half a million American fighting men remain mired in Vietnam, fighting to preserve a South Vietnamese Government that shows no serious inclination to compromise, reform itself or fight its own battles. Like his predecessor, President Nixon finds himself confronted with a rising tide of dissent at home. Also like his predecessor, he has appealed to the country -- in strikingly Johnsonian terms -- not to 'buckle and run.'"

"There is no question that unity at home would strengthen the Government's effort to negotiate an honorable settlement in Paris with a tough

14

and stubborn foe. But the support for which Mr. Nixon pleads
requires a confidence that he has not earned by his actions to date.

"The new President has not brought any significant new ideas to the Vietnam problem. His withdrawals of American troops so far have been token withdrawals. Massive American forces in the field have continued the aggressive tactics initiated under President Johnson. His offer of free choice for the South Vietnamese people -- which had been heard before -- has been openly repudiated by the words and deeds of a Saigon Government he continues uncritically to support.

"Nor has Mr. Nixon greatly altered the cast of characters on the American side of the Vietnam drama. His commander in the field, his Army Chief of Staff and his chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are all men identified with the Vietnam failures of the past. His Ambassador in Saigon was President Johnson's Ambassador. His chief negotiator in Paris was twice Mr. Johnson's man in Saigon. As to leadership, the Administration's recent confused response to the Ho Chi Minh funeral truce has led many to wonder who, if anyone, was in control.

"The American people need to be united for peace. But, as Mr. Nixon himself observed a year ago, unity cannot be won with old ideas, old faces and no leadership."

Programs for Peace

The Vietnam Moratorium to be marked in all parts
of the country today holds many different meanings
for those who join in its observance. The only gen-
eral consensus among those who organized the appeal
and the vast majority of those who intend to heed it
is a compelling sense of urgency in the search for
peace and a determination that the nationwide expres-
sion of concern be lawful and nonviolent. No breach
of domestic peace can serve the cause of peace
abroad.

The quest for peace, however, cannot be left to
emotional or nostalgic statements. It is unrealistic
and unfair to assume that the American involvement
in Vietnam is easily terminated by simplistic demands
that President Nixon follow the advice of those who,
in a caricature of policy-making, tell him that the way
to get out of Vietnam is "in ships."

The special opportunity of a day that appeals to the
nation's conscience and permits an introspective look
at America's goals and priorities is to engage in
rational discourse. Throughout the nation, planned
and impromptu discussion groups and assemblies will
be meeting today, and the university campuses will
be the scene of teach-ins on an unprecedented scale.
Those who come to these sessions united in their
opposition to the war have a special obligation not
merely to criticize but to propose and debate realistic
ways of speeding a settlement

The present disastrous entrapment is the result of
years of deceptive policies compounded by mistaken
strategic and political estimates and unproductive tac-
tics. The answer now is not a panicky pull-out; the
logical beginning is a standstill cease-fire, followed by
substantially stepped-up withdrawal of troops. Such
a course, rather than continued talk about a military
victory that has so clearly proved unattainable by
either side, offers the best hope of piercing Hanoi's
intransigence and moving to productive negotiations
in Paris.

President Nixon cannot be faulted for his refusal to
end the present stalemate by unconditional surrender.
But those who appeal for a break with the futile and
destructive policies of the past have every right to
demand assurances, in deeds instead of words, that
they will not simply be fed re-runs of stale slogans
about the "Vietnamization" of the war and the drying
up of infiltration from the North. Presidential
promises of peace around the corner have too reg-
ularly been followed by United States military an-
nouncements that nothing has changed in the conduct
of the war and by Saigon's political boasts that nothing
will change the aims of President Thieu.

The purpose of the Moratorium can be simply
stated: to underscore national dedication to the search
for peace. This yearning by young and old alike must
not be allowed to fade into a mirage. It is not enough
to long and demonstrate for peace; the need is for
policies, not just pronouncements—both on the part
of the Administration and the public. If today's observ-
ance can point to such a course, then the Moratorium,
far from undermining the President's power to end
the war, can strengthen his mandate to lead the nation
out of the prison of past errors.

A daily newspaper, by definition, deals in the ephemeral. Mercifully, one seldom compares its positions one day with the positions it took the week before. But to be accountable for one's actions and their consequences is the essence of responsibility. A government that attempted to conduct foreign policy by following the recommendations of a daily newspaper would find itself riding a roller coaster to nowhere.

I do not mean to single out the _New York Times_ for harsh criticism. It was selected for analysis because it was the journal that was taken the most seriously. Indeed the _Times_ was among the most moderate and thoughtful of the critics because it always imagined itself to be offering specific and reasonable suggestions that were not drastic but in the framework of a gradual disengagement. The shouting demonstrators in the streets were not nearly so precise or tactful in their recommendations. But the very fact that the most sober, the most prestigious, the most respectable Establishment newspaper conducted such a pattern of advocacy is a vivid revelation of the style of the public debate.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

PETER RODMAN

SUBJECT:

Commentary on U. S. Foreign Policy,
1969-1972

The commentary in *Commentary* called for an early end to the Vietnam war throughout the period 1969-1972. For the first few years, criticism of the Nixon Administration on Vietnam was infrequent and mild, but on the assumption that the Administration was in fact withdrawing. *Commentary* writers took their readers' opposition to the war for granted. After the Cambodian operation of May, 1970, a more bitter tone became evident. *Commentary*'s liberals found themselves very uncomfortable, however, with the strident anti-Americanism of Noam Chomsky, Mary McCarthy, Susan Sontag, I. F. Stone, etc., and said so.

On other topics, the Administration was criticized for proceeding with the ABM and MIRV and for delaying in SALT. Very little was written on the Middle East, which was quiet. Brandt's Ostpolitik was viewed cautiously, but favorably. Walter Laqueur began writing in early 1972 of the risks of detente in Europe. He saw both hopes and risks in Ostpolitik and a European Security Conference; he feared that while the USSR had not abandoned its aims, the U. S. was irretrievably in a mood of withdrawal, from Europe and elsewhere. For this reason he feared detente might turn out to be an unequal bargain.

This neo-isolationism was generally deplored, although Edmund Stillman wrote a bitter piece in October 1971 blaming the Vietnam War for America's exhaustion and coming close to welcoming America's retrenchment.

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In short, it is hard to conclude that *Commentary* was a leading or aggressive vehicle of neo-isolationism. It took conventional liberal positions on many issues but found itself self-consciously in opposition to the insanities of the extreme left and devoted much of its space to that contrast.

* * *

The first *Commentary* article in 1969 discussing the Vietnam issue was a critique of Noam Chomsky -- "The Position of Noam Chomsky," by Lionel Abel in May 1969. The author identified himself as an opponent of the war but concluded:

> "...it is by no means the case that the arguments against our policy in Vietnam are as overwhelming as he [Chomsky] thinks." (p. 35)

Abel could not accept Chomsky's wholesale indictment of U. S. postwar policy. He said Chomsky was half-right.

> "...unquestionably our government *has* exploited the threats to us from the Communist part of the world for selfish, aggressive and reactionary purposes in Europe, in Asia, in South America, in Africa, and come to think of it, in the United States too during the McCarthy era.... But if Professor Chomsky *is* only half-right in his judgment of American power, this is because he denies, if only by implication, that there is a threat to the world from Communist power." (p. 40)

So Abel saw no virtue in American weakness or defeat:

> "But if we are barbarous to the degree that we are strong, should we try to civilize ourselves by striving to be weak? Is that reasonable? I should say not." (p. 44)

In July, 1969, Peter Shaw wrote a critical book review of Mary McCarthy's *Hanoi* and Susan Sontag's *Trip to Hanoi*. He concluded:

> "The intellectual consequences of not simply opposing the United States over Vietnam, but committing oneself

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to supporting North Vietnamese Communism seem to
me more damaging to the anti-war cause than these
two well-intentioned writers may suspect." (p. 88)

On another subject, Aaron Wildavsky in "The Politics of ABM" (November, 1969) dissected the pro-and anti-ABM arguments in the furious public debate. He was skeptical of both sides and particularly unhappy with the rampant anti-militarism. His own conclusion:

"The decision to proceed with deployment of the Safeguard ABM was a political mistake for the nation. Nixon should have realized that his foreign policy will remain mortgaged to the Vietnam War as long as that conflict continues, and that he cannot subject the nation to controversy without opening the floodgates of recrimination." (p. 63).

In March, 1970, Maurice J. Goldbloom assessed "Nixon So Far." His discussion of foreign policy was a conventional liberal critique:

"One way or another, the Nixon Administration will have to move toward a political settlement of the war or it will face disaster both in Vietnam and at home." (p. 30).

"The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks were begun and have continued in an atmosphere of cordiality, but they have achieved nothing of substance.... While the diplomats talk around the issue, preparations for the installation of anti-ballistic missiles and the testing of MIRV's threaten to add a new dimension to the nuclear arms race. ... [T]he continued labors of technicians in both the U. S. and the USSR make every day's delay in the SALT talks a source of escalated menace." (p. 30-31).

Goldbloom commented favorably on Brandt's Ostpolitik and chided Nixon mildly:

"This is certainly not a development which found its origin in Washington, but it is one on which Washington has learned to smile. The chances now seem good for a European Security Conference in the near future;

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such a conference may succeed in giving the existing
detente some concrete form, or it may simply be
another fencing match...." (p. 31).

In July 1970 -- after Cambodia -- Norman Podhoretz wrote bitterly
about the war:

> "By the time we leave [Vietnam], more than 40,000 Americans will have been killed in a war for which even the President of their country refuses to make any noble or transcendent claim." ("First Things, and Last," p. 27). "... the wanton American involvement in Vietnam comes closer and closer to an end." (p. 27).

A few months later, Dennis H. Wrong criticized the left opposition in "The Case of the 'New York Review'" (November 1970). The New York Review's causes were right, but it went too far:

> "Vietnam became, and remains, the most frequent subject of the *NYR*'s political journalism. In attacking forthrightly the deepening American involvement in the Spring of 1965, the *NYR* undoubtedly helped to mobilize intellectuals against the war, especially through the reports on Vietnam itself by Jean Lacouture and the late Bernard Fall, and on policy formulation in Washington by Hans J. Morgenthau, Joseph Kraft, and Theodore Draper (all of whom, to be sure, were writing on Vietnam in other magazines, including, of course, *Commentary*, as well). ... But by 1966 and 1967, a new tone of extravagant, querulous, self-righteous anti-Americanism began to creep into the *NYR*'s reports on Vietnam, especially those of Noam Chomsky, Mary McCarthy, and I. F. Stone. The war seemed increasingly to provide the occasion for an extreme and bitter repudiation, marked by an unmistakable touch of *Schadenfreude*, of a great deal more in American life than the Johnson Administration's foreign policy, the Pentagon, the military-industrial complex, and the wretched clichés of cold-war propaganda. (pp. 52-53).

-5-

Your friend Pat Moynihan wrote a well-known article, "The Presidency and the Press." in March 1971, deploring the press's treatment of Nixon Administration policies.

Meanwhile, Norman Podhoretz's anti-war passion increased:

> "As one who never believed that anything good would ever come for us or for the world from an unambiguous American defeat, I now find myself...unhappily moving to the side of those who would prefer just such an American defeat to a 'Vietnamization' of the war which calls for the indefinite and unlimited bombardment by American pilots in American planes of every country in that already devastated region." ("A Note on Vietnamization," May 1971, p. 9).

Nathan Glazer wrote a long piece arguing for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. He weighed pros and cons in terms of American credibility and so forth, but concluded the damage being done was too great. He felt he was arguing on pragmatic and not radical ideological grounds:

> "....for the United States, there is only one solution: immediate withdrawal." (p. 33) "....Vietnamization was senseless" (p. 34); "The war in Vietnam was not made by systems. It was made by the decisions of men who might have decided otherwise. It will come to an end when men decide that, whatever the costs of ending it, they are exceeded by those of continuing it. Now, in the aftermath of the Laotian episode, we may hope that a continued and determined opposition to the war will hasten the day when that decision is made." (p. 37).

Edmund Stillman assessed "America After Vietnam" in October 1971. His theme was that America was now "past its apogee," after decades of overinvolvement:

> "The American people have been cried wolf to, over and over again, and the inevitable reaction has set in. Even the calm with which the news of the China initiative was accepted may reflect less the growing maturity of the nation than its simple exhaustion.

> "But if America were merely suffering from physical or financial exhaustion, the problem, while serious, would not be a deadly one." (p. 47).

-6-

Stillman though the condition of exhaustion would be a lasting one:

> "Most of all, what seems to have been irretrievably lost in Vietnam is the old American sense of omnipotence on which the national optimism had always, in the last analysis, been based." (p. 49).

He criticized the Nixon Administration for trying to prolong an activist policy on the cheap:

> "But in the final analysis, for all the air of realism that tricks out the Administration's pronunciamentos on foreign affairs, they are based on an overriding illusion that America can win the same victories in the world as Mr. Nixon's predecessors sought, but at bargain-basement prices." (p. 51).

Stillman, in fact, endorsed a "neo-isolationist" policy, in the sense of a retrenchment from crusading overextension. He was nevertheless depressed at the extent of the disillusionment in America, and blamed it on the globalism that produced the evil of Vietnam:

> "Having, then, for more than twenty years exaggerated the confrontation with communism -- having generalized a power-political combat with the Soviet Union, finite in time and space, into a universal combat for the totality of world civilization -- America itself has now fallen into internal jeopardy. The whole society having foolishly been mobilized -- materially, intellectually, spiritually -- the failure of this vast national effort, as epitomized in Vietnam, now triggers a totalist and exaggerated and often misdirected reappraisal in which the very legitimacy of the society and its subordinate institutions comes into serious question.

> "The damage has gone beyond the possibility of easy repair: no mere retrenchment now will do the trick, and certainly no feckless foreign adventures." (p. 52).

Walter Laqueur began writing about the European situation in "The Fall of Europe?" (January, 1972). He welcomed Brandt's Ostpolitik as a welcome change from Bonn's earlier rigidity:

> "It is clear in retrospect that the official German attitude was too rigid: Bonn should have accepted long

-7-

ago, unilaterally if necessary, such consequences of
World War II as the Oder-Neisse line, and it should
have renounced the Munich Agreement of 1938." (p. 35).

But he felt that: felt that:

"There is some promise in the new German Ostpolitik, and there are many dangers." (p. 35).

He was worried about the conventional military balance in
Europe, which he feared was shifting unfavorably:

"The age of dialogue, we are told, has replaced the age of confrontation. This is only party true. Western Europe no longer fears a Soviet invasion, but on the other hand neither the fundamental assumptions nor the political aspirations of the Soviet Union have changed. It is the age of detente -- not, unfortunately, a detente that signals real peace and security, but a detente in the more narrow meaning of a 'period that succeeds a period of crisis in the Cold War.' For European security since the end of the war has rested not on dialogues and mutual understanding, but on the existence of a certain balance of military power, and this balance, never complete or perfect, has in recent years been radically upset." (p. 36).

He weighed the pros and cons of a European Security Conference. He cited the Berlin accord and MBFR as quid pro quos the West had obtained. He noted Eastern European interest in it, but thought it could cut both ways:

"The West has been strongly urged to participate in the European Security Conference, not only by the Soviets, but by East European leaders as well. The interest of some of the latter is obvious: while the Soviets negotiate, any military initiative against Rumania and Yugoslavia, for example, would be self-defeating. Since the talks would last a long time, perhaps several years, Rumania and Yugoslavia would gain, at the very least, a breathing space. Other East

-8-

European leaders, notably in Poland and Hungary, think that they, too, would gain more freedom as a result of ESC, but the position of these particular states would more likely worsen; for the Soviet Union, fearing that it's allies might go too far for toward rapprochement with the West, would be inclined to tighten rather than loosen its hold over them." (p. 38).

Laqueur's basic point was that a secure detente in Europe depended on either a long-term American military presence in Europe, or its replacement by an integrated Western European defense. He was dubious about the chances of either, and foresaw a gloomy outcome from detente:

> "But if the American retreat continues and if Western Europe proves incapable of strengthening its own defenses fairly rapidly, the argument will be increasingly heard that accommodation with the Russians, being inevitable, should be sought sooner rather than later." (p. 39).

Back to the war. Alexander Bickel, in "The Constitution and the War: (July 1972), continued the liberal (non-radical) critique of the Vietnam War:

> "But ours has been no conventional imperialist war; wrong and morally wrong in its conduct and consequences, it was nevertheless not evil in intent or origin. What propelled us into this war was a corruption of the generous, idealistic, liberal impulse which, together with a sense of legitimate self-interest, informed and sustained this country's foreign policy through the Second World War, and in the years after." (p. 54).

Walter Laqueur assessed "The World of the 1970's" in August 1972. He saw neo-isolationism as deplorable, but probably inevitable. His lamentation would be attacked as defeatist by Zumwalt and Reagan if said by you:

> "Certainly one of the main contributing factors to the confusion is what has come to be known in America as neo-isolationism.... -- that retreat from globalism

-9-

which seems to be the defining mark of the current American mood. ... [N]oone can dispute that the impulse behind it is today a major presence in American domestic politics or that its repercussions on the world scene will be widespread and decisive. Although it was no doubt hastened by Vietnam, there is reason to suppose that the new mood would have developed anyway, perhaps inevitably." (p. 21).
"When military might has been neutralized, as it effectively has, other factors come to assume decisive importance: the appearance and credibility of power, and the readiness to exercise power in the pursuit of national interests. ... In this respect the image of America as far as the outside world is concerned is more and more that of a nation unwilling to exercise power, a nation beset by a mood of pervasive defeatism, and ridden with internal dissent. On the other hand, the Soviet Union presents itself as purposeful and dynamic.... (p. 24).

Laqueur believed Ostpolitik was sound as long as illusions were not fostered:

"Not that there is anything basically wrong with Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik; the agreements with Russia and Poland should have been signed long ago, and in some ways Ostpolitik does not even go far enough. But if the policy itself is sound, the illusions engendered by it should give pause; Brandt himself and some of his colleagues have encouraged such illusions by speaking in terms of a historical turning point in European affairs and by predicting a radical improvement in East-West relations." (p. 27).

Laqueur's analysis of the prospective European Security Conference was balanced and quite good:

"The overriding long-term aim of a European Conference as far as the Russians are concerned is not just collective security, but a lasting peace on their terms -- a Pax Sovietica. Not for a moment do the

-10-

Soviets contemplate dissolving the Warsaw Pact.

... At best, as the Economist has observed, the European conference promises to be a bore, a sort of mini-UN assembly in which weary politicians exchange weary platitudes. At worst, it could offer the Soviet Union an opening for an aggressively expansionist policy with regard to Western Europe. The whole affair may in the long run be of no consequence. But it demonstrates very clearly the weakness of Western Europe, its inability to take the initiative, to assert its interests, to shape a common policy. The problem facing Western Europe is one of survival, of maintaining its security and independence in the face of the gradual American retreat from globalism." (p. 27).

He was extremely gloomy about the West's future and thought the Nixon Administration's optimism was unfounded:

> "While America is in retreat, the Soviet Union still has a globalist policy. As the US opts for disengagement, the Soviet Union increases its commitments. To this extent, regardless of America's economic performance and strategic might, the Soviet Union is now in a superior position. Nor is the hypothesis warranted that new centers of power are about to emerge. It is uncertain that they [Western Europe and Japan] will succeed in weathering the coming storms once the American umbrella is removed from over their heads." (p. 28).

An interesting debate occurred in *Commentary* in September 1972 on Nixon vs. McGovern. It centered on the question of whether McGovern was good for the Jews. Nathan Glazer wrote:

> "... in the end, for me, Vietnam is decisive, and on that ground I support McGovern." ("McGovern and the Jews: A Debate," p. 47).

Milton Himmelfarb, on the other hand, wrote:

> "The Jews' overriding foreign-policy interest is Israel....

-11-

How seriously can we take the new pro-Israel statements and planks of a candidate whose policy is diplomatic and military withdrawal? ... Of what use will McGovern's new professions of friendship and support for Israel be when he recalls those carriers from the Mediterranean?" (p. 48).

Alexander Bickel, who had been counsel for the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case, wrote a piece in November 1972 on the implications of the case. He defended the legitimacy of both executive privilege and the First Amendment. He offered the wise view that the balance between them had to be settled by the "pulling and hauling" of individual cases, not by any abstract formula. ("The Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open' First Amendment: From'Sullivan' to the Pentagon Papers," Nov. 1972).

Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., a Yale Law professor, discussed "The Question of War Crimes," in December 1972. He discussed the historical evolution of the law of war crimes, did not think atrocities like My Lai were widespread on the U. S. side, and criticized Falk and Chomsky for ignoring or excusing Communist atrocities in Vietnam:

"It is hard for me to see how anyone much above the intellectual level of Jane Fonda can take seriously the idea that Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, and all their 'policy-making' subordinates, intended to emulate Hitler by starting and waging a war of aggression. I think it far more probable that they thought they were applying the lessons of Munich and Korea, that they were international policemen promoting peace by deterring aggression. Indeed, my objection to United States policy in Vietnam is that it has been based far more on morality than on a prudent appraisal of this country's selfish interests. The evidence simply does not support Professor Falk's verdict of guilty." (p. 91).

39

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

July 30, 1976

FROM: PETER RODMAN (MR)

SUBJECT: Smyser Article for Clearance

Dick Smyser has sent me an article he wrote on detente. (Tab A). Most of the work was done while he was on leave as a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He hopes to publish and intends to do so under a pseudonym. He wants to be absolutely sure that the article causes you no problems.

The article is thoughtful and non-contentious. Its thesis is that the Cold War was succeeded by a period of detente, and that now detente (after about five years) is being succeeded by a third phase which combines elements of both. "It resembles traditional great-power relationships as they have been conducted for hundreds of years, with positive and negative elements and trends...." (p. 11):

-- "During the detente period, the United States and the Soviet Union even recognized and acted on the basis of several common interests." (p. 12). These common interests remain.

-- In 1969, there were pressures that led both sides to seek measures of conciliation. "Some of these pressures have proven temporary on both sides. Moreover, a reaction to the enthusiasm that welcomed the first detente agreements has set in, in part out of a natural political process and in part out of displeasure over the execution of the agreements." (p. 18).

-2-

-- There are serious geopolitical and ideological sources of contention. However, "both sides now perceive alternatives to opposition and have an interest in some cooperation. Neither will consciously wish to enter a path that leads to a resumption of the bitterness, the high risks, and the cost of the Cold War. Even if they stumble onto such a path by miscalculation, they should find it easier than before to pull back. During the Cold War, both sides accepted confrontation as the only available course. Now they know that other choices may at least be possible." (p. 18).

-- "If international tensions and crises still prevail, ... they cannot be ascribed to Cold War machinations or described as evidence that the Cold War is returning. Arms races, territorial disputes, succession crises, racial conflicts, clashes over resources, wars or nearwars all prevailed long before the Cold War. They will continue long after that Cold War and detente take their place in the annals of history. One cannot see a return to the Cold War in every international crisis, even when the United States and the Soviet Union are on opposite sides. Instead, what must be seen is the continuing stress and strain of nations pushing against each other in a process that is as old as history...." (p. 26).

-- He balances off a quote from you (p. 27), with a quote from Brzezinski! (p. 24).

I see no substantive problem in the piece, certainly if it's published under a pseudonym.

## RECOMMENDATION:

That you indicate:

If you read it and agree, I will let Smyser know it's OK.

If you want Sonnenfeldt to look it over and clear it, I'll do that.

As the United States of America passes its 200th anniversary, it is entering the third phase of its international relations since the end of World War II. The first phase, lasting over two decades, came to be called the cold war. The second phase, lasting about five years, came to be known as the era of detente. The third phase will be different from both.

With the passing of detente, there have been suggestions that the world was passing back onto the cold war, returning to an era of East-West confrontation. Key harbingers of this trend are said to be the burgeoning Soviet armament effort, especially on the oceans, the apparent stagnation in such detente-related negotiations as SALT, and the Soviet Angolan enterprise. Other harbingers include growing American--and Western--skepticism about detente, furthered by allegations that the Soviet Union has already violated some of the agreements it has signed and appears to be increasing its pressure against Western positions everywhere.

In order to evaluate these suggestions, and to determine whether we are indeed returning to the cold war, it is necessary to arrive at a clear understanding of what the cold war was and how it ended. Then, one must evaluate the characteristics of the new era in

2

order to derive a meaningful comparison.

The cold war began in the late 1940's, shortly after the end of World War II. Its exact beginning or end cannot be established since, unlike at least some hot wars, it was never formally declared and was never formally terminated. One can, however, recall some generally agreed beginnings: the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Iran crisis, the Berlin blockade, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the establishment of NATO. Virtually all the initial moves took place in Europe, though the Communist revolution in China and the Korean War were perceived by many analysts at the time as evidence that the Kremlin was orchestrating a world-wide campaign.

As the cold war began, the lines in Europe were drawn quickly and clearly. One government after another in Eastern Europe fell to a communist party, either through coups d'état or through other political processes that did not meet the ideals for which the Western nations believed that they had fought against the Nazis. In France, on the other hand, the Communist Party was expelled from the government. Marshall Plan aid, offered initially to all countries of Europe, was not accepted by the Soviet Union for itself or for what came to be

3

known as its satellites. An "Iron Curtain," as Churchill
termed it, divided Europe.

Two principal disagreements between the Soviet
Union and the United States brought about the cold war,
dictating its development and the full engagement of
both countries.

The first disagreement was over the terms for
settlement of World War II. Such a settlement would
normally have come after the war at a great international
conference. At such a conference, the victors could
either agree on terms among themselves and then impose
them on the vanquished--as was done at Versailles in
1919--or the victors and the vanquished could negotiate
jointly on the terms of peace--as was done at Vienna in
1815.

After World War II, however, no such negotiated
settlement was possible because the principal victors
could not agree among themselves. They soon realized
this, and they began to muster their assets for the
struggle that they recognized to lie ahead. Both wanted
to press for a settlement consonant with their interests
and with the sacrifices they had made. If that could
not be achieved, they wanted at least to consolidate

4

their gains until a favorable settlement opportunity
might arise. Neither dared to let the other fill the
vacuums left by the defeat of their former common
enemies.

In one very real sense, therefore, the cold war
served as a substitute for a formal peace conference.
It was not, however, peacemaking by the traditional
standards or practices of diplomacy. It was peacemaking
by every means and tactic within reason that either of
the principal contending parties and their allies could
apply to influence the outcome or to improve their
situation on the terrain. Both sides used military,
economic, and diplomatic pressures, though they stopped
short of direct conflict with each other. No effort
was spared to bring about a favorable outcome, and almost
no terrain appeared inviolate.

The main antagonists, the United States and the
Soviet Union, also had a second disagreement. This was
ideological. They championed and incorporated diametri-
cally opposite philosophies of politics, economics, and
human purpose. Each believed that victory in the war
had confirmed the historic mission of its system. Each
believed that it was serving a cause greater than itself.

5

The conflict between the respective systems, and the conviction of both parties that they bore a grave responsibility not only to their own people but to the future of all humanity, deepened the dispute over the settlement of World War II. The stakes were high. Both believed they could and should win. Neither believed it could afford to lose. Both sides judged that the outcome of their struggle would decide not only the future of the defeated powers but the future of the world.

The cold war grew out of the diplomatic and ideological confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, but during the process of the confrontation a new element was added to their struggle. That element, which was soon to develop a life and a logic all its own, was the massive arms race that developed between the principal antagonists as they arrayed themselves with weapons and delivery systems of hitherto unprecedented capacity. Each believed that the only way to safety and victory in the cold war was to push the development and deployment of vast new weapons systems. Each tried to leapfrog or at least catch the other. Both saw their only security in the urgent development

6

of new armaments and new strategic concepts.

In a shrinking world every issue became a major subject of contention: not only the future of the principal defeated nations, Germany and Japan, the fate of the neighboring states in Eastern and Western Europe, or the fate of other nations divided by the war, but a whole range of other issues that bore no intrinsic relation to the conflict.

Large or small problems anywhere in the world became issues in the cold war. Each problem had a substance of its own, but that substance would not have seemed so important had it not been folded into the wider struggle. Matters that originally bore no relation to the points at issue in the cold war, like independence revolutions in Asia and Africa, the nationalization of Western enterprise, or support for rival groups in states around the world, suddenly became the stuff of major political and popular concern in the most distant capitals. Issues that had considerable global importance in themselves, like the economic underdevelopment of ex-colonial areas or man's travel into space, became submerged in the total structure of rivalry and were seen in an artificial light. Beyond will and beyond

7

apparent reason, every problem everywhere was seized
up in the central confrontation, and that central
confrontation in turn suffused every other problem. It
became difficult if not impossible for the nations
involved in any aspect of the global struggle to
separate the parts from their sum, either in reality
or in conception.

The cold war continued for over twenty years,
with each central or peripheral confrontation, in
Asia or Europe, adding to the total complexity, to
the total determination, and to the total fear of all
the parties concerned that any loss anywhere could
collapse all that they held. America saw dominoes
in Western Europe and Asia. Russia saw them in Eastern
Europe. And the United States, whose people had hoped
for peace after World War II, found itself militarily,
politically, economically and emotionally committed
across much of the surface of the earth.

After the cold war came a respite. Detente, as
it came to be known, was a transition phase. The word,
originating from the days when French was the language
of diplomacy, simply means--and meant in this case--the
relaxation of tension. In a series of sudden strokes,
detente relieved the accumulated tensions of the cold
war.

8

The diplomacy of detente left behind a record of achievement impressive by the standards of any age: the SALT agreements on arms control and, along with them, an array of other Russian-American agreements on a wide range of issues; the opening to the People's Republic of China; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); the opening of negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Europe; and a series of agreements regarding Central Europe. Some of the latter, like the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, were negotiated among the four victor powers of World War II. Others were negotiated by the Federal Republic of Germany and its eastern neighbors. In addition to these, there were the agreements regarding the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam.

A wave of enthusiasm and relief in the United States and elsewhere greeted detente diplomacy. Many heralded it as the beginning of a new and different world. After the frustrations of apparently endless confrontation everywhere, the world appeared to be transformed almost from one day to the next. Just as, in the waning days of the cold war, there seemed little hope of change, in the opening days of detente it appeared as if a new world order had been created.

9

It is vital to understand what detente diplomacy
did and what it could not do, regarding each of the three
areas of conflict that had marked the cold war:

- with regard to the struggle for a settlement of
World War II, detente diplomacy agreed that neither side
would use force to change the boundaries as they emerged
in the early post-war years and during the Berlin crises.
All the concerned parties, in effect, gave their acquiescence.
Detente, therefore, reached a form of territorial settle-
ment of World War II in Europe. It was far from an ideal
settlement for a number of states on both sides, but it
was widely accepted as preferable to the continued tension
and risks of the cold war. It has not been ratified in
a formal agreement and may never be. In accepting the
status quo, however, detente diplomacy did not and could
not legitimize it. Only the people of the different
countries could legitimize the regimes that governed them
and the boundaries that they had agreed among themselves.

- detente showed that the ideological confrontation
between the communist states and the Western democracies
need not prevent common agreement on areas of mutual
interest. It showed, in other words, that the antagonistic

10

systems need not commit suicide in order to demonstrate
the rightness of their respective causes. It did not
and could not, however, end the confrontation completely,
and it could not make the two systems live comfortably
side by side with one another.

-detente showed that the hostile powers could
negotiate even about such central security issues as
the arms race. It showed, therefore, that statesmen
could impose some rational control upon the weapons
systems that they had created. In doing so, it offered
promise that men could reach other similar agreements in
other fields as well. It did not, however, and could
not, end the arms race completely.

Detente demonstrated the capacity of diplomacy
to detect areas of common interest and to elaborate
agreements that could give concrete expression to these
common interests. It could not, however, create
friendship where there had been hostility. It could not
arrest all rivalry or arrest all political processes.
It could end the cold war, but it could not bring on
an era of international relations that would be different
from everything in the past.

Like the cold war, the era of pure detente now
passes into history. American foreign policy is entering

11

another era, more normal by historical standards though
novel to the United States. That new era combines elements
of the cold war and of detente, though it is not a
continuation of either. It resembles traditional great-
power relationships as they have been conducted for
hundreds of years, with positive and negative elements
and trends, while allowing for the vast force that the
two major powers possess as well as for the great differences
in their political and economic systems.

To evaluate what lies ahead, it is necessary to
examine the state of American-Russian relations, the
condition of the cold war antagonists, the new inter-
national issues that confront all states, and the
interrelationship between these factors.

The series of detente agreements have produced a
basic change in the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the United States. That relationship has
become more variegated than during the cold war. Even
if the detente period is over, it has marked the conscious-
ness of both states and peoples.

For the United States, the relationship with the
Soviet Union must remain the single most important
security relationship, at least for the foreseeable

12

future, since the Soviet Union is the only state that
has the capacity to destroy the United States. That
security relationship need not, however, remain as
obsessive as it was during the cold war. During the
cold war, the rivalry between America and Russia stood
at the center of world events and of all their interests.
Now, both states have other concerns that mute their
hostility toward each other.

During the detente period, the United States and
the Soviet Union even recognized and acted on the basis
of several common interests. Those interests cannot
be dismissed as negligible. They include such factors as
the desire to reduce the risk of war, to cut some military
burdens, and to channel more of their energies into other
areas than direct confrontation.

Recognition of these common interests by both
states means that American policy makers--and probably
Soviet policy makers as well--must now consider a much
more intricate pattern of policy options than during
the cold war. This complicates the bureaucratic and
political processes in both states.

13

Even a cursory look at such questions as arms control
and trade can illustrate the kinds of contradictory
considerations with which both sides must now deal.

Given the power of modern weaponry and the stress
placed by current strategic doctrine on the initial
exchange of nuclear weapons and on the danger of surprise
attack, the American-Soviet agreement to try to place
some control on strategic weapons signified that each
state was letting the other have some influence on its
most vital security interests. Such a step was nothing
short of unprecedented, especially among powers as hostile
to each other as the United States and the Soviet Union.
That the step was taken at all, could not help but
show how both states wished to escape from the spiraling
financial burden of modern arms expenditures.

Even with the best of intentions on both sides,
however, it may be difficult to put further controls on
the American-Russian arms race. The recent articles by
Messrs. Paul Nitze and Jan Lodal have shown that honest
and honorable men can disagree about the implications of
that process for the security of the United States.
Recent statements by Leonid Brezhnev show that there is
also some doubt in Russian minds about how to react to
current increases in American arms expenditures.

The technical issues involved are complex. Each
state has developed systems to meet

14

its own strategic needs and not, necessarily, to trade
off against the systems developed by the other. In
both states, arms development and deployment programs
have been elaborated without reference to international
negotiations. Those programs often appear to take
precedence over the negotiations for arms control and,
in fact, help structure the negotiations. New weapons
are constantly on the drawing boards, complicating
agreed balances. Negotiating trade-offs are almost
impossible to formulate, since the old and new weapons
to be controlled do not match each other in type, in size,
or in method of delivery. As if to complicate negotia-
tions further, it is an historical reality that Russia,
Czarist or communist, has traditionally kept large
forces in being to meet its perceived security needs
along thousands of miles of frontier as well as to
control its own and associated peoples.

Like arms control, economic relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union represent an actual
and potential area for cooperation, although the volume
of trade is not now large. Recent Soviet purchases in
the West show that the Soviet Union will probably be a

15

permanent customer for Western technology and food, at
least as long as Russian leaders want to modernize industrial
production methods and as long as the agricultural
incentive structure in the Soviet Union remains as it is.
Other opportunities for economic cooperation or exchange
could emerge as well.

Like other American-Russian relations, however,
economic ties cannot be entirely free of tension despite
such benefits as they may bring to both countries.
There are basic incompatibilities built into these
relations, such as the contrast between a free economy
based on market considerations and a state economy based
on a plan. Many Americans, like other Westerners,
wonder whether trade with Russia helps the Soviet military
effort. They are also beginning to question whether the
Soviet Union will be able to repay or even to service
the debts that it is accumulating in the West, debts
reminiscent in size of those accumulated by the Soviet
Union's Czarist predecessor. One cannot, therefore,
assume that economic relations will improve without
interruption or without at least some friction, even if
they meet some genuine interests.

16

Similar problems beset other possible areas of
collaboration on which breakthroughs were reached during
the detente period, including the implementation of the
agreement of the CSCE, the reduction of forces in Europe, or
the effort to normalize relations with China. Even if
both sides have the best of intentions, progress will be
difficult (one could even conjecture that progress might
be faster if one side had ill intent, since it would have
a greater interest in reaching an agreement if it planned
to violate the agreement anyway). Given the accumulated
suspicions of the cold war and the ideological barriers
that still remain, the problems may prove impossible to
surmount and progress may be arrested.

The American and the Soviet system must always
represent a threat to each other, even if that threat is
not as active and as virulent as during the cold war.
The Soviet system could not justify the sacrifices that it
imposes on its people and on its allies without crediting
itself with some kind of ideological mission. It must,
therefore, press its ideological goals. At the same
time, the United States will, consciously or unconsciously,
represent a threat to the Soviet Union simply because
it is a more dynamic and more open form of political

17

association. The Soviet Union will want to find some
means to protect itself from those influences.

Despite their mutual exhaustion with the cold war,
the domestic systems of the two powers may find
confrontation easier than negotiations. To achieve
agreement by negotiations, each side must compromise.
Otherwise, there can be no agreement among great powers
that do not need to yield under duress. It is often
easier not to give up anything in negotiating, since
all that one loses is an opportunity to agree. The cold
war confrontation between the superpowers was simpler
in a variety of respects. It required greater military
expenditures but less domestic and bureaucratic debate
and less fear on both sides of being tainted by
association. Both sides could appeal more easily to
patriotic feeling. The cold war over time generated
tensions of its own, tensions that drove both sides
toward detente. But those tensions can be forgotten
with surprising speed.

What remains to be seen is whether the factors that
drove both sides toward detente will recur, and whether
they need recur. In 1969, American pressures for
conciliation had risen to unprecedented heights because
of the Vietnam War and because of a widespread frustration

18

with military expenditures and obligations. In the Soviet Union, pressures for conciliation rose because of the intensity of the Sino-Soviet split and deepening economic difficulties. Some of these pressures have proven temporary on both sides. Moreover, a reaction to the enthusiasm that welcomed the first detente agreements has set in, in part out of a natural political process and in part out of displeasure over the execution of the agreements.

We may expect, therefore, that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union will not always move smoothly. The arms race may continue, economic relations may falter, threatening propaganda may increase, and conflicts of interest may arise almost anywhere on the globe. This represents a hollow kind of normalcy after the sacrifices of the cold war and the euphoria of detente. But it need not represent a return to the total antagonism of the cold war.

Both sides now perceive alternatives to opposition and have an interest in at least some cooperation. Neither will consciously wish to enter a path that leads to a resumption of the bitterness, the high risks, and the cost of the cold war. Even if they stumble onto such a path by miscalculation, they should find it easier than before to pull back. During the cold war, both sides accepted confrontation as the only available course. Now they know that other choices may at least be possible.

19

Even as the cold-war relationship between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, has evolved, so have the two superpowers themselves. Some of their attitudes have mellowed. Their power relative to other countries has declined, except in nuclear arms. The world is no longer mute witness to a bilateral confrontation in which Washington and Moscow make all the decisions.

The United States is less self-confident than it was at the beginning and during much of the cold war. In the early years of the cold war, Americans read George Orwell's 1984 with the confident conviction that it spoke of a communist society. Now, they have discovered that the threat of impersonal bureaucratism can also exist in their own land. Vietnam and Watergate have taken their toll of the American psyche, even though they have been followed by the patriotic stimulation of the Bicentennial. The American people are not as ready to take on other burdens as they were a generation ago. In 1947, George Kennan (as Mr. "X") could write of Americans "accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear." Now, many Americans are tired of those responsibilities.

20

The relative American power position, in classic terms, has weakened over the past decades. At the beginning of the cold war, and during much of its course, the United States had either a nuclear monopoly or a considerable superiority. Despite fears to the contrary, the "missile gap" was to America's advantage until well into the 1960's. Now the relative nuclear strike forces are more nearly balanced, although the United States still holds the edge in deliverable warheads. For the first time in history, the United States can be destroyed. America's overwhelming economic preponderance has also passed from the scene. It can no longer ignore economic limitations in deciding foreign policy issues. It is gradually even becoming resource-poor, and by the year 2000 will depend on imports for over half its consumption of almost all the basic materials required for industrial production. American jobs and American habits can be deeply affected by events far beyond American borders.

The Soviet Union's position has also changed. Like the Russia of the Czars, the Soviet Union is both strong and weak. It is strong in military hardware, having caught up with the United States in strategic power, but weak in its economic structure and performance as well as in its claim on the loyalty of its citizens. Even though

21

the Soviet regime has been in power for almost 60 years,
it still denies its people and the East Europeans the
simple freedoms that other European people and many
nations far less developed than the Soviet Union enjoy.

The Soviet record cannot sustain the notion that communism
will be the wave of the future, a notion widespread after
World War II. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union
has proven an effective instrument for seizing and holding
power. It has not, however, shown the capacity to make
Russia a truly modern state in every sense of the word.

The respective alliance systems have evolved from
the early years of the cold war, when they were centered
absolutely on Washington and Moscow. In the Western
alliance, much of the conventional defense burden is now
carried by the European states. The American alliance system
has remained intact in Europe though not in parts of Asia.

The alliance system includes several of the world's
fastest growing states and societies. The alliance system
has not proven incompatible with an improved American-Russian
relationship. Many of the allies, in fact, want the
United States to continue its efforts to improve relations
with the Soviet Union. It remains to be seen, however,
how the possible advent to power of communist parties in
some European countries will affect the alliance.

22

The Soviet alliance system has proven more brittle. It suffered a major rupture through the Sino-Soviet split. It remains intact in Eastern Europe only because of Russian forces. Moreover, the network of ties with other communist parties, once regarded as Moscow's instruments, is becoming less and less reliable. West European communist parties openly defy the Soviet Communist Party, and the recent European Communist Party Conference showed that the Soviet Union has lost control of what was once regarded as one of communism's principal instruments to power.

Sino-Soviet antagonism, at one level or another, will probably remain a constant element of the international scene, unlike in the early years of the cold war. The Moscow-Peking alliance lasted from 1949 until 1956. Since then, the two states have increasingly disputed a wide range of ideological and national issues. The climax came in the major border incidents of 1969, when Soviet diplomats all over the world were asking how other states would react to a Soviet attack on China.

The real questions we should pose, therefore, is not why there should be a Sino-Soviet split and when it will heal, but how the Sino-Soviet relationship will evolve without a complete Moscow-Peking reconciliation and how that relationship will affect Soviet and Chinese policies toward the United States. The Sino-Soviet alliance lasted

23

only seven years out of the entire post-war period. It
may well not be the alliance, but some form of dispute
or only partial reconciliation that we should regard as
the norm.

As Russian-American relations have changed since
the cold war, and the respective alliance systems have
changed, an even more fundamental change has taken place
in the world. Statesmen must now consider and attempt
to solve many international problems that were either
ignored during the cold war or were considered not on their
own merits but as manifestations of the East-West
confrontation. Though it would be impossible to review
all those problems here, even a listing of some of the
principal issues shows that no nation can now ignore them
or attempt to resolve them in a cold war framework:

-Raw material disruptes. The states that produce and export raw materials are no longer prepared to accept a world in which they suffer bouts of prosperity and poverty on the basis of raw material prices that they cannot influence. They want guaranteed prices and assured markets. The industrialized states, as principal consumers of raw materials, are attempting to work with the exporters to find a mutually acceptable system. If they cannot find it, both the exporters and importers

24

could face severe difficulties.

-The Law of the Sea. The sea remains the last great resource of this planet. Now, as greater exploitation appears imminent, states are attempting to find a new regime to regulate the use of the oceans and of the land that lies below them. The Law of the Sea Conference may succeed. If the conference fails, the sea will be divided as was the land.

-Technological advance. As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski has stated, we are in a "technetronic" age. Technology advances faster than the adjustments that men and states can make. As it does, nations impact on each other in new ways. A dam in one country can create a desert in another or increase the salinity of major water areas; a factory in one country can pollute the water or the air in another; overfishing by one country can deplete a resource that all must use; terrorism originating in one country can affect the citizens of many others. It may well be necessary to develop a new definition for the old international legal concept of an "unfriendly act," in order to help find a means by which states can protect themselves and their citizens.

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-The danger of nuclear proliferation. It is known that at least six states already can make atomic weapons. Others may try to follow. Yet the technology and the means to make weapons are intimately related to the technology and the means to develop civilian power. One cannot be sure that nuclear proliferation will be stopped, but it may be a matter of survival to delay it as long as possible.

These four issues represent no more than a partial listing of the new types of problems that increasingly dominate international life. There are many others: the claims of the poor against the rich; the frictions between different races; the potential instabilities of the international financial system; the danger of food shortages, etc.

These new issues transcend the cold war. They cannot be ignored any longer, as they were during the cold war, or solved in a cold war framework. Efforts to exploit them for ideological purposes cannot succeed over the long run. Only the most sober and searching approaches offer any hope at all of finding a solution.

The world that lies ahead is not the bipolar world of the cold war. Neither is it a triangular or pentagonal world, but a world of many power centers based on military or economic capacity, on resource control, on votes at the

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United Nations, and many other old or new sources of
national strength. It is not, however, a totally random
world. Certain patterns of common interests, like
alliance systems or economic associations, exist. Certain
patterns of conflicting interests, like East-West or
North-South tensions, also exist. The patterns of
cooperation and conflict overlap and intersect, leaving
images that shift like those of a kaleidoscope even if
the basic pieces remain the same.

If international tensions and crises still prevail,
however, they cannot be ascribed to cold war machinations
or described as evidence that the cold war is returning.
Arms races, territorial disputes, succession crises,
racial conflicts, clashes over resources, wars or near-wars
all prevailed long before the cold war. They will continue
long after that cold war and detente take their place in
the annals of history. One cannot see a return to the
cold war in every international crisis, even when the
United States and the Soviet Union are on opposite sides.
Instead, what must be seen is the continuing stress and
strain of nations pushing against each other in a process
that is as old as history and that may some day put an
end to history.

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The American people entered the cold war with the "lesson of Munich" firmly in their consciousness. They entered detente with the "lesson of Vietnam" firmly in their consciousness. These "lessons" now mingle with the positive and negative experiences of the last few years, suggesting that no principle prevails universally and that no lesson drawn from any single event can be automatically or mechanically transferred to another. Different voices will urge different policies, each with equal conviction and perhaps even with equal justitication. Honest arguments can be made for confrontation, negotiation, or both.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said that there could be no end to foreign policy. The world that lies ahead offers no terminal point for respite or relaxation. It will go on without reaching a favorable resolution for all problems and without allowing any nation to withdraw to the ease of solitude.

From this perspective, therefore, the cold war period may well have presented an easier burden for American opinion than the time that lies ahead. The choices were clearer, and some outcome could be promised or at least anticipated.

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Because of the growing impact that foreign events
may have on American lives, and because of the increasingly
complicated choices that may lie ahead, foreign policy
will not have a unifying effect on the American people,
as it often had during the cold war and detente years.
Instead, it will be more likely to provoke dissatisfaction,
uncertainty, and debate. The era that lies ahead will
mean neither peace abroad nor peace at home.

It has become habitual, from de Toqueville to the
present, for analysts of foreign affairs to question the
capacity of a democracy, and particularly of the American
democracy, to conduct foreign affairs. Yet the American
people resolutely carried the tasks of the cold war,
including major breaks with cherished American traditions,
enormous military expenditures, and the burdens of two
distant conflicts. At the same time, they kept their
country at the forefront of the real world revolutions
and accomplished major advances in science and social
well-being. After braving all the trials of the past
decades, they are fully deserving of confidence even for
the more tedious and enduring trials that lie ahead.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 22, 1975

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN

SUBJECT: New York Times on CSCE, 1969-1975

New York Times editorials supported the idea of CSCE from 1969-72. However, they consistently backed our insistence that Berlin be addressed first and that MBFR be taken up in the Conference or in parallel. On this basis, the Times reached a peak of enthusiasm in 1972. (Tab D) By 1973, the Times had rediscovered the oppressive nature of the Soviet system; ever since Stage I convened in July 1973, the Times has consistently pushed Basket III and expressed skepticism about Soviet policy.

-- In 1969, the Times endorsed a proposal by a UNA/USA Panel calling for a European Security Commission "to prepare the principles of a general European settlement." (Feb. 2) On November 12, the Times saw the emerging East-West dialogue as "itself . . . a stabilizing factor." On December 7, the Times recommended negotiations on concrete issues, with "many years of patience and persistence," to advance the "vital process" of detente. [1969 editorials, Tab A.]

-- In 1970, the Times hailed the FRG's treaties with Poland, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia because, once they are ratified, "the way would be open" for a European Security Conference and MBFR talks. [Tab B.]

-- On March 31, 1971, Reston complained of the Administration's skepticism about a Conference, because he felt mutual troop reduction was "worth discussing." [Tab C.]

-2-

On Nov. 21, 1972, the Times was more enthusiastic. They decided that the commencement of MBFR and SALT II made a CSCE "worthwhile." Brezhnev's goals to secure the status quo in Central Europe had already been achieved, with the FRG-GDR Treaty. The Times concluded happily: "The emerging theme of the post-cold war era is a belief that the process of negotiation can promote mutual confidence as much as the outcome of negotiation." [Tab D].

In 1973, the Times was skeptical that CSCE would achieve any relaxation of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe (July 3). Then it was aroused by Sir Alec Douglas-Home's speech at the opening of Stage I calling for improvements in "the life of ordinary people." (July 9). The Times then urged that the West "hammer home" the importance of Basket III (Sept. 19). [1973 editorials, Tab E].

In 1974, the Times cited the suppression of Soviet dissidents as evidence of the difficulty of getting the Soviets to do more than lip service to the CSCE principles of free exchange of ideas (Feb. 3). They insisted "further progress" was needed on CBM's and Basket III (March 29). [1974 editorials, Tab F].

Nevertheless the editorial of July 21, 1975 [Tab G] is far more extreme and cynical than any of its antecedents.

In short, the July 1975 editorial is an innovation in several respects: They have long known of our skepticism; they acknowledged in 1972 that Willy Brandt gave it all away already; they were rightly skeptical in 1973 that anything significant should be expected from it. Never before did they say that CSCE "should not have happened" or that it "could mislead many into believing that peace already has arrived."

## European 'Security'...

The 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, now nearing its climax after 32 months of semantic quibbling, *should not have happened*. Never have so many struggled for so long over so little as the conference's 100-page declaration of good intentions in East-West relations. So little, and yet so much.

So little, because after hundreds of diplomats drafted this document, they specified that it will not be legally binding on anyone. So much, because it commits the United States, Canada and 33 nations of Europe to the "inviolability of frontiers," symbolically ratifying the territorial status quo, including the division of Germany and Europe and the Soviet Union's huge annexations of East European territory, including all three independent Baltic states plus large chunks of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

What the West gets out of the C.S.C.E. declaration is a reference to the possibility of border changes by peaceful agreement—meaningless except to protect the West German Government from its domestic critics—and some vague Soviet pledges to permit freer movement of persons and information.

The only military item in what originally was to be an all-European security treaty is a promise by the Russians (and everyone else) to give three weeks notice, and to admit observers, for military maneuvers that involve more than 25,000 men within some 150 miles of their frontiers. But it does not cover other military movements such as a reinforcing move or an actual invasion of Eastern or Western Europe!

If this document now were to be signed by the diplomats who negotiated it, or even by foreign ministers, and then consigned to history as an effort to humor a Soviet propaganda exercise, the damage might be modest. The problem is that Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has maneuvered all the major leaders of the Western world one by one into the commitment to sign the C.S.C.E. declaration at a euphoric 35-nation summit conference in Helsinki, now tentatively scheduled for July 30, less than ten days away.

N.Y. Times

Monday July 21, 1975

## ... and Real Détente

It is true, as Secretary Kissinger has just repeated, that there is no alternative to coexistence of East and West in the nuclear era and that détente—real rather than illusory—must be pursued. But the Helsinki carnival, like the Soviet-American handclasp in space, could mislead many into believing that peace already has arrived. Very limited forms of arms control and East-West cooperation are still accompanied by intensified repression within the U.S.S.R., heightened Soviet rivalry with the West in the Middle East, South Asia and the Indian Ocean and little real sign of progress in strategic or conventional arms reduction talks.

If it is too late to call off the Helsinki summit—or even to delay it for a more propitious moment—every effort must be made there, publicly as well as privately, to prevent euphoria in the West. Equally important, the Soviet Union must be put on notice that a Communist takeover by force or subversion of Portugal's democratic revolution will not be accepted by the Western world even if the West may now have acknowledged Soviet domination of its immediate Eastern neighbors.