Copy No. 4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 28, 1963

Dinner with General Martin (Inspector General of French Armed Forces), M. Beaumarchais (Chief of the European Section of the Foreign Office), M. Monet (Secretary of National Defense) and General Gallois - May 23, 1963

Gallois began the evening with a vituperative account of his experiences with the U.S. Embassy. According to him, he had been asked by someone in the Naval Attache's office to come and see him. He did so bringing his charts along. While explaining the French nuclear program, he corrected some of the figures on the chart in the light of published presentations to the Assemblée Nationale. The naval attache getting the two sets of figures mixed up reported a French shortfall in its nuclear program. Somebody high up in the Administration thereupon decided to discredit Gallois adding some lies that were on the face of it absurd. Gallois was after all not likely to report to the U.S. Embassy the failure of a plant his own company was producing. In any event, the simultaneous publication of these falsifications in Newsweek, the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Corriere della Sera had to be orchestrated from Washington.

Gallois then turned to an exposition of his strategic views: the French nuclear force was essential because in the nuclear age alliances had lost their meaning. No country would permit itself to be destroyed for another, etc.

I replied that the contrary was the case. Though I took a much more favorable view of the French nuclear effort than the Administration I did not for a minute believe that national nuclear forces made alliances dispensable. On the contrary, it was precisely the U.S. guarantee which gave the French nuclear effort its strategic significance. Were the U.S.S.R. convinced that the U.S. would not support France, the force de frappe would be destroyed in a matter of hours. It was the fear that a Soviet preemptive strike against France would trigger SAC which deterred a Soviet attack.

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Somewhat to my surprise, the others agreed with me. They argued that the force de frappe should not be seen as a device to do away with the Alliance. Rather it was designed to enable France to play a role with dignity in Allied councils. When France had fought its colonial wars, General Martin said, the United States had never tired of pointing out that national independence was inevitable whether or not the people were ready for it. Was not the same true in the nuclear field? Until the United States took a more understanding view of French purposes, relations would go from bad to worse.

I said that we could hardly compare France to an underdeveloped country. And the nuclear problem did have complexities and dangers transcending purely strategic relations.

General Martin then said that France needed nuclear weapons for strategic reasons as well. U.S. strategy seemed to envisage a nuclear disengagement from Europe. The withdrawal of Jupiter bases from Italy and Turkey was a straw in the wind. Even more worrisome were certain war plans of which General Martin had become aware while visiting the 4th U.S. Tactical Airforce in Germany. According to these plans, the nuclear strike element of the tactical airforces was to be withdrawn to Britain in the contingency of a Soviet attack short of general war. Britain with its own bomber force was to act as a nuclear sanctuary. At the same time, C-130's were to pick up nuclear warheads and either bring them to England or drop them into the sea. France had by all means to achieve the same sanctuary status for itself.

I replied that (a) I could not believe these war plans. It did not make any sense to position nuclear warheads in Germany only to pull them out in the face of a conventional attack. (b) If the plans were genuine, Britain was probably chosen not because of its bomber force but because France had refused

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

us permission to base our nuclear-armed planes on French soil. Martin disagreed and insisted on his own interpretation.

Beaumarchais then asked why the United States behaved in such a hostile fashion towards France when France was only following a path already charted by Britain. I replied that the difference in timing was of great consequence. By the time France entered the nuclear club a lot of people in the U.S. had become worried about Germany and the whole problem of nuclear diffusion. Beaumarchais said that it was galling for France that we could not recognize the distinction between a traditional ally and a defeated country prohibited by treaty from developing its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, why should France be the country which served as a guinea pig for our theories of nuclear diffusion? Did we really think that Israel or Egypt or China would be deterred from developing nuclear weapons by our policy towards France? Finally our policy towards Germany was more likely to spur nuclear diffusion than to arrest it.

I said that another explanation for our behavior was irritation at French tactics. Rightly or wrongly many Americans thought that it was impossible to negotiate with De Gaulle while the British were much more conciliatory in form. Beaumarchais said that negotiation was not De Gaulle's long suit. On the other hand, we constantly exacerbated relations by pressing for things to which De Gaulle was opposed in principle such as the so-called multilateral force.

Monet entered the conversation to point out that people who defended America's good faith were having an increasingly tough time in the French bureaucracy. For example, after Secretary Gilpatrick had offered assistance with the Skipjack nuclear submarine many French officials suspected a trick. Monet had argued that we were in good faith. Events since had justified the doubters. The Administration was still delaying and hiding behind Congressional

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disapproval. I said that these Congressional doubts were real and had to be seen in the context of all events during this year.

Manet said he was concerned that we were facing a spiral of distrust. De Gaulle seemed to have no understanding of the impact he was making. Manet was very worried about U.S. reaction to an impending French move which De Gaulle had taken largely as a question of principle: the withdrawal of the remaining French naval units assigned to NATO. He hoped U.S. reaction would be low-key for De Gaulle was extremely stiff-necked. Moreover, he intended the move only to solidify political control over the French armed forces.

I asked Manet how De Gaulle made his decisions. Manet, who is working in the French equivalent of our NSC staff, said that he wished he knew. On economic matters De Gaulle often asks for advice. On political issues he simply made his decisions. He invited factual briefings but not recommendations. A great deal depended on bringing matters before De Gaulle at an appropriate moment and in the right way. Once he had said no he almost never changed his mind or even entertained a request for reconsideration. Also his reaction to critical views was extremely ambivalent. He was an exceptionally good listener and he had the ability to make his interlocutor believe that he was very sympathetic. However, if someone pressed his point too insistently he would suddenly find himself shunted off to some obscure post. The result was a tendency to tell De Gaulle what he liked to hear.

Beaumarchais asked me about my impressions of Europe. I said that I thought France was largely isolated. Beaumarchais said this was true as far as the governments and the press were concerned. However, the public mood was different. It was significant that no party in Germany derided vote against the Franco-German treaty. He thought similar pro-French attitudes existed in Belgium

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and Italy. Moreover we should not take everything Europeans told us too seriously. A little flattery would bring Speak around. As for the Germans while they no doubt told us that the preamble to the treaty neutralized its effect, they told the French that the preamble was a concession to American pressure and did not affect the significance of the treaty.

I said neither side would be able to draw much comfort from this state of affairs. Beaumarchais agreed and said that some day the Germans will turn on all of us.

At this point Gallois launched into a violent diatribe to the effect that the New Frontier was trying to bring Socialist governments to power all over Europe. They would bankrupt their countries in short order and then the U.S. would dominate Europe again. I said that Gallois gave us more credit for being able to affect events than was warranted. Gallois said he knew we had bought two papers in Paris, a weekly and a monthly. They were now pushing our line contrary to their previous policy. He knew for a fact that the same and worse was true in Italy.

Beaumarchais said that he had heard the same stories. He would not go so far as to say we wanted to beggar Europe. But the New Frontier had an affinity for European socialists for two reasons: (1) it thought erroneously that this was the best way of stopping Communism. (2) the socialist parties were more prepared to merge the national identity in some vague supra-nationalism which amounted to American hegemony.

I asked about the possibility of Franco-British nuclear cooperation as the beginning of a European effort. General Martin was very enthusiastic. Beaumarchais and Monet said they had been disillusioned by their experiences of the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dinner with General Martin (Inspector General of French Armed Forces), M. Beaumarchais (Chief of the European Section of the Foreign Office), M. Manet (Secretariet of National Defense) and General Gallois -- May 23, 1963

Gallois began the evening with an oral vituperative account of his experiences with the U.S. Embassy. According to him, he had been asked by someone in the Naval Attache's office to come and see him. He did so bringing his charts along. While explaining the French nuclear program, he corrected some of his figures in the light of published presentations to the Assemblée Nationale. The naval attache getting the two sets of figures mixed up reported a French shortfall in its nuclear program. Somebody high up in the Administration thereupon decided to discredit Gallois adding some his that were on the face of it absurd. Gallois was after all not likely to report to the U.S. Embassy the failure of a plane his own company was producing. In any event, the simultaneous publication of these falsifications in Newsweek, the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Corriere de la Sera had to be rescinded from Washington.

I replied that the contrary was the case. Though I took a much more favorable view of the French nuclear effort than the Administration I did not for a minute believe that it made alliances dispensable. On the contrary, it was precisely the U.S. guarantee which gave the French nuclear effort its strategic significance. Were the U.S.S.R. convinced that the U.S. would not support France, the force de frappe would be destroyed in a matter of hours. It was the fear that a Soviet preemptive strike against France would trigger SAC which deterred a Soviet attack.

Somewhat to my surprise, the others agreed with me. The force de frappe should

2

[N]

I said that we could hardly compare France to an underdeveloped country.
And the nuclear problem did have complexities and dangers transcending bilateral
strategic relations.

General Martin then said that France needed nuclear weapons for strategic
reasons as well. U.S. strategy seemed to envisage a nuclear disengagement from
Europe. The withdrawal of Jupiter bases from Italy and Turkey was a straw in the
wind. Even more worrisome were certain war-plans of which General Martin had
become aware while visiting the 4th U.S. Tactical Air Force in Germany.
According to these plans, the nuclear strike element of the tactical airforces was
to be withdrawn to Britain in the contingency of a Soviet attack short of general
war. Britain with its own bomber force was to act as a nuclear sanctuary. At the
same time, C-130's were to pick up nuclear warheads and either bring them to
England or drop them into the sea. France had by all means to achieve the same
sanctuary status for itself.

I replied that (a) I could not believe these war plans. It did not make any
sense to position nuclear warheads in Germany only to pull them out in the face of
a conventional attack. (b) If the plans were genuine, Britain was probably
chosen not because of its bomber force but because France had refused us permission
to base our nuclear-armed planes on French soil. Martin disagreed and
insisted on his own interpretation.

3

fashion towards France when France was only following a path already charted by Britain. I [xxii] replied that the difference in timing was of great consequence. By the time [xxii] France entered the nuclear club a lot of people in the U.S. had become worried about Germany and the whole problem of nuclear diffusion. Beaumarchais said that it was galling for France that we could not recognize the [xxii] distinction between a traditional ally and a defeated country prohibited by treaty from developing its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, why should France be the country which served as a guinea pig for our theories of nuclear diffusion? Did we really think that Israel or Egypt or China would be deterred from developing nuclear weapons by our policy towards France? Finally our policy towards Germany was more likely to spur nuclear diffusion than to [xxii] arrest it.

I said that another explanation for our behavior was irritation at French tactics. Rightly or wrongly many Americans thought that it was impossible to negotiate with De Gaulle while the British were much more conciliatory in form. [xxiii] Beaumarchais said that negotiation was not De Gaulle's long suit. On the other hand, we constantly [xxiii] relations by pressing for things to which De Gaulle was [xxiii] opposed in principle such as the so-called multilateral now inter-allied force.

Manet entered the conversation to point out that people who defended Americans good faith were having an increasingly tough time in the French bureaucracy. For example after Secretary Gilpatrick had offered assistance with the [xxiv] nuclear submarine many French officials suspected a trick. Manet had argued that we were in good faith. Events since had justified the doubters. The Administration was still delaying and hiding behind Congressional disapproval. I said that these Congressional doubts were [xxiv] and had to be seen in the context of all events during this year.

Manet said he was [xxiv] concerned that we were [xxiv] a spiral of distrust. De Gaulle seemed to have no understanding of the impact he was

4

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making. Manet was very worried about U.S. reaction to an impending French move which De Gaulle had taken largely as a question of principle: the withdrawal of the remaining French naval units assigned to NATO. He hoped U.S. reaction would be low-key for De Gaulle was extremely stiff-necked. Moreover, he intended the move to only to solidify political control over the French armed forces.

I asked Manet how De Gaulle made his decisions. Manet who is maxk working in the French equivalent of our NSC staff said that he wished he knew. On economic matters De Gaulle often asks for advice. On political issues he simply made his decisions. He invited factual briefings but not recommendations. A great deal depended on bringing matters before De Gaulle at an appropriate moment and in the right way. Once he had said no he almost never changed his mind or even entertained a request for reconsideration. Also his reaction to critical views was extremely ambivalent. He was an exceptionally good listener and he had the ability to make his interlocutor believe that he was very sympathetic. However, if someone pressed his point too insistently he would suddenly find himself shunted off to some obscure post. The result was a tendency to tell De Gaulle what he liked to hear.

Beaumarchais asked me about my impressions of Europe. I said that I thought France was largely isolated. Beaumarchais said this was true as far as the governments and the press were concerned. However, the public mood was different. It was significant that no party in Germany dared vote against the Franco-German treaty. He thought similar pro-French attitudes existed in Belgium and Italy. Moreover we should not take everything everything Europeans told us too seriously. A little flattery would bring Spaak around.

5

[Y]

At this point Gallois launched into a violent diatribe to the effect that the New Frontier was trying to bring ~~Staxx~~ Socialist governments to power all over Europe. They would bankrupt their countries in a short order and then the U.S. would dominate Europe again. I said that Gallois gave us more credit for being able to affect events than was warranted. Gallois said he knew we had bought two papers in Paris, a weekly and a monthly. They were now pushing our line contrary to their previous policy. He knew for a fact that the same and worse was true in Italy.

I asked about the possibility of Franco-British nuclear cooperation as the beginning of a European effort. General Martin was very enthusiastic. Beaumarchais and Manet said that they had been disillusioned by their experiences of the past year. The British feelers had always been of a nature and on a level that made it impossible to come to grips with them. They doubted that in the present frame of mind of De Gaulle such an effort would be accepted.