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Sept. 15, 1969

Memo - to Dr. Henry Kissinger

From - Robert Shaplen

1 - You will, of course, have heard from Ellsworth by now and what he thinks of the political situation, plus which you undoubtedly have done your own appraising based on your trip to Saigon, etc. However, over and above the points I've made in the September 20th New Yorker piece, let me add a few others and add some emphases.

I'm afraid I remain considerably more pessimistic than either Ellsworth or Sam Berger (whom I've known for 35 years). Without our pushing a lot more than we have, the Vietnamese simply will not willingly work together in political terms, and Ellsworth's line that "Why don't they realize what happened in America at the start of WW II when everyone got behind FDR even tho a lot of people hated his guts?" doesn't work with these people. Especially when dealing with a man of Thieu's strange personality. I saw him alone for more than an hour this time and did pretty much what Bob Coate had done a few days before -- try to convince him that if he wanted to obtain our support for the slowest possible US withdrawal (and I'm not at all sure President Nixon doesn't want to move fast anyway, or that Thieu himself wants us to move that slowly), then he has to convince not only his own countrymen but ours that he is doing everything he can or could to create a true consensus. This includes not only broadening the government as such, which the new cabinet scarcely has done, but setting up the brain trust or advisory group for welding a strategy for peace I spoke with you about when I saw you.

I'm not at all convinced, in my own mind, that Thieu really wants to do this, though he tells all and sundry (Bunker, Coate, me, etc.) that he does. I am at odds here with the American mission (including Colby and Shackley etc. as well as Bunker and Berger), who at least welcome me as the devil's advocate. I still have my own belief that Thieu is very much playing his own game of survival in his own way, that he has sent out his own lines to the Communists all along, in Paris and elsewhere, and I would not altogether dismiss the stories that have reached us via the Poles and Canadians on the ICC that the eastern Europeans have spread in Hanoi -- to wit, Thieu would be acceptable for bargaining and perhaps compromise purposes to the other side. For the above reason or reasons, I still also believe that everything Thieu does, either consciously or subconsciously, is divide-and-conquer stuff, and that he does want to make his own deal eventually which would permit him to run in 1971 and beat the Communists at their own game. Consequently, he does (as I said in this last piece) play the clay-pigeon game with Big Minh, with Buu (the labor leader), and with anyone and everyone else he considers a possible threat.

We may not want to do anything about this, if Nixon is intent on withdrawing as gracefully and as smoothly as he can, for this would mean less rather than more intervention at the political level, and using less rather than more of our remaining leverage (which is considerable on the troop withdrawal issue). Ellsworth makes the point, which is valid to a degree, that he can't push Thieu too hard because Thieu recoils, and that the best thing to do is to urge something several times and then drop it (as was the case with the two III corps generals he finally removed after we stopped prodding him). I feel myself, however, that if we are interested in strengthening South Vietnam politically as much as possible before we move out in force, in order to avoid an even more prolonged war that will badly affect the rest of SEA, then we should still be pushing harder in

Saigon and at the same time doing what we can to back worthwhile political movements and developments on our own, with the help of selected Vietnamese. I imagine you have read Sam Huntington's paper, and while I thought some of his Neumann-like games were a bit overdone, I did agree with many of his main ideas -- including the one recommending that we concentrate on building up those communal groups that are strongest in specific areas, the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, Buu's labor-peasant forces, the Buddhists, Catholics, etc., and thereby avoid further fragmentation and competition which will simply play into the hands of the Communists in the countryside as well as in the cities. (Shackley also speaks of "penetrating" at the lower levels.) This, of course, is what we should have been doing long ago, and it is still indeed necessary. But so is the continued pushing at the top, too, and my own feeling is that we should continue to press Thieu as hard as we can whether he proves stubborn or not. Thieu himself admits that his political front is not getting anywhere -- the six-party deal. But then - does he really want it to?
I personally doubt it, as do many of my Vietnamese friends. I had several long talks with Buu which were extremely interesting in this regard. Buu has seen Thieu a lot lately and has told him of the plans to push ahead with a peasant-labor party, separately. Thieu told Buu he "wants to talk some more about that" -- pretending great interest -- but Buu is now convinced that Thieu has no desire at all to see such a party get off the ground and that, in fact, he would like to torpedo it (as Nhu did Buu's union under Diem) because it represents a threat to him, and because Buu might decide to run for President himself. Every time Buu left the palace, he told me, General Dam Van Quang (who privately runs the security services) poisoned Thieu's mind about Buu. The influence of Nguyen Van Huong at the palace may now be diminished, but the rest of the inner guard, including Quang, remains.

The question remains - what do we want to do about Vietnamese politics at that level at this late juncture? Maybe nothing. But, if we do, we should be more aware of what goes on under our "long noses." It is also as true as it was when we last spoke that the more we can create truly popular movements and sentiments -- even ones that will support the Second Republic but may represent legitimate threats to Thieu in the next election -- the more the Communists will become upset and the greater the chances that they will begin to believe that they have to take part in an election contest on our terms. As you well know, there are serious and increasing difficulties in the North, which Ho's death will surely not diminish, and troubles galore in the South too for the Communists. Why not move in, at this eleventh hour, while there still is a chance to salvage the situation, despite the fact we've been dealing with it so frustratingly for so many years? Why give up at the last minute, after having and invested so much in human and material ways? This does not mean, as you have implied, that the Vietnamese should not settle their affairs among themselves. I agree, but there remain some Vietnamese who deserve our help, including money, and such help can be rendered quietly and covertly in the coming and perhaps ultimate fight between true nationalists and the Thieus, who in the final analysis represent no one but themselves, and perhaps, as I suggested in this latest piece, between the Communists and the ex-Communists (Silone's thesis).

2 - Let's not kid ourselves about "Vietnamization." And let's not kid the American public either. If Nixon is sincere about wanting to teach them everything from how to use an M-16 properly to building latrines and operating highly technical communications equipment, etc., then let him make clear, once and for all as soon as he can feasibly do it, that we intend to continue maintaining that kind of presence over and above the withdrawal of our fighting forces. In this sense, it seems to me, we should re-enforce

4 shaplen

To follow through a bit more on this -- I do think that Nixon's trip out here was a success, but that it should only be regarded as a first step, and we have a habit, in America, of letting too much time elapse between such initial action and follow-up. What I'm suggesting, therefore, is a quick follow up of volunteer brain trusts all the way from the Saigon level down to the land-reform plans being implemented at the village and hamlet level (assuming they finally pass that bill they've been playing around with in the House). I read your backgrounders in Bangkok and, on the Thai one especially, could see the difficulties you were confronting in trying to define "insurgency" versus "invasion." I assume the President means what he says, to the Vietnamese and Thais et al, that "We love you still, we won't let you down, but you've got to pull your own ears." True, but simplistic, because they just haven't got the ears yet, and they feel that we may be letting them be stuck alone up the proverbial creek without any. It may be too soon to create the sort of all-embrasive volunteer peace force of our own (obviously over and above any ultimate ICC-type arrangement on the military side), but I do think we might start some contingency planning on this. More than anything else, some such move would convince the Asians, from Vietnamese down to Indonesians, that we won't indeed let them down, even if we do ultimately "re-Achesonize" where our main interests lie, in strategic terms -- India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea and Japan.

On top of what I say, about the volunteer approach, I continue to feel more strongly than ever about the need for the agency to continue to play an important political and operational role out here (as elsewhere). Too bad the unfortunate, and uncalled for Green Berets case hasn't helped.

3 - I have no special comment to offer on the military situation, and I'm sure you're up to your ears on material on that.

I think the North is in deep trouble and I doubt that the pipeline will be replenished very much in the future. They will go on adjusting their tactics to meet ours, as Giap has said, and so far they haven't done badly with their "high point" approach. Some time in the next few months I expect them to make a fairly big effort to hit the South Vietnamese, to engage them somewhere, probably in the highlands, and that will be worth watching.

I assume, too, that you've got all the background you need on North Vietnam, the deep problems of agricultural production and cadre-training and efficiency they're experiencing. Ho's death will obviously not help them on all this, though I don't expect any power struggle now, or maybe ever -- certainly not for a couple of years.

4 - Finally, if you haven't already done this, I would think it perhaps highly worthwhile for you to have someone from your own shop out in Vietnam on a fairly permanent basis at this juncture, sitting on top of the possible brain trust developments and relating the whole Vietnam situation to everything else that is going on in SEA, especially in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. I realize we have liaison galore, but it's not the same as someone with an eyes only approach on the scene.

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