German Radio & Television

WASHINGTON BUREAU

ARD

Herrn
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

2. Juli 1979

Sehr verehrter Herr Dr. Kissinger,

spaet, aber hoffentlich nicht zu spaet uebersende ich Ihnen
in der Anlage das Transkript unseres Fernsehinterviews.
Ausserdem finden Sie in der Anlage ein Exemplar der Berliner
Zeitung "DER ABEND". Der Chefredakteur des Blattes, Juergen
Engert, fand das Interview so interessant, dass er es in
weiten Passagen abdruckte.

Meine Kollegen in Deutschland hatten ausserdem fuer den 17.
Juni eine Wiederholungsausstrahlung in unserem 3. Programm
angesetzt.

Insgesamt war das Echo in Deutschland - wie konnte es auch anders
sein - sehr positiv. Ich hoffe, dass Sie an unserem gemeinsa-
men Unternehmen ebensoviel Spass hatten wie Peter Merseburger
und ich. Ich waere Ihnen sehr dankbar, wenn wir auch in Zu-
kunft gelegentlich auf Ihre Mitwirkung an unseren Programmen
zaehlen duerften.

Danken moechte ich ferner sehr herzlich Mr. Hyland und Ihren
Damen, die bei der Terminplanung fuer dieses Interview so viel
Verstaendnis und Geduld aufgebracht haben. Mr. Hyland schulde
ich noch eine Einladung zum Mittagessen. Wegen redaktioneller
Verpflichtungen wuerde ich diese Einladung gern auf den August
verschieben.

Noch einmal sehr herzlichen Dank fuer Ihre Mitwirkung.

Mit freundlichen Gruessen
Ihr

Lothar Loewe

Anlagen

JUL 31 1979
#

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INTERVIEW MIT DR. HENRY KISSINGER

von Lothar Loewe und Peter Merseburger

Aufgenommen am 1. Juni 1979 in New York

Sendetermin: 13. Juni 1979

Lothar Loewe:

Dr. Kissinger, Sie haben einmal SALT den Eckstein der Entspannung genannt, und Sie haben versucht in Ihrer Aussenpolitik, durch ein Gewebe von Vertraegen das amerikanisch-sovietische Verhaeltnis zu stabilisieren und zu verbessern. Was ist eigentlich daraus geworden in den letzten Jahren?

Dr. Kissinger:

One of the curious things about being in office is that you are always quoted for things you have said that you don't exactly remember. Ah, nevertheless, it is accurate to say that the policy I conducted sought to involve the Soviet Union in a web of relationships, including SALT. I have always believed that SALT and political restraint have to be closely connected or linked. After 1974, for a variety of reasons, part of them connected with domestic American politics, part of them connected with a new wave of Soviet aggressiveness, the agreements either didn't get implemented or lost some of their significance. And I think we now face a situation where we have to take into account the events of the last five years and where the political context of these agreements has to be kept in mind.

- 2 -

### Peter Merseburger:

So gibt es also so etwas wie einen Code der Entspannung, von dem
Dr. Brzezinski mal gesprochen hat? Der eingehalten werden muss?
Ohne den SALT auf die Dauer nicht stehen kann?

### Dr. Kissinger:

That has always been my belief. In 1972 when we signed SALT I
it was coupled with a declaration of principles. Now, of course,
principles have no legal force, but they indicated a direction
which we thought was essential, namely that you cannot maintain
over the long term restraint in weapons unless you also have
restraint in political conduct. I think this is the big problem
of the contemporary period.

### Lothar Loewe:

Was erwarten Sie von der Gipfelkonferenz in Wien, SALT II wird ja dort unterzeichnet. Glauben Sie, dass es zu einem Aufschwung fuehren wird in den amerikanisch-sovietischen Beziehungen?

### Dr. Kissinger:

Well, there is almost no sense in having a summit conference,
unless a major effort is made to bring about a substantial change
in relationships, and I think it is hard to visualize a summit
conference which will not lead either to a deterioration or to an
improvement. It is almost impossible to keep the relationship

- 3 -

exactly as it was before the summit. The question is whether
the improvement is a real one or an atmospheric one, whether
it creates the illusion of relaxation or the reality of relaxation,
that is the test of the conference.

Peter Merseburger:

Wien dient der Unterzeichnung von SALT II, aber gleichzeitig
wird auch ueber SALT III gesprochen, das wird ja anvisiert.

Frage: Ist SALT III als Absprache und Vertrag zwischen den beiden
Supermaechten, und das war ja die bisherige Konzeption, eigentlich
noch denkbar? Oder muss man nicht wegen der Einbeziehung der
eurostrategischen Waffen eine Abruestungskonferenz in Europa ins
Auge fassen, von der etwa Giscard d'Estaing spricht.

Dr. Kissinger:

If, what we call the forward-based systems you call euro-strategic
systems, are discussed, then, without question our allies will have
to participate in one way or another, either through much more
intimate consultation with us, or by being part of the nego-
tiations themselves. And it would not be appropriate for us to
negotiate about forward-based systems without including a much
greater degree of coordination with our allies.

Lothar Loewe:

Wie glauben Sie denn koennte man denn die franzoesische Komponente
der --- die franzoesischen Nuklear-Streitkraefte in ein SALT III

- 4 -

Abkommen mit einbauen, solange die Franzosen nicht bereit sind,
darueber zu sprechen?

Dr. Kissinger:

Well, if the French president has asked for a conference, he must
be prepared to talk about them. But what we need is some --
before we can have a realistic negotiation, we need an agreed
strategy between the NATO allies and ourselves, because otherwise
we do not know whether we are giving up a significant weapon,
limiting a significant weapon, insisting on something that affects
the security or is peripheral to our security, and I don't see how
we can go into a serious negotiation on euro-strategic weapons
or forward-based systems without having settled within the alliance
the significance of the changed strategic relationship.

Peter Merseburger:

Dr. Kissinger, in Wien wird Praesident Carter mit Praesident und
Parteichef Breshnev zusammentreffen. Die Sovietunion stellt sich
heute als eine Art Gerontokratie dar, eine ueberalterte Fuehrung,
und fuer den Fortgang der Entspannung ist ja Kontinuitaet ein
wichtiger punkt auch auf der anderen Seite. Frage: Wie beurteilen
Sie die Stabilitaet der Sovietunion, falls eine neue Generation
die Fuehrung dort uebernimmt?

- 5 -

Dr. Kissinger:

The first thing one has to get clear - if you speak of the
continuation of Detente, or the relaxation of tension, it would
be hard to demonstrate that there is a detente to continue on the
basis of what has happened in the last three years. After all,
we had Cuban troops in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, we have had
a communist coup in Afghanistan, we have had the Vietnamese taking
over Cambodia with soviet encouragement, and therefore to
say there is a continuation of detente is in itself one of our
problems. We cannot create the impression that there can be
a continuation of what has been going on in the last few years. So,
I would like to think that Vienna starts a new period, rather
than continues an existing period. And if it doesn't do that, we will
all be in great danger. Secondly, your question whatever it is
that comes out of Vienna, can it be continued? Clearly the present
soviet leadership is coming to the end of its period in office.
That is not intended as an insult to them, but it is a biological
necessity which affects even soviet leaders. Who the new leaders
will be, I believe not even the existing soviet leaders know,
because in every change of government in a communist state, people
have managed to come to the top that were not foreseen. So, what
conclusions they will reach, what policy they will conduct is not
self-evident, though it may well be affected by what happens in
Vienna..

Peter Merseburger:

Glauben Sie nicht, dass eine neue Generation irgendwann die
Macht uebernimmt in der Sovietunion? Juengere Leute?

Dr. Kissinger:

Certainly, within the next five years. All I say is that you
cannot be sure about what conclusions they will reach, because we
don't know them. What we can know is that they come from a
generation to which World War II is no longer a living experience,
to which the Stalin period is no longer a living experience, and
therefore we really cannot know exactly what conclusions they
will reach.

Lothar Loewe:

Das heisst also, Sie wuerden nicht bestimmen koennen oder nicht
vorhersagen wollen, wie die Sovietunion etwa in 20 Jahren aussehen
wird?

Dr. Kissinger:

In 20 years, I am more confident to predict than in five years.
In 20 years, I think, no communist system as it now exists can
continue, because you cannot run a modern industrial state by
the method of total planning, and the pressures of the various
internal groups and of the bureaucracy would become unmanageable.
The problem is what happens in the next five years, when the soviets
have tremendous military power and see at the same time the social

- 7 -

changes occurring. That is the question, what conclusions will the
new soviet leaders draw from that. Will they draw the conclusion
that they must reform their society? Or will they draw the
conclusion that they need a spectacular foreign policy success?

Lothar Loewe:

Bedeutet das, dass Sie die Befuerchtungen mancher Leute teilen,
dass es innerhalb der naechsten 5 oder 10 Jahre eine sehr ge-
faehrliche Situation geben koennte im Ost-West-Verhaeltnis,
die eventuell sogar die Gefahr eines neuen Krieges in sich
birgt?

Dr. Kissinger:

I don't want to speak about the danger of a new war. That I
don't know. I'd say there is at least the theoretical possibility
of a dangerous situation arising in the first half of the eighties.

Peter Merseburger:

Dr. Kissinger, viele betrachten heute die Sovietunion als eine
konservative Macht. Sie wuerden dem widersprechen, oder wie
sehen Sie die Mischung zwischen konservativem Beharren in der
Sovietunion und gleichzeitig doch dem Ausgreifen in der Dritten
Welt, von dem Sie eben gesprochen haben?

- 8 -

**Dr. Kissinger:**

I think at the moment you would have to say there are conservatives in the domestic structure, they are ready to seize opportunities in foreign policy, especially opportunities that are open to them by an imbalance of forces, either of actual forces or of willingness to engage themselves. Ten years ago nobody would have believed it possible that the Soviet Union would support Cuban military forces simultaneously in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and that soviet military power could develop such a reach. We have become used to this, but it does not change the geopolitical impact. At the same time internally in the Soviet Union, change is very slow if it takes place at all. So you have a strange mixture of a foreign policy that tests every equilibrium, and a domestic policy which resists every change.

**Lothar Loewe:**

Sie haben einmal gesagt, die Vereinigten Staaten koennten es sich nicht leisten, sich von den 9 Millionen Kubanern wirklich auf der Nase herumtanzen zu lassen. Wie, glauben Sie, kann man das aendern?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

You are putting it into a rather dramatic form. What I am saying is this: Here is an island, 75 miles off our shores, population of 9 million, no industrial resources. They are sending expe-

ditionary forces of about 60,000 men, that would be the equi-
valent of about a million Americans, if you put it into
proportion to the population around the world, into continents where
the introduction of a small number of military forces can overturn
the equilibrium. These forces are acting in directions that are
hostile to our interests, and they are overturning or threatening
governments that have been associated with us. The impression
that it creates, that the United States is incapable of
resisting this, is in itself a geopolitical fact beyond the
intrinsic importance of the countries where the Cubans are
stationed. Moreover, the Cubans are not getting there by them-
selves, they are getting logistic support from the Soviet Union,
they are getting financial support from the Soviet Union, and the
Soviet Union has its own airplanes, its own pilots in Cuba, flying
combat missions out of Cuba, so that the Cuban Air Force can be
in Africa. This is a geopolitically absurd situation that we cannot
accept permanently. Now, what we can do in any particular case,
it would be irresponsible for somebody out of office to prescribe.
But that a super-power can do something in such a situation, that
this is incompatible with a long-range policy of peaceful
co-existence, I take for granted. And we can do something
in our relations with the Soviet Union. And I think we have not
reached a point of impotence where we don't know what to do
in relation to Cuba, once we make up our mind, that this is no longer
free.

Peter Merseburger:

In Ihrer Antwort, Dr. Kissinger, haben Sie die machtpolitische
Seite dieser ganzen Frage angesprochen, aber dahinter steckt
ja auch eine moralische, die der Legitimation von verschiedenen
Politikern. Waere nicht die beste Moeglichkeit, neue kubanische
Interventionen, beispielsweise, zu stoppen, dadurch, dass man eine
konsequente Politik in Afrika fuehrt, die den Kubanern jede
Legitimation fuer ein neues Engagement entzieht durch eine klare
Position zugunsten der Majority Rule, der Mehrheitsregierung.

Dr. Kissinger:

There are two problems involved here: One is, of course, the Cuban
question, the second is, what position should we take in Africa.
It is very difficult to take a correct position in Africa as long
as the impression is created that it is extorted from us by the
fear of Cuban intervention, because as long as the impression is
created that it is fear of Cuban intervention that makes us put
forward proposals, we create an incentive for Cuban intervention.
Secondly, the issue in Africa is not that clear cut as if there
were one position that is legitimate and all other positions are
illegitimate. There are various gradations of positions that can
be taken, and if we give to the Cubans the final Veto, that is to
say if we determine what it is that will deprive the Cubans of a
pretext, then we will have to take in the final analysis a
position the Cubans can support, in other words to support the

most radical elements in the African struggle. I believe that with
respect to Africa it is in the western interest and in the
interest of the black nations that on issues such as Rhodesia
and Namibia the final outcome is one that is achieved by non-
violent means, that establishes majority-rule, and also brings
about protection of minority rights. Because, if one could
demonstrate in Rhodesia and Namibia that the black and white
communities can live side by side under some constitutional
system, then there is hope for a positive evolution in South
Africa. If, however, the outcome in Rhodesia and Namibia is one
in which the first concessions lead to the expulsion of the
white communities, then the white community in South Africa would
without any question -- will not even take the first step and there
will be a race war which will be a disaster for everybody.

Now, therefore, to have constitutional guarantees, you must
have some entrenched clauses, that means that the majority cannot
do everything that it wants to do, that is the meaning of
constitutional guarantees, in your constitution, in our con#ti-
tution, and in any system that has constitutional guarantees. So,
I was attacked in 1976 violently in this country when I came out
for majority-rule and minority rights on the grounds that I had gone
too far with majority-rule. In the meantime the process has gone
very far towards the radical side to a point where it is probably
very difficult to find a negotiated solution.

- 12 -

**Lothar Loewe:**

Welche Politik, meinen Sie, sollte denn Praesident Carter jetzt treiben gegenueber Rhodesien?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

I think we should recognize that there has been an election, that by African standards, on the basis of all observers, this election has been more free than most elections, and that the government that emerges from this is one of the major factors that has to be taken into consideration. I would probably recommend one more effort to bring in at least Nkomo into this negotiation, but I would not hide behind the essentially incorrect and somewhat specious argument that this is not straight majority-rule in Rhodesia because you cannot have straight majority-rule and the co-existence of the two races, you must have some constitutional guarantees, whatever they are.

**Peter Merseburger:**

Dr. Kissinger, Sie haben selbst die Oeffnung Chinas gegenueber der westlichen Welt eingeleitet. Sind Sie mit der Konsequenz dieser Politik eigentlich zufrieden? Es ist ueber viele Jahre nun eine multipolare Welt entstanden, die nicht mehr vom Ost-West-Dualismus beherrscht ist, und birgt das nicht Gefahren, weil weniger Ordnung darin steckt und die Welt heute in einem labileren Zustand zu sein scheint?

- 13 -

Dr. Kissinger:

I don't think that the opening to China with which I was connected created the multipolar world. I think the opening to China recognized the multipolar world. If we had not opened to China, China would have opened to everybody else, except to us, and there would still have been multipolarity. China is a fact that we have to deal with. Yes, a multipolar world is more complicated than a bipolar world, but it is the world in which we have to live. Has it not evolved in exactly the direction we expected at the time? I tell you quite frankly, I didn't know what to expect precisely at the time because I was quite ignorant about Chinese psychology and the way the Chinese look at the world. It is very difficult for a nation with a history of 200 years to deal with a nation with a history of 3000 years. When I was in China recently I went to a museum where they had all the dynasties listed, in Chou. It suddenly occurred to me that in the year that Chou stopped being the Chinese capital, which was around 900, they already had had a history longer than the history of France, after which they had another history as long as the history of France, and that almost every dynasty in China has a longer history than the history of the United States, than the whole United States. So there are different perspectives, and the dialogue between us and China is therefore somewhat complicated by the difficulty between a sort of more historic and geopolitical and a more pragmatic approach which you see for example now at a time when China is going through tremendous turmoil - invert turmoil, not physical

- 14 -

turmoil - in trying to come to a conclusion about its long-range modernization. We suddenly confront it with a negotiation on textil and that has to be for China a trivial problem compared to the decision what it wants to look like in the year 2000. Yet, our own domestic pressures drive us in that direction.

**Lothar Loewe:**

Sie haben die Fuehrer der Sovietunion kennengelernt, Sie haben die Fuehrer Chinas kennengelernt, Sie haben also eine gewisse Erfahrung darin. Worin unterscheidet sich aus Ihrer Sicht die Denkweise und die philosophische Auffassung dieser Kommunisten in Peking und Moskau?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

You will guarantee that I cannot visit at least one, and maybe neither of these countries again, if I give you a detailed answer to this question. I think that the Soviet Union has a leadership that, of course, has been in power as a communist state for a much longer period than the Chinese leadership and has undergone many upheavals caused in part by foreign policy. I think the soviet leaders are more bureaucratic, less conceptual, more concerned with the day-to-day events. The Chinese leaders represent a perhaps more historic approach, more geopolitical, more conceptual, and of course they dispose of different quantities of power which greatly affects the conduct of state affairs.

- 13 -

**Lothar Loewe:**

Koennen Sie sich eine Annaeherung, eine Wiederannaeherung zwischen
Peking und Moskau vorstellen?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

Oh, I can imagine it, yes -- I think we should assume that first
of all the Chinese did not survive for 3000 years of history
by excessive sentimentality. Secondly, I think that the leaders
of China are -- I believe that they must make a code (or:current?)
assessment of the balance of forces as it presents itself to them.
I don't believe they would easily chose such a course, or that
they would prefer to chose such a course. But I also believe that
they will draw whatever conclusions impose themselves from their
assessment of our adequacy in maintaining the balance of power and t
general trend of history.

**Peter Merseburger:**

Da taucht dann nauterlich die Frage auf, wer hier wessen Karte
spielt, die Chinesen die amerikanische, oder die Amerikaner die
chinesische. Der Ost-West-Dualismus ist im Grunde durch ein
Dreiecksspiel abgeloest worden, und wie sehen Sie die Rolle der
Amerikaner in diesem Dreieck?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

I don't think basically any great nation can play another nation
as its card. The art of foreign policy consists not of using

- 16 -

somebody else as your tool, but in trying to bring about a community of interests where each nation puts its own -- in pursuit of its own concerns is pursuing a parallel policy. We cannot use the Chinese as a card, and I don't think the Chinese can really use us as a card. We do have a common interest in the sense that it is against our individual interest to have another nation become physically so powerful that it can impose its will either partially or totally. In this sense we have a common interest for which we don't need a formal treaty or relationship. To the extent that this common interest is no longer perceived or that one of the parties is not carrying out its side of it, it will alter the relationship. But that is the essence of the relationship, not who can play the card. It's childish to think that you can play China as a card.

**Lothar Loewe:**

Wenn Sie die Aussenpolitik der Regierung in Washington betrachten, haben Sie nicht den Eindruck, dass es immer schwieriger wird, wer immer auch Praesident ist, eine wirksame Aussenpolitik fuer die Vereinigten Staaten zu betreiben angesichts des wirklich gewachsenen Einflusses des Kongresses als Folge von Watergate und Vietnam?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

I think we have three problems in the conduct of our foreign policy. One is within the executive branch, it's to get a clear conception of what it is we are trying to do. The second, which affects the

first, is to get a clear conception within our nation or a
consensus of what our purpose is, ought to be. And the third is
the role of the Congress. The Congress has intruded since
Watergate into the tactical conduct of foreign policy in an excessive
way, and it is difficult for the executive to fight this as long
as every issue comes up individually, because most of these issues
are so abstruse that it is very hard to explain them to the general
public, especially when there is no pressure group that has strong
views and the majority that has no views. So this is the difficulty
we will have, and I think you are quite right, no matter who is
President, and it can only be mastered by a very strong presidency
that forms both an opinion in the Executive Branch and starts
building a consensus within the Nation.

Peter Merseburger:

Sie sprechen von einer starken Praesidentschaft. Aber sind viele
Schwaechen von Jimmy Carter beispielsweise nicht das Ergebnis eines
Excesses an Executivgewalt, so sehen es viele Amerikaner, der in den
letzten Jahren stattgefunden hat, ehe Carter an die Regierung kam,
Stichworte Johnson und Nixon. Und schwingt hier einfach inner-
amerikanisch das Pendel zurueck zu einem Punkt, wo die Verfassungs-
vaeter eigentlich die Gewalteinteilung haben wollten, und die haben
nicht an eine Weltmachtrolle Amerikas gedacht.

Dr. Kissinger:

Well, the curious phenomenon is that for about 50 years the liberals in the United States were the advocates of a strong executive authority, and the conservatives were the ones who extolled the role of the Congress. All of the New Deal was really a building up of the executive authority. Then, as a result of the Vietnam war, the liberals used the Congress, or tried to use the Congress to weaken the executive authority. Now it is an interesting question whether there was an excess of executive authority in the case of Johnson and Nixon and indeed it is important to disentangle the mythology that is being developed about these administrations from the reality, and the use of certain methods, in order to win political battles from what in fact went on. Clearly there has been a shift of power from the executive to the legislative, what the reason for it was is very complex, certainly Watergate plaid a decisive role, and that was totally unexpected and it represents, of course, an abuse of executive power, in fact over very petty issues.

Peter Merseburger:

Ist Amerika nicht heute als Weltmacht beschraenkt und gelaehmt partiell. Wenn ich an Rhodesien denke, der Praesident muss sich bald erklaeren ...

Dr. Kissinger:

I don't think we are paralyzed, but I think it is a problem. But leaders cannot use problems as an alibi. They are elected to solve their problems. And they are not professionals that make analyses of the situation, they must draw some conclusions to overcome this. And you have correctly described our situation. And I think I have correctly told you what needs to be done to overcome it. Whether this is possible, that we will have to see.

Lothar Loewe:

Da wir vom Kongress sprechen, mochte ich doch noch einmal ganz kurz auf SALT zurueckkommen. Glauben Sie denn, dass der Senat den SALT II Vertrag retifizieren wird?

Dr. Kissinger:

I think it is much too early to tell, because so far the debate has been pursued on a very superficial level. Right now I do not think that there would be a majority in the Senate, a constitutional majority in the Senate for the ratification. But the situation looked even worse for the Panama Treaty when it started, and therefore it is really much too early to tell whether the treaty can be ratified. It will be a very tough battle.

Peter Merseburger:

Dr. Kissinger, Amerika wirkte schwaechlich in der iranischen Krise. Es hat den Shah mit Panzern und Duesenjaegern praktisch bis an die

Zaehne aufgeruestet, Sie selbst haben daran mitgewirkt, Waffen gegen Petrodollars war vielleicht mal ein gutes Geschaeft. Welche Lehren sind aus der Krise des Iran fuer die westliche Welt und fuer die amerikanische Fuehrungsmacht zu ziehen?

Dr. Kissinger:

First, let me deal with the question of weapons for Petrodollars. It wasn't quite so simple. In 1972 when the question of arms for Iran came up, what was the situation? The Soviet Union, in April 1972, had made a friendship treaty with Iraq, and Iraq was being equipped with large quantities of very advanced soviet weapons. Syria was already being equipped with large quantities of advanced soviet weapons. And there were still 15,000 soviet combat troops in Egypt, and with none of these countries did we have diplomatic relations.

Moreover, Britain, which had acted as a balancer in the Middle East, was in 1972 also withdrawing its forces from the Persian Gulf. Therefore, if we were going to have any balance of power which would protect moderate regimes like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Emirates, there were only two choices: either the presence of an American force to replace the British, or the build-up of an indigenous force or of a regional force to balance the radical forces. In the period of 1972 it was unthinkable to station an American military force in that region. And therefore if we had not armed Iran, the radical forces in the Middle East would have gained the upper hand even more rapidly than they have since, and the impact on Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Jordan that we are now

seeing, and it is partly reflected even in their energy policies,
would have occurred much earlier. So this was not a simple business
of trading arms for Petrodollars. The second lesson, I think, we can
learn, we must draw from Iran, is that one has to look at the Shah
not as a reactionary, but as a reformer, and he was brought down
in part because of the rapid rate of economic reform not coupled
with a rapid rate of political reform that created the political
institutions that would run parallel with the economic changes
that he was bringing about. That, incidentally, is a criticism
that I would accept. Having said this, however, what exactly is
it that we should today tell the Saudis and others about the
nature of political reform, that still makes it worth their
while to continue a system of government. It's not an easy
question to answer, and it's one which very few of western in-
tellectuals and politicians have thoughtfully addressed. The
Third lesson we have to draw is that once a crisis occurs, no
matter how it occurs, and no matter what the reasons are, even if you
are partially involved, your choice is between managing the crisis
or letting it get totally out of control, and you get no rewards
for a brilliant analysis that does not lead to some stabilisation.
And objectively the impact of the Iranian collapse on stability
in the Middle East has been disastrous, we have to face this fact.
Maybe there is nothing we could do about it. That is no consol-
lation to those countries that have to depend on us for internal
and external support, and any policy has to start from that re-
cognition.

- 22 -

[Lc]

**Lothar Loewe:**

Wenn Sie heute den Iran betrachten, haben wir dort nicht eine Art
Uebergangsregime, eine Form eines Kerensky-Regimes, das letzten Endes
in eine Regierung muenden wird, in der die Moskau-freundlichen
Kraefte die Oberhand behalten, wie gross ist die Gefahr?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

That is certainly one of the possible outcomes. It is certainly
a transitional regime, whether you compare it with Kerensky or with
somebody else, partly because of the age of Khomeini, partly
because this is not an institutional structure, it is dependant even
more on one personality in many respects than the previous regime.
Now, which group emerges in such a constellation, whether it is the
most radical group on the left or some radical groups on the right is
very hard to predict, except, that some transition is going to take
place. Then I would make a distinction - I think it is important
for us to keep in mind that a great deal of damage can be done
to western interest, even by governments that are not necessarily
under the control of Moscow. If what emerges in Iran eventually
is very similar to what has emerged in Libya then, even if it is not
under the control of Moscow, as it would not be, it would still
pursue a policy so hostile to the long-term interest of the West -
of both in the Middle East and in Africa that it would have very
unfortunate consequences. So, both of these dangers exist, and both
of them must be kept in mind.

Peter Merseburger:

Sie haben gesagt, die iranische Krise war ein destabilisierender Faktor in Nah-Ost. Nun rechnet die amerikanische und westliche Politik damit, dass der Frieden zwischen Aegypten und Israel stabilisierend wirkt. Aber das erste Ergebnis scheint eine Entfremdung zwischen Washington und Saudi Arabien zu sein?

Dr. Kissinger:

I think, the attitude of Saudi Arabia is in part also the result of its perception of our actions in Africa, especially in Ethiopia, and of our actions in Iran. And yet - I basically approve of the policy of negotiating as much progress as was possible between Egypt and Israel. Whether all the tactics by which this was achieved were precisely those I would have recommended and whether that particular month was the right one to produce such a dramatic confrontation in the Arab world, this is something that historians will have to sort out on the basis of more information than I now have. But I don't think one can look at the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation separate from the moderate radical split within the Arab world which in turn depends on factors partly independent of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation.

Lothar Loewe:

Wenn Sie das Verhaeltnis heute betrachten zwischen Washington und Saudi Arabien, dann ist es sehr viel schlechter als vor der

Friedensregelung zwischen Israel und Aegypten. Was glauben Sie, soll
die Regierung tun, einfach um dieses Verhaeltnis zu verbessern,
einfach um ihre Oelzufuhr fuer die Vereinigten Staaten zu sichern?

Dr. Kissinger:

I think we need a quiet and extended and serious dialogue with Saudi Arabia. It cannot be in Saudi Arabia's interest to undermine the position of Sadat, and it cannot be in Saudi Arabia's long-term interest to bring about international economic chaos. But equally it cannot be in Saudi Arabia's interest to put itself into the front line of confrontation with the radical Arab states, this is Saudi Arabia's dilemma. I think the Europeans are making a mistake by believing that the way to solve this dilemma is to lean completely towards the radical side. I think others may make a mistake in believing that they can just talk the Saudis out of this. They have a real problem, and it requires some compassionate extended conversation. It is after all a society in which personal relationships do play a very important role and in which a sense of human dignity and honor still is very important. So, superficial as it may sound, what we need is a substantial dialogue before we can do anything else, and a quiet one, which is not our style.

Peter Merseburger:

Dr. Kissinger, eine der Schwaechen der Weltmacht Amerika ist ihre
Abhaengigkeit von Oelzufuhr aus fernen Welten. Aber der Geopoli-
tiker in Ihnen wird sicher nicht widersprechen wenn ich sage, dass

- 25 -

Oel vor der Haustuer liegt, und ist es nicht ein Versaeumnis der amerikanischen Politik, dass es dieses Oel vor der Haustuer durch eine vernuenftige Politik zu Mexico nicht gesichert hat und auch kein Konzept fuer so etwas wie einen energiepolitischen gemeinsamen Markt von Alaska bis Mexico entwickelt hat?

### Dr. Kissinger:

Again, there are two aspects: one, how much oil is there actually in Mexico, and secondly, what should be the relation, our long-term relationship to Mexico? With respect to the realities, I don't think that Mexico will be able to produce much more than 2 and a half million barrels a day over the next five years, and therefore it is unlikely to be able to export much more than a million to a million and a half barrels a day over the next five years.

### Peter Merseburger:

May I interrupt you for a second: Ist das nicht eine Frage der Bereitschaft der Mexikaner, und kann man die nicht durch eine entsprechende Politik wecken?

### Dr. Kissinger:

My impression is that this is limited technologically. But after five years, of course, the numbers will increase. On the second thought it is fundamentally very crucial for the United States to develop a new relationship with Mexico, because we have never had

the experience of having a substantial economic and political power as a neighbour. Our neighbours have been generally much weaker than we. Now, Mexico will have a major development, whatever we do. It's important that at this stage when it has to make significant decisions, we enable it to move in a constructive direction so that it doesn't eventually wind up as an Iran or as a radical marxist state. In this end, I think, we have not used our opportunity to develop a new relationship to Mexico, for that matter, eventually Canada will have to be included in such a concept. We need it not only from the energy point of view, but we need it almost from the historic point of view. The next question though with respect to energy is that we have known since 1973 what was ahead of us. We know that the only real answer is production, that the best you can do with conservation is to limit the rate of growth. You cannot get back with conservation even to 1973. Now here, what is needed is a long-term coherent program in which all the consumers cooperate and there has been a very inadequate cooperation among the consumers. When I was in office I tried to get a consumer cooperation established, and many of the industrial nations were afraid that this would be provocative towards the producers. I have never understood this, and I don't understand it today. And I think that if the Five want to discuss something useful at the summit in Tokyo, energy cooperation would be - should be high on their agenda.

- 27 -

**Lothar Loewe:**

Koennen Sie sich denn einen all-umfassenden Sparplan der
Industriewelt vorstellen?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

Certainly, I am in favour of it. But we have to recognize that
the best it will achieve is to slow down the rate by which we
increase our imports. At the very best it will stabilize the
import. It does not by itself decrease our vulnerability. It
prevents our vulnerability from increasing, that's important
too.

**Peter Merseburger:**

Dr. Kissinger, lassen Sie uns mal einen Blick auf die Bundesrepublik tun, die feiert in diesem Jahr ihren dreissigsten Geburtstag. Wie beurteilen Sie die politische Rolle der Bundesrepublik, ist sie immer noch wirtschaftlich Riese und politisch zu sehr Zwerg, wie das Schlagwort heisst?

**Dr. Kissinger:**

I think, of course, that Germany, because of its division,
because of a history which is now becoming more and more a
distant past, nevertheless is in a delicate position internationally,
more so than perhaps any other of the major countries. At the same
time it is inevitable and desirable that the Federal Republic play
a larger role internationally. I think it should come to this

view by its own decisions and not by our own pressure, and it
makes it more necessary than ever that the United States and the
Federal Republic have some common understanding not about every
detail of foreign policy, but the general direction in which they
want to move and the kind of world they want to bring about.

Lothar Loewe:

Gibt es nach Ihrer Meinung noch immer eine gewisse Furcht der
Auslaender vor den Deutschen? Sie mussten ja Deutschland ver-
lassen als Junge. Wie stabil ist aus Ihrer Sicht die Demokratie
in Deutschland?

Dr. Kissinger:

I think in many respects it is remarkable how stable German
democracy has been, considering the international pressures to which
the Federal Republic has been exposed. I think there is a certain
fear of Germany abroad, partly objectively founded as a result of
history, and partly deliberately exploited by those who want to
undermine the cohesion of the alliance by playing on certain events
in the past which, after all, a generation has grown out. So I
think this a reality. But I do not think the German foreign policy
can be asked to - - that we can ask the Federal Republic to con--
duct its foreign policy by beginning every policy initiative with
an admission of a guilt which was not produced by the existing
generation in which the present group of leaders have really done
everything that can humanly be done to distance themselves from.

- 29 -

### Peter Merseburger:

Es gibt immer wieder Spekulationen ueber die Sehnsuechte der Deutschen nach einer Wiedervereinigung, und daran gebunden sind auch einige Aengste. Sehen Sie die West-Einbindung der Bundesrepublii moeglicherweise einmal gefaehrdet durch solche Tendenzen? Ihr Nachfolger auf dem Stuhl des Sicherheitsberaters spricht von Selbstfinlandisierung.

### Dr. Kissinger:

I keep telling that person that he is the successor of General Scowcroft - I think that for any German Government the problem of reunification is to some extent unavoidable and to the extent that the Federal Republic feels its self-disappointment in its relations either with us or with the European Community or with both. That tendency will become even greater but under no circumstances can it be eliminated. If the Federal Republic should suddenly pursue this goal then it will be driven on a road of semi-neutralization, but I would also think that thoughtful German leaders will understand that danger and I don't see that either the present German Government or its likely alternatives are going to engage in a deliberate policy of self-finlandization.

I think it's maybe a historic danger one should keep in mind, but it is so much against the German interest that I find it difficult to imagine.

- 30 -

### Lothar Loewe:

Das amerikanische Engagement in Berlin ist seit Jahrzehnten unbestritten. Koennen Sie sich vorstellen, dass doch in den naechsten zehn oder zwanzig Jahren ein amerikanischer Praesident ins Weisse Haus einziehen koennte, der das amerikanische Engagement zumindest ueberprueft, um vielleicht dafuer langfristig doch eine andere Lösung zu finden?

### Dr. Kissinger:

There is no other solution, because if we give up the present status of Berlin, every other status is equally precarious short of its being taken over by the East German government. And realistically therefore no American President has any choice except to support the independence and freedom of Berlin, not the independence, the freedom of Berlin.

### Peter Merseburger:

Dr. Kissinger, Sie haben jetzt einige Jahre Abstand vom Amt. Wenn Sie zurueckblicken, beschleichen Sie dann manchmal Zweifel an der Richtigkeit Ihrer Entscheidungen? Ich denke an den Einmarsch in Kambodscha, das Bombardement Kambodshas? Es ist jetzt ein Buch erschienen, das Ihre Politik sehr hart kritisiert, Sie der Zerstoerung Kambodshas bezichtigt und von dem eigentlichen Watergate spricht.

- 31 -

Dr. Kissinger:

I haven't read the entire book. I have read enough in the book. I consider this book the McCarthyism of the liberals, which shows absolutely no understanding of the complexity of the situation for which a country, on which the freedom of so many others depends, faces. When we came into office, we found 550,000 Americans fighting 10,000 miles away, that we didn't put there.

We attempted to extricate them, how you extricate people without a collapse of American credibility worldwide, under conditions when the other side suddenly opens up an entire new front of 600 miles, is not a trivial question. One can debate whether every decision we made was right, but one can not use the message of that book which puts it all in terms of one monumental stupid conspiracy.

If it had been that simple, it's possible that we might have thought of some of the answers. The second thing which this book totally ignores is, that the North Vietnamese were in Cambodia in the sanctuaries for four years before we ever did anything. There were four North Vietnamese divisions in Cambodia and to speak of the bombardement of neutral Cambodia is a total distortion of the reality. We were bombarding Vietnamese sanctuaries inside Cambodia from which Cambodian officials and population had been expelled.

Without any protest from the Cambodian government which recognized that it had been invaded by the Vietnamese, and therefore any fair description must take into account that Vietnamese armies were marching all over Indochina before Americans ever became involved.

Vietnamese armies have been marching all over Indochina after
America had withdrawn. And therefore there is some presumption
that maybe the Vietnamese were the original attackers. Whether
then every tactical decision was the right one, I think, goes beyond
the scope of this program and one would have to go into great detail,
but it is a onesided, distorted and essentially untrue account of
what went on.

Lothar Loewe:

Haben Sie in Peking bei Ihrem letzten Besuch den Eindruck gewonnen,
dass es zwischen der chinesischen Fuehrung und der Fuehrung in
Hanoi einen Interessenausgleich nach diesem juengsten Konflikt
gehen kann? Oder sehen Sie hier eine Vertiefung in eine weitere
langfristig: doch Verschaerfung der Situation?

Dr. Kissinger:

When I was there, which was at the end of April, I did not have
the impression that Peking and Hanoi were moving towards a
solution of their differences, which are, after all, geopolitically
-- which is out from geopolitics and not just from ill will of
leaders, and that it is difficult for China to except the hegemony
of Vietnam of all its neighboring countries. That is the root cause
of the difficulty.

- 33 -

### Peter Merseburger:

Dr. Kissinger, Senatoren verfuegen in Washington ueber viel Macht und Einfluss. Einige davon erscheinen manchmal maechtiger zu sein als ein Praesident, wie ein gegenwaertiges Beispiel zeigt. Moechten Sie die Rolle einer politischen Kassandra auf dem Capitol spielen, wollen Sie sich um einen Sitz im Senat bewerben?

### Dr. Kissinger:

First of all, there is no Senate seat available for which I would be a logical candidate and therefore, a great deal would depend on whether there are retirements from the Senate. Second, when that situation arises, which has not arisen and probably will not arise, I will then have to assess it in terms of where I can play a more useful role, in the Senate or outside in commenting on public affairs. And I quite honestly have not made this decision. My present position is that I support Senator Javits. If he runs for re-election, I will campaign for him and will help him in any other way. If he should decide not to run, then I will have a decision to make which I have not yet made.

### Peter Merseburger:

Schoenen Dank, Dr. Kissinger.