New York,

January 1, 1917.

Secretary McAdoo telephoned from Washington to tell me how incensed he was over the rumors concerning his speculations in Wall Street, and what action he intended to take in the matter. He also discussed his statement regarding the necessity of increasing revenues; about the Tariff Commission, etc. etc.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey called by appointment. He has his plans in some shape now and will proceed vigorously. I find Godfrey a great egoist.

January 2, 1917.

The British Ambassador and Sir William Wiseman took lunch with us. The Ambassador said I might consider him at this interview the representative of all the allied representatives at Washington; that what I said to him would be reported to them as soon as he returned. He said they all wished to see me personally which he thought was better, as some feeling would be thus avoided. He thought it would be best to have them come to New York; but since I am to be in Washington on Thursday, I felt it would be better to see them at Phillips' home.

I suggested that they delegate one of their number to talk with me rather than for me to meet with them together.

Spring-Rice was in a quiet mood and only at one time in our conversation was he on the verge of being offensive. He is disturbed over the thought of the British Government sending someone to this country to explain the views of the Allies. He said it must necessarily be an Englishman because the French spoke the language so indifferently. Northcliffe, he thought, would be an impossibility because among other objections he had "brain storms". Northcliffe would be glad to hear this for it is the brain storms that

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Spring-Rice is subject to that makes Northcliffe so antagonistic. He suggested Asquith and Bryce, but I agreed with him that at this particular time there was no need for anyone to come. I did this largely out of sympathy for the Ambassador. He believed the United States needs propaganda in England to set herself right much more than Great Britain needed propaganda here. He thought the influence that had kept the two democracies at peace was the great good feeling which the British workingman had for America-- a feeling which was now rapidly disappearing.

He went back to the inevitable discussion of the President's failure to say some word favorable to democracy which would express his sympathy for the allied nations. We agreed that the royal families of Europe were almost unanimously for Germany and that Germany was the mainstay of monarchies. He tried to tell me what would happen to the United States if the Allies lost or if we lost the good will of the Allies. I replied that I was not so much concerned about our future as I was the immediate situation which faced Great Britain if the Germans instituted unbridled submarine warfare. If we went into the war, and unbridled u-boat warfare was begun, the consequences might be disastrous not alone for Great Britain but for all the allied powers. I was on safe ground here for I saw I had hit the mark.

We got upon fine terms from then on and before he left he was enthusiastic over his visit and declared he would come over often to keep in touch with me. He said it was impossible to keep in touch with the President through the State Department; that Grey had told him at one time to write letters to the President direct but that was a dangerous practice and he had persuaded his government to discontinue it.

I thought if the Allies would consent to peace parleys that, with our added strength, they would get practically what they were contending for-- at

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least Great Britain and France would, since our sympathies were with them and
would continue to be provided they were moderate in their demands. As for in-
demnities, I was in favor of the United States rehabilitating Belgium, Poland and
Serbia, if by doing so we could facilitate the making of peace.

I said the President had warned Germany not to continue her u-boat activ-
ities on this side of the Atlantic. The conference was a decided success. The
most confidential part of it was with the Ambassador alone, though Wiseman was
present during a part of it.

Frank Polk followed. He is much disturbed over conditions at Washington,
especially as to the President's frame of mind. He thinks he is for peace almost
at any price. He is concerned, too, at the lack of a positive program. Lansing
cannot get from the President anything definite to work on and wishes me to come
to Washington for a conference with the President so as to work out something for
them to follow. I am to see Lansing at ten o'clock Thursday, and I am to see the
Allied Ambassadors, or their representative, at 11.30 Thursday.

Polk thinks well of Northcliffe coming over, or anybody who could take
back word of the pro-ally feeling in this country, thereby setting England right.

Donald, of the Shipping Board, Charles Ferguson, Muller-Ury, the artist,
and Whitehouse all followed in quick succession.

The White House, Washington.
January 3, 1917.

I took the 11.08 for Washington. As usual it was late and I did not arrive
at the White House until just in time to dress for dinner. Dr. Grayson met me
at the station. I was also met by Lincoln Colcord and Brougham of the Public
Ledger. They had been unable to get in touch with the President. I promised
to find out the trouble.

Grayson is exceedingly anxious to be appointed a rear admiral, but Daniels

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is halting his plans. I had, until now, thought of Grayson as among the few who were serving unselfishly.

The President, Mrs. Wilson, Margaret and I were the only ones at dinner. Immediately after dinner the President and I went to the upstairs sitting room and were in continuous session until half past ten.

We first took up the question of Federal Judges. Then the coordination of foreign relief societies about which the President was averse to taking a leading part. He thought anything he might do would be misinterpreted by one side or the other of the belligerents. He was willing to help but he wanted the societies to take the lead. We threshed out what seemed to be a satisfactory plan and I am to explain it to those interested when I return to New York.

He read me the confidential despatch which Page had sent him with a notation at the top that it was to be deciphered by the President and not by the State Department. He thought it a foolish proceeding since the despatch, from his viewpoint, was unimportant. Page began it "At Midnight". I suggested that perhaps we were to have a Sherlock Holmes recital, but it was merely telling the President of an interview with Lloyd George in which George expressed himself as being anxious to work in harmony with the United States. It was a long, rambling despatch, but of more importance I think than the President accorded it. It should be answered but I doubt whether he does so.

I asked what he had decided to do about Page. He replied that he intended to accept his resignation. Mrs. Wilson asked if I would take his place. She thought I ought to do so during the war. The President also expressed a wish that I accept it. However, it did not take me three minutes to persuade him it would not be wise since it would confine my activities to Great Britain and I would not even be able to go to France in the event it were necessary for me to do so, much less to Germany.

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The President said he was interested in Josiah Wedgwood's memorandum which I sent him and he wondered why I called it "fantastic". He asked whether it was because Wedgwood thought that he, the President, was the only one who could lay down the terms by which the war could be ended. I replied that I largely agreed with Wedgwood in that statement, but I considered his plan fantastic wherein this Government was to hold in trust, as it were, certain territory for the common use of other nations.

The President wished to know what I thought of his stating in some way what, in his opinion, the general terms of settlement should be, making the key-stone of the settlement arch the future security of the world against wars, and letting territorial adjustments be subordinate to the main purpose. I was enthusiastic since it was the exact proposal I outlined to Bernstorff and wrote of to the President in my letter of December 27th. (Note.) He had evidently forgotten where the thought came from, which is of no consequence if it is of value and I believe it is. This war and its consequences have become too great for any ordinary settlement, and the terms upon which it should be closed should be the fairest and best that the human mind can devise.

We went into a long discussion as to what terms he might properly lay down and how it could be done. I thought he should outline the terms in an address to Congress if he wished to make it impressive. If he desired not to attract marked attention at first, then it would be better to make it in an address before some society. He thought he might do it before the Senate, and that was the tentative arrangement when we finished our discussion. The time that it should be ready we left open for it would be well to let the answers to his note come in and all discussion of them ended before he makes this other and more important move.

Notes The beginning of the 14 Points, E.M.H.

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We thought that the main principle he should lay down was the right of nations to determine under what government they should continue to live. This, of course, involves a wide range. We thought that since Germany and Russia had agreed to free Poland that should be put in. We naturally agreed upon Belgium and Serbia being restored. Alsace and Lorraine we were not quite certain of, but we agreed that Turkey should cease to exist. I urged in addition that something be put in regarding the right of Russia to have a warm seaport. If this were not done it would leave a sore which in time would bring about another war.

The question was raised as to what would happen to our Ambassador at Constantinople when this speech was made, and whether he would be promptly executed or be permitted to flee the country. The question of the American Colleges in Turkey was also thought of. It is my purpose when I return to New York to study this matter more closely and outline in some detail a plan which I think the President could follow, and bring it to him when I return next week.

I encouraged him in the thought of doing this great and dramatic thing. I said, "you are now playing with what the power players term 'the blue chips' and there is no use sitting by and letting great events swamp you. It is better to take matters into your own hands and play the cards yourself".

I spoke to the President about the conversation I had with Joseph Willard just before he sailed, and what he told me concerning the resentment which the King of Spain felt because he, the President, allowed three months to elapse before he answered his query. The President looked embarrassed at this point and admitted that he should have replied sooner. I thought Spain's refusal to concur in his peace note was due to this. I also told him what Willard had said concerning Albert of Belgium.

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We thought if he made his speech before the Senate, the occasion could
be arranged in answer to a request from the Senate for information as to
what America would demand if she consents to join a league to enforce peace.
Whatever the President said in this way would be largely our own concern and
could not be construed as meddling with the affairs of the belligerents.
While it was clearly actually would be a proposal of peace terms, yet apparently,
it would be a statement of the terms upon which we would be willing to join
in a league to enforce peace.

I do not know whether the President will decide to discuss this
matter with Lansing but I shall not mention it to anyone myself.

I got to bed at eleven o'clock. We agreed to meet for further talk
just before lunch tomorrow. In the morning the President will play golf and
in the afternoon he has many engagements.

January 4, 1917.

My first visitor was the Attorney General. We discussed the appoint-
ment of Federal Judges, the advisability of prosecuting the paper combination,
a District Attorney for New York to succeed Snowdon Marshall, and his, Gre-
gory's personal plans. He has decided to remain in the Cabinet for the pres-
ent.

I drove with the Attorney General to the State Department and he left me
there. I was with Lansing for more than an hour. His first concern was to
put himself straight regarding the two statements he had made the morning the
peace note was published. He has written a careful statement of his purposes
and has made a good argument in favor of them.

He is much concerned because the President fails to discuss interna-
tional questions with him. He says he seldom sees him and that as far as

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he is concerned, the State Department is sailing without a chart. He said the President sees no one and that "his mind is a vacuum during your absences" Lansing does not know how constantly the President and I keep in touch and how, from day to day, I send him information concerning international affairs.

Lansing desires the President to press the submarine issue and to send
Bernstorff home. He has written the President a note urging him to take a
firm stand. He believes the President will not do this <ins>hasaussaxka</ins> told him
the other day that he did not believe the people of the United States were
willing to go to war because a few Americans had been killed.

From Lansing's rooms I went to see Phillips to talk of foreign ap-
pointments. Phillips expressed the hope that someone would take charge of
this rather disagreeable and difficult task. I suggested that it be turned
over to Vance McCormick under my supervision. In speaking to the President
about it later he surprised me by saying that he did not intend to make a po-
litical appointment in the foreign service, at least, until the war was ended,
and that he did not wish McCormick to have anything to do with it. I ap-
plauded this resolution for it is in line with what I have recommended from
the beginning of his administration and many times since. Even the last
time I talked with him he was inclined toward political appointments of some
sort. I find he changes his views frequently. I noticed this change when
we talked before luncheon about appointments in general. He declared he in-
tended to pick out the best men regardless of factions. This, too, I ap-
plauded as it is in line with what I suggested at the beginning of his admin-
istration.

Phillips rode with me to his home where I met the French Ambassador,
Phillips leaving us to return to the Department.

Jusserand and I had an interesting talk. He started to tell of the

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grievances of the Allies but I stopped him at the inception saying that was
past and there were too many difficulties to be overcome in the present to
make it worth while going into things which were over. I could see a
marked depression. We discussed the condition of Germany and I expressed
the opinion that Germany would not lack for man power during this year, and
that her army would not lack for food. I was uncertain as to what extent
she could procure raw materials for high explosives. Other than that I
thought she could go through. I commended the German people as a whole and
thought they were inoffensive and made good citizens. In the United States
they are docile and law-abiding and I expressed the opinion that they would be
so in Germany if they were not led by an ambitious, cruel and selfish military
oligarchy. To my surprise, Jusserand agreed with both my views and conclu-
sions.

I returned to the White House and had a few minutes talk with the
President before luncheon. This discussion concerned departmental and rou-
tine affairs. There was no one at lunch except the President, Mrs. Wilson
and myself.

The President made one remark which alarmed me. I told him, as
I have many times before, how unprepared we were and that Jusserand had call-
ed my attention to it, expressing the hope that we would take some steps par-
ticularly if there was any chance of a break with Germany. Jusserand thought
there would be from 20,000 to 40,000 Germans in the Eastern States who would
for the moment have things their own way; blowing up bridges, powder maga-

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zines, munitions etc. He did not consider it improbable that they might
capture Washington and the President himself. Neither the President nor
I was disturbed at this thought, but I took the occasion to express the
feeling that we should not be so totally unprepared in the event of war.

The President replied, "there will be no war. This country does not intend to become involved in this war. We are the only one of the great White nations that is free from war today, and it would be a crime against civilization for us to go in".

The President may change this view for, as I said before, he changes
his views often. For instance, the last time I was here and suggested Cleve-
land H. Dodge for England, he thought it would not do. This time he suggest-
ed it himself.

McAdoo came and spent three quarters of an hour. He was terribly
depressed. He thought the President had lost all interest and all "punch";
that things were drifting in an aimless sort of way. He tried to get an
expression from me about his foreign policy, but I evaded it and protested
there was nothing to tell. I find that the President is now much more in-
terested in foreign affairs than he heretofore has been and apparently less so
in domestic affairs.

McAdoo is quite right, though, in deploring his lack of attention to
departmental affairs. He permits his Secretaries to do pretty much what
they please in routine matters, and he does not know whether things are well
or badly done.

Frank Polk followed but he merely wanted to find out something of
the situation as I found it in Washington, especially as to the President.

Dudley Malone followed Polk and I took him to the train where I met Hugh
Wallace, Lincoln Colcord, Brougham of the Public Ledger, Jack Golden, the

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playwrite, and others who were on their way to New York so my time was occu-
pied until I reached my destination.

New York, January 5, 1917.

The usual accumulation of work awaited my return. Cleve Dodge, Jerome
Green and Honnold of the Belgian Commission came to hear what I had to tell
concerning the President's decision regarding the plan to coordinate foreign
relief societies.

The President is willing to help but not to take the lead, because he is
afraid some criticism might arise on account of the critical condition of
foreign affairs, all of which he wishes to avoid. I was amused to hear him
say when I was in Washington, that if he took the lead in a general relief
plan someone would be certain to say that he sympathized with one side or the
other. I hope that feature of his last note has struck home.

Mrs. Borden Harriman came to tell what news she had gathered since I
last saw her. Walter Rogers called to say goodbye before taking a trip to
the Orient. He asked what questions I thought best for him to try and unravel.
I told him to find out the sentiment in Japan toward Great Britain, Germany,
Russia and the United States. I showed him the importance of each and its
bearing upon the general international situation.

Sidney Brooks came to find if there was anything I could give him to
cable to London. I was cautious in what I said, for he is not sympathetic
with the President's views, and he goes almost wholly with the enemies of the
administration.

January 6, 1917.

John Golden and Dudley Malone took lunch with us. Afterward, Golden
took me to the Gaiety Theater where his play, "Turn to the Right" is being

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acted. During the entire play we fluctuated between the audience and behind the scenes. He showed me the mechanism and introduced me to each of the cast. I found it interesting. I had seen the play before, but to meet the different actors and to hear their stories and get their point of view from behind the scenes, was an experience which I enjoyed thoroughly. Golden was good enough to tell me every detail as to expense, what he paid each member of the cast, and why certain lines were written and what effect they were supposed to produce upon an audience.

Brougham and Colcord called to thresh out the plan of sending Colcord to Europe to write of conditions there.

Howard Whitehouse called to tell something more of conditions in England and of the reception there of the President's note.

January 7, 1917.

Senator Towne was my principal caller. He came to tell about his plan for Mexico. I asked him not to do so for the reason that I could be of no service since it was a question about which I had but little knowledge and of which I seldom talked to the President. I let him know that even if he told me anything of value I would not repeat it because I did not want to add the Mexican problem to my other burdens. He insisted, however, upon talking for a half hour regardless of my disinclination to hear him and my positive pro-mise not to repeat it to the President.

January 8, 1917.

A Mrs. Pringsheim of Berlin came to say that a member of the German Foreign Office had given her a message to deliver to the President. She landed on November 14th and it took her sometime to find out that she could not see the President. In speaking to Miss Jane Addams about it she was told that her next best move was to see me. Miss Addams gave her a letter of intro-

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duction and I made an appointment for her to call.

She wished to tell the President as a message from the German Foreign Office (1) that they expected to conquer Roumania by the 10th of December, and when this was accomplished, they would make a peace proposal.

(2) They considered the President the best mediator. The only others they had in mind were the Pope and the King of Spain; and both of them being Catholics, they thought it inadvisable to have them mediate since Protestant Germany would not approve.

Mrs. Pringsheim's father is a professor at Hamilton College and her husband is a professor at the University of Berlin.

Paderewski followed Mrs. Pringsheim. He wished to explain the trouble which would probably follow the coming of the new Austrian Ambassador, Tarnowski. The Austrian Poles plan to give him a great welcome which Paderewski thinks will be resented by the Poles in general, and that all sorts of complications may ensue.

He thought the proposals for a new Poland made by Russia and Germany were absolutely selfish. Germany proposes to take a part of Russian Poland in order to strengthen her eastern frontier, while Russia wants to create a Poland composed of Russian, German and Austrian Poland for the purpose of securing Dantzig for a Russian port.

Rumeley of the Evening Mail came about a plan he wishes the Department of Agriculture to adopt by which corn can be made a general article of food in Europe. He thinks the Department of Agriculture ought to wage a campaign to accelerate agricultural development. He believes America has been over developed industrially and under developed agriculturally. He is unable to get Houston to act and wants me to spur him on.

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We went to dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Fulton Cutting and to the opera later. Among those who visited us in the box was Governor Herrick whom I have not seen since the election.

January 9, 1917.

Stephen Bonsal, Secretary to the Mexican Commission, called. He would like another diplomatic post. He gave some interesting information about Mexico, Central and South America. His talk on those countries is full of interest.

Willard Straight followed Bonsal. The most interesting thing Straight had to tell was that he had seen the Japanese Ambassador in Washington and that may the Ambassador told him that Japan was perfectly willing to have the United States help develop China, in fact, they would be willing for us to take the lead in her economic development. The reason for this is perhaps to allay the suspicion of the Chinese and permit Japan to secure a firmer grip upon China politically.

Charles Ferguson followed Straight and Robert Monroe followed Ferguson.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Edward S. Martin. One of the guests told me that a stockbroker had informed her that he knew as a fact that the President had made three million dollars in the late decline in the Stock Market because of the peace note. It is astonishing that anyone with intelligence enough to be at large should believe such reports. It shows how perverted the minds and morals of a part of our citizenship are.

January 10, 1917.

Mr. Cyrus H. K. Curtis and Mr. John J. Spurgeon of the Curtis Publishing Company came over from Philadelphia to see me about sending Lincoln Colcord

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abroad. Spurgeon asked whether they could consider it merely as a newspaper
enterprise or as an enterprise helpful to the administration. I told him
merely as a newspaper undertaking, but that it might incidentally be of bene-
fit to the Administration.

I believe Curtis really wants to make a great paper out of the Public
Ledger. I hope he knows how, but I have my doubts. He can get circulation
but it is character and influence that is needed.

Hollis Godfrey came at 1.30 and remained for an hour. I am afraid I
shall have to revise my estimate of Godfrey because of his intense egotism.
He told me of his distinguished family, reciting glibly the different
branches of his family, all to show his fitness for the work he is doing.

Baruch called later and spoke of Godfrey having made an exhibition of
himself at the last meeting of the Council for National Defence, and asked
me if he was not a little crazy. Godfrey explained his actions by telling
how adroitly he forced the Council to do what he desired.

Baruch told me, too, that in the future he would not speculate. He
said he had some eighteen or twenty million of dollars and that it was no de-
privation to him to keep out of the market since he very much preferred to do
the work on the National Defence Council, and he could see that I was right in
advising that he had to give up one or the other. He said he fairly hunger-
ed, though, to get at the market and "smash it" so as to bring to grief the
enemies who had tried to besmirch him in this leak inquiry.

The White House, Washington.

January 11, 1917.

We left for Washington this morning and, strangely enough, the train was
on time. Grayson met us at the station.

Almost as soon as we arrived, the President and I went into executive

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session. The President closed his study door so as not to be interrupted and we were at it for about two hours, having more time than usual since the Lansing dinner to the President was not until eight o'clock, while the White House dinner is always at seven.

The President opened the discussion by reading me the "flimsy" containing the Allied response to his note. He then read the address which he had prepared in accordance with our understanding last week. It is a noble document and one which I think will live.

As usual, he struck the wrong note in one instance which he seems unable to avoid. He said "this war was brought on by distrust of one another". I asked him to strike out this sentence, which he did. In another instance he said "both sides say they have no desire to humiliate or destroy the other". I asked him to strike out "humiliate" which he did.

I asked if he had shown the address to Lansing. He replied that he had shown it to no one but that he intended to read it to the Secretary and Senator Stone before cabling it. He thought Lansing was not in sympathy with his purpose to keep out of the war. This discussion came up when I mentioned the difficulty I was having with the Department in getting their permission to send Bernstorff's messages through to Berlin. I told him that Lansing disliked Bernstorff and Bernstorff disliked Lansing, but that the Secretary's grievance was perhaps more just since he thought he had evidence that Bernstorff was trying to have him removed from the State Department, regarding Lansing's resignation. I instanced the many rumors appearing from time to time in papers. The President replied, "Bernstorff is not nearly so dangerous to Lansing as he is to himself, for I came very near to asking for his resignation when he gave out the statement regarding the last note."

We decided that his address should be delivered before the Senate

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and we then discussed how best to get the text of it to the peoples of the belligerent nations. The President is not so much concerned about reaching the governments as he is about reaching the people. He thought it would be best to cable it to Page and have him mail copies to all the other belligerent countries. This, I told him, was impracticable because of the time it would take. I suggested that it be cabled to London, Paris, Berlin and Petrograd letting Gerard give it to the Central Powers and Sharp to the Entente, other than Russia and England where it would be sent direct. This was tentatively agreed upon, although he rather hesitated on account of the cost.

It was also agreed that the Ambassadors should see that the address was published in full in the several belligerent countries. This is important as one can see by reading the text of the address.

When we had finished this subject, I read him some letters which I had just received from Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton, W. H. Buckler etc. etc. He said he did not intend to allow Lansing to make any changes in the address since it was to be delivered before the Senate and was not a note to foreign governments.

When we parted to dress for the Lansing dinner, the President insisted upon my taking the address and reading it over more carefully and returning it to him when we meet tomorrow morning.

The Lansing dinner was a brilliant affair. There were twenty-two at the table. Besides the President, Mrs. Wilson, the Lansings and ourselves, there was General and Mrs. Scott, Justice Clarke, Justice and Mrs. Brandeis, Mr. and Mrs. Hamlin, Mrs. Dewitt Talmadge, Mr. and Mrs. Coudert and General and Mrs. Barnett.

I had a long talk with Justice Clarke. He said the Supreme Court was an exceedingly conservative body meaning, I think, reactionary. He

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thought McReynolds was about the most reactionary Justice on the Bench. I as as explained McReynolds' appointment both to the Department of Justice and to the Supreme Court, by telling of his especial fitness for the suits which were under way in 1912 under the Sherman Act. I expressed the opinion that the President would strengthen the progressive end of the Bench during the next four years. In order to do this, I asked him to be on the lookout for material so, when a vacancy occurred, he could suggest names to the President and to the Attorney General. Clarke spoke in high terms of Gregory.

January 12, 1917.

Lanier Winslow was my first caller. Then Gregory followed. I wished to talk to Gregory about Grayson's affairs and many other matters of passing importance. Phillips followed Gregory. He was overcome with emotion when he talked of his promotion to First Assistant Secretary of State. I should think he would be since he did not vote for the President, and yet had this honor thrust upon him. The President does not know this and his regard for Phillips is such that I shall never tell him.

We discussed foreign appointments and made out a list which I am to present to the President.

Senator Culberson called. I have never seen such a change in the physical condition of a man. I could hardly look at him without emotion. Culberson is one of the finest characters I have ever met in political life, and was formerly a perfect specimen of physical manhood, and to see him in this sad plight, filled me with sorrow.

I went to the Treasury and had an hour with McAdoo. He was full of criticism of the President's reticence with him and of his growing seclusion. McAdoo declared that he could not get him to take any interest in political matters and that things were getting in a bad way in

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Congress He does not know that the President at last seems to have awakened to the importance of the foreign situation, and that he is conserving his strength and mind for that great work. I can not tell him this without be-traying confidence so I did not argue the matter. McAdoo stated that he would not remain in the Administration much longer than the fourth of March.

I returned to the White House and found the President had been waiting for me. He had written another page to his address since last night. It is to be a prelude mentioning the receipt of the Allies' response to his last note. He has done it marvellously well and it tones in with the balance of the address.

He mentioned Page's resignation again and of his determination to accept it. He expressed the opinion that Page would come home disgruntled and would show his true state of mind through the pages of the World's Work. I did not believe he would do this as there would be no excuse for such action. The President had not made up his mind whom he would send in Page's place but I think he will offer it to Cleveland H. Dodge.

We discussed Gerard's latest indiscretion in his speech in Berlin. At the time I talked to the President, they had not received a reply giving the text of Gerard's speech, but later, Lansing had it. In some ways it was as reported, in others, not.

Since we were going to lunch at the Wallace's I bade the President goodbye, for he has a Cabinet meeting at 2.30 which would be in session when I returned. He asked when I expected to come back, and if there was anything that would call me over again soon. I told him we expected to go to Texas for a week sometime this month. He hoped I would not go before he made his address and the echoes from it had come back. I promised not to do so.

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In discussing foreign appointments he thought we ought to get the best man
possible for Argentine since it was the only one of the A. B. C. Powers working
cordially with us.

At the Wallace luncheon, there were present, Secretary and Mrs. Lansing,
Ambassador and Mme. Jusserand and Vance McCormick. I had some talk with
Lansing before lunch and explained why it was necessary to allow Bernstroff
to communicate with his Government. I told him the President desired it.

During lunch Jusserand and I had some conversation, principally about
Russia. I again expressed the opinion that Russia was the danger point for
the Allies, and to this he agreed. The recent changes in the Government
It
there have alarmed him. He has now gone from reactionary to liberal and
from liberal back to extreme reactionary, showing how unstable conditions in
that country are.

Phillips had told me of the Department's desire to transfer A. H.
Frazier from France to Vienna as First Secretary or Counselor if the French
Government would consent. In speaking about it to Jusserand he said if I
recommended it, he would ask his Government to consent, although they did not
like the practice of sending anyone who had been in France so long into an
enemy country.

We returned to the White House where Mrs. Wilson was awaiting me. We
had a long talk about affairs in general. She was disturbed about the Gray-
son-Daniels controversy. Daniels placed Grayson's appointment before the
President in such a way that the President had to decline to advance him to
the rank of Rear Admiral. Mrs. Wilson told me the entire story, how
Grayson had been pushing for nearly two years to have this law passed in
order to get the appointment. He enlisted her aid even before she had ever
met the President. She feels, as we all do, that Grayson had been pushing

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his own fortunes in an indelicate and objectionable way. She said the President was as disturbed over it that he lay awake nearly all night. He feels that he should refuse Grayson this advancement.

I told Mrs. Wilson of my talks with Grayson and what I was doing to try to straighten the matter out. She said, since we last talked together, the President had told her about the Tumulty incident, and he thought Tumulty would resign on the fourth of March. The little circle close to the President seems to have dwindled down to the two of us, Mrs. Wilson and myself.

I kept Polk waiting for fifteen minutes because of my conversation with Mrs. Wilson. My talk with him was rather hurried since we had to catch the four o'clock train for New York. Polk was disturbed at the constant reports that were reaching Lansing and which Lansing repeated to him that he, Polk, was trying to displace him in order to be his successor. Lansing, of course, does not believe this and has every confidence in Polk's loyalty, otherwise, he would not go to him with the stories. However, it distresses Polk.

Polk gave me a message from the German Ambassador. He said he had received a reply from his Government to the proposal I made through him and that he would be in New York at 10.30 Monday to make it known to me.

New York, January 13, 1917.

Sir William Wiseman called this morning to discuss the Allies' note and to ask how our Government received it. He was pleased to know that it was as good or better than we expected. Sir William asked if he might say to his Government that, for the moment, nothing further would be done by us toward bringing about peace and that their reply had closed the chapter. I told him, no, we had just begun and that the war was entering its last

phase and whether it would continue six months, ten months or a year longer
was the only question. I thought the Allies would have plenty of time to
find out whether their spring affan and summer offensive would be effective.

Hamilton Holt and Mr. Short of the League to Enforce Peace came shortly
after lunch. They made a report on what they were doing and advised with me
as to what should be done further. I told Holt the League to Enforce Peace
was making a mistake in so closely defining the purposes of the League. I
advised making the purposes more general for no one at this time could tell
be the
what would result of international negotiations on that subject, and it was
not well to tie ourselves down to a special program. He understood and said
he would try to change the attitude. He wished to proceed in still another
direction which I thought inadvisable and which he agreed to drop.

Mr. Howard Whitehouse, M. P. came to confer further regarding the pro-
gress of the President's peace program.

January 14, 1917.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey telephoned from Philadelphia asking if he might come
over for a half hour's conference. He came with his secretary and confined
himself to the thirty minutes allotted. There was no necessity of his coming
at all.

B. M. Baruch came to talk over his troubles in which he is involved
because of "the leak" and his stock operations. I politely intimated that
I thought it would be just as well if he did not come again soon. I do not
wish to be mixed up with his affairs which are none of my making and in
which I am not interested.

January 15, 1917.

The Attorney General telephoned from Washington last night at bedtime

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and asked if he might see me early this morning about a matter of much im-
portance. I asked him to breakfast and he reached the apartment around
eight o'clock.

He says Tumulty had been indiscreetly telling his friends that the
State Department has tapped the wires of the German Embassy, both in New York
and in Washington. Gregory knows of six people he has told and concludes this
part of the
is only a small number. He is alarmed and, after a conference with Frank
Polk, decided to come to New York and advise with me. He says Tumulty is
trying to exert pressure upon the Department of Justice to drop its investi-
gation of one of the members of the Excise Court of the District of Columbia,
an Irishman who is a friend of Tumulty's and who was appointed upon his recom-
mendation. It seems that this man's wire has also been tapped and Tumulty
heard of it through Swazy of the Telephone Company who is another Irishman.

I advised Gregory to take the matter up with the President. He is the
only man I thought who could come reasonably near making Tumulty hold his
tongue. I also advised that the tapping be discontinued immediately. It
is one thing to be able to deny that the wires are tapped and another to have
to admit it. There is no need for Polk to hear what happened in the past if
he can only truthfully say that the wires are not tapped.

Gregory has been with me most of the day, having taken breakfast,
lunch and dinner with us and tonight we go to the theater. I invited Bain-
bridge Colby and Raymond Fosdick to lunch. Gregory desired to offer Colby
the U. S. District Attorneyship here when Marshall resigns.

We had a delightful time at lunch and I was pleased with Colby. It
was the first time we had met. Much to my surprise, he is considering the
appointment. Gregory had not made much headway when I entered the discus-
sion. The point I made was that it would identify him, Colby, with the

Notes. / When I pinned Bernstorff down in writing I found they were referring to after peace had been made. E. M. H.

Democratic Party and put him in line for the Governorship, U. S. Senatorship or any other party honors.

I looked over Raymond Fosdick, asking him something about his activities to see whether he would be available for the Collectorship. My opposition is that he is available.

The most important visitor was the German Ambassador who came at 10.30 by appointment and remained for an hour. He made what I consider the most important communication made by any of the belligerents since the war began. My letter to the President of today indicates what this statement was.

The fact that they are willing to arbitrate; willing to permit the President to name the terms upon which the peace conference is to be called is of far reaching significance. So also is their willingness to join a league to enforce peace, and to reduce armaments, both land and sea. Note.

I was not so much impressed at their willingness to sign the so called Bryan Treaty with this country, for the reason that it would not be to our advantage now to have them do so. They could resume their submarine activities and we could not go to war with them under such a treaty within a year. However, all of this shows what a change of heart has come over the governing class in Germany.

Before the war, the Emperor spoke to me of the absurdity of asking them to sign one of the Bryan treaties. He said that Germany's strength lay in the fact that she was prepared for immediate war, and they could not consider signing a treaty which would give an enemy a year in which to prepare.

I have repeatedly urged upon Germany military disarmament as a peace condition, and I have always been met with a refusal. They now seem willing to concede everything the most forward looking nations desire. I feel that Germany is tottering, otherwise they would not make such concessions.

On the other hand, I feel that France is also reaching the verge of exhaustion. Russia is an uncertain quantity and Great Britain is the only one of the belligerents that has taken a firm grip and shut her eyes to all outside influence and proposals.

Walter Lippman and Croly came for information for this week's issue of the New Republic. I gave them enough food for thought to keep them on the right road.

The only other important caller was Sir William Wiseman. We had an interesting talk in which I tried to prove that England's safety lay in the freedom of the seas. I explained again that it was my proposal and not a German creation. I told Wiseman that the war was necessarily entering its last phase and that Russia England ought to take advantage of the fact that Germany was willing to make peace upon liberal terms, embracing practically all the democratic world was contending for. I thought peace should be made while von Bethman Holweg and other liberals were in the Government rather than wait for the reactionaries to get into the saddle.

One of the interesting things Wiseman told me was that Great Britain would probably try to force Russia into a constitutional monarchy when peace was made. He thought this could be done by declaring that the Western Democracies would not be willing to give a warm seaport or other concessions to a government which was not responsible to the people. That it would be dangerous to democracy to take any other course. I thought the United States' active cooperation could be counted upon in this direction.

Wiseman tells me that he is affiliated with the Unionists in England, but he seems to be entirely liberal in his tendencies. We had a satisfactory talk which included my criticism of his Ambassador and Gaunt because of their association with no one except enemies of this Administration. Wiseman ad-

mitted this and said he had brought it to the attention of the Ambassador.
Wiseman has had but little experience and is a young man, but Great Britain
would be far better represented by him than by the older and experienced di-
plomat, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice.

Secretary Lane called to tell me of the breaking up of the Mexican Com-
mission and of his conclusions. Lane is always interesting.

January 16, 1917.

Sidney Brooks came to get permission to send a long cable to London out-
lining what the United States has done for the Allies. I postponed giving
him a definite answer.

Madame Selenka called and tried to prove that the German Military Par-
ty, at least in Bavaria, did not desire the war.

Xxhakapkuuxix McAdoo telephoned concerning the "leak inquiry" before
Congress. I sent him a suggestion today by Gordon, who goes with Janet to the
White House this evening to attend the President's Diplomatic Dinner. I
told him, through Gordon, to have the democrats insist upon widening the in-
quiry. It is not certain that this entire matter had not been raised for
the purpose of smirching the Administration. My notion is to take the bri-
dle off and to have a complete investigation, not only of the democrats but of
republicans.

This suggestion was conveyed to McAdoo early this morning and I know by
the papers and from his telephone call that he has set the ball in motion.

January 17, 1917.

A letter comes from the President this morning concerning his pro-
posed address to the Senate. It is attached as, indeed, is my reply and my
letters to Bernstorff, the Secretary of State, Lord Bryce, Noel Buxton, Am-

bassador Thos. Nelson Page, Frederic Penfield, A. H. Frazier, W. H. Buckler,
Norman Hapgood, and Joe Grew.

Dr. Grayson telephoned from Washington that Secretary Daniels had inform-
ed him that his, Grayson's, personal matter would go through. He was very
much elated and thanked me for my efforts in his behalf.

Arthur Little of Pearson's Magazine asked my consent for Frank Harris to
write a character sketch of me.

Macauley, the cartoonist, came to tell of a new play he is writing which
is to be used by the movies and which he wishes thrown on a screen in the
House of Representatives at Washington for the benefit of members of Congress.
The theme has to do with a league to enforce peace.

Paderewski called to make some corrections in the memoranda he gave
me the other day. He again expressed deep appreciation of the Poles for my
efforts in their behalf. I am a sincere friend of Poland and I am pushing
her fortunes at every possible opportunity, and I am thankful that there is
some prospect of success. The Poles I am sure will be pleased to read what
the President has to say in his proposed address before the Senate.

Bainbridge Colby came to tell of his decision not to accept the U. S.
District Attorneyship.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Cass Gilbert.

January 18, 1917.

My letter of today to the President is the only important feature in the
diary.

Whitehouse came to talk over the situation. He desired me to give him
a hint of the next move, but of course I shall not do so since it is intend-
ed that it shall be a profound secret.

January 19, 1917.

Peter Clark Macfarlane took lunch with us. He does not like the

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President and gives as his reason that he is insincere and does not rise to
the great opportunities of leadership which have been given him.

Morganthau followed Macfarlane. He came for advice upon several un-
important matters.

Sir William Wiseman was the most interesting visitor I had during the day.
We discussed the international situation with great candor. He brought a
message from the British Ambassador to the effect that the French Ambassador
had not been altogether open with him recently, notably, regarding my last
two conversations with Jusserand, which he failed to report to the British
or other Allied Ambassadors. He said there were some things I should
 told him which he regarded as confidential, but as a whole, he felt it his
duty to report our conferences to the other ambassadors.

Wiseman and I discussed Spring-Rice's temperamental defects, giving
him praise where praise was due. The question came up as to what was best
to be done when Captain Gaunt returned which will be in a few days. I do
not want to hurt Gaunt's sensibilities, and yet I feel that it is more pro-
fitable to work with Wiseman. He has more aptitude for the kind of work to
be done as liaison officer between the British Government and myself. We
agreed to think it over and determine what was best to do.

I outlined the kind of peace I thought should be made, and deprecated
the gamble the Allies were taking in refusing to consider peace until after
they have made their spring and summer offensive. Wiseman says the main
difficulty now is with the British people who believe a decisive victory will
come before Autumn. In turn, I told him this impression had been given them
by their Government and if they were not successful, a terrible reckoning
would be awaiting them. In my opinion, the worst thing that could happen
to the world would be a decisive victory for either side. We realize why

Germany should not win, but it is not certain that if the Allies won they
would not war among themselves over the spoils just as the Balkan States did,
particularly if Russia and France link up with one another against Great Brit-
tain.

Mr. and Mrs. Whitney Newton came for dinner. The letter from Bernstorff
and my letters to him and to the President are the principal features of the
day's correspondence. We are trying to pin Bernstorff down to something
definite.

January 20, 1917.

The President's letter is the most important item of the day. Lin-
coln Colcard took lunch with us. He plans to sail for Germany next Saturday.

Lloyd Griscom called to ask advice regarding a request which the Rockefel-
ler Foundation, Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. have made of him to go to the belliger-
ent countries and try to coordinate the relief work in prison camps. Judge
Howe of Vermont, and Senator Thomas of Colorado were among my callers.

January 21, 1917.

Wiseman came in the morning and we had another long conference regard-
ing international affairs and peace. I outlined what the President will say
in his speech tomorrow before the Senate. I did this in order to prepare his
mind for what was coming and to argue in favor of the points made without tell-
ing him of the proposed address. I asked him to come in tomorrow at 2.30 and
take the 3.30 train for Washington as there was something I could tell him
then which I thought would make a visit to Washington worth while.

Herbert Hoover of the Belgian Relief Commission landed this morning
and came to see me this afternoon. He had much of interest to tell about
the situation on the other side. I shall have him to lunch within a day or

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so in order to get a fuller account of what he thinks of the situation.

S. R. Bertron, Frank Trumbull, Thos. Love and others filled up the rest of the day. McAdoo telephoned from Washington to ask about a suitable successor to Lowe who has resigned from the Internal Revenue Collectorship here. He also asked about appointments to the Farm Loan Bank in Texas. My letters to the President and von Bernstorff explain themselves.

January 22, 1917.

Lippman and Croly came for their weekly talk to get information in order to write intelligently in the New Republic. They were pleased with the President's address to the Senate.

Bainbridge Colby came to make suggestions regarding the Federal District Attorney appointment.

Sir William Wiseman called as agreed and we had a few minutes talk before he left for Washington. We discussed the address which I asked him to read on his way to Washington, and to get the consensus of opinion of the Allies representatives. He is to return tomorrow night.

I wrote again to the President today and my letter covers the different points.

January 23, 1917.

My letter to the President is a part of the record. Karl von Weigand the war correspondent from Berlin called. He tells me that Germany is now in the hands of four men. Von Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Kaiser and von Bethman Holweg, their importance in the order named. He considers Ludendorff the brains of the group. He is rather bitter in his criticisms of Gerard and of Herbert Bayard Swope. Von Weigand was late and instead of giving him a half hour as intended, he only had ten minutes.

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Hugh Gibson from the London Embassy followed von Weigand. I wished to see him because of his intimacy with the Asquiths. I felt certain he would give some information which could not be obtained elsewhere. He verified my belief that Asquith is quietly waiting to try and put Lloyd George in the scrap heap. He also verified the report that Asquith had been offered an earldom and the garter and had refused both which is significant. I told Gibson it reminded me of Kipling's lines which paraphrased would run:

"I am sorry for you Mr. George, I am sorry to cause you pain,

But a terrible spree there is sure to be when we two meet again".

Gibson says the Asquith Government that went out could not understand why Balfour was placed by the George Government in the Foreign Office. Gibson was present not long ago when Balfour asked Asquith to accept his resignation. This was at a time when the Germans had made a sea raid and Balfour was being criticized. Asquith refused to let him resign while he was under fire because Northcliffe and his, Asquith's, other enemies would consider they had brought it about. He was quite willing for Balfour to resign at a quieter time.

Lloyd George in criticizing the Asquith Ministry directed his attack more directly at the retention of Balfour than at any other man in the Cabinet, but, almost over night when George became Prime Minister, he placed Balfour in another and fully as important a place. Gibson does not believe the George ministry will last long.

My English friend, Whitehouse, called to express his delight over the President's speech and to make some further suggestions.

Dr. Rumely came apropos some ideas he has regarding peace. Billy Phillips telephoned from Washington that the German Ambassador had handed in another long message to his Government, and the Secretary asked Phillips to telephone me whether it should be sent. In the circumstances, I thought

the Secretary had best ask the President as I preferred not to pass upon the
matter again. My real reason was that I do not like being called up every
few days about the same matter, and I thought if Lansing spoke to the Pres-
ident, he would settle it once and for all.

January 24, 1917.

The day opened briskly. A reporter from the International News Service came to ask me to affirm or deny a report which was published in the World concerning my having received a peace envoy from France. A telephone from Washington came asking for an appointment. A telephone from the Public Ledger asking my opinion as to when Lincoln Colcord should sail.

Frank Trumbull called to discuss the proposed Adamson legislation before Congress. I declined to commit myself or to advise except in a very general way. I expressed myself as being too busy to go into such matters.

Hampson Gary, of the State Department, came apropos of his own ambitions.

Many other callers came and all before twelve o'clock. Thos. F. Logan of the Washington Post came to lunch.

Rublee came in the afternoon to talk with me about the Trades Commission.

Sir William Wiseman called to report upon the Allied opinion in Washington concerning the President's address before the Senate. He was much disturbed, largely, I feel, because he had been twenty-four hours with Ambassador Spring-Rice. He made much of the President's phrase "peace without victory".

My letter of tomorrow to the President will explain our conversation and I shall not go into it here.

Mr. and Mrs. Richard Washburn Child took dinner informally with us.

Child is going to China and Japan and we had some pleasant discussion as to those countries and the purposes of his trip.

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January 25, 1917.

Lincoln Colcord came twice today concerning the article he is writing for the Public Ledger, which he wished to submit before sending, since the article is almost wholly mine.

Gunther, of the London Embassy, called to tell of their growing dissatisfaction with the State Department's treatment of them. According to Gunther, they are all ready to resign because they have not had what they consider proper advancement. They do not understand that the entire Embassy has come under the ban of the Department's displeasure.

Mr. Short and Hamilton Holt of the League to Enforce Peace called together. Holt expressed himself almost as warmly in regard to the President's speech as did Herbert Croly, speaking of it as "an event in his life."

I received an important letter from the President today. I immediately telephoned Phillips and had him arrange with the German Ambassador to come to New York today and meet me here at 10.30 tomorrow morning.

Mrs. Francis L. Higginson, Jr. dined with us and we went to the theater to see Stevenson's Treasure Island.

January 26, 1917.

The German Ambassador came at 10.30 and my letter to the President and to the Secretary of State pretty well cover the subject of our conversation. I feel the necessity of getting peace overtures begun before the spring offensive. One has to deal, though, with the ambitions and selfishness of those composing the belligerent governments. The people themselves do not know the true state of affairs, and the governments are not so much to blame for not informing them, for it is essential that their courage and enthusiasm should be kept at white heat. The people in each country are sure that vic-

tory is within sight. We therefore find peace sentiment less acute among
the people than it would be if they knew the true state of affairs.

Richard H. Dana, of Boston, came to discuss Civil Service Reform, he
being President of that society.

Commissioner Edwards called to tell of his trip to Washington and of
his conferences with McAdoo and Burleson.

Wiseman and I had another long conference. He has changed his attitude
since yesterday, as my letter to the President indicates. It is the most
hopeful conversation I have had with anyone representing the British.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. John M. Bowers and went to the opera to
hear Martha.

January 27, 1917.

My letter to the President of today is a part of the diary. It indicates
my further feeling regarding the conference Wiseman and I had yesterday.
McAdoo telephoned last night concerning the Congressional Inak investigation
and I put him in direct touch with Sherman L. Whipple. Whipple telephoned
to ask advice regarding certain features of the investigation.

Von Weigand called again to tell of conditions in Germany and of the
mental attitude, as far as he knew it, of the men in charge. What he had
to say about von Hindenburg, Ludendorff and others was interesting and valua-
ble.

Mr. Radcliffe of the Manchester Guardian and London Daily News called to
tell of British liberal opinion.

Whitehouse followed, and then came Hollis Godfrey. We dined
with Doctor and Mrs. Myles.

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January 28, 1917.

We took lunch today with Mr. and Mrs. S. R. Bertron to meet the Hoovers.
It has been a quiet and restful Sunday. Martin called in the morning but I
could give him but little time. I had a long talk over the telephone with
Daniel Roper, otherwise the day was uneventful.

January 29, 1917.

This has been another quiet day. No one of importance has called
and there has been but little mail.

January 30, 1917.

Today made up for the last two quiet ones. We started off with a large
European mail. Letters came from Gerard, Lord Bryce, Jos. Grey, John Garrett
Frazier etc.

Martin called to get some material for his weekly editorials in Life.
Walter Lippman came for the same purpose for the New Republic. Edward G.
Lowry, formerly of the London Embassy, came to discuss the advisability of
doing some Belgium relief work for that Commission.

Congressman McLemore and Senator Meacham of Texas called in order to
enlist my aid in a matter before the War Department.

Captain Guy Gaunt was my most interesting visitor. He has just returned from a two months trip to England where he has had long conferences with Lloyd George, Balfour, Cecil etc. etc. and has been in the trenches for a week at a time. He believes the Allies can break through this spring and summer. I did not agree with him. The way I diagnosed the situation to him was: *this: the Kaiser, the Chancellor and Germany generally desire and peace. Von Hindenburg, Ludendorff, who control Germany, believe that peace can be secured quicker by the sword than through negotiations. The Chancellor and Kaiser will therefore not be able to offer such terms as the Allies can afford to accept.*

Gaunt considered this a fair estimate of the situation. He tells me the British Intelligence Service is marvellously good. They have reports of everything going on in Berlin, and oftentimes they get copies of letters and documents of great value. He says in one letter von Bernstorff gives his estimate of me and claims that he has <u>me</u> in his pocket. Gaunt promised to show me a copy of this letter. I doubt whether Bernstorff said this.

Gaunt said the soldiers wish to fight through this war to a victorious peace, for they all say _they will not stand for another war_. He told me this largely to let me know that we could not count upon Great Britain to help in the event Germany and Japan combined against the United States. In turn, I told him we were not afraid of both Germany and Japan and did not need Great Britain's help.

While Guant was here, Bernstorff telephoned from Washington that he had received an answer from his government and would send it over by special messenger tomorrow. My letter to the President explains this.

January 31, 1917.

The German Ambassador telephoned again this morning to say he was not able to get his message off until the 12.30 train. He said the reply is "half good and half bad, but the general terms are good though spoiled by the insistence of the Admiralty in putting in something which is wholly bad".

R. W. Woolley was with me this morning to talk over general administration affairs, and to tell of conditions in Washington from his point of view.

Lincoln Colcord called to get material for another article. He is to bring it tomorrow for my visit before sending it to the Public Ledger.

Polk telephoned from Washington in the afternoon that Bernstorff had delivered the U-boat note which recinded their agreement of May 4, 1916, and

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opens up an unrestricted submarine warfare. He was very anxious for me to
come to Washington. I told him I would determine this after I had received
Bernstorff's messenger and had gotten the answer which his Government had made
to the President, through me, for peace terms.

As the afternoon grew late the excitement became intense, for the dif-
ferent news agencies had begun to receive the news. Wiseman, Gaunt, news-
paper men, etc. etc. called me up to discuss it. We had a dinner engagement
at the Plaza with Frank Trumbull, and the confusion of dressing, of receiving
visitors, and of answering telegrams and telephone calls was something beyond
endurance.

Trumbull had for his other guests, Mrs. Henry Redmond, Stuyvesant Fish
and an Englishman, Mr. Ackwith. I was constantly interrupted by telephone
calls. Wiseman had told me that there was unusual activity in German and
Austrian circles; that the Consulate had been open and busy all the night be-
fore, and that they were planning to do something with the interned ships. I
therefore telephoned Dudley Malone before we went to the Plaza and succeeded
in getting him just as he was leaving for a dinner engagement. He broke his
engagements and began at once to take such precautions as seemed necessary in
regard to the interned ships.

It was necessary for me to leave the dinner before the entertainment
which Trumbull had provided for our pleasure was finished, for I had an en-
gagement with Malone before I left for Washington on the midnight train.

Bernstorff's letter, which is attached, arrived at 6.15. It is absurd
to call it an answer to our request for terms. Germany had evidently, long
ago, determined upon her u-boat warfare and the peace proposals which she put
out last month were probably gotten up for home consumption, and to better
Germany's position in the eyes of the neutrals. She desired some justifica-

Notes In a subsequent letter he gave the terms firmly. E. M. H.

tion for her submarine warfare and thought she could get it by declaring her willingness to make peace. Germany has never given any terms, although, unofficially, she has put out terms which seemed liberal but which had no official authority. This, too, was done to better her position among the neutrals.

In von Bernstorff's letter to me he says: "These are the terms which my Government would have been willing to have submitted in a peace conference" which, of course, make them no terms at all. In making them in this indefinite form, they might have made them much more liberal, because they could have evaded them since they mean nothing. Note.

Dudley Malone called for me at eleven o'clock and we went to the station together. I could see that there was a good deal of suppressed excitement among the Pennsylvania officials who knew of my departure for Washington. A tenseness was already beginning to be felt since the newspapers had gotten out extras forecasting the seriousness of the situation. Dudley wished to send a secret service man with me but I declined.

The White House, Washington.
February 1, 1917.

I arrived in Washington on time and went directly to the White House and had breakfast alone. Soon after breakfast the President appeared and we were together continuously until two o'clock. I handed him Bernstorff's letter and he read it aloud. He saw at once how perfectly shallow it was. Bernstorff's protestations were almost a mockery when the substance of the cable from his Government was considered.

The President said Lansing was preparing a communication to Bernstorff, citing our notes and theirs in the Sussex case, and their promise of May 4th.

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This was being prepared for the purpose of giving Bernstorff his passport
if it was thought advisable.

The President was sad and depressed and I did not succeed at any time
during the day in lifting him into a better frame of mind. He was deeply
disappointed at the sudden and unwarranted action of the German Government.
We had every reason to believe that within a month the belligerents would be
talking peace. Wiseman and I had already discussed how it could be begun
and the Germans, on the surface, seemed eager for it. The German people, I
am sure, feel as they appear to, but there is some devilish machinations in
governmental or military circles back of it all. It may be that it is to
save the Hohenzollern Dynasty; it may be to save the military caste; it may
be that the Civil Government desires to save its face, but I feel certain
that there is an inhuman and selfish purpose back of it all.

The President said he felt as if the world had suddenly reversed itself;
that after going from east to west, it had begun to go from west to east and
that he could not get his balance.

The question we discussed longest was whether it was better to give
Bernstorff his passports immediately or wait until the Germans committed some
overt act. When Lansing came this discussion was renewed and we all agreed
that it was best to give him his passports at once, because by taking that
course, there was a possibility of bringing the Germans to their senses. If
we waited for the overt act, they would believe we had accepted their ultima-
tum. I had in mind, too, the effect it would have on the Allies. We would
not be nearly so advantageously situated if we waited as if we acted promptly.

The President was insistent that he would not allow it to lead to war
if it could possibly be avoided. He reiterated his belief that it would be
a crime for this Government to involve itself in the war to such an extent

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as to make it impossible to save Europe afterward. He spoke of German, as
"a madman that should be curbed". I asked if he thought it fair to the
Allies to ask them to do the curbing without doing our share. He noticeably
winced at this, but still held to his determination not to become involved
if it were humanly possible to do otherwise.

We sat listlessly during the morning until Lansing arrived, which
was not until half past eleven o'clock. The President nervously arranged
his books and walked up and down the floor. Mrs. Wilson spoke of golf and
asked whether I thought it would look badly if the President went on the
links. I thought the American people would feel that he should not do any-
thing so trivial at such a time.

In great governmental crisis of this sort the public have no conception
on the stage
what is happening behind the curtain. If the actors and the scenery could be
viewed as a tragedy like this is being prepared, it would be a revelation. When
the decision has been made, nothing further can be done until it is time for
the curtain to rise. This will be when the President goes before Congress to
explain why he is sending the German Ambassador home. Meanwhile we were
listlessly killing time. We had finished the discussion with a half hour and
there was nothing further to say. The President at last suggested that we
play a game of pool. Toward the end of the second game Lansing was announced.
The President, Lansing and I then returned to the study.

Lansing was so nearly of our mind that there was little discussion. He
read what he had written and we accepted it. The President showed him the
German communication which the German Ambassador had made through me. Lansing
took it to have a copy made and then left.

The President asked if I thought he ought to call a Cabinet meeting
today. I thought it was not necessary; that he could call it tomorrow

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at the usual time, since it had been decided that Bernstorff should not be
given his passports until Saturday morning. The President had promised Sen-
ator Stone, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that he would not
give Bernstorff his passports without first notifying him, Stone. Stone is
in St Louis and the President has telegraphed him to come at once to Wash-
ington.

We speculated upon how the Cabinet would stand. He thought the only
ones who would dissent from the program agreed upon would be Burleson, Dan-
iels, he thought, would be passive; McAdoo for immediate and drastic action;
Baker and Gregory would agree with our program in toto; Lane would be for war,
and Houston for somewhat more drastic action than had been determined upon.

In talking with Burleson and McAdoo later in the day, I found he was
correct in his judgment. Much to my surprise, Lansing agreed with the Pres-
ident and me that if we could possibly retain the Austrian Ambassador, we
should do so. I advised the President to begin at once with Tarnowski and
see whether we could not make peace proposals through the Austrians. I be-
lieve we have made a mistake in confining ourselves so wholly to the English
and the Germans, for they are the real belligerents and the most stubborn of
them all. This conflict comes down so largely to a question of supremacy
between these two nations that neither one will likely listen to a reasonable
peace unless their allies force them to it.

After seeing Polk, McAdoo and Burleson I took the Congressional Limited
for New York. Grayson accompanied me to the station in order to tell of his
troubles. The President has sent his name to the Senate and he believes he
will be confirmed. Even at such a time do we think of our own puny interests.
Chief Flynn of the Secret Service returned with me to New York.

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New York,
February 2, 1917.

Wiseman, Gaunt, Whitehouse, Dilnot, of the London Chronicle, Sidney Brooks, Lincoln Colcord and many others have taken my time today.

Polk telephoned twice from Washington to keep me in touch with the situation there, so altogether, I have had a strenuous day.

I told Wiseman just what was to be done. With the others I was more careful because something might occur to prevent the action decided upon. I am finding some embarrassment in dealing with Gaunt and Wiseman. They both wish to inform their Government of what I say. Heretofore, I have given everything to Gaunt, but in his absence I found Wiseman much more satisfactory for reasons which I have given before.

Wiseman came again before leaving for Washington. I wondered whether the British Ambassador was sending messages to his Government similar to the complaints he has been making to Lansing and Polk. Wiseman thought he was not. He felt certain he would submit cables to him, Wiseman, before sending anything to London, since he knows Wiseman is in close touch with me.

I told Wiseman of the action the President proposed taking regarding Bernstorff.

February 3, 1917.

Another day similar to that of yesterday. Suppressed excitement everywhere. The British contingent had the field. All of them either telephoned or called. Willett, of the London Times, was my most interesting visitor. I advised him as, indeed, I did Dilnot, of the London Chronicle and other correspondents, not to send too enthusiastic despatches to their papers. That while the President would break diplomatic relations with Germany, it did not necessarily mean war. I thought the Allies would be delighted with the news and the President would be popular for ten days or two weeks, but

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the usual reaction would follow, and something would come up again to make them critical. I thought the President had been treated unfairly and that amends should be made.

Akkaughall insisted that the United States was unafraid, although the Allies could not appreciate this feeling on our part. It might be the valor of ignorance, but, nevertheless, it existed and we could not bring ourselves to feel the gratitude which Great Britain and France thought we should feel for the battles they claimed to be fighting for us as well as themselves.

Dudley Malone, Gaunt and many others have advised with me. Telegrams have come and offers of service in the event of war have been numerous. It saddens me to see how blithely people go into war. They are much the same in all countries and in all times.

February 4, 1917.

Frank Polk telephoned early this morning to tell of conditions at Washington, particularly regarding Tarnowski. They are following my suggestion as best they can and are endeavoring to segregate him from von Bernstorff and not break off relations with Austria. I have prepared the British for this move and they are in thorough sympathy with it.

Richard Washburn Child called to say goodbye before leaving for Japan and China. Sidney Brooks followed to get as much information as I would give regarding our future course.

Ambassador Fletcher came to say he was leaving for Mexico next Friday or Saturday. He has not even seen the President, and he is afraid lest he does not understand his mind as fully as needs be regarding the course he should pursue. I had him repeat what he thought was the President's policy and later confirmed his understanding of it. I urged him to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza and gave him such arguments as I could think of to help

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the situation. It is no time to break with Mexico.

McAdoo telephoned to express concern regarding the inaction at Washington. He has in his mind the same thought I had, that is, that he should go to the Navy, Houston to the Treasury, and Daniels to Agriculture. With all McAdoo's shortcomings he is the very great driving force in the Cabinet and he should be where the Government could use this quality to the best advantage.

February 5, 1917/

A great snowstorm was raging this morning and I hoped it would give me a quiet day, but I had as many callers as usual.

Gifford Pinchot was the first. He came with a message from Colonel Roosevelt expressing a desire for a conference with me. He is anxious to form a division in the event of war and wants my help at Washington. I thought it advisable to take the matter up just now and asked Pinchot to say to the Colonel that I should be glad to see him in the event of war, and would be glad to see his services utilized. I hope he will not be offended, but I considered a conference with him at this time an unwise venture.

Von Weigand took lunch with me. I wanted to extract further information regarding conditions in Germany. I see these Germans and German-Americans and get what they know or willing to tell, and try to piece things together just as one would a picture puzzle. I find it of value in many ways.

Sir William Wiseman called to tell of his trip to Washington. He was a few minutes late and I could not give him sufficient time to thoroughly discuss the matters we have together. He is coming again tomorrow.

Walter Lippmann and Herbert Croly came for their weekly interview before going to press.

We took dinner and went to the theater with Mrs. Marshall. The other guests were Perry Belmont, Nelson O'Shaughnessy and Mr. Cotton. We

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went to see "Cheating Cheaters" which is an amusing farce. Mrs. Cornelius Vandebildt invited us in to supper afterwards but we declined.

February 6, 1917.

Chief Flynn of the Secret Service was my first caller. I gave him some cablegrams from our Minister at Berne telling of a plot to assassinate the President and giving the name of a German in New York who was concerned in it. Flynn and I went over the situation carefully as to possible disturbances here which might arise in the event of a break with Germany.

Ralph Pulitzer called at ten o'clock. I am trying to get the editors and managers of newspapers to keep out all sensational matter, and I am counseling calmness. I am also trying to keep out any disagreeable references to the German-Americans. Pulitzer is in sympathy with this movement.

Mr. van Hamm, General Manager of the Hearst properties, came to ask my good office in getting the Allied Governments to reinstate the International News Service. I afterward spoke to Wiseman about this and he gave me some interesting information regarding it.

Wolf, of the American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin, called to tell of his recent interviews with the Chancellor and Zimmermann. I got nothing of value from him.

Sir William Wiseman was my most interesting visitor. We went into the difficulties Great Britain is having with German submarines. He said one way in which they were being destroyed was to send out what were apparently tramp steamers which were really fully armed vessels. The submarines come to the surface, probably with the idea of giving warning, and it is promptly sunk. I wonder how many submarines have been destroyed in this way and whether their crews have survived to tell the story. With unrestricted warfare, such as the

This suggestion was given me by Richard Washburn Child, E.M.H.

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Germans now propose, this could not be done since no warning they will be given to merchantmen in the future.

February 7, 1917.

The French Ambassador called by appointment at half past nine o'clock. I got nothing of value from him, although we had a pleasant talk of a half hour. Brougham, of the Public Ledger, called to get advice about some matters relating to his publications.

Commissioner Woods called to go over the general situation and to talk of plans to meet it. I made several suggestions. One was to get Judge Gary, of the United States Steel Corporation, Corey, of the Midvale, and Schwab, of the Bethlehem, to make public offers to the Government of their properties in case of war, and to state what these corporations could do under pressure. Such statements may throw the fear of God in the hearts of our enemies.

I asked Woods to see Corey, Gary and Schwab but to have them confine themselves within the bounds of probability. I also suggested that the Mayor appoint a committee of safety and have all citizens go to police stations to stand up and be counted. (Note) This would have a wholesome and disciplinary effect. My idea is to have many German-Americans on the committees and to have them embrace practically the entire adult male citizenship.

Polk telephoned from Washington to tell the day's news. The President's letter and my reply are appended.

February 8, 1917.

The President sent me the latest despatches from Geraddin which the German peace terms are mentioned. My letter to the President tells what I think of them.

upon

Wiseman called to discuss the situation. I tried to impress him the necessity of the Allied Governments not being over confident. That, I thought, was

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the prevailing error of all the belligerent governments. I thought it foolish
to underrate an antagonist.

Willeit, of the London Times, came for direction for future despatches.
Howden Smith, of the Evening Post, called for the same purpose; Miss Buel to
get letters from Hapgood; Cardeza, Ambassador Penfield's secretary, who has just
arrived from Vienna, to tell of conditions there. I summarize what he said in
a letter to the President.

William R. Willcox, Chairman of the Republican Committee, was a caller and
my letter to the President also explains his visit.

Captain Elia, of the Italian Navy, Edward Harding, and several others
were visitors. Polk telephoned a resume of the day's doings in Washington. We
advise together at least once or twice each day and sometimes oftener. Malone
also keeps in touch with me and has expressed his intention of consulting with
me in futuer rather than with Washington, since he gets little satisfaction there.

February 9, 1917.

Von Weigand was my first caller. He is anxious to send a despatch
through to Amsterdam and for it to get in the German papers. I told him to
write it and submit it to me and I would send it to Washington for approval.
He desires to return to Germany with Bernstorff on the Frederick 8th. His idea
is that he might do something toward letting the German people know what our
real attitude regarding them is.

Lincoln Colcord followed von Weigand. He came to submit his article
entitled "Junkerism". He has written it wonderfully well. It is a combination
of his own, Ferguson's and my ideas. I made some changes which he accepted.

Harry Sleeper called to enlist my sympathies in behalf of the American
Ambulance Corps in France. They fear that our participation in the war will

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rob them of their men.

Captain Gaunt was the first caller in the afternoon. Friction is beginning to arise between him and Wiseman. I feared as much. The trouble is with the Ambassador, and we are floundering around trying to talk with the British Government as best we may. Gaunt admitted this and we discussed whether it was best to keep Spring-Rice or advise the British Government to bring him home. The argument in favor of keeping him is that he might be replaced by a man who would know nothing of the situation and thereby cause more trouble. We are all fond of Spring-Rice and realize that it is merely his health and nerves which make him unfit for the place at this critical time.

Gaunt said that Sir Edward Carson and Lord Curzon were trying their best to get Lloyd George to depose Spring-Rice. I confessed to Gaunt the President's and Lansing's desire to have him replaced last year, and their request that I ask the British Government to do this. As I have already told in the diary I did nothing about it.

Gaunt said he had a cable complaining of Wiseman's activities. On the other hand, Wiseman tells me that Gaunt merely communicates with the Intelligence Office. I shall let them work it out between themselves. I had thought of cabling direct to Balfour but, for the moment, I shall let it rest.

Vance McCormick called about party matters. He has just seen the President who asked him to advise with me.

Grant Smith, Counsellor at the Vienna Embassy, called and I received further information regarding Austria.

Gordon came with Mr. Stanley and Mr. Dillon who desired to offer their services in the event of war. We went to dinner with the Mezes.

February 10, 1917.

This has been a quiet day. Nothing of importance has arisen and the

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callers have not been worthy of note. Grayson came for an hour and gave some
Washington gossip.

February 11, 1917.

Herbert Hoover was my principal caller today. He is much distressed over
the turn of affairs and believes he will have to give up his work in Belgium and
turn it over to some neutral country like Holland.

Lincoln Colcord followed to read what he had written for the Ledger and to
get my approval.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. James Speyer to meet Consul General and Mrs.
Julius Lay. The other guests were ex-Mayor and Mrs. George B. McClellan, Mr.
and Mrs. Henry Morganthau, and Judge Day of the Equitable Life Co.

February 12, 1917.

This has been the quietest day we have had for a long while. Colcord came
with some of his work, and Frank Polk telephoned from Washington to tell of the
President's reply to the German overtures made through the Swiss Government.
Polk telephoned last night to ask me to write the President concerning this. I
did so in time for him to receive it this morning. My letter to the President
is a part of the record. The President's assertion to me some weeks ago that
this country would not go to war seems likely to be unverified for we are drifting
into it as rapidly as I expected.

February 13, 1917.

The President's letter and my answer are attached. My most interesting
callers were Captain Gaunt and Sir William Wiseman. I am using Gaunt's services
in connection with the cables which the President sent from Washington.

Wiseman came late and I could see him only a few minutes since we had a
seven o'clock dinner engagement with the Chadbournes. The other guests were

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Maxine Elliot and Vance McCormick. Miss Elliot and I found we had many mutual
has been
friends in England, and since she is doing war work near La Panne for nearly two
years, we had much to talk about.

I was on the telephone a large part of the day with Dudley Malone and
Commissioner Woods incident to the departure of Count von Bernstorff tomorrow.

February 14, 1917.

I have been unusually busy today. I reviewed some further matter for
Colcord. He is writing an article, which I have practically dictated, concern-
ing the peace conference and the manner in which it should be held. It is my
purpose to have it published in Europe, as well as here, so as to bring about in-
ternational discussion of the subject.

We lunched with Mr. and Mrs. Cornelius Vanderbilt. The other guests were,
Dr. Carrel, Lloyd Griscom, Mrs. Ogden Goelet and Mrs. Pendleton. After lunch I
had a few minutes conversation with Dr. Carrel. I complimented him upon the great
work he has done in France, especially upon his new antiseptic treatment of wounds.
It was interesting to hear of this directly from him and to know of its advantag-
es and limitations. He tells me that under this treatment wounds heal from 2/3
to 9/10 quicker than under the old treatment, but that it is difficult to get it
used properly.

In the afternoon my first caller was George Foster Peabody. I was sur-
prised to find him loyally supporting the President's policy regarding Germany.

Wiseman followed to advise caution in dealing with the Allied Ambassadores.
He said both Spring-Rice and Jusserand had to be handled carefully since they
both had troubles at home to be reckoned with. He was not specific and I was
left in some doubt as to why he came to give the warning.

Dr. Henri Bergson, the great French philosopher, followed Wiseman. We had

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a pleasant talk of a half hour. He made a move to leave after he had been here a few minutes because he thought my time was limited and that he might be trespassing. I asked him to remain and assured him that his visit was giving me one of the few pleasures I have had recently. We discussed the psychology of the German mind, particularly as to their diplomacy; and we found ourselves pretty much in agreement.

J. Allen Baker, M. P. then came. I found we had much in common. He has been trying for years to bring about a rapproachement between England and Germany, and in doing this he had several interesting interviews with the Kaiser. He believes the Kaiser was swept away from his moorings by the militarists.

Bergson remarked that the reason German militarism must be broken was because the Germans held it in worship; that it came even before the Kaiser, and that if the Kaiser interfered, he would be brushed aside. I mention this as it bears out Allen J. Baker's view as well as my own.

Baker said all of England had watched my activities with the deepest interest and hope. He expressed himself as being certain that both the President and I had done everything within our power to keep our country out of war, and to bring peace to the belligerents.

February 15, 1917.

Dudley Malone telephoned this morning telling of Bernstorff's departure. He said both Bernstorff and the Countess were inexpressibly sad. The Ambassador's message to me was, "Give him my love and tell him he is the best friend I have in America. He has saved me many times and but for him it would have been impossible for me to have remained as long as I have". There is something pathetic about this message for, as a matter of fact, while I have done much for Bernstorff, it has been done merely in line with my duty, as I saw it, to the President and to my country.

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Colcord came for a final review of one of his articles. Mr. Morgan, our Ambassador to Brazil, called and we had an interesting half hour. I urged him to press in every way possible the Pan-American Pact which we have been trying so hard to put in operation.

Chief Flynn came to discuss secret service matters.

February 16, 1917.

Arthur W. Little was my first visitor. He wished me to pass upon an article which he is writing for Pearson's Magazine. He has used some information I gave him.

Patten, of California, the late defeated democratic candidate for Senator, was another caller.

Roy Howard of the United Press and Dudley Malone came to lunch. After lunch I told Howard of my activities toward keeping the German-American quiet and he agreed to cooperate. I put him in touch with the Commissioner of Police and the Mayor. When the movement is started here he is to notify, through the United Press, mayors of all the cities in the United States to form similar organizations.

Herman Ridder of the Staats Zeitung came to tell of the loyalty of the German-Americans. I approved the plan which he outlined of getting them together in committees to offer their services to the Mayor. I could give his plan my most cordial support since it was my own which had come to Ridder indirectly through the Mayor and Woods. I congratulated him upon the patriotism of the German-Americans and did what I could to stimulate that feeling. I was careful what I said to him.

Arthur Bullard called to discuss the international situation and to make

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some suggestions. He is writing a novel which he expects to publish soon.

John M. Quinn called to unburden himself of some of his troubles. Brougham and Colcord came to discuss the future policy of the Philadelphia Public Ledger and to tell of how they were getting along in their efforts toward "liberalizing it". They wished me to release Colcord's latest article concerning the peace conference, which is almost wholly mine, and but which I thought would be more effective later when people began to think more of peace and less of war.

Chief Flynn reported on pending matters.

We went to dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Frederick H. Allen. The other guests were Senator and Mrs. Max Wetmore, Mr. and Mrs. Wm. Church Osborne, Mr. and Mrs. Twombley, Mr. Ingraham, Mr. and Mrs. C. B. Alexander, Mr. and Mrs. Glynn and Mr. and Mrs. Iselin.

Frank Polk telephoned that he would be in New York tomorrow afternoon.

February 17, 1917.

I took lunch with Melville Stone at the Lotus Club. We had an interesting discussion regarding the Kaiser and internal German conditions. Stone tells me that the beginning of the trouble between England and Germany was started by Edward the Seventh, and because of the quarrel the Kaiser had with his uncle and his mother.

Stone was disturbed about the boats of the American Line not sailing. He undertook to see Franklin of the Mercantile Marine and ascertain whether something could not be done which would meet not only the views of the company but those of the Government as well. I arranged a meeting for him with Frank Polk so they might discuss it together and try to arrive at some understanding. Polk spent most of the afternoon with me going over international and departmental affairs.

February 18, 1917.

Matthew Hale of Boston was one of the interesting callers. We had for lunch

Consul General and Mrs. Lay, Mr. and Mrs. Iselin, Mrs. Marshall and Sidney Brooks.
Frank Cobb of the World telephoned concerning the arming of merchantmen and also
the sentiment in Congress regarding it. He had heard that a careful poll had
been made by the pro-Germans which resulted in showing that the President could
not command a majority. I did not believe this was true.

February 19, 1917.

Colcord was my first caller. I gave him material for another article.
I want him to write upon the necessity for the inviobility of treaties and the
international chaos which must result from their violation.

Paderewski and Mr. Short, of the League to Enforce Peace, were callers in
the afternoon. Paderewski came primarily to offer the Government the
service of the American Poles. He said there would be no governmental ex-
pense attached to this offer further than the supplying of some officers and arms.
Paderewski thought the President's address to the Senate was a great document, and
said the Poles were deeply appreciative of his action.

Short came at my suggestion in order to discuss ways and means of getting the
Carnegie Peace Foundation to back the plan of a league to enforce peace, rather
than Root's plan for a world court. My letter to the President of today explains
my views.

February 20, 1917.

Herbert Hoover and Captain Gaunt were the most important visitors.
Hoover wished advice concerning a plan to raise money for the Belgians. He is
one day's income
thinking of setting a day upon which all Americans are to be asked to give to this
cause. He desires the President to set the pace.

February 21, 1917.

Polk came in the morning and again in the afternoon. He and I and Mel-
ville Stone have been trying to thresh out a satisfactory plan of censorship. At

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one time the discussion became acrimonious, but it softened down and we parted in
entire agreement.

Short and Filene followed to discuss plans for raising funds to keep the pro-
paganda going for a league to enforce peace.

February 22, 1917.

Indian Commission Cato Sells came from Washington by appointment to see
me. He wept copiously, (a habit of his), as he told of his services to the
Government during the past four years. From time to time he spoke of himself and
of the sacrifices he was making, and at each reference he would weep. As a mat-
ter of fact, he has worked well and assiduously and has made a good Indian Commis-
sioner.

Bob Woolley followed Sells to complain that he had not been offered any-
thing up to now and that the 4th of March was getting dangerously near. I am
afraid, the President will not reward Woolley as he deserves. I am afraid,
too, that his estimate of Woolley's abilities differ widely from Woolley's estimate
of them. I believe the President does him an injustice in that particular for
he was one of the most effective forces we had in the campaign.

Cleveland H. Dodge followed to say that the President had offered him
the Ambassadorship to the Court of St James. I told him I had been hesitating
for sometime between my desire to talk to him about this and my feeling that the
first
President wished to do it himself. My reasons for desiring to anticipate the
President were that I thought I might persuade him to accept better the Pres-
ident. Dodge feels he would be criticised if he took the place because of his
large campaign contributions. He thinks he would be charged with buying the
post. His character is such that I thought there would be no criticism worthy
of notice.

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Dodge was surprised at what the President told him about Page and what I added to make the picture complete. We agreed that it was best to have Page remain for the present and decide a little later what had best be done. Dodge was insistent that he could not perform the duties satisfactorily. He thought that Elihu Root or I were the two men conspicuously fit for the work to be done there at this critical time, and since the President could not be brought to appoint Root, I ought to take it whether I desired to do so or not.

Martin called and Thomas Logan lunched with us and gave me the latest Washington gossip.

February 23, 1917.

Sherman Whipple came to tell of the findings of the Congressional Leak Committee, and to talk of the proceedings of that body.

Captain Gaunt followed to bring some mail which had arrived in the British pouch for me. Frederick H. Prince of Boston called to ask my good offices in getting his son, Frederick Jr. back from the French Aviation Corps, so he might enlist in the American Aviation Corps which is now being formed. Prince has lost one of his sons, Norman, and he feels that the pace is so swift in France at present that it is only a question of a short time when he will lose this other son if he is not brought home. I promised to help him.

Allen Baker, M. P. came in to bid me goodbye; to bring some messages from Spring Rice and to take messages from me to Balfour, Lloyd George and other English friends.

Whitehouse followed Baker. He is distressed over the recent turn of events and sees no good way out. He has tried to think out a solution but has been utterly unable to formulate anything that seemed worth while.

Sir William and Lady Wiseman took dinner with us. There were no other guests excepting Gordon and Janet. Wiseman and I had a long and confidential

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talk after dinner. He has straightened out matters regarding his own political activities and desires me to confirm this through the British Ambassador when I go to Washington. He made a proposal concerning the Federation Meeting which is to take place in London within a week or ten days. He thinks there should be some message from this country to that meeting, outlining our position. When this is done, and the representatives return to their respective countries, they will take with them an understanding and appreciation of our position. I promised to take this up with the President.

February 24, 1917.

Mr. Walker, Editor of the Scientific American, called by appointment to tell of his belief that our big fast battleships now being constructed are defective in some particulars. He has been before the Naval Committee, but desires me to talk to the President.

Miss Buel, who is editing Norman Hapgood's war articles cabled from Europe, came to discuss that matter, and Lincoln B. Colcord to discuss his literary work.

Durant, head of the General Motors Co. called to express the hope that the President would keep us out of war. He has just returned from the Far West and insists that he only met one man between New York and California who wanted war. He believes we are "sitting on a volcano" and that war might cause an eruption. I did not quite follow his argument, nor did I agree with it. He was surprised to learn of my peace activities which began before the war and which have continued without cessation until our break with Germany.

We dined with the Shellings (the pianist). Among the guests were Mr. and Mrs. Paderewski, Mr. and Mrs. Fritz Kreisler, Mr. and Mrs. Rogers, Mr. and Mrs. George Eustis, Mr. Draper and several others. Paderewski and I talked together almost the entire time. I left soon after dinner and do not know whether

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Paderewski and Kreisler played. Other guests came in after dinner.

February 25, 1917.

A very quiet Sunday. There were few callers and none of interest excepting Consul General and Mrs. Lay. We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Adrian Iselin. The other guests were, Henry White, Bronson Winthrop, Cabot Ward, Thos B. Hoeller, Counselor for the British Embassy, and several others.

February 26, 1917.

Ralph Easley of the Civil Federation, came to tell of their activities in uncovering German plots and propaganda in this country. He is plainly scared and believes we are in for a bad time. He is suspicious of our Secret Service, both in the Treasury and the Department of Justice. He claims to have spies out who are receiving information which he does not believe the Government is getting. I asked him to get in touch with Frank Polk and to keep me informed.

Fred Lynch called to talk over party matters in which I cannot feel interested at present.

Arthur Bullard came for advice concerning a book the McMillans have asked him to write. He did not wish to say anything in it which would embarrass the Administration. We went over what he had in mind to write and I tentatively approved.

Frank Polk telephoned from Washington to say that they had obtained a despatch which Zimmermann had sent Bernstorff, January 19th, in which Bernstorff was instructed to inform Carranza that in the event of war with the United States, he could consider Germany an ally of Mexico and they would give all the assistance possible. Polk said the President was much disturbed over this development and ~~they~~ are considering a plan as to what is best to do. My letter to the President is a part of the record.

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February 27, 1917.

Walter Lippmann came this morning for his weekly talk before the New Republic
is issued. Colcord came to have me read another article and pass upon it.

Paderewski called to present a water color of a Polish cavalry officer which
he hoped I would "do him the favor of accepting". He also presented an offer in
writing from the different Polish societies in America agreeing to furnish 500
trained officers in the event of war. The training of these officers is to be
without cost to the Government.

J. Bernard Walker of the Scientific American came again to discuss battle-
ship construction.

Last night U. S. District Attorney Snowdon Marshall called to ask advice
regarding some matters relating to the custom service which needed attention.

February 28, 1917.

Vance McComick was my longest caller today. We discussed party matters
almost wholly.

Paderewski came to give me some additional data concerning the offer of the
Polish societies. Polk telephoned to say that the Zimmermann-Bernstorff cable-
gram would be given to the Associated Press in the morning.

March 1, 1917.

This has been an exceedingly busy day. Members of the Press have called and telephoned constantly because of the exposé of the Zimmermann cable. Howard of the United Press has hurt feelings because it was given to the A. P. instead of to them. I have written the President asking him to see that the U. P. get the next sensation

Mrs. Harriman was an interesting caller. Her house in Washington has be-
come a rendezvous for governmental circles. Army and Navy men and the entire of-
ficial family meet there. She says Bergson paid me a high compliment, saying he
reminded him of the Romans who lived their lives wholly to the advancement and
old

of their country.

March 2, 1917.

Another busy day. Hetty Higginson was the first caller. She has been spending ten days in Washington with the Henry Cabot Lodges and she was wondering whether a better feeling could not be brought about between him and the Administration. I explained how impossible it was because of the different outlook. I thought men like Lodge belonged to another age and, what one might term the "Germans" of this country. Germany is trying to do what nations did some centuries ago, and she does not realize that her methods are obsolete. It is like slavery in the South. Sixty years ago everyone there was in favor of it; now it would be difficult to find a single person in the entire South who would advocate it.

It is the same in business. The ethics employed twenty-five years ago would be considered dishonest today. I told her this to show how impossible it was for men like Woodrow Wilson and Senator Lodge to meet upon common ground. It was not a question as to which one was right, but Wilson typified the present tendency of human thought and men like Lodge did not.

Sir William Wiseman came in to tell me of his recent visit to Washington and to give me some messages from the British Ambassador.

Lincoln Colcord, Sidney Brooks, Commissioner Woods, Captain Gaunt and George Moore were among the visitors.

Moore has recently returned from England and presents rather a dismal story. It is not Moore's opinion that I value, but it is important because he is one of General Lord John French's close friends, and he probably reflects French's opinion. I will not go into detail regarding the conversations with visitors today since it is all of passing importance in the working out of the things we are trying to do.

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Washington, March 3, 1917

Loulie and I came over here today for the Inauguration. There were many
people acquaintances on the train and I was not able to rest.

We drove immediately to the White House. After having tea with the President and Mrs. Wilson, the President and I went to his study where he read me his Inaugural Address. There was much to commend and nothing to criticise since it was a replica of his Senate Address of January 22nd.

We were much concerned about the action of the Senate regarding the bill to permit the arming of merchantmen, and little else was talked of. There were some other house guests, consisting almost wholly of relatives. After dinner Mrs. Wilson and I had a confidential talk. She told me that she disliked McAdoo; that she had always disliked him. She considered him thoroughly selfish in as much as he would let nothing stand in the way of his ambition. In this she is pretty nearly right, although, by and large, he is an affectionate and generous friend. She asked what chance I thought he would have for the nomination for President. My opinion was that his chances were better than they had been, but it was too far off to speculate.

She said Mrs. Lansing had a lady ask her the other day if she knew the new way of spelling Lansing. Mrs. Lansing of course said no, and the lady proceeded to spell it "H o u s e". Mrs. Wilson did not say what effect this had on Mrs. Lansing but I assured her it had none on Lansing himself. Lansing is a pretty big fellow in that way and does not seem to be disturbed by jealousy.

March 4, 1917.

The day is dark and gloomy with high winds and floods of rain. The President and Mrs. Wilson started for the Capitol at 10.30. This was necessary in order that the President might sign the bills as they came in from Congress,

and to be ready to take the oath of office at twelve o'clock. They asked me to go with them but I thought it best not to do so. I never like to be conspicuously in evidence. There is enough jealousy abroad without accentuating it unnecessarily. If in serving the public and the President I excite jealousy, I bear it with indifference, but I try to avoid it when there is nothing to be gained except some personal glorification.

When the President returned he showed much excitement, and was bitter in his denunciation of the small band of senators who undertook to use the arbitrary rules of the Senate to defeat the wishes of the majority regarding the arming of merchantmen. I suggested that he say to the public what he was saying to me, and to say it immediately. His answer was that he could not put it in his Inaugural Address because it would spoil the texture of it, but he would put it out in a few days. I urged him to do it now, giving it to the papers tomorrow morning in order to strike while the iron was hot. He wondered whether he could do it so quickly but said he would try.

He shut himself in practically all the afternoon and later produced the statement to be given out for publication in tomorrow morning papers. He called in McAdoo, Burleson and Tumulty after dinner to discuss it. They were unanimously in favor of the plan.

We discussed the formation of the new House of Representatives. The President is indifferent whether we control it or not believing that our control would be so narrow that it would perhaps be better not to have the responsibility. McAdoo differed from him. There are many arguments in favor of both positions.

March 5, 1917.

The family have been greatly alarmed as to the safety of the President. I tried to reassure them and partially succeeded. Loulie went with them to the Senate. I remained at home for the same reason I declined to go to the Capitol

yesterday. There was nothing to be gained by making myself conspicuous and I
have no inclination to attend such functions. I remained at home in the White
House until lunch time when some two or three hundred guests, mainly of the of-
ficial family, came for a buffet luncheon. I had difficulty in getting something
to eat since there were so many people who insisted upon talking to me. I lead
such a retired life and avoid public functions to such an extent that the general
public rarely get at me. When they do, they make full use of it.

Lansing wished to talk with me privately, and before luncheon was over I took
him to my bedroom and we had an hour or more together. Then followed a succes-
sion of interviews. Gregory, McAdoo, Houston, Polk, Phillips, Franklin Roosevelt,
etc. etc. My old friend Captain Bill McDonald came and it was a joy to be with
him once more.

We had a quiet dinner and went upstairs to the oval sitting room to witness
the fireworks. The family generally were at the main windows. The President
and Mrs. Wilson sat by a side window, curtained off, and asked me to join them.
The President was holding Mrs. Wilson's hand and leaning with his face against
her's. We talked quietly of the happenings of the day and I spoke of my joy
that we three, rather than the Hughes family, were looking at the fireworks from
the White House windows.

Shortly after nine, the President suggested that we drive through the
streets to see the illuminations. This turned out to be rather a risky adven-
ture. There was no secret service man on the box, although a car with them
followed. We had gone no distance before we were in a jam and the people,
thronging the sidewalks and streets, recognized the President and sent up cheer
after cheer. It was a dangerous moment, far more than anything he had gone
through during the day. I sat with my automatic in my hand ready to act if the
occasion arose.

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When we returned to the White House, the President, Mrs. Wilson and I talked until eleven o'clock. There were a number of matters we had to discuss and decide which could not be done in the morning since he desired to have an early game of golf, and I intended to leave on the eleven o'clock train for New York.

Mrs. Wilson again expressed the hope that I would take the Ambassador ship to the Court of St James. The President said he had written Page that he would not make any change for the moment, but he was afraid Page had misconstrued it to mean that he would not make any change until the war was over.

We agreed upon the form of message which the President is to send to the meeting of the Commissioners from the Dominions of the British Empire who are to assemble soon in London.

March 6, 1917.

I breakfasted with the President's brother, Joseph, and his wife. I saw the President for a moment as he was starting for the links. He expressed regret that I would not remain for luncheon which he is giving to the National Committee today. He hoped I would return soon or when I felt the inclination.

Frank Polk was my first caller. We discussed the Cuban situation which is now in his hands, and I gave him a plan which Sidney Brooks had outlined. Brooks knows Cuba well and the plan he suggests seems a good one. I also asked Polk to see whether Hugh Wallace would accept the Ambassadorship to Italy, in the event Thos. Nelson Page resigned. Wallace wants England or France but in Polk's opinion, as in mine, he should take Italy and if he succeeds there he might later get one of the other posts.

I told Polk of my interview with Franklin Roosevelt and he advised that I keep in touch with the Navy situation through Roosevelt. And this reminds me that I discussed with the President the question of the disposition of our fleet. Roosevelt says the Navy is divided in opinion as what is best to do, some be-

lieving that the fleet should be sent to the Pacific for safety and others that
it should seek the protection of Chesapeake Bay, or some other North Atlantic har-
bour.

I urged the President to look into the matter and expressed a decided pre-
ference for the North Atlantic, giving my reasons for thinking it unwise to send
the fleet through the Panama Canal into the Pacific at this time.

At ten o'clock I met the British Ambassador at Billy Phillips'. Most
of our time was wasted by his telling me the gossip he had heard, ~~which he~~
believed to be true, regarding Mr. Bryan, Senator Stone and others. Bryan, ac-
cording to him, had just had $350,000. placed to his credit in a Nebraska bank;
Stone had had an incredible amount loaned him by some banks in Missouri upon
worthless security. I tried to get the Ambassador off such nonsense and to
get him down to something worth while. He sees spooks everywhere.

He started to criticise Burleson and Gregory, a process I soon interfered
with. We then had a few minutes serious talk of pening matters of importance.
I returned to the White House where Bill McDonald and Loulie were waiting to go
with me to the train. Our trip was restful and uneventful.

New York,
March 7, 1917.

Sir William Wiseman came to ascertain the result of my talk with the
President concerning the message to be sent to the gathering of representatives
of the British Empire. We agreed upon a form which is included in the diary.
I told Wiseman of my interview with the British Ambassador and he thought he
could straighten him out some of the things that were disturbing him.

Edward G. Lowry called for advice regarding the writing of an article
upon the perfidy of Senator Stone. He wishes to go to Missouri for material.

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Captain Gaunt called to discuss those features of my Washington trip which concern his department.

at the moment Herbert Hoover came to ask advice as to whether it would be worth while to continue his endeavors to raise funds in this country for the Belgians. I thought the time inopportune. The people are engrossed with our entry into the war and cannot be brought to think of anything else. And this reminds me, when I was in Washington, the President spoke of Hoover as being "obsessed with one idea". I am afraid this will bar Hoover from such activities as I have had in mind for him in the event of war.

March 8th, 1917.

Herman Ridder of the Staats Zeitung called to tell of the progress being made to organize German-Americans into a patriotic body to uphold the President in the event of war. I told Ridder just where the trouble was with the German, as I saw it. He took this kindly and agreed with me. He wanted to write an editorial in his paper condemning Zimmermann and suggesting Bernstorff as his successor. I thought it would do Bernstorff more harm than good, and that Bernstorff was perfectly capable of taking care of himself when he reached Germany.

Police Commissioner Woods telephoned about some arrests he was making of international plotters, and to discuss some better form of coordination between his department and the Federal Government.

The Mayor's Secretary telephoned to inquire whether there was anything in the rumor going the rounds, both here and in Washington, that the President was contemplating appointing the Mayor Secretary of War. I advised him there was not. He said the plan I suggested of a council of safety is being carried out. Roosevelt, Choate, Root and many others have gotten together, have drawn up a pledge, and signatures were being obtained. He read the pledge which I ap-

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proved, but which I should have changed somewhat if I had been consulted in advance.

Mr. Short, of the League to Enforce Peace, came at Mr. Taft's suggestion to ask what I thought of postponing their national meeting at Washington, which is called for sometime during May. I advised that it be postponed.

March 9, 1917.

The papers have been after me about the rumors of Mitchel becoming Secretary of War.

Hoaller, of the British Embassy, called by appointment to discuss the Mexican situation. He was British Chargé there for five years and knows the recent history of the country better than almost anyone. We had a satisfactory conference. Hoaller asked me in the most naive way how it was we obtained the Zimmermann note. I replied, "I think you know". He assured me that he had not the remotest idea; that perhaps the Ambassador knew and had not told him. He expressed the intention of taking the Ambassador to task for his reticence. I happen to know that Hoaller was the man who unearthed it all. Of course he had not the remotest idea that I knew the facts and I am wondering why he brought up the subject. The lack of cadet on his part will cause me to be careful with him in the future.

Lippmann and Croly of the New Republic came for their weekly quiz. I am finding it difficult to keep them in line because of the President's slowness of action.

J. K. Ohl, Manager and Editor of the New York Herald, telephoned suggesting Vance McCormick as Ambassador to Japan in place of the late Ambassador Guthrie who died yesterday. I had already thought of McCormick and intended to write the President today which I have since done.

Frank Cobb, of the World, telephoned to suggest Henry Morganthau whom

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esting visitor and our talk was mostly of details.

Lincoln Colcord submitted an address which he is to read tomorrow before the National Conference on the foreign relations of the United States.

I telephoned Vance McCormick advising him not to make too much of a pro-
test against Baruch, for I think the President's mind is practically closed.

Hugh Wallace wrote me a few days ago that he was counting me in on a spec-
ulation that bade fair to realize a profit. I wrote him Saturday that I could
not go into speculation, giving as my reasons many my close affiliations with
the President and the Government. Today he tells me that he has closed out the
speculation with a profit of $2400. $1200. of which he wanted me to take, but
which I declined. He had bought United States Steel and made it in the
rise. I cannot understand why he made me this offer, for I have never had any
business with him and I have told him repeatedly that under no circumstances
would I speculate in stocks or buy or sell anything in which the Government was
directly or indirectly interested. While I am puzzled at his action, I feel
that he meant it well and that it was a purely generous offer on his part, know-
ing that my finances are at low ebb.

May 29, 1917.

Carl Ackerman was my most interesting caller. I am arranging with
him to get his articles entitled "The Peace Snag" widely syndicated in this
country, South America and Europe. It seems necessary for the world to know
what
the German military clique have in mind, and how impossible peace is at the
moment. I shall set forth my views tomorrow in a letter to the President. I
am anxious to have his cooperation,

Sam Hill of Seattle, a most curious, egotistic specimen called to tell
about his various activities with great and near-great men.

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May 30, 1917.

Sir William Wiseman came first. We went over many matters of detail. He tells me that in the new code, the President is designated as Ajax, and I as Caesar; the name Beverly under which I have heretofore been designated has been dropped, because it has become too generally known.

He had a telegram from Balfour for me in which these names were used for the first time. Balfour is to be called Damon, a name not unfamiliar to this diary, since we used it at one time for McCombs when he was on the political stage.

Professor Clarke called by appointment in order to ask that General Goethals was making a mistake in insisting upon steel ships instead of wooden. His son was one of the first to suggest wooden ships and is now employed by the Government as an engineer to construct them. The Professor failed to convince me that Goethals was wrong, and his son right, though I did not argue the matter with him.

Frank Polk is over from Washington and we had a two hour conference this afternoon. He says Lansing seldom sees the President except at Cabinet meeting and never has an opportunity to discuss policies with him. He writes the President and the President briefly replies, all of which is most unsatisfactory. Lansing says he saw more of Balfour, during the few weeks he was here, than he has seen of the President in six months.

The last note Lansing wrote the President was concerning Costa Rica. France and Great Britain both desire to recognize the new government there and Lansing also urges it. The revolutionary President is willing to declare war against Germany and it is important that this be done because of Costa Rica's coast line. The President declines to do so in a veryurt note, stating that

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Costa Rica's President came by his title through devious methods. I approve
the general trend of such a policy, but it cannot be carried too far, for the
President is setting himself up as a judge of the actions of other nations which
he has no right to do.

Polk says that many of the Cabinet members are disgruntled, Houston and
Lane among them. The difficulty, as I see it, is that the President, as usual,
is doing things too casually. He does not get enough information about a sit-
uation to enable him to decide it correctly. He sees but one side, and then
acts without making full inquiry. Another difficulty is that he does not call
his advisers together and formulate a policy and then work to it. For instance,
Lansing, I am sure, has no idea what the President has in his mind, or what he
has been discussing with Balfour. All the information Lansing gets is from
Balfour and not from the President. This policy makes it inevitable that the
President must oftentimes reverse himself. He is willing to do this when he
finds he is wrong, but it is a pity that in such serious times as these he
should be so casual.

I discussed with Polk the question of starting propaganda in Russia jointly with the British Government. I gave him a memorandum which he is to take up with Lansing, and the Secretary is to discuss it with the President. Polk thoroughly approved and hoped I would push strongly in that direction.

May 31, 1917.

Vance McCormick telephoned from Harrisburg last night and talked for
nearly a half hour. He was unable to see the President for more than twenty
minutes and his talk with him was very unsatisfactory. He adopted my suggestion
as to Baruch and amxy mentioned him incidentally only to be waved aside by the
President.

The plan for propaganda which Pomeroy Burton, Adamson, Chas. E. Hughes, Geo-
W. Perkins, Frank Munsey and others have begun working on, McCormick made his
chief discussion. The President accepts the idea as being good, but swept
aside with a single gesture the thought of any cooperation whatever with Hughes,
Perkins, Munsey or any of their tribe. He declared he would not have them
serve on any committee with which he had to do. This is an extraordinary at-
titude and thoroughly inconsistent. He takes Henry P. Davison as head of the
Red Cross and rejects Hughes. However, he has now some so often to declare that
he will not do a thing and later yield, that I am not certain he will not do so
in this instance.

It is always to be remembered that I get this information second hand.
The President probably did not open his real mind to McCormick as he seldom does
to anyone. When I discuss matters with him myself, I almost always find a rea-
son for his point of view. I have the habit myself of not opening my mind to
others, and I am sure many people leave, after an interview, with a totally
wrong impression of my views. It is to be remembered too, that Washington is
a hot-bed of gossip. The Cabinet and officials generally have their petty
grievances and unload them on me. I never take these to the President to
get his opinion, for it is not worth while. He has a tremendous task and if
he does nothing except to decide things, that is sufficient to tax any man's
strength.

The British Ambassador and Sir William Wiseman were my first callers.
The Ambassador was exercised over two despatches which he had just received
from Mr. Balfour. One was a repetition of a despatch from the British Gov-
ernment to Balfour suggesting that Lord Northcliffe be sent over here in
much the same capacity André Tardieu occupies with the French Government.
the other was Balfour's reply. He replied just as I would have done, and

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very much in the same terms I employed when I urged Balfour not to remove
Spring-Rice. In this reply, Balfour suggested that they first ascertain from
me, the President's wishes, and he earnestly argued against the whole plan. The
Ambassador asserted that if Northcliffe came he would go home. I talked him out
of this in a few minutes. I thought he and I could take care of Northcliffe if
he came, and I suggested that he, the Ambassador, should merely "sit tight" and
let Northcliffe do the rest.

I decided to send a paraphrase of the cable Balfour received to the
President and get an expression from him. I complimented the Ambassador upon
the success of Balfour's visit, which I attributed as much to the Ambassador as
to Balfour himself. He wants Lansing or Polk to make an official visit to Cana-
da. He believes it would promote good relations.

He said Lloyd George would soon write the President a letter, a letter,
in fact, which I suggested to Lloyd George's friend, Davis, he should write, and
it was arranged that it should come through me. For some reason he did not con-
sider it proper to send it through the Embassy.

There is something pathetic about Spring-Rice bringing his troubles to me,
and of my trying to protect him in every way possible. He asked whether we
desired a military or naval man of high rank to come over and stay, or whether
we would prefer the work to be done through such men as Gaunt. He also asked
whether it would not be well for us to send a military man of high rank to Eng-
land. I thought he should take these matters up directly with Washington, for
there is no need for me to bother with them.

I wish I had more time in which to write this diary. It must be remembered
that it is nearly always hastily done, and at the end of a tiresome day.

June 1, 1917.

Frank Polk took lunch with me. We discussed the matters about which the

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Ambassador and I talked yesterday, as well as an intimate number of details relating to departmental and foreign affairs. Polk tells me of how guarded he has to be with the Secretary of State, not so much indeed as to the Secretary himself, but more because Mrs. Lansing shows a disposition to be jealous. This quality of jealousy or envy constantly confronts one and hampers in the work one try to do.

The British Ambassador wishes Polk to visit Canada in return for the many visits which Canadian officials have made to the United States. Polk thinks it would not do for him to consider the matter, and I am to write Lansing telling him the Ambassador desires him to go. This I shall do today or tomorrow.

The day has been one of confusion because of our breaking up for the summer. Dudley Malone and Wiseman were callers. Wiseman is worried about the proposed visit of Lord Northcliffe. My letter to the President about this is a part of the diary. Both Wiseman and the Ambassador are afraid the Northcliffe faction in the British Cabinet will have him sent over before Balfour's return, knowing that Balfour's influence will be thrown against the project.

June 2, 1917.

Another day of turmoil. Wiseman was the earliest caller and Frank Polk followed. Both visits were largely to arrange details of communication, etc. etc. for the summer.

Frank Polk tells me that a secret service man overheard two men planning to tap our private telephone somewhere between Washington and Magnolia. The report has evidently gotten abroad that I have a wire directly to the White House. This story comes to me from several quarters, showing it has wide currency. The State Department will place two secret service men in a motor to go over the line all the way from Washington to Magnolia.

J. S. H. K. A. X. K. A. M. O. X. K. A. M. O.

X

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Magnolia, Massachusetts.

June 9, 1917.

Just as I was leaving New York my nephew, T. W. House Jr. arrived, hav-
ing just come from Texas without notice. I put him in the motor and brought
him as far as Norwalk and we did our talking in that way. I spent the night at
North Wilton with Edward S. Martin.

I left Martin's Sunday at ten o'clock and took my lunch in the open, and
slept at the Wayside Inn. On Monday the 4th I arrived here in time for lunch.

On Tuesday my time was taken up in getting things in shape. The special tele-
phone connection had to be made. The Telephone Company sent some of their head
men from Boston, and it was done most skillfully and expeditiously and I was soon
talking to both New York and Washington.

On Wednesday I had several unimportant callers from New York and Boston.
On Thursday, R. W. Woolley lunched with us and gave some Washington gossip.

Yesterday, Lincoln Colcord lunched with us and U. S. District Attorney George
W. Anderson spent the afternoon discussing governmental matters in which is de-
partment is interested.

The most important letter I have had was one from the President dated June
1st, which was awaiting my arrival. It is a generous letter giving me full credit
for the work I have tried to do. My reply is also a part of the diary.

I am trying hard, as my correspondence and this diary will show, to have
the policy of the German Government shown up in its true light. No one can do
this so well as the President, and I am hoping he will find himself at his best
when he does so.

I have had constant telephone calls from Wiseman and from the State
Department. I find with the help of this private wire I can accomplish as much
as if I were in either New York or Washington. Sir William talked with me for
nearly an hour on Thursday. We discussed Northcliffe's proposed visit. The

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much feared action was taken before Balfour's return and Northcliffe will arrive
on the Saint Paul tomorrow. It seems that Page was asked concerning the desir-
ability of Northcliffe's mission, and he considered it well for him to come. My
letter to the President upon this subject is a part of the record.

Wiseman and I decided to make the best of it and try to guide Northcliffe
so as to make Mark Twain his visit a success rather than a failure which it bids
fair to be. He is to be surrounded with people who will keep him straight.
Arthur Willert, Washington correspondent of the London Times is a dependable fel-
low and is in sympathetic touch with both Wiseman and me. He is to be his right
hand man. When we discussed Northcliffe's coming with the Ambassador it was
our intention to let him run amuck, but after enjoying the thought of this, Wise-
man and I decided the matter was too serious and that we should help where we
could. Wiseman and Polk both tell me that Spring-Rice is greatly excited and
likely to " explode". He is being urged to compose himself and let matters take
their course.

One of the interesting subjects Colcord came to talk about was Gerard's
forthcoming book. Gerard wishes to put in some conversations he had with the
Kaiser, and also some despatches he sent the State Department while he was Am-
bassador. He wishes to add the remarkable message sent to the President by
the Kaiser on August 10, 1914. This message, as my diary will show, was writ-
ten in the garden of the Palace at Berlin, and at a time when the Kaiser was
laboring under great excitement. It is in pencil and in his own hand. I
do not know what the President will say to Gerard's request, but I am quite sure
of what I should do if the matter were put to me. Gerard should not write or
talk at this particular time concerning his diplomatic work. It is too recent
and too intimate and has too great a bearing upon current events to be advisable.
The Public Ledger has paid him $100,000. for the book.

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June 10, 1917.

My most important work these days is done by telephone. The special
wire to New York and Washington leaves but little need for correspondence. It
is unfortunate, in a way, that I have no record of the work I plan and carry out.
Matters come up on the spur of the moment and are immediately settled, just as if
I were in Washington instead of here.

One of the things I have had on my mind since our entry into the war is
the acceleration of our air service. I have a feeling that we should literally
smother the Germans with aircraft. This is one of the things we can do most
efficiently. If I had my full way, I would have from ten to twenty airmen in
France by the Spring of 1918. It would go a long distance toward winning the
war. I am making arrangements to have General George O. Squier, who is at the
head of our Aviation Service, come here over Sunday in order to talk it out with
him. It is my purpose to urge it later upon the President. I feel that the
shipping question is safe in the hands of Goethals, and now if we can get the air
service properly organized, we will have gone a long way toward ultimate victory.

General Butler Ames of Lowell came by appointment. I had an interest-
ing hour with him.

June 11, 1917.

I have devoted a large part of yesterday and today to my foreign corres-
pondence. Letters to Lord Bryce, Walter Pager, Jules Cambon and others are
parts of the record.

Nord Northcliffe arrived in New York today. Wiseman telephoned over the
special wire for nearly an hour telling all the details of his arrival. Fortu-
nately he has been advised by his Government to seek the counsel of Wiseman.
Sir William has taken the precaution to give him his own private secretary, and
with Willert, who has been delegated by Northcliffe himself to be with him dur-

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ing his stay, we feel he is in safe hands. Instead of making his visit a fail-
ure, we are doing everything we can to make it a success. Tomorrow I shall write
the President about it, and that letter will be a part of the record. I shall
also telephone Frank Polk and ask him to be cordial and give him necessary help.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Frederick H. Prince. The only other guests
were Justice and Mrs. Loring. Lieut. Prince is just back from France and we
were entertained with stories and photographs of the Front, particularly the
aviation part of it. Young Prince said "I have met your nephew a young Cana-
dian flyer of much daring over there". He told Prince that "his uncle, Col
House, ruled his, Prince's country". He was not aware that Prince knew me and
would perhaps bring the story back to have it denied.

Billy Phillips is over from Washington. We had an extended conference con-
cerning departmental affairs. And this reminds me, I have never told of the
mission Henry Morganthau has suggested for himself and upon which he departs this
week. The plan is for him to go to Egypt and try to get an invitation from the
Turks to go into Palestine for the ostensible purpose of helping the Jews. The
real purpose is to make a separate peace if possible with Turkey, segregating her
from her allies, the Central Powers. Morganthau believes he can get an inter-
view with Enver Pasha and, if he can, he believes it will not be difficult to ar-
range the balance. It is a daring enterprise and one full of danger for Morgan-
thau.

I cautioned him about talking for, upon his own confession, a number of peo-
plw know what he has in mind. In discussing the matter we agreed it would be
best to draw Enver out and let the proposal come from him, if possible, so that
Morganthau could act as Enver's agent rather than as an agent of the Allies.

I spoke to Phillips of the indiscretions of General Edwards, who commands
the Department of the East, and he is to convey this information to the Secretary

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of War.

Frederick Dixon of the Monitor says he has never heard such intemperate talk from an army officer as Edwards is indulging in.

I asked Phillips to see that Lord Northcliffe was properly received in Washington, and that he had an invitation to one of the various White House functions, which will follow the arrival of the Japanese and Russian Missions. I sent Northcliffe a message upon his arrival and received a cordial reply, both of which are attached.

June 13, 1917.

Wiseman, over the private wire, said he spent a large part of yesterday with Northcliffe. Northcliffe had written a number of letters to his Government bitterly criticising the British Ambassador. Sir William finally persuaded him not to send them. Northcliffe goes to Washington tomorrow or next day, and Sir William is concerned about the meeting between him and Spring-Rice.

I have not heard directly from the President about his Flag Day address but he is giving it the publicity I advised. I am sorry he has not sent it to me to look over before it is delivered, for I am always fearful lest he undo the admirable impression which his message to Russia created. This is one of the things it is impossible to get him to do. He speaks too casually and without sufficient consideration. It has led him into all the errors of speech he has made, and for which he has been so censured. If events had gone differently, he could never have lived down his "Too proud to fight", his "All the belligerents say they are fighting for the same objects and purposes", etc. etc.

Nelson O'Shaughnessy came from New York for a few minutes' interview. My letter, which I shall write McAdoo on the 15th, will cover our conversation. I am not writing before because the Liberty Loan is closing on the 15th and until then he will be engrossed with that.

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June 14, 1917.

The President made his great Flag Day speech today. My letter to him tells what I think of it. As a matter of fact, it only partially tells the story, for I think he has done one of those necessary things which, as yet, had not been well done. I have suggested, time and again, to the Governments in both France and Great Britain that they make a proper indictment of Germany. They may have attempted it, but neither Lloyd George, Grey, Asquith, Briand, Poincaré or Viviani have done more than scratch the surface. The President has done it properly, and what he has said will leave a scar that will stay for generations.

To illustrate a point of recently made in the diary, a man in the President's position has the world for an audience, and if he says something worth while and says it well, it will live forever. Roosevelt made an address at Lincoln, Nebraska, yesterday and, I take it, not one in ten thousand read more than the headlines. What he said may be as fine as what the President said, but he now occupies an unimportant place that no one cares whether it was well or badly done.

June 15, 1917.

Donald Marshall Ryerson came all the way from Washington for about a fifty minute interview. He has in mind a plan for Russian propaganda which has met the approval of Arthur Bullard, Vance McCormick, Vanderlip, Herbert Parsons and others, and he wished my advice and cooperation. I tore the plan to shreds, and together we built a new one.

I am delighted at the splendid reception the President's Flag Day address has received. Even the Boston Transcript eulogised it in a long editorial.

I have a letter from Lincoln Colcord today which pleases me much. My letters will probably tell the story of the summer better than the diary itself. Frank Polk telephones me good news this afternoon. The President has agreed to join the British Government in the work which Wiseman and I planned to do in

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Russia. He has also accepted my plan to take over certain British warships at the end of the war, and has come to an agreement with Balfour about the matter before he left.

Polk telephoned that Northcliffe called this morning at the State Department with the Ambassador. They were polite to one another, but it was easy to see that they were not close friends. Northcliffe expressed profound admiration for the President's Flag Day speech.

June 16, 1917.

Mr. de Billy took lunch with us. He came at the instance of André Tardieu to review the work they have done with the Government and to ask my help in certain directions. They wished to give their point of view so I could act intelligently in their behalf.

The letter from the President received today explains itself. My letter to Gerard about it is also explanatory. The memorandum which I sent the President and which he returns makes clear the situation.

Bill Nye of the Secret Service came this afternoon to make an inspection of our private telephone wire. He has gone over it carefully from Washing ton here. It is underground now all the way up to a few hundred yeards from the house, but he wished to be certain that there were no leaks anywhere. He has directed that a man be sent here three times a week to look over the exposed part. I am told it is the largest underground wire in the world.

Sir William Wiseman and I had a long talk over the telephone. I told him of the President's decision to cooperate with the British in the Russian propaganda, the plan of which Wiseman and I had worked out.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. H. L. Higginson Jr.

June 17, 1917.

Although it has stormed from morning until night, this has been one of my

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busiest days, so far as visitors go. John Saltonstall, Charles Auchincloss, Billy Coolidge, Hurlburt, Henry Marsh, White, Tucker, Frederick Prince, General Squier and Capt. Hanks were among the many. General Squier was the only one who came about matters of sufficiently important to record.

We discussed the organization of our air service. My letter to the President will tell my views. As far as I know, I was one of the first, if not the first, to suggest making a feature of our aircraft. When I first talked to General Bridges some months ago, he was rather luke-warm at first though he later came into line. I have been pushing it steadily until now it seems everybody is of one mind in regrad to it. I suppose the recent battles on the Western front, in which the air fleet took such a conspicuous part, has brought it home to those in authority.

June 18, 1917.

A very quiet day and, outside of my correspondence, Hugh Wallace was the only interruption.

June 19, 1917.

Matthew Hale and Assistant Secretary Vrooman of the Agricultural Department took lunch with us. The discussion was mainly concerning Massachusetts politics, and the coalition of the liberal forces against the conservatives.

My old friend Clarence Esty was also a caller.

In talking with Frank Polk over the telephone this morning, he told me that when the British Ambassador gave his dinner to Northcliffe, he asked Northcliffe to come a little in advance of the other guests. Northcliffe arrived fifteen minutes before eight o'clock, to be told by Spring-Rice that he regarding him as an enemy. He went into one of his tirades when he is hardly responsible for what he says. Northcliffe was about to leave the house when the French Ambassador appeared, and he concluded not to make a scene. Spring-Rice is brilliant

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but at times abnormal. The British Government should never have allowed him to return to the United States when the war broke out, which found him an invalid in London. As I have pointed out before, one of Sir Edward Grey's grievous mistakes was in holding unfit men in the Diplomatic Service. However, we are doing the same thing here, so there is nothing to be said.

Vrooman and I discussed some of the problems of the Department of Agriculture.

June 20, 1917.

Wiseman had me on the telephone once or twice today and Sidney Mezes called me up from New York concerning General Goethals and the interview he is to have with the President on Friday.

Colcord telephoned from Washington about the same matter. My two letters to the President today explain this as I see it.

Wiseman is disturbed about Spring-Rice. He desires to come here tomorrow, but I advised him to let me see the Ambassador first and then follow.

June 21, 1917.

Wiseman has been on the telephone twice today about Spring-Rice, Northcliffe and his own visit here. I have again cautioned him about preceding the Ambassador, or to unduly mix up in the quarrel between Northcliffe and the Ambassador.

Ex-Ambassador Henry White telephoned to make an engagement in the near future. Edmund Billings, Collector of the Port of Boston, came out for an hour to discuss various matters of passing importance.

I had thought to send for Arthur Bullard, who sails on Saturday, but concluded to write him instead. See my letter of this date. Carl Ackerman sends me his book entitled, "Germany, the next Republic". He inscribed on the flyleaf: "To Colonel House, who in his quiet way is helping the President make the opinion

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of the world, the mistress of the world' ":

Frederick Palmer also sends me his book, "With our Faces in the Light".

Gordon tells me that he and Janet dined at Frank Polk's last night to meet the Belgian Mission. The Belgian Minister told them that they hoped to visit Magnolia in order to see me and express their appreciation for what I had done for Belgium.

June 22, 1917.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. W. H. Coolidge. At my request they had no other guests. We enjoyed their beautiful new home, into which they have just moved.

The British Ambassador and Lady Spring-Rice took lunch with us today. We had an hour's conference afterward. He does not feel as badly about Northcliffe as I had supposed, although he knows how imminent his (Spring-Rice's) recall is. He expresses contempt for Northcliffe in every possible way. He believes Balfour would have resigned at any other time if Northcliffe had been appointed to this mission. He says Northcliffe is a "bounder" and that Balfour is "a great gentleman". I am glad the Ambassador is in a pleasant humor with me.

We dines with Mr. and Mrs. F. L. Higginson Jr. Hetty is one of the British Ambassador's oldest friends and it is convenient for him to stop there which gives him an excuse for coming up here. Sir William Wiseman will be out tomorrow. We have arranged for a conference.

B. F. Yoakum telephoned from New York asking me to see Brent of the Shipping Board. I declined and explained that I understood the situation but did not care to become involved in that controversy.

I have a telegram from Hamilton Holt indicating that he would like to see me.

June 23, 1917.

Spring-Rice and I went to the station to meet Wiseman who arrived around

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10.30. We brought him back here and I gave them a half hour together before the three of us conferred for an hour and a half. Much to my surprise, the Ambassador has agreed that we should all be pleasant to Northcliffe. Sir William suggested it would be best to make him useful since he was here, to which I agreed and to which the Ambassador consented. The plan is to have the Ambassador stop over in New York to see Northcliffe and urge him to come to Magnolia to see me. Northcliffe wishes to do this, and told Wiseman that it was his purpose to accept Wallace's invitation to visit him at Manchester, in order that he might confer with me. Spring-Rice is to make the suggestion as if independently, so as to give Northcliffe the impression that he, Spring-Rice, is trying to help him.

Wiseman and I lunched alone. In talking of the above subject afterward, we concluded it would be wise to make a friend of Northcliffe, because we would then take in an element now antagonistic to our purposes.

We debated the question of trying to keep Spring-Rice here, or letting his Government bring him home, which they would like to do. Sir William thought I had been one of the best friends Spring-Rice ever had, and he wondered if the Ambassador realized it. Wiseman knows that even after the President and Lansing authorized me to ask the British Foreign Office to recall Spring-Rice several years ago, I did not act upon it and persuaded them to let the matter rest.

The difficulty now is that he is likely to break out in some violent way, which will make his recall a necessity and will discredit him. We have about decided that if a good man can be found to replace him, it would be better for Spring-Rice to be recalled and given all the honors promised. Spring-Rice is so suspicious that he is as likely to turn upon his best friend as he is upon an enemy.

It was decided that it was best for Wiseman to return to England in about three weeks in order to talk with the different factions in his Government, par-

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ticularly, Lloyd George. While Balfour and his entourage understand conditions here, Wiseman fears Lloyd George and his following do not understand them. He believes when he talks with George, there will be no danger of anything being done about appointing an Ambassador or anyone else connected with this Government, without passing it up to the President through me. In other words, he is certain he can arrange for it so that nothing of importance will be done without my visit. He wishes his own position better defined, and wishes his Government to understand the place he occupies in the United States.

I have arranged for Sir William to meet the President before he leaves, for the same reason that Whitehouse desired to meet him. If Wiseman goes home and has not met the President, it would, in a way, discredit him. I pointed out the difficulty of bringing such a meeting about. It would create trouble with Wiseman's superiors over here, and cause the President some embarrassment since it would break a precedent if he made a regular appointment to see him, without having it come through the British Embassy. I concluded the way to do it was to have Wiseman invited to some large function which the President was to attend, and then have the meeting brought about there. It is not a conference with the President that is wanted, but merely an opportunity to shake hands with him.

So far, Sir William has been able to hold the confidence of both the Ambassador and Northcliffe which is a tribute to his diplomacy.

Hugh Wallace took dinner with us. I invited him to meet Wiseman so he could again send a message to Northcliffe to come up. Sir William returned to town on the nine o'clock train, but I had an engagement afterward with Hamilton Holt, Filene and Fahey of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce. They did not reach the house until half past nine and I was late getting to bed. Holt came to tell of the financial difficulties of the Independent, and to ask advice regarding as to

the remedy. I was astonished to find that Andrew Carnegie and James Speyer had financed Holt in the first instance, and that he owed them a large part of the stock he holds in the Independent. It is a serious problem this question of the wealth of the country controlling the press and periodicals. There is hardly one that is absolutely free from that sort of influence. If it had not been for the war, it was my purpose to have advised some plan to curb it. It is a situation not without danger. It can be met, though the opposition would be terrific.

June 24, 1917.

Gordon telephoned from Washington in the morning and we took lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Abbott. There were some ten of us at the table, mostly society people along the shore. It has been a quiet day.

June 25, 1917.

Lincoln Colcord arrived from Boston on the 9.26 and remained for luncheon. I had cleaned up my correspondence in order to be free. He brought the manuscript of Gerard's book for me to look over, and is to return on Wednesday for a discussion after I have read it. He verified Gerard's having received from the Curtis Publishing Co. $100,000. for the book.

June 26, 1917.

I read Gerard's manuscript last night. I hope the book will be a success. It is not well written, but he tells many things in an interesting way. Colcord said Gerard accepted my judgment and did not mention the private conversation he had with the Kaiser on the yacht "Hohenzollern". I did not mean for Colcord to tell Gerard literally what I said, that is, I thought it a breach of hospitality and diplomacy.

I have a cable in code from our Ambassador to France which explains itself and is a part of the record. It is an answer to the despatch I received from

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Raymond Swing through the State Department, which is also a part of the record. I asked Lansing to have the Ambassador give an opinion as to the facts stated by Swing, and this despatch of today is an answer to that.

I arranged, over the telephone, for Gordon to ask Wiseman to Washington in order that he might attend the reception Secretary Lansing is giving tonight at the Pan American Building to the Russian Mission. The President is to attend, and Gordon is to arrange for Wiseman to meet him as planned, and for the reasons I shall give in my letter to the President tomorrow.

June 27, 1917.

We dined last night with Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Beal at Beverly Cove. The interesting part of the dinner was an admission by Mr. Beal that he had been mistaken concerning the value of the Federal Reserve Banking System. It will be remembered that this diary records a meeting I had with the bankers of Boston at Mr. Beal's house during the late summer of 1913 in order to discuss the banking bill which was then under discussion in Congress. Practically every one of the bankers were opposed to the bill in any form, although none of them had any creative suggestions in regard to it.

MrxxRexx Last night Mr. Beal modestly disclaimed any knowledge of scientific banking and excused himself on this ground. Most American bankers are but little more than glorified pawn-brokers. The question came up by Mr. Beal telling us that he had only $700,000. in cash on hand in his bank tonight when he closed, although his deposits run, I think, around $25,000,000. He confessed that he felt safer with this small amount of cash on hand than he formerly felt when he had ten times as much under the old banking system, and all because of the Federal Reserve System.

Frank Trumbull, Chairman of the C&O and M. K. & T. Railways took lunch with us, having come from New York for the purpose of seeking my influence

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toward having suitable men appointed to the vacancies in the Interstate Commerce Commission. Trumbull is Chairman of the Railroad Legislative Committee. They have no candidates, and they merely want a man big enough and honest enough to do the work that is gathering around this most important of commissions. It is rather absurd that the Commission is largely dependent upon men who seek the place for the salary that is in it.

I explained to Trumbull the difficulty of finding men of the type such a
place calls for. I recalled the difficulty the President has in selecting mem-
bers for such boards, and of the innumerable refusals he receives whenever he
tries to go beyond the mere place hunters. What Trumbull and I thought should
be done, if it were possible, is to get some dominant figure to accept a place on
the Board, so it can be lifted from the rut and put upon a higher plane of useful-
ness.

Lincoln Colcord and Mrs. Colcord were with us during the late afternoon.
Stuart Forbes, who has just returned from France, called to report on conditions
there. My letters to the President, Lansing and Hoover are parts of the record.

Gordon and Wiseman telephoned from Washington that the plan for Sir William
to meet the President was a great success. The President talked to him for fif-
teen minutes at the Lansing reception, and in a most conspicuous way. Everybody
was talking about it and wondering why. It was good of the President to respond
so cordially to my request.

David Miller telephones that the German Government is using the small
neutral governments for the purpose of buying and storing food for the use of
Germany. He estimates that it may amount to a billion of dollars worth of
food now stored in this country for the account of small neutrals, and which it
is intended shall finally drift into Germany.

Strangely enough, I have been reading during the day a twenty odd page

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report of the British Government, giving an analysis of the export of food from
the nearby neutrals into Germany. This statement of Miller's clears up much of
what seemed incredible in that report.

June 28, 1917.

I have another budget of foreign mail. Buckler writes concerning conditions in England, and encloses a letter to the President signed by Norman Angell, Philip Snowdon, Ramsay McDonald, E. R. Morel, Chas. N. Buxton, Charles Trevelyan and several others. I received a copy of this letter sometime ago, but did not send it to the President. I shall send the original, although I do not altogether agree with the purpose of the letter, which is to ask the President to demand of the Allies a restatement of their peace terms, and to have them made to harmonize with the President's January 22nd speech and the Russian statement of terms.

In my opinion, what is needed now, is to force Germany to give her terms.

I have an important letter from Paderewski which came last night by special delivery. I shall answer it by telephone today. The Poles in Russia want to segregate the Poles now in the Russian Army and form a separate army under Polish officers. They claim that there are 600,000 Polish soldiers who would be available at once.

Sir William Wiseman telephoned about the same subject. A cable came from the British concerning it, but Sir William did not know until he telephoned that the Poles had already given me a copy. I advised cabling to the British Government suggesting that we place the matter in the hands of Mr. Root of our Mission to Russia, and of Mr Ambassador at Petrograd, and have them thresh the subject out and cable their decision so we may have a more intelligent judgment about it before acting. It may cause complications which may make it inadvisable to press it. The Russian Government does not approve, but the British and Amer-

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ican Governments could bring enough pressure perhaps to force it. The question
is whether it would be wise to do this, and also whether it would be wise, from
another standpoint, to have 600,000 Poles turned loose pretty much on their own
initiative. They are a fine, chivalrous race, but have many of the qualities of
the Irish, therefore caution must be observed. Wiseman will let me know when
he has a reply and I will then make a second move.

Wiseman also has a cable from Mr. Balfour in which he states he in ca-
bling Northcliffe to see me at once about the oil situation which is becoming se-
rious. Upon this I advised him not to have Northcliffe come until the 13th
as planned, but to have him go to Washington instead and learn the facts before
coming here.

Wiseman says that a great deal of curiosity has been raised in British
Embassy circles over the talk he had with the President at the Lansing reception.
He thought it well not to make a mystery of it, and has told them if all the com-
monplace matters discussed, and has been apparently quite candid, at the same
time, giving nothing of the real purpose of the conversation. He told them that
the President was probably led to talk to him so freely and graciously because he
was a guest of Gordon's, and this seemed to satisfy them.

When Wiseman returned to New York, Northcliffe was told about it, so he,
too, was informed directly without having to get it from others. Northcliffe
also seemed quite satisfied with the explanation.

Sir William is anxious for me to be in touch with Northcliffe directly
rather than indirectly as I have been since his arrival. He says he is showing
signs of restiveness and of doing foolish things. The trouble now is with
McAdoo concerning the ever increasing demand for funds. I asked Sir William to
explain to Northcliffe that there were limits to our purse and that McAdoo could
not get more money from Congress until the Autumn and he must make what he had

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June 29, 1917.

Last night before I went to bed Sir William Wiseman telephoned that North-
cliffé had received such an urgent message from the Prime Minister to see me im-
mediately that he had concluded there was nothing to be done except to come up
today. However, Sir William and I talked the matter over the telephone this
morning and, in view of other cables of a more imperative nature, decided it was
best for Northcliffe to go at once to Washington. His coming here would be mere-
ly perfunctory, for Wiseman and I are doing everything over the private telephone
which he might do were he here. Pending matters are freighted with too much im-
portance to waste time upon conventionalities.

I received the following cable from Mr. Balfour:

"For reasons fully explained to Page here and to Spring-Rice in Washington we seem on the verge of a financial disaster which would be worse than defeat in the field. If we cannot keep up exchange neither we nor our Allies can pay our dollar debts. We should be driven off the gold basis and purchases from the U. S. A. would immediately cease and the Allies' credit would be shattered. A consequence which would be of incalculable gravity may be upon us on Monday next if nothing effective is done in the meantime. You know I am not an alarmist but this is really serious. I hope you will do what you can in proper quarters to avert calamity."

I called up Washington and gave this despatch to Gordon to be conveyed to the President through the Secretary of State. It will be done at once and the Secretary will also arrange for the President to receive Northcliffe.

I have been at the telephone continuously for hours talking first to the State Department, then to New York, trying to unravel the tangle. There seems to have been bad judgment on both sides. Sir William Lever and Sir Richard Crawford do not work closely together. Crawford works with our people and Lever

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has a tendency to work with J. P. Morgan & Company, and it is not certain that
Morgan does not want such a crisis as has arisen in order to force themselves
again into the situation from which they have been ejected by the Government.

Lloyd George's despatch to Northcliffe asking him to see me largely concerned the oil situation. Balfour's was entirely about the financial crisis. I sent a cable to Balfour through Wiseman reassuring him and to let him know that I have the situation in hand. I will send a despatch later, in the private code, of further explanation.

June 30, 1917.

Balfour's panic cable which came to me yesterday is alarming. I see evidences of all the belligerents weakening, and the cracking process being actively at work. My letters from France indicate that the condition there is most serious, and it is a question whether they will be able to hold out during the year. Great Britain, I have counted upon but if she is going to pieces financially because certain funds are not given her, or certain debts paid, the situation is not reassuring.

It will be recalled that I told the Governments in France and England that if they would let us know before they were in extremities, the United States would come to the rescue. They did not do this, but bluffed it out almost to the end. It is nothing short of criminal, and I cannot understand the statesmanship that inspired such a course. The prudent action would have been to ask me to come over, or someone else, and carefully disclosed the truth. I feel a lack of confidence in the outcome, no matter what the final result of the war may be. If Germany is defeated too completely, there will be difficulties to be met because of the rapacious demands of the Allies. If Germany wins, we know what that result portends. If it is a draw, then revolution and social problems seem to be the probable portion of the world. Never was there more need of steady, stabilizing and able leadership than now.

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Lord Northcliffe is to see the President at two o'clock. Yesterday the President declared he would not see him, but I suppose my letter which he received this morning changed his view.

I cabled Mr. Balfour yesterday as follows:

"Your cable of yesterday is receiving my undivided attention, and I feel confident there will be a satisfactory solution. The crisis has been largely brought about by the lack of some directing mind here that would have inspired general confidence. No such situation could have arisen while you were in this country. Sir William Wiseman seems to be in sympathetic touch with everyone, and while possessing both the ability and tact necessary to keep a difficult situation composed, he lack the authority. I hope both Governments will make allowances and maintain a firm purpose to adjust their differences in a spirit of compromise."

There is a long cable from Ambassador Sharp to the Secretary of State supplementing the one sent me regarding Raymond Swing's report on conditions in France. This very lengthy cable was read to me this morning over the telephone from Washington and I have asked for a copy which I shall attach to the record.

I have a ten page letter from Swing this morning in which he holds to his opinion expressed in his cable. I also have a xahkm letter from Frazier giving a reverse view.

Karl Weigand writes from Copenhagen enclosing a copy of a letter from Maximilian Harden which I shall attach.

Mrs. Richard Washburn Child writes an interesting letter from China, and my good old socialist friend, Lincoln Steffens, sends a line from New York. The usual budget from Buckler completes the foreign news for the day.

One could almost write a book on what has happened since I received Balfour's cable yesterday. I have been in constant telephonic communication

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with New York and Washington, advising each move from both sides.

Sir William has just telephoned that Northcliffe was satisfied with his in-
terview with the President, and is writing out a report to be cabled to his govern-
ment. When this report is ready to be cabled it will be telephoned to me, so
I may be apprised of its contents. Northcliffe does not realize how he is being
moved on the chess-board, and how carefully he is being watched to keep him from
making mistakes.

Wiseman wishes me to see Governor Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York and I have promised to do so. Strong, he thinks, is the only one con-
nected with the Treasury or Government banking circles who understands the exact
condition in which the British Government finds itself. I cautioned Wiseman not
to let it be known that Strong was coming here, and I shall advise Strong if he
does come not to tell anyone for fear of exciting jealousy. As a matter of fact,
there is no necessity for Strong to see me, because I have every confidence in
his ability to handle the situation without further advice.

Mr. and Mrs. Albert Ruddock called this afternoon by appointment. He
came out from Belgium with Brand Whitlock, where he was acting as First Secretary.
He tells the usual story of pathos that is so heartbreaking. I do not go into
these matters because it will all be told by Brand Whitlock and those who know it
at first hand. I shall try and arrange to have Ruddock assigned to Washington
for awhile, for I have a feeling of sympathy for those Americans who have been
where the Germans have ruled during the war.

July 1, 1917.

Frederick Allen, of Lee, Higginson & Co., now connected with the Council
for National Defence, took lunch with us. He came an hour or so in advance
in order to discuss the situation in Washington in relation to his work. I
made this engagement with him through Gordon, and largely because Baruch desir-

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ed me to do so. Allen spoke in behalf of Baruch as well as himself. When
the matter is thoroughly threshed out, I shall write the President my conclu-
sions.

and
The other guests at lunch were Mr. and Mrs. F. L. Higginson Jr. Mr. and
Mrs. Hugh Wallace.

I had a long talk with Lincoln Colcord this evening concerning his work
with the Public Ledger. Lansäng's letter of yesterday is a part of the
record. He enclosed Ambassador Sharp's cablegram concerning Raymond Swing.

July 2, 1917.

Frederick Allen and I finished our conference this morning and my let-
ter to the President gives the details of it.

Judge Lovett telephoned yesterday from Locust Valley asking me to see him upon Red Cross matters. He came out on the 9.35 train from Boston, remained to lunch, and returned to Boston in time to catch the five o'clock back to New York. It seems that Davison is irritated with the President because he understood the President had agreed to give him entire control of Red Cross matters. According to Davison, the President assented by silence which when he, Davison, at their first interview agreed to take up the load, provided he was given supreme authority. He admits the President did not reply to this direct request, and Cleveland Dodge, who was present, does not think the President to blame. Judge Lovett wondered what we could do about it and what I would advise in the premises.

I thought Davison had done a great piece of work in raising the hundred
and odd million of dollars, and that he could well afford to stand upon that
record even though he did nothing else. I advised him to go ahead with like
enthusiasm toward making a success of the work yet to be done. It only needed,
I thought, a little more diplomacy to give him all the authority needful. Davi-

son does not understand governmental processes. He wants to do things as private individuals or corporations would. I sympathize with him in wishing for a free hand, and it was my understanding that he was to be given it. If I were the President I would arrange it as nearly as possible. You cannot get the best out of anyone, or a great work done, by divided authority. I have tried it too many times. I never like to undertake anything, except in an advisory way, unless I have a free hand. I am always willing to take the entire responsibility, but I am not willing to be interfeered with. This is one of the reasons I never desired to go into the Cabinet.

Judge Lovett seemed to feel better after our talk and thought he could satisfy Davison.

Wiseman telephoned that, at the request of the British Ambassador, Governor Strong will come up tomorrow to discuss the differences now pending between the British and ourselves concerning finances. The British believe that Strong understands their position better than anyone else and they wish me to receive a favorable view of it.

I have a letter from Hamilton Holt which is gratifying and which I attach to the record. I hope I have been instrumental in aiding him and The Independent.

Sir William telephoned again to read a cable which had just come from the Foreign Office. It reads as follows:

(Balfour) (House)

"Damon is most grateful to Ceasar for his intervention. Results are already apparent. When we left Washington our relations with McAdoo were excellent. Can you tell me what has occurred to change this and can you suggest a remedy?"

I have been working assiduously in my effort to adjust the differences between the United States and British Governments in regard to finances. I am in touch with every phase of the situation and am advising from three or

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four angles, but always under cover, so that one group does not know I am ad-
vising the others. In this way I have the whole picture before me and can
act to the best advantage without creating friction.

Governor haa Strong has been with me most of the day. He is conversant
with an angle I did not have before. I am arranging to put him in touch with
the situation in such a way as to enable him to advise openly and with McAdoo's
approval. He thinks McAdoo's trouble is that he does not understand the mat-
ter himself and is not willing to delegate authority to others. This is a
defect which the President also has, and which makes him less efficient.

Gordon telephoned that Herbert Hoover will be here tomorrow for the day.
I was in hopes I might have one holiday free, but no such luck is to be mine.
Sundays and holidays are favorite days for people to come with their troubles.

July 4, 1917.

Wiseman tells me that Northcliffe and Sir Richard Crawford are de-
lighted at the suggestion of having Governor Strong help in the financial ad-
justment. My only concern is that there will be too much talking done. Near-
ly every situation is ruined by indiscriminate talk.

Hoover came at 10.30 and remained until half past five. We went over
the food situation both from a domestic and international viewpoint. We went
into the question of trading with the enemy, trading with neutrals, blockade,
and all the ramifications of the food question. Hoover knows the story better
than anyone. It is a pity he has so little personal charm, for he could go
further than he will with the lack of it.

Cullinan of Texas, who is assisting Hoover, came for a part of the day
and joined us at luncheon. Hoover thinks matters are getting into a jam at
Washington, and wonders why the President does not take some action. The
truth of the matter is, the President does not know things are not going smooth-

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ly, because he talks to almost no one excepting his Secretaries and they re-
assure him. From their viewpoint, things are going well, but viewed outside
of departmental circles, they are not. If the President comes through the
present situation without serious trouble he will have to be in good luck. I
can see how circumstances will carry him through, but I can also see danger
lurking on every side. He has the power to hold the situation so well in hand
that there could be no danger of failure.

Hoover says he has not seen the President for two weeks and then only for
twenty minutes. There are a few men like Hoover who could clear up the situa-
tion for him within a week, if he would only sit down with them and work the
thing clear through. I tried to get him to do this when war became inevitable
after he had sent Bernstorff home. At that time I urged him to let me organize
a war machine for him. It is the kind of thing I know how to do, and I have
experience gathered from intimate touch with the European belligerents. I
assured him that it could be done in a few weeks and in a way to give him en-
tire freedom from details. Our country is rich in the kind of material need-
ed for such an organization and if he would let me select it regardless of party,
the result would be sure to his credit. He feared I would displace certain
members of his Cabinet and he did not wish that done without first trying to
work out a satisfactory organization with them. Mrs. Wilson told me the
next morning, after I had given him this talk, that he had spent a sleepless
night worrying over what I had said.

Among other things I told him that he did not have the ability neces-
sary to organize the country for war. I softened this by saying that the
ability to organize was not rare and could be found in plenty, but the ability
to frame and force policies of government was rare, and he should confine his
time to that. I shook him, but did not entirely convince him that I was
right.

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Hoover is to put our conclusions in the form of a memorandum, copies of which
he is to send to the President and to me.

July 5, 1917.

The interest in the day's work has been centered in telephone talks
with the State Department and New York. Wiseman held me at the telephone for
nearly three quarters of an hour this afternoon. He was apologizing for the
trouble his confreres were giving me. I told him that André Tardieu, after
consultation with Northcliffe, had asked for a conference Sunday. Wiseman was
afraid they would begin to run to me with every petty trouble rather than wait
until a real crisis arose when my assistance would be necessary.

He read a cable which Northcliffe is sending his Government, the last
paragraph of which Sir William cut out after telling Northcliffe he declined to
send it because of its criticism of the Ambassador. He read me the eliminated
paragraph which handled the Ambassador in true Northcliffe style.

I told Wiseman that the trouble was bad enough with an incapacitated Am-
bassador, but it was made worse by the British Government sending over a man
they knew to be antagonistic to the Ambassador. They would not wait until
Balfour returned and could give them a survey of the field but precipitated
Northcliffe into what they must have known was a serious situation. I thought
the British Government entirely to blame for any trouble now in process or
which might arise. It was probable that Northcliffe was sent either because
he desired to get away or because it was thought wise to have him out of England.
If they were actuated by no better purpose, they should not complain if their
business goes badly here.

I have a most interesting letter from Richard Washburn Child about
the Chinese-Japanese situation. He writes clearly and well and I am sending
copies to the President and the State Department for their information.

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July 6, 1917.

I have had a very busy and interesting day. Keith McLeod, connected with the Air Service at Washington, took lunch with us, and gave me the latest word from that department. He wished my opinion of the bill now before Congress, and to have me advise concerning certain points. I declined to do so because of lack of information on the points in question.

Mr. Wallace B. Donham of the Old Colony Trust Company, who is connected with the Defence League of the Navy, was also in close touch with the Council for National Defence, came to report upon conditions as he saw them.

Mr. Gillette, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives when Mann is away, was another caller. I get an insight into each situation from so many angles, that it is not difficult to discard the inaccurate views and piece together the others in order to get a true picture. It is a wearisome job, but I keep at it assiduously.

My telephone talks were unusually interesting. Gordon led off by telling some of the Washington gossip. Things seem going well there from Mrs. Gordon Harriman's viewpoint. She is a great news gatherer. She believes matters are shaping up fairly satisfactorily. She told Gordon that Lord Northcliffe told her that before he left England he saw the King who said to him, "I wish I had a Colonel House".

Wiseman believes Northcliffe would like to do without my mediation in governmental affairs. He would like to see the President and other Government officials himself instead of having to work through me. This is quite natural and understandable.

Frank Polk is back in Washington and I have had two talks with him today. Matters are going badly with the Shipping Board. Lansing is away and Polk is acting Secretary of State.

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My most interesting conversations were with Sir William over the telephone.

He has cables from his Government sent for my information. One was to me personally

read and reads:

"Balfour has received House's message and is most grateful for all the trouble he has taken, and for the kind things he says. Balfour, of course, fully agrees with last sentence."

The other is for Wiseman and reads:

"Your telegram of July 3rd, Mr. Balfour highly appreciates all you are doing to help matters forward. He quite agrees it will be useful for you to come home as suggested and explain situation. Will you let me know where I can address telegrams to Colonel House personally in case necessity arises during your absence".

He also has a long despatch regarding the strengthening of our Navy after the war in lieu of our continuing our naval program at the expense of our merchant marine and submarine destroyers. This cable is of such a confidential nature that Wiseman wanted to send it up by a Scotland Yard man who belongs to his entourage, but I concluded it was best to send it by registered, special delivery mail. I shall include it in the diary tomorrow when it arrives.

Governor Strong's visit to Washington seems to have worked satisfactorily. He returns to New York tonight and wished to talk with me over the telephone. I have advised that he talk to me through Sir William, because I do not wish him to know that I have a private wire to New York and Washington.

Wiseman tells Strong that he has certain code words by which he can communicate with me freely which I hope will satisfy him. Sir William and I have been discussing the difficulties we have with his Ambassador, Northcliffe and other representatives of the Allies. I thought the trouble was that they were trying to get what they could out of us, which was the wrong spirit. We should

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consider ourselves in the same boat and partners, therefore we should approach
everything from the same point of view.

I have a letter from President Lowell of Harvard which is a part of the
record as is my answer to him.

July 7, 1917.

Today brought an important cable from Balfour concerning the proposed
naval agreement. It is of such moment, and of such a delicate nature that the
greatest care needs be taken. If Japan should learn that these negotiations
are in process, there is no telling what the result might be. I shall confine
all knowledge of it to the President and the acting Secretary of State. My
letter to the President which I shall write tomorrow will be a part of the re-
cord.

Wiseman telephoned this morning to tell of the latest developments in the
financial crisis now on between Great Britain and the United States. McAdoo was
glad to have Strong take part in the negotiations and this simplifies matters.
Strong talked over the telephone from New York telling me pretty much what Wise-
man had already explained. I shall try to get McAdoo and Wiseman in direct
touch early next week.

Strong tells me that Northcliffe does not understand the subject well
enough to discuss it intelligently with McAdoo.

Carl Ackerman saw Congressman Gillette and Hugh Wallace took lunch with
us. Ackerman came in advance, having travelled from his home in Pennsylvania
for the purpose of discussing his future movements and the nature of certain ar-
ticles he is to write for the Saturday Evening Post. I obtained more informa-
tion from him than he obtained advice from me. He gave me a thorough understand-
ing of some of his confreres in Berlin. I wanted to know something of Karl Wei-
gand, Raymond Swing and others with whom I am in touch over there.

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I found Gillette an interesting fellow. W. A. Tucker and Harry Marsh followed. Marsh wished to give some misinformation regarding German spies, etc. etc. Billy Phillips came next and remained for an hour. We went over the international situation in detail including Japan and China. He says there was a terrible row in Washington between Secretary Lane on the one side and Gregory, Daniels and Baker on the other over the fixing of coal prices by Lane. He was also present last night when Roosevelt made his assault on Gompers. Phillips was sitting just behind Gompers. He describes the scene as disgraceful, and although he has been a warm partisan of Roosevelt's, he thought he had acted like a maniac. I am asking him to cable Richard Washburn Child at Yokohama suggesting that he remain in Japan for the present.

The day has been a trying one and tomorrow bids fair to be more so.

July 8, 1917.

An important letter comes from Gerard which is a part of the record. Also my two letters to the President which I sent to him by hand. The day has been a burdensome one from start to finish.

André Tardieu and his secretary, Lieutenant Gillet, and Breckenridge Long came on an early train. I had Loulie take charge of Long so that Tardieu and I could have an uninterrupted session. There were an infinite number of matters he wished to discuss, such as international finances, the proper training of our officers, etc. etc. The French wish to retain J. P. Morgan & Co. in the capacity of agents to do their accounting. I expressed no objection although it seems strange that they, as well as the British, cannot understand that the feeling between the Administration and Morgan & Co. makes it inadvisable for them to use them in that capacity. It makes for constant friction. There is suspicion on both sides.

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Tardieu asked my advice about taking some of these matters to the President.
I advised him to do so. He came from Washington at the instance of North-
cliffe, who wanted him to talk these matters out with me. Northcliffe proposed
that all the Allied High Commissioners should seek an interview with the Presi-
dent at one time and present their difficulties. Tardieu thought they should
go singly if at all. I agreed to this, telling him, however, that they should
not all present the same phase of the situation. They should decide the differ-
ent subjects to be discussed and delegate each commissioner to present one.

He wished advice as to the best way of presenting the financial views of
the Allies to this Government. The plan worked out was for the Allies to get
together, make out a program, decide between themselves the proper needs of each,
and present them to our Government as a whole. In this way there would be no
continually
necessity for applying for small amounts by each country, and without our Govern-
ment being able to determine what was best to reject and what was best to grant.

It is rather a complicated question and I expressed doubt whether the Allied
countries could agree among themselves as to the amount each country should have.
Russia and Italy we think are applying for loans to be used for rehabilitating
themselves after the war, and which are not pressing at present. However, I
cordially approved every attempt to bring about some such coordination amongst
themselves. They have handled the matter badly as far as their negotiations
with the Treasury are concerned, and the Treasury Department, on the other hand,
according to Governor Strong, is not sufficiently well organized to meet the
strain put upon it.

I invited President Lowell to meet Tardieu for the purpose of dis-
cussing what I knew to be in the minds of both. That is, the more efficient
training of our officers before being sent abroad. Lowell desires the Harvard
plant
organization to be used as a base for such a training camp and he desires me, as

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his letter states, to be an intermediary between the President and Secretary of War, on the one hand, and Harvard University, on the other. Lowell is entertaining and since everyone spoke French a little, and since Tardieu spoke English a little, there was no difficulty.

I invited Gordon Abbott not only because of his knowledge of French and
France, but because I thought it would be interesting to Tardieu to meet that
type of American banker, a higher type than one is likely to meet in this country.
Then, too, I wanted someone to entertain Breckenridge Long when I was talking to
Tardieu privately, and someone to entertain Tardieu when it became necessary to
have a private talk with Long. It was an interesting and tiresome day.

Breckenridge Long came from Washington to New York with Lord Northcliffe and brought a message from him to the effect that the King had said that I owed him a letter and he hoped to hear from me soon. Strangely enough, I had intended to write the King for sometime and shall do so through Lord Stamfordham and send it by Wiseman.

July 9, 1917.

Edward G. Lowry, the writer, took lunch with us. We discussed affairs at Washington, of which he has intimate knowledge, and the pieces he is preparing to write for various periodicals. I have suggested to the Public Ledger people to have Lowry direct their Washington office, but he does not wish to be bound down in such a way. He gave a dinner to Lord Northcliffe last week and Northcliffe told him how much he was impressed with the President. He claims to have met almost every prominent person in public life of today, both in Europe and America, and he places the President, in point of ability, at the head.

July 10, 1917.

Captain Shannon of the Regular Army now stationed at Harvard took lunch with us in order to discuss the matter which President Lowell and André Tardieu

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brought to my attention Sunday. I found Shannon an intelligent and fine type of American officer, and he gave me what was lacking to make my information complete. My letters to Lowell and to Secretary Baker are parts of the diary.

I have a telegram from the President saying:

"Sorry the book is to be published, but am willing to withdraw objection to publication of personal message referred to.

W. W. "

I think he has been generous in this. It was a little too much to ask him to give as much attention to a personal matter as he has already given to Gerard's desire to have his book a success.

Frank Polk telephoned telling of the service Gordon is rendering his department. He was enthusiastic in his praise of him. There was no limit to his expressions of appreciation. Gordon is serving without salary and his firm has quit the practice of law to devote their energies to war work.

Gordon is arranging to have McAdoo and Wiseman lunch with him tomorrow. I am anxious for them to meet. I have authorized Gordon to tell McAdoo that I consider it of the greatest importance. McAdoo has expressed a determination not to see Lever again and for reasons I appreciate. Sir William and I agreed that a new man must be sent over to handle the financial end of the British Government's interest's here.

July 11, 1917.

Gordon's lunch to bring McAdoo and Wiseman together was a success. McAdoo was quite frank and gave out side of the case which Sir William acknowledged as being fair. They got along well together and I consider nothing more useful has been done recently than the bringing of these two in touch with one another.

The President and Mrs. Wilson have invited Janet, Gordon and Sir William

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to an informal dinner at the White House on Friday. This would not mean much under other administrations, but it means a great deal under the Wilson regime, because they entertain practically not at all excepting formal state dinners.

Late last night I received a fifteen or twenty minute telephone message from Baruch. He is disturbed over the crisis which seems to have arisen in the Council for National Defence circles. The Council is formulating a new plan for purchasing which Baruch does not consider workable. He is sending Lincoln Colcord here with the details in order that I may be informed and advise what is best in the premises.

Colcord arrived at half past five o'clock, hot-foot from Washington. I talked to him long and earnestly, but declined to commit myself to any program for the reason that I have as yet but one side of the controversy, and I am not willing to take the matter up with the President without having the full picture before me. Colcord remained to dinner and we had an interesting evening until time for him to leave on his return trip to Washington.

July 12, 1917.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey, of the Commission for National Defence, telephoned from Boston, he, too, having come from Washington to tell of the troubles in Council circles. I had to listen to him as I did to Colcord and Baruch, without letting him know that I had had the story before in all its details. He left a memorandum which the Commission have passed up to the Council and which I attach to this record in order to explain the differences which exist.

Wiseman telephoned for nearly an hour explaining his conversation with McAdoo, and telling of the financial crisis which, for the time, has been averted. He thought McAdoo spoke too slightly of the Allies, which was one cause of the friction existing between his Department and the Allied representatives in this country. Wiseman said if McAdoo spoke to the others as he

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he did to him, he did not wonder at their irritation. Asked for a specific example, he said that McAdoo complained that Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy were constantly coming to him for funds. He spoke as if they were a lot of beggars with their hats in their hands. As a matter of fact, McAdoo was not offensive, for Gordon was present at the interview and did not receive that impression. Great Britain is sensitive because, for a century or more, she has held the first financial place in the world. Balfour's cable to me is a most extraordinary document, and when the history of these times is written, will be looked upon with amazement.

international
I wrote the President today regarding these financial problems.

July 13, 1917.

The telephone has been busy during the entire day, particularly between Washington and here. Wiseman, who is with Gordon again to attend the dinner at the White House, has telephoned from the State Department several times. He is still talking of his Government's financial troubles and trying to have me find a way to straighten them out. He believes now that McAdoo has more sympathy than he first thought and that he is sincere in his effort to meet the $400,000,000. short time loan which Great Britain placed with Morgan & Co. and which is now past due. This is the rock that is blocking the way.

I have a letter from Frank Cobb of the World which is a part of the record, and also my letter to the President about it and the pending crisis in the Council for National Defence.

I am arranging through Vance McCormick to have the Independent financed under certain conditions. McCormick says he can get the money if I will say I consider it worth while.

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July 14, 1917.

Gordon from Washington, and Sir William from New York, say the dinner at the White House last night was a success. The President, Mrs. Wilson, Gordon, Sir William and Sam Auchincloss were present. Gordon overheard the President and Sir William discussing me at some length. The President said I was wholly detached in my viewpoint and kept it entirely untangled from personal ambition, and, as he expressed it, I "could see things as through a vacuum".

Sir William is in the seventh heaven of pleasurable excitement. The President asked him into his study and talked with him for an hour concerning the naval negotiations which we have in hand with the British government, and which Sir William is coming here to discuss with me on Monday before he sails for England.

He has another cable from the Foreign Office about this asking the status of it. He has replied that he will take it up with me on Monday and will cable further.

The President told Wiseman that it would be necessary for them to send another financial man here other than Lever. I advised this in my letter of a few days ago. I also advised the President not to discuss the naval matter with anyone other than with Lansing, Polk and Sir William. He has neglected, however, to discuss it with the State Department at all which has caused them some chagrin since I told them he would do so.

Frank Polk believes the President has gotten a wrong view concerning the value of capital battleships. I know this to be true, and when I thresh it out further with Wiseman I shall again take it up with the President. There may be something better in the future, but up to now, Great Britain's successful blockade of Germany is maintained because she has a superiority in capital battleships.

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Polk says Morganthau's trip has turned out to be a fiasco. When Morganthau spoke to me about it in May, I asked him how many people knew of it. He claimed to have told only Houston, Lane, Adolph Miller, Lensing and the President. My advice to Morganthau then was to undo this part before he left. Instead of that, it seems he told a few more, and that it is known to practically every synagogue in New York. He has also undertaken to speak for the United States as to future peace conditions, which is disturbing the President and the State Department. They are undetermined whether to let him go as far as Palestine and bring him home from there, or to bring him home directly from France. I advised the latter.

We dined with the Wallaces last night. Northcliffe's party was late, consequently we did not sit down until after half past eight, and we did not have an opportunity to talk after dinner because of the lateness of the hour.

Wallace gave Northcliffe a luncheon but I did not go. I asked at the last moment to be excused. It was a larger affair than I care to attend and I was not feeling very fit. Northcliffe dines with us tonight. I asked him to come at half past six although we dine at eight, in order that we may talk out any business he has in mind beforehand. I have a long letter from Walter Page today.

July 15, 1917.

Lord Northcliffe came to dinner last night. He arrived at half past six and we had an hour and a half before dinner. I found him very willing to give all the information he had concerning the financial crisis which has arisen between our two governments. But, as Wiseman said, he knows but little about banking and even less about international financing. Curiously enough, he told me that Lloyd George had sent for him quite hurriedly and told him it was necessary for him to leave for America at once. Lloyd George did this, he said, because Balfour cabled that it was necessary to have him come. He

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spoke of Balfour in the most cordial way, saying he had fought him at times,
but had always liked him, and that Balfour had given him his peerage. He does
not know that Balfour sent me all the cables in connection with his coming which,
in a way, is unfair to Northcliffe.

We had Hetty Higginson, Mona and Ran for dinner. After dinner,
Northcliffe, Ran and I sat for a half hour or more smoking and talking. I
asked Northcliffe's opinion as to the value of the proposal which I had Sir
William make to Cobb, of the World, regarding a challenge to the Tageblatt
or some other German paper, to discuss the differences between the Allies and
the Central Powers. Northcliffe was enthusiastic over the proposal and pro-
mised cordial support, in the event it was carried out.

My letter of today to Frank Cobb is a part of the record.

I had another conference with Lord Northcliffe this morning. He gave all
the data he had relating to the pending financial crisis, showing the letter
addressed to him by Morgan & Co. and giving a memorandum of the participants
in the $400,000,000. loan. This memorandum is attached.

He also gave a memorandum concerning the shipping situation. He show-
ed a copy of the cable he sent jointly to the Prime Minister, Balfour and Bonar
Law, outlining his interview with McAdoo, and McAdoo's position. It was well
written and seemed to be accurate. He said a Mr. Gordon, a banker from Canada
who is now attached to his staff, prepared it. Much to my regret, Northcliffe
is to remain over until Tuesday. This brings him in conflict with Wiseman
who arrives tomorrow morning. I hope there may be no friction because of
it.

July 16, 1917.

An exceedingly heavy day. Wiseman arrived early. We had a two
hour conference before Northcliffe joined us for lunch. Sir William had

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written a memorandum of his talk with the President, a copy of which he gave me
and which is attached. The President's view regarding capital ships is an ex-
traordinary one. I shall write him about it tomorrow.

Sir William made notes of all the matters he was to take up with his Gov-
ernment while in England. I sending letters by him to the Prime Minister, Bal-
four, Page, the King and General Bridges, Lady Paget and Mrs. Astor. We went
over every phase of the situation between our governments. There was nothing
held in reserve, either or criticism or praise. It is the only way to do in
order to get the best results and to keep good relations.

We concluded that the situation here is an impossible one and, since it
is impossible for Northcliffe to go because his Government would not dare re-
call him, even if it were desirable to do so, it that it would be best for
Spring-Rice to go. We also decided to ask that he, Sir William, be given no
special duties on this side further than to keep in touch with me and work out
the things we plan together.

When Northcliffe joined us the discussion became more general. He
remained until half past four o'clock which gave us something like four hours
together. I found him amenable to reason and anxious to cooperate in every
possible way. He said he was subject to my orders and would return to Magno-
lia whenever I thought it necessary. He spoke of Lloyd George's intimacy
with the Lord Chief Justice, saying that Reading was "the Col. House of their
Government". We decided that the Lord Chief Justice would be a good man to
come over and negotiate with McAdoo upon financial questions. We discussed
many other names but finally rested on Lord Reading who was suggested by me.
Before finally asking for Reading, it was agreed that I should see McAdoo and
discuss it with him. Meanwhile, Northcliffe is to send me such names
of others who are available.
as may occur to him. I told Northcliffe that it was es-

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sential that he should be in full control so as not to have divided authority.
He disclaimed any desire for this and said all he wanted was to "serve as you
do". Wiseman a similar remark during the day. I find an ever growing number
of people who like my job-- whatever it may be.

We discussed the financial questions, in which Great Britain is interested
from start to finish, and I expressed a willingness to help work them out.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace and Northcliffe and his party motor-
ed into Boston at nine to catch the midnight train for New York.

Bainbridge Colby telephoned from New York asking for an appointment for
tomorrow. I am sorry he is coming for I am sure he wishes to take up the ad-
visability of his running for Mayor of New York on the Tammany ticket.

I have a long letter from McAdoo telling some of his troubles. Abram
I. Elkus, who has just returned from his Ambassadorial duties in Turkey, also
writes. I may say in passing that while he was there but a short time, he
made an exceedingly good impression, both in Turkey and in the State Department.

July 17, 1917.

My letters to the President and to McAdoo are parts of the record. Pres-
ident Lowell telephoned asking advice as to whether he had better see the Se-
cretary of War concerning the Harvard Training Camp. I thought it well to do
so. He then wanted to know whether it would be advisable to see the President
about it. I thought not. He said he was going to Washington to attend a
meeting of the League to Enforce Peace and that the members thought he should
see the President about the affairs of that association. He wondered what I
thought of it. I advised against it. I did not tell him so, but I was
afraid the President would not be cordial.

Charles J. Glidden telephoned asking permission to bring General Clar-
ence Edwards out to see me. I appointed Sunday at five o'clock.

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Henry P. Davison of Morgan & Co. called to tell of his activities in the Red Cross. He expressed him as happy over the work he was doing and said he was glad I had put him in harness, even though it would allow him no vacation this summer.

Justice Loring was another visitor during the day. Bainbridge Colby arrived in the afternoon and remained for dinner. He always interests me. He wished my advice, as I anticipated, on the Mayoralty race, and also as to whether he should accept the Federal Circuit Judgeship for the Southern District of New York, which the Attorney General has offered him.

We talked this question out at length, and while I did not give him any direct advice, it was clear that I thought he would be foolish to run for Mayor on the Tammany ticket, and for reasons which are obvious and need not be repeated here. I thought if Murphy would relinquish the leadership and the organization became manned by high-class, forward-looking men, it would be another question. But there was an incongruity between the platform which he said Tammany was willing to run him on and the leaders of the organization as now constituted.

I gave a hint that the first vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by a Justice whose residence was in an Eastern state, would make the nomination of a man from New York quite obvious. I told him the Attorney General and I had ransacked New York last summer for a suitable man as a successor to Justice Hughes, but we abandoned it as hopeless. The thought probably went through his mind that since then he, Colby, had aligned himself with the Democratic Party and had done service for the President, and if another search were to be made for a suitable Justice, he might easily be found.

July 18, 1917.

I am pleased to receive a favorable reply from Frank Cobb about the plan to open international discussion between Germany and this country. I shall

send a copy of his letter to the President and my reply. They are attached to
the diary.

Ambassador Fletcher arrived at 10.30 and took lunch with me. We had a thorough discussion of the Mexican situation. Fletcher's affiliations have been largely with great wealth and I was afraid he would take their viewpoint, and press upon Mexico unfair settlements. I have cautioned him about this before, and what he said today somewhat reassured me. The oil companies have had enormous concessions in Mexico in land and in freedom from taxation through the acts of corrupt governments; therefore I have but little sympathy with the demand for "the pound of flesh."

Both Grunsky and British and American oil companies are protesting loudly because the Mexican Government has placed an export tax upon oil. This tax amounts to something like 10%. The war has caused a phenomenal advance in the price of oil, and yet they would have us go to war with Mexico rather than allow that Government to collect a reasonable tax. The Mexican Government has to live, and it cannot live without taxes. If good relations could be brought about the production might be enormously increased, and that is the important thing just now.

Fletcher tells me the American citizens in Mexico City are resentful, unpatriotic and bent upon making trouble between Mexico and the United States. He tried to get them to organize to help out a bad situation and to help meet German propaganda which is still going on largely through German citizens and representatives. Fletcher was told that the American Government had done nothing for them and they intended to reciprocate in kind. I thought Mexico was not unlike France, England and Germany where resident Americans abused their country and caused much international bad feelings.

He told me in confidence that he was to be married next week. He said

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he had not told his father as yet and I was cautioned to keep it a profound secret. In talking to him of his ambassadorial duties, I hoped I might live long enough to see an ideal ambassador at the Court of St James-- an ambassador who, while protecting American interests, would have the good sense to bring about a dignified friendship between the two governments; an ambassador who would become the farther confessor of the Central and South American Republics, and who would make our embassy the rallying point for the weaker nations of the world.

I introduced Fletcher to my old friend, T. Jefferson Coolidge. He told Mr. Coolidge that he had come here to see me in order to be able to write "Hadji" after his name.

Sidney Brooks writes me an interesting letter. He had an interview with the King and he, too, finally confirms what Northcliffe said, that the King wondered why I had not written him.

July 19, 1917.

Fortunately, I have had no visitors today and have been able to pick up the odds and ends. The telephone has been only fairly busy. The use of the telephone so freely makes my diary incomplete because I cannot record the number of things I do through its instrumentality.

I am pleased to have such a cordial reply from the World through Cobb concerning my plan for an international forum. Copies of Cobb's letter, my reply and my letter to the President about it are parts of the record.

McAdoo writes that he intended to come up today but was detained by urgent business. He will probably be here next week. In response to his request to see me, Gordon has arranged for the Russian Ambassador to come on Sunday for lunch. Frank Polk and Gordon are insistent upon sending a secret service man here to guard this place at night. I am fighting against it, as he would be something of a nuisance, and I do not like having such a man around for more reasons than one.

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An attempt was made in New York the other day to get into Gordon's desk. They made the mistake of confusing Gordon with his brother who has an office in the same building. They jammied his desk and went through his papers; though no valuables were taken.

July 20, 1917.

Gavin McNab of San Francisco came for lunch. He came to tell of conditions in California and in Washington as he sees them. He is a canny Scotsman and, while full of his own importance, had much to tell that was worth while. He said the Administration's appointments in California to Federal offices were ludicrous, most of the appointees being unknown in the State. He supposed they were people largely without occupation who had drifted into Washington, made an impression by their social graces, and had obtained recognition from the Cabinet.

He thought Denman an absurd appointment, as far as its political value on California was concerned. He consideres him intellectually able, very tenacious, not altogether trustworthy, and utterly without executive ability. He believes his peculiar qualities are likely to give him the advantage in his controversy with Goethals.

McNab told how he had carried the State of California for the President in the last campaign.

I have a cable from Mr. Balfour today which reads:

"Communication of utmost importance and urgency with regard to financial position was made to the United States Ambassador today with request that he should telegraph it in extenso to State Department. I should be most grateful if you could ensure that it receives the immediate personal attention of the President, and any assistance you can give as matter is really vital. I am sure nothing short of full aid which we ask will avoid a catastrophe."

I am sending a copy of this to the President today and my letter is attached. I answered Balfour as follows:

"I will take up this matter with the President immediately. I have been discussing the question with the Secretary of the Treasury direct and he promised

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to see me yesterday but was detained and I am expecting him early next week".

We took dinner with Mr. and Mrs. William A. Tucker. The other guests
were Mr. and Mrs. John Hays Hammond and Harry Marsh. After giving Hammond
my views regarding peace and its aftermath, he expressed a wish that I should
meet President Taft, President Lowell and himself to discuss it together.

Fitzgerald of Boston telephoned asking permission to bring down T. P.
O'Connor, I may invite them for lunch Sunday.

July 21, 1917.

The day has been devoted largely to the telephone talks with Washington and
with Sir William Wiseman in New York. Wiseman sails tomorrow on the St Louis
and we are buttoning up everything within reach. I have asked him to say to
Lloyd George and Balfour that they must lay all their cards on the table with
faces up; that the two governments are working too much in the dark. I suggest
that they let Wiseman have their inner confidence so that he, in turn, can im-
part the information to us.

I have cautioned him about what to tell the King and what not to tell
him. Governmental policies of a confidential nature are not to be revealed
but interesting gossip may be told freely. The reason for this is that he
would get in trouble with Lloyd George and Government leaders if he told the
King everything that was transpiring. Lloyd George may do this himself, but
he would not like it to come from Wiseman.

Wiseman will advise the Government to bring Spring-Rice home in order to
relieve the friction caused by the sending of Northcliffe here. Of the two,
Northcliffe bids fair to be of more value.

Frederick Dixon, Editor of the Christian Science Monitor, came
from Boston in the afternoon. We exchanged information.

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July 22, 1917.

This has been one of the busiest days of the summer. Among my visitors were the Russian Ambassador, T. P. O'Connor, General Clarence P. Edwards, Chas. J. Glidden, Barron, of the Boston News Bureau, etc. etc.

I like Bachkmeteff. I will epitomize in my letter to the President tomorrow the immediate cause of his visit. I shall put it mildly in order that the President may not feel piqued because such people are coming to me rather than directly to him.

The lack of action at Washington is a disturbing factor, and I am turned to as a last resort. I sounded Bachkmeteff upon the Russian situation and got some encouragement. He seemed sympathetic to my peace plans, although I did not tell them to him in detail, but gave him merely the broad outlines of what I thought should govern. We are to talk the matter out further in September when I go to Washington. Bachkmeteff said it was the most hopeful view he had received since he came to America, and he assumed me the new Russia would stand side by side with the United States in the advancement of such a program. He asked to come again when necessary, meanwhile, we are to keep in touch through Gordon. The Ambassador came at eleven o'clock and remained until half past four. We invited no one to lunch excepting Hetty Higginson, Mona and Ran.

T. P. O'Connor came immediately after lunch and we went to my study for a confidential talk. He outlined the Irish situation up to date, and we advised together concerning it. He seems to be fair-minded, and his program is not too radical, I think, to be adopted and I promised to help. He is to come again in about three weeks for a further talk. He is a good conversationalist; has a slight Irish brogue; takes snuff like a gentleman of the Eighteenth Century and altogether is a picturesque character.

General Edwards came before they left and at one time every avail-

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able part of the veranda was occupied. Edwards, too, had to be taken to the study for a confidential talk. He wished to tell of the Army and what he was doing for the Northeastern Division of which he is head. He talks too much, but is a clear-cut, fine type of American soldier. I read him a letter which I had just received from the Secretary of War. This letter is a part of the record.

July 23, 1917.

Acting Secretary of State, Frank Polk, sent Lanier Winslow from Washington last night with a copy of the recent communication which the British Government has made through Walter Page. This is the memorandum Balfour referred to in his cable to me. My letters to the President, Northcliffe and Lawrence Lowell are parts of the record.

I received a letter from the President concerning the proposed debate between the WORLD and the TAGEBLATT. His letter is a part of the record. It shows that the importance of the debate has impressed him deeply. He considers it of such importance that he is evidently fearful of it. The letter was sent by mistake to Manchester. When one reads its text, it is to be wondered that he dared send it through the mail, for his remarks concerning our holding the Allies within our financial grip would cause a storm if known.

July 24, 1917.

I have a letter from Frank Cobb today. I shall not write the President further until the letter from Cobb comes to which he refers.

McAdoo was to have been here this morning. He and Mrs. McAdoo started and got as far as Baltimore when he says he became sick and had to return to Washington. Bob Woolley, who is here today, was on the train with them and he says McAdoo thought of an important conference which he had on in Washington for today. I am wondering who has the right of it. Polk tells me that at the Cabinet

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meeting McAdoo told him he returned because he was sick, and Polk said he looked
it. I am sorry, for it was important that he should be here.

Woolley desires to be Interstate Commerce Commissioner. I advised
him not to count on it, but to go along with his private plans.

Governor Martin H. Glynn motored over from Lynn to
talk about matters in general and nothing in particular.

July 25, 1917.

While we were at the Wallaces at dinner last night, their house was burglar-
ized and kewelry and money to the extent of more than $2500. was stolen. We
made a thorough search of the house and found where the burglar had gotten in,
but he had disappeared completely.

Daniel C. Roper came from Washington to talk over some of the questions
which are troubling the Tariff Commission. After he finished, I gave him my
views as to the breaking down of all tariff barriers as nearly as can be when
the war is over. He tells me the Tariff Commission as a whole is decidedly
low tariff.

I had a notion that Roper was coming to ask me to use my influence to
have him transferred from the Tariff Commission to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. I was glad he did not broach that subject.

M. de Billy of the French High Commission came at the instance of
Andre' Tardieu to talk over the situation as it is to date. He brought a
memorandum to show which McAdoo had addressed to all the Allied Commissioners.
There were a sentence or two in it that hurt their sensibilities. This seems
to be the usual thing for our Government officials to do when they discuss in-
ternational matters. I explained to de Billy that there was no intention to
be discourteous and that the document was probably drawn up by the legal ad-
viser and in legal form.

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We discussed it at some length and the reply which the Allied Commissioners have about decided to make. It was to advise with me about this reply that brought him to Magnolia. He will send me a copy when the document is sent to McAdoo. De Billy talked of that part of Belgium and Northern France now held by the Germans. He gave me a copy of a letter which Tardieu had sent the President, which is a part of the record. I promised to help. I called his attention to the fact that the President was never properly addressed as "Your Excellency" and gave him the approved form. We discussed the situation on the Western front; the condition of France; the help the United States could give and many other questions. De Billy is one of the best representatives any country has sent us.

William Bullitt, formerly of the Public Ledger, but now working in the State Department, came to seek advice as to whether to return to the Ledger or accept a place offered him as secretary to that part of the Tariff Commission going abroad to investigate European and Asiatic tariffs.

A'letters from Sir Eric Drummond comes and in the last two sentences he says:

"I trust you are well and that your many cares are not placing too great a strain upon you. I do not like to contemplate what the position might be if we were deprived even for a short time of your counsel and assistance".

I also have a letter from Captain Gherardi which is a part of the record. A letter and budget came from Buckler of the London Embassy.

July 26, 1917.

Dudley Malone telephoned from New York asking for an engagement in the late afternoon. As a matter of fact he did the usual Malone act and arrived at twenty minutes after ten o'clock. It was twelve before I got to bed. He brought the Collector of the Port of Boston with him, but considerably left

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Billings in the open automobile, out of doors in the fog, during the time we
talked. It was a distressing interview.

He is ready to quarrel with the President because of his lack of action
in the Suffrage movement. He told the story of his interview with the President
and it was not a pleasant thing to hear. He feels that the President, and per-
haps rightly, could bring about national suffrage almost immediately if he was
sincerely for it. The President was inclined to argue the matter and stated
that he did not feel it was right to go to Congress and demand it of it. In
reply to this, Dudley asked him why he considered it right to demand of Congress
practically all of the important legislation he had gotten through. The Presi-
dent made a mistake in giving such a reason, he should have stated the truth.

Whenever the President gives an evasive or foolish reason-- reasons I
know are not the real ones, I never argue with him as Dudley did, but I simply
cease talking. The President understands that I know he is talking nonsense,
and my method is far more effective.

Dudley's action has led me to be afraid, to a breach-- a breach that will
widen as time goes on. It is a pity that a man of Dudley's remarkable talents
use them
should not maximize to better advantage. He is temperamentally unable to do
sustained work. He wishes to resign at once. I urged him not to do so for
the present. In demanding my reasons, I thought it would be better for him and
better for the President that there should be no apparent breach. He gave me
no definite promise.

I have a letter from S. R. Bertron, one of the Russian Commission,
which is a part of the diary.

I sent Sir Horace Plunkett a cable today as follows.

"Hearty congratulations." He has just been elected Chairman of the Irish
Convention in Dublin.

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Herbert Croly took lunch with me to talk over New Republic affairs. He now has a satisfactory arrangement with the Willard Straights, as far as the financial control of the paper is concerned. The Straights are to have the preferred stock, and the common is to control the paper. He also wished to talk of the future policy of the New Republic, and to get an outline of the foreign situation, so that he and his staff might write intelligently and not conflict with the purposes of the Government.

It was public opinion in Germany expressing itself through the Reichstag that forced the resignation of Bethman-Holweg. The Reichstag had no power to make him resign, but the Government felt itself unable to withstand the voice of Germany speaking through the Reichstag. Not many years ago the youth of the country had the great captains of industry held up before them as examples to the exclusion of other useful citizens. The result was that the ambition of our young men was directed mainly to the acquisition of wealth.

The thought I am trying to convey to publicists is that we can build up throughout the world a public opinion which will influence nations just as individuals are now influenced by their respective communities. When this is done, we will have the road toward international peace. One nation will hesitate to despoil another even as one citizen refuses to dispoil his neighbor. It is to be hoped that as soon in time the good will and good opinion of other nations will become of more value to a country than great possessions or great power. It will be difficult, but quite possible to force public opinion in this direction.

Hamilton Holt came just after lunch. He has worked himself into a fine frenzy over the Independents troubles, and he broke down completely in talking to me about them. I advised him to take a rest for a day or two before doing anything further. When he spoke of supporting the President, I told him I was

trying to help him and not trying to get the support of the Independent: that
I was perfectly willing for the Independent to criticize the President whenever
they thought he was wrong, and I knew they would sustain him when they thought
he was right.

July 27, 1917.

The day has not been a busy one. Dr. Short of the League to Enforce
Peace came from Boston to seek advice concerning pending matters in that organ-
ization. He also wished advice as to the proposed meeting of the League at
Washington in the Autumn and the scope it should cover.

July 28, 1917.

We dined last night with Mr. and Mrs. F. L. Higginson Jr. The other
guest was Ellery Sedgwick.

Gordon and Janet came from Washington today, Janet to remain the balance
of the summer and Gordon to return tomorrow night. I hear only good reports of
Gordon's work from Washington. Janet, too, has had her share of admiration and
attention.

Mrs. Borden Harriman called in the afternoon and gave much gossip of Wash-
ington and New York-- some of it hardly fit to print.

July 29, 1917.

Major Henry Higginson was my most prominent caller. He came to talk about
the war and the submarine menace, and I let him do so for an hour or more.

I have a letter from McAdoo saying he will be here Wednesday. I also
have a letter from Frank Cobb about the challenge of THE WORLD to the TAGEBLATT.
My reply is a part of the record.

July 30, 1917.

The cable I sent Wiseman on the 28th is a part of the record.

Sir Chas.

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Gordon, at Lord Northcliffe's request, came from New York and remained to lunch. We discussed the question of prices. The Allies, especially Great Britain, are much upset because nothing has been done to regulate or fix prices. Their needs are such that it is essential for them to buy soon, and yet the prices asked by American producers and manufacturers are almost prohibitive. For instance, the British Government are paying for steel plates at home 2½ cents, while the U. S. Steel Corporation is asking them eight cents. The difference in the cost of production is perhaps half a cent, which shows the enormous profits the American manufacturers are contemplating.

I called Sir Charles' attention to the assertion that the Allies were trying to get prices in the United States at the same figures paid by our Government, and that these prices were in many instances lower than they were paying their own producers. In reply he said they would hereafter insist upon their producers meeting the American figures. I found Gordon an interesting virile Canadian.

August 3, 1917.

I have the following cable from Sir William Wiseman:

"I have just had long conference with Mr. Balfour. He says your help in the whole situation and particularly in recent difficulty was the factor which saved a very grave disaster. He is intensely grateful to you and anxious to use all his influence to do anything to improve and facilitate relations between the two governments. I explained the need for fullest information and frankest exchange of views.

As to further discussions as to best method I will cable you again. A very full memorandum on submarine situation has been prepared by the War Cabinet. It gives all important information we have in our possession. We discussed the best way to communicate this and decided to telegraph the memorandum in full to

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Northcliffe tonight with instructions to present it to you and take your judgment as to whether it would be better for you to forward it direct to the President or for him to present it formally to the President. I shall see this memorandum tomorrow and I am told it states the position as very serious, but offers suggestion for fusion measures which may solve the problem.

I have also seen Sir Horace Plunkett. He feels a solution of the Irish question must be reached by Convention at almost any cost and is happy to know that you and the President will follow developments with interest and sympathy. He will keep me constantly posted and I shall inform you of everything in confidence. In future cables "Syntax" will mean the man we lunched with at your house at Magnolia recently."

The last few days have been extremely hot and there has been a lull in correspondence, telephone calls and in visitors. I have noticed in the winter, too, when a blizzard occurs, the same thing happens. The thermometer reached 94 on our veranda. However, it was only in the afternoon of one day and the morning of the next that were too warm to be comfortable.

Abram I. Elkus came from New York to lunch and to tell of conditions in Turkey, and of his activities there as Ambassador. We had a good laugh over Morganthau's peace project. Elkus says Morganthau was even indiscreet enough to write about it to friends in Europe, and that it was well known everywhere that he was bound for Turkey to try to make a separate peace. The remarkable thing about it, as Elkus sees it, was that he intended to make the peace with Enver Pasha, whom Morganthau supposed to be his devoted friend. Elkus says that Enver is nothing more than a German agent and is the last man in Turkey with whom anyone could talk separate peace. Some of the Turkish Cabinet are pro-Ally in their feelings, and would like to get out of the German entanglement

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if they saw a clear way to do so. Unfortunately, they saw no way out. It was
a question of having Turkey dismembered and divided among the Allies, in the
event of Allied success, or to become a German province, in the event of German
success. Of the two, they preferred the latter.

They know in Turkey of the secret treaties the Allies have made among them-
selves, in which they have sheerfully partitioned Turkey. This knowledge comes
from the indiscreet talk which is current in Europe. Of all the belligerents,
Germany seems to have kept her counsel closest. What she has told, I take it,
she has told for the purpose of having it repeated.

Elkus was cordially treated in Austria as he passed through on his way out
of Turkey, even though relations had been broken. There seemed to be no feel-
ing against Americans, and there was an ardent desire for peace which can find
no way of expression because they, too, are tied hard and fast to the Prussian
war chariot.

Elkus talked with much intelligence, and we discussed almost every phase
of the European situation. He saw Balfour, Lloyd George, Ribot and many others.
His final impression is that with a strict embargo against the nearby neutrals,
Germany must have peace during the coming winter.

Samuel Untermyer called this afternoon, apropos of nothing. Collector
Billings of Boston and Mr. Storrow came by appointment and remained for the bal-
ance of the afternoon. We dined with Judge and Mrs. W. H. Moore.

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August 4, 1917.

Mr. and Mrs. Untermeyer invited us to lunch with them on their house-boat now in Gloucester Harbor. Loulie and Janet went but I declined. Untermeyer called again in the afternoon, and so did Chas. J. Glidden and W. H. Coolidge. We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Wallace. Henry White was there and we had an interesting discussion regarding the international situation and of prospective peace terms.

White had made some notes of his conversations with the members of the French Mission, who occupied his home in Washington while there. The acceptance of the White home as the stopping place for the French Mission indicates rank indiscretion. White's daughter, Murial, is married to a member of the German General Staff and while White is a patriotic American, still he has been in close touch with Bernstorff and Berlin. White did most of the talking, and one can easily see that he does not share the anti-German feeling which is prevalent in the United States and Allied countries.

I received several cables from his William Wiseman, copies of which are included in the diary.

August 5, 1917.

Today has been a quiet Sunday. Randolph and Mona came for lunch and Colcord and Brougham for the afternoon. I have tried to get some rest and finish some back correspondence. I gave Colcord and Brougham a talk concerning a worldwide press organization for the purpose of creating international comity. Something should be done to stop the loose talk indulged in by nations of one another, which is spread broad-cast by the press and periodicals. It creates a sentiment for war based upon prejudice and misunderstanding. As I have said many times before in this diary, nations are not unlike individuals, and gossip that goes on in small communities is not unlike the gossip that goes on internationally, and

the result is largely the same. It makes for quarrels and bad feeling.

I am trying to impress upon members of the press their power to serve the public in this direction. The time may conceivably come when people can be made ashamed to repeat idle gossip, as they are now ashamed to repudiate their honest debts or to do other things upon which society frowns.

August 6, 1917.

Edward S. Martin spent the better part of the day with me. I took occasion to tell him the harm *Life* and some other publications had done the United States by depicting Americans as hopeless mercenaries without a thought above a dollar. I repeated what Elkus said Turkey thought of us. When they read of our raising a hundred million of dollars for the Red Cross, they thought there must be some mercenary purpose back of it, using expressions from our own periodicals and public men to prove it.

Edward Filene and Jahey called to ask whether the United States Chamber of Commerce should take a poll of the chambers of commerce throughout the country, for the purpose of getting their opinions as to price fixing. I advised them to do so. They do not wish to come in conflict with the President's plans, but I cannot see that what they have in mind will do so.

We dined last night with Mr. and Mrs. Reginald de Koven. The other guests were Senator and Mrs. Beveridge, a captain in the British Army and a Mrs. Putnam.

August 7, 1917.

McAdoo came from Washington to spend the day and to review the situation, and talk regarding

*WILL BEING spent on every(x)detain(x) of international finances.* He spent a large part of the time complaining that the President would not give him sufficient authority to properly discharge his duties as Secretary of the Treasury. There is much in what he says, and yet I can well understand the President's feeling when McAdoo tells him that it is essential for the proper conduct of his office to

to see all the foreign despatches to the State Department in order that he may
have a clear survey of international political affairs and better know how to
apportion loans to the Allies. Another day he goes to the President with a
demand for representation on the Embargo Board, giving the same reason. The day
after he appears with a demand to be placed in control of the Shipping Board, be-
cause there must be coordination between the lending of money to the Allies and
the purchasing of their supplies, and facilitating the transport of these supplies
to Europe. Another day he demands the control of the Purchasing Board, and
for the same reason, that is, he cannot properly apportion money unless he is in-
formed as to what is being bought.

"When you sum up, McAdoo, it means he would be in complete control of the
Government. He even went further and thought the Secretaries of the Army and
Navy should report to him in order that he might correct any duplication which
they or the Allies might have in mind. He makes a plausible argument; for, in
a way, he ought to know something of the entire situation in order to act intel-
ligently, but, taking his demands as a whole, it would leave him as arbiter not
only of the United States but of the European nations as well.

He complained that this lack of authority was ruining his health. That
he could not work with a brake placed upon him in so many directions. He com-
plained, too, of the President's unwillingness to face any sort of friction or
trouble. This trait, McAdoo said, has grown of late rather than diminished. It
is a fact that the President does try to evade issues among his subordinates. I
have seen him grow grey in the face when I would suggest the need of action that
would entail the facing of a disagreeable situation concerning his official fam-
ily. McAdoo attributes his growing tendency in this direction to Mrs. Wilson.

McAdoo grumbled at the lack of coordination in the Cabinet. He declares
the President never consults any of them about critical situations, and never

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makes plans for the Cabinet to work to as a whole. This, I think, is a just
criticism. He asked how much the President consulted me. I evaded this in the
usual way. He said he knew of no one who had his ear. He thought perhaps
Baker had it more than any other member of the Cabinet. The President seldom
goes to the Executive Offices, and Tumulty, McAdoo says, knows absolutely nothing
of what is going on.

McAdoo said he offered to resign because he thought perhaps his being the
President's son-in-law embarrassed him at times, not only with other members of
the Cabinet, but with the public. Matters are constantly coming up in which the
President has to make decisions between members of the Cabinet and in which Mc-
Adoo is involved. He thinks it is embarrassing to the President to decide in
his favor, because there is always a latent suspicion that family relationship
has something to do with it.

He maintains that he is not a candidate for President. This, however, is
contrary to general belief in and out of Washington. He spent so much time
talking of his personal relations with the President and members of the Cabinet,
that we were not able to discuss the international financial situation as thor-
oughly as I had hoped. However, I was able to give him my view as to what had
best be done in dealing with the Allied demand for loans. I urged him to let
the money go, when it had to go, in a spirit that would create satisfaction and
gratitude rather than to give it grudgingly, leaving a feeling of resentment. The
English, naturally, desire to maintain the pound sterling, but McAdoo would like
to see the dollar become the world standard of value, although he did not say so.

Collector Edmund Billings brought McAdoo out in his motor and remain-
ed to lunch with us, though he was not present at any time in our conference.

August 8, 1917.

Mr. Metcalf and Mr. Rathom of the Providence Journal motored from Providence

for an hour's talk. They were complimentary to the Administration in some directions and critical in others. Contrary to my general custom, I argued with them rather vigorously.

A Mr. Murphy of Los Angeles came from New York to see me on a most trivial errand relating to the home guard of his city. I made short work of him, but he seemed satisfied.

R. W. Woolley telephoned from Washington about his desire to be Interstate Commerce Commissioners.

August 9, 1917.

I have letters from Walter Bippmann, W. H. Buckler, Frank Cobb, Bernard Ridder, S. R. Bertron, Karl Weigand etc.

Baron Monsheur, the Belgian Minister, came on the 10.45 from Boston to lunch with us. We had our talk before lunch, and we invited to meet him, Mr. and Mrs. William Phillips and Mr. and Mrs. Frederick Prince.

I gave a general outline of my views regarding the war and after war conditions. He is a courteous and cultivated gentleman and promised to hold in confidence all I had told him. As a matter of fact, I said nothing I was not willing to have him repeat. The object of his visit was supposed to express the thanks of the Belgian Government for my efforts in their behalf.

Hugh Wallace, Bert Tucker and several others were callers in the afternoon.

August 10, 1917.

Dudley Malone spent the day with me. He is in a better frame of mind, as my letter to the President will indicate. However, I see future trouble. Dudley's relations with the socialists will probably grow closer and I look for him to someday break out with an attack upon the Administration. He has given me an interesting insight into the causes of the de Saulles' murder, he being a friend of both parties.

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Cables from Sir William Wiseman are attached.

August 11, 1917.

Lord Northcliffe came at 12.30 and we were in conference until 5.15 excepting the intermission for lunch. He is worried over the submarine situation, and well he may be. Northcliffe has become exceedingly frank and seems to tell me everything in his mind. He said the reason the recent German air raid on London was not better met was because so many of their airplanes had gone to France to protect the King and Queen, who were visiting the front. If the British public knew this, there would be a sensation.

He gave an insight into Lloyd George's character and daily life that I had not had before. While Northcliffe does not seem to think Lloyd George is in sight altogether what he should be, yet he declares he is the only man in Great Britain able to handle the situation. He says Lord Milner does most of the actual work of "picking up" as Milner puts it, "after Lloyd George". He believes George could work more effectively if he would leave off some of his social activities, such as breakfasts, lunches, dinners etc.

We went into the financial situation at some length. He was surprised that his Government had not taken kindly to the suggestion which he and Tardieu made, regarding an international bureau in Paris for the purpose of bringing in concrete form requests which the Allies will make of the United States. Of course, McAdoo accepted this suggestion with avidity. I told Northcliffe I was certain his Government would not look kindly upon it, for the reason they would not think it possible for the Allies to agree among themselves what proportion of money, or what priority each should have in the way of supplies. England would feel that since she was the backbone of the opposition to Germany, her wants should receive first consideration.

I have two cables from Wiseman today and have sent one. All are at-

tached to the record.

I have a delightful letter from Dr. Henri Bergson, dated July 18th, which
is also attached.

August 12, 1917.

William Bullitt and Lincoln Colcord called this afternoon. We dined
with Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Wallace. The other guests were, Lord Northcliffe and
party, ex-Secretary and Mrs. Geo. von L. Meyer, and Mrs. Patterson of the Chicago
Tribune.

Northcliffe and I had an interesting discussion today, and I afterward
had a few minutes with Major Higginson, who was deprecating the appointment of
Admiral Bowles, of the Fore River Shipbuilding Company, as Consulting Engineer for
the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

August 23, 1917.

When I reached home last night around 10.30 or 11 o'clock, David Miller
was in his office in New York waiting to read me a cable which had come from
Wiseman. This cable is attached to the diary.

I had a telephone call from Filene in which he protested against Admiral
Bowless in terms even stronger than those used by Major Higginson.

Northcliffe came at 12.30 and remained for an hour. He read me a
cable from Wiseman which was somewhat similar to the one he sent me. I keep my
own counsel and Northcliffe does not know that I am in closer touch with his Gov-
ernment than he is himself. I dislike this, but I would prefer being as
as frank as he is, but the exigencies of the occasion forbid. If he knew that
his Government was consulting me concerning his activities and those of the Am-
bassador, there would be trouble. However, I talk to Northcliffe as frankly
as I can upon all subjects. There is a difference here again is that he in turn

has too many confidants. He has now taken Wallace into the circle. I do not mind these, but I dare not run the risk of the others in whom he confides. He sees George Harvey, and sometimes Hearst, and often Roosevelt, consequently, I must needs be guarded in what I tell him.

He spoke of the impossibility of getting along with the Ambassador. He maintains that the fault is not his and I am inclined to believe it. I pointed out the danger of an open breach with the Ambassador, and of how it could be used by his, Northcliffe's, enemies in England, both against him and against the Government. I expressed the belief that his Government would recall Spring-Rice for a vacation, and for the purported of conferring some honors upon him. This, I thought, would silence any criticism his home coming might cause.

Arthur H. Pollen, the British naval writer and critic, came before Northcliffe left and remained for lunch. He came from Washington to be with me a part of the day to talk over some suggestions he has been making to Secretary Daniels and other naval officials. He is a man of much ability, and I enjoyed discussing naval and war matters with him.

When Northcliffe left, I asked Pollen his opinion of his ability. He said he knew Northcliffe well and liked him, but he never had an original thought; that his talent consisted in the newspaper man's instinct to know where to go for advice. I do not agree with him in this estimate. I think Northcliffe's success is due to his force more than to anything else. He is a dominating man with boundless energy. I like him the more I see of him.

My letter to the President is a part of the diary. I have had a number of telephone calls and visitors.

August 14, 1917.

Colcord, Wallace, telegrams and telephone calls filled the day.

August 15, 1917.

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August 15, 1917.

Frank Polk took lunch with us and spent the better part of the day. We went over every phase of the international situation and departmental affairs. He does not think the President appreciates Lansing. The President told Polk while he was acting Secretary of State during Lansing's absence, that Lansing could not write clearly; that he always had to do the work himself. Both Polk and I think this is an unfair criticism, and that Lansing writes unusually clearly. What he lacks, in my opinion, is imagination, the diplomatic touch and a spiritual outlook. He is practical, has a legal mind, and desires to do things largely by precedent.

Polk believes the Secretary has no jealousy toward me, although he realizes I have the full confidence of the President and he has hot.

Polk believes the President is practically running both the Navy and Army himself, because he is constantly visiting those departments or sending for Daniels or Baker. He deprecates, as we all do, the President's lack of administrative ability. He cannot seem to arrange affairs so they may be expedited, nor can he get the fullest service from his advisers. Polk, while acting Secretary, sent the President an important letter on Tuesday. Not hearing from him, he called up the White House on Friday to find that he had not even read it. In the meantime, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, who had been awaiting the President's leadership in the matter, decided it for themselves leaving the President to follow. This is typical.

Polk says he gets misinformation from men like Denman and others and it is difficult to put him straight. He has no fear of the President's judgment if he has all the facts before him.

He believes Lane has entirely lost the President's confidence and wonders why. McAdoo thought Baker had more influence with the President than any member

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of the Cabinet, but Polk thinks that Houston and Wilson are listened to with more attention.

I gave Polk my views of the Pope's peace proposal, and talked at length of the war situation as it appeared to me. I was glad to have him agree. I believe I talked him out of the position he had-- a position, indeed, which I am sure Lansing holds. Polk says that Gordon is indispensable, and is already of more value to him that Billy Phillips, First Assistant Secretary of State.

My letter to the President concerning the Pope's peace proposal is the important document of the day. I know I am running counter to the advice of Lansing, Phillips and others in the State Department. I feel, too, I am running counter to the President's own judgment, nevertheless, I am willing to stand upon it for I am sure I have a more complete picture of the situation than either the President or Lansing. I simply saturate myself, in every way possible, with facts relating to the present status of the war. I see ten people to their one, and I read, perhaps, ten documents to their one. Not only that, my knowledge of the situation in the belligerent countries from personal observation since the war began gives me, I feel, a better opportunity than they have to form a correct judgment.

I have a telegram from Northcliffe. He sends me a remarkable communication from Premier Hughes of Australia. My letter to Gordon, enclosing this for Lansing's information, is a part of the record. The document is attached. This note shows two things: First, that Hughes is unfitted for the place he occupies, and second, that Northcliffe is unfitted for the one he has. Hughes may be excited because he did not dream that the text of his communication would reach our Government, but Northcliffe should have had the discretion to modify the unfortunate phrasing of it. If he had done this, we would probably have made an exception of Australia.

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August 16, 1917.

W. S. Culbertson of the Tariff Commission came by appointment to discuss tariff matters as they relate to the war and after war conditions. I found him an intelligent young fellow with an appreciation of the importance of the subject. My views on the tariff are well known to this diary as I have expressed them frequently, and I found Culbertson largely sympathetic with them.

The President appointed Culbertson as a republican. As a matter of fact, he was a progressive and there is not an old-line republican on the Tariff Commission. As I have said before, I think this a mistake and is not carrying out the spirit of the law. It is one of the things the President does which I cannot reconcile with any sense of fairness and justice. I advised Culbertson to keep in touch with republicans, and try and let them feel that they have some representation on the board. I take it he is the only member who voted for Hughes in the last election. We might as well have no Tariff Commission unless the majority minority has actual rather than nominal representation. This policy will finally kill the Board's influence and we will soon find the tariff back in politics, a thing the Commission was created to prevent.

August 17, 1917.

Karl von Weigand, the international newspaper writer, came from New York to take lunch with me. I got a good fund of information from him regarding Germany. Weigand is not trusted by many people. Gerard does not think well of him, but I could find nothing in what he said to justify such an estimate. He seemed entirely fair in his criticism and praise of Germany and in his view of the situation.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. William Phillips to meet Secretary and Mrs. Lane. The other guests were unimportant.

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August 18, 1917.

This has been an extremely full day. Gordon came from Washington for the week end. Gordon Abbott asked for a few minutes and remained nearly an hour in order to tell me that George Anderson, U. S. District Attorney of Boston, would make an excellent Interstate Commerce Commissioner. I agreed with him, but I am wondering why a man of Abbott's affiliations should desire such a radical man as Anderson on the Commission.

Secretary and Mrs. Lane and Major and Mrs. Stanley Washburn lunched with us. After lunch I had a long talk with Lane. We reviewed what was going on in administration circles. I am sorry the President does not consult Lane more frequently. He has real ability, perhaps the best all round ability of any member of the Cabinet, and yet, outside of his departmental duties, these abilities are seldom or never used.

I discussed with him the Pope's peace proposal and was glad to find him sympathetic with the view I gave the President in my letters of the 15th and 17th. These letters are important and I particularly call attention to them.

The President's letter of the 16th which came last night is on the same subject and shows that his mind is not running parallel with mine. This letter is in answer to an inquiry which Balfour made by cable to me through Wiseman. The President did not answer it sooner because the text of the Pope's message did not arrive until Thursday. This message must have reached London, or an intimation of it, nearly a week earlier. I cannot understand why there was so much delay in its coming through to us. I have asked the State Department two or three times a day whether it was in.

The President, I feel, has taken a wrong position and I am as certain as I ever am these days that he will make a colossal blunder if he treats the note

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lightly and shuts the door abruptly. I wish I could be with him. I feel it
something of a tragedy to be heat bound at this moment. I trust the President
will decide the question wisely in the end and I shall not borrow trouble.

The Russian Ambassador sent me a letter yesterday asking to see me
upon urgent business. I suppose it has to do with the Pope's message. I hope
so for I am sure he will take the same view of it as I do. This may give an
additional lever with the President. I wired Bakhmetieff that I would see him
today or tomorrow, as he desired, and I have a reply that he will be here to-
morrow. Gordon was not in Washington, otherwise, I should have gotten the mes-
sage to the Ambassador in time for him to take the Federal Limited last night.

I am sending a cable to Mr. Balfour today stating the President's position
and intimating my disagreement with it. The matter is of such importance that
I thought it well to caution him.

After I finished talking with Lane after lunch, I gave Major Washburn an
hour to tell of the Russian Mission of which, I think, he was secretary. He
knows Russia well, better than any other member of the Mission, having been
there several years in the capacity of correspondent for the Northcliffe papers.
He said Senator Root desired to see me. Washburn did not seem to know Root's
real mind, but said Root had told him he wanted to see me in order to give his
confidential views. While I feel complimented, I have a feeling there is some-
thing back of his desire to see me.

I have read the report of the Mission on their Russian trip, therefore,
Washburn's recital did not reveal much that was new. He emphasized the need
for propaganda in order to meet German effort in that direction. This is in
line with the advice I have given our Government.

We went to dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Frederick Prince. Governor Harding

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of the Federal Reserve Board, was there and we had an interesting talk concern-
ing international finances, of which he knew little, but which he is in process
of acquiring. He made a suggestion regarding the maintenance of sterling ex-
change which will probably not meet British desires, but which may prove a satis-
factory solution of that difficult question.

August 19, 1917.

It has been an interesting but tiresome day. The Russian Ambassador
motored from Boston and remained until half past four o'clock. We had no one
to meet him at lunch excepting Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Abbott and Mrs. T. Jefferson
Coolidge. I was pleased to find that my forecast as to the purpose of his visit
was correct. It was the Pope's peace proposal that brought him. The other mat-
ters of importance he talked of were the Japanese question and the Stockholm Con-
ference. I knew he would not have come unless the matter was pressing for he has
to be on the train for four consecutive night, two coming and going from here to
Washington, and two from Washington to Boston and return to attend a reception
given him by the State of Massachusetts on Tuesday.

Bakhmetieff and I "speak the same language". He is a thorough-going lib-
eral. He asked how I got along with Northcliffe and Tardieu, and if I talked
to them as I talked to him. I replied that my conversation with those two and
in fact with all the other representatives of the Allies, was confined to questions
relating to submarines, ships, finances and other inter-allied subjects.

My letter to the President today epitomizes our conversation. Bakhmetieff
was relieved when he found that I agreed with him. When he began to tell me his
views and those of his Government concerning the Pope's overture, I interrupted
him, saying it was entirely unnecessary to discuss it for I was sure our minds
entirely met and that I had already conveyed those views to the President.

I got copies of my letters to the President of the 16th and 18th and read extracts of them to him. I checked his enthusiasm by asking him to remember that these views were my views and not necessarily those of the President; that the President was being advised differently by others. I did not mention names. However, in a moment he said, "I find no sympathy in Lansing. When I talk of these matters to him, he does not appear sympathetic or to have any real understanding of Russian liberal opinion."

Bakhmetieff thinks, as I do, that the Stockholm Conference will become a real menace if the Pope's overtures are not treated in the right way. He suggested that the President should call an Allied Conference in order to formulate peace terms and announce them to Germany as the common Allied terms.

In speaking of the Stockholm Conference, I explained the difference between the European Socialist, particularly a German Socialist, and an American one. Scheidermann would be termed a Progressive in this country, while some of our Socialists would be called Anarchists in Germany.

At Bakhmetieff's suggestion we discussed how a peace move could be made. He could not see how it was possible unless some terms were stated. I thought terms could be made so general that it would not be necessary for the Allies to entangle themselves in details. For instance, if the President stated the position of the United States and, better still, if he could state it as being the position of all the Allies, that this country was willing to treat with the people of Germany but not with an autocracy which did not represent the people, that would be the first move. Later, broader questions might enter, such as the evacuation of occupied European territory and the relinquishment of the general idea of conquest.

I called attention to the difficulties this would bring up as to Alsace and Lorraine, African Colonies and the German Pacific possessions. I

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thought that if it were deftly handled, there were no insuperable obstacles, provided we could bring Germany to reason.

I asked Bakhmetieff to keep in touch with Gordon, who had my entire confidence and who would send messages he might wish to request me.

August 20, 1917.

This has been another busy day. Major General Henry P. Davison, of the Red Cross, and Brigadier General John D. Ryan came twice, once before luncheon and again later to discuss Red Cross matters and to ask advice concerning various phases of their work. They wished to come yesterday but my day was full. I dislike to ask such busy men to wait for a week end, but because of the Russian Ambassador's visit, it was necessary. Then, too, they wished me to see Felix Frankfurter of the War Department first.

Frankfurter came from Washington by direction of the State Department to tell me of his recent visit to France. I will not go into detail further than I talked to Frankfurter about the Pope's proposal and he agreed with the attitude I have taken. I suggested that he ask Justice Brandeis tomorrow to send the President a letter giving his views on this subject. I take it for granted Brandeis' mind runs with mine. Anyway, I am willing to risk it.

August 21, 1917.

The statement which the Russian Embassy gave out today concerning the Pope's peace proposal is discouraging and misleading. Colcord telephoned last night from Gloucester that he had been talking with Bullitt of the Ledger who had just seen Lansing. Lansing told Bullitt that the Russian Ambassador was opposed to the peace proposal and took the same view of it that he did.

I concluded today to write the Ambassador a note and sent it in by Colcord to Boston where the Russians are being entertained. Colcord had about

ten minutes with the Ambassador. He denied absolutely that he had talked to
Lansing differently from what he had to me, and told Colcord that his views were
the same as mine. When he was here on Sunday, I advised him to cable his Govern-
ment asking them to instruct the Russian Ambassador in each of the Allied countries
to warn the governments to which they are accredited of the effect an abrupt ans-
wer would have in Russia. I outlined the kind of message I hoped the Russian
Foreign Secretary would think it well to send. The Ambassador sent work by Col-
cord that he had cabled his Government as I had suggested.

On Sunday, Bakhmetieff talked of the Japanese question. He felt the
Japanese Mission had come for the purpose of pressing their demands upon the
Government of the United States at this critical time. He thought these demands
would embrace the Chinese question and the German possessions in the Pacific, taken
over by the Japanese. I thought they might have these things in mind, but I
also thought they had questions like the embargo on steel, the land question, the
question of immigration and other long-standing grievances. Bakhmetieff felt
the Japanese Government was not to be trusted and we agreed that if Russia had
remained an autocracy, Russia and Japan would have exploited China between them
regardless of the balance of the world, and perhaps they would have made a coal-
ition with the Central Powers.

Colcord wished to return to Boston and see the Ambassador before he left
and ask him to give out a statement similar to the one made to me. I advised
against this. It would be unwise for an ambassador to do so, and I do not want to
let him fall into trouble inadvertently. He has no diplomatic experience and
while an able man, is still new to his duties.

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August 22, 1917.

Bakhmetieff telephoned at seven o'clock last evening to explain further about the statement the Russian Embassy gave to the press and which he said was distorted by headlines. He asked my advice as to whether he had better make another statement. I advised against it. He has done enough now to be recalled and the sooner he gets out of the papers, the better it will be for him and everyone. I counselled either of two courses. One to see the President and make a personal explanation, or to write a letter to Secretary Lansing deploring the fact that his meaning had been distorted by the press, giving his real views, and expressing the hope that these views be transmitted to the President.

He said he had no advice from his Government upon the subject, but he had the views which came to him from unofficial sources. He said if Lansing had received any impression other than the one I got, he could not understand it, for he had expressed to him the same viewpoint, in the exact terms, he had used to me.

Two important cables came today from Mr. Balfour and Sir William Wiseman, which are parts of the record, as is my letter to the President transmitting them for his information.

The President is rapidly becoming the spokesman for the Allied world. Colcord is writing some fine despatches for the Public Ledger. He is here every day and frequently telephones between times. He seems uneasy for fear the Ledger in committing itself to my view might find itself taking a different view from the one the President might finally adopt. My reply was that they were taking what we thought the right view, and it did not matter whether it was the one officially taken or not, since it was better to be right than to go with the tide.

F. R. Williams, Editor of the Boston Transcript, asked to come out and see

me about a matter of importance. I invited him to lunch. He was disturbed
Leonard
over the transfer of General Wood from the South to the West, and wanted to
know whether there was good reason for it, or whether it was the irreconcilable
antagonism of the War Department to General Wood. I dissented from this latter
view, but expressed a willingness to find the real purpose of the War Department.
We talked on many subjects of national and international interest.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Walter Denegre.

Messrs Storrow and Endicott called by appointment in the afternoon to
ask advice concerning some matters they have up with the Departments in Wash-
ington-- particularly concerning the coal situation as it affects the North-
eastern States. They came late and I was unable to give them more than a few
minutes.

August 23, 1917.

This has been one of the busiest and most important days of the summer.
The President sent me his reply to the Pope's peace proposal, asking me to cri-
ticise and return as soon as possible. I did not receive it until twelve
o'clock and, although I had John J. Spurgeon, Colcord and Bullitt, of the Public
Ledger with me, I succeeded in reading, digesting and answering it in time to
have Postmaster Murray of Boston, who was also an afternoon caller, take it in
to mail on the Federal Express. While Murray did not know its contents, he
seemed to sense its importance, for he said that unless the superintendent would
guarantee its safe delivery by tomorrow morning, he would himself take it to
Washington. He is to place the letter in a special pouch, and it is to be
taken at once to the White House upon its arrival in Washington. Murray would
have been even more impressed had he known that he had in his possession what,
at the moment, was the most important interesting document in the world.

My opinion as to the President's reply is covered in my letter to him

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and is a part of the record. While I should have written somewhat differently
myself, I am thoroughly satisfied with the way he has done it, for he has cover-
ed all the points I asked him to embrace, and has left out the dangerous points
to which I called his attention. The entire world has been on tip-toe concern-
ing his answer, but he has taken no one into his confidence excepting me-- his
usual method in matters of grave moment. While I am complimented, yet if I
were President I should take a different course.

Balfour's cables to me and my replies tell the inside story. I feel
a sympathy for Lansing. The President, I think, could take him into his full
confidence and still permit me to play the part I am doing.

The cable from Wiseman and my cable to Balfour and Wiseman are parts of
the record. I shall probably send an additional despatch to Wiseman as to the
advisability of making Viscount Grey Ambassador at Washington. While Grey
would be an ideal selection from our viewpoint, yet the question of Northcliffe
stands out as an objection. Northcliffe and Grey would not get on even as well
as Spring-Rice and Northcliffe have. Their antagonism is of long standing and
deeper rooted.

Northcliffe's message to me and mine to him about Lord Reading are attach-
ed.

Spurgeon took lunch with me. I did not invite Colcord and Bullitt as Spur-
geon desired to talk with me alone. We discussed the Ledger's future policy.
He was afraid I was not satisfied with the progress the Ledger was making toward
liberalism, and he wished to tell of the difficulties. The Ledger, as I already
knew, had a most conservative clientele and if he went as fast as Brougham and
Colcord desired, it would disrupt the finances of the paper. He seemed re-
lieved to know that I agreed with him, and that I had placed a restraining hand
on them both.

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Postmaster Murray came to see me about General Edwards and to enlist my
good offices further in his behalf. He also discussed the Massachusetts po-
litical situation, both state and local.

I went to bed very tired but quite satisfied.

August 25, 1917.

A special delivery letter from the French Ambassador came last night and
is attached. It is difficult to understand his view. France is almost spent
and yet one would think they were at their full strength and that there was no
doubt of Germany's complete defeat.

Colcord came this morning. I told him in confidence about the President's
reply to the Pope. He was happy and enthusiastic. It justifies all he has
written in the Public Ledger. He was complimentary beyond my deserts, giving
me credit for properly directing the policy of this Government, and perhaps, of
the Allied Governments as well, at a crisis scarcely equalled during the war.
Maxaduxradxhaxxakka. He said he the thing he admired most was the courage dis-
played in my cables to the British Government, and my direction of the policy of
the Russian Government. It seemed to him a parallel with Bryan's attempt to
influence the Central Powers in the U-boat controversy when he advised Dumba
that the United States Government did not mean what it said. Bryan went down
in defeat, and he could easily see how I might have shared the same fate, had my
a missle judgment been at fault, and if I had not seen my way through.

Colcord does not realize that the President's mind is an open book to me, and
I feel as confident in interpreting it as I do in my own. Nevertheless, in
this instance, the President's mind was set in a contrary direction and might
have remained set. I took the gamble that I would be able to persuade him
to come to my point of view.

Mr. and Mrs. Owen Johnson (the novelist) lunched with us. They came from York Harbor as he wished to impress upon me the necessity of carrying on a Catholic propaganda in this country. He is Catholic himself, but believes Catholic opinion is being improperly set against the Allies, and for reasons which might easily be overcome if Cardinal Mercier, or some such Catholic, could be induced to visit this country in order to tell the story as it actually is. The point Johnson makes is a good one, and I may or may not follow it up.

Governor Strong of the New York Federal Reserve Bank came next. My cable to Wiseman explains something of our interview. We discussed international finances, especially foreign exchange. I made a suggestion by which the $400,000,000. call loan, which the British have with Morgan & Company, and which is disturbing the international situation, could be met. I asked Strong to see Northcliffe, and the French representative and then McAdoo, but to keep the negotiations entirely in his own hands. Strong is competent to do this work, Northcliffe is not.

Dr. Short and Prof. Glenn Frank of the League to Enforce Peace drove Strong away. They came for advice as to the future activities of the League, and upon some matters troubling that organization. I advised them to leave the President alone and not try to involve him in any plans, as it was impossible for him to give them his sanction.

I have another despatch from Wiseman which is attached. I also have one from Lord Robert Cecil which is important. Lord Robert's cable is astounding. It makes me fearful. The fact that he is asking my individual opinion as to whether they shall recall their Ambassador and whom I would suggest in his place, and whether they shall send Lord Reading over as Financial Agent; asking my opinion as to what his duties and those of Lord Northcliffe should be

somewhat staggers me, steeped as I am in national and international governmental affairs.

My first thought was to give an evasive answer, but I later determined that I would take the responsibility. I shall send a reply tomorrow.

August 26, 1917.

My cables to Lord Robert Cecil and Sir William Wiseman are the important documents of the day. I did as I determined I would and advised according to the best of my ability.

August 27, 1917.

W. H. Coolidge called today to show me a part of an airplane propeller which had been treated by a new process of copper solutions. Coolidge believes it will keep the propellers from fraying. If this experiment is a success, it will make considerable improvement in the durability of machines. These propellers revolve at the rate of nearly five hundred miles an hour, and the friction frays even the hardest woods in a very short while.

I am leaving for York Harbor to spend the night with Mr. and Mrs. Ralph Ellis.

August 28, 1917.

My secretary, Miss Denton, called me over the telephone soon after I reached York Harbor to deliver another message from Lord Robert Cecil. I directed part of an answer over the telephone, and I arranged to take an early start home, where I arrived before eleven o'clock and in time to send a code despatch to the President which is a part of the record. I think it is too late to do what Lord Robert requests, for I have a feeling that the President's reply to the Pope is being given out today for publication tomorrow.

August 29, 1917.

The President's note is being enthusiastically received by the

press. It is the culmination of an idea I have had for a long while. My
diary will show the many times I have advised both the British and French Gov-
ernments, as well as the President, to do what the President has now done. I
am anxious to see whether the result will be as valuable as I have hoped. It
has seemed to me for a long time it has seemed to me the obvious thing to do and
I shall await the effect upon the German and Austrian people with the keenest
interest.

Last Friday I asked Gordon to telephone the Russian Ambassador and ad-
vise him not to make a statement, but to wait until the President's note was
published, and then give it his cordial approval. Bakhmetieff was anxious that
his Government be advised in advance, and an intimation be sent giving them an
idea of the kind of answer we desired made. This seemed wholly unnecessary. I
think it is the function of the Ambassador, and not fax ourselves, to suggest to
his Government what reply they should make.

It occurred to me today that if the Pope could be induced to say something
favorable about the President's reply, it would add greatly to the chance of
peace. What I should like him to say would be that he felt the President had
not closed the door, but had indicated a way by which it could be thrown wide
open.

I have arranged for Colcord to go to New York to see Dudley Malone and to
get him to suggest to Cardinal Farley or Cardinal Gibbons, perhaps to both, that
they cable this suggestion to the Pope. If we could bring the Pope to say this,
it would create a sensation in Austria and Catholic Germany. It would make them
feel that there was but one way by which peace could be obtained.

I have suggested that the Pope be told that while the President has
partially closed the door, he has pinned upon it a notice explaining how it can
be opened.

Mrs. Philip Lydig and Miss Graham-Mullhall took lunch with us. After some correspondence by letters, I wired making an engagement with them today in order to discuss what seems to me, on the face of it, a wholly impracticable, though entirely worthh, project.

August 30, 1917.

The British Ambassador came by appointment this morning. Talking to him is full of pitfalls. One never knows how much information he has concerning what is happening between our two governments, or how little. He knows but little of Northcliffe's activities, and claims that he thinks it a good thing to have Northcliffe here because his influence would be worse if he were at home. If he is here, his papers must necessarily not speak ill of the United States or become antagonistic to American views or purposes. The Ambassador believes Lloyd George feels it necessary to keep him here in order to be rid of him there. He says he tells Northcliffe that he is doing great work, believing this is the only way in which he can keep the situation moderately calm, distasteful though it is to do this.

Wiseman in one of his cables, speaks of Northcliffe's reference to my conversation with him. The Ambassador flattered me, from time to time, in the most subtle way, and I am sure he left quite pleased with his efforts, for I gave no indication of not accepting his remarks at their fact value. I feel, as always, a deep sympathy for him, for he is in a humiliating and impossible position. He harped on the Northcliffe appointment, and indicated his intention of informing his Government that it would be unwise to send anyone over here again without first ascertaining if the person to be sent would be acceptable to the President. I excused the British Government in this instance by saying Page had expressed his approval of Northcliffe's visit. In reply he said he would ask his Government not to pay any attention to Page's approval, unless they

were certain Page had it direct from this Government. I did not reply to this
for I felt that both Page and Spring-Rice are in much the same position with
their respective governments.

Mr. and Mrs. Richard Washburn Child came to lunch in order to tell of
their recent visit to China and Orient. Child has a well ordered mind and was
able to give within an hour a clear idea of the Far East and its present pro-
blems. I have asked him to put the substance of this conversation in a type-
written memorandum, so I may use it in the way I consider best. I shall proba-
bly attach it to the diary.

He was anxious for me to meet Viscount Ishii, the new Japanese Ambassador,
with whom Child came over. I am eager to have Washington take a more sympath-
tic view of the Far Eastern situation than they now do, and to give it the at-
tention it deserves. It only needs a little thought to bring a seemingly chaotic
condition into a well ordered policy. Child tells me the Japanese are in a re-
ceptive mood because they see, for the first time, the potentialities of the
United States.

August 31, 1917.

Last night I went to a stag dinner which Mr. Thomas Beal of Boston gave to
the Governor and Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank. They were an interest-
ing and intelligent lot of men. I was especially impressed with Governor Aiken
and I have made a mental note to use him in the event the necessity arises.

Spring-Rice called again this morning. We had a delightful hour to-
gether. He was at his best. He had apparently forgotten that there was such
a thing as a German spy or a pro-German anywhere. I do not know a more schol-
arly man than the Ambassador, and it is delightful to have him talk of matters
in which he is deeply versed. Child had brought me from Japan a carved yogi,
and Spring-Rice, upon seeing it, gave me the mythological interest that sur-

rounds these Japanese images. He thought, which I know to be true, that Child
had me in mind, as in a way, representing that type of philosopher.

The Ambassador understands better than others how entirely satisfactory
my life is, a life free from personal ambition, content to do the day's work as
it presents itself, without being disturbed by the personal equation.

While Spring-Rice was with me, Governor Strong telephoned to report pro-
gress on my suggestion as to the liquidation of the four hundred million dollar
call loan made by the British through Morgan & Co. The suggestion was for the
French to borrow from us a sum greater than their immediate needs, and repay some
of their British debt, this payment to go to liquidate the Morgan loan. The
French Commission have accepted the justice of the plan and are willing to do
their part, provided it is understood that such payment to the British shall not
mitigate against other loans which the French may find it necessary to make.

The French Commission are taking the matter up with their Government, and
they will discuss it directly with the British Government, and matters should
come to a head by the first of October. Meanwhile, I have promised to give it
some direction at Washington. Strong discussed it with McAdoo and while
he was non-committal, Strong tells me, with my help, he will consent to the ar-
rangement. I cautioned Strong as to the modus operandi and indicated that
largely
it was a matter of book-keeping and that it should be done as between the two
governments in the payment, or repayment, of purchases made here. I shall fol-
low up these details when I return to New York and Washington, for I consider
they have an important bearing upon the transaction.

I told Spring-Rice of these negotiations in order that he might have
the credit of cabling to his Government. It was the first he knew of what
was going on in this direction. He drafted a despatch to send his Government

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embracing the suggestions I made yesterday as to the answer the British Govern-
ment should make to the Pope's peace proposal. It is important that they en-
dorse the President's reply in order that the Allies may present a united front.
He worded the message very cleverly. He also wished to send a message asking
his Government not to send any further representatives here without first know-
ing, beyond peradventure, that the President approved. I counselled against
this and he acquiesced.

S. R. Bertron, one of the members of the Mission to Russia, and Basil
Soldatenkoff came from New York to lunch. Soldatenkoff has come to the United
States, so I learn from confidential sources, to check up Bakhmetieff, the pres-
ent Russian Ambassador, and to find whether he is equal to the situation. He
was also instructed to find whether it was possible to bring about an agreement
between the Allies regarding Turkey. They believe if Turkey could be given as-
surances that she would not be dismembered, she would make a separate peace. He
thinks this question should be taken up at the proposed Allied Conference in
London at the end of September.

I advised against this. I also advised against the Allied Conference
taking place at all. Soldatenkoff was somewhat staggered at this because the
conference was called at the instance of Russia. When I explained to him the
dangers incident to a conference of this nature, he seemed to recede from his
position and to accept my conclusion. I have explained these reasons in
the diary and I shall not repeat here.

I suggested a different way by which the subject might be covered, and
indicated my entire sympathy with the general idea.

I was surprised to learn that Russia does not want the internationali-
zation of Constantinople and the Straits. They are afraid of it. They be-
lieve it might lead to the necessity of Russia having a great Black Sea fleet

to protect herself from aggression. They would prefer the freedom of egress
for merchantmen but not ships of war. I believe they are short sighted in
this, and have taken counsel of their fears rather than of their best interests.
However, I did not argue the point since it is a matter for their concern and
not ours.

An important despatch has just come from Wiseman which reads as follows:

"We have intercepted important German messages, most important disclosures since Zimmermann note. It was arranged that I was to bring these to you and the President. It has been decided that it is inadvisable to delay until I arrive. Information was therefore given to Page yesterday and he has cabled it to the President. We want you to know about it and give your advice as to how it can best be used. I shall bring with me documents confirming for you and the President".

I am telephoning this message to the State Department leaving out reference to me and to the President and making it impersonal.

September 1, 1917.

Visitors have taken the entire day. Frank C. Hind, British critic and author, Miss Catherine Burke, well known Irish lecturer and charity worker, Baron of the Boston News Bureau, Alfred Millard, Jr. Gordon Abbott and Mrs. James Creelman. We took dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace.

September 2, 1917.

A cable comes from Lord Robert Cecil which reads as follows:

"Many thanks for your message of August 30th, received through W. W. We greatly admire the Note and it has been received with much satisfaction by our press". I am very grateful for the advice you have given with regard to our representation in the United States. Both Balfour and I appreciate in the highest degree your kindness in allowing us to trouble you with such these matters. Reading is sailing on Tuesday and Wiseman returns with him. It would be hard to overestimate the latter's services."

I have spent the day picking up loose ends of correspondence and doing some necessary reading.

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September 3, 1917.

Franklin Bouillon, the French radical, came over from Washington to see me concerning his international parliament plan. He wishes the United States to join with the French, British and Italians at their next meeting in November. He has seen the President and did not find him sympathetic. The President told him, so he says, that he was afraid if our members of Congress went over to such a conference, they would come back full of ideas as to the prosecution of the war, which seriously hamper the plans he has made.

The truth is, the President is something of an autocrat by nature. He does not desire any interference. Even when he knows and feels the necessity of going forward, his nature rebels at any interference. This is not unusual in public men. They know the right path and they can describe it vividly for others to take, but when it comes to using it themselves, it is a different story.

I am sure Bouillon's plan is a good one, but at the moment, I can see no objection to our considering it. Anything that will promote a better understanding between nations should be encouraged. But the President is set against commissions either going from this country or coming from abroad. He believes in a one man authority. A benevolent dictatorship, under intelligent direction, is undoubtedly the most effective and benign government in the world, but it is dangerous in the extreme and should not be countenanced. It is better to lose something of efficiency in order to retain that which is of more value.

Raymond Swing, just back from Paris, took lunch with us, having come from New York to report upon his stay abroad. I did not get anything from him that I did not know before. However, he is a likable fellow and has his face set in the right direction.

Bullitt and Colcord called while Swing was here. The most important news of the day comes from Washington concerning the matter about which Wiseman cabled me on Thursday. It relates to German intrigue in the Argentine and

Sweden and gives a fresh insight into German methods. In my opinion, it will
cause a sensation something akin to that caused by the Zimmermann note concern-
ing Mexico and Japan.

The British Government have asked my opinion as to how it should be used
and I am giving some thought to it. Nothing should be done until Wiseman ar-
rives with the proof, and we should see how conclusive that is before making
the disclosures public.

September 4, 1917.

We took dinner last night with Mr. and Mrs. F. L. Higginson. The
other guests were Boston society people.

I had a remarkable letter from Dudley Malone this morning, enclosing
an even more remarkable one from Monsignor Dunn of New York. What I asked
Dudley to do was to suggest to the Papal Delegate at Washington that the Pope
answer any inquiry concerning the President's reply to his peace message by
saying that he did not believe the President had closed the door to peace, but
rather had indicated a way by which it might be opened wide. I cautioned Dudi-
ley about mentioning my name, either directly or indirectly, and also about giv-
ing an impression that the suggestion had any significance whatever beyond his
own personality. It was to be merely a thought of his own which he desired to
convey to the Papal Delegate so if he thought fit, he might convey it to the
Vatican. My purpose was two-fold: First to unite Austria and Catholic Germany
the
in favor of legislative reforms which the President made as a requirement for
peace negotiations. Second, to leave the door open for further discussion in
the event it seemed necessary.

What Dudley did was to convey the impression that he was in some
way acting for the President. It is an extraordinary indiscretion. It seem-
ed a simple thing to do and it never occurred to me that it could be distorted.

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It has taken me the greater part of the day telephoning to New York to David Miller, and having him in turn telephone Dudley, in order to get the situation measurably composed. Fortunately, the Papal Delegate refused to take an anonymous suggestion and transmit it to the Vatican, therefore the matter stands just where it was before, excepting Dudley's conversation with Monsignor Dunn and Dunn's letter to the Papal Delegate.

I shall try to leave the matter as it is. In other words, I shall be satisfied if the whole thing can be undone and left as if nothing had been said. This will be difficult, according to Miller, because of Dudley's insistence that he did the right thing. He does not seem to realize his indiscretion.

Dudley's letter and Dunn's are parts of the diary.

A letter comes from the President this morning written from the Mayflower on September 2nd. He requests me to work out the necessary machinery to be used by this Government at the peace conference, and to formulate our policy. I do not quite know how I shall do this, but my letter to him indicates the pleasure such a task will give me. It means an additional burden and just how I shall meet it, I do not know. I am anxious for the President to go to the peace conference, if it is found possible for him to go, thoroughly equipped, for I realize, if good fortune follows, that he has a chance to leave a record in history second to no man that has yet lived.

A cable has come today from Lord Robert Cecil which I have quoted in my letter to the President, merely adding the word "unofficial" which I did in order to soften the request and make it more acceptable in the eyes of the State Department.

Another cable came from Wiseman relating to the Polish question. This also is attached.

September 5, 1917.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Philip Dexter last night. There was no one

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present excepting society folk along the Shore.

The Attorney General stopped off on his way to Maine and spent the day.
when
He had but little of interest to tell. I asked him what the Cabinet knew
about the President's reply to the Pope. He said not until the afternoon of
the 28th at the Cabinet meeting. The note had already been coded and cabled
abroad and had been given to the foreign ambassadors. Gregory said there was
no dissension concerning it. It was too late to make any changes since it
had already been put out. The first proof of the message had in it the word
"childish", but after receiving my second letter on the subject, the President
evidently called in the first issue and eliminated that word. Gordon tells
me that the British Ambassador told him that Jusserand "jumped the bars" when
he first read it before the elimination of "childish" was made, and was happy
of the change.

Gregory asked how I got along with Lansing. I told him that Lansing
had never shown the slightest indication of jealousy, but had acted splendidly
from start to finish, and I wondered why Mr. Bryan had shown so much of that
feeling. Gregory thought the explanation easy. Bryan is egotistic and
counts himself as one of the great men of the world. He therefore felt hu-
miliated at finding himself in such a position. He became Secretary of
State without knowing that condition would exist where I had the complete con-
fidence of the President and he did not. Lansing, on the other hand, was
Counsellor under Bryan and understood the condition and was willing to become
Secretary of State fully realizing my position. Gregory thought, too, that
the fact that I had been so largely instrumental in securing Lansing's ap-
pointment had some effect upon his actions.

Gregory expressed pleasure that the President named Lansing instead
of Houston. He thought it would have been impossible for me to get along

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with Houston, and he felt the President himself would have found it difficult to do so.

I had a talk over the telephone with President Lowell and he is to lunch with us on Friday. He invited me to come to Cambridge to lunch with him but I explained how impossible it was for me to leave my base here. I may ask Lowell to help me plan the organization to obtain data for the peace conference. At the moment, it seems to me that Lowell would be a good peace commissioner. My choice now would be the President, Lansing and Lowell, subject, however, to a change of opinion after I see more of Lowell.

Major General Clarence P. Edwards motored from Boston to say goodbye before sailing for France. He talked steadily for an hour. This my only criticism of Edwards. He talked, though, sensibly and well. He promised to keep me informed about his personal fortunes and I told him I would do what I could for him over here in the event he needed a friend.

September 6, 1917.

Major Stanley Washburn came to discuss the Roumanian situation. He is in a highly nervous state and I advised him to take a month's rest and get in better shape. General Edwards has offered him command of the intelligence department of the division he is to take to France, and Washburn desires to accept provided he can get in condition.

The usual rumor of a break between the President and myself is in today's press. It is somewhat belated as it usually comes about mid-summer along with the sea serpent stories. This time it is supposed to be because of a disagreement over Josephus Daniels.

September 7, 1917.

President Lowell took lunch with us. I asked him out in order to get information regarding the men I have in mind to collect data for the peace con-

ference and to make suggestions as to other men suitable for such work. I
talked to him quite freely, and went rather exhaustively into the subject not
only of the peace conference but of the part we ought to play. I invited him
to come to New York from time to time to advise with me further.

I shall also talk with Root, John Bassett Moore and men like them so
as to get their ideas.

Lowell told me that after the President had written his "Congressional
Government", (when he was about 26 years old) and he, Lowell, had written a
caustic criticism of it in the Atlantic Monthly, one day "a lantern jawed
youth" came into his office and said, "my name is Woodrow Wilson, and I
think we had just as well be friends", and Lowell said they had been friends
ever since until he criticised the President's appointment of Brandeis to the
Supreme Court.

I did not find Lowell very fertile in ideas, but I did not expect ka.it.

September 8, 1917.

A letter comes from President Lowell today in which he says:
"I never remember to have had so interesting a conversation as that with you yesterday". This surprised me for I was not at my best.

Ellery Sedgwick came for lunch. I obtained what information I
could from him about Archibald Coolidge and other men I thought we might want
to use in the near future. I gave him my usual talk concerning the necessity
properly
of directing public opinion, and its bearing upon the comity of nations.

I spoke to Lowell of this yesterday, and I noticed that he used it in
his speech last night at a dinner given by the Harvard Unit. I am trying to
disseminate the thought that nations should use the same rules as gentlemen
between one another.

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Nelson Perkins of Boston followed Sedgwick. He talked of conditions in France where his brother has charge of Red Cross interests. Perkins has just returned from Russia. I found him able and interesting and I liked him much.

William Phillips followed Perkins. He has just come up from Washington. He told of the Japanese Mission and of their confidential talks with Lansing. It seems they have developed no demands so far except for steel for their ship-building program. Lansing thought if they would give one ton to the Atlantic trade, we should give them two tons of material for new ships. They have this under consideration. They also discussed the open door for China. Ishii thought Japan should have a preferential influence in Manchuria. Lansing contended for the open door everywhere, with a recognition that Japan on account of geographical position and racial similarity, would always have an advantage in the East.

Phillips and I talked of the President's request that I should undertake the getting of data for the peace conference and formulate plans for it. He cautioned me about hurting Lansing's sensibilities, since he has had in mind to do this work himself. I had thought of this and intend to speak to the President about it. I am entirely willing for the State Department to do it for, after all, what I care for most is to formulate the plan and outline our policy.

September 9, 1917.

Last night around seven o'clock two secret service men called to say that the President had sent them from Washington to tell me he would be here tomorrow on the Mayflower. No one knows of his visit, not even the Cabinet or his own household. The President and Mrs. Wilson left by the rear entrance of the White House, escaping notice until they reached New York where they boarded the Mayflower. He gave there an indefinite statement as to their cruise.

Around eleven o'clock the Navy Yard of Boston called me over the telephone to say they had a wireless for me stating that the Mayflower would be in Gloucester Harbour at two o'clock.

Loulie and I went over to meet the boat, boarded it and got the President and Mrs. Wilson and motored along the shore for two hours or more. We stopped first at our cottage and then went over to Mrs. T. Jefferson Coolidge's house to look at her prints, china etc. which have been inherited from Thos. Jefferson. We dined on the Mayflower.

Before dinner the President and I had an intimate talk of perhaps an hour and again for an hour and a half after dinner. He came, he said, to talk about the advisability of asking for Lansing's resignation. He said that every time he wrote a note, or put out a statement, Lansing followed it with a conservative construction. Then when the President objected, he would correct it, thereby making endless confusion and largely nullifying the effect of the note. He thought Lansing was not well, and that he led a life to tax a strong man, much less a sick one. Lansing is out every night attending dinners, returning home to work until two o'clock or after, and is in his office at nine in the morning. He consumes an infinite number of cigarettes and black coffee between times. The President thought the character of people with whom he goes is not conducive to a broad outlook as they are mostly society folk and reactionaries.

I argued against asking for his resignation as I doubted whether he could do better. I asked whom he had in mind to replace him. He said there were one or two members of his Cabinet he thought would do better, Baker being one, although he felt Baker could not be spared from the War Department. I said, "I suppose Houston is the other man you have in mind;" to which he tentatively assented. I expressed the belief that it would be a serious mistake

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to if he put Houston in the State Department. I considered him a man of good judgment, but without diplomacy and that he would be very hard to work with. The President said he had never found Houston at all obstinate in taking advice. My reply was that Houston's department was one in which the President had not been taken to active supervision, but he would find if he came in contact with him as often as it would be necessary if he were Secretary of State, a different story would have to be told. I thought, too, it would be impossible for me to work with him, friends though we have always been.

I thought if he took Baker, he should make Polk Secretary of War. The President seems to have a distaste for most of the State Department personnel. I argued strongly for Polk and also for Lansing, suggesting that he allow Lansing to remain until he fell ill again, and then use that as an excuse, thus saving his sensibilities.

The President suggested sending Lansing as Chairman of the Commission which is to go to Brazil. I did not consider this commensurate with his position and urged an ambassadorship. He said there were none vacant. I replied "you could make a vacancy at London. That between hurting the sensibilities of Page and Lansing, there was less reason for sparing Page." I thought if he would promise Lansing a place on the peace commission he would be willing to accept London. The President demurred. He did not think him fit for a peace commissioner; that he would give out statements at that congress just as he does in Washington, thereby nullifying his, the President's, work.

We left the subject with a tentative agreement that he would speak to Lansing when he returned to Washington and offer him London. I also suggested that he mention the work he had asked me to do regarding the peace congress. I think, however, I shall qualify this for if he asked for his resignation, it would be better not to bring me in, directly or indirectly, be-

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cause Lansing might use that as an excuse to resign himself, giving my activi-
ties in his department as an excuse. I shall caution the President about this.
I insisted again that he appoint Polk to the War Department in the event Baker
is transferred to the State Department. I practically guaranteed Polk's suc-
cessful administration of the War Department.

We discussed Root in relation to the peace conference.

The President spoke quite cautiously against the Catholics in the endeavor
to control the Government through appointments. He said he was never so fully
awake to its as now. This came about when we were discussing the appointment of
a new Chief of Staff and Quartermaster General. I mentioned General Barry.
The President thought well of him, but was unwilling to put an Irish Catholic
in that place because his experience with them was that they never recommended
anyone for office excepting fellow Catholics, which brought about an undesira-
ble state of affairs.

He told me of the talk he made to the naval officers when he inspected
the fleet at Hampton Roads not long ago. He spoke to all of them, including
ensigns, and said about this: "None of you have had any experience in modern
warfare, therefore, the least of you knows as much as the highest, and I would
like suggestions from any officer in the Navy, no matter how humble his rank,
regarding the conduct of our war at sea. These suggestions will be received
by the Navy Board, and if you find they are not received, then send them to
me direct." The President said he noticed the Admirals squirm under this
sort of takka

He is sending a commission to England which I recommended at the sug-
gestion of Arthur Pollen and others, and he told the members before they left
that he wished them to go over and find a way to break up the hornets nest,

Balfour argued long and earnestly against Germany having such a colony for a
submarine base in future wars. I parried this by saying we would join England
in an effort to bar the use of submarines in the future. They finally accepted
my judgment in the matter and said it would be dropped.

We then went into the question of war aims. Maps were brought and Mr. Balfour started in with his ideas of territorial division. I did not allow him to go far when I spoke of the futility of such a discussion. I thought what we agreed upon today might be utterly impossible tomorrow, and it seemed worse than useless to discuss territorial aims at this time. They both caught the point and agreed to drop the discussion.

What I thought was necessary and pertinent at this time was the announcement of war aims, and the formation of an international association for the prevention of future wars. I urged that Allied statesmen refrain from saying the things the German Government wished them to say. The Prime Minister read us a statement which Clemenceau made this afternoon as being a case in point. Clemenceau declares that France will not sit in a society of nations with Germany as a member. We all denounced the absurdity of such a statement. George said that he, himself, might as well declare that he would never sit around the council table and talk peace with a German representative.

We agreed upon a method of procedure at Paris and thought we might
possibly bring the Interallied Conference to a close in one day, and then begin
sitting in the Supreme War Council.

cabled

I cabled the President and it is a part of the record, as is my letter
to him. The despatches from America indicate that the President has
given out a statement regarding the wireless despatch in which Tumulty denied
that the President had sent me a cable concerning the Supreme War Council. And
this reminds me that last night I read to Lloyd George and Reading the cable

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which the President actually sent. Lloyd George asked why I had not published
it as the President sent it rather than diluting it as I did. My reply was
that I considered it too strong, and while I desired to help him, Lloyd George,
I did not want to overdo it, which I thought the message in its entirety would do.

Lord Robert Cecil, Eric Drummond and Geoffrey Dawson lunched with us.

The ex-British Ambassador to Austria was an interesting caller. He now has
direction of Mexican affairs in the Foreign Office, and came to tell me that the
British Government would follow our lead and recognize Carranza if we so desired.

Josiah Wedgwood, Noel Buxton, the Italian Ambassador, Admiral Benson,
the French Ambassador and many others called.

The Italian Ambassador came to suggest that it would have a good effect upon
Italian public opinion is the United States would declare war on Austria.

We went to dinner with Mrs. John Astor. I returned immediately after
dinner and did not go with the other guests to the opera.

HOTEL DE CRILLON,
PARIS.

November 22, 1917.

We left this morning at 11.40 from Charing Cross. A large number of
people were down to see us off including Mr. Balfour, Lord Cunliffe, Ambassador
Page, the Lord Chief Justice, and many others. We travelled by special train
and it was a delightful rest for me to take this ordinarily fatiguing journey
from London to Paris. We made the trip in the almost record time of eight
hours and twenty minutes. At Dover, the British gave us one of their fleetest
super-destroyers, having a speed of 35 knots. The sea was calm and the Channel
had been carefully swept for mines; some having been found, not only on the Dover-
Calais route, but many, recently laid, on the Folkestone-Boulogne route. I
wonder whether these were intended for us?

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We were met at Calais by newspaper correspondents and representatives of the French Foreign Office. We came through to Paris without stop on a beautiful special train, arriving at the Gare du Nord at eight o'clock. We were met at the station by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Pichon, Ambassador Sharp, Ambassador Willard, General Pershing and others. A list is attached. We drove in motors to the Hotel de Crillon where we shall be the guests of the French Government. They have given my immediate staff a beautiful suite of rooms on the first floor. We have an office the large public salon and a private sitting room adjoining. There were many invitations, cards of welcome etc; etc. awaiting us.

General Bliss, General Pershing and I held a conference before I went to bed. Pershing had just returned from the Cambrai front, where the great British thrust has taken place and tanks used for the first time. He gave an account of the battle.

November 23, 1917.

The day has been busy from start to finish. I had the entire Mission assemble in the salon, and we went together to the Embassy to meet the Ambassador and his staff in order that they might be placed in touch with their opposites in the French Government and get down to work at once.

I returned to the Hotel for conferences and to receive guests who poured in during the morning and afternoon. My friend Henri Bergson was one of the callers I enjoyed most.

Franklin Bouillon, Members of Congress who happen to be in Paris, journalists, authors etc. called. Brand Whitlock was here to see me. He says his story of Belgium will be ready for the press in January. The more I see of Whitlock the better I like him. He is a fine type.

Ambassador Willard followed. He has been here for several days awaiting

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our arrival. He told of conditions in Spain and of conversations he has had
with the King. The King is now favoring the Allies and is convinced Germany
cannot win. Alfonso discussed possible peace terms, and Willard asked whether
he should continue to encourage this sort of talk. I advised doing so.
I also gave some further advice along these lines.

General Bliss, General Pershing and I lunched together. We discussed
the military situation and the organization of our army and, above all, whether
the Supreme War Council could be made workable. I do not believe it can be as
now planned, as my letter to the President of today will tell. I feel that it is
clearly up to us to devise a working arrangement that will bring about real unity
of command and direction.

I have been sizing up the relative merits of Bliss and Pershing but
have not come to a definite conclusion as yet. They are both likable and able
men. Of the two, I think Bliss has the more attractive personality after you
get under his exterior.

I called on the Prime Minister. He was cordial and we talked most
intimately. My letter to the President will tell of our conversation. Clemente
said the war had not developed any really great General. Petain had ability,
but did not have the breadth of outlook. Foch, he thought, was showing
signs of age and was not the man as he knew him twenty years ago.

November 24, 1917.

Today has been an exaggeration of yesterday. I began with the representatives of the French Press. There were some twenty-five or thirty of them. The usual procedure was followed, they standing in one part of the room and I in the other facing them. They questioned me and I answered where I properly could. When they left, I received the American correspondents. Between the two groups the better part of an hour was taken up. It keeps one on the qui

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vive to do this sort of thing, but there is a sporting chance involved that appeals to me. Sometime, perhaps, I shall do it once too often.

After the press came the movie people, and after them, the photographers.

We lunched with the President of the Republic and Madame Poincaré at the Elysée Palace at 12.30. There were fifty-six at the table. Madame Poincaré took me out and I was made the guest of honor, the American Ambassador sitting to her left. Madame Poincaré speaks English well enough to be interesting and we held an animated conversation during the déjeuner which was simple but beautifully served. The table decorations, the state dining room and the notable gathering made it a memorable occasion.

Besides the President there was practically every member of the Government, General Petain, Chief of Staff, Marechal Joffre, Henri Bergson, and many of the most notable men in France. Madame Poincaré and I led the way out and then followed general conversation in the reception room.

General Petain asked me to visit him at Headquarters which I have promised to do if possible. I had talks with Joffre, Clemenceau, Poincaré and many others. Upon leaving, Sharp and I walked to the Crillon together where we had an intimate talk for nearly an hour.

I received an autograph note from M. Clemenceau asking me to bring General Bliss for a conference with himself and Petain tomorrow afternoon at three o'clock. Bliss and I have worked out a plan which we think an improvement on that of Lloyd George's for the Supreme War Council. We shall try it out on Clemenceau and Petain tomorrow, and if they approve, we shall try to have it adopted.

Paul Lewis of the Temps followed my conference with Bliss and was in turn followed by Sharp. Then it was Brand Whitlock for an hour and after him,

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Ambassador Willard. Judge Walter Berry of the American Chamber of Commerce, followed Willard, and Hervé of La Victoire was my last but not least interesting caller.

Whitlock told of his book and of his plans for the future. Willard believes peace proposals will be made by Germany before long. He had heard of the tentative offers in that direction which the King of Spain made a month or more ago, but he did not know the British Government's answer. I told him what the reply was, and explained how cautious the British Government had to be concerning such peace feelers; that it was impossible for them to say anything further than that they would be glad to receive proposals from Germany and submit them to their allies. I asked Willard to convey to the King of Spain the suggestion that peace proposals had better be made to the United States rather than to Great Britain or her allies. The United States was entirely disinterested as to territorial aims, and our influence at the moment was paramount in the making of peace.

Willard asked if he was right in believing that the British would be stif-
fer in their terms than any of the Allies. I thought it would be impossible for
them to consider relinquishing the German South African Colonies because of the
friction it would cause with the South African Republic; but I thought Germany
would find England willing to give ample compensation elsewhere.

I censured Willard for his lack of cooperation and failure to keep in touch with me by letter. He laughed and said Mrs. Willard told him the other day, "I am sure the Colonel will get you". He promised to do better in the future. He is anxious that we bring economic pressure on Spain in the way of exports, particularly of cotton, in order to make her feel more dependent upon us.

My cables to the State Department in reply to queries regarding Russia, Hol-
land, etc. are parts of the record.

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The French Press have been cordial regarding my visit, and French statesmen, soldiers and publicists have been even more so. They seem to consider me a friend of France, and with that I am content.

November 25, 1917.

I called the Mission together this morning and gave a short talk regarding their work, about plans for the week, and cautioned them about the spies infesting this hotel. I am quite certain that all the larger nations are represented in some way, Germany among them. I am told the United States also has two men. I thoroughly frightened our people, and I believe they will be careful.

The entire Mission went to the grave of Maxfaakka Lafayette to lay a wreath upon it. The inscription was: "The American Mission in Grateful Remembrance", November 25th, 1917."

I drove to the Convent and Picpus Cemetery with Admiral Benson, discussing on the way Allied naval plans with him, and I returned with General Bliss in order to discuss Allied military plans.

We went to the home of Henri Bergson for lunch. We had a delightful and intimate talk. I have asked him to prepare an article for the purpose of destroying the German pose that they are fighting the entire world successfully. I called attention to the fact that Great Britain and France were practically standing the brunt of the German attack, and had been since Russia retired from the field. The Allies which Great Britain and France have, other than the United States which has not yet brought its man power to bear on the situation, are a source of weakness rather than strength. I also pointed out that Great Britain would have been better off, and would have come out of the war with greater prestige, if she had fought Germany and Austria single handed, and for the reasons I have given before. Bergson was delighted with the thought, and promised to elaborate it in an article which he said he would entitle "The German Bluff".

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I shall undertake to have the article circulated in the countries where it will be most effective. The German people are being held together, and their courage exhilarated, by the constant reminder that they are fighting the entire world and cannot be defeated.

General Bliss and I went to the Ministry of War in response to M. Clemenceau's invitation to talk matters out with him and General Petain. I am attaching General Bliss' report of our conversation in lieu of one of my own, for he and I went over the conference afterward and agreed as to its substance, and I asked him to prepare a report of it.

Petain has not as agreeable a personality as Joffre. He is more reserved and without enthusiasm. Clemenceau told me the other day, that while Petain was a great General, he did not have a broad outlook; that he had been a professor, I suppose at a military college, and while a tattingian of high order, he lacked other essential qualities. I found him direct, and not at all diffuse either in his ideas or conversation.

I had many callers in the afternoon, among them, Norman Hapgood, a Socialist Deputy, Hovelaque, Minister of Education, and many others. Hovelaque desired to place me <u>au courant</u> with certain conditions here of which he thought I might not be advised. Montel had something of the same idea, except what he had to say related almost wholly to the advanced liberal and socialist sentiment in France.

We gave a small dinner at which Lady Paget and some other guests were present.

November 26, 1917.

James Hazen Hyde and the Marquis de Chambrun were my first callers, other than members of the Mission. De Chambrun went into the past military

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situation in some detail for the purpose of leading up to present conditions
and to give me a clearer idea of some things about which he thought I might be
ignorant.

I gave Hyde several commissions to perform and he is to report later.
I lunched at the Café de Paris with Gabriel Hanataux. It was one of the pleasantest affairs I have had for a long while. I asked Frazier to write of it so as to relieve me of doing so and the report is attached.

I was glad to have everyone speak so well of Ambassador Sharp. The sum
of what they said was, "we trust him".

Among my callers this afternoon was the Minister of Finance, M. Klotz.
He desires to establish, in connection with the Interallied Council, a finance
council to represent the Treasuries. The plan itself is not a bad one, but the
appall-
way in which committees are being piled up on top of one another is simply
smoking.

Sharp followed Klotz. He wishes me to see several people, friends of his,
and I have agreed to do so. He also wished to know if he was to sit in the In-
terallied Conference. He had heard that other ambassadors would be present. I
could only tell him that no one seemed clear upon the subject, but if the British
Ambassador sat in, I should certainly ask him. He said he had been asked by the
French how many places we would require. My reply was that we would match the
opposite numbers sent by Great Britain and France.

I dined tonight with Mrs. Edith Wharton and had a delightful time with
her and some of her literary friends. Joseph Reinach, who was one of the guests
saluted me as "the man of the hour, at the moment, the most important en tout le
monde".

November 27, 1917.

I have had conferences today with Crosby about the details of his de-

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partment, and with McCormick and Taylor as to the Swiss Agreement. The situation there is critical, seven out of nine of the Government are pro-German; I am told, and the Chief of Staff is almost offensively so. I asked McCormick and Taylor to get in touch with the Swiss Minister at once and see whether our differences as to the embargo could not be settled and an agreement reached herein Paris, otherwise, I thought it would be necessary for them to go to Switzerland.

Gabriel Hanotaux called to outline the French Military situation as it relates to the heads of the army and to politics. He gave some information as to why Joffre was deposed, and as to the attitude of Petain, Foch and Nivelle. I will not go into his argument for making Joffre General Director of the Military Supreme War Council, or that regarding an economic warfare upon Germany since they would be mere repetition of what has gone before.

Sir William Wiseman took lunch with me and gave the latest news. We discussed the difficulties of a Supreme War Council as Lloyd George has planned it. We agreed it will not work, but we both see difficulties in reaching a conclusion satisfactory to George. It is a matter to be handled skillfully and delicately.

Following some remarks we had on the subject, Clemenceau told a mutual friend that he had about decided to open the Conference with not more than three sentences. He will virtually say: "Gentlemen, we are at war, let us proceed to work". I sent word to him that this would be the most dramatic incident of the Conference, and I hoped he would hold to his intention. If he says this, it is my purpose to move immediately that speeches of a general character be dispensed with and that committees be appointed and work inaugurated at once.

Lloyd George, I know, will wish to speak, not that he thinks it will be of service, but to please himself and use the occasion to address the world. I

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shall try to buy him off by letting him make the motion I thought to make myself, telling him it will be more dramatic than any speech he could possibly make. If he speaks, the representatives from every other country will wish to do likewise, and it will entail an interminable loss of time. It is not to convince the Convention they will speak, but to make political capital in their own countries.

Wiseman tells me that Lloyd George had neither the liberal, labor or conservative members back of him, but that he had a majority of newspapers, if Northcliffe's publications were taken into consideration, and since it was impossible to have a general election until next July when the new Franchise Law goes into effect, it was necessary to place Northcliffe in every way possible. The Prime Minister has just named Northcliffe's brother, Lord Rothermere, head of the Air Ministry which Northcliffe himself refused in such an insolent manner.

André Tardieu and M. Clementel called after lunch. They gave me a plan which they had worked out regarding an economic embargo, or pressure, upon Germany in the event a just peace cannot be made with her. They were surprised to learn that I had already discussed this question with the President and had suggested the same procedure to him some weeks ago, and that it was probable the President would mention it in his forthcoming address to Congress. This information eliminated the need for discussion as there was but little left to say. They gave me a memorandum which I looked over and for which I thanked them as it was better prepared than the one I have.

The British came in tonight and I immediately got in touch with Lloyd George. It did not take five minutes to persuade him that the civil end of the Supreme War Council should be eliminated, and that the body should be composed of

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military experts alone. The heads of governments, I told him, would lessen their
authority and dignity by sitting in such a council. They should stand back as
the supreme and final authority, and not place themselves on a level with the mil-
itary. He accepted the point.

I also talked him into having the President of the Military Council act as
the executive official. After I had accomplished this, I told him Clemenceau
would probably make a speech of not more than two or three sentences in opening the
Conference and I hoped he would offer a resolution that speeches be dispensed with,
that committees be appointed, and the Conference get down to immediate business.
I called his attention to the dramatic touch this would give, and he took to it
kindly.

I left the Prime Minister for a few minutes to see some visitors in my
apartment, which is just opposite the British quarters and adjoining. When I
returned someone had told him that Clemenceau was determined to have a Generalis-
semo for all the armies and that he intended to have the chiefs of staff act as
the Supreme War Council. Lloyd George walked up and down the room, becoming
angrier as he did so. He declared that Clemenceau was a stubborn old man and
had done nothing constructive in his life until he was sixty-seven years old, and
had been merely a critic. That he was trying now to tear down rather than build
up. I calmed him as much as I could by saying that Clemenceau's proposal was as
much mine as it was his, and that he was not wedded to any particular plan. I
was sure since he, George, had agreed to the <sup>a</sup>civil end of the Supreme War Council
and to have the Chairman of the military end act as executive officer, Clemenceau
would not insist upon the Chiefs of Staff sitting on the Council. What Lloyd
driving at
George is <sup>b</sup>XXXXXXXXXis the elimination of General Robertson and Field Marshal
Haig and substituting his friend General Wilson.

I am entirely agreeable to the change since he has conceded the main

points I advocated. It would be better to have the Chiefs of Staff, but since
he is so thoroughly committed to Wilson, and since the appointment of Wilson will
mean Lloyd George's trouble and not ours, no one should complain.

George insisted that if Clemenceau broke what he termed "our agreement with
the French Government", he would leave for England tomorrow and would not attend
the Conference. He is acting like a spoiled child.

I have arranged to see Clemenceau at half past nine o'clock tomorrow morn-
ing, (Lloyd George is to see him at ten) in order to smooth matters over before
these two hotheads get together.

I pointed out to George the danger of having speeches made at the Con-
ference. He saw it at once. If they are made, I am sure the Russian question
will be ventilated and many indiscreet things said which might make the Conference
an instrument for evil rather than good. We will get down to work at once,
having already agreed upon the committees to be appointed.

We dined tonight with Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp.

November 28, 1917.

The day opened briskly. Wiseman came to say that Lloyd George had again
shifted and now wanted a civil end to the Supreme War Council, although he agreed
last night that this was not to be desired. Sir William says someone had his
ear since I saw him. I find this constantly happening. He changes his mind
within a few minutes after a definite agreement has been reached.

I was with the French Prime Minister at half past nine. It took barely ten
minutes to carry through the program I had in mind. Clemenceau agreed to yield
to Lloyd George as to the Chiefs of Staff, but said with a sardonic smile, "it
vitiates the entire plan. What I shall do is to put on a second or third rate
man instead of Foch, and let the thing drift where it will".

I told Clemenceau that Lloyd George had said he had a positive agree-

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ment with Painlevé, late Prime Minister. Clemenceau denied this and said the
Rapallo Agreement had never been officially signed. I remarked that it was hard
enough to fight the Germans and we had best not begin fighting among ourselves, and
if Lloyd George insisted upon such a Supreme War Council as had been suggested, but
which was not supreme, we would have to yield because of his difficulties at home.
The differences between George, Robertson and Haig make it impossible to carry out
the general desire for complete unity of military action.

I convinced Clemenceau that the appointment of General Wilson was Lloyd
George's problem, and that we had better, for the moment, let him extricate him-
self as best he might, and not do anything to aggravate the situation for him.

When this was settled, I asked about the Interallied Conference. Again Cle-
menceau's face twisted into a curious smile and he shrugged his shoulders. We
are both of the opinion that it is useless to call all the experts and delegates
who are here into a general meeting. It will be difficult to prevent the confer-
ence from doing harm rather than good. Clemenceau did not know who should proper-
ly be asked to attend it, how large it should be or when it should be convened, but
expressed the wish that I should go to the Foreign Office and see Pichon and come
to an agreement with him.

I do not wish it to be understood that I do not approve the general pur-
pose for which this Conference is called, for I feel strongly that the war can be
won only by a coordination of all the Allied resources. What both Clemenceau
and I object to is the manner in which it was called, and the spectacular way
George would like to carry it through. All the men on our mission, and those on
the other Allied Missions could have met quietly and coordinated the work to be
done without such a meeting as is planned, and which will be filled with political
leaders bent upon airing their opinions. It is this we are trying to avert.

Clemenceau telephoned Pichon that I was on the way and said any understanding
we reached he would abide by.

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Pichon and I thought it would be best to invite everyone in at the beginning and then segregate the members of the Conference into sections or committees, and to keep down general discussion in order to prevent friction. We agreed, too, to let all the Allied Ambassadors, all the French Cabinet and practically everyone else who desired to sit in, do so. I asked him to include Sharp in the invitations.

I suggested that Clemenceau, Pichon, Lloyd George, Balfour, Orlando, Sonnino and myself meet this afternoon for a general conference and discussion and do what real planning is necessary for tomorrow's conference and later. Pichon readily consented to this and named six o'clock at the Foreign Office for the meeting. I am hoping it may be a success.

I am dictating the day's work as it proceeds and whenever I have a few minutes to spare.

When I returned to the hotel I had a conference with Lloyd George. In the meanwhile he had seen Clemenceau and was delighted with the result which he attributed wholly to me. He said, "Clemenceau expressed warm admiration for you".

In explaining to George the understanding which Pichon and I had come to, he demurred at the lack of speeches. He evidently desires to make one himself and I was affaid when he consented to the program last night that he would change his mind. However, tomorrow is twenty-four hours away and we may succeed in heading him off. It is not only George but Orlando, Venizelos and many other delegates having a <u>penchant</u> for public speaking will be disappointed when they find their eloquence is not to be given an opportunity to flow.

After George, I had an interview with Balfour, during which we discussed the Roumanian situation and the conference tomorrow. Balfour thought the speeches would be necessary, but after a few minutes argument, he agreed they would be dangerous.

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Northcliffe came in and then General Bliss, M. Lavisse, Will Irwin and others. I have no time to relate their business but it was all comparatively unimportant. Lord Reading called after lunch to discuss some details to tomorrow's conference I congratulated him over being made an Earl. He was good enough to say that I was largely responsible for it.

I went to the Foreign Office at six o'clock. Lloyd George, Balfour, Orlando, Sonnino, Clemenceau and Pichon were present at the meeting. We discussed the procedure for tomorrow's conference. M. Pichon had a protocol arranged which did not seem to me at all practicable. I made a diffarant suggestion for something different which Balfour enthusiastically supported and to which Sonnino agreed, and it was finally decided upon.

I thought that at all our meetings we should be cordial and sympathetic to the delegates from the smaller countries and try to make them feel that we were deeply concerned in their welfare.

Pichon thought committees could be formed by tomorrow afternoon. I replied that our members on the committees could be selected within ten minutes after I returned to the hotel.

I took Balfour back to the Crillon, and he put Sir Eric Drummond in touch with Gordon, and in a few minutes he and Drummond had the committees arranged.

The London Times of yesterday in a long editorial says:

"The attendance of a representative of the United States distinguishes this conference from all which have preceded it. The presence of Colonel House at a gathering of European statesmen convening to decided the most vital problems of the world war, is an immense event in the history of mankind."

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. James Hazen Hyde. There were seventeen present. If I had known the dinner was to have been so large I should have de-

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clined. I accepted on condition that it was to be small. General Foch and a son of the owner and manager of _Le Petit Parisien_ and his wife were to me the most interesting of the guests, although the Italian Ambassador and his wife, and several dukes and duchesses were in the party. Foch and I had a satisfactory talk about war conditions. He has just returned from the Italian Front and says "it is now glued together and will hold until Spring".

The cable which I shall send the President tomorrow will tell of this conversation.

November 29, 1917.

The Interallied Conference took place this morning at ten o'clock at the Foreign Office. It went absolutely as scheduled. It was an imposing gathering. The Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries, Ambassadors, Army Chiefs of Staff, Navy heads etc. etc. of the Allied forces were brought together in one place for the first time. The meeting itself was of no importance. At my request, all of our people were invited, even to some of the secretaries. I sat directly opposite Lloyd George at the table with my staff to the right.

After Clemenceau had read a short address of a few lines, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs made exactly the speech we agreed upon yesterday, and the Conference immediately adjourned and the different sections went into executive session. It was dramatic and unusual. When Clemenceau and I first discussed the general meeting, we decided to curb all talk. We thought unless there was some ban put on oratory we might be in session for a month or more. I feel sure there has never been a conference of such importance with so little trouble. I have never seen a more surprised set of delegates. Even the British were but partially aware of how drastic the curtailment of speech was to be. It was exactly eight minutes from the time Clemenceau rapped the Conference to order until

it was akas adjourned.

Lloyd George, Balfour and I got together at once to discuss the Russian
situation which is becoming critical. George wanted me to advise with them as
to what had best be done. Their military people have made a mess of it and con-
ditions could not be worse.

After the Conference had adjourned, I returned to the Crillon for
a further conference with Reading and others. After lunch, Lloyd George asked
to see me again. He proposed that we should find out what Austria's peace terms
are. Austria has made several advances to the British who have insisted that
the terms be put in writing. George asked if I would back him if he insisted
that this latest offer of Austria should be probed. I acheerfully acquiesced.
I asked him why he did not attend the meeting which is to be held at the Foreign
Office at four o'clock, which was to consist as I supposed, of the Prime Ministers
and Foreign Secretaries and myself. George declared he had not been invited,
and asked me to have him telephoned for as soon as I reached the Foreign Office.
I did this and the conference was held in Pichon's room with Clemenceau, Pichon,
de Margerie, representing France; Lloyd George, Balfour and Addison represent-
ing Great Britain; Orlando and Sonnino representing Italy, and I alone represent
the United States.

George precipitated the discussion by making a rather too vehement ar-
gument in favor of investigating the Austrian peace feeler. Sonnino at once re-
sented this and, for a moment, it looked as if there would be a first class row.
I backed Lloyd George as I had promised, at the same time, I soothed Sonnino and
we finally got him and Orlando to consent to the proposal.

We were in conference for something like two hours and a half, when
we might have finished in a half hour if George had proceeded in a gentler and
more diplomatic way. He made an able argument, every word of which I endorsed

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but it was done too precipitately. If we had first seen Clemenceau and gotten
him in line, and then talked with Sonnino alone, the matter could have been set-
tled in a few minutes and without causing any feeling. At one time, it looked
as if the Latins would line up against the Anglo Saxons, but finally Clemenceau
came over on our side and Sonnino and Orlando succumbed.

I may change my mind before I leave Paris, but it seems to me now that
Clemenceau is one of the ablest men I have met in Europe, not only on this trip,
but on any of the others. He has many faulty characteristics, but there can be
no doubt of his great courage and his unusual ability.

Lloyd George and I walked from the Foreign Office to the Crillon to-
gether. It is a clear night and the moon is full and as we strolled along we
both thought the Germans would surely take advantage of the weather to honor the
Conference with an air raid.

After seeing one or two people I hastily dressed to dine with Prince
and Princess Lusinge.

November 30, 1917.

Today has been a perfect whirlpool of extremely interesting and impor-
tant matters.

I have been in constant conferences with Lloyd George, Balfour, the two
Japanese Ambassadors, Baron Chinda of London and his conference here. General
Pershing, Horodyski, Shulski, the Liberian Minister, General Bliss, Admiral Ben-
son and the different members of the Mission.

The Prime Ministers, and Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, France and
Italy and I held another meeting of two hours and a half at the Foreign Office.

I sent the President two cables during the day which will explain
the resolution which I am trying to get the Interallied Council to adopt. Baron

Sonnino was as difficult today as he was yesterday. He is an able man but a
reactionary of the worst type. If his advice should carry, the war would never
end, for he would never consent to any of the things necessary to make a begin-
ning toward peace.

I sat alone in the Conference as yesterday, although the British, French
and Italians had secretaries. I have asked the British to give me a memorandum
of what was discussed and if I get this it will be attached, otherwise, I shall
dictate further and tell of it more in detail. It was primarily a discussion
as to what statement should be sent Russia. Balfour read a despatch from the
British Ambassador at Petrograd strongly recommending that the Allies release
Russia from her promise to continue the war, giving his reasons for thinking
this would be good policy. This brought violent opposition from Sonnino and
a somewhat milder objection from Clemenceau. We finally sent for the Russian
Ambassador here and asked his opinion. He decided against such a reply as the
British Ambassador at Petrograd suggested, but recommended practically what I
had proposed. Lloyd George said; "that is what Colonel House has already pro-
posed". It was finally decided to ask the Russian Ambassador to draw up a
memorandum of what attitude he thought we should take and report tomorrow.

We discussed a more active participation in the war by the Japanese,
but finally came to the conclusion that we would let Pichon see what he could
do with them, without any of us believing he would be successful. It is hard
for the Japanese to do anything, but they seem unwilling to do even the things
they are able to do, such as sending two of their fast cruisers to join the
British fleet, as they have been asked.

I shall push to a conclusion tomorrow or next day my suggestion
that this Conference state the Allied War aims, in some such terms as I outlined
in my cable to the President.

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I feel a deep sympathy for the soldiers and sailors of the Allied Nations who are dependent upon those of us here to give proper direction to the cause for which they are fighting. We are not doing all we could, and I realize it every time we meet in conference. I often find it hard to contain myself, and yet if I did not do so, matters might be made worse rather than better. There is so little thought of aiding the military situation by diplomacy of a sane and helpful sort.

December 1, 1917.

Roman Dmouski, President of the Polish Council was my first caller. He came to bring some resolutions which I had asked him to draw up, and upon which I *promised* to try and get Allied action.

Bliss and Benson followed to discuss details in their respective departments.

At 9.45 A. M. General Bliss and I started for Versailles, with Frazier and Gordon following in another car. The Supreme War Council was held in the Trianon Palace Hotel, and Clemenceau and Orlando were already there when we arrived. Clemenceau and I went up stairs for a conference and to outline a program before the Council convened. Before Lloyd George came, Clemenceau showed considerable excitement concerning the relative lengths of the British and French lines on the Front, declaring that an adjustment must be made and that he would not permit George to evade the issue. He said he would resign from the French Ministry if an adjustment satisfactory to France was not made. At that point Lloyd George came in and the three of us agreed upon a program.

First, we discussed the length of the lines which France and Great Britain were to hold on the Western Front. I did not commit myself on this, stating it was a matter for them to determine among themselves since the United States as yet had no line.

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We next discussed Italy and our war policy there. Then came Greece, and
later, Roumania.

After this private conference was finished we descended to the larger con-
ference room. Clemenceau and I sat opposite one another at the table with Or-
lando on my right. I shall not go into a discussion of what occurred because
I have asked Frazier and Gordon to prepare a report in detail which I shall at-
tach.

General Bliss and I agreed not to take any positive position, but to listen
and get information. We feel that it is not in good taste to do more at this
time since we have no men on the firing line. When our army is here in poten-
tial numbers, then it will be another story. Questions of general policy, fi-
nance, munitions and all economic problems we feel at liberty to take an active
part in, but as to military plans, other than naval, it seems best to remain in
the background and listen.

We did not break up until after one o'clock. The rooms were very
cold and there had been no preparations for lunch. I did not get back to Paris
until two o'clock.

Just after lunch I had a conference with Oscar Crosby regarding Greek
finances. I told him what I had done at the Supreme War Council so he might be
guided accordingly.

McCormick followed in order to discuss embargo matters. Washington is only
now doing what we advised more than a week ago, *thak that time has been lost.*
It will be necessary for McCormick or Taylor to remain another
week after we sail and return to England in order to settle embargo controversies
with the English, the Swedish, Danish and Dutch. The agreement with Switzerland
has been practically finished here in Paris. I have followed all these matters
closely, but have made but little note of them, for while they are of immediate
importance, they are of passing moment.

Admiral Sims came to complain that Colby was about to take home with him Commander McBride whom he considers one of his best men and whom he loaned to Colby temporarily while here. I promised "to take a sharp stick to Colby" which sent Sims away happy.

The Lord Chief Justice and I had a long discussion on the Lansdowne letter and its effect upon the British political situation. I thought Lloyd George was making a mistake in not insisting upon the resolution I have been urging on the Interallied Conference regarding a statement of our war aims. I thought he could take the wind out of the sails of his opponents at home if he would join me in pressing the Conference to do what seems to me so necessary at this time. Reading apparently agreed, but I do not think I succeeded in frightening him as much as I intended. I called his attention to the lack of any program. The conferences we have with Clemenceau and Orlando are not fruitful of results, and the reasons are that George and I never reach Clemenceau beforehand. It is perfectly hopeless trying to get Sonnino into anything progressive or constructive, and I was in favor of putting the "steam roller" over him.

My talk with Reading had no effect. While Lloyd George and I walked from the Foreign Office together I could not pin him down to anything definite. He evidently thinks he had better tie his fortunes to the Conservatives rather than the liberal cause. If I am a judge of political conditions in England, he is making a mistake. I look to see him swept out. The only thing lacking now is a suitable man to supercede him. He is alienating the conservatives by his action toward Haig and Robertson, and he has not the liberal backing to offset it.

In our conference today various matters came up. The principal one was the resolution I had proposed. The Russian Ambassador was present and brought in several resolutions, any of which he thought would be of value to the Russian situation. Lloyd George tried to embody a part of what the Rus-

sian Ambassador said and all of what I had proposed. He was not very successful.
It seemed to suit George, but it did not suit me. Sonnino then tried his con-
servative hand, and all the Conference approved excepting myself. I stated that
in no event would the United States sign it; that they might draw up a resolu-
tion to suit themselves and sign it, but that the United States must rest just
were we were now, that is, upon the broad constructive and progressive statements
which the President had from time to time made.

This threw the resolution in the "scrap-heap" because everyone there knew
that without the support of the United States it would be less than useless.

My cable to the President of today will tell of this more in detail, and
Frazier's report of the proceedings of the Conference is also attached.

We invited the Japanese Ambassadors in at about the middle of the con-
ference in the afternoon, for the purpose of ascertaining whether more substantial
help could be obtained from Japan. The Japanese Ambassador at Paris answered.
He spoke in a voice scarcely audible, and without any inflection whatsoever. He
spoke in French and what he said was very akky clear and ably presented the Jap-
anese viewpoint. There was some discussion of asking the Japanese to retire
after this statement had been made, but Balfour and I objected and the matter
was passed over without embarrassment, and perhaps without the Japanese knowing
that such a move was imminent.

While Pichon, Foreign Minister, brought a good many subjects before the
Conference, not one, I think, was brought to a conclusion. I can understand quite
readily why Germany has been able to withstand the Allies so successfully. She
has no superior ability, but she has superior organization and method. Nothing
is buttoned up with the Allies; it is all talk and no concerted action. The
changes of Government in France, and even in Great Britain, are partly respon-
sible, but lack of coordination and decision are the chief obstacles.

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Lloyd George and I walked together from the Foreign Office to the Hotel de Crillon. He was full of the proposed peace with Austria. One would think that it was as good as done. His imagination runs away with his judgment.

Lloyd George and Reading dined alone with me. We had a pleasant evening together. They were both in good form and George was happy over the conclusion of the Conference. Just why he was happy, excepting that the Conference had adjourned and he was returning to England, is more than I can fathom for, certainly, we have not done one half of what should have been done. The Supreme War Council has taken up but few of the matters which properly should have come before it and instead of sitting for one morning, it should have sat for a week.

While George, Clemenceau, Orlando and I have not formulated and co-ordinated policies as well as could have been done, still the good the Conference has done in the way of coordinating the Allied resources; particularly the economic resources, can hardly be estimated. Heretofore, everything has been going pretty much at sixes and sevens. From now there will be less duplication of effort. What the United States can do better than Great Britain, France or Italy we will do; what they can do better will be largely left to them. No one accepting those on the inside can know of the wasted effort there has been. This Conference may therefore well be considered the turning point in the war even though the fortunes of the Allies have seemed never so low as now. What is still lacking, and what this Conference has not brought about, is intelligent diplomatic direction. It is disappointing to come to a gathering of this sort and not find an appreciation of the needs of the hour. We should have formulated a policy here as broad, as far-reaching, and as effective as the coordination of our military, naval and economic resources have been. It should have been a world appealing policy and one which would have shaken Germany behind the lines. I have talked to George, but he either does not know how, or he does not see eye to eye with me in the matter.

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Clemenceau, Petain, Bliss and I did more in our conference of last week than was done at the Supreme War Council, for we at least determined how many American soldiers should come to France, when they should come, and how to get them here. We also planned a Military War Council which would have proved of real service if George had approved.

Returning to our dinner conversation, I complained to George of the British Censorship, stating that it was ridiculous that the American people should be compelled to have their news censored by the British. I cited the instance when the Root Mission was in Russia and the Censor cut out a large part of Root's speech. George promised to give the matter attention and admitted I was right in my contention. He will do nothing unless I follow it up which I shall do by "putting Wiseman on his back" until something is done.

After dinner we took up the question of Reading going to Switzerland to meet a representative of the Austrian Government to discuss the making of peace with Austria. George asked Reading to go. Reading thought it would not do for him to go because everyone would *know* wonder what the Lord Chief Justice of England was doing in Switzerland. George declared he could go under an assumed name, such as Brown, and no one would know who he was. Reading thought it was beneath the dignity of the Lord Chief Justice to go under an assumed name. He also thought that questions would be asked which he could not answer. George, in reply, cheerfully recommended that he lie about them. Reading again did not object so much to the lying as he did to the Lord Chief Justice telling a lie. I was greatly amused with the entire procedure. In talking to Balfour about it afterwards, he agreed with me that no man was justified in lying, or doing anything dishonorable for his country in the name of patriotism. I did not believe international morals would ever become what they should be until representatives of governments acted as honorably toward one another as pri-

vate individuals. I considered it just as reprehensible to lie or to do other
dishonorable things diplomatically as it was to cheat at cards or refuse to pay
a debt of honor. When such a code of international morals was established, in
my opinion, people of every country would resent an infringement of this code by
their representatives as much as a family resents one of its members doing some
thing which casts reflections upon it. Balfour agreed with everything I said.

In trying to persuade Reading, George declared there were only three
men he knew in the world who could successfully undertake such a delicate mission,
and those three, if we would pardon the inclusion of himself, were sitting around
the table. This pleased Reading; but it did not convince him that the Lord
Chief Justice of England should lie and masquerade under the name of Brown.

Lloyd George asked when I was coming back to Europe. I thought perhaps in
the Spring. He hoped I would do so.

George is constantly ridiculing Northcliffe. He again asked if I would not
agree to take Northcliffe back if he would agree to let Roosevelt come to England.
learned
I replied that I had learned to like Northcliffe and that he could send him to
America and we would welcome him.

The Prime Minister goes home in the morning, leaving Balfour in charge.
I am glad, for while he lacks the force and energy of George he has what is need-
ed at this Conference, and that is, character and a commanding historic back-
ground.

The cables I am sending the President and Secretary of State today are
parts of the record.

December 2, 1917.

Lord Reading, the Russian Ambassador, Wiseman and newspaper correspondents
crowded in on me during the morning.

For luncheon we had Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Mr. Winston Churchill,

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Lady Paget, General Pershing, Mr. and Mrs. August Belmont and Mrs. Parsons.
Of them all I enjoyed Mrs. Belmont most. It was a diversion to talk to her
since she is clever, sweet tempered, and has great charm.

Milner was laughing about Lloyd George and his characteristics, although
he likes him and considers him the best man in sight for Premier at this time.

Clemenceau and Pichon have asked me to close the Interallied Conference with
a few words, very much as Clemenceau opened it. I agreed to do so, and I am
writing something harmless and which I think will please the French. I wish
I could say what I would really like to say, but with the reactionary crowd I
find here, I do not dare to do so. More would be lost than could be gained.

My cabbes to the President are parts of the record. I was certain the
President would take the attitude he has, and I am sorry it has not been possi-
ble to carry out his wishes.

Mr. Balfour, Sir Eric Drummond and Dr. Alexander Lambert were among my
late afternoon callers. I declined an invitation to dine at our Embassy as
it was necessary for me to do some work.

December 3, 1917.

This has been another heartbreaking day, but since it is near the
last I have borne it with what fortitude I could.

During breakfast, after breakfast, and up to the time I sat in with the
Prime Ministers at the Quai d'Orsay at eleven o'clock my time has been occupied.
Frazier has made a report of the proceedings at the Foreign Office and it will
be attached. General Foch was there and introduced one foolish resolution
after another. It has lessened my good opinion of him. Balfour leaned over
and said to me, "I often wonder at the workings of the French mind. Did you
ever hear such proposals?"

We sat from eleven o'clock until one, and would have remained indefin-
itely if I had not broken up the meeting by announcing that I had an important

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engagement for a one o'clock luncheon.

The Japanese who sat in with us today showed much good sense. On every question they took the sensible point of view. I sat between the Japanese and Balfour, and we would discuss together each proposal in a low voice with the result that each proposal that should be killed, promptly met its death.

We lunded with Mr. and Mrs. Robert Bliss. There was no one else present excepting Aristide Briand. I had one of the most interesting conversations with him that I have had in France. Bliss is to write a summary of it and it will be attached to the record. It seems astounding that the Allies could have been so stupid as to have refused Germany's proferred peace overtures, or at least followed them up to see where they would lead.

I went from the Bliss residence to the hotel to meet Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, and then entire Mission, including our Ambassador, went to the Foreign Office for the final Interallied Conference. I will not go into detail as a full report is a part of the record.

The speech I made was not what I desired to say, it was merely an attempt to say nothing pleasantly and to gratify the French people. What I should have liked to have said is a different story, and it would have perhaps broken up the Conference in confusion. I have determined to wait until my return and ask the President to say, with all the authority back of him, what ought to be said at this time.

After my conference with Balfour last night, he wrote a despatch to the British Ambassador at Petrograd which goes far in the direction I have been urging. He started to bring this up at the Conference this morning, but I urged him not to do so. I thought it would only provoke discussion, and Sonnino and perhaps the French would have brought pressure upon him to modify it. Balfour agreed to send the despatch without submitting it to them, believing that he betrayed no confidence in doing so because of the resolution that was

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adopted on this subject at the meeting Saturday afternoon.

After the adjournment, Clemenceau handed me an autographed copy of the proceedings of the Conference. He wished to confer with me and asked me to go with him to the War Office. What he wished to say was that the American forces at the Front were not getting proper instruction, and were not being prepared quickly enough. The French have offered to help in many ways, but have been met with refusal. Clemenceau said if the Americans do not permit the French to teach them, the Germans will do so at great cost of life. He asked who was of higher rank, Bliss or Pershing. I told him Bliss, and that Bliss had in mind to go home with me in order to organize an effective staff, and return to sit on the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

This pleased Clemenceau and he thought that would answer all purposes. He said he had in mind to form a bureau here to deal solely with American affairs, and he will put Jules Cambon in charge of it. I promised we would have a similar bureau in Washington so that perfect cooperation could be established. We are to have a final conference on Wednesday or Thursday.

Brand Whitlock sent his secretary from Havre to tell me that someone whom he suspected to be Hugh Gibson and perhaps Hoover, had asked the British use their influence with the Belgian Government to have him, Whitlock, recalled. He says he has a letter from Hoover urging him to return to the United States to help in the Food Administration. There seems to be a cabal against Whitlock of which Hoover is the head, Hugh Gibson the most active member, and Walter Page a sympathizer. I sent word to Whitlock not to worry and not to accept Hoover's invitation under any circumstances, since he was not fitted for that work. Hoover proposed, and that no one knew it better than Hoover. It was merely a scheme to get him, Whitlock, out of Belgium and for reasons which were apparent. Hoover evidently wishes his name to be the one indelibly associated with Belgium, and he is not gener-

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ous enough to be willing to let Whitlock share the honors.

The President and Madame Poincaré gave a beautiful dinner at the Elyseé Palace in honor of the Interallied Conference. Madame Poincaré took me out. I could not quite understand why they placed the Italian Prime Minister to my right. I feel the United States was greatly complimented for nearly all of Diplomatic and Military Europe, outside the Central Powers, were present. I like Madame Poincaré because she is simple and unaffected and unspoiled by her position. I talked with a number of people after dinner including the Japanese Ambassadors, Ribot, Venizelos and numerous others. I started home early since I had appointments to see both Balfour and Reading, who were also at the dinner, before going to bed.

December 4, 1917.

After I returned from the Elyseé Palace last night there were several waiting to see me, among them Balfour with whom I had a long and final talk. He left this morning for England. He expressed pleasure that I had come to Europe, saying there was no one in America who could have done the work as I had done it, because of my acquaintance with all the participants, and having followed the war from its inception, and having carefully studied the problems involved at close range. He said it was a pleasure to work with me and they all felt grateful for the help I constantly gave.

It has been definitely decided to send Reading back within a few months as Ambassador Extraordinary, and to bring Spring-Rice home. I suggested leaving Spring-Rice until Reading was on his way since it would make it easier for Spring-Rice. We agreed there was little danger of bad relations between our two countries as long as I continued in the relation I occupy with both Governments. We talked of the political situations in the Entente countries. I urged him to see the light and not blunder along as most of those in the Governments of

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Great Britain, France and Italy were doing I agreed with Briand that there was a danger of the people taking matters into their own hands as the Russians had.

After Balfour left, I was nearly ready for bed when Reading announced himself at my bedroom door. I had to put on my dressing gown in order to see him. He had just received a letter from Lloyd George containing a memorandum from Sir William Robertson, Chief of Staff, which George wished him to hand to me. Reading and I parted as warmly as Balfour and I had. I like them both and it has been a pleasure to work with them.

We left this morning at eight o'clock by special train to visit the American Front. We did not return until ten o'clock in the evening. Every minute of the trip was interesting. Our troops were put through their paces; bataionet practice, rifle practice, trench warfare, artillery fire, etc. etc. Some of the marksmanship was very good. One young sergeant by the name of Frederick J. Nutter, Company A. 103rd Infantry, from Dexter, Maine, was the best, having hit the bull's eye four times out of five. I took his score card and promised to show it to the President. I shot several times myself, and if we had not been hurried, I should have liked to have tried more than the two kinds of guns which I did. I can readily understand how our men soon become inured to the killing of their kind. The few hours I spent on the field gave me a keen interest in such activities. I sincerely hope that wholesale murder will never again be planned on so gigantic a scale.

We visited Headquarters at Chaumont, and had the different departments explained to us by the officers in charge. We then drove in motors to General Pershing's house and had tea. We took dinner on the train enroute to Paris. Outside the members of the Mission, the Ambassador and Mrs Sharp, Miss Sharp, Lord Northcliffe, his Aide, Colonel Campbell Stuart, Count de Chambrun and Mr. Charles Grasty accompanied us.

I had a long talk with Pershing and called attention to what I considered the difficulties of his position. I wished him to know how much I desired his success. If he were a failure, it would reflect upon the President, and it could be said if he had sent Roosevelt or Wood or someone ~~that ilk~~, things might have been different. I called his attention to the importance of his task and urged him to attend strictly to the military part and leave the semi-diplomatic end of it to others. Some of this I thought Sharp could do and I advised him to get a trusted friend, who had some knowledge of politics and diplomacy, to do the rest. He said he had selected Robert Bacon for that purpose but had found him incapable of doing it properly. He thought, too, he had made a mistake in getting an ex-Ambassador and for reasons which can readily be understood.

I promised Pershing to talk with his father-in-law, Senator Warren, upon my return and then select some man to help him. I thought if this was not done, his troubles would accumulate and he would find himself seriously hampered in the discharge of his military duties and his influence generally lessened.

He took occasion to tell me that he had no political ambition whatsoever and that the stories being told about his desire to be a candidate for President were wholly false. I encouraged him in this position. I said we had never had a military President who had been a success or who had added to his prestige, accepting General Jackson who was more of a politician than an army man. Grant, I thought, would be considered greater today if he had not touched politics or business. Washington, too, lessened rather than added to his reputation when he entered politics. Pershing agreed to all this and I hope he will hold to his previous resolution.

I asked if he and his men realized what a responsibility rested upon them. The United States would be judged for a century or more by the conduct of the American Army in France. There might never again be such an opportunity for a display of courage and proper conduct, and everyone at home believed in them to an extent which was pathetic.

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December 5, 1917.

The Russian Attaché and Soldatenkoff were my first callers. They had nothing of importance but rather wished to get something from me.

Prof. William Rappard of the Swiss Commission was among my visitors. McCormick closed an agreement with them today. Our people have buttoned up everything as they have gone along and have done wonderfully fine work. I doubt whether any commission ever did more effective work than they have since our arrival.

Dear Lady Paget was one of my callers. She came to say goodbye and to tell of some of the pleasant things that have been said of the Mission.

A French Deputy, Hennessy, was disturbed over a part of the President's address to Congress which referred to "Northern France". Pichon followed in the same frame of mind. I tried to make it clear to him that the President had no reference either directly or indirectly to Alsace and Lorraine, and did not intend to accentuate the fact that France should only recover the northern portion of France now occupied by the Germans. I advised Pichon not to allow his countrymen to make an issue of Alsace and Lorraine, and to try to push the President into making a public declaration such as Lloyd George made, for I thought there was nothing that could do France more harm. I have given my reasons for this belief in another part of the diary.

M. and Madame Laroux came for a short call and to give me some memoranda of matters in which he is interested. He was altogether the most complimentary visitor I have had. He said all France was glad to welcome me; that there was no other American, excepting the President, for whom they had so high a regard; that even the cabmen in the street knew what a friend I had been to France and appreciated it deeply.

Lord Milner was an interesting caller. We talked largely of the Supreme War Council. I asked him to permit Frazier to attend their conferences and to act as liaison officer between me and the Council while I was in Amer-

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I had two short conversations with Lord Northcliffe. He advised with me as to whether he should return to America or remain in England. I thought it would be well for him to travel back and forth at intervals, and not remain long enough in either place to lose touch with conditions in each country. He said he would do this as it coincided with his own view.

He spoke of the necessity of someone being near Lloyd George. He thought while George had courage, at times he hesitated to do necessary things. For instance, Northcliffe thought before the Asquith Ministry was overthrown, Lloyd George should have threatened to resign, thereby precipitating what seemed to Northcliffe a necessary crisis. He had great difficulty, he said, in getting George to do this. He feared to take the step; he thought it might be political ruin. Northcliffe believes (he has expressed this to me frequently) that George's incredible timidity at certain times, is due to his humble origin and the fear of criticism by the aristocracy. He says that Lloyd George has a brother who is a carpenter and quite without education. Northcliffe himself thinks of the aristocracy as we do in the United States, praising them when they deserve it, condemning them when they do not, but never allowing the fact of their to high birth make a difference in estimating them.

I gave a luncheon in honor of M. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. There were present, Jules Cambon, Gabriel Hanotaux, Marquis de Chambrun, M. Klotz, Minister of Finance, M. Clementel, Minister of Commerce, Crosby and Cravath. The conversation was unimportant. Pichon and I had some intimate talk concerning matters which we have had up together and which relate to the near future.

General Petain called immediately after lunch. He spoke frankly about the American Army in France, General Pershing and his subordinates. He thought Pershing was making a mistake in not using the facilities the French have offered. He thought, too, that the troops should go into the French Army in companies and

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battalions and receive their training in that way. He had made a memorandum of subjects he wished to discuss with me. I asked him to give it to me more fully in writing, which he did in the course of the afternoon, and I shall attach it as a more complete record of our conversation.

He said the Prime Minister had requested that we both come to see him as soon as we had finished our talk, therefore, we drove to the Ministry of War where Clemenceau, Petain and I conferred together. Petain told Clemenceau in French what he thought of Pershing. I suggested to Clemenceau that the proper course for Petain to follow was to open his mind to me just as he would to him; that if he did so, it would be of value in helping to straighten out whatever differences there were. Clemenceau told Petain in French that he could speak to me as frankly as he could to him, and asked him to open his mind entirely, which Petain then did. He said he thought Pershing was a good man but narrow, that he did not take a broad view of the situation, and that his Chief of Staff, General Harbord, was even worse. That most of the help proffered by the French had been curtly refused. I asked Petain what he thought of General Bliss. He replied that he had not seen enough of him to form more than a cursory opinion which was good.

I promised them both that when we reached home we would undertake to form a staff to return under General Bliss, or some equally competent General, to sit on the Supreme War Council, and that this organization would probably right such difficulties as now appeared to exist. They both wished me success in the undertaking. Clemenceau expressed gratification over the result of my visit. He spoke quite warmly and wrote this inscription on his photograph which he gave me:

"To my good confederate and friend, Colonel House, en souvenir de nos fraternal rapports à Paris, 1917"

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They both shook my hand cordially, Clemenceau taking both of his to do so. He asked me to tell the President that he was now his warm admirer, and he hoped he would only remember his former criticism of him to make his present attitude the more complimentary.

In leaving these two great figures of the war, I wish to say that Petain impressed me very much as Clemenceau characterized him-- cold-blooded, able but not among the first class of Generals. Clemenceau expressed much the same opinion of Petain as Petain expressed of Pershing, that is, he lacked vision and a broad outlook. As for Clemenceau, I have not changed my mind that he is a big man. Whether he will be able to handle the difficult situation confronting him I doubt, both because of his age and his temperament. He is of the reactionary type, and if I mistake not, the situation in France will soon need a leader of another sort.

I returned to the Hotel de Crillon for a very long list of engagements, among them being a large delegation from Alsace and Lorraine, the Minister from Porto Rica, the Chinese Minister, Kessler, "the Champagne king", who is devoting all his time and much of his money to the care of the blind, my old friend, Henri Bergson, who spoke warmly and in complimentary terms of my remarks before the Interallied Conference. He said the French people were touched because what I said seemed to come from my heart. Norman Hapgood, Edith Wharton and many others made up my callers. Nevertheless, I cleared the way for General Pershing and we conferred for a half hour.

I had asked Pershing to see the Prime Minister in order to get at the bottom of whatever differences there might be. He had done so but had gotten nothing of advantage from him. Clemenceau evidently thought it would be better to be frank with me rather than with Pershing. This I look upon as a mistake as he should be frank with both. It was evident that Pershing had no idea of the situation, and I was in doubt as to how much or how little to tell

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him. I had promised Petain that what he told me would be held in confidence, excepting as far as the President was concerned, and I did not feel that I had the right to tell Pershing, who might resent it and make the situation worse than now. I gave him as nearly as I could my feeling about the situation and urged him to meet it as diplomatically as possible. I told him of the dissatisfaction with his Chief of Staff. He admitted that he was not as diplomatic as he should be, and he promised to give him another talk, saying he had already mentioned the matter to him.

I told Pershing of the French and British desire to have our troops go into their ranks for training. He thought the situation might require it, but he was of the opinion that if the American troops went in, very few of them would ever come out, and that it would be foolish to expect to build up a great American army by that method. He was very fair and open-minded about this.

When I pressed upon him the difficulties of the situation and how nearly impossible it was for one man to do both the military and diplomatic end of it, he agreed and urged me to come back and sit on the Supreme War Council in order to take over that part of the work. He thought there was no one who could do it so well because there was no one who knew the situation as I knew it, and held the confidence of the President to such an extent. He said it would be particularly gratifying to him if I would do this; that he had learned to have a sincere regard for me, and that he thanked me from the bottom of his heart for the frankness with which I had talked to him, which had been and would be of inestimable benefit. I promised again to help in every way possible and suggested that he write me from time to time when anything occurred which he thought I might bring directly before the President, and be of service to him and his great work in Europe. I have a sympathy for Pershing. I doubt whether any man, however able, could satisfy both the British and the French-- particularly the French.

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It would be bad enough to bring an army three thousand miles and construct it in-
to a fighting machine, but to bring it to an alien land where the habits, thoughts
and point of view are so different, is a task for a super-man.

We had for dinner the numerous secretaries, stenographers, etc. of my
immediate entourage, and after dinner we left separately for the special train
which is to carry us to Brest. No one knew, not even the members of the party,
where we were to embark or whether we would embark singly or together.

ON BOARD, S. S. MOUNT VERNON.

December 8, 1917.

We arrived at Brest at 12.45 P. M. Admirals Benson, Sims, Blue, Wilson
and several others were at the station to meet us and take us to the converted
cruiser Mount Vernon, erstwhile Kronprincessin Cecilie. It is a great improve-
ment on the Battleship Huntington as far as accommodations are concerned. We
all have beautiful suites, and I hope we may have a safe voyage home. I may not
continue to dictate until we reach America.

I wish to say in conclusion that our Mission has been successful be-
yond our greatest expectations, and the compliments that have been given us are
enough to turn one's head. Colby said today as the shores of France faded
into the mist, "We have been so used to potentates and kings that the first
thing we had been do upon arrival in the United States is to take a week's course
at Child's Restaurant, sitting on a stool, and getting down again to our own
level." He thought also it would aid us in getting back to normal to take
an upper berth on the midnight train from Washington to New York.

We are being convoyed by six destroyers and the Cruiser San Diego. It
is as safe as sea travel can be made in these perilous days.

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AT SEA.

December 11, 1917.

We have had a remarkable voyage so far, one day rough, the balance of the time calm and almost like summer. All the members of the Mission have gotten down to work upon their reports. I have asked each to make a complete report for their several departments, a summary for the State Departments, and an epitome of the summary for the President.

We are now proceeding proceeding with the San Diego as a convoy, all the destroyers having turned back around the Twentieth Meridian. I have busied myself going through papers and formulating reports, nevertheless, it has been a great rest for me.

I cannot help dwelling upon the thought that my particular work might have been very much more effective if I had had a different man to deal with other than Lloyd George. He makes an appealing speech, states his case well, has a charming personality, and there, as far as I can see, his usefulness ends. My experience leads me to believe that the world suffers from such men as Lloyd George. Able men are unable either to get the hearing or obtain the influence, because they lack the power of expression, and the consequence is the governments of the world are largely controlled by brilliant and eloquent speakers and writers. Often-times I find that these men get their ideas, which are so beautifully elaborate, from other people, often from their subordinates who are totally unknown.

It would be much better if there was at the head of each of the Allied Governments a strong executive who knew how to coordinate the resources of their respective countries, and bring them to the highest point of efficiency in the fight against the Central Powers. That is what we are meeting in Germany. She has no supreme ability, but she has superior organization. The German Army, man

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man for man, is inferior to the British and French, nevertheless, as a machine,
it is superior to either.

What disheartens me most in this last visit to Europe is the utter lack
of virile unity of purpose and control. The material is there in those just
under the supreme authority, but it is lacking at the head. The armies and na-
vies are fighting with courage and tenacity; the men in charge of different de-
partments are capable and willing, but what is lacking is some great executive
mind at the head to bring together these elements of strength and make them as
great a force against the Germans as is necessary to win the war.

The Conference at Paris is but an example. We were called together with-
out any program or without any fixed purpose other than that the idea of meeting
was useful and that good would come of it. I have no doubt that much good will
result, at the same time, the fact that there was no directing mind or program
lessened its usefulness. Lloyd George wished to make a speech and then he would
have liked to go home. We arranged it so he could not speak, therefore he went
home at the earliest possible moment and before the Conference had finished its
labors.

Clemenceau, having just come into the Ministry, could not be expected to
have a well thought out program arranged. The Italians and ourselves came in
largely without knowing why we were invited, and believing that we would have
definite proposals put up to us. As for ourselves, being new comers and never
having sat in before at such a conference, it would have been indelicate to have
taken control of it more than we did. As a matter of fact, we did control it,
and made possible whatever good results may be accomplished.

December 12, 1917.

We are having an extraordinary passage. The weather today is as yester-
day, mild and the sea smooth, the thermometer running about 64 degrees.

I learned today from the Admiral that a vessel was sunk at the mouth

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of Brest Harbor a few hours after we had passed out. A submarine was evidently
in waiting and probably for us.

The running of the ship in war time has been interesting. For the
first few night out the boat was totally without lights. We ate our dinner in
the afternoon before dark, and then lounged about and slept with our clothes on.
The discipline is strict and it is forbidden for anyone on board to light a
match. There are a few troops on the ship and we have conformed to all the
rules governing them. The food is poor though plentiful.

When sitting in the dark it reminded me of the old days in Texas and
the camp life I enjoyed so much. To tell of the voyage, one would think it was
uncomfortable, but as a matter of fact, it has been pleasant and I shall always
remember it as an interesting experience.

December 15, 1917.

We are to land this afternoon. The fact that we sailed from Brest on
Friday upset some of our party. The reason I named Friday was first because
our work was finished and there was no need to remain another day in Paris. Then,
too, it occurred to me that Germans, knowing of the superstition among sailors
and others concerning the sailing on Friday, would lessen their watchfulness on
that day.

All the reports are written and summaries have been given me for filing
with the State Department and the President. Gordon has written me with the
exception of the last four pages, which I wrote myself.

When we left the United States I predicted that the center of gravity
would shift from Washington to London and Paris. This prediction came true,
for after we left there was a general scramble among the foreigners to follow.
Northcliffe, Reading, Sir Charles Gordon, Sir William Wiseman, Andes Tardieu,
de Casenave, Soldatenkoff, etc. etc. all turned up from time to time in London

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and Paris soon after our arrival. None of them excepting Wiseman knew when we
were leaving since it was considered unsafe to have our movements known. However,
I expect to welcome them all soon after our return, for I am sure the migration
will move westward in short order.

I wish to pay a tribute to <u>SMXXNavy</u> the efficiency of our Navy as I have
come in close touch with it. It is far ahead of anything I have seen in the
world excepting the British Navy and, unit for unit, it is equal to that. The
personel is something of which America may well be proud. They are a clean
cut, able, fearless type that will give a good account of themselves should the
opportunity present itself.

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The White House,
Washington.

December 17, 1917.

I came to Washington today on the 11.08 train. Bill Nye of the State Department Secret Service accompanied me. He read the riot act to the railroad officials and succeeded in having the train arrive on time. Janet, Louise, Frank Polk, Grayson and Gordon met me. I drove by the White House first, intending to leave my bags and go on to Janet's, but I found the President in his study waiting for me. We had a conference which lasted from five until seven o'clock.

It was then too late to dress for dinner and we postponed that formality until afterward when we dressed and went to the theater.

I gave the President a report of my activities in London and Paris and he seemed deeply interested. I shall not go into detail, but I recommended that he send General Tasker H. Bliss over as soon as he could make ready to act as our Military Adviser in the Supreme War Council. I explained the formation and working of that Council and how inefficient it had been made because of Lloyd George's determination to eliminate the British Chief of Staff and the General Commanding in the Field.

In reply to his query as to how matters could be remedied, I thought it would be necessary to wait until we had a sufficient force on the firing line to give us the right to demand a voice in the conduct of the military end of the war. I suggested that I should return to Europe around the first of April, or whenever it was thought the right time, to sit in with the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy on the Supreme War Council. He gave cordial assent to this proposal, remarking "I could not possibly send anyone else, for no one knows my mind as you do." Quick decisions are necessary, and it is often useless to try and consult by cable. Someone must be there who knows what to do without referring

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back to me, and you are the only one whom I would trust to do this, for you and
you alone know what I should do in like circumstances.""

The President knows, as I do, that it is necessary to have someone who
will act on his own initiative and who will receive his unqualified support.

Mrs. Wilson, the President and I dined alone and after the theater went to bed
without further discussion.

December 18, , 1917.

I have had many consultations today with the President, Lansing, Polk,
Bliss, Baker, Benson, McCormick and others. I have received several cables from
Lloyd George and Wiseman, some of them relating to one thing and some to another.
Lloyd George's chief trouble is the shipping and the keen desire of both the
British and the French to have our men amalgamated with their troops in companies
and regiments.

In talking this over with the President, I thought it advisable to settle
the matter at once and not allow it to drag along. I told him pretty much what
I recommended in my report, therefore I shall not repeat it here. He said he
would send for Secretary Baker and discuss it with him. While he was at the tel-
ephone, I suggested that General Bliss be also invited, which was done. Bliss and
Baker came to the White House immediately and, as I anticipated, Bliss did all
the explaining, for Baker knew but little of the subject under discussion. Bliss'
advice was almost identical with what I had already given the President, and it
was decided that Baker should draw up a cable to General Pershing indicating our
decision.

The President asked me to see Secretary Baker later and advise him as
to the substance of his cable, which I did. The President also thought I had
better let both the British and French Governments know what had been cabled to

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General Pershing, since it was a complete answer to their requests. Instead of doing this, I got Lansing to paraphrase the Baker cable and take it up personally with the British and French Ambassadors. In telling the President of this afterward, and of my reasons for bringing Lansing and the Ambassadors into it, he smiled and said, "I suppose it is well to let them feel they are doing something now and then".

An important decision the President and I made was to formulate the war aims of the United States. I never knew a man who did things so casually. We did not discuss this matter more than ten or fifteen minutes when he decided he would take the action I told some of the Interallied Conference he would take as soon as I returned to America. It will be remembered that I urged Lloyd George, Reading and Balfour at Paris to join me in formulating a broad declaration of war aims that would unite the world against Germany, and would not only help the Russian situation, but would knit together the best and most unselfish opinion of the world. I could not persuade them to do this, and now it will be done by the President. It would have been better if the Interallied Conference had done it for reasons which are apparent.

The President asked me to have Mezes give a memorandum of the different questions which a peace conference must necessarily take up for solution. I told him I already had this data in my head. He replied that he also had it, but he would like a more complete and definite statement such, for instance, a proper solution of the Balkan question.

I suggested that I cable Sir William Wiseman to return to New York at once in order to have the benefit of his advice regarding the way England would receive what we have in mind to say. The President said he thought it would not be well to consult with anybody. If we consulted with the British we should have to consult with the French etc. I combatted this by saying it was not for the purpose of consulting Wiseman but merely to have him look over what was decid-

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ed upon and judge if there was anything offensive to the British point of view which we had overlooked. The President did not reply, but later in the day asked how soon I thought I could get Wiseman here. I cabled Wiseman to start immediately. My cables to him and his replies are a part of the record. It will be remembered that Wiseman is now acting as liaison officer between me personally and the British Government.

I complimented the President upon his message to Congress, telling him what it was practically I should have advised if he had waited until my return, although I should have made a more thorough job of it. I should have said not only all he said, but should have added what is now proposed, that is, it should have been done in one document rather than in two. He did not agree as to the wisdom of this, although he did not dissent.

We took up the discussion of the railroad question. He had made up his mind to take over the railroads and put McAdoo in as Administrator. The legal difficulties involved were holding him back. He had found he could not take over the funds which the railroads had on hand, and without them, he could not run them railroads unless Congress made an appropriation for that purpose.

I have been so engrossed with foreign affairs that I have not given this question any attention, but since it is a matter of such burning importance, I shall try to help find a way by which immediate action may be taken without referring it to Congress. I told the President I hoped he would do for the railroads what had had done for the banks. That is, he would make them conduct their business honestly and then see that they had a fair deal.

He surprised me by saying that the only constructive thought he had applied to any of the great measures was in the Federal Reserve Act. My opinion is, he gives himself too much credit in that case and not nearly enough in the others, for I know myself of suggestions and thoughts he has put into other great measures

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enacted during his administration which made the difference between a great measure and an inferior one.

At lunch we had an interesting conversation which I brought up by saying that I found myself thinking of Lloyd George's secretaries and was wondering why I had thought of them. The process was as follows: There were some Virginia apples on the table and I speculated upon whether they were the kind Mrs. Dana Gibson had promised to send us. This took me to kawakawakawahewai in London, Mrs. Astor, and Waldorf Astor being the Secretary of Lloyd George brought up the line of thought.

I mentioned this to the President and asked if he ever thought how the roads of destiny turned. For instance, he was now in a position to influence, for good or for evil, a large part of humanity, and I wondered if he had followed the turning in the road which had brought him to this position. If he had not had the quarrel with the authorities at Princeton, he would not have securing the nomination for the Governorship of New Jersey. In ordinary years, New Jersey would have elected a republican rather than a democrat. If Roosevelt had not fallen out with Taft, Taft would probably have been re-elected. And so it goes.

The President thought these things were not chance, but were well worked out conclusions which had reached a conjunction. He admitted that there was such an element as chance. For example, if one were walking down the street and a brick fell from a chimney on him that, he thought, was purely chance. We finally decided that Providence had direction in human affairs because one could not account for the conjunction of circumstances otherwise.

The President spoke of how much he was handicapped by not having a secretary whom he could trust with his confidential work. He said Congress, he was sure, would be willing to give him an additional secretary, but that Tumulty's heart would be broken if he asked for one. I expressed regret that he did not have such a secretary as Newton Baker. I told of how efficiently I was served

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while abroad on my mission, and how often I thought of him and wished he could
be served so well. He said, " I suppose you had nothing to do but to steer, and
that is what I should be in a position to do".

He said he had offered Tumulty another place, that of Customs Appraiser,
at a salary of $9000.00 for life, but he had declined it. He thought Tumulty
wanted a Cabinet place but he considered him utterly unfit for it and there-
fore he could not dispose of him in that way. I disagreed with him. I
thought Tumulty wanted the position he has now, and his refusal to be forced
out, and his determination to hold it even at the expense of his pride, made
me suspicious of him. He said "suspicious in what way?" I replied that per-
haps the Catholic Church insisted upon his remaining. To this he answered
"they do not like him." "Perhaps not, said I, "nevertheless, they would pre-
fer him to a Protestant".

I have no such prejudice against the Catholic Church as the President
seems to have. I have tried repeatedly to get him to put them in the Cabinet
and other high places, not, indeed, because they were Catholics but because
they were best fitted for the positions for which I suggested them. Ixk The
reason I think it a mistake to keep Tumulty as Secretary to the President is
because of the feeling Protestants generally have on the subject.

The President could not see in what way the Catholics could benefit by
Tumulty's position since he never told him anything of value. He spoke of
the folly of the Catholic Church trying to force itself into politics. He
thought the country had gotten the impression that he did not treat his friends
with consideration and that he was not grateful. He thought a man could not
serve his country well and allow personal friendships to enter into any of his
acts.

I know where the President got this idea. It was from Tumulty himself.
He has been driving it into the President for the past three or four years

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in fact, ever since his position became precarious. He has made the President
believe that under no circumstances can he afford to break with any of his
other friends, citing McCombs and Harvey as two instances. I disagreed with
the President and said he was more criticised for sticking to his friends than
he was for breaking with them. He replied, "I suppose you refer to Daniels and
Tumulty. The country now seems to realize that Daniels is making good".

I told the President that as far as Tumulty was concerned, he went with
the wrong people. The President knew this and realized they were trying to
use him, but he did not believe Tumulty had anything of value to give them.
In this again he is mistaken. By some means, Tumulty is aware that the Pres-
ident contemplates taking over the entire railroad system of the United xxXXxx
States. This information is of enormous value to the men with whom Tumulty
associates, many of whom are merely paid agents of Wall Street operators.

In speaking of the dinner at the Elysee Palace given by President and
Madame Poincare to the Interallied Conference, I told the President that they
made me the guest of honor. He replied, "They should have done so as you
were my personal representative". In answer to this I answered that they
did not know it since I had not shown my credentials to anyone in England or
France. This astonished him. I do not see exactly how I should have
preceded the Prime Ministers of other countries even though I was the Pres-
ident's personal representative. It was an honor the French desired to
pay the United States, and neither the President nor I were thought of.

I informed him that I had arranged with the French Government to
have all the members of our Mission sit in the Interallied Conference and
also Ambassador Sharp. I explained that it did not make any difference what-
ever how many sat in; that the real work was done by the Prime Ministers of
Great Britain, France, Italy and myself at private conferences. I thought
I now understood how to handle the peace conference most effectively when it

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came, but I did not go into details.

I saw Vance McCormick today, and after some discussion with him I decided to ask Admiral Benson to call the Mission together tomorrow after I had gone and have them work out a plan for better coordination between the Allies; particularly as to our representation. I did not mention this to the President for I prefer to see what they recommend before bringing it to him.

After dinner tonight the President and I went inot executive session
until half past nine o'clock when we went to bed.

I find the President still antagonistic to Lansing. Lansing con-
stantly does something to irritate him, and generally along the line of
taking action without consultation. In this instance, it was sending a
despatch to John W. Garrett at the Hague concerning the receving of some
peace overtures which Garrett thought the Germans were about to make, but
in which the President had no confidence.

I have about come to the conclusion that it is George Creel who is
prejudicing the President against Lansing.

I thought the President or Lansing should give out a report of the
Mission's work at the Paris Conference, and the President agreed to it ex-
cept that he preferred to give it out himself. I try my best to keep him
from being so secretive. It would be much better to take the public into
confidence whenever it can be done without injury to the public welfare. I
should inaugurate an entirely new policy if I were President. I should do
away, as far as possible, with secret diplomacy. In most instances it could
be done with entire safety.

December 19, 1917.

Secretary Lane called today and complained rather bitterly that the

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President no longer trusted him and did not take him into his confidence.
I combatted this and thought the work the President was doing in other depart-
ments relating to the war, was the reason for his reticence. As a matter of
fact, I think the President has cooled considerably toward Lane. He mentioned
but
him once yesterday and that was to say that Lane had told him something about
George Harvey, showing that Lane had been in conference with Harvey about certain
matters.

I have had up with Lansing and the President the question of representa-
tion in Switzerland. I believe, and so does Lansing, that Abram Elkus should
replace Stovall. The President hesitates to displace Stovall although he knows
he is not equal to the work there. I suggested as a compromise sending Elkus
as Commercial Attache or some such minor position, and have him keep in touch with
the situation.

I told the President I would return the $2500.00 he gave me for ex-
penses abroad since I had not spent any of it. Brown Brothers paid me $542
in interest on the amount so my check on the Guaranty Trust Company is for
$2505.42.

The President was interested in my conversation with General Pershing
and that I believed I had won him over to our side.

I am leaving on the four o'clock train for New York after a busy and
profitable stay in Washington. It is agreed that I shall return Sunday to re-
main four or five days. I shall then stop with Janet and Gordon for the hol-
idays, but will doubtless see something of the President in order that we may
get up the statement he is to make as to our peace terms.

New York,
December 20, 1917.

Among my visitors today were Jacob Shiff, who wished to tell me about

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the financial situation and to advise as to a remedy, Herman Kohlsaat and Lincoln Steffens. I am too pressed for time to go into detailsof the conversations. I shall have to discontinue the diary for a day or two as it is utterly impossible to get at it for the moment.

December 22, 1917.

Among those who called today were Edward Bok of the Ladies Home Journal, the Russian Ambassador, the Belgian Minister, Mrs. Philip Lydig, Dudley Malone, Edward S. Martin and a number of others.

The Belgian Minister came to offer me "The Decoration of the Crown". I asked him to hold it for the present as I was uncertain whether I could accept it. I should much prefer not accepting it, for if it should become known, it might suggest to other governments to do likewise.

The Russian Ambassador and I took up the Russian situation and I asked him to make a memorandum of the position he thought this country should take. I shall discuss the question with the President and perhaps suggest that he incorporate some reference to it in his forthcoming speech.

Frank Harris of Pearson's is in trouble with the Censor and asked me to use my good offices in his behalf.

December 30, 1917.

I have done nothing with the diary for a week. It has been impossible not only because I spent nearly a week in Washington, but the time has not been propitious. However, I made notes each day while in Washington and will now dictate from them.

Loulie and I went to Washington on the 12.08 train Sunday the 23rd to spend Christmas with Janet and Gordon at No. 1827 Nineteenth Street. We had a delightful and quiet trip. A White House motor was waiting to take me to the

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White House where I had a few minutes with the President. I gave him the data
I had prepared for his information and to use in his forthcoming message to
Congress upon the United States' war aims. We did not discuss these, but ~~ther~~ took up the railroad question which is the burning issue at the moment.

I urged him to take over the railroads as soon as possible. He thought
he could not do so before Wednesday or Thursday because the papers would not
be ready until Monday night the 23rd, and he did not wish to make the announce-
ment Christmas Day. Besides, there was a long statement to prepare which would
probably take the matter over until Wednesday or Thursday.

Sunday evening for dinner Janet and Gordon had the Attorney General and
Mrs. Gregory, B. M. Baruch, Chas. R. Crane and Mrs. Crane and their son Richard
and his wife.

My day on Monday was largely spent at the State Department consulting
with Lansing, Polk, Phillips and with different members of our Mission whom
I had asked to come to the Department to meet me. Now that Gordon is in the
Counsellor's office, I receive everyone there rather than at the White House.
It is just as convenient and less conspicuous.

We have gotten our report in final shape. It has gone to Lansing, who,
in turn, will transmit it to the President for whatever action he may see fit.
while

Monday night we were all busy with Louise's Christmas tree, the President
called unannounced. He had a package of papers with him about which he said
he wished to consult me. He remained for a half hour or more, but there was
nothing, as far as I could see, that required immediate attention, and I am at
a loss to know why he should have called. He must have done it merely as an
act of courtesy rather than for any advice he wished to get upon the matters
he presented.

Christmas Day was cold and wet and I did not leave the house although

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a number of people called. Among them was Secretary McAdoo with whom I had a long conference regarding the railroads. McAdoo showed an almost childish delight in assuming this new and great responsibility. He already has more than he properly can do, particularly with his methods. He has ability, vision and an enormous amount of energy, but he lacks both the ability and the desire to delegate authority to others as fully as he should with the amount of work he has to do. Not only that, he is a poor judge of men, which is a great drawback and, in a measure, justifies his disinclination to delegate full authority to his subordinates.

For Christmas dinner we had Sam Auchincloss, Sam Sloan Colt, Mrs. Lewis Hancock, Dorothy and Margery.

On Wednesday I had a quiet day. I undertake to use my visits away from the White House to see a number of my friends. I find it difficult to get in touch with them ordinarily. I also saw a number of people at the State Department, among them Herbert Hoover who asked me to recommend some good man for Counsellor for the Food Administration. I recommended Sherman Whipple of Boston who declined. I afterward suggested William A. Glascow of Philadelphia, who accepted. The man he has is incapacited by over-work. I find with Hoover, as with others, that the matter he is working on is the most important in the world. Hoover believes that food should be moved at the expense of coal or other necessary commodities. He does not think it matters much if the people are a little cold just so the Allies have food. I find this characteristic in nearly all self-centered individuals having a particular specialty. One finds in France, for instance, that Petain believes we should send men at the expense of everything else, Tardieu believe we should send steel and supplies of a like nature, even thought we have to curtail the supply of men.

Gordon and Janet had invited Sir Cecil and Lady Spring-Rice with

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several other important personages to dine Thursday evening but an invitation came about midday from the President and Mrs. Wilson inviting us all to dine at the White House. Janet's dinner was called off and we went to the White House.

The President and I went to his study after dinner for a half hour. I could see some signs of weariness in him and I begged him to take, as nearly as possible, a week's rest before we got at the war aims messages. He promised to do the best he could. I know him so well that I detect, almost sooner than anyone, I think, signs of fatigue or nervousness. I am enabled to do this because I am not with him constantly, but frequently enough to note the difference in him from time to time.

We went through a great many things which are of passing importance and which were decided with unusual celerity. The only matter we differed on was the appointment of Mayor Mitchel to the Army. Mitchel has been trying in every creditable way to get into the service even in a subordinate capacity, and the President has instructed Baker not to permit him to do so on the ground that it would be injecting politics into the army. As a matter of fact, his real reason is his personal dislike of Mitchel. The President carries these dislikes to a degree which is not creditable to him.

We argued about Mitchel for some ten or twelve minutes, and he finally concluded to reconsider the matter, although he did not agree to pass upon it favorably. It is not because of my high regard and sincere friendship for Mitchel nor that I fail to realize that he deserves the President's disapproval for some of his actions toward the President personally, but I do not approve of mixing personal feeling with public service. If Mitchel wishes to go into the army at this critical time, he should be permitted to do so, and in such capacity as he is fitted, for he has had military training. A refusal to permit him to

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volunteer will make a martyr of him and the President by his action will help Mitchel rather than hurt him.

The President asked me to return Friday of next week. He plans to address Congress on the railroad question on the 4th and after that we will prepare together his address on war aims which he hoped to deliver to Congress, Tuesday, January 8th. We think the peace terms upon which Germany is insisting at Brest-Litovsk will give him the proper opportunity to state our war aims.

In talking to the Wilson family about the Sargent portrait, we practically all agreed that it did not do the President justice; that it gives him rather a weak face. I again suggested that Sargent had pictured him as the esthetic scholar rather than as the virile statesman, but my conclusion was that it did not make much difference what kind of face a portrait gave a man, but it was what the man had accomplished that counted. If he did great deeds in a masterly way, it made but little difference what posterity saw in his face. We then fell to citing instances of strong faces of men we had known who had no strength of character or ability.

We left the White House early not only because I knew the President was tired and needed rest, but also because I had to take the midnight train to New York. We have had a delightful Christmas holiday with Gordon, Janet and little Louise. They seemed so glad to have us with them and they have done everything in their power to make our stay happy and comfortable.

I arrived home Friday morning. My first callers were the British Attorney General, Sir Frederick E. Smith, his brother, and his aide, Colonel Murray.

Governor Beeckman was also a caller as well as Lincoln Steffens. Sir Frederick Smith desired to see me before he went to Washington. He has just

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landed and thought it best to get some outline of the situation. He is to make
some speeches throughout the country and he wished my opinion as to their scope.

Governor Beeckman came to tell of his trip to France, and of his desire
to become Senator from Rhode Island, in which event, he indicated his intention
of supporting the President cordially.

With Steffens, it was to take up questions bearing upon the I. W. W.
and the Socialist outlook.

Yesterday Ignace Paderewski was my most interesting caller. He and Madame Paderewska sent us for Christmas a beautiful silver basket filled with violets. He speaks of me almost as if I were superhuman. I could not repeat the things he says. He expects so much, that disappointment must surely follow.

Marcel Knecht, my old friend Tilly Dickinson, Hamilton Holt and Karl von Weigand were other visitors.

I lunched at the Metropolitan Club with Dr. Robert T. Morris. The other
guests were President Schurman of Cornell and Ira Place of the New York Central
Railway who, xhyxxhxxmxx_xxxhakxkxxy, was a classmate of mine at Cornell.

Holt wished advice regarding the expending or the church fund he is
handling in behalf of a league of nations to enforce peace. He brought up the
assertion again that my strength lay in my unselfishness of purpose.

Norman Hapgood sent an article he has written for a Paris paper which
I am attaching to the diary as it brings out the same idea. Dr. Frank Crane
in his syndicate articles has written of me in this strain.

I suggested to President Schurman that he write a brief on the Balkans,
giving his views as to what would be a fair settlement of that vexed question.
He has made some study of that situation and had an opportunity when he was
Minister to Greece to meet many of the present leaders.

Among my callers today were Otto Kahn, S. R. Bertron and Mezes. I

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about some
sounded Kahn as to his availability to go to neutral countries nearby Germany
to do some propaganda work and obtain information. However, I doubt whether he is
persona grata with enough influential Germans to make it worth while sending
him.

I have talked the President into sending Abram Elkus to Switzerland, but
I thought if we could get some trustworthy German-American of great intelligence
to go to Holland or Denmark, it would be well worth while.

I went over with Mezes questions regarding the work for the peace con-
ference.

December 31, 1917.

The Russian Ambassador was one of my most interesting visitors. He came
from Washington to spend a half hour with me. His train was eight hours late.
I got nothing new from him worth while, and I had in mind to advise the Presi-
dent almost along the exact lines he urged upon me. He thinks something should
be done immediately to put this country in a better light with Russia, and to
avert the German peril if it is possible.

My old friend Dittlinger of Austin, Texas, has just returned from
Germany where he has been living for the past six years. He gave me much val-
uable information regarding the food situation there and the temper of the
people.

Dr. Crampton, Liet. Governor McDowell of Montana, Miss King of the Eve-
ning Post, Allan Markley of the International News Service and many others made
up my day. In the evening I went over a vast quantity of papers and formulated
the advice I intend to give the President for his forthcoming message as to
the United States' war aims. I have read and ap-
praised this Diary from pages 1 to 430 inclusive, running from
Jan. 1/17 to Dec. 31/17. Best wishes