THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This year has been widely called the Year of Europe.

I am supposed to be the originator of the phrase.

I am not sure that I was.

If all goes well, I am certain I can find where and when I said it.

If not, I can always blame it on the Associated Press.

Our present focus on relations with Europe did not begin on January, 1973. The Alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of the postwar era. It marked the end of US isolationism. It provided the essential political and security framework for American engagement in Europe. It created the political confidence that allowed the countries of Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the prerequisite for the realization of an unprecedented endeavor in European unity. And it was the principal means to forge the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation.

Our connections are more diverse and more intimate with our European friends than with any other countries.

Our consultations have been franker and more intensive with our European allies than with others. The President has seen European leaders more frequently than of any other part of the world.

Our values, our goals and our basic interests have been, and are,

more closely identified with those of Europe than with any other region.

Indeed, it is precisely because of the enormous variety and intimacy of our connections that we are more sensitive to differences and more conscious of problems that arise.

If 1973 is the year of Europe, it is not because 1972 or 1969 were not.

-- It is because in the international environment the era that was shaped by decisions a generation ago is ending.

-- The revival of Western Europe is an established fact, as is the historic success of its economic unification.

-- The East-West strategic balance has changed from the t
American preponderance which Alliance defense posture and doctrine
long presupposed and has become more nearly equal.

-- We are in a period of <u>relaxed</u> tensions. <u>Defense remains</u>
vital interest only basis some coals
important but it can no longer provide the principal unifying bond.

Moreover, as each ally pursues detente independently, suspicions
and uncertainty multiply.

-- Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan,

for example, has emerged as a major power center. In many fields,

paradoxically, Atlantic solutions must include Japan.

-- New problems have arisen requiring new types of cooperative
action such as the supply of energy for industrialized nations.

-- A new generation in Western societies take stability and peace for granted. But they are less committed to the unity that made it possible and the effort which is required to maintain it.

-- The frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have produced a reluctance in the United States to sustain our involvement in the world on the basis of predominant American responsibility.

4/20 - 12:00 Noon

Thus Europe and the US are challenged much as the post-war generation of leaders was to a new act of creation. Then the task was reconstruction and security against the danger of attack.

Today the need is to make Atlantic relationship the dynamic element in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspiration from its goals rather than its fears.

Inevitably a period of transition will be characterized by strains.

There have been complaints on the American side that Europe is taking advantage of us economically and not carrying its fair share of the defense burden. There have been complaints on the European side that America is out to wreck European unity, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

These debates are futile if conducted by slogans or preeminent with intentions.

4/20 - 12:00 Noon

By the time he travels to Europe at the end of the year the President
hopes to have worked out with our allies a new Atlantic charter setting
the goals for the future -- a charter

-- that builds on the past without becoming its prisoner;

-- deals with the problems our success has created;

-- creates a new relationship for the nations bordering the Atlantic
in whose progress Japan can share.

This is what we mean by the Year of Europe.

Let me now turn to the problems with which we propose to deal.

32

must reexamine our doctrine and strategy. The local defense
of Europe becomes more urgent, _deceivable_.

-- The ebbing of the Cold War military confrontation now faces all of our governments with domestic pressures to reduce the defense establishments that have preserved this security.

-- Budgetary pressures -- the high cost of manpower, _particularly_ with volunteer armies, and the high costs of modern equipment -- add to the pressures against maintenance of conventional military forces -- at the precise moment when strategic conditions make them crucial to a rational posture of security.

-- In an era in which the United States is adjusting its global responsibilities, and the Alliance is negotiating mutual and balanced force reductions with the Warsaw Pact, there are fears in Western Europe that America intends to withdraw.

-- The urgency is underlined by the approaching negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. These are hopeful in that they may enable us to stabilize the defense of Europe at somewhat lower cost. But they can be disastrous unless the Alliance first agrees on what constitute elements of security. The following tasks remain to be accomplished:

*   [x] = complete
*   [ ] = incomplete
*   [x] = partial
*   [ ] = partial

-- There are inadequacies in important areas of our conventional defense.

-- There are still ambiguities in our doctrine, particularly on the crucial question of the relationship of conventional defense to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

-- There are anomalies in our deployments and logistics structure.

The greatest problem is in the political field. During the Fifties and Sixties a whole host of institutions was created to deal with specific problems. When these institutions were rudimentary the compatibility in their mode of operation was not apparent. But as they have become elaborated three different modes of action have developed:

-- In our economic relations, the European Community has increasingly developed a regional unity; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile the two approaches.

-- In our collective security, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integrated defense, but in radically different strategic conditions, and without a full willingness to face all its implications.

-- Diplomacy is essentially to be conducted by nation states. The US has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have interests. The two are not necessarily in conflict, but neither are they by definition identical.

In short, the Atlantic nations need above all a common view of the nature of its unity and the limits of diversity. It is not possible indefinitely to choose autonomy for oneself and claim unity as a brake on one's allies. What is needed is a common union of the shape of the future in our relations and a common view of the nature of a peaceful world. That it is our common purpose to build,

### III. Agenda for the Future.

-6-

Nevertheless, there are practical economic consequences of European integration. For years, we expected that a unified Europe would ease many of our burdens. We always assumed that political unity would follow economic integration. We saw European unity as the building block of a vital Atlantic partnership, looking out to it the rest of the world.

Europe's success -- the very goal we supported -- has in fact transformed the Atlantic partnership, and faces the Atlantic nations with a new challenge.

Because of Europe's phenomenal economic success, some conflict between our economic interests is inevitable.

It is clear that Europe remains the realized! community.

Some Americans see the enlarged community as building its prospertiy behind a protective shield at our expense, and at the expense of a stable international system. Some in Europe see the United States as hostile to European integration and trying to prevent its further strengthening.

B

It will never be the objective of the United States to undo Europe's achievement. Our goal remains a strengthening of the West, and we continue to support European unity as a bridge to Atlantic unity.

But we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing conflict between potential conflict in trade policy and we need to achieve a new balance in our over trade policies.

This year we begin a comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe and Japan. We believe these negotiations are an historic opportunity for a positive achievement.

Let me deal with each area in turn.

A. Economic

There has been no more consistent part of post-war American policy than European unity. At every turn we supported it. We still do.

We knew a United Europe would be more difficult to deal with.

But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our own basic interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that unity would not be limited to economic integration; that there would be an evolution toward political unity and strengthened Atlantic partnership.

This is why the accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major economic disputes must be ended. The United States remains committed to European unity. We will continue to support Europe's achievement.

We have no intention of pursuing a divide-and-rule policy.

2

But we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing conflict
> and that a new balance must be achieved
> arm in arm with
over trade policy. This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations
with Europe and Japan. We believe these negotiations are an historic
opportunity for a positive achievement.

In these talks we must deal with the outstanding issues fairly.
In trade and monetary matters we must keep in mind the imperative of
allied unity.

This is why we believe the negotiations must be raised above the
level of experts. If they are left to the technicians the inevitable com-
petitiveness will be maximized. The influence of pressure groups will
grow pervasive. There will be no framework for a generous solution on
either side of the Atlantic.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to insure that economics
serve greater political purposes. We intend to adopt a broad political
approach that recognizes our overwhelming common interest with both
Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can we justify the mutual concessions
that are essential to the success of these talks.

Our challenge is not to a test of strength, but of statesmanship.

## Defense and Arms Control

Atlantic unity always came most naturally in military policy because
the threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them

3

were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's
responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Still a major June dialogue
is essential.

All Western governments face a paradoxical challenge. At the very
moment when a strong conventional defense is most crucial to Western
strategy, our ability to maintain an adequate military posture is under
attack. Each ally faces rising military budgets to pay for sophisticated
and expensive equipment. The lessening of tensions in Europe has
accentuated domestic economic arguments that we can safely begin
reducing forces unilaterally and relax the momentum of the past two years.

The only answer that will command the support of our peoples and
legislature is to ensure that we have a sound and agreed defense doctrine and
the means to implement it.

4

-- On this basis -- and on this basis alone -- the President can ask
the American people to maintain the necessary U.S. forces in Europe,
not as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons, but as an essential
contribution to an agreed and intelligent structure of Western defense.

Some of this work has already been done. We must complete the
*remaining to be accomplished;*
task. *from page 3.*

This year we will begin negotiating on a mutual balanced reduction
of forces in Central Europe. A rational strategy is a prerequisite for
developing an Allied negotiating position. No formula for reductions is
defensible -- whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale -- if it
undermines the security that underpins detente.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the
product of our own preparations for mutual force reductions. It will be
our contribution to a dialogue on security. It was designed not from the
point of special American, but of general Alliance interests. The President

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

I am not sure that I was.

If all goes well, I shall find where and when I said it.

Our present focus on relations with Europe did not begin in January, 1973. The Alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all our postwar policies. It marked the end of US isolationism.

It provided the essential political and security framework for American engagements in Europe. It created the political confidence that allowed the countries of Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the prerequisite for the realization of an unprecedented endeavor in European unity. And it was the principal means to forge the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation.

2

If 1973 is the Year of Europe, it is not because 1972 or 1969 were not.

-- It is because the era that was shaped by decisions a generation ago is ending.

-- The East-West strategic balance has changed from American preponderance to near equality.

-- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. Our common defense remains a vital interest, but it can no longer provide the only basis of our cohesion. Moreover, as each ally pursues detente independently, suspicions and uncertainty multiply.

-- Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many fields, Atlantic solutions must include Japan.

-- New problems have arisen requiring new types of cooperative action such as ensuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations.

3

Thus Europe and the US are challenged to a new act of creation, much as the post-war generations of leaders was.

Then the task was reconstruction and security against the danger of attack. Today the need is to make Atlantic relationships the dynamic element in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspiration from its goals rather than its fears.

Inevitably a period of transition will be characterized by strains. There have been complaints on the American side that Europe is ignoring its wider responsibilities in overemphasizing its economic self-interest and not carrying its fair share of the defense burden. There have been complaints on the European side that America is out to wreck European unity, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

Our debates will be fruitless if conducted by slogans or preoccupied with suspicions.

4

The solutions will not be adequate to the opportunity if left to
technicians.

We know that if we permit one partnership to atrophy, or to erode
through neglect, or carelessness, or mistrust, all Atlantic nations
will suffer and world peace will be in danger.

This is why the President is now embarking on an approach at the
highest level to our European allies. In his discussions with the heads
of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
France, and the Secretary General of NATO, it is the President's
purpose to lay the basis for a new spirit of creativity in the West.

He will want to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively. The
political, military and economic elements are linked not by our choice
but by reality. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed relations with our adversaries.

In 1973 the President seeks a new foundation of cooperation with
our friends.

By the time he travels to Europe at the end of the year the President
hopes to have worked out with our allies a new Atlantic charter setting
the goals for the future -- a charter that

- builds on the past without becoming its prisoner;

5

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and ultimately Japan to join us in this effort.

## Problems in Atlantic Relationships

It would be idle to deny that the problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They can be summed up as follows:

In the economic field, Europe's phenomenal economic success has made an adjustment in our economic relationships inevitable.

During the entire post-war period, the revival of the European economies had been of great benefit to all the Atlantic countries. Mutual prosperity developed based on the principle of relatively free trade. But as the European Community evolved, it designed its policies to enhance its regional autonomy, especially in trade. Its growing economic strength has compelled third countries to seek special arrangements to protect their own access to a market of over 250 million. This prospect of relatively closed trading systems internally within Europe, and in arrangements with third countries, has evolved at the very time when the United States is encountering an increasingly unfavorable balance of payments.

6

This introduces a potentially dangerous element of friction. ✓

In the military field we face a number of immediate issues.

-- The danger of war has receded, largely because of our collective strength. But as strategy parity is approached we

7

must reexamine our doctrine and strategy. The local defense of
Europe becomes much more important.

The ebbing of the Cold War military confrontation now faces all of our governments with domestic pressures to reduce the defense establishments that have preserved our security.

At the precise moment when strategic conditions make them crucial to a rational posture of security.

The urgency of all these issues is underlined by the approaching negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. These are hopeful for they may enable us to stabilize the defense of Europe at somewhat lower cost. But they can be disastrous unless the Alliance first agrees on what constitute the elements of our security.

There are anomalies in our deployments and logistics structure. But our greatest challenge is in the political field. During the Fifties and Sixties a whole host of institutions was created to deal with specific problems. When these institutions were rudimentary the potential in compatibility in their mode of operation was not apparent. But as they have become elaborated three different modes of action have developed:

In our economic relations, the European Community has increasingly developed a regional development and personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two approaches.

In our collective defense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integrated defense, but in radically different strategic conditions, and without a full willingness to face all its implications.

8

---

Diplomacy is essentially being conducted by traditional nation states.

The U.S. have global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

In sum, the Atlantic states need above all a common view of the nature of its unity and the limits of diversity. Europe's dependence on the United States for security is no longer sufficient for an organic Atlantic relationship. We must identify interests and values that unite us in order to engage the commitment of peoples and parliaments. What is needed is a common vision of the shape of the future in our relations and a common view of the peaceful world that it is our common purpose to build.

## A. Economic

There has been no more consistent part of post-war American policy than European unity. At every turn we supported it. We knew that a united Europe would be more difficult to deal with. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our own basic interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that unity would not be limited to economic integration; that there would be an evolution toward political unity and cooperative Atlantic partnership open to the rest of the world. It is clear that this hope remains to be realized. Some Americans see the enlarged Community as building its prosperity behind a protective shield at our expense, and at the expense of a stable international system. Some in Europe see the United States as hostile to European integration and trying to prevent its further strengthening.

9

This is why the gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a new cooperative spirit. The United States remains committed to European unity. We will continue to support it. We have no intention of pursuing a divide-and-rule policy.

But we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing uneasiness over trade policy and that a new balance must be achieved. This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We believe these negotiations are an historic opportunity for a positive achievement.

We believe the negotiations must be raised above the level of experts. If they are left to the technicians inevitable competitiveness will be maximized. The influence of pressure groups will grow pervasive. There will be no framework for a generous solution on either side of the Atlantic.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to ensure that economics serve greater political purposes. We intend to adopt a broad political approach that recognizes our overwhelming common interest in an open balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can we justify the mutual concessions that are essential to the success of these talks.

Our challenge is not to a test of strength, but to an art of statesmanship.

10

Defense and Arms Control

Atlantic unity always came most naturally in military policy because the threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Still a major dialogue has become essential.

All Western governments face a paradoxical challenge. At the very moment when a strong conventional defense is most crucial to Western strategy, our ability to maintain an adequate military posture is under attack. Each ally faces rising military budgets to pay for sophisticated and expensive equipment. The lessening of tensions in Europe has accentuated domestic arguments that we can safely begin reducing forces unilaterally and relax the momentum of the past two years.

-- On this basis the President is prepared to ask the American people to maintain the necessary U. S. forces in Europe, not as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligent structure of Western defense.

Some of this work has already been done. But a great deal remains to be accomplished:

11

This year we will begin negotiating on a mutual balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. A rational strategy is a prerequisite for developing an Allies negotiating position. No formula for reductions is defensible -- whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale -- if it undermines the security that underpins detente.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for mutual force reductions. It will be our contribution to a dialogue on security. It was designed not from the point of special American, but of general Alliance interests. The President does not view these negotiations as a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of consequences. What we do want is a common approach to security, serious enough to meet foreseeable changes and broad enough to take into account the possibility of effective arms control.

## Diplomacy

-- In diplomacy we have witnessed a truly remarkable period. There is an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European

12

Security Conference and on mutual force reductions. These were not a series of isolated actions, but part of a general strategy worked out in 1969.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing uneasiness -- all the more insidious for being rarely admitted -- that superpower diplomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. Some of these concerns about excessive flexibility come from the same groups that used to decry excessive US rigidity. It is worth recalling that in 1969 when the President visited Europe immediately after taking office, he was besieged with ideas on how to begin an "era of negotiations." Some allies wanted to start with a European Security Conference; others talked of negotiating force reductions; some suggested a summit meeting. All of them urged us to begin the SALT talks.

The President has asked me to stress that we did not come all this way to buy an illusory tranquility at the expense of our friends.

The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others.

But the perception of common interests is not automatic. It requires constant rearticulation.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In many areas of the world emphasis will differ. But we do require an understanding of our common objectives.

13

If we agree on common principles of our external diplomacy it will become a technical question whether it is carried out in a particular forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally. With such a framework of common purpose, we will have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. If our Allies seek reassurance of America's commitment, they will find it not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty, but in the knowledge of the common purposes toward which agreed policies are directed.

If we cannot articulate our common purposes, we will lose ourselves in irrelevant tactics and procedures. We will expose our differences to exploitation, do permanent damage to mutual confidence, and accomplish neither our joint nor our individual objectives.

We cannot achieve a wider confidence and unity in Europe between East and West if we cannot maintain it among ourselves.

* * *

This agenda is not an American prescription but an appeal for a joint effort of creativity. We have a rare opportunity to build a structure of peace that may last for decades. But we can do so only if we build on the vitality of the Atlantic partnership. We are prepared to make our contribution:

- We will support European unity. We will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.

14

-- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies. We will maintain major forces and not withdraw from Europe. We expect in turn from each ally its fair share of the common effort.

-- We will never consciously sacrifice the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will not oppose our interests or our responsibilities.

-- Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself so the Atlantic Community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise.

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. For this will be the basis for progress that may dwarf the great achievements of the past decades. And then the Atlantic nations, together with Japan will have served their peoples as well as the cause of peace.

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

I am not sure that I was.

2

-- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. Our common defense remains a vital interest, but it can no longer provide the only basis of our cohesion. Moreover, as each ally pursues detente independently, suspicions and uncertainty multiply. In these conditions, an un稳定的 defense remains a vital interest, but it can no longer provide the only basis for our solution.

3

4

We know that if we permit *one* partnership to atrophy, or to erode
through neglect, or carelessness, or mistrust, all Atlantic nations
will suffer and world peace will be in danger.

5

6

7

- The ebbing of the Cold War military confrontation now faces all of our governments with domestic pressures to reduce the defense establishments that have preserved our security.

4. At the precise moment when strategic conditions make them crucial to a rational posture of security.

- The urgency of all these issues is underlined by the approaching negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. These are hopeful for they may enable us to stabilize the defense of Europe at somewhat lower cost. But they can be disastrous unless the Alliance first agrees on what constitute the elements of our security.

11. In our economic relations, the European Community has increasingly stressed its developed regional development and personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two approaches.

- In our collective defense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integrated defense, but in radically different strategic conditions, and without a full willingness to face all its implications.

8

(4)

Thus we deal with each other especially in economics, on an integrated basis in the military field. To determine its limits we must develop a common view of the nature of its unity and the limits of diversity. Europe's dependence on the United States for security is no longer sufficient for an organic Atlantic relationship.

And we must see the necessity, if we are to remain a great power, that our foreign policy must be based on the principle of one's ally and on the basis of a united state in diplomacy.

### A. Economic

American policy in the post-war period has been no more consistent part of post-war American policy than European unity. At every turn we supported it. We knew that a united Europe would be more difficult to deal with. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our own basic interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that unity would not be limited to economic integration; that there would be an evolution toward political unity and cooperative Atlantic partnership open to the rest of the world.

10

## Defense and Arms Control

14

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

I am not sure that I was.

2

3

4

5

In the _economic field_, Europe's phenomenal economic success has made an adjustment in our economic relationships inevitable.

7

-- The ebbing of the Cold War military confrontation now faces all of our governments with domestic pressures to reduce the defense establishments that have preserved our security.

-- At the precise moment when strategic conditions make them crucial to a rational posture of security.

-- The urgency of all these issues is underlined by the approaching negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. These are hopeful for they may enable us to stabilize the defense of Europe at somewhat lower cost. But they can be disastrous unless the Alliance first agrees on what constitute the elements of our security.

-- There are anomalies in our deployments and logistics structure. But our greatest challenge is in the political field. During the Fifties and Sixties a whole host of institutions was created to deal with specific problems. When these institutions were rudimentary the potential in compatibility in their mode of operation was not apparent. But as they have become elaborated three different modes of action have developed:

-- In our economic relations, the European Community has increasingly developed a regional development and personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two approaches.

-- In our collective defense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integrated defense, but in radically different strategic conditions, and without a full willingness to face all its implications.

8

## A. Economic

9

10

## Defense and Arms Control

-- On this basis the President is prepared to ask the American people to maintain the necessary U.S. forces in Europe, not as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligent structure of Western defense.

11

## Diplomacy

12

13

***

-- We will support European unity. We will make concessions to
its further growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.

14

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

I am not sure that I was.

1973. The Alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all our postwar policies (and thus definitive). It marked the end of US isolationism. It provided the essential political and security framework for American engagements in Europe, as it created the political confidence that allowed the countries of Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the prerequisite for the realization of an unprecedented endeavor in European unity. And it was the principal means to forge the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation.

2

It is because the era that was shaped by decisions a generation ago is ending. It is because the success of the policies of two decades has produced new realities that require new approaches.

-- The East-West strategic balance has changed from American preponderance to near equality, giving with it the necessity of rethinking the security nature of our common defense.

-- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. Our common defense remains a vital interest, but it can no longer provide the only basis of our cohesion. Moreover, as each ally pursues its own independently, suspicions and uncertainty multiply.

-- New problems have arisen requiring new types of cooperative action, such as ensuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations, and a good example.

3

Inevitably a period of transition will be characterized by strains. There have been complaints on the American side that Europe is ignoring its wider responsibilities in overemphasizing its economic self-interest and not carrying its fair share of the defense burden. There have been complaints on the European side that America is out to wreck Europe, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

(Y)

4

Our solutions will not be adequate to the opportunity if left to technicians.

This is why the President is now embarking on an approach at the
leaders of Western Europe.
highest level to our European allies. In his discussions with the heads

of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
France, and the Secretary General of NATO, it is the President's
and his being about a reaffirmation and reinvigoration, of his
purpose to lay the basis for a new spirit of creativity in the West.
In his approach will be

The President will
but by reality. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1973 the President seeks a new foundation of cooperation with
our friends, particularly in Europe, and especially in the Western
Europe and Suspicion toward long-time adversaries.

-- builds on the past without becoming its prisoner;

In 1973, -- deals with the problems our success has created;
we will attempt to gain the support of our friends, and the friends
will gain us support and mutual interests with our friends.

5

6

7

When these institutions were rudimentary the potential in compatibility in their mode of operation was not apparent. But as they have become elaborated three different modes of action have developed.

## II. Problems in Atlantic Relationships

In the economic field, Europe's progress toward economic unity and its phenomenal economic growth have created new sets of issues.

The very achievement of these goals, that we supported for so long and without reservation, has in fact created areas of friction.

The nature of the European Community was that it gave member nations free access to one another's markets, and that all members have the same tariff barriers with respect to imports from non-member nations.

This is the nature of European economic integration - and other economic entities of this sort. And the increased trade created within Europe as the result of the formation of the Community has been in large part responsible for Europe's high rate of development and the vast increases in European trade with the U.S. It has thus served to our mutual benefit.

But the natural economic weight of this market of 250 million people has exerted pressure on other states to reach favorable arrangements to protect their access to that market. The prospect of relatively closed trading arrangements between the Community and other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa has been of concern to the United States and other nations which do not participate in those arrangements.

And in the area of agriculture, where the United States has a comparative advantage vis-a-vis other nations, many Americans look with dismay at the prospects of diminishing access for some of their products in European markets.

9

This is why the gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a new cooperative spirit. The United States remains committed to European unity. We shall continue to support it. We have no intention of pursuing a divide-and-

rule policy. We shall continue to support the strategy of the United States and we shall continue to support the strategy of the Atlantic partnership. We support the strategy of Europe as a bridge to Atlantic partnership.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to ensure that economics serve greater political purposes. We intend to adopt a broad political approach that recognizes our overwhelming common interest in an open and balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can we justify the mutual concessions that are essential to the success of these talks.

10

Defense and Arms Control

11

There are anomalies in our deployment as well as in NATO strategy. This year we will begin negotiating on a mutual balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. A rational strategy is a prerequisite for developing an allies negotiating position. No formula for reductions is defensible -- whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale -- if it undermines the security that underpins deterrence.

**Diplomacy**

11

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for mutual force reductions. It will be our contribution to a dialogue on security. It was designed not from the point of view of special American, but of general Alliance interests. The President does not view these negotiations as a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of consequences. What we do want is a common approach to security, serious enough to meet foreseeable changes and broad enough to take into account the possibility of effective arms control.

## Diplomacy

-- In diplomacy we have witnessed a truly remarkable period. The last two years saw much of an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European

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(M)

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-- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies. We will maintain major forces and not withdraw from Europe, initially. We expect in turn from each ally its fair share of the common effort.

-- We will never consciously sacrifice the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will not oppose our interests or our responsibilities, and that day will come when we can end this war and live in peace. -- F. D. Roosevelt

We are prepared to work cooperatively on common problems such as energy until causes such as armed conflict or economic issues of supply, too important to be dealt with by international agencies, can be resolved. We support the cause of peace and freedom, and we support the efforts of all countries to build a more stable and secure world.

4/20/73

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This has been called the Year of Europe.

In any case, the Year of Europe is much more than a slogan. I
want to speak to you today about what we mean by it and what we expect
to emerge from it.

This is the Year of Europe for three reasons:

-- First, the Western Alliance has accomplished its original objectives;

-- Second, we face an agenda of new issues.

-- Third, we are in a new international environment vastly different -- and far more promising -- than the period of the Alliance's birth.

We are challenged, as were the statesmen of the 40's, to shape
our future. We are summoned in Dean Acheson's words to be present
at a new creation.

The Alliance that had the vision and courage to shape its future
in the period of danger can surely be as vital and creative a force for
a new era of peace.

-2-

This is not a task for a single year. But if we succeed, the
Year of Europe will be remembered as the year we gave Atlantic
relations a new direction.

Our goal in 1973 is twofold: First, to frame an agenda of specific
problems in our relations that need to be resolved -- in economics,
in defense, and in our efforts to reduce international tensions. We
cannot address these as entirely separate, or purely technical problems,

If we are to give Atlantic relations a new momentum we must establish
a new set of agreed principles and common objectives. This will require
an extraordinary effort of political will.

This effort of will is the second challenge, and the more profound
one. In the 1940's, unity was forged in the face of urgent common
dangers. Today, it is not enough for us to concentrate on what we are
trying to prevent. We are challenged to develop a concept of the future
of the Atlantic Alliance and its role in the international order. We are
asked to reaffirm our common purposes, to give firm direction to our
common endeavor.

It is time for a new Charter for the Atlantic Community.

The United States is ready for this undertaking, and we appeal to
our Allies to join us as partners in the building of a new structure of
peace. This is what the President is seeking in his meetings with
European leaders this spring, and on his trip to Europe this fall.

-3-

For it cannot be accomplished by American leadership alone, or by American prescriptions, but only by common statesmanship.

## Patterns of Change

It is no extravagance to call the North Atlantic Alliance history's most successful peacetime coalition. It guaranteed Western Europe's economic revival; it assured our collective security in an era of confrontation and crisis; it has created conditions of stability which now offer us the promise of a wider structure of peace embracing East and West.

Our deepest challenge today arises not from external danger but from the evolution of the relationship between Europe and America, and from the major transformation in international relations.

-- Europe is a major center of power.

-- The East-West strategic balance has shifted away from the American preponderance which Alliance defense posture and doctrine long presupposed, and has become more nearly equal

-- We are in a period of relaxed tensions. The danger of war that it can no longer provide to the conflicting parties, has receded, and we face new vistas of detente. E-ch Ally shares

this goal, but pursues it in independent policy

-- A new generation in Western societies accepts a more stable international order, anduk B ut tley are less sensitive to the

conditions on which it depends.

-5-

But at the same time, in the name of that same unity, they impose
limits on _our_ independent action in pursuit of our international
responsibilities.

There have been complains on the American side that Europe is
taking advantage of us economically and not carrying its fair share
of the defense burden. There have been complaints on the European
side that American is out to wreck European unity, or to desert
Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

It is time to end the preoccupation with our fears, and reassert
our positive goals. The problems and anxieties produced by change
must be overcome by a shared vision of the future.

This is the President's purpose in the Year of Europe.

Let me discuss in turn what this means in each dimension of our
policy.

## European Unity and the Economic Relationship

First, we need to understand what, exactly, are the problems
between America and the European Economic Community. The concept
of a European Community is emphatically not an issue.

No element of postwar American policy has been more consistent
and more basic than our support for European unity. At every turn,
we supported it. We still do.

-6-

Nevertheless, there are practical economic consequences of
European integration. For years, we expected that a unified Europe
would ease many of our burdens. We always assumed that political
unity would follow economic integration. We saw European unity
as the building block of a vital Atlantic partnership.

Some Americans see the enlarged Community as building its
prospectivity behind a protective shield at our expense, and at the
expense of a stable international system. Some in Europe see the
United States as hostile to European integration and trying to prevent
its further strengthening.

But we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing conflict
over trade policy. This year we begin a comprehensive trade negotiations
with Europe and Japan. We believe these negotiations are an historic
opportunity for a positive achievement.

-7-

In these talks we must address concretely the economic issues
that are before us. Yet if we approach these issues solely on the basis
of their technical merits, all parties will have no choice but to seek
to maximize their self interests in the narrow commercial sense.

The result will be a deadlock or constant conflict.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to raise these negotiations
to a higher plane of international responsibility. What we propose is
~~to adopt a broader political approach that recognizes our transcendent~~
common interest with both Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can
we justify the mutual concessions that are essential to the success of
these talks.

This spirit of reciprocity is reflected in the President's trade bill.
This is the spirit in which the United States will enter the negotiations
this fall.

It is not a test of strength, but of statesmanship.

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present and future strategic balance; second, a new definition of our
basic security requirements from which we can contemplate negotiated
reductions.

But we have not completed the task.

-- There are still ambiguities in our doctrine, particularly on the
crucial question of the relationship of convention defense to the use of
tactical nuclear weapons.

-- There are anomalies in our deployments. In addressing such issues, all Western governments face a paradoxical challenge. At the very moment when a strong conventional defense is most crucial to Western strategy, our ability to maintain an adequate military posture is under attack. Each ally faces rising military budgets to pay for sophisticated and expensive equipment. The lessening of tensions in Europe has accentuated domestic economic arguments that we can safely begin reducing forces unilaterally and relax the momentum of the past two years.

The only answer that will command the support of our peoples and
legislature is to ensure that we have a sound and agreed defense doctrine.

We cannot plausibly justify a defense program or negotiate reductions
safely and intelligently with our adversaries, if we cannot articulate the
requirements of our security.

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-- We owe to the Alliance a credible doctrine, an agreed strategy, and modern forces sufficient to support them.

-- We owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the minimum possible level, equitably shared, that clearly enhances not only Atlantic security but international stability.

-- On this basis, the President can maintain the necessary U.S. forces in Europe, not as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligent structure of Western defense.

In defining our defense requirements we must take into account the possibility that we can enhance our security through some measure of arms control. This year we will begin negotiating on a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. A rational strategy is a prerequisite for developing an Allied negotiating position. No formula for reductions is defensible -- whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale -- if it undermines the security that underpins detente.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for mutual force reductions. This will be our contribution to a dialogue on security. The President does not view these negotiations as a device to withdraw a maximum number of U.S. forces. It we can agree in the Alliance on how to maintain our security at reduced force levels, these negotiations will enhance security in Europe.

This is the purpose of the negotiations -- and indeed the purpose of the Alliance.