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## Introduction

By Henry A. Kissinger

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in full swing. But this week, the campaign that has mesmerized America for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the spinners on talk shows—with their combination of cagerness to please and congenital insecurity—will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

What will remain are the challenges that gave rise to this battle and the responsibility of dealing with them.

And these challenges are formidable. No president has faced an agenda of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to conduct a war with neither front lines nor geographic definition and, at the same time, to rebuild fundamental principles of world order to replace the traditional ones which went up in the smoke of the World Trade Center.

The newly elected president's task is perhaps most analogous to that inherited by President Truman at the end of the Second World War. In 1945, a vacuum had been left a vacuum in Central Europe and the Soviet Union had emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. Today's principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington. In the 1940s, the solution to the crisis was straightforward, albeit difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Eu-

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rope and an economic program to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of shortages that threatened domestic stability.

The contemporary security challenge arises from two unprecedented sources: terror caused by acts until recently considered a matter from internal police forces rather than international policy; and scientific advances and proliferation that allow the survival of countries to be threatened by developments entirely within another state's territory. Truman could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the Atlantic alliance emerged full-fledged from the Second World War. The newly elected president will have to bring about an effort to define and then maintain

--------- End of column---------

an international system that reflects the new circumstances.

I supported President Bush during the campaign and hope for his success. But whatever the results, the United States cannot tackle this agenda except in the context of a commitment by all sides to healing partisan wounds. All those concerned with the future of the country must find ways to cooperate so that the world will again see Americans working toward a common destiny. It is to such an effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

No issue has caused more controversy than the concept of preemption, too often presented as if it were the personal invention of President Bush. In fact, it is inherent in the structure of the new international order, regardless of who serves as president. The international system of the twentieth century was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Seeking to avoid a rep-

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etition of the Thirty Years' War, during which nearly 30 percent of the population of Central Europe was killed in a conflict nominally over religious belief, the rulers based the new system on the principle of sovereignty and noninterference across state borders. Hence threats to the international order were defined as movements of military units across established frontiers. Because weapons were relatively small and technology moved sufficiently slowly, national security could be protected by awaiting the actual aggression.

September 11 marked the end of that op-
tion. Threats, it taught, did not require
states; they could be organized by private
groups operating from the territory of sov-
ereign states for goals transcending the
purposes of the host countries. Cold War
strategies ceased to apply, since deterrence
cannot work against an adversary with no
territory to defend; and diplomacy does not
work when the adversary rejects any limita-
tion of objective and seeks the overthrow of
societies.

In the Westphalian system, the balance
of power could generally be upset only by
conquest. In the world of privatized terror
and proliferating weapons of mass destruc-
tion, aggression can no longer be dealt with
after the event. Preemption is therefore in-
herent in the technology and ideologies of
the new international system.

Inevitably the concept of preemption
leads to a clash between new realities and

--------- **End of column**---------

traditional notions of order. Countries
used to old patterns find it difficult to ac-
cept the new necessities, and all nations
will seek some rules of conduct that do not
leave decisions on preemption to the uni-

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lateral, unconstrained determination of a
single state. When implemented by a pow-
er with the overwhelming military prepon-
derance of the United States, the doctrine
of preemption prompts claims of hegemo-
ny by some on the American side and in-
creasing resistance by others, particularly
members of traditional alliances.

No greater challenge awaits the new
president than to make a distinction be-
tween power and the claims made on its be-
half. No nation, no matter how powerful,
can organize the international system; over
an historical period it is beyond the psycho-
logical and political capacity of even the
most dominant state. It is not a task the
United States should undertake without the
cooperation of others. The goal of Ameri-
can foreign policy must be to turn domi-
nant power into shared responsibility—to
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar
Coral Bell has written, as if the internation-
al order were composed of many centers of
power, even while we are aware of our
strategic preeminence. It implies the need
for a style of consultation less focused on
imposing immediate policy prescriptions
than on achieving a common definition of
long-range purposes.

It is not in America's interest to encour-
age every state to define preemption in
purely national terms. The newly elected
president could contribute greatly to a new
global order by indicating a willingness to
discuss international principles of preemp-
tion—even while reserving the right of to
defend its national security alone as a last
resort.

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**IRAQ.** No issue has been more frequently raised in the campaign than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported that objective, but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task at hand. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is the radical, fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, which aims to overthrow both moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad—because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism—the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

Today the U.S. acts as the trustee of global stability, while domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many countries. But such a one-sided arrangement cannot continue much longer. Other nations should find it in their interest to participate at least in the tasks of political and economic reconstruction. There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the restoration of security in Iraq, especially in areas that have become terrorist

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sanctuaries, and the holding of elections.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching the security effort in too mechanical a manner. In Vietnam, it took far longer to make units ready for combat than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training manual. The effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only on their military training but on the degree to which the emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenary bands that will be least reliable when most needed.

The first national elections are only the first and perhaps least complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democrat

racy in the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed pluralism of religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on competition and the market. None of these conditions exists in the Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has come about only in Turkey and there paradoxically by the imposition of democratic forms by an autocratic leader. This is not to say that individually Muslims in the Middle East are incapable of operating democratic institutions, only that the emergence of such institutions and of the arrangements which hold them together will take time and faces great cultural and traditional obstacles. It

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cannot be engineered as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty.

It is particularly important to understand the obstacles to democracy in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West, democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no institutional impediment to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral defeat was considered a temporary setback that could be reversed. But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority status has often meant permanent discrimination and the constant fear of political extinction.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent each. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality. Thus in Iraq, elections, if confined to majority rule, imply a radical upheaval in the relative power and status of the three communities. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy. The Shiites tolerate the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve the goal of reversing the historic

--------- End of column ---------

patter of Sunni rule and as a first step to replacing it with Shiite dominance. It remains to be seen to what extent they will continue to support our role as the transfer of power progresses.

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The January elections in Iraq, therefore, must be regarded as the beginning of an extended contest among the various groups. It will carry the constant risk of civil war, or of a national struggle against the U.S., or both. All factions maintain militias for such eventualities. It will thus be necessary to supplement the national electoral process with a significant element of federalism and to establish clear-cut constitutional protections for those who might find themselves in the minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government in local affairs would give the various factions a democratic identity. Federalist structures and the assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience, and due process of law are constitutionally beyond the reach of any majority might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various groups and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

In this potential witches' cauldron it is the interest neither of America nor Iraq that the United States be the sole interlocutor with *for* the emerging Iraqi government regarding its political evolution. Some degree of internationalization is the only realistic path toward political stability. The survival of the political process depends in the first instance on security - for which the United States retains a major responsibility - but ultimately on its international acceptance. An international contact group - under UN auspices - to advise on Iraq's political evolution after the January elections is therefore desirable. Logical members would be countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq - countries such as India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, in addition to the

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## THE LONG-RANGE CHALLENGE.

For all their importance, the regional crises—Iraq, North Korea—are dwarfed by the fundamental transfer of power within the international system. Historians agree that the emergence of a unified Germany over a century ago unbalanced the European system by introducing a state stronger than each of its neighbors. Disraeli called the event of greater significance than the French Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging structure would either imply German hegemony or else that balance could be restored only by an increasingly rigid alliance system depriving diplomacy of maneuvering room.

In our age, the rise of China as a potential superpower is of even greater historical significance, marking as it does a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development: establishing a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe while meeting the needs of an interior population of perhaps 900 million, some of it subsisting at a level non significantly better than the least developed nations.

The impact of China and, a little later on, of India on the international system will be deeper, wider and more rapid than the diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure, unlike Germany, China is unlikely to seek to assert itself using military power. For one thing, China's leaders are (or at least have been) more careful, more deliberate, more prone to accumulate

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advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Today heads of every major country— and especially the prudent leaders of China—have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it only to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest.

But the long-term relationship with China should not be driven by expectations of a strategic showdown. China will not conduct as imprudent a policy as the Soviet

----- End of column -----

Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United States to a contest of survival. But it will seek the diplomatic and political role to which its growth entitles it.

An interesting recent article described the difference in the diplomatic style of China and the United States as the difference in the major intellectual games, between the West's chess and Chinese go. Chess has only two outcomes: draw and checkmate. The objective of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the center of the board. The aim of go is relative advantage; the game is played all over the board, and the purpose is to increase one's options and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than strategic progress.

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades from now. But leaders in both Beijing and Washington have a

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responsibility to help shape the judgments of emerging generations. In China, the priority is to keep the nationalism that has replaced Communism from taking a confrontational turn. In America, it is to transcend the temptation to view history through the prism of the most recent experience rather than of the long-range view.

China and the United States require a strategic dialogic seeking a common definition of long-range purposes—to make them compatible where possible, and to reduce the dangers of confrontation when that effort fails. They need to keep the Taiwan issue from undermining the relationship while remembering the importance of solving it by peaceful means. In Sino-American relations, the future of Korea will play an increasingly prominent role. It is not simply a nonproliferation issue but a challenge for a security system for all of Northeast Asia.

China's economic renaissance, the rapid growth in India and the globalization in every corner of the world, beneficent as these conditions may be for individuals, are creating massive issues of policy that can be postponed only at peril to the world economy. The equitable management of access to energy and raw materials is beyond the capacity of the international system as presently constituted, involving as it does the risk of a modern version of the rivalries of the colonial era and a commodity pricing crisis that could drive the world into gener-

-------- End of column --------

al recession.

Nor can it be safely assumed that America's current account deficit with the rest of the world (now tending toward $700 billion every year), or the accumulation of

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America's international debt (now some-
thing like two and half trillion dollars) can
be sustained indefinitely. These imbal-
ances, together with the issues of currency
misalignment and trade policy, must be ad-
dressed with great seriousness by the new
administration—not in isolation, but in
concert with our trading and financial part-
ners who are as directly affected.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic re-
lations. The political campaign has cast At-
lantic disagreements in terms of American
short-term tactical errors. This is a mis-
reading of reality. Tact has not always dis-
tinguished every U.S. statement. But the
problem goes deeper than personalities.

The impasse is partly due to the fact
that the generation that formed the Atlantic
relationship is passing from the scene. In
the United States, the new leadership
group is preoccupied with the challenge of
radical Islam; our European allies either do
not share America's assessment of that
threat or, to the extent that they do, believe
themselves capable of dealing with it out-
side the Atlantic framework. In the United
States, the political center of gravity has
shifted to parts of the country whose repre-
sentatives have fewer personal connections
with Europe and less experience with its in-
ternal challenges than their predecessors
who created the postwar structure.

Across the Atlantic, leaders have been
concentrating on transferring national sov-
erignty to new European institutions. The
host of technicalities and legal issues this
involves is a subject both arcane and elusive
for most Americans, including our leaders.
More fundamentally, the United States
conducts its policies as the sovereign states
of Europe did in the nineteenth and first
half of the twentieth centuries. The Euro-

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pean nations having invented the concept of the nation-state are now in the process of seeking to abandon their sovereignty to a European Union not yet possessing the traditional attributes of the state. They find themselves in a halfway house between their history and a future still in the process of evolving.

All this has generated a witches' brew of mutual misunderstandings. In Europe the

--------- End of page---------

media rarely emphasize common transatlantic ties; they cite racial tension, the death penalty, differences over the environment and mistreatment of prisoners as if these aberrations reflected the total meaning of America. Shifting their emphasis to the UN Security Council, Europeans feel no special obligation to support U.S. policy, on occasion actively opposing it.

The real issue then becomes to what extent the Atlantic relationship is still special—that is, what will the allies do for the relationship beyond the international consensus reflected at the UN? Much of European debate implies that the answer is “very little.” To subject common military action to prior approval of the Security Council spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character. The United States and Europe should be prepared to do things for each other in the sphere beyond the immediate concepts of national interest and without universal consensus.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic is imperative. The debate between unilateralism and multilateralism must be transcended with

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this perspective in mind. Unilateralism for its own sake is self-defeating. But so is abstract multilateralism. The former absorbs purpose into a sense of special national mission; the latter waters down purpose in a quest for a formal consensus. The question for Europe is whether it views Atlantic relations as a partnership or as part of an international system of multipolarity very similar to pre-World War I Europe, in which major power centers engage in shifting coalitions to maximize their advantage from case to case. That system broke down in the early twentieth century; its modern version is not likely to be more successful.

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. The choices ahead were perhaps best summed up by the philosopher Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual Peace", he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It would come about either by human foresight or by a series of escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice. Which it will be is the ultimate question

that the newly elected President will have to face.

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CJ

HENRY A. KISSINGER

VIA FACSIMILE
(212/445-5146)

October 19, 2004

Dear Mark:

This is very rough, and I know it needs a lot of
work. Please work out with my office how to get
it to me while I am traveling.

33 pages follow

Mr. Mark Whitaker
Editor
NEWSWEEK
251 West 57th Street
16th Floor
New York, NY 10019

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
FACSIMILE (212) 759-0042

4462 WORDS

10/19/04 DRAFT

General comment: this is looking good. I have only minor suggestions, as noted below. Stape

ARTICLE

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in
full swing. But in a few days, what has mesmerized America for three
months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the spinners on
talk shows combining eagerness to please with congenital insecurity,
will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

What will remain are the challenges that generated the frenzy
over who will have the privilege of dealing with them.

And these are formidable. No president has faced [an agenda]
of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to conduct a
war without front lines and geographic definition and, at the same

Stape's edits

10/21 Sent marked
pages only to
HAK in Frankfurt
via fax.

4

I supported President [George W.] Bush during the campaign and hope for his success. But whatever the results, the US cannot fulfill this agenda except in the context of a commitment by all sides to healing the partisan wounds. All those concerned with the future of the country must find ways to cooperate *in giving the world the chance to* see America rediscovering a common destiny. It is to this effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

Comment:

Deleted: in [allowing]

Deleted: giving a chance to

No issue has caused more controversy than the concept of preemption, too often presented as if it were the personal invention of President Bush. In fact, it is inherent in the structure of the new international order, regardless of who *serves* as president. The international system of the twentieth century was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Seeking to avoid a repetition of the Thirty Years' War during which [nearly] 30 percent of the population of

Deleted: served

6

rejects any limitation of objective and seeks the overthrow of the
societies [it] terrorize[s].

In the Westphalian system, the balance of power could generally
be upset primarily *by* conquest. In the world of privatized terror and
proliferating weapons of mass destruction, the balance can be upset
and survival threatened by developments within the borders of a
sovereign state. Aggression can no longer be dealt with after the
event. Preemption is therefore inherent in the technology and
ideology of the new international system.

Inevitably the concept of preemption leads to a clash between
traditional concepts of order and new realities. The nations used to
the traditional pattern find it difficult to accept the new necessities,
and all nations will seek some rules of conduct that do not leave the
decision on preemption to the unilateral, unconstrained determination

14

national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political
dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds
means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy while
the Shiites support it to some degree to reverse the historic pattern of
Sunni rule and replace it with Shiite dominance. The Shiites tolerate
the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve this
goal. It remains to be seen to what extent they continue to do so as
the transfer of power progresses.

Deleted: or simply replaces

The January elections in Iraq, therefore, must be regarded as
the beginning of an extended contest among the various groups with
the constant risk that it will lapse into civil war or a national struggle
against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both. All factions maintain
militias for that purpose. It will thus be necessary to supplement the
national electoral process with a significant element of federalism and

15

to establish clear-cut constitutional protections for those who, in
consequence of a democratic vote, might find themselves in the
minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis
and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government on
local affairs would give the various factions a democratic expression
that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; federalist
structures and the assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience,
and due process of law are constitutionally protected from the
arbitrary actions of any majority might provide some guarantee for the
concerns of the various groups and a safety net if national
reconciliation proves impossible.

In this potential witches' cauldron it is neither in America's
interest nor that of Iraq that the US be the sole interlocutor for the
emerging Iraqi government regarding its political evolution. Some

Deleted: beyond the reach

21

outcome. With respect to North Korea, the insistence on US-North
Korea bilateralism would leave America as the sole enforcer of any
agreement at the borders of China. And it would invite Pyongyang to
use the new agreement yet again for future bouts of blackmail on the
pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of 1994.

The most urgent task for the United States is to clarify together
with other interested parties an answer to the following questions:

(a) How much time is left before the process of proliferation in
North Korea and Iran becomes irreversible?

Deleted: India

(b) If negotiations make progress, what precisely do we insist on, and what concessions or assurances are we prepared to offer in return?

25

China – have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it *only* to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest, as will America.

But the long-term relationship with China should not be driven by expectations of a strategic showdown. In pursuit of that strategy, China will not conduct so imprudent a policy as the Soviet Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United States to a contest of survival. But it will seek the diplomatic and political role to which its growth entitles it.

An interesting recent article described the difference in the diplomatic style of China and the United States as the difference in the major intellectual games, between the West's chess and Chinese *weiqi*, better known by its Japanese name of go. Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The purpose of the game is

4462 WORDS

10/19/04 DRAFT

## ARTICLE

And these are formidable. No president has faced [an agenda] of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to conduct a war without front lines and geographic definition and, at the same time, to rebuild fundamental principles of world order to replace those

The challenge perhaps most analogous to that [facing] the
atonement for the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central
Europe and the Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global
equilibrium. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically
definable. [Today's] principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror
has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, to
Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington.
In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit difficult: to
construct a defensive line in the center of Europe and an economic
program to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of

3

economic shortages which was the greatest threat to domestic
stability.

The contemporary security challenge arises from two
unprecedented sources: terror caused by acts until recently
considered the task of internal police forces rather than international
policy; [and] proliferation [that] grows out of a scientific evolution
enabling countries to pose threats to the survival of other states as a
result of developments entirely within a state's territory. Truman
could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the
Atlantic alliance emerged full-fledged from the Second World War. The
newly elected president will have to bring about an international effort
to define and then maintain an international system that reflects the
new circumstances.

4

I supported President [George W.] Bush during the campaign and hope for his success. But whatever the results, the US cannot fulfill this agenda except in the context of a commitment by all sides to healing the partisan wounds. All those concerned with the future of the country must find ways to cooperate in [allowing] the world [to] see America giving a chance to rediscover a common destiny. It is to this effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

No issue has caused more controversy than the concept of preemption, too often presented as if it were the personal invention of President Bush. In fact, it is inherent in the structure of the new international order, regardless of who served as president. The international system of the twentieth century was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Seeking to avoid a repetition of the Thirty Years' War during which [nearly] 30 percent of the population of

5

Central Europe was killed in a conflict at least formally over religious belief, the rulers based the new system on the principle of sovereignty, which postulated noninterference across state borders. Hence threats to the international order were defined as the movement of military units across established frontiers. Because weapons were relatively small and technology moved sufficiently slowly, national security could be protected after the event, by awaiting the actual aggression.

September 11 marked the end of that option. Threats, it taught, did not require states; they could be organized by private groups operating from the territory of sovereign states for goals transcending the purposes of the host countries. The Cold War strategies ceased to apply [as] deterrence cannot work against an adversary with no territory to defend; diplomacy does not work when the adversary

6

In the Westphalian system, the balance of power could generally
be upset primarily conquest. In the world of privatized terror and
proliferating weapons of mass destruction, the balance can be upset
and survival threatened by developments within the borders of a
sovereign state. Aggression can no longer be dealt with after the
event. Preemption is therefore inherent in the technology and
ideology of the new international system.

7

of a single state. When implemented by a power of the overwhelming
military preponderance as the United States, the doctrine of
preemption merges with claims of hegemony by some on the American
side and increasing resistance to it by others, including members of
the traditional alliance.

No greater challenge awaits the new president than to make a
distinction between power and the claims made on its behalf. No
nation, no matter how powerful, can organize the international
system; over an historical period it is beyond the psychological and
political capacity of even the most powerful state. It is not a task the
United States should undertake without the cooperation of others
except as a last resort. The greatest single challenge for American
foreign policy is to turn dominant power into shared responsibility, to
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if

8

the international order were composed of many centers of power, even
while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need
for a style of consultation less focused on imposing immediate policy
prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of long-range
purposes.

It is not in America's interest to encourage every state to define
preemption in purely national terms. The newly elected president
could contribute greatly to a new international order by indicating a
willingness to discuss international principles of preemption - even
while reserving the right of every sovereign state to defend its national
security alone as a last resort.

9

Iraq

No issue has been more frequently raised in the campaign
[nearing its] end than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing
on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported
that [course], but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task
[at hand]. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism
is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is [the] radical,
fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, aiming to overthrow both
moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in
the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many
societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a
stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in
Baghdad because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary
exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism, the entire

10

The international community therefore has a major stake in the
outcome. The US acts as the trustee of global stability even while
domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many
countries. Such a one-sided arrangement cannot continue indefinitely
or indeed much longer. Other nations will find it in their interest to
participate at least in the tasks of political and economic
reconstruction.

There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the
restoration of security in Iraq, especially in areas that have become
terrorist sanctuaries, and the holding of elections.

11

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching the security effort in too mechanical a spirit. In Vietnam, it took far longer to make units ready for combat than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training manual. The effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only on their military training but above all on the degree to which the emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenaries least reliable when most needed.

The first national elections are only the first and perhaps least complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democracy in the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed pluralism of religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy

12

of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which
broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on
competition and the market. None of these conditions exists in the
Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics
inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has come
about only in Turkey and there paradoxically by the imposition of
democratic forms by an autocratic leader. This is not to say that
individually Muslims in the Middle East are incapable of operating
democratic institutions, only that the emergence of such institutions
and of the arrangements which hold them together will take time and
faces great cultural and traditional obstacles. It cannot be engineered
as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty.

Special understanding is needed of the obstacles to democracy
in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West,

13

democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no
institutional obstacle to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral
defeat is considered a temporary setback capable of being reversed.
But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority
status turns into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of
political extinction.

14

national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political
dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds
means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy while
the Shiites support it to some degree to reverse the historic pattern of
Sunni rule or simply replaces it with Shiite dominance. The Shiites
tolerate the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve
this goal. It remains to be seen to what extent they continue to do so
as the transfer of power progresses.

15

to establish clear-cut constitutional protections for those who, in
consequence of a democratic vote, might find themselves in the
minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis
and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government on
local affairs would give the various factions a democratic expression
that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; federalist
structures and the assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience,
and due process of law are constitutionally beyond the reach of any
majority might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various
groups and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

In this potential witches' cauldron it is neither in America's
interest nor that of Iraq that the US be the sole interlocutor for the
emerging Iraqi government regarding its political evolution. Some
degree of internationalization is the only realistic course toward

16

political stability. The survival of the political process depends in the
first instance on security - for which the United States retains a major
responsibility - but ultimately to a significant extent on its
international acceptance. An international contact group - under UN
auspices - to advise on Iraq's political evolution after the January
elections is therefore desirable. Logical members would be countries
[having] experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the
radicalization of Iraq. Countries [such as] India, Turkey, Russia,
Algeria, together with the United States, Britain, and other nations to
be agreed are logical candidates. This is not an abdication to
consensus. The United States, by virtue of its military presence and
financial institutions, would retain a significant role. In the context of
protecting an agreed political evolution, the issue of military

17

contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised again at a
later stage in a more favorable political environment.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Militant Islam is the most immediate challenge to international
order; nuclear proliferation is the most insidious threat to the survival
of civilization. In a world of multiple nuclear powers, the principles of
deterrence will erode for at least three reasons: it will not always be
clear who is seeking to deter whom; the calculus of deterrence may no
longer be uniform so that the possibilities of miscalculation multiply
exponentially as more states join the nuclear club; nuclear materials
may spread into the possession of non-state principals, creating
threats that transcend historic targets of deterrence theory.

18

Dealing with nuclear proliferation requires a diplomacy that is inherently preemptive diplomacy; it is meaningful only before the process of proliferation of a given country has become irreversible.

This makes it difficult – or at least controversial – to demonstrate the extent and the imminence of the danger. A gap opens up between the diplomacy of nonproliferation which concentrates on technical issues while the underlying challenge is political. For the state undertaking the journey toward proliferation, the motive is never technical. Iran and North Korea, the two most imminent proliferators, seek to enhance their power relative to other countries of the region and to reduce the role of large powers, especially the United States. This is the exact opposite of the general incentives put before them, which are designed to increase their dependence on foreign countries and

19

obliges them to rely on the promises of countries against which the
process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

It is therefore likely that an incentive-based diplomacy will fail
and will raise the question of what pressures should be applied. This
will raise again the issue underlying the Iraq debate: to what extent
the United States can pursue such a policy unilaterally. Economic
sanctions are doomed in the absence of support from the major
industrial countries. With regard to the threat or use of military force,
the attitude of neighboring or close-by countries – China with respect
to North Korea, Russia and India with respect to Iran – becomes
especially crucial.

To achieve a successful nonproliferation policy, the newly elected
president will need to clarify these issues. The controversies about the
appropriate forum detract from the main task, which should be to

20

decide on a precise program to be negotiated. In Europe, the
discussion about the method for dealing with Iran too often is
presented as a means to restrain American bellicosity instead of as an
elaboration of common purposes. And on North Korea, the dispute
concerns whether the United States should negotiate bilaterally with
Pyongyang.

It goes without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be
resolved diplomatically without the direct participation of the
interested parties, including the proliferating country. But in the case
of Iran, care must be taken lest proliferation assume a symbolic
character in an ongoing Atlantic controversy. The United States has
signaled often enough that it is prepared for some dialogue with Iran;
but our allies do no one a favor by tempting dialogue designed to
enhance the prestige of the regime in Teheran rather than an

21

(a) How much time is left before the process of proliferation in
North Korea and India becomes irreversible?

22

If we cannot answer these questions before we go to the table,
the nonproliferation effort bids fair to become a means to legitimize
and promote proliferation rather than avert it.

If the drift continues, the issue of how we would react in the face
of a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin either in this country or
on friendly territory will come before us. There is not much time left
to avert this danger if we do not want to face a choice not too far
down the road on how to impose, together with like-minded nations, a
nonproliferation regime on transgressors.

The Long-Term Challenge

The regional crises - Iraq, North Korea - for all their importance
are dwarfed by the fundamental transfer of power within the
international system. Historians agree that the emergence of a unified

23

Germany over a century ago unbalanced the European system by
introducing a state stronger than each of its neighbors individually.

Disraeli called the event of greater significance than the French
Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging structure would
either imply German hegemony or else could be restored only by an
increasingly rigid alliance system depriving diplomacy of maneuvering
room.

In our age, the emergence of China as a potential superpower is
of even greater significance marking as it does a shift in the center of
gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is
obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its
cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development with
a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe and with
an interior containing a population of perhaps 900 million, some of

24

whom subsisting at a level non significantly better than the least
developed nations.

The impact of China and, a little later on, of India on the
international system will be deeper, wider and more rapid than the
diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure, unlike
Germany, China is unlikely to seek to vindicate its role by military
power. For one thing, China's leaders are – or at least have been –
more careful, more deliberate, more tending to accumulate
advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after
Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war
between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political
option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done
so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Every
leader of every major country – and especially the prudent leaders of

25

China – have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest, as will America.

Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The purpose of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the center of

26

the board. The purpose of go is relative advantage; the game is
played all over the board, and the purpose is to increase one's options
and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than
strategic progress.

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades
from now. But both nations' leaders have a responsibility to affect the
judgments emerging generations make of the challenges they face. In
China, they need to forestall the nationalism which is replacing
Communism from taking a confrontational turn and, in America, it is to
transcend the tendency toward the immediate and the temptation of
viewing history through the prism of the most recent experience rather
than of the long-range view.

China and the United States require a strategic dialogue seeking
a common definition of long-range purposes to make them compatible

27

where possible and to reduce the dangers of confrontation where that
effort fails. They need to keep the Taiwan issue from undermining the
relationship while remembering the importance of solving it by
peaceful means. In relations between China and the United States,
the future of Korea will play an increasingly prominent role. It is not
simply a nonproliferation issue but a challenge for a security system
for all of Northeast Asia involving the nuclear future of many countries.

China's economic renaissance, the rapid growth in India and the
globalization in every corner of the world, beneficent as these
conditions may be for individuals, are creating massive issues of
policy, issues which can be postponed only at peril to the world
economy. The equitable management of access to energy and raw
materials is beyond the capacity of the international system as
presently constituted, requiring [as] it does a minimum of foresight

28

lest we trigger a modern version of the rivalries over commodities of
the colonial era and a commodity pricing crisis which could drive the
world into general recession.

Nor can it be safely assumed that America's deficit on current
account with the rest of the world - now tending toward $700 billion
every year - or the accumulation of America's international debt - now
something like two and half trillion dollars - can be sustained
indefinitely. These imbalances, together with the issues of currency
misalignment and trade policy, must be addressed with great
seriousness by the new administration - not in isolation, but of
necessity with our trading and financial partners who are as directly
affected.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic relations. The political
campaign has cast Atlantic disagreements in terms of American short-

29

term tactical errors. This is a misreading of reality. Tact has not
always distinguished every American statement. But the problem goes
deeper than personalities.

Part of the difficulties is caused because the generation that
formed the Atlantic relationship is passing from the scene. In the
United States, the new leadership group [is] preoccupied with the
challenge of radical Islam; our European allies either do not share
America's assessment of that threat or, to the extent that they do,
believe themselves capable of dealing with it outside the Atlantic
framework. In the United States, the political center of gravity has
shifted to parts of the country whose representatives have fewer
personal connections with Europe and less experience with its internal
challenges than their predecessors who created the postwar structure.

30

In Europe, leaders have been concentrating on transferring
national sovereignty to new European institutions. The host of
technicalities and legal issues this involves is a subject both arcane
and elusive for most Americans, including their leaders. More
fundamentally, the United States conducts its policies as the sovereign
states of Europe did in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
centuries. The European nations having invented the concept of the
nation-state are now in the process of seeking to abandon their
sovereignty to a European Union not yet possessing the traditional
attributes of the state. They find themselves in a halfway house
between their history and a future still in the process of evolving.

All this has generated a witches' brew of mutual
misunderstandings. In Europe the media rarely emphasize common
transatlantic ties; they use the race problem, the death penalty,

31

differences over the environment, mistreatment of prisoners, as if
aberrations reflected the total meaning of America. Shifting their
emphasis to the UN Security Council, European [foreign policy] feels
no special obligation to support the US view, on occasion actively
opposing it.

The real issue then becomes to what extent the Atlantic
relationship is still special – that is, what will the allies do for the
relationship beyond the international consensus reflected at the UN?
Much of European debate implies that the answer is "very little." To
confine common military action to prior approval of the Security
Council spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a
world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The
relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character –
that is, the United States and Europe should be prepared to do things

32

for each other in the sphere beyond the immediate concepts of interest
and short of an attainable universal consensus.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the
Atlantic is imperative. The debate between unilateralism and
multilateralism must be overcome with this perspective in mind.
Unilateralism for its own sake is self-defeating. But so is abstract
multilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in emphasis on a special
national mission; the latter waters down purpose in a quest for a
formal consensus. The challenge for Europe is whether it views
Atlantic relations as a partnership or as part of an international system
of multipolarity very similar to pre-World War I Europe, in which major
power centers engage in shifting coalitions to maximize their
advantage from case to case. That system broke down in the early

33

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher
Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual
Peace", he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It
would come about either by human foresight or by a series of
escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice.

That is the ultimate challenge the newly elected President will
have to face.

Pink = material used before [illegible]

4482 WORDS

10/19/04

With HAK changes

## ARTICLE

2

The challenge perhaps most analogous to that [facing] the
atonement for the war dead is that inherited by President Truman when
the end of the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central
Europe and the Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global
equilibrium. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically
definable. [Today's] principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror
has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, to
Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington.
In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit difficult: to
construct a defensive line in the center of Europe and an economic
program to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of

3

4

5

6

7

No greater challenge awaits the new president than to make a
distinction between power and the claims made on its behalf. No
nation, no matter how powerful, can organize the international
system; over an historical period it is beyond the psychological and
political capacity of even the most powerful state. It is not a task the
United States should undertake without the cooperation of others
except as a last resort. The greatest single challenge for American
foreign policy is to turn dominant power into shared responsibility,
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as i

Repeated on p. 32

7

No greater challenge awaits the new president than to make a
distinction between power and the claims made on its behalf. No
nation, no matter how powerful, can organize the international
system; over an historical period it is beyond the psychological and
political capacity of even the most powerful state. It is not a task the
United States should undertake without the cooperation of others
except as a last resort. The greatest single challenge for American
foreign policy is to turn dominant power into shared responsibility,
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as

7

8

The debate between unilateralism and multilateralism must be overcome with this perspective in mind. Unilateralism for its own sake is self-defeating. But so is abstract multilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in emphasis on a special national mission; the latter waters down purpose in a quest for a formal consensus. It is not in America's interest to encourage every state to define preemption in purely national terms. The newly elected president could contribute greatly to a new international order by indicating a willingness to discuss international principles of preemption – even while reserving

9

as a last resort.

## Iraq

10

stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in
Baghdad because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary
exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism, the entire
Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or
struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic
minorities, such as India, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism
will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

11

12

[Y]

13

[Y]

faces great cultural and traditional obstacles. It cannot be engineered
as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty.

Special understanding is needed of the obstacles to democracy
in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West,
democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no
institutional obstacle to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral
defeat is considered a temporary setback capable of being reversed.
But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority
status turns into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of
political extinction.

14

dominated by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with
extraordinary brutality. Thus in Iraq, elections, if confined to majority
rule, imply a radical upheaval in the relative power and status of the
three communities. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a
national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political
dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds
means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy while
the Shiites support it to some degree to reverse the historic pattern of
Sunni rule or simply replaces it with Shiite dominance. The Shiites
tolerate the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve
this goal. It remains to be seen to what extent they continue to do so
as the transfer of power progresses.

The January elections in Iraq, therefore, must be regarded as
the beginning of an extended contest among the various groups with

15

LYJ

the constant risk that it will lapse into civil war or a national struggle
against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both. All factions maintain
militias for that purpose. It will thus be necessary to supplement the
national electoral process with a significant element of federalism and
to establish clear-cut constitutional protections for those who, in
consequence of a democratic vote, might find themselves in the
minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis
and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government on
local affairs would give the various factions a democratic expression
that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; federalist
structures and the assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience,
and due process of law are constitutionally beyond the reach of any
majority might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various
groups and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

16

In this potential witches' cauldron it is neither in America's interest nor that of Iraq that the US be the sole interlocutor for the emerging Iraqi government regarding its political evolution. Some degree of internationalization is the only realistic course toward political stability. The survival of the political process depends in the first instance on security - for which the United States retains a major responsibility - but ultimately to a significant extent on its international acceptance. An international contact group - under UN auspices - to advise on Iraq's political evolution after the January elections is therefore desirable. Logical members would be countries [having] experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq. Countries [such as] India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, together with the United States, Britain, and other nations to be agreed are logical candidates. This is not an abdication to

17

consensus. The United States, by virtue of its military presence and
financial institutions, would retain a significant role. In the context of
protecting an agreed political evolution, the issue of military
contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised again at a
later stage in a more favorable political environment.

18

19

C4J

are designed to increase their dependence on foreign countries and obliges them to rely on the promises of countries against which the process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

20

appropriate forum detract from the main task, which should be to decide on a precise program to be negotiated. In Europe, the discussion about the method for dealing with Iran too often is presented as a means to restrain American bellicosity instead of as an elaboration of common purposes. And on North Korea, the dispute concerns whether the United States should negotiate bilaterally with Pyongyang.

21

enhance the prestige of the regime in Teheran rather than an
outcome. With respect to North Korea, the insistence on US-North
Korea bilateralism would leave America as the sole enforcer of any
agreement at the borders of China. And it would invite Pyongyang to
use the new agreement yet again for future bouts of blackmail on the
pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of 1994.

22

The Long-Term Challenge

23

24

25

An interesting recent article described the difference in the diplomatic style of China and the United States as the difference in the major intellectual games, between the West's chess and Chinese go. Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The purpose of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the center of

26

[Y]

27

28

Nor can it be safely assumed that America's deficit on current
account with the rest of the world - now tending toward $700 billion
every year - or the accumulation of America's international debt - now
something like two and half trillion dollars - can be sustained
indefinitely. These imbalances, together with the issues of currency
misalignment and trade policy, must be addressed immediately and
with great seriousness by the new administration - and addressed not
in isolation, but of necessity with our trading and financial partners
who are as directly affected.

29

30

31

32

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the
Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy
is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility. The
challenge for Europe is whether it views Atlantic relations as a
partnership or as part of an international system of multipolarity very
similar to pre-World War I Europe, in which major power centers
engage in shifting coalitions to maximize their advantage from case to
case. That system broke down in the early twentieth century; its
modern version is not likely to be more successful.

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher

Repeated on p. 7

32

32

33

4482 WORDS

10/19/04

## ARTICLE

2

The challenge perhaps most analogous to that [facing] the
atonal elected] president is that inherited by President Truman when
the end of the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central
Europe and the Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global
equilibrium. But the Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically
definable. [Today's] principal threats are abstract and mobile. Terror
has no fixed address; it has attacked from Bali to Singapore, to
Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis, New York and Washington.
In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit difficult: to
construct a defensive line in the center of Europe and an economic
program to close the gap between public expectation and the reality of

3

4

5

6

7

8