November 12, 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to express my deepest appreciation to you, the members of the Advisory Board, and anyone else connected with the Kissinger Scholarship Committee. It is a great privilege to be among the first recipients of the Kissinger Award. I hope I will be able to maintain the standards necessary for the renewal of the award.

I would also like to apologize for the delay in writing. Settling into college life has been quite demanding and I've consumed much time. Again, thank you very much for the award.

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February 19, 1976

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was in the process of dictating a letter to you when I received your kind and thoughtful letter of February 12 concerning the time you spent with us here in San Francisco and your appearance before the Commonwealth Club luncheon meeting at the Fairmont Hotel.

On behalf of the Commonwealth Club, I again thank you for taking the time that you did with us. You were at all times most interesting, but you also exuded a friendly, confident warmth that was comforting for all of us who were with you and heard you. I know that you have developed many critics, but I believe that the great majority of Americans support and appreciate you and the noble services you are rendering for your country. I am delighted that you are healthy and vigorous and that your skin is not as sensitive as the newly returned professor at Harvard.

I thought you would be interested in how your speech was summarized in "The Commonwealth" which is the regular weekly bulletin that goes to all of the more than 13,000 members of the Commonwealth Club, and I enclose a few copies for your information and use. I am also burdening you with a few copies of the bulletin dated January 12, 1976, which contains an address by me and a listing of those who spoke before the Commonwealth Club in 1975. My purpose in sending you this is that my remarks are aimed at describing the purposes and scope of the Commonwealth Club.

52

THE COMMONWEALTH

"THE U.S. TODAY IS CONFRONTED BY
UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES," Says Kissinger

TUESDAY FLASHES — FEB. 3rd

From Address by
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State

"The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a central feature of American policy for three decades. What is new today is the culmination of thirty years of postwar growth of Soviet industrial, technological and military power. No American policy caused this; no American policy could have prevented it. But American policy can keep this power from being used to expand Soviet influence to our detriment; we have the capacity to enable allies and friends to live with a sense of security.

## Soviet Expansion Checked

We must do so, however, in unprecedented conditions. In previous periods, rivalry between major powers has almost invariably led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable.

In the period after World War II, our policies sought to build alliances and positions of military strength from which we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union.

These policies served us and our allies well. Soviet expansion was checked.

Yet the hope that these policies would produce permanent stability, positive

evolution of the Soviet system, and greater normality, was only partially realized.

In strategic military terms the USSR has achieved a broad equality with the United States, as was inevitable for a large nation whose rulers were prepared to impose great sacrifices on their people and to give military strength the absolute top priority in allocation of resources.

For the first time in history the Soviet Union can threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian land mass—including the U.S. Soviet diplomacy has thrust into the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real power.

## Central Security Problem

Coping with the implications of this emerging superpower has been our central security problem. This condition will not go away, and it will perhaps never be conclusively 'solved.' It will have to be faced by every Administration for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the consequences.

In the nuclear era, when casualties in a general nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter of days, the use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It is our responsibility to contain Soviet power without global war, to avoid abdication as well as confrontation.

We must strive for an equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond it to

*(Continued on next page)*

## The Commonwealth

Published every Monday by the
Commonwealth Club of California

681 Market Street
San Francisco, California 94105
(415) 362-4903

Editor: Durward S. Riggs

Managing Editor: Michael J. Brassington

Associate Editor: Jane M. Rumolo

Second class postage paid at San Francisco,
California. Subscription rate $6.00 per year included in annual membership dues.

### OFFICERS OF THE CLUB

John B. Bates President

James W. Halley Vice President

David J. McDaniel Chmn., Exec. Comm.

Richard H. Peterson Secretary

Ivy Lee, Jr. Treasurer

Durward S. Riggs Executive Director

Michael J. Brassington Associate Executive Director

Stuart R. Ward Exec. Director Emeritus

### GOVERNORS OF THE CLUB

Dean Daskarolls, Justice Murray Draper,
Bradley B. Garretson, Vernon L. Goodin,
Rear Adm. William H. Groverman, Donald
P. Krotz, E. Kelth Larson, David J. Mc-
Daniel, Bruce T. Mitchell, M. Lester
O'Shea, Dr. Edgar E. Robinson, Justice
Allison M. Rouse, Renee Rubin, Howard
G. Vesper.

THE COMMONWEALTH

53

"We Must Manage Fundamental Clash of Ideologies
And Harness the Rivalry of Nuclear Superpowers"

KISSINGER—(Continued from preceding page)
promote the habits of mutual restraint,
coexistence and ultimately, cooperation.
We must stabilize a new international
order in a vastly dangerous environment.

This is what is meant by the process
called 'detente.'

The policies pursued by this Adminis-
tration have been designed to prevent
Soviet expansion, but also to build a pat-
tern of relations in which the Soviet
Union will always confront penalties for
aggression, and also acquire growing in-
centives for restraint. These goals are well
within our capacities. Soviet power is
evolving with considerable unevenness.

Engine of World Economy

It is the great industrial democracies,
not the Soviet Union, that are the engine
of the world economy and the most prom-
ising partners for the poorer nations.

Our essential task is to recognize the
need for a dual policy that simultaneously
and with equal vigor resists expansionist
drives and seeks to shape a more construc-
tive relationship.

At the same time, we have an historic
obligation to mankind to engage the Soviet
Union in settlements of concrete problems
and to push back the shadow of nuclear
catastrophe. At the very least, we owe it
to our people to demonstrate that its gov-
ernment has missed no opportunity to
achieve constructive solutions and that
crises which occur were unavoidable.

This is why the U.S. has set forth prin-
ciples of responsible relations in the nu-
clear age: respect for the interests of all,
restraint in the uses of power, and ab-
stention from efforts to exploit instability
or local conflicts for unilateral advantage.

Confrontation and Crisis

It has been our belief that, with pa-
tience, a pattern of restraints and a net-
work of vested interests can develop
which will give coexistence a more hope-
ful dimension and make both sides con-
scious of what they would stand to lose
by reverting to the politics of pressure,
confrontation and crisis.

Throughout the course of 1970 and
1971, we were involved in a series of
crises with the Soviet Union and were
often accused of provocation or bellicos-

ity in the process.

Thus, only a few short years ago, the
pressures in this country and from our
allies were overwhelmingly to move rapid-
ly toward better relations with Moscow.
We resisted these pressures then, just as
we now refuse to let ourselves be stam-
peded in the opposite direction. The coun-
try needs a balanced, long-term policy,
combining firmness and conciliation,
strong defense and arms control, political
principles and economic incentives.

Ironic National Debate

It is therefore ironic that our national
debate seems now in many respects to
have come full circle. The conditions in
which detente originated are largely for-
gotten. Those who pressed for concessions
and unilateral restraint towards Moscow
now accuse the government of being too
conciliatory. Those who complain about
our failure to respond with sufficient vigor
to Soviet moves are often the very ones
who incessantly seek to remove this coun-
try's leverage for influence or action—
through restrictions on trade and credit,
through weakening our intelligence capa-
bilities, through preventing aid to friends
who seek to resist Soviet aggression.

So let us understand the scope and lim-
its of a realistic policy:

Scope and Limits

- We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

- We cannot prevent a build-up of Soviet forces but we have the capacity, together with our allies, to maintain an equilibrium. We cannot neglect this task and then blame others if the military balance shifts against us.

- We have the diplomatic, economic and military capacity to resist expansionism, but we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confrontation while depriving ourselves of the means to confront.

- We must accept that sovereign states, especially of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other and must proceed by compromise.

- We must live with the reality of the nuclear threat but we have it in our

(Continued on next page)

54

THE COMMONWEALTH

# "For the First Time — Soviet Union Can Threaten Places Beyond Eurasian Land Mass" — Kissinger

power to build a new relationship that transcends the nuclear peril.

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful and overwhelming while American policy is bumbling, uncertain and weak. We have a design and the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a united people.

## All Within Reach

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods—the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared from the effects of a general nuclear exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable.

## Face a Paradox

We thus face a paradox: at current and foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides determined the outcome. Today these arsenals increasingly find their purpose primarily in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent. Under virtually no foreseeable circumstance could the United States—or the Soviet Union—avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange. Yet the race goes on.

The fixation on potential strategic arms inbalances that is inherent in an unstrained arms race diverts resources into strategically unproductive areas—especially away from forces for local defense, where shortfalls and imbalances could be turned rapidly to our disadvantage.

If no restraint is developed, the com-

petition in strategic arms can have profound consequences for the future of international relations, and indeed of civilization.

The U.S. has sought and achieved, since 1963, a series of arms control agreements which build some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok accord leads to a new agreement, an even more important advance will have been made.

## SALT is a Surrender

Yet, at this critical juncture, the American people are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender of American interests. There are assertions that the U.S. is falling behind in the strategic competition and that SALT has contributed to it. There are unsupportable charges that the Soviets have systematically violated the SALT agreements.

What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960s set the level of our strategic forces for the 1970s. We then had the choice between continuing the deployment of large, heavy-throwweight missiles like the Titan or Atlas, or undertaking development and deployment of large numbers of smaller, more flexible ICBMs, or combinations of both types. The Administration then in office chose to rely on an arsenal of 1000 small, sophisticated and highly accurate ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats, along with heavy bombers; we deployed them rapidly, and then stopped our buildup of launchers unilaterally when the programs were complete.

## Soviet Missiles

The Soviets made the opposite decision; they chose larger, heavier missiles; they continued to build up their forces through the 1960s and 1970s; they passed our numerical levels by 1969-1970, and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year until stopped by the first SALT agreement.

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity and sophistication, and

(Continued on next page)

THE COMMONWEALTH

55

# "U.S. Responsibility Is to Contain Soviet Power Without Global War or Unnecessary Confrontation"

KISSINGER—(Continued from preceding page)
we possess larger numbers of warheads.

In 1972 when the SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was still building at the rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a year, while we were building none, as a result of our own repeatedly reaffirmed unilateral decisions.

The Interim SALT Agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers of launchers on both sides for five years—thereby limiting the momentum of Soviet programs without affecting any of ours. It stopped the Soviet build-up of heavy missile launchers. It forced the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on missile-carrying submarines. The agreed-upon silo limitations permitted us to increase the throwweight of our own missiles, if we decided on this avenue of improving our strategic forces.

## U.S. Intention

The first SALT agreements were in the American national interest.

In the five-year respite gained by the 1972 Interim Agreement, it was our intention to negotiate a long-term pact on offensive weapons that would firmly fix both sides at an equal level once our new programs became operational. This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2400 strategic weapons covering strategic systems and heavy bombers—but not counting any of our forward-based aircraft in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil.

The ceiling of 2400 is lower than the level the Soviet Union already has reached; it would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons while the planned levels and composition of our forces would not need to be reduced or changed.

## Vladivostok

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem. If we succeed in turning the Vladivostok accord into a 10-year agreement, we will have crossed the threshold between total, unrestrained competition and the difficult but promising beginning of long-term strategic

equilibrium at lower levels of forces.

The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase of the negotiations starting in 1977.

No charge is more irresponsible and potentially dangerous than the allegation that the U.S. has knowingly tolerated violations of the first SALT agreements.

What are the facts? A Standing Consultative Commission was created by the 1972 agreements precisely to consider disputes or ambiguities in implementation. Every questionable activity that has arisen has been systematically analyzed by this Government and considered by the President and his advisors. Whenever any question remained, it was then promptly raised with the Soviets.

## Flurry of Allegations

Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations, no recommendations are made of what countermeasures we should take, or how to assess the significance of any given alleged violation. In what way do the alleged violations affect the strategic equation? In what manner, if any, have we been foreclosed from protecting ourselves? Would those who inaccurately allege violations simply throw over all the agreements regardless of the benefits they provide to the United States?

What purpose is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to believe—totally incorrectly—that the U.S. is blind to violations, or that its government deliberately deceives its people?

## No Tolerance

This Administration will not tolerate violations. It will continue to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously. It will pursue energetically all ambiguities or signs of non-compliance. But it will not be driven by demagoguery to make false or hasty judgments. No department or agency charged with responsibility for this problem holds the view that any violations have occurred.

As we assess our negotiations we must face squarely one question: what is the alternative to the agreement we have and seek? If the process of negotiation falters, we must consider what new or additional strategic programs we would undertake,

(Continued on next page)

56

THE COMMONWEALTH

## Angola Represents a "First" for U.S. and U.S.S.R.

KISSINGER—(Continued from preceding page) their likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose. An accelerated strategic buildup over the next five years could cost as much as an additional 20 billion dollars. Failing a satisfactory agreement, this will surely be the path we must travel.

It would be a tragically missed opportunity. For, in the process of such a buildup, and the atmosphere it would engender, it would be difficult to return to serious negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to increase; a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future negotiations would eventually have to begin. And in the end, neither side will have gained a strategic advantage. At the least they will have wasted resources. At worst, they will have increased the risks of nuclear war.

### Angola Conflict

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder these alternatives as well. Their sense of responsibility must equal ours if there is to be an equitable and durable agreement based on strict reciprocity.

As the United States strives to shape a more hopeful world, it can never forget that global stability and security rest upon an equilibrium between the great powers.

This is why the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa with nearly 200 million dollars of military equipment, its advisors, and its transport of the large expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit.

And it is the first time that Congress has halted national action in mid-crisis.

### Tips the Balance

When one great power tips the balance of forces decisively in a local conflict through its military intervention—and meets no resistance—an ominous precedent is set, of grave consequence even if the intervention occurs in a seemingly remote area.

The U.S. seeks no unilateral goals in

Angola. We have proposed a ceasefire; withdrawal of all outside forces—cessation of foreign military involvement, including the supply of equipment; and negotiations among all three Angolan factions. This approach has the support of half the nations of Africa.

Last summer and fall, to halt a dangerously escalating situation, the United States provided financial support through African friends to those in Angola—the large majority—who sought to resist Soviet and Cuban domination. Using this as leverage, we undertook an active diplomacy to promote an African solution to an African problem. We acted quietly, to avoid provoking a major crisis and raising issues of prestige.

### African Opposition Evident

Our assistance prevented a takeover. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention became more and more evident. On December 9, the President warned Moscow of the consequences of continued meddling and offered to cooperate in encouraging a peaceful outcome that removed foreign influence. The Soviet Union appeared to have second thoughts. It halted its airlift from December 9 until December 24.

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. It was demanded that we explain publicly why our effort was important—and then our effort was cut off. After the Senate vote to block further aid to Angola, Cuba more than doubled its forces and Soviet military aid was resumed on a large scale.

### No Analogy Exists

There is no analogy with Vietnam. The President has pledged that no American troops or advisors would be sent to Angola, and we were prepared to accept legislative restrictions to that effect. What was involved was modest assistance to stabilize the local balance of forces and make possible a rapid political settlement.

It is charged that the Administration acted covertly without public acknowledgment. That is correct, for our purpose was to avoid an escalated confrontation that would make it more difficult for the others to back down, as well as to give the greatest possible scope for an African

*(Continued on next page)*

THE COMMONWEALTH

57

"Moynihan Major Contributor to U.S. Foreign Policy"

KISSINGER—(Continued from preceding page)
solution. Angola was a case where diplomacy without leverage was likely to be impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve needless risks. This is precisely one of those grey areas where unpublicized methods would enable us to influence events short of direct conflict.

### Fully Limited Operations

More than two dozen Senators, 150 Congressmen, over 100 staff members of both Houses, and eight Congressional Committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of Congress, and there was little sign of active opposition to our carefully limited operations.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be eased out by the Africans themselves over a period of time. This may or may not prove true. But such an argument, when carried to its logical conclusion, implies that we can abandon the world to interventionist forces, and hope for the best. And reliance on history is of little solace to those under attack, whose future is being decided now.

Where are we now? The Government has a duty to make clear to the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again. It must reassure adjacent countries that they will not be left exposed to attack or pressure from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold. Congress and the Executive must come together on this proposition—in the national interest and in the interest of world peace.

### Will Not Remain Indifferent

Let no nation believe that Americans will long remain indifferent to the dispatch of expeditionary forces and vast supplies of arms to impose minority governments—especially when that expeditionary force comes from a nation in the Western Hemisphere.

We live in a world without simple answers.

Foreign countries must be able to deal with America as an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. If our divisions paralyze our international efforts, it is America as a whole that will suffer."
(DSR)

### Answers to Written Questions from Floor:

**Q:** How rate Ambassador Moynihan's performance in U.N.? **A:** Like many Harvard professors, Moynihan is sensitive to criticism. He is a close friend and I recommended him for the position. We knew what he would do when he was appointed. He carried out with distinction instructions of President and Secretary of State. His resignation was not a result of policy disagreements. If he didn't return to Harvard he would lose his tenure. He made a major contribution to American foreign policy.

**Q:** Possible Angola issue internal matter—if so, why not let Soviets find out as we did in Vietnam? **A:** There are two big differences: U.S. would not have gotten itself engaged financially in an internal struggle in Angola. We are prepared to work with any government that emerges from African processes. Fighting is mostly done by Cubans, not Africans.

**Q:** Why Cubans involved in Angola? **A:** I think because of revolutionary zeal: they believe they should support revolutions all over. There are Cuban forces all over Africa—and in Southern Yemen.

**Q:** What extent has secrecy abrogation in U.S. adversely affected our diplomatic endeavors? **A:** Every democracy has to strike a balance so they can make meaningful decisions. No one can operate when everything is to become public record. Result is no memorandum will be written and confusion will result. We need to strike balance between necessary secrecy and covering mistakes with secrecy.

**Q:** Your Near-East diplomacy basically matter of taking American money and paying both sides not to fight? **A:** In '73 Middle East war can have most direct consequences. Contributed to unemployment and worst post-war economic situation we have had in many years. Egypt and Jordan only other countries to receive aid. Our policy is not to pay people not to fight but for peaceful coexistence.

**Q:** What mutual concessions would enable Israel and P.L.O. to establish detente? **A:** Until P.L.O. recognizes Israel's existence, we cannot ask Israel to negotiate.

**Q:** Why not use American wheat as instrument of foreign policy in dealing with Soviet Union? **A:** We are told very often we should use American economic power. Inevitably we would interrupt private markets. There was monetary restraint on wheat sales to Soviet Union in July-October during negotiations. The wheat deal introduces some stability to our markets.

**Q:** Continue plan to give Panama Canal away? **A:** Our concern is to avoid situation in which U.S. is drawn into confrontation with Latin American countries where our full military might would be drawn into a guerrilla warfare. Avoid having Panama Canal become rallying ground for all U.S. resentments in Latin America. (MJB)

58

THE COMMONWEALTH

"MECHANICAL REMEDIES WILL NOT ELIMINATE IMMORALITY IN POLITICS" — Reg Murphy

FRIDAY FLASHES — FEB. 6th

From Address by
REG MURPHY
Publisher & Editor of the
"San Francisco Examiner"

"As Americans begin to choose a President, I am absolutely confident of one thing: This will be the cleanest election since Watergate.

Any further claims to the quality of the current campaigns is specious, notwithstanding the reforms which have been put on the lawbooks in the past two years.

There are those who would claim far greater benefits will flow from the campaign reforms enacted with fanfare and toothy smiles by the Congress. We had best await the judgment of history before acceding to those claims.

## Doomed to Failure

We must wait for these reasons:

1. We have adopted mechanical reforms for moral problems.

2. We have imposed particularized itemization on creative needs.

3. We have tried to deal with failing institutions by creating other institutions.

These reforms, in my view, are doomed to failure.

Most of the analysts have said that Watergate was caused by an excess of dollars floating around in the re-election campaign of former President Richard Nixon. I beg to differ. Those burglars, like Frank Sturgis, who went into the Democratic National Committee headquarters did not break and enter because of money. They taped a door open and slipped upstairs to bug Larry O'Brien's telephone because they thought it was vital to win a political campaign. They were convinced by the zealots that what they were doing was patriotic. They all said as much.

## Nixon Allowed Coverup

President Nixon himself allowed the coverup to go on not because of the money his campaign had attracted, but because he thought it was necessary if he had any hope of remaining in office. Nixon's aides carried out the coverup not because they

had spent money in the campaign, but because they thought the secret activities were necessary to maintaining the power of the Presidency.

What we have done is impose financial and legal controls over the campaigns. In fact, that was not the problem. The dirty tricks came from zealots, not from bagmen.

Walter Lippmann, the wisest of all the political commentators, recognized this would someday happen. In his book, *Preface to Politics*, Lippmann said:

## Machined World

'Feckless—that is what our politics is. It is literally eccentric, it has been centered mechanically instead of vitally. We have been seduced by a fictitious analogy. We have hoped for machine regularity, when we needed human initiative and leadership, when life was crying that its inventive abilities should be freed. (Our political thinking) needs the infusion of contemporary insights.'

Alas, instead of contemporary insights we have infused the campaign of 1976 with legal and accounting rules. We have passed a series of laws which encourage citizens to think of mechanical remedies for immorality in politics. It doesn't work.

We have made the financial and legal whzzes, who spend all their time on the technicalities, the leaders of the new politics. That is not what the nation intended, and not what it will tolerate long.

Just how did we get into this machined world?

## Spending Allowed

Any analysis has to begin with the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities and the shooting eyebrows of Senator Sam Ervin. The Senate Committee worked for 20 months on the Watergate investigation. Its recommendations resulted in the Campaign Reform Act of 1974 signed by President Ford. It was called a major effort to end corruption in federal campaign financing.

It provided for public financing of Presidential primaries and national election.

*(Continued on next page)*

THE COMMONWEALTH

59

"NEW CAMPAIGN SPENDING DECISION PERPETUATES INCUMBENTS"—Murphy

MURPHY—(Continued from preceding page)

It allowed candidates about $10 million for the primaries. Another $5 million could go to each of the two major candidates in the general election.

A new, independent Federal Elections Commission was created to administer the Act. The Justice Department was assigned jurisdiction to handle violations.

Individuals were forbidden to contribute more than $1,000 to campaigns. Candidates were told to hold chicken suppers or other fund raising activities in 20 states to qualify for federal tax funds for their campaigns. Families were forbidden to squander their fortunes on the heirs to the fortunes; they were limited to $35,000 in total spending.

## Gov't. Imposing Controls

While the federal government was imposing these controls, states and federal government were moving inexorably toward requiring candidates to disclose their personal finances.

It seemed to a few of us that a question had to be raised here. Was it public interest or prurient interest to demand to know the personal finances of individuals who were running for office.

I knew a candidate who started rather poor, worked his way through college, became a successful southern banker and ran for governor of his state. He was required by both public pressures and the increasing demands of the law to disclose his personal financial condition.

He told me once: 'People look at you in a different way when they find out you are worth $3 million. They don't think you are as human. And a few of them make threats against your family. I don't like it—and I won't run again.'

## Wrong and Unhealthy!

Brutalizing politicians in that way seems illogical to me. God knows there are few enough candidates who are worthy of any consideration whatsoever. To scandalize or strip those who are decent, while allowing the liars and cheats to carry on, seems wrong and unhealthy to me.

If the campaign laws were brutal to the candidates, they also had come to be ruin-

ous to what Walter Lippmann called the 'inventive abilities that need to be freed.'

Example: A United States senator told me last weekend that it costs him $50,000 to hire the professionals, the lawyers and accountants, he must have to start his campaign. He said 'I need them to keep me out of jail while I run a campaign.'

## Supreme Court Response

Within the week the Supreme Court has responded to some of these invasions. It held that it is unconstitutional to tell contributors they may not spend money on a campaign. It recognized that free speech demands the right of individuals to attempt to influence campaigns with their volunteer efforts. It also said that candidates may spend without limit to try to get themselves elected.

Those are major decisions. They hold that political activity is a form of free speech which the Constitution guarantees.

But the Court also left in place the laws which help Ronald Reagan and George Wallace most. They get the little contributions. The Court held that no individual may contribute more than $1,000 to any campaign. What that means is that a would-be candidate like Julian Bond cannot go to a small number of sources and get seed money for a campaign. It means that the incumbents in all offices can use their carefully constructed mailing lists to perpetuate themselves in office.

## Eighty-seven Candidates

I spoke to a United States Senator who said, 'There's no question about it, this is an incumbent's law. Nobody knew it was going to work out that way, but it has.'

Nonetheless, it has become the law which will perpetuate incumbents, and it should be struck down.

As I said at the outset, we have tried to deal with failing institutions by creating other institutions. The political elections were failing, and so we created the Federal Elections Commission. It has on file the names of 87 persons who have declared themselves candidates for President. It has ruled on everything from the validity of contributor lists to the question of whether primaries are fair.

*(Continued on next page)*

60

THE COMMONWEALTH

# "Propose New Law: Candidates Disclose Only Contributions of More Than $1,000"—Murphy

The Supreme Court also has tried to deal with the Elections Commission. The court said it is illegal as it is presently constituted. So it is possible that we will have some other form of dealing with fairness before the summer has turned to fall and the campaign has turned to an endurance contest.

So that deals with the three points I made at the outset. First, the mechanical reforms don't substitute for moral problems. The particularized itemization of creative needs makes no sense. The institutions which are failing cannot be remedied by creating other institutions.

Rather, it will take a new atmosphere in which politics can work.

## In for the Money

Some candidates think they get into politics solely for money. Others have enough sense to realize it will ruin them. Teddy Roosevelt even used the modern idiom to make that point. His father left him a little money and he said, 'I've got enough bread. What I had to do... was provide the butter and jam.'

But today he could not make that comment. Today we would ask how much bread he inherited. How much jam he accumulated. How much he thought was enough. How much his wife inherited. How much he was prepared to spend on the campaign. Whether he was getting more than $1,000 from any contributor. Whether he was spending his campaign funds on bumper stickers or buttons. Whether his volunteers were paid or unpaid. Whether his white paper was printed free or for cost. Whether his position was based on the good of the country or his personal economics.

## Wrong Approach

I genuinely believe this to be the wrong approach, if we want responsive government. We are substituting money inquiries for position papers. We are dwelling on personal economics rather than on new ideas. Surely that is not the way a great nation can be put together.

Let us formulate a new law: A candidate must disclose all campaign contributions of more than $1,000. And then let's get

back to the issues which matter.

Henry Steele Commager once dealt with that in a book called 'The American Mind.' Commager said:

'They (the Americans) had begun to question the value of traditional moral codes; could they formulate new ones as effective as those they were preparing to abandon? They had relaxed their moral standards and habits; would they preserve themselves from corruption and decadence? They were idealistic; could they make their ideals work?'

In truth, the next election will be cleaner than Watergate only if we begin to insist on moral standards which make our ideals work." (JMR)

**Q:** Where draw line between public's 'right to know' and individual's right of privacy to be protected? **A:** U.S. Constitution very clear. We have violated it with campaign reform laws as Supreme Court said. Cannot continue to add to strictures to political campaigns, thinking up new ways of asking personal questions and expect qualified candidates to enter every campaign.

**Q:** Please comment on your kidnappers? **A:** Kidnapper got off easy. I was kidnapped in February of 1974 by a man who represented himself as a right winger who said he represented the American Revolutionary Army and that he kidnapped me as a symbol of the leftist liberal press in the U.S. I got away after $700,000 ransom paid. He was brought to trial, sentenced to 40 years. A group of judges, who are more interested in technicalities than justice, decided there was too much pretrial publicity, so trial overturned and new trial ordered.

**Q:** What political implications you foresee re Nixon's forthcoming China trip? **A:** Don't think it's going to help or hurt anyone. Going to make it more embarrassing for whoever is next president to carry on normal diplomatic relationship with People's Republic of China.

**Q:** Who you believe our best politicians, regardless of party? **A:** Inevitably get into partisanship in this kind of question. Some good public servants are John Sirica, Sam Ervin, Chief Justice Burger, and Dr. Kissinger. Most of those running for political office today are not my kind of people.

**Q:** Why you think Rockefeller removed himself from vice presidential position in upcoming election? **A:** There is going to be serious effort to dump him. He didn't like the job after 15 years of being chief executive of a major state. Probably chafing at restraints and restrictions of job. Wanted to tell people 'I'm my own man and not Jerry Ford's man.'

(Continued on next page)

THE COMMONWEALTH

61

APPLICATIONS FOR COMMONWEALTH CLUB MEMBERSHIP

If no objections are filed with the Secretary prior to March 5, 1976, following applicants will stand elected:

AGNEW, R. GORDON, D.D.S., professor emeritus, Univ. of California, Editor-in-chief, Journal of the International College of Dentists (Scientific and Educational), San Mateo, Ca. Proposed by Durward S. Riggs.

ANAST, PETER, real estate broker, S.F. Proposed by George Christensen.

AUSTIN, ALAN K., attorney, Orrick, Herrington, Rowley & Sutcliffe, S.F. Proposed by William Bates III.

AUSTIN, THOMAS C., supply analyst, Standard Oil of California, S.F. Proposed by Sara Lohse Gibson.

BENT, MARYLEE, student, University of California, Berkeley, Piedmont, Ca. Proposed by Patty Kaitz.

CONNER, H. W., public relations, Pacific Gas and Electric Co., Lafayette, Ca. Proposed by Charles A. Foster, Jr.

COTTON, ARLENE, assistant vice president, Life Insurance Co. of Calif., S.F. Proposed by Warren Eggert.

CRAIG, MARTHA, retired school teacher, San Francisco School Dept., S.F. Proposed by Carrie T. Sissala.

DAVIS, SELMA LYDA, home economist, College of Marin, Kentfield, San Rafael, Ca. Proposed by Clarence S. Davis.

DAY, CAPT. DE VERE L., S.F. Proposed by Durward S. Riggs.

FARR, RALPH W., retired, Ashland, Or. Proposed by Dr. Vaughn D. Bornet.

GREEN, PEGGY, real estate saleswoman, Colonial Realty and Investment Co., S.F. Proposed by Ann C. Carmack.

GRINER, DOROTHY H., school librarian, San Diego City Schools, Collier Sr. High, La Mesa, Ca. Proposed by E. Lee Griner.

HALE, PRESTON Q., realtor-rancher, Preston Q. Hale and Assoc., Reno, NV. Proposed by Donald E. Campbell.

HALL, JOHN D., computer operations manager, University of Calif., Cooperative Extension, Berkeley, Ca. Proposed by John A. Fantazia.

HURLEY, MARTHA S., Berkeley, Ca. Proposed by Melvin T. Hurley, M.D.

JOHNSON, ORVILLE R., retired, Crown Zellerbach Corp., Flexible Packaging Div., San Leandro, Ca. Proposed by O. P. Winnengstad.

KAPLAN, MURRAY JACK, regional director of security sales and services, Pinkerton's Inc., S.F. Proposed by Durward S. Riggs and Michael J. Brassington.

MACKIN, DAVID J., account executive, vice president, Shuman Agnew and Co., San Mateo, Ca. Proposed by Dora McLean Hughes.

MILES, JOHN A., vice president/travel agent, Portal Travel Inc., S.F. Proposed by Jordan Tartikoff.

NEIDER, LEROY, attorney at law, Los Gatos, Square, Ca. Proposed by Robert H. Bohn.

ROBBINS, HON. EARLDEAN V. S., adm. law judge, National Labor Relations Bd., S.F. Proposed by Renee Rubin.

SHAPIRO, JAMES, M.D., physician-ophthalmologist, Piedmont, Ca. Proposed by Joseph Epstein.

STEIN, WILLIAM D., attorney, California Department of Justice, S.F. Proposed by Membership Committee.

THOMAS, GEORGE W., D.D.S., Lafayette, Ca. Proposed by Walter Birnbaum, M.D.

WAREHAM, RUTH K., home creator, Walnut Creek, Ca. Proposed by Leslie D. Wareham.

WILDER, PERRY, bank planning, Wells Fargo Bank, S.F. Proposed by David E. Weymouth.

WILKINSON, PETER, consulting engineer, Beamer/ Wilkinson & Assoc., Piedmont, Ca. Proposed by George Sievers.

WOESTE, ESTHER B., insurance and investments, T. Jack Anttonen & Assoc., S.F. Proposed by Ruth Church Gupta.

Feb. 9, 1976 RICHARD H. PETERSON, Secretary

IS YOUR SECTION
MEETING THIS WEEK?

Check Study Section
Luncheon Schedules

"ENDURANCE CONTEST"

Q: How can businessmen do better job of telling their side of story in press? A: Business has failed to deal with people in a straightforward flat out honest way. Had the word 'image' never been invented, we would all be better off. It's a serious problem. You have to deal straightforward. You should see what business is trying to make the press believe through its press releases!

Q: Please give your appraisal of news coverage? A: Parochial attitude in San Francisco: people have been far too critical of media. Professionals don't deserve much of this type of criticism. Need constructive criticism. This community probably generates more ideas than any other community in U.S.

Q: Re political reporting, how rate quality of media compared to England and Canada? A: There is great myth about reporting in other parts of the world. Newspapers in this country do more comprehensive job of international events. Not true world press is better, if you compared you would find U.S. press better. I am not satisfied with our quality—it needs a great deal of improvement.

Q: How significant voter polls in influencing an election? Are voter polls generally fairly accurate? A: Polls are fairly accurate, although there have been some spectacularly bad ones. Doubt polls have much impact.

Q: Comment on our system of electing presidents in present primary type of configuration? A: Think we have an endurance contest—doesn't make much sense. Should have regional primaries, i.e., concentrate in South for month, hold primary, go to the East have primary, doing this in the 4 or 5 regions would bring some coherence. No one can think of a way to systematize this without going to a federal system. Need common election date.

Q: Comment on which candidates get majority of small campaign donations? A: Far left and far right get most small contributions. (MJB)

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1974

MR. SECRETARY:

Attached is a letter which
Jonathan Bates, recently freed
by the Syrians, left for you.

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

1761 N STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

LUCIUS D. BATTLE
PRESIDENT

February 11, 1974

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Middle East Institute has its quarterly Board meeting on March 7th. Betty and I will be having a small cocktail buffet for the group that evening at our house, 3200 Garfield Street, N. W., from 6:30 to 8:30. We would be delighted if you could join us. You will, I believe, find a number of people who have influence on American opinion on the Middle East and who have had long and meaningful ties with that part of the world.

We enjoyed very much having you at dinner with the Board of the American University in Cairo. I must tell you that it has been years since I have seen Americans cheered in Egypt the way they were in the days following the disengagement arrangement. Crowds pursued us wherever we went. In one small village square in Upper Egypt I made a speech, following a most tumultuous welcome. I began it by saying, "This welcome suggests you may have me confused with Dr. Kissinger." A young man in a gallibiyya who spoke perfect English screamed from the crowd, "You are all Dr. Kissingers and we love you!" We were all delighted to share in the credit you richly deserve for your efforts at peace in the Middle East.

I hope that you can be with us on March 7th.

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Washington,D. C. 20520

UNITED STATES
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

May 18, 1976

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for taking the time to meet with current and former White House Fellows and for your summary of major current issues in American foreign policy.

I share your anxiety about the absence of a consensus on many critical issues in this country. We have labored without a satisfactory consensus in the energy field for at least two years, the result of which has been an absence of demonstrable progress in improving our energy self-sufficiency. We appear to have come to a time in our Nation's experience in which the rejection of a course of action is viewed as enthusiastically as the endorsement of some proposed course or the articulation of an alternative one. Perhaps we have yet to experience the bitter fruit of non-decisionmaking. When that occurs, current demagogues will be absent from the scene.

I applaud the steady, statesmanlike, and appropriate main lines of policy which you have created and sustained during your tenure as Secretary of State. Your most recent efforts to develop a policy toward black Africa which recognizes the inalienable human rights of its citizens exemplifies the reality that if anyone's rights are denied, then our own are diminished.

In the final analysis, these are times which will test our endurance as well as intellectual brilliance in articulating and defending values that are an integral part of the American culture. It is a season in which irresponsible demagogues hold strident sway in a media often concerned with conflict for its own sake.

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger - 2 -

May 18, 1976

Best wishes in your good work. Thanks again for taking
the time to share your thoughts with us.

S:BB:qc

1975 JUL 23 PM 9:25
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Milwaukee.
University of Wisconsin --
Institute of World Affairs,
Dr. Carol Baumann,

Henry V. Klausinger

Beat regards,

in Milwaukee extremely stimulating and help-
ful.
I also want you to know that I found the
preach of our exchange on international issues

 Affairs.

 contribution and that of the Institute of World
 cease it proved to be. I greatly appreciate your
effort was expended in making my visit the suc-
appeal. I recognize that a great deal of time and
most kind in providing an opportunity for me to
Milwaukee. The Institute of World Affairs was
your help in making possible my recent visit to
I want to thank you and your staff for all

Dear Dr. Baumann:

7601349

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Copy to:
RF:njs

January 19, 1976

Dear Mr. Baumann:

It was very kind of you and all your
staff to remember me at Christmas with your
most thoughtful gift of the sheepskin foot
warmers.

Mrs. Kissinger joins me in wishing
you a happy and prosperous 1976.

Mr. Curt Baumann,
Bama-Verke,
695 Mosbach/Baden,
Germany.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 57356
JP/JRP
German

Schützenhof 11
(8370) Regen, Bay. Wald,
June 24, 1976

Dear Mr. Secretary:

When I learned through the press that you would be meeting with
John Vorster in Grafenau for political talks, I did not wish to miss
the opportunity to greet you there. I wanted to use the occasion to
make you a small gift from my present place of retirement, Regen.

I therefore asked your esteemed press and protocol chief of the
Penthouse Suite to submit my request to you. He gladly wanted to ful-
fill my wish and let me know by telephone at my number 09921-2715 in
Regen when the Secretary could find time to see me. Shortly after-
wards, this morning, I was informed by telephone from Grafenau that it
would not be possible, because of lack of time, to see Mr. Kissinger,
but that the Secretary conveyed his greetings to me and hoped that I
would understand. I, of course, do understand.

Therefore, I am sending you the small gift by mail. I hope that
it will help you, in your leisure time, to compensate for your taxing
efforts toward achieving world peace.