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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY
USINT BAGHDAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIFRS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY
CINCEUR PRIORITY

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'.0. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY SISCO INTERVIEW ON "MEET THE PRESS"

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

CINCEUR FOR POLAD

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF

UNDER SECRETARY SISCO'S APPEARANCE ON "MEET THE PRESS"
TELEVISION PROGRAM, SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 23

QUOTE MR. VALERIANI (NBC NEWS): MR. SISCO, IS THE UNTITO
STATES NOW CONSIDERING A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH ISRAEL
IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND SURVIVAL?

MR. SISCO: NO, IT IS NOT, MR. VALERIANI. I THINK THERE
HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION IN THE RECENT PRESS
REPORTS. WE ARE FOCUSING, AS YOU KNOW, ON TRYING TO
ACHIEVE AN INTERIM NEXT STEP.

THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES HAS BEEN STUDIED OVER THE YEARS
AND ANY STUDIES THAT WILL BE GIVEN TO THIS MATTER WILL BE
IN RELATION TO AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

MR. VALERIANI: ISN'T SUCH A TREATY INEVITABLE IN WE CON-

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TEXT OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT?

MR. SISCO: WELL, LET ME SAY THIS: THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION ABOUT THIS WORD "GUARANTEE." WE HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT THAT THE BASIC ASSURANCE THAT IS ESSENTIAL IN THE AREA IS THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES. ANY STUDY OF GUARANTEES I THINK WILL BE IN THE CONTEXT NOT

ONLY OF AN OVERALL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, BUT ALSO AS SUPPLEMENTARY AND COMPLEMENTARY TO THE AGREEMENT ITSELF.

WE THINK THE OBLIGATIONS THAT THE SIDES EXCHANGE WITH EACH OTHER, WE THINK THE AGREEMENT THAT IS TO BE ACHIEVED BASED ON THE NOVEMBER 1967 RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE QUESTION OF BORDERS, IS SOMETHING THAT HAS TO BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. SO THAT WHEN ONE TALKS OF GUARANTEES, ONE HAS TO TALK IN TERMS OF A SUPPLEMENT AND A COMPLEMENT TO THE ACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

MR. VALERIAN: THEN YOU DO NOT RULE OUT AN EVENTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH ISRAEL?

MR. SISCO: I AM SAYING THAT THIS IS SOMETHING WHICH IS QUITE FAR DOWN THE PIKE; IT IS SOMETHING THAT ORVIOUSLY WE WILL WANT TO LOOK AT IN THE CONTEXT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

MR. GWERTZMAN (NEW YORK TIMES): MR. SISCO, WHEN DR. KISSINGER RETURNED FROM THE MIDDLE EAST HE SAID SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. WHAT WAS THIS PROGRESS?

MR. SISCO: I THINK THE ESSENTIAL PROGRESS, MR. GWERTZMAN, WAS IN DEFINING AND DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POSSIBLE NEXT STEP.

AS YOU KNOW, WE EXPLORED THIS POSSIBILITY WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES PRINCIPALLY CONCERNED AND WE WILL SOON BE RETURNING TO THE AREA TO RESUME THE PROCESS. I AM FRANKLY GUARDEDLY OPTIMISTIC BECAUSE I THINK WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE AT LEAST THE PARAMETERS OF THIS PROBLEM.

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MR. GWERTZNAN: SPECIFICALLY IN ISRAEL DR. KISSINGER SAID ISRAEL WOULD NOT HAVE TO GIVE UP TERRITORIES WITHOUT A

QUID PRO QUO. DID DR. KISSINGER GET FROM MR. SADAT IN EGYPT AN AGREEMENT THAT EGYPT HAD TO GIVE SOMETHING TO GET SOMETHING?

MR. SISCO: WELL, WITHOUT GETTING INTO THE SPECIFICS OF THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS, I THINK WE COMP AWAY WITH THE FELTNG

THAT THERE ARE REALLY TWO ELEMENTS HERE. THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL, OF COURSE, HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED, AS WELL AS THAT THERE MUST BE PROGRESS TO PEACE. WE THINK THAT THE DESIRE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND THE DESIRE FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE WHICH HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZED ON ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER CAN BE RECONCILED, AND FOR THAT REASON I THINK THAT WE CAN LOOK FORWARD HOPEFULLY TO MOVING THIS ALONG.

MR. KRAFT (COLUMNIST, FIELD NEWSPAPER SYNDICATE): MR. SISCO, WOULD LIKE TO ASK A QUESTION THAT IS A LITTLE BIT OFF THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH NOT ENTIRELY. MR. ALKHIMOV, WHO IS THE DEPUTY FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER OF THE SOVIET UNION, GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE HERE IN WASHINGTON THE OTHER DAY IN WHICH HE SAID THE ADMINISTRATION COULDN'T BE TRUSTED TO KEEP ITS COMMITMENTS. DOES THAT SEEM TO YOU AN APPROPRIATE THING FOR A SOVIET OFFICIAL TO BE SAYING HERE IN WASHING- TON?

MR. SISCO: WELL, I SAW THAT REPORT, MR. KRAFT. I WOULD SAY THIS: I THINK IF ONE LOOKS OVER THE HISTORY OF THE COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, I THINK THE HISTORY IS VERY CLEAR.

I THINK WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS; I THINK WE HAVE CARRIED THEM OUT, BOTH DEFINITIVELY, AS WELL AS IN GOOD FAITH AND I OBVIOUSLY WOULD NOT AGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT.

MR. KRAFT:

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DO YOU THINK IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO
MAKE IT? ARE YOU GOING TO DO ANYTHING TO INDICATE DIS-
PLEASURE, FOR EXAMPLE?

MR. SISCO: I THINK I WOULD JUST REPEAT AGAIN, I WOULD NOT
AGREE WITH THAT STATEMENT.

MR. KRAFT: IN THE COURSE OF YOUR TRIP, THE SECRETARY SAW
MR. WILSON AND MR. GROMYKO. DID YOU GET ANY REPORTS ON
THE STATE OF MR. BREZHNEV'S POLITICAL AND PERSONAL HEALTH?

MR. SISCO: WELL, I THINK THE QUESTION OF HEALTH IS FAIRLY
SELF-EVIDENT. MR. BREZHNEV WAS VERY HEAVILY INVOLVED IN
THE ENTIRE WILSON VISIT. THIS WAS VERY CLEAR TO THE ENTIRE
MEDIA AND AS FAR AS WE KNOW HE IS OPERATING FULLY, AS WAS
EVIDENCED BY THAT PARTICULAR HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGE.

MR. TREWHITT (BALTIMORE SUN): TO PURSUE MR. KRAFT'S POINT
ABOUT THE MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINTSTER GROMYKO, ONE GOT
THE INPRESSION THAT THE MEETING WAS SOMEWHAT CHILLY. I
WONDER WHAT YOU CAN SAY ABOUT THE GENERAL STATE OF DETENTE?

IS DETENTE IN ANY WAY IN JEOPARDY AS A RESULT OF THE
INTERVENTION OF CONGRESS?

MR. SISCO: WELL, I THINK THE BREAD AND BUTTER ISSUE BE-\TWEEP OURSELVES AND THE SOVIET UNION IS THE QUESTION OF
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THE SALT IT TALKS ARE PROCEEDING.
MY HOPE IS THAT THESE WILL MAKE PROGRESS. I THINK THAT IS
THE KEY ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION. THESE WERE VERY GOOD
TALKS THAT WE HAD WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. OBVIOUSLY THE
PRACTICAL ISSUES THAT WERE DISCUSSED ARE BOTH DELICATE AND
DIFFICULT, BUT I THINK MYSELF THAT THERE IS A VERY GOOD
CHANCE THAT WE CAN DEEPEN THE RELATIONSHIP.

I THINK THE NEXT FEW MONTHS IN PARTICULAR ARE IMPORTANT IN
RELATIONSHIP NOT ONLY TO SALT II, BUT THE WHOLE QUESTION
OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AS WELL AS THE QUESTION
OF MUTUAL BALANCE, THE REDUCTION OF FORCES, AND THESE KEY
AREAS OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND CYPRUS.

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MR. TREWHIT: HOW DO YOU ASSESS THE SOVIET ROLE IN ITS ATTITUDE ON THE MIDDLE EAST? AT WHAT POINT MUST THEY COME IN? ARE THEY UNHAPPY ABOUT BEING DEALT OUT AT THIS POINT?

MR. SISCO: MR. TREWHIT, NO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS POSSIBLE IN THE LONG RUN WITHOUT THE COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE REASON WHY WE ARE UNDERTAKING THE KIND OF MIDDLEMAN ROLE THAT WE ARE PURSUING AT PRESENT IS THAT THIS IS THE DESIRE OF THE PARTIES. WE DON'T PRECLUDE THE RENEWAL OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. NEITHER ARE WE PURSUING A POLICY OF EXCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BECAUSE THE REALITY IS THEY ARE THERE. THEY HAVE INTERESTS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT IF YOU ARE GOING TO GET A DURABLE PEACE, THEY HAVE GOT TO BE PART OF THE PROCESS AND THEY HAVE GOT TO AGREE WITH IT.

MR. SPIVAK: MR. SECRETARY, MAY I ASK YOU THIS: THERE HAVE LONG BEEN MANY OBSTACLES TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WHAT DO YOU NOW CONSIDER THE MAJOR OBSTACLES? HAVE THEY CHANGED ANY?

MR. SISCO: WELL, I FEEL THAT THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS IN THE AREA, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR, ACTUALLY HAVE IMPROVED THE PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE REASON WHY I SAY THIS IS THIS: I THINK THAT BOTH SIDES IN THE AFTERMATH OF THAT WAR CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST ALTERNATIVE IS THE PROCESS OF DIPLOMACY AND THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE ARABS, FOR EXAMPLE, DID NOT FEEL THAT THEY NEEDED TO GO TO THE CONFERENCE TABLE WITH THEIR HEADS BOWED AS THE RESULT. FOR

EXAMPLE, OF THE DEFEAT DURING THE '67 WAR. I THINK THE AFTERMATH OF THE '73 WAR PROVES THAT BOTH SIDES, REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THERE ARE GAPS TO BE BRIDGED AND THERE ARE DIFFERENCES TO BE BRIDGED, THAT BOTH SIDES CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTED TO THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. I FIND THAT IS A HUGE PLUS IN THIS SITUATION.

MR. SPIVAK: MR. SECRETARY, A RECENT GALLUP POLL SHOWS

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THAT 61 PERCENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO WERE POLLED SAID THEY THOUGHT A WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS IS LIKELY

THIS YEAR. BASED ON YOUR INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION, DO YOU THINK A WAR IS LIKELY THIS YEAR?

MR. SISCO: WAR, OF COURSE, CAN NEVER BE PRECLUDED AS A POSSIBILITY. I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS LIKELY. THE REASON IS I AM STILL HOPEFUL THAT WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON A STEP-BY-STEP BASIS AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESSES OF DIPLOMACY HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MOREOVER, AS I READ THE AREA--AND I HAVE NOW SPENT AS MANY AS FOUR MONTHS OF THE LAST TWELVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST--I THINK BOTH SIDES ARE SICK AND TIRED OF WAR. I THINK THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS THAT WE ARE SEEING IS A REFLECTION OF THE DESIRE OF BOTH SIDES TO TRY TO GET SOMETHING DONE.

MR. SPIVAK: WAS THERE ANYTHING NEW AND ESPECIALLY ENCOURAGING FROM THIS TRIP THAT YOU CAME AWAY WITH?

MR. SISCO: NOTHING THAT ONE CAN CITE AS NEW OR DECISIVE. I FIND IT SIGNIFICANT THAT BOTH SIDES WANT THE PROCESS TO CONTINUE. AS LONG AS EACH SIDE WANTS THE PROCESS TO CONTINUE, IT MEANS EACH FEELS THERE IS STILL AN OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING AS A RESULT OF DIALOGUE.

MR. VALERIAN: MR. SISCO, AN EGYPTIAN MAGAZINE SAID THIS PAST WEEK THAT ANOTHER EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IS ALREADY IN THE DAG. IS THAT REPORT ACCURATE?

MR. SISCO: NO, IT IS NOT. I WISH IT WERE. MR. VALERIAN. IT MIGHT SHORTEN THIS NEXT TRIP THAT WE INTEND TO TAKE IN THE MONTH OF MARCH.

MR. VALERIAN: WHAT MAKES IT SO DIFFICULT?

MR. SISCO: I THINK WHAT MAKES IT DIFFICULT IS THAT EACH SIDE NEEDS TO TRY TO MEET AT LEAST THE MINIMAL CONDITIONS AND THE MINIMAL TERMS OF THE OTHER. EACH SIDE IS OPERATING WITHIN WHAT I WOULD CONSIDER TO BE A RATHER CONFINED POLITICAL SETTING.

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MR. VALERIANT: FOR EXAMPLE? WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?

MR. SISCO: IT MEANS THAT BOTH THE LEADERS IN ISRAEL, AS WELL AS EGYPT, HAVE TO GET THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE FULLY JUSTIFIED BEFORE THEIR OWN PEOPLE. IN THE CASE OF ISRAEL IT HAS TO BE THE KIND OF AGREEMENT THAT CAN GET THROUGH THE PARLIAMENTARY PROCESS. IN THE CASE OF EGYPT, NOT ONLY MUST THIS AGREEMENT BE SUPPORTED BY THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WHATEVER AGREEMENT IS ACHIEVED HAVE BROAD SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD AS WELL.

MR. GWERTZMAN: FOLLOWING UP ON THAT, HOW SERIOUS IS THE OPPOSITION OF SYRIA TO AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL?

MR. SISCO: I HAVE READ REPORTS OF THIS SORT, AND LET ME SAY THIS: THE FOCUS, AS IS EVIDENCED FROM THE PRESS, IS ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, I WOULD RECALL TO YOU THAT WE WENT TO EVERY CAPITAL, THAT WE FEEL THE QUESTION OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT INVOLVES ALL OF THE FRONTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE PROGRESS WHEREVER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE, BUT WE ARE NOT EXCLUDING ANYONE OR ANY ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM.

MR. GWERTZMAN: BUT AFTER THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, PRESUMING IT IS CARRIED OUT, DO YOU ANTICIPATE THERE COULD BE AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN INTERIM ACCORD, OR WOULD ALL SIDES THEN GO TO GENEVA IMMEDIATELY?

MR. SISCO: IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO SPECULATE. WHAT WE WOULD DO IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS ORVIOUSLY TO CONSULT NOT ONLY WITH ISRAEL, BUT WITH THE KFY ARABS AS WELL, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE PROCESS AND WHERE WE COULD GO FROM THERE.

MR. KRAFT: HAVE THE SYRIANS SHOWN ANY DISPOSITION TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN THE EVENT THE ISRAELIS MOVED A FEW KILOMETERS BACK FROM THE GOLAN HEIGHTS?

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MR. SISCO: WE ARE EXPLORING, OF COURSE, ALL POSSIBILITIES WITH BOTH SIDES. THE QUESTION OF CONCESSIONS OR CONCILIATION, OR WHETHER IT BE ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OR THE SYRIAN SIDE, I THINK ONE CAN'T MAKE THIS KIND OF A JUDGMENT AT THIS JUNCTURE. ONE WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THIS KIND OF A JUDGMENT AS THE PROCESS CONTINUES.

MR. KRAFT: WOULD YOU SAY, MR. SECRETARY, THAT THE ISRAELIS MIGHT BE MISSING THE BOAT BY NOT EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THIS AREA?

MR. SISCO: WELL, THE ISRAELIS HAVE SAID, AND THE LEADERS IN ISRAEL ARE ON RECORD AS SAYING, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO TRY TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACE AGREEMENT ACROSS THE BOARD. SO IT CAN'T BE SAID THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NECESSARILY EXCLUDED ANY PARTICULAR FRONT IN TERMS OF A PEACE AGREEMENT.

MR. KRAFT: IS THERE ANY DISPOSITION, MR. SECRETARY, TO MOVE BACK AT ALL FROM THE GOLAN WEIGHTS? FIVE MILFS EVEN?

MR. SISCO: AGAIN, I WOULD REFER YOU TO WHAT HAS BEEN SAID PUBLICLY BY THE ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER IN THIS REGARD.

THAT IS, THEY HAVE INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE WHAT THE POSSIBILITIES ARE ON ALL FRONTS AS IT RELATES TO A PEACE AGREEMENT. NOW, LET ME EMPHASIZE "A PEACE AGREEMENT."

MR. TREWHITT: MR. SECRETARY, JUST TO CLARIFY A POINT--I TAKE IT YOU FEEL IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT MIGHT CALL FOR A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL ON THE SINAT PENINSULA WITHOUT A CORRESPONDING WITHDRAWAL ON THE NORTHERN FRONT WITH SYRIA.

MR. SISCO: I WAEN'T SAID THAT, MR. TREWHITT. ALL I HAVE SAID IS THAT THE FOCUS AT THIS PARTICULAR JUNCTURE IS ON THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ASPECT OF IT. BUT I WOULD UNDERSCORE AGAIN THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS ARE NOT LIMITED TO THIS; OUR DISCUSSIONS HAVE INCLUDED TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS AS WELL AS THE JORDANIANS.

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MR. TREWHITT: I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO MR. VALERIANI'S ORIGINAL QUESTION IF I MIGHT: OTHER THINGS SET ASIDE FOR THE MOMENT--DOES THE UNITED STATES IN FACT GUARANTEE THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL AS A SOVEREIGN STATE?

MR. SISCO: WELL, THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE, HAS NO FOR-MAL TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL. HOWEVER, I THINK OUR SUPPORT OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN MADE MANIFEST. BOTH ON THE BASIS OF AN ONGOING MILITARY ASSISTANCE RELA-TIONSHIP AS WELL AS THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT. I FIND NO BASIC CHANGE IN THE POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION IN THIS REGARD. OUR SUPPORT CONTINUES.

MR. SPIVAK: MR. SECRETARY, FROM TIME TO TIME THERE HAS BEEN DEBATE AS TO WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REGARDS THE SECURITY OF ISRAEL AS A VITAL AMERICAN INTEREST AND THEREFORE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT TOLERATE ITS DESTRUCTION.

CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER WE DO CONSIDER IT A VITAL INTEREST TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?

MR. SISCO: MY ANSWER WOULD BE AFFIRMATIVE. WE HAVE BEEN LONG THE PRINCIPAL SUPPORTER OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND ITS ECONOMIC VIABILITY. WE HAVE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, AND I THINK EVER SINCE THE CREATION OF THE STATE WE HAVE BEEN ITS PRIME SUPPORT, MY ANSWER TO YOU WOULD BE AFFIRMATIVE.

MR. SPIVAK: MR. SECRETARY, THE NEW YORK POST INDICATED THAT YOU BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. IS MOVING TOWARD OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. DO YOU THINK THE U.S. IS LIKELY AT ANY TIME SOON TO OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZE THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION GROUP?

MR. SISCO: I DO NOT BELIEVE THIS AND I HAVE MADE NO SUCH STATEMENT, BUT TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION--

MR. SPIVAK: THEY SAID NOT THAT YOU MADE THE STATEMENT BUT THAT YOU HAVE INDICATED THIS.

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MR. SISCO: NEITHER IS TRUE. I WILL GET TO YOUR QUESTION HERE, MR. SPIVAK. INSOFAR AS THE PLO IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE CANNOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE RECOMMEND ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PLO AS LONG AS THE PLO FAILS TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. I SEE NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PLO HAS ANY INTENTION TO DO SO IN THE FORESEABLE FUTURE.

MR. SPIVAK: WHERE DOES THAT PUT THE PLO AS FAR AS THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IS CONCERNED THEN?

MR. SISCO: WHEN WE CONVENED ORIGINALLY AT GENEVA, ONE DECISION WAS TAKEN, NAMELY, THAT THE QUESTION OF ANY ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS AT THAT CONFERENCE WOULD BE A DE-TERMINATION TO BE MADE BY THE MEMBERS OF THAT CONFERENCE. IN OTHER WORDS, THE QUESTION OF THE PLO WOULD COME UP IF AND WHEN ANY GENEVA CONFERENCE WERE RECONVENED, AND IT WOULD BE A DECISION THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE BY THOSE PRESENT.

MR. VALERIANT: MR. SISCO, YOU SAID HERE THAT WAR CANNOT BE PRECLUDED IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PRESIDENT FORD, SECRETARY KISSTINGER HAVE EMPHASIZED REPEATEDLY HOW EXPLOSIVE THE AREA IS, HOW VOLATILE THE SITUATION. YET THE ADMINISTRATION IS POURING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF NEW WAFIONS INTO THE AREA ON BOTH SIDES. WHY?

MR. SISCO: WELL, LET ME SAY, FIRST OF ALL, THAT INSOFAR AS OUR SUPPORT ON THE MILITARY SIDE FOR ISRAEL IS CONCERNED, I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN A TREND. INSOFAR

AS OUR ARMS SALESTO OTHER PARTS OF THE AREA--LEFT'S TAKE FIRST OF ALL THE GULF AND THE ARABIAN PENINSULA. I HAVE HEARD IT SAID THAT WE ARE DOING THIS WILLY-NILLY, ON AN AD HOC BASIS.

THIS IS NOT THE CASE. I CAN RECALL THE KIND OF STUDIES THAT WE UNDERTOOK ON THIS WHOLE QUESTION OF ARMS IN THIS AREA IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE EXODUS OF GREAT BRITAIN. WHAT CONFRONTED US AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME WAS THIS: DO WE TRY

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TO FILL THIS KIND OF A VOID DIRECTLY OR DO WE UNDERTAKE A
POLICY OF HELPING THOSE WHO REALLY HAVE LEGITIMATE SECURITY
INTERESTS AND NEED THE ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE
PURPOSES. WE

CONCLUDED THE WAY TO PROCEED IN THIS AREA WAS TO TRY TO
HELP IN REGIONAL COOPERATION. WE SEE SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN
AND THESE COUNTRIES AS ELEMENTS OF STABILITY IN THE AREA
WITH LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE NEEDS. IT IS NOT A QUESTION
OF WHETHER WE PROVIDE ARMS, OR NO ARMS GOING INTO THE AREA,
IT IS A QUESTION OF WHETHER WE PROVIDE THEM OR OTHERS, IN
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY PERCEIVE A REAL DANGER.

MR. VALERIANT: ARE YOU WILLING TO GO ALONG WITH A SIX-
MONTHS' MORATORIUM ON ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF
AS SUGGESTED BY SENATOR KENNEDY?

MR. SISCO: I HAVE READ THE PRESS REPORT THIS MORNING.
OBVIOUSLY, I HAVE NOT SEEN THE RESOLUTION ITSELF. BUT I
WOULD ONLY EMPHASIZE THAT WE FEEL THAT WE ARE MEETING A
LEGITIMATE CONCERN OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. THESE
ARE FRIENDS OF OURS, THESE ARE FRIENDS WHO ARE TRYING TO
PURSUE A MODERATE COURSE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

MR. GWERTZMAN: SPEAKING OF ARMS, HAS THE ADMINISTRATION
DECIDED TO LIFT THE EMBARGO AGAINST ARMS SHIPMENTS TO
PAKISTAN?

MR. SISCO: I EXPECT AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON THIS VERY SOON. LET ME SAY THAT WE HAVE FELT A RATHER ANOMALOUS SITUATION HAS EXISTED IN THE AREA, WHERE ONE STDF HAS BEEN GETTING ARMS FROM THE SOVIETS AND HAS ITS OWN PRODUCTION CAPACITY. WHEREAS THE OTHER SIDE--AN ALLY I MIGHT ADD, WITH WHOM WE HAVE A FORMAL RELATIONSHIP--HAS BEEN DENIED THIS INSOFAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED. THE MATTER HAS BEEN UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION. I EXPECT ANNOUNCEMENTS VERY SOON.

MR. GWERTZMAN: FROM WHAT YOU ARE SAYING, I ASSUME THE
ANSWER IS WE WILL LIFT THE EMBARGO. DO YOU THINK THIS WILL
REALLY DAMAGE RELATIONS WITH INDIA AS THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT
SAYS IT WILL?

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MR. SISCO: IN MY JUDGMENT IT SHOULD NOT. BECAUSE I THINK WE HAVE EXPLAINED THIS QUITE THOROUGHLY. WE ARE NOT TRYING TO BALANCE ONE SIDE AGAINST THE OTHER IN THIS SITUATION. WE THINK THAT IT IS AS MUCH IN INDIA'S INTEREST TO HAVE A RELATIVELY SECURE PAKISTAN, TO PURSUE THE SO-CALLED SIMLA PROCESS, TO PURSUE THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION, AS IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF PAKISTAN ITSELF.

MR. KRAFT: PEAKING AGAIN OF ARMS, THE WHITE HOUSE KEEPS SAYING THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS A COMMITMENT TO SOUTH VIETNAM AND ON THE BASIS OF THAT COMMITMENT IS PUSHING FOR THIS $300-MILLION SUPPLEMENTAL. WHAT IS THAT COMMITMENT AND WHEN WAS THAT COMMITMENT MADE, TO WHOM AND BY WHOM AND WHEN?

MR. SISCO: LET ME JUST SAY THIS ABOUT SOUTH VIETNAM, WITHOUT GETTING INTO THE LEGAL BASIS. I THINK THAT WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT WE, DIRECTLY, HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM INSOFAR AS OUR OWN PERSONNEL ARE CONCERNED. THE QUESTION BEFORE US IS, DO WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SOUTH VIETNAM SO THAT IT CAN CONTINUE TO DEFEND ITSELF IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE IT CONTINUES TO BE UNDER THREAT. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT THIS $300 MILLION IS NEEDED TO DO THIS.

MR. TREWHITT: MR. SECRETARY, WE HAVEN'T TALKED ABOUT OIL AT ALL. I WILL ASK YOU WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO SETTLE THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION POLITICALLY WITHOUT A CONCURRENT SETTLEMENT OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF ENERGY AND OIL IN THE AREA?

MR. SISCO: I THINK THESE ARE TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS, MR. TREWHITT. I THINK OBVIOUSLY, TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON THE ARAD-ISRAEL DISPUTE. THIS WILL HELP THE OVERALL CLIMATE. BUT I THINK THE OIL QUESTION HAS TO BE RESOLVED ON ITS MERITS. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE UNITED STATES DEVELOP ITS OWN INDEPENDENCE AND THAT IT NOT BE VULNERABLE TO OUTSIDE SOURCES. WE ARE NOT INTERESTED IN A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARABS. WE ARE INTERESTED IN A PRODUCER-CONSUMER DIALOGUE THAT RESOLVES THE PROBLEM.

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MR. SPIVAK: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE WORKED PRETTY CLOSELY WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER NOW FOR SOME TIME AND HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE REACTION TO THE RECENT ATTACKS ON HIM BY CONGRESS AND THE PRESS. WHAT HAS BEEN THE EFFECT ON HIS POWER AND HIS INFLUENCE?

MR. SISCO: I DON'T SEE ANY DININUTION EITHER OF HIS POWER OR HIS INFLUENCE, MR. SPIVAK. FOR EXAMPLE, I SPENT THE

LAST TWO WEEKS WITH HIM IN THE MIDDLE FAST. I FIND IT VERY SIGNIFICANT THAT BOTH SIDES ARE VERY ANXIOUS TO HAVE OUR SECRETARY OF STATE CONTINUE THIS PROCESS. IN FACT, I WILL GO FURTHER. BOTH SIDES SEE MR. KISSINGER AS THE INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND I SHARF THIS VIEW.

END QUOTE
KISSINGER

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February 25, 1975

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#49

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will go straight to the
questions. Mr. Davis?

Q Mr. Secretary, the reports coming from
Cambodia and Viet-Nam are becoming very bleak. One of
your top aides estimates only two more months of survival
for Cambodia if they do not receive supplemental
assistance. The question is: What good would further
supplemental assistance be when so many billions in
past assistance has not helped; and, secondly, what
is your appraisal on a new American peace initiative
that might stop the fighting?

A Let me first separate the problem in Cambodia
from the problem in Viet-Nam. In Cambodia, we have an

For further information contact:

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Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you a question which appears to concern not only the relations with the subcontinent of India but the detente between the United States and Russia -- if you could put it in that context -- and that is the somewhat bitter criticism that India has made at the decision to lift the 10-year-old arms embargo out there, and the allegations that this would start an arms race and the implication that you somehow are guilty of bad faith in this whole thing.

A I think there are two types of comments that have been made from India. One is the comments of the Indian Ambassador in Washington; and the second, the statement of the Foreign Minister of India in the Indian Parliament.

We believe that the statement of the Foreign Minister is restrained and statesmanlike and continues the basis for the improving relationship that has characterized Indian-American relations in recent months.

The statements made yesterday by the Ambassador are unacceptable.

Now, with respect to the relationship between India and the United States: In a speech in New Delhi last

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October, I pointed out that India, because of its size and its position, has a special role in South Asia which the United States recognizes.

I have also pointed out that the United States has no interest and will not support or engage in an arms race in South Asia.

We maintain both of these statements. It seemed to us, however, that to maintain an embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship, while its neighbor was producing and acquiring nearly a billion dollars' worth of arms a year, was morally, politically and symbolically improper.

I repeat: The decision to lift the arms embargo does not mean that the United States will engage in a massive supply of arms to Pakistan or that the United States will engage in arms deliveries that can affect the underlying strategic balance. But it seemed to us an anomaly to embargo one country in the area, to be the only country in the world to be embargoing this country, when its neighbor was not exercising a comparable restraint. But, even with this, we will not engage in massive deliveries

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of arms.

And, secondly, we place great stress on the improving relationship with India. We maintain all the principles that we have asserted with respect to India; and we believe that with wisdom and statesmanship on both sides, the natural friendship between these two great democracies can not only be maintained but be strengthened. This is certainly our attitude.

Q Are you going to ask for the recall of the Ambassador who made the unacceptable remarks?

A No, we will not ask for his recall.

Q Mr. Secretary, in recent months the Administration has been conducting foreign policy in one way, in one manner, and Congress has been conducting foreign policy in another. And wherever there appears to be a conflict, Congress usually wins. How are you adjusting to this reality?

A Well, it is inherent in our system that the Congress, having the power of the purse, can impose its will. I believe that in a conflict between the Executive and the Legislative, neither side wins. I believe, as I pointed out in Los Angeles, that it is imperative for a

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Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the statement in an interview by Syrian President Assad that he would be willing to sign a formal peace treaty is helpful to your step-by-step approach? And if I may just follow that up with one question, do you necessarily exclude an additional step after the one that you are about to leave on, on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel?

A I think the statement by Syria that it is willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel is a major step forward. I remember the first time I visited Syria in December 1973, the newspapers reported that the Secretary of State arrived from occupied territory-- "occupied territory" at that time being Tel Aviv. So I think that this is a hopeful sign.

With respect to negotiations between Syria and Israel, we have always believed that a peace, to be lasting, must involve all the fronts and must involve a general settlement, and I am certain that Israel shares this view.

Q Mr. Kissinger, the United States has been involved for some time now in the efforts to achieve a settlement on Cyprus. Can you tell us where you think those efforts are now, and what the possibilities are for reconvening a negotiating session between the two sides?

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to the period in which one can be useful, and that is a
decision that has to be made largely by the President.
And I have not made any such decision as these reports indi-
cate.

Q Mr. Secretary, it was reported after your
recent meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in
Geneva that he raised the possibility at this meeting of an
accord to limit arms to the Middle East.

Are the Russians prepared to cooperate in re-
straining the flow of arms to the Middle East? And if so,
are we going to talk to them about it?

A Well, I do not believe that this report
is exactly accurate. But, in principle, the United States
has been willing to discuss the principle of a limitation of
the flow of arms into the Middle East. Given the inter-
connection, however, of the Arab world, one now would have
to draw the line rather widely, and one could not confine
the limitation of arms imports only to the states neighboring
Israel; but one would have to include all the states that
could possibly transfer their arms into areas where a con-
frontation might be possible. But as part of a settlement,
we would be prepared to explore this, yes.

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Q What is the Russian view towards that possibility?

A As I understand the Soviet view, they are prepared to discuss this as part of an over-all settlement. They are not prepared to discuss it at the moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, of the vast amount of aid we have sent to Southeast Asia, and our own involvement, why would any country in the world ever have grave doubts about American commitments?

A Because if the collapse of Southeast Asia is caused by an American decision to withhold aid under conditions in which such a decision can have only one outcome, the conclusion will be inevitable that it was the United States which has the responsibility. There is no possible way that Viet-Nam can acquire the arms that are needed to defend itself until its economy has reached a point where perhaps there is sufficient surplus from oil income or other economic developments. And there are many other countries in the world that find themselves in analogous circumstances.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it reasonable to talk about any finite period of time -- the three years, for

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Q Mr. Secretary, when you were in Israel on this last trip you said that Israel couldn't be expected to give up its territory without a *quid pro quo*. Did you come away from your talks with President Sadat feeling that he acknowledges this principle?

A The fact that I am returning to the Middle East indicates that I believe there is a chance to implement this principle, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, following up on that, do you think that it will be necessary for there to be American guarantees for the next stage of the disengagement?

A No. The question of an American guarantee can arise only in connection with a final settlement, and then not as a substitute for a final settlement but as a backup position to enhance the security of the parties.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow that, if I may, briefly, do you have in mind something that would have to be ratified by the Congress, a treaty?

A Well, I have not any specific idea in mind, but it has been axiomatic in all the discussions about peace in the Middle East that a final settlement would have to have some sort of a guarantee. Some people have suggested a Soviet-American guarantee. Others have suggested a

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security Council guarantee. Others have suggested a unilateral American guarantee. All that I have suggested is that the United States is studying the problem of what guarantees would be adequate for a final settlement, I repeat, not as a substitute for the sense of security and justice of the parties concerned, but as a reinforcement of it once the negotiation has been concluded.

It is inconceivable to me that there could be any American participation in a guarantee that did not have the full support of the Congress of the United States. By what means that is achieved would depend on the nature of the guarantee and on the commitments that it would involve. But there does not yet exist an Administration position either on the nature of the guarantee or on the commitment; nor have we had any discussions with the Israeli Government. All I indicated is that this is a subject we are studying within our Government, as we are duty-bound to do in the process of moving towards a final peace.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you speak of a *quid pro quo*, would that be expressed at this step or at some future stage? And secondly, would it be something directly given to Israel by Egypt or indirectly? And indeed, if it's indirect is that a *quid pro quo*?

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A Well, I think that Israel has to be the judge of what it considers an adequate arrangement. And that is not for me to say at this moment. It stands to reason that a settlement is not possible until both sides are satisfied with it. It is also clear that, Israel being a democracy, any agreement that is made must have visible parts that can be presented to the Israeli domestic opinion and to the Israeli Parliament.

What combination of direct and indirect assurances will be given must be left to the process of negotiation. But it goes without saying that any settlement to have any meaning must be acceptable to both parties.

Q Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back for a moment to the Viet-Nam problem and the grave doubts that you referred to. You seem to be saying that it is more important for the United States to enjoy credibility abroad than to have credibility at home.

A No. I'm saying that the security of the United States and the security of the many countries in the world that depend on the United States is a matter of the gravest importance to the American people as well. And I, therefore, believe that however painful the discussions, however anguished the experiences, that the American people

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the security of those countries that rely on it. This has serious consequences. I know it is fashionable to sneer at the word "domino theory." I think this is a very grave matter on which serious people have had a divided opinion. And we've been torn apart by the Viet-Nam War long enough. But I do not believe we can escape this problem by assuming the responsibility of condemning those who have dealt with us to a certain destruction.

The answer to your question is, yes, this is one of the things. But I was talking of a more general problem.

Q More specifically, the country that's most often discussed in the context of American security is Israel. Do you think Israel perhaps is exempt from this problem because of support in Congress?

A I do not think it is appropriate for me to go around the world asking which countries would be particularly threatened by this attitude. I would say that the questions that are now being asked can be applied to almost any country as far as terminal date is concerned, as far as the end process is concerned. I do not want to apply it to any particular country. And it is, of course, clear that there has been a special relationship between Israel and the United States that can withstand strains

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that other relationships might not be able to withstand.

But it is not a trivial matter.

Q Mr. Secretary, within the spirit of meaningful
detente why haven't you put more pressure on the Russians
and the Chinese not to supply Hanoi so abundantly?

A First of all, I am constantly being asked
why don't we bring pressure here, bring pressure there,
as if the word "pressure" had a concrete significance.
When you ask about pressure, you have to ask yourself
what concretely the United States can do, what is the "or
else" that we are threatening.

Secondly, it has been our policy throughout not
to turn these issues into public confrontations on the
theory that countries can go along more easily if it is
not turned into a public confrontation. I believe that the
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China know what
our view of this matter is. I think it is also important
to point out that the scale of the North Vietnamese
offensive in the South is not only related to the amount
of arms that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
are supplying, it is also related to the fact that, now
that there is no longer any interdiction and that the
communications system has been improved so enormously,

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almost the entire input into North Viet-Nam can be moved
rapidly to South Viet-Nam together with all of the stockpiles
that existed at the end of the war.

Q Mr. Secretary, this morning in New York City the Anti-Defamation League charged that the Army Corps of Engineers is using discriminatory practices by requiring individuals applying for work on projects in Arab countries to state their religion. Would you comment on that, and also state what the Administration's policy is and attitudes are on U.S. private investment in Arab countries?

A I do not know about this particular charge.
And I do not know about the particular practice of the
Army Corps of Engineers, which is a question which should
be addressed to the Defense Department. I know, however,
that the basic policy of the Administration is totally
opposed to discrimination in any form.

As far as the Department of State is concerned,
for which I am responsible, I know that officers are assigned
without regard to race or religion, and that we don't even
know their race or religion in making the assignments.

With respect to the U.S. policy of investment in
Arab countries, the United States basically favors it. The
United States is strongly opposed to any discriminatory

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Q Mr. Secretary, in your earlier responses on
the future of Indochina, you dwelled mostly on South Viet-
Nam. Is there anything more hopeful that can be looked
to in Cambodia, apart from staving off collapse?

A We would do our utmost in Cambodia, if
collapse can be staved off, to promote a negotiation.
And it is difficult to know whether such a negotiation is
possible.

We have, over the past year, made major efforts
to promote a compromise settlement, which it would be wrong
to detail now. We would continue these efforts, but I
will not make any misleading statements as to what is
possible. I am putting the issue: whether the United
States wants to take the responsibility of cutting off
ammunition at this particular moment.

Q Mr. Secretary, I didn't quite understand
your answer to Mr. Gwertzman's question.

Were you saying that the Congress might now,
indeed, take a harder look at providing military aid to
Israel?

A I do not want to be put into
a position in which I am asserting that the lessons of

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Viet-Nam are going to be applied in any particular area.
I see no evidence that the Congress is applying a
harder look to aid to Israel now, and I am not bringing
these two matters into a relationship.

Q Mr. Secretary, will you comment on the foreign
policy implications of the tariff, versus the quota, with
particular reference to the suggestion that one would be
indiscriminate and the other might be used selectively?

A I have really not thought this particular
issue through, and I will make sure that our Spokesman
will say something about it during the week.

Q Mr. Secretary, a related question:

You are reported at continuing cross purposes
with the Treasury Department on international oil policy.
Is there an "Administration" policy or is it a "Kissinger"
policy?

And is there going to be a consumer-producer
conference in March?

A First, the speech that I delivered-- on
I believe it was February 3rd -- was done at the request of
the President. It was approved in all its particulars by
the President. It was gone over by the White House officials