Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank my friend Valéry Giscard d'Estaing for speaking in French. It would be extremely embarrassing if a French President were heard to speak with less of an accent in English than a former American Secretary of State.

I will talk about the problem from a historical and foreign political point of view. Let me say, first of all, that I agree in fact with all of the specific recommendations that President Giscard d'Estaing put before us. So, what I say should not be taken as a reluctance to aid Russia, or a lack of appreciation of the importance of economic recovery in Russia.

But I would like to make a brief historical analysis of the problem we face. I think every nation is in part a product of a historical evolution, in the sense that what it has done over the centuries indicates what its leadership groups have considered reasonable and sensible. This is very difficult for North Americans to understand. In some American movies somebody with a particular type of personality and then he has an automobile accident and he emerges as a man of almost angelic quality as the result of a single experience. I have never seen this in any person and I assume as well that historic evolution has to be taken into account.

Now, I believe that Russia today and the former Soviet Union is the result of at least three developments. One, Russian historic imperial expansion. Second, the Russian method of government and third, communist ideology. And those are not the same phenomena.

I believe indeed that of those three, the removal, or the change from communist ideology is relatively the easiest and for that reason, the definition of the issue that is so often presented to the public - that by supporting one particular leader, we are supporting the democrats and that otherwise, the communists will come back - is a fair description of the actual situation in Russia. It is unwise for the West to say that it must do what it is doing because otherwise, Russia will go back to its military expansionism and that as a way to finance lower defense expenditures, we should give part of the savings to Russia. If the Soviet Union could not prevail in the military arms race during the Cold War that it can prevail in its present disorganized position.

I would hate to have western policy based on the proposition that we are being blackmailed regardless of whether the Soviet Union is strong or whether Russia is weak. Therefore, we have to have some better reasons for proceeding - which exist.

Let me now say a few words about the various elements that I mentioned. Russia has always been a state which has been partly in Europe and partly outside Europe: not only geographically but also conceptually. It is a nation with open frontiers, characterized at one and the same time by an enormous sense of insecurity and by a vast sense of mission. A nation that on two occasions at least, vis-à-vis Napoleon and Hitler, preserved the European equilibrium and on many other occasions rebelled against the balance of power as conceived in Europe. Symptomatic of this is the fact that the foreign ministry in Russia in the 19th century, right up to the end of World War I, had under its jurisdiction all the territories in which Russia was not expanding, while all the other territories were under the so-called Asiatic Department, which included the Balkans, the Ottoman Empire, Central Asia. The Asiatic Department always insisted that it was not playing by European rules but that it would proceed on the issues that it dealt with unilaterally. So, there is a tradition in Russia of both attraction to the European equilibrium and expansionism. There are similarities to European politics and similarities to American. The expansion across Siberia and into Central Asia was more similar to the American expansion across the continent, except that eventually Russia ran up against

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opposing imperialisms in Central Asia, in the form of Britain, and in the Far East in Japan. There
was a Russian nationalist writer who at the end of the 19th century said the partition of Poland was
a declaration of war against Europe by us and now, if we do not reach the Adriatic, they will push
us back to the Dneiper.

On the other side of the world, the Russian Chancellor Witte said in 1903, located as we are,
it is our destiny that major parts of China fall under our rule and that should be the thrust of our
policy. This was just before the Russo-Japanese War, which one forgets today was about who would
govern Manchuria.

So, there is a certain historic momentum in Russian policy. When one looks at Stalin's
policy and the pre-Gorbachev Russian foreign policy, it really followed the same basic pattern, a set
of objectives for almost exactly the Peter the Great territory in the West, and at the end of the War
in the Far East, by asking for control of the Manchurian railways in China and control over Port
Arthur, in other words a reversal of World War I results in the West and of the Russo-Japanese War
results in the East. This is a reality and it must have appeared reasonable to most leading Russians
or it would not have been sustained as it was. Therefore, we find ourselves vis-à-vis the former
Soviet Union in a situation where it is mistaken to believe that we are dealing here with a European
country on the road to bourgeoisization to which the rules of the Marshall Plan can be automatically
applied and which if it is only encouraged to engage in recovery, it will become like the West
European nations did in the 1950s, 60s and 70s.

It faces a whole series of unusual problems. One is that the organization of the economy in
Russia was far more pervasive under the Stalinist system of central planning, and central direction,
than was the economy of China. In Russia, there are no survivors left of the capitalist period who
could help guide it. Indeed, there was no capitalist period in the western sense. The free enterprise
that existed in Russia is largely of a trading variety.

Secondly, the system as it developed in the former Soviet Union had these features:
managers of economic enterprises were not selected for their entrepreneurial skills but for their
political acumen. Their skill consisted in negotiating goals for themselves in collusion, one must say
with the planning mechanism and the ministries, that they knew could be fulfilled or if they could
not be fulfilled, could be covered up in such a way that not even the top leadership knew exactly
what the production level was. So, the managers of the communist system as it developed in the
Soviet Union, do not have an entrepreneurial attitude; they do not have a conception of the market
that existed in Europe at the end of World War II and that exists in China partly because the system
was not so pervasive and partly because of the profound individualism of the Chinese society which
it was impossible to put under the same degree.

Thirdly, and paradoxically, one result of the communist system was that on the whole the
ablest people in the Soviet Union were in the Communist Party. When Gorbachev moved the center
of gravity out of the Communist Party he threw this group into opposition. Without discussing
Gorbachev's fate - he is a man for whom I retain great respect because of his enormous historic
contribution - the fact is that anybody governing Russia today is in a way a product of the communist
system and must appeal to former members of the communist system if he wants to govern. It is

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therefore absurd to say that this is a struggle of democrats against communists. It is a power
struggle which concerns a number of specifically Russian problems.

On the economic side, I believe that the issue will come down to free enterprise on the
American model, or some kind of market economy on the Asian model, whether there should be
some kind of unconstrained free market, or whether there should be some governmental setting of
priorities. This seems to me to be the debate between the sensible reformers and the sensible
members of the Yeltsin opposition. We really do not do ourselves a favor in the West by pretending
that there is a group of communists there that is going to re-establish Stalinist central planning.
Indeed I believe communism collapsed, primarily because of its economic failings and not because
of abstract aspirations towards political freedom.

This being the case, we are now at the beginning of the process in the former Soviet Union,
not at the end of the process. We cannot gear ourselves to the victory of one particular individual
that will then solve all of the problems. We must keep in mind that probably, the most important
issue that we will all face - we of the outside world and I would say we and the constructive Russian
- is that, in a situation as we see now in the former Soviet Union, nationalism may turn out to be
the chief unifying force.

There are in fact two revolutions in Russia, in the former Soviet Union; the anti-communist
revolution which is mostly on economic issues and on which I would believe 90 percent of the people
of the former Soviet Union agree. But then there is a second revolution: an anti-imperialist, anti-
Russian imperialist revolution. On this one, 90 percent of the people outside of Russia agree, and
only a very small percentage of the people inside Russia agree, and we are refusing to face that
reality. I know very few Russians - if the truth be known, I do not know any - who have accepted
the break-up of the Soviet Union. I know many who accept the break-up of the Stalinist and
communist system. But the reality is that for most Russians - and very understandably - the
disintegration of the Russian empire started by Peter the Great is an extraordinarily painful matter
and that applies even to the Baltic countries. We have to face the fact that whoever wins in the
Russian power struggle, which we cannot control, will probably appeal to nationalism in the end.
It would be ironical if the people we support most assiduously are the ones that have to do it most
urgently so that they can prove that they are not western tools.

If we think ahead to the future, we have to consider that the relationship of Russia to the
neighboring members of the former Soviet Union will become one of the major foreign policy
problems of our time period and at least in our own discussions we will have to face it. I agree
strongly with one of the points Valéry made which called attention to the need to develop a new set
of relationships with these former members of the Soviet Union. This way, at least the Russian
leadership would know that in the political perception of the outside world with which they may wish
to cooperate, attempts to regain Ukraine or the Baltic states are not free.

In fact, our conduct is quite the opposite: we all act as if these new states were appendages
of Moscow. When Moscow takes over their debt - as Giscard told us - I consider this a symptom
of the same problem. The way we have handled the nuclear and other issues almost legitimizes
Russian eventual pressure on Ukraine and elsewhere, and takes no account of the tendencies that I
have described. In all our countries around this table, we never read about visitors from the Ukraine

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or visits of high officials of other new countries. We do far too little to signal that we are taking the independence of these countries seriously. There are very few political ties built between the European Communities and at least those countries which would logically have some relationship to Europe. Strangely enough, in Central Asia where we and Russia really have comparable strategic interests and where we and Russia could have a strategic dialogue about how to prevent a growth of fundamentalism, we are still not dealing with these countries as if they were really independent countries. The dialogue that I think we must have with our Russian leaders can be based on major cooperation in many areas of the political field.

If one looks at the evolution of Russia, one can see the following possible outcomes:

a. Russia could become a bourgeois West European type of state concerned with mass consumption, interested only in local foreign policy, primarily concerned with being left alone by the rest of the world and a member of international economic organizations. This, of course, would be by far the most desirable outcome.

b. The second alternative would be a Russia which I hope becomes strong, our economic aid programs succeed. Then the question is, having succeeded, will it become a state like the first one, or will it do one of two things: to try to reclaim the old empire of Peter the Great in one way or another. And I believe most of the Russians that I know, of the generation above forty, which is the one I know best, have in the back of their minds, that this is their destiny. If that happens, the historic Russian relationship to Europe will recur: of a Poland terrified of attempts and building defenses together with the rest of Europe. While it will not be the Cold War, it will still have certain similarities to the period prior to World War I.

c. Another possibility is that Russia moves its center of gravity to the Urals and then becomes much more active in Asian policies. This was the experience for 30 years between the Congress of Berlin and the Russo-Japanese War. Russia might well have continued in that direction - probably would have, had the Japanese cooperated in relieving Europe by letting them take Manchuria. Still, I do not think that there are any territorial objectives of Russia in Asia.

Where does this lead me? There is some considerable utility in cooperating with Russia, even if one has no illusions about its likely course, because one of the themes of Russian history has been the isolation from the rest of the world and the sense of being surrounded by a hostile environment. And, therefore, the West and Japan at least ought to make an attempt to demonstrate in this period of crisis that it was willing to be cooperative.

But, there are a number of qualifications. Qualification one is we should not delude ourselves. We should not say that the struggle between Yeltsin and his opponents is about democracy versus communism inside Russia. If you read the constitution that Yeltsin has put forward, it is about Pinochet-type, Salazar-type autocratic rule. I do not know that it is our duty to oppose this, because it is probably true that, as the Chinese say, you cannot have huge political upheavals and huge economic upheavals simultaneously. But, we should also not delude our publics as to what is really going on. Two or three years from now, many of those in the West who are now speaking so lightly about intervention in Russia's internal struggles may be embarrassed.

[LJ]

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Second, it is not in our interests to say that there is only one Russian leader with whom we can work. We should work with the President of Russia. But, we should not try to select the President of Russia. It was a mistake when we did it with Gorbachev and it is a mistake when we do it with Yeltsin.

Third, to pick up a point that I have heard Helmut made many times - we have to treat Russia with dignity now, and let it participate with genuine conviction in international problems, so that it does not believe that only by rattling the sword will it be taken seriously.

Fourth, we have to indicate what our priorities are and we have to pay some attention to the newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union who are going through a terrible trauma, even greater in many respects than that of Russia. By building Moscow into a new imperial center through which all our attention flows, we are buying ourselves into a very big crisis later on.

Fifth, in talking to Russian leaders, we have to get across this fact. In a way, the previous perception of the greatness of Russia has been expansionist. Russia has never been content within Russian borders. A Russia extending from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok has 11 time zones: it need not feel claustrophobic. In an age of nuclear weapons and modern technology it need not feel insecure - there is no Napoleon or Hitler that can march into Russia. So, it is incumbent on Russian leaders to break the rhythm of the history as a condition for long-term cooperation with the West, because on that basis, there is no reason for clashing interests. And there is no reason why Russia could not become a major contributor to international peace and stability. But we should not kid ourselves that just by spending a little money and by making pronouncements whenever there is a certain type of crisis in Russia on behalf of this or that leader, we are getting to the core of the problem. I want to repeat that none of this is inconsistent - in fact, all of this is compatible with the specific program that Valéry has put forward and all I tried to do is to embed it in a larger framework.

Thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger's intervention,
InterAction Council meeting, Shanghai

May, 1993

Mr. Chairman, first of all let me correct what must have been a misunderstanding by the interpreter. I did not speak of a Manifest Russian Destiny in Asia or in Europe. I spoke of the fact that the Russian expansion across Siberia was similar to the North American expansion across that continent in the name of Manifest Destiny and I was making the historical point that, while Russia had certain similarities to Europe, it also had certain similarities to the United States which, however, I did not apply to the present period. This is simply to correct my own view.

Secondly, with reference to a point that Jim Callaghan made, and then I will deal with the important point made by Giscard -- that there is indeed a difference between Russian imperialism and British imperialism: Russian imperialism created ever new requirements for its armed forces, an ever renewed sense of insecurity and of threat which made it possess a momentum that was not just much more difficult to reverse but is also much more difficult to abolish at this particular moment.

I agree with Mr. Alfonsin on the point about democracy. I do not believe we can accomplish anything by supporting individuals. I do not consider Yeltsin a particularly democratic phenomenon, but I also consider him the representative of one power faction in the Soviet Union as opposed to another power faction, hence I believe we should stand

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for institutions and not for individuals, and for Russia, not for a particular political grouping within Russia which we do not understand well enough. Where Mr. Alfonsin's point was most relevant was in the nature of aid; I would far prefer to give some of our aid to social development than to academic professors who have liberated themselves from their universities and are imposing abstract theories on the basis of no experience in government in a country with a totally different social structure. This is my view and it would in fact be the most beneficial route of getting American and other foreign aid to Russia.

Now, to the critical point raised by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. It is without any question a key problem which we should address and to which there is no simple answer. I think it is a sign of some frivolity on the part of Western leaders that they are not addressing it at all. We have the paradox that at this moment, of the 15 nations which are members of the United Nations and on whose territory there are Russian troops -- or (as Jim Callaghan has pointed out) on all of them practically -- nobody has raised the question about the anomaly of there being four Russian divisions in Kazakhstan, Russian divisions in Moldavia, in the Ukraine, and in Georgia and elsewhere -- most of which are participating in the civil wars that are going on over there.

Now, I think it is a real problem that the borders were drawn by the previous regimes in such a way that these are not natural states. The Ukraine, as a matter of fact, was simply given the Crimea in 1954 by Krushchev. In each of these countries, including

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the Ukraine and the Baltic, the Russians have carefully maintained their minorities.

So, I think the question you raised ought to receive serious attention. Certainly Russia will have certain preeminent interests in the bordering countries to keep its security interests from being challenged. But the question is: what do the Russians want? Do they want certain adjustments or do they want to reconquer all the territories? Belarus is a complicated case, having little historical tradition. Ukraine was an independent country from the year 1000 to 1654, and it took another hundred years before it was swallowed up due to Russian imperialism. So, for Russia to reconquer 60 million Ukrainians would be such an assault on the international order that it would send shock waves throughout Europe. And I believe that, at a minimum, one ought not to encourage the specifically Russian version of imperialism by conducting ourselves as we do in the West of never raising the issue, and secondly of dealing with Moscow as if it were still the imperial center. Certainly nations can change and nothing would be better for the world than if Russia gave up the imperialistic part of its tradition. In that framework, one could discuss, and should discuss, border adjustments reflecting the nationalities. In a way, I do not think it is possible in the Baltics, but I think it should be possible with the other surrounding countries. Now in Central Asia, I believe that if Russia accepts the independence of those nations, we can cooperate with it in respect to some of the threats -- especially from the South -- so I am suggesting that we should not concentrate our attention on the day-to-day power struggles in Moscow, as is the dominant Western trend right now, to giving aid in order to affect referendums on this

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or that issue.

Incidentally, I believe that the constitution proposed by Mr. Yeltsin is a very authoritarian and not a particularly democratic one. It therefore makes it particularly complicated for the West to intervene in a struggle of the personalities. So, with respect to your question, I believe that the democratic nations ought to discuss among themselves what answer they will give to themselves and to your question. I would not be absolutely doctrinaire about it, but I would certainly insist that it be done in the context of their independence rather than with an assault on their basic structure. In the post-World War I period, the Germans had a lot of legitimate complaints about self-determination. But, once they were given the authority to end them, the independence of even the non-German parts of those territories became lost, even recognizing that it was in the course of a very unusual regime. So, we should not trivialize the demise of the Soviet Union by turning it into an issue of personalities or by making believe that we can pay our way out of this by aid programs whose magnitude is really relatively small in relation to the total issue -- if one compares it with what Germany has had to pay. And while I have no final answer to your question, I do think it is being frivolously neglected at this moment.