MEET THE PRESS

**MR. UTLEY:** Hello again. On "Meet the Press" today, the Middle East—Iraq and the United States. What does a great power do?

Our guests this morning are Senators William Cohen, Republican of Maine, and John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio. Later in the program, we'll be talking with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

**MR. UTLEY:** We may well be in the post-Cold War era, but not yet in the post-war era. There will always be the Saddam Husseins of this world who will make sure of that. His invasion of Kuwait has focused our attention once again on one of the fundamentals of our lives: our dependence on stability in the Middle East, and the energy—the oil—that flows from it. That is what we are talking about this morning, first with Senators William Cohen, who is in New York, and John Glenn, here in Washington. Both are members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the Armed Services Committee.

And joining me on the panel this morning are R.W. Apple of *The New York Times* and Fred Francis, NBC's Pentagon correspondent. Good morning, gentlemen.

**Senator Cohen, let's start with you in New York—the question of intelligence, what we knew or didn't know, and how we acted upon it. Was our intelligence up to the proper standards, and did we act on it correctly?**

**SENATOR COHEN:** Well, I think the intelligence certainly was up to the proper standards. There is no question in my mind but that we had a very good fix on the massing of troops and their location. As to whether or not we took appropriate action, of course, that's in great doubt. But I think the intelligence was there.

And, of course, we have to remember our intelligence community can often tell us what's in a man's hand, but not often what's in a man's heart—and that's the key issue here. We could ask Hosni Mubarak, for example, whether he believed that Saddam Hussein was going to invade and he would tell you, no. So I think that it's a question of did we know what his intent was? Answer—no. Were we reasonably sure that he was going to attack, at least a day before? I think the answer is, yes.

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**MR. UTLEY:** But you raise doubt about this. Senator Glenn, let me come to you. Do you raise the same doubts that we acted on the intelligence properly—the intelligence that was there?

**SENATOR GLENN:** Well, I don't know there was a lot that we could have done. Maybe we could have started our diplomatic efforts 24 hours sooner—something like that. Would that have changed the whole situation? I rather doubt that it would have. But I agree with Bill that I think the evidence is pretty much there that we did indeed know about the build-up—and we couldn't define the final intent, but the build-up indicated the intent.

**MR. FRANCIS:** Senator Cohen, Saddam Hussein is very largely a creature of our making. During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States government gave him critical intelligence to beat off Iran over and over and over again. In hindsight, sir, was that the thing we ought to have done?

**SENATOR COHEN:** Absolutely not, as far as I'm concerned. We have a situation where we've had a wolf knocking at our door, and we persuaded ourselves that he's really a vegetarian. And I think this past week's incident indeed indicates that he likes red meat. I think we've made mistakes over the years with respect to Saddam Hussein. For years we've known he's been building a chemical weapons capability—and the West has helped. For years, we have supplied him with trade credits, purchased his oil. We have helped build this particular monster as such that is now swallowing up countries like Kuwait and threatens to—even if not invade Saudi Arabia—to attack Saudi Arabia.

Another point here: even though the intelligence may indicate that he at this point is not prepared to attack Saudi Arabia, I believe he has the capability to do so within a very short period of time—and there is very little that John Glenn has indicated that we could do even to stop that at this point.

**MR. FRANCIS:** Senator Glenn, our options are so limited—the president's options are so limited. It's my understanding that the president has to have a go from Saudi Arabia to begin moving heavy armored divisions from the United States. We can do nothing without that, can we?

**SENATOR GLENN:** Well, no, we can't really. They've wanted us over the horizon. They've always wanted us in the area, but over the horizon and out of sight.

**MR. FRANCIS:** The Saudis?

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**SENATOR GLENN:** The Saudis——they haven't wanted us to appear to be dominating their politics and their regional situation.

I differ slightly on what Iraq has done in the past with Bill just a little bit. I think we have to put it in proper context here. At one time we were very worried about whether Iran was going to prevail, come right around the Horn to the top of the Gulf, down through Kuwait, the Saudi oil fields, and was going to be——the new Iran was going to control all the oil——that's 70 percent of known reserves of the world that are in the Persian Gulf. And that was our major concern. It was in that context that we went, as I would agree with Bill, sort of overboard on backing Iraq. But you have to put it in the proper context in that time.

**MR. APPLE:** Senator Cohen, there's a Republican in the White House. He's a man everybody has been calling a very lucky president for 18 months. His luck seems to have run out.

Is there a possibility, is there a danger——everybody's comparing this to the 1930s——that if he doesn't take military action, he's going to be seen as the Neville Chamberlain of this episode?

**SENATOR COHEN:** I don't think so. Frankly, I don't believe his luck has run out. I think circumstances have changed rather dramatically in the past week; but nonetheless——

**MR. APPLE:** But that's what luck was called.

**SENATOR COHEN:** No——this has been coming for some time. We have ignored this issue. And part of it is our over-indulgence in energy consumption. Rather than simply looking for a war on Baghdad, perhaps we ought to be also focusing and declaring a war on energy waste. We don't have an energy conservation policy in this country, and that's also part of the president's options that we ought to be pursuing.

I don't think he's going to be looked upon as a Neville Chamberlain. I think at this particular point, we have to look to the Saudis and say, "Saudis and others, are you now prepared to call upon the United States to do the kinds of things that may be necessary to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking you and putting all of us on the cruel rack of ex-tortion?"

A lot is going to depend on the cooperation of our allies. Japan, in particular, was very helpful in announcing it's going to impose sanctions. But this is not simply a United-States versus a Saddam-Hussein issue; this involves all of the western world. So it's not simply Neville Chamberlain for the president of the United States. Everybody is involved in this one.

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MR. UTLEY: But, Senators, following up on this point— the hard option. If the Saudis were to call on American military support—intervention—could we do it? Now, I remember the early 1980s—I think the viewers remember, too—this rapid deployment force, able to go in there and secure the oil fields, airlift commands. What happened to all of this?

SENATOR GLENN: We have two different levels of things. One is the tactical situation they're in right now. Do we have forces in position to prevent him from moving down toward the Saudi oil fields—

MR. UTLEY: The answer is, no?

SENATOR GLENN: —right away in a few days? The answer is absolutely, no, we do not. We can't protect every single place around the whole world.

Now, long-term, tactically, can we control it? Yes, his economy is completely based on oil. It's through two pipelines. We can either set up a sea blockade—or, if it really came to a tough situation, we could take out the pumping stations on those lines, and his economy comes to a screeching halt. So long-term, we can control that.

Short-term, tactically, we take time to mobilize, time to get in. We could do some things like bombers and things that can come in immediately. But as far as controlling real estate on the ground on behalf of the Saudis, we're not in an immediate position to do that.

MR. FRANCIS: Senator Cohen, do you blame the Saudis? Let me take their position for the moment. The United States sends several hundred thousand troops into Saudi Arabia. We beat back an advance, we retake Kuwait, and then we go home. And the Saudis say, "Saddam Hussein's still in Baghdad." Can you blame the Saudis for not wanting to get into this fray?

SENATOR COHEN: No, I'm not looking to blame the Saudis. What I'm suggesting is that the Saudis and the other, quote, moderate Arab states have to make some choices now. Now, they have to make this judgment: Are they prepared to call upon the United States for assistance, realizing that the United States does not have a good record in terms of its long-term commitment? Are we willing to make that kind of commitment to the Middle East? That remains up in the air. That's why I think it's important that we have a consensus developed within the Congress before the president even makes that kind of a commitment. Are we willing to stand behind the president, if he's willing to do so, and to send that kind of a message to the Saudis that we're going to be there?

I think it's going to require—

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MR. APPLE: Senator Glenn—excuse me.

SENATOR COHEN: If I could just finish—it's going to require more than just the United States; it requires our allies as well. And that point should not be lost.

MR. APPLE: Senator Glenn, I've just been out in your state, as it happens. All the television news, all the newspapers, are full of only one kind of story. They are not discussing military options; they are not discussing any of the things we're discussing. They're discussing gasoline prices—pictures of prices going up, up, up.

Isn't this going to make people in the country eager for the president to do something—that phrase that always happens when we seem to have our fate in the hands of someone else?

SENATOR GLENN: Yes. I think there will be that pressure—there isn't any doubt about that. People's interests are in their own pocketbook at the local level all the time. And, of course, prices are going to go up. And the very fact that we're proposing a boycott there means the supply of oil around the world is going to be diminished; it means that we're going to be party to putting prices of oil up for a while.

MR. APPLE: I hate to mention mundane things at a moment of crisis like this, but there's an election in the fall. Is the Democratic Party going to try to capitalize on this and say George Bush got us into this mess? After all, the Republicans did that to Jimmy Carter, as I recall.

SENATOR GLENN: Well, maybe they did; but I wouldn't think that would be something that would be a major campaign theme. This has developed over a long period of time, and I think everybody realizes that.

MR. APPLE: So you're going to take the high road?

SENATOR GLENN: Well, I would certainly hope we would.

MR. UTLEY: Coming back to the specific question of Saudi Arabia and American policy, sometimes we get all bollixed up with countervailing policies. For example, we sold a lot of weapons to Saudi Arabia, including F-14s. We sold those planes without the capacity, the capability, to attack tanks because Israel didn't want the Saudis to have that capability in case of a war with Israel.

Now there is Saddam Hussein with all these thousands of tanks. The Saudis can't use our American-built planes to fight them. Isn't there something wrong here?

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**SENATOR GLENN:** Well, there aren't that number of planes anyway, there, Garrick, because the number of planes they have up against some 5,500 or 5,700 Iraqi tanks—good tanks—are hardly a match there for that number. They could still overwhelm them.

Let me say one thing. The American public has never gotten serious about a policy—an energy policy—and what we’re going to do in this part of the world. We haven’t gone into conservation—things we could do here. We’re back to driving big cars again. Are we willing to really address this and make a long-term commitment, as Bill says? Will the American public make a long-term commitment to seeing that those oil lanes remain open from the Mideast? That’s something we’ve never done.

**MR. UTLEY:** Important question—one quick question about the defense budget. Cuts are coming—post-Cold War era. Many people raise questions, perhaps we shouldn’t go so fast. Senator Cohen, your opinion—will this affect the cuts in defense spending?

**SENATOR COHEN:** I think it will have some impact. There has been a rush to have almost a free-fall in defense spending. I think this is going to put somewhat of a moderation on that. We’ll still have substantial cuts, as we voted yesterday in the full Senate. But I don’t think they’ll be as deep as they otherwise might have been.

**MR. FRANCIS:** Briefly, Senator Cohen, to stop Saddam Hussein, must we go all the way to Baghdad?

**SENATOR COHEN:** I don't think we have to go all the way to Baghdad. I think we have to make him pay a penalty for his actions; but I don't think we have to go to Baghdad yet.

**MR. UTLEY:** Senators, thank you very much for being with us this morning here on "Meet the Press."

Next we'll talk with Dr. Henry Kissinger about the Middle East and what should or can be done there, as "Meet the Press" continues.

(Announcements)

**MR. UTLEY:** On "Meet the Press" this morning, the subject is the Middle East and the United States. R.W. Apple, Fred Francis and I are talking now with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is at his home in Connecticut this morning.

Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

**DR. KISSINGER:** Good morning. How are you?

**MR. UTLEY:** Very well. You, of course, have great, lengthy experience in the sands of the Middle East; you know that area very

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well. As we look at the Middle East on this Sunday morning, are we not in a situation where just about all the talk of embargoes and sanctions and freezing assets—where we are going to have to face the fact of a Saddam Hussein not only occupying Kuwait but really dictating the future Saudi oil production and therefore world oil prices?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, I would hate to accept this. I think the fundamental issue is whether we can get Saddam Hussein to withdraw his army from Kuwait and take his puppets with him. If we don't achieve this, then he will have a stranglehold on the world oil supplies.

**MR. UTLEY:** Do you think we can achieve this? Is it possible within reasonable terms and options to achieve that?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I think if all these embargoes that the industrial democracies have announced—that is, the European Community and Japan and the United States—are in fact being maintained, if no oil is being bought from Iraq and Kuwait, and if an economic blockade is made effective for several months, I think that, then, Iraq will have to withdraw.

**MR. APPLE:** Dr. Kissinger, I don't want to sound cynical, but economic blockades and embargoes imposed by different countries in different parts of the world with different geopolitical imperatives don't have a great record.

**DR. KISSINGER:** You are right.

**MR. FRANCIS:** Suppose this doesn't work?

**DR. KISSINGER:** If that doesn't work, then we will face a situation in which the various—the small principalities in the Saudi peninsula, so-called emirates, will be totally intimidated, because they will face essentially the same problem as Kuwait; and in which the Saudis will begin to tack towards Iraq whose fundamental demand is a reduction in oil production so that the price of oil can be pushed up. And I don't think we'll ever get to the point of military protection.

**MR. APPLE:** Do you think that we have the stomach in any way to involve ourselves militarily in that part of the world?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, it depends what kind of military action is contemplated. In the immediate future, I don't believe that Iraq has any intention of invading Saudi Arabia. And I believe there is too much discussion of how we're going to protect Saudi Arabia and not enough discussion of how we're going to get them out of Kuwait. If they stay in Kuwait, either with their troops or with their government, their domination of the Gulf will be extremely probable. And that is what we need to focus on.

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For the immediate future, the only military action that I can see necessary is a possible blockade of the Straits of Hormuz and of the two ports through which Iraqi oil flows. And the European Community has hinted that they might be willing to join us in this. I don't think we should do this alone. Europe and Japan get much more of their oil from the Gulf than we do, and it will be a test of whether it is possible in the post-Cold War period to organize the industrial democracies on an issue that after all—that involves their economic survival.

**MR. FRANCIS:** Dr. Kissinger, isn't that very dangerous—blocking Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil? Doesn't that invite Saddam Hussein to close the Saudi oil fields? Isn't it a very serious gamble?

**DR. KISSINGER:** But his long-term strategy is to reduce the oil flow from the Gulf to a level at which the price of oil can be escalated by him to arbitrary levels.

**MR. FRANCIS:** So that lays the foundation for Saudi acquiescence, lays the foundation for all the sheikhdoms to say, well, we just have to live with this monster to the north.

**DR. KISSINGER:** If he stays in Kuwait, if the Iraqis under any guise stay in Kuwait, I think that it is very likely to happen. I'm not saying we should do any military action unilaterally. And I would like to see whether the economic boycott can work without it. But before we station troops in Saudi Arabia, I would try these other measures.

**MR. UTLEY:** But, Dr. Kissinger, if worst comes to worst, he doesn't get the troops out of Kuwait, can we live with a Saddam Hussein in Baghdad occupying Kuwait and oil production continuing in Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia?

**DR. KISSINGER:** I would suspect that he will make some such proposal, and that's like asking can we live with Hitler occupying the Rhineland. His announced strategy is to unify the Arab world in what will essentially amount to an anti-Western coalition, or an anti-industrial-democracy coalition. In the short term, we will probably be able to live with it. In the long term, it means that we are at the mercy of oil production in an area dominated by a country that has shown a ruthless hostility.

**MR. UTLEY:** Dr. Kissinger, as you've just indicated, this goes beyond the question of oil in the Persian Gulf; it comes back to the question of Israel itself. Yesterday I was interviewing King Hussein of Jordan who's very worried about what has happened in Israel, feels more and more threatened by Israel. He's seeking protection from Baghdad.

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Do you see Iraq becoming a frontline state, quote-unquote, in the conflict or confrontation with Israel?

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is working itself into that position. But this particular issue now with Kuwait is not between Israel and Iraq; it is between the industrial democracies and Iraq. And we should take great care not to involve Israel in it and make it look as if this is a Zionist-American joint enterprise.

MR. APPLE: Dr. Kissinger, a few moments ago you were comparing Saddam in Kuwait to Hitler in the Rhineland or in the Sudetenland or Czechoslovakia.

DR. KISSINGER: Only in the sense that they are turning points in which strategic realities are created—

MR. APPLE: I understand that.

DR. KISSINGER: —after which the control of events is out of your hands.

MR. APPLE: I understand that. One thing that a lot of people and—think would have been a good thing is if more effective attempts had been made to assassinate Hitler early. Do you think that that sort of thing—do you think that that sort of thing is something that ought to be attempted in Iraq by us or by another intelligence service, which shall remain nameless?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think assassinations—state-sponsored assassinations—are not an American specialty, and shouldn't be an American specialty.

MR. FRANCIS: Dr. Kissinger, is it not in the Soviet interest, the Soviet interest, to join forces with the United States, in that if the Western economies are plundered by $45 a barrel oil, $35 a barrel oil, all those loans and credits will not go to the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: That's right. I think in the immediate situation the Soviet Union has an interest in preventing a major recession in the West; and this would certainly contribute to it.

MR. FRANCIS: How should they contribute? How should the Soviets contribute, other than just an arms embargo?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets—if the Soviets actually cut their military supplies and if what they've said—it isn't clear to me from the announcement whether they are stopping new sales, which would only be effective two or three years from now, or whether they are actually stopping the pipeline into Iraq. If they do the latter and if they don't buy any Iraqi oil, which I don't believe they would do, then I think

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that's the maximum contribution that they can make under present circumstances. But it would be a substantial one.

**MR. UTLEY:** Dr. Kissinger, finally, the one and only option we have is the one we're using right now—that is, the economic pressure—all of our allies, the Japanese, the Europeans, standing together, imposing this economic pressure. What chance do you give for this succeeding, on a 1-to-10 scale, 10 being the most?

**DR. KISSINGER:** Well, I must say, I'm impressed by the extent to which this embargo has been organized. And I think that is a great success for American diplomacy.

**MR. UTLEY:** But the embargo is sticking and lasting?

**DR. KISSINGER:** The embargo is sticking. The test will come when the supply of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, for example, into Italy will stop, where they control a network of gasoline stations. When the price of oil goes up in the short term, and if the Saudis don't increase their production rapidly, then I think we'll come under pressure. And if—the only thing we ought to keep in mind is, we can get a temporary relief by letting them stay in Kuwait at the price of a certain crisis a year or two down the road.

**MR. UTLEY:** Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much for being with us this morning on "Meet the Press."

In a moment, R.W. Apple, Fred Francis and I will be back with some personal observations.

(Announcements)

**MR. UTLEY:** Talking about the Middle East this morning—Fred, and Johnny Apple. Dr. Kissinger was interesting; and he seemed to say, yes, we have to try these sanctions, the embargoes, but let's not be too optimistic. I think we're seeing the shape of this thing fall into place.

**MR. FRANCIS:** I think that what's the Saudis and the other Arab states are seeing right now. I think they're looking at accepting an Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. And unless the Saudis change their minds—and I understand from senior administration officials that they will not—that's where it's going.

**MR. UTLEY:** They'd rather live with the devil in Kuwait rather than to face a war.

**MR. FRANCIS:** You bet.

**MR. UTLEY:** Johnny?

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**MR. APPLE:** Well, I think that the administration is going to have to try very hard the other option that hasn't been discussed much today, which is to try to persuade the Turks and maybe the Saudis to close the valves on the Iraqi trans-shipments.

**MR. UTLEY:** That's a big if.

**MR. APPLE:** I think it's a huge if, but I think they have to try. I think that is less risky than blockading the ports, frankly.

**MR. FRANCIS:** Yes.

**MR. UTLEY:** And the least risky, of course, as always, is to do nothing, to see what happens. Johnny, Fred, thank you very much for being here this morning.

Well, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, said it when he spoke of a, quote, quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. That was 52 years ago. The crisis then was between Hitler's Germany and Czechoslovakia. But the reactions then were not that different from what we may see now: initial outrage over naked aggression, followed by appeasement by some, and, finally, yes, acceptance by most.

Is it going to be different now with Iraq and Kuwait—far-away countries? Yes, assets are frozen, embargoes are proclaimed, the international community closes ranks for a while. But oil is powerful, and it is slippery. It has a way of oozing through embargoes, sanctions, and good intentions. Saddam Hussein knows that in Baghdad. So do the countries which do business with him on a big scale—France and West Germany and the Soviet Union among others. Even some Arab leaders, such as Jordan's King Hussein, see where the oil and power are flowing and are acting accordingly.

How will it end? Here's one prediction. Six months from now, Iraq will still control Kuwait, if not occupy it with 100,000 troops. The Kuwaiti royal family will be living in the south of France or Spain in comfortable exile, and the oil will be flowing. And then we won't have to worry about Saddam Hussein any more—or at least not until he trains his sights on Israel or achieves his dream and is able to build nuclear weapons. But that, as they say, is a different story.

Stay tuned. I'm Garrick Utley. I hope you'll join us this evening for "NBC Nightly News" and again next week for "Sunday Today" and "Meet the Press."

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MEET THE PRESS - August 5, 1990

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MR. UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" today, the Middle East--Iraq and the United States. What does a great power do?

We may well be in the post-Cold War era, but not yet in the post-war era. There will always be the Saddam Husseins of this world who will make sure of that. His invasion of Kuwait has focused our attention once again on one of the fundamentals of our lives: our dependence on stability in the Middle East, and the energy--the oil--that flows from it. That is what we are talking about this morning, first with Senator Cohen who is in New York, and John Glenn here in Washington. Both are members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the Armed Services Committee. And joining me on the panel this morning are R.W. Apple of The New York Times and Fred Francis, NBC's Pentagon correspondent. Good morning, gentlemen.

Senator Cohen, let's start with you in New York--the question of intelligence, what we knew or didn't know and how we acted upon it. Was our intelligence up to the proper standards, and did we act on it correctly?

SENATOR COHEN: Well, I think the intelligence certainly was up to the proper standards. There is no question in my mind but that we had a very good fix on the massing of troops and their location. As to whether or not we took appropriate action, of course, that's in great doubt. But I think the intelligence was there.

And, of course, we have to remember our intelligence community can often tell us what's in a man's hand, but not often what's in a man's heart--and that's the key issue here. We could ask Hosni Mubarak, for example, whether he believed that Saddam Hussein was going to invade and he would tell you no. So I think that it's a question of did we know what his intent was? Answer--no. Were we reasonably sure that he was going to attack, at least a day before? I think the answer is yes.

MR. UTLEY: But you raise doubt about this. Senator Glenn, let me come to you. Do you raise the same doubts that we acted on the intelligence properly--the intelligence that was there?

SENATOR GLENN: Well, I don't know there was a lot that we could have done. Maybe we could have started our diplomatic efforts 24 hours sooner--something like that. Would that have changed the whole situation? I rather doubt that it would have. But I agree with Bill that I think the evidence is pretty much there that we did indeed know about the build-up--and we couldn't define the final intent, but the build-up indicated the intent.

MR. FRANCIS: Senator Cohen, Saddam Hussein is very largely a creature of our making. During the Iran-Iraq war, the United States government gave him critical intelligence to beat off Iran over and over and over again. In hindsight, sir, was that the thing we ought to have done?

SENATOR COHEN: Absolutely not, as far as I'm concerned. We have a situation where we've had a wolf knocking at our door, and we persuaded ourselves that he's really a vegetarian. And I think this past week's incident indeed indicates that he likes red meat. I think we've made mistakes over the years with respect to Saddam Hussein. For years we've known he's been building a chemical weapons capability--and the West has helped. For years, we have supplied him with him trade credits,

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purchased his oil. We have helped build this particular monster as such that is now swallowing up countries like Kuwait and threatens to--even if not invade Saudi Arabia--to attack Saudi Arabia.

Another point here: even though the intelligence may indicate that he at this point is not prepared to attack Saudi Arabia, I believe he has the capability to do so within a very short period of time--and there is very little that John Glenn has indicated that we could do even to stop that at this point.

MR. FRANCIS: Senator Glenn, our options are so limited--the president's options are so limited. It's my understanding that the president has to have a go from Saudi Arabia to begin moving heavy armored divisions from the United States. We can do nothing without that, can we?

SENATOR GLENN: Well, no, we can't really. They've wanted us over the horizon. They've always wanted us in the area, but over the horizon and out of sight.

MR. FRANCIS: The Saudis.

SENATOR GLENN: The Saudis--they haven't wanted us to appear to be dominating their politics and their regional situation.

I differ slightly on what Iraq has done in the past with Bill just a little bit. I think we have to put it in proper context here. At one time we were very worried about whether Iran was going to prevail, come right around the Horn to the top of the Gulf, down through Kuwait, the Saudi oil fields and was going to be--the new Iran was going to control all the oil--that's 70 percent of known reserves of the world that are in the Persian Gulf. And that was our major concern. It was in that context that we went, as I would agree with Bill, sort of overboard on backing Iraq. But you have to put it in the proper context in that time.

MR. APPLE: Senator Cohen, there's a Republican in the White House. He's a man everybody has been calling a very lucky president for 18. His luck seems to have run out.

Is there a possibility, is there a danger--everybody's comparing this to the 1930s--that if he doesn't take military action, he's going to be seen as the Neville Chamberlain of this episode?

SENATOR COHEN: I don't think so. Frankly, I don't believe his luck has run out. I think circumstances have changed rather dramatically in the past week; but nonetheless--

MR. APPLE: But that's what luck was called.

SENATOR COHEN: No--this has been coming for some time. We have ignored this issue. And part of it is our over-indulgence in energy consumption. Rather than simply looking for a war on Baghdad, perhaps we ought to be also focusing and declaring a war on energy waste. We don't have an energy conservation policy in this country, and that's also part of the president's options that we ought to be pursuing.

I don't think he's going to be looked upon as a Neville Chamberlain. I think at this particular point, we have to look to the Saudis and say, "Saudis and others, are you now prepared to call upon the United States to do the kinds of things that may be necessary to deter Saddam Hussein from attacking you and putting all of us on the cruel rack of extortion?"

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A lot is going to depend on the cooperation of our allies. Japan, in particular, was very helpful in announcing it's going to impose sanctions. But this is not simply a United-States- versus-a-Saddam-Hussein issue; this involves all of the western world. So it's not simply Neville Chamberlain for the president of the United States. Everybody is involved in this one.

MR. UTLEY: But, Senators, following up on this point--the hard option. If the Saudis were to call on American military support--intervention--could we do it? Now, I remember the early 1980s--I think the viewers remember, too--this rapid deployment force, able to go in there and secure the oil fields, airlift commands. What happened to all of this?

SENATOR GLENN: We have two different levels of things. One is the tactical situation they're in right now. Do we have forces in position to prevent him from moving down toward the Saudi oil fields--

MR. UTLEY: The answer is no.

SENATOR GLENN: --right away in a few days? The answer is absolutely no, we do not. We can't protect every single place around the whole world.

Now, long-term, tactically, can we control it? Yes, his economy is completely based on oil. It's through two pipelines. We can either set up a sea blockade--or, if it really came to a tough situation, we could take out the pumping stations on those lines, and his economy comes to a screeching halt. So long-term, we can control that.

I think it's going to require--

MR. APPLE: Senator Glenn--excuse me.

SENATOR COHEN: If I could just finish--it's going to require more than just the United States; it requires our allies as well. And that point should not be lost.

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MR. APPLE: Senator Glenn, I've just been out in your state, as it happens. All the television news, all the newspapers, are full of only one kind of story. They are not discussing military options; they are not discussing any of the things we're discussing. They're discussing gasoline prices--pictures of prices going up, up, up.

Isn't this going to make people in the country eager for the president to do something--that phrase that always happens when we seem to have our fate in the hands of someone else?

SENATOR GLENN: Yes. I think there will be that pressure--there isn't any doubt about that. People's interests are in their own pocketbook at the local level all the time. And, of course, prices are going to go up. And the very fact that we're proposing a boycott there means the supply of oil around the world is going to be diminished; it means that we're going to be party to putting prices of oil up for a while.

SENATOR GLENN: Well, maybe they did; but I wouldn't think that would be something that would be a major campaign theme. This has developed over a long period of time and I think everybody realizes that.

SENATOR COHEN: Well, there aren't that number of planes anyway there, Garrick, because the number of planes they have up against some 5,500 or 5,700 Iraqi tanks--good tanks--are hardly a match there for that number. They could still overwhelm them.

Let me say one thing. The American public has never gotten serious about a policy--an energy policy--and what we're going to do in this part of the world. We haven't gone into conservation--things we could do here. We're back to driving big cars again. Are we willing to really address this and make a long-term commitment, as Bill says? Will the American public make a long-term commitment to seeing that those oil lanes remain open from the Mideast? That's something we've never done.

MR. UTLEY: Important question--one quick question about the defense budget. Cuts are coming--post-Cold War era. Many people raise questions, perhaps we shouldn't go so fast. Senator Cohen, your opinion--will this affect the cuts in defense spending?

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SENATOR COHEN: I think it will have some impact. There has been a rush to have almost a free-fall in defense spending. I think this is going to put somewhat of a moderation on that. We'll still have substantial cuts, as we voted yesterday in the full Senate. But I don't think they'll be as deep as they otherwise might have been.

MR. FRANCIS: Briefly, Senator Cohen, to stop Saddam Hussein, must we go all the way to Baghdad?

SENATOR COHEN: I don't think we have to go all the way to Baghdad. I think we have to make him pay a penalty for his actions; but I don't think we have to go to Baghdad yet.

MR. UTLEY: Senators, thank you very much for being with us this morning here on "Meet the Press."

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" this morning, the subject is the Middle East and the United States. R.W. Apple, Fred Francis and I are talking now with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who is at his home in Connecticut this morning.

Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Good morning. How are you?

MR. UTLEY: Very well. You, of course, have great, lengthy experience in the sands of the Middle East; you know that area very well. As we look at the Middle East on this Sunday morning, are we not in a situation where just about all the talk of embargoes and sanctions and freezing assets, where we are going to have to face the fact of a Saddam Hussein not only occupying Kuwait but really dictating the future Saudi oil production and therefore world oil prices?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I would hate to accept this. I think the fundamental issue is whether we can get Saddam Hussein to withdraw his army from Kuwait and take his puppets with him. If we don't achieve this, then he will have a stranglehold on the world oil supplies.

MR. UTLEY: Do you think we can achieve this? Is it possible within reasonable terms and options to achieve that?

DR. KISSINGER: I think if all these embargoes that the industrial democracies have announced--that is, the European Community and Japan and the United States--are in fact being maintained, if no oil is being bought from Iraq and Kuwait, and if an economic blockade is made effective for several months, I think that then Iraq will have to withdraw.

MR. APPLE: Dr. Kissinger, I don't want to sound cynical, but economic blockades and

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DR. KISSINGER: You are right.

MR. FRANCIS: Suppose this doesn't work?

DR. KISSINGER: If that doesn't work, then we will face a situation in which the various--the small principalities in the Saudi peninsula, so-called emirates, will be totally intimidated because they will face essentially the same problem as Kuwait; and in which the Saudis will begin to tack towards Iraq whose fundamental demand is a reduction in oil production so that the price of oil can be pushed up. And I don't think we'll ever get to the point of military protection.

MR. APPLE: Do you think that we have the stomach in any way to involve ourselves militarily in that part of the world?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it depends what kind of military action is contemplated. In the immediate future, I don't believe that Iraq has any intention of invading Saudi Arabia. And I believe there is too much discussion of how we're going to protect Saudi Arabia and not enough discussion of how we're going to get them out of Kuwait. If they stay in Kuwait, either with their troops or with their government, their domination of the Gulf will be extremely probable. And that is what we need to focus on.

For the immediate future, the only military action that I can see necessary is a possible blockade of the Straits of Hormuz and of the two ports through which Iraqi oil flows. And the European Community has hinted that they might be willing to join us in this. I don't think we should do this alone. Europe and Japan get much more of their oil from the Gulf than we do, and it will be a test of whether it is possible in the post-Cold War period to organize the industrial democracies on an issue that after all--that involves their economic survival.

MR. FRANCIS: Dr. Kissinger, isn't that very dangerous--blocking Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil? Doesn't that invite Saddam Hussein to close the Saudi oil fields? Isn't it a very serious gamble?

DR. KISSINGER: But his long-term strategy is to reduce the oil flow from the Gulf to a level at which the price of oil can be escalated by him to arbitrary levels.

MR. FRANCIS: So that lays the foundation for Saudi acquiescence, lays the foundation for all the sheikhdoms to say, well, we just have to live with this monster to the north.

DR. KISSINGER: If he stays in Kuwait, if the Iraqis under any guise stay in Kuwait, I think that it is very likely to happen. I'm not saying we should do any military action unilaterally. And I would like to see whether the economic boycott can work without it. But before we station troops in Saudi Arabia, I would try these other measures.

MR. UTLEY: But, Dr. Kissinger, if worst comes to worst, he doesn't get the troops out of Kuwait, can we live with a Saddam Hussein in Baghdad occupying Kuwait and oil production

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DR. KISSINGER: I would suspect that he will make some such proposal, and that's like asking can we live with Hitler occupying the Rhineland. His announced strategy is to unify the Arab world in what will essentially amount to an anti-Western coalition, or an anti-industrial-democracy coalition. In the short term, we will probably be able to live with it. In the long term, it means that we are at the mercy of oil production in an area dominated by a country that has shown a ruthless hostility.

MR. UTLEY: Dr. Kissinger, as you've just indicated, this goes beyond the question of oil in the Persian Gulf; it comes back to the question of Israel itself. Yesterday I was interviewing King Hussein of Jordan who's very worried about what has happened in Israel, feels more and more threatened by Israel. He's seeking protection from Baghdad.

DR. KISSINGER: Only in the sense that they are turning points in which strategic realities are created--

MR. APPLE: I understand that.

DR. KISSINGER: --after which the control of events is out of your hands.

MR. APPLE: I understand that. One thing that a lot of people and think would have been a good thing is if more effective attempts had been made to assassinate Hitler early. Do you think that that sort of thing--do you think that that sort of thing is something that ought to be attempted in Iraq by us or by another intelligence service, which shall remain nameless?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think assassinations--state-sponsored assassinations--are not an American specialty, and shouldn't be an American specialty.

MR. FRANCIS: Dr. Kissinger, is it not in the Soviet interest, the Soviet interest, to join forces with the United States in that if the Western economies are plundered by $45 a barrel oil, $35 a barrel oil, all those loans and credits will not go to the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: That's right. I think in the immediate situation, the Soviet Union has an interest in preventing a major recession in the West; and this would certainly contribute to it.

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DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets--if the Soviets actually cut their military supplies and if what they've said--it isn't clear to me from the announcement whether they are stopping new sales, which would only be effective two or three years from now, or whether they are actually stopping the pipeline into Iraq. If they do the latter and if they don't buy any Iraqi oil, which I don't believe they would do, then I think that's the maximum contribution that they can make under present circumstances. But it would be a substantial one.

MR. UTLEY: Dr. Kissinger, finally, the one and only option we have is the one we're using right now--that is, the economic pressure--all of our allies, the Japanese, the Europeans, standing together, imposing this economic pressure. What chance do you give for this succeeding, on a 1-to-10 scale, 10 being the most?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I must say, I'm impressed by the extent to which this embargo has been organized. And I think that is a great success for American diplomacy.

MR. UTLEY: But the embargo is sticking and lasting?

DR. KISSINGER: The embargo is sticking. The test will come when the supply of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, for example, into Italy will stop where they control a network of gasoline stations. When the price of oil goes up in the short term, and if the Saudis don't increase their production rapidly, then I think we'll come under pressure. And if--the only thing we ought to keep in mind is, we can get a temporary relief by letting them stay in Kuwait at the price of a certain crisis a year or two down the road.

MR. UTLEY: Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much for being with us this morning on "Meet the Press."

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: Talking about the Middle East this morning--Fred, and Johnny Apple. Dr. Kissinger was interesting; and he seemed to say, yes, we have to try these sanctions, the embargoes, but let's not be too optimistic. I think we're seeing the shape of this thing fall into place.

MR. FRANCIS: I think that what's the Saudis and the other Arab states are seeing right now. I think they're looking at accepting an Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. And unless the Saudis change their minds--and I understand from senior administration officials that they will not--that's where it's going.

MR. UTLEY: They'd rather live with the devil in Kuwait rather than to face a war.

MR. FRANCIS: You bet.

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MR. UTLEY: Johnny?

MR. APPLE: Well, I think that the administration is going to have to try very hard the other option that hasn't been discussed much today, which is to try to persuade the Turks and maybe the Saudis to close the valves on the Iraqi trans-shipments.

MR. UTLEY: That's a big if.

MR. APPLE: I think it's a huge if, but I think they have to try. I think that is less risky than
blockading the ports, frankly.

MR. FRANCIS: Yes.

MR. UTLEY: And the least risky, of course, as always, is to do nothing, to see what happens.
Johnny, Fred, thank you very much for being here this morning.

Well, Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, said it when he spoke of a, quote,
quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing. That was 52 years ago. The
crisis then was between Hitler's Germany and Czechoslovakia. But the reactions then were not that
different from what we may see now: initial outrage over naked aggression, followed by appeasement
by some; and, finally, yes, acceptance by most.

Is it going to be different now with Iraq and Kuwait? Are today's far-away countries--yes, assets
are frozen, embargoes are proclaimed, the international community closes ranks for a while--but oil is
powerful, and it is slippery. It has a way of oozing through embargoes, sanctions, and good intentions.
Saddam Hussein knows that in Baghdad. So do the countries which do business with him on a big
scale--France and West Germany and the Soviet Union among others. Even some Arab leaders, such
as Jordan's King Hussein, see where the oil and power are flowing and are acting accordingly.

How will it end? Here's one prediction. Six months from now, Iraq will still control Kuwait,
if not occupy it with 100,000 troops. The Kuwaiti royal family will be living in the south of France
or Spain in comfortable exile, and the oil will be flowing. And then we won't have to worry about
Saddam Hussein any more--or at least not until he trains his sights on Israel or achieves his dream and
is able to build nuclear weapons. But that, as they say, is a different story.