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D. 750,707 SUN. 1,079,945

JUL 1 1977

Buckley

Nick Thimmesch

# Carter's cozying up to Euro-Communists is worrisome

WASHINGTON-Like the faint silhouette of a fogbound ship, the outline of the Carter administration's foreign policy can dimly be seen. The President's much publicized push for human rights in the world is clear enough. But behind it, there seems to be a move to weaken the ties between Communist or revolutionary states and Moscow.

How else to explain Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's view that, while the United States prefers a democratic Europe, it would not be disastrous if Communist parties won elections in Western Europe? Vance reasons that such a development could give the Soviets a bad time in the Communist bloc nations of Eastern Europe.

In the Eastern European Communist countries, there has been a marked improvement in the economy and a movement for greater personal liberty. According to a new logic which Vance apparently shares, there would be an even stronger move for greater personal freedom in these nations if there were Communist victories in Western Europe, because people in the bloc nations would look more to the West than to the East.

Then there's United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young, raising his fist to give the black power salute when he visits Africa-an effort to woo Marxist guerrilla forces. Young sees nothing

wrong with the Cuban presence in Africa, and speaks approvingly of the revolutionary regimes in Angola and Mozambique.

Moreover, Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has moved the administration toward a closer relationship with Communist Viet Nam. He has discussed diplomatic recognition and played with the

idea of payments, never to be called reparations, but rather humanitarian aid.

The Carter administration also has played footsie with Cuba. It has agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives, and remove the ban on travel by Americans to Cuba.

While nearly all Americans approve of the human rights cry uttered constantly by Jimmy Carter, they are not so sure its good to cozy up to Cuba, Viet Nam, and other Communist nations.

By resolution and by votes on spending, the House has stated loud and clear that it does not like Cuba or Viet Nam. The House recently passed amendments to the foreign aid bill which prohibit international banks and other lending institutions from using money contributed by the U.S. to fund seven Communist-run countries.

Some other reactions to the apparition of Carter foreign policy are also being voiced. Henry A. Kissinger said some time ago that he didn't think Communist Viet Nam deserved any aid money. He also told a Republican audience in Dallas that the U.S. should not resume diplomatic relations with Cuba until Castro pulls his troops out of Africa. And, in a private meeting with congressional Republicans, Kissinger predicted that if the Carter administration continued its

African policy, the result would be either a Communist Africa or a horrible race war.

Kissinger's strongest statements on foreign policy were those in his speech before the American Enterprise Institute, where he warned of the dangerous consequences of Communist-dominated regimes in Europe. The French Communist Party, he declared, is clearly, perhaps to Moscow.

The Communist parties of Spain and Portugal are also strengthening, Kissinger said, and "Communist participation in the government of either country would bring serious consequences for Western security." We should not imagine, Kissinger warned, "that a Communist electoral victory [in Europe] would be accidental, transitory, or inconsequential..."

If the Latin nations of Europe-Italy, Spain, Portugal, France-elect Communist governments, it is unrealistic to believe that they will be devoted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. That means NATO would be an essentially German-U.S. alliance.

What happens if we wake up one morning with only a dozen nations left that truly earn the reputation of giving their citizenries a large measure of liberty and civil rights?

© 1977, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

Between Issues

THE SEEDS of Polycentrism planted two decades ago by Italian Communist party leader Palmiro Togliatti have flowered this summer into an ideological spectacle of sorts bearing the rubric "Eurocommunism." If not entirely new, it is nonetheless a variously-hued display, with the participants large and small in many ways as different from each other as they are united in rejecting Moscow's claim to be the sole fount of Marxist wisdom. In the Soviet Union, the heresy is feared as the beginnings of a conspiracy to undermine "proletarian internationalism," a euphemism for Kremlin supremacy. It is also a source of problems on a day-to-day strategy level, as Eliahu Salpeter shows in his report from the Helsinki follow-up meeting now under way, "Soviet Brinksmanship at Belgrade," starting on page 5.

In the United States, reaction to the latest flexings of the Western Communist parties has given rise to much debate and some serious division of opinion. Last month, for example, in an interview granted to an Italian journalist, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance suggested that Communist victories at the polls in countries like Italy and France could prove more troublesome to the Soviet bloc than to the Atlantic Alliance. In addition, although he noted that the Carter Administration was not "indifferent" to "who serves in the government of any country" and preferred "those who have a democratic backdrop," he said: "We have tried to make clear from the outset that we believe it is not for us to tell any country whom they should elect in the way of their political leaders. That is their responsibility and their right."

Last month, too, Henry A. Kissinger addressed himself to Eurocommunism: That he views the phenomenon with less equanimity than his successor at the State Department is already well-known from his past official pronouncements. But in a paper delivered at a Washington conference sponsored jointly by the *American Enterprise Institute* for Public Policy Research and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Kissinger presented in detail his assessment of what Western Communist "independence" from Moscow would mean in a crunch, why the Atlantic Alliance remains vital and would be undermined by Communist participation in NATO governments, and how this might be prevented. Reading the paper, we found it a remarkably lucid and cogent analysis of what is, after all, more than merely a summer spectacle, and we have adapted it as the feature article for this issue. "Eurocommunism: A New Test for the West" begins on page 8.

OUR COVER drawing is by Sam Kweskin.

THE NEW LEADER: Published biweekly—except the last issue in August—by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, Inc. Editorial offices: 212 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010. Telephone (212) 889-6316. (Postmaster: Please send change of address on form 3579 to THE NEW LEADER, 212 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010.) National distributors: Eastern News Company, 111 Eighth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10011. Indexed in the Public Affairs Information Service. Price this issue: 75 cents. Subscription $15 per year, Canadian $16, foreign $17. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. Copyright © 1977 by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, Inc. Microfilm editions available from Xerox University Microfilms, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without written permission prohibited.

2

(LC)

THE New Leader

JULY 18, 1977

VOLUME LX, NUMBER 15

<table><tr><td>Correspondents' Correspondence</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Pressuring Israel/MARVIN KALB</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Janata's Shaky Future/DARRYL D'MONTE</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Soviet Brinksmanship at Belgrade/ELIAHU SALPETER</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Eurocommunism: A New Test for the West/ HENRY A. KISSINGER</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Bermuda Shorts/RICHARD J. MARGOLIS</td><td>15</td></tr></table>

Writers & Writing

<table><tr><td>India Through a Glass Darkly/GEORGE WOODCOCK</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Playing Back a Life/GIL MULLER</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Pointless Passion/LAUREL GRAEBER</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>A Fairy Tale Gone Awry/ANNA QUINDLEN</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>On Music/M. ANATOLE GUREWITSCH</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>On Art/VIVIEN RAYNOR</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>Dear Editor</td><td>27</td></tr></table>

Executive Editor: MYRON KOLATCH

Assistant Editors: BEN YAGODA, DEAN VALENTINE

Assistant to the Editor: BARBARA SHAPIRO

Art Director: Herb Lubalin. Regular Critics—

Literature: Pearl K. Bell (on leave), Isa Kapp, Poetry:

Phoebe Pettingell. Theater: John Simon. Film: Robert

Asahina. Television: Marvin Kitman. Art: Vivien Raynor.

Music: Bruce Cook. Regular Contributors—Daniel Bell,

Theodore Draper, Milton R. Konvitz, Robert

Lekachman, John P. Roche. Regular Columnists—

Ray Alan, Walter Goodman, Richard J. Margolis.

Signed contributions do not necessarily represent the views of The New Leader. We welcome a variety of opinions consistent with our democratic policy. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

The New Leader

Thinking Aloud

EUROCOMMUNISM:
A NEW TEST
FOR THE WEST

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

(L)

ENRICO BERLINGUER

THE COHESION of the industrial democracies of Western Europe and North America plus Japan has been for 30 years the bulwark of peace and the engine of global prosperity. It has been the keystone of our foreign policy in every Administration from President Truman to President Carter. The first permanent peacetime security alliance in U.S. history was with the democratic nations of the Atlantic Community; that was soon followed by our commitment to the security of Japan. Since then, the agenda of cooperation among the industrial democracies has spread from collective defense to common action on energy policy, on the international economic system, and on relations with the Communist countries and with the Third World.

This cohesion rests not simply on material considerations of wealth and power but on a common moral foundation as well—on the shared conviction that the consent of the governed is the basis of government, and that every individual enjoys inalienable rights and is entitled to constitutional liberties. So it is ironic that at the moment when the industrial democracies are most unified in their opposition to external threats, at a time when their cooperative efforts cover a broader range than ever, their unity should be jeopardized by an internal danger: the growth of Communist parties and the possibility of their accession to power in some of the countries of Western Europe.

In *Italy*, in the parliamentary elections of June 1976, the Communist party obtained 34 per cent of the vote, strengthening its position as the second largest party and as a powerful rival of the Christian Democratic party that has governed the country throughout the postwar period. The Communists' growth has been primarily at the expense of the Democratic Socialist groups, and is part and parcel of an increasing polarization of Italian politics. The Communists have already achieved a virtual veto over government programs in the Italian Parliament.

In *France*, in the Presidential election of April 1974, a coalition of the Communist and Socialist parties came

HENRY A. KISSINGER's article is adapted from a paper delivered at the Conference on Italy and Eurocommunism sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and the Hoover Institution.

8

The New Leader

(LC)

within one percentage point of victory on the final balance. A majority for this coalition in the parliamentary elections that must take place by March 1978 would bring Communist leaders into key ministerial positions. It would do so, moreover, in conditions of constitutional crisis, for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has not yet faced the test of a President and a Prime Minister from different parties.

In the Iberian peninsula, where hopeful steps are being taken toward democracy, Communist parties have fought with ruthlessness and disciplined organization to increase their influence. Portugal is a member of NATO; Spain is strategically crucial and tied by special agreements to the United States. Communist participation in the government of either country would have serious consequences for Western security.

And these Communist challenges do not exist in isolation from each other. There is no doubt that a Communist breakthrough to power or sharing of power in one country will have a major psychological effect on the others, by making Communist parties seem respectable, or suggesting that the tide of history in Europe is moving in their direction. Most of the causes of this phenomenon are indigenous to the individual countries. By the same token, the response to it has to come in the first instance from European leaders and voters who are persuaded that democracy is worth the effort. America cannot make their choices for them or decide the outcome of free elections.

But we must not delude ourselves about what the accession of Communist leaders to executive power will mean to the basic premises of American foreign policy. Similarly, we must not weaken the resolve of those in allied nations who take our judgments seriously by treating a Communist electoral victory as inevitable—which it is not—or by imagining it would be a transitory or inconsequential matter. While the ultimate decisions are for the voters of Europe to make, we all would be indulging in wishful thinking if we did not acknowledge that such an eventuality (1) would represent a massive change in European politics; (2) would have fundamental consequences for the structure of the postwar world, and for America's relationship to its most important alliances; and (3) would alter the prospects for security and progress for every free nation.

THOSE WHO take a less grave view often claim that the European Communist parties are independent of Moscow, that they have been effectively democratized'and assimilated, and that they therefore pose no international problem in the broader East-West context. Granted, the centrifugal and polycentric tendencies in the Communist world are one of the most striking developments of our age. Granted, too, these schisms are made doubly intense by the passions of a quasi-religious battle over what is true dogma and what

is heresy. Symptomatic is the fact that the Soviet Union has used military force in the postwar period only against other Communist countries—in East Berlin, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, and on the Sino-Soviet border. The Sino-Soviet conflict may indeed be the most profound and potentially explosive current international conflict. In addition, no serious observer disputes that the Communist parties in Western Europe have in fact occasionally demonstrated some degree of independence from the Soviet Union.

But this hardly exhausts the subject. For we must ask: In what sense and on what issues are they independent? And what are the objective consequences for the West of their policies and programs?

We are entitled to a certain skepticism about the sincerity of declarations of independence that coincide precisely with electoral self-interest. One need not be a cynic to wonder at the decision of the French Communists, traditionally perhaps the most Stalinist party in Western Europe, to renounce the Soviet concept of dictatorship of the proletariat without a single dissenting vote among 1,700 delegates, as they did at their party Congress in February 1976, when all previous party Congresses had endorsed the same dictatorship of the proletariat by a similar unanimous vote of 1,700 to nothing. Why was there not at least one lonely soul willing to adhere to the original view? Much was made of this change as a gesture of independence. Now it turns out that the new Soviet Constitution, in preparation for years, drops the phrase as well.

Throughout their existence, the guiding principle of the Communist parties has been their insistence that a minority had to seize power as the vanguard of the working class and impose its views on the rest of the population. This disdain for democratic procedures—whether it is presented in the usual form of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” or wrapped in Antonio Gramsci's more elegant phrase, “the hegemony of the working class”—is precisely what has historically distinguished the Communist from the Socialist parties. I find it hard to believe that after decades of vilifying Social Democracy and treating it as their mortal enemy, especially in every Communist country, Communist parties have suddenly become Social Democrats. Independent of Moscow or not, Communists represent a philosophy that by its nature and their own testimony stands outside the “bourgeois” framework of Western constitutional history; they are a movement that appeals to a different tradition and uses a largely misleading vocabulary.

To be sure, the French, Spanish and Italian Communist parties have recently declared their resolve “to work within the pluralism of political and social forces and to respect guarantees and develop all individual and collective freedoms.” Italy’s Enrico Berlinguer and France’s Georges Marchais pledged their devotion to

July 18, 1977

9

[10]

national independence and political pluralism at a con-
ference of Communist parties in East Berlin in June
1976. Yet can we take these declarations at face value?
After all, Marchais has listed Bulgaria, Poland and East
Germany as countries having a "pluralistic" party sys-
tem. As recently as 1972, French Communist doctrine
was that "there can be no return from Socialism to
capitalism." And a few weeks ago, to the great irritation
of their Socialist allies, the French Communists esti-
mated the cost of the economic program of the two
parties at over $100 billion. The Communist program
—by definition—calls for the radical transformation of
society; by the very nature of their beliefs Communists
will be driven to bring about institutional changes that
would make their ascendance permanent.

It should also be noted that professions of the na-
tional road to Communism and of devotion to demo-
cratic principle are not really something new. The fol-
lowing quotations from European Communists illus-
trate the point.

* Georgi Dimitrov, leader of the Bulgarian Commu-
nist party, in February 1946: "The crux of the matter,
and we Marxists should know this well, is this: Every
nation will effect its transition to Socialism not by a
mapped-out route, not exactly as in the Soviet Union,
but by its own road, dependent on its historical, na-
tional, social, and cultural circumstances."

* From a proclamation of the (East) German Com-
munist party in June 1945: "We take the view that the
method of imposing the Soviet system on [our country]
wou'd be wrong, since this method does not correspond
to present-day conditions of development. . . . We take
the view rather that the overriding interests of the . . .
people in their present-day situation prescribe a differ-
ent method . . . namely the method of establishing a
democratic anti-Fascist regime, a parliamentary demo-
cratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties
for the people."

* Erno Gero, Communist party leader of Hungary,
in November 1944: "The great national task facing the
country cannot be solved by either the Communist party
or by any other party alone. The Communist party
holds that it does not have a monopoly, and it does not
need the monopoly, to work among the masses for the
reconstruction of the new [nation]. The Communist
party does not approve of the idea of a one-party sys-
tem. Let the other parties operate and organize as well."

* Wladyslaw Gomulka, Communist party leader of
Poland, in January 1946: "In [our country] there is a
division of functions, and State power is based on par-
liamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the prole-
tariat or of a single party is not essential. [Our country]
can proceed and is proceeding along its own road."

* Klement Gottwald, Communist party leader of
Czechoslovakia, in January 1947: "The Communist
party seeks to attain Socialism, but we are of the opin-

ion that the Soviet system is not the only road to So-
cialism. . . . The coalition of the Communists with other
parties is not opportunistic, a temporary limited coali-
tion, but the expression . . . of all strata of the working
people. . . . We seek at present to make certain that our
new democratic parliamentary methods . . . be ex-
pressed in constitutional law. If you want the view of
the Communists, I can only say that they will be the
strictest guardians of the new Constitution."

Interestingly, Marchais speaks of "Socialism in the
colors of France," and in 1938, George Orwell de-
scribed French Communist strategy as "marching be-
hind the tricolor." In short, what the leaders of the
Western Communist parties are saying today about their
affection for democracy is not significantly different
from what East European Communist leaders declared
with equal emphasis in the 1940s—before they seized
the total control they have never relinquished.

CERTAINLY Communist parties are willing to
come to power by democratic means. But could
they permit the democratic process to reverse
what they see as the inevitable path of "historical pro-
gress"? Would they maintain the institutions, the free-
doms that could turn into instruments of their future
defeat? No Communist party governing alone has ever
done so, and the vast majority of democratic parties
that entered coalitions with European Communists are
now in the indexes of history books rather than in
ministries or parliaments.

The Italian Communist party, of course, left the gov-
ernment following its disastrous defeat by the Christian
Democrats in 1948. But the situation is greatly changed.
In 1948, the Communists were a far smaller party, with
little regional or municipal power. They had to contend
with a younger and more united Christian Democratic
party, a strong Socialist party, and a determined West-
ern Alliance alarmed by Stalin's adventures in Greece
and Czechoslovakia. In 1977, Italian Communists par-
ticipate in the governments of most major cities and re-
gions, have enormous trade union strength along with
substantive support from intellectuals and the popular
culture, and have reduced the role of the Socialists to a
fraction of what it was three decades ago.

The French Communists were similarly removed
from the government in 1947, following the intensifica-
tion of the Cold War. But, just as in the Italian case the
following year, the popular revolt against the Commu-
nists took place within the framework of a united West
with a clear perception of an external and internal
threat to its survival. By contrast, there are currently
many people on both sides of the Atlantic who have
permitted themselves to be convinced that European
Communism is only Social Democracy with a Leninist
face.

We cannot know, beyond all doubt, whether or not

10

The New Leader

a fundamental change has occurred in these parties' traditional goals and tactics. But their internal organization and management speak against the likelihood. It is not democratic pluralism but the stern Leninist precept of "democratic centralism" that continues to guide the internal structure of all European Communist parties. This is a doctrine of iron discipline, not a principle of free and open dialogue. It is a system of dogma, of a "party line," of authority and obedience, of suppression of dissent and purge of dissenters. There are too many recent instances of resorts to violence, attempts to censor newspapers and broadcasting, and efforts to control the functioning of universities to be optimistic about their character.

Only in Western Europe and the United States are there still illusions about the nature of Communist parties. In Eastern Europe, boredom, intellectual emptiness, inefficiency, and stultifying bureaucratism have been obvious for decades. Countries that used to be

GEORGES MARCHAIS

leading industrial powers have been reduced to mediocrity and stagnation; nations with long democratic traditions have seen the destruction of civil liberties and democratic practices. The nations of the West would mortgage their future if they closed their eyes to this reality. Societies that try to avoid difficult choices by making comforting assumptions about the future win no awards for restraint; they only speed their own demise.

Nonetheless, it is sometimes asked: If the United States can deal with Communist governments in the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and even Cuba or Vietnam, why can we not accept and learn to deal with Communist parties seeking power in Western Europe? Is not the Soviet Union uneasy about the prospect of new Communist regimes that they may not be able to control?

These questions miss the central point. There is a crucial difference between managing a conflict with adversaries and maintaining an alliance among friends,

particularly when the prospects for stable East-West relations depend vitally on the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Even if some West European Communist parties should prove more difficult than the better disciplined satellites of East Europe, and thus pose new problems for Moscow, they would pose far more serious problems for the West.

For the key issue is not how "independent" the European Communists would be, but how Communist. The dynamics of the Communist parties and the program they would be elected on suggest that their foreign and domestic policies are not likely to be consistent with the common purposes of the members of the Atlantic Alliance.

THE SOLIDARITY of the great industrial democracies has maintained global security for 30 years. Western collective defense provided the shield behind which the United States, Western Europe and Japan developed the institutions of European unity and the progressive world economic system. All of these would be severely jeopardized if Communists came to power in allied governments. More specifically:

1. The character of the Alliance would become confused to the American people. The signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty pledged in 1949 that "they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." If Communists entered governments in allied countries, the engagement to help maintain the military balance in Europe would lack the moral base it has stood on for a generation. The American people would be asked to keep their Alliance commitment on the basis of two highly uncertain, untested assumptions: that there is a new trend of Communism which will in time split from Moscow, and that the West will be able to manipulate the new divisions to its advantage.

Both of these propositions are open to the most serious doubt. No major Communist split has ever been generated or sustained by deliberate Western policy—in fact, the Soviet Union's disputes with Yugoslavia and with China had been festering for months and possibly years before the West became aware of them. But even such a split would hardly diminish the danger to existing Alliance relationships. By the time it occurred—and it would surely take years to develop—the damage to the NATO structure would probably have become irreparable. And the character of the Atlantic Alliance would be totally transformed, even should the United States, for its own reasons, eventually decide to support a revisionist Communism. While the United States can never be indifferent to the extension of Soviet hegemony to Western Europe, the permanent stationing of American forces in Europe could hardly be continued for the object of defending some Communist

July 18, 1977

11

governments against other Communist governments. A
development of this kind could be justified only on the
crudest balance of power grounds that would be incom-
patible with American tradition and public sentiment.

2. The effect on Alliance cohesion generally would be disastrous. The Western Alliance has been held together by a system of close consultation based on shared goals and compatible philosophies. President de Gaulle cherished France's independence from the United States, but in major crises, over Berlin or Soviet missiles in Cuba, he stood firmly with his allies. In the same way, Communist governments in Western Europe, however independent of Moscow they may be on intraparty issues, can be expected to demonstrate their basic Communist convictions on major international issues—giving rise to significant foreign policy divergences between Europe and the U.S., and between the European states with Communists in their governments and the others.

In February 1976, for instance, Berlinguer told a London *Times* interviewer that "the Soviet Union's peace policy is in the general interest of mankind." The Italian Communist newspaper denounced NATO last year as "one of the fundamental instruments for American manipulation of the politics and economy of our country and Western Europe," and declared that "relations between the countries of Western Europe and the two superpowers must be rediscussed." A leading member of the Italian party's Central Committee was asked in a recent interview with Radio Free Europe: If the French and Italian Communist parties were in power, what would you do in the event of "a grave international crisis between the Soviet Union and the West?" He answered: "We would choose the Soviet side, of course." Such "support" of NATO as is expressed is explicitly tactical, and rests upon a distortion of détente. It is coupled with the proposition that a Soviet threat against Western Europe is inconceivable. No European Communist party suggests that it wishes to be part of the Western Alliance to withstand Soviet expansion. And, indeed, one could hardly bank on Communist parties dedicating themselves with any conviction to an alliance whose primary purpose was and remains to counter Soviet power.

Those parties have had their differences with the So-
viet Union, but in practically every case it has been on
a matter of relations within the Communist movement.
They have rarely, if ever, diverged from the Soviet po-
sition on an international issue. The Italian Communist
party has hailed the Cubans in Angola as "freedom
fighters," condemned the Israeli rescue of hostages at
Entebbe as an "intolerable violation of Uganda's na-
tional sovereignty," applauded Soviet policy in Africa,
and denounced America's diplomatic efforts in South-
ern Africa as an attempt to "save the neocolonial and
military-strategic interests of imperialism."

At best, West European Communist parties can be
expected to steer their basic policies closer to the so-
called nonaligned block and in an anti-Western direc-
tion. Yugoslavia—whose independence from Moscow
on East European issues is by now traditional—has
emerged as a champion of anti-Western and anti-Amer-
ican positions on most international issues outside of
Eastern Europe. Why should we think that Communist
parties in Western Europe would be more friendly to
us than the most independent East European state,
which has been engaged for nearly three decades in an
open dispute with Moscow and whose government the
Kremlin has sought repeatedly to undermine?

The strong role our allies play in defending Western
interests in many parts of the globe—such as President
Giscard's courageous actions in Zaire—could not be
expected from a nation where Communists share power.
In the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in relations
with the Third World, on Berlin, on arms control and
European security, the parallelism of views that has
existed between the United States and its European
allies would almost certainly be eroded. Worse, active
opposition, especially in regions of long-standing Eu-
ropean cultural and political influence, is probable. In
our common efforts to improve the world economy and
stimulate progress in both the developed and develop-
ing worlds, divisions would soon be apparent. Atlantic
unity could not be maintained in such circumstances,
even in the area of security.

3. The military strength and unity of NATO would be gravely weakened. It is hard to visualize how the present NATO structure could continue, with its exchange of highly classified information, its integrated military planning and political consultation, if Communists had a significant share of power in West European governments. That would force a major change in NATO practices, as happened temporarily when Portugal had to exclude itself from classified discussions because its political future was in doubt. In addition, the Communists are unlikely to give NATO defense a high budgetary priority; instead, they would use their positions to diminish the combined defense effort of Western Europe and inevitably sap the U.S. will to pay the costs of maintaining forces in Europe.

Furthermore, if Communists participate in key Eu-
ropean governments, NATO may turn by default into a
largely German-American alliance. This specter could
then be used in other West European countries to un-
dermine what remains of Atlantic cohesion. With NATO
thus weakened, while the Soviet Union continued to
increase its strategic and conventional strength and
maintained its grip on the Warsaw Pact, the essential
East-West equilibrium in Europe would be fundamen-
tally threatened. The freedom of many European coun-
tries, allied or neutral, to chart their own future would
be diminished in direct proportion to the growth of their

12

The New Leader

fear of Soviet power. Eventually, massive shifts against us would occur, not because a majority freely chose such a course, but because the upsetting of the overall balance left them no alternative.

4. The hopeful progress toward European unity would be undermined. The French and Italian Communist parties opposed the creation of the European Common Market as a conspiracy of monopoly capitalism. Until quite recently, they have consistently fought advances in European unity. Lately they have come to accept the European Community as a fact of life; they now say they seek to make it more "democratic" and to transform it, in Berlinguer's words, by "a process of innovation . . . in the spheres both of institutions and of general orientations." They can be counted on to reorient the Common Market toward closer ties with the state economies of Eastern Europe and toward the more extreme of the Third World's demands for a "new international economic order." It can be assumed that they will not encourage European political unity to foster cooperation with the United States; rather they will urge it, if at all, to encourage Third Force tendencies. Over time, the governments with Communist participation will manage to pull the others in their direction, or deep fissures will open up between the traditional Atlanticists and the "New Left" in the European Community. Either outcome would be destructive of European unity and Atlantic solidarity.

Whatever hypothesis we consider, therefore, Communist participation in governments of Western Europe would have a profound impact on the international order as it has developed in the postwar period. We cannot be indifferent to this, or delude ourselves that it would amount to anything short of a watershed in Atlantic relationships.

SITUATION, THE reaction of the United States necessarily has to be complex. As I have said, the crucial role must be played by the European governments; the final decision must be that of the European voters. There is no way we can substitute for either. For in the end, Western Europe's Communist parties find their opportunities less in their inherent strength than in the demoralization, division or disorganization of their opponents; they succeed only when the democratic system seems unable to solve the social problems of the day, when the center does not hold and societies become polarized. Violence—like that currently tormenting Italy—drives many to support Communism in desperation, convinced that drastic remedies are required to end a state of siege.

The basic causes of Communist gains, in other words, go deep and are not easy to remedy. In many European countries disillusionment with democratic government and democratic leaders is pervasive. In an era of peace, in a world of bureaucracy and mass production, there

is no galvanizing crisis and little opportunity for heroic performance. A relativist age debunks authority and puts nothing in its place as an organizing principle of society. Massive impersonal bureaucracy disillusions the citizen with the responsiveness of his government, and simultaneously makes the task of elected officials more difficult. In too many democratic countries the young are offered too little inspiration; their elders too often have lost confidence in their own values. Too frequently democratic leaders are consumed by winning and holding office and are unable to demonstrate the philosophical self-assurance of their radical opponents.

The very success of Western societies in maintaining prosperity at a level undreamt of even 40 years ago sometimes contributes to their malaise. Intellectuals condemn society for materialism when it is prosperous and for injustice when it fails to ensure prosperity. The widespread economic difficulties of the last four years—recession and inflation unparalleled in a generation, to a large extent induced by the extraordinary increase in oil prices—fuel the frustration of all whose hopes for economic advancement are rebuffed. The interdependence of economies causes inflation and recession to surge across national boundaries, compounding the sense of individual impotence.

And yet, with all these difficulties, the democratic forces of the West have it in their power to determine whether the Communist parties have opportunities to succeed. They have the capacity to put their economies on the path of steady noninflationary expansion. They have the intellectual capital and the resources to usher in a new period of creativity. Anti-Communism is not enough; there must be a response to legitimate social and economic aspirations, and there must be a reform of the inequities from which these antidemocratic forces derive much of their appeal. With able leadership—and Western cohesion—the democracies can overcome their challenges and usher in a period of dramatic fresh advance. And in this process it is vital that the United States encourage an attitude of resolve and conviction.

First of all, we must frankly recognize the problem that we will face if the Communists come to power in Western Europe, and we must understand the practical decisions this will impose on us as a nation. We must avoid facile projections that seek to escape difficult choices by making the most favorable assumptions about what might happen. We must have a program for supporting the forces of moderation and progress in this critical period, and for rallying them should a Communist party nonetheless prevail.

Second, we must avoid giving the impression that we consider Communist success a foregone conclusion by ostentatious association or consultation with Communist leaders, or by ambiguous declarations. Communist success is not a foregone conclusion; United States

July 18, 1977

13

hesitation or ambiguity can, however, contribute to it. Communist parties are riddled with weaknesses and internal strains, and marked by a fundamental flaw: Parties that do not speak for the humane values that have inspired the peoples of the West for centuries are unlikely to appeal to a majority in a Western nation, except in a moment of unsettling crisis. In no Western European country has the Communist party ever fairly won more than about a third of the vote. Their most powerful weapons are fear, distrust and discouragement; their principal asset is the myth of their inevitability. Consequently, we do our friends in Europe no favor if we encourage the notion that the advent of Communists and their allies into power will make little or no difference to our own attitudes and policies. I am talking less of formal statements—which depend on tactical judgments difficult for any outsider to make—than of a clear U.S. position.

Some have argued that such a policy would be counterproductive, that it would encourage Communist protest votes. I believe the opposite to be true. On balance, I consider it important that Europe know of America's interest and concern. Many voters in allied countries value the friendship of the United States and appreciate the security supplied by the Atlantic Alliance. We should not ignore them, or demoralize them, or undercut them. The gradual gains scored by the Communist parties over the past years occurred—by definition—at the margin, among voters who had not voted Communist before; who did not vote by anti-American reflex; who for one reason or another were persuaded that the Communists have now become acceptable or indispensable.

There is no evidence that voters are influenced to vote Communist by American attitudes. On the contrary, the real danger may well be the other way; many usual opponents of the Communist parties may be lulled by voices, attitudes and ambiguities in this country implying that our traditional opposition has changed. Paradoxically, we even weaken whatever moderate elements may exist in Communist movements by settling too eagerly for verbal reassurances.

If the United States has a responsibility to encourage political freedom throughout the world, we surely have a duty to leave no doubt about our beliefs on an issue that is so central to the future of the Western Alliance, and therefore to the future of democracy. Human rights is not an abstraction concerned only with judicial procedures and unrelated to basic questions of political and geopolitical structure. We cannot fail to reckon the setback to European freedom that will result if Communist minorities gain decisive influence in European politics; we must not close our eyes to the effect on freedom throughout the world if the global balance tips against the West.

Third, the United States should conduct its policies

toward its allies in a manner that strengthens the moderate, progressive and democratic governments of Western Europe. We must, on the one hand, avoid demands or lectures which, regardless of their intrinsic merit, magnify domestic fissures in European countries or the sense of impotence of European governments. On the other hand, the United States can contribute to a sense of accomplishment by offering vigorous cooperation in joint efforts to solve common problems in the fields of diplomacy, arms control, energy, and economic growth. This was the purpose of the economic summits among Western leaders begun by President Ford at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico, and continued so successfully in London by President Carter.

Unity and cooperative action among the democracies are crucial to all that America does in the world. Western unity defends not simply our security but our way of life and the most basic moral values of our civilization. Here we cannot be neutral. Fostering these principles deserves the same dedication and commitment that inspired the most imaginative diplomacy in the history of our country.

THE STAGNANT societies of the East to which I have referred serve as both a warning and a hope. They remind us that the West's latent intellectual and political vitality, even more than its material prosperity, is the envy of the world. The winds of change are ultimately blowing from the West. The men and women of Eastern Europe are certainly aware that the West, for all its doubts and spiritual dilemma, is the vanguard of modernization, the vital source of learning and of much of modern culture, and the haven of the free human spirit. The developing countries yearning for progress also turn to the West, not the East, for assistance, support and the measure of what man can achieve when he aspires. Our technology, our creativity, our unequaled economic vigor, not some bureaucratic doctrine of economic determinism, are the forces that will shape the future if we mobilize the energies of free peoples.

This is not the time for resignation or acquiescence. It is a time for confidence, determination and hope. The power of free men and women and free nations acting in concert, confident of their strength and of their destiny, cannot be matched by any totalitarian regime or totalitarian movement. The spirit of freedom can never be crushed. But freedom can be lost gradually. That danger exists today in Western Europe, and that threat could have consequences throughout the community of democracies and the world. If we cherish freedom, we will face the peril, marshal joint efforts to overcome it and begin an era of new fulfillment for our peoples. Western Europe, our closest partner and the cradle of much of our civilization, is too precious to us for us to do otherwise.

14

The New Leader

Press Intelligence, Inc.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

<table><thead><tr><th>Front Page</th><th>Edit Page</th><th>Other Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="3">WASHINGTON, D.C.</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">STAR</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">JUN 12 1977</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">E - 385,240</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">S - 374,267</td></tr></tbody></table>

# More agrarian reformers?

The hope that perhaps communism doesn't have to be cruel and repressive dies hard. The latest version of it has been rallying around a banner labeled "Eurocommunism."

The idea here is that the Communist parties hovering on the periphery of power in France, Italy and Spain, with strong prospects that they will be part of ruling coalitions before long, are different. Independent of the Soviet Union, for one thing. And democratic. Gradualist, even. No violent overthrow of institutions, nobody going to jail over a difference of opinion.

Is it a reasonable hope?

Not if you believe Henry Kissinger. The former secretary of State, addressing a conference of scholars on Italy and Eurocommunism sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and Stanford's Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, came down on the whole concept with the force of Winston Churchill denouncing the Iron Curtain.

"Only in Western Europe and the United States are there still illusions about the nature of Communist parties," he said, "In Eastern Europe boredom, intellectual emptiness, inefficiency, and stultifying bureaucratism have been obvious for decades. Countries which used to be leading industrial powers have been reduced to mediocrity and stagnation; nations with long democratic traditions have seen the destruction of civil liberties and democratic practices. The countries of the West would mortgage their future if they closed their eyes to this reality. Societies that try to avoid difficult choices by making comforting assumptions about the future win no awards for restraint; they only speed their own demise."

This from the author of *detente* and the over-

tures toward the People's Republic of China? Mr. Kissinger explained that there is a difference between "managing conflict with adversaries and maintaining an alliance among friends."

At least one Eurocommunist leader has hinted that his country might even be willing to stay in NATO under his party's leadership. It wouldn't suit Mr. Kissinger, though. Dismissing the enticements of the Titoist model, he said, "The key issue is not how 'independent' the European Communists would be, but how Communist." He cited case after case of supposedly independent Communist leaders standing by Moscow at any point of international crisis. It is only *within* the Communist movement that they want national freedom. In other words, a Eurocommunist component in the Atlantic Alliance would be unthinkable for the United States.

Mr. Kissinger was not proposing to send in the Marines if a NATO country should come under a Communist-dominated government. What he was urging was clear thinking in the United States about what it would mean if this happened. No illusions about different kinds of communism. That, plus a policy of unequivocal encouragement to moderate groups in the countries with strong Communist parties. They haven't taken power yet; it is not inevitable that they will.

The most President Carter has said on the subject is that we hope Western Europe doesn't go Communist, but we wouldn't presume to tell anybody how to vote. He too might clarify his thinking by listening to Henry Kissinger.

Or, if he'd prefer to hear it from a Democrat, Sen. Moynihan has been delivering the same message with comparable eloquence.

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The Page

* 'Few rich men own their property. The property owns them'
—Robert G.Ingersoll

1/25/77

# What ARE those Sr. Citizens up to?

HELLO Young Lovers: Eye loves young lovers, wherever they are.

Like the ingenious pair who "date" in a state-owned senior citizens' van (official plates, Mass. M22481).

State vehicles are forbidden for private business, but a couple popped out of the van after midnight on Summit Ave., Brookline.

They drove off in a hurry, when passersby began to examine the van.

**$5 MILLION MAN:** That's the amount Henry Kissinger will collect for publication of his Memoirs as U.S. Secretary of State — and other stuff.

Eye can't wait. Just the thing for a little, light reading in the hammock.

But Henry hasn't put a word on paper, he tells Boston editor Ned Brown. And he won't sit down to his typewriter until Sept. 1.

Eye can't understand that. The Constant Readers are pacing the beaches waiting for the first edition.

Henry tells Ned that he and a three-person staff are digging through the files for the Good Stuff.

Eye guesses that's OK, will have to be patient until the first pages get to the publisher around the end of the year.

GOOD FIELD, no hit: In our Eye, Atty. Jeffrey Denner of Cambridge is quite a catch.

Denner went to the All Star game at Yankee Stadium, casually lifted his hand — to stretch, Eye guesses — and

caught the homer whomped by Joe Morgan into right field.

So far, the Sox haven't summonsed Jeff and Eye wants to know why?

**LITTLE BOAR:** Another big-time ball player is Cadillac Dealer Peter Fuller, popular pitcher at softball games in the Fuller family compound at Little Boar's Head near Rye N.H.

"That's because everything comes up soft," said Fuller, who racks up a lot of losses against nieces and nephews.

The houses on the compound —Pete's big house with white pillars, one for sis (Dr. George Bottomley's house), one for neice Lilla Langley and another for cousin Hope Talbot.

On how many Fuller acres?

"Oh, gosh. I don't know," said Peter, "but it stretches right along the coast."

MORE COOL: Little Rasputin, the boa constrictor of Beacon street, got ever so hot in last week's heat wave.

So his owner, the Snaky lady, filled

up the bathtub with tepid water for the six foot, 15 pound Raspy to flit and play in.

"He loves it," the Snaky lady reported to Eye. He even disappeared underwater for a full two and one-half minutes without coming up for air as he did a few laps around the tub.

That gave Eye a terrible scare, snake lovers, but he was all right! Thank goodness!

Eye is knitting Raspy a tiny bikini for his scaly body.

Henry: 'Sure I WANT to get down to writing the book — but there've been so-o-o-o many distractions!'