Copy No. 5

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1963

Dinner with M. Lefevre, Belgian Prime Minister - May 15, 1963

A great deal of the conversation concerned the domestic situation in Belgium and particularly the language problem. Lefevre makes the impression of a bulldog, very tenacious, quick and a willing fighter.

With respect to foreign policy, Lefevre asked me about the NATO multilateral force. I told him that I had written an article about it which stated my views and that I would not go beyond it. I had not advocated the project. However, if negotiations led to a commitment by the major European countries--or at least some of them--I would favor its adoption. It would be very unfortunate for NATO if another major project collapsed.

Lefevre said Belgium had only two interests in the multilateral force: to prevent national nuclear arms for Germany and to demonstrate Atlantic solidarity. If Britain did not participate in the multilateral force, Belgium's interest would cool rapidly.

For the rest, Belgium was not really interested in strategic weapons. Lefevre did consider it essential that Europe develop nuclear technology for industrial purposes and that it participate in space research. He would be more interested in a multilateral force if Europe could manufacture part of it. But he would above all be interested in nuclear know-how relevant to industrial progress.

Lefevre spoke scathingly about De Gaulle. He said that all the criticisms De Gaulle made of Anglo-Saxon treatment of him applied to De Gaulle's treatment of Belgium. It was unacceptable to base Europe on French hegemony.

Lefevre spoke of the GATT negotiations. He thought the U.S. position

Belgium asked of the GATT negotiations. It brought the U.S. position
forward. Belgium made of United States treatment of him subject to the
conclusion of Belgium. It was unacceptable to pass Belgium on French territory.

But he would above all be interested in further study of relevant
more detailed in a multilateral force. It would confine itself to it.
industrial burdens and that it would have to do so in these records. He would
believe did consider its essential that Belgium develop nuclear weapons for
the rest. Belgium was not really interested in strategic means.

Interest would be highly
quickly. It Britain did not barter its in the multilateral force, Britain's
so far distant national nuclear arms race with Germany and to demonstrate Atlantic self-
relief and Britain had only two interests in the multilateral force:
to prevent national nuclear arms race for Germany and to demonstrate Atlantic self-
relief and Britain had Britain had only two interests in the multilateral force:

or at least some of them--I would favor this option. It would be very un-
wise, if negotiations led to a commitment by the major European countries--
by atom and that I would not be beyond it. I had not advocated the project.
In itself, I would find it that I had written an article about it which stated
with respect to Germany below, Belgium asked me about the NATO uni-
ited of a pipeline, very tensions, during and a writing tighter.

Belgium and particularly the language problem. Belgium asks the question
of a pipeline, very tensions, during and a writing tighter.

Dinner with M. Ferey, Belgium Prime Minister - May 12, 1963

SECRETARY TO CONFERENCE

June 3, 1963

Copy No. 2

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

unreasonable. An equal percentage cut of tariffs would leave U.S. duties still very high while reducing those of Europe to a negligible level. Thus Europe would lose its bargaining power with the U.S. He thought the United States would have to accept a larger percentage reduction than the Common Market. Belgium, in any event, would do everything to facilitate agreement.

Speaking about Germany, Lefèvre said that he considered Adenauer one of the two great men he had met (the other was de Gasperi). As for his successors, Lefèvre thought Erhard incompetent and stupid. He might ruin the Christian Democrats. Schroeder was very shrewd and tactically oriented. No one could be sure what he was up to. Von Hassel had made a good impression in Belgium. The trouble with all German politicians was the lack of any political experience. They were used now to the authority of Adenauer. What would happen after him was unpredictable. A great deal depended therefore on tying Germany to Europe and NATO as closely as possible.

Lefèvre then told me of a long conversation he had recently had with the Pope. The Pope was a most remarkable human being, of genuine goodness and compassion. His major concern was for the spiritual welfare of his flock. He was uninterested in politics. He had told Lefèvre that Communism was an existing fact which would not be wished away. It was the duty of the Church to minister to its faithful whether they lived behind the Iron Curtain or even when they were members of Communist parties in the West.

I asked Lefèvre whether he thought such an attitude eroded dividing lines and thus aided the Communists. Specifically did he think the Pope's attitude had affected the Italian elections. Lefèvre said that at first he had thought so. But then he had compared the Italian electoral results with

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

those of communal elections some months before the encyclical and the pattern
was essentially the same. Lefevre thought that the left wing of the Nonni
socialists had voted Communist and every other party had lost its left wing
to the next party on the left. I said that this sounded like the definition
of a left-wing trend. He said that the major culprit was not the Church but
the reactionary and stupid land-owners and capitalists in Italy. In any event
the Italian elections did not set a pattern for the rest of Europe.

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

With respect to foreign policy, Lefevre asked me about the NATO multilateral force. I told him that I had written an article about it which stated my views and that I would no go beyond it. I had not advocated the project. However, if negotiations led to a commitment by the major European countries - or at least some of them - I would favor its adoption. It would be very unfortunate for NATO if another major project collapsed.

For the rest, Belgium was not really interested in strategic weapons. Lefevre did consider it essential that Europe develop nuclear technology for industrial purposes and that it participate in space research. He would be more interested in a multilateral force if Europe could produce part of it. But he would above all be interested in nuclear know-how relevant to industrial progress.

Lefevre spoke scathingly about De Gaulle. He said that all the criticisms De Gaulle made of Anglo-Saxon treatment of him applied to De Gaulle's treatment of Belgium. It was km unacceptable to base Europe on French hegemony.

Lefevre spoke of the GATT negotiations. He thought the U.S. position unreasonable. An equal precentage cut of tariffs would leave U.S. duties still very high while reducing those of Europe to a negligible level. Thus Europe would lose its bargaining power with the U.S. He thought the United States would have to accept a larger percentage reduction than the common view of Belgium, in any event, would do everything to facilitate agreement.

2

Speaking about Germany, Lefevre said that he considered Adenauer one of the two great men he had met (the other was De Gasperi). As for his successor, Lefevre thought Erhard __MINCHERKANK__ incompetent and stupid. He might ruin the Christian Democrats. Schroeder was very shrewd and tactically oriented. ME No one could be __MEKE__ sure what he was up to. Van Hassel had made a good impression in Belgium. The trouble with all German politicians was the lack of any political experience. They were used now to the authority of Adenauer. What would happen after him was unpredictable. A great deal depended thereupon on tying Germany to Europe and NATO as closely as possible.

Lefevre then told me of a long conversation he had recently had with the Pope. The Pope was a most remarkable __KK__ human being, of genuine goodness and compassion. His __KM__ major concern was for the spiritual __GODDESS__ welfare of his flock. He was uninterested in politics. He had told Lefevre that Communism was an existing fact which would not be wished away. __MEXW__ It was the duty of the Church to minister to its faithful whether they lived behind the Iron Curtain or even when they were members of Communist parties __IKK__ in the West.

I asked Lefevre whether he __KONG__ thought such an attitude __ERASE__ dividing lines and thus aided the Communists. Specifically did he think the __P__ Pope's attitude had affected the Italian elections. Lefevre said that at first he had thought so. But then he had compared the Italian electoral results with those of __COMMUNIST__ elections some months before the encyclical and the pattern was essentially the same. Lefevre thought that the left wing of the Nenni socialists had voted Communist and every other party had lost its left wing to the next party on the left. I said this sounded like the definition of a left-wing __tend__ party. He said that the major difference was not the Church but the __KAP__ and stupid land-owners and capitalists in Italy. In any event the Italian elections did not set a pattern for the rest of Europe.