MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

December 16, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Richard J. Barnett

Barnett, of the Institute for Policy Studies, will call on you December 17 to talk about his visit to Hanoi during the first half of November. Barnett went as a guest of a North Vietnamese jurists association.

He did a little touring around the DRV, and talked with Pham Van Dong for three hours. He is said by those who have talked with him since his return to be sincere in his beliefs about his findings concerning the North Vietnamese.

Barnett's Views

-- His central impression was that Hanoi was quite optimistic over its war prospects. It allegedly anticipates a failure of Vietnamization and believes the political situation is souring for Thieu in South Vietnam.

-- Hanoi is also counting on US anti-war sentiment to undermine American policy, but is not relying on this to the extent that many in the US believe.

-- Hanoi is not much concerned with the possibility of allied re-escalation of the war, believing it is not a real Washington option. It has prepared its people, however.

-- The North Vietnamese really want to negotiate an end to the conflict, but the US must make a change in its support of the Thieu regime before this is possible.

Your Position

I recommend that:

1. You outline the President's policy on negotiations and Vietnamization. It is possible that Barnett plans to transmit your views to the

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North Vietnamese.

2. You may also wish to probe his belief that Hanoi is really optimistic over its prospects, citing the real problems that the other side has in terms of its position in the South and the growing burden of the war on the North.

3. You may also wish to question whether Barnett got any impression of North Vietnamese future war plans; did they hint at trying a big offensive, or did they imply that they are counting on a long protraction of the conflict as the principal means of breaking down US policy?

Memorandum for Henry Kissinger

The following ideas for ending the Vietnam War have been
developed after extended conversations with North Vietnamese and NLF
officials including Premier Pham Van Dong. These ideas are based on the
assumption that this Government has now concluded that the primary goal of
the U.S. is to achieve a compromise political solution in South Vietnam.
The purpose of the plan is to provide the greatest possible self determination
and protection for all political elements in South Vietnam after the complete
withdrawal of U.S. forces.

1. The President should immediately appoint a new negotiating team in Saigon and in Paris. Ambassador Bunker should be replaced by an individual who is not identified with old policies and long association with the present Saigon leadership. Senator John Sherman Cooper might be asked to take on a temporary assignment as the President's Special Representative in Saigon. Someone such as Milton Eisenhower or Arthur Flemming could be appointed to to replace Lodge. The North Vietnamese would take it very seriously, in my view, if Secretary Rodgers or Under Secretary Richardson should be appointed as Paris negotiator with a 60 day mandate to reach a settlement.

2. The new Ambassador in Saigon should promptly communicate the following to President Thieu: The United States has decided to remove 300,000 troops by the end of 1970 and all troops by the end of 1971. 100,000 troops will leave within the next 60 days. All B-52 missions will be stopped unless there are indications of a major North Vietnamese or VC attack. The decision to withdraw all U.S. forces by the end of 1971 is final and irreversible assuming the VC and NVA do not harass the U.S. troops as

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they leave or mount a major offensive against the ARVN forces. The Ambassador should point out to President Thieu that the negotiating position of the Saigon government will be strongest while the U.S. troops remain. He should suggest that it is in the interests of the Saigon government to commence serious negotiations with the NLF as soon as possible.

3. To that end he should propose that President Thieu authorize the formation of a Provisional Commission for National Reconciliation with a mandate to prepare a plan for the holding of elections and the preparation of a coalition government. The mandate should make clear that the Provisional Commission is not bound by the present Constitution and that its recommendations may include the amendment or replacement of that Constitution. Once the Commission has agreed upon a plan for holding elections it would meet with the NLF to work out a joint plan for designing and administering the electoral process. The Ambassador should point out to President Thieu that the Provisional Commission should include members of the Saigon cabinet, prominent Saigon figures such as Minh, Don, Lieng, representatives of the two Buddhist groups, and prominent exiles such as Au Truong Thanh. The Commission should elect its own President. To preserve the flexibility of the Commission it should not be headed by either Ky, Thieu, or Khiem. The Ambassador should make clear to President Thieu that the U.S. cannot force him to follow the recommended course but that if he does not follow this or another credible plan for negotiation, the U.S. will feel compelled to accelerate the troop withdrawals in the interests of protecting our forces. We will also be unable to supply ARVN forces if the Saigon government resists this realistic proposal for negotiation, since the American people will

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not support the indefinite prolongation of the war. The Ambassador should
make clear that the Administration does not believe that the NLF or Hanoi
will ever negotiate with the presently constituted Saigon government.

4. The U.S. negotiator in Paris should ask for a private meeting with the North Vietnamese representative and communicate the following: The U.S. is now prepared to make a firm commitment to withdraw all its forces by the end of 1971, to follow the withdrawal schedule outlined above, to cease offensive operations including B-52 strikes, and to encourage a negotiation between the Provisional Commission described above and the NLF. This commitment is premised on good faith negotiations between the Provisional Commission and the NLF. The Ambassador should point out that if the NLF press offensive operations during the period of negotiation and withdrawal, the process will be halted. The Ambassador should emphasize the fact that the U.S. is now prepared to accept whatever government will emerge in South Vietnam as a consequence of the negotiation between the Provisional Commission and the NLF. The U.S. interests are limited to insuring maximum participation and protection for all elements in South Vietnam. To this end the U.S. will lend whatever support it can to demands from Vietnamese themselves for international inspection and specific assurances for amnesty. But the character of the South Vietnamese government is to be determined by the Vietnamese themselves.

The Ambassador should propose that the North Vietnamese Government release the list of U.S. prisoners on the same day as the U.S. withdrawal pledge is given. The U.S. and North Vietnamese could sign a joint statement that the prisoner list does not imply acceptance of the Geneva Convention but that it is given as an expression of confidence that

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the negotiation and withdrawal process have begun. The North Vietnamese
should also be asked to release a significant number of prisoners and to
agree to release the rest from time to time to match U.S. troop withdraw-
als.

5. The President should explain the schedule of withdrawal and negotiation to the American public. He should make it clear that it is now the Administration view that we have arrived at the optimum moment to achieve self determination in South Vietnam. He should candidly tell the public that we cannot guarantee or even predict what the future political development of South Vietnam will be. All that we can do is to put the non-communist forces in South Vietnam in the best possible position to compete for power. This we have done by a five year massive effort. Now the South Vietnamese themselves are saying that they must stand on their own feet and work out the reconciliation and reconstruction of their own society.

Richard J. Barnet