VIETNAM - 1969

I. The Setting: January 20, 1969

On January 20, 1969, the US troop level was still heading upward to the authorized ceiling of 549,500 (as set on April 11, 1968). The troop level actually reached its peak of 543,482 in May 1969 and thus was still rising when the Administration took office. The total budget cost of the war was $30 billion in 1969, of which $24 billion was the "additional cost" of the war. US casualties were averaging 200 KIA a week over the second half of 1968. US combat deaths in 1968 totaled 14,592, and the cumulative total of Americans KIA at the end of 1968 was about 31,000.

As far as the military situation in Vietnam was mixed. The "body count" ratio of allied vs. VC/NVA KIA had been constant for the preceding two years at about 5 to 1 (currently 200 US plus 200 RVNAF per week vs. 2000 VC/NVA). Enemy losses were estimated at 291,000 in 1968, roughly balanced by infiltration and recruitment of 298,000. RVNAF regular forces were much larger (826,000) than a year earlier (743,000) or two years earlier (623,000), and much better equipped. All ARVN combat units now had the M-16 rifle and were beginning to get more of their own artillery and helicopter support. But regular force desertions (net and gross) hit a two-year high in September 1968, with not nearly as many desertions equivalent to one ARVN division per month. And NVA forces in South Vietnam represented only 10% of their total regular forces. VC infrastructure existed in 80% of the hamlets. It was estimated that 65% of the total population and 81% of the rural population was subject to some degree of VC influence. By the end of 1968, the VC had not gained significantly since their last visit in October 1966.

Enemy strategy (as reported by the JCS in the January 25, 1969, NSC meeting) seemed to be to maintain military pressure and sporadic attacks in all areas of South Vietnam, using main force units to attack US forces and using guerrilla operations to disrupt pacification and strengthen its political infrastructure.

In the second half of 1968, COMUSMACV General Abrams had adopted a US strategy of fewer large-scale sweeps and more small patrols for intelligence and spoiling. Forces were deployed for defense in depth around major cities. Because of the "understanding" on the bombing halt and non-violation of the DMZ, Abrams redeployed one division from northern I Corps to III and IV Corps and freed up for operations in the Danang area a division that had been held there in reserve for a DMZ contingency. This apparently deterred attacks on the cities.

2.

The GVN political situation seemed more stable than at any time in the previous four years. Thieu had broadened his base to include more Southerners and some respected nationalists, such as Premier Tran Van Huong.

The diplomatic situation was as follows: When LBJ announced his withdrawal from the Presidential race and a bombing halt above 20° on March 31, 1968, a US-DRV negotiation began in Paris at Avenue Kléber. On November 1, 1968, bombing was halted completely over the DRV (and continued only in Laos). (The US exempted reconnaissance flights from the prohibition; the DRV never explicitly agreed to this but commenced the new Paris talks in the knowledge of the US position.) In return for the bombing halt, it was agreed that "serious talks" would begin, now including the VC and GVN. Agreement was reached on the shape of the table only on January 16, 1969.

The "bombing halt understanding" was that there would be (1) "no indiscriminate attacks on the major cities" (Saigon, Danang and Hue) and (2) no firing of artillery, rockets or mortars from, across and within the DMZ, no movement of troops from, across and within the DMZ, and no massing or movement of troops near the DMZ "in a manner threatening to the other side". The DRV never explicitly agreed to these points but rather "assented by silence", and Kosygin assured LBJ in a letter of October 28 that "doubts with regard to the position of the Vietnamese side are groundless". We told the DRV repeatedly that indiscriminate attacks on the major cities "would create a situation which would not permit serious talks and thus the maintenance of a cessation [of the bombing]".

The only US settlement plan on the table was the Manila Formula of October 24, 1966, which stated that "allied forces...shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. These forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled". The GVN offered, in "a program of national reconciliation", simply "to open its doors to those Vietnamese who have been misled or coerced into casting their lot with the Viet Cong". Harriman and Vance indicated to the DRV in private talks on September 15, 1968, that the Manila formula really meant mutual withdrawal, beginning simultaneously, with the proviso that US forces would be completely out not later than six months after the NVA were completely out. "Residual violence" might be tolerated under the Manila Formula as long as the NVA were withdrawn.

3.

Harriman admitted to Rogers (according to Rogers at the January 21 NSC meeting) that we really had no policy with respect to negotiating objectives. Nor were there plans for US troop withdrawals. In the fall of 1968, DOD consistently denied the existence of withdrawal plans, and Clark Clifford stated in a press conference on December 10, 1968: "Let me reiterate that at the present time there is no plan for any net reduction in our troop level in Vietnam."

The Communist negotiating position, as set forth in a statement by the NLF Central Committee on November 3, 1968, called for the US to "withdraw all US and Satellite troops and their war equipment from South Vietnam and dismantle US military bases in South Vietnam," and insisted that "the internal affairs of South Vietnam must be settled by the South Vietnamese people in accordance with the NFLSV political platform, without foreign intervention. The NFLSV advocates the formation of a broad national and democratic coalition government and the holding of free general elections in South Vietnam."

President-elect Nixon initiated a secret channel to Hanoi through Jean Sainteny and Mai Van Bo (DRV representative in Paris) with a secret message on December 20, 1968, stressing readiness for serious negotiations:

"1. The Nixon Administration is prepared to undertake serious talks.

"2. These talks are to be based on the self respect and sense of honor of all parties.

"3. The Nixon Administration is prepared for an honorable settlement but for nothing less.

"4. If Hanoi wants, the Nixon Administration would be willing to discuss ultimate objectives first.

"5. If Hanoi wishes to communicate some of their general ideas prior to January 20, they will be examined with a constructive attitude and in strictest confidence."

The North Vietnamese replied on December 31, 1968, calling for U.S. withdrawal and concluding: "To be quite honest, as long as the Thieu-Ky-Huong clique remains at the head of that Administration it will be difficult to settle any of these problems." Nixon responded on January 2, 1969, that "the Nixon Administration solemnly affirms its readiness to withdraw U.S. forces from South Vietnam as part of an honorable settlement, which includes mutual troop withdrawal." The DRV kept the ball in play with a long reply on January 13, 1969, denouncing the "policy of aggression of President Lyndon Baines Johnson against Vietnam," which, according to Mai Van Bo, "has failed." There the matter lay on January 20.

## A. <u>Vietnam</u>

Among the earliest of the contributors was Henry Cabot Lodge, who wrote to Nixon on October 31, 1968, recommending that the new Administration launch a "quick survey of the Vietnam situation" as soon as possible after the election. He proposed also that the new President appoint a senior civilian "Vietnam generalist" to coordinate the "Washington end of the war." There were too many competing voices in Washington and he urged that someone be appointed, preferably in State, to centralize all operations. Thirdly, Lodge proposed a shift in military strategy. He felt that US forces should shift to a "police/self-help operation" in South Vietnam, behind the "shield" of military operations. By "police" he meant an intensified pacification effort including the RFPF; by "self-help" he had in mind a concentrated community action program to promote economic progress. Such a shift in strategy would be better able to maintain domestic support in the United States.

A similar endorsement of greater efforts on pacification was submitted by Ithiel de Sola Pool who wrote on December 6 to congratulate HK on his appointment as national security adviser:

"We have talked often about the problem of pacification in VietNam. As you know, I have a deep personal commitment to getting some needed reforms made in our program. These are all the more essential now since they are preconditions to the GVN effectively taking over the pacification effort."

Some brief points on Vietnam are included in the <u>talking points</u> for HK's briefing of the new Cabinet on December 12. It is not clear who drafted them -- possibly Eagleburger -- but they hint at some of HK's known views, including the January