THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

The presupposition of US policy has been that the elapse of a
brief period of war would permit a restoration of the status quo
ante -- without significant US involvement. However, the objectives
of avoiding direct involvement, and preventing Israel from becoming
fundamentally hurt through the continuation of hostile action by
Egypt and Syria are becoming increasingly hard to reconcile. A
combination of improved military tactics, enhanced skill in handling
anti-tank weapons, and SAM belts of surprising depth and resiliency,
have permitted Egypt and Syria to offset in large part what had been
thought as Israel's substantial advantages and to supplant Israel's
planned lightning campaign into a war of attrition. Israel's apparent
complacency and miscalculations contributed significantly to this
result. As a consequence, restoration of the 1967 ceasefire lines
in the Sinai probably will require some combination of an extended
period of campaign (at least several weeks), infusion of new equip-
ment to replace losses, and heavy Israeli casualties. Thus, the
initial objectives of US policy which were to avoid major involvement
and to restore pre-attack conditions in a matter of a few days before
diplomatic consequences would become serious, no longer appear attainable.

The following developments underscore this conclusion:

* The Saudi decision to move combat forces to Syria, with the import of Saudi forces being bloodied for the first time by the Israelis and the fostering of a Saudi position irreconcilable with US interests.

* The increasing pressures, first externally and now internally, on Hussein not to stand aloof. This implies that with the passage of time Hussein will have to commit forces or the stability of his regime perhaps will be permanently undermined.

* The re-emergence of the Soviets as an abettor as well as supplier of Arab attacks on Israel and a nominal supporter of Arab unity. Whether this was calculated in advance or reacted to opportunistically is of secondary importance. The Soviets stand on

the threshold of being held as supporters of the
Arabs and of Arab unity in a period of success--
while the US, isolated in its support of Israel,
becomes labeled once again as Israel's sole mainstay.

As time passes, it becomes more difficult to perceive the US as being able to reassemble the rudiments of the pre-war conditions: continued security for Israel and retention of a satisfactorily hedged position in the oil-rich Arab states. In light of the situation that could emerge during the next two weeks, the Saudis (as well as the Kuwaites and the Emirs) could be permanently embroiled in the conflict. The Hashemite regime could be destroyed. The US could be regarded as having sacrificed its relations with Arab states in favor of support for Israel, with immediate consequences for our interests in the oil-producing states.

Under these circumstances, it appears the hope of attaining our initial objectives has now waned to the point that our strategy should be altered. Unless the war can be terminated in the very near term, the damage to US interests may become irreparable. For this reason, pressing for an in-place ceasefire may be the desirable strategy. It will require time and high costs for the Israelis to reduce the Egyptian forces and restore the status quo ante. During such a period, whether it be one week or two, the impact of the US being perceived as the supplier and mainstay of Israel would undermine the basis of our relations with the conservative Arab states. The consequences probably would be immediate -- particularly if the Israelis were ultimately successful with our logistic support in striking back with sufficient force to humiliate a growing collection of Arab states. Rather than risk this, pressing for an in-place ceasefire has obvious appeal. In any event, the prior presuppositions of US policy should be reviewed in light of the changed lines of force associated with the loss of Israel's paramountcy.

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20230

SEP 21 1973

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State Designate
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Henry:

I want to extend hearty congratulations
upon your confirmation as Secretary of
State by the United States Senate and
also to express my deep regret at being
unable to attend your swearing-in ceremony.

As you may know, we are departing on a
2-week trip to eastern Europe in the
interest of expanding our commercial oppor-
tunities there, and will for that reason
be unable to attend the ceremony.

I look forward with considerable anticipation
to serving within the Cabinet with you in
the days ahead.

TEL. NO. 251286
251287

University of Bombay

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF BOMBAY
BOMBAY 32.
(INDIA)

13th June 1969

The Editor,
Confluence,
10 Weld Hall,
Cambridge 38,
Massachusetts,
U.S.A.

Dear Sir,

This is in continuation to my letter dated
6 May 1969. This is the fourth letter that I
have written to you (the earlier ones being dated
March 29, and January 7, 1969) seeking permission
to reprint parts of an article from *Confluence* in
a volume that I am editing on slums and allied
topics.

The extract that I would like to reprint comp-
ises Parts I & V of the paper 'The New Shame of
the cities' by Morton Grodzins, in *Confluence*,
vol.7, No.1, spring 1958.

The author will be paid Rs.30 as a token remu-
neration, and also a copy of the edited volume
which is shortly to be brought out by a Bombay
publisher.

Appropriate acknowledgement will of course be
made in respect of the above-mentioned extract in
my volume.

I hope you will extend your co-operation by
giving me the necessary permission as early as
possible as the manuscript is on the way to the
press.

WESTON, PATRICK & STEVENS

A PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION

COUNSELLORS AT LAW

84 STATE STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02109

AREA CODE 617
TELEPHONE 742-9310
CABLE ADDRESS • WESTPAST

LOOMIS PATRICK
FREDERICK M. SEARS
STUART DEBARD
HAROLD E. STEVENS
GARDNER W. RUSSELL
GEORGE B. REDDING
RALPH H. WILLARD, JR.
FRANK P. HURLEY
CHARLES E. HOLLY
LEWIS M. STILLMAN
EARL F. NAUSS, JR.
JOSE DE VARON
DAVID LEE TURNER
ELLIOTT J. MAHLER
C. PETER R. GOSSELS
LINDSAY BIATHROW
CHARLES S. ADAMS
WILLIAM C. GARDINER
RICHARD B. OSTERBERG
JAMES B. WINWARD

December 22, 1972

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

A few weeks ago I wrote a piece for the Boston Globe which the Globe graciously rejected "because it was too long."

It occurred to me, since it was entitled "In Defense of Kissinger," that perhaps before I submitted it in either shorter or longer form elsewhere, I should pass it through your hands in case you wish to comment.

Let me say that the last two lines on page 9 were not meant flippantly.

You might also be interested in my conception of American foreign policy of a few years ago as stated in a position paper I wrote for John Collins on the occasion of a Foreign Policy Debate at the Harvard Club in which Mayor Collins

175

[LC]

For the Globe

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon

Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's
*NATIONAL*
Special Assistant for International Security Affairs,
told us last October "peace is at hand". Of course,
what Dr. Kissinger really meant has to be seen in the
context of the meaning of the word peace. It is,
therefore, useful to paraphrase from von Clausewitz'
famous motto in "Von Kriege" - "diplomacy is the waging
of war by other means" and to translate it to "peace is
the waging of war by other means".

As Jacobovsky told the Colonel, and as Dr.
Kissinger of course knows, there are always at least two
possibilities: either Hanoi and Saigon will sign the
cease-fire agreement and work on a winding down of the
war or they will not. Let us assume the first possibility,
that the representatives of the United States and of Hanoi
as well as of Saigon and the Viet Cong, do indeed sign in
the near future, the October cease-fire agreement and
adopt the various protocols and implementations which are
now in the works. What happens next? Of course, the
struggle will be continued, we hope without the "big stuff" -

[10]

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon -2-

the big planes and big armies and the extreme suffering
of total war.

It is necessary in this connection to remember
that the North Vietnamese Communists are Communists in a
much more sincere and primitive sense than the Communists
of today's Soviet Union or even the People's Republic of
China. This is not meant in any way to say that the
Russians or the Chinese are not, or do not consider them-
selves, Communists and true followers of Marx, Lenin and
Stalin. I am only saying they are in a later and therefore
different stage.

In such earlier stage of the Revolution in
today's Vietnam, especially in North Vietnam, the writings
and, indeed, the general party line as enunciated by
Lenin and Stalin have a great deal more meaning and are
taken most seriously by the Communist leadership as the
theoretical basis for the revolution: that movement through
the transitional dictatorship of the proletariat and
constant struggle against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie
on the way to the classic classless pure Communist condition
where oppression and exploitation are no more and the state

[1c]

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon -3-

has withered away.

Forget for the moment that, as some of us
observe it, the Soviet Union itself is now a dictatorship
not of the proletariat but for the proletariat, - in
political organization an authoritarian state and in
function very much of a technocracy. Here is a society
with a growing well-to-do managerial class.

Forget also, for the moment, that the great
cultural revolution in the People's Republic of China is
now perceived as a serious attempt to renew the sacrament
of revolution and to prevent the rise of a technocratic
and basically mandarin elite with allegiances growing more
and more to a growing upper middle class.

And with your memory so stultified, forget Stalin's
later years and the 20th Party Congress. Then go back to
the year 1924 when in April Stalin gave a series of lectures
in the city of Sverdlov entitled "The Foundations of
Leninism" where he really laid it all out and indeed
created the perfect link between Marx and Engels to
Lenin, and from Lenin to the modern day high priests of
Communist ideology. I suggest that every reporter and

[Lc]

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon -4-

and commentator on international affairs pull out
Stalin's 1924 lectures on "The Foundations of Leninism"
and consider what is happening today in Vietnam in
terms of theory and practice, strategy and tactics, as
spelled out by Stalin in those lectures. Read his
explanation of what Lenin was up to at Brest-Litovsk
which ended the first world war for the Soviets. Here it
is much abbreviated with appropriate quotation as always
from Lenin:

> "The reserves must be handled in such a way
> as to safeguard an orderly retreat should the enemy be
> very powerful, should a withdrawal be inevitable, should
> it be obviously undesirable to accept the enemy's offer
> of battle, should retreat be the only way whereby (in
> the circumstances) the vanguard can escape destruction
> and keep the reserves at its disposal. In this connection,
> Lenin writes:

> 'Revolutionary parties must go on learning.
> They have learned how to attack. Now it is time for them
> to realise that this knowledge must be supplemented by
> acquiring a knowledge of how best to retreat. We have

[lc]

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon -5-

got to understand (and a revolutionary class learns
this by bitter experience) that victory can only be won
by those who have learned the proper method both of
advance and of retreat. (Works, Russian edition, vol.
xvii, p.121.)

"The object of such strategy is to gain time, to scatter the forces of the enemy while consolidating our own for a future advance.

"The peace of Brest-Litovsk is a model instance of such strategy. This peace enabled the Party to gain time, to take advantage of the dissensions in the imperialist camp, to disintegrate the enemy forces, to retain the support of the peasants, and to gather strength for an attack on Kolchak and Denikin. In the days of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin wrote:

'By concluding a separate peace, we free
ourselves as far as is possible at the present moment
from both the contending imperialist groups, turning
their mutual hostilities to our own account, taking
advantage of the state of warfare between them which
prevents their joining forces against us, thus freeing
ourselves for a time so that we can further and consolidate
the socialist revolution. (Works, Russian edition, vol.
xv., pp.68-69.)

[lc]

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon -6-

"Three years after the peace of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin wrote:

'Even the dullest have now come to see that the peace of Brest-Litovsk was a concession which strengthened us while it disintegrated the forces of international imperialism. (Works, Russian edition, vol. xviii, part I, p.355.) '

Stalin's Sverdlov lectures are a fascinating mixture of Russian patriotism, Communist belief, and indeed a very serious and successful bid by Stalin to become one of the leading theoreticians of the Communist world. That's why, by the way, de-Stalinization was concerned with the old man's excesses in his later years.

Of special relevance to us today is Stalin's treatment of the "*Doctrine of Advance and Retreat*" in the hard-fought battle by the dictatorship of the proletariat against the forces and traditions of the older societies, a battle which as Lenin said, is "a fight that is both bloody and unbloody, both violent and passive, both military and economic, both educational and administrative".

In his Sverdlov lectures devoted particularly

[1c]

In Defense of Kissinger by Jose de Varon -7-

to strategy and tactics, Stalin emphasized the importance
of understanding when and how to shift from the offensive
to the defensive and back again. He said time and again that
this is as important a principle to the revolutionary
movement as it is to military strategy.

Stalin especially hammered home this important
difference between short term tactics which could mean
activities within a span of 1 to 10 or more years with
long term strategy which could embrace periods longer than
our normal presidential terms and indeed might stretch to
decades, generations and centuries.

Without continuing the sermon, here are 3
quotations from Stalin's Foundations of Leninism. The
first one on strategy and tactics is by Stalin himself, the
second and third are Lenin as quoted by Stalin in his
lectures:

"1. Tactic is the determination of the line to be taken by the proletariat during a comparatively short period of the ebb or flow of the movement, of advance or retreat of the revolution; the maintenance of this line by the substitution of new forms of struggle

[Lc]

-8-

and organization for those that have become out of
date, or by the discovery of new watchwords, or by the
combination of new methods with old, etc. Whereas
strategy is concerned with such wide purposes as the
winning of the war against tsarism or the bourgeoisie,
tactic has a narrower aim. Tactic is concerned, not
with the war as a whole, but with the fighting of this
or that campaign, with the gaining of this or that
victory which may be essential during a particular period
of the general revolutionary advance or withdrawal.
Tactics are thus parts of strategy, and subordinate thereto.

"2. Revolutionary parties must go on learning.
They have learned how to attack. Now it is time for
them to realize that this knowledge must be supplemented
by acquiring a knowledge of _how best to retreat_. We
have got to understand (and a revolutionary class learns
this by bitter experience) that _victory can only be won_
by those who have learned the proper method both of
advance and of retreat.

"3. To wage a war for the overthrow of the
international bourgeoisie, a war which is a hundred times

[lc]

-9-

more difficult, more prolonged, more complicated,
than the most bloodthirsty of wars between States,
while renouncing beforehand the use of maneuvering,
of playing off (though for a time only) the interests
of one foe against the other, of entering upon
agreements and effecting compromises (even though these
may be of an unstable and temporary character) - would
not such renunciation be the height of folly? We might as
well, when climbing a dangerous and hitherto unexplored
mountain, refuse in advance to make the ascent in zigzag,
or refuse to turn back for a while, to give up the chosen
direction in order to test another which may prove to be
easier to negotiate."

Anyway, it's worth thinking about. Peace is a
struggle and remember that Barbara Tuchman, in her
delightful recent essay on her stay early this year in
China, quoted one of her good Chinese hosts as saying
"friendship is a struggle too". So, good luck Henry.
Keep up the struggle for peace and friendship!!

As delivered by Mayor John Collins
of Boston on Tuesday, May 31, 1966
at the Harvard Club in Boston.

FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT FOR MAYOR COLLINS

The World Affairs Council is certainly performing a most
useful function by asking those of us who are candidates or
prospective candidates for Senator from Massachusetts to state
what we think are some of the chief issues in American foreign
policy.

As you all know, my principal interest, profession, and
activity these last few years has been as chief executive officer
of Boston, a city full of challenge, problems, possibilities, and
even promise. In that role I have of course concentrated largely
on the problems of the city in today's shrinking world - problems
of urbanization, problems of adjustment among the various con-
flicting interests all crying for help, problems growing out of a
recognition that society has obligations to help those who for
no fault of their own are not as fortunate as the majority of our
citizens. And I have tried to make Boston, with its new approach
to urban renewal and redevelopment, a leader in a modern world.
As a Senator I would of course take my background as Mayor with
me to Washington, and I naturally would be chiefly concerned with
the national aspects of these same problems of urbanization

Under the Constitution, the Senate is also asked to play
an important role in the formulation of American foreign policy.

-2-

The Senate, as you know, in addition to its lawmaking function is given the role "TO ADVISE AND CONSENT," and this goes beyond merely examining, cross-examining, studying, and then approving or disapproving the Presidential nominees for high office. The Senate indeed can and probably must be, to paraphrase Aristotle's famous description of the state, "THE CITIZEN WRIT LARGE."

In the context of American foreign policy, this will often mean that the Senate will indeed not speak with one single voice but necessarily will reflect in its debate many different approaches to the difficult problems of foreign policy - the many different, though equally patriotic, views held by our citizens. While the Senate thus cannot pretend to reflect one view or speak with one voice, it nonetheless is under a Constitutional mandate to give its ADVICE AND CONSENT and to help the President and his Cabinet arrive at and adopt one view out of the many in the course of making decisions of foreign policy. And as a Senator, of course it will be a part of my duty to take an active part in this process.

And so, recognizing that in most cases, especially on the issues of foreign policy, there are several equally patriotic and equally respectable alternative views, let me mention briefly what I think are today's chief issues or problems of American foreign policy and where I stand on these issues.

[L]

-3-

First in the headlines and in the minds of many Americans comes the war in Viet Nam, where we are today deeply engaged in a difficult, confusing, but at the same time most crucial effort to prevent a takeover of South Viet Nam by force of arms by a combination of North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese Communists fighting a cruel guerrilla war, with terror, murder, and massacre of civilians as one of their chief weapons. The struggle which that sad country is now going through - and even its own internal conflict between the government forces and the sympathizers of the Buddhist monks - shows the great difficulty of running what is today called a counter-insurgency war in an undeveloped or underdeveloped country which has not had a chance since becoming independent from a colonial power to reach the political maturity, the political unity, which it needs to repel an enemy from without and to restore stability and order in the face of a resourceful enemy from within its own borders.

I will in a moment speak more of this question of economic development of the poorer nations, but before leaving the subject of Viet Nam, I want to say that I have talked with the President and members of his Cabinet. And I can tell you that the Administration is constantly studying, probing, evaluating, and re-evaluating our methods as well as our goals in South Viet Nam. And although the headlines are most likely to be about military actions, our real purpose is to bring a better life, a stable government, and a chance

[Lc]

-4-

at economic development to the people of Viet Nam in a context of
political stability and behind a shield of military security. It
is this combination of the shield of military security being sup-
plied by our forces plus a program of economic development for the
whole area of Southeast Asia, going far beyond the borders of South
Viet Nam, which is at the heart of the goals and methods of our
policy in that sad country.

For that reason I cannot join those who say we must either
win an immediate, decisive victory or get out, because I know that
a departure of American forces from that area could well lead the
way to a complete Communist takeover in Southeast Asia and endanger
not only Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma but also would deal a
fatal blow to India's great experiment of trying to achieve a modern
agricultural and industrial society, retaining at the same time
democratic political institutions and without resorting to military
or Communist dictatorship.

As a Senator, I will of course listen objectively to all
views expressed by people who have made a serious and honest study
of this problem, and the business of forming foreign policy must
always be a dynamic thing. Positions must be flexible at the same
time that they are realistic, and we must constantly search for
practical alternatives.

[L]

-5-

Turning from Viet Nam to the problem of Communist China, I personally know that there is now going on in the Administration a massive review of our political and economic lack of relations with China, as well as of the danger of a growing hostile confrontation with another great power armed with the atomic bomb. More and more we are hearing from Washington of this great reappraisal.

The isolation which Red China has imposed upon itself can be a source of great danger, and although it would be foolish to say that we could become friends with Communist China while the Communist Chinese themselves declare their hatred and hostility towards us, it may well be that an effort should be made to reduce that isolation and reduce the danger of a tragic mistake. The beginnings could be made by the exchange of scholars which our Government has very cautiously proposed, the exchange of journalists, beginnings to an exchange of diplomatic officials, and an exploration of ways in which, as we have done with the Soviet Union, we can open up channels of trade where our national defense and security are not threatened.

There is much talk of bridges these days - how to build them, what kind of traffic will go over them. And I would hope that some bridge could be built before the world ends up in a thermonuclear holocaust. Here again we need bridges. We cannot expect solutions tomorrow, but we must recognize that the answers of yesterday may no longer be adequate answers for tomorrow.

[L]

-6-

Recently Senator Robert Kennedy and even more recently Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara reminded us that the world is round and that possibly even more important than today's headlines and dispatches from Viet Nam is the awakening of the peoples of the southern hemisphere - the peoples of South America and the peoples of Africa - to the great gulf between the rich nations and the poor nations and that consequently the richer, more developed nations of the north will increasingly have to take on the burden of helping the poorer nations of the south on the road to the kind of economic development to which they all aspire.

And economic development there must be if we are to avoid the internal strife and the senseless struggles between nations which, if permitted to grow, would no doubt escalate by a number of apparently logical steps into the disaster of nuclear warfare.

Therefore, we cannot avoid involvement in this great puzzle and challenge and task of the economic development of the poorer nations, and our task will include helping these people to learn to help themselves. As Secretary of Defense McNamara put it so well last week in Montreal, our role must be to offer to help economic development and to provide security to those nations which genuinely need and ask our help and which are able and willing to help themselves.

While we cannot police the whole world, there are certain crucial areas where we have been asked for help and security, where we can furnish aid to help with economic development,

-7-

and where in order to do so we must, in addition, help provide law
and order, the basic shield behind which development can be achieved.
At the same time, as Secretary McNamara said, we have no charter to
rescue floundering regimes who have brought violence on themselves
by refusing to meet the legitimate expectations of their citizenry.

Another important fact of the world of tomorrow is the
growing unity - industrial, agricultural, fiscal, and finally
political - of Western Europe. And it may well be that within the
next six years we will see emerging in Western Europe one large and
highly industrialized country absorbing the present Common Market
countries and also attracting the countries now outside the Common
Market. A large European free-trade zone could well become very much
like our own United States. Indeed, who would think of having to
pay a tariff on butter imported into New England from Wisconsin in
order to protect the dairy farmers of New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Connecticut who also send their butter to the Boston markets?

A federal system with the flexibility to preserve the
differences of nationality and culture but at the same time getting
all the advantages of a single monetary and tariff system, possibly
a single tax system and a single internal security and external defense
system - all become too logical for the Western Europeans to resist
much longer.

Although de Gaulle at present is promoting the image of a
nationalistic France and has apparently caused setbacks to the Atlantic
Alliance and to the development of Western Europe as a single political

-8-

entity, I would say that within the six-year term of a senator elected in the fall much could happen in Europe in the direction of creating Western Europe as a single nation in spite of the differences of language and custom and as a result of the development of standardized modern techniques of agriculture, industry, and finance. Here I think politics lags behind economics, but if the Europeans can solve their political problem, Western Europe could well become one of the superpowers, taking its place beside the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Peoples Republic of China.

Thus, for the near future, one of the great problems, one of the great challenges, is to establish a working relationship with an independent and proud Europe which is on the way to becoming a single great power; to encourage Great Britain and France to abandon their funny, if it weren't so tragic, habits and trends towards isolation from each other; and to work towards a world in which the confrontation between Western Europe and the Soviet Union is carried on in the area of competing and, at the same time, complimentary economies, without, in this intermediate period, in any way slackening our vigilance and defense capability. After all, we know that there are "doves" and "hawks" in Moscow as well as in Washington. The balance may be more precarious than we think, and certainly our defenses now provided by NATO must be maintained.

As Senator Robert Kennedy recently said in his important policy talk on South America, a great revolution is on its way in that continent, too. The people of South America will be on the march. Much wisdom will be required of us in the near as well as

-9-

long-term future if we are to have these people on our side. The great changes that are coming will be in the direction of giving an increasing portion of the population a chance at a better life, a chance to first produce and then enjoy more of the goods and services which they consider they deserve and which more often than not in today's world in these countries are not enjoyed by the vast majority of the population.

In South America as in Africa and Southeast Asia there has already occurred what in the last few years has come to be called the "Revolution of Rising Expectations." People in the new nations of Africa, more and more people in South America, and indeed the peoples of India and the other countries of Southeast Asia know or think they know that in the more industrialized societies, what we sometimes call the richer societies, there is more food, more clothing, more education, better medical care, less hunger, less disease, indeed less struggle for survival. And these peoples will not be satisfied unless they feel they too have a chance to share or at least to get on the road to the condition of the richer countries.

This will be an important problem, issue, and challenge for the development and the execution of American foreign policy. The Senate will have before it many times great questions of where do we go during this period of revolutionary change.

I think it is also important to note that a Senatorial term beginning January, 1967, takes us into the period through 1973,

[Lc]

-10-

often described by our strategy analysts as a period of great danger. This is the period during which the great nuclear powers will have developed sophisticated weapons of offense and defense; and with the anti-ballistic missile and the anti-antiballistic missile and with all this fancy hardware of destruction at the ready, a greater effort than ever will have to be made to find a peaceful solution to the great problem of co-existence in a world which, if we and our adversaries permit it, will become an armed camp. I do not mean to say that we should slacken our defense effort in the least, but I must emphasize that while we are maintaining our defense posture, we must never cease in our struggle and in our search to build a world where co-existence means more than an armed truce until we are ready to strike a victorious blow, because in tomorrow's world it may no longer be possible to strike a victorious blow which at the same time is not a signal for mutual suicide by the superpowers.

Let me say another word about China. Here too, careful students of this great puzzle tell us that even in China big changes are due; and when the original generals of the Chinese Revolution are replaced by a younger group - the technicians, professors, factory managers, farm managers, and economic planners - their efforts in building their own country and their desire to become a modern industrial nation will have the healthy effect of blunting what now

-11-

is of course a most disturbing element in the foreign policy of
Communist China, namely, their expansionist drive and their almost
hysterical anti-Americanism born out of a misunderstanding of our
aims, ideals, short-range and long-term goal and methods. Certainly
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will have to continue its
thorough examination of the China question in order to be able to
give appropriate ADVICE AND CONSENT to the President as he carries
out the task assigned to him by our Constitution to conduct American
foreign policy.

Our unarmed boundaries with Canada and our almost unarmed
boundary with Mexico certainly testify that we can live at peace with
our neighbors. And although we may be racing against time and although
an analysis of the problems of foreign policy is disturbing - even
frightening - I am enough of an optimist to believe that there will
be enough wisdom in this country and in the world to permit us to
move towards a day when the rish countries will recognize the need to
help the poor countries and do something about it and when we will
not live in constant fear of annihilation by our fellow inhabitants
of this shrinking planet.

Thanks again to the World Affairs Council for giving me an
opportunity to state my views on some of the main issues and challenges

-12-

of American foreign policy. And certainly if I am fortunate enough
to be sent by the people of this Commonwealth to the United States
Senate, I think you will see that what I have said today will be an
overall guide and key to whatever action I will be asked to make
as a Senator in the field of American foreign policy.

Jose de Varon, Esq.
Weston, Patrick & Stevens
Counsellors at Law
84 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02109

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Born:

August 4, 1914 in Madrid, Spain; lived in Madrid, Spain until July 1924, when family moved to Boston, Massachusetts following death of father in Spain.

Father, Jose Varon y Caballero, was a lawyer in Madrid, Spain, specifically in private international law.

Citizenship:

Citizen of the United States of America.

Education:

Boston Public Schools, 1924-1930

Roxbury Latin School, 1930-1934

Editor-in-Chief of literary magazine, THE TRIPOD

Harvard College, A.B. 1938

Magna Cum Laude and Phi Beta Kappa

Harvard Law School, LL.B. (now called J.D.) 1941

Harvard University--School for Overseas Administration, May 1943 - April 1944.

Successfully completed course in military government and civil affairs, Central European Area--languages, history, literature, economics, government and sociology--under the joint auspices of U.S. Army and Harvard.

Because I was fluent in German, the School for Overseas Administration placed me in a special intensive Russian language course.

War Service:

U.S. Army, August 1942 - November 11, 1945.

Harvard School for Overseas Administration; 104th Infantry, 26th Division; Information and Education officer during the day and Assistant Operations officer (S-3) during the night during offensive in France, the "Battle of the Bulge", and the Battle of Germany. Interpreter and liaison officer working with Russian regiments in

[L]

Jose de Varon - Bio - Page 2

**War Service**
Cont'd:
Czechoslovakia; in charge of regiment's education and orientation program; established on VE Day first regimental academy in European Theatre to function as a high school and junior college.
**DECORATIONS:** Combat Infantryman's Badge; Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster.

**Positions Held:**

**Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates, Law Department**
Associate Counsel, 1941-1960;
Assistant General Counsel, 1960-1963;
Vice President and General Counsel, 1963-1966;
Senior Vice President-Law and Public Affairs, 1966-1970;
Member of Board of Trustees, 1967-1970.

**Union Pacific Corporation**
President, Rocky Mountain Energy Company (a Union Pacific subsidiary to begin the mining of coal), October 1, 1970 - December 31, 1971.

**Practice:**
Admitted to practice of law--Bar of Massachusetts, U.S. Federal Courts, and United States Supreme Court.

**Organizations:**
Member, American Bar Association, Mineral Law, Business Corporation and Banking Sections; Director, World Affairs Council; Director, International School for Girls in Spain; Trustee, Longy School of Music.

**Government Service:**
Member, General Technical Advisory Committee of Office of Coal Research, United States Department of the Interior, 1967 to date.

**Foreign Languages:**
Spanish and German fluently; Russian and French, working knowledge.

**Married:**
To Lorna Cooke de Varon, May 14, 1944.
Lorna Cooke de Varon has been the conductor of the New England Conservatory Chorus since 1947. In 1966 she led a State Department sponsored tour of the New England Conservatory Chorus to Spain and

Jose de Varon - Bio - Page 3

Married
Cont'd: the Soviet Union and during the
summer of 1972 she led a similarly
sponsored tour to Ireland, France,
Belgium, and Germany.

Children: David, Joanna, Christina, Alexander.

Professional
Affiliation: Member of Weston, Patrick & Stevens,
Counsellors at Law, 84 State Street,
Boston, Massachusetts 02109.

Present
Interest: A tour of duty with the Executive Branch
of the United States government. My
years as a senior executive in industry
and in the practice of corporate law
have made me more of a generalist than
a specialist. Title or salary are not
as important as the chance to make a
meaningful contribution. Fields where
my background and training suggest I
can make a valuable contribution in
government include the following:

1. **National Energy Policy**--This could involve working with or coordinating in the following Offices or Departments: Office of Management and Budget, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Interior, F.P.C., or a post in the O.M.B. with special emphasis on interdepartmental and interoffice liaison, coordination and direction.

2. **Federal-State Liaison and Coordination Work**--This could be in either the O.M.B. or in H.E.W. where there is necessarily a large amount of interface between the federal and the state governments.

3. **Interdepartmental Executive Branch Liaison**--This logically would have its locus in O.M.B.

4. **Securities Regulation**--I have had experience in practice relating to Public

Jose de Varon - Bio - Page 4

Present
Interest
Cont'd:

Utility Holding Company Act of 1935
and Securities Act of 1933.

5. **Foreign Affairs**--with emphasis primarily in Spain and Latin America and secondarily with the Soviet Union, the latter being based on Harvard and army training in Soviet policy and Russian language which, although now a little rusty, could be brushed up in a few months of intensive work.

6. **Foreign Economic Policy**--also with special emphasis in Spain and Latin America. In 1968 I spent some time in Buenos Aires, Argentina and Asuncion, Paraguay at the request of the State Department to collaborate with the United States Embassy, and the private industry development group in Asuncion, on the early stages of the planning and development of what would have been a privately financed river transportation system for the "Basin of the Platte" (Cuenca de la Plata) countries. This would have opened up the tremendously rich virgin forests and agricultural territories of Paraguay, Bolivia and Southern Brazil, now without adequate transportation. A year ago the Paraguayan government apparently caught up with my memoranda and requested I return to Paraguay to continue that work. At that time I was not able to respond because of my engagement with the Union Pacific referred to above. While I agree that foreign aid programs probably should be reduced, this particular program for the uniquely conservative and able Paraguayans showed great promise.

7. **Public Information**--A field in which I have had no experience to boast of, but in which I am sure I could make a contribution, is Public Information.

Transcript of a conversation between
President Anwar el Sadat of the Arab Republic
of Egypt and C. R. Devine, Vice President,
Reader's Digest, at the President's Maamoora
"Rest House", Alexandria, Egypt, Wednesday
June 30, 1976 (Also present: Moussa Sabry,
Chairman and Editor-in-Chief, Akhbar el Yom)

CRD: First of all, Mr. President, I want to apologize to you for speaking in my language and not in Arabic . . .

SADAT: Not at all, not at all.

CRD: And making you speak in one of your many secondary languages.
(Laughter) My friend Henry J. Taylor and his wife Rikki have asked
me to convey to you their best wishes.

SADAT: Thank you very much.

CRD: And also DeWitt and Lila Wallace, the founders of "Al Mukhtar" and
Reader's Digest, have asked me to convey to you their personal best
wishes and great respect.

SADAT: Thank you very much.

CRD: They have asked me to say to you that if by any chance you are ever
in the United States on a private visit, which doesn't seem too likely,
they would appreciate the great opportunity of according you some
hospitality. If Mrs. Sadat should go privately for the "Faith and Hope"
project, Mrs. Wallace would be delighted to help be her host in
New York City and to see that everything is just the way she wants it.

SADAT: Thank you very much.

**CRD:** Before speaking about Reader's Digest in Arabic, Mr. President, I want to ask you a few simple questions with a larger overview than the daily things, even though some of these immediate issues set the stage for wider consideration of factors that are going to affect the future of the Middle East. Specifically in the beginning I'd like to ask you briefly about Lebanon. If you accept the commonly-held belief that *religion* is the fundamental cause of the conflict in Beirut, is there any possibility that the Christians might split off in a place like Junieh and set up a sort of independent principality like Monaco? That's not likely?

**SADAT:** Well, I must tell you quite frankly it has never been a conflict between the Moslems and the Christians at all. Since the beginning, and before fifteen months in Riyadh I told King Khalid and President Assad at that time the Lebanese problem has two aspects: the first one is among the Lebanese themselves; the system is not agreeable and is not working now. They have chosen this system and, after their independence in '43, well they should sit together - the Lebanese - without any foreign interference and make amendments for this system. This is the first aspect. The second aspect is that there has been some misunderstanding between the Lebanese - some sects only in the Lebanese, not all the Lebanese - and the PLO, and in this aspect also I say that they should sit together - the Lebanese and the Palestinians - and they consult everything. At that time I prepared Mahmoud Riad, the Secretary General of the Arab League, and before

- 2 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

I left to Riyadh, and if they had agreed to my proposals fifteen months
before when I sent Mahmoud Riad to bring Franjieh and Yasr Arafat
together, everything wouldn't have flared up like we have seen and
I told them that the fire is under the ashes now but it would flare up,
and it did flare up during the last fifteen months. Well after fifteen
months they are now fulfilling my proposals.

CRD: Too late.

SADAT: Too late, and after all this frustration, and so...

CRD: I have heard it said that Lebanon in a very strange way has become the focal point of many, many conflicts, as for example the U. S. A. vs. the U. S. S. R.

SADAT: That's right.

CRD: Arab vs. Israeli.

SADAT: Quite right.

CRD: Egypt vs. Syria. Palestinians vs. other Arabs. The left vs. the right.
The have's vs. the have-nots. The rich vs. the poor. Christians vs.
Moslems. And even the young vs. old.

SADAT: Young vs. old? Quite right, quite right. And mainly the PLO vs.
Syria, because Syria, after their agreement with King Hussein, it
appears that Syria and King Hussein cooked something and were
prepared to fulfill it but they didn't have the opportunity at all and now
King Hussein is uncovered, especially after we sat together with Syria
in Riyadh last week. So I quite agree with you it has raised all these
problems.

-3-

CRD: I had the feeling myself as the tragedy unfolded in Lebanon that there was some blame that must go to Sulieman Franjieh and possibly to Kamal Jumblat and Yasr Arafat and George Habash and Raschid Karami but particularly the President and the Prime Minister. I think, Mr. President, you made a speech in the early Fall warning of the danger if they didn't immediately come to grips with the situation.

SADAT: Quite right.

CRD: And yet nobody listened and especially Franjieh and Karami together might have had the power to interject a military policing that in some way would have stopped it but nobody did.

SADAT: Nobody. Nobody did and it reached what I fear today is that the conflict is on its way to be a conflict between the Moslems and the Christians. We shouldn't have reached this state.

CRD: Which isn't really the conflict.

SADAT: Which is not the nature of the conflict at all but because of what Chamoun* is doing, and you know the history of Chamoun, Chamoun is trying to do this and he is trying to internationalize the whole thing. Well this would be very grave and very dangerous.

CRD: What specifically can be done now? It seems to me that it should be a Pan-Arab solution and I hear that the foreign ministers are back in Cairo now . . .

*Camille Chamoun, 76-year old former President ('52-'58) of Lebanon.

- 4 -

**SADAT:** Today they will be discussing. I shall be urging that Franjieh should resign. He shouldn't stay one moment. Sarkis must be given the opportunity to sit and bring the friction around the table and all (inaudible). I know Jumblat is ready - the other sects, the Moslems and the Maronites or Christians, all of them are ready to sit together but Franjieh with Chamoun - Chamoun now is leading. Well this man is full of hate and full of grudge - and really a madman - and it appears that some of his business, I mean enterprises, has been destructive (destroyed ?) and for that also he is very furious and going off of the Palestinians the way they are now with the Lebanese or with most of the Lebanese army and the arms that Chamoun has received, we are in great danger. For that we have asked this meeting of the foreign ministers to try and contain the whole thing before it changes to a war between Moslems and Christians. And that's what Chamoun is trying to do.

**CRD:** And that would be a tragedy.

**SADAT:** Very, very big tragedy.

**CRD:** The best single thing then is for Franjieh to resign now?

**SADAT:** The key to the whole solution.

**CRD:** Could Egypt itself have done any more in a positive way this last winter in bringing an end to the Lebanese civil war?

**SADAT:** We could have. We could have on condition that we don't have Syria sending arms to both parties fighting when what is the use of Egypt interfering there and trying to do whatever we can do and whatever

- 5 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

we could have achieved possibly? When Syria can send arms to this and
that, both sides end up fighting each other, and you know that they have
waged a very big campaign against the second disengagement agree-
ment and they tried to build this propaganda in the Arab world just for
pure intrigue and pure - I mean - conflicts and the very narrow vision
in the party. Really. We could have, but because of Syria, no one
could have . . . look, when Kuwait subjected (projected ?) their
foreign ministers meeting last Fall, it was rejected by Syria and by
the Palestinians and they didn't accept at that time. At that time they
were imposing their guardianship on the PLO. Now the PLO, from what
you have seen - I quite agree with you - one of the results is that the
PLO's versus Syria now. Because they have discovered what is behind
the Syrian maneuver. So. Well, even when we asked for this meeting
in the Fall, Syria refused to come because they wanted to monopolize
the whole problem and so they have drowned in the marsh.

CRD:

The western press has given the general impression that you, Mr.
President, were emerging rapidly as the real statesman and the real
leader in the Middle East and then it appeared from President Hafez
el Assad's intervention in Lebanon that he really was the one most
actively interested in solving the problem. I think that may be an
illusion but . . .

SADAT:

Really a very sad miscalculation.

SABRY:

What is happening now in the American press, you see, last week,
you see . . .

- 6 -

SADAT: In America, yes.

SABRY: They are confessing now in the New York Times - and the Times of Paris - that all the calculations of President Sadat were correct, you see, and he's the real leader of the Middle East, and the Los Angeles Times correspondent wrote a wonderful article with the title that el Sadat is now sitting on the whole world because everyone in the States and all over the country is convinced now that all these proposals were the right proposals and now they are beginning to think that one year...

SADAT: One year - fifteen months later - And even while I was in Teheran and this evacuation problem came, well from Teheran I have sent to Mahmoud Riad in Beirut and am happy to say that Mahmoud Riad has fulfilled all I have asked from him and all the Americans were evacuated under the guard of the PLO, of Riad himself.

CRD: President Ford recognized that the other day in a public statement.

SADAT: Yes, yes.

CRD: And of course there were immediately complaints from the Israeli that this was too friendly a posture with the PLO.

SADAT: This is a fact.

CRD: There's an interesting change in the attitude of the PLO toward the United States.

SADAT: They are, they are ready to be moderate and they have urged President Ford, and Henry Kissinger also, that some sort of dialogue should take place between you and the PLO, and the moderates and

- 7 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

the PLO, I mean Fat (Yasr Arafat), and you know Fat is 80% of the
whole PLO. Well I was urging this a year before and I am still
urging this now because look what has happened - look what has
happened to the Syrian blunder there in Lebanon. And at one time
they tried to get rid of Yasr Arafat and all the moderates and put
their extremists at the head of the PLO and that's what I was fighting
hard against and I'm happy we succeeded.

CRD:

So Arafat is beginning to appear as more of a moderate than his
public image before now has been? I would submit, Mr. President,
that your own influence had a lot to do with that (Sadat laughs) - in
moderating the point of view of Mr. Arafat. Just very briefly about
the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and it's all the old questions, but you
have frequently said that the solutions depend first of all on the
absolute return of what you call "my land" to the borders of
1967.

SADAT:

That's right.

CRD:

And also the reestablishment of the inalienable rights of the
Palestinians. Do you now favor a package solution or the step-by-step
approach that Dr. Kissinger was recommending two or three years
ago? In other words, the Geneva roundtable way to get at this
problem or . . .

SADAT:

Well, as a start, Geneva is the most proper place for any solution or
for any peace to be searched and built there. Because in Geneva all
parties concerned will be convening around the table, including Israel

- 8 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

and also including the PLO and we shall be asking that the PLO take
their seat as an equal party. I consider Geneva is the most proper
place for starting. Now, after the second disengagement agreement,
it was supposed that the second disengagement agreement would take
place on the Golan Heights but as I told you, because of the party
intrigue there and many things - no need to say it - they have
slackened but the fact remains that they have renewed the mandate of
the United Nations forces last on the 13th of May another six months.
They are not another six months; they are six months officially but
practically, they are one year because the mandate would expire on
the 13th of November - the six months - well, starting from the first
of November, the conditions there at the Golan Heights don't permit
any operations. So half of it, as I said, automatically will be
renewing another six months. Practically, he has renewed only six
months officially but practically he has renewed one year without any
cost. That's what I was telling them. So I must tell you that we were
in complete agreement with President Ford and Henry that after this
second disengagement agreement, that the step-by-step should end and
we should sit in Geneva and try to put the frame of the *global* solution
of the whole problem. I hoped at one time, and this was my strategy,
that we, during '76 - this year because this is the year of elections
there in the United States and according to system, your administration
is not ready for any decision also, I thought at one time that we could
convene there and try to put the frame of the global solution, until the

- 9 -

SADAT: election takes place in November, and then starting '77, the United (Cont.) States should take its responsibilities and its role and join us in putting the final touch to the global solution. This was my strategy.

CRD: What, specifically, Mr. President could the United States do to take a more affirmative role - what specific postures could it assume or actions could it take to be more specifically helpful in solving the problem? - Either getting to Geneva or bringing some other . . .

SADAT: At any time and under any circumstances, the United States, as I have said always and am repeating again, holds 99% of the cards of this game. Look to what Eisenhower has done in '56. Look to what Ford has done in '75. After the Israelis in the first trial of the second disengagement in March failed Henry and failed President Ford, well he has put pressure on them. In September we concluded - well the United States can do at any time, either in Geneva or out of Geneva or under any circumstances - the United States, if it has the will, it can do because, for the very simple reason as I said (inaudible) . . . the Israeli budget. So you can do it. You can do a lot. You are the main part of the whole problem.

CRD: There is a chance, as you know, that the administration in the United States may change.

SADAT: Quite right, quite right.

CRD: Is that change likely to affect the ability of the United States to participate right away?

SADAT: Well I think it may, in my view, it may detain for some time but I don't think it will have any percussion on the point of view of the United States

- 10 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

because - this is for the United States to decide, to have their president as they like - but from what I have already read about Carter, he is for a peaceful solution, and I am sure - after I have seen the United States people there - for whom I seize this opportunity to thank them again for the very warm welcome that has been accorded to us on my visit and the real feeling that we were very deeply touched by them. Well I am sure the people of the United States want a peaceful solution. The administration also wants a peaceful solution. If there is a change in the government, I think it may detain for some time, as it happened in '74, because it was supposed that the second disengagement agreement should take place in '74 and not '75 but because of the Watergate problem, it was postponed for one year. I think it would only mean some time for the new government, if there will be a new government, to discuss the whole thing and then get hold of the whole situation and then after that, as I told you, either he is a Republican or a Democrat the United States holds 99% of the cards of this game.

CRD:

Mr. President, I remember in February 1974 you told me that "not for one moment" would you consider serving another term as President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. Has anything happened since then to change your point of view about that?

SADAT:

I've tried my best but unfortunately for me in the Congress of the Socialist Union last year they took a decision that I must renew. Well the whole month I will be (inaudible) because two months from now,

- 11 -

SADAT: according to our constitution, starting from the 17th of August, they
(Cont.) must start the whole process for the election of the president here.

CRD: Speaking purely as a private citizen, I hope you will agree to remain!
(Laughter)

SADAT: Believe me, I am tired, believe me, I am tired.

CRD: You've done your share. I have one very quick thing: In the principal
elements of this Arab-Israeli confrontation, what, in the briefest
terms, what are the maximum concessions that you personally would
be prepared to make - and I'll just quickly tell you what I am going
to say - in respect to the Palestinians, Giza, the West Bank,
Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sharm el Sheik, the Gulf of Aqaba,
Sinai - is there any one of these major points on which you would
compromise...?

SADAT: First of all let us agree upon a fact, a solid fact that they must withdraw
to the borders of '67. On all the borders.

CRD: On all the borders, including Jerusalem.

SADAT: Yes, yes, yes. Out of that let us take Sinai. In Sinai I'm ready for a
United Nations contingent. In Sharm el Sheik - without the Israeli
there or whatever contingent can be formed by the United Nations, I
shall agree to it (inaudible) and they can guarantee even a (inaudible)
I should like the thought that they take my word because I am now
guaranteeing a free passage in the Aqaba, Sharm el Sheik. But if
they want more guarantees, I'm ready to accept a United Nations
contingent. On my borders I am ready to agree to United Nations forces

- 12 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

on the borders, on both sides of the borders, but I shall be considerate
and understanding according to the area proportionately that would be
given to this United Nations force to stay in. If Israel is ready to
settle the Palestinian question, the ships can pass in the Suez Canal.
I'm ready if they are ready. For the Palestinians I'm asking for a
Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with a corridor
between them. The Golan Heights, well, they should speak for
themselves - Assad should speak for himself - but I don't think, if we
reach this point, I don't think he would refuse to have some observers
on the borders - on the borders as such, but it is not for me to decide.
This is for President Assad to decide this. And Syria. The major
concession is that we shall end the state of beligency that has
already taken place until now for 28 years and try to build permanent
peace after that in the whole area.

CRD:

Very briefly, Mr. President, the difficulty that currently exists
between Syria and Egypt tends to dramatize the long history of Arab
disunity. Since World War II, for example, 19 Arab heads of state
have been assassinated by fellow Arabs. The Arab states have
frequently professed unity as in the case of the United Arab Republic
of Egypt, Syria and Yemen in '58, and Tunisia and Libya - almost,
and Egypt and Libya - almost, Syria-Iraq. In the light of this history,
what prospects do you see over the next ten years that Arab nations
can unite in some fashion to solve their common problems?

- 13 -

SADAT: Well, you need some - I mean to know us much more better than this from the psychological point of view. We are accustomed to this in the Arab world. All over history. We are accustomed.

CRD: We have assassinations in the United States!

SADAT: Yes. We are accustomed to all these disputes and so... And what I fear is that you are exaggerating the whole thing. For instance, we don't differ - either Egypt or Syria or anyone in the Arab world - on the common strategies that have been put in the summit Arab conferences - and the last one was at Rabat. We don't differ - this strategy is of two points - the first one is not to submit what is our Arab land. The second point is not compromise on the Palestine rights. Well no one differs on this, either me, or Syria, or anyone, but still there are disputes because in tactics there are differences but you can see now (exchange here in Arabic between Sadat and Sabry as latter checked tape on smaller of two tape recorders being used.)

CRD: Mr. President, I don't want to intrude on your time too much. I've already taken too long.

SADAT: No, no. I know he (Moussa Sabry) is behind this!

CRD: He's a wonderful man. I've gotten to know him well in the last two years.

SADAT: He wants to have it for his own paper also. (Laughter)

CRD: The President is beginning to speak like a journalist. I'll be very brief. There are a couple small general areas I'd like to get to. That's all.

- 14 -

**SADAT:** What has been achieved in October '73 will never shake or waver from the Arab point of view. There will be disputes, and as I told you, unfortunately we are accustomed and this is our attitude and the Arab world throughout all our history, but it doesn't mean at all that our Arab unity, after '73, and after many centuries - what has been done in '73 has brought the Arabs forever together. All what you hear now these are tactical differences and it doesn't mean at all that - or it doesn't give what you think and exaggerate as an Arab disruption of sorts.

**CRD:** Just briefly: we publish Reader's Digest. And we have been having some very friendly discussions with our old good friends at Akhbar el Yom in recent weeks about the possibility of returning to Egypt. People ask me why I am so anxious to come to Cairo instead of Tunis or Riyadh or somewhere else and my answer is very simple: Egypt has been for centuries the populational, historic, cultural, political, economic, geographic, and educational center of the whole Arab world.

**SADAT:** Quite right.

**CRD:** And that if this international publishing mechanism, which is more international now than it used to be - it's less and less U. S. American and more and more international. Our French edition, for example, has many articles that are just French and deal with just France. And so do the British and the German editions; we're very hopeful we will have permission, and that they will get a license, and

- 15 -

CRD:
(Cont.)

that together we will seek some means whereby it will be mutually advantageous, and particularly advantageous we hope for our Egyptian partner - we're very hopeful on that point. Just looking way ahead for a minute - and you have always been a man of vision, I think - in the face of projected population increases and diminishing supplies of food and raw materials and especially in Egypt, where the birth rate is increasing rapidly, how is the government in Egypt in its long-range planning going to cope with all this? It's not easy.

SADAT:

This is a very important question. I, myself, am supervising this program of food. My problem and the problem of the whole world for the next hundred or two hundred years would be food. I am concentrating on this problem myself. We have land. You know we don't use except 4% of our area and this on both shores of the Nile - but 96% of our land is desert. Now we have started planning with most of the very famous houses of planning, either in the States or in western Europe. . . Great Britain and France and so and even some of the American houses have already achieved the plan for some places here in Egypt but we are doing the planning for the Year 2000.
We started with the Suez Canal. A British house has taken it and it is now fulfilled - under fulfillment - we have started from the western shore near the western desert - we have 500 kilometers from Alexandria to the borders of Sudan. The most important thing is this: we are in a very tight economic position now. I confess this. Very tight. But look to the prospects in 1980 after four years only from now. After four years only from now from the oil I have already found,

- 16 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

and it is under our hands, under the water of the Suez Canal. In
1980 I shall be producing a million barrels a day. Already I have
this - and your people at Mobil have told me - that my people were
very moderate - we shall have more - I am quite content with one
million barrels a day. Imagine this. In the Suez Canal the Japanese
have started our plan for the widening of the Suez Canal and the
deepening. In two years, this '78, we shall be permitting fifteen
hundred shiploads to pass through the Suez Canal. This will mean
doubling the tolls that I am receiving now which is about 400 or 450
million dollars. By '78 it will be doubled. By '80 the second phase -
the Japanese have been working now since six months and they are
completing. By '98 I shall be having the full plan of widening the
Suez Canal and this would mean tripling the tolls also. So I shall be
having a million barrels a day. I shall be having triple of the tolls
that I receive from the Suez Canal. Very well. I have given 22
concessions for oil prospectors here in the western desert and the
delta and we have already found in the delta gas and oil. In comparative (?)
this is something that has made the whole turning point. The oil people
in my country and in America also because it was not supposed at all
that in the delta we could find gas and oil. We found gas but we didn't
know that there was oil so there (inaudible) but 22 companies will be
working and they have already started in the western desert. The
western desert didn't pay its way up to this moment. It is an extension
of Algiers and Libya. So the most important thing I learned from the

- 17 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

oil prospectors is that they found **water** in the desert, so I have started
already planning new cities, new communities, because we shall
explore in the very narrow valley of the Nile. I am planning now new
communities, new cities, because whenever I find water in the desert,
it is much more precious than oil because this will mean cultivation
and this will mean lives, new communities. So we are doing day and
night - for that I am telling you I am tired - but we are doing it. We
are doing it. There are great prospects. You have asked about the
most important problem that I am concerned after at this moment and
this is good. I have started three projects. One will be Austrian in
the new land that we have (inaudible) near Alexandria and this is one
of the richest lands in the world, not only in our country. The next
one we shall be doing with Denmark. The third one will be Dutch.
Another one will be with your people in North Dakota. We have the
government here and we shall be building very big industrial complexes.
My concentration will be in the next few years - if I am in power - will
be on the agro-industrial complexes, and the new know-how in
agriculture. You know that according to the weather and to the
irrigation system I have always three crops a year - not one crop -
from my land. With the new methods, especially the American
know-how in agriculture, my land can yield double or triple what is
yields now. Three crops a year. So my main aim in the next 25 years
is to change Egypt. Every province is an agro-industrial complex in
itself. I shall have food and **surplus** of food also. This is my concentration.

- 18 -

SADAT:
(Cont.)

Apart from this, I told them: I don't want petro-chemicals. But I want cement factories, I want sugar factories. We shall plan for this in the new land reclaimed also. It will be done by the French. I want to expand my field (length ?) so for the building I have cement and I have iron and I have all the other parts. For food I shall be having agro-industrial complexes and a surplus of food. I am intending, by hook or crook, to do this in no time. So I think by this I can solve the problem and shall be concentrating mainly on this food problem like I am now.

CRD:

Mr. President, I've taken too much of your time. After all these large issues, there's one small matter I would like to report to you. My colleague, Mrs. Wallace, has made a grant of money to work in the Cairo Museum. I go in there many times myself and I think it's too bad that it's a little like a warehouse now.

SADAT:

That's right.

CRD:

There are too many good things and not very well labeled. She has donated funds to help remedy this problem.

SADAT:

Marvelous.

CRD:

In which I can help - I've talked to Dr. Gamal Mokhtar about this - all with his full approval and he will supervise the whole project - to put better labels in Arabic, in English and in French.

SADAT:

What about a new museum on the Nile - and they have the land?

CRD:

They're talking about one in Giza.

SADAT:

It is near - on the road to Helwan.

- 19 -

SABRY: This is the project of the Metropolitan Museum in New York.

SADAT: I should prefer this on the land of the (inaudible). It is a very big
land on the Nile and on a highway. There is a highway from Cairo
to Helwan. Just beyond Maadi. On the highway. And with very
big land direct on the Nile. I have it. If we can get them to start
the building there . . .

CRD: Do you think that's more desirable than Giza?

SADAT: I should prefer. I should prefer because I am creating there not
only one museum but a lot of museums there that can fulfill new
ideas, so that . . .

CRD: Cultural centers.

SADAT: Cultural center and we shall have in there also all our own
accommodations for the tourists to see everything and so on the part
of the present now and for our idea for the future but mainly I shall
be having museums, not only one . . . museums, and some new way
to label our antiquities, etc.

CRD: What we're doing here in the Cairo Museum is purely temporary
until something bigger is done but in the meantime, for instance in
the Mummy Room, Ramses II - there is simply a little sign that says
Rames II; there's nothing that tells who he was, when he lived, or
what he did, and we're writing little paragraphs about Ramses II, the
19th Dynasty, the longest reign in Egypt . . .

SADAT: If you agree to my proposition, this would mean, for example, that
I shall not only be doing this, I am intending to build a large tomb

- 20 -

SADAT: for the kings there (inaudible) I am ready to start this project.
(Cont.)

CRD: In this ground, on the Nile?

SADAT: Just the thing.

SABRY: In the Metropolitan Museum, you see, there is a donation of one million dollars given by an unknown American, he does not like to show his name.

Your Mrs. Wallace, you know, gave one million dollars to Abu Simbel.

SADAT: I know that. Yes, if we start this - because I have the land already.

CRD: I didn't know about that.

SADAT: I brought the pictures (?) down.

CRD: That's better than building one for the Tutankhamen things at Giza?

SADAT: Quite right, quite right. It will be a complex, a very big complex on the Nile.

SABRY: Building museums instead of prisons!

CRD: Well Mr. President, I'm deeply grateful to you for seeing me.

SADAT: Thank you very much. I must seize this opportunity to tell you that one of the sources that has already lessened my suffering in the cell of '54 in Cairo prison was the Reader's Digest. Maybe I told you about it.

CRD: You told me a little about that.

SADAT: The only articles that I didn't have - all the articles I read and I profited from they are with me here with the stamp of the prison on it. This was a psychiatrist. He was telling his experience after 24 years as a psychiatric doctor and he spoke about things and most of the cases he has seen would never have happened if one has faith. It was a tremendous article.

- 21 -

(At this point, recording tape ran out. President Sadat made a number of complimentary remarks about "Al Mukhtar," said he hopes to see it back in Egypt, and said he hoped we'd see our way clear to help Akhbar el Yom secure needed printing equipment.

The article to which he refers in his last recorded remarks, above, is almost certainly "How to Keep Out of the Psychiatrists' Hands" by Harry Emerson Fosdick which appeared in the September '47 Arabic edition.)

- 22 -

[LC]

THOMAS E. DEWEY

March 2, 1971

Dear Henry:

That was a superb
State of the World Message. I
know the enormous toil and grief
involved and it was worth it.

I wish you would in
addition give my congratulations
to the President.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.