ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
1800 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 833-2408

July 23, 1987

Dear Fred:

As we move into the stage of drafting the report, I would like to share with members of the Commission some thoughts which bear on the critical parts of our report.

Accordingly, could you please distribute to all of the members of the Commission the enclosed materials:

1. My testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee;

2. Some selected pages from my book GAME PLAN, which develops in far greater depth my thoughts regarding the changes needed in our strategy and posture.

Obviously, members of the Commission, yourself included, may disagree with this or that argument, but I think it would be useful for all of them to have the enclosed materials. They represent at least an effort to address systematically some of the issues of concern to us.

Hon. Fred C. Ikle
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Washington, D.C. 20301

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

January 13, 1987

I would like to commend the committee for holding hearings on a subject that is often neglected: the fundamental strategic underpinnings of American defense policy. In my opening remarks, I would propose to outline briefly the basic geopolitical premises that our policies must address and then to take up in turn the strategic policies that I believe follow from these premises. (Specific recommendations are underlined in the text and itemized in the appendix.)

A long-term strategy for the United States must contain the following three elements: (1) it must be derived from a correct diagnosis of the American-Soviet conflict and be based on a realistic assessment of the Soviet challenge; (2) it must provide an effective response to the strategically most pressing threats and exploit the principal vulnerabilities of the adversary; and (3) it must actively explore opportunities for an equitable accommodation and generate the necessary incentives for a positive response from the adversary.

Basic Geopolitical Premises:

1. The American-Soviet rivalry is a long-term contest. It is a classic historical conflict between two major powers and is not susceptible to a broad and quick resolution, either through a victory by one side or through a grand act of reconciliation.

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2. The American-Soviet contest is global in scope, but its central focus is the struggle for Eurasia. The Eurasian landmass constitutes almost half the world's land surface and contains the bulk of the world's population and economic wealth.

3. In the contest for Eurasia, there are three central strategic fronts.

The first front, Europe, is critical because it encompasses the most vital and industrialized section of Eurasia and controls the principal outlets to the Atlantic Ocean. Today, the European peninsula of the Eurasian landmass is also the most highly militarized region in the world.

The second front, the Far East, represents the world's fastest growing economic region and controls Soviet access to the Pacific Ocean. U.S. trade with the countries of the Pacific Basin now exceeds U.S. trade with the countries of Western Europe. This second front emerged after the Soviet-supported North Korean invasion of South Korea and the resulting American military intervention.

The third front, southwest Asia, contains almost two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves and contains the principal outlets to the Indian Ocean. The third front, therefore, is catalytic in nature, for a Soviet victory in the Persian Gulf region would give Moscow tremendous leverage on the other two fronts. It is also the most volatile of the three central strategic fronts. This front emerged with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent American commitment to the defense of the

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Persian Gulf region embodied in the Carter Doctrine, reaffirmed
by the Reagan administration.

4. There is a danger that a fourth central strategic front may soon emerge in Central America. The Soviet Union realizes that in a superpower conflict in Central America or the Caribbean it would be at a massive geographical, logistical, and economic disadvantage to the United States. It therefore has pursued its geostrategic goals in the region with caution, advancing its interests with tactics not so aggressive as to precipitate a direct clash. Should the internal problems of Central America merge with a larger domestic explosion in Mexico that inflames the U.S.-Mexican relationship, the Soviet Union is almost certain to exploit it, thereby opening up a fourth central strategic front in the U.S.-Soviet conflict.

5. The Soviet Union is unique among major national powers in history because it is a one-dimensional power. Moscow's only claim to the status of a world power is its military might, for in all other respects it is not even a truly competitive rival of the United States. While the United States is plunging headlong into the technetronic age, the Soviet Union is still struggling desperately to make its relatively conventional industrial economy more efficient and modern. That difference is crucial for the historical outcome of the U.S.-Soviet conflict. Unless military means prove historically decisive -- with Moscow exploiting its military leverage to attain Eurasian preponderance -- social creativity will probably determine which side prevails.

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Strategic Policy:

These are the basic geopolitical premises that the United
States must address. They call for a long-term American strategy
with a military, a geopolitical, and a negotiating component.

1. Military component:

Once Soviet military power is checked, the Soviet Union
ceases to be a historically threatening rival. But that is no
mean task. My best estimate of trends in Soviet military capa-
bility vis-a-vis the United States is as follows:

1986 1996

Strategic Forces

No assurance that the United
States would be unable to in-
flict massive destruction on
the Soviet Union in the event
of a Soviet first strike

A reasonable possibility that
a Soviet first strike would be
able to disarm the United
States to such a degree that a
retaliatory response would be
fragmentary

Conventional Ground Forces on the Three Central Strategic Fronts

Probability of Soviet success
in a purely conventional en-
gagement on the first and third
fronts, offset by the possibi-
lity of nuclear escalation

Probability of Soviet success
with a higher degree of assur-
ance, and a lower likelihood
of U.S. nuclear escalation

Conventional Ground Forces in Long-range Force Projection

High vulnerability to conven-
tional attrition by U.S. RDF
because of inadequate logistics
and vulnerable supply lines

Progressive improvement in
in capabilities, but probably
continued inferiority to U.S.
RDF

Naval Forces in Strategic Conflict

Secondary role in strategic
conflict

Gradual shift to a significant
strategic SLBM and SLCM capa-
bility

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1986

Naval Forces in Central Conventional Conflict

Soviet capacity for serious, but not conclusive, disruption of U.S. ocean control and of U.S. sustaining efforts on behalf of U.S. forces engaged in conventional conflicts on any one of the three main fronts

1996

No basic change

Naval Forces in Remote Local Conflict

Soviets unable to sustain long-range deployment of ground forces in the event of limited conventional naval collision with the United States

No basic change but progressive expansion in radius of Soviet capability

In the light of the above, on the strategic level, the objective of U.S. policy must be Mutual Strategic Security. That requires the maintenance of a strategic balance that makes a first strike for either side militarily futile and societally suicidal and that sustains extended deterrence.

To best deter a nuclear war, the United States must adjust its strategic doctrine and its deployments away from mutual assured destruction and toward greater flexibility in war-fighting options, so that it will be able to respond at any level of a possible conflict.

American strategic forces should have both offensive and defensive components. U.S. strategic offensive forces must be modernized, but their configuration and numbers should be contrived not to pose a threat of a disarming first strike to Soviet strategic forces. But in light of Soviet modernization plans -- which in the mid-1990s will provide Moscow between 8,000 and 10,000 first-

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strike warheads -- it is also necessary to deploy a limited
strategic defense. That defense should be oriented toward the
protection of U.S. strategic forces and command and control
systems. It should be composed of a space-based screen to
destroy Soviet missiles in the boost phase and a land-based
terminal defense to intercept incoming warheads. While it would
be an imperfect defense, it would achieve the critical objective
of injecting a degree of randomness into any Soviet planning of a
first-strike nuclear attack. As a result, no Soviet military
planner could ever advise the Soviet leadership that Moscow could
prevail in a conflict at the strategic level. That, in turn,
would give the United States the needed strategic confidence to
compete with the Soviet Union at other levels.

The alternate means of seeking Mutual Strategic Security --
namely, through the proliferation of mobile strategic system --
is in my view less desirable militarily and probably in terms of
cost. Leaving aside the likely domestic U.S. difficulties over
the deployment of numerous mobile systems, the fact is that in a
competitive proliferation of mobile systems the Soviet side is
likely to have a major advantage, both in quantitative deploy-
ments and in strategic deception. Moreover, competitive deploy-
ment of mobile strategic systems is likely to breed greater
insecurity than the deployment of a prudent mix of offensive and
defensive systems would be.

On the conventional level, the United States must address a
perilous strategic paradox: U.S. conventional forces are weakest

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where the United States is most vulnerable, along southwestern Eurasian strategic front, and strongest where its allies have the greatest capacity for doing more on their own behalf and where the risk of a U.S.-Soviet clash is lowest, along the far western Eurasian strategic front.

Consequently, the United States should undertake a gradual -- and certainly only partial -- reduction in the level of American forces in Europe. A total of perhaps 100,000 troops could be gradually withdrawn. That would leave over 250,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe, a number that represents a clear deterrent to the Soviets and substantial commitment to the defense of NATO. Budgetary savings from these reductions should be allocated to a significant expansion of U.S. airlift capability. Manpower withdrawn from Europe should be absorbed into an enlarged Rapid Deployment Force through the creation of additional light divisions for potential use on the southwest Asian central strategic front or in Central America.

## 2. Geostrategic component:

The first priority for American policy is to hold the three central strategic fronts.

In Europe, the United States should encourage the development of a politically and militarily integrated Western Europe, less dependent on the United States but still tied to it by a strategic alliance. NATO should become increasingly a European regional alliance, though with an active and major U.S. presence in it.

In the Far East, the United States should promote an
informal geopolitical triangle through wider economic, political,
and some military cooperation among the United States, Japan, and
the People's Republic of China. **Japan should be encouraged not
to increase its defense spending greatly, but rather to increase
its economic assistance to developing countries in which Japan
shares a security interest with the other industrialized democracies.** Recipients of this strategic economic assistance should
include Egypt, Pakistan, the Philippines, and even the democratic
states of Central America. In the future, the combination of
Japanese defense spending and strategic economic aid should reach
about 4 percent of Japan's GNP, which would represent a spending
level comparable to those of West European countries.

In southwest Asia, the most important priority for the
United States is to step up the political and military pressure on the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is imperative that
the United States increase, quantitatively and qualitatively, the
level of military assistance sent to the Afghan resistance and
promote a wider international awareness of the war through public
denunciations of the Soviet occupation and through efforts to
facilitate television and radio coverage. The United States
should also press in U.S.-Soviet bilateral meetings for a disengagement of Soviet forces. It should advance a diplomatic formula that calls for the external neutralization and the internal self-determination of the country. The former would restore
Afghanistan's previous status as a neutral, and the latter would

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allow the Afghan people to determine their own form of govern-
ment. As a temporary expedient, peace-keeping forces from
Islamic countries not unfriendly to the Soviet Union but still
independent of Moscow (such as Algeria and Syria) could be
stationed in Afghanistan upon the prompt removal of Soviet occu-
pation forces.

In addition, the United States must seek to reinforce the
resilience of Iran and Pakistan to Soviet advances where pos-
sible. Continued economic and military aid to Pakistan and the
eventual restoration of more normal relations with Iran are
essential components of the needed U.S. strategic response on the
third front.

In addition, as part of its effort to hold the three fronts,
the United States should exploit the weaknesses of the Soviet
Union. Moscow is vulnerable at three levels, the systemic weak-
ness of its socio-economic system, the geopolitical weakness of
its imperial system, and the internal weakness of the multi-
national nature of the Soviet Union itself.

The Soviet objective in Eastern Europe is to dominate its
satellites militarily and ideologically and to integrate them
into a kind of economic commonwealth. Consequently, the United
States should promote the development of an independent-minded
and increasingly assertive East European public opinion, not only
through radio broadcasts, but also through new communications and
information technology, such as videocassettes, miniaturized
printers, and word processors. The United States should also

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look with favor on the growing economic cooperation between Western Europe and Eastern Europe because such cooperation would inevitably lead indirectly to closer political ties. That means, for example, that the United States should encourage the countries of Western Europe to provide Eastern Europe with economic options that even the communist regimes would find attractive.

The internal weaknesses of the Soviet Union stem from the fact that Moscow rules over the world's last surviving multi-national empire. The central government dominated by the Great Russians, whose population numbers about 135 million, dominates in turn a dozen other major nations and scores of smaller nations. Those include 55 million Soviet Muslims, 50 million Ukrainians, and 10 million Balts. The multinational character of the Soviet Union creates fissures and openings -- as demonstrated most recently in the protests in Alma Ata in Kazakhstan. The United States goal should be to give sharper political definition to these trends through greatly intensified use of modern means of communication. The techniques that have proven so effective in breaking down the Soviet Union's efforts to isolate Eastern Europe should be more actively applied to the Soviet Union itself. The object of the effort should not be to stoke national hatreds or even to foster the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The real opportunity is to mobilize the forces for genuine political participation, for greater national codetermination, for the dispersal of central power, and for the termination of heavy-handed central domination that breeds the expansionist impulse.

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Soviet systemic weakness compounds Moscow's vulnerability at both these levels. In virtually every other imperial system in history, the center exerted some kind of an attraction for the periphery, whether in terms of learning, culture, economic wealth, or ideology. That is not the case with the Soviet Union. Its ideology has lost its appeal, with not even the most fervent third world revolutionary movements aspiring to a future based on the Soviet model. Its imperial realm might be characterized best as an "economic co-stagnation sphere," with the communist bloc lagging severely behind the West in all indexes of economic well-being and falling further behind in most.

### 3. Negotiating component:

As part of the same overall strategy, the United States should engage the Soviet Union in bilateral negotiations. These should not, however, become obsessed with arms control at the strategic nuclear level, as has occurred in the last few years and particularly at the Reykjavik summit.

First, in the short term, the United States should formally propose a schedule for ministerial-level meetings to move forward U.S.-Soviet negotiations during the remainder of the Reagan administration.

Second, on the strategic level, the United States should in the course of the next two years seek a five-year interim agreement that provides for serious reductions in the overall arsenals of the two sides. The current proposals at Geneva which

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call for a restriction of 6,000 on warheads, 1,600 on launchers, and 154 on heavy missiles create the basis for such an agreement. A more comprehensive agreement, however, requires progress on issues of verification and modernization and on finding ways to incorporate limited strategic defense into the arms control process.

In addition to watertight provisions for verification and for restricting modernization, the United States should press the Kremlin to lift gradually Soviet strategic secrecy. In the age of highly accurate and prompt strategic systems, Soviet strategic secrecy introduces an element of uncertainty and anxiety that is incompatible with strategic stability and that vastly complicates the effort to achieve effective arms control. In this regard, the United States must make a major public issue of Soviet strategic secrecy and insist that its veil be lifted for the sake of mutual strategic security.

Third, beyond any potential five-year interim START agreement, the United States should propose a wider set of negotiations, involving proportional reductions in the strategic and conventional forces of both sides. Such Comprehensive Arms Reduction Talks (CART) ought to have as their objective the shaping of truly comprehensive mutual security, without either side enjoying a one-sided advantage in either strategic or conventional forces. This is of particular importance to stability and security in Europe. It is in the U.S. interest to draw down forces on the central European front, both because a smaller U.S.

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presence in Western Europe leads to less friction in allied
relations and more self-reliance among West Europeans and because
a smaller Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe will inevitably
lead to greater self-assertion among the East Europeans.

Fourth, the United States should indicate a willingness to resolve the crisis in Nicaragua on the basis of the same formula as in Afghanistan. In both cases, the United States should seek external neutralization and internal self-determination. The external neutrality of Afghanistan and Nicaragua is consistent with the interests of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither country should become a base of operations for one superpower against the other. Internal self-determination for Afghanistan and Nicaragua disengages Washington and Moscow from the struggle for power within the two countries, thereby defusing the potential crises. At the same time, it is reasonable to assume that the outcome of genuine self-determination in both countries will produce regimes whose ascendence will be in the U.S. national interest.

Conclusion: The Need for Strategic Policy Planning

One final point. Within the executive branch, there must be
more emphasis on strategy. Occasionally, this has been provided
by particularly insightful top policymakers. There have also
been periods when all the top U.S. foreign policy decision makers
have been quite unversed either in Soviet-American affairs or in
matters of grand strategy. To compensate, the role of strategic
planning should be enhanced. The Policy Planning Council in the

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State Department is not the right vehicle because all too often
the State Department tends to confuse diplomacy with foreign
policy. Only in the White House is it possible to generate the
necessary broad, interagency approach to long-term planning.
Hence, within the NSC, a top-level, civil-military geostrategic
planning staff should be created to formulate and periodically
revise the broad outlines of a long-term policy. U.S. policy is
likely to become infused with the requisite longer-term geostra-
tegic content only if the top decision makers or their immediate
deputies are engaged in this undertaking, only if periodically
the president himself is involved, and only if regular consulta-
tions are held with appropriate congressional leaders.

Thank you.

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Game Plan

They must know that the United States is more vulnerable to a surgical first strike because the precise location of key U.S. assets is much more easily ascertained and can be more effectively targeted than those of the Soviet Union. In brief, the troubling reality is that increasingly numerous and accurate nuclear weapons are making it possible for the first time for strategic planners to design an attack that would leave the opponent crippled, capable of only a spasmodic, disorganized, and strategically aimless response — or even none at all. This still does not make a first strike attractive from a moral or even a political point of view. But the truth is that given the growing Soviet capacity for strategic offensive preemption and defensive attrition, the military feasibility of this option — even if not its political attractiveness — is increasing.

Military feasibility is not to be mechanically translated into probability. Even in the context of wider strategic asymmetry, there are still good reasons to assume that the Soviet leaders would be unlikely to initiate a first strike, though one must be on guard against the possibility. The execution of a first strike would be such a complicated undertaking, with so many operational uncertainties and such enormous risks, that it is improbable that in the near future any Soviet leadership would embark on this course in cold blood. Even a partial American retaliation could still be quite destructive.

The central dilemma confronting the United States is more nuanced, and yet menacing. In the course of about a decade, the continuing Soviet buildup of strategic weapons and the convert expansion of Soviet strategic defenses could create a more unbalanced and inherently insecure situation. Indeed, the main danger is not that of a first strike as such but rather that the increased U.S. vulnerability to such a strike would give the Soviet Union greater flexibility for the use of both its strategic and conventional military power while inducing geostrategic paralysis on the American side. This would bode ill for the stability of our political relationships.

The One-Dimensional Rival: A Threat Assessment 111

Such a state of heightened strategic insecurity would be the consequence of the fundamental difference between the U.S. and the Soviet strategic postures. The Soviet Union has been developing a nuclear war-fighting capability at several levels of intensity and potentially for protracted periods of time, and through its procurements over the last decade it has begun to realize such a capability operationally. In contrast, the United States has concentrated essentially on maintaining a nuclear war-deterring capability. Although its declaratory doctrine has been evolving toward giving decision makers greater targeting flexibility and although it has recently deployed some weapons with a first-strike capability, the United States still relies heavily on maintaining the threat of a massive retaliatory response. The growing asymmetry between these U.S. and Soviet strategic postures and doctrines is bound to heighten U.S. insecurity, and it could also embolden the Soviet Union to act more assertively to expand its influence through the use of conventional or even strategic military power.

This danger can only be offset by timely U.S. strategic programs or effective arms control. Lead times for strategic weapons are long, often stretching past a decade. Hence the danger — which may become critical in as little as a decade — requires not only early recognition, but also a prompt programmatic response. It follows that unless the threat of one-sided vulnerability is alleviated by a comprehensive arms control agreement, the key issues for the near future are in what mix and numbers U.S. strategic offensive forces must be deployed so that a survivable U.S. second-strike capability credibly delivers a Soviet first strike; and/or what kind of strategic defenses the United States should also deploy so that a Soviet first strike is rendered militarily pointless.

The Soviet leaders are not sentimentalists when it comes to the uses of power. One cannot improve here on the warnings George Kennan wrote from Moscow in 1945, when he was

The One-Dimensional Rival: A Threat Assessment 121

The answer to the vital questions posed at the outset of this chapter is therefore that during the next ten years the most ominous change for the United States could occur as a consequence of shifts on the strategic level. A deterioration of the strategic balance might affect the American willingness and capacity to deter the use of Soviet conventional forces in geo-politically critical areas proximate to the Soviet Union. American determination to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to a major conventional attack would be undermined if the Soviet Union held a significant advantage in strategic weapons. A decision to escalate to the level of tactical nuclear weapons would depend on whether or not the United States could stop there. That, in turn, would depend on whether or not Washington had the capability to respond effectively to any Soviet nuclear counterescalation without fear of a Soviet first strike on the strategic level. An overall strategic imbalance can thus filter down to undermine the credibility of nuclear escalation as the deterrent of conventional aggression.

In the past, U.S. strategic superiority had the effect of counterbalancing Soviet conventional superiority. The growing U.S. vulnerability to a disarming Soviet strategic first strike changes that. There is now a risk that the nuclear deterrent might no longer dissuade Moscow from launching a conventional aggression in some area contiguous to the Soviet Union. At the very least, there is more probability of successful Soviet political intimidation. At the worst, there is the danger of outright military action. On the wider global scale, however, the Soviet Union will continue to lack the means for assertively projecting its power without regard to a possible U.S. response.

Thus, the principal political effects of the Soviet military buildup are still likely to be felt on the Eurasian landmass, while the main operational military consequence is likely to be greater Soviet flexibility in the use of conventional forces.

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Game Plan

the Soviet Union — though Soviet incapacity to provide mili-
tarily decisive aid might work against the effective Soviet ex-
ploitation of such political opportunities.

(10) A fragmentation of either Iran or Pakistan, with Soviet political influence established on the Persian Gulf. Such influence could be attained primarily as a consequence of political fragmentation, in part purposely encouraged by the Soviets, and then as a result of gradual intrusion of Soviet military forces.

(11) A transformation of much of Western Europe into states that are neutralist in substance but not in form, with U.S. influence declining and Soviet rising. The emergence of such de facto neutralism would most likely be a piecemeal process, with gradual separation of the European nations from the United States on non-European issues and with West Germany increasingly accommodating itself to Soviet foreign policy requirements as a price for obtaining greater all-German social intercourse.

(12) A continuation of present trends: the Soviet Union decays economically, remains frozen politically but powerful militarily, jealously protecting its decaying empire in Eastern Europe, without any major change in the relationship with the United States and with continued competition on the three central strategic fronts. This involves a continuing national rivalry that remains essentially unchanged — a prospect most easy to assimilate intellectually, though history teaches us to expect sudden discontinuities.

The threat assessment, as well as this list of possible scen-
arios, provides an appropriate point of departure for the defi-
nition of what U.S. policy should be. The task for such policy
must be to avoid the most dangerous scenarios and to promote
the most desirable ones — all the while bearing in mind that
the Soviet Union is like a giant with steel hands but rotten
innards. It can crush in its grip weaker opponents but a spread-
ing corrosion is eating away at its system.

V

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

A SINGLE central consequence stems from the nature of the Soviet challenge: once its military power is checked, the Soviet Union ceases to be a historically threatening rival. Accordingly, American strategy's first task is to prevent the Soviet Union from using military force to advance its offensive objectives. Once the United States has done that, it will be in the position to pursue more constructive goals designed to temper the more hostile manifestations of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and even to prompt a contraction of the bloated Soviet empire.

To neutralize Soviet military power, the United States must maintain a military capability sufficient (1) to negate any Soviet effort to intimidate countries in which the United States has a security stake; (2) to block Soviet attempts to use its own forces or those of its proxies to expand the scope of its political control; (3) to deprive the Kremlin leaders of the certainty of a quick conventional victory on any one of the three central Eurasian strategic fronts and to increase their uncertainty regarding possible U.S. nuclear escalation in the event of such a war; (4) to counter at all levels of nuclear escalation the Soviet Union's strategic war-fighting capability; (5) to maintain a secure nuclear retaliatory force capable of inflicting massive dev-

146

Game Plan

astation on Soviet society even after a Soviet first strike directed at U.S. strategic forces.

Each of these five strategic imperatives is essential to preserve peace between the United States and the Soviet Union and to prevent a decisive shift of the world balance of power in Moscow's favor. This, in turn, requires that U.S. military power satisfy several criteria. It must have political credibility to reassure allies and friends. That means it must be physically adequate to protect them if they are threatened or attacked and politically sufficient to demonstrate American will. It must be flexible enough for use in varying geopolitical, climatic, and logistical settings, often in areas remote from the United States. Its conventional forces must be strong enough to deny the Soviets a rapid victory in an intense nonnuclear engagement. Its tactical nuclear weaponry must be integrated into U.S. operational plans to such a degree that Soviet military strategists cannot confidently expect to be able to disaggregate on Soviet terms conventional and nuclear warfare. But to make the threat of escalation credible, the United States must have nuclear forces that can survive a Soviet first strike. It must be able to employ them at levels ranging from the tactical to the strategic, selectively at a large variety of targets, and over protracted periods of time.

In effect, the United States must maintain an integrated military capability for surface, sea, and space combat as the prerequisite for an enduring and consuming political contest for earth control. In the globally decisive struggle for Eurasia, America and the Soviet Union have been aware of three fundamental geostrategic facts. First, only through oceanic domination has the United States been able to deny the vital peripheries of the central Eurasian landmass to its dominant state, the Soviet Union. Second, if the Soviet Union were to control the entire central Eurasian landmass, it could effectively contest U.S. control of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Third, if the Soviet Union were to achieve oceanic domination, it would

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

147

turn the United States into an isolated and increasingly vulner-
able fortress America. Moscow would then be able to exploit
anti-American national sentiments even in the Western Hemi-
sphere itself, on the very peripheries of the United States.

Over the last thirty years, however, the American-Soviet contest has acquired a further, potentially decisive dimension. Surface and sea control have become dependent on control of space. Indeed, to the foregoing three key geostrategic propositions, a fourth must now be added: the power that dominates space can thereby dominate both the earth's surface and its seas. The struggle for space is the successor to the earlier struggles for the sea. In previous national rivalries, the power that ruled the seas controlled access to the continents, which led to mastery over the littoral and eventually even to domination of the continents themselves. In our age, military control over space is similarly becoming a potential source of decisive leverage for exacting geopolitical compliance on earth. Indeed, given the massive destructive power than can be leveled against earth targets with nuclear weapons, ultimate preponderance in space is likely to be far more critical than naval supremacy ever was. And domination of space can be rapidly translated into fundamental geopolitical gains on earth. Not to acquiesce in political demands from the power that exercises preponderance in space would be to invite destruction without the means for retaliation. In essence, unlike land wars but like naval combat, the contest in space is not so much for spoils as for decisive strategic leverage.

The United States must make certain that the Soviet Union does not win it. Conceivably, ironclad U.S.-Soviet arrangements might preclude the deployment in space of both offensive and defensive systems; such agreements would have to be integrally linked to an equally binding and mutually stabilizing limit on the deployment of earth-based but space-traversing offensive weaponry. Without this the United States will have to take two actions. First, it should acquire the capability to wage

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

159

more real that arms control agreements reached because of domesti-
c political pressures may stifle U.S. strategic innovation.
U.S. strategic impotence could thereby become the dangerous
end result.

Mutual Strategic Security

Mutual strategic security should be a common American and
Soviet objective. MSS means that each side is strategically
secure — that it knows that a disarming first strike against its
opponent would be militarily futile and that it is confident that
a first strike by its opponent would be suicidal. In effect, the
goal of MSS incorporates the essentials of the doctrine of MAD
— for the ultimate sanction remains the same. It differs in its
emphasis by placing the highest priority on the survivability of
one's own strategic forces and on the maintenance of a flexible
strategic counterforce capability for selective war-fighting and
thus for deterrence at all levels of a potential nuclear conflict.

MSS can be sought in two ways. An arms control agreement
along the lines sketched above would be the least costly. But
if reaching doctrinal understanding on strategic convergence is
impossible, MSS can and must be sought unilaterally. Indeed,
a unilateral American effort may over time convince Soviet
leaders that a genuine arms control accommodation is prefera-
ble to continued competition. Real arms control offers greater
mutual predictability and stability and can enhance mutual se-
curity at lower costs than a full-blown race in weapons tech-
nology. But Moscow will not be convinced of this as long as
it can assume that arms control can be used as a tool for halt-
ing U.S. strategic innovation while protecting and even en-
hancing the Soviet edge in strategic first-strike systems.

A unilateral effort by the United States to enhance mutual
security will require an adjustment in its strategic doctrine and
deployments. It is far from clear that the United States cur-
rently possesses a coherent strategic doctrine for meshing its

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Game Plan

Critics of even limited strategic defense deployment have argued that it would simply pile up more weapons. For example, a *New York Times* editorial stated that strategic defense would be "highly provocative" to the Soviets, who would then be compelled to respond with "a destabilizing new buildup of Soviet offensive weapons." This argument fails to take into account two salient points. First, the Soviets themselves have been taking steps to enhance their strategic defenses, to a degree considerably greater than the United States has done or is planning to do, without evoking the charge from such editorial writers that these Soviet actions are "highly provocative." Second, a new Soviet offensive strategic buildup would not be remotely justified in response to a manifestly restrained deployment of U.S. offensive systems and merely a limited U.S. strategic defense. Such a Soviet response would be menacing. It would both signal and confirm a Soviet determination to acquire a first-strike attack capability. There could be no other credible motive. The exposure of such a Soviet strategic intent would be a further argument for a U.S. limited defense, not an argument against it.

It might be objected that the Soviets could misread an American deployment of a limited number of accurate offensive systems and a limited defense. They might interpret it as a preliminary step toward the acquisition of a full-blown first-strike capability that would be reinforced with a gradually expanding defensive screen. That argument is simply not credible. With lead times in strategic deployments measured in years and with Congress publicly reviewing U.S. strategic plans and usually limiting their funding, it is impossible for the United States to acquire such a one-sided capability without early and full warning to the Soviets. Moreover, there is no public support in the United States for such a massive effort to regain one-sided strategic superiority.

The best outcome for both the United States and the Soviet

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

167

Union would be to move jointly to relatively similar mixed but limited offensive-defensive postures. It is more likely that such movement will be undertaken tacitly than through formally contrived agreements because of the overwhelming difficulties of verification and of formulating complicated trade-offs. Thus, a gradual reduction in Soviet first-strike deployments and some expansion in present Soviet ABM capabilities should be paralleled by an American deployment of a limited strategic defense against Soviet first-strike systems. This could give both sides greater strategic security than they enjoy today. Even unilateral movement in this direction by the United States will make it more likely that Soviet leaders will decide that the further acquisition of first-strike systems is economically wasteful and neither strategically nor politically justifiable. That decision, in turn, might lead the Kremlin to see that some reciprocal accommodation is preferable.

Indeed, a strong case can be made for a unilateral U.S. rejection of the limitations on strategic defense of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, based on the now anachronistic strategic assumptions of the era of MAD. A forceful act of this kind, conveying U.S. determination to move away from MAD, might precipitate a more conclusive, comprehensive, and stabilizing arms control accommodation dedicated to mutual strategic security. Should such a step become the catalyst for a more forthcoming Soviet attitude on arms control, the United States could in return pledge to defer for the life of any new agreement the actual deployment of the otherwise needed counter-first-strike SDI system. To move events in that direction the United States should propose to the Soviet Union a renegotiation of the ABM treaty to permit some limited deployment of space-based defenses. Subsequently, in response to the likely negative Soviet reaction, the United States should announce that it is initiating a careful reassessment of the continued strategic and political value of the ABM treaty, includ-

168

Game Plan

ing the possibility of terminating the U.S. adherence to it. The United States should also indicate its intention to proceed with the deployment of a two-tier, limited, counter-first-strike strategic defense, unless in the meantime the Soviets agree to a truly stabilizing arms control agreement.

In summation, the United States is currently sliding into the worst possible strategic posture. While premature top-level talk of population-wide strategic defense has probably made Soviet leaders accelerate their own strategic defense efforts, the United States is not moving decisively either to augment its own strategic offensive forces or to deploy a strategic defense for its retaliatory forces. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is doing both. To overcome this danger, the United States must make a determined choice among three basic options: (1) to rely on arms control — which only makes sense if it results in a comprehensive and verifiable agreement that massively reduces the Soviet first-strike systems; (2) to maintain the precarious state of mutual assured destruction by proliferating at very high cost of its own survivable strategic forces so as to counter the projected enormous expansion in Soviet first-strike systems and the Soviet covert enhancements in strategic defense; or (3) to move toward a relationship of mutual strategic security through a moderate expansion and modernization of U.S. strategic attack forces and the deployment within the decade of a two-tier strategic defense to counter Soviet first-strike weapons.

Option three is the best. It provides greater security. It also constitutes the one course of action most likely to persuade the Soviet Union seriously to consider a truly comprehensive, mutually stabilizing, and fully verifiable arms control agreement.

## Global Conventional Flexibility

The maintenance both of nuclear stability and of a credible strategic deterrent is the point of departure for coping with the threat of a conventional attack by the Soviet Union. But that

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

169

threat also has special dimensions. At the outset of this analysis, I registered three imperatives pertaining to conventional conflict: the United States must be able to negate any Soviet military intimidation of countries in which the United States has a special stake, to block Soviet conventional military expansion, and to deprive the Soviets of a quick conventional victory on any one of the three central Eurasian strategic fronts. Neither the current U.S. doctrine nor the composition and deployment of U.S. conventional forces provides the confidence that these tasks could be executed.

U.S. doctrine is vague, overgeneralized, and poses — if taken seriously — the real risk of military overextension. In recent years, top U.S. defense officials have articulated a defense doctrine intended to convey American determination to fight on several fronts at the same time, almost in a politically and strategically indiscriminate fashion. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in his 1983 annual report to Congress warned that the Soviets have the "capability to launch simultaneous attacks" on all three key fronts and that therefore the United States must "be capable of defending all theaters simultaneously." This assertion is open to challenge. Notwithstanding the Soviet Union's large conventional forces, it is highly doubtful that Moscow could launch truly major operations on all three fronts simultaneously. Moreover, the military rationale of such a huge conventional operation, which would disperse Soviet conventional superiority rather than concentrate it, is even more open to doubt. It is unclear why Moscow would choose to wage a massive and consequently more prolonged three-front conventional war that would be more likely to escalate into a nuclear conflict than a concentrated and quick conventional assault on one of the three fronts. It is therefore very unlikely that the Soviets would mindlessly disperse their forces and maximize the number of their enemies.

Even more skepticism is justified regarding the administration's strategic prescription for the United States. Is it seri-

U.S. Strategic Imperatives

191

they are less likely to engage in the test. But if our lead were to erode to the point that such a strategic calculus held out a certainty of success, Moscow would enjoy the single condition for the exploitation of its military power through assertive pressures or direct aggression.

## An Integrated Strategic Framework

The United States does not have an up-to-date, integrated, overall strategic doctrine. Its nuclear strategy does not match nuclear realities. Its conventional ground posture is in a mismatch with geopolitical dangers, and its naval forces are preoccupied by their strategic mission. On the strategic nuclear level, despite the doctrinal initiatives of recent years, the United States is still largely poised for a spasmodic, apocalyptic counterattack, while its strategic forces are gradually becoming more vulnerable to a disarming attack, with the enemy seeking to develop a reserve strategic force to checkmate any possible U.S. societal retaliation. On the conventional level, U.S. combat-ready ground forces are highly concentrated on the first central strategic front — the one front most likely to escalate into a nuclear collision in the event of major hostilities. And they are thinly deployed or unavailable for a conventional defense on the other fronts — where protracted conventional warfare is more likely. In naval strategy, the emphasis has lately been on enhancing the U.S. capacity both to carry conflict to Soviet home ports and to project U.S. power through close-up heavy naval/air bombardment of the enemy. As a result, the United States suffers from a series of handicaps: rigidity at the highest strategic level that undermines the credibility of its nuclear deterrent at less than total war; a lack of mobility and geopolitical balance in terms of conventional combat capability; and a degree of uncertainty, even about whether the U.S. can control the oceans in a prolonged conventional engagement.

192

Game Plan

An integrated strategy, combining mutual strategic security with conventional global flexibility, should seek to combine capacities we need for a wide variety of nuclear responses to enhance extended deterrence with ground and naval strength to deny the Soviets a quick conventional victory in any Eurasian theater, and ground and naval strength to defeat the Soviets in any non-Eurasian clash. Accordingly, survivable U.S. strategic forces necessary for deterrence must be able both to destroy selectively high-value Soviet military targets and to retaliate comprehensively against Soviet society. In other words, to keep its deterrent credible, the United States must have not only secure nuclear forces but also communications, command and control, and intelligence systems designed for actual war fighting. Offensively, that means U.S. strategic systems capable of attacking a significant portion of the Soviet command and control facilities, leadership shelters, and hardened Soviet first-strike strategic weapons — but with such U.S. forces not deployed in numbers that could pose a first-strike threat to the Soviet side — as well as a survivable U.S. second-strike force capable of inflicting prohibitive damage on the Soviet society as a whole, notably on its imperial Great Russian component. Defensively, it means a U.S. counter-first-strike strategic defense capable of protecting most valued U.S. command and control facilities and at least a significant portion of the U.S. second-strike retaliatory strategic force.

In conventional warfare, U.S. ground forces must reinforce — but not assume the major burden of — the regional defense of the far western and the far eastern extremities of the Eurasian continent. They must also be capable of deploying rapidly to the southwestern Eurasian front, and of inflicting a clear-cut defeat on any Soviet forces that threaten U.S. interests beyond Eurasia. U.S. naval forces must maintain, above all, effective sea control in support of conventional ground missions, including blockading Soviet naval choke points if necessary.

Arms control must be seen as an integral part of an effort to

INTER-OFFICE MEMO

Science Applications International Corporation

AUG 10 1987

DATE: 6 August 1987

TO: CILS Summer Study
Participants

SUBJECT

Attached is a preliminary version of the calendar of events for the Summer Study of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. This calendar will undergo further revision before August 20, but the dates for social events are firm.

Also firm is the general outline of the calendar for August 20-28, which is as follows:

* Preliminary drafts of Working Group reports and the Executive Overview report will be sent on August 13 to all Summer Study participants who plan to be present on August 20-21.

* These drafts will be reviewed and critiqued in plenary sessions on August 20-21.

* During August 22-26 we will:

  - Revise draft reports.

  - Hold special cross-cutting sessions on topics involving more than one Working Group.

  - Meet in another plenary, probably on the morning of August 26, to review progress and problems.

* We will review the substance of the Working Group reports (including preliminary findings and recommendations) with members of the Commission, selected members of Congress, and other senior officials in plenary sessions on August 27 and the morning of August 28.

* The Summer Study will end at noon on August 28.

Preliminary Summer
Study Calendar
Page 2

We are in the process of scheduling several
special sessions on topics that cut across Working Groups to
be held during August 22-26. The current list of cross-
cutting topics is as follows:

* CONUS defense (air defense and BMD)

* Theater force structure in Europe

* Uses of advanced satellite technology (firm for August 24-25)

* Stealth utilization

* Naval capacity to project power ashore

* Super-smart autonomous weapons

* Advanced technology for low intensity conflict
and special operations forces

* Report on analyses of four contingencies
(Northern Europe, Central Europe, Southwest
Asia, and Northeast Asia)

Please be sure that your Secret or Top Secret clearances have been passed to LTJG Karen Jeffries, USN, or COL John Sullivan, USAF, at the following address:

Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy
C/O Office of the Secretary of Defense
(Net Assessment)
Room 3A930, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
(202) 697-4557

If you have SCI clearances, please have your SSO pass them to the SSO at the Naval Ocean Systems Center (Mr. Carl Grieve or Mr. Richard Shearer, 444135-SNOO), with a copy to LTJG Karen Jeffries. This will facilitate organizing SCI sessions as needed at the Summer Study.

If you have questions about the schedule, call me at (619) 546-6297 or Susan Londos at (619) 546-6155. Questions about security should be directed to Col. Sullivan or LTJG Jeffries.

Attachment

cc: J. Meriwether

PRESS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 30, 1987

DIRECTOR ADELMAN SUBMITS RESIGNATION

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman, announced today that he has informed the President of his plans to resign from his position this fall.

The Director has taken this decision for the reasons outlined in his letter to the President (copy attached). As he wrote the President:

"I feel I have accomplished what I set out to do: to help you chart a new course for US-Soviet arms control that dramatically reduces nuclear weapons and helps reduce the risk of war. General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement last week was the clearest and latest indication that the Soviets, at long last, have bought onto that course. Because of your resolve, we stand on the verge of a new type of arms control. I could not say that until now.

You also asked me to strengthen ACDA. The Agency today stands strong and healthy. I have never before served with such an outstanding, professional and dedicated staff and am profoundly grateful for their support and service during these years. The Agency is an invaluable resource for the government and the country.

Upon his resignation, Director Adelman will write a twice-weekly nationally syndicated column, monthly articles for a magazine, engage in speaking tours and be affiliated with a think-tank in Washington. He also hopes to resume teaching Shakespeare at a university.

AUG 03 1987

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY WASHINGTON DC 20451
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 647-8714

AUG-07 10:07

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

July 30, 1987

The President
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. President:

It has been a great honor to serve in your Administration, first as Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and then as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This has enabled me to work on some of the most important and challenging issues facing the Nation.

But now I feel I have accomplished what I set out to do: to help you chart a new course for US-Soviet arms control that dramatically reduces nuclear weapons and helps reduce the risk of war. General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement last week was the clearest and latest indication that the Soviets, at long last, have bought onto that course. Because of your resolve, we stand on the verge of a new type of arms control. I could not say that until now.

When I began my tenure at ACDA, the second longest in the Agency's history, few believed that your commitment to strengthen America would permit progress towards genuine arms control. You have now proven the two go together.

Travelling down this road has been tough. Along the way, critics contended that we could not deploy missiles in Europe and hold the Alliance together. The missiles were deployed and the Alliance grew stronger in the process.

Critics said the Soviet walk-out in 1983 would continue so long as the missiles were kept in Europe. The missiles stayed and the Soviets came back to the negotiating table.

Critics claimed that the "global zero option" -- your bold proposal to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons -- was non-negotiable, even a "non-starter" for serious discussions with the Soviets. Just last week the Soviets adopted what was widely said to be non-negotiable not so very long ago.

-2-

Critics similarly claimed that we could never bring the
Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on your bold proposal for
deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms. Since Reykjavik, the
Soviets have agreed to negotiate deep cuts, 50 percent
reductions in the arsenals of each side.

Finally, but by no means least, critics contended that your
Strategic Defense Initiative would undercut arms control. The
contrary has happened. We have had more progress toward real
arms control since you launched SDI than in all the years
preceding.

None of this was easy. The pressures to yield to Soviet
demands were fierce at times. But as you know better than
others, and as I said in my swearing-in ceremony, nothing
worthwhile ever comes easily.

I firmly believe that, thanks to your leadership, this year
we will conclude a solid arms control agreement. This accord,
unlike those of the past, will dramatically reduce nuclear
weapons (even eliminating an entire class of such weapons) with
sound verification provisions and without adversely affecting
our vital SDI program.

In accomplishing this, it becomes even more important to
reinforce what you have stressed throughout your Presidency:
that arms control must be viewed as one among several pillars of
our national security policy and only one of the major factors
in US-Soviet relations.

I am so proud and deeply appreciative of the opportunity
you have given me to participate in your efforts and the
historic accomplishments now in the offing. But it is time for
me to return to my work in research, writing and speaking on
public policy issues.

To provide an orderly transition, I plan my resignation to
be effective in mid-October. However, in the event that a
summit meeting is planned for after that time, I would be happy
to serve through its completion.

BIOGRAPHY

[L.C]

KENNETH L. ADELMAN

DIRECTOR
U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Kenneth L. Adelman is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Nominated by President Reagan in January 1983 and sworn into office on April 14, 1983, Ambassador Adelman is by law principal advisor to the President on arms control matters. As such, he is responsible for preparing and backstopping the American position in arms control talks.

He had served from 1981 to 1983 as Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, second in command to Jeane Kirkpatrick. In this capacity, he headed the American delegation to the Second Special Session on Disarmament.

Ambassador Adelman has more than a decade in Federal service. From 1976 to 1977, he was Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. He also served with the Agency for International Development (1975-1976), the Office of Economic Opportunity (1970-1972), and the Department of Commerce (1968-1970).

From 1977 to 1981, Ambassador Adelman was a member of the Strategic Studies Center at SRI International (Stanford Research Institute). He also taught courses on Shakespeare at Georgetown University and on African studies at Catholic University of America. His articles and reviews have appeared in numerous publications, including *Foreign Affairs*, *Harper's*, *The New Republic*, *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Wall Street Journal*.

From 1972 to 1975, he lived in Kinshasa, Zaire, where he conducted his doctoral research. He also served as translator for the Ali-Foreman championship heavyweight fight, and participated in the three-month river expedition on the 100th anniversary of Stanley's trip down the Congo River. He is an ardent collector of and expert on African art.

Ambassador Adelman received his PhD in political theory from Georgetown University in 1975. He also holds a Master of Science degree in foreign service from Georgetown (1969) and a Bachelor of Arts in philosophy and religion from Grinnell College (1967).

He was born on June 9, 1946, in Chicago, Illinois, and is married to the former Carol Craigie. They reside in Arlington, Virginia, with their two daughters, Jessica (11) and Jocelyn (9).

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451

MASON/MARTIN - BRITISH CONTRIBUTION

There is much talk at present of a crisis of confidence in NATO; this phrase may be emotive, but certainly there is a sense of being at a turning point and there is considerable anxiety that American policy may be diverging from that preferred by Europeans and vice versa.

The root of the problem seems to be a lack of political will to face up firmly to divergent interests, to admit frankly that compromise is necessary to permit co-operative defence and that by its nature the compromise must be less than perfect.

The United States has for decades loyally and at great expense invested in the military security of its interests in Europe but it naturally wishes to limit the risks and consequently takes a cautious view of the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe and in the deterrence of aggression upon it. European nations naturally have a more direct interest in their own security - though not necessarily in the security of some or all of their European allies - but, conscious of the historical record are fearful of a failure of preparations for conventional defense, to deter aggression. They are also dubious of their own will to provide the wherewithal for a truly impressive conventional defense and, while recognising that new technology and new doctrines can help, are sceptical about improvements so great as to transform the problem. The United States, conscious of these European failings as well as of the need to neutralise the political as well as military implications of a Soviet monopoly of nuclear "options" in Europe, does not endorse the removal of nuclear weapons from NATO strategy, or even as yet a doctrine of No First Use, but is increasingly anxious to limit their role. There is thus a circularity of anxieties here which is having a deleterious effect on morale and is inhibiting the taking of sensible measures.

01.01.13 13.00

SWE ADOPTION FRA 450110 70312
04

A solution will have to reiterate more openly the compromise of the 1967 flexible response: i.e. that if the United States wants to stay in the business of European defence it will have to take the risk of having a nuclear/phase in the regional defensive strategy and the Europeans will have to accept that that component must be limited and relegated to a role behind a robust conventional defence and hence deterrent. Both must accept that to have a deterrent effect, the nuclear component must have a practical military utility and that any attempt to derive deterrence from an operational strategy that could not nor would never be implemented would be ineffective or dangerous in crisis and divisive in the meantime. Any such operational strategy must be extremely limited, requiring highly effective control, and, because it must be an implementable and not merely declaratory strategy, could embrace the incremental recession of the nuclear stages as new conventional options become available, provided the nuclear phase persists as insurance against failure at lower levels.

If the allies, from the Americans to the Germans, are not prepared to accept the implications of such a strategy - on the one hand nuclear risk for all; on the other, major effort to contain it - the alliance is probably not viable. If these implications are accepted, then it should be possible to set on foot a review of strategy within present terms of reference to establish a floor of forces that can form the basis for an active rather than reactive arms control policy, with good political results. It would be possible to do this under the EXISTING label of flexible response. But while this is probably wise, this should not be taken as an opportunity to hide what is happening from public opinion, for it is the failure to face up frankly to the risks and burdens of effective defence and deterrence that has led us to our present plight, exemplified in our vulnerability to Soviet arms control offensives.

To make the continued application of nuclear weapons to deterrence
in Western Europe requires continued efforts to make NATO less dependent
on early use of nuclear weapons. In particular Western Europeans are
concerned about the short-warning option for the Warsaw Pact which may
also even more practicable if the double zero agreements are concluded.

In both political and military terms NATO will possess credible deterrent and defence postures if it is perceived to be and, indeed is, capable of disrupting the Warsaw Pact's concepts of operation. Warning time, made up from surveillance and communications allied to more adequate command and control, is a vital parameter in the deterrence and defence equations. It will determine the dynamic of the early phases of a high intensity conflict on the Central Front: whether NATO's forward defences can contain first echelon forces and whether interdiction capabilities can be directed with sufficient specificity at follow-on forces; objectively, conventional interdiction against mobile follow-on forces requires control and a surveillance, command and/ or munition delivery system where architecture has yet to be defined - some nuclear capabilities are required into the medium timescale.

NATO Europe must construct a coherent programme designed to complement
U.S. strategic and theatre surveillance capabilities, European space pro-
grammes have suffered from total fragmentation and enjoyed no priority
in resource allocation. Enhanced industry - industry collaboration is
required to ensure that other sectors of information technology, critical
to defence capabilities, are realised in an optimal and cost-effective
way.

Apart from surveillance and communications and control, NATO's success
in the early phases of a Warsaw Pact offensive will be determined by the

SENT BY: Newcastle University ;15- 7-87 11:32AM ;

0912611182→

496176 70312; θ

4.

effectiveness of its air defences, by the establishment of air superiority over the battlefield, by anti-armour capabilities and, more generally, by counter-mobility forces. Europe must generate a more coherent position on air defences - on the contribution of passive, active and counterforce components to the air-breathing and aerodynamic threats which are evolving significantly. Counter air and defence suppression are essential capabilities in which present co-operative efforts need enhancement. Air superiority over the battlefield requires much more consistent understanding of the way in which U.S. Tactical Air Force reinforcements will be received and secured.

If NATO can provide in such ways for effective counterstroke in the land battle and counterforce in the air battle, it may be politically acceptable to retain a highly selective nuclear response as insurance against failure and hence as added deterrent. This will only be possible if efforts continue to replace the specific nuclear operational missions with conventional means and to enhance provision for control.

At the highest level there needs to be renewed consultation, including France, to blunt the Soviet political offensive and to generate a consensus for Alliance strategic doctrines and for collaborative efforts to provide the material means with which to execute them. Only on such a coherent basis can arms control be made to serve Western security interests rather than provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to undermine them.

'87.07.15 15:02

Uwe Nerlich

25 June 1987

Draft Outline on a European Statement on the ILS-Study

The underlying strategic and operational concepts can be summarized as follows:

* The effectiveness of NATO strategy has political consequences in peace and crisis and strategic consequences in crisis and war. It has a dual character.

* It depends on the degree to which NATO succeeds to hold WP forces at risk and to deny WP confidence in low risk attack options.

* In case of war this means NATO must be able to disrupt the WP's operation concept.

* In the recent past nuclear and conventional arms control have generally run counter to these objectives, and the outcome of arms control agreements can be comparable to threat developments: Both can result in unilateral option disqualification on NATO's side.

* WP force structure developments have resulted in enhanced conventional, nuclear and chemical capabilities that provide a range of attack scenarios (ranging from an attack with initial use of nuclear forces to a large-scale conventional attack).

* In either case the WP is acquiring the unprecedented option to suppress or to bypass NATO's nuclear responses. This threat development may be reinforced by arms control agreements that eliminate the means for deliberate escalation.

* NATO would be least prepared for a conventional short-preparation time attack which the WP could hope to keep limited and to terminate on its own terms.

07.07.15

15:03

SWF EBENHUSEN/FRG

498178 7/0312

08

* For NATO its military security will depend on whether it can maintain or generate the conventional and nuclear force structures needed to keep the time window for deliberate escalation open.

* Strength, readiness and combat power of NATO's defensive forces must suffice to force WP into recognizable preparations as a precondition for a prepared defense. Improved surveillance can prolong further the preparation time for NATO.

* NATO's forward defense must be sufficiently robust to slow down the attack of first echelon armies early without fully absorbing NATO's main defense forces.

* A slow-down or deadlock of first echelon armies will change the requirements for scheduled WP reinforcements: Subsequent echelons would have to follow more rapidly. The WP's operational concept is crucial.

* In addition to a robust forward defense, NATO would thus need conventional and nuclear options for interdiction.

* To disrupt the WP's operational concept by rendering the attack more dependent on more rapid reinforcements while exposing second echelon armies more effectively to interdiction is thus the most critical part of NATO's defense. If NATO fails here, all other operations lose their strategic importance.

* Whether or not NATO succeeds in this effort will in large measure depend on to what extent it will reduce the impact of the WP air strike, win the air battle and maintain the forces for OCA.

* Disruption of the WP's operational concept is a precondition for restoring deterrence. To deny a successful attack requires additional capabilities. NATO must be able to use the extra-time gained from extented preparation time and delays.

* Without timely reinforcements NATO would still lose. Preventing WP interdiction of NATO reinforcements is thus crucial.

* NATO must be prepared to mobilize reserves within the time frame given in this circumstance.

* It is under these conditions that selective employment with the objective of terminating the war is an option. This implies that an escalatory use for political purposes might have to come after selective initial uses for interdiction purposes.

* Increasing emphasis on selectivity in nuclear response increases demands on C³ capabilities and political consultation.

* With escalation dominance gone, deterrence is conceivable only in terms of a denial concept along these lines.

* Restoring deterrence in this way would not only allow to preserve NATO's strategy of flexible response. It would have enormous political consequences in the ongoing peace-time military competition over how to structure East-West relations in Europe. It would buy time at a point in history where it may be usable.

COMMISSION ON INTEGRATED LONG-TERM STRATEGY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000
(202) 697-8360

JUL 10 1987

9 JUL 1987

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 1021
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry:

In preparation for our meeting next Tuesday, July 14th, I am enclosing a proposed agenda and a draft outline for the Commission report.

The draft outline is an expansion of the earlier list of "Key Topics" that we discussed and revised in previous meetings. This version of the outline is intended only to help guide and stimulate our discussion. It will, undoubtedly, be revised as a result of our meeting and lead to a better charter for the San Diego summer session and follow-up work.

Albert and I look forward to seeing you next Tuesday.

Enclosures (2)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2000

(202) 697-8360

Proposed Agenda

Room 208

Old Executive Office Building

0830 - 0930 Commissioners' views on over-
arching themes and priorities
for final report.

0930 - 1130
Review of the enclosed draft
outline, recommendations for
changes, questions of format
and substance.

Guidance for the San Diego
Summer Session Aug 20-28.

1130 - 1200 How to deal with the resource (defense budget) question.

1200 Luncheon
Planning for the Commission's
remaining meetings in the fall,
possible briefing of key members
of Congress, Commissioners'
meeting with the President, and
possible 1988 follow-up actions.

2

(3) Our emphasis, also, is on a strategy that is
<u>integrated</u>. That is to say, a valid strategy must recognize:

(a) The many interrelationships between nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities;

(b) the interaction of offensive and defensive systems and tactics--whether with nuclear, chemical, or high explosive munitions; and

(c) the connections between theater and intercontinental capabilities.

B. The Need For Change

(1) The need to renew the West's military strategy is highlighted by the recent disarray about an INF agreement among all political factions and on both sides of the Atlantic. When Moscow appeared to accept NATO's offer, made in 1979, to keep intermediate range missiles out of Europe provided the Soviets did the same, it became evident to most participants in the debate that the West needs to rethink not only the policy guiding arms negotiations, but also the strategy guiding the role of nuclear weapons and conventional arms, and the conditions for the credibility of nuclear guarantees issued by a country with nuclear weapons--whether it is the United States or France or Britain or some combination of the three--to countries without nuclear weapons.

(2) This debate highlights a long-standing confusion in the Alliance: the pretense that the Alliance can, in all relevant contingencies deter a Soviet attack by a strategy of response that would clearly be regarded as assuring our own destruction (as well as that of the Soviet Union). Proponents of an absolute separation between "deterrence" and "warfighting," who claim that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is enough to deter, find it hard to explain the concern shown in NATO that deterrence might be affected by some of NATO's nuclear systems were no longer based in Europe. The fact that NATO has drifted towards relying on threats that would be self-defeating if implemented has now become more obvious; and more obviously disturbing.

(3) A valid concern underlying this disarray about nuclear strategy is the East-West asymmetry in the ability to use conventional force: critical regions in Europe and elsewhere in Eurasia that the Soviets might have an incentive to invade, are much closer to the USSR than to the United States. For budgetary reasons and because the United States had a very large nuclear advantage until the late 1960s, NATO has placed a heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to compensate for the American geographic disadvantage for detering any large-scale nonnuclear invasion.

3

(4) The current debate indicates that many political leaders in the alliance, and not just the anti-nuclear domestic factions, hold that any war with the Soviet Union in Europe would mean the end of Europe--if not the end of the industrialized world--that even an allied victory with conventional arms would be Pyrrhic. If that were true, it would be impossible for the United States--or France or Britain--persuasively to deter a Soviet invasion of the Federal Republic or Turkey or Norway or any other ally, whether by threatening a nuclear or a non-nuclear response.

(5) Yet, the members of NATO have interests beyond the national boundaries of each that require the collective deterrence of such an invasion or its defeat, without self-destruction. In fact, the Alliance has important interests beyond the territories of its members, notably in the Persian Gulf.

(6) The questions raised by the INF agreement illustrate that the concepts of "stable deterrence," which became widely accepted among NATO political elites since the late 1960s, are not a useful guide for alliance defense policy or arms agreements.

# II. THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT FOR AMERICA'S SECURITY

(This section is to consist largely of graphics.)

## A. Introduction

(1) The essential features of America's security structure were established decades ago, when the relative strength of nations and technologies for defense were vastly different. The Atlantic Alliance was started 40 years ago, substantial forward deployment in Europe 37 years ago, the commitment to forward deployment in Korea 32 years ago. Given the changes in America's security environment, it stands to reason that US strategy requires updating.

## B. Economic and Military Trends

A series of charts on the changing geography of military and economic power: GNP, industrial production, armed forces, etc., growth of the industrial and military capacity of the Third World, etc.

4

C. The Arms Competition

(1) A series of charts on the "arms race" question.

(2) The US nuclear weapons stockpile has not increased in number or in yield in the last two decades--contrary to popular anticipation in the 1950s. The average yield peaked in 1957 at a level 15 to 22 times higher than the present level. There has been no exponential arms race in nuclear weapons.

(3) There has, of course, been competition. One should not expect that serious adversaries like the Soviets who, under some circumstances, are plainly willing to use force to expand at the expense of the West, would hesitate to improve performance of their arsenal when able to do so.

D. Technological and Geostrategic Changes

(1) The most important technological changes in the last 30 years, and especially in the last ten, have been the improvements in the acquisition, processing and transmission of information. These changes help make it possible to reply to attack effectively, with destruction largely confined to military targets and thus leaving the enemy a stake in restraint. The Soviet forces are increasingly incorporating this technology; hence they will be able to carry out selective, yet militarily effective, attacks which would leave the West a stake in avoiding indiscriminate escalation.

(2) The principal obstacle to Western innovation in the military application of these technologies has been the failure to get an agreement on the need for them. Congressional views and bureaucratic tendencies among the Services have led to the emphasis of threats of mutual destruction to the neglect of preparations for effective and discriminate military responses.

(3) Third world powers have increased the sophistication of their weaponry. In addition, there has been a wide spread of the materials and know-how for nuclear explosives. [Elaborate?}

(4) One of the most significant geostrategic changes has been the decrease in American (and Western) access to air space and air bases needed for projecting power to key points on the periphery of Eurasia. There has been a large, long-term decline in the number of nations that provide bases for the United States, or Britain or France. US base structure and access to air space worldwide has thinned least in the center of Europe. Accompanying this change has been a great increase in the ability of the Soviets to project power, especially on its periphery. (Show with charts)

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(5) Long-term changes in air access and basing have also affected the US ability to cope with third country and terrorist threats.

E. The Next Twenty Years: Possibilities of Sudden Discontinuities

(1) In planning US strategy and defense capabilities for the future, we have to be mindful that the security environment could suddenly be changed in a radical way by a major new event. For example, an isolated use of nuclear weapons could lead to sharp changes in expectations of and attitudes toward nuclear warfare. A major loss of US bases could drastically alter US capability for projecting power into a region. Sudden internal political changes in the USSR or in China could cause a major change in the threats confronting the United States.

(2) We expect the world 20 years from now to look very different from the way it is now. And in good part we want a long-range strategy to cope with such drastic change and not merely to deal with the familiar problems, even where these are difficult and unresolved.

(3) [Should the Commission develop these or other examples?] [ What should the Commission say about preparing for such discontinuities? Obviously, the prospect of uncertain major and sudden change calls for flexibility in US and Allied forces and renders an industrial mobilization base more important.]

(4) Apart from such sudden discontinuities, the cumulative impact of continuous, gradual change can also be revolutionary. A case in point is the economic growth of Japan. The world can look very differently 20 years hence even if there are no sharp discontinuities or sudden breakthroughs. (a) Economic changes can proceed at contrasting geometric rates and, through the wonders of compounding, balances can change enormously in 20 years. (b) Alliances can crumble steadily for many years with implications that are only revealed in a crisis or a war. (c) Nuclear materials and nuclear know-how needed to make fission weapons continue to be spread by the marketing of civilian nuclear energy.

(5) Such gradual changes with a cumulative impact, paradoxically, may be harder to cope with than sudden changes. This paradox is illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis and its sequel. The US government did rise to the challenge presented

6

by the transfer of missiles and jet fighter-bombers capable of
delivering nuclear weapons deep in the United States. As we
boasted, the other fellow blinked; he took them out. On the
other hand, though the rapid attempt by the Soviets to change
the balance didn't work, the slow change in the balance did.
We did something about the first. We hardly noticed the second;
and when we did, we elaborated splendid reasons for not doing
anything about it.

## III. RECOMMENDATIONS ON STRATEGIES, OBJECTIVES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACQUISITION PROCESS

### A. The Need For Allies (and Other Geopolitical Requirements)

(1) Recent and future economic and military trends (II. B. above) point to a growing importance of allies for US strategy. Moreover, Soviet threats against some regions beyond our borders would be critical for US security even if we did not have alliance commitments in these regions.

(2) However, changes in Alliance strategy are needed in response to the changes in relative power, the changing state of the art of offense and defense, and the profound difficulties of current strategy.

(3) Our strategy in the past, in particular our way of justifying budgets and establishing requirements, has centered on the prospect of a global Soviet attack which might be nuclear from the outset, or which may start with conventional combined arms attacks in Central Europe, but which would quickly become a global nuclear war. By assuming that a Soviet conventional attack would quickly become worldwide, we tend to neglect the problem of potential disunity among our allies) with some opting-out in the face of selective attacks) -- and to devote inadequate attention to the possibility of exploiting disunity and dissidence in the Soviet empire in the event that it launches a combined arms invasion. These strategic assumptions also encourage us to neglect the flanks and critical areas outside of NATO and to devote our attention mainly to NATO's central front where the West is relatively less weak and where our threats rapidly to raise the level of violence to the use of nuclear weapons may be more credible.

(4) By and large, strategies and capabilities designed against the most massive attacks do not meet contingencies where the enemy pursues more limited objectives, with a more selective use of his forces. Democracies need to defeat challenges, or attacks, with least harm to themselves; they cannot effectively rely on indiscriminate responses.

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(5) [Should the Report address the significance of Third World regions outside of alliances? ]

B. Strategic Doctrine

[This is likely to be the most important part of this Report. It can be structured in several different ways. We might group the recommendations into four or so major points. For example:

(1) Changes in the nature of offensive systems - nuclear and conventional. The means for precision and the importance of discrimination.

(2) The offense-defense symbioses. The need for a better balance (in nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces) between offensive and defensive systems and strategies for their use.

(3) The need for flexibility and mobility.

[Present graphics of changes in the relative ability of the US and the Soviet Union to project power to points in each of the four regions studied by our regional teams. These would include the kind of graphs presented to the Commission on December 15, 1986, but apply them to other regions than South West Asia.] We want to show the difference between such comparisons with respect to single theaters and a comparison in the global war case in which all four regions are included. This will make graphic the fact, concealed by the predominant focus on the global contingency, that it is in the "lesser cases" that the Soviets get the greatest benefit from their interior lines of communication since they don't need nearly as much force to hold out the threat of potential attack to deter the West's switching forces from regions not actually invaded. And the West can now switch forces only much more slowly. It will also show that a truly global attack would strain Soviet logistic resources.

(4) "Space Control"
The need for wartime capabilities in space.

May 28, 1987

Albert Wohlstetter

DISCONT

DISCONTINUITIES, BREAKTHROUGHS AND CUMULATIVELY
REVOLUTIONARY GRADUAL CHANGE

We expect the world 20 years from now to look very different from
the way it is now. And in good part we want a long-range strategy to
cope with such drastic change and not merely to deal with the familiar
problems, even where these are difficult and unresolved. The purpose of
this note is to describe and illustrate three sorts of drastic change
and their implications, sometimes paradoxical, for working out a viable
strategy.

1. *Sharp and sudden discontinuities.*

We have had several such in the past: (a) The sudden change in alliances and alignments that was signaled by the Stalin-Hitler Pact -- an important political example. (b) The successful development of fission weapons in the early 1940s -- the most familiar example of a massive technological breakthrough with enormous significance for strategy. (c) The introduction of Soviet nuclear-tipped IRBMs and MRBMs into Cuba in 1962 -- *almost* a drastic change in the balance brought about by a sudden stealthy increase in the number of Soviet weapons capable of deep strikes against the United States. (The number could have been several times the small Soviet strategic missile force at the time if the Soviets had continued to transfer more missiles from the European theater and we had done nothing to stop them.) The thwarting of that Soviet attempt at a sudden change in the balance has almost too frequently been cited, especially by American participants in the confrontation. (d) The Arab oil embargo in 1973 with all that it revealed of the shifts that had taken place in relative economic power

1

between the users of oil and the producers, and with the prospects it
presented for a huge transfer of capital from users to producers.

(e) The collapse of the Shah and the loss of any substantial American or
Western combat presence within reach of Soviet invasion routes through
Northwest Iran with all that it made visible of the decline in Western
power that had been taking place since the British withdrawal east of
Suez and the American failure to replace them.

It is quite likely that in the next 20 years we will see some
similar discontinuities or breakthroughs. (a) The Soviets might, for
example, after accumulating key components in secret, rapidly deploy a
substantial ballistic missile defense. (b) It is conceivable that NATO,
which has been eroding, might come visibly to an end -- perhaps as the
result of a Soviet incursion on a flank of NATO which split the Alliance
or as the result of a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf to which NATO
had no adequate response. There are other examples.

2. <u>Cumulatively Revolutionary Continuous Change.</u>

The world can look very different 20 years hence even if there are
no sharp discontinuities or sudden breakthroughs. (a) Economic changes
can proceed at contrasting geometric rates and, through the wonders of
compounding, balances can change enormously in 20 years. It wasn't
until the sixties that the Japanese and other Pacific miracles began to
be noticed. (b) Alliances can crumble steadily for many years with
implications that are only revealed in a crisis or a war. (c) Nuclear
materials and nuclear know-how needed to make fission weapons continue
to be spread by the marketing of civilian nuclear energy. Even though
the spread of plutonium has been slowed somewhat by the actions
initiated by the Ford and Carter administrations, and even more by the

2

poor economic performance of the nuclear energy industry which had greatly overestimated the demand, the spread of fissile materials and know-how hasn't stopped. And the spread of ballistic and other vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons effectively has probably accelerated. (d) Sophisticated technologies for delivering non-nuclear warheads using advanced guidance has continued to spread in the Third World making the environment for U.S. projection of power increasingly hazardous. Finally, (e) technical revolutions affecting our own capabilities too often are confused by the military metaphor of a breakthrough. The best example of steady but cumulatively revolutionary changes in technology that are altering both civil society and military realities are the changes usually labeled the "information revolution". To be quite precise, the changes in the state of the art available to us of weapons delivery at long-range have occurred more or less steadily over the last 30 years. (Or, what amounts to the same thing, there has been a continuing sequence every few years of substantial changes no one of which seems immediately as substantial as the fission revolution.) But the results of these steady or steadily recurring changes over a long period have been revolutionary -- easily the equivalent in military effectiveness of the fission and fusion breakthroughs. We have had improvements of several orders of magnitude from the median inaccuracy of 12,000-30,000 feet as expected in the mid-1950s to the three foot CEPs that are now on the horizon for cruise missiles, not to mention the CEPs of a couple of hundred feet already achieved by ICBMs without midcourse or terminal guidance, and the much lower median inaccuracies already achieved in ballistic missiles with terminal guidance such as the radar-guided Pershing II or the even more accurate optically guided cruise missiles. Since for purposes of destroying a point target by

3

blast, an improvement in accuracy is worth the cube of an improvement in
yield, this now familiar example plainly illustrates a revolution
without the visibly spectacular breakthroughs that marked the Manhattan
Project and the development of the H-bomb.

One other example illustrates, as the next section of this note
will suggest, the sometimes paradoxical problems for policy posed by
cumulatively revolutionary gradual changes as distinct from sudden
massive changes. This has to do with the sequel to the Cuban missile
crisis: a slow, steady, publicly visible, and in the end very
large, increase in the absolute numbers of Soviet weapons capable of
striking deep in the United States and their great relative increase
compared to the number of American weapons that could strike at the
Soviet Union. By the end of the 1970s this slow change had drastically
transformed the balance between the US and the Soviet Union and
undermined some of the basic assumptions of NATO strategy.

3. <u>Cumulatively Revolutionary Gradual Changes Paradoxically May be</u>
   <u>Harder to Cope With Than Sudden Changes.</u>

This paradox is illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis and its
sequel. The U.S. government did rise to the challenge presented by the
transfer of IRBMs and MRBMs and jet fighter-bombers capable of delivering
nuclear weapons deep in the United States. As we boasted, the other
fellow blinked. He took them out. On the other hand, though the rapid
and hidden attempt by the Soviets to change the balance didn't work, the
slow public change in the balance did. We did something about the
first. We hardly noticed the second. And when we did we elaborated
splendid reasons for not doing anything about it. It was, as Roberta
Wohlstetter calls it, "a slow Pearl Harbor".

4

[L.C.]

In important respects our reaction, or rather our essential failure to react adequately, to the cumulative revolution in precision and control has been similarly disastrous. The changes in the technologies of precision and control that are becoming available to each side call for large changes in doctrine and strategy. But our strategy is still mainly premised on the technology of the late 1950s when delivery inaccuracies were expected to be enormous, and the destructiveness of nuclear weapons matched the enormous areas of uncertainty as to where weapons would land. Our strategy is still based on the expectation of worldwide conventional war that would rapidly become a global nuclear war involving the prompt destruction of a very comprehensive list of targets; and we find it hard to let go of the declaratory doctrine of mutual assured destruction in spite of the tangle of absurdities it leads us into. Our major allies in Europe, even more than we, have moved toward the view that any substantial conflict with a Warsaw Pact country -- nuclear or non-nuclear -- would mean a total loss of control and the worldwide destruction of civil society. Moreover we have lagged in establishing a clear consensus in the Alliance, in the Administration and in the Congress that we need the precision now possible in order to field active defenses and selective offenses that are effective with non-nuclear weapons and adequately discriminate as well as effective with nuclear weapons of confined effects. And we continue to lag in fielding the capability for keeping destruction under control and directing military force to political ends throughout potential conflicts. Meanwhile, the Soviet military are evidently more conscious than we are that these changes constitute a potential revolution in military affairs exactly opposite to assured destruction and that they call for new strategies and doctrines.

5

Strange as it may seem offhand, the failure of the democracies in
this respect has something to do with the fact that the change has been
slow and continuous. At no point in time has it seemed to offer a
dramatic and obvious challenge, like the A-bomb or the Cuban missile
crisis. Nor ever to require a basic rethinking of strategy. If we are
going to think, it seems democracies need a very plain challenge.

4. Implications for Policy.

How can we cope with the apparently intractable problem of sharp
discontinuous changes? How do we deal with the subtler problem of the
usual neglect in a democracy of slow continuous change which is
cumulatively drastic. It is clear that we need to think of forces that
are more flexible, less totally reliant on existing Alliance arrangements
and on the past state of the art. Which is only to say that we need
forces that can adapt to change. And as long as we stay at such a level
of abstraction, it is hard to say more. However, some indications of
how to make it more concrete are contained in the illustrations of both
discontinuous as well as continuous change.

The difficulty in reacting to continuous change is that governments
tend not to notice them, and especially not to notice their implications
for strategy. The primary remedy then is to search out such trends that
can have a major effect on the success or failure of our strategies of
defense, and to analyze the likely consequences of continuing change.
Thought has to substitute for the jolt on which we depend to stimulate
thinking. That is the principal purpose of study on an integrated long-
term strategy.

However, a glance at the illustrations of sharp discontinuities
suggests that choosing the kind of flexibility we need to handle such

6

sudden changes is not unrelated to the sorts of studies required to
adapt to and use continuous change. In most of the examples, the
sudden discontinuity appeared to be sudden, rather than just a large
change in a short time, because of a prior neglect of some steady more
continuous changes that had preceded the discontinuity. The oil embargo
was preceded by years of an increased but hardly noticed peacetime
dependency of the industrial powers on oil which at the time when NATO
was first formed hardly figured in the peacetime economies of any of the
countries other than the United States. The collapse of the Shah was
preceded by a long period in which the British were steadily withdrawing
not only east of Suez but west of Suez as well, and in which the
changing economic and political power relations and instabilities in the
Gulf were neglected by the United States and the other Western powers.
Even the most famous breakthrough in technology, fission, was preceded
by a sequence of advances in subatomic physics which made the
possibility of fission visible to people like Leo Szilard who were
capable of the imaginative leap. (These advances were gathering swiftly
enough for Szilard to propose to his fellow physicists at the end of the
1930s that they stop publishing some of them because of their potential
for use by the Nazis.)

In short, some sharp changes are sudden only if we are not paying
attention to the continuous or at least frequent smaller changes that
could make visible the prospect. This applies to the crumbling of
alliances as well as to technological change. Sudden massive changes
which have immediate disastrous or beneficial effect seldom come
unannounced by prior, continuous or smaller changes. The hard problems
are working out the implications of changes on the way.

7

JUL 2 1987

(LC)

ISSUES BRIEF

June 19, 1987

INF VERIFICATION

At Reykjavik in October 1986, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to a global limit of 100 warheads on longer-range INF (LRINF) missiles for each side, with none in Europe. (LRINF missiles include U.S. Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Soviet SS-20s and SS-4s.) The 100 missile warheads would be deployed in Soviet Asia and on U.S. territory respectively. President Reagan has noted that verification would be facilitated if the Soviets were to accept a global zero outcome for LRINF missiles. This is the long-standing preference of the U.S. and our allies, and the U.S. will continue to seek Soviet agreement to it.

Deep reductions in the total number of LRINF missile systems, such as the U.S. has proposed, would significantly reduce the Soviet nuclear threat to NATO -- if the Soviet Union fully complies with them. But verifying compliance with such an agreement on these mobile missiles will pose difficult challenges.

The U.S. has three basic verification objectives for an INF arms reduction agreement:

* First, to ensure confidence in the agreement;

* Second, to deter violations by increasing the risk of detection; and

* Third, to permit quick and unambiguous detection of any violations, thereby providing timely warning of a potential or actual threat to Allied security.

To achieve these objectives we seek to establish an effective verification regime for treaty-limited systems and their related infrastructures, and to establish an effective mechanism to deter prohibited production, storage or deployment. Negotiation of these verification provisions must occur concurrently with negotiations of other INF Treaty issues.

The United States has proposed a six-element regime to help us achieve these ends:

First, provision for the use of, and non-interference with, National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. This includes a

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requirement for the broadcast of engineering measurements on missile flights, a ban on encryption, and a ban on concealment measures that impede verification.

Second, specification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited systems may be located (called Designated Deployment Areas and declared facilities), and prohibitions on their presence elsewhere unless in authorized transit. This is essential since the systems to be limited by an INF treaty are mobile and otherwise might be located virtually anywhere.

Third, reciprocal exchange of a specified, comprehensive set of baseline data related to treaty-limited systems and their support facilities and equipment.

Fourth, reciprocal updating of these data. Since the inventories will be changing, it is essential that the data be updated.

Fifth, specialized procedures for destruction, dismantlement and conversion of LRINF systems, including on-site inspection. On-site inspection will be required at the specified destruction sites to confirm the elimination of missiles, launchers, and specified launch-related support equipment.

Sixth, on-site inspection/monitoring initially to verify baseline data and subsequently to ensure continuing compliance with the treaty limitations. This element is supported by four types of on-site inspection plus monitoring provisions included in the U.S. draft treaty: (1) an initial comprehensive inspection to confirm the baseline data; (2) inspections to verify the elimination of systems reduced under the provisions of the Treaty; (3) short-notice inspections at U.S. and Soviet "declared" facilities; and (4) short-notice inspections at other U.S. and Soviet facilities; and continuous presence to monitor the permitted residual levels of treaty-limited systems. This fourth set of measures includes continuous monitoring of certain critical U.S. and Soviet facilities for the production, final assembly, repair and storage of treaty-limited systems.

No verification regime can provide complete assurance that the permitted residual missile inventory is not exceeded. However, supplementing our National Technical Means (NTM) of verification with a comprehensive verification regime with clearly defined, stringent verification obligations would help make it more difficult for the Soviets to have an illegal inventory. At the same time, a treaty that reduced NATO's military capabilities would be unsatisfactory if it lacked effective verification measures to confirm a parallel reduction in Soviet military arsenals. We, therefore, are determined to ensure effective verification of Soviet compliance with such an agreement.

VERIFICATION IN AN AGE OF MOBILE MISSILES

Kenneth L. Adelman

One of the areas of arms control that the American people feel most strongly about, opinion polls consistently show, is verification. Exact numbers vary, but polls generally indicate that about 80 percent of the public disapprove of arms agreements that cannot be effectively verified, and I think rightly so.

However, the American attitude toward verification is a bit paradoxical. On the one hand, we seem to care very much about it. On the other hand, we sometimes tend to take it for granted.

Verification is one of those fields where we have become, to some extent, victims of our own success. It took quite a number of years to persuade the American people and Congress that satellites and other electronic intelligence could make possible arms control agreements that otherwise would be beyond our reach. Such methods are referred to euphemistically in arms control treaties as each nation's "national technical means" of verification.

The use of satellites to verify arms control agreements was probably the single most important breakthrough in arms control in the 1960s and 1970s. It made feasible the SALT agreements of the 1970s. Up to that time, the Soviet obsession with secrecy, and the refusal of the Soviet Union to permit overflights of Soviet territory or on-site inspection in any form, made such arms limitation agreements unwise, if not impossible.

However, now that Americans have become convinced of the supposedly wondrous things we can do with our reconnaissance satellites, it is sometimes difficult to persuade them that these tools have some real limitations. There is much misinformation in the public domain concerning the capabilities of satellites.

Verification more difficult

My message this afternoon may therefore strike you as a bit surprising: Today it is tougher, not easier, than it was ten years ago to guarantee effective verification of arms control agreements we may sign with the Soviet Union.

Why? Basically three reasons.

* First, technology. Owing to advances in technology, nuclear weapons systems today are becoming smaller and more mobile and hence a lot more difficult for satellites to find, much less track.

* Second, Soviet noncompliance. While we have always understood that the Soviet Union was capable of violating agreements, the strong presumption in the 1970s was that it was unlikely that the Soviet Union would violate arms control agreements.

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agreements. However, we now know that the Soviets are capable of violating arms control agreements--in fact, we know that they are engaging in serious violations of major arms agreements at this very moment. Consequently, in negotiating future agreements, including their verification measures, we have to take the real prospect of Soviet noncompliance into account. Soviet noncompliance is a big problem, for which we do not yet have an entirely satisfactory answer.

o Third, increasing Soviet concealment and deception. A number of Soviet violations involve forbidden forms of concealment. In general, we have seen an increasing pattern of concealment and deception. Improvements in technology only exacerbate this problem.

## Underlying problem of Soviet secrecy

The basic, underlying problem in all this is the continuing Soviet obsession with secrecy. Despite all the talk under Gorbachev about a new "openness" or glasnost in Soviet society, the Soviet regime remains today as secretive as ever. What we have seen from the Soviets thus far in this respect is for the most part a change in rhetoric rather than a change in policy. Soviet secrecy continues to be one of the major barriers to getting effective arms control and remains a de-stabilizing influence in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Add to all this the fact that today in our START proposals we are trying to get at more meaningful measures of strategic capabilities. We are attempting to reduce the total number of missiles, the number of warheads, and the throwweight of missiles--factors that directly affect the strategic balance. And we are going for deep reductions. But all this puts added demands on verification.

So here we stand, over a decade and a half since the SALT process got underway. Rather than seeing an easing in the difficulties of verifying arms agreements, we find that verification is becoming harder and harder to achieve. Let me say more about the three trends I mentioned.

## Problems of size and mobility

First, the move to smaller, more mobile systems.

Whatever else you might say about the SALT agreements of the 1970s, many of the verification challenges they posed were simpler than those we face today, because the era of the SALT accords was also the era of fixed, silo-based missiles.

-3-

Indeed, SALT was in part the product of a coincidence of technologies. First, there was the development of improved national technical means of verification, including the use of satellites. Second, there was the emergence of the silo-based ICBM as the key weapon in both the Soviet and the U.S. arsenals.

The whole logic of SALT was based largely on the idea of counting fixed missile silos using satellites. The approach of the United States during SALT was to control what we could effectively verify. The easiest thing to verify, it turned out, was not the number of missiles or the number of nuclear warheads the Soviets had, but the number of launchers or silos from which these missiles would be fired.

From the standpoint of verification, silos were a good unit of account, because they were easy to keep tabs on. Missile silos are essentially holes in the ground. Holes in the ground stay put. They take many months to build. They cannot be moved around at night. They cannot be driven down the highway to a new location a hundred miles away. You can keep an absolute count on them.

## Weaknesses of SALT

That was the strength of using silos. But there were also weaknesses. From the standpoint of meaningful controls on strategic arsenals, silos were a poor choice. Why? Because controls on silos gave you only very indirect controls on the actual size and power of nuclear arsenals. A silo can hold a missile with one warhead, or it can hold a missile with ten separate, independently targeted warheads. By replacing a one-warhead missile with a higher throwweight ten-warhead missile you increase your firepower tenfold without increasing the number of silos. Further, some silos could be reused, indeed the Soviets have practiced reuse of silos.

So by controlling the number of silos, you were not really controlling the growth of nuclear arsenals very effectively.

That is part of the reason why under SALT you did not get the kind of arms control I think the American people supposed they were going to get when SALT I was signed in 1972. Since the signing of SALT I, the Soviets have actually managed to increase the number of strategic weapons in their nuclear arsenal by a factor of four. That is hardly minor growth. Even just since the signing of SALT II in 1979, the number of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons has roughly doubled. The qualitative upgrade in Soviet forces has even been greater than the increase in the number of weapons.

Now we face a new problem, and that is the move toward mobility. Today both sides are moving increasingly--the Soviets faster than the U.S.--toward small, mobile nuclear weapons. Right now the Soviets are deploying or near to deploying two major mobile

-4-

ICBMs--the SS-25 and the SS-X-24. The SS-25, I should point out, also happens to be a violation of SALT II.

Though we are not quite as far along as the Soviets are in this process of moving toward mobility, we have on the drawing board now the proposed rail-garrison basing mode for our MX missile and the small ICBM, or Midgetman, which is also designed to be mobile.

## Formidable problems for arms control

Mobile missiles like these--and other mobile systems, like cruise missiles--are considerably less vulnerable to attack than the silo-based missiles of yesterday, which is one reason why both sides tend to prefer them. However, mobile missiles are also much harder to monitor. Unlike silos, mobile launchers can be moved around frequently and at night. They can be far more easily concealed. They are difficult to count, because you don't see them all at once. You have to remember that in exercising surveillance on the Soviet Union, we are observing a vast geographical area, a nation eleven time zones wide, covering one-sixth of the earth's land-mass surface.

All this poses formidable problems for arms control. One reason our START proposal includes a ban on mobile missiles is that it would be far simpler, by orders of magnitude, to verify a ban on such strategic systems that it would be to verify compliance with numerical limits.

Americans expect technology to be constantly advancing, constantly making their lives easier. But that is not necessarily the case with arms control verification. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s progress in satellite reconnaissance made verification easier. Now progress in weapons system design is making verification more difficult.

This trend is not all bad. On the one hand, smaller, more mobile systems are harder to monitor, let alone keep track of, and thus harder to verify. On the other hand, from the standpoint of arms control theory, such systems are potentially more stabilizing because they are more survivable. A major theme of arms control theory has always been the promotion of stability--which means the promotion of a situation in which neither side has an incentive to go first in a crisis. It means a de-emphasis on vulnerable first-strike capable forces and an emphasis on survivable retaliatory forces. Small, mobile, survivable systems may contribute to stability even as they complicate our efforts to design verification provisions for new arms control agreements.

-5-

Old assumptions

The second major trend I mentioned is Soviet noncompliance.

Fewer than ten years ago, the almost universal assumption in
this country was that the Soviet Union had every incentive not to
violate its arms agreements with the United States. Just the chance
that the United States would detect a violation would be enough, it
was said, to deter the Soviets from cheating. As Harold Brown,
President Carter's Secretary of Defense, told the Senate Armed
Services Committee in testimony on SALT II in 1979:

In assessing the adequacy of verification we must also
consider the likelihood that the Soviets would be tempted to
cheat on the limits of SALT II. In most areas, the chances of
detection are so high that the issue of the utility of
cheating would never arise. My view is that the Soviets would
find little advantage in attempting to exploit those other
areas where our verification uncertainty is greater.

In defending SALT II, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance told the
Senate Armed Services Committee much the same thing:

I think if one takes a look at what they [i.e., the Soviets]
have done with respect to agreements in the arms control area,
one comes to two conclusions. They will push ambiguous
language to the limit. On the other hand, they will abide by
clear straightforward language and carry it out.

The working assumption in those days was two-fold: first,
that the Soviets would be deterred from violating arms agreements by
the mere fact that the United States could detect such violations;
and second, that the consequences for the Soviets of violating these
agreements would be so grave that they never would attempt it.

Unambiguous violations

Neither contention has proved out.

Take the 1972 ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty is often considered
the jewel in the crown of arms control, the central achievement of
the SALT process. No one could have mistaken the seriousness with
which the United States regarded the ABM Treaty when it was signed.
And yet in the early 1980s, we detected a large phased-array radar
under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. By virtue of its
location and capabilities this radar--several football fields across
and many stories high--is a blatant violation of the ABM Treaty. It
violates a key provision covering such radars, which our negotiators

-6-

spent hours and upon hours of hard bargaining to pin down. No one could mistake this violation; and no informed person today disagrees with our judgment that the Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation. Indeed, recently the House of Representatives voted unanimously, 418-0, to declare the Krasnoyarsk radar to be illegal under the treaty. There is nothing ambiguous about it.

Or take SALT II. SALT II, which the United States and the Soviet Union made political commitments to observe, forbids either side from deploying a second "new type" of ICBM. It defines a new type--among other parameters--as differing by 5 percent in throwweight of an existing type. In addition to their declared new type--the new mobile SS-X-24--the Soviets, as I have mentioned, have begun deploying the mobile SS-25, a missile with about twice the throwweight of its predecessor, or 20 times the permitted increase--a clear second new type and a clear violation.

SALT II also forbids the encryption of telemetry to impede verification, but the Soviets have been encrypting missile telemetry heavily. Indeed, encryption for some time has been more than 90 percent. These are not ambiguous cases.

So much for the first contention--that our capacity to detect violations would deter the Soviets from committing them. Such capacity has not deterred. The Soviets have violated arms control treaties; in fact, we have instances of noncompliance on almost every major arms agreement we have with them.

But what of the second contention--that the Soviets would be deterred from cheating by the strong U.S. response? In 1979, Secretary Vance told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

> [The Soviets] know that if they violate the [SALT II] treaty, the consequences are very serious, not only in terms of the fact that we could terminate the treaty if there was a serious violation of the treaty, but second, the effect that this would have on how they were viewed in the world, and their relationships with others, including our Allies, and those in the nonaligned world as well.

Well, let me tell you. The news is out that the Soviets are violating these treaties, and I have not yet heard the predicted outcry from the "nonaligned world." On the contrary, it is hard enough to get our own Congress to respond sensibly and constructively to the problem of Soviet noncompliance.

## Congress and SALT

In 1982, President Reagan made a political commitment not to undercut SALT II as long as the Soviets did not undercut it. SALT

II, remember, was never ratified. It failed to gain ratification largely because it was a flawed agreement in the first place. In addition, it would have expired by now on its own terms. On top of all this, the Soviets began to undercut it. They are seriously violating key provisions of the agreement, provisions which were declared by the agreement's proponents in 1979 to be central to the treaty. In a press conference in April of 1979, President Carter said that the Soviets would know that any violation of SALT II would be grounds for the United States rejecting the treaty.

And yet President Reagan's May 1986 decision that the United States would no longer be bound by this unratified, expired, flawed, and violated agreement has been resisted by Congress every step of the way. And this despite the fact that we have shown the Congress in detail, in careful analyses, why this move does not harm the United States, why indeed it will serve our security.

The President has declared that the United States will no longer abide by SALT and the House has voted again and again to force him to do so. Indeed, the argument has even been made in the halls of Congress that the President was contradicting his own no-undercut policy--even though this policy was always conditioned on the assumption that the Soviets would themselves not undercut the agreement. Congress wants the United States to abide selectively by an unratified and expired agreement that the Soviet Union has chosen to violate. So much for the strong, unambiguous U.S. response to Soviet arms control violations that was predicted in 1979.

Not that this problem was unanticipated. As long ago as 1961, the present Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Fred C. Ikle, wrote an article about the problem of arms control compliance for *Foreign Affairs* titled "After Detection, What?" That article was written before we had signed a single arms agreement with the Soviet Union. Several agreements and--in recent years--many violations later, we still do not have an adequate answer to that question, and Congress, unfortunately, isn't helping.

## Increasing concealment and deception

Finally, there is the problem of detection itself, and the increasing pattern, over the past couple of decades, of Soviet concealment and deception. Some of these instances of concealment involve actual violations of agreements, as is the case with telemetry encryption and the concealment of the association between the SS-25 and its launcher. Others do not necessarily involve explicit violations, but they still make the job of verification more difficult. As Amrom Katz has observed, we have never found anything that the Soviets successfully concealed.

-8-

Note that deliberate, orchestrated deception of the outside world has been a constant of Soviet history and indeed Russian history. The Potemkin village has been an enduring motif. In 1944, Vice President Henry Wallace visited the Soviet Union and stayed briefly at a mining camp in Kolyma, the notorious site of labor camps in the Soviet Union where literally millions suffered and perished. During the visit, the Soviets sent the prisoners away, dressed the prison guards up in peasant clothing, shined the place up, and Wallace came back with glowing reports of mining life in the socialist paradise. He was neither the first nor the last foreigner to be deceived.

## Verification and the open society

There is a change that would solve all these problems, of course, and that is if the Soviet Union were to become a genuinely open society. If the Soviet Union were a truly open society, we would not need satellites to verify arms agreements--just as the Soviets do not need satellites to verify our compliance with arms control. (They have The Washington Post, The New York Times, Aviation Week, and a host of other independent publications--not to mention the Congressional Record--to help them with the job of verifying U.S. compliance with arms treaties. Obviously, we have no comparable independent sources on the Soviet side.) Indeed, if the Soviet Union were a truly open society, I doubt we would find ourselves at odds with the Soviet government. I doubt the Soviet government would be pouring 15 to 17 percent of that nation's GNP into military hardware and military activities, attempting to intimidate the surrounding world into submission. If the Soviet Union were an open society like Britain or France or West Germany, I doubt we would have anything to fear.

But it is not. It is not an open society, and we must remain clear about this fact.

Today we hear a lot of talk of "openness" from the Soviet Union. We should be wary of it. The moves that the Soviets have made in the direction of openness--the release of some dissidents, the greater coverage of negative news in the state-owned press, the limited measure of cultural loosening that observers report--we should welcome all this. But we should also be wary.

Much that the Soviet Union has done has been calculated to gain maximal publicity for minimal concessions. By and large, it is the most famous dissidents who have been released, while literally thousands of others remain in camps, prisons, or psychiatric hospitals. Remember that over thirty years ago Nikita Khrushchev released thousands, and yet the basic nature of the system did not change.

-9-

Glasnost and arms control

So far, moreover, glasnost has had no real impact on arms control. Take a matter as simple as military budgets. The United States publishes its military budget in great detail. The Congress debates the U.S. military budget in great detail. In 1985, that budget came to about $250 billion. Our best estimates suggest that in that year the Soviets also spent the equivalent of $250 billion. In that year the Soviets claimed to have spent 20.3 billion rubles on defense. Assuming the official exchange rate of $1.50 per ruble, that comes to about $35 billion--about a seventh of the real total, and a ridiculously small sum for the budget of a military superpower.

Or take the example of chemical weapons. For the past seventeen years, the United States has not produced any chemical weapons. During that same period Soviet production of chemical weapons has gone full steam ahead. The Soviets have extensively upgraded their chemical war-fighting capabilities, with 80,000 specially trained and equipped troops. We have nothing comparable, and in fact Congress keeps postponing and killing funding for new Western chemical weapons absolutely essential to strengthen deterrence against chemical warfare.

But, meanwhile, in addition to producing chemical weapons in large quantities, the Soviets until very recently denied even possessing chemical weapons. Then, all of a sudden, they announced the creation of a facility for the destruction of chemical weapons. That is pretty much how it goes with glasnost sometimes. Having refused to admit that it possesses chemical weapons, the Soviet government then announces that there is a chemical weapons destruction facility--which presumably means there are chemical weapons somewhere to be destroyed. Well, at Moscow, Secretary Shultz proposed to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the two sides exchange visitors to each other's chemical weapons destruction facilities. The Soviets agreed, all right. The problem was that no one on the Soviet delegation could tell us the location of that facility or anything else about it. Such are the trials and tribulations of the new Soviet "openness."

Test of openness

One test of openness will be whether the Soviets are willing to accept the verification provisions we are proposing in the agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces that the two delegations are negotiating now in Geneva. This agreement involves mobile missiles, and all the verification problems that such missiles bring. Our key purpose in these negotiations has been to remove the threat posed to Europe and Asia beginning in 1977 with the deployment of the Soviets' mobile SS-20 missile. In 1981, President Reagan proposed the "zero-zero option" for these

-10-

missiles--global elimination of all longer-range intermediate-range
nuclear missiles. We are at present close to an agreement that
would either radically reduce or eliminate such missiles--the SS-20
and the SS-4 on the Soviet side, and the Pershing II and Ground
Launched Cruise Missiles which NATO deployed beginning in 1983 in
response to the SS-20.

But because of the problems associated with mobile missiles,
we have proposed an extensive verification package--the most
comprehensive ever--which will involve, among other things, not only
the first on-site inspection of Soviet missiles being destroyed, but
a round-the-clock Western presence at the gates of Soviet INF
weapons facilities, as well as other forms of inspection.

A comprehensive verification approach, that goes beyond
satellite monitoring, is not optional with this agreement. It will
have to be more intrusive if the Soviets insist on keeping some of
these mobile missiles than if they agree to eliminate all of them.
It is absolutely essential if the agreement is to be effective. So
a test of Soviet willingness to work toward genuine arms control
with us will be whether the USSR is ready to accept the INF
verification package. Watch the progress of these talks. Arguments
from Moscow to the effect that Washington's insistence on adequate
verification is an impediment to an agreement should be taken as a
sign that glasnost is little more than empty rhetoric.

But how far even these kinds of verification measures can take
us toward genuine arms control remains an open question. On-site
inspection of Soviet territory would be progress. But there is more
to establishing trust than allowing another nation's representatives
to set foot on one's military reservations. We should be clear
about this. On-site inspection is not a panacea for verification
problems. History shows that on-site inspection can be thwarted; it
can be circumvented. During the Second World War, the Red Cross
inspected a Nazi concentration camp, and came back with positive
reports. Remember Henry Wallace's experience in Kolyma. By itself,
inspection is no guarantee. It is necessary. But how much it can
compensate for the gaps left by satellite reconnaissance remains to
be seen.

We should face the facts. In an age of small, mobile weapons,
we are butting up against the outer limits of "national technical
means." We are butting up against the limits of what arms control
can achieve without a fundamental change in the way the Soviets do
business. Already verification requires more than national
technical means; and already confidence in Soviet compliance with
arms control is beginning to require more than any mere verification
package can offer.

In short, there is a direct, practical link between openness
and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of

-11-

verification. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of
what we can achieve in arms control. We can control effectively
only what we can effectively verify. But verification is often
directly limited, in turn, by the degree of openness permitted by
the states that subscribe to an arms control agreement.

Too, there is a clear connection between openness and
international trust, between peace and the open society. Societies
that respect the rights of their citizens, that respect freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom to travel
and to emigrate, freedom of assembly--that defend the rights of
individuals to criticize their leaders and to vote them in and out
of office--such societies also keep their international treaty
commitments. Such societies can be expected to behave in a fashion
that promotes world peace. Such societies do not crave new
territory. Such societies do not menace their neighbors.
Conversely, as President Reagan said not long ago, "... a
government that will break faith with its own people cannot be
trusted to keep faith with foreign powers."

The day of real glasnost, real openness, in the Soviet Union,
may be long distant. We must hope. But we must also ensure, as
long as such a day fails to come, that our own freedom and our
children's freedom and their children's freedom are safeguarded and
secure.

AUG 13 1987

12 August 1987

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Attached are 3 copies of invitational travel orders valid for the Summer Study of the Project on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. I have enclosed travel packets for your use in claiming reimbursement.

Each packet contains a travel worksheet, a voucher and an envelope for return to me. I request that you fill out and sign the worksheet and return it--along with a blank, signed voucher and appropriate receipts (for transportation, lodging, car rental and any other reimbursable expense greater than $25, such as cab fares)--in the envelope. I will then make sure the voucher gets filled out with all the niceties, and I will submit it, mailing you a copy for your information. A check should be forthcoming within a few days after I submit the voucher.

You will be compensated for air travel, up to the tourist fare, for lodging up to the maximum amount designated for the area visited ($67 in San Diego, CA) and for meals at the rate specified for that area ($33 for San Diego, CA). Car rental at the government discount rate will also be reimbursed (please use the orders to obtain that rate when you rent the car), as will taxi fares to and from your residence and within the TDY area (again, they want receipts for individual fares over $25).

I know that Dr. Ikle very much appreciates your willingness to devote your time and energies to this effort. If I may be of assistance, please do not hesitate to call me at (202) 697-4557.

POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

Invitational Travel

Order Number: DSTE75171

Date: 6 AUG 1987
ORC: 3311
Other Travel

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, DC 20006
(081-12-6256)

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

You are invited and authorized to proceed on or about 19 August 1987 from New York, NY, to San Diego, CA, for approximately ten days to consult with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and his staff on Integrated Long-Term Strategy matters. Upon completion of this temporary duty, you are authorized to return to New York, NY.

Travel by rail and pullman, military aircraft or commercial aircraft is limited to the most economical accommodations to satisfy mission requirements as may be determined by the appropriate transportation officer. Travel by privately owned conveyance at the rate of 20.5 cents per mile is authorized. Reimbursement for mileage by privately owned automobile will not exceed the cost of travel by the usual mode. Taxis are authorized in and around the TDY area. Government discount rate rental car is authorized. Travel advances are not authorized.

While enroute and away from your home or place of business on these missions, your actual transportation expenses, including reimbursement for transportation not furnished in kind, will be paid, plus a per diem in lieu of subsistence in accordance with Volume 2 of the Joint Travel Regulation. Receipts and ticket stubs will be required to substantiate your claims for cost of transportation and subsistence for items in excess of $25 (twenty-five dollars).

Submission of a travel claim is required within 15 days after completion of TDY to OSD Travel, Rm. 3B259, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301.

Approved under authority of the Secretary of Defense memo dated 11 July 1972

This travel is chargeable to: 9770100.1120 3311 2101 2102 5171 S49447

REQUESTED BY:

M. E. Hampton
Assistant for Administration
OUSD/P (Ext 78126)

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

Invitational Travel

POLICY

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

REQUESTED BY:

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

Invitational Travel

POLICY

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

REQUESTED BY:

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>AUTHORITY:</td><td>5 U.S.C. 5701-5742, 37 U.S.C. 404-427, and E.O. 9397.</td></tr><tr><td>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:</td><td>Used for reviewing, approving, accounting and disbursing for official travel, SSN is used to maintain a numerical identification system for individual claims.</td></tr><tr><td>ROUTINE USES:</td><td>To substantiate claims for reimbursement for official travel.</td></tr><tr><td>DISCLOSURE:</td><td>Voluntary. Failure to furnish information requested may result in total or partial denial of amount claimed.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>22.</th><th>CLAIMANT'S STATEMENT</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a.</td><td>I have identified on the face of this voucher all travel in connection with leave, delay en route or travel to home or permanent station for personal reasons.</td></tr><tr><td>b.</td><td>I have not claimed any allowances for travel, transportation and/or TDY for which I have or will receive reimbursement from any other agency of the U.S., Foreign Government, or the United Nations, except as specifically authorized by the Secretaries concerned.</td></tr><tr><td>c.</td><td>I hereby assign to the United States any rights I have against other parties in connection with reimbursable charges described herein associated with transportation procured at personal expense.</td></tr><tr><td>d.</td><td>If travel by POC was authorized as more advantageous to the Government I, as owner or operator of the vehicle, was primarily responsible for payment of its operating expenses.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>23.</th><th>REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a.</td><td>Original or copies of all travel orders and amendments.</td></tr><tr><td>b.</td><td>Traveler's copy of transportation requests and MAC authorizations used.</td></tr><tr><td>c.</td><td>Receipts from transportation office for unused transportation request, totally or partially unused carriers' tickets, and unused meal tickets.</td></tr><tr><td>d.</td><td>Receipts from carriers, copies of tickets, or required certifications if cost of transportation is claimed.</td></tr><tr><td>e.</td><td>Receipts for lodgings and any item of expense claimed in excess of $15.</td></tr><tr><td>f.</td><td>Statements of nonavailability (Government quarters, mess and directed mode of transportation).</td></tr><tr><td>g.</td><td>Itemization of actual expenses on a daily basis when claim for reimbursement includes travel on an actual expense basis.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>24.</th><th>DEDUCTIBLE MEALS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">Meals consumed by a member/employee when furnished with or without charge incident to an official assignment by sources other than a Government mess. (See JTR, Vol 1, App. J and Vol. 2, App. D for definition of Deductible Meals.) Meals furnished on commercial aircraft or by private individuals are not considered deductible meals.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>25a.</th><th>SYMBOLS (Use two letters)</th><th>25b.</th><th>SYMBOLS</th></tr><tr><th>MEANS/MODE OF TRAVEL</th><th>SECOND LETTER</th><th>REASONS FOR STOPS</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>FIRST LETTER</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(1) TRNSPN REQ</td><td>T</td><td>(5) AUTO</td><td>A</td></tr><tr><td>(2) GOVT TRNSPN</td><td>G</td><td>(6) BUS</td><td>B</td></tr><tr><td>(3) COML TRNSPN</td><td>C</td><td>(7) PLANE</td><td>P</td></tr><tr><td>(own expense)</td><td></td><td>(8) RAIL</td><td>R</td></tr><tr><td>(4) PRIVATELY-OWNED</td><td></td><td>(9) VESSEL</td><td>V</td></tr><tr><td>CONVEYANCE</td><td>P</td><td>(10) MOTORCYCLE</td><td>M</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>26.</th><th>REMARKS</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>27.</th><th>APPROVED FOR PAYMENT (When required by individual service regulations)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>DATE</td><td>SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED APPROVING/CERTIFYING OFFICER</td></tr></tbody></table>

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>AUTHORITY:</td><td>5 U.S.C. 5701-5742, 37 U.S.C. 404-427, and E.O. 9397.</td></tr><tr><td>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:</td><td>Used for reviewing, approving, accounting and disbursing for official travel, SSN is used to maintain a numerical identification system for individual claims.</td></tr><tr><td>ROUTINE USES:</td><td>To substantiate claims for reimbursement for official travel.</td></tr><tr><td>DISCLOSURE:</td><td>Voluntary. Failure to furnish information requested may result in total or partial denial of amount claimed.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>22.</th><th>CLAIMANT'S STATEMENT</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a.</td><td>I have identified on the face of this voucher all travel in connection with leave, delay en route or travel to home or permanent station for personal reasons.</td></tr><tr><td>b.</td><td>I have not claimed any allowances for travel, transportation and/or TDY for which I have or will receive reimbursement from any other agency of the U.S., Foreign Government, or the United Nations, except as specifically authorized by the Secretaries concerned.</td></tr><tr><td>c.</td><td>I hereby assign to the United States any rights I have against other parties in connection with reimbursable charges described herein associated with transportation procured at personal expense.</td></tr><tr><td>d.</td><td>If travel by POC was authorized as more advantageous to the Government I, as owner or operator of the vehicle, was primarily responsible for payment of its operating expenses.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>23.</th><th>REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a.</td><td>Original or copies of all travel orders and amendments.</td></tr><tr><td>b.</td><td>Traveler's copy of transportation requests and MAC authorizations used.</td></tr><tr><td>c.</td><td>Receipts from transportation office for unused transportation request, totally or partially unused carriers' tickets, and unused meal tickets.</td></tr><tr><td>d.</td><td>Receipts from carriers, copies of tickets, or required certifications if cost of transportation is claimed.</td></tr><tr><td>e.</td><td>Receipts for lodgings and any item of expense claimed in excess of $15.</td></tr><tr><td>f.</td><td>Statements of nonavailability (Government quarters, mess and directed mode of transportation).</td></tr><tr><td>g.</td><td>Itemization of actual expenses on a daily basis when claim for reimbursement includes travel on an actual expense basis.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>24.</th><th>DEDUCTIBLE MEALS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">Meals consumed by a member/employee when furnished with or without charge incident to an official assignment by sources other than a Government mess. (See JTR, Vol 1, App. J and Vol. 2, App. D for definition of Deductible Meals.) Meals furnished on commercial aircraft or by private individuals are not considered deductible meals.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>25a.</th><th>SYMBOLS (Use two letters)</th><th>25b.</th><th>SYMBOLS</th></tr><tr><th>MEANS/MODE OF TRAVEL</th><th>SECOND LETTER</th><th>REASONS FOR STOPS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>FIRST LETTER</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(1) TRNSPN REQ........ T</td><td>(5) AUTO............ A</td><td>(1) AWAITING TRNSPN .................... AT</td></tr><tr><td>(2) GOVT TRNSPN...... G</td><td>(6) BUS............. B</td><td>(2) LEAVE EN ROUTE .................... LV</td></tr><tr><td>(3) COML TRNSPN...... C</td><td>(7) PLANE............ P</td><td>(3) MISSION COMPLETE.................... MC</td></tr><tr><td>(own expense)</td><td>(8) RAIL............. R</td><td>(4) AUTHORIZED DELAY.................... AD</td></tr><tr><td>(4) PRIVATELY-OWNED</td><td>(9) VESSEL............ V</td><td>(5) TEMPORARY DUTY.................... TD</td></tr><tr><td>CONVEYANCE........ P</td><td>(10) MOTORCYCLE...... M</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>26.</th><th>REMARKS</th></tr></thead><tbody></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>27.</th><th>APPROVED FOR PAYMENT (When required by individual service regulations)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>DATE</td><td>SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED APPROVING/CERTIFYING OFFICER</td></tr></tbody></table>

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 5701-5742, 37 U.S.C. 404-427, and E.O. 9397.

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: Used for reviewing, approving, accounting and disbursing for official travel, SSN is used to maintain a numerical identification system for individual claims.

ROUTINE USES: To substantiate claims for reimbursement for official travel.

DISCLOSURE: Voluntary. Failure to furnish information requested may result in total or partial denial of amount claimed.

22.

CLAIMANT'S STATEMENT

a. I have identified on the face of this voucher all travel in connection with leave, delay en route or travel to home or permanent station for personal reasons.

b. I have not claimed any allowances for travel, transportation and/or TDY for which I have or will receive reimbursement from any other agency of the U.S., Foreign Government, or the United Nations, except as specifically authorized by the Secretaries concerned.

c. I hereby assign to the United States any rights I have against other parties in connection with reimbursable charges described herein associated with transportation procured at personal expense.

d. If travel by POC was authorized as more advantageous to the Government I, as owner or operator of the vehicle, was primarily responsible for payment of its operating expenses.

23.

REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS

a. Original or copies of all travel orders and amendments.

b. Traveler's copy of transportation requests and MAC authorizations used.

c. Receipts from transportation office for unused transportation request, totally or partially unused carriers' tickets, and unused meal tickets.

d. Receipts from carriers, copies of tickets, or required certifications if cost of transportation is claimed.

e. Receipts for lodgings and any item of expense claimed in excess of $15.

f. Statements of nonavailability (Government quarters, mess and directed mode of transportation).

g. Itemization of actual expenses on a daily basis when claim for reimbursement includes travel on an actual expense basis.

24.

DEDUCTIBLE MEALS

25a.

SYMBOLS (Use two letters)

<table><thead><tr><th>FIRST LETTER</th><th>SECOND LETTER</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>(1) TRNSPN REQ</td><td>T</td></tr><tr><td>(2) GOVT TRNSPN</td><td>G</td></tr><tr><td>(3) COML TRNSPN<br/>(own expense)</td><td>C</td></tr><tr><td>(4) PRIVATELY-OWNED<br/>CONVEYANCE</td><td>P</td></tr></tbody></table>

25b.

SYMBOLS

<table><thead><tr><th>REASONS FOR STOPS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>(1) AWAITING TRNSPN</td></tr><tr><td>(2) LEAVE EN ROUTE</td></tr><tr><td>(3) MISSION COMPLETE</td></tr><tr><td>(4) AUTHORIZED DELAY</td></tr><tr><td>(5) TEMPORARY DUTY</td></tr></tbody></table>

26. REMARKS

27.

DATE

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="2">INFORMATION REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>AUTHORITY:</td><td>5 U.S.C. 5701-5742, 37 U.S.C. 404-427, and E.O. 9397.</td></tr><tr><td>PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:</td><td>Used for reviewing, approving, accounting and disbursing for official travel, SSN is used to maintain a numerical identification system for individual claims.</td></tr><tr><td>ROUTINE USES:</td><td>To substantiate claims for reimbursement for official travel.</td></tr><tr><td>DISCLOSURE:</td><td>Voluntary. Failure to furnish information requested may result in total or partial denial of amount claimed.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>22.</th><th>CLAIMANT'S STATEMENT</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a.</td><td>I have identified on the face of this voucher all travel in connection with leave, delay en route or travel to home or permanent station for personal reasons.</td></tr><tr><td>b.</td><td>I have not claimed any allowances for travel, transportation and/or TDY for which I have or will receive reimbursement from any other agency of the U.S., Foreign Government, or the United Nations, except as specifically authorized by the Secretaries concerned.</td></tr><tr><td>c.</td><td>I hereby assign to the United States any rights I have against other parties in connection with reimbursable charges described herein associated with transportation procured at personal expense.</td></tr><tr><td>d.</td><td>If travel by POC was authorized as more advantageous to the Government I, as owner or operator of the vehicle, was primarily responsible for payment of its operating expenses.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>23.</th><th>REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>a.</td><td>Original or copies of all travel orders and amendments.</td></tr><tr><td>b.</td><td>Traveler's copy of transportation requests and MAC authorizations used.</td></tr><tr><td>c.</td><td>Receipts from transportation office for unused transportation request, totally or partially unused carriers' tickets, and unused meal tickets.</td></tr><tr><td>d.</td><td>Receipts from carriers, copies of tickets, or required certifications if cost of transportation is claimed.</td></tr><tr><td>e.</td><td>Receipts for lodgings and any item of expense claimed in excess of $15.</td></tr><tr><td>f.</td><td>Statements of nonavailability (Government quarters, mess and directed mode of transportation).</td></tr><tr><td>g.</td><td>Itemization of actual expenses on a daily basis when claim for reimbursement includes travel on an actual expense basis.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>24.</th><th>DEDUCTIBLE MEALS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">Meals consumed by a member/employee when furnished with or without charge incident to an official assignment by sources other than a Government mess. (See JTR, Vol 1, App. J and Vol. 2, App. D for definition of Deductible Meals.) Meals furnished on commercial aircraft or by private individuals are not considered deductible meals.</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>25a.</th><th>SYMBOLS (Use two letters)</th><th>25b.</th><th>SYMBOLS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">MEANS/MODE OF TRAVEL</td><td colspan="2">REASONS FOR STOPS</td></tr><tr><td>FIRST LETTER</td><td>SECOND LETTER</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(1) TRNSPN REQ</td><td>T</td><td>(1) AWAITING TRNSPN</td><td>AT</td></tr><tr><td>(2) GOVT TRNSPN</td><td>G</td><td>(2) LEAVE EN ROUTE</td><td>LV</td></tr><tr><td>(3) COML TRNSPN<br/>(own expense)</td><td>C</td><td>(3) MISSION COMPLETE</td><td>MC</td></tr><tr><td>(4) PRIVATELY-OWNED<br/>CONVEYANCE</td><td>P</td><td>(4) AUTHORIZED DELAY</td><td>AD</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>(5) TEMPORARY DUTY</td><td>TD</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>26.</th><th>REMARKS</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="2">26. REMARKS</td></tr></tbody></table><table><thead><tr><th>27.</th><th>APPROVED FOR PAYMENT (When required by individual service regulations)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>DATE</td><td>SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED APPROVING/CERTIFYING OFFICER</td></tr></tbody></table>

[L]

**AUTHORITY:** 5 U.S.C. 5701-5742, 37 U.S.C. 404-427, and E.O. 9397.

**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** Used for reviewing, approving, accounting and disbursing for official travel, SSN is used to maintain a numerical identification system for individual claims.

**ROUTINE USES:** To substantiate claims for reimbursement for official travel.

**DISCLOSURE:** Voluntary. Failure to furnish information requested may result in total or partial denial of amount claimed.

22.

CLAIMANT'S STATEMENT

23.

REQUIRED ATTACHMENTS

24.

DEDUCTIBLE MEALS

25a.

SYMBOLS (Use two letters)

25b.

SYMBOLS

REASONS FOR STOPS

<table><tr><td>(1) AWAITING TRNSPN</td><td>AT</td></tr><tr><td>(2) LEAVE EN ROUTE</td><td>LV</td></tr><tr><td>(3) MISSION COMPLETE</td><td>MC</td></tr><tr><td>(4) AUTHORIZED DELAY</td><td>AD</td></tr><tr><td>(5) TEMPORARY DUTY</td><td>TD</td></tr></table>

26. REMARKS

27.

DATE

INTER-OFFICE MEMO

SEP - 4 1987

DATE: 28 August 1987

TO: Distribution
FROM: J. J. Martin

SUBJECT CILS Report Schedule

Attached is the schedule for publication of the Commission report and supporting volumes, as agreed to by the Commissioners present at the Summer Study on August 28 and the Working Group Chairmen. The current plan is to publish a two-volume report in December 1987 that will have the imprimatur of the Commission and Working Group supporting reports in March 1988 that will be coordinated with and consistent with the Commission's report, but that will not have been reviewed and approved in detail by the Commission. The two-volume Commission report will consist of:

* Volume I - the report of the Commission, per se (about 40 printed pages).

* Volume II - summaries of each Working Group report (each summary to be 20-30 printed pages).

Attachment

Distribution:

A. Armstrong
Z. Brzezinski
R. Chandler
G. Claytor
W. Clark
D. Epstein
A. Goodpaster
P. Gorman
C. Herzfeld
F. Hoffman
J. Holloway
S. Huntington
F. Ikle
J. Keeley
H. Kissinger
P. Kozemchak
J. Lederberg
A. Marshall

Col. R. Rosenkranz, USA
H. Rowen
B. Schriever
D. Seligman
Col. J. Sullivan, USAF
J. Vessey
A. Wohlstetter
C. Wolf

August 28, 1987

COMMISSION REPORT SCHEDULE
(INCLUDING WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES)

SEP 17 COMMENTS ON AUGUST 27 DRAFT TO DR. IKLE AND DR. MARTIN
SEP 18 WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES TO DR. IKLE, PROF. WOHLSTETTER, DR. MARTIN AND WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN FOR REVIEW
SEP 22 DRAFT COMMISSION REPORT RECEIVED BY COMMISSIONERS
SEP 29 COMMISSION MEETING
  o REVIEW DRAFT COMMISSION REPORT
OCT 2 MR. SELIGMAN START EDITING DRAFT COMMISSION REPORT
COMMENTS BACK TO WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN ON WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES
OCT 16 REVISED COMMISSION REPORT TO PRINTER FOR PRELIMINARY PAGE LAYOUT, WORD PROCESSING AND GRAPHICS WORK
REVISED WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES TO MR. SELIGMAN FOR EDITING
OCT 30 EDITED WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES TO COMMISSIONERS (AND WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN)
WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES TO PRINTER FOR PRELIMINARY PAGE LAYOUT, WORD PROCESSING AND GRAPHICS WORK
NOV 12-13 COMMISSION MEETING. AGENDA:
  o REVIEW/APPROVE COMMISSION REPORT (EDITED GALLEY PROOF)
  o REVIEW/APPROVE WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES (EDITED GALLEY PROOFS)
  o FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BRIEFING?
NOV 20 COMMISSION REPORT AND WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES TO GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
DEC 10* (APPROX) PUBLISH COMMISSION REPORT AND WORKING GROUP SUMMARIES
DEC 31 WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN SEND SUPPORTING VOLUMES TO DR. IKLE, PROF. WOHLSTETTER, DR. MARTIN AND OTHER WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN FOR REVIEW
MAR 1, 1988 EDITED SUPPORTING VOLUMES TO GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE FOR SETUP AND PRINTING

* Exact date to be determined in coordination with the Government Printing Office

Assistant to
the President
for National
Security Affairs

6 OCT 1987

OCT 8 1987

**Co-Chairmen**

Dr. Fred C. Ikle'
Professor Albert J. Wohlstetter

**Members**

Ambassador Anne Armstrong
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. W. Graham Claytor, Jr.
General Andrew J. Goodpaster
(USA, Ret.)
Admiral James L. Holloway, III
(USN, Ret.)
Professor Samuel P. Huntington
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Dr. Joshua Lederberg
General Bernard A. Schriever
(USAF, Ret.)
General John W. Vessey
(USA, Ret.)

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

At our last meeting we discussed how we might
brief members of Congress on the Commission's key
findings. For Chairmen and ranking members of
the key committees, we agreed we should seek to
set up small individual office visits rather than
invite these senior members for a dinner.
However, I have since canvassed several of you on
the idea of using our scheduled dinner on
November 12th to invite other selected members of
the relevant committees, including, in
particular, some freshmen Senators. This
proposal found favor, and I would therefore
suggest that you try to keep the evening of
November 12th on your calendar for this event.

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-2000

(202)697-8360

30 NOV 1987

DEC 1 1987

Co-Chairmen

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K. Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Enclosed is the latest draft of the
Commission Report, for your consideration.

Enclosure

Members

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301-2000

(202)697-8360

FI 11-30

# THE COMMISSION'S MAIN POINTS

To deter war and to support American foreign policy in protecting our interests, future US military strategy will have to:

* Diversify and strengthen our ability to bring discriminating, non-nuclear force to bear where needed in time to defeat -- and so to deter -- aggression.

* Base our conventional and nuclear posture on a mix of offensive and defensive systems: strategic defense to help deter nuclear attack; and a capability to respond to aggression by conventional counter-offensives deep into enemy territory.

* Emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning -- the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out Soviet nuclear attack designed to eliminate our strategic forces.

* Maintain capabilities that can, in all circumstances respond to and thus deter a massive nuclear attack intended to eliminate our nuclear forces. But against lesser threats, recognize that threatening a nuclear "exchange" that would devastate both the Soviet Union and the United States is not a reliable deterrent.

## The Next Twenty Years

Our strategy must be designed for the long term, to guide both force development and arms negotiations. Armaments the Pentagon chooses today will serve our forces well into the next century. Arms agreements take years to negotiate and remain in force for decades.

The next twenty years are likely to bring drastic changes: additional major powers, particularly Japan and China, will play a large role in the world; lesser powers will acquire advanced weaponry, thereby diminishing the military advantage of both US and Soviet forces; and arms agreements may have a sizable impact on forces.

A key military problem (faced since the end of World War II) will continue to confront us: how to be able to defeat -- and thus deter -- aggression against our major interests at fronts that are much closer to our adversaries than to the United States. Disparities in distance and disparities in forces will be only part of the problem. Our difficulties will be exacerbated by uncertainty about whether allies or friends would grant us bases, overflight and other access and would join us in defense preparations in response to ambiguous warning.

The problems of reach and access may worsen as a result of Third World conflicts that jeopardize our bases, or permit Soviet expansion in areas previously free of Soviet forces. Our means for influencing Third World conflicts -- whether in distant regions or nearby in Central America -- are now highly inadequate, in large part for lack of a national consensus on both ends and means.

Advanced technologies -- especially nuclear technology -- have for four decades played a large role in our defense effort. Although the Soviets have deprived us of our nuclear advantage, the American nuclear guarantee must continue to deter both nuclear attack on our allies and an overwhelming conventional attack. For non-nuclear war, military technology will change substantially in the next twenty years, and as long as Soviet military research exceeds ours it will continue to erode our qualitative edge on which we have come to rely.

3

An Integrated Strategy for the Long Haul

* To help defend our allies, or to defend our interests abroad, we cannot rely on threats that we expect would also provoke our own annihilation if carried out. In peacetime, a strategy based on such threats would undermine support for national defense. In a crisis, reliance on such threats could fail catastrophically for lack of public support. We must have militarily effective responses that can limit destruction if we are not to invite destruction of what we are defending.

* We and our allies need to exploit emerging technologies of precision and control that can provide our conventional forces with more discriminating, yet effective capabilities for destroying military targets. And our forces have to become more versatile to cope with more varied dangers.

* Control of space is becoming increasingly important to our security. Our space capabilities, so critical for military communications and intelligence collection in wartime, must be made survivable or replaceable, particularly in a conventional war.

* In the future, even more than in the last forty years, the United States will require allies who share the risks and burdens of the common defense.

* To help protect US interests and allies in the Third World, we will need a range of flexible instruments:

  -- security assistance at a higher level and with fewer legislative restrictions;

  -- versatile mobile systems, minimally dependent on overseas bases, that can deliver precisely controlled strikes against distant military targets; and

  -- allies that help us defend common interests beyond national boundaries.

* In special cases where important interests are at stake, the United States should provide assistance to anti-Communist insurgents who are resisting a regime imposed from the outside. The Free World will not remain free if its options are only to stand still or retreat.

4

* Our arms control policy should balance conventional and nuclear reductions. Elimination of the large Soviet advantage in tanks, artillery, and other heavy equipment would help both NATO's security and the Soviet economy, and hence be in the interest of both sides. In order to deter violations, any arms agreement must be backed by an industrial mobilization capacity and the political will, in the event the agreement breaks down, for effective responses including a surge in defense production.

* US defense budgeting in the years ahead should be guided by the strategic priorities outlined, permitting economies in some areas and providing needed enhancement in others. A two-year defense budget and less fluctuation in spending will offer opportunities for greater efficiency. If, in the near future, the US defense budget should fail to grow or should decline, it would be better to protect continued growth in advanced non-nuclear munitions, conventionally armed tactical missiles, sensors and communications systems, while taking cuts in the large "platforms" (ships, aircraft) and other elements of our force structure.

* Given the perils and uncertainties facing our nation and our allies in the future, the Commission strongly recommends, commensurate with our growing economy, a steady moderate budget growth for defense and security assistance.

11-30

# I THE CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Defense planning in the United States has centered for many years on a grand strategy of extraordinary global sweep. The strategy can be stated quite simply: forward deployment of American forces, assigned to oppose invading armies and backed by strong reserves and a capability to use nuclear weapons if necessary. Resting on alliances with other democratic countries, the strategy aims to draw a line that no aggressor will dare to cross.

The durability of this strategy seems astonishing. American forces have now been deployed in Central Europe for 40 years. They have been in the Republic of Korea for 35 years. The Atlantic Alliance has now outlasted all multilateral peacetime alliances in history.

The strategy has had considerable success. All the alliance members are still free countries. Soviet forces have not attacked Western Europe, and North Korean forces have not again attacked South Korea.

But the strategy has also had some setbacks. Soviet power has bypassed the lines we drew and has pushed into Southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. In a world that is less bipolar than it once was, the strategy has not helped much in dealing with hostile countries (Iran, for example) outside the Soviet bloc. In Europe itself there are signs of severe strain. The alliance has not succeeded in matching Soviet conventional forces on the continent, and for many contingencies our threat to use nuclear weapons against them has become progressively less credible in light of the growth in Soviet nuclear forces.

The Commission is not proposing to replace the strategy. We believe in forward deployment of American forces, in backing them with strong reserves, and in retaining the nuclear threat to help defend our allies. But we also believe that the strategy needs to be brought into line with contemporary realities.

I-2

The revised strategy proposed in these pages is meant to sustain our defense planning for many years into the future -- at least twenty -- and not just because alliance policy is slow to change. Our planning has to be long-term because many of the decisions on defense policy cast shadows far ahead. The Pentagon must choose today among armaments that will be in service well into the next century. Arms control agreements may remain in force for decades.

As the Commission's name indicates, we believe that the revised strategy has to be more "integrated" than it is today. That term refers in part to the never-ending trade-offs in defense planning. It also refers to the powerfully ramifying effects of our core ideas, which call for credible responses to aggression (and not a posture based on threats of indiscriminate destruction). Those ideas should affect the way we procure weapons, the priority we assign to scientific research, the policy we adopt on arms control, and the force structures we create. A major purpose of this report is to lay out the interconnections between these decisions.

In committing to a long-term perspective, the Commission is not assuming the permanence of today's international security environment. Indeed we believe that the environment may change dramatically. Twenty years hence America may confront new enemies, may require new kinds of alliances, may face threats from new kinds of weaponry. Some possible changes are already discernible at several points on the strategic landscape, and six in particular seem worth focusing on:

### (1) The Rise of Japan and China.

In some measure, military power must reflect economic power. Japan's economy is now the second largest in the world and is apt to continue growing at a moderate rate. In the decades ahead, a major question affecting the strategic balance will be whether Japan exercises its option to become a major military power. Even if it does not, it may be influencing the strategic environment

I-3

simply by its investment decisions. A Japanese decision to help in the development
of Soviet technology and Siberian resources, for example, would have serious
implications for Western security.

Over the next 20 years, the Chinese economy may well grow faster
than those of the United States, Europe, or the Soviet Union. By 2010 China may
have the world's third largest economy (replacing the Soviet Union), and it may well
be a superpower. The Soviet Union would probably remain one too, at about the
same level as the United States, although large uncertainties attach to its future.

A world with three or four major powers would confront American
strategic planners with a far more complicated environment than does the familiar
bipolar competition with the Soviet Union. In any such multipolar world, US
security policy might have to cope with the massive uncertainties implied in shifting
coalitions.

(2) Soviet Economic Difficulties.

The USSR's persistent economic difficulties, and the regime's efforts
to deal with them via "restructuring," are huge imponderables for US defense
planners. Whatever the long-term prospects for growth, progress in the near term
is apt to be modest. It is also unclear what, if anything, higher rates of economic
growth imply for Soviet foreign policy. Confessing to many uncertainties in this
area, the Commission generally believes that the nature of the Soviet government
does not encourage the conclusion that a healthier economy implies a more benign
foreign policy.

What about the possibility that continuing economic weakness
might mean a reduced Soviet threat? In the long run, the Soviet leaders would have
difficulty maintaining the country's present military position if restruc-
turing fails. Still, nobody can be sure how even a resounding failure would play out.
Failure might drive the regime to seek legitimacy in military successes abroad, or

I-4

even to try gaining control over foreign resources. In combination with the USSR's
growing ethnic tensions, economic failure might even trigger efforts by some parts
of the Soviet empire to loosen their bonds. Nobody can say where such efforts
would lead.

(3) Changes in Military Technology.

Technology applicable to military systems has been changing
rapidly and will continue to do so over the next 20 years, primarily through further
advances in micro-electronics and related sensor and information processing
technology. These developments have been associated with missiles and other
delivery systems capable of great precision, even at greatly extended ranges. The
new technologies will strengthen the case, made elsewhere in this report, for a
deterrence posture based on discriminating non-nuclear responses to aggression
(as opposed to postures relying on threats of vast destruction).

The precision associated with the new technologies will enable us
to use conventional weapons for many of the missions once assigned to nuclear
weapons. The new technologies will also work to strengthen defense against
invasions. Particularly important in this connection is the prospective use of "low
observable" (Stealth) technology in combination with extremely accurate weapons
and improved means of locating targets. In the years beyond 2000, this
combination will provide new ways to stop invading forces far away.

But high tech is not an American monopoly. Since the mid 1960s,
Soviet gains in nuclear weapons have gradually deprived us of a strategic edge that
served to compensate for the Soviet advantage in conventional forces threatening
Western Europe. In light of this revolutionary change it became increasingly
important for the Atlantic Alliance to counter the Soviet numerical superiority in
tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and other equipment with the
broad qualitative superiority of its systems. But this qualitative advantage is by no

means guaranteed. The Soviet military establishment is striving to match or even
surpass our weapons technology, unless we increase our research efforts.

Soviet military industry is already producing vastly improved armor for tanks. They have made enormous strides in submarine technology. The Soviets are sure to stay well ahead in their research on chemical and biological weapons, where they have practically no US competition. Particularly ominous is the large and rapidly growing Soviet capability for military use of space in support of conventional warfare, in combination with vigorous research efforts on several technologies relevant for space warfare.

Soviet qualitative gains might be extended for several different reasons. At present, for example, the United States has fewer scientists and engineers working on military technology. The US budgets for defense research and procurement have been lagging the Soviet effort and may continue to do so. Western controls on the transfer of technology to the East (whose effectiveness has varied over time) might again become less effective. Based on past performance, we can assume that any agreements on the testing of military technology would be observed far more rigidly in the United States than in the Soviet Union.

Thus far, at least, the United States has led in developing many of the most important new technologies. But the Soviet military establishment has done better than the United States at making them militarily useful. They have been quicker than we at adjusting their doctrine, planning, and operations to make effective use of the technologies. The Soviets appear to have concluded that they imply revolutionary changes in the nature of war.

### (4) The Worldwide Diffusion of Advanced Weapons.

The relationship between the major and minor powers will change in the early 21st century. Today the United States and the Soviet Union can often decisively influence the military postures of smaller states by their decisions on

I-6

whether or not to make weaponry available. In the years ahead, weapons production will be much more widely diffused, and the superpowers (especially if there are three or four) will have less control over transfers of advanced systems. Many lesser powers will have sizable arsenals. These will often include chemical weapons and short-range or even medium-range missiles. Several large and mid-sized countries that used to be listed among the less-developed countries -- India, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia -- are now building sizable industrial bases.

The next twenty years could also see the production of atomic bombs in many countries not now possessing them. Because of the spread of nuclear reactors and the technology associated with nuclear energy, many countries are in possession of fissile material or the means to produce it. This creates a potential for some of the countries, including several that are relatively poor and less industrialized, to build an arsenal of a dozen or more atomic bombs. Early in the next century, forty or more countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere will have the technical wherewithal to build such arsenals within a few years. Today, fortunately, nearly all countries other than the five avowed nuclear powers hesitate for political reasons to launch programs for building nuclear weapons. (A few go about it furtively and slowly.) In some regions, increasing arms competition or a prolonged war might undermine this extraordinarily important restraint and might even bring to a shattering end a half-century of non-use of nuclear weapons.

The advanced weapons of the lesser powers will make it riskier and more difficult for the superpowers to intervene in regional wars. US ability to support its allies around the world will increasingly be called into question. Where American intervention seems necessary, it will generally require far more cooperation with Third World countries than has been required in the past. Furthermore, American efforts to influence military outcomes in regional wars will

I-7

call for use of our most sophisticated weaponry, even though this could compromise
its effectiveness in a US-Soviet war.

(5) Deteriorating US Access

One long-term trend unfavorable to the United States concerns our diminishing ability to gain timely agreement for access, including bases and overflight rights, to areas threatened by Soviet aggression. The trend has been severely reducing our ability to project power into the Third World. The total number of "base sites" -- facilities or installations that have been at least partially US-funded and are used regularly by US forces -- has dropped from over 450 in 1947 to less than 120 today. Our current basing agreement with the Philippine government expires in 1991, at which point our stay there becomes subject to a one-year termination notice. The 1979 Panama Canal treaty and its supporting agreements specify that all US bases in the area be closed down by 1999. Both treaties allow for renegotiation, but it is far from certain that we will be able to retain a base support structure in either country. Our bases in the Azores are also in jeopardy.

The United States will continue to need bases because the need will remain to deter or defeat aggressors at distant points overseas -- typically at points much closer to our adversaries than to us. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, which begins with the advantages of greater proximity, has enormously strengthened its airlift and sealift capabilities; in addition, it now meets little resistance to its overflights in many parts of the world. Reversing the relationships of the Fifties, the Soviets could now put forces into the Middle East quite rapidly, while the United States cannot do so without more help than we have been getting from our allies there.

(6) The Emergence of New Threats in the Western Hemisphere.

The absence of significant security threats close to home has helped free the United States to play a global military role in the years since 1945. This situation might change if more pro-Communist regimes come to power in the Hemisphere. If the Sandinista regime consolidates its power in Nicaragua and continues to receive Soviet support, hostile Communist regimes might gradually become established elsewhere in Central America -- for example, in El Salvador, Honduras, Panama. Any such trend could be expected to endanger control of the Panama Canal and threaten the political stability of Mexico. These developments would force the United States to divert far more of its foreign policy resources and defense assets to the Caribbean region, resulting in a reduced American role in NATO.

One overriding message in all these imponderables is the need for flexibility in the US defense posture We will presumably continue to face Soviet challenges at various points on the periphery of the USSR, but we must also expect a broader range of challenges in the Third World. The demands on US forces may well be growing at a time when budgetary constraints are limiting the size of those forces. The challenge will be to defend our interests in many different places, even while lacking the resources to offer much peacetime support to our allies and friends there. Plainly the Pentagon must give preference to more mobile and versatile forces -- forces that can deter aggression by their ability to respond rapidly and discriminately to a wide range of attacks.