Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ambassador Freeman
9:30 a.m. 11/17/69

K said the earlies we could have the visit of the Prime Minister would be Jan. 27 and 28. The President won't be back from California until the 10th and it will be the State of the Union week. The Turkish P. M. will be coming the following week but the President will see Wilson anyway. Before it is announced, K wondered when the State Dept. should be brought into this. Freeman said he would phone London and then the State Dept. would become involved.

K said he could assure the P. M. that the visit would be successful and warm.

K said he would plant a question on the other point.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Blake - Paris Embassy
9:35 a.m. 11/17/69

Blake was asked to attend meetings to discuss the forthcoming trip of Pompidu. Blake hadn't see anything particular which the President or K wanted to say and wondered if there was anything. K said no. Blake thought he would is say that we hope to make the trip pleasant and productive, maximum exposure to the American people, we are not in any way pressuring for ceremonial functions -- asked if that would suit K. K said that would be fine. Blake could tell them we want to make the trip a success and they should feel comfortable about it. Blake indicated that they were being pressured by different groups to attend banquets. K said we should ask them what they want to do and not to let any group say they are representing us.

By KHU NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
Prof. Doty

11/17/69 9:35 a.m.

D was sorry about Saturday--he felt that he wasn't very useful, but there was someone else in the room, and he really couldn't talk. K said that was all right--he thought D was watching the football game.

K said he wanted to tell D how much he appreciated the letter. K said he took the liberty of showing it to the President, and it is this kind of letter that makes our policy possible. D said he remembered even Moynihan saying he never gets a single letter from the academics.

K said they would meet at 6:00 on Wednesday; D should come at about 20 minutes of 6:00. D said that was good; he thinks this is a crucial business, and people who can still offer advice should. K said he was going to bring Larry Lynn in on it. The more K can keep DuBridge out of it, the better; he doesn't add anything for the President. But K is eager to keep that contact.

D said how are things in Helsinki? K said he hadn't heard anything yet. K doesn't know if he expects anything spectacular. K is going to the Hill for a briefing tomorrow. K said the Kleiman news stories are as wrong as they can be. D said, you mean Finney? K said yes, but Kleiman too. What he says is just nonsense. What good is what we call option 3? K said you cannot talk about MIRVs without freezing new deployments. K said if they have to trade some of their present force for untested MIRVs, we have got a problem. K thought Bundy's article was good. K said the trouble with Hoopes (?) is that he isn't at the right level to know what's going on. K said there was just too many lacuna there. Basically K doesn't think Hoopes and we disagree all that much. K said basically, what's the disagreement?

K asked if D was going to the Galbraith thing tonight. K said he was going to try to get to it. D said great. But K said he is in tough shape about it. K said if he can't come he hopes D will tell Galbraith of his firm intention of getting there. K said for some reason he is fond of this cynic. G keeps chopping K up, but K is fond of him.

K said he thinks on CBW we are moving in the right direction; he will bring D up to date on that on Wednesday.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/64

Telecon
Professor Doty

9:55 a. m. 11/17/69

K said he had a talk with Joe Kraft. He had dinner with him Friday night and mentioned in passing and not for his use, that he had a letter from Doty's people and how touched K was by it. K said when he spoke of polarization, he should mention that the two sides ... what was lacking was movement in the intelligence community. Kraft called K and said that he(Kraft) had talked to some of Doty's people about the letter and they were upset that Kraft knew about it. K wanted to let them know that he would not mention it to any newspaper men and considers Kraft a personal friend and one of us. Doty said he would speak to them today. K said for Doty to give them his word that he would not take advantage of the letter. It will not be released.

By: KHL NARA, Dated: 5/13/64

Telecon
Governor Harriman
10:00 a. m. 11/17/69

K discussed Harriman's speech over the weekend and the reaction the press had. Harriman said he has made more friends and Nixon has helped him. Harriman said he would send him a copy of the speech. K wanted H to know that his door remains open. Harriman didn't understand why the Administration didn't follow some of the advice of the people who got us into this great difficulty.

K mentioned H's invitation to dinner and asked if it would be convenient for H on Tuesday, Nov. 25. Harriman said that would be fine. They settled on 8:00 but K hoped that H would understand if he was a few mintues late.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon
Walt Rostow

10:10 a.m

11/17/69

K said that he hand't heard from Johnson City in so long, we were getting worried, and probably rightly so, that they were mad at us. Rostow said he would be in Washington on Dec. 29. He had agreed to talk to the American Historical Association on Asia and would be in again in January. K said he would like to get him here before that on a consultant basis and Rostow should have his secretary work on some dates.

K wanted to say one word about a part of the speech which K heard rumors that they were unhappy about. K wanted R to know there was nothing in the pre-inaugural correspondence with Hanoi. It was a general expression that we would negotiate seriously and said nothing to them about waiting until Nixon got in office before negotiating. Rostow said he couldn't speak for Johnson on this. Some observations were made that were untrue which made it painful. He was speaking about the passage in the beginning of the speech. R said only Nixon can make judgments as to what political requirements he has. R said he would never second guess a President who bares this responsibility. R would say that the speech wasn't wholely accurate. It did not throw Johnson into a state to make war but it had its costs. Rostow felt it was unfortunate. R repeated that only a President can decide what to do. He hated to see the relationships between the two President's strained. K agreed and said we have so many enemies that we should do what we can for our friends. Leaving aside the passage, K thought that the speech would have pleased Rostow. Rostow was pleased and said he has been around the country and deeply believes that the people will sweat it out under the new leadership. Rostow said he didn't know enough about the situation in Vietnam to know whether the President is doing right or wrong. The thing that worries him most is the damage of political fragmentation. K said it was a religious article at Foggy Bottom that unless you have humilitated Thieu, the day hasn't been worthwhile. R thought they were losing politically in Vietnam and they will lose in the U.S. if the President holds steady. They only way they will survive is if they hang together. The political elite has to stand together. R said that he has been talking around the country and despite the media, people of this country have enough sense and character that they don't want to walk away from it.

Rostow said that Valentine Zorine(sp) of the Soviet Academy of Science will be visiting the President Johnson tomorrow and would like to know if there was anything K wished to be passed on. K said anything the President could say to support Nixon and also that when the chips are donw, the people will support their President. This would be a great opportunity for the Soviet Union to get the war wound up and move to our basic relationships. Rostow said that would have been his instinct. K asked him again to make arrangements to come down in early December.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon
Philip Farley

10:25 a. m.

11/17/69

Farley said in going ahead with the backstop work following NSDM, they had only run into one issue. His feeling is it should be shouldn't be an issue though. It depends on what the NSDM means. It has laid out that we are committed to one component(?) on Safeguard. (Missed a couple of sentences here). Farley thought this seemed dubious to him and K agreed. It would be a mistake to and he would oppose it. Farley said we can protect the full thing.

K asked if he could see whatever it is that goes out. He said mentioned that Jerry Smith had shown him something before he left which was now OBE. Farley said he was preparing a number of backup statements and K's people have been sitting in on it. K will get a copy via LDX but he will also make sure everyone knows K is interested in the ABM part.

K said the briefing would be at 9:00 on the Hill. It will be a larger group and Helms will brief then Farley will explain how we prepared for it and Farley will sum it up.