July 13, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL STIKKER, JUNE 26, 1962.

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I made an appointment with Stikker--whom I had never met before--by calling his secretary. I met with him in his office in Paris.

Stikker opened our conversation by voicing very strong complaints about American policy. He called it "irregular," "tricky," and "unprecedented." He said that ever since 1958, the United States had not really led NATO. As Secretary General of NATO, he found it impossible to tell what our objectives were. NATO was being deluged with visitors from Washington, each of them with a slightly different version of United States policy. He had the impression that Rostow, Eindhoven, Rowen, Nitze, Finletter and General Taylor, to name just a few, were each presenting a different point of view. How could he tell what Administration policy was? For example, General Taylor seemed to affirm the importance of tactical nuclear weapons, while Eindhoven and Rowen had told a number of people that we really should pull tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe.

I asked him what he meant by "tricky." He said that most of our proposals seemed to have a different character from their surface meaning. For example, the United States had presented in the middle of May a proposal for a NATO-based MRBM force which he simply could not understand. He did not know whether it meant that we did not or did want a force. While proposing a sea-based MRBM force we also said that there was no military requirement

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for it. In addition, NATO should pay for it as a supplement to its existing
program. How could he possibly defend a proposal before the NATO Council
which its sponsors considered militarily useless and which involved heavy
additional expense? Moreover, he had never seen the proposal before it
had been formally made.

Another example was that during what he thought was a presentation
of American nuclear capabilities, Finletter suddenly introduced proposals
to increase conventional forces by a heavy percentage. Stikker had had his
staff study these proposals and found that they involved an increase in
the military budget of many member countries by as much as fifty per cent.
Aside from the fact that the goals stated in this proposal were clearly
infeasible, this procedure put him, as Secretary General, into an impossible
position.

Another example was on the occasion of his visit to the President
in February. He found himself presented with a paper called the "Stikker
Plan" which in fact had been worked out by Finletter and Strauss. What
did we hope to accomplish by such methods? Though he did not disavow
the plan when he spoke with the President, he was forced when he returned
to Europe to tell other members of the NATO Council the true facts. If
we wanted to whittle down the authority of the Secretary General, this was
our business, but it was certainly not conducive to NATO cohesion.

He went on in this way, criticising the Rostow presentation to the
NATO Council, the Bowie plan for NATO forces, and so forth. However, I think
the basic flavor is already apparent from the above. I have not seen any
of the documents to which he referred and I am therefore not passing judgment
on what he said. Nevertheless, it is apparent that he is not using his influence
to support our objectives. All of the comments quoted above were offered
gratuitously in response to my query about the future of NATO. Much of Stikker's

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attitude may reflect wounded vanity--a conviction that he is not being adequately consulted. This seems all the more unfortunate as Stikker by instinct is probably an ally of ours. Consideration might be given to how he could be brought into our planning at an earlier stage, so that he could carry the ball for us in the NATO Council more effectively.

August 24, 1962

Secretary General Dirk Stikker
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny
Paris XVI, France

Dear Mr. Stikker:

I still remember with great pleasure our conversation in your office a few weeks ago. Unhappily, I have been out of town almost constantly since my return from Europe, and have, therefore, been unable to thank you before this for your courtesy in seeing me. I would like you to know how encouraging it is to have a man such as you in a position with major responsibility for guiding the destiny of NATO.

Another purpose of this letter is to inquire about your schedule during your visit to the United States in October for the Conference on Atlantic Partnership.

As you know, I am connected with the Center for International Affairs, of which Robert Bowie is Director. The Center attempts to combine basic research in foreign affairs with advanced study by experienced individuals. For this purpose, it invites participation by senior civil servants, scholars and military personnel from this country and abroad to engage in seminars and research. I am enclosing two booklets which explain our program in more detail. Our Third Annual Report also describes the Fellows and Faculty for the 1961-62 academic year, and I will send you a list of the 1962-63 personnel as soon as it is available.

I wonder whether it would be possible for you to meet with our Fellows and Faculty during your visit here. I would like to suggest Friday afternoon, October 5th. While any time during the afternoon would be convenient for us, the most pleasant occasion would be for you to join us for luncheon at 12:30, to be followed by a seminar from 2:00 p.m. until 3:30 or 4:00. All of our meetings are off-the-record and very informal, so that you need not prepare anything in particular. Our general format is to have the speaker give a talk for about forty-five minutes to an hour, with a similar period afterwards for discussion and questions.

If Friday, the 5th, is not possible for you, we would be delighted to have you come either in the morning or afternoon of October 10th or any subsequent day if your schedule permits it.