DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

NARA, Dato

TELCORN

Secyl Morton/kissinger

10:05 a.m.

3/17/71

M: Is there anything I should know about Williams thing that came out of the appointment on Micronesia thing? I wasn't in these discussions. I came out of the blue.

K: I am sorry.

M: Neither I or Secy. ______ knew anything about it.

K: There was no intention to keep you out of it.

M: I think I know what you want him to do.

K: We don't want the State Dept. to run it and it was a problem of interdepartmental machinery. We wanted someone appointed by the President but that you would have access to.

M: I just don't want to make a slip. He is not like every other ambassador. He will report to me or the President.

K: Not taking away existing responsibilities.

M: It's a good idea because our office of territories is nothing.

K: He is a hell of a good fellow.

M: He is coming here, in a few minutes.

K: No change of changing jurisdiction (?).

M: Just ask your boys to let us know.

K: Probably because of the change in administration in your building. We are responsible but probably came from the change in your building.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Lord Cromer/Kissinger

10:12 a.m.

3/17/71

C: I have two messages for the President. One a thank you letter saying how great everyone is about ______. The other is about computers. I will not send them personally but I will send them to Bergsten for your desk as appropriate but wanted you to know they are on their way.

K: I will get them to the President later when he rethrns.

C: I missed you at dinner last night. The first time in some time.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Arguelles/Kissinger
10:16 a.m. 3/17/71

K: I am mortified because I understand due to a slip up you never got a reply to that request. Alex Johnson thought I was getting in touch with you and vice versa. Now he is waiting for your call. My profound apologies.

A: I let you know I was away from Washington until Monday evening.

K: I had it settled a week ago.

A: I will call Alex.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

10:17 a.m.

3/17/71

K: I just wanted to remind you that the Spanish Ambassador would be calling
about their project in Tunisia.

J: That's right.

K: Lopez Bravo sent him in to see me. I sent him to you. I just want to be
sure --

J: I am glad you reminded me because it slipped my mind.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

10:31 a.m.

3/17/71

R: I notice here going through my papers this morning on the protocol on herbicides and tear gas that neither Mel or Packard are testifying. I don't think that's right. It's going to be Nutter. They will have Bundy against us.

K: I think we should get out our senior people. I will call them this morning.

R: Nutter will kill it. Did Mel call you xxx in anguish?

K: About the xxx report?

R: No, because I supported him on --

K: He called me first. I told him the President wanted him to stop giving figures.

R: When?

K: At 2:15 I called him and said the President wanted him to stop giving the figures which Zeigler told you and then he called in the evening.

R: He called this morning and complained. He said I did what the President wanted. I said after you used figures I got word from the WH saying they didn't want me to use figures. He called this morning and said the President said this.

K: If we had let it drop then there'd have been no problem.

R: I didn't use figures.

K: It kept the existing rate which isn't the same as giving the rate month after month. The President is travelling. The President is 100% on your line.

R: I am just supprised that Mel is still --

K: I talked with him twice.

R: On the report?

K: He mentioned something that you didn't give Cambodia enough or the Nixon Doctrine.

R: We referred to the President's section on Nixon Doctrine.

K: I said we had every opportunity to comment and our comments had been

oh

NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

10:31 a.m.

3/17/71

K: (cont) absorbed or worked into yours. We weren't going to domore.

R: I thought the Nixon Doctrine was best in yours.

K: You might check Cambodia. I haven't noticed it.

R: I haven't either. We checked everything with Defense.

K: My people and I didn't have that feeling. It's just something he raised.

R: Fine.

Kissinger Doctrine.

It was referred to the President's sec

I said we had every opportunity to con

the other hand.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

John Chancellor
3/17/71 ca. 11:00 a.m.

K: You are not going to call Mary McGrory and tell her I talked to you are you?

C: No I'm not. Someone else did though.

K: I don't see anyone anymore. Actually I'm not seeing more people -- they're just talking.

C: What happened with our friend Eugene?

K: I don't know.

C: How did you like Tilson Thomas? Did you get to talk to him?

K: No.

C: He's kind of a genius I am told.

K: I liked him, but just to chat with.

C: You think you'll be able to make it Monday?

K: Yes. Will I be told where?

C: I talked with Dave about this. It will be at the Occidental Restaurant, either 12:30 or 1:00. 12:30 is actually a little easier for us.

K: Let's make it 12:30 then.

C: Okay and we try to keep it very discrete so if it's all right I won't come and get you.

K: That's fine; I'll get there myself. Who will be there?

C: Dave Kraslow (LA Times), Allen Otten (Wall Street Journal)

K: I don't know him.

C: He's quite good.

K: I know what he writes; he is good.

C: Dave Broder (Washington Post), Tom Littlewood (Chicago Sun Times), Dick Dudman (St. Louis Post Dispatch), Marty Nolan (Boston Globe) and Elizabeth Drew ( )/

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

John Chancellor
3/17/71 ca. 11:00 a.m.
page 2

K: And it is off the record?

C: Totally, and no one I am pleased to say has every been ______.

K: As long as you don't see White House sources . . .

C: No, if it ever comes out in anything it would be very hidden. We really kx like it to be almost conceptual. We have had a number of people from the White House -- had Finch last time. It's quote helpful for us.

K: So that's 12:30?

C: Yes.

K: 1:00 is actually a little easier for me.

C: Okay, that's fine. There are some who come at 1:00. We'll do that.

K: Good.

C: While I have you on the phone, it came up yesterday in New York "What ever happened to Cuba?" I said I don't know what happened to Cuba. Would there be a story if I decided to look into it? Are those ships gone?

K: Yes, but sometimes they put it back in. The basic thing is that they know what they know what they cannot do and they haven't done it. I think it would be best to leave it along lest we trigger them knto some other move.

C: I see. But you haven't seen signs of some other involvement?

K: No. Frankly, they aren't generous people. As soon as they make an agreement they start nibbling at the edges of it.

C: I see. Okay Henry we'll see you at the Occidental at 1:00 on Monday.

K: 1:00 Monday?

C: Yes.

K: Good.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Moorer/Kissinger

11:07 a.m. 3/17/71 (secure phone)

K: I wanted to check two things with you. I am not sure I understand from Abrams' cable how long they will stay in Laos on the strategically relevant paths. Where 914 branches into 9 and .

M: Abrams has to work it out with Vinh. They are talking about phase 5. Phase 3 will be finished on April 15. Phase 4 will be base area 611. They are on 914 now.

K: Stay for sometime!

M: At least move on down. They will have whatever traffic they have will move (?) behind them. Then Marines will move south.

K: At Muong Nuong if they are west of that they are interdicting south both traffic but east of that the routes are open again. So they should stay west as long as they can.

M: They are working on it now. It's what they have had in mind from the outset. ____ down and concentrate on 611. Come up highway 626 and 911 and get them in a ____ movement.

K: We are trying to keep them in Tchepone area. As soon as we vacate 914 they will move south again.

M: I think everyone understand that.

K: As I look at the daily maps there's a movement southeast and I am not sure they are not following the old plan.

M: The old plan was to get into base 611. The question is whether that ____ that's 914 and 92 and 99 --

K: They ought to stay as long as possible into April if they can in the 914 complex. Otherwise all we will have done except for bodies -- they can go into a crash program in April and move south.

M: I am working up a message to Abrams now.

K: How's the weather?

M: I talked with them last night and feel we will perhaps be able to go this time. We have an extension for 3 days.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Moorer/Kissinger

11:07 a.m.

3/17/71 secure phone

-2-

K: I got it for you over the violent opposition of your boss.

M: He doesn't talk like that to me. I hope we can get it in this picture. The ground cover is diminishing up there. We will do our best to get it off in this period. I understand you had a frustrating meeting yesterday afternoon.

K: I wanted to flush out CIA.

M: I saw holes in their arguement. They are using one intercept and moving it into other areas. They are suspect. They say the enemy is trying to block ______ southwest of Tchepone and they have not even been close to that. They may be practicing deception on us. It will be difficult to get exact figures on it. It's good to have a feel but it's not a precise business. I think DIA has good points you should hear.

K: We will have another meeting tomorrow.

M: I will be back to you.

into April if they can in the one except for bodies -- they will be in the south.

K: How's the weather?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Ellsworth/Kissinger

2:33 p.m. 3/17/71

E: Thank you for taking my call.

K: Listen, you sarcastic thing, when didn't I?

E: But I appreciate it when you do. John Eisenhower was here this afternoon saying that at the dinner table in Key Biscayne there was a discussion about my wanting to leave. Yesterday afternoon a friend said he had heard I would be there in the middle of the summer and wanted to talk to me on private business.

K: I talked with the President and made clear your necessities and preferences. He said he did understand. He would like you to stay as long as you can but if you felt financial necessities to leave he would understand and get you back in during the second term. I hope you understand everyone here thinks you have done a superb job and would like you to stay indefinitely.

E: I appreciate that. My immediate problem is --

K: We have not discussed it with anyone except the President.

E: What I want to ask you to do is to tell Rogers and Laird about this so they get it from you and not rumor mill because obviously the rumor mill is moving. After they have told them, let me know so I can write a letter.

K: As long as I have you on the phone, Laird told me that there was a feeling I was blocking Eagleburger. Will you assure Larry that it's not true and anytime he wants to come back here or any where, I will help him?

E: I don't know why Laird would say that. I haven't heard anything from Larry. As soon as I get a reply from the President or if you know, let me know so I can tell Brosio and my colleagues in advance.

K: What sort of reply do you need? I will tell Rogers and you and he work out who should be notified when.

E: Will you also tell Laird?

K: Certainly. I will tell them both this afternoon. Or let's leave it this way, that I will call you when I have talked with them.

NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Phil Geyelin/Kissinger

2:37 p.m. 3117/71

K: How is my favorite radical editor?

G: I have just caught up to the people you have been seeing.

K: I have been doing the same thing for 15 months but they haven't seen the publicity before.

G: I am just back from Nigeria and I would be glad to tell you about the American foreign policy as seen from the eyes of the Africans. The thing in Lagos was fascinating. Also very sad.

K: Because of Whitney Young or other reasons?

G: That. It was crystallizing into making a lot of sense. My big moment was about to arrive as I had been asked to keep a record and I was going to make the summary statement in the last meeting. Of course, they cancelled the last meeting.

K: There's no one to take his place.

G: No one. They have a guy but he can't fill his role.

K: I have just been asked to see the President. Can we get together?

G: I am wide open. Breakfast or lunch if you are free.

K: Let's do it next Tues for lunch at the Metro. Club or Sans Souci.

G: Sans Souci is fine. It's good for my image.

K: But it will destroy mine.

G: Then we will go to the Metropolitan Club where we don't care.

K: We will re-negotiate that.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger (Secure Phone)

5:06 p.m., March 17, 1971

R: I wanted to talk about the situation in Laos. From television and radio, it looks like we are getting clobbered.

K: It's unbelievable.

R: I had a briefing from the Pentagon, and they said it was working all right.

K: That is my impression. I get a briefing every day. The President has called Moorer; and I read the military reports. Unless these guys are reporting through channels that they don't tell anybody... They all claim things are going exactly as they want them to go. Haig is out there. He called this morning and said the same thing.

R: The fact that it appears we are getting clobbered at the moment doesn't hurt, just so we know the facts. If we are having a problem, it's a hell of a lot better to stay quiet than pretend everything is rosy.

K: I couldn't agree more. The President called Moorer personally. A Colonel briefs me position-by-position daily. But they may be lying to us all.

R: I had a briefing...

K: I saw the text. I thought you handled it beautifully.

R: I didn't get out of line. I said the things we thought were good. I guess we have done everything we can.

K: Maybe Alex told you I got all the intd ligence analysts together about the traffic flow.

R: Doesn't that shake the hell out of you?

K: How they can be in so much disagreement... I can't believe the tonnage figures. In terms of proportion, they are pretty close -- it's only 20 per cent of what went in last year. DIA says they can convert it to tonnage. CIA says the tonnage is much higher.

R: If they are that far apart/...

NARA, Dale

5/26

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger (Secure phone)

5:06 p.m., March 17, 1971

K: One is relying on intercepts; one on sensors. You would think they could put both together and refine it.

R: I don't see how we could do any better. I hope they are telling the truth.

K: The only thing that gives me slight confidence that it is the truth is Moorer called Abrams a half-hour ago. Abrams said this is poppycock.

R: In some ways it has a silver lining. If it is poppycock, in a week or two we can say we can't trust the press. The best thing is to stay quiet for a couple of days.

K: I have to restrain the President on Friday.

R: I wonder why he is having a Press Conference. Why is he doing it?

K: And he'll be on television on Monday. Some maniacs have convinced him of the need for more exposure. I can't see what he can add to what he said already.

R: I think Howard K. Smith was pretty good. It's a different format. He can avoid what he wants to. But a full fledged press conference and then on for an hour?

K: This is an office press conference; it's not televised.

R: That's at least some better.

K: But he tends to ramble on in those.

The
R: On the Middle East, we are positioned pretty well. /Times and the Post had good editorials yesterday. I will now lay off a little bit, to see if we can get them to move ahead on the Suez proposition.

K: I think it will unfreeze a lot.

R: Some criticism now may influence a move in that direction.

NARA, Dato 5/26

5:06 p.m., March 17, 1971

K: If you can hook it to a ceasefire, that would give Sadat a way out.

R: It gives everybody a way out.

K: That's my strong preference. If you could bring that off...

R: The whole purpose is to be sure they don't get the jump on us to clobber us. We haven't done it in a way that is difficult. Interestingly enough, Mrs. Mier's statement and my statement yesterday were not far apart.

K: If that now leads them to go ahead on the Suez, a great thing would have been achieved. If they only have the Suez thing, they are likely to back off that, too. Have we told Smith to stick to that...

R: Yes, we have. Phil Farley was advised by phone of the importance of Part IV to the effect 'it is being forcefully carried out by me. It will be fully and forcefully carried out after full consultation with all delegates.' He was thinking about Semenov and the political advisors going back to Moscow to attend the Party Congress. Gerry was going to take it up before they left.

K: It's very important.

R: I said it was a good idea.

K: So he doesn't spring it while they are gone.

R: Or doesn't wait until Semenov gets back.

K: Wonderful. I saw Jha today -- it was an entirely social lunch. Now that she has won, she wants good relations with us. He mumbled something about interference in their political life.

R: We had a check made of that. There wasn't anything to it.

K: I said from my knowledge of such activities, it would have to be known in the White House and that nothing of that kind is being done.

R: At one point it was said that it wasn't government -- that they were private individuals, but there is no evidence of that at all.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Lord Cromer/Kissinger
5:50 p.m. 3/17/71

K: I have a problem which is 25% personnal and 75% business which I think Annenberg has screwed up between you and me. I would like to be in London for a week in the second half of June. 15% is for personnal reasons but above all I need an excuse for being in Europe that is not professional for doing XXXXX somethings with the President.

C: Have you heard from Annenberg?

K: What I understood was arranged was a function by the English Speaking Union.

C: As it appears.

K: But I can't have an invitation that says if you are in Europe we will have a dinner for you. I need a function that's suitably prestigious to make me go.

C: They are being polite. The invitation is could you come and address a lunch of several hundred people.

K: Could the text be kept out of the paper? I understood there was an official function in memory of Churchill.

C: If there is, I don't know. There was one last year at which an astronaut spoke. Do you want your speech off the record?

K: It has to be because it's hard to explain why I cannot speak on the record here but can in Britain.

C: Then this probably isn't possible because something of this size would be on the record. Perhpas a small party at Chatham House that could be private or something at Ditchley or something like you say but that would be public.

K: I could of course take a vacation in Europe.

C: I don't think there's a problem whatsoever.

K: I don't think anyone would take seriously that I would speak at Chatham House unless there were a function.

C: There might be.

K: But it would have to have credibility here and there.

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

C: There might be. A key requirement should be that it's not for publication.

K: Unless it's on something other than foreign policy. If it's on decision making or something abstract.

C: I think it's rather ____.

K: I don't see why people there would care about how I make decisions.

C: And you don't have time for doing that.

K: A neither possibility would be that I talked to Burt ______ when I was there and said I would come to talk with him. But of course that would raise the bureacratic issue.

C: That wouldn't give you the background you want.

K: Not unless I tell people why I am doing it.

C: If you will leave it in my hands for a day or two I am certain we can devise something custom made like you are looking for.

K: I want the option of doing business over there. That would have to be between you and the Prime Minister and me. No one here knows about that except the President.

C: No problem about that. I will see what I can do and come back with some suggestions.

K: The second half of June would be the best for me.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Clark MacGregor
3/17/71 5:55 p.m.

M: I understand you are sneaking United States Senators in and out of
your office without telling me.

K: You mean McCarthy?

M: Very underhanded of you.

K: You mean Benson?

M: Yes.

K: He just came back from Vietnam. You want to sit in on these things?

M: Yes, I'd like to.

K: I thought you knew about it. It was set up by BeLieu. I thought he
was working for you.

M: He is working for me, but sometimes we are running here and there
in different directions. What I would really like is to have your gal call
mine...

K: He said Vietnamization is a greater success than we thought. Laos
is more successful than Cambodia and he came back touting it like mad.

M: Good.

K: He doesn't know how big the operation is but so what?

M: That's great.

K: He said the impact of both Cambodia and Laos is spectacular. I am
not as optimistic as he is.

M: I think I'll ask him to put his observations he made to you into a speech.

K: I liked him.

M: Yes, and he has substantial experience in Congress. He was here in the 50s.

K: He told me that -- he's a fine man.

M: It would be good if your gal would just tell Kay Humphries and if I can
I'll drop by from now on.

By. NAFA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Adm. Moorer
3/17/71; 6:55 p.m.

K: The President is really going on about these stories in Laos and these stories of helicopter pilots. What is the story? I have been telling him we have no information.

M: That's correct. Some young warrant officer 19 years old might say. . . I talked to the Chief of Staff in Pearl. He says he has an intercept from the North Vietnamese saying that the movements by the South Vietnamese are being conducted in an orderly manner. I was trying to get a copy of that to show you. We don't have any indication of that and, of course, Haig is right there now. I don't blame the President.

K: He wants something to be done about these pilots that are mentioned by name.

M: When Knowles went out there I told him to take it up with the Squadron Commanders -- to explain what havoc they wrought. They were told, I understand, to say nothing.

K: Do you think you could get a message back here that I could show the President tomorrow morning that gives the assessment from out there and what actually is going on. I think that would help an awful lot.

M: Sure. (The following is in answer to a question I did not hear.) Three-day operation around LoLo -- killed 1100 North Vietnamese and lost 66 of their own people.

K: That was partly planned.

M: I will get you a message. It just infuriates me -- these people right write these headlines. I will get you a message directly from Abrams.

K: And there is nothing going on that we have not counted on.

M: That right. This was in the plan. I told you we had message today from Abrams discussing a conversation he had with Lam. I went back to Abrams . . . I told you.

K: No, you didn't tell me.

M: Yes, I did. I had ideas from Abrams that Lam had about coming down through Pass 611. He gave a rough schedule and says it would last until April 15.

K: Oh, yeah!

By NARA, Date 5/26

3/17/71; 6:55 p.m.

M: I don't know how they are going to do it. I know they are going to come into Pass 611 from Laos and the other side. I asked him more questions about it. I will get a message for you in the morning. I will send it before I get over there at 11:00. When I saw the horrible headlines I had someone call MACV headquarters and they said they had no such reports. I will get a message that will bring him up to date. If I ever get my hands on these people, I will wring their necks.

feg

ideas fr
He gave a rc

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin

3/17/71 7:15 p.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

I: On the matter Dave raised as we were leaving, Stevenson's cable had come in and the Secretary had sent an answer by the time I got back in adopting what they recommended from Geneva: to have Ambassador Hill talk with the foreign office and Stevenson and a defense representative would join him. I asked our people to draft another giving the background, some additional thoughts and possible some suggestions and to get in touch with Packard and your people. Who in your shop should they contact? It's a combination of law of the sea, Spain, Ecuador, Brazil...

K: Ask them to let them deal with Colonel Kennedy.

I: I asked them to tie the three things in together with a message to Geneva and Spain and to Brazil, and a paper showing how this ties into Ecuador and the fishing [l. o. s. ?] problem.

K: Good, thank you Jack.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012567
By: CNARA Date: 03/16/71

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

7:25 p.m., March 17, 1971

K: ... After yesterday's good dinner.

D: You mean at the White House.

K: Yes. Well, I know a lot about Irish history.

D: I am sure you do.

K: Antoliy, I have a slight technical problem on Friday.

D: Then we can do it on Monday if you have a difficulty.

K: That's one possibility. No, Monday I already have a lunch which I can't change. Maybe I could meet you at the Embassy on Friday. The President is leaving at 2:25 and it might be a little difficult getting you in quietly.

D: I tell you I would like to make the following suggestion --

K: We can also wait till Monday.

D: I would like to tell you one thing, what is really -- tomorrow I would like to give you in a sealed envelope a new suggestion on a Berlin question.

K: Oh, good.

D: Tomorrow for you it is right to put everything there. My government now will have other questions to discuss in Berlin. You can give it from my Government to the President for the Four Power. You will be in a position to give me a certain kind of reaction before the meeting on the 25th. Then we will propose it and put up to now (??). You can make a translation of this.

K: Yes.

D: Tomorrow.

K: Right. We will call you in the morning. Why doesn't your assistant call Mr. Halperin or Mr. Young?

D: As usual. Then I would ask how we could do it.

K: How should I.....

DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

7:25 p.m., March 17, 1971

D: Just look through it and make a suggestion, maybe you will be in a position --

K: If you are still here Monday, I can probably get you a more thoughtful answer on Monday.

D: Yes, on Monday you probably could.

K: I can't do it for lunch but could do it for dinner.

D: That's all right with me.

K: Let's say dinner on Monday.

D: My place or your place?

K: I don't know if I could arrange a dinner here.

D: Let's say my place then at 8:00 p.m.

K: Then I will be endebted to you for two. If you have a --

D: But on this Monday at 8:00 p.m., but tomorrow I would give you this sealed envelope.

K: The only other question I have, you will not object if I show this to our man in Berlin -- Rush?

D: Very privately?

K: On a very private basis.

D: I am afraid even our Ambassador knows nothing of this, no one knows about it, and if he should --

K: Let me worry about whom I show it to.

D: I understand how you do it.

K: You can be certain it will remain in the Presidential channel.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLASEX
By CNARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

7:25 p.m., March 17, 1971 -- page 3

D: As of now, I have instructions to give it to you for the President for consideration on what you ???? Up to now haven't given to anyone. Would like for you to look at it and make suggestion and then would like to present on the 25th.

K: Let me read it and we will leave it at the moment that I will show it only to the President.

D: Personally I don't mind but you have to warn the President that no one has seen it.

K: Anything that has been given to me has been kept in our channel.

D: Our Ambassador knows nothing about it but he will know about it in a few days.

K: ??

D: Wex If not, we will have a meeting Monday at 8:00 p.m.

K: At your place?

D: That's right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

D: I am sure you do.

K: Oh, good.

K: Yes.

D: Tomorrow.

K: How should I ......

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

7:25 p.m., March 17, 1971

D: That's all right with me.

D: My place or your place?

D: Very privately?

K: On a very private basis.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin

K: ??

D: Max. If not, we will have a meeting Monday at 8:00 p.m.

K: At your place?

D: That's right.

Will call you in the morning. Why doesn't your assistant alperin or Mr. Young?

So, then I would ask how we could do it.

I should I.....

TELECON
The President
3/17/71 7:43 p.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: I talked to moorer and he had talked since my conversation with him at 3:00 to the Chief of Staff out there and says this is one of the wierdest things -- there is absolutely nothing to it. Usually there is some basis for it which has been exaggerated. He said it was a tough fight: 66 ARVN killed and 180 wounded. They killed 1100 of the enemy.

P: Must have been a hell of a battle.

K: He thinks this must have something to do with because they got 270 individual and 20 crew-served weapons. So they are claiming a victory. But in intercepted messages the other side is saying to their headquarters that the South Vietnamese are retreating in good order, and I said to him we can't kid ourselves. He's talked to the First Corps commander, to and to Abrams and they all say this was a planned operation. There were losses...

P: I know that. I don't care about the losses...

K: But it's the same as Hill 31 which was a debacle for the enemy; they also claimed that we were getting whipped. And there is no evidence to back it up.

P: The question is what are we going to do about getting the public relations of this turned around. Laird can't do that; Moorer can't... Are we going to brief someone? Are you going to... I'm not sure you should -- they will be saying the White House is trying to rescue a debacle.

K: If in a week we are still where we are...

P: I know. That's right. I agree. But I want you to be sure to read that article in the Staff word for word...

K: I have read it word for word.

P: There were two men in there who made statements that were very bad. If they were right they should be promoted but if they were wrong...

K: Moorer said he talked to all the heads... Of course you can't guarantee they didn't see anybody running where they were

P: Of course.

K: It's a battle.

P: That's right. But these smart son-of-a-bitching reporters. I really

page 2

NARA, Dale

5/26

think some of them are trying to serve Hanoi now.

K: I believe they have a vested interest in our losing.

P: Put them out on a limb. You briefing tomorrow?

K: There's a group of Republican leaders Colson set up. I'm going to brief them and get Moorer over here.

P: You get Moorer over here and pour it to them. Say this is the most distasteful reporting in history. Don't go out on a limb or it is going to be sawed off. The same was true of Cambodia. The same is true here. Say we are not kidding you.

K: Clark MacGregor is trying to get Benson to say publicly what he said to me today.

P: He was really enthusiastic?

K: Yes, he said he went there very positive about Vietnamization but it went beyond what he expected. If we put it out what he said to me today everyone would say it was the White House doing a brainwashing.

P: What time are you seeing them?

K: 11:00. I'm spending two hours every day with these groups to get the figures. I'm bringing the whole intelligence community in tomorrow to go over the ________. I was trying to find out today about the vulnerability of strategic forces.

P: Has the weather cleared yet?

K: No, but I think in two weeks it's a disgrace . . .

P: There's going to be a new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, I can tell you that. They have no gues, no imagination, nothing. My suggestion about the B-26s -- nothing!!

K: No. They've been doubling the number of gunships. But if it hadn't been for your pushing they wouldn't have done that.

P: I'm tired of having these . . . the AP guy . . . these guys are nuts to talk to the press like that. Who's in charge of the helicopters out there -- some left-winger?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President

3/17/71 7:43 p. m.

K: I don't know but these guys crawl all over the base.

P: I know -- these kids are tired and scared . . .

K: And they want to make themselves look heroic.

P: Just so the South Vietnamese fight.

K: Maybe they are liars but . . .

P: No, I think Moorer is telling the truth.

K: I don't think Abrams and Moorer are liars.

P: They are doing okay -- moving from base to base. But I want you to call Moorer right now and get the strike laid on. Call him right away.
You call me back.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:13 p.m., March 17, 1971

K: Moorer is at a banquet.

P: Don't bother him.

K: I did talk to him this afternoon about it and he thinks they will be able to get it off within the 72-hour authority.

P: Right.

K: We will look at the weather.

P: Come in the first thing in the morning and let me know, I will be in at 8:00 a.m. I think this is a critical moment, after Friday we can't do it.

K: Put off the meeting with Dobrynin till Monday, partly at his request because he is coming in with a big request for Berlin and I need time to study it.

P: We got till Monday then.

K: So if this --

P: I think these reports out about Helicopters Pilots and _________
I think this is a job. Haig better get up there.

K: Haig is there, I will get a message to him but it will be hard to get to him before he gets back tomorrow night. Hanoi radio may be doing this for their own domestic purpose which may be in deep trouble too.

P: Could be.

K: We just haven't had any reports that will substantiate this and usually you have something to substantiate this sort of thing.

P: Okay, Henry.

TELECON 3/21/71 7:30 a.m.
Admiral Moorer
Brought in 3/21/71.

K: Hello.

M: Henry good morning

K: Tom how are you?

M: All right.

K: I've been on the phone half the night with the President who was really upset by these news stories.

M: Yeah, well I imagine so.

K: And wouldn't be quieted down and asked me to call you
well actually asked me to call you during the night and I
didn't see much point in that since there wasn't anything you could
do about it. The first thing I wanted to do was to find out
whether you had any later news and to find what you're going to
in case he calls you that we both know what the situation is.

M: Yeah, well I'm due to have a message here that you asked me to get here in 15 minutes from Abrams

K: Right.

M: And according to the people out there, according to
Abrams the movement of these forces is going in an orderly
fashion and that it is not a rout or anything such as described
in the papers, And I asked them to put this in writing which
they are doing and I imagine I'll be able to get that message
over to you in the next 30 minutes or so.

K: Oh good. That would help.

M: Yeah, okay.

K: And how does this fighting compare to what was around
Hill 31, just to give me a sense of it.

M: It's about the same I think.

K: It's about the same.

M: Yes,

K: And how are the Vietnamese troops doing?

M: They're doing all right so far as I can see. According
to Abrams they are operating in a very orderly fashion. They are
having some very heavy fighting but as you notice the caches of
the other side have gone up over 10,000. So it's tough fighting
for both sides, but it's no rout as described in the paper last
night. This morning the paper kind of calmed down. But I'll get
you that message. Now what's going . . . I understand that

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
 Authority
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELECON
Admiral Moorer
Brought in 3/24/71

page 2

Bunker and Abrams do have . . . and and Van (?) . . . are going
to talk to Thieu tomorrow.

K: Right, about what?

M: About the future operation, exactly what their plans
are in Phase 4.

K: Phase 4 is the one they are in now?

M: They are in between . . . they change. They did have
four phases and they went to three; now they've gone back to
fourth and even five. So I've asked him about eight or nine ques-
tions just to get this in perspective so he is going to get
Bunker and go over and talk to Van and Thieu like they did
before, tomorrow.

K: Right.

M: And I will have that message for you, I am sure, I am
on my way to the office right now and I'll send it right over to
you.

K: Okay. Now how about this air business we were talking
about which the President is also getting pretty restless about.

M: Well it is the same story. The weather. There's no
point in going in there if you can't do a good job and that is
just a thin slice of clouds right over the North Vietnamese
panhandle and I'll give you a report on that here in a few
minutes, the latest report.

K: Right. Do you think you'll get it in before the
expiration of this latest authority.

M: Well we're sure going to try awful hard; I've passed
the word down the line what the situation was back here. And
they understand. The people that are going to do it understand
what the problem is.

K: Yeah, because the President frankly was on the verge
of ordering it last night no matter what happened, even if only
one plane got through. It's obvious that if we do it we should
do it right.

M: Sure, I think so.

K: And having waited this long . . .

M: Well, let me check on it . . . I'll check on that again
but . . . you know, might only be able to do it half or day or

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON
Admiral Moorer

Brought in 3/21/71

something of that kind. But I'll send that report over to you
here in a few minutes.

K: Okay, well, look, on the air business, we ought to do
this when it's right.

M: That's what I think too.

K: And I can hold the fort here.

M: All right.

K: As long as it's within a, you know, well let's see how
it develops. I don't know whether we'll . . . I doubt that
we can extend it much beyond this weekend. In fact it's already
gone way beyond our political game plan.

M: Well I would think that . . . it's been ten days now . . .

K: It's been two weeks.

M: Yeah, two weeks. And we've just got a tough break
on the weather. Although this is that time of year up there.

K: Yeah, no but I just want you to be aware of it that ~~he~~
with the Party Congress coming up and one or two other moves we
wanted to make before that . . .

M: I understand.

K: We're in some difficulty about. Okay.

M: I'll be back with you soon.

K: Good thank you.

M/W F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Autonumber
By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird
3/18/71 9:00 a.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

L: I have now Abram's proposal on withdrawal and the complete
logistics problem, and I wanted to present that to you and the President.
Any time deadline? I would like to make some comments and I think it
would be good if I could do it next week.

K: That's okay.

L: I suggest Wednesday or Thursday.

K: Right, but it's going to be kept in a very small circle.

L: Right. General Abrams, McCain -- he isn't even briefing Al on
it. About eight colonels, General Abrams . . . Tom Moorer and
Knowles. I think we're going to have to look it over, particularly the
logistics part. You have three million tons of equipment that we cannot
leave there. In order to get the ships scheduled -- that's tough. We've
got GAO over there by Congressional mandate at each port on the equip-
ment, 15 inspectors at each port. That part of the program has got to
have some help.

K: My problem is that the talk of withdrawing has got to stop now.
We're going to lose all hope of negotiating if everyone knows the ship
schedules.

L: I'm not the one giving the rates out here. My program was not to
do anything and just keep this through June (?).

K: But then Pierpoint came in yesterday and said to Ziegler that his
colleague Sheafer at the Pentagon said we are going to hold the President
to this schedule.

L: That's not true. Of course Ziegler said yesterday the President is
making predictions, not commitments. I think that's a mistake.

K: Ziegler said he was talking about the next increment but not for the
time period it would be.

L: Wlater Cronkite (I guess you saw the news programs last night). . .

K: No I didn't.

L: He ridiculed the whole thing. Said the President is making predictions
not commitments.

K: When we start scheduling ships they know what's going to happen.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

L: It doesn't need to be more than four months in advance, and we are keeping the schedules in more than two to four months. The only problem is it's easier to put it in than to take it out. Not we've got not only the Department of Agriculture there and but the GAO under mandate from the Senate and House.

K: But if we generate this idea of a massive withdrawal the whole thing will be down the drain.

L: I'm not one of these pessimistic ones around town. I'm optimistic.

K: I think we may have an opening in the negotiations this year if we just keep our cool this summer. After this summer we've got to go the other way.

K: But you're not having any problems . . .

L: I have no problems with you. I sent that transcript over, what I said. I don't know what more there is to say.

K: Unless we just say we won't say any more till the President has spoken.

L: Okay.

K: And we'll have you, Markx, Moorer, Rogers . . .

L: Yes, I'll send over to you an advance copy.

K: Good. If I could have it Tuesday and have the meeting Friday.

L: My problem is that Monday and Tuesday I am on the Hill all the time. I'll try to get it over Tuesday or Wednesday.

K: When do you start scheduling ships they know what's going to happen.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Adm. Moorer/Kissinger
9:10 a.m. 3/18/71

M: Robbie's on his way over with 3 messages and information on the weather. Two problems as I see it. One is tactical evaluation of the situation of the moment. I called Abrams on the phone because he didn't answer that in this message. I will send a transcript of the conversation. He said they are proceeding in an orderly way. One battalion in trouble but the balance of the regiment doing okay. Subject of plans. He sent me yesterday the phase 4 plans. I told him that I thought he was moving too far east. You will see in the message. He has come back with an answer on Vinh's report on Thieu tonight our time. I suggested to Robbie you send another message to Bunker as we did before.

K: They are not replacing units they are taking out. They are strung along Rt. 9 and they are strung out Route 9. They are not trying for our objectives.

M: That's why I think you should wire Bunker.

K: How can you keep the home fires burning when they don't meet the plan. I have been telling Senators that we are moving out of Tchepone to hold 914. Now they are not moving near 914. I think they are bugging out.

M: They are moving back faster than we expected.

K: In a strategically unproductive direction. They are moving along Rt. 9.

M: After you have read the message I think you should go back to Bunker and Abrams before their meeting tonight.

K: Come over a half hour early. I don't know what to tell the Senators because they will put their heads on the block and we will kill ourselves.

M: Tchepone through highway 9 to 611.

K: The original idea was to stay in Tchepone for a month or two and block roads. We can tell the press anything but they are not in Tchepone or on 914 to do any defense. The disruption of traffic was ______.

M: That was my understanding.

K: They haven't been doing that.

M: Not enough of it. You are right.

K: They have shied away from 914. I don't know why. They keep pulling off. To me it looks like they are doing what they said they were going to do last week and bugging out of Route 9.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Adm. Moorer/Kissinger

9:10 a. m.

3/18/71

-2-

M: It's apparently Thieu alone who is doing this. You will see when you read the messages that Abrams does not agree with this. So we need to put some backbone back in them.

K: What are we going to tell the Senators today? At this rate they will be out by April 1.

M: That's the truth. Those Marines will have to stay in there. We will have to work on it.

K: That way they are rotating and not replacing them. Thieu is setting himself up for a massive bug out on our part. Perhpas he had an impression from our senior people. Al sent a message yesterday -- he hasn't been up there yet. He said he sent an urgent message telling me to let me know what he found in I Corps. His last message was from Pehnom Penh. 914 was open and ARVN moved back at the first sign of contact. The ARVN trying to get out as soon as possible. 914 not cut. Moving yesterday at the first sign of enemy pressure.

M: He was up there last night. It would be helpful to hear from him.

K: I sent him an urgent message yesterday saying people are nervous here. The thing is they will kill us domestically. If they had told us a weekago they were doing this we could have said we have our victory. Instead we are moving down 914 and not saying a word to us. Of course we control the helicop-
ters.

K: We can't just leave them in there.

K: Why not?

M: We could but make more political problems then the other way. I think I should come at 10:30 and talk. I will send the messages now.

K: This is no reflection -- I know you and I are on the same wave length. Abrams must be more heartbroken then the two of us.

M: We will have to do what's necessary. We will look at this at 10:30.

K: Send a back channel to Bunker and have no illusions of what we will do here.

M: Look at these messages before you send that to him.

week a

M. Kone y.

By. NAFA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
11:05 a.m. 3/18/71

VP: I am going up north in the citadel of your former associates in Mass. Tomorrow I have an all-media, one hour interview. I want to get briefed on foreign policy matters you think are important. What's the story in Laos? I read the AP story in the Star last night and I thought it was a cheering section for the NVN.

K: That's right. When are you leaving?

VP: Leaving after lunch. Are you busy for lunch?

K: I'm lunching with the A&ETY Gen.

VP: I am leaving around 1:00.

K: I am tied up until then. I have to brief some congressmen. I will send Col. Kennedy over. Haig is in VN. I will send Col. Kennedy over around noon.

By. 5 NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

1:50 p. m.

3/18/71

L: Are you satisfied in your mind on this arrangement on the back up on SALT?

K: No.

L: It's been changed somewhat.

K: How?

L: They were going to send papers over for backup committee to go over them. Now they xx will have the staff work done over there. I think you and I have certain capabilities that could help.

K: This delegation is a disaster.

L: Nitze thinks the arrangement before was better because it maintains some check. I don't want to get Paul into trouble with Smith --

K: I will check on the arrangement with Smith. Send a memo that I can act on with the President.

L: Send a copy of Gardner's memo to me. The other thing, I chacked on the game CBS is playing. They have read the President's statements and mine and see no disagreement but they say there's a disagreement as far as Ron is concerned. They are trying to divide people. No one in this building who has access, from Friedheim to James, would make a comment like that.

K: I was certain of that.

L: Shaffer and Pierpoint -- we are in a war with CBS here. Reporting there is terrible. Selling the Pentagon on that film. They are trying to give us the shaft right now. I hope people don't get carried away.

K: The President dictated a draft this morning on what should be said on (withdrawal) and being sent to the departments.

L: Staying with his position.

K: Talking about the next installment.

L: We hadn't planned to go that big on the next installment but we can. If we can go through Jan, we can but if he says through Christmas --

K: He is playing now for a shorter one. I think he is waiting to talk on memo.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

1:50 p.m. 3/18/71

L: We have no problem with that. One other thing -- U-2 thing we had a couple of calls on on Cuba. That's happened before. We have no evidence there was a MIG 17 up. No tracking. They do it as a spoof. We are watching that and Korea thing closely. We are moving the track out a bit. It's the same exercise and same track that happened 30 days prior to the Pueblo and 30 days prior to EC-131.

K: It's a sensitive one for them.

L: We have it all plotted out.

K: Good.

L: We have moved them 100 miles and they can't get out there.

K: When does the authority in VN run out?

L: Sunday at noon.

K: As long as it's through Sunday noon.

L: Let me look -- no, Sat. at noon.

K: Yeah because the President said something about going to Sun. noon.

L: I will let it. The satellite picture is bad.

K: But if it's not gone then we had better re-consider it.

L: Then delay it a little.

K: With the Party Congress coming up.

L: And with other conditions. I think they should get the artillery anyway. They want to go whole hog.

K: My doubts about the Air Force are getting big.

L: Did you see the number of B-52 sorties on the Ho Chi Minh trail? The Situation Room wanted to know. Number of tons of bombs equal all of that in Southeast Asia during WWII.

K: You wonder when it takes them 2 weeks to get something off. You wonder about Russia if they would wait until there were those conditions there. 3 days in July, I guess. Let it run until Sun.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger
1:50 p.m. 3/18/71

-3-

L: I will be out for a physical tomorrow. In Wisconsin.

K: Just a routine thing?

L: Yeah. Haven't done it for a year and a half. Will be back Sat. I will be available all the time.

per and hierpoint -- we are in a war with CBS here. Reporting is to be sent to the Pentagon on that film. They are trying to give us some right now. I hope people don't get carried away.

The President dictated a draft this morning on what should be sent and being sent to the departments.

with his position.

I am talking about the next installment.

I haven't planned to go that big on the next installment but we can. through Jan, we can but if he says through Christmas --

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Peterson/Kissinger

3:50 p.m.

3/18/71

K: What can I do for you?

P: I wanted your reaction to textile thing I talked with you about once before.
I gave you that memo.

K: What memo?

P: They said you got it yesterday. Textiles and setting up a group.

K: I am not sure if we have a fax in favor of 204 possibility.

P: Could you look at it soon?

K: I will look at it before tomorrow morning.

TELECON
Benjamin Wells
3/18/71 4:10 p.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

W: I am calling you because Arnold Nachmanoff is on vacation. I was wondering if there would be a chance to chat before Sunday about out relations with Chile.

K: What point are you making?

W: Well, it seems there is a deviation in the government at a rather high level about how we are handling the Western Hemisphere and especially Chile, and particularly in regard to the <u>Enterprise</u>. And this spreads into the whole hemisphere. The point is there is a deviation between a hard line and a soft line in the people in the government.

K: And how do you see the White House in this?

W: I see the White House as taking a very hard line on this, contrary to the impression given in the world report. It opposed the <u>Enterprise</u> visit.

K: And who alledgedly was for it?

W: There was apparently a good bit of feeling in favor of it at the Defense Department and I think the White House came down hard on this.

K: How do you explain the curious phenomenon that a Presidential statement wouldn't reflect Presidential policy?

W: This is one of the things I am pointing out in the story. The statement and the policy seem to be at some variance.

K: I don't play the game of who in the government supports what stand. If you want to play that kind of game I am sure you can find a lot of self-serving people who will help you.

W: I am not playing a game. I am trying to check this out.

K: I am telling you what was in the President's statement reflects our policy and it has been the policy that has been followed and is the White House line. Now what more do you want?

W: This doesn't square with what I see with my own eyes. The visit was cancelled.

K: In order to explain this I would have to explain a lot.

W: Yes?

K: I would have to go into how it originated, who recommended that it be

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Benjamin Wells (NYT)

3/18/71 4:10 p.m.

cancelled and so forth. This would put it into better perspective. But you
can go ahead and write what you want.

W: No, that is just my point. I cannot and will not just write what I
want. I write what I find out.

K: If there is any doubt. . . If there is anyone saying we in the
White House are not in letter and spirit following our own policy they are
grinding bureaucratic axes. In order to . . .

W: Okay, we will write on the basis of the information we have. We
have tried our best to check it out. Have you seen the article in _Le Monde_
by Amalric about Chile? He quotes a high Administration official saying
off the record that there will be a crisis in Chile, saying that Mr. Allende
is a Marxist and always has been . . . . . [reading]/

K: It sure as hell couldn't have been me. When would I have done
that? I haven't seen Amalric.

W: Well, then we can just go back to September 25 when
was in the White House.

K: I have told you what I have to say and you can write what you want.

W: You can't fault us for not trying.

K: What else do you want to know? I am telling you what we stated
in our policy. What else do you want?

W: I want an intelligent discussion with someone on the NSC staff.
I do not consider five sentences an intelligent discussion. And I do not
consider restating what you have said in the report an answer to my ques-
tions. If we can't have one, we can't have one.

K: If you want to talk to me you had better use a different tone. [hung up]

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger
4:27 p.m. 3/18/71

K: We had a call here from Ben Wells who is doing an article on Chile and Latin American policy. He says -- he I refused to say anything to him. He says the WH is imposing a hard line and that the ENTERPRISE was cancelled at WH orders over everyone else. Military contact is undercut by the WH.

R: An article?

K: That will appear on Sunday.

R: Have you seen it?

K: He asked for my comment. I told him that I would have to give you a check list of who recommends what and I said I couldn't. He got insolent and said? ? ? ?. It's not true.

R: There are stories in the paper that said we recommended it. Haven't you seen stories to that effect.

K: I think they came out of Defense and not State. They probably came from Zumwalt. Maybe McCloskey --

R: I will talk to Bob about it. ? ? ? of the ways I have said that the reason we assigned was the right reason for the operational problems.

K: Mel didn't recommend it.

R: The political contention was that he wanted the sailors to move around in Chile to see how a democracy operates. It was exploitation.

K: State and Defense together.

R: I will be glad to do that.

K: I don't think you should do it. I think it comes out in Defense. The main point was that -- -- was in to see Zumwalt yesterday and said it would continue like this for 10x 19 months.

R: Did you see the radio tape? You should read it, it's a dilly.

K: The President put out a directive on withdrawals. He mentioned it again this morning and feels you handled it right.

R: The press didn't interpret the President's remarks like that because if they thought the President was saying through this year and next year it would have been banner headlines. They would have had the whole schedule.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sen. Harry Byrd/Kissinger
4:52 p.m. 3/18/71

B: I wondered if you and I could have dinner together one night next week.

K: Let me see. It could be possible on Thurs.

B: That would be fine. How about the Sans Souci?

K: About 8:00?

B: That would be ideal.

K: I don't have my exact calendar. If I am wrong about that I will call you tomorrow.

B: Fien. Otherwise I will look forward to talking with you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012587
By C.A. NAVA Date 05/18/71

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

3/18/71 6:12 p.m.

D: You received the paper?

K: Yes, and an analyzing them now. There are some positive elements and some that may present troubles.

D: We tried what you said to put it as compromise.

K: I recognized that there were many positive elements.

D: Even things we didn't discuss, for instance about presentation. Can I say to them that I will get your reaction, just to give them a time, by Monday?

K: I will give you some reaction on Monday. Whether it will be the formal one . . .

D: No need to be the formal one, just your reaction.

K: You can tell them you will get my reaction by Monday, but maybe not to every point.

D: I understand. Then after I think they have a meeting on the 25th.

K: Right. Are you committed to putting it forward on the 25th?

D: I think so.

K: Let me see what my reaction is.

D: Yes, because they have the last meeting of the Congress then. But I didn't give it to anyone but you. You can consult with the person ________ but please observe strictly the instruction not to speak with our people. And on the second point -- I think it would be a good idea ________ to begin some private exchange . . .

K: The trouble has been that we have been blocked by the Germans on this.

D: But you remember ________.

K: On that point I was not fully clear.

D: You have to give chance to discuss it on very private basis. They were waiting for others but waiting for ________ on this particular point.

K: Our trouble has been . . . I had better tell you personally when we see each other but there is a reason for this which is not in our direct control here. I gave you our view . . . .

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101257

By

CHINARA Date 05/01/71

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin

3/18/71 6:12 p.m.

D: But I understand your ambassador was prepared to discuss the two other on a confidential basis with the others involved. They have this in Moscow.

K: Let me see. I will give you an answer on that on Monday also.

D: Okay, so I can say the initial reaction will be on Monday at 8:00.

K: Yes, and I'll see on this other matter. We are approaching it in an attempt to be constructive.

D: This was too.

K: In reading it quickly I can see points where you were. There are also some points that will not be acceptable.

D: But this is not worse.

K: No, it is not worse.

D: And there are points where this is definitely better.

K: That is true. This represents a movement.

D: Okay, Monday evening at 8:00 at my house.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

D: You received the paper?

D: I think so.

D: But you remember ________.

By NARA, Date 5/26

page 2

R: Yes, and I'll see on this other matter. We are approaching it in an attempt to be constructive.

D: This was too.

D: But this is not worse.

K: No, it is not worse.

["DECLASSIFIED", "Authority Folleson\nBy CHIARA Date 5/10/71", "*", "TELCORN", "Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin", "7:15 p. m., March 18, 1971", "(Very bad connection --\ndifficult to hear)", "D: Did you call me, Henry?", "K: Oh, oh, oh, yes. I didn't realize they --", "D: I was out and they told me you called me.", "K: Yes, yes. I have two things. One, I have just talked to the President about our conversation and also about your document -- I hadn't had a chance to talk with him before. I will make a preliminary response to you on Monday. Secondly, the President said less there be a misunderstanding in Moscow about the document....", "D: About what?", "K: The one I discussed with you yesterday about freezing and so forth.", "D: So forth? Please speak a bit louder, the connection is very bad.", "K: About that document, he wanted to make sure we understood each other about how it would be negotiated . . . . . . but that the final conclusion would not take place until the other one was completed.", "D: Understand . . . . . . . . final stage of discussion. Second part of discussion -- not a specific date but in the second stage of discussion.", "K:", "K: That's all right.", "D: Hello.", "K: That's roughly right but it would not be first.", "D: Then it will come . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By NARA, Date 5/26", "(Very bad connection --\ndifficult to hear)", "TELCOM", "Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin", "7:15 p.m., March 18, 1971", "D: Did you call me, Henry?", "K: Oh, oh, oh, yes. I didn't realize they --", "D: I was out and they told me you called me.", "K: Yes, yes. I have two things. One, I have just talked to the President about our conversation and also about your document -- I hadn't had a chance to talk with him before. I will make a preliminary response to you on Monday. Secondly, the President said less there be a misunderstanding in Moscow about the document....", "D: About what?", "K: The one I discussed with you yesterday about freezing and so forth.", "D: So forth? Please speak a bit louder, the connection is very bad.", "K: About that document, he wanted to make sure we understood each other about how it would be negotiated . . . . . . but that the final conclusion would not take place until the other one was completed.", "D: Understand . . . . . . . final stage of discussion. Second part of discussion -- not a specific date but in the second stage of discussion.", "K:", "K: That's all right.", "D: Hello.", "K: That's roughly right but it would not be first.", "D: Then it will come . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

9:35 a.m.

3/19/71

R: A couple of things about our x report. I reviewed it myself and we are enthusiastic about Cambodia.

K: He didn't make it as a formal point.

R: On the Nixon Doctrine we spe it out and your people think it's good. The other thing we haven't told you about but I am sure you will like it. I say we "review as well as our management and carry out in the NSC system ? ? ? for the President." I wanted to tie it in.

K: I thought your opening statement is good. It's come off very good. I think they tie together very well.

R: I gather on Laos there's some withdrawal.

K: My impression is that SVN are getting out. The position we have to take is that they accomplished the major objectives. I am teed off because when they took Tchepone we could have postured ourselves that way.

R: Our people thought that wasn't the case.

K: Moorer two days ago was talking about a 5-phase operation. Yesterday morning a Lt. Col. came over and he said you are not heading in the direction you said you were and on that basis did I find out what was going on.

R: When I had a briefing a few days ago, there was no indication.

K: That's right. Telling you and me and the President everything goingslowly. I think they are not pulling out under pressure but vice versa. Thieu has decided he needs the First Division in I Corps for his election and he doesn't want them to have a lot of casualties. And they withdraw the others are attacking. The President has a lot riding on it. I sent a scorcher to Haig saying that we are briefing all over town -- You were asked at the press conference. You said they are cutting roads and they pulled off 914 without advance warning or getting attacked there.

R: It's touch for the President. S. O. B.

K: We will take the position we have achieved the basic objectives. If we had thought we could have announced it at your press conference or the President's. If you had been able to say we have achieved objectives and will be out by April 1 it would have been before Lolo (?) and all that.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
3/19/71 10:10 a.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

R: I notice that Hubert Humphrey is trying to reach the President on the
Middle East. Has he made any progress?

K: Not that I know of, and that would go through me.

R: Has he called?

K: I'm not sure. I'll check.

R: It's important to keep tabs on this.

K: If the President knows what it's about it will come through me. I'll
put a hold on it and make sure it doesn't go through till I talk with you. Do
you want me to check. What usually happens is that I take the call and then
pass any request on to the President. I'll call you as soon as the request
comes in and I'll check right now and see whether it has happened.

R: Find Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Zeigler/Kissinger

tl:07 pxx 11:07 a.m. 3/19/71

Z: I shouldn't say APRN haven't announced an end date. That's correct?

K: We are trying to find out what it is. We have cables coming in from Bunker.
Hold tight.

Z: No new assessment and according to plan in the field.

K: Say we have achieved essential objectives and whatever appears now, leave
open the possibility that we might pull out. Don't suggest it but leave it open.

Z: You don't know if they have established an end date?

K: I won't know until after.

Z: My gosh! okay.

TELECON

The President
3/19/71 11:10 a.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: I could drop over right now.

P: No, I think . . . I've got Colson coming in right now.
Can you come at 11:30?

K: Yes, I can do it then.

P: What does your schedule look like? Are you free?

K: Yes, I can come then.

P: I've talked to Moorer. He gave me an undate; he's probably
told you the same thing. Heard anything from Haig?

K: I got a cable from him confirming what we already know --
they are pulling out. There's another one that will be coming in after
his conversation with Thieu.

P: Well, he said they are going to be pulling out but the first
division will stay and they will be conducting raids in the Muong Nuong (?)
area.

K: I frankly doubt that they will do that.

P: But the point is, as you said, if they are pulling out to make
the best of it.

K: I think it is better for them to pull out than to take a shellacking
there. It wasn't an absolute . . .

P: But it had enormous effect.

K: It obviously wasn't as effective as if it had been Americans
but it was the best possible thing that could conceivably have been done
at this period.

P: We'll talk about it at 11:30.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Moorer/Kissinger

11:15 a.m.

3/19/71

M: I talked with the President earlier and I just want to be sure you know that we have a message and are confirming a phone call took place two hours before I talked with Abrams -- it confirms what he said over the phone. In effect he talks about Thieu's objectives coming back highway 9 about April 8-9 and a heavy raid on Muong Noung with heavy air support. Then Abrams says he supports this and a couple of areas we have key, near Bon Bok where we had explosions a couple of weeks ago, and said the Senate passed a resolution commanding troops so it appears he has political support and public support as to the success of the operation.

K: That doesn't make it a success.

M: No but it would be a disaster if he didn't have support. __________ has been up there to look over the plans because you __________ get g screwed; up __________ moving people out. Abrams thinks they have a solid plan.

K: They have had solid plans for 6 weeks and not executed one.

M: He says that right here. The plan is for fire support plan is what they are doing now. They will be in trouble if they don't do it now. They are giving it special attention. I had the morale of the helicopter pilots checked and it's excellent. The morale over all it says in the Post -- first time we have a reasonable coverage of what's going on -- a helpful sign, trying to put it into perspective.

K: I know these guys. If they had told us when they took Tchepone we could have planned it to protect the President in the best way. Instead they have us babbling the wrong things and now they have us on the defensive. Throughout this operation no plan has stuck for a week. There's water over the dam now. I don't think they will be able to execute on Muong Noung.

M: Sympathetic to your position. No reason why they cannot.

K: Haig feels the ARVN loses it's stomach for Laos. Just wants to get out in an orderly fashion.

M: The commanders or troops?

K: The commanders.

M: I think that's right.

K: He recommends that the pressure from Washington to stay be terminated and try to get them out in an orderly manner.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Moorer/Kissinger

11:15 a.m.

3/19.71

-2-

M: That's why Wan (?) was sent up there. When is Haig coming back?

K: Sunday night. He had 20 min bellyache with Rogers this morning. Next week all who were against it will come out of the woodwork. How's the weather?

M: Some degree of lessening of cloudiness. We have told Clay this is his last chance. He will try to go. He knows our problem. He will go if there's any chance.

K: I wouldn't push him. No sense in taking the heat on another thing that gets no results. But from our meeting yesterday the results aren't all that insignificant.

M: They are significant. CIA talking through their hats. We have some information over here -- Bennett --

K: Bennett impressed me yesterday.

I think th

He recommend

to stay be terminated and
y to get them out

to stay be terminated and

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Atherton/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p.m., March 19, 1971

A: The Foreign Minister will be there in 10 minutes.

K: I know already -- he agreed to go back to the 1967 border.

A: The Secretary made strongly the point that we are not telling them what their position should be -- they know our views. He said they owed us a statement of their position because we are involved. The only way to get the Jarring talks off deadcenter is to make a counter-proposal to the Egyptian proposal. He said the only place they have a position is on Sharm-El-Sheihk -- we have to retain presence there. On the border and the Sinai they haven't made up their minds, especially what else they want on the Sinai. They have made up their minds not to go back to the border.

K: But not how much to ask for.

A: Or arrangements for the Sinai. The only positive position they conclude is they must retain Sharm-El-Sheikh.

K: What KX should I talk about?

A: Follow up the Secretary's point that we need to know their position -- if they can't tell Jarring or the Arabs, at least tell us.

K: Nothing ever leaks out of us, so you are safe. Is there going to be a Suez Canal proposal?

A: They will be coming to us with a viable proposal on the Suez Canal. They have problems with the ideas we suggested, They are going to come back in the first instance to us with ideas of their own -- that would be in about a week from now.

K: Good. Can I push that?

A: Yes. It was a good atmosphere. We got the general feeling from them they don't want to create an atmosphere of confrontation -- and, of course, neither do we.

K: Joe told me I should make a speech about security. What does he mean? What is the nature of the security?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Atherton/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 pm., March 19, 1971

- 2 -

A: I think he means the Israeli position is they can't have security in Sharm-El-Sheikh except by their presence.

K: ] Joe is coming with him?

A: He will come ahead of him a little bit.

K: Does the Minister understand I will have at most 15 minutes?

A: You will have to make that clear to the Ambassador when they arrive.

K: Thank you. Good-bye.

lds

General feeding
f confrontation --

What does
it security.
y?

TELECON

Clark MacGregor

3/19/71 6:35 p.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

M: Two items; and you may be familiar with both of them. One is Javits' plan to make what he calls a "major speech" on the Middle East on Tuesday of next week in the Senate. He is tomorrow morning submitting to his fellow liberal Republican Senators either the speech itself or an outline of it and asking for comments. The general thrust of it will be to take the Administration to task for being too tough on Israel.

K: I get the point. He's right of course. What should we say?

M: I'm hoping to get a copy of the outline tomorrow.

K: Of course I'll try to pull him off of it but when the Secretary of State takes the side of the ______________. . . 1

M: Okay, number two. On the House and Senate members being in touch with Frishman (?). He is seeking help.

K: They have turned it down already. Tell them we are strongly in favor of that.

M: Nothing in this in any sense embarrassing to the President?

K: Not at all -- we strongly favor it. You don't want me to do anything with Allen do you? On Schlesinger?

M: No, I think now Rog Morton should make the decision. I haven't heard yet what that is.

K: Will you let me know what he thinks because I may go after Schlesinger if he doesn't.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:35 p.m., March 19, 1971

P: Where did I find you?

K: In my office.

P: Still working huh? That's too bad. I just got to Camp David and was just taking a look at the news. Did you see anything in the papers?

K: No.

P: One story in the Baltimore paper says that -- some wire service -- the South Vietnamese say they won't fight. On the other hand, the Star said ________________. I don't know which is the truth.

K: Both of them are true, depending on which helicopter pilot these reporters are talking to. Don't doubt that there is this or that company.

P: That's right. It seems to me they are doing very well.

K: They are doing it in a very professional way.

P: No panic[ing] or running.

K: The other side is suffering heavy losses too. It is just one of those things. For the next few days there will be a spurt of stories like that.

P: Poor Moorer and the rest of them are on top of it. Ryan (?) is up there?

K: Ryan (?) is up there and he is excellent. __________ adequate artillery support. If they screw this thing up, it can turn --

P: As a matter of fact, they have knocked the hell out of the enemy.

K: If they had put in additional forces, they would have broken the back of the enemy __________. Hill 31 __________ during this withdrawal they have not been able to mount an attack from the North. Now they have brought in some regiments from the South. I talked to Rabin a few weeks ago -- saw him at a dinner at the Alsops -- and said something to him about fighting them off in the North and he said if I were you, I would watch the South and that's what they did.

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:35 p. m., March 19, 1971 -- page 2

P: Yeah.

K: The troops they have in the South pulled out of South Vietnam.

P: That sucks it out of that.

K: Enemy troops being brought back into their base area. It is going to be a sticky week.

P: I don't mind that. A sticky week doesn't bother me a bit. I know they are on top of it, the press is panting so that they can make it into a defeat. Our announcement is going to knock the hell out of them.

K: On TV Monday night, if you put it the way you did before -- our biggest achievements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . you can in the next 6 months, it will then be vindicated. Then when you speak about troop withdrawal later --

P: Yeah, okay.

K: You have to let it run its course.

P: There's nothing you can do about it but let it run its course.

K: I will call Moorer right away and say do a highlevel briefing in South Vietnam.

P: This air strike --

K: It is just a disgrace.

P: We just aren't going to be able to get it off.

K: They didn't get it off tonight when they were supposed to but they have another 24 hours.

P: You might tell Moorer to give a highlevel briefing. I don't know whether it will do any good in Saigon. We probably have probably got terribly inadequate people on the briefing.

K: No one gives a damn how many helicopter flights we do.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:35 p.m., March 19, 1971 -- page 3

P: That's right, just give a rundown of how it will work.

K: Moorer is at a dinner, I will call Vogt.

P: Don't bother Moorer. Where is Haig right now?

K: Leaving for CINCPAC.

P: Why don't you leave him out there?

K: I think we should get his personal assessment.

P: Tell him to stay.

K: He is leaving --

P: Hell! I meant stay in Vietnam.

K: He has already left, there isn't much he can do in Vietnam, he has got what he needs.

P: Our guys out there have got to be on top of the facts. What about Laird and the Pentagon guys?

K: Laird is getting a medical checkup, won't be out until tomorrow night. It is just a routine check, nothing is wrong. Vogt will just push away at it.

P: They will do it in Saigon. If they do it in Saigon, I can talk off that. Do you think that makes sense?

K: It makes a lot of sense.

P: That's the way to do it.

K: Exactly.

P: Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NAIA, Dato 5/26", "TELCORN", "Mr. Kissinger/General Vogt", "8:45 p.m., March 19, 1971", "K: Johnny, the President is really fit to be tied.", "V: About what?", "K: About everything that is going on out there. If one of your generals out there will take an order and give a goddamn briefing and tell what is going on so that when he goes on the television interview he can talk off of that. What the strategic significance is and stop giving sorties of helicopters -- Give a strategic concept -- what we think it has achieved.", "V: When is he going on?", "K: Monday night, can they do it Sunday?", "V: They can do it.", "K: What about the air strikes?", "V: It is still the old problem. Another alternative involves all weather birds. There is an area we have been authorized to go to that we could do --", "K: All weather one?", "V: Fixed targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NARA, Date 5/26", "TELCOM", "Mr. Kissinger/General Vogt", "8:45 p.m., March 19, 1971 -- page 2", "K: The weather won't lift?", "V: My guess is it won't.", "K: There has been 16 days of uninterrupted rain.", "V: March is the worse of them all. Normal expectancy is two days -- it is the worse period of all.", "K: Thought in March it was beginning to turn.", "V: Transitional switch which begins in May. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/General Vogt

8:45 p.m., March 19, 1971 -- page 3

K: It is a great tradey -- it would have been a political plus for psychological reasons.

V: ..... at which point they are most vulnerable to missiles. We can do it if it is to a psychological advantage to do it.

K: But we would have to order it. Would it have a military advantage?

V: Militarily -- no. But we can really bang it up to make it worldwide if it is to a psychological advantage. In other words, if political gains were worth it.

K: It would have been a tremendous political gain to do it now.

V: When the smoke clears, it will be a big plus.

K: After taking all this from them and not doing anything.

V: I suspect they realize there is a weather problem here, but I do think when the last chapter is written on this operation is in the plus column.

K: But we needed this.

V: I will lay on the briefing.

K: Make sure that is done. Cable Abrams.

wgh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:55 p.m., March 19, 1971

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to tell you I have talked to Vogt and there will be a briefing on Sunday, at the latest Monday before you speak. Monday morning their time would be Sunday evening our time. They will try to put it in a general context. On the air strikes, the weather just doesn't look good.

P: How does Vogt feel about it?

K: He thinks that when it is all over, it will be a big plus. But I would like to get in a big bang at the North.

P: I hate to have to do it later, it will ruin the whole thing up again, that's the problem.

K: They can do a strike which ............

P: Not unless it is going to be an effective one. When it gets right down to it, they are going to charge they were in retreat but if we can do this, I don't give a damn what they charge. They have been waiting till they clearly see the trucks.

K: They are asking for a ceiling of 9,000 feet.

P: Oh, for Christ's sake!!!! Wonder if Pursley put that out to keep that from happening.

K: They are worried about SAMs. 9,000 gives them maneuverability room.

P: Vogt --

K: Feels that when the smoke clears, it will look like a big plus.

P: I agree.

K: That is everybody's assessment who has studied this.

P: The main point is just to sit out the next 3 to 4 days. Let them move out, it is no problem. For Christ's sake -- not using air in other places. With 12 of those --

K: They are doubling that amount.

P: Thank God!!!! It did some good to order it.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
Dwight Chapin

3/19/71 p.m.

C: I'm sorry to bother you sir. Peterson's economic group. Should we consider having them meet in California & -- it involves Rogers. Or should we do it when we get back?

K: When we get back, unless you have an urgent requirement. I think it's best for all of us to have a chance to unwind, and the President is thinking of another group which will involve a lot of people. But I have nothing strongly against it.

C: For your meeting, if it takes place, will you have to have Rogers and Laird?

K: Yes, I think so.

C: This one would bring out Stans and Connally, and others, and I just have a feeling that's too much horsepower.

K: And then he'd have to entertain them.

C: Okay, that's all I need. Thank you.