since French control for symbolic reasons. It had been found that the force
was whether a small part of the *force de格段* around be kept under excite-
ment. The only thing that had not yet been settled in internal French discussions
already decided to end in joint planning with American strategic forces.
Still very much so. For example, during the fall the French government had
discovered as always. He felt that our handling of the French was bathochroic-
Vitaleber De is Grandville's assessment of the situation was as

Conclusion

of the regime than to protect the individuals that had been involved.

Of course De Gallec decided that it was more important to advise the prestige
of the French Secret Service in Africa. When the Ben Banks operation pack-
manipulated the Moroccan Secret Service was being used by the French as the
py of the French Secret Service as a favor for the Moroccan Secret Service,
results as well as by the Ben Banks again. Ben Banks had been appointed
sented by Pombalard. The latter had been badly weakened by the electoral
theoreticians were gaining the upper hand against the bradamatists repre-
more opiniative. The return of Depre meant that the left Gallec and the
De la Grandville felt that the defeat had made De Gallec, if anything,

Domestic French Politics

air-grope from a Mirade plane.

improvements in the weight to yield ratio. The major tests would involve

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
H. V. Kleindorfer

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[A]

H. A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

de frappe was so small that no part of it could be split off without appearing absurd. Then Secretary McNamara, on the occasion of the December NATO meeting had had breakfast with Mesmer. He had so pressed on him the need for joint planning that De Gaulle had begun to think that there was more to joint planning than he had first thought. As a result, he had now ordered a re-study of the whole problem.

Also, the proposal of Senator Mansfield for a Johnson-De Gaulle meeting did not meet with too happy a reception, particularly when Senator Mansfield said that De Gaulle and Johnson would make two beautiful figures together on a balcony.

together on a balcony.

Manatield said that De Gansle and Johnson would make two beautiful figures
meeting did not meet with too happy a reception, particularly when Senator
Alao, the proposal of Senator Manatield for a Johnson-De Gansle
ordered a re-study of the whole problem.

more to joint planning than he had first thought. As a result, he had now
the need for joint planning that De Gansle had begun to think that there was
NATO meeting had had breakfast with Meamer. He had so pressed on him
spamd. Then Secretary McNaughts, on the occasion of the December
meeting was so small that no part of it could be split off without appearing
de transparence

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
H. V. Klauser
-0-

[A]

[4]