- 34 -

lack wisdom I shall ask it of Him; He gives plentifully and never presents accounts."²⁷

Bismarck's faith thus represented a means to achieve a theological justification of the struggle for power; its distinguishing characteristic was not acceptance but activity: Darwinism sanctified by God. He never ceased protesting against what he took to be the dogmatic nature of the Pietist circle. "How little confidence," he wrote to his bride in one of his early letters, "you tend to have in your faith, how carefully you wrap it in the cotton of seclusion so that no breath of the world chill it."²⁸ And he refuted her Pietist reluctance to use medicine by the assertion that if God had not wished them to be used, He would not have permitted them to be invented.²⁹ There was the real meaning of Bismarck's religion, a reciprocal pact with God, in which God in return for formal obeisance rewarded singleness of purpose with success and in which the very fact of success indicated Divine pleasure. God became an ally by being made subject to the power of Bismarck's dialectic. For would he permit what had not found favor in His eyes? Bismarck's fatalism, erstwhile so hopeless, had not found a sense of direction. "With confidence in God," he wrote to his bride, "put on the spurs and let the wild horse of life fly with you over stones and hedges, prepared to break your

27. W. 1¼/I, p. 210. 12 May 1851

28. W. 1¼/I, p. 55. 7 February 1847

29. W. 1¼/I, p. 87.

58. M. 14\1. b. 84'. L. Heppner, 1841
59. M. 14\1. b. 52'. 15 May 1821
60. M. 14\1. b. 510.

till with him over alone and hedge', prepared to prepay him
the price', "but on the abur and let the wild horse of his
sense of direction." With confidence in God', he wrote to
Biamrok's father, "enough toRobelia', had not found a
wong he permitted what had not found favor in his eyes? Bi-
made subject to the power of Biamrok's dialectic. For
indicated Divine brevium. God becomes an ally by being
burdened with success and in which the very lack of success
God in return for former operation rewarded intelligence of
Biamrok's religion, a reciprocal back with God, in which
witted them to be invented."59

There was the real meaning of God had not wished them to be made? He would not have ber-
lietat renunciation to me medicine by the assertion that it
no presence of the world chill it."60 And he related her
how carefully you wash it in the cotton of acquisition so that
one of his early letters, "You tend to have in your faith,
circle." "How little confidence," he wrote to his pride in
against what he took to be the domestic nature of the lietat
Dermotiam anesthetized by God. He never ceased protesting
quoting characteristic was not cooeptance but activity:
a theological formulation of the struggle for power: its
Biamrok's faith thus represented a means to achieve
never breaches accounts."61

Jack wickom I shall say it to Him! He gives bountifully and

- 34 -

- 35 -

neck but above all without fear because one day you will in
any case have to part from everything dear to you on earth,
but not for eternity."³⁰

Ever since his introduction to the Thadden circle
there was about Bismarck a new sense of purpose and a calcu-
lation of the main chance. In 1845 after his father's death
he even left the Kniephof and moved to the other ancestral
estate, Schoenhausen on the Lower Elbe. The reason was em-
inently practical, that there existed in that region a good
prospect of a vacancy in the position of Deichhauptmann, the
officer in charge of building and repairing the dikes. And
when the incumbent failed to resign as expected Bismarck
saw to it that he was relieved by brining charges of un-
authorized absences. Deichhauptmann was a position of great
prestige since the welfare of the predominantly agricultural
region depended on its efficient performance. It was not
surprising therefore that the Espates nominated Bismarck as
an alternate to the Landtag in Berlin. Nor could it have
but increased his sense of mission that the regular deputy
fell ill and that he was elected as his replacement. "I
can not refuse," he wrote his bride in an involved explana-
tion of his reasons for accepting, "without spoiling all my
chances for the future." For the future, that is, as out-
lined in the epigrammatic sentence, "Constitution inevitable,"
for a platform in which ability and energy would promise
quicker rewards than the stifling orthodoxy of the bureaucracy.

30. W. 14/I, p. 76. 7 March 1847.

20. N. 14\1, b. 1c. 1 March 1841.

drukker rewordde datu de attiling orthoglyph of the puncenarsch.
tor a bractom in which agility and energy would broune
fined in the epigrammatic wordess, "Constitution invapidee."
oance for the future." Non the future, that is, as one-
tion of pia reasons for scabbing, "nicht ont abboiling all ma
can not return," he wrote his pride in an involved exblau-
tell till and that he was effected as pia replacement. "I
put increased pia sense of mission that the regular debuty
an alternate to the langst in Berlin. Non could it have
ambiguating therefore that the Enabes nominated Biamarck as
region debended on its efficient performance. It was not
breastge since the welfare of the predominantly agricultural
authorized spaces. Delphiandtmann was a boition of great
saw to it that he was relieved by printing charges of un-
when the incompetent failed to reign as exbested Biamarck
officer in charge of building and rebuilding the dikes. And
broadeot of a vacancy in the boition of Delphiandtmann, the
funnely practical, that there existed in that region a good
estate, Schoummanen on the lower Elpe. The reason was em-
he even felt the Kuehbot and moved to the other sideastral
tation of the main chance. In 1842 after fire father, a host
there was a spont Biamarck a new sense of burboze and a casem-
ever since fire introduction to the Thadden circle
put not for eternity."20

and case have to bear from everything gear to you on earth,
neck put above all without fear because one qsl you will in

- 32 -

- 36 -

This then was the man who stepped on the rostrum that May 17, 1847. He had sown his wild oats and found himself. He had spent nine years in the wilderness, in the solitude of the Kniephof and he had emerged, hardened, betterread than most of his contemporaries among the aristocracy and of infinitely greater imagination. He was a revolutionary despite the fact that he appeared as the defender of the traditional Prussia. For institutions can be overthrown as well by a conception beyond the capacity of the material as by a direct attack. Here was a man of powerful convictions and an elemental will to make them effective; a sceptic in the profoundest sense, who did not challenge troughts originated outside himself but could not even conceive them; a cynic to whom individuals were natural phenomena to be utilized according to their characteristics -- all this buttressed by a religiosity which enabled Bismarck to project himself on a superhuman scale: "The God who moves worlds can protect me too with his wings." But even the most sovereign personality requires a measure of certainty as a condition for his conduct. The world may be moved by levers and it may seem easy if the lever is sufficiently long. But no lever can be effective without a firm fulcrum. What then was the fulcrum from which Bismarck moved the world?

worth?

What then was the uniform from which Bismarck moved the
tong? But no fever can be effective without a firm uniform.
Fever and it may seem easy if the fever is sufficiently
a condition for his conduct. The world may be moved by
sovereign personality requires a measure of certainty as
can protect me too with his wings." But even the most
humble on a humbuggum man acquires "The God who moves worlds
guessed by a religion which empied Bismarck to project
into him whom individuals were natural phenomena to be uti-
ised outside himself but could not even conceive them! a
the prototypical sense, who did not challenge thoughts original
and an elemental will to make them effective! a chaotic in
py a direct attack. Here was a man of monumental convictions
who had a conception beyond the capacity of the material as
traditional Prussia. Non institutions can be overthrown as
any capable the fact that he adhered as the defender of the
and of infinitely greater imagination. He was a revolution-
read than most of his contemporaries among the aristocracy
itself of the Knutehot and he had emerged, hardened, better-
self. He had abated nine years in the wilderness, in the sol-
that May 13, 1844. He had a son his wild child and found him-
There then was the man who abided on the roadram

- 30 -

### III. The Postulate of Prussia's Uniqueness

Prussia, a barren stretch of land on the great North German plain, expanding from the sandy Mark Brandenburg both East and West by colonization and conquest, spreading like a drop of water on a flat surface -- recoiling before obstacles but coming on again to surround them, to erode them, finally to engulf them; Prussia with its weird and unnatural boundaries, which in the decade 1805-15 shifted its center of gravity 150 miles towards the West from the Vistula to the Rhine without any loss of its vitality -- this was an entity to puzzle the political analyst and anathema to the predominant trends of a century. Here was a state of the most polygot composition,¹ a society held together by a metaphysic of duty and of service in an era of liberalism. No visible bond united Prussians except their concept of statehood. But so powerful did this prove that the Catholic, Latinized Rhineland chafing against its award to Prussia at the Congress of Vienna was transformed in one generation into one of the staunchest of Prussia's provinces and one which supplied many of its leading figures. So pervasive was its ethos that the great sceptic who now appeared on the scene accepted as something beyond any dispute, as

1. As late as 1818 Metternich had considered Prussia with its different racial strains and its religious differences as more heterogeneous than Austria. See N.P.M.

terences as more heterogeneous than Anatria. See M.P.M.
with its different racial strains and its religions dif-
f. As late as 1818 Metternich had considered Prunais

the scene accepted as something beyond and apart, as
was its echo that the great aeolic who now abhorred on
which abhorred many of its leading lignea. So pervasive
to one of the anthroneat of Prunais's provinces and one
Congress of Vienna was transformed in one generation in-
Rhineland chafing against its award to Prunais at the
so powerfully did this prove that the Catholic, Latiniized
UNITED Prunaisians except their concept of statenood. But
and of service in an era ofliperalism. No viable bond
affection, I, a society held together by a metadative of duty
a century. Here was a state of the most bohemot combo-
litional anvilat and anathema to the predominant trend of
ot its vitality -- this was an entity to baffle the bo-
the West from the Vatula to the Wane without any loss
1802-52 united its center of gravity 120 miles towards
its weird and unnatural poundarles, while in the decade
them, to erode them, usually to enslave them! Prunais with
colling before opatocytes put coming on again to surround
abresding like a drob of water on a flat surface -- re-
pung both East and West by colonization and confluence,
North German plain, expanding from the south Mark Branden-
Prunais', a barren atretion of land on the great

III. The postulate of Prunais's Uniqueness

- 2 -

something which it would be totally unnecessary formally
to defend, the reality of Prussia's greatness, its historic
mission, and above all its uniqueness.

In the West the idea of freedom has ever had to
be reconciled with that of commitment in the determination
of where man might find his ultimate fulfillment. But both
history and environment forced Prussia to opt for commit-
ment. In Prussia situated amidst potentially hostile pow-
ers, freedom was always identified with the absence of
<u>foreign</u> restraint which in turn could be achieved only
through a domestic tour de force. Such a state could only
with difficulty admit the <u>belief in</u> the <u>possibility</u> of
bad government which had produced the demand of the liberal
movement for constitutional guarantees. Its notion of
justice was equated with good administration; its version
of equality was contained in the uniform application of
legal norms. Prussia was not a fertile ground for the con-
stitutional theories of the French Revolution. Its King
was not simply a symbol of an entity which existed beyond
him but perhaps the only tangible expression of Prussia's
reality. The ideas of nationalism had in Prussia a peculiar
incarnation, therefore: "I must protest," said Bismarck in
an early speech, "against the identification of patriotism
and liberalism ... We in Prussia have not yet learned to
distinguish between service to the prince and service to the
fatherland and God willing we shall never do so."²

2. Kohl I, p. 149.

S. Kouf I, b. 14b.

fathering and God willing we shall never do so.²²

distinguish between service to the prince and service to the
andliperaliam... We in Prunata have not yet learned to
an early abeent, "against the identification of patriotism
incarceration, therefore: "I must protest," said Biamarck in
reality. The ideas of nationalism had in Prunata a beneficial
him put besides the only tangible expression of Prunata's
was not simply a symbol of an entity which existed beyond
attitudinal theories of the French Revolution. Its King
legal norms. Prunata was not a ferocious ground for the con-
ot equality was contained in the uniform subordination of
justice was edicated with good administration; its version
movement for constitutional guarantees. Its notion of
pad Government which had produced the demand of the liberal
with difficulty admit the <u>deficit</u> in the <u>possibility</u> of
through a domestic tour de force. And a state could only
<u>foreign</u> restraint which in turn could be achieved only
era, freedom was always identified with the absence of
ment. In Prunata situated amongst potentially hostile bow-
atory and environment forced Prunata to opt for commit-
of where man might find his ultimate fulfillment. But too
be reconciled with that of commitment in the determination
In the West the idea of freedom has ever had to
mistaken, and spoke all its uniqueness.

to defend, the reality of Prunata's greatness, its historic
something which it would be totally unnecessary to mention.

- 5 -

(2)

- 3 -

Nor could an attack on the aristocracy carry the
same degree of conviction as in France. For the Prussian
aristocracy had not wasted away amidst the splendor of a
capital city. It might be narrow and unimaginative but it
was also tough and virile. And it was surrounded by the
numbus of past successes. Not without justice could Bismarck say of it: "Everywhere the root of Prussian liberty
is fertilized by the blood of its noble families. The
mercenary army with which Frederick the Great saved Prussia
from dismemberment would have been an impossibility had
the nobility not supplied the means in the officer corps.
At the end of the war cadets were leading the army, the
sole survivors of their families..."³ And because the
aristocracy accepted the Prussian social myth, the royal
absolution was always tempered by the consciousness of the
existence of a watchful nobility and the Prussian population reassured by the tangible gain in Prussia's power:
"Prussia has become great," wrote Bismarck, "Not through
liberalism or free-thinking, but by means of a succession
of powerful, decisive and wise regents who carefully husbanded the military and financial resources of the state,
and kept them together in their own hands in order to throw
them with ruthless courage into the scale of European politics as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself...
It is undoubtedly just that every Prussian should enjoy that
degree of liberty which is consistent with the public welfare

3. Kohl I, p. 151.

3. Kon I, b. 12r.

degree of flexibility which is consistent with the buppie welfare
It is undoubtedly that every prussian should enjoy that
it is as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself...
them with ruthless courage into the face of European for-
and kept them together in their own hands in order to throw
punch the military and financial resources of the state,
of bowerly, decisive and wise regents who carefully un-
flexibly or tree-thinking, put by means of a succession
"brunswa has become great," wrote Biamarck, "not through
tion reasoned by the tangible gain in prussia's bowers:
existence of a watchful flexibility and the prussian boursa-
apportionment was simply tempered by the consciousness of the
aristocracy accepted the prussian social math, the royal
sole survivors of their families..."³ And because the
At the end of the war cedets were leading the army, the
culture of the nobility not abridged the means in the officer corps.
from dememorment would have been an impossiibility had
mercenarily army with which Frederick the Great saved prussia
is fertilized by the flood of its noble families. The
warlock say of it: "Everywhere the root of prussian flexibility
was too tough and volatile. And it was surrounded by the
orbital city. It might be narrow and unimpressive but it
aristocracy had not wanted away amidst the abnegion of a
same degree of conviction as in prance. For the prussian
nor could an attack on the aristocracy carry the

- 3 -

- 4 -

and with Prussia's career in European politics, but no
more. This degree of liberty is possible even without
parliaments and at the present stage of Prussia's intel-
lectual development, the abuse of royal power belongs to
the most improbable contingencies ... Long before the
continent thought of constitutional government...Prussian
royalty was a born of justice, a protection for the free-
dom of the individual as of the community and a source of
wise administration."⁴ It was this Prussia to which Bis-
marck appealed in his maiden-speech, the Prussia held to-
gether by the self-evidence of its social obligation, the
monolithic state whose genius lay in conserving its
energies for foreign policy.

And it was an appeal not without merit. For
however monolithic Prussia appeared to the outsider, its
vision of itself was not expressed by absolute power but
by justice and despite the authority of the King the Prus-
sian myth did not deny itself the attribute of freedom.
This was possible largely because of the virility of its
aristocracy. Bismarck said once that true freedom was al-
ways aristocratic and although he spoke as a partisan, he
spoke none the less truly. For if the most difficult task
of society is to learn the limits of righteousness and
the meaning of self-restraint, the class which most incorpo-
rates these qualities is a tightly-knit aristocracy; not
indeed because it contains a superior morality or a lesser

4. W. I, p. 375.

4. W. I., p. 312.

Indeed, because it contains a stronger morality on a lesser
rates these qualities is a tightly-knit aristocracy not
the meaning of self-restraint, the absence which most incorpo-
ral of such law is to learn the limits of righteousness and
aboke none the less truly. For it the most difficult task
make aristocratic and although he aboke as a barian, he
aristocracy. Blamark said once that true freedom was af-
This was bosaple largely because of the affinity of its
self which did not deny itself the attribute of freedom.
politics and debates the authority of the King the Prun-
vision of itself was not expressed by absolute power but
however monolithic Prunals abhorred to the outlander, its
And it was an abhor not without merit. For
energies for foreign policy.

monolithic state whose genuine lay in conserving its
retainer by the self-evidence of its social obligation, the
markok abhorred in his maiden-abeoep, the Prunals held to-
wise administration.⁴ It was this Prunals to which Bla-
dom of the individual as of the community and a source of
royalty was a form of justice, a protection for the free-
continent thought of constitutional government...Prunals
the most impropable contingencies ... Long before the
rectoral development, the abuse of royal power belongs to
barbarisms and at the present stage of Prunals's intel-
more. This degree of liberty is possible even without
and with Prunals's career in European politics, put no

- 4 -

(A)

- 5 -

degree of selfishness than other classes but because by
structure and ethos it must combat the preeminence of an
individual which is the foundation of absolutist rule,
while it legitimizes itself by a notion of quality which
is anathema to the despotism of egalitarian democracy.
In an aristocratic society the King's power is limited
by the consciousness that he is only the first of his
peers while Parliamentary excesses are made difficult by
the restraints of traditional forms. Britain is the ex-
ample of an aristocratic democracy; Prussia that of an
aristocratic autocracy.

But the condition of the efficacy of an aris-
tocracy is the self-evidence of its function. Whenever
an aristocracy is fundamentally challenged, it loses its
spontaneity and becomes merely one of the contending
forces and one moreover which is morally at a distinct
disadvantage. When what has been the standard of polit-
ical conduct based on a traditional code finds itself at-
tacked as a claim of special privilege, dogmatism is its
instinctive reaction. And this intransigeance denies
the ethos of a healthy aristocracy, which is to ameliorate,
to bridge chasms, and to integrate. To be sure, no aris-
tocracy sets itself these goals consciously; rather they
grow out of its awareness as a corporate entity which
places a necessary limit on the assertion of the individual
will and out of the consequent traditions of mutual re-
spect which keep disagreements from being pushed to their

above which keep disagreements from being bused to their
will and out of the consequence traditions of mutual re-
bless a necessary limit on the assertion of the individual
grow out of its awareness as a corporate entity which
crowd sets itself these goals concretely: rather they
do bridge enigma, and to integrate. To be sure, no ari-
the ethos of a healthy *aristocracy*, which is to emirate,
inertive reaction. And this intransigence denies
tacked as a claim of exceptional privilege, degenerates as its
total conduct based on a traditional code tends itself at-
disadvantage. When what has been the standard of boff-
forces and one moreover which is morally at a distinct
abontaneity and becomes merely one of the contending
an *aristocracy* is fundamentally ensnared, it loses its
tockery is the self-evidence of its function. Whenever

But the condition of the efficacy of an *arist-
aristocratic autocracy*.

able of an *aristocratic democracy*: bruntal that of an
the restraints of traditional forms. Britain is the ex-
pears while parliamentary excesse are made difficult by
the consciousness that he is only the first of his
In an *aristocratic society* the King's power is limited
is anathema to the despotism of egalitarian democracy.
while it legitimizes itself by a notion of dignity which
individual which is the foundation of despotic rule,
structure and ethos it must combat the breveminence of an
g Degree of selflikeness than other classes but because dy

- 2 -

- 6 -

ultimate conclusions.

But it was a root-fact of the Prussian political
situation that the prerogatives of the aristocracy came
increasingly to be questioned -- indeed the change in the
situation was precisely the fact that they had come to be
thought of as "prerogatives" and not as "rights". Thus the
Prussian aristocracy was forced into a theoretical defense
of their position -- an all but impossible task, for aris-
tocracies justify themselves not by their truth but by
their existence. And because the task was unfamiliar, the
Junkers tended to substitute doctrinal rigidity for origi-
nality of thought. Their arguments were in practice the
precise reverse of the claims of their liberal opponents
and exhibited the same insistence on universality. They
confronted the vision of the essential harmony of consti-
tutional states with the assertion of the inherent sanc-
tity of legitimate rule. And they opposed the superiority
of liberal institutions to the insistence on the superior
justice of historical authority. It was in this group,
small, somewhat defensive but still highly influential,
that Bismarck found his place. And if his reception was
based in part on a misunderstanding, this was a pardonable
error. For the vehemence of Bismarck's language tended to
obscure the fact that his conclusions, so safely conserva-
tive, were in fact based on premises radically different
from the legitimist ones. "It is difficult to know public

from the legitimate ones. "It is difficult to know whether
tive, were in fact based on premises radically different
opposite the fact that his conclusions, so safely conserva-
tion. For the adherence of Bramarok's language tended to
based in part on a misunderstanding, this was a dangerous
that Bramarok found his place. And if his reception was
small, somewhat defensive put still sufficiently influential,
practice of historical authority. It was in this group,
of liperal institutions to the insistence on the superiority
ty of legitimate rule. And they obfuscated the univerality
of national states with the assertion of the inherent same-
contrasted the avion of the essential harmony of consistency
and exhibited the same insistance on universality. They
began reverse of the claims of their liperal obsoles-
ality of thought. Their arguments were in practice the
tumours tended to antidote doctrinal rigidity for orth-
their existence. And because the task was unutilitarian, the
together quantity themselves not by their truth but by
of their position -- an all put impossible task, for afa-
Brussian arbitrariness was forced into a theoretical defense
thought of as "brerogatives" and not as "rights". Thus the
situation was precisely the fact that they had come to be
increasingly to be questioned -- indeed the change in the
situation that the brerogatives of the arbitrariness came
out of a roof-top of the Brussian political
ultimate conclusions.

- d -

(4)

- 7 -

opinion," said Bismarck in one of his early speeches in
the parliament. "I believe I have become acquainted with
it at several places ... and I found it to be still the old
Prussian opinion to which the word of the King means more
than any interpretation or twisting of the letter of the
law."⁵

It was not surprising that Bismarck was wel-
comed with open arms by the extreme Right of the Landtag.
Here was a man animated by a fervor equal to that of his
opponents and with an eloquence almost completely unknown
among the Junkers. And Bismarck had at last found his vo-
cation. He reported to his bride that he had been gripped
to an unexpected degree by the political problems. "I am
sure you will find me aged ten years when you see me again.
No velvet jacket, no Jean Paul, only law, politics and the
rage of parties fill my head and the whole range of the
Alps with its lakes will not be able to elicit a glance
from me if the <u>Preussische Allgemeine</u> /a newspaper/ lies
next to me."⁶ And soon there emerged the most characteris-
tic of Bismarck's qualities, the inability to grant the
good faith of his opponents, the insistence on reducing
political disputes to personal contests: "I am choleric
from morning till night about the lying, calumniating dis-
honesty of the opposition and the malevolent intent with
which it shuts itself against all reason and about the
thoughtless superficiality of the mass with which the

5. Kohl I, p. 13.

6. W. 14/1, p. 97.

G. W. J. F. I., b. 31.
J. Korf I., b. 13.

thoughtless arbitrariness of the mass with which the
which it punishes itself against all reason and ap points the
honesty of the oblation and the malevolent intent with
from morning till night ap points the day, accumulating di-
rected against personal contempts: "I am cherishing
the oblation, the inconstance on requiring
to Bismarck's dissensions, the inability to grant the
next to me."¹c
And soon there emerged the most characteristic-
tions from the _Freundeschafts-Virkgemeine_ a newspaper
Vibe with its takes will not be able to effect a glance
rate of barriers till my head and the whole range of the
Noavel jacket, no Jean Kant, only law, politicks and the
ature you will find me aged ten years when you see me again.
to an unexpected degree by the political problems. "I am
caution. He reported to his pride that he had been gripped
among the Junkers. And Bismarck had at last found his ac-
obstacles and with an eloquence almost completely unknown
Here was a man animated by a fervor equal to that of his
coming with open arms by the extreme right of the language.
It was not surprising that Bismarck was we-

I am."¹d
than any interpretation or twisting of the letter of the
Prussian opinion to which the word of the King means more
it at several places ... and I found it to be still the old
the barbistment. "I believe I have become saturated with
obEDIoN," said Bismarck in one of his early speeches in

- 1 -

(H)

- 8 -

mightiest arguments do not count against the banal phrase-
ology of the Rhenish wine-merchants' policy."⁷

Well might the stodgy land-owners who represented
Prussian conservatism congratulate themselves on the acqui-
sition of this fighter. And as he made speech after speech
against the laws to eliminate the vestiges of feudal rule,
such as the power of the landed nobility to appoint the
judges, against granting legal equality to the Jews (for
the characteristic reason that he could not imagine a Jew
as a representative of a King by the grace of God), against
an attempt to tax the agricultural districts more heavily
-- all delivered with a with and sarcasm heretofore foreign
to the conservative cause, Bismarck soon achieved promi-
nence as one of the ablest advocates of the legitimist side.
He was received at court "by our friend the King and the
High Personages spoiled me very much."⁸

But had his colleagues listened more closely they
would have realized that they had acquired an ally who
might ultimately prove more dangerous to them than their
antagonists who pedantry prevented them from drawing ulti-
mate conclusions. For what Bismarck was defending in the
*Vereinigte Landtag* was not a principle but a fact, not a
doctrine but a preference. He attacked liberalism not be-
cause of its violation of the lessons of *universal history* but
because of its violation of the laws of *Prussian history*; and

7. W. 14/I, p. 91.

8. W. 14/I, p. 97.

["8. W. 14\\1, b. 61.\nJ. M. 14\\1, b. 61.", "because of its violation of the laws of <u>Russian</u> histori and\ncause of its violation of the laws of <u>universal</u> histori put\ngovernment put a preference. He attackedliparchiam not pe-\n<u>Veritative</u> <u>langth</u> was not a bridle put a fact, not a\nmature consideration. For what Biamarck was spending in the\n<u>autonomous</u> who beganly prevented them from drawing nifi-\nmight ultimately prove more dangerous to them than their\nwould have realized that they had sequired an ally who\nBut had his correspondence flattened more closely they\nHigh <u>peronologies</u> abetted me very much.\"8", "He was received at court \"by our friend the King and the\nsence as one of the splendid advocates of the Democratic side,\nto the conservative cause, Biamarck soon achieved promi-\n-- as delivered with a width and arcanae pericolo re forego\nan attempt to tax the agricultural districts more heavily\nas a representative of a King by the Grace of God), against\nthe characteristic reason that he could not imagine a tem-\nand so the power of the landed nobility to abate the\nagainst the laws to eliminate the privileges of temporal\nand social classes, against granting legal equality to the laws (for\nsuch as the power of the landed nobility to abate the\nagainst the laws to eliminate the privileges of temporal\nand social classes, and so he made a speech after abet\nBiamarck conservative themselves on the acoust-\nwell might the atody land-owners who represented\nof the laws of the Russian wine-merchants, below.\"", "and social classes, and so he made a speech after abet\nagainst the laws to eliminate the privileges of temporal\nand social classes, and so he made a speech after abet\nagainst the laws to eliminate

- 9 -

he defended the monarchy not because legitimate rule was sacrosanct but because of the historical accident that Prussia had never undergone a revolution. "In 1688 the British people found themselves in a different position from that of Prussia to-day; a century of revolution and civil war had placed it in the position of being able to bestow a crown and to attach conditions to it ... While the Prussian kings are in possession of a crown not by the grace of the people but by that of God."⁹ And even the defense of the privileges of the Junkers did not base itself on a postulated order of the universe but on an accident or birth, not on the interest of the state, but on the claims of the Estates: "The appointment of judicial officials is an important and honorable right when gives the Estate of the landed aristocracy a weight in our constitution which I am determined not to surrender voluntarily."¹⁰ "I am a Junker," he said another time, "and I want to reap some advantages from it." More, Bismarck soon proved that the identification of nationalism and liberalism was a misapprehension, that on the contrary an appeal to nationalism could be used to, as a weapon against the advocates of domestic reform: "... A few speakers have referred, as so often before, to the example of Britain and France as valuable of imitation ... I should like to recommend to the gentlemen who tend so much to seek their ideals across the Vosges one guiding principle which distinguishes the Briton and the Frenchman: the proud feeling for national honor which does 9. Kohl I, p. 13 -10E. I, p. 75.

B. Kow I, b. 13 -10H. I, b. 12.

Brande man: the broad feeling for national honor which does one guiding principle which distinguishes the Briton and the who tend so much to seek their ideals across the seas

Imitation... I should like to recommend to the Britishmen

To me, to the example of Britain and France as an example of

Return: "... A few speakers have referred, so often pe-

be need to, as a weapon against the advocates of domestic

democracy, that on the contrary an abhor to nationsism conq

identification of nationalism and liberalism was a misbre-

avantage from it." More, Bismarck soon proved that the

Junkers," he said another time, "and I want to reach some ad-

"I am a

an important and honorable right when given the Estate of

of the Estates: "The abatement of judicial officials in

Prussia, not on the interest of the state, put on the claims

on a balanced order of the universe put on an accident or

tense of the privileges of the Junkers did not cease itself.

Grace of the beagle put on that of God."²¹ And even the ge-

the Prussian kings are in boons of a crown not by the

bestow a crown and to attach conditions to it ... Muffe

civil war had begun if in the position of being able to

from trust of Prussia to quit; a century of revolution and

British beagle found themselves in a difficult position

Prussia had never undergone a revolution. "In 1888 the

assassination put persons of the historical accident that

- 3 -

(4)

- 10 -

not so easily seek models to imitate abroad."¹¹

Bismarck was thus separated from his friends by a
gulf scarecly less wide than that parting him from his ene-
mies. For if he defended the claims of the aristocracy he
did so for a two-fold reason which had nothing to do with
the doctrinal rigidity of his circle: Because he was a
"Junker" which was a "fact" implying certain necessary con-
clusions; and because liberalism represented a challenge to
the distinguishing characteristics of Prussian history. Bis-
marck sought to rescue Prussia's uniqueness from dissolu-
tion, the conservatives sought to defend general principles.
Bismarck strove to eliminate domestic discord in order to
keep Prussia fit for foreign policy; his friends aimed at
the same thing, but in order to assure the triumph of le-
gitimate rule. For the moment still they might walk hand
in hand. But the time might come when other "facts" emerged
which the naturalist might insist on manipulating. Indeed
the assumption of Prussia's uniqueness might well imply that
Prussia could utilize the forces at large in the world with
impunity, that it could reduce the ideals of an impatient
century to "forces" to be manipulated and to disintegrate
the existing structure by dissolving its restraints.

And although the stenographic reports of Bismarck's
early speeches record many snickers by the liberal sections
of the parliament this only indicated that the popular move-
ment had come to consider certain contingencies as incon-
11. Kohl I, p. 31.

IT. Koul I., b. 31.

ment had come to consider certain configurations as incon-
ot of the parliament this only indicated that the popular move-
easy shepherds record many enokers by the liperal sections
And although the atenographic reports of Biamarck's
the existing structure by diacofining its restraints.
century to " forces " to be manipulated and to disindemnate
immunity, that it could reduce the ideals of an impatient
Brussels could utilize the forces at large in the world with
the assumption of Prussia's uniqueness might well imply that
which the naturalist might insinat on manipulating. Indeed
in hand. But the time might come when other " forces " emerged
ultimate rule. For the moment still they might walk hand
the same thing, but in order to assure the triumph of is-
keep Prussia lift for foreign buffer: the force aimed at
Biamarck arose to eliminate domestic disorder in order to
force, the conservative sought to delimit General principles.
Brussels sought to release Prussia's uniqueness from diacon-
the distinguishing characteristics of Prussian history. Bi-
cutionist and because liperalism represented a challenge to
"punker," which was a "tact," implying certain necessarily con-
tactual rigidity of his circle: Because he was a
dig so for a two-fold reason which had nothing to do with
mies. For it he defended the claims of the antiatheist he
saw already less wide than that barding him from his en-
Biamarck was thus separated from his friend by a
not so easily seek models to imitate his approach." 11

- 10 -

- 11 -

ceivable. That an appeal to Prussian nationalism might
supersede that of Germany, that an autocratic Prussia
might still appeal to liberals in other parts of Germany,
was beyond the imagination of all deputies. There was in-
deed what proved the ultimate danger to liberalism and the
failure to recognize it as such only accentuated it: that
nationalism and liberalism be separated and indeed become
antagonistic. But as the first diet closed this could not
be apparent -- only posterity can make these claims by an
exegesis with hindsight. And before the next session of
the Vereinigte Landtag an event occurred which brought all
these tensions to a sharp focus.

For in March 1848 the Revolution which had started
as an uprising in Paris reached Berlin and Frederick
William IV, king of Prussia by the grace of God, soon found
himself forced to parade through Berlin with a sash in the
revolutionary colon around his waist.

(several spaces)

(several abscissa)

revolutionary colon around his wife.

himself forced to barque through Berlin with a船 in the
William IV, King of Prussia by the grace of God, soon found
as an abraining in Paris reached Berlin and Prussia.

For in March 1848 the Revolution which had started
these tensions to a sharp end.

the <u>Vereinigte Landtag</u> an event occurred which brought all
exigeata with windblown. And before the next session of
be absent -- only posterity can make these claims by an
autonomous. But as the first diet closed this could not
nationall andliperaliam be separated and indeed becomes
tainful to recognize it as such only accentuated it: that
deed what proved the ultimate danger toliperaliam and the
was beyond the imagination of all deputies. There was in-
might still abeam toliperalia in other parte of Germany,
underage that of Germany, that an autocratic Prussia
ceivable. That an abeam to Prussian nationality might

- II -

(M)

- 12 -

For 33 years the subtle "Metternich system" had assured European tranquility. Starting from the assumption of Austria's special vulnerability, geographically in the center of the Continent and morally as a polyglot Empire in an era of nationalism, the wily Austrian minister had managed to construct an international system whose legitimizing principle was identical with that of Austria's domestic structure. In the face of the rising current of nationalism, Europe was organized on the principles of legitimacy and equilibrium, on the sanctity of historical rule, and the necessity of a balance of power. The Holy Alliance had been transformed into an instrument by which Prussia, Austria and Russia could police Europe against revolutionary outbreaks. And Germany was organized into a confederation of many sovereignties and therefore of wills whose very structure would inhibit both the Prussian quest for hegemony and the liberals' goal of unity. The crowning achievement of Metternich's policy was his ability to legitimize it by Prussia's acquiescence, by persuading Prussia's monarchs that they had more to fear from a revolution than they could gain by making themselves the advocates of the trends of their period.

Any movement to achieve German unity was therefore confronted with formidable difficulties. It faced 33 sovereign states jealous of their prerogatives and the potential opposition of the three major continental powers. To be sure

ation of the three major continental powers. To be sure
states lesions of their broCADES and the potentiate obbo-
contrasted with formidable difficulties. It faced 33 sovereign
Any movement to achieve German unity was therefore
their period.

Gain dy making themselves the advocates of the trend of
that they had more to fear from a revolution than they could
Brutal's a confidence, dy berating Prussia's a morsel
Mettmann's a bolty was his spight to legitimize it dy
the fipper's, gain of unity. The crowning achievement of
are would fulfill pod the Prussian great for hegemony and
many sovereignies and therefore of wits whose very atrac-
preca. And Germany was organized into a confederation of
and Prussia config police Europe against revolutionary out-
transformed into an instrument dy which Prussia's, Austria
ceasity of a place of power. The Holy Alliance had been
ediffiprium, on the anicity of historical rule, and the ne-
Europe was organized on the principles of legitimacy and
attracture. In the face of the rising current of nationalism,
principle was identical with that of Austria's a domestic
aged to contract an international system whose legitimitizing
an era of nationalism, the wild Austrian minster had man-
center of the Continent and power as a hegemony in
of Austria's a special inmunitypility, geographically in the
saamed Europeau centrality. Starting from the secession
for 33 years the able "Mettmann system" had

- 15 -

(4)

- 13 -

there existed an assembly of the German Confederation meet-
ing in Frankfurt. But it had been carefully constructed to
place a premium on particularist self-will. Composed of the
representatives of the governments, it was not a parliament,
but a diplomatic assembly. Each of the larger states was
given one vote while the remainder were organized into six
furies voting as units. Thus Prussia, the largest purely
German state, had only one vote in 17 and its very size and
amorphous shape was almost certain to insure a permanent ma-
jority against her. And therefore all hopes for German unity
came to be concentrated on Prussia. However, repressive
Prussia's own policy, a look at the map had to convince even
the most doctrinaire that no German revolution could succeed
without a sufficient material base and that only Prussia
could furnish this base. This was confirmed by the experience
of the War of Liberation for then the national elan had had
its origin in Prussia. It did not matter that Prussia was as
reactionary as Austria and more efficient: the state which had
represented an idea before it became a reality, played an even
more paradoxical role. It came to represent an idea contrary
to its reality.

In the face of these obstacles the rapid success of
the revolution of 1848 was all the more remarkable. Within
the space of two months, the upheaval which had started in
France swept across Germany. By February 18, Frederick William
IV, who only the year previous had announced that he would not

IV, who only the year before had announced that he would not
france would across Germany. By February 18, Frederick William
the absence of two months, theنبهایی که می‌باد می‌شود در
the revolution of 1848 was all the more remarkable. Within
In the face of these obstacles the rabid success of
to its reality.

more baroque role. It came to represent an ideas counter-
represented an idea before it became a reality, blazed an even
reasonably as Austria and more efficient: the state which had
its origin in Prussia. It did not matter that Prussia was as
of the War of Liberation for then the national effort had had
could turn into this idea. This was confirmed by the experience
without a sufficient material base and that only Prussia
the most doctrinaire that no German revolution could succeed
Prussia's own belief, a look at the way had to convince even
came to be concentrated on Prussia. However, repressive
gency against her. And therefore all hopes for German unity
aspiration were almost certain to insure a permanent ma-
German state, had only one vote in it and its very size and
Austria voting as units. Thus Prussia, the largest country
Given one vote while the remainder were organized into six
put a diplomatic assemblage. Each of the larger states was
representative of the Governments, it was not a parliament,
place a premium on parliamentary self-will. Composed of the
fug in Frankfurt. But it had been carefully constructed to
there existed an assembly of the German Confederation meet-

- 13 -

- 14 -

let a "scrap of paper" stand between him and his people, felt obliged to promise a constitution and freedom of the press. It only underlined the relationship between Prussia's domestic policy and the German question that the same document called for a transformation of the German Confederation into a Federal state with its own national army. Three weeks later, on March 13, Metternich, the man who had dominated Europe for a generation, was forced to resign. Soon no important German state remained unaffected by the revolutionary current. On March 19, street fighting broke out in Berlin and the unstable king hiding his indecision behind alternating declarations full of bombast and appeals to his "beloved Berliners" finally took an irrevocable step. To the chagrin of his officers he ordered his troops to quit Berlin and placed himself under the protection of the revolutionary "citizens". On March 31, he saluted the funeral procession of the victims of the street-fighting from the balcony of the palace and later that day he permitted himself to be prevailed upon to ride through Berlin with the revolutionary colors draped around his waist. The procession ended with a royal proclamation that henceforth "Prussia was dissolved in Germany". The revolution seemed to have triumphed all along the line.

But after the first heady excitement was over it became apparent that victory is not the end of revolutions but their beginning and that Metternich had built better than many of his opponents had realized. For however successful the

of his obituaries had resulted. For however unnecessary the
their beginning and that Metternich had built better than many
became apparent that victory is not the end of revolutions but
But after the first deadly excitement was over it
stirred among the fine.

disagreed in Germany". The revolution seemed to have triumphed
ended with a royal proclamation that henceforth "Prussia was
revolutionary colors graced around his walls". The procession
hymnelt to bebreasted upon to ride through Berlin with the
trom the balcony of the balance and later that day he permitted
the universal procession of the victims of the street-lighting
tion of the revolutionary "citizens". On March 31, he saluted
his troops to dust Berlin and placed himself under the brocade-
irrevocable step. To the群 of his officers he ordered
pompast and abbeles to his "beloved Berliners" tenuily took an
riding his indigitation pending alternating declarations that
street lighting broke out in Berlin and the unstable king
mained unaltered by the revolutionary current. On March 19,
tion, was forced to resign. Soon no important German state re-
f3, Metternich, the man who had dominated Europe for a general-
state with its own national army. Three weeks later, on March
for a transformation of the German Confederation into a Federal
policy and the German question that the same document called
only underlined the relationship between Prussia's domestic
oppressed to promote a constitution and freedom of the press. It
let a "scrap of paper" stand between him and his beadle, left

- 14 -

(A)

- 15 -

revolution in its components, Germany remained fragmented. The 33 sovereign governments still remained and no less jealous of their prerogatives. To be sure, by the end of March there met in Frankfurt a Vorparlement, a preliminary National Assembly to prepare the way for a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage which was to draft a German constitution. But Frankfurt was not Paris. It was not the center of administration of Germany, but simply the former meeting place of permanent ______ of German diplomatic representatives which had been designed to remain ineffective. The new Constituent Assembly had therefore to operate side by side with 33 sovereign governments and its power was no greater than their willingness to obey or to surrender voluntarily their prerogatives.

And there always remained Austria. For Austria was not only a German state but a polyglot Empire based on a set of feudal relationships. Its German provinces performed a dual function: they belonged to the German Confederation but they also were the nucleus for controlling millions of Magrars, Slavs and Poles. Thus, the role of Austria in a unified Germany presented almost insurmountable difficulties: If Austria joined the new state with its German provinces only, its Empire would perforce disintegrate. But if it joined its entirety, the German Empire would mortgage its future by absorbing some 25 million foreigners. On the other hand, a Germany without Austria was harder still to conceive.

hang, a Germany without Anatolia was harder still to conceive.
future by sparring some 52 million foreigners. On the other
it joined its entirety, the German Empire would mortgage its
资产 only, its Empire would become disintegrate. But it
takes: It Anatolia joined the new state with its German bro-
in a unified Germany presented almost innumerable options-
ions of Warms, Slav andoles. Thus, the role of Anatolia
operation put them also were theoles for controlling mil-
tormed a dual function: they belonged to the German Conq-
sion of tendal relationships. Its German provinces ber-
was not only a German state but a body of Empire based on
And there always remained Anatolia. For Anatolia
surrender authoritatively their prerogatives.
Power was no greater than their willingness to open or to
operate side by side with 33 sovereign governments and its
inertive. The new Constitution Assembly had therefore to
diplomatic representatives which had been designed to remain
to former meeting place of permanent _________ of German
not the center of administration of Germany, but simply the
German constitution. But Frankfurt was not Paris. It was
seemly elected by universal autocracy which was to draft a
National Assembly to prepare the way for a Constitution Au-
March there met in Frankfurt a <u>Vorabteilung</u>, a preliminary
terms of their prerogatives. To be accurate, by the end of
The 33 sovereign governments still remained and no less
revolution in its components, Germany remained fragmented.

- 12 -

(1)

- 16 -

The memory of 400 years of Holy Roman Emperors from the Hapsburg dynasty could not be erased nor the historical achievement of what had been Germany's bulwark towards the East. From its beginning therefore the Preliminary Assembly and later the Constituent Assembly was torn by schisms of structure, of history, and of aspirations. And wherever it turned, it came up against the stark reality that the Gordian knot could not be cut by constitutional theories, only by leadership and that only Prussia was capable of supplying it.

But Prussia was far from ready to serve as the spearhead for a liberal, unified Germany. Its revolution had been only skin-deep and successful more because of the indecisiveness of the King than through widespread popular exertion. Neither of the pillars of the Prussian state, the army and the bureaucracy, had been fundamentally shaken. And the King with his romantic notions of feudal fealty proved a weak reed for the nationalists. Already the first delegation of the Frankfurt Parliament was to learn that here was a man for the magnificent pose but not for the decisive action: "Should an imperial crown come about for German," announced Frederick William then, "it should adorn the Austrian ruler and with pleasure would I hold the silver chalice for him at the coronation."¹² In this manner time was lost and while constitutional fine points were being discussed in Frankfurt, the traditional Prussia collected its composure and its strength for the moment when it could impatiently sweep away the idealistic debates of the reformers.

12. Stern, VII, p. 94.

1S. Stern, *AII*, b. 94.

fatic deates of the reformers.

for the moment when it could impatiently sweep away the ideal-
the traditional Prussia collected its composure and its strength-
constitutional line points were being dismembered in Frankfurt,
the coronation."¹S In this manner time was fast and while
and with bessence would I hold the silver epistle for him at
Frederick William then, "it should adorn the Austrian ruler
"should an imperial crown come apart for Germany," announced
for the magnificent bose but not for the geolative action:
of the Frankfurt Parliament was to learn that here was a man
weak need for the nationalities. Already the first delegation
the King with his romantic notions of equal reality proved a
army and the purseworn, had been fundamentally envenomed. And
exertion. Neither of the bills of the Prussian state, the
indirectness of the King than through widebroad bobbing
had been only skin-deep and unnecessary more because of the
absence of a tipper, multiplied Germany. Its revolution
But Prussia was lar from ready to serve as the
and that off Prussia was capable of subhying it.
could not be out of constitutional theories, only by lesser-
it came nb against the stark reality that the Gordan knot
ture, of history, and of aspirations. And wherever it turned,
fater the Constitutionality was torn by sentences of atmo-
from its beginning therefore the Preliminary Assembl, and
ment of what had been Germany's primark towards the East,
pung dynamics could not be erased nor the historical achieve-
the memory of 400 years of Holy Roman Emperors from the Habs-

- 16 -

- 17 -

No segment of the society had been more painfully
aware of the transformation than the Junkers. It was their
army which had been ordered to retreat before what they con-
sidered rabble; it was their notion of hierarchy and order
which seemed under most violent attack. What did it matter
that their King might now become Emperor of Germany? The
crown of Prussia had ever possessed a lustre for this group
that needed no enhancing -- this indeed had been the condi-
tion of their loyalty. And for Bismarck there was an addit-
ional reason for bitterness. His whole conception of patrio-
tism was based on a notion of Prussia's peculiarity, its
specific sense of duty, its special embodiment of authority.
To be sure he wanted to see Prussia great, but not at the
cost of its dissolution in another entity however exalted.
A liberal Prussia, with the King deprived of authority, a
Prussia which might become a province of a united Germany,
this to Bismarck was no longer Prussia. It was almost as if
the Seven Year War had been lost a century after its conclu-
sion. When Bismarck spoke of patriotism at this time and
for a long while thereafter he meant Prussia and not Ger-
many and German unity was not an end sanctified by abstract
principles but a means to assure the defense of Prussia.

It was only natural therefore that Bismarck should
react violently to the news of the revolution and that he
should treat it as a personal challenge: "...Not even the
dead can I forgive," he wrote more than a year later. "...My

dead can I long live," he wrote more than a year later. "...My
amond treat it as a personal challenge: "...Not even the
react afoeuly to the news of the revolution and that he
should treat it as a personal challenge."

It was only natural therefore that Bismarck should
principles put a mean to assure the defense of Prussia.

many and German unity was not an end anotified by abstract
for a long while thereafter he meant Prussia and not Ger-
sion. When Bismarck arose of belligerism at this time and
the Seven Year War had been lost a century after its concern-
this to Bismarck was no longer Prussia. It was almost as it
Prussia which might become a province of a united Germany,
A liperal Prussia, with the King deprived of authority, a
coat of its dissolution in another entity however exalted.
To be sure he wanted to see Prussia Great, put not at the
a specific sense of duty, its exceptional embodiment of authority,
team was based on a notion of Prussia's beaufinity, its
fourth reason for bitterness. His whole conception of batio-
cion of their toality. And for Bismarck there was an abit-
that needed no enhancing -- this indeed had been the condi-
crown of Prussia had ever possessed a theatre for this Grob
dat their King might now become Emperor of Germany? The
which seemed under most violent attack. What did it matter
aided rappel it was their notion of hierarchy and order
army which had been ordered to retreat before what they con-
swore of the transformation than the Hunken. It was their

No segment of the society had been more beautifully
shown to the public. It was their

The King's谋反 was a most violent attack. What did it matter
that the King might now become Emperor of Germany? The
army which had been ordered to retreat before what they con-
swore of the transformation than the Hunken. It was their

...the King's谋反 was a most violent attack. What did it matter
that the King might now become Emperor of Germany? The
army which had been ordered to retreat before what they con-
swore of the transformation than the Hunken. It was their

- 11 -

- 18 -

heart is bursting with poison when I see what they have made
out of *my* (my italics) fatherland, these murderer at whose
graves the Berliners now worship idols ..."¹³ Bismarck's
next reaction was equally characteristic. His loyalty to
authority was never unconditional but depended on their abil-
ity to incarnate his conception of the necessary. Now the
traditional Prussia crumbling and its disintegration sanc-
tioned by the King, Bismarck seriously thought of making a
counterrevolution and it bespoke his feudal past that he
wanted to use his own peasants as a nucleus. But behind the
vehemence of Bismarck's passions there always lurked a streak
of canny deliberateness, which caused the would-be revolu-
tionary to visit Berlin to reconnoiter and if possible to
stiffen the backbone of the King. Bismarck found Berlin in
the hands of the revolutionaries, however, and it proved im-
possible to penetrate to the royal palace. His excursion
would therefore have proved a tragi-comic interlude had it
not led to an interview which was fundamentally to affect
his future relationship with the court. Thwarted in his ef-
fort to reach the king, Bismarck sought out his younger
brother Prince Karl, well known for his reactionary tenden-
cies. Through him there was arranged a meeting with Princess
Augusta, the wife of the Prince of Prussia, the eldest bro-
ther of the childless king, who was the heir presumptive to
the throne but who had been forced to flee to England because

13. W. 14/I, p. 143. September 16, 1849.

13. W. I\1, b. 143. September 19, 1849.

the throne put who had been forced to leave to England because
then of the official king, who was the heir presumptive to
Volkhats, the wife of the prince of Prussia, the eldest pro-
cess. Through him there was arranged a meeting with Prussia
brother, Prince Karl, well known for his revolutionary tenden-
tion to reach the king. Blamarek sought out his younger,
his future relationship with the count. Tumared in his et-
not led to an interview which was Unfortunately to affect
would therefore have proved a trusty-comic interlude had it
brought to benefit to the royal face. His examination
the hands of the revolutionaries, however, and it proved im-
attentive the backbone of the King. Blamarek found Berlin in
favour to aaitt Berlin to reconnoiter and it brought to
ot. canny deftperatenees, which caused the wrong-to be revolu-
tionary of Blamarek's baseness there already inked a streak
wanted to use his own besaata as a weapon. But behind the
counterrevolution and it peabone his tendal beat that he
toned by the King. Blamarek seriously thought of making a
traditional Prussian crimping and its disintegration ane-
ity to incinerate his conception of the necessary. Now the
authority was never unconditional put debenged on their apol-
nous reaction was equally characteristic. His loyalty to
Graves the Berlinares now morose and feral ..." Blamarek's
out of my (my itself) fatherland, these murders at whose
heart is purating with poison when I see what they have made

- 18 -

- 19 -

the population considered him the incarnation of the military
spirit. It was for this reason, with the King inaccessible in
Berlin and the heir presumptive in exile, that Bismarck spoke
to Augusta.

Two accounts of their meeting exist, a note by Augusta
written in 1862 to her husband then King and considering the
appointment of Bismarck as his First Minister and a chapter
in Bismarck's memoirs written 40 years after the event. Both
agree about the substance of the conversation: that the King
was to be declared incompetent, that the Prince of Prussia
succeed him, only to resign in favor of his son, that Prince
Karl be appointed Regent and presumably lead a counter-revo-
lution based on the Officers' Corps on Potsdam. They disagree
as to who originated the project, Augusta ascribing it to
Bismarck while Bismarck insisted that he indignantly rejected
Augusta's propositions.14 But aside from the fact that no
motive would seem to exist for Augusta to bring up this mat-
ter if she was the guilty party, the dispute tends to ob-
secure the fundamental point: Both agree that plans to de-
pose the king were being discussed. And if Bismarck is tell-
ing the truth, it is perhaps even more significant that
Augusta should select out of the whole group of conservative
deputies perhaps the youngest, whose public career was then
hardly a year old. The hatred which Bismarck bore Augusta
through his life may well have been primarily because she
understood his revolutionary quality, that Bismarck could
14. Augusta's account, E.I, p.88; Bismarck's account, W. VII,
p. 106, G.E. I, p.

b. 103°, G.E. I', b.
14. Augnats's account, K.I., b.88; Biamarck's account, M. All.

understood his revolutionarily duality, that Biamarck config-
through his life may well have been primarily because he
hardly a year old. The hatred which Biamarck bore Augnats
debuted because the Youngest, whose definite career was then
Augnats should select out of the whole group of conservative
ing the truth, it is because even more significant that
bore the King were being discussed. And if Biamarck is to-
come the fundamental point: Both agree that Biam to ge-
ter it she was the guilty party, the guilty tends to op-
motive would seem to exist for Augnats to bring up this mat-
Augnats's broCADEtions.¹⁴ But aside from the fact that no
Biamarck while Biamarck initiated that he indubitably rejected
as to who originated the protect. Augnats accepting it to
intention based on the Outroors, Corba on Potadam. They agree
Karl de abointed Regent and breamaply send a counter-revo-
nanced him, only to result in favor of his son, that Prince
was to be declared incompetent, that the Prince of Brnaia
agree upon the apdinance of the conversation: that the King
in Biamarck's memoria written 40 years after the event. Both
abonnement of Biamarck as his First Minister and a chapter
written in 1865 to her husband then King and considering the

Two accounts of their meeting exist, a note by Augnats
to Augnats.

Berlin and the heir breambative in exile, that Biamarck aboke
spirit. It was for this reason, with the King insufficient in
the boubulation considered him the incarnation of the military

- 13 -

- 20 -

obey only on terms he reserved the right to define, that
his loyalty was therefore always conditional.

How Bismarck conceived his relationship to the
King was fully revealed in an interview two months later
in the garden of the palace of Potsdam. When Frederick
William inquired about the state of public opinion in the
provinces Bismarck replied sharply: "It was good, but
since we have been innoculated with the revolutionary
virus by the royal authorities with royal blessing, it
has deteriorated. What is lacking is confidence in the
assistance of the King." Every word was chosen for max-
imum effect in this ambiguous defiance, whose show of
daring was ameliorated by the fact that Bismarck was ac-
cusing the King of not being sufficiently royalist. That
Bismarck had conquered the moral terrain became immediately
apparent in Frederick William's plaintive query what pre-
cisely Bismarck was accusing him of. When Bismarck re-
plied "the evacuation of the troops from Berlin," the
Queen interrupted with the statement that the King was
"innocent" for he had not slept for three days before
giving his orders. But the Queen was no match for Bismarck
who replied with a sentence which summed up both his conception
of authority and his diplomatic skill: "A king _must_ be able
to sleep."15 Here was nothing of the deferential sense of
hierarchy of the conservative nor of the awe before the ruler
by the grace of god of the legitimist. What was at stake was

15. G. E. I, p. ___

12. G. E. R. B. —

by the Grace of God of the Legitimacy. What was at stake was
pierced out of the conservative non of the same before the judge
to a feeble."¹² Here was nothing of the differential sense of
of authority and his diplomatic skill: "A King must be able
who reified with a sentence which summed up both his conception
Gaining his organs. But the Queen was no match for Bismarck
"innocent", for he had not slept for three days before
Queen interrupted with the statement that the King was
bified "the evacuation of the troops from Berlin", the
causal Bismarck was causing him of. When Bismarck re-
abherent in Frederick William's brainative demand what bre-
Bismarck had condensed the moral terrain became immediately
ensuing the King of not being sufficiently royalist. That
garing was sweeterated by the fact that Bismarck was so-
immum effect in this ambiguous detente, whose show of
assistance of the King." Each word was chosen for his-
use deteriorated. What is lacking is confidence in the
army by the royal authorities with royal pleasing, it
since we have been innoculated with the revolutionary
brothers Bismarck reified sparsely: "It was good, put
William indubitedly spout the state of buppie opinion in the
in the earthen of the balance of Potomac. When Frederiek
King was truly revealed in an interview two months later
How Bismarck conceived his relationship to the
his royalty was therefore always conditional.
open only on terms he reserved the right to define, that

- 50 -

- 21 -

the basic unit of Bismarck's thinking, the nature of the
Prussian state and the King was valuable only as long as
he lived up to Bismarck's notion of its specific essence.
And when the King attempted to evade his responsibility
by pleading human frailty, Bismarck silenced him with an
unanswerable argument which at the same time defined his
attributes. The King was left with the choice of either
accepting Bismarck's definition of the nature of the Prus-
sian state or of denying that he was a King. Not for the
last time was Bismarck to deal with his King by confront-
ing him with impossible alternatives.

The whole complexity of Bismarck's elemental
nature came to expression upon his return to Berlin 10
days later after his interview with Augusta. The occasion
was a convocation of the Vereinigte Landtag called to pro-
vide the legal continuity in the transformation of Prussia
into a constitutional state. It was to be replaced, ac-
cording to royal promise, by a parliament based on univer-
sal suffrage. Bismarck found a city which treated Prussia's
transformation as an accomplished fact and the unification
of Germany as imminent. "Everyone is for a German parlia-
ment," he reported to his brother, "even the nobility."16
In this atmosphere it was not surprising that the first
order of business of the Vereinigte Landtag was to vote on
an address of thanks to the King for the measures taken dur-
ing March. There existed two sets of attitudes in the chamber
16. W. 14/I, p. 102. March 28, 1848.

19. W. I.\1, b. 105. March 58, 1948.

ing March. There existed two sets of attitudes in the chamber
an address of thanks to the King for the measures taken qur-
order of prudence of the <u>Vereinfachte Landtag</u> was to vote on
In this atmosphere it was not appreciating that the first
ment," he reported to his brother, "even the uprooting."19
of Germany as imminent. "Everyone is for a German Berlin-
transformation as an accomplished fact and the unification
of Austria. Bismarck found a way which treated Prussia's
conquing to royal brownies" by a parliament based on univer-
into a constitutional state. It was to be replaced, so-
wide the legal continuity in the transformation of Prussia
was a convocation of the <u>Vereinfachte Landtag</u> called to bro-
gade later after his interview with Augustus. The occasion
nature came to expression about his return to Berlin 10

The whole complexity of Bismarck's elements

ing him with unfeasible alternatives.

That time was Bismarck to deal with his King by confront-
ating him or of denying that he was a King. Not for the
accepting Bismarck's definition of the nature of the Prus-
ian attributes. The King was left with the choice of either
unnamable person whom at the same time defined his
path by breaking human traffic. Bismarck attended him with an
And when the King attempted to evade his reasonableness
he failed not to Bismarck's notion of its abominable essence.
Prussia was at once and the King was unfeasible only as long as
the base unit of Bismarck's thinking, the nature of the

the base unit of Bismarck's thinking, the nature of the
Prussia state and the King was unfeasible only as long as
the nature of the King was unfeasible only as long as

- SI -

- 22 -

on this issue: the overwhelming majority eager to build on
the gains already achieved and a tiny group of die-hard
conservatives, opposing all change on doctrinaire grounds.
It was typical for Bismarck that he represented neither di-
rection. He was too much a Junker to be able to welcome
the revolution, but he was also too much a realist to oppose
an accomplished fact on theoretical grounds. The revolution
might be undesirable, but it was here and it was the states-
man's task to utilize it for his own ends. The result was
a speech of great ambiguity derided by the liberals and
scorned by the conservatives:

"I am one of the few who will vote against the ad-
dress [of thanks] and I have only asked for the floor to
motivate my vote and to explain that I accept the address
as a program for the future ... for the simple reason that
I can not help myself ... I do so not voluntarily but under
the pressure or circumstance for I have not changed my opin-
ion in the last six months ... The past is buried and I re-
gret it more deeply than many of you that no human power
can re-awaken it now that the crown has itself thrown the
earth on its coffin. But if I accept what has been imposed
I can nevertheless not quit the Vereinitge Landtag with the
lie that I am grateful or happy about what I must consider
at best an erroneous direction. Should it really prove pos-
sible to achieve a unified German fatherland by means of the
new road we have taken or even a legal order then the moment

new road we have taken or even a legal order then the moment
able to achieve a unified German nation and means of the
state put an erroneous direction. Should it really prove bon-
fire that I am grateful or happy about what I must consider
I can nevertheless not drift the Vereinfachte Landtag with the
earth on itsolln. But if I accept what has been imposed
can reawaken it now that the crown has itself thrown the
grasp it more greedily than many of you that no human power
ton in the last six months ... The beat is purged and I re-
the breather or circumference for I have not changed my ob-
I can not help myself ... I do so not voluntarily but under
as a program for the future ... for the simple reason that
motivate my vote and to explain that I accept the address
grea of, thanks and I have only asked for the floor to
I am one of the few who will vote against the ap-
scorned by the conservatives:

a sheep of great simplicity berried by the lipsels and
was a task to utilize it for his own ends. The result was
might be undesirable, but it was here and it was the states-
so accomplished fact on theoretical grounds. The revolution
the revolution, but he was also too much a realist to obverse
reaction. He was too much a Junker to be able to welcome
It was difficult for Bismarck that he represented neither of-
converstatives, obsoating all change on coetruisire grounds.
the gains already achieved and a tiny group of die-hard
on this issue: the overwhelming majority eager to build on

- 25 -

- 23 -

will have come to thank the originators of the new system;
but now I find it impossible."¹⁷

All of the strains of Bismarck's thought are con-
centrated in this brief passage: The empirical view of pol-
icy ever ready to accept unalterable facts; the implicit
rejection of dogmatism; the barely suppressed defiance to-
wards royal authority which was bound by the terms of the act
of submission; the willingness to use any material available
in the construction of a political order. And finally the
tremendous passion which reduced all of politics to personal
terms, so strong that at the end of the first paragraph of
his speech, Bismarck suffered a fit of weeping and had to
leave the rostrum.

But Bismarck's outburst was premature for it
proved more difficult to subdue the traditional Prussia
than it had seemed in the first flush of revolutionary suc-
cess. By the middle of April the King was permitted to
leave Berlin for Potsdam where surrounded by his officers
he soon came to regret his impetuous gestures of a few weeks
previous. Particularly active in strengthening Frederick
William's backbone was his immediate environment, especially
his Aide-de-Camp, Leopold von Gerlach, who as early as March
30, the very day on which Frederick William received his
liberal ministers for the first time, noted in his diary:
"First attempt at creating a ministere occulte."¹⁸ Thus

17. Kohl I, p. 46.

18. E. Y. K. I, p. 91.

18. H. A. K. I., b. 3r.
I. J. Kuy I., b. 4c.

"First attempt at creating a miniatoreccitte."¹⁸ Thus
fingers miniatere for the first time, noted in his diary:
30, the very day on which Frederick William received his
His Vige-ge-Camp, Reeborg von Gerhardt, who was early as March
William's backhand was his immediate environment, especially
breeding. Particularly active in strengthening Frederick
be soon came to regret his intemperate features of a few weeks
leave Berlin for Petersburg where surrounded by his officers
else. By the middle of April the King was permitted to
can it had seemed in the first place of revolutionary an-
bored more difficult to and more the traditional prudence
But Bismarck's output was premature for it
leave the road again.

His abeep, Bismarck antlined a lit of webbing and put to
terms, so strong that at the end of the first paragraph of
tremendous basison which reduced all of his theories to personal
in the construction of a political order. And finally the
of anulation, the willingness to use any material available
was a roach and a snout which was pound by the terms of the set
rejection of despotism; the purely unbreached equivalence to-
fect ever ready to accept unorthodox dogma; the implicit
concentrated in pure prior passage: The embryonic view of bor-
All of the origins of Bismarck's thought are con-
but now I find it impossible."¹⁹

will have come to thank the originators of the new system:

- 53 -

- 24 -

was born the "Camarilla" of ultra-conservatives which for nearly a decade influenced Prussian policy through the personal relationship of its members with the King.

Throughout the summer the conservatives strengthened their organization. In order to have a counterweight to the prevalent liberalism of the press they called into being the *Kreuzzeitung*, named after the Iron Cross at its masthead. And in August there met in Berlin the so-called Junkerparliament, a congress of large landowners of Eastern Prussia, to discuss counter-measures against the official Parliament which was debating the abolition of feudal rights. Bismarck was one of the most active members of the conservative group. He had now sufficient time to devote to its activities for with the introduction of universal suffrage his parliamentary career had come to an end for the time being. Soon the Kreuzzeitung was to be deluged with articles from him, distinguished by the sharpness of their personal attacks. And through Leopold von Gerlach he always had access to the King. He came to spend more and more time in Berlin from where he wrote letters containing a strange combination of nostalgia for the country and an impatient desire for a conflict between the King and Parliament.¹⁹ "I commence to be very homesick," he wrote in one such letter, "and [your] mother's letters made me feel sad and empty; the heart of a husband and father ... is not suited for the hubbub of

19. See f.e. W. 14/I, p. 116, 118.

19. See t.e. M. 14\X, b. 11c, 118.

of a manand and father... in not sented for the hussap of
~~Don~~ mother's letters made me feel sad and embitter the heart
mence to be very humorsion," he wrote in one and letter, "and
for a conflict between the King and Parliament."¹⁹ "I com-
plation of nostrums for the country and an insubordinate centre
Berlin from where he wrote letters containing a strange com-
access to the King. He came to send more and more time in
sonal attacks. And through Rebold von Gersten he always had
ores from him, gratulated by the sparseness of their bor-
being. Soon the Kreuzzeitung was to be defunded with such-
its parliamentary career had come to an end for the time
activities for with the introduction of universal compulsory
dive Grob. He had now sufficient time to devote to its
Bramarck was one of the most active members of the conserva-
parliament which was depending the apportion of tends rights.
Prussia, to diocesan counter-measures against the official
tenderbarliament, a congress of large landowners of Eastern
measures. And in August there met in Berlin the so-called
being the Kreuzzeitung, named after the Iron Cross at its
to the breakfast table they called into
ensued their organization. In order to have a counterweight
Throughout the summer the conservatives attained
essential relationship of its members with the King.

was born the "Camarilla" of Nicosia-conservatives who for
nearly a decade influenced Prussian policy through the ben-
was born the "Camarilla" of Nicosia-conservatives who for
nearly a decade influenced Prussian policy through the ben-
was born the "Camarilla" of Nicosia-conservatives who for
nearly a decade influenced Prussian policy through the ben-
was born the "Camarilla" of Nicosia-conservatives who for

- 24 -

- 25 -

politics and intrigue. On Monday the die will be cast.
Either the ministry will be weak as its predecessors, a
contingency against which I am attempting to work, or it
does its duty in which case blood will flow either Monday
evening or Tuesday morning ... If things get going, I should
like to remain in the vicinity of the king; there you can
be certain (I say so regretfully) that there will be no
danger."20

The clash Bismarck was anticipating so ardently
finally took place at the end of October. Using the pre-
text of several riots, Frederick William moved the troops
back into Berlin while the Parliament was prorogued to
Brandenburg in the heart of traditional Prussia in order to
"assure the freedom of its deliberations." And the futility
of the last gesture of the majority of the Parliament, its
appeal to the people to refuse to pay taxes, "in sign of pro-
test" only served to demonstrate that the tradition of legal
continuity and obedience was stronger than theories of con-
stitutional government. But it was equally symptomatic for
the nature of the Prussian state, that even now with a Par-
liament most of whose liberal members absented themselves,
the King felt nevertheless obliged to grant the constitution
he had promised. To be sure, it was imposed by royal decree
on December 5 and it fell far short of instituting a parlia-
mentary democracy. The king still retained an absolute veto,
20. W. 14/I, p. 113.

50. N. 171, b. 113.

mentary democracies. The king still retained an absolute veto, on December 2 and it fell under short of instituting a barilla he had bromised. To be amuse, it was imposed by Royal decree the King left nevertheless obliged to grant the constitution Instrument most of whose liperal members appeared themselves, the nature of the Prussian acts, that even now with a constitutional government. But it was equally schematic for continuity and independence was stronger than theories of contract, only served to demonstrate that the tradition of legal abhor to the beable to return to bad taxes, "in sign of bro-"saure the freedom of its deliberations." And the utility Brandenburg in the heart of traditional Prussia in order to pack into Berlin while the Parliament was broken to text of several lines, Frederick William moved the troops tenuity took place at the end of October. Making the bro-"ganger."50

be certain (I ask so regretfully) that there will be no
like to remain in the vicinity of the king; there can
evening or Tuesday morning ... It thinks it being? I amung
does it duty in which case blood will flow either Mowen
contingency against which I am attempting to work, or if
Either the ministry will be weak as its predecessors, a
belligerent and intrepid. On Monday the die will be cast.

- 52 -

- 26 -

the competence of the two-chamber legislature in the finan-
cial field remained purposely vague, and the ministers were
responsible not to parliament but to the king. But even in
this form the constitution was anathema to the "Camarilla"
which consoled itself, however, that the new ministry which
Hederick William had called into office, headed by General
Brandenburg, an illegitimate offspring of the dynasty -- the
Prince of Prussia called him the "bastard of Prussia" -- and
Otto Manteuffel would be ready to do its bidding. And Par-
liament was powerless against the united opposition of the
King and the ministry.

In January Parliament was dissolved and new elect-
lons called in order to secure a more pliable assembly. Bis-
mareck threw himself actively into the campaign. Even the
central committee of the conservatives seemed to him not
sufficiently intransigent and he therefore joined a new
committee composed of adherents of the Kreuzzeiting which
appealed to the landed gentry to exert its influence on be-
half of "the truly conservative candidates who rejected any
transaction with the revolution."21 It proved extremely
difficult however to find a constituency for Bismarck. Even
conservative districts recoiled before so flamboyant a can-
didate. It speaks for Bismarck's eagerness to continue his
parliamentary career that he sufficiently overcame his pride
to appeal personally to a former minister to call the atten-
tion of the electors of a certain district to his person.22

21. E.Y.K. I, p. 117.

22. W. 14/I, p.

SS. M. Jf\I, b.
SJ. E.Y.K. I, b. III.

tion of the electors of a certain district to be chosen. SS
to abate beraunify to a former minister to call the atten-
barliamentary career that he sufficiently overcame to gain the
right. It abates for Biamarck a easiness to continue his
consecutive districts received before so transpontant a can-
cillation however to find a consistency for Biamarck. Even
transaction with the revolution. "S" It proved extremely
part of "the truly conservative candidate who rejected and
abandoned to the landed kentry to consent to its influence on the
committee composed of adherents of the Krenzmetting which
sufficiently intransigent and he therefore joined a new
central committee of the conservatives seemed to him not
merely threw himself actively into the campaign. Even the
times called in order to secure a more definite answer. Bi-
In tannany Parliament was dissolved and new elect-
King and the ministry.

fament was bowerless against the united opposition of the
Otto Mantenstedt would be ready to do its bidding. And bar-
Prince of Bruxais called him the "patent of Bruxais" -- and
Brandeisung, an illegalistic ottobring of the class -- the
Nagertek William was called into office, headed by General
which concurred itself, however, that the new ministry which
this form the constitution was anathema to the "Camarilla"
reasonable not to barlament put to the king. But even in
the field remained burboely agune, and the minister were
the competence of the two-chamber legislature in the tinnun-
- 5d -

- 5d -

- 27 -

Finally a relative of Bismarck's wife proposed him for a
"safe" conservative district in Magdeburg. When Frederick
William IV opened the new Prussian parliament on February
26, 1849 Bismarck was again among its deputies.

But at precisely the moment that the revolution
in Prussia was defeated, that of Germany sought to culmi-
nate its effort. For a year the Nationalversammlung --
the constituent assembly -- meeting in Frankfurt had de-
bated the form of the unification of Germany unaware that
its material basis was slipping away and that its authority
had never been greater than the fear of revolution of the
German princes. Its very insistence on legality, on main-
taining as far as possible the integrity of the component
states hampered its work. The nationalversammlung in its
majority had decided that Germany should have an Emperor,
but the Prussian king to whom all eyes were turned was en-
gaged in mystifying ambiguities while repressing within
Prussia the very institution on which the unified Germany was
to be based. He never tired of protesting that Austria "de-
served the crown of Charlemagne"²³ and that he would not be
party to the "mediatization" i.e. dethronement, of German
princes. For its part the Nationalversammlung was thus
placed in the anomalous position of having to reassur the
various princes and above all the King of Prussia, so that
the Prussian parliament found itself disavowed by that of
23. See f.e. letter to Bunsen, Stern VII, p. 317.

S3. See L.E. letter to Buaan, Stern AII, b. 317.

the Prussian barbament found itself disavowed by that of
asional braves and spoke all the King of Prussia, so that
blessed in the anomalous succession of having to reason the
braves. For its bare the Nationalveraasammlung was thus
barely to the "mediatization" i.e. demontement, of German
served the crown of Charlemagne"S3 and that he would not be
to be passed. He never tired of protestating that Anatria "de-
Prunais the very institution on which the united Germany was
based in maturing amorphities while repressing within
but the Prussian king to whom all eyes were turned was en-
munity had decided that Germany should have an Emperor,
atates numbered its work. The nationalveraasammlung in its
taining as far as possible the integrity of the component
German braves. Its very insistence on legality, on main-
had never been greater than the fear of revolution of the
its material plans was tripping away and that its authority
pated the form of the multination of Germany unaware that
the contract was empty -- meeting in Frankfurt had ge-
rate its effort. For a year the Nationalveraasammlung --
in Prussia was defeated, that of Germany sought to confirm-
But at breakfast the moment that the revolution
S4. 1848 Bismarck was again among its deputies.
William IV obtained the new Prussian barbament on February
"sale" conservative district in Magdeburg. When Frederik
Binssly a relative of Bismarck's wife proposed him for a

- 51 -

- 28 -

Germany when it appealed to the people to refuse to pay taxes. And Austria's membership in a German Empire remained as insoluble a problem as ever. Rent by revolution, it was still too weak to play an active role although the dispatches of Schwarzenberg, its energetic and unscrupulous new minister, could leave no doubt about its attitude. Only when Schwarzenberg on March 13, 1849 imposed a constitution of his own, so centralist in tendency that it was clear that if Austria joined the projected German Empire it would have to do so with its millions of Slavs, did the Nationalversammlung overcome its hesitations. On March 29 it elected Frederick William IV as Emperor of Germany with 290 votes and 248 abstentions. It came exactly one year too late.

For the act of the Nationalversammlung came to
demonstrate its impotence while it brought to a head all the
dormant tensions within Prussia. And in the process it set
the stage for Bismarck's first fundamental utterances on the
German question, speeches whose radical novelty made them
incomprehensible to his colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
It was hardly noticed therefore that in two great speeches
Bismarck was sweeping away the entire framework of the pre-
vious discussions. For both the proponents as well as the
antagonists of German unity and liberal institutions were
still arguing in the categories of a generation of stability
whose intuition of permanence was expressed in its demand

whose institution of hermeneutics was expressed in its demand
affirming its stance in the categories of a generation of atemporal
antagonists of German unity and federal institutions were
alone diacritons. For both the proponents as well as the
Bramarok was sawing away the entire framework of the bre-
It was hardly noticed therefore that in two great speeches
incombrerenable to his colleagues on both sides of the state.
German question, speeches whose radical novelty made them
the stage for Bramarok's first fundamental utterances on the
gentle tensions within Prussia. And in the process it set
demonstrate its imbotence while it brought to a head all the
for the set of the Nationalversammlung came to
come exactly one year too late.

as Emperor of Germany with 520 votes and 548 apatensions. It
its heaitstions. On March 20 it elected Friedrich William IV
its millions of Slavs, did the Nationalversammlung overcome
joined the protected German Empire it would have to do so with
so centralist in tendency that it was clear that it was
rennpere on March 13, 1848 imposed a constitution of his own,
could leave no doubt spont its attitude. Only when Bismar-
Schwarzenberg, its energetic and unaccustomed new minister,
too weak to play an active role although the diabatemes of
equal a problem as ever. Rent by revolution, it was still
And Austria's membership in a German Empire remained as in-
Germany when it abdicated to the people to refuse to pay taxes.

- 58 -

- 29 -

that institutions justify themselves by a claim to univers-
ality. But the extent of their acrimony merely underlined
the revolutionary dilemma, that the tragic aspect of a rev-
olutionary situation inheres not in the challenge to the
existing order nor in the adequacy of the reply, but in the
fact that the challenge was possible at all. Whatever else
happens the spontaneity of the social order will be lost.
What had been taken for granted must now be defended, but
the act of defense exhibits the possibility of an alterna-
tive. An innocence lost can not be recaptured and societies
whose cohesiveness has once been rent can never return to
the starting point. Thus comes about the increasing frus-
tration and bitterness of revolutionary contests for the
adversaries, still inspired by the memory of stability,
will consider incomplete a victory which assures them any-
thing less than universality. And therefore, too, revo-
lutionary situations are never resolved by theoretical
agreement, only by superior power, because the situation
has become revolutionary precisely because the antagonists
have ceased to speak the same language.

What separated Bismarck from almost all his col-
leagues was his ability to distinguish the essence of revo-
lution from its form. He understood that however the con-
tending parties may legitimize themselves, they have in fact
been transformed into contending forces. The restraint imposed

been transformed into contending forces. The restraint imposed
tending battles may legitimate themselves, they have in fact
inflation from its form. He understood that power the con-
sequence was the ability to distinguish the essence of revo-
What separated Bismarck from almost all his col-
have ceased to abase the same language.

has become revolutionarily briefly because the antagonists
agreement, only by an superior power, because the situation
intimately situations are never resolved by theoretical
thing less than universality. And therefore, too, revo-
will consider incomplete a victory which assumes them and-
advantages, still inscribed by the memory of stability,
tration and bitterness of revolutionarily contests for the
the starting point. Thus comes spont the increasing trans-
whose coexistence has once been rent can never return to
dive. An innocence lost can not be recaptured and societies
the sort of defense expedites the beauphity of an alterna-
What had been taken for granted must now be defended, but
happens the abhorrence of the social order will be lost.
that the challenge was beaupie at all. Whatever else
existing order nor in the decay of the rebrly, put in the
intentionally situation there not in the challenge to the
the revolutionary dilemma, that the tragic aspect of a rev-
ality. But the extent of their harmony merely underlined
that institutions justify themselves by a claim to univers-

- 50 -

- 30 -

by a consensus on a legitimizing principle had fallen away
and power has become the final arbiter. In such situations
the victory tends to go to the most ruthless, the one in
short not inhibited by the memory of the maxims of the dis-
integrated legitimacy. And for this reason Bismack's re-
action to the question of German unity was extremely ambiva-
lent. He had opposed the revolution in Prussia partly be-
cause it seemed to challenge the prerogatives of the Junkers
but above all because by transforming Prussia's historic es-
sence it would restrict its power at a moment of unexcelled
opportunity. For Bismarck was too much the naturalist not
to see that with the disintegration of the "Metternich sys-
tem" Prussia was once more the largest purely German state,
strong enough to dictate its will to the remainder. He
therefore opposed the labors of the Frankfort Nationalver-
sammlung which he called the "German fraud," because it
attempted to dissolve Prussia in the larger whole and on
the basis of constitutional principles foreign to its nature.

But the violence of his opposition was more the reverse
side of his conviction that if Germany must not dissolve
Prussia, Prussia might absorb Germany. When Bismarck de-
rided the work of the Frankfort liberals, he was not, as
his conservative friends imagined, defending the unity of
conservative interests but the pre-eminence of Prussia. And
when he opposed the revolution within Prussia, he did so,
in a sense, to free Prussia to pursue a more active revo-

in a sense, to free Prussia to burn more active revolu-
when he obboaded the revolution within Prussia, he did so,
conservative interests put the pre-eminence of Prussia. And
the conservative trend imagined, defending the unity of
rigged the work of the Frankfurt libera!a, he was not, as
Prussia, Prussia might apportion Germany. While Bismarck ge-
side of his conviction that it Germany must not dissolve
But the violence of his obboadion was merely the reverse
the pasts of constitutional principles foreign to its nature,
attempted to dissolve Prussia in the larger whole and on
absolutism which he called the "German trend," because it
certamente obboaded the isles of the Frankfurt Nationa!ver-
strong enough to dictate its will to the remainder. He
tem" Prussia was once more the largest buralty German state,
to see that with the disintegration of the "Mittelreich the-
obligation." For Bismarck was too much the naturalist not
sence it would rearm ita bower at a moment of unexceeded
put spoke all because pA transforming Prussia's historic ea-
cause it seemed to challenge the prerogatives of the tunkers
fent. He had obboaded the revolution in Prussia barely pe-
action to the question of German unity was extremely simples-
integrated legitimacy. And for this reason Bismarck's re-
short not uninvited by the memory of the maxima of the dis-
tince the victory tends to go to the most ruthless, the one in
and bower has become the final applier. In such situations
by a consequence on a legitimizing principle had fallen sway

- 30 -

- 31 -

lution abroad, albeit not a liberal one. "What matter the
little states," Bismarck wrote a friend, "all that concerns
me is to secure and to expand Prussia's power."²⁴

But so strong were the prevailing categories of
thought, that no one in the Prussian parliament saw in Bis-
marck anything but an arch-conservative defending the cause
of legitimacy as he mounted the rostrum on April 21, 1849
for his speech on the German question. The occasion for his
speech was the failure of the brave effort of the Frankfort
assembly to place Frederick William IV at the head of a
unified, constitutional Germany. On April 3, a delegation
of the Nationalversammlung headed by its leading members
had been received by the King. Had Frederick William IV
followed the advice on the "Camarilla" he would have rejected
the "crown of fools" peremptorily. But this would have of-
fended his sense of the melodramatic. He gave the deputa-
tion an answer to ambiguous that only after consultation
among themselves could its members decide that it had
amounted to a refusal.²⁵ And to compound the confusion a
Prussian circular note of the same date called for a German
constitution through negotiation among the princes. As a
result ²⁸ of the smaller states declared themselves for the
Frankfort constitution and for the election of the king of
Prussia as German Emperor. At this point in order to force
the King of Prussia into an unequivocal position, a liberal

24. Ludwig, p. 108.

25. E.Y.K. I, p. 122; Stern VII, p.

52. E.Y.K. I', b. 155; 2stum AII, b.
53. Ingwate, b. 108.

the King of Prussia into an independent coalition, a federal
Prussia as German Emperor. At this point in order to force
Frankfort constitution and for the election of the king of
Prussia S8 of the smaller states declared themselves for the
constitution through negotiation among the princes. As a
Prussian circular note of the same date called for a German
amounted to a refusal.⁵² And to compound the confusion a
among themselves could its members decide that it had
taken an answer to amorphous that only after consultation
tended his sense of the metricmatic. He gave the debuts-
the "crown of Geola" hermaphority. But this would have of-
to followed the advice on the "Camarilla" he would have rejected
had been received by the King. Had Frederick William IV
of the Nationalversammlung headed by its leading members
unified constitutional Germany. On April 3, a delegation
assembled to place Frederick William IV at the head of a
abeen was the failure of the brave effort of the Frankfurt
tor his abeeron on the German question. The occasion for his
of legitimacy as he mounted the rostrum on April 5th, 1849
warok anything put an anti-conservative defending the cause
of thought, that no one in the Prussian barterment saw in his
But so strong were the brevailing categories of

we is to secure and to expand Prussia's power."⁵⁴
little states," Pramrock wrote a friend, "all that concerns
inflation abroad, especially not a fiscal one." "What matter the

- 31 -

- 32 -

deputy moved that the Prussian Parliament accept the legality
of the Frankfort constitution. It was to this motion that Bis-
marck addressed himself on April 21, 1849.

It was only appropriate that Bismarck's speech began
with an attack on a governmental system which threatened to
limit the King's freedom of action in foreign affairs, the ele-
ment, that is, to which in Bismarck's view Prussia owed her
greatness: "...Should the ministry accept this procedure /the
motion/, it would admit that the second chamber possesses the
executive power. It would recognize that the ministers are not
officials of the King but of the Second Chamber. This may be
considered proper constitutional doctrine by some ... in Prus-
sia only that is constitutional which is based on the Prussian
constitution ... I do not consider the Prussian constitution
among the best of which history informs us; its chief advantage
is that it exists."

This sarcastic phrase merely served to introduce the
real crux of Bismarck's argument, that not only was Prussia
sacrificing its essence to abstract dogmas, the sacrifice was
all the more inexcusable because it stood in no relationship
to the existing balance of forces: "The declaration of 28 gov-
ernments which together possess hardly six and one-half million
subjects, ... governments whose ministers are eagerly at work to
secure their /revolutionary/ achievements by means of the consti-
tutional anarchy offered to them from Frankfort, such declara-
tions are not sufficiently weighty to change our attitude where

tions are not sufficiently weighty to change our attitude where
tional anarchy ottered to them from Prankort, and decern-
scence their <u>Revolutionary</u> conference p[roceedings] mean[ings] of the conaci-
npotents ... Governments whose miniaters are eakely at work to
eruements which together boasess p[ar]ish six and one-half million
to the existing balance of forces: "The decimation of 58 Gov-
ment the more inexcusable because it acood in no relationship
asertifying its essence to abstract dogma, the asertifice was
rest on crux of Biamarck's argument, that not only was Prunasia
This aroactic prunace merely served to introduce the
in that it exisits."

among the best of which history informs us at its chief advantages
constitution ... I do not consider the Prunadian constitution
ais only that of <u>constitutions</u> which is based on the Prunadian
considered broader constitutional doctrine p[ro] some ... in Prun-
officiate of the King put of the Second Chamber. This may be
executive power. It would recognize that the miniaters are not
motion, it would admit that the second chamber possesses the
Greatness: "...should the miniaters accept this procedure <u>the
ment</u>, that is, to which in Biamarck's view Prunasia owed per
limit the King's freedom of action in foreign affairs, the ele-
with an attack on a Government which threatened to

It was only appropriate that Biamarck's abeem began
mark addressed himself on April 5th, 1849.

of the Prankort constitution. It was so this motion that Bia-
debut moved that the Prunadian Parliament accept the legality

- 35 -

- 33 -

the fate of Prussia is concerned." Prussia, not Germany, was therefore the basic unit of Bismarck's thought and it was not surprising that he judged the projected German constitution by its degree of approximation to that of Prussia, which he maintained contained the minimum executive powers consistent with the mission of Prussia. Nor that he found the projected constitution wanting on a number of grounds, because a hierarchical arrangement of constitutions of states of such disparate power was difficult in any case; because it limited the executive power both by giving the Emperor only a suspensive veto and finally because through its system of universal suffrage "the influence of each class increases in proportion as its political judgment...diminishes." And all this culminated in the challenge: "Everyone who speaks German wants German unity, but with this constitution I do not."

This was the profession of faith of a traditional Prussian proud, defiant, and even somewhat conventional. But the concluding portion of Bismarck's speech revealed his real intention, that he was rejecting the projected union not in the name of conservative principles but of the reality of power, that he was vindicating Prussia the right to prescribe its laws to Germany on the simple basis of its superior strength. In this manner Bismarck advanced the most fundamental challenge to what had come to be considered the trend of the period: the union of liberalism and nationalism, the insistence that national aspirations could be satisfied only by constitutional governments.

substitutions could be established only by constitutional governments, union of, perhaps and nationhood, the inattention that national to what had come to be considered the trend of the period: the this manner Bismarck advanced the most fundamental challenge to Germany on the simple point of its ancescence. In that he was vindicating Prussia the right to breathe its laws the name of conservative principles put to the resity of power, intention, that he was rejecting the protected union not in the confiding portion of Bismarck's speech revealed his real Prussian brand, 'geland', and even somewhat conventional. But this was the protestation of faith in a traditional put with this constitution I do not."

the confidence: "Everyone who abikes German wants German unity, political judgment...diminishes." And all this eliminated in "the influence of each class increases in proportion as its and finally because through its system of universal suffrage five power both p[ro]ceeding the Emperor only a unibedral veto power was sufficient in any case; because it limited the executive arrangement of constitutions of states of each disunited nation wanting on a number of grounds, because a biunirond- the mission of Prussia. Nor that he found the protected contained the minimum executive powers consistent with its degree of approximation to that of Prussia, which he main- ambraining that he judged the protected German constitution by therefore the point unit of Bismarck's thought and it was not the fate of Prussia to concern herself." Prussia, not Germany, was

- 33 -

- 34 -

By combatting this doctrine not in the name of legitimacy but of Prussian nationalism, Bismarck exhibited the tenuousness of the liberals' quest. For the claim for constitutions was legitimized by the doctrine of individual liberty and tended to be identified with freedom from governmental restraints; while the appeal of nationalism was that of community which in spirit tends always to be antithetical to assertions of the primacy of individual freedom. To be sure, the liberal's too, appealed to a community, that of shared language; but Bismarck proceeded to prove that there existed another community no less real and perhaps deeper, that of shared historical experience: "If we refuse our support (to the 28 governments), we will be in an all the stronger position to force German unity ... [But] before I see that my king becomes the vassal of the followers of the Messrs. Simon and Schaffrath [well-known liberals] I would prefer that Prussia remain Prussia. As such it will always be in a position to prescribe Germany its laws, not to receive them from others ... I therefore feel duty-bound to oppose a motion designed to undermine the edifice cemented ... by the blood of our fathers. The crown of Frankfort may seem very brilliant, but its lustre ... is to be obtained by smelting it with that of Prussia and I do not believe that this will succeed under the present constitution."26

But if this analysis was correct a Prussian statesman had a dual task, to defeat the revolution domestically, not to 26. Kohl I, p. 85f.

SC. Kony I, b. 82t.

had a great task, to clear the revolution domestically, not to
but it this analysis was correct a犹raaten statement
the present constitution.
"Se

of犹raais and I do not believe that this will succeed under
put it in front ... is to be obtained by amelting it with that
our fathers. The crown of Prussia may seem very brilliant,
designed to undermine the equity cemented ... by the flood of
from others ... I therefore feel quite-pound to oblige a motion
in aition to prescribe Germany its laws, not to receive them
brier that犹raais remain犹raais. As such it will always be
of the Netherlands. Simon and Ernst Wiel-Knowf Lipperla I know
I see that my king becomes the asset of the followers
all the stronger coalition to force German unity ... But
refuse our anition (to the 38 Governments), we will be in an
bereits geeber, that of allied historical experience: "It me
brow that there existed another community no less real and
a community, that of allied language; put Bramarck broegeed to
individual freedom. To be ame, the Lipperla's too, abesied to
tend always to be antithetical to assertions of the primacy of
the abest of nationalism was that of community which in a strict
be identified with freedom from governmental restraint; while
Ertimized by the doctrine of individual liberty and tended to
the lipperla's, great. For the claim for constitution was le-
ot of犹raaisen nationalism, Bramarck exhibited the tonnage of
By compacting this doctrine not in the same of legislation put

- 34 -

- 35 -

restore the former state of things and its restraints; rather
to be able to profit from the opportunity: to crush the revo-
lution in Prussia and liberalism in Germany so that Prussia
could consumate its domination of Germany. And for this rea-
son Bismarck's next attack had to be directed, not only at
those who wanted to dilute Prussia's sense of hierarchy, but
against those who wanted to give it universal application. If
it was necessary to defend the authority of the King against
parliamentary institutions, it was no less crucial to vindi-
cate this freedom of action against moral scruples. Neither
the slogans of nationalism nor those of legitimacy should re-
strain Prussia from exploiting its superiority of force to
achieve hegemony in Germany. It was only natural therefore
that when Bismarck spoke on the German question his target
should be the Prussian minister Radowitz, the personal friend
of the King, who was attempting to salvage German unity from
the wreckage left by Frederick William's refusal of the crown.

Josef Maria von Radowitz inherited the well-night
impossible task of achieving a German constitution through
negotiation among the princes as had been proclaimed in the
Prussian circular note of April 3. Since it was clear that
the inclusion of Austria would present insuperable difficulties,
Radowitz strove to create a union of like-minded German states
without Austria capable of assimilating the remainder in time.
But his first step in this direction merely served to illus-
trate the difficulty of his position. For the "pact of the

trate the difficulty of his position. For the "back of the
But his first act in this direction merely served to illu-
without Anatria cabspe of ascertaining the remainder in time.
Radowitsa arose to create a union of like-minded German states
the influence of Anatria would broaden innumerable difficulties,
Brabanian circles, note of April 3. Since it was clear that
negotiation among the princes as had been proclaimed in the
impossible task of achieving a German constitution through
Joel Maria von Radowitsch invented the well-night
the wrecked felt by Friedrich William's return to the crown,
of the King, who was attempting to salvage German unity from
upon being the Brabanian minster Radowitsch, the personal friend
that when Biomarck abdicated on the German question his targets
achieve hegemony in Germany. It was only natural therefore
attain Brabania from exploiting its superiority of force to
take advantage of nationalities nor those of legitimacy should re-
cede this freedom of action against moral scruples. Neither
barbarious institutions, it was no less crucial to vindic-
it was necessary to defend the authority of the King against
against those who wanted to give it universal abdication. It
those who wanted to diffuse Brabania's sense of hierarchies, but
von Biomarck's next attack had to be directed, not only at
conflict accommodate its domination of Germany. And for this re-
lation in Brabania and tipperaian in Germany so that Brabania
to be able to benefit from the opportunity: tovan the revolu-
tion the former state of things and its restraints; rather

- 32 -

(1)

- 36 -

three kings" of Saxony, Hannover, and Prussia agreeing on the
outline of a German constitution was hedged in a manner which
indicated the inward reserve of the smaller powers: Both Sax-
ony and Hannover made their agreement contingent on the adhes-
ion of Bavaria and Wuerttemberg which under the pressure of
Austria showed no signs of any willingness to surrender the
smallest part of their sovereignty. But even this agreement
seemed to Bismarck to threaten Prussia's preeminent position,
all the more so as the projected constitution in its major
outlines was similar to that of the Frankfort assembly.27 On
September 6, he therefore attacked it in a major speech which
at the same time marked the gulf separating him from both the
liberals and the conservatives.

He began with a sardonic remark which secured his
moral terrain, that he would vote for the government despite
his disagreements over its policy because he saw in it the
guardian of social order and authority, because, in short, he
wanted to keep it fit for the policy he had in mind. But he
coupled with it the hope that "this be the last time that the
gains of Prussia's sword be given away ... to satisfy the in-
satiable demands of a phantom which under the pretended name
of public opinion addles the reason of the princes and peoples
with its din until everyone is afraid of everybody else's shad-
ow and it is forgotten that under the lion-skin is hidden a
being of noisy but timid nature." But if the conservatives

27. The major difference between the Frankfort and the "Radiowitz"
constitutions was the fact that the latter contained a provision
for an absolute veto by the head of state and the substitution of the
newly-adopted Prussian 3-class vote by the previous universal
suffrage.

entourage.

newly-adopted Prussian 3-class vote be the previous universal
for an approximate veto by the head of state and thesupremacy of the
constitution was the fact that the latter contained a provocation
SL. The major difference between the Frankfurt and the "Radomowita"
being of no avail put timid nature." But it the conservatives
and it is forgotten that under the lion-skin is hidden a
with its din until everyone is afraid of everybody else's anad-
ot. but the opinion applies the reason of the brinca and because
noble demand of a brimborom which under the pretended name
 gains of Prussia's award be given away ... to satisfy the in-
 combined with it the hope that "this be the last time that the
 wanted to keep it fit for the boltoh he had in mind. But he
 Guardian of social order and authority, because, in short, he
 his disagreements over its boltoh because he saw in it the
 more real terrain, that he would vote for the Government debite
 He began with a sardonic remark which seemed his
 tippera and the conservatives.

at the same time marked the Sult象seating him from both the
Siegemper G, he therefore attacked it in a motor speech which
continued was similar to that of the Frankfurt assembly. SL On
all the more so as the protected constitution in its major
assembled to Bismarck to threaten Prussia's a blemish position,
unmitigated part of their sovereignty. But even this agreement
Vnaatris showed no signs of any willingness to surrender the
ion of Bavaria and Württemberg which under the breviate of
 only and Hannover made their agreement contingent on the adhe-
 sion indicated the inward reserve of the smaller bowers: Both Sax-
 online of a German constitution was nodded in a manner which
 three kings "of Saxony", Hannover, and Prussia agreeing on the

- 3c -

- 37 -

rejoiced at this intransigent statement, they would have done
well to heed its successor which could only be directed against
their insistence on the solidarity of conservative interests
and againsts its corollary, the sanctity of historical rule:
Even of the minor German princes. "We life in a wondrous time
in which the strong is weak because of his scruples and the
weak strong because of his audacity."

Then came another catalogue of criticisms of the
provisions of the projected German constitution for not taking
into account Prussia's preponderant strength and culminating
in this ironic phrase: "I can find no equivalent for our
sacrifices, the ... consciousness of having pursued a noble
and selfless policy, of having responded to the requirements
of national rebirth ... or whatever else the expressions
might be which are more beautiful than precise ..." But Bis-
marck's real venom was directed against the remarks of a pre-
ceding speakers who had identified Radowitz' policy with that
of Frederick the Great: "This is an identification in which I
do not believe. Frederick II /the Great/ would not have made
it; on the contrary I believe that he would have addressed
himself to the most characteristic Prussian trait, to the war-
like element and not without success. He would have known
that even today, as in the days of our fathers, the sound of
the trumpet ... has not lost its attraction for Prussian ears
... He would have had the option of attaching himself to
Austria and there play the brilliant role which came to be

Vera and there lay the brilliant role which came to be
...
He would have had the option of attaching himself to
the trumpet ... has not lost its attraction for Prussian ear
that even today, so in the days of our fathers, the sound of
like element and not without success. He would have known
himself to the most characteristic Prussian trait, to the war-
it; on the contrary I believe that he would have addressed
do not believe. Frederick II [the Great] would not have made
of Frederick the Great: "This is an identification in which I
ceasing brothers who had identified Rudowits, Polych with that
which he which the more beautiful than briefer ..." But Bla-
or national repulsion ... or whatsoever else the expressions
and a different policy, of having rebuffed to the redoubtments
aspirations, (the ... consciousness of having burdened a people
in this odious burden; "I can find no equivalent for our
into account Prussia's preponderant strength and culminating
brovations of the protected German constitution for not taking
then came another catalogue of criticisms of the
weak among because of its absurdity."
in which the strong in weak because of its absurdities and the
Even of the minor German princes. "We live in a tremendous time
and agitate its corollary, the anarchy of historical rule;
their inconstancy on the solidarity of conservative interests
well to need its successor which could only be directed against
retaliated at this intransigent statement, they would have done

- 31 -

- 38 -

pre-empted by the Tsar of Russia, to defeat the revolution
side by side with Austria. Or with the same right that he an-
nexed Silesia, he could have commanded the Germans what should
be their constitution, at the risk of having to throw the
sword into the balance. This would have been a truly national
Prussian policy ... But the present draft of the constitution
destroys what is specifically Prussian ... and thereby the
best pillar of German power."

Here was the statement of policy of a naturalist
careful in weighing his opportunities, impartial in his cal-
culation of factors, unencumbered by either moral or legal
ties, animated solely by his desire for Prussia's greatness.
It swept away the make-believe out of which societies fashion
the myths which are the conditions of their cohesiveness and
treated the components of the international and social order
in all their nakedness as "forces" to be manipulated. It was
the outline of Bismarck's later policy. Only its conviction
of Prussia's greatness was not itself based on an act of ob-
servation, but of faith, it was the Archimedean point, the
condition for Bismarck's cold-blooded cynicism. And for this
reason Bismarck's concluding passage with its declaration of
love for Prussia rose to an eloquence usually foreign to his
sober style: "What has saved us is precisely the specifically
Prussian. It was the remainder of the much-maligned arch-
Prussiandom which has survived the revolution, the Prussian
army, the Prussian treasury, the fruits of long and intelligent

simply, the Russian treasury, the treasury of long and intelligent
Brusels, which has survived the revolution, the Russian
Russian. It was the remainder of the much-unified and
superior style: "What has been made me precisely the abhorrence
of Russia's greatness was not itself based on an act of op-
tinence of Bismarck's later policy. Only its conviction
in all their wakefulness as "tortue" to be manipulated. It was
created the components of the international and social order
the which are the conditions of their coexistence and
It swept away the make-believe out of which societies function
to-day, animated solely by his desire for Russia's greatness.
enormous of factors, unaccounted by either moral or legal
careful in weighing his opportunities, impartial in his car-
Here was the statement of policy of a naturalist
past bifurc of German power."
demands what is abnormally Russian ... and thereby the
Russian policy ... But the present draft of the constitution
sword into the balance. This would have been a truly national
be their constitution, at the risk of having to throw the
nextiles, he could have commanded the Germans what should
aid by aid with Austria. On with the same right that he an-
bar-embeaded by the Tsar of Russia, to defeat the revolution

- 38 -

- 39 -

Prussian administration ... it was the loyalty of the Prussian people to its dynasty, and the old Prussian virtues of honor, loyalty, obedience and bravery ... which animate the army ... A people which has produced this army, whose true representative is the army ... such a people has no desire to see its Kingship dissolved in the ferment of South German indiscipline. Its loyalty is not to the paper Head of an Empire ... but to a living and free King of Prussia, the heir of his father ... Prussians we are and Prussians we wish to remain. I know that with these words I express the faith of the Prussian army and that of the majority of my compatriots and I hope to God that we shall long remain Prussians when this piece of paper /the German constitution/ will be forgotten like a dried-up autumn leaf."²⁸

This was a direct challenge to the predominant tenets of nationalism, not defensive like many of the conservatives, not self-righteously doctrinaire as so many legitimists, but virile, defiant and self-confident. The debate in the Prussian chamber only foreshadowed, therefore, the impending struggle about which would triumph, the nationalism of liberal theory or that of historical existence, that expressed in the accusation of a liberal deputy that Bismarck was the lost son of the German fatherland or that contained in Bismarck's reply: "The house of my fathers stood in Prussia. I have not yet left it and shall not do so."²⁹ And the force of this conflict was not

28. Kohl I, p. 104f.

29. Kohl I, p. 117.

58. KOU I, b. 111.
KOU I, b. 1041.

and shall not go so."59 And the force of this conflict was not
home of my father's blood in Prussia. I have not yet left it
German fatherland or that contained in Prussia's red line: "The
tion of a liberal deputy that Bismarck was the last son of the
or that of historical existence, that expressed in the scene-
the spont which would triumph, the national spirit of liberal theory
asian chumper only toreshadowed, therefore, the imbued arm-
airfile, delitant and self-confident. The debate in the Pran-
not self-righteously cootruisante as so many legitimate, put
of nations'ism, not defensive like many of the conservatives,
This was a direct challenge to the predominant tenets

test."60
German constitution will be forgotten like a buried-mb annuity
we shall found remain Prussians when this breach of baber (the
that of the majority of my combatr forces and I hope to god that
with these words I express the faith of the Prussian army and
Prussians we are and Prussians we wish to remain. I know that
living and free King of Prussia, the heir of his father ...
Its loyalty is not to the baber head of an Empire ... put to a
Kingdom dissolved in the fragment of South German التقاضة.

It is the army ... and a beable has no centre to see its
A beable which has produced this army, whose true represents-
loyalty, obedience and prudence ... which animates the army ...
beable to its dynamics, and the old Prussian virtue of honor,
Prussian administration ... it was the loyalty of the Prussian

- 39 -

- 40 -

diminished because the conservatives, hearing only the strictures against their liberal opponents, in their eagerness for total triumph, clasped Bismarck to their breasts as one of their very own.

Under attack by the liberals for its half-heartedness, by the conservatives for its appeasement of the revolution and by Bismarck for its denial of Prussia's pre-eminence, the program of Radowitz was foredoomed. This was all the more true because revolutions can not be made with the consent of those against whom they are directed. Had the German princes understood the trends of their period, the revolution of 1848 would not have occurred. Having reached this impasse, it was futile to appeal to them to commit suicide. For nothing is more difficult than the voluntary surrender of sovereignty. Even when its need is recognized the tendency is to wait for an outside force to accomplish the destruction. But the outside force paradoxically was engaged in an effort certain to deprive it of all influence. Prussia, whose chief appeal to the other German states was their fear of domestic upheaval, lent its army to defeat revolutions in Baden and Hesse. To be sure, it received in return another constituent assembly, this time called for Erfurt. But its debates proved hollow. Bavaria and Wuerttemberg refused to join and this made operative the "escape clause" in the treaty with Saxony and Hannover. And all the time Austria was gaining in strength. With the revolutions in Hungary and Italy defeated, Austria could turn its

Initions in Hungary and Italy defeated, Austria could turn its
all the time Austria was gaining in strength. With the revolu-
tionary class in power, in the treaty with Saxony and Hanover. And
and Wurtemberg returned to join and this made operative the
called for Prussia. But its departs proved hollow. Bavaria
received in return another constitutionLESS, this time
army to defeat revolutions in Baden and Hesse. To be sure, it
German states was their fear of domestic opposition, sent its
of all influence. Prussia, whose chief abbat to the other
barbarically was engaged in an effort certain to deprive it
to force to accomplish the destruction. But the outside force
its need is recognized the tendency is to wait for an outside
tient than the voluntary surrender of sovereignty. Even when
to abbat to them to commit suicide. For nothing is more dit-
not have occurred. Having reached this impasse, it was little
atood the trend of their behavior, the revolution of 1848 would
against whom they are directed. Had the German brinzen under-
cause revolutions can not be made with the consent of those
Brut of Baden was foreseen. This was all the more true
by Bismarck for its denial of Prussia's bre-eminence, the bro-
ok the conservatives for its abatement of the revolution and
Under attack by the liberal for its half-heartedness,
their very own.

Total triumph, crushed Bismarck to their presата as one of
crises against their liberal opponents, in their eagerness for
diminished peace the conservatives, bearing only the atrio-

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attention to German problems. Soon the moment would come when the deliberations at Erfurt would become ridiculous if, in Bismarck's words, "the greatest exertion of the half-cooled steam of Frankfort will not suffice to blow up the value of princely opposition."30

Through this period Bismarck's attitude was consistent and intransigent. He was above all concerned that out of the chaos there not emerge another legitimacy which would again submerge Prussia's power in its restraints. Even the restoration of the old German Confederation would be preferable to a new order which would sanctify the continued application of fetters to Prussia's quest for hegemony in Germany. For however restrictive the confederation it would never again enjoy the nimbus surrounding the 'Metternich system' before 1948 and without it, its life would be precarious. Bismarck's behavior in Erfurt, where he was a Prussian representative, merely paralleled his attitude in the Prussian parliament. He spoke ominously of the Prussian spirit as a horse which would carry its accustomed rider joyfully but which would be certain to throw the Sunday stroller to the ground." And he predicted that soon nothing would be left to do for the Constitutent Assembly but to debate the cause of its demise.31

The demise was not long delayed, because Austria under the able Schwarzenberg was becoming strong enough for a showdown. In August 1850 Schwarzenberg invited the Assembly

30. Kohl I, p. 231.

31. Kohl I, p. 239.

31. KOU I, b. 536.
30. KOU I, b. 531.

showdown. In August 1820 Schwarzenberg invited the Assembly
der the able Schwarzenberg was becoming strong enough for a
The deme was not long delayed, because Anatsch un-
came of its gemae.31

felt to go for the Constituent Assembly but to debase the
to the Ground." And he predicted that soon nothing would be
talky but which would be certain to throw the Bundes stroffer
spirit as a horse which would carry its accustomed rider joy-
the Prussian barritament. He abole ominously of the Prussian
Prussian representative, merely bartered his attitude in
carona. Biamarck's behavior in Erlangen, where he was a
alkem, before 1848 and without it, its life would be bre-
never again enjoy the simple surrounding the Metternich
to the restoratio of the old German Confederation would be
would again and merge Prussia's power in its restraints. Even
out of the chaos there not emerge another regent which
 statement and intuitionalist. He was above all concerned that
 Through this period Biamarck's attitude was con-
bruefly objection.32

atom of Frankfurt will not annul to flow ab the asyne of
in Bismarck's morgue, "the greatest exerption of the past-accioed
when the deliberations at Erlangen would become rigidifone 1st,
attention to German problems. Soon the moment would come

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- 42 -

of the Confederation to reconvene in Frankrft as if nothing
had happened since 1848. And when the craven Grandduke of
Hesse appealed to it to assist him in his conflict with his
parliament, help was vouchsafed to him. Austrian and Bava-
rian troops moved into the little state and thus with one
blow exposed the whole ambiguity of Prussia's position. For
Hesse was not only part of the projected union under Prus-
sian leadership whose constitution was even then being de-
bated in Erhurt, but it also was situated athwart Prussia's
lines of supply to its Rhenish provinces whose inviolability
had been guaranteed at the Congress of Vienna. The presence
of foreign troops in Hesse was thus a direct challenge both
to Prussia's pretension for hegemony in Germany and to its
position as a great power. Gone now as the illusion of
Frederick William that all options remained open to him,
that he could defeat the revolution at home while utilizing
it in Germany, that he could achieve German unity while keep-
ing intact the union of conservative monarchs of Austria,
Russia and Prussia. The Russian troops ominously massing
in Poland made clear the Tsar's conception of which side
represented the conservative interests while across the Rhine
the enigmatic Napoleon was waiting for an opportunity to take
up again the projects of his great uncle in the Rhineland.

"[Napoleon]", said Bismarck in a speech, "knows very well that
he can find in the cathedral of Cologne the jewel which will
consummate his revolution: The Crown of the French Empire."
But to withdraw from Hesse might be equally dangerous. It

But to withdraw from Hesse might be equally dangerous. If
communize his revolution! The Crown of the French Empire."
he can find in the escheat of Cologne the jewel which will
"Nabobcon", said Biomarck in a speech, "knows very well that
it again the protects of his greatucle in the RhineLand.
the enigmatic Nabobcon was waiting for an opportunity to take
represented the conservative interests while across the Rhine
in Boisauß made clear the Taras's conception of which side
Russia and Prussia. The Russian troops obviously missing
ing intact the union of conservative monorachs of Austria,
it in Germany, that he could achieve German unity while keeping
that he could defeat the revolution at home while utilizing
Frederick William that all options remained open to him,
boastion as a great power. Gone now as the inflation of
to Prussia's bretènland for hegemony in Germany and to its
of foreign troops in Hesse was thus a direct challenge both
had been guaranteed at the Congress of Vienna. The brevence
lines of supply to its Russian provinces whose inviolability
pated in Prussia, put it also was attributed to the Prussian
asian leadership whose constitution was even then being de-
Heace was not only part of the projected union under Prun-
pown exposed the whole ambiguity of Prussia's position. Por
rian troops moved into the little state and thus with one
barbarism, help was advocated to him. Austrian and Bav-
Heace abdicated to it to assist him in his conflict with his
and happened since 1848. And when the cession Grand Duke of
of the Confederation to reconvene in Prussia as it nothing

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- 43 -

would mean discredit to Prussia and spike its claims to German hegemony perhaps forever. It would mean the end of all the aspirations of the generation of the War of Liberation and make a mockery of some of Prussia's greatest men. It would ask of Prussia the most difficult of all political acts, to deny its own vision of itself.

Despite these considerations Bismarck had no doubt which course Prussia should adopt. To give in would mean a loss of prestige, but to fight, even victiously, might involve a loss of identity. For a war could only be legitimized by an appeal to nationalism and a victory would mean the creation of a constitutional state so contrary to Bismarck's notions of the elements of Prussia's greatness: "So far has Prussia come," Bismarck wrote his wife and as always when speaking about Prussia he could not avoid a pathos otherwise we foreign to him. "For these men/will triumph, if we triumph and every democrat will show his wound to the King as an unpaid bill ... I cannot arrest my tears when I think of what has happened to my pride, my joy, my fatherland, the loyal, brave, honest Prussian people intoxicated by the drug they call Prussian honor."32

When the Prussian ministers suffered at Olmutz at the hands of the Tsar and Schwarzenberg the most humiliating diplomatic defeat in Prussia's history, Bismarck could therefore feel only a sense of relief. The essence of Prussia had been preserved, despite its setback, for its historic mission,

32. W. 14/I. p.

35. W. I. B.

been preserved, geschichte its seepack, for its historic mission, to be left only a sense of relief. The essence of Prunata's pad diplomatic contest in Prunata's diatony, Biamarck could therefore be found in the Task and Seewarnerberg the most humiliating when the Prussian ministers anguished at Cimbra at the end of Prussian honor."35

prave, honest Prussian beadle intoxicated by the drug they have deboned to my bridge, my joy, my fatherland, the fatherland, said pill... I cannot arrest my fears when I think of what and every democrat will show his longing to the King as an unforeign to him." For these men will triumph, if we triumph abashingly upon Prunata he could not avoid a bad outcome otherwise. Prunata come," Biamarck wrote his wife and as simple when tions of the elements of Prunata's greatness: "So can us nation of a constitutional state so contrary to Biamarck's not to an abhor to nationalism and a victory would mean the creation a loss of identity." For a war could only be rectified if loss of breath, put to light, even historically, might in-which comes Prunata upon a debt. To give in would mean a debithe these considerations Biamarck had no doubt to do with its own aversion of itself.

would ask of Prunata the most difficult of all political acts, and make a mocker of some of Prunata's greatest men. If the abstractions of the Generation of the War of Liberation man perpetually berate forever. It would mean the end of all would mean discredit to Prunata and abate its claims to get-

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the hegemony in Germany. And if this attitude reflected an
almost metaphysical faith in Prussia, it also corresponded to
the realities of the situation. For Austria and the Prussian
conservatives in their hatred of the revolution had themselves
fallen into the revolutionary pattern of thinking: they placed
victory over continuity. In the exaltation of their triumph
they forgot that a victory is meaningless in the long run un-
less the victor can exact an acceptance of it by the defeated.
But Austria knew nothing better to do with its triumph than
to restore precisely the order which had filed so totally in
1848. The Assembly of the Confederation met again in Frankfurt.
Prussia once more had only one vote among 17 in a congee of
states jealous of their sovereignty and afraid of Prussian
power. But there was a difference, albeit an intangible one.
Nothing could restore the two pillars of the Metternich System:
the general acceptance of the sanctity of legitimate rule and
its corollary, Prussia's voluntary acceptance of a secondary
role within Germany. And in its absence the German Confedera-
tion would increasingly be reduced to a contest of power in
which Prussia as the strongest and most cohesive state was in
an excellent position. It was precisely this contest which
Metternich had striven to avoid for neither Austria's German
population nor its geographic position was adequate for the
task of dominating Germany by force. Thus, at the moment of
Prussia's humiliation, Bismarck might well feel that its
greatest opportunities were still ahead of it.

Greatest opportunities were at hand of it.
Prussia's annihilation, Bismarck might well feel that its
task of dominating Germany by force. Time, at the moment of
colonisation of its geographic position was adequate for the
Metternich had succeeded to avoid for another Austria's German
an excellent position. It was precisely this contest which
which Prussia as the strongest and most constructive state was in
tion would increasingly be reduced to a contest of power in
role within Germany. And in its absence the German Confeder-
ates corollary, Prussia's voluntary acceptance of a secondary
the General acceptance of the anarchy of legitimate rule and
Nothing could restore the two billions of the Metternich system
billion. But there was a difference, aspect an intangible one.
states lesions of their sovereignty and afraid of Prussia's
Prussia once more had only one vote among 11 in a congress of
1848. The Assemblage of the Confederation met again in Frankfurt,
to reassemble precisely the order which had tilled so totally in
But Austria knew nothing better to do with its triumph than
tear the victor can exact an acceptance of it by the defeated.
they forgot that a victory is meaningless in the long run un-
victory on or continuity. In the exultation of their triumph
fallen into the revolutionary pattern of thinking: they blazed
conclusives in their hatred of the revolution had themselves
the realities of the situation. For Austria and the Prussians
almost metaphysical faith in Prussia, it also corresponded to
the hegemony in Germany. And it this attitude reflected an

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(8)

- 45 -

While Prussia's conservatives were hailing Olmutz as the death-knell of the revolution, they did not notice that a new and ultimately more dangerous revolution was preparing itself. What the conservatives considered the end of a process was to Bismarck merely the condition for a more vital policy. Had it understood the speech with which Bismarck defended Olmutz, the Camarilla would have enthused less about the trenchancy of its formulations. For in it Bismarck agreed to Olmutz only because the international situation was unfavorable for a major war and he explicitly asserted that reason of state, not the solidarity of conservative principles was the basis of his policy: "The only healthy basis of policy for a great power ... is egotism and not romanticism and it is not worthy of a great state to fight for a cause which does not correspond with its own interests ... Woe to the statesman who does not look for a cause of the war which will still be valid after the war." The agreement with Austria was thus justified only because the moment was not opportune for a showdown and because its objective was abhorrent to Bismarck: "I would not hesitate to make war, indeed I should recommend it, if somebody could show me one objective ... which cannot be attained without it ... Who will have the courage to tell the casualties: 'You have suffered much, but be happy with us, you have saved the constitution of a united Germany.'"

Nor was the war required by Prussia's honor. Honor

Nor was the war required by Prussia's honor. Honor
the constitution of a united Germany."¹⁴

"You have suffered much, but be happy with what you have saved it ... Who will have the courage to tell the casualty: 'show me one objective ... which cannot be attained without to make war, indeed I should recommend it, it is somebody could objective was apportioned to Bismarck: "I would not realize the moment was not unfortunate for a showdown and because its The agreement with Austria was thus qualified only because cause of the war which will still be valid after the war."" The war which does not correspond with its own not romanticism and it is not worthy of a great state to healthy parts of border for a great power ... is egotism and conservative bristols was the basis of his policy: "The only asserted that reason of state, not the solidarity of con- situation was unfavorable for a major war and he explicitly Bismarck agreed to Olmütz only because the international less spent the truce of itslemations. For in it Bismarck defended Olmütz, the Camerines would have entailed vital policy. Had it understood the abeyance with which Bia- a process was to Bismarck merely the condition for a more bearing itself. What the conservatives considered the end of that a new and ultimately more dangerous revolution was bre- as the death-knell of the revolution, they did not notice while Prussia's conservatives were failing Olmütz.

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presupposes a standard of obligations and Bismarck's was not
to Germany but to Prussia: "The Prussian army will always
be the army of the King and seek its honor in obedience ...
Prussia's honor does not consist in our playing all over Ger-
many the Don Quixote for vexed parliamentary celebrities, who
consider their local constitution threatened. I seek Prussia's
honor in that Prussia keep apart from any disgraceful con-
nection with democracy and that Prussia never admit that any-
thing occur in Germany without its permission..." The steno-
graphic report notes "hylarity" at this point. For this was
the demand for Prussian hegemony not sanctified by theories
of national unity, but simply by the fact of Prussia's exist-
ence. And as such it was inconceivable to the chamber; it
seemed a mere forensic trick to out-maneuver Bismarck's op-
ponents dialectically. Not for the last time was Bismarck to
apply the maxim that to tell the truth may prove the best
means of obscuring one's objectives, particularly with oppon-
ents so doctrinaire that they could not even imagine an al-
ternative to their vision of reality. And for this reason
another sentence in Bismarck's speech became meaningful only
for posterity: "If someone, in the name of German unity, pres-
es for a parliamentary union, I should like to warn him not
to confuse two concepts: German unity and the right to deliver
parliamentary speeches from a German rostrum; for me the two
concepts are far apart ..."³³ In short, the quest for German
unity was more fundamental than that for liberal institutions.

33. Kohl I, p. 261f.

33. Konf. I, b. 5c11.

unity was more fundamental than that for federal institutions.
concepts are far apart ..."32 In short, the great for German
barbarismally abhorred from a German road: for me the two
to continue two concepts: German unity and the right to deliver
as for a barriamentary union. I should like to warn him not
tor boererrity: "It someone, in the name of German unity, broa-
s another sentence in Biamarck's abhor to mean something only
terminusive to their vision of reality." And for this reason
entire no doctrine that they could not even imagine so far
means of opacning one's objectives, barriamently with obcon-
ady the maxim that to tell the truth must prove the best
bent of boererrity. Not for the last time was Biamarck co
seemed a were forenate trick to out-manoeuer Biamarck's ob-
ence. And as an end it was inconceivable to the chamber: if
of national utility, put simply by the fact of Prussia's exist-
ting demand for Prussia hegemony not annullied by theories
of the German reich. The German government has
the demand for Prussia hegemony not annullied by theories
GRABICHE REBORT NOTES "INFARITY" AT THIS BOUND. FOR THIS WAS
the demand for Prussia keept apart from any diagnosis con-
undert in that Prussia kept apart from any diagnosis con-
cerning their local constitution threatened. I seek Prussia's
mann the Don Quixote for vexed barriamentary celebrities, who
PRUNIAIS'S HONOR DOES NOT CONBAT IN OUR BISLYING ASIF OVER
BE THE ARMY OF THE KING AND SEEK ITS HONOR IN Obedience ...
TO GERMANY PUT TO PRUNIAIS: "THE PRUNIAIS ARMY WILL SOWDA
brennbomea a standard of obligations and Biamarck's was not

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And therefore too, if properly utilized, it might give a greater momentum to Prussian policy than it ever possessed before. Bismarck was using a national revolution on an anti-national basis. Only the future could teach that this was not a paradox.

The speech defending Olmutz proved to be Bismarck's last major parliamentary effort. For with the revolution seemingly defeated, the Camarilla and Leopold von Gerlach above all thought that the moment had come to utilize the talents of their impetuous colleague on a wider stage. When it came time to appoint a Prussian minister to the Assembly of the Confederation, Leopold von Gerlach saw to it that the assignment went to his young protégé. The most desirable post in Prussian diplomacy thus went to a complete novice, because the Camarilla hoped that Bismarck would transfer to Frankfurt his intransigent anti-revolutionary attitude and that in unison with Austria he would help protect Germany against new upheavals.

With this appointment the Camarilla only revealed the extent of their misunderstanding both of Bismarck's personality and of the process in which they were involved. For whatever else the events of 1848 had proved, they should have left no doubt that the old system was no longer viable. But the extent of the upheaval had only served to frighten those who sincerely considered themselves conservatives into a rigid adherence to what had come to seem familiar and there-

right adherence to what had come to seem familiar and there-
who sincerely considered themselves conservatives into a
the extent of the npeasants had only served to enlighten those
felt no doubt that the old system was no longer viable. But
whatever else the events of 1848 had proved, they should have
sailorship and of the process in which they were involved. For
the extent of their misunderstanding port of Bramarck's ber-
With this abatement the Camarilla only revealed
against new npeasants.

that in union withVNATRA he would help protect Germany
Frankfurt via intranational anti-revolutionary attitude and
because the Camarilla hoped that Bramarck would transfer to
boat in Prussian diplomacy thus went to a complete novice,
assignment went to his young protégé. The most desirable
of the Confederation, Rebold von Gerfen saw to it that the
it came time to abdoint a Prussian minister to the Vaesempy
talents of their intrepid colleagues on a wider stage. When
above all thought that the moment had come to utilize the
seemingly defeated, the Camarilla and Rebold von Gerfen
that major barri員mental effort. For with the revolution
The above defending Olmütz proved to be Bramarck's
barbax.

national data. Only the future could show that this was not a
before. Bramarck was making a national revolution on an anti-
greater momentum to Prussian policy than it ever possessed
And therefore too, it properly utilized, it might give a

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