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1 and defense ministers were quite supportive of the INF Treaty
2 and the timing.

3 Therefore -- and I certainly listened attentively and
4 talked to a number of persons outside of those that we met
5 with directly. If there is a credible collection of
6 viewpoints contrary to the INF Treaty, I did not perceive it
7 to exist.

8 Do you find that there is?

9 Dr. Kissinger: I think one has to do this country by
country. I think the nuclear-armed countries of NATO were so
10 shaked by Reykjavik, where they thought we were giving away
11 their nuclear weapons, that they decided that, since this
12 Administration was not likely to leave office without giving
13 away some nuclear weapons, it was better for them if we gave
14 away ours rather than theirs.
15

16 And I think this is particularly true of the British, who
17 were worried about the Trident program and whose
18 understanding of the internal German trends is not as highly
19 developed as that in France.

20 In France there is that feeling, plus perhaps also the
21 sense that a Germany completely dependent in the nuclear
22 field on France might have certain benefits for the French
23 political influence. I think, incidentally, that latter is a
24 short-sighted view and it is not likely to stand the test of
25 time.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

Within the Federal Republic, the problem is that the people who have been most disillusioned are also the ones with the longest tradition of pro-American feelings, and therefore for them to go public now and indicate reservations which they know to be futile would mortgage their political position even more than they feel that it has been jeopardized.

So I think this is not an issue on which simply asking people gives you a good count. I am quite convinced that at the beginning of this process, ~~if they~~ had been given another choice, say 50 percent reduction at first and another 50 percent in the case of conventional disarmament, or ~~if we had~~ begun at the short range end of the spectrum. I believe it would have been received in a much more positive way.

But this is all water over the dam now and within the present context no European leader will want to risk his political position by attacking a fait accompli.

Senator Warner: Well, we are now negotiating a START agreement. Do you think there is adequate consultation and consideration being given to allied views as we work on the START agreement?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the START agreement, strangely enough, has less of an impact, because the Europeans did not stake their own political position on the deployment of the weapons that are now being negotiated.

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Now again, one has to ask oneself, what kind of political consultation? I believe there has been adequate political consultation in the sense of keeping the Europeans meticulously informed of the details of the negotiations. I do not believe there has been adequate consultation on the grand strategy that emerges from all of these agreements, not because we have kept it from them but because we have not developed it for ourselves.

We do not know ourselves what it means. It seems to me to be a fact that when, on the one hand, INF shifts the nuclear defense of Europe to weapons based in the United States or at sea, and now at the same time we are cutting these weapons by 50 percent and shifting the ratios with respect to land-based weapons to an even more unfavorable direction to the United States, so that the practical result will be, as soon as people start doing the figures, to raise even more doubts about the American willingness to initiate general nuclear war in the defense of Europe.

So what our nuclear strategy will be after we have made all of these agreements is something that we absolutely have to face, for ourselves, and then, within the alliance.

And in this sense, there has not been adequate consultation because there has not been an adequate thinking through. Take an issue which I am sure those of you who deal

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with NATO know very well. There are four submarines
technically assigned to NATO. I do not attach any importance
to that because it is sort of a theological point what
"assignment" means.

But it seems to me obvious that when we are down to 17
submarines, which we will be after the START agreement, that
we will not be able to maintain that particular commitment.
Now, has that been explained to the Europeans? Have we
explained alternative ways by which we will meet our
commitment and, above all, what exactly is going to be the
strategy of nuclear war after a START agreement?

This is something we need to think through.

Senator Warner: The application of the doctrine of
flexible response is what you are speaking to?

Dr. Kissinger: Correct.

Senator Warner: Now, in the event it is the Judgment of
the President and others -- and hopefully the allies would be
a part of that formation of the judgment -- that we cannot
reach a START agreement at this coming summit or within the
foreseeable balance of this President's term, what procedures
would you recommend to hold sort of in place the work, the
valuable work that has been done on START, should it go on to
the next Administration?

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you, I am not familiar with
the details of the negotiation. I have the greatest

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difficulty visualizing how they can possibly work out the
verification procedures for a START agreement when I look at
the difficulties we have had with the INF verification
procedures, which deal with only one category of weapon and
at zero level.

But they can do a Vladivostok type agreement, in which
they state, as they more or less did after the Washington
agreement -- or after the Washington summit, in more
specificity where they stand in the negotiations, and hand
that on to their successors.

I am frankly uneasy about a forced draft push toward
START without thinking through the strategic implications of
some of the questions with respect to which I have raised.

Senator Warner: In particular, the verification aspect
of the START?

Dr. Kissinger: The verification aspect and what exactly
is --

Senator Warner: You are not suggesting it is
unachievable?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I think it is achievable, but I think
that I think that all of arms control theory arms
control theory was developed in the late fifties and it has
now become almost a numbers gave.

For example, after the Soviet heavy missiles are cut by
50 percent and our land-based missiles are cut by whatever