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# MAJOR ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PANEL

## THE FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL PURPOSE:

There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period. On the physical plane, the power of modern weapons is out of balance with the objectives for which they might be employed; as a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find ourselves paralyzed by the implications of our own weapons technology. On the political plane, many of the newly independent Powers continue to inject into their international policies the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence. On the ideological plane, the contemporary ferment is fed by the newly awakened hopes and expectations of hitherto inarticulate peoples and by the rapidity with which ideas can be communicated. And these factors, of themselves serious enough, are aggravated by the policies of the Soviet Bloc, eager to exploit all doubts and dissatisfactions to its own ends.

Although the problems and opportunities of the next ten to fifteen years will present themselves as a series of individual cases, they cannot be solved in those terms. For the world situation is revolutionary precisely because old values and long-cherished concepts no longer seem to fit new conditions.

Millions are groping for a new definition of themselves and of society. They are expressing their dissatisfactions by protests against the existing order, but can propose no clear substitute, no alternative goal. As long as these powerful sentiments are unchannelled -- or worse, misdirected -- revolutionary ferment will continue, for a revolution cannot be mastered by understanding alone. Only when these revolutionary movements are given a sense of direction can they be utilized for good, and this requires that the objectives which they pursue be compatible with ours.

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This emphasizes one of the basic problems of international relations: How to relate a nation's vision of itself to the vision of it as seen by others. To it-self a nation is an impression of justice because people will accept laws voluntarily only if they believe them to be in the general interest. (Totalitarian states find themselves obliged to erect elaborate propaganda machines to achieve this agreement.) But the international experience of a people may be a challenge to the universality of its notion of justice because the international order depends on the reconciliation of different national purposes. If the objectives and the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order are sufficiently similar, this may not become apparent. When the national purpose is well under-stood and uncontested, foreign policy itself is a series of technical problems. In a revolutionary situation, however, national purposes of different nations will clash and their conflict will underlie all relationships. In such a case, technical problems are insoluble unless we can relate them to our image of ourselves and unless this image can be given a more general application. A framework of national policy therefore suggests the necessity of an attempt to define a national purpose. This task of defining national purpose is particularly important for the United States, since our development has been largely an inward-turning process, geared to the problems of colonizing and developing a vast continent and erecting on that continent a new political and social structure. The beliefs and values which contributed so enormously to the growth of this country should have inter-national application, but, if so, they need definition and presentation in a form understandable both to our neighbors and to ourselves. Particularly, they need searching analysis to determine both their fitness and their applicability in this

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revolutionary era, which is so different from the age in which our values were
shaped. Only when this has been done can we confidently proceed to outline a
framework of national policy, secure in the knowledge that it will coincide with
our national purpose and strengthen our efforts to secure our national objectives.

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In seeking to determine our national purpose we might well ask ourselves
the following questions:

1. What are the basic moral and philosophic beliefs which motivate the United States? Are these values sufficiently universal to be comprehended by and attractive to peoples who have been raised in non-Western religious cults and philosophical beliefs? What factors today militate against our moral values and what challenge do these face from other competing systems?

2. Does the U. S. possess a sense of mission which can and should motivate its policies? Can U. S. interests be defined in terms of a set of values of universal application? If so, how can these values and the policy concepts derived therefrom be related to day to day actions and decisions?

3. To what extent are U. S. objectives based on a sense of national purpose? To what extent do these objectives promote our national purpose? Can there be a correlation between purpose, objectives, and values, or must we, in order to attain objectives, discard or minimize national values?

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# SECTION I - INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY.

**Introduction.** The technological revolution has led to profound and awesome changes in weapons and weapons systems. Nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents, radioactive materials, have all been coupled with delivery systems such that we are actually or potentially capable of devastating whole continents -- as is the Soviet Bloc. In an armed and divided world, the possession of such weapons systems is essential to national security, yet their full-scale employment by both sides might well mean national -- if not racial -- suicide. Yet this does not necessarily mean that both sides abjure war; it may mean merely that the military struggle will take place in a different arena -- and with other weapons. To maintain mutual nuclear deterrence is a difficult and a costly measure; the upkeep of other types of forces, however politically desirable or militarily necessary they may be, compounds the economic burden of the Free World. Under these circumstances, it is proper that we ask searching questions such as the following:

1. What is the role of force in the nuclear age? Is force a feasible solution for international differences in the nuclear age? For what kind of differences? If not, what are the alternatives? Disarmament? World Government?

2. What are the technological trends in weapons systems over ten to fifteen years? What is the relation between these technological trends and our political-military requirements? Are military alliances likely to add to U. S. security or to impose additional demands upon our strength? Are alliances compatible with the theory or actuality of all-out nuclear war?

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3. What are the implications for U. S. strategy and military policy of an era of relative nuclear parity with the Soviet Union? What is the meaning of nuclear parity? What strategy or strategies will best serve U. S. interests during this period? To what extent must we be concerned with problems of limited war? Of guerilla and civil war? What are the relations between these various strategies and the size and relative strength of the various elements of our Armed Services?

4. What problems does the new technology pose with respect to integrated strategic planning? To budgetary requirements? The organization of our military establishment?

station of our military establishment?

4. What problems does the new technology pose with respect to integrated strategic planning? To parliamentary requirements? The organic

Armed Services?

and the size and relative strength of the various elements of our civil war? What are the relations between these various strategies we be concerned with problems of limited war? Of guerrilla and best serve U. S. interests during this period? To what extent must the meaning of nuclear parity? What strategy or strategies will of an era of relative nuclear parity with the Soviet Union? What is 2. What are the implications for U. S. strategy and military policy

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**SECTION II - INTERNATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY, INTRODUCTION.** To a certain extent, the political problems confronting the United States derive from recent developments in military technology, coupled with the existence of a hostile system of Communist states. Thus problems of alliances, of disarmament, of the support of undemocratic regimes, of the continuation of divided countries such as Germany and Korea, result more or less directly from these factors. Yet certain broader political problems, such as colonialism in all its aspects, the mutual antagonisms among newly-formed states, the conflict in interests between European and Middle Eastern countries, would remain to plague us even if Communism suddenly disappeared. To react rationally to these situations is in itself difficult; to manipulate and shape them, over a long period of time, in directions favorable to U.S. interests, is not only more difficult but requires a clear understanding of both those interests and the basic issues confronting us. We may well ask ourselves:

1. What are the basic factors which determine American interests abroad and what are the natures of these interests? Do they derive largely from a desire for self-preservation? From a sense of mission? From a wish for isolation?

2. Is there an irreconcilable antagonism between the U.S. and the Communist bloc, or is a policy of accommodation both possible and feasible in terms of basic U.S. interests? What is the meaning and future possibility of recent developments within the Soviet orbit? What is the relationship between internal developments and foreign policy? What changes in policy may we expect once the Soviets have attained relative nuclear parity?

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3. Considering both military and political factors, what should be the role and nature of alliances in which we engage? Can we, and to what extent should we, seek to establish with our allies common goals and objectives in foreign affairs? To what extent are alliances valuable for other than military reasons and how can this value be enhanced?

4. Can the American values and institutions continue to flourish in a system of nation-states? In a different vehicle both more desirable and more suitable for the attainment of American objectives? Specifically, should we seek truly to promote regional and international political and economic organizations in which the U.S. would be only "first among equals"?

5. What are the implications for the United States of the emergence into statehood of former colonial peoples? To what extent is it in the U.S. interests to support national independence movements? Is the attainment of statehood by colonial peoples a most desirable form of self-determination? What alternatives may be developed?

6. What specific problems and opportunities may confront us in Europe? In Asia? In Africa? In Latin America? To what extent can or should the United States temper its policies in one area to accord with those in another? Can the U.S. pursue divergent regional policies and still operate successfully?

# SECTION III - INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY.

**Introduction.** The political objectives of many states are accompanied by, and in many cases motivated by, corresponding economic aspirations. One of the major tenets of this era is the equation of economic improvement, especially industrialization, with political strength and social betterment. Whatever the true validity of this equation, the leaders, at least, of many states, are convinced of its correctness. Their fierce nationalism and exaggerated fear of colonialism leads many states to seek this economic improvement not through the classical methods of promoting increased trade and foreign investment, but through governmentally planned and directed economic autarchy. Yet they cannot simultaneously increase social services, improve the standard of living, and promote economic development without large amounts of outside capital, which in most instances is not available through private channels. Their problem is compounded by the fact that the already-industrialized countries themselves restrict both trade and the flow of funds, seek largely outlets for finished goods and sources for raw materials, and do not welcome new competitors for world markets.

It is questionable whether the economic aid sporadically given by some industrialized countries is either of sufficient magnitude to meet requirements or of sufficient economic and political validity to insure its continuance.

Questions which we might ask concerning U. S. foreign economic policy include:

1. What problems do the under-developed countries face in attempting to improve their standard of living? To what extent are these problems affected by increases in population? By the rate of growth of

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agriculture? By the utilization or depletion of other resources?

2. What interests does the United States have in the maintenance or improvement of living conditions in foreign countries? To what extent do such improvements increase or decrease the chances for political stability? For resistance against Communism? For mutually profitable trade with the United States?

3. To what extent can economic aid and trade policy be used to implement national policy? What purposes do we want to achieve both with economic aid and with our trade policy? What can be done to mobilize and coordinate both government and private resources in pursuit of economic policy? To what extent do economic and political stability abroad depend upon U. S. trade policy?

4. To what extent is economic, as distinct from military, aid required to achieve U. S. policy objectives? What can and cannot economic aid be expected to achieve? To what extent and under what circumstances can private capital or government loans be substituted for economic assistance?

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# SECTION IV - U.S. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY.

**Introduction.** Perhaps in no other field is the relationship between precept and policy so loose and so ill-defined as in the field of U.S. economic and social policy. To begin, there is little or no agreement on the relative roles of government and the individual in economic growth and stability, in the utilization and development of resources, or in social welfare programs such as health and hospitalization. Secondly, we have, under temporary political or economic pressures, adopted measures for the protection or subsidization of given industries, professions or geographic areas which are difficult to reconcile with our professed economic tenets. Thirdly, we have been handicapped by conflicting international and domestic economic objectives which have caused us to adopt contradictory positions or to vacillate between one policy and another as the spirit moved us. Moreover the gap between the ideal and the actual, which exists in any society, has particularly redounded upon us, since we are widely regarded, by others as by ourselves, as spiritual leaders in the democratic revolution and as the prime exponents of social equality. Questions which this study group might consider include:

1. What do we mean by economic growth? What are the factors which assist or hamper economic growth? To what extent are these factors controllable or influenced by the government? By private enterprise?
What is the effect, for example, of taxation policy on economic growth and stability?

2. What are the trends in the American economy and to what extent do they differ from previous trends? What is the impact of the new

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technological revolution on such problems as energy require-
ments? Demand for skilled manpower? Concentration of
industry? What steps should we now take to best prepare for
further technological change? To what extent do these trends
in the American economy affect, or become affected by, the
availability and use of various domestic resources?

3. To what extent should the government assume responsibility for social welfare programs such as education, health and hospitalization, social insurance, etc.? How and to what extent can private enterprise and non-governmental organizations share in the promotion of social welfare? To what extent have social welfare programs become a political necessity? What is likely to be the impact of expanded social welfare programs in such fields as taxation? The budget?

4. What specific problems confront us with regard to farm policy?
Uneven industrial growth? Utilities development? What concepts should govern the relative roles of government and private enterprise in these fields? What is the relationship between our policy and expenditures in these fields and our foreign policy?
Our international economic objectives? The resources available for national security purposes?

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# SECTION V - UNITED STATES UTILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES,

## Introduction.
The political, social, and technological changes of the last two hundred years have raised increasingly grave questions concerning the education, training, and utilization of manpower. An increasingly complex society requires constant improvement of the human element of that society. No longer can this country afford ignorance among the electorate, indifference among the members of our growing communities, waste and misuse of the talents of our citizens. And yet the effort to overcome our deficiencies, to marshal our resources, requires constantly greater effort by an increasing number of individuals and agencies. The problem of correlation and coordination of these manifold activities, of overcoming prejudice and misunderstanding as to the capabilities of our peoples and as to the best methods of developing and utilizing those capabilities, is an urgent one. Questions with which we might concern ourselves include:

1. What are the population trends in the United States. What are likely to be the sociological and political impacts resulting from these trends? To what extent do these trends indicate our ability to support our security objectives? Our domestic economic objectives? Our political objectives?

2. What problems of education does our growing society face? How can we gear our educational system to inculcate knowledge needed by citizens of a democracy without detracting from scientific and technical schooling required? Specifically, what is the relationship between education (particularly education of high talent manpower) and increased utilization of manpower?

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3. What problems do we face with regard to the utilization of avail-
able manpower? What barriers exist to the full utilization of man-
power? How can they be surmounted?

4. What broad problems in the field of national health do we antici-
pate? What specific questions of mental health may we anticipate?
What are likely to be the sociological problems resulting from our
problems in the field of health?

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# SECTION VI - PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION.

**Introduction.** There is a natural tendency for the members of a functioning organization to take for granted the efficiency of that organization and the suitability of its various governing precepts. This is perhaps particularly true among Americans, whose governmental structure was -- and remains -- a sufficient blend of the ideal and the practical to permit of a large measure of flexibility without perceptible organic change. Yet the problems of 1956 were neither conceivable nor conceived in 1789, nor indeed in 1906. That we have occasionally, perhaps frequently, failed policy-wise, few will deny; some will maintain that these policy failures were marked by equally pronounced failures in governmental organization, leadership, or both. Whether or not this be true, successive investigations and commissions of inquiry have characterized government operations as something less than perfect. While our concern is not with government organization in general, it is pertinent to consider, in a study on future problems and opportunities, the efficiency of the government in long-range planning and its effectiveness in translating its decisions into publicly-supported actions. Questions which we might well ask ourselves are:

1. Do any factors of our national heritage, governmental or social, handicap us in the organization and functioning of government?

To what extent do the following assist or hamper governmental leaders in carrying out American policy: The separation of powers? The Federal structure? The type and nature of our

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political parties? Our attitude toward government?

2. What are the problems of the overall organization of the government with regard to producing and implementing long-range policy decisions? What are the relations between Congress and the Executive with regard to the decision-making process? How well suited to participate in long-range decision-making is the Department of Defense? The Department of State? What is the role of the budgetary process in the formulation of national policy?

3. What are the problems of our leadership with respect to creating an informed and responsive public opinion? To what extent can and should government take the lead in molding public opinion? How can other leadership groups be brought into the decision-making process and be utilized to create public support for American policy? How can major elements of this policy be removed from the political arena?

ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT

PURPOSE

1. To seek to define the problems and opportunities that the United States may face over the next 10 to 15 years.

2. To review our national purposes and objectives in terms of these problems and opportunities.

3. To develop a framework of concepts and considerations on which policies and decisions to implement our purpose might be based.

might be passed.

3. To develop a framework of concepts and considerations on which policies and decisions to implement can be made.

2. To review our national budgets and objectives in terms of these problems and opportunities.

1. To seek to define the problems and opportunities that the United States may face over the next 10 to 12 years.

PURPOSE

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT

ROCKETTER BROTHERS LUND

There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period. On the physical plane, the power of modern weapons is out of balance with the objectives for which they might be employed; as a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find ourselves paralyzed by the implications of our own weapons technology. On the political plane, many of the newly independent Powers continue to inject into their international policies the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence. On the ideological plane, the contemporary ferment is fed by the newly awakened hopes and expectations of hitherto inarticulate peoples and by the rapidity with which ideas can be communicated. And these factors, of themselves serious enough, are aggravated by the policies of the Soviet Bloc, eager to exploit all doubts and dissatisfactions for its own ends.

Although the problems and opportunities of the next ten to fifteen years will present themselves as a series of individual cases, they cannot be solved in those terms. For the world situation is revolutionary precisely because concepts held for a long time no longer seem to fit new conditions.

~~and because~~ Millions are groping for a new definition of themselves and of society. They are expressing their dissatisfactions by protests against the existing order, but can propose no clear substitute. As long as these sentiments are unchannelled revolutionary ferment will continue, for a revolution cannot be mastered by understanding alone. A revolution can

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be constructive only to the extent that its hopes and resentments are
given a sense of direction.

This emphasizes one of the basic problems of international relations:
How to relate a nation's vision of itself to the vision of it as seen by others.
To itself a nation is an *impression* of justice because people will accept
laws voluntarily only if they believe them to be in the *general* interest.
(Totalitarian states find themselves obliged to erect elaborate propaganda
machines to achieve this agreement.) But the international experience of a
people may be a challenge to the universality of its notion of justice because
the international order depends on the reconciliation of different national
purposes. If the objectives and the domestic structure of the states comprising
the international order are sufficiently similar, this may not become apparent.
When the national purpose is well understood and uncontested, foreign policy
resolves into a series of *technical* problems. In a revolutionary situation,
however, national purposes of different nations will clash and their conflict
will underlie all relationships. In such a case, technical problems are
insoluble unless we relate them to our image of ourselves and unless this
image can be given a more general application.

A framework of national policy therefore suggests the necessity of an
attempt to define a national purpose. For this task, the U.S. confronts
particular difficulties. Until the end of World War II, the primary concerns
of our society were domestic. Because American society was sure of its
values, they were rarely elaborated. Foreign policy, in turn, outside of
Western Hemisphere relations, was conducted as a response to an unambiguous

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threat. Even then, the security conferred by two great oceans and the
existence of the British navy created the illusion that the nature of our
foreign commitments was entirely up to us. But the present revolutionary
situation cannot be met with methods we learned in a more secure past.

The temptation of our history is to treat most problems as primarily
technical because the vision which formed America has been so much taken
for granted that it was rarely made explicit. But the challenge of the present
revolutionary period is that its problems are primarily moral in the sense that
major portions of the world are in search of a sense of direction. We therefore
cannot avoid a more explicit consideration of our values. This suggests some
of the following problems:

1. What are the basic moral and philosophic beliefs which motivate the United States? What challenges do our moral values face from other competing systems? What degree of diversity of values can be encompassed in a more general system of purposes? What set of values can unite societies of different cultural patterns?

2. Does the U.S. possess a sense of mission which can and should motivate its policies? Can U.S. interests be defined in terms of a set of values of universal application? If so, how can these values and the policy concepts derived therefrom be related to day to day actions and decisions?

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the new weapons for policy, strategy, indeed for survival, depend on our
interpretation of their significance. This raises some of the following
questions:

3. What are the implications for U.S. strategy and military policy of an era of relative nuclear parity with the Soviet Union? What is the meaning of nuclear parity? What strategy or strategies will best serve U.S. interests during this period? To what extent must we be concerned with problems of limited war? Of guerilla and civil war? What are the relations between these various strategies and the size and relative strength of the various elements of our Armed Services?

# SECTION II - INTERNATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

**Introduction:** To a certain extent, the political problems confronting the United States derive from the existence of a hostile system of Communist countries, coupled with recent developments in military technology. The division of countries such as Korea and Viet Nam occur as a result of war between parts of the free world and parts of the socialist world. In action against the aggressor, who was supported in each case by the Communists, war was handicapped by fears lest the expansion of conflict should result in global nuclear war. Similarly, many of our other problems, such as the threat to the security of Taiwan - indeed the very existence on Taiwan of a rump government of the Republic of China, - result directly from the combination of Soviet, ideological hostility and growing military strength.

Finally, in a similar sense the problems which we encounter in holding together a system of alliances, and the difficulties which we face in developing a workable program for disarmament, are all magnified by these factors where they are not caused, if they are not caused, by the existence of a hostile Soviet world. Yet certain broader political problems would remain to plague us even if Communism suddenly disappeared. Although anti-Colonialism is exploited by the Communists, Colonialism in all its aspects is one manifestation of the revolutionary period through which we are now passing. The conflict in interests between industrialized and underdeveloped countries and between former Colonial powers and erstwhile Colonial peoples, which is illustrated by the current dispute over Suez, may be expected to continue and perhaps even grow in time. To react rationally to situations

**Introduction:** The political objectives of many states are accompanied by and in many cases motivated by corresponding economic aspirations. One of the major tenets of this era is the equation of economic improvement, especially industrialization, with political stability and social betterment. Whatever the true validity of this equation, the leaders, at least, of many states, are convinced of its correctness. Their fierce nationalism and exaggerated fear of colonialism leads them to seek this economic improvement not through the classical methods of promoting increased trade and foreign investment, but through governmentally planned and directed economic autarchy. Yet they cannot simultaneously increase social services, improve the standard of living, and promote economic development without large amounts of outside capital, which in most instances is not available through private channels. Their problem is compounded by the fact that the already-industrialized countries themselves restrict both trade and the flow of funds, seek largely outlets for finished goods and sources for raw materials, and do not welcome new competitors for world markets.

One method of meeting the requirements of the under-developed countries is through economic assistance, either in the form of grants or through commodity and currency loans of such duration and rate of interest that they virtually become grants. Prior to 1939 a few peoples of any nation considered that their Government had a moral obligation to extend economic assistance to less fortunate countries, and even fewer peoples claimed an

intrinsic right to such assistance. Economic help, such as the series of French loans to Russia in the period 1890-1914, was motivated almost entirely by political considerations. Today there is no clear consensus as to whether economic aid should be given for the attainment of political objectives, for the purpose of economic development, or for moral ends, nor is it clear that these aims can be reconciled. Moreover, it is questionable whether the economic aid sporadically given by some industrialized countries is either of sufficient magnitude to meet the requirements of the under-developed areas, or of sufficient economic and political validity to ensure its continuance. In order to focus attention on these problems we might ask ourselves the following questions concerning U. S. foreign economic policy: might it be richted.

free trade is important, since it symbolizes both a lack of co-ordination
between domestic and foreign policy and a disregard for the economic
interests of other states, which is difficult to justify to those concerned.
Questions which the ~~Study Group~~ on U. S. Economic and Social Policy
might consider include:

SECTION VI - UNITED STATES PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

One of the problems of any bureaucracy is the need to strike a balance between the requirements of organization and the need for inspiration. Organization expresses the importance of continuity, the establishment of a routine which can operate on average performance; inspiration represents the mode of growth, the ability of transcending a framework which has come to be taken for granted. The danger of too much emphasis on organization is bureaucratization and lack of imagination. The peril in too much stress on inspiration is a tour de force exceeding the ability of a society to assimilate change. A vital society establishes a balance between these: NEED FOR ROUTINES + THE NECESSITY OF CHANGING! ORGANI

When the problems and opportunities a society confronts develop gradually, this distinction may not become apparent, for then they can be dealt with on the basis of the lessons of the past. When a society faces new challenges which are novel not only in their extent but in their rapidity, a serious conflict may arise between the quest of bureaucracy for average performance and the need for great conceptions. This may be a particular problem in a government organized as ours is for the conduct of domestic affairs. There exists a temptation then to deal with policy problems administratively and to judge them by mistakes avoided rather than goals achieved. This is all the more true because of the success of American

institutions in dealing with these problems heretofore. It therefore becomes
important to consider problems of American government, not so much from
the point of view of organization in its own right as from that of the fit-
ness of the organization to develop the concept to deal with the problems
and opportunities of the next 10-15 years. This suggests some of the fol-
lowing questions:

To what extent do the following assist or hamper our leadership in carrying out American policy? The separation of powers?

The Federal structure? The type and nature of our political parties? Our attitude toward government?

# SECTION VI - UNITED STATES PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

**Introduction:** One of the problems of any bureaucracy is the need to strike a balance between the requirements of organization and the need for inspiration. Organization expresses the importance of continuity, the establishment of a routine which can operate on average performance; inspiration represents the mode of growth, the ability of transcending a framework which has come to be taken for granted. The danger of too much emphasis on organization is bureaucratization and lack of imagination. The peril in too much stress on inspiration is a tour de force exceeding the ability of a society to assimilate change. A vital society establishes a balance between these two dangers. Its bureaucracy runs sufficiently smoothly to take care of ordinary problems as a matter of routine, but not so pervasive as to inhibit the grasping of new opportunities.

When the problems and opportunities a society confronts develop gradually, this distinction may not become apparent, for then they can be dealt with on the basis of the lessons of the past. When a society faces new challenges which are novel not only in their extent but in their rapidity a serious conflict may arise between the quest of bureaucracy for average performance and the need for great conceptions. This may be a particular problem in a government organized as ours is for the conduct of domestic affairs. There exists a temptation then to deal with policy problems administratively and to judge them by mistakes avoided rather than goals achieved. This is all the more true because of the success of American institutions in dealing

with these problems heretofore. It therefore becomes important to consider
problems of American government, not so much from the point of view of
organization in its own right as from that of the fitness of the organization to
develop the concept to deal with the problems and opportunities of the next
10-15 years.