DRAFT

Dear Mort:

As we discussed, I am writing this letter to put an end to the
painful acrimony which has characterized our relationship for
nearly twenty years.

I regret this because I valued our friendship and still recall
our association at Harvard and in the government as productive and
stimulating.

Both of us have paid a price. Twenty years ago your privacy
and your family's were invaded and you have been pursuing legal
relief ever since. For me the result has been virtually a decade
and a half of defending myself in court against charges that I was
the principal person responsible for a violation of Constitutional
rights.

In fact, I accept a moral responsibility in two respects:

In the first place, I acquiesced in the tap. It was Hoover
who originally identified you as within the range of criteria

established by Nixon and him. But the NSC office became part of
the process at least to the extent of reading the reports until May
1970. It is something if circumstances were repeated I would not
do again.

and never tried to terminate the surveillance.

Second, I never inquired into termination procedures. I
should not have simply left the matter to investigators who lacked
a foreign policy or national security perspective.

As to the papers filed on my behalf by the Department of
Justice, they are not based on my personal knowledge and I have
not reviewed them. My views are those expressed in this letter.
*confirm what Justice says.* It is clear that I did not question
your loyalty and integrity and that I resisted all efforts to
remove you before the wiretaps were established. Indeed I warned
you that you were under surveillance at the outset. Though the
reports came to my office until May of 1970, the actual logs were
almost entirely dealt with by my staff. After May of 1970 I was
out of the loop entirely.

and, with your agreement, cut off
your access to sensitive material.

I have always entertained the highest regard for you. I brought you into the NSC and I urged you to stay after you wanted to leave. As I have stated publicly and at my deposition, nothing that came to my attention from the surveillance or otherwise cast any doubt on your integrity or loyalty to the country. To this day I have regarded you as a colleague of the highest talent, one who served his county well.

Though nothing I say can erase the human costs of this
episode, I am please that we may now be able to put at least the
legal matter behind us.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

December 19, 1991

Dear Mort:

Both of us have paid a price. Twenty years ago your privacy and your family's were invaded, and you have been pursuing legal relief ever since. For me the result has been virtually a decade and a half of defending myself in court against charges that I was the principal person responsible for a violation of Constitutional rights.

Second, I never inquired into termination procedures; I should not have simply left the matter of termination to investigators who lacked a foreign policy or national security perspective.

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

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As to the papers filed on my behalf by the Department of Justice, they are not based on my personal knowledge, and I have not reviewed them. My views are those expressed in this letter. It is clear that I did not question your loyalty and integrity and that I resisted all efforts to remove you before the wire-taps were established. Indeed, I warned you that you were under surveillance at the outset and, with your agreement, cut off your access to sensitive material. Though the reports came to my office until May of 1970, the actual logs were almost entirely dealt with by my staff. After May of 1970 I was out of the loop entirely.

I have always entertained the highest regard for you. I brought you into the NSC, and I urged you to stay after you wanted to leave. As I have stated publicly and at my deposition, nothing that came to my attention from the surveillance or otherwise cast doubt on your integrity or your loyalty to the country. To this day I have regarded you as a colleague of the highest talent, one who served his country well.

Though nothing I say can erase the human costs of this episode, I am pleased that we may now be able to put at least the legal matter behind us.

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Remarks by
Ambassador Masamichi Hanabusa
Consul General of Japan in New York

&

Questions and Answers

"U.S.-Japan Relations and the Gulf Crisis"
Presented by the Center for Japan-U.S.
Business and Economic Studies

New York University
Leonard N. Stern School of Business
New York, New York

Wednesday December 5, 1990

WHAT CONSTRAINS JAPAN'S RESPONSE TO THE GULF CRISIS

The Gulf crisis happened at the most unfortunate moment. We are on the threshold of the post-Cold War world. We have just started to grope for a new world order and the Japanese, like many other nations, have not been attuned to the new situation. We have, in fact, been discussing how Japan can make contributions to the international community in the past four or five years. The new situation requires further new thinking, which has not been done. So, it took Japan by surprise, unprepared.

Secondly, this has happened at a time when bilateral relations between our two countries are strained over various issues. In the United States, there is growing anxiety about Japan's financial and economic strength catching up with that of the United States and even overtaking the U.S. in some areas.

Thirdly, in the post-Cold War period, it is obvious that the world is not free from regional conflicts. Any conflict in the Middle East is onerous and difficult. The Iraqi aggression happened exactly in the area which is the toughest region.

Fourth, we had the "go-go '80s" and now face its consequences. All the major nations of the world, the United States, Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, are all adjusting themselves to the consequences of the gaudy period we had for a decade.

Yes, this crisis happened when the world was in a flux, when new rationales for
action are not clear for any nation to see. But the Japanese government took a very
clear, unambiguous position when the Iraqi forces invaded and annexed Kuwait. We
condemned it, froze the Kuwaiti assets immediately and imposed a trade embargo
without waiting for the United Nations resolution. Why? Because we thought this was a
very critical happening in the post-Cold War period, where everybody must make his
position clear. We left no ambiguity about the position we took.

When it came to the question of how we could positively contribute to the
international effort to deny the aggressor gains from his acts, however, it took more than
three weeks, before on August 29 Japan announced the package of Japan's contribution
to the Gulf crisis. It took another two weeks before we made public that our total
package reaches $4 billion. We had already donated $22 million to evacuate refugees
from Jordan, which amounted to more than half of the total cost incurred by the
international organizations. As usual, we responded methodically and logically.

In the meantime, American, Arab and allied forces were being deployed to the
Gulf to deter Iraqi forces from invading Saudi Arabia. Japan could not participate in
military action and very strong criticism erupted in the U.S. Congress. You may recall
that Representative Bonior suggested and the House of Representatives eventually
passed a resolution that Japan should bear the total cost of American forces stationed in
Japan, and if Japan does not do that, the United States should withdraw American forces
at the rate of 5,000 every year. This is a very interesting suggestion and many of the
American military experts doubted its wisdom. Eventually it was toned down.

But that was the level of emotion against Japan's seeming reluctance to take part
in military action. Congressman Aspin graded nations in their contribution to the crisis,
and Japan was rated as a C-student. There was resentment in Japan, actually,
heightened by the fact that at that time, although there were only 88 Americans detained
in Iraq as "shields" against the possible coalition attack, there were more Japanese, in
fact, 114 Japanese taken as "shields." Incidentally, there were 350 British treated in this
miserable manner. But there were no Germans, no French, no Italians and no
Canadians detained that way. Why? Japanese asked themselves why our brethren were
treated in the harshest way as the Americans and the British were treated.

There is a tremendous gap between the perception in the United States that
Japan is not cooperating and the fact that the Iraqis are treating Japan in the harshest
manner possible. The gap is apparent for the Japanese. Our newspapers reported daily
how the Japanese hostages were treated. There wasn't a line in the American
newspapers describing the plight of the Japanese hostages. I don't think that 99 out of
100 Americans knew this fact.

The reason why the Iraqis were treating Japan so harshly is obvious. Our joining
the coalition in a most unambiguous manner is hurting them. They know that Japan is

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the weakest link in the coalition. But we are standing firm on the coalition's side. I would just like to make this point absolutely clear at the beginning of my speech, because my title, I'm afraid, might erroneously give the impression that Japan is not contributing to the Gulf crisis, so the Ambassador finds it important to explain what constrains Japan's contributions. Having said this, I would like to point out that there are certain differences between the United States and Japan, in legal framework, national psychology, and perceptions of threat. I would like to develop those points this morning because I believe that understanding those differences is very important in the months ahead, when our relations are going to be subjected to harder strain.

First, political military aspects. Since time at my disposal is limited, I cannot dwell upon the historical explanation of those limitations. I would just like to point out that we have a security treaty between our two countries, and we have an alliance relationship, but this is a very special alliance relationship. Students of Japan, I'm sure, know that the Japanese military position is solely defensive. If Japan is attacked, we expect the United States to help us. But if America is attacked and Japan is not attacked, Japan is not expected to come to the rescue of the United States. This is a rather asymmetrical alliance.

This is special, but we are vanquished, and we know that Germany, another vanquished nation limited in its military scope, can only operate within the NATO theater. This is a kind of restraint, imposed upon those vanquished in the last war. Japan first was totally demilitarized. After the outbreak of the Korean War, we were encouraged to arm, but since the pacifist sentiment in Japan is strong, the Self-Defense Forces which were created have been solely for the defense of the nation.

As a result, the Japanese government cannot accept the doctrine of collective self-defense. Collective self-defense means that if you are attacked, I go to your help, if I am attacked, you will come to my help. But in the Japanese case, as I said, we only accept the doctrine of individual self defense. That is, we will defend ourselves, and if someone comes to our help, we will thank them very much, but don't expect us to reciprocate. That is our basic doctrine. I'm not going to discuss the propriety of this doctrine here, because this is a given for Japan.

So if the United States comes to the rescue of Saudi Arabia, in accordance with collective self defense, Japan, I am afraid, cannot join it. But the question posed was not solely a question of collective self defense, it is also a question of collective security enshrined in the United Nations. The United Nations Charter, if you study it closely, is based on this idea of collective security. The international community will collectively address itself to the threat or use of force. But the United Nations has never taken any collective security measures, the only exception being the Korean War, which happened when the Soviet Union was absent from the Security Council.

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Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the very first case, after the end of the Cold War, of bringing the Soviet Union and the United States, two military superpowers, together to join forces to suppress aggression. This is an entirely new development, and the coalition action against Iraq was only possible under these new circumstances. But this fundamental change in international relations has escaped the attention of the Japanese people, the attention of the American people, not to mention the Iraqi leader.

I think we have yet to adjust ourselves to the new possibilities and new requirements. That is why I said at the outset that this happened at a very unfortunate moment. An important shift is happening from the traditional concept of collective self-defense in the days of east-west confrontation to collective security enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

The Japanese government saw the need to adjust to the new situation. It presented to the Diet a law creating the legal framework by which units of Japan's Self Defense Forces could take part in non-combat military action that might arise in the future, including the Gulf crisis if the legislation was passed in time. The Japanese general public and the Japanese Diet could not accept this law and toward the end of the last session this bill, by agreement among the government and opposition parties, was dropped. We are going to present another law to get Japan prepared for the possibility of participating in collective security type of activity or peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. Even if such a law is enacted, Japan is subject to important limitations in terms of military participation.

During the course of the Diet deliberations, a very important statement was made by the Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. He said that under Articles 42 and 43 of the United Nations Charter, where the Security Council decides on taking military action against the aggressor, as long as those articles stand as they are, participation in U.N. forces by Japan is fraught with constitutional questions. That is to say, Japan's Self Defense Forces will not take part in military enforcement measures to be undertaken by the United Nations under Chapter 7.

This is a legal problem, and there is another dimension to these differences which is political. You watched on CNN the deliberation of the Security Council on the adoption of the resolution authorizing the coalition members to take whatever necessary action, including military action, against Iraq if it does not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Did you see a Japanese representative there? No, there was no Japanese representative. Japan right now has no place in the important policy decision-making process in the U.N. system; Japan is not a permanent member of the Security Council.

Americans say, "We are going to shed American blood, where are the Japanese?" But the Japanese are saying, "We are making serious decisions, where is the Japanese representative?" Naturally, many Japanese feel that without representation, no taxation.

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Still $4 billion is pledged. Most Japanese rationalize this financial contribution on the grounds of the extension of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. That is, we should stand on the American side.

In the eyes of many Japanese, this is not Iraq against the world. In the eyes of quite a few Japanese, this is the continuation of the usual "America against somebody." Why not support our ally, the United States? But legally, this should not really be the case. This is the world against Iraq, and Japan is joining the rest of the world. The popular perception in Japan is that Japan again succumbed to U.S. pressures. This is unfortunate, but I tell you very frankly that psychologically, I think this is the feeling on the part of the Japanese.

If that is the case, Japan has good reason for doubt, when here in the United States, very active controversy is going on over what ground would justify your waging war on Iraq. Day after day, ex-senior government officials and senior military leaders testify before the Armed Services Committee in the Senate expressing doubt about American participation in the war. If America is in doubt, Japan is at a loss. Right or wrong, this is the psychological dimension of the unfortunate state of affairs existing in Japan.

As far as the stance of the Japanese government is concerned, it is absolutely clear. We condemn aggression and do everything short of military combat participation. We have provided money so that the material needed in the Gulf area by the coalition forces can be provided from any source. We defray the cost of transportation of materials, not directly related to military action in the Gulf.

There is some physical participation, such as Japan Airlines and All Nippon Airlines sending aircraft to the Gulf region to take refugees back. Also, Japanese civilian vessels carrying land rovers or other needed equipment to the Gulf area. In comparison with the activities of other nations participating in the Gulf operation, the Japanese participation is preponderantly limited to financial participation.

I'd like to address myself to the concept of objectives. Here in the United States, I think the conceived objectives of this operation are three-fold. One is how to deter aggression, two is oil, three is the demilitarization of Iraqi forces. With oil, the big difference between Japan and the United States is the historical fact that Japan has never controlled oil. We are almost totally dependent on imported oil, so that we are at the mercy of those who control oil. That is quite different from the United States which has substantial control over oil. Who will control oil is a serious issue for the U.S. this time. But it is not a very serious issue for Japan. It is of course better that oil is in friendly hands. But experiences tell us that whoever controls oil will be disposed to sell it. We are prepared to pay for oil; if the price goes up, our options are two-fold. One, either we conserve consumption of oil, or two, we develop alternative energy sources.

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We have reduced oil consumption. In 1979, we imported 5.5 million barrels of oil per day. Ten years later, in 1989, we imported 10% less oil, just 5 million barrels per day. Given the fantastic economic development which has taken place in Japan in the past decade, it is remarkable that we are consuming less oil than we did ten years ago. This is the degree of conservation achieved by the Japanese.

Here in the United States, about 5% of the total world population consumes more
than a quarter of the world's oil. In the Japanese eyes, where is the problem? The
problem is obviously that the United States is consuming too much oil. The American
argument is that Japan is dependent on the Middle East for 70% of its oil so Japan is
responsible for securing the oil supply.

The Japanese perception is entirely different; oil is a fungible commodity, so from where you import oil is a secondary concern. The question is, who consumes oil most? Those who consume most worry most about the supply of oil. This is an entirely different perception about oil between us.

The same can be applied to the demilitarization of Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq War, I was the Deputy Director General of the Middle Eastern African Affairs Bureau. I know that the whole world supported Iraq in that war. Even after the end of the war, many nations continued to support Iraq, supplying military equipment, foodstuffs, and financial resources. If Iraq is a military monster, all those countries created it. There is not a single tank or missile in the possession of the Iraqi military forces which came from a Japanese source. We take pride in this. Why? Because we know we cannot contribute to other nations militarily, we will not make the world more difficult by exporting arms or building an arms industry in developing countries.

This is the policy mix of the Japanese response to this issue. Japan's policy is just to defend ourselves. But we will not make problems more difficult for others by exporting arms. If someone says, here is a nation which is going to possess military and chemical weapons, 5,000 tanks, tremendous artillery, Japanese wonder why, yes, this is a very serious threat, but if you are really concerned about this threat, why did you start from the beginning? Did you not make Iraq strong and then say, "We must face this and you must join us, you must shed your blood."?

I don't think the Japanese public will buy that argument. This is another very important difference in perception with regard to the demilitarization of Iraq's forces. Therefore, with those differences, all in all we responded this way. First, we took a very clear stance that we cannot condone aggression. Second, we took part in trade and financial sanctions against aggression. Third, we made financial contributions to make these sanctions effective. Fourth, we contributed financially to help those nations who suffer from those sanctions.

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I think that the package which the Government finally decided on was about the maximum that the Japanese people are willing to contribute, given those constraints. I, for one, believe that this is a really substantial and appropriate contribution from the Japanese side. I firmly believe and hope that we in Japan and the United States will not harm a very important bilateral relationship because a misguided, foolish leader started all this. I think it would be absurd if U.S.-Japan relations become the first casualties if a shooting war starts. Thank you very much.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

**Question:** Considering that the level of economic activity in Europe, with the convergence of Eastern and Western Europe, will be greater than that of the United States and Japan together, I wonder if you have any comment to make about the European contribution in the Middle East.

**Hanabusa:** Well, first of all, I'd like to compare the present state of affairs to the situation in the late '30s and very early '40s. You remember that Hitler wanted to get Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. Lord Chamberlain flew to Munich and came back striking a sort of compromise. Later, Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia.

America refused to lift a finger, as the American position was "cash and carry"; I will sell you arms to fight with, but carried in your vessels. It was later in history that the U.S. passed the Lend Lease Act and provided vessels to Britain. America refused to take part in standing against stark aggression for quite some time, until people were convinced that the threat is really threatening you. As a matter of fact, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor brought you into the European war.

The Japanese situation is much likened psychologically, sentimentally, to the feeling of the Americans in that period. You, all of a sudden, ask the Japanese people to take part militarily. I agree with what Professor Samuelson said, that every member of the community must pay for the common good. We appreciate that. But when it comes to the question of military participation, of course you must convince your people, you must convince your voters, and we, in Japan, are simply not prepared for this. This is at the base of my analysis of the present situation.

And then comes the question of European participation. Europeans are operating under the same difficulties, I believe, because they have a long association with the region, more association with the region than the Americans. They are on the threshold of Europe 1992. Besides, they face the democratization of Eastern Europe and a corollary financial burden to make the renaissance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union a success. Under the circumstances, they have an issue of priorities and some of

7

the European countries have deployed forces to join the United States and allied forces to prevent Iraq forces from committing further aggression into Saudi Arabia.

Now it becomes a question of using force to liberate the occupied territory. Actually, this is a new situation. I don't think the Europeans have answered this question yet. I really don't know. You, in this country, are just asking what you're going to do about it. And then, I think Europeans will think about it. The Japanese have already thought of creating a legal framework and failed. That is a cold analysis of what happened, and I don't like to pass subjective judgements of who is right, who is wrong. This is what has happened. This is because of the historical as well as many other factors.

**Question:** In 1950, George Kennan wrote a memorandum to the State Department saying that the United States should have power in the Middle East ... to have veto power over Japanese industrial policy. I'm wondering if you see the current U.S. policy in the Gulf as an extension of the long-term U.S. desire to control the industrial policies of Europe and Japan through control of the flow of oil?

**Hanabusa:** I think the question had better be addressed to Mr. Kennan, because I have not read the paper. I don't take that cynical view. America acted in a very honorable fashion. We Japanese respect the United States for that. We feel that we should do as much as possible to join forces with the United States in this connection. So there is no element of a clash between the American interests and the Japanese interests. The interests are parallel.

The question arises as to how you address the question, given your restraints and the modality of response. The Japanese modality lacks a military element. Some people in America are unhappy and my view is that this is the best we can do under the circumstances and do please understand that, and don't strain our relationship.

The American administration professed the view that America is not fighting a war to secure cheap oil, and I believe that. We are fighting together against an aggressor, and this is the first case in the post-Cold War period where aggression took place. How can we restore the status quo ante? This is the common task we are faced with, and a military reaction is one option. There are other options probably, and there are questions whether options short of using military forces are really effective in achieving the common objective. The American view may be that only war can do the job.

The Japanese, I'm sorry, we don't know. We are probably not in a position to say anything because we are not militarily taking part. But we are quite happy to keep the sanctions in place, indefinitely if necessary. I don't know the European position on that.

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**Question:** Ambassador, you spoke about the asymmetrical defense alliance between the United States and Japan. Could you possibly explain if our economic alliance is also asymmetrical?

**Hanabusa:** I think the national endowments are different. What we in Japan are endowed with is human resources. So we sell added value. We have overachieved probably. We are in the process of rectifying structural elements which perpetuate the imbalance in trade and economic relations. I firmly believe the worst is over by now; because the trade imbalance is shrinking, the crash of the Japanese stock exchange made our financial prowess far less, and the possible fall of land prices will further debilitate the Japanese financial power. I think Japanese investment in the United States has peaked because of those reasons.

On the positive side, Japanese are moving production facilities to the United States and starting to replace Japanese exports to the America market by American production, and probably over time, exporting to the Japanese market. I think those things are rectifying the asymmetry in our economic relationship. The greatest asymmetry exists in the fact that we have been successful in selling our added values, while the Americans have not.

On the American side, during what I called the "go-go 80s," the American financial and banking fabric has been very much weakened. Your saving rate is so low. How can you finance manufacturing plants and equipment, which are clearly needed if America is to remain the number one exporter of the world? American economic strength, American growth, will have to be dependent more on exports in the years ahead.

If you are going to sustain your exports without substantially depreciating your currency, you must strengthen your productive capability. The question is whether you have enough savings to finance it. If you are dependent on the import of capital, as you were in the 80s, the debt problem will be enormous over time. This is another asymmetry existing between our two countries.

This is not a situation of Japanese making. Japan cannot solve these issues. We are jointly going to solve them; that is the purpose of the Structural Impediment Initiative talks between our two countries. These are extraordinary talks. They are not considered negotiations, because this is not the sort of thing to be negotiated. Those are the things which belong to the domestic jurisdiction of each country. But, as our two economies get very close and interdependent, the two leaders decided that we should come out of the conventional view that those structural issues are left to each. Perhaps chewing gum must be chewed together.

**Question:** I would appreciate comments as to whether the sanctions will work in the long-term. I have doubts about whether the sanctions will really work.

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**Hanabusa:** Well, I agree that sanctions have a poor record of success in the past. But Iraq is different from Japan in the '30s and '40s, or Germany in the '30s and '40s, in that it is not a developed industrial economy. It is dependent on foreign experts, there are still 3,000 Russian experts in all sectors of the society. It is dependent on the importation of arms to sustain military warfare. Suppose we were to place sanctions for 10 years; all the military weapons would become obsolete. This is a highly hypothetical situation. If that is possible, I think sanctions will work.

The dilemma we are faced with comes from the fact that Saddam Hussein is not a madman. He is a cold, calculating leader. There is a chance of his backing down, but he will back down only if he is convinced that he is really militarily threatened. If you threaten him that way, you must convince your own nationals and the coalition members that we will go in fighting. This is the dilemma, just like the atomic weapon as a deterrent. You may not use it, but if the deterrent is credible, the other side must be convinced that you might use it.

The same thing can be applied with amassing of forces. You don't like to use them, and you may not use them, but unless you deploy them, you cannot convince him. So this is a dilemma, and that is understood by everybody. If that moment approaches, naturally, anxiety will rise if things don't happen the way they are expected, intended, then you've got to face the real use of force.

So Gorbachev is quite right in telling Mr. Baker that if you're really serious in deploying more forces, you are going to fight a war. This is the real question. Are you really going to fight a war? If the answer is positive, Russians will go along with Americans. This is understandable. This is going to be asked here, in Europe, and in Japan.

**Question:** My question is about the soul of Japan. To paraphrase, if we go back in history, we're more likely to repeat it, perhaps not in the same fashion, but there is military influence on the world, there are economic, commercial ties, hopeful influences and so on and so forth.

Considering the history, not so long ago, of Japanese relations with some Asian neighbors -- the Koreans, the Chinese, Filipinos, others who know about the rather horrible brutalities committed by the Japanese -- what could we expect, in the future of Japan in the world, with growing influence, and without having had some rather wrenching self-examination like, to some extent the Germans have undergone, without having honestly and openly within the society of Japan, dealt with this sort of effect? What does this mean to speak to them?

**Hanabusa:** I think the Japanese people, as a nation, regret the unsavory past, particularly those brutal atrocities committed. I have no intention to defend Japan's past misdeeds. But when you talk about the future, it will probably be not only the Japanese

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but also the Asian neighbors who should answer the question of how to face this past. It
would be a historian's task to pass historic judgement on this. I am a diplomat, so I don't
like to go into that field.

Looking toward the future, say, if the Japanese soul changed, if the Japanese
passed a law enabling Japan to take part in peace-keeping operations of the United
Nations, and enabling the Japanese Self-defense Forces to participate in such kind of
operations, in one way or another.

The United Nations decides that the international community will send units or
forces, depending on the case, say in any of the Asian countries. Will that country accept
Japanese participation or not? This is not only a Japanese question, this is a question to
be put to the Asian neighbors over time. They must face this. If the answer is positive,
they must live with the past in a harmonious way. If the past lingers on, then the
collective security involving Japan in Asia is not a working proposition. This may be the
case, or it may not be the case.

On the Japanese side, the pendulum has probably swung to the farther extreme.
We are now faced with the criticism that you are too pacifist, you are shunning
international responsibility. This is a surprise for the Japanese. The majority of
Japanese people feel that we are told that we did the wrong thing, and we repent that, so
we decided and we enshrined pacifism in the Constitution and we will not make trouble
abroad, and now the world is finding fault with us. You are damned if you don't and
damned if you do. This is a catch-22 situation for Japan and is very difficult to
understand for the Japanese.

We cannot go on saying that we don't understand. We have got to face it. The
realistic response to the government is to educate the population about the requirements
of today. Presenting a bill, which was prepared in haste, to the Diet is one very
responsible way of the government trying to address this question. Unfortunately, it
didn't succeed. But a few days ago, I spoke with the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the House of Representatives of the Japanese Diet, and he said we will try
and try and try. Well, I trust the Japanese politicians will succeed in persuading the
Japanese people in that direction.

**Question:** In regard to international borders that you envisage, with respect to Japan's role, could you elaborate further on what that role might be? Also, if you would express if the Japanese people presently have an idea of what they expect their country's role to be and what kind of a debate is there presently in your country?

**Hanabusa:** We have been, as a nation, groping for how Japan can contribute to the international community in the past three to five years. There is strong consensus on one point, that is the Japanese role in assistance to the Third World. Japan is the largest donor, providing some $9 billion last year. America is in second place with about $8

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billion or less. Japan is by far the greatest donor right now. That is an area where we
contribute.

We are trying to enmesh the Japanese economy into the world market, and we
are taking in exports of our Third World Asian neighbors by leaps and bounds. This is
another area where we contribute. In the security area, I have already spoken about the
extent the Japanese people can go right now, and when the heat is over, whether the
world will find Japan wanting, I really don't know. Probably not. Many responsible
American people have told me personally that Japan should not consider a military role,
although it is very much asked of us. I really don't know whether they are right.

What is the post-Cold War role? That requires definition. Whether we can do
away with substantial military conflicts, I don't know. At the outset I said that it is
unfortunate that this happened because it happened in the Middle East, because the
Middle East is a most difficult area. And if it happened between, say two countries in
the Indian Subcontinent, or in Africa, where two combattant nations fighting with each
other, perhaps your response may be selling arms to each of them. This kind of
approach is not possible in the Middle East.

That's why this is a rather unique case; the situation in Latin must be described as *sui generis*. But I don't think this is a universal happening in the years ahead. In that case, economic contributions count more. Economic contributions mean the provision of financial and technical resources as well as opening up markets. There, I think Japanese are fairly agreed on the future course Japan should follow.

# # #

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ELCJ

## II. Disbursements -- Total about $1.2 Bil.

1) Contribution to Peace Restoration Efforts -- About $600 Mil.

a) Cooperation in Finance and in Kind -- About $530 Mil.

* Around $100 Mil. has been disbursed for 1,100 vehicles including 4WDs, water tank trucks and freezer vehicles, copy machines, fax machines, personal computers, de-salinization equipment, and materials for construction have been procured and sent

* About $430 Mil. has been spent to pay for the transportation costs of the U.S. and other countries.

b) GOJ Transportation Cooperation -- $70 Mil.

* Chartering of Civil Aircraft: 29 flights (1 by Nippon Cargo Airlines Co., 28 by Evergreen Int'l Airlines) have flown cargoes to the region since Sept. 21. An additional 45 flights (by Evergreen) will be made by March.

* Chartering of Civil Ships: Three ships (one U.S., two Japanese) are carrying cargoes to the region

c) GOJ Medical Cooperation -- About $20 Mil.

* Presently the form of medical cooperation is under consideration, based on the results of these previous steps:

<table><tr><td>Sept. 18</td><td>Departure of advance team<br/>Consultations held with Saudi<br/>authorities and local hospitals</td></tr><tr><td>Oct. 1-7</td><td>Visit to Jordan by team members for on-site study of evacuees' situation</td></tr><tr><td>Oct. 19</td><td>Return of advance team; some members<br/>remain in Saudi Arabia</td></tr></table>

2

[LC]

2) Economic Assistance for Frontline Countries -- $950 Mil. allocated, $600 Mil. disbursed

*Emergency Commodity Loans ($600 Mil.)*

* To Turkey: $200 Mil. (already disbursed)

* To Jordan: $100 Mil. (currently being disbursed)

* To Egypt: $300 Mil. (currently being disbursed)

*Other Assistance ($1,400 Mil. total; $350 Mil. already allocated).*

* To Jordan: $150 Mil. for Industry and Trade Policy Adjustment Loan

* To Egypt: $100 Mil. for Beni-Suef Cement Factory Construction Project

* To Turkey: $100 Mil. for Expansion of Golden Horn Bridge

3) Evacuee Relief -- $22 Mil.

3

JAN 28 1991

CONSULATE GENERAL OF JAPAN

299 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10171
(212) 371-8222

January 24, 1991

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue, Suite 26
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It is indeed tragic that despite all efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, war has broken out.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, Japan was at the forefront in its support of the multinational coalition aligned against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We remain steadfast in our support of the efforts of the multinational forces.

As you undoubtedly have heard, Prime Minister Kaifu today announced that the Government of Japan will take the following additional measures to support the multinational effort in the Gulf:

1) An additional contribution of US $9 billion will be made to support the multinational forces in the Gulf. A supplementary budget bill for FY 1990 will soon be submitted to the Diet for approval.

2) Civilian aircraft and, if necessary, Self Defense Force aircraft, will be dispatched to the Gulf to assist in the evacuation of refugees.

These contributions, in addition to our earlier contributions, demonstrate unequivocally Japan's firm commitment to the efforts of the multinational forces in the Gulf.

I look forward to our continued close contact during these difficult times.

[LC]

CONSUL GENERAL OF JAPAN
NEW YORK

July 19, 1991

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Next year, 1992, will mark the 20th anniversary of the reversion of
Okinawa, a landmark which was only made possible with your foresight and
strong support and that has consolidated U.S.-Japan relations as one of the
most important and reliable alliances in the world. The Government of Japan
is planning to hold a special ceremony and symposium to reaffirm our
commitment to U.S.-Japan relations. The ceremony will be held by the
Government of Japan on May 15, 1992 and the symposium will be held by a
special committee in the following days. Former Prime Minister Noboru
Takeshita will chair this committee.

I am instructed by the Japanese Government to inquire if you and your
wife could attend this ceremony and address on the future of U.S.-Japan
relations at the symposium. The Government of Japan and its people would
be most honored with your attendance at this special commemorative
occasion. All expenses will be borne by the Japanese Government. A formal
invitation from the Government of Japan will follow. We are also extending
an invitation to President Nixon as well as the other members of the Nixon
Administration including Mr. William Rogers and Mr. Melvin Laird.

May is the best season in Japan. We hope that your schedule will
permit such a trip and allow us the honor. I earnestly await your reply.

[LC]

JUL 22 1991

July 19, 1991

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I feel we have to rationalize this Hanover Films program of your life
as the outline they have presented is untenable in several crucial
aspects. The various shots of you at Harvard and in Germany will simply
not work.<sup>and elsewhere</sup>

Suggestion: that they come by here for a certain amount of time and
film you and have a lengthy interview. Do you want anything at the
house or at Kent? ✓_________

Do you want to tie it in with <u>any</u> European travel? I don't see how
it will logistically work as your time is taken up every minute when
you <u>are</u> there (we have so far given them no information about your
schedule abroad) ___________ In addition, at this time,
it could be a security risk.

They have already suggested to interview the following: Fritz Kraemer
(who seems to have a significant running monologue with); Liv Ullmann,
Nancy, David, Vernon Walters, Helmut Schmidt, Manfred Worner, Nixon,
LSE, Scowcroft. They are asking for suggestions of people to contact:
Please check off names that you approve, if any:

Giscard ___________
Thatcher ___________
Agnelli ✓_________

von Weizsacker ✓_________
Oppenheimer <u>NO</u> ___________
Maxwell ___________

Robinson ✓_________
Donhoff ✓_________
Augstein ✓_________
M. Forman ✓_________

Kay Graham ___________
G. Ford ✓_________
G. Shultz ✓_________

Do you have names of people from your youth or the army or
college that you would be willing to suggest they contact?
We did not think you did.
Suggest ___________ Correct ✓_________

Recommend no one for them to interview ___________

If you select the latter, then really they have very little
to work with except archival film footage, etc. I presume you
are not about to submit to them family photos, which they have
requested as well?

Correct ___________

Rather ___________

All in all, I think given your schedule and the world situation,
they could make due with a bunch of interesting observations
from people who have known you in various walks of life, and
archival materials as well as interview with you.

Agreed ✓_________

[Y]

gm

[LC]

HANOVER-Film GmbH

The Henry Kissinger Story

The former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is one of the very few politicians, who became a living legend. Statesmen in the whole world, journalists and professors speak of him in superlatives. "The American Clausewitz", "Genius Statesman", "Master of Diplomacy", "Second most powerful man in the world", "Political Genius" and "Intellectual superstar" are just a few characterizations.

"Born in Germany - The Henry Kissinger Story", a 90 minute film portrait, documents the Henry Kissinger biography in its known and private aspects.

Its goal is to track down the man Henry Kissinger.

Although the film follows Kissingers life mostly chronologically, it is not meant to be a simple series of events.

The film is characterized by his life's developments and their value and appreciation.

Based on his active political life which continues until today, the portrait tries to answer the following key questions:

-Which factors lead to his decision to go into politics?

-The greatest success? the worst defeat?

-How direct is his influence on the American foreign and security policy today?

To document Henry Kissinger's background, the film occupies itself with his childhood as a Jude in Germany, with his flight from the Nazis, the difficult early years in New York and the return to Germany as a GI in the US-Army.

The influence of his mentor Dr. Fritz Kraemer is as important as his years at Harvard.

Part 1 of the portrait ends after Dia 20, Kissinger's appointment to Secretary of State.

Little is known about Henry Kissinger private life. It is said, that he works 15 hours daily, even on weekends, leaving has little time for hobbies, sports or long vacations.

The possibilities of filming private scenes of Henry Kissinger will have to be discussed in a later phase of filmplanning. At this time, the value of the pictures in film will be determined.

Ideas to the topic "Private Life" are added as a supplement to this treatment.

It should be noted that all interviews with Henry Kissinger can be conducted in German. A synchronisation is not necessary.

Private Life:

Private life and untypical aspects

Henry Kissinger with his children

Interview with his children about their father

Interview with the actress and close friend Liv Ullmann

Filming in Disney World, Orlando, Florida, especially the attraction "Its a small, small world", which Kissinger especially likes

Etc

HANOVER-Film GmbH

Picture

1
H.K. stands with his back to the camera at the window of his office at the Kissinger Associated Inc. (K.A.I.) with one foot on the window sill, phoning.

Presentation of the "Thinking Factory" with offices in Washington and New York making foreign policy analyses for royal fees.

today: millions for political expertise.

earlier: politics with expertise for millions.

2
Newspaper clippings/headlines

Who is H.K., the deigned "Genius of Foreign Policy", the "Intellectual superstar" and the "Secret president"?

3
Picture of the schoolboy H.K. in Germany, scan, Picture H.K. being sworn in as Secretary of State

A boy in Germany, who became Secretary of State for the United States of America from 1973-1976

4
Fürth: With H.K. in his city of birth: apartment house/school/soccerfield, as well as picture of school class, certificate of birth, report cards, early classmates, neighbors

Reichskristallnacht

Refugee camp, Washington Heights in Manhattan, as well as pictures from the years 1938-1943

Commentary and memories with H.K. in ON and OFF
Original tone (O-tone), H.K.'s memories

Flight of the family to New York

5
City College, Factory where H.K. worked

6
Pictures of H.K. as GI,
Dr. Fritz Kraemer

Commentary, interview with his mentor about their first meeting, also interview with Vernon Walters, US-Diplomat in Bonn, at that time GI with H.K. (assent)

7
Landing of the American Forces in Germany (Archives NDR)

Commentary, H.K. returns to Germany as American citizen, relationship to Germany at that time, H.K. in ON and OFF,

H.K. in Benscheim/Krefeld or Oberammergau (one of the three cities, where H.K. was active as GI)
H.K. in Thüringen an der Elbe

H.K. ON with his memories of the day where the US- and Red Army met at the Elbe River and this pictures influence of his world outlook

8
Harvard University in Cambridge Mass., Library, H.K. pulls his doctors thesis from the shelf

Dr. Fritz Kraemer in ON and OFF about the H.K.s hunger for education/information

Commentary: Metternichs and Castlereaghs influence on H.K.

The first meeting with diplomacy and statesmanship

L.C. 10

HANOVER-Film GmbH

9
Picture of wedding to Anna Fleischer,
pictures of the family with children
Elizabeth and David

Commentary

10
Pictures of H.K. as Professor at the
Harvard University

Interview with college classmates and colleagues

11

His growing interest in practical statesmanship with comments from himself and his mentor Dr. Fritz Kraemer
"The Policymaker and the Intellectual", in: Reporter
5.3.1959

12
Publications: H.K.'s former office at the
Harvard University

The theoretical basics: "The Necessity for choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy", 1961; "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", 1961; "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", 1969; "Problems of National Strategy", 1965; "American Foreign Policy", 1969

13
Interview at H.K.'s home in New York
undermined with pictures of H.K.
and Presidents Kennedy and Nixon,
newspaper clippings, as well as archive
pictures (NDR)

The transferal from the sciences to politics, interview with H.K. to: Special Adviser for Military Strategy under President Kennedy and Foreign Policy Adviser to President Nixon, also interview with Alexander Haig, at that time Assistant on the National Security Board (assent)

14
Archive pictures of Vietnam War (NDR)

Commentary to H.K.s secret diplomacy in Vietnam, H.K.s balancing game and peace plans (emphasis of Metternichs and Bismarcks influence)

Interview with Vernon Walters, at that time General at the Pentagon, about the theory of the limited war and stable peace (assent)

15
Interview with Dr. Manfred Wörner
(assent), longtime friend and
NATO-Secretary General
Pictures from NATO archives

H.K. and NATO, the "Father" of the flexible response

16
Archive pictures (NDR) of Kissinger and
Mao Tse-tung

Commentary: H.K. and the establishment of the American-Chinese friendship

17
Archive

Commentary: Kissinger and the SALT-negotiations

18
Archive pictures of Watergate

Commentary and H.K. in ON and OFF, also Richard Nixon (assent)

HANOVER-Film GmbH

29
Interview, if possible filming in Israel at the
important sights for the Jews

H.K. on his relationship to Israel and the Jewish Religion
also Kissingers speech at the Jewish World Congress (Nov.
1977)

30
Archive

Commentary: Nixons resignation (8.8.1974), Gerald Ford
becomes new US-president and adopts H.K. as Secretary
of State

31
Archive

H.K. in ON and OFF: "The second major defeat", H.K. and
the Chile-operation of the CIA (Sept. 1974)
The Anti-Kissinger-Group in the White House becomes
larger; resignation demands arrive

32
Archive

Commentary: The defeats increase - the idol loses his spell:
H.K. and the Cyprus-crisis, H.K. and the failure in the
Middle East, H.K. and Indochina

33
Archive
Presentation of the Citizens Medal, H.K.
shows his wife his city of birth (Dec. 1975)

Commentary: While his days are being counted in the USA,
the city Fürth celebrates its "great son"

34
Archive
Interview

Commentary with H.K. in ON and OFF: How partners
become opponents: Ex-president Nixon incriminates his
Secretary of State in the Watergate Scandal in the White
House

H.K. becomes scapegoat during the election battle
Interviews to this topic with Richard Nixon

35
Archive

The decision of staying/leaving his office is taken: Jimmy

36
Interview with previous German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

Between idealism and damnation: H.K.'s foreign policy
achievements

An appreciation spoken by Helmut Schmidt

CLC

HANOVER-Film GmbH

37
Office of the K.A.I.
Interview

Commentary and interview with H.K.

H.K. - the most expensive expert for international questions

H.K. - the most expensive journalist

H.K. - the most expensive business and banking advisor

How does the K.A.I. work?

How does it influence American politics?

a) through members of congress, who belong to H.K.s inner circle? (interview with Eagleburger to this subject)

b) through H.K. himself? (as Bush advisor concerning the German reunification)

38
Interview

to b) interview with NATO-Secretary General
Dr. Manfred Wörner

39
H.K. sits as model for a portrait for the
artist Janet Brooks-Gerloff (H.K.'s longtime
plan)

H.K. in OFF "The final word about H.K. has H.K. personally."

MEMORANDUM

TO: HAK

FROM: GINA

RE: HANOVER FILM "THE HENRY KISSINGER STORY"

I met with Hubertus Hoffman (bio attached) who brought as a gift to you a piece of the Iron Curtain (in SSM office) and a piece of the Berlin Wall (in my office). It was his idea to do this piece, which emerges from what I gather is a long-standing admiration of you as a historical figure as well as from his encounter with you last fall when he interviewed you for ZDF (which he has since left). He is also a protege of sorts of Fritz Kraemer (from his CSIS days), who is purportedly a former colleague of yours.

He conceives of the piece as a historical document and does not want to pressure you time-wise at the risk of losing you. Hence there is no deadline but also no budget so the trip you would need to make to your home-town would have to be part of some other scheduled event. The documentary would be a personal approach to the lesser known Henry Kissinger. They would use archival TV clips and have asked for names of programs in the US that have already done documentaries about you. The focus would be your person, your family, your feelings about things and would conclude with your vision of the trans-Atlantic partnership and America's role in the new Europe.

The program would begin with scenes of your home-town and interviews with surviving personages that might have known you and your family; hopefully they could get footage of you in Fuerth walking in front of your home, your school, etc. as you reminiscent about your thoughts and feelings while you lived there; likewise they would try for footage in Krefeld and similarly interview you there about what it felt like to be back as an American soldier. They would also try to locate compatriots during this period and interview them, not so much personalities as real people, friends and such. Old photos from family albums would be vital.

The scenery would finally move to NYC, to your office, and - if you permit - your homes, to capture what your life is like now. The entire time you speaking would be the focus of the camera. The extent to which you would want to open up your family life or offer family and friends to be interviewed would be up to you, but without at least a certain amount of this the program would obviously suffer.

Throughout, the questions you would be dealing with would relate to personal as well as global issues, such as - has Europe changed from when you made your skeptical comment in 1973 that it was "the year of Europe?"

[LCT]

HANOVER-Film GmbH

- 2 -

negotiating the details of the production with Norddeutscher
Rundfunk (ARD). We already agreed that "The Henry Kissinger
Story" will be on TV nation-wide in November this year on
Prime-Time, Sunday night with two pieces of fourty-five minutes
each.

If you have any more questions concerning the details don't
hesitate to call me.

Best wishes

Dr. Hubertus Hoffmann

Enclosure

HANOVER-Film treatment

(Lc)

HANOVER-Film GmbH

Der ehemalige amerikanische Außenminister Henry Kissinger ist einer
der ganz wenigen Politiker, die schon zu Lebzeiten zur Legende wurden.
Staatsmänner in aller Welt, Journalisten und Hochschullehrer sprachen
über ihn in Superlativen. Die Charakterisierungen reichen von "der
amerikanische Clausewitz", "Genie der Staatskunst", "Meister der
Diplomatie", "Zweitmächtigster Mann der Welt", "Politisches Genie" bis
"intellektueller Superstar".

"Geboren in Deutschland - Die Henry Kissinger Story", ein Filmportrait von 90 Minuten Länge, soll die Lebensgeschichte Henry Kissingers in ihren vielen bekannten und den unbekannten Seiten dokumentarisch aufbereiten.

Dabei wird das Ziel verfolgt, dem Menschen Henry Kissinger auf die Spur
zu kommen.

 Wenngleich die Dramaturgie des Films im wesentlichen der Chronologie
des Lebens von Henry Kissinger folgt, so soll doch keinesfalls eine
bloße Aneinanderreihung der Ereignisse entstehen. Es werden vielmehr
die Gewichtungen der einzelnen Lebens- und Entwicklungsphasen Henry
Kissingers sowie deren Wertung und Würdigung den Film
charakterisieren.

Vor dem Hintergrund seines bis in die Gegenwart hineinreichenden,
aktiven politischen Lebens, soll das Portrait Aussagen zu folgenden
Schlußfragen liefern:

- Welche Faktoren haben die persönliche Entscheidung, in die Politik zu gehen, ausgelöst bzw. begünstigt?

- Der größte politische Erfolg?
  Die größte politische Niederlage?

- Wie unmittelbar ist der Einfluß auf die amerikanische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik heute?

Um den Background Henry Kissingers zu erfassen, wird sich der Film mit
der Kindheit des Politikers als Jude in Deutschland beschäftigen, mit
der Flucht vor den Nazis, den schweren Anfangsjahren in New York und
der Rückkehr nach Deutschland - als Soldat der US-Armee.

Der Einfluß seines Mentors Dr. Fritz Kraemer ist ebenso zu untersuchen
wie die Jahre in Harvard.

Teil 1 des Portraits endet nach Bild 20. der Ernennung Kissingers zum Außenminister.

LCS

HANOVER-Film GmbH

Über den Privatmann Henry Kissinger ist wenig bekannt. Man sagt ihm
nach, daß er regelmäßig 15 Stunden pro Tag arbeitet, auch an den
Wochenenden. Für ein ausgeprägtes Hobby, für Sport oder ausgedehnte
Urlaubsreisen bleibt kaum Zeit.

Die Möglichkeiten, Szenen aus dem Privatleben Henry Kissingers zu
drehen, müssen in einem späteren Stadium der Filmplanung im Detail
eruiert werden. Entsprechend ergibt sich erst dann die Verwertung der
Bilder im Film.

Im Anhang zu diesem Treatment ist daher lediglich eine Sammlung von
Ideen zum Themenkreis "Privates" zu finden.

An dieser Stelle soll noch darauf hingewiesen werden, daß alle
Interviews mit Henry Kissinger in Deutsch geführt werden können.
Eine Synchronisation ist nicht nötig.

LDC

HANOVER-Film GmbH

Bild

1

H.K. steht mit dem Rücken zur Kamera am Fenster seines Büros der Kissinger Associated Inc. (nachfolgend abgekürzt K.A.I.) Fuß auf der Fensterbank, telefoniert.

Vorstellen der "Denkfabrik" mit Büros in Washington und New York außenpolitische Analysen gegen fürstliche Honorare.

heute:
Millionen für politischen
Sachverstand.

früher:
Politik mit Sachverstand für
Millionen.

Vorstellen der "Denkfabrik"
mit Büros in Washington und
New York
"außenpolitische Analysen gegen
fürstliche Honorare"

2

Zeitungsausschnitte/Schlagzeilen

Wer ist H.K., das vieigerühmte
"Genie der Staatskunst", der
"intellektuelle Superstar,
der "heimliche US-Präsident."

3

Foto Schüler H.K. in Deutschland
Durchblende
Foto Vereidigung H.K. zum
Außenminister

Ein Junge aus Deutschland, der von
1973-1976 Außenminister der
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika
war

4

Fürth

mit H.K. in seiner Geburtsstadt:
Wohnhaus/Schule/Fußballplatz,
außerdem Klassenfoto (liegt vor),
Geburtsurkunde, Schulzeugnisse

Kommentartext und
Erinnerungen
H.K. im ON und OFF

[Lc]

HANOVER-Film GmbH

12

Publikationen;
H.Ks. ehemaliges Arbeitszimmer in
der Harvard-University

Die theoretischen Grundlagen
"The Necessity for choice:
Prospects of American Foreign
Policy", 1961
"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy", 1961
"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy", 1969
"Problems of National Strategy",
1965
"American Foreign Policy", 1969

13

Interview-Situation
Location: Wohnung H.K. in New York
unterschnitten mit Fotos
H.K. und Präsident Kennedy bzw.
Nixon, Zeitungsausschnitten, ggf.
Archivbilder (NDR)

Der Wechsel von der Wissenschaft
in die Politik
Interview H.K.
zu:
Sonderberater f. Militärstrategie
unter Präsident Kennedy und
Außenpolitischer Berater des
Präsidenten Nixon
dazu auch Interview mit Alexander
Haig, damals Assistent im
Nationalen Sicherheitsrat
(zugesagt)

14

Archivbilder Vietnamkrieg
(NDR)

Kommentartext zu
H.Ks. Geheimdiplomatie in Vietnam
H.Ks. Gleichgewichtsspiel und die
Friedenspläne
(Herausarbeiten des Einflusses von
Metternich und Bismarck)
Die Theorie vom begrenzten Krieg
und stabilem Frieden
dazu auch Interview mit Vernon
Walters, damals General im
Pentagon (zugesagt)

LCOJ

HANOVER-Film GmbH

15

Interview
NATO-Generalsekretär und
langjähriger Kissingerfreund
Dr. Manfred Wörner (zugesagt)

Archivbilder aus NATO-Filmarchiv

H.K. und die NATO

Der "Vater" der Flexible Response

16

Archivbilder (NDR)
Kissinger und Mao Tse-tung

Kommentartext:

H.K. und die Begründung der
amerikanisch-chinesischen
Freundschaft

17

Archiv

Kommentartext:

Kissinger und die SALT-
Verhandlungen

18

Archivbilder Watergate

Kommentartext und H.K. im ON und
OFF

dazu auch Richard Nixon (zugesagt)

19

H.K. am Swimmingpool seines
Hauses in New York

"Entscheidung am Pool"

H.K. wird Außenminister (August
1973) unter Nixon

Erinnerungen und Kommentartext
dazu auch Interview mit Richard
Nixon (zugesagt)

E.C.S.

HANOVER-Film GmbH

25

Archivbilder (NDR)

Kommentartext:

Oktoberkrieg

26

Archivbilder(NDR)

Kommentartext:

Friedensmission im Nahen Osten
(1974)

H.Ks. Popularität steigt weiter

Personenkult um den

Außenminister

"Kissinger for President"

27

Archivbilder (NDR)

H.K. im ON und OFF

"Die erste schwere Niederlage",

H.Ks. Nahostregelung scheitert

28

Archivbilder (NDR)

Kommentartext:

Anti-Kissinger-Demonstrationen
in Israel: "Heinrich Kissinger - Der
größte Lügner des Jahrhunderts",

"Ein Jude verschaukelt Israel"

Attentatsversuche

[LC]

HANOVER-Film GmbH

37

Büro der K.A.I.

Kommentartext und Interview H.K.

H.K. - der teuerste

Sachverständige für internationale
Fragen

H.K. - der teuerste Journalist

H.K. der teuerste Firmen- und
Bankberater

Wie arbeitet die K.A.I.?

Wie ist der Einfluß auf die
amerikanische Politik?

Interview

a) durch Regierungsmitglieder, die
aus H.Ks. Kaderschmiede
stammen? (dazu auch Interview
Eagleburger)

b) durch H.K. selbst? (z.B. Bush-
Berater in der Frage der deutschen
Einheit)

38

Interview

zu b)

auch Interview mit NATO-
Generalsekretär Dr. Manfred
Wörner

39

H.K. sitzt Modell für ein Portrait
bei der Aachener Malerin
Janet Brooks-Gerloff
(ist von H.K. seit längerem
geplant)

H.K. im OFF

"Das Schlußwort über H.K. hat
H.K. selbst."

[L.C.]

HANOVER-Film GmbH

Anhang:

Untypisches und Privates

H.K. mit seinen Kindern

Interview mit seinen Kindern über
ihren Vater

Interview mit der Schauspielerin
und engen Freundin Kissingers
Liv Ullmann

Dreh'in Disney World,
Orlando/Florida
bes. die Attraktion "Its a small,
small world", die Kissinger
besonders mag

JUN 06 1991

KHMER FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL

PRESIDENT: HRH Prince George
W. of Hanover
L.L.D.

SECRETARY: Mr. Main D.
Chandandhino

Mittermayrstr. 27 :
D-8000 Munich 40
FR of Germany

49/89/3087620 : TELEPHONE
49/8026/72 65

OFFICE

Fax : 49-89-308 1587

Dr.Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue 26th floor
New York, NY 10022
United State of America

Munich, 26th of May 1991

Dear Dr. Kissinger!

Your may remember, that some time ago I wrote to you
about our engagement with the Cambodian cause. (I have to
explain, I am uncle to Princess Irene of Greece, whom you
met about some years ago and I am brother in law to Prince
Philip Duke of Edinburgh).

You kindly mentioned to my niece, who explained our
intentions, to help the Cambodian, you would like to advise
us if you can.

We have just come back from an information tour to
Paris and through the USA, where we met Cambodian
personalities and associations, in New York City, Washington
DC, Minneapolis, Seattle and California, Mr. Chhor Kylin,
Executive Officer DPI of UN in New York, Mr. Siv Sichan,
Deputy Assistant to the President for Public Liaison, the
White House, Washington DC.

The aim of our mission was, to find out the best way,
to help the Cambodian people, although peace has not been
reached yet, due to the constant blocking of the proposal of
the 5-Permanent Members of the UN-Security-Council by the
Vietnam backed-Regime in Phnom Penh, whilst the Coalition-
Government has accepted all points without condition.

After intensive discussion with the Cambodian
Children's Education Fund in Minneapolis we agreed, that,
what ever happens, we should start now already, to establish
"a Research and Development Institute for the Reconstruction
of Cambodia".

This Institute should be non Governmental, non profit
seeking (auf Deutsch : Gemeinnützig).

It is meant to develop various branches, like :
Education and Culture, Infrastructure and Environment,
Technology, Oecology, Agriculture etc...

The most important branche so far seems to be
Education, as most of the teachers have been killed during
the last 16 years of unrest and war in Cambodia.

Therefore we have proposed to create a Teachers-
Training-Center, which might be started in Singapore as long
as the situation is not save anough, but moved into
Cambodia, when the UN has taken over the administration and
control in Cambodia, as proposed by the 5-Permanent-Members
of the UN-Security-Council.

We have now started to find a staff of about 10 to 15
experienced Cambodian paedagoges, living in Camps at the
Thai-Cambodian border and Cambodians living in France,
Germany, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United
States, who would have to be trained for at least half a
year, to become a well working team for teaching and school
administration, which then would start training the younger
generation.

The main point is, besided passing on the knowledge of
the various subjects of the school curriculun, that they can
be made acquainted whith the idea of organising life in a
democratic community.

This might help, to bring democracy slowly to the
villages and towns, when the teachers will leave the
training center to live in another part of the country.

We have found great interest for our proposal and moral
support from all Cambodians and those foreign personalities,
who work for the Cambodian cause.

In Singapore we have excellent representatives. the
well known architect Mr. Sophana Mam, who has studied in the
US, is expert in envrtonment planning and has built the
modern Singapore aiport and also the Cambodian Dr PhD Than
Sina, who is a member of the Southeast Asian Institute in
Singapore

The financial question is ofcourse always a problem. We
have been encouraged by the European Council to apply for
our project, what we have done, but sofar, we have not heard
the decision, due to polical complications all over the
world.

Page - 2

MAR 18 1991

14 March 1991

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I realize that you keep an extraordinarily busy schedule, so I was quite pleased that we had the opportunity to talk yesterday. As I mentioned, Sally and I have decided to settle initially in Washington, D.C. as most preliminary second career prospects focused here.

Having said that, I am still most interested in the Pacific and National Security Affairs. As we have discussed, it is the Century of the Pacific and I believe we would be ill-served if we do not factor the importance of the Pacific in our global responsibilities. Hopefully, we will ensure in a post Desert Storm environment that we do not create a preception or the reality of a lack of commitment to this region. Accordingly, if you know of an area where I can be of service, please let me know. I have enclosed a copy of my resume as you suggested.

I have always enjoyed meeting with you and hope we will be able to do so in the future.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

HUNTINGTON HARDISTY

Quarters A
#6 Hale Alii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96818

Home: (808) 422-6900

Work: (808) 477-7804

OBJECTIVE

Senior management position which will challenge the highest level executive leadership, communications facility, human resource and planning skills in an organization which seeks to develop and maximize opportunities in today's rapidly changing domestic and international environment.

SUMMARY

Chief Executive Officer with fourteen years as a Flag Officer in top level management positions within the United States Navy, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Unified Command. Leadership, organizational, analytical, planning and execution skills acquired through service as a Naval Officer with over thirty-eight years of diverse managerial, operational, foreign policy and political experience.

EXPERIENCE

United States Navy 1952 - Present

Chief Executive Officer 1988 - Present
United States Pacific Command

* Directed training, readiness and operations of U.S. Forces over (380,000 personnel. 250 ships, 2,500 aircraft and large support establishment) in the United States' largest Unified Command covering over 50% of the globe.

* Coordinated political and military affairs in over 40 nations with host governments, U.S. State Department and Defense Department furthering United States' National Security interests. Dealt directly with Heads of State in many of these nations.

* Travelled extensively throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Northeast, Southeast and Southwest Asia in support of United States policy, security assistance, disaster relief, civic action and military relations.

* Interacted extensively with Congress, the media and foreign governments.

* Published articles and delivered a broad range of speeches on the importance of the Pacific to United States' national security, economic and political interests.

HUNTINGTON HARDISTY

Page 2

* Sponsored and executed a broad range of initiatives to assist in nation building and self-sufficiency for allies and friends throughout the Pacific region.

* Planned and justified all service requirements of the command in the Program Planning and Budget System of the Department of Defense.

United States Navy

1962 - 1988

Progressed in responsibility in major aviation commands at sea and Navy and Joint staff positions culminating as Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

EDUCATION

MS International Relations, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Boston, Massachusetts.

BS Naval Science, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland

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Quarterly

Lower Case

The Third World, R.I.P.

Owen Harries

THE RECENTLY founded National Review Institute held its first conference on international affairs—"The World After Communism"—in October. It took place at Stapleford Park, an architecturally eclectic but beautiful stately home assembled over several centuries and now converted into an outstanding hotel, in Leicestershire, England. The first thing to say is that if you ever get invited to one of these events, drop everything and go. The whole occasion—the setting, the hospitality, the company, the discussion—was splendid.

The second thing to say is that, in the face of stiff competition—including, among others, Henry Kissinger, Robert Conquest, Alistair Horne, Karen Elliott House, Norman Stone, and Bill Buckley himself—the undoubtedly star of the conference was Margaret Thatcher. This remarkable woman, who had her sixty-sixth birthday during the weekend we met, arrived at 1 a.m. on the first night, stayed up talking until 3 a.m., and then chaired all the sessions the next day; and for Mrs. Thatcher, it should be emphasized, chairing is a strenuous activity, involving much positive guidance and firm correction of error. So much for the image of a broken and demoralized figure promoted by her enemies (promoted, that is, in those interludes when they are not exhibiting extreme fear of what she might do next).

Owen Harries is editor of *The National Interest*.

In her opening remarks, Mrs. Thatcher identified as a central theme of the times "the disintegration of artificial groupings constituted earlier in this century." This suited me fine, for while Mrs. Thatcher had principally in mind the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself (as well, perhaps, as her expectations concerning the European Community), the phrase sums up very well what is happening to the Third World, which is what I had been asked to speak about.

THE THIRD World is dying, if not dead. One may still, I suppose, use the term in lower case to designate a rather vague socio-economic category. But in its upper case sense of a militant ideological and political grouping, it is finished. The response of nearly all conservatives to this will be, "And a very good thing too." Conservatives have usually been contemptuous of the Third World, and there has been much about it that deserved contempt—its preten- tiousness and hypocrisy, its cynicism, its corruption, and, not least, its cruelty.

Still, it has to be conceded that for a couple of decades the entity that went by that name served rather well the leaders of the new states that came into existence with the collapse of European empires. Individually, those states lacked power, wealth, status, experience, and confidence. How to make up for their weakness, to make their presence felt on the international stage, to make the pow-

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erful pay attention to them—these were real problems. And the answer was the invention of the Third World.

Conceptually, Third Worldism combined two distinct ideas—that of a “third force” and that of a Have/Have Not division of the world. The notion of a third force was pinched from those English and French social democrats and radicals, like George Orwell, who in the 1940s envisaged a democratic, socialist Europe as a force separate from both American capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism, and holding the balance between the two. When, with NATO, Western Europe became committed to the American camp, the idea languished for a few years, before being picked up and appropriated by the ex-colonies.

The Have/Have Not distinction was older and, on the face of it, did not fit in well with a tripartite division of the world; but it was an essential part of Third Worldism, with the Soviet bloc being accommodated as a kind of non-exploitative, semi-Have. (Later on, the terminology North/South gained favor to describe Haves and Have Nots.)

Operationally, Third Worldism had three components: First, the playing off of one superpower against the other, and the exploitation of one's status as the uncommitted—the hearts and minds that were being struggled over—to initiate a bidding war for one's favors. Second, the exploitation of Western humanitarianism and liberal guilt about the colonial past in order to extort political and economic concessions, a.k.a. retroactive justice. Third, the exploitation of the quasi-democratic nature of the UN system, which put a premium on voting and therefore on numbers, one of the few political assets the new states collectively possessed. Hence the ideology's strong emphasis on solidarity, to exploit their numerical strength to the fullest.

For a couple of decades all this worked pretty well. In the 1970s, in particular, a Third World backed by OPEC's oil power, and tilting hard toward the Soviet bloc, was very assertive, and had considerable success in imposing itself on a demoralized West.

In the 1980s things worked less well. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were not good at feeling guilty and not amenable to moral blackmail. OPEC's power broke. And, as Henry Kissinger had warned its leaders, the Third World's flagrant abuse of the UN system ended up by destroying most of what authority that institution possessed, thus diminishing its utility as an instrument.

Still, as long as the Cold War was a going concern, the essence of the Third World game remained intact. Grenada, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia—local conflicts in such normally inconsequential countries continued to engage the great powers, as long as they saw themselves involved in a single over-riding global struggle in which everything counted.

NOW, AT the beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War has knocked the remaining struts out from under the Third World edifice. In the absence of a competition between—or indeed the existence of—two other blocs, it makes no conceptual sense to postulate a third force. The tactic of playing one side against the other is not available in the absence of such a competition. Third World countries no longer have a ready-made, automatic way of linking themselves to the central issues of world politics—as counters in a game, as trophies to be won, or as reluctant neutrals to be seduced.

So one can anticipate a reparochializing of Third World politics into third world politics, with local and regional factors determining how things go. Without the controlling and distorting effects of great power intervention on the one hand, and the internal pressure for solidarity on the other, disputes concerning ethnic and tribal minorities, artificial boundaries, religious differences, and the like are certain to multiply. But the importance of such disputes in the total scheme of things will be much diminished. Except where some special factor operates—oil, say—the hearts and minds and territories of most of the third world will become essen-

110 The National Interest—Winter 1991/92

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tially irrelevant to the great powers. In this
respect, the Gulf War was atypical and not a
sign of what is to come.

These changes may take a little time to
sink in on both sides—in the West and the
third world—because old habits are well in-
grained. But they will come.

IF THE END of the Cold War invalidates the notion of a third force, what about the other conceptual ingredient of Third Worldism—the division between Haves and Have Nots? Will this be a goer in the post-Cold War world?

Well, unlike the "third force" idea, it at
least has the advantage of not being logically
dependent on the prior existence of a two-
camp conflict. It will certainly be pushed—is
already being pushed, not only by third
world spokesmen but by the Jacques Attal-
ises of the world. But in several respects new
conditions do not favor it.

First, and as already noted, Western
liberal guilt has been eroded by time and
abuse. Pop singers and actresses will continue
to mimic it, engaging in what James Coleman
has called "conspicuous benevolence," but
the game of moral blackmail is essentially up.
Second, given the state of the U.S. economy
and the need to attend to its own ills, America
is unlikely to be in the giving vein. Third,
Eastern Europe and what was the Soviet
Union are going to offer serious competition
for what European aid and investment capital
are available, and they are likely to be given
preference over the third world.

Fourth, the world's main aid giver and
source of investment capital is already, and
will continue to be, Japan, and the Japa-
nese—strangers to humanitarianism and
guilt—are not a soft touch. They put a pre-
mium on self-reliance and self-generated
strength, both in themselves and in others.
Professor Takashi Inoguchi of the University
of Tokyo expresses it this way:

> Giving grants in too large amounts spoils recipients. If they cannot manage loan repayments by industrializing the economy rapidly and

> thus generating enough surplus through self-
discipline, then self-strengthening will not be
achieved.

Last and crucially, the aid industry will
no longer be underpinned and reinforced by
geopolitical considerations, as it was through-
out the Cold War. For a combination of
reasons, then, the Have-Nots are not likely to
be very successful.

After the Gulf War, many see the revi-
talization of the UN as a feature of the post-
Cold War order, and as the UN has been the
Third World's preferred forum it might be
thought that this will be in its favor. But,
again, it will not work that way. The Third
World's manipulation of the UN depended on
the Cold War's stalemating of the Security
Council, and the consequent shifting of the
action to the General Assembly where Third
World numbers could prevail. But what is
happening now is that, with the end of the
Cold War, the Security Council is being
unfrozen and reactivated. For the first time
the Council is working more or less according
to the manual, and the action, such as it is, is
moving back there. But the Security Council
is the instrument of the great powers, not of
the Third World. (I leave aside in this context
the important question of whether it will
prove wise in the long run for the United
States to play up the importance of the
Security Council.)

HOW, THEN, if at all, will third
world countries impinge seri-
ously on the wider international system in the
new era?

Two ways suggest themselves. First,
proliferation—proliferation of nuclear, chem-
ical, and biological weapons, and of the bal-
listic missiles to launch them over great dis-
tances. Ironically, the post-Cold War era may
actually see that extensive proliferation that
many predicted and feared during the Cold
War, but which did not happen. Then, the
superpowers were able to maintain some dis-
cipline and control, and also to discourage
proliferation by providing their nuclear um-

Lower Case

111

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brelias as protection. But even then it was
difficult to hold the line in the face of the
ambitions of some Third World countries
and the greed of Western suppliers. In a more
volatile, complex, and unpredictable world,
several threshold states are certain to do what
Saddam Hussein has been caught doing. In-
deed, we should assume that they are already
doing it. For startling evidence of their
chances of success, consult the article by
Tom Clancy and Russell Scitz in this issue. It
appears that not only is the genie out of the
bottle, but the bottle is shattered.

A SECOND looming issue is migra-
tion—the real prospect of large-
scale, sustained, and uncontrolled migration
from third world countries to the developed
industrialized ones, with all the tension and
hostility that would entail.

Unless third world countries make re-
markable economic progress, or unless the
developed countries can seal their doors very
effectively, and both things are very improb-
able, millions will migrate—driven by misery
at home and drawn by the good life that
television, and the increasing number of
friends and relatives who have gone ahead,
will tell them about.

When this happens it can be expected
that America, with its tradition of accepting
immigrants, will cope reasonably well. In-
deed, it *is* already coping well—for the U.S.
already took in more immigrants in the 1980s
than in any previous decade in its history,
and ninety percent of them were from third
world countries.

On the other hand, a Japan that sets great
store by racial purity will continue to exclude
immigrants virtually completely, and will
solve its labor problems by moving factories
to the third world, rather than letting immi-
grants come to Japan.

As Graham Fuller observes in this is-
sue, the region that will be hit hardest by
the influx will be Europe, traditionally and
until very recently a huge exporter of peo-
ple, not an importer, and a continent of

comparatively homogeneous nationalities.
Europe will neither be able to keep immi-
grants out nor to cope with them when they
are in place.

The strains are already clearly evident as
a result of the relatively modest numbers—
ten million or so—who have already arrived
there. Most of these are Muslim and they are
not being absorbed into the general popula-
tion. As the French historian Jean Marie
Domenach puts it, "Even as we are integrat-
ing all Europe, we can see a Muslim commu-
nity that cuts across European lines, a sort of
thirteenth nation of the European Communi-
ty." That thirteenth nation will grow rap-
idly, both because of high birth rates and
further heavy immigration. Indications of
the politically explosive character of this
process are already being given by those
leading French politicians from both Left
and Right who have decided there are votes
in exploiting racial resentment and hatred.
And in Germany, the first anniversary of
unification in September of this year was
marked by widespread riots directed against
migrant hostels. The problems will be all
the worse, and will be made more complex,
because of the virtual certainty that mass
South-North immigration will be combined
with mass East-West flows.

Both proliferation and mass migration
mean that third world countries and peoples
will have a significant impact on international
affairs. But they will not have it as "the Third
World." In the case of nuclear proliferation, the
weapons in question have most significance in
terms of international conflicts *among* third
world countries themselves. In the case of mass
migration, this will not be a consequence of a
Third World policy or strategy, but of the
individual decisions of millions of people seek-
ing relief from a misery largely created by inept
and corrupt third world politicians. As the
lachrymose Kenneth Kaunda finally falls and
Mobutu Sese Seko totters, the interlude during
which such politicians had to be paid serious
attention by statesmen like Kissinger and
Thatcher is over.□

112

THE
NATIONAL
INTEREST

EDITOR OWEN HARRIES

1112 16th STREET NW • SUITE 540 • WASHINGTON DC 20036 • (202) 467-4884 • FAX (202) 467-0006

30 December 1991

Dear Henry,

I am absolutely delighted at the prospect of publishing an
advance chapter of your book.

I don't know the book's publishing date, nor am I clear
about its precise subject. Could someone from your office send
me the basic information? If it all possible, I should like to
have the chapter in the Spring issue, which means having copy in
hand by late January. Is this feasible if Korda agrees?

If there is a chapter in the book that bears directly on the
discussion we had at the National Interest dinner in October--or,
indeed, on any aspect of the current debate among conservatives--
so much the better. But I am sure that whatever you select will
make an appropriate lead article.

It would help me a lot in planning the Spring issue if you
could let me know in the next few days how things stand.

Have a very good New Year.

PUBLISHER IRVING KRISTOL

ADVISORY BOARD ELIOT A. COHEN • MIDGE DECTER • MARTIN FELDSTEIN

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON • H.J. KAPLAN

JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK • HENRY A. KISSINGER

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK • DANIEL PIPES • ROBERT A. SCALAPINO

PUBLISHED BY NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.

PREZIDENT
ČESKÉ A SLOVENSKÉ FEDERATIVNÍ REPUBLIKY

16 October 1991

Mr Henry A. Kissinger
Twenty-sixth floor
350 Park Avenue
New York
New York 10022
U.S.A.

Dear Mr Kissinger,

Thank you very much for your letter of 3 October 1991. I take
into consideration your support to President Gerald Ford's
invitation to deliver the annual William E. Simon Lecture at the
University of Michigan next spring. It is, however, highly
improbable that the presidential duties will allow me to accept
this offer. I am afraid I will be fully engaged in home affairs
in the proposed time as the latest developments in Czechoslovakia
indicate.

I hope there will be an opportunity to meet with you personally
in Washington or Los Angeles during my visit to the United States
next week.

I would be pleased to visit the Bohemian Grove next year,
although I cannot promise it definitively at this moment.

I send very best wishes to you and look forward to seeing you
soon.