TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Ziegler

6:10 p. m. 2/26/73

RZ: Hello.

HK: Ron.

RZ: Hi, Henry.

HK: How do you think your stooge's interview went?

RZ: I thought it went fine, didn't you?

HK: I don't know--I am getting tired of myself on these things.

RZ: I think as we talked the other day--

HK: I think it is just absurd coming back from China to spend 20 minutes on Vietnam.
But did you think it was all right?

RZ: Sure, it was fine. I just think we're to the point now where you shouldn't do anymore for a while.

HK: I couldn't agree more.

RZ: But I think it was worthwhile to get those points out on the record
-- get em straight.

HK: Yeh. Actually this morning she showed the one where I said we couldn't have had peace earlier-- which would have been a more useful one to have yesterday.
ABut it doesn't make -- but you thought it turned out okay?

RZ: I did, yes.

HK: As well as the Kalb or better?

RZ: I think better--it was more animated--better from that standpoint.

HK: Well, okay. Anything else?

RZ: No, how about you?

HK: No, you know we--you know, we've got to space the news.

RZ: Okay, keep working at it Henry.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Rabin

2/26/73 7:15 p. m.

HK: How are you?

AR: Fine--

HK: I've got all your problems settled for you.

AR: Do you?

HK: Of course.

AR: I would like to give you a continuation of--you remember I gave to you--about the guy you met--I've got all what was in the opposing power.

HK: You are talking about our friends--you can't talk that way.

AR: Huh? Hello?

HK: Ah---I say you--these are friends of ours--they're not opposing powers.

AR: Fine--you can define them the way that you want.

HK: No, I'm joking

AR: It's your problem not mine.

HK: I want to see you tomorrow. And ah--damn it all--

AR: Can we do it as early as possible?

HK: You know I've been out of the office today--about 10:30 maybe--10:00 cannot be possibly before then because I have to be in the Pentagon for breakfast.

AR: I see--all right 10:30?

HK: Yeh, maybe I can move it up to 10:00--let's say 10:00

AR: If you have any delay, just let me know.
And I'll bring with me--I think it is very interesting.

HK: It is?

Page 2

AR: Because it includes--can I arrange to send it to you now?

HK: Yeh, send it to me right now.

AR: All right--I'll ask to arrange it with your secretary--

HK: Send it to General Scowcroft.

AR: The General? Or it might be I'll bring you tomorrow--you will not have enough time to read it now.

HK: Well, if it came in the next half-hour I would have time.

AR: You know, it is very sensitive

HK: All right, well you bring it then.

AR: I will bring it tomorrow--because it includes a letter from the two bosses.

HK: I would be interested in seeing how much double dealing is going on there.

AR: You'll see--I don't know the other side.

HK: What I can give you tomorrow is a summary of discussions--we won't have the transcript finished for another day or so.

AR: Hm huh/ All right.
Then at 10:00 at the same place.

HK: Right. Good.

Page 2

HK: That's right.
And I told him you tell you son, you got us into this.

RN: Yeh. That's way I say, this little nitpicking and the rest just pay no damn attention--because most of--and also we have to remember that these are isolated things--even among the press themselves generally they are handling it we'll don't you agree?

HK: Oh yes.

RN: D would say the Times and Post are really out of touch with rest.

HK: They are not really as vi cious as they used to be--it is just they are just looking for little things to nitpick about

RN: They can't stand the idea thatwe are doing it isn't that it?

HK: It's going to be hard to write American foreign policy without mentioning the changes of your Administration

RN: Even--I understand--even Reston grudgingly conceded that a couple of days ago.

HK: Well, not grudgingly, actually, on Friday he had a most enthusiastic article about you. He didn't say

RN: About what?

HK: About you are producing a basic transformation in the structure of peace and he winds it up saying the country owes President Nixon a debt of gratitude for his vision and courage or whatever

RN: (laughing) that's right. How about Joe Alsop did he come through with a good piece?

HK: He hasn't written yet about the economic aid, but

RN: Yeh, but he would have been good in anything else,

HK: Oh yes, very good.

RN: Because I know you spend a lot of time with him. Okay, get a little rest.

HK: Right.

Telcon
Secretary Richardson/Dr. Kissinger
2-27-73 8:48 a.m.

R: Hello.

K: Hello.

R: I thought I might relay to you what he says. . . the conversation through the Command Center here focussed on the question of the credibility of the spokesman for Hanoi in Saigon. He says in effect that the press spokesman N______ Tinh (?) and the Deputy Director of their delegation to the Four Power Joint Commission and the Head of the delegation General Wah(?) are all in his view very simply mouth pieces for an orchestrated process directed by Hanoi. He thinks there is no question about that at all and that therefore dealing directly with them would not change the course of things.

K: Right, Well I

R: Further, I haven't seen it, I gather that Bunker has sent a cable on this. Have you seen it?

K: No.

R: I was trying to get a copy of it.

K: No we haven't normalized relations with State yet. But I am establishing a liaison office there.

R: Well I can serve that much for you Henry.

K: Okay I'll get it.

R: That's about all I know. You have I assume.

K: Well the President is thinking of making a statement at his press conference today.

R: Well we were just talking about that. I personally think that is a good idea.

K: And he is planning to be very tough.

R: I think - you know - it would seem to me that this is the time for him to say something and that it should be tough. We thought he might want to say that he directed the suspension of minesweeping operations.

Telcon
Sec Richardson/Dr. Kissinger
2-27-73, 8:48 a.m.
Page 2

K: Alright.

R: That it seems to me that we were about to get underway with the aerial sweeping today. So it is a very direct reaction and I would think - well I don't need to improvise what he could say but it would seem to me that that would be a good thing.

K: Good, I think that's right. We were thinking along the same lines.

R: If it is decided that he will or doesn't want to have the minesweeping operation suspended. Of course it is 9:00 their time now almost.

K: I'll let you know within the hour.

R: Okay. Could you have the release - what they gave out in Saigon.

K: Our people, yes.

R: Yes.

K: I have that. Okay I have got to get it altogether for the President because if my people aren't working on China they don't volunteer work.

R: Okay. Well that's all I have.

K: Okay, good. I'll call you back around ten.

R: Fine.

Telcon
Amb Sullivan/Dr. Kissinger
2-27-73, 8:58 a.m.

K: Hello.

S: Hi Henry.

K: Bill, I have a President who is going through the ceiling here, because McCloskey said that not all the violations are on our side that were shown on television.

S: He said what?

K: McCloskey said not all the violations of the ceasefire are on our side. Would you mind instructing him that - to take a more offensive position.

S: I haven't heard what he said.

K: It was on television - we saw it.

S: Yeah.

K: I mean this was not somebody transcribing it. This was on satellite.

S: Yeah. Good Lord! Alright I'll get hold of him.

K: Now, what do we know about the prisoners?

S: Well that's what I wanted to ask you. We, here have the impression that they are refusing to ______ and make the releases until their small petty conditions are satisfied and we want to know what position you want us to take on it.

K: Well, they haven't officially said yet what their conditions are.

S: Well you see the news said which suggests ______ made by a Colonel Tinh.

K: Yes, that's all we have. It's got mostly to do with the living conditions there.

S: The point is what you want us to do about it. So far, I have held off.

Page 2

K: Why was the plenary session cancelled tomorrow?

S: Tomorrow? It was not cancelled, it never was scheduled. The idea was that tomorrow would be the day in which there would bilateral efforts to push along the drafting on the . . .

K: Now what you should do is call an urgent meeting with Thach.

S: I am going to be in with Thach anyway. The question is should we have at a higher level should we have the Secretary make a meeting with Tho so that it becomes public knowledge.

K: What do you think?

S: We are getting a lot of questions from the press as to what our attitude is on the prisoners and we have been waiting for some guidance from what you are going to take there. Are you going to take a tough position, or are you going to . . .

K: Absolutely. We are going to take a very tough position.

S: So it is a public position that you demand that they fulfill and no conditions attached and all that sort of thing.

K: That's right.

S: Well we have to seem to be doing something here because there are two questions: one, as to what McCloskey says to the press on which we had no guidance yet and the second thing is whether the Secretary should ask for and demand a meeting with ______ and we let it be known publicly and I think that probably needs to be done.

K: Why don't you wait until 11:00 when the President may say something.

S: The President is going to say something at 11:00?

K: He may.

S: May, that's let's see what time are we now?

K: That's two hours from now.

S: Two hours from now?

Telcon

K: Right.

S: Alright, well anyway as far as McCloskey is concerned he can say something very tough and very positive. Right?

K: That's right.

S: And then the question of whethery the Secretary demands a...

K: I'll a call you and you should tell Thach that they had better not monkey around with it.

S: Alright, I'll be seeing him in a couple of hours - about three hours. But the question is whether the Secretary should make a - whether we should let that ~~know publicly~~ be known publicly. It seems to me to have.

K: Not before the President has spoken if he doesn't interfere with the flow of publicity.

S: I cannot hear you.

K: I said we just as soon let the President speak first.

S: Absolutely, yes. Since he is contact here there has to be some motion here.

K: I know but we'd prefer to have the President push the Secretary rather than the other way around.

S: I understand. We'll wait until we hear from you.

K: So why don't you wait until 11:00.

S: Wait until 11:00 but also wait until we hear in a telephone call that you want him to do it.

K: Right.

S: Good. We'll be here then waiting for you.

K: Excellent.

Telcon
Sec Richardson/Dr. Kissinger
2-27-73, 9:58 a.m.

K: Elliot?

R: Yes, Henry.

K: The President wants to suspend mining and to suspend withdrawals but not announce it. Then we can confirm it.

R: Alright. We'll get word out right away.

K: Tell the PAOs to restrain their enthusiasm.

R: Now when is he. . .

K: He isn't going to say it himself - Ziegler will say it at 11:00. But he won't announce it - he will just do it.

R: What will Ziegler do?

K: Ziegler will just make a very tough statement and say that Rogers has been instructed to conduct no further business in Paris until this issue is clarified.

R: Okay. No one will say anything about the suspension.

K: No, but you can confirm it. You should do your best not to have it triggered too fast.

R: Okay.

K: I mean don't let the public inquiry trigger it too fast.

R: I see.

K: But we will notify the North Vietnamese of this.

R: Okay, good.

K: Okay?

R: Yes, good. When is the President going?

K: He is not going Elliot today because of this. Ziegler is doing it.

R: Oh, I see.

K: He may not go on now until tomorrow.

R: I had originally planned to have a press conference today which I was not going to do. I think I had better put it off anyway.

K: Well he's not going today.

R: Well the question is should I? Do you have any feelings on that? If I do I'll get - this will dominate it. Maybe it might be better to have it handled in one place.

K: Well we wouldn't object to your making some tough statements about it.

R: Well alright we'll think about that.

K: Okay Elliot, I've got Sullivan on the other line.

R: Okay.

K: Goodbye.

Telcon
Amb Sullivan/Dr. Kissinger
2-27-73, 10:00 a.m.

Page 2

K: Well if we don't get it so what? We are going to send a message anyway in addition.

S: Alright, we'll until after 5:00 we probably won't get it until tomorrow morning. Is that alright?

K: Yeah. I'm thinking how wise it is to have that high level of a confrontation. What do you think?

S: Well, as long as that man doesn't have any ______ to refer it back home.

K: Why don't we wait until Ziegler has made his statement.

S: Alright, we'll wait until he has made his statement. And I'll have Bob speak on both counts, right?

K: Exactly.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>to</td><td>pass</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>Ash</td><td>On</td><td>July</td></tr><tr><td>Date</td><td>6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 p.m., February 27, 1973

K: ... you demand clarification but not at that level.

S: I see.

K: Secondly, we shouldn't do anything high profile on what he does because we got a message coming about 2 o'clock our time.

S: I see.

K: And we better know what that says before we start running off to meetings.

S: Yeah, all right.

K: But let McCloskey confine himself to the prisoner issue.

S: To the POW issue?

K: Right.

S: Not to the violations?

K: Don't you think that would escalate it too much?

S: He's getting hit on both counts and he's having to appear rather mushy.

K: Well, then let him hit on both.

S: All right. ..... and we have had another crisis since the last time I talked to you. The whole drafting committee has reached a standstill because the North Vietnamese and the Communists have raised the issue of throwing out the representative of the Secretary General who is sitting in the Committee but not participating as a member but he's just participating more or less as an observer. I've told my people to hang tough on it and if necessary, let the Committee's work come to a stall while we persevere the position for the Secretary General.

K: That's okay.

S: It's a bit of a stupidity because we got the guy in this morning and he was there all morning perfectly all right but then he was stupid enough to insist that he have an eating place put in front of him and that's what precipitated it. (laughter)

TELCOM
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

10:45 a.m., February 27, 1973

K: Hello, Bill. I've just been talking to Bill Sullivan --

R: I know that. I'd appreciate it if you'd speak to me.

K: Okay, I just thought he could transmit it more easily.

R: Yeah. I have serious reservation about making any statement about cancelling the Conference.

K: He didn't say -- There's no issue of cancelling the Conference.

R: Well, maybe I didn't get the signals straight then.

K: Oh, no. What he said is -- What he's going to say is that he's asking you to demand clarification.

R: Yes, I understand.

K: And to conduct no other business until you've received that clarification.

R: Well, on that one, why don't we just say the first until -- I mean, if we start saying things like that, we're going to have the other governments just say to go to hell. They're not too happy about it anyway. It seems to me I ought to be able to have the opportunity to talk to the other side. Honest. And then if it's unsatisfactory, then start making threats. But you'll find that some of the other parties are fed up anyway with the whole idea of the Conference and they'll just say well, you fellows have it, we're going home. You follow me?

K: Yeah. Let me raise it with the President.

R: It seems to me you can say the same thing and the same sense of urgency without the threat. I'd rather not on the phone go into the details but you'll find that a couple of these governments will just leave. If we start saying that without checking with them, they will just --

K: Well, I would doubt that but still you --

R: I'm here, I can tell you that. I just had two conversations -- I don't want to go into it on the phone but I know that's what the situation is.

K: Okay. Let me check it with the President right away.

10:45 a.m., February 27, 1973

- 2 -

R: One of them has gone already and he says he might come back but believe me, that's a fact.

K: Is that a government?

R: Well, I mean the Foreign Minister.

K: Oh, really. From where?

R: Well, there's Britain. And they just said they're leaving and he'll be back maybe Thursday night for the ceremony but if we start saying to them without telling them or without consulting with them that we're not going to conduct any business, then -- You really can't understand how fed up the British particularly, are with the Conference unless you were here.

K: Yeah.

R: And I don't see any point if we can say that tomorrow. If I see Trend tonight, then we're dissatisfied, we can say the same thing in the morning.

K: Well, we should wait with Trend -- We have a message that they're sending to us, which I'm going to re-transmit to you immediately.

R: Henry, you want to speak a little louder, I have trouble hearing you.

K: I say, we're getting a message from them, which I'm going to get re-transmitted to you immediately and I think you should hold up seeing him until we know what that message says.

R: Hello.

K: Which we'll get at about 9 o'clock your time.

R: Henry.

K: Hello.

R: Yeah, I'm having a little trouble hearing you.

K: I'm saying, Bill, you shouldn't see Trend until we've had a message from them which is on the way.

R: You want to speak a little louder -- I'm having trouble hearing you.

K: Let's put in the call again -- I'm speaking as loud as I can.

woh

TELCORN

Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., February 27, 1973

R: Henry, I can hear you now. Well, I gather then what you have in mind is not saying anything for the moment about not conducting any business.

K: Well, I haven't been able to reach the President yet on that but I guess he'll go along with it if that's your judgment.

R: Yeah, it is. We can do that later if we decide that that's --

K: Well, it looks a little weak though to have a Presidential statement that yells and screams and then says all we've done is ask for clarification.

R: Well, no, I think you can say more than that but it doesn't seem to me that he ought to say that -- In the first place, we have nothing to do tomorrow anyway and it seems to me you can say something to the effect if the clarification is not satisfactory, then we'll have to consider what to do. Something of that kind.

K: Right. Okay.

R: But I think if you put it the other way, you'll find that it will really be unacceptable to several other countries here.

K: Well, if that's your judgment, we have to abide by that.

R: Now, a couple of other things, on the business about what Bob McCloskey should say, I have thought about whether he ought to go into details about violations. My thought would be just to make a general indictment.

K: That's right. I agree with that. We weren't all that eager on the violations, just so that it didn't look that we were in a totally defensive position.

R: Yeah. Okay. Well, we'll see. Ron, is he going to have a prepared statement?

K: Yes. And we've given it to the Secretariat but we'll have to modify it now in the light of our conversation.

R: All right. Now, I won't try to see Trend until after 8:00 p. m. tonight.

K: Well, why don't you wait until we transmit to you, which should be around 8:00 - 8:30, the message which they're sending to us and then you'll know what the situation is.

R: Yeah.

Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., February 27, 1973

- 2 -

K: Because otherwise you'll be flying blind.

R: That's right.

K: So if you could wait and we'll phone you as soon as we have the message and then ask for the appointment.

R: Okay. Fine. One of my problems is I'm going to have dinner with Gromyko tonight. Mrs. Rogers and I are going to have dinner with him and Mrs. Gromyko.

K: Well, then why don't you ask for the appointment for tomorrow morning.

R: Well, we can do that.

K: You know, I don't think much can happen tonight anyway.

R: I think that's right. I have a feeling it will work out. I think that they're just playing games again.

K: I'm certain it will work out. And that's why the President thought he would rather take a tougher than a softer line.

R: That's right. Well, I think that's fine as long as we understand -- Keep in mind that the Conference has gone pretty well so far.

K:

K: Right.

R: But there is a little unhappiness, particularly among the Canadians. Apparently the Canadian Red Cross were refused to serve anyone and they are on their way home.

K: Humph.

R: Because they got sort of pushed around. Particularly by the other side.

K: Well, when you get through with this job, you can run a boys school for unruly children.

R: That's right. (laughter) It's no problem. I'll keep it in good shape.

K: Okay.

Secy Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., February 27, 1973

- 3 -

R: Oh, incidentally, on Bob McCloskey's statement, this statement really if you saw the whole thing, was not bad. He was just trying to stay out --

K: Now, look, McCloskey is outstanding and I've said this to the President. But the trouble is they just showed --

R: ... efforts to observe the ceasefire and in all its aspects in Vietnam it simply cannot be questioned. He said we're sorry to have heard the remarks this morning. The record of violations is not entirely one-sided affair between the forces on the ground and they do not involve U.S. forces in any manner.

K: Yeah, but you see, on the one morning news show they just showed that one sentence -- the record is not one-sided.

R: Uh-huh.

K: And that sort of made of look as if 90% of it was on our side of it.

R: Yeah. It's awfully tough for him though because we're trying to keep the damn thing out of the -- Nobody wants to argue about violations over here in the Conference.

K: Yeah.

R: And all the speakers say this is no place to decide that. That's for the ICCS to decide. So what we're trying to do is not have this a forum for that decision. And I think he was just trying to follow that line. He doesn't want to try to create a big contrast. We can do that if that's what the President wants, there's no problem there. We can make a hell of a fight over here.

K: No, the major thing we want to do is hit the prisoner issue publicly.

R: Yeah. I think that's right.

K: That's the major concern.

R: Okay, Henry, fine. Thank you very much.

K: Right. Bye.

wgh

TELCONE

Secy Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

11:18 a.m., February 27, 1973

K: George, how are you?

S: Pretty good. How are you?

K: Okay.

S: I'm trying to develop an itinerary for this trip, including the Russian part of it.

K: Right. Incidentally, I meant to call you -- If you could delay it one week until after the French election, I think it would help.

S: Well, under the current itinerary the way it's set up is to go to Rome to see the Italians and then go to Moscow.

K: Right.

S: And then come back and go to the Common Market and then to London and then hit Paris last, which would be around the 20th.

K: Okay. Well, that's fine. [Hold on a second -- talking to someone in his office] Hello.

S: Yeah. Now, we have a toast in the Treasury called "Under Secretary"

K: Yeah.

S: And it is kind of an Under Secretaryship without portfolio.

K: Right.

S: And it is a person in this job that we would think of as carrying the laboring oar on a lot of the international things that we're getting into. I don't mean the monetary talks because Volcker does that but in our dealings with the Soviet Union on the policy level and so on.

K: Yeah, I understand.

S: And I have been racking my brains for somebody who is experienced and good and I come back in my mind quite frequently I find to your man, Hal Sonnenfeldt.

K: Oh.

Secy Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

11:18 a.m., February 27, 1973

- 2 -

S: So I'm calling to test you out on that whether you think --

K: I'll be delighted to let you have him.

S: Well, how do you think that would be?

K: I think he'd be excellent if you're willing to take some temperandems.

S: Well, would he be a good man to negotiate with the Russians?

K: Yes, if you discipline him. You know, he is substantively superb. He has some personality problems, most of which will be solved by giving him the title of Under Secretary.

S: He is a Foreign Service Officer in his background, isn't he?

K: Yeah.

S: There are a number of advantages that I think of in addition to his innate intelligence.

K: He would work closely with me --

S: First of all, you know him.

K: He knows my strategy.

S: He knows your strategy. It would be easy to stay in very close tune by him. Second, he understands the dimension of the world that passes me by. That is, he understands, as I get it, the politics of Europe; he knows a lot about the Soviet Union.

K: That's right.

S: And so on. So that rather than getting somebody in here who I know and who knows all the things I know and nothing more, that doesn't help any. Sonnenfeldt would bring an area of knowledge that would contribute very greatly.

K: Right.

S: He would be a very odd appointment for the Treasury because he doesn't have any economics or finance experience and people would say my God, why the Treasury? And so it would be put down as a statement of the expanded breadth of interest of the Treasury. That is sort of given by

Secy Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

11:18 a.m., February 27, 1973

- 3 -

S: (cont'd) the fact that the President's decision that we should handle this Russian thing and our interests have expanded. But anyway, that would be a martyr of that and there would be some struggle about that in the confirmation hearings --

K: George, I must run off to an appointment unfortunately for which I'm already 10 minutes late. Could I --

S: Do you think well of this idea?

K: Very well and it's extremely imaginative. If I could ask for a favor -- If you go ahead with this, could you let me tell him that you're going to approach him so that I get a little credit for --

S: Oh, I wouldn't think of doing it any other way because I think that would, among other things, enhance our chances.

K: Right. And would also help the cooperation afterwards.

S: Yeah. But you think this is a good idea?

K: I really think it's a good idea.

S: And you might drop that into the President at some point.

K: Good.

S: If we decide to go ahead.

K: Good. Now, wait a minute, one other thing, would you do a good sales job on Cooper?

S: Yes, I will. I'll get him in here pretty soon -- sometime today.

K: What I would like him to do really is to do the whole -- I'd make him Deputy to me handling all big matters that concern you. He'd be the liaison for you and Sonnenfeldt, if you take him. And he'd have that, foreign aid, and all those matters in which now I don't get the adequate political input. Vietnam reconstruction. I mean, he wouldn't run it -- you would run it but the backstopping.

S: Um-humm. Okay, I will talk to him very strongly.

TELCOM

President/Kissinger

2:35 p.m. - 2/27/73

K: Mr. President.

P: Have you heard anything on our stuff yet?

K: Oh, it's playing very well in the press.

P: Yeh, I talked to Ron.

K: But they were going to deliver a message here at 2 o'clock.

P: From Paris?

K: From Paris.

P: Yeh, but as far as the press thing is concerned we are just as well to get our position out there at the moment and I think that it doesn't bother me about Rogers' position because we're not going to meet tomorrow anyway and he ought to spend the day raising hell about this.

K: Absolutely and he'll realize when he thinks about it for five minutes that he's going to get better publicity out of this than by being a great conciliator.

P: Sure. Sure.

K: And he'll get the credit for having solved the problem because no one will know the tough private message you sent.

P: That's right. That's right. Incidentally, I think you ought to get a very strong message to Bunker for Thieu to the effect that between now and the time the prisoners go out that he must recognize - and his visit of course here - that his aid is very, very much at jeopardy if he does anything. You know?

K: Why is that?

P: Because as I anticipated and you know I predicted, Ron said that three-fourths of the questions were trying to put the blame on Thieu.

K: Right. Right.

P: Now if they ever get him hung on that, you know, something happens - that's the whole point - he's going to have to bend over backwards, Henry, between now and I'm referring to when we get out. Then he can sic the hell out of them. I don't care what he does.

K: I'll get that message off this afternoon.

P: He's got to realize that his aid program - don't you agree - do you see my point. He's going to catch holy hell here. The press always wants to jump on him; they don't want to jump on the North. For Christ's sake, they're the ones who broke the ceasefire more than the South. We know that. But Thieu is the one who will be made the whipping boy. Will you see that off, please?

K: I will get that off within the next 10 minutes.

P: OK.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Call me when you get it together.

K: Right.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Mar. 16 1983</td><td>Date</td><td>6/16/83</td></tr></table>

TelCon

Prof. Graubard/Mr. Kissinger

3:10 pm, Feb. 27, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello Steve.

G:q How are you?

K: Okay.

G: Good. Henry, I have my pages and I would love to see if I could get them to you, and I wonder if you think there is any chance-- they are pushing me in an unbelievable way here, I have to get them back to them in 48 hours. I've explained that I--

K: You know---

G: There are other things on you mind.

K: That's right.

G: Henry, what I'm really curious about is would there be some chance that you might look at them at all if I got them to you.

K: Oh, I might leaf through them.

G: I see. Would there be any chance of our breakfasting together, or something. Tell me what is possible.

K: Well, towards the end of the week maybe.

G: Okay. What they want me to do, let me do just tell you, is to give them back the thing on Thursday night before I leave New York. But they then say if something drastically happened over the weekend I could still get in touch with them, if I got them to you on Thursday or so, or Friday, or whenever you say, you think you would have a chance sometime over the weekend to leaf through them.

K: I'll do my damndest.

G: Okay. Does this seem possible, you know I'm--

K: I'll do my best Steve.

G: Right, and I'm not imposing - what shall I do, shall I call you

-2-

again and see if I can--

K: Well, send them to me, the worse you'll lose is the postage.

G: I'll send them to you today.

K: Right, I'll read in it over the weekend.

G: Good, wonderful. Okay.

K: What does Nancy have, are those galleys or--

G: Those are galleys, they are much improved, but I think she's quite --

K: She likes it and I leafed through it and it seems very good to me.

G: I've had very good comments, Henry, and I'm very pleased. I will send these to you--is there a courier or anything that goes down from New York to you.

K: I don't know whether the U. N. has something.

G: Who would know that, and I wouldn't have to keep you on the phone.

K: I don't know, my secretary maybe.

G: I see, well otherwise--

K: Call the U. N. Mission, call Scali's office.

G: Scali!

K: That's the Ambassador, the biggest jerk in the world.

G: And I can leave your name.

K: Yeah, tell them you want to send something to me.

G: And this is Ambassador Scali.

K: Right. I wouldn't call him, just call his secretary.

G: His secretary, exactly.

K: Okay, Steve, I really must go.

G: Okay and I will call you later in the week.

K: Right, bye.

G: Bye.

TELCONE

Dr. Kissinger - Bob Toth

February 27, 1973; 3:35 p.m.

T: Are you gonna go with me, or not?

K: Go with you where?

T: To the White House correspondents dinner.

K: Oh, GD, let me answer by the end of this week.

T: (Laugs)

K: I haven't focused on it.

T: Uh huh. Uh, now, I was gonna ask Al if you couldn't make it.

K: Uh, huh.

T: Al Haig. But, um, I had a question about the North Vietnamese position on the prisoners. Is this a serious thing or is it sort of a first of a series of minor crisis on this.

K: At this point I think it's the first of a series of minor crisis.

T: Uh huh.

K: I just can't believe it.

T: Uh huh.

thick over,

K: At least that they would / you know, the whole Agreement or an essential element of the Agreement at this stage.

T: Un huh. Well, um, and the fact that it didn't come from, um, Hanoi itself really it just came from this piddling colonel down the line, it sounds like they're just testing something out.

K: That's what I think but you know by tomorrow we may know differently.

*

-2-

T: Ah, you mean from Paris?

K: You know, no, they may make a radio broadcast by tomorrow.

T: Uh huh. Have we stopped withdrawals?

K: No, but you know I don't know what's gonna happen if this
continues.

T: Well, I mean, obviously it's being taken quite seriously. Ah, I was just wondering whether or not, you know my first reaction was why the President should choose to respond in such sharp turns to something that a colonel for the North Vietnamese Army said in Saigon.

K: Cause we don't want to let it get out of hand.

T: Uh huh. Uh huh. Well, ok. I guess it's a pretty straight-
forward story other than that.

K: It's a straightforward story. There's no hidden significance.

T: Henry, ah, one of the things I asked Julie about was coming by and talking to you, you know, for about 15-20 minutes about the Mideast one day, when you get a chance.

K: All right, but not this week.

T: No.

K: Ok.

T: No, after she goes.

K: Let's do that.

T: Ok. Good. Thank you.

K: Bye.

T: Bye.

TELCONE

Dr. Kissinger - Valeriani

February 27, 1973; 5:35 p.m.

K: Hello?

V: Hello. I'm confused because your secretary always calls you Mr. Kissinger.

K: Because I know how Ph D's are acquired so I can't take them seriously.

senior

V: I was told that / Administration officials are confident that the next group of prisoners will be released promptly.

K: Well, why don't you ask the senior officials. I'm only at the Under-
secretary level.

V: Is that accurate?

K: Huh?

V: Is that accurate?

K: That's a question of judgment.

V: Well, now what do you think?

K: Uh, I think there's a better than 50-50 chance.

V: Uh huh. Do you figure they're ground-standing?

K: I think that's a little test of manhood.

V: Uh huh. Are your views directed at us or at the South Vietnam-
ese?

K: Probably at both.

V: At both.

K: But we can't admit the composition that they can do that; I mean
that they can hold us responsible for the South Vietnamese actions.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger - Sec. Richardson

February 27, 1973; 5:40 p.m.

K: Hello?

R: Hi, Henry.

K: Hello, Elliot.

R: Thanks for calling back. Ah, I had two things. One is that
you call at our last breakfast to discuss the NSSMs and the
studies that, uh. (Interrupted)

K: Incidentally, when are we having breakfast, now?

R: I don't know. We were trying, I think, to set it up on Thursday.
I hadn't heard whether we can do it or not. I hope we can.

K: Right. Good.

R: Anyway, what they handed you this morning and I'm now
sending over by messanger the memorandum we've developed
outlining the studies that we propose to undertake here. It
reflects the ongoing work that has been underway already and
identifies the additional things we think we ought to do and I
hope will also digest areas that you will find of interest and
that will contribute in turn at least as building blocks to follow-
on studies by the process itself.

K: Good. Well, let us discuss how your individual studies can be
related to the inter-agency process.

R: I think that would be very useful.

K: Good.

R: We have tried to develop this outline in a way that does have
in view what we believe to be the border kinds of strategic
issues that we would expect to be of ..... (trails off)

K: Well, that's very helpful.

R: It's not, you know, one always wishes this kind of thing is
better done but I did want to have it ready for your when you
got back rather than call you up and say we have another week or so,
you know.

-2-

K: Well, you're a man of your word.

R: So, maybe we could talk about that when we do get together.

K: Good.

R: The other thing I wanted to say is that the thing about this GVN proposition about taking out the SAM sites.

K: Yeah.

R: To me, that's, that does not sound like a good idea. They're sitting, why not make it a major subject of protest within the formal processes of the Four Party Joint Military Commission of the ICCS and so on, at least in the first instance.

K: I agree with you.

R: Ok. Well, I won't labor the point.

K: No, I agree and let's do that.

R: Ok. Well, we'll get that word back to Vogt then.

K: Good.

R: And ask him to, and it may be that, ah (interrupted)

K: Can you trigger from where you are Woodward to make this a formal complaint?

R: I would think, yes. And we can certainly as far as Woodward is concerned. It may be that it ought also go around by some other route to Bunker.

K: All right. I'll (interrupted)

R: Because as I understand it's a GVN proposal to use GVN air. Then we've got to tell them we think that's a lousy idea that they can be more effective putting the other side on the defensive. It's not as if these were weapons that could affect the defensive weapons in any event.

K: Yeah. I agree.

TELCONE

Dr. Kissinger - Ozzie Johnson

February 27, 1973; 5:50 p.m.

K: Hello?

J: Hello?

K: How are you?

J: Johnson. Thank you for calling back. I was fascinated by the reports that I've not seen-made much of Joe's remarks Sunday night in Peking to the effect that the representatives would be at the Ambassadorial level and implications seemed to be that these would be notably ranking people. Is that accurate? And do you want to draw conclusions from it?

K: We haven't made a final decision yet.

J: Uh huh. One reason it fascinated me was to place it beside what the President is supposed to have said in the Rose Garden the other day to the effect that the Mardi Gras girls could expect you to show them around Peking anytime they wanted.

K: No, no, no.

J: What was the setting on that?

K: That's wishful thinking of the State Department. I will not be head of the mission. Don't speculate on that.

J: Ok. I wanted to be steered straight.

K: Look, on this you can, really, this is not gonna happen. I'm not meant for that sort of a post, as much as I love China.

J: Uh huh. We could forget it instead.

K: Yeah, I don't know what he meant.

J: You were there, though.

K: I was there.

J: Then that is more or less then what he said.

-2-

K: Frankly, I don't remember his saying that.

J: Uh huh.

K: I thought he said I just got back from Peking but you know I wasn't, I didn't think it was a historic moment so I was more interested in trying to figure out how I could get their phone numbers. No, I don't know what he said but it has no significance.

J: It would be easier if I'd lay those things to rest.

K: Believe me, you'd really be way, way off the beam if you did that.

J: How we hear such things.

K: No, this is not. We haven't really made the decision yet.

J: And the decision hasn't been made so you are in a sense speculating.

K: No, we are exchanging messages on the subject but we haven't really focused on it yet. I mean we've focused on it, but we haven't made a decision yet. Ok.

J: Fine. Thank you very much.

K: Ok.

TELCONE

Dr. Kissinger - Joe Alsop

February 27, 1973; 5:53 p.m.

K: Hello?

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, Joe. How are you?

A: Now is this news as bad as it looks?

K: On the prisoners?

A: Yeah.

K: Oh, no. We're gonna, that's just a little test of manhood.

A: Oh, Oh.

K: As soon as we get our Secretary of State back here where
we can calm him and relax him, it will all be all right.

A: Where is he now?

K: He's in Paris.

A: Oh, yeah. When's he coming back?

K: On Friday or Saturday.

A: People will be getting in an awful peaking about it, Henry. I
wonder if we could meet tomorrow morning.

K: Impossible, Joe. I'm just about 6 weeks behind in my work.

A: You are.

K: But, I would not make that a major column; just by the time
you have it written it may be out of the way. If it's not
resolved by Friday, then we've got ourselves a problem.
But from all the other messages that are going back and forth
between us and Hanoi - it does not look to me as if this is a
showdown.

A: When will it come, do you think?

-2-

K: The showdown?

A: Uh hum.

K: Oh, maybe this time next year, maybe this summer, but not now.

A: Ok, Sir.

K: They're much more plantive in their private communications to us.

A: Oh, they are.

K: They're not putting it to us yet.

(Herbolos)

A: Henry, did you decide you'd like to come to see the family for supper or not?

K: Can I let you know tomorrow morning?

A: It doesn't matter, then, call me at the last minute. This is the plan.

K: I would love to come-it's just a question of, we have to prepare for Mrs. Meir and other things and I'll know it better in the morning.

A: When is Nancy coming down?

K: I guess Saturday only.

A: Could she stay so she could have supper with us Sunday?

K: I can ask her but probably not. I think she's quite determined to get back.

A: Let me ask her. I'll call her.

K: [Laughs]

A: I've had some success in those quarters. Good.

K: Bye.

A: Goodbye

TELCONE

Sec. Rush/Kissinger

6:25 p.m. - 2/2/73

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Ken, how are you?

R: I'm fine, thanks. How are you?

K: You got our foreign policy in a total turmoil, I'm told.

R: And my hearty congratulations for all that you did, Henry.

K: Thank you.

R: Really terrific.

K: Are we going to meet this week sometime?

R: I would love to. Should we have breakfast Thursday morning?

K: No, you refused breakfast Thursday morning.

R: Oh no I didn't.

K: I was told you had.

R: Oh, for heaven's sake, who told you that?

K: I was already starting a feud with the State Department again. You're qualified as long as you're Acting Secretary.

R: Something Henry has gone very wrong.

K: How about lunch on Friday?

R: I'd be glad to do that.

K: Let's have lunch on Friday.

R: I'd like it very much.

2

K: Ken, I have had - it's too complex - a wailing complaint from the British that we are steamrollering them too much on that MBFR. And they request whether we couldn't hold off through one NATO session tomorrow.

R: All right.

K: And since Dobrynin is coming back, I'm wondering whether we couldn't sell it to him twice.

R: Well, we might.

K: I mean do you think we could ask whoever - I mean to keep it moving in that direction without steamrollering it tomorrow and it might then give us a claim on the British for the next meeting.

R: The British were the ones. I'm not in the office, I'm at a meeting I had to go to outside the building.

K: Yeh, I understand. I know where you are, Ken. You're at the Senate.

R: I'm at the Rayburn Office Building. Right you are. Your assistant is as always.

K: None of this consorting with the enemy.

R: (Laugs) We have to keep the enemy smiling.

K: I agree with you.

R: But Henry, we were going to have - to call on the British in London tomorrow. I've done really all I felt I should do with Cromer over here.

K: Well, no, everyone agrees you've done really a superb job on it. I'm just wondering whether tactically before Dobrynin is back we should use all our muscle whether we couldn't do it again as a sign of good will after he's back.

R: I think that's a good idea.

K: So will you call off the dogs for tomorrow.

R: I will call the dogs off for tomorrow. K: Good, thank you.

R: Henry, while I have you on the telephone, we're sending a letter over to the President with regard to this vote in ICAO tomorrow. Do you know about that?

K: Yeh, what's your recommendation?

R: Well the recommendation is unequivocally that we first, we'll try to change the "condemned".

K: Right.

R: We won't be able to do it. The British have tried, I've talked to Scali; he's been working very hard on it. We will not be able to do it.

K: Right.

R: Scali says that our support for the 25% maximum will be seriously undermined if we vote against it. We isolate ourselves. The feeling is we might touch off something very drastic in Libya who might want to shoot down an American plane.

K: So you're in favor of accepting it?

R: I'm in favor of making a very strong attempt to knock out the "condemned" and then when we vote for it, we will vote for it with strong disapproval as we will make clear ahead of time of prejudging this thing in advance and of the "condemned."

K: Good, I agree.

R: OK. Well, then we'll go ahead on it.

K: You go ahead on that. Good.

R: OK. Thanks, Henry.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Attention: <em>EO 1983-6</em></td></tr><tr><td>By: <em>CH</em> CARY, Date: <em>6/1/63</em></td></tr></table>

TELCOM
Sen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger

6:40 pm, Feb. 27, 1973

K: Hello.

J: Henry!

K: Jack how are you?

J: Welcome home.

K: Thank you.

J: With pockets full of POWs.

K: I wouldn't worry about it.

J: Well, I think you did absolutely great, we're all so proud of you.

K: Aren't you; nice. Well you were a great friend; in the difficult period and I won't forget that.

J: Well, I'm glad. Henry I called for a personal reason because I'm going to see Nelson on Thursday. There's an awful lot of pressure on me to run for Mayor of New York, and it's precisely that you are so far away from that scene, but know me well in my place down here, that I thought perhaps either now or if you turned it over in your mind you might have some helpful word for me, or if you've got the time, I'll come and talk to you about it.

K: Well let me, you know, that's an important decision, let me not do it lightly. Can I call you tomorrow and see whether we can have a drink at the end of the day of something like that.

J: That would be great. I'll tell you why I say what I do, as I say I'll be seeing him, there are many considerations involved, both personal and also processional, but there's one thing that while you are thinking about it let me put in your mind. Ehrlichman was here about a week or ten days ago and he came up to talk about how things were going here, etc., kinda getting himself oriented. He mentioned something about this to me and I said well it's the kind of thing which I'm not entertaining seriously but if I should, I would want to see the President about it. He said why. And I said to me the answer to New York is to reverse the course by which Mayors of New York have beaten the President and Governor over the head. But rather to reverse that and find out whether the President's interested in making New York the big jewel of the United States or the world because it is the most dynamic and the most busy city, I suppose, on earth.

-2-

K: Right.

J: And he said that's a very interesting idea any time you say. Well, I'm not saying because if I walk in with such a mission then I'm hooked. You follow me.

K: Of course.

J: But I did want to tell you that so that you might have it in back of your head as to their feeling about it, see.

K: Right.

J: That's all, I just--

K: Let me feel it out around here what the attitude, you know, what they really think.

J: Right.

K: Good, and I'm more sympathetic to the thought than I would have been say, eight years ago.

J: Well, it's interesting, you know, I've had this opportunity twice I had it in '65 when Lindsay ran and I had it in '61 when I actually turned it down, a thing which I'll tell you - they tried to push me into it and I said flatly no.

K: Kæs. But I'd like to make it a responsible reaction, so I'll call you tomorrow.

J: Yes, wonderful. Thank you Henry.

K: Right, bye.

J: Bye.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:55 pm/February 27, 1973

K: Mr. President

P: Hi Henry. I wanted to see if there's any development on that POW thing. Give me a call if--

K: Absolutely.

P: Because I have to do that press thing tomorrow, I have to start to work on it again, you see.

K: The way the timing runs now--

P: You see this is now--well, it's daylight out there now, it's just beginning.

K: Yes that's right. Well we have a press statement here, one of them said, one of the NVN said they have not suspended the prisoner release--

P: This is after the hoopla?

K: Yeah. They said they have not suspended it, all they have done is call our attention to the need to implement all the provisions.

P: Uh huh.

K: At the same time they haven't given us any prisoners, so--but they've stayed away from saying--

P: Well, this statement though I would say is they haven't crossed the Rubicon.

K: Exactly.

P: And that probably was made, having the knowledge of what we've said.

K: Right.

P: That statement was probably made after--

K: I was certainly made after our press statement.

P: Right, whether they've had our private statement--

K: Our private statement, I doubt that they had had it at that time.

P: No, because of the --

K: But I think--

P: That ought to shake them even more.

K: I think they are not going to shake us down on this. Or try to face us, because they know--

P: It's not the right time.

K: The internation conference going on, the Chinese and Russians aren't going to jeopardize their relations with us. No one else is going to back them at that conference, and not only this, they know if you stated clobbering them again, you'd have the American people with you on this. If this were the issue.

P: Right, you see we've always realized as I --in December, you know, if we could have made the POW the issue I could have gone on television, but we couldn't. It's partly the issue. But right now if it's on the POWs and I say I'll bomb them, we are going to bomb them until we get the POWs, by God the people would back you all at the way.

K: And if you played all the strings and said after the stories that the returning prisoners told you about conditions in prison camps, you will not permit them to stay there one extra day, that you will --but I don't think it's going to come anywhere close to that.

P: I agree. But these things must be going through their minds.

K: Exactly.

P: They were certainly going through the mind of somebody as clever as Gromyko, and people like that. Chou En-lai would understand that.

K:q That's right.

P: In fact--

K: We may even consider putting the Russians involved on our private channel, if it keeps going through tomorrow. I don't know if Rogers will do it toughly enough.

P: My view tomorrow is that if it doesn't break, I will not go on the press thing.

K: I agree.

-2-

-3-

P: Because it can only be just a general bunch of crap, about this and that and throwing it up.

K: But if it were to break, it would be a good time to go.

P: Then if it breaks, I'll just go out and take other questions.

K: That's right.

P: But if it doesn't break then we'll face this one down and go through with the Meir dinner on Thursday, and by Friday it ought to break --by Friday it either breaks or we are going to have to go to a very very tough alternative.

K: Exactly, by Friday it hasn't broken, you'd have to do something pretty drastic.

P: Well, it wouldn't be apress conference then, I think we'll just give it to them, don't you agree.

K: Well I would certainly not--

P: I mean an ultimatum basically.

K: I don't see how you could let Rogers sign a final act in Paris under those conditions.

P: Never.

K: But it won't get to that point because--

P: Either this or that, there can be no God damned signing without the POW think.

K: Mr. President, we will swing along as he always has and by the end of the day tomorrow he'll realize that you've made him a strong man.

P: Yeah, I saw in the paper tonight that he was threatening to leave.

K: Kicking and screaming. We made him do it kicking and screaming.

P: I know but the it's the best thing he ever did.

K: Of course, Mr. President, and he will gain in respect.