The New York Times Magazine

Defense planners—NATO staff officers confer before a map at SHAPE, the supreme headquarters of the alliance in Paris.

# 'As Urgent as the Moscow Threat'

The immediate task arising out of the Berlin crisis is to strengthen the unity of NATO, for European doubts of American dependability have weakened the alliance.

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

THERE can be little doubt that Western policy has reached a turning point. Soviet pressure, which began with Moscow's threat to turn over control of the routes to Berlin to its East German satellite, has placed into question some of the basic assumptions of Western policy. One of the most comforting of these has been that Western Europe was so vital to our security that the Soviet Union would not dare to menace it. Now that idea has been shattered and, in the process, a fundamental threat to the future of the Western alliance has arisen.

Strangely enough, in the debate about foreign policy in the United States little attention has been paid to this challenge. The discussion has proceeded from the premise that Western unity is a root fact of political life; that our basic problem is to develop "flexibility" and "new ap-

proaches" in our relations with the Soviet bloc.

A month's visit to Germany and France has convinced me that these assumptions are of very dubious validity. Conversations with political leaders of both government and opposition, editors of major newspapers and representatives of the academic community indicated that the Western alliance is in serious danger, partly because of confusion about our purposes. In the present situation strengthening the unity of the West is a task as urgent as Moscow's threat.

European criticism of the United States is not new, of course. What is new is that, for the first time, there exists grave doubt about our willingness to run risks on behalf of our allies, and even about our ability to understand what might constitute a threat. For purposes of immediate policy it is beside the point whether this attitude is justified; it is the psychological environment in which our actions will be interpreted and with which we must reckon.

The extent of the uneasiness in Germany and France about the future course of United States policy is striking. To take two examples: A French editor, to whom I remarked on what seemed to me the excessive suspiciousness of high officials, replied: "They think you are about to commit treason in a war that has already started." The moderate intellectual German weekly Die Zeit, which had been a frequent critic of the rigidity of Western policy in the past and an advocate of disengagement, carried a front-page headline: "How Soft Is the United States?"

Even if recent consultations have produced some agreement on immediate tactics, the underlying suspicion remains. These fears can be summed up in the following questions that are constantly being asked:

*Is the United States unwilling to run risks?*

EUROPE has suddenly awakened to the implications of our concept of massive retaliation. Until fairly recently, American strategic superiority was taken for granted as the chief

deterrent to Soviet aggression. A greater European military effort was regarded as irrelevant or dangerous, because it might encourage the Soviets to believe that an attack on Europe might evoke only a limited, local response. As long as European security was thought to depend entirely on United States willingness to engage in all-out war, the European powers could rely on our nuclear capability without participating in it. They even could afford the luxury of criticizing us for alleged bellicosity.

With the Soviet's development of long-range missiles, the steady shrinking of the United States' capability for limited war and the, widely advertised "missile gap," confidence in American power and in our willingness to run risks has been gravely shaken. A high German official said in a television interview that 1959 was perhaps the last year in which the United States would risk war in defense of Berlin or even of Europe. Newspapers, officials and opposition leaders in both Germany and France con- (Continued on Page 76)

HENRY A. KISSINGER, associate director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard, wrote "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy."

MARCH 8, 1959

19

# Crisis: 'The Art Of Bolshevik Policy'

"THE art of Bolshevik policy," Stalin declared more than thirty years ago, "lies in the ability to choose the time and place *** so as to concentrate the fire on that front where it is possible first of all to obtain maximum results."

In the decade and a half since World War II, Russia's leaders have practiced that art repeatedly, applying pressure, withdrawing when the United States reacts, reapplying pressure at another spot. At first, Stalin focused primarily, though not exclusively, on Europe. After the Chinese Communists took over mainland China, he shifted to Korea. When Stalin died, his successors lost the initiative for a time, and were even faced with crises not of their own choice, as in Hungary in 1956. But they quickly recouped with new cold war successes in the Middle East. Now Khrushchev has shifted to another front in an effort "to obtain maximum results": Berlin. The pictures on these pages show the main chapters in the history of fourteen years of crises between Russia and the West.

—HARRY SCHWARTZ

**BREAKDOWN IN LONDON**—The guns were hardly still when Soviet obduracy on treaties for Germany's allies at the 1945 Council of Foreign Ministers meeting showed what peace was to mean. Here Russia's Molotov (center) confronts Secretary of State Byrnes (right).

**RIOTS IN EUROPE**—Taking their cue from Russia, Western European Communists staged strikes and riots, such as this clash in Paris, in a vain effort to frustrate the Marshall Plan, the American scheme announced in 1947 to promote European economic recovery.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA GOES UNDER**—In February, 1948, armed Czechoslovak Communists, protected by Soviet troops at the border, seized the country and ended any doubt about the reality of the cold war. Above, a Communist rally in Prague during the upheaval.

**ARMS FOR EGYPT**—Russian-made tanks parade in Cairo. Soviet penetration of the Middle East began with the delivery of arms to Egypt, arranged in 1955. It was followed by Egypt's seizure of the Suez Canal and the abortive British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt.

**REVOLT IN HUNGARY**—Moscow's worst post-war political defeat came in October, 1956, when the Hungarian people rose in revolt. Above, in the U. N., Soviet Delegate Arkady Sobolev vetoes a resolution ordering Russia to cease sending troops into Hungary.

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE

the Berlin issue ends in a Western defeat or even if it reveals what
our allies may interpret as American irresolution or lack of conception,
NATO, as well as European integration, may not survive
will-be-in-dire-jeopardy.

A month's visit to Germany and France which included conversa-
tions with political leaders both government and opposition, editors of
major newspapers and representatives of the academic community has con-
vinced the author that the Western alliance is in serious danger. The
current situation is dominated not only by the Soviet threat but also
by the distrust of us by our European allies.

The author has in the past been frequently exposed to European
criticism of the United States. The new feature in European comments is
that for the first time there exists serious doubt about our willingness
to run risks for some issues of major concern to the Continental powers,
and
or even about our ability to understand what might constitute a threat.
For the purposes of immediate policy it is beside the point whether this
attitude is justified; it will form the environment in which our actions
will be interpreted.

The extent of the distrust of United States motives in Germany

3.

and France cannot be exaggerated. Officials may not go as far as the French editor to whom the author commented about what he took to be the excessive suspiciousness of high French officials and replied: "They think you are about to commit treason in a war that has already started." But there is reason for serious concern when the moderate intellectual German weekly *Die Zeit*, which had been a frequent critic of the rigidity of Western policy in the past and an advocate of disengagement, can have a front-page headline: How soft is the United States? In a month's trip, it was difficult to find any individual either in government or in opposition circles who did not consider it at least conceivable that the United States might let down its closest allies.

These fears are concentrated on the following problems:

(a) **Fear of United States Unwillingness to run risks.** Europeans have suddenly awakened to the implications of the concept of massive retaliation. In the past American strategic superiority was taken for granted. Pressure for a greater European military effort was regarded as irrelevant or dangerous because it might encourage a Soviet belief that an attack on Europe might evoke only a limited response.

5.

would
be improved by European control of nuclear weapons. An inevitable
result of a U.S. policy that European powers will interpret as irreso-
lute will be a redoubled effort to develop a local deterrent; in other
words, to make the United States dispensable. And the political corollary
will be an increasing effort to conduct policy independent of the United
States, which is another way of saying that there exists a real prospect
of a growing European neutralism.

(b) **Fear of a Separate U.S. - Soviet arrangement.** Whatever
the utility of the Mikoyan visit, on the Continent it accomplished a
major Soviet objective: it gave credence to the argument that direct
Soviet - U.S. negotiations to the exclusion of Europe were possible.
The author experienced the Mikoyan visit only through European press
reports. These painted a picture of eminent American business men
abjectly seeking to prove to a commissar that they were "regular"
fellows; of an ergy of eagerness particularly by circles generally con-
sidered conservative. A high NATO official summed up the European
attitude in the phrase: "How could you behave this way, at this par-
ticular time?" This bewilderment in turn has been exploited by the

It is possible to share the dismay at our unimaginative reactive policy of the past six years. There is no doubt that we have defined ourselves more by what we oppose than what we stand for, that every Soviet overture has absorbed Western energies in essentially sterile, defensive countermoves. Neither German unity nor European security nor the problems of the emergent nations has evoked a dynamic American response capable of being applied consistently and subtly over a period of time. We seem to be the prisoner of circumstances instead of seeking to shape them constructively.

What is worrisome about the current foreign policy debate is not the criticisms but the conclusions drawn from them. A mistaken course cannot necessarily be overcome by adopting its opposite under pressure. Many policies that might have been promising a few years ago are likely to be considered now as a sign that the United States compounds its lack of imagination by vacillation under stress even by our critics.

This is not the place to discuss the merits of such proposals as the substitution of German troops for those of the West in Berlin, disengagement, or the Rapacki plan. Their key feature is that each of them has become a subject of intense controversy only *after* the Soviet note on Berlin of

and subject of intense controversy only after the Soviet note on Berlin of
or the Reback plan. Their key theme is that each of them has become a
supstitution of German troops for those of the West in Berlin, disengagement,
This is not the place to discuss the merits of such proposals as the
tie's lack of imagination by oscillation under stress even by our criteria.
are likely to be considered naive as far as the United States composite
breastwork. Many policies that might have been promoting a few years ago
conseque cannot necessarily be overcome by adopting its obsolescence under
not the criteria but the conclusions drawn from them. A mistake
What is worrisome about the current foreign policy debate is
them coexistotively.

We seem to be the prisoner of circumstance instead of seeking to shape
capsule of being abridged consistently and speedily over a period of time.
problems of the emergent nations has evoked a dynamic American rationale
deliberate countermeasures. Neither German unity nor European security nor the
every Soviet takeover has absorbed Western energies in essentially sterile,
defined ourselves more by what we observe than what we say for it, that
reactive policy of the best six years. There is no doubt that we have

If it is possible to share the drama of our unimoginative

November 27th. Each of them involves some withdrawal of American forces at a moment which, on the Continent at least, appears as intense ✓

Soviet pressure. And all purposes regarding stability concern me. Europe须知 are being menaced, instead of the many

It is futile to argue that the substitution of German for American troops in Berlin could be coupled with a NATO guarantee. In the present climate of opinion such a course could only increase the general sense of insecurity. If serious doubts already exist about our willingness to honor our commitments at a time when United States forces are in the direct line of a Soviet advance, a withdrawal of these forces in the face of what Europeans consider a Soviet ultimatum would inevitably be considered interpreted ✓ as a United States attempt to shed its responsibilities.

Because the Europeans doubt our steadiness and reliability, the repeated declarations of United States firmness over Berlin have proved relatively ineffective. Our allies are reasonably confident of our readiness to defend Berlin against military attack. They do question whether we will resist other pressures the total impact of which may prove no less pernicious.

III

In charting Western policy it is therefore essential to place
first things first. The threat to Western unity is deep and real. Our
most immediate task must therefore be to strengthen the cohesion of the
Western alliance. We must demonstrate that we are a reliable partner in
 times of stress. Excessive elasticity will earn us not credit for states-
manship but opprobrium for weakness. Only if we succeed in restoring
confidence and in imparting a sense of direction can we begin the reexamination
of Western policy demanded so frequently but specified so rarely.

*to the extent that*
*undertake,*

In this sense the current situation represents not only a
serious threat but a great opportunity. For while many of the European
allies powers are uneasy about our course, they have no clear program of their own.

Indeed the absence of any definite conception throughout the West is one
of the causes of their uneasiness. This leads to the demoralizing situation
where some of our allies develop proposals in which they do not fully
believe in response to what they take to be American desires and that these
proposals are then treated as expressions of European wishes in our own
internal considerations. If we behave imaginatively as in the days of the

note of November 27th ends with what is interpreted by our allies as an
American defeat or withdrawal, the Western alliance will prove no firmer
than the French system of alliances in the inter-war period.

To say that we will be firm on Berlin is not a policy. Our
task is to give this term concrete content. We should make specific
proposals about a guarantee of free access, to be given either by the
Soviets or supervised by a Four Power Commission or guaranteed by the
United Nations. Within the context of such a guarantee, it would make
little difference whether the Soviets or the East Germans man the checkpoints.
But in the absence of such an assurance we cannot proclaim the East Germans
as Soviet agents. To do so would appear to our Continental allies as
surrender.

It is unwise to connect, as we are doing, the issue of Berlin
with that of European security. If we relate the two problems too closely,
the Soviets can use our desire to save Berlin to blackmail us during
negotiations. Or else they can use any failure of negotiations on
security as a pretext to step up the pressure on Berlin. For these reasons

b. **Negotiating Tactics.** Rigidity is surely not helpful. But neither is flexibility an end in itself. There are some principles and positions we cannot yield without giving up what we stand for. There are others which lend themselves to compromise. During Suez it was said that we would uphold our principles even against our allies. We must not give the impression that we will uphold them only against our allies.

It is dangerous to permit the Soviet Union to define all issues and to withdraw topics from negotiation simply by declaring them insoluble as it bids fair to do on the issue of free elections for Germany (the author has always favored intermediate stages such as free elections on the local level as a first step). To do so is to reward Soviet intransigence. If we admit the proposition that the West has the obligation to break any deadlock with new proposals we shall encourage Soviet obstinacy for we will give rise to the belief that if Soviet negotiators hold out long enough they will elicit ever more favorable Western offers. In short, the West

the control of the over-all military establishment. Such a force would
also be the best, probably the only, means to prevent the proliferation
of national atomic forces which is almost inevitable if present trends
continue.

d. **Towards a Larger Europe.** We should push the concept of a greater Europe open also to the satellites, particularly in the social and cultural field. Even on the issue of European security there are opportunities for initiatives entirely within our control. NATO could immediately give Poland a military guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line against German aggression as a token of its good faith. Such a move would remove a measure of the Soviet ability to control Poland through its fear of Germany. The author advanced this idea in many public talks in Germany and encountered no opposition.

e. **A Greater Effort.** The above ideas indicate a direction and not a program. Nothing is possible without a more dynamic conception by the United States of its role in the world. We have treated our problems for too long as technical ones; we have concentrated too much of our thought on how we could make the least possible effort.

III-7

Our military program is inadequate; continued at its present scale it will doom our diplomacy to futility by creating constant opportunities for Soviet pressure while reducing the means to resist them. Our economic program both domestic and foreign is too tentative and too conscious of the obstacles in our path. Our diplomacy lacks dynamism and conception.

We live through a period which in retrospect will undoubtedly appear as one of the great revolutions of history. We cannot withdraw from it; we can only contribute to shaping it constructively. The great challenge of our time is that the self-sufficient nation-state is breaking down. No nation - not even the largest - can survive in isolation or realize its potentialities, material or spiritual, by itself. We of the West who bequeathed the concept of nationalism to others have the duty to show the way to a new international order first by the manner with which we regulate our relations among each other and then by the imagination with which we help the newly independent states realize their aspirations. Vacillating policies will prove equally disastrous to everybody. Nothing is more important than for the West to raise its sights and to develop policies which will make of it a true community.

2/16/59

The Soviet note of November 27 threatening to turn over control
of the access to Berlin to its East German satellites marked a turning
point in East-West relations. It shattered the comfortable assumption
that Western Europe was too vital to our security for the Soviet Union to
dare to threaten it. It has forced a reappraisal of many seemingly fixed
positions. It has posed an immediate and fundamental threat to the
future of the Western alliance.

Strangely enough, the debate which the Soviet initiative has
evoked in the United States has paid little attention to this last problem.
It has proceeded from the premise that Western unity was a root fact of
political life; that the basic problem was to develop "flexibility" and
"new approaches" in our relation with the Soviet bloc. In the process we
stand in danger of sacrificing the achievements of a decade to a negotiating
position. We risk overlooking the importance of timing in policy: we
cannot overcome past omissions by adopting new and under pressure policies
which might have been promising five years ago! We may overestimate the
degree of flexibility available to us: For if the Berlin issue ends in

2.

a Western defeat or even if it reveals what our allies may interpret as American irresolution, lack of understanding of their special problems or weakness, NATO one of the cornerstones of the U. S. post-war policy will be jeopardized beyond repair.

A month's visit to Germany and France which included conversations with political leaders both government and opposition, editors of major newspapers and representatives of the academic community has convinced the author that the Western alliance is in serious danger. Whatever the advantages of greater elasticity and imaginativeness may have been in the years preceding the present impasse, the current situation is dominated not only by the Soviet threat but also by the distrust of us by our European allies.

The author has in the past been frequently exposed to European criticism of the United States. The new feature in European comments is that for the first time there exists serious doubt about our willingness to risks ourselves for some issues of major concern to the Continental power. Our understanding is even more severely drawn into question than

3.

our-strength. For the purposes of immediate policy it is beside the point
suspicions are they
whether the distrust is justified; it will form the environment in which
our actions will be interpreted.

The extent of the distrust of United States motives in Germany
and France cannot be exaggerated. Officials may not go as far as the French
editor to whom the author commented about what he took to be the excessive
suspiciousness of high French officials and who replied: "They think you
are about to commit treason in a war that has already started." But there
is reason for serious concern when the moderate intellectual German
weekly *Die Zeit*, which had been a frequent critic of the rigidity of
Western policy in the past and an advocate of disengagement can have a
front-page headline: How soft is the United States? In a month's trip,
it was difficult to find any individual either in government or in
opposition circles who did not consider it at least conceivable that the
United States might let down its closest allies.

(a) Strategic doctrine - Europeans have suddenly awakened to the implications of the concept of massive retaliation. In the past American strategic superiority was taken for granted. Pressure for a greater

European military effort was regarded as irrelevant or dangerous because it might encourage a Soviet belief that an attack on Europe might evoke only a limited response. As long as European security was thought to depend entirely on U.S. willingness to engage in all-out war, the European powers had little incentive to do much more than provide facilities for our strategic striking forces. They could rely on our nuclear capability without participating in it. They could even afford the luxury of criticizing us for our alleged bellicosity.

With the Soviet development of missiles, thermo-nuclear weapons and Sputniks, the confidence in American power and even more in our willingness to run risks has been severely shaken. A high German official stated in a television interview that 1959 was perhaps the last year in which Germany could count on the United States risking all-out war in defense of Berlin. Newspapers, officials and opposition leaders in both Germany and France were raising the question: What objective in Europe would seem worth the destruction of Washington and New York to the United States?

States.

seem worth the destruction of Washington and New York to the United
and France were retaining the question: What objective in Europe would
of Berlin. Newspapers, officials and opposition leaders in both Germany
Germany could conf on the United States risking all-out war in defense
a television interview that 1928 was because the last year in which
to run risks has been severely shaken. A high German official stated in
and Shukra, the confidence in American power and even more in our willingness
with the Soviet development of missiles, thermo-nuclear weapons
criticizing us for our alleged pellicosity.

without participating in it. They could even afford the luxury of
our strategic striking forces. They could rely on our nuclear capability
batteries had little incentive to do much more than provide facilities for
debend entirely on U.S. willingness to engage in all-out war, the European
only a limited response. As long as European security was thought to
it might encourage a Soviet belief that an attack on Europe might evoke
European military effort was regarded as irrelevant or dangerous because

5.

The correctness of this fear is not at issue. Its existence
lies behind the strenuous efforts of Germany and France (particularly
the latter) to obtain nuclear weapons under national control. The
explanation generally given is that the United States deterrent is no
longer credible or certain; that both plausibility and reliability would
be improved by European control of nuclear weapons. One certain result
of a U. S. policy that European powers will interpret as irresolute
will be a redoubled effort to develop a local deterrent; in other words
to make the United States dispensable. And the political corollary will
be an increasing effort to conduct policy independent of the United States
which is another way of saying that there exists a real prospect of a
growing European neutralism.

(b) **Fear of a Separate U. S. - Soviet arrangement.** Whatever the utility of the Mikoyan visit in exposing a high Soviet official to the U. S. democracy on the Continent, it accomplished a major Soviet objective; it gave credence to the argument that direct Soviet - U.S. negotiations to the exclusion of Europe were possible. The author experienced

[Y]

the Mikoyan visit only through European press reports. These painted a picture of eminent American business men abjectly seeking to prove to a commissar that they were "regular" fello ws; of almost an orgy of eagerness to come to a settlement almost on any terms. As a result the most frequent questions put by officials in both Germany and France was into the meaning of the seeming American enthusiasm for Mikoyan. A very high German official summed up the European attitude in the phrase: "How could you behave this way, at this particular time?"

In France the uneasiness about the Mikoyan visit was compounded by displeasure about the Geneva negotiations seeking to ban nuclear testing French objections were directed not so much against the goal of ending tests as against the fact that an issue of such importance was being dealt with to the exclusion of France. This attitude in turn has been exploited by Soviet diplomats in Paris who - so the author was told - continually suggest direct France - Soviet talks to forestall a separate U. S. - Soviet arrangement, inherent in the Mikoyan visit and the Geneva negotiations.

71

(c) The Special Position within NATO of Great Britain. This alleged special British position with NATO is being resented particularly in France. The objection derives not only from the fear that matters vital to European interests are settled by direct U S-British negotiations but also from the belief that Britain is at present the most irresolute major partner in NATO. The conviction was general that Britain would seek to avoid a show-down almost at any price, that is was exerting pressure on the U. S. to make concessions which would be tantamount to a major Western defeat. Since its special position with NATO is ascribed to the possession by Great Britain of its own nuclear deterrent an additional argument is furnished for pressing for the national development of nuclear arms.

(d) The lack of steadiness of American policy. All criticisms finally resolve themselves into this issue: How understanding and reliable a partner is the United States? And distressingly often the reply is not so much negative as bewildered. The most frequent query by editors, officials and political leaders was: What does the United States really want? The Europeans, even some of those who had formerly criticized us

10.

As a result, every Soviet overture has been treated by the West
as a tactical problem. The price we pay for the lack of our sense of
direction is that we seem rigid and unimaginative without gaining even
the benefit that might accrue from true resolution. Every Soviet note
absorbs Western energies in countermoves and in an essentially sterile
effort of drafting legalistically adequate replies. We spend more effort
on determining where we are than defining our purpose. We give the impression
of being the prisoner of circumstances instead of seeking to shape them
constructively.

It is possible to agree with all these criticisms without
sharing the conclusions drawn from them. A mistaken course cannot
necessarily be reversed by adopting its opposite under pressure. Many
policies that might have been promising a few years ago could involve
disaster if adopted now or if interpreted abroad as a sign that the United
States compounds its lack of imagination by vacillation under stress.
This is not the place to discuss the merits of such proposals as the
substitution of German troops for those of the West in Berlin, disengagement,
Rapacki plan and confederation. Their key feature is that each of them
has become a subject of intense controversy only *after* the Soviet note

has become a subject of intense controversy only after the Soviet note
Rebacki plan and confederation. Their key feature is that each of them
supposition of German troops for those of the West in Berlin, disengagement.
This is not the place to discuss the merits of such proposals as the
States compromise its lack of firm position by acquiescence under areas.
disaster it adopted now or if interpreted abroad as a sign that the United
belligerents that might have been broaching a few years ago could involve
necessarily be reversed by adopting its opposite under pressure. Many
attaining the conclusions drawn from them. A misaken course cannot
If it be possible to agree with all these criteria without
constructively.

of being the prisoner of circumstances instead of seeking to escape them
on determining where we are than defining our purpose. We give the impression
effort of drafting legislation sufficiently adequate reprises. We send more effort
applies Western energies in countermeasures and in an essentially sterile
the benefit that might accrue from time resolution. Every Soviet note
direction is that we seem rigid and unmagnanimous without earning even
as a factual problem. The brunt we bear for the lack of our sense of
As a result, every Soviet overture has been treated by the West

10.

11.

on Berlin on November 27th. More importantly, each of them involves some withdrawal of American forces at a moment which in Germany and France at least appears as intense Soviet pressure. It is futile to argue, for example, that German troops in Berlin or on the zonal boundary would have the benefit of a NATO guarantee. In the present climate of opinion, the sense of insecurity of the Continental powers could only be increased by such a course. If there already exist serious doubts about our willingness to honor our commitments at a time when United States forces are in the direct line of the Soviet advance, a withdrawal of these forces in the face of what Europeans consider a Soviet ultimatum would inevitably be interpreted as a reduction of United States concern for its European allies.

The recent debate in the United States, whatever the substantive merit of the proposals advanced, has therefore had a pernicious impact on the Continent. It has raised doubts about our steadiness; it has given the impression that even our most solemnly adopted positions may prove hollow under the pressure of events. This is why the repeated declaration of United States firmness over Berlin have proved relatively ineffective. Our allies do not doubt our readiness to defend Berlin against an overt

Our efforts do not doubt our readiness to defend Berlin against an overt
United States timeliness over Berlin have proved relatively ineffectual.

Under the pressure of events. This is why the rehearsed declaration of
impression that even our most solemnly requested propositions may prove hollow
in the Continent. If we raised doubts about our readiness; if we given the
merit of the proposals advanced, we therefore had a benignous impact on

The recent debate in the United States, whatever the antecedents
are a reduction of United States concern for its European allies.

What Europeans consider a Soviet ultimatum would inevitably be interpreted
into the Soviet advance, a withdrawal of these forces in the face of
honor our commitments at a time when United States forces are in the direct
affect. If there already exists serious doubts about our willingness to
sense of insecurity of the Continental Powers config only be increased by an
the benefit of a WTO guarantee. In the present climate of opinion, the
examen, that German troops in Berlin or on the south bank would have
fearat abscissa as influence Soviet brevets. If it little to smoke, for
withdrawal of American forces at a moment when in Germany and France at
on Berlin on November 25th. More importantly, each of them involve some

11.

12.

attack. They do question our resolution and understanding in the face of subtle and more ambiguous Soviet challenges. In short, the flexibility so frequently demanded is impossible without confidence in us by our partners. Without it, it may create separate efforts to settle with the Kremlin on the best terms obtainable.

In charting the future course of the Western alliance it is therefore important for us to place first things first. In the immediate future the task of the United States is above all to use this present crisis to strengthen the cohesion of the Western World. We must demonstrate that we are a partner that can be relied upon in times of stress. As the strongest member of the alliance, as the possessor of its chief retaliatory power we will be judged by our confidence, our calmness and our resolution. Only from the basis of a cohesive West can we engage in the long overdue reexamination of the Western policy. We must be strong enough not to become a victim of the transparent Soviet effort to split the Western alliance thereby unleash and then to start a race towards Moscow by the various partners.

Moreover the time is highly propitious for an exercise of American leadership. A diplomat of one of the smaller European countries told the author: "Do not come to us and ask us what you should do. We

I told the author: "Do not come to me and ask me what you should do. We American leaders are agh conflict of one of the smaller European countries. Moreover the time is right for us to start a race towards a common language for the various countries."

And then to start a race towards a common language for the various countries.

A victim of the transparent Soviet effort to split the Western Alliance reexamination of the Western policy. We must be strong enough not to become only from the basis of a cooperative West can we emerge in the long overture power we will be judged by our confidence, our calmness and our resolution, strongest member of the Alliance, as the possessor of its chief retaliatory that we are a partner that can be relied upon in times of stress. As the create to strengthen the cohesion of the Western world. We must demonstrate future the task of the United States is a prove still to see this present therefore important for us to place first things first. In the immediate

In charting the future course of the Western Alliance if it is to be made on the best terms possible.

Kremlin on the best terms possible.

Without it, it may create separate efforts to settle with the partners. So frequently demanded is imbecilic without confidence in us by our enemy and more ambiguous Soviet challenges. In short, the flexibility attack. They do question our resolution and understanding in the face of

15

13.

do not know your resources and we cannot assume your responsibilities.

Whether you want to or not you are the leader of the Western alliance.

We will judge you by the sense of direction you seem to have. We will

share any risks you seem willing to assume." The author always answered

European criticisms by insisting that the failure was not America's alone,

but that of the whole Western alliance, that the entire West was now paying

the price for the lassitude of a decade. Inevitably the response of both

governmental and opposition leaders was that if the present crisis was

successfully surmounted it could lead to a revitalization of all allied

relationships.

It is therefore essential that the United States not confuse a
negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union with the substance of
Allied relationships. We have a unique opportunity to give new vitality
to Western relationships if we act boldly and decisively. Excessive
elasticity under pressure will earn us not credit for statesmanship but
the opprobrium of weakness. If we succeed in restoring confidence we can
then initiate the examination of the dynamic program that everyone calls
for, but few specify. Such an approach should have the following components:

for, put few points. Such an approach should have the following consequences:

then initiate the examination of the dynamic program that everyone offers

the opportunity of meeting. If we succeed in reuniting confidence we can

effectively under pressure will earn us not credit for statement which put
to Western relationships if we set forth clearly and decisively. Excessive

Vilified relationships. We have a unique opportunity to give new vitality

negotiating position via-a-vis the Soviet Union with the assistance of.

If it is therefore essential that the United States not continue a

relationships.

successfully amounted it could lead to a revitalization of allffied

governmental and oppositional faders was that if the present criteria was

the price for the situation of a decade. Inevitably the response of both

put that of the whole Western alliance, that the entire West was now paying

European criteria by infatating that the failure was not America's alone.

share and risks you seem willing to assume." The author always answered

We will judge you by the sense of direction you seem to have. We will.

do not know your resources and we cannot assume your responsibility.

13.

14.

a. **The Berlin issue.** Free access to Berlin will be the touchstone of all other measures. If we fail on this issue, most of the present debate will be dissolved by the disintegration of NATO. If the sequence of events initiated by the Soviet note of November 27th ends with what is interpreted as a Western defeat, the Western alliance will prove no firmer than the French system of alliances in the inter-war period. However imposing on paper it found that declarations of Allied unity were no substitute for concerted action on concrete issues and it collapsed because it could not be applied to any of the challenges for which it was designed.

To say that we will be firm on Berlin is not a policy. Our sense of purpose will be judged by the concrete content we are able to give this term. The issue posed by the Soviet note of November 27th is most fundamentally whether the Soviets are to be permitted to create a problem by a unilateral act and then ask the West to "solve" it. We should at least be clear in our own minds that if the Soviets gain only 25 percent of what they demand, this is not a Western "victory;" it means that the Soviets and their East German puppets are by that much better off than before their ultimatum.

their nuptials.

Soviets and their East German colleagues are that much better off than before
of what they demand, this is not a Western "victory," it means that the
least be clear in our own minds that if the Soviets gain only 52 percent
by a unilateral act and then ask the West to "solve" it. We should at
fundamentally whether the Soviets are to be permitted to create a problem
this term. The issue posed by the Soviet note of November 23rd is most
sense of burden will be judged by the concrete content we are able to give
To say that we will be firm on Berlin is not a patch. Our
desired.

designed.

because it could not be abridged to any of the challenges for which it was
were no substitute for converted action on concrete issues and if colluded
barred. However imposing on border it found that declarations of "liberty
proved no timer than the French system of alliance in the inter-war
with what is interpreted as a Western defeat, the Western alliance will
seduce of events initiated by the Soviet note of November 25th ends
present despite will be dissolved by the disintegration of NATO. If the
foresight of all other measures. If we fail on this issue, most of the
s. The Berlin issue. Free access to Berlin will be the

14.

15.

It is often said that we cannot run major risks about who controls the check points on the Autobahn. But surely our diplomacy can be more imaginative than this. All our efforts should be directed towards placing the issue on a different plane. We should make specific proposals about a guarantee of free access, to be given either by the Soviets or supervised by a Four Power Commission or guaranteed by the United Nations. Within the context of such a guarantee, it would make little difference whether the Soviets or the East Germans man the checkpoints. But in the absence of such an assurance we cannot proclaim the East Germans are Soviet agents any more. To do so would appear to our Continental allies as surrender. Our firmness on this issue will determine our freedom of maneuver on all others.

Moreover, it is unwise to connect, as we are doing, the issue of Berlin with that of European security. If we relate the two problems too closely, the Soviets can use our desire to save Berlin to blackmail us into concessions on European security. On else they can use any failure of negotiations on security as a pretext to step up the pressure on Berlin. For these reasons the West should insist that a guarantee of free access precede any negotiations on European security.

b. We should immediately strengthen consultative arrangements within the Western alliance so that we can determine our common purposes over the longer future. In the present state of the Western alliance, subtle negotiations are inhibited by the conflicting conceptions of the major NATO powers. A negotiation, particularly on Germany with all the memories it evokes, is inherently divisive. The West must therefore get its own house in order. This presupposes a clear American position. We,

16.

are now in the situation demoralizing for all partners where some of our
European allies make proposals in which they do not fully believe as a
response to what they assume to be American desires and that these proposals
then become the expression of European desires in our own consideration of
policy.

c. **Negotiating Tactics.** It is highly dangerous to identify flexibility with willingness to discuss long-standing Soviet demands which have no more to recommend them than Soviet obduracy in holding to them. It was said during the Suez crisis that the United States would uphold principle even against its allies. Some recent pronouncements give the impression that we will uphold it only against our allies. The mere fact that the Soviet Union has rejected free elections in Germany should not make us give up the principle of the self-determination of peoples though various intermediate stages before all-German political elections can be considered. But we must not permit the Soviet Union to define all issues and to withdraw topics from negotiation simply by declaring them insoluble. To do so would place a premium on Soviet intransigence and turn negotiations into a form of surrender. If we admit the principle that we always have an obligation

of surrender. It is admitted the principle that we propose have an opportunity to place a premium on Soviet intranetence and firm negotiations into a low fabric from negotiation simply by declaring them incoherent. To do so would put us at a great disadvantage and to withdraw intermediate efforts before all-German political elections can be considered. We give up the principle of the self-determination of becouse though various that the Soviet Union has rejected free elections in Germany should not make impression that we will uphold it only against our allies. The mere fact that we give up the principle even against our allies. Some recent pronouncements give the same effect during the same criteria that the United States would uphold have no more to recommend them than Soviet opposition in holding to them. It flexibility with willingness to decline long-standing Soviet demands which c. <u>NEGOTIATING TACTICS</u>. It is highly翰翰的 to identify both.

then become the expression of European desire in our own consideration of
reasons to what they same to be American desire and that these proposals
Europea allies make proposals in which they do not fully believe as a
are now in the situation demoralizing for all belligerent where some of our
pe.

19

17.

to come up with new ideas we shall encourage Soviet obduracy for it will
encourage the Soviet belief that if they hold out long enough they will be
rewarded by even more favorable Western proposals.

d. We should push the concept of a greater Europe open also
to the satellites, particularly in the social and cultural field. Even
on the issue of European security there are great opportunities to elaborate
a distinction between Soviet interests and those of the satellites. For
example the West could take unilateral steps to contribute to the sense
of security, of the satellites,
NATO could immediately give Poland a military guarantee
of the Oder-Neisse line against German aggression as a token of its
good faith. Such a move would not only be a dynamic step, it would remove
a measure of the Soviet ability to control Poland through its fear of
Germany. The author advanced this idea in many public talks in Germany
and encountered no opposition either in the press.

---

Jy

e. The Western European powers could immediately elaborate
the institutions increasing its cohesion. To the extent that the West
European powers consider themselves as a political unit their policy will
gain in flexibility. This author is opposed to the disengagement schemes

Gain in flexibility. This author is opposed to the dengen arrangement because
European powers consider themselves as a buffer to mask their losses will
the institutions increasing its cohesion. To the extent that the West
e. The Western European powers could immediately evaporate
and encountered no objection either privately or in the press.

Germany. The author advanced these ideas in many h铺paticr fakes in Germany
a measure of the Soviet ability to control Poland through its rear of
good faith. Such a move would not impart a dynamic aptitude, it would remove
of the Ober-Heuse fine against German aggression as a token of its
of security. NATO could immediately give Poland a military security
example the West could take multilateral steps to contribute to their cause
a distinction between Soviet interests and those of the satellites. For
on the part of European security there are great opportunities to evaporate
to the satellites, particularly in the socialist and agricultural fields. Even
q. We should push the concept of a greater Europe above that
referred to even more favorable Western proposals.

encourage the Soviet policy that it they hold out enough they will be
to come up with new ideas we shall encourage Soviet optimism for it will

15.

18.

so far advanced and even more to the significance attached to them.

Nevertheless, such schemes have promise only if they reflect political cohesion rather than leading to the splintering of the West. If there existed for example a European atomic force the precise location of its arms might be a secondary matter. Such a force would also be the best means to prevent the proliferation of national atomic forces and avoid the issue of atomic arms for Germany. In this connection greater British consideration of Continental sensitivities would be a major contribution.

f. **Greater effort.** Nothing is possible however without a greater effort material, political and spiritual on the part of the West. Our military effort is inadequate; continued at its present scale it will doom our diplomacy to futility by creating constant opportunities for Soviet pressure while reducing the means to resist them. Our diplomacy must develop more dynamism and a greater sense of direction. We should avoid the situation where all issues come to be defined in Soviet terms. A more imaginative policy should include a determined effort to define the world we wish to come about and the effort we are prepared to make to achieve it. In these terms the Berlin crisis contains not only great dangers but

If, in these terms the Berlin crisis contains not only great dangers but
world we want to come about and the effort we are prepared to make to achieve
A more imaginative policy should include a determined effort to define the
avoid the situation where all issues come to be defined in Soviet terms.
must develop more dynamism and a greater sense of direction. We should
Soviet pressure while reducing the means to reach them. Our diplomacy
does our diplomacy to fulfilly fulfil creating constant opportunities for
Our military effort is inadequate; continued at its present scale it will
Greater effort material, political and spiritual on the part of the West.
1. Greater effort. Nothing is possible however without a
of Continental sensitivities would be a major contribution.
of atomic arms for Germany. In this connection Greater British consideration
to prevent the proliferation of national atomic forces and avoid the issue
arms might be a secondarily matter. Such a force would also be the best means
exposed for example a European atomic force the precise location of its
calculation rather than leading to the blundering of the West. If there
nevertheless, such schemes have promise only if they reflect political
so far advanced and even more so the significance attached to them.

18.

# Reappraisal and Western Unity

## Henry A. Kissinger

There can be little doubt that Western policy has reached a turning point. Soviet pressure which began with Moscow's threat to turn over control of the routes to Berlin to its East German satellite has shattered the comforting assumption that Western Europe was so vital to our security that the Soviet Union would not dare to menace it. In the process, a fundamental threat to the future of the Western alliance has arisen.

Strangely enough in the debate about foreign policy in the United States little attention has been paid to this challenge. The discussion has proceeded from the premise that Western unity is a root fact of political life; that our basic problem is to develop "flexibility" and "new approaches" in our relations with the Soviet bloc.

A month's visit to Germany and France has convinced the author that these assumptions are of very dubious validity. Conversations with political leaders of both government and opposition, editors of major newspapers and representatives of the academic community indicated that the Western alliance is in serious danger, partly because of confusion

the Western alliance is in serious danger, partly because of confusion
political leaders of both government and opposition, editors of major
newspapers and representatives of the academic community indicated that

that these assumptions are of very dubious validity. Conversations with
A month's visit to Germany and France has convinced the author

fact of political life; that our basic problem is to develop "flexibility"
discussion has proceeded from the premise that Western unity is a root
United States little attention has been paid to this challenge. The

ariaen.

process, a fundamental threat to the future of the Western alliance has
our security that the Soviet Union would not dare to menace it. In the
shattered the comforting assumption that Western Europe was so vital to
over control of the routes to Berlin to its East German satellite has
turning point. Soviet pressure which began with Moscows a threat to turn
turning point. Soviet

Henry V. Klaasen

Resignation and Western Unity

-2-

about our purposes. In the present situation the fear of our European
as to our dependability
allies that they might be let down by the United States is a factor
almost as important as the Russian threat.

European criticism of the United States is not new, of course.
What is new is that, for the first time, there exists serious doubt about
our willingness to run risks on behalf of our allies, and even about our
ability to understand what might constitute a threat. For purposes of
immediate policy it is beside the point whether this attitude is justified;
it is the psychological environment in which our actions will be interpreted
and with which we must reckon.

The extent of the distrust of United States policy in Germany
and France was striking. To take two examples: A French editor, to
whom the author remarked on what seemed to be the excessive suspiciousness
of high officials, replied: "They think you are about to commit treason
in a war that has already started." The moderate intellectual German weekly
*Die Zeit*, which had been a frequent critic of the rigidity of Western policy
in the past and an advocate of disengagement, carried a front-page headline:
"How soft is United States?"

"How soft is United States?"

in the past and an advocate of disengagement, carried a front-page headline: "Die Zeit", which had been a frequent critic of the rigidity of Western policy in a war that has already started." The moderate intellectual German weekly of high officials, replied: "They think you are spent to commit treason whom the author remarked on what seemed to be the excessive anpicionaneas and France was striking. To take two examples: A French editor, to

The extent of the diarrat of United States policy in Germany

it is the psychological environment in which our actions will be interpreted
immediate policy it is beside the point whether this attitude is justified;
ability to understand what might constitute a threat. For purpose of
our willingness to run risks on behalf of our allies, and even spent our
What is new is that, for the first time, there exists a serious doubt spent
European criticism of the United States is not new, of course.

allies that they might be let down by the United States is a factor
as to our dependability

apont our purposes. In the present situation the fear of our European

- 3 -

P Even if recent consultations have produced agreement on immediate tactics
X the underlying suspicion would remain. ~~German and French fears can be summed up~~
in the following questions:

Is the U. S. unwilling to run risks?

Europeans have suddenly awakened to the implications of our
concept of massive retaliation. Until fairly recently, American strategic
superiority was taken for granted as the chief deterrent to Soviet
aggression. A greater European military effort was regarded as irrelevant
or dangerous, because it might encourage the Soviets to believe that an
attack on Europe might evoke only a limited, local response. As long as
European security was thought to depend entirely on U. S. willingness to
engage in all-out war, the European powers could rely on our nuclear
capability without participating in it. They could even afford the
luxury of criticizing us for our alleged bellicosity.

With the Soviet development of missiles, thermonuclear weapons
(Germans called the "stupid thinking of the 1950s") and earth satellites, confidence in American power and in our willingness
to run risks has been gravely shaken. A high German official said in a
television interview that 1959 was perhaps the last year in which the

television interview that 1929 was perhaps the last year in which the
to run risks has been gravely shaken. A high German official said in a
and earth satellites, confidence in American power and in our willingness
With the Soviet development of missiles, thermonuclear weapons
luxury of criticizing us for our alleged pellicosity.

engage in all-out war, the European powers could rely on our unclear
European security was thought to depend entirely on U. S. willingness to
attack on Europe might evoke only a limited, local rationale. As long as
or dangerous, because it might encourage the Soviets to believe that an
aggression. A greater European military effort was regarded as irrelevant
an superiority was taken for granted as the chief deterrent to Soviet

concept of massive retaliation. Until fairly recently, American strategic
Europeans have suddenly awakened to the implications of our

in the following questions:

the underlying anpicion would remain. [Europeans] tears can be ammed up

- 4 -

Newspapers, officials and opposition leaders in both Germany and France constantly raise the question: What objective in Europe would seem to the U. S. worth the destruction of Washington and New York? This fear has already led to the European efforts (particularly of France) to produce their own nuclear weapons. Officials maintain that the American deterrent no longer is effective or credible -- that the security of the continent would be improved by European possession of nuclear weapons.

A U.S. policy that our European allies interpret as irresolute will inevitably result in a redoubled effort to develop a local deterrent; in other words, to make the United States strategically dispensable. And the political corollary will be an increasing effort to conduct policy independently of the United States. This is another way of saying that there exists a real prospect of a <u>growing European neutralism</u> which could jeopardize the achievements of a decade both within NATO and with respect to European integration.

Is a separate U.S. - Soviet arrangement possible?

Whatever the effect of the Mikoyan visit in the U.S., it

Whatever the effect of the Mikoyan visit in the U.2., it
Is a separate U.2. - Soviet arrangement possible?

to European integration.

Jeopardize the achievements of a decade both within NATO and with respect there exists a real prospect of a growing European-centrism which could independently of the United States. This is another way of saying that the political corollary will be an increasing effort to conduct policy in other words, to make the United States strategically dispassable. And will inevitably result in a redoubled effort to develop a local deterrent;

A U.2. policy that our European allies interpret as irreconcilable continent would be improved by European belligerion of nuclear weapons. deterrent no longer is effective or credible -- that the security of the produce their own nuclear weapons. Officials maintain that the American has already led to the European efforts (particularly of France) to the U. 2. worth the destruction of Washington and New York? This fear constantly raises the question: Must objective in Europe would seem to Newspapers, officials and opposition leaders in both Germany and France United States would risk war in defense of Berlin or even of Europe.

- 5 -

accomplished a major Soviet objective on the Continent: it gave credence
to the argument that direct Soviet-U.S. negotiations, to the exclusion
of Europe, were possible. European press reports added up to a picture
of eminent American business men abjectly seeking to prove to a commisar
that they were "regular" fellows; of conservative circles eagerly
welcoming his presence and seemingly desiring an agreement on almost any
terms. A high official summed up the European attitude in the phrase;
"How could you behave this way, at this particular time?"

This bewilderment in turn has been exploited by the Soviet
Union. Soviet diplomats continually suggest direct talks to both
Germany and France to forestall a separate American-Russian arrangement.
In short, Moscow seeks to split the Western alliance by citing to us
the "rigidity" of our European allies while warning them of our "unreliability."

Has Britain a special position in NATO?

The continental powers, especially France, resent what they
consider Britain's special status within NATO. Since they ascribe this
status largely to Britain's possession of her own atomic deterrent, an
additional incentive is created for diverting resources to the creation

additional incentive is created for diverting resources to the creation
of status largely to Britain's possession of her own atomic deterrent. An
consider Britain's special status within NATO. Since they sacripe this
The continental powers, especially France, reaseut what they

the "rigidity" of our European allies while warning them of our "inclusiveness."
In short, Moscow seeks to split the Western alliance by citing to us
Germany and France to forestall a separate American-Russian arrangement.

Union. Soviet diplomats continually suggest direct talks to both
This aجدلية في دور has been exploited by the Soviet

term. A high official approached up the European attitude in the phrase;
welcome his presence and seemingly deiring an agreement on almost any
that they were "regular" fellows; of conservative circles eagerly
of eminent American business men adjectively seeking to prove to a commissar
of Europe, were possible. European press reports added up to a picture
to the argument that direct Soviet-U.S. negotiations, to the exclusion
accomplished a major Soviet objective on the continent: it gave credence

to the exclusion of the continent: it gave credence to the

- 6 -

of nuclear arms. Our continental allies fear that matters vital to
European interests are being settled by direct U.S.-British negotiations,
and, at the same time, that Britain has become the least resolute major
partner in NATO.

They are convinced that Britain will seek to avoid a show-down
at almost any price, that it is exerting pressure on the U.S. to make
concessions which would amount to a major Western defeat. A prominent
European said: "Britain is not conducting foreign but domestic policy."

Is American policy reliable?

The question that German and French editors, officials and
political leaders asked most frequently was: What does the United States
<u>really</u> want? The general conviction was that U.S. policy had become
confused and uncertain. Even some of those who had criticized us most
severely for rigidity were now concerned about the circumstances in
which the clamor for flexibility had come about: policies which had
been declared sacrosanct seemed suddenly in flux -- because of a Soviet
threat to sever the lifeline to Berlin. Our reiteration of slogans such
as "elasticity" and "new approaches" seemed less a constructive approach

as "elasticity" and "new approaches" seemed less a constructive approach
threat to sever the lifeline to Berlin. Our reiteration of alogna auch
been declared acroasunct seemed suddenly in flux -- because of a Soviet
which the clamor for flexibility had come about: policies which had
severely for rigidity were now concerned about the circumstances in
continued and uncertain. Even some of those who had criticized his most
really want? The general conviction was that U.2. policy had become
political leaders asked most frequently was: What does the United States

Is American policy reliable?

European said: "Britain is not conducting foreign policy,"
concessions which would amount to a major Western defeat. A prominent
at almost any price, that it is exerting pressure on the U.2. to make

They are convinced that Britain will seek to avoid a show-down
partner in NATO.

and, at the same time, that Britain has become the least remote major
European interests are being settled by direct U.2.-British negotiations,
of uncertain aims. Our continental allies fear that matters vital to

- 6 -

-7-

than a panic reaction to a Soviet menace. The impression was that we
have neither a new policy nor the courage to stand by our previous
convictions.

It is possible to share the dismay of many critics of U.S. foreign policy at our unimaginative policy of the past six years. There is no doubt that we have defined our position more by what we oppose than by what we stand for, that every Soviet initiative has drawn Western energies into essentially sterile, defensive countermoves. Neither German unity nor European security nor the problems of the emergent nations have evoked a dynamic and consistent American response. We seem to be prisoners of circumstances rather than their creators.

But in making these criticisms we stand in danger of over-
estimating the degree of flexibility open to us in Europe. Our European
allies would very likely interpret any basic shift in our policy now as
a sign of American vacillation under stress. The common feature of such proposals as
the substitution of German troops for those of the West in Berlin, disengagement,
or the Rapacchioli plan for a neutral zone in middle Europe, is that each of
them became a subject of intense controversy only after the Soviet threat

["them became a subject of intense controversy only after the Soviet annexation\nor the Redback plan for a neutral zone in middle Europe, is that each of\nthe annihilation of German troops for those of the West in Berlin, disengagement,\na sign of American avulsion under stress. The common feature of such proposals is\nallies would very likely interpret any basic shift in our policy now as\nestimating the degree of flexibility open to us in Europe. Our European", "But in making these criticisms we stand in danger of over-\nto be prisoners of circumstances rather than their creators.\nnations have evoked a dynamic and consistent American rationale. We seem\nGerman unity nor European security nor the problems of the emergent\nenergies into essentially sterile, defensive countermeasures. Neither\nby what we stand for, that every Soviet initiative has drawn Western\nis no doubt that we have defined our position more by what we oppose than", "is no doubt that we have defined our position more by what we oppose than\nwe no doubt that we have defined our position more by what we oppose than\nis no doubt that we have defined our position more by what we oppose than\nwe no

- 8 -

threat to Berlin. Each of them accepts the Soviet claim that the danger
to European security is the all-too-inadequate Western defense effort.
And each of them would involve some withdrawal of American forces at a
time of intense Soviet pressure. Under present conditions an American
guarantee cannot be substituted for the presence of American troops. If
serious doubts already exist about our willingness to honor our commitments
-- at a time when United States forces are in the direct line of a Soviet
advance -- a withdrawal in the face of what Europeans consider a Soviet
ultimatum would inevitably be considered as a United States attempt to
escape its responsibilities.

Because the Europeans doubt our steadiness and reliability, the
repeated declarations that the United States will stand firm on Berlin
have proved relatively ineffective, all the more so as our deeds are so
inconsistent with our words. It is difficult to convey determination while
reducing our armed forces and focussing the national attention on a
balanced budget. To be sure, our allies are reasonably confident of our
readiness to defend Berlin against military attack; but they question
whether we will resist other pressures, more subtle, but just as dangerous.

- 9 -

What, then, can be done to reestablish Allied unity? Our most immediate task must be to strengthen the cohesion of the Western alliance.

We should demonstrate that we are a reliable partner in time of stress.

Excessive elasticity will earn us not credit for statesmanship but opprobrium for weakness. Only to the extent that we succeed in restoring confidence can we undertake the reexamination of Western policy demanded so frequently but specified so rarely. In this sense the present situation represents not only a threat but also a great opportunity. For while many of our European allies are uneasy about our course, they have no clear program of their own and are eager for American leadership.

No P
A diplomat of one of the smaller European countries told the author: "Do not come to us and ask what you should do. We do not know your resources and we cannot assume your responsibilities. Whether you want to or not you are the leader of the Western alliance."

In the absence of clear American purposes the demand for leadership has had a demoralizing effect: some of our allies develop proposals in which they do not fully believe in response to what they take to be American desires; while we in turn treat these proposals as expressions of European wishes.

However, if we behave imaginatively, as in the days of the Marshall Plan and the Greek-Turkish Aid Program, we can lay the basis for a new era of ever deeper Western cooperation and not only in Europe. The Far East, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America all require "new approaches". But the area under attack ~~Israel~~ is hardly the place to prove our flexibility.

The most crucial task before the West is therefore to get its own house in order. The challenge is not simply to devise a hurried proposal to meet a Soviet deadline. We must not delude ourselves that a negotiating position can remedy the lassitude of nearly a decade or that clever bargaining can substitute for the effort and dedication that have been lacking heretofore.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to develop a detailed program, some general guidelines can be sketched:

**The Berlin Issue.** Free access to Berlin will be the touchstone of all other measures. If the sequence of events initiated by the Soviet threat ends with what is interpreted by our allies as an American defeat or withdrawal, NATO will prove no stronger than the French system of alliances in the inter-war period.

To say that we will be firm on Berlin is not a policy. Our task
is to give this term concrete content. We should make specific proposals
defining a guarantee of free access, to be given either by the Soviets or by
a Four Power Commission, or by the United Nations. With such a guarantee, it
would make little difference whether Russians or East Germans man the checkpoints.
But in the absence of such an assurance we cannot escape the problem by
declaring the East Germans as Soviet agents. At the same time, it is
essential to make clear the seriousness of the situation to our people, to our
allies and to the Soviet Union. Half of the six-month Soviet warning period
has already passed while the West has been bemused with determining Soviet
intentions, first by marking time till the Mikoyan visit, then waiting for the
21st Party Congress, then for the results of Prime Minister MacMillan's
sojourn in the Soviet Union. We are sliding towards a crisis for which the
American people have not been prepared, while our allies are becoming nervous
about the lack of a tone of urgency in the United States and the Soviet Union may
be misled into the belief that the issue of Berlin can be pressed with impunity.
A Congressional resolution affirming our determination to maintain our rights
in Berlin and an increased alert of our armed forces would seem minimum requirements.

**Negotiating Tactics.** Rigidity is surely not helpful. But neither is flexibility an end in itself. There are some principles and positions we cannot yield without giving up what we stand for. There are others which lend themselves to compromise. If we base our negotiations on the "principle" that the West has an obligation to break any deadlock with new proposals, we shall encourage Soviet obstinacy, for we will nurture the belief that if Soviet negotiators hold out long enough they will elicit ever more favorable Western offers. We have no obligation to make only proposals the Soviet Union says it will accept, for this would turn diplomacy into a device for surrender. We do have a responsibility to make proposals which express our values and take into account legitimate Soviet security concerns. In short, the West requires a sense of direction more than negotiating skill. Only the purposeful can be flexible.

**Western Cohesion.** The Western powers should not confine themselves to issues raised by the Soviet Union; they should act boldly to strengthen unity among themselves. In particular, this time seems opportune to make another large advance towards European integration, especially in the field of foreign policy.

A permanent committee of European diplomats should be created charged with developing a common European foreign policy. To the extent that Western Europe considers itself a political unit, its policy will gain in assurance. Such an institution would counteract the persistent Soviet effort to play off the allies against each other. With Great Britain's participation, it would remove the suspicions created by the alleged special British position within NATO.

At the same time, we should use this crisis to encourage creation of a West European Atomic Force. The West could then negotiate much more flexibly about the precise location of these arms. Following any threatened member might feel protected by the voice it has in the control of the over-all military establishment. Such a force would also be the best, and probably the only, means to prevent proliferation of national atomic forces, which is almost inevitable if present trends continue.

**Towards a Larger Europe.** We should advocate the concept of a greater Europe open to the Soviet satellites. This initiative might be particularly effective in the social and cultural field. But there are opportunities in the strategic area as well. NATO could immediately give Poland a military guarantee of the Oderneisse Line, its postwar boundary, against German aggression. Such a move would lessen the Soviet ability to control Poland through its

fear of Germany. The author advanced this idea in many public talks in Germany
and encountered very little opposition.

**A Reexamination of NATO Strategy.** A basic cause of Allied disunity is the weakness of NATO and the ambiguity of its strategy. It is no doubt correct that we need not match the Soviets in every strategic category. But we are reaching a situation where we are not keeping up in any category. Against the background of this weakness, declaration of firmness ring hollow and the sense of insecurity of our allies must inevitably increase.

Moreover, NATO has never resolved the question whether it is a device
to unleash all-out war or a means to prevent Soviet occupation of Europe
should deterrence fail. By adopting an uneasy compromise, NATO is in danger
of paralyzing itself. The doubts by our allies as to our willingness to risk
all-out war for the defense of Europe while five US divisions are stationed there,
the inherent lack of plausibility of the doctrine of massive retaliation.
In fact current strategy has two contradictory but equally dangerous consequences:
Either it leads to resignation and hopelessness on the part of our allies or it
causes them to make strenuous efforts to develop their own nuclear deterrent,

a field where their own contribution can be marginal at best. Current
strategy produces either inadequate effort or wasteful duplication.

Two sets of measures are therefore required: (a) An immediate
strengthening of the US deterrent. (b) A common effort to devise a defense
of Europe which does not appear as suicide to all partners. A defensive
alliance which cannot protect the territory of its members without destroying
them is inherently brittle. There is no reason why the United States and
Western Europe whose combined resources human and material still far
exceed those of the USSR cannot create an adequate force for a local defense of
Europe. The obstacle is not capability, but lack of will.

These ideas indicate a direction and not a program. Nothing is
possible, however, without a more dynamic conception by the United States of
its role in the world. For too long, we have treated our problems as technical
ones; we have concentrated too much of our thought on how we could make the
least possible effort.

As a result, our military program is inadequate; continued at its present
scale it will doom our diplomacy to futility by creating constant opportunities
for Soviet pressure while reducing the means to resist them. Our economic

program, both domestic and foreign, is too tentative and too conscious of the
obstacles in the path. Our diplomacy lacks dynamism.

We are living through a period which, in retrospect, will undoubtedly
appear to be one of the great revolutions of history. We cannot withdraw
from it; we can only contribute to shaping it constructively. The great
challenge of our time is that the self-sufficient nation-state is breaking
down. No nation -- not even the largest -- can survive in isolation or
realize its potentialities, material or spiritual, by itself.

We of the West, who bequeathed the concept of nationalism to others,
must show the way to a new international order by initiative in setting our
own house in order and by imagination in helping the newly independent states
to realize their aspirations. Vacillating policies will prove disastrous to
everybody. The West must raise its sights; it must develop policies which will
make of it a true community.

MO1.....

NONA BROWN
WASHINGTON

REPPRAISAL REPPRAISAL

HENRY A. KISSINGER

WESTERN POLICY HAS REACHED A TURNING POINT. THE SOVIET PRESSURE WHICH BEGAN WITH MOSCOW'S THREAT TO TURN OVER CONTROL OF THE ROUTES TO BERLIN TO ITS EAST GERMAN SATELLITE HAS SHATTERED THE COMFORTING ASSUMPTION THAT WESTERN EUROPE WAS SO VITAL TO OUR SECURITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT DARE TO MENACE IT. IN THE PROCESS, A FUNDAMENTAL THREAT TO THE FUTURE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE HAS ARISEN.

STRANGELY ENOUGH IN THE DEBATE ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES LITTLE ATTENTION HAS BEEN PAID TO THIS CHALLENGE. THE DISCUSSION HAS PROCEEDED FROM THE PREMISE THAT WESTERN UNITY IS A ROOT FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE, BUT IS IT? AND NEW APPARATUS IS NEEDED IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF US MAY BE LOST?

A MONTH'S VISIT TO GERMANY AND FRANCE, WHICH INCLUDED CONVERSATIONS WITH POLITICAL LEADERS OF BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, EDITORS OF MAJOR NEWSPAPERS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ACADEMIC INDICATED COMMUNITY HAS CONVINCED ME THAT THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS IN SERIOUS DANGER. IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THE DISTRAST OP US ON THE PART OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES IS A FACTOR ALMOST AS IMPORTANT AS THE RUSSIAN THREAT.

EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT NEW, WHAT IS NEW IS THAT, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THERE EXISTS SERIOUS DOUBT ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO RUN RISKS FOR THE CONTINENTAL POWERS, AND EVEN ABOUT OUR ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MIGHT CONSTITUTE A THREAT. FOR PURPOSES OF IMMEDIATE POLICY IT IS BESIDE THE POINT WHETHER THIS ATTITUDE IS JUSTIFIED; IT IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH OUR ACTIONS WILL BE INTERPRETED AND WITH WHICH WE MUST RECKON.

THE EXTENT OF THE DISTRUST OF UNITED STATES POLICY IN GERMANY
AND FRANCE CANNOT BE EXAGGERATED. TO TAKE TWO EXAMPLES: A FRENCH
EDITOR, TO WHOM /REMARKED ON WHAT SEEMED TO BE THE EXCESSIVE SUS-
PICIOUSNESS OF HIGH OFFICIALS, REPLIED: "THEY THINK YOU ARE
ABOUT TO COMMIT TREASON IN A WAR THAT HAS ALREADY STARTED." THE
MODERATE INTELLECTUAL GERMAN WEEKLY DIE ZEIT, WHICH HAD BEEN A
FREQUENT CRITIC OF THE RIGIDITY OF WESTERN POLICY IN THE PAST AND
AN ADVOCATE OF DISENGAGEMENT, PRINTED A FRONT-PAGE HEADLINE: "HOW
SOFT IS THE UNITED STATES ?"

DURING THE MONTH'S TRIP, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND ANY INDIVIDUAL, EITHER IN GOVERNMENT OR IN OPPOSITION NOT CIRCLES, WHO DID CONSIDER IT AT LEAST CONCEIVABLE THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT LET DOWN ITS CLOSEST ALLIES UP IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. THEIR FEARS CAN BE SUMMED UP IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS. (EUROPEAN EMBASSY, NEWSPAPER, TELEGRAM)

IS THE U. S. UNWILLING TO RUN RISKS ? EMMAWEN IS THE IMPLICATIONS OF OUR CONCEPT OF MAN ? IS IT MASSIVE RETALIATION ? WAS TAKEN FOR GRANTED AS THE GREAT DETERRENT RUSSIA. PRESSURE FOR A GREATER EUROPEAN MILITARY EFFORT WAS REGARDED AS IRRELEVANT OR DANGEROUS, BECAUSE IT MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO BELIEVE THAT AN ATTACK ON EUROPE MIGHT EVOKE ONLY A LIMITED, LOCAL RESPONSE. AS LONG AS EUROPEAN SECURITY WAS THOUGHT TO DEPEND ENTIRELY ON U. S. WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN ALL-OUT WAR, THE EUROPEAN POWERS COULD RELY ON OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WITHOUT PARTICIPATING IN IT. THEY COULD EVEN AFFORD THE LUXURY OF CRITICIZING US FOR OUR ALLEGED BELLICOSITY.

WITH THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF MISSILES, THERMONUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EARTH SATELLITES, CONFIDENCE IN AMERICAN POWER AND IN OUR WILLINGNESS TO RUN RISKS HAS BEEN GRAVELY SHAKEN. A HIGH GERMAN OFFICIAL SAID IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW THAT 1959 WAS PERHAPS THE LAST YEAR IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD RISK WAR IN DEFENSE OF BERLIN OR EVEN OF EUROPE. NEWSPAPERS, OFFICIALS AND OPPOSITION LEADERS IN BOTH GERMANY AND FRANCE CONSTANTLY RAISE THE QUESTION: WHAT OBJECTIVE IN EUROPE WOULD SEEM TO THE U. S. WORTH THE DESTRUCTION OF WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK ?

EUROPE OFFICIALS MAINTAIN THAT THE AMERICAN DETERRENT NO LONGER IS EFFECTIVE --- THAT THE SECURITY OF THE CONTINENT WOULD BE IMPROVED BY EUROPEAN CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ~ THUS THE ATTEMPTS BY GERMANY AND FRANCE, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, TO OBTAIN THEIR OWN ATOMIC BOMBS.)

A U. S. POLICY THAT EUROPEAN POWERS INTERPRET AS IRRESOLUTE WILL INEVITABLY RESULT IN A REDOUBLED EFFORT TO DEVELOP A LOCAL DETERRENT ; IN OTHER WORDS, TO MAKE THE UNITED STATES DISPENSABLE. AND THE POLITICAL COROLLARY WILL BE AN INCREASING EFFORT TO CONDUCT POLICY INDEPENDENTLY OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING THAT THERE EXISTS A REAL PROSPECT OF A GROWING EUROPEAN NEUTRALISM.

IS A SEPARATE U. S. - SOVIET ARRANGEMENT POSSIBLE ?

WHATEVER THE EFFECT OF THE MIKOYAN VISIT IN THE U. S., IT ACCOMPLISHED A MAJOR SOVIET OBJECTIVE ON THE CONTINENT : IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE ARGUMENT THAT DIRECT SOVIET-U. S. NEGOTIATIONS,

TO THE EXCLUSION OF EUROPE, WERE POSSIBLE. EUROPEAN PRESS REPORTS ADDED UP TO A PICTURE OF EMINENT AMERICAN BUSINESS MEN ABJECTLY SEEKING TO PROVE TO A COMMISAR THAT THEY WERE

"REGULAR "FELLOWS; OF CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES EAGERLY WELCOMING HIS PRESENCE AND SEEMINGLY DESIRING AN AGREEMENT ON ALMOST ANY TERMS. A HIGH OFFICIAL SUMMED UP THE EUROPEAN ATTITUDE IN THE PHRASE; "HOW COULD YOU BEHAVE THIS WAY, AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME?"

THIS BEWILDERMENT IN TURN HAS BEEN EXPLOITED BY THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET DIPLOMATS CONTINUALLY SUGGEST DIRECT TALKS TO BOTH GERMANY AND FRANCE TO FORESTALL A SEPARATE AMERICAN- RUSSIAN ARRANGEMENT. IN SHORT, MOSCOW SEEKS TO SPLIT THE WESTERN ALLIANCE BY CITING TO US THE "RIGIDITY" OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WHILE WARNING THEM OF OUR " UNRELIABILITY."

HAS BRITAIN A SPECIAL POSITION IN NATO ?

THE CONTINENTAL POWERS, ESPECIALLY FRANCE, FEEL THAT BRITAIN IS RECARDED AS MORE EQUAL THAN THE OTHER EQUAL PARTNERS OF NATO. THEY ASCRIBE THIS SPECIAL STATUS LARGELY TO BRITAIN'S POSSESSION OF HER OWN ATOMIC DETERRENT. THEY FEAR THAT MATTERS VITAL TO EUROPEAN INTERESTS ARE BEING SETTLED BY DIRECT US-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS, AND, AT THE SAME TIME, THAT BRITAIN HAS BECOME THE LEAST RESOLUTE MAJOR PARTNER IN NATO.

THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT BRITAIN WILL SEEK TO AVOID A SHOW-DOWN AT ALMOST ANY PRICE, THAT IT IS E EXERTING PRESSURE ON THE U. S. TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD AMOUNT TO A MAJOR WESTERN DEFEAT. A PROMINENT EUROPEAN SAID TO ME: "BRITAIN IS NOT CONDUCTING FOREIGN BUT DOMESTIC POLICY."

IS AMERICAN POLICY RELIABLE?

THE QUESTION THAT EUROPEAN EDITORS, OFFICIALS AND POLITICAL LEADERS ASKED ME MOST FREQUENTLY WAS: WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES REALLY WANT? THE GENERAL CONVICTION WAS THAT U. S. POLICY HAD BECOME CONFUSED AND UNCERTAIN. EVEN SOME OF THOSE WHO HAD CRITICIZED US MOST EVIDEPLY FOR RIGIDITY WERE NOW CONCERNED ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH OUR NEW-FOUND FLEXIBILITY HAD COME ABOUT: POLICIES WHICH HAD BEEN DECLARED SACROSANCT SEEMED SUDDENLY IN FLUX -- BECAUSE OF A SOVIET THREAT TO SEVER THE LIFELINE TO BERLIN. OUR REITERATION

OF SLOGANS SUCH AS "ELASTICITY" AND "NEW APPROACHES" SEEMED LESS A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH THAN A PANICKY REACTION TO A SOVIET MENACE.

THE IMPRESSION WAS THAT WE HAVE NEITHER A NEW POLICY NOR THE STRENGTH TO STAND BY OUR PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS.

IT IS POSSIBLE TO SHARE EUROPEAN DISMAY AT OUR UNIMAGINATIVE POLICY OF THE PAST SIX YEARS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WE HAVE DEFINED OUR POSITION MORE BY WHAT WE OPPOSE THAN BY WHAT WE STAND FOR, THAT EVERY SOVIET INITIATIVE HAS DRAWN WESTERN ENERGIES INTO ESSENTIALLY STERILE, DEFENSIVE COUNTERMOVES. NEITHER GERMAN UNITY NOR EUROPEAN SECURITY NOR THE PROBLEMS OF THE EMERGENT NATIONS HAVE EVOKED A DYN-

AMIC AND CONSISTENT AMERICAN RESPONSE. WE SEEM TO BE PRISONERS OF CIRCUMSTANCES RATHER THAN THEIR CREATORS.

THE EUROPEAN ALLIES WOULD VERY LIKELY INTERPRET ANY BASIC SHIFT IN OUR POLICY AS A SIGN OF AMERICAN VACILLATION UNDER STRESS. TAKE SUCH PROPOSALS AS THE SUBSTITUTION OF GERMAN TROOPS FOR THOSE OF THE

WEST IN BERLIN, DISANGAGEMENT, OR THE RAPACI PLAN FOR A NEUTRAL ZONE IN MIDDLE EUROPE. THEIR COMMON FEATURE IS THAT EACH OF THEM BECAME A SUBJECT OF INTENSE CONTROVERSY ONLY AFTER THE SOVIET THREAT TO BERLIN.

AND EACH OF THEM WOULD INVOLVE SOME WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN FORCES AT A TIME OF INTENSE SOVIET PRESSURE. IF SERIOUS DOUBTS ALREADY EXIST ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO HONOR OUR COMMITMENTS --- AT A TIME WHEN UNITED STATES FORCES ARE IN THE DIRECT LINE OF A SOVIET ADVANCE --- A WITHDRAWAL VXMMXXXMZZZZZZZZ OF THESE FORCES IN FACE OF WHAT EUROPEANS CONSIDER A SOVIET ULTIMATUM WOULD INEVITABLY BE CONSIDERED AS A UNITED STATES BACKDOWN.

BECAUSE THE EUROPEANS DOUBT OUR STEADINESS AND RELIABILITY, THE REPEATED DECLARATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL STAND FIRM ON BERLIN HAVE PROVED RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE, TO BE SURE, OUR ALLIES ARE REASONABLY CONFIDENT OF OUR READINESS TO DEFEND BERLIN AGAINST MILITARY ATTACK; BUT THEY QUESTION WHETHER WE WILL RESIST OTHER PRESSURES, MORE SUBTLE, BUT JUST AS DANGEROUS.

WHAT, THEN, CAN BE DONE TO REESTABLISH ALLIED UNITY? WHAT CAN WE DO? OUR most immediate task must be to strengthen the联盟 in the Western allies. NO WE SHOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT WE ARE A RELIABLE PARTNER IN TIME OF STRESS. EXCESSIVE ELASTICITY WILL EARN US NOT CREDIT FOR STATESMANSHIP BUT OPPROBRIUM FOR WEAKNESS. ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT WE SUCCEED IN RESTORING CONFIDENCE CAN WE undertake the REEXAMINATION OF WESTERN POLICY DEMANDED TO FREQUENTLY BUT SPECIFIED SO RARELY, WHILE MANY OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES ARE UNEASY ABOUT OUR COURSE, THEY HAVE NO CLEAR PROGRAM OF THEIR OWN. INDEED THE ABSENCE OF ANY DEFINITE WESTERN POLICY IS ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THEIR UNEASINESS. THIS LEADS TO A DEMOCRALIZING SITUATION; SOME OF OUR ALLIES DEVELOP PROPOSALS IN WHICH THEY DO NOT FULLY BELIEVE IN RESPONSE TO WHAT THEY TAKE TO BE AMERICAN DESIRES.

THE MOST CRUCIAL TASK BEFORE THE WEST IS THEREFORE TO GET ITS
OWN HOUSE IN ORDER. THE CHALLENGE IS NOT JUST TO DEVISE A HURRIED
PROPOSAL TO MEET A SOVIET DEADLINE; IT IS MORE COMPLICATED THAN THAT.
WE MUST NOT DELUDE OURSELVES THAT A NEGOTIATING POSITION CAN
REMEDY THE LASSITUDE OF NEARLY A DECADE OR THAT CLEVER BARGAINING
CAN SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EFFORT AND DEDICATION THAT HAVE BEEN LACKING
HERETOFORE.

(IF WE BEHAVE IMAGINATIVELY, AS IN THE DAYS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN
AND THE GREEK-TURKISH AID PROGRAM, WE CAN LAY THE BASIS FOR A NEW
ERA OF EVER DEEPER WESTERN COOPERATION, NOT ONLY IN NOR SHOULD THIS COOPERATION
BE CONFIRMED TO EUROPE. THE FAR EAST, THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA AND
LATIN AMERICAN ALL REQUIRE "NEW APPROACHES." BUT THE AREA UNDER
ATTACK -- BERLIN -- IS HARDLY THE PLACE TO PROVE OUR FLEXIBILITY.)

WHILE IT IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS ARTICLE TO DEVELOP A DETAILED
PROGRAM, SOME GENERAL GUIDELINES CAN BE SKETCHED:

THE BERLIN ISSUE. FREE ACCESS TO BERLIN WILL BE THE TOUCHSTONE
OF ALL OTHER MEASURES. IF THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS INITIATED BY THE
SOVIET THREAT ENDS WITH WHAT IS INTERPRETED BY OUR ALLIES AS AN
AMERICAN DEFEAT OR WITHDRAWAL, IT WILL PROVE NO STRONGER THAN THE
FRENCH SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD.

TO SAY THAT WE WILL BE FIRM ON BERLIN IS NOT A POLICY. OUR
TASK IS TO GIVE THIS TERM CONCRETE CONTENT. WE SHOULD MAKE SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS DEFINING A GUARANTEE OF FREE ACCESS, TO BE GIVEN EITHER
BY THE SOVIETS OR BY A FOUR POWER COMMISSION OR BY THE UNITED NATIONS.
WITH SUCH A GUARANTEE, IT WOULD MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE WHETHER
RUSSIANS OR EAST GERMANS MAN THE CHECKPOINTS. BUT IN THE ABSENCE
OF SUCH AN ASSURANCE WE CANNOT ALLOW THE EAST GERMANS TO AGIT AS
SOVIET AGENTS. TO DO SO WOULD APPEAR TO OUR CONTINENTAL ALLIES AS
A SURRENDER.

NEGOTIATING TACTIS. RIGIDITY IS SURELY NOT HELPFUL.
BUT NEITHER IS FLEXIBILITY AN END IN ITSELF. THERE ARE SOME PRINCIPLES
AND POSITIONS WE CANNOT YIELD WITHOUT GIVING UP WHAT WE STAND FOR.
THERE ARE OTHERS WHICH LEND THEMSELVES TO COMPROMISE. DURING
SUEZ IT WAS SAID THAT WE MUST UPHOLD OUR PRINCIPLES EVEN AGAINST
OUR ALLIES. YET WE MUST NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WILL UPHOLD

THEM ONLY AGAINST OUR ALLIES.

IT IS DANGEROUS TO PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO DEFINE ALL ISSUES AND TO WITHDRAW TOPICS FROM NEGOTIATIONS SIMPLY BY DECLARING THEM INSOLUBLE-- MAS MOSCOW MIGHT DO ON THE ISSUE OF FREE ELECTIONS FOR GERMANY (I HAVE ALWAYS FAVORED INTERMEDIATE STAGES SUCH AS AS FREE ELECTIONS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL AS A FIRST STEP). TO DO IS TO REWARD SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE.

IF WE ADMIT THAT THE WEST HAS AN OBLIGATION TO BREAK ANY DEADLOCK WITH NEW PROPOSALS, WE SHALL ENCOURAGE SOVIET OBSTINACY, FOR WE WILL NURTURE THE BELIEF THAT IF SOVIET NEGOTIATORS HOLD OUT LONG ENOUGH THEY WILL ELICIT EVER MORE FAVORABLE WESTERN OFFERS. IN SHORT, THE WEST REQUIRES A SENSE OF DIRECTION MORE THAN NEGOTIATING SKILL. ONLY THE PURPOSEFUL CAN BE FLEXIBLE.

WESTERN COHESION. THE WESTERN POWERS SHOULD NOT CONFINE THEMSELVES TO ISSUES RAISED BY THE SOVIET UNION; THEY SHOULD ACT BOLDLY TO STRENGTHEN UNITY AMONG THEMSELVES. IN PARTICULAR, THIS TIME SEEMS OPPORTUNE TO MAKE ANOTHER LARGE ADVANCE TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY. TO THE EXTENT THAT WESTERN EUROPE CONSIDERS ITSELF A POLITICAL UNIT, ITS POLICY WILL GAIN IN ASSURANCE.

FOR EXAMPLE, WE SHOULD USE THIS CRISIS TO ENCOURAGE CREATION OF A WEST EUROPEAN ATOMIC FORCE. THE WEST COULD THEN NEGOTIATE MUCH MORE FLEXIBLY ABOUT THE PRICES LOCATION OF ARMS. THEN ANY THREATENED MEMBER MIGHT FEEL PROTECTED BY THE VOICE IT HAS IN THE CONTROL OF THE OVER-ALL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. SUCH A FORCE WOULD SO BE THE BEST, AND PROBABLY THE ONLY, MEANS TO PREVENT PROFILERATION OF NATIONAL ATOMIC FORCES, WHICH IS ALMOST INEVITABLE IF PRESENT TRENDS CONTINUE.

T TOWARDS A LARGER EUROPE. WE SHOULD PUSH THE CONCEPT OF A GREATER EUROPE OPEN TO THE SOVIET SATELLITES. THIS WOULD HAVE PARTICULAR EFFECT IN THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL FIELD, AND DEREIGNMENT THERE ARE OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR INITIATIVE IN THE STRATEGIC AREAS. AS WELL, NATO COULD IMMEDIATELY GIVE POLAND A MILITARY GUARANTEE OF THE ORDERNESS LINE, ITS POSTWAR BOUNDARY, AGAINST GERMAN AGGRESSION. SUCH A MOVE WOULD LESSEN THE SOVIET ABILITY TO CONTROL POLAND THROUGH ITS FEAR OF GERMANY. THE ADVANCED THIS IDEA IN MANY PUBLIC TALKS IN GERMANY AND ENCOUNTERED OPPOSITION.

X X X

THESE IDEAS INDICATE A DIRECTION AND NOT A PROGRAM. NOTHING IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, WITHOUT A MORE DYNAMIC CONCEPTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD. FOR TOO LONG, WE HAVE TREATED OUR PROBLEMS AS TECHNICAL ONES; WE HAVE CONCENTRATED TOO MUCH OF OUR THOUGHT ON HOW WE COULD MAKE THE LEAST POSSIBLE EFFORT.

OUR MILITARY PROGRAM IS INADEQUATE; CONTINUED AT ITS PRESENT SCALE IT WILL DOOM OUR DIPLOMACY TO FUTILITY BY CREATING CONSTANT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOVIET PRESSURE WHILE REDUCING THE MEANS TO RESIST THEM. OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM, BOTH DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, IS TOO TENTATIVE AND TOO CONSCIOUS OF THE OBSERVACITIES IN THE PATH. OUR DIPLOMACY LACKS DYNAMISM.

WE ARE LIVING THROUGH A PERIOD WHICH, IN RESTROSPECT, WILL UNDOUBTEDLY APPEAR TO BE ONE OF THE GREAT REVOLUTIONS OF HISTORY. WE CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM IT; WE CAN ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO SHAPING IT CONSTRUCTIVELY. THE GREAT CHALLENGE OF OUR TIME IS THAT THE SELF-SUFFICIENT NATION-STATE IS BREAKING DOWN. NO NATION --- NOT EVEN THE LARGEST--- CAN CURVIVE IN ISOLATION OR REALIZE ITS POTENTIALITIES, MATERIAL OR SPIRITUAL, BY ITSELF.

WE OF THE WEST, WHO BEQUEATHED THE CONCEPT OF NATIONALISM TO OTHERS, MUST SHOW THE WAY TO A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER BY INITIATIVE IN SETTING OUR OWN HOUSE IN ORDER AND BY IMAGINATION IN HELPING THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES TO REALIZE THEIR ASPIRATIONS. VACILLATING POLICIES WILL PROVE DISASTROUS TO EVERYBODY. THE WEST MUST RAISE ITS SIGHTS; IT MUST DEVELOP POLICIES WHICH WILL MAKE OF IT A TRUE COMMUNITY.

END BERGMAN NY FEB 25

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