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Should the conference fail, as is likely, EDC and the cold war could be resumed in a much healthier political climate. The very fact of failure of a Four-Power meeting of the "one last chance" so ardently demanded by so many Europeans would lead to an intensification of the cold war. The Soviet threat would be more patent, the risk of disarmament more clear. We should not be afraid of our own opportunities nor be mesmerized by the moves of an antagonist who may well be afraid to face the consequences of his own proposals.

Henry A. Kissinger

June 3, 1953

# THE SOVIET PEACE OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN UNITY

## A. The Problem

The Soviet peace offensive has brought to a head the tensions long dormant within the Western Alliance. It would be a mistake to assume that the slow progress of NATO or the almost hysterical reaction to Churchill's speech on both sides of the Atlantic are isolated phenomena caused by specific Soviet measures, to be combatted by conciliatory statements or legally correct replies. Rather they reflect a crisis in U.S. national strategy: they are a symptom of the frustration evoked by two solid, rigid fronts confronting each other across an Iron Curtain, in a contest that seems to many of our Allies both endless and sterile. The result has been the absorption of much of U.S. energy in a form of diplomatic civil war, the holding in line of our Allies, rather than the reduction of strength of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

The state of mind of our Allies is not, of course, the fault of the U.S. but its existence must be taken into account. By acting with a rationalistic matter-of-factness which assumed that the recognition of a problem was tantamount to its solution and that a certain level of military strength in Europe depended entirely on U.S. policy, we have gradually helped bring about the present impasse: The governments of our Allies knowing the economic facts of life formally agree to U.S. proposals; but this very act of agreement has made them tend to lose domestic support leading to the paradoxical situation that present-day foreign ministers enjoy considerable popularity in all countries save their own.

Communist strategy has thus had a deceptively easy task. Since the U.S. coalition effort was justified by a threat which was not felt as such by the public opinion of our Allies, Soviet "peace offensives" have had a fertile ground for cheap victories. U.S. pressure could be represented to seem almost as pervasive as that of the U.S.S.R. and U.S. intransigence has become the shibboleth of the very people who would blanch at the prospect of being left alone in Europe with the U.S.S.R. U.S. strategy had in fact put the cart before the horse: It had assumed Soviet bad faith and intransigence and had conceived its task as primarily technical: the creation of an adequate defense force. But in fact the problem proved primarily psychological: the bringing about of a psychological climate which would support such a force. A diplomatic offensive designed continuously to demonstrate Soviet intransigence would have taken the wind out of the sails of our socialist and nationalist opponents who, it should be added in all fairness, often are not creating distrust of the U.S. but exploiting it.¹ Titoism,

1) The best way to make haste with a European defense force might have been to move slowly: to assuage French fear of Germany by giving priority to the build-up of France, by making a German army conditional on a German request and thus utilizing the Franco-German rivalry to stimulate rearmament; by holding another Four-Power Conference regarding German unification.

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as a phenomenon of the cold war, is not confined to the Soviet side but makes its appearance in the West as well. The real danger to the U.S. system of alliances may well be not communism but a reverse Titoism — nationalist governments who to prove their independence of the U.S. will lean increasingly on the U.S.S.R.

## B. General Considerations for a U.S. Strategy

The above has been an effort not to assess blame, but to define the conditions within which U.S. strategic thinking must take place. It may be best to begin with two truisms: (1.) U.S. strategy should have as its primary object not relationships with our Allies but the struggle with the U.S.S.R. or at least Allied relationships only as an incident of East-West relations. To the extent that U.S. energy is absorbed in maintaining our relations with the rest of the Western World, U.S. policy must be defensive and Soviet policy obtains freedom of action. Indeed, Allied relationships are soluble only as part of a larger framework. By shifting the emphasis on Soviet-Western relations, the U.S. can solidify its alliance and perhaps bring about a reduction of the Soviet sphere. (2.) East-West relations should not be conceived in terms of a certain level of military strength on the Soviet periphery, rather in that of the total power balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This would enable the U.S. to establish the proper priorities: a diplomatic effort to create the psychological climate and a military effort only as its consequence.

Many observers have studied the ideological causes of the East-West tension; the Soviet fear of capitalist encirclement and the quest for absolute security; the fact that absolute security for the U.S.S.R. and its satellites is obtainable only at the cost of absolute insecurity for everybody else. But if the ideological cause provided the impetus, it had a geopolitical expression: In relation to the Eurasian continent, the U.S. is in the position of Great Britain to the Continent in the 19th century. It is an island power with inferior resources, at present only in manpower but in time even in industrial capacity. Therefore, the U.S. cannot permit the consolidation of the Eurasian continent under the domination or control of one power whatever its form of government, at least under present conditions of national sovereignty. More, in order to conserve its own resources, U.S. strategy should attempt to create a balance of force on the Eurasian continent. This means that the Soviet sphere can under no circumstances be permitted to expand -- in fact, it should be reduced, for the consolidation of a Chinese-Soviet-East European satellite bloc must in time present mortal dangers to the security of the U.S.

One must first discuss what is implied by a reduction of the Soviet sphere. Two possibilities present themselves -- a reduction of the core of the Soviet bloc, the U.S.S.R. itself; or a split between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites including China. The former alternative involves war and will presumably not be considered. This leaves the second possibility. It would be pat and trite to predict the precise conditions of a possible break between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites or even to guarantee its possibility. It may be possible to outline the general framework in which it may occur:

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The satellites represent an accretion to Soviet strength only if they do not merely absorb Soviet power in an effort to hold them down. If the satellites do not in their majority become more or less willing allies, they will represent a drain on Soviet strength and in those circumstances the U.S.S.R. may prefer to let them shift for themselves. But the most effective bond in a totalitarian society is ideological conformity. Indeed, Russian interference from the Elbe to the Yalu could hardly be legitimized on a nationalistic basis. U.S. strategy should therefore not permit the U.S.S.R. to ride two horses at the same time -- the nationalist in its appeal to European neutralism and the ideological in relation to its satellites. Put in another way, U.S. strategy should attempt to demonstrate the incompatibility of the ideological and the nationalist motivation of Soviet policy; or if there has been a change in the nationalist direction within the Soviet Union to accelerate it, to take away its options, to commit it decisively. This is not a purely propagandistic task. Little will be gained by a largely verbal analysis of logical inconsistencies. Rather the U.S. effort should be to force the Soviet policy into one or the other direction, to make its commitment less indeterminate. If then the ideological element should triumph, we will be able to continue the cold war during a period of internal consolidation for the U.S.S.R. having at the same time rallied our Allies. If the nationalist element should win out we might restore fluidity to the situation and reduce the Soviet sphere at least in Europe.

But what inducement can there be for the Soviet Union to relax its pressures on the satellites and to adopt a nationalist line? There are two: one negative, the other positive. The U.S.S.R. must be made to realize that a continuation of the cold war, and even more its intensification, will lead to a hot war. And the Soviet Union must be made to feel secure within its own territories, for no Soviet relaxation is possible as long as she conceives the present period as but a prelude to an inevitable war. We should attempt to demonstrate to the present Soviet leadership that inflexible intransigence assures not security, but disaster, that a continuation of the policy of the post-war period must bring about the very things they fear most: a mortal struggle for the very existence of the Soviet state and on a world-wide scale. By moderation where we have the upper hand and unyielding perseverance under pressure, the U.S. may be able to build the bridges to lead or to force the Soviet Union into a more conciliatory attitude -- (a very moderate peace offer after Inchon would have been worth much). But it cannot be repeated too often, a conciliatory attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R. which is permitted to remain largely formal is more dangerous than a continuation of the cold war. By relaxing the pressure and leaving the Soviet Union in unchallenged possession of its sphere, it permits the completion of the internal consolidation and leaves the ultimate choice of policy and its timing in the hands of the Soviet leaders. Thus the U.S.S.R. would obtain at little or no cost its maximum objective -- gaining time and disrupting the U.S. system of alliances.

The present moment seems particularly auspicious for a major diplomatic effort. The transfer of power in a dictatorship is never a simple matter. Even if the transfer of the organs of power is handled smoothly, the creation of a new principle of legitimacy remains difficult for the new regime must prove its ability to govern and its function. The very concentration of power in dictatorship makes it psychologically most unlikely that any prior arrangement can provide the machinery for the solution of a real conflict of

["arrangement can provide the means for the solution of a real conflict of\ndivided 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割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割割

opinion, partly because of the omnipresence of the still living dictator, partly because of the impossibility of predicting the nature of all contingencies. Thus the Soviet leadership needs a period of peace to consolidate itself; it can hardly establish itself and fight a war at the same time. In fact, its domestic "legitimacy" may well be its ability to bring peace and to raise the standard of living. But what if Soviet leadership is "sincere"? What if it has had a real change of heart? It is difficult to determine what sincerity means when security and ideology command such parallel courses. It is doubtful if the Soviet leadership itself knows how "sincere" it is. In any case, the U.S. strategic problem in the short run will remain unaffected for the reasons stated above. We must prevent any further extension of the Soviet sphere; we must attempt to reduce it. If Soviet leadership is still motivated by Stalinist ideology, we should not give it a breathing space and if the Soviet Union is withdrawing to a more national base, this is not too early to test it.

U.S. strategy is thus confronted with a great opportunity: We can at once reverse the tide within our Alliance and increase the pressure on the U.S.S.R. by boldly capturing the peace offensive. By reducing the peace offensive to concrete terms, we can explode the myth of U.S. intransigence among our Allies; we can create a series of contingencies for Soviet leadership which may increase internal tension; we may restore fluidity to the international situation; we may be able to take first steps in reducing the Soviet sphere.

### C. Measures of U.S. Strategy

The U.S. strategic problem can be summarized as four-fold: (a) to restore the vitality of its system of alliances, (b) to demonstrate, insofar as this is possible, that the U.S. has no designs on the territory of the U.S.S.R. proper, (c) to attempt to restore fluidity to the international situation, (d) to reduce the Soviet sphere.

It would seem that a Four-Power meeting, called by the U.S. for any point outside the U.S.S.R. would be a useful initial step. The reception of Churchill's speech, the fact that even the Vatican found it necessary to associate itself with a proposal for international conferences shows the strength of popular feeling among our Allies in this respect. The U.S. should therefore demonstrate by a series of acts, concrete and simple enough to be able to become symbols, that the widespread belief in U.S. intransigence is unjustified. The justice of that belief is not at issue here, its existence is a fact to be reckoned with.

The membership of a meeting will represent a problem. If at all possible, France should be invited but the U.S. should refuse Chinese participation by insisting that Far Eastern problems are to be dealt with at the Far Eastern conference in any case. The Soviet Union would then confront the dilemma of wrecking the conference or of excluding China. The best method of achieving a Four-Power meeting would be to confine the agenda primarily to European problems.

What specific issues could constitute the agenda of such a meeting? If as stated above it should be the U.S. objective to create a series of contingencies which may maximize dissension between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites as well as internal dissension within the U.S.S.R., Germany would seem to provide the best issue. It is a problem which we will have to face sooner or later in any case

Issue. It is a problem which we will have to face sooner or later in any case
internal dissension within the U.2.A.R., Germany would seem to provide the best
which may maximize dissension between the U.2.A.R. and its satellites as well as
stated above it enough to the U.2. objective to create a series of contingencies
What specific issues could constitute the agenda of such a meeting? It as

a foreign-power meeting would be to continue the agenda primarily to European problems, wrecking the conference or of excluding Communists. The best method of solving
conference in any case. The Soviet Union would then confront the issue of
instating that the Western problems are to be dealt with at the foreign
Europe should be invited but the U.2. should refuse Chinese participation by
The membership of a meeting will represent a problem. It at all least
of that problem is not at issue here, its existence is a fact to be reasoned with,
that the widespread problem in U.2. intransigence is unmitigated. The justice
by a series of acts, concrete and simple enough to be able to become amenable,
relating among our peoples in this respect. The U.2. should therefore demonstrate
with a proposal for international conference should the strength of belligerent
 states, the fact that even the Soviet Union itself necessarily to associate itself
 outside the U.2.A.R. would be a useful initial step. The reception of Communists
 would seem that a foreign-power meeting, called by the U.2. for any point
 the Soviet sphere.

(c) to attempt to restore flexibility to the international situation, (d) to reduce

decisive, that the U.2. may no longer be the territory of the U.2.A.R. broken,
the validity of its system of alliances, (e) to demonstrate, instead as this is
The U.2. strategic problem can be summarized as four-fold: (a) to restore
the Soviet sphere.

O. Measures of U.2. Strategy

sphere.

international situation; we may be able to take first steps in reducing the Soviet
which may increase internal tension; we may restore flexibility to the intern-
ernally among our peoples; we can create a series of contingencies for Soviet leadership
offensive to concrete terms, we can exclude the main of U.2. intransigence
U.2.A.R. by effectively capturing the balance offensive. By reducing the balance
once revenue the trade within our Alliance and increase the presence on the
U.2. strategy is thus confronted with a great opportunity: We can at
Union is withdrawing to a more national degree, this is not too early to test it.
Statistat ideology, we should not give it a preexisting space and if the Soviet
must attempt to reduce it. It Soviet leadership is still motivated by
stated above. We must prevent and further extension of the Soviet sphere; we
U.2. strategic problem in the short run will remain unmetted for the reasons
it the Soviet leadership itself knows how "sincere" it is. In such case, the
reason when security and ideology command such benefit comes. It is根本
it has had a real change of heart? It is difficult to determine what sincerity
standard of living. But what if Soviet leadership is "sincere"? What if it
domestic "rightism" may well be its ability to bring peace and to raise the
can permanently eternally itself and light a war at the same time. In fact, its
time the Soviet leadership needs a period of peace to consolidate itself; it
bitterly because of the inaccessibility of precluding the nature of all contingencies
opinion, bitterly because of the omnipresence of the still living logic.

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whenever the Soviet Union chooses. Indeed, the fact that the U.S.S.R. has not yet done so might indicate that German unity is less to be feared by us than by the U.S.S.R. The U.S. should therefore propose the conclusion of a treaty of peace and all-German elections. But there is no chance of the U.S.S.R. agreeing to this without some prospect of security against future German attack, whether as a real fear or as a propaganda move to frighten its satellites. The U.S. together with its Allies should therefore offer the most solemn guarantees, either in the form of a Locarno-type treaty or in the form of Byrnes' proposal of a treaty of alliance for whatever boundaries a peace conference decided and -- if necessary -- Germany's present Eastern boundaries. This might also assuage French fears. And in order to achieve the objective of making the Soviet Union feel secure within its frontiers, the U.S. should propose a Four-Power guarantee of each other's boundaries. If a settlement of Germany proves possible, an Austrian peace treaty will follow almost automatically. If not, an Austrian peace treaty would be of doubtful utility.

To be sure, German unity has its dangers. But by refusing to tackle it, we are yielding to Russia the fruits of its advocacy without the danger of its accomplishment. Without doubt, all-German elections would postpone EDC, but EDC stands little prospect of ratification in any case and a Four-Power conference might be an honorable way out. It would leave the way clear, moreover, for building up France and France confronted by a unified Germany might well clamor for U.S. assistance. We should not be too squeamish about the motivations behind rearmament. Cannons, after all, do not know the motives that build them, only the enemy at which they are directed. French cannons will be none the less serviceable against the U.S.S.R. for having been built out of fear of Germany. Conversely, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops would provide an added incentive for the rearmament of a unified Germany.

It may be objected that a unified Germany would be paralyzed by fear of the Soviet armies at the Oder. This hardly seems likely. The certainty of being overwhelmed at the First blow has not prevented West Berlin from openly defying the Soviet Union. A unified Germany, with increasing self-confidence and industrial potential, with a bloc of refugees and millions who have had direct experience of Soviet rule, can be expected to exert all its strength to avoid a repetition. Soviet armies on the Elbe have not prevented the re-armament of Western Germany. In fact, Socialist opposition is based primarily on the fear that rearmament now would make unity impossible. A sovereign, unified Germany could not be kept unarmed, if we chose. It will require only a permission not an incentive to rearm itself. EDC might then be resurrected not as an American policy but in response to European requests.

This arrangement of a collective guarantee but an initial defense by substantial indigenous forces would also reflect the realities of the strategic situation. It would formalize the political objective of the U.S. -- that any expansion of the Soviet sphere would be a cause for a major war with the U.S. But it would also leave the U.S. free to choose the theater of conflict for the maximum strategic advantage and this will depend at least in part on the availability

1) Because of the Soviet Union's sensitivity to Locarno as a symbol, this proposal should retain the substance without the form of that pact.

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of allies. Europeans have long maintained that for them the crucial victory is not the last but the first — that they cannot again survive a foreign occupation. If this is true, a sufficient incentive exists for European rearmament, backed by a U.S. guarantee.

There are other objections to a Four-Power meeting: the effect of a conference as assisting the stability of the Soviet regime; the relationship of the conference to NATO and the UN; the danger to the Western defense effort. But, aside from the fact that great gains are never achieved without risks, the objections are not convincing: The Soviet leadership has never depended for its legitimization on foreign approbation; NATO need not be affected although EDC would be postponed and Western rearmament would be spurred rather than delayed.

But, in any case, the possible delay in a rearmament program distinguished primarily by paper plans would be more than outweighed by substantial advantages. These fall into two groups: advantages produced by the very fact of a U.S. initiative in concrete terms and advantages obtained should the Soviet Union agree to the U.S. proposals.

The following gains would be achieved by a U.S. proposal for calling a Four-Power meeting:

(a) It would provide a symbol of U.S. peaceful intentions and in case of rejection by the U.S.S.R. of Soviet intransigence.

(b) It would explode the myth of U.S. belligerence and would rally our Allies. All the advantages of Churchill's speech might accrue to such an effort.

(c) The intelligence potential would be considerable. It would enable the U.S. to form some estimate of the real Soviet leadership. It would provide an answer to an interesting question: Would Malenkov dare to leave the U.S.S.R. without taking all his competitors with him?

(d) The preparation for a Four-Power meeting might increase internal dissension in the Soviet leadership. We should, in any case, force them to move at our speed, not at theirs.

(e) The effect on China of a Four-Power meeting sacrificing a Soviet satellite might be profound, particularly if a subsequent Asian conference should prove unproductive.

(f) This distrust may be reinforced by putting on the agenda a mutual guarantee of each other's boundaries by the Four Powers, but excluding China.

(g) If the conference failed, its very failure would provide the psychological basis for extended military preparations.

The following advantages would result from a Soviet agreement to all or a substantial part of the proposals outlined above:

essential part of the proposal outlined above:

(a) The following advantages would result from a Soviet agreement to sign or a separate for extended military preparations.

(b) It is the conference's task, its very nature, would provide the necessary conditions for each other's negotiations with the Soviet Powers, put excusing China.

(c) This disorder may be reinforced by putting on the agenda a mutual guarantee without problem, basically if a separate Vietnam conference should prove unprospective.

(d) The effect on China of a Soviet-Power meeting surrounding a Soviet satellite not at present.

(e) In the Soviet leadership. We should, in our case, force them to move at our speed.

(f) The preparation for a Soviet-Power meeting might increase internal discussion without taking all its competitors with him.

 answer to an interesting question: Would Malenkov dare to leave the U.2.2.8.

(g) The intelligence potential would be considerable. It would enable the U.2. to form some estimate of the real Soviet leadership. It would provide an

(h) The advantages of Chourolli's speech might accrue to our effort.

(i) It would provide a sample of U.2. peaceful intentions and in case of rejection by the U.2.2.8. of Soviet intelligence.

(j) It would provide a sample of U.2. peaceful intentions and in case of

Soviet-Power meeting:

The following gains would be achieved by a U.2. proposal for calling a

agree to the U.2. proposals. initiative in concrete terms and advantages obtained should the Soviet Union these still into the groups: advantages produced by the very fact of a U.2. directly by paper gains would be more than outweighed by substantial advantages. But, in any case, the possible delay in a settlement program might be

strongly hindered. It would be postponed and Western settlement would be shunned rather for its legitimization on foreign appropriation: NATO need not be affected

the objections are not convincing: The Soviet leadership has never depended on the conference to NATO and the UN; the danger to the Western defense effort. conference as existing the stability of the Soviet regime; the relationship

There are often objections to a Soviet-Power meeting: the effect of a

settlement,迫迫性,如 U.2. guarantee. in the case it is true, an sufficient incentive exists for European cooperation. It is true that they cannot again survive a foreign policy.

-C-

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(a) It would be the first roll-back of Soviet power anywhere in Eurasia where Communism had been entrenched. To be sure, it is only a roll-back of some 100 miles. But on the small European scale 100 miles are not inconsequential. Europe divided along the Oder would resume a more familiar aspect and thus strengthen European morale. The myth of Soviet all-pervasiveness would be shaken.

(b) It would represent the sacrifice of a satellite government. The psychological effect of this on the remaining satellites cannot be over-emphasized, all the more so since there can be no doubt about the fate of the present East-German government. A free election would return triumphant pro-Western majorites. Moreover, the Socialists of the Eastern zone, with a direct experience of Soviet rule, will provide a useful counter-weight to the more narrow nationalism of their Western brethren. It is not unreasonable to expect that the personal fate of many East-zone functionaries would poison Soviet-German relations for many years.

(c) A unified Germany and a liberated Austria will exert a tremendous pressure on Czechoslovakia. We should not forget that although a Soviet army on the Oder is only 75 miles from Berlin, a pro-Western Army in Germany is only 50 miles from Prague and in Austria only 15 miles from Bratislava.

(d) A unified Germany would reduce the pressure for markets for West German industry. The impoverishment of the East Zone should provide a market for consumer goods at least over the short run.

(e) The pressure on the other satellites already affected by Yugoslavia would be substantial. To be sure, the Soviet Union may be able to keep them in line by force. But if a Four-Power meeting should guarantee Russia's western boundaries, the U.S.S.R. may not consider it worthwhile to diffuse its power on its periphery, particularly in the Balkans.

The list of arguments could be continued on both sides but the essential argument can be summarized into four propositions: (1) A Four-Power meeting would reverse the psychological current *within* the Western Alliance. (2) A unified Germany outweighs NDC. It would reverse the *real* strategic balance of which rearmament is only a reflection. A unified Germany cannot long remain disarmed. (3) A Four-Power meeting might increase Soviet dissensions internally as well as in its relation with the satellites. (4) A Four-Power guarantee of their boundaries and a special one for Germany might help bring about the Soviet trend towards a more narrowly nationalist policy.

All this is based on the assumption that the U.S.S.R. would accept both a Four-Power conference and an agenda substantially as proposed in this paper. This seems more than unlikely, however. The rigidity of a dictatorship probably does not permit as radical a change of policy as the one proposed in this paper. The incentive to the U.S.S.R. would be two-fold: a four-power guarantee of its boundaries at a potential sacrifice of some of its satellites or an intensified cold war. The question is open: Would the U.S.S.R. fear more accepting or rejecting such a guarantee?

more accepting or rejecting and a guarantee!

or an intangible aid mark. The question is open: Would the U.8.2.R. fear
Guarantee of its pombarie at a potential effort of some of its satellites
date paper. The incentive to the U.8.2.R. would be two-fold: a four-boner
properly goes not permit as radical a change of policy as the one proposed in
this seems more than sufficient, however. The rightsh of a dictatorship
Born-boner conference and an agenda sustainability as proposed in this paper.
VII site is based on the assumption that the U.8.2.R. would accept both a

apart the Soviet trend towards a more narrowly nationalistic policy.
Guarantee of their pombarie and a special one for Germany might help bring
internally as well as in its relation with the satellite. (4) A Born-boner
remains disheartened. (3) A four-boner meeting might increase Soviet tensions
of which reenment is only a reflection. A multiple Germany cannot long
unified Germany outside MCC. It would reverse the real strategic balance
would reverse the belated effect current within the Western Village. (5) A
argument can be summarised into two propositions: (1) A four-boner meeting
the list of arguments could be continued on both sides put the essential
on its basis, particularly in the sense.

Pombaries' the U.8.2.R. wish not consider it worthwhile to diffuse its power
would be insufficient. To be sure, the Soviet Union must be able to keep them in
(2) The presence on the other satellites already affected by the Soviet paper
market for consumer goods at least over the short run.

(3) A multiple Germany would reduce its time the presence for markets for
20 miles from Cologne and in Austria only 12 miles from Bratislava.

on the Oder to only 25 miles from Berlin, a pro-Western Yarm in Germany is only
presence on Gdansk. We should not forget that although a Soviet and
(4) A multiple Germany and a lipenanized Austria will exert a tremendous
German relations for much less.

that the personnel rate of much East-southern functionaries would become Soviet-
far away nationalities of their Western pretends. It is not unreasonable to expect
experience of Soviet men, will provide a nearly counter-weight to the more
Western majorities. Moreover, the socialites of the Eastern zone, with a direct
present East-German government. A free election would return trinominal pro-
subdivided, iff the more so since there can be no doubt about the fate of the
behavioural effect of this on the remaining satellites cannot be over-
(p) It would represent the sacrifice of a satellite government. The
would be spoken.

except and time strengthen Großen more. The map of Soviet air-batteries
increase substantially. Smoke clouded front the Oder would resume a more familiar
pack of some 100 miles. But on the small Großen average 100 miles are not
enough where Communism had been entrenched. To be sure, it is only a few-
(c) It would be the third roll-pack of Soviet power whenever in

-3-

Many observers have studied the ideological causes of the East-West tension; the Soviet fear of capitalist encirclement and the quest for absolute security; the fact that absolute security for the U.S.S.R. and its satellites is obtainable only at the cost of absolute insecurity for everybody else. But if the ideological cause provided the impetus, it had a geopolitical expression: In relation to the Eurasian continent, the U.S. is in the position of Great Britain to the Continent in the 19th century. It is an island power with inferior resources, at present only in manpower but in time even in industrial capacity. Therefore, the U.S. can not permit the consolidation of the Eurasian continent under the domination or control of one power whatever its form of government, at least under present conditions of national sovereignty. More, in order to conserve its own resources, U.S. strategy should attempt to create a balance of force on the Eurasian continent. This means that the Soviet sphere can under no circumstances be permitted to expand — in fact, it should be reduced, for the consolidation of a Chinese-Soviet-East European satellite bloc must in time present mortal dangers to the security of the U.S.

One must first discuss what is implied by a reduction of the Soviet sphere. Two possibilities present themselves — a reduction of the core of the Soviet bloc, the U.S.S.R. itself; or a split between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites including China. The former alternative involves war and will presumably not be considered. This leaves the second possibility. It would be pat and trite to predict the precise conditions of a possible break between the U.S.S.R. and its satellites or even to guarantee its possibility. It may be possible to outline the general framework in which it may occur:

-3-

The satellites represent an accretion to Soviet strength only if they do not merely absorb Soviet power in an effort to hold them down. If the satellites do not in their majority become more of less willing allies, they will represent a drain on Soviet strength and in those circumstances the U.S.S.R. may prefer to let them shift for themselves. But the most effective bond in a totalitarian society is ideological conformity. Indeed, Russian interference from the Elbe to the Yalu could hardly be legitimized on a nationalistic basis. U.S. strategy should therefore not permit the U.S.S.R. to ride two horses at the same time — the nationalist in its appeal to European neutralism and the ideological in relation to its satellites. Put in another way, U.S. strategy should attempt to demonstrate the incompatibility of the ideological and the nationalist motivation of Soviet policy; or if there has been a change in the nationalist direction within the Soviet Union to accelerate it, to take away its options, to commit it decisively. This is not a purely propagandistic task. Little will be gained by a largely verbal analysis of logical inconsistencies. Rather the U.S. effort should be to force the Soviet policy into one or the other direction, to makes its commitment less indeterminate. If then the ideological element should triumph, we will be able to continue the cold war during a period of internal consolidation for the U.S.S.R. having at the same time rallied our Allies. If the nationalist element should win out we might restore fluidity to the situation and reduce the Soviet sphere at least in Europe.

But what inducement can there be for the Soviet Union to relax its pressures on the satellites and to adopt a nationalist line? There are two one negative, the other positive. The U.S.S.R. must be made to realize that a continuation of the cold war, and even more its intensification, will lead to a hot war. And the Soviet Union must be made to feel secure within its own territories, for no Soviet relaxation is possible as long as she conceives the present period as but a prelude to an inevitable war. We should attempt to demonstrate to the present Soviet leadership that inflexible intransigence assures not security, but disaster, that a continuation of the policy of the post-war period must bring about the very things they fear most: a mortal struggle for the very existence of the Soviet state and on a world-wide scale. By moderation where we have the upper hand and unyielding perseverance under pressure, the U.S. may be able to build the bridges to lead or to force the Soviet Union into a more conciliatory attitude — (a very moderate peace offer after Inchon would have been worth much). But it can not be repeated too often, a conciliatory attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R. which is permitted to remain largely formal is more dangerous than a continuation of the cold war. By relaxing the pressure and leaving the Soviet Union in unchallenged possession of its phere, it permits the completion of the internal consolidation and leaves the ultimate choice of policy and its timing in the hands of the Soviet leaders. Thus the U.S.S.R. would obtain at little or no cost its maximum objective — gaining time and disrupting the U.S. system of alliances.

4-

[Y]

opinion, partly because of the omnipresence of the still living dictator, partly because of the impossibility of predicting the nature of all contingencies. Thus the Soviet leadership needs a period of peace to consolidate itself; it can hardly establish itself and fight a war at the same time. In fact, its domestic "legitimacy" may well be its ability to bring peace and to raise the standard of living. But what if Soviet leadership is "sincere"? What if it has had a real change of heart? It is difficult to determine what sincerity means when security and ideology command such parallel courses. It is doubtful if the Soviet leadership itself knows how "sincere" it is. In any case, the U.S. strategic problem in the short run will remain unaffected for the reasons stated above. We must prevent any further extension of the Soviet sphere; we must attempt to reduce it. If Soviet leadership is still motivated by Stalinist ideology, we should not give it a breathing space and if the Soviet Union is withdrawing to a more national base this is not too early to test it.

## C. Measures of U.S. Strategy

The U.S. strategic problem can be summarized as four-fold: (a) to restore the vitality of its system of alliances, (b) to demonstrate, in so far as this is possible, that the U.S. has no designs on the territory of the U.S.S.R. proper, (c) to attempt to restore fluidity to the international situation, (d) to reduce the Soviet sphere.

-5-

[Y]

whenever the Soviet Union chooses. Indeed, the fact that the U.S.S.R. has not yet done so might indicate that German unity is less to be feared by us than by the U.S.S.R. The U.S. should therefore propose the conclusion of a treaty of peace and all-German elections. But there is no chance of the U.S.S.R. agreeing to this without some prospect of security against future German attack, whether as a real fear or as a propaganda move to frighten its satellites. The U.S. together with its Allies should therefore offer the most solemn guarantees, either in the form of a Locarno-type treaty¹ or in the form of Byrnes' proposal of a treaty of alliance for whatever boundaries a peace conference decided and — if necessary — Germany's present Eastern boundaries. This might also assuage French fears. And in order to achieve the objective of making the Soviet Union feel secure within its frontiers, the U.S. should propose a Four-Power guarantee of each other's boundaries. If a settlement of Germany proves possible, an Austrian peace treaty will follow almost automatically. If not, an Austrian peace treaty would be of doubtful utility.

To be sure, German unity has its dangers. But by refusing to tackle it, we are yielding to Russia the fruits of its advocacy without the danger of its accomplishment. Without doubt, all-German elections would postpone EDC, but EDC stands little prospect of ratification in any case and a Four-Power conference might be an honorable way out. It would leave the way clear, moreover, for building up France and France confronted by a unified Germany might well clamor for U.S. assistance. We should not be too squeamish about the motivations behind rearmament. Cannons, after all, do not know the motives that built them, only the enemy at which they are directed. French cannons will be none the less serviceable against the U.S.S.R. for having been built out of fear of Germany. Conversely, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops would provide an added incentive for the rearmament of a unified Germany.

It may be objected that a unified Germany would be paralyzed by fear of the Soviet armies at the Oder. This hardly seems likely. The certainty of being overwhelmed at the first blow has not prevented West Berlin from openly defying the Soviet Union. A unified Germany, with increasing self-confidence and industrial potential, with a bloc of refugees and millions who have had direct experience of Soviet rule, can be expected to exert all its strength to avoid a repetition. Soviet armies on the Elbe have not prevented the re-armament of Western Germany. In fact, Socialist opposition is based primarily on the fear that rearmament now would make unity impossible. A sovereign, unified Germany could not be kept unarmed, if we chose. It will require only a permission not an incentive to rearm itself. EDC might then be resurrected not as an American policy but in response to European requests.

This arrangement of a collective guarantee but an initial defense by substantial indigenous forces would also reflect the realities of the strategic situation. It would formalize the political objective of the U.S. — that any expansion of the Soviet sphere would be a cause for a major war with the U.S. But it would also leave the U.S. free to choose the theater of conflict for the maximum strategic advantage and this will depend at least in part on the availability

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of allies. Europeans have long maintained that for them the crucial victory is not the last but the first — that they can not again survive a foreign occupation. If this is true, a sufficient incentive exists for European rearmament, backed by a U.S. guarantee.

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(b) It would represent the sacrifice of a satellite government. The psychological effect of this on the remaining satellites can not be over-emphasized, all the more so since there can be no doubt about the fate of the present East-German government. A free election would return triumphant pro-Western majorites. Moreover, the Socialists of the Eastern some, with a direct experience of Soviet rule, will provide a useful counter-weight to the more narro nationalism of their Western brethren. It is not unreasonable to expect that the personal fate of many East-zone functionaries would poison Soviet-German relations for many years.

(d) A unified Germany would reduce for a time the pressure for markets for West German industry. The impoverishment of the East Zone should provide a market for consumer goods at least over the short run.

The list of arguments could be continued on both sides but the essential argument can be summarized into four propositions: (1) A Four-Power meeting would reverse the psychological current within the Western Alliance. (2) A unified Germany outweighs EDC. It would reverse the real strategic balance of which rearmament is only a reflection. A unified Germany can not long remain disarmed. (3) A Four-Power meeting might increase Soviet dissensions internally as well as in its relation with the satellites. (4) A Four-Power guarantee of their boundaries and a special one for Germany might help bring about the Soviet trend towards a more narrowly nationalist policy.

All this is based on the assumption that the U.S.S.R. would accept both a Four-Power conference and an agenda substantially as proposed in this paper. This seems more than unlikely, however, The rigidity of a dictatorship probably does not permit as radical a change of policy as the one proposed in this paper. The incentive to the U.S.S.R. would be two-fold: a four-power guarantee of its boundaries at a potential sacrifice of some of its satellites or an intensified cold war. The question is open: Would the U.S.S.R. fear more accepting or rejecting such a guarantee?