172 The Strategic Issues

situations in which the Alliance has already collapsed. But
neither is the MLF, which could be even more easily paralyzed
by a single veto. There is no technical or legal expedient
which can serve as a substitute for political unity or which
could protect the Alliance against failure to achieve it.

Responsible people in the Federal Republic understand
that the Alliance could probably not survive German national
ownership of strategic nuclear weapons. The real test of equal-
ity for the Federal Republic must be in the political field and
in strategic planning. In the long term, the solution to the
nuclear problem requires the fostering of European political
unity and Atlantic cooperation. The most dangerous course
is one which in the name of integrated strategic planning mag-
nifies the divisions within Europe.

Even in the present framework, care must be taken to
assure full political equality to the Federal Republic. Partici-
pation in vital negotiations should not depend on the posses-
sion of a national nuclear arsenal. The Federal Republic
must have a real opportunity to contribute to the formula-
tion of positions in such fields as disarmament while they are-
still fluid. In other words, political unity must precede nu-
clear integration. To seek to reverse the process is to sow the
seeds of unending disputes.

What would be the mission of an Allied Nuclear Force
drawn from national contingents? It would appear that its
most useful role would be deep interdiction, say, from a dis-
tance of some 300 miles behind the combat zone. It would be
important to recognize, however, that effective counterforce
operations against several hundred MRBM's are unlikely.
Whatever its targets, the Allied Nuclear Force should be de-
signed so that it is able to conduct discriminating nuclear
operations according to the principles of "flexible response."

All the weapons suitable for its mission should become
part of the Allied Nuclear Force. It should include major
portions of the British and French national forces and a com-
parable contingent of American strategic weapons, probably

Nuclear Problem - Where Do We Go from Here?

in the form of Polaris submarines. The longer-range nuclear

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here?

123

in the form of Polaris submarines. The longer-range nuclear weapons now in Europe, such as the Pershing missiles and the F-104 airplanes, which are under the double-veto system should also be assigned to this force.

With respect to the MLF, the best course would be to admit frankly that it was a mistake and to satisfy German desires by improving the process of political consultation and by giving the Federal Republic an equal role in the control of the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. But if it appears that the German desire for access to nuclear weapons has been so stimulated as to be irreversible, we may be honor-bound to proceed with a mixed-manned element as a part of the Allied Nuclear Force. However, in that case, the purpose and size of the MLF should be redefined.

In the context of an Allied Nuclear Force, the previous extravagant claims for the MLF could be abandoned. It should no longer be the central focus of United States nuclear policy. There would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant Allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of the mixed-manned element should not be determined by the political objective of dwarfing the British and French nuclear programs but by the military goals of the Allied Nuclear Force.

The Allied Nuclear Force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO Strategic Command. To symbolize a greater European influence in strategic matters, the command could in time be headed by a senior European officer and should be located in Europe. The purpose would be to place in one command all the weapons—European and American—relevant to deep penetration of hostile territory. Tactical nuclear weapons of ranges up to 300 miles would remain under SACEUR.

In bringing such a force into being the United States has

174 The Strategic Issues

obvious interests in insuring that its European components meet certain criteria. The following seem most important: (1) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability. (2) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction. (3) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response. (4) They should be coordinated as part of a common NATO strategy.

Some European Allies will undoubtedly object to the creation of a separate NATO Nuclear Strategic Command. They will see such a command as the first step toward nuclear disengagement. These Allies seem to feel that, since SACEUR is located in Europe, he will be more sensitive to European needs than the President in Washington. But such attitudes are not healthy in the long run.

SACEUR's primary responsibility should be the land battle; he should not be burdened with military or political missions irrelevant to that important and complicated task. From a military point of view, operations that involve large sections of Soviet territory cannot be conducted as an adjunct to ground operations in Europe. SACEUR does not have sufficient information about the over-all strategic context; he will be too preoccupied with conditions within the European theater of operations. Deep penetrations of Soviet territory should be carried out only as part of an over-all plan for general nuclear war. The location of a NATO Strategic Command in Europe could allay concerns that Europe's interests would be neglected; in fact, by giving it the mission to conduct the portion of general nuclear war directly relevant to Europe, a forum for fulfilling Allied needs in the strategic field would be created.

The notion that unfavorable arms control measures can best be prevented by freezing the existing NATO command structure underlines the need for a focal point within the

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 175

Alliance to develop common political objectives. The issue of arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance for many years. It has been evaded because some Allies have

Alliance to develop common political objectives. The issue of
arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance
for many years. It has been evaded because some Allies have
been reluctant to express their fears and others have been
loathe to voice their hopes. The absence of a consensus guar-ntees that the issue will always arise at a moment of
maximum embarrassment. Decisions will be taken by subter-
fuge and under stress. Distrust will grow. A military com-
mander cannot possibly be used to paper over this problem
indefinitely. Its solution must be sought by developing a po-
litical program for the Alliance as a whole.

Within the framework of a newly created NATO Strategic
Command and a corresponding political control body, the
Alliance could finally address itself to the tasks which must be
undertaken rather than spend energy on legalistic debates
about who has a right to do what in circumstances that no
one can describe. With some insurance available for the im-
probable contingency that the United States might interpret
its interest differently from those of Europe, our Allies are
likely to come to conclusions very similar to ours about the
desirability of a strategy which provides multiple options.

Such a system would be more flexible than the MLF. It
would give the existing strategic forces a clearly defined mis-
sion. It would create a structure that France could ultimately
join, if not under its present government, certainly under its
successor. As compared to the MLF, the United States would
sacrifice some measure of physical control, but the Alliance as
a whole would gain in political cohesion. This arrangement
would differ from previous assignments of nuclear forces be-
cause it would include a political mechanism for managing
crises for the Alliance as a whole and because it would create
an explicit Allied doctrine for strategic war.

Such an arrangement provides the greatest flexibility with
respect to the future. If European political integration pro-
gresses, the European contingents in the Allied Nuclear
Force can merge into a European nuclear force. If desired by

176 The Strategic Issues

the European members, the Western European Union could
be given official status in the Allied Nuclear Force from the
beginning. If integration proceeds more slowly the major
Allies can contribute individually to the planning of the
Allied Nuclear Force. In either case, the United States will
remain closely linked to Europe through a structure in which
the Europeans can develop under their own initiative. An
Allied Nuclear Force in which an American contingent is an
integral part and which controlled all the weapons relevant
to its mission would be a better symbol of the indivisibility of
Atlantic interests than an MLF whose strategic role would be,
at best, marginal.

For this to be achieved a change in attitude on both sides
of the Atlantic is needed. The United States would have to
abandon its futile insistence on maintaining physical control
of all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Some of our Allies
would have to stop extolling the theoretical virtues of au-
tonomy and begin dealing with the problem of how autono-
mous nuclear forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We
have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical vir-
tues of "integration." But our Allies—especially the French—
bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs
because they have never spelled out concretely what they
mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and
doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current dis-
putes is far from hopeless. Arguments about the right of in-
dependent action in the nuclear field are acute only when
they are theoretical. Any crisis serious enough to cause the
Allies to consider the use of nuclear weapons is also likely to
reveal the underlying community of interest. It is this com-
munity rather than American physical control which is the
best guarantee of the cohesion of the Alliance.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One of the consequences of the obsession with the MLF has
been that many issues requiring urgent attention have been

177

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 177

swept under the rug in order to maintain the momentum behind the Multilateral Force. One of these problems concerns the role and control of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons have had a checkered history in NATO strategy. They were first introduced into the NATO arsenal in the middle fifties to offset what was then believed to be a permanent numerical superiority of Soviet manpower. As a result, thousands of nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe. They included almost everything from artillery pieces with ranges of about fifteen miles to Pershing missiles with ranges up to 700 miles (in the improved versions). The term tactical was defined to include all weapons placed under the authority of SACEUR even though some of the longer-range weapons would be indistinguishable from those controlled by SAC. From its beginning, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent raised formidable problems of coordination that remained dormant only because the dominant American strategic doctrine predicted that any nuclear war was likely to be massive and all-out.

The advent of the Kennedy Administraton in 1961 changed this. Committed to a strategy of flexible response, the new administration began to evaluate the suitability of the nuclear establishment on the Continent for discriminating military operations. Its conclusions were skeptical: Early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war.³ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no obvious “fire-break” exists short of large scale thermonuclear war.⁴ Secretary McNamara spoke deprecatingly of a limited nuclear war below some “ill-defined threshold of strategic

³Roswell L. Gilpatric, Press Conference on June 6, 1961, *New York Times*, June 7, 1961.

⁴Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," *Survival*, Vol. V, No. 3 (May–June 1963), p. 96.

178 The Strategic Issues

exchange.” These views were given urgency by the problem of exercising political control over the nuclear weapons stationed on the Continent. Controlling a few hundred strategic weapons during military operations is difficult but soluble. Controlling thousands of weapons of many different ranges and characteristics in the confusion of combat is another matter.

At the same time, while skeptical about the utility of much of the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have muted their doubts in order not to complicate further the disputes over the role of the conventional weapons and the MLF. Indeed, tactical nuclear weapons have been used as a means to reassure the Europeans about the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee and to insure German support for the MLF. As a result, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent has been substantially increased since 1961—by some 60 per cent according to Secretary McNamara's announcements. The thousands of nuclear weapons on the Continent thus exist in a shadow land. To many of our Allies, they have become a touchstone of the American commitment, while American planners regard them with extraordinary ambivalence. To build up the tactical nuclear establishment without clarifying its mission would seem to emphasize the worst features of all available options.

The question whether so much reliance should have been placed on tactical nuclear weapons ten years ago must not obscure the need to deal with the current situation, which is dominated by the following facts: (1) On the Continent there exists a large and growing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons without a clearly defined mission. (2) The United States is solemnly committed to maintain this arsenal in Eu-

✓Robert S. McNamara, "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," speech made before the Economics Club of New York, New York City, November 18, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16, 1963), p. 917.

179

rope. (3) The Soviet army is equipped with tactical nuclear weapons; therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to the West. (4) NATO ground forces are inadequate to withstand a full-scale Soviet onslaught. Even the proposed build-up of NATO ground forces to thirty divisions would leave the West numerically inferior to a fully mobilized Soviet army—and this does not take into account the inevitable disadvantage of a coalition when confronting a single state. (5) The tactical nuclear establishment in Europe is extremely vulnerable. Because strategic weapons are relatively secure, fears that they will tempt a disarming, pre-emptive blow are usually exaggerated. But the classic pre-emptive situation does exist with respect to the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe. As now deployed it is capable of inflicting severe damage; it is, in turn, highly vulnerable to a first strike. This may well add to deterrence; at the same time, it increases the probability of escalation should war occur.

There exists yet another inconsistency between NATO's military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon officials have indicated a clear preference for resisting even a major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same time, they have announced repeatedly that if a conventional defeat were imminent, we would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Considering the extreme vulnerability of the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent and the fact that the Soviets would not attack without expecting to win, these two propositions tend to cancel each other out. If there is large-scale aggression—an admittedly improbable contingency—the Soviets have every incentive to seek to neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal by launching an attack against it.

All this suggests that it is imperative to reconsider the mission and deployment of the tactical nuclear arsenal on the Continent. Some argue that all nuclear missions—including the so-called tactical ones—can be performed by the strategic

[L]

180 The Strategic Issues

forces, which are more easily controlled and more suitable for discriminating operations. They maintain that any use of nuclear weapons would bring about so much confusion that the situation in the combat zone would appear relatively unimportant. Finally, some officials have implied that the nuclear arsenal in Europe is militarily unnecessary. Secretary McNamara has on occasion seemed to share this view.

The notion that all tactical missions can be performed by strategic forces must be assessed in terms of three problems: (1) the probability of uncontrolled escalation if battlefield weapons are used, (2) the suitability of strategic forces for tactical operations and (3) the feasibility of conducting nuclear operations confined to a battlefield.

The problem of escalation has two aspects: escalation within the theater of operations and escalation into general war. As long as NATO's tactical nuclear establishment is so vulnerable, the danger of escalation of any military operations within Europe is enormous even if they begin with conventional weapons. The precondition of any effective use of tactical nuclear weapons—as of strategic weapons—is to enhance their invulnerability.

The probability of escalation to general war depends on the vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. If the strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, any use of nuclear weapons is likely to expand very rapidly. In that case, any large-scale military operation—even a conventional one—in an area as vital as Europe would involve risks out of proportion to any conceivable gain. The doctrine of massive retaliation will remain valid.

When retaliatory forces grow increasingly invulnerable, as Secretary McNamara has postulated, the pressures against rapid escalation would probably be great. There may be no logical stopping place once nuclear weapons are being used. There is, however, a very crucial psychological obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great

Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here? 181

181

military advantage, neither side can be very eager to let escalation proceed automatically. Both sides are likely to look for excuses to limit, not expand, military operations.

This is not to say that in case of a full-scale Soviet attack on Europe our responses should be confined to battlefield weapons. On the contrary, there are important reasons for making sure that the Soviets are under no misapprehension that a full-scale attack on Europe could be confined to Europe. If the Soviets have shown a willingness to conquer Europe, the war is by definition no longer local. It cannot end with the *status quo ante*. If the Soviets come to believe that their territory would be spared but we would devastate Europe by confining the use of nuclear weapons to the combat zone, they may have an incentive for aggression. Such a strategy, even if it succeeded in stopping the attack, would eliminate Europe as a factor in international politics; it would guarantee that any other threatened area would surrender.

Nevertheless, even though a full-scale attack on Europe would inevitably bring the strategic forces into play, there is a problem of relating their action to local operations. Strategic forces are not designed to affect a local situation directly. Whether used demonstratively, punitively or in discriminating counterforce operations, their purpose is to force the aggressor into ordering an end to his local attacks, not to blunt the attacks themselves.

But is it wise to neglect the local outcome? It is at least possible that once strategic weapons are used, however discriminately, all other considerations could become submerged in the desire to end a spiral toward ever greater devastation. If the aggressor has made major advances, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable him to consolidate his gains.

This suggests that, together with an agreed doctrine for the use of strategic forces, the Alliance requires a nuclear capability to deny an aggressor a significant territorial ad-

182 *The Strategic Issues*

vance. Tactical weapons used early in the face of a full-scale
attack could perform this role. If a standstill in military
operations can be forced, a major objective of the defense
will have been achieved. Aggression would have no object if
it were certain to result in a stalemate.

Thus the nuclear components of NATO must have two
aims: (1) they should be able to force a standstill of the
initial onslaught and (2) they should be able to inflict suffi-
cient punishment on the aggressor so that he is forced into
negotiations. The aggressor must not believe that our re-
sponse will shift all the risks of nuclear devastation to the
victims of aggression. But there must also be a local response
capable of preventing a *fait accompli* and an attempt to
negotiate on the basis of it.

To achieve these objectiyes, the tactical nuclear establish-
ment on the Continent must be adapted along the following
lines: (1) its mission must be redefined, (2) its vulnera-
bility must be reduced and (3) its deployment must be
changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical
nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient
explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use
of battlefield weapons according to purely military criteria
would surely obliterate the combat zone, and this cannot be
in the interest of any threatened country. Thus the mission
of the tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered in
isolation from the other, primarily strategic, operations
which will be taking place. This makes it necessary to rede-
fine some traditional military missions. For example, given
the range of modern weapons, air superiority can be obtained
—if at all—only by deep penetration of hostile territory on a
scale indistinguishable from general nuclear war. Such opera-
tions should not be conducted by a theater commander fully
occupied with the land battle. This is why all weapons above

183

183

a certain range (say 300 miles) should be put under the
NATO Strategic Command described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons that remain under SACEUR's command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine the requirement of relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons remaining on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, presents different problems when thousands of weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communications system could withstand such a strain.

During the Presidential campaign of 1964, it was proposed that one way of solving this problem would be to delegate authority to a military commander, specifically to SACEUR. This was justified with the argument that communications between Washington and Paris might be interrupted. But such a scheme would create more problems than it solves. For one thing, no other member of the Alliance would be prepared to make such a delegation of authority. Also, SACEUR would be extremely ill-advised to resort to nuclear weapons without making sure that SAC is alerted. If communications are adequate for that purpose, they should also be adequate for political control to be exercised. Moreover, the real communications bottleneck is not between Washington and Paris, but between NATO headquarters and the field commanders. But if authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons were delegated to field commanders, this would mean that nuclear war could be started by officers least familiar with the strategic context and most subject to immediate

184 - The Strategic Issues

pressures which may or may not be symptomatic of the over-
all situation. Field commanders do not have access to strate-
gic intelligence about the Soviet Union or to plans for gen-
eral war. Thus the initial decision to use tactical nuclear
weapons will have to be made by Washington (or by the
Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).
Once the decision is taken, they will have to be released by-
category of range, yield and geographic location. This under-
lines the urgent need for an agreed NATO strategic doctrine.

Another subject requiring careful reexamination is NATO
deployment. Currently it is an uneasy compromise between
the desire to retain a conventional option and the reality that
nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the equip-
ment of all military units. This reflects a real dilemma. To
fight a conventional war, military units must concentrate; to
be effective during nuclear operations, they must disperse.
Units deployed for conventional operations present tempting
targets for nuclear attack and may thus invite it. Units de-
ployed for nuclear war are too dispersed to resist an attack
with conventional weapons. In all likelihood, it will be im-
possible to shift from one mode of deployment to another
during military operations, particularly if the opponent has
introduced nuclear weapons first. But current NATO deploy-
ment involves precisely this danger. Units are concentrated as
if the likely attack would be conventional. At the same time,
even their forward echelons are equipped with nuclear weap-
ons. This concentration coupled with the ambiguity of NATO
doctrine and the vulnerability of tactical nuclear weapons
gives an aggressor a high incentive to use nuclear weapons
first.

It has become increasingly clear that NATO will not raise
sufficient troops for a purely conventional defense of Europe
—all trends, in fact, are in the opposite direction. It is there-
fore crucial that deployment on the Continent take into ac-
count the realities of NATO in the next decade. NATO's con-
ventional forces are suitable for two major roles: (1) to act

185

as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack is, in
fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures of

185

as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack is, in
fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures of
NATO territory and (2) to furnish a reserve to resist aggres-
sion on the flanks of NATO or in areas outside of Europe
where the Alliance might agree on joint action.

NATO deployment should reflect this. There should be a
screen of conventional forces deployed forward and organized
for purely conventional combat. The size of this screen
would depend on the total NATO forces available and on a
military estimate of what is required to force a major Soviet
concentration before aggression can have any chance of suc-
cess. The remainder of NATO's divisions—deployed behind
this screen—should be equipped and organized for nuclear
war. With such a deployment, it would be obvious to any
aggressor that once operations reached a certain magnitude
nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO
deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives
for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsi-
bility for operations should not be assigned to any level
lower than corps. Weapons should be released to these com-
manders only by an appropriate political authority (prefera-
bly the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described
below).⁶

In addition, there should be a strategic reserve capable of
conducting either conventional or tactical nuclear war and
organized to intervene rapidly either in a land battle in Eur-
rope or in distant theaters.

CONCLUSION—THE MILITARY
ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

The military organization of the Alliance would then ap-
pear as follows:

1. There would be an Allied Nuclear Force. It would be constituted from existing NATO weapons above a range of, say,

See Chapter 8.

186 The Strategic Issues

300 miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States, together with long-range delivery vehicles now on the Continent, and an eventual French contribution. If the MLF survives the reexamination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.

2. SACEUR would retain tactical nuclear weapons up to a range of, say, 300 miles. However, their deployment would be altered in order to create real conventional and nuclear options. Their number would be related to the existing missions.

3. The deployment of conventional forces would clearly reflect their primary mission of acting as a screening force and furnishing a strategic reserve.

However, no arrangement of military forces will, of itself, solve the problems of the Alliance. The ultimate challenge lies in the political field. It is whether NATO can develop common purposes and whether it can devise a political structure that combines community with flexibility.

See Chapter 8.

188 The Strategic Issues

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the early years of NATO our European Allies feared above all that we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, therefore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about the American understanding of the Communist threat. If anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did the rest. America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew absolute. In American thinking, the danger of Communist aggression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic aloofness from international affairs was great.

After the death of Stalin, the previous Allied unanimity about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated.¹ Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic change in the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in Soviet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Repub-

¹Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that NATO was provocative.

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany

lic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the

lic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful
that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the
division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with
the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks
regarding Berlin. They have been unhappy about most of the
schemes advanced at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
France rejected—as the Federal Republic would have liked to
do but did not dare—the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

United States policy has oscillated between these conflict-
ing views. American pronouncements include many of the
phrases about Soviet intransigence characteristic of the early
days of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral
dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting
views of its Allies but not reconciling them, the United States
has retained the liturgy of the Cold War while adopting a
good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of relaxa-
tion of tensions.

As a result, much of the Allied debate about East-West
relations has concerned not the content of a program for
negotiation but the nature of the Soviet system. Those who
assume that there has been a change in Soviet policy tend to
stress the impact of modernization on Soviet purposes. To
them a great deal depends on establishing good personal rela-
tions with Soviet leaders and on bringing about a general
atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangea-
ble nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society im-
mune to the erosion of time—an achievement which would
be unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in
dispute. The only sensible debate can concern the question
of how peace can be achieved and then made secure. The
issue is not whether tensions should be artificially maintained,
but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Is
the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have
deeper causes? Is a lasting detente reached by improving the
atmosphere first and moving from there to specific settle-

190 The Strategic Issues

ments? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied
from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding
issues? Above all, what exactly is to be understood by a settle-
ment? These are the questions which the Alliance must an-
swer for itself if it is to determine whether a given peace
offensive represents a change of tactics or a change of policy.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history. Peaceful co-existence has been avowed since the advent of Communism in Russia. It was stressed particularly between 1924-1939; between 1941-1946; at the time of the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khru-shchev's visit to the United States in 1959; and following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each occasion the reason for the detente was some internal or external strain on the Soviet system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, which was followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges; in 1941-1946 it was the German invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle after the death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to push the Allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused by the shock of the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an
opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself.
The period of tranquillity after 1924 was followed by the
annexation of Bessarabia, the Baltic States and one third of
Poland, as well as an attack on Finland. World War II led to
the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The
spirit of Geneva gave way to an attempted penetration of the
Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the spirit of Camp
David was succeeded by another Berlin crisis which did not
end until the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the
West—including some who thought of themselves as
staunchly, sometimes almost religiously, anti-Communist—
hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. This demon-

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 191 /3
strates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is

191/3

strates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.²

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the late Senator Tom Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."³ In 1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance."⁴ This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people."⁵

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken—except Secretary Rusk's, which is too early to judge. The reason is not obscure. Any system has its own dynamism that shapes its leaders and affects what is considered reasonable in internal discussions. There is need for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system that produce belligerence and those that encourage accommodation. These are deli-

²Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 216.

³*New York Times*, May 23, 1943.

⁴U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, February 25, 1956.

⁵Secretary Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D. C., on February 25, 1964. *DOSB*, Vol. L, No. 1290, (March 16, 1964), p. 393.

[Lc]

194 Political Prospects

192 The Strategic Issues

cately balanced. It should be the goal of Western policy to give a maximum spur to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist world: the qualities of the men who rise to leadership positions and the ideology on which the Communist system is built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any decade with its membership at the end of that decade illustrates the precariousness of high office in the Soviet system.⁶ Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves public disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any public activity.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at least have the consolation that the enormous risks they run are on behalf of their own ambitions; those on the lower levels may find themselves submerged as a result of events totally out of their control. Loyalty may turn into a source of personal danger; subordinate officials will often share the fate

⁶ The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows by Severyn Bialer in "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," New York Times Magazine, November 1, 1964, p. 27:

Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still members of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikhailov, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-rate post. Only two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev and are now in the front ranks of the post-Khrushchev leadership.

195

of the leader even though they may have had no real alternative.

19

All this creates an atmosphere of suspicion—even of conspiracy—in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruthless enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich, whose protégé he had been, and turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they nevertheless overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career—indeed their survival—has been advanced by the ability to dissemble. Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for his rivals to organize against him. Suspiciousness is therefore inherent in the domestic position of Soviet leaders. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world is more benign. There is no reason for them to treat foreign statesmen more gently than their own colleagues or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically this means that the power of potential competitors

196

Political Prospects

194 The Strategic Issues

must be broken. Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that they feel secure only when all conceivable rivals have been reduced to impotence. Wary of even his closest colleagues, the type of man who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of forces and will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure makes them possible competitors of the U.S.S.R. This does not make crises inevitable or settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever their experience, are cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend on their pronouncements alone, it would not be very secure.

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because these writings are too contradictory and too dependent on tactical considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory that will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of any Communist system, in the immediate future ideology continues as one of the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation.

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an invaluable tool in understanding historical trends and the relation of forces existing at any particular moment. According to it, "subjective" factors, such as the personal convictions of statesmen, matter less than the "objective" factors they reflect. These objective factors include the social and

195

economic conditions of society, the nature of the economic

[LC]

1951

economic conditions of society, the nature of the economic
process and, above all, the class struggle. Communists con-
sider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to distinguish be-
tween appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism"
inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "ad-
venturism" that risks a historical movement on one throw of
the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors ex-
plains why Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a
choice between Western goodwill and a territorial or politi-
cal gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the latter. The friend-
ship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of World
War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establish-
ing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe.
The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered
by the prospect of penetrating the Middle East. The spirit of
Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin. The
many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were re-
buffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the
balance of forces was not in fact favorable.

The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the
reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so
frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they
could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose un-
derstanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by
definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate
"concessions" because they believe that concessions are made
to reality, not to individuals. They may change their posi-
tion, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that
they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For
them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to
most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining
process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very
similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients:
no matter what is said, they think that they understand their
Western counterpart better than he understands himself.

198 Political Prospects

196 The Strategic Issues

[LC]

This is one of the reasons that exercises in personal
diplomacy—even at the highest level—have been so futile. No
Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposi-
tion that he has been impressed by the personal qualities of a
capitalist statesman. Settlements are possible; but to be
meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect “objective” con-
ditions and not a personal relationship.

The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class strug-
gle causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable
philosophical hostility toward the non-Communist world.
Even while advocating political co-existence, the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. declared:

The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truths, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.

Thus peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the policy of "peaceful co-existence":

Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the
development of the revolutionary class struggle in the capitalist
countries, the upsurge of national liberation movements?

In yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet
Communist Party affirmed:

"The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter referred to as CDSP), Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

"Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3; CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

1979

We fully support the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.⁹

["We fully support the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.⁹", "Moreover, “peaceful co-existence” is advanced by Soviet leaders not as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition. This proposition has elicited the following exasperated comment from George F. Kennan:", "... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life... by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence...¹⁰", "These factors, which almost overnight could produce again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be balanced against restraints that, over a period of time, may become dominant. First, there is the power of modern weapons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that, if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West—even if it is not an ideal one—Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge. To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action, and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called “wars of", "⁹ The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," op cit., CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20.", "¹⁰ George F. Kennan, \"Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View,\" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (January-1960), p. 174."]

198 The Strategic Issues

national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself with reasonable prudence, the traditional methods of military pressure can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible to implement one interest which the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is in the West's interest to see to it that it remain so.

Another factor which acts as a restraint on Soviet foreign policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering. It is a symptom of weakness that, over forty years after seizing power, the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession. Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor.

In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office. In the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian people may support such a style of government. At some point, however, cynicism and demoralization are likely to set in. Sooner or later, the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a system which constantly invokes the universality of its maxims can produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of "objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration—again by its own account—the "cult of personality."

The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability of Communist countries to deal with each other. Communist ideology does not admit the possibility of conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear wherever Socialism has triumphed. In the absence of any provision for the settlement of disputes,

199-201

Communist leaders try to deal with disputes among Communists by

[LC]

Communist leaders try to deal with disputes among Commu-
nist states as they conduct their own internal struggles: by
seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents.
But among sovereign states, such tactics cause disputes to
harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, dem-
onstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be inter-
preted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence
in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the dis-
cipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a profoundly
disruptive impact on the unity of the world Communist
movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist
parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the
scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of
Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scien-
tific truth supplied the inward assurance; the pre-eminence
of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical
flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

The unity produced by these factors has been under-
mined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Sino-
Soviet split and the manner in which Khrushchev has been
overthrown. De-Stalinization raised the question of the rela-
tionship between the scientific truth of the dominant ide-
ology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How
could a system that was supposed to end forever man's op-
pression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the
one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be recon-
ciled with slave labor camps and a police state? Even if the
Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres
must have been assailed by doubts which must have been
reinforced when Khrushchev was overthrown in his turn and
denounced for "hare-brained schemes."

The Sino-Soviet split was the catalyst for the overt frag-
mentation of the Communist world. The causes of this rift
are many and complex. There is the rivalry of two empires
along the most extended land frontier of the world. Competi-

tion for a dominant role in the underdeveloped countries plays a part. But what makes the dispute insoluble is the conflict over the leadership of the world Communist movement. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up from time to time, its underlying cause seems beyond repair. A movement that claims to represent a universal truth cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist—whatever temporary adjustments may be made.

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to compete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previous monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be moralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their attitudes toward Khrushchev, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics of their Soviet colleagues—including a highly developed sense for personal power—the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves by a measure of autonomy. They must try to safeguard their position against possible future upheavals in Moscow. The initial

hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in en-

201/3

hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in en-
dorsing Khrushchev's ouster can be partly explained by this.

Personal ambition thus reinforces the dominant trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have, if anything, intensified traditional nationalism. Communism has been able to gain a measure of popular acceptance only where its leaders emphasize national and not Communist concerns. The autarchic organization of Communist economies compounds these tendencies. It encapsulates each state in a system of total planning, which complicates relations even with Communist neighbors. A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension has been initiated by the Soviets not because a few individuals have overcome the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it. To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows: When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press for the settlement of issues that produced the tension in the first place?

Domestic considerations impel many Western leaders to present themselves to their electorate as the architects of a lasting peace. The temptation is, therefore, strong to treat a more conciliatory Communist tone as a permanent conversion to a peaceful course and to gear everything to personal diplomacy.

Such attitudes will cause the West to squander its opportunities, as has happened so often in the past. The prospects for peace are not served by leaving the Soviet leadership with the impression that any action, no matter how belligerent, can always be reversed by a change of tone. Negotiations will prove empty if they are confined to vague protestations of goodwill. If a detente is not to be part of another cycle leading to renewed tensions, it is essential that negotiations be concrete and programs specific.

204 Political Prospects

202 The Strategic Issues

Above all, the West must conduct its policy without illusions. The same pressures that have produced a relaxation of tensions can also tempt Soviet leaders to enter upon another period of hostility. There is always the danger that the Kremlin will try to restore the unity of Eastern Europe by fostering a crisis centered on Germany. Even as it is, the East European governments almost invariably support Soviet foreign policy, particularly in the underdeveloped world. Events in other continents can have a backlash in Europe. The Soviets could be drawn into an intransigent course as a result of situations over which they have no direct control. The weakening of central authority in the Soviet Union may enable various bureaucracies to operate relatively autonomously, including those with a vested interest in fomenting upheavals. The spiritual malaise of Communism could be reversed if an unchecked collapse of Western influence and power around the world seems to demonstrate the validity of the basic tenets of Leninism.

Even the split between the largest Communist countries represents danger as well as opportunity. It means that henceforth the West will confront not alternating periods of hostility and conciliation but both at the same time. It can also happen that the two Communist giants may try to outbid each other in giving so-called liberation movements an anti-Western cast—Soviet actions in the Congo are a good example.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable" form of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situation of several of our Allies. One of the major achievements of the postwar period in Europe has been the isolation of the Communist parties. Under the impact of many factors, this isolation is beginning to break down. In Italy, for example, the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new-found strength for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of the traditional parties by De Gaulle and the change in tactics

208

by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popular Front for the first time in thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in

208

by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popu-
lar Front for the first time in thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in
the new countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders
were restrained from joining the Communist camp because
this action reduced them to the status of satellites. With the
growing disarray in the Communist world it will seem in-
creasingly possible to combine nationalism and Communism.
Many in the West draw comfort from this. But it is impor-
tant to distinguish between a national Communist govern-
ment in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example,
Latin America or Africa. A national Communist regime in
Eastern Europe is an improvement over the previous condi-
tion of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin
America or Africa would inevitably become a center of anti-
Western policy.

If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it must
develop a common policy and a specific program. The temp-
tation for bilateral approaches is great. Each national leader,
depending on his temperament, has visions of appearing as
the arbiter of a final settlement or of adding Communist
pressures to his own as a bargaining device within the Alli-
ance. This sets up a vicious circle. Since leaders generally do
not reach eminence without a touch of vanity and since some
stake their prestige on their ability to woo their Soviet coun-
terparts, they tend to present their contacts with the Soviets as
a considerable accomplishment. But the real issues have gone
unresolved because they are genuinely difficult; hence they are
usually avoided during summit diplomacy in favor of showy
but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer the East-West
discourse, the greater will be the confusion in the West.
Moreover, each leader faces two different audiences: toward
his own people he will be tempted to leave the impression
that he has made a unique contribution to peace; toward his
allies he will be forced to insist that he will make no settle-
ment in which they do not participate. Excessive claims are

206 Political Prospects

204 The Strategic Issues

[LC]

coupled with reassurances to uneasy allies which are in turn tempted to pursue bilateral diplomacy.

Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate distrust within the Alliance. The traditional Western balance of power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Kremlin. Any Soviet incentive to be responsible will vanish. The Soviet leaders will be able to overcome their difficulties with the assistance of the West and without settling any of the outstanding issues. Since in the Kremlin—as in the West—there must be many who consider the status quo preferable to change, the result is likely to be diplomatic paralysis obscured by abstract declarations about peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies: (1) the willingness of the members of the Alliance to subordinate short-term advantages to a long-term conception of the future and (2) their ability to develop a concrete and common program. A united West would have unusual opportunities for negotiation. The disarray in Eastern Europe should permit the West to adjust its policies to the degree of autonomy shown by the various East European countries. Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered in a new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy urgently requires a comprehensive solution. All these approaches presuppose some consensus in the West about the shape of international affairs over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the future of Germany. No other issue illustrates so dramatically the need for unity and for purpose, for an agreed Allied policy as well as for concrete proposals.

## THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-German Treaty of Collaboration has become increasingly complicated. After the initial period of shock, the United

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 205

States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Republic. One motive behind the MLF was to prevent West Germany from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear cooperation—an offer which has not yet been made and

States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Repub-
lic. One motive behind the MLF was to prevent West Ger-
many from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear
cooperation—an offer which has not yet been made and,
given De Gaulle's awareness of the European equilibrium,
might never have been extended. In order to tie Germany to
us, successful efforts were made to have German arms pur-
chases funneled to the United States. The culmination of this
process was an agreement between Secretary McNamara and
Defense Minister von Hassel signed on November 14, 1964,
which in effect made the German armed forces dependent on
the United States for their military equipment.

In the political field the United States, while welcoming Franco-German rapprochement, has made clear that it does so only as long as this does not lead to a new power grouping —a condition inherently impossible of fulfillment. Thus, George McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, has said:

... It is true that the signature of the Franco-German Treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been accomplished without a formal treaty... Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle ... for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.¹¹

American pressure and high-handed French actions have placed the Federal Republic in an extremely uncomfortable position. Germany, though courted on all sides, runs the risk of finding itself isolated. Every gesture by the Federal Republic toward one of the protagonists evokes so much pressure by the other that a compensatory move must then be made. In order to assuage American outrage over the Franco-German treaty, Chancellor Adenauer agreed in principle to the MLF. When the negotiations over the MLF threatened a Franco-

¹¹George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues," July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), pp. 140-141.

208 political Prospects

206 The Strategic Issues

German rift, Chancellor Erhard felt obliged to re cement
Franco-German ties. Because of its understandable insecuri-
ties, Germany requires, above all, a calm and steady senior
partner. The frequent changes in American policy on strategic
doctrine, nuclear control and the emphasis to be given to
various partners must radicalize German political life, what-
ever the merit of individual United States positions. French
policy has been consistent but it has confronted the Federal
Republic with choices which it is unprepared to handle. As a
result, the Franco-German rivalry threatens to split the pro-
Western elements in Germany into pro-American and pro-
French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must
be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists. Thrown on its own
resources by the rivalry between France and the United States,
the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly
conscious of its own national aspirations.

Thus Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet
cajolery or Communist blackmail—a trend further magnified
by American hints that Germany should be more flexible
toward the East. As long as Germany could avoid a direct
confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other
relationship—the Western Alliance or the Franco-German
Treaty—these dangers were minimized. The combination of
De Gaulle's abruptness and America's short-sighted reaction
to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should
fear most: a Germany increasingly absorbed in its own unful-
filled national aims and aware of the bargaining position con-
ferred on it by its central position and growing power.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which
Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It
exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and
temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of
the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, 17
million of whose people are Communist hostages, has become
the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not
be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the con-

East-West Relations and the Future of Germany 204/9

flict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Demo-

207 / 9

flict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Demo-
cratic Union, which largely forged the pro-Western orienta-
tion of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies in
the other parties that are now restrained by their desire to
present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-
established consensus. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-
German Treaty by which it has sought to limit the Federal
Republic's freedom of action has had the practical conse-
quence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be
tempted to seek reinsurance by improving its relations in
Eastern Europe. Thus the current situation contains a series
of time bombs.

The most serious potential conflict between the Federal
Republic and its Allies—and the lever which the Communist
countries may hope to use to pry Germany loose from its
Atlantic ties—concerns reactions to the division of Germany.
The problem is complicated by three factors: (1) NATO is
an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal
members seeks a basic change in the status quo. (2) None of
Germany's allies shares her national aspirations with equal
intensity. (3) Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust
that creates special obstacles to its international role. These
divergences would be difficult enough for a cohesive Alliance
to reconcile; the rivalry between France and the United
States threatens to make them insoluble.

These problems become particularly severe whenever
there appears to be some relaxation in East-West tensions. To
most of the members of NATO, detente comes as a welcome
respite. To the Federal Republic, it implies the danger of a
tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most of the Allies do not
find the status quo intolerable, whereas the Federal Republic
considers consolidation of the East German regime a sacrifice
of basic national aspirations.

This is why German leaders are always extraordinarily
ambivalent during periods of detente. They welcome relief
from pressures against Berlin; but they are uneasy lest all

210 Political Prospects

208 The Strategic Issues

other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between “peripheral” settlements which they welcome and “central” agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. If this progress is delayed too long, there will be increasing pressures for purely German initiatives. The Alliance may soon have to choose between developing a common, active policy on German reunification or seeing the Federal Republic pursue the goal independently.

Many in the West find both possibilities disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy about the prospect of having international tensions focus on Germany for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to restore Germany to a respected place in the international community, it is unfair to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the 17 million people in East Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept their country's division as permanent. Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic tends to magnify the uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called Rapallo policy—a change of fronts toward

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the East—is extremely unlikely; but the consequences for the West would be serious enough if Germany thought that its national aspirations were being thwarted by the Alliance.

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209

the East—is extremely unlikely; but the consequences for the West would be serious enough if Germany thought that its national aspirations were being thwarted by the Alliance. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use a national appeal to Germany and an appeal based on the fear of Germany to the other Western countries.

Any policy on Germany must deal with three problems: (1) relations with the Soviet Union, including the complex of issues involved in any relaxation of tensions, (2) relations with the East German satellite regime and (3) relations with the East European governments. In all three respects the interests of the Western Allies and of the Federal Republic are potentially divergent; at the very least they must be carefully synchronized.

With respect to the detente, German concerns are often met with the argument that almost any measure that eases tensions also promotes German unification. According to this theory, once a policy of co-existence is firmly established, Eastern Germany may grow dispensable in Soviet eyes. As the Soviet Union begins to pursue more national policies, the ideological impetus for maintaining a Communist regime in Eastern Germany may decline.

However, it is dangerous to arouse German expectations that are not likely to be fulfilled. Arguments that a detente automatically furthers the cause of German unity must be balanced against others which, on the whole, seem more likely. A statesman can always escape his dilemmas by making the most favorable assumptions about the future. A wise policymaker will also consider the consequences if his hypothesis should turn out to be wrong. The Soviet Union, even if it becomes less committed ideologically, is unlikely to relinquish its hold on Eastern Germany simply as a result of an improvement in the international atmosphere. On the contrary, to the degree that a detente with the West exists, Soviet leaders may well calculate that concessions on the uni-

212

political Prospects

210 The Strategic Issues

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fication of Germany become unnecessary. The German concern that a detente may freeze the status quo in Germany is, therefore, not wholly unjustified.

Granting that the problem of German unification cannot be left to the more or less automatic operation of a detente, the question becomes how German unity is to be promoted: Is it a task for the Alliance as a whole or should the primary initiative come from the Federal Republic? Many leaders in both Washington and London seem to favor a more active role for the Federal Republic. They wish to avoid constant criticisms and to induce the Federal Republic to assume greater responsibility for its future.

But toward whom is the Federal Republic to assume these responsibilities? It would be highly desirable for the Federal Republic to participate more actively within the Alliance in formulating common policies on Germany's future. Some Western officials go further, however. They argue that the Federal Republic should take the lead in dealing with the East, principally with the East German satellite. They are convinced that increased contacts between the two Germans will promote the erosion of the East German regime. According to this school of thought, the superior cohesiveness and strength of the Federal Republic will give it by far the stronger bargaining position. At a minimum, such negotiations may make life more bearable for the East German population. In time, the East German regime would become more humane, comparable perhaps to the Kadar government in Hungary.

Such reasoning has caused Western proposals for reunification gradually to move toward enhancing the status of the East German regime. In 1955, the Western plan still called for unification through free election. In 1959, a new plan called for a technical commission composed of twenty-five West and fifteen East Germans to engage in preliminary negotiations for a year. Decisions were to be taken by a majority of three-fourths, giving East Germany an effective veto. In

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13

the schemes of 1962, the composition of these commissions had become equal and the time limit of one year had been

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the schemes of 1962, the composition of these commissions had become equal and the time limit of one year had been removed. Also in 1962, the West proposed an International Access Authority to Berlin, in which the East German regime was given equal status with the Federal Republic.

This policy has in recent years found support even in the Federal Republic. The West German government has accepted—albeit reluctantly—the principle of technical commissions in which East and West Germany would enjoy parity. Others in Germany have begun advocating a “policy of little steps” toward the East German regime. By this time they mean agreements between the two German states leading to expanding cultural and perhaps economic ties. They argue that contacts between the two Germanys will carry the “bacillus of freedom” into the East and thus “infect” the East German satellite with Western values.

But enhancing the status of Eastern Germany is a dangerous course. It could lead to a situation where two German states will be competing for adherents all over the world; it could defer indefinitely any hope for unification. It is risky also because the bargaining position of the Federal Republic is precarious. In all such contacts, humanitarian concerns will outweigh political considerations. Even if these negotiations do not succeed in luring Germany out of its formal Western ties, they may produce a serious political split in the Federal Republic.

Germany's allies should not contribute to the already considerable confusion between three partly incompatible objectives: improvement of conditions in Eastern Germany, consolidation of the East German regime and progress toward German unification. Ameliorating conditions in Eastern Germany is desirable for humanitarian reasons. At the same time, it is likely to help the East German regime consolidate itself and thus make unification more remote except on East German terms. As the respectability of the East German regime grows, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining

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Political Prospects

212 The Strategic Issues

ing the division of Germany is diminished. As the East German regime gains stature, its pressure on the Federal Republic will almost surely mount.

This process is likely to be gradual. While the East German regime is striving to establish its international status, its demands may be moderate. But once it is recognized—or even if its international status is substantially enhanced—it will have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Republic. It will, in fact, be driven to do so by its precarious position. National feelings in Eastern Germany, unlike those in Eastern Europe, are hostile to the existing government. In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia patriotism can lead to the conclusion that the national interest is best served by liberalizing the existing governments. They seem to have become permanent; no focus for alternative loyalties exists. In East Germany, by contrast, national aspirations clash with the existence of a Communist regime. A prosperous, democratic West Germany acts as a powerful magnet. Thus the East German regime has every incentive to seek to weaken the Federal Republic, and it can use its own population as a hostage.

The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position—which is postulated by some American policymakers—may, therefore, be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at what point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn, every West German concession to the German Democratic Republic will strengthen those in the West who favor recognition of that satellite regime. The result is more likely to bešt two hostile, competing German states will become permanent than progress toward unification.

The indefinite continuation of

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To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to

218

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it. But we should make certain that the West cannot be blamed for the probable consequences. And we should do nothing to promote policies that may lead to a growing demoralization of the Federal Republic. In 1962, the United States encouraged an "opening to the Left" in Italy that was supposed to isolate the Communist Party. Instead it has undermined the center and opened the way to respectability for the Communists. The same role could be played in Germany by the policy of "technical contacts" or of "little steps" and with much more dangerous results.

Those in Washington and London who believe that the so-called "flexible" Germans will always follow their lead may, moreover, be in for some unpleasant surprises. The Germany version of flexibility could become indistinguishable from traditional nationalism. This mood was expressed by Berlin's Senator Hoppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party. Criticizing the Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives in West Berlin, Senator Hoppe said:

> Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. Faith in the strength of the West, in its political superiority, in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests.¹²

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP Minister for all-German affairs, later supported Hoppe. Unless relations are handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic, such an attitude carries within it the seeds of serious misunderstandings.

Finally, as German activity toward the East increases, the

¹²Spandauer Volkszeitung, September 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany, for calling my attention to this quotation.

216 Political Prospects
214 The Strategic Issues

fear of another Rapallo may create a vicious circle. Germany's Western neighbors will draw closer together; they may also seek to anticipate the Federal Republic by speeding up their own contacts with Moscow. This cannot be in the interest of either Atlantic or European cohesion; in the long run it will prove disastrous for the Federal Republic as well, because it may lead to its eventual isolation.

Only a united Atlantic Community facing jointly the issue of Germany's future can minimize the danger of a sharp conflict between Germany's national goals and its Atlantic ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essential not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance, but also for the peace of Europe as well. It is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as two German states exist, they are bound to interact with each other. If they consider that their social and political systems are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the other. Since they contain the same basic population and a similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will move beyond the control of either East or West—and perhaps of the Germans themselves. The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own interests, they will realize that the present course may have the gravest long-term consequences.

If German unification is to be a central concern of the Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East, it should be given every encouragement to make a major contribution to the formulation of an Allied position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder

215

proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and December 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification, be desisted.

215

proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and December 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification, he deserved a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the Western Allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. If we can discuss only those items which the Soviets have declared negotiable, the agenda of any conference will be determined by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that, if no progress toward unification is made, the onus for it rests on the Soviets.

While the Allies should show greater understanding for the anguish of a divided country, the Federal Republic has to face the fact that German unity can become an active policy only if it is embodied in a concrete program. Heretofore Bonn has demanded support for German unification, but it has re-coiled from encouraging a specific scheme to achieve it. It has feared that any proposals might involve provisions about Germany's frontiers and about limitations on German arms which would amount to unilateral concessions. Understandable as these concerns are, they run the risk of turning the issue of German unity into a largely rhetorical enterprise. Serious negotiations on German unity presuppose the willingness of the Alliance to develop a specific set of proposals.

A precondition of any negotiating program is an agreed strategy toward Eastern Germany. Specifically, should the West seek to ameliorate conditions in the so-called German Democratic Republic by increasing contacts with it or by isolating it? The latter course seems the most promising and the one most consistent with a long-term policy on German unification. This presupposes, however, an orchestration of the policy of the Allies with those of the Federal Republic toward the countries of Eastern Europe. Today the East German re-

218

216

The Strategic Issues

gime is being widely supported in Eastern Europe at least in part because of the historical fear of Germany and the memory of the Nazi occupation. The East European countries are much less committed to the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany than to a divided Germany, which may seem to them the best guarantee of their security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified Communist Germany might worry the East European states hardly less than any other powerful unified German state. There is reason to believe that the East German regime is despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot be fully exploited so long as the Federal Republic is not able to pursue a more active policy in Eastern Europe.

Heretofore, the Federal Republic has refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. One possible method for ameliorating the Hallstein Doctrine with respect to Eastern Europe would be for the Federal Republic to announce that in order to promote a final settlement it would establish diplomatic relations with all of Germany's neighbors, enabling it to bring about direct contact with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a policy will not in itself lead to unification. Nor will it make the East European countries abandon their preference for a divided Germany. It will, however, contribute to the isolation of East Germany and hence promote its demoralization. It is likely to reduce the already small East European incentive to support Soviet or East German pressures against exposed Western positions such as Berlin.

Regardless of how successful the West is in coordinating its approach to Eastern Europe and Eastern Germany, a specific plan for the unification of Germany will have to be developed. Any new approach to the problem of German unification should seek to escape the process whereby every succeeding Western plan has moved closer to the Soviet position. If every new Western proposal incorporates additional features

21

of the Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any
incentive exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet frame-

tures of the Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any
particular program exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet frame-
work for German unity becomes established: that it be ne-
gotiated directly by the two German states, which is another
way of saying that the East German satellite would be con-
solidated.

But it is important that all concerned recognize that no
plan on German unity can avoid a consideration of the difficult
and sensitive issue of Germany's frontiers. This tragic issue
has its origin in 1945, when the Potsdam Agreement placed
the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which had been
German for centuries, under Polish administration pending a
final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland then proceeded to
expel the 13 million Germans living there and to replace them
with Polish settlers, mostly from Polish territories taken over
by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to ac-
cept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a
bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly be-
cause of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed terri-
tories, most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the
human tragedies of our time. The reluctance of the Federal
Republic to renounce territories which had been German for
centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something
cynical about the insistent East European demand that the
Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East Ger-
man satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East
European countries. The Eastern European countries obvi-
ously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany
divided along the Elbe; but they also insist that the Federal
Republic recognize the eastern frontier of the Soviet puppet
regime on the Oder-Neisse. These inconsistencies complicate
a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these obstacles, the per-
petuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-
Neisse line complicates progress on the issue of unification. It

220 The Strategic Issues-

provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintain-
ing their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements Soviet rela-
tions with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to
territories that no longer contain any German settlers con-
tributes to perpetuating foreign rule over 17 million Germans
between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line. The refusal to
face the issue of the Polish border guarantees that the frontier
of free Germany will remain on the Elbe.

To be sure, it is an important tactical question at what
point the Federal Republic should renounce its claims. It is
possible to sympathize with the reluctance to offer such a
painful sacrifice gratuitously. But it is essential to recognize
that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontiers will have
to be part of any responsible program for unification. Unifi-
cation is impossible so long as it is considered an inevitable
prelude to a new set of pressures in Eastern Europe.

Thus three factors must be reconciled in any plan for
Germany's future: (1) the German desire for self-determina-
tion, (2) the East European concern for security and (3) the
Soviet concern lest a unified Germany impair its own security
and shake its international position. These objectives are, of
course, incompatible to some extent. A great deal depends on
whether it proves possible to convince those most concerned
that to strive for absolutes will lead first to stagnation and
ultimately to crisis.

For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a detailed
program; rather, the primary need is to agree on a new con-
cept. One possible course would be to separate the issue of
self-determination from that of unification for an interim
period, say fifteen years. Pressure for immediate unification
consolidates all opponents of Germany in Eastern Europe
and sub rosa in Western Europe as well. Self-determination,
on the other hand, is a moral imperative commanding wide
consensus. If rejected by the Communists, it would place
them at least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: The

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210

/21

Western countries, including the Federal Republic, could declare that, while the unification of Germany remains the ultimate goal, their immediate aim is to enable the population of East Germany to choose the form of government it prefers. The Western Allies could, therefore, declare their willingness to acquiesce in the existence of an East German state provided its government emerges from a process of free elections. For a period of fifteen years the territory now called the German Democratic Republic would have a status similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A commission composed of the European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps Finland, would monitor the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebiscite supervised by the same commission to determine whether East Germany wanted to continue as a separate state in loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral commission certified that the government of East Germany was freely elected, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist.

Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany. Within the Federal Republic foreign troops would retire an average distance of 100 kilometers from the Western borders

222 Political Prospects

220 The Strategic Issues

of the new East German state, and the number of West Ger-
man troops in that belt would be limited. The Federal Re-
public would renounce access to the ownership of strategic
nuclear weapons.

Even if there were agreement in principle, many details
would remain to be worked out: for example, the precise
definition of demilitarization or what international under-
takings would be consistent with the neutral status of the
new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution
for East Germany is taken, the advantages would be plain:
while Germany would have to defer full unification for
fifteen years, the German states that emerged would no
longer be antagonistic. There would be opportunity for con-
ditions within Germany to be equalized gradually. A foreign
regime detested by the population would be removed. The
East European states would gain the security of a divided
Germany for fifteen years and a demilitarized belt along their
borders for the indefinite future. The East European econo-
mies could adjust to the loss of the East German partner over
a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Ger-
many's frontiers would be settled both juridically and psy-
chologically because the generation that was expelled from
Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time
Germany was unified. Arms control schemes for Europe
could be considered in a new atmosphere.

The price, of course, would be high. The Federal Repub-
lic would have to defer its hopes for immediate unification in
return for agreement on a terminal date to the division of
Germany. The Soviet Union would have to be prepared to
give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East Euro-
pean governments would have to change their policy of
acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior
partner. The Western Allies would have to overcome inertia
and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

But the rewards would be great. Such a program would
end a situation that is bound to become more dangerous the

22

longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of
arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could

22

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longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of
arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could
be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program
rejected initially by the Soviets, it would change the frame-
work of negotiations. Rather than begin with enhancing the
status of the East German regime, as is the case with current
schemes, the new program would focus attention on its op-
pressiveness as the principal obstacle to unification. By taking
a stand on the issue of self-determination, the West would
have a platform most likely to command international sup-
port. By separating self-determination from unification, an
interim period for adjustments and a framework for meeting
legitimate security concerns of Germany's neighbors are
provided.

Nevertheless, it is improbable that any negotiating
formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasona-
ble program is likely to be rejected by the East. The long-
term hope for German unity therefore resides in the unity of
Europe. As nations lose their former significance, the fear of
any one state will diminish. A united Western Europe more-
over will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern
Europe. If an all-embracing European structure ever comes
to pass, the existing dividing lines may seem less crucial.

This is why the existing rift in the West is so unfortunate.
The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that
each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by
holding out vague hopes and grandiose schemes for the
achievement of Germany's maximum objectives. German
leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies
and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so
often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of
repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by
committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special
friendship it was braking temptations of nationalism and
providing for the construction of Europe. Washington's atti-
tude toward the Treaty of Collaboration was motivated by a

CHAPTER EIGHT

What Kind of Atlantic
Partnership?

Two solutions are usually offered for enhancing Allied cohesion: (1) an improvement in the process of consultation and (2) the development of a united Europe with federal, supranational institutions as the precondition for an Atlantic partnership.

THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified under present conditions by three factors:

1. The firm commitment of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the existing balance of power provides their allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

2. The internal workings of modern government are so

226 Political Prospects

924 The Strategic Issues

complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterward in international forums. The American tendency to confine consultation to an elaboration of its own blueprints often reflects a desire to avoid complicating still further our own increasingly complex decision-making process.

3. As governments have found in their own domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, differences are almost certain to arise. And they are likely to be intensified because the histories of the states vary widely and because of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

The American historical experience causes our policymakers to be reluctant to admit that the process of consultation may have objective limits. United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise. A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that agreement is sure to emerge if the interested parties gather around a table. This creates a temptation to conduct Alliance diplomacy as if it were analogous to the domestic policy of stable societies.

However, the most difficult issues of coalition diplomacy are more complicated. Differences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. The analogy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled generally consider maintenance of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if they do not, domestic policy acquires some of the characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy and, in extreme cases, leads to civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the

225

17

hope of winning another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists

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hope of winning another round later or of influencing the
implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists
the possibility of changing the government with the next
election.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves are
not available. Legitimacy resides in the individual govern-
ments. Decisions require their consent—this is the essence of
sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by majority
vote—a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with
NATO—their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the
treaty. In short, those who dissent and are prepared to insist
on their sovereignty cannot be bound indefinitely.

If fundamental differences among sovereign allies persist,
the partners are torn between the desire to maintain the ap-
pearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate their views.
The need to present a facade of harmony has at least three
consequences: (1) It puts a limit on the sanctions that can
be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (2) One of the few pres-
sures available is to mobilize domestic pressures against an
obstructive partner, thus multiplying resentments. (3) Be-
cause misgivings are sometimes subordinated to an appear-
ance of amity, the real views of the governments cannot
always be deduced from their formal statements. Simul-
taneously—and somewhat contradictorily—a premium is
placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use their part-
ners' desire for harmony to impose a desired course. But if
this happens too frequently, there is a dangerous build-up of
frustration that cannot be smothered indefinitely by declara-
tions of friendship. This has been happening in the Atlantic
Alliance.

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least
effective when it is most needed: when there exist basic
differences of assessment or of interest. It works best in
*implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it. Never-
theless, an improvement in the consultative process should be
one of the primary objectives of the Alliance.

226 The Strategic Issues

Many American schemes for strengthening NATO have taken the form of making our predominant position psychologically more acceptable; we try to create a structure which physically prevents any ally (except the United States) from acting autonomously. This tends to turn our Allies into advisors in an American decision-making process. It then becomes relevant to inquire whether such a system serves the long-term political vitality of the Alliance.

The effectiveness of any process of consultation is tested by the answers to the following questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has technical competence? These three questions do not necessarily have identical answers. Many agencies in our own government have a right to be heard, but not all have the same influence. When some Europeans ask for a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up some of their military autonomy, the issue they raise is: compared to whose voice *within* the United States government? That of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, the outcome is clearly affected by the constituency that the agency or department represents. The weight given to advice is related to the competence that it reflects and this in turn depends on how seriously a given department takes its role.

These considerations apply even more strongly in an alliance of sovereign states. The challenge is not only to provide a forum for the expression of a point of view—important as this is—but also to bring about a framework which encourages the emergence of responsible attitudes. Setting up lines of communication without paying corresponding attention to what flows through them is to evade the key problem. If the United States insists on retaining a dominant position and complete freedom of action—if integration becomes in practice an exegesis of American schemes—we will probably find

that the political will of Europe will eventually be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view, it must be convinced that its views matter not only by the

that the political will of Europe will eventually be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view, it must be convinced that its views matter not only by the grace of a senior ally but also because of structural necessities.

American policy has not always been sensitive to the psychological prerequisites for effective consultation. It generally holds that influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company: the partner with the largest number of shares in a common enterprise is supposed to have the greatest influence.

Influence is, of course, an intangible quality. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle, with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality, has put his finger on the fact that as long as NATO is an alliance of sovereign states, a too literal conception of "integration" can easily lead to an evasion of responsibility. Difficult decisions can be avoided, and failure can be blamed on other allies. Even a major effort may not result in a corresponding increase in influence. In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real—as opposed to his formal—role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement. To combine technical integration with insistence on sovereignty can in time erode the moral basis of joint action.

Heretofore, American policy has assumed that the chief obstacle to close United States-European cooperation on a global scale is that the resources of the European nation-state are inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. According to this school of thought, the political integration of Europe will solve the problem of Allied consultation. A united Europe will be prepared to share world-wide burdens

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Political Prospects

228 The Strategic Issues

which a Europe of national states is reluctant to assume.
Under Secretary of State Ball has expressed the American
view as follows:

The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on fur-
ther with the achievement of its own unity—until it organizes itself
on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of
world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of
such responsibility under post-colonial conditions must be based
on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid—
and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more
than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently
mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.

The nature of world responsibility is rarely defined; it is
assumed to be self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador
to Germany, George McGhee, spoke as follows:

This [Atlantic partnership] entails increasing contributions in
formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from
countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the
ability to contribute.²

American policy seems to consider that its goals in these areas
are in the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge;
what it desires is a sharing of the cost.

But is it really true that willingness to assume global re-
sponsibilities is related to availability of resources? The
American national experience would seem to contradict this
assumption. Through the greatest part of its history, the
United States possessed the resources but not the inclination
to play a global role. Conversely many European states main-
tained overseas commitments when their resources were
much smaller than they are today.

For many European countries, the combination of de-

¹George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 216.

²George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), p. 138.

229

colonization and two World Wars has been traumatic. Hav-

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What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 229

colonization and two World Wars has been traumatic. Hav-
ing been forced to relinquish their overseas possessions, they
no longer consider that their security is *directly* affected by
what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than
run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area
from which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to
shift the risks and the burdens to us. They are reasonably
sure that long before upheavals in other continents threaten
the safety of Europe, the United States will have entered the
fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European
concerns in much the same way that the United States looked
at Europe's quarrels until 1941.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions—
often moralistic in tone—between “responsibility” and “in-
terest.” Under Secretary Ball, echoing similar statements by
Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

We Americans have few national interests—in the narrow sense
—outside our own territory but we have assumed vast world re-
sponsibility. . . . The willingness to accept world responsibility—
as distinct from the preservation of national interests—is, in our
observation and experience, not universal among the NATO mem-
bership.®

Aside from the fact that our European Allies are likely to
consider a "disinterested" foreign policy as both mercurial
and unsteady, the distinction misses the central point. The
chief reason for the reluctance of most of our Allies to assume
world responsibility is precisely that in the past decade they
have been obliged to give up their global interests. Sharing
our burdens would give impetus to Atlantic cooperation only
if our Allies have the same view as we of what is at stake
outside of Europe and if they believe that the United States
would curtail its commitments but for their assistance.
Neither condition is met today. The very commitment of the
United States to a global role—our often-invoked sense of
world responsibility—reduces the incentive of our Allies to

®Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," op. cit., p. 215.

232 Political Prospects

230 The Strategic Issues

share in it, much as the commitment of Britain and France to
the European balance of power permitted the United States
to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941.

Thus, European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic
disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than
reduce differences. As Europe gains structure, it will be in a
better position to assert divergent perspectives whose ulti-
mate cause is structural rather than personal. Phrases like
"indivisible interest" are correct when applied to the defense
of Europe or East-West relations; they come close to being
platitudes in other parts of the world. A wise Alliance policy
will not gear everything to the expectation that common
positions can be developed on a global basis; it will also take
account of the fact that the interests of Europe and America
are not identical everywhere.

This fact is relevant to any assessment of the degree of
integration of Atlantic policy which it is in our interest to
promote. Over the next decades the United States is likely to
find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast
Asia and in Latin America. Our European Allies will almost
certainly consider that their vital interests are not at stake in
these areas. If Atlantic policy is completely centralized, it
may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only
on doing nothing. Or else, it will engage in a series of pre-
tenses. The behavior of our Allies toward American requests
for assistance in Vietnam is a good example. The Soviets may
use our involvements in other continents as a pretext to
blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest
among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alli-
ance beyond the breaking point.

Looking beyond the immediate future, it is not difficult
to visualize an increasingly powerful China fomenting the
already strong tendencies toward turmoil in other parts of
the world. If we insist on remaining the sole trustee of global-
policy, the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be
too great. The day will come when we will consider a meas-

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 231 /3

ure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant.
In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning

23

ure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still/exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least/responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny.

If we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence. Each partner will regain a measure of flexibility. The temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Europe could assume greater responsibility for its defense and its future. Put positively, the Atlantic Alliance will have to decide whether to emphasize immediate convenience or long-term political vitality. At any given point of time, centralization of decisions guarantees the greatest degree of coordination. Critics of such schemes can always be put on the defensive by being accused of fomenting distrust. In the long term, however, excessive concentration of decision-making in the hands of the senior partner may deprive our Allies of the incentive to be responsible and it may create profound fissures when a conflict of interest becomes apparent.

This suggests that the vitality of the Alliance would be served by an Allied structure which makes possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues. For responsible attitudes to emerge, participants in a consultative process must do more than simply advise. Influencing another country's actions—however benevolent the dominant partner may be—will be demoralizing in the long run. If coalition diplomacy becomes largely an exercise in affecting essentially American decisions, most of our Allies will lose the incentive to make responsible judgments. The type of leader comfortable with such a relationship may be only too ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders; this very quality may make him unreliable when he is most needed in

234

Political Prospects

232

The Strategic Issues

times of crisis. For decisions to be meaningful, our Allies must consider them their own, not ours.

Paradoxically, some autonomy in political decision for Europe is psychologically important for the cohesion of the Alliance. Though this proposition will be granted by most American policymakers in the abstract, they tend to resist independence when it takes the form of challenging our judgments. A decade and a half of hegemony have accustomed us to believing that our views represent the general interest. The difficulty with which decisions are reached in our government produces temptations to turn Allied consultation into an attempt to implement essentially American conceptions.

Nevertheless, the future well-being of the Alliance depends on our willingness to adjust the pattern of relationships which grew up after the war. Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to control all the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality. Grandiose schemes of great technical complexity may magnify inward insecurities. What is needed is a recognition that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to share responsibilities even more than burdens. This will involve a painful loss of some of our former pre-eminence—a process to which no nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of European self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing

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238

238

/5

pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is
important for us as well.

In too much of the current dialogue we offer our good
intentions as a guarantee of the validity of our actions. But
the nature of our intentions is not at issue. It is important for
us to realize that our style and our commitment which have
been responsible for so many constructive measures can also
dissolve the identity of others. Our optimism makes us press
for final answers to any problem. These often take the form
of abstract models in which other nations are considered
interchangeable entities. Our pragmatism produces a willing-
ness to try everything once and a restless quest for ever "new"
remedies. Thus, sudden changes in our policy are not
uncommon-witness the checkered career of the MLF. Deci-
sions within our government are influenced by a combina-
tion of bureaucratic pressures in which the immediate often
predominates over the long-term.

All of this can make our impact undermine the sense of
responsibility of even close allies. Most societies lack the co-
hesiveness for the restless quest for novelty which seems
natural to us. The constant adjustment of policies to differ-
ing pressures can be demoralizing for countries whose margin
for maneuver is more limited. What appears as open-
mindedness to us may be seen as unsteadiness by others. The
fluctuations in our German policy from impatient aloofness
in 1961 to ardent wooing in 1963 to a more distant policy in
1965; the changes in the MLF from indifference to passionate
advocacy to aloof goodwill in the space of three years; the
frequent alterations of our strategic doctrine; the tendency of
our bureaucracy to conduct their internal battles by lining
up support in foreign capitals—all suggest that it is necessary
even for the stability of our own policy to have self-confident
partners with a strongly developed sense of identity. Reluc-
tant as we may be to admit it, we could benefit from a
counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and

234 The Strategic Issues

to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract
and “final” solutions. The real case for European autonomy
is not burden-sharing but the establishing of a psychological
balance between us and Europe.

For centuries one of the most difficult problems of West-
ern political thought has been how to reconcile unity with
respect for diversity. Overemphasis on either unity or di-
versity destroys the delicate balance of creativity. Excessive
stress on unity leads to a deadening conformism; exalting
diversity as an end produces a relativism hostile to great con-
ceptions and, on the political level, an overconcern with na-
tional peculiarities. To strike this balance is the big unsolved
problem before the Western Alliance.

THE GRAND DESIGN
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961,
the United States has argued that the most effective structure
for Atlantic cooperation is a partnership between the United
States and a united, supranational Europe. "When one part-
ner possesses over 50 per cent of the resources of an enterprise
and the balance is distributed among sixteen or seventeen
others, the relationship is unlikely to work very well." A Real
partnership, according to American spokesmen, is possible
only among equals.

As a result, American pronouncements have often as-
sumed that before Europe could be an effective partner of
the United States it would have to unify. This concept of
Atlantic partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Euro-
peans as Jean Monnet, has been described by the image of
"twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary of State
Herter has written:

¹George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962), p. 366.

23

1/7

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 23

17

I believe the present Administration [the Kennedy Administra-
tion]... holds the... view, which has come to be termed the
"dumbbell" concept—meaning that an economic and political
alliance is stronger if it has been agreed to by partners of equal
weight on both sides.

The European side of this partnership is to be a United
States of Europe organized on federal lines with suprana-
tional institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents
one form of Atlantic partnership. But an excessive, almost
doctrinaire commitment to it runs the risk of treating a
symbol as the only possible reality. This may cause us to beg
the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept
has been pursued obscures three questions: Is it true that
partnership is possible only among equals? What has been the
real progress toward European political integration? To what
extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of
European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of
the world, it seems strange that partnership should be said to
be possible only among equals. The assertion that we can
deal effectively only with countries of equal strength is not
conducive to inspiring confidence among the great majority
of the nations of the world which are weak.

Granting that a strong and united Europe is on balance
in our best interest, we must nevertheless inquire whether it
is wise—either from the point of view of Europe or of the
United States—to insist that there is only one reliable method
of bringing about that unity: that of federal, supranational
institutions. In the aftermath of De Gaulle's abrupt rejection
of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it has be-
come almost a commonplace that the willful act of a single
individual interrupted what would otherwise have been a

Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1963), p. 301.

smooth advance toward political integration. According to this view, once Britain would have entered the Common Market, an "outward-looking" Europe would have emerged. Progress toward supranational political institutions would have been continuous. In the opinion of the "integrationists" in Europe and in the State Department, European unity would have been promoted by a "community spirit," which in turn was to be fostered by supranational commissions. Expert judgment unaffected by considerations of national interest was to move European political integration forward, step-by-step, toward a final culmination in which the supranational authorities would be dominant. All this is said to have been destroyed by De Gaulle's abrupt exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences ascribed to De Gaulle. Significant underlying factors must have been operating to obstruct the idealized progression envisaged by the European integrationists on both sides of the Atlantic. It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which economic integration had been achieved could be applied automatically to the political arena. The "community" approach—which equates method and purpose—works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in *defining* this objective.

In the aftermath of World War II, this was obscured because Europe had been so shattered by the war that immediate needs were overwhelming. Leaders did not think that their problem was to choose among different objectives; on the contrary, the task of meeting minimum necessities absorbed all their energies. Most countries on the Continent had governments so weak or were so eager to overcome a past—or both—that an abdication of some of their sovereignty seemed a respite from overwhelming uncertainties. For many in Europe, economic activity became a means to avoid

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 237 /9

facing nearly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that the governments were only too glad to turn them over to supranational experts.

237

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the national state, the traditional repository of European loyalties. This process took place with varying intensity in each country. Germany and Italy, partly to escape their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a federal Europe than Britain and France. Smaller countries accustomed to the protection of some major power had less difficulty with the supranational concept than those that had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain—with the longest history as national states—have consistently aimed for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution; that is, a structure that preserves the identity of the states and in which decisions will be made, at least initially, on the basis of agreement among governments. Four years before De Gaulle came to power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated the obstacles faced by a supranational approach to political integration.

But if De Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for confusing the debate about the future of Europe in at least two ways: (1) The controversy between the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes toward De Gaulle. The line-up is not a reliable guide to the real views of the participants because many who strongly oppose De Gaulle's style and domestic policy are in agreement with him about the organization of Europe. (2) Some of the most ardent advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents of a federal Europe, which is as unacceptable in London as in

* For a splendid discussion of the problem of Europe's identity see Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and America," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Fall 1964).

240

Political Prospects

238 The Strategic Issues

Paris. Thus opponents of European integration have often-
combined forces with dedicated advocates of it to advance
sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the French
President.

This confusion has been magnified by the role of the
United States. Our strong support of supranational, federal
institutions has contributed to the stalemate in European dis-
cussions. While not sufficient to bring about our preferred
solution, our influence is strong enough to block approaches
with which we disagree. Moreover, despite our ardent sup-
port for European unity, our impact has often been the con-
trary of what was intended. While affirming the need for
European integration, we have unintentionally tended to
undermine a European sense of identity.

During the long period of American predominance, a
group of experts comfortable with the existing relationship
has grown up on both sides of the Atlantic. Having worked
well together for many years, they tend to see problems from
the same perspective. Though they generally favor European
integration, they consider the quest for European autonomy
inherently divisive. According to them, if United States
policy is wise, European autonomy will be unnecessary. If
United States policy is mistaken, an independent European
policy would only magnify the problem. Thus, both in Eu-
rope and the United States, many who urge European inte-
gration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European
policy—which is one of the likely results of European
integration.

This attitude is particularly noticeable in the field of de-
fense. Were Europe thrown on itself, it would probably unite
sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to
do so. But, having been sheltered by American power for
nearly two decades, many Europeans are concerned that the
emergence of an autonomous Europe in the area of defense
will undermine the American guarantee and force them into
assuming direct responsibilities. American pronouncements

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238

41

239

41

sometimes encourage this concern. The threat to withdraw American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic preferences. Proposals such as the MLF have the practical consequence of preventing the emergence of a European point of view on nuclear matters. These American attitudes have inhibited a European quest for autonomy; they have also caused some advocates of European identity in the defense field to give their case an anti-American cast.

These tendencies are reinforced by the fact that some Europeans prefer an Atlantic structure based on the existing NATO states to a united Europe. The smaller countries in particular fear that European integration will result in the hegemony of powerful neighbors. They see no advantage in European autonomy. Since they must follow the lead of a dominant country in any event, they prefer the hegemony of an ally 3,000 miles away and with a tradition of using its power with restraint. Consequently, these countries are a ready-made constituency for schemes to perpetuate the relationship between Europe and the United States that developed after the war.

In short, American policy has been extremely ambivalent: it has urged European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences. We have sought to combine a supra-national Europe with a closely integrated Atlantic Community under American leadership. These objectives are likely to prove incompatible. Indeed, the United States will have to reconcile itself to the fact that no matter what structure emerges in Europe, a difference in perspective with the United States is probable, particularly about policies outside of Europe. A wise policy will try to mitigate the impact of this difference; it will not be able to remove it.

This latent difference could well be accentuated by the manner in which European unity is achieved. History teaches that the more abrupt the political transitions, the more drastic have to be the efforts to reestablish some sort of co-

INSERT

In any event, the real issue is not the institutions but the
composition of a united Europe. An effective Europe cannot be
built without the whole-hearted support of Great Britain. As long
as Britain stands on the sidelines, uncertain about its direction
and undecided about its European role, any solution will be partial.
Symbolic and substantive measures will be confused. Many in Europe
will be wary of British proposals because they fear that they are
intended to undermine a European sense of identity. This is most
noticeable in the field of nuclear control, but it applies in all
other areas of policy as well. "Atlantic" and "European" conceptions
will be viewed as alternatives rather than as complementary. This
will produce a schism in many countries, most obviously in the Federal
Republic. As long as Britain does not make a commitment to the unity
of Europe, the thrust of most current policies will be either to
isolate Britain or to isolate France.

To be sure, Britain was prevented from entering the Common
Market by a French veto. But it is also clear that Briatin's
ambivalence contributed to this outcome and that it has been uncertain
about its relations with Europe for the entire postwar period.
Exclusion from the Common Market cannot prevent a major British
contribution to the political construction of Europe if Britain is
prepared to exercise leadership. Until Britain is ready for this role,
debates about the relative merits of federalism and confederalism
are academic.

(cont'd)

INSERT (cont'd)

This suggests that the future of a united Europe depends more
on developments in London, Paris and Bonn than on strictures from
Washington. The United States should therefore → no →

240 The Strategic Issues

hesion. A Europe that grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties must have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to European unity could produce either a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *partries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity could be what distinguished it from America.

It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the European national parliaments has been apparent for decades. In no European country—not even Great Britain—does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. Party discipline has become so pervasive that in European parliaments the majority almost always ratifies the decisions of the cabinet. And where the party system is ineffective—either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them—the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals. A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely unrelated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to reexamine American priorities. The mechanical notion that one particular form of European integration automatically will solve the problem of Atlantic partnership should be abandoned. The United States should leave the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity and influence in devising new forms of *Atlantic* cooperation. The passionate commitment

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 241

of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form and substance. It could in fact bring about results quite contrary to those intended. Many European federalists have been

of so many American policymakers to a single formula of
European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form
and substance. It could in fact bring about results quite con-
trary to those intended. Many European federalists have been
devoted adherents of Atlantic partnership: Jean Monnet,
their most significant figure, has been a staunch and remarka-
ble friend of the United States. By contrast, President de
Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt and uni-
lateral tactics designed to exalt the status of France, occasion-
ally at our expense. It would be one of history's frequent
irritations if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet
would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy
generally described as Gaullist, while the structure advocated
by De Gaulle turned out to be best suited for flexible At-
lantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies some-
times blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own
momentum, which cannot necessarily be foreseen from the
intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any unified Europe that reflects the desires of Europeans, it is doubtful that either our national or Atlantic interests require our passionate commitment to a supranational structure for Europe. A very schematic and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is each European country always inherently closer to its European neighbors than to the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility?

There may be various roads to European unity. The one
traced by the Fouchet Plan—calling for institutionalized meet-
ings of foreign ministers and subcabinet officials—is not the
least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with
British participation. It has the advantage that it would pro-
duce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future