30

[Y]

the strategy preferred by the United States. What if the Soviets use nuclear weapons on Europe only? Even more, what if they use them on Europe in the controlled, flexible way recommended by Secretary McNamara? It is a great deal to ask of the Europeans to concentrate all their military efforts on weapons which can be overcome by the introduction of nuclear arms while the United States reserves control over the weapons at any level of conflict which is not purely conventional. Such a situation would be made to order for Soviet "nuclear blackmail".

Thus both our concept of general war and the emphasis on particular, we have given to conventional operations have raised the nuclear issue in acute form. Our insistence on a single chain of command for strategic nuclear war and our downgrading of tactical nuclear weapons has seemed to polarize the choices for the Europeans. When faced with the alternative between a small nuclear force and a few strategic conventional divisions, they are likely to opt for weapons which appear

more deviations, they are likely to opt for weapons which abhor
with the alternative between a small nuclear force and a few
agreed to polarize the choices for the European states. When faced
unclear war and ourown الأن导ing of tactical nuclear weapons has
form. Our inattention on a single chain of command for strategic
conventional operations have raised the nuclear issue in some
& some pay our concept of general war and the Ambrose at
would be made to order for Soviet "nuclear strike."

conflict which is not barely conventional. And a situation
ted States reserves control over the weapons at any level of
be overcome by the introduction of nuclear arms while the Uni-
to concentrate all their military efforts on weapons which can
secretary MacMans? It is a great deal to ask of the European
them on Europe in the controlled, flexible way recommended by
use nuclear weapons on Europe only? Even more, what if they use
the strategy preferred by the United States. What if the Soviets

30a

[N]

to maximize risks rather than minimize losses. Our tendency
to look on the Alliance as a unit and the participating coun-
tries as subdivisions of a large corporation has frozen inter-
allied dialogue in a framework of abstractions. Our quest

-- reflecting the subordination of the State to
the Defense Department --

for technical options has had the curious result of limiting
the range of our political choices. This is why the new
strategy has led to what is probably the most serious crisis
in NATO's history.

(to page 31--Section III.)

(to be 37--Section III.)

in NATO's history.

attractively has led to what it properly the most serious criteria
the range of our political choices. This is why the new

for technical objectives has put the curious result of limiting

stifled disinformation in a framework of operations. Our defeat

tried as subdivisions of a large corporation has broken inter-

to look on the Alliance as a unit and the participating com-

30a

31

### III. European Concerns: National Nuclear Forces.

The nature of the crisis is underlined by the inability of the two sides to understand what really is in dispute.

We have called national nuclear forces--particularly the French

(to page 31a)

31a

[N]

effort--divisive, inimical to the West, based on distrust of the United States, prone to obsolescence, and even less flattering epithets. It has been said that the French nuclear program is based on a rejection of the interdependence of the Atlantic Community. "Premier Khrushchev, " President Kennedy has argued, "believes our nuclear guarantee and I believe he is right."

The French have not helped matters by pressing their own arguments with a kind of Cartesian rationalism which sometimes threatens to turn valid arguments into parodies. It is one thing to argue the undeniable fact that in the age of nuclear plenty the old nations of nuclear protection have to be modified and that a redistribution of responsibilities on nuclear matters is required. It is quite another to insist that this ends all possibility of one country coming to the assistance of another. Both sides have had a tendency to set up straw men for debating purposes: the French, the bogey of our complete unreliability; the United States, the pretense of a

33

on as a unit, a strategy which exposes a limited territory to
the fluctuations of conventional combat may seem eminently
sensible. To the allies on whose territory such a war would
be fought, a Soviet penetration of even a hundred miles might
well spell the end of their national existence. Since they be-
lieve that even a conventional war may spell the end of their
national existence, they have a high incentive to strive for
a strategy which poses the threat of maximum devastation for
the Soviets. Europeans are almost inevitably more concerned
with deterrence than with defense.

In this context, such statements as Secretary Ball's to
the NATO parliamentarians in November 1962 are extraordinarily
double-edged. Secretary Ball argued that the Cuban crisis
proved the importance of a conventional superiority and there-
fore of a conventional build-up in Europe. It was of course
fortunate that the Cuban crisis occurred in an area of over-
whelming U.S. conventional superiority. But most Europeans
are convinced that in Europe the reverse relationship obtains.

35

allied front, thus in effect giving a veto to the least resolute ally.

During the Berlin crisis it was often said that since the United States has the entire responsibility for nuclear defense, we would reserve the right to negotiate even without the consent of our allies: [Kennedy press conference statement, April, 1962]. And in October 1962, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, wrote: "Outside the nuclear field, our claims upon our allies can be entrusted to the formula of reciprocity." In these terms, our allies have an incentive to develop national nuclear forces not only to bargain with the Soviet Union but to gain a greater influence over our actions.

Since the chief impetus for the European nuclear programs derives from intangibles of political and psychological influence, it is therefore extraordinarily immature to turn the issue into a personal debate about the integrity of the assurances of a particular President. For the Europeans to forge

36

any national nuclear programs would be to resign forever from
a realm of technology on which their future security and in-
deed economic welfare will depend to a greater or lesser ex-
tent. It would mean entrusting their fate not to this Presi-
dent but to all future Presidents. It would turn Europe from
a partner into a satellite. Apart from the moral issue this
raises, Europe has had too many recent proofs of the inability
of one President to commit another, not to want some means to
determine their fate. The change in emphasis in U.S. strategic
thinking over the past two years, the perempby way in which we
cancelled xlm Skybolt, withdrew the Jupiter bases and altered
the strategic doctrine of NATO indicates that no political
leader can possibly predict the judgments of successors in an
age of extraordinarily volatile technology.

But the problem goes deeper still. Europeans living on
a continent covered with ruins testifying to the impermanence
of human foresight feel in their bones that history is more
manifold than systems analysis. They have had too much ex-
perience with the nuances of interpretation of formal commit-

37

ments. They know that in this century no person, however
wise, could have predicted at the beginning of any decade
the world
what/would be like at its end. They do not feel that they
must be able to describe the exact circumstances in which they
might have to rely on their nuclear forces in order to wish to
reserve some degree of control over their destiny.

Our frequently expressed outrage at the seeming European
doubt about the reliability of our nuclear guarantee has
blinded us to the fact that we have in effect accused our allies
of being too irresponsible to be entrusted with the ultimate
means of their protection. The asymmetry--to use a favorite
word of the new strategic analysis--between the two kinds of
distrust is pronounced. For, if the Europeans are wrong, the
chief penalty is a certain duplication of effort; while if
they are right, our policy would deprive them of the means to
influence their fate.

Our arguments that we oppose European nuclear efforts
because they are useless tend to be overdone even on the purely
technical plane. A few hundred British and a few score French

beside that resort and not the normal practice, though we can
then we--that using their forces independently would be a ge-
we is a motif surely wrong. They must know--perhaps better
But the fear that our allies may prove more reckless than
to be forced into a unclear war against our will.

McMoRans's a counterforce strategy. Above all, we do not want
fear that they make imhoardable the application of Secretary
forces, then, is not so much their ineffectiveness as the
attack first. The rest parte of our opposition do uncertain
French retaliatory forces in case of extreme provocation--they
decisive--casualties which can be inflicted by the British and
der whether the objective is worth the very large--even if not
launching other forms of attack the Soviets must surely coust-
 influence an extraordinarily risk of U. S. retaliation. And in
 the NATO guarantee retains some ambiguity, and an attack would
 these forces even if their bases are vulnerable. We found as
 irritations. The Soviets cannot launch a preemptive attack against
delivery appliances cannot be without some impact on Soviet air-

39

hardly expect them to advertize this fact. Whatever they may say, now they will learn that they must think of their nuclear forces much as Sweden and Switzerland think of their armies. Neither country is able to withstand a full-scale attack by a major power. Both would prefer allies in such a case. Their military forces do give them the possibility to pose risks which an aggressor may consider out of proportion to the objectives to be achieved. And they may gain time for allied assistance to be effective.

We thus reach the heart of the issue raised by European nuclear forces. Does the interdependence of the Atlantic area have to be vindicated by a structure in which only one ally possesses the physical ability to engage in nuclear war? Is the test of Atlantic partnership really a "single strategic force" integrated into a "single chain of command," as Secretary McNamara asserts. Or is it possible to have several centers of decision coordinated with each other politically so that their power serves a common end?

that their power serves a common end
centers of decision coordinated with each other politically so
to support McNamara's assertions. Or is it possible to have several
forces integrated into a "single chain of command," so secre-
tary McNamara asserts. Does the interdependence of the Atlantic
nuclear forces, does the interdependence of the Atlantic
We thus reach the heart of the issue raised by European
to be effective.

to be achieved. And they may gain time for stilted resistance
an addressor may consider out of proportion to the objectives
military forces go give them the possibility to pose risks which
a major power. Both would better stilt in and on a case. Their
Neither country is able to withstand a full-scale attack by
forces may be Sweden and Switzerland think of their smiles.
Yes, they will learn that they must think of their enemies
largely expect them to square off this fact. Whatever they may

39

After all, one of two things is likely to happen with
respect to European nuclear power: either our allies realize
that our strategic theory is right, in which case they will
coordinate their forces with ours; or they will assume the
major burden of their own defense, which is what we have al-
ways said we wanted and what in fact is in the common inter-
est. The former is by far the more likely outcome. It has
been our experience with Great Britain. It is likely to be
our experience with France if we ever get away from scholastic
arguments over the relative merits of "integration" and "co-
ordination", and face the practical issue of how to relate
a French nuclear force to the common defense.

A policy of confidence in our European allies is all
the more necessary as the range of our control over events
is extremely limited. A British strategic force exists. A
French nuclear program has been in operation for nearly a
decade. Attempts to atrophy them are likely to lead to the
most extreme formulations of strategic doctrine and to the

most extreme formulations of strategic doctrine and to the decade. Attempts to stifle them are likely to lead to the French nuclear program being put in operation for nearly a decade. A British strategic force exists. The more necessarily so the range of our control over events A policy of confidence in our European allies is iff a French nuclear force to the common defense. Organization, and face the practical issue of how to relate arguments over the relative merits of "integration" and "co-our experience with France if we ever get away from ad hoc manner purporting of their own defense, which is what we have already coordinate their forces with ours; or they will assume the that our strategic theory is right, in which case they will respect to European nuclear power: either our allies realize After all, one of two things is likely to happen with

most dangerous, because vulnerable, strategic design. Or
else, if we succeed, we may well discredit not a particular
defense policy but **all** attempts to assume responsibility
for national defense. Then we will have brought about the
kind of Third Force which should really worry us: based on
the resentments of the impotent and relying on the manipul-
ations of the irresponsible. The difference can best be il-
lustrated by the contrasting behavior of President De Gaulle
and Premier Fanfani during the Cuban crisis. Not everyone
who gives us no trouble will give us support.

To be sure, many of the formulations on behalf of Euro-
pean nuclear forces have been extreme and one-sided. A rudi-
mentary technology has produced an often crude strategic doc-
trine. But these theories are subject to the same evolution-
ary process as they have been in the United States. We should
not judge a mature European program by its beginnings which,
moreover, are needlessly protracted by our opposition.

The real problem is whether we are ready to face an in-
dependent European center for decision on nuclear matters, and

rely on political consultations to relate European purposes
to ours. So far, we have opted for continued hegemony.

Phrases like "multilateralism" and "interdependence" have
hidden the reality of an attempt to maintain individual phy-
sical--which would mean U.S.--control. Given European pres-
sures in the opposite direction, this policy has forced us
to adopt remedies more dangerous than the ill they have
sought to cure. We have purchased brief respites in Allied
disputes by mortgaging the future. Almost every program
which we have advanced in the name of our notion of multi-
lateralism has had the practical consequence of accentuating
rather than ameliorating NATO's nuclear dilemma, and there-
fore it has undermined the long-term political stability of
the Atlantic Alliance.

the Atlantic Alliance.

fore it has undermined the long-term political stability of
rather than ameliorating NATO's unclean dilemma, and there-
fores if possible the practical consequence of accentuating
which we have advanced in the name of our motion of multi-
diplomacy by working out the future. Almost every program
sought to cure. We have purchased brief rebates in Allied
to adopt remedies more generous than the ill they have
arise in the opposite direction, this policy has forced us
strictly--which would mean U.S.--control. Given European brea-
frigden the reality of an attempt to maintain intact bry-
bureaus like "multilaterals" and "interdependence," have
to cure. So far, we have opted for continued hegemony.

rely on political couplings to relate European burdens

IV. United States Remedies for the Nuclear Dilemma--The
lateral Force.

The Administration has adopted three policies in pursuit
of its goal of a single, centrally-controlled nuclear force
for the Alliance.

(a) It has indicated increasing willingness to permit Europeans to share in the targeting of our strategic forces, the vast majority of which remain under our exclusive control.

(b) It has "assigned" nuclear submarines subject to
agreed NATO guidelines.

(c) It has pushed--ambivalently and with various degrees
of intensity--the creation of a NATO multilateral force.

Of these steps, the first is constructive even if it
does not go to the heart of the problem. It is no doubt
highly desirable for Europeans to know of the targeting of
our strategic forces and to participate in planning. Joint
targeting does not, however, alter the United States monopoly
position. It meets, to some extent, the interests of all
allies in a common war plan. It does not solve the far more

important problem of political control, specifically the de-
cision to enter nuclear war.

As for the assignment of Polaris submarines to NATO,
this measure was first announced by President Kennedy in
Ottawa in May, 1961. It was then repeated with considerable
by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial meeting in
Athens in 1962. At that time, it was stated that five Polaris
submarines had been "assigned" to NATO, with more to come. In
his report to the House Armed Services Committee on January
30, 1963, Secretary McNamara pointed out that we had "ear-
marked a fully operational Polaris force to the NATO command."

However, it is important to understand what this "ear-
marking" consists of. All forces in NATO are national forces.
The line of command of U.S. forces runs from Washington through
the appropriate U.S. headquarters. NATO headquarters are
planning outfits which control forces "assigned" to them only
during specified maneuvers or in war. Each ally, of course, re-
tains the right to go to war according to its own constitutional
processes.

processes.

tains the right to do so war according to its own constitutional
guring abetted men however or in war. Each sily' of course, re-
pending outいて which control forces "assigned" to them only
the abrobriste U.S. presidurter. NATO presidurter are

The line of command of U.S. forces runs from Washington through
marking "concrete of. All forces in NATO are national forces.
However, it is important to understing what this "er-

marked a fully operational Polaris force to the NATO command."
30, 1963, Secretary McNamara pointed out that we had "er-

his report to the House Armed Services Committee on January
submarines had been "assigned" to NATO, with more to come. In
Athena in 1963. At that time, it was stated that five Polaris
by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial meeting in

Ottawa in May, 1963. It was then reposed with considerable
this measure was first announced by President Kennedy in
Ya for the assignment of Polaris submarines to NATO.

cisation to enter unclear war.

44 45

[4]

With respect to Polaris forces, the line of command
runs from Washington to the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlan-
tic. The same Admiral is also NATO Supreme Commander, At-
lantic.

The practical effect of the "assignment" of Polaris
to NATO is that the Admiral involved can give orders in his
capacity as NATO commander to himself in his capacity as
United States commander. Whatever "hat" the Admiral wears,
in ultimate control of our Polaris Force,
to give direct orders to this force as a United States naval
unit. Our veto remains absolute. The influence of our
allies over targeting and planning of this force is not notice-
ably greater than over those strategic forces which remain
under exclusive United States control--particularly if Euro-
peans can participate in the targeting of the latter. In
other words, the "assignment" of the Polaris force to NATO is
largely symbolic.

In fact, the influence of our European allies on nuclear
strategy has actually diminished with respect to the three
Polaris submarines "assigned" to the Mediterranean to replace

the Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey. The Jupiter missiles were subject to the double-veto system, that is to say, had Italy and Turkey ~~would~~ have to agree before ~~they~~ could be fired. The only influence Italy and Turkey ~~will~~ have over the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean is through NATO guide-lines, if these can be agreed upon.

The notion of guide-lines presents serious problems of its own. Are they to be conceived as a kind of contingency plan for the employment of nuclear weapons, *provided* the governments concerned agree to implement these plans? Or are they to be considered a delegation of authority to the *Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic* to use nuclear weapons in certain specified contingencies without further reference to political authority?

to political authority?

in certain specified contingencies without further reference
Supreme Allied-Commander, Atlantic to see nuclear weapons
are they to be considered a delegation of authority to the
governments concerned agree to implement these plans? Or
plan for the employment of nuclear weapons, provided the
its own. Are they to be conceived as a kind of contingency
The notion of bridge-lines presents serious problems of
lines, if there can be agreement now.

Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean is through NATO guide-
fired. The only influence Italy and Turkey have over the
Italy and Turkey would have to agree before they could be
HAG
the Inifiers
If they are agreed upon.

43

If guidelines are to be interpreted in the former
sense--as a form of contingency war plan--they are another
version of the joint targeting previously described.

However, in that case it is not clear why a formal assignment
to NATO was necessary or how the NATO-committed Polaris
forces are distinguished from our other strategic forces.

If, on the other hand, the guidelines are to determine
not the targets but the circumstances in which nuclear
weapons are to be used, serious problems would arise.

A guideline so conceived not only includes; it also
excludes. It defines not only when nuclear weapons are to
be employed, but the circumstances when they will not be
used. It is possible that the only contingency where all
allies would agree in advance is the case of a massive
Soviet nuclear attack on Europe--the circumstance about
which there is likely to be least doubt and where the

obvious and unambiguous cases of nuclear aggression, for
which the very act of predelegation may indicate uncertainties
likely to create problems of its own. In short, guidelines
have the uses and limitations of joint targeting; they are
but a small step in the direction of solving NATO's nuclear
dilemma.

These considerations come to a particular focus with
respect to the kingpin of our NATO nuclear policy: the
NATO multilateral force. This proposal has had a checkered
history. It was first advanced for study by Secretary
Herter in December, 1960. It was then cold-shouldered in
the first few months of the Kennedy Administration. Then
in May, 1961 at Ottawa, President Kennedy announced a
willingness to consider "a NATO sea-borne force which would
be truly multilateral in ownership and control." Our
European allies were invited to make proposals to this end.

Given the fact that none of our allies possessed
seaborne nuclear systems and that a command and control
system even for a national force is not a simple matter,
the probability that our allies would come up with a
meaningful control system was not great. Indeed, many
believed that the problem would be recognized as insoluble.
Our allies were then expected to ask the President to act as
executive agent of the Alliance with respect to nuclear
weapons.

When this did not transpire, the United States a year
later again offered to consider a NATO nuclear force provided
our allies first built up their conventional forces and
came up with an acceptable control system. Since the control
problem had not become any easier in the interim and since most
of our allies were dubious about the need for the kind of
conventional build-up we were proposing, it was not clear

conventional build-up we were bussing up, it was not clear
of our allies wereSUPPOSED to need for the kind of
problem had not become any easier in the interim and since most
came up with an acceptable control system. Since the control
our allies first put up their conventional forces and
later again offered to consider a NATO nuclear force provided
when this did not transpire, the United States a year
ago broke.

executive agent of the Alliance with respect to nuclear
our allies were then expected to ask the President to set up
believed that the problem would be recognized as inextricable.

meaningful control system was not direct. Indeed, many
the probability that our allies would come up with a
system even for a national force is not a simple matter,
responsive nuclear systems and that a command and control
given the fact that none of our allies possessed

whether our proposal was put forward in order to be accepted
or to be rejected.

Three months later, in September, 1962, the Special
Assistant of the President for National Security Affairs,
McGeorge Bundy, spoke in terms of a multilateral _European_
force: "It would be wrong to suppose that our aversion for
individual weak and non-integrated nuclear forces would
automatically be extended to a unified and multilateral
European force which could be effectively integrated into
joint NATO defense planning." This speech said nothing
about what we understood by "multilateral," "integrated" or
"unified."

Two months later, in November 1962, Under Secretary of
State George Ball returned to the theme of a NATO force. He
argued that we thought a NATO multilateral nuclear force
militarily unnecessary. However, "should other NATO countries

multilaterally unnecessarily. However, "should other NATO countries agreed that we thought a NATO multilateral nuclear force state George Ball returned to the theme of a NATO force. He two months later, in November 1965, Under Secretary of "united."

apart what we understand by "multilaterals," "integrated" or joint NATO defense planning." This approach said nothing to the United States. "It would be wrong to assume that our action for force: "If would be wrong to assume that our action for George Bungl, whose in terms of a multilateral European Vassatant of the President for National Security Affairs, Three months later, in September, 1965, the Special or to be rejected.

whether our probes were but forward in order to be accepted

so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to
the creation of a genuinely multilateral medium-range
ballistic missile force fully coordinated with the other
deterrent forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

A month later, at the regular NATO Ministerial
Conference in December, 1962, nothing was done about the
creation of a NATO multilateral force. A week later, on
December 21, 1962 (check) President Kennedy and Prime
Minister Macmillan signed the Nassau Agreement, which
provided not for two multilateral forces composed of two groups-
of-force, one which would absorb the strategic forces of
Great Britain and France together with a United States
contribution of nationally-owned submarines; another in
which the non-nuclear countries of NATO would create a
"truly" multilateral Polaris force which was later explained
to mean that it would be jointly financed, owned, planned,

manned, and operated.

Nothing was said about how either multilateral force
was to be controlled, deployed or targetted. Two weeks
later-- on January 10, 1963, before President de Gaulle's
press conference--Secretary Ball was back in Paris to explain
to the NATO Council that the multilateral NATO force, which
he had declared militarily unnecessary two months previously,
was now a high priority goal of the Kennedy Administration.

Indeed, he was reported to have suggested that the United
States was ready to begin training submarine crews of
mixed national composition immediately.

This sequence of events is important to keep in mind
because it might well have led even political leaders less
suspicious of United States motives than President De Gaulle
to doubt whether we really had a "grand design" or whether
we were not simply offering palliatives to perpetuate our

hegemony. In any event, after President De Gaulle's press
conference, the multilateral force composed of the presently
non-nuclear powers was pushed energetically. "Informed
sources" were quoted as having said that we would create a
force sufficiently strong so that the Federal Republic of
Germany in particular would see that the advantages of our
notion of multilateralism far exceeded any benefits to be
gained by association with France.

In order to thwart French nuclear pretentions we
proposed to create a counterweight by bringing some of the
non-nuclear European countries into the act. The already
difficult issue of multilateral control has thus become
further complicated because we have made membership in the
"mixed" force a test of Atlantic solidarity. Livingston Merchant
has been appointed to carry out the negotiations to bring
this force into being.

this force into being.

has been appointed to carry out the negotiations to bring
"mixed" force a test of Atlantic solidarity. Rivaudatou Merchant
further complicated because we have used memperabip in the
difficult issue of multilaterat control has thus become
non-unclear Emobesen countries into the set. The strictly
proposed to create a counterweight by printing some of the
In order to trimart French uncleat pretentions we
dained by association with France.

notion of multilaterism tar exceeded any benefits to be
germany in particular would see that the advantages of om
force sufficiently atroud so that the Federal Republic of
sources" were quoted as having said that we would create a
now-unclear bowers waspued energetically. "Informed
conference, the multilaterat force composed of the kreasurly
pedemouy. In any event, after President De Galle's break

in any event, after President De Galle's break

Since then, the United States position has continued
to shift. Despite the offer to train submarine crews, we
have recently indicated that surface ships might be a
better solution. Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy
have spoken of both a European and an Atlantic multilateral
force. But the practical requirements they make for
either cause the distinction to be ephemeral. They agree
that it must be "integrated"; there must be a single chain
of command and a single finger on the trigger. In the
light of Secretary McNamara's strategic theories, this
must mean that either a NATO or a European nuclear force
has to be under ultimate United States command.

For the McNamara strategy of a controlled response
against the Soviet retaliatory force presupposes, according
to our own statements, central control of all the strategic
forces of the Alliance. Indeed, one main advantage urged on

behalf of a multilateral over a national force is that
the former is said to permit centralized control. And,
as the President has emphasized in this press conference
of ..., this control must be in the hands of one
man. "The United States will make clear" the New York Times
reported on February 27 "that there will be only one finger
on the trigger of any nuclear force established by NATO.
It will be that of the President of the United States."

In giving multilateralism this definition we are trying
to defend Atlantic solidarity on an issue and with a solution
certain to magnify Allied divisions in the long run.

Political problems are not amenable to solution by technical
gimmicks, however subtle. It will only discredit the valid
and important concept of interdependence to associate it with
schemes which deprive our allies of the physical possibility
of independent action while reserving this right for ourselves.

of indigentent action while reserving this right for oneself.

scheme which gebrive our allies of the brutal possibility
and important concept of intergebeugence to associate it with
Dummicks however ample. It will only discredit the asid

Political problems are not simple to solve by technical
certainly to meanly lifted divatiae in the land run.

In giving multilaterally this definition we are trying

on the trigger of any nuclear force aspirated by NATO.

reported on February 31 "that there will be only one finger
man." The United States will make clear "the New York Times
of .... .... .... this control must be in the hands of one

as the President has emphasized in his press conference



because of a multilateral over a national force is that



22

57

This may be a desirable solution from our point of view--
though it is in the long term likely to prove short-sighted.
But we should not call such an arrangement partnership and
we must not delude ourselves that this is a long-term
solution. On the contrary, the NATO nuclear force is the
beginning and not the end of a process. It will generate,
not alleviate pressures for change.

At the moment, the political constellation of Europe
prohibits an articulation of this problem, perhaps even
its clear recognition. Great Britain, though in practice
striving to retain a nuclear independence, is very similar to
France's, cannot afford any further controversy. Nevertheless,
the much heralded "assignment" of the British V-bomber force
to NATO, has had the same significance as our previous
earmarking of Polaris submarines. It was a symbolic act which
did not diminish British wishes. The Federal Republic of

did not diminish British wishes. The Federal Republic of
earmarking of Polaris submarines. It was a symbolic act which
to NATO, had put the same significance as our brevions
the much pursued "assignment" of the British A-pomper force
France cannot afford any further controversy. Nevertheless,
achieving to retain a nuclear independence very similar to
its clear recognition. Great Britain, though in practice
broadens its articulation of this problem, perhaps even
not satisfaire blemmes for cause.

beginning and not the end of a process. It will generate
solution. On the contrary, the NATO nuclear force is the
we must not verge ourselves that this is a long-term
but we should not call such an arrangement partnership and
though it is in the long term likely to prove short-lived.

This way be a desirable solution from our point of view--

27

58

[N]

Germany has seen in agreement to the multilateral NATO force of mixed crews an opportunity to reassure us about Atlantic solidarity. The other European countries that have agreed to participate--at last report Italy, Belgium and, perhaps, the Netherlands--are more likely to do so to keep an eye on Germany and not because of strategic convictions.

Indeed, any reflection about the structure of the multilateral composed of mixed crews gives as much reason to worry about those that agree to join as about those who refuse. For one thing, the requirement of mixed manning is a symptom of extraordinary distrust of our allies. The chief reason is to prevent any national government from withdrawing part of the force. Is every national contingent to receive separate instructions before the missiles can be fired? No wonder that almost without exception military commanders, U.S. as well as allied, consider the requirement of mixed manning

59

with extreme distaste.

Apart from the problem of what may be termed control
by the threat of mutiny, it is difficult to see just what
would be achieved by the proposed force. According to
Secretary McNamara's testimony, it cannot be used independent
of our much larger forces. In any event we would presumably
keep control over the nuclear warheads of the NATO--according
to the *McMahon act* we would have no other choice. Even if
the law were changed with respect to the physical control
over warheads, the problem of the veto would remain.

If we retain the veto one of two things would happen.
If we decide to engage in nuclear war and our allies refuse,
we would use SAC and our entire Polaris force including that
part of it "assigned" to NATO. If the situation were
reversed--that is, if our allies wish to use nuclear weapons
and we disagree-- neither the NATO force nor SAC could operate.

In short, a multilateral NATO force with a United States veto
would multiply safety catches but not triggering devices and
even the safety catch would be largely illusory because the
major part of our nuclear strength would remain outside of
NATO control.

WTO control.

Major part of our nuclear strength would remain outside of even the safety catch would be largely financially because the would multibly safety catches put out triggering devices and in some, a unilaterral WTO force with a United States veto

Can we give up the veto? It is not easy to see how a
country can abdicate so fateful a decision to a majority vote
of allies, no matter how close. The constitutional issue would
surely be formidable.

Moreover, what would giving up the veto commit us to? Does
it mean that we would go to war with part of the Polaris missiles
assigned to NATO? In terms of Secretary McNamara's testimony,
this partial employment of nuclear power is what must in all
circumstances be avoided. And it is in any event difficult to
imagine making a commitment to go to nuclear war indirectly and
with only the smallest part of our forces.

But if we agree to go to war with out entire nuclear
arsenal, what is the point of creating a NATO force? Then it
would be wiser to create a political control body for the
Alliance as a whole and agree to go to war on the basis of whatever
majority vote seems indicated. (Of course, such a commitment would
probably still not meet the need: Even under existing arrangements

propably still not meet the need. Even under existing arrangements
majority vote seems indicated. (Of course, such a commitment would
Villisea as a whole and agree to do so to war on the basis of whatever
would be wiser to create a political control body for the
areas), what is the point of creating a NATO force? Then it
But it we agree to do so to war with our entire enemy
with only the smallest part of our forces.

insaine making a commitment to do to enemy war indirectly and
circumstances be avoided. And it is in any event difficult to
this bilateral employment of enemy power is what must in all
satisfied to NATO? In terms of Secretary McNaught's a testimony,
it means that we would do to war with part of the Polish allies
Moreover, what would giving up the veto commit us to? Does
anxiously be formidible.

of allies, no matter how close. The constitutional frame would
country can spade so fast as a decision to a majority vote
Can we give up the veto? It is not easy to see how a

we could refuse to aid our allies if we are prepared to wreck NATO,
which would be exactly the situation under the new scheme.)

It is sometimes suggested that the issue of the veto be avoided by constituting the multilateral force as an European forec particularly if the European countries so desired. But this runs counter to our repeated public declarations of the need for a single target system, rapid response and unified command. Then again, the European nations now envisaged as participants in the multilateral force are unlikely to ask us to leave it. Such a gesture would defeat one of the chief purposes for joining it: the demonstration of Atlantic solidarity. It would greatly increase the financial burden. It would raise the specter of Germany domination of the force and thus create powerful antagonisms in other European countries. And it would yield our allies no greater control over this destiny. A multilateral force composed of the Federal Republic, Italy, Belgium and, perhaps, Holland is not likely to be unanimous about the decision to go to nuclear war except in conditions so overwhelmingly clear that the United States

veto would present no concern even for the most suspicious.

It has also been reported that the United States is willing to accept a European commander for the proposed multilateral force. ~~either~~

But this is ~~with~~ a palliative or a source of concern. If political control is effective the issue of the veto will not be affected by having an European commander. But if political control is not reliable we would be in the position of showing more confidence in a European military man than in the constitutionally established leadership. And unauthorized use is likely to be a particular problem in an organization deliberately constructed so that its members can have no primary allegiance to any of the established political entities. In short, the multilateral force of ~~presently~~ non-nuclear powers may wind up by frustrating every member. It is often said that this force will avoid the issue of strategic weapons in German lands. But if the Federal Republic is seriously interested in arguing strategic weapons, the multilateral force is likely to prove only an interim step and may turn out to be the easiest way of getting Germany into the

nuclear business. The danger in the multilateral force as now projected is that those who want serious control over their nuclear destiny will not remain long content with the projected arrangements, while those who go along for such motives as pleasing us, defying France or keeping an eye on Germany will soon grow tired of the expense and search for other options.

This becomes apparent when the financial implications of our proposal are examined. The number of missiles most frequently mentioned for the NATO nuclear force is three hundred or some eighteen Polaris submarines. It is interesting that this represents four times the delivery vehicles of the French Mirage force and three times that of the projected British Polaris force. In order to prevent the development of the existing national nuclear forces, we are engaged in the curious process of diffusing an even larger number of weapons to a group of countries not now in the nuclear business and with no immediate prospect of entering it.

The cost of an individual Polaris submarine has been estimated by the British Defense Minister Thorneycroft at around £150 million.

by the British Defense Minister Winston Churchill at around £20 million.

The cost of an individual Polaris submarine has been estimated
the Unclear business and with no immediate prospect of entering it.

even earlier number of weapons to a number of countries not now in
forces, we are engaged in the curious process of difficulting an
order to prevent the development of the existing national Unclear
three times that of the projected British Polaris force. In
four times the delivery vehicles of the French Mirade force and
eighteen Polaris submarines. It is interesting that this represents
mentioned for the NATO Unclear force is three hundred or some
our proposal are examined. The number of missiles most frequently

This becomes apparent when the financial implications of
tired of the expense and search for other options.

As, getting France or keeping us alive on Germany will soon draw
arrondements, while those who do so find for such motives as blessing
Unclear destiny will not remain loud content with the projected
projected is that those who want serious control over their
Unclear business. The danger in the multistarted force as now

23

The NATO Polaris force would then require a capital expenditure of $2.7 billion. Operational costs for a single submarine have been estimated at around $20 million a year or $360 million a year for the entire NATO force. If one adds such expenses as communication systems and shore installations, the yearly maintenance cost is likely to be $1 billion. Though the apportionment of this expense has not yet been established, it is clear that the Federal Republic would be the largest European contributor. It has been estimated that the operational costs and the amortization of the capital investment will require an increase of 12% in the defense spending of the countries participating in the multilateral force (with the German budget increasing probably by more than that). The costs for a surface fleet equipped with Polaris missiles would be somewhat less but if one considers escort vehicles and the expenses of conversion probably not significantly so.

For this heavy expense, more if the participants would obtain a significant increase in control and no new military capability. Can anyone seriously believe that this can be a

cability. Csู sуhоу exсиоnally pеrlievе thаt thус сu pе a
optiuь a significant increase in control and no new military
no
mеm

for this heavy expense, more if the participants would
of conversation properly not significantly so.

jeans put it one considers a sort of article and the
a surface fleet equipped with Polaris missiles would be somewhat
pudget increasing properly by more thus that). The costs for
participating in the multilateral force (with the German
increase of 15% in the defense expenditure of the countries
and the amortization of the capital investment will require so
contributor. It has been estimated that the operational costs
is clear that the Federal Republic would be the largest European
abortion of this expense has not yet been estimated, it
maintenance cost is likely to be $1 billion. Though the
communication systems and some installations, the least
for the entire NATO force. It one adds expenses so
estimated at around $30 million a year or $360 million a year
$3.1 billion. Operational costs for a single弹弹ine have been
The NATO Polaris force would then require a capital expenditure of

permanent state of affairs? Is it not infinitely more likely
that after a few years we would face in relation to some of the
projected members of the NATO nuclear force the same problems
we now confront with France?

Our present proposals grant the need for a separate
force, but they do not grant the equality which would give that
force meaning. Having gotten into the nuclear business with our
assistance, some of the countries now projected as participants
will indeed be much better placed to raise
the nuclear issue in a few years than France is today. They will
not have to argue about the possession of nuclear technology--
since this will have been conceded--but about the control of a
force where their influence is patently out of proportion to
their contribution. If we resist these pressures, we may
bring about a violent swing towards De Gaulle's conceptions.
Nothing is more likely to promote Third Force tendencies in
Europe than for us to engage our prestige in pressing for a force
which, on our own showing, makes no sense militarily, does not
alter significantly existing control arrangements, yet requires
a heavy European financial contribution.

The multilateral NATO force is thus likely to combine the
disadvantages of every course of action. It will not stop the
diffusion of nuclear weapons; it may well accelerate it. It
will neither stop the acquisition of nuclear arms by Germany nor
satisfy over any extended period whatever demands may exist in
the Federal Republic for a greater voice on nuclear matters. It
will stop the building up of conventional forces, for none of
the countries reported ready to join the NATO nuclear force is
likely to increase its defense budget beyond the heavy
expenditures required for the multilateral force. Among the
many inconsistencies of our present position is the simultaneous
pressure for the NATO multilateral force and an increase in European
conventional strength. The two policies are utterly incompatible.
Finally the NATO nuclear force will not represent any significant
burden-sharing. Since some of the European countries will possess
some kind of veto, our planning could not count on the NATO
force. The strategy envisaged by Mr. McNamara would then require
us to maintain whatever strategic forces are thought necessary

na to maintain whatever strategic forces are thought necessary
force. The strategy envisaged by Mr. McMichael would then require
some kind of veto, our position could not count on the NATO
pursue-unionist policies in some of the European countries will become
uniquely the NATO uniesr force will not represent any significant
conventional strength. The two biggest are utterly incompatible.
breast for the NATO multilater force and an increase in European
will increase its defense budget beyond the means
of our present station is the simultaneous
expenditure required for the multilater force. Would the
likely to increase its defense budget beyond the means
of the countries reported ready to join the NATO uniesr force is
will stop the meaningful end of conventional forces, for some of
the Federal Republic for a greater voice on uniesr matters. It
would over any extended period whatever demands may exist in
will neither stop the acquisition of uniesr arms by Germany nor
disturbance of uniesr weapons; it may well accelerate it. It
disrupts the order of every course of action. It will not stop the
The multilaterally NATO force is thus likely to complicate the

breast for the NATO multilater force and an increase in European
will increase its defense budget beyond the means
of the countries reported ready to join the NATO uniesr force is
likely to increase its defense budget beyond the means
of the countries to be reported ready to join the NATO uniesr force
will stop the meaningful end of conventional forces, for some of
the Federal Republic for a greater voice on uniesr matters. It
would over any extended period whatever demands may exist in
will neither stop the acquisition of uniesr arms by Germany nor
disturbance of uniesr weapons; it may well accelerate it. It
disrupts the order of every course of action. It will not stop the
The multilaterally NATO force is thus likely to complicate the

for a United States counterforce response--as if the NATO force
did not exist.

As for the political effects often advertised as the chief,
if not the sole, purpose of the NATO force, Europe will be
fragmented even further. France will be isolated, but at a
heavy price. Disputes about the control of the NATO force will
be inevitable. We will have shifted the relative weight in
Europe towards countries which, while in the short term more
pliable, may prove in the long term more unstable. If the influence
of Germany with multilateral force becomes too great, neutralism
may grow in Britain, Scandinavia and the Low Countries.

The effort is to isolate France by developing an alternative
structure in which the Federal Republic is the key European member
--
may-particularly in the nuclear field--in fact overstrain the fabric
of European cohesion, Atlantic solidarity and undermine the
domestic stability of the Federal Republic. It is in nobody's
interest--least of all the Federal Republic's--to set in motion
events which can only end with suspicion and concern in most

of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role.
It serves nobody's purpose to force the Federal Republic to
choose between France and the United States. A divided coun-
try which, in the space of fifty years, has lost two wars, ex-
perienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme
inflation, and is still affected by the trauma of the Nazi
era, should not—in its own interest—be placed in a position
where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet
pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy.
We are encouraging tendencies which we may later regret.
There must be better ways for the Federal Republic to demon-
strate its devotion to the Atlantic Alliance than to become
the largest European contributor to a NATO multilateral nuclear
force.

force.

the largest European contributor to a NATO multilateral nuclear
armate its devotion to the Atlantic Alliance than to become
there must be better ways for the Federal Republic to demon-
strate its own interest--be placed in a position

where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet
breasts, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy.

ers, should not—in its own interest—be placed in a position
inflation, and is still affected by the trumps of the West

benevolent three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme
try which, in the absence of fifty years, has lost two wars, ex-
choose between France and the United States. A divided con-
It serves nobody's purpose to force the Federal Republic to
of the countries of the West apart Germany's nuclear role.

68

The danger of our present course thus goes far
beyond disputes about strategic theory. An issue as
complicated as the control over nuclear weapons within the
Alliance cannot be expected to have a quick or a neat
solution. Nevertheless, the frequent and rapid changes of
our position undermine our reputation for reliability--
whatever the merit of particular proposals. Our friends
do not know what to support. Our opponents are encouraged
to exert pressure on at least to procrastinate in order to
elicit other offers. Open-mindedness is often a virtue.
But we must remember that a leader of a great coalition
simply cannot afford to do its thinking in public.

Moreover, the course on which we are embarked is not simply
a detour on an essentially correct direction. It
represents a major political peril even if the price will

represents a major political barrier even if the brice will
a detour on an essentially correct direction. It

Moreover, the course on which we are embarked is not simply
simply cannot afford to go its thinking in circles.

But we must remember that a leader of a great coalition
elicit other otters. Open-mindedness is often a virtue.
to excite pressure on at least to procratinate in order to
go not know what to abhor. Our opponents are encouraged
whatever the merit of particular proposals. Our friends
our position undermine our reputation for relapsibility--
solution. Nevertheless, the trend and rapid changes of
Villuance cannot be expected to have a quick or a neat
complicated as the control over unclear mesbome within the
proudly diabutes spout strategic theory. You issue so
the question of our present course thus ends far

not have to be paid for a while. We are still able to
obtain support, partly because we remain the strongest
ally and our good will continues vital; partly because
many of the smaller European countries have developed a
habit of dependence; and partly because of the domestic
considerations which threaten to produce a long-term
malaise.

One of the major achievements of American post-war
policy has been the growth of a Europe which is moderate,
self-confident, and willing to assume a degree of responsibility
over its destiny. We take this so much for granted that we
tend to forget how difficult the process has been and how
precarious the balance still is in many European countries.
In our eagerness to advance our new strategic theories we
have overlooked that ultimately success or failure depends

have overlooked that ultimately success or failure depends
on our esasiness to advance our new strategic theories we
prescribe the presence still in many European countries
tend to forget how difficult the process was and how
over its gratuity. We take this so much for granted that we
self-contingent and willing to assume a degree of responsibility
bonych use pen the growth of s Europe which is moderate.

One of the major achievements of American boat-war
wars are.

concerns which threaten to produce a loud-term
in many European countries
uspit of gebeugence; and partly because of the domestic
msuy of the amiller European countries have developed a
sily and our dog will continue until; partly because
optsin andbart, partly because we remain the strongest
not have to be bid for a while. We are still able to

on the political forces associated with us.

In this respect, there is reason for serious
concern. In too many countries, governments which
painfully ~~swear~~ a commitment to the existing defense
programs and to the very concept of NATO find themselves
charged with undermining U.S. relationships by those who
opposed every step along that road. In several countries,
our policies are supported by groups who see in the slogan
of Atlantic solidarity a convenient tool to discredit the
existing European structure. The Nenni Socialists in Italy
have not become converts to our concept of nuclear defense;
they do so because they want to retain an option for their
favorite schemes of nuclear disengagement. Britain, if it
abandons its nuclear program, will not introduce
conscription. Convective defense may be invoked to

conception. Conventional defense may be invoked to
spoilous its nuclear broadsword, will not intoguence
favorite schemes of nuclear hegemony. Britain, if it
took so because they want to resist an option for their
own not become converts to our concept of nuclear defense;
existing European structure. The Nazi Socialists in Italy
of Atlantic solidarity a convenient tool to discredit the
our policies are anemborted by droubs who see in the above
obsoled every step should first regard. In several countries,
curried with undermining U.S. relations with those who
broadsword and to the very concept of NATO find themselves
brightly (asか) s commitment to the existing defense
concern. In too many countries, governments which

[Y]

72

wreck the nuclear program; the result is much more likely to be a form of neutralism than a conventional build-up. And it is difficult to reconcile the commitment to a conventional build-up of the Labour Party with the equally strong commitment to disengagement. One cannot undermine the major program of an ally without producing upheavals that cannot be measured by purely technical standards.

Our present course may thus encourage simultaneously both neutralism and rabid nationalism, both a sense of impotence and of frustration. In another five years we may then be confronted by a Europe to which many of the epithets applied to President De Gaulle will really have come true.

To be sure, in foreign policy penalties are rarely immediate. Often a deceptive calm between crises occurs. But the longer a solution is delayed the more violent the crises become. The French nuclear program--and the resulting disputes--

become. The French nuclear program--and the resulting diabetes--
the founder a solution to delayed disease more violent the crises
qide. Often a deceptive calm between crises occurs. But

To be sure, in foreign policy benefits are rarely imme-
subbed to President De Gensle will really have come true.
then be confronted by a Europe to which many of the epithets
botence and of frustration. In another five years we may
poty neutrality and rapid nationalism, both a sense of im-
onousness

measured by barely technical atolls.

draw of such stability without producing upheavals that cannot be
ment to disengagement. One cannot mangle the major pro-
pund-nb of the Laspour fairly with the edulity and strong commit-
it is difficult to reconcile the commitment to a conventional
pe a form of neutrality than a conventional build-up. And
wreck the nuclear program: the result is much more likely to

be a form of neutrality than a conventional build-up. And
wreck the nuclear program: the result is much more likely to

was importantly influenced by our behavior before and during
the Suez crisis in 1956. A similar price may have to be paid
in another five years for some of actions today, even when
they are taken--as was our Suez policy--with the seeming agree-
ment of much of our press and some of our allies. The test
of leadership is not tomorrow's editorial but the one three
or five years from now.

or five years from now.

of tomorrow's editorial put the one three
went out when of our press and said so of our office.
The test
they are taken--as was our News policy--with the seeming sullen
in another five years for some of those today, even when
the News crisis in 1926. A similar price may have to be paid
was importantly influenced by our peevishness before and during

[Y] 74

## V. The Road Ahead.

It is always painful to reverse course. The longer a given policy is maintained, the more vested interests--in dedication, in conception and in bureaucratic persistence--it is bound to create. Yet nothing short of a radical change of approach will suffice in the present situation.

Perhaps the best way to begin would be to ask ourselves what our real interests in Europe are. We should examine what kind of structure we desire in the long term rather than seek for devices to head off immediate pressures.

The goal of a strong, unified and self-sufficient Europe, which American policy has consistently pursued for a decade and a half is as valid today as it was when first developed in 1947. We may not have fully understood then that an economically powerful Europe would be more self-assertive in the political and military field as well. We may have believed

subconsciously that our policy would relieve us of economic
burdens without requiring a redefinition of Atlantic relation-
ships. But whether we fully realized the implications of what
we were doing or not, the Europe of today stands as a testi-
mony to our foresight and our ability to subordinate short-
term advantage to long-term benefits.

However, in the past few years there has been a tendency
to recoil before the inevitable implications of our policy.
It was always in the cards--indeed it was our stated purpose--
that as Europe regained its economic health it would also seek
to develop its own specific policies. It was never considered
originally that the relations of the European states to each
other should not be closer than each of them was to the United
States. On the contrary, the original conception was that a
cohesive Europe would be a more effective partner for the United
States. Atlantic partnership was then thought of in terms of

States. Atlantic partnership was then thought of in terms of
cooperative Europe would be a more effective partner for the United
States. On the contrary, the original conception was that a
other should not be closer than each of them was to the United
originally that the relations of the European states to each
to develop its own specific policies. It was never considered
that as Europe regained its economic position it would also seek
It was always in the charge--indeed it was our stated purpose--
to recoil before the inevitable implications of our policy.

However, in the best few years there has been a tendency
to advance to long-term benefits.

In our foreight and our spight to subordinate short-
we were going or not, the Europe of today stands as a testi-
ment. But whether we fully realized the implications of what
purdue without requiring a redefinition of Atlantic relation-
unconditionally that our policy would relieve us of economic

76

[Y]

establishing a relationship with a Europe whose internal structure would be tighter than the Atlantic bonds.

This great conception can be reversed today only by under-mining the structures that have been so painfully developed over the past fifteen years. Fifteen years ago it might have been possible to try to construct an Atlantic Community on the most favored nation principle, that is, that no nation have closer relation to the other than to the United States. Today this attempt hazards all that has been achieved.

Yet, stripped to its essentials, this is the course we have been pursuing with Europe in the nuclear field. The multilateral force is an attempt to prevent the emergence of a European identity with respect to nuclear weapons. Efforts to develop European programs have been described as divisive, and a separate European force as based on mistrust of the United States.

However, if we cut through the phrases to the facts, a

However, if we cut through the pressure to the facts, a
European force as based on whatnet of the United States.

been programmes have been described as directive, and a separate
tity with respect to nuclear weapons. Efforts to develop Euro-
force is an attempt to prevent the emergence of a European iden-
been burning with Europe in the nuclear field. The multistage

Yet, attributed to its essentials, this is the course we have
this attempt passade all that has been achieved.

closer relation to the other than to the United States. Today
most favored nation principle, that is, that no nation have
been possible to try to construct an Atlantic Community on the
over the past fifteen years. Fifteen years ago it might have
mining the structure that have been so beautifully developed

This great conception can be reversed today only by under-
ture would be tighter than the Atlantic pond.

eatsplashing a relationship with a Europe whose internal struc-

77

[N]

separate European entity need be no more divisive in the military than in the economic field. In both instances it calls attention to the need for a political effort to devise common objectives. If this is not possible among equals, it is unlikely to be achieved by having one of the partners in a condition of impotence.

In the nuclear field this implies that we should be ready to accept a truly independent European nuclear entity—all the more so as we have no real choice in the matter. The relationship to our nuclear strength should be by means of political coordination and joint strategic planning.

This cannot be achieved by creating a multilateral force composed of presently non-nuclear countries. Any long-range European nuclear policy must build on the European nuclear programs which exist and which are likely to continue whatever the fate of the multilateral force. This means that we will

[Y]

78

have to give up our hostility to the French and the British
nuclear effort.

We need not, of course, underwrite every European strategic theory. It is plain that we have certain interests in any European nuclear development. The following five seem paramount:

(a) The European forces should be well-protected so that they do not tempt preemption or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability.

(b) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction.

(c) They should be part of a strategy which includes the possibility of flexible response.

(d) They should become an instrument to foster European integration.

integration.

(b) They should become an instrument to foster European
possibility of flexible response.

(c) They should be part of a strategy which includes the
political direction.

control system so that they are at all times reasonable to

(d) These forces should possess an effective command and
because of their vulnerability.

they do not attempt preemption or have to be used precipitately
(s) The European forces should be well-protected so that
barriers:

such European unclear development. The following five seem
topic theory. It is plain that we have certain interests in
We need not, of course, underwrite every European stra-
unclear effort.

[4] 79

(e) They should be coordinated with our forces.

Our effort to atrophy the French nuclear program has had the consequence of working against all these objectives. France has had to stretch meager resources and thus commit itself to a force which is vulnerable and perhaps weak with respect to command and control. It has led to an elaboration of one-sided strategic theories. It has deepened the split in Europe. It has absorbed energies in a scholastic debate over phrases like "integration," or "multilateral and diverted attention from the practical problem of how to cooperate in the common interest."

A much better course would have been--and still is-- to announce our willingness to cooperate with a European nuclear effort. To this end, we could offer assistance to Great Britain and France in enhancing the invulnerability of their forces and improving their command and control. We could make the

81

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called multilateralism.

It may be argued that once we help Britain and France, every European country will want its national force. The President has mentioned even a Belgian nuclear force as a possibility. We must distinguish, however, between the possession of some nuclear weapons and the development of an indigenous nuclear program. The latter is beyond the present capability of any European country either for political or economic reasons or both.

The Federal Republic is prohibited by the Paris treaties from manufacturing nuclear weapons. While treaties have been broken before, in this particular instance the international repercussions are likely to be so serious as to give any German government pause. At the moment and for at least the next legislative period, that is, until about 1969, there are, in any event, no signs of any domestic pressures in Germany for a

any event, no signs of any domestic pressures in Germany for a
regressive period, that is, until about 1969, there are, in
Germany hence. At the moment and for at least the next
reconciliations are likely to be so serious as to give any German
proven before, in this particular instance the international
from manufacturing nuclear weapons. While treaties have been
The Federal Republic is confronted by the Nazi treaties
ones or two.

at any European country either for political or economic res-
unclear program. The latter is beyond the present capability
of some unclear weapons and the development of an indigenous
ity. We must distinguish, however, between the possession
President has mentioned even a Belgian unclear force as a boss-
every European country will want its national force. The

called multilaterally.

81

[L]

82

[Y]

national nuclear weapons program. This may change, however,
after the multilateral force has whetted appetites.

Italy has neither the resources nor the domestic support
for a national nuclear program. As for Belgium and other
smaller countries, it can hardly be argued that the French
program exceeds France's resources, but that we must gear our
NATO nuclear policy to the contingency of preventing the de-
velopment of similar programs by much poorer countries.

To be sure, a joint Franco-British program would prob-
ably lead to efforts by the Federal Republic and perhaps other
European countries for a degree of participation at least in
the control mechanism. But in this way the Franco-British
effort could become a spur to European political integration.
And even from the point of view of nuclear diffusion, the pro-
gram outlined here is apt to be more moderate than the pro-
jected NATO multilateralism. It would be a long time before

jected NATO multilaterally. It would be a long time before
dram outlined here is abt to be more moderate than the bro-
And even from the point of view of uniesr situation, the pro-
effort config become a bar to Eurobeu political integration.
the control mechanism. But in this way the Franco-British
Eurobeu countries for a degree of participation at least in
apply lead to efforts by the Federal Republic and perhaps other
To be sure, a joint Franco-British program would prop-
elopment of similar programs by such power countries.
NATO uniesr policy to the contingency of preventing the ge-
bragm exceeds France's reasons, put that we must dear our
amiller countries, it can hardly be argued that the French
tor a unousl uniesr program. As for Belgium and other

Itself has neither the resources nor the domestic support
after the unilateral force has whetted sabunes.
nousl uniesr wessone program. This way change, however,
as other?

a European force would attain the dimensions of the projected NATO force.

Of course, conceding Europe's nuclear independence would emphasize the urgent need for greater political cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. But this is required whatever we do in the military field. We are now in the curious position of pressing for military integration while practicing political bilateralism. On a variety of issues from Berlin to the test ban we have claimed the right for independent approaches to the Soviets.

However, unity in the security field is bound to be ephemeral unless there exists a common diplomacy. We cannot have different elaborations of a possible casus belli--which is at least one purpose of negotiations--but insist that the resulting strategy has to be unified. If we want to spare integration, the political field would seem much more promising than the

the political field would seem much more broadened than the
strategically use to be multiplied. If we want to make integration,
first one purpose of negotiations--but rather just the resulting
gutterous aspirations of a possible <u>common peat</u>--which is at
emergent unless there exist a common wisdom. We cannot have
however, might in the security field is found to be <u>ex</u>-

brothers to the Soviet.

the fact now we have claimed the right for independent ab-
tical pikes. On a specificity of issues from Berlin to
of breathing for military integration while practicing boil-
co in the military field. We are now in the curiously position
in the Atlantic Viliance. But this is right, whatever we
embarrass the agent need for greater political cooperation with-
Of course, conceivably Europe's nuclear independence would

Meaning why?

MYTO force.

a European force would assume the dimension of the projected

military. If the nations of Atlantic Community follow common policies, the existence of different centers of military decision would present primarily a problem of technical coordination, not a challenge to Allied unity.

The Atlantic Alliance requires urgently not a multilateral nuclear force but a political body to define common objectives and the means to achieve them. It might be useful to begin by developing a common position on such issues as Berlin, disarmament or the test ban. If it should be argued that this is impossible, the emptiness of the nuclear multilateralism is patent. Nations that cannot agree on common negotiating positions are not likely to be able to devise a common strategy for a possible apocalypse.

Withal, it is important to keep the difficulties of the Western alliance in proper perspective. Deep as the divisions are, they are the result of the success of previous policies.