MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

PRESIDENT: Captain B. H. Liddell Hart

12th February, 1957

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

I have only very recently received from Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, who is our member, your address, and I would be delighted, if I could establish a contact with you.

I have read with a very great interest your article "Force and diplomacy in the nuclear age", published in the "Foreign Affairs" in April 1956, which gave me many useful ideas and food for thoughts.

I take this opportunity to enclose two cuttings with my two articles, on the matter of our mutual interest: the cuttings are from the weekly, The Tablet, to which I contribute rather frequently.

My second article, on the "Neutral Zone" is appearing in 6 languages in various versions, and I have submitted also a longer version to the "Foreign Affairs": I'll feel very honoured, if it will be accepted.

I would be particularly interested in your comments on the problem of neutral zone in Europe, the support for which is gaining momentum, and, which, I feel, seems to be the only one solution, which under the circumstances, could contribute to the lessening of the international tension.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Council of Foreign Relations
Harold Tratt House
68 East, 68th Street
New York 21.

HON. SECRETARY: Captain Eugene Hinterhoff
10 Victoria Grove · London W 8
Western 5047

January 12th, 1957

THE TABLET

29

But the history of the Smallholder movement goes much further back than 1945. The first initiative to bring the Hungarian peasantry into a parliamentary system (at that time aristocratic) came from men touched by the spirit of *Rerum Novarum* in the 1890s, Count Alexander Károlyi and Count Ferdinand Zichy. Much of the later success of the Smallholder movement was due to Joseph Kristófý, a strongly Austrophil conservative democrat, Archduke Francis-Ferdinand's confidant and adviser on Hungarian affairs. "Two kinds of social revolution are taking shape in Hungary," Kristófý wrote in 1908. "One is an agrarian Socialism, revolutionary in its means but conservative in its aim, which is to increase the number of landowners by radical expropriation of some of the big properties. The other is industrial Socialism, revolutionary in its ultimate aim but conservative in its methods, to the point that it may contribute to a more workable and more disciplined parliamentary government."

Since the beginning of the century, aristocratic or oligarchic Liberalism has been on the defensive in Hungary against three new democratic forces, the Christian Social movement, the Smallholders and industrial Social Democracy. The religious division in Eastern Hungary was mainly responsible for the Smallholder movement not uniting more closely with the Christian Social action which developed mainly in Transdanubia, in provinces near Vienna, under the influence of Austrian ideas. It was especially after the separation of Hungary from Austria that Protestant Liberal ideology became predominant in the agrarian movement, the founders of which were Catholics inspired by *Rerum Novarum*. The decade of Count Bethlen's "social restoration," which began in 1921, after the violent phase of revolution and counter-revolution was over, was in reality an attempted return to Liberalism; round the flag of "social restoration" gathered the more opportunist elements both of the Christian Social and the Smallholder movements, while Social Democracy, without joining the Government, extenuated its former revolutionary character. A more transient minority of each remained in firm opposition.

The events of 1956 have shown that Transdanubia, with its Catholic population, has preserved its importance. Nowhere was the rising more universal than in the towns near the Austrian border. The more conservative trade union element in Social Democracy was essential in the phase of passive resistance, while the peasantry in the eastern part of the country, for which the Protestant radical wing of the Smallholders, so prominent in the 1945 coalition, may be taken as representative, had a relatively small part.

Kádár's efforts—how voluntary they are we do not know at present—aim at a return to the 1945 basis. It should not be overlooked that 1945 excluded two elements in Hungarian politics which have been constant since the beginning of the century, and the actual strength of which could be seen in 1956, the Christian Social movement and the trade union Labour movement. Neither should it be overlooked what perils a Hungary neutralised and brought back to the 1945 footing would still face. An unreformed Stalinist Communism in Czechoslovakia (which keeps fallen Hungarian Stalinist émigrés in reserve, as we know from Radio Bratislava), a national Communism in Yugoslavia which is uncertain in its duplicity, and a strengthened Soviet occupation in Rumania, would still surround it. Just as an unreformed East German Stalinist Communism remains an obstacle to Poland's full return to its own national self, keeping the country between the two fires of Russia and the twenty or twenty-five Soviet divisions around Leipzig and Berlin, Hungary would be further exposed to pressure from Czechoslovakia and further separated by this latter country from its natural ally, Poland.

Such a half-solution, or pseudo-solution, would not satisfy the Hungarian people. It would also be unacceptable to the West, which has a moral responsibility to see that the aim of the rising, the desire for independence which was so clearly and so firmly manifested, should prevail. Nothing short of real and total neutralisation of the whole of Eastern Europe holds out a prospect of even temporary peace, or of a transitional phase in which promising developments could materialise.

# LIMITING ATOMIC WARFARE

## The Danger of Slogans

### By EUGENE HINTERHOFF

WHEN President Wilson in 1917 drafted his famous Fourteen Points, he forged—without realising it—a powerful weapon in psychological warfare. His Charter, and especially the slogan of self-determination, became a determining factor in the Allied victory in 1918, precipitating the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and driving a deep wedge between the German Government and people. Some two decades later, another American President, with his slogan of "unconditional surrender," stiffened the resistance of the German nation, uniting it behind the hated regime, and, consequently, by prolonging the war, enabled the Russians to overrun half of Europe.

The word "deterrent," which became part and parcel of the Western political and military vocabulary, is an even more dangerous slogan in its implications than the unfortunate slogan of "unconditional surrender." By integrating this word into its thinking, the West decided never to use its monopoly or, at the later stage, its superiority, in atomic weapons in order to back its diplomacy in negotiations with Russia. An ability to use force is the elementary prerequisite of a foreign policy, if it wants to be independent and not merely reactive. It was the West's renunciation of the use of force as the handmaiden of diplomacy, prompted by fear that even a limited display of military power, as during the intended intervention at Dien Bien Phu, could give rise to the "unthinkable" thermo-nuclear war, which rendered even relatively small issues unmanageable.

By showing this fear of an atomic war, the West has increasingly exposed itself to the "atomic blackmail" of the Soviet Union, and this refusal to run any risk—as, for instance, in the case of Hungary—amounted eventually to giving the Russians a blank cheque. Consequently, the catchword "deterrent," acting a boomerang, has in fact deterred Western policy and Western public opinion from any constructive initiative, based, perhaps, on some calculated risk; and the sentence, used sometimes proudly by Western politicians "speaking from a position of strength," must have become in the eyes of the Russians a hollow threat, an empty bluff.

With these general considerations in the background, the study of a pamphlet *On Limiting Atomic Warfare*, published under the auspices of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, and written by a group including Rear-Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, Mr. Denis Healey, M.P., and Mr. Richard Goold-Adams, may lead to some interesting conclusions. The authors are trying to establish the "desirability" and "practicability" of a distinction between a tactical atomic and an "all-out nuclear war." They even quote Sir Winston Churchill's famous phrase, "We arm to parley," although it probably does him an injustice by imputing that he, who opposed the policy of "appeasement," would also interpret and apply the word "deterrent" as it has, unfortunately, been interpreted and applied so far.

30

THE TABLET

January 12th, 1957

Having stated a case for tactical atomic weapons, which are in fact being introduced in increasing numbers in the American, Soviet and British armed forces, the authors criticise both the British and the American Governments for failing to enlighten public opinion and to crystallise their policy in relation to this complex technological, military and political problem. Unfortunately, however, there is no such cut-and-dried policy on this subject, either in Washington or in Whitehall. On the contrary, there has been a tug-of-war going on for the last few years in Washington between two schools of thought, with casualties on both sides. The best proofs of the lack of such a policy are on the one hand the stern pronouncements by high-ranking military commanders in the West, leaving no doubts that any Soviet aggression in Europe will lead to an "instant" and "massive retaliation" and to an "all-out" thermo-nuclear war; and on the other hand, and at the same time, when the Soviet troops are being reorganised, in accordance with the conditions of a future atomic war, the whole strategic concept of the use of the land forces in Europe, namely the fighting withdrawal of a NATO "shield", based on the experience of the last war. The intended organisation of the German Bundeswehr-if it ever comes into being-is also based on the lessons of the campaign in Russia, which have been made completely obsolete by the revolutionary progress of the new weapons of mass destruction.

It seems, however, in view of the staggering Soviet technological progress, especially in the construction of long-range supersonic bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles, that the victory is already on the side of those who, like Admiral Radford, are in favour of the increasing and flexible use of nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic, depending on the circumstances. Such a victory will eventually mean severe cuts in the American land forces, and will also mean, as the authors of the pamphlet rightly point out, that small units with tactical atomic weapons will take over the whole of the commitment now implemented by five American divisions in Europe.

The authors of this pamphlet, in advocating the introduction of tactical atomic weapons, which they speak of as a "graduated deterrent," very rightly emphasise that these weapons on the battlefield will greatly reduce the Russian advantage in numbers. In point of fact, the introduction of atomic tactical weapons has been suggested for some time already by several outstanding military writers with the vision of a future war, such as General Chassin, General Lawton Collins, Lieutenant-Colonel Miksche, and others. It is doubtful, however, whether it will be ever possible, as these authors suggest, to introduce rules or international agreements to limit the use of atomic weapons in particular circumstances. There is no doubt whatsoever that, if Colonel Nasser, for instance, had had atomic weapons at his disposal he would have used them to smash either the Israeli offensive or the Anglo-French landing. One must always bear in minds the words of Marshal Zhukov, who said that tactical weapons could not be used without provoking a wider war.

The study of recent statements and articles by high-ranking Soviet military leaders leads to an inescapable conclusion that, in the event of a future major war, the Russians will try to stage a super-Pearl Harbour. If it comes to that, the devastating force of the new weapons will be so terrific the initial blow will be so staggering as to make retaliation a theoretical abstraction.

There can be several possible tactical situations in which these words, intended obviously to increase in the West the fear of an atomic war, would not necessarily apply. But the West must first of all shape and formulate its own doctrine of the flexible use of nuclear weapons, which must become an integral part of its diplomacy. One of the main merits of this very interesting pamphlet is that the authors are clamouring for it.

# THE RESPONSIBLE SOCIETY

## The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches

By MICHAEL P. FOGARTY

CONTEMPLATING the decline in Christian influence on society from the standpoint of fifty years ago, Ernst Trotsch wrote that if it was to be restored "new thoughts will have to be thought." So they have been, only they turn out actually to be rather old ones. Protestants, it used to be said, had an individual dynamism and a sense of vocation in even secular affairs. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, had a capacity for broad views, synthesis, and grand strategies. Each party had its own qualities, but also tended to lack the qualities of the other, and the influence of Christianity in society suffered from it.

But now, lo and behold! we Catholics have turned Protestant. We launch our laity into individual, responsible action in industry or politics or social life-or at least we would like to think we did-armed with Civardi on Catholic Action and Congar on the Theology of the Lay State. There are prelates after us, as Mgr. Tracy Ellis has recently been in these pages, if in the Universities we go slovenly to bed instead of burning the midnight oil in the intellectual apostolate. It is only fair that Protestants should reply by turning Catholic, at least to the extent of equipping themselves, in the World Council of Churches, with a world focus of Protestant, and in part of Orthodox, opinion on both theology and social affairs. Father Edward Duff, S.J., has now written the first study by either a Protestant or a Catholic of the social thought of the World Council.¹ He also includes a crisp and excellent review of the history of the World Council and the nature and limits of its authority.

Protestant as well as Catholic reviewers have praised Father Duff's impartiality, and the value of his book for reference. I am more concerned here with its substance. What stands out first of all is the breadth of the area in which Protestant and Catholic ideas on social policy run parallel, and co-operation is likely to be fruitful. The World Council's central concept is that of the "Responsible Society," neither Communist nor old-style capitalist, but built on the spreading of responsibility among individuals and institutions. The State is assigned a positive though carefully limited role. This is essentially the same idea as is summed up in Catholic social theory in the word "subsidiarity," except that "the Responsible Society" makes a much better slogan. I do not remember ever hearing a sermon on "subsidiarity." But the Sunday after a copy of Father Duff's book found its way into the presbytery of my parish, the sermon at the eight o'clock Mass was on the Responsible Society.

The trouble begins, though, with the working out of this idea. The World Council is new, and even the conferences leading up to it run back only to around or just before the first world war. The first continuing machinery was set up after the Stockholm Conference of 1925. To this day the World Council is greatly under-staffed and under-financed for the work it might be doing, and its officials have had to work long and patiently to attract the present degree of interest and co-operation from member Churches. The central machinery of the Catholic Church is, compared to this, relatively large and efficient, and the series of Papal encyclical on modern social problems goes back to the 1870s-to the 1860s, in fact, if one counts Pius IX's *Syllabus and Quanta Cura*. It is not surprising that much of the World Council's work so far gives a tentative, unfinished, and piecemeal impression. There is a splendid simplicity, not to say naïvete, about-for instance-some of the com-

¹Edward Duff, S.J., *The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches, Longmans 1956*. 25s. Attention was drawn to this book in The Tablet of June 30th last, when, before its publication, Father Duff presented it as a doctorate thesis in the University of Geneva. His three examiners were all Protestants, one of them, Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft, being the General Secretary of the World Council of Churches.

January 26th, 1957

THE TABLET

[10]

77

# PROSPECTS FOR THE COMMON MARKET

## The Debate in Europe

By JOHN DINGLE

THE negotiations in Brussels on a draft treaty setting up a European common market have entered their final and most difficult phase. Provided nothing occurs to disrupt the time-table, a text should be submitted to the Foreign Ministers of the six countries by the end of this month, and M. Spaak hopes to be able to take it, along with their benediction, to the meeting of the ministerial council of O.E.E.C. opening on February 12th. It is a measure of the difference between the atmosphere now and that during the elaboration of the plan for a European Defence Community that even in the countries most concerned there is still confusion about what is proposed. This influenced the debate in the French Chamber, which is still continuing at the moment of writing.

Three basic conceptions are at present struggling for predominance. One is a customs union of the six countries, which would involve a unified commercial policy and a common tariff against countries outside the union. Then there is the common market properly so-called. A common market goes much further than a customs union because the ultimate aim is a complete harmonisation of the economic and social policies of the countries concerned. If the market is fully established the national Governments will lose most of their control over the economy and even over the movement of labour. The logical outcome would be a common European currency and eventually a United States of Europe—a prospect that frightens some of the less adventurous spirits.

Finally, there is the European free trade area proposed by Great Britain, which would be associated with the common market of the six but would embrace other countries in O.E.E.C. This differs from the customs union in that its members would retain the right to fix whatever tariffs they thought fit against goods from outside the common market and the free trade area. The idea has taken on a new importance in the last few days, the forthrightness of Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Thorneycroft having tempted some of the more nervous Europeans to argue that it would be better to go ahead immediately with the free trade idea and leave the more ambitious common market plan until later. This is not at all the view of the real Europeans. Besides regarding the free trade area as a poor substitute for a common market, they do not minimise the difficulties facing Mr. Macmillan's policy, and believe that the best way of making sure of British co-operation is by demonstrating the advantages of a unified European economy. "If we get the common market," remarked one Benelux diplomat, "the free trade area will follow as night follows day."

The question-mark is at the moment placed over France. When the Brussels plan finally takes shape it will be seen to be a compromise between a mere customs union and full co-ordination of the economies of the different countries. It will also prove to be a compromise between laissez-faire and a completely planned economy. The doubt relates to the proportions in which these various ingredients will be mixed. As a rough generalisation, the tendency is in Germany towards laissez-faire and in France towards dirigisme. These two countries are setting the pace in the negotiations.

Dr. Erhart's views are well known, but even if he were not there to express them Germany would naturally be tempted to emphasise the economic value of complete freedom from restrictions. The German view is that if the countries throw themselves into the deep end of the swimming pool, self-preservation will soon induce them to swim strongly. The French are not so sure, and want an adequate

supply of water-wings. But there is more in this differing attitude than psychology. The French can hardly be blamed for the view that if anybody sinks it won't be their friends across the Rhine. The French economy is out-dated in many sectors. It bears heavier social service charges than the German, and has also to make its contribution to the increasing cost of the French overseas territories.

The Germans, and to a lesser extent France's other partners, have realised that they cannot get France in without making considerable concessions—"sacrifices," M. Faure called them in the debate, and the term is not inappropriate. The two main economic arguments in favour of the common market are that it will afford wider opportunities to industries which need room for expansion if they are to modernise, and that the removal of protective tariffs and props implicit in the plan will stimulate a healthy competition. The French negotiators have been ingenious in designing new props to take the place of the ones it is proposed to abolish. This has led the well-known commentator Maurice Duverger to observe that to accept the challenge is reasonable and to refuse it equally so, but to accept it and then multiply exceptions to the rule to such an extent that the common market loses all real meaning is quite unjustifiable. This, he seems to think, is the attitude that France is now preparing to adopt.

He is perhaps hardly fair to his own country. The European Coal and Steel Community has proved a very effective working compromise between extreme liberalism and controlled economy. Any plan for a wider common market attractive enough to pass the final test of ratification will have to be an equally careful synthesis of opposites. The debate in the French Chamber shows that in France at least the fight will be a tough one. French Deputies are often criticised for a tendency to see national and world problems in too narrowly local terms. Even if this were not so, however, they would have some excuse for shivering on the brink of a common market while the French economy faces its present difficulties.

The chief concessions so far obtained by the French negotiators are a promise that their partners will apply the policy, to which they have already agreed in principle, of equal wages for men and women workers, and that their overtime rates will be made to correspond with the French. The French have also secured permission to maintain their special system of import taxes and export subsidies until the present disequilibrium in the balance of payments has been corrected for a year and the monetary reserves have reached a satisfactory level.

Their partners have further agreed on a European investment fund to offset the hardships caused by the structural changes necessary to meet increasing competition. This is somewhat similar to the scheme already in operation in the European Coal and Steel Community, and is in line with the thinking of British trade unionists. The battle fought by the French at the moment would, in fact, seem to make final British participation easier. Whether this is regarded as an argument for or against the French attitude, depends on the point of view of the arguer.

It has to be remembered that the establishment of a common market is progressive. Discriminations and tariffs of various sorts within the six countries are to be broken down over a period which may be as short as twelve years and may be as long as seventeen. Once the treaty has entered into force there is only one thing that can legitimately prevent the establishment of a common market. This is a reunification of Germany, followed by the decision of the

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January 26th, 1957

Working-class people have never been very articulate or skilled in leaving written records of themselves, and it seems a pity that our knowledge of their lives should be derived so often from outside observers of different social class, even when these observers are understanding and sympathetic. Writers like Disraeli, Mrs. Gaskell, Kingsley and Dickens wrote novels sound in their economic and social sources, but Disraeli went a step further by "lifting," sometimes sentence by sentence, the evidence given by mining folk to the Midland Mining Commission of 1843. It is this faithfulness to the original words that gives such an authentic touch and which helps to make *Sybil* so great a story of rich and poor. It is better to listen to the real voice of the miner than to an educated interpretation of it.

Arthur Wilson's voice rings true. The background to most of the stories is in Scotland, where the author worked, and there is something of the Scots' ferocity and tendency to the sentimental underlying many of the old stories of mine disasters, favourite pit ponies and sly jokes played on newcomers. The rhymes and verses fall at the poetic level and are too often over dramatised and sentimental to satisfy at the aesthetic level, but if they are to be judged by their power to evoke feeling and images of the hard, dangerous and earthy life of the miner, then many of them succeed.

Modern mass means of communication, such as press, radio, television and transport will more and more tend to eradicate the regional, parochial and district differences in speech, dress, amusements and other habits. In time the miners will tend to lose the uniqueness which was their's when they formed a close-knit group, often segregated physically from the rest of industry, as in the Welsh mining valleys or the remote mining villages in Scotland. The mining community, with its traditions of poverty, bad working conditions, self-help and strong loyalties, can be regarded as a social institution in itself and as such worthy of serious study, though too little of this has been undertaken. But a study at the academic level is no substitute for a record of the life of the miners interpreted by themselves, and recorded in their song, verse and out-of-mine activities.

The older men are dying out and youth takes their place, and in time the nation will have modern miners making their voice heard in the modern idiom. The philosophy created by the constant struggle between masters and men, with the odds nearly always in favour of the masters, by hardship and heroism, by unemployment and poverty, by loyalty to fellow workers and by charity to each other in times of distress, has a place in social history; as yet insufficiently set down in some permanent manner. There was, too, a tension underlying the surface of things in the mining community, where disaster could come with such speed. Only the hazards of the fishing industry compare with mining, and only in fishing towns and villages is this same tension felt. But the fisherman has been more publicised in saga and song than the miner. There is a rich field of story, song and ballad not yet reaped in the mining industry, and as time goes by the difficulty of doing this will become greater.

I remember a Scottish mining community in which I lived for ten years as a child. This community had a passion for greyhound racing, boxing, quoits, the local co-operative society, and boots with medium high heels and raised block toes; ties were worn only on Sundays, but without collars, and pigtail brown was more popular than thick black. It must have had its rhymesters, storytellers and men with an ear for a song.

The miners, in the past, have been conscious of themselves as constituting a group with strong group loyalties, part of and yet somewhat remote from other occupational groups, held together by the peculiar nature of their jobs. This has been expressed vocally but little has been written down. Some responsibility rests on the older men within the industry, and the institutions which support them, to gather this material before it is lost for ever.

# CRITICS' COLUMNS

## Irish Triumph

TO have two Irish plays in London in one week is unusual; to have even one such success would be surprising. And both Synge's *Playboy of the Western World* (Theatre Royal, Stratford) and O'Casey's *Shadow of a Gunman* (Lyric, Hammersmith) are successes. Without a doubt, *The Playboy* is a first-class play, and easily lives up to Synge's standards: reality and joy. It is written with a tautness which is superbly brought out in the production, and the interplay of comedy, seriousness and lyricism is handled to perfection. The reality of the spoken rhythms is enhanced, and not vitiated, by the glorious Blarney, by the richness of the expression and by the use of other pure poetical techniques. Could any other play use the phrase "Quit my sight" and get away with it? Theatre Workshop knew exactly how to play it, and how to let themselves be carried away by their words and actions. Brian Murphy plays Christie Mahon, and cleverly allows the character develop of the man who talks himself into a myth and goes on talking until it becomes true. With all those fine words to say, it would have been very easy to drift along with them, but he remains in full control of them the whole time, and he can also control subtly the many shades of tone in his character through the many rises and falls of the play. He has a good foil in Eileen Kennally as Pegeen Mike, and the two display a clever sense of balance, seeming to persuade each other rather than to shout each other down. Glyn Edwards' Old Mahon was a comic masterpiece in expression and timing. This production is an absolute must for anyone with any love for the theatre, and for anything else. It deseryes a West End run twice as long as Dr* R* t.

The O'Casey play suffers, in comparison, by being too Irish, and some of the members of the Irish Players fall over backwards in trying to put over the Real Thing. O'Casey, like Synge, is aiming at a mixture of poetry and realism, but the cleavage remains too pronounced: the realism is more of the Socialist variety than that of the earth, and the poetry is sometimes a little too conscious. The overt political implications are strong—though not the mainspring of the play—but the analyses of the Irish character with its vainglorious patriotism (until it comes to something like governing themselves) and all its other contradictions is essentially comic. The company boasts one extremely good actor, Jack MacGowran, in the part of the comic pedlar Seumas, and it is he who manages to keep the play well together. There are more laughs than in *The Playboy*, but in the long run it is less rewarding.

ALEX MATHESON CAIN.

## Tribute to Toscanini

TO describe Toscanini, who died last week at eighty-nine, as a "legendary" figure, would be an accurate use of a conventional phrase. Remoteness breeds legend, and Toscanini was remote from us by physical distance, which gave the edge of rarity to memories of his performances. But he was also remote through age. Even for those who remember that he conducted the Milan *première* of Puccini's unfinished *Turandot* in 1926, it comes as a shock to realise that he also conducted the first performance of *La Bohème* exactly thirty years earlier.

For music-lovers in this country now approaching middle life, the first impact came with his London visit of 1930 and, for many who never came near a London concert-hall, with the recorded performances of Beethoven's symphonies by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra under his direction, and a still earlier, miraculous, record of Mozart's

July 1, 1957

Dear Mr. Hinterhoff:

If one has not replied to a letter in five months, perhaps the best procedure is to forget about it completely. I do want to tell you however how very sorry I am not to have replied to your very kind note of February 12th. It reached New York as I was changing offices and has followed me around various places since. I am all the sorrier because I very much appreciated the clippings you sent.

I am not sure a neutral zone would bring all the advantages that are claimed for it. I should think, for example, that a neutral rearmed Germany might become a worrisome factor. Still, it seems to me that we have more to gain from it than otherwise.

I promise you that I shall be more prompt in replying in the future.

Best regards.

Mr. Eugene Hinterhoff
10 Victoria Grove
London W.8
England

[1c]

Your ref: GEN/692/3A

Dear Sir,

18th February 1959

In answer to your letter of the 16th, I would like to support, and endorse most strongly, Captain B. Hinterhoff's application for a N.A.T.O. Fellowship. As to your particular question, he certainly has "the ability to pursue the project proposed by him". Indeed, it would be difficult to find anyone who can devote time to such a project so well qualified for the purpose.

When I first became acquainted with his military writings, in the early 1930s, they showed a grasp of modern trends and requirements in defence that was then very rare in Continental military quarters. He has continued to keep well abreast, and often ahead, of changing conditions and needs, while realising the influence of political and economic factors better than most military experts. In recent years, his thoughtful articles in a number of the more serious journals here and abroad have made an increasing impression among those concerned with current problems.

It is much to be hoped that he will be given the opportunity and means of devoting himself more fully to such studies. For he combines a sustained enthusiasm, energy, and vision with a long and wide background of experience - an exceptional combination.

The Secretary,
Committee for Foreign University Interchange,
The British Council,
65 Davies Street,
London, W.1.

["MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE", "PRESIDENT: Captain B. H. Liddell Hart", "May, 21, 1959", "Henry A. Kissinger\nDirector of Special Studies\n22, West 55th Street\nNew York 19, New York.", "Dear Mr. Kissinger,", "Further to our pleasant correspondence in 1957, I have pleasure in enclosing the cutting from \"The Tablet\" with my last article on Disengagement: other versions of this article have already appeared recently in the leading French and German periodicals, such as \"Politique étrangère\" and \"Aussenpolitik\", and another one is appearing next month in \"L'Armée-La Nation\" in Brussels.", "I would like to draw your attention to my book, which I have written on the same subject, which is already in print, and which will appear simultaneously in this country and in the United States, and after a short interval, in France and Germany.", "The English version will be preceded by short comments on the jacket by Marshal of the RAF, Sir John Slessor, Captain B.H. Liddell-Hart and Denis "ealey, M.P. - I suppose, a good collection of names...", "I hope, you don't mind that I have quoted you, at a few instances, from your book \"Nuclear weapons and foreign policy\" as well as your articles in \"Foreign Affairs\".", "The main value of my book, I suppose, will consist in a comprehensive comparative chart of all plans and proposals put forward by the East and West during the last decade or so.", "As a result of my numerous articles, I gave last year lectures in Athens, Ankara, Tel Aviv and Rome, and this year at NATO Defence College: there is some possibility that, after my book appears, that I'll have a chance for a lecturing tour in the United States.", "If you feel that my expert knowledge of the problem could be of any use to your organisation, perhaps, you could help in arranging this tour: at any case, you'll make your decision on the strength of my book.", "HON. SECRETARY: Captain Eugene Hinterhoff\n10 Victoria Grove · London W 8\nKnightsbridge 8835"]

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

September 6, 1959

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6, Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thank you for your letter of July 21.

My book will appear only sometime in November, and I enclose the cutting from the Publishers's prospect: I also enclose the cutting from The Tablet with my latest article on a subject of common interest, and I would be delighted to have your valuable comments on it.

I take this opportunity to ask you for your kind advice in the following matter: I intend to write another book, under the title: "The Soviet's unwilling allies- the armed forces of the satellites": the very rough structure of the book would be as follows:

Part I-war period: the setting up of the nuclei of the future puppet regimes in Eastern Europe: "Free German Committee" Unions of Polish Patriots, Czech Communists under Gottwald and Nejedly etc: first military formations fighting alongside the Russians: short history of relations with the Governments in exile in London, etc: Part II- 1945-1955: period of amalgamation of various military formations in Eastern Europe: officers corps and its purge: the attitude of the Russians: Stalin's decision in 1949-as an answer to the setting up of NATO-to integrate those forces into the Soviet military machine: Part III-the Warsaw Pact and its implications: events in Poland and Hungarian uprising: the methods to get situation under control.

The purpose of the book-as it will be set in the short foreword to the book-will be to examine the painful dilemma facing the Soviet High Command, whether it can rely on the satellite forces and to what extent, and, if not, what to do with them, in case of war.

As far as I know, there is no such book, and, consequently, my book will fill the gap and will contain valuable information.

OVER.

HON. SECRETARY: Captain Eugene Hinterhoff
10 Victoria Gröve · London W 8
Knightsbridge 8835

As writing of such a book would need a lot of research, I wonder, whether it would be possible to find in the States a Foundation, Institute or a Center, which would be interested in such a study, and which could finance its preparation.

If necessary, I could yet you have my personal background and qualifications for such a job.

Hoping to hear from you,

With kind regards

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

November 10, 1959

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6, Divinity Avenue
Cambridge-Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thank you very much for your kind letter of October 29.

I, I am going to send you in a few days a rough outline of the structure of my book and a few letters of reference, as well as a few cuttings with my articles on satellite armed forces, which will show you the continuity of my research in this field. However, I feel that the best testimonial to my ability to write a book, which I am planning, will be my book on "Disengagement".

2. If nothing unforeseen happens, my book will be on sale in this country and in the United States on November 30: I am sending instructions to Messrs. F. Praeger Inc, my publishers in New York to send you one copy as a token of my profound admiration for your writings.

This brings me to the following problem, which has been worrying me for the last several days: I have approached various authors and publishers with the request for permission to quote extracts from the books and articles, mentioned by me: I am glad to say that all of them have given me their permission, and only one or two have asked a purely symbolic fee of one guinea.

I have approached equally "Foreign Affairs", and received a letter from Mr. Ph. Quigg, Managing Editor saying that I can freely use up to 500 words from each of the article in "Foreign Affairs"; in fact, I have used much less than the above limit, except in one case...

I became so thrilled with your most penetrating article "In search for stability" because it fitted so well into the pattern of my book and in support of my line of arguments that I have used much more than 500 words... I have used 980 words... obviously, if I would had the slight idea about the 500 words limit, I would have acted accordingly.

For your information, I have used the following extracts: p.547, beginning with the words: "The line of demarcation between limited war......" - 14 lines.

Knightsbridge 8835

OVER

p.553, beginning with the words: "Nevertheless a proposal to neutralise Germany......" - 32 lines

p.548-49, beginning with the words: "A preferable solution would be..." - 32 lines

p.550, beginning with the words: "If, as seems quite a possible..." - 20 lines

As my book will be published only on November 30, and the time for sales will be only about 3 weeks, I cannot expect too heavy royalties: furthermore, I had already very heavy secretarial and other expenses, and I am fraid, on January 1, 1960 when accounts are usually made, I'll be in the red... if, in addition I'll have to pay Fee to "Foreign Affairs", it will be a devastating blow to me..

I would be most grateful to you, if you could most kindly intervene on my behalf with Mr. Ph. Quigg and persuade him, perhaps to be satisfied with a nominal Fee.

Thanking you in anticipation

Yours sincerely

P.S. I thought, you might be interested in reading my latest article, being the result of my recent short trip to Spain.

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

their rule.
knowing how strictly they square to
Philip Gring, but I have no way of
tune with me. I will drop a note to
from my article is concerned, this is
as far as we using the section

having the material you mentioned.
November 10th. I will look forward to
Thank you for your letter of

Dear Captain Hinterhoft:

London W. 8, England
10 Victoria Grove
Captain Eugene Hinterhoft

November 23, 1926

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

[L]

November 26, 1959

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Centre for International Affairs
6, Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissinegr,

Thank you very much for your letters, dated November 23.

May I, first of all, thank you for your kindness in not claiming any fee for the quotations from your article, as well as for your letter to Mr. Quigg with your suggestion to follow your example.

I hope that in the meantime you have received from my Publishers my book, whom I have asked to add in the forwarding letter that my book is a token of my most sincere admiration for your writings.

I also hope that you have received in the meantime letters from Alastair Buchan and from Mr. J. Giedroyc, Editor of a monthly "Kultura", published in Paris, where my article on Rokosovsky's Army appeared sometime ago.

I also enclose another reference, this time from my Editor, Mr. Douglas Woodruff, which, I hope, will be also helpful.

Finally, as you wanted to have some more details about my contemplated book, I enclose a rough outline of the structure of the book-as I see it at this juncture.

In anticipation that I'll be able to proceed with writing it, I have already secured promise of fullest cooperation from General Veres, President of Hungarian Freedom Fighters, from General Anders and from some Roumanians as well

Hoping for a favourable decision of the Foundation, and thanking you for your kind interest,

With my kind regards

Yours sincerely

E. Hinterhoff

HON. SECRETARY: Captain Eugene Hinterhoff
10 Victoria Grove · London W 8
Knightsbridge 8835

IO, Victoria Grove.W.8

26th December, 1959

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

I hope that you have received by now all the information necessary, regarding my book together with the references-as mentioned in my letter of November 28, and I trust that it may enable you and your colleagues to form their decision about my contemplated book-I do hope that it will be favourable.

In case, the decision will be negative, perhaps, you could give
me a few useful suggestions how to proceed with my plans.

No doubt, you have also received by now from my Publishers,
Messrs. Fr.Praeger Inc my book"Disengagement", which I asked them to
send to you, as soon as it appears on the bookshelves.

Needless to say, I would be delighted to hear your criticism
of my book.

With my best greetings of the Season,

I am,

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

February 3, 1960

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
Xambrige 38, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Further to my letters of November 26 and December the same date, I would be most grateful to you for a few news about the possibility of getting a grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation.

I understand from Alastair Buchan, to whom you wrote that you are not in a position to give any grants from the above Foundation. I would have thought that your recommendation would carry a great weight with that organisation.

I hope that, in the meantime, you have received from my publishers my book: which could be the best testimonial to my ability to produce another one.

I take this opportunity to enclose the cutting from The Tablet with my article, which, I hope, may be of interest to you.

IO, Victoria grove.W.8

April 3, 1960

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

I came recently back from Pakistan/see the cutting and
Lebanon, and, en route I stopped in Rome to avail myself of the
charming invitation by Admiral Brown to visit VI Fleet, and found
the letter from profesor K. Dziewanowski.

By the way, in Pakistan I was discussing with FM Ayub, President of Pakistan your book "Nuclear weapons and foreign policy"...

Prof. Dziewanowski wrote me that you have suggested
that I should make an approach to Mr. Kenneth Thompson at the
Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, mentioning your name and applying
for a grant.

Before I'll follow your kind suggestion, for which I am
most grateful, I would be very much obliged, if you could
kindly let me know, what is Mr. Thompson's position at the Foun-
dation, and consequently, how must I address him: secondly, I would
like to know, whether you have passed on to him all the documenta-
tion, namely the contemplated structure of the book together with
the references-if not, could you most kindly send them to him with
your most valuable sponsorship.

Prof. Dziewanowski mentioned also your other suggestions, so
that I should approach Institute for Strategic Studies, mention-
ing your name: I believe that there must be some misunderstand-
ing: I am a member of the Institute from the beginning, and I also
know Alastair Buchan very well: he is, by the way Vice-President
of the Military Commentators' Circle, of which I am Hon. Secretary
furthermore, the Institute has no money for other people's pro-
jeets, except for its own.

My book has so far very good reviews not only in this
country but also on the Continent: I enclose a very comprehen-
sive a favourable review published in the bulletin of the Ministry
of External Affairs of Ireland.

As far as the American edition is concerned, American publi-
sher quite suddenly took a violent exception to some of my views
and refused to publish it under his imprint-in spite of the fact
that it had a foreword by Sir John Slessor and comments by Liddell
Hart and Healey.. this another proof of the controversial nature
of my book.

AWAITING YOUR ANSWER AND THANKING YOU FOR YOUR
readiness to help,

Yours sincerely,
E. Hinterhoff

IO, Victoria Grove, W.8

June 4, 1960

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Studies
6, Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thank you very much for your letter, dated May 11, which I found after my return from Europe.

I was delighted having met Mr. Kenneth Thompson in New York, where I was last month, and he was extremely kind to me.

After a long discussion about my book "Disengagement", which I hope you have already seen, Mr. Thompson told me that, if my project will reach him with the sponsorship either of the Institute for Strategic Studies or Chatham House-I belong to both, he will give it his very sympathetic consideration.

Alastair Buchan is putting my project before the meeting of the Council, and, if it will be approved, it will be sent to New York with the Institute's sponsorship.

If you'll come sometime this year to Europe, perhaps you could find time to address the Military Commentators' Circle, of which Liddell Street is the President, Buchan-Vice-President, and I am Hon. Secretary.

To open cut here

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

President: MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE SIR JOHN SLESSOR, G.C.B.

President Emeritus: CAPTAIN B. H. LIDDELL HART

Vice-Presidents:

MAJOR GENERAL W. H. A. BISHOP, C.B., C.M.G., O.B.E.

HON. ALASTAIR BUCHAN

AIR MARSHAL SIR VICTOR GODDARD, K.C.B., C.B.E.

JOHN GRANT, Esq.

Founder and Hon. Secretary:

CAPTAIN E. HINTERHOFF

Hon. Treasurer: W. CHARLTON, Esq.

Hon. Secretary's Address:

10, VICTORIA GROVE, W.8

Tel.: KNI 8835

June 26, 1961

Profesor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

As you have been so kindly interested in my project of a book on the armed forces of satellites, it might interest you that my application, in spite that it had been sent under the auspices of the Institute for Strategic Studies, and sponsored by some prominent personalities like Liddell Hart, Sir John Slessor, FM Auchinleck has been turned down.. the same happened at the Rand Corporation.

However, at present the project is being studied at the Institute for Defence Analyses, and I keep my fingers crossed.

At the same time, Professor Z. Brzeziński from the Russian Institute at the Columbia University has expressed his great interest in the project and authorised me to mention his name as a reference if necessary.

In the meantime, I take the liberty of enclosing the cuttings from The Tablet with my latest article on NATO, in which I have mentioned your name, and which, I hope will be of interest to you.

I am,

E. Hinterhoff

June 17th, 1961

THE TABLET

577

CARL GUSTAV JUNG: 1875-1961

Exploring Uncharted Territory

By RENEE HAYNES

WITH the death of Jung there goes into the immutable past the last and greatest of that great trio who made the Western world fully and vividly aware that the unconscious mind exists. Earlier thinkers, from Augustin and Averroes to William James and F. W. Myers, had discussed its activities and had even coined terms such as "the subliminal consciousness" for this source; but it rested with Freud, Adler and Jung, formed in the discipline of medicine, to announce, to explore and to chart an interior New-found-land as startling to the twentieth century as the exterior continent had been to the sixteenth, despite the ancient and persistent reports of earlier travellers. Though they emphasised different aspects of the terrain, though their maps were drawn to different scales, though one might see in a rock a phallic symbol, another a ladder to success and the third an archetypal image of the *Magna Mater*, all three bore witness to this vast, strange, hidden area of human experience.

Of the three, Jung was the least conditioned by the rigid assumptions of nineteenth-century science; though even he had to work out, in the close reasoning of his essay on synchronicity, an intellectually satisfying argument against that belief in material determinism, that "non-law of causality," which does not weigh quite so heavily upon a generation that has had to accept the notion of small-scale a-causal events in nuclear physics.

Freud and Adler, each in his own way, took for granted the theory of the Darwinian school that the meaning of any phenomenon was to be found by investigating its origin, rather than its goal. Thus, the former traced the pattern of adult development back to the way in which the tiny child had dealt with the primeval and recurrent "infantile sexual trauma"; while the latter taught that that pattern was largely determined by the struggle, begun in babyhood and varied by the child's sex and position in the family (eldest, middling, youngest) to keep or to attain power and self importance. Jung on the other hand accepted with Aristotle the idea that every living thing "strives towards its own perfection," and held that the purposive striving of that living thing the psyche, though coloured by the past, is essentially an affair of the continuous present, working through the principle of balance towards a harmonious integration of all its elements. It can never reach a completely static condition; it is "well-adjusted" not to any given, exterior, sociological or political or family norm, but to dealing with "the changes and chances of this mortal life".

It is significant to note—since language not only expresses but stimulates thought—the key phrases with which each of these men enlarged knowledge. Much of their terminology of course grew up piecemeal between them with the need to name and link new discoveries and interpretations. It can fairly be said, though, that we owe to Freud the idea of the Oedipus complex; to Adler that of the inferiority complex and its over-compensation; and to Jung—how many more. The words "introvert" and "extrovert"; the classification of psychological types (fruitfully linked by Kretschmer and others with physiological types): the notion of some hidden

irrational, powerful image of the 'opposite sex working like yeast in the emotional life, the anima in men, the animus in women; the concept of the four main psychological functions, thought, feeling, intuition and sensation, interacting differently in each human being; the recognition of archetypal symbols common to all mankind, and, most startling of all, the idea that they arise from a collective unconscious mind; all these come from the work of Jung.

Startling is the word. The idea of the collective unconscious has become so familiar that one tends to forget how astonishing it is. Despite his medical training, Jung does not seem to have made much attempt to work out any theory of mind-body relationship in this connexion, or to trace in detail any link with the given structure of brain and nervous system inherited by every generation of human beings. He simply recorded the fact that he was continually finding archaic material—legends, symbols, images—in the dreams of patients who had never had any waking knowledge of it; and concluded that these emerged from some vast, living racial memory. Two interpretations might be put forward; but a brief glance is enough to show their inadequacy.

One would attribute these findings to that frequently noticed telepathy at work between mother and infant of which Dr. Joan Fitzherbert has lately written, in the *Journal of Mental Science*, a study based on her work in Child Welfare. This, however, seems to be so deeply personal that adopted babies, and—even more—babies brought up in institutions and handled by a number of substitute mothers, tend to get dazed, puzzled, baffled by the different patterns of memories and feelings to which they are sensitized. Infant awareness is not of universal symbols, but of the psyche of one or more individuals.

The other explanation, that the material dreamed by the patient might be attributed to telepathy between him and the analyst—a phenomenon recorded and discussed by Dr. Jan Ehrenwald and others—does not cover the fact that the traditions of so many peoples remote from and unknown to one another (such as the Spaniards and the Incas in the fifteenth century) should yield under different names so many of the same archetypal myths and heroic figures.

No, it looks as if the collective unconscious were in fact the human mode of the group-mind posited by that eminent biologist Sir Aleister Hardy, F.R.S., as "a general subconscious sharing of a form and behaviour design—a sort of psychic blue-print—between members of a species" with "a racial experience of habit form and development". The implications of this idea "for intellectual disciplines as diverse as anthropology, political science, philosophy and theology" are extraordinarily interesting and stimulating.

For years, however, Catholic thinkers paid much more attention to Freudian psychology, perhaps because its thesis was more sharply defined, its pattern more easily grasped, than to the ever developing and proliferating thought of Jung, whose extraordinarily active and receptive mind sought to trace the underlying relationship between so many different manifestations of the human

June 17th, 1961

THE TABLET

579

the pressure from Germany will not subside; and General Heusinger, in his new capacity as Chairman of the Standing Committee in Washington, will be in a strong position to exert it on behalf of the Federal German Government.

Such a wise attitude on the part of the Americans is also a token of a retreat from the policy of the previous Administration, when Mr. Herter was putting before the NATO Council in Paris the idea of a special NATO middle-range missile force to operate under a multi-lateral system—in other words, a NATO nuclear force —and was offering as a first step five Polaris submarines, with eighty missiles, and canvassing for the purchase by the Governments of Western Europe of another hundred Polaris missiles. A corollary to that proposal was General Norstad's plan (as reported in the Press) to equip NATO with another three hundred land-based and mobile Polaris missiles.

It appears that, as result of this euphoria with Polaris missiles, a certain confusion had arisen regarding the allocation of targets for the sea-borne land-based Polaris missiles and the tactical air forces, equally capable of carrying atomic bombs. However, why not say frankly that this whole orchestra of Polaris missiles —or strictly speaking, the whole system of IRBM missiles to which the Polaris missiles have made a valuable contribution—can, *acting alone*, neither deter the hypothetical aggressor nor ensure an effective defence of Europe? In view of their limited range, Polaris missiles—even in their improved version, with a range of over two thousand miles—will still be unable to reach the Soviet launching platforms, with their inter-continental rockets, deployed east of the Urals. Consequently it would be something like a duel between a man armed with an airgun and one armed with a machine gun.

Although a bombardment of the territory of the Soviet bloc by the whole range of IRBMs, including Polaris missiles, could inflict most terrible destruction on the Western parts of Russia, including Moscow and Lenin-grad, and on the unfortunate countries of Eastern Europe, the far greater part of Russia, east of the Urals with its war industries, would remain intact. At the same time, as a result of the Soviet retaliation in kind, Western Europe would be utterly destroyed. This sombre picture shows that a NATO nuclear force would *be unable either to deter or to defend*. In other words, it would fail both in its fundamental purpose of pre-venting nuclear war as an inadmissible disaster and in waging it.

In streamlining the problems of deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, the military planners of the West will undoubtedly pay increasing attention to the problems of the conventional defence of Europe, and of the shortage of manpower for even General Norstad's modest goal of thirty divisions. Yet, dismissing irresponsible talk about the Soviet "wall of flesh," one may conclude that thirty divisions, and perhaps even slightly fewer, ought to be sufficient to offer a reason-able resistance for a certain period, and in so doing to shift the onus and risk of initiating a nuclear war to the other side. The resistance of these divisions, if properly prepared and well led, would produce the "pause" so much desired by General Norstad, which would make an ultimate recourse by the West to nuclear weapons politically and psychologically simpler, while at the

same time affording an opportunity for a settlement before such step was taken.

If we look more closely at the whole problem of the conventional defence of Europe—and the military planners of the West will undoubtedly be doing this—it would seem, at least theoretically, to present less difficulty than has generally been imagined.

First of all, if we take into consideration that the "forces in being," in General Norstad's expression, are, according to Professor Kissinger, "more important than at any previous time in our history," and if we estimate that the existing ratio of force in Western Europe is almost one to one, and assuming, in order to be flexible, that the present twenty Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany could be built up in some ten days to, say forty, still the ratio of force alone would be such as to give to an aggressor no real chance of success.

Furthermore, according to Liddell Hart, although the Central front in Europe is about four hundred and forty miles in length, only the more northerly stretch of some two hundred and fifty miles is suitable for a surprise attack and a rapid advance by the Soviet armoured and mechanised divisions in Eastern Germany. Even within that limited stretch the suitable roads are limited, and the direction of the enemy's main effort would become clear once he started crossing the rivers near the border. It must not be forgotten that conventional warfare favours the defence, provided of course that the opposing forces are of similar quality, and that the last war, on all fronts, gave some most convincing demonstrations of this. Apart from valuable experience in Russia, where the German Panzer divisions, often depleted and exhausted, were capable of holding wide fronts for several days against overwhelming odds, with the ratio sometimes ten to one against them, allied actions in Western Europe, Italy and North Africa confirmed this golden rule. During the Normandy campaign the Allied attacks hardly ever succeeded unless the attacking troops had a superiority of more than five to one in fighting strength, having, in addition, an indisputable mastery in the air. The most enlightening example is the second battle at El Alamein, when, in spite of a crushing British superiority, with a ratio of force of three to one in men and six to one in tanks, and with a much greater superiority in artillery, with complete British mastery in the air, Montgomery won only after thirteen days of struggle, and by sheer attrition of the enemy, who had almost no petrol for his tanks, losing thirteen times more men and three times more tanks. As Mr. Correlli Barnett writes in *Desert Generals*, in the chapter called "Military Messiah": "The offensive had staggered to the verge of defeat after just forty-eight hours' fighting—an amazing event, in view of the forces engaged." Rommel's generalship at El Alamein was the best evidence of the power of defence in the hands of a skilled and resolute commander, even when desperately outweighed by the attack.

To analyse those battles of the last war with detachment is then to ask why one should accept the gloomy view professed by Western propaganda that the Russians could swamp Europe without much difficulty, and why on earth the "shield" forces could not put up a similar show to that put up by the Germans under Rommel, or by the Russians in Stalingrad.

*(To be concluded)*

580

THE TABLET

[Lc]

June 17th, 1961

# CONVERSATIONS IN EGYPT

## IV: Evening and Morning in Cairo

By E. J. ALEXANDER

SALEH, a University student whom I met several times in friends' homes, waved to me from a nearby table. He was having coffee downstairs in the Nile Hilton with a friend. I joined them with pleasure on condition that I paid for myself, to which they agreed after much genuine protest.

'How do you intend to spend the evening?' I asked.

"We thought of going to see folk dancing and make a party; do join us."

We went to see "The Brides of the Nile," presented by the Reda Folkloric Dancing troupe in the Engineering Syndicate Theatre. First they performed the story of Sheikh Ramadan who gave a poor girl his beautiful lantern, thus enabling her to join her friends in the celebrations of a Ramadan night. Then there was a highly romantic love story based on an old legend that the most beautiful maiden in the land was offered each year to the river Nile on the day of the first flood. The one who offered herself did it out of despair, but the river refused to swallow a victim of true love and returned her to her lover.

The costumes and the choreography were obviously an attempt at presenting a ballet based on Egyptian traditions and music. There were clashes of colour, there was good and expressive dancing beside some ill-adjusted copies of the Russian *trepak*, grotesque when danced there in Egyptian dresses. Still, it was impressive in its sincerity, enthusiastically performed by a group of young amateurs who had attempted to do something so far never done before in Egypt. The applause was frantic; we joined in as well.

"It is a moving performance," said an elderly man whom I met during the *entr'acte*; "it is the first attempt yet made here to create our own ballet, an Egyptian ballet. Good luck to these youngsters."

It was well after midnight when we managed to reach our car. We decided to drive to the centre of old Cairo, to see how people enjoy themselves during a Ramadan night having fasted for the whole day.

Hundreds of electric bulbs hanging from the domes of the minarets lit up the windows of the shops and boutiques, and in addition to the street lights almost turned night into day. The streets around the mosques of Al-Arhbar and Hussein were filled with gay crowds of simple people, who bought fruit and cakes from street vendors, listened to street organs, watched dancing dogs and fire-eaters. The Café Fishawi, the largest and best-known in Cairo, was full. The owner, a very rich man, was sitting in the middle, collecting money. His portraits, in the Egyptian fashion; hang in almost every room or passage. I did not notice any foreigners there. We sat, about ten of us, in one of the recesses, ordered coffee and fruit juice, and mingled with this gay, light-hearted, friendly crowd of men and women, poor and well-off, young and old.

"How well you speak English, all of you," I remarked.

"We ought to," answered the young man; "after all, our studies are conducted in English at the engineering faculty."

"So your Russian and German professors lecture in English? "

"Yes," he replied, "and most of our text-books are English, or in English if you want to be precise."

"What about other European languages?" I asked. Chafik, one of the youngest among us and obviously just at the beginning of his university studies, was anxious to answer.

"I was brought up by the Jesuits in Cairo, where we spoke French, as many people in Egypt do, although fewer than before the war."

"How did you like your school?" I continued.

"We learned a great deal," he answered, "it is the best school in Egypt. There are many Moslems among the pupils, including sons of the leaders of the revolution."

It was getting late. On our way home walking through the still crowded streets, looking like a large bazaar, we passed beside a biggish hall. A man was sitting at a high desk surrounded by a gay crowd. "You pay him a few piastres," explained Chafik, "tell him your name, and he writes a poem about you."

I was wakened up next morning by drums and rhythmic shouts. It was the boys from the neighbouring State school, who were marching to a large playground for morning parade. Children from five to sixteen years of age assembled in platoons around the playground. First they sang a new patriotic song as the flag was hoisted. Then they were addressed by a man who spoke for about half-an-hour. Whenever he mentioned the name of Gamel Abdel Nasser, the boys shouted the equivalent of our "Hurrah" and then clapped both hands three times against their hips and again three times above their heads. When the man had finished they were marched to the school building.

"What is this talk about?" I asked my friend at the breakfast table.

"Each morning," he said, "an army officer in mufti tells them what happened in the world the day before, mostly about political developments as seen by the regime. The theme is always the same, namely that colonial Powers and their stooges try to keep the African and Asian peoples down, but these revolt and with the help of Nasser and the Eastern bloc become more independent almost every day. The Western Powers are always represented as oppressors."

"And who taught them this method of clapping?"

"Probably ex-Nazi officers who are now instructors in the armed forces," was the answer.

"What do they learn at this school?" I asked.

"It is supposed to be a primary school," answered my friend, "but among the few boys I know, none knows how to read or write. They learn the text of the text of the books by heart, which they find easier. The school, however, is the first attempt at public education. Before the revolution these boys would have been in the streets or working. Now they are well dressed and to some extent disciplined, but unfortunately submitted every single day to a systematic propaganda of hatred."

"My son is sixteen," expounded one of my associates, "and he is forced to train as a paratrooper. Military training is part of his tuition programme from the age of thirteen. He has sores on his legs from the harness he has to wear. He goes periodically to military camps, where he is very well fed and looked after, but indoc-trinated with hatred of what we stand for. I talk with him frankly, but avoid criticising these methods and views so as not to create problems for him. He tells me

June 24th, 1961

THE TABLET

603

he temporarily loses his freedom of moral choice, owing
to the fact that certain areas of his brain are inflamed
and are as useless to him as is a broken leg to an athlete.
The surgeon who pins a broken femur and the psychia-
trist who, by various established procedures, restores
memory and judgment, are, therefore, performing a
similar technical service—namely, giving back free-will
within their respective spheres.

If this neutral and non-moral role of the forensic
psychiatrist is agreed, then we can accept as matters of
fact, not of opinion, some of the propositions he puts
forward. In particular, we should heed the conclusion
that a psycopath is emotionally retarded and that
the extent to which he is retarded can even, in
some cases, be quantitatively measured by an electro-
encephelograph.

All children go through a destructive phase, when
they take delight in breaking their toys and the furniture,
and are apt to bully their smaller brothers and sisters.
This phase doesn't worry us unduly, because it is
common experience that they grow out of it. But a
psychopath does not grow out of it—at least until much
later in life; and once this destructive urge is conjoined
to the full strength of manhood and the sexual instinct,
then it is obvious that he is likely to knock down old
ladies where formerly he knocked down his small sister;
and, in extreme cases to be destructive to small girls
instead of to his jigsaw puzzles and trains. To treat all
these manifestations, from grievous bodily harm with
intent, to murder in the course of rape, as being crimes
deserving the appropriate prison sentence, seems to me
to be as out-dated as burning witches.

For this reason, I would like to see all non-capital
crimes of a violent and psychopathic nature put on the
same footing, as being subject to a mandatory life
sentence, the question of release being left to the Home
Secretary, who would, no doubt, employ a suitable
advisory panel. In some cases, as at present, where the
violence has been caused by provocation or some
transitory emotional disturbance, release could be
envisaged quite quickly, while in other cases it would
be deferred, on the clinical evidence alone, very much
longer than at present, the over-ruling principle being
the safety of the general public.

In fact, the sole Home Office argument, that indefinite
prison terms lead to deterioration owing to lack of hope,
has no relevance so far as psychopaths are concerned,
since one of the principal defects is an inability to take
a long-term view of their own prospects; so that once
a prisoner started to co-operate with a view to securing
his own release that in itself, when sufficiently sustained,
would be an objective indication of his having achieved
maturity. At the same time, forensic psychiatrists, who
are widely regarded by the public as helping the criminal
to "get away with it," would be seen in their true light
as those most concerned to see that violent individuals
received an indefinite rather than a limited prison
sentence. In this manner, since most of them give pre-
liminary indications by minor crimes of violence, many
murderers would be prevented from committing their
crimes rather than punished afterwards.

This solution would, I believe, restore public con-
fidence and please all shades of opinion. Those who
believe the people concerned to be wicked would have
the consolation of their suffering far greater punishment
(in terms of loss of freedom) than at present; those who

believe they are deranged would know they had been
sent somewhere where any possible treatment was avail-
able; while those who, like myself, believe that in the
last analysis these matters can only be decided by
Almighty God would have the satisfaction of knowing
that in either event the public was properly protected.

DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE

A Fortified Zone in Europe ?

By EUGENE C. HINTERHOFF

ONE of the reasons why, during the last war, the de-
fence was able to hold its ground for several days
against superior forces was the proper use of the terrain
—namely, of minefields and of fortifications; in other
words, of a static defence combined with manoeuvre.

However, in spite of all the most valuable experience
from the last war, there seems to exist some sort of
inhibition in the West against any form of a static
defence, and any suggestion in favour of it results in an
outracy and accusations of a "Maginot Line" mentality.
The reasons for such an attitude are more complicated
than they would seem at first glance, and the reser-
vations are too deep-rooted to be easily eradicated,

NATO as such is the expression of two concepts: a
military one, the basic purpose of which is to defend
Europe against a possible Soviet aggression, and a
political one—the concept of a political coalition, with
all its implications. As a matter of fact, when NATO
was brought into being, it was meant primarily for a
single task, namely, for the defence of Europe, and the
concept of a political coalition was formulated at a later
stage, under M. Spaak's leadership, when, in view of the
apparent absence of the danger of Soviet aggression,
NATO began slowly to lose its raison d'être. Yet
these two concepts sometimes not only contradict each
other but pull in opposite directions. One may venture
to suggest that one reason for NATO's decline has
been the increasing accent on its political nature.

A fortified zone in Europe, in particular in Germany,
would be highly desirable from the military point of
view, solving many problems of defence, as illustrated
by various examples from the last war. Yet from the
political point of view such a concept seems to be
almost as inadmissible as Spain's admission to NATO.

Such a suggestion was made in 1954 by Colonel B.
von Bonin, who was employed at the Federal Ministry
of Defence, who put forward a plan for a fortified zone,
some fifty kilometres deep, along the whole frontier
with Eastern Germany, to be defended by perhaps
120,000 or 150,000 men, equipped with some 8,000 anti-
tank guns, manning strong-points and supported by
three armoured divisions as a mobile reserve, plus the
NATO troops, withdrawn west of the Rhine, as a
strategic reserve. This plan was rejected outright in
the Blank Office by Generals Heusinger, Speidel and
Laegeler as militarily inadequate, and contrary to
NATO plans—which, incidentally, provided for a
fighting withdrawal from the Elbe river towards the
Rhine, applying, if possible, a "scorched earth"
policy. In addition, von Bonin's plan was subjected to
tvietropic criticism in the Press, and its author was even-
tually dismissed and put on the retired list.

Dr. Hans Speier, in his book *German Rearmament and Atomic War*, published in 1957 under the auspices of the Rand Corporation, writes on page 77: "Bonin's

604

THE TABLET

June 24th, 1961

[LC]

plan was held to be politically dangerous because it was
feared that the deployment of German forces along the
frontier might be misread as a West German recognition
of Germany's partition." We may assume, however,
that one of the main reasons for the rejection of von
Bonin's plan and its author's demotion was the fact that,
according to him, the West German forces would have
been numbering only some 120,000 or 150,000 men, in-
stead of 500,000, and consequently, German influence
within NATO would have been much smaller.

Lt.-Colonel F. Miksche, who has for years enjoyed great popularity in Germany as a military writer, suggested a similar solution in his book *The Failure of the Atomic Strategy*: "The sole remaining solution is the defence of a fortified zone along the Iron Curtain," (page 180). And yet, in spite of all his popularity, he complains (page 185) that his proposal "has aroused the sharpest criticism, especially in Germany."

Without recommending the erection of a replica of
the Maginot Line, we believe that static defences in the
form of minefields and strong-points would be ex-
tremely useful in some sectors of German territory,
especially in the open spaces in the north, from the
Baltic, covering for example the approaches to Ham-
burg and Frankfurt, to delay any advance of Soviet
mechanised units. A similar solution would be of ex-
treme importance in Denmark and in Schleswig Hol-
stein, areas which at present could be easily overrun by
the Soviets either with an overland thrust or with an
amphibious operation, considering that the Russians
have in the Baltic landing craft for two divisions. Under
prevailing circumstances, this area, after twelve years of
NATO, presents the Russians with a temptation which
perhaps one day they may be unable to resist. One
cannot but agree with Captain Liddell Hart's devastat-
ing criticism of NATO, when he writes that "militarily
its product has been very poor." But the concept of
static defence, like the question of Spain's admission to
NATO, is taboo, although for quite different reasons.

There is another taboo, equally for political reasons,
operating against a concept which from a purely military
point of view could be of great advantage to the de-
fence capabilities of NATO; namely, against the set-
ting up of a demilitarised zone along the demarcation
line. Without going too far into arguments, whereas at
present the Soviet troops are only about a hundred
kilometres from the Kiel Canal and a hundred and
twenty from Frankfurt, in the event of their withdrawal
from Eastern Europe this distance would increase to
between eight hundred and a thousand kilometres.
Moreover, in the event of their attempt to re-enter, which
would certainly be strongly resisted, the Russians would
have to make three major river crossings, involving
complicated operations.

Obviously, an increasing use of the fortified zones
for the defence of some sectors of the Central Euro-
pean front would only emphasise the defensive nature
of the Alliance. Certainly it would do this much more
than, would a saturation with nuclear weapons, es-
pecially with Polaris missiles, able to strike at the heart
of the Soviet territory.

During the Königswinter conference this spring some
speakers expressed the view that the new NATO
strategy, based upon the use of Polaris missiles, tends
"to raise the level of provocation," and it is difficult
to disagree. Examples can easily be found to show

how purely military considerations, expressions of the
original concept of NATO as a military alliance, have
been subordinated to political and other considerations.
Although the idea of a demilitarised zone in Germany
is the product of British diplomacy, the latest
Watkinson-Strauss "deal," when Herr Strauss was
signing in London, like Santa Claus, contracts for
British war industry going into tens of millions of
pounds, makes it clear that any suggestion at this junct-
ture for the setting up of a demilitarised zone would
be considered highly improper and undesirable.

Perhaps the Western planners, in making their blue-
print of a new strategy for NATO, will also take another
look at an idea which has rapidly gained a consider-
able popularity in some circles in the West, probably
as a result of its rather attractive name: that of the
setting up by SHAPE of a "fire-brigade" for use on
certain sectors of the front, preferably on the peri-
pheries. Such a formation, consisting of three batal-
lions from the major NATO countries, strongly recom-
mended by Mr. Goodhart in his Report on European
Security before the recent meeting of Western Euro-
pean Union, ought to represent, in the eyes of its advo-
cates, a token of the solidarity of the Alliance. As
one of the main prerogatives of a senior commander is
the use of his reserves, one may assume that the dis-
patch by SHAPE of a brigade with such a picturesque
name might disrupt the chain of command and result
in chaos in a rather tense situation. However, this
idea, apart from its military inconvenience, presents
very great dangers, from the political point of view,
because it would nip in the bud all efforts to restrict
any local conflict to a limited encounter. The appear-
ance on the spot of a brigade representing the whole
Alliance will certainly doom such efforts to failure
and involve the whole of NATO in a general war from
the very start.

All these controversies show that it will not be
an easy task for the military planners of the West to
work out a new strategy for the defence of Europe.

(Concluded)

CRITICS' COLUMNS

The Merchant at the Old Vic

THE vogue is all for an eighteenth century *Merchant*,
but these pastel shades hardly convey the heavy opul-
ence of a mercantile society. At the Old Vic I never quite
believed in the overdrafts, and this is not a play in which
one can afford to add to the improbabilities. Visually Mr.
Peter Potter's production rather conspicuously lacked grace,
but it was direct and forceful, decently spoken and vigor-
ously paced. The new ideas were good ideas—the festive
opening to set off Antonio's melancholy; leaving Portia
and Bassanio by themselves for their casket scene; and
playing the Trial scene in front of an arcaded wall beyond
which Tubal could escort Shylock home across the bridge.
But I think Mr. Potter was mistaken in placing his Doge
in profile to the audience, thereby diminishing his authority,
and he did not know what to do with his magnificoes. I
am patiently waiting for a producer who will seat these
gentlemen in a semi-circle, with the Doge in the middle,
and firmly keep them there until the court breaks up. They
have an incurable tendency to wander.

The Old Vic performance is enjoyable on several counts.
Mr. George Baker is a much more positive Antonio than

July 24, 1961

Captain E. Hinterhoff
Military Commentators' Circle
10, Victoria Grove, W.8
London, England

Dear Captain Hinterhoff:

Thank you for your letter of
June 26th and the enclosed article. It was
thoughtful of you to write, and I am pleased
to learn about your activities in past months.
I hope that you will receive encouraging news
from the Institute for Defense Analyses.

I read your article on NATO
with interest, and appreciate your sending
it.

All good wishes.

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

Vice-President;

Founder and Hon. Secretary:

CAPTAIN E. HINTERHOFF

Hon. Secretary's Address:
10, VICTORIA GROVE, W. 8

Tel.: KNI 8835

March 7, 1962

Dear Profesor Kissinger,

Further to our correspondence I have pleasure in enclosing the cuttings from The Tablet with my article dealing with the subject of considerable interest to you: in case, you would care to let me have your comments, I would greatly appreciate them.

I am sorry to add that all my efforts since about 2 years to secure a grant for the research publication on the Warsaw Fact-about which I wrote you some time ago-were unsuccessful:

in spite of a sincere interest expressed by various Foundations and Institutes as well as by Profesor Z. Drzeziński, a known authority on Eastern Europe, who expressed readiness to write a foreword to my book, I was unable to make any head way. Although, in the meantime I have published several articles about the Warsaw Fact in different countries, including the United States, this all what I could achieve.

I enclose the synopsis of the book, and, if you think that it is worthy of your support, perhaps you could pass it on to the Russian Institute at the Harvard University with your kind sponsorship.

I am,

Yours sincerely,

MILITARY COMMENTATORS' CIRCLE

President: GENERAL SIR RICHARD GALE, G.C.B.

Vice-President:
MAJOR GENERAL W. H. A. BISHOP, C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., O.B.E.

Founder and Hon. Secretary:
MAJOR E. HINTERHOFF V.M.

Tel.: KNI 8835

December 12, 1963

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

As I have quoted your views on various occasions in my article, dealing with American military potential, as I saw it during my recent trip to the United States, I have great pleasure in enclosing it herewith.

Needless to say, if you would care to make any observations or comments, I would be delighted to read them.

Professor Henry Kissinger
The Center for International Study
The Harvard University.

now strong

IS THE UNITED STATES?

Impressions from a recent visit by E. Hinterhoff

A few hours after the French trumpeter, Sellier, blew a "cease-fire" signal on his trumpet on November 11, 1918, the victorious French Army made a mad rush towards Paris and other French towns. It was simply impossible to stem that human flood, and soon hundreds of thousands of horses, left unattended and unfed, were dying along the deserted front lines. The French army was simply melting away like a piece of butter under the warm rays of a summer sun.

Almost the same thing happened to the American armed forces after World War II, both in Europe and on the Pacific front. A few months after the capitulation of Germans and Japanese, only a few undermanned, skeleton divisions remained, so swift was the disintegration of American armed forces. Home-sick GIs rioted from Marseilles to Manilla: in a few months the ground forces had almost ceased to exist. Ten months after V-E Day, the 3,500,000 Americans under arms had shrunk to some 400,000 men; the 149th Air Group in Germany had fizzled out to two wings with barely 175 pilots. General M. Ridgway, former Chief of Staff of the Army, and former Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, in January 1956, published two bitter articles in the *Saturday Evening Post*. Soon after his dismissal from the post of Chief of Staff he wrote: "In the months following the V-Day, it was my unhappy duty to supervise the swift and shameful destruction of that great light-hearted force which has beaten Germany and Japan to their knees."

The explosion of two atomic bombs over Japan created the illusion that this new weapon would be sufficient to safeguard the peace. Furthermore, it seemed that the weapon, even in its infancy, offered a radical solution of many problems at a very cheap price. The war in Korea shattered the

pleasant illusion that the possession of a few atomic weapons and a strong air force would be sufficient to prevent any future aggression. Further, the fear of Soviet aggression in Europe stimulated the rebuilding of American military power almost from scratch. Since that time, the relentless process has been going on, with defence expenditures reaching astronomical figures, and with millions of people working in armaments industries on contracts from the Pentagon.

I recently visited the U.S. for several weeks under the auspices of a NATO Fellowship, and had the privilege of visiting several military establishments. I had frank high-level talks both at the Pentagon and in the State Department, which gave me insight into and better understanding of the prodigious effort involved in building the most powerful military system in the world, and of the intensity of the intellectual exertion to formulate the "strategic doctrine" which will guide its use. Before detailing the American military build-up, I believe it essential to stress the extreme importance of military doctrine in relation to factors like geography, ratio of forces, weapons capabilities, etc.

Before the Blitzkrieg doctrine was introduced into the Wehrmacht, it was opposed by several conservative old generals. However, it was only due to its adoption that Germany was able to win her campaigns in Poland and France in such a short time. As a matter of fact, it was the Poles who, with a small, combined motorised force and a company of tanks, in a bold manoeuvre executed the first armoured raid deep behind enemy lines. The time was August 1920: the war was the Polish-Bolshevik one. The Soviet Army Corps was utterly defeated. No conclusions were drawn by the Poles from that gallant deed of arms, which, two decades later, became a com-

NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS, December 1963 - January 1964

1

An addition to the U.S. POLARIS arsenal being launched at Groton, Connecticut.

monplace in Blitzkrieg campaigns in Poland, France and the plains of Russia. Another bit of irony is that the *Blitzkrieg* was not a German idea, but was conceived by two British military writers, Major-General Fuller and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, several years before the world had ever heard of de Gaulle and his book, which was published in the late thirties. I saw in Liddell Hart's country residence a photo of General Guderian, famous German tank commander, with the inscription: "From a grateful pupil..."

The virtue of the *Blitzkrieg* doctrine became even more obvious in France where the Germans did not have the numerical superiority they had in Poland. The Germans were inferior to Franco-British forces, not only in number of divisions, but also in tanks: the Allies had over 4,000; the Germans had 2,800 with a weaker gun. Unfortunately, as far as the Germans were concerned, their *Blitzkrieg* doctrine dealt only with the

conduct of operations on land and in the air. Their naval strategy was purely defensive, and they lacked an aggressive amphibious doctrine, the kind which, soon after, was put into operation by the Americans in the Pacific. After Dunkirk, when Britain would have been completely defenceless against any bold amphibious operation, the German General Staff simply had no knowledge of how to organise one. *Operation Sea Lion*, ordered a few months after Dunkirk, was merely an improvisation. For lack of a suitable strategy, the Germans did not invade Great Britain, and this was their undoing.

American setbacks in Korea were due to the use of the wrong tactical doctrine in the wrong place: the methods used were completely unsuited to local conditions and ineffective against the Chinese strategy of deep infiltration and night fighting.

Two more examples will be sufficient to complete this brief analysis of the importance of a suitable strategic and tactical

2

MINUTEMAN, a three-stage surface-to-surface solid-propellant ICBM, can be stored indefinitely "at the ready," giving the Strategic Air Command instantaneous retaliation capability.

doctrine, namely the Israeli offensive in the Sinai campaign in October 1956, and the Franco-British landing in Suez a few days later. The Israeli offensive was a super-Blitzkrieg masterpiece, adapted to the conditions of the terrain, deployment of the enemy, and of the ratio of forces on both sides. The principles of the five-pronged Israeli offensive which ensured them a complete victory in 100 hours had been discussed and played on a map by two Israeli commanders and Capt. Liddel Hart in his country house a few years before the actual incident.

An example teaching quite a different lesson was the Franco-British landing in Egypt in October-November that same year, under the ominous code name *Operation Musqueteer*. It was almost a replica of the Normandy landing, and was therefore almost completely out of place in those tactical conditions and against that dark political background. No doubt a lighting operation in the style of the German air assault on Crete would have achieved quite different results. This grotesquely obsolete operation took place for lack of suitable military strategy. Though Britain is a sea power, proper advantage had not been taken of her geo-political situation, nor

were her armed forces organized properly, stretched, as they were according to pre-World War I principles, all over the world in small packets. Had Britain had a force equivalent to the American Marine Corps, built around a carrier task force, and ready for instant use, she could have reacted against the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Nasser in a matter of days, and at the right psychological moment — when the whole world was united against him.

All this has only now been understood in Britain. The result is that a strategic mobile reserve has been created, and the use of attack aircraft carriers is being stressed — these were used when Iraq was threatening Kuwait two years ago. Unfortunately this has come much too late and Britain has paid a heavy penalty for her lack of a proper military doctrine.

Before my trip to the U.S. I studied many books and articles dealing with the evolution of American military doctrine, and above all, General Maxwell Taylor's book *The Uncertain Trumpet*, which is an expose of present strategy on all levels, as written by the architect of that strategy. He describes U.S. doctrine as the "strategy of a flexible response," and defines this term as "a capability to react across the entire spectrum

3

[L]

of possible challenge, for coping with everything from general
atomic war to infiltration and aggression such as threaten Laos
and Berlin in 1959." This doctrine contrasts sharply with the
previous one of "massive retaliation," which as Taylor points
out "would have crippled American military power." Massive
retaliation, ironically labelled the "new look" replaced the
"sword and shield strategy," which had been fostered by its
architect Admiral Radford. The latter would have been in
force by 1957, and would have resulted in the following,
according to General Taylor:

"... the Army deployment in Europe and Asia were to be reduced to small atomic forces: resistance to enemy's ground attack would have been left to those token U.S. forces, supplemented by the forces of U.S. allies: all this process would have amounted to a unilateral American disengagement into the "Fortress America," and a complete breach of American undertakings, arising out of her membership of NATO ... Under that plan, the land forces of the United States would have been also considerably reduced and limited primarily to civil defense missions; the business of fighting limited war would have been given to air and naval forces, with the Marines doing the general fighting..." (pp. 39-40)

I have quoted at such length from General Taylor's book to show the contrast between what could have happened had the "new look" been put into operation and what is happening now in the U.S. Indeed since President Kennedy has been in office, and since the re-organisation of American armed forces and re-formulation of military doctrine have been entrusted to the dynamic Secretary of Defence MacNamara and to General Taylor, stupendous results have been achieved during the past eighteen months. Surely American successes on the international arena, both during the Cuban crisis and during the negotiations preceding the signing of the Moscow Treaty, were partially attributable to changed defense policy.

These few comments upon the extreme importance of a
suitable military doctrine are a key to the background
against which I formulated my impressions when visiting
various military establishments and commands and in my
Pentagon talks. My impressions are substantiated, I believe,
by the figures quoted below. These are based on the report of
the proceedings of the Senate Appropriations Committee as
well as on a publication of the Institute for Strategic Studies,
and help to give a full picture of present American military
power.

In view of the extremely important role played by
McNamara, it is useful to note that he takes decisions based
not only on advice given him by the Chairman of the Chiefs
of Staff Committee, but also after studying the conclusions of
various research and study groups. The groups, made up of
highly intelligent young civilians, have specialised in the
problems of strategy and are familiar with the works of
Kissinger, Kahn, Wohlstetter and others. In short, the new set
up and its work methods in the Pentagon remind one of a
modern industrial enterprise, which precedes the placing of a
product on the market with thorough market research. In this
respect the Pentagon is quite different from the conventional
Ministries of Defence or General Staffs which we know on
the continent. A typical example of these methods was a

research project ordered by McNamara early this year: its
aim was a complete reassessment of Soviet military potential
and intentions with a view to applying these conclusions in
the build-up of American potential. According to an article
in the *Sunday Telegraph* (London), October 6, 1963, this
project revealed "the biggest single Western intelligence
failure since the fateful summer of 1939. This report has
shown that the West had consistently overrated Soviet
strength, miscalculated Soviet capacity and misunderstood
Soviet intentions. As a result NATO had embarked on a cost-
ly and self-defeating policy to counter the wrong Soviet threat
with the wrong weapons, the wrong strategy and the wrong
assumptions."

The conclusions drawn from this report perhaps provide a
clue to various McNamara policy statements, as well as to
his future plans for the streamlining of the organisation of
American armed forces.

President Kennedy, in a statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee last February, presented his request for a $57 billion military budget, and pointed out that the 2,815,000-man armed forces were being reduced to 2,680,000. This goal, to be achieved by June, was being reached through "pruning" and increase of efficiency. According to Mr. McNamara, American military power consists of two elements: the *strategic or retaliatory forces*, consisting of S.A.C. bombers and ICBM's and *Polaris* flotillas; and the *general purpose force*, all three fighting services, including the Marine Corps, which is considered part of the Navy, although after a long struggle, its C.i.C. sit with the Chiefs of Staff, and all Marines are very proud of it. In addition to all these forces, a special NORAD command exists, which is responsible for the air defence of the U.S. and Canada. Its headquarters are in a delightful little town near the Rocky Mts., Colorado Springs, and I shall deal with it later.

The army is now at 16 combat-ready divisions, all at full
strength. It had been cut after 1950 to 10 divisions, increased
in 1952 to 20 divisions, and then cut again to 11 as a result of
the fluctuations of American strategic doctrine which were
making the Continental allies desperate.

Although, at present, most of the infantry divisions are still
organised as Pentomic divisions, consisting of five battle
groups, a re-organisation and conversion to a highly modern
and flexible type of ROAD division is going on. At Fort Bragg,
in North Carolina, experiments with this new divisional struc-
ture as well as with new weapons, are being conducted.

A considerable part of these land forces has been earmarked
for a new command, set up in 1961, called "The United States
Strike Command." It combines for operational purposes some
combat-ready elements of the land forces as well as of the
Tactical Air Command. Headquarters of this Command is at
Fort McDill, near Tampa, a picturesque old Spanish town
along the Mexican Gulf. The Army component consists of eight
divisions, of which two are armoured and two are airborne.
All infantry divisions earmarked for Strike Command are al-
ready organized in accordance with ROAD principles. The air
component consists of some air divisions and various transport
and refuelling wings, altogether amounting to some 1,000
planes, and can ensure a smooth airlift over very long dis-
tances. The whole force earmarked for the Strike Command
can be airborne within 14 hours from receipt of order for any
destination in the world. The airlift of heavy equipment

4

presents a problem, which has been solved by pre-positioning
of it in different, carefully chosen spots in the world, includ-
ing, of course, Europe. An experiment in October with the
Strike Command, "Big Lift," the airlifting of the whole
armoured division from the U.S. to Germany, may have a
serious impact on all strategic planning if the results are
assessed as satisfactory. It may result in a gradual disengage-
ment of American forces from Europe which would be bene-
ficial for the balance of payments.

A considerable effort is being made by the Administration
to reduce the $3,000 million expenditure for the maintenance
of overseas forces by at least 15 million dollars. There are plans
to close down all bomber bases in Britain and Spain, and to
cut tactical air units, as well as to prune personnel in com-
munications. This has already happened in France: about
5,200 Americans have been withdrawn from communications,
and 6,000 Frenchmen on the American payroll have already
received notice.

The results of the "Big Lift" exercise, started on October
22nd, will be therefore be carefully studied. This operation
coincides with the appearance of an article by General
Eisenhower in the Saturday Evening Post, in which he recom-
mends the cutting down of American forces in Europe to one
token division. If his recommendations were carried out, the
political implications would be serious: there would be a
greater tendency to substitute tactical atomic weapons for the
withdrawn divisions, and the Bundeswehr's responsibility for
the defense of Europe would be greater than it is. Germany's
status in NATO would change, and the balance of power
would shift.

The Army's armaments are equally undergoing a process of
constant improvement; the old M-47 tanks, many of which
have been given to the Bundeswehr, are being replaced by
M-48 which has a 90 mm. gun, and all American units in
Europe are being equipped with M-60 tanks with a powerful
105 mm. gun. One could not omit, at this juncture, the tactical
atomic weapons which have become a matter for heated
controversy in the last few years. The range of these weapons
varies from the half kilo ton warhead of the Davy Crockett
mortars to the Redstone, Pershing or Mace which have a
several hundred mile range, far in excess of the real require-
ments of a battlefield zone. In view of the highly controversial
nature of this problem, complicated, in addition by a relent-
less, although subtle, pressure from the Bundeswehr for these
weapons, I prefer to avoid stepping on the treacherous morass.

The U.N. Navy played an important role in the last war,
especially in the Pacific. According to Admiral Anderson, the
Navy's Chief of Staff, 862 ships have been preserved from that
period of which 385 are warships. They are more or less evenly
distributed between the 1st and 7th fleets, operating in the
Pacific, and the 2nd and 6th fleets operating in the Atlantic
and in the Mediterranean respectively. Both the 2nd and 6th
fleets are earmarked for NATO in case of war. The Navy is in
the middle of a constant build-up: 25 ships have been added
during the last year, including 3 aircraft carrier, the 75,000 ton
Enterprise (nuclear-powered), the Constitution and the Kitty
Hawk.

The active fleet includes one 75,000 ton carrier; three 51,000
ton attack carriers; seven 33,000 ton attack carriers; nine
30,000 tons anti-submarine carriers; 15 cruisers; 225 escorts;
nine ballistic submarines; 105 general purpose submarines, of

which sixteen are nuclear-powered. It must be mentioned that
the Polaris submarines are not a part of the general purpose
forces, but of the strategic forces, although they are manned
by the Navy. Their number will reach 18 by the end of this
year and the total by 1967 will be 41.

The naval aircraft inventory is 7,400 and includes planes
which belong to the Marine Corps. Sixty percent are combat
machines, and include the most modern and sophisticated air-
craft, e.g., the FRH Phantom fighters, considered the fastest in
their class. Of greatest interest to me was the analysis of the
role which will be played by the Navy which I heard at
SACLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia. The "striking
fleets" (five or six aircraft carriers coming from three NATO
countries, the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands) would assist
the land forces of America's continental allies, which would
be engaged in holding operations against the superior enemy
forces in such places as northern Norway, the Baltic area,
Schleswig-Holstein, or the Mediterranean. Intervention by
hundreds of aircraft, taking off from the decks of the carriers
of the striking fleet, and all carrying nuclear bombs, if needed,
would be of tremendous, if not decisive importance. This is
one form taken by American participation in European
defence.

Another form of American support to her European allies
would be an amphibious operation which could be carried out
by Marine Corps units in combat teams of 7,500 men up to full
division strength. The Marine Corps, which enjoys the reputa-
tion of being the elite of the American armed forces, consists of
190,000 men, all volunteers. These men make up three
divisions, each with an organic air wing of some 300-400
close support aircraft. This force is therefore a highly aggres-
sive one.

One division is based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina;
another is in San Diego, California; the third is in Okinawa.
The fourth division is in skeleton form, but can easily be
brought to full strength as there are some 50,000 reservists.
During my visit to Camp Lejeune, I was greatly impressed
with the very modern equipment and sophisticated battle
training, which took into consideration all possible tactical
situations, including guerilla warfare and thus reflected the
d doctrine of the "flexible response."

In view of their high mobility and fire-power, Marine Corps
units could probably be used with great success in much of
Europe, e.g., in northern Norway, in the Baltic, in Schleswig-
Holstein or in any part of the Mediterranean. The huge
province of Finnmark in northern Norway west of the frontier
with the Soviet Union is protected by only two infantry com-
panies. It is completely empty of troops, and there is only one
brigade stationed in the Narvik-Tromso area that could be
possibly used for a holding operation - and this brigade has
other missions to perform. In the event of a conflict, the land-
ing of a Marine Corps team, 7,500 men strong, could dramatic-
ally change the situation there and keep the conflict a conven-
tional one. Such intervention would be another token of active
American participation in the defence of Europe.

During my briefings, both at SACLANT Headquarters and
at Camp Lejeune, I felt the keen interest of American officers
in any possibility of close cooperation with their continental
allies. The spirit of a "Fortress America" simply doesn't exist
anymore.

The Air Force consists also of "three" components: the

NATO'S FIFTEEN NATIONS. December 1963 - January 1964

ξ

HOW STRONG IS THE UNITED STATES?

Strategic Air Command or "strategic forces"; the Tactical Air Command, which is in charge of the greater part of the fighter-bombers and interceptor air forces which are a section of the *general purpose forces*; and finally the air forces, earmarked to NORAD command for the purpose of defending the air space of the territory of the U.S. and Canada. The total air force consists of some 90 wings.

The Strategic Air Force or S.A.C. with headquarters in Omaha (which is a sort of Mecca to those who go to the U.S. to get acquainted with its military power), consists of a manned bomber force and a missile force. The first is divided into 2nd, 8th and 15th Air Forces, all stationed in the U.S., and of the 16th Air Force in Spain (including elements withdrawn from Morocco), 7th Air Force division in Britain, and the 3rd Air Force division in Guam. The missile force consists, for the moment, of the First Aerospace Division, deployed only on the territory of the U.S.

The manned bomber air force, stationed in the U.S., consists of 14 wings, predominantly B-52 heavy bombers, able to carry a free-falling nuclear bomb of a multi-megaton capacity. But the latest B-52G models will also or alternatively have two air-to-ground *Hound Dog* missiles each capable of delivering 4 megaton warheads to targets up to 600 miles away. They are the substitutes for *Skybolt* which was supposed to reach a range of about 1,000 miles. The cancellation of *Skybolt* by Mr. McNamara (which was a disappointment not only to the R.A.F. but to the S.A.C.) was the cause for a diplomatic conflict between Britain and the U.S. In the meantime a phased withdrawal of B-47 bombers from Britain is in progress, together with a withdrawal of *Thor* and *Jupiter* middle-range missiles from Britain, Turkey and Italy.

When I was in Omaha I was told that some 50 per cent of all bombers are kept on 15 minutes alert. I do not know if this situation changed after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, which, incidentally, was not received enthusiastically in American air force circles though it was designed to reduce international tension and diminish the chances of war. Furthermore some bombers are always airborne, flying with a small staff and an air force general ready to take over command of the S.A.C. in case its headquarters are destroyed in a sudden Soviet nuclear first strike. All these precautions are hangovers from Pearl Harbor and no effort is being spared to prevent a repetition.

Although air force circles hotly deny the twilight of manned bombers, the accent is slowly shifting to long-range missiles, ICBM's, which belong to the First Aerospace Division. There are 90 *Atlas* missiles at present, which will be increased to 120 by the end of the year, and 36 *Titans* (18 more expected this year), and finally 150 *Minuteman* missiles organized in three squadrons and able to fire a salvo. As this type of missile has been found to be most sophisticated and reliable, 800 more have been ordered and will be in service by next year. All these missiles with ranges exceeding 6,000 miles can reach any target in the U.S.S.R. or China with multi-megaton bombs. They are stored in deep silos which ensures their complete invulnerability to sudden Soviet nuclear strike, and therefore their instant readiness to retaliate. This search for invulnerability, which is demonstrated by the regulation that 50 per cent of the bomber force is on 15 minute alert, is a keystone of the

doctrine of nuclear retaliation and of second-strike capability.

The same goes for the third component of the American deterrent, the *Polaris* submarines, which have been considered invulnerable till now because of the extreme difficulty in detecting their whereabouts deep under the ocean's surface. However, the great progress being made in anti-submarine warfare can very considerably threaten this advantage which *Polaris* submarines have enjoyed, making the survivability of the American deterrent a relative rather than an absolute one.

Against this background I put forward my arguments in Washington against the American pet project of a multi-lateral NATO seaborne force. Among its many drawbacks this lack of invulnerability is perhaps the most decisive in favor of scrapping it altogether. No doubt these unhappy ships will be shadowed by Soviet submarines or fishing trawlers, which, from the moment they leave their harbors, are sophisticated espionage weapons. The *Polaris* ships would probably be sunk during the first minutes of war without ever being able to fire a single *Polaris* missile from their decks. I was glad to find out, after returning home, that some British military commentators take the same line. It was especially comforting to me to read Mr. H. Kissinger's article in *The Reporter* last March which even more strongly condemned the project.

I was impressed to see above the entrance to headquarters in Omaha, the following words: "Peace is our profession." The deterrent force of missiles other than *Polaris* (soon to reach 1,000 or more in number) must have been one of the fundamental reasons for Soviet withdrawal in Cuba and for the signing of a test ban treaty. If one adds the 650 *Polaris* missiles to these, and the S.A.C. bombers, the "overkill" capacity of the U.S. is sufficient to destroy the Soviet Union completely many times over. According to a recently published study by a group of American independent specialists, "A Strategy for American Security—an Alternative to the 1964 Budget," the overkill capacity is about 1,250 to 1.

I confess that when I read these fantastic calculations, I had in mind another publication, namely an article by the noted French military writer General Chassin. In the July 1963 issue of *Revue de Defense Nationale* ("Les armes chimiques et biologiques") he discusses the conclusions of a recently held medical conference at SHAPE. The danger of a sudden attack with a small quantity of bacteria or gas was discussed. For instance, a few hundred liters of a highly dangerous bacteria could be sprayed during the night by a small boat from a distance of a few miles off the coast and could infect an area of some 40,000 miles. No doubt a few fishing trawlers could, in such a way, paralyze San Francisco or New York, or any other place on U.S. territory, in spite of the existence of a powerful concentration of nuclear power, which could hardly be used under the circumstances. I was sorry that I read this article only after my return from the U.S. because I could not have resisted the temptation to ask some senior officers at S.A.C. what they thought about a situation such as this in which they would find themselves powerless. The purpose of these random thoughts has been to state that the American position of strength, in spite of its terrifying destructive power, is still only a relative and not an absolute one.

The air forces belonging to the so-called "general purpose" forces consist of B-57 and B-66 squadrons and of 16 tactical

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wings. The greater part of these general purpose forces has been allocated to Tactical Air Command which has 16 wings and 50,000 men. Six of these wings are tactical fighters and two of them are normally on rotational duty in Europe. Other wings include 220 transport and aerial tankers. Further, there is a Military Transportation Service with some 600 four-engine transports suitable for airlift purposes, most of which are at the disposal of the Strike Command.

The task of the tactical air force in Europe is, first of all, to ensure ground support to land forces, and, secondly, to attack enemy communications in eastern Europe, mainly in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This is part of "interdiction strategy" which, in view of the growing saturation of NATO's shield with tactical atomic weapons, is slowing becoming a keystone of it. In performing this mission, these air units will be assisted by the British V-bomber force which, after Nassau, was placed at the disposal of Saceur. In view of the cancellation of Skybolt, the missions of this V-bomber force will be limited to attacking enemy communications and airfields on the territory of eastern Europa and on the fringes of the western part of Russia proper.

For the same reasons, the French force de frappe, perhaps with some exceptions in view of its limited range, will be used for the same purpose. If one adds to the destructive power of these air forces, the tactical atomic weapons that will be in the Bundeswehr equipment, the intensity of a nuclear strike in the context of interdiction strategy could be, perhaps, estimated in the neighbourhood of 70-80,000 Hiroshima bombs. If one takes into consideration that, as a result of one Hiroshima bomb, some 35,000 people were killed and another 35,000 suffered serious damage to their health, the effect of the nuclear strike described above directed only at "military" targets, bridges, marshalling yards and airfields, would be absolutely beyond comprehension, especially as these targets are usually situated near cities and towns. Consequently, applying this strategy will completely contradict the fundamentals of MacNamara's "counter-force" doctrine, as opposed to the "cities strategy." My article on the implications of "interdiction strategy" published recently in The Tablet aroused lively interest at the Pentagon and has been photostated for distribution. After I returned from my trip I discovered that H. Kissinger in "The United States and Nassau" in The Reporter took the same line that I did.

Unfortunately, as matters stand, interdiction strategy has become one of the keystones of NATO defense strategy in Europe, and units are being equipped with increasing numbers of tactical weapons with ranges considerably higher than battlefield requirements, e.g., Mace B with a range of over 1,290 miles. If one does not judge this concept entirely from a narrow military point of view, one comes to the conclusion that this strategy includes a dangerous fallacy.

Even if the entire population of the countries subjected to this terrifying nuclear strike were completely wiped out, and the whole area transformed into smouldering, radio-active rubble, there is still no guarantee that this strategy would achieve its purpose- the denial of access to the forward zone of operations of Soviet reinforcements and supplies. Reinforcements can be moved by helicopter without any difficulty, could easily drop their airborne divisions to any part of the even a few hours after a nuclear spasm. Further, the Russians could easily drop their airborne divisions to any part of the

forward zone, or much further afield. Transport of supplies, in view of modern bridge-building techniques, would present no difficulties. Also the Russians have considerable numbers of amphibious vehicles which could substitute for destroyed bridges. The pollution of the terrain by fallout would present no obstacles to troop and supply movements by tracked vehicles.

The implications of the slaughter of a whole population should be understood in the light of the experiences of the German campaign in Russia in 1941. There is much literature on the subject of Soviet defections in World War II such as A. Lyon's *Our Secret Allies*, G. Fisher's *Russians Against Stalin*, B. Shub's *The Choice*, etc. These books point out that at the time of the invasion the Red Army enjoyed an overwhelming superiority in manpower, aircraft, tanks and artillery. Within the first eight months the Germans took about 3.6 million prisoners and captured immense quantities of war material, including 16,000 guns and 17,500 tanks. Otto Brautigam, one of the leading officials of the Reich Ministry of the East, testified at the Nuremburg trials: "... the population greeted us with joy as liberators and placed themselves at our disposal willingly and freely with body and life." Yet, as a result of senseless Nazi brutalities, the same population turned itself against the German invaders, operating on a mass scale in the rear of the German troops. If Hitler had had the imagination to drop arms to the forced labor camps in northern Siberia, the millions of inmates seething with fanatical hatred of the Communist regime would have risen in revolt.

If those responsible for interdiction strategy would ponder these facts, as well as think over the principles of psychological warfare, they might understand, perhaps, that in case of war, millions of eastern Europeans who hate Russia in a way beyond western comprehension, would rise against their own regimes. Such uprisings would be more effective than "interdiction" in preventing supplies and reinforcements from reaching the forward zone. Senator Thomas Dodd, in an article in the *New Leader* (July 22, 1958) stated:

> "We have in our grasp a deterrent potentially even more powerful than our arsenal of atom and hydrogen bombs. It is a deterrent of which we regrettably appear almost wholly unaware... the hatred which the peoples behind the Iron Curtain feel for their tyrannical regimes."

Finally the third element of the American air force consists of a considerable number of interceptor-fighters, allocated to the special NORAD command. In view of its mission, it consists of the following:

1. Five Canadian interceptor-fighter squadrons plus a certain number of Momarc ground-to-air missiles, over which there was a bitter conflict between former Prime Minister Dieffenbaker and his successor Lester Pearson.

2. About 1500 interceptors deployed in depth all over U.S. territory, as well as several anti-missile launchers like Nike-Hercules (12 launchers per battery).

3. Several elaborate combinations of various early-warning and radar stations of which the most important are in Greenland, Alaska, and Fyllindale (Great Britain); the last is the most recent.

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[L]

Pictured is the PERSHING, one of the tactical atomic weapons that have been a subject for controversy in recent years.

This highly complicated system of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence is run from NORAD Headquarters at Colorado Springs, where I had an amusing exchange of arguments after a fascinating briefing about its mission. I expressed the view that this Command, because of its location in a small brick building, could be blasted to smithereens by a few kiloton bombs, and was therefore the weakest point in the whole NATO area. An American general, present at this discussion, smiled and said he could comfort me by informing me that a few years ago underground HQ in the Cheyenne Mts. a few miles from Colorado Springs were prepared, and that HQ would soon be immune from the strongest nuclear attack.

This short review of the tremendous build-up of American military power, gives an impressive picture of its strength and

"overkill" capacity, I believe, in spite of the few Achilles' heels. I am sure that the U.S. it assured in its present impregnable "position of strength." As Senator Hubert Humphrey said, in a speech to the Senate in favor of the Moscow test ban treaty: "... the Russians have been aware of the dramatic increase in U.S. military strength during the past three years. They saw that the U.S. had effectively doubled its military power since 1960, particularly by equipping its strategic alert force with nuclear warheads, by modernizing and accelerating ship construction, and by 200 per cent increase in the nation's counter-guerilla forces..."

I am glad to say that, after my visit to the U.S., I can fully endorse his words.

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