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KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCES
1973

BOOK I

1. January 24, 1973 re Vietnam Peace Agreement.

2. February 1, 1973 re Interview with Marvin Kalb, CBS News.

3. February 22, 1973 re Trip to Hanoi and Peking.

4. February 23, 1973 re Interview with Barbara Walters, NBC News

5. April 13, 1973 re Remarks to Federal City Club.

6. April 23, 1973 re Address Delivered to the Associated Annual Luncheon re the Year of Europe.

7. May 2, 1973 re President's Foreign Policy Report.

8. May 3, 1973 re President's Foreign Policy Report.

9. May 12, 1973 re Upcoming Summit Meeting Between US-USSR.

10. May 29, 1973 re Year of Europe.

11. May 31, 1973 re Meeting of the President with President Pompidou of France.

12. June 13, 1973 re Joint Communique on Vietnam.

13. June 14, 1973 re Upcoming US-USSR Summit.

14. June 21, 1973 re Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations of Further Limitation for Strategic Offensive Arms and Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

15. June 22, 1973 re Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

16. June 25, 1973 re Joint Communique re US-USSR Summit.

17. June 29, 1973 re Joint Press Conference with Michel Jobert, Foreign Minister of France.

BOOK II

18. August 2, 1973 re Remarks at International Platform Association.

19. August 23, 1973 re Nomination as Secretary of State.

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BOOK II - cont'd

20 July 6, 1973 re Exchange of Remarks Between Kissinger and White House Press Corps.

21 September 7, 1973 re Statement Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

22 September 22, 1973 re Exchange of Remarks Between President and Kissinger at the Swearing-in Ceremony of Kissinger as Secretary of State.

23 September 24, 1973 re Address Before the 28th United Nations Assembly.

24 September 26, 1973 re US Mission to the United Nations.

25 September 28, 1973 re Remarks Before Department Employees.

26 October 8, 1973 re Speech at Pacem in Terris Conference.

27 October 12, 1973 re Press Conference at International Conference re Personnel, Middle East, NATO, Etc.

28 October 16, 1973 re Remarks On Being Notified of the Award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

29 October 18, 1973 re Remarks Upon Receipt of the George Catlett Marshall Medal of the Association of the United States Army.

30 October 25, 1973 re Middle East Crisis.

31 November 12, 1973 re Interview by ABC, CBS, and NBC in Peking.

32 November 14, 1973 re Joint Communique re China (PRC) Trip.

33 November 16, 1973 re Message on the Occasion of Foreign Service Day.

34 November 21, 1973 re Middle East, South East Asia, and Energy.

35 November 30, 1973 re Remarks at Reception Honoring Chiefs of Mission.

36 December 2, 1973 re Press Conference on Plane Returning from China-PRC- (Seoul to Anchorage) re China.

37 December 6, 1973 re Appointments of Ambassadors, Middle East, Energy, and Korea Talks.

BOOK II cont'd

38 December 12, 1973 re Close of NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Brussels.

39 December 12, 1973 re Address Before A Dinner Meeting of the Pilgrims of Great Britain.

40 December 20, 1973 re Visit to Lisbon, Portugal - Joint Communique.

41 December 22, 1973 Statement to the Cpening Session of the Geneva Conference (December 21, 1973).

42 December 27, 1973 re 1973 Year-End Review.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 24, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE ROOM

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen:

The President last evening presented the outlines of the agreement and by common agreement between us and the North Vietnamese we have today released the text and I am here to explain, to go over briefly what these texts contain, and how we got there, what we have tried to achieve in recent months and where we expect to go from here.

Let me begin by going through the agreement which you have read.

The agreement, as you know, is in nine chapters. The first affirms the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, agreements which established two zones, divided by a military demarcation line.

Chapter II deals with a cease-fire. The cease-fire will go into effect at seven o'clock Washington time on Saturday night. The principal provisions of Chapter II deal with permitted acts during the cease-fire and with what the obligations of the various parties are with respect to the cease-fire.

Chapter II also deals with the withdrawal of American and all other foreign forces from Vietnam within a period of 60 days and it specifies the forces that have to be withdrawn. These are in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. We are permitted to retain economic advisors, and civilian technicians, serving in certain of the military branches.

Chapter II further deals with the provisions for re-supply and the introduction of outside forces. There is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any military force into South Vietnam from outside of South Vietnam, which is to say that whatever forces may be in South Vietnam from outside South Vietnam, specifically North Vietnamese forces, cannot receive reinforcements, replacements, or any other form of augmentation by any means whatsoever. With respect to military equipment, both sides are permitted to replace all existing military equipment on a one-to-one basis under international supervision and control.

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There will be established, as I will explain when I discuss the protocols, for each side, three legitimate points of entry through which all replacement equipment has to move. These legitimate points of entry will be under international supervision.

Chapter III deals with the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians, as well as with the question of civilian detainees within South Vietnam.

This, as you know, throughout the negotiations, presented enormous difficulties for us. We insisted throughout that the question of American prisoners of war and of American civilians captured throughout Indochina should be separate from the issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel detained, partly because of the enormous difficulty of classifying the Vietnamese civilian personnel by categories of who was detained for reasons of the civil war and who was detained for criminal activities.

And secondly, because it was foreseeable that negotiations about the release of civilian detainees would be complex and difficult and because we did not want to have the issue of American personnel mixed up with the issues of civilian personnel in South Vietnam.

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This turned out to be one of the thorniest issues, that was settled at some point and kept reappearing throughout the negotiations. It was one of the difficulties we had during the December negotiations.

As you can see from the agreement, the return of American military personnel and captured civilians is separate in terms of obligation, and in terms of the time frame from the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel.

The return of American personnel and the accounting of missing in action is unconditional and will take place within the same time frame as the American withdrawal.

The issue of Vietnamese civilian personnel will be negotiated between the two Vietnamese parties over a period of three months, and as the agreement says, they will do their utmost to resolve this question within the three month period.

So I repeat, the issue is separated, both in terms of obligation and in terms of the relevant time frame from the return of American prisoners which is unconditional.

We expect that American prisoners will be released at the intervals of two weeks or fifteen days in roughly equal installments. We have been told that no American prisoners are held in Cambodia. American prisoners held in Laos and North Vietnam will be returned to us in Hanoi. They will be received by American medical evacuation teams and flown on American airplanes from Hanoi to places of our own choice, probably Vientiane.

There will be international supervision of both this provision and of the provision for the missing in action. And all American prisoners will, of course, be released, within 60 days of the signing of the agreement. The signing will take place on January 27, in two installments, the significance of which I will explain to you when I have run through the provisions of the agreement and the associated protocol.

Chapter IV of the agreement deals with the right of the South Vietnamese people to self-determination. Its first provision contains a joint statement by the United States and North Vietnam in which those two countries jointly recognize the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination in which those two countries jointly affirm that the South Vietnamese people shall decide for themselves the political system that they shall choose and jointly affirm that no foreign country shall impose any political conditions on the South Vietnamese people.

The other principal provision of the agreement that it implemented is the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. The two South Vietnamese parties will decide, will agree among each other, on free elections for offices to be decided by the two parties at a time to be decided by the two parties. These elections will be supervised and organized first by an institution which has the title of National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord, whose members will be equally appointed by the two sides which will operate on the principle of unanimity, and which will come into being after negotiation between the two parties who are obligated by this agreement to do their utmost to bring this institution into being within 90 days.

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Leaving aside the technical jargon, the significance of this agreement, of this part of the agreement, is that the United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose any political solution on the people of South Vietnam. The United States has consistently maintained that we would not impose a coalition government or a disguised coalition government on the people of South Vietnam.

If you examine the provisions of this chapter, you will see, first, that the existing government in Saigon can remain in office; second, that the political future of South Vietnam depends on agreement between the South Vietnamese parties and not on an agreement that the United States has imposed on these parties; thirdly, that the nature of this political evolution, the timing of this political evolution, is left to the South Vietnamese parties, and that the organ that is created to see to it that the elections that are organized will be conducted properly, is one in which each of the South Vietnamese parties has a veto.

The other significant provision of this agreement is the requirement that the South Vietnamese parties will bring about a reduction of their armed forces, and that the forces being reduced will be demobilized.

The next chapter deals with the reunification of Vietnam and the real relationship between North and South Vietnam. In the many negotiations that I have conducted over recent weeks, not the least arduous was the negotiation conducted with the ladies and gentlemen of the press, who constantly raised issues with respect to sovereignty, the existence of South Vietnam as a political entity, and other matters of this kind. I will return to this issue at the end when I sum up the agreement, but it is obvious that there is no dispute in the agreement between the parties that there is an entity called South Vietnam, and that the future unity of Vietnam, as it comes about, will be decided by negotiation between North and South Vietnam; that it will not be achieved by military force; indeed, that the use of military force, with respect to bringing about unification, or any other form of coercion is impermissible according to the terms of this agreement.

Secondly, there are specific provisions in this chapter with respect to the Demilitarized Zone. There is a repetition of the agreement of 1954 which makes the demarcation line along the 17th Parallel provisional, which means pending reunification. There is a specific provision that both North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line, and there is another provision that indicates that among the subjects that can be negotiated will be modalities of civilian movement across the demarcation line, which makes it clear that military movement across the Demilitarized Zone is in all circumstances prohibited.

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Now, this may be an appropriate point to explain what
our position has been with respect to the DMZ. There has been a
great deal of discussion about the issue of sovereignty and about
the issue of legitimacy, which is to say which government is in
control of South Vietnam.

And finally, about why we laid such great stress on the
issue of the Demilitarized Zone. We had to place stress on the
issue of the Demilitarized Zone because the provisions of the
agreement with respect to infiltration, with respect to replace-
ment, with respect to any of the military provisions, would
have made no sense whatsoever if there was not some demarkation
line that defined where South Vietnam began. If we had accepted
the proposition that would have in effect eroded the Demilitarized
Zone, then the provisions of the agreement with respect to
restrictions about the introduction of men and material into
South Vietnam would have been unilateral restrictions applying
only to the United States and only to our allies. Therefore,
if there was to be any meaning to the separation of military and
political issues, if there was to be any permanence to the
military provisions that had been negotiated, then it was essential
that there was a definition of where the obligations of this
agreement began. As you can see from the text of the agreement,
the principles that we defended were essentially achieved.

Chapter VI deals with the international machinery, and
we will discuss that when I talk about the associated protocols of
the agreement.

Chapter VII deals with Laos and Cambodia. Now, the
problem of Laos and Cambodia has two parts. One part concerns
those obligations which can be undertaken by the parties signing
the agreement—that is to say, the three Vietnamese parties and the
United States—those measures they can take which effect the
situation in Laos and Cambodia.

A second part of the situation in Laos has to concern
the nature of the civil conflict that is taking place within
Laos and Cambodia and the solution of which, of course, must
involve as well the two Laotian parties and the innumerable
Cambodian factions.

Let me talk about the provisions of the agreement with
respect to Laos and Cambodia and our firm expectations as to the
future in Laos and Cambodia.

The provisions of the agreement with respect to Laos
and Cambodia reaffirm, as an obligation to all the parties, the
provisions of the 1954 agreement on Cambodia and of the 1962
agreement on Laos, which affirm the neutrality, and right to
self-determination of those two countries. They are, therefore,
consistent with our basic position with respect also to South
Vietnam.

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In terms of the immediate conflict, the provisions
of the agreement specifically prohibit the use of Laos and
Cambodia for military and any other operation against any of
the signatories of the Paris Agreement or against any other
country. In other words, there is a flat prohibition against
the use of base areas in Laos and Cambodia.

There is a flat prohibition against the use of Laos
and Cambodia for infiltration into Vietnam or, for that matter,
into any other country.

Finally, there is a requirement that all foreign
troops be withdrawn from Laos and Cambodia, and it is clearly
understood that North Vietnamese troops are considered foreign
with respect to Laos and Cambodia.

Now, as to the conflict within these countries which
could not be formally settled in an agreement which was not signed
by the parties of that country, let me make this statement,
without elaborating: It is our firm expectation that within a
short period of time there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos
which, in turn, will lead to a withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Laos and, of course, to the end of the use of Laos as a
corridor of infiltration.

Secondly, the situation in Cambodia, as those of you
who have studied it will know, is somewhat more complex because
there are several parties headquartered in different countries.
Therefore, we can say about Cambodia that it is our expec-
tation that a de facto cease-fire will come into being over a
period of time relevant to the execution of this agreement.

Our side will take the appropriate measures to indi-
cate that it will not attempt to change the situation by force.
We have reason to believe that our position is clearly under-
stood by all concerned parties, and I will not go beyond this
in my statement.

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Chapter VIII deals with the relationship between
the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

As I have said in my briefings on October 26th
and on December 16th, and as the President affirmed on many
occasions, the last time in his speech last evening, the
United States is seeking a peace that heals. We have
had many armistices in Indochina. We want a peace that will
last.

And, therefore, it is our firm intention in our
relationship to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to
move from hostility to normalization and from normalization
to conciliation and cooperation and we believe that under
conditions of peace we can contribute throughout Indochina
to a realization of the human aspirations of all the
people of Indochina and we will, in that spirit, perform
our traditional role of helping people realize these
aspirations in peace.

Chapter IX of the agreement is the usual
implementing provision.

So much for the agreement.

Now, let me say a word about the protocols. There
are four protocols or implementing instruments to the
agreement: On the return of American prisoners, on the
implementation and institution of an international
control commission, on the regulations with respect to the
cease-fire and the implementation and institution of a
joint military commission among the concerned parties, and
a protocol about the deactivation and removal of mines.

I have given you the relevant provisions of the
protocol concerning the return of prisoners. They will be
returned at periodic intervals in Hanoi to American
authorities and not to American private groups. They will
be picked up by American airplanes, except for prisoners
held in the southern part of South Vietnam, which will be
released at designated points in the south, again, to
American authorities.

We will receive on Saturday, the day of the signing
of the agreement, a list of all American prisoners held
throughout Indochina and both parties, that is to say,
all parties have an obligation to assist each other in obtaining
information about the prisoners, missing in action, and about
the location of graves of American personnel throughout
Indochina.

The International Commission has the right to visit
the last place of detention of the prisoners, as well as
the place from which they are released.

Now, to the International Control Commission. You
may remember one of the reasons for the impasse in December
was the difficulty of agreeing with the North Vietnamese
about the size of the International Commission, its function,
or the location of its teams.

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On this occasion, there is no point in rehashing all the differences. It is, however, useful to point out that at that time the proposal of the North Vietnamese was that the International Control Commission have a membership of 250, no organic logistics or communication, dependent entirely on its authority to move on the party it was supposed to be investigating and over half of its personnel were supposed to be located in Saigon, which is not the place where most of the infiltration that we were concerned with was likely to take place.

We have distributed to you an outline of the basic structure of this Commission. Briefly stated, its total number is 1,160 drawn from Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland. It has headquarters in Saigon. It has seven regional teams, 26 teams based in localities throughout Vietnam which were chosen either because forces were in contact there or because we estimated that these were the areas where the violations of the cease-fire were most probable.

There are 12 teams at border crossing points. There are seven teams that are set aside for points of entry, which have yet to be chosen, for the replacement of military equipment. That is for Article 7 of the agreement. There will be three on each side and there will be no legitimate point of entry into South Vietnam other than those three points. The other border and coastal teams are there simply to make certain that no other entry occurs and any other entry is by definition illegal. There has to be no other demonstration except the fact that it occurred.

This leaves one team free for use, in particular, at the discretion of the Commission and of course the seven teams that are being used for the return of the prisoners can be used at the discretion of the Commission after the prisoners are returned.

There is one reenforced team located at the Demilitarized Zone and its responsibility extends along the entire Demilitarized Zone. It is in fact a team and a half. It is 50 percent larger than a normal border team and it represents one of the many compromises that were made between our insistence on two teams, their insistence on one team and by a brilliant stroke, we settled on a team and a half. (Laughter)

With respect to the operation of the International Commission, it is supposed to operate on the principle of unanimity, which is to say that its reports, if they are Commission reports, have to have the approval of all four members. However, each member is permitted to submit his own opinion so that as a practical matter, any member of the Commission can make a finding of a violation and submit a report at the first instance to the party.

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The International Commission will report for the time being to the four parties to the agreement. We expect an international conference will take place at the Foreign Ministers' level.

Within a month of the signing of the agreement, that international conference will establish a relationship between the International Commission and itself, or any other international body that is mutually agreed upon, so that the International Commission is not only reporting to the parties that it is investigating, but for the time being, until the international conference has met, there was no other practical group to which the International Commission could report.

In addition to this international group, there are two other institutions that are supposed to supervise the cease-fire. There is first of all, an institution called the Four-Party Joint Military Commission, which is composed of ourselves and the three Vietnamese parties, which is located in the same place as the International Commission, charged with roughly the same functions, but as a practical matter, it is suppose to conduct the preliminary investigations. Its disagreements are automatically referred to the International Commission, and moreover, any party can request the International Commission to conduct an investigation regardless of what the Four-Party Commission does, and regardless of whether the Four-Party Commission has completed its investigation or not.

After the United States has completed its withdrawal, the Four-Party Military Commission will be transformed into a Two-Party Commission composed of the two South Vietnamese parties. The total number of supervisory personnel, therefore, will be in the neighborhood of 4,500 during the period that the Four-Party Commission is in existence, and in the neighborhood of about 3,000 after the Four-Party Commission ceasing operating and the Two-Party Commission comes into being.

Finally, there is a protocol concerning the removal and deactivation of mines which is self-explanatory, and discusses the relationship between our efforts and the efforts of the DRV concerning the removal and deactivation of mines which is one of the obligations we have undertaken in the agreement.

Now, let me point out one other problem. On Saturday, January 27th, the Secretary of State on behalf of the United States, will sign the agreement bringing the cease-fire and all the other provisions of the agreement and protocols into force. He will sign in the morning a document involving four parties, and in the afternoon a document between us and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. These documents are identical, except that the preamble differs in both cases.

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The reason for this somewhat convoluted procedure
is that, while the agreement provides that the two South
Vietnamese parties should settle their disputes in an atmosphere
of national reconciliation and concord, I think it is safe to say
that they have not yet quite reached that point; indeed, that
they have not yet been prepared to recognize each other's exis-
tence.

This being the case, it was necessary to devise one
document in which neither of the South Vietnamese parties was
mentioned by name and, therefore, no other party could be
mentioned by name on the principle of equality. So the four-
party document, the document that will have four signatures,
can be read with great care and you will not know until you get
to the signature page whom, exactly, it applies to. It refers
only to the parties participating in the Paris Conference,
which are, of course, well known to the parties participating
in the Paris Conference. (Laughter)

It will be signed on two separate pages. The United
States and the GVN are signing on one page, and the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam and its ally are signing on a separate
page, and this procedure has aged us all by several years.
(Laughter)

Then there is another document which will be signed
by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the afternoon. That document,
in its operative provisions, is word for word the same as the
document which will be signed in the morning, and which con-
tains the obligations to which the two South Vietnamese parties
are obligated.

It differs from that document only in the preamble
and in its concluding paragraph. In the preamble it says the
United States, with the concurrence of the Government of the
Republic of Vietnam, and the DRV, with the concurrence of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government, and the rest is the
same, and then the concluding paragraph has the same adapta-
tion. That document, of course, is not signed by either Saigon
or its opponent and, therefore, their obligations are derived
from the four-party document.

I do not want to take any time in going into the
obstruse legalism. I simply wanted to explain to you why
there were two different signature ceremonies, and why, when we
handed out the text of the Agreement, we appended to the docu-
ment which contains the legal obligations which apply to
everybody -- namely, the four parties -- we appended another
section that contained a different preamble and a different
implementing paragraph which is going to be signed by the
Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam.

This will be true with respect to the agreement and
three of the protocols. The fourth protocol regarding the
removal of mines applies only to the United States and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam and, therefore, we are in the
happy position of having to sign only one document.

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Now, then, let me summarize for you how we got to
this point, and some of the aspects of the agreement that we
consider significant, and then I will answer your questions.

As you know, when I met with this group on December
16th, we had to report that the negotiations in Paris seemed to
have reached a stalemate. We had not agreed at that time,
although we didn't say so. We could not find a formula to take
into account the conflicting views with respect to signing.
There were disagreements with respect to the DMZ and with the
associated aspects of what identity South Vietnam was to have
in the agreement.

There was a total deadlock with respect to the
protocols, which I summed up in the December 16th press confer-
ence. The North Vietnamese approach to international control
and ours were so totally at variance that it seemed impossible
at that point to come to any satisfactory conclusion, and there
began to be even some concern that the separation which we
thought we had achieved in October between the release of our
prisoners and the question of civilian prisoners in South Vietnam
was breaking down.

When we reassembled on January 8th, we did not do so
in the most cordial atmosphere that I remember. However, by the
morning of January 9th it became apparent that both sides were
determined to make a serious effort to break the deadlock in
negotiations, and we adopted a mode of procedure by which issues
in the agreement and issues of principle with respect to the
protocols were discussed at meetings between Special Advisor
Le Duc Tho and myself, while concurrently an American team headed
by Ambassador Sullivan and a Vietnamese team headed by Vice
Minister Thach would work on implementation of the principles
as they applied to the protocols.

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For example, the Special Advisor, and I might agree on the principle of broader control posts and their number, but then the problem of how to locate, according to what criteria, and with what mode of operation presented enormous difficulty.

Let me on this occasion also point out that these negotiations required the closest cooperation throughout our government, between the White House and the State Department; between all the elements of our team, and that, therefore, the usual speculation of who did what to whom is really extraordinarily misplaced.

Without a cooperative effort by everybody, we could not have achieved what we have presented last night and this morning.

The Special Advisor and I then spent the week, first on working out the unresolved issues in the agreement and then the unresolved issues with respect to the protocols, and finally, the surrounding circumstances of schedules and procedures.

Ambassador Sullivan remained behind to draft the implementing provisions of the agreements that had been achieved during the week. The Special Advisor and I remained in close contact.

So by the time we met again yesterday, the issues that remained were very few, indeed, and while we settled relatively rapidly, I may on this occasion also point out that the North Vietnamese are the most difficult people to negotiate with that I have ever encountered when they do not want to settle. They are also the most effective that I have dealt with when they finally decide to settle. That is why we have gone through peaks and valleys in these negotiations of extraordinary intensity.

Now then, let me sum up where this agreement has left us. First with respect to what we said we would try to achieve, and then with respect to some of its significance and, finally, with respect to the future.

First, when I met this group on October 26th and delivered myself of some epigrammatic phrases, we obviously did not want to give a complete check list, and we did not want to release the agreement as it then stood, because it did not seem to us desirable to provide a check list against which both sides would then have to measure success and failure in terms of their prestige.

At that time, too, we did not say -- it had always been foreseen that there would be another three or four days of negotiations after this tentative agreement had been reached. The reason why we asked for another negotiation was because it seemed to us at that point that for a variety of reasons, which I explained then and again on December 16th, those issues could not be settled within the time frame that the North Vietnamese expected.

It is now a matter of history, and it is, therefore, not essential to go into a debate of on what we based this judgment. But that was the reason why the agreement was not signed on October 31, and not any of the speculations that have been so much in print and on television.

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Now, what did we say on October 26th we wanted to achieve? We said, first of all, that we wanted to make sure that the control machinery would be in place at the time of the cease-fire. We did this because we had information that there were plans by the other side to mount a major offensive to coincide with the signing of the cease-fire agreement.

This objective has been achieved by the fact that the protocols will be signed on the same day as the agreement, by the fact that the International Control Commission and the four-party military commission will meet within 24 hours of the agreement going into effect or no later than Monday morning, Saigon time; that the regional teams of the International Control Commission will be in place 48 hours thereafter, and that all other teams will be in place within 15 and a maximum of 30 days after that.

Second, we said that we wanted to compress the time interval between the cease-fire we expected in Laos and Cambodia and the cease-fire in Vietnam.

For reasons which I have explained to you, we cannot be as specific about the cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia as we can about the agreements that are being signed on Saturday, but we can say with confidence that the formal cease-fire in Laos will go into effect in a considerably shorter period of time than was envisaged in October, and since the cease-fire in Cambodia depends to some extent on developments in Laos, we expect the same to be true there.

We said that certain linguistic ambiguities should be removed. The linguistic ambiguities were produced by the somewhat extraordinary negotiating procedure whereby a change in the English text did not always produce a correlative change in the Vietnamese text. The linguistic ambiguities to which we referred in October have, in fact, been removed. At that time I mentioned only one, and therefore I am free to recall it.

I pointed out that the United States position had consistently been a rejection of the imposition of a coalition government on the people of South Vietnam. I said then that the National Council of Reconciliation was not a coalition government, nor was it conceived as a coalition government.

The Vietnamese language text, however, permitted an interpretation of the words "administrative structure" as applied to the National Council of Reconciliation which would have lent itself to the interpretation that it came close or was identical with a coalition government.

You will find that in the text of this agreement the words "administrative structure" no longer exist and therefore this particular, shall we say, ambiguity has been removed.

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I pointed out in October that we had to find a
procedure for signing which would be acceptable to all the
parties for whom obligations were involved. This has
been achieved.

I pointed out on October 26th that we would seek
greater precision with respect to certain obligations
particularly, without spelling them out, as they applied to
the Demilitarized Zone and to the obligations with respect
to Laos and Cambodia. That, too, has been achieved.

And I pointed out in December that we were looking
for some means, some expression, which would make clear that
the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each
other, and that neither side would impose its solution on
the other by force.

This is now explicitly provided, and we have achieved
formulations in which in a number of the paragraphs, such
as Article 14, 18(e) and 20, there is specific reference
to the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

There are specific references, moreover, to the
same thing in Article 6 and Article 11 of the ICCS protocol.
There are specific references to the right of the South
Vietnamese people to self-determination.

And therefore, we believe that we have achieved
the substantial adaptations that we asked for on October 26th.
We did not increase our demands after October 26th and we
substantially achieved the clarifications which we sought.

Now then, it is obvious that a war that has lasted for
10 years will have many elements that cannot be completely
satisfactory to all the parties concerned. And in the two
periods where the North Vietnamese were working with
dedication and seriousness on a conclusion, the period
in October and the period after we resumed talks on
January 8th, it was always clear that a lasting peace
could come about only if neither side sought to achieve
everything that it had wanted; indeed, that stability
depended on the relative satisfaction and therefore on the
relative dissatisfaction of all of the parties concerned.
And therefore, it is also clear that whether this agreement
brings a lasting peace or not depends not only on its
provisions, but also on the spirit in which it is implemented.

It will be our challenge in the future to move
the controversies that could not be stilled by any one
document from the level of military conflict to the level
of positive human aspirations and to absorb the enormous
talents and dedication of the people of Indochina in tasks
of construction, rather than in tasks of destruction.

We will make a major effort to move to create a
framework where we hope in a short time the animosities
and the hatred and the suffering of this period will be seen
as aspects of the past, and where the debates concern differences
of opinion as to how to achieve positive growth.

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Of course, the hatred will not rapidly disappear, and, of course, people who have fought for 25 years will not easily give up their objectives, but also people who have suffered for 25 years may at least come to know that they can achieve their realization by other and less brutal means.

The President said yesterday that we have to remain vigilant, and so we shall, but we shall also dedicate ourselves to positive efforts. And for us at home, it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight, and now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies; an agreement which should preserve the dignity and the self-respect of all of the parties that together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America.

I will be glad to answer any questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what supervision do you envisage over the Ho Chi Minh Trail by an international agency?

DR. KISSINGER: We expect that the International Control Commission that exists in Laos will be reinstituted. We have also provided for the establishment of border teams, as you can see from the maps, at all the terminal points of the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam and therefore, we believe that there will be international supervision of the provisions, both within Laos and within South Vietnam.

Q Dr. Kissinger, one of the major problems has been the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in the south. Could you tell us, first, so far as you know, how many of these troops are there in the south now, and do you have any understanding or assurance that these troops will be withdrawn?

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DR. KISSINGER: Our estimate of the number of North Vietnamese troops in the South is approximately 145,000. Now, I want to say a number of things with respect to this. First, nothing in the agreement establishes the right of North Vietnamese troops to be in the south.

Secondly, the North Vietnamese have never claimed that they have a right to have troops in the South, and while opinions may differ about the exact accuracy of that statement, from a legal point of view it is important because it maintains the distinction that we do maintain.

Thirdly, if this agreement is implemented, the North Vietnamese troops in the South should, over a period of time, be subject to considerable reduction. First, there is a flat prohibition against the introduction of any outside forces, for any reason whatsoever, so that the normal attrition of personnel cannot be made up by the reinfiltration of outside forces. I am talking now about the provisions of the agreement.

Secondly, there is a flat prohibition against the presence of foreign forces in Laos and Cambodia, and, therefore, a flat prohibition against the use of the normal infiltration corridor.

Thirdly, as the agreement makes clear, military movement of any kind across the Demilitarized Zone is prohibited, both in the clause requiring respect for the Demilitarized Zone, which by definition excludes military personnel, and second in the clause that says only modalities of civilian movement can be discussed, not of any other movement between North and South Vietnam.

Fourth, there is a provision requiring the reduction and demobilization of forces on both sides, the major part of which on the South Vietnamese Communist side is believed, by all knowledgeable observers, to have arrived from outside of South Vietnam.

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Therefore, it is our judgment that there is no
way that North Vietnam can live up to that agreement without
there being a reduction of the North Vietnamese forces in
South Vietnam, without this being explicitly stated.

Of course, it is not inconceivable that the agreement
will not in all respects be lived up to. In that case,
adding another clause that will not be lived up to
specifically requiring it, would not change the situation.

It is our judgment and our expectation -- it is
our expectation -- that the agreement will be lived up to
and, therefore, we believe that the problem of these forces
will be taken care of by the evolution of events in South
Vietnam.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can I try to get a clarification
of just that point? Several times, I think, you have said
it is understood that North Vietnamese troops in Laos and
Cambodia are considered foreign troops.

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Are they so considered?

DR. KISSINGER: I said it once, Peter.

Q You said it in answer to Marvin's question, but
is it so considered in South Vietnam? Is North Vietnam
a foreign entity in South Vietnam according to this agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: This is one of the points on
which the bitterest feeling rages and with which it is best
not to deal with in a formal and legalistic manner.

As I have pointed out, in this agreement, there
are repeated references to the identity of South Vietnam,
to the fact that the South Vietnamese people's right of
self-determination is recognized by the DRV and by the United
States, to the fact that North and South Vietnam shall settle
their disputes peacefully and through negotiation, and other
provisions of a similar kind.

Therefore, it is clear there is no legal way by
which North Vietnam can use military force against South
Vietnam.

Now, whether that is due to the fact that there are
two zones temporarily divided by a provisional demarcation
line or because North Vietnam is a foreign country with
relation to South Vietnam, that is an issue which we have
avoided making explicit in the agreement,
and in which ambiguity has its merits from the
point of view of the international position, and from the
point of view of the obligations of the agreement.

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There is no legal way by which North Vietnam can
use military force vis a vis South Vietnam to achieve its
objective.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on that subject, by what means
was the United States able to convince President Thieu to
accept the presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, it is not easy to
achieve through negotiations what has not been achieved on
the battlefield, and if you look at the settlements that have
been made in the post-war period, the lines of demarcation
have almost always followed the lines of actual control.

Secondly, we have taken the position throughout that
the agreement cannot be analyzed in terms of any one of
its provisions, but it has to be seen in its totality and
in terms of the evolution that it starts.

Thirdly, we have not asked President Thieu, nor
has he accepted, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in
South Vietnam as a legal right, nor do we accept that as
a legal right.

We have, since October 1970, proposed a cease-fire
in place. A cease-fire in place always has to be between the
forces that exist. The alternative of continued war also
would have maintained the forces in the country.

Under these conditions, they are cut off from the
possibility of renewed infiltration. They are prevented from
undertaking military action. Their re-supply is severely
restricted.

And President Thieu, after examining the totality
of the agreement, came to the conclusion that it achieved
the essential objectives of South Vietnam, of permitting
his people to bring about self-determination and of
not posing a security risk that he could not handle with
the forces that we have equipped and trained.

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Q Because of a news report from Paris this morning that actually there were some 15 or 20 protocols of which only four are being made public, were there any secret protocols agreed to?

DR. KISSINGER: The only protocols that exist are the protocols that have been made public.

Q What about understandings?

DR. KISSINGER: There are, with respect to certain phrases, read into the record certain statements as to what they mean, but these have been explained in these briefings and made clear.

There are no secret understandings.

Q Dr. Kissinger, it has been widely speculated that the 12-day saturation bombing of the North was the key to achieving the agreement that you found acceptable. Was it, and if not, what was?

DR. KISSINGER: I was asked in October whether the bombing or mining of May 8th brought about the breakthrough in October, and I said then that I did not want to speculate on North Vietnamese motives. I have too much trouble analyzing our own.

I will give the same answer to your question, but I will say that there was a deadlock which was described in the middle of December, and there was a rapid movement when negotiations resumed on the technical level on January 3 (January 2) and on the substantive level on January 8. These facts have to be analyzed by each person for himself.

I want to make one point with respect to the question about understandings. It is obvious that when I speak with some confidence about certain developments that happen with respect to Laos and other places, that this must be based on exchanges that have taken place, but for obvious reasons I cannot go further into them.

The formal obligations of the parties have all been revealed, and there are no secret formal obligations.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the amount to which the United States is committed in rebuilding construction you referred to in North Vietnam, the reparation or whatever it is to be -- is there any dollar amount suggested?

DR. KISSINGER: We will discuss the issue of economic reconstruction of all of Indochina, including North Vietnam only after the signature of the agreements, and after the implementation is well advanced, and the definition of any particular sum will have to await the discussions which will take place after the agreements are in force.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any understanding with the Soviet Union or Communist China that they will take part in an international conference or will help toward the preservation of this framework of the agreement?

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DR. KISSINGER: Formal invitations to the international conference have not yet been extended. But we expect both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to participate in the international conference which will take place within 30 days of the signature of the agreement.

We have reason to believe that both of these countries will participate in this conference.

Now, with respect to their willingness to help this agreement become viable. It is, of course, clear that peace in Indochina requires the self-restraint of all the major countries and especially of those countries which on all sides have supplied the wherewithal for this conflict.

We, on our part, are prepared to exercise such restraint. We believe that the other countries, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, can make a very major contribution to peace in Indochina by exercising similar restraint.

Q If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what agreement or understanding is there on the role that will be played by the so-called neutralist or third-force group in Vietnam in the National Council of Reconciliation?

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DR. KISSINGER: We have taken the position throughout that the future political evolution of South Vietnam should be left, to the greatest extent possible, to the South Vietnamese themselves and should not be predetermined by the United States.

Therefore, there is no understanding in any detail on the role of any particular force in South Vietnam. The United States has always taken the view that it favored free elections, but on the whole, the essence of this agreement is to leave the political evolution of South Vietnam to negotiations among the various South Vietnamese parties or factions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, about a year ago, President Nixon outlined a peace proposal which included a provision for President Thieu to resign prior to elections. Is there any similar provision in this agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: That proposal was in a somewhat different context. In any event, there is no such provision in this agreement and this again is a matter that will have to be decided by the Vietnamese parties within the context of whatever negotiations they have, but there is no requirement of any kind like this in the agreement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when do you expect the first American planes to arrive in Hanoi to pick up the prisoners?

DR. KISSINGER: Our expectation is that the withdrawal, as well as the release of prisoners, will take place in roughly equal increments of 15 days over the 60-day period, so within 15 days of January 27th. That is the outside time. It could be faster.

Q I wanted to know the earliest time.

DR. KISSINGER: I can't give any earlier time than within 15 days.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have addressed yourself to this general area before, but the question keeps coming up. Would you just review for us briefly how you feel that the agreement that you have reached differs from one that could have been reached, say, four years ago?

DR. KISSINGER: Four years ago the North Vietnamese totally refused to separate political and military issues. Four years ago the North Vietnamese insisted that as a condition to negotiation the existing governmental structure in South Vietnam would have to be disbanded and only after this governmental structure had been disbanded and a different one had been installed would they even discuss, much less implement, any of the other provisions of the agreement.

Therefore, until October 8th of this year, all of the various schemes that were constantly being discussed foundered on the one root factor of the situation, that the North Vietnamese, until October 8th of this year, demanded that a political victory be handed to them as a precondition for a discussion of all military questions. But in that case, all military questions would have become totally irrelevant because there was no longer the political structure to which they could apply.

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- 22 -

It was not until October 8th this year that the North Vietnamese ever agreed to separate these two aspects of the problem and as soon as this was done, we moved rapidly.

There was the second phase, which I have described, which included the changes that were made between October and January, which produced this agreement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, earlier you said that as of December 16th there were various disagreements which then existed and the first one was the question of the Demilitarized Zone and associated aspects over what identity South Vietnam should have under the agreement.

Can you elaborate on this, and most particularly, can you elaborate on it from the standpoint of whether you are referring here to President Thieu's objections?

DR. KISSINGER: I have made clear what exactly was involved. We have here several separate issues. One, is there such a thing as a South Vietnam even temporarily until unification?

Secondly, who is the legitimate ruler of South Vietnam? This is what the civil war has been all about.

Thirdly, what is the demarcation line that separates North Vietnam from South Vietnam?

Now we believe that the agreement defines adequately the demarcation line. It defines adequately what the identity is to which we refer. It leaves open to negotiation, among the parties, the political evolution of South Vietnam and therefore, the definition of what ultimately will be considered by all South Vietnamese the legitimate ruler.

The President made clear yesterday that as far as the United States is concerned, we recognize President Thieu. This is a situation that has existed in other countries and these were the three principal issues involved, of which two have international significance, and were settled within the agreement, and the third has significance in terms of the political evolution of South Vietnam, and that has been left to the self-determination of the South Vietnamese people.

As to the question of President Thieu's objections, comments and so forth, we said on October 26th that obviously in a war fought in South Vietnam, in a war that has had hundreds of thousands of casualties of South Vietnamese, enormous devastation within South Vietnam, it stands to reason that the views of our allies will have to be considered.

There is nothing wrong or immoral for them to have such views.

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- 23 -

Secondly, their perception of the risks has to be different from our perception of the risks. We are 12,000 miles away. If we make a mistake in our assessment of the situation, it will be painful. If they make a mistake in the assessment of the situation, it can be fatal and therefore, they have had a somewhat less flexible attitude. Where in some respects have at some points been content with more ambiguous formulations, they were not.

Nevertheless, it is also obvious to any reader of the Saigon press and of their official communications that we did not accept all of their comments, and that we carried out precisely what the President had said and what was said at the various press conferences in which I presented the U.S. Government view, namely, that we would make the final determination as to when American participation in the war should end.

Those parts of their comments that we thought were reasonable we made our own; those that we did not, we did not. And once we had achieved an agreement with the North Vietnamese that we considered fair and just and honorable, we presented it with great energy and conviction in Saigon.

Q This is what I am asking you, Doctor. You say you made some of his points your points. What did he get in January that he didn't have in October?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not want to discuss what he got. I pointed out the list of objectives we set ourselves in October and what was achieved. I pointed out the changes that were achieved between October and January. We believe them to be substantial, and I do not want to make a checklist of saying which originated in Saigon or which originated in Washington.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you personally feel strengthened in the negotiations as a result of the saturation bombing?

DR. KISSINGER: The term "saturation bombing" has certain connotations. We carried out what was considered to be necessary at the time in order to make clear that the United States could not stand for an indefinite delay in the negotiations.

My role in the negotiations was to present the American point of view. I can only say that we resumed the negotiations on January 8th and the breakthrough occurred on January 9th and I will let those facts speak for themselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is now the extent and the nature of the American commitment to South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The United States, as the President said, will continue economic aid to South Vietnam. It will continue that military aid which is permitted by the agreement. The United States is prepared to gear that military aid to the actions of other countries and not to treat it as an end in itself.

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And the United States expects all countries to
live up to the provisions of the agreement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say, "The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacements of armaments, munitions, and war material which have been destroyed." Why do we have to put any more materials in there? Why should they be in there and will these materials come from the United States or what countries?

DR. KISSINGER: Let's separate two things, what is permitted by the agreement and what we shall do. What is permitted by the agreement is that military equipment, as you said, that is destroyed, worn out, used up or damaged, can be replaced.

The reason for that provision is, if for any reason
the war should start at any level, it would be an unfair
restriction on our South Vietnamese allies to prohibit them
from replacing their weapons if their enemies are able to do
so.

The degree, therefore, to which these weapons
have to be replaced will depend on the degree to which there
is military activity. If there is no military activity
in South Vietnam, then the number of weapons that are
destroyed, damaged or worn out will, of course, be
substantially less than in other circumstances.

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Secondly, what will be the United States' position?
This depends on the overall situation. If there is no military
activity, if other countries do not introduce massive military
equipment into Vietnam, we do not consider it an end in itself
to give military aid. But we believe that it would be unfair and
wrong for one country to be armed by its allies while the
other one has no right to do so. This is what will govern our
actions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the plan for the rather
sizable United States military force off shore and warships off
South Vietnam and also B-52 bases in Thailand? Will these
forces be reduced, and is there an understanding with the
North Vietnamese that you have not mentioned to us here that would
reduce those forces?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no restriction on American
military forces that is not mentioned in the agreement.
One would expect, as time goes on, that the deployment of our
Naval forces will take account of the new situation.

As you know, we have kept many of our forces on station
for longer than the normal period of time, and we have had more
carriers in the area than before, but this is not required by the
agreement. It is simply a projection of what might happen.

The same is true with respect to Thailand. There are
no restrictions on our forces in Thailand. It has always been
part of the Nixon Doctrine that the deployment of our forces
would be related to the degree of the danger and has not an
abstract quality of its own.

So that as a general rule one can say that in the
initial phasing of the agreement, before one knows how it will
be implemented, the deployment will be more geared to the
war situation, and as the agreement is being implemented, the
conditions of peace will have a major impact on it. But this
is simply a projection of our normal policy and is not an
outgrowth required by the agreement.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END (AT 12:42 PM EST)

[11] Jan. 23

Public Papers of the Presidents

sorrow, do hereby direct that the flag of the United States be displayed at half-staff at the White House and on all buildings, grounds, and Naval vessels of the United States for a period of thirty days from the day of his death. I also direct that for the same length of time the representatives of the United States in foreign countries shall make similar arrangements for the display of the flag at half-staff over their Embassies, Legations, and other facilities abroad, including all military facilities and stations.

I hereby order that suitable honors be rendered by units of the Armed Forces under orders of the Secretary of Defense on the day of the funeral.

I do further appoint Thursday, January 25, 1973 to be a National Day of

Mourning throughout the United States. I recommend that the people assemble on that day in their respective places of worship, there to pay homage to the memory of President Johnson. I invite the people of the world who share our grief to join us in this solemn observance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereinunto set my hand this twenty-third day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-seventh.

RICHARD NIXON

NOTE: On the same day, the President signed Executive Order 11700, providing for the closing of Government departments and agencies on Thursday, January 25, 1973, as a mark of respect for President Johnson.

## 12 Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. January 23, 1973

Good evening:

I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.

The following statement is being issued at this moment in Washington and Hanoi:

At 12:30 Paris time today, January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris

Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris.

The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

That concludes the formal statement.

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8 [1972], I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.

In the settlement that has now been

18

[LC]

agreed to end the

war will begin in
January 27,

With American forces out of Iraq

During the American South.

The war has been going on for three years, and their interference has been very harmful.

By the time it was agreed to end the war, the

war has been going on for three years, and their interference has been very harmful. During this time, the American forces have been suppor

The war has been going on for three years, and the American forces have been supporting the North.

We have been trying toend the war and peace in South Vietnam.

We are on our way to peace. This is not the kind of peace that the American people want, and it certainly does not end the war.

Richard Nixon, 1973

Jan. 23 [12]

[L]

agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met:

A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time.

Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam.

We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement, and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that healing—and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia but

congratulates to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

First, to the people and Government of South Vietnam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future, and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future—friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so too will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly

United States. We assemble on the pages of world memory the people of to join

have heretofore third day since nine-and-a-half of the States of the United States of America have been taken by

NIXON President signed for the closing agencies as a mark of

fan

January 27, Conference

began at 2400 on January 27, 1973. Democratic leaders in the hope ensure stable government in Indo-

al statement. We continue our negotiations, with honor. In addition to this room [1972], I set aside all other considerations

as now been

19

[12] Jan. 23

our efforts to secure peace would not
only have violated our understanding
with North Vietnam, it would have seri-
ously harmed and possibly destroyed the
chances for peace. Therefore, I know
that you now can understand why, dur-
ing these past several weeks, I have not
made any public statements about those
efforts.

The important thing was not to talk
about peace, but to get peace—and to get
the right kind of peace. This we have
done.

Now that we have achieved an honor-
able agreement, let us be proud that
America did not settle for a peace that
would have betrayed our allies, that
would have abandoned our prisoners of
war, or that would have ended the war
for us but would have continued the war
for the 50 million people of Indochina.
Let us be proud of the 2½ million young
Americans who served in Vietnam, who
served with honor and distinction in one
of the most selfless enterprises in the his-
tory of nations. And let us be proud of
those who sacrificed, who gave their lives
so that the people of South Vietnam
might live in freedom and so that the
world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a
word to some of the bravest people I have
ever met—the wives, the children, the
families of our prisoners of war and the
missing in action. When others called on
us to settle on any terms, you had the
courage to stand for the right kind of
peace so that those who died and those
who suffered would not have died and
suffered in vain, and so that where this
generation knew war, the next genera-
tion would know peace. Nothing means
more to me at this moment than the fact

that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American, who
once occupied this office, died. In his
life, President Johnson endured the vili-
fication of those who sought to portray
him as a man of war. But there was
nothing he cared about more deeply than
achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with
him. It was just the day after New Year's.
He spoke then of his concern with bring-
ing peace, with making it the right kind
of peace, and I was grateful that he once
again expressed his support for my efforts
to gain such a peace. No one would have
welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in ask-
ing—for those who died and for those
who live—let us consecrate this moment
by resolving together to make the peace
we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:01 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television. An advance text of the President's address was released on the same day.

Before delivering the address, the President
met separately with members of the Cabinet
and 6 members of the bipartisan leadership of
the Congress.

On January 24, 1973, the President met with
the expanded bipartisan leadership of the Con-
gress to discuss the agreement. On the same
day, the White House released the following
related material: the texts of the agreement
and protocols to the agreement; the transcript
of a news briefing on the agreement by Henry
A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs; and fact sheets on the
basic elements of the agreement, the Interna-
tional Commission of Control and Supervision,
and the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.
The texts of the agreement and protocols and
Dr. Kissinger's news briefing are printed in
the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu-
ments (vol. 9, pp. 45-74).

20

13

To
C
pro
bra
con
Pre
the
cie
pr
be
ge
con
du
ne
le
ne
p
C
n
o
a
p
s
f
e
t

[LC]

INTERVIEW OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
BY
MARVIN KALB, CBS NEWS

February 1, 1973

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, thank you so much for allowing us to join you in your office here at the White House. I would like to start immediately on Vietnam which will come as no surprise to you and to ask first what is your judgment on the fragility, the firmness of the truce in Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: One has to look at the peace in Vietnam now in two parts, in the terms of the agreement and in the spirit in which it is going to be carried out.

The war has been going on for 25 years. It has been partly a civil war, partly an international war. It has had some outside intervention and some local sources.

The terms themselves of the cease-fire are firm and they are specific. The supervisory machinery is as precise as one can make it. The biggest task now is to move a generation that has known nothing but war towards an attitude of peace, and that is an intangible quality. The political settlement still has to be reached. But I think with good will on all sides, and some patience and some wisdom, we can manage that transition period.

MR. KALB: Well, the President said yesterday in his news conference, and he repeated this morning once again, that so much will depend on the good will of all of the parties. Do you trust the good will of the Vietnamese parties right now?

DR. KISSINGER: If you look at the historical record you have to say that people who have been killing each other for 25 years are not animated by exceptional good will towards each other.

On the other hand, they have also suffered for 25 years.

I was struck during the negotiations that one of
the biggest hurdles was their difficulty in imagining peace.
If we can now get a period of some months in which they get
used to more peaceful pursuits, then I believe many of these
factors can begin to assert themselves. I don't trust the in
good will. A lot depends on the actions of the Soviet Union,
the People's Republic of China and on the sort of relationship
we will be able to establish with North Vietnam. So it is
a difficult period that is ahead. But it gives us an
opportunity to build for peace.

MR. KALB: You mentioned the Soviet Union and China
right now. How do you see their role coming up?

DR. KISSINGER: While the war was going on, they
supplied North Vietnam with a great deal of its military
equipment. When peace exists, all of the countries concerned,
including ourselves, have to ask ourselves not only in terms
of the local conditions, and of the desires of the parties,
but in terms of the incentives our supplies give to each
side to resume the fighting, and while we have no formal
agreement or even formal discussions with these parties at
this moment, it would seem reasonable that everybody will
assess now this military relationship to the contestants.

MR. KALB: Does that mean that you, as the diplomat
says, have some reason to believe that the Soviet Union
or China might reduce the flow of their supplies to North
Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The peace is less than a week old,
and it is too early to draw any such conclusions, but there
will be an international conference at the end of February
at which all of these parties are represented. All I am
saying is that whether the peace is fragile or not depends
in part on the Vietnamese,

It depends in part on outside countries, and this
is what we now have to work out.

MR. KALB: But it would be fair to assume from what
you are saying that a hope of the Administration is that just
as we are prohibited by the terms of the agreement from shipping
unlimited supplies of military arms to South Vietnam, that
likewise you would like to have the Chinese and the Russians
reduce their flow of supplies into the North?

- 3 -

DR. KISSINGER: We would like the Chinese and the Russians to behave responsibly in preserving the peace in Indochina, that is right.

MR. KALB: The Chinese leader today, Chou En-lai, made the point that the United States really is not living up fully to the terms of the agreement because it is continuing the war, as Chou put it, in Laos and Cambodia. Do you have any sense that very soon we can stop the bombing along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos?

DR. KISSINGER: Our position is clear and has been made clear to the North Vietnamese during the negotiations. We will observe any cease-fire that is established in Laos and Cambodia. We have reason to believe that there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos soon. There has been a de facto cease-fire in Cambodia, in fact, since Monday and we have observed it.

MR. KALB: Are the Communists living up to that, too?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. KALB: Yes?

DR. KISSINGER: And we will continue to observe it as long as the Communists live up to it de facto.

In Laos we have hopes that a formal cease-fire will be signed in the near future and in that case, the question of our role will become moot.

MR. KALB: In the near future meaning perhaps even before the first American prisoners of war come out of North Vietnam or is there a connection really between a cease-fire in Laos and when the American prisoners are released from North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no connection between the cease-fire in Laos and the release of American prisoners. The American prisoners according to the terms of the agreement, have all to be released in 60 days and in a supplementary protocol it is provided that they be released in approximately equal installments at 15-day intervals so the latest that the American prisoners can be released would be around February 11.

- 4 -

But we haven't worked out the precise date yet.

There is no relationship between the release of American prisoners and the cease-fire in Laos, but as I said, we expect that a cease-fire in Laos will be established soon.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, what about American prisoners who might be in Laos, those missing in action? There is some question as to a list that has not been turned over.

DR. KISSINGER: We received today a list of prisoners that are being held in Laos. We are now examining it. It doesn't look to us as if it could be complete, and we are querying the North Vietnamese to see whether they have any supplementary information.

But, at any rate, we received some names today and we are informing the next of kin.

MR. KALB: What do you mean you don't feel as though you have a complete list on the Laos prisoners?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the list was handed to us as a list. It was not handed to us with the explicit comment that this is the entire list.

MR. KALB: I see.

DR. KISSINGER: And since there are several hundred unaccounted for, the relationship between the number that was handed to us and the number that is missing seems to be smaller in Laos than it is in Vietnam and we have queried Hanoi about this discrepancy.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, you will be going to Hanoi soon, which is one of the major Communist capitals you have not gotten to as yet. We understand that the two major purposes will be to try to check on how the agreement is being implemented and also to discuss post-war aid.

When was this trip first arranged?

DR. KISSINGER: The trip has been under discussion with the North Vietnamese at various stages of our negotiations and it has always been under discussion, not in the context of the negotiations, but in the context of establishing a post-war

- 5 -

relationship, and I really don't quite agree that the purpose
is for the purpose of determining aid. That is one of the
possible middle term outcomes.

The real problem in relation to North Vietnam is
that here is a country that has been almost constantly at
war throughout its existence. It is a country with which we
have made armistices in 1954, in 1962, but we have never made
a genuine peace with it. Now we would like to explore the
possibility of whether after the experiences of the last decade,
having established a pattern of co-existence with Moscow and
Peking, it seems to us not inconceivable that if we can co-exist
with Peking, we can co-exist with Hanoi.

So the basic purpose of the trip is an exploratory
mission to determine how we can move from hostility towards
normalization.

Now it has always been part of the American policy --
indeed, it was first established by the late President Johnson --
that at some point, the United States would contribute to
a reconstruction program for all of Indochina, and this is one
of the problems that I will discuss in principle while I am
in Hanoi.

As anybody who knows me can tell you, my lack of
confidence in discussing technical economic questions is well
established, so I will not be able to make the final
determinations while I am there.

The basic purpose is to establish a new relationship,
similar perhaps to my first trip to Peking.

MR. KALB: Will the new relationship envisage the
possibility of establishing relations with North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, far down the road. The first
problem is to establish some sort of ongoing dialogue to work
out machinery for exchanging ideas, and in principle we are
willing to explore this, but not as the first step.

MR. KALB: Isn't there a White House projection of
$7-1/2 billion over a five-year period of which $2-1/2 billion
would be earmarked for North Vietnam?

- 6 -

[c]

DR. KISSINGER: That was a projection that was used about a year ago.

MR. KALB: Yes. Is that current?

DR. KISSINGER: More than a year ago. No, we have taken the position that the problem of aid to North Vietnam would be discussed in the context of peace-time relations and not as the outcome of a negotiation to end the war. We will look at the requirements with an open mind. This was a study based on reasonable facts at the time. We would have to look at the situation again.

As we said when we briefed the Congressional Leaders, as the President repeated yesterday, any projection we make would be fully discussed with the Bipartisan Leadership and fully discussed in public before it became our policy.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, shifting south for a moment, to South Vietnam, now that the peace agreement has been signed, how would you define the nature and depth of the American commitment to Saigon?

DR. KISSINGER: We have been allies in a bitter and difficult war and we have a responsibility to give those with whom we have been associated an opportunity to shape their own future. Therefore, we have a responsibility to continue a program of economic assistance along the lines that have been developed.

We also will, as the President pointed out in his speech announcing the peace, continue that degree of military assistance that the agreement permits and which is made necessary by the military situation.

Now, the agreement permits us to replace weapons that are used up, destroyed, damaged or worn out. Needless to say, there is no conflict, the amount of replacement of military equipment that is needed will be much less than it was during the war. In the longer term, it has always been our intention to enable the South Vietnamese to take over the burden of their own military defense and we believe we have left them in a position where they can handle most of the challenges that we can now foresee.

- 7 -

LC

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I was trying to get at is what happens -- and I suppose this question must be asked. In the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire is going to hold. In the world that we live in it may not. President Thieu said in an interview tonight on CBS that he would never call upon American troops to go back to Vietnam, but he would feel free to call upon American air power to go back. And Ambassador Sullivan said only last Sunday that there are no inhibitions, I believe were his words, on the use of this air power. Is that correct?

DR. KISSINGER: That is legally correct.

MR. KALB: Politically and diplomatically?

DR. KISSINGER: We have the right to do this. The question is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It depends on the extent of the challenge, on the nature of the threat, on the circumstances in which it arises, and it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official at this stage, when the peace is in the process of being established, to give a check list about what the United States will or will not do in every circumstance that is likely to arise.

For the future that we can foresee, the North Vietnamese are not in a position to launch an overwhelming attack on the South, even if they violate the agreement. What happens after a year or two has to be seen in the circumstances which then exist.

Most of the violations that one can now foresee should be handled by the South Vietnamese.

MR. KALB: So that for the next year or two, if I understand you right, there would be no need for a reinvolvement of American military power?

DR. KISSINGER: Marvin, we did not end this war in order to look for an excuse to re-enter it, but it would be irresponsible for us at this moment to give a precise check list to potential aggressors as to what they can or cannot safely do.

- 8 -

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, let's move the clock back about one month at a time when the United States was engaged in a very extensive bombing program in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.

We have never heard any explanation about why that was really necessary. Will you give us your own feeling on that?

- 9 -

DR. KISSINGER: The decision to resume bombing in the middle of December was perhaps the most painful, the most difficult, and certainly the most lonely that the President has had to make since he has been in office.

It was very painful to do this at that particular season when the expectation for peace had been so high, and only six weeks before his inauguration. It was very difficult to do it under circumstances when the outcome was not demonstrable.

There were really three parts to it. One, should we resume bombing? Two, if we resume bombing, with what weapons? That involved the whole issue of the B-52. And three, should we talk to the American people, which was really implied in your question -- there has never been an explanation.

With respect to the first part, why did the President decide to resume bombing? We had come to the conclusion that the negotiations as they were then being conducted were not serious; that for whatever reason, the North Vietnamese at that point had come to the conclusion that protracting the negotiation was more <u>endangered</u> than concluding them.

It was not a case that we made certain demands they rejected. It was a case that no sooner was one issue settled than three others emerged, and as soon as one approached a solution, yet others came to the forefront.

At the same time, the more difficult Hanoi was, the more rigid Saigon grew, and we could see a prospect, therefore, where we would be caught between the two contending Vietnamese parties, with no element introduced that would change their opinion, with a gradual degeneration of the private talks between Le Duc Tho and me into the same sort of propaganda that the public talks in the Hotel Majestic had reached; and therefore, it was decided to try to bring home really to both Vietnamese parties that the continuation of the war had its price. And it was not generally recognized that when we started the bombing again

- 10 -

[L.C]

of North Vietnam we also sent General Haig to Saigon to make very clear that this did not mean that we would fail to settle on the terms that we had defined as reasonable. So we really moved in both directions simultaneously.

Once the decision was made to resume bombing, we faced the fact that it was in the rainy season and that really the only plane that could act consistently was a B-52, which is an all-weather plane.

You mentioned the Hanoi-Haiphong area, but major efforts were made to avoid residential areas, and the casualty figures which were released by the North Vietnamese of something like a thousand tend to support that this was the case, because many of these casualties must have occurred in the target areas and not in civilian residential areas.

MR. KALB: Yet a lot of the civilian areas were hit apparently. There were pictures of that.

DR. KISSINGER: You can never tell when a picture is made how vast the surrounding area of destruction is, but of course some civilian areas must have been hit. And I don't want to say that it was not a very painful thing to have to do.

Now, why did the President decide not to speak to the American people? The President can speak most effectively when he announces a new departure in policy and indicates what can be done to bring that particular departure to a conclusion.

He could have done only two things in such a speech, which was considered. One is to explain why the negotiations had stalemated, and two, to explain under what circumstances he would end the bombing.

The first would have broken the confidentiality of the negotiations even more than was the case anyway through the exchanges that were going on publicly, and the second would have made the resumption of talks an issue of prestige and might have delayed them. And therefore, the President decided that if this action succeeded, then the results would speak for themselves in terms of a settlement, and if a settlement was not reached, then he would have to give an

- 11 -

accounting to the American people of all the action that
led to the continuing stalemate.

Now, whatever the reason, once the talks were
resumed, a settlement was reached fairly rapidly, and we
have never made an assertion as to what produced it, but you
asked why was the decision made to resume bombing and this
was the reasoning that led to it.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, isn't the assumption that you are leaving with us that without that kind of heavy bombing the North Vietnamese would not have become serious -- your term -- and that therefore, one could conclude that it was the bombing that brought the North Vietnamese into a serious frame of mind?

I ask the question only because they have been bombed
so repeatedly and for so many years and still stuck to their
guns and their position. What was so unique about this?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, that it came at the end of
a long process in which they, too, had suffered a great
deal. But I don't think at this moment when I am preparing
to go to Hanoi it would serve any useful purpose for me
to speculate about what caused them to make this decision.

Obviously they made a big decision in October when
they decided to separate the political and military
issues, And at this moment, I think it is important to
understand that the decision was not made lightly; that it
was made in the interest of speeding the end of the war and
that now that the war is ended, I think it is best to put
the acrimony behind us.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, let's talk for a
moment about the man with whom you negotiated. How long
was it, with Le Duc Tho, three and one-half years, something
like that?

DR. KISSINGER: Three and one-half years.

MR. KALB: What kind of a person is he?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, when one talks about negotiation and looks at the pictures of my opposite number in a garden with me, joking and jovial, a great deal of emphasis tends to be put on the personal relationship, and over three and one-half years of extensive negotiations, of course we established a certain personal relationship, sometimes humorous. But one has to remember, also, what sort of a man he is, what his background is.

Le Duc Tho is an impressive man, who joined the Communist Party as a very young man, a man, therefore, driven in the context of this time by a certain missionary zeal; spent seven years at extremely hard labor in a French prison; organized guerrilla movements and finally, after long struggle, wound up in a Politburo of a country that then found itself at war almost immediately.

He is a man who has never known tranquility. And where we fight in order to end a war, he fights in order to achieve certain objectives he has held all his life. He holds values quite contrary to ours, and I never had any illusions about that. I didn't convert him to our point of view.

He said when he left Paris that we were negotiators having different points of view who were always correct and courteous. I agree with this, and we achieved a conclusion when both of us had realized the limits of the strengths that we had to achieve our objectives, and he realized that in the two phases, in October and then in January.

He could be maddening when he didn't want to settle and he was most effective when he did want to settle.

He is a man of great theoretical interests. We used to joke with each other that after the peace we would exchange professorships, he at Harvard and I in Hanoi.

MR. KALB: You may have a chance when you go to Hanoi to give one lecture.

- 13 -

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, do you feel that the conclusion of the Vietnam war, at least for the United States, does mark a jumping off point for American policy? I am thinking back four years now when you came in. It seemed as though the Vietnam war blocked almost every opportunity to get on with the major powers.

Do you not see this as an opportunity to literally
move into some kind of a new era in global diplomacy, or
is it just cosmetics?

DR. KISSINGER: When this Administration came into
office four years ago, Vietnam was really our national obsession.
It was almost the only foreign policy that was being actively
debated, the one that absorbed the greatest amount of time
of the policy-makers, and also the greatest amount of time
with our domestic debate.

The President held the view from the beginning that we had to change the emphasis of that concern. He felt that we had to end the war on honorable terms so that we would be free to be taken seriously in the conduct of other events.

But I think it is fair to say that we didn't wait
for the end of the Vietnamese war to turn to the construction
of peace. I think major progress was made in our relations
with the Soviet Union. A breakthrough was achieved in our
relations with the People's Republic of China.

There was a transition in Japan which we cannot
say we brought about, but which was inevitable, and Europe,
again not necessarily as a result of our actions, but as a
result of policies that had preceded us, gained more identity.

So, we took office at a time when it was possible
to think of a global foreign policy and of a new structure
of peace for the first time in the post-war period, apart
from dealing with individual crises.

The end of the Vietnam war frees us to concentrate
even more actively on the constructive steps. I think
it is fair to say that we probably couldn't end the Vietnam
war had we not already during the President's first term
taken those steps and had the President not had the opportunity
to visit Peking and Moscow.

- 14 -

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I would like to talk to you a good bit more about Russia and China and we shall in just a few moments.

(Commercial)

MR. KALB: Is it fair to say that your effort to establish a new kind of relationship with China and Russia really is kind of a 19th century approach in a way to a late 20th century problem? This balance of power is certainly something that you wrote about before you came to Washington, and one could easily get the impression that you were in a way, with the President, seeking to set up an international mobile consisting of great powers and that as you were suggesting a moment ago, helped end the Vietnam war.

In what way was this balance a way of ending the war?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, let me make one point, because you said that I, with the President, was trying to establish something. I think it is important to get my role in this into perspective, Because I essentially have three jobs here. One is when a problem exists, to tell the President as honestly as I can what choices he has, and I do my best to be fair.

And secondly, to make recommendations when the President asks for them, and thirdly, to negotiate when the President sends me.

But the decisions are not made by me, and one does not become President of the United States by having a weak will. So, this is not a situation -- if you look at the President's writings; for example, in 1967 or 1968, I think '67, he wrote an article which really foreshadowed the Peking initiative, and this has to be understood when one discusses who does what and what the role of the various officials is.

Now, is the conception that you mentioned -- a 19th century conception -- one that the President also developed in his speech in Kansas City in July, 1971? In fact, he made that speech in Kansas City while I was on the way to China and I didn't know he had made that speech. And when I arrived in China, Chou En-lai asked me about the same question you just did. He said, "What about this five-power world that your President mentioned?"

- 15 -

MR. KALB: The five powers being the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Japan?

DR. KISSINGER: So Chou En-lai asked me what about this.

MR. KALB: Well, what about it?

DR. KISSINGER: I said what about it? So he had to get a copy of the speech and show it to me.

The balance of power in the 19th century sense about which I wrote is obviously not applicable to the contemporary situation. In the 19th century, you had a large number of states of approximately equal strength that were trying to prevent marginal changes in the international situation because they believed that any marginal change could be transformed into an overwhelming advantage sooner or later.

In the nuclear age the biggest change in the situation can be achieved without any territorial acquisition at all. No amount of conquest could have given the Soviet Union as much additional power as the development of the nuclear and later the hydrogen bomb.

So, we are talking about a completely different world than the one that existed in the 19th century.

You can't have these shifting alliances; you can't have these endless little wars. But there is something in the balance of power in two respects. One, no nation can make its survival dependent on the good will of another state if it has a choice about it, especially of a state that announces a hostile ideology. So you must have a certain equalibrium of strength in order to retain some freedom over your fate. That is a fact.

Now, what this Administration has attempted to do is not so much to play a complicated 19th century game of balance of power, but to try to eliminate those hostilities that were vestages of a particular perception at the end of the war, and to try to deal with the rude fact of the contemporary situation, that we and the Soviet Union and we and the Chinese are ideological adversaries, but we are bound together by one basic fact: that none of us can survive a nuclear war, and therefore it is in our mutual interest to try to reduce those hostilities that are bureaucratic vestages or that simply are not rooted in overwhelming national concerns.

- 16 -

Now we thought it was extremely dangerous to continue isolating one of the great countries in the world. We thought that with the Soviet Union, simply to amass more and more nuclear arms, without attempting to put some control over them, was extremely risky, and therefore, we made the opening to China with full realization that they remain ideologically hostile, and we concluded an agreement on Berlin with the Soviet Union which brought us to the brink of war four times and we made a first major step toward the limitation of nuclear arms last May in Moscow with the SALT agreement.

Now you ask in what way has this contributed to ending the Vietnam War? Vietnam takes on a different perspective for itself and for us when it is an appendage to the land mass of Asia than when you make it a test case to stop an unified Communist thrust across the whole world.

When Hanoi realized that foreign policy could not be blocked by the Vietnam war forever, and when we realized that there was more to Asia than Vietnam, we could conduct our negotiations in a different framework.

So it was in this sense that we, of course, continued to know the difference between our friends and our opponents, but we have also responsibility to reduce those tensions that we can with our opponents, and we are working hard at that and seriously at that.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, so much of what you have been talking about now relates to the continuing tension and quarrels between China and Russia. So much of it almost seems to rest at the bottom of an analysis that you are giving.

Do you worry here that China and Russia may, at some point, be on a collision point?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, Marvin, nothing I have said rested on tension between China and the Soviet Union. Of course we know that China and the Soviet Union have had their differences, but the most foolish thing we could do is to try to maneuver between those countries. The only possible policy for us is to deal openly and honestly with each of them on the basis of whatever common interest we have with them or common problems we have with them.

- 17 -

The most certain road to undermining the confidence
of both would be to engage in petty maneuvers, to pit
them against each other. Their quarrel does not have its
origin with us and their quarrel is not being ~~accomplished~~
by us.

MR. KALB: I understand what you are saying, sir. Do you worry about them fighting, coming to any kind of head-on collision? Or is that past us? There certainly was that fear in 1969 when you arrived here.

DR. KISSINGER: When we arrived here there were military clashes along the SinoSoviet border and the other way, of troop concentrations of both sides along the Sino Soviet border and both sides have accused each other of harboring aggressive intent.

It is hard to believe that two such great countries would engage in so suicidal a course as fighting with each other. At any rate, this is not a decision that we can influence and it is not an outcome that we desire. A war between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would be unfortunate for everybody.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, we have talked about an international balance of power and I wonder if we could shift rather suddenly, I suppose, to a domestic balance of power.

The Constitution talks about a balance between this office here and Capitol Hill, and there certainly is a feeling on Capitol Hill of having been ignored and about a vast and almost unnecessary accumulation of power in the White House.

What do you feel you could do at this point in the second Administration to try to eliminate some of this building hostility?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, Marvin, my specialty is foreign policy ---

MR. KALB: A lot of people up there are interested in it.

- 18 -

DR. KISSINGER: -- not domestic policy. And I think we have to look at it from two aspects. One, in every modern state there has been an accumulation of executive power for a variety of reasons -- and I am not saying this is necessarily a good development -- partly because the issues become so complex that it becomes more and more difficult for an individual lawmaker to keep sufficiently informed of the subtleties, to have a continuous influence on the shaping of it.

In fact, in our system the Congress is much better off than European Parliaments. Our Congress has regular committees with their own staffs. So I recognize that there is a problem and that the uneasiness of some Senators and Congressmen has a real root.

Now, in my field, which is the only one I am competent to talk about, the President has made major efforts to make it possible for Senators and Congressmen to be informed about the operations of my office. Now there is the problem of Executive privilege which is that assistants of the President should not be in a position where their private conversations with the President become subjects of Congressional subpoena.

Now what we have attempted to arrange is periodic briefings with Congressmen, usually by me; I have met with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at about monthly intervals in settings that maintain the legal position of Executive privilege, that is to say, we would not meet in a committee room. We would meet in a private office of one of the Senators. But notes were taken and we conducted the conversations as close to a hearing as they could be while still maintaining the legal fiction of Executive privilege.

Last week the President sent me to Capitol Hill to brief any Senator who wanted to come and any Congressman. So it is a problem and we are trying to make efforts to deal with it. I don't know how satisfactory it will be.

MR. KALB: Will you be doing this more often over the next year or so? Will you be going up to the Hill to see the Foreign Relations Committee or the Armed Service Committee more often?

- 19 -

DR. KISSINGER: I have always had the policy that I would meet with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whenever its Chairman requested it, so long as the setting was informal. I have always tried to be available to as many Senators as possible on an individual basis and I will go up to the Hill -- I enjoy meeting with Senators and Congressmen and I think it is in our long-term interest to have the Congress understand what we are doing.

Now, it must be understood, however, that it is not my primary job to defend the President's policy on the Hill. The separation of powers makes the President not an officer of the Congress. This is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, and of the statutory members of the Cabinet, who of course testify before the appropriate committees at all times.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, some of the things that you might have told Congressmen who asked over the past year or so related to some of your experiences traveling secretly to Peking, secretly to Moscow and now publicly to Hanoi. The two were principal Communist figures, Chou En-lai and Leonid Brezhnev.

What kind of people are they, representing not only different countries, but really different interpretations of Communism?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, Marvin, you recognize they are both leaders with whom we will continue to deal and therefore there are limitations to what I can say. Again, what I said about Le Duc Tho has to be kept in mind. The type of man who enters the competition for Communist leadership is a different personality than the type of man who enters the competition for political office in the United States and even more different from the type of man who enters the competition for being bank president in the United States, or a professor.

Now, both of them represent different stages of Communist evolution. Chou En-lai is the first generation of leader. He joined the Communist Party at a time when only great believers could even conceive of an ultimate Communist victory. He is a survivor of the Long March in which tens of thousands died and it is an experience that keeps recurring in his conversations, so he is a more missionary type, a more prophetic type.

- 20 -

Brezhnev's long march has been through the bureaucracy of an established Communist system. And he runs a state that is much more elaborated and much more complex, and no doubt there are national differences.

Chou En-lai is very intellectual and very subtle. Brezhnev is a more elemental, more physical person. But they are both considerable figures and you do not get to the top of that competition by being a man of weak character.

- 21 -

MR. KALB: You couldn't, obviously, get to Lenin, but you did get into a conversation with the President, I understand, with Mao Tse-tung?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

MR. KALB: Did you get the sense that he is in daily charge of China? What are some of the differences there between Mao and Chou?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that would be very difficult to judge on the basis of one conversation, but there is no question in anybody's mind who has ever seen those two Chinese leaders together, who is number one, and Mao is visibly the dominant figure, but how they proportion the daily work among themselves I wouldn't wish to speculate on.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, before you got to office, you had obviously spent a great deal of time at Widener Library at Harvard studying all about the world and writing about it, and you came here, as I recall, with the idea that you would be thinking the big, long, strategic thoughts and really would not involve yourself in tactics as much as you have been.

When do you get a chance to think? When do you get a chance to just sit back and reflect on whether you are doing the right thing, for that matter?

DR. KISSINGER: Before you become a Harvard professor the idea that you could be fallible is driven out of you.

But seriously, the problem between planning and execution is one when one is on the outside that isn't often understood.

When I was a professor, I used to think that the way to get policy made is to plan it, to write it out, and then to get somebody to adopt it.

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Now, if you look at the history of the American bureaucracy, most policy planning staffs have not been effective. They have not been effective because there was no way they could be made relevant to action. Nobody who had to do something ever had to ask the policy planning staff whether it was approved.

So unless you sit at a strategic point at which action is not possible without your office (?), there is a danger that you become simply an abstract, an academic adjunct to an operating agency.

MR. KALB: There is the other danger, too, though, isn't there?

DR. KISSINGER: There is the other danger, too. The other danger is that you become so obsessed with tactics that you never ask yourself where you are going.

I must say candidly it is a problem that has occupied me. When one comes into office, one has had a chance, hopefully, to do a great deal of thinking,--much of it probably not applicable. Then one gains experience, and at some point in one's term in office, there is a happy balance between one's thinking and one's experience.

Beyond a certain point, the danger you mention is very real, that one becomes so conscious of the tactical that one forgets the purpose it is supposed to serve, and one probably is the last person to know that one has failed in that.

Now, I have thought about it. I have a lot of time on airplanes, for example, to think, and I try to keep groups working on long-term projections and to spend at least three afternoons a week on long-term projections, But what you said is absolutely a problem.

MR. KALB: One of the things that occurred to me is that I remember an article you wrote back in 1958 warning then President Eisenhower about summitry with the Russians, and I recall, too, that then Vice President Nixon, I believe,

sent you a note of congratulations and agreement that he, too, had his problems with summitry, and yet we find in the evolution over the past four years that both of you uniquely have worked summitry into almost the major eye-catching element of your policy.

DR. KISSINGER: But I think there is an important difference. What I warned against in 1959 was to use a summit meeting as a substitute for detailed negotiations, and the danger that we saw then was that if Heads of State met without adequate preparation, since you could not appeal their disagreements to anybody, the danger of a confrontation was too great, And therefore, you were driven into atmospherics and you thought if Khrushchev ate hotdogs in a corn field in Iowa that he had changed his basic policy, or if somebody was received well in Moscow, that meant a change in policy.

But what the President has insisted on from the first day he came into office, from his first press conference, was that all problems were related to each other, linked to each other. Secondly, that summit meetings could take place only if they were very carefully prepared.

So when we went to Moscow, we know the probably outcome; at least we knew the range of possible outcomes, and as you remember, there was one or two agreements announced almost every day and we used the summit not to start a negotiation, but to give an impetus to existing negotiations, to bring them to a focus and to have very concrete solutions.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, we have about two minutes left. I want to ask you something the President mentioned yesterday. He looked down at several of the newsmen and said that "several of you when writing about peace with honor, gag on the expression."

Since I assume that you can consume the expression easily, why has it all been so important -- peace with honor, given the impact of this war on American society, the people, the morals, everything?

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DR. KISSINGER: When we came into office this country was torn by the war. No President has had to take office and was immediately greeted by massive public demonstrations. We thought we were at the edge of an era of peace, but the President felt very strongly that we could never carry it out if the government did not have enough authority so that its actions meant something and could be carried out over a period of time.

Secondly, we felt we owed it to the American people, too, that the war would be ended by a decision of its government, and not in an act of exhaustion, And now that the war is over, and we have achieved terms better than most of our critics thought possible, terms that Americans don't have to be ashamed of, we think this fact could be the basis of a reconciliation of the American people. It is no shame to have wanted to end the war more quickly than we did. And what we attempted to do was to create the basis for a constructive policy at home, and abroad, and this is why the President has thought it was so important.

MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I only have about 430 odd questions left, but we have run out of time. I certainly hope that sometime soon you will invite us back.

Thank you very much and good night.

END

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1672

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 9:50 A.M. EST

FEBRUARY 14, 1973

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The communique which is being released jointly with the DRV has been handed to you. I think you have had a chance to read that. I can take a couple of questions on it.

First, I should remind you that Dr. Kissinger, while in Hanoi, met for five hours with Special Advisor Le Duc Tho, and for 14 hours with the Prime Minister of the DRV, for a total of 19 hours of meetings. And the communique which you have reflects the meetings.

Dr. Kissinger will depart Hong Kong on February 15th for the People's Republic of China. That is Wednesday evening, Eastern time. Dr. Kissinger will remain in the PRC until February 19th.

The communique refers to the fact that Dr. Kissinger and his party visited points of interest while in Hanoi, and the cables that I have looked at referred to the fact that the party visited the Museum of History and Archeology in Hanoi, and also the Museum of Art in Hanoi. This was during brief periods between the meetings.

Let me take the questions you may have.

Q Ron, on page two there is one brief reference to the International Conference and agreement to prepare the ground for successful meetings. Were any other agreements reached vis a vis the Paris conference?

MR. ZIEGLER: As you know, in the agreement that was signed, reference was made to an International Conference on Vietnam. The State Department has already announced that the International Conference on Vietnam would meet on February 26th in Paris, and I believe all of you know the participants of the International Conference, the United States, the DRV, South Vietnam, the PRG, Canada, Poland, Hungary, Indonesia, United Kingdom, USSR, France, the PRC and also the Secretary General of the United Nations will attend.

That reference in the communique refers to the fact that in the discussions that Dr. Kissinger had in Hanoi, the two sides agreed on sending out formal invitations to the participants for the International Conference which will begin on February 26th. They also had an exchange of views on the substance of the topics to be discussed at the Conference, and will continue their contacts on these questions in established channels. That refers to the fact that the two sides agreed on sending out invitations.

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Q Can you break down the topics, apart from the obvious one of guaranteeing the peace?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I am not prepared to do that.

Q Did they agree on an agenda, when you say they exchanged views?

MR. ZIEGLER: The information that I have from Dr. Kissinger, Bob, is just as I have given it to you, and it did not reflect the establishment of a specific agenda. It reflected what I have told you.

Q Did they arrange a cease-fire in Laos?

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe you know that the United States considers an early cease-fire in Laos a matter of great urgency and we expect such a cease-fire to take effect in a matter of days.

For your background, what I am about to say is ON BACKGROUND -- not my previous statement -- for your background, I think if you look at the communique, the communique reflects the fact that Laos was obviously a subject of conversation in the discussions.

Q I just want to make one thing clear. All of this is embargoed on the wires for ten o'clock, is that right?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, everything I said.

Q Ron, the Joint Economic Commission, can you tell us anything more about who would be the U.S. participants on it?

MR. ZIEGLER: The communique pointed out that a Joint Economic Commission, it was agreed, would be established. The purpose of the Joint Economic Commission is to talk, as the communique points out, about the overall matter of economic relations with the DRV and to study the problem of reconstruction and as the communique points out, this is in the context of our efforts that would apply throughout Indochina, but specifically this Commission would determine the needs and be a forum for discussion of that.

In terms of the membership, we will nominate our members within two weeks, and I understand from Dr. Kissinger that the Joint Economic Commission should be organized in about a month.

Q Ron, what is meant by the periodic exchanges of views? How are they going to take place?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, as we have indicated to you, have established channels of communications which can be employed. Moreover, our two delegations to the Paris Conference will stay in place for a limited period of time, and can serve as a channel for an exchange of views. That is the reference there.

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Q Were any dollar figures discussed as a potential U.S. contribution to the reconstruction of North Vietnam?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. Dr. Kissinger, I believe, talked about that in his press conference that he had just after the agreement, but the answer to your question is no. The two sides exchanged views on the manner in which we might contribute to economic reconstruction in North Vietnam, which we plan to do as a part of an Indochina-wide effort.

Any specific figures and all other details will be taken up in the Joint Commission, which I referred to earlier, and which the communique refers to, and will, of course, be subject to full consultations with and approval of the Congress. We have made that point before.

The specific answer to your question, therefore, is no.

Q This reference to the normalization of relations, does that imply diplomatic relations at some point?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, as the communique states, the two sides examined various steps designed to normalize relations. They will stay in contact through various channels, which I have referred to, including the new Joint Economic Commission, which will develop relations. They also agreed on certain principles to govern the two sides' mutual relations.

After these measures are complete, which we have referred to, we can consider further steps.

Q Ron, several places in this communique refer to full and scrupulous implementation, and earlier it says they discussed various imperative measures. This seems to reflect considerable disappointment on how certain parts have been implemented to this point. Is that correct?

MR. ZIEGLER: As you are aware, there are still sporadic breaches of the cease-fire and both sides noting that have referred to this point in the communique. Also, in the course of the discussions, both sides agreed to the need -- this is what is reflected in that portion of the communique -- of setting up a system for the location of missing in action and establishing missing in action. That is another point which is referred to there.

Improvement of the cease-fire, generally, is referred to there. Also, there are other matters of detail such as designation of legitimate points of entry for military replacement supplies. The agreement, as you know, refers to points of entry and this refers to the fact that designation of legitimate points of entry for military replacement supplies should be acted upon immediately.

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I should say in the overall discussion on this
particular section of the communique, Henry mentioned that
significant progress was made on all of these points. But
those are the points that are being referred to.

Q Does the missing in action refer particularly
to the lists which have come from Laos?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, this reference refers to the
entire Indochina situation. I wouldn't want to pinpoint
one specific reference.

Q Is there a possibility on the United States
side of the Joint Economic Commission there will be some
Members of Congress?

MR. ZIEGLER: I just can't answer that question,
because I have not discussed with Dr. Kissinger the makeup
of our side of the Joint Economic Commission. I don't mean
to leave that open. That will be a subject of discussion
after Dr. Kissinger returns. He will want to explore that
more fully with the President as to the precise makeup.

Q Was Southeast Asia used as a synonym for
Indochina?

MR. ZIEGLER: In the communique?

Q Yes. There is reference to Indochina and
reference to Southeast Asia. Are we talking about the same
country?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, the traditional reference to
Indochina has been the same as applies to Southeast Asia.

Q Was there any discussion while Dr. Kissinger
was on the subject of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea?

MR. ZIEGLER: Was there any discussion regarding
South Korea?

Q Yes.

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there was not.

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Q Ron, in the last paragraph of the first page of this communique, there is reference to settling the problems existing between the Indochinese countries on a certain basis.

How many countries are they talking about, one
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, or two Vietnams, Laos and Cambodia?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger has explained our position on that matter frequently, and I will have to stand on what he has said.

Q Ron, did Dr. Kissinger, in his visits around Hanoi, see any damage caused by U.S. bombing?

MR. ZIEGLER: I cannot respond to that question because I have seen nothing in any of the reports that indicated that that was the case.

Q For example, he was taken to see two museums. Did they want him to see any of the bomb damage?

MR. ZIEGLER: Sir, I am operating on a response to your questions based upon the reports we have, and obviously this cannot be complete. I would have to tell you that the points of interest referred to in the communique relate to the two points of interest that I referred to.

Incidentally, I should tell you in talking to Dr. Kissinger this morning, in Hong Kong, we discussed the fact that I would provide some information on the communique which you have, and I have exhausted that pretty much.

Dr. Kissinger, I believe, will be prepared when he returns, to have a press conference with you ladies and gentlemen, and we will try and work that out shortly after he returns. Obviously, because he has been there, he can be more responsive to some of your questions.

Q Whatever international aid is contemplated, would that be channeled through this Commission, or is there something beyond this that would be set up?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is something that I would prefer you wait and address to Dr. Kissinger when he comes back. We have to have more extensive discussions here when Dr. Kissinger returns and reports to the President.

It is my understanding of the Joint Economic Commission that it relates to our efforts and our plans to provide assistance on an Indochina-wide basis. The Joint Economic Commission, as I understand it, goes to the point of determining what the needs are and what the problems are in relation to the DRV. In other words, to formulate the needs and that is the scope of it, as I understand it.

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Q Ron, you said that one of the things they discussed was the manner in which the aid would be supplied to North Vietnam. What were some of the methods they talked about?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't believe I have said the manner in which it would be provided.

Q It is in the communique.

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, but I said I don't think I said that. It is referred to in the communique and I cannot expand on that.

Q Is there any contemplation at the present time, which you can tell us about, of setting up a permanent wing of this Commission in Hanoi in order to administer this? That is, are we talking about sending Americans to live in Hanoi?

MR. ZIEGLER: Bob, my understanding of the Joint Economic Commission is as I have given it to you, and as far as I know, it does not indicate that, but that is something Dr. Kissinger can expand on when he meets with you.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

(AT 10:07 A.M. EST)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 22, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE BRIEFING ROOM

10:20 A.M. EST

MR. ZIEGLER: You have had a chance to read the
communique. As Jerry mentioned to you, it is embargoed
for transmission until 11:00 o'clock, Eastern Standard Time.

Dr. Kissinger left on the 7th of this month, and
he has visited Thailand, Laos, the DRV and the PRC and Japan,
and returned to the United States on the 20th of this month
and is here to talk about his travels and to take some of your
questions. He is on the record, of course.

DR. KISSINGER: I noticed that Ron has begun to
speak with a German accent. (Laughter)

Ladies and gentlemen, I thought I would begin by
making some remarks about my trip to the People's Republic
of China, and then take some questions on that, including the
communique, and then perhaps make a few additional comments
to the briefing that Ron has already given you on the Hanoi
communique.

To put this communique into perspective and to
elbaorate on it for a bit, one should review the evolution
of our China policy. When we first began our contacts with
the People's Republic of China in 1969 through third parties,
and in 1971 directly, the United States had not had any con-
tact with the People's Republic in nearly 20 years; that is,
no contact on a really substantial level.

Our early conversations were concerned primarily
with building confidence, with explaining each other's posi-
tion, with establishing channels of communication. Last
year our achievements consisted of setting out directions
and indicating the roads that might be traveled. After the
end of the war in Vietnam, and in these discussions in Peking,
we were able to begin to travel some of these roads, and to
move from the attempt to eliminate the obstructions and the
mistrust to some more concrete and positive achievements.

What happened in these meetings was really a con-
tinuation of possibilities that had been outlined during the
President's visit and during the conversations between the
President and Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou En-lai,
except that now they took some more concrete form. As the
communique points out, we reviewed the progress in Sino-
American relations in great detail, and we reviewed the
international situation in great detail.

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We discussed the principles of the Shanghai Communi-
que, particularly those that dealt with the desirability of
normalization of relations, the desirability of reducing
the danger of military conflict, the affirmation by both sides
that neither would seek hegemony in the Pacific area, and each
of them opposed the attempt of anyone else to achieve it,
and that the relations between China and the United States
would never be directed against any third country.

In that spirit, it was decided to accelerate the
normalization of relations, to broaden contacts in all fields,
and an initial concrete program for extending these contacts
was developed.

Given this new range of contacts, it was decided
that the existing channel in Paris was inadequate and that,
therefore, each side would establish a liaison office in the
capital of the other. This liaison office would handle trade
as well as all other matters, except the strictly formal
diplomatic aspects of the relationship, but it would cover the
whole gamut of relationships. This liaison office will be
established in the nearest future. Both sides will make
proposals within the next few weeks to the other about their
technical requirements, and henceforth it will be possible
for the United States and the People's Republic of China to
deal with each other in the capital of the other.

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Now, in order to give some concrete expression to
this desire for the normalization of relationships, it
was agreed that a number of steps be taken.

First of all, the Chinese, as a sign of good will,
have informed us that they would release, within the same
time period as our withdrawal from Vietnam, the two
military prisoners that they hold in China, Lt. Commander (Robert J.)
Flynn and Major Philip (E.) Smith. They have been held in China
since 1967, and 1965, respectively. They will be released
within the next few weeks.

Prime Minister Chou En-lai also asked me to inform
the President that the Chinese Penal Code provided for the
periodic review of the sentences of prisoners and that
this provision would be applied in the case of John Downey.

The Chinese Penal Code provides for commutation
of sentences on the basis of good behavior. We have been
told that the behavior of Mr. Downey has been exemplary
and that his case would be reviewed in the second half of
this year.

With respect to outstanding issues that have
been discussed in other channels, it was agreed that the
linked issue of United States private claims against the
People's Republic of China and PRC blocked assets in
the United States would be negotiated on a global basis
in the immediate future. Discussions will begin on this
subject between Secretary of State Rogers and the Chinese
Foreign Minister next week when both are attending the
International Conference on Vietnam in Paris, and we expect
these negotiations to be concluded rapidly and in a compre-
hensive way and we are certain that both sides are approaching
them in a constructive spirit and in an attitude consistent
with our intention to accelerate the improvement of our
relations.

With respect to increased exchanges between the
two countries, the Chinese have agreed to invite, during
this year, the Philadelphia Symphony by the fall of 1973,
a medical group during the spring, scientific groups during
the summer, a group of elementary and high school teachers,
again during the summer, and increased visits by Congressmen
and Senators, as well as athletic teams, an amateur
basketball team and swimming and diving team.

The People's Republic has agreed to send to the
United States the archeological exhibit from the Forbidden
City, which will probably come here in 1974, a group of
water conservation experts, insect hormone specialists,
high energy physicists, and a gymnastic team.

When the liaison offices are established, possibility
will exist for developing further contacts and accelerating
this entire process.

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The major point we want to make is this: Our contacts with the People's Republic of China have moved from hostility towards normalization. We both believe that it is essential for the peace of the world that the United States and the People's Republic of China act with a sense of responsibility in world affairs; that we are part of an international community in which all nations have a stake in preserving the peace, and that therefore, as the Shanghai communique has already said and as was reaffirmed once again, the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic is not directed against other nations, but is part of a pattern that the President has pursued of building a structure of peace in which all nations can participate and in which all nations have a stake.

It remains for me only to say that we were received with extraordinary courtesy and that the discussions were conducted in what was always described as an unconstrained atmosphere.

Now I will take your questions on China and after that a few comments on North Vietnam.

Q Did you come to any agreement with regard to Taiwan and U.S. troops there?

DR. KISSINGER: Inevitably the issue of Taiwan is one in which the People's Republic and we do not have the same perspective. The leaders of the People's Republic stated their view and we expressed our general commitments.

We, of course, continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The level of our troops on Taiwan is not the subject of negotiation, but will be governed by the general considerations of the Nixon Doctrine with respect to danger in the area. There exists no immediate plan for any withdrawal, but there will be a periodic review.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what will be the rank of the liaison office heads? Will they be Ambassadors?

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Lisagor has addressed me by my academic title, which is very impressive to me.

The formal title of the head of the liaison office will be Chief of the Liaison Office. And we are not giving any formal diplomatic rank on either side. As soon as the person is selected, which should be within a month, I think his stature will then determine it, but there will be no formal title other than the one I have given.

Q To what do you attribute the Chinese decision to send a permanent representative here in view of their previous refusal to have a permanent person any place where Taiwan is recognized?

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DR. KISSINGER: The liaison office, of course, is not a formal diplomatic office, but I don't want to speculate on the motive of the Chinese decision.

Our policy had always been clear from our first contact. Certainly from the time that the President visited the People's Republic, he pointed out to Prime Minister Chou En-lai the types of American representation that would be available for establishment in Peking, which ranged from trade missions to various other possibilities, to the idea of a liaison office.

Why the Chinese leaders have decided at this particular moment to accept this and to establish an office of their own in Washington, I would not want to speculate on, except that it is certainly consistent with speeding up the process of normalization.

Q Was there any restriction or understanding on the size of the respective delegations?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but we expect it to be of
moderate size at the beginning.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how about the exchange of
journalists and opening of permanent bureaus in both countries?

DR. KISSINGER: This is one of the topics that will be discussed through the existing channel and then through the liaison office. The Chinese side has indicated that it would be willing to send some journalists over here and it is, of course, clearly understood that we want to increase our journalistic contacts in the People's Republic.

I think there is some understanding in principle with respect to that; the details of which have to be worked out.

Q What is the concrete program of expanding trade the communique refers to?

DR. KISSINGER: To begin with, there is already a reasonable amount of trade, much larger than any projection had foreseen two years ago. The initial step in a further expansion has to be the discussion of the two issues I have mentioned, namely the blocked assets and the private claims. When these two issues are resolved, which we expect to be fairly soon, then further steps can be taken.

Up to now, the trade has been essentially in private channels on the United States side and has proceeded more rapidly than anybody projected two or three years ago.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you see the liaison office as something, as far as you can go, in terms of permanent representation, short of diplomatic relations, or do you see something further down the road?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no further steps in mind. This is as far as we can go for the moment.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, did you have a chance to discuss with the Chinese leaders the possibility of mutual restraints in sending military equipment to Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Our view on the question of military equipment to Indochina is clear and we have made clear to all the countries with which we have talked the importance of tranquility in Indochina to the peace of the world, and Indochina was one of the subjects that was discussed in Peking.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us something of the nature and the detail of your discussions with Chairman Mao?

DR. KISSINGER: I am debating whether to spend ten minutes saying "No," or just to say "No." (Laughter)

I will say two general things. One, I obviously cannot go into the details of the discussion. The atmosphere was cordial. Chairman Mao was in apparently good health and spoke with great animation for about two hours, and extended a personal message to the President, as the Chinese announcement made clear.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was there any discussion of a visit here by Chou En-lai or any other senior Chinese representatives in the future?

DR. KISSINGER: There was no discussion of this.

Q Were there any secret agreements made in view of the fact you are not discussing the Mao conversations?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the essential nature of what was discussed is contained in the communique and in my explanations. There were no secret agreements.

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