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by insisting that discontinuance of tests should be conditional on
satisfactory progress towards real disarmament.

How should we prevent this? I think the answer is that we
should now drop our link with real disarmament all the more
because the link is a vague formula, impossible to define precisely.
We have a lot to gain by doing so, and in my opinion, nothing of
any real value to lose. It would make it obvious to all the world
that, if the Russians then refused an agreement on controlled
discontinuance of tests, it would be because they would not accept
a genuine control system on their own territory, despite their pro-
fessed acceptance of the recommendations of the previous Geneva
Experts' Conference.

And if, on the other hand, by dropping our conditions we
oblige the Russians to make an agreement on the controlled sus-
pension of tests, we should get an even more substantial gain.
We should get a proper control system in the Soviet Union. I
think all our advisers agree on the importance of this. It would
certainly make it difficult for the Russians to refuse a control
system later on for other forms of disarmament. In effect, it would
safeguard what had been contained in our dropped condition.

There is another point. If, by insisting on this condition, we
lose the chance of getting a controlled discontinuance of tests,
there could eventually be an alarming increase in the number of
nuclear powers. This would work to our disadvantage.

In conclusion, I think we have everything to gain and nothing
to lose by adopting the course which I advocate. If our two Govern-
ments make this decision I think it would have a most favourable
effect on world opinion and probably also on the negotiations at
Geneva. We should need to consider how and when our decision
should be made known. It might be best done at Geneva by our two
delegates there, preferably at a stage in the conference when we
might get a reciprocal concession from the Russians. This need
not inhibit us from making clear to the world the size of the
concession we are making in order to secure an agreement.

The President, while thinking it unwise that we should give this
change in position any undue publicity, replied on 13 January in
substance accepting my proposal. To use his own words:

Although, on the basis of the progress to date, it seems to me
that the prospects are not bright that the Russians will accept an

effective control organisation in the current negotiations, I agree
that our public position would be much better if we remove as a
point of contention the issue of the link to disarmament, which
the Russians may use as a screen to evade accepting responsibility
for failure in the negotiations or to evade facing up to the control
problem.

So far, so good. But while the experts were carrying on their
argument in Geneva, in a relaxed if somewhat academic atmosphere,
Khrushchev suddenly introduced a note of harsh reality.

On 10 November he made a public demand for the withdrawal
of the Allied troops from West Berlin. This declaration followed an
interview a few days before in which he had compared the recent
meeting of Adenauer and de Gaulle with that of Hitler and
Mussolini in 1934. On 20 November the Russian Ambassador at
Bonn called on the Chancellor and informed him brutally that his
Government intended 'to liquidate the occupation statutes concern-
ing Berlin'. The next day I received a personal message from
Adenauer in which he expressed his deep concern. He had evidently
been much shaken by his talk with Ambassador Andrei Smirnov
which seemed to him 'to show that the Soviet Union is resolved to
make the Berlin question a test for the policy of the free world.' He
went on to make an urgent request:

> Please let me ask you to consider whether you could not with
> the whole of the influence of which the United Kingdom disposes
> in the world, make representations in Moscow with a view to
> drawing the attention of the Soviet Government to the fateful
> consequences of such a decision, and whether you could not
> attempt to prevent the Soviet Union from realising this intention.

After expressing his surprise that the Soviet Government should take
this violent action at a time when discussions in Geneva were still
being conducted on a friendly basis, his message ended with a
moving appeal:

> This letter, dear Mr. Macmillan, is dictated by serious
> anxiety about a development the consequences of which we can-
> not foresee. I feel this responsibility not only towards the German

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people; we all bear it towards all peoples in the world, and we should leave nothing untried which perhaps could prevent the Soviet Union at the last hour from setting in motion a stone which could become a destructive avalanche.

Although we had not yet received the formal Russian note, I found it difficult not to yield to the Chancellor's request. I therefore sent a message on 22 November direct to Khrushchev.

I am sending you this personal message to tell you of the anxiety which your recent statements on Berlin have caused me. I must tell you frankly that I find these statements difficult to reconcile with your many previous expressions of the desire to reduce tension in the world. The British Government have every intention of upholding their rights in Berlin which are soundly based. That also I believe to be the position of our allies as is well known to you. At the moment discussions are taking place in Geneva. I still profoundly hope that fruitful results will come both from the political conference on nuclear tests and from the technical conference on measures against surprise attack. I cannot imagine anything more calculated to increase tension at a moment of opportunity for an improvement in our relations than the kind of action which your statements appear to foreshadow. I hope therefore that you will seriously consider what I say before deciding to proceed to such action.

I also sent messages to the United States and French Governments explaining that I acted without formal consultation with my allies in order to try to get my message to Khrushchev before the Russians took any formal action.

On 27 November, however, an official Soviet note was delivered to all the Governments concerned. In this the Russian Government served notice upon the three Western powers that the Soviet Union regarded as null and void the existing arrangements about Berlin. At the same time it was prepared to negotiate with these Governments as to the establishment of West Berlin on the basis of a 'demilitarised free city'. The note went on to declare that the Soviet Government 'proposed to make no changes in the present procedure for military traffic from West Berlin to the Federal Republic of Germany for six months'.

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573

When there is a prolonged state of tension between two nations or groups of nations, every move, formal or informal, great or small, is scrutinised and analysed by the experts on each side with microscopic care, to try to find the hidden and twisted motives which lie behind the simplest and most overt statements. This has always been so in the history of national conflict. But when, as in these years, the division lies not merely in the normal geographic, economic or political interests in the two sets of contenders but is based on a far more decisive opposition of the fundamental ideas of life and political organisation, this process becomes exaggerated. In the chancelleries of the free world, above all in Washington, there has grown up a race of 'Kremlinologists', trying to draw the most profound deductions from the most slender evidence. No doubt in the huge bureaucracy of Russia there are similar groups attempting to dissect the strange and uncertain motives which would seem to influence the Governments of the free world.

The immediate situation, although grave, gave us at least some interval for thought. Yet all these new threats were interlaced with existing difficulties and the latest was only a new turn in this wheel of complexity and danger.

After the receipt of the Russian note I sent a minute to the Foreign Secretary on 28 November:

> *The Berlin issue* is, in fact, an ultimatum with six months to run. We shall not be able to avoid negotiation. How is it to be carried out? Will it necessarily lead to discussion of the future of a united Germany and possible 'Disengagement Plans'?

### *Tests and Surprise Attack*

These negotiations at Geneva seem likely to drag on more or less indefinitely. If we can get American consent to abandon the link altogether, we may make some advance from the propaganda point of view, but I doubt whether we shall reach any nearer agreement.

### *European Free Trade*

You will have no doubt read an excellent article in the *Financial Times* this morning. If not, pray do so. It is clear that the Germans have really sold out to the French on every count.

I do not think we can deal with these problems separately. The groups of powers in this strange quadrille keep changing. In the

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first, it is Russia and the three occupying powers, with Germany the most interested and with most to gain. In the second, France is out and Germany is out. In the third, the United States seem uninterested and the Germans and French have made an unholy alliance against the British. We must think of all these problems together, for that is what the British people will do....

As regards Russia, it may be that Khrushchev is really working for a Summit Conference without the Chinese. In that case, it would certainly not be bad politics for me to take the lead in suggesting it.

The visit of Vice-President Nixon to London at this time proved useful. Although I was never sure of the extent of his influence either with the President or with the Secretary of State, both Selwyn Lloyd and I took much trouble to hear his views, which seemed sensible and restrained.

In the Foreign Affairs Debate on 4 December there was no difficulty. The whole House, with very few exceptions, resented the Russian move, although there was a strong feeling in favour of trying to find some solution by negotiation.

The Foreign Affairs debate went off well. Foreign Secretary made an *excellent* speech in his new style-firm, clear and short. Bevan was rhetorical and quite effective until the end, when he started up again the controversy about arming Germany, over which the Labour Party had been split so deeply.¹

Khrushchev sent me a long personal reply formally delivered by the Soviet Ambassador in London. He justified his action on the grounds that it was right for one Government to give warning of a dangerous situation.

The Soviet Government's main aim in proposing the abolition of the last vestiges of the occupation régime in Berlin, as was clearly stated in its note, is to eliminate a dangerous, indeed I would frankly say, an extremely dangerous, source of friction and tension which complicates the relations between our countries and creates an abnormal atmosphere in Europe as a whole. In taking appropriate steps in relation to West Berlin and in submitting its proposals in this matter, the Soviet Government has

¹ 4 December 1958.

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575

been prompted by the consideration that in certain circumstances the situation existing in West Berlin, where the occupation régime is being artificially and illegally maintained, could lead to the gravest consequences for the cause of peace in Europe, and perhaps not only in Europe.

He went on to question our rights in Berlin, which we maintained were derived not from the Potsdam agreement, but from the unconditional surrender of Germany in 1945. Khrushchev devoted a long and ingenious argument to proving that the breakdown of the Potsdam agreement had in fact removed these rights. He went on to an interesting passage on the military value of Berlin to either side.

> If one looks at things realistically, as statesmen are obliged always to do, one must admit that neither the security interests nor any other vital interests to Great Britain will suffer as a result of the liquidation of the quadripartite status of Berlin. And if those who now adopt a critical attitude towards the proposals of the Soviet Government on this question sometimes point to the military and strategic importance of the Western part of Berlin, this can only make anyone smile who knows more or less to what extent modern military techniques have changed the conception of war and the nature of military action when weapons of mass destruction are used. We think it unlikely that you, Mr. Prime Minister, will dispute this.

From this he drew the deduction that

> even if Great Britain and the other Western powers were to relinquish something as a result of the abrogation of the quadripartite status of Berlin, this would only be the doubtful advantages which they enjoy from the use of Western Berlin for continuing the 'cold war' and for conducting subversive activities against the G.D.R.,¹ the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

There then followed a definite statement which could be regarded as a warning or a threat:

> To make the proposals of the Soviet Union on Berlin completely clear I feel it necessary to stress that if the period of six

¹ German Democratic Republic, or Deutsche Demokratische Republik (D.D.R.), the official name for East Germany.

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months which was mentioned in the Note of the Soviet Government is not used to reach an appropriate agreement it goes without saying that the Soviet Union will carry out the proposed measures by means of an agreement with the German Democratic Republic and no one will be able to prevent the Soviet Union from abrogating its functions deriving from the maintenance of the occupation status in Berlin.

In the last two pages of this six-page document, Khrushchev returned to blandishment, if not blarney:

> In this connection we cannot help remembering our meetings with you, Mr. Prime Minister, and your predecessor, Sir Anthony Eden, in London in the spring of 1956 and that frank and, it seemed to us, useful exchange of opinions on the problems of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain as well as on many international problems. We expected that the visit of the Soviet Government delegation to Great Britain would lay a good basis for a rapprochement between our two nations and would contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the cessation of the 'cold war'.

Next he deplored the present state of Anglo-Russian trade. Moreover Great Britain was almost the only major state with which the Soviet Union had so far no cultural, scientific or technical co-operation. Finally he declared:

> We sincerely wish that all the prejudices which clearly influence the attitude of the British Government towards the Soviet Union would yield to a more favourable approach to the problem of establishing mutual understanding and co-operation between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain. The Soviet Government is convinced that a rapprochement of the two countries would not only bring material advantages to our peoples and enrich them spiritually but would also favourably influence the solution of important international issues, thus promoting the cause of peace.

I was still pondering on the recondite implications of this message, when the Soviet Government sent on 13 December a somewhat curious declaration to all NATO powers in connection with the forthcoming NATO conference. In the course of a restatement of

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their views in now familiar terms they renewed the call for a Summit Conference. Was this to be treated as propaganda or a serious proposal? Once again the experts on Russian psychology expressed their varying, but admirably presented, views.

The rest of December was taken up in the various preliminaries which are necessary for consultation within an alliance, such as that which held the Western powers together. These delays do not affect a monolithic power whose allies are satellite or even subject states. Nevertheless the task was rapidly performed. There were meetings of the Foreign Ministers, meetings of the NATO Council, meetings of the Western European Assembly, and by 31 December the replies of the British, French and American Governments were delivered in Moscow. They were in similar terms. They made it clear that the proposals for Berlin were unacceptable; that the three Western powers, in addition to their rights, had responsibilities towards two million West Berliners to remain in the city; accordingly they looked to the Soviet Government to adhere to its obligations and in particular to the agreement of 20 June 1949, to afford free and unhindered access from West Germany to Berlin. At the same time the notes stated that the Western Governments were prepared to discuss Berlin in the wider framework of negotiation for a solution to the German problem as well as that of European security.

Selwyn Lloyd had admirably set out our position in the House of Commons.

> The fact, however, that we intend to uphold our rights in Berlin, and find the Soviet proposals unacceptable, does not mean that we should fail to seek discussion with the Soviet Union on the German position as a whole. . . . We are ready to discuss the matter with the Russians in all its aspects.¹

On this note, dangerous but by no means yet disastrous, the year ended.

During the Christmas holidays Selwyn Lloyd underwent a slight operation. This meant that I had to take control of the Foreign Office as well as my own work. Although the negotiations in Cyprus were about to reach a critical stage I was not unhopeful of their

¹ Hansard, 4 December 1958.

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success. My main anxiety, therefore, was concentrated upon the
Russian declaration or ultimatum. I felt that, while the Western
allies must uphold their right of access to Berlin, we must avoid
giving Russia no choice but humiliation or war. Moreover a warning
with six months to run was scarcely an ultimatum in the ordinary
sense of the word. We had no right in law or equity to prevent the
Russians from giving the same recognition to East Germany as we
had given to the Federal Republic. Everything turned upon Berlin.
How would our position be affected if the Russians handed over
their rights to the Government of East Germany, the D.D.R.?

The Berlin 'crisis' is approaching, and we have (as yet) no
agreed policy with our allies. The Paris declaration only
papered over the cracks. Are we really prepared to face war over
Berlin? If so, just in what way are we to play the hand, so as to
get the Russians sure that we are serious and be ready to come to
a serious conference. I feel sure (although the Americans so far
are *not* quite agreed) that we must not *over* play our hand. If we
do, the Russians will see through and call our bluff.

I doubt therefore whether we can make the question of
whether Russians or East Germans approve the bills of lading
or punch the railway tickets into a *casus belli*. What matters is
whether civil and military supplies actually reach Berlin.¹

At the same time we had to consider the more dangerous position.
If access by road or rail was interfered with either by the Russians
or by the D.D.R. after the Russians had unilaterally transferred
their functions, we should be back in the circumstances of the
blockade of 1948. In that event we should either have to repeat the
air operation, so successfully carried out ten years before, or take
steps to force our way through upon the ground.

Before Christmas I had received a long appeal from Adenauer.

The unequivocal 'no' of the British Government to the Soviet
demands has filled the German people and myself with deep
gratitude. I believe that the important thing now is that the
communiqué should eliminate all doubt for the Russians, too,
about the firm attitude of the three Western powers on the
question of Berlin. Should the Soviet Government or the people

¹ 5 January 1959.

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579

of Berlin be able to detect any signs at all of a yielding attitude
in that communiqué it is my opinion that such a mistake could
seriously endanger the peace of the world. We know from ex-
perience, after all, that the Soviets have retreated each time they
have met with energetic resistance, and I am convinced that in the
case of Berlin, too, the Russians will undertake nothing that could
jeopardise peace if the powers responsible for the freedom of the
city maintain a clear-cut and unequivocal attitude. On the other
hand, I believe we also know from experience that the slightest
appearance of a yielding attitude when the legal position was
clear has caused the Soviets to advance still further.

He rightly pointed out a significant and somewhat sinister change
in the situation over the decade.

The situation of West Berlin is fundamentally different from
what it was at the time of the 1948 blockade. The economy of the
city has blossomed out remarkably, thanks to the help of the
United States and the continual support of the Federal Republic,
and, whereas in 1948 the citizens of Berlin were all more or less
equally poor, and there was no appreciable difference between
the standard of living in West and in East Berlin, there are
sections of the population in Berlin today who again have something
to lose and who must fear that they will lose their laboriously
acquired possessions as well as their personal freedom.

For these reasons he declared that

it is clear to every thinking person that an air-lift would not
manage to maintain even approximately the standard of living of
West Berlin. Finally—and this is very important—during that
blockade no one could leave Berlin, whereas at present everyone
is free to do so.

Adenauer readily agreed that there must be negotiations at some
point with the Soviet Government, not merely on Berlin but upon
the whole German problem. Such negotiations would be necessary
at the right time and after thorough preparation.

But I believe it would be unwise and also very dangerous to
begin such negotiations under the pressure of a demand with a
time limit. The point of departure of the West would in such an