7

minimum risk, it restored fluidity to the diplomatic situation in the Middle East and South-East Asia. A sale of arms to Egypt during the Cold War might have been considered an intolerable provocation; Nehru might have thought twice about permitting such unbridled attacks in the West, had not the Soviets first succeeded in establishing themselves as the champions of peace.

The diplomatic position of the U. S. is all the more precarious because many of the erosions of Soviet tactics are occuring behind a facade of seeming normalcy and protestations of peaceful coexistence. NATO, lacking either a unifying military doctrine or psychological cohesion, is holding together only to the extent that its members believe that war is unlikely. SEATO is in severe jeopardy from Soviet and Indian pressure and the harm the Baghdad pact has done in Egypt is hardly outweighed by its dubious impact on the Soviets. In the U. N., anti-American majorities have already been formed on the issue of colonialism. And the cynicism of the deal about the admission of new members has only symbolized the disintegration of all dividing lines. By dint of endless repetition of simple slogans, the USSR has emerged in many areas as the champions of peace, of economic development, of freedom from foreign bondage, while holding a number of drafts such as the Formosa situation and Indo-China, which can be used at any moment to strain further our international position. Through great skill in exploiting conferences for their psychological impact, the most ruthless of powers has succeeded in picturing itself as the victim of American aggressiveness. And by keeping up an unremitting stream of communications and proposals, the Soviets have preempted the categories of discourse and placed upon us the diplomatic defensive almost everywhere around the Soviet periphery.

The Primary Task Ahead

I. New Wine In Old Bottles

Since 1947 the US has followed a policy of containment vis-a-vis the
USSR. This policy, however, never has been fully implemented even in a
military sense. In fact, efforts to implement it militarily vis an exten-
sive system of alliances and pacts were not made until after the more
flagrant phase of Soviet military expansion had ended. (SEATO and the
Bagdad Pact followed the Indochina Armistice).

The possibility of a successful outcome of the containment policy was premised on creating an effective defense on a broad front around the entire permitter of the Soviet orbit. US efforts to create the defense were facilitated by Soviet "hard" tactics, and particularly by the Korean war. After Stalin's death the Soviet Union pursued a more flexible policy aimed at breaking up the US alliance system, destroying the free world's access to strategic bases, and the infiltration of non-communist Asia, Africa and the Middle East through economic and political penetration.

The US has not yet found the counter to the new Soviet tactics. The "solutions" most frequently advanced all fall within the old framework, political and economic as well as military containment on a broad front. In particular, greater US effort is now urged in the economic and cultural sphere in order to prevent the defection of newly independent nations into the Communist Bloc.

Because of our determination not to accept the risk of a single
country succumbing to communist blandishments or pressure Soviet strategy
in much of the world has been presented with an easy task. The Soviets

have been able to move into the old Colonial areas as a benign power without
paying any real price for the title. The newly independent countries are
having a field day, by capitalizing on the Soviet offers of economic and
military aid program to areas outside the Soviet orbit. The Egyptian story
is illustrative. By making a deal with the Soviets for arms Egypt, a 3rd
or 4th rate country by any objective standards, becomes for the first time
in thousands of years an important country. Egypt not only obtained Soviet
arms, she also received $200,000,000.00 US dollars as a bribe for future
good behavior. Turkey, meanwhile, the only militarily worthwhile ally in
the region sadly observes the US playing up to a country the Turks dominated
for centuries, and wonders why not US money is available to help solve her
chronic economic troubles. And so it goes.

Every country in the Free World takes US largess for granted. Few
fear our displeasure or value our friendship. We have become the greatest
eager-beavers of diplomatic history. We have tried to be all things to
all people and in the process may lose these associations that are really
vital to our survival.

## II. Crossing The East-West Barrier

American society was founded upon humanistic and theistic principles,
i.e., the secular-humanist ideas of the Reformation and the Enlightenment
and the Christian faith. To this extent, America stands entirely within
the European tradition with its characteristic and precarious balance of
humanist and Christian elements. The rejection of either of these intellectual
and moral traditions has always led to political and social breakdowns.

Nevertheless, the US has become an increasingly humanistic, pragmatic
society. In other terms it has been described as an "outer directed" in

- 2 -

contrast to "inner" or "traditional" directed societies. Action values
are being increasingly determined by the level of social acceptance other
than religious beliefs or deeply felt personal convictions. This may not
necessarily be a desirable development in terms of the long-term viability
of our society. The prophet's warning, "Where there is no vision the
people perish" may still apply. The immediate issue which this development raises
however, is the relationship between our pragmatically oriented society and
the still largely "inner" or "tradition" directed oriented societies.
If a deep sociological gulf divides us, can we be certain that our values
and methods can be readily applied to the solution of the revolutionary
problems confronting the newly formed governments of Asia and the Middle
East?

The tendency of American society towards the subordination of religious
beliefs to humanistic principles does not enhance its attractiveness to
other societies. Historically the supremacy of humanistic values has always
gone hand-in-hand with the decline of individual responsibility and the
growth of bureaucracy, social conformism and the cult of personal leadership.
Not a few historians have interpreted the rise of nationalism in Asia and
Africa as not so much a "revolution of rising expectations" as a revolt against
the humanist civilization of the West. If this were true then the attractiveness
of the Western democratic example and of the West's brilliant record
in the field of the production and distribution of commodities would be
largely offset by the protest of cultures which, however moribund they
may have been or may have appeared to us, are now being revived forcibly
by native elites. Although there are many signs that Asia strives for
those improvements which we associate with the Western democratic life,

there are also many signs that she rejects some of our most cherished humanistic ideas. American society is remarkably cohesive, dynamic, uniform and, sociologically conservative. We are conservative in all respects except one: we are revolutionary in economics. Now, at this moment, the situation in Asia and Africa is exactly the opposite: the Asian societies are socially and politically revolutionary, and the economic revolution, although it is due to take place, has not really started on a large scale, and, wherever it has started, it is imitative and lacks all creative originality. The leaders of Asia -- the Brahmins of India and the Mandarins of China masquerading as Indian democrats and Chinese communists may at heart despise our disciplined, utilitarian, pragmatic and cheerful management of natural forces and the material needs of society.

### III. Europe and Asia in Perspective

After Lenin died Stalin was faced with a policy dilemma, whether to pursue world revolution on a broad front or to first build up the security of the Soviet Base. He chose the latter. We now face a similar problem; whether to concentrate on transforming NATO into a viable community, or to strengthen NATO while simultaneously participating full-scale in promoting the growth of the undeveloped nations.

The great Western community is still rudimentary. So far it is but an alliance. It is a step in the right direction, the alliance of men united by centuries of common culture and common ideals, forced together in a defensive alliance against the rising forces of alien ideologies and neo-barbarism. They are set apart from the rest of the world by their underlying unity. The histories of Europe and America are understandable when joined together, meaningless if taken separately. They cannot be split

- 4 -

because they would not be today what they are if the other fragments had
not existed. The whole complex Europe-America is an integrated world
revolving around a mobile center of gravity which has shifted across the
Atlantic in our century, from the Old to the New World. But this joint
history sets them apart from all other civilizations. It does not require
direct references to Russia or Asia or Africa to be comprehensible. It
is a self-contained unit of its own, a living organism which Europe alone
is not.

We must determine upon certain priority goals, especially those that
are within the range of a society that is becoming progressively more
humanist with all the positive and negative connotations which this develop-
ment implies. If this is indeed the proper approach, then our first goal
must be security of base. American foreign policy appears now increasingly
determined to widen the scope of NATO. The pursuit of this task entails,
however, the acceptance of certain limitations as regards the pursuit of
other goals. The more we emphasize NATO, the more we are apt, even given
the best intentions and the subtlest diplomacy, to strengthen certain adverse
tendencies that beat against us in Asia. This need not be true at all
times and all places. But it will be true at most times and at most places.
The transformation of NATO into the Western Community under American political,
military and economic leadership is an undertaking favored by the countless
historical and cultural affinities which line the Western peoples. For these
affinities, there exists no counterpart in Asia. As far as American relations
to the non-Western world are concerned, the requirements of security of base,
i.e., the security of the Western Community, can be summed up as follows:
first, to hold those strategic bases in Asia (notably Japan and Formosa)

- 5 -

and Africa that must be held, because they are integral parts of the Western
system of defense; and secondly, to pursue flexible policies in relation to
all those emerging states, the territories of which are not essential to the
defense of the Western alliance. In brief, such a course, while it does
not rule out considerable mobility as regards political and economic re-
lations with the so-called uncommitted peoples, necessitates an inflexible
posture as regards the defense of the Western alliance. It should be under-
stood, however, that the United States will have to pay a heavy price for
establishing this priority. The United States will not be able to play
the role of mediator between the former colonial powers and some ex-colonial
peoples as effectively as some may wish. Incidentally, the questions may
well be asked: how effectively has the United States played this role in
the past and how effectively can it play this role in the future, and
have not past American attempts to stand aloof or to mediate the "colonial
question" given rise to ambiguities which have weakened our allies without
reconciling the colonial and ex-colonial peoples? It is certain that some
of our experiments in seeking to have the best of both worlds have confused
or alienated our friends. The process of the devolution of empires has not
only gone very far but also very fast. This process must now be braked.
If our Western allies are forced to abandon their remaining positions,
then not only a very important *raison d'être* of NATO vanishes but also the
future possibilities of Western economic expansion will be foreclosed.

## IV. *A New Policy*

Any system of priorities implies concentrations on things that are
important and less concern with secondary issues.

- 6 -

We need to introduce a large dose of relaxed indifference into our
diplomacy. The nations of the world that may want our help must come to
recognize that we are more important to them than they to us. Those nations
in the world that are of vital importance to us must see the prospect of
tangible benefits from their association with us.

We can achieve the above by abandoning the policy of containment on a
broad front. In practical terms this will mean strengthening our association -
political, economic and militarily with these nations essential to a strong
US-Free World position.

We should regard the other areas of the world, the so-called neutral
bloc as truly neutral for the foreseeable future. In the event of global
war, these nations are not areas of vital strategic significance to the US.
Consequently, we can let them become the testing ground for competitive co-
existence. We should do business with them in the same manner as the Soviet
Union does, but feel no paternal responsibility towards them. In fact, if
the Russians want to assume responsibility for assisting in the economic
responsibilities of these countries, we should permit them. This may appear
to be a gamble, but not a very risky one. The Soviet Union does not now
have the resources to underwrite simultaneously its own plans for expansion,
as well as the future economic growth of China, India, Indonesia, and
these countries of the Middle East which it is currently wooing. We should
play our cards so as to call the Soviet bluff. As of now the Russians are
being credited with a desire to assist these nations equivalent to the one
we have actually displayed during the past ten years. They are paying
practically nothing for this credit. Indeed the neutrals are using Soviet
promises of aid to force up our bids. For us this can only be a losing
game.

But suppose the leaders of "Free Asia" turn to the Soviet Union for economic aid? Would the Soviet Union, by assuming obligations for the economic development of certain Asian countries, be able to derive an appreciable net gain in strategic and political terms? The very variety of our own experience in this field of endeavor, to which we have brought thus far greater skills than the Soviets, suggest a careful examination of this question. Moreover, if the assumption holds that the raising of standards of living operates *per se* in favor of Western values, then there is no reason to bar the Soviets from cooperating in the undertaking. Of course, it must be presumed in this context that the Asian leaders are serious in their rejection of political "strings." Evidently, if they allow the Soviets to tie such "strings" then their avowed fear of "Western-colonialism-entering-by-the-back-door" is a mere pretense. In that case, the West would have gained nothing by complying with their demands.

One thing that characterizes all the neutral bloc nations is their almost psychopathic desire to have a chance to work out their own problems. Any "uninvited" effort we make to assist them is regarded as interference in their own right to make mistakes. If we pull out of the game we will force the Soviets to implement their promises by deeds. Eventually Soviet assistance to them will also be regarded as interference in their internal affairs. In this way we could transfer to the Soviets the onus associated with assisting a developed country.

What this line of reasoning suggests is that for the time being our strategy in Asia can be no more than a holding action. This also goes for our strategy in the U.N. where we must retain our present *de facto* control

- 8 -

and not let us be talked into all kinds of experiments by people who, although
more sophisticated than we are, have really nothing to contribute to the practical
solution of the world's problems. Once we have consolidated the Atlantic comm-
munity we will be ready to confront Asia. The U.N. can then come into its
own. Behind the screen of its various agencies, we can then pursue our
economic initiative in Asia, backed by the immense skills and resources of
the American-European complex. By then, Asian nationalism will have en-
countered the same frustrations which nationalism is bound to encounter
everywhere; the pseudo-mystique of Asian leadership, the fervour of peasant
rebellions, the resentments of colour and the appeal of Russia will have
lost their kick. As long as they knew, we should not cater to these forces.

A pooling of Western resources for the purpose of supplying capital
equipment and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries would stimulate
economically and morally the West itself -- "doing great things together"
-- and ease the immensely difficult transition of Africa and Asia from pre-
dominantly agricultural societies to industrialized ones. The most immediately
favorable conditions for this kind of team work are to be found in Latin
America or Africa. In Africa, also, it is possible to conjugate Western
economic policies with strategic interest and to widen, by settling European
surplus populations, the frontiers of Western economic enterprise and
political control.

Prospects in Asia are not high as long as Asian demands that foreign
economic aid must have "no strings attached," continue. All foreign
economic aid has some "strings" attached -- and quite properly so. In the
case of Asia, these "strings" may consist of nothing more formidable than
modest undertakings _not_ to do certain things as for example, _not_ to

- 9 -

nationalize foreign investments or *not* to indulge in officially sponsored anti-Western propaganda. Certain minimum requirements for establishing a mutually satisfactory political-psychological climate must be met. There are many and ingenuous ways (Colombo Plan-type organizations, and even UN agencies provided the U.S. and its partners retain a periodic veto on their operations) for eventually channeling Western aid to Asia so that the prestige-consciousness and extreme sensitivity of Asian leaders will not be unduly affronted. But the *a priori* renunciation of any and all political concessions in return for economic aid would place us, vis-a-vis the bargain conscious East, in a non-negotiable and non-maneuverable position from which the Asians need not let us escape except at the price of ever larger Western concessions.

## V. The Choice

1. Either to raise our sights and pursue a broad front strategy more vigorously, or

2. Establish priorities and accept the risks and gain the benefits that commitment to such priorities would entail.

## Conclusion

By establishing priorities of US effort and concentration, nations which have little responsibility for taming the Soviet threat or contributing to the maintenance of world order will no longer be arbiters of US success.

- 10 -

Section II-o
Mr. Lindsay/j

Why "we have left undone those things
which we ought to have done,..."?

Mr. Keiffer:

We have had no agreed national goals since the Continent was
settled in the last part of the 19th Century. National action since then
has been negative and consisted of reacting to external initiatives.

Dr. Thomson

We must create a sense of participation so that each individual
can relate his own activities to broader measures. Our limits of
sacrifice can be raised substantially.

Mr. Creel

The basic question is how does a people get a sense of mission,
a sense of crusading, of vitality? He feels that at the core of the pro-
blem is basically a moral question.

Mr. Lockwood

Qualified people in this country are preoccupied with other
matters. There is relatively little awareness of the importance of
training and of developing leadership. He is concerned with the
quality of leadership at lower levels.

Dr. Speier

During and since the war there have been three phases in our
relations with the Soviets:

a. During wartime we assumed that our military allies
would remain our political friends.

Section IJ-b

Mr. Lindsay/1

- 2 -

b. In the post-war period we found that the Soviets were evil but we can and could be deterred by relatively inexpensive gadgets

c. We now find that the Soviets are strong and again hope that they will be good.

Dr. Speier emphasized that we must have economist education along with technological education. We are now faced with a permanent crisis and must abandon the idea that the best foreign policy is no foreign policy. We must also replace the policy of reacting in crisis with one of study and continuous perseverance.

Mr. Free

The basic problem is one of a credo on which the nation can operate. We should not distinguish between people on one hand and the top leadership on the other. The credo is not an intellectual matter, but rather one of feeling and values.

Our assets are:

a. We believe in progress

b. We believe in public service and public good. Traditionally this has been applied to the U.S. but can now be extended to foreign areas.

c. We believe in competition.

We have been intimidated in international affairs because of fear, and this has vitiated the best part of American ideals. In order to go ahead this fear must be relaxed and replaced by self-confidence

... 3 ...

Section Hho
Mr. Lindsay/1

in international dealings. He thinks that the American people are waiting for a call and challenge and need a sense of purpose and of concrete and positive programs. Since the war all of our major programs have been essentially negative, including even the Marshall Plan. He doesn't believe the Americans are built to operate along negative programs. Machlavellianism in politics is not our dish.

Mr. Cantril

We haven't set our goals high enough. We have been operating on too mechanical and technical level. Only by operating on a high ethical level can we be successful.

Dr. Strausz-Hupe

We must transcend ourselves and sublimate our individual personalities into a higher community.

Dr. Linebarger

The Soviets have many frustrations also. They lost the chance of 1,000 years for a military fuctory over the world by needlessly provoking American rearmament in Berlin, Korea and elsewhere.

Foreign policy as foreign policy is self-defeating. Rather, foreign policy must be increased within a broader national policy. He believes that the present frustrations may lead to new institutions and that a series of new institutions essentially competitive and overlapping are necessary to evolve new policies and programs.

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great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of York.\n\nThe Prince of Wales's great-great-grandchildren include his great-great-grandchildren, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of Kent, the Duke of Cambridge, the Duke of York, the Duke of

- 4 -

Section II-b

Mr. Lindsay/1

General Anderson

The young people of the United States are frustrated and are
ready to participate in broad programs of national service.

Mr. Lockwood

We should not forget that no other nation has met its world
responsibilities in the way the United States has.

Mr. Jamieson

We communicate a feeling of self-satisfaction abroad and
therefore have lost contact with foreign peoples.

Mr. Barnett

We are now engaged in total war, and if our limited government
institutions are to assume full responsibility the government will of
necessity become a total government and quite different than it is
today. If this is to be avoided, private institutions play a major part
in the conflict. We should establish a civilian counterpart with the
War College in order to give top leaders of private industry and other
private organizations the training and indoctrination they need.

Dr. Possony

Conviction is the necessary element to the sense of mission.
Dr. Possony has examined a list of USIA books selected for trans-
lation in foreign languages and has found that there are almost no
philosophic books on the nature of the American mission.

Mr. Keiffer

A major problem in top government is getting the right informa-
tion to the right man at the right time.

- 5 -

Section III-b
Mr. Lindley/1

Dr. Pettee

Although basic values are built into man, a sense of purpose commonly held by many is only found after an intellectual is supplied the leadership. In the 19th Century the need for intellectual leadership was rejected by the common man. We are now in need of basic philosophic re-interpretations of the American objective. Coupled with this is the need to modify top leadership to specific short-term action.

General Parker

We haven't done the things we should have done because we (including the President) didn't think they were either necessary or important enough.

Dr. Elliott

The need for a Presidential staff to adjudicate among conflicting departmental programs is paralleled by the need for outside groups, such as the Killian Committee, which can communicate new concepts and ideas to the President.

Dr. Johnson

The need of greater foreign understanding by Americans is paralleled by the need for greater understanding in America for peoples.

Dr. Cantril

The Communists deny the individuality and the self direction of men, and this may be our greatest strength.

Section IV
Mr. Ruecauseren/1

Role of Private Citizen and Private Organization

Mr. Webster made initially three observations:

1. We are trying to know more and to acquire understanding.

It is essential that at least an informed nucleus be formed.

2. We are also concerned that the decisions made must be right.

3. Moreover, the right decisions must be put into effect.

Then he made three suggestions:

1. We need a roster, which is up to date and non-partisan, of available skilled personnel willing to work for the government. The roster should include not only those available but the names of fertile minded peoples who can tap the available talent.

2. We need institutes or groups. Here the emphasis should not be on numbers but on quality. He expressed skepticism that a Rand type organization would be effective for foreign policy -- it would be subject to too much pressure and tend to rigidity if it were identified with the government.

If a Rand type organization could be kept wholly private, however -- with the flexibility which would then be possible -- this would be ideal.

3. It is also desirable to have small groups to think through problems, to communicate ideas, to locate personnel, etc.

Section IV
Mr. Ruebhausen/!

Mr. Lindsay then commented that there are two things we are after:

first: to think through problems

second: to see that actions are rightly motivated.

Organizations to be influential in this field should have certain characteristics:

1. They should never have a claim to a monopoly on the right answers.

2. They should have access to classified information.

3. They should be of reasonably certain duration: they should not be compelled to justify themselves in a single year or over a short term; and also they should be able to attract continuity of personnel.

Mr. Lindsay would advocate at least one or more quasi-governmental organizations of the stature to command in this foreign field the stature of Rand and O.R.O. It is conceivable that private foundation money would be available for the purpose.

At no time, he observed, has the NSC made a conscious allocation of priorities of expenditure for various aspects of the national program. When, for example, should the last billion dollars available to us be spent?

In answer to a question by Mr. Rockefeller, he indicated the studies made by such an organization should be available to the public. Mr. Millikan observed that while publication which touches on

The government of the United States has the duty of protecting its citizens in the performance of their civil and political rights.

In all cases the government has the duty of protecting its citizens in the performance of their civil and political rights.

[1c]

Section IV
Mr. Ruebhausen/1

sensitive areas is sometimes difficult, more difficult in publication privately of positions which may not be in accord with the official positions which were formed in part on the basis of the private work underlying the publication. Thus there should not be too close an identification of the private organization with the public agency which it serves.

Dr. Elliott questioned whether an external body could be successful in influencing judgment on the life and death decisions involved in the allocation of funds to particular programs or projects.

Granted the difficulties, the problem Mr. Lindsay said, was to develop some mechanism for meeting the need for a Rand type study.

Dr. Johnson favored an inside organization with access to confidential data, an organization which would acquire the trust of its "customer." To do this, however, the disposition of the research project must be left to the customer -- either to act upon it, destroy it, or publish it. In order to meet the public's need for informed analysis there is also a need for a similar but outside organization.

Mr. Millikan suggested multiplying this device and contracting with a number of organizations to generate ideas on foreign policy subjects. Advantages of multiplicity lie in diversity of approaches and results. Multiplicity also frees the contracting agency from any felt compulsion to follow the conclusions of the study -- a compulsion which would be strong if only one organization were functioning as a research arm.

["The following are some of the most interesting and original poems which have appeared during the year:\n\n1. \"The White Angel,\" by a lady in England, which was recently published in our own journal.\n2. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n3. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n4. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n5. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n6. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n7. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n8. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n9. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n10. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n11. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n12. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n13. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n14. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n15. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n16. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n17. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n18. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n19. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n20. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n21. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n22. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n23. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n24. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n25. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n26. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n27. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n28. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n29. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n30. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n31. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n32. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n33. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n34. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n35. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n36. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n37. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n38. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n39. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n40. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n41. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n42. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n43. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n44. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n45. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n46. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n47. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n48. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n49. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n50. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n51. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n52. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n53. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n54. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n55. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n56. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n57. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n58. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n59. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n60. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n61. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n62. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n63. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n64. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n65. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n66. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n67. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n68. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n69. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n70. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n71. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n72. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n73. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n74. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n75. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n76. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n77. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n78. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n79. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n80. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n81. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n82. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n83. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n84. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n85. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n86. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n87. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n88. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n89. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n90. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n91. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n92. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n93. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n94. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n95. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n96. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n97. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n98. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n99. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n100. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n101. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n102. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n103. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n104. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n105. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n106. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n107. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n108. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n109. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n110. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n111. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n112. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n113. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n114. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n115. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n116. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n117. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n118. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n119. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n120. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n121. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n122. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n123. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n124. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n125. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n126. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n127. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n128. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n129. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n130. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n131. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n132. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n133. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n134. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n135. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n136. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n137. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n138. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n139. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n140. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n141. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n142. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n143. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n144. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n145. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n146. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n147. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n148. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n149. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n150. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n151. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n152. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n153. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n154. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n155. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n156. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n157. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n158. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n159. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n160. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n161. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n162. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n163. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n164. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n165. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n166. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n167. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n168. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n169. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n170. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n171. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n172. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n173. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n174. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n175. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n176. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n177. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n178. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n179. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n180. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n181. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n182. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n183. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n184. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n185. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n186. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n187. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n188. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n189. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n190. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n191. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n192. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n193. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n194. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n195. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n196. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n197. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n198. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n199. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n200. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n201. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n202. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n203. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n204. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n205. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n206. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n207. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n208. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n209. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n210. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n211. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n212. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n213. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n214. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n215. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n216. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n217. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n218. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n219. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n220. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n221. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n222. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n223. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n224. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n225. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n226. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n227. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n228. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n229. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n230. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n231. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n232. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n233. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n234. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New York, which was recently published in our journal.\n235. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Boston, which was recently published in our journal.\n236. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Philadelphia, which was recently published in our journal.\n237. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in Washington, which was recently published in our journal.\n238. \"The Lovers,\" by a lady in New

- 4 -

Section IV
Mr. Ruethausen/II

Dr. Kissinger observed that the problem in government is not lack of facts. The files are bulging. The point of interest to him is the disparity between analysis and action. He added that when Soviet leadership comes into office they have more than 20 years of preparation and indoctrination. In our case when a new official takes a responsible office he must be briefed in the elementary facts of the area for which he is assuming responsibility.

Dr. Kissinger would add to the roster suggestion, a program that groups of key people be continually briefed through study groups in problems. This would apply to potential leaders as well as former officials so that there may be a continuous education process for an informed elite in foreign policy problems.

Dr. Possony observed that there are many aspects of the problem -- ranging from informing the public to briefing the top brass on the latest research analyses. No single organization can do all these things. There must be a variety of organizations -- some tied in with the government, some not.

Dr. Speier believed that a research organization for NSC wouldn't work from the outside. The need for it must be recognized first from the inside and set up by the NSC for service to it. As to the seminar, or briefing idea, he suggested that the "thin layer" of key figures who are showing forward progress in the foreign area be brought in as participants in such groups. Mr. Millikan added that it is particularly important to get in such groups not the present

Section IV
Mr. Ruebhausen/

5

"thin layer" but the people from whom the future public servants will be drawn.

One problem we face, thought Dr. Millikan, is that outsiders tend to low rate their own competence to form sound judgments in the foreign field because of their lack of access to current data. This lack can be cured by the seminar or briefing technique, particularly if the Secretary of State encouraged the formation and submission of views by such groups. In this connection, he endorsed the practice of attaching civilian advisory groups to all projects being undertaken by the government or by government contractors.

Attention was called by Dr. Strausz-Hupe to the advantage of a fresh outside point of view unfreighted by burdens of administration or too close an association with the facts. Also, outside groups can think through to conclusions will be readily available for use in the future when the occasion arises.

None of this reaches the middle-elite of this country, thought Dr. Possany.

Mr. Cantril inquired as to the possibilities of "test tube" studies in certain areas. Demonstrations might be conducted in certain areas that would cost relatively little but have a very constructive impact.

The dilemma, said Dr. Pettee, is this: can an organization be effective without access to secret data, and can it publish its results if it has such access.

- 6 -

Section IV

Mr. Ruebhausen,

There is also a need to select from the welter of published material some of the good things, give them a push, widen publication and circulation. This involves a research job of evaluation of material and, in effect, awarding a prize to the best of them.

How do you get fundamental studies to the people who need to know about them? This is the crucial problem. Some magazines have attempted to do this through popularization. The bridge between the classified and the unclassified world can possibly be built by insisting that such portions of classified reports as can be published, be published in abridged form.

-1-

II - Report

(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

IX. SPECIAL PROBLEM OF NATO

Preserving Western Europe from Communist control is the primary
U. S. security objective -- superior to all other security objectives
except the defense of our homeland against destruction. In order to
appreciate the importance of this objective we need only to contemplate
(and it does not require much imagination) our situation if Western Europe
were in hostile hands or even lay weak, divided, and helpless against
a potential Communist aggression. The conversion of this not very
difficult flight of imagination into a dollar and cents estimate of the
incidental increase in the U. S. security budget should have a very
sobering impact on those who view with alarm any current security costs
incident to alliances.

Among our military arrangements none is so important as the
NATO alliance, and the effective staff structure and supporting military
forces which give it expression. Nor is any geographical region of such
strategic significance as that embraced by the North Atlantic Treaty.
It contains 300 million of the world's most highly trained and educated
people, operating a well-developed and diversified industrial economy
exceeded in magnitude only by the industrial complexes of the U. S. and
U.S.S.R. And its geographical boundaries are essentially coterminus
with western civilization, whose preservation and extension is our

- 2 -

II - Report

(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

fundamental purpose.

Western democratic ideals may or may not come to predominate
in other parts of the world; but if they do, this will be wholly attri-
butable to the strength, unity and vitality of those nations in which the
roots of these values are deepest. If, on the contrary, these nations
decay and their traditions wither, western civilization is not likely to
flourish elsewhere. We are concerned here chiefly with the military
aspects of NATO, and more particularly with what we perceive to be
present problems and weaknesses. But our analysis should be read in
a broader perspective, for we regard NATO as a basic element of United
States security.

The Weaknesses of NATO

The factors and elements which make the area encompassed by
NATO, and hence NATO, an essential element of U. S. security also
inevitably create difficulties and complications. Along with the newly
awakening peoples and newly developing states of the Afro-Asian complex,
our older Western civilization is also subject to the stresses and strains
of the revolutionary changes going on in the world.

The change of international climate since the first Geneva
Conference has tended to dissolve the sense of urgency upon which
NATO was founded and to revive a number of rivalries and irritations
between NATO members. The dispute over Cyprus was allowed to burst

- 3 -

II - Report
(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

into the open without serious regard by Britain, Greece or Turkey for
the consequences to NATO. France has withdrawn most of her fourteen
European divisions to Algeria and resents the lack of political support
she has received from her NATO allies for her effort to pacify that part
of "metropolitan France". The failure of the Anglo-French adventure in
Suez, including the condemnation of this action by the United States,
has not strengthened NATO ties.

The recent British White Paper on Defense which basically
reflects Britain's severe economic limitations but which was surely
hastened by the debacle at Suez announced sharp reductions of British
forces in Germany, the replacement of the home fighter defense command,
with a guided missile system, the end of conscription by 1960 and a re-
duction by 1962 from a total British armed forces of 690,000 to 375,000.

In central Europe, the Germans are offered the choice of unifica-
tion on Soviet terms or continued membership in NATO and no unification.
If they should leave NATO, our present strategy would have to be funda-
mentally revised and all allied forces withdrawn from Germany.

The Soviet development of air-atomic capability has created
progressive contradictions between the organization of NATO forces
and the strategy to which SACE UR -- is committed. The U.S. has
about five infantry divisions in Germany and the British have about four,

-4-

II - Report
(Sixth Draft - DC)

June 25, 1957

but SACEUR has proclaimed a nuclear strategy of defense which implicitly rules out either local defense or the effective use of non-atomic forces. Nevertheless, the United States continues to press the Germans and the lesser members to contribute non-atomic ground forces, and NATO maintains a supply line across Europe wholly incompatible with nuclear warfare.

European peoples and their leaders are becoming more and more restive and worried about the use of atomic weapons because of an increasing awareness of damages and casualties certain to result from even the use of tactical weapons, and they fear that the U.S. is becoming less willing to commit SAC in case overt aggression trips the "trip wire" because of increasing power of the U.S.S.R. to bring nuclear catastrophe directly to the U.S.

- 5 -

June 25, 1957

(Page left blank to develop the causes and results of
neutralism in NATO members)

(And any other relevant NATO problems --? Fifth Draft
material on IX 8, 9, 10 re changing Weapons Systems?
I didn't see it was necessary. There's been so much
earlier in Report on this...)

- 7 -

II - Report
(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

tell the Soviet Union to mind its own business.

As to the Soviet estimate of the future of NATO, these indications from the Kremlin bear witness that the Soviet Union at least considers that NATO, in shifting to greater reliance on European nuclear and missile capability, is not becoming in their estimate a "dead pigeon."

It is even on the hopeful side that some people prophesy a loosening of NATO bonds in the somewhat distant future when European countries possess nuclear weapons and missiles due to a stronger European will and capacity to resist communist pressure. Coupled with the other developing factors in Europe such as economic unity, this may lead the sum total of relationships around and across the North Atlantic toward a close cooperation of technically separate sovereign powers like the Canadian-U.S. relationship.

## NATO Strategy

The fundamental strategy of NATO has been defined as being made up principally of two components. There is 1) a "shield" or "trip wire" or "plate glass window" of forces in Western Europe to deter, if necessary to handle, local dis-

- 6 -

II_ Report
(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

For all of these reasons the future viability of NATO
cannot be taken for granted. But it is an alliance we must
most affirmatively support.

The Strengths of NATO

Therefore the US must evaluate NATO's future in the
light of the confidence and strengths it can give its member
countries plus the attempt the communist world is making to
weaken and destroy NATO.

We have recently had positive indications of the strength
of will and determination of members of NATO to stand up against
Kremlin atom rattling which would have been unthinkable without
NATO. This has been the high water mark on the psychological
side in NATO and it is significant that it occurs at a time shortly
after we have had the greatest spate of doom-ridden prophecies
about NATO. Within recent months, Turkey, Norway, West
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Britain, Greece, Iceland
and Finland have had definite threats from the Kremlin of
Soviet retaliation for their participation in NATO.

These warnings have had no effect. Even the smallest
and weakest nations of Europe, knowing they are, in this matter,
an integral part of the NATO unified whole, have been able to

- 9 -

II - Report
(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

From the beginning the United States has exercised almost complete control over NATO strategy. This was tolerable so long as the Europeans felt they were making a meaningful contribution through the development of ground forces that would provide Europe's "shield" against the Red Army, and so long as full confidence was felt in our strategic air power both as a deterrent and as the "sword" with which to strike at Russia if war should come. But since the decision taken by the NATO Council in December, 1954, to defend in Europe with tactical atomic weapons, the difficulties have grown. Only the United States has possessed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but United States law does not allow these instruments to be put in the hands of allies. Therefore, as planning for the use of atomic weapons has gone forward, the Europeans have been progressively deprived of the chance to make a meaningful contribution while they have progressively become aware of the damage and casualties likely to result from the use of several hundred tactical atomic bombs in Europe.

## Towards Strengthening NATO

Europe needs to be strengthened militarily. For a great

- 10 -

June 25, 1957

many reasons related broadly to United States economic and political interests and the development of self-confidence and responsibility in Europe, it would be very desirable if this strengthening were achieved in substantial part through a greater European contribution to NATO. We face the fact, however, that Europe cannot be prodded into developing large numbers of conventional forces when the U.S. and Britain are moving sharply away from reliance on such forces and toward a concentration on air-atomic power; for in light of these developments and of the proclaimed nuclear strategy for defense of the NATO area, the continued maintenance of standard infantry forces and propeller-driven aircraft must seem to the Europeans an exercise in futility.

To the U.S., the central problem is to provide, within Europe and controlled by Europeans a military capability that will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U.S. strategic airpower. We think this is necessary both to restore the declining power position of Europe vis-a-vis the USSR and to bolster the European sense of hope and of participation, which are basic ingredients of the will to resist.

- 11 -

June 25, 1957

We believe the answer is to place the Europeans themselves in a position to exercise more influence over the means and scale of their own defense by providing through SACEUR, beginning now and extending progressively over the next few years, a variety of tactical atomic weapons including intermediate-range missiles, and the necessary training in their use.

This could have the effect, in our judgment, of creating a kind of atomic stand-off as between Europe and the USSR, similar to the broader strategic stand-off now existing between the United States and the USSR. It would have the effect of reducing the disparity in effective power as between Russia and Europe and thus of reducing the existing dangers from atomic blackmail.

It is important that we understand the inevitable time lag between a national policy decision on this matter and the development of operational nuclear forces manned by Europeans. At a conservative estimate, full resolution of the legislation, financial and technical problems, and delivery of "atomic capable" weapons in operational numbers, will take about five or six years. The small numbers of

- 12 -

June 25, 1957

intermediate-missile units promised to the British at the
recent Bermuda Conference, for example, are slated for
delivery sometime in 1959, but this schedule is subject
to all the uncertainties of missile development, as the
IRBM is still in the experimental stage, and to detailed
negotiations concerning division of costs and operational
control. It will therefore be most optimistic to believe that
the European NATO countries as a whole could be equipped
with significant numbers of "atomic capable" weapons,
and particularly of guided missiles, before 1963-65. In
the meantime, NATO's defensive strength must continue
to depend decisively on the deterrent power of SAC and on
the presence in Europe of substantial U.S. military forces.

The risks which the United States would incur by
moving toward an atomic sharing with its NATO partners
would have to be weighed against the risks of standing
still. There is a possibility that the offer would not be
accepted, but this seems remote since for most European
powers the situation will increasingly appear to present a
choice between abject defenselessness and possession of
atomic weapons. In the short term, such a re-distribution

- 13 -

II - Report
(Sixth Draft-E)

- 14 -

II - Report
(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

we must admit that the European hope to escape total destruction in the event of war appears, at least superficially, to conflict with the foregoing proposal that our NATO partners should be equipped with atomic weapons. We believe, however, that a careful look at the problem will show these views to be reconcilable.

**First**, it is evident that Europe cannot be defended against serious attack with recourse to nuclear weapons. This would seem to be true whether the Soviets employed massed conventional forces or atomic bombs. Therefore, if a serious defense is to be made, nuclear weapons must be used and the inevitable consequence will be extreme destruction. **Second**, nuclear weapons placed in the hands of the Europeans themselves offer the prospect of significantly reducing NATO dependence on U.S. strategic air power and thus of reaffirming the NATO deterrent which has been weakened by the growth of the Soviet capacity to strike heavy blows against the United States. **Third**, this new power situation requires the United States to revise its strategy of "all-out" response to an attack on NATO, and to recognize that it is in the interest of the United States to limit and localize any conflict that might get started in Europe. For similar reasons, the

- 15 -

II - Report

(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

Soviets will also be interested in avoiding general war as a result of conflict in Europe, unless they deliberately provoke it. Therefore in addition to urging the U.S. promptly create a maximum deterrent to war by providing the Europeans with nuclear capability, our Panel has another broad recommendation.

While making clear to all concerned, including the Soviets, that the defense of NATO is based firmly on the abundant use of atomic weapons against large-scale attack, the U.S. must work with the Europeans to develop a system of "graduated responses" and be willing and prepared if driven to it, to join our allies in limited war in Europe.

Such a system would definitely require respectable non-atomic ground forces and support units in Berlin and other forward areas to discourage or deal firmly with minor border incursions and any other local disturbances fomented by the Soviets or their satellites. Such forces would either be maintained with the full awareness that they could not be effectively employed in the event of large-scale conflict, or if technically feasible, they would be trained and equipped to fight both atomic and non-atomic war.

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II - Report
(Sixth Draft-DC)

June 25, 1957

We believe that in such a system of graduated responses may be found the means of reconciling the desire for maximum deterrence and combat effectiveness with the desire for avoiding excessive destruction in Europe. If deterrence should fail and a deliberate attack be launched in force, neither Europe nor probably the United States and Russia would, of course, escape great destruction.

But the problem we are facing here is essentially political and psychological. Therefore we must now join with the Europeans in devising means of defense--however which offer an alternative strategy to automatic all-out counter-attack. To the extent we can achieve this, we can revitalize the NATO alliance by giving new hope and a sense of meaningful participation to our European partners.

And we should be able to approach this task with conviction, for it is equally in our interest to see that a conflict in Europe, particularly one that started by miscalculation, did not spread to world-wide hydrogen war.

3rd draft

12/4/57

# PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Problem of adjusting historic preconceptions to rapidly changing situation.

Preconceptions:

Peace as normal relation among states

Aggression as unambiguous - therefore proper strategy is one of "punishing" aggressor

War and peace as successive phases of policy

These notions were based on existence of

(a) Safety indicators

Precautionary policy - Essense is precisely to prevent threat from becoming unambiguous

(b) "Normalcy" of Peace reflected legitimate order

But we live in a revolutionary period - Ambivalence

United States torn between applying its attitude for peaceful relations or its remedy for aggression.

Have had difficulty in balancing capability vs. intention

Even when we recognize Soviet intransigence have difficulty in admitting it is inherent in Soviet system. Treat them as "unreasonable" or as "misunderstood legitimists" -

Also W. attitude vs. Hitler

But reliance on pure process of negotiation unrelated to other pressures highly unreal vs. USSR.

- Belief in superior understanding of "objective forces"

- 2 -

To us settlement is achieved thru (process of negotiation) to us.
Soviets, it is ratified by it. If forces are correctly calculated settlement
is always possible. If not good faith cannot act as substitute. Therefore
typical posture of belligerence to squeeze last possible gain from existing
relation of forces coupled with abstract protestations of goodwill.

Two modes of negotiation: Legitimate ---- Revolutionary

Negotiable -------- Programmatic

Maximum -------- Minimum

Substantive -------- Symbolic

Insufficient attention to symbolic content of foreign policy

Ban the bomb - Nuclear aggression

This attitude [towards negotiation and the role of force] also makes
difficult our relations with uncommitted despite their ~~public~~ pronouncements.

"Can defend ourselves only by exalting moral principles"

When we go to other extreme our approach to power is too absolute.

Developed abstract concept of war based on analogy of Pearl Harbor

Thus both horror and power of modern weapons tended to paralyze
action. The horror because it made seem most issues not worth contending
for, the power because it made most transformations seem irrelevant.

Deterrence ------ Strategy for fighting a war

Gap - which has enabled opponent to hamstring us by shifting onus
of countermoves to us.

- 3 -

Difficulty of bridging power and policy has brought about defensiveness.

Spending more time on analyzing nature of problem than on solving it.

Never in position to take advantage of opportunities

Other consequences of defensive stance - not all related to our posture nor avoidable.

(1) Out of tune with spirit of age

(2) Forces us to holding a 20 thousand mile perimeter while giving Soviets chance to be "parliamentary opposition."

(3) Technological revolution opens increasing spectrum of options

(4) Paradoxically - the more we convince Soviets of our sincerity & peaceful intentions, the tougher our problem becomes.

Most basic cause is within American society and as in all tragedies reflects our best qualities: A "fatal!" flaw. Humility. Absence of basic social schisms.

A kind of rationalistic empiricism

Relates policy to "truth" - therefore often gives impression that policy fails because correct memorandum has not yet been written.

At the same time tendency to wait till all facts are in.

Intellectual fastidiousness - Confuses mode of analysis with mode of action - Problem of certainty

Rejection of tragic aspect of policy-making: Incantation of complexity of problem - Rejection of irremediable areas.

Thus committee system is not only an organizational device but a psychological necessity. Only means of approaching certainty.

- 4 -

Always start from scratch.

## Results:

Policy achieved often only by nervous exhaustion.

Slow reaction time - No case ever quite fits plan

Rigidity - On other side of status quo is chaos

Creates in others impression of Manipulativeness and Cynicism

Administrators - concern with equilibrium

Lawyers - concern with individual case.

Role of scholars - Last and most difficult point

Have impression that have too much accepted ethos of other groups

Justify themselves not by own intrinsic qualities but by trying to live
up to qualities of environment.

Tendency encouraged by foundations.

Turn him into (1) Collector of facts

(2) Legitimator

(3) A lobbyist for given course of action

Judged not by effort but by utility

In this sense all research is applied research

Argument for role of scholar is not that by babying him ICBM's will

emerge but that by encouraging him may open vistas not yet even imagined.

Can show that some things are worth doing intrinsically

In a situation which is inherently borderline scholar can show attitude
of exploration and running risks in deeper sense.

## Problems of American Foreign Policy

### Preconceptions:

- Peace as normal relation among states

- Therefore inherent merit in process of negotiations

- "Peace will break out"

- Aggression as unambiguous - therefore proper strategy is one of "punishing" aggressor

- War and peace as successive phases of policy

Of course the notion of unambiguity in foreign policy decisions and peace as normal relations is itself an illusion produced by our history. Based on existence of

### (a) Safety indicators

- World War II - Danzig - World War I - Belgium

- Precautionary policy - Essence is precisely to prevent threat from becoming unambiguous

### (b) "Normalcy" of Peace reflected legitimate order

But we live in a revolutionary period characterized by twin revolutions: anti-colonial and Soviet.

When reality clashes with our expectation of it, ambivalence is inevitable consequence.

- 2 -

Have had difficulty in balancing capability vs. intention
Most difficult calculus.

Foreign policy as art of affecting will of
sovereign state.

Great Britain's thermonuclear capability.

USSR - Ambivalent - Tendency to interpret intentions most favorably a symptom of our desire to believe in stability.

Plethora of statements of basic change in Soviet policy
and society.

Been vulnerable to peaceful coexistence

Difficulty in admitting implacable hostility -
Even when we recognize Soviet intransigence have
difficulty in admitting it is inherent in Soviet system.

- Appeals to reasonableness unrelated to possibility of employing force seems either hypocrisy or stupidity

- Cutting thru protestations

Stalin: "sincere diplomat - dry water"

Stalin: "Annuity diplomat - dry water."

- Cutting firm pretension

force seems either hydrology or astrophysics

- Appeals to reasonableness unrelated to feasibility of employing

Highly unrelated vs. USSR

But reliance on pure process of negotiation unrelated to other processes

legitimates" - Vico W. attitude vs. Hitler

Treat them as "unreasonable" or as "misunderstood"

Even when we recognize Soviet intrusiveness have

Difficulty in admitting unfeasible hostility -

been vulnerable to excessive coexistence

and society.

Pioneers of statements of basic change in Soviet policy

favorably a symptom of out degree to believe in stability.

Great Britain's thronomolecular capability.

sovereign state.

Most difficult calculus.

- 5 -

-3-

To us settlement is achieved thru process of negotiation; to
Soviets it is ratified by it - If forces are correctly calculated settlement
is always possible. If not good faith cannot act as substitute. Therefore
typical posture of belligerence to squeeze last possible gain from existing
relation of forces coupled with abstract protestations of goodwill.

Two modes of negotiation: Legitimate - Revolutionary

Negotiable ---------- Programmatic

Maximum ---------- Minimum

Substantive ---------- Symbolic

Insufficient attention to symbolic content of foreign policy.

Our proposals are carefully prepared

But Soviets have captured categories of discourse

Compounded by approach to diplomacy that negotiations inherently
useful enables Soviets to shift negotiations to issues of maximum embarrassment
to us.

This attitude towards negotiation and the role of force also makes
difficult our relations with uncommitted despite their public pronouncements.

"Can defend ourselves only by exalting moral principles."

UN - Also substantive ---------- symbolic

Pearl Harbor surprise attack

-4-

Ever since 1945 postulate that war would start this way

Highly esoteric and even more unlikely

Thus every crisis that started otherwise raised arguments to
preserve our strength for "clearer" case.

Deterrence — Strategy for fighting a war

Attitude of letting events develop.

By the time we see opening too late to take advantage of it.

Other consequences of defensive stance - not allrelated to our posture
nor avoidable.

(1) Out of tune with spirit of age.

-5-

Most basic cause is within American society and as in all tragedies reflects our best qualities: A "fatal" flaw. Humility. Absence of basic social schisms.

Always start from scratch.

## Results:

Policy achieved often only by nervous exhaustion. Contributes to extraordinary formalism and abstractness of our policy views.

Need for exegesis

Therefore crisis forces renegotiation.

- 6 -

**Rigidity** - On other side of status quo is chaos

Therefore reflects state of mind of dominant groups

**Administrators** - concern with equilibrium

Goals as given.

**Minimum risk.** - Does not reject great conception

but classifies it as unsound, unsafe, etc.

**Lawyers** - concern with individual case.

Object to hypothetical case involved in long-range
planning.

**Role of scholars** - Last and most difficult point

Trouble is that intellectual is not alienated.

Turns him into (1) Collector of facts

(2) Legitimator

Argument for role of scholar is not that by babying him ICEM's will

emerge but that by encouraging him may open vistas not yet even/imagined.

["emerges but that by encountering him may open status not yet even/\\"}, "Admission for role of scholar is not that by paying him ICBM's will", "In this sense all research is applied research", "Judged not by effort but by utility", "(3) A lepidopter for given course of action", "(3) Regulator", "Turn him into (1) Collector of facts", "Tendency encouraged by foundations", "Trouble is that intellectual is not alienated", "to live up to qualities of environment", "Justify themselves not by own intrinsic qualities but by trying", "Have impression that have too much accepted errors of other cranks", "Role of scholars - Last and most difficult point", "bismarck", "Object to hypothetical case involved in long-range", "Lawyers - concern with individual case.", "but classifies it as unamused, unuseful, etc.", "Minimum risk. - Does not reflect great conception", "Goals as given.", "Administrators - concern with equilibrium", "Therefore reflects state of mind of dominant cranks", "Creates in others impression of manipulativeness and Cynicism", "Rightly - On other side of stage who is chosen", "- 6 -"]

- 7 -

Intellectual fastidiousness may be form of arrogance

Humility spiritual may be pride

Can show that certainty is more complicated

Cannot combine every course of action. Must pay for

maturity with innocence and perhaps even spontaneity

Cannot escape our power but can use it with Compassion.

Nation has no choice between playing role or not. Can
only achieve Self-Knowledge.

only achieve Self-Knowledge.

Cannot escape our power but can use it with compassion.

Maturity with innocence and perhaps even apportionment.

Cannot combine every cause of action. Must pay for

Humility, spiritual may be rude

Intellectual modestiousness may be form of modesty

- 3 -

(C6)

-1-

First draft [1]
12/3/57

Will speak mostly about difficulties

Not because there have been no achievements but because we must measure our task not by our accomplishments but by magnitude of the challenge.

### Preconceptions:

- "Peace will break out"

- Industrial potential

- Margin of victory as determined by superior offensive effort

- Other Powers hold line while we mobilize resources

- Deterrence ---------- Strategy for fighting a war

Many of these preconceptions have been overthrown by recent developments

Based on existence of

(A) Safety indicators - Powers with lower boiling point and more

- 2 -

(a) Safety indicators - Powers with lower boiling point and
more sophisticated assessment of equilibrium

- World War II - Danzig

- World War I - Belgium

Precautionary policy - Essence is precisely to prevent threat from
becoming unambiguous.

(b) "Normalcy" of Peace reflected legitimate order, i.e.
order in which maintenance of system seemed more important
than any disputes within it.

But we live in a revolutionary period characterized by twin revolutions: anti-colonial and Soviet which, however different their presuppositions, agree on overthrowing status quo.

When reality clashes with our expectation of it ambivalence is
inevitable consequence.

United States torn between applying its attitude for peaceful
relations or its remedy for aggression. Has oscillated between conciliation
and intransigeance, between negotiating as if all problems were soluble
and could be resolved by process of negotiation independent of any
of the pressures brought to bear and insisting that negotiations were inherently
futile.

Most difficult calculus.

Liberian policy as part of affecting will of sovereign state.

Most difficult problem.

Have had difficulty in balancing capability vs. inflation

Title.

of the bretagne brought to bear and flatting that negotiations were insurmountable and could be resolved by process of negotiation independent of any and inadmissibility, between negotiating as if all problems were soluble relations or its remedy for aggression. Has capitulated between capitulation United States toward applying its attitude for peaceful invasible consequence.

When reality clashes with our expectation of it insurmountable it arises on overwhelming status due.

Anti-colonial and Soviet which, however different their brotherhoods, But we live in a revolutionary period characterized by twin revolutions than any disputes within it.

(b) "Morning" of peace reflected legitimate order, i.e. order in which maintenance of system seemed more important becoming unimportant.

Precautionary policy - Balance is precisely to prevent threat from - World War II - D meaning

more accommodated statement of equilibrium

(a) Safety indicators - Powers with lower polling point and

- 5 -

- 3 -

As if we could not negotiate with Soviets against background of recognized hostility

Difficulty in admitting implacable hostility - Even when we recognize Soviet intransigence have difficulty in admitting it is inherent in Soviet system. Treat them as "unreasonable" or as "misunderstood legitimists" - Also W. attitude vs. Hitler.

- Cutting thru protestations

Stalin: "Since our diplomat - dry water."

- Cutting through protestations

force seems either hypocritical or stupidly

- Whichever to reasonableness unrelated to possibility of employing

- Belief in superior understanding of "objective forces."

highly unrelax vs. USAR

Vice W. attitude vs. Hitler.

as "unreasonable" or as "inappropriate/legitimate" -
in admitting it is inherent in Soviet system. Treat them
when we recognize Soviet intuitionalism has difficulty

Difficulty in admitting un行政区 hostility - Even
background of recognized hostility

been vulnerable to peaceful coexistence

policy and society

Pioneers of statements of past change in Soviet

stability.

most favorably a symptom of our desire to believe in
USAR - Ambivalent - Tendency to interpret intentions

Great Britain's thermomagnetic capability.

- 3 -

(m)

- 4 -

To us settlement is achieved thru process of negotiation; to
Soviets it is ratified by it - If forces are correctly calculated settlement
is always possible. If not good faith cannot act as substitute. Therefore
typical posture of belligerence to squeeze last possible gain from existing
relation of forces coupled with abstract protestations of good will.

Two modes of negotiation: Legitimate - Revolutionary.

Maximum -------- Minimum

Substantive -------- Symbolic

Compounded by approach to diplomacy that negotiations interently
useful enables Soviets to shift negotiations to issues of maximum
embarassment to us. - Ban the bomb. - Nuclear aggression.

Nature of their historical experience

Domestic Problem

Insecurity heightened by being made responsible for our actions.

Balance of Power - the closer we approach the more we may push them awar.

Conversely Soviets have often profited from posture of intransigence. "Can defend ourselves only by exalting moral principles."

UN - Also substantive ----- symbolic

There is one UN attitude given decisive U.S. leadership (Korea).

Then going along with us is only way to gain influence over our actions.

There is another if we make our action dependent on consensus of humanity.

Then may go too far in not negotiating, for example, Germany.

Policy of massive retaliation and all-out war.

View of strategy facilitates Soviet strategy of ambiguity. During
atomic monopoly could never bring our power on issue actually in
dispute. In fact began each dispute with assertion that this was
not conflict for which we had prepared.

- Developed abstract concept of war based on analogy of
  Pearl Harbor surprise attack

- Ever since 1945 postulate that war would start this way
  Highly esoteric and ever more unlikely

-7-

Need greater flexibility both in diplomacy and in strategy: Put maximum number of steps between doing nothing and doing everything between surrender and suicide.

Difficulty of bridging power and policy has brought about defensiveness. Attitude of letting events develop.

(1) Out of tune with spirit of age. Revolutionary is exactly opposed to status quo. Forces us to support many regimes which have no future.

(3) Technological revolution opens increasing spectrum of options - forces us to cover ever wider series of bets. - Gives Soviets constant lead-time in whatever they choose to emphasize. True not only in military field but among fields.

(4) Paradoxically - the more we convince Soviets of our sincerity & peaceful intentions the tougher our problem becomes.

behave in such a way that the enemy becomes
helpful to the enemy.

(4)logically - the idea we convince ourselves of our actuality &
true not only in military field but among friends.

constant lead-time in whatever they choose to emphasize.
forces us to cover over wider series of facts. -ves Sovets

(3) Technological revolution opens increasing spectrum of options -
divingsovets chance to do "parliamentary opposition".

(2) Forces us to hold a 50 thousand mile horizon while
which have no future.
opposed to existing quo. Forces us to support many regimes

(1) Out of time with spirit of age. Revolution is exactly
not avoidable.

Other consequences of defensive stance - not all related to our benefits
By the time we see opening too late to take advantage of it.

advantage of opportunities

Never in position do we allow ourselves to be taken
spending more time on analyzing nature of problem than on solving it.

Attitude of fighting events develop.

Difficulty of finding power and policy has brought about defensiveness.

surrender and suicide.
number of steps between doing nothing and doing everything between
need greater flexibility both in diplomacy and in strategy: but maximum

- 3 -

- 8 -

Most basic cause is within American society and as in all tragedies reflects our best qualities: A "Fatal" flaw. Humility. Absence of basic social schisms.

Intellectual fastidiousness - confuses mode of analysis with mode of action - Problem of certainty

Rejection of tragic aspect of policy-making: Incantation of complexity of problem. - Rejection of irremediable areas.

Thus committee system is not only an organizational device but a psychological necessity. - Only means of approaching certainty.

Always start from scratch.

## Results:

Policy achieved often only by nervous exhaustion - Contributes to extraordinary formalism and abstractness of our policy views.

Need for exegesis

- 9 -

Goals as given.

**Lawyers** - concern with individual case. Tendency to lack
feeling for nuance and relationship.

**Role of scholars** - Last and most difficult point.

Turns him into (1) collector of facts

(2) Legitimator

In this sense all research is applied research.

Argument for role of scholar is not that by him ICBM's will
emerge but that by encouraging him may open vistas not yet even

- 10 -

Humility, spiritual pride.

Cannot combine every *essential* course of action. Must pay for
maturity with innocence and perhaps even spontaneity

Nation has no choice between playing role or not. Can only
Achieve Self-Knowledge.