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openly debate whether or not we should commit our military in Indo-
China, we most likely would have decided against it.

If there were a free flow of information and debate on the money
and police and advisory support we have given to various dictatorships,
such as Brazil and South Vietnam, I am confident the American people
would strongly oppose American tax money going to support the imprisonment
and torture that those regimes are able to carry on with our help.

Neither Henry Kissinger nor Richard Nixon suffers from the results
of their secretive foreign policy. The people who suffer are those
who are kept outside of the decision-making process--the people of this
country, who have their income stripped from them in excess taxes--
who weep over their sons whose lives and limbs have been lost.

We know enough about Dr. Kissinger to know that he is capable
of deceiving the Congress and the public. We know enough about him to
know that he has little regard for the basic liberties of even his own
staff.

We know enough to realize that confirmation means a continuation
of a "daddy knows best" attitude, where the Congress and the people
will both continue to be excluded from this vital part of our own
government.

If we are capable of learning anything, we should learn from our
mistakes.

Senator George D. Aiken
United States Senate

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

September 21, 1973

Senator George D. Aiken today called upon the Congress to accept Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's offer for conducting a bipartisan foreign policy.

"I, for one, accept his invitation on the assumption that it is the President's invitation, too, and I urge my colleagues to do likewise."

Senator Aiken, the Ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, also stated he hopes the confirmation of Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State will mean an end to the policy of "President Kings".

The Vermont said he hoped there would be more cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches on foreign policy problems and Dr. Kissinger will bring to an end the feeling that "foreign policy was too an important matter to be shared by anybody else, even the State Department, much less the Congress".

"It is not what a politician hides, but what he discloses that determines the health of American politics."

"Only newborn babies have nothing to hide. Smart politicians know that the more they disclose, the more they can hope to stay in office."

"The more they disclose about their methods, the more their motives will be taken for granted, even by those in opposition."

"This is what has been missing during recent years. This is what can be restored if Dr. Kissinger's appointment is fruitful, and is imitated in other parts of the Government," Senator Aiken said.

Wisconsin

SENATOR GAYLORD NELSON

(202) 225-5323

FOR RELEASE: Friday, September 21, 1973

73-185

WASHINGTON, D.C., Sept. 21--Sen. Gaylord Nelson (D-Wis.) voted
against the nomination of Henry Kissinger for Secretary of State today.

Nelson said that Kissinger had the ability to be Secretary of State.
However, the Senator said he was not convinced that Kissinger was sufficiently
sensitive "to fundamental constitutional liberties..."

"I cannot support anyone for high and influential political office
who does not have a strong conviction and a clearly delineated position on the
issue of government surveillance of American citizens. Government intrusion
upon privacy by wire tap, bugs, and personal surveillance threatens the survival
of the whole concept of personal privacy, which goes to the very heart of
freedom itself," Nelson said.

Nelson is the author of a bill to create a Joint Congressional Committee
on Individual Rights, which annually would call in officials of the CIA, the FBI,
all military surveillance units, and of any other government agency that conducts
information operations to report on their activities, and to see that legal and
constitutional safeguards are maintained.

THE FULL TEXT OF SEN. NELSON'S STATEMENT IS ATTACHED.

####

I213jm

Wisconsin

SENATOR GAYLORD NELSON

(202) 225-5323

STATEMENT ON THE NOMINATION OF HENRY KISSINGER TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. President. Henry Kissinger is a man of unique intelligence and talents. There can be no question that he possesses the requisite ability to direct the foreign affairs of this nation as Secretary of State.

I am not convinced, however, that Dr. Kissinger has shown sufficient sensitivity to the fundamental constitutional liberties which are the hallmarks of our democratic system. I cannot support anyone for high and influential political office who does not have a strong conviction and a clearly delineated position on the issue of government surveillance of American citizens. Government intrusion upon privacy by wire tap, bugs, and personal surveillance threatens the survival of the whole concept of personal privacy, which goes to the very heart of freedom itself.

The record is clear that approximately 13 members of Dr. Kissinger's National Security Council staff had their telephones wiretapped in 1969. Those wiretaps were installed without any court authorization. There was no showing to any impartial tribunal that any of those staff members had committed or were about to commit a crime. There was no showing to any impartial tribunal that any of those staff members were in fact leaking sensitive information which could undermine our national security interests.

Dr. Kissinger knew about those wiretaps before they were installed. It was he who provided the FBI with the names of the individual staff who had access to certain information. Dr. Kissinger understood that the named individuals would probably have their telephones wiretapped by the FBI. Nonetheless, Dr. Kissinger did not voice any objection or raise any question about the propriety of such wiretaps.

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Add One - Kissinger Statement

At his confirmation hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, Dr. Kissinger was asked several questions about his role in instituting wiretaps on members of his NSC staff and about his present view of such wiretaps. At no point in the hearing record is there any evidence of Dr. Kissinger's disapproval of the wiretaps which were installed in 1969 on the telephones of his staff members. At no point in the hearing record is there any evidence that Dr. Kissinger would disapprove of such wiretaps in the future.

In an exchange with the Senator from Maine, Mr. Muskie, Dr. Kissinger did state that, in deciding whether to install wiretaps, a balance must be struck between human liberty and national security, and that "...the weight should be on the side of human liberty." But implicit in Dr. Kissinger's statement is a clear willingness to condone again wiretaps installed without court authorization. Indeed, Dr. Kissinger declared flatly that he would not object to such wiretaps if they were approved by the Attorney General.

I am disturbed by Dr. Kissinger's failure to state unequivocally that he opposes, as a matter of principle, wiretaps installed without court authorization.

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution states quite simply that:

> The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the persons or things to be seized.

The amendment's provisions apply to all unreasonable searches and seizures. There is no exception for national security cases. Before any search or seizure can be made by the Government, a warrant based on probable cause must be issued. In my view, this applies to all cases. The Fourth Amendment does not waive the requirement of a warrant based on probable cause for national security cases.

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Add 2 Kissinger Statement

One need not be a lawyer to understand the basic purpose of the Fourth
Amendment. It is designed to protect an individual's privacy against invasions
by the Government. Nor must one be a lawyer to understand that this right of
privacy is fundamental to our concept of democratic self-government.

In his dissent in the 1928 case of Olmstead against the United States, Justice Louis Brandeis made clear the significance of the citizen's Fourth Amendment rights:

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone --the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Justice Brandeis' view found expression most recently in the case of United States versus United States District Court, decided by the Supreme Court last year. In that case, the Court held that the Government may not install wiretaps in domestic security cases without court authorization. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice *W*illiam Powell stated:

> Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the executive branch. The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of the Government as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute. . . .The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasion of privacy and protected speech.

The Court expressly declined to decide whether court authorizations are
likewise required in all cases concerning national security. Nonetheless, the
same considerations which underlie the Court's decision in the domestic security
case suggest strongly that court authorizations are also required in national
security cases.

I discussed the issue of unlawful Government surveillance in a speech on the Senate floor on February 23, 1967. I pointed out then that Government surveillance activities unreviewed by either the Congress or the courts jeopardized the individual freedoms which are the cornerstone of our democratic system.

On April 15, 1971, I introduced "The Constitutional Rights and Civil Liberties Protection Act of 1971," a bill to remedy the shameful abuses of Government wiretapping and other surveillance activities.

Most recently, I introduced a bill to establish a Joint Committee on
Individual Rights, a bipartisan congressional committee which would provide the
critically necessary oversight of Government surveillance activities.

The issue of unsupervised Government surveillance is one of fundamental
importance to this nation's well-being. Accordingly, I intend to keep raising
the issue on the Senate floor until the Congress passes legislation to control this
dangerous monster.

MORE

[c]

Add 3 Kissinger Statement

Today the Senate is asked to vote on the nomination of a man for the high
position of Secretary of State. He is a man of unimpeachable talents; but he is,
unfortunately, a man who has failed to demonstrate the requisite sensitivity to
fundamental constitutional liberties.

It is no answer to state that Dr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, would
have no responsibility or authority to install wiretaps and that, therefore, his views
on wiretapping are of no consequence. In a government of laws, all those who
participate in public affairs must appreciate and adhere to the limitations under
which the Government operates. All must share a responsibility to insure that
those limitations are not violated. A decision to acquiesce in silence to a shame-
ful and dangerous policy because it falls within someone else's jurisdiction is a
decision to condone that policy.

This is not an academic debate or a mere question of philosophy. If
Dr. Kissinger had not furnished the FBI with names in 1969, or if he had raised
some objection to the installation of wiretaps without court authorization, the
matter might have been handled with greater concern for human liberty. The same
is true of the future.

Every citizen shares the responsibility to defend freedom and individual
rights no matter what his station in life, and that burden is all the heavier for
those in positions of power and influence.

In conclusion it should be noted that the Congress itself has shamefully
defaulted in its own responsibility by its failure to bring these dangerous
activities under careful and regular Congressional oversight.

#####

1213GN

NEWS

from the office of

Sen. Ernest F. Hollings

D-S.C.

TEXT OF STATEMENT BY SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS (D-S.C.) DELIVERED
ON THE SENATE FLOOR, SEPTEMBER 21, 1973

MR. PRESIDENT, on the occasion of this debate over
the confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger to be Secretary of
State, I would like briefly to state my views.

I am voting to confirm Dr. Kissinger's appointment.
I do so with misgivings -- persistent misgivings about his demon-
strated propensity to mislead Congress, and the Nation, on vital
foreign policy issues -- and equally persistent misgivings about
the wisdom of several Kissinger-inspired initiatives.

The most blatant misleading of the Congress goes back
to the invasion (or "incursion" as the Administration would have
it) of Cambodia in 1970. At the time, I believed that strong
military action to wipe out COSVN headquarters across the border
from South Vietnam was long overdue. But I also believed that
such military action should in no way constitute a commitment
to the government of Cambodia. We had already made too many com-
mitments in Southeast Asia -- commitments that two Presidents
-- one a Democrat, the other a Republican -- were unwilling to
see through to their logical conclusion. It should have been
plain to anyone with eyes to see that another commitment in South-
east Asia would only make it more difficult for the United States.
Any commitment to the leaders of the Cambodian regime would only
drag us headlong into another Vietnam.

At the time, Dr. Kissinger and every other Administration
spokesman assured us that no such commitment was contemplated
or implied, and that the purpose of this surgical incursion was
simply to shorten the war. The months passed and each one saw
us further and further bogged down in. Cambodia. And by 1972,
we were being told by Dr. Kissinger that we must keep our commit-
ment to Cambodia. The result, of course, is that we were forced
to keep fighting over Cambodia even after the bombings stopped
in Vietnam, because the Administration -- with Dr. Kissinger as
the principal architect of its policy -- had given a commitment
to the leaders of the Lon Nol Regime.

It was bad policy. And it was policy made in the same
secrecy and seclusion which has characterized this Administration
every step of the way. Congress was mislead, the people were
ignored, and we reaped the result of this subversion of the demo-
cratic process.

Within the past year, Congress has also been mislead
on the matter of post-war aid to North Vietnam. In the presence
of some 43 Senators at a rare briefing session, Dr. Kissinger
assured us time and time again that the Administration had given
no commitment to the North Vietnamese that any aid would be forth-
coming. Yet when the terms of the agreement were made public,
it became clear that Article 21 implicitly commits the United
States to participate in the post-war process of rebuilding North
Vietnam. Once more, the policy was wrong on its merits. Any
aid channeled into North Vietnam will only be used to build up
the military and the economy and allow the North to continue its
aggressions against the South. We can no longer afford to aid
our friends. How anyone could contemplate aiding our enemies
is beyond me!

And not only was the policy wrong on its merits, but
again it was lacking in candor. Again the strategy was to deceive
rather than to inform. This time, however, the people and their
representatives uncovered the facts and now the chances of any
American dollars being wasted in North Vietnam are about nil.
Had it been up to the Administration, we would probably be engaged

[L.C]

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in a gigantic Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Southeast Asia by now. We can be thankful that common sense prevailed.

Even more important to America's long-term prospects is our diplomacy vis a vis the Soviet Union. I am one person who has never seen much worth in this new policy of consorting and cavorting with the communist leaders of Soviet Russia. Whenever we get involved in negotiating with the Russians, we somehow manage to come out on the short end.

As I speak today, Americans all across the land are feeling the backlash of the wheat deal. The Administration has always prided itself on its business acumen, but yet when they got with a few communist traders, they lost everything but their trousers. As a result, the American housewife is being bled white to buy a loaf of bread, while the Soviets turn around and resell our wheat to Italy. A person can buy a loaf of bread in Rome more cheaply than in Columbia, South Carolina.

Perhaps the most ominous policy in terms of our future security was the disastrous SALT Agreement on Offensive Weaponry signed last year. When that matter came before this body for a vote, I was one of only two Senators to vote against it. Today, the papers are filled with journalists, analysis, and repentent politicians all pointing out how bad the agreement was, and how we must do much better in any future arms agreements. What SALT did was to confirm Soviet missile superiority. Any further agreements along that line and we can forget about keeping America second-to-none in its national defense.

Mr. President, I think by now it is generally conceded that Administration policy with regard to the popular struggle which gave birth to Bangladesh was completely counter-productive. Yet Dr. Kissinger and the President believed firmly in tilting toward Pakistan. By so tilting, they drove India further into the waiting arms of the Soviet Union, and further diminished American influence on the subcontinent. Now we are told that the Administration tilt was necessary in order to break the ice with communist China. For my part, Mr. President, I say let's not worry about breaking the ice if we are only going to drown as a result. For my part, I do not see the wisdom of cozying up to the Chinese if we are going to use our broadened contacts to repeat such follies as the wheat deal or the SALT agreement.

In his confirmation hearings, Dr. Kissinger assured us that a new day is dawning, and that future policy initiatives will not be taken in the dark of night or behind closed doors. I hope this is true. We have a long way to go to restore the mechanism given us by our forefathers for the making and implementation of American foreign policy.

It has always been my belief that unless a nominee for office is obviously unfit -- by reason of intelligence or character -- that the President should have relatively a free hand in selecting the members of his own team. President Nixon is entitled to the same treatment as his predecessors. He was given an overwhelming victory last November at the polls. And now he must be given the chance to translate that victory into action. That is why I am today voting to confirm Dr. Kissinger's appointment. It is my sincere hope that events of recent months have made us all more cognizant of the need for cooperation and communication in all the councils of government. I believe that message has been made clear to Dr. Kissinger, and I believe that he possesses the intelligence to see that accommodations are going to be necessary in the future.

##

SENATOR HARRY F. BYRD, JR.

VIRGINIA

For Immediate Release

September 21, 1973

SPEECH CONCERNING VOTE ON CONFIRMATION OF DR. KISSINGER

I intend to cast my vote in favor of confirmation of Dr. Henry Kissinger to be Secretary of State.

Before casting this vote, however, I wish to make clear that I am not enthusiastic about all of the developments in foreign policy in which Dr. Kissinger has had a hand during the present administration.

It is my feeling that in the current excitement about the so-called "detente" with Communist China and the Soviet Union, a number of dangers may be lurking.

At the outset, let me say that I favor President Nixon's visits to Peking and Moscow. Open lines of communication and a continuing dialogue between the great powers of the world are healthy.

But let us not deceive ourselves.

Let us not suppose that all has become amity between the Communist powers and the United States.

In the field of arms limitation we must be wary of the illusion that because of a few meetings and agreements we can afford to make major reductions in the defenses of the United States.

I was deeply concerned about the terms of the temporary agreement on limitation of offensive nuclear weapons when it was sent to the Senate. This agreement gave numerical superiority in strategic offensive missiles to the Russians.

I gave my support to that agreement only on the basis of two conditions: first, the testimony of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that this accord, because it is temporary, would not compromise the security of the United States; and second, the adoption of the Jackson Amendment -- which I cosponsored -- assuring that the United States would demand equality in future agreements.

On that basis, I voted in favor of the offensive weapons agreement.

But unless future agreements provide for the equality demanded in the Jackson Amendment, I do not think that I can give them my support. The United States must not be the second strongest nation in the world.

It is not alone in the field of arms that I feel there has been some disposition on the part of American negotiators

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[LC]

to give too much away. I think the same tendency showed
itself in the 1972 sale of grain to the Soviet Union.

Under the terms of that sale, we sent to Russia vast
quantities of wheat at a price substantially below the
world price. The American taxpayer was hit with the bill
for a $300 million subsidy. And to top it all, we extended
long-term credit to the Soviet Union to finance the pur-
chase.

That is not the way to do business with other nations.

It is most certainly not the way to do business with
the Russians.

If we are to have a genuine detente -- if we are to
have a relaxation of tensions based on true international
security -- then we are going to have to do some hard-nosed
bargaining.

In casting my vote in favor of the confirmation of
Dr. Kissinger today, I call upon him and his associates in
the field of foreign policy -- who will determine our nego-
tiating position -- to keep our guard up, and put the long-
range interests of this country ahead of any desire to achieve
dramatic agreements.

True peace can come only from strength and hard bar-
gaining.

###

August 27, 1973

The Honorable George Aiken
United States Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear George:

I am writing this up in Newfane just prior to
taking off for a month in Australia.

I assume that you have a good view of Henry
Kissinger, and this is just to add my own. As I told
Fulbright, I think he did about as good a job as anyone
could given the context in unwinding the mistakes of my
political co-religionists. And I was enormously impressed,
particularly during my trip to China last year, with how
well they regard him as an emissary seeking to dissolve
the cold war tensions. I think he has earned the job, and
I am glad to see him in it.

I don't remember a greener or more perfect late
summer than this. I weep in sympathy for the amount of
your life you have had to spend away from here.

All the best.

JKG:arb

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

September 5, 1973

Honorable Stuart Symington
Acting Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During my appearance before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee on August 9, 1973, you asked that I provide further data
on SEA operations under the Committee's review. I indicated
that we would, of course, comply and do our best to have it back
to you today.

Our Task Force has been at work on this difficult and complex job
throughout the Congressional recess including Labor Day weekend,
but we have not yet completed the task. Additional items remain
to be addressed before I would be prepared to provide you with a
responsive document. The Task Force continues its work daily,
and I will personally review this White Paper upon my return
from the annual Defense Security Consultative meeting in Seoul,
Korea. Or, if the paper is ready prior to my return September
19, I will have it dispatched to me so that I can review it enroute
and provide it to you at the earliest possible date.

I regret that we have not yet completed a satisfactory paper. How-
ever, I think the most important criteria is that it be as responsive
as we can make it to the Committee's several requests. You may
be assured that I appreciate the consideration you and the Committee
have given to me and to the Department of Defense throughout these
hearings.

[Lc]

# INTRODUCTION

On August 9, 1973, Senator Symington asked that the Department of Defense undertake a review of statistics sent to the Congress and also of the circumstances that lay behind the submission of those statistics. He asked for a "simple, concise account" which specified what orders were given; the special security communications channels used; the actions of the military commands; and the reports filed -- especially in those cases in which errors ultimately occurred in reports to Congress.

This report responds to Senator Symington's request for such a "simple and concise" account. In further compliance with the Congressional request, this report is limited to Southeast Asia operations in which special reporting procedures had an impact on the data that were provided to the Congress. A separate report is being submitted containing a corrected update of the unclassified statistics provided in June, 1973.

The review has established that all operations discussed in this report were authorized by civilian authority. It should also be noted that operations for which special security and reporting procedures were established and utilized constituted a small portion of the overall spectrum of Southeast Asia military operations. This paper, therefore, deals with the exceptions in these operations -- not the rule.

The Department of Defense has recognized the interest of the Congress in the submission of this report at the earliest feasible date. However, there are still some unknowns. They are limited in the context of the widespread, well-publicized, and thoroughly documented main thrust of the Southeast Asia conflict. Understandably, too, not all events at the operating levels can be described in exactly corresponding detail. Those uncertainties are identified in this report, and the Department will continue its review in an attempt to resolve the unknowns and uncertainties if at all possible.

There are differences between some of the statistics in this report and those contained in the May, 1973 submission of *classified* statistics. The May submission did not identify the helicopter gunship sorties shown in the attached reports on SALEM HOUSE and

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# AIR MISSIONS OVERVIEW

This section will review the following air operations:

**MENU:** B-52 operations in Cambodia, March 17, 1969 to May 26, 1970. Missions were carried out based on intelligence of substantial North Vietnamese (NVN) and Viet Cong (VC) buildups in Cambodian sanctuary areas at the time of both impending and actual American troop withdrawals under President Nixon's plan which brought home the more than one-half million Americans fighting in Vietnam.

**GOOD LOOK:** B-52 operations in the Plaine Des Jarres (PDJ) region of Laos from February 17, 1970, to April 20, 1972. Those missions were authorized in response to the request of the Royal Laotian Government.

**PATIO:** Fighter-bomber (TACAIR) operations in Cambodia augmenting MENU operations during April-May 1970.

**FREEDOM DEAL:** Fighter-bomber TACAIR operations in Cambodia from May, 1970 to August, 1973.

Several general statements apply to all air operations conducted during this period. First, throughout the period of U.S. Southeast Asia involvement, the accounting and reporting methods for air operations were steadily improved. The JCS automated data base that was developed made information available to large numbers of people, with varying information requirements and for which varying information aggregations were needed and appropriate.

Secondly, in order to assure optimum effectiveness in command and control and to minimize the opportunity for error, a number of communications channels and means were authorized and used. The choice of the communicating channel was determined by the requirements for security, for transmission speed, for detailed content, etc. The availability of multiple communications channels, and the coincident use of both highly secure and routine channels for transmission of data of differing sensitivities but relating to the same operation was not unique to these operations; nor for that matter, was it unique to this war. Materials were routinely handled in the channel most appropriate to the required degree of security. High-security channels -- referred to as special security or "back"

- 3 -

channels -- were reserved for highly-classified messages and ex-
tremely sensitive background information passed among top-level
commanders.

Finally, while the amount of collected data -- statistics and records --
on U.S. combat activities in Southeast Asia are more extensive than
during any other war, there are still gaps in our ability to retrieve
some information. It is felt, however, that the data available, as
presented, allow for reasonable and responsible assessment of the
various operations for which the Congress has requested this review.

A basic characteristic of these air operations was that they were con-
ducted in and over countries whose political leaders were either un-
willing or unable to acknowledge publicly such activity. At the time,
these same political leaders had either requested the operations or
had knowledge of and acquiesced in them. The Cambodian bombing
during Prince Sihanouk's regime, as well as the subsequent U.S. /
ARVN ground operations into Cambodia were directed toward denying
the enemy sanctuaries, protecting American lives and providing a
tactical environment which would permit the safe withdrawal of U.S.
combat forces under President Nixon's withdrawal plan.

-4-

[c]

MENU OPERATIONS

GENERAL:

On March 18, 1969, B-52s were used for the first time against Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army elements located in Cambodian sanctuaries adjacent to the South Vietnamese border. The name MENU was given this operation, and it continued through May 26, 1970. The purpose of MENU was to protect American lives during the preparation for and actual withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Southeast Asia by pre-empting imminent enemy offensive actions from the Cambodian sanctuaries into South Vietnam and against U.S. servicemen and women.

Due to the unusual and sensitive diplomatic situation between the Cambodian government and the governments of the United States and South Vietnam, information on MENU was held very closely. Knowledge of the operation was limited to those personnel essential to its successful administration and execution. The special security or "back" channel communication system for insuring optimum security in highly sensitive matters was used for TOP SECRET sensitive aspects of MENU. Less highly classified channels were used to handle the routine mission requests and authorizations. The approval/ execution procedures for MENU are discussed on pages 8 - 10. Special security procedures are discussed on pages 15-18.

The following is a summary of MENU methodology adopted and utilized by field units and in the military chain of command:

A B-52 strike on a target in South Vietnam would be requested through normal communication and command channels.

Through the special security communication and command channel, a strike on the MENU (Cambodian) target nearest a requested target in South Vietnam would be requested.

Upon approval, the mission would be flown in such a way that the MENU aircraft on its final run would pass over or near the target in South Vietnam and release its bombs on the enemy in the MENU sanctuary target area.

On return of the aircraft to its base, routine reports on the

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mission would be filed in normal communication channels which
did not reveal the MENU aspect of the mission.

Separate reports were provided by "back" channel on the
MENU aspect.

All MENU sorties occurred at night and were directed by ground
control radar sites. These radar sites were used to direct aircraft
throughout the Southeast Asia conflict, and their operation permitted
extremely accurate strikes against the enemy. The name for this
ground-directed bombing operation was COMBAT SKYSPOT. In
MENU operations, the radar site crews received instructions that
resulted in the aircraft releasing their bombs on the MENU targets
rather than on the targets in South Vietnam. Details of radar pro-
cedures are discussed on pages 10-11.

In their pre-take off mission preparation, all the B-52 crews were
briefed on the South Vietnamese targets. Only the pilots and navi-
gators of the aircraft to be directed to MENU targets were briefed
to react to all directions for bomb release from the ground control
radar sites. This special guidance to MENU pilots and navigators
was necessary since the entire crew was briefed routinely, as they
normally had been throughout the war, to make every effort not to
bomb in Cambodia. The pilots and navigators, while not controlling
the exact release point of their bombs, had indications from on-board
radar and navigation instruments of their position. Other crew
members had no indication that their aircraft was directed on other
than the target in South Vietnam which had been covered in their
routine briefing since the MENU target was in close proximity to and
in alignment with the routine target. Details of MENU aircrew
procedures are discussed on pages 11-12.

MENU mission reports were carried in both the routine and special
security communications channels depending on their degree of
security sensitivity. Reports on the sensitive aspects, which were
sent through the special security channel, were available only to
those in the command and control chain who had a "need-to-know".
Reports based on the routine requests and containing routine data
were forwarded via routine channels, so that for administrative and
logistical purposes, MENU sortie information blended into other
less highly classified information in the data base. MENU sorties

- 6 -

[10]

thus properly were included in overall Southeast Asia statistical
totals but not identified with Cambodia in any but the special security
channels. When the routine data base was subsequently utilized in
providing Congress a country-by-country breakout of sorties --
first in classified and then in unclassified form -- the MENU sorties
were reflected in South Vietnam as they were routinely carried in
that data base, rather than in Cambodia as they were carried in
the closely held MENU records.

This error was subsequently discovered, corrected and apologized
for.

The Department's review of MENU operations gave particular
attention to the procedures directed for providing inputs to the formal
reporting system that accounted for the operational and logistic
aspects of this operation. The review established that under the
procedures directed no one was required to make any input to this
formal reporting system that the individual knew, or should have
known, to be incorrect. The procedures permitted only correct
formal reporting. There was careful selection of individuals who,
in addition to TOP SECRET clearance, had a need-to-know about
MENU. Everyone in the reporting chain received and reported that
information for which he had a need-to-know. Those who had no need-
to-know about MENU could not perceive a difference between MENU
and any other sorties. Any reports they submitted were within the
normal reporting procedures.

With regard to the originally erroneous statistics inadvertently fur-
nished to the Congress, and through the Congress to the public, the
high-security classification and closely-held character of the informa-
tion resulted in the error. Steps have been taken to assure that in
the future the automated data systems themselves, and attendant
procedures, will be so structured that any need for special-security
policy decisions will be brought to the attention of proper civilian
leaders for their decision as well as policy matters such as declas-
sification. It must be stressed again that despite the inadvertent,
erroneous report to Congress all appropriate civilian and military
decision makers had accurate and complete command and control
data throughout MENU.

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APPROVAL/EXECUTION:

To understand the approval, execution and special reporting pro-
cedures used during MENU, normal B-52 reporting procedures
must be understood. For normal missions in South Vietnam, The
Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV)
originated a "strike request" for targets against which missions would
be flown for the next 24-hour period. This request -- which was dis-
patched to Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), Commander in
Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), the operating units, and the
JCS -- showed time-over-target, target coordinates, weight of effort
recommended, and a mission identifier (usually a letter and three
numbers). While this message was termed a "strike request", COMUS-
MACV and CINCSAC had standing authority to conduct B-52 missions
in South Vietnam. COMUSMACV did however routinely transmit each
"strike request" to CINCPAC, CINCSAC and JCS to provide them the
opportunity to review -- and to disapprove should that be necessary
for some overriding reason -- any mission.

Subsequently, a "frag order" was issued by the operating headquarters, which originally was Third Air Division and subsequently was Eighth Air Force. This "frag order" was basically a mission-profile order which narratively described how the mission was to be conducted. It noted ground control check-in points, target size, altitude and bombing tactics. The "strike request" and the "frag order" were the only two documents necessary for the conduct of the missions which contained target coordinates. In the absence of a disapproval, CINCSAC issued an execution order by mission identifier and "frag order" number. This order authorized the planned strike and established the take-off time.

In the event a mission was to be directed to another target, a
"strike request amendment" was issued which imposed such changes
from the original "frag order" as might be required.

After weapons release, the aircrew would initiate the post-strike
reporting procedure with a radio call to the command post in Guam,
giving time over target and mission success codes (type of release,
malfunctions, weather, etc.). The Guam command post then
initiated an operational report (OPREP-4) of the mission to SAC
Headquarters. The OPREP-4s showed only mission identifier,
number and type of aircraft, time-over-target, and the guidance

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system utilized. SAC retransmitted the OPREP-4s to the Organiza-
tion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS). The OPREP-4s and the
"strike request" constituted the principal input for the JCS data base.

MENU procedures were designed to parallel and complement the
routine B-52 procedures. If, for example, COMUSMACV was
authorized a level of 60 B-52 sorties a day, he would, through the
routine procedure, identify routine targets for all 60 of these sorties.
Through the special communication channel he also would transmit
a special request, classified TOP SECRET, to strike MENU targets
in Cambodia.

Requests for MENU strikes came to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff from COMUSMACV after review and validation by CINCPAC.
Each request included current intelligence confirming that no
Cambodians were known to be located in the enemy target area.
After appraisal of the request by the OJCS, a brief memorandum
was sent to the Secretary of Defense requesting him to obtain auth-
ority to conduct the MENU strikes. Only after additional appropriate
civilian authority was obtained did the Secretary of Defense authorize
the OJCS to dispatch an execute message. When transmitted, this
execute order went through the special security channels.

COMUSMACV then had in hand two authorizations: The routine
message approving targets for all 60 sorties; and the second mes-
sage approving the MENU sorties that would be diverted from South
Vietnamese targets. After MENU strike approval authority had been
obtained, a time-over-target was assigned for each MENU target
from one of the previously designated times contained in the routine
MACV "strike request". Thus, by using time-over-target and
mission identifier, the limited number of personnel who had a need-
to-know about the MENU missions could correlate the routine opera-
tional data with the MENU missions, and correctly identify the number
of sorties flown and ordnance expended in the MENU operation.

The routine sorties were retained as alternate targets should the
Cambodian targets subsequently be disapproved or should COMUSMACV
make a later determination that the routine targets in South Vietnam
were of higher value than the MENU targets in Cambodia. Meanwhile,
the execute order for normal missions was issued by CINCSAC. The
MENU aircraft were then directed away from the routine to the MENU

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targets by implementation at the radar site of directions in the close-
hold MENU message which was provided to each applicable radar
site (see Radar Procedures, below). Thus, from a military stand-
point, the MENU procedures were identical to normal, routine
procedures except that the orders diverting the mission to Cambodia
never entered the routine OJCS data base.

RADAR PROCEDURES:

As noted earlier, B-52 sorties were directed and controlled over
their targets by COMBAT SKYSPOT radar. These all-weather
bombing-control ground radar facilities (MSQs) were manned by SAC
personnel and contained SAC equipment; but the sites were under the
operational control of the U.S. Seventh Air Force (TACAIR) head-
quartered at Tan Son Nhut Airbase, South Vietnam. These radars
controlled all MENU missions. For routine missions, the COMBAT
SKYSPOT site received the South Vietnam target information by nor-
mal message channels. The radar-site crew then prepared the
required plotting charts, computations, worksheets, computer input
tapes, forms, and other data necessary to conduct each mission.

Included was preparation of 1st Combat Evaluation Group Form 15, a
form used by the ground radar sites to carry post-release data such
as time-over-target, track, airspeed, altitude and ground speed of
the aircraft at release.

Prior to a MENU operation, a representative from the Strategic Air
Command Advanced Echelon (SACADVON) at MACV Headquarters in
Saigon went to the radar site with the MENU target information. A
new set of computations and forms was then prepared at the radar site
using the MENU target information. After a MENU strike, the MENU
post-release data were entered on the Form 15 which had been pre-
pared earlier based on the routine Vietnamese target coordinates.

The highly-classified MENU target information, including computations,
worksheets and the plotting board trace sheet showing the aircraft's
final track to the target, was then destroyed in order to preserve the
security of the operation. The Form 15 showing the South Vietnamese
target and post-release data was forwarded to Saigon for maintenance
and quality control purposes and destroyed after 90 days. This was
normal procedure for all B-52 missions. The Form 15 was not a
command and control report. The only formal, official report re-
quired of and issued after a MENU mission by the ground-control

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radar site was "mission complete" relayed to SACADVON by
telephone.

The foregoing procedures to obtain necessary reports and to preserve
security were developed and authorized by MACV. Initially, for
security reasons, the SACADVON representative personally went to
the radar site to assure that personnel without need-to-know of MENU
were not involved. The SACADVON representative remained during
conduct of the MENU mission. He retained possession of the radar-
site's MENU working material and returned to his Saigon headquarters
where he destroyed it. Later, the procedure was modified so that a
SACADVON courier was flown to an airstrip near the radar site and
handed the MENU target coordinates to the radar site commander;
security destruction of the MENU working materials was accomplished
at the radar site.

In addition to the MSQ radar sites, MENU B-52 operations came under
the surveillance of Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radar sites whose
mission was to monitor all flights in their assigned zone to, among
other missions, assure that buffer airspace along the South Vietnam-
Cambodian border was not penetrated by unauthorized flights. Under
routine circumstances, the GCI sites would track and warn any air-
craft that appeared to be heading into either the buffer zone or Cambo-
dian airspace. These sites then would report any possible violations
of Cambodian airspace. Pursuant to instructions from Seventh Air
Force (issued by a personal representative's visit to the GCI site),
officers on duty at those sites took no action to warn or to report the
MENU missions since they had been informed that these were
authorized missions.

AIR CREW PROCEDURES:

Authorization for B-52 missions in South Vietnam routinely pro-
ceeded as described in pages 8-10. CINCSAC received authorization
from OJCS and in turn ordered the missions to be flown in the regular
manner. CINCSAC issued implementing instructions to the Commander,
Third Air Division -- later to Eighth Air Force -- who passed the
orders to the B-52 operational units. Missions would be assigned to
flight units in the normal manner, appropriate preparations made and
crew briefings carried out. These were routine procedures for B-52
ARC LIGHT strikes in South Vietnam and Laos.

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For MENU missions, sorties were ordered, prepared and briefed according to routine procedures and were based on information relating to the targets in South Vietnam. This procedure was adequate, since the geographical locations of the MENU targets were proximate to the South Vietnam targets, and since the heading for final bomb runs on the MENU targets took the crews close to the South Vietnam targets. The only variance from the routine required for the MENU mission would be to slightly extend the release point of the bombload as directed by the MSQ site as the plane flew on its final heading, and in some cases a minor correction to the heading itself. Accordingly, for MENU missions, SAC representatives briefed the pilots and navigators that they would receive corrections in heading and bomb release instructions from the radar sites and that they should follow those instructions.

Only the pilots and navigators were in a position to know they were in fact striking targets in Cambodia. And, because of the special MENU orders to GCI radar sites to disregard penetration of Cambodian airspace by MENU missions, the regular warning these crews might have expected upon a penetration of Cambodia were not received.

These procedures were virtually identical to those used for normal B-52 ARC LIGHT operations. The only significant variation was in the designation of personnel with a need-to-know about MENU. Each command level recommended to its superior the numbers and duties of personnel who had a MENU need-to-know. Normally this access was limited to unit commanders, unit vice commanders, limited numbers of operations and intelligence staff personnel, and the aircraft commander and navigator on B-52s directly involved.

## REPORTING:

This section discusses the various reports submitted for all B-52 operations. These reports, in conjunction with the strike request and mission frag orders, were structured to provide planning data, logistic data and information on operations conducted. The types of reports discussed are reports of B-52 tactical operations, OPREP-4; crew debriefing reports; and reports by supporting radar facilities.

After weapons release, the aircrew initiated the post-strike reporting system with a radio call directly to the command post in Guam,

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giving time-over-target and mission success codes (type of release, malfunctions, weather, fuel reserves, etc.). Based on this information -- and after correlating it with pre-mission data -- the Guam command post initiated an operational report (OPREP-4) of the mission to SAC Headquarters. The OPREP-4s show only mission identifier, number and type of aircraft, time-over-target, and the guidance system utilized. SAC retransmitted the OPREP-4s to MACV and to the OJCS. The OPREP-4 and the "strike request" provided the basic input to the automated data base.

The use made of this data base is important to clear understanding of MENU reporting. The data base was designed primarily for administrative and logistics uses rather than for operational or intelligence purposes. This information had to reflect the total number of B-52 sorties flown and the munitions expended in order to meet the requirements of DoD logisticians. To assure continuing adequate support of B-52 operations, logisticians needed to know the number of hours and missions each aircraft was being flown, which influenced the amount of fuel and munitions required; the number of spare parts to procure; the number of personnel needed and similar support necessary. In addition, there was a need for administrative purposes to identify and report the operational employment of the B-52 aircraft. However, most of those who normally followed this information had a need-to-know only about the extent of the effort and not the location specifics that distinguished MENU. Whether these missions took place in South Vietnam or several miles inside Cambodia was neither material nor relevant to their requirements. However, if the information on MENU sorties had been totally deleted from the data base reports, not only would the necessary administrative and logistics actions based on these data have been hindered, but the personnel dealing with the data would quickly have perceived that some operations were being conducted but not entered in the OJCS routine data base.

Accurate data on MENU operations were maintained at MACV, Headquarters SAC, and the OJCS. These data were based on the mission identifier and target coordinates in the basic MENU authorization message as missions were confirmed by the routine OPREP-4 reports.

SAC procedures required an intelligence debriefing of all aircrews after combat missions. The form used by the intelligence officer

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was keyed to the mission identifier; target coordinates -- unless the crews indicated a change (under MENU operations the actual target coordinates were not passed to the aircrews by the MSQ site) -- were listed only as associated with the original mission identifier. Debriefing of MENU crews proceeded routinely with crews reporting malfunctions, bomb damage assessment, weather and other operational data. The intelligence report forwarded for a MENU mission was indistinguishable, in the view of the intelligence officer, from other such mission reports. The debriefers did not have a need-to-know about MENU; and all submitted debriefing material that was, to the best of their knowledge, complete and accurate.

No formal report was required from MSQ radar site personnel. Only a telephone call to SACADVON indicated mission completion. No formal written report was required. See page 10 for additional discussion of MSQ procedures.

The GCI radar sites in South Vietnam were tasked to report unauthorized airspace penetrations by U.S. or other friendly aircraft. Personnel at these sites were aware that MENU flights were authorized and for that reason, no reports of violations were required or submitted. See page 11 for additional discussion of GCI procedures.

## STATISTICS:

During the MENU operation, six enemy base sanctuary areas along the South Vietnam/Cambodian border were struck. These base areas were named: BREAKFAST, DINNER, DESSERT, SNACK, SUPPER and LUNCH.

As the combat action developed during the ground operations in Cambodia in early May and June 1970, the requirement for special security procedures was lifted. The last MENU strike to use special procedures in South Vietnam was on May 26, 1970. The sorties and total tonnage of munitions dropped from March 18, 1969 to May 26, 1970, during MENU were as follows:

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<table><thead><tr><th>Base Area</th><th>Sorties</th><th>Tons</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>350 (DESSERT)</td><td>706</td><td>20,157</td></tr><tr><td>351 (SNACK)</td><td>885</td><td>25,336</td></tr><tr><td>352 (DINNER)</td><td>817</td><td>23,391</td></tr><tr><td>353 (BREAKFAST)</td><td>228</td><td>6,529</td></tr><tr><td>609 (LUNCH)</td><td>992</td><td>26,630</td></tr><tr><td>704 (SUPPER)</td><td>247</td><td>6,780</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>TOTALS</td><td>3,875</td><td>108,823</td></tr></tfoot></table>

## SPECIAL SECURITY PROCEDURES:

This section discusses the actions necessary to provide special security and identifies responsibility for the development of these procedures and the granting of authority for their use. This section is supplemented by and must be viewed together with the preceding sections on Approval/Execution Procedures, Radar Procedures, Air Crew Procedures, and Reporting Procedures.

The first major opportunity for compromise of the security necessary to permit MENU operations was through the normal unclassified reporting of B-52 operations. On days when there were MENU missions, the number of MENU sorties may have constituted as much as 60 percent of the B-52 missions. This was a sufficiently large portion of the total that failure to indicate a level of operation consistent with the total missions would have almost certainly led to speculation that unreported operations were being conducted. For this reason, the procedures supporting MENU operations included the selection of cover targets in South Vietnam which would indicate a level of activity consistent with the clearly observable number of B-52 missions launched. This selection of cover targets provided

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the same type of security cover historically characteristic of military operations of particular sensitivity.

The necessity to minimize the likelihood of public speculation or disclosure was established within the NSC. Procedures were designed to assure security and at the same time to provide public information that would be as complete as was consistent with security. NSC guidance issued for the first MENU mission -- which remained representative of the guidance for all MENU missions -- directed that the MACV daily press release report missions on "Enemy activity, base camps and bunker and tunnel complexes 45 kilometers northeast of Tay Ninh city". U.S. B-52s did on that date so strike, and MACV's press release so reported. On subsequent missions specific cover targets were drawn from those already nominated by MACV in their routine B-52 "strike request" message. MACV issued its subsequent press statements as directed, listing generalized cover-target locations but not specifying their exact relationship to the South Vietnam-Cambodian border. Normally the generalized cover-target locations noted were actually struck, typically in the priority MACV had assigned them in their South Vietnam requests. In every instance the generalized press guidance would deal with an approved and executed South Vietnam strike taken from the MACV request or would reflect a general geographic locale without specifying that the target -- listed as so many kilometers from a reference point in South Vietnam -- was, in fact, in Cambodia.

Consistent with the objective of providing information as complete as possible within security requirements, guidance also was provided on responses to possible specific inquiries about Cambodian operations. MACV was instructed that if faced with specific inquiries, they should neither confirm nor deny attacks in Cambodia but state the situation would be investigated. The responsibility and authority for any other response to persistent inquiries was retained by the appropriate civilian authorities. There were no persistent inquiries so it was not necessary to implement any further guidance. The Department of Defense, thus, never publicly either confirmed or denied the conduct of MENU strikes.

Another major opportunity for compromise of security was the requirement that operational data be provided within DoD for daily

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use. This administrative requirement, treated on page 13, was
as matters evolved, not affected by the sensitive MENU aspects of
the missions. The routine reports were sufficient for adminis-
trative and logistical purposes and were considered in those cases
complete and accurate.

The responsibility for development of detailed MENU procedures
was delegated to the levels in DoD that normally controlled these
procedures. The OJCS was responsible for the data reporting system.
It was and is characteristic of the DoD automated data system that
the information contained in this system must be available to many
personnel whose security clearances are limited to SECRET and who
had no need-to-know about MENU. Because of this, and because
MENU was especially sensitive, it was not possible to include within
the automated data base the accurate target locations for MENU
strikes. For this reason, MENU strikes were not carried in the
data base as having occurred in Cambodia. They were simply identi-
fied by the target identifier carried in the original B-52 "strike
request" and "frag order" messages and, as a result, appeared in
the data base with the data for South Vietnam. MENU procedures
were designed so that no procedures in the reporting chain had to
be modified to comply with this limitation in the automated data
system. Other than the non-recording of the "strike request amend-
ment" (MENU authorization), all of the official reports which fed
into this automated data system were simply allowed to routinely
reflect the data normally carried.

Data peculiar to the MENU strikes were maintained manually in
MACV, SAC and in the OJCS and were available to those with a
need-to-know. They were not introduced into any automated data
base.

CINCSAC was responsible for development of crew reporting pro-
cedures consistent with MENU security and no changes were required
for MENU in normal SAC crew reporting procedures. Crew brief-
ing and notification procedures were proposed by the Commander
Third Air Division, and approved by CINCSAC and OJCS. See
Reporting, Pages 12-14.

The procedures for providing MENU data to the MSQ radar sites
were developed by MACV. Both CINCSAC and OJCS were informed
on these procedures.

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The Strategic Air Command Advanced Echelon (SACADVON) acted as the principal coordinator and technical planner for MENU operations. SACADVON was a liaison unit for CINCSAC located at MACV Headquarters to assist with the B-52 effort. This unit had no independent command authority and was in Saigon only to assist COMUSMACV and to expedite staffing between the two headquarters. SACADVON also had the responsibility for establishing direct contact with the MSQ radar sites and for receiving oral reports of mission completion from these sites. SACADVON also provided B-52 strike location information -- including geographically-generalized cover-target location information when necessary -- to the MACV Office of Information (MACOI). No one in MACOI had a need-to-know about MENU details.

As noted in the General section, the MENU procedures permitted only correct formal reporting. Everyone in the reporting chain received that information which he had a need-to-know and received it in accordance with routine procedures. Thus, those who did not have a need-to-know about MENU could not perceive a difference between MENU and normal operations. Those who had a need-to-know about MENU operations submitted and received reports that were consistent with their knowledge. Each of the operational reports submitted provided complete and accurate information to those who required it.

The Department understands that selected members of Congress were advised of the MENU strikes by various persons in the Executive Branch who were monitoring MENU. Previous testimony and transmittals to the Congress have included information that among those notified were Senators Russell, Stennis and Dirksen, and Representatives Rivers, Arends and Gerald Ford.

Some other members of Congress may have been advised, but the Department, itself, holds no specific record detailing this. The Department understands that the decisions on whom to advise in the Congress were made by the notifying Executive Branch individuals who apparently took into account the extremely sensitive diplomatic situation and the strict orders for security. The restricting of MENU information within the Legislative Branch was consistent with similar strict restrictions within the Executive Branch.

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GOOD LOOK

On February 17, 1970, B-52s were used for the first time to bomb military targets in the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) area at the request of the Royal Laotian Government (RLG). The name GOOD LOOK was used for these operations, and their immediate purpose was to counter the buildup of approximately 15,000 North Vietnamese personnel and their supplies north and east of the PDJ area and poised for an imminent effort to recapture this area.

The first B-52 mission came in response to a specific request to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos from Laotian Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma requesting B-52 sorties to help Laotian General Vang Pao's troops hold the PDJ by blunting the anticipated North Vietnamese offensive. The transmission of this request and of all later mission requests for B-52 bombing in the PDJ area were made through the U.S. Ambassador to Laos. The original requests were validated by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC and were then forwarded with supporting intelligence to CJCS. After appraisal by the Joint Staff, CJCS requested authority from appropriate civilian authorities to conduct the requested mission.

After January 1, 1972, COMUSMACV was given authority to approve B-52 missions in the PDJ area, subject to cancellation by the Secretary of Defense.

It was the nature of B-52 operations in Southeast Asia that they were routinely controlled by ground radars. Where this was not possible, the B-52 on-board radar systems were used to locate and strike targets. The PDJ area initially fell outside the capabilities of ground radar systems. For this reason, radar scope photography was needed of the PDJ area as a part of normal planning to have the ability to respond to any contingency. Such reconnaissance was understood and accepted by the RLG. Accordingly, a B-52 radar reconnaissance mission, GOOD LOOK ALPHA, was authorized and flown over the area in August, 1969.

After the enemy offensive in the PDJ area began in late January, 1970, a second radar reconnaissance mission, GOOD LOOK BRAVO, was flown. This mission was authorized in the hope that Hanoi would perceive the warning that B-52 operations were being considered in

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the PDJ, and would modify its operations in northern Laos. There was no apparent NVN diminution in combat operations, and follow-on B-52 sorties were directed under the name GOOD LOOK. A ground-directed radar bombing site was later located at Ubon, Thailand, to direct the GOOD LOOK missions.

Restrictions on disclosure of the U.S. strikes in the PDJ area were responsive to the Royal Laotian Government. All message traffic to Washington on GOOD LOOK was classified TOP SECRET and was processed through special security channels. Subordinate command elements were directed to handle this information on a close-hold, limited distribution basis. As a result, for each B-52 PDJ area target request submitted through special security channels, a corresponding routine request for a mission in southern Laos, South Vietnam, or Cambodia was originated through routine communication channels. Post-strike reports were not identified by location of target but rather by a mission identifier and a time-over-target which coincided with the routine mission. At the same time, actual target information was being furnished on a strict, need-to-know basis through special security channels. The need for extra security had been established by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos based on the expressed concern of the Laotian Government. Missions through April 26, 1972, continued to use the special target reporting system.

The sorties and total tonnage of munitions dropped from February 17, 1970 to April 17, 1973, in the Laotian PDJ area are provided in the following summary:

<table><thead><tr><td>Year</td><td>Sorties</td><td>Tonnage</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>* 1970</td><td>147</td><td>4,217</td></tr><tr><td>* 1971</td><td>270</td><td>6,513</td></tr><tr><td>* 1972</td><td>1,051</td><td>25,097</td></tr><tr><td>1973</td><td>1,050</td><td>22,547</td></tr></tbody></table>

* Sorties from February 17, 1970, to April 16, 1972, (1,076 sorties) used cover targets in the following areas: 896 in Southern Laos, 166 in South Vietnam and 14 in Cambodia.

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PATIO

In addition to the special MENU operations conducted by B-52s, complementary U. S. tactical air was employed in Cambodia for a brief period prior to the initiation of ground operations there by friendly forces on April 30, 1970. Targets for these tactical sorties were of a more transitory nature than MENU targets and were therefore more suited to tactical fighters than B-52s. The name PATIO was given these tactical air missions.

On April 18, 1970, COMUSMACV requested that special authority be granted for a 30-day period to employ tactical air against maneuvering enemy personnel and material located in a narrow area of northeastern Cambodia about eight miles wide and adjacent to the South Vietnamese border. COMUSMACV's request was based on increased sightings of enemy force movements in this area. Attack of these targets was deemed essential to prudent military conduct of the conflict in South Vietnam and especially to the protection of the lives of U. S. military personnel during the continuing U. S. redeployment program. On April 20, 1970, with the concurrence of appropriate civilian authorities, CJCS approved the requested authority. On April 25, 1970, the PATIO authority was extended to a uniform depth of 18 miles into Cambodia. The results of each day's operations were to be reported through special communications channels addressed only to those with an absolute need-to-know. The first PATIO strikes were on April 24, 1970.

Instructions, authorizations, and requests pertaining to all PATIO operations were handled on a close-hold basis. All message traffic, including strike reports and bomb damage assessment, relating to the PATIO operations was transmitted via special security channels and further restricted by instructions to deliver to designated addressees only. Thus, because of this high classification, the first 124 of the total of 156 PATIO sorties were inadvertently not included in the less-highly classified automated data base.

On May 11, 1970, a one-time expansion of the PATIO authority was granted by CJCS, with Secretary of Defense approval, authorizing the employment of tactical air against a lucrative enemy truck park and storage area in Cambodia near the Laotian border and along the XeKong river-- outside the then-standard 18 mile PATIO zone.

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COMUSMACV had advised that this special PATIO effort would be limited to a 12-hour period, with a planned weight of effort of 48 strike sorties. The Seventh Air Force specified that cover targets in Laos would be used for this special, one-time mission. The operation was conducted as planned on May 14, 1970, with 32 sorties expended under Forward Air Controller (FAC) control. The remaining 16 strike sorties were not required for adequate target coverage and were subsequently cancelled.

The assigned cover targets in Laos were used in the routine reports and were recorded in the automated data base. Special communication channel reports, however, gave the complete details on the targets struck and the bomb damage assessment to all those with a need-to-know. The automated data base has been updated to correctly reflect all of the 156 PATIO sorties with their correct target locations.

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FREEDOM DEAL

The name for U.S. TACAIR operations in Cambodia beginning on June 30, 1970 was FREEDOM DEAL. The term FREEDOM DEAL designated an area generally east of the Mekong River in north-eastern Cambodia within which the U.S. would conduct air interdiction operations in addition to the ongoing air support for U.S. ground forces inside South Vietnam and near the South Vietnam-Cambodia border. These air interdiction operations, following the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Cambodia at the end of June, 1970, were requested by the Cambodian Government, processed through MACV channels, and authorized by appropriate U.S. civilian authority. By August 23, 1970, the original FREEDOM DEAL area had been expanded southward approximately 50 miles and westward approximately 50 miles. Both of these expansions were designed to allow attack of enemy military targets which threatened the remaining and redeploying U.S. forces in South Vietnam.

Normal operational reporting was made on all U.S. air operations under the FREEDOM DEAL authority. An exception pertained to special authority, requested from and granted by appropriate U.S. civilian authorities, to employ U.S. air power in interdicting enemy supply lines and caches on the supply trails and river routes being used by the enemy, particularly in situations which involved a serious threat to any major Cambodian positions. Instructions in the field relating to the reporting of such operations which occurred outside the designated FREEDOM DEAL areas stipulated, as they had for the PATIO operations conducted earlier, that special security communications channels would be employed. The requirement to report these air strike data via special security communications channels presented difficulties for those field units not possessing the special communications equipment. This difficulty, coupled with the need to insure accurate statistical accounting of sorties flown, flying-hour utilization, and ordnance expenditures, apparently gave rise in the field to a system of attributed targets. As a result, authorized strikes conducted outside FREEDOM DEAL were reported in the data base as having been flown within the FREEDOM DEAL operating areas. Separate limited-distribution reports sent via the special security communications channels from field headquarters did, however, continue to reflect these special operations.

This dual reporting system used in the field was discovered in February, 1971, when duplicate data were received on an aircraft

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loss. The Seventh Air Force immediately directed the discontinuance of these attributed-target reporting procedures. Field reports indicated that of over 8,000 sorties flown in Cambodia between July, 1970, and February, 1971, approximately 44 percent or 3,634 sorties were flown outside the FREEDOM DEAL areas. The official data bases were reviewed at that time and updated as necessary to insure that correct sortie statistics were reflected. Inquiries to date have failed to disclose the source of the orders that effected the attribution of these sorties to the FREEDOM DEAL operating areas. It appears that the relevant directives were disposed of in the course of dissolution of MACV, establishment of the United States Support and Assistance Group (USSAG) and the displacement of the Seventh Air Force from Vietnam to Thailand in March of 1973.

On February 17, 1971, special reporting was discontinued and it was directed that all future reporting of these special air operations in Cambodia would be accomplished through normal reporting channels. Except for a brief two-week pause following the January, 1973, Vietnam ceasefire, U.S. air support in Cambodia continued at the request of the Cambodian Government, until the August 15, 1973, bombing halt. No further special air operations, such as MENU or PATIO, were conducted in Cambodia between February, 1971, and the August, 1973, bombing halt.

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GROUND MISSIONS OVERVIEW

This section will treat those ground operations in which errors in statistical reporting have been found during the DoD review.

In September 1965, the worsening situation in the Republic of Vietnam caused the U.S. to undertake limited ground reconnaissance actions in Laos. These operations, initially named SHINING BRASS, but subsequently known as PRAIRIE FIRE, involved small reconnaissance teams composed of indigenous civilians led by Vietnamese or U.S. special forces personnel assigned from the MACV Studies and Operations Group (MACSOG). The teams conducted on-the-ground reconnaissance missions in Laos to determine the nature and extent of enemy activities in the assigned areas of operations.

When the enemy later began moving major amounts of supplies through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville on the central coast of Cambodia and into the sanctuary areas along the South Vietnam border, a limited ground reconnaissance program (initially DANIEL BOONE, later SALEM HOUSE) was authorized in May, 1967, to gain information on these activities.

A total of 3,683 missions into Laos and Cambodia were conducted prior to the termination of U.S. participation in April, 1972. A total of 5,210 intelligence reports were filed.

These low-visibility, cross-border operations were carried as a separate budget line item since at least 1966. MACSOG operations were carried as "classified projects" in the Navy budget (NOP 345). The House Appropriations Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee were briefed on the nature of these activities, their functions, and costs, including casualties. Additionally, the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held extensive hearings on U.S. operations in Laos and Cambodia, including SOG operations. Detailed information was provided the Committee at that time.

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PRAIRIE FIRE

PRAIRIE FIRE was the name for MACSOG cross-border intelligence collection and interdiction operations into southern Laos against enemy bases and infiltration routes. The rationale for the operations into southern Laos was based on strong evidence in early 1965 that the Laos corridor was being used as an infiltration and resupply route in support of the communist effort in South Vietnam. During the period 1965-1972 the name assigned to cross-border operations into Laos changed from SHINING BRASS to PRAIRIE FIRE to PHU DUNG. For purposes of clarity these operations will be referred to as PRAIRIE FIRE in this report.

Missions included such intelligence and intelligence-associated activities as emplacing sensors; prisoner apprehension; and area, point and linear reconnaissance by small teams; and selected reconnaissance by larger units. South Vietnamese personnel performed PRAIRIE FIRE operations with U.S. Army Special Forces or Army of the Republic of Vietnam advisors/commanders and were supported with U.S. trooplift and gunship helicopters, and U.S. TACAIR. PRAIRIE FIRE teams were trained in air-control procedures and made considerable use of tactical air and helicopter gunship support in their operations in Laos.

The table below reflects the number of PRAIRIE FIRE cross-border operations, by type, from the inception on September 20, 1965, until deactivation of MACSOG on April 30, 1972.

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1965</th><th>1966</th><th>1967</th><th>1968</th><th>1969</th><th>1970</th><th>1971-Apr<br>1972</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Missions</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Reconnaissance<br>Team</td><td>7</td><td>105</td><td>187</td><td>271</td><td>404</td><td>422</td><td>183</td></tr><tr><td>Platoon</td><td>0</td><td>12</td><td>71</td><td>56</td><td>48</td><td>16</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Multi-Platoon</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>3</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>7</td><td>117</td><td>258</td><td>327</td><td>452</td><td>441</td><td>196</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>1965</th><th>1966</th><th>1967</th><th>1968</th><th>1969</th><th>1970</th><th>1971-April<br>1972</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Helicopter Gunship<br>Sorties</td><td>UNK</td><td>130</td><td>329</td><td>287</td><td>689</td><td>1116</td><td>993</td></tr><tr><td>TACAIR Sorties</td><td>155</td><td>405</td><td>1157</td><td>635</td><td>1016</td><td>1419</td><td>623</td></tr><tr><td>Enemy Prisoners</td><td>UNK</td><td>12</td><td>10</td><td>1</td><td>0</td><td>3</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>Intelligence<br>Report</td><td>21</td><td>371</td><td>774</td><td>410</td><td>748</td><td>553</td><td>175</td></tr></tbody></table>

The PRAIRIE FIRE historical records and operational reports do not indicate how many U.S. personnel accompanied each operation nor how many operations were U.S.-accompanied. U.S. personnel were authorized to accompany PRAIRIE FIRE cross-border operations from September 20, 1965, to February 8, 1971. It is believed that during this period virtually all of the 1,446 reconnaissance team, 203 platoon, and 3 multi-platoon operations conducted involved U.S. participation. The operational guidelines for the conduct of PRAIRIE FIRE missions provided that generally the organization of a U.S.-accompanied reconnaissance team would include three U.S. personnel. Larger units normally included 5-6 U.S. personnel with a platoon force and 20-22 U.S. personnel with a multi-platoon force.

No U.S. personnel participated in ground reconnaissance in Laos after February, 1971. U.S. air support of Vietnamese-led teams was authorized by appropriate U.S. civilian authorities until March, 1972. In recognition of the complete Vietnamization of the operations in Laos, the Vietnamese name PHU DUNG was given the operations on April 7, 1971.

PRAIRIE FIRE security guidance precluded advising next-of-kin of the actual location of casualties since this information would compromise the area of operation. Generally, the Services, in notifying next-of-kin, indicated the loss location as either "Southeast Asia", "classified", or "along the border". On May 9, 1973, the Secretary of Defense approved the release of the actual location of PRAIRIE FIRE casualties to the next-of-kin.

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In view of the special security precautions protecting these operations the PRAIRIE FIRE casualty data included in the OJCS data bank could not reflect actual locations. These casualties were grouped with the South Vietnam data. The data submitted to the Congress prior to July 25, 1973 also reflected South Vietnam. At that time the Congress was advised that there had been 76 U.S. personnel killed in action in Laos in conjunction with PRAIRIE FIRE.

A complete review of all appropriate personnel records to verify these casualty statistics has been made. Efforts to verify data are continuing, principally through interviews with those who might have personal knowledge of the locations where casualties occurred.

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SALEM HOUSE

SALEM HOUSE was the name for MACSOG cross-border operations in northeastern Cambodia. When the enemy buildup of logistic and base-camp facilities in the border area of northeastern Cambodia created a threat to the safety of U.S. forces in the Republic of Vietnam, selective and reconnaissance interdiction were authorized to assess the enemy threat. The name for these operations varied from DANIEL BOONE to SALEM HOUSE to THOT NOT (when the South Vietnamese assumed complete responsibility). For simplicity, these operations will be referred to as SALEM HOUSE in this report.

The mission of SALEM HOUSE operations was basically intelligence collection and verification. The approval to initiate SALEM HOUSE cross-border operations was provided on May 22, 1967. Approval was subject to restrictions such as:

a. Only reconnaissance teams were to be committed and could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men to include not more than three U.S. advisors.

b. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of additional forces were not authorized across the border into Cambodia. Teams were not to engage in combat except to avoid capture.

c. No contact with civilians was permitted.

d. No more than three reconnaissance teams could be committed on operations into Cambodia at any one time.

e. The total number of missions could not exceed ten in any 30-day period.

By October, 1967, appropriate civilian authority approved SALEM HOUSE operations along the entire Cambodia-South Vietnam border to a depth of 20 kilometers. The use of helicopters for infiltration was authorized at the rate of five per month to a depth of 10 kilometers into Cambodia.

In December, 1967, with State Department concurrence, the Secretary of Defense authorized the use of Forward Air Control (FAC) aircraft

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over the SALEM HOUSE area to control helicopters and to conduct reconnaissance of landing sites. Only two such flights were authorized per SALEM HOUSE mission.

After the Tet offensive of 1968, SALEM HOUSE cross-border ground reconnaissance operations into Cambodia were modified. The emplacement of land mines with self-destruct features was authorized in October, 1968. By December, the depth of these operations was increased to 30 kilometers in the northern part of Cambodia. In the central and southern operating areas -- where specific JCS approval was required for any ground reconnaissance operations -- penetrations were limited to 20 kilometers. While the restriction on numbers of participating U.S. personnel was removed, total team size remained constrained to 12 members and various additional restrictions re-emphasized the intelligence collection and verification nature of SALEM HOUSE.

During the Cambodian incursion in 1970, authority to conduct SALEM HOUSE operations to 200 meters west of the Mekong River in the FREEDOM DEAL air interdiction zone was granted and use of tactical air operations in support of SALEM HOUSE also was authorized. No reconnaissance teams ever reached the Mekong, however, due to range and lift limitations of the helicopters involved. After the ground operations into Cambodia ended on June 30, 1970, no more U.S. ground personnel were permitted to take part in SALEM HOUSE. However, use of tactical air and helicopter gunships to support SALEM HOUSE operations conducted by the South Vietnamese in not larger than platoon-size operations was continued -- when such support was required and was clearly beyond Vietnamese capability. Troop lift helicopters were exclusively manned by Vietnamese after June 30, 1970. In April, 1971, in recognition of the complete Vietnamization of the ground reconnaissance operations, the name was changed to THOT NOT, and the program continued until April 30, 1972, when all U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese cross-border operations terminated.

The table below reflects the number of SALEM HOUSE cross-border operations, by type, conducted from its inception on May 22, 1967, until deactivation of MACSOG on April 30, 1972.

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were submitted by message from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC for
approval with information copies to the OJCS, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Secretary of State. Approval of the schedule was
assumed if no objections were raised.

SALEM HOUSE security guidance precluded advising next-of-kin of the actual location of casualties since this information would have compromised the area of operation. The Services, in notifying the next-of-kin generally indicated the loss location as either "Southeast Asia", "classified", or "along the border". On May 9, 1973, the Secretary of Defense approved the release of the actual location of SALEM HOUSE casualties to the next-of-kin.

In view of the special security precautions protecting these opera-
tions, the SALEM HOUSE casualty data included in the JCS data bank
did not reflect actual casualty locations. The SALEM HOUSE casualties
for security reasons were grouped with the South Vietnam data. On
July 25, 1973, the Congress was advised that there had been 27 U.S.
personnel killed in action in Cambodia as a result of SALEM HOUSE
operations.

A complete review has been made of all appropriate personnel records
to verify these casualty statistics. Efforts to verify data with respect
to location are continuing -- principally through interviews with those
who might have personal knowledge of the locations where casualties
occurred.

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Those who hide the truth can say "no" only so long as those who are denied the truth say "yes" at times like this. That's why the "no" vote.

Lastly, the principle that should not be skipped over is the importance of how we achieve our ends in America. I don't want the United States to accept a little law breaking, a little spirit breaking in the name of security or the greater good. The state of our spirit is what truly determines the state of our Union. I'm not sure Dr. Kissinger understands this.

I wish to Dr. Kissinger great success in his new venture as Secretary of State. Hopefully he will understand that my action is not meant to demean his professional ability or a brilliant personality. It is merely giving expression to what I believe to be important in this country.

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SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN

South Dakota

REMARKS BY SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE -- FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1973.

Mr. President, I voted against this confirmation in Committee, and I intend to oppose it today on the floor.

Despite assurances given during the hearings, I remain deeply troubled over many aspects of the past and projected foreign policy of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger.

Both in his extensive writings and in his record, Dr. Kissinger has posed essentially the same view of the world and the same range of international priorities we have followed since World War II. Our deployment and our diplomacy still reflect, even if some of our words do not, an alignment of the world into two armed camps. In the postwar climate, that seemed to most people to be our only option. But certainly, we should have a more developed view now. We should be able to see that Communist nations, like other nations, seek their own national interest first, rather than a commitment to worldwide Communist advances. We should surely acknowledge that the major non-communist nations that lay broken after World War II now stand strong and prosperous. We must be able to account for the fact that developing countries, regardless of their internal economic and political systems, are more and more determined to act independently in their external relations. And we should know that whatever influence the so-called superpowers may have, either in sponsoring or suppressing revolts, it weighs far less than internal conditions which are beyond our control.

Yet, even after this bitter and destructive decade of involvement in Indochina, we still hear no realistic definition of American security interests which could help us avoid the same mistake again; rather, we are told it was an honorable venture all along, and we are exhorted to a global role which threatens to repeat it. At the very least, we are following a policy that makes the needs of our own society secondary to the demands of a growing arsenal for adventures abroad.
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I am not satisfied that we can expect a notable improvement in our approach to other diplomatic challenges which are real and immediate.

Dr. Kissinger has written that "diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force is sterile." A "plausible employment of force" will not help our depleted economic position in the world. It will not bring back the value of our dollar. It cannot replace four years of neglect in our relations with developing countries. Force cannot coax more wheat out of the ground to replace that sold to the Soviet Union, under circumstances which have left us wanting at home and incapable of meeting our commitments to the hungry abroad.

And it certainly will not recover the losses we have suffered because there has been closer consultation with Moscow and Peking than with Tokyo, Paris, London and Bonn -- to say nothing of Canada and Latin America.

Nonetheless, while voicing these policy reservations, I do recognize that we cannot change this Administration's approach to the world by opposing this President's choice for Secretary of State. On the broad outlines of policy, Mr. Nixon will choose his own course regardless of who heads the State Department. It is for us in the Congress to legislate our own alternative strategies, not to deny the President his personnel. And in the special circumstances of this case -- in which Dr. Kissinger will doubtless be directing American foreign policy whether he is confirmed or denied -- I have suggested that it may be well that he will be in the State Department and not just in the White House, so he will be obliged to consult and confer with the Legislative Branch. We expect him to be available to us and candid with us. We will certainly be candid with him.

But I see more compelling reasons for opposing this nomination. There are matters on the record which I suggest bear not only on our posture in the world but on Dr. Kissinger's qualifications for this most sensitive position.

In the years ahead there will be no shortage of perplexing international challenges to our foreign policy establishment. I have no doubt that Dr. Kissinger has the skill to address them, from the Administration's policy point of view and within the framework required by Congressional action.

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But the still greater challenge lies in reconciling the requirements this Administration sets for our global role with the institutional requirements of our democracy. And on this score I have grave doubts.

I have thought that foreign policy should be regarded as a shield behind which our society could prosper and develop. It should be the instrument of our democracy, not its ruler.

Yet today, that proposition stands reversed. Our operations abroad have become less and less related to our legitimate security interests. They seem more and more the attempts of a few leaders, Dr. Kissinger included, to impress their counterparts elsewhere and to leave their marks on the world.

Further, it appears that tendency is likely to become even more pronounced in the days ahead. Mr. Nixon has been incapable of dealing with inflation and other complex troubles in America. His Administration is mired in unprecedented political scandal. What is his response? He talks of crucial negotiations around the world and of America's vast global obligations. He will, he says, veto any military program that reduces his military budget, or any domestic program that increases his budget. He gives every indication that he will attempt to escape his difficulties in America through exploits overseas, regardless of how remote they may be to our legitimate security needs.

But it is precisely this approach which has so seriously degraded our own institutions.

For more than four years, we waged a war the American people wanted to end. It was a war they voted to end in 1968.

Does Dr. Kissinger believe the voice of the people counts in such matters? He has given us no plausible assurance on that.

For fourteen months we secretly bombed in Cambodia, a country with which we were not at war. At the end of those fourteen months, we were told specifically that no action had occurred -- rather, that "for five years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries.." And the deception went on for three long years more, until the truth was finally forced out in 1973. There was never a word to the Congress and the American people -- only false reports from the Administration as recently as August of this year.

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There may be room for dispute over the Constitutional powers of Congress to initiate or end military operations. But there is no disputing this: we cannot end or prevent wars we cannot see. And that secrecy and deception, in which Dr. Kissinger was a prominent participant, has shattered public trust. Words cannot restore it; the record speaks so much louder. So over this long period, the Administration has placed its own international purposes ahead of the requirements of constitutional democracy. And that our system cannot stand.

Nor is there much cause for satisfaction in the reassuring words we heard in the hearings. Dr. Kissinger tells us that if the same conditions existed again, he would see that appropriate members of the Foreign Relations Committee were advised. But the war powers of the Congress are not delegated to any committee or any select group. And the problem, which I hope Dr. Kissinger will perceive, is not that the secret was not widely enough shared; it is the secret itself, and the gross deception employed to maintain it, long after any real purpose had ceased to exist. If we believe in a democratic system, then unless overwhelming military necessity temporarily requires it, there is no excuse for keeping from the people the truth about what their government is doing and for what purpose.

Nor, in my judgment, is there an excuse for constitutional defiance of another sort -- for wiretapping and snooping to uncover dissenting subordinates. That may have a place in other kinds of governments. It should have no place in America. We have heard of wiretaps placed in the name of "national security." But we are powerfully equipped to handle threats to our national security from abroad. I am convinced that the gravest threat to our freedom now comes, not from any foreign power, but from practices which, in the name of "national security", have been chipping away at our constitutional liberties from the inside. In that context, I believe our highest officials must do more than avoid responsibility for activities of this kind; they must move to firmly condemn them and end them.

This nomination raises other matters bearing on the relationship between our international posture and our internal condition. Did we "tilt" toward Pakistan -- despite no constitutionally chosen preference in that civil conflict, and in the face of the slaughter in Bangladesh -- because Pakistan was a (more)

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diplomatic route to Peking? Do we suffer food shortages and inflation this year because last year our wheat served as a diplomatic tool in the Soviet Union? To what extent are we spending our treasures for military "bargaining chips" which do not protect our people, but only underwrite our diplomats pursuing their private view of the world.

Where Dr. Kissinger is concerned, these are grey areas. Obviously, he cannot be made to carry alone full responsibility for the Administration's actions. I do not assign him that heavy burden.

But Dr. Kissinger must bear his part. And on that basis, I cannot approve.

Dr. Kissinger may do better in the future. I hope he does. In careful and scrupulous practice, it should be possible to allay some of the concerns I have raised and the suspicions which are so widely held both in this country and throughout the world.

The best way to begin may be with a modest recognition that, especially now in the wake of the war and Watergate, this nation cannot exist primarily to conduct a power policy abroad; we must exist first of all to preserve the freedom and fulfill the aspirations of our own people.

# # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Friday, September 21, 1973

STATEMENT BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON
on the
Nomination of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State

Senate Floor

Friday, September 21, 1973

Mr. President, as we approach the vote on the confirmation of Henry Kissinger to be Secretary of State, I want to make these brief comments.

Over the last few years, in connection with many crises in foreign affairs and many critical international negotiations, I have been in touch with Henry Kissinger. From time to time we have talked over in depth major issues which confront American foreign policy. He has told me how he sees things. I have had an opportunity to frankly state my views. On some matters we have agreed. On others we have disagreed. I have great respect for Dr. Kissinger's intellectual capacity and for his unusual grasp of complex problems. He will bring to the office of Secretary of State great professional expertise, in many ways unique in the history of that office.

Mr. President, Henry Kissinger will be taking on new and enormous responsibilities. In the American system of government, the Secretary of State occupies a very special position. Of the Cabinet officials, only the Secretary of State is primarily charged with looking at our nation as a whole in its relation to the outside world. His perspective, like the President's, is essentially political-strategic. Together with the President, the Secretary of State must try to speak and act for the priority of national policy. As Dean Acheson has said:

"Foreign policy is the whole of national policy looked at from the point of view of the exigencies created by 'the vast external realm' beyond our borders. It is not a 'jurisdiction.' It is an orientation, a point of view, a measurement of values -- today, perhaps, the most important one for national survival."

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In our system, there is no satisfactory substitute for a strong and
sensible Secretary of State who is able and willing to exercise genuine
leadership in our major policies toward other nations.

It is my personal conviction that no Secretary can spend most of
his time as a Special Assistant in the White House without clouding his
title as Secretary of State. The Secretary is the head of a great department
with a history and traditions stretching back almost 175 years. In the
councils of the President, a Secretary of State ought to be the Secretary
of State. That, I believe, is the challenge facing Dr. Kissinger.

One question of importance the new Secretary must immediately face
is whether the Department of State -- and particularly the Office of the
Secretary and the Department's long-range planning function--is staffed
and organized to support the Secretary in exercising his responsibility.
I anticipate that there will have to be some major changes in the Department
and in key personnel to fortify the new Secretary in the discharge of
his duties.

I wish him well. He will have my full cooperation.

Hughes / news
release

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY ON THE SENATE FLOOR

HUGHES OPPOSES KISSINGER NOMINATION

WASHINGTON -- Iowa Senator Harold E. Hughes voiced his opposition to the nomination of Dr. Henry Kissinger today in a speech on the floor of the Senate.

The complete text of Hughes' statement follows.

Mr. President, I shall vote against confirming this nomination for a number of reasons, the most compelling of which is this:

Despite his luminous intellectual powers, his personal drive and dedication, and his extraordinary accomplishments as special assistant to the President, Dr. Kissinger, in my judgment, is guided by a philosophy that is inimical to the long range cause of world peace and inconsistent with the moral purpose of our nation.

It is the pragmatism of the power broker who sees force or the threat of force as the only practical way to change the shape of international relations.

From his earliest academic writings to his latest pronouncements, Henry Kissinger has had a chilling, chessboard view of the world. Nations are bloodless pawns to be moved around at will in support of some grand strategy. The very phrase so commonly used now -- the "structure of peace" -- suggests some kind of mechanistic, balance of power approach to international problems.

At the core of this philosophy is the proposition that in the grand design of re-structuring the world, the ends justify the means. If we have not yet seen what this concept has done to the moral fabric of our democracy by this time, we will never see it.

I am well aware that there will be only a tiny handful of votes against this nomination. Since there are an abundance of considerations that favor Dr. Kissinger's confirmation, I am not critical of the majority of my colleagues who will support it. I do not question that the President should have "his own man" in this vital post and Dr. Kissinger is clearly that. But the points that cause me to oppose this nomination need to be made, not just as a symbol of protest but as a reminder and a warning that even the most brilliant strategy is destructive and dangerous if it distorts our true national purpose.

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UNITED STATES SENATOR HAROLD E. HUGHES
DEMOCRAT OF IOWA
ROOM 1327
NEW SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
TELEPHONE: 202-225-3744

Not paid for at government expense

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Here is the case against Dr. Kissinger, as I see it, some of the facts of record that reflect this power broker, ends-justify-the-means philosophy that make me apprehensive about his being given the vast powers of the Secretary of State.

-- As de facto Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger recommended and implemented a policy which prolonged and widened the fighting and suffering in Southeast Asia. Here, as elsewhere, was an obsession with power rather than a compassion for people.

-- Even as a power broker, Dr. Kissinger has had failures as significant if not as spectacular as his successes. He has alienated our closest allies -- in Europe and Asia -- by his careless disregard of their interests and concerns while he pursued his secret pre-summit diplomacy. He has neglected and been insensitive to the problems of the developing world while he pursued big-power deals.

-- As the President's foreign affairs assistant, Dr. Kissinger cannot escape responsibility for bully boy economic policies that have alienated our good neighbor, Canada, and our fastest growing economic ally, Japan. The heavily subsidized Russian wheat deal may have helped win an election that was in the bag anyway but it set off the biggest inflationary bomb in this country that has been seen in recent years. What it did to advance detente with the Soviet Union is still problematical, but there is no doubt whatsoever as to what it did to the price of a loaf of bread in this country.

-- Kissinger's predilection for power broker, secret, summit diplomacy has resulted in his shunning multi-national approaches. He has treated the United Nations as some kind of unwelcome dinner guest who is to be humored but not helped, tolerated but not strengthened. My own view is that precisely because there are so many nations with important concerns and vital interests to be taken into account, we need to rely more than ever on those international institutions which can moderate conflicts and serve as a forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

-- In his reliance on the diplomacy of big power clout, Dr. Kissinger has shown no inclination, to my knowledge, to look beyond the facades of dictatorships to see if people are suffering and dying from war, hunger, or brutal repression. Military intervention to protect the right of self-determination of a nation is a hollow shibboleth if the only choice for the people is one repressive dictatorship over another. Most Americans have rejected for their country the role of global policeman or merchant of death. Has Dr. Kissinger? We are interested in helping to feed the hungry of the world; we are concerned with social and economic progress in developing nations. Preoccupation with the machinations of power diverts us from our national purpose.

There is no convincing evidence that Henry Kissinger has empathy for these matters or the humane concern and understanding that any American Secretary of State should have.

-- The unprecedented concentration of power in the White House coupled with a jealous obsession with secrecy produced many abuses with which no one links Dr. Kissinger. But his acquiescence in the wiretapping of his own, personally chosen aides cannot be explained away. Either his own judgments about his subordinates were faulty or he is basically insensitive toward the individual's right of privacy. The new era at State I am afraid will begin with something less than an atmosphere of complete trust in its leader.

-- It is worth noting too that Dr. Kissinger's exceptional abilities as a lone operator wielding great power may not necessarily translate into the organizational ability to head a vast department which everybody recognizes to be in a low state of morale, partly because of the pre-emption of its powers and prestige by Dr. Kissinger himself in recent years.

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-- One of the most serious reasons I am opposing the Kissinger nomination relates to the secret bombing in Cambodia which began only a few days after President Nixon's first inauguration. Since Dr. Kissinger was chief architect of the Nixon foreign policy, it is clear that this secret war was part of his grand design. There has been no convincing indication that the secrecy and deception here involved, so destructive of the constitutional processes, was considered a mistake or would not be repeated at some future time.

I am grateful that the Foreign Relations Committee raised this issue with Dr. Kissinger on my behalf and obtained answers from Dr. Kissinger to specific questions which I had suggested. I can only say that I was disappointed and disillusioned with the answers, which were in part evasive, in part arrogant, and on the whole, completely unsatisfactory.

I wanted to know, for example, why only a few members of Congress were informed about the secret bombing. While Dr. Kissinger denies that there was any intention to deceive the Congress, he says that the decision to inform only a handful of members "was a consequence of the deteriorated state of trust and cooperation between the branches and the lack of adequate consultative procedures between Congress and the Executive."

Mr. President, this response gets to the nub of my apprehensions about Dr. Kissinger as our next Secretary of State. Since when was the Executive Branch endowed with the divine right to suspend constitutional processes on its own judgment that there was a "deteriorated state of trust and cooperation between the branches?" The truth is that Congress, except for a few chosen partisans, was kept in the dark because it was feared that they would exercise their constitutional prerogative to disagree and to stop a secret and illegal war.

Moreover, one does not have to possess a phenomenal memory to recall that in the early days of this Administration, we in the Congress were bending over backward to cooperate with the President who had been elected on the promise to end the war quickly. If the President or his representatives had consulted with appropriate committees of the Congress, even on the most classified basis, there might have been Congressional support for his policy of widening the war. I don't know. But at least the constitutional processes -- that we presumably fight wars to defend -- would have been honored. Instead, what we had was a pernicious undermining of the equality of members of Congress as well as a flagrant violation of constitutional law.

The Pentagon's own white paper on the Cambodia bombing and other secret operations admits that Congress was informed of a secret budget line item for the cross-border ground operations in Laos and Cambodia. But only a few were told -- and the rest deceived -- about much larger air operations in these two countries which, in a 16-month period, by the Pentagon's own estimate, cost American taxpayers over 1.5 billion dollars, without the consent of the branch of the government empowered by the Constitution to appropriate funds.

The attempts to justify this secrecy and deception on the grounds of delicate negotiations is a sham. The Cambodians, the Vietnamese, the Chinese, the Russians all knew what was going on. Only the American people and Congress were kept in the dark. The Administration feared the reaction of the American people and it was demonstrated that its fears were justified judging from the angry response in our country when the secret war became public with the invasion of Cambodia in 1970.

When the secret bombing failed to bring peace, we had an open invasion, the only lasting consequence of which was the widening of the war and the extension of the bloodshed to the people of Cambodia.

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Even then, the Congress and the American people were not told the
truth. Dr. Kissinger now says that the Administration did not then disclose the
bombing because "we did not wish to charge the atmosphere or force North
Vietnam into a retaliatory effort which might jeopardize the negotiations."

That is the lamest kind of an argument, for we had already "charged
the atmosphere" with our ground invasion of Cambodia, just as we later risked
upsetting negotiations by supporting a South Vietnamese invasion of Laos and by
our own massive bombing of the North and mining of Haiphong. The truth should
have taken precedence.

I am now more convinced than ever that the President's secret plan to end the
war -- and also Dr. Kissinger's, so far as we can tell from the available evidence--
was really a plan for secret and expanding war. Within days of taking office, the
President and his advisors approved a large ground attack into Laos and set in
operation the plans for secret bombing of Cambodia. This was followed up with
implicit and explicit warnings to Hanoi about further U. S. actions. Dr. Kissinger
admitted in response to my questions that "we left no doubt in Hanoi's mind that
we would take whatever defensive actions were required if it stonewalled the
negotiations and stepped up attacks."

The secret war became a prolonged war and then a public war.
Thousands of lives and billions of dollars later, we had a compromise settlement
which was probably not much different from what could have been achieved years
before.

Dr. Kissinger was not responsible for the war, of course, but he was
the architect of the Nixon policy of prolongation and deception. And his hindsight
now shows none of the necessary appreciation for how this particular policy
weakened our country from within as well as internationally.

If we now learn the wrong lessons from Vietnam, it follows that our
foreign policy in the years ahead will be another series of tragic mistakes. On
this score, neither Dr. Kissinger's actions nor his statements give us the
assurance we seek that this will not be allowed to happen.

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I do not question that Dr. Henry Kissinger is one of the ablest and
most brilliant men who has ever served our government. I do not question his
dedication or his personal honesty.

The prospect of the first foreign born Secretary of State invites my
soul rather than distressing it. The Lady of Liberty still welcomes the people
of other lands to equal citizenship; this is our heritage and our strength; I would
not have it otherwise.

However, apart from personal or partisan feelings, I have the gravest
reservations about Dr. Kissinger's philosophy of international relations and his
attunement to our national purpose.

If Dr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, propels this country in the
direction of continuing war, military intervention, secrecy, deception, big power
politics; then his very assets as an individual become the nation's liabilities. I
am concerned, as I have stated, about his insensitivity to individual liberties and
to the general run of human problems, his disregard for an outgoing approach to
international economic issues and his apparent contempt for the United Nations.

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had nothing to do with security matters. National security has been invoked to justify surveillance of employees who had access to information that was leaked to the press in May of 1969, and has been invoked to justify eavesdropping on other employees a year later, when their superiors' real concern was dissent, not indiscretion. And national security supposedly required tapping the phones of men even after they had left government service and gone back to private life.

I can hypothesize situations in which a clear foreign danger to the safety of the community could justify a decision to favor the greater needs of the whole society over the rights of individuals in that society. But the power to make such judgments will always be open to misuse if it remains unsupervised and unshared. Even the pledge of Attorney General Richardson to be scrupulous, when asked to authorize wiretapping, in balancing the need for security against the rights of personal privacy cannot guarantee us the permanent safeguards we require.

Officials do not lose their Constitutional rights when they assume responsibility for sensitive policies and activities. While they must agree to be subject to closer scrutiny than ordinary citizens, they should not have to accept telephone taps on themselves and their families as a condition of employment.

And their loyalty to the government should not be questioned simply on the basis of their conscientious dissent from one course of action or policy decision. If a man's private conversations are to become the property of his superiors simply because he opposes their judgment on an issue, then the vigorous internal debate from which the best policies are formulated will be stifled, and sychophants will take the place of candid, constructive advisers.

To avoid these dangers--the continuation of past practices we all recognize as improper--Congress must fully explore the government's use of wiretapping and other surveillance techniques. The Foreign Relations Committee, acting on a motion I offered with the senior Senator from New York (MR. JAVITS), has already committed itself to such a study in connection with foreign affairs. That resolution is printed in the Committee Report.

In the course of our examination I hope we can weigh the applicability of safeguards contained in the Safe Streets Act of 1968 with respect to the use of wiretaps in domestic security cases:

* that wiretapping be subject to judicial warrant;

* that such warrants be for limited periods of time, renewable only by return to court; and

* that records itemizing the principal subjects of such wiretapping, the justification for the surveillance and the duration of it be made available, with requisite provisions for confidentiality, routinely and periodically to the appropriate oversight committees of Congress.

Beyond these mechanical safeguards, however, we must address the harder task of formulating criteria to guide and limit the freedom of executive and judicial officials to authorize actions which will, inevitably, abridge the rights of individuals.

We enacted such standards in 1968, for many types of criminal activity, but apparently we did not define closely enough the President's discretion to act in situations he judged to present threats to national security. Now we have seen that discretion twisted to serve questionable purposes, and the burden is on us--as much as on those officials who acted improperly in the President's name and who now promise new concern for individual rights--to define discretion so surely that it cannot be abused again.

The second principal area in which the Administration's diplomatic style has caused serious difficulties is that of alliance policy. U.S. relations with our major allies in Western Europe and with Japan have undergone severe strain in recent years. To some degree such strain is an understandable consequence of our policies of detente with China and the Soviet Union--for the alliances themselves were born in opposition to

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conceptual basis of our foreign policy--and particularly our policy of detente--come to grips with this issue. In the words of Solzhenitsyn,

> "There are no internal affairs left on our crowded earth. And mankind's sole salvation lies in everyone making everything his business--in the people of the East being vitally concerned with what is happening in the West; the people of the West vitally concerned with what goes on in the East."

For a man who has written cogently about the need for conceptual clarity in foreign policy, I am not sure that Dr. Kissinger has thought clearly enough about this dilemma--or about the ultimate goals of detente with the Soviet Union. I hope that this matter will be more fully aired in the great public dialogue on foreign policy which we have been promised.

I believe that the Committee hearings on Dr. Kissinger's nomination have been a useful exercise--for him, for the Committee, and for the country. While the size of the Committee and the constraints imposed by time made it difficult to probe deeply, I believe the hearings were a satisfactory first step in a new relationship between Congress and the Administration in the area of foreign policy. I have confidence in Dr. Kissinger's ability to fulfill the responsibilities of his position with distinction. I support him, and I wish him well.

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SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN

South Dakota

Both in his extensive writings and in his record, Dr. Kissinger has
posed essentially the same view of the world and the same range of international
priorities we have followed since World War II. Our deployment and our
diplomacy still reflect, even if some of our words do not, an alignment of the
world into two armed camps. In the postwar climate, that seemed to most
people to be our only option. But certainly, we should have a more developed
view now. We should be able to see that Communist nations, like other nations,
seek their own national interest first, rather than a commitment to worldwide
Communist advances. We should surely acknowledge that the major non-
communist nations that lay broken after World War II now stand strong and
prosperous. We must be able to account for the fact that developing countries,
regardless of their internal economic and political systems, are more and
more determined to act independently in their external relations. And we
should know that whatever influence the so-called superpowers may have,
either in sponsoring or suppressing revolts, it weighs far less than internal
conditions which are beyond our control.

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For fourteen months we secretly bombed in Cambodia, a country with which we were not at war. At the end of those fourteen months, we were told specifically that no action had occurred -- rather, that "for five years, neither the United States nor South Vietnam has moved against these enemy sanctuaries." And the deception went on for three long years more, until the truth was finally forced out in 1973. There was never a word to the Congress and the American people -- only false reports from the Administration as recently as August of this year.

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STATEMENT BY SENATOR JAMES ABOUREZK
OPPOSING THE CONFIRMATION OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Delivered in the United States Senate

September 21, 1973

MR. PRESIDENT, it has been said that Dr. Kissinger is a clever, witty, urban and intelligent man. It has been written that he is the most capable Cabinet nominee submitted by President Nixon.

Of the arguments advanced by Dr. Kissinger's opposition, any one is sufficient reason, in my opinion, to justify a vote against his confirmation.

Certainly, wiretapping of his own staff, participating in the deception surrounding the Cambodian bombing, all of the deceptions practiced during the Vietnam War, as well as his refusal to resign as a presidential advisor, are acts which I personally believe to be wrong. They are acts which are not compatible with my notion, or the notion of a great majority of my constituents, of what American political leadership ought to be.

Dr. Kissinger was able to negotiate our withdrawal from Vietnam four and one-half years after the withdrawal was promised by the President. Some say, myself included, that the terms--a simple withdrawal in exchange for our prisoners--could have been negotiated at any time within the last 10 years, had there been a desire to do so.

Since World War II the American people have fallen victim to the games of power played by the few government leaders who have controlled our foreign policy. We have seen, since then, decision after decision in foreign policy made in secret, carried out in secret, then presented to the American people as a fait accompli.

By asking for a more open foreign policy, I do not ask that we be made privy to troop movements, or to the location of nuclear warheads. And I do not believe a Secretary of State should be made to call the Foreign Relations Committee every morning for instructions.

But I do ask for openness and honesty in the basic decision, making process. If the Congress and the American people had been able to

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