Le 9 Juin 1976

librairie ernest flammarion

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington D.C.
20520

Phalle

LLC

flammarion et ci
26 rue racine
75278 paris cedex 06

téléphone
033-94-10

adresse
télégraphique
flammedit paris

r.c. paris
56 b 6157
c.c. postal
paris 156.72

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Remember : <u>The future of the future</u> ? I shall be at the Saint Regis,
New York, from June 21st to July 1st and would love to see you
if it would be possible for you to spare a moment.

Rumors have spread here about your _Memoirs_. I guess you are much
too young to put it down. Do write another book, 250 pages, about
prospective and the next five years, according to you. Your brain
is Mount Palomar telescope and if you put it on any point, one will
clearly see what it is going about.

Main parts could be : Middle East, China, USSR, Europe. A tour d'Mhori-zon by Henry Kissinger. Would'nt it be fantastic ? Of course, it would be impossible for you to start this work as long as you are having official obligations.

Best regards and I do hope to catch a glimpse of you !

Thérèse de Saint Phalle

SECRETARY WSH

S3P EDT

PHARACN FAMILY

WE ARE CRATEFUT FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUINESS

OUR GOOD WISHES STOP THANK GOD HIS HEALTH CONTINUES TO IMPROVE AND FATHER HAS ASKED US TO CONVEY TO YOU HIS SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR WASHINGTON DC

SECRETARY OF STATE

PM2 H E DOCTOR HENRY A KISSENGER

S1et411900 WT TDBN CLEVELAND OH 40 OS-S1 0131P EST
102 IPMBNG2 CPB

TLX1S2

WAD102(1331)(S-0SS131E028)PD

OS/S1712 1331
SECRETARY WSH

S22

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1975

Dear Mr. Phelps:

I want to thank you for your hospitality
during my visit to Pittsburgh. I was extremely
pleased by the warm reception I received and
particularly enjoyed the opportunity of
meeting you and Mrs. Phelps.

Nancy joins me in saying how much we
enjoyed our visit. In our view the trip was
a most successful and memorable one.

Best regards,

Mr. William Walter Phelps, Jr.,
Senior Vice President,
Mellon Bank,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Embassy of Viet Nam
Washington, D. C.

September 16, 1974

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On the occasion of the visit of Mr. Vuong Van Bac, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, it is my honour and privilege to extend to you and Mrs. Kissinger an invitation to a Black Tie Dinner on Thursday, October 3rd, at eight o'clock p.m. at our chancery.

Your presence and Mrs. Kissinger's will certainly add more meaning to our entire evening. I do hope that in spite of your very busy schedule, Mrs. Kissinger and yourself would be able to share a few moments with us.

May I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest esteem.

With best wishes and awaiting your reply, I am,

CDIJEPHOISE®

1973 NOV 29 16 13

RU NYC 11-27-73

DR. HENRY KISSINGER WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON D C

DEAR HENRY,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR NOTE OF OCTOBER 19TH.
I SUPPORT YOUR EFFORTS DURING THIS DIFFICULT TIME.
I SHOULD LIKE TO HELP - WITH OR WITHOUT TENURE.

EOM DR. GEORGE PIECZENIK / ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY
YORK AVENUE & 66TH STREET / NEW YORK N Y 10021

RU NYC
END

PIECZENIK

E107

#003

'73 NOV 29 AM 11:23

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

7323172

THE NEW
REPUBLIC

Walter Pincus
Associate Editor

November 27, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary,

The attached invitation needs a brief explanation. For years, Joseph Alsop has leavened his dinners with younger men and women--people whose ideas he found interesting and whose company he enjoyed. Joe has also taken up with others, and I include my wife and me in this category, with whom he has spent time in almost endless debate--but a debate that finds both sides learning from the other.

We who have benefited by these events have decided to honor Joe at a dinner December 27, done in a style we think he would appreciate. It will essentially be a stag affair tendered by some 35 of us. To that list we have added about eight of Joe's older male friends--you being one of those. And to further leaven our dinner, we have added five of Joe's oldest female friends.

Most professional curmudgeons--and I count Joe among these--turn sentimental in the face of an event such as this. We hope it will be a bit that way, but not altogether since there will be enough of Joe's critics in attendance to keep him in line. Your presence would add immeasurably to Joe's evening.

1244 Nineteenth Street, NW • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 331-7494

The Government Research Corporation

1730 M Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone (202) 833-8000

February 13, 1976

PERSONAL

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear HK:

Just a short note to let you know what's become of me.

I have left Pete McCloskey's employ and have embarked on a
new adventure. I am now the Assistant Publisher of the _National Journal_. I'll be working on putting together and running a section
made up of contributions from public corporations and interest
groups, law and policy-makers, and private citizens with experience
and information on matters of current public interest. The magazine
deals almost exclusively with domestic policy issues. Otherwise,
I'd be camping on your doorstep, asking you to be my first contributor.

This is quite a departure from the way I entered the working
world, but I'm excited about it and think it may be just the challenge
I was holding out for.

I hope you are well and not too drained by all the pressures.
Please say hello to Nancy for me and give her my best wishes for
a speedy recovery.

As always,

Julienne L. Pineau

JLP/els

Publisher **National Journal Reports**

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02138

ROBINSON HALL

August 13, 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

Upon my return from Moscow a few days ago I found
on my desk your kind letter of May 30 in which you
responded to the memorandum that Zbig Brzezinski, Bill
Griffith and myself had sent to you concerning Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

I was very relieved to learn that no pressure is
exerted by the Department of State on these two stations
in order to make them resemble more closely the Voice
of America, this country's official voice. In July,
I spent a week with Dick Davies in Warsaw and I believe
I now have a better appreciation of his criticisms of
RFE recent Polish broadcasts.

I was also glad to learn from your letter that our
government is fully cognizant of the campaign of
vilification being waged against these stations by
certain East European countries.

Having spent two months in Russia I am more
convinced than ever of the immense political power exer-
cised by foreign broadcasting into that country. Obser-
ving day after day the performance of Soviet media,
especially television which appears the most liberally
minded, I could not help but think that the willingness
of the authorities to discuss openly a great variety of
public issues is a direct response to the challenge
posed by foreign broadcasting.

With best wishes,

Henry B. Platt
825 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

Miss Charlotte Curtis
Associate Editor of the New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York

Dear Miss Curtis:

I wish to commend the New York Times for printing the article by
Amos Kenan on "Israel's Inflexible Stand" in the Middle East.

I believe Secretary of State Kissinger's biggest problem today is one
of communication - to inform an American public of the 180 degree turn
that has taken place in the Arab position and their willingness to
accept Israel as an independant political state. Mr. Kissinger has
handed Israel a plausible solution to their number one problem. In
addition to this, he has given Israel and the Arab nations along with
America and her Allies in Europe and Asia, an opportunity for securing
peace with a minimum Russian presence in the area. The importance of
this in view of Europe's almost total dependence on the Middle East's
oil and America's interest, investment, and commitment to Europe's
survival should be apparent to all Americans.

This is not the first time Israel has passed up an opportunity for securing
peace in this area. A year ago, our Secretary of State convinced President
Sadat and King Faisal that they should announce their support for King
Hussein as the leader of the Palestinian people which they subsequently
did on June 17, 1974. Israel, instead of seizing the initiative and
approaching King Hussein, let the opportunity go by.

The fact that no government in Israel can survive today and at the same
time accept Mr. Kissinger's moderate plan for exchanging the passes as a
major step towards peace in the area is largely America's fault in that
the Hawks in Israel believe they have the United States Congress in their
"hip pocket". Many of them even mistakenly believe they have the power

-2-

to remove our Secretary of State if he does not conform to their viewpoint. This is largely because the American people have an outdated idea of the situation today in the Middle East after a twenty year history of irresponsible behavior by some Arabs.

Naturally, Israel is free to pursue its own foreign policy without any interference from the United States but it should be made clear that they cannot expect us to follow them in what many of us believe to be a suicidal course.

I believe the situation is terms of our national interest is every bit as important as "Watergate" and that time is of critical importance if the situation is to be resolved in America's interest. The media have a crucial and responsible role to play in getting the current story across to the American public in order that they can make an intelligent judgement.

The cake may not be passed for the third time.

HBP/tv

May 16, 1975

The Editor
Op Ed Page
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York

To the Editor:

I find it very disturbing that on the eve of President Ford's and Secretary of State Kissinger's departure to Europe to act as mediators between Egypt and Israel that 75 Senators have sent a letter to President Ford requesting that he submit a foreign aid request to Congress "that will be responsive to Israel's urgent military and economic needs." (Israel has requested 2 1/2 billion dollars in primarily military aid.)

Since when has it been sound practice for a mediator between two parties to give any indication of partisan support? I wonder if any of these senators, including the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and some Presidential aspirants, did the President or our Secretary of State the courtesy of asking them if this letter would be of assistance to them in accomplishing their mission.

May 29, 1975

HBP/tv

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 3, 1975

THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Dear Henry:

I cannot leave Washington without expressing once again
my appreciation of the reception you gave for me on June 20. It
was not only an honor, but also a most pleasant occasion to meet
for a last time with many old friends.

I have accompanied your career with the keenest of in-
terest and have greatly enjoyed our long association. I hope that
events will continue to bring us together in the future, despite
my departure from the Organization of American States.

With every good wish both for your personal well-being
and for the success of your endeavors to promote and ensure peace
in our troubled world, I am

His Excellency
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State of the
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 3, 1975

THE SECRETARY GENERAL

Dear Henry:

MOUNT HOLYOKE CLUB OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 29, 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger and Mrs. Kissinger
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger:

It has been ten years since the voice of Edward R. Murrow
stirred our minds and our souls...and we have missed him.

On Thursday, April 17, the Mount Holyoke Club will pay tribute to the memory of Edward R. Murrow with a reception and film showing at the John F. Kennedy Center. With the advice and guidance of Janet Murrow, a devoted Mount Holyoke alumna, we have planned this event for the benefit of the Edward R. Murrow Scholarship Fund at Mount Holyoke College. Naturally, Janet plans to be with us that evening. Her enclosed note explains the relationship between the Murrows and the club. CBS News has agreed to lend us two choice Murrow films which will be shown throughout the evening.

We would be honored if you agreed to be a member of the Honorary Committee for this tribute to Edward R. Murrow. Invitations listing the names of members of the Honorary Committee will be mailed in March. We hope you will indicate in your reply how you wish to be listed on the invitation.

If you have any questions or want additional information,
please telephone me. (301 - 229-0114).

We look forward to hearing from you very soon.

*Dear Nancy,*

[L.C]

GEORGE C. MARSHALL RESEARCH FOUNDATION

The River House
1111 Army-Navy Drive
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202

OMAR N. BRADLEY
GENERAL OF THE ARMY
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS

MARSHALL S. CARTER
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA (RET.)
PRESIDENT

ROBERT A. LOVETT
CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF TRUSTEES

September 4, 1973

FORREST C. POGUE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Brigadier General Frank McCarthy, wartime Secretary General Staff for General Marshall and a member of our Foundation's Board of Trustees, called me over the weekend concerning a question you had posed to him several weeks ago at a reception on the West Coast. He said that your conversation was interrupted and that he planned to talk to you at a dinner at Danny Kaye's but that unexpected developments caused you to have to cancel the engagement. Since he is leaving today for several weeks in the Far East, he asked if I would write you. You had asked him, he said, about how General Marshall had won the high regard of members of the State Department staff.

It happens that I talked for several hours last week with Mr. Robert A. Lovett concerning his work with General Marshall at the State Department. When I asked for his views on how General Marshall operated there, he handed me a copy of the address which he gave at the first Marshall Award dinner given by the Association of the U. S. Army and said that it summed up his feelings. We have reprinted in the Marshall Foundation News Letter some excerpts from books by Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and former Ambassador George Kennan.

These accounts accord with statements in interviews I have received from these three and others who worked with him at the State Department. Always they mentioned the General's quiet magnetism, the feeling that he knew more about a problem than they did, the feeling that he considered their advice important, that he listened carefully to what they said (although he was impatient with prattle), the fact that he seemed to be interested in them as individuals, a certain warmth he showed toward those with whom he worked closely, his willingness to assign an individual a task and then to allow him to work without constant interference.

I was delighted to hear that you are to receive the Marshall Award at the Association of the U. S. Army dinner this year. You are one of the first to receive it who did not work with General Marshall during World War II. I think he would be delighted to see you receive it because of your splendid work during the past year in our foreign relations.

10/17/60

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A6061

[Lc]

after no modern structure will replace it; a building, in Colonial style, will appear—white chpboard with black trim. As one teenager put it, "We're against change, against building, and against tourists."

Address by Hon. Robert A. Lovett, Former Secretary of Defense

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. HENRY M. JACKSON

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, August 11, 1960

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Appendix of the Record the speech of the Honorable Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, at the George C. Marshall memorial dinner, August 10, during the annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army.

Mr. Lovett's speech is a stirring document, one filled with warm tribute to a great soldier-statesman, General Marshall, and one containing sound advice on vital defense matters. I commend Mr. Lovett's speech to all of my colleagues and to the American people.

Appropriately, the Association of the U.S. Army awarded to Mr. Lovett its first George Catlett Marshall medal "for selfless service to the United States of America." I know of no living American more deserving of this recognition.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY HON. ROBERT A. LOVETT, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, AT GEORGE C. MARSHALL MEMORIAL DINNER DURING ANNUAL MEETING OF ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10, 1960

If a man is very fortunate he may have, once in a lifetime, the opportunity to work in a cause he believes in, with all his heart and soul and under the leadership of a man whom he admires, respects, and comes to love. I have had that great privilege three times: Once, with Henry L. Stimson and, twice, with General Marshall, and, until the day I die, I will be grateful to them for letting me see, at first hand, the qualities of greatness and true leadership. Both these extraordinary men had much in common. The strengths of both stem from the fundamentals of sterling character. Both had unshakable integrity. Both were fearless of the consequences of a course of action they felt in duty bound to take. Working close to them was, therefore, a stimulating and inspiring experience, in part because their own personal standards were so high that, unless you were a hopeless clog, you had to raise your own. Service with them could not fall to refine and add balance to each sense of values.

Once, in October 1962, I have wanted to share with General Marshall a little incident in my own experience of him and to remind about the little 'D' man, behind the serious and determined exeter, from the world regarded with respect, administration, and something akin to love. The first of the memorial dinners seems to be to be the proper time and place to do so. I know you one or two vignettes of this remarkable man whom you honor, love and to remind you of some of his characteristics which made him so inspiring a figure.

I have no words to express my own feeling of administration, gratitude, and affection for

this noble man. Perhaps it is as well, if what could my words—or indeed, any words, add to the stature of General Marshall—Chief of Staff, General of the Army, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, citizen and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize.

The whole world has recognised his magnificent accomplishments in the service of his country and the civilized world has sought to honor him. His public virtues have been extolled by the great of every country who have paid him homage and, in almost unmitigated eloquence, have expressed their gratitude.

Consider, for example, the moving testimony of the value of his services to his country from the two Presidents whom he served.

President Roosevelt stated simply, "I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country."

President Truman, whom he served twice as Cabinet officer after his brilliant service as Chief of Staff, has called him "the organizer of victory, the greatest of the great in our time." and has said "he takes his place at the head of the greatest commanders of history."

Or hear what his British colleagues in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, said to him in a message on his retirement as Chief of Staff in November 1945. It is a document almost without parallel.

It reads, in part:

"On your retirement after 6 years as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, we, your British colleagues in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, send you this message of farewell.

"We regret that Field Marshall Sir John Bill, and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Found, two of your greatest friends and admirers, are not alive today to add their names to ours. As architect and builder of the finest and most powerful Army in American history, your name will be honored among those of the greatest soldiers of your own or any other country."

"Throughout your association with us, in the higher direction of the Armed Forces of America and Britain, your unfailing wisdom, high principles and breadth of view have commanded the deep respect of us all. Always you have honored us by your frankness, charmed us by your courtesy, and inspired us by your singleness of purpose and your selfless devotion to our common cause. * * *"

Few examples of simple gratitude surpass that of brief and moving ceremony on May 8, 1945. in Secretary Stimson's office. Some of you here tonight may remember, as vividly as I do, that General Marshall was summoned to the office of the Secretary, where Mr. Stimson had invited 14 senior generals and his own assistants to be present. The Secretary asked General Marshall to stand beside him, facing the rest of us who were formed in an easy semicircle in front of the Secretary's desk. The Secretary, then 78 years old, took off his old-fashioned specacles, and holding them in his hand, said General Marshall, bowed slightly, and said:

"I want to acknowledge my great personal debt to you, sir, in common with the whole country. No one who is thinking of himself can rise to true heights. You have never thought of yourself. Seldom can a man put aside such a thing as being the commanding general of the greatest field army in our history. This decision was made by you for wholly unselvish reasons.

"But you have made your position as Chief of Staff a greater one. I have never seen a task of such magnitude performed by man.

"It is rare late in life to make new friends; at my age, it is a slow process, but there is no one for whom I have such deep respect and, I think, greater affection. I have seen a great many soldiers in my lifetime but you, sir, are the finest soldier I have ever known."

Much has been said of General Marshall as a great public figure but not nearly enough

about him as a very great human being. This is not surprising since the general permitted no intrusion into his private life, except by his Government, for he treasured the brief periods of time that he had with his wife. He found solace, encouragement, and refreshment of spirit in them.

So I would like tonight to speak of the warmhearted, considerate, generous, and modest man, whom many of you knew so well, and I think the general will forgive me and realize that it is a comfort to speak of those we miss.

One of the pictures of General Marshall, that I relish, reminds me of his wry, quiet form of humor and his expertness at kidding you while he maintained a straight face and a fairly solemn air. He used to have the barber, Joe Abbate, come up to his room and cut his hair at least once a week. He found the interlude refreshing, the convention relaxing, and the results becoming. Now, I must confess that I regarded these weekly hearings with amazement and envy, as nature had so scantily endowed me in hirtue gifts that a trip to the barber was a major occasion for me.

When we were in the Department of State, the operation was performed in a blue-flied bathroom, with the general ensconced in a leather chair, and Joe, a trusted friend, busily engaged in shipping away with appropriate flourishes. General Marshall left strict instructions, regardless of the haircut, that I was to come in and discuss any matters with him which were not highly classified.

Time and again I would go in to clear something with the general and I began to look forward to it after a while, because I could see a plot was developing. I rather suspected that the general's aide, Jim George, was involved in it. I would customarily knock on the door and ask if I might interrupt him. He would say, "Certainly, come in, Lovett." I would ask him if he would take a look at this particular piece of paper. He would reply he didn't have his glasses; read it to him. I would do so. He would think it over; he might discuss it a bit; then he would give me my instructions, and I would gather up the papers and get ready to go.

At this point I remember seeing the general looking at me out of the corner of his eye, with his head dropped down, and the barber working on the back of it. I knew a trap was about to be sprung. He said, "Lovett, do you want Abbate to wait for you?" I said, "No, thank you, sir; I think I had better get on with this job." I started from the room and, just as I got to the outer door, the general, said, "Lovett, you're an ex-banker. Why don't you try negotiating with Abbate for half price?" And I left the room with the general and Abbate looking at each other in the mirror and chuckling with delight.

Observing General Marshall at close range under all manner of difficult circumstances, it seems to me that his greatbeast stems from a number of traits and talents which have not been fully recognized or adequately mentioned. Some were exceptional gifts. His eminence in leadership, it seems to me, was a talent bestowed by a divine providence and heightened by use and experience, as in the case in any great talent, whatever the field.

His greatness, however, was enriched by personal traits which, like ardor, spring from the heart. He was a man of extraordinary compassion, of most sensitive and discriminating instinct, and there was an air of natural elegance about him which was unassuming and added enormously to his calm dignity. Dean Acherson, who worked closely with General Marshall over a period of years, found the precise word to describe this quality I speak of. He says, "The moment General Marshall entered a room, everyone in it felt his presence. It was a striking and communicated force."

A6062

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August 11

There were two qualities which seemed to me to have had deep, perhaps even controlling influence in lifting him to the heights of true greatness first, his sincere concern for others; and secondly, his acceptance of change as a law of nature. Perhaps you'll permit me to explore these traits with you tonight and to draw a lesson from the second.

His concern for other people was something more than consideration or courtesy. It stemmed from a genuine interest in people and particularly those for whom he felt some remoniscibility. It was shown in many ways and on many occasions--some touching and a few amusing.

It comes through clear and strong and heartwarming in his attitude toward the Army which, I often thought, approximated the worried affection you see when a mother, on a street corner, with her very dear, small son bede her, sees him rather vaguely step off the curb into a street filled with speeding traffic. She reaches down, snatches him by the arm, yanks him back against the sidewalk, hands him a resounding shock on his dumb little head and, while he buggles at the top of his lungs, she bounces him out of having scared the living darlings out of her. In many things, the "Old Man," to give him that wonderful, privately used title in the Army felt compelled to do, there was definitely that attitude. And in it, I found comfort and delight.

But this quality of concern for others is most evident in his deep feeling for the individual soldier. We can hear the understanding and the blunt ring of strong conviction when his third biennial report in 1916 he has this to say: "It is impossible for a nation to compensate for the services of a fighting man. There is no pay scale that is high enough to buy the service of a single soldier during even a few minutes of the agony of combat; the physical miseries of the campaign, or the extreme personal inconvenience of leaving his home to go out to the most unpleasant and dangerous spots on earth to serve his nation."

There was an incident in 1916 which, I think, is not only very revealing about many of General Marshall's traits of character but also shows a most engaging quality of President Truman. I have obtained permission to tell this story in detail.

A meeting of the Organization of American States was scheduled to be held in Bogotá, Colombia, beginning April 9, 1918, a little over a year after General Marshall had taken over the difficult job of Secretary of State, to try to resorb our foreign policy in the light of new conditions in the world.

We had been forewarned that International Communists had selected the occasion as a time for a demonstration and that the United States and General Marshall might be used as symbols to attack. We felt some apprehension about having a substantial number of Americans attend in a mission headed by our Secretary of State.

Just before the mission took off, the general called me in and asked me if there were any last-minute matters that I wanted to take up with him. I said there were not. I then asked him if he had any final instructions for me and he said, "Yes," he had. Using his expressive hands to emphasize his points, he said something like this: "Lovett, I don't like the sound of that chest cold you've got. You've had it for a week and it doesn't seem to be getting any better. I want you to go to see a doctor right away, act on his advice, and be over it by the time I get back next week." I said, "Yes, sir," and bade him goodby.

Not long after the start of the meeting in Bogotá, a carefully planned and well-led major riot broke out, during which many of the city's buildings were burnt down and the radio stations and local phone exchange were seized by the mob. It was clear the situation was getting rapidly out of hand and

concern for the safety of the U.S. delegation mounted. I stayed at the Department most of the night of April 10-11 and went home a little bit after 8 o'clock in the morning to get a couple hours' sleep, from which I was awakened by the watch officer calling to say that we had a message in, indicating that the roof of the section of the Embassy, which housed the communication and code room, had been set on fire and that the codes and equipment might have to be destroyed for security reasons. I went back to the Department and, as we were not able to maintain reliable contact by normal radio means, my apprehension grew.

It was clear from an earlier message that General Marshall was staying at a villa located in a large property about a block in size. We decided to try to get through to him by a telephone circuit which was the sole remaining method of communication. After considerable delay we did reach the house which had been assigned to General Marshall. Jim George and Pat Carter answered the call. I asked how the general was and they said "fine"; I asked how the mission was, and they said so far as they knew, "everything was OK; nobody had been hurt; some had had narrow escapes." I asked Carter if there was any particular danger. He said he thought not at the moment.

To my question as to how the general was getting along, he said—and this is a reasonably accurate quotation—"The old man is fine, he is untroubled, to tell you the truth. I think he has having more fun than he has had since he was a young lieutenant in the Philippine insurrection. A little while ago he was out in the garage instructing a young lieutenant of the Colombian Army as to how to dispose his men, telling him to bring most of them in out of the rain to shelter, where they could be warm and get some coffee, and to leave on duty only the minimum required to sound an alert if necessary, so that the others, warm and rested, could come out fighting and repel any attacks if needed." Carter said "The old man" wanted to talk to me and in a moment or two, the General's calm voice came on the line. To the best of my recollection, the conversation went something like this: The general said, "Can you hear me, Lovett?" I said, "Yes, sir," and started to say, "General, how are you?" where he cut in with, "Lovett, how's your color? Are you doing what I told you to do about it?" At that point, my gaskets blew and I think, in a sensitized version, I said, "Holy smoke, General, never mind about me. How are you and the delegation?" He said, "Everything's fine at the moment. We've had a little excitement down here" but he felt the situation was beginning to stabilize, or would shortly; that the Colombian Government had tried to provide protection, which he thought was going to be adequate but that the riot was going to pretty well break up the meeting unless other delegations could be acquired of being evacuated if necessary. I asked him what we could do to be helpful and told him the President had instructed me to tell him that he could have anything he wanted to insure the safety of the delegation or for any other purpose.

General Marshall said he thought that the meeting could be held together if positive assurance of air transportation could be given. He said at last resort the government still held the af filiet and that he felt that some troop-carrier plans of a squadron from the Panama Canal Zone would do the job if they could be held on alert in Panama subject to his call. I asked him if he needed any particular supplies, emphasizing the word "ruppies" in such a manner as to make me feel sure he realized that I meant small arms or other defensive equipment. The general said, "No," all he wanted was a grow of candles, some evaporated milk, some karo syrup, and several thousand ponchos. I remember hanging onto the desk while I di-

gested this weird list and wondering who was going to hold a taffy-pull at night in a rain-storm. I said that I would see about having them flown in at once with some emergency relations from the Canal Zone.

It was a little after 7 o'clock in the morning by now and I called the White House operator and asked her to try to locate the Secretary of the Army at his residence in Washington. She reported shortly that he was out of town on an inspection trip. I then tried the Chief of Staff of the Army, who was away on official business at some Army post. The operator was then asked to try to get hold of the Deputy Chief of Staff.

I was feeling a bit frustrated by this time and, in a rather self-pitying voice, I said to the operator, "Good gosh, isn't there anybody in Washington on this bright April morning except you and me?" The reply came promptly back, "Yes, Mr. Secretary, President Truman is here. Would you like to speak to him?" I said, "Isn't it a bit early?" and the answer was, "No, he has been up over an hour; I'll see if he's available to take the call."

In a moment President Truman's voice came on the phone and he said, "What's the news, Bob?" I gave him the reassuring report from General Marshall about our delegation and included a report on the request for supplies. The President asked what I was doing about getting them down to him promptly. I told him that I was having a little trouble digging out someone early on Sunday morning who could issue the necessary authority to the commanding general in the Panama Canal Zone to make delivery of the requested supplies. He said, "Well, Bob, you've found him." Rather startled, I said, "I beg your pardon, sir"—and heard laughter from the other end of the line, followed by the question, "Have you forgotten that the President is also the Commander in Chief?" I said I was sorry that I had for the moment, and the President said that a heck of a lot of other people around town had, too, with less excuse than I had. He then asked me to tell him what General Marshall had requested. I read him the list and said, "Mr. President, have your authority to send a message to General Crittenberger and tell him that you have approved the shipment of these items immediately?" He said, "No, I'll call him on the phone myself and tell him that I want them shipped at once and to have those troop carriers warmed up and ready to go on General Marshall's call." The President called back in about 20 minutes and said that he had talked to General Crittenberger and that everything was being taken care of.

My embarrassment at the episode with the President was eased by two things: the President never told me and our people got home safely. But my curiosity about the ponchos almost killed me until I got the story from Carter and George. It appears that the Colombian troops came up from the jungle heat to the high altitude of Bogotá, with the temperature about 60, in thin cotton uniforms and the general realized that standing around in the driest and coldest would make them miserable and, therefore, as reliable in facing aanh as if they could be dry and warm. The ponchos were issued, the troops were comfortable about them, and the delegation got on with the business as soon as they knew they could be airlifted out if necessary.

If you will reflect on this incident a moment, you will recognize that calm, steadiness, instinct about a solider's needs and concern for them, in addition to ability to inspire confidence turned something that might have been a shameful disaster into a minor, irritating event.

I mentioned earlier that one of General Marshall's most unusual attributes—and one,

1960

A6063

I think, which added a great deal to his
statute—was his recognition of the fact
that Nature never stands still and that
change is, indeed, one of the primary laws
of life. His receptiveness to new ideas,
which you have seen, for example, in the use
of airspeed and in the Marshall plan, was
made easier by this philosophy, for he was
not burdened with the attitude of mind which
regards any change as a threat to the es-
tablished order—or vested rights. If you
choose—which must, therefore, be auto-
mathically, even blindly resisted.

About 6 months ago I testified before a
Senate committee regarding, policymaking
machinery in the special field of the De-
partment of Defense, that I expressed the
opinión that the essential military attribute of
close relationship between planning and
operational responsibility existed and that
proved operations machinery was currently
in being; and, finally, that the departments
were staffed, for the most part, with compo-
nent, specially trained officers whom we were
fortunate to have in good supply. I sug-
gested, however, that it seemed to be in-
creasingly difficult to fit new feet into old
boots; that there was, I thought, excessive
staff layering and, obviously, far too many
committees with the resultant trend toward
a reduction in the authority of the individual
which I greatly deplored.

It may be that I place too much impor-
tance on men and not enough on the ma-
chine. I do not think so. But it is of no
consequence anyway because events in the
world are building up forces which will in-
variably raise again the question of the
proper organization of the services to meet
the new situations which face us. The
world is full of dangers, and the attitude to-
ward change will be even more important
than in the past.

Wherever you look in the world today you
find one great common denominator the in-
creasing role Government is playing in every
aspect of every man's life, everywhere. We
do not like to admit it, but Government is
retting bigger all the time—partly because
big government is necessary to deal with big
labor and big business; partly because our
people are asking the Government to do more
for them each year; and, partly because Gov-
ernment by its very nature is a glandular
grower.

Now, to oversimplify things a bit, this
means more Government expenses. More
Government expenditures mean more taxes;
or more economy and efficiency; or a mixture
of both. Looking at the problem of national
security with such calmness as I can muster,
I cannot avoid the conclusion that world
change has overtaken us and that, in a rela-
tively few years, economic pressure alone will
force us to reexamine our current organiza-
tion and procedures.

When that time comes, and I think it will
come sooner rather than later, we will need
the detached approach to the problem of
what is best for national security that Gen-
eral Marshall exemplified and which won him
universal respect. National security seems
to me to be more complex than ever. I feel it
is a problem we will have with us for genera-
tions to come and it is not helped in an open
society by either an open mouth or a closed
mind.

It will most certainly not be solved by trot-
ting out those tired old slogans of warnings
about "reduction of civilian control" and
the "man on horseback" that have been used
to divert attention for generations. When
you hear them just remember that the chiefs

of the branches of the Army used the same
"man on horseback" argument against Secre-
tary Elihu Root's reorganization plan which
established the position of Chief of Staff of
the Army.

Not is the problem likely to be solved by
appointing several committees of distin-
guished citizens from remote walks of life.
Such groups normally come to Washington
ignorant of the problems and ways of Gov-
ernment and, by dint of concentration on
committee procedures, remain in that happy
state. Some may even be attracted by the
title "ad hoc committee" little realizing that
it is merely a device used ad infinitum to
obtain snap judgments and nausea.

The solution will be found, I suppose, when
necessity or good judgment make it abun-
dantly clear that in national security the
whole is more important than its parts.

Having spoken in behalf of receptiveness to
good new ideas or changes for the better, let
me identify an area in which I hope you will
permit no change to occur. Part of my in-
heritance from General Marshall is a feeling
of real affection and admiration for the Army
and the way it performs its manifold duties.
The great traditions, which are handed down
from generation to generation in the armed
services, of duty, honor, loyalty, and deden-
tion to the service of one's country are among
the most admirable virtues of mankind.
These have been kept alive by a dedicated and
skilled group of officers who realize that self-
discipline is one of the higher attributes of
man. We simply cannot afford to lose these
virtues. Our great schools and their stand-
ards must be nurtured and strengthened so
that the code of excellence may be carried
forward in a world which seems to have an
increasing taste for the mediocre.

My strong conviction about this results
from my experience with you, of which I am
proud, and because it was these traditions,
training, and discipline, which I have just
mentioned, that produced the young Army
officer who became one of the greatest gen-
erals and greatest men of his time.

Since I spoke at the outset of certain basic
characteristics shared by General Marshall
and Secretary Stimson, it is sitting and proper,
I believe, that I should close my comments
by letting the venerable and distinguished
Secretary of War be heard again, through me,
in his valedictory remarks made at a press
conference in September 1945.

Hear Mr. Stimson's words: "General Mar-
shall's devotion to the Nation he served was
a vital quality which infused everything he
does. During the course of a long lifetime,
much of it spent in positions of public trust,
I have had considerable experience of men in
government. General Marshall has given
me a new gage of what such service should
be. The destiny of America at the critical
time of its national existence has been in the
hands of a great and good citizen. Let no
man forget it."

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SRA
MONTE
CARLO

LE PRÉSIDENT

LdP/mk

SOCIETE
DES BAINS
DE MER

PLACE DU CASINO
MONTE-CARLO
PRINCIPAUTÉ DE MONACO
TEL.: 30.69.31 - 30.99.31
TELEX:
46.925 PARIHOT CARLO

11th May, 1974

Mr. H. KISSINGER
Minister of Foreign Affairs
State Department
WASHINGTON, Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

Your Excellency,

It gives me great pleasure to request the honour
of your presence and Mrs Kissinger's as our guests during
the festivities which will take place from Friday 21st June
to Sunday 23rd June, for the opening of the new Monte-Carlo
Sporting Club.

The inaugural dinner will be held on Saturday 22nd of June. This dinner will be presided by their Serene Highnesses Prince Rainier III and Princess Grace of Monaco and will gather many high International personalities.

A descriptive brochure of Monte-Carlo Sporting Club
is enclosed for your perusal, together with the programme
which has been prepared for our guests, during their stay
in the Principality.

I sincerely hope we will have the great honour and
pleasure of your presence for this great event.

Awaiting your confirmation, I remain,
Your Excellency,

SRM
MONTE
CARLO

[lc]

MONTE-CARLO SPORTING CLUB

The Societe des Bains de Mer's latest establishment is the biggest ultra-modern complex of this day which will gather in all seasons, all pleasure and entertainment offered to the Monte-Carlo Tourists.

The " Salle des Etoiles " room, will present each night a different show.

- A European Gambling Room : Roulette
Chemin de Fer
Baccara

- An American Gambling Room: Black Jack
Craps

- Two typical restaurants, entertained by Regine, in an exceptional site, surrounded by gardens, at the point of an islet built on the sea, where the view spreads out to the bay and the Monaco Rock.

ARF/mb

MONTE-CARLO SPORTING CLUB

INAUGURATION

FRIDAY, JUNE 21 st 1974

<table><tr><td>Morning and afternoon</td><td>: Arriving of the Guests giving of the programme with détails</td></tr><tr><td>Lunch (at you convenience)</td><td>: Grill-Room, Hôtel de Paris Belle-Epoque, Hôtel Hermitage</td></tr><tr><td>8.30 p. m.</td><td>: Cocktail, Salon Louis XV</td></tr><tr><td>9.30 p. m.</td><td>: Dinner Buffet Salle Empire</td></tr></table>

SATURDAY, JUNE 22 nd 1974

<table><tr><td>Morning (free)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Lunch (at you convenience)</td><td>: Grill-Room, Belle Epoque or Monte-Carlo Beach Club.</td></tr><tr><td>Afternoon (free)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>from 8.00 p.m. to 8.30 p.m.</td><td>: Transportation to the M.C.S.C.</td></tr><tr><td>8.30 p. m.</td><td>: Cocktail</td></tr><tr><td>9.00 p. m.</td><td>: Arrival of their Serene Highnesses the Prince Sovereign and the Princess of Monaco.</td></tr><tr><td>10.00 p. m.</td><td>: Dinner</td></tr><tr><td>11.45 p. m.</td><td>: Floor Show</td></tr></table>

SUNDAY, JUNE 23rd 1974

<table><tr><td>Morning (free)</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Brunch</td><td>: Monte-Carlo Beach Club or Piscine des Terrasses</td></tr><tr><td>9.00 p. m.</td><td>: Dinner of the sea at the Hôtel de Paris.</td></tr></table>

The Washington Post

OUTLOOK

SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 25, 1973

# Roads to Mideast Peace

By William R. Polk

Polk, a former member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, is president of the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs and professor of Middle Eastern history at the University of Chicago.

SECRETARY OF STATE Kissinger has helped the Israelis and Egyptians take a giant step toward peace in the Middle East. After so many years of frustrating impasse, arranging the truce was a great achievement. Now, if the truce is to become peace, we must build what might be called a "negotiating climate."

First a word of caution: Several times in the past promising opportunities to make peace have evaporated, while on other occasions we have chased after mirages. Remembering Santayana's lesson that those who are ignorant of the past are condemned to repeat it, we should pause to be sure we know why past efforts failed.

Past failures have been of two kinds: programs mounted and opportunities missed.

The first American peace-seeking effort was the mission of Gordon Clapp in 1950. As administrator of the TVA, Clapp had seen a major economic development plan uplift a poor, divided and sullen area of our country. He thought the same process might work in the Middle East. If a labor shortage could be created and the refugees could find jobs, he reasoned, the "Palestine problem" would melt away. The works were undertaken but the refugees and the Arab host governments remained intent that no one lose sight of the political issue, and the scheme failed.

Next, movie czar Eric Johnston was sent to find an equitable way to divide up the Jordan River so that water might be taken out of politics. But, as any Californian should have known, in a parched land nothing is more political than water, so the scheme and all that Mr. Johnston wished for failed.

## Substance and Symbol

IN THE KENNEDY administration Joseph Johnson, then president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, sought a means acceptable to Israel and the Arab states to satisfy the form if not the substance of the refugee issue. The "right of return" was to be honored, but in such a way as to be unattractive to the refu-

gees. Everyone appeased, we could all relax. But it was not to be: Israel found it too dangerous and the Arabs too transparent.

In another still unpublicized diplomatic gambit, our government set out in the 1950s to redraw the frontiers of Egypt, Israel and Jordan into intersecting triangles so that where the three countries met would be merely a point on the map. This gimmickry lent itself too readily to parody: The vision of Arabs and Israelis leaping nimbly but peacefully past one another melted in the harsh light of day.

Each of these ploys was an attempt to avoid the issues as perceived by both Arabs and Israelis, to bypass or obscure their passions, fears and hopes and to reduce international relations to a bloodless strategic transaction. Each rested on the assumption that international relations occur between states and that the scoring chips are abstract issues of "national interest," when in fact the actors are leaders, governments and parties and the issues which move them are often political rather than strategic. Indeed, frontiers, territory, arms and access are often less important as matters of substance than as symbols of success or failure, honor or shame. If we again treat Middle East issues as mere spaces on a chessboard or moves in a war game, failure is almost certain and we will be condemned to watch the Middle East states rearm again in unrequited hatred and fear.

## Missed Opportunities

THE SECOND category of past failure is omission. There have been five, significant opportunities, I believe, to make peace in the Middle East in the past decade. In space-age terms, these were "windows" open only for limited times. In each case either the Israelis, the Egyptians or we were unready to seize the opportunity. We are now at the sixth "window." If we delay long, the occasion will pass us by. Secretary Kissinger has shown himself to be adept at timing, but the issues to be confronted are among the most complex and emotion-fraught anywhere, and a massive, carefully "orchestrated" but speedy effort will be needed if we are to help the two sides negotiate with success.

What can we do to bring about this negotiating climate? There are four categories of actions and inactions required to build such a climate.

First, recognizing that negotiations

occur between governments, not states, we should place heavy emphasis on those factors which will make it attractive for the governments to undertake this risky venture.

Gen. de Gaulle gave us a lesson in this respect which we should heed in the Middle East. At the end of the bitter Algerian war, he called for a "Peace of the Braves." Peace, he said, was honorable among men who had fought hard; the worthy goal was not victory or defeat, pride or humiliation, but peace. It was a simple declaration, but I believe it did more to create a "negotiating atmosphere" than any strategic concessions or economic incentives.

In contrast, after the 1967 Middle East war, descriptions of Egyptian obtitude, incompetence or cowardice—and particularly jokes about these matters—made peace-seeking virtually impossible. Both Jews and Arabs are sensitive. Both have suffered from brutal stereotyping, the taunts of "wog" and "kike" still ring in their ears, and both—and we—must recognize the fragility of political sensitivity. There are two facts: The Israelis won but the Arabs fought bravely. Neither will gain by emphasizing factors which will make peace recede before our eyes.

In this we can help by both actions and inactions. By involving the United Nations, we have helped to bring about an international consensus on the morality of peace-seeking; that stands in marked contrast to the aftermath of wars where the "sensible" leaders of the vanquished could be charged as appeasors, traitors or Quislings. Other moves can be devised to underscore the wisdom and courage of the leaders of both sides.

Equally important, but very difficult for us is to avoid moves or indeed jokes which would further inflame sensitivities on either side. No Israeli government can afford to appear to be bullied into peace, nor can an Egyptian government afford to appear to be humiliated. The formalities thus become critical. If sufficient attention is paid to these political issues, I believe strategic issues will prove surprisingly tractable.

## The Economic Strains

SECOND, EACH government faces severe financial problems. The gross national product of Israel is $5.6 billion, and the war may have cost almost that much. But Israel is a rich "European" country with a per capita income of $2,000 while Egypt is a poor African-Asian country of about 34 million people with a per capita income of only $210 and a total GNP of $6.9 billion. Because Israel is technologically advanced and modern in social organization, it can mobilize and demobilize rapidly; Egypt cannot move quickly in either direction. Both receive not only the bulk of their armaments from abroad but also large foreign remittances of gifts. Each will thus come under various kinds and degrees of pressure during war, alert, negotiation and truce. Outside powers, particularly the United States, can play a beneficial role by helping to alleviate the economic strains which will have to be met by each government in the coming months.

Consider the more difficult case of Egypt. In undertaking negotiations, Egypt will probably lose some or all of the subsidies it has received from other Arab countries. Yet its expenses will not diminish. No Egyptian government could survive if it rapidly demobilized hundreds of thousands of men into a poor, inelastic and labor-surplus economy. Thus, in the coming months it will need as much income but will have fewer means of getting it.

There is no simple solution to this problem. If we gave the money, it might appear to Arab "hawks" that we were buying acquiescence to our designs and that those who took it were selling out the Arab cause. One obvious answer is to speed the negotiating

process, but this raises problems of another order and may not be wise or even possible. Perhaps among other parts of a "package" could be an embodiment of the Biblical injunction to beat swords into plowshares. A World Bank-administered tender might be offered to all the Middle Eastern states to buy "surplus" military equipment for destruction. This would remove some hardware which, even if not destructively employed, is expensive to keep up. It would pump money quickly into the Middle East. Since the timing

and extent would be controlled by the Middle Easterners, it would reward those most who are most willing to work for peace, and, if the price were fixed on the generous side, acceptance would appear shrewd rather than submissive.

Such a venture could be made to coincide with bilateral and/or multilateral security guarantees to participating countries (so that governments could safely seek to avail themselves of the maximum gain from arms sales) and, hopefully, with an agreement be-

tween the Soviet Union and the United States to limit further arms sales.

Third, the United States should quickly commit itself to the formation of a Middle East Development Bank. Such a bank could play a doubly useful role in the moves toward peace. In the short run, the proclamation of a "vision of peace" would have an immediate and beneficial effect on the negotiating environment. In the long run, acceptance of an international obligation to make a serious, sustained attack on

poverty and underdevelopment would address the fact that true peace is impossible when, added to all of the other burdens of the past, there is the great and growing disparity between the rich European suburb of Israel and the poor Afro-Asian "ghetto" of Egypt.

More perhaps than the money committed would be the effect of creating an experienced international staff to plan the social and economic development of the whole area. Governments would be energized; resources would be better utilized; and human contacts

established which would be profoundly valuable and constructive.

But, of course, money is necessary, and I think it would be reasonable for the United States to commit itself to a figure which would demonstrate its seriousness. Perhaps the figure committed to recent arms supply to Israel, $2 billion, would be reasonable. This could be made contingent upon matching grants of, say, $1 billion from the Arabs and $1 billion from the Israelis, plus $500 million from others.

The announcement of such a plan could be made now even if organization of the bank took a year and the first project could not be started for some time. The psychological effect would, I believe, be important, perhaps even crucial, in the next few months.

## The Palestinian Problem

FOURTH, TO ACHIEVE peace, some satisfaction must be given to the Palestinians. Theirs is an issue which dwarfs the problems of frontiers, waterways and territory, but they have no advocates in the negotiations. Recognition of their position is crucial to the creation of a negotiating environment.

In a world which has learned to pay at least lip service to the justice of the claims of Indians, blacks and other minorities, the plight of the Palestinians cannot simply be swept under the map. The refugees have suffered long in their diaspora. They cannot "go back" for there is no "back"; they could go to Israel, but they are not wanted there and would be as alien in a Jewish state

as are the Pakistanis in England or the Turks in Germany.

The simplest "solution" is some form of Palestinian state centered on the West Bank of the Jordan, but there are now too many people for this area. Thus a combination of solutions will have to be put together. Sovereignty could, perhaps, be satisfied by such an entity; economics could be helped by some form of "economic union," as called for in the 1947 U.N. partition resolution. And population pressure could be relieved by generous immigration quotas for the United States, Canada and Australia. Whatever the precise form of disposition, we should do everything possible to avoid a return to the stultifying camp life, because this is inhuman and because of the effect of such an approach on the negotiating process.

Parallel to the refugee problem is that of Jerusalem. Ideally, Jerusalem should be internationalized and thus removed from contention, but this is no more likely than other attempts to depoliticize aspects of the Palestine problem. However, consideration must be given to the concern of Muslims and Christians if Jerusalem is not to be a thorn in the crown of peace.

Two ways could be considered: cre-

ation of an internationally approved statute of Jerusalem according it aspects of an international open city even if under Israeli sovereignty; and focusing such activities of the world community in Jerusalem as will put it permanently in the world limelight. For example, Jerusalem might be made headquarters of part or all of the United Nations.

Beyond these concrete efforts to improve the negotiating atmosphere, we must be realistic and not deterred by setbacks. Both the Arabs and Israelis are heirs to painful memories and prisoners of present fears. Good will not suddenly be achieved no matter how massively or intelligently we or the Russian intervene or how "just" are the solutions or how cordial are the negotiations. The road ahead is long and difficult so the journey had better begin.

ABE POLLIN
Chairman of the Board

August 1, 1974

Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It certainly was a pleasant evening that we spent at Ted Koppel's the other night. My wife and I enjoyed the film very much. Also, I would like to tell you that the short note you sent to my father was very much appreciated by him--he shows it to all his visitors and intends to have it framed.

I have a personal favor to ask of you. My son, Robert Pollin, who is 23 years old, works at the Washington Star-News in the Metro Desk. He also has done quite a few book reviews that have appeared in the Portfolio section. He is most anxious to become a member of the staff of the newspaper in order that he can have some credentials that would enable him to eventually get a foreign correspondents job which is his ultimate ambition. If it were possible for you to grant him a private interview for a very short period of time, this might insure his becoming a member of the staff.

I know how busy you are and how limited your time is; but if you would find it possible to grant this short interview with my son, I would consider it a very much appreciated personal favor to me.

My best regards to your wife, and looking forward to seeing you at one of our early hockey games, I am

N.B.A. N.H.L.

Landover, Maryland 20786 / (301) 350-3400

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520

Special Assistant to the Secretary

September 24, 1974

Sir:

Abe Pollin has written again, asking that you and the President attend the opening game of the Washington Capitals October 15. (Tab B) He wants the President to "throw out the first puck." Pollin called to say he is anxious to get an answer either way because he wants to use the President's or your prospective attendance to promote the opening game.

At Tab A is a letter saying your schedule is such that they should not plan on your attending and that you have forwarded the letter to the President to the White House (I will get it into proper channels at the White House).

September 6, 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary:

During some of our previous meetings, you made it clear to me
that you are a real "hockey nut". With that knowledge in
mind, I would like you to know that the new National Hockey
League team, the Washington Capitals which I own, will start
its first full season this year at the Capital Centre.

The opening game is against the Los Angeles Kings and will be
played on October 15 at 8 p.m. at the Capital Centre. I would
like to extend a personal invitation to you and Nancy to join
Irene and me for the opening game.

Knowing the sports background and great interest in sports of
President Ford, I would also very much like to have the
President and Mrs. Ford join us for the first NHL game ever
to be played in the Nation's Capital and to "throw out the
first puck". I am enclosing a separate note of invitation
to President Ford, and I would hope that you would use your
good offices to present the invitation to the President to
see if he would join you and Nancy here for that very
memorable night.

With very best personal regards, I am

Enclosure

NBA NHL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D. C. 20520

September 24, 1974

Sir:

[Y]

7612839

COPIES TO:

S
RF-ws

THE SECRETARY OF STATE'
WASHINGTON

June 19, 1976

Dear Licenciado Lopez Portillo:

I was pleased that my visit to Mexico
City included an opportunity for our pleasant
and very useful meeting. You were thought-
ful to make time available from your busy
campaign schedule. I very much appreciate
the gift of your three books, which I shall
proudly add to my library.

Mexico and the United States have reason
to be proud of our record of resolving mutual
problems in a constructive and cooperative
manner. As two newly elected administrations
take office in our respective countries, I
am confident that past practice will be a
good augury for the future.

Senor Licenciado,

Jose Lopez Portillo y Pacheco,
Moctezuma 14,
Coyoacan, Mexico, D. F.

MICROFILMED
BY S/S-I

JOHN C. PORTMAN, JR.

1900 PEACHTREE CENTER SOUTH
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

June 23, 1975

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I would welcome your attendance at a
reception for Youth for Understanding,
an international exchange organization
supported by Assistant Secretary John
Richardson's Bureau. Members of the
Consular Corps and other Atlanta friends
of Youth for Understanding will meet in
my offices here in Peachtree Center at
6:30 this evening, June 23, 1975.

In a recent address, Secretary Richardson
expressed enthusiasm for "The positive
steps Youth for Understanding has taken to
ensure a superior experience for each of
its some 50,000 exchange students."

We hope you can attend.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY

December 3, 1973

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Henry:

It is the understatement of the age to
acknowledge that you have been busy, and there
have been countless occasions during the past year
when I wanted to congratulate you on your latest
achievement.

Let me sum them all up by saying that
both the highest national interest and the cause
of world peace are being splendidly served by you.
Among your many friends in higher education I am
especially proud that one of our own colleagues is
playing such a vital public role.

With best regards,

PROPOSALS FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE GREEK PROBLEM

1. The situation in Greece has reached deadlock and requires urgent solution. Such solution should combine the smooth functioning of a democratic form of government with constitutional safeguards for the future security of the country.

2. The question of the Monarchy need not present any problem. The abolition of constitutional Monarchy by the Papadopoulos government and the subsequent plebiscite of 29 July 1973 were not taken seriously by anybody, inside or outside Greece. In any case, in his declaration of June 1973, King Constantine said:

> "Those in power to-day declare that they will ask the opinion of the Greek people by referendum. I do not fear the Greek people's verdict. On the contrary, I willingly accept the challenge, under the obvious prerequisite that the referendum will be carried out under conditions of freedom and full guarantee that the real wishes of the Greek people will be expressed through it."

3. The vital question is whether the military clique now in power can be persuaded to withdraw voluntarily from power, or whether compulsion will have to be used. It should be noted that the individuals concerned, both civilian and military, are not totally lacking in patriotic feeling, and an amnesty should be proclaimed to cover them, provided they agree voluntarily to carry out the necessary measures towards the desired solution. Should they prove unwilling to do so, a public disavowal of the military dictatorship by the U.S. Government, timed to coincide with a corresponding posture by the various American services in Greece, would have the desired effect.

4. The main task of the operation should be left to the Greek Armed Forces. The large majority of officers will immediately realise the facts of the new situation and do whatever is necessary to remove at once the supporters of the dictatorship at all levels in the Army. They will then place themselves under the orders of the lawful government which will in the meantime have taken over.

5. The new Government, which should be purely caretaker in character, would be appointed for a period of at least two years, in the course of which it will make arrangements for the holding of free and honest elections. The elections should be held on the proportional representation system so that new political groups and

- 2 - [LC]

personalities may be encouraged to emerge. For psychological
reasons the date of the elections should be announced from the
very beginning. A period of two years would be necessary for
new parties to form, organise and work out their programs, and
also to allow passions to calm down. The Greek people have
never had any serious civic education, and these two years would
give the new government useful time to develop some activity
in that field.

6. If this Government is to succeed in its mission, the
following requirements are indispensable:

a) The caretaker Government must be legally constituted.

b) The foreign and domestic policy of the country must
remain unchanged.

c) The caretaker Government must inspire the people's
trust as being truly democratic.

7. To fulfil the first condition, the government must be formally appointed by the Crown and the oath of office must be administered by the King by virtue of the powers exclusively vested in him by the constitution.

To fulfil the second condition, the Prime Minister must
be a man of foresight and imagination, must be a democratic
personality of proven competence and experience and must be a
loyal friend of the U.S.A.

8. It is generally agreed that the 1952 constitution, which was
in force until the coup of April 1967, requires revision in some
of its non-fundamental articles. To encourage a popular interest
and involvement in this important matter, the new government
should immediately nominate a committee of jurists to prepare a
draft for a new constitution. This draft would be open to public
discussion and would be submitted to the people for approval
through a plebiscite. To eliminate the possibility of future
dangers and irregularities, it would be advisable for the new
constitution to include the following provisions:

- 3 -

a) The essential meaning of the security of the country, for which the responsibility at all times would lie with the Armed Forces, would be based on the proposition that Greece shall remain within the Western world at the same time maintaining a democratic form of government.

b) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the three Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of the two branches of the Police should be nominated by the Government and serve for a fixed term, say 5 years. Promotion of all other officers, including two-star and three-star Generals, should be carried out by Committee consisting exclusively of Officers. This procedure would require constitutional cover so as to protect the Armed Forces from traditional interference by the politicians.

c) A special article should stipulate that any person who has given an oath of allegiance to a foreign power shall be precluded from holding any Government appointment or from being elected to Parliament.

9. As mentioned above, the situation in Greece is highly dangerous. Perhaps for that very reason, it is also highly receptive of decisive measures for the re-establishment of normality.

The Armed Forces as a whole desire a return to normal democratic conditions. To-day, the Greek people detest the military regime. They are thirsting for new hopes and new expectations. If a solution should emerge promising a responsible and honest approach to the problems of the country, it would find eager and wholehearted acceptance. And if such a solution should coincide with the proposed change in American attitude towards the military regime, the Greek people would immediately forget the disappointments and frustrations of the last seven years and would swiftly revert to their previous devotion and attachment to the United States.

27 March 1974.

THE GREEK SITUATION

1. It is assumed that the reader is already familiar in broad terms with political developments in Greece in recent years.

2. It is further accepted that American foreign policy in Europe and the Middle East since World War II has aimed at securing, in Greece and certain other countries, the Western way of life, freedom from foreign domination, the means to develop and make progress, and in the final analysis the very existence of these countries.

3. It is also accepted that in implementing its foreign policy, the United States exerts a decisive if unobtrusive influence on the internal affairs of Greece and more particularly on the Greek Armed Forces.

4. Irrespective of the slogans and public declarations of the regime established in 1967 -- which were in any case intended for domestic consumption -- the real justification for establishing the military regime and maintaining it in power in Greece was to safeguard Greece's place in NATO and eliminate any possibility of a shift towards the left.

5. The purpose of the present Memorandum is to show that, as matters have developed today, Greece is now becoming a negative factor in American foreign policy, and that it is therefore imperative that vigorous corrective action should be taken without further delay.

6. It is a fact that the long and unfettered exercise of power has corrupted the ruling military clique and has eroded the Armed Forces. It has also exhausted the limits of tolerance and patience of the people. The symptoms of disintegration of the military rulers and the simultaneous upsurge of popular resentment manifested themselves early in 1973 and were followed during that year by events and developments that are well known.

7. These developments have not yet completed their full circle and the situation has still not crystallised, but the following characteristic points may be mentioned:

- 2 -

[LC]

8. On 8th October 1973, for the first time since April 1967, Greece acquired an exclusively civilian government pledged to hold parliamentary elections. The people had grave reservations as to exactly how honest these elections would be; furthermore, despite the official abolition of martial law, the signs of a police State were still very much evident. Nevertheless hopes began to rise of a possible advancement towards democracy, when suddenly the coup of 25 November 1973 shattered these hopes and sent the country back to a naked military dictatorship of indefinite duration.

9. Rightly or wrongly, the Primer Minister Mr. Androutsopoulos is generally regarded as a C.I.A. agent. This automatically provokes popular opposition to his programs and greatly diminishes his credibility. His difficulty, indeed his sheer inability, to find capable men to fill Ministerial and other high posts in the Administration is characteristic. This unusual situation is reflected in the people's attitude of almost total indifference towards the Government, towards its actions, and towards the persons who are running it -- an unprecedented state of affairs in Greece.

It should also be mentioned that Mr. Androutsopoulos has a frigid personality lacking any warmth or feeling. The only emotions he seems capable of inspiring are aversion and fear.

10. Greece is now ruled from behind the scenes by a new Military Committee most of whose members are below the rank of Colonel. It is obvious that they will force many of their senior officers into retirement -- indeed, they have already begun to do so. If they continue, they will make worse a situation that is already very bad, as the Papadopoulos regime earlier had already placed into compulsory retirement a large number of high-ranking officers who had shown no particular devotion to it, thus weakening the Armed Forces by eliminating most of their best cadres.

11. The leader of the coup of 25 November 1973 and Greece's real ruler to-day is Brigadier-General George Ioannides, Commanding Officer of the Military Policy since 1967. He is the man universally regarded as responsible for police interrogations and for torture of persons detained for anti-government activities.

- 3 -

[LC]

12. Army discipline has fallen to a very low level. The various military units are in fact commanded by their Intelligence and Security Officers who represent the new dictatorship and who have at their disposal their own private and uncontrolled means of communication. The Commanding Officers know only too well that they are at the mercy of these officers, and that a word from them to the Secret Services of the ruling Military Committee will bring about their dismissal from active service.

13. From among the thousands of officers on active service, only two or three hundred are actually identified with the military regime. The main corps of officers, who are under constant surveillance, are too disorganised and lacking in leadership to stand up against the military regime. They are also disenchanted by the apparent support of the military regime by the Americans, and have resigned themselves to accepting the situation.

In addition to their other weaknesses, the Armed Forces as a whole feel no respect or esteem towards their present leadership, for which they also feel contempt as being subservient to Brigadier Ioannides.

14. For some time after 1967 the Colonels gave the appearance of a solid group, implying strength and cohesion. To-day, after successive mass dismissals of echelons of the military group, including Colonel Papadopoulos, reputedly the strongest of them all, without a single shot being fired, the image of a monolithic power structure has collapsed.

15. Some of the younger Army officers are imbued with social ideas against the "establishment" such as redressing the unquitable distribution of wealth, nationalisation of industry etc. It should be noted that these particular officers make no attempt to conceal their anti-American sentiments.

If the present regime, which is supported by the junior officers, remains in power for any length of time and begins to feel stronger and more sure of itself, various unpredictable and highly undesirable consequences could arise as a result of insufficiently-studied, carelessly-planned, basically unsound and technically impractical economic and social reforms and changes in foreign policy. At the present moment the exposure and punishment of economic scandals under the Papadopoulos regime

- 4 - [LC]

is in full swing. It is an inevitable and expedient course of action, although it is a fact that the present Prime Minister and other members of his Cabinet served as Ministers under Papadopoulos but never raised their voices then against the scandals they are now investigating.

16. Public, and more especially student, unrest provides the communists with good opportunities to infiltrate the protest movement. During the riots of November 1973 just before the last coup, when many demonstrators were killed, it was rumoured that casualties had reached hundreds, and this produced a strong revulsion of feeling against the Army and the Police. In the event of new outbreaks of unrest, it is not at all certain that the troops and the police would obey an order to fire against the crowds.

17. In Greece to-day a general uncertainty prevails as to who exactly rules the country. Various high-handed acts of the present regime, which no government would normally undertake without some sort of cover, prove that power does not rest with it; it is therefore assumed that the military are the real rulers. But it is rumoured that even the military are split into three or four different cliques struggling for predominance. The strong man still appears to be Brigadier Ioannides.

18. The tolerance of the people, on which the military regime has been able to rely since 1967, is no longer forthcoming. Nobody believes that the present government is capable of coping with the urgent problems now facing the country, especially the economic problem. In view of the international situation, it is certain that the economic crisis will become worse in the near future. The lower-income groups have been feeling the effects of inflation for a long time already. As a result, universal hatred towards the military dictatorship and its administration is steadily building up. Even the Church, which has traditionally played an important role in moments of national crisis, is in the throes of an internal upheaval itself.

19. Anyone seeking to undermine the present social and economic order in Greece and its foreign policy would clearly try to achieve the following:

- 5 -

A. Foster anti-American sentiments among the people.

B. Remove the King and abolish the Monarchy, which constitutes the main conservative focal point.

C. Undermine the Armed Forces.

D. Make the Armed Forces unpopular.

E. Instil hatred towards the Police.

F. Develop a revolutionary climate.

G. Attack capital and make it disreputable.

H. Make the public believe that the Administration is corrupt.

These are the very things that the Military has succeeded in doing in the seven years it has been in power.

27 March 1974.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 740

PAGE 01 STATE 191439

46
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CPR-02 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 SS-15
USIA-15 PRS-01 /066 R

DRAFTED BY AF/C:TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
9/25/73
APPROVED BY: AF/C:HJCOHEN
S/S-S: MR.VIETS

068628

R 261523Z SEP 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGUI

UNCLAS STATE 191439

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S RESPONSE TO MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS
PLEASE PASS TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
JOSEPH POTOLOT FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY:

QUOTE "DEAR MR. MINISTER: IT WAS THOUGHTFUL OF YOU TO SEND YOUR GOOD WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF MY NOMINATION AS SECRETARY OF STATE. I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE YOUR KIND WORDS. GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES MEAN A GREAT DEAL TO ME, AND I HOPE TO FURTHER THESE ENDS IN MY NEW CAPACITY. WITH MY PERSONAL APPRECIATION AND BEST REGARDS, (SIGNED) HENRY A. KISSINGER." END QUOTE.

DEPARTMENT DOES NOT PLAN TO RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION
SHOULD CAR WISH TO DO SO. RUSH

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-1652

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

DEANE BAKER, ANN ARBOR
PAUL W. BROWN, PETOSKEY
GERALD R. DUNN, LANSING
LAWRENCE B. LINDEMER, STOCKBRIDGE
ROBERT E. NEDERLANDER, BIRMINGHAM
SARAH GODDARD POWER, ANN ARBOR
THOMAS A. ROACH, DETROIT
JAMES L. WATERS, MUSKEGON
ROBBEN W. FLEMING, PRESIDENT
RICHARD L. KENNEDY, SECRETARY

April 2, 1975

Mr. Hugh Morrow
Special Assistant to the Vice President
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Hugh:

Will you, as we discussed several weeks ago, be kind enough to transmit the attached letter to Henry K. to the appropriate person on his staff. You mentioned Mr. Eagleberger or Ambassador Andersen. Thanks very much.

Michael Whiteman tells me that you have been very sick. I hope that was prior to the time Philip and I saw you. You sure looked good then. In any event, stay well.

Special regards to you.

Sarah Goddard Power