THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

23 June 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CALIFANO

SUBJECT: Commendation of Lt. Colonel Alexander P. Butterfield, 24747A, USAF

The recent demonstrations at the Pentagon by representatives of the Committee for Non-Violent Action posed potentially serious problems for the Defense Department. As you know, under your supervision, Colonel Butterfield was charged with full responsibility for planning for these demonstrations, for discussing policies and potential problems with leaders of the demonstration, and for coordinating all Defense Department plans and actions throughout the period in question. All of these matters were handled with tact, thoroughness, high efficiency and complete success.

I want to record my appreciation and admiration for the way in which Colonel Butterfield carried out his responsibilities, and to commend him highly for his performance.

I request that this correspondence be made a part of Colonel Butterfield's permanent, official file.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

28 JUN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of the Air Force

Attached is a Commendation signed by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense and concerning Lt Colonel Alexander P. Butterfield.
I wish to add my personal appreciation to that of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense for the great judgment and calm analysis
brought by Colonel Butterfield to the complicated problem of
demonstrations at the Pentagon. The success with which this
threat of disorder was met and dissipated is a tribute to the
personal effectiveness of Colonel Butterfield.

In adding my own commendation for his performance of duty,
I also request that this correspondence be made part of his
official file.

Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

July 1, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

It is a pleasure to forward the attached memorandums
from the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Special
Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense
which commend Lieutenant Colonel Alexander P. Butterfield
for his outstanding performance of duty in coordinating all
Department of Defense plans and actions in connection with
the recent demonstrations at the Pentagon by representa-
tives of the Committee for Non-Violent Action.

This was an especially sensitive assignment and I
wish to add my own personal congratulations and apprecia-
tion to Colonel Butterfield for a job well done.

It is requested that a copy of this correspondence
be placed in Colonel Butterfield's official personnel file.

Attachments

cc: Vice Chief of Staff

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20330

28 November 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
22 Roland Drive
Short Hills, New Jersey 07078

Dear Mr. Lincoln:

This letter responds to your request that I make available to
you my comments on the structure and functional arrangements for
discharge of responsibilities within the Department of Defense. It is
my understanding that what we are concerned with is the fundamental
conceptual framework which is reflected in the organizational establish-
ment, the allocation of functions, and the assignment of responsibilities.

First I will attempt to define where I think we are now. Without
new basic legislation, the DOD has changed considerably from the
structure identified in the 1958 Defense Reorganization Act and described
in the related hearings and legislative history. This evolution has
been guided by a theme of centralization of authority and control.
Concurrently, there has been a tendency to blur obligations and responsi-
bilities among organizationally distinct DOD elements. The result is
that there is some lack of consistency and coherence within the
organizational framework of the DOD when what we need is a framework
precisely defined, commonly understood and susceptible to effective
exploitation, especially under circumstances of great operational stress.

I will reiterate my comment to you that I am a firm proponent of civilian control of the military establishment, but I believe in centralized civilian control with authority vested where the legal responsibility lies. In the present organization of the Department of Defense, authoritative influence, either by design or circumstance, either by delegation or evolution, is exercised at levels below those where legal responsibilities can be delegated.

In my opinion, what has happened is that the OSD has gradually
assumed centralized authority and responsibility --- which is not
inappropriate --- but has also gradually dissipated the authority to

establish policy and, unduly influence decisions at echelons which by education, training, experience and philosophy, are not appropriately equipped to do so. I believe this has come about through the influx of highly paid, ambitious but inexperienced, and in some cases immature, civilian personnel as Deputy Assistant Secretaries, of whom there are a plethora, and their immediate staffs. I do not have the exact figure, but I am reasonably certain that since 1960 the number of individuals filling positions which have been established as GS-16, 17 and 18, or PL 313, has more than doubled. These people not only infringe upon the responsibilities of management but sometimes are inclined to arrogate the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in matters of national military strategy and in the field of military operations. During this process there has been an erosion of the authority of the Secretaries of the Services to the extent that they find themselves having to seek the approval of Assistant Secretaries of Defense in order to discharge what, in my opinion, their legal responsibilities were meant to be.

Having identified this departure point, I will attempt to identify first what I think some of the essential issues are -- and additionally what they are not. It seems to me that central to the question of any changes which might appropriately be effected in DOD is some common understanding of the role and the scope of responsibility of the three military Departments/Services within the DOD. Related to that issue is the question of the degree to which organization, procedures and processes should be structured, so that decisions are made only at the appropriate level of the structure. There is also a related or derived question of degree to which the marked expansion in size of the OSD staff has inevitably led OSD to involve itself in detailed staff actions in areas more properly the responsibility of the military departments or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As for those matters which clearly are not at issue, I would identify two. First, as I have stated, there is no question as to civilian control of the military establishment. Second, there is no question as to the need for central authority (with power of decision) over the elements of the DOD; said another way, there is no question as to the requirement for a single DOD which includes the three military Departments/Services and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

From the departure point I have just identified, I would like now to deal more specifically with existing situations which in my judgment warrant change:

(1) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis.

This function has become excessive in both scope and influence. Although Systems Analysis has long been a useful technique to help the decision maker, it has never sufficed as the only basis for a given military decision. There will indeed be occasions when it is not even the important basis for decision. However, as now organized and established within OSD, Systems Analysis often appears to be the major if not sole factor in important strategic and operational decisions. This office should be sharply reduced in size, and its role in decision making should be limited and precisely defined. In arriving at these limitations there needs be acceptance that this office will not be used to formulate military strategy, to establish military force structure, or to involve itself in military operations. These areas are primarily the province of the JCS and the Services. Detailed examination and expression of alternatives in these areas should be the task of the military departments as part of their obligation to identify and propose required weapons systems and forces to employ these systems. Systems Analysis should be limited to gathering and presenting factual data to the appropriate authority. Once the Systems Analysis function has been redefined along the foregoing lines, it probably should be subordinated to the ASD/Comptroller, where it originally was established.

(2) Budget Process.

(a) This process needs review with the objective of greater balance and integrity within the individual Service budget. In earlier years the DOD budgeted on a "bogey" basis with separate service addendum recommendations for specific items to be evaluated by the Secretary of Defense. This method assured reasonable balance within given totals for each service and special handling for selected items with more than one service implication. On the whole the process worked well. Whether there is an "announced" bogey or not, there always has been and will be an "implied" or "understood" bogey. More recently, OSD instituted a system for submission of "total" requirements with OSD analysts presenting specific programs to SecDef. Service submission totals on this basis have been so much in excess of a reasonable total for DOD that the DOD analysts have had to recommend severe reductions in submissions during a short and harassing review period. The result has been that the role of the individual service has been greatly reduced in formulating the make-up of its final budget.

3

(b) Decision authority involving resources has been highly centralized. The machinery for this centralized decision making is complex. Actions recommended by field offices must go through numerous echelons with each adding detail which it envisions is required by the next higher echelon. Priority action should be taken to decentralize some authority to Secretaries of the Military Departments. This could be spelled out in terms of dollars and manpower limitations.

(c) Organization of the system also needs additional review. It seems questionable that the budget should be organized and articulated within a program package framework which cuts across the basic organizational framework of the DOD. This is not to say that we should not, for example, know what we spend for strategic weapon systems but we can know this as a result of bookkeeping without introducing categorizations which do not respect the internal operating structure of the DOD.

(d) Within the context established by the budget process actions we need to review and modify the documentation process. This must include the Five Year Defense Plan and the Draft Presidential Memorandums, although the latter would presumably be in line for elimination with the restructuring of the systems analysis function.

(3) Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA).

The problem here seems to be essentially operational. At one time ISA was viewed as DOD's interface with State. There now appears to be a tendency for ISA to be a separate policy-developing office, frequently evolving views separate and distinct from the remainder of DOD (particularly the JCS) and State as well. ISA and the JCS require the close working relationship and effective communication that once prevailed. With the passage of time there have been significant divergencies in view and differences in advocacy, with the JCS views often achieving relatively little impact. ISA has also competed with Systems Analysis in dealing with strategic military questions. Once again this is an area primarily the concern of the JCS, and ISA should be reoriented to respect this limitation.

(4) Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

DDR&E warrants attention because of independent activity and impact in the areas of strategy and force structure. Strategic issues and force application are properly the province of the JCS. Doctrine, operational concept and capability requirements should be formulated and presented by the military Departments/Services. DDR&E should be responsible for developing, with the services, a balanced and coordinated program of technology among the services and budget for such a program. The services should be permitted to implement the program with minimum interference from DDR&E.

(5) Other Major OSD Elements.

As a generality, all other major OSD elements need review, restructuring and reduction in size and scope to render their functioning compatible with responsibilities appropriate to a policy making level. OSD elements have demonstrated an increasingly active tendency to establish and sustain vertical functional relationships penetrating through the framework of the military Departments/Services in spite of the responsibilities prescribed for the Secretaries of the Departments. This is a continuing source of confusion and conflict.

(6) Defense Agencies.

These relatively new organizational creations are a source of confusion. Their relationship to the military Departments/Services, to the JCS and to the SecDef is variable. The extent to which they have assumed responsibilities from other DOD elements and whether this assumption of responsibility has altered statutory relationships and responsibilities is difficult to determine. Once again, hard review is required, oriented to reducing this centralization trend and to reverting to the basic framework of the DOD.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be disestablished as an agency and subordinated to the JCS. The resulting reestablished J-2 structure should be oriented to Intelligence planning and Military Intelligence Production.

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA), initially chartered to operate under the JCS, has in practice become an adjunct of the OSD staff, increasingly preoccupied with staff and operational responsibilities.

5

The National Security Agency (NSA) which now reports directly to the Secretary of Defense through an element of DDR&E should be subordinated to the JCS.

The Defense Supply Agency (DSA), consistent with the general agency pattern, shows a tendency to encroach on Service responsibilities.

Particular note needs be taken that with centralization of function has come an adulteration of responsibilities inherently associated with employment in the field of combat forces. The impact of DCA, and to a lesser extent DIA in this area requires particular attention because there is little point for peacetime structuring which may threaten adverse impact on operational response and flexibility in war.

### (7) The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I assign special importance to assuring active JCS participation in the development of governmental positions in which military considerations are significant. The JCS should continue to have an assured opportunity to be heard and it should remain clear that their regular participation is desired by and at the highest level.

The role of the JCS in the budget process should be strengthened. Within current procedures there is no provision for the JCS to recommend programs or postures within an OSD prescribed ceiling. This results in the JCS making recommendations for expenditures which are not constrained by some prescribed budgetary level. This causes the Secretary of Defense -- or elements of his staff -- to arrive at scaled down postures which have been developed separately without a professional assessment of the strategic and operational impact of a given reduction.

Finally, it would be appropriate to consider removing the Directorate of Inspection Services (DINS) from OSD and assigning it within the organization of the JCS. This would provide the JCS with an inspection capability commensurate with operational responsibilities.

COMMANDANT of the MARINE CORPS--General L.F. Chapman, Jr.
MARINE CORPS

Problems in Defense facing the new President.

a. **Problem:** There is no single Basic National Security Policy (BNSP).

Discussion

(1) The role of the National Security Council in the determination of national policy and other major decisions should be increased, and should focus at once on the development of a Basic National Security Policy.

(2) There is an urgent requirement for development of a Basic National Security Policy (BNSP). This policy is the logical point of departure in the formulation of the Joint Strategic Objective Plan strategy (JSOP). The JSOP strategy, in turn, provides a basis for determining JCS recommended force requirements to discharge that strategy.

(3) Such action would preclude many of the problems with Draft Presidential Memorandums in that there would be a common, accepted understanding of national objectives, and an agreed military strategy, against which to evaluate military requirements as derived both in the DPMs and as recommended by the JCS in the JSOP.

Recommendation

(1) The role of the National Security Council be expanded and upgraded to insure coordination of military, political and economic policies.

(2) That a Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) be developed and published which would include a statement of national purposes and objectives.

(3) That the JCS, in the JSOP, develop military strategy to support the national objectives.

(4) That the JSOP then be approved and serve as a basis for further development of military requirements.

(5) That DPMs be based upon the BNSP, and approved JSOP military strategy.

b. **Problem:** The military forces required to execute the national strategy pose severe funding burdens, and may exceed the funding tolerance levels.

Discussion

(1) The presently approved strategy will require very large funding outlays.

(a) A large bowwave of drawdowns and deferrals has been pushed ahead by the Vietnam War.

(b) Costs of new weapon systems are increasing.

(c) The enemy threat is increasing.

(2) Current Defense decisions, in order to cope with funding limitations, are substantially degrading the forces required to execute the current strategy. This effect will worsen.

(3) There is some level above which defense costs will not be tolerated even though they could be afforded.

(4) It is better to have fewer forces fully modern and ready. A strategy and forces having been approved at the highest level, full funding should be provided.

**Recommendation:** Determine a defense funding tolerance level, and develop a national strategy which it will support.

c. **Problem:** Determine the need for and future role of Systems Analysis.

Discussion

(1) By definition, Systems Analysis is the determination of the costs and effectiveness of competing weapons and other systems, for use by the decision maker as one tool in arriving at a choice. Systems Analysis has served a very useful and necessary function within this definition, and should be continued.

2

(2) The criticism of Systems Analysis stems from the fact the Systems Analysis Office has moved very far outside the above defined realm and into:

(a) Military Judgments,

(b) The creation of national strategy not supported by the JCS, and not always internally consistent,

(c) Decisions based on funding limitations, and

(d) The details of daily management of the military departments.

Often, alternatives are not offered, and conclusions are unsupported by any analysis.

(3) The number of billets in the Systems Analysis office is substantially greater than necessary to perform the defined function.

(4) The location of the office in the Defense organization is not critical, although placement under the Comptroller would insure restriction to the defined function.

**Recommendation:** Continue the defined Systems Analysis function, with appropriate reduced staffing, in the office of the Secretary of Defense, preferably under the Comptroller. Restrict activities to the defined area of "systems analysis."

d. **Problem:** Appointment of the Secretary of Defense.

Discussion

(1) As presently operating, the Secretary of Defense concerns himself with matters of high policy, major Defense decisions, conduct of the war and the peace negotiations, and relations with other agencies of the government. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is the day to day manager and decision maker within the Department. This is an excellent, effective arrangement, closely analogous to a commanding general and his chief of staff.

(2) We are heavily engaged in a difficult and complicated war, which is approaching the critical military and political stage which will determine its outcome. Continuity and experience at the top of the Defense Department is of fundamental importance.

(3) Defense matters are of exceeding magnitude and complexity.

(4) As between the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, continuity in the former position is of the greater importance.

**Recommendation:** In order to insure continuity and prevent a holiday, consider continuing the present Secretary of Defense in office, at least until a new Deputy Secretary is thoroughly experienced.

### e. Problem: Role of the JCS.

#### Discussion

(1) The views of the JCS should be given heavy weight on matters of military judgment, national strategy, forces to execute the strategy, and the conduct of war.

(2) The views of the JCS should be heard when reaching decisions on these matters.

#### Recommendation

(1) That a program of regularly scheduled meetings with the President be instituted.

(2) That the JCS be present when discussions are held at the highest level regarding significant matters of national security.

(3) That when matters upon which there is a difference of opinion within the JCS are discussed, a member holding the divergent view be present to present this view.

4

-6-

Science Foundation be appointed by the President,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
Before any person is so appointed the President
shall afford the National Science Board the
opportunity to make recommendations to him with
respect to such appointment. The Director serves
for a term of six years unless sooner removed by
the President. The incumbent is Leland J. Haworth
and his term expires May 15, 1969. It was
indicated that Mr. Haworth is in poor health and
is eager to leave the post.

The Act also provides that the President
shall appoint, with Senate confirmation, a Deputy
Director. The National Science Board and the
Director are given an opportunity to make
recommendations. There are also four Assistant
Directors of the Foundation who are to be appointed
by the President with Senate confirmation. The
Board and the Director have the opportunity to make
recommendations. These five individuals serve at
the pleasure of the President. There are no
incumbents, because these positions are newly
created and are not yet filled. President Johnson
has no intention of attempting to fill them.

## National Science Board

The National Science Foundation Act of
1950, as amended by P.L. 90 - 407, approved July 18,
1968, created a National Science Board consisting
of twenty-four members to be appointed by the
President, with Senate confirmation, and the
Director of the National Science Foundation ex
officio. The Board is given the power to establish

IRA C. EAKER

1612 K STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

STERLING 3-3280

December 11, 1968

Mr. Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.
Nixon Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Mitchell
20 Broad Street
New York, New York 10005

Dear Frank:

An able young Air Force officer I have known since
his childhood (his father was a long-time friend, whom I
greatly admired), Brig. General Robert N. Ginsburgh has
been on duty in the White House for several years. He is
one individual who, in my judgment, might well be considered
for continuity there during the transition period or perhaps
longer.

There is no military man of his age and grade for
whom I have a higher regard than Bob Ginsburgh. He is
unusually intelligent, exceptionally well qualified pro-
fessionally and what is of equal importance in a sensitive
assignment, such as that he holds on the President's staff,
he is discreet, quiet, reserved and completely reliable.
He has a pleasing, agreeable personality and his character
and habits have always been exemplary.

If I had Dr. Kissinger's job, I would not be without
the services of Ginsburgh. He would also be excellent for
the National Security Council.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

13 December 1968

Dear Mr. Lincoln

This letter responds to your request that I furnish my views on the matter of Defense Task Forces designed to study critical areas of Department of Defense interest, formulate basic guidelines for policy and operations within the new Administration and concurrently facilitate the transition from the present to the new Administration.

There are, I believe, only a limited number of issues which, because of magnitude and immediacy, warrant this Defense Task Force approach. For this limited number of issues I suggest that the task forces should be responsible to the Secretary of Defense Designate. They should be manned by individuals who will be working in the Department of Defense in positions of responsibility as part of the new Administration. Members of the task force need to appreciate that they will live with the recommendations they produce. In addition, I suggest the desirability of participation of qualified active duty military officers.

In keeping with the general guidelines I have just outlined, I would identify two areas of activity for Defense Task Forces. The emphasis is somewhat different for each of the two:

(1) Among basic issues requiring examination and fundamental policy definition, the most critical is in respect to organizational and operating relationships within the Department of Defense, specifically within the Pentagon. There needs to be a review of the role and scope of the Departments/Services in relation to the Office of the Secretary of Defense with attention given to the degree of concentration of authority and operational activity to remain assigned to an OSD staff. A specific objective of this effort should be a clarifying of fundamental structural concepts and the defining of tasks and obligations of DOD components in keeping with such a clarification. It is desirable that this examination begin at an early time in order to facilitate the transition but also in order to gain time in the establishment of what would be a critical departure point for other important actions.

(2) The second Defense Task Force that I would contemplate is one which would deal with the budget and the budget process. Study of the budget is particularly relevant to the transition between Administrations, and it appears to me that this consideration would determine the character and structure of this task force. However, there is also a need to look at budgetary procedures and processes and this needs to be done in the context of organizational determinations which the other task force would be producing. Thus, while the primary emphasis of this task force might focus on transition, it could have either a concurrent or follow-on responsibility to review and revise budgetary processes in light of the decisions reached in respect to organizational and operating relationships within the DOD.

Finally, I suggested earlier that participation by experienced and competent active duty military officers in these task forces would be desirable. If it becomes appropriate for me to do so, I will be prepared to offer recommendations concerning Air Force personnel who would, in my judgment, make constructive contributions to the efforts now being contemplated.

Sincerely

J. F. McCONNELL, General, USAF
Chief of Staff

2

[LC]

# WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS

## INTRODUCTION

During the period of our investigation, we evaluated, as best we could, a large number of candidates for the positions we comment on here. These candidates came from a number of sources, including some within our group. We have chosen to submit our recommendations for each position as follows:

1. An ordered selection of three

2. Those who remained during our final deliberations.

It is important to recognize that we consider any individual in either group to be of very substantial stature and competence. Further, many of the candidates could, and should, be considered for more than one position; we simply did not have time to properly address this last point.

JOB QUALIFICATIONS

INTRODUCTION:

○ This submittal is restricted in its inquiry to those
positions which can be expected to have a direct and
first order effect on national security issues.

(1) Director NASA

o Ability to sell NASA to the Congress and people

o Vision to reconstruct NASA goals

o Ability to lead large complex programs

(2) Chairman and Commissioners, Atomic Energy Commission

o Ability to:

Direct a needed re-assessment of military
and civilian nuclear policy

o Communicate with Executive Branch, Congress and the public

(3) DOD - Director of Defense Research and Engineering

o Ability to:

o Effectively participate in a re-assessment of
the present and future military posture of the nation

o Establish vigorous, creative military R&D policy

o Aggressively defend and manage the implementation
of this new policy

(4) DOD - Assistant Secretaries for R&D

o Ability to select and give policy direction to large,
advanced development programs

o Prior experience with military R&D activities, including complexities of DOD procurement

(c)"

DR. KENNETH PITZER

o Professor, Chemistry - University of Calif., Berkeley

o Director of Research - U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

o President, Rice Institute (former)

o President, Stanford University (Current)

o Broad experience on top policy committees in Executive Branch; including President's Scientific Advisory Committee

DR. KENNETH PITZER

DR. A. D. WHEELON

o Demonstrated technical excellence

o Long involvement with National Security Issues (DSB, DDS&T/CIA, AF/SAB, etc.)

o Substantial management experience (TRW, CIA, Hughes)

o Presently VP, Engineering, Hughes Aircraft Corp.

o Technically innovative

o Driving, aggressive leader

o Recently finished (2-1/2 years ago) demanding tour in government

DR. WILLIAM MACMILLAN

o Currently Professor of Chemistry, UCLA (has been chairman of department).

o Scientific advisor to Gen. Westmoreland, MACV, Saigon.

o Member and chairman of many government and DOD committees for many years.

o Has extremely broad knowledge of science and technology

FRANK W. LEHAN

o Presently Ass't. Secretary for Research and Technology, Department of Transportation

o High technical competence, especially in Aero-space field

o Managerial capability - participated in building a very successful company from scratch

o Formerly President, Space General Corp., and VP, Aerojet

o Substantial involvement with national security issues with various executive branch committees, (e.g., PSAC)

BRUNO W. AUGENSTEIN

o Currently Vice President, Research RAND Corporation

o Special Assistant to President, Institute for Defense Analysis

o Deputy Director for Intelligence, DDR&E

o Research Planning Staff; Lockheed Aircraft Corp.

o Has broad grasp of technology

o Considerable experience with many military matters

o High technical integrity

SECOR BROWNE

o VP of Bolt, Beranek, & Newman; sold his own successful analytic research company to BB&N.

o Man of keen intelligence and good judgment. Very knowledgeable regarding U. S. - USSR military, commercial, and economic power structures. (Not identified publicly as a "military man.")

o Linguist par excellence (fluent Russian, Japanese, etc.)
Professor of Languages at M. I. T. One of key negotiators
in Aeroflot - Pan American Moscow - New York air route
negotiations.

SPECIAL ISSUE

Our group developed a deep division within itself as to whether
Edward Teller should be our leading contender for the position of Chairman,
AEC. The division crystalized along the following lines:

1. One segment felt strongly that Dr. Teller's historical positions, generally urging an aggressive effort in both military and civilian nuclear programs would, and should be a strong indication to the people, the Congress, the nuclear community and the Soviet bloc as to the policy of the new Administration.

2. The other view, equally strongly felt, was that Dr. Teller's position on key policy issues has been on occasion unrealistic and further, that his appointment would cause disruptive reactions in many quarters.

SPECIAL ISSUES

o Upgrade to statutory rank the post of Science Advisory to Sec. of State.

o Consider establishment of Ass't. Sec. of Def., Intelligence

o Evaluate composition of PFIAB

o Determine necessary re-orientation and re-structuring of PSAC