PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1964

Conversation with Francois de Rose - Recently appointed French Ambassador to Lisbon; formerly Deputy Chief of the French General Staff. May 26, 1964.

I asked De Rose whether De Gaulle was pursuing his present policy to raise the ante for eventual negotiation or because he really wanted to undermine our world-wide influence. He said probably both and perhaps even De Gaulle did not know which was his ultimate goal. De Rose added that so many mistakes were being made by both sides that it was no longer possible to tell cause from effect. De Gaulle was impossible and some of his followers, like Peyrlefitte were fools. At the same time, American actions seemed almost calculated to demonstrate the correctness of De Gaulle's basic thesis. He thought that in South East Asia De Gaulle was being petty, if not malicious. But our constant detente policy without consultation was also short-sighted. Everybody in Europe was disquieted. Moreover, we moved unilaterally on many issues without even informing France. For example, the French Foreign Office had to learn through the newspapers of Ball's plan to station NATO troops (including French contingents) in Cyprus. Adding German paratroopers to the list made the proposal even less palatable to the French.

De Rose said that he had recently seen De Gaulle. During that conversation, De Rose had said that the French nuclear effort would have to be Europeanized. De Gaulle had said this was a question of timing; there was no sense talking until more of a force existed. He then asked De Rose

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what he thought of Franco-U.S. relations. De Rose replied that he did not know whether the nuclear issue was the best ground on which to challenge us. De Gaulle had replied: "Can you think of a better can opener?"

De Gaulle had requested a paper from the Foreign Office about the future evolution of French nuclear policy. De Rose had been one of the chief drafters of this paper. According to De Rose, the argument of the paper was as follows: A U.S.-Soviet accommodation was the greatest danger for Europe. The Soviet Union might want it to be free to deal with China. The U.S. might want it because its political climate was volatile and because its general political orientation was in that direction. Europe could prevent its interest from being slighted only be being so strong that a bilateral detente would not meet Soviet needs. On the other hand, French resources were insufficient to build this strength. Therefore, some form of European cooperation in the nuclear field was essential. De Gaulle at present had this paper under advisement.