ELCS

> **'We can choose our own lives': In the New Sun Marriage Shelter**

dom and profit, people think you shouldn't
do anything for too long," says Chen. "Ad-
vertising encourages you to change every-
thing—including love and marriage."

People in the backlands have swung to the other extreme. Rural villagers have revived one of pre-revolutionary China's harshest traditions: bride-trafficking. Shady marriage brokers—essentially slave dealers—roam the countryside, offering girls for sale to prospective husbands. Sometimes they get their merchandise by kidnapping; sometimes they buy daughters from impoverished peasants. From 1991 through 1996, Chinese police freed 88,000 kidnapped women and children and arrested 143,000 people for participating in the slave trade. But brides often work with a marriage broker in the hope of saving their families from hunger. "Local people will defend the man who buys a wife," says Liu Bohong, a social worker in Beijing. "They think if she takes money and sends it to her parents, he should be able to marry her. Everyone sympathizes with him."

Women's frustration cuts through all levels of society. In a tiny office down a twisting alley in Beijing, a group of activists is operating the country's first telephone hot line especially for women. The callers' complaints are much like those of Western women— even the aching emptiness of life at the top. For businessmen, one of the proudest status symbols is a nonworking wife. The hot line recently got a call from one of those wives, a trained physician whose husband forbids

her to work. "He won't let me go out," the
wife said. "I'm ready to kill myself. I feel like
a high-class prisoner."

In one way or another almost every
caller has an intolerable sense of being
trapped. The phone rings and Chen Xinxin,
a sociologist who works as one of the hot
line's counselors, answers. The caller's hus-
band has been seeing a lover for the last
seven years, and the caller has just found
out. More than 60 percent of the hot line's
calls involve cheating husbands. "Sexually,
we're no good together anymore," the
caller complains. "It's gotten more and
more distant. He says to me, 'When I'm
with you I'm just thinking of her.'" Chen
speaks up. "Have you considered the idea
of getting a boyfriend?" she asks. The caller
replies: "I never thought of that." Chen ad-
vises the caller to give the marriage one last
chance. Dress up a little, try to recapture
the husband's sexual desire. And if that
doesn't work, dump him. "Why do you
need a husband like that?" Chen demands.
"Someone who won't talk to you and who's
not interested in you sexually? You have to
rely on yourself."

That's the activists' biggest challenge: persuading women to stand up for themselves. Liu, the Beijing social worker, helped establish a Women's Health Network in China in 1993. The aim, she says, is to provide women with the medical and legal information they need to take charge of their own lives. This month she is publishing a Chinese translation of "Our Bodies, Ourselves," the American feminist handbook of the 1970s. "We need to teach women that they have a choice," says Liu. "That they should respect their bodies." In China, for example, many doctors routinely prescribe hysterectomies for mothers suffering from uterine cysts—a needlessly drastic treatment by Western medical standards. So far Liu has helped two women persuade their doctors to remove the lumps but save the uterus. Activists like Liu must often take their victories one at a time.

That beats winning no victories at all.
Zhang Xianfen, the New Sun shelter's
founder, says the place was inspired by her
own experience as an abused wife. "I do
whatever I can to help these women learn
self-reliance," she says. "In China it is very
difficult for a woman to stand on her own
two feet." Not long ago a woman in Shanghai
tried to set up the center's second domes-
tic-violence shelter. The government shut it
down, explaining cryptically that the prob-
lem was the center's "unclear status." Chi-
nia's activists have grown used to surmount-
ing such troubles. A big-character slogan is
splashed across a wall at the New Sun shel-
ter: WE CANNOT BE FATE'S PRISONERS! The
thought has given strength to young Pan
Jingling. Millions of other Chinese women
have barely begun to hear it.

VOICES OF CHINA

**Chen Yiyun** The 58-year-old sociologist founded Beijing's first family-counseling center in 1993 after visiting women's shelters in Los Angeles. Many of her clients, says Chen, blindly shed traditional values in a rush to get rich. 'We don't understand the

market,' she says. 'This
worship of
materialism
and this mon-
ey-oriented
society are
not sustain-
able.' Chen
tries to com-

bat feelings of inadequacy that grow from
China's new climate of economic competi-
tion. 'We teach people not to compare them-
selves to others,' she says. 'They are all sacri-
ficial lambs in the quest for economic
development.'

publishing books and newspapers. “We women have lost some things,” says Xie Li-hua, prominent editor of the magazine Rural Women Knowing All. “But now we can choose our own lives. For the first time, women are developing a sense of responsibility to themselves.”

They face some formidable obstacles. Some 60 percent of China's unemployed are women, and their numbers are growing fast. Even college-educated women can't find jobs. And the ideal of universal education is evaporating. Today as many as 70 percent of China's 140 million illiterates are female, and peasant parents often refuse to send their daughters to school. "There is this feudal attitude that 'girls are going to get married and won't be part of the family anyway, so why waste the money?'" says Feng Cui, an official for the Women's Federation. Last year the group provided funding to help 600,000 primary-school drop-outs resume their education.

Divorce rates are soaring. Chen Yiyun
runs Beijing's first marital-counseling serv-
ice, where desperate women seek sympathy
and help for their broken marriages. She
says unfaithful husbands are her clients'
No. 1 complaint. Married men don't risk
much social stigma for taking lovers. Chen
says many Chinese, male and female, are ea-
ger to imitate everything about Western so-
ciety—including the stereotyped notion of
pervasive casual sex. “In the pursuit of free-

PHOTOS BY ANDRES HERNANDEZ FOR NEWSWEEK

JUNE 29, 1998 NEWSWEEK

SPECIAL REPORT

**Reflection:** The former secretary of State argues that too many Democrats and Republicans view China through the prism of the past, rather than analysis of what our national interest requires. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

No Room for Nostalgia

CHRIS STOWERS - PANOS PICTURES

The old and the new: A statue of Shanghai's first mayor stands in front of the city's modern new skyline

I CANNOT RECALL WHEN A PRESIDENT HAS LEFT ON A MAJOR foreign trip amidst so much controversy. The right wing of the Republican Party and the left wing of the Democratic Party either oppose the trip to China or state conditions for it that are more compatible with confrontation than with stabi-lizing, much less improving, the relationship with the world's most populous country and second largest economy.

Republicans see China as a threat; Democrats view it as a labo-ratory for the spread of American values. Both view China through the prism of their parties' experiences over the last 30 years.

Republicans rightly see themselves as the party that has most consistently attended to U.S. security in recent decades. Demo-crats are justly proud of their long advocacy of civil and human rights. But with respect to China, too many in both parties substi-tute nostalgia for analysis of what our national interest requires.

I have often been critical of the foreign policy of the Clinton ad-ministration, disturbed about its discomfort with the role power plays in international affairs—most recently in the calamitous han-dling of the gulf crisis—and dismayed with its tendency to conduct foreign policy as an aspect of domestic politics. But on the trip to

China, the president deserves bipartisan support. In the present global turmoil, nothing is to be gained by turning China into an en-emy; much by exploring potential areas of common interest.

Unfortunately, too many Republicans have substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union and seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the collapse of the Soviet empire: diplomatic con-frontation, economic ostracism and ideological warfare. Too many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American policy should be to replicate our institutions and principles in China, even at the cost of our many other interests at stake in Asia and without regard for the complexities of Chinese history.

Still, each group has raised a number of serious issues.

Chinese proliferation of missile and some nuclear technology has been worrisome (though less so than that of countries with which we continue to cultivate friendly relations, such as Russia). Chinese human-rights practices have often fallen far short of desir-able standards. Clearly, if China continues to grow at anything like the rate of the past two decades, it will be in a stronger position to oppose American interests politically.

No serious student of history can doubt that the emergence of

50 NEWSWEEK JUNE 29, 1998

China as a world power presents a serious challenge to American foreign policy. Such a process is never smooth (witness the emergence of Germany in the last century). Yet it will not go away by railing against it. It must be in our interest that China emerge as a responsible member of the international community with interest in regional and global stability and progress.

To be sure, this will not depend on American actions alone. And if, despite our most serious efforts to bring about a cooperative relationship, China should come to pose a direct threat to U.S. security or seek hegemony in Asia, we would surely resist that at any cost.

But our ability to sustain such an effort, were it to become necessary, would depend on having explored alternatives that are reasonable and, I believe—on the basis of recent conversations with Chinese leaders—available. It is an abdication to base America's policy toward China on the assumption that U.S. actions and policies cannot affect the evolution of Chinese policies, or that China is destined to be congenitally hostile to American interests. Such a course could lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy.

In its 5,000-year history of independence, China has resisted foreign pressures with extraordinary tenacity and intelligence. Do we really want to turn the world's most populous nation and second largest economy into an enemy at a time when Japan is in economic

crisis, South Asia is entering the nuclear age, Indonesia is in turmoil, the Russian evolution is uncertain, the Persian Gulf unsettled and the Balkans on the brink of war? Should we treat China as an enemy when it has, on the whole, behaved responsibly on most of these issues?

China is seeking to improve relations with the United States in pursuit of its own interests, notably to sustain its economic reform. In pursuit of that goal, it has been prepared to adjust its policies in many areas. On human rights, considerable progress has been made in the years since the death of Mao Zedong. Abuses continue. Are they more likely to be improved by all-out

confrontation or by the further integration of China into the international community?

Between great powers, a complete confluence of interests is rarely achieved. For example, more remains to be done on such issues as nuclear proliferation. But do these gaps justify the provocative needling implicit in so many congressional measures and of some of our public discourse? Why shouldn't the differences be the subject of a serious diplomatic dialogue? Are we so unsure of ourselves that we assume that such an approach is bound to fail to achieve our objectives?

It cannot be an accident that every former president, secretary of State and national-security adviser—the people with the longest experience in dealing with the nation's foreign policy—reject the confrontational strategy urged by both the left and right wings of American politics. Nor would any other major power—or, for that matter, any country—join us in such a course.

Before going further, let me state that I head a consulting firm that advises a few clients with business interests in China. Anyone who, despite my record of fostering Sino-U.S. relations for nearly three decades (for most of which nobody did any business in China), believes that my views are for sale should stop reading here.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN the old Soviet Union and today's China. The Soviet Union avowed an ideology fundamentally hostile to our values, actively propagated it around the world and backed it up by supporting communist revolutionary parties bent on undermining the domestic cohesion of governments friendly to the United States. Moscow had deployed thousands of missiles and tens of thousands of warheads capable of reaching the United States. And it espoused a foreign policy that directly challenged American interests, occasionally including the threat of force.

None of this has been true of America's relations with China. Though Beijing describes its ideology as communist, in practice it bears no similarity to Moscow's Stalinist state-run economy. The economy in China is increasingly market-oriented; Beijing is making strenuous efforts to get rid of its state-run enterprises; its reform depends crucially on linking China to the world economy. China supports no political movement hostile to American interests and, except for Taiwan, does not challenge the existing world order. And Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is not considered a foreign-policy issue in Beijing.

There are overwrought scenarios that sketch an increasing Chinese military threat to the United States. Thirteen missiles are reported to be aimed at American cities and Chinese anti-ship missiles

are supposed to pose a threat to our Navy. But can one seriously believe that China will take on the United States with 13 obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles in the face of 2,000 American strategic weapons and perhaps 15,000 warheads, not to speak of the thousands of ship-based warheads on cruise missiles and U.S. planes on aircraft carriers? (At any time, the U.S. has 96 Trident missiles on submarines, each with at least 10 warheads.) No doubt, Chinese military capacity will grow in tandem with its economic development. But it will not be a global military power for at least a

quarter of a century. Is the United States so unsure of its capacity to maintain its supremacy that we must take pre-emptive action based on hypothetical perspectives?

Little in China's current or even historical performance justifies such an assumption. China's responsible conduct in the Asian crisis has demonstrated its interest in the region's economic and political stability. It has resisted strong pressures to devalue its currency, has kept its promise not to suppress political expression, including demonstrations commemorating Tiananmen in Hong Kong, and has supported the American objective of maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.

China has adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as test-ban, biological and chemical-weapons conventions. It follows most of the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (though it is not a signatory and the U.S. has some legitimate complaints in this area). China has extended some nuclear help to Pakistan in ways that we cannot condone. But its purpose was not mischief-making, as is often alleged, but to establish some balance of power on the Indian Subcontinent after the Indians tested nuclear explosives in 1974. This perhaps unwise policy is com-

CHARLES JING-GAMMA-LIAISON

A world power: Chinese missile proliferation has been worrisome

JUNE 29, 1998 NEWSWEEK

SPECIAL REPORT

parable to America's direct assistance to Britain, indirect help to France and acquiescence in the nuclear program of Israel. China has also proposed resumption of talks with Taiwan.

Should all this progress be jettisoned for the sake of preventing what China might do 25 years from now? Undoubtedly, if China continues to grow at the rate of the past 20 years, it will become perhaps the most powerful country in Asia. Its impact on its neighbors would magnify. But do we really want a showdown now to block what is inherent in the existence of China rather than its policies? It would be an unprecedented objective of American foreign policy to prevent the emergence of any potential major power. Such a neo-imperialist course would, sooner or later, unite China with the rest of the world against us.

No country has ever grown indefinitely at China's recent rate. And China is not doing so at this moment. But were Beijing, at whatever juncture, to pursue hegemonic policies, it would have to contend around its borders with many states of considerable strength. A wise America could forge a determined resistance among them. Which is the better course: to make Chinese hostility a self-fulfilling prophecy by the confrontational and provocative measures now being advocated; or to seek to establish a cooperative pattern at a moment when Chinese leaders seem uniquely receptive to it?

A
COOPERATIVE
relationship
should be given
a chance, and
the president's
trip should be the occasion
for working on the sub-
stance of such a relation-
ship. Neither side should
act as if the visit itself is a
concession or an opportu-
nity to gain a unilateral
advantage.

These principles should
guide the presidential trip:

* The United States and China are two great powers seeking to adjust potential differences and to fortify common purposes. The test of the meeting is the ability to harmonize in-

terests and to take the sting out of disagreements. The key principle is reciprocity. A full and candid explanation by each side of its views of the international situation is an essential component of this process.

* High priority must be given to encouraging restraint in troubled regions of Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula and the Indian Subcontinent.

The U.S. and China are already pursuing largely parallel policies on the Korean peninsula. These should be strengthened by discussions designed to synchronize attitudes toward accidents, irrational acts (such as military offensives) and political upheavals.

With respect to the Indian Subcontinent, the U.S. and China should avoid giving the impression that they have established a condominium to deprive the two emerging nuclear powers of their newfound capability. Rather, they should try to enlist Delhi and Karachi in a nonproliferation regime Washington and Beijing are themselves practicing. And they should use their influence to defuse political tensions between India and Pakistan.

* The two sides should strengthen their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

China has already joined a number of the international nuclear agreements described above. It has agreed to stop nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. I have reason to believe that it is possible to persuade Beijing to take further steps, particularly toward developing bilateral arrangements for more stringent controls over the exports of nuclear, chemical and biological materials.

* Efforts by both countries to calm the economic crisis in Asia should be coordinated to the greatest extent possible. This implies a full discussion of trade relations. The presence in Clinton's entourage of Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky should allow a full discussion of global economic issues of key concern to both countries. Chinese prosperity and Chinese cooperation are essential to Asian recovery. If the economy of Asia stays flat, and surely if it declines, the global economy would risk a worldwide recession.

Secretary Rubin could help allay Chinese concerns that America opposes Chinese devaluation while acquiescing to, or even encouraging, Japan's, which threatens to undermine the exports of both China and Korea. This is a particular problem at a moment when China is beginning to confront many of the institutional problems common to other Asian countries: capital allocation on

the basis of political, not
commercial, criteria; asset
inflation, especially in real
estate; a shaky banking
system, and huge loss-
making state enterprises.

For its part, China
needs to do much more to
create an open and free
market and to take effec-
tive measures to reduce its
growing trade surplus
with America.

* China must recognize that human-rights pressures are not generally intended as instruments of harassment but reflect America's deepest values and necessities. No administration that fails to take account of this reality can maintain public support. The president speaks for all Americans when, with due regard to the na-

tional pride of an ancient civilization, he affirms these concerns.

* For China, Taiwan is the most sensitive issue. It cannot be put aside, and a realistic discussion is essential. To China, Taiwan is not a foreign country but a secessionist province. It must therefore be handled with great sensitivity.

Six U.S. presidents from both parties have affirmed the unity of China and rejected a two-China or China-Taiwan solution. The same presidents have endorsed peaceful resolution of the issue.

The United States has therefore an implied obligation to oppose Taiwanese independence or membership in the U.N. or its institutions made up of sovereign states. Within that framework, constructive, close U.S.-Taiwan relations should be maintained.

The above agenda defines the president's trip as an opportunity to point Sino-American relations in a positive direction. Keeping the journey from turning into nothing more than a photo opportunity is a matter of choice, not necessity. And for the critics at home, the time has come to give the relationship a chance before we throw ourselves into a new set of confrontations that guarantee decades of tensions with an uncertain outcome.

ARCHIVE PHOTOS

Give cooperation a chance: With Zhou planning Nixon's 1972 trip

52

NEWSWEEK JUNE 29, 1998

Please Deliver to: Hon. Henry Kissinger Suzanne McFarlane

FROM LA TIMES SYNDICATE. AVAILABLE BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT ONLY.

FOR RETRANSMISSION, PLEASE CONTACT JOYCE AUSTIN IN LOS ANGELES

TEL: 213-237-7901 OR FAX: 213-237-4616.

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ATTENTION: SUBSCRIBERS TO THE HENRY KISSINGER COLUMN
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NO ROOM FOR NOSTALGIA
By Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger has written a column arguing that too many members of the United States Congress view China through the prism of the past, rather than an analysis of what the national interest requires. The article, which appears in the June 19, 1998, issue of Newsweek, is available for immediate release to all subscribers of Kissinger's column. If you would like a copy of this text, please contact the New York office of the Los Angeles Times Syndicate International, and we will fax it to your office.

( END OF TEXT )

NewsCom

06/22/98 10:45:52 AM

JUN 19 '98 06:19PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.3

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

I have often been critical of the foreign policy of the Clinton Administration, disturbed about its discomfort with the role power plays in international affairs—most recently in the calamitous handling of the Gulf crisis—and dismayed with its tendency to conduct foreign policy as an aspect of domestic politics. But on the trip to

-------- End of column --------

China, the President deserves bipartisan support. In the present global turmoil, nothing is to be gained by turning China into an enemy; much by exploring potential areas of common interest.

Unfortunately, too many Republicans have substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union and seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the collapse of the Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic ostracism and ideological warfare. Too many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American policy should be to replicate our institutions and principles in China, even at the cost of our many other interests at stake in Asia and without regard for the complexities of Chinese history.

Chinese proliferation of missile and some nuclear technology has been worrisome (though less so than that of countries with which we continue to cultivate friendly relations, such as Russia). Chinese human rights practices have often fallen far short of desirable standards. Clearly, if China continues to grow at anything like the rate of the past two decades, it will be in a stronger position to oppose American interests politically.

SR0426 Page 2 of 13

JUN 19 '98 06:20PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

<hnj Tight> To be sure, this will not depend on American actions alone. And if, despite our most serious efforts to bring about a cooperative relationship, China should come to pose a direct threat to U.S. American security or seek hegemony in Asia, we would surely resist that at any cost.

But our ability to sustain such an effort, were it to become necessary, would depend on having explored alternatives that are reasonable and, I believe—on the basis of recent conversations with Chinese leaders—available. <this wording okay? mark> It is an abdication to base America's policy toward China on the assumption that U.S. actions and policies cannot affect the evolution of Chinese polices, or that China is destined to be congenitally hostile to American interests. Such a course could lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy.

<hnj Tight> In its five thousand year history of independence, China has resisted foreign pressures with extraordinary tenacity and intelligence. Do we really want to turn the world's most populous nation and second largest economy into an enemy at a time when Japan is in economic crisis, South Asia is entering the nuclear age, Indonesia is in turmoil, the Russian evolution is uncertain, the Persian Gulf unsettled, and the Balkans on the brink of war?

SR0426

P.7

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

economy in China is increasingly market-oriented; Beijing is mak-
ing strenuous efforts to get rid of its state-run enterprises; its reform
depends crucially on linking China to the world economy. China
supports no political movement hostile to American interests and,
except for Taiwan, does not challenge the existing world order. And
Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is not considered a foreign poli-
cy issue in Beijing.

There are overwrought scenarios that sketch an increasing Chi-
nese military threat to the United States. Thirteen missiles are re-
ported to be aimed at American cities and Chinese anti-ship mis-
siles are supposed to
pose a threat to our
Navy. But can one seri-
ously believe that China
will take on the United
States with thirteen ob-
solescent liquid-fueled
missiles in the face of two
thousand American
strategic weapons and
perhaps fifteen thousand
warheads, not to speak of
the thousands of ship-
based warheads on
cruise missiles and U.S.
planes on aircraft carri-
ers? (At any time, the

SR0426

JUN 19 '98 06:21PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

U.S. has 198 Trident «source? our researcher says the number should be 96. mark»
missiles on submarines
deployed in the Pacific,
each with at least ten
warheads.) No doubt,
Chinese military capacity
will grow in tandem with

its economic development. But it will not be a global military pow-
er for at least a quarter of a century. Is the United States so unsure
of its capacity to maintain its supremacy even then that we must take preemp-
tive action based on hypothetical perspectives?

Little in China's current or even historical performance justifies
such an assumption. China's responsible conduct in the Asian cri-
sis has demonstrated its interest in the region's economic and politi-
cal stability. It has resisted strong pressures to devalue its curren-
cy, has kept its promise not to suppress political expression,
including demonstrations commemorating Tianamen in Hong
Kong, and has supported the American objective of maintaining
stability on the Korean peninsula.

China has adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as
well as complete test ban, biological and chemical weapons conventions. It
follows most of the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (though it is not a signatory and the U.S. though the United States has some legiti-
mate complaints in this area). China has extended some nuclear
help to Pakistan in ways that we cannot condone. But its purpose
was not mischief-making, as is often alleged, but to establish some
balance of power on the Indian subcontinent after the Indians test-

SR0426

P.9

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

------ End of column ------

ed nuclear explosives in 1974. This perhaps unwise policy is not so
different in intention from America's direct help assistance to Britain, indirect help
to France and acquiescence in the nuclear program of Israel. China
has also proposed resumption of talks with Taiwan.

Should all this progress be jettisoned for the sake of preventing
what China might do twenty five years from now? Undoubtedly, if
China continues to grow at the rate of the past twenty years, it will
become perhaps the most powerful country in Asia. Its impact on
its neighbors would magnify. But do we really want a showdown
now to block what is inherent in the existence of China rather than
its policies? It would be an unprecedented objective of American
foreign policy to prevent the emergence of any potential major
power. Such a neo-imperialist course would, sooner or later, unite
China with the rest of the world against us.

<hnj Tight> No country has ever grown indefinitely at China's recent rate.
And China is not doing so at this moment. But were Beijing, at what-
ever juncture, to pursue hegemonic policies, it would have to con-
tend around its borders with many states of considerable strength.
A wise America could forge a determined resistance among them.
Which is the better course: to make Chinese hostility a self-fulfilling
prophecy by the confrontational and provocative measures now be-
ing advocated; or to seek to
establish a cooperative pat-
tern at a moment when Chi-
nese leaders seem uniquely
receptive to it?

SR0426 Page 8 of 13

JUN 19 '98 06:22PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.11

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DEPT: PG:

(b)«bullet»High priority must be given to encouraging restraint in troubled regions of Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula and the Indian subcontinent.

«hnj Tight»The U.S. and China are already pursuing largely parallel policies on the Korean peninsula. These should be strengthened by discussions designed to synchronize each side's attitudes toward accidents, irrational acts (such as military offensives) and political upheavals.

With respect to the Indian subcontinent, the U.S. and China should avoid giving the impression that they have established a condominium to deprive the two emerging nuclear powers of their new-found capability. Rather, they should try to enlist Delhi and Karachi in a non-proliferation regime they Washington and Beijing are themselves practicing. And they should use their influence to defuse political tensions between India and Pakistan.

(c)«bullet» The two sides should strengthen their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

China has already joined a number of the international nuclear agreements described above. It has agreed to stop nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. I have reason to believe that it is possible during the Presidential trip to persuade Beijing to take further steps, particularly toward developing bilateral arrangements for more stringent controls over the exports of nuclear, chemical and biological materials.

«hnj Tight»(d)«bullet» Efforts by both countries to calm the economic crisis in Asia should be coordinated to the greatest extent possible. This implies a full discussion of trade relations. The presence in Clinton's entourage of Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Trade Rep-

SR0426 Page 10 of 13

P. 12

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DEPT:

PG:

representative Charlene Barshefsky should allow a full discussion of global economic issues of key concern to both countries. Chinese prosperity and Chinese cooperation are essential to Asian recovery. If the economy of Asia stays flat, and surely if it declines, the global economy would risk a world-wide recession.

Secretary Rubin could help allay Chinese concerns that America opposes Chinese devaluation while acquiescing acquiesces to, or even encouraging, Japan's, which threatens to undermine the exports of both China and Korea. This is a particular problem at a moment when China is beginning to confront many of the institutional problems common to other Asian countries: capital allocation on the basis of political, not commercial, criteria; asset inflation, especially in real estate; a shaky banking system; and huge loss-making state enterprises.

For its part, China needs to do much more to create an open and free market and to take effective measures to reduce its growing trade surplus with America.

(e)«bullet» China must recognize that human rights

SR0426 Page 11 of 13

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

pressures are not generally intended as instruments of harassment but reflect America's deepest values and necessities. No Administration that fails to take account of this reality can maintain public support. The President speaks for all Americans when, with due regard to the national pride of an ancient civilization, he affirms these concerns.

(f) For China, Taiwan is the most sensitive issue. It cannot be put aside, and a realistic discussion is essential. To China, Taiwan is not a foreign country but a secessionist province. It must therefore be handled with great sensitivity.

Six U.S. American Presidents from both parties have affirmed the unity of China and rejected a two-China or China-Taiwan solution. The same Presidents have endorsed expressed their concern in a peaceful resolution of the issue.

The United States has therefore an implied obligation to oppose Taiwanese independence or membership in the UN or its institutions made up of sovereign states. Within that framework, constructive, and close U.S.-Taiwan relations should be maintained.

The above agenda defines the President's trip as an opportunity to point Sino-American relations in a positive direction. Keeping the journey from turning into nothing more than a photo opportunity is a matter of choice, not necessity. And for the critics at home,

SR0426

JUN 18 '98 05:13PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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DEPT: VER # 5
BU: HJ: Galley 395
PG: ISSUE:
CREATOR: DFRIED; 06/16/98, 15:54

PRINTED BY: mwhita; 06/18/98, 6:05 PM

WRITER: KISSINGER
FROM: dfried; 06/16/98
FILE: SR0426-MWHITA-NWK

REVISOR: MWHITA; 06/18/98, 17:58

By Henry A. Kissinger

I cannot recall when a President has left
on a major foreign trip amidst so much con-
troversy. The right wing of the Republican
Party and the left wing of the Democratic
Party either oppose the trip to China or
state conditions for it that are more compat-
ible with confrontation than with stabiliz-
ing, much less improving, the relationship
with the world's most populous country and
second largest economy.

Democrats view it as a laboratory for the
spread of American values. Both view
China through the prism of their parties'
experiences over the last thirty years.

Republicans rightly see themselves as the
party that has most consistently attended to
American security in recent decades.

Democrats are justly proud of their long
advocacy of civil and human rights. But
with respect to China, too many in both par-
ties are substituting nostalgia for careful

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P.3

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DEPT: PG:

analysis of what the our national interest
requires.

I have often been critical of the foreign
policy of the Clinton Administration, dis-
turbed about its discomfort with the role
power plays in international affairs—most
recently in the calamitous handling of the
Gulf crisis—and dismayed with its tenden-
cy to conduct foreign policy as an aspect of
domestic politics. But on the trip to China,
the President deserves bipartisan support.

In the present global turmoil, nothing is to
be gained by turning China into an enemy;
much by exploring potential areas of com-
mon interest.

Unfortunately, too many Republicans
have substituted China for the collapsed
Soviet Union and seek to deal with by the
methods that accelerated the collapse of the
Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation,
economic ostracism and ideological war-
fare.

Too many Democrats act as if the princi-
pal goal of American policy should be to
replicate our institutions and principles in
China, even at the cost of our many other

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DEPT:

PG:

Chinese proliferation of missile and some
nuclear technology has been worrisome
(though less so than that of countries with
which we continue to cultivate friendly rela-
tions, such as Russia). Chinese human
rights practices have often fallen far short of
desirable standards. Clearly, if China con-
tinues to grow at anything like the rate of
the past two decades, it will be in a stronger
position to oppose American interests polit-
ically.

No serious student of history can doubt
that the emergence of China as a world
power presents a serious challenge to
American foreign policy. Such a process is
never smooth (witness the emergence of
Germany in the last century). Yet it will not
go away by railing against it. It must be in
our interest that China emerge as a respon-
sible member of the international communi-
ty with interest in regional and global stabil-
ity and progress.

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To be sure, this will not depend on
American actions alone. And if, despite our
most serious efforts to bring about a cooper-
ative relationship, China should come to
pose a direct threat to American security or
seek hegemony in Asia, we would surely
resist at any cost.

But our ability to sustain such an effort,
were it to become necessary, would depend
on having explored alternatives that are
reasonable and, I believe—on the basis of
recent conversations with Chinese lead-
ers—available. *this wording okay? mark* It is an abdication to base
America's policy toward China on the
assumption that U.S. actions and policies
cannot affect the evolution of Chinese
polices, or that China is destined to be con-
genitally hostile to American interests. Such
a course could lead to a disastrous self-ful-
filling prophecy.

In its five thousand year history of inde-
pendence, China has resisted foreign pres-
sures with extraordinary tenacity and intel-
ligence. Do we really want to turn the
world's most populous nation and second
largest economy into an enemy at a time
when Japan is in economic crisis, South

SR0426

JUN 18 '98 05:14PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

Asia is entering the nuclear age, Indonesia is in turmoil, the Russian evolution is uncertain, the Persian Gulf unsettled, and the Balkans on the brink of war? Should we treat China as an enemy when it has, on the whole, behaved responsibly on most of these issues?

China is strenuously seeking to improve relations with the United States in pursuit of its own interests, notably to sustain its economic reform. In pursuit of that goal, it has been prepared to adjust its policies in many areas.

On human rights, considerable progress has been made in the years since the death of Mao Ze Dong. Abuses continue. Are they more likely to be improved by all-out confrontation or by the further integration of China into the international community?

Between great powers, a complete confluence of interests is rarely achieved. For example, more remains to be done on such issues as nuclear proliferation. But do these gaps justify the provocative needling implication in so many Congressional measures and of some of our public discourse? Why shouldn't the differences be the subject of a

SR0426

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

serious diplomatic dialogue? Are we so
unsure of ourselves that we assume that
such an approach is bound to fail to achieve
our objectives.

It cannot be an accident that every former
President, Secretary of State and National
Security Adviser—the people with the
longest experience in dealing with the
nation's foreign policy—reject the con-
frontational course strategy urged by both
the left and right wings of American politics.
Nor would any other major power—or, for
that matter, any country—join us in such a
course.

Before going any further, let me in the
interest of full disclosure state that I head a
consulting firm that advises a few clients

--------- End of column ---------

with business interests in China. Anyone
who, despite my record of fostering Sino-
American relations for nearly three decades
(for most of which nobody did any business
in China) nevertheless believes that my
views are for sale, should stop reading here.

It is important to understand the distinc-
tion between the old Soviet Union and
today's China. The Soviet Union avowed an

SR0426

P.8

SR0426 kissinger

ideology fundamentally hostile to our val-
ues, actively propagated it around the
world, and backed it up by supporting
Communist revolutionary parties bent on
undermining the domestic cohesion of gov-
emments friendly to the United States.
Moscow had deployed thousands of mis-
siles and tens of thousands of warheads
capable of reaching the United States. And
it espoused a foreign policy that directly
challenged American interests, occasionally
including the threat of force.
None of this has been true of America's
relations with China. Though Beijing
describes its ideology as Communist, in
practice it bears no similarity to Moscow's
Stalinist state-run economy. The economy
in China is increasingly market-oriented;
Beijing is making strenuous efforts to get rid
of its state-run enterprises; its reform
depends crucially on linking China to the
world economy. China supports no political
movement hostile to American interests
and, except for Taiwan, does not challenge
the existing world order. And Taiwan, as
will be discussed below, is not considered a
foreign policy issue in Beijing.

DEPT:

PG:

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Page 7 of 16

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PG:

There are overwrought scenarios that sketch an increasing Chinese military threat to the United States. Thirteen missiles are reported to be aimed at American cities and Chinese anti-ship missiles are supposed to pose a threat to our Navy. But can one seriously believe that China will take on the United States with thirteen obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles in the face of two thousand American strategic weapons and perhaps fifteen thousand warheads, not to speak of the thousands of ship-based warheads on cruise missiles and U.S. planes on aircraft carriers? (At any time, the U.S. has 196 Trident missiles on submarines deployed in the Pacific, each with at least ten warheads.) No doubt, Chinese military capacity will grow in tandem with its economic development. But it will not be a global military power for at least a quarter of a century. Is the United States so unsure of its capacity to maintain its supremacy even then that we must take preemptive action based on hypothetical perspectives? Little in China's current or even historical performance justifies such an assumption. China's responsible conduct in the

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JUN 18 '98 05:15PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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China has adhered to the Non-

Proliferation Treaty, complete test ban accords and biological and chemical conventions. It follows most of the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (though it is not a signatory and though the United States has some legitimate complaints in this area). China has extended some nuclear help to Pakistan in ways that we cannot condone. But its purpose was not mischief-making, as is often alleged, but to establish some balance of power on the Indian subcontinent after the Indians tested nuclear explosives in 1974. This perhaps unwise policy is not so different in intention from America's direct help assistance to Britain, indirect help to France and acquies-

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Should all this progress be jettisoned for
the sake of preventing what China might do
twenty five years from now? Undoubtedly,
if China continues to grow at the rate of the
past twenty years, it will become perhaps
the most powerful country in Asia. Its
impact on its neighbors would magnify. But
do we really want a showdown now to
block what is inherent in the existence of
China rather than its policies? It would be
an unprecedented objective of American
foreign policy to prevent the emergence of
any potential major power. Such a neo-
imperialist course would, sooner or later,
unite China with the rest of the world
against us.

No country has ever grown indefinitely at
China's recent rate. And China is not doing
so at this moment. But were Beijing, at
whatever juncture, to pursue hegemonic
policies, it would have to contend around its
borders with many states of considerable
strength. A wise American could forge a
determined resistance among them. Which

SR0426

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DEPT: PG:

A cooperative relationship should be given a chance, and to use the President's trip should be the occasion for working on the substance of such a relationship.

Neither side should act as if the visit itself is a concession or an opportunity to gain a unilateral advantage.

These principles should guide the Presidential trip:

(a) **<bullet>** The United States and China are two great powers seeking to adjust potential differences and to fortify common purposes.

The test of the meeting is the ability to harmonize interests and to take the sting out of disagreements. The key principle is reciprocity. A full and candid explanation by each side of its views of the international situation is an essential component of this process.

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DEPT: PG:

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Page 12 of 16

JUN 18 '98 05:16PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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DEPT: PG:

Barashefsky should allow a full discussion of global economic issues of key concern to both countries. Chinese prosperity and Chinese cooperation are essential to Asian recovery. If the economy of Asia stays flat, and surely if it declines, the global economy would risk a world-wide recession.

Secretary Rubin could help allay Chinese concerns that America opposes Chinese devaluation but while acquiescing acqui-

SR0426

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

esces to, or even encourages encouraging,
Japan's, which threatens to undermine the
exports of both China and Korea. This is a
particular problem at a moment when
China is beginning to confront many of the
institutional problems common to other
Asian countries: capital allocation on the
basis of political, not commercial, criteria;
asset inflation, especially in real estate; a
shaky banking system; and huge loss-mak-
ing state enterprises.

(e)«bullet» China must recognize that human
rights pressures are not generally intended
as instruments of harassment but reflect
America's deepest values and necessities.
No Administration that fails to take account
of this reality can maintain public support.
The President speaks for all Americans
when, with due regard to the national pride
of an ancient civilization, he affirms these
concerns.

End of column

(f) For China, Taiwan is the most sensi-

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Page 14 of 16

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DEPT:

PG:

tive issue. It cannot be put aside, and a real-
istic discussion is essential. To China,
Taiwan is not a foreign country but a seces-
sionist province. It must therefore be han-
dled with great sensitivity.

Six American Presidents from both par-
ties have affirmed the unity of China and
rejected a two-China or China-Taiwan solu-
tion. The same Presidents have expressed
their concern in a peaceful solution of the
issue.

The United States has therefore an
implied obligation to oppose Taiwanese
independence or membership in the UN or
its institutions made up of sovereign states.
Within that framework, constructive and
close U.S.-Taiwan relations should be
maintained.

The above agenda defines the President's
trip as an opportunity to point Sino-
American relations in a positive direction.

Keeping the journey from turning into noth-
ing more than a photo opportunity is a mat-
ter of choice, not necessity. And for the crit-
ics at home, the time has come to give the
relationship a chance before we throw our-
selves, into a new set of confrontations that

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Page 15 of 16

JUN 18 '98 11:32AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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DEPT: VER # 4
BU: HJ: Galley 394
PG: ISSUE:
CREATOR: DFRIED; 06/16/98, 15:54

PRINTED BY: mwhita; 06/18/98, 11:19 AM
WRITER: KISSINGER
FROM: dfried; 06/16/98
FILE: SR0426-MWHITA-NWK
REVISOR: DDEPKE; 06/17/98, 18:20

By Henry A. Kissinger

SR0426

Page 1 of 16

JUN 18 '98 11:33AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.3

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DEPT:

PG:

I have often been critical of the foreign
policy of the Clinton Administration, dis-
turbed about its discomfort with the role
power plays in international affairs—most
recently in the calamitous handling of the
Gulf crisis—and dismayed with its tenden-
cy to conduct foreign policy as an aspect of
domestic politics. But on the trip to China,
the President deserves bipartisan support.
In the present global turmoil, nothing is to
be gained by turning China into an enemy;
much by exploring potential areas of com-
mon interest.

Unfortunately, too many Republicans
have substituted China for the collapsed
Soviet Union and seek to deal with it as
seeking to deal with it by the methods that
accelerated the collapse of the Soviet
empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic
ostracism and ideological warfare.

SR0426 Page 2 of 16

P.4

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DEPT: PG:

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DEPT: PG:

To be sure, this will not depend on American actions alone. And if, despite our most serious efforts to bring about a cooperative relationship, China should come to pose a direct threat to American security or seek hegemony in Asia, we would surely resist at any cost.

But our ability to sustain such an effort, were it to become necessary, would depend on having explored reasonable, and I believe available, alternatives. It is an abdication to base America's policy toward China on the assumption that U.S. actions and policies cannot affect the evolution of Chinese polices, or that China is destined to be congenitally hostile to American interests. Such a course could lead to a disastrous self-fulfilling prophecy.

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Page 4 of 16

P.6

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DEPT: PG:

On human rights, considerable progress
has been made in the years since the death
of Mao Ze Dong. Abuses continue. Are they
more likely to be improved by all-out con-
frontation or by the further integration of
China into the international community?

Between great powers, a complete con-
fluence of interests is rarely achieved. For
example, more remains to be done on such
issues as nuclear proliferation. But do these
gaps justify the provocative needling implic-
it in so many Congressional measures and
of some of our public discourse? Why
shouldn't the differences be the subject of a
serious diplomatic dialogue? Are we so
unsure of ourselves that we assume that

SR0426 Page 5 of 16

P.7

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DEPT: PG:

It cannot be an accident that every former
President, Secretary of State and National
Security Adviser—the people with the
longest experience in dealing with the
nation's foreign policy—reject the con-
frontational course_strategy urged by both
the left and right wings of American politics.
Nor would any other major power—or, for
that matter, any country—join us in such a
course.

Before going any further, let me in the
interest of full disclosure state that I head a
consulting firm that advises a few clients
with business interests in China. Anyone
who, despite my record of fostering Sino-
-------- End of column --------

American relations for nearly three decades
(for most of which nobody did any business
in China) nevertheless believes that my
views are for sale, should stop reading here.
It is important to understand the distinc-
tion between the old Soviet Union and
today's China. The Soviet Union avowed an
ideology fundamentally hostile to our val-
ues, actively propagated it around the

SR0426 Page 6 of 16

JUN 18 '98 11:34AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.8

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

world, and backed it up by supporting
Communist revolutionary parties bent on
undermining the domestic cohesion of gov-
ernments friendly to the United States.
Moscow had deployed thousands of mis-
siles and tens of thousands of warheads
capable of reaching the United States. And
it espoused a foreign policy that directly
challenged American interests, occasionally
including the threat of force.

None of this has been true of America's
relations with China. Though Beijing
describes its ideology as Communist, in
practice it bears no similarity to
Moscow's Stalinist state-run economy. The
economy in China is increasingly market-
oriented; Beijing is making strenuous
efforts to get rid of its state-run enterprises;
its reform depends crucially on linking
China to the world economy. China sup-
ports no political movement hostile to
American interests and, except for Taiwan,
does not challenge the existing world order.
And Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is
not considered a foreign policy issue in
Beijing.

SR0426 Page 7 of 16

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DEPT: PG:

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Asian crisis has demonstrated its interest in
the region's economic and political stability.
It has resisted strong pressures to devalue
its currency, has kept its promise not to sup-
press political expression, including demon-
strations commemorating Tiananmen in
Hong Kong, and has supported the
American objective of maintaining stability
on the Korean peninsula.

accords and biological and chemical con-
ventions. It follows most of the guidelines of
the Missile Technology Control Regime
(though it is not a signatory and though the
United States has some legitimate com-
plaints in this area). China has extended
some nuclear help to Pakistan in ways that
we cannot condone. But its purpose was not
mischief-making, as is often alleged, but to
establish some balance of power on the
Indian subcontinent after the Indians tested
nuclear explosives in 1974. This perhaps
unwise policy is not so different in intention
from America's direct help assistance to
Britain, indirect help to France and acquies-

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DEPT: PG:

SR0426 Page 10 of 16

JUN 18 '98 11:35AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

P.12

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DEPT: PG:

(a)«bullet» The United States and China are two great powers seeking to adjust potential differences and to fortify common purposes.

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DEPT: PG:

largely parallel policies on the Korean
peninsula. These should be strengthened by
discussions designed to synchronize each
side's attitudes toward accidents, irrational
acts (such as military offensives) and politi-
cal upheavals.

With respect to the Indian subcontinent,
the U.S. and China should avoid giving the
impression that they have established a con-
dominium to deprive the two emerging
nuclear powers of their new-found capabili-
ty. Rather, they should try to enlist them-
Delhi and Karachi in a non-proliferation
regime they Washington and Beijing are
themselves practicing. And they should use
their influence to defuse political tensions
between India and Pakistan.

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(d)~~bullet~~ Efforts by both countries to calm the economic crisis in Asia should be coordinated to the greatest extent possible. This implies a full discussion of trade relations.

The presence in Clinton's entourage of Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Trade Representative Charlene Barashefsky should allow a full discussion of global economic issues of key concern to both countries. Chinese prosperity and Chinese cooperation are essential to Asian recovery. If the economy of Asia stays flat, and surely if it declines, the global economy would risk a world-wide recession.

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esces to, or even encourages encouraging,
Japan's, which threatens to undermine the
exports of both China and Korea. This is a
particular problem at a moment when
China is beginning to confront many of the
institutional problems common to other
Asian countries: capital allocation on the
basis of political, not commercial, criteria;
asset inflation, especially in real estate; a
shaky banking system; and huge loss-making
state enterprises.

--------- End of column---------

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JUN 18 '98 11:36AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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DEPT: PG:

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SR0426 kissinger
DEPT: VER # 2
BU: HJ: Galley 388
PG: ISSUE:
CREATOR: DFRIED; 06/16/98, 15:54

PRINTED BY: mwhita; 06/16/98, 5:52 PM

WRITER: KISSINGER

FROM: dfried, 06/16/98

FILE: SR0426-MWHITA-NWK

REVISOR: DFRIED; 06/16/98, 16:01

By Henry A. Kissinger

I cannot recall when a President has left
on a major foreign trip amidst so much con-
troversy. The right wing of the Republicans **Republican Party?** OK
and the left wing of the Democrats **Democratic Party?** either OK
oppose the trip [to China]/cut? or state condi-
tions for it **that are?** more compatible with confronta-
tion than with stabilizing, much less
improving, the relationship with the world's
most populous country and second largest
economy.
OK

Republicans see China as a threat;
Democrats view it as a laboratory for the
spread of American values. Both view
China through the prism of their parties'
experiences over the last thirty years.
Republicans rightly see themselves as the
party that has most consistently attended to
American security in recent decades.

Democrats are rightly proud of their long
advocacy of civil and human rights. But
with respect to China, too many in both par-
ties are substituting nostalgia for careful

SR0426

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

analysis of what the «our?» national interest
requires «end sentence here?» under current conditions.

I have often been critical of the foreign
policy of the Clinton Administration, dis-
turbed about its discomfort with the role
power plays in international affairs—most
recently in the calamitous handling of the
Gulf crisis—and «dismayed?» with its tendency to con-
duct foreign policy as an aspect of domestic
politics. But on the trip to China, the
President deserves bipartisan support. In
the present global turmoil, nothing is to be
gained by turning China into an enemy;
much by exploring potential areas of com-
mon interest.

Unfortunately, too many Republicans
have «substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union?» fallen into the habit of substituting
China for the collapsed Soviet Union and «seek to deal with it?» of
seeking to deal with it by the methods that
accelerated the collapse of the Soviet
empire: diplomatic confrontation, economic
ostracism and ideological warfare.

Too many Democrats act as if the princi-
pal goal of American policy should be to
replicate our institutions and principles in
China, even at the cost of ~~the many other~~
interests at stake in the ~~SinoAmerican~~ rule.

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DEPT:

PG:

More remains to be done on such issues
as nuclear proliferation. Between great
powers, a complete confluence of interests
is rarely achieved. But do these gaps justify

the provocative needling «implicit in so many congressional measures?» of so many
Congressional measures and of some of our

public discourse? Why should «shouldn't the differences be the subject? mark» they not be
the subject of a serious diplomatic dialogue?

SR0426

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT:

PG:

assume that«such an approach is bound to fail to achieve our objectives?» we are bound to fail to achieve
our objectives in this manner?

OK

It cannot be an accident that every former
President, Secretary of State and National
Security Adviser—the people with the
longest experience in dealing with the
nation's foreign policy—reject the con-
frontational course«strategy?» urged by both the left
and right wings of American politics. Nor
would any other major power—or, for that
matter, any country—join us in such an«a course?»
enterprise.

OK

OK

Before going any further, let me in the
interest of full disclosure state that I head a
consulting firm that advises a few clients
with business interests in China. Anyone
who, despite my record of fostering Sino-
American relations for nearly three
decades«parenthesis?»—for most of which nobody did any
-------- End of column --------

OK

business in China-«end parenthesis?» nevertheless believes
that my views are for sale, should stop read-
ing here.

OK

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Communist revolutionary parties>bent on undermining?« to under-
mine the domestic cohesion of governments

friendly to the United States. «Moscow had deployed?»Thousands of
missiles and tens of thousands of warheads
>were/cut?« capable of reaching the United States.

And«it espoused a foreign policy?» these backed up a foreign policy that
directly challenged American interests,
occasionally including the threat of force.

None of this has been true of America's
relations with China. Though Beijing
describes its ideology as Communist, the
practice of<in practice it bears?» it bears no similarity to
Moscow's Stalinist state-run economy. The
economy in China is increasingly market-
oriented; Beijing is making strenuous effort«efforts?»
to get rid of its state-run enterprises; its
reform depends crucially on relating«linking?» China
to the world economy. China supports no
political movement hostile to American
interests and, except for Taiwan, does not
challenge the existing world order. And

Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is
<u>very special case</u>.

«There are?» Overwrought scenarios«that?» sketch an
increasing Chinese military threat to the

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DEPT:

PG:

United States. Thirteen missiles are report-
ed to be aimed at American cities and
Chinese anti-ship missiles are supposed to
pose a threat to our Navy. But can one seri-
ously believe that China will take on the
United States with thirteen obsolescent liq-
uid-fueled missiles in the face of two thou-
sand American strategic weapons and per-
haps fifteen thousand warheads, not to
speak of the thousands of ship-based war-

heads on cruise missiles and «U.S.»planes on air-
craft carriers? No doubt, Chinese military
capacity will grow in tandem with its eco-
nomic development. But it will not be a
global military power for at least a quarter

of a century. Given the vast implications of a
confrontation with China, is the United
States so unsure of its capacity to maintain

its supremacy even then/cut? that we must take
preemptive action based on such hypotheti-
cal perspectives?

Little in China's current or even histori-

cal performance justifies such an assump-
tion. China is responsible for the
Asian (areal) and has shown its interest in
the region's economic and political stability.

SR0426

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its currency, has kept its promise not to sup-
press political expression, including demon-
strations commemorating Tianamen in
Hong Kong, and has supported the
American objective of maintaining stability
on the Korean peninsula.

China has adhered to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, complete test ban«accords?» and
biological and chemical conventions. It fol-
lows most of the guidelines of the Missile
Technology Control Regime «parenthesis?» though it is not
a signatory and though the United Statf-s

has some legitimate complaints in this area.«end parenthesis?»

Pakistan in ways that we disapprove<del> cannot condone?</del>». But its

different in intention from American«America's?» direct

help«assistance?» to Britain, indirect help to France and

Should all this <del>presume</del> be jettisoned for
the sake of preventing what China might do

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ed; or to seek to establish a cooperative pat-
tern at a moment when Chinese leaders
seem uniquely receptive to it?

The wise course of action is to give a constructive relationship a chance, and to use the President's trip as an occasion for working on the substance of such a relationship.

Neither side should act as if the visit itself is
a concession or an opportunity to gain a uni-
lateral advantage.

The purpose and cut? test of the meeting is the
ability to harmonize interests and to take
the sting out of disagreements. The key
need principle? is reciprocity. A full and candid expla-
nation by each side of its views of the inter-
national situation is an essential component
of this process.

(b) **<bullet>** High priority must be given to encouraging restraint in troubled regions of Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula and the Indian subcontinent.

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DEPT:

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The U.S. and China are already pursuing largely parallel policies on the Korean peninsula. These should be strengthened by discussions about each side's attitudes toward accidents, irrational acts (such as military offens-

-------- End of column --------
sives) and political upheavals.

ty. Rather, they should try to enlist them «Delhi and Karachi? » in a non-proliferation regime they «Washington and Beijing? » are them- selves practicing. And they should use their influence to defuse political tensions between India and Pakistan.

further steps, particularly in toward? » developing

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bilateral arrangements for more stringent
controls over the exports of nuclear, chemi-
cal and biological materials.

(d) «bullet» The efforts of «Efforts by?» both countries to calm the economic crisis in Asia should be coordinated to the greatest extent possible. This implies as well/cut? a full discussion of trade relations. The presence in Clinton's entourage of the/cut? Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and the/cut? Trade Representative Charlene Barashefsky should allow a full discussion of «global economic? mark» issues of key concern to both countries and the global economy/cut?. Chinese prosperity and Chinese cooperation are essential to Asian recovery, or to prevent a further downward spiral/cut? If the economy of Asia stays flat, and surely if it declines, the global economy would risk a world-wide recession.

Secretary Rubin could help allay Chinese
concerns that America opposes Chinese
devaluation but «while acquiescing?» acquiesces to, or even
encourages «encouraging?», Japan's, which threatens to
undermine the exports of both China and
Korea. This is a particular problem at a
moment when China is beginning to con-
front many of the institutional problems

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common to other Asian countries: capital
allocation on the basis of political, not com-
mercial, criteria; asset inflation, especially
in real estate «semicolon?», a shaky banking system, «semicolon?» and
huge loss-making state enterprises.

The President speaks for all Americans
when, with due
regard to the national pride of an ancient
civilization. he affirms these concerns. «moved down»

(f) For China, Taiwan is the most sensitive issue. It cannot be put aside, and a realistic discussion for a peaceful evolution/cut?» is essential. To China, Taiwan is not a foreign country but a secessionist province. It must therefore be handled with great sensitivity.

Six American Presidents of «from?» both parties

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EDITORIAL ADMIN

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PRINTED BY: mwhita; 06/16/98, 5:52 PM
WRITER: KISSINGER
FROM: dfried; 06/16/98
FILE: SR0426-MWHITA-NWK
REVISOR: DFRIED; 06/16/98, 16:01

By Henry A. Kissinger

I cannot recall when a President has left
on a major foreign trip amidst so much con-
troversy. The right wing of the Republicans *Republican Party* and the left wing of the Democrats *Democratic Party* either oppose the trip [to China]/cut? or state condi-
tions for it *that are?* more compatible with confronta-
tion than with stabilizing, much less
improving, the relationship with the world's
most populous country and second largest
economy.

Republicans see China as a threat;
Democrats view it as a laboratory for the
spread of American values. Both view
China through the prism of their parties'
experiences over the last thirty years.
Republicans rightly see themselves as the
party that has most consistently attended to
American security in recent decades.
Democrats are ~~fairly~~ *justly* proud of their long
advocacy of civil and human rights. But
with respect to China, too many in both par-
ties are substituting nostalgia for careful

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EDITORIAL ADMIN

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Too many Democrats act as if the princi-
pal goal of American policy should be to
replicate our institutions and principles in
China, even at the cost of the many other
interests at stake in the Sino-American relation.

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To be sure, this will not depend on
American actions alone. And if, despite our
most serious efforts to bring about a cooper-
ative relationship, China should come to
pose a direct threat to American security or
seek hegemony in Asia, we must resist—
strongly, seriatim at whatever cost

But our «Yet even our» ability to sustain such an effort,
were it to become necessary, depends «would depend?» on
having explored reasonable, and I believe
available, alternatives. It is an abdication to
base America's policy toward China on the
assumption that American «U.S.?» actions and poli-
cies cannot affect the evolution of Chinese
polices, or that China is destined to be con-
genitally hostile to American interests. Such
a course could lead to a disastrous self-ful-
filling prophecy.

In *its five thousand year history of independence?* the five thousand years of its history of independence, China has resisted foreign pressures with extraordinary tenacity and intelligence. Do we really want to turn the world's most populous nation and second largest economy into an enemy at a time when Japan is in economic crisis, South Asia is entering the nuclear age, Indonesia is in turmoil, the Russian evolution is uncer-

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It cannot be an accident that every former
President, Secretary of State and National
Security Adviser—the people with the
longest experience in dealing with the
nation's foreign policy—reject the con-
frontational course«strategy?» urged by both the left
and right wings of American politics. Nor
would any other major power—or, for that
matter, any country—join us in such an «a course?»
enterprise.

business in China—«end parenthesis?» nevertheless believes
that my views are for sale, should stop read-
ing here.

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Communist revolutionary parties<b>«bent on undermining?»</b> to under-
mine the domestic cohesion of governments

Yes

friendly to the United States. <b>«Moscow had deployed?»</b> Thousands of
missiles and tens of thousands of warheads

Yes

<b>were/cut?»</b> capable of reaching the United States.

Yes

And «<b>it espoused a foreign policy?</b>» these backed up a foreign policy that
directly challenged American interests,
occasionally including the threat of force.

Yes

None of this has been true of America's
relations with China. Though Beijing
describes its ideology as Communist, the

practice of <b>in practice it bears?</b>» it bears no similarity to
Moscow's Stalinist state-run economy. The

Yes

economy in China is increasingly market-
oriented; Beijing is making strenuous effort«<b>efforts?</b>»
to get rid of its state-run enterprises; its

Yes

reform depends crucially on relating «<b>linking?</b>» China
to the world economy. China supports no

Yes

political movement hostile to American
interests and, except for Taiwan, does not
challenge the existing world order. And
Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is a
<u>very special case</u>.

not made a foreign policy
mistake in Beijing.

<b>«There are?</b>» Overwrought scenarios «<b>that?</b>» sketch an
increasing Chinese military threat to the

Yes

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heads on cruise missiles and <u>U.S.?</u>planes on air-
craft carriers? No doubt, Chinese military
capacity will grow in tandem with its eco-
nomic development. But it will not be a
global military power for at least a quarter
of a century. Given the vast implications of a
confrontation with China, is the United

States so unsure of its capacity to maintain
its supremacy <u>even then/cut?</u> that we must take
preemptive action based on <u>such hypotheti-
cal perspectives?</u>

Little in China's current or even histori-
cal performance justifies such an assump-
tion. China is a responsible conduit in <u>Asia</u>—the
Asian [arena] and has shown its interest in
the region's economic and political stability.

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JUN 16 '98 05:08PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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China has adhered to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, complete test bans on
biological and chemical conventions. It fol-
lows most of the guidelines of the Missile

Technology Control Regime *<u>parenthesis?</u>* though it is not
a signatory and though the United States

has some legitimate complaints in this area. <<end parenthesis?>>

China has extended some nuclear help to
Pakistan in ways that we disapprove <<<end? cannot? end?>>. But its
purpose was not mischief-making, as is
often alleged, but to establish some balance
of power on the Indian subcontinent after
the Indians tested nuclear explosives in
1974. This perhaps unwise policy is not so
different in intention from American <<America's?>> direct
help <<assistance?>> to Britain, indirect help to France and
acquiescence in the nuclear program of

Israel. China has also proposed resumption of talks with Taiwan.
Should all this <u>progress</u> be jettisoned for
the sake of preventing what China might do

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(a) The United States and China are two great powers seeking to adjust potential differences and to fortify common purposes.

The purpose and effect of the meeting is the
ability to harmonize interests and to take
the sting out of disagreements. The key
need for reciprocity is the principle of equality.
A full and candid explanation by each side of its views of the inter-
national situation is an essential component
of this process.

(b) High priority must be given to encouraging restraint in troubled regions of Asia, especially in the Korean peninsula and the Indian subcontinent.

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The U.S. and China are already pursuing largely parallel policies on the Korean peninsula. These should be strengthened by discussions ~~about each side's?~~ attitudes toward accidents, irrational acts (such as military offens- ~~villians) and political upheavals.

With respect to the Indian subcontinent, the U.S. and China should avoid giving the impression that they have established a con- dominium to deprive the two emerging nuclear powers of their new-found capabilities. Rather, they should try to enlist them«Delhi and Karachi?» in a non-proliferation regime they«Washington and Beijing?» are themselves practicing. And they should use their influence to defuse political tensions between India and Pakistan.

(c)«bullet». The two sides should strengthen their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and missile technology.

China has already joined a number of the international nuclear agreements described above. It has agreed to stop nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran. I have reason to believe that it is possible during the Presidential trip to persuade Beijing to take further steps, particularly in«toward?» developing

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JUN 16 '98 05:09PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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common to other Asian countries: capital
allocation on the basis of political, not com-
mercial, criteria; asset inflation, especially
in real estate«semicolon?», a shaky banking system, «semicolon?» and
huge loss-making state enterprises.

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have affirmed the unity of China and reject-
ed a two-China or China-Taiwan solution.

its institutions, "made up of sovereign states?" where they are based on
sovereign states. Within that framework,
constructive and close U.S.-Taiwan rela-
tions should be maintained.

"Keeping the journey from turning into nothing more than a photo opportunity is a matter of choice, not necessity?" If the journey turns into a television opportunity, it is by choice and indeed against necessity. And for the critics at home, the time has come to give the relationship a chance before we throw ourselves, while the world is in crisis/cut?, into a new set of confrontations that guarantee decades of tensions with an uncertain outcome.

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Page 15 of 15

By Henry A. Kissinger

I cannot recall when a President has left
on a major foreign trip amidst so much con-
troversy. The right wing of the Republicans *Republican Party?*
and the left wing of the Democrats *Democratic Party?* either
oppose the trip [*to China*] *cut?* or state condi-
tions for it *that are?* more compatible with confronta-
tion than with stabilizing, much less
improving, the relationship with the world's
most populous country and second largest
economy.

SR0426

JUN 16 '98 05:00PM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

SR0426 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

Too many Democrats act as if the princi-
pal goal of American policy should be to
replicate our institutions and principles in
China, even at the cost of the many other
interests at stake in the SinoAmerican rela-

SR0426

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ADMINISTRATION 05:00PM EDITORIAL

JUN 16 '98

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On human rights, considerable progress
has been made in the years since the death
of Mao Ze Dong. Abuses continue. Are they
more likely to be improved by all-out con-
frontation or by the further integration of
China into the international community?
More remains to be done on such issues
as nuclear proliferation. Between great
powers, a complete confluence of interests
is rarely achieved. But do these gaps justify

the provocative needling «implicit in so many congressional measures?» of so many
Congressional measures and of some of our
public discourse? Why should «shouldn't the differences be the subject? mark» they not be
the subject of a serious diplomatic dialogue?
Are we so unsure of ourselves that we

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DEPT: PG:

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Communist revolutionary parties«bent on undermining?» to under-
mine the domestic cohesion of governments

friendly to the United States. «Moscow had deployed?» Thousands of
missiles and tens of thousands of warheads

were/cut?» capable of reaching the United States.

And«it espoused a foreign policy?» these backed up a foreign policy that
directly challenged American interests,
occasionally including the threat of force.
None of this has been true of America's
relations with China. Though Beijing
describes its ideology as Communist, the
practice of«in practice it bears?» it bears no similarity to
Moscow's Stalinist state-run economy. The
economy in China is increasingly market-
oriented; Beijing is making strenuous effort«efforts?»
to get rid of its state-run enterprises; its
reform depends crucially on relating«linking?» China
to the world economy. China supports no
political movement hostile to American
interests and, except for Taiwan, does not
challenge the existing world order. And
Taiwan, as will be discussed below, is a
very special case.

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JUN 16 '98 05:02PM