["POSTE APPELE: PAS D'IDENTITE 1993-09-18 00:54 63-96 S BIEN RECU #13", "[Y]", "IN0413 henry", "DEPT. in", "the lead, but major resources must come\nfrom the Arab world. In addition, the world\ncommunity has been an obligation to come\ndown hard on terrorism. Heretofore, the\npattern has been token opposition to terror-\nism and passionate condemnation of Israeli\nretaliations. That pattern must end.<-", "[21]", "But the ultimate challenge remains\nthe follow-on negotiations. Fitting\ntwo states into a territory fifty miles\nwide—the distance from the Medi-\nterranean to the Jordan River—\nwould be difficult even if irredentism\nwere not built into the situation. This\nremains above all a psychological\nproblem. Israel will have to navigate\nbetween the two extremes of an oc-\ncupation mentality on the one hand,\nand a nearly mystical belief in a for-\nmal peace (for which there is no his-\ntorical warranty) on the other. After\nall, most wars start between coun-\ntries that are legally at peace; recog-\nnition has never precluded war or\neven conquest. The PLO must over-\ncome the twin temptations of sus-", {"bbox": [748, 1362, 881, 1383], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))", "P.13", "SEP 17 '93 05:57PM 2123505146"]

POSTE APPELE: PAS D'IDENTITE 1993-09-18 00:54 63-96 S BIEN RECU #14

LJ

IN0413 henry

DEPT. in PAGE-13

taining the intifada and using softer
language to disarm Israel while pur-
suing its traditional objectives.<-

[22]

※America's role should be to rally support
for the development of the autonomous
area, insisting that most of these funds
come from the Arab world. It should use its
influence with the moderate Arabs to end
their boycott of Israel, and to encourage
Palestinian restraint. It should be available
at times of deadlock, but without returning
to its dominating role. And it should orga-
nize plausible international sanctions
against terrorism and make clear to the
PLO that this is a key test of its seriousness.<

[12]

※What America must not do is to offer its
military forces as the deus ex machina for
solving every security issue. Nothing would
more undermine the willingness of the
American people to support the peace pro-
cess than a permanent stationing of U.S.
combat troops, especially in the heavily
populated territories on the West Bank,
where they could easily repeat the experi-
ences of Beirut.<-

[10]

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P.14

SEP 17 '93 05:58PM 2123505146

BIEN REC U #15

63-96 S

00:55

1993-09-18

POSTE APPEL : PAS D'IDENTITE

[Y]

IN0413 henry

DEPT. in

A formidable agenda thus lies ahead. Li-
ke all diplomatic documents, the agreement
signed in Washington represents a compro-
mise which must be compared not with
what each side would consider ideal, but
with what would exist in the absence of the
agreement. All the parties must now learn
to live with what they have built, which is
quite different from what is familiar to
them. As a first step, the spirit shown at the
emotional signing should be a big help in
getting the parties to their destination.<-

(((END)))

[12]

SEP 16 '93 05:10PM 2123505146

P.4

413 · Henry

DEPT.

Only the most churlish or fanatical would refuse to join the almost palpable hope expressed at that historic ceremony, but on the other hand, statesmen who base their policy on the expectation of miracles usually suffer shipwreck. In the years ahead, the idyll on the White House lawn can only be fulfilled if all the parties concerned apply its spirit to resolving the nagging questions which remain. For example, What exactly was being recognized by each party? Was it pre臥ture (however unavoidable) to invest Arafat with the aura of a head of state three years after his support of Gaddam Hussein in the Gulf War, and on the basis of ``granting'' Israel a status that is the automatic prerogative of nearly every other nation? Was the euphoria in which we all shared a spur to the process? Or will it prove an obstacle if it leads to disillusionment after the nearly inevitable deadlocks appear?<-

Whether the agreement leads to greater flexibility or greater tension will depend on the United States. Until now, every Arab-Israeli agreement has been brokered by the United States, and many of the for-

[21]

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["SEP 16 '93 05:13PM 2123505146", "P.13", "[Y]", "INO413", "henry", "DEPT.", "The prospects of a permanent peace thus depend on how well the interim arrangements can be made to work. In this respect, the outside world has a major responsibility. While the role of economic development is often exaggerated, in this case rapid progress in that field is one of the few tools available to give the parties-especially the Palestinians-a stake in an evolutionary approach. A substantial aid program is necessary. America has quite properly taken the lead, but major resources must come from the Arab world. In addition, the world community has an obligation to come down hard on terrorism. Heretofore, the pattern has been token opposition to terrorism and passionate condemnation of Israeli retaliations. That pattern must be ended.<-", "Fitting two states into a territory fifty miles wide-the distance from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River-would be difficult even if irredentism were not built into the situation. When I was involved in Middle East diplomacy, I too favored the return of Jericho and Gaza-although to", "and after two years of谈判 with the leader-onnegotiations onJericho, Ramallah, and other settlements, will slow progress.\n\nBack the ultimatum, peace challenge remains the leader-on negotiations.", "[19]", "This position above all a psychological problem: web lost abot it (I understand)", (((MORE)))"]