Recent U.S. policy toward Czechoslovakia has been in my view short-sighted and shameful. In order to explain briefly why it deserves in my opinion to be characterized by what may be thought to be such strong adjectives, I must begin by outlining my own analytical assumptions. What were the causes for the 1967-1968 Czechoslovak developments? What would their implications have been for the USSR and the U.S.?

Czechoslovakia was liberalized in 1962-1968 by the interaction of five factors.* The first was de-Stalinization, which destroyed Novotny's prestige by making public his complicity in crime. The second was the 1962 serious economic recession, caused by the increasing inefficient centralized Stalinist economic model: low worker productivity, disruption in foreign trade patterns, extensive Soviet-directed aid to the third world, and low agricultural productivity. This recession convinced the Czech and Slovak intelligentsias that drastic economic reforms, the end of wage egalitarianism, and massive infusion of high-level western technology were necessary in order again to make Czechoslovak exports internationally competitive, and that since Novotný would not agree to these reforms because they would threaten his political power, he must go. The third was the recoalescence and return to power of the Czech and Slovak intelligentsias, to the leftist, social democratic traditions of Masaryk and the First Republic, and, let it not be forgotten, to the pre-1929 moderate traditions of Czechoslovak Communism. The fourth was the development in the Czech intelligentsia of a less unfavorable attitude toward the West Germans and of a more unfavorable one to the East Germans and the Russians. This reversal was caused by (a) the realization that, however politically undesirable, there was no other source for both western technology and investment credits than West Germany, which was largely democratized; and (b) resentment at Ulbricht's and Moscow's support of Novotný and at rigid soviet control over Czechoslovakia, plus realization of the technological inferiority of the USSR to the West. The fifth factor, the Slovak nationalist revolt and demand for autonomy and equality was the immediate incident cause of Novotný's fall.

*See, for more extensive analysis and bibliographies, my "Eastern Europe after the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia," RAND P-3983, October 9, 1968.

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In order to dispose of Novotný, Dubček in effect removed controls
from the communications media, whereupon they pushed toward economic
rationalization, free speech and press, equality for the Slovaks,
maintenance of the primary alliance with Moscow but improvement of
political and economic relations with the West (including with the U.S.,
and inevitably, because of the need for technology and credits, with
Bonn), plus a degree of political opposition which, many hoped and
expected, would lead to a genuine multi-party system.

Dubček could or would only partially control and limit the reform
wave and became himself more liberal in the process. Yet he was deter-
mined to rehabilitate communism by reforms, not to replace it by demo-
cratic socialism. He was also determined to maintain what he saw as
the three essentials of communism in Czechoslovakia: alliance with
Moscow, continuing nationalization of industry, and a communist party
federalized but continuing to control the commanding heights of the
society, with other interest groups consulted but not forming opposition
parties: in brief, a variety of communist corporate state.

The Soviet leadership was long divided and hesitant about invasion--
longer than Tsar Nicholas I would have been! They finally invaded
because they feared that Dubček would not or could not safeguard his
essentials; that the KSCÁ conservatives would be purged; that opposition
parties and press freedom would be established and would bring rising
criticism of Moscow, East Berlin, and Warsaw, and East Germany, Poland,
and the USSR itself (notably, via liberalization and Slovak federalization,
the Ukraine) would thereby be infected; and that, finally, in order to
modernize and make competitive his economy, Dubček would (unwillingly--
but that did not matter) accept more West German credits that the $375
million Ceausescu had and that thereby West Germany would begin to replace
Soviet economic and then political influence in Czechoslovakia and East
Germany would thus be destabilized and isolated.

In sum, the Soviet Union realized (correctly, in my view) that it
could not continue its present form of imperial rule in Eastern Europe
and even in the long run its present repression in the USSR unless it
crushed the Czechoslovak liberalization. Since Brezhnev and his associates
were not prepared, given their general hardening view of Soviet domestic
and foreign policy (including outside Eastern Europe), they invaded.

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The invasion was primarily an assertion of Great Russian imperialism, not "proletarian internationalism." Indeed, the Thermidor of Bolshevism may well become a peaceful transition into Great Russian Fascism: imperialism, anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism.

In the short run, a fortiori since they seem determined to move toward more extremism in general at home and abroad, the Soviet leaders thus probably had no alternative. In the long run, however, their prospects in Eastern Europe seem to me to be less favorable. The invasion will not only not solve but will probably make it more difficult for Moscow to solve Soviet and East European technological backwardness and to contain indefinitely East European nationalism.

On the international scene, the Soviets for the near future restored their domination in Czechoslovakia, thus also stifled any tendencies in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, or Bulgaria toward liberalization or independence, and checked a major potential success for West Germany. On the other hand, Moscow greatly worsened its relations with Yugoslavia, Romania (although the latter has much less room for maneuver) and West European Communist parties, who for the first time almost unanimously denounced the Soviet invasion, as have the Chinese and the New Left. (But even so Moscow recently got near-unanimous endorsement for its planned May 1969 international conference--a sign that opposition to its policies by Western Communists is subsiding.) Castro, dependent on Soviet aid, endorsed Moscow but only in order to try to push Soviet policy in a more militant, anti-American direction, and for the first time publicly asked for a Soviet military guarantee. The disintegration of NATO and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from West Germany was at least delayed. West Germany, more fearful of Moscow, is less likely, as is Japan, to move away from the United States. Bonn also suspended its decision to begin ministerial-level discussions with East Berlin, a major Soviet and East German objective. Franco-American relations improved as a result of the French assessment of the invasion, the franc crisis, and rising Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and influence in Algeria. (Yet in the long run the invasion, by frustrating Bonn's eastern policies, and the franc crisis, which saw Bonn opposed to its allies, will probably aid German nationalism, a development toward which Moscow is not unfavorable.) The U.S. loss of international prestige and

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influence from its Vietnam policy was at least in part counterbalanced by
the world-wide outcry against Moscow's occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Finally, the blow to East-West detente slowed down U.S. and, for Moscow
more importantly, West German ratification of the non-proliferation treaty
as well as the initiation of and progress in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic
weapons negotiations.

In short, by restoring their control over Czechoslovakia, the
Russians blocked any potential deviations in Poland, East Germany,
Hungary, and Bulgaria, but in the rest of the world their influence
suffered. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Good Soldier Svejk's
tradition of silent, concealed, but persistent opposition to foreign
domination is long, Dubček, Svoboda, and the Czech and Slovak peoples
will hardly soon forgive or forget. The soviet invasion probably ended
the long tradition of pro-Russian feeling among the Czechs, who will now
bide their time and husband their strength for the long, complex struggle
ahead.

What will be the final result we can hardly yet foresee. The Soviets
will try to turn Dubček into an unwilling instrument to support Soviet
foreign policy, notably against West Germany, and to purge his liberal
colleagues, repress domestic dissent, lose popular support, and thus be
able to survive only by soviet backing--or they will remove him and try
the same with his successor. Limited economic decentralization, as in
East Germany, will be allowed as long as political repression continues,
and Slovak autonomy, although discouraged, will be permitted as long as
it does not further liberalization or weaken Soviet control. As for the
West, the Russians anticipate that as after 1956 its shock will soon be
overshadowed by its desire to resume East-West detente, while conversely
the destabilizing effects of détente in Czechoslovakia will now be more
effectively kept under control. Dubček and his associates, on the other
hand, will try to be only as repressive as they feel compelled to be and
to maintain an unspoken national conspiracy of *attentisme*, holding out
for better days.

Has the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia decisively and permanently
reversed the trend toward autonomy and liberalization in Eastern Europe or
will the indigenous forces for national communism *again revive*? On balance,

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it seems to me unlikely that any permanent reversal has occurred. Rather, the invasion has probably limited and slowed down tendencies that will reoccur.

This seems likely for reasons arising out of Soviet as well as East European affairs. As to the former, I share Professor Brzezinski's view that Soviet society is tending toward bureaucratic rigidity* and that its countervailing forces of intellectual ferment, nationalities tensions, and economic revisionism make a full-scale reversion to Stalinist imperialism in Eastern Europe extremely difficult. Brezhnev has neither Stalin's complete power nor the former dictator's iron conviction that his own solutions should be imposed regardless of cost in life or rubles. Nor did Khrushchev. And the likelihood that even a new and more charismatic leader in Moscow could reconsolidate the Soviet political elite without the aid of wartime pressure is slim.

As to Eastern Europe, modernization furthers rationalization and popular pressures on their regimes, which may be controlled as in East Germany or acquire independent impetus as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. If politicization outruns institutionalization it leads to political decay (e.g. Poland). Everywhere politicization and nationalism, combined with the demand for economic growth, threaten rigidly centralized regimes. Moreover, the attraction of Western Europe, and particularly the economic pull of Western Germany, can be temporarily contained but hardly obliterated.

Thus an interim period of repression and then a slower, more limited resumption of liberalization seem to me the most likely prospect for Eastern Europe. Even so, however, it will probably remain, as will Western Europe, the object, not the subject of world politics. Soviet evolution, the East-West relationship, and the German problem will overshadow although not necessarily override internal changes in Eastern Europe.

I now turn to a reassessment of Soviet policies in the light of the invasion. First, the present Soviet leadership has within the last few years adopted a more prpressive policy at home and a more expansionist one abroad. Given this, and its refusal to loosen its grip on the northern East European states, it will apparently preemptively intervene

*Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?", Problems of Communism, XV, 1 (January-February 1966), pp. 1-15.

in what it considers a strategically vital East European country even if the latter does not intend to break with Moscow and remains under control of its Communist party (contrary to the 1956 Hungarian case) when Moscow becomes convinced that there exists a clear threat to Soviet hegemony and/or a rise in West German influence.* This likelihood is compounded when there is liberalization and decline in Communist party control so extensive that they might spread to East Germany, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. itself. Qualitative change in such areas of Eastern Europe therefore depends, as it has since 1945, upon such change in Soviet policy itself, which has not as yet occurred and seems unlikely in the near future. Second, the invasion showed Moscow's readiness to use rapid, overwhelming force in Eastern Europe with little or no reliable advance warning to the West. Third, it indicated that the influence of East Germany and Poland in this sphere of Soviet policy is greater than had been previously assumed. Fourth, it demonstrated major Soviet concern over the spread in Eastern Europe of West German economic and technological influence. Finally, it revealed disunity and indecisiveness within the Soviet leadership that may reoccur in other areas of Soviet policy.

The primary implications of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia relate to U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, the most important American foreign policy problem, and not to policy toward Eastern Europe. The inadequate information, hesitation, and reversals of Soviet policy, and its heightened willingness to use force, require a general reassessment of the level of Soviet risk-taking, in both the strategic and conventional fields. The theory of deterrence is based on making a reliable calculation of the opponent's intention (his "rationality"). Logically, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia requires that the U.S. become less confident in its estimate of Soviet "rationality." Consequently, U.S. deterrence posture should be strengthened in order to achieve higher credibility-- recently weakened, perhaps, in the Soviet view by Moscow's rundown of U.S. offensive strategic superiority. Such a rise in U.S. deterrent credibility is in fact under way by MIRV and "thin" ABM deployment.

* Cf., *mutatis mutandis* (e.g., Cuba instead of West Germany), or what may be most mercifully described as the U.S. Dominican caper.

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In Europe the military situation has changed significantly. For the first time in modern history Russian divisions are stationed on the Czechoslovak-Bavarian Border. Although this does not increase the size of the Warsaw Pact forces, it advances their forward deployment in an area confronting U.S. ground forces. (True, Czechoslovak military forces are presumably now less reliable to Moscow, but this hardly counter-balances the new forward Soviet deployment.) As a minimum this makes significant unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Central Europe undesirable and unlikely in the near future. It also makes undesirable any further rundown of British, French, or West German forces as well as any unilateral decline for political gain in Western tactical atomic capabilities in Europe. Finally, the rapidity, massiveness, and reportedly high-level professional competence of the Soviet invasion require an urgent reassessment of the NATO early warning system.

With respect to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general, the new U.S. administration will presumably reassess the U.S. policy of peaceful engagement. Specifically, this means reevaluating such issues as ratification of the non-proliferation treaty, strategic weapons discussions with Moscow, and cultural and economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

The policy of peaceful engagement was a logical consequence of U.S. economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, which enabled Belgrade to consolidate its independent course. Begun by Truman and pursued by Eisenhower and subsequent Presidents, it was a policy of the possible, an attempt to act, even if slowly and in a limited fashion, rather than merely verbally to condemn. (The post-Stalin Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence, including active engagement in Central and Western Europe, was its counterpart.) Peaceful engagement was not directed toward removing all Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and did not intend to substitute Western penetration for Russian control. Rather, its purpose was to heal peacefully the division of Europe into East and West "with the consent of the East European countries and the Soviet Union." Peaceful change in Eastern Europe became possible in part because of such Western acts of "measured firmness" as the Berlin airlift.*

*Speech by President Johnson, October 7, 1966, Department of State Bulletin, October 24, 1966, pp. 622-625. Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, July 1961.

Peaceful engagement thus presupposes adequate deterrent strength, a concept which should now more than before the invasion be defined as U.S. qualitative strategic superiority, coupled with willingness for reciprocal lowering of tensions through such measures as mutual, inspected troop withdrawals. It uses trade and cultural exchange as incentives to East European Communist states to transform themselves into political organisms less totally dependent upon the U.S.S.R. (but not hostile to Moscow) and with more open domestic policies.

Without U.S. support of peaceful engagement and detente, developments such as the recent Czechoslovak liberalization would have been hindered, and similar developments in the future would be less likely. (Conversely, Soviet crushing of it might not have occurred had the United States been more restrained in its relations with Moscow while the Soviets were deciding whether to invade.)

The basic policy of peaceful engagement in my view remains valid. It was, however, always intended to be discriminating. Yugoslavia's and Romania's condemnation of the invasion should thus be viewed positively, but the Soviet move, and Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and East German participation in it, should be viewed negatively.

These criteria imply the intensification of trade and cultural exchange with Yugoslavia and Romania--specifically, most-favored nation (MFN) treatment for Romania and authorization of dollar credits for U.S. wheat purchases and dinar credits for U.S. investment in Yugoslavia, plus the withdrawal of MFN from Poland and the refusal to grant it to Hungary or Bulgaria. Should Yugoslavia so desire, we should assist it to maintain a firm deterrent posture against any Soviet military threat.

Cultural exchange should be temporarily cut back with all the countries who invaded Czechoslovakia, and first of all with the U.S.S.R. The Soviet-U.S. flight agreement should also be suspended. Both suspensions should continue until it is clear that Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia will not harden further but, rather, allow maintenance of some of the reforms.

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Our reassessment of policy toward Moscow should also be brought into
accord with our reassessment of our policy toward Peking. What Professor
Barnett has proposed as "containment without isolation" of Communist
China is similar to peaceful engagement toward it: a policy of the
possible, of preparing for the day after Mao, by putting ourselves in
a less hostile posture toward Peking and thus furthering moderation
there. Now there is another, more immediately compelling reason, in
my view, for revising now our policy toward Communist China: why, after
the invasion, should we continue to not only relieve Moscow of its great
fear, a U.S.-Chinese coalition, but also, in effect, join them in total
hostility toward Peking? Our conflict of interest with China is less
than the Soviet Union's: Moscow holds vast territories in Siberia and
Central Asia which the Tsars took from the Manchu Emperors, and the
shared Marxist-Leninist ideology exacerbates, not improves, the Sino-
Soviet split. Let us, therefore, realize that we shall continue to be in
a fundamentally competitive situation with both Moscow and Peking, and
therefore adjust our posture toward both so that we may contribute toward
their remaining competitive to each other as to us; thus we will have
room for maneuver between them. After all, as Lord Salisbury wisely
remarked: "Her Majesty's Government has neither permanent friends nor
permanent enemies but only permanent interests."*

I now return to my initial statement that U.S. policy--or more
accurately the lack thereof--was short-sighted and shameful. It was
in my opinion short-sighted because President Johnson did not foresee
that if the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia he would be compelled <u>nolens</u>
<u>volens</u> to acquiesce in postponement of the ratification of the non-
proliferation treaty (NPT) and of the initiation of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
strategic weapons discussions. When in spring 1968 some of us proposed
that the Soviets should be specifically informed that these two develop-
ments would (unfortunately) occur if they invaded, the counter-argument
was that, because the NPT and the strategic weapons negotiations were
more in our interest than in the Soviets', we should not use this threat.
This assessment was mistaken, in my view, for two reasons. First the

*Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexistence,'" *The New Leader*, Vol. LI, No. 24 (December 16, 1968), pp. 11-13.

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NPT and the weapons discussions are more in the Soviet than in the U.S. interest. Moscow wants by the NPT to prevent West German access to nuclear weapons. This is a greater potential danger to them than our more generalized--and valid--fears of proliferation, which unfortunately will probably occur anyway, are to us. The Soviets would like the weapons discussions to freeze the near-parity they have obtained in land-based missiles, while for the present we have by MIRV deployment cut the ground out from under any discussions based on parity (wisely, in my view.) In any case, Washington should have known that an invasion would force us to postpone the NPT and weapons discussions. Therefore we had nothing to lose by telling the Soviets this, and perhaps it might have helped to deter them. (To the counter-argument that we did not know if this would work, my answer remains that we could not know and never will; but there were ample reasons why we should have tried.) None of the above means that we do not have overlapping peripheral interests with Moscow--re slowing down the arms race and nuclear proliferation, preventing a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation as in the Middle East, etc. We do, and should continue to pursue them, without, however, damaging our alliances as much thereby as we have done in the past.

Our inaction was also shameful, in my view, for two reasons: first, Washington was unwilling to risk *any* of what, in my view incorrectly, it saw as its interests to help preserve from invasion a country in whose foundation we participated and whose liberalization we had correctly favored while not unrealistically interpreting liberalization as a severing of the Czechoslovak alliance with Moscow. Second, our inaction, I suspect, reflected in part the desire of President Johnson for a summit meeting with Kosygin to begin the weapons discussions. In view of the then forthcoming U.S. Presidential elections, one might most charitably assume that he wanted political profit therefrom. A more uncharitable interpretation would be that personal vanity also played a role. In any case, only the new President can effectively initiate the weapons discussions; so why not wait?

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What should the U.S. do now? First, it should make contingency plans for a sharp worsening of Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia, involving something like the Soviet forced removal of Svoboda, Dubček, etc. Such a plan in my view should involve informing the Soviets that this would mean the end of the NPT, for the West Germans and for us, and the end of the strategic weapons negotiations. We should privately inform Moscow that we would follow the same policy if they invade Yugoslavia and that in addition we would then aid Yugoslavia as they have aided North Vietnam, including preventing, if necessary by barring the Adriatic to the Soviet fleet, any interruption of our aid. Unless and until we are convinced by Moscow that they will not undertake such a sharp increase in their occupation pressure, we should continue our cuts in cultural exchange to the invading countries, intensify exchanges with East European countries who did not invade, and pursue, in general, those policies suggested above which have not been implemented. We should ratify the NPT this spring, provided that the Soviets indicate to us that the situation in Prague will not sharply deteriorate, if only to avoid the "Versailles syndrome." Although we should continue to encourage Western Europe, Japan, India, Israel, etc. to ratify the NPT, we should not do so to the extent that it is as detrimental to other U.S. interests in these areas as it has been to date. We should open the strategic weapons discussions while making publicly clear that we intend to maintain qualitative strategic and conventional superiority over the Soviet Union.

Some may say, with considerable truth, that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was not so unfavorable to U.S. interests--it reconsolidated NATO. True, but the continuation of the Czechoslovak experiment would have been in my view more advantageous for that country, for the U.S., since it is the U.S. interest to encourage liberalization in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. and, indeed, in the long run for Russia itself. Now, as before the invasion, our enlightened self-interest, a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind," and our realization that Czechoslovakia, even if, as Chamberlain put it, "a far-away country of which we know little," has some moral call on our conscience, should convince us that more can and should be done by Washington to try to influence Moscow to loosen its oppressive grasp on that tragic country.