V. The Crimean War

In the settlement of 1815, the equilibrium main-
tained by the Central Powers had been conceived as a safety-
valve, a last resort all the more effective for never being
put to an explicit test. The real cement of the settlement
was the appeal to legitimacy not only within Germany but
also in the remainder of Europe. To be sure, the postulate
of the sanctity of historical rule could not by its mere ex-
istence stem the currents of a century -- and revolutions in
Belgium, Spain, Italy, and France revealed that tranquillity,
though desirable, is not sufficient to inspire men. But the
very proximity of the abyss solidified the unity of the three
great traditional rulers of the Continent, the King of Prus-
sia and the Emperors of Russia and Austria. Only the clos-
est cooperation among the defenders of the conservative in-
terests seemed capable of saving the world from imminent
chaos. Thus, the Holy Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and
Russia conceived originally as an instrument to protect the
territorial settlement of 1815 became in effect an organiza-
tion held together by the common fear of revolution and the
common determination to prevent the spreading of liberal in-
stitutions. It seemed almost a matter of course therefore
that the Tsar in 1848 used his troops to help quell the rev-
olution in Hungary and in 1851 to bring back into line a
Prussia dangerously wavering towards a national, if not a
liberal, policy.

- 2 -

In these circumstances there was an inherent limit
to the disputes of the German Confederation in Frankfurt:
that the requirement of the unity of the Conservative mon-
archs superseded all considerations of local advantage. And
while it was easy enough for Bismarck to ridicule the claims
of the common nationality, the Russian ambassador sent by
the Tsar to insist on a settlement of the fleet issue repre-
sented a more tangible reality. Whatever one might think of
"legitimacy," the master of the divisions on the Vistula
could not be antagonized with impunity. But even under these
circumstances, Bismarck denied that Prussia would have to
agree to every proposal of its allies. While he admitted
that as long as Austria and Russia were united, Prussia had
to remain allied to Austria¹ a formulation which expressed
the reality of a power-relationship much more than a convict-
ion of ideal bonds, he interpreted the requirement of unity
as a weapon to exact concessions or to obtain a veto over
Allied actions: "We must act," wrote Bismarck to his mentor
Gerlach, "so that Austria and Russia solicit our assistance
and do not treat us as an ally who has no other choice. We
must stick to them, but never give them the certainty that
it could not be otherwise."²

But the policy indicated by this letter was im-
possible as long as Russia saw in Austria the repository of

1. W. I., p. 354.

2. L. G., 60.

- 3 -

conservative interests. The full implications of Bismarck's
position could not become apparent until the powers were no
longer inhibited by "rules" which restricted the full devel-
opment of their potential strength. The revolution of 1848
had brought about this condition for the German Confedera-
tion; the Crimean War was to do the same for the internation-
al order. And then, with Austria and Russia separated, it
could become apparent what a skillful diplomacy might achieve
in first frustrating and then paralyzing Austria, a token of
what might be in store if the man who now only represented
Prussia would someday rule it.

No war has resulted from more contradictory motives
than the Crimean war, none was due to a greater degree to the
indecision of the major powers. Europe was brought to the
point of war because the Tsar thought war was impossible and
it entered the war because Austria in its frantic desire for
tranquility prevented all measures that could have prevented
the clash before the major powers were too deeply committed.

The Crimean War began as a dispute over the rights
of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. This had been the
traditional source of friction between Russia and Turkey, in
its nature insoluble and therefore suitable for being used
as a pretext for Russian intervention whenever the interna-
tional situation appeared most favorable. And in 1853 the
moment seemed propitious indeed to Nicholas I who had ruled
Russia for nearly 30 years. All the major powers were either

- 4 -

absorbed in their own affairs or concerned with threats more
immediate than the fate of the Ottoman Empire. It seemed im-
possible that Austria which owed its survival to the Tsar's
troops should refuse to support his plans through benevolent
neutrality. The exalted Prussian king never tired of pro-
testing his affection for his Romanoff brother-in-law and in
any case the Camarilla saw in Nicholas I the protector of the
social order. Great Britain, to be sure, was suspicious. It
had evaded the Tsar's overtures in 1844 when he suggested that
it might be well to come to an understanding about possible
spheres of influence in case of the demise of the "sick man
of Europe."³ But the emergence of a new Napoleon in France
furnished a reasonable assurance that Britain's attention
would be focused more on the protection of the Low Countries
than on the security of the Straits.

The crisis in the Balkans therefore took the course
which had become almost traditional in the disputes between
Russia and the Ottoman Empire: an insistence by the Tsar that
both history and treaty relationships had made him the pro-
tector of the Christian faith in the Ottoman Empire, coupled,
with an intransigent demand for specific guarantees. The
Porte, in turn, resorted to dilatory measures while it sought
help from the other powers.⁴ Finally when faced with the

3. See Stern VI, p. 45.

4. The specific issue this time concerned the protection of the Holy places in Jerusalem and the theft from them of religious objects some years previously. It was complicated by the fact that not only the Tsar but also Napoleon sought to use this opportunity to appear as the protectors of Christianity; the former to inherit the Trukish Empire, the latter to appeal to French Catholicism.

- 5 -

threat of war, the Sultan issued a Ferman in which he acceded
to most of the Russian demands. But it soon became apparent
that the Tsar was less interested in his co-religionists than
in the humiliation of the Turks. A special envoy, Mensikov,
was dispatched to Constantinople with demands that the Sultan
reiterate the Ferman in the form of a treaty and in effect
recognize Russia formally as the protector of the Greek-
Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. And if the Porte
hoped to buy peace with such a surrender of sovereignty,
Mensikov's arrogant behavior made it clear that nothing less
than complete subservience would placate the autocrat in St.
Petersburg.

The Tsar had however been mistaken about the re-
action of the West. Had he behaved more subtly, he might
have exploited Britain's distrust of France and Austria's
weakness to achieve his goal of hegemony in the Balkans. But
Nicholas' arrogance overcame Great Britain's misgivings and
it gave Napoleon an opportunity to end the isolation which
for 30 years had paralyzed French policy on the Continent.
On March 19, 1853, the French fleet sailed for Salamis on
the Greek coast from which it could easily reach Constanti-
nople in case of need. On May 21, Mensikov quit Constanti-
nope with an ultimatum demanding Turkish acceptance of the
Russian terms within eight days. On June 2, the British
squadron stationed in Malta sailed for the Bay of Besira
just south of the Dardanelles where it was soon joined by

Cy

- 6 -

the French fleet. On July 2, Russian troops crossed the Pruth and occupied the Danube Principalities in order to obtain "material guarantees" for the fulfillment of the Tsar's demands. Europe which had not known war for a generation began to look to its rusty armaments.

It was clear that the attitude of the Central Powers would decide the course of events. If the Holy Alliance continued unimpaired, Russia was unassailable and the Franco-British measures would be reduced to empty demonstrations. Even if Austria and Prussia remained neutral, Russia could hope to settle the Near Eastern problem to its satisfaction. But the Russian advance into the Danube Principalities confronted Austria with all the dilemmas of its existence. Its fear of revolution counselled close ties with the Russian autocrat; but its dread of nationalist upheavals urged resistance to an advance which was certain to unloose Pan-Slavic sympathies and outflank Austria to the south. Austria had barely survived its internal upheavals of 1848; it could not fail to be dislodged by the emergence of a new Paloleon and by France's traditional designs on Italy. Its finances were weak; its government lacked self-confidence. Austria wanted tranquillity above all and peace.

But to obtain peace is not as easy as to desire it. Oppressed by the consciousness of its impotence, the Austrian ministry attempted to achieve the benefit of every course of action and thereby only accellerated the contingencies it

- 7 -

dreaded most. A powerful Austria might have dissuaded the
Tsar before his prestige had become too deeply involved.
But Austria considered a balanced budget more important than
its European position and in the crucial summer of 1853 it re-
duced the size of its army. A friendly Austria might have
used its influence to dissuade Russia from rash adventures as
Metternich had so often succeeded in doing -- but while Rus-
sian armies were massing on the Purth the Austrian ministry
hid its indecision behind petulant sulking. The attempt to
conduct diplomacy and military policy in separation always
leads to the atrophy of both: the former runs the risk of an
overconcern with finesse; the latter, that it is reduced to
empty posturing. The Austrian minister, Schwarzenberg, was
reputed to have said with respect to Russia's assistance in
1848, that Austria would astonish the world by its ingratitude.
If he had the Balkans in mind, he was proved right by the
course of events although it was not ingratitude as much as
the inability to realize that a power which refuses to lead
events must of needs become their prisoner.

It was no different with the other Central Power,
Prussia. As always in hours of crisis, its King confused
verbose manifestos with decisive action and sought to balance
each move towards one of the contenders with an almost hys-
terical reaction in the opposite direction. A flood of Prus-
sian missives descended on the capitals of Europe, soon to be
followed by the special envoys Frederick William so delighted

tup

- 8 -

in employing. But the very verbosity of official Prussia
only hid its indecision. For what took place within Prus-
sia was almost a repetition of the disputes in 1848 by the
same parties and with the same general objectives. Those
who had advocated a liberal Germany under Prussia's leader-
ship now urged the closest possible ties with the Western
powers to overcome the influence of the Russia which in 1851
had put an end to all their hopes. This group included many
of the entourage of the Prince of Prussia, the heir to the
throne. Those who had grown up on the concepts of the
"Metternich system" pressed for the implementation of the
Holy Alliance to assure the triumph of legitimacy and to
defeat the usurper in France. One of the most influential
members of this group was Leopold von Gerlach who even had
visions of converting the Turks to Christianity.⁵ Between
these parties stood the King, eager to participate in the
Western demarches towards Russia, but afraid to break with
the iron-willed Tsar; concerned lest Prussia find itself iso-
lated and yet shrinking from the consequences of any course
that could avoid this fate. "My dear brother-in-law," said
Nicholas I, "goes to bed every evening as a Russian and
rises the next morning as an Englishman."⁶

But while the hesitations of Austria proved dis-
astrous because they could only lead to the war which would

5. H., p.

6. EYCK I, p. 237.

- 9 -

disintegrate its European position, Prussia's vacillations
laid the basis for its eventual triumph over Austria. Aus-
tria's ambiguities only deferred its day of reckoning because
the Central Empire could not remain impassive indefinitely
while its southern flank was being turned. But Prussia's
confusion encouraged the Tsar and thereby prepared the
schism of the Holy Alliance. Thus Prussia achieved through
its indecisiveness what it failed to obtain through the vis-
ion of its leaders, the position where alone of the major
powers it could make its assitance conditional on the satis-
faction of its demands.

But it would be too much to say that the Prussian
statesmen understood this. The inflexible dogmatism of the
contending influences on the King had to produce the equipoise
which would have been the policy of the Prussian ambassador at
Frankfurt. For while the Prussian statesmen argued as if
Prussia had perforce to throw in its lost with either the
West or with Russia, Bismarck almost alone argued that not the
unity of conservative interests nor yet the Danube Principal-
ities, but Germany was Prussia's concern. And while the
various contending groups made their option on the basis of
their domestic views, Bismarck maintained that domestic claims
-- even those of the conservatives -- had to be subordinated to
the requirements of national strategy. If this was true, only
one policy seemed indicated: to remain aloof -- "to button

- 10 -

ourselves into one great-coat of 400 thousand men,"⁷ as Bismarck plastically expressed it -- until the other powers and Austria, above all, were so committed that Prussia could utilize their embarrassments to profit within Germany. And to this end it was necessary to disintegrate the close alliance with Austria which for over a generation had been a basic postulate of Prussia policy. "I will give my head as a surety," Bismarck wrote to Leopold von Gerlach at the first rumors of the Balkan crisis, "that present-day Austria will never be our honest ally."⁸ The corollary that no sentimental ties should inhibit Prussia at a moment of unexcelled opportunity, Bismarck reserved for a dispatch to Manteuffel: "Among all our potential allies, Austria is precisely the weakest and most unreliable. I have no doubt that we should separate ourselves from Austria as soon as it breaks with Russia."⁹

In the months immediately following the outbreak of the Balkan crisis, Bismarck's quest for freedom of action for Prussia resulted in an extraordinary ambiguity. Now leaning toward Russia, now toward the West, moving from hesitant advocacy of neutrality to grudging agreement to Western overtures, Bismarck seemed to parallel the vacillations of his monarch. But while Frederick William IV hesitated because he was at a loss to deal with a situation of such intricacy, Bismarck's seeming inconsistencies masked his basic aim: to take away Austria's options, to exhaust it and to undermine the

7. L. G.

8. L. G., p. 85, July 8, 1853.

9. W. I., p. 354, July 15, 1853.

- 11 -

source of its traditional strength in Germany. Thus every
Austrian proposal to the Assembly of the Confederation was
met by dilatory tactics or outright opposition incomprehen-
sible if one analyzes only the substantive issues involved.
When Austria attempted to obtain the backing of the Confed-
eration for its declaration of strict neutrality in the
Russo-Turkish war, Bismarck pleaded lack of instructions
and explained his delay to Manteuffel as an attempt to pre-
vent Austria to appear as "the spokesman for the firm,
Austria-Prussia."¹⁰ And when Austria sought to restrain
Russia by a conference of the four major powers in Vienna
and a joint note to the warring parties, Bismarck opposed
Prussian participation in this step in a letter to Gerlach:
"When Austria offers us a fraternal hand, I always have the
impression that they have the mange and would like to infect
us, because it is easier to endure in company."¹¹

Thus whether Austria sought safety in neutrality
or in commitment, Bismarck used its embarrassments to demon-
strate its paralysis of will. For while an act of decisive
leadership on Austria's part might have brought about a sit-
uation which permitted no further equivocation, the petty
finesse which characterized the policy of the cabinet of
Vienna gave Bismarck the opportunity to conduct an indepen-
dent policy at Frankfurt and made Austria the real victim of
the Crimean war. Austria's fear of revolution in Italy in-
duced it to support an Anglo-French note of December 5 which

10. W. I., p. 388, November 9, 1853.

11. L. G., p. 113, December 18, 1853.

- 12 -

proclaimed that Turkey had fulfilled Russia's demands and
suggested a peace conference. But its dread of isolation
produced the precise degree of ambiguity which deprived
the note of whatever effectiveness it might have had while
nevertheless causing the Tsar's fury to be directed against
"perfidious" Austria. Thus the rigid alignment of forces
which had inhibited a continental policy and which had ab-
sorbed Prussia's aspirations in the requirements of legit-
imacy was disintegrating. The result was an immediate ac-
cretion of strength for Prussia as the less vulnerable of
the Central Powers. All of Bismarck's efforts were conse-
quently directed toward making the Prussian statesmen aware
of their opportunity, that the isolation and the defeat of
Austria was within the grasp of their boldness. With the
approaching end of the Holy Alliance, whole rows heretofore
 blacked again became accessible on the chess-board of
European diplomacy and combinations grew possible which
would put a premium on dexterity. Henceforth there can
therefore be noted in Bismarck's dispatches a growing self-
confidence coupled with a frustrated impatience at a states-
manship which was kept from realizing its opportunities by
its own inhibitions. To be sure, Bismarck cautiously justi-
fied his policy by ascribing his own motives to Austria, that
Austria might seek to break Prussia's power even while pre-
paring a struggle against Russia. But the practical conse-
quence he drew was invarying, that only a sober calculation
of power relationships, not sentimental attachments, should

- 13 -

motivate Prussia's commitments. And for this reason all of Bismarck's dispatches from the very beginning of the Crimean crisis could be reduced to a calculus of strength: "Austria has such vulnerable flanks towards Russia and France," Bismarck wrote to Gerlach, "that it would be a very weak support ... [while] Russia is for us the cheapest ally since it only seeks to grow in the East and not at our expense. Britain alone can not protect us. In order to carry out its policy of centralization Austria requires ... a strict hegemony over the German Confederation. There we stand in its way, however unobtrusive we may seek to be ... Our policy has no other trade ground than Germany and this is precisely the one Austria thinks it badly requires for itself... We deprive each other of the air we need to breathe; one must give up or be forced to give up; until then we must remain opponents and this I consider a fact which cannot be ignored however unwelcome it may be. An alliance with France would require a measure of baseness, but if Russia should be forced into it ... we may have to join lest Austria anticipate us."¹²

Here, even before the lines in the Balkans were irrevocably drawn stood the outline of the revolution which a brief six months had wrought in international relations: A Prussian stateman could catalogue the possible allies classing Austria, the confederate, as an antagonist and France, the traditional "hereditary enemy," as a possible ally. But even more impressive than the specific proposals was the matter-of-

12. L. G., p. 116, December 19, 1853.

- 14 -

factness of the tone which endowed power with an aura of nemesis. To be sure, Leopold von Gerlach protested in shocked terms that Prussia would lose its soul were it to make a pact with Napoleon and that nothing good could ever emerge from a sinful act. But he misunderstood the nature of the new world which has demoniac charge was conjuring up, a world in which only miscalculation was evil and only failure a sin. It was a world without illusion in which only giants or nihilists could live: "We must not let ourselves be caught by phrases," Bismarck's letter concluded, "they count only against, never for us. Instead we should boldly announce a specifically Prussian policy which seeks its ends through the interests and the fears of others, not through sentiments to which every one pretends and which no one possesses. But equally we should not be surprised if others adopt the same principle."¹³

Had Austria known of the policy proposed by the Prussian envoy in Frankfurt, had it even understood that this policy was now possible it might have arrested its headlong rush into isolation. But to the unimaginative a crisis deferred appears dilemma overcome, to the timid a contest avoided seems a guarantee of continued tranquillity, and to the uninspired correct policy defines itself by the direct opposite of failure without the possibility of intermediary nuance. So Austria realizing that the Balkan strife could not be banished by refusing to recognize its existence, only three months after it had reduced its army and only two months after it had declared 13. L. G., p. 117.

- 15 -

its neutrality began to reverse its course, offering both sides its misgivings as a guage of its good faith. It not only supported the Western note of December 5, but it rejected a Russian offer of a treaty in effect reaffirming the Holy Alliance and it began to concentrate an army in Hungary on the flanks of the Russian advance into the Danube principalities. And all the time the increasing tension between the Western powers and Russia revealed that the conflict was approaching which could not but engulf the Central Empire. For the facts of geography and history brook no denial by the fears of statesmen.

If Austria was to commit herself, however, it required the good will of Prussia, unless it was prepared to risk its position in Germany. But while the contending influence in Prussia argued about which camp Prussia should join as if no other option were even conceivable, Bismarck advocated that Prussia stand alone as a symbol that the period where moral claims could insure Prussia's assistance was over, that henceforth Prussia's cooperation was dependent on the satisfaction of her demands. For this reason he did not oppose the rejection of the Tsar's proposal for a reaffirmation of the Holy Alliance made concurrently to Prussia and Austria; but he urged that the refusal be couched in terms which would keep open Prussia's Russian option: "There are many who consider insults to Russia a proof of patriotism; but these are not the people whose admiration is of any practical use for

- 16 -

Prussia."¹⁴ The full force of his eloquence was directed
however against the proposition that the refusal of the
Russian offer entailed an alliance with Austria as a logi-
cal corollary: "Austria has at most 40-80 thousand men
available for a war beyond its borders," he wrote to Gerlach,
his channel to the king. "We therefore do not assume an easy
task if we challenge our century arm in arm with Austria.
Nevertheless I would never advise against running risks if
only we can gain by it (Bismarck's italics); but for heaven's
sake no sentimental alliances where the consciousness of hav-
ing performed a good deed furnishes the sole reward for our
sacrifice."¹⁵ "I could answer the question whether it is in
accordance with our interests to weaken the European position
of Austria further only if I knew the degree of boldness and
energy which will animate our policy," Bismarck wrote cautious-
ly to Mantueffel, his source of influence in the government.
"Many statesmen are of the opinion that it is preferable to
have Austria as an enemy than as a friend. Be that as it may,
I should be concerned were we to seek safety before possible
storms by hitching our smart and seaworthy frigate to the
worm-eaten hulk of Austria. We are the better swimmers and
a welcome ally for everyone ... The great crises supply the
climate conducive to Prussia's growth; if we use them without
fear, perhaps even with great ruthlessness. If we wish to
continue to grow we must not be afraid to stand alone with
400 thousand men, particularly as long as other do the battling...

14. L. G., p. 129, February 20, 1854.

15. L. G., p. 130, February 20, 1854.

- 17 -

The value of our assistance will increase with the growing entanglement of the powers, and we will be paid more for it later than now."¹⁶

And the entanglements of the powers soon created a situation which confronted Prussia with fateful decisions. A plaintive Austrian circular, note of February 9 spoke of its desire for peace, its hope for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, its refusal of the Russian offer of alacriance and its conviction that the German Confederation would support it, as if one policy could embrace all these goals.¹⁷

But the measures of the other powers left no doubt that the issues could no longer be evaded by protestations of good faith. A personal appeal by Napoleon to the Tsar to quit the Danube Duchies in return for a simultaneous withdrawal of the Franco-British fleet could only exacerbate the feelings of the autocrat who had refused the French usurper the traditional address: mon frere. In the meantime a Russian note had demanded that the combined Western fleet, if its intentions were peaceful, not only protect Turkish ships but those of Russia as well. In case of an unsatisfactory answer the Russian ambassadors were to demand their passports. By February 6 diplomatic relations between Russia and the Western powers were broken off. On February 24, France and Britain issued an ultimatum to Russia to quit the Danube Principalities by April 30.

16. P. I., p. 425, February 15, 1854.

17. Text Poschinger IV, p. 172.

- 18 -

With war thus imminent France and Britain redoubled their efforts to align the German powers with them. But Austria which had supported the Western conditions of peace recoiled from the measures to achieve them without a guarantee of Prussian support. Berlin thus became the focal point of European politics in March 1854.

As always when fundamental decisions were required Frederick William IV took refuge in grandiloquence and thereby unleashed a struggle in his entourage which his constant vacillations only sharpened. And once more Bismarck, although he disdained the dogmatism of the Conservatives hardly less than the self-righteousness of the liberalist, come to assist his old mentor Gerlach in the struggle against the Western alliance. For while he was little concerned about the unity of conservative interests, Bismarck was all the more determined to prevent Austria from escaping its dilemmas by a show of Confederate unity. "Are we unable to stand on the most moderate pinnacle without fainting into the arms of the nearest individual with strong nerves?" Bismarck wrote to Gerlach. "Does anyone seriously believe that Austria will engage in a life-and-death struggle with Russia without being certain of our help or even secured against an attack on one part? ... A cowardly policy has always led to disaster."¹⁸

"It is not my province to criticize, that His Majesty the King disdains exploiting the embarassments of other powers," Bismarck

18. L. G., pps. 138 - 140, 7/9 April 1854.

- 19 -

wrote to the Prince of Prussia. "I would not consider the alliance [with Austria and the Western Powers] a misfortune had it not been discussed on a plane where the ardor of the contending parties has replaced cold calculation ... Our interests and those of the West are not identical; their desire to put our power in the service of their ambitions is only natural. Sooner or later the moment must come when we refuse to comply with this wish. Our freedom of action remains unimpaired if we refuse to join the Convention."¹⁹

The Prince of Prussia might call Bismarck's policy that of a school boy (eines Gymnasiasten) but only because he failed to understand its import. For the policy proposed by Bismarck was not motivated by a predeliction for Russia; rather it was the calculation of a scientist who had weighed the factors, considered the possible combinations, and sought to manipulate into being a structure which would reflect the real power-relationships. Bismarck strove for Prussian freedom of action not from the doctrinal motives of either his friends or his adversaries, but to let Prussia's inherent power assert itself and to demonstrate the tenuousness of the myth which had assured European tranquillity for over a generation. If Prussia could stand alone in the middle of a European crisis, it would not permit itself to be paralyzed indefinitely by so fragile an instrument as the German Confederation.

19. W. I., p. 436.

- 20 -

And the hysteria of Frederick William IV -- who was beginning to show the symptoms of the mental illness which was to lead to his abdication -- brought about what could not be accomplished by an act of will. At the very moment when the signature of an alliance with Austria and the Western Powers seemed imminent, its chief proponent, Pourtales, was forced to resign and even the Camarilla was at a loss to explain what had caused the fall of their most hated adversary.²⁰ Whether Frederick William IV had finally reacted to Gerlach's Pietist warnings against "unfaithful servants" or whether in his panic he blamed the advocate of commitment for the conditions which had made it necessary, the projected alliance was defeated for the time being. But while the Camarilla was celebrating the victory of the conservative cause, Bismarck engaged in two conversations which demonstrated his virtuosity in reducing the beliefs of a decade into forces to be manipulated. Upon his return to Frankfurt, he visited the Russian ambassador to explain to him that the refusal of the convention was a victory of the pro-Russian party at Berlin and that he, Bismarck was their chief exponent.²¹ Had the British ambassador seen the jubilant report of his Russian colleague, he would have been vastly surprised. For he had just been told by Bismarck that the rejection of the convention had had nothing to do with pro-Russian sympathies. On the contrary,

20. EYCK I, p. 233.

21. EYK I, p. 236; Martens-Traites VIII, p. 440.

- 21 -

the fall of Pourtales was due to a victory in Berlin of the
national party which had not opposed the convention in prin-
ciple but had been put off by the treats of the English press
and of English statesmen.²²

Here was an example of the policy of keeping all
options open until the last moment which was to characterize
all of Bismarck's diplomacy, the confusing frankness, the
bold caution, the unanswerable personal appeal. But it was
a diplomacy doomed to futility with a monarch of Frederick
William's indecision. For no sooner had Frederick William
obtained his freedom of action than he came to rue it and on
April 20 he signed a treaty of alliance with Austria which
guaranteed Austria's territory and even promised Austria
Prussian assistance if Russia should refuse to halt its ad-
vance across the Danube or to evacuate the Principalities.²³

In this manner ended the first phase of the Cri-
mean War as anti-climatically as it had begun and with Austria
seemingly successful in imposing its policy on Prussia. But
Austria's victory was only apparent. For an alliance repre-
sents an accretion of strength only if its members are in ac-
cord about their objectives. In the absence of such an agree-
ment the requirement for unity can be used to exact a veto
over allied actions and the policy of the alliance will be
shaped by its weakest, or at least its most irresolute, com-
ponent. Anyone familiar with the psychology of the Prussian

22. Valentin, p. 98; L. G., p. 43, April 17, 1854.

23. Stern VIII, p. 70.

- 22 -

King, moreover, could be certain that he would shrink from
the consequences of his audacity. It was one thing to make
a treaty to please the traditional ally in Vienna; it was
quite another to put that treaty to the only use which had
any meaning for Austria: to force Russia to evacuate the
Danube Principalities. As soon as they had gotten over the
initial shock the Camarilla and Bismarck therefore set about
to deprive the treaty of all meaning by an exegesis of its
terms which might supply Frederick William a justification
for inaction. Gerlach conceived the rather unimaginative
interpretation that the treaty of April 20 obliged Austria
to obtain Prussia's concurrence before it took any measure
to force Russia to evacuate the Principalities.²⁴ In practice,
this would have restored conditions precisely to the
point before the treaty was signed and not even the unstable
King could be induced to accept so flagrant a breach of his
undertaking. Bismarck therefore entered the fray with a solution
more intricate if no more honorable. The treaty of
April 20, he argued, was not an alliance at all but merely
an engagement to conclude an alliance and he suggested to
Manteuffel that he act as if another interpretation were unthinkable
outside of an insane asylum.²⁵

But the real stumbling block to Austria's utilization of the alliance lay in Frankfurt not in Berlin. In

24. EYCK, I. p. 239.

25. G. E. II, p. 78, W. I, p. 442; L. G., p. 148.

- 23 -

order to marshal a maximum force, Austria had insisted on a
clause inviting the German Confederation to accede to the
treaty of April 20. The Austrian negotiators apparently never
doubted that the acquiescence of the Confederation would prove
to be a mere formality. For was this not precisely the prior
Austro-Prussian accord for which Bismarck had been calling
these many years? Were not the minor powers reduced to the
secondary status which Bismarck had been insisting was properly theirs? But no sooner did the new Austrian ambassador
to Frankfurt, Prokesch-Osten, seek to implement the agreement
than he ran into the same stubborn opposition by Bismarck as
his predecessor had encountered in his effort to proceed by
a majority vote. For this was the moment Bismarck had been
anticipating when Prussia could operate within the Confederation like a parliamentarian forging a union of all discontended to overthrow the ruling faction. Nothing had occurred
to affect Bismarck's basic aim to eliminate or to reduce
Austria's influence in Germany; on the contrary the degree
of its Balkan embarrassments only placed Austria into the
paradoxical position of attempting to expedite a decision in
a body it had itself designed to inhibit decisive action. And
the Prussian envoy was fully alive to the irony of Austria's
situation. No sooner had he learned of the treaty than he
wrote to Manteuffel that it would find the approbation to
the degree that it offered guarantees against the danger of
war.²⁶

26. W. I. p. 440, April 21, 1854.