DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON
Secretary Laird

12/23/71 9:20 a.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: You are in a foul mood at 11:00 at night.

L: Was I?

K: Yes.

L: My wife got me out of the sack; that's probably why.
What I wanted, I got that memorandum, and I have no problem understanding the
memo, but what I think happened was I got ______ at little of that.
Monday, Shultz was talking about 78.5. That was his figure.

K: I thought you knew what the original 78.5 was about.

L: That was his figure, not mine though. The original chart
added to the 78.8.

K: Let me tell you my understanding. At the staff level the
people had been working on the 78.5; the content of that was agreed on. You
wanted to make additions; you indicated no disagreement as to what the 78.5
was comosed of. I figured by letting you keep this it was like giving you
350 million.

L: But if you look in the chart it isn't by OMB; they had already taken
out that.

K: I promised you you'd get 400 million on top of what you are going to
get in the 78.5. If that wasn't included then you will get 78.9.

L: I can live with anything.

K: No, but we want you to be happy with this.

L: I am easy to live with. I just thought I was getting jobbed.

K: I don't want to job you.

L: But in this ______, the Bureau of the Budget
can't identify these unidentified ______ s.

K: Let me get Haig on this.

L: Oh no.

K: The whole point of the exercise was to show you we took your
concerns seriously.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By. NARA, Dato 5/26", "TELECON", "Secretary Laird", "12/23/71 9:20 a.m. p. 2", "L: It all depends on what this three hundred million up at the top of the chart are identified as savings. I always assumed that was tied up with the pay bill. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

John Osborne/Kissinger

9:33 a.m. 12/23/71

K: I got your message on the article you are doing. Your point that's not getting across in this background discussion. I won't take an issue on moral but on immediate issue that produced it, it's the most ______ case. I don't know if you know the circumstances. The press complained that they had had no background and I went back to speak with them. Hank Truitt said they had heard we were going to General Assembly again. I said I don't want to prescribe it to WH sources but if you apply it as a Lindley rule, I will. It wasn't hiding a point but something they agreed to. It was different from my saying I want to make comments on India/Pakistan -- even then they can break the rule. But when you are genuinely trying to help out the press and the ______ wasn't the point I was making. I said we will have to reassess our whole assessment of U.S./Soviet relations. They said including the Summit and I said that's part of U.S./Soviet relations. I don't know if that makes a difference.

O: It certainly does. We are going to press next week. As I told Coleman, my understanding was that it was a background basis to series of individuals on background basis.

K: None.

O: None? Saying Administration did a great deal and bring about India/Pakistan ceasefire and ______. Didn't you see people on that?

K: Two people. I talked with them together. Henly and Gulick. Only two. No one else on any basis what's so ever.

O: Not Kraslow? He had a strong stroy.

K: You talk with Kraslow. Only two people. They wrote very mild stories.

O: I am glad you told me that. The Henly and Gulick stories, though not run in Washington they got good play. They were pretty strong. Not as strong as Knight Newspapers. I understood there was a limited group backgrounder at the State Dept.

K: I am sure there was. I think it took the exact opposite line.

O: I am checking into it. My main focus here -- frankly as I said on TV that Post was an outrageous --

K: I don't want to go into that. When I do backgrounding it is purely philosophical and for the rest I don't want to be involved. On the issues of fact I was went back to explain we were not being insane that way. That was the thrust.

O: I think I understand the circumstances.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Osborne/Kissinger

9:33 a.m.

12/23/71

K: Whatever else given out was not from me or my office.

O: I assumed you had more activity in it.

K: You ask Kraslow. I haven't talked with him since they canceled that plane or had contact with him although I respect him.

By. NARA, Date 5/20

TELECON

Gerard Smith

12/23/71 10:50 a. m.

S: In making my report this afternoon, do you object if I read out the message to the Russians from the President that they would judge their seriousness by how much they got down to offensive work.

K: Which report?

S: To the Verification Panel.

K: Oh, not at all. I think that would be nice.

S: Okay, we'll do it. Did everything go well in Bermuda?

K: I think so. It wasn't a very specific meeting but it got a trend established.

S: You think I can see the President before I go back?

K: When are you going?

S: I was scheduled to go on the second of January.

K: I will do my damnedest. You may have to come to Key Biscayne.

S: I can accomplish that.

K: Okay.

S: I mentioned earlier about having Farley go back. I am speculating whether it would be good to have him going back by himself. Like to have it so if necessary I could come back and have him up to speed on what's happening.

K: So he would go back on the second and you on the tenth.

S: If that means we can get more guidance, yes. Or both go over and if there's some meeting here, we can both go over and I'll come back.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Bob Pierpoint/Kissinger

12:55 p.m. 12/23/71

K: Lindly Rule.

P: Let's not start that. I want to go to my study. Could I go down?

K: Sure.

P: I suppose I ought to ask you first of all -- I gather you confirm you met with Burchette. Is that on the record?

K: Yes.

P: On the record, anything he told you that's worthwhile or useful?

K: Not much. He had a message that he had something to say. Because I ran down every lead I talked with him but he had nothing I didn't know.

P: Did you know of his background?

K: Yes.

P: That he is considered a traitor by the Australian government.

K: It's not morale abrobation. I will take information for peace from the devil.

P: But he didn't have anything. So you would listen to anybody.

K: That's right. I didn't use him and had no further contact with him.

P: Why did he do this?

K: I don't know. He hasn't written about it, has he?

P: No. He is apparently back in Peking.

K: He was going to China and I thought it might have information concerning peace.

P: Did someone on the Hill contact you?

K: No.

P: He contacted you?

K: Through an intermediary but no on the Hill. Many people think they have something that's new but it's familiar to us.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Pierpoint/Kissinger

12:55 p.m.

12/23/71

P: One version is he told you that Hanoi would negotiate without ? ? ? . That's the old line.

K: There was nothing new in it. I don't hold it against him

P: He was wasting your time. You think he was acting in good faith?

K: Yes and he didn't take advantage of it so I don't want to blast him.

P: But he could have used it in Peking.

K: I have been there since. They know my views.

P: Do you know about the visa problem?

K: No.

P: I am told he had a visa problem about only going 25 miles --

K: It's not for me to consider that. If he says he can come, I don't question it.

P: It might not be true.

K: It wasn't a big deal for me. It was something I tried to run down.

P: He has a bad taste in our mouths.

K: Off the record he is not one of my heroes.

P: I want to do a story on this. I don't want to stir up trouble for you. But it's interesting since he is the guy he is. Did you contact the Australian govt. ?

K: I told them about it.

P: Afterwards?

K: Yes.

P: Did you know he was in such ill repute?

K: My interest was he talked with the NVN after anyone else had and I thought he might have a hint we could use.

P: Was he close to the NVN?

K: He has in the past.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Pierpoint/Kissinger

12:55 p.m.

12/23/71

P: But not used in this case.

K: Either that or they didn't give him something that wasn't known. But this
happened in Oct.

P: It hasn't been out before.

K: In Australia.

P: But not here. It might be that CBS isn't interested either.

K: Don't put it in context of a social breakfast with him. I thought he might
have information for me.

P: You won't tell me who the intermediary was?

K: No.

P: Make a difference?

K: Not particularly.

P: It's an interesting guy for you to see and fact he is back in Peking is interesting.
You don't think that's anything because you are in contact with them. Nothing
on VN or k China.

K: No but I took the 2% chance he would.

P: Thank you for the call and happy holidays.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

12/23/71 ca. 4:30pm

HK: I never told you how much I appreciated the stand you took.

K: I didn't do it for your benefit, but for my own integrity

HK: It showed great integrity. You knew I hadn't come back there to make a point.

K: Right, right. And I told Bradlee and everybody at the Post the issue is not the backgrounder but our ethics.

HK: You know if I step out and say I want to talk about Indo-Pak...

K: That's different.

HK: What did you want to talk about?

K: Our old project. I haven't seen you in so long I can't remember.

HK: You going to be in Key Biscayne?

K: No, I'm not. Bob Toth will be down, and I won't be in San Clemente either. I hope I will be in China with you.

HK: I will do my damnedest.

K: I think it's in line.

HK: Well, tonight is out of the question.

K: How about tomorrow?

HK: Maybe we could have breakfast tomorrow?

K: Okay.

HK: Let me call you tonight.

K: You said some time ago by the end of the year you'd have some idea of whether the project was feasible.

HK: I would want to talk with the President about that either in Key Biscayne or San Clemente. Let me call you at home tonight.

HK called Kraslow subsequently and they agreed to a noon meeting in HK's Washington office on Monday, January 3, 1972.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Eberle:

12/23/71 ca. 4:45pm

E: While I was in Europe this last trip a got a lot of volunteer talk about the proposed appointment of David Kennedy to the NATO spot. and Malfatti said having such a NATO association with NEE NEC (?) and OEEP would have a bad effect. It would be easier for him to start I think with the European community post and then do the others. I just pass that along . . .

K: Let me talk to the President about it.

E: Second on this meeting with Brandt, one issue on trade is important and will come up -- the question of grain prices remaining different in Germany than in the balance of Europe. WE are for it, and it's no problem because it allows the rest of the agriculture to keep their unit price.

K: Could you do me a note on that so I don't screw it up.

E: That I will do. Last, I have gotten from a conversation with Ushiba that there will be at least two trade issues for San Clemente. How can I get the best feed-in to you without taking too much of your time?

K: I've got about 20 people stacked up right now.

E: No, I'm not talking about now. Just think about it

K: Why don't you come out to San Clemente?

E: Pete Peterson and I might do that.

K: That would be good and I would like to see you every three weeks or so.

E: Okay, you get to your 20 stacked up people.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Haldeman/Kissinger
morning 12/23/71

K: Whoever the guy was who told you about my quote was making mischief. Was it Scali?

H: No.

K: The quote was if you and I clashed and if you were the Svengali and what does he talk about all those hours with the President? I said his great strength is that he is aggressive, non-substantive and never injects his own views on substance and carries out what President wants done. They are not going to use that because it's favorable.

H: Don't you get the feeling the direction they are taking is the President is a good guy because he has ________ people around him?

K: That's not bad.

H: No.

K: They were going to do story on theme that I did all and then changed to President is guy after which they lost their enthusiasm. Now put it off for 4 weeks. Trying to get my staff and me to say we did it all and when told not true -- is it or maybe it was because of India/Pakistan thing that made it less urgent.

H: We will probably get lots of quotes and misquotes.

K: I will not make comments here about my colleague. Not even Rogers. I think Scali has done nothing but mischief. He told Rogers I called Gulick and Hensley. Then he told Rogers what he saw me with Kalb and Collingwood in Bermuda, which was true.

H: I will try to get strings on him.

K: I don't want to deal with him anymore.

H: If he is doing things badly --

K: He will be ABC at State after here.

H: Maybe but he can do good here.

K: That backgrounding was a total disaster on Friday. I did much better on my own. I always got the stories out and right.