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[L.C.]

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Stanislav Menshikov, adviser to the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and shortlv, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and the senior democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn of Georgia, in a moment.

(Announcements).

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Menshikov in Moscow, thank you very much for coming in today to talk to us, happy to have you with us. Here with us are George Will of ABC News, and Sam Donaldson, ABC News White House correspondent. Now, Mr. Menshikov, at the Geneva meeting the great topic of disagreement was the SDI or Star Wars. Mr. Gorbachev called it a weapon, Mr. Reagan sees it as a defense against weapons, which is a rather striking disagreement. Why - which is it? How do you see it? What do you think it is?

MR. MENSHIKOV: Well, I think it --

MR. BRINKLEY: And why are you so unhappy about it?

MR. MENSHIKOV: Well, I think it is a weapon. It can be used to defend but it can also be used to strike the other side, you see, it works both ways. You know, anything that can - that can knock out a rocket can knock out people. It can knock out anything, in fact, so it is really a two-sided weapon - a two-edged so to say thing, but you see the problem here is that this difference has been there for quite a long time between the two sides, and what I think happened in Geneva was that for the first time the President of the United States and the General Secretary of our country listened to the arguments of the other side, not just through the media or through experts, but to each other, and I think they came to understand

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better the concerns of the other side. The factors that determine the decision making of the other side, and I believe that now, on coming back, both sides, including Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, will think it over once again and maybe they will find ways to solve this issue and to come to a general agreement, on this particular issue. See, the important thing, the important thing, not just in this field but in all fields, I think, that separate us, is to - not to over dramatize the differences, and that's what these gentlemen in Geneva have been doing. They've been trying to bring forward the differences but trying to understand each other, and that's - and maybe in that way to lay the first step in trying to solve the differences.

MR. WILL: Since March, 1983 when the President first started talking publicly about SDI he has stressed the fact that the United States would, as research proceeded, share this technology with the Soviet Union to obviate worries that this was-a first strike weapon that we could deploy and leave the Soviet Union far behind. Do the members of your government believe the President on this, or do they think he's kidding?

MR. MENSHIKOV: Well, we have no reason to believe him on that very much, at least we didn't before now, because the United States has not shared much technology with us on various other things that are less dangerous in our minds than the space weaponry that we are talking about, or your SDI technology if you would like to call it that. Well, there is always a chance that in the concrete situation of the moment the United States will choose in the future to deploy its own weapons without sharing the technology, and Mr. Reagan is here today, but he may not be around when the actual thing happens,

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you know. Yes, this is nothing that one can sign a check for the
future, you see.

MR. WILL: He's apt to be here, certainly for three more
could
years, and if a Republican of kindred spirit wins you / have cer-
tainly a strong commitment to SDI for the indefinite future. Now,
your government's position is no steep reductions in offensive
forces until there is an agreement to really either eliminate or
substantially cripple the SDI program. Given what you learned at
Geneva, is it now your expectation there can be no serious reductions
of offensive forces as long as President Reagan is President?

MR. MENSHIKOV: No, I believe that there's a possibility
for the United States to really realize that the important thing is
where you draw the line, you see. If you draw the line where - where,
on research, without really putting those weapons into space, meaning
testing and putting them into space, then you have a very good deal,
you see. Then the other side can have the trust - they can trust
the other side, they can have time to prepare themselves if the
worst happens, and they can also go ahead with research in the same
area, which does not mean creating weapons but means being prepared
in the case of even - of an eventuality. This is a realistic approach
and it serves, I think equally, the interest of both sides, the secur-
ity of - interests of both sides. I think they --

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Menshikov --

MR. MENSHIKOV: Yes?

MR. DONALDSON: I didn't want to interrupt you, finish
your thought.

MR. MENSHIKOV: No, no, let's go ahead. I think that would

[L.C.]

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serve both interests and it would mean that both sides would under-
stand the concerns of each other. You see, Mr. REagan has been say-
ing, what is really - before the meeting he's been asking - I want
to know what is really, what concerns the Soviet Union. I think that
in five or six hours he came to understand what is concerning. Now,
it will take some time for the analysis of that to go ahead and do
it, but we shouldn't waste time, because you know, it's like a wedd-
ing, the wedding is set for some distant date and then the more dis-
tant it is the more chances are that the bride and the bridegroom
will be driven apart by whatever happens inbetween.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, Mr. Menshikov, there's going to
be a first anniversary of this wedding, in about a year the two lead-
ers are going to get together. What must happen between now and then
for that to be a successful summit? Clearly they can't just get
together and once again get to know each other well.

MR. MENSHIKOV: Well, I would - I would think that the best
as
for them would be to go into all the differences as fast/they can,
go into all the differences that separate us on the - on the strateg-
ic weapons, and there are differences, but I don't think they're
unsurmountable. It's a question of very difficult negotiations, but
it is possible, once they get a go ahead from their governments, and
on the intermediate I think they're even closer to possible agreement.
That's my personal view.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you think we've got to have some sort of
an arms control agreement, or at least the framework, before they
can have a second successful summit?

MR. MENSHIKOV: Yes, I think so. And also, if the United

5.

[L]

an
States sees that both sides are close to/agreement on those issues
I think they will - they may think twice about SDI, because this
would be a chance that they wouldn't like to miss.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Menshikov, let me quickly raise two
other subjects. Was there progress made in the field of human rights?
We have nothing but a vague line in the communique, but we have hints
from U. S. officials that if we just don't talk about it your gov-
ernment will do more to ease the human rights burden in the Soviet
Union, is that right?

MR. MENSHIKOV: Well, I can't agree with you on your formula
because it means that, you know, I would have to say that we have a
burden. I don't think that we have a burden, but if we talk about
this, yes, I think there is a much better understanding of the fact
that first these issues should be settled on an individual basis,
second, that this is something for the government of the Soviet Union
to decide and not for the Congress of the United States to decide,--

ment made --

MR. MENSHIKOV: -- there's a better understanding of these
things.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you think your government may decide
to allow Mr. Sakharov to leave the Soviet Union, if he chooses?

MR. MENSHIKOV: Well, that's an individual case, and I
cannot speak for my government, I don't know what they will do about
this, but you know, things are moving and there may be different
issues here, you know, even in that field there have been changes
recently.

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MR. WILL: Mr. Menshikov, the Red Army has been fighting what you call the bandits in Afghanistan for longer than the Red Army fought Hitler's armies, and in Geneva Mr. Arbatov said that the assistance of the United States would be most welcome in resolving the Afghanistan crisis. What's the matter with just putting the tanks in reverse and backing out? I mean, what do you have to fear from little old Afghanistan?

MR. MENSHIKOV: We don't fear Afghanistan, we're not fighting against Afghanistan. What we are fighting is against people that come from Pakistan, from some other countries, and help some people in Afghanistan who don't like their regime, you see. This is an internal struggle supported on the one side by, quite frankly, Pakistan and other countries, including the United States, who spent some money on it. On the other hand, we are supporting the other side, you see. This is, let's put it, a civil war in which the government is being supported by us and the anti-government forces are supported by your side. So, you know, if we back out at this moment leaving these people to themselves they may - there may be bloodshed, there may be more bloodshed than there is now, you know. This has to be decided in a political way. It's not a military decision that can solve this issue, and I think that perhaps the discussion in Geneva may have helped understand these things.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Menshikov, thank you. Thank you very much for being with us today.

MR. MENSHIKOV: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State who helped negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union.

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still in effect, and shortly, Senator Sam Nunn, of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, in a moment.

(Announcements).

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger in New York, thank you very much for coming in to talk with us today, pleasure to have you here.

MR. KISSINGER: Good to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, in some of your writings prior to the summit, in one of them you said this meeting in Geneva could be an episode or a historic breakthrough. I'm aware it's too early to make final judgments, but as of today, this Sunday, how would you characterize it?

MR. KISSINGER: I would not characterize it as a historic breakthrough. I think what could be reasonably achieved was achieved. Is there a procedure for discussions, a general definition of the topics to be discussed, but whether it's a breakthrough or not will be determined at the next two summits in terms of concrete agreements that may or may not be engotiated. I do not think that simply establishing a better personal relation... between the leaders is in itself decisive.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kissinger, you just heard Mr. Menshikov saving that yes, there can be progress on reductions of offensive force levels if the President can agree to restrict SDI to a research program. If you were advising the President what would you tell him to say now about SDI?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I noticed in the Menshikov presentation that the Soviets are attempting to focus the discussion on two issues. One to say that all the differences between the United States

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[L]

and the Soviet Union are in the weapons field, and secondly, within
the weapons field they are exclusively or primarily caused by the
Strategic Defense. What I would recommend to the President to say is
one, tensions are caused by political conditions at least as much as
by weapons conditions, and that there has to be some progress in the
political actions, resulting political actions that caused the crisis
in the first place. Secondly, that we do not accept the proposition
that defensive weapons are put into a special category from other
weapons, and that the issue of the limitations of offensive and de-
fensive weapons should be negotiated concurrently, and that they
should be limited in relation to each other, not one in the abstract,
as the Soviets seem to be proposing on the face of it. The President
is right in the sense that defensive weapons are less threatening
than offensive weapons, and I do not see how we can get from here to
there only by limiting offensive weapons and banning defensive
weapons.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kissinger, you were present at creation of
the ABM Treaty. Now, the ABM Treaty presumed, according to Jerry
Smith, who helped negotiate it, that it would be followed by substan-
tial reductions of offensive forces, which has not been the case.
The Soviet Union, with its own defensive spending, has shown that it
does not accept mutual vulnerability as a doctrine, and as you these
days say constantly, the mutual vulnerability thesis, the assured
destruction thesis produces nuclear pacifism in the west. Why, I
guess I'm asking, were you the ABM Treaty in the first place, and
isn't it time to say that it's time has passed?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, the ABM Treaty was negotiated in

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[LC]

different circumstances. First of all, at the time the technology was entirely different. Now, secondly, quite frankly, the Congress was systematically cutting the program that we had, so that we were heading towards the unilateral abandonment of whatever ABM we had. Thirdly, there was the hope at the time, maybe even the expectation, that there could be very substantial cuts of offensive weapons. In all these circumstances some limitation of defensive weapons, especially given the technology of the time, seemed appropriate. The evolution since then has indicated that offensive weapons have quadrupled, and that even a 50 percent cut would not reduce the danger either of a surprise attack or cataclysmic destruction of the population, and the purpose of arms control is not just to have an agreement, and not just to have a theoretical cut, the purpose of arms control is to make nuclear war less likely, and to limit its damage if it should occur. That should be the criteria.

MR. WILL: The logic of your position seems to be that since time and technology have changed, the President should say that if SDI works, and the Soviet Union doesn't seem to dispute that by its behavior, that if SDI works we're going to deploy it. Is there anything the matter with the President saying that?

MR. KISSINGER: My view is that the emphasis on the word "research" is going to confuse the issue completely. The issue on SDI is eventually deployment. If that is the case we should negotiate, if we are willing, limitations on deployment proportionate to the limitations on the deployment of offensive weapons. If we are trying to elaborate a distinction between research, testing, and deployment we're going to get into an arcane era of esoteric

10

technicalities.

MR. WILL: So you're saying assume deployment and negotiate about the pace of it and scale?

MR. KISSINGER: Exactly, that's what I'm saying, and I'm saying if the ABM Treaty has to be amended let's amend the ABM Treaty. rate There's nothing more sacrosanct about the ABM Treaty, at any/it has a provision by which it could be abrogated, which I'm not advocating at this moment, in one year, with one year notice. But why not say let us, we are in a new field of technology, hopefully in a new field of relationship. Why not negotiate an arrangement between offensive and defensive weapons that will last for the indefinite future, or at least for the next 20 years, rather than simply go along on the estab- lished track with somewhat lower numbers but the same danger, so that we are totally vulnerable to accidents of political conflicts that the last 10 years have shown break out maybe even without the wish of the super powers.

MR. DONALDSON: Dr. Kissinger, the President's advisers say the most important thing to come out of this summit was the personal relationship and chemistry that developed between the two leaders because of their extraordinary five hours of one on one meetings, and the President has said that he believes Mr. Gorbachev is sincerely interested in reducing tensions and working toward peace. Do you think they're naive?

MR. KISSINGER: I believe that it is not doing the President a favor or the cause of peace of favor to give the impression that the tensions are caused by the misunderstandings between two leaders and can be resolved by the good/relations between the two leaders.

11

[L.C]

I think the President handled the diplomacy leading up to the summit in an extraordinarily skillful and thoughtful manner. I think he handled himself extremely ably at the summit. But this is not the same as saying that we can rely for the future on the personal relationship between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan. Anytime American Presidents - look back to 1955 at the Geneva summit - have relied on their personal relationship they became extremely vulnerable to the changes of political conditions. Within three years of the Geneva summit we had a Soviet ultimatum on Berlin, within a year-and-a-half we had threats of nuclear war against western Europe. I'm not saying that the relationship is not important, I'm saying it must be used to get some concrete agreements, concrete limitations, and if we don't get that it cannot by itself be the basis of U.S./Soviet relations.

MR. DONALDSON: On that basis, they've agreed to meet again in a year, and again after that a year later. That puts a sort of deadline on coming up with concrete agreements, does it not?

MR. KISSINGER: Absolutely.

MR. DONALDSON: And does this deadline hurt us or help us?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, that depends how we handle our own internal debate. It is absolutely imperative now that we straighten out our own internal debate on strategic defense, and on the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons. It's equally imperative that we develop a program in which we can explain to our public, to our allies, and to the Soviets exactly what we mean by political restraint. If we do all of this I think our basic negotiating position is strong enough for Mr. Reagan's presidency to be

12

[LC]

marked by historical breakthrough. If we don't do this then I think that the next summit is going to be a very difficult one, because I think that the Soviets have very skillfully created the impression that if it doesn't succeed next time that we have jeopardized the good relationship that has been built up on this one.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, thank you very much, thank you for coming in today, we've been happy to hear your views.

MR. KISSINGER: Good to be here, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you. Coming next, Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who is the senior democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee. In a moment.

(Announcements).

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn, thanks very much for coming in today. It's always a pleasure to have you with us. Now, you have heard, we have all heard, that the Russians have offered a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms in return for all kinds of things. Suppose we had a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms? We wouldn't be any better off than we are now. There would still be a deadly threat to the human race. We could spend the rest of our lives arguing about numbers and throw weights and so on. Isn't there some better way to go about this?

SEN. NUNN: Well, I think you can improve what we call stability, depending on what arms you were to use. I can visualize a 50 or even 75 percent reduction that would make the world more dangerous rather than less dangerous, so it depends on, in my view, getting both sides to cut back, or at least perhaps even terminate, first strike weapons, large land based MIRV missiles, which are very

13

lethal offensively, but exposed to a first strike from the other side.
That kind of agreement would be stabilizing.

MR. BRINKLEY: Do you see any possibility of a sort of
political - our problems are political, and the weapons are a result
of that. Any chance of success in political negotiations that you
can see?

SEN. NUNN: Well, it's going to be very hard, it's going
to be tough, but there are some indications, not just from the summit
but even before that, that the Soviets may be having second thoughts
about Afghanistan, and that is a possibility. It seems to me we also
have the possibility of trying to do something about what you alluded
to in your first question, that is the use of nuclear weapons. Even
if we got what most people would consider a very stabilizing, equit-
able and verifiable arms control arrangement we still would have a
grave danger of some type of war by accident or miscalculation.
It seems to me the risk reduction effort as Senator Warner and I have
been talking about a long time, and that both leaders said we're now
going to try to negotiate, is a step in that direction.

MR. WILL: On the subject of a cut that could make matters
worse, Dr. Kissinger has said that it is incomprehensible for the
Administration to propose a ban on mobile missiles, because if you
combine that with a 50 percent cut you would have fewer targets to
hit and the targets would be all fixed, and therefore, a first strike
would be easier. Do you agree that the Administration made a mis-
take in proposing a ban on mobile missiles?

SEN. NUNN: I would say it depends on whether that's a
tactical proposal or a substantive proposal, and that depends on who

14

you talk to in the Administration. Some people I believe view it
as tactical, others as substantive. But I do believe that mobile
missiles, if they're single warhead missiles, provide a way of stab-
ilizing the possibility or the temptation of a first strike on either
side. So a ban on mobility, a total ban coming out of this negotia-
tion to me would be a step in the wrong direction, it would be a step
against the Scowcroft recommendations, a step against the first con-
sensus we've had on a real arms control goal in the Congress for a
long time, so I would not welcome that.

MR. WILL: Given that the President has invested SDI with
the highest moral significance, and given the fact that we seem to
be getting nowhere with this rather Jesuitical argument about where
research begins and ends and development begins and ends, what do
you think of Dr. Kissinger's suggestion that we say, if it works
we're going to deploy it and we're willing to negotiate about the pace
and scale of deployments?

SEN. NUNN: Well, for one thing, we're a long way from
knowing whether it will work. Paul Nitze says, and I think he's
correct, that we do not know whether so-called SDI is going to be a
contribution to our security yet. It's a research program. So to me
it would be negotiating now about deployment of something we have
no idea whether it's really going to work and how much it's going to
cost.

MR. WILL: Well, you wouldn't be negotiating about deploy-
ment, you'd be saying let's not waste time trying to kill it, because
we're going to deploy it if it works. It's a subjunctive.

SEN. NUNN: Well, deployed if it costs $2 trillion,

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[L.C]

deployed if it means we have to eliminate the Army and the Marine
Corps and the Tactical Air Force, deployed if it means by the year
2000 we won't be able to retake Grenada? It seems to me that's a
pretty great leap of faith.

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Nunn, the joint statement --

MR. WILL: We're going to lose Grenada again.

(laughter)

MR. DONALDSON: We took Grenada, I mean we did it.

(laughter)

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Nunn, the joint statement issued in Geneva suggested that the two sides would move forward at the negotiating table now on an accelerated basis in reducing offensive weapons, trying to find a deal there. Star Wars was not mentioned in the communique. But right afterward Mr. Gorbachev held a news conference and returned to the familiar Soviet position that there can be no major reductions in offensive weapons until the United States gives up the Star Wars effort, which is the real Gorbachev?

SEN. NUNN: Well, Gorbachev also said in the Time magazine interview that you can't limit laboratory research. So we are not going to give up an SDI research, and I think to use the word "give up" by the Soviets or by some people on both ends of the political spectrum here is a misnomer. I don't agree with that.

MR. DONALDSON: So you think that we can go ahead with research and still make a deal on offensive weapons reductions. What if we go ahead with testing? Before Geneva Mr. Reagan, whenever he was asked the question, said yes, he meant testing, and something that was not negotiable.

16

[LQ]

SEN. NUNN: Well, some testing under the ABM Treaty is permitted, other testing is not. So it depends on the type testing, and we have a raging legal dispute now about a broad interpretation or a narrow. So we've got to sort out the ABM interpretation in this government, then we've got to get the Soviets to agree to a reasonable interpretation of ABM, that's the starting point. We're not going to get an offensive reduction in my opinion, unless we can at least agree on the terms of a treaty we both say we're going to adhere to. And it seems to me the best evidence of offensive/defensive kind of relationships, which I agree with Dr. Kissinger on, is the Weinberger letter that recently came out, where it was very plain that in response to Krasnoyarsk we might very well have to build up our offensive forces. And so we have always reacted to Soviet defenses with increased offenses. I think it's normal to assume they will do likewise.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, then what do you see as happening in January when the arms negotiators reconvene? Are you persuaded there will be a new impulse, a new impetus, which might narrow the differences and move toward a treaty, or do you think the positions at the table will be roughly the same and we'll make no progress?

SEN. NUNN: We've got a lot of roadblocks, we've got a lot of tough obstacles in the way, but I think there's more opportunity for reasonable and very substantial and also stabilizing arms control now than there has been in the last two decades. Whether we'll reach it or not I do not know, but I think there's a strong possibility and I believe this summit improved the atmosphere and improved the opportunity.

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[LQ]

MR. WILL: I would like to ask you two questions about continued compliance with the SALT II Treaty. There was a story in the New York Times yesterday that says the reason it didn't come up at the summit was that we had told them in a back channel way that we would continue complying. Is that your understanding?

SEN. NUNN: I do not know the answer to that.

MR. WILL: And the story also said we could continue complying, with the exception that we'd have proportional responses to their violations. Is that a policy you'd recommend?

SEN. NUNN: Well, that's the policy the Senate passed overwhelmingly, and it was my language that said we would not undercut, provided we maintained the right to have proportional responses.

MR. WILL: Should the President retire submarines as long as they're not in compliance?

SEN. NUNN: It seems to me that first of all we want to try to get them to come in/compliance. Second, one of the things they're not in compliance on is a new single warhead mobile missile. We also are developing that type missile, it seems to me that's a proportional response. Third, I think we ought to think carefully before taking out submarines. I prefer to take out vulnerable missiles, but that's a military type decision.

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn, thank you.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thanks very much for coming in today.

SEN. NUNN: Thank you.

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