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2950 Words

Dr. Kissinger Newsweek Article 9/12/93 - PM

Having the honor of attending the historic signing ceremony between Israel and the PLO at the White House, I felt slightly guilty about my feelings of ambivalence. Here was my ~~old and~~ trusted friend, Yitzhak Rabin, a partner in so many diplomatic efforts and conversations over three decades. And there was Yasir Arafat, from whom I had received quite a few messages which I had been obliged to rebuff because of the conventions and convictions of the period that was now ending.

Every instinct impelled one to celebrate this as the ~~new~~ beginning of a permanent reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. But nagging questions remained. What exactly was being recognized by each party, and what was its long term significance? Was it premature to invest Arafat with the aura of a new leadership in Israel?

And the ceremony signified one country's acknowledged leadership while it submitted Americans to like pride.

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This most sweeping of Arab-Israeli arrangements so far
occurs at a moment of weakness for both sides. The PLO is
being squeezed. In the Gulf War it lost the financial support
of the moderate Gulf states and the military and intelligence
support of Iraq. Since the collapse of Communism, it has been
deprived of the support of most of its friends outside the
region. The growth of radical fundamentalism threatens it
within the Muslim world. The PLO in fact needed the deal in
order to survive, and its weakness was a reason for Israel to
proceed lest it be left only with fundamentalists as partners.
But this raises the question whether Arafat is strong enough
to undertake the cooperative approach needed for a permanent
agreement or, whether, to secure his base, his incentive is
gradually to step up the pressure on Israel.

The mutual recognition is therefore far from symmetrical. Of
all the Arab adversaries of Israel, the Palestinians are among

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the most attractive humanly, and those with the greatest
grievance. Egypt and Syria have insisted on their historic
borders - Egypt successfully, Syria, so far, inconclusively.
But once these are satisfied, they have no necessary incentive
to go beyond them except to show solidarity with Palestinians.
But even the most moderate Palestinians will find it difficult
to look across whatever the dividing line turns out to be at
the lights [x] of Jerusalem or Tel Aviv without feeling a
twinge of regret at the loss of what they are bound to
consider Palestinian territory. When they recognized Israel,
did the Palestinians mean that they have become genuinely
reconciled to its existence? Or was it with the same attitude
that France renounced Alsace-Lorraine to Germany in 1871, only
<u>unbroken struggle</u>? To spend the next generation trying to get it back? Not even
the most moderate Palestinians are in a position to give a

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truthful answer, if only because they cannot ~~yet~~ know what
~~until~~ they will feel ~~when~~ the final borders are drawn.

As for Israel, much of its body politic seems to be
psychologically drained. It yearns for an end to non-
recognition, to intifadas, and the sense of permanent danger.
It therefore has endowed the word "peace" with a quality for
which there is no historic warrant whatsoever. Recognition has
not ~~in the past~~ been an obstacle to war or even to conquest;
almost all wars in history have started between nations
legally at peace. ~~In the Middle East, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to think of any conflict between states that has~~ a single
~~finally ended in reconciliation on the basis of one agreement.~~

Most Israelis expect from peace an almost Biblical conversion
in which tensions disappear and they live in brotherhood with
their Arab neighbors. No single agreement can fulfil this
hope. Such a result can come - if at all - only at the end of

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a long historical process. The statements of too many leading
Israelis ignore this reality and thereby may be setting the
stage for a monumental let-down.

In any event, mutual recognition is not symmetrical. At the
latest after the West Bank elections in nine months' time, the
Israeli recognition of the Palestinian entity (and soon-to-be
state) will be irrevocable, as will be the Israeli withdrawal.
Israeli politicians who speak blithely of abrogating the
agreement or of recognizing the West Bank are deluding
themselves. The international isolation such acts would
produce would prove unsustainable. And even if Israel should
withdraw its recognition of a Palestinian entity, the rest of
the world would not follow. The Palestinians, on the other
hand, always have the option of at least breaking off talks
and thereby returning Israel to a status not so dissimilar
from non-recognition.

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Thus the likely evolution is that Israel benefits more from
the beginning of the current peace process while the
Palestinian bargaining position is likely to improve with the
passage of time.

In the immediate future, Israel will gain considerable
benefits. It will be rid of the nearly half of the total Arab
population of the occupied territories which live in Gaza. It
will be able to withdraw its forces from the populated areas
in the rest of the territories and thus reduce, perhaps even
eliminate, the impact of the intifada. Some cooperative
patterns between Israeli and Arab authorities on the West Bank
are sure to develop. Relations with several Arab countries
will improve, though I would expect full recognition to be
withheld pending agreement on an overall settlement.

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The Palestinians' major achievement in the initial period resides in the de facto recognition of a Palestinian entity.

This will totally alter the negotiating pattern after a while.

The result will be that, in the interim period, the presence of Israeli settlements, military bases, and unrestricted use of roads is likely to be challenged, at first by the dissident elements of the Arab population but sooner or later by the established leaders if they want to retain public support.

Israel is therefore unlikely to enjoy a five-year respite.

Much more likely are attempts to harass the continuing Israeli presence, at least diplomatically, on what will increasingly be considered Arab soil by both the local population and, in great part, the rest of the world.

A perhaps more serious challenge will come from within the Muslim world. Since 1948, every progress toward peace in the Middle East has been followed by an increase in terrorism as

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dissident groups try to interrupt the process, either by
assassinating those who carry it forward, as happened to
Sadat, or by triggering Israeli retaliation, in order to
destroy an atmosphere of cooperation. Some leading Israelis
seem to believe that Arafat and the police force he will be
permitted to organize will help keep the West Bank quiet.

Arafat certainly has an incentive to establish himself as a
responsible leader. But it is difficult to believe that he
is able to persist in his pursuit of合作
will move from the tacit encouragement of terrorism to
cooperating with Israel against his own constituencies.

Indeed, the "strong" Palestinian police force envisioned in
the agreement could become a study in ambivalence. With what
energy will they resist acts to complicate the Israeli
presence? At what point do they become the problem rather than
the solution?

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The most serious danger is that the dissident groups will be strong enough to try to create Lebanese-style conditions on the West Bank. The central authorities may not be able to prevent terrorism, either against moderate Arabs or against Israelis on the West Bank, or even inside Israel. If conditions become too chaotic, Israel may intervene or outside Arab forces may try to infiltrate the West bank, or both. This could then usher in another Middle East war.

Thus, even in the interim period, there will be many unsolved, perhaps insoluble, problems requiring an extraordinary degree of cooperation between the two sides. While the role of economic development is often exaggerated, in this case rapid progress in that field is one of the few tools available to give the parties - and especially the Palestinians - a stake in an evolutionary approach. The

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outside world should rally for a substantial assistance

program, for which America has quite properly taken the lead.

In the euphoria of celebrating an agreement, one is easily

tempted to believe that a true spirit of conciliation has
descended on the parties. No one should exclude the

possibility of conversion. With the best will in the world,
the final reconciliation between Palestinians and Israelis can
not take place until the permanent settlement is concluded.

None of the key issues has been dealt with in the present
agreement - not borders, not settlements, nor Jerusalem. In
the short term, that is the strength of the agreement; in the
long term, a peril.

Fitting two states into a territory fifty miles wide - the
distance from the Mediterranean to the Jordan - would be
difficult even if irredentism were not built into the
situation. When I was involved in Middle East diplomacy, I

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favored the Jericho-Gaza portion of the present arrangement,
only in favor of Jordan rather than the PLO. And I was quite
unhappy when Israel refused to consider it. Some years later,
I had an occasion to drive from Jerusalem to Jericho. Though
we had barely left, in less than thirty minutes, we had already
reached our destination. Outsiders looking at maps drew to a
comprehensible scale do not guess how little land there is to
work with and how precarious the situation is for all parties.
Jerusalem carries similar emotional freight. And the
settlements will be an even more complex issue.

Thus, the parties will soon find that the operation of the
agreement is painful and that the movement toward a permanent
settlement is likely to move through a series of deadlocks. It
will become apparent that Israel's security does not permit it
to return to the '67 borders while Arab dignity will prove
This is a mistake
It had been made by
Israel but it did
bring peace to me

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this leads to greater flexibility or greater tension depends
in part on the United States.

The role of the United States will be complex. Until now,
every Arab-Israeli agreement has been brokered by the United
States and many of the formulae leading to solutions were
designed in Washington. Arab negotiators were counting on
America to induce Israel to make concessions they did not have
the means to evoke. Israel went along (and sometimes
encouraged) such an American role to maintain support from its
principal friend, and to get a limit

On this occasion, the United States was on the sidelines,
apparently uninformed and not emerging until the final signing
ceremony. The reasons for the near exclusion of the United
States were the newness of the Clinton administration, the
slowness in developing an American position, and the parties'
lack of confidence in America's ability to maintain secrecy.

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1) It must rally support for the economic development of the autonomous area. Most of these funds should come from the Arab world.

2) It should use its influence with other Arab countries to move rapidly to deal with Israel and to play a moderating role with the Palestinians. At a minimum, the Arab boycott of Israel should be lifted.

3) It should be available at times of deadlock without returning to its previous dominating role.

4) It should avoid permanent peacekeeping functions, especially in the West Bank. Before offering guarantees, we must know what we are guaranteeing and how to implement the promise.

In assessing these difficulties, it is important to understand how far all the parties have already come. What

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will determine the future is not the magnitude of the task,
but the magnitude of the resolution with which it is tackled.

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2950 Words

Having the honor of attending the historic signing ceremony between Israel and the PLO at the White House, I felt slightly guilty about my feelings of ambivalence. Here was my old and trusted friend, Yitzhak Rabin, a partner in so many diplomatic efforts and conversations over three decades. And there was Yasir Arafat, from whom I had received quite a few messages which I had been obliged to rebuff because of the conventions and convictions of the period that was now ending.

Every instinct impelled one to celebrate this as the beginning of a permanent reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. But nagging questions remained. What exactly was being recognized by each party, and what was its long term significance? Was it premature to invest Arafat with the aura

CYJ

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of a head of state on the basis of "granting" Israel a status
enjoyed automatically by every other nation? Was the euphoria
which was inescapable a spur for the process whose most
difficult stages are still ahead, or an obstacle if it leads
to disillusionment when the nearly inevitable deadlocks of the
next stage appear?

It was a moving moment presaging vast opportunities. Every
instinct drives one in the direction of the hope that
Palestinians and Israelis sharing a territory only fifty miles
wide from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River will have
learned that, in conflict, they are both condemned to
permanent misery. They will therefore settle the remaining
issues, which happen to be all the major ones, in the same
spirit of goodwill that characterized the ceremony. Israel and
the now inevitable Palestinian state will live side by side
much as Holland and Belgium do, benefitting not only the

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