1

On 29 September 1938, in the city of Munich in which he started his rise, Adolf Hitler was given the Sudetenland at a conference of the heads of state of Germany, Italy, France, and England. The event was greeted with jubilation in many circles of Western Europe. Chamberlain and Daladier received a hero's welcome on returning to their respective capitals. Little did the cheering throngs realize that the piece of paper that promised "peace in our time" actually constituted the inevitability of war. For Hitler was now free of internal opposition. Munich had done more than given him the Sudetenland, more even than opened the way to the East, it had rid him of internal opposition. Now the advocates of dynamism, Himmler and Ribbentrop, were vindicated, the counsellors of moderation discredited. For at Munich the elements opposed to Hitler who had finally coalesced into a Grand Alliance, whose plans for Hitler's overthrow were perfected, were dealt a death blow. Had Chamberlain delayed his flight to Munich by four hours, Hitler would have been overthrown. (1) Instead, the opposition, so laboriously marshalled, dissolved, not to reappear until much too late, on the fateful 20 July 1944.

To understand the crisis that led to Munich it is necessary to discuss the internal pressures of the Germany of 1938. For German foreign policy was to a large

(1) Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946) II, 69-72

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extent the outlet from impasses reached in domestic crisis. (1)

The year 1938 opened with the Nazis apparently securely holding political control. The civil service had been largely infiltrated, unemployment removed, and Germany re-armed. The dissatisfied element within the Nazi party had been eliminated by the Blood purge of 30 June 1934. There was, however, one segment of German life still independent and possessing very real power: the German Reichswehr. This formidable heir of the traditions of Moltke and Schließen was still free from Gestapo spies, stood apart from the otherwise omnipotent Nazi, and on it were based the hopes of all those elements in Germany who still believed in the feasibility of Hitler's overthrow. (2)

Who were those groups that were opposed to Hitler? Strangely enough, their main strength came from the very circles that had done most to help Hitler attain power: the German Conservatives. But their conception of a Hitler regime had been something widely different from the existing conditions. They had believed that after helping Hitler to office, he could be relegated to the Conservatives' hands. The dynamism of National-Socialism had now far outstripped them and they were looking easily for an escape. The leader of this group was the German Finance Minister: Hjalmar Schacht. (3) At first

(1) Von Ebenstein, *The Nazi State*, (New York 1943) 110-112

(2) Ulrich von Hassell, *The Other Germany*, (Zurich 1947) 35-40
Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946) I, 280-320

(3) Govt. Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials V*, (Interrogation of General Halder)

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he was an avid supporter of Hitler but was now the driving force among anti-Hitler elements.

Another group was represented by the former Catholics Centrists who feared that the development of totalitarianism would eventually threaten religion. A third group were the remnants of the trade-unions and Social-Democrats. Lastly there was a not inconsiderable number of people who did not feel too strongly about political ideologies but who were outraged by the continuing atrocities of Nazi internal policy. Yet the very heterogeneity of these groups made joint action difficult. They needed a unifying force and power. (1) For that, the co-operation of the army was needed.

An opportunity arose early in 1938. Hitler, not unmindful of these trends, decided to take over the High Command of the German Army. As so frequently happened, Hitler had actually let matters drift, until brought to a head by somebody's firm decision, in this case, Goering's. (2)

In January 1938, Field Marshall von Blomberg, the War Minister, a man of seventy years, married. Goering knew (3) that the bride had been a registered prostitute, yet he arranged for Hitler to give her in marriage.

After the ceremony, Frau Blomberg's police file was shown Hitler. In an insane rage at this humiliation he dismissed

(1) Govt. Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials IV*, (Interrogation of Laternsen)

(2) Trevor-Roper, *The Days of Hitler*, (New York 1947) 50-80

(3) Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946) I, 400-420

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(Y)

von Blomberg. (1) Yet still another man remained to be dealt with, the chief-of-staff of the German army: von Fritsch. Goering now produced a convicted homosexual who swore that one of his clients had been the chief-of-staff of the German army. (2) This convinced Hitler of the utter immorality of the Reichswehr and he consequently decided to assume personal command. Hitler took the position of Minister of War and von Brauchitsch was made chief-of-staff.

But the Reichswehr was not to be dealt with in this manner. Prodded by Schacht, von Brauchitsch began making plans for a revolt. (3) Typically enough, this revolt was to be directed against Goering and not primarily against Hitler. However, the German army, mindful of the "stab in the back" legend, did not want to move until its legal grounds were clearly defined.

This hesitation, because of legalistic considerations, we shall encounter again and was one of the factors in the eventual collapse of all resistance movements and the descent of Germany to catastrophe. Consequently von Brauchitsch demanded the convening of a court-martial to determine the guilt or innocence of von Fritsch.

(4) If the court-martial should find von Fritsch innocent, the German army would move against the Nazis. This, Von Brauchitsch promised Schacht on his word of

(1) Govt. Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials III*, (Interrogation of von Brauchitsch)

(2) Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946) I, 0-420-450

(3) Gisevius, *op cit*, I, 435

(4) Von Hassel, *The Other Germany*, (Zurich 1947) 185-190

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CyJ

honour. (1) Hitler agreed to the court-martial, but appointed Goering president of the court.

The court convened on 10 March 1938. In the evening of the same day German troops invaded Austria. It now became the duty of soldiers to rally behind Hitler and the court adjourned. The driving force behind this invasion was Goering. Hitler at first merely wanted to establish a Nazi regime in Austria, but Goering forced his hand, ordered the troops to cross the border. (2) When one considers that Goering was the chief target of the army, that he, too, must have been aware that repercussions of great consequence for him would result from the unavoidable acquittal, then it becomes clear to what extent internal policies influenced Germany's outward dynamism.

The court-martial reconvened on 17 March 1938. By that time the situation had drastically changed. Hitler was now the conquering hero, a revolz was out of the question. Hitler could afford magnanimity. Fritsch was acquitted and Hitler promised to rehabilitate him before the assembled General Staff.

And here begins the next act of the drama that led to Munich. On June 4th in front of the assembled General Staff, Hitler made a speech. For the first time he told the thunderstruck officers of his plans for invading Czecho-Slovakia. Sandwiched into this speech and overshadowed completely was the rehabilitation of von Fritsch. (3)

(1) Gustaf Freytag, *Generals Against Hitler*, (Zurich 1946) 280-282

(2) Govt. Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials V, VI, XI, (Interrogations of Keitel, Goering, Seyss-Inquart)*

(3) Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946) II, 35
Govt. Printing Office, *op cit*
IV, (Interrogation of Laternsen)

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(Y)

The dictator had accomplished the impossible again: he had
admitted a mistake and at the same time forced the Generals
to close ranks behind him. All except one. General-Colonel
Beck, the chief of the operational staff of the German Army
resigned and joined Schacht's opposition movement. Before
resigning, however, Beck took care to appoint in his place
a trusted subordinate: General Halder.

During June, July, and August the Czech crisis
developed. Schacht took up contact with Halder.(1) Halder
was a strange mixture of timid intellectual and aggressive
soldier. He expressed determination to eliminate Hitler.
Yet, he felt that such was Hitler's hold on the German peo-
ple that only on the very brink of the abyss, when Hitler's
war-like plans were clearly manifest, would he strike.(2)
Halder expressed a willingness to accept a military defeat
in the West to create a condition favorable to Hitler's
overthrow. This explains that the whole Western front was
held all during the Czech crisis by never more than eight
divisions.(3) In the meantime however, preparations went
on apace. A reliable armored division was placed in the
Thuringian forest to cut off Hitler's body-guard division
stationed in Munich. The commander of the Potsdam garrison,
von Witzleben, moved his troops to strategic points around
Berlin, explaining his dispositions as emergency man-
oeuvers.(4)

On September 28th everything seemed ready.

(1) Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946)
   II, 20

(2) Gisevius, *op cit*
   II, 20-25
   Govt. Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials*
   V, (Interrogation of General Halder)

(3) Winston Churchill, *Memoirs*, *Life* magazine, Vol.24,#16.

(4) Gisevius, *op cit*
   II, 47

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Chamberlain had met Hitler at Godesberg on the Rhine, but the meeting had broken up. This seemed the final proof of Hitler's determination for war. But Halder and von Brauchitsch asked for one more final interview with Hitler. Then they would be convinced of the legality of their procedure. And while they were seeing Hitler, the Italian ambassador, Attolico, brought Mussolini's offer of mediation. (1) The Munich conference was created, Hitler was saved.

The preceding has been given in so much detail, for detail is necessary to establish the validity of the following conclusions. The reliability of sources of information is unquestionable and most items have been confirmed from both Allied and German sources.

Several conclusions are inescapable. German foreign policy in the crucial years before the outbreak of the war can not be explained, as is so often done, as merely a reaction to the Treaty of Versailles. The very dynamism of dictatorship, the very necessity of internal pressure frequently forced external adventures. Also Munich marked the turning point of the Nazi regime. Henceforth the apostles of strength, like Himmler, and the prophets of Western decadence, like Rippentrop, had Hitler's ear. The various resistance groups fell completely apart. Schacht lost his standing with the generals, for after all, hadn't he always prophesied Western determination to fight for Czecho-Slovakia? (2) During the fateful year of 1938 the

(1) Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946) II, 75

(2) Govt. Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials VIII, (Interrogation of Schacht) V, (Interrogation of Halder)*

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German army, the last bulwark of real strength outside the Nazi orbit, became subordinate to Hitler. Starting with the Fritsch crisis they had been consistently out-manoeuvered. From March 10th, and the invasion of Austria, to June 4th, and the announcement of the projected attack on Czechoslovakia, to September 29th, and Munich runs a thread, one aspect of which is foreign triumphs and the other the assimilation of the army into the Nazi system. After Munich the German generals became convinced that Hitler's policy was not leading Germany to war, that he was of superior ability: the myth of Hitler's infallible intuition was born. From Munich the road for the German generals was one of clear subservience to Hitler and when in August 1939 a new crisis occurred, nobody thought of revolting against the man who in 1938 had been triumphant. (1)

From Munich Hitler could only go to war, for his faith in his own infallibility was now unshakeable and the German generals went the bitter road that on 20 July 1944 ended with the almost complete wiping out of the German Junker class.

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This essay has been concerned only with one aspect and in one country, of events the full discussion of which is beyond the scope of a History 1b paper. But in this simple recitation of facts there may be a lesson of the dangers of a form of government in which palace-intrigue determines the fate of millions and, for me at least, a deep

(1) Gustaf Freytag, *Generals Against Hitler*, (Zurich 1946)
210
Hans Bernhard Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, (Zurich 1946)
II, 120
Ulrich von Hassell, *The Other Germany*, (Zurich 1947)
300

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Gisevius, Hans Bernhard, *To The Bitter End*, Zurich 1946, 2 volumes

Author is one of the founders of Gestapo. In 1934 he joined Frick's Ministry of the Interior. From 1935, he was Schacht's assistant in the resistance movement. Close friend of Colonel-
General Beck, author was destined for the position of Minister of the Interior in case of success of the plot of the 20th of July 1944. Author's autobiography, *To The Bitter End*, appeared in 1946, and has been found reliable by Allied intelligence. Good source for details of German political situation between 1933-45.

Hassell, Ulrich von, *The Other Germany*, Zurich 1947

Author was member of German diplomatic Corps. Ambassador in Rome 1938-43. Member of anti-Hitler resistance movement from 1938. Executed in 1944. *The Other Germany* consists of diary preserved by author's family. Also author of *Gavour and Bismarck*, Leipzig, 1937. *The Other Germany* is useful as a picture of the state of mind of the German Conservative class.

Trevor Roper, H., L., *The Last Days of Hitler*, New-York, 1947

Author is history don at Oxford, England. Was charged, after the war, with investigating Hitler's death. First part of book contains analysis of Nazi personalities and foreign policy.

Churchill, Winston Spencer, *Memoirs*, Life Magazine, Volume24, #16

Source for military strength of Germany at time of Munich.
Considered reliable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (continued)

Ebenstein, Wilhelm, *The Nazi State*, New-York, 1943

Author is professor at Wisconsin University. Good analysis
of interrellation of Nazi foreign and domestic policy. Other

books: *Fascist Italy*, New-York, 1939

Government Printing Office, *The War Crimes Trials*, Washington, 1948

Transcript of the sessions of the military tribunal in Nuremberg