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HERALD-DISPATCH

OCT 30 1957

Army Strategy Expert Urges Shift In Policy

WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 (P)—The Army and its friends heard a scholar of strategy say today that too much of the nation's military thinking is characterized by nostalgia for the past.

Dr. Henry Kissinger, executive director of Harvard University's international seminar, gave his views to the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army.

He said it seemed to him that military planners have merely added nuclear strategy to old World War II concepts.

He suggested there is need for a more flexible strategy, a need for something more

than the policy of deterrent force which he thought was a strategy of revenge.

There should be a shift, he said, to strategy which would deny an aggressor any possibility of attaining his objectives by war.

The advent of new weapons and weapons delivery systems, Kissinger said, means that an all-out war would be fought with the weapons at hand. "The industrial potential, in case of all-out war, would be almost useless once war had started," he said.

David Sarnoff, retired Army brigadier general and chairman of the board of the Radio Corporation of America estimated that within five years and possibly so soon as both the United States and Russia will be in mass production

intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Dr. Willard F. Libby, an atomic energy commissioner, outlined the progress so far in preparing the civilian population for the realities

of hydrogen war and additional needs.

possess no constitutional
right to resist the legal proc-
ess which may be directed in
this case."

Gen. Phillips

Continued From Page One.

clarity of purpose to give as-
surance that national strategy
control weapons rather than the
other way around. Unless the
use of nuclear weapons is scrup-
ulously planned and controlled
within the context of a sound
strategy of limited war, their
great military potentiality, in-
stead of being our salvation
could easily become the very
thing that would defeat our
political objectives and even
lead to our utter devastation."

Strategy Hinges on Cost.

Osgood criticizes the Admin-
istration practice of making
strategy dependent on a mili-
tary cost limitation. "Unless the
American Government has
grossly underestimated the na-
tion's objective economic ca-
pacity, one must conclude that
it has consistently determined
the economic limits of defense
expenditure by domestic politi-
cal criteria and then tried to
de devise defense programs that
would give as much security as
possible within arbitrary budget
ceilings."

He believes that 50 billion
dollars annually would provide
a flexible capacity adequate to
meet the Soviet threat in any
form.

These two books are land-
marks in writing about Ameri-
can military problems from the
point of view of strategy, doc-
trine and international politics.
There have been no such com-
prehensive studies written be-
fore.

They appear at a critical time
when Americans are asking why
with all our military and mili-
tary assistance expenditures we
still seem to be dancing to the
Soviet fiddle. They point the
way to reverse this situation.

Redskins Turn
ALL-STAR

NEW YORK, Sept. 9 (UP) line" on the 1957 National Football those scrambled exhibition res

Monday morning experts could ponder today such items as the second loss in four games for the world champion New York Giants and an impressive victory over tough Baltimore by previously winless Washington as typical of a full-weekend of pro gridiron play.

In Sunday games, the Redskins ended a three-game losing streak by whipping highly touted Baltimore, 24-14; the Chicago Bears bounced back from a loss to the Giants to hand the winless Philadelphia Eagles their fifth straight defeat and the Pittsburgh Steelers handed the Detroit Lions their first loss, 20-14.

Forty-Niners Beat Cards.

On Saturday, the San Francisco Forty-Niners downed the Chicago Cardinals, 27-21; and the Green Bay Packers surprised the Giants, 13-10. On Friday night, the Los Angeles Rams beat the Cleveland Browns, 20-14.

The Redskins almost sewed up their game with the Colts in the first period when they racked up 14 points on an intercepted pass from Tom Braatz scored from 44 yards and an off-tackle slash by Joe Scudero for 40 yards. The Redskins wrapped it up in the third when Don Bosseler plunged for another score and added a 32-yard field goal by Sam Baker in the fourth. The Colts scored on two T.D. passes by Johnny Unitas, but they didn't come until the third and fourth periods.

At Kansas City, rookie Willie Galimore from Florida A. & M. turned in touchdown runs of 73 and 100 yards to lead the Bears to their victory over the Eagles. Rick Casares raced to 50 yards with a Bear T.D. on the play and

Seventy-nine probationary firemen and promote three captains to battalion chief, nineutenants to captain and seventy-nine firemen to lieutenant in ceremonies tomorrow at 10 a. m. at the Western Union Auditorium, 60 Hudson St. The new probationary firemen will raise the department's roster of firemen to 12,084, the largest in the department's history.

Wednesday and Friday

Table Theats

Brioches, Croissants
Petits Fours, French pastry

Eclair Pastry Shops

PASTRY AND COFFEE SHOP AT
1 West 72nd Street TR 3-7700
ECLAIR—SUTTON Place Branch
54th St., First Ave.—PL 9-5355
ECLAIR—Cooper, Stuyvesant Branch
31st Ave. (Opp. 19th St.) OR 7-7747

OPEN 7 DAYS A WEEK

286

THE ECONOMIST OCTOBER 26, 1957

at long last a higher dollar price of gold). But, in the interim, a major American slump would certainly cause bitter unemployment and setback here.

No small reflationary measures taken by Britain now, however, would make the situation then any better. The present prospect is like the uncertain British weather. Up there in the sky, as we plough out chosen furrow, are quite a few scattered dark clouds. Mr Gaitskell thinks they spell rain. Other commentators think that there is a rather better-than-even chance of the clouds blowing over; but they add to this a warning, more insistent than Mr Gaitskell's, that past experi-

ence has shown that Britain still lies in the economic hurricane belt. Come respite, rain or hurricane, come perhaps—at their time of impact—a case for different policies. But the one thing that cannot be sensible would be to fit policies now to any one assumption drawn from this prophetic guesswork, instead of to present realities. In the climate in which Britons have to live, no outside work of any sort would ever get done if it became the fashion to leave off present labour at moments of overcast (not yet of rain), in order to seek provisional shelter under the premature impediment of an umbrella.

## Nuclear Dilemma

After Russian technological successes, does the growing western arsenal of tactical atomic weapons really offer a chance of "war without suicide"?

Much will have been gained from their few hours' talks at Washington if the President and the Prime Minister have agreed not only on the joint objectives of their two countries in defence planning, but also on the general nature of western military strategy. The immediate question, no doubt, is how the United States with Britain can, by renewing something like wartime co-operation catch up, and pass, Russia in missile technology. Possession of the intercontinental ballistic missile does not at once break the thermo-nuclear stalemate in Russia's favour. So long as the western strategic air forces can take off from their string of bases Russia has no prospect of winning a world war. This would be possible only if Russia ever came to possess enough missiles of sufficient accuracy to be able by one vast pyrotechnic Pearl Harbour, to knock out the western strategic air forces on the ground.

Even so, Russian possession of the ICBM may increase the immediate strategic and diplomatic threat: that is, Russia's ability to nibble at western positions by advances to halt any one of which would not, in itself, seem worth the threat of mutual suicide. For now American cities are in the front line, from the first hour. Even when the west had superiority in the threat of "massive retaliation," Russia practised much successful brinkmanship; and the inflexibility of western policy in this predicament has for some time been called into question by those who—like the Kissinger school of thought—believe that the west's arsenal of limited, or tactical, atomic weapons should enable the west to resist local advances without fearing the risk of total war. (Mr Kissinger's book was discussed on page 615 of *The Economist* on August 4, 1957.) Mr Dulles has stated firmly that, if Turkey were attacked, the response would be more than a defensive operation; it is the

British view now that an attack on such a vital western interest as the integrity of Turkey would have to be met by full-scale war or the threat of it. Yet in Europe, where there seems even more certainty that a Russian attack would be met by full-scale retaliation, NATO forces are being equipped with tactical weapons for limited war.

There is here, it would seem, a confusion in military thinking that the President and the Prime Minister might profitably examine; it may be an extremely expensive confusion. It can be stated in a few sentences. General Norstad's forces, we are told, could not prevent Europe from being overrun in a day or two unless they used atomic weapons. But the use of these weapons is seen as a means of gaining time until bombardment of the invader's bases and industrial areas causes his pressure to relax. That, however, would be massive retaliation, which, as the stockpile of atomic bombs grows, and in the light of Russia's possession of intercontinental missiles, seems sure to destroy both sides indiscriminately. What, then, is the role of the American 288mm cannon or the short-range missiles ("Honest John" and "Corporal") which are at present mounted in Europe?

Presumably the allied command either thinks them necessary to full-scale war itself or (behind its many denials) is thinking in terms of defending Europe by some sort of limited atomic retaliation which would not unleash missiles or strategic air forces. The implications of either point of view are worth pursuing.

If European defence remains based on the all-out threat of strategic bombing, the build-up of tactical arms must mean that the generals think that, even while hydrogen bombs were "taking out" cities and sprinkling fall-out over the countryside, there would

287

still be some point in holding a "front" against invaders. If so, their views do not square with Mr Sandys's white paper; they believe, that is, that "Phase One," for all its devastation, will be followed by a period of broken-backed warfare. If not, they are spending a lot of money in going through the motions, which they privately think irrelevant, of preparing to defend Europe from occupation, and they are doing this for the political purpose of reassuring the European allies, not for any directly military reason. This may be; but it suggests that the generals' and the politicians' ideas of defence may be sadly—and expensively—at odds.

If the military planners have, however, begun to believe that limited atomic defence may be possible, they presumably think that an invader could be stopped in his tracks by atomic bombardment in a limited operational area. This makes sense of General Norstad's demand for forces stronger than a mere "tripwire"; for to do this, the allied command must compel the attacker to mass in such force that he would present sizeable targets. A thin screen of conventionally armed forces could be pierced by small mobile commando formations, backed by air power; in that case the attackers need offer few targets for atomic shells in the lower kiloton ranges.

BUT how limited an area? This is the crux. The "graduated deterrents" school of thought argues that it would probably be necessary to destroy targets behind the enemy's own lines; most military commanders would agree. This might lead to full-scale retaliation and the end of limitation. Hence the advocates of graduated deterrents are led to urge formal announcements that targets would be limited to military objectives. But is such a course realistic? It would limit the actions of the allies without necessarily restraining the other side; and, clearly, the deeper the atomic attack is carried, the greater the danger that the enemy will mistake the intention of the attacking aircraft to be aimed at his "vitals"—and will therefore rush into all-out war. But there is now an even more practical objection to this thesis. This is that the Russians' recently demonstrated ballistic achievements suggest that they may be just as well equipped with tactical weapons as the West is. If so, a limited war in Europe would not end in the *status quo* ante. The Russians might withdraw, but leaving western Europe in ruins—a palpable gain to them in the balance of world power, even if eastern Europe suffered too. Limitation cuts both ways.

Indeed, the time may come when Mr Khrushchev may change his mind and welcome rules for limiting war. It has always been assumed by the Kissinger school that the use of limited weapons would be to the West's advantage, because its scientists would provide more of those weapons, or better ones. The unconscious assumption has been that western excellence in atomic technology enabled the West to find a "cheap way" to

neutralise Russian superiority in manpower—or, rather, Russian readiness to make material sacrifices to provide that manpower. Might not, on the contrary, the Russians have the advantage—and not only in Europe? In many other areas it might be the western forces that would be massed in fleets or ports, and so provide ideal targets for tactical atomic weapons. This is the strongest argument in insisting that the West cannot tie its hands in advance; that an aggressor must know that any encroachment on vital western interests is liable to spark off the sort of war that would incinerate communism along with communists.

There are, however, two other possibilities. The military planners can foresee a time when tactical atomic weapons could be used to seal off a frontier within a very narrow area and without necessitating attacks on enemy terrain at all. But before this atomic Maginot concept could become a plausible reality, the western allies in Europe would need a much more mobile and accurate atomic piece of artillery than it has got, and in great quantity—an atomic 155mm gun, perhaps. The carnage on the frontier would be terrible; but the fatal "tit-for-tat" process might conceivably be avoided.

The other possibility is that the Supreme Headquarters of the Allies in Europe may consider that, though the atomic field-pieces would be irrelevant in action, they are necessary to convince the Russians that an attack on Europe would inevitably touch off the global war. If the Nato forces have such weapons, the Russians must realise that in a mêlée these would go off, as it were, of themselves and precipitate a major conflict; Europe could not be occupied in a night or America, under threat of intercontinental missiles, be asked to accept a *fait accompli*.

THESE are nice, and deadly, calculations. The trouble is that nobody knows what the military planners do propose, and they give the impression, meanwhile, of wanting to have a bit of everything—atomic artillery and, for example, four fully equipped British divisions on the Continent—"just in case" one or other of these might turn out to be the very thing to meet the (at present unforeseen) need of the moment. This may, in the present fog of thought, be the only, and vastly costly, way of insurance. But if the West does need all forms of defensive armaments, in sufficient quantities, in order to have the initiative which its foreign policy requires, this should be said outright, so that the frightful cost can be frankly faced and borne collectively.

Here the argument may pause. A layman cannot offer answers—he can only work out the likely implications of the known capacity of weapons. The Kissinger argument has certainly had little effect on the Ministry of Defence in Britain—perhaps rightly, since the sputnik has shown up flaws in it. The problem is left unsolved, and that must continue to occupy British and American statesmen in their consultations.

Saturday, October 5, 1957

INFORMATION SERVICE

Published Bi-Weekly, Except During July and August by the

BUREAU OF RESEARCH AND SURVEY

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

297 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 10, N. Y.

Price $3.50 Per Year—Single copies of this issue 20 cents.

Volume XXXVI, No. 29

The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America is the cooperative agency through which thirty communions render united service. Articles appearing in this publication furnish information on current issues and are not to be construed as declarations of official attitudes or policies of the National Council of Churches.

Entered as second-class matter January 4, 1924 at the Post Office at New York, under the act of March 3, 1879.

Radioactive Fallout—How large is a small risk?

"Our generation has succeeded in stealing the fire of the gods, and is doomed to live with the horror of its achievement," writes Henry A. Kissinger in a book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957. $5.00). The book is concerned with the implications of nuclear explosives for military strategy and the conduct of foreign policy and international relations generally. It was written after three years of discussion with a group of informed persons convened by the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. The main discussion, so far as United States policy is concerned, is over a variety of nuclear weapons needed for the purpose of deterring the varied threats that come from time to time from the Soviet Union.

In this issue of INFORMATION SERVICE reference is made to portions of the current public controversy concerning the health of the people while the weapons are being developed. In this discussion, scientists, government officials, and churchmen, among others, are taking part.

"Clean Bomb"?

The extensive public debate, sometimes called an "outcry," has recently been influenced by the announcement, June 24, 1957, at the White House, that three prominent atomic scientists had informed the President that the radioactive fallout from testing bombs, the subject of much writing and speaking, had already been greatly reduced, and that further refinements of technique would in about five years result in making the fallout "essentially negligible." The scientists also gave the opinion that it would be possible to produce a "small" hydrogen bomb. A small hydrogen bomb might become a useful "tactical" weapon because it could be used against military targets without fear that its devastating effects would kill or injure many persons at a considerable distance from the target. The small clean hydrogen bomb would also be of first importance because its use would permit ground troops to follow through or to approach without fear of radioactive contamination of debris near the point of destruction.

The report to the President by the three atomic scientists was arranged by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of Congress, whose members had previously

heard the scientists testify. Those reporting were physicists at the University of California: Ernest O. Lawrence, director of the Radiation Laboratory; Edward Tiller, associate director; and Mark M. Mills, head of the theoretical division of the laboratory. Dr. Lawrence was quoted in *The New York Times*, June 25, as stating: "We are convinced" that it is possible "to produce nuclear weapons that are in a sense just like TNT, except tremendously more powerful. They are an explosive—the fallout radioactivity is a small element in the picture with such weapons."

In a review of the matter, William L. Lawrence, science editor for *The New York Times*, in that newspaper, June 30, 1957, noted that President Eisenhower had stated at his press conference the previous week that the scientists are now producing bombs that have 96 per cent less fallout than was the case with the original bombs which are now called "dirty." The President was also reported to have stated that scientists had told him that if given four or five years more for testing every step of the development "an absolutely clean bomb" could be produced.

Mr. Lawrence writes that "both statements need a certain amount of elucidation." He thinks if 96 per cent of the fallout has been eliminated, then the process of manufacture has been changed. The original dirty bombs were produced by the fission of two isotopes of uranium, but now apparently 96 percent of the explosive power comes from the fusion of the heavy varities of hydrogen, a process that does not produce a fallout. Thus a "small" bomb, only as destructive as those used over Japan, would produce only a relatively small amount of fallout products. But the monster of the type tested in the Pacific in 1954, producing an explosive force reported to be equal to 15,000,000 tons of TNT, would produce fallout thirty times that of the type used in Japan. It is assumed, writes Mr. Lawrence, that the monsters need no longer be tested, and that the emphasis now is on the production of the smaller hydrogen bombs. It is the elements used to "trigger" the hydrogen bomb that produce the fallout. The announcement must mean, writes Mr. Lawrence, that the scientists are of the opinion that the fallout from the "refined weapons would be so small that it would be . . . insignificant for all practical purposes."

"Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars"

The announcement has had a varied response. One has been the observation that even if fallout could be practically eliminated, the devastation at the target point would still be horrible, and that an explosive weapon which could produce millions of corpses and practically destroy our cities should not be called "clean."

Page 1 Radioactive Fallout—How large is a small risk?

Page 4 Laymen's Summary of Scientific Opinion

Page 7 C.C.I.A. on Atomic Tests and Disarmament

Page 8 World Council's Message

Page 8 "No Short Cut to Nuclear Disarmament"

Saturday, October 5, 1957

One of the most vigorous comments came from Norman Cousins, editor of *The Saturday Review*, New York, in that weekly journal, July 13, 1957. The first paragraph in the editorial reads:

"Almost without realizing it, we are adopting the language of madmen. We talk of 'clean' hydrogen bombs, as though we are dealing with the ultimate in moral refinement. We use fairyland words to describe a mechanism that in a split second can incinerate millions of human beings—not dummies or imitations but real people, exactly the kind that you see around your dinner table. What kind of monstrous imagination is it that can connect the word 'clean' to a device that will put the match to man's cities? Yes; what is really meant by 'clean' is that we may be able to build a bomb with a greatly reduced potential for causing radioactive fallout. But to call a hydrogen bomb or any bomb 'clean' is to make an obscene farce out of words."

Further: "It is made to sound as though something beautiful and gleamingly wholesome were coming into a man's life. We seem to forget that this is human tissue that is involved here. Also human germplasm. And the effect on both of added radiation is a cheapening and a damaging effect, and therefore an evil one. To use the pretty words of the nursery in connection with such an effect is to en-gage in a fiendish act of moral shrinkage."

"There was," writes Mr. Cousins, "a general air of jubilation about the announcement, as though this was the deliverance the human race was waiting for. The announcement [at the White House] said nothing about the fact that what the world is waiting for is not a better way to make a 'clean' hydrogen explosive, but a better way to get rid of dirty wars."

Do those who are jubilant think that the nuclear armaments' race will be called off? "Do they think unlimited freedom to continue unlimited testing will cause the present world anarchy to disappear?"

A laboratory is not the whole world, even though a laboratory may be very important to the scientists of the Atomic Energy Commission. "The whole world is a world of movement . . . And it is precisely the boiling and churning of the unpredictables that make it necessary today to bring the weapons of mass destruction under control, to define new relationships among the nations, and to make these new relationships work under enforceable law."

## Albert Schweitzer's Appeal

On April 24, 1957, the Nobel Prize Committee, Oslo, Norway, issued Albert Schweitzer's "Appeal to Conscience," prepared by the noted physician and missionary at Lambarene. He had been urged by the Committee, by prominent scientists in Europe, and others, including Norman Cousins who earlier went to Lambarene, to issue the statement. He had at first declined, partly because of a lifelong practice of not issuing or signing pronouncements. He told Mr. Cousins that he had always felt his contribution to the world should come out of his attention to music, theology, philosophy, and medicine. But Dr. Schweitzer finally decided to prepare a declaration and hand it to the Nobel Committee. Radio Oslo broadcast the full text, as apparently did radio stations in many other nations in the world. A check made by *The Saturday Review* indicated that three nations in which the appeal was not broadcast in full were the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. The appeal was published in full in *The Saturday Review*, May 18, 1957.

"We are committing a folly in thoughtlessness . . . We must muster the insight, the seriousness and the courage to leave folly and to face reality." Dr. Schweitzer con-

cluded that the main reason why there was no agreement to stop the testing of nuclear weapons was because public opinion was not being effectively expressed.

For many years the world was not aware of the danger of radiation to those operating X-ray apparatus. As a result thousands of physicians and nurses were injured. The results of radioactive fallout from testing of hydrogen weapons have now been studied and analyzed. Good evidence has accumulated. While the materials collected are not complete, it enabled Dr. Schweitzer "to draw the conclusion that radiation resulting from the explosions which have already taken place represents a danger to the human race—a danger not to be underrated—and that further explosions of atomic bombs will increase the danger to an alarming extent." Dr. Schweitzer notes that many others have expressed the same conclusion.

The testing of an atom bomb "creates an inconceivably large number of exceedingly small particles of radioactive elements which decay like uranium or radium." Certain of these particles decay "extraordinarily slowly." Although the amount of radioactive elements in the air, and even the water, may be very small, it also affects vegetation and soil. "Unfortunately, for us, nature hoards what is falling down from the air." Thus "none of the radioactivity of the air" is unimportant.

On one occasion, Dr. Schweitzer notes that the radioactivity of the water in the Columbia River, into which the Hanford atomic plant deposits waste matter, was "insignificant." But the radioactivity of the plankton found in the river was 2,000 times higher than that of the water; that of ducks eating plankton, 40,000 times higher; that of fish, 150,000 times higher.

"The cells of the red bone marrow, where the red and the white blood corpuscles are formed, are very sensitive to radioactive rays. . . .

"Not our own health only is threatened by internal radiation, but also that of our descendants." Among the descendants of 3,000 operators of X-ray apparatus a higher percentage of stillbirths has been found than among non-radiologists.

"We are forced to regard every increase in the existing danger through further creation of radioactive elements by atom bomb explosions as a catastrophe for the human race, a catastrophe that must be prevented."

## Scientists vs. Scientists

In the public discussion preceding and following the Schweitzer appeal, scientists have been arrayed against scientists, so much so that many a lay reader may have been tempted to give up in frustration. But in an article, "Fallout and Health," in *The New Leader*, New York, July 1, 1957, Walter C. Bauer, a physician, and John M. Fowler, a professor of physics, suggest that "it is not the scientist, neither AEC [Atomic Energy Commission] employee nor university professor, who must decide this question. The decision must be made by an informed and concerned public."

"The risk is extremely small," wrote Willard F. Libby, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission of the United States, in "An Open Letter to Dr. Schweitzer," April 25, 1957. Dr. Libby was formerly of the Institute for Nuclear Studies, the University of Chicago. Dr. Libby's letter was widely published and appeared in full in *The Saturday Review*, New York, May 25, 1957, as part of a forum on the Schweitzer declaration.

Dr. Libby doubts that Dr. Schweitzer has had "access to the most recent information." The Government of the United States does take account of the possible hazards.

2

Saturday, October 5, 1957

There are "some differences in findings of scientists," but there is general agreement "upon the approximate magnitude of the fallout and the rate at which it is descending ..." "There is less agreement about the magnitude of the physiological effects which can be expected to result from fallout radiation." The U. S. Government is endeavoring to have "very small test radiation" and is endeavoring to reduce it.

"I do not mean to say that there is no risk at all. What I would like to demonstrate to you is that the risk is extremely small compared with other risks which persons everywhere take as a normal part of their lives. At the same time, I ask you to weigh this risk against what I believe would be the far greater risk—to freedom-loving people everywhere in the world—of not maintaining our defenses against the totalitarian forces at large in the world until such time as safeguarded disarmament may be achieved. Of course, a workable, safeguarded system of international disarmament is a paramount objective of the United States Government, and one which we must work for and hope and pray will be achieved. ..."

"What is a 'small' risk?" asks Harrison Brown in a "counter-reply" to Dr. Libby, appearing in the same issue of the *Review*. Dr. Brown is professor of geochemistry at the California Institute of Technology and has been associated with the plutonium laboratory at Oak Ridge, Tenn. "Continued testing at the present rate may well result in the death each year from leukemia of nearly 10,000 persons who would not otherwise have died." Dr. Brown refers to the concern of geneticists, and particularly to findings of E. B. Lewis of the California Institute of Technology "who found that the incidence of leukemia is increased with exposure to low-dosage radiation." And, Dr. Brown goes on: "Leukemia is but a single manifestation of danger caused by low-dosage radiation. Are there others? We don't know, but it would be surprising if there were not. And if there are, it seems unlikely that the AEC will discover them if they continue to operate within the framework of their present philosophy."

We print below the major portion of a background paper recently presented to the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs by Alan Booth and Richard M. Fagley of the staff of the Commission, because it is a careful summary of much of the current output by scientists on the health aspects of the radioactive fallout.

## "Clouds from Nevada"

This is the title of a "special report" by Paul Jacobs in *The Reporter*, New York, May 16, 1957, on the Atomic Energy Commission's "Weapons-Testing Program."

"A blinding flash, a great bang, and a shaking of the earth ... are no longer novel sounds and sights to the people living in Nevada and Utah near the test site," which is located 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Most people in the area go about their usual ways when a weapon is tested, but others, "justifiably or not, ... regard the Atomic Energy Commission as an army of occupation" and are "filled with apprehension and dread."

In 1956, Martin Bardoli, aged 7, living on the Fallini Ranch, near Warm Springs, Nev., some 100 miles from the test site, died of leukemia. One of the doctors attending him said his disease "may have resulted from the atomic explosions in southern Nevada." Actually, writes Mr. Jacobs, although the Atomic Energy Commission maintains that leukemia may be brought on only by much larger doses of radiation than Martin Bardoli received, the AEC "does not know how much radiation exposure 'Butch' Bardoli received as a result of radioactive fallout from its weapon-testing programs."

Complaints come from people who have contracted cancer; from sheepmen and cattlemen whose animals have died. But the AEC's official attitude seems to be "keep smiling." Two ranchers, Dell and Cornell Stewart, reported in June, 1953, that 16 horses had been burned and "six cattle had dropped dead" after leaving a water-hole at Papoose Lake and claimed that the water had been "badly affected by radioactive fallout." The Government indemnified the ranchers for the horses, but not for the cattle. It apparently pays for burns that can be seen and has the policy "to deny everything else."

"Public relations was apparently at least as important as public health" to the AEC official who wrote that "to deny the owners the use of waterholes would bring about new problems to both owners and the Government. ... The waterholes were not closed."

The AEC's public relations has also been accompanied with considerable public pressure. Whenever Robert Cran dall, editor of the weekly *Times-Bonanza* of Tonopah, Nev., publishes material that the AEC regards as "critical," the AEC's public relations men call on him to make "cor rections." The AEC, e.g., was quick to ask for "correc tions" of publications of statements made by Linus Paul ing, a chemist of the California Institute of Technology, on the genetic effects of exposure to radiation. Mr. Jacobs writes that in the area "information is hard to get."

The AEC also used its influence to prevent Herman J. Muller, of the University of Indiana, a distinguished gene ticist and Nobel Prize winner, from delivering a paper on the genetic damage of radiation and fallout, at the Inter national Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic En ergy in Geneva in August, 1955. The paper had previously been accepted by the technical staff of the United States delegation.

The AEC, thinks Mr. Jacobs, pays more attention to testing weapons than to investigating the hazards to health of radioactivity. It imposes a high degree of conformity on its own scientists. Mr. Jacobs concludes that the guard ing of public health should be separated from development of weapons, as has been done in Great Britain. There, the Medical Research Council, with 1,000 employes, is inde pendent of the Atomic Energy Authority. The Medical Council there "has full liberty to appoint its own research officers and to pursue its own scientific policy."

## Choosing Among Risks

Expressions of concern from church bodies throughout the world have been numerous. The World Council of Churches, Geneva, issued, May 14, 1957, in mimeographed form a selection, "Statements on Nuclear Weapons," made during the past few years. Pope Pius gave a message to the Japanese envoy, Matsushita, April 14, 1957, noting "the exhausting and costly race toward death," and stating that "scientists of all nations and all faiths must feel grave moral obligation to pursue the noble aim of harnessing these energies for the service of man."

O. Frederick Nolde, director of the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council, discussed the experimental nuclear tests, and summed up the current dilemma of the free world as follows in an address, May, 1957, before the U. S. Conference for the World Council of Churches:

"The Problem. While there is common agreement that radioactive fallout from nuclear weapon explosions can adversely affect health, there are disagreements and un-

3

Saturday, October 5, 1957

certainties as to whether the danger exists at the present
level of experimental tests or whether the potential dan-
ger will become real only if tests are continued and acceler-
ated. Two kinds of risks are involved. The first is the dan-
ger to health and in this connection the hazards attached to
peaceful uses of atomic energy must not be overlooked.
The second is the risk in negotiating such international
agreements to discontinue tests that will at the present
time clearly be inadequate because, in dealing with only
one segment of the disarmament problem, they will not
equivalently ensure the security of all countries. The prob-
lem reduces itself to the difficult choice between an appar-
ently uncertain risk to health and an apparently clear risk
to security.

"Proposed Action. There should be a firm commitment to discontinue experimental tests of larger nuclear weapons either at the time when the danger to health is established with reasonable scientific certainty, or at the time when an adequate international agreement can be negotiated. Information should be continually solicited from scientists, particularly from those who are brought together under impartial, international auspices. If at any time scientific opinion preponderantly asserts an immediate risk to health, the risk of an inadequate international agreement to discontinue tests must be run."

The Violent Force of the Bombs

*The Effects of Nuclear Weapons* is the title of a 579 page handbook compiled by the Department of Defense, published by the Atomic Energy Commission, and sold by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. (1957. $2.00). It brings down to date the information in a previous volume issued in 1950.

The Problem of Waste Disposal

A recent incident in the disposal of radioactive waste
from an industrial plant highlighted a problem which
may become more and more difficult. Steel drums were
being transported to sea, to be sunk 185 miles southeast of
New York. The fuse of one drum failed to function, and
instead of sinking began to drift on the surface of the
ocean. The drum was filled with radioactive sodium and
according to reports might have caused damage from ex-
plosion if it had been struck by a ship. After frantic efforts
the Coast Guard located the drum, and it was sunk by gun-
fire from airplanes on July 16, 1957.

This is but one of the problems dealt with in an ar-
ticle, "Is Atomic Power Safe?" by Charles M. Herzfeld,
a physicist, in *The Commonwealth*, New York, May 31,
1957. "Here one will have to deal with a steady accumula-
tion of tons of highly radioactive materials. These can-
not be stored among populations indefinitely . . . A prom-
ising disposal scheme is that of forming the wastes into
brick-like chunks which would be dumped into the deep
valleys of the ocean floor. To prove this scheme feasible,
the rate at which water from these deep valleys mixes with
the rest of the ocean must be determined. . . . Research in
geophysics is required and must be carried out on an inter-
national scale, another example of the urgent need for in-
ternational cooperation in atomic matters."

Following is the main text of a paper, "Notes on the
Health Dangers of Radioactive Fallout," prepared by
Richard Fagley and Alan Booth of the staff of the Com-
mission of the Churches on International Affairs. The
paper was presented to the Commission in July 1957:

To facilitate discussion of the complex of problems sur-
rounding the development of atomic power in a divided
world, we have tried to summarize some of the concerns
and conclusions of scientists regarding the hazards to
health from bomb-test fallout of the delayed or general
type. On this aspect . . . , which has been clouded by public
controversy, we have sought the advice of scientists on
both sides of the Atlantic and have tried to take into ac-
count the major studies now available. The summary which
follows is our attempt, as laymen in this field, to report
what seems to us the main burden of responsible scientific
opinion. The value of a compilation of this sort is clearly
very limited, and the chief justification for duplicating it
is that a brief up-to-date digest on the subject is not at
hand.

The main documents referred to here are *The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation*, (June 1956), the summary reports of a study sponsored by the (U.S.) National Academy of Sciences (NAS); *The Hazards to Man of Nuclear and Allied Radiations*, (June, 1956), the report of a committee appointed by the Medical Research Council in the U. K. (MRC); and *Effect of Radiation on Human Heredity*, the report of a World Health Organization study group soon to be published. This latter study dealt more with the need for research than with the present dangers, but noted that the study group was in "essential agreement" with the findings and recommendations of the NAS and MRC studies. The desirability of more widely representative findings is clear, but the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Radiation is not expected for another year.

While the ensuing notes focus on the dangers from
bomb-test fallout, it seems to us clear that these hazards
should not be abstracted from the far greater perils in-
volved in the insecurity of this atomic age. In terms of
radiation alone, an atomic war would multiply a thousand
fold the present dangers from fallout. The risks which
stem from bomb testing must be weighed against the
various risks inherent in policy in the field of international
security. Reflecting this point of view, we have added a
few questions on these wider considerations to the notes
on the genetic and non-genetic dangers of test fallout.

1. *The Genetic Danger*

The genetic danger from atomic radiation is real even
though it is not now possible to describe in precise and
meaningful terms the injury to future generations. The
gravity of the danger stems from the fact that an injury
of uncertain dimensions is being wrought upon the genetic
heritage of the human race. The geneticists generally
agree that any increase in radiation increases the danger
to some degree. While knowledge of the effects of small
doses is still scanty, the WHO study group concluded
that "there are strong grounds for believing that most
genetic effects are very closely additive so that a small
amount of radiation received by each of a large number
of individuals can do an appreciable amount of damage
to the population as a whole."

While the mutation of genes is essential for evolution,
the overwhelming majority of mutants are injurious. Con-
sequently, geneticists regard any increase in the mutation
rate for man as being clearly harmful. This harm is not
immediately or fully evident because the majority of
mutant genes are recessive. Also, many result in embryonic
deaths, and the majority produce defects of a minor char-
acter. On the other hand, those that do not result in

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Saturday, October 5, 1957

uncertain. On the whole, the warnings on this pathological risk do not compare in urgency with those on the genetic peril. The MRC report, while recommending that the level of exposure to external radiation be kept as low as possible, thought an individual could accept, without undue concern about leukemia, a life-time dose of 200 r (in addition to natural background radiation), provided the maximum weekly exposure does not exceed 0.3 r. This latter figure is roughly comparable with the life-time exposure from test fallout at the rate of recent years. The NAS report expresses the view that, while the permissible exposures for individuals may be dangerous for large populations, the level permissible from the genetic point of view (10 r over the reproductive period) would have "no demonstrable somatic effect."

On the other hand, the link between radiation and leukemia, the scanty knowledge of the effect of chronic exposure to small doses, and the rise in the incidence of leukemia (e.g., from 11 per million to 49 per million annually between 1920 and 1954, in England and Wales—only partly explained by better diagnosis), all suggest that fallout involves some pathological risk. One expert has calculated that, on the most pessimistic assumptions, bomb testing would produce an increase of less than 2 per cent in the incidence of leukemia. When this small percentage, however, is applied to a world population approaching 3 billion, it becomes clear that the fate of a considerable number of people is at stake—perhaps an additional 1,000 victims each year.

Of the delayed action consequences of increased whole-body radiation, leukemia is the condition about which most is known. There is the possibility that other forms of anemia, cataracts, skin and lung cancer, and a shortening of the life-span from non-specific damage may also result, but the minimal dosage required for these is not known.

*Internal Radiation—Bone Cancer.* This becomes important in so far as radioactive fallout may be ultimately ingested by human beings and settles in the body. The element most significant here is the isotope strontium 90, because a good deal is produced by nuclear fission; it is widely dispersed and is deposited gradually, it is radioactive for a long time, with a half-life of 28 years; and it is chemically similar to calcium and can enter as a substitute the food chain of plant and animal life. The tendency is for this substance to become lodged in bone, and in due course under certain conditions to produce a breakdown in blood-forming tissues and cancer of the bone.

Because of inadequate knowledge about radiostrontium, there is considerable diversity among scientists as to how large a contamination danger it presents. It is the subject of very active research, which may in time establish the basis for a more significant consensus. On the whole, the tendency of scientists is to take a graver view of the possible perils from strontium 90 than was formerly the case.

It is true that the amount thus far found in human bones is small, 1 to 2 micromicrocuries in young children (England), and less in adults. The maximum permissible amount for the population as a whole is stated as 100 m.m.c., a figure derived from the maximum of 1,000 m.m.c. set for adults in special occupations by the International Commission on Radiological Protection. Also, the internal radiation produced by this radiostrontium is small compared with that produced by natural radioactivity. The director of the Health and Safety Laboratory of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission estimated that the maximum

dose from strontium 90 absorbed from the fallout produced by past bomb tests (Nov. 1956) would range from 7 to 30 per cent of the dose delivered in the U. S. by natural radioactivity.

It should be noted, however, that this internal radiation is in addition to that produced by other causes. Also, it does not take into account the strontium 90 released by continuing tests. Dr. Willard Libby of the A. E. C. states that continued testing at the present rate might lift, in a few decades, the concentration of radiostrontium in human bones to 5 to 20 per cent of the maximum permissible limit.

Moreover, the danger is far greater in areas deficient in calcium. In such areas the ingestion of strontium 90 occurs at a markedly higher rate at least for grazing animals. In certain parts of Wales, for example, sheep have been found with 150 m.m.c. of strontium 90 in their bones. While human beings, with a more varied diet, face a less immediate peril, Dr. Libby indicates that people in calcium-deficient areas might have 5 times as much radiostrontium in their bones as the population in general. Such people, given the continuance of testing at the present rate, might reach the permissible maximum after some decades.

It should be remembered, furthermore, that knowledge of the biological effects of radioactive strontium is too limited to regard the "permissible maximum" of 100 m.m.c. as an established standard. It is thought to be a reasonable level, because the internal radiation caused by such an amount would be roughly equivalent to that produced by natural causes, and because known damage has been reported only after far larger doses have been accumulated. But studies of the effects of smaller doses may conceivably lead to a downward revision of the present standard.

While the pathological perils of fallout may not be commensurate with the genetic danger affecting the future of the race, they nevertheless cannot be wholly dismissed as unreal. Mankind has moved into the atomic age with very inadequate knowledge of the consequences of this newly-acquired power. It may be that the hazards to the health of this and future generations from radioactive fallout will prove to be small. It may very well be that the risks will prove tolerable when weighed against risks of a different order which could flow from a unilateral or unreliable cessation of bomb testing. But the hazards to health, whether they stem from actual danger or ignorance of the facts, must not be ignored. They must be reckoned with fully in any moral calculation of policy.

### 3. Weighing the Risks

Since, as indicated at the outset, the prevention of atomic war must be the main consideration, even from the point of view of the threat to health from delayed fallout, it is clear that the demand to stop the bomb tests which continue to produce fallout must be judged in relation to this over-riding concern. If the scientists agreed that grave damage was being done to the present or future generations by test fallout, the case would be different, and stopping the tests would become a predominant moral imperative. The situation is not that clear. There is damage of uncertain extent to the genetic heritage and there is possible pathological damage. But knowledge to date does not establish that the actual and possible damage are of compelling gravity, even though they may spell suffering or death for many people. Consequently,

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Saturday, October 5, 1957

the risks to health from test fallout must be weighed against risks of a different sort.

Without attempting any analysis of the arguments for continuing the testing of atomic weapons or for stopping such tests only under certain conditions, we indicate a few of the issues which need to be taken into account.

1. *How essential is continued bomb testing to the maintenance of a relatively effective deterrent against resort to atomic war? ...*

2. *How important is testing for the development of smaller or more precise atomic weapons? ...*

3. *How important is testing for the development of relatively "clean" atomic weapons? ...*

4. *Is there danger in treating as a separate issue the question of an agreement to halt testing rather than as an integral part of a disarmament agreement? ...*

### C.C.I.A. on Atomic Tests and Disarmament

*Following is the full text of a statement on atomic tests and disarmament adopted in July, 1957, by the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, of the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council, and commended by the Central Committee of the World Council, August 5, "to the attention of the member churches":*

"The peoples of the world have been visited by a new fear. They are moved, indeed deeply alarmed, by current tests of nuclear weapons. These to them appear to be a portent or shadow of world conflict. At the very least, these tests seem to them to carry a potential and grave menace to health.

"The hazards to health from nuclear experiments must be taken seriously. All people are affected in some degree by radioactive fallout. More important is the effect upon generations yet unborn. The degree of damage may thus far be comparatively small, but uncertainty itself gives rise to genuine anxiety. But fear alone is no sufficient basis for the pursuit of moral ends.

"We must point out that this world-wide concern in which we share has deeper roots. Tests are taken to be a visible sign of preparations for atomic warfare. Vast areas could be depopulated by the powers of destruction now available and the dangers of fallout be multiplied a thousandfold. The main concern must always be the prevention of war itself, for the evil of war is an offense to the spiritual nature of man. But since any war carries increasing danger of becoming an atomic war, this task makes the prevention of atomic war, which shocks the conscience of mankind with a peculiar repugnance, all the more imperative.

"The total problem involved is so baffling and complex that no man can speak with certainty. All must humbly confront the issues, for all are involved. The mounting stockpiles of atomic weapons and increasing dependence upon atomic deterrents heighten the danger that atomic weapons will at some point actually be used. Yet, in the judgment of many, our present insecure peace rests mainly upon the possession of atomic deterrents on both sides of a divided world and upon the suicidal character of atomic war. This paradox does not relieve us of the need to examine our goals and the means thereto.

### "I. What Is Needed?

"The objectives of a strategy to overcome the menace of atomic war are interrelated and interdependent. And they must be pursued in such a way as to safeguard as

fully as possible the security of all nations. While they may be variously stated, we urge consideration particularly of the following:

"(a) To stop, by international agreement, the testing of nuclear weapons; and

"(b) To bring to a halt the production of nuclear weapons, under such controls as will most fully ensure compliance; and

"(c) To develop measures which will reduce national armaments, nuclear and conventional, with provision for necessary safeguards as such measures are progressively taken; and

"(d) To accelerate international cooperation in the development of atomic power for peaceful purposes, under proper safeguards; and

"(e) To establish more effective mechanisms for peaceful settlement of international disputes and for peaceful change.

"Together, these objectives form a framework for responsible action against the atomic threat as a whole. Each is important in itself, but more important in combination with the others. In this connection, we note the following:

"(a) *Atomic Tests.* It is important that compliance with agreements to stop testing nuclear weapons be verified internationally. Otherwise, distrust may in fact be increased. Further, such agreement should be related to general disarmament, whether as an integral part or as a first step, if subsequent disillusionment is to be avoided.

"(b) *Atomic Production for Military Purposes.* Stopping the production of nuclear weapons is more fundamental than stopping nuclear tests. Any agreement to stop tests requires a further commitment to stop production. Measures undertaken to ensure compliance would constitute a major element in a broader system of disarmament.

"(c) *Measures for Disarmament.* Partial disarmament measures must always be seen in relation to comprehensive disarmament. The whole range of the disarmament problem, including provisions for warning against surprise attack, must be dealt with as may be appropriate and practicable: conventional armaments, guided missiles, biological and chemical warfare, as well as nuclear weapons. As progress is made toward disarmament, international forces, and instruments for peaceful settlement, the need to rely on atomic deterrents will be reduced.

"(d) *Cooperation in Atoms for Peace.* Both the hazards of diversion of fissionable material to military purposes and of waste disposal need to be considered in relation to a broader system of atomic control and general disarmament. International safeguards against diversion may indeed grow in importance as the use of fissionable material for military purposes decreases.

"(e) *Peaceful Settlement and Peaceful Change.* Ultimately true peace rests upon the continuing adjustment of conflicting interests and claims. To this end, international instruments must be strengthened and established, and must be related to the requirements of an international security system. But local conflicts may break out with the danger that atomic weapons may be used. Therefore the nations must seek to avert such conflicts by timely negotiation and conciliation. If all these efforts fail, they must strive to deal with conflicts without recourse to atomic weapons.

### "II. Moving Forward

"It is important to stress all of the objectives in their interrelationship. Yet simultaneous progress towards all

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Saturday, October 5, 1957

of them seems improbable, until there is a much greater
degree of international confidence. Is it safe to advance
towards one or more without the others? Choices will
have to be made, and they are hard choices. Any decision
involves risk. But to make no decision may be even more
dangerous.

"Each proposed partial agreement, such as cessation of testing, needs to be considered on its own merits. But it also should be appraised by the extent to which it advances or retards the attainment of related objectives. Again, each proposal should be judged in terms of its potential contribution to mutual confidence.

"The dangers involved are unprecedented. Technical obstacles to effective inspection and control grow with every delay. Both factors impose a compelling sense of urgency. Yet stubborn moral and political factors require unremitting patience and persistence, because time and effort may bring opportunities not now apparent.

"Easy solutions cannot be expected for the problems which plague man in an atomic age, both because the problems themselves are complex and man himself is sinful. God stands in judgment over all the nations of the world, and it is not for man to presume to identify his cause with the fullness of God's purposes. For it is man's disobedience which is the basic cause of his despair and frustration. Christians, who share with all men in the guilt of the world, have nevertheless a hope which transcends the failures and successes of history, and a faith which overcomes fear.

"If persistent efforts bring no sufficient agreement on any of the interrelated objectives, Christians can oppose counsels of despair and still strive to establish true conditions of peace. Moreover, there is a risk for the sake of peace which Christians, especially in countries projecting tests of nuclear weapons, are justified in advocating, in the hope of breaking through the barriers of distrust. They can urge their governments to declare their resolve to forego tests for a trial period, in the hope that others will do the same, a new confidence be born, and foundations laid for reliable agreements."

World Council's Message

The Central Committee of the World Council issued its
own message to the churches on August 6, 1957, accom-
panying the statement of the Commission of the Churches
on International Affairs. A number of paragraphs are
here quoted from the Central Committee's document:

"We recognize that the question of stopping the test-
ing of nuclear weapons has to be considered in the wide
context which is set out in the C.C.I.A. statement. We
agree that it is not possible to deal with one part of the
interrelated disarmament problem. . .

"There are, however, certain moral principles affecting the whole issue of atomic warfare which we desire to emphasize. The Central Committee reaffirms the conviction expressed at its Toronto meeting in 1950 that 'such methods of modern warfare as the use of atomic and bacteriological weapons and obliteration bombing involve force and destruction of life on so terrible a scale as to imperil the very basis on which law and civilization can exist.' The condemnation of such methods finds broad support in the fact that total war in the sense of warfare without any limitation in the methods employed is universally in conflict with the conscience of mankind. We also believe that the use of such methods of warfare inevitably involves spiritual degradation for any nation that uses them.

"We are bound to ask ourselves whether any nation is justified in continuing the testing of nuclear weapons while the magnitude of the dangers is so little known and while effective means of protection against these dangers are lacking. We must ask ourselves further whether any nation is justified in deciding on its own responsibility to conduct such tests, when the people of other nations in all parts of the world who have not agreed may have to bear the consequences. Therefore, we call upon each nation conducting tests to give full recognition to this moral responsibility as well as to considerations of national defense and international security.

"Nothing less than the abolition of war itself should be the goal of the nations and their leaders and of all citizens. The attainment of this goal constitutes a solemn challenge to our particular generation. We welcome and support every honest effort now being made to limit and control armaments of all kinds and to establish conditions for a secure peace. We repeat the Evanston appeal for prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, including atomic and hydrogen bombs, with provision for international inspection and control.

"We know that a comprehensive program for disarma-
ment must proceed by stages, and we realize how much
depends upon the deepening of confidence between the
nations. But we urge that as a first step governments
conducting tests should forego them, at least for a trial
period, either together, or individually in the hope that
the others will do the same, a new confidence be born,
and foundations be laid for reliable agreements. . .

Proposals for cessation of bomb tests by international
agreement, or for their limitation, or for their registration,
come "at an apt moment," and "point an apt moral, which
is that there is no short cut to nuclear disarmament,"
states *The Economist*, London, May 11, 1957. Mere
emotion is a "treacherous counsellor . . . , however
natural." The current outcry "demonstrates the need for
some attempt to disentangle the issues, and within the
limits of incomplete knowledge, the facts."

"The use of hydrogen bombs by both sides in another conflict would certainly be suicidal; but, because of this, the possession of hydrogen bombs by both sides may be a means to prevent another world war. This is the balance of terror to which Sir Winston Churchill has attached his eloquent hope."

Those who would ban the bombs propose varied means
from varied motives. If an international agreement could
be secured, with international inspection and control,
"there is no known means . . . of making sure that no
stocks of bombs exist." Also, if a full agreement could
be secured respecting the bombs, "it would leave the
Russians and their allies with strategic superiority, both
in conventional weapons and in manpower."

Thus the proposed ban on bombs is inextricably a part of "the plodding search for disarmament," which falls within "the framework of painstaking diplomacy."

"The truth is that, though the universal horror of the bomb is a powerful force, the demon cannot be exorcised simply by calling the bans. The way to peace is still by the long hard road of defense and diplomacy. Many of the implications of what is being done are alarmingly unknown, and this time the penalty for failure may well be universal ruin, but there is still no short cut to the safety we all crave."

333 Printed in U.S.A.

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OCTOBER 3 1957

such but from the foolishness of governments, the vested interests of soldiers, the avarice of armaments manufacturers, or the criminal ambition of some individual potentate or power. Wars are caused only by 'aggression'. If we have to fight we do so as a crusade against evil, which can end only with the overthrow and arraignment of the guilty party; and once that has been done we can disarm and return to our natural condition of peace. For the liberal therefore all wars must be total wars: one does not compromise with criminals.

It is certainly difficult for us, living in our cosy and comparatively well-ordered society, not to believe that peace is the natural order of things and war something totally monstrous and unnatural. But it is just as difficult sometimes not to believe that the world is flat—and certainly no more absurd. We, that is the members of western society, have by our energy, our curiosity, and our acquisitiveness set on foot during the past 500 years the greatest social and economic transformation that the world has ever seen. How can we reasonably believe that this transformation has now been arrested at a point which suits our convenience? We have precipitated a revolution, and we cannot begin to see the consequences. Our apparent peace is merely the result of conflicting forces in momentary equilibrium; and if we are to survive, if we are to preserve what we value from the past and transmit our beliefs to the future, we must ensure that the forces favourable to this are going to be strong enough either to maintain our position or to ensure that any transformation it undergoes will not be utterly disastrous. Such strength has to include the ability to use effective force—and this is not the force of a policeman checking a criminal but the force of Powers locked in remorseless struggle, each firmly believing in its own righteousness. No renunciation of force can offer any escape. It merely eliminates the penalty for intransigence and, as Dr. Kissinger writes, 'places the international order at the mercy of its most ruthless or its most irresponsible member'. The experiences of the past twenty-five years should at least have taught us the truth of that.

## The Paradox of Our Time

But the paradox of our time is that the very magnitude of the force now at our disposal inhibits us from using it as an instrument of policy at all. The whole western conception of 'aggression' had led us to develop a military policy designed not so much to forward and protect our own interests in the most effective possible way, as to meet the most improbable of all eventualities—an overt and massive attack by communist forces on an area so vital to us that we would rather perish altogether than lose it. The bulk of our strategic thinking and a large proportion of the resources we are prepared to spare for defence have gone into the creation and maintenance of what is perhaps euphemistically called the Great Deterrent; but the very size and horror of the deterrent makes it useless except as a weapon of ultimate defence. It cannot be used as an instrument of any conceivable policy: indeed, the greater the size of the deterrent, the greater will be our inhibitions about using it at all, and the greater the boldness which our adversaries will be able to display. As a result, Dr. Kissinger maintains, the diplomacy of the West has had to dispense with the use of force altogether; and this has resulted not in an improvement but in a worsening of international relations—for 'the inability to use force', he points out, 'may perpetuate all disputes however trivial'.

Here I do think that Dr. Kissinger overstates his case. It is hard to recall any occasion during the past ten years, with the possible exception of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, when an overt challenge to the West has not been met by force or the threat of it; or any incident which the intervention of troops would have turned to our advantage. Would the situation in China, for example, have been improved in 1946 if the United States had intervened with conventional forces to support General Chiang Kai-shek? But in principle the argument is convincing. Our problem, he says, is to devise a strategy which 'can give an impetus to policy rather than paralyse it'; and 'strategy can assist policy', he writes, 'only by developing a maximum number of stages between total peace (which may mean total surrender) and total war'. In short, we must not be afraid of using war as an instrument of policy; but this will only be possible in the nuclear

age if we clear from our mind all idea of war as something inevitably total, inevitably aiming at the complete defeat of the enemy, and prepare ourselves instead to aim at limited objectives, to adopt a strategy directed at the armed forces of the enemy rather than at his civil and industrial potential, and to offer terms for a settlement which he can be reasonably expected to accept.

I am afraid that this will be condemned by many people as 'unrealistic nonsense'. And this criticism will be all the stronger in that Dr. Kissinger goes on to suggest that such wars might be conducted with nuclear weapons subject to certain mutually agreed restrictions devised to spare the homelands of the belligerents and, so far as possible, cities within the battle zone; and it must be admitted that Dr. Kissinger's discussion of the details of such restrictions carries at first sight about as much conviction as Erskine May's Rules of Parliamentary Procedure would if applied to a tribe just emerging from primitive barbarism. As Sir John Slessor once said of similar proposals advanced in this country: 'These are the sort of things that pundits may enjoy debating, but they do not make sense in real life'.

## Considering the Alternatives

But Sir John Slessor's proposition is arguable. All that he or anyone else can say is that they have not made sense in real life yet. Nor have we, in real life, had to meet the challenge of the hydrogen bomb. And we have no right to laugh Dr. Kissinger's well-reasoned thesis out of court until we have considered what the alternatives are.

We are dealing with a Power, or rather, as Dr. Kissinger shows by certain quotations from the works of Mao Tse-tung, with two Powers, which regard peace as the continuation of the struggle by other means, for whom no détente can be anything more than a truce, whose strategy is subtle and endlessly patient, and which only by the most crass of miscalculations are going to present us with a straightforward casus belli. A strategy whose emphasis lies on a deterrent involving mutual annihilation plays straight into their hands. It has now been publicly admitted on both sides of the Atlantic that we need an infinitely flexible range of weapons for defence and counter-attack, and that limited war is a real possibility. We have in fact already fought two, in Korea and Indonesia, and in both these cases the major Powers showed themselves willing to accept a limited defeat rather than raise the stakes any further.

In principle there is no reason why we should not continue along these lines, wage our limited wars with conventional forces and keep the distinction between total and limited war identical with the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. But that is a course of action that we have already virtually abandoned. The Americans, determined to avoid at almost any cost another blood-bath like Korea, have made tactical atomic weapons a conventional part of their armoury, and Mr. Dulles has recently made it clear that they would not hesitate to use them. We in Britain, fed up with the ennui and the expense of conscription, have whittled down our capacity to fight limited wars and are also turning to nuclear weapons in an attempt to replace the manpower which we are unwilling to provide. Once we abandoned the attempt to match Russia and China with conventional forces the choice before us was no longer whether to use nuclear weapons or not: the question is now, whether some effort should be made to ensure in advance that our use of them for a limited object does not spark off a total war, or whether we shall simply go ahead, use them, and blindly hope for the best. It looks at the moment as if we have adopted the policy of blind hope. Dr. Kissinger's proposals may seem unrealistic, but this course of action seems simply suicidal. The burden does not now lie with Dr. Kissinger to prove that his proposals would work: it lies with those who condemn him to suggest a practical alternative.

## Indefinite Postponement?

The whole aim of our military policy should now surely be this: to support our diplomacy in protecting and furthering our interests throughout the world, and to do it so effectively that we can stave off for ever the moment when some sick and harassed Prime Minister—or, rather, President—is forced to choose between the sacrifice of some interest really vital to the nation and

OCTOBER 3 1957

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501

the unleashing of forces which will not merely destroy the enemy and our own country, but will bring unimaginable disaster to the whole of mankind and its posterity. This moment can be postponed indefinitely only if we are able and willing to fight for peripheral areas, to keep our adversaries in play by resolute but moderate frontier warfare; and any reduction in our ability and our willingness to undertake this struggle brings the moment of decision disastrously nearer. We must, as it were, keep the ball away from our own goal; but at the same time we must not try to score ourselves, because any threat to the enemy's goal is going to impose on him the same agonising choice. And here Dr. Kissinger puts forward another unconventional view: that we should never leave our adversaries in any doubt about our intentions. The old argument, that 'It is always a good thing to keep the other chap guessing' simply does not apply any longer. We do not want 'the other chap' to guess wrong. It would be bad enough if he were to see through some bluff of ours and force us to humiliating surrender; but it would be far worse if he made the opposite mistake and mistook a bluff or a limited action on our part for the prelude to an all-out attack, and decided to get his blow in first. A frank avowal of our intentions is essential if limited war is to be kept limited and anything recognisable as civilisation is to survive.

Dr. Kissinger is thus liable to be attacked on two counts. First, on the grounds of his Machiavellian frankness, his open assertion that force is a normal and indispensable weapon of policy. Frankly I believe that the refusal to face this fact has caused us quite enough trouble during the past twenty-five years, and any per-

petuation of such an attitude, in the face of two Communist Powers which harbour no such illusions, will rapidly force us to the point of having to choose between annihilation or surrender. The second line of attack is one with which I must confess much more sympathy: the argument which, while admitting that we have got to be able to conduct limited war, alleges that it simply will not be possible to discriminate between different types of target and different sizes of nuclear weapons at all. But if we do not use nuclear weapons we must be prepared to use conventional forces on a very large scale; and that we are apparently not prepared to do. It looks unpleasantly as if our insistence on maintaining our standard of living and our aversion to the splendours and miseries of military life, by undermining our ability to conduct conventional warfare, are bringing the danger of a nuclear holo-caust appreciably nearer. If those who oppose the development of nuclear weapons want to be logical, they should demand that conscription be reintroduced.

So I would urge you to read Dr. Kissinger's book, and to read it with patience. It is not easy going: frankly, a good deal of it is turgid in style and repetitive in content, and one grows at times rather impatient with his somewhat naive distress at the clumsy and illogical way in which high policy is formulated and the affairs of the world are run. But throughout the course of his long and often involved arguments his grasp of two realities never falters: the real nature of the danger offered by Communism, and the full horrors of thermonuclear war. For his suggestions as to how we might steer a course between these two perils the western world is heavily in his debt.—*Third Programme*

# The Need for Civil Defence

By the Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon. R. A. BUTLER

THE hydrogen bomb lays one supreme duty on all nations: to learn to live peaceably together in a world which has declared that it outlaws the use of force. But we must decide now, in peace-time, what we could do as individuals and as a nation to reduce the chaos and suffering that a nuclear attack might cause. A hydrogen bomb could devastate an area several miles across. It could irreparably damage buildings for another mile or two all round; it could do severe damage, or moderate damage, out to thirteen miles from the point of burst, and perhaps light damage as far away as twenty miles. Nobody can feel anything but horror at the casualties which such figures might imply; but if you try to imagine the damage particularly in those enormous areas where it would stop short of devastation, you will realise there would be only comparatively small areas in which Civil Defence could do little or nothing.

There might well be people trapped by debris, homeless, injured, suffering from shock, menaced by fire. There would surely be countless thousands of survivors needing the help which trained rescue, fire, welfare and casualty services could give, and thousands more who could survive if their fellows were there to help them; and they must be trained to know what to do.

One of the products of these horrifying bombs is radio-active fall-out. This dust is blown perhaps hundreds of miles by the prevailing winds before it settles. Even after a very heavy nuclear attack, by far the greatest part of the country would be free from damage by blast and fire, but in no part could people be certain of safety from fall-out. It gives off harmful radiations that can cause death or sickness according to the dose received. But radioactivity decays quite rapidly, and the dose you receive is much less if you put some form of thick cover between yourself and the source of the radiation. In many undamaged areas people could escape any serious ill-effects from fall-out by staying under cover while the radio-activity decayed.

Fall-out would certainly cause many casualties, and it would immensely complicate the tasks of the Civil Defence services, but it is a killer which we can fight. The Civil Defence Corps is being trained to control and advise the public in contaminated areas.

The Royal Observer Corps have been given the vital job of monitoring the extent of fall-out all over the country. Their readings would provide the means to give local warnings of fall-out wherever a dangerous dose were found.

There is no doubt at all, then, that Civil Defence could do a tremendous amount if we suffered a nuclear attack, provided we had made our plans and preparations in advance. Already over half a million public-spirited men and women are voluntary members of one or other of the Civil Defence services. The Armed Forces are being trained to give them support. But in a country of 50,000,000 this is not enough, and that is why I am asking you to consider what contribution you can make. There are plenty of interesting jobs to choose from, and none of them need take more than an hour or two of your time each week. The Civil Defence Corps needs people to man its control rooms and mobile control headquarters, to operate telephones and wireless, to be wardens and welfare and rescue workers, and to provide the rest of the service with information about fall-out and other technical matters as members of what is known as the Scientific and Reconnaissance Sub-Section. The auxiliary fire service needs fire-fighters. People to learn First Aid and nursing are wanted in the National Hospital Service Reserve. So are trained nurses who are not now nursing as a career. With the toll of home and road accidents training in First Aid is as valuable to have in peace-time as in war. Your council offices, your local fire station, your nearest hospital or W.V.S. centre will tell you more about these jobs and how to join. Or perhaps your firm has a unit of the Industrial Civil Defence service.

The choice before all of us is simple. We could pretend there is no risk of war, or we could admit the risk and decide to do nothing about it, knowing that the price if everyone did the same would be millions of unnecessary casualties if our gamble failed. Or—and this is the Government's policy—we can make sensible preparations now while there is time, as a sort of commonsense insurance such as most of us have taken out against the comparatively more understandable risks of burglary or fire. Please make a patriotic choice and enrol now.

—From a talk in the Home Service

# Ist er der neue Clausewitz?

[LCl]

Prof. Kissinger veröffentlichte ein aufsehenerregendes Buch über die Strategie von heute

Die sowjetische Regierung hat die Fernrakete. Die US-Regierung gebietet über ein reiches Lager an H-Bomben. Die deutsche Wählerschaft fragt sich, ob die NATO nun ihren heimathlichen Grund und Böden verteidigen oder ein Stolperdraht für die beiden feindlichen Großmächte sein soll. Militärexperten zerbrechen sich den Kopf darüber, wie man bei totaler Konzentration auf Atomwaffen einem „konventionellen" Krieg à la Korea begegnen soll. Der amerikanische Kongreß will möglichst keine Auslandshilfe mehr bewilligen, weil er nicht recht weiß, wozu Verbündete heutzutage noch gut sein sollen, und die Londoner Abrüstungsgespräche einen keineswegs von Erfolg zu Erfolg.

## Er kam aus Deutschland

In dieser allgemeinen Verwirrung ist ein sehr heilsames Buch* erschienen, das berechtigtes Aufsehen erregt hat. Experimente bezeichnen es als das wichtigste Buch über Strategie, das seit Eintritt der USA in den letzten Krieg geschrieben worden ist. Einige stellen sogar Vergleiche mit Clausewitz an, dem Klassiker der Strategie.

Dieses Buch prüft mit wissenschaftlicher Gründlichkeit die Basis der westlichen Strategie auf Herz und Nieren, und zwar im harten Licht der Realität. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger ist erst 34 Jahre alt. An der berühmten Universität Harvard gilt er als Star unter den Professoren. Seine Vorlesungen über internationale Angelegenheiten sind regelmäßig überfüllt.

Erst im Jahre 1938 ist Dr. Kissinger mit seinen Eltern nach Amerika gekommen — auf der Flucht vor Hitler. Er ist verheiratet, hat keine Kinder und gibt die einflußreiche Zeitschrift „Confluence" heraus. Er arbeitet fünfzehn Stunden am Tag, obwohl seine Freunde ihn beschwören, endlich einmal auszuspannen. Sein neues Buch wird ihn wahrscheinlich sehr wohhabend oder gar reich machen, seine Verleger bestürmen ihn, noch zwei oder drei Bücher dieser Art zu schreiben. „Sie wollen, daß ich mehr oder minder das gleiche schreibe wie das, was ich schon geschrieben habe", sagt Dr. Kissinger und lehnt ab.

Seine Studenten gehen für ihn durchs Feuer. Seine geistige Elastizität, sein kalter Realismus beeindrucken sie tief. Weniger begeistert von ihm sind die

vereinigten Stabschefs der Vereinigten Staaten, denen er von Zeit zu Zeit Vorträge hält. Er sagt ihnen zu viele Dinge, die gar nicht bequem sind für alte Soldaten.

Höchst unbequem ist auch sein Buch über die Strategie von heute. Kissinger geht von dem großen Dilemma des Kernzeitalters aus: „Die Ungeheuerlichkeit der modernen Waffen läßt uns vor dem Gedanken eines Krieges schaudern. Aber die Weigerung, irgendein Risiko einzugehen, wäre gleichbedeutend mit der Ausstellung eines Blankoschecks für die Sowjets."

Kissinger befaßt sich in seinem Buch sehr ausführlich mit der amerikanischen Überzeugung, daß ein neuer Krieg nur mit einem sowjetischen Überraschungsangriff auf die Vereinigten Staaten beginnen könne. Diese Überzeugung habe dazu geführt, daß jetzt im Westen ganz allgemein nur noch an einen großen, umfassenden Weltkrieg gedacht wird. „So entsteht ein verhängnisvoller Kreis: Durch die Konzentration auf Maßnahmen zur Zerschlagung eines sowjetischen Versuchs, uns physisch zu neutralisieren, haben wir der sowjetischen Führung Gelegenheit gegeben, uns psychologisch zu neutralisieren. Wir bemessen ihre Unternehmungen nur danach, daß die Provokation niemals einen umfassenden Krieg — die einzige Kriegsform, die unsere Doktrin in Rechnung stellt — ‚wert' wäre."

## „Begrenzter Atomkrieg“

„In der Vergangenheit wurden Kriege oft durch bestimmte Ziele und Notwendigkeiten umschrieben und begrenzt. Im nuklearen Zeitalter können sie nur durch eine bewußte und wohlüberlegte Politik begrenzt werden. Das aber setzt begrenzte Kriegsziele voraus und einen Verzicht auf die moderne Ketzerei der bedingungslosen Kapitulation.“ Und Kissinger fügt hinzu: „Es setzt auch eine grundlegende Revision der Struktur der Streitkräfte voraus, da es im Gegensatz zu den Behauptungen des Pentagons nicht zutrifft, daß die für einen totalen Krieg vorhandenen Streitkräfte auch für einen begrenzten Krieg geeignet sind.“

Das bedeutungsvollste Kapitel dieses Buches befaßt sich mit einer Prüfung der Möglichkeit eines begrenzten nuk

klearen Krieges. Kissinger steht keineswegs auf dem Standpunkt, daß jeder Konflikt zwischen größeren Mächten und auch zwischen den nuklearen Mächten unbedingt die Verwendung von nuklearen Waffen auslösen müsse. Aber er ist der Meinung, daß die nuklearen Mächte, falls sie in einen Krieg verwickelt werden, es für nützlich halten könnten, ihre nukleare Kapazität anzuwenden, gleichzeitig aber die Größe der Waffen und der Ziele streng zu begrenzen.

## Örtlicher Widerstand

„Der Zweck einer Politik des begrenzten nuklearen Krieges besteht nicht darin, einen Ersatz für einen totalen Krieg zu schaffen, sondern eine Skala von Möglichkeiten zu eröffnen, die es gestattet, die Reaktion in ein tragbares Verhältnis zur Provokation zu bringen, so daß die militärische Kapazität und der Wille, sie anzuwenden, besser harmonieren werden als in dem krassen Fall, wo ein totaler Krieg unsere einzige Antwort auf eine Herausforderung ist.“

Viele Menschen werden mit Kissinger darin übereinstimmen, daß unsere Skala der Möglichkeiten erweitert werden und einen begrenzten Krieg einschließen muß. Dagegen wird man kaum mit ihm die Ansicht teilen, daß ein begrenzter Krieg, in dem nukleare Waffen angewendet werden, begrenzt bleiben kann. Wenn die NATO sich aus ihrer lähmenden Ungewißheit über Sinn und Zweck ihrer militärischen Bemühungen in Europa erholen soll, wenn die Verteidigungsplanung der Vereinigten Staaten und der europäischen Verbündeten — unter ihnen nicht zuletzt die Bundesrepublik — vor der Vergeudung ungeheurer Mittel für unbrauchbare Waffen gerettet werden soll und wenn die Abrüstungsfrage neue Lebenskraft erhalten soll, dann muß der Westen sehr ernsthaf die Strategie prüfen, die in der Lage wäre, sowjetischen militärischen Drohungen wirkungsvollen örtlichen Widerstand entgegenzusetzen.

Die Doktrin der „massiven Vergeltung“ als einzig mögliche Antwort auf einen sowjetischen Angriff — das ist die Quintessenz dieses wichtigen Buches — muß überwunden werden.

## JOHANNES WALLER

*) Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy von Henry A. Kissinger, Oxford University Press, 40 sh,

(Witwer), PT 52655 Wams, Hann-
burg oder Essen.

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HERREN

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Wer möchte in der Schweiz eine zweite Heimat u. ein reifes Glück finden? Ich bin in der Lage, ein sorgenfreies Heim zu bieten, da ich in mehreren Schweizer Städten Häuser besitze. Bin 55 Jahre alt, verwitft, Handwirtsmeister mit hohem Einkommen. Eine warm- herzige Frau wird an meiner Seite ein tief innerliches Glück finden. Nähere Auskunft gern durch den internat. Briefbund „Kontakt“ (WS 8829), Postfach 30, Lugano-Paradiso (Schweiz), Nebenstelle. g

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Persönlichkeit, vital und seriös, mitten im Leben stehend, kultiviert, gesund, geistig und menschlich aufgeschlossen, Großunternehmer, mit bedeutenden Unternehmungen, dementsprechend hohem Einkommen, Vermögen, wundervoll gelegenen Landhaus, von großer, gepflegter, stattlicher, ansprechender Erscheinung, vornehm und ritterlich im Denken u. Handeln, weitgereist und lebensbejah. wünscht baldig Begegnung mit nicht alltäglicher, gepflegter, sportlich schlanker, eleganter Dame, klug, intelligent, gesund u. warmherzig, eine ideale Gattin u. wirkliche Lebenskameradin im Alter von 32 bis 44. Persönliche unverbindliche Rücksprachen erbittet wochentags 16-19 (außer freitags) Frau Hanna Konrad, Düsseldorf, Taubenstraße 9, Teleph. 49 02 69. g

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Umgangsformen und gutem Geschmack, fursorglich und von offenem Wes., bittet, da ihm offenen Lernen in Lokalen oder auf der Straße unbekannt, Dame, 28/35, dunkel, elegant, von nur wirklich gutem Aussehen und Figur, aber ohne Geld, nur Rheinland, um frei mutige Bildzuschrift, die gern erwidert wird, unter PU 52 677 an WamS, Hamburg oder Essen. g

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AU JOUR LE JOUR

# Le vrai secret

Je ne voudrais pas faire de peine à nos voisins d'outre-Rhin, mais, pour bon Américain qu'il soit, M. Henry Kissinger ne fait pas mystère de ses origines allemandes. Et de fait, il fallait être compatriote de Clausewitz pour écrire un livre comme Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Armes nucléaires et Politique internationale).

C'est un bon livre, intelligent, infini-
ment trop intelligent. Il a beaucoup de
succès en Amérique, nettement trop de
succès.

En effet M. Kissinger y révèle le vrai
secret atomique, le seul qui soit réelle-
ment dangereux pour l'avenir de l'es-
pèce humaine : c'est qu'on peut envi-
sager une guerre nucléaire limitée.

La bienheureuse psychose atomique,
tout en créant un climat international
assez difficilement respirable, avait au
moins cet avantage que chacun des deux
partenaires possibles était convaincu que
s'il déclenchait le conflit ou le laissait
se déclencher plus rien ne pourrait
l'arrêter jusqu'à l'anéantissement de
l'humanité tout entière. La peur du suïcide et peut-être un vague scrupule de conscience étaient les plus sûrs garants
de la paix.

M. Kissinger vient de révéler aux états-majors politiques et militaires qu'il y a tout de même moyen de s'amuser sans casser définitivement ce beau jouet qu'est la vie humaine, pour peu que de part et d'autre on respecte quelques règles élémentaires.

Vous me direz que c'est le secret de
policinelle et que M. Dulles est de l'avis
de M. Kissinger. Je vous répondrai qu'on
a électrocuté ou fusillé des espions ato-
miques pour des révélations bien moins
graves que celle-là.

ROBERT ESCARPIT.

loi-ce-
elle de

Ils
conna-
tiellen-
tout é-
pleine
avaient
au mo-
cutabl-
manœ-
flatter
1947
leurs
ment
tout d-
d'être
cela p-
positi-
plus p-
collèg-
encore
traux
suspic-
C'èto-
de tra-
le gou-
son el-
l'éneig-
Il es-
rébelli-
interne-
temps
lesque-
partie
musul-
avec
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materiel et discrediterait notre pays. Alors la décision nous échapperait aussi bien sur le plan international, où nos représentants viennent de développer un si grand effort, qu'en Algérie même.»

M. Laforest, secrétaire d'Etat, s'est de son côté félicité de l'accord intervenu, qui doit, selon lui, permettre une amélioration rapide de la situation politique en Algérie.

## Le F. L. N. confirme son opposition

Le Caire, 23 septembre. — M. Tewfik El Medani, représentant du F.L.N., a déclaré dimanche au Caire :

« Nous rejetons, par principe et sans discussion, la loi-cadre sur l'Algérie. Elle ne peut servir de base à de futures négociations. La proposition française, à notre avis, est inexistante.

» Etant donné que cette loi-cadre sur l'Algérie considère l'Algérie comme partie intégrante de la République française, nous avons décidé de continuer la lutte jusqu'à ce que la France soit obligée de reconnaître notre droit à l'indépendance. »

## HARANGER

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CHEMISES POPLON (la plus belle qualité de popeline de nylon). 4.900

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Reuther's Fight on Inflation, P. 3

The "Files" Bill: A Victory in the FBI Campaign Against the Supreme Court, See P. 2

I. F. Stone's Weekly

VOL. V, NO. 34

SEPTEMBER 9, 1957

101

WASHINGTON, D. C.

15 CENTS

The First Victim of The Soviet ICBM

Comment on the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile has avoided the most obvious of its consequences. This is the destruction of the Eisenhower "open skies" proposal. The idea was that continuous aerial inspection of the bases from which a strategic blow could be launched would eliminate the fear of a nuclear Pearl Harbor. In this improved atmosphere, reduction in arms would become feasible.

But the debut of the long feared ICBM opens a new era. Inspection is no longer the key to relaxation of tension. Air fields may be spotted and policed from the air, but ICBM launching sites may be widely scattered and easily hidden. A strategic strike requires measures of concentration and unusual movement; these can be observed. But widely separated ICBM launching sites may be activated quickly and unobtrusively, underground. In addition, most important of all, is the time difference. The fastest bombers would take at least six hours to reach their targets; an ICBM can make the trip in 30 minutes. This would be the maximum warning time even with perfect inspection, assuming that a country devilishly determined on sudden war would be high-minded enough not to seize inspectors and inspection posts at the zero hour.

A Public Relations Dilemma

The Pentagon will not be sorry to see the end of the "open skies" proposal; one has only to read the discussion of inspection in Henry A. Kissinger's well-informed *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* to gather how astringently the armed services have always regarded it. But politically the collapse of the aerial inspection approach is serious. From a public relations standpoint, the "open skies" plan was all the U. S. had to offer world opinion in competition with the Soviet's "ban-the-bomb" campaign. So long as we could go through the endless palaver of perfecting a 100 percent certain aerial inspection plan, we could avoid the issues of testing and nuclear warfare.

Meanwhile the Pentagon could go on with its dream (see the August issue of *Fortune*) that we were so far ahead technologically that we could soon reestablish something like the atomic monopoly we enjoyed in 1945-49 and then, if necessary, negotiate disarmament. The State Department, for its part, hoped that from the pressures of the continued arms race, it could exact a Soviet surrender on Germany. All these hopes have now been exploded. Whatever the full truth about the Soviet ICBM, it is clear that the Russians will soon have that "ultimate weapon" in working order, apparently before we do.

The outlook is not hopeless if public opinion as a first step can force the military at least to give up their insistence on further testing, if not their reliance on nuclear weapons. We

have already achieved the fabrication of a hydrogen warhead small enough to be used on a missile, and a ban on tests will not block development of an ICBM. Further testing means (1) that other nations will soon have nuclear weapons, thus making control all the more difficult, and (2) further pollution of the atmosphere by fallout. Of this problem of pollution, one can only say two things with assurance (1) that there is a wide and uncomfortable margin of ignorance around current estimates of both the somatic and genetic dangers, and (2) that since 1931, long before the perilous atomic nucleus was unlocked, scientific estimates of the safe limits of radiological exposure have proven too optimistic, and have steadily been revised downward.

In Less Than 15 Years

The latest warning in this area is that given by two scientists of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory in San Francisco at the meeting last month of the American Institute of Biological Sciences; they estimated that in less than 15 years the concentration of strontium 90 in humans as a result of nuclear weapons set off through 1955 may reach the danger point. An agreement on testing is feasible because monitoring stations 500 miles apart would be enough to detect violations as low as the kiloton range. If this could be negotiated apart from the Rube Goldbergian complications and conditions of the whole Western package plan, a great step forward would be accomplished.

A Military Minuet With Moscow

What is required is what any bureaucracy hates most to do—some new thinking. It was difficult enough for the Eisenhower Administration to find in the "open skies" proposal a common denominator low enough to reconcile Pentagon and State Department. To find a new formula, especially one which involves real negotiation, would be even more difficult. The newspapers generally also take the line of least resistance—their panacea is to step up the arms race, but this route leads only to bankruptcy, moral and financial, and to war. As for the military, always worried lest the public "relax" and Congress cut appropriations, they probably see the Soviet ICBM as a not unmixed blessing, since it must raise fear and tension.

The military's favored nostrum at the moment is the one Kissinger puts forward in his brilliant but poisonously delusive book. This is that, with both sides fully armed for mutual suicide, we must now prepare to wage limited nuclear war. The same men who say peaceful co-existence is impossible will now tell us that we can go into a kind of military minuet with Moscow, politely agreeing to fight nuclear wars but only on a limited scale and for limited objectives.

2

I. F. Stone's Weekly, September 9, 1957

## How Congress Was Stampeded by A Smear-and-Fear Campaign Against the Supreme Court

### Why the "FBI Files" Bill May Be Declared Unconstitutional

The so-called FBI files bill is the first triumph in a campaign to create public distrust of the judiciary. In this campaign the white supremacists and the FBI have a common interest, since both regard the new liberal trend as a menace. The real menace is the demonstration that we have reached the stage where our secret police have more power in Congress than any other agency of government. In a session which saw the President defeated on one basic issue after another, J. Edgar Hoover got what he wanted.

Respectable and even liberal elements were mobilized. Not only the Hearst chain but usually responsible conservative papers helped to spread false reports. "Supreme Court Ruling on FBI," the New York *Herald-Tribune* screamed in a four column headline across page one on August 10, "May Force U. S. to Drop Abel Case." This story which emanated from "not to be attributed" sources was so completely false that Assistant Attorney General Tompkins denied it next day. But that did not keep it from reverberating in the press and Congress.

### The Whisper That No One Can Be Trusted

A Senator like Clark of Pennsylvania who refused to be stampeded complained to a visitor that even the American Civil Liberties Union was putting pressure on him to support the bill the Department of Justice wanted. The FBI orchestrated all its friends. Semi-literate Broadway gossip columns suddenly sprouted eruditely with quotations from Jefferson criticizing the judiciary. Someone ghosted an article for the September issue of the *American Legion Monthly* in which its National Commander hinted, "We must be alert to the fact that it may be easier for the enemies of our Constitution to subvert nine Supreme Court Justices than 96 Senators and 435 Congressmen. . . . A subverted Supreme Court will be more dangerous to us than an infiltrated Congress." This implication is that no agency of government can *really* be secure against subversion or infiltration. Only the FBI can be trusted.

In the Senate, thanks to the brilliant fight waged by such Senators as Clark, Javits, Morse and John Sherman Cooper, the bill was whittled down to the point where the Hearst papers in a front page editorial on August 26 declared it had been "emasculated by pseudo liberal appeasers." But in the House the opposition of a few men like Celler was steamrollered. In conference committee the vacillating O'Mahoney surrendered and substantially accepted the House version. Only Langer and Kefauver voted "No" in the face of misleading reassurances later given the Senate by O'Mahoney. The House passed the final bill on voice vote, without any recorded opposition. It is time for reflection when Congress shows more respect for J. Edgar Hoover than Earl Warren.

### The Objectives Were Broader

The objectives of the campaign against the Jencks decision went beyond a desire to protect the FBI's files. The original bill, introduced by Congressman Walter (HR 7915), would in effect have enabled the Attorney General to keep from a court "any books, records, papers or documents" he considered "confidential." This was so extreme it was scrapped in the House Judiciary Committee.

The Department of Justice substitute, introduced in the

House by Keating and in the Senate by O'Mahoney would have revised the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to cut down rights of pre-trial discovery. These enable defendants in many types of cases, from murder to anti-trust, to see certain documents for the adequate preparation of their defense. The philosophy behind them is that the government's interest lies not in successful prosecution but in a trial so full and fair that the truth can be determined. Debate in the Senate uncovered the fact that the Department was concerned with a District of Columbia murder case (*Fryer v. U. S. 207 Fed. 2d 134*) where the Court of Appeals allowed the accused not only to know the names of the witnesses against him (as is traditional in a capital crime) but to examine their statements three days in advance of trial.

Celler in the House, like Clark, Javits, Morse and Cooper in the Senate, protested against revision of the rules of criminal procedure without hearings. These rules are too delicate for draftsmanship in mob scenes. But they protested in vain. The final bill restricts pre-trial discovery as well as the Jencks' decision and in doing so may prove unconstitutional.

The Fifth amendment says "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Due process is only a legal term for fair trial. It is the Supreme Court, not Congress, which decides what constitutes a fair trial. This is what the Senate Judiciary Committee had in mind when, in reporting the bill, it nervously denied any intention "to nullify, or to curb, or to limit" the Jencks decision and added, "The committee believes that legislation would be clearly unconstitutional if it sought to restrict due process."

### Where the Bill Conflicts

But the bill does restrict due process. The Court ruled in *Jencks* due process required that "the criminal action be dismissed when the Government . . . elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection . . . relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial." There are three rules laid down here, and all three are violated by the bill.

(1) The case need not be dismissed. The Judge can strike the testimony of the witness or declare a mistrial instead. This would encourage the government to take a chance on refusing the defense vital evidence, since at the worst—in the event of a mistrial—it could try the case again.

(2) If the government does elect to produce the witness' earlier reports, they go under the bill to the Judge rather than the defense, a procedure the Court specifically disapproved.

(3) Most important of all, the bill limits the earlier reports the defense could demand to those the witness had signed or otherwise approved or which had been taken down stenographically or electronically. This is the biggest loophole of all. The debate in the Senate brought out that the usual practice is to have the informant give his statement orally, and to have this written down in summary form by an FBI agent.

Such summary reports of oral statements would be exempt from subpoena, though they might be essential—as they were in the Jencks case—to test the veracity of the witness.

3

## Behind Walter Reuther's One-Man Crusade Against the Inflationary Spiral

### Some Economic Realities Neither Adam Smith Nor Karl Marx Expected

Walter Reuther's campaign for lower automobile prices must be seen against the background of some economic realities neither Adam Smith nor Karl Marx expected. American capitalism, like Russian Communism, bears little resemblance to its idealized image. In big organized industry wages are now determined by a peculiar kind of competition—competition among labor leaders. Their popularity with their members and their standing in the labor hierarchy depends on how much they can get in increased wages at annual or biennial bargaining sessions with the managers of industry.

These bargaining sessions have the spurious ferocity of a wrestling match, in which the mountainous contenders make up by groan and grimace for the essential unreality of the contest. The lords of industry look forward eagerly to being pinned to the mat. Trade unionism has become their profit escalator. Every extra dollar in wages gives them an excuse for several dollars extra in price increases.

These increases are made possible because the arms race has created a cost-plus economy in which big industrialists can afford to be gentlemanly. When the leading company puts up its price, its competitors (as they are still quaintly called) put up theirs by the same amount.

### The Unorganized Are The Victims

This happy game of wage-and-price leap frog in the organized sector of the economy exploits the unorganized. The consumer, the smaller businesses which have to fight for their dwindling share of his dwindling dollar, the folk who live on fixed incomes, the unorganized worker and professional man, all these are the victims of perpetual inflation.

This can no more go on forever than could that New Era of Herbert Hoover's in the 20's, but it is as hazardous for a labor leader as for a capitalist to be socially responsible. The average trade unionist, like the average investor, is interested in his own take, not in the over-all effect on the economy. When Mr. Reuther in his broadside of August 29 said the prerogatives of labor and management should not be "exercised in a vacuum unrelated to the needs of the whole society," he was talking a language risky with his own rank-and-file—long hair stuff, "sort of socialistic."

The Reuther proposal for a $100 cut in the price of next season's cars was smart public relations. But his offer, however cagily worded, to take that cut into account at next year's wage bargaining session, took courage. The average auto worker will not relish the idea that he might possibly be called on to make a contribution from his own pay envelope to the *pro bono publico* of combatting inflation.

### A Sudden Stammer

Indeed the text of the letters to the Big Three which Mr. Reuther released on August 18 seem to reflect some difficulties with his own executive board. The letters are brilliant

in their analysis of the industry's economic and sales position, but a slight stammer develops when the question comes up of just what labor would do if prices *were* cut $100.

At one point Mr. Reuther speaks of submitting to impartial arbitration if "a question should arise as to whether the granting of our demands would necessitate a restoration of part or all of the $100 per car price reduction." At another he speaks of "adjusting our demands downward to the extent shown to be necessary in order to avoid a price increase." The companies might have challenged this contradiction, but only at the expense of discussing a subject they would like to avoid.

A man's size can be measured by his willingness in the public interest to take positions his own following may not like. Walter Reuther has again shown himself the one American labor leader of first rank who still has this kind of social vision and daring.

### A System of Compulsory Investment

The Reuther campaign represents the kind of responsible leadership commensurate with the huge power now exercised by a great trade union. The campaign cites the plea made recently by the past president of the National Automobile Dealers Association pleading with the manufacturers to absorb increased costs in pricing new models and estimating that this might be a difference in sales of a million more cars. Since autos are our most important consumer durable industry, the effect would be felt by the whole economy.

In his original letters released on August 18, Mr. Reuther showed that the effect of a $100 price cut and a million more sales for each of the Big Three would still leave them with profit margins after taxes far above the national average for manufacturing corporations generally: 18.9 percent for GM, 13.9 percent for Ford, and 19.2 percent for Chrysler as compared with the manufacturing average of 12.1 percent.

These percentages are figured on a net worth which itself represents a vast expansion financed out of exorbitant earnings at the consumer's expense. Since 1947, as Mr. Reuther showed in his statement of August 29, GM's net worth has tripled, Ford's has gone up by two and a half times, Chrysler's has doubled. Very little of this has come from the sale of stock. Most of it represents, in Mr. Reuther's vivid phrase, a compulsory investment by the consumer.

If we had a President with a flair for leadership, he could utilize Mr. Reuther's initiative. What is true in autos is also true in steel, and in every basic industry. Walter Reuther has launched a one-man campaign to educate the labor movement and the country. Will other labor leaders join him, or will they prefer comfortably to acquiesce as junior partners (very junior) in a continuous price gouge which spells serious trouble for the future?

### Stone to Speak on Disarmament in Chicago, Detroit and Toronto

I. F. Stone will speak on disarmament (under the somewhat P. T. Barnumish title, "Will Mankind Destroy Itself?") in Chicago, Sept. 20 at 8 p. m., Curtis Hall, 410 S. Michigan; in Detroit, Sept. 21 at 8 p. m., Central Y. W. C.

A., 2230 Witherell at Montcalm; and in Toronto, Sept. 22 at 8 p. m. in United Steel Workers Hall, 35 Cecil Street. Brad Little, peace education speaker, American Friends Service Committee, will be co-speaker in Chicago.

THE WASHINGTON POST and TIMES HERALD

A10

Wednesday, September 11, 1957

R1

HENRY A. KISSINGER

# Kissinger to Address Book Luncheon

Henry A. Kissinger has spent most of his 34 years as a student of the diplomacy and strategy of war and peace.

His book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, published by Harper in June, has been acclaimed as one of the most important books of the past several years.

Kissinger will appear with Quentin Reynolds and Gwen Terasaki at The Washington Post Book and Author luncheon in the Hotel Statler Sept. 19. The three writers will talk on their work at the mid-day session.

The Kissinger book is the

end-product of a study directed for the Council of Foreign Relations. It deals with the need for a new American approach to international politics and military strategy.

Kissinger served in the Army from 1943 to 1946. He entered Government service with the Operations Research Organization in 1950 and currently is a consultant for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Kissinger is associate director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard and editor of Confluence, a forum of international ideas. He has written numerous magazine

articles on history, diplomacy and strategy. This fall Houghton-Mifflin will publish his book on the restoration of peace after the Napoleonic wars.

Reynolds will discuss his book, "They Fought for the Sky," and Mrs. Terasaki her autobiography, "Bridge to the Sun." Tickets for the luncheon may be purchased for $3.50 at the front counter of The Washington Post building and at the following book stores:

Ballantyne's, Brentano's, Francis Scott Key, Franz Bader's, Hecht's, Kamm's, Pearman's, Pocker's, Pursell's, Savile, Sidney Kramer's, Woodward & Lothrop; and World Affairs. Also, in Alexandria, a Better Mouse Trap, in Bethesda at Center Book Shop and Cucumber Book Shop, and in Chevy Chase at Airport Book Shop.

[LC]

Best Seller List

<table><thead><tr><th>August 25</th><th>September 1</th><th>September 8</th><th>This Week</th><th>An analysis based on reports from leading booksellers in 36 cities showing the sales rating of 16 leading fiction and general titles over the last 3 weeks. Sales through the book clubs are not included. Figures in the right-hand column do not necessarily represent consecutive weeks and do not indicate week-to-week shifts on the chart.</th><th>Weeks on List</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>Fiction</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>Peyton Place. <i>Metalious</i></td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>14</td><td>2</td><td>By Love Possessed. <i>Cozzens</i></td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>On the Beach. <i>Shute</i></td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>The World of Suzie Wong. <i>Mason</i></td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>13</td><td>7</td><td>5</td><td>Rally Round the Flag, Boys! <i>Shulman</i></td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>6</td><td>Letter From Peking. <i>Buck</i></td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>5</td><td>7</td><td>Compulsion. <i>Levin</i></td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>6</td><td>8</td><td>Silver Spoon. <i>Gilbert</i></td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>The Pink Hotel. <i>Erskine and Dennis</i></td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>8</td><td>9</td><td>10</td><td>The Scapegoat. <i>du Maurier</i></td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>11</td><td>10</td><td>10</td><td>11</td><td>The Durable Fire. <i>Swiggett</i></td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>12</td><td>12</td><td>12</td><td>12</td><td>The Last Angry Man. <i>Green</i></td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>11</td><td>13</td><td>13</td><td>Life at Happy Knoil. <i>Marquand</i></td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>15</td><td></td><td></td><td>14</td><td>The Flower Drum Song. <i>Lee</i></td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>9</td><td>11</td><td>15</td><td>The Blue Camellia. <i>Keyes</i></td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>16</td><td>The Velvet Horn. <i>Lytel</i></td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td colspan="6"><strong>General</strong></td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>1</td><td>The Hidden Persuaders. <i>Packard</i></td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>Baruch: My Own Story.</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>9</td><td>9</td><td>3</td><td>The New Class. <i>Djilas</i></td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td>4</td><td>The Day Christ Died. <i>Bishop</i></td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td>5</td><td>The Innocent Ambassadors. <i>Wylie</i></td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>10</td><td>5</td><td>6</td><td>"Where Did You Go?" "Out." "What Did You Do?" "Nothing." <i>Smith</i></td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>Stay Alive All Your Life. <i>Peale</i></td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>5</td><td>10</td><td>8</td><td>Silver Platter. <i>Berlin</i></td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>11</td><td>12</td><td>9</td><td>Operation Sea Lion. <i>Fleming</i></td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>11</td><td>10</td><td>Too Much, Too Soon. <i>Barrymore and Frank</i></td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>6</td><td>7</td><td>11</td><td>Rascals in Paradise. <i>Michener and Day</i></td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>12</td><td></td><td></td><td>12</td><td>The Organization Man. <i>Whyte</i></td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>16</td><td>14</td><td>13</td><td>13</td><td>Take My Life. <i>Cantor and Ardmore</i></td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>14</td><td>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. <i>Kissinger</i></td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>8</td><td>8</td><td>15</td><td>The Turn of the Tide. <i>Bryant</i></td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>16</td><td>The Dog Who Wouldn't Be. <i>Mowat</i></td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

Drama Straight From the Nature

NEW ART IN AMERICA: Fifty Painters of the Twentieth Century. By John I. H. Baur, editor; Lloyd Goodrich, Dorothy C. Miller, James Thrall Soby, Frederick S. Wight. 50 color plates, 177 black and white illustrations. 280 pp. Greenwich, Conn.: New York Graphic Society. In cooperation with Frederick A. Praeger, New York. $22.50.

By BARTLETT H. HAYES Jr.

THIS is a "picture book" which is so much a mixture of interesting text and illustration that I must begin comment on it in a round-about way. I have noted a tendency on the part of foreigners, both professional and non-professional, to seek in American art a reflection of what symbolizes for them the vigor of this country, from red-skins to automobiles. Not readily finding it, although the subject matter of most American painting is drawn straight from the American scene with nativist candor, they wonder that the idioms employed, as well as the esthetic content, are somewhat familiar. The melting pot unexpectedly distills aromas they know at home. Yet, trying to isolate any one of these aromas, they find themselves clawing at vapors.

Trying to identify an artist in America with one at home they discover to be a puzzling pursuit. New art in modern America, as in other countries, they may learn, is the creation of very personal insight and interpretation. An artist in America today resembles and differs from his twentieth-century contemporary in another land in about the same degree as he does, in comparison and contrast, with a fellow artist in America.

What is new, as this volume demonstrates, is not so much the American flavor as it is the great diversity resulting from the special interest of each artist in one aspect of the many-faceted newness of modern civilization no matter where that may be encountered. This very diversity not only makes it well nigh impossible to evaluate the numerous interests with any finality, but also causes

relating them in a survey that would be comprehensible. The panorama is so widespread as to be sensed rather than viewed at one glance.

From the point of view of the book, fifty artists dot the landscape. Observing them from the vantage points of their own experience are five writers, critics, if you wish, whose job is to separate them out in the original Greek meaning of the word; the fact that they also hold distinguished museum positions is, perhaps, financially incidental. Chief spotter for the group, John I. H. Baur, curator of the Whitney Museum of American Art in New York, has written the foreword and the three chapters prefacing the periods under which the artists are individually discussed: New Discoveries (1900-20); The Native Scene (1920-40); The Widening Search (1940-55).

WITHIN the relative economy of two thousand words each, these chapters are lucidly condensed and thought provoking. They constitute the core of the book and will serve the student of American studies well as he threads his way through the artistic profusion which is the "revolution rather than evolution" of art in America.

The fifty brief commentaries which form the bulk of the text are uneven, not because of the varied authorship, but because the interpretive emphasis varies according to the artist being discussed; a few of the commentaries are almost purely biographical and it is in such cases one wonders why that particular artist was selected in favor of another. Certainly, anyone who is acquainted with modern art in America will be tempted to play the game of substituting, but, as Mr. Baur points out, the book is predicated upon a choice and whether history (or even the authors in time to come) will sustain the present verdict is irrelevant.

For myself, I prefer to play

NEW STATESMAN · 14 SEPTEMBER 1957

305

Vicky in Wirtschaftswunderland

A CARTOON in the *Simplicissimus* depicted a gluttonous, bull-necked German surveying the left-overs of a gargantuan meal, lighting a cigar and saying: 'I'm as full as a pig. The question is what to eat now?' This devastating drawing appeared in 1907. But it would be an apt comment on Dr Adenauer's *Wirtschaftswunderland* of 1957.

Visiting Germany for the first time for seven years, I was struck not only by her incredible recovery but by the almost indecent haste, greed, fanaticism and covetousness with which the average German chases after an ever increasing material wealth.

This famous 'Deutsche Wunder' has become a magic term and the German wears it as proudly and ostentatiously as he once wore his party badge. Even those who do not get most out of the 'miracle' take pride in it and abstain with docility from asking for a bigger share of the cake they helped to bake. It is, after all, the workers of the Ruhr who have made Alfred Krupp the richest man in Europe (and recently staged a great celebration of their boss's 50th birthday) 12 years after he was condemned as a war criminal. It is indeed a far cry from those brave wartime plans for 'Internationalising the Ruhr' to the present 'Privatisation of Volkswagen'—one of the most successful of state enterprises.

But, surely, it is of no avail and somewhat undignified to point jealously at the German prosperity and accuse them of being 'bad creditors hoarding gold'. Once we accept the American plan to make the Bundesrepublik the showpiece

good' that the CDU is fighting the election. The smug, prosperous-looking, almost ridiculously type-cast Dr Ludwig Erhard proclaims from huge posters: 'Prosperity for All'; while from the hoardings the face of the 81-years-old Chancellor admonishes the people not to 'try any experiments.' He has stuck throughout his campaign to his banal and simple slogan: 'a vote for the SPD is a vote for Communism against Christianity and will bring about the downfall of Germany'.

If the Russians succumbed to the 'Cult of Personality' and the Americans developed the 'Father complex', then the Germans are indeed suffering from a 'Grandfather complex'. This time they voluntarily accept the leadership of a vain, headstrong authoritarian, who, as even some of his supporters admit, tends to treat parliament

brash, ambitious Defence Minister Strauss, who shouted back that they were 'abusing their democratic freedom', were 'simply Communists'—before having them chucked out of the meeting.

As the compère said in one of Germany's many brilliant little political cabarets: 'We are progressing, aren't we? Hitler banned the Communist Party. Adenauer banned the Communist Party. But he didn't set fire to the Bundestag first!'

VICKY

'One egg or two in your consommé, Mein Herr?'

'We shall never recognise the Oder-Neisse line'. —Frang-Josef Strauss. 16 August 1957

Hamburg, '57.

Prosperity for all

of 'Capitalist Free Economy' we cannot well complain that they are making it work—work at least for a time. For, as thoughtful Germans themselves say, even if there are miracles, miracles do not last for ever. This Angst and restlessness, no less than the traditional diligence of the Germans, explain their fanatical desire to 'have more'. In any case, memories of Berlin in the 1920's and 1930's leave me with the feeling that almost any excess to-day is less dangerous than the hungry, inflated Germany which followed the First World War.

It is on the theme of 'you've never had it so

—and indeed the lesser members of his own coalition—with contempt.

Is there then no opposition to this docile conformism? Are there no signs that the German has 'learned'? There is the courageous campaign by the Social Democrats—so weak and woolly on the home front—for a fresh approach to Russia on re-unification: and this in the face of much calculated obstruction from the Russians.

There are papers like *Die Welt* and *Der Spiegel* continuously pointing out that another four years of Dr Adenauer (which now seem assured) would perpetuate the division of Germany and might create the climate for an authoritarian one-party state.

There was the sensational success of the play *The Diary of Anne Franck*, which has been stunning large audiences all over Germany and has at last awakened people's consciences to the Nazi crimes.

There was the moving pilgrimage of thousands of young Germans to Belsen; and there was the —at least for me—exhilarating experience of hearing a large audience of young voters at a Hamburg election meeting booing and heckling the

'Why should anybody want to win the next war Herr Direktor?'

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1957.

AIR AIDE ASSAILS
SMALL-WAR IDEAS

Strategist Calls Theories of
Big or Little Conflicts
an Escape From Truth

By JACK RAYMOND
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 15—A
leading theorist on Air Force
policy has challenged recently
publicized statements favoring
new defense doctrines to deal
with “limited” wars.

Col. Ephraim M. Hampton,
deputee for evaluation at the
Air War College, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama, sug-
gested that some current dis-

tinctions between "total" and
"limited" war were an "es-
capist device—a case of candy-
coating the bitter truth."

"If war is viewed in its broad-
est context, there is no such
thing as limited war," declared
Colonel Hampton in the Air
University Quarterly Review,
the Air Force's professional
journal.

"It does not exist in fact; it
is at best a hope and not a
reality," he emphasized in an
article entitled, "Unlimited Con-
fusion Over Limited War."

The article was prompted by
the growing discussion of mili-
tary policies in the nuclear era
that has been stimulated here
by a book, "Nuclear Weapons
and Foreign Policy." The au-
thor, Henry A. Kissinger, based
his book on studies for the
Council of Foreign Relations.

The book has found favor
with Army leaders because it
appears to reinforce a major

Army contention. The Army
feels that overemphasis on the
policy of massive nuclear re-
taliation from the air in the
event of aggression may result
in neglecting forces, such as
the Army's, that can deal with
"limited" or "brushfire" wars.

The Air Force attitude was
indicated when Gen. Thomas D.
White, Chief of Staff, intro-
duced an article in a new service
magazine with the statement:

"Today, the air-nuclear coun-
terpunch of the United States
Air Force is the keystone of our
national progress and security."

The Army's not necessarily
contradictory but differing
attitude was seen in the state-
ment of Gen. Maxwell D.
Taylor, Chief of Staff of the
Army. In a report to the Sec-
retary of Defense he said that a
massive nuclear war was be-
coming highly unlikely.

"Therefore the threat of sub-
version and local aggression

tends to become the most
serious threat to world peace,"
General Taylor emphasized.

Charles E. Wilson, Secretary
of Defense, and Admiral Arthur
W. Radford, former chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
previously had asserted that the
capacity to deal with general
war included the capacity to
deal with limited or brushfire
wars.

Discussion Widespread

Discussion of these concepts
has become widespread here, in
view of increasing limits on the
funds available to the services.

Colonel Hampton dealt with
the suggestion, underscored in
Mr. Kissinger's book, that
United States policy should be
directed to specifying the limi-
tation of aims by both sides in
the event of a struggle.

The Air Force theorist con-
tended that this was "unreal-
istic" for "it is not possible to

predict the precise form, scope,
location, significance and scale
of combat actions that will be
involved."

Discussing the use of nuclear
weapons, Colonel Hampton
asked:

"How could we ever be sure
an enemy possessing nuclear
weapons would keep his agree-
ment not to use them?"

First priority in weapons
should go to those forces that
can establish power for total
war, Colonel Hampton declared.

VICTORIANA COMES
TO SWEDEN

Daily Telegraph and Morning Post,

It is hard to believe, but these are pictures of a SWEDISH room. After years of bleached woods stark, simple lines and uncluttered rooms, the wedes are going in for all the fuss and detail of Victoriana. Nothing is missed. Look, and in the two pictures you will see:

candles, portraits, ornaments and embroidered shawl on the old-fashioned piano which has big casters on its heavy legs.

Another shawl, fringed this time, over the tripod-legged table.

China plates, daguerreotypes and heavily framed pictures on the walls.

Ants on the windowsill and an embroidered runner on the occasional table.

Brocade and velvet covered easy chairs and an ornate oriental rug on the floor.

China and glass knick-knacks everywhere.

NO MORE IRONING FOR
HEATHER

WHAT has film stardom meant to Heather Sears? For the moment, she and her husband are still living in a tiny flat; she still buys her clothes from a girl friend who has a wonderful dressmaker and similar tastes and figure; she still receives callers with coffee made from instant powder.

But her widely acclaimed performance in the film, "The Story of Esther Costello," has brought her a tour round England, Europe and America to promote it; and what seems to please her all is that when she

and found room for Heather

Parents still

BACK - TO - SCHOOL shopping this month will cost you more. But don't be alarmed—you will gain far more on the roundabouts than you lose on the swings.

School principals, parent-teacher associations, store uniform advisers and manufacturers are joining forces in "Operation Economy," a campaign to prune down some of the expenses which have made some outfits an almost greater burden than hefty fees.

Attractive Styles

Among long-term saving ideas is that of using clothes which may be adapted for growing children. Some schools, too, are switching to the "outdoor uniform only" rule, and at last there is a definite swing towards clothes which are attractive enough to carry on into playtime and even Sunday best wear.

Although rising production costs are immediately adding to the cost of nearly every item on the school shopping budget, few parents would like to abandon all uniform regulations.

This is the verdict of three parents who met recently in a London store's school outfitting department for an on-the-spot discussion.

sa

first-hand experience.

"I never get the people who are never occurred to the idea of a market school them too."

The three agreed that at is a good thing to do. A full claim for it would be made. It helps parents to be practical school-boys, and it is like to wear their class-mates' clothes.

Mrs. James children take all the uniform. At complete uniform £80 over two years' expenditure on a compulsory regulation sportswear, another £25 a year's expenses.

Rising

"But why," clothes so expensive?" prices rising?" said the daughter of Mr. Andrew, a schoolmaster, and Andrew's son, Mr. Labour, not long since a shoots up the schoolboy's list of work involved. "There's more to be done, and a schoolboy that He ruled out

Her query, of parents, was: "Why?" She said: "The shell by Mr. Labour, not the shoots up the schoolboy that He ruled out"

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1957

Kissinger Volume
Stirs a Debate

By Chalmers M. Roberts

ONE of the unconquered Washington problems is how to get away from the telephones and the cocktail parties long enough to read a book. But one massive

455-page book is mak-
ing history here in
this respect.

It's Henry A. Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, a brilliant but often hard-ploughing volume dissecting the failures of the Administration to marry diplomacy with modern weapons and presenting some recommendations on how to do it.

Roberts

Whether President Eisenhower has read it is unknown. But Secretary Dulles had a go at it and has absorbed and agreed with at least the Kissinger thesis that a small nuclear war is possible. Under Secretary of Defense Quarles, at last account, had read a chapter of the book which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* and was debating with himself whether to take the full plunge, meanwhile arguing against the Kissinger conclusions.

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have discussed the book across their conference table and some of them at least approve of Kissinger's analysis of the problems facing America and the free world without agreeing to the conclusions.

AT THE Capitol several key Senators have worked their way through the book but others, Democratic whip Mike Mansfield among them, have laid it aside for autumn reading during the congressional recess. Some of the Senators are a bit unhappy that Kissinger went so far as to call for an Army-Air Force merger with a single service as the ultimate objective. They felt that this would get up the backs of the top Pentagon brass, as indeed it clearly has, and thus debilitate the power of Kissinger's analyses.

The yellow dust jacket on the Kissinger volume can be glimpsed on a good many Pentagon desks. And the book remains high on the local best-seller lists.

All in all, this is a remarkable tribute to the written word in a time of hurry-hurry and an Administration not noted for its egghead approach to public affairs. Probably the explanation is that Kissinger has put together a mass of relevant material at a moment when official Washington and those who report on and work with it are generally highly confused over what should be American policies in the nuclear age.

Kissinger's argument is that if we keep our powder dry the big wars are out, and the coming of the intercontinental ballistic missiles will make that doubly so. Therefore, the United States must have the means and the will to fight small wars and probably small nuclear wars. You don't have to agree with his idea on service unification to follow his logic on small wars.

ALTHOUGH the affair in Jordan last spring occurred before the Kissinger book appeared, it is interesting in retrospect to see just what the United States was prepared to do at the time. With the American Sixth Fleet then in the eastern Mediterranean, this was the Navy's planning:

If King Hussein had asked American help against his enemies, presumably Communist-backed, Marines with the fleet would have been moved in and fleet aircraft would have been used. If land passage across Syria and/or Israel had been refused, the air space of one or the other would have been violated to move in the forces.

If Soviet aircraft had joined the action, American planes would have taken them on. And, if the military had had its way, the Soviets would have been explicitly warned that if they did not call off their aircraft, American planes in "hot pursuit" would have followed them to their bases in the south of the Soviet Union, but without any general attack on Russia.

This, at least, is a concrete picture of what a "small" war might be like. It should be added that the fleet could have used nuclear weapons on less than two hours' notice, after the necessary presidential order, though potential targets for such weapons might have been hard to find.

# VICTORIANA COMES TO SWEDEN

It is hard to believe, but these are pictures of a SWEDISH room. After years of bleached woods, stark, simple lines and uncluttered rooms, the Swedes are going in for all the fuss and detail of Victoriana. Nothing is missed. Look, and in the two pictures you will see:

Candles, portraits, ornaments and embroidered shawl on the old-fashioned piano which has big casters on its heavy legs.

Plants on the windowsill and an embroidered runner on the occasional table.

## Parents still say

BACK TO SCHOOL shopping this month will cost you more. But don't be alarmed—you will gain far more on the roundabouts than you lose on the swings.

### Attractive Styles

first-hand evidence of uniform problems.

"I never guinea side," Mrs. James never occurred to the people who market school them too."

The three agreed that all is a good thing, ing a full claim that it up with the job it helps parents: practical school wecomed by like to wear their classmates.

Mrs. James children take all uniforms. And complete uniform £80 over two years' a compulsory regulation spend another £25 a year.

### Risik

"But why?" clothes so expensive rising? daughter's face and Andrew's ing nearly £100 than many adults.

Her query, of parents, was shell by Mr. Labour, not the shoots up the There's more work involved a schoolboy that He ruled out

## NO MORE IRONING FOR HEATHER

But her widely acclaimed performance in the film, "The Story of Esther Costello," has brought her a tour round England, Europe and America to promote it; and what seems to please her most of all is that when she

and round room for Heather

peace which
in Yugoslav

makers, who
had problems
 raises for
and mili-
life would
be compli-
sure to
that this
conciliation is
be criminal
a another
an aid. But
side on the
, it should
similar state-
ago after
oscow pact
know that
in some
can be un-
was un-
it a chance
cial state-
ance is simi-
l e powerful
Eastern
us and too
out, even
a two such
and Tito.

GOOD

It pleasure
generally from
Republican
County, in

campaign at just this time. Japan
is openly trying to court trade with
Red China and in so doing has again
taken off the embargo from some
materials that are certainly not far
from the strategic category. The
thanks that they have received is a
mass of denunciation and warning.

If they and we go to the heart of
the matter, however, it will be seen
that the real target of the Chinese
Communists is not Japan but the
United States. Japan is assailed as
a "lackey" in an obvious effort to
sting Japanese pride and possibly to
exploit it against the United States.
That the step-up in the attacks has
coincided in time with the further
reduction of American military
forces in Japan may be more than
mere coincidence, since the Com-
munists must have felt that any
good effects of such American action
must be offset in any way possible.

Mao Tse-tung has been direct and
outspoken in his demand that Japan
join with India and Red China to
"drive the United States out of
Asia." Chou En-lai, somewhat more
subtle, has been blunt enough in
telling the Japanese that they can-
not expect a trade treaty with Red
China until they achieve "perfect
independence" from the United
States.

The Japanese Government of
Premier Kishi is wise in choosing to
ignore these latest manifestations

how dreadful it
same room with
quito. But paus
even though his
more upon his
goodwill. Cons
than can go or
awake with a n

Wh

Due
man
to
wheel
same
due to
Noise

say that the
who discovered
of same, while
are excellent th
devices trace
source, one ma
grind out the
wishing the f
smudge to driv
the man who
doing so in the
of rapid locomo
from the sound
origins of the
the past. About
and the result o
or so then. We
some song write
tonight, and a
relentlessly on,
fect note, a pe
who can say ho
be started in
tonight, how m
appeal, how m

# Joint Chiefs

*(Continued from page one)*
missiles at this or Allied nations.

There are inter-service divergencies also over strategy. The Air Force is preoccupied about general war. The Army and Navy believe increasingly that general war is becoming more remote and limited war more likely.

These often-conflicting viewpoints lead to insistence by each service for funds for equipment and men to perform its mission as the service sees it. And this insistence runs headlong now into the Administration's policy of ceilings on how much money shall be devoted to defense, thus generating disputes on how the funds shall be divided.

## The Big Need

What is needed—and Army, Navy and some joint staff officers agree on this—is a definition of the “functions” of the services, the tasks and duties they shall perform in event of war, limited or general.

If the “functions” were outlined more precisely, some feel, the services could better tailor their demands for money, men and equipment to the jobs assigned them.

WASHINGTON POST

Monday, August 12, 1957

New Policy Opportunity

# McElroy Arriving At Critical Moment

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Staff Reporter

Second of three articles

The arrival in Washington of Neil H. McElroy as the new Secretary of Defense, together with the advancement of Gen. Nathan F. Twining, comes at a critical moment in the Administration's conduct of foreign affairs.

Several factors have inspired to make this so:

* The development of both "small" and "relatively clean" nuclear weapons will have as important an effect on military strategy as did the creation of the multi-megaton, "dirty" hydrogen weapons just before General Eisenhower entered the White House. This is the considered view of the political planners in the Administration.

* But there is a great gulf today between State Department thinking, from Secretary John Foster Dulles on down, and the views of the retiring Pentagon leaders.

Charles E. Wilson and especially Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose post Twining takes over this week.

* The budget pressure is so great that, in logic, it is making inescapable some fundamental changes in Administration politico-military policies. Already the budget pressure has brought a measure of American unilateral disarmament. And if the present military doctrines, laid out at the Key West Conference of 1948 in prehydrogen bomb days, are not revamped the defense budget will either rise by some $10 billion over the next couple of years (from $36 billion to around $46 billion or more) or else the military will be totally unable to create the forces necessary to counter the Soviet threat.

This latter statement is the judgment of men high in the policy-making level of the See POLICYS, Page All, Col. 4

["Page 2", "Hoover's Report\nDefends Secrecy\nFor Files of FBI", "WASHINGTON—(UP)—FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover\nreports that convictions in cases investigated by the\nFBI set a 10-year high final fiscal year—a period of “ever\nmounting” crime wave.", "Hoover, in a report on his\nactivities during the\n12 months ended June\n20, also stumbly defended\nthe use of confidential de-\nformants.", "> \"The very basis of our success in the FBI's assurance of this country's citizens that the information the FBI will have made available in the strictest confidence in our files,\" he said.", "The FBI, in a report on his\nactivities during the\n12 months ended June\n20, also stumbly defended\nthe use of confidential de-\nformants.", "Hoover's report to Attorney\nGeneral Herbert Brown-", "General Brown's report\nsaid there were 11,218\nconvictions based on FBI\nevidences listed in\nthe report during the\nprevious 12 months\nof the defendants who\ndrew life sentences\nand the other sen-\ncerities. He said such\ncases would \"reveal to\nthis country that the\nBureau is making a\nstrong effort to\nimprove its\nBureau's domestic secu-", "The FBI chief gave\nno comment on the\nother cases. He said\nsuch data would \"reveal to\nthis country that the\nBureau is making a\nstrong effort to\nimprove its\nBureau's domestic secu-", "He reported that the\ncoordinated effort\nagainst gang\nenforcement in\nthe U.S. again showed\n\"drainage\" in\nconvictions again\nshowed \"drainage\" in\nconvictions again\nshowed

# DEFENSE: 'Drastic Shakeup' of Military Held Possible in Future

*Continued from Page One*

American atomic submarine which has taken refuge in Melbourne, Australia. He turned his submarine over to the command of the Australian navy and it is the only craft there capable of sustained operation because there is no source of fuel supply for conventional ships.

Another American atomic submarine has made a tour of the affected areas of the northern hemisphere, traveling under water where it is immune to radioactive fall-out and contamination. It made its way up the Hudson river observing that not only was there no life in New York but that the whole terrain was altered. Its explorations were halted when it became entangled with the twisted wreckage of the George Washington bridge.

## Lasting Impact Upon Readers

There is much more to Shute's story. Though its characters are purely one-dimensional, it has a hypnotic effect on the reader. One who reads it through a long evening, retires to restless sleep and when he goes to the office, may look about him and feel that he is in an unreal world, that the real world is Shute's, lifeless and radioactive.

The book shocks the senses as reports by the civil defense administration, or even movies of the H-bomb tests have been unable to do. Furthermore, Shute is something of a prophet. In a previous book, "Ordeal," he fictionalized the battle of Britain before it happened.

Men like Finletter and Symington see in this book a means of truly awakening the masses of the people to the nuclear problem, if they will only entertain and shock themselves by reading it. Shute fans consider it to be his best work.

If the population in general becomes excited by Shute's apocalyptic vision, then the leaders will have to pay more attention to Kissinger's profound studies. Anyone who thinks he does not have a particularly good mind for this kind of thing should not try to read Kissinger because he may emerge badly muddled. Kissinger himself is not immune from some muddling.

But there is immense respect for the book at high levels in the government. It serves a double and contradictory purpose by furnishing new material for criticizing Mr. Eisenhower's national policy while at the same time it pushes on the comprehensive review of these policies which Mr. Eisenhower himself has initiated.

## Popular Impressions Contradicted

The main thoughts in the book go absolutely contrary to prevailing popular impressions and at the same time, if applied, would shake up the whole military establishment as never has happened before.

Kissinger does these things:

* He brings into focus the limitations of the Dulles-Eisenhower policy of "massive retaliation."

* He advocates the development of a fully defined concept of limited nuclear war. The United States would declare its intention to use this form of warfare to thwart the aims of the Soviet bloc.

* He proposes a new kind of unification of the armed services which would subordinate the army, navy and air force to training and administrative organizations. He would superimpose upon them two commands, the strategic force and the tactical force.

Each of these forces would include elements of all three of the existing services.

It is a long and hard course Kissinger outlines, contemplating a continuing struggle with the Communist world as far ahead as the mind can project.

He takes fully into account the constant variations of Americans as well as Russians that limited nuclear war is impossible because it will force either side to progress into the all-out war which would leave both sides destroyed.

Much of his repetition is devoted to tearing down this concept. He believes that limited nuclear war, calling for greater mobility and higher technical adeptness, would work to the advantage of the United States.

## All-Out Soviet Attack Unlikely

An all-out attack, he writes, is the least likely Russian first strategy. He predicts she will keep on nibbling away, first hostile, then conciliatory and always expanding.

He writes that massive retaliation, which he would not under any circumstances abandon, has its limits in

the struggle with Russia. He is concerned with preventing Russia from arriving at its goals by the use of limited war, but he always would have the United States maintain its ability to deliver a nuclear knockout blow.

Those who consider Kissinger's ideas novel or ridiculous would have to cope with a great mass of documentation in arguing with him. He has had the advantage of broad studies in the council of foreign relations and much information from government sources.

According to Kissinger the directives under which the army, navy and air force now operate give them no choice but to build up each service as if it were to fight the next war singlehanded. In other words, each service is trying to develop its own version of these hundreds of weapons systems. The cost is commensurate.

## Defense Fund Cuts Criticized

It is at this point that the politicians pick up the Kissinger doctrines. Symington accuses the Eisenhower administration of narrowing down the choice between these various weapons system on the wrong basis, their cost in dollars.

He argues that in trying to meet the requirements of nuclear war the Eisenhower administration is making bad mistakes. He says it has been making mistakes continually by cutting back big bombers and not advancing fast enough in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. He and others in the senate think the Soviet Union is advancing faster than the United States in the air, in missiles and in the development of submarines which can fire atomic projectiles from under the water as far as 1,000 miles off the United States coasts.

Kissinger does not wholly agree with criticisms of this type. As far as all-out war is concerned, he sees some limits in the need for strategic power. At present he thinks United States strategic power is greater than Russia's.

## Author Calls for Preparedness

It is because of the unlikelihood of the all-out war that he places his heavy emphasis on plans to conduct limited nuclear war as a further deterrent to Russian expansion.

The discussions centering on all these ideas is considered by some to be the most important development currently taking place. It hits the headlines occasionally in the feuds between the various services over their roles and missions, size and equipment.

It would seem reasonable to expect that the present discussions will, over a period of time, lead to a very drastic reorganization of the military establishment.

But before this happens much will have to be done to overcome the adhesion to tradition of many of the top commanders of the various services.

They do not feel they can afford to take risks involved in such radical departures as those suggested by Kissinger. Some of his concepts tax their comprehension.

# A New Look at War-Making

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. By Henry A. Kissinger. Foreword by Gordon Dean. 455 pp. New York: Harper & Bros. $5.

By EDWARD TELLER

THREE years ago the Council on Foreign Relations assembled a number of men exceptional in their experience, ability and power of imagination. The question put to this group was what to do about nuclear war. The correct answer would be a bargain at sixty-four billion dollars. The discussion lasted for eighteen months. Henry A. Kissinger, the study director of the group, was then asked to write a book on the subject. This book was not to state the consensus of the members but to contain his own opinions for which he alone would be responsible. The last official statement of the panel was unanimous: "Good luck, Dr. Kissinger."

The author did indeed need luck. He had arrived at an answer, but this answer contradicts statements which in the last years have been so often repeated that they appear to most of us not only true, but axiomatic. By discarding our usual way of thinking, Mr. Kissinger arrived at an answer which may be hard to accept for some people, but which could transform our outlook for the future into a much more hopeful one. Mr. Kissinger believes that: (1) we must be prepared to meet an all-out attack as well as limited aggression; (2) an all-out attack must be met with an all-out counterattack; (3) a limited aggression must be repelled by limited warfare. In each case we should use the most appropriate weapon for the task. The most

Mr. Teller is Professor of Physics and an associate director of the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California

propriate weapon usually is a nuclear weapon.

Mr. Kissinger sees clearly and states clearly that limited nuclear war is unacceptable to our traditional thinking. To us peace is the natural state; diplomacy, a method to arrive at this state by the way of reason and persuasion; and war, a last and horrible resort. We are not driven to war except by extraordinary provocation. In that case, however, our war is a crusade and must end in total victory. Our preparation for all-out nuclear war as a deterrent of any aggression has in fact grown out of this set of ideas.

Unfortunately all-out nuclear war has become so horrible that it can lead to no victory in the common sense of the word. We are beginning to feel that war has become absurd. Unfortunately the Russians do not feel that the smaller and more ambiguous provocations to war have become absurd. Our only effective weapon is of such terrifying size that we hesitate to use it against a minor provocation. This was true even while we were in possession of nuclear monopoly.

DURING those very years, communism conquered China and converted the eastern European countries into colonies of Russia. Now we live under the threat of a Russian all-out attack. We shall be therefore more hesitant than ever to use a nuclear counterblow on Russia as a response to limited aggression. We have assigned to our armed forces the task of preserving peace by threatening destruction which we know will turn out to be mutual.

In Mr. Kissinger's book a task is assigned to our armed forces which is more comprehensive and makes more sense. The very fact of our preparedness should preserve peace. In case of war our armed forces should strive

to limit the conflict, and whether or not the war stays limited, our forces must do their utmost to win it. Can a war stay limited in the nuclear age? The author argues that the Russians are no more anxious for mutual destruction than we are. If we are winning a local conflict, we can restore peace by making it clear to our enemies that we are fighting for limited objectives and that a limited defeat will be far less disastrous to them than an all-out war.

Would the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war be to our advantage? In many cases such weapons would be essential. Since we merely want to preserve the peace, the Communists have the initiative and will choose a place of conflict that is easily accessible to them but not to us. Light but powerful weapons and highly mobile warfare will make it possible for us to appear in time on the scene and to resist effectively.

Would not nuclear weapons destroy any country we try to defend? Any kind of war is destructive. Nuclear warfare need not be more destructive than other types. In nuclear warfare supply centers and supply lines need not be es-

(Continued on Page 13)

## Vulnerable

THE new technology increases our dangers at the precise moment when our commitments have never been greater. For the first time in our history we are vulnerable to a direct hostile attack. No remaining margin of industrial and technological superiority can remove the consciousness of our increasing vulnerability from the minds of policymakers who have to make the decision of peace or war.
—"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy."

# The Colonel Is a Symbol

THE RETURN OF GUNNER ASCH.

By Hans Hellmut Kirst. Translated from the German by Robert Kee. 310 pp. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. $3.95.

By HERBERT MITGANG

NATURALLY, an American reader's antennae are way up while reading war novels beamed from Germany. The tendency is to listen for the fact behind the fiction, to discover what political viewpoint the author holds, what apologies his characters have to make. There have been any number of personal narratives in the past few years, by lowly flight officers and high-ranking generals, absolving an author's particular unit or branch of service from participation in or even knowledge of the behavior of Nazi Germany.

"The Return of Gunner Asch," by Hans Hellmut Kirst, is the third of the "Gunner Asch" novels. The author conveys the bitterness of the soldier's life and the final note of pacifism in a satirical style.

Asch is a German artilleryman, first a corporal and here, in the last days of World War II, a lieutenant. He is in the Wehrmacht, fighting where they send him, enduring the miseries of military life in an army that sounds like other armies. There is one added element: Nazi political officers, diehards for Hitlerism, putrefy the ranks. The novel's conclusion parallels those of Kirst's predecessors in post-World War I fiction, Erich Maria Remarque and Arnold Zweig—war is no damn good and Germans, especially, should stay out of uniform.

KIRST has a story to tell more than a philosophy to espouse. It is the week when the American tanks begin to roll into Asch's

Germany, 1945

THE town awaited the Americans. The white flags, some the size of handkerchiefs, not a few the size of bed sheets, lay ready to hand. The streets grew emptier and emptier. Children of all ages peeped out from behind the curtains. Large sections of the Volksturm withdrew into private life again. . . . The local [Nazi] party official, already wearing homely civilian clothes, burned twenty-eight copies of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, including thirteen bound in leather. — "The Return of Gunner Asch."

played along with the worst elements in Germany for "existence" reasons. All the father can think of when his son returns is that his cafe will be turned into a barracks, his house into a brothel and his business ruined. "Poor Germany!" says Father Asch, as a result, equating his financial losses with those of soldiers' lives. So with other characters in this bitter novel—they feel sorry, vaguely, for the trouble they've caused, but they feel sorrier for themselves.

It is probably asking too much of a European author to write knowingly about Americans. Even English novelists draw caricatures of their English-speaking cousins, believing that by dropping in some current slang in the dialogue the character rings true. In the newest "Gunner Asch" story the American Intelligence officers are fast-talking but extremely naive. They are deceived by the opportunists in Germany and supposedly know little of what the shooting was all about. Mr. Kirst's characters do not seem to realize that there were Americans in and out of the armed forces who knew the nature of the Nazi beast—in many cases

# These Heroes Have Had It

TIP ON A DEAD JOCKEY AND

OTHER STORIES. By Irwin Shaw. 242 pp. New York: Random House. $3.95.

By WILLIAM PEDEN

THE central character of many of Irwin Shaw's stories is becoming a recognizable post-World-War-II type in the same way that Scott Fitzgerald's sad young men are uniquely associated with the Jazz Age. In his middle thirties, a veteran, he may be a foreign correspondent, a promising junior statesman, a well-heeled business man, or a footloose expatriate. He is good-looking, in a damaged sort of way, and is attractive both to good and not so good women. But he is essentially melancholy *weltschmerzig*; in one way or another, he has had it.

Characteristic is Lloyd Barber of the title story of this collection. A wartime pilot, he ekes out a precarious existence in Paris: he plays the ponies, when he can afford to; keeps himself clear of pursuing women; but for the most part he lives amidst memories of a past when life was adventurous, women were gay and money was easy. Around this twentieth-century Werther, Mr. Shaw expertly manipulates his secondary characters who, along with the situation, are familiar to most television-viewers and moviegoers. It comes as no surprise to hear that the story is being made into a motion picture. Only Mr. Shaw's extreme competence transforms this material into something more than highly effective journalism.

SEVEN of these ten stories originally appeared in The New Yorker; three or four of them were reprinted in annual collections of distinguished short fiction. They don't however, re-

# A New Look at War-Making

*(Continued from Page 3)*

tablished and defended. Territories will not be held permanently. The war will resolve itself into local engagements in which the side will win that has better technological preparation and firmer support in the local population. Such warfare will require independent small units and self-reliant fighters. This is the kind of war a free country is prepared to fight but a dictatorship is not. There will be no military inducement and no justification to use atomic weapons against centers of population. They will be used only against the enemies' armed forces.

Will not the use of nuclear weapons at once lead to all-out war? Skillful Russian propaganda has in fact all but persuaded us that it will. This propaganda has been launched because the use of nuclear weapons would make it possible for us to resist local aggression. In a limited nuclear war as in any limited war it is possible to avoid the big scale conflict if our aims remain moderate and our diplomacy skillful.

To be prepared for limited nuclear warfare is, however, not enough. If we neglect preparations for all-out war, then a threat of an overwhelming all-out attack against our own country will paralyze our forces and in the end leave us no other choice than to surrender or be wiped out. We must therefore be prepared to hit back at any time, and we also must be prepared to absorb an attack against us, however heavy it may be. Such preparedness is difficult, but it is possible. If we are prepared, the catastrophe of a full scale war will not occur, and we shall remain strong enough to insure the safety of the free world.

It is obvious that Mr. Kissinger's

proposals cannot become effective unless they are understood and accepted by our own people as well as by our allies. Public opinion seems to be so radically different from the point of view proposed in this book that such acceptance might seem hopeless. No other solution, however, has been proposed. Goaded by necessity and provided with adequate information public opinion can change rapidly.

Compared to our own inflexible and ineffective post-war diplomacy, Russia's performance has been clever and successful. Mr. Kissinger suggests that Stalin was informed about the imminence of the atomic bomb at an earlier date than Harry S. Truman. Stalin certainly was better prepared. Outside of Russia he promptly capitalized on Hiroshima and Nagasaki with the slogan, "Ban the bomb." Inside Russia the effects of atomic warfare were minimized and the collapse of Japan ascribed to the Russian attack in Manchuria. Not until 1954 was the Russian population informed about the dangers of nuclear warfare. By that time, of course, Russia was in possession of a stockpile of nuclear weapons and also had exploded a hydrogen bomb.

The interplay of nuclear threat and diplomacy is frightening. It is also very complex. Mr. Kissinger discusses these complex problems with remarkable thoroughness. He does not mind repeating himself nor does he simplify the problems by ignoring the many arguments that can be marshaled against him. As a result the book is not only fairly long, it is also somewhat difficult to read. Yet everyone on this side of the Iron Curtain who will study "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" will learn of a better way to contribute to the safety of the free world.

# Letters
To the Editor

## Craganour

**TO THE EDITOR:**

I REGRET to inform you that Walter Lord in his article "It All Came From Being an Author," had been misinformed when he referred to Bruce Ismay's horse as Cragmount. The horse's name was Craganour. Owned by Ismay, the president of the White Star Line, Craganour was sensationally disqualified in the Derby of 1913, and the race awarded to Aboyeur, ridden by a jockey named Piper. I was acquainted with a gentleman who a few minutes before the set time of Craganour's race accepted a wager of £500 to £5 against Aboyeur winning.

J. A. PARTRIDGE.

Buffalo, N. Y.

## Fuller

**TO THE EDITOR:**

MAY I take one exception to Frances Winwar's thoughtful review of my biography of Margaret Fuller, "In Quest of Love." How could poor shipwrecked Margaret Fuller have been "told that all was lost"? The barque had struck a sandbar and was breaking up, but it lay only a few hundreds of yards off the Fire Island shore. Clinging to spars and bits of wreckage, the acting captain, the mate and all but three men of a crew of seventeen made land safely.

Bayard Taylor, then a young reporter, questioned the survivors. They stated that the ship's carpenter rigged planks with rope to serve the passen-

F. Surice

gers in lieu of lifeboats, yet that Margaret steadfastly refused all offers of help that might have saved her. Could your distinguished reviewer read the full report of the disaster in The Tribune of July 24, 1850, I think she would agree that Margaret Fuller's death was not then quite "inevitable."

FAITH CHIPPERFIELD.

New York.

## Guilt

**TO THE EDITOR:**

I would have pleased me to be able to accept Richard Hoffman's letter regarding the death of an A. V. H. major as a document of humane feeling above partisanship. Characteristically, however, it ignores the setting in which the act arose: the torture of untold scores of Hungarians by the A. V. H. and the Russians throughout the years, ending in the slaughter of over 50,000 men, women and children in a few days.

When I served as a United States War Crimes Investigator in Germany, I was presented with evidence of the terrible end of certain Gestapo officials and SS majors at the hands of concentration camp inmates and others. As a human being I could not but be horrified by such acts, but, on the whole,

## BOOK EXCHANGE

### LITERATURE OF OTHER NATIONS

#### HEADQUARTERS

For Everything in Literature

From the SOVIET UNION

In English, Russian and many other languages spoken in the U.S.S.R. Recordings, sheet music, handicraft. Ask for our free

> "Everyone this side of
> the Iron Curtain
> who will study

# NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

by HENRY A. KISSINGER

will make a contribution
to the safety of the free world."

—EDWARD TELLER,
New York Times Book Review

Here is the one great book for everyone who wonders
whether his future will be decided under this cloud
or over a conference table. And here is what some
distinguished thinkers are saying about it:

**GORDON DEAN, former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission:** "A great book — by far the best — on the hardest problem facing our country."

**J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER, Director, Institute for Advanced Study:** "Dr. Kissinger's history-making book is extraordinarily well informed, and in this respect quite without precedent in the field of nuclear armament."

**CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, Member, House Military Affairs Committee, 79th Congress:** "Far and away the best treatise that I have seen on a subject in which I have been deeply interested ever since my days in the United States Congress. The patience, objectivity, and thoroughness of the argument, and its constant contact with scientific and military fact, are altogether admirable."

**CARYL P. HASKINS, President, The Carnegie Institution:** "The most important document on foreign affairs that I have seen in the last ten years and certainly the most needed. Its sweep and its penetration seem to me the work of authentic genius."

480 thought provoking pages. $5.00 at bookstores.

Published for the COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

HARPER & BROTHERS • NEW YORK

23

Minneapolis Sunday Tribune

The Voice
of Minnesota

Circulation More
Than 625,000

JOHN COWLES, President; JOYCE A. SWAN, Executive Vice President; LYLE K. ANDERSON, Vice President and Treasurer; STANLEY HAWKS, Vice President and Secretary; OTTO A. SILHA, Vice President and Business Manager; WILLIAM P. STEVEN, Vice President and Executive Editor; JOHN W. MOFFETT, Vice President and Advertising Director; HOWARD MITHUN, Vice President; JOHN COWLES, JR., Vice President; WILBUR ELSTON, Editor of Editorial Pages; JOHN THOMPSON, Publisher, Enverilus.

2

E

VOLUME XCI
NUMBER 58

SUNDAY, JULY 21, 1957

2

2

TOPIC OF THE WEEK

Strong Case Made for
Limited War Concept

By WILBUR ELSTON

of the editorial page staff

THERE is a widely-held fear in the United States that the use of nuclear weapons in any future war would provoke an all-out war that might destroy civilization.

One scientist has gone so far as to predict that nuclear war might reduce modern man to the primitive rural life of his forefathers. He foresees such appalling destruction in any future nuclear war as to make it impossible for our highly complex, industrialized society ever to recover.

In recent months, however, a more optimistic view has been widely expressed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, who served as director of a Council on Foreign Relations study of this problem. Out of the study has come articles in such publications as Foreign Affairs quarterly and the Reporter magazine and now a book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy."

Elston

DR. KISSINGER starts with the assumption that any future war is likely to be a nuclear war. With the spread of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, he points out that many secondary powers can be expected to enter the nuclear race. Another scientist predicts that at least 15 nations could produce nuclear weapons in another decade or so.

Thus Dr. Kissinger contends that we no longer can simply rely on the threat of "massive retaliation" to protect us and our friends from the Soviet Union. He warns that as the Soviet ability to inflict great damage on the United States increases, our reluctance to engage in all-out war will be certain to increase, too.

Thus it would be to the Soviet's advantage to nibble the free world to death. The Soviet Union, like the United States, no doubt wishes to avoid all-out nuclear war. But if we regard any further Soviet encroachment on an all-or-nothing basis, then we will be faced on each occasion with the dilemma of going to all-out war or letting the Soviets get by with their latest example of creeping aggression.

TO AVOID this choice, Kissinger proposes that we contemplate the possibility of limited nuclear war when necessary. As he says, "the United States should shift the emphasis of disarmament negotiations from the technically almost impossible problem of preventing surprise attack to an effort to mitigate the horror of war." How would this be done? Kissinger continues:

"We should leave no doubt that any aggression by the Communist bloc may be resisted with nuclear weapons, but we should make every effort to limit their effect and to spare the civilian population as much as possible.

"Without damage to our interest, we could announce that Soviet aggression would be resisted with nuclear weapons if necessary; that in resisting we would not use more than 500 kilotons explosive power unless the enemy used them first; that we would use 'clean' bombs with minimal fall-out effects for any larger explosive equivalent unless the enemy violated the understanding; that we would not attack the enemy retaliatory force or enemy cities located more than a certain distance behind the battle zone or the initial line of demarcation (say 500 miles); that within this zone we would not use nuclear weapons against cities declared open and so verified by inspection...."

Kissinger insists, however, that such a limitation of war would be impossible without a "strategic doctrine adapted to the new role of nuclear weapons." He suggests that the logic of strategy demands a greater degree of unification among the armed forces, and especially between the air force and the army because their roles and missions overlap most.

HE PROPOSES, then, that the army, navy and air force continue as administrative and training units, but that for all other purposes, two basic organizations be created: the strategic force and the tactical force. The former would contain the units required for all-out war, the latter the units required for limited war. While the tactical force might be used in an all-out war, the strategic force would not be used for a limited war.

But in Kissinger's mind this organizational change would not be as important as a necessary shift in American thinking about foreign affairs and foreign policy. He calls for greater flexibility in foreign policy, a willingness to run risks instead of simply reacting to each Soviet maneuver, and an ability to use our power to support our interpretations of justice and our conception of vital interests.

There is more, very much more, in Dr. Kissinger's provocative book. It's not easy reading, but it's well worth the effort it takes to wade through it.

L.C.]

*Continued from Page One*

There is much more to Shute's story. Though its characters are purely one-dimensional, it has a hypnotic effect on the reader. One who reads it through a long evening, retires to restless sleep, and when he goes to the office, may look about him and feel that he is in an unreal world, that the real world is Shute's, lifeless and radioactive.

Kissinger does these things:

He takes fully into account the constant objections of Americans as well as Russians that limited nuclear war is impossible because it will force either side to progress into the all-out war which would leave both sides destroyed.