DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

General Clay/Mr. Kissinger

12:26 p.m., April 20, 1971

C: How are you this morning?

K: Lucius, how are you?

C: Do you remember I talked to you some time ago about the Engineers and the Ash Report? The Ash Report was all right. But what was sent to Congress is awful.

K: As I understand it -- I am told they have preserved the autonomy of the Engineers, and it only concerned the planning functions.

C: If you take away the planning functions and money -- if you are just left with money and planning in another department, you are not going to last very long.

K: Write me a strong letter for the President. That way I can try to do something. I know I let you down on that, but I didn't get in on it early enough.

C: Just as long as I know you helped. I still want to make a stab at it. Maybe some simple statement from the White House to the Committee...

K: Write me a strong letter with a recommendation of what you think should be done.

C: Righto. Bye.

K: Good-bye.

Ids

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:30 p. m.

4/20/71

L: I have this speech at the ASNE (?) tomorrow in NY and going over it awfully carefully. Hardline speech as far as the Soviet Union is concerned. Builds up a need for defense requirements in view of ______ and strategic weapons ______. Follows up speech of a year ago. It's hard line. As SecDef I think I must make that kind of speech.

K: That deosnt bother me.

L: I will have to send it to State and never get it coordinated this way.

K: Send it to me first.

L: It k goes beyond VN requirements and where we have to be in '73-'74 on strategic problems. If you would look at it and if you have any questions, let me know.

K: Right.

L: It's fairly tough.

K: On what subject? Arms build up?

L: Yeah. The President doesn't have to support it.

K: It doesn't bother me.

L: I will send it to you in the next hour.

BY NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 p.m., April 20, 1971

I: Hello, Henry. Something just came to my desk late -- I wanted to get your thinking. Javits wrote me back on April 2 about the Inter-American Congress of Cardiology in San Francisco beginning on April 23. Apparently, this Inter-American Congress has Cuban members, and Javits is writing at the inquiry of its President, John Sampson, about the Cuban physicians who are members and want to come but are not able to get visas. Our visa office automatically turned it down originally. That is why Javits has written back. I have the feeling or impression that the President had -- maybe not on this specific issue -- strong views.

K: I'm pretty sure he opposes it, but I'm willing to try it on him.

I: It seems to me it's the sort of thing, in line with past policy, to turn down. If we change our policy, it might raise more troubles in the future.

K: Is that a UN thing?

I: It's an Inter-American Congress hosted by the American Heart Association. Two-thousand doctors are expected to be present. It is held every four years and is open not only to Latin American and United States physicians but to doctors from countries outside the Western Hemisphere as well. [Secretary Irwin then read Javits' letter.] I just wanted to touch base with you about the feeling over there. I don't think we have to do it.

K: My instinct is the President will oppose it. Write to me -- instead of the President -- and ask for my guidance; informally, I will raise it.

I: It begins the 23rd -- it just got to my desk.

K: If you will get a memo over, I will try to raise it by tomorrow morning.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Timmons or McGregor/Kissinger
3:50 p.m. 4/20/71

?: The President has declined to put in an early mornign session with the
partisan leaders on AID. We are endeavoring to set up ? ? ? ? from
11:30-12:15. Can you make it?

K: I am not eager to do it.

?: Some of your people think it's important.

K: Bergsten is a G-- Damn pain in the ass.

?: You said it, I didn't. Unless Peterson is gung ho it's best to let it be
submitted as it will be submitted.

K: That's my feeling.

TELECON
Mr. Ehrlichman

4/20/71 6:50pm

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: What happened to your Spanish vacation?

E: Nothing except that the idea of travelling so far just to sit on a beach wasn't so appealing.

K: It's Dubrovnik. There's The only way to get there is by plane. South of Belgrade the roads are awful.

E: Where do you stay there?

K: The best hotel when I was there was the Imperial.
But if you really want to do it, give me the dates and let me get in touch with
the Yugoslav ambassador.

E: Okay, I'll call the dates down to your office.

K: Dubrovnik is a great place.

E: Is it really? Okay, I'll take your recommendation. We'll get back to you with the next dates and thanks very much.

K: All right.

President/Kissinger

7:40 p.m. April 20, 1971

By NARA, Dated 5/26

Missed the first two or three minutes of conversation.

K: Well, one of my former State Department employees is now a professor and resident in Germany and brought some of his students by.

P: I see, well I want to tell you two things -- one must not be concerned about the babble of these Senators. The second thing is the guy I think that has talked to them is Laird. Laird is one who is always playing both sides.

K: That is right, Mr. President. When you suggested breakfast with Laird he was in New York, I think it might be good for his morale if he had it.

P: Fine, Thursday morning.

K: I will do my best -- I think you are right.

P: He talks always with Baker and Gurney and the rest that we should not have done the Laos thing, that they insisted. You know Henry, both State and Defense are trying to play everyone. Of course they don't look beyond to see what would have happened if we hadn't had the Laos operation.

K: I have . . . North Vietnamese

P: I know the point is it was a decision we made, it is done now. Everybody has got to stand by it.

K: Right, I don't think we would have the Chinese move.

P: The point is that we have to realize that Laird in particular must stand up. Tell the others of these fellows. . . . Baker is an honest man so is Gurney. They are just reporting mail. We polled the whole country.

K: I think that is right Mr. President. In the next few weeks I think we will get a turn.

P: Laird is very key ______, he has got to stand . . . affirmatively on our own.
______ take away from us.

K: Right Mr. President, thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Phil Farley (ACDA)

9:10 p.m., April 20, 1971

F: Good evening.

K: Phil, how are you?

F: Fine.

K: I hear from Hal Sonnenfeldt that there are some mumblings about our supposed position and I just wanted to make sure that you understood that we want to be as responsive to Gerry as possible. I want to give you the President's views and they are -- he wants it understood that on ABM that he will eventually come down on Safeguard over NCA. He therefore wants no legislative record built up that tentative buildup against NCA. How Gerry surfaces it is of course up to him. This position does not imply a Safeguard preference over Zero.

F: It has not been as clear as you have just put it. Can we afford to show a preference of Safeguard over Zero?

K: He doesn't have to show a preference of Safeguard over Zero, he does have to show a preference over NCA.

F: Your authorization managed to get results. Think you communicated that to Gerry yesterday.

K: Hal Sonnenfeldt is under the impression that State Department might not understand.

F: I don't mean any injustice to Hal but it is the second point which hasn't been crystal clear ..... which will make State Department happy. I really don't think you have a problem.

K: I just don't want to find myself in the newspapers again as the man who killed Zero.

F: I think we have it crystal clear now.

K: You are clear now and you will make sure Gerry is clear.

F: Yes, and thank you for calling.

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Mosbacher/Kissinger
9:31 xxxxx a.m. 4/21/71

M: You are a mind reader. I was going to call you.

K: Talk about the same subject. Are we still going?

M: The thing I was going to tell you is that we have accepted an Australian dinner on Thurs. night and since I am going to Australia I don't think I should bug out. But I have the tickets for Thurs. for you if you want them. There will be a game early Sunday evening or Sunday afternoon and you can goto that too.

K: Sunday I may not be able to do it.

M: Why don't you take the 4 tickets and take whom you wish. Don't you think I shouldn't cancel out on Plimsoll?

K: It's up to you.

M: Then you are on for Thurs. night. I will get tickets to you. They are in NY. Maybe have them send to Miss Maginnes.

K: I will get there late in the afternoon and come back at night.

M: The game is at 7:30.

K: Then eat before?

M: Or settle for hot dogs or something. You are a swinger so you don't do that to a girl.

K: That's at Penn Station now. Traffic jams? I will have a car.

M: Getting there isn't bad -- if you can get there on the early side.

K: 7:00?

M: Or before. Maybe I could arrange for you to eat at the Madison Square Garden Club -- 6:15.

K: That would be a good arrangement. And you are sure you cannot go?

M: I will talk with Pat and leave word with one of the girls in half an hour. I will get the tickets to you and arrange dinner. Also any reason I should go over and talk to Holdridge on N. Zealand and Australia?

By. NARA, Dato

Amb. Mosbacher/Kissiger

9:30 a.m. 4/21/71

-2-

K: Nothing of consequence but it might help to touch base.

M: I will give him a call. I will let you know about that other in half an hour.

darrange

ood arrangement. Ano

ch Pat and leave word with one

...ckets to you and arrange dinner

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

10:01 a.m.

4/21/71

R: Something bothering me from is that casualties are running higher than we thought. If they continue to occur for a period of time when related to casualties after Cambodia it will be troublesome.

K: On Cambodia it took 4 weeks before they got to 50. From then on they declined -- so far they are lower than after Cambodia.

R: After the end of Cambodia?

K: After July 1. I agree with your concern. What do you think we can do about it.

R: I thought you or someone should call have a meeting with Defense to see how the casualties are occuring. There's not much combat.

K: 11 in one ambush last week.

R: The other thing I think is we should impress on them that like after Cambodia to keep casualties in bounds. I don't think it's critical now but it could be if they stay in the 50-60 area it will be noticeably. We had it to 30 for awhile. It's best to let Defense know the President is concerned about it.

K: I will do that. I will try to get an idea when on how the casualties are occuring.

R: Taking a vacation?

K: The middle of next week for 10 days or so.

R: Getting married?

K: Anyone in mind?

R: No but I would like to be the first to know.

K: You will be one of the first.

R: I am leaving Sunday. I may go to the M.E.

K: I have seen the cable.

R: Not decided yet.

K: Now that you have that proposal you will have something to talk on.

R: I don't think I can screw it up.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

10:01 a.m.

4/21/71

R: The Egyptians invited me. I see the Russians have a new plan. If they
do it's a good thing.

K: I don't see how the Russians think they can settle the M.E. without us.

R: I think other things are going on.

K: The Chinese thing is turning well. We have to be careful -- your people
have been terrific -- but if we overplay it the Chinese will pull the rug out.
People overplayed it/

R: We welcome it and hope it will be responsive to the President's moves. I
think I will have a press conference on Friday. Let me know if you have any
thoughts. I am going to CEATO and CENTO.

K: And keep going. Going for 10 days?

R: About 2 weeks. The same time you are. Alex Johnson was planning to
go to Africa. Do you think he should postpone his trip? With you and going
good to be away?

K: That week? I think he should be here with us gone. He is the only crisis
manager we have got. Postpone until we get back.

F: I am leaving Sunday. I may go to the M.E.

G: I have seen the cable.

H: Not decided yet.

I: That you have that proposal you will have something to talk on.

I think I can screw it up.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

10:21 a.m., April 21, 1971

S: Henry, I am going to get over to you in about an hour our suggested reply to the Israelis, now that they have given us this Suez Canal proposal. You will recall they have asked us for certain assurances on three or four points. We have no problems with them but I am getting them over to you for your review. The Secretary has been over it, and it is satisfactory from our point of view. If it would be possible to get it out today, it would be helpful.

K: Then, do you think...

S: There are some positive elements in the Israeli proposal. Alon made it clear that many points are negotiable. Ours is a telegram you won't have any difficulty with. It's intended to be responsive to the Israeli desires to be helpful on our part.

K: How did the conversation go?

S: Very well. I think, frankly, he is the most attractive personality in Israel. My regret is that he has lost political ground. He is not as charismatic as a Dyan, but he would be a tremendous Prime Minister. He is reasonable, flexible, and loves America. He would be infinitely better than Golda Meir. She sees herself as a Joan of Arc and the last defense of Israel rather than a woman who will bring peace to this country.

K: Yeah, yeah.

S: When you and I write our books on this when we are both professors in Arizona...

K: Okay.

S: I will get it over in an hour.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Cromer

2:27 p.m., April 21, 1971

C: How are you?

K: How are you? I was going to talk to you about the matter we discussed the other day. What I need is something that can be plausible between a Cabinet office and the White House and which does not require any political advisor -- such as, if the Prime Minister or Burke Trend, though I would prefer the Prime Minister, could bring himself to say he mentioned to the President the NSC machinery to see if it could be adapted to the British system. Or something of the kind.

C: What about the National Security Council?

K: That is under my jurisdiction.

C: Anything you say -- we will find a suitable pretext. But you don't think the NSC would be sensitive here?

K: They wouldn't be -- that is my secretariat. The others are just members. Say that or anything plausible between us.

C: That's not too political. I am with you on the objective. It's difficult to find a solution.

K: Once there, I will be glad to talk with the Prime Minister about anything he wishes.

C: Let me have a word with him along these lines.

K: I would like to get there the middle of May and would like to have the option of coming back but not tied to a particular date.

C: And in June?

K: Probably, but it would depend on other things.

C: Let me try this on him.

K: Good; thank-you.

lds

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Ambassador Mosbacher

3:36 p.m., April 21, 1971

K: When an Assistant to the President can't get into a club for dinner...

M: You can get into the Madison Square Garden Club. But it will be a madhouse. I think you'll enjoy more an invitation to cocktails/cheese, etc. in the Director's Room before the game, and we could get a bite to eat afterwards.

K: That's a good idea. It doesn't put us under so much pressure making the plane. Are you coming back with me?

M: Probably not.

K: Then you don't care how late we are out.

M: We are going to White Plains to see Clifford Daniel about Truman's funeral plans.

K: Is he sick?

M: No; we found 10 days ago that there were plans for the service in Independence, but none for the memorial service in Washington. Our office is responsible, so I will do it.

K: It's a ghoulish business.

M: But somebody has to ask questions. It's a good thing it's a son-in-law.

K: Should I make reservations for dinner afterwards?

M: Pat and I would like you to join us for dinner.

K: I can probably get a plane around 11:30.

M: But the plane will wait, won't it?

K: It has no choice.

M: Do you like the Plaza, 21 or where?

BY, C NARA, Dato

5/26

K: The 21 is nice.

M: It's convenient. -I'll make a reservation.

K: Shall we meet here at 4:15?

M: Could we meet a little earlier? Could we pick you up at 3:30 at your office?

K: If we leave at 4:30, we would arrive at 5:30, and then could pick up Nancy. I will have a car in New York.

M: May we ride in with you? Let's shoot for 3:30 and a take-off at 4:15.

K: Is Pat going to be with you?

M: Yes, we will go out in our car.

K: We will be with Nancy by 6:00 and get to Madison Square Garden by 6:15. You don't think it's too early?

M: We will go to the reception. They will take pictures of you and your new girl and pump you on how things are going in Vietnam.

K: Don't muscle into the pictures. You haven't earned it. No, if there is one man who hasn't tried to get into pictures, it is you.

M: This leaves a little time to relax and enjoy it. The office is at Madison and 63rd. I might ask that the tickets be sent to Nancy. Is that all right?

K: She may invite three other friends to the game.

M: Pat and I are both looking forward to it.

K: Thanks, Bus.

Ids

By.

NARA, Dalo 5/20

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

4:49 p. m.

4/21/71

K: I just wanted to let you know that the President wants to have breakfast with you and me tomorrow or Friday.

L: Tomorrow is fine.

K: At 8:30.

L: I have a note here -- that's fine. Excellent. Speech went well with the publishers and editors.

K: Nothing in particular. General review.

L: That's fine. Very good.

K: You don't have to prepare anything unless you want to. Just a visit.
That's what he has in mind.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCONE
Amb. Ortona/Kissinger

5:26 p.m.

4/21/71

K: Is this one of the serious fxxx Italian foreign office people?

O: I am asking you to dinner with Mrs. Ford.

K: I am crazy about her but you have found out I will not be here.

O: Would the 5th of the coming month be good?

K: I will be on the West Coast.

O: I know that if you are not there she will not come. The only say to hook her --

K: The following week I can do it.

O: I will talk with Cristina and arrange something with her.

K: And tell her I won't come if she isn't there.

O: I will x let you know. She is very eager to come because of you, of course. I will do my best.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELCORN
Irwin/Kissinger

5:30 p.m.

4/21/71

I: I had two things. One on Peru on IDB loan on roads. I had Custer call Nachmanoff to tell him about it. Our impression is that Connally is thinking of taking a negative position on the loan. I talked with Volker and so has Nat Samuels but at the latest we have heard is that Connally is negative which would cause a confrontation.

K: I will talk with him about it.

I: On the weapons and law of the sea. We have talked with Defense and they really come up with a position that there's an important conference on law of the sea in July and August and we should do nothing until then. Under that position there are two points. One relates to Brazil and one to the West Coast. On Brazil they are willing to talk with them and hope to avoid a specific action and agreement. Our position is to talk with them on a modus vivendi to be sure we won't have any incidents with them. Both Defense and State feel it's good to talk with them but with a slightly different (emphasis) on what will be the best result. On the West Coast Defense doesn't want to take any action. We have a proposed action that includes new legislations which we think is better than taking any action and doesn't put us in a position on law of the sea and doing nothing with ad hoc procedures. I understand there's a NSDM coming out --

K: It has come out.

I: It would help if we knew what it recommends.

K: It went through Eliot.

I: I haven't seen it.

K: I understand it has everyone's approval.

I: That's the second thing.

K: I will check on it.

I: Since we -- what may happen is Laird may talk with Rogers on our decisions on this. Our thought is that both of these need not -- they are separable from law of the sea and can be done even though a NSDM is being studied.

K: I will look into it.

I: And I will check here too.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:45 p.m., April 21, 1971

R: I have a couple of things. First, John Connally has gotten concerned and interested in the problem of the drug traffic and wants to insist to Turkey that they do more. He is even thinking of holding up all economic assistance.

K: We have gone through this before.

R: We can't do that; Turkey is important to us. The new government is cooperative, and we just can't do that.

K: That just drives them... It won't stop the drug traffic. We have gone through this before.

R: It doesn't work. It's fine to say we will show them, but...

K: Connally has that tendency. If it comes in here, I am completely on your side.

R: Just slow it down.

K: It won't leave this office at least without my telling you and with a strong recommendation against it.

R: The second thing -- you have a telegram to Wally Barber regarding the Suez proposal.

K: I haven't seen it yet. I will get back to you tonight.

R: I guess there's nothing else. Matters in Pakistan seem to be still on track. We have Ken Keating quieted down.

K: I appreciated that. It looks as if this thing for the moment is... I am sure the long-term prospects for Pakistan are not all right there. Our stance is essentially the right one.

R: I will see the Ambassador in Ankara. This Ambassador here has talked to me a couple of times. We can't go around expounding secession.

K: The Indians are free with advice when their own interests are involved.

By.

4

NARA, Date 5/26

5:45 p.m., April 21, 1971

- 2 -

R: You remember we were considering Rudy Peterson for the Hoffman job?

K: That's right.

R: I have talked to him. He is interested, but he has a problem with his wife. She doesn't want to live in New York. So he wants more time. I would like to caution, however -- be careful that the President doesn't spout out that he is doing this. We will have to exercise a good deal of care, but I think he will take it.

K: That would be an excellent choice.

R: What do you think of Jim Schlesinger?

K: He's abrasive. For what kind of job?

R: The security assistance coordinating job.

K: He wouldn't be bad for that.

R: You need someone who is...

K: He would be good for that. He is highly intelligent, very thoughtful, but he has this abrasive quality. When you get used to him, you realize he does it because he is a dedicated guy.

R: I think he might be pretty good. We need someone to deal with the Pentagon. They don't really follow too well.

K: He knows where the bodies are buried. Shultz and I are talking to him about an evaluation group over here, too.

R: I also have the job Mike Collins left. One fellow who was suggested was Marshall Wright. He's damned good; he has done some successful things.

K: I would have thought he would be better for the McCloskey job than for the top job.

R: In a sense, McCloskey's is more important than the PA job.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

- 3 -

K: Just give me a good man in return.

R: How about Armen Meyer?

K: He has not been all that successful in impressing people coming through Japan.

R: The Governors think he is wonderful.

K: I sort of liked him.

R: He's pretty good. He didn't fit in with the Orientals. He is not particularly subtle or clever, but he's pretty good on public relations.

K: He is a more experienced fellow than Marshall Wright.

R: If I should decide -- there's no rush -- I will talk to you about it first.

K: Okay, Bill.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Zeigler/Kissinger

7:20 p.m. 4/21/71

Z: Helen is going with this. Why did Chinese make these steps?

K: I did not say VN.

Z: International organizations. Relating to disarmament and trade. Broad
political trade and disarmament. You want to say disarmament?

K: I didn't know what negotiations. So she isn't left out. She's a great power.

Z: Can I tell here that? (Aside: He says you are a great power)

K: No, China, because he didn't want China left out.

Z: I understand.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Ron Ziegler (I. O.)

7:30 p. m., April 21, 1971

Z: Helen's going to do an overnight lead on that thing, I just want you to know.

K: Is that a bad thing?

Z: No problem if you want to do it.

K: Just say Administration officials.

Z: The Administration officials said ...... DPRC respond this way ..
... Japan ... involved in international negotiations, that's probably
why they have taken this move.

K: That's all right.

Z: I just wanted you to know.

K: I have said that to other newspapermen.

Z: I tried to [pre-empt] you by saying that the President was made an
honorary member of the U. S. table tennis. You don't think that's
bad do you?

K: No, I think that is good.

Z: Okay.

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Chalmers Roberts

7:55 p.m., April 21, 1971

R: ... how alarming is Laird's speech today. He is talking about a new ICBM program and we are getting some other people in the Pentagon -- new pictures picking up new silos and new ABM tests and so on, is this a major change?

K: A significant new program.

R: It is significant new information about a new program.

K: Before we just picked up a few holes, then you could argue are these test holes or whatever but this is probably the largest deployment of missiles but don't hold me to it -- I mean since November.

R: November doesn't mean anything to me.

K: They have ducked the whole thing since December.

R: Since December.

K: Because of weather we couldn't complete photography.

R: This seems to be a whole new system.

K: That's probably all of it.

R: A new ABM system, both missile testing and radar work.

K: Yeah.

R: What does this do with SALT?

K: It means we have to come to some agreement, they can't keep building while we are negotiating.

R: They give us new ......

K: Don't ascribe this to White House sources.

R: Does this mean they are using SALT deliberately as a cover?

K: Certainly not yet?

R: Not a very happy situation.

BY NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

7:55 p.m., April 21, 1971 -- page 2

K: If we did the same, then what would you think?

R: You couldn't get away with it here. Your current picture of this pattern is both European and Asiatic?

K: I don't want to go into it.

R: Tens of scores.

K: Scores.

R: Scores would be better. The trouble with Laird giving this speech at this time is that everybody says it is appropriation time.

K: That just isn't true. The counter-argument is that we could just show them the pictures.

R: Why don't you?

K: Because it hasn't been done before. Semenov just came back.

R: But he hasn't ...... Dobrynin is back in town I gather.

K: Is he back today?

R: I have heard from others that he is back but I don't know it for certain. You haven't heard?

K: No, we expected him this week.

R: Nothing on SALT yet?

K: Not yet, at least not today.

R: You can't go on diddling this way indefinitely, Laird is saying ...... on the public record and that raises all sorts of problems starting with money.

K: (laughter). Yeah, which reminds me -- have you heard that the senior officials are going down to the LBJ Library dedication with the President?

R: Only after the invitations were printed. Are you going?

K: I may have to.

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., April 21, 1971

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I was wondering -- I noticed this story in the Star about the Paris statement by the North Vietnamese, have you seen it?

K: Not yet.

P: That Hanoi had no intention of dragging out the releasing of prisoners once the withdrawal has been set which leaves me to believe what I said about the release of prisoners being tied to withdrawal date.

K: Well, we will know it in two weeks because that's what we are going to put to them.

P: Take a look at it.

K: I have it in front of me but there is a hook in it.

P: Of course, prisoners versus withdrawal but we mustn't let them put us on that hook before we make our offer.

K: No diplomatic pressure can be made until ....

P: Have you put that to them?

K: Not yet but we are sending it to them. We have requested an appointment and we are waiting for an answer.

P: Okay, Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Dean Price/Kissinger

10:15 a.m.

4/22/71

P: If I may take a couple of minutes on the phone.

K: Unless you are asking me to resign.

P: What nonsense!

K: I keep getting letters asking me to resign.

P: I have been seeing this stuff. The nasty attacks are on Sam Huntington. The SDS is making him the principle target after no freedom of speech for war criminals. That's not what I called about.

K: I was joking.

P: It's serious because it's nasty around here. I called about a possibility of having something checked. A group of younger government department types who are specializing in measurement of opinion ? ? ?. They have been doing work previously and said look here, all work on VN has been crap. It's not sex sophisticated or discriminating enough to be of use. It's an able group of young people and wondered if it's of interest to you and whether you would want to talk with them sex or your staff.

K: I don't conduct public opinion polls in my office but some people here do. Could they write me a page on what they want to do and I will get it to the right people?

P: One will be there Monday and Tuesday and I don't think they could get word to you before that. His name is Bupp. He was the ______ of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mid-career student and my assistant. He will have him call your office on Monday.

K: Is this a group that's open-minded or a group determined to end the war and wants to prove it should be ended now?

P: If it's the latter you shouldn't touch it. I don't know.

K: It doesn't have to be endorsement of what we are doing.

P: I think it would be just. They are probably personally biased but not among the idealogs. They are working on Project Cambridge. Not among those that sign petitions.

K: What their private views are is their business. It's the studies they are important.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

D. Price/Kissinger

10:15 a.m.

4/22/71

P: Whoever talks with them should quiz them on that. Since we don't know much about that, we can assume they are among those that think social science should be distorted to come to their view. They have been discreet and non-public. I will have him call your office.

K: I may see him briefly and have him talk with someone. Let me know when you are down here.

P: I hope it will be soon but I don't know when.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger

2:32 p.m. 4/22/71

L: I got a copy of the memo that the President signed to Dave on Southcom. I
wished I knew about that. That drives Dave right up the wall. The Joint Chiefs
signed up on that. Dave should have been given an opportunity to present it.
xxx Johnson signed off on it.

K: The President toughened it. It was his decision.

L: I didn't know about it.

K: It's giving the Latin Americans ________ access.

L: We are putting military assistance under a new set up and up ~~greek~~ grade
the whole thing. The Southern Command isn't worth a damn. He worked so
hard on that thing. It's like a bomb fall to him. He was told he was going to
have an opportunity to present it to you. It's like a bolt out of the blue.

K: Let me talk with the President about an appeal.

L: I think Dave should have some chance. He thinks its something he worked
awfully hard on.

K: I will work a meeting with the Chiefs, Dave and the President.

L: Alex is for it and the Chiefs. Dave thinks like a letter of Lodge's--

K: Lodge and Rockefeller and a lot of others.

L: Dave worked it through State and the Chairman.

K: State is usually wrong.

L: But Dave isn't and he worked hard. Dave hasn't seen it yet. But we will
show it to him this afternoon.

K: I will take it up with the President first thing in the morning.

L: Remember the DPRC which was set up? It was cancelled and I just
thougth it would be rescheduled. It was set up to discuss this.

K: Right.

L: The this is Dave has become so personally involved in this thing.

K: Don't do anything about disestablishing it but let's have Dave meet with
the President and Chairman.

By.

NARA, Date

5/26

TELCON
Rabin/Kissinger

2:36 p.m. 4/22/71

R: I got from Argov what your friend told him. I would like to make clear that we have no fall back position at present.

K: I understand.

R: It's not tactical.

K: I understand.

R: Therefore this is the situation at present. What I would suggest -- I will go in xdx 10 days from now back to Israel.

K: Your people may have misunderstood what I said at the first meeting. I was opposed to the sharp formulation as it went to the President.

R: I understood very well. I tried to explain that question for who is particularly on your side for negotiation. That was the main issue. I believe I will go back in 10 days before the Secy. comes to Israel. If then you are in a position to give me ideas on what you mean "acceptable."

K: I may not know that.

R: We will see.

K: Let's get together next week. I have given youmy judgment on how to handle this but I cannot develop your position. I will be glad to meet with you.

R: Before I go -- we have now the paper from Sisco in response to our paper and it's now back in Jerusalem and they will discuss it tomorrow. Before I leave --

K: I think we should get together. I don't think I can add a great deal to what I said on the general approach at breakfast.

R: It's very clear.

K: On the details I will take a look at it.

R: It would be helpful if I can come back and say something.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Under Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger

3:26 p.m., April 22, 1971

K: Jack, I have looked that cable over and my problem is I have rammed that present text down the Chairman's throat. I have talked with Gerry on the phone and he is content. I feel if we start monkeying with it now, we will be negotiating as long as the SALT agreement lasts. On ABM, I can assure you we are not walking away from that. The offer is part of the NSDM -- explicitly reaffirmed. I don't think it needs any other reaffirmation.

I: I think we had concerns on two points -- (1) substance, and (2) publicity.

K: Can't we keep something quiet?

I: You know better than I -- or perhaps I should say worse than I --. Substance-wise, I want you to tell me -- as you did -- the President's feelings. I don't have any further question on that. I must admit we worry if it leaks out, it puts us in the position of looking like as soon as they accept, we state it in such a way it appears we are backing away and withdrawing.

K: There is no way we can avoid it without another legislative...

I: It depends on how it is worded -- how the leak is worded.

K: Let's make sure it doesn't leak out.

I: I asked Phil to explain to you when he came over for the meeting.

K: I had a talk with Phil and he is content.

I: Well, we will just worry about it and you go ahead.

K: Okay; thank you.

I: Okay. Good-bye

lds

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird
4/23/71 9:20am

K: You called me last night.

L: I wanted to check. Evidently there is some concern on your staff that we ought to keep the McG______ thing quiet.

K: No, that was all right.

L: In fact, a meeting or two was held.

K: It didn't bother me.

L: It came through our public affairs people you wanted that quiet. I was afraid it will lead at a time when we ________.

K: It doesn't bother me.

L: I just don't want to get into any credibility gap.

K: No, I think that was fine.

L: I didn't want to talk to you on the airplane about it. That other matter I talked to you about, Dave. He thinks there has been too much paper work and some of these meetings drive him up the wall. He gets upset about half of this paper. He has a problem -- his family and kids aren't supporting the fact that he's over here. It's gotten to the point where we have to let him go this summer some time. I don't want you to announce that. But he thinks he deals with a lot of kooks in these meetings.

K: But he's been terrific. I know the President feels that way.

L: I do ok too.

K: On the ________ comment that's something the President feels strongly about, but I will arrange it next week that Dave and the Chairman should come over.

L: It's cumulative over here.

K: When did we overrule Dave?

L: He gets a little teed off about everything. He is not used to governmental operations you've been associated with for quite a whole.

K: I'll talk with him about NSSMs before we publish them.

L: And his kids all think he is making war. It's a lot of things -- he goes out to Stanford where he's been all his life and they demonstrate against him; they

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird

4/23/71 9:20 a.m. page 2

picket his home.

K: They're running me out of the University I've spend all my life at. I won't be able to get an academic job after this.

L: Well, this is all part of the problem. I just wanted you to have a little understanding.

K: I do, and I'll get him in to see the President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Braden/Kissinger

11:21 a.m. 4/23/71

B: Yesterday on the tube Hubert Humphrey said there will be great risks in with-drawing but greater risks in staying. Off the record. What are the risks in with-drawing?

K: That the whole thing would come apart.

B: We would wind up with a communist government?

K: In a rapid time. In a short period.

B: On the risk of staying is another offensive?

K: You will have to ask him what he meant. I suppose that's what he meant.

B: That's what he must have meant. Are you satisfied in your mind that it's an
unlikely event? That they are weak.

K: Through this year and first of next year except in Northern part.

B: They have plenty of manpower?

K: Sure if the y want to spend it all in SVN.

B: And they haveto get them down there.

K: That means I suppose that we are better off if we leave. They would have to
infiltrate more than they have in the last 3 years. It's definitely in a period when
manpower should have increased and it has decreased.

B: That's fascinating. That means I suppose that we are better off if we leave
50,000 more or something there.

K: That's obviously our judgment. It cannot be in anyone's interest to have a Tet
offensive next year. It just seems to us to be a national disaster if everything
disintegrates by the communists marching into Saigon. We might perhaps should
not have gotten into the war but to get out saying no matter what happen--

B: Last night's program shows this as the Democratic platform.

K: Before they were saying Jan. '73 and now --

B: Dec. '71. That leaves the possibility of great risk to you and President and
everyone that when you get to 100,000 an offensive against you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Braden/Kissinger

11:21 a.m. 4/23/71

-2-

K: If someone said there are great risks either way and we have come up with this course and think it's best and others think other course is best then we have a serious debate. But who is for and against war then you have nothing. The demonstrators didn't even know we have offered a ceasefire. If the Senators would say we have made offers and including a ceasefire -- I think our national trauma on VN will happen when it's over. We can end the war. The war will end. It will end either in defeat or the other way. We are not talking about 10 years any more.

B: A short time. Do you still think as you once said that this war will x wind up on the negotiating table?

K: I am the only guy in Wahsington who thinks that.

B: You have been helpful.

K: Don't get me involved. You are honorable. Hope to see you soon.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Taft Schreiber/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., April 23, 1971

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Taft, where are you?

S: At Price-Waterhouse, but I've been all over town. I'm going to lunch now, but I have to see Len Garment at 6:00. Could I come by at 5:30? I would like to deliver a paper and get a look at you. If you are late, I will be patient -- I have plenty to read.

K: I have a meeting which I can move a half-hour.

S: I only need five minutes.

K: Well, I will slip it soon. Good. I will see you then.

lds

TELCORN

Amb. Debrynin/Kissinger

5:00 p. m.

4/23/71

K: I have had a talk with the President. The Berlin reaction was what I predicted.

D: On the first or second?

K: On language.

D: On that one.

K: On specifics I will talk to you next week after the weekend conversation. On the letter I -- many positive aspects in it and only one problem that concerns the President is that point I made to you on which I will have a compromise suggest that will try to meet your point.

D: Men, or Tues.?

K: Monday. I want to go on vacation and the President is going the end of the week and he has to make a decision with respect to it within another week. Do you think you could get an answer from your govt. within a few days after I get word to you?

D: It depends on how ______ it is.

K: It's in the frame work of what I discussed.

D: On Monday I will try to get it by the end of the week. I was couldn't give you any ideas -- but I will do my best in this case.

K: They don't meetk before Friday anyway.

D: Unless something special. There was a meeting scheduled on Friday when I left Moscow.

K: When the President is on the West Coast. There will be meetings out there. Towards the end of the week would be fine. If you could alert your people. We will try to be constructive in our response and try to handle the defense (?) and offer a compromise that's reasonable.

D: When I receive it I will try to explain to them.

K: I thought you might agree before you saw it.

D: I didn't find you in such a state of mind. That's what I thought tx you would be in. Especially when I brought you a good answer. I was under the impression that

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101235R
By CHNARA Date Stot

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOU256

Dobrynin/Kissinger

5:00 p. m.

4/23/71

-2-

D (cont.): there would be one word in my telegram -- yes. Or OK.

K: There's only one particular problem. I will explain it to you on Monday. I think we will come up with a proposal that I am confident your people can meet.

D: We will discuss it Monday. On the time being I will say nothing and say you are considering it. Then I will get the detail. No problem. On Monday you will know. As for the second I don't quite understand -- this is what you said. This is all you are going to make additional comments?

K: On Berlin?

D: Yes.

K: I will make some comments after conversations with the man this weekend. We will handle it separately.

D: See you Monday. You will give me a time?

K: Let's fix it now. When? Can you hold on half a second? 10:30?

D: I will not call you.

K: At the diplomatic entrance. Where you have been coming in the past.

D: As today. The usual way.

K: I will see you at 10:30 Monday.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

5:00 p. m.

4/23/71

D: On the first or second?

K: On language.

D: On that one.

D: Mon. or Tues.?

D: It depends on how ____ it is.

D: On Monday I will try to get it by the end of the week. I couldn't give you any ideas -- but I will do my best in this case.

K: They don't meet before Friday anyway.

D: I didn't find you in such a state of mind. That's what I thought I would be in. Expecially when I brought you a good answer. I was under the impression that

By. NAHA, Date 5/26

Dobrynin/Kissinger
5:00 p.m. 4/23/71

-2-

D: We will discuss it Monday. On the time being I will say nothing and say you are considering it. Then I will get the detail. No problem. On Monday you will know. fix As for the second I don't quite understand -- this is what you said. This is all you are going to make additional comments?

K: On Berlin?

D: Yes.

D See you Monday. You will give me a time?

D: I will not call you.

D: As today. The usual way.

By. NARA, Dated 5/26

TELCORN

Alan Ginsberg/Mr. Kissinger

7:50 p.m., April 23, 1971

G: I am calling at the request partly of Senator McCarthy. Senator McCarthy told me to call you. My idea is to arrange a conversation between yourself, Helms, Rennie Davis, and maybe even Nixon with Rennie Davis, Dillinger and Abernathy. It can be done at any time. They were willing to show their peaceableness and perhaps you don't know how to get out of the war and who by private meeting --

K: I have been meeting with many members representing peace groups but what I find is that they have always then rushed right out and given the contents of the meeting to the press. But I like to do this, not just for the enlightenment of the people I talk to but to at least give me a feel of what concerned people think. I would be prepared to meet in principle on a private basis.

G: That's true but it is a question of personal delicacy. In dealing with human conscienceness, it is difficult to set limits.

K: You can't set limits to human conscienceness but --

G: We can try to come to some kind of understanding.

K: You can set limits to what you say publicly.

G: It would be even more funny to do it on television.

K: What?

G: It would be even more useful if we could do it naked on television.

K: (Laughter)

G: It might be too __________ but under some kind of circumstances. What shall I tell them that would be encouraging?

K: That I would think about it very seriously.

G: Good deal.

K: I will call Senator McCarthy. I am leaving town for a conference that I have had scheduled for some time but I will be back on Monday. When did you intend to do this?

G: During the May Day Meetings in Washington. They will be lobbying and they could meet with you. May 2 or 3.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Alan Ginsberg/Mr. Kissinger

7:50 p.m., April 23, 1971 -- page 2

K: May 2nd or 3rd. Damn it! I would like to do it in principle but --

G: It is a good principle.

K: Now wait a minute. I don't know about those dates, I may not be in town. If not, we can do it at some other reasonable date.

G: I gather you don't know how to get out of the war.

K: I thought we did but we are always interested in hearing other views.

G: If you see Helms, ask him if he has begun meditating yet.

K: [About what.]

G: ............ on the opium market ...... Long Chin (spelled phonetically). He promised to meditate one hour a day. I still have to teach him how to hold his back straight.

K: How do I reach you?

G: City Lights, San Francisco.

K: Where are you calling from?

G: Sacramento, California -- I just gave a talk on gay liberation (?) to the students here, and I am going to San Francisco to join the march there. I will be at the following number --

K: I won't be able to call you, I am leaving town. How can I reach you after Monday?

G: I will be there until June 15th.

K: You are not coming here?

G: If I were needed, I could arrange --

K: No, no -- I will call McCarthy.

G: Talk to him, I will try to arrange a private meeting. It would be good to talk to the Army too, you know the war people and the anti-war people.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Senator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

8:10 p.m., April 23, 1971

K: I am sorry to disturb you.

M: That's okay.

K: Talking in reference to the letter from Sihanouk, I think your reply is very appropriate.

M: Good, I'll send it then.

K: I think that would be the right thing to do.

M: For the time being.

K: I have made that other contact for you that we discussed here in my office. They ______ reply and at any rate not that quickly.

M: I will leave it that way.

K: You can always go through this channel if it doesn't work.

M: Through the French.

K: Through the French.

M: I will keep that in mind.

K: I want you to know we appreciate the extraordinary sense of responsibility you have shown.

M: Thank you but I should point out that I got a letter from an outfit which is in Santa Barbara ... from/for the President. There is going to be a meeting in Japan, I think this August. A man by the name of Usonna Mara (spelled phonetically) -- you may have heard of him -- who is inviting people such as Douglas, Fulbright and others and they are going to attend and they think I am going to attend, although I don't know where they get that idea, some mainland ______ and it is quite likely that an offer will come from them to a number of Senators who would be delighted to accept an offer to visit Peking.

K: There is no member of Congress we would rather see go to Peking than you and whatever we can do to support it, we will do.

M: There have been at least a dozen requests for visas and more will come from others too.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Nxx Jos. Alsop/Kissinger

10:53 a.m. 4/26/71

K: Sorry I couldn't see you on Friday.

A: You are not free for lunch today?

K: No.

A: How about at the end of the day?

K: I may be free about 6:30.

A: I will turn up about 6:15. I was talking with my Israeli chums. How much help will we get from the Israeli negotiators?

K: I am for it but not much hope in the negotiations.

A: What is your reading? Depends on how much the Russians want the Suez Canal opened.

K: What their alternatives are and how they are presented to them. If they think we think that ? ? ? ? ? why are they not settle for half a solution. The interim will make it harder.

A: Opening the canal and keeping it open a bit. Therefore, adding to the Soviet power in the Persian Gulf (?) and Indian Ocean.

K: They are in the Indian Ocean and shuttle back and forth.

A: What's your reading of the Russian view?

K: Good for the interim if they cannot get everything.

A: If we won't deliver Israel on a plate.

K: No sense in cutting off a limb of someone you will commit suicide.

A: I agree with you. My inclination is that the Russians may go for it. ? ? ?

K: In the right circumstances they would go for it.

A: The opportunities in the Persian Gulf will be so big. In Sadat's interest to make it look a success. It's sacrificing Egypt in a most frightful manner.

K: Don't write that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Gerard Smith/Kissinger
1:04 p. m. 4/26/71 (secure phone)

S: According to your message of April 13 I am planning to be in Washington
May 9. Is there something especially important about that particular date?

K: No.

S: The only problem I have is that the Australian Govt. and ______ have for
sometime been planning a joing Soviet/American trip down to ______. I can
tell them at the appropriate time --

K: What day?

S: That weekend.

K: From our point of view it would be better in the middle of the week.

S: That is the 11 & 12.

K: That's right. We picked the 9th only because it's the first day the
President will be back from the West Coast.

S: We could use a little more time and I will plan to be back on the 10th. I
can use the time back there for homework and anytime that week will be fine.

K: You pick the date after the 9th.

S: I will leave on the 10th.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Dr. Billy Graham/Kissinger
5:01 p. m. 4/26/71

G: I hate to bother you.

K: I hope we can sit down together sometime soon.

G: I am on a lengthy crusade at the University of Kentucky. I am sending you a report today, an indepth study on VN done by friends out there. I gave two of the to the President --

K: I have seen them both.

G: I wrote them about 3 weeks ago and asked if they could call me and tell me how they would do it if they could do it so as to get out by the middle of nest year. They have sent back an extremely indepth study. You might find something in it. I don't want it to get lost.

K: I look forward to seeing it and look at it with care and show it to the President

G: I didn't put my name or their on it. If the missionaries out there were thoght to be doing it they would lose their place. We have thought of a world wide intelligence operationa among some of us and this is part of it. They have done a real job. I will sent it this afternoon.

K: We will hold it quiet and show it to the President.

G: God Bless you.

K: Hope we can get together soon.

G: The earliest I can do it will be early in May.

K: I will be back about the 10th.

G: Around that time I will be free.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
Sen. Javits/Kissinger

5:10 p. m.

4/26/71

J: About this Erickson dinner. I gather you didn't go away.

K: I haven't replied because I wasn't sure I will be away on holiday and I will be. Our you delaying it?

J: Yes until the first or second week of June.

K: Good. I am most eager to go.

J: I will work it out. My office will be in touch with yours on a date.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Chalmers Roberts/Kissinger
5:20 p.m. 4/26/71

K: What secret information do you want now?

R: I am reading Edgar Snow's interview with Mao. It's fascinating in many ways. for one thing that Mao said the foreign ministry was thinking last Dec. of admitting Americans. He goes on to imply there have been a lot of messages back and forth through a third party and the head of one European country came back in Dec., bypassed State, and went directly to the WH. Who? There's only the Scandinavians and French. Someone who had been here prior to Dec. and came back and went to China in Jan. He further said he learned in Peiking' that a (message had been conveyed asking Peking how they would react to having a WH official go to Peking.)

K: I love Chinese food so much I will do anything to get there.

R: You have been up to more hanky-panky then you have said. Edgar Snow is usually pretty factual. When he states this it in fact occured.

K: I am not making any comments.

R: I am encouraged by this as a citizen and writer also from the kind of reaction you have gotten in this country. It's hard to convince people that the China lobby has been dead for years.

K: We have been moving. I am looking for the article. I haven't read it yet.

R: Since you won't tell me who your agent is.

K: I have the Australian Defense Minister waiting for me.

R: He said that problems with China and the US have to be solved with Nixon. Snow "couldn't settle ? ? ? ? ? ? That question had to do with Truman and Acheson." Fascinating.

K: I can't talk about these things. So we leave it at that. Ask me something analytical and I will comment.

R: When are you coming down on the UN problem? When would you say so? Outloud?

K: We will know within -- what did Rogers say -- late spring or early summer.

R: I had forgotten that.

By. NARA, Dale 5/20

TELCOM
Shultz/Kissinger

morning 4/26/71

K: I can't make the DPRC at 2:15 and you have a meeting with the President. Given the importance of the meeting could you slip to 3:30?

S: I have to be on my way to NY by 4:00.

K: Could you skip the Presidential one at 3:00?

S: I hate to miss it because I have several things to report.

K: Could you see him before 1:00?

S: What's your time -- you can't make it until 2:15?

K: It's an important meeting. The second thing I want to plead with you is that you should the fiscal complaints. Maybe we will be at the 79.6 level. If it goes further down -- I want you to hear where we will be.

S: My point is the overall picture. We should be ready to give the President the overall alternatives for broad picture by June. One thing is a budget with full employment balance with current tax system. That means squeeze on Defense budget this year. Maybe it will stand at 76. My information is it won't. I recognize we don't want to give any softening in our approach to that and everything else. They explore it makes it easier to leak all over the place. If it went to 74 then a loss figure 79.6 and 73 is not so difficult.

K: But that's curious because you might argue is that you might want more in the next year.

S: They talk about stuff that builds up. I just say here are our options and we have to be ready to present them.

K: I will ask you to lead off with this problem.

S: Our idea is to have a strong national defense.

K: I wish you could hear what we are up against. I have asked my people for their answers and they don't have it. They want to be paid by the newspapers to whom they leak. See how I build morale? They are sitting right here.

S: The intelligence topic it seems to me should be brought to a head right away. It's a pithy subject and it's been too long. We should be doing something.

K: We have to get comments back.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Shultz/Kissinger
morning 4/26/71

-2-

S: Why not this week? I thought that was what they were told.

K: They will be told.

S: This week.

K: Don't threaten me. You have to treat a paranoid kindly.

S: I recognize if you tell them they will take it seriously and if I tell them they will laugh.

K: That's been my experience with Laird exactly.

By. NARA, Dalo. 5/26

TELECON

Secretary, Lord McGeorge Bundy

4/27/71 9:05 a.m.

B: Henry, two points: One, you already know I am sure. I was testifying in front of Fulbright yesterday on the Javits bill and he tried to pull me into whether members of the NSC staff should testify. He said he thought the White House staff should be available in executive session. I said I understood that you had met with them. He said not with the committee.

K: I have offered it to him three or four times now -- he won't accept it any more. He wants me to meet in a closed session in the committee room. But from there to open testimony isn't a long step and then you've established the precedent.

B: The whole problem with him from the beginning is that substantive cooperation is so hard. He turns it into a procedural question. It drove the President right up the wall.

K: He's driven this one up the wall.

B: Well that makes two of them in a row. It's too bad. Second point: I don't know how much time you have put in on Pakistan. We have some very skilled people on both sides. I thought I would share with you a conclusion driven in to us. Pakistan is finished as a unified country. It will look as if West Pakistan has reunited the country, but it won't work.

K: That is our conclusion too.

B: It's not the sort of conclusion people like to hear from their best friends.

K: But the toughest problem is what do we do from here?

B: I agree. What we are going to try to do -- and our position is much easier than yours because you have to decide about commodities and arms sales -- but we are going to try to find a way of saying this to the people like Ahmed.

K: The problem we have is not absence of a civil war, if things quiet down as they appear to have for the moment, I agree about the ultimate unmanageability of the situation, but it's tough to tell a government that it will lose an area which is not visibly contested.

B: That's right, and no one knows what form it will take. And of course the timing is highly conditioned by what you and the bank do. If the United Stated government says we are not able to help in an essentially military occupation, it will probably be somewhat shorter. But we have to know if West Pakistan like [African nation] will pull their temples down on themselves. I would want to distance myself somewhat from this government. Because otherwise, we carry the terrible ____ of making this last longer.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
McGeorge Bundy

4/27/71 9:05 a.m. page 2

K: What we are playing with is asking them to give us a development plan for West Pakistan.

B: Then what about the East?

K: Provide relief but not development money. But that still is a half-formed idea.

B: We picked up a little of that from our friends at State. What about military sales?

K: We have looked into that. There is nothing in the pipeline right now -- a few spare parts are on the way, but nothing new is scheduled for shipment for six months or so. So we don't have to face that for a few months. We're going to drag our feet on implementing sales and drag out negotiations.

B: I would be hard to talk to and lose the papers on that.

K: ____________ we can handle

B: Access to East Pakistan for Western observers should be part of the package too.

K: On the PL-480, yes. But long-term development we haven't sorted out yet.

B: Have you talked to McNamara about this?

K: No, but I plan to see him this week.

B: Their people are going to take a slightly harder line there. It would be easy government-to-government. But the position is easier for them to take if you and they understand it together. It may be most important to have a single line of communication, a thing we don't often get in the State Department. . . Like our friend Tasca and the Secretary of Commerce in Greece.

K: A Secretary of Commerce who can't make the back pages here.

B: It was not an unpredictable error.

K: You can't protect yourself against what you didn't foresee.

B: From where you sit your itinerant members of the cabinet aren't the most controlable and predictable.

K: Sometimes I find them hard to be taken seriously.

TELECON
McGeorge Bundy

4/27/71 9:05 a.m. page 3

NARA, Dato 5/26

B: Well, I guess I've exhausted my wisdom on this.

K: We are very eager to have help on factual matters and policy ideas. We have it under constant review, but that doesn't help with this badly divided bureaucracy.

B: No, I am reasonably morally certain that the Pentagon is all a bunch of Yahyas under the skin. And State doesn't like dealing with the extremely large facts like a country's coming apart.

K: And the Embassy in Dacca and the Consul in Islamabad are at war with each other.

B: That's what I figured. What is important about our people is that they have taken hold of the kind of sea-change (?) phenomenon. The President should find a way to have the kind of perception of this of a de Gaulle or a Churchill. [x]Churchill. It's not a bureaucratic episode -- it's the anguish of a nation. We can't take sides. But that's what the bureaucracy will be trying to force you to do, to be a little closer to the more powerful of what is in fact two separating nations.

K: This is very helpful.

B: I'll get you a non-memo on this. I'll send it to you. I'll wait till I've heard a little more from one or two of our people.

K: Good, and I'll be easily reachable, so I'll read your memo while I'm away.

The situation is highly condi-
Stated government says w
speculation, it will probab
What Pakistan like
rumor on themselves I wou-
government. Because othe
This last longes.

By

NARA, Dalo

5/26

TELECON

Henry Brandon

4/27/71 12:03pm

B: I just wanted to get hold of you before you depart.

K: You are coming in tomorrow at 2:00, aren't you?

B: I didn't know that -- is that set up?

K: Yes.

B: Fine. I have to do this week a leader-page article on U.S. - China policy. I would like to discuss it if you have time.

K: Yes, we'll have 20 minutes or half an hour.

B: Good/

K: How's Muffie?

B: At any minute . . . it's hanging fire, but will probably be tomorrow.

K: I hope you'll let me know when it occurs.

B: Yes.

K: Will it be in the papers?

B: I think that will be the easiest, to save myself 12 dozen telephone calls.

K: Good, see you tomorrow.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Atty. Gen./Kissinger

12:07 p.m.

4/27/71

AG: Is there anything new on Gleason Works I can tell these people?

K: I have looked at this thing. It was in Sat. thing. I had seen yesterday's.
Obviously they want those works because if they had easy alternatives they
would have taken them. We are making some progress and if it's wrapped
up we will know. If he gives that speech I will hold onto it two more months.

AG: Also the material is classified about the delegation coming over.

K: Highly classified. With a delegation they can bet nothing is going to happen.
You can tell them it's a possibility afterwards.

AG: Then the delegations is coming without an invitation. That's where we
will leave it and try to keep quiet.

K: I would because it's close to resolution one way or the other and if it fails
they can scream in June.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

James Reston/Kissinger

2:45 p. m.

4/28/71

K: I wanted to ask call you about your Sunday column which had one reference I know didn't come from you but which was a low blow and one you are reporting that I thought I should straighten out. The first is that because of religious reasons I am restrained from M. E. policy. One can conduct foreign policy no matter what his religion.

R: It's not a question of people in this government but in other governments.

K: I will let that go, but the other one is the German point which I don't want to go into, but if you ask several of the German leaders they will confirm. I know this is simply not so.

R: My recollection was that it came from a conversation with you.

K: That may be.

R: You said to me that I am interested in Ost-Politik but I think I wish it had been done by another country.

K: Oh. That isn't -- yeah. That's a different problem. My view is -- I see what you are getting at. I think they are two separate issues. There are problems where Ost-Politik should bring about detente from Europeans. That's true because other Europeans won't take it from the Germans. But on unification and settling WWII remnants it has to be done by the Germans.

R: Obviously. I was thinking of the whole movement of Brandt Ost-Politik.

K: I think it's a delicate problem. On the whole it isn't a key issue because it's only a U. N. gov't. position. We have been doing our damnedest, myself included, to bring this policy to success including in Berlin talks and only the only way since German Parlimant won't ratify.

R: How is it doing?

K: It's like SALON -- if it breaks the log jam it will go vast. Both positions on the table and now we need ingenuity in finding -- it's possible. Are you going to China? I here you are.

R: I don't think so. I want to. We have a policy on the TIMES of putting in -- both and me -- but I don't want to press in case it interferes with Dirter (?). He has forgotten more than I'll ever know on China. I want to keep him there. They have given him a month's visa. We hope to extend it month by month. I don't want to get into his way.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

J. Reston/Kissinger
2:45 p.m. 4/27/71

-2-

K: The Chinese will make those <u>weak</u> decisions one at a time. They have their own reasons.

R: I suppose so. They tell me in Ottawa there's a queue that goes around the block. Everyone and his brother is trying to get in. Some of the candidates. Other party is trying to back up the Chinese vote.

K: I don't doubt it.

R: Lots of silly things being done.

K: If we could have nursed it before it got public but I think they will move it at their own pace. They will move it.

R: They don't want to get left out of the world.

K: I think not. They can get into VN but the bigger issue is what you raise. If you go let me know before you go.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

4:59 p.m.

4/27/71

C: You wanted me first.

K: I have two things. One, I am going to see you about tomorrow and we don't need to discuss it on the telephone. It's a 15 min. visit. The other is on that possible trip of mine.

C: I have a reply.

K: I want to be free to take it starting on the 14th.

C: Let me read you the message.

K: It's not kicking all over your government, is it?

C: No, only with the PM. "Henry Kissinger very happy to talk with Burt Trend about NSC and comparable set up in Whitehall. It would be embarrassing if it were at the PM initiative. A mutual working out."

K: Why am I in England?

C: To compare notes of operations on Whitehall and the NSC.

K: That can be said?

C: Yes.

K: What didx would embarras him?

C: Only that it would be a deliberate invitation to do so. It came out of talks between the President and PM and you and the Secy. of the Cabinet. We can dress it up together.

K: What I need is an excuse for one or two visits.

C: It;s what you are searching for and can be dressed to meet everyone's purpose. I realize the delicacy from your point of view.

K: This is entirely business right now. I have no personal reason on this occasion.

C: I will work on it this evening and do it tomorrow.

K: Whatever can be publicly said and your people will support.

C: We can do that all right. K: I think they have fixed something with your secy. tomorrow around 3:00.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Hilaly/Kissinger
6:47 p.m. 4/27/71

H: You asked me the question as to when the thing could have left my man.
Remember that the covering note said the answer was conveyed to me yesterday.

K: That was the 23rd. You will make the point that he should use absolute discretion to the opposite number and we will have an answer during the week of the 10th. Between the 10th and 20th.

H: All I request to you is don't have another operation in the meanwhile.
Somethings one has to strike the iron when it is hot.

K: You are a good friend. I will take the advice seriously.

By. NARA, Date 5/20

TELCONE

Amb. Hilaly/Kissinger

6:57 p.m.

4/27/71

K: I was wondering whether if for the President you could let me have those communications which you have to your friend. On a personal basis.

H: Which I read to you. OK.

K: I will send someone for it. Then he knows everything they know.

H: I will have a photocopy made and give it to you.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971

P: I had a couple of thoughts on this. One with regard to the Bruce thing which seems to me may pose to them a difficult problem because of him being directly involved in the Vietnam negotiations. Secondly, let me think of whether there is something else -- how about Nelson?

K: No.

P: Can't do it, huh?

K: Mr. President, he wouldn't be disciplined enough, although he is a possibility.

P: It would engulf him in a big deal and he is outside of the Government, you see.

K: Let me think about it, I might be able to hold him in check.

P: It is intriguing, don't you think?

K: It is intriguing.

P: How about Bush?

K: Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated enough.

P: I thought of that myself.

K: I thought about Richardson but he wouldn't be the right thing.

P: He is still too close to us and [I don't think it would set well with Rogers]. Nelson -- the Chinese would consider him important and he would be -- could do a lot for us in terms of the domestic situation. No, Nelson is a wild hair running around.

K: I think for one operation I could keep him under control. To them a Rockefeller is a tremendous thing.

P: Sure. Well, keep it in the back of your head.

K: Bush would be too weak.

P: I thought so too but I was trying to think of somebody with a title.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971 -- page 2

K: Nelson has possibilities.

P: A possibility, yeah. Of course, that would drive State up the wall.

K: He would take someone from State along but he despises them so much he will take our direction and I would send someone from our staff to go along.

P: Send Haig. Really, he's really tough.

K: And he knows Haig.

P: Henry, it wouldn't have happened if you hadn't stuck to your guns. We played a game and we got a little break. It was done skillfully and now we will wait a couple of weeks.

K: We have done it now, we have got it all hooked together; Berlin is hooked to SALT. Nelson might be able to do it, particularly if I sent Haig.

P: Oh, we would have to have Haig; and a State guy but not that Green guy.

K: Oh, Green could go. On foreign policy, Nelson would take my advice.

P: He would be a special envoy in a sense.

K: Actually, Mr. President, that's a very original idea and he's tough.

P: Particularly if you get him in right at the mountain top and say look, it will make or break you, boy.

K: Oh, he would do it and I could tell him on this one. On the long operation he would be hard to control but on this one he would be good.

P: If Dewey were alive, he could do it.

K: Nelson would be better.

P: But Dewey isn't alive.

K: If you can hold on a minute, I can get you -- I have the oral note that the Pakistans sent me. Here it is -- the Pakistan note to Yahya which Yahya passed onto the Chinese that asked him (read portion of note -- In reply to questions from me, Mr. Kissinger said ............)

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971 -- page 3

P: They opened that up on Taiwan.

K: On this ambiguous formulations could make that clear in the exchange and announcements.

P: Their reply is can not come over and talk about Taiwan. There is no limit to that because there is no meeting.

K: The difference between them and the Russians is that if your drop some loose change, when you go to pick it up the Russians will step on your fingers and the Chinese won't. I have reviewed all the communications with them and it has been on a high leve.

P: Yeah, they have.

K: The Russians squeeze us on every bloody move and it has just been stupid. They cannot trick us out of Taiwan, they have to have a fundamental understanding.

P: Put Nelson in the back of your head. What did Haig think about this?

K: He thinks it is a great diplomatic move and if we play it coolly and toughly as we have until now, we can settle everything.

P: He said that.

K: Mr. President, I have not said this before but I think if we get this thing working, we will end Vietnam this year. The mere fact of these contacts makes that.

P: Another thing, of course, our little problem of time. In terms of wanting to announce --

K: We ought to be able to announce it by the first week in June anyway.

P: We would have to if we are going to be there in June. Is SALT going to turn them off?

K: No, no.

P: Particularly, if we are going to drag our feet with the Russians on the Summit. They are fiddling around with it; well, let them fiddle.

K: They won't move fast because of the protests in this country. A more sophisticated analysis of the report was made by Chou en Lai.

BY NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971 -- page 4

P: His analysis in effect realized what we were doing.

K: A very subtle analysis of the international situation.

P: Well, anyway, there is another player we can keep. Bruce is another possibility too. It would be quite dramatic to pull Bruce out of Paris and send him to Peking.

K: For that reason, they might not take him.

P: In terms of Bruce, he is our senior Ambassador and we feel he is the best qualified man.

K: They would jump at Rockefeller, a high visibility one.

P: Visibility and it would be enormous. Can't you just see what that would do to the Libs in this country, oh, God. Rockefeller over there, Jesus Christ.

K: That has great possibilities.

P: Here is Rockefeller -- he is lined up with us all the way; he has lined up with us on foreign policy all the way. Anyway, that is something to think about.

K: That's a good problem to have.

P: It is a good luxury to have.

K: Once this gets going -- everything is beginning to fit together.

P: I hope so.

K: You will have to hold hard on Vietnam on Thursday.

P: I intend to hold it hard. What's happening on the prisoners?

K: I have three proposals which I am putting in writing -- they will release 1,000, they are opening their camps and calling on the North Vietnamese to do the same, and proposing that all prisoners be held in a neutral country. This should be announced by Bruce in the morning --

P: Good.

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971 -- page 5

K: And you can hit it in the evening.

P: They might hit that play if we build it up a bit. They will all think it
is about bugging out but it will be on prisoners.

K: We are beginning to hold the cards.

P: That's true but we are going to hold it. The demonstrators may
overplay their hand.

K: John Chancellor, whom I had lunch with today, thinks the tide has
turned.

P: What turned it?

K: He thinks what happened this week has ruined them.

P: John Chancellor ......

K: Absolutely. He doesn't exactly know what you have up your sleeve
but --

P: I am not saying anything about China except that the proposals are at
a very sensitive stage and I don't intend to comment on the future and
next question, gentlemen.

K: Right.

P: I don't want to get into the proposal of a two-China policy, UN
membership, Taiwan and so forth. I am going to finesse all questions
by saying that developments here are significant and I don't think the
interests of the nation will be served by commenting on it further.

K: I think that would be the best position to take, Mr. President.

P: Haig was pretty pleased.

K: If anyone had predicted that two months ago, we would have thought it
was inconceivable.

P: Yeah, yeah. After Laos --

K: After Cambodia, the same thing --

By. NARA, Date 5/26

8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971 -- page 6

P: Yeah. But look at after Laos, the people over two to one thought it had failed and yet here comes the Chinese move, the Ping Pong team and something more significant that pales that into nothing. It can have an enormous significance. Well, look, Nelson's tongue made that statement to Snow. How can we get the Mansfield thing turned off. I don't know how we can do it but one way we could do it is to invite him to go along.

K: No. Why give this to him?

P: He could go along with me.

K: He can go along with you when you go.

P: We could invite Mansfield and Scott.

K: If you want to share it with the Democrats.

P: Share it; the Chinese will treat them very well but they will know where the power is.

K: But they actually haven't invited anyone yet.

P: Could you get a message to him?

K: Think I can get some oral message to him.

P: Two weeks away and I wonder if they will move on Mansfield before then.

K: No, but they may.

P: As a temporary action, can you say that the President will be in California and --

K: I have already told them and that a constructive reply will be coming.

P: If you could add to that, that any other visits should be held in abeyance until we give our reply.

K: I will get that across.

P: There will be many requests and we feel that political requests
........

K: Right.

P: Good idea. Okav. Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

D. Rockefeller/Kissinger

12:26 p.m.

4/29/71

R: I just wanted to call you. I was in Washington yesterday. I thought you made
a tremendous impression in Bilderburg.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: An important one. The Europeans had thought of you as a cold academic
type who was master minding things and hadn't seen the human side. It was the
event of the next meeting.

K: It means a lot that you called. It was a very good meeting.

R: High level -- Denis was brilliant.

K: His presentation was good and so was Geo. Ball.

R: And a lot of others. Even though I don't like what Jay said --

K: They had to hear it.

R: I doubt it was lopsided but it expresses views of a lot of people. I am
terribly pleased you came and not a waste of your time.

K: I got a lot out of it. That sort of formal exchange I never have time for here.

R: It was a great success.

K: It means a lot to me. I appreciate it.

R: Good to see you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Secy. Irwin/Kissinger
2:00 p. m. 4/28/71

I: Thank you for calling back. I have a couple of things. You are going on vacation?

K: If I get away.

I: I have to testify on Monday on the end-the-war resolutions. If you are going to be away who would be good to check with on what formal statement I can make.

K: Haig.

I: Second, on sugar. I just learned yesterday that things have advanced quite far on the taking of 300 thousand tons of Puerto Rican sugar quota and giving it to domestic market where 180 thousand tons have been going to South America. There's the lesser problem of Panama, Philippines, and Malagasy. The main point is the problem we will raise with the South Americans when we take about 180 thousand tons. Speeches of the Secy. stressing the importance.

K: We can't take it away from the Panamanians.

I: I am talking generally. On Panama President ________ talked with us in Panama and said he was encouraged by the President and felt he had a commitment for a general increase in it. All of it effects this question which I understand is being worked on by Pete Peterson. All of it's pretty well along on handing over 300 thousand tons to domestic industry.

K: We can't do this.

I: I heard it for the first time last night. Agriculture is also pushing this. Testimony by the Administration next Tuesday, by Agriculture and us but unless there's a unified push we will be testifying opposite it which is bad for the Administration. I am preparing a memo. Outlining our view.

K: I am with you on it.

I: I gather that you people are the only ones with us. I just got into it last night. I am seeing Dobrynin this afternoon with a variety of things.

K: We want to go easy on MBFR.

I: I am talking on the exhibit problem but not too pointed and congratulating him on his election. We are going to go ahead with peaceful nuclear talks with AEC. I will moderate it that we are concerned on exhibit. If I have an opportunity now or later talking with Dobrynin we think it would be good to ask him about the new silos and see if he has any information that he might be willing to talk about. Gerry tried it. I wanted to touch base.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

Irwin/Kissinger

2:00 p.m. 4/28/71

-2-

K: We have no objection to that. No SALT discussions prior to Gerry's return.

I: No just any information that probably is unlikely. Not today.

K: Have you met him before?

I: Several times. Unfortunately every time I am protesting something. Today he will go on bombing I am sure. Sugar was the main thing. Testimony on the end of war because I think they will get into sensitive things and wanted to clear testimony with the WH.

K: I will support you on this.

I: Have a good time if you get away. When will you get back?

K: Middle of the end of next week.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

H. Hubbard/Kissinger

2:10 p.m. 4/28/71

K: What can I do for you that you can misrepresent?

H: I don't know what you want to do for me. In light of the Edgar Snow piece anything more I can say on the diplomatic on the ping-pong visit.

K: I am not blaming you but twice I have given you what a prepack perscriptive editor could pick up and no one listens. The ping-pong thing wasn't Chou En-lai waking up and thinking about America. Did you see that note which was snotty? I know you were serious about it.

H: The FBI reads our files anyway.

K: I get a daily report.

H: You made all sorts of suggestions on the President's efforts but many private things going on you couldn't talk about.

K: Now that it's surfaced, I cann't go further.

H: But there are any number of things we don't know.

K: Obviously you don't know the secrets.

H: On Roger's trip -- on the peace efforts and so forth you came to it late.

K: When?

H: Saying that you were Jewish and your efforts --

K: First part is totally untrue and I have been in it as much as anyone else in terms of operation.

H: This is a subject Rogers wants for his own. Is this understating it? Bill is very aggressive about holding on to it and making it his issue. Just doing his job?

K: He is doing his job.

H: He wants this real bad. Trewhitt is with him. It's interesting in terms of substance but also a play for the history books.

K: I don't want to get into it. There are constant stories. Most of these things are done cooperatively with shading here and there.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

H. Hubbard/Kissinger

2:10 p. m. 4/28/71

-2-

H: Does he feel he can be more effective in this as opposed to SALT or SEA.

K: He is in SEA as much as anyone else.

H: So no personal (gain)?

K: I don't feel so. How can I psychoanalize people? I love WonTon soup. Does that tell you anything?

H: If it's on the record. Going on vacation with your children?

K: No, just a rest.

H: The President will be there. And you will be the Secy. of State now.

K: I will be in Palm Springs. We are equally involved with everything.

H: This had the added virtue of being true -- that's what you always like to say. All this business on Rogers making this his issue is being overplayed.

K: I don't think so but you can find people you will say it. I am not in competition with him.

H: Is he?

K: No.

H: If I run with what you told me a couple of weeks ago on China --

K: What would you say?

H: If someone said no contact with China I would be a fool.

K: Don't say Administration figure but if you said it I would not say Hubbard isn't again lying. Don't draw any conclusions from what I don't say. It's pure speculation.

H: Maintain strict silence. Except for Henry Kissinger saying all in a private interview.

K: I could believe you will say that.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E112352
By CNARA Date Stot

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

4/28/71

5:55 p. m.

K: I was afraid you were settling on problems with the Under Secy.

D: I left something for us.

K: I would miss seeing you.

D: I would rather in order not to interfere with certain fields we discussed.

K: I know what he raised. I have every confidence you didn't give him a
meaningful answer. I saw no way I could interfere and I was sure you could take
good care of yourself. I don't really get into the field, except indirectly. Did
he get into deployment?

D: He doesn't matter.

K: On Telex business, I have not been able to find out.

D: I found the man here who knows a little bit. He knows Germany and I will
do it after 6:00. His knowledge and mine of the subject we will do something.

K: You will find the words are the same with one clause missing here and there.

D: Take the original text and compare it. I have a teletype text.

K: I would have to make a great ______.

D: No real need. I hope you have some real ? ? ?.

K: If you have news call me.

D: Only in case of necessity. I will try not to spoil your vacation.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

4/28/71

5:55 p. m.

D: I left something for us.

K: I would miss seeing you.

K: I know what he raised. I have every confidence you didn't give him a
meaningful answer. I saw no way I could interfere and I was sure you could take
good care of yourself. I don't really get into the field, escept indirectly. Did
he get into deployment?

D: He doesn't matter.

K: If you have news call me.