JOURNAL OF THE ARMED FORCES

15 MAY 1965

USAF Academy Report

Affirms Honor Code

WHEN the cheating scandal which blackened the New Year was revealed at the U.S. Air Force Academy, instantly numerous attacks were made on the Honor Code of the Cadet Wing. THE JOURNAL took the position then that whatever else would be recommended to Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert by the eminent advisory panel he appointed, the Honor Code must be safeguarded.

The distinguished report by the White Committee, covered extensively in this issue, gives strong attention to the Honor Code. The report says that its administration and implementation "may need modification," but quickly adds that "the purpose would be not to weaken but to strengthen the Code."

The White Committee, in its monumental study, conducted confidential interviews with more than 100 Cadets. "Without a single exception," the Committee members learned, "these cadets affirmed not only their acceptance of the Code but also their positive preference for living under it. With equal emphasis, they stressed that the Code imposed no unrealistic or unreasonable demands on them."

The Cadets regard the Honor Code as their own, the White Committee stressed. "They believe in it. If the Code were to be abandoned or ordered changed, the Wing would regard the loss as irreparable."

The exhaustive inquiry conducted by General Thomas D. White, USAF-Ret., and his colleagues will provide a catharsis, it must be hoped, for what has been in the Committee's words a "sense of shocked surprise experienced by many Americans when they learned of the cheating episode." To those who in the days immediately after the scandals came to public light wailed and despaired, we urge careful reading of the White Report, and of its assessment:

"The Academy's program is fundamentally sound. Any notion that the cheating episode reflects either a major institutional collapse or requires a major overhaul of the Academy program may be dismissed as misguided." The White Committee pays particular tribute to the "superb" curricular content, and declares that "the Academy's leaders are dedicated officers, motivated by the highest purpose of public service. The Academy in its brief 10-year history has returned to the Nation more than a fair share on its very necessary investment."

The task ahead for the Air Force and for its Academy is to push forward with renewed vigor and dedication the challenging mission of

EDITORIALS

CHICAGO DAILY NEWS

15 MAY 1965

Shocks from China's A-Bombs

China's second nuclear bomb test will accelerate the enormous psychological changes already set in motion by the first.

One aspect can be seen in Sino-Soviet relations. Russia's refusal in 1960 to supply China with nuclear weapons technology became a basic issue in the Sino-Soviet rift, widened by Russia's signing the nuclear test-ban treaty. The first Chinese nuclear explosion last Oct. 16 coincided with the ousting of Nikita Khrushchev. This shift has not brought the two Communist powers together again. Their friction is hottest in Asia, where they compete for dominance and share 4,000 miles of border, near which the nuclear explosions took place.

Another aspect of the psychological changes can be seen in the uneasiness and ambitions of smaller powers. India has asked the UN for protection against nuclear blackmail, hinting that otherwise it may develop its own nuclear arsenal. Canada and Sweden have warned that the time is short for deterring small nations from developing nuclear capability. Almost simul-

taneously with the second Chinese explosion, an American official at the NATO conference said that to stop the spread of nuclear weapons the world's great powers have until early 1968, by which time "as many as 20 countries will be able to manufacture cheap but deadly atomic bombs."

Nuclear capability is only the most dramatic evidence that China is succeeding in becoming, not just industrialized, but one of the world's three great powers. China coupled the announcement of the second nuclear explosion, as it did the first, with a defiance of American "nuclear blackmail" and a call for "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

With the world's largest ground armies and nuclear capability, however immature, China must be reckoned with, for war or peace. When this enormous fact is digested, it will alter the shape of world affairs in many ways, including, not probably, new relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States that a few years ago seemed inconceivable.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE 15 MAY 1965

The Second Bomb

The Red Chinese have accompanied the explosion of their second nuclear device with the kind of commentary that reveals, both directly and indirectly, their purposes in developing this costly weapon.

When the Peking communique praises the atomic bomb as a triumph for the Communist party's "general line of Socialist construction," and for "Mao Tse-tung's thinking," it expects to be taken at its word. The mushroom cloud is a status symbol; a demonstration that the Chinese Reds can build a bomb without assistance from any country, capitalist or Communist; specifically, it is an advertisement on an international scale that the economic failure recorded in China's abortive "great leap forward" should be overlooked.

But in other respects, the communique was remarkable for its mendacity. It asserts that the bomb was constructed for defensive purposes only, and to counteract America's "nuclear blackmail." But an atomic arsenal like Red China's, given its poverty of means for delivery, cannot be applied as a deterrent to the United States. Like the Chinese military insistence upon China's ability to withstand a nuclear attack and win

with "people and not things," the Chinese atomic development is, at least at this stage, essentially a matter for regional effect—Asian effect. China's armed horde cannot cross the Pacific in decisive numbers, nor can China's bombs.

In other words, when the Chinese Communists speak of countering American nuclear blackmail, it is precisely blackmail that they have in mind. A major confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, such as occurred in the Caribbean crisis, is just that—two massive missile systems with nuclear warheads, pointed at the vitals of two great powers. But China can only point at its immediate neighbors and hope that its capacity for destruction will be taken seriously enough to induce concessions or surrender.

This could undoubtedly affect American policies in the Far East, but it could hardly determine them. It might be pointed out for the benefit of Moscow that Siberia is closer to China than any comparable area under the American flag. And it is certain that while Peking doesn't mention this fact, it never forgets it.

combining among each member of the burgeoning Cadet Wing, which will grow from 2500 to 4400, intellectual development with military

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discipline "to produce well-rounded career officers, professionals in the highest meaning of the word, who are dedicated to Duty, Honor and Service to the Country."

THE NATIONAL OBSERVER

IT HAPPENED near a place called Lop Nor in the Takla Makan Desert of Sinkiang Province, this latest explosion of a nuclear device by the Chinese Communists. It was not unexpected; indeed, our Government predicted it last February. Still, the blast casts long shadows, across continents, across time, and across the intellect of men. It has added, as Senator Sparkman says, "a little more bleakness to the world."

The same might be said—indeed, it is being said in various ways—about U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia and in the Caribbean. Bleak is the prospect of an early peace in Vietnam; bleak are the reports of American soldiers being sniped to death in Santo Domingo.

Bleaker still, however, is the pallid thought that this is all somehow unnecessary.

THE MELANCHOLY TRUTH is that the United States is confronted with three somber facts that will not yield to simple solutions.

Fact one: The Chinese Communists now possess a nuclear capability. Whether their weapons are "sophisticated," whether they are deliverable, whether they are many or few—these questions are beside the point. In time, our experts agree, the Chinese can build a stockpile of sophisticated and deliverable atomic bombs.

Fact two: The Chinese Communist regime is militantly expansionist. It is determined, by word and deed, to increase its power and its territorial boundaries. The battleground today is South Vietnam; if it were not there, it would be some place else—in Burma, in Thailand, in India, in Korea.

Fact three: The Communists are testing the United States. It is the only nation with the power and the resources to block them. Does it have the will?

It would be more pleasant for an affluent America if all these things were not so. But to pretend they are not is folly.

TO HIS CREDIT, President Johnson has faced the facts squarely and has done what had to be done. He hasn't "solved" the problems, which distresses all the critics with simple solutions to offer. But neither has he sidestepped the harsh decisions.

When the Communists tightened the squeeze on Vietnam, he correct-

ly saw it as a challenge to our will to stand and fight. The military response has appalled the critics who clamor for a "political" settlement, as though Mr. Johnson had any real choice. It was fight or run.

In the Dominican Republic, the President made another kind of decision on the same kind of challenge. It was wait and watch a bloodbath, with the probable emergence of another Red regime in the Caribbean, or by acting avoid it.

Neither the Vietnam response nor the Dominican move has settled anything yet. In Vietnam, as in any

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

17 MAY 1965 (16)

The human cost
in Vietnam

This newspaper continues to support President Johnson's policy in Vietnam. The increasing use of force has seemed necessary to prepare the way for terms of settlement leaving the Vietnamese people free from unwanted outside interference of whatever nationality. We have confidence that the President would respond to any initiative of the other side toward ending its military operations.

Yet we cannot overemphasize the reluctance with which we have approved the continuation and escalation of the conflict. Against the long-range losses for freedom and humanity in an abdication of the field to communism must be placed the daily individual suffering wrought on both sides by the present course. It is an evaluation of the certain suffering as worse than the potential communization that moves many sincere Americans to be willing to take the first step in reducing the display of might.

Not to follow such instincts requires an agonizing decision. In choosing the other course—the course of growing resistance—we and those who similarly support the President must remain sensitive to what the policy means in terms of flesh and blood.

By sending a reporter-photographer team on a 1,500-mile journey through South Vietnam recently, this newspaper has sought to bring to readers an awareness of the "cost of a conflict"—both if it continues and if it is abandoned.

The reports of killing, maiming, a brother in the South bombing the North where his sister lives, a steady stream of caskets returning to mothers and widows—these remind us that, as the correspondent wrote, "if Americans far away in security elect to continue this war they should be fully aware of its grim implications."

Neither Americans nor anyone else should allow tough-minded analyses of big-power struggles to harden their hearts to the human beings in the grisly midst of the struggle.

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17 MAY 1965

'Political'

Settlement

Clamor

war, battles are won and, they are lost. Nobody, least of all Mr. Johnson, was under the illusion that air strikes and the landing of American troops would swiftly end hostilities there. The best that could be hoped for was that the Communists would be persuaded, hopefully sooner rather than later, that they could snatch no easy victory in Vietnam. That point surely cannot now have been lost on Peking, or on the other Asian nations in the shadow of the dragon.

WHAT HAS EMERGED from both the Vietnam and Dominican episodes is a clear signal to the Communist world, and it reads like this:

> Up to now, we have tolerated the fiction that "small wars," so-called "wars of liberation," The are somehow different from large-scale Johnson aggression. Aggression, large or small, Message obvious or obscure, henceforth will be treated as such.

The small war, the use of infiltrators and guerrilla tactics to create internal havoc, evolved as Communist strategy when it became apparent that open aggression was too risky in an era of relative nuclear balance. The initiative in these small wars always lay with the Communists and it was always difficult to identify the sources of aggression in time. It's hardly practical to try to take a head count of Communists involved, say, in an upheaval like that which occurred in Santo Domingo. It would be thoroughly impossible in a land like Vietnam where guerrillas shuttled back and forth from bases outside the country. And, any place, it's absurd to believe all Communists will openly proclaim themselves such. A judgment has to be made.

As long as there was no effective deterrent to this type of aggression-by-proxy, the Communist world felt safe to pursue its ends. Mr. Johnson has served notice that the United States will act, and act swiftly, to thwart this kind of Communist probing.

It is essential that the Communists make no mistake about our capacity or our will to defend our national interests. It has been demonstrated in the past in Greece, in Iran, in Berlin, in Korea, and belatedly in Cuba. That is the underlying meaning of our action in Vietnam and Santo Domingo.

If the message gets through, the future will not seem nearly so bleak. If it doesn't, the future will be no bleaker than it would have been anyway.

AVIATION DAILY 17 May 1965 (16)

NAVY TO REQUEST FUNDS FOR NEW ASW PLANE

The Navy plans to ask funds for a new antisubmarine warfare aircraft in FY 1967. This rules
out the regenerative turboprop engine which had originally been proposed for use aboard the VSX.

Secretary McNamara cut funds for the power plant out of the fiscal 1966 budget, saying no need was forseen for it in the next ten years. Some $37.5 million has been spent on the program so far.

Rear. Adm. Allen M. Shinn, chief of the Bureau of Naval Weapons, told the Senate Armed
Services Committee, "we are studying several possibilities for the VSX with power plants that are
available today and the technology today." Allison Division of General Motors, developers of the
regenerative turboprop, reportedly has only enough money to continue work until October.

Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), in an earlier hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, said, "They say 'we can't build a plane because we haven't got the engine.' But when they get going on the engine they say 'we are not going to develop this engine because there is no military requirement for the plane,' and you can go round and round in this regard forever," Pike said.

Need for a new ASW plane is pressing. The Navy is ending its purchases of the Grumman S-2E tracker, standard carrier ASW plane, in fiscal 1966. However, Rear Adm. William I. Martin, assistant chief of naval operations for air, told the House group that the Navy might have to extend the S-2E program if a good follow-up plane is not selected soon.

ONE REASON Secretary McNamara has delayed development of the AF manned interceptor is the com-
parative weakness of the Soviet intercontinental bomber force. Military intelligence estimates Russia
can put only 100 heavy bombers over the U.S. on round-trip missions. But the U.S. can launch over
670 lona-range bombers.

MARINE CORPS WILL BE FIRST TO RECEIVE NEW ECM AIRCRAFT

The Marine Corps will be the first service to receive the Grumman EA-6A, a new electronics countermeasures plane, in July. Twelve have been bought with FY 1965 funds. A further small purchase is proposed for fiscal 1966. The Navy first sought to buy the aircraft in fiscal 1964 but Congress denied the request. Total funding so far has been $308 million.

The EA-6A is a modification of the A-6A Intruder and probably will work with it on combat missions. As the all-weather Intruder attacks, the ECM Intruder will attempt to frustrate enemy radar and electronically controlled weapons, and also pick up intelligence information. The ECM Intruder has two wing pods and a fin cap pod for ALQ-53 passive countermeasures gear. It also has active jammer ability.

WHITE HOUSE EXPLAINS "FREE LUNCH" ORDER; DESCRIBED AS GUIDELINE ONLY

The Executive Order on ethical conduct for government employes issued last Monday (DAILY, May 11) is a guideline only and is actually aimed more at disclosure of finances than it is at any other possible conflict of interest. The order covers 5 million executive branch employes, military and civilian, and will require that about 4000 or possibly more report all financial dealings which could in any manner be considered a possible conflict. It also directs all agency heads to write a set of standards and submit them to Civil Service Commission chief John Macy.

The order is described by authoritative sources as an aid to government agency heads, as well as employes, in formulating standards of conduct. Macy, who is the author of the order, sees the regulation as doing nothing to interfere with normal relationships now in existence between government employes and private industry. In short, if up to now you have been able as a government employe to accept a lunch from a representative of private industry, nothing in the new order is meant to change that.

It also means, though, that your agency head must draw up a code and submit it to Macy for clearance. If your agency chief decides that agency employes should not be having lunch with private industry representatives, then you'll be buying your own.

Under the present plan all agencies will submit their programs or may seek advice from Civil Service before writing them. Once approved by Macy, they are to be made public.

There also is the understanding that nothing in the order stops an agency head from issuing more restrictive regulations than those envisioned by the White House. The order of last week, official sources point out, is merely a floor.

The order is less restrictive than the current DOD practice but government sources paint out that DOD is a special case and that, in fact, every agency is different. In essence, the agency involved will not only have to write a broad code for all its employes, but someone in charge will have to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.

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GAO CLAIMS "BASIC WEAKNESS" IN ARMY CALCULATION OF AIRCRAFT NEEDS

The General Accounting Office claims the Army has a "basic weakness" in its method in determining aircraft requirements and has called for Congress to force a change. The accusation arose from an alleged overstatement of H-23 helicopter needs at Ft. Wolters, Tex.

GAO said the mistake came about through "an erronious aircraft availability rate and an invalid weather and holiday factor used in computation of requirements. Availability of aircraft on hand was unnecessarily reduced through scheduling periodic inspections during flying hours." It resulted in 32 too many helicopters being assigned to the fort, GAO said.

This "not only reduced the capability of other units which had a need for these helicopters but, unless corrected, could have eventually resulted in over procurement of this type of helicopter." Partly because of these findings the Army has set up a new system for documenting authorizations. It is to go into effect Oct. 1; conversion from the present system will require two years.

The system will cut the number of forms and set up a central reviewing office.

GAO said, "We are recommending that the secretary of the Army supplement the revised procedure for documentation to provide for periodic verification of the basic data used to compute requirements. We are also recommending that the secretary of the Army inquire into the feasibility of scheduling periodic inspections of aircraft during non-flying hours at other installations..."

"We are reporting this matter to the Congress because it demonstrates a basic weakness in the Army's system for determining equipment requirements, a weakness which requires corrective action," GAO concluded.

GAO WANTS TIGHTER CONTRACT INFORMATION CONTROL

Military contracting officers should have to justify their reliance on cost or pricing data supplied by contractors, the comptroller general says. General Accounting Office report urges that the Armed Services Procurement Regulation be changed to provide penalties if the contractor supplies defective cost or pricing data.

The comptroller cited an alleged $284,000 overcharge Bell Aerosystems Co. made for labor and material costs for aircraft coder-decoder identification equipment. He said AF contracting officials "accepted the increased prices without appropriately examining into the accuracy and currency of the cost and pricing information on which the contractor's proposals were based." The report calls for Bell to refund the money.

"We are recommending that ASPR be amended to require the contracting officer to include in the record of negotiations a statement evidencing the extent of his reliance, or the reasons for and extent of his non-reliance, on cost or pricing data required from and supplied by the contractor." Another recommendation is that any bad information "be construed as having increased the contract price" and that "a downward adjustment in the price" be made. In addition, the contracting officer should be required to tell where he did get information, if it did not come from the contractor, and to justify it, GAO said.

GAO Report Urges Interservice Use Of Items

In other reports, GAO revealed the Pentagon is going to see if a system can be set up "which will identify items capable of being modified at nominal cost so that the items can be utilized on an interservice basis." The services have bought $85 million worth of equipment 1962-64 which could have been obtained from the other branches, the comptroller claimed.

In another pamphlet GAO hit again at indirect procurement. The Navy spent $1.7 million too much for A-4 subsystems and assemblies in five years, it claimed, buying them from Douglas instead of furnishing them. Indirect procurement during the past three years has cost the government $17.9 million unnecessarily, GAO charged.

MISSILE/SPACE DAILY 14 May 1965

JOHNSON WILL ASK $150 MILLION SUPPLEMENTAL FOR SST PROGRAM

President Johnson is ready to ask Congress for a $150 million supplemental appropriation for the supersonic transport program, The DAILY has learned. Informed sources report that Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee which would consider SST funding, expects a formal request for the supplemental for Fiscal 1966.

The money would be used for additional SST research, primarily in the field of powerplant development, since the Presidential Advisory Committee on the SST, headed by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, is still not satisfied with progress to date in this area, Magnuson has indicated. Refuting reports that McNamara has made his recommendations on the program to Johnson, the Senator said additional time for engine research is required before a formal recommendation can be made to the White House.

"However," he said, "if Congress approves the $150 million, it's a pretty good guess that we would be prepared to go ahead with development." He denied knowledge of DOD recommendations that competing prototypes be built by Boeing and Lockheed, the two SST airframe finalists, and repeated his personal belief that the Federal government will have to pay the full cost of SST development, and regain its investment through a royalty payment system.

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NEW YORK TIMES

16 MAY 1965 (17)

## Pause in Vietnam

The pause, now three days old, in United States bombing of North Vietnamese targets is a logical and desirable sequel to President Johnson's recent speeches. In his latest address he argued that it was to the advantage of Hanoi, economically and politically, to consider immediate negotiations for a cease-fire.

The solution of the conflict, in the long run, has to be in a cessation of the fighting and in the promise of economic aid to give all Vietnamese, North and South, an opportunity for a better life in a sovereign and independent nation. This is what Mr. Johnson has been offering since he publicly stated his willingness to take part in "unconditional discussions."

However, after saying this in a speech at Johns Hopkins last month, bombings were stepped up. Those like Senator Fulbright who argued for a truce in the attacks or for a "descalation"—a reduction in the raids—were told that Hanoi, Moscow and Peking could always reply to President Johnson's peace offer and the next move was theirs.

Now the bombing has at least temporarily been stopped and the opportunity for a favorable Communist response is unchallengeable. Even though Washington says that the letup in the attacks is operational, reports from Vienna indicate that Secretary Rusk is seeking to capitalize on the situation to initiate Vietnamese truce talks with the Soviet Union.

It is still much too early to speculate on whether any of the Communist countries are ready to take part in efforts to effect an immediate truce. The bombing of North Vietnam has not achieved its purpose of forcing Hanoi to accept negotiations and there is no evidence that, if continued, it would do so in the near future. The monsoons are beginning and the Vietcong is apparently getting set for major attacks inside South Vietnam. The United States offer of economic and financial aid, while it holds promise of an ultimate solution, cannot answer the paramount revolutionary and ideological aims of Hanoi and the Communist bloc in present circumstances.

These pessimistic aspects of the immediate situation do not at all mean that President Johnson's offers of negotiations and aid or the present pause in the bombing are wasted. They demonstrate to the whole world, where American policy in Vietnam has been generally criticized or has aroused fears, that Washington sincerely desires negotiations looking toward a peaceful solution. If Hanoi is neither willing nor

able now to take advantage of the peace offers, it will know that the United States is always prepared to talk peace.

The Russians are in a position to assist in effecting a peaceful settlement of a conflict that no one can ever "win" by arms. Extension of the pause in bombings will provide adequate time to determine whether this is their desire.

NEW YORK TIMES

17 MAY 1965

## Lesson in Democracy

The academic community has given the American people—and their Government—a badly needed reminder that democratic discussion is both important and useful for the defense of democracy. Professors and students in all parts of the country spent most of Saturday listening in—by radio, television and special telephone—on what was surely the most comprehensive and civilized public debate on the Vietnamese war in all the decade since the United States became involved in the conflict there.

The emergency trip to Santo Domingo which obliged McGeorge Bundy to cancel his talk deprived the White House of any spokesman with the prestige and intimate knowledge necessary for a full explanation of the Administration's position. But the academicians on both sides conducted themselves with a dignity and respect for fact that contrasted favorably with the emotionalism that too often passes for discussion in foreign affairs among champions and critics of Government policy alike.

All that was lacking for a truly magnificent exhibition

of how a democracy exchanges views was a spontaneous decision by that old school teacher Lyndon B. Johnson, to pinch-hit for his absent aide. The President, speaking in the vein of his Johns Hopkins speech, would have done well for himself and his cause.

Nevertheless, it was refreshing after the sour remarks Secretary Rusk and other Administration leaders had made about prior teach-ins on Vietnam to find Mr. Bundy saying in his message of regret that "open discussion between our citizens and their Government is the central nervous system of our free society."

Whether any large number of minds—young or old—were changed by the hundreds of thousands of words the debaters exchanged is less consequential than this reaffirmation of the right of all citizens in a democracy to participate in shaping official policy through the full and unhampered interchange of ideas. Nothing could do more to erase the distinction between our system and totalitarianism than the notion that the Government has a monopoly of wisdom and any questioning or criticism is subversive. The teach-ins have helped to keep that crucial distinction alive.

# EDITORIALS

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

17 MAY 1965

## Reserves Merger Compromise

If a workable compromise between the Pentagon and the House Armed Services Committee has been reached — on the proposed merger of the Reserves into the National Guard—the Nation has been well served.

But both Defense Secretary McNamara and Committee Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D., La.) seemed to have some reservations about the bargain they had struck after publicly announcing it. Mr. McNamara said he still was not compromising anything that had to do with defense readiness (and the whole merger idea has been predicated on the idea that it would improve defense readiness); Representative Hebert said the committee was not compromising, either, on its legislative responsibility—and, specifically, that a merger would require legislation.

So it is still moot where this intense struggle rests. Some details of the general merger are, indeed, up for legislative attention: permission for individual reservists to be attached to the Guard for training, permission for women and retired enlisted men to join the Guard, and establishment of a National Guard in the Virgin Islands.

The unresolved point still outstanding is whether the Secretary of Defense has to have Congressional

authorization for the over-all merger. He says he doesn't; some Congressmen, at least, insist that he does. All concur he must come to Congress for appropriations.

In any event, the effective date of the plan, July 1, appears to have been delayed, as has the possibility of whatever saving may eventuate from it.

And it is still possible for the taxpaying public to be of several minds about the whole proposition. Streamlining for efficiency and the saving of tax dollars would undoubtedly be a good thing for all concerned, but we are in parlous days when tampering with existing organizational structures, for eventual good OR ill, might leave us disastrously vulnerable at the wrong moment in the interim. Reserve officers fear the worst.

Pennsylvania, with strong forces in both Reserves and the Guard, would not be so drastically affected as most States, but the whole question remains of far more than academic interest even here.

It may at least be hoped, now that the Pentagon and Capitol Hill are on speaking terms, they will continue to meet and thrash out not only peripheral matters but the real core issue: Is the reorganization necessary at this time? And, if so, get at it.

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MISSILE/SPACE DAILY 14 May 1965 (17)

TEST SIMULATES NUCLEAR BLAST EFFECT ON MISSILE SILO

A scale model of a "typical underground missile silo" has been subjected to a high explosive blast at Kirtland AFB in a program to develop a system to simulate ground shock effects of nuclear blasts on missile installations.

Although labeled a research effort to develop a simulation device that can under the nuclear test ban treaty permit on-site tests of full-scale missile silos, the test is nevertheless producing data for Ballistic Systems Division to apply to operational sites, as did the first one last Dec. 15.

The test simulation device consists of primacord woven across a square wooden framework to simulate the traveling shock waves induced in the earth by a nuclear blast. Earth is piled atop the primacord to form a surcharge to focus the force in the desired direction.

Of prime interest is the shock effect induced in the ground by an aerial nuclear explosion since overpressure waves traveling out from the blast center induce wave of varying directions and speeds. According to a number of investigators, these shock waves may produce more formidable effects than the jolt received by a ground blast. They could induce widespread "jiggling" forces on underground structures, perhaps in sufficient number and force to damage and render inoperable silos and their contents over an entire silo complex, according to sources close to this research. It is possible to envision a "missile smasher" designed for this purpose.

Size of the scale model silo and data from the test is now classified, although it was announced earlier that a quarter-scale silo would be used. The program is aimed at eventual test on a full-scale "live" silo somewhere in the U.S., and if results are successful the simulation device then could be applied to numerous missile sites throughout the country. A major worry among missile and silo designers is lack of data on how shock waves spread through the earth and difficulty in extrapolating results from one area to another because of differing geological makeup.

The second test came at a time when fresh concern has been noted within Department of Defense about possible vulnerability of the U.S. ballistic missile defense, recalling Sen. Barry Goldwater's charges during the last presidential campaign. While Goldwater's charges faded away toward the end of the campaign, leaving the public to guess whether he had been asked to keep quiet, expressions of concern from some sources have not abated.

Some observers see as efforts to bolster confidence the recent release of statements by Dr. Harold Brown, director of Defense Research and Engineering, before the House Armed Services Committee. In one statement, Brown discounted the threat to Minuteman of electromagnetic effects produced by very large nuclear explosions. In another, Brown declared that DOD regards development of the Nike-X anti-missile system as "our highest priority development item."

The latter statement may be significant in view of recent indication that DOD is thinking of moving ahead faster with development of the high altitude portion of the proposed Nike-X dual system, composed of Sprint missiles for low altitude interception of enemy warheads and Zeus for high altitude engagement.

SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-ICBM INDICATED: DR. BROWN MISSILE/SPACE DAILY 14May65(17)

There is some indication that the Soviet Union may be moving toward deployment of something in the form of an anti-ballistic missile, according to Dr. Harold Brown, director of Defense Research and Engineering. Brown made the statement recently in a televised question and answer session. "Whether it's exactly the same as Nike-X, which itself is changing and evolving with time, can't be clear for a while yet," he said. He also noted that the Soviets are working very hard on the development of an anti-ballistic missile program comparable in size to that of the United States.

Brown said recently (M/S DAILY, April 30), that the Defense Department is funding the Nike-X anti-missile weapon to the brink--just short of the procurement stage. He had made the statement before the Armed Services Committee. In censored testimony, he said, "this is a very rapid development; we regard this as our highest priority development item and have budgeted for it and requested money accordingly."

He stated to the committee that the $390 million of RDT&E and something over $3 million for military construction requested for Nike-X" actually contains some production planning money; that is, engineering money; it doesn't contain any procurement money. But there is $10 million in there for doing the engineering that you would have to do if you were going to procure. Short of actually going ahead to procurement, there is nothing more we can do at the moment."

In answer to a question during the interview, "If you made the determination right now and Secretary McNamara and the President agreed with you that we should go ahead and deploy the Nike-X, how long would it take, not in terms of money, but in terms of time, to have such a system," Brown said, "It would take several years, three or four, before one could have even the very first installation and it would probably take somewhat longer than that before one could have a system that would defend or make an attempt at defending most parts of the country."

Brown also noted during the televised interview "that our offensive forces and the penetration aids that we have included in our offensive forces can for the foreseeable future penetrate any defense which the Soviets might deploy, in sufficient numbers to destroy their society should they force us to retaliate by attacking use. And that will be true, I think, for the foreseeable future."

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AVIATION DAILY 14May1965 (17)

DOD BUYING C-5A TO REPLACE "TOO SMALL" C-141, McNAMARA TESTIFIES

The Defense Department is buying a transport too small to do an adequate job and another plane is being bought to cure this defect which was recognized four years ago. These facts concerning the Lockheed C-141 which the Air Force is not getting, and the C-5A which will soon be acquired, were brought out in Secretary McNamara's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Sen. A.S. Mike Monroney (D-Okla.) termed the C-141 a "very great plane" but sait it was limited by lack of cubic capacity, which could be corrected by lengthening the fuselage. McNamara agreed, but said the plane was too far along in development when he took over, to change its desing. However, he said he had cut back production because of this deficiency.

The exchange, which took place Feb. 26, has just been released in a bound volume of the hearing on the fiscal 1966 military budget.

Monroney told McNamara "I am very much afraid you are going to fill up your inventory, if something is not done by you, with this plane that can not, I repeat can not, carry its maximum gross weight New York to Frankfurt excepting for ammunition or extraordinary heavy cargo like that." He advocated inserting "a nine foot plug in front and a nine foot plug in the back that will give you the cubage you will need."

## AF "Reluctant" To Ask For Design Change

He added he thought the AF is reluctant to ask for this improvement "because they are afraid it will get in the way of your C-5A." The C-141 "is a great airlift plane but unless you get the cubage with it you are going to fill up the inventory (with) short coupled aircraft, and it seems to me it is worth the cost, I think the figures run something around $50 million, to adjust the whole line at this time."

McNamara told Monroney, "you are quite correct in your basic contention. This was obvious. When I first came in the department four years ago, one of the first things we did was to examine this to determine whether we could lengthen the fuselage. It would have been possible to do it but the plane was then at a stage in design such that it seems unwise to do it and, therefore, I am recommending eliminating the last (censored) squadrons of C-141s and replacing them with the C-5As."

The Senator asked, "why keep on making a plane which you know will be inadequate? It will be far better to have a uniform air cargo plane. In fact, that was the reason we appropriated and kept needling the AF to buy this plane so we could have a joint use plane, commercial and military. The cargo lines will not buy the C-141 because they know they can't get their gross weight and cubage organized as well as when this one will do it."

Monroney said the lengthening could be done smoothly now, but McNamara disagreed. McNamara said any modifications would be a delay in production for testing and even then "we are left with serious deficiencies in the loading capacity of the aircraft. I very much wanted to do it three to four years ago before we started, but after examining it in great detail, was finally convinced it was too late. It should have been done at the time the airplane was designed. The whole aircraft should have been designed differently with larger entrance ports and with a cubic content that would utilize its full weight carrying capability."

F-111 PROGRAM COST SET AT MORE THAN $7.6 BILLION AVIATION DAILY 14May65(17)

The cost of the F-111 program has been officially pegged at better than $7.6 billion in congressional testimony. Maj. Gen. Durward L. Crow, Air Force comptroller, told the House Appropriations Committee the AF will spend $4.5 billion for production and $963 million in research and development. The Navy will put $2.1 billion into procurement and $84.9 million in R&D.

This figure represents a cut of about $2.5 billion in the originally planned program. AF Secretary Zuckert said, "In the testimony I gave before, when we were talking about higher quantities of the aircraft, I think it was always referred to loosely as a $10 billion program." DOD has never announced a final production figure because this changes every year as the five-year planning base is revised. The F-111 is apparently proving more satisfactory than first expected and fewer are now required for adequate defense. The generally accepted number is 1500.

Crow indicated that the B-52 program is probably the all-time cost champion. He said the AF will have spent $10 billion on the big bomber before it is retired.

MARINE AIRCRAFT WING READY TO GO TO VIET NAM AVIATION DAILY 14May65(17)

The First Marine Aircraft Wing is reportedly ready to move from its Iwakuni, Japan, base to Viet Nam. CBs and Marines were landed last week at Chu Lai Beach, some 60 miles south of Da Nang, to make way for the transfer. A Short Airfield for Tactical Support (SATS) has been laid down to take the first planes, while the Navy construction battalion is putting in a permanent strip.

The purpose is to relieve heavily taxed facilities at Da Nang, as well as to put more combat strength in the area. The move, which will be carried out within a month, apparently means the Viet Nam land war will become essentially a Marine show. Army paratroopers introduced last month to protect Bien Hoa airfield are expected to return to their Okinawa home as soon as the Marine buildup reaches its peak.

AFSC COMMANDER BERNARD SCHRIEVER warned last week that the United States must not repeat the same mistake with Red China it made in underestimating the Soviet Union's military and space ability. Speaking at the National Aerospace Electronics Conference in Dayton, he pointed out that the date and complexity of the Chinese nuclear test outstripped predictions and that the nation should be prepared for the same jolt with the development of delivery systems.

14-F

II

Jean Paul Sartre, William James...

My History class was divided into two parts, the first one concentrated in the civilizations of all the countries in the world: Civilization of France, of the United States, of India, of Japan, of China, of Russia, the Islamic Civilization. The second part concerned the events from 1914 till the present time.

In Geography, we learnt the physical and economic aspects of all the countries. We chiefly studied the economic relations between different countries such as: the relations between the United States and Canada, the common market, the Commonwealth...

In Mathematics, I studied Algebra, plane and solid Geometry.

In Physics, we learnt Electricity and Optics. Chemistry was composed of studies about Organic Chemistry.

Our Vietnamese class concerned Vietnamese literature, History of Vietnam, and Civics.

We had twelve Philosophy hours per week.

Our highschool had an enrollment of 800 students, and is a coeducational school. After my courses, I had to prepare my homework at the study room with all my friends. My sparetime was spent in reading. Our schoolyear lasts nine months.

During the summer holidays I live with my step-parents and give French lessons. I am attending the Vietnamese-American Association courses and I am actually in the 16th form (this form is the finishing form at the Vietnamese-American Association, I am pursuing my German lessons at the German Cultural Center.

Now, I am a freshman at the University of Saigon. I am studying Letters and Law. I am taking English as my major subject, the allied subjects are: French, Vietnamese, History and Geography.

Though I go to University, I keep on working as an interpreter to earn some money for my extra-expenses, and I am pursuing my typing lessons at the French Chamber of Commerce.

I am greatly interested in the American education. I think that the American educational system will be more appropriate than the French system which I have studied for all my secondary schoolyears and acquired a great knowledge. I would like to pursue my studies in a cosmopolitan atmosphere with the students coming from all parts of the United States and the other foreign countries.

First, my specific purpose in applying for admission to your college is to achieve my competence in the broad areas of knowledge essential to living in a modern world and the development of my interests and aptitudes. As soon as my immediate educational goals have been acquired at your college, I plan to return to my home country which is now at war, in order to put in use the experiences and education I will have received.

HEADQUARTERS COMBINED ARMS GROUP
U. S. ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

August 20, 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center For International Studies
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

It was good to talk with you on Monday. I am certain that your trip will be very useful for us all and, I hope, fruitful from your personal viewpoint.

The interpreter-companions, all of the Embassy. Sam Thompson: Good French, knows Hue and the I Corps Area well. Shrewd, not very deep, anxious to please, pragmatic in the extreme. Dave Engel: Knew him fairly well at Princeton. Sensitive, highly intelligent and has best grasp of Vietnamese language of any American I know. Good for use with the Buddhists, and in the Center generally. John Negroponte: Has excellent French and good Vietnamese. Very much the Yale man - but also very Greek. Opportunistic, wants badly to get on. Good for the area around and including Saigon and the Delta. All are as discreet as any American is apt to be. I suggest that you use more than one and preferably, all - as the geography and the occasion indicates.

The Diplomatic Community. D'Orlandi: Italian Ambassador, a good friend who is committed, does not have a detached viewpoint. He has many useful contacts among the Vietnamese. Msgr DePalmas: Not as good as his predecessors by all accounts, but possessing obvious sources and an interesting viewpoint. Etherington-Smith: British Ambassador - A better man than generally rated, not always listened to - the more apt to have something to say to you. Seaton: The Canadian ICC man. Very clever, with good contacts in the North. Ted Serong: The Australian most knowledgeable in counterinsurgency, with an impressive background in Burma and Malaya. Thinks big, highly opinionated, but always worth an hour. If RKG Thompson has returned from the UK, he is top flight. For a number of reasons, some of them bureaucratic, some personal, he never has enjoyed the hearing from the U.S. he deserves.

The Vietnamese. Many people, including the Ambassador, will have suggestions - you must, of course, see the important figures of the

regime. A few interesting lesser lights: Vo Van Hai - prominent before
the "revolution" as a confidant of Diem, now rehabilitated apparently. I
found him to be one of three or four Vietnamese with the long view - and
a concept of personal honor. Nguyen (Charles) Tuoi - formerly publisher
of the Saigon Post, courageous, outspoken, well informed and well versed
in who's in - who's out. Bui Diem: Pretty much the same sort of fellow
as Tuoi. Trickier, less forthright, but even better informed. Major
Le Minh Dao: A friend and confidant of Le Van Kim and of Duong Van "Big"
Minh, he is, perhaps, the brightest of the young officers. Knows more
about the remnants of the first "Revolutionary" Government than anyone
else who would talk to you. You must talk to Tri Quang and Tam Chau - the
leading Buddhist politicians (in fact, the only politicians other than
cafe). We haven't heard the last of them.

**Americans:** Those you can trust? I simply don't know. They have bled out many of the best. The attrition imposed by the "system" has taken care of most of the rest. (Can you imagine our opponents posting people for one year or eighteen months or even two years?) In USIS - Ev Bumgardner is very much worth while. In USOM - Len Maynard and George Melvin have much experience, many interesting contacts. Lowe, Jack Ryan's replacement, is supposed to be a good man. Worth talking to anyway, because of his contacts with the police. In MacV - Generals Rosson and DePugh are the most talented; hopefully, they will give you a straight story.

Generally, the military are the most professional in their viewpoint -
also most likely to feel constrained. The CIA people are apt to be the
best informed, but unfortunately, are not always objective. The Embassy
people are, alas, seldom either professional in their attitudes or
particularly well informed. The USOM field people used to be pure gold,
but the best and most experienced have gone the way of all flesh. The
newer ones may have the potential but no longer enjoy much freedom of
movement.

I appreciate very much your taking on this chore and am only sorry
that I can't offer more help to you. Good luck. I hope to see you
again, either before you go or after you return.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1965

Dear Professor Kissinger:

We heard from Ambassador Lodge immediately. He said that an October visit from you would be fine, and that he agreed with Mr. Bundy's various observations. So I would suggest that you go right on ahead and plan a visit for mid-October, perhaps dropping a personal note to the Ambassador at some point.

I look forward to hearing from you about a visit some time next week, and will set up appointments accordingly as we discussed. We sent out a parcel of material for you on Saturday which should give you some interesting reading up there.

I cannot tell you how pleased I am to be in touch with you, following that excellent evening at Bill Andres', and to be able to be of some small service. I have some more ideas concerning the focus of your work on this project and some special material which I will hold here until you return to Washington.

With warm regards,

Professor Henry Kissinger,
Center for International Studies,
Harvard University,
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

September 24, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Major General Edward Lansdale
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Ed:

As my departure for Vietnam is approaching, I wanted to write to discuss my plans and to ask for your assistance.

One of the key issues which I propose to study is the ability to create a viable political structure in South Vietnam. This, I take it, is part of your assignment. You could be of tremendous help by assisting me to meet as many different Vietnamese groups as possible both in Saigon and in the provinces. I would like these talks on as informal a basis as possible and in an atmosphere which generates confidence. I do not mind working fifteen hours a day for the three weeks that I plan to be in Vietnam (including the week-ends).

My present plan is to arrive on October 15th and to leave on November 4th. I am planning to spend about six days in Saigon and get into the country for about a week and then return to Saigon for another five or six days.

I remember our conversations with the greatest pleasure and I am looking forward to seeing you.

With warm regards.

Henry A. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

when I return.

I look forward to seeing you

enjoyed our human contact very much.
assistance has been invaluable and I
everything you have done for me. Your
to tell you how very much I appreciated
Before leaving, I would like

Dear Jonathan:

Washington, D. C.
Department of State
Room 6208
Mr. Jonathan Moore

October 4, 1962

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

OCT 11 1965

6 October 1965

Dear Henry:

You were very kind to write in your letter
of October 4 regarding your visit to the Agency.
I shall pass along your comments to Peer de Silva
and William Colby.

Please let me assure you of our continuing
interest in assisting you and the Ambassador in
any way in which we can. Kindly let us know and
we will be most responsive.

I want to congratulate you, if I may, on the
work you are going to do for our country.

Warmest best wishes for your continued
success.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

October 4, 1965

Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. USN Ret
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral Raborn:

This is just a note to tell you how very much I enjoyed our conversation as well as the longer meeting to which you were good enough to ask me.

As you know, I am leaving for Vietnam in a few days and I want to tell you how very grateful I am for the help your associates have given me. Peer deSilva and William Colby were especially cooperative.

May I say how very much impressed I am by what your agency is doing in this part of the world.

When I return, I hope to have the pleasure of renewing our acquaintance.

With warm regards and every good wish.

Henry V. Kissinger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards and every good wish.
of renewing our acquaintance.
When I return, I hope to have the pleasure
world.

what your agency is doing in this part of the
world.
May I say how very much impressed I am by
especially cooperative.
Given me. Beer, tea, and William Colby were
grateful I am for the help your associates have
a few days and I want to tell you how very
As you know, I am leaving for Vietnam in
July.

to ask me.
longer meeting to which you were good enough
much I enjoyed our conversation as well as the
This is just a note to tell you how very
I am sure you know, I am leaving for Vietnam in
July.

My dear Admiral Eaporn:

Washington, D. C.
Central Intelligence Agency
Director
Vice Admiral William R. Eaporn, Jr., USN Ret

October 4, 1962

October 29, 1965

Dear Henry,

I've learned from your office here in Washington that you expect to return from abroad directly to Boston about the 9th of November, hence this letter. Needless to say, we are eager to talk with you as soon as you can find the time on returning to Washington, and Admiral Raborn specifically asked if I would mention this to you, and ask if you would find time, soon after your return to Washington, to come out to Langley and spend an hour or so with him.

You can write me at my home address given below, or
else telephone me at my office, 351-4055. I know you must
have found your Vietnam visit both stimulating and challenging;
we're looking forward to hearing your views concerning the
problem. By the way, Ray Cline will be getting in touch with
you concerning another and possibly more formal meeting
at which you might wish to express your views, a meeting
along the lines of the last rather large one you attended here
just before you left. In any event, he'll discuss this with
you separately.

Best regards.

9609 Atwood Road
Beau Ridge
Vienna, Virginia

September 30, 1965

Mr. Peer deSilva
6909 Atwood Road
Vienna, Virginia

Dear Peer:

In my rush to make sure not to lose Bill Bundy,
I neglected to tell you how much I appreciated everything
you did to give me a quick picture of the situation as
you saw it. There were many briefings which I thought
could profitably have been shortened; however, my con-
versations with you always seem much too brief.

I would be very grateful if you wrote your station
chiefs in Hong Kong and Saigon that I am coming. They will
be told through State Department channels anyway but I am
sure a word from you would help. Also, if you could ask
your station chief in Saigon to help me get in touch, on
an informal basis, with some non-official groups in Vietnam
I would be most grateful. In addition, I would very much
like to get his judgment about what we actually know about
the identity of VC on the provincial and district level.
Bill Bundy was especially interested that I explore this.

You see I started out to thank you and I wound up
asking for more help. I look forward to seeing you when
I return.