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Kissinger Interview with Yediot Aroneth

What's your opinion of the Israeli-PLO Accord? Would you recognize the PLO? Do you think we'll have a Palestinian state in 5 years? Is it good, is it bad?

Yitzak Rabin has been a life-long friend of mine. And I have genuinely great confidence in him. His analysis of the situation has always been very close to mine. So I'm predisposed in his favor. It was a daring step.

There are many aspects of the agreement that make me uneasy. But then there were many aspects of the status quo that also made me uneasy. It's a legal thing.??? It's a !??¿ I don't know whether more limited !???¿ were possible., It's too late now to debate this.

I believe that a Palestinian state is now inevitable. I believe one has to understand that. I've written that and said it publicly. The question is, is this a mechanism of coexistence which the Palestinians can nature?

The word " peace" doesn't interest me so much, to tell you the truth. The Israelis give it a Talmudic importance but I've said a thousand times wars start between countries that are at peace; it's only in the Arab-Israeli conflict that they start between countries that are already at war. Lebanon was at peace with all its neighbors and it didn't prevent its terrible fate.

The question is, can coexistence work. It's a gamble--- but

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the previous position of occupation could not be sustained in Israel. And one has to look at the background -- Israel's continuing to act as an occupying power would have compounded its isolation. And the fact that Rabin could go to China and Indonesia and Morocco and that the diplomacy of Israel now has much scope---I think that is a major achievement. And on balance, with many hesitations and many questions I understand why the agreement was signed. In fact next week I'm giving an award to Rabin and Arafat in Paris....

Q: Do you think that in 5 years there will be a Palestinian state?

A: I don't know whether in what period, but at the end of this process there will be a Palestinian state. Because what will inevitably happen is once the Palestinian authority is established, other nations will deal with it as if it were a state. It will go into the United Nations in a capacity close to being a state. And Israel will not be able to stop it.

Q: You have spent more time with Hafez Assad than any other Western statesman. Do you think that he really wants peace?

A: With all due respect, it's an almost meaningless question. The agreement on the Golan Heights has been kept for 20 years without peace, without formal peace, because neither side thought a war was desirable and the Arabs and the Syrians saw that the balance of forces was unfavorable to them. As long as that situation exists there will be no war. Now will it be better after the Golan Heights are returned? Marginally. But if Israel should ever become so weak as

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Lebanon vis-a-vis Syria, which I don't think will happen, I do not expect that the word "peace" would restrain Syria.

Q: What should Israel be prepared to give back?

A: The one thing that Israel cannot do is go back to the '67 borders on the West Bank. On the Golan Heights it depends what they get for it. And it's hard to answer in the abstract. I myself have always preferred stages to one local ??? settlement. It really depends on what the Syrians are willing to pay for it.

Q: They may agree to have full relations with Israel.

A: Yes. And then what have you got? But if they have full relations, if the borders are open, if there's an international force on the Golan Heights I think ... ❌

Q: What's your opinion of Assad as a leader, as a person?

A: Well, I have always had a high regard for Assad within his framework. He's highly intelligent, highly analytical, oriented towards reality so when people say he's become convinced of the desirability of peace...

Q: Yes. Which comes with age, of course.

A: Well, but I'm not so sure that's true. He now he has no arms supplier, he has no country that he can rely on in a war and he would like to become more respectable so he's ❌ I'm not so sure he's convinced of peace but he may be willing to make an agreement. It's not like Sadat, who, I believe, had a almost philosophical conversion. I don't think that is true of Assad. On the other hand he's kept the 1970 border agreement.

Q: When you make an agreement with Assad he keeps it to the

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letter.

A: That's true up to now. not true. Including things he promised that were not written down. There has been no terrorism on the Golan Heights.

Q: May I ask what's your strongest memory from '74, from those dramatic days with Egypt?

I remember the day that you came back from the Mosque the release of the Israeli prisoners, a very moving day.

A: One moving day was when I was sitting with Sadat in Aswan and we were talking and suddenly somebody brought him a message. And he tears were in his eyes and he got up and walked over to me and embraced me, which he had never done before. He said, "I will never wear a uniform again."... T hey had just signed the agreement at Kilometer 101.

I didn't have any such moving experiences with Assad but, even there, getting the list of prisoners was a very moving thing. I felt the negotiations had failed. And I had a final meeting with Assad. And when he said, "Shall we make one more effort?" I knew we were going to get an agreement.

Q: What's your opinion of the present Israeli leadership?

A: Well, as I said, I have a very high opinion of Rabin. And I've known Peres for a long time. And I know all the Israeli leaders. Lack of intelligence is not an Israeli problem.

Q: Did you believe that the Soviet Union would disappear as it did?

A: No. No. I thought the satellite orbit would disappear

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but I thought it would take eight years. I didn't think it would disintegrate as quickly as it did. I thought that at every stage there was a danger of Russian intervention.

A: With the Soviet Union, I felt that Communism might weaken but I didn't think the state would disappear.

Q: How has it affected the situation in the Middle East?

A: In the Middle East, the Soviet Union was the arms supplier to the belligerent states. Soviet diplomacy backed up more or less the radical program, not totally, but in effect Syria and the other states knew they would get back in diplomatically from the Soviet Union. Those props are now gone. And so the radical Arab states have to seek some accommodation with us and at least an attempted accommodation with Israel. I find it very hard to believe that another Arab Israeli war can happen in the next 20 years, maybe longer.

Q: What about Islamic fundamentalism?

A: At the same time, fundamentalism is growing. And if that became dominant, a totally new situation of crisis would arrive. If it succeeds in Algeria and then spread to Tunisia and Morocco and Egypt....

Q: After the Second World War, was the so-called balance of terror developed eventually between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Do you think this balance of terror can be formed also between smaller states? For example, are you pessimistic or optimistic about North Korea, Iran, Pakistan?

A: The balance of terror among smaller states is more difficult.

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A: The Soviet Union and the United States did not want to destroy their societies, but when you deal with smaller states and fanatical states, their willingness to suffer may be much greater.

A: On North Korea, I think the United States has to understand that there's no compromise possible between a nuclear and a non-nuclear North Korea.

Q: On the failure of intelligence services from Pearl Harbor to the Yom Kippur War: is there something that can be done to a greater proficiency of the services?

A: What usually happens is that the intelligence services have the information but they either don't know how to interpret it or the political leadership doesn't want to believe it. At Pearl Harbor we knew something was happening that weekend. But we thought it would happen in Southeast Asia. We didn't believe it was possible that they would attack Pearl Harbor. One of the more puzzling things: The Philippines, because of the difference in time, wasn't attacked for 36 hours after Pearl Harbor. And they still caught every American airplane on the ground. And I've never seen a satisfactory explanation of why that was.

Now in the 1973 war which is something that I was closely associated, we knew, by chance, when I became Secretary of State I came in one Sunday just to see what our intelligence reporting was in the State Department. I saw that there were 2,000 Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights, or anyway a huge number. I then asked for an intelligence report every other

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day. We knew what was going on. Your government knew what was going on. Your government did not believe that the Arabs could attack. Our government got most of its information from your government. Secondly, your government was concerned if it told us there was a danger of war that we might start a peace initiative. So, they had an additional reason to play it down. But above all they didn't believe an attack was possible. And I have written this. On the day that the war started I was in New York and I asked our Intelligence and other experts to assemble in Washington and analyze it. And they thought Israel had attacked. Because they couldn't conceive.... And I said, "Let me tell you something. The one thing that is absolutely impossible is that Israel attacks on young people without some strong provocation and without mobilization, that is impossible." And after a couple of hours it was clear. But our first reaction of our people was it was Israel who had attacked.

So it's not just upgrading the intelligence, it's to get the analyst to interpret it properly, and then to get the political leadership to believe it. I found that during the Vietnam War the intelligence analysts always followed and did not guide the ??? of the department making it. With respect to Cambodia, those people who were against doing something in Cambodia denied that the Cambodians' actions were very important. Those who were in favor of it had an opposite opinion.

Q: Let me ask a personal question. How is your health?

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A: Excellent.

Q: You look excellent. You haven't changed in 20 years.

A: Maybe I went to a holy place in Israel that you all don't know about and got eternal youth out of it.

Q: I would like to know the address.

A: You would like to go there too? So maybe I don't even know where it was.

Q: Have you ever thought what would have happened if your family had immigrated to Israel in the '30s or '40s when you came to the States? What would have become--

A: Would I have entered politics? I don't know. Probably I'd have become a professor.

Q: A professor at the university? I thought so.

A: I never had any particular interest in becoming a political figure.

But I don't know. Life depends on so many accidents.

You know, you read books which say I plotted to become a national security adviser all my life. I plotted to become a national security adviser to Nixon by always supporting his opponent. You see, I hadn't even met Nixon when he appointed me.

Q: Do you have any connections now with Israeli leadership, with Rabin or Peres?

A: Oh yes. I see most of them when they come to the States.

Q: You haven't been in Israel for a long time.

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A: No. But I will be in the next year.

Q: Yes, yes, yes. I was going to ask you, what is your emotional attitude towards Israel?

A: Here's one I shouldn't talk about.

Q: I thought if maybe this is for our newspaper and not for The Los Angeles Times.

A: Yeah, can you do that?

Q: Of course I can.

A: Well, 13 members of my family were killed in concentration camps. Many people live in Israel whose fate I understand very well. Because I can't be indifferent to the fate of Israel, it's not just a foreign country to me. And I've never denied that.

Q: Is there anything you'd like to say to an Israeli newspaper ?

A: This is a troubling period for Israel and probably for Jews. The agreement has now been now made. There's no possibility of reverse.

I believe Israel must make sure not to go back to the '67 borders on the West Bank.

But it also must explore the possibilities of coexistence. When I read every day all the talks that are going on, I'm very happy with those, because they're all very practical. And they should enable the Palestinians and Israelis to get to know each other and see where they depend on each other. What was good about Egypt was that you could put 200 miles of sand

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between Egyptians and Israelis.. You can't do that on the West Bank. So the question is can you work on some practical coexistence. And it's going to be difficult. Very difficult and very painful.

end it

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## Kissinger Interview

What's your opinion on the Israeli-PLO Accord? And Would you recognize the PLO? hthem? Do you think we'll have a Palestinian state in 5 years? Is it good, is it bad? Yitzak Rabin has been a life-long friend of mine. And I have genuinely great confidence in him. His analogy of the situation has always been very close to mine. So I'm predisposed in his favor.

There are many aspects of the agreement that made me uneasy. But then there were many aspects of this latest quote that also made me uneasy. It's a legal thing. It's a ?-I don't know whether more limitedly -I?, it's, it's too late now to make, to debate this. I believe that a Palestinian state is now inevitable. I believe one has to understand that. I've written that and said it publicly. The question is, is this a mechanism of its coexistence with the Palestinian's merger. World peace doesn't interest me so much, that is the truth. The Israelis have given it ?-I- importance but I've said a thousand times start between countries without -, it's only in the Arab Israeli country that they start between countries that are not already at war. Lebanon was at peace with all its neighbors and it didn't prevent their terrible fate. Uh, so, ?-I- coexistence. It's a gamble but the previous position of occupation could not be sustained in Israel. And one has to look at the background of Israel as an occupying

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power in the present world, one has compounded the isolation
of Israel. And the fact that Rabin could go to China and
Indonesia and Morocco and that the diplomacy of Israel now has
much ???I think that is a major achievement. And uh, and so
on ??? with many hesitations and many questions I understand
why the agreement was signed. In fact next week I'm giving an
award that is--

Q: I'm curious as to...I'm really curious ??? And if you think that in 5 years there will be a Palestinian state.

A: I don't know whether in what period but at the end of this process--

Q: At the end of the process.

A: --it will be a Palestinian state because what will
inevitably happen is once the Palestinian authority is
established, other nations will deal with it as if it were a
state. You will go into the United Nations in a capacity close
to being a state. And Israel will not be able to stop it.

Q: Another question, I mean you have more Hafez Assad hours
than any, any other western statesman. Or do you think that
he, he really wants peace?

A: No, I, with all due respect, with all due respect, it's
an almost meaningless question.

Q: Yes.

A: The agreement on the Golan Heights has been kept for 20
years. Without peace, without formal peace, because neither
side thought of what was decided, the Arabs and the Syrians
saw that the balance of course (force??) was unfavorable to

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them. As long as that situation exists there will be no war.
Now will it be better after the Golan Heights are returned?
Marginally. If Israel should ever become so weak as Lebanon it
will be serious, which I don't think will happen. I do not
expect that the world peace will restrain Syria.

Q: Yes. And should Israel be prepared to give back all of the governments?

A: The one thing that Israel cannot do is go back to the 67
borders in the west bank. On the Golan Heights it depends what
they get for it. And it's hard to answer. I myself have always
preferred stages to one local settlement.

Q: Yes, yes.

A: I don't know what the Syrias are.

Q: Yes. Because they may agree to have full relations with
Israel.

A: Yes. And then what have you got? But if they have full
relations and the borders are open, if there's an
international border I think I think I think I think

Q: What's your opinion of Assad? I don't think I know
person?

A: Well, I have always had a high regard for Assad within
his interests, highly intelligent, highly analytical, uh, oriented
towards reality so when people say he's become convinced of
the desirability of peace...

KISSINGER 07-07-94

and he would like to become more ???? so he's ???? but he's willing to make an agreement. It's not like Sadat, who, I believe, almost philosophical conversion. I don't think that is true about Assad. On the other hand he's kept the 1970 border dream. But to keep--

Q: Yes. That's what ???? always says. When you make an agreement with ???? to the letter.

A: ???? not true. Including things he promised that were not written down. There has been more terrorism on the Golan Heights.

Q: May I ask what's your strongest memory from '74, from those dramatic days?

A: With Syria?

Q: With Syria, with Egypt, I mean. I remember the day that you came back from the Mosque the least of the Israeli prisoners. Which was a very moving day.

A: Well...one moving day was when I was sitting with Sadat in ???? and we were talking and he suddenly...somebody brought him a message. And he started--tears were in his eyes and he got up and walked over to me and embraced me. ???? and he said I will never a uniform again. ???? he had just signed an agreement ???? in 101. I didn't have any such moving experiences with Assad but, ???? we were nearly at the end of, ???? the prisoners was a very moving thing. And we were--I felt the, our negotiations had failed. And I had a final meeting with Assad. And when he said shall we make one more effort? I knew we were going to get an agreement ???? ; ???? for me I have so

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many encounters with the Israelis I can understand their grievance and I don't want to single any one of them out.

A: Well, as I said I have a very high opinion of the Israeli leadership. And I've known Peres for a long time. Also the Israeli contribution so far, they're friends of a long time. And I know all the Israeli leaders, I know they have the intelligence is not an Israeli problem.

Q: What did I mean, did you believe that the Soviet Union would disappear as it did?

A: No. No. I thought the satellite orbit would disappear but I thought it would take 8 years. That's very tricky. I didn't think it would be. That's every stage there was a danger

Q: Yes, yes, the Israeli

A: With the Soviet Union I felt that Communism might weaken but I didn't think the state would disappear.

Q: Yes. How did it affect...has it affected the situation in the Middle East?

A: Well, in the Middle East, the Soviet Union was the arms supplier to the Israeli Soviet diplomacy backed up more or less the Israeli program, not totally but in effect Syria and the other states knew they would get back in diplomatically. Now those traps are now gone. And so the Israeli Arab states have to seek some accommodation with us and at least attempted accommodation with Israel. I find it very hard to believe that another Israeli war can happen in the next 20, maybe

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longer years.

Q: Yes. On the other hand the fundamentalism is...

A: That's a different ???? You asked me about the Soviet Union. At the same time, fundamentalism is growing. And that became ???? a totally new situation of crisis would arrive. You could see it in Algeria and then spread to Tunisia and Morocco as Egypt.

Q: And the other question, ???? once stability is a factor in the system great enough ???? second world war, was the so-called balance of terror developed eventually between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, do you think this balance of terror can be formed and then tamed, also between similar, smaller states for example, are you pessimistic or optimistic about North Korea, Iran, ???? Most of the other countries.

A: Well, the balance of terror among smaller states is more difficult.

Q: Yes.

A: It is clear... Soviet Union and the United States did not want to destroy their society but when you deal with smaller states and ???? states their willingness to suffer may be much greater. And uh, I would not think it is that much taken for granted. Am I optimistic about North Korea?

A: on North Korea I think the United States has to understand that there's no compromise possible between a nuclear and a non-nuclear North Korea.

Q: The favor of intelligence services from ???? to the ????,
is there something that can be done to a greater proficiency

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of the services?

A: Well, I don't know, what...you'd have to look at the situation. What usually happens is that the intelligence services have the information but they either don't know how to interpret it or the political leaders don't want to believe it. At Pearl Harbor we knew something was happening that weekend. But we thought it would happen in Southeast Asia. We didn't believe it was possible...that they would attack Pearl Harbor and that one of the more puzzling things: The Philippines, because of the difference in time wasn't attacked for 36 hours after Pearl Harbor. And they still caught every American airplane on the ground. And I've never seen a satisfactory explanation, why that was ????. Now in the 1973 war which is something that I was closely associated, we knew, by chance, when I became Secretary of State I came in one Sunday just to see what our intelligence reporting was in the State Department I saw that there were 2,000 Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights, ????. I then asked for an intelligence report every other day. We knew that, what was going on. We knew government knew what was going on. Your government did not believe that the Arabs could attack. Our government got most of its information from your government. Secondly, your government was concerned if it told us there was a danger of war that we might start a peace initiative. So, they had an additional reason to play it down. But ????. And I have written this. On the day that the war started I was in New York and I asked our Intelligence and other experts to assemble in

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Washington and analyze it. And they thought Israel had attacked. Because they couldn't conceive. And I said Let me tell you something. The one thing that is absolutely impossible is that Israel attacks on young people without some strong provocation and without mobilization, that is impossible. And after a couple of hours it was clear. But our first reaction of our people was it was Israel who had attacked. So the question is it's not just upgrading the intelligence, it's to get, A, to get the analyst to interpret it properly and then to get the political leadership to believe it. I found it ????& the intelligence analysts always followed and did not guide. The threatened of the department ????& so with respect to Cambodia, those people who were against doing something in Cambodia denied that the Cambodian's actions were very important. Those who were in favor of it had an opposite opinion.

Q: Yes, yes. Let me ask a personal question, how is your life now? I mean how is your health?

A: Excellent.

Q: Excellent. You look excellent. You haven't changed in 20 years.

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know where it was.

Q: Yes, yes.

A: But I don't know. Life depends on so many accidents.

Q: Accidents?

A: I never had any ambition to become a political figure here. You know, you'd get-read books which say I plotted to become national security adviser all my life. I plotted to become national security adviser to Nixon by always supporting his opponent. You see, I hadn't even met Nixon when he appointed me.

Q: Yes, yes. Do you have any connections now with Israeli leadership? !????

A: Oh yes.. I see most of them when they come to the States.

Q: In the next year?

A: Yes.

Q: !????

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A: No, I don't have any ????

Q: This is always hard, ???? never had to feel like you ?????

A: Well, ??? Golda was a remarkable figure.

Q: Golda was a remarkable figure, yes, she was.

A: I think Rabin will be seen as a remarkable figure.

Q: Yes.

A: By history.

A: Yeah, can you do that?

Q: Of course I can.

Q: I remember your meeting with the newspaper editors in
'74. I wasn't a newspaper editor then.

A: What were you?

Q: I was the news editor. And, but I remember when the
editors came back from the meeting, how moved they were by
what you said, by what you said at that time. It was very,
very moving.

A: I ?????

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Q: Yes, yes.

A: I also was Secretary of State of America so I have
certain obligations.

Q: Of course, yes, yes. I talked to Rabinm on the subject of Russia a couple of months ago and he told me in the plane he talked about your conversations in '74 which he can repeat now as if it were a couple of months ago. He was...he remembered every word and--

A: Favorably or unfavorably?

Q: Favorably. Always favorably.

A: He's a dear friend.

Q: Of course favorably. He said, I mean it was a personal conversation between us on the plane and he said that never had he such good and moving relations with any Secretary of State.

A: We're good friends.

Q: Yes, yes. Is there anything you'd like to say to an Israeli newspaper that there hasn't been?

A: Well, you know, this is a traveling interview for Israel and probably for me. I think the agreement is now being made. There's no possibility of reverse. I believe Israel must make sure not to go back to the 67 borders on the west bank.

Q: Oh the west bank.

A: but it also must explore the possibility to coexist. And when I read every day all the talks that are going on, I'm very happy with those. Because they're all very practical. And they should enable the Palestinians and Israelis to get to

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know each other and see where they depend on each other. Of
course it'd be better...what was good, what was good about
Egypt, but you could put 200 miles of sand between Egypt and
Israel. You can't do that on the west bank. So the question is
can you work on some practical coexistence. And it's going to
be difficult. Very difficult and very painful.

Q: Yes, yes. But ???? diminished in the last month or 2.

A: Yes?

Q: Yes, definitely.

A: No, no. I think it might.

Q: It has diminished and suddenly there's... I mean until
about 2 or 3 months ago we had never ???? a person killed in
the streets. It doesn't happen now any more. But ???? Because
I--

A: Are we through with the interview?

Q: I...

A: No, no. I mean you can go on if you--if it's a personal
conversation from now on we'll just shut off the machine--

end

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Kissinger Interview with Yedediah Aroneth

There are many aspects of the agreement that make me uneasy. But then there were many aspects of the status quo that also made me uneasy. It's a legal thing. It's a good thing. I don't know whether more limited versions were possible. It's too late now to debate this.

I believe that a Palestinian state is now inevitable. I believe one has to understand that. I've written that and said it publicly. The question is, is this a mechanism of coexistence which the Palestinians can muture?

The word a peace doesn't interest me so much, to tell you the truth. The Israelis give it a Talmudic importance but I've said a thousand times wars start between countries that are at peace; it's only in the Arab-Israeli conflict that they start between countries that are already at war. Lebanon was at peace with all its neighbors and it didn't prevent its terrible fate.

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PAGE 2

the previous position of occupation could not be sustained in
principally
Israel. And one has to look at the background ... Israel's
continuing to act as an occupying power would have compounded
its isolation. And the fact that Rabin could go to China and
Indonesia and Morocco and that the diplomacy of Israel now has
much scope---I think that is a major achievement. And on
balance, with many hesitations and many questions I understand
why the agreement was signed. In fact, next week I'm giving
award to Rabin and Arafat in Paris...

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Lebanon vis-a-vis Syria, which I don't think will happen, I do not expect that the word 'peace' would restrain Syria.

A: The one thing that Israel cannot do is go back to the '67 borders on the West Bank. On the Golan Heights it depends what they get for it. And it's hard to answer in the abstract. I myself have always preferred stages to one local settlement. It really depends on what the Syrians are willing to pay for it.

A: Yes. And then what have you got? But if they have full relations, if the borders are open, if there's an international force on the Golan Heights I think there should be a new settlement.

A: Well, but I'm not so sure that's true. He now he has no arms supplier, he has no country that he can rely on in a war and he would like to become more respectable so he's not so sure he's convinced of peace but he may be willing to make an agreement. It's not like Sadat, who, I believe, had a almost philosophical conversion. I don't think that is true of Assad. On the other hand he's kept the old border agreement, which is not very healthy for the region.

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letter.

A: That's true up to now, not true. Including things he promised that were not written down. There has been no terrorism on the Golan Heights.

I remember the day that you came back from the mines the release of the Israeli prisoners, a very moving day.

A: One moving day was when I was sitting with Sadat in Aswan and we were talking and suddenly somebody brought him a message. And tears were in his eyes and he got up and walked over to me and embraced me, which he had never done before. He said, "I will never wear a uniform again."... They had just signed the agreement at Kilometer 101.

A: No. I thought the satellite orbit would disappear

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A: With the Soviet Union, I felt that Communism might weaken but I didn't think the ~~empires~~ would disappear.

A: In the Middle East, the Soviet Union was the arms supplier to the belligerent states. Soviet diplomacy backed up more or less the radical program, not totally, but in effect Syria and the other states knew they would get ~~war~~ in diplomacy from the Soviet Union. Those props are now gone. And so the radical Arab states have to seek some accommodation with us and at least an attempted accommodation with Israel. I find it very hard to believe that another Arab Israeli war can happen in the next 20 years, maybe longer.

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Now in the 1973 war which is something that I was closely associated, we knew my chance, when I became Secretary of State I came in one Sunday just to see what our intelligence reporting was in the State Department. I saw that there were 2,000 Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights, or anyway a huge number. I then asked for an intelligence report every other

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day. We knew what was going on. Your government knew what was going on. Your government did not believe that the Arabs could attack. Our government got most of its information from your government. Secondly, your government was concerned if it told us there was a danger of war that we might start a peace initiative. So, they had an additional reason to play it down. But above all they didn't believe an attack was possible: And I have written this. On the day that the war started I was in New York and I asked our Intelligence and other experts to assemble in Washington and analyze it. And they thought Israel had attacked. Because they couldn't conceive... An initiative Let me tell you something. The one thing that is absolutely impossible is that Israel attacks on young people without some strong provocation and without mobilization, that is impossible." And after a couple of hours it was clear. But our first reaction of our people was it was Israel who had attacked.

So it's not just upgrading the intelligence, it's to get the analyst to interpret it properly, and then to get the political leadership to believe it. I found that during the Vietnam War the intelligence analysts always followed and did not guide the analysis of the department making it. With respect to Cambodia, those people who were against doing something in Cambodia denied that the Cambodians' actions were very important. Those who were in favor of it had an opposite opinion. And we did not really know until we went in and saw what was going on.

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A: Excellent.

You know, you read books which say I plotted to become national security adviser all my life. I plotted to become national security adviser to Nixon by always supporting his opponent. You see, I hadn't even met Nixon when he appointed me.

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A: Yeah, can you do that?

Q: Of course I can.

A: This is a troubling period for Israel and probably for
Jews. The agreement has now been made. There's no
possibility of reverse.

TOTAL P.01

["was good stock. Style was that you could put 200 miles at a\nbrake to well. I could figure out how to do it. I had to do it\nvery slowly, which was very difficult. And I had to do it in\nmy car, which had a transmission and I had to get a\nbrake to stop. That was a little hard on my credit. But I did\nwell. I did it. I did it. I did it. I did it. I did it. I did it.\nI did it. I did it. I did it. I did it. I did it

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between Egyptians and Israelis. You can't do that on the West
Bank. So the question is can you work on some practical
coexistence. And it's going to be difficult. Very difficult
and very painful.

end it

TOTAL P.09

and so on

and very briefly,

coincidence. And if it's a long to be discussed, very general

bank. So the question is can you work on some broadcast

between English and Israeli. You can't do that on the West

KISS\JIM 04-08-92

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HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, July 17, 1994

(ATTENTION EDITORS: The following article is strictly embargoed
for publication until Sunday, July 17, and is available only to
newspapers that subscribe to Henry Kissinger's column.)

(c) 1994, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

(This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Moshe
Vardi, editor in chief of Yediot Ahronot, a leading Israeli
newspaper published in Tel Aviv, Israel.)

MOSHE VARDI: What's your opinion of the Israeli-PLO Accord?
Would you recognize the PLO? Do you think we'll have a Palestinian
state in five years? Is it good, is it bad?

HENRY KISSINGER: Yitzak Rabin has been a life-long friend of mine. And I have genuinely great confidence in him. His analysis of the situation has always been very close to mine. So I'm predisposed in his favor. It was a daring step.

There are many aspects of the agreement that make me uneasy. But
then there were many aspects of the status quo that also made me
uneasy. I don't know whether more limited steps were possible. It's
too late now to debate this.

A Palestinian state is now inevitable; one has to understand
that. I've written that and said it publicly. The question is: Is
this a mechanism of coexistence which the Palestinians can nurture?

The Israelis give the word "peace" a Talmudic importance, but I've
said a thousand times wars start between countries that are at
peace; it's only in the Arab-Israeli conflict that they start
between countries that are already at war. Lebanon was at peace
with all its neighbors and it didn't prevent its terrible fate.

The question is, Can coexistence work? It's a gamble -- but the
previous position of occupation could not be sustained
indefinitely, neither in Israel nor internationally. And one has to
look at the background -- Israel's continuing to act as an
occupying power would have compounded its isolation. And the fact
that Rabin could go to China and Indonesia and Morocco and that the
diplomacy of Israel now has much scope -- I think that is a major
achievement. And on balance, with many hesitations and many
questions I understand why the agreement was signed.

MV: Do you think that in five years there will be a Palestinian
state?

HK: I don't know whether in what period, but at the end of this
process there will be a Palestinian state. Because what will
inevitably happen is once the Palestinian authority is established,
other nations will deal with it as if it were a state. It will go
into the United Nations in a capacity close to being a state. And
Israel will not be able to stop it.

MV: You have spent more time with Hafez Assad than any other
Western statesman. Do you think that he really wants peace?

HK: With all due respect, it's an almost meaningless question.
The agreement on the Golan Heights has been kept for 20 years
without formal peace, because neither side thought a war was
desirable and the Syrians saw that the balance of forces was
unfavorable to them. As long as that situation exists there will be

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PAGE 2

no war. Now will it be better after the Golan Heights are returned? Marginally. But if Israel should ever become so weak as Lebanon vis-a-vis Syria, which I don't think will happen, I do not expect that the word "peace" would restrain Syria.

MV: What should Israel be prepared to give back?

HK: The one thing that Israel cannot do is go back to the '67 borders on the West Bank. On the Golan Heights it depends what they get for it. And it's hard to answer in the abstract. I myself have always preferred stages to one overall settlement. It really depends on what the Syrians are willing to pay for it.

MV: They may agree to have full relations with Israel.

HK: Yes. And then what have you got? But if they have full relations, if the borders are open, if there's an international force on the Golan Heights, it would be a new situation.

MV: What's your opinion of Assad as a leader, as a person?

HK: Well, I have always had a high regard for Assad within his framework. He's highly intelligent, highly analytical, oriented toward reality so when people say he's become convinced of the desirability of peace. ...

MV: Yes. Which comes with age, of course.

HK: Well, but I'm not so sure that's true. He now has no arms supplier, he has no country that he can rely on in a war and he would like to become more respectable. I'm not so sure he's convinced of peace but he may be willing to make an agreement. It's not like Sadat, who, I believe, had an almost philosophical conversion. I don't think that is true of Assad. On the other hand, he's kept the 1974 Golan agreement very strictly.

MV: When you make an agreement with Assad he keeps it to the letter.

HK: That's true up to now. Including things he promised that were not written down. There has been no terrorism on the Golan Heights.

MV: May I ask what's your strongest memory from '74, from those dramatic days with Egypt? I remember the day that you came back from Damascus, the release of the Israeli prisoners, a very moving day.

HK: One moving day was when I was sitting with Sadat in Aswan and we were talking and suddenly somebody brought him a message. And tears were in his eyes and he got up and walked over to me and embraced me, which he had never done before. He said, "I will never wear a uniform again." ... They had just signed the agreement at Kilometer 101.

I didn't have any such experiences with Assad but, even there, getting the list of prisoners was a very moving thing. I felt the negotiations had failed. And I had a final meeting with Assad. And when he said, "Shall we make one more effort?" I knew we were going to get an agreement.

MV: What's your opinion of the present Israeli leadership?

HK: Well, as I said, I have a very high opinion of Rabin. And I've known Peres for a long time. And I know all the Israeli leaders. Lack of intelligence is not an Israeli problem.

MV: Did you believe that the Soviet Union would disappear as it did?

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HK: No. I thought the satellite orbit would disappear but I thought it would take eight years. I didn't think it would disintegrate as quickly as it did. I thought that at every stage there was a danger of Russian intervention. I felt that Communism might weaken but I didn't think the empire would disappear.

MV: How has it affected the situation in the Middle East?

HK: In the Middle East, the Soviet Union was the arms supplier to the belligerent states. Soviet diplomacy backed up more or less the radical program, not totally, but in effect Syria and the other states knew they would get diplomatic support from the Soviet Union. Those props are now gone. And so the radical Arab states have to seek some accommodation with us and at least an attempted accommodation with Israel. I find it very hard to believe that another Arab-Israeli war can happen in the next 20 years, maybe longer.

MV: What about Islamic fundamentalism?

HK: At the same time, fundamentalism is growing. And if that became dominant, a totally new situation of crisis would arrive. If it succeeds in Algeria and then spreads to Tunisia and Morocco and Egypt. ...

MV: After World War II, the so-called balance of terror was developed eventually between the United States and the Soviet Union. Do you think this balance of terror can be formed also between smaller states? For example, are you pessimistic or optimistic about North Korea, Iran, Pakistan?

HK: The balance of terror among smaller states is more difficult.

MV: On the failure of intelligence services from Pearl Harbor to the Yom Kippur War: Is there something that can be done to improve proficiency of the services?

HK: What usually happens is that the intelligence services have the information but they either don't know how to interpret it or the political leadership doesn't want to believe it. At Pearl Harbor, we knew something was happening that weekend, but we thought it would happen in Southeast Asia. We didn't believe it was possible that they would attack Pearl Harbor. One of the more puzzling things: The Philippines, because of the difference in time, wasn't attacked for 36 hours after Pearl Harbor. And they still caught every American airplane on the ground. And I've never seen a satisfactory explanation of why that was.

Now in the 1973 war, which I was closely associated with, we knew that something was going on but we misinterpreted it. By chance, when I became secretary of state I came in one Sunday just to see what our intelligence reporting was in the State Department. I saw that there were 2,000 Syrian tanks on the Golan Heights, or anyway, a huge number. I then asked for an intelligence report every other day. We knew what was going on. Your government knew

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Secondly, your government was concerned if it told us there was a danger of war that we might start a peace initiative. So, they had an additional reason to play it down. But above all they didn't believe an attack was possible. On the day that the war started, I was in New York and I asked our intelligence and other experts to assemble in Washington and analyze it. And they thought Israel had attacked, because they couldn't conceive of an Arab initiative.

And I said, "Let me tell you something. The one thing that is absolutely impossible is that Israel attacks on Yom Kipper without some strong provocation and without mobilization, that is impossible." And after a couple of hours it was clear. But the first reaction of our people was that it was Israel that had attacked.

So it's not just upgrading the intelligence, it's to get the analysts to interpret it properly, and then to get the political leadership to believe it. I found that during the Vietnam War the intelligence analysts always followed and did not guide the views of the department making it. With respect to Cambodia, those people who were against doing something in Cambodia denied that the Cambodians' sanctuaries were very important. Those who were in favor of it had an opposite opinion. And we did not really know who was right until we had gone in and seized vast supply dumps.

MV: Let me ask a personal question. How is your health?

HK: Excellent.

MV: Have you ever thought what would have happened if your family had immigrated to Israel in the '30s or '40s when you came to the States? What would have become ...

HK: Would I have entered politics? I don't know. Probably I'd have become a professor.

MV: A professor at the university? I thought so.

HK: I never had any particular interest in becoming a political figure. But I don't know. Life depends on so many accidents. You know, you read books which say I plotted to become national security adviser all my life. I plotted to become national security adviser to Nixon by always supporting his opponent. You see, I hadn't even met Nixon when he appointed me.

MV: Do you have any connections now with Israeli leadership, with Rabin or Peres?

HK: Oh yes. I see most of them when they come to the States.

MV: You haven't been in Israel for a long time.

HK: No. But I will be in the next year.

MV: Is there anything you'd like to say to an Israeli newspaper?

HK: This is a troubling period for Israel and probably for Jews. The agreement has now been now made. There's no possibility of reverse.

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where they depend on each other. What was good about Egypt was that you could put 200 miles of sand between Egyptians and Israelis. You can't do that on the West Bank.

So the question is, Can you work on some practical coexistence? And it's going to be difficult. Very difficult and very painful.