NO

14

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Middle East, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have a strong common interest in preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, hence an interest, which is also strong but difficult to define and delimit, in checking international violence which might escalate into nuclear war. They may have a further common interest in containing any Chinese aggressiveness which might develop if and when Peking again consolidates its authority.

7. There are significant external and internal pressures operating on the Soviet Union to diminish its enthusiasm for provoking revolution and upsetting the status quo. There are also internal pressures constraining it to match the military capabilities of the United States and to compete more aggressively with it in some parts of the world.

8. All these considerations call for an urgent and vigorous effort by the United States and U.S.S.R., after a Viet Nam settlement, to reëxamine their relationship and to determine to what extent they can coöperate rather than compete in maintaining international security. They should concentrate particularly on limiting the arms race, on the two most critical areas, East and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and on more effective utilization of U.N. peacekeeping capabilities.

9. Whatever the degree of success or failure of this bilateral reëxamination, the United States will nevertheless continue to be saddled during this decade with substantial unilateral responsibilities, arising from previous commitments or from continuing interests, for the maintenance of international security. They will apply particularly in the two above-mentioned critical areas but also to some extent elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

10. These unilateral responsibilities should nevertheless be held within the narrowest compass consistent with existing treaty commitments and with "vital" interests strictly defined. The emphasis should be on assisting competent and representative governments to meet the political and economic imperatives of modernization, through giving them economic aid, preferably via multilateral instruments, and through limited military aid where a serious threat exists. The presumption should be against direct unilateral military intervention, unless an ally is subject to overt aggression across frontiers. Finally, the United States cannot suppress insurgency in a country whose government is itself incapable of competing with the insurgents.

Preface

This would seem to be an appropriate moment to review once
again the prospects and means of ending the war in Vietnam. A
new Administration is taking office in Washington. Both the
United States and North Vietnam have accepted some military
restraints in the field. The Paris negotiations, after nine
months of preliminaries, may at last be about to deal with the
basic issues. By its actions each party has signified that it
would like to end the war -- if it can do so on acceptable terms.

This paper opens with a brief outline of the war's impact
on the United States which accounts for the American desire and
need to end it. It proceeds to an assessment of the military
situation, of prospects for victory and of the political assets
and liabilities of the Vietnamese contenders. It continues with
an analysis of the objectives of those directly or indirectly con-
cerned, North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, China and
the Soviet Union, the government of South Vietnam and other non-
Communist Vietnamese, and the United States and its allies outside
Vietnam. Its main component, however, is a series of recommendations
in regard to the conduct and content of negotiations, to realistic
and tolerable terms of settlement for Vietnam and for the rest of
Southeast Asia. The paper concludes with a brief recapitulation.

The process of negotiation will be long and complicated. No
attempt is made here to spell out details of negotiating positions.
My purpose is to set forth the political and military realities which
limit our choices, and to sketch out a course by which the American
people's clear wish to see an end to the war might be met in ways
consistent with international security and with the principle of
self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

Charles W. Yost

Abbreviations

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand)
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
GVN Government of Vietnam
ICC International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam (Canada, India, Poland) - established by the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
NLF National Liberation Front
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, U.K., U.S.A.)

# I

## Impact of the War on the United States

Why has the Vietnam war caused such traumatic divisions in American opinion? There is controversy about its morality, its aims and its tactics, but what has aroused the most serious doubts are the unforeseen side effects on American interests at home and abroad which the scale and duration of the war have imposed. It is the impact of these side effects which provoked a nation-wide debate on the U.S. interest in Vietnam, caused the President on March 31, 1968, drastically to alter his strategy and persuaded all the major candidates in the recent political campaign to promise an early end to the war.

Neither casualties nor draft calls have been large in comparison with those of other wars but they have been growing and, what is much more important, to a greater extent than in other wars, they are felt by a large proportion of young people, particularly the best educated, to be morally unjustified. This sentiment is producing among a large segment of the younger generation an alienation from political, military and overseas responsibilities which could have damaging consequences on American political life over a very long period.

An expenditure of over $25 billion a year in Vietnam, forty per cent of our budget and about fourteen per cent of our total federal budget, has inescapable effects on our national economy and political capabilities. Anti-poverty programs are cut at a time when they are most

-2-

urgently needed to check the gravest sort of crisis in the cities. Balance
of payments difficulties and the debate over measures to correct them are
threatening the international monetary system, the liberalization of trade,
necessary foreign aid and desirable foreign investment, and a healthy expan-
sion of both developed and developing economies.

On the military side, despite our willingness to make a truly massive
effort, each passing month in Vietnam casts more doubt on our capacity to
deal successfully with insurgency and "wars of liberation." One reason is
that we chose for a crucial test of this capacity the most unfavorable pos-
sible site -- one of the very few areas in the Third World outside the Com-
munist bloc where Communism had over twenty years profoundly and extensively
penetrated the grass roots.

As to our relations with the Third World, these have been badly
damaged, except among some nations closest to the conflict by what has seemed
to many a massive and brutal white assault on a small non-white nation. On
the other hand, the lamentable performance of the South Vietnamese government
over the years has helped to foster in American public opinion our growing
disillusionment with foreign aid of all kinds, which may seriously limit
our ability in the future to carry the world-wide responsibilities we should
in this field.

The Vietnam conflict, equally with the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
is prolonging the Cold War with the Soviet Union and inhibiting negotiations
to prevent a new escalation of the arms race and a new confrontation in the
Middle East. It has also, for this and other reasons, damaged our relations
with our European allies. The inability of the United Nations to cope with
this conflict is further undermining the multilateral peacekeeping potential-
ities of that organization, the pressing need for which the conflict itself
so clearly demonstrates.

-3-

Finally, most of these factors contribute to the growth of neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States which, if it became dominant, would nullify in the future most of the objectives for which we are fighting in Vietnam, even if we should succeed in our immediate aims there.

In summary, it seems more and more probable that, even though U.S. objectives have been sound in principle, they may be in large measure inapplicable in the hard political context of Vietnam and that, moreover, the costs of the conflict, conducted in the manner it has been, may be far out of proportion to any benefits we and our allies can reasonably hope to gain.

On the other hand, as has so often been said, a precipitate withdrawal leaving a vacuum in Southeast Asia could be disastrous to some of our allies and very damaging to ourselves. A withdrawal that was felt at home and abroad to be involuntary or "dishonorable" might have side effects, not now wholly predictable, as unpleasant as those our massive presence is now causing. The external consequences might not be as disastrous as is claimed, but the internal consequences could conceivably be even more so.

There is therefore no easy answer to the question what we should do. Most relevant to such an answer would be a fresh and realistic assessment of the situation.

## II

### Assessment of the Situation

#### A. Military

##### 1. Strategy and tactics of the Communists

It is foolhardy to be dogmatic about the presumed plans and intentions

-4-

of any enemy. This is particularly so when the enemy is an Oriental Communist government which is by its nature accustomed and able to mask its intentions even from most of its followers. "Captured enemy documents" and public pro-nouncements are an unreliable source because they reveal at best only what the leaders want their followers to believe and at worst what they want their adversaries to believe.

The only safe basis on which to forecast North Vietnamese intentions is on present and past performance, of course as limited by capabilities. Once again, however, it would be foolhardy to underestimate their capabilities. They have been fighting, with a five-year interval, over a period of twenty years. During that time it has been repeatedly predicted that they were at or close to their "last gasp." Yet each time they have continued, and often escalated, the war.

There is no doubt that the scale of their military operations has diminished during recent months, that some North Vietnamese forces have been withdrawn, and that there has been more public talk of "protracted war" and less of "early victory" since the offensives of the first half of 1968. However, recalling the ups and downs of the war over more than twenty years it would be rash to predict that their capabilities for continuing it have declined until much more evidence is in.

At present they still have considerable unused military manpower in the North. Infiltration of men and weapons from North to South has been reduced but it could be quickly resumed. How much the VC can continue to recruit in the South is a factor of the areas they hold or penetrate and of the attitude of young Southerners toward the contending political forces. The February offensive widened the areas open to the Communists and probably

-5-

weakened Southern loyalties to the GVN. Intensified VC recruiting is
probably still taking place in these areas and increased VC capabilities
may result. The U.S.-GVN military position has undoubtedly improved
sharply since February, but there is little evidence of a corresponding
improvement in the GVN's political position, or in its ability to con-
strict appreciably the VC's recruitment base.

The primary military objectives of Hanoi are presumably political:
(1) to disrupt the GVN apparatus at all levels and erode its popular sup-
port, and (2) to inflict sufficient American casualties to cause American
opinion to want to end the war. Subject to its political decision to
keep the Paris negotiations alive, it is continuing to display these two
capabilities. What seems least likely is that Hanoi would at any time
"go for broke," that is, hazard so much of its total capability that,
if it failed, it would have to stop fighting.

2. Strategy and tactics of the allies

If this estimate of the main components of Communist military
strategy is correct, allied strategy might best have been designed to
counter it -- that is, (1) to protect the GVN apparatus at all levels
and to provide security and economic benefits to as much of the popula-
tion as possible, and (2) to keep U.S. casualties at moderate levels
commensurate with successful pursuit of the first objective over an
extended period.

The United States has, however, been accustomed to fighting mili-
tary, not political, wars. During the early sixties "counterinsurgency"
became a catchword, but it does not seem that we ever adequately analyzed
what it required or accurately weighed our ability to wage it, particularly
in a country so alien to us as Vietnam.

-6-

Up until 1968 the U.S. military concentrated there on "search and destroy" tactics, with a view to driving out the enemy or, to the extent that is not possible, to wering him down by attrition. This tactic has long seemed of dubious promise for three reasons: (1) there seems little probability of exhausting the Communists' pool of manpower in either the North or South to the extent required to cause them to stop the war; (2) a large proportion of allied forces have been re-quired to fight in exposed positions with precarious lines of supply and close to enemy sanctuaries; (3) the centers of population, both cities and villages, on whose security and allegiance to the GVN the outcome of war depends, were left exposed, as the events of February 1968 showed.

The basic error in U.S.-GVN strategy would seem to have been that, instead of putting primary emphasis on providing military protection for a political process, they put primary emphasis on military operations intended to achieve military victory. Their main tactical errors, in consequence, have been two: (1) to have failed to provide steady long-term security to the heavily populated rural areas, under the umbrella of which effective and lasting pacification might have been carried out; (2) in both "search and destroy" and "seize and hold" operations, to have bombed and shelled villages far too extensively and indiscriminately, the consequent civilian casualties, destruction of homes and displacement of persons having probably cost the GVN more popular support than all the pacification programs together have won. An experienced journalist, Ward Just, has claimed, and he may be right: "The American army ended up fighting the entire country,

-7-

because it was impossible to tell who was on the right side and who was on the other side."

There has been some correction of these tactics in recent months and as a result substantial military improvement has been achieved. Most important, the capabilities of the ARVN have undoubtedly improved. Whether they have improved sufficiently to enable them to resume in a realistic and consistent fashion the pacification program which was disrupted by Tet remains to be seen. There is certainly as yet no evidence that they could carry on the war without the support of very substantial U.S. forces.

As to bombing of the North, while it no doubt lessened the flow of men and supplies to the South and tied up substantial manpower in the North, it clearly did not do either to a degree which would reduce Communist capabilities in the South below a level which constantly required new increments of U.S. manpower. Combatants in the South continued throughout the bombing to receive more and better weapons. Nor was there any sign that the bombing caused sufficient physical or psychological damage to destroy Hanoi's capacity and will to continue to fight. It did, however, cause the United States serious political damage throughout much of the world and at home.

The President's decision first to curtail and then to end the bombing of the North was therefore a wise one. If productive negotiations follow, the cessation should continue; if they do not and infiltration should resume at a high rate, bombing south of the 19th parallel could be resumed.

### 3. Prospects for escalation

Pressure on the American side for escalation has almost disappeared but it could quickly revive if new Communist offensives occurred. On the basis of the demonstrated capacity and will of the North Vietnamese and of

-8-

the interests and capabilities of their allies, it is still hard to es-
cape the conclusion that escalation would *not* be decisive in ending the
war, that it would be more likely to enlarge and prolong it, and that
if it did the latter it would increase, perhaps very greatly, U.S.
losses and costs.

It has been argued that sealing off the port of Haiphong would cut off most of Hanoi's supplies and bring it to terms. While sealing off Haiphong might well reduce supplies, Hanoi has fought successfully in the past with less supplies than it now receives and could probably do so again. Substantial quantities of supplies would continue to come down from China by land and by junks and barges delivering along the coast north and south of Haiphong. Bombing, mining or blockading that port would greatly aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations, would at the least cause the Soviets to increase their aid to Hanoi through other channels, could well lead to use of missiles against our naval vessels and might bring the United States and the U.S.S.R. close to direct hostilities. Such escalation would therefore be extremely hazardous without in all probability being decisive.

It has also been argued that "hot pursuit" into Cambodia, cutting off the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos or invading North Vietnam would serve our military purposes and help to win the war. This also seems most unlikely. DRV forces pursued into Cambodia would simply fade into the jungle so that we should have either shortly to withdraw (after having incurred the political liabilities) or would have to penetrate further, pin down more of our own forces and probably clash with the Cambodians. We could perhaps seize and hold much of the Laos panhandle, though it

-9-

would require many more troops to do so, but the North Vietnamese would be
likely to respond by seizing and holding Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Paksane
and Thakhek, thus planting themselves just across the Mekong from Thailand.
A U.S. invasion of North Vietnam would be likely to provoke a Chinese dis-
patch of "volunteers" in substantial numbers. Whether or not it did so,
very large numbers of additional U.S. troops would be required if the in-
vasion were more than a raid and, if it were not, it would be of marginal
utility. Moreover, almost the whole population of North Vietnam would be
hostile, fighting would be much more difficult than in the South, casualties
would be very large, and even so there is little reason to believe the in-
vasion would bring the war to an end.

4. Prospects for victory

A conservative conclusion from the above observations would be one that
has been often made regarding the Vietnam conflict -- that there is not likely
to be a military victory for either side. This remains as true now as it was
before the improvement in our military tactics and our military performance.

The Communists cannot defeat half a million Americans. On the other
hand, the DRV and the VC have demonstrated over the last three years that,
no matter how many "battles" they may lose or losses they may suffer, how
often they may shift their strategy and tactics, they can and will continue
to fight at whatever level is necessary to keep the war in progress and to
prevent lasting pacification from being achieved.

The United States has now stopped its input of forces and asserted
that the South Vietnamese must assume more of the burden of war. It is by
no means certain how much they will prove willing and able to do so. Even
if they continue to improve their military performance, it is very doubtful

-10-

this would be enough. As has often been said, the war can only be won
on the political level. This or another government would have to rally
enough of the people behind them to dry up VC manpower and to squeeze
out the North Vietnamese invaders. What chance is there of this occur-
ring?

B. Political

1. <u>Communist strength and strategy</u>

It is impossible and unnecessary to be statistical about Com-
munist strength in South Vietnam. Even subtracting the forces from the
North, they are certainly strong.

As has often been noted, Ho Chi Minh captured most of the Viet-
namese nationalist movement during the struggles against Japan and France.
By 1954 the Communists were deeply rooted through much of the South
Vietnamese countryside. While certainly not a majority of the population
and probably not even a majority of the politically active elements,
they may well have been the strongest of any one of the latter -- what
might be called the plurality of the politically energetic. Many of
their members went north in 1954 but most of these returned in the late
fifties and early sixties.

Since then they have controlled varying amounts of the country-
side but there was little of it from which they were permanently ex-
cluded. How much they controlled by terror and how much by loyalty is
arguable but a great deal they did control. None of the numerous and
usually ephemeral "pacification programs" over the past fourteen years
seems to have made much of a dent in this control. It also seems that
the VC had a more effective apparatus inside the cities than had been
realized.

There can be little question that the VC and the NLF are controlled
by Hanoi and that their basic policy and strategy are dictated by Hanoi.
Whether some measure of independence, arising from distinctive Southern
attitudes and interests, would emerge after hostilities is a possibility,
but certainly no reliance should be placed upon it. The NLF does of course
include some non-Communist elements and is no doubt trying to rally others.

In their program published in September 1967 the NLF laid down four
main goals ostensibly nationalist in spirit: (1) unite all the people and
struggle against American aggression for national security; (2) create an
independent, democratic, pacific, neutral and prosperous South Vietnam;
(3) re-establish normal relations between the two zones, North and South,
of Vietnam and move toward peaceful reunification of the fatherland; (4)
apply a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. The program also proposed:
the abolition of the "disguised colonial regime established by the United
States" and the overthrow of the "puppet administration" set up by the
Americans; free elections by universal, direct and secret suffrage, for a
"truly democratic national Assembly"; designation by this Assembly of "a
government of national union comprising representatives of various social
strata, nationalities, religious communities, democratic and patriotic
parties, etc." The program also promised that "officers, soldiers and
personalities of the Saigon government who rejoin the ranks of the NLF
will be received with indulgence," though "agents of the United States
will be severely punished." Economic provisions convey the impression
that private property and industry will be protected but introduce qualify-
ing phrases about the national interests and conformity with laws of the
state. The main points of this program were reiterated by the Front when

-12-

it dispatched a representative to the Paris negotiations in early November 1968.

In summary, the NLF political strategy is the traditional Communist one of attempting while in opposition to attract into their ranks all elements of the population, even including those associated with the GVN, except those irrevocably committed to the Americans. This strategy has not up to this time been successful in attracting important political elements, even those most opposed to the present government, but its os- tensible openness and flexibility affords an available alternative to almost all South Vietnamese if and when their confidence in the capacity and future of the GVN might be further undermined or might be destroyed.

## 2. GVN strength and strategy

South Vietnamese political forces are fragmented among powerful religious sects, weak political parties, a conservative bureaucracy and shifting military cliques. There are certainly among the elite and in the armed forces many able and dedicated individuals. The mass of the people, however, remain apathetic and skeptical. No government or leader over the past fourteen years has been able to offer them a convincing national political alternative to the Communists. None has carried out to any substantial extent over any substantial time programs of reform and public welfare, of honest and efficient administration, which would persuade the people that their interests were deeply involved with its survival.

For a time it seemed that Diem might succeed in this endeavor; for shorter times it has seemed that one or another of his successors might. High hopes were held for the present government after the

-13-

successful conduct of a series of regional and national elections; these were
upset by the Tet offensive. Recently the Thieu government has seemed again
to be improving, but there are few signs that it has yet obtained any wide
popular support. So far it has neither succeeded nor failed, but it has a
very long way to go.

A significant parliamentary structure has been created but it has been
little used to strengthen or broaden the government either at the base or the
top. The provinces have been administered in most cases through satraps who
have either milked or neglected the villages in which most Vietnamese live and
on which the survival of the government must eventually depend. Land, rent,
tax and other reforms which might have won the allegiance of the peasants
have been occasionally promulgated but rarely carried out. The elite have
not been galvanized into the dedication required for a war of liberation to
match that of their adversaries. Non-Communist leaders have been jailed at
a moment when non-Communist unity was most badly needed. The press is still
heavily censored and papers frequently suppressed. Efforts to create new
anti-Communist Fronts have often seemed more a reflection of in-fighting
between military leaders than of a real rallying to the flag. There have
been without doubt in recent months real improvements in the composition and
posture of the government and in designation of more able corps commanders
and provincial governors. Whether these changes penetrate to fundamentals
or are merely superficial remains to be seen. The measure of the inadequacy
of the GVN is the still prevalent belief that, were the Americans suddenly
to withdraw, it would be swept away almost overnight.

-14-

Senior U.S. officials in Vietnam have over the years usually recognized many of the things that had to be done and urged them upon their Vietnamese allies but, out of regard for Vietnamese sovereignty or fearing to make a bad situation worse, have rarely exerted the full leverage that Vietnamese dependence on American support could provide. Only when the behavior of the Diem regime became intolerable did they venture to cultivate an opposition, and they were not encouraged by the results. Perhaps excusably but unfortunately, in an attempt to create a favorable psychological climate, they repeatedly made excessive claims on behalf of ambitious reform or pacification programs. As a result, Washington was repeatedly misled and Saigon governments reassured that, despite polite American prodding, they would not have to do on the political side more than the shadowboxing they had been doing. Having so long refrained from using its full power to enforce upon its ally the better performance on which their common success essentially depends, the U.S. government has found itself in a weak position to reverse its course at times when either military pressure or the real prospect of negotiations made better performances by the GVN particularly necessary.

## III

### Objectives

#### A. Of DRV and NLF

It is easy to estimate maximum objectives. It is much more difficult to speculate intelligently about minimum terms because these depend, at any given time, on circumstances, capabilities, judgments, pressures and will, of which no outsider can be fully cognizant.

-15-

While there are no doubt some differences between DRV and NLF, that is, between Northerners and Southerners, there is little question that the objective of both is to reunite the whole of Vietnam under a Communist government very similar to that now in power in Hanoi. It is also probable, though not quite so certain, that such a government, after fighting alone for twenty years, would not be willing to be dominated by either China or the Soviet Union and could make that unwillingness stick. (Despite its dependence on both for essential supplies, Hanoi has in recent years displayed and is now displaying considerable independence from Peking and Moscow in both policy and strategy.) Though such a government might pursue an "independent" Rumanian-style foreign policy, it would certainly consider itself one of the "Socialist bloc" and might therefore be unwilling to be "neutralized" by treaty. While it might well have territorial or ideological ambitions of its own vis-à-vis its neighbors, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, whether and how it would attempt to realize those ambitions would depend on the organization of power in and among those states, in the Southeast Asian region and in the world generally.

What minimum terms the DRV and the NLF would settle for short of reunification and short of full Communist domination of the South is quite another question. In their propaganda they continue to promise their people "complete victory," though if the NLF program already quoted is "complete victory" it nevertheless offers room for maneuver. In 1954 they accepted a temporary division of the country and a total exclusion of Communists from power in the South. Both the DRV and the NLF have repeatedly stated, the latter explicitly in its September program, that immediate reunification

-16-

is not one of their present goals, though eventual reunification is. They have indicated that they would accept continued separation for an indeterminate number of years, but it can be presumed that, if a Communist-controlled government came to power in the South, reunification would not be long delayed.

It can also be presumed that, after fighting for nearly ten years in the second round in the South, theDRV and NLF would not settle again for their exclusion from its political life, unless they were militarily defeated in a way our appraisal so far indicates is extremely unlikely. They would certainly not otherwise accept a settlement which merely promised amnesty to their supporters and the right to engage in political life as individuals. They would probably not accept an arrangement which authorized them to operate as a political party or "Front" but which excluded them from the government, and gave them no solid guarantees that their party would not subsequently be outlawed.

What the NLF September program proposed was overthrow of the present "puppet administration," free elections by secret ballot for a new Assembly, and designation by this Assembly of "a government of national union, comprising representatives of various social strata, nationalities, religious communities, democratic and patriotic parties, etc." The program did not indicate what sort of interim government would be set up to carry out the elections nor whether there would be an international supervision of them, though historical experience indicates the Communists would be opposed to the latter. Historical experience also suggests that the Communist definition of "democratic" and "patriotic"

-17-

is a very special one and that the "government of national union" which the NLF is hoping to achieve would be a mirror of itself, that is, one in which the supposedly non-Communist elements were either bogus or were thoroughly under control.

The program, however, is so worded as to give the NLF, and the DRV which must of course have approved it, considerable flexibility in negotiating a compromise settlement. Their objective would be perfectly clear but they could settle temporarily, if their assessment of all the circumstances so dictated, for a larger or a smaller piece of it. Their assessment, however, if they were to accept a settlement at all, would have to give them grounds for the judgment that, even though they had not obtained what they wanted, there was no insuperable bar to their doing so later, indeed a reasonable prospect that under existing and foreseeable circumstances they could. In this perspective there is serious question whether they would settle for less than significant NLF participation in a new government, which would also include various political elements represented in the present non-Communist spectrum and which might be designed to be either an interim caretaker government to carry out early elections or a longer-term government to restore order and tranquility before elections were held. Furthermore, if there were to be any sort of international presence after the settlement, the DRV and NLF would certainly insist that it have a Communist component with a veto on important decisions.

## B. Of China and the Soviet Union

One may presume that Peking would like to dominate either a divided or a reunited Vietnam but that it is probably realistic enough to recognize

-18-

that it cannot do so under present circumstances. It would certainly
try to have the maximum possible influence in Hanoi and Saigon.

It is generally assumed that Peking wants the war to continue
as long as possible, regardless of cost to the Vietnamese, in order to
preoccupy, bleed and weaken the United States. This is probably so but
the Chinese, in their present state of extreme disarray, may be somewhat
ambivalent on the subject. There is some evidence that they have since
late 1965 been apprehensive that the United States might so escalate
the conflict as to involve them directly or oblige them to send into
Vietnam forces they could ill spare. For this reason they might not
prefer a prolongation but a cooling off of the conflict.

In any case it is difficult to believe that the Chinese, in their
present situation, could prevent the DRV and the NLF from negotiating a
settlement which the latter felt to be advantageous. There is no evi-
dence that they control the Hanoi Politburo or that their economic
leverage is so great they could force it to submit to their will.
Hanoi's agreement to the opening of negotiations in April and to their
enlargement in October are the latest evidence of this independence.

The Soviets probably desire in equal measure that the DRV be
victorious and that it not be dominated by China. There has been con-
siderable debate as to whether they prefer the war to be prolonged in
order to weaken the United States and disaffect its friends, or whether
on balance they prefer it to end because they fear it might eventually
prove profitable to China. On the whole their behavior in recent months
argues for the latter alternative.

-19-

The Soviets seem likely, therefore, to continue both military aid to the DRV and efforts to de-escalate the war, but in the latter connection to be careful not to drive the DRV into the arms of China, or to give grounds for the latter's charges that the U.S.S.R. is in alliance with the "imperialists." Under these circumstances they will not try or, if they do, will not be able to force the DRV into a settlement for which it is not ready.

There are some pertinent broader considerations. The United States has claimed that it is assisting South Vietnam in order to contain Chinese expansionism and discourage further "wars of national liberation." Are these objectives of Peking and/or Moscow?

Communist China may or may not in the future be expansionist. This will depend on a whole range of factors: internal developments and capabilities; military, political and economic obstacles or temptations to expansion; the whole nexus of China's relationships with and attitudes toward the rest of the world. In its present state of internal disarray, however, it seems most unlikely that China, whether or not it has the capability, would risk invading any of its neighbors, except defensively as in Korea. This would remain true even if the Communists took over South Vietnam tomorrow.

Peking no doubt intends, as it has intended since 1949, to exercise over the long run whatever capabilities it has to bring about, by subversion, infiltration, "wars of national liberation," or whatever indirect means are feasible but not too hazardous, the fall of neighboring "dominoes," that is, the coming to power in East and Southeast Asian countries of Communist or

-20-

"friendly" regimes. This objective will remain and will be pursued whether South Vietnam falls or not, though experience since 1949 does not suggest that it will be pursued recklessly. Whether it will be successful, once again whether South Vietnam falls or not, will depend on the will of the peoples of those countries to maintain their independence, on the capacity, dedication and enlightenment of their governments and elites, on the mutual cooperation among them, and on the assistance, economic and military, they receive from outside. If these elements are present, these countries will not fall to Communism of any kind whether or not Vietnam does; if they are not present, these countries will fall whether or not Vietnam does.

How actively the Soviet Union intends in the future to support in East and Southeast Asia "wars of national liberation" is open to serious question. While if another such war should break out it might feel obliged to support it, there are some reasons to believe it may not relish further exercises of that kind. These reasons would be that such wars in that area are more costly than profitable, that if any major Communist power profits from them it is more likely to be China than the Soviet Union, and that the danger of escalation hazardous to Soviet security and interests is too serious to risk for such hypothetical gains. These reasons will remain valid however the Vietnam war comes out. They will not necessarily govern the Soviet attitude toward "wars of national liberation" in other parts of the world.

### C. Of the GVN and other non-Communist elements

It is difficult to speak of the objectives of the GVN and other

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non-Communist elements in South Vietnam, because they are heterogeneous, or of their minimum terms, because only their maximum terms have been formulated.

It has always been a major factor of strength in the South that no significant political group and extremely few significant political figures have gone over to the NLF. The military, the old parties, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals, the Catholics and other sects, the dominant Buddhist groups, have almost all been firmly anti-Communist and have sought a settlement which would maintain independence from Hanoi, political and religious diversity, freedom for all of them to pursue their separate but not incompatible aims.

The weakness of the situation in the South has been the incorrigible factionalism of the active political elements and the limited, the essentially negative, character of this common objective. None of these elements, including the government itself, has sincerely and consistently sought to modernize the country. Essentially each has been primarily associated with the preservation of a status quo which has little attraction for the uncommitted 60 or 70 per cent of the population. None has energetically pursued, even if it has formulated, programs of reform which would "capture the hearts and minds of the people." Another weakness has been that over the past thirty years so many of the political elite have been eliminated, either by death in war or assassination, by recurrent coups, purges and exile, or by "dropping out" in frustration and despair.

Many of these non-Communist political elements, including of course the present military leadership, oppose any negotiation with the NLF or any

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recognition of it as a political party, a fortiori its inclusion in any eventual coalition government. Presumably they do so, among other reasons, because they lack confidence in their ability to prevent it, once it is recognized or in the government, from taking over completely.

Other non-Communist political elements might be willing to permit the NLF to participate in the political process, even in the government, if they thought the war could be ended by so doing. These latter elements are clearly in a minority now, though in a situation which was further deteriorating they might become dominant. Presumably the attitude of the United States might be decisive with them. If they felt they had no choice to accommodate with the NLF some would do so; others would go into exile.

The key question, and one to which no definitive answer can be given, is whether there are politically active elements in the elite and in the population strong and determined enough to balance an authorized NLF party in or out of the government and to prevent it from ultimately monopolizing power. The Buddhists, the Catholics, the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai, the old parties, the bureaucracy, the trade unions, the military, the students, have together the capability of doing so if they would display the necessary determination and cohesiveness, but would they? Probably the most one could say at this juncture is that most of them would try to play this role if they thought the terms of the settlement as a whole were sufficiently propitious, but whether or not they would persist and prevail is debatable and would depend on all the accompanying circumstances.

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D. Of the United States and its allies

The United States has put forward a number of objectives for its presence in Vietnam. Among them are: (1) to check Communist expansion, (2) to contain China, (3) to discourage further "wars of national liberation," (4) to protect other Southeast Asian nations from the operation of the "domino" theory, (5) to oblige North Vietnam to leave South Vietnam alone, (6) to preserve self-determination in South Vietnam, the right of its people freely and peacefully to choose their form of government and leaders.

We ventured the judgment, in Section B above, that the war being conducted in South Vietnam by the DRV and the VC did not derive from Chinese or other non-Vietnamese expansionism, that future "wars of national liberation" would or would not be initiated and supported by Communist powers on the basis of an appraisal of the conditions obtaining at the time in each separate case, and that other Southeast Asian nations would or would not maintain their freedom depending on their own behavior and on the organization of power around them. In other words we concluded, rightly or wrongly, that the consequences of U.S. success or failure in Vietnam would not automatically determine what happens elsewhere, any more than the takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and again in 1968, of China in 1949 or of North Vietnam in 1954 determined what happened elsewhere.

Of course the United States, by its own enormous commitment of men, resources and prestige in Vietnam over the past three years and by the sweeping and ambiguous character of its announced objectives, has acquired a political stake there which to some degree transcends any local or "rational"

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objective. It fears that any defeat or "loss of face" in Vietnam would have unpredictable consequences throughout the world and at home, encouraging adversaries, discouraging friends and undermining domestic morale. A major supplementary U.S. objective, therefore, perhaps now the most important of all, is to avoid or minimize "loss of face" or appearance of disaster.

On the other hand, other U.S. objectives, which have been loom-
ing larger and larger in recent months, must be to end or mitigate the
disastrous side effects of the war which were outlined in the first
section of this paper -- the alienation of the younger generation be-
cause of their moral objection to the war, the economic hemorrhage
which is restricting our capacity to cope with urban problems and is
exacerbating an international financial crisis, the damage to our re-
lations with many of our allies, most of the Third World, the United
Nations, and finally the impetus the war gives to neo-isolationist
sentiment in this country.

All these objectives have become so entangled and confused, so
subject to vertiginous and unforeseen events from day to day, that it
is impossible to say which will be dominant even a month or two from
now, and hence which will have most weight in determining what minimum
terms either the U.S. government or U.S. public opinion would be willing
to accept now or later. This subject will be further discussed below.

Those of our allies who are actively participating in the war,
Thailand, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, have
done so in order to encourage and assist us to restore in South Vietnam

the status quo ante 1960 (before the second round of insurgency began) be-
cause they believe this is important to their own security. This certainly
remains their objective and they would be most reluctant to deviate from it
or to accept less satisfactory terms. Such minimum terms as they might be
prevailed upon to accept, if the United States should prove unable or un-
willing to restore the status quo ante 1960, would relate not so much to
what might be negotiated about Vietnam, which they would certainly find
unpalatable, but as to what posture the United States might be prepared cred-
ibly to assume and to maintain in East and Southeast Asia outside Vietnam
after a settlement there which was equivocal. In other words, in exchange
for their grudging acquiescence in a Vietnam settlement which fell short
of their hopes, they would seek to extract from the United States firm
military commitments which they would feel doubly essential to their se-
curity in light of the Vietnam failure. The United States would pre-
sumably have a strong interest in meeting their minimum terms in this re-
gard in pursuit of the broader objectives it has enunciated in connection
with Vietnam. This subject also will be further discussed below.

IV
Negotiations

A. The conduct of negotiations

It would be foolish to attempt in a paper of this kind to lay out
detailed tactics for the conduct of negotiations, which necessarily must
shift from day to day as the pressure of unforeseeable events requires.
Certain broad lines, however, can be usefully indicated.

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After six months of empty sparring and two months of productive behind-the-scenes conversations, the negotiations may at last be genuinely under way. Not only has the bombing issue been at last suspended but the next significant preliminary issue, representation of the GVN and NLF, has been partially resolved by seating them both at the table without formal recognition of either by their adversaries being required. This is a substantial step forward and real negotiations on substantive issues can perhaps now proceed.

It remains practically certain, however, that they cannot be quickly concluded. All the main issues of substance remain to be confronted. Particularly with a somewhat improved military situation, the U.S. government is not likely, despite the pressure of domestic opinion, to accept what would clearly be a defeat or a humiliation. The Saigon government is somewhat stronger militarily and seems as reluctant as ever to make political concessions. On the other hand, as we have repeatedly suggested, the DRV and the NLF continue to have capabilities which are not heavily impaired and which are likely to permit them to go on fighting effectively and indefinitely while they negotiate. Before negotiations began and during their early stages, whenever one side showed a little "give," the other interpreted this as a sign of weakness and hardened its terms, whereupon the first backed away. This unprofitable rhythm could continue as long as both are able and willing to continue fighting.

The United States would be well advised to push forward promptly and resolutely into the substantive issues. It can for a time finesse

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the precise status of the NLF, but it will have to talk with them as a
mainly interested party about both military and political issues in the
South; it will have sooner or later to recognize them as a party to the
settlement and to the political processes that will follow. The GVN will
eventually have to do likewise; the United States will no doubt have to ex-
ert the strongest sort of pressure to persuade it to do so. What the United
States will probably have in effect to say is that, while it is prepared to
go on fighting to help the GVN prevent a Communist victory, it is not pre-
pared to go on fighting to prevent the NLF from playing a significant political
role in the life of the country.

The DRV and the NLF must also come to accept the role of the GVN in a
settlement. This does not mean, however, that the present composition of the
GVN is sacrosanct. That composition is slightly better than it was a year ago
but it still represents a very narrow political base. It needs broadening and
strengthening. Whether such broadening and strengthening could be brought
about without causing the whole structure to fall apart is of course open to
question, but without it the non-Communist elements in South Vietnam will be
prevented from exercising their full weight in and out of the negotiations.
Indeed, the more serious negotiations become, the more other South Viet-
namese non-Communist elements will want to get in on them. If the more signi-
ficant of such elements are not represented on the GVN side of the negotia-
tions, some of them are likely to turn up, before it ends, on the NLF side.

It is to be hoped that the negotiations can be limited to the present
four-party, or two-plus-two, forum. This is the simplest and probably the
most effective. If it eventually proves necessary to secure broader sanction

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or final agreement through a large Geneva-type conference, that could
and should follow. Such a conference would, however, be cumbersome,
distracting and perhaps unmanageable; it should be avoided if possible.

B. The substance of negotiations

Unless the military situation changes radically, the essence of
any political settlement would have to be arrangements which fall well
below the desiderata of either side but under which each believes it
has a reasonable prospect of achieving its aims by political rather than
military means. If either side believes the proposed terms do not offer
such a prospect, it will continue fighting as long as the political will
and the physical means exist.

One school of thought urges as a practicable means to settlement
either an agreed general cease-fire or a progressive reciprocal de-esca-
lation of military action throughout the country. In either case, if
the cease-fire came about and persisted, a de facto partition of South
Vietnam would have occurred, the map of the country representing an ir-
regular checkerboard with some areas controlled by one side and some by
the other. Some have suggested that, under all the present circumstances,
this is the best outcome we could hope to obtain, that it leaves the
majority of the heavily populated areas in the hands of our friends,
and that we should endeavor over time to obtain from the other side at
least tacit recognition of this new status quo from which they would gain
at least part of their objective.

I doubt very much that this would be a realistic or feasible
course. Unless the DRV and the NLF have suffered or in the future do

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suffer substantially greater military reverses than seems apparent or likely, they will not this time, after their experience in 1954, settle for a new partition of the country which excludes them from part of it. If this assessment is correct, they will not, in advance of a political settlement, accept cease-fires, except as brief tactical maneuvers to give themselves breathing spells.

The "checkerboard solution" is moreover inherently instable and unenforceable. There are many areas which the GVN controls by day and the NLF by night. In the absence of a very large international supervisory force scattered over the whole country, which is almost certainly not practicable, both sides would constantly be engaged in endeavoring to consolidate and extend the areas they control. The cease-fire, even if it were once agreed, would soon break down in scores of places and, each side accusing the other of bad faith, the war would resume. The fighting will no doubt rise and fall, ebb and flow, while negotiations proceed, but it is most unlikely to terminate until they reach some clear agreed conclusion.

The heart of the problem of political settlement is the position of the NLF, that is, bluntly, the Communists in South Vietnam. If there is to be a negotiated settlement, the NLF will almost certainly have at least to be recognized as a participant in the South Vietnamese political process enjoying equal rights and guarantees with other parties and groups. It would be foolish to expect the NLF and VC, unless they are beaten in the field, to agree to compete in the political arena on anything less than equal terms or to put themselves in a situation where, after an armistice or a settlement, they could once again be outlawed and driven underground.

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It is not too difficult to conceive in principle a scenario for political settlement under which the NLF might be accorded equal status in the political process without the country being turned over to them. Such a scenario certainly cannot be recommended as attractive or agreeable nor can there be any assurance in advance that it would prove viable. It is sketched out here, as noted above, merely as the outer limit of what might be considered tolerable in light, on the one hand, of an intractable and perhaps insoluble politico-military situation on the ground and, on the other, of an American opinion progressively more unwilling to bear for objectives in Vietnam the onerous and hazardous side effects outlined at the opening of this paper.

The central feature of such a scenario might be new national elections in South Vietnam in which the NLF would participate with equal rights, which would be under strict and extensive international supervision, and on the basis of which a new government responsible to the new parliament would be formed. This arrangement obviously raises numerous questions. Could the elections be held under the present Constitution or would it have to be modified in some respects? Would the elections be carried out by the present GVN, a new one or entirely by some international authority? What would be the nature of the international authority and how large a force would it have? Would it be responsible for maintaining a cease-fire throughout this political process? Would foreign troops, U.S. and North Vietnamese primarily, remain in the country, and if so, where and for how long?

It is neither possible nor necessary to answer all these questions in this limited paper. The key problems would be (1) the character of

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the GVN during the pre-electoral and electoral period, and (2) the character
and powers of the international authority.

As to the first, both Saigon and Hanoi would seek control during the
interim period. Elections in Vietnam tend to reflect the electorate's ac-
quiescence in a mandate which heaven has already bestowed on those in power.
Both sides are now feverishly trying to improve their political position in
the countryside in expectation of some political settlement. The composi-
tion of the government during the electoral period might well therefore
determine, even if the elections were strictly supervised, what their out-
come would be. Ideally there should be a "neutral" caretaker government,
but after twenty years of civil war is it possible to find neutral figures
who command the confidence of both sides? Offhand one would say no, but
that may well be the only viable solution.

The alternative would be the dreaded "coalition government." Theo-
retically there is no reason why there could not be put together a balanced
coalition in which "neutrals" would hold key ministries such as interior
and defense and the various political parties and groups, including the
NLF, would each be allotted two or three less critical ministries. To
argue that this would inevitably mean a rapid takeover of all power by the
NLF would be to denigrate rather shockingly the will and capacity of all
the other political elements in South Vietnam. If they could not hold
their own in such a coalition, what prospect would there be of their govern-
ing the country over the long term in any circumstances? More telling
arguments against such a coalition might be either that the DRV and the NLF
would never accept one which gave them such a subordinate position or that

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the "neutral" occupants of key ministries could not be agreed among
the parties. The only answer would be that these objections could be
tested in the negotiations. If no "neutral" interim government, whether
"coalition" or not, can be agreed on, the chances of reaching a settle-
ment without further prolonged fighting seem dim indeed.

The second major problem would be the character and powers of
the international authority. Would it be the UN? In view of their fre-
quently expressed rejection of it, the DRV and NLF would probably refuse.
Would it be the old ICC? But this has been completely hamstrung by the
Polish veto. Would it be possible to agree upon and put together a
force large enough to enforce a cease-fire and subsequently to supervise
elections throughout the whole of Vietnam? Those experienced with inter-
national forces will have doubts but, unless an agreed and viable care-
taker government can be worked out, what is the alternative?

What we are, perhaps rashly, assuming here is that both sides
have, or will at some not-too-distant point, become convinced that a
military victory is impossible or too costly, that a further prolonga-
tion of the war is also too costly, that even a "rather bad" political
settlement is better than a further prolongation, and that it is there-
fore worthwhile to accept compromises on these two major problems, and
on some lesser ones, which hitherto have seemed unthinkable. If and
when that point is reached, a scenario somewhat along the following
lines might be agreed. We repeat that we are not recommending it as
desirable or even "viable," but are submitting it as illustrative of
what sooner or later both sides may reluctantly decide to swallow.

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1. A cease-fire, preferably simultaneous throughout the country, if not, as rapidly progressive as possible. As suggested above, it is very unlikely that a cease-fire could be obtained or maintained in isolation; it would be foolish to expect to obtain a cease-fire from the DRV and NLF without paying a political price. A cease-fire, however, would obviously be an indispensable part of a political settlement.

2. Supervision of the cease-fire by an international force of modest size, preferably under the UN, more probably (because of DRV attitude toward the UN), under the old tripartite or a new multipartite control commission. The commission would have to have Communist membership but its machinery should not permit them to hamstring its operations.

3. An interim caretaker government composed of "neutral" non-political figures not associated with either side but tolerable to both. Depending on the character of its membership and what was agreed in the negotiations, this government might either exercise real power during the interim electoral period or might be largely a facade behind which the agreed international authority would supervise the cease-fire and carry out the elections. A possible alternative to this "non-political" government would be a coalition government with "neutrals" in key ministries and all major political groups, including the NLF, represented.

4. Armed forces of both sides (except foreign -- see below) should stand fast where they are and should be subject to overriding control of the international force until elections have been held and a new government formed. (The last clause may be unobtainable but should be sought, not in the belief control would be fully effective but in order to give maximum leverage to the international command of the force.)

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5. Foreign troops (including North Vietnamese) would within three months from cease-fire retire to designated areas in South Vietnam from which they would gradually be withdrawn during the subsequent twelve to eighteen months.

6. Economic and financial assistance for current expenses, relief and reconstruction would be under the UN or under an international consortium consisting of those states contributing substantially to it. The United States should be prepared to make a major contribution and commitment for these purposes.

7. Elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held by the caretaker government under the supervision of the international force six to twelve months after the cease-fire. The first business of the Constituent Assembly would be to designate a new government responsible to it.

8. South Vietnam would remain a separate state for at least five years but after that time could by referendum decide whether or not to reunite with North Vietnam.

9. South Vietnam would enter into no military alliance and would have no foreign troops on its soil (including North Vietnamese) after withdrawal provided under 5 above.

10. The Geneva Accord of 1962 in regard to Laos would be reaffirmed and all parties would comply at once with its provisions, that is, all foreign troops would withdraw under international supervision. Sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cambodia would be reaffirmed.

11. The failure of any party to the settlement to carry out any part of its terms would justify other parties in refusing to carry out

other parts of its terms. (This might be a separate U.S. statement rather
than a clause of the agreement.)

C. <u>Terms of settlement for Southeast Asia</u>

Much of the tenacity with which the United States and its allies in
the region have supported South Vietnam has been based on our and their ap-
prehension that its conquest by the Communists would have grave, perhaps
fatal, consequences throughout Southeast Asia, would persuade neighboring
governments that U.S. protection is not to be relied on and that they must
accommodate as best they can to the dominant Communist powers. A major
element of a tolerable Vietnamese settlement, assuming it would fall short
of U.S. and allied goals, would be credible assurance to other Southeast Asian
governments that they would not suffer these consequences.

It seems desirable to give a high priority to including in the Viet-
nam settlement itself provisions which would require the DRV to withdraw its
military forces from Laos and reinvigorate the 1962 Accord there, as well as
reaffirm the sovereignty of the other Indochina state, Cambodia. This would
reinforce the barrier to DRV expansion; since it would be based on inter-
national accords to which they, Moscow and Peking are signatory, it would
be difficult for them to reject reaffirmation. It is possible, depending
on the composition of the states signing a Vietnam settlement, that it might
also contain a general clause guaranteeing the independence and territorial inte-
grity of other Southeast Asian states. It is not certain, however, that this could
be negotiated or, if it were, that some Southeast Asian states would have much
confidence in Communist guarantees. More would therefore be required.

The composition of SEATO, including France, Britain and Pakistan, is such
that it could not be revived as an effective protection to Southeast Asian states.

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There are, however, a number of other emerging political and economic associa-
tions among many of the states of the region, the most promising of which is
probably ASEAN. What would best serve the specific purpose of security would
be a new defense arrangement among those Southeast Asian states which desire such
an arrangement, the United States being either a member or a guarantor, more
probably the latter. States which preferred not to assume military obliga-
tions or to be associated with a military alliance, and these might be the
majority, might nevertheless derive some confidence from such arrangements in
their neighborhood. Of course, it is altogether possible that no new military
alliance would be feasible or desirable. In that case those Southeast Asian
states which feel themselves threatened would have to be satisfied with bi-
lateral arrangements, primarily with the United States, such as it already
has with Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines.

Possible variations are infinite but the essential point would be
that Southeast Asian states should be given substantial reason to believe
that any further Communist attempt to change the status quo in the region
by force would be met by strong indigenous and external counterforce. Obvious-
ly the more it can be indigenous the better but, in view of current pacifism
in Japan, the remoteness of Australia, the internal preoccupations of
Indonesia, and the military weakness of the remaining states of the
area, a considerable part of the applicable counterforce would probably
have to be American. Whether this would involve stationing U.S. forces in
peacetime elsewhere in East Asia than where they already are (Korea, Okinawa,
Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand), or even for long in some of those
places, seems most unlikely but would depend on the wishes of the governments

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concerned and on what was politically practicable in the United States.

It may be argued that, after what might be viewed as an American
defeat in Vietnam despite the commitment of half a million U.S. troops,
American guarantees to other Asian states, whether or not organized in
a military alliance or protected by an American military presence, would
not be credible. I do not believe this to be necessarily the case; it
depends on the whole context. It would be feasible, even after an un-
satisfactory Vietnam settlement, to maintain the security of the rest
of Southeast Asia, if the United States at once demonstrates its in-
tention to assert the necessary power there and if the governments of
those states display over time the necessary competence, integrity and
progressiveness.

Others might argue, on the other hand, that after the disillusion-
ing and costly experience of Vietnam, the United States should thereafter
refuse to commit itself militarily on the continent of Asia and should
content itself with defending the offshore island chain. The U.S.
Senate might refuse to approve and the U.S. public to support new com-
mitments, or even to reaffirm old ones, on the Asian continent. Such
a withdrawal would in my view be most unwise at this particular juncture
and would indeed be likely to validate the domino theory.

A U.S. military presence on the Asian mainland or unilateral
U.S. guarantees to Asian states should, however, be thought of as tem-
porary expedients designed to bridge the gap until regional power or
effective multilateral peacekeeping can be developed and applied. It
should also be made clear that any U.S. presence and guarantees are

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intended to deter or to meet external invasion, that the burden of dealing
with insurgency, if it occurs, must rest with the governments and peoples
of the region, that the U.S. contribution to counterinsurgency must hence-
forth be limited to funds, arms and advice, and will not again involve
U.S. combat forces.

In the meantime the whole problem of bringing the Communist powers
of Asia, most of all China but also North Korea and North Vietnam, back into
the community of nations and thereby of creating a more stable equilibrium
in Asia, should be dealt with on an urgent and comprehensive basis. Cer-
tainly there is no better time to move forward with all these tasks, to
which the Vietnam war is at the moment an almost insuperable obstacle, than
now when Communist China is weak and divided and is bitterly hostile to the
Soviet Union. Neither of those conditions can be counted on to endure in-
definitely.

D. If negotiations break down

The possibility must be faced that the negotiations might break down,
either because one side or the other might anticipate a victory making com-
promise unnecessary or because one or both could not bring themselves to
swallow compromises which were indispensable to settlement.

We have expressed the view that conclusive military victory for either
side is extremely improbable. Conclusive political victory for the GVN, that
is, pacification of most of the countryside, seems equally improbable; political
victory by the NLF is unlikely as long as the United States remains in force
in South Vietnam. It is not at all inconceivable, however, that one or both
sides might become so hopeful of military or political victory that it would

refuse to make real concessions and that the Paris talks would thereby
be stalled or even broken off.

In that case the United States would have no alternative but to
rely on the strategy it has announced and pursued during the past few
months, that is: to continue the fight on the ground with more dis-
criminating but still intensive tactics, to rearm, reorganize and
phase in ARVN forces and to phase out U.S. forces if the situation
permits, to exert more effectively and ruthlessly the great leverage
the United States potentially has to ensure the GVN carries out the
measures of political and social reform on which its survival and our
disengagement most of all depend.

It has been the main contention of this paper, however, that this
alternative strategy is <u>not</u> likely to end the war, and the drain on
American lives, resources, prestige and morale, with sufficient rapidity
to satisfy an increasingly embittered U.S. opinion. Under these circum-
stances a political settlement negotiated in 1969, even if it falls far
short of what we want and includes terms we find most distasteful, may
be much better than one internal and external pressures might constrain
us to accept in 1970 or 1971.

V

Recapitulation

We shall end with a brief summary of the conclusions and recom-
mendations in this paper.

1. Current U.S.-GVN military and political strategy are most
unlikely to exhaust either the will or the resources of the DRV and

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the NLF and hence to oblige them either to stop fighting or to settle on unfavorable terms.

2. No feasible U.S. escalation of the war would be likely to bring "victory," but would be more likely to prolong it and to raise its price.

3. Side effects of the war carried on at present or higher levels are so damaging to U.S. domestic and international interests even more vital than those at stake in Vietnam, that it will be neither politically wise nor practicable to carry on the war at such levels for much longer.

4. A fundamental readjustment in U.S.-GVN military and political strategy, if it could be successfully carried on, might permit conduct of the war at lower levels of expenditure of lives and resources, and hence permit it to be longer sustained. Such readjustment of strategy would not, however, be likely to end the war in the foreseeable future.

5. It is, therefore, in the clear interest of the United States and the people of South Vietnam to undertake a most serious effort to negotiate a compromise settlement on tolerable terms. This effort, if it is to have any chance of succeeding, will have to involve much more substantial concessions by the GVN and the United States than either has so far been willing to contemplate.

6. It would be illusory to expect the DRV and the NLF, unless they suffer much more serious military setbacks than seems likely, to settle for anything less than full and equal NLF participation in the South Vietnamese political process, including the opportunity at some stage to participate in its government.

7. The key to a negotiated settlement is likely to be agreement on new elections, in which all groups including the NLF would participate and

-41-

on the basis of which a new government, responsible to the new parlia-
ment, would be formed. The most intractable problem in connection with
such a settlement would be the character of the government and/or inter-
national authority which would preside over or supervise these elections.

8. Terms of such a settlement tolerable to both sides might in-
clude: a cease-fire supervised by an international force under the
control of which all undemobilized South Vietnamese forces would remain
for some time; concentration of foreign troops in designated areas from
which they would be evacuated within twelve to eighteen months; formation of
an interim caretaker government composed of neutral non-political figures,
or alternatively of representatives of political groups including the
NLF but with neutrals holding the key ministries; elections for a Con-
stituent Assembly within six to twelve months under supervision of the
international force; designation by the Assembly of a new government respon-
sible to it; requirement that South Vietnam remain a separate state for
five years but thereafter have the option of reunification, in the meantime
being neutralized; reaffirmation of the Laos Agreement of 1962 and en-
forcement of its provisions.

9. The United States would offer to renew military guarantees to those allied East and Southeast Asian states that so desired, to participate in a regional security pact if so requested and to continue temporarily to maintain troops in Thailand if asked to do so. It would make clear, however, that these guarantees and this presence are designed to deter invasion and that U.S. forces would not henceforth be used to combat insurgency. International, including Soviet and Chinese,

-42-

guarantees to East and Southeast Asian states would also be sought. These
measures would be undertaken as transitional steps until regional or UN
peacekeeping had been more fully developed. In the meantime the United
States would take all reasonable steps to encourage the re-entry of the
Asian Communist states into the international community.

10. Under these conditions it is believed that the failure of the United States to achieve its full objectives in South Vietnam would not cause other states of the region to despair or to capitulate. Their eventual fate of course would depend not on international guarantees and protection but primarily on their own future performance.

December 1968

# U.S. Policy Toward the Israel-Arab Conflict

## The Present Situation

The UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, represented a remarkable degree of agreement on the general principles of an Arab-Israel settlement. However, US policy thereafter was that detailed terms of settlement should be worked out by the parties themselves - with such help as they were willing to take from Ambassador Jarring, the UN mediator.

This policy has not worked. The governments chiefly concerned, Israel, the UAR and Jordan, were all under great internal or external pressures **not** to make significant concessions. They therefore mainly used Jarring as a postman to carry back and forth restatements of their own positions or loaded questions addressed to the other side. Jarring interpreted his mandate narrowly and took little initiative himself.

After eight or nine months it became completely clear that this strategy would not produce a settlement or prevent further conflict. The Arab governments and the Palestine "liberation movements", exasperated at Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory, multiplied their raids into Israel. Israel, infuriated at the constant violation of cease fire lines and murder of her citizens, retaliated with much more massive attacks on Arab territory, in some cases demolishing whole villages. By the summer of 1968 the situation was as bad as it had been in the spring of 1967 and only the military

-2-

weakness of the Arabs prevented a further war from breaking
out.

In the late summer, both the US and the USSR, alarmed
at the deterioration of the situation, brought behind-the-
scenes pressure on their respective friends to be more
accommodating. This pressure produced some slight concessions
from both sides and a few weeks of more serious negotiation
through Jarring while the Arab and Israeli Foreign Ministers
were in New York at the General Assembly. The concessions,
however, proved too meagre and ambiguous to produce results
and the negotiations have again been suspended. Jarring has
returned to his post at Moscow.

Meanwhile the violence on both sides has increased.
What is most alarming is the strengthened organization and
determination of the Palestine "liberation movements" and
their growing appeal to the younger generation. The ground
is being prepared for an Algerian or Viet Cong type guerilla
war. If this trend proceeds much farther even the Arab govern-
ments may not be able to stop it. Some Israelis have long
hoped for a separate West Bank Arab state which would cooperate
with them; the danger now is that, if such a state should
eventually emerge, it would be even more hostile to Israel then
are her present neighbors.

A word about Soviet policy, which is not easy to fathom
and which is I suspect not entirely clear to themselves. They
obviously want to strengthen their position in the Arab world;

they may believe they can establish more of a sphere of
influence there than I think the Arabs will permit. On the other
hand, the Soviets certainly do not want to get into a direct
confrontation with us in the Middle East and they realize, as
we do, that our respective friends there, if the present de-
terioration goes on, might drag both of us into a confrontation
which neither of us wants.

The Soviets have shown a willingness to work toward a
cooling off, perhaps towards a settlement. We do not know how
far they will go but they will certainly not push the Arabs
into what the latter would consider a surrender. It seems
most unlikely that either the Arabs or the Soviets would
agree to significant partial measurer - like an arms embargo-
while the Israelis still occupy Arab territory, or that the
Israelis will evacuate that territory until they get from
their neighbors a recognized status and guaranteed frontiers.

The stalemate is, therefore, still complete. However, as
I found in my visit to the Middle East last summer, it is by
no means impossible to draw up terms of settlement, based
squarely on the November 22 resolution, which would be fair
to both sides, would satisfy most of the legitimate aspirations
of both, and would be tolerable to moderates on both sides,
though most of them dare not publicly admit it.

## Possible Terms of Settlement

The following are illustrative terms of settlement which
might meet the main objectives of Israel, the UAR and Jordan:

-4-

1. An international compact reaffirming the status, sovereignty and frontiers of Israel, to which at least those two and perhaps other Arab states would subscribe without signing bilateral treaties with Israel.

2. International guarantees, perhaps as part of the same compact, of the sovereignty and frontiers of those states in the area which wish to participate.

3. Demilitarization of the Sinai from which Israel would withdraw. A UN observer post at Sharm el Sheik which would not be withdrawn without consent of Israel and the UAR. The Gaza strip to be placed under UN administration, unless and until the UAR and Israel agree on another disposition.

4. Demilitarization of the West Bank of the Jordan from most of which Israel would withdraw. Minor boundary rectifications in Israel's favor.

5. Jerusalem to remain united under a single elected municipal administration, but with sovereignty over its "boroughs" divided and a special status for its Holy Places. (This is essentially Major Kollek's plan and is the most difficult part of the settlement.)

6. Suez and the Strait of Tiran open to the shipping of all nations.

7. The Arab refugees - Israel to accept a token number, the remainder to be generously compensated by Israel and the

-5-

international community (primarily the US) and permanently
resettled elsewhere.

8. The Golan Heights to remain under Israeli occupation
until Syria is ready to negotiate a settlement.

9. A substantial UN observer force would remain indefinitely along frontiers and cease fire lines.

## Alternative US Policies

Essentially there are three alternative courses the US
could follow:

1. We could decide that a political settlement is hope-
less, support Israel in its occupation of presently held
territories, provide her with the armament she requests and,
by strengthening our commitments to her, make clear we would
assist her directly if she were attacked and unable to handle
the situation alone. This course would complete the alienation
of the Arabs from the US and would involve grave danger of
leading eventually to a direct US-Soviet confrontation. If
my fears are correct about the growing guerilla capabilities
of the Palestinians, this course would also not provide
security for Israel.

2. We could continue our present policy of supporting
Jarring's mission and of pressing Israel, the UAR and Jordan
to work out themselves, with his help, either a comprehensive
settlement or partial measures. This approach has not worked
over the past year and seems unlikely to work in the future.
If followed for long, it would tend to shade off into alternative
one.

3. The third alternative would be for the interested Great Powers - the US, USSR, UK and France - to endeavor to work out

-6-

a detailed implementation of the November 22 resolution which
would be fair to Israel, the UAR and Jordan and which these
three could be persuaded to accept.

Theoretically this could be done outside the UN. The
UN would, however, be the most desirable vehicle for such
action because of its past and present involvement, because
all of the states of the area are represented in it, and
because acting within its framework provides the best protection
against the inevitable charge that the US and USSR are imposing
a settlement.

If we choose this course the following steps would be
required: (a) private consultations with the USSR, UK and
France at the UN to determine whether they are agreed in
principle that this is the preferable course (there are
indications that they are agreed); (b) if these consultations
are satisfactory, private negotiations among the Four, with
the assistance of the Secretary General and Jarring, each of
the Four remaining in close consultation with the representatives
of Israel, the UAR, Jordan and such other interested states
as they wish; (c) if this process, which would undoubtedly
be prolonged and painful, were eventually successful in producing
what seemed to the Four a just and viable settlement, probably
more or less along the lines indicated above, they would bring
their full influence to bear to obtain the consent of the parties,
recognizing that no settlement can be imposed against the will
of the parties; (d) if the parties consented, one or more
Security Council resolutions and/or other international instru-
ments embodying the agreements and the guarantees would be
adopted.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, I INC.
THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK
AREA CODE: 212 LEhigh 5-3300

DEC 2 6 1968

December 26, 1968

Dear Henry:

Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing two papers. The
first sets forth my views on how we should proceed on the
Israel-Arab conflict and is essentially a summary of my
"Atlantic" article.

The second paper, prepared for our Discussion Group on
the Deployment and Control of Arms, is a distillation
of the most significant points emerging from our four
meetings so far. Incidentally it also represents my view,
not of what would be ideal, but of what might be practicable
in the way of arms negotiations, arms limitation and redeploy-
ments. This paper has not yet been reviewed by anyone and
may of course be substantially modified when the group reviews
it at our final meeting on January 8.

I shall do for you a little piece on Vietnam as soon as I
can find the time. I enclose, as a convenient summary of
my views on our security responsibilities generally, a copy
of my recent "Foreign Affairs" article on this subject.

If there is anything further I can do, please let me know.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Hotel Pierre
Room 1231
New York City

CONFIDENTIAL: Not for Publication
Not to be quoted or cited

# DEPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF ARMS

## Preface

This paper is a summary of the proceedings of a Discussion Group on the Deployment and Control of Arms which, with Carl Kaysen as Chairman and Charles Yost as Secretary, held five meetings at the Council on Foreign Relations between October 1968 and January 1969. A list of those who attended one or more of these meetings is attached. Views expressed in the summary are not attributed to any individual nor do they necessarily represent a consensus of the whole group. What they are is a distillation of the prevailing views expressed on the most significant subjects.

There were two meetings on the deployment and control of strategic arms, one on the deployment of general purpose forces in Europe, one on the deployment of general purpose forces elsewhere than Europe, and a final one to review this paper. The paper is broken down into three sections, one on each of the topics just mentioned.

## I

### Deployment and Control of Strategic Arms

#### Introduction

The central trend of thinking of the Group was that, in regard to strategic weapons, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are at a technological turning point, that the best place to stop the strategic arms race would be as close as possible to where we are now and that, if the present level is significantly exceeded, a prolonged, costly and dangerous escalation is probable.

-2-

In reviewing the past and drawing lessons for the future, the following related points were made. The United States has often in the past bought more insurance than a reasonable assessment of the risks would warrant, thereby producing reactions on the other side which have increased the risks. Our official pronouncements, often made to meet domestic criticisms or satisfy pressure groups, frequently caused the Soviets to respond disproportionately or unnecessarily. For example, we spent billions on air defense against a Soviet bomber threat which did not exist; we deployed great numbers of missiles to fill a "missile gap" which did not exist, and thereby induced the Soviets to match our deployment; the Soviet Talliun air defense system was probably prepared for defense against our B-70 which was not built. Now we are again overinsuring by proceeding with an ABM system and may soon be in a less favorable situation to stop the strategic escalation than we were a year ago.

Nevertheless, it would be clearly in the national interest of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to stabilize the arms race. As far as the United States is concerned, now that domestic priorities demand all possible defense savings, it is doubly important we not buy defense against threats which are unlikely to materialize or which can be limited by agreement. This is in fact a good time to negotiate because each side has about 1000 ICBM's, neither is yet starting a major new offensive system, the United States has as yet no ABM and the Soviets only a small poor one, the United States still has overall quantitative superiority but qualitatively the Soviets have caught up. If the United States adds to its present deployment over the next eight years only systems approved in principle ("thin" ABM and MIRV's) costs for strategic arms will rise from $10 billion to about $13 billion annually; if a new full-scale arms race should follow a failure

-3-
to negotiate or to agree, costs for such arms alone could rise to $30
billion or more annually.

A final reason why a U.S.-Soviet agreement to limit strategic arms
is imperative in the near future is that, in its absence, there is almost
certain to be a proliferation of nuclear weapons among other nations.

While most may be willing to sign the non-proliferation treaty now, several
have made clear that they would not feel bound indefinitely if the nuclear
superpowers do not themselves begin to reduce the deployment of these weapons.

## Inspection

We should neither overestimate nor underestimate our intelligence
capabilities in regard to monitoring either an arms agreement or an arms
race.

There has been no detectable shift in the Soviet refusal to permit
on-site inspection. Such inspection would not, however, be for the most
part valuable, since what we cannot detect by present means could probably
not be detected by any practical form of on-site inspection. There might
be isolated instances where it would be useful to avoid costly misunderstandings, as in the case of the Tallinn system.

On the other hand, our present intelligence systems are adequate
to observe fixed offensive and defensive installations; sufficient violations of an agreement to jeopardize U.S. security could be detected. There
is some question whether a MIRV capability could be detected, but it probably could be in the course/testing necessary to determine its reliability.

## ABM's -- Anti-missiles

Defensive missile systems are broken down into "area defense" and
"hard point," the former being either "thick" or "thin," the latter for

-4-

the defense of specific targets. There is some question whether it would be feasible for the United States (a) to stop with a "thin" system or (b) to distinguish between "thin" and "thick" in an adversary, though the latter would probably be possible.

The system is made up of interceptors and radars. We call our projected Sentinal system "thin" with 600 interceptors, but it has enough radars to allow thickening rather quickly -- a capability that would worry us if the Soviets had it. Since the system is not deployed, it would be possible to limit deployment of interceptors at any number, e.g. 100, 600 or 1000. The most convenient basis for agreement with the Soviets might be 100, roughly the equivalent of what we estimate the only Soviet ABM deployment, that around Moscow, to be. They would be likely to consider our projected deployment of 600 not as a limitation but as the signal for a new arms race.

If there is no agreement to limit, a race for "thick" ABM systems will be not only very costly but profoundly destabilizing, because it will tend constantly to cast doubt on the reliability of the second strike capability of both sides and because it will stimulate intensive competition in MIRV's.

the Defense Department,

It was noted that, in presenting the ABM program to the Congress, had first justified it as a "thin" system against the Chinese and then, in face of Congressional skepticism that a serious Chinese threat exists, had implied that the program in fact constituted the beginning of a "thick" system. It was reported that, in light of all the above considerations, there might be considerable sentiment, in the Senate at least, for not proceeding with the program.

-5-

## Offensive Missiles

The appropriate measure of security provided by strategic weapons is not relative numbers deployed but damage-inflicting capability as related to damage-limiting capability of the adversary. The second-strike damage-inflicting capability of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. is already sufficient to make a nuclear attack by either wholly irrational and destructive of itself as an organized society. This situation would not be materially changed by either or both sides doubling the number of weapons deployed.

The most practicable point at which to stop deployment of offensive land-based missiles would be where we are, at approximate parity. There could be a freeze on number of launchers and on "holes in the ground," which can be monitored by present means of surveillance. There might also be a freeze on the "throw weight" of missiles, by agreeing not to produce new missiles. Since new missiles would require testing, their development could be detected.

Mobile ground-launched missiles should, if possible, be prohibited. Large violations could probably be detected and small ones would not matter. There would, however, always be the possibility of production without deployment.

The invulnerability of the Polaris sea-launched missile is essential insurance to the United States in light of the possible future vulnerability of other systems. Experts see no prospect for surprising improvement in anti-submarine warfare which would threaten Polaris invulnerability but our research and development in this field should proceed diligently. There is some argument whether we should move from the Polaris to the Poseidon system, first, because of the cost of $4 billion and, second, because we

-6-

would be substituting an untested system for one of known reliability.

The rapidly expanding Soviet sea-launched missile program is disquieting but hardly surprising in view of their well-known tendency to follow and match us.

## MIRV's -- Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles

MIRV's are destabilizing because they can erode land-based deter-
rence. It would be better if they could be banned, in order to avoid a
new dimension to the arms race and new costs. On the other hand, warheads
cannot be inspected and, in enforcing a ban, we would have to rely on
agreed mutual monitoring of tests, which might not be completely reliable.

If the Soviets should continue deployment of ABM's, we should cer-
tainly want MIRV's to penetrate them. One possibility, if effective agree-
ment on MIRV's should not prove feasible, would be to proceed with the
development of Poseidons and/or other MIRV-bearing missiles but not deploy
them as long as the Soviets deploy no more ABM's.

## Budgets

Our present level of strategic arms costs about $10 billion annually.
An agreement with the Soviets to freeze strategic missiles and limit ABM's
to/projected Sentinel system, plus desirable increases in research and
development, would probably result in adding only about $3 billion annually
to this amount. If there are no agreements with the Soviets, it seems
likely we shall feel constrained over coming years to produce and deploy
new types of land and sea-launched offensive missiles, a "thick" ABM
system and a new intercontinental bomber aircraft. These could increase
costs of strategic weapons systems by about $20 billion per year and absorb
one-half our annual anticipated GNP increment.

Form of Agreements with Soviets

There is some question whether it would be preferable to seek
formal agreements or informal understandings reviewable annually. Latter
the
would be easier. On the other hand, / subject is so vital that Congressional
and public opinion might require a formal treaty. Also the Soviets might
suspect that the pursuit of informal understandings was merely an intelli-
gence probe on our part. Perhaps the best course would be to seek a
treaty but to make clear to public opinion from the outset that a treaty
may not be achievable and informal agreements would be an acceptable
fallback.

Summary Recommendations for Negotiation with Soviets

1. Freeze numbers of offensive missiles, land- and sea-launched, at as close to present level as possible.

2. Prohibit new missile systems and, if possible, agree on mutual monitoring of tests.

3. Prohibit mobile land-launched missiles.

4. Limit ABM deployment to no more than 100 interceptors.

5. If above are agreed, do not deploy MIRV's but continue development.

-8-

II

Deployment of General Purpose Forces in Europe

The United States has hitherto calculated that there was an appro-
ximate balance of forces -- ground forces, tactical aircraft and tactical
nuclear weapons -- along the line in Central Europe. Soviet divisions,
though more numerous, have been considered less effective than Western,
as have Soviet aircraft.

Present Western posture -- colloquially termed a "bear-trap" as
opposed to a "trip-wire" -- provides a force sufficiently "thick" all
along the line to require substantial Soviet pre-D-day mobilization and hence
warning time. Prior to Czechoslovakia, it was believed that U.S. troop
strength in Europe could safely be reduced by about 50,000 in the near
future. Several of our NATO allies were also reducing or planning to
reduce their forces on the line.

As a result of Czechoslovakia, some now believe the Soviets could
move more quickly in Europe than we had previously calculated. The time
previously estimated that they would require to prepare -- 4-6 weeks --
should perhaps be reduced 30-50 per cent.

Also as a result of Czechoslovakia, our European NATO partners
are increasing their defense budgets over levels previously anticipated,
but only marginally, more verbally than actually. There is little ques-
tion that they could and should bear more of the load relative to what
the United States bears, but it seems extremely unlikely that they will
do so unless they come to believe a Soviet attack on Western Europe much
more probable than they now do.

The basic question is that of Soviet intentions. Despite Czecho-
slovakia the European and the U.S. estimate still is that a Soviet move

-9-

against the West is unlikely. There remains the question how the West
would react to a Soviet move against Rumania or Yugoslavia.

If the situation in Europe remains relatively calm for some time,
pressure will resume in the United States and Europe to reduce forces on
the line, in the form either of mutual reductions negotiated with the
Soviets or of unilateral reductions. It would be prudent not to use
strong public rhetoric about the necessity of holding present troop levels,
since they may well be cut over the next few years. The United States
could follow the European example of retaining the number but reducing
the size of divisions by scaling down the logistical "tail"; this expedient
would cause great anguish to the U.S. Army. There are also other related
questions: (1) whether it is a more effective deterrent to maintain a
larger force in Europe or to move additional forces there as a warning in
time of crisis; (2) whether troops brought home should be disbanded to save
money or held as a ready reserve.

We have about 7000 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe; largely
placed there before anyone had a clear idea how they would be used. Some
feel the ground forces would be so hard pressed as to require the use of
nuclear weapons within a few days of D-day. On the other hand, it is hard
to see how very many could be used, as has been said, "without everything
coming apart at the seams." Even a not very large tactical use would be
hard to distinguish from a strategic use, and would be conducive to rapid
escalation. Under these circumstances the Germans and the British might
be the first to demand that they not be used at all.

A "nuclear free zone" would be hard to negotiate and hard to inspect.
The danger of accidents and consequent political risks would, however, be

-10-

reduced by removing nuclear weapons from aircraft and restricting them to
Pershing short-range missiles. The Europeans, despite their probable
reluctance to use them, consider them useful as a deterrent and would object
to their total withdrawal. Such withdrawal might also make the Europeans
more reluctant to agree to reductions in U.S. forces.

In the absence of new contingencies, the Sixth Fleet should be
maintained in the Mediterranean at approximately its present level.

Summary Recommendations

1. Maintain status quo for the present.

2. If the situation in Europe remains quiet over the next year, negotiate with our Allies modest reductions in ground forces (e.g., one division or logistical tails of several divisions), and sound out Soviets on larger mutual reductions.

3. Retain in ready reserve most of U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe.

4. Discuss promptly with our Allies removal of tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft and possible reduction in numbers retained for Pershings.

-11-

III

Deployment of General Purpose Forces Outside of Europe

If there is to be any major cut in the defense budget in the near
future, it will have to come out of the general purpose component planned
for Asian contingencies, since no substantial early cuts can be expected in
existing strategic systems, in general purpose forces in Europe, or in
research and development.

The present size of our general purpose force is calculated to deal
with 2½ simultaneous contingencies, a large one in Europe, a large one in
Asia and a small one elsewhere. If, after the Vietnam war is brought to a
close, we estimate that Communist China does not have the capability or the
intention to create in the next 5-8 years a major contingency requiring a
U.S. response, the U.S. might over time disband 4 to 5 divisions from the
strategic reserve with a saving of $5-7 billion annually. Such an estimate
of Chinese capabilities and intentions would not seem unwarranted in light
of conditions obtaining in China during the past three years.

In Korea the ROK forces can be built up quite quickly, after the
return of the two divisions from Vietnam, to be the main feature of a con-
vincing deterrent. Token U.S. ground forces and U.S. air support should
remain but the bulk of our two ground divisions might be withdrawn after
due psychological preparation, if North Korea does not undertake further
serious aggressive moves. We should support ROK forces from our Defense
rather than MAP budget.

We should maintain a substantial part of our bases in Japan and Oki-
nawa, but subject the latter to the same political arrangements as the former.

-12-

As to Thailand, if the Vietnam settlement is not too unfavorable and if as a part of it the Laos Accord of 1962 is reconstituted, the Thai Government can successfully resist insurgency with modest U.S. financial help and without U.S. combat forces. After our experience in Vietnam there is no likelihood in any case that U.S. public opinion would sanction a similar U.S. involvement in Thailand. Withdrawal of U.S. forces presently there, however, should be carefully timed in agreement with the Thais. There is no foreseeable need to introduce U.S. ground forces elsewhere in South or Southeast Asia.

The Seventh Fleet will continue to have a most important role in patrolling the Taiwan Straits and constituting a mobile deterrent up and down the coast of East Asia. It could probably be cut back after a Vietnam settlement to its pre-Vietnam level. A useful role for it may emerge in the Indian Ocean, but probably only if the Soviet naval presence there becomes significantly more obtrusive.

## Summary Recommendations

1. Examine utility and prudence of altering rationale governing strategic reserves to provide for meeting 1½ rather than 2½ simultaneous contingencies; if conclusion is positive, reduction over time of 4-5 divisions with eventual annual savings of $5-7 billion may be possible.

2. If North Korea does not threaten further serious aggression, build up ROK forces to point where U.S. forces can be phased down to tactical air support and token ground force.

3. After Vietnam settlement and after agreement with Thai Government, phase U.S. combat forces out of Thailand.

4. After Vietnam settlement, maintain Seventh Fleet in Western Pacific at approximately pre-Vietnam level.

Outstanding Senior Foreign Service Officers

John Tuthill, Ambassador to Brazil

Robert McBride, Ambassador to the Congo

Taylor Belcher, Ambassador to Cyprus M.E.

Tyler Thompson, Ambassador to Finland

Lewis D. Brown, Ambassador to Senegal

Marshall Green, Ambassador to Indonesia

Walworth Barbour, Ambassador to Israel M.E.

Harrison Symmer, Ambassador to Jordan M.E.

William Porter, Ambassador to Korea M.E.

William Sullivan, Ambassador to Laos

Fulton Freeman, Ambassador to Mexico

William Tyler, Ambassador to the Netherlands

Robert Miner, Ambassador to Sierre Leone M.E.

Leonard Unger, Ambassador to Thailand

Robert McClintock, Ambassador assigned to the State Department M.E.

Rodger Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State M.E.

John Baker, DCM, Czechoslovakia

Robert Blake, DCM, France M.E.

Dwight Dickenson, DCM, Morocco M.E.

Brewster Morris, Civilian Chief of Mission, Berlin

William Johnson, Canada M.E.

Donald Bergus, United Arab Republic M.E.

Martin Herz, Vietnam

Alfred Atherton, State Department M.E.

Thomas Bartlett, President, American University of Cairo (formerly with U.S. Mission to the UN) M.E.

A VIETNAM SETTLEMENT

I. Possibly Compatible Objectives

A political settlement in Vietnam will be possible
only if the minimum objectives of the two sides prove to be
compatible. The present postures of North Vietnam and the
United States, of the GVN and the NLF, while in each case some-
what less ambitious than a year ago, are still in each case
almost certainly more than the adversary would accept. A poli-
tical settlement will not occur unless, because the military and
political obstacles to victory for anyone are too great to be
overcome at an acceptable cost, minimum objectives on all sides
prove to be in fact substantially less than present postures
would indicate, and unless and until real minimum objectives are
reflected in substantial and painful concessions by all four
parties.

As far as our adversaries are concerned, it is clear
from repeated policy statements on their part that they do not
contemplate an early reunification of North and South Vietnam,
though that no doubt remains a long-term goal. It seems possible
that their minimum objective may be an assured position for the
NLF in the political life of South Vietnam, a position which is
at least commensurate at the outset with its present strength,

-2-

which will not after a settlement be subject to suppression or
curtailment by legal or illegal means, which on the contrary
will in the judgment of the NLF offer a reasonable prospect of
substantial and probably decisive improvement over time. It is
hard to believe that the DRV and the NLF, after all their sacri-
fices over the past twenty years, after their bitter disappoint-
ment with the 1954 settlement, after holding the United States
at bay for four and a half years, will now settle for less than
this, unless their military and political situation deteriorates
much more disastrously than we have grounds to expect it will.

On the other hand, it is far from clear, even if the
minimum objective of the DRV and the NLF is as just stated, how
significant a participation in the political life of South Vietnam
they would feel the NLF must have at the outset, in order not to
risk subsequent suppression and to offer in their eyes a reason-
able opportunity for ultimate political success. It is hard to
imagine them confiding their fate to the present GVN. On the other
hand, they may or may not insist on a "coalition government"
which would give them real control. Would they settle for a
"neutral government" if one could be formed from political figures
not recently committed to either side? Would they settle for a
"coalition" in which they played a minor role, as the Pathet Lao
did in Laos? Would they agree to abide by the results of free
elections? What would be the role and deployment of NLF armed
forces after a settlement? Would the NLF agree to an interna-
tional force exercising real control for a substantial time?

-3-

These key questions can be tested only by bold but patient
negotiation.

As far as the GVN is concerned, it is difficult to
see how their minimum objective could be other than to reduce
what may be inevitable NLF participation in political life to
the smallest possible proportions. They would be most reluctant
to recognize its status as a political party; they would be
adamantly opposed to its taking part, even in a minor way, in
any coalition government; they would presumably be equally
opposed to any "neutral government" which would supersede them-
selves.

As far as the United States is concerned, our basic
minimum objective is still undetermined. It is certainly at
least to prevent the takeover of South Vietnam by the DRV or
NLF while our forces are still there, and presumably also to
refuse a settlement which would rather clearly imply a takeover
shortly after our departure. If a takeover is excluded, we
would presumably have no strong preferences about the character
of South Vietnamese political life after a settlement, and
would be glad to leave that decision to the South Vietnamese.
On the other hand, there are a broad range of compelling reasons
external to Vietnam which constrain us to terminate the war, or
at least substantially reduce our participation in it, in the
very near future and hence not to permit an interminable
inconclusive negotiation.

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## II. The Negotiating Process

The exact form in which negotiations take place is not of vital importance. Prolonged bickering about seemingly petty points will increase the impatience of U.S. public opinion and make it less ready to support extended negotiation over more substantive matters. Arguments about the shape of the table should be brought to a close rapidly by arrangements embodying the U.S.-DRV understanding of two months ago, that is, that there would be four parties present but that the United States and GVN need not recognize the status of the NLF nor the DRV and NLF the status of the GVN.

There will be advantage, to the extent to which it may prove feasible, subsequently to break down the negotiation into two parallel bilateral processes, one between the United States and the DRV to concentrate primarily on the deescalation of military action and withdrawal of "foreign" forces, the other between the GVN and NLF to work out political arrangements inside South Vietnam. There may prove to be rather narrow limits, however, within which this separation will prove possible.

It seems most unlikely that the DRV will agree either to a cease-fire of any duration or, a fortiori, to any general withdrawal of its forces, i.e., its disengagement from the war, until what we presume to be its minimum objective, an assured and significant position for the NLF in the political life of South Vietnam, has been agreed. Success in the U.S.-DRV bilateral process will therefore in fact depend on success in the GVN-NLF bilateral process.

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As to the latter, however, even though the GVN has
admitted that the NLF is an "entity," it is difficult to believe
that it will concede to the NLF whatever the latter's minimum
objective may prove to be without the strongest sort of pressure
from the United States. Whether the United States will wish
to exert such pressure will depend on whether it considers the
NLF's minimum to be tolerable in the light of U.S. objectives,
but it is almost certain to find tolerable and perhaps attractive
(considering the strong pressures upon it to end the war) terms
which the present leaders of the GVN will oppose as hard and as
long as they possibly can.

Regardless, therefore, of what may be the form of
the negotiation, the political part of it, ostensibly between
the GVN and the NLF, will be the decisive part which will deter-
mine whether or not there is to be a settlement. If the United
States wishes and needs a settlement, it will be obliged to
participate behind the scenes in the political negotiation, and
very probably, in order to bring the GVN to accept what the
United States would consider tolerable terms, not only to
threaten to withdraw its support but in fact to begin to do
so by commencing to phase out its forces.

On the other hand, it is important to remember
the disastrous instability which followed our withdrawing our
support from Diem in 1963 without taking timely precautions to
prepare a viable alternative. From this point of view it would
be desirable, despite the more overt involvement in South Viet-
namese political affairs which would be involved, if Ambassador

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Bunker could be instructed at an appropriate stage to exercise
the same talents he displayed in the Dominican Republic to help
bring into being a new government in Saigon, more broadly
representative of the major non-Communist elements there, a
government which would be willing and able to reach a political
settlement with the NLF which both the United States and the
new government believed to be reasonable, tolerable and
honorable.

### III. Elements of a Settlement

If it should prove that the minimum short-term
objective of the DRV and the NLF is neither the reunification
of North and South Vietnam nor an immediate overt or covert
takeover of South Vietnam, but rather an assured and significant
position for the NLF in the political life of the South, the
elements of a political and military settlement, covering a
fairly wide spectrum of alternatives, are not too difficult
to lay out.

#### Political

1. There will probably be advantage in providing for new elections throughout South Vietnam at some appropriate stage, perhaps for a new constituent assembly since the old constitution is unlikely to be suitable to the new circumstances. This act will help to satisfy U.S., world and, to some extent, South Vietnamese opinion that there has been a genuine expression of self-determination and that the will of the majority is

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reflected in the settlement. The U.S. government should not
deceive itself, however, about the real import of elections in
Vietnam: most of the people will vote for whomever they feel
has, either locally or nationally, already received the "mandate
of heaven," that is, whomever they believe is or shortly will
be in charge.

2. It is of primary importance, therefore, under
whose auspices the elections are conducted. There seem to be
four theoretical alternatives: (a) the present GVN, (b) a new
"neutral" government acceptable to the main political groups in
South Vietnam, including the Buddhists, the Catholics, the sects,
the ARVN and the NLF, (c) a token "coalition" government which
would differ from (b) only in that the NLF would hold minor
portfolios in it, and (d) an international control body supported
by an international force and acting more or less as a plebiscite
commission.

It seems inconceivable that the NLF would agree to
(a). As to (d), while an international commission and force
could observe elections, in order actually to conduct them it
would have to be far larger and more effective than could pro-
bably be organized. The real choice therefore centers around
(b) and (c). Either would be very difficult to bring into being
but one very probably must be if there is to be peace. (B) is
obviously preferable to (c), but if (c) proves to be unavoidable
it need not be fatal, as the Laos experience demonstrates,
provided NLF representation is small and the key ministries,

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particularly Defense and Interior, are held by strong non-
Communists. Either (b) or (c) would provide sufficient diversity
in its composition so that the people in an election conducted
by such a government would feel free, at least in many parts of
the country, to vote as they actually preferred.

Military

1. If agreement can be reached on the broad lines
of a political settlement, it should then be possible to agree
on a general cease-fire.

2. The second step on the military side would be a phased withdrawal of "foreign forces," that is, forces of the DRV, U.S. and the latter's allies. It seems unlikely that the DRV will agree to withdraw entirely before the United States does. While we may prefer to keep some forces in Vietnam until we are sure the political settlement is being carried out, we would have to weigh this preference against the fact that it would probably also prolong the presence of DRV forces. It is also likely that the DRV and NLF will insist that new elections cannot be held until all foreign forces have been withdrawn. It might be possible partly to finesse some of these problems by arranging that some "foreign forces" remain temporarily in a few enclaves, separate from the mass of the population. It should be remembered, however, that a similar expedient in Laos in 1954 resulted in the de facto partition of the country. Probably the safest course, if there has been a decent political settlement, would be to withdraw all foreign forces within 12-18 months after the end of hostilities.

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3. The most difficult problem will probably be the disposition of indigenous South Vietnamese forces, ARVN, VC and irregulars on both sides. Certainly substantial numbers should, if possible, be demobilized and disarmed rapidly. On the other hand, both sides will, at least for some time, insist on keeping substantial numbers mobilized and armed, and will cache away additional supplies of arms for emergencies. There is no simple solution to this problem. Perhaps the most practicable would be to permit most of these forces to remain, for an undefined interim period, where they are when hostilities cease. However, it is unlikely that NLF forces can be wholly excluded from the principal cities.

4. If most of the projected military, and some of the political, arrangements are to have a chance of working, there will have to be an international control body and an international observer force, charged with supervision and implementation of the agreements. It would be desirable if this could be a UN commission and force, because of UN experience and impartiality in these matters, but the UN would probably not be acceptable because neither North nor South Vietnam, not to mention Communist China, are UN members. A second choice might be the present International Control Commission -- India, Canada, Poland -- expanded to include other Asians. The commission and its force cannot be fully effective if there continues to be a single-member veto, as there has been so far, but it will be extremely difficult to dilute it. If the force is to be effective,

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it should be given the widest authority over indigenous armed
forces that it is possible to negotiate.

Southeast Asia

A Vietnam settlement, if it is to reenforce stability
in the area, should also provide for: (a) full reconstitution
of the Laos agreement of 1962, including withdrawal from Laos
of all foreign forces; (b) renewed assurances to Cambodia. It
would also be desirable, if it were possible, to negotiate
broad international guarantees for the independence and integrity
of all the states of the region, but this would require a much
broader negotiation, including the Soviet Union and Communist
China, than is now contemplated.