DRAFT

Mr. Louis Shecter

Dear Mr. Shecter:

Thank you for your letter of April 8, 1963 urging
ratification of the Genocide Convention.

As you note in your letter both Senator Javits
and Senator Keating have supported ratification of the
Convention. I endorse their stand wholeheartedly and
believe that the Convention should be reported out of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it has been pending
since 1949, and voted on by the full Senate.

Sincerely yours,

DRAFT

Mr. Louis Specker

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where it has been bending

As you note in your letter both Senator Javita

Thank you for your letter of April 8, 1963 asking

Dear Mr. Specker:

Sincerely yours,

June 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM TO: GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

I agree substantially with the enclosed memorandum
from Representative Hosmer. This particular line of argument
is not especially sophisticated. However, its basic point
seems to be correct. We have withdrawn step-by-step towards
the Soviet position on nuclear testing. A complete ban on
testing seems to me uninspectable. A good way out might be
to fix an upper limit on fall-out and assign questions to
countries. The risk of evasion will be minimal. Our weapons
program would not be inhibited. It would represent a new
departure. I have drafted a letter to Representative Hosmer
which you might consider sending.

graduation. I have written a letter to Representative Hooper
program would not be implemented. It would represent a new
condition. The risk of escalation will be minimal. Our weapons
to fix an upper limit on tail-out and exceedances to
testing seems to me unacceptable. A good way out might be
the Soviet position on nuclear testing. A complete plan on
seems to be correct. We have withdrawn step-by-step towards
the not especially sophisticated. However, its basic point
from Representative Hooper. The particular line of argument
I agree substantially with the enclosed memorandum

FROM: HENRY V. KISSIMINER

MEMORANDUM TO: GOVERNOR MERCY V. ROCKKEFILTER

June 28, 1963

July 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO: Debbie Brown

FROM: Diane Van Wie

Following are the letters which we discussed
on the phone:

Dr. Richard G. Stoneham 6/6/63 Complains of persecution of Buddhists in Vietnam

✓ Tran Van Tung 6/14/63 Religious persecution in South Vietnam

✓ Enrique Fletcher 6/19/63 Requests message endorsing Pres. Lopez Mateos for the Nobel Peace Prize

Andrew Brichant 1/19/63 Comments on Kashmir issue

Andrew Brichant 1\19\63 Comments on Kadhair taane
the Nopal Peace Prize
Brea. Lober Mateo for
Redneata message endorating 6\19\63
Enrique Fletcher 6\19\63
Tran Van Tung 6\14\63
South Vietnam
Religious peraecution in
of Boddhists in Vietnam 6\6\63
Complaints of peraecution

on the phone:

FROM: Diane Van Wie
TO: Debbie Brown

MEMORANDUM

July 9, 1963

DRAFT

Mr. Enrique Fletcher Breton
Paseo de la Reforma 393-701
Mexico D.F.

Dear Mr. Fletcher:

Thank you for your letter of June 19th. As an "Ambassador of Good Will" you have performed a most careful service in the cause of common understanding between the peoples of the Mexican Republic and the United States. The friendship between our two countries is enduring testimony to the indestructable bond which exists among all freedom-loving peoples.

I hope that you will extend the warm and affectionate
greetings of an old friend to your distinguished President,
Adolfo Lopes Mateos. His dedication to world peace has been an
inspiration to all the peoples of this Hemisphere. He has served
all mankind no less than he has served your great Republic.

Sincerely yours,

7/17/63

5/13/63

countries is enduring testimony to the indestructible bond which
Republio and the United States. The friendship between our two
cause of common understanding between the peoples of the Mexican
of Good Will," you have performed a most careful service in the
Thank you for your letter of June 19th. We an "Ambassador

Dear Mr. Fletcher:

Mexico D.F.
Base de la Reforma 393-101
Mr. Enrique Fletcher Bretex

DRAFT

July 16, 1963

To: HAK
From: DLB

Re: NAR reply to Senor Fletcher's letter asking for a message of good will for the President of Mexico and a recommendation of him for the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize.

NAR should certainly not be recommending people for the Nobel prize. Specifically he should not recommend Lopes Mateos, whose government has not been entirely cooperative in American efforts to isolate the Castro regime. I would suggest the following reply which says all the nice things but ignores the question of the Nobel Peace Prize.

Draft Reply:

Thank you for your letter of June 19th. As an "Ambassador of Good Will" you have performed a most important service in the cause of common understanding between the peoples of the Mexican Republic and the United States. The friendship between our two countries is enduring testimony to the indestructable bond which exists among all freedom-loving peoples.

22 WEST 55TH STREET

July 17 1963

To: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: Debby Brown (for John Deardourff)

Attached wire from Andrew Brichant now remains only pending correspondence that should be answered by you. (Was dated January 19, 1963) Diane VanWie requested that you send response directly to her in Albany.

Thank you.

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

500P EST JAN 19 63 SYA271 0A200
0 BHA065 NL PD AR BEVERLY HILLS CALIF 19
GOVERNOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER, MSGR DLY GET SIG
GOVERNORS MANSION ALBANY NY
RE PAKISTANI APPEALS FOR WESTERN HELP IN KASHMIR ISSUE.

MAY I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER RECOMMENDING PUBLICLY UNITED STATES URGE BOTH INDIA AND PAKISTAN SIGNED MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION TREATY TO WHICH THIS COUNTRY AND BRITAIN WOULD BE SIGNATORIES, THEREBY IN EFFECT GUARANTEEING FRONTIERS OF PAKISTAN AGAINST WHAT LATTER BELIEVES IS REAL THREAT FROM INDIA MADE MORE OMINOUS AS RESULT RECENT WESTERN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

RE KASHMIR SPECIFICALLY IF PLEBISCITE APPROVED ORIGINALLY BY INDIA AND UNITED NATIONS PROVES IMPRACTICABLE COULD YOU SUGGEST CREATION OF CONDOMINIUM IN KASHMIR HEADED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION PRESIDED BY UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVE WITH INDIAN,

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

PAKISTANI, AND LOCAL KASHMIRI MEMBERS AS MINIMUM.

NET RESULTS WOULD BE FIRSTLY, MAKING POSSIBLE DEFENSE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT WHICH WITHOUT PAKISTAN IS INDEFENSIBLE.

SECONDLY, WE WOULD SHOW OUR ALLIES THROUGHOUT WORLD WE BACK THEM WHERE THEY HAVE LEGITIMATE NEED FOR OUR ASSISTANCE. THIRDLY, PAKISTAN WOULD BE LESS INCLINED TO SLIP FURTHER INTO RED CHINESE ORBIT, A TENDENCY RECENTLY MANIFESTED BY CHINESE PAKISTANI FRONTIER AND TRADE AGREEMENTS. FOURTHLY, WE WOULD SHOW WORLD UNITED STATES SEEKS RECONCILLIATION OF NATIONS THROUGH HARD-HEADED PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL GIVEN PROBLEMS.

ABOVE REASONS AMPLY JUSTIFY IN MY OPINION ANY PRESSURE WE PLACE ON INDIA TO AGREE TO PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF DISPUTE. I WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT.

August 5, 1963

To: HAK
From: DLB

Re: Allott proposal to establish provisional Cuban government at Guantanamo; and NAR reply to Allott letter on subject.

1. Senator Allott's proposal, briefly, is as follows:

a. We would pledge our firm support to a "unified interim (provisional) government" of Cuba, made up of representative refugees.

b. We would give to this provisional government land at Guantanamo to establish headquarters.

c. We would, at the earliest possible moment, withdraw recognition of the Castro regime (we have thus far only ended diplomatic relations) and extend recognition to the provisional government at Guantanamo as the legitimate government of the Cuban people.

d. We would insist that the provisional government be only an interim government and would request that its officers deposit "with the Secretary-General of the OAS their undated resignations, to become effective when the Cuban people, by free elections, reassert their own ultimate sovereignty."

e. We would retain our full treaty rights and our perpetual leasehold on Guan-tanamo; and if there were legal complications concerning our right to per-mit the establishment of the Cuban government at Guan-tanamo we would be able to renegotiate the agreement accordingly with the legitimate Cuban government which we had just recognized.

f. We would continue the policy of training free Cubans in the U.S. armed forces. These men would be the core of the Cuban military effort against the Castro regime.

g. "We will, at every step in this process, seek the fullest possible collabora-tion and support of the OAS community....But with or without such collabora-tion, this NAtion will honor its pledge with every necessary resource."

h. This proposal is primarily designed to encourage the Cuban refugees to unite behind strong leadership of their own choosing.

i. This policy of liberation would be accompanied by an intense effort to keep all outside influence (arms or otherwise) out of the area, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine.

2. The goal of uniting the refugees into a cohesive force is, of course, a worthy one, but this plan does not seem to hold any greater promise of doing that than previous efforts.

3. There is no obvious reason why we should expect that a responsible refugee regime would be recognized as such by all the OAS members.

4. Allott suggests that this plan would permit the Cuban refugees to handle their own liberation without shedding a drop of American blood. This is highly doubtful, for surely Castro could not allow the refugee insurgents a sanctuary from attack directly on Cuban soil. Guantanamo would, of course, be attacked and the United States would automatically be in the middle of it.

[Y]

DLB to HAK -- Re Allott Cuba Proposal -- page 2

5. Obviously the Guantanamo lease would not permit such activity. The argument that it could be made legal by renegotiating the agreement with the provisional regime at the time of recognition is nonsense.

6. We need not be too concerned with legal niceties in accomplishing our purposes in Cuba, but this action would concern all countries where we presently have bases and would be dragged out over a long period of time. If you are going to do something which people don't like it is much better to do it quickly and get it over with.

7. The use of the Guantanamo naval base for this purpose would definitely not be popular in the OAS. It would stir up once more the whole question of the Panama Canal and U.S. rights.

8. The proposal does, however, open up a new area for thought -- the possibility of establishing a provisional government in exile, which could be the rallying point of the anti-Castro movement. It might be worthwhile thinking about giving some small U.S. island in the Caribbean to such a government for this purpose. Ideally it might be preferable for the U.S. to give such an island to the OAS and for the OAS to give it to a provisional Cuban regime, but it is unlikely that the OAS could agree on who should form the government even if the refugees could agree which is doubtful.

9. Allott's proposal has received broad Republican support in the Senate. It probably would not be wise to dismiss it, although to support it would be irresponsible.

DRAFT REPLY:

Thank you for your letter of July 25th which contained your proposal that the United States grant a home to a provisional Cuban regime at the Guantanamo naval base.

You should be commended for taking the initiative in making this proposal, which is both interesting, imaginative and provocative. It deserves thorough study by the Administration and a thorough response from the State Department. In view of the Administration's apparent inaction in confronting the Cuban problem, it may be that only through debate on proposals such as yours can we spur on the State Department to adopt constructive policies to remove the Communist military base from the Western Hemisphere.

Three aspects of your proposal seem to me to be of particular importance. First, I agree entirely with your position that we must act re-

DRAFT

Mr. Gordon Allott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Allott:

You should be commended for taking the initiative in making
this proposal, which is both interesting, imaginative and provocative.
It deserves thorough study by the Administration and a thorough
response from the State Department. In view of the Administration's
apparent inaction in confronting the Cuban problem, it is only
through debate on proposals such as yours that we can spur on the
State Department to adopt constructive policies to remove the Communist
military base from the Western Hemisphere.

Three aspects of your proposal seem to me to be of particular
importance. First, I agree entirely with you that we must act re-
sponsibly to encourage the Cuban refugees to forge themselves into a
unified front against the Castro regime. This is, of course, an
absolute prerequisite if Cuba is to be returned to her people.

Secondly, you have emphasized an important point when you stress
that any anti-Castro organization if it is to form the nucleus of the
immediate post-Castro government must be committed to immediate and
free elections on the island.

free elections on the island.

immediate host-Castro government must be committed to immediate and
that any anti-Castro organization it is to form the nucleus of the
Secondly, you have emphasized an important point when you stress
absolute preeminence in Cuba is to be returned to her people.

unified front against the Castro regime. This is, of course, an
abandonment to encourage the Cuban refugees to forge themselves into a
importance. First, I agree entirely with you that we must act re-

military phase from the Western Hemisphere.

State Department to adopt constructive policies to remove the Communist
through debate on proposals such as yours that we can abut on the
abherent inaction in confronting the Cuban problem, it is only
reasonable from the State Department. In view of the Administration's
It deserves thorough study by the Administration and a thorough
the proposal, which is both interesting, imaginative and provocative.

regime at the Guantánamo naval base.

proposal that the United States grant a home to a provisional Cuban
 proposal that your letter of July 25th which contained your

Dear Mr. Vliott:

Washington, D. C.
United States Senate
Mr. Gordon Vliott

DRAFT

Mr. Gordon Allott

DRAFT - Page 2

Third, your suggestion that our policy toward Cuba be undertaken with the collaboration of the Organization of American States is extremely well taken. It is vitally important that we recognize that the lesson of the Cuban experiment with Soviet imperialism might easily be lost upon the countries of Latin America if the United States approached the Cuban problem in a manner which took no account of the feelings, aspirations and desires of the peoples of Latin America.

The use of the Guantanamo naval base as a home for a provisional Cuban government is the aspect of your proposal about which gives me some concern. To establish a government in exile in Cuba under the protection of American guns would seem to me to be likely to have very unfavorable psychological consequences. It should be recognized that the countries of Latin America might have reason to think that this approach is reminiscent of earlier twentieth century policies which have been the source of some discord between the United States and its southern neighbors.

I would be hesitant about concluding that Guantanamo can be used as you have suggested without causing the loss of American lives. It seems unlikely that Castro would allow a militant movement against his government a sanctuary on Cuban soil. We would have to expect military, or at least air, attacks against the base.

military, or at least air, attacks against the peace.

The Government a sanctuary on Cuban soil. We would have to expect it seems unlikely that Castro would allow a militant movement against us as you have suggested without causing the loss of American lives.

I would be pleasant about concluding that Guantánamo can be

Twenty-first century policies which have been the source of some discord have reason to think that this approach is reminiscent of earlier It should be recognized that the countries of Latin America might to be likely to have very unfavorable bayological consequences. In Cuba under the protection of American States would seem to me which gives me some concern. To establish a Government in exile atonalibai Cuban Government is the aspect of your proposal about The use of the Guantánamo naval base as a home for a bro-

of Latin America.

no account of the feelings, aspirations and desires of the peoples United States approached the Cuban problem in a manner which took might easily be lost upon the countries of Latin America if the that the reason of the Cuban experiment with Soviet imperialism extremely well taken. It is vitally important that we recognize with the collaboration of the Organization of American States is Third, your suggestion that our policy toward Cuba be undertaken

Mr. Gordon Elliott

DRAFT - Page 3

Mr. Gordon Allott

DRAFT - Page 3

I hope that these remarks prove to be useful to you on a
private basis. Once again, my congratulations on your efforts
to urge the Administration to adopt a positive foreign policy
in regard to Cuba.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Gordon Viott

DRAFT - Page 3

simply yours,

in regard to Cuba.

to urge the Administration to adopt a positive foreign policy
private policies. Once again, my congratulations on your efforts
I hope that these remarks prove to be useful to you on a

DRAFT

With kind regards.

Thank you for sending me

Dear Gerry:

Washington, D.C.
Special Advisor to the Secretary of State
Mr. Gerard C. Smith

Sincerely,

2
with these understandings of the Senate.

Among the understandings which I believe should be included in the Senate
resolution of consent are the following:

(1) That the language of the treaty in no way prohibits the use of nuclear weapons to repel aggression anywhere.

REVISED ANSWER - TEST BAN TREATY

(2) That the Administration will take every feasible step to preserve the ability of our military establishment to deter and defeat Communist aggression anywhere including:

(a) Utilization to the full of the possibilities of underground nuclear testing for continued weapon development.

(b) Vigorous support of the research and development programs of our weapons laboratories.

(c) Vigorous pursuit of research and development in the vital area of anti-missile defense, and

(d) Preparation of a series of stand-by tests in the atmosphere for the contingency of cancellation of the treaty.

(3) That eventual adherence to the treaty by the authorities now in power in East Germany in no sense constitutes a recognition of that regime or an acceptance by the United States of the partition of Germany.

(4) That effective steps will be taken to avoid being caught short again by Soviet duplicity as occurred when Russia broke the nuclear test moratorium in 1961, including the installation of a space surveillance system which would detect nuclear testing in outer space.

(5) That under the language of the treaty the United States will be able to explode nuclear devices underground for peaceful purposes both within the United States and in other countries, at their request, provided that such explosions do not cause debris to be issued beyond the territorial boundaries of the countries in which such testing might take place.

In addition to these understandings, which, as I have said, should be included in the text of the resolution of consent, I believe that during its consideration of the treaty, the Senate should call upon the Administration to take positive and immediate steps to strengthen the unity and vitality of the NATO alliance, which has been further weakened by the manner in which negotiations on the treaty were conducted. These steps should include full consultation with our allies in advance of any further negotiating and a renewed effort to resolve disputes concerning NATO nuclear strategy so that the legitimate national aspirations of close allies are not jeopardized by the treaty.

Henry A. Knaufager

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

on Latin America.
can file here for possible use in a speech
various (God sent me this) in our Latin Ameri-
th report on Cuba from Dr. Manuel V. de
digest of the speech by Felipe Herrera and
I am keeping the Vogt article, the

until I received your note of September 11th.
realizing you wanted a reply to the Vogt letter
Oeporn, Mr. Staatsen and Mr. Vogt. I had not
signature of replies to the letters from Mme.
Enclosed are drafts for the Governor's

Dear John:

New York, New York
33 West 22nd Street
Mr. John Deardourff

September 12, 1963