Before discussing the efficacy of recent negotiations and their
impact on the U. S. strategic problem, it may be worthwhile to state a
number of propositions applicable to any effort to achieve an international
settlement: (For purposes of discussion these will be advanced rather
dogmatically.)

Each international settlement represents a compromise between a
state's vision of itself and the vision of it by other powers. No power can
doubt its own good faith -- it is the vehicle of its social cohesion. But
equally no power can make its survival dependent on the good faith of
another sovereign state -- this would be an abdication of the responsibility
of statesmanship. To itself a nation appears as an expression of justice
and the more so the more spontaneous its pattern of social obligation.
To others it is a force or an expression of will. Could a power achieve
all its wishes, it would strive for absolute security -- a world-order free
from the consciousness of foreign problems. But since absolute security
for one power means absolute insecurity for all others, it is never
obtainable as part of a negotiated settlement. There exists therefore an
inherent incommensurability between a state's domestic and its inter-
national experience. Domestically a state's action is determinate --
its action is limited only by its domestic legitimization and its technical
feasibility. But internationally, a state's action is contingent -- it is
restricted by the notions of justice and the strategic interests of other
powers.

An international settlement, therefore, never results from anything so simple as a "willingness to come to an agreement" or "good will" -- although it may appear so to posterity. Unless it takes into account the minimum requirements of security of a great power -- the possibility of conducting an independent foreign policy -- it will of necessity prove ephemeral. And unless the domestic structures of the negotiating governments (expressed in their notions of "justice"), are sufficiently commensurable, negotiations tend to degenerate either into platitudes or into stage plays for the benefit of the uncommitted to attach them to one or the other of the contenders.

I have dealt in a previous paper with the relationship between security and the stability of a settlement. It can be summarized that if any state achieves preponderant power, the peace will be precarious not only because of the feeling of insecurity it engenders, but because of the impossible demands thus placed on the self-restraint of the power which possesses or believes it possesses superior strength. But a relative equilibrium of power may nevertheless be precarious if the domestic structures of the negotiating powers are sufficiently different. If the domestic notions of justice of the contending powers are incommensurable, they will never be able to agree on what constitutes a "reasonable" demand or they will not be able to "sell" a theoretically achievable compromise domestically. It is therefore futile to speak of "secret diplomacy" or a "better atmosphere" unless the two above prerequisites are met. Secret diplomacy could function only when there was a prior agreement

-2-

in fundamentals, a general acceptance of the legitimacy of the international
order. And even then, the Congress of Vienna nearly broke up in a war.

It should be plain that Geneva has settled none of our security
problems -- indeed, it has magnified them. The Soviet hold on Central
Europe has not been weakened; the Chinese claims in Asia have not been
reduced. And all the time we are approaching a point of nuclear parity in
which the Soviet strategic advantage can be translated into effective
political pressure. The Soviet gain at Geneva is therefore plain --
they have gained time. Has there been a corresponding change in the
favor of the U. S. position?

Before answering the strategic question, we might inquire whether
Geneva may have brought about a lessening of the ideological conflict. This
conflict can be summarized by contrasting the U. S. and the Soviet view
of the individual and of history. The U. S. view can be summarized in
these propositions:

1.) human life has no significance without freedom and without the guidance of a transcendent concept ("laws of nature and nature's God");

2.) the international community, in order to insure individual
liberties, will be ordered under the principle of national
self-determination, and the American outlook upon the
inter-national scene is determined (for better or for worse
I would say) by the symbolic life force of the Wilsonian
principle;

3.) an international system of security must preside over the
international community in order not only to keep the
world at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations
to determine themselves and backward nations to evolve
towards higher levels of material well-being and individual
freedom.

-3-

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The international system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedoms, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedoms, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedoms, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for the\nfreedom, towards the highest level of material well-being and individual\nfreedom, to determine themselves and backhand unilaterally to a degree\nworld at peace under law but also to allow smaller nations\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security in order not only to keep the\ninternational community in order not only to keep the\ninternational system of security must provide for 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The Soviet view contains these elements:

1.) The notion of a scientifically predetermined course of history in which political power and leadership belonged legitimately only to those who understood the scientific key, i.e., the true Marxists.

2.) The notion that the achievement of certain democratic values, in the humanistic sense, would automatically accompany the transition from capitalism to socialism.

3.) The notion that all societies would pass, by means of class struggles, from feudal to bourgeois-capitalist to socialist stages, in each stage of which political power would be exercised on behalf of a dominating class; and that the process would end with the mystically enunciated withering away of the state upon the emergence of a classless society.

Nothing that has happened at Geneva indicated a modification of these basic ideological antimonies. The fact that the Soviet rulers appear more conciliatory is as consistent with a tactical maneuver to gain time as with a fundamental change in attitude. No statesman has the right to run the risk of Soviet duplicity in the absence of any _concrete_ transformation of the strategic situation and in the face of a growing Soviet nuclear capability. Moreover, if the Soviets do in fact face economic difficulties, it would be a major and perhaps disastrous error were the U. S. to permit them to escape their dilemmas by means of conciliatory platitudes.

In this situation the U. S. confronts a dual task: to maintain the pressure on the U.S.S.R. but to do so in a manner which will not disintegrate the Western Alliance. The U. S. can maintain the pressure on the U.S.S.R. economically by keeping the Soviets in an armament race and diplomatically by taking the initiative at the series of conferences which began at Geneva. But this diplomatic initiative should not be

-4-

confused with propagandistic gimmicks. It should confront the Soviets
with a series of contingencies which will make withdrawal seem the
lesser risk. Thus the failure of every negotiation should be used as a
means to step up the cold war and the armaments program. In this
manner too, we will give an incentive to our European allies to bring
pressure on the U.S.S.R. as the only way of escaping an armament race.
The U. S. proposals should be made in a series of phases, the acceptance
of each serving as the condition for further negotiations.

a.) As a first step the U.S.S.R. should be invited to join a
reciprocal declaration renouncing the use of force in the settlement of
disputes, including the Formosa Straits. If they refuse, we should reject
all further negotiations.

b.) The U. S. should aggressively push its German program along
the lines of the F.P.R.I. proposal.

c.) The U. S. should insist on the disarmament proposals of Geneva.

d.) The U. S. should propose concrete conventions liberalizing
travel behind the Iron Curtain.

e.) The U. S. should be prepared to make a "package proposal"
for Asia along the lines of Dr. Elliott's paper. We should not permit the
Chinese to discuss Formosa apart from Korea and Indo-China.

It may be argued that the U.S.S.R. has no incentive to accept such
a program. This is true if we attach no sanction to a failure of negotiations.
If, however, the penalty for failing to agree is a continued armaments race

-5-

and stepped-up pressure on the satellites, the U.S.S.R. economic
difficulties might well multiply.

If the U.S.S.R. does agree, the diplomatic situation will again
be "fluid." This has a dual aspect:

1.) As long as the lines are rigidly stabilized the Soviet strategic
advantage in conventional strength remains an ever-present threat, and
the Soviet control problem is greatly simplified. As long as the present
Soviet sphere is considered sacrosant, any negotiation will be beside the
point. The very fact of negotiation phased package deals will therefore greatly
complicate the Soviet control problem by increasing the nervousness of the
satellites. (See, for example, the need for Bulganin's reassurance of the
East Germans after Geneva).

2.) A concession by the Soviets, for example, on East Germany,
may start a process they will find it difficult to control. Thus, an
acceptance of a package deal on Germany may shake the whole satellite
structure. A package deal in the Formosa Straits may strain Sino-Soviet
relations.

But all of this is conditional on the psychologic al climate in the
U. S. If we permit ourselves to be lured into complacency by conciliatory
statements, if we do not increase or even reduce our military expenditures,
if we do not use the failure of negotiations as a means to step-up the cold
war -- then we may in a decade confront isolation and a preponderant
Sino-Soviet bloc.

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8-4-55