Newsweek

Dancing with Hillary at one of the Inaugural balls

## Clinton Seizes the Moment

With a muted call to sacrifice and roars of jubilation, Bill Clinton and his Friends moved into the White House. After 12 years of Republican rule, power passed to another party, a new generation and an altogether different crowd of people, exulting in their diversity. “This is our time,” declared the 42d (and third youngest) president, and what a time it was—made for television and picture

perfect. A special photo portfolio captures the high-concept, down-home Inaugural blowout. **Special Report: Page 24**

One of the first issues Clinton chose to confront was the question of gays in the military, symbolized by the plight of Keith

Meinhold, the homosexual sailor who was kicked out of the navy and then ambiguously reinstated. Clinton wanted to make good on a campaign promise to lift the ban against gays. But he faces strong opposition in the ranks and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. **Society: Page 52**

Gay sailor Keith Meinhold

Former nominee Baird

Another backlash doomed his nominee for attorney general. Zoë

Baird was swamped by public anger over her past employment of illegal aliens for child-care and chauffeuring chores. Even women's groups chose not to fight for a nominee whose freshly defined offense is widespread among wealthy working couples. **National Affairs: Page 32**

## Special Report

<table><tr><td>Glory day</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Hoping for passion</td><td>30</td></tr></table>

## National Affairs

<table><tr><td>Zoë Baird: off the books, out of the chair</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>The parent trap</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>On the road to power</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>The FBI's Leona Helmsley?</td><td>39</td></tr></table>

## International

<table><tr><td>Planning a plague?</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>Clinton and the world, by Henry A. Kissinger</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>Iraq: war, rebuilding, more war</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Havel: "There is a kind of absurdity"</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td>Robert J. Samuelson</td><td>51</td></tr></table>

## Society

<table><tr><td>Gays and the military (the cover)</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>The navy's grisly murder mystery</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>Diary: a sailor's private torment</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>What's fair in love and war</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Media:</strong> NBC's wonder boy takes on the Evening News</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>In Pittsburgh, a happy return for ink stains</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Books:</strong> Behind the scenes at the end of the cold war</td><td>62</td></tr><tr><td>A philosopher's death wish</td><td></td></tr></table>

## Lifestyle

<table><tr><td><strong>Trends:</strong> Back to Wiggy For gamines' gams, it's grunge gear</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Mind:</strong> Fans who love too much</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Television:</strong> Practicing bad medicine</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Religion:</strong> From Rome, glittering prizes</td><td>67</td></tr></table>

## Business

<table><tr><td>Our fearful fliers</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>How David Stockman would cut the budget</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>How the "100 Best Companies" got there</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>Microsoft's workaholic wunderkind</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Loose Change</strong></td><td>72</td></tr></table>

## Departments

<table><tr><td>Periscope</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Letters</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>My Turn</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Perspectives</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Transition</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>Meg Greenfield</td><td>76</td></tr></table>

Cover: Photo by Karen Kuehn—Matrix.

Letters to the Editor should be sent to NEWSWEEK, 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022, and subscription inquiries to NEWSWEEK, The NEWSWEEK Building, Livingston, N.J. 07039, or call 1-800-634-6850 for change of address and 1-800-631-1040 for all other inquiries. NEWSWEEK (ISSN 0028-9604), February 1, 1993, Volume CXXI, No. 5, is published weekly, $41.08 a year, by NEWSWEEK, Inc., 444 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022. Richard M. Smith, Editor-in-Chief and President; Tina A. Ravitz, Secretary; Joanne O'Rourke Hindman, Controller. Second Class postage paid at New York, N.Y., and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTERS: Send address changes to NEWSWEEK, The NEWSWEEK Building, Livingston, N.J. 07039.

© 1993 NEWSWEEK, INC.: 444 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993 3

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INTERNATIONAL

WESLEY BOXCE—JB PICTURES

The American will to convert foes to the cause of peace: U.S. Marines at a Somali military base on the eve of their arrival into Baidoa

# Clinton and the World

## He must find a role for an America that can neither dominate nor retreat

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

When President Clinton spoke to The New York Times a week before his Inauguration about how to deal with Sadam Hussein, he said that he was a Baptist, and he believed in the possibility of conversion. This comment was widely criticized as evidence that the new president might not possess the diplomatic acumen required to function effectively on the world scale.

In fact, Clinton's attitude was not very different from that of Franklin Roosevelt, who, in the 10th year of his presidency, after Stalin killed as many Russians as the Germans had, proclaimed that the Soviet leader was a reasonable person "possessed of stalwart good humor." At the Teheran summit, Roosevelt went a step further by referring to Stalin as Uncle Joe and reporting afterward

that "the ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers."

Clinton's remarks reflected an old American nostalgia for the conversion of adversaries as the key to peace. As the only nation explicitly created to vindicate the idea of liberty, America has always believed that her values were relevant to the rest of mankind. That conviction has been reflected in two somewhat contradictory impulses. One is that these values can best be served by concentrating on their perfection at home—this was the basis of isolationism. The other is a sense of missionary obligation to crusade to transform the world in our image.

The belief in conversion explains why President Reagan, who began by talking about the Soviet Union as an evil empire, later came to pride himself on having brought Gorbachev to an appreciation of democratic values. At various stages of the postwar period, a number of other opponents have been similarly described as ei-

ther having almost converted to the American viewpoint or as having realized that economic cooperation and democratic progress were more important than political gain. It was a replay of the fantasy often found in American movies, where a villain finds sudden illumination due to some dramatic event and, from one day to the next, turns benign.

President Clinton seems to believe in both strands of this tradition—the belief that America should focus on affairs at home, and that she should promote democracy when she ventures abroad. And he is far from unique in that respect. Therefore, the real issue is not what he may or may not know about the fine points of diplomacy, something he is in any case sure to learn on the job. His challenge as president will be to understand that, for the first time in her history, America now finds herself in a world which she cannot dominate, but from which she also cannot simply withdraw.

NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993 45

INTERNATIONAL

The cold-war period was dominated by two superpowers. The so-called new world order contains five or six power centers of nearly equal strength. Even the nuclear equation is beginning to edge toward parity as START II reduces the arsenals of the erstwhile superpowers into the numerical range of such nuclear countries as France, Britain and even China. A multipolar world must seek stability through balance of power—a concept to which America has been traditionally hostile, preferring to treat all nations as more or less interchangeable and hence subject to salvation by domestic transformation.

Take, for instance, the U.S. attitude toward the Persian Gulf. After the fall of the Shah of Iran, the moderate regimes in the gulf faced two preponderant threats, nei-

the gulf remains how to organize some outside force to balance Iraq's continued ambitions as well as the growing strength of Iran. And we can no longer hope to create that balance by conciliating Iraq.

Problems of equilibrium are emerging in other parts of the world as well. In the former Soviet Union, the growth of democracy and market economics is widely seen as the solution to historic foreign-policy problems. I favor economic assistance to Russia and the encouragement of its nascent democracy. But prudent policymakers must prepare for the fact that a Russia made stronger by economic reform will no doubt lead to far more complicated relations with its neighbors. Most Russian leadership groups still find the disintegration of the old empire difficult to accept. A

China, it has the highest sustained economic growth rate in the world, which will be increasingly translated into military strength. Finally, Korea will begin to rival the stature of European nations. America must seek to promote a healthy evolution in its relationships, but her role will have to be more like Britain's traditional approach to Europe, as a balancing agent rather than as a dominant force.

President Clinton wisely pointed out that there are now also forces in the world that do not fall into traditional categories, such as environment, population, nuclear proliferation and catastrophic diseases. And the drive toward popular participation in government will surely remain a dominant theme. Unfortunately, the importance of a challenge does not automatically guaran-

DAVID BURNETT—CONTACT

LES ASPIN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Developed expertise as
chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee.
Rejects the Pentagon's "all
or nothing" approach to the
use of force; believes new
technology enables precision
responses. Keen instincts for
what the public will tolerate.

IRA WYMAN FOR NEWSWEEK

SAMUEL (SANDY) BERGER
DEPUTY NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER

A deputy to Anthony Lake in the Carter era, during the campaign he coordinated foreign-policy advice for Clinton. Cares about human rights, but believes that "diplomacy disengaged from force isn't much diplomacy."

LARRY DOWNING—NEWSWEEK

WARREN CHRISTOPHER
SECRETARY OF STATE

Old enough to be Clinton's father, the corporate lawyer is careful, deliberate, judicious. Not known for his vision or identified with any particular school of foreign policy or ideology. He is a lawyer who (deftly) carries out the wishes of his client.

JEFF MITCHELL—REUTERS-BETTMANN

ANTHONY LAKE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

He split with Kissinger over the invasion of Cambodia. But he's no dove: he sees America as an internationalist power pushing free markets and democracy globewide. Seen as the foreign-policy team's intellectual powerhouse.

ther of which they could handle by themselves: radical, secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. When these two nations started fighting each other in 1980, after Iraq sought to annex Iranian territory, a balance-of-power approach would have dictated support for the weaker country, which was Iraq—but only so long as it was weaker. Then, as soon as Iraq won the war, that support should have been withdrawn.

The Reagan and Bush administrations supported Iraq against Iran out of an appreciation for the balance of power, but failed to carry that policy to its logical conclusion. They chose to believe that Saddam had learned the virtues of moderation and that continuing to support him after the war ended was not only expedient but just. By extending assistance after Iraq became the strongest power in the gulf, they contributed to its later aggressiveness, which culminated in the annexation of Kuwait. Today, the basic geopolitical challenge in

stronger Russia is likely to challenge its neighbors with respect to the treatment of Russian minorities, borders and alleged common security concerns, creating the premise for renewed domination. We may also see the emergence of a kind of pro-market authoritarian government like that of Pinochet in Chile. The Clinton administration would then have to weigh the traditional American impulse to insist on democracy against both the danger of conflict among the republics and the political future of Russia itself.

**Balancing agent:** A strategy is urgently required for promoting Russian progress but also—paradoxically—for the potential impact of that evolution on relations with Russia's neighbors. Similarly, Japan will not rest content during the Clinton presidency with being an economic superpower while remaining politically inactive and militarily weak. And a more autonomous Japan will rattle Asia's equilibrium. As for

tee that American action can resolve it. The so-called global problems continue to be filtered through the prism of national perspectives. Commitment to the spread of democracy does not ensure our understanding how to make it relevant to other societies, how to buttress our convictions with appropriate policies or how to keep these slogans from being exploited by essentially anti-democratic groups. What are slogans in domestic politics, foreign policy must transpose into international strategy.

President Clinton's biggest challenge is therefore conceptual: to impart to his impatient people goals and strategies for an era whose turmoils reflect the painful initiation into a new international order. He will, moreover, have to do so while being inundated by daily cables alleged to require immediate answers, and by the pleadings of bureaucracies that subtly—or not so subtly—will try to push him in their preferred directions. Foreign leaders will descend on him in the

46 NEWSWEEK : FEBRUARY 1, 1993

hope of establishing a personal relationship or extracting statements that they can use to their advantage later on. If Clinton permits himself to be engulfed by the minutiae of diplomacy, he risks losing, or never establishing, a sense of direction. Foreign leaders may not understand this, but they would do themselves a favor by waiting until Clinton has had time to organize his administration and think through what he must do.

Clinton would be wise to resist the pressures to conduct too much personal diplomacy, despite his considerable charm. The latitude for real concessions is defined by the national interest. It can be marginally extended by personal contact but not fundamentally altered. Moreover, when heads of government negotiate on details, there

sides disagree, a compromise should be sought somewhere in the middle. If the other party knows in advance that this is the operating principle, it will have every incentive to stake out an extreme position so that the "compromise" comes as close to its real position as possible. There is also the belief that deadlocks must always be broken by new American proposals as a demonstration of our flexibility. The practical result is often to promote the very deadlock one seeks to avoid. In my view, the best negotiating tactic is to stake out a moderate, reasonable position and then stick to it. Salami tactics of making little concessions one at a time please the bureaucracy but confuse the other party.

President Clinton has said that he wants foreign policy made in the White House and

necessary sense of nuance to the apparatus that must implement policy decisions. Though the National Security Council staff should frame policy options, it is the secretary of state who must have a primary voice in the final selection.

Some conflict of views within the new foreign-policy team is inevitable, and should not be discouraged by the president. It is much better to be presented with clear-cut alternatives than to insist on recommendations in the form of predigested compromises. Usually, that has the effect of shifting the field of the bureaucratic battle from phraseology to interpretation. For the foreign-policy bureaucracy has a truly remarkable skill in hearing only what supports its preconceptions. The president may think that he has approved a

JOHN HARRINGTON—BLACK STAR

WINSTON LORD

ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS

The GOP Yalie is, like Lake, a former Kissinger protégé. Ambassador to China during the democracy movement, he will be tougher on Beijing than Bush. But he's too realistic to cut the Chinese off.

JACQUES CHENET—NEWSWEEK

PETER TARNOFF

UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Will move to restore State's career experts to the policy-making role that Jim Baker's people usurped. "Process Man" is more a facilitator than thinker; may be better at setting up the seminar than answering the question.

ROB CRANDALL—PICTURE GROUP

TIMOTHY WIRTH

UNDER SECRETARY FOR
GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Former senator bargained hard for a job at State with clout. New post recognizes that environmental degradation, population growth, drug trafficking and refugees pose real threats to U.S. security.

MARIO RUIZ—TIME MAGAZINE

STROBE TALBOTT

AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

Another Yale smoothie, the longtime Time editor and Russian expert is a Friend of Bill. New post focusing on free markets and democracy for former U.S.S.R. signals a Clinton priority. Talbott has many friends among the old East bloc's reformers.

are two risks. One is a genuine potential for misunderstanding, when each thinks he has convinced the other, but in fact neither has. The other is that they may make their disagreements too explicit. For world leaders tend to achieve their eminence with the aid of highly developed egos, and they do not like to be perceived as backing down from well-publicized positions.

When I was in government, I generally tried to avoid situations in which the president would meet a foreign leader without knowing what the foreign leader was going to say ahead of time. I also made every effort to tell foreign leaders what the president would have to say to them. When heads of government meet, surprise should be reduced to a minimum and major emphasis should be placed on conceptual understanding.

For a new president, it is important to be wary of certain conventional wisdoms regarding negotiations. One is that if two

implemented in the State Department. This was certainly the operating style in my early years in the Nixon White House. But it was due to emergency circumstances not applicable to current events. The Vietnam negotiations, while exhausting, concerned a few relatively simple issues. The opening to China was a spectacular but singular event. Economic issues were not then as crucial as they are now. In any event, it is not a pattern to be repeated when the challenge is to devise a new concept of foreign policy and to implement it across the entire spectrum of our nation's endeavors.

**Primary voice:** Given this need, it would be a mistake for a president, particularly one with little international experience, to try to run all aspects of foreign policy from the White House. The range and complexity of issues facing the United States today are so great that a secretary of state needs to be involved with the development of concepts from the start in order to convey the

pre-negotiated compromise, but each department will interpret the decision in the way that suits its own purposes.

Ironically, President Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that America should place her top priority on domestic restructuring, has come to office at a time of great international turmoil. Yet this also presents him with an opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, yet he became responsible for designing the architecture for a generation of successful foreign policy. Clinton faces a similar challenge, though of course under different circumstances. If he can teach America to reconcile her twin impulses of missionary zeal and isolationism to her interests, he will have laid a groundwork for a lasting peace. History will then little care how well he understood the world when he entered office.

NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993 47

PETER BRINKMANN—AXEL SPRINGER VERLAG

A 'dialogue of bitterness and accusation': Cruise-missile damage at Al-Rasheed hotel

# War, Rebuilding, More War

While America's leaders change, it's business as usual in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. An on-scene report.

THOMAS HARTWELL—SYGMA
Eyes on the sky: Aboard the U.S. carrier Kitty Hawk

Baghdad glistens in the winter sun, and a thin layer of smog on the horizon even hints at industrial prosperity. Heavy traffic crosses the eight bridges over the Tigris. The trains run on time. There is electricity everywhere, and water. Bureaucrats man their desks. Republican Guards man their posts. Saddam Hussein's portraits are as ubiquitous as ever: praying, soldiering, balancing the scales of justice, even carrying mortar for reconstruction.

No wreckage hints that Baghdad was ground zero for wave upon wave of allied bombers during the gulf war

two years ago. Or that a factory on its outskirts was obliterated just last week by $40 million worth of American cruise missiles. Even the luxury Al-Rasheed hotel, where a wounded cruise landed in the garden at the beginning of the week, was mostly repaired by Thursday, ready for business as usual.

**No surrender:** War. Reconstruction. More war. That is business as usual for Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The cycle has gone on now for more than a dozen years, and despite some sudden Iraqi peace overtures to Bill Clinton, it is likely to continue. As one senior official in Baghdad told NEWSWEEK, Iraq may want to do business with the rest

of the world, but ultimately it has no intention of bending to the demands of the United Nations, the United States or anyone else. After Desert Storm "we accepted a cease-fire, but we never signed a surrender document with anybody," he said. "What we accepted at the end of the fighting we refused to accept a year later. What we accepted a year later we do not accept now, and what we are accepting now we will refuse a year from now."

Only hours after Clinton took office, skirting resumed. In the northern no-fly zone, U.S. and allied jets attacked Iraqi antiaircraft positions after the Iraqis took

the hostile step of turning on their fire-control radar. Apparently surprised, Baghdad asserted it had done nothing to warrant the first attack and claimed it didn't even have an antiaircraft battery at the site of the second attack. U.S. officials weren't sure the Iraqis meant to provoke them—but the incidents continued over the weekend with more attacks on U.S. fighters, this time in the southern no-fly zone.

What one Iraqi intellectual calls the "dialogue of bitterness and accusation" continued. In the streets, weary resignation reigned. During one air-raid alert, the national soccer stadium left its lights on and contin-

ued play as tracer shells crossed the sky like fireworks. During the cruise-missile attack, a group of painters at the Artists Club ordered another bottle of arrack and kept on drinking, debating and smoking. That same night, a government official was talking to a reporter as the cruise missiles and rooftop guns started their thunderous percussion. The Iraqi glanced out his window, checked to see what CNN was showing and continued the interview to its end.

Saddam Hussein and the men around him regard this kind of cool as courage. The ability to impose order and rebuild the country in the face of adversity is, by their estimation, part of what makes their dictatorship legitimate. "Is there any president who can do this [reconstruction] without the support of his people?" one of Saddam's aides asks rhetorically.

**Born again:** For the true believers near the top, and perhaps for Saddam himself, such claims may make a kind of mystical sense. The name of their party, the Baath, literally means "resurrection" in Arabic. Their secular ideology has blended Christian notions of redemption with the Islamic idea of martyrdom. To be crushed and to reconstruct, to die and be reborn, may even be a fate for which the Baath faithful devoutly wish. "In less than two years, our people could rebuild the country," Izzat Ibrahim, a top party official, told a delegation of Muslim fundamentalists last week. "We are people who have a message."

Few ordinary Iraqis join in the refrain. Exhausted by rhetoric and war, they see themselves as victims of both Saddam and Washington. The allies' failure to support the postwar uprisings among Kurds in the north and Shiites in southern Iraq has not been forgotten by those who were exhorted to oust the dictator. "After the war, I've never seen Saddam so off balance," said a merchant in the upper-class Mansour area. "They had their chance, but they missed it." Now Saddam has reorganized his army

48 NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993

INTERNATIONAL

WESLEY BOXCE—JB PICTURES

# Clinton and the World

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

When President Clinton spoke to The New York Times a week before his Inauguration about how to deal with Saddam Hussein, he said that he was a Baptist, and he believed in the possibility of conversion. This comment was widely criticized as evidence that the new president might not possess the diplomatic acumen required to function effectively on the world scale.

NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993 45

INTERNATIONAL

DAVID BURNETT-CONTACT

IRA WYMAN FOR NEWSWEEK

LARRY DOWNING-NEWSWEEK

JEFF MITCHELL-REUTERS-BETTMANN

46 NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993

JOHN HARRINGTON—BLACK STAR

**WINSTON LORD**
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
EAST ASIAN AND
PACIFIC AFFAIRS

The GOP Yalie is, like Lake, a former Kissinger protege. Ambassador to China during the democracy movement, he will be tougher on Beijing than Bush. But he's too realistic to cut the Chinese off.

JACQUES CHENET—NEWSWEEK

**PETER TARNOFF**
UNDER SECRETARY FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS

ROB CRANDALL—PICTURE GROUP

**TIMOTHY WIRTH**
UNDER SECRETARY FOR
GLOBAL AFFAIRS

MARIO RUIZ—TIME MAGAZINE

**STROBE TALBOTT**
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE

Ironically, President Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that America should place her top priority on domestic restructuring, has come to office at a time of great international turmoil. Yet this also presents him with an opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, yet he became responsible for designing the architecture for a generation of successful foreign policy. Clinton faces a similar challenge, though of course under different circumstances. If he can teach America to reconcile her twin impulses of visionary zeal and isolationism to her interests, he will have laid a groundwork for a lasting peace. History will then little care how well he understood the world when he entered office.

NEWSWEEK: FEBRUARY 1, 1993 47

Newsweek

444 MADISON AVENUE • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022-6999 • (212) 350-4000

January 22

Dear Ms. McFarlane,

Enclosed is a copy of Dr. Kissinger's
piece with the changes. Thanks very
much in advance for going over the copy
to make sure that Mark Whitaker
read it correctly.

Mark will be sending further suggestions
along for editing.

Our confidential fax number is:

350-5146.

Thanks very much for your help.

Enclosure

["JAN '22 '93 18:16 VILLA CYPRESS", "P.68", "[y]", "IN0606 Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "that should\nwon the war, support would have been\nterminated. willshawn.", "[14]", "The /deletion/ Reagan and Bush admin-\nistrations supported Iraq against Iran out\nof an appreciation for the balance of power,\nbut failed to carry that policy to its logical\nconclusion. (After the war ended, they\nchose to believe that Saddam had learned\nthe virtues of moderation and that /con-\ntinuing to/ supporting him was not only\nexpedient but right. Hence they /extend-\ned/ support after Iraq/ had become the\nstrongest power in the Gulf, thereby con-\ntributing to its later aggressiveness,\nwhich culminated/ in the annexation of\nKuwait. /Today/, the basic geopolitical\nchallenge in the Gulf remains /how to orga-\nnize/ some outside force to balance Iraq's\ncontinued ambitions and the growing\nstrength of Iran. And I do not believe that\nwe can any longer hope to create that bal-\nance by conciliating Iraq. <—\nare also emerging", "[20]", "are also emerging\nThe problem of equilibrium presents it-\nself as well in other parts of the world. In\nthe former Soviet Union, the issue is usual-", (((MORE))))"]

JAN '22 '93 18:18 VILLA CYPRESS

P.113

[y]

IN0606

Kissinger

DEPT. IN

regarding negotiation. One is
required to chart broad avenues for discussion /deletion/conventional wisdom /has
if that/ if two sides disagree, a compromise
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But if the /other party/ knows that this is
the
an operating principle, he will have every
incentive to stake out an extreme position
so that the "compromise" comes as close to his
real position as possible. Then there is the
belief that /the way to break a deadlock is
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to offer, new proposals as a demonstration
of America's flexibility. The practical result
is often the deadlock one seeks to avoid /
deletion/. In my view, the best negotiating
tactic is to stake out a moderate, reasonable
position and then stick to it. Salami tactics
of making little concessions at a time
please the bureaucracy but confuse the
/other party./<--

When I was in government, I generally
tried to avoid situations where the presi-
dent /deletion/ had to meet foreign leaders
without knowing what the foreign leader
was going to say ahead of time. And I used
to make every effort to tell foreign leaders
what the president /deletion/ would have.

[21]

(((MORE))))

JAN 22 '93 18:20 VILLA CYPRESS

10

1408625344P.14p.05

IN0606

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DEPT. IN

PAGE-13

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# Altrically, Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that most of our foreign problems had been solved, and that we can could therefore focus on domestic restruc- turing, has come to office at a time of great national turmoil, and perhaps crisis. But so far, this has also a time that presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to redefine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his presidency, but he was responsible for designing (deletion) the architecture of a generation of American foreign policy. Clinton faces a similar challenge, though of course, under very different circumstances. If he can teach America to temper its twin impulses to a world, a missionary zeal and isolationism, and to /reconcile its values with its interests, he will have laid the groundwork for a long-term program toward peace. History will then little care how well he understood the world when he comes to office.

(((END)))

[22]

TOTAL P. 05

JAN 23 '93 11:18AM 2123505146

P.3

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DEPT. IN

about how to deal with Sad-
dam Hussein, he said that he
was a Baptist, and he believed in the possi-
bility of conversion. This comment was
widely criticized as evidence that the new
president might not posses the diplomatic
acumen required to function effectively on
the world scale.<-

#In fact, Clinton's attitude was not very different from that of Franklin Roosevelt, who, in the tenth year of his presidency, after Stalin had killed as many Russians as the Germans had, proclaimed that the So-viet leader was a reasonable person ``possessed of stalwart good humor.'' At the Te-heran summit, Roosevelt went a step further by referring to Stalin as Uncle Joe and reporting afterwards that ``the ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers.''<--

## Indeed, Clinton's remarks reflected an old American nostalgia for the conversion of adversaries as the key to peace. As the only nation explicity created to vindicate the idea of liberty, America has always

(((MORE)))

[11]

[12]

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believed that her values were relevant to
the rest of mankind. That conviction has been
reflected in two somewhat contradictory
impulses. One is that these values can best
be served by concentrating on their perfec-
tion at home--this was the basis of isola-
tionism. The other is a sense of missionary
obligation to crusade to transform the
world in our image. <--

The belief in conversion explains why
President Reagan, who began by talking
about the Soviet Union as an evil empire,
came later to pride himself on having
brought Gorbachev to an appreciation of
democratic values. At various stages of the
post-war period, a number of other oppo-
nents have been similarly described as ei-
ther having almost converted to the Ameri-
can viewpoint or as having realized that
economic cooperation and democratic pro-
gress were more important than political
gain. It was a replay of the fantasy often
found in American movies, where a
villain finds sudden illumination due to
some other dramatic event and, from one
day to the next, turns benign. <--

[14]

[17]
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■President Clinton seems to believe in both strands of this tradition—the belief that America should focus on affairs at home, and that she should promote democracy when she ventures abroad. And he is far from unique in that respect. Therefore, the real issue is not what he may know about the fine points of diplomacy, which he is sure to learn on the job. The challenge to understand that for the first time in her history, America now finds herself in a world which she cannot dominate, but from which she also cannot withdraw.←

■The cold war period was dominated by two superpowers. The so-called new world order contains five or six power centers of nearly equal strength. Even the nuclear equation is beginning to edge toward parity as START II reduces the arsenals of the erstwhile superpowers into the numerical range of such nuclear countries as France, Britain and even China. A multipolar world must seek stability through balance of power—a concept to which America has been traditionally hostile, preferring to treat all nations as more or less inter-

(((MORE))))

[13]

["JAN 23 '93 11:19AM 2123505146", "P.6", "IN0605 Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "changeable and hence subject salvation by\ndomestic transformation.<-", "[15]", "Take, for instance, the U.S. attitude to-\nward the Persian Gulf. After the fall of the\nShah of Iran, the moderate regimes in the\nGulf faced two preponderant threats, nei-\nther of which they could handle by them-\nselves: / radical, secular Iraq and / funda-\nmentalist Iran. When those two nations\nstarted fighting each other in 1980, after\nIraq sought to annex Iranian territory, a\nbalance of power approach would have dic-\ntated support for the weaker country,\nwhich was Iraq-but only so long as it was\nweaker. Then as soon as Iraq won the war,\nthat support should have been withdrawn.<-", "[14]", "The Reagan and Bush administrations\nsupported Iraq against Iran out of an ap-\npreciation for the balance of power, but\nfailed to carry that policy to its logical con-\nclusion. They chose to believe that Saddam\nhad learned the virtues of moderation and\nthat continuing to support him even after\nthe war had ended was not only expedient\nbut just. Their extended support even after", {"bbox": [737, 1260, 860, 1280], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

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Iraq had become the strongest power in the Gulf, thereby ed contributing to its later aggressiveness, which culminated in the annexation of Kuwait. Today, the basic geopolitical challenge in the Gulf remains how to organize some outside force to balance Iraq's continued ambitions as well as the no growing strength of Iran. And we can say longer hope to create that balance by con-ciliating Iraq.<-

Problems of equilibrium are also emerging in other parts of the world. In the former Soviet Union, the growth of democracy and market economics is being widely seen as a solution to foreign policy problems. I favor economic assistance to Russia and the encouragement of its nascent democracy. But yet prudent policy makers must prepare for the contingency that a Russia made stronger by economic reform will no doubt lead to have far more complicated relations with its neighbors. Most Russian leadership groups still find the disintegration of the old empire difficult to accept. A stronger Russia is likely to challenge its neighbors with respect to the treatment of Russian

(((MORE))))

[19]

["JAN 23 '93 11:21AM 2123505146", "P.8", "IN0605", "Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "minorities, borders and alleged common\nsecurity concerns, creating the premise for\nrenewed domination. We may also see the\nemerge as a kind of pro-market authoritarian\ngovernment like that of Pinochet in Chile.\nThe Clinton administration would then\nhave to weigh the traditional American im-\npulse to insist on democracy against both\nthe danger of conflict between the repub-\nlics and the political future of Russia itself.<-", "A strategy is urgently required both for\npromoting Russian progress and para-\ndoxically for the potential impact of that\nevolution on relations with Russia's neigh-\nbors. Similarly, Japan will not during the\nClinton presidency (rest content) with being\nan economic superpower while remaining\npolitically inactive and militarily weak.\nAnd a more autonomous Japan will rattle\nAsia's equilibrium. As for China, it has the\nhighest sustained is this about economic or population growth\nrates of growth rates in the world,\nwhich will be increasingly translated into\nmilitary strength. Finally, for Korea with a\npopulation of 100 million our almanac says 21 million for north\nkorea and 43 million for south Korea, note the UK is 55 and", {"bbox": [736, 1266, 860, 1287], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))", "[26]"]

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germany is still will begin to rival
the stature of European nations. America
must seek to promote a healthy evolution
in their relationships, but her role will be
more like that of Britain's traditional atti-
tude towards Europe as a balancing agent
rather than a dominant force.<-

President Clinton wisely pointed out
that there are also new forces in the world
which do not fall into traditional catego-
ries such as environment, population and
catastrophic diseases. And the drive to-
wards popular participation in govern-
ment will surely remain a dominant
theme. Unfortunately, the importance of a
challenge does not automatically guaran-
tee that American action can resolve it.
The so-called global problems continue to
be filtered through the prism of national
perspectives commitment to the spread of
democracy does not insure that we under-
stand how to make it relevant to other
societies, how to buttress our convictions
with appropriate policies, or how to keep
these slogans from being exploited by es-
sentially anti-democratic groups. What is

(((MORE))))

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PAGE-9

In domestic politics, a slogan, foreign policy must transpose into an international strategy. →

President Clinton's biggest challenge is therefore conceptual: to teach his patient people goals and strategies for an era whose turmoil/ reflects a painful initiation into a new international order. He will, moreover, have to do so while being inundated by daily cables that are alleged to require an answer/ and by the pleadings of bureaucracies which subtly-or not so subtly-will try to push him in their preferred directions. Foreign leaders will descend on him in the hopes of establishing a personal relationship or extracting statements that they can use to their advantage later on. If Clinton permits himself to be engulfed by the minutiae of diplomacy, he risks losing, or never establishing, a sense of direction. Foreign leaders may not understand this, but they would do themselves a favor by waiting until Clinton has had time to organize his administration and think through what he must do. →

[22]

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[22]

8

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## Clinton would be wise to resist the pressures to conduct too much personal diplomacy, despite his considerable charm. The latitude for real concessions is defined by the national interest. It can be marginally extended by personal contact but not fundamentally altered. Moreover, when heads of government negotiate on details, there are two risks. One is a genuine potential for misunderstanding, when each thinks he has convinced the other, but in fact neither has. The other is that they may make their disagreements too explicit. For world leaders achieve their eminence with the aid of highly developed egos, and they do not like to be perceived as backing down from well-publicized positions.<-

## When I was in government, I generally tried to avoid situations in which the president would meet a foreign leader without knowing what the foreign leader was going to say ahead of time. I also made every effort to tell foreign leaders what the president would have to say to them. When heads of government meet, surprise should be reduced to a minimum and major em-

(((MORE))))

[17]

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phasis should be placed on conceptual
understanding.<--

For ~~an~~ new American president, it is important to be wary of certain conventional
wisdoms regarding negotiations. One is
that if two sides disagree, a compromise
should be sought somewhere in the middle.

If the other party knows in advance that
this is the operating principle, it will have
every incentive to stake out an extreme
position so that the ``compromise'' comes as
close to its real position as possible. There is
also the belief that deadlocks must always
be broken by new American proposals as a
demonstration of our flexibility. The prac-
tical result is often to promote the very
deadlock one seeks to avoid. In my view, the
best negotiating tactic is to stake out a
moderate, reasonable position and then
stick to it. Salami tactics of making little
concessions one at a time please the bu-
reaucracy but confuse the other party.--

## President Clinton has said that he wants
foreign policy made in the White House
and implemented in the State Department.

(((MORE)))

[11]

[20]

["JAN 23 '93 11:24AM 2123505146", "P.13", "[v]", "IN0605", "Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "PAGE-12", "This was certainly the opertaing style in\nmy early years in the Nixon White House.\nBut it was due to emergency circumstances\nnot applicable to current events. The Viet-\nnam negotiations, while exhausting, con-\ncerned a few relatively simple issues. The\nopening to China was a spectacular but [singular] [stand-alone] event. Economic issues were\nnot then as crucial as they are now. In any\nevent, it is not a pattern to be repeated.\nToday, the challenge is to devise a new\nconcept of foreign policy and to implement\nit across the entire spectrum of our nation's\nendeavours.<-", "[17]\n#Given this need, it would be a mistake for\na president, particularly one with little in-\nternational experience, to try to run [the
details] of foreign policy from the White\nHouse. The range and complexity of issues\nfacing the United States today are so great\nthat a Secretary of State needs to be in-\nvolved with the development of concepts\nfrom the [start in order to convey] the\nnecessary sense of nuance to the appartus that\nmust implement policy decisions. Though\nthe National Security Council staff should", "(((MORE))))"]

["JAN 23 '93 11:24AM 2123505146", "P.14", "IN0605", "Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "PAGE-13", "frame policy options, it is the Secretary of\nState who must have a primary voice in the\nfinal selection.<-", "[15]", "Some conflict of views within the new\nforeign policy team is inevitable, and\nshould not be discouraged by the president.\nIt is much better to be presented with clear-\ncut alternatives than to insist on recom-\nmendations in the form of predigested com-\npromises. Usually, that has the effect of\nshifting the field of the bureaucratic battle\nfrom phraseology to interpretation. For\nthe foreign policy bureaucracy has a truly\nremarkable still in learning only what sup-\nports its preconceptions. The President\nmay think that he has approved a pre-\nnegotiated compromise, but each depart-\nment will interpret the decision in the way\nthat suits its own purposes.<-", "[16]", "Ironically, President Clinton, who cam-\npigned on the proposition that America\nforeign problems had been solved, in the spirit of fairness, Clinton\nspoke frequently about the unsolved problems of Haiti, Iraq,\n bosnia, and the EC during the campaign, and that\nwe can therefore focus on domestic restruc-", (((MORE))))"]

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turing has come to office at a time of great
international turmoil. Yet this also pre-
sents him with an unprecedented opportu-
nity to redefine America's role in the
world. Truman knew little about foreign
policy when he started his own presidency,
yet he became responsible for designing the
architecture of a generation of successful
foreign policy. Clinton faces a similar chal-
lenge, though of course under different cir-
cumstances. If he can teach America to
reconcile
temper-her twin impulses of missionary
zeal and isolationism, and to reconcile her
values with her interests, he will have laid
a groundwork for a lasting peace. History
will then little care how well he understood
the world when he entered office.<-

(((END)))

[23]

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PAGE-2

[11]

In fact, Clinton's attitude was not very
different from that of Franklin Roosevelt,
who, in the tenth year of his presidency,
after Stalin had killed as many Russians as
the Germans had, proclaimed that the Sovi-
et leader was a reasonable person ``pos-
sessed of stalwart good humor.'' At the Tehe-
ran summit, Roosevelt went a step further
by referring to Stalin as Uncle Joe and re-
porting afterwards that ``the ice was broken
and we talked like men and brothers.''<--

[11]

## Clinton's remarks reflected an old Ameri-
can nostalgia for the conversion of adversar-
ies as the key to peace. As the only nation
explicitly created to vindicate the idea of
liberty, America has always believed that
her values were relevant to the rest of man-
kind. That conviction has been reflected in

(((MORE))))

["JAN 23 '93 03:18PM 2123505146", "P.4", "[L]", "IN0605", "Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "PAGE-3", "two somewhat contradictory impulses. One\nis that these values can best be served by\nconcentrating on their perfection at home-\nthis was the basis of isolationism. The other\nis a sense of missionary obligation to crusade\nto transform the world in our image.<-", "[13]", "The belief in conversion explains why\nPresident Reagan, who began by talking\nabout the Soviet Union as an evil empire,\nlater came to pride himself on having\nbrought Gorbachev to an appreciation of\ndemocratic values. At various stages of the\npost-war period, a number of other oppo-\nnents have been similarly described as ei-\nther having almost converted to the Ameri-\ncan viewpoint or as having realized that\neconomic cooperation and democratic pro-\ngress were more important than political\ngain. It was a replay of the fantasy often\nfound in American movies, where a villain\nfinds sudden illumination due to some dra-\nmatic event and, from one day to the next,\nturns benign.<-", "[17]", "President Clinton seems to believe in\nboth strands of this tradition—the belief", {"bbox": [734, 1250, 857, 1270], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

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that America should focus on affairs at
home, and that she should promote democ-
racy when she ventures abroad. And he is
far from unique in that respect. Therefore,
the real issue is not what he may or may not
know about the fine points of diplomacy,
something he is in any case sure to learn on
the job. His challenge as President will be
to understand that, for the first time in her
history, America now finds herself in a
world which she cannot dominate, but from
which she also cannot simply withdraw.<--

The cold war period was dominated by
two superpowers. The so-called new world
order contains five or six power centers of
nearly equal strength. Even the nuclear
equation is beginning to edge toward parity
as START II reduces the arsenals of the
erstwhile superpowers into the numerical
range of such nuclear countries as France,
Britain and even China. A multipolar
world must seek stability through balance
of power—a concept to which America has
been traditonally hostile, preferring to
treat all nations as more or less inter-
changeable and hence subject to salvation

[14]

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contributed to its later aggressiveness, which culminated in the annexation of Kuwait. Today, the basic geopolitical challenge in the Gulf remains how to organize some outside force to balance Iraq's continued ambitions as well as the growing strength of Iran. And we can no longer hope to create that balance by conciliating Iraq.<-

[18]

# Problems of equilibrium are emerging in other parts of the world as well. In the former Soviet Union, the growth of democracy and market economics is widely seen as the solution to historic foreign policy problems. I favor economic assistance to Russia and the encouragement of its nascent democracy. But prudent policy makers must prepare for the factokay? contingency doesn't track with the emphatic ``will no doubt lead'' below. mark that a Russia made stronger by economic reform will no doubt lead to far more complicated relations with its neighbors. Most Russian leadership groups still find the disintegration of the old empire difficult to accept. A stronger Russia is likely to challenge its neighbors with respect to the treatment of Russian minorities, borders and alleged

(((MORE))))

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common security concerns, creating the
premise for renewed domination. We may
also see the emergence of a kind of pro-
market authoritarian government like
that of Pinochet in Chile. The Clinton ad-
ministration would then have to weigh the
traditonal American impulse to insist on
democracy against both the danger of con-
flict among the republics and the political
future of Russia itself.<--

[28]

## Balancing agent: A strategy is urgently required for promoting Russian progress but also paradoxically—for the potential impact of that evolution on relations with Russia's neighbors. Similarly, Japan will not rest content during the Clinton presidency with being an economic superpower while remaining politically inactive and militarily weak. And a more autonomous Japan will rattle Asia's equilibrium. As for China, it has the highest sustained economic growth rate in the world, which will be increasingly translated into military strength. Finally, Koreadeletion has will begin to rival the stature of European nations. America must seek to promote a healthy evolution in

(((MORE)))

["JAN 23 '93 03:21PM 2123505146", "P.9", "IN0605", "Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "PAGE-8", "their relationships, but her role will have to\nbe more like Britain's traditional approach\nto Europe, as a balancing agent rather than\nas a dominant force.<--", "[20]", "President Clinton wisely pointed out that\nthere are now also forces in the world that\ndo not fall into traditional categories, such\nas environment, population, nuclear prolif-\neration and catastrophic diseases. And the\ndrive towards popular participation in gov-\nernment will surely remain a dominant\ntheme. Unfortunately, the importance of a\nchallenge does not automatically guaran-\ntee that American action can resolve it. The\nso-called global problems continue to be\nfiltered through the prism of national per-\nspectives. Commitment to the spread of de-\nmocracy does not ensure our understand-\ning how to make it relevant to other\nsocieties, how to buttress our convictions\nwith appropriate policies, or how to keep\nthese slogans from being exploited by essen-\ntially anti-democratic groups. What are slo-\ngans in domestic politics, foreign policy\nmust transpose into international strategy.<--", {"bbox": [737, 1244, 859, 1264], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))", "[21]"]

JAN 23 '93 03:22PM 2123505146

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## President Clinton's biggest challenge is therefore conceptual: to impart to his impatient people goals and strategies for an era whose turmoils reflect the painful initiation into a new international order. He will, moreover, have to do so while being inundated by daily cables alleged to require immediate answers, and by the pleadings of bureaucracies which subtly-or not so subtly-will try to push him in their preferred directions. Foreign leaders will descend on him in the hopes of establishing a personal relationship or extracting statements that they can use to their advantage later on. If Clinton permits himself to be engulfed by the minutiae of diplomacy, he risks losing, or never establishing, a sense of direction. Foreign leaders may not understand this, but they would do themselves a favor by waiting until Clinton has had time to organize his administration and think through what he must do.<-

[22]

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PAGE-10

the national interest. It can be marginally extended by personal contact but not fundamentally altered. Moreover, when heads of government negotiate on details, there are two risks. One is a genuine potential for misunderstanding, when each thinks he has convinced the other, but in fact neither has. The other is that they may make their disagreements too explicit. For world leaders tend to achieve their eminence with the aid of highly developed egos, and they do not like to be perceived as backing down from well-publicized positions.<-

[17]

"When I was in government, I generally tried to avoid situations in which the president would meet a foreign leader without knowing what the foreign leader was going to say ahead of time. I also made every effort to tell foreign leaders what the president would have to say to them. When heads of government meet, surprise should be reduced to a minimum and major emphasis should be placed on conceptual understanding.<--

[11]

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wary of certain conventional wisdoms regarding negotiations. One is that if two sides disagree, a compromise should be sought somewhere in the middle. If the other party knows in advance that this is the operating principle, it will have every incentive to stake out an extreme position so that the ``compromise'' comes as close to its real position as possible. There is also the belief that deadlocks must always be broken by new American proposals as a demonstration of our flexibility. The practical result is often to promote the very deadlock one seeks to avoid. In my view, the best negotiating tactic is to stake out a moderate, reasonable position and then stick to it. Salami tactics of making little concessions one at a time please the bureaucracy but confuse the other party.<--

#President Clinton has said that he wants foreign policy made in the White House and implemented in the State Department. This was certainly the opertaing style in my early years in the Nixon White House. But it was due to emergency circumstances not applicable to current events. The Viet-

[20]

({{(MORE)}})

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nam negotiations, while exhausting, concerned a few relatively simple issues. The opening to China was a spectacular but singular event. Economic issues were not then as crucial as they are now. In any event, it is not a pattern to be repeated when the challenge is to devise a new concept of foreign policy and to implement it across the entire spectrum of our nation's endeavours.<--

[17]

## Primary voice: Given this need, it would be a mistake for a president, particularly one with little international experience, to try to run all aspects of foreign policy from the White House. The range and complexity of issues facing the United States today are so great that a Secretary of State needs to be involved with the development of concepts from the start in order to convey the necessary sense of nuance to the appartus that must implement policy decisions. Though the National Security Council staff should frame policy options, it is the Secretary of State who must have a primary voice in the final selection.<--

[15]

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PAGE-13

## Some conflict of views within the new foreign policy team is inevitable, and should not be discouraged by the president. It is much better to be presented with clear-cut alternatives than to insist on recommendations in the form of predigested compromises. Usually, that has the effect of shifting the field of the bureaucratic battle from phraseology to interpretation. For the foreign policy bureaucracy has a truly remarkable skill in learning only what supports its preconceptions. The President may think that he has approved a pre-negotiated compromise, but each department will interpret the decision in the way that suits its own purposes.<-

[16]

## Ironically, President Clinton, who campaigned on the proposition that hakAmerica should place her top priority on domestic restructuring, hak has come to office at a time of great international turmoil. Yet this also presents him with an cut for space: unprecedented opportunity to rede-fine America's role in the world. Truman knew little about foreign policy when he started his own presidency, yet he became

({{(MORE)}})

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[d]

IN0605

Kissinger

DEPT. IN

responsible for designing the architecture
for okay? a generation of successful foreign poli-
cy. Clinton faces a similar challenge,
though of course under different circum-
stances. If he can teach America to recon-
cile her twin impulses of missionary zeal
and isolationism to her interests, he will
have laid a groundwork for a lasting peace.
History will then little care how well he
understood the world when he entered
office.<-

henry--one of your best. many thanks maynard <--
------------------------------------------
[21]

[1]

(((END))

25 JAN 1993 05:26 GMT

(212) 447-1454/5

L.A. TIMES SYND. INTL.

TMI 7666962A001.027

ATTN: SUZANNE MCFARLANE/KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

FROM L. A. TIMES SYNDICATE INTL<
AVAILABLE BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT ONLY<
FREE TO SUBSCRIBERS OF THE HENRY KISSINGER COLUMN
WORLD RIGHTS<

FOR RETRANSMISSION, PLEASE CONTACT BETH BARBER/MELANIE OAKES,
L. A. TIMES INTL<

TEL: (212) 447-1450; FAX: (212) 447-1454/5

In an article appearing in this week's Newsweek, former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger offers advice to President
Clinton on a foreign policy approach based on an America
living in a ''world which she cannot dominate, but from which
she also cannot simply withdraw.'' <

Kissinger also focuses on America's need to balance its
foreign policy at a time when global issues of power are
affected by forces that do not fall into traditional
categories.

Kissinger cites his own negotiating experience and tactics
during his White House years, and he offers Clinton some
insights that the President may find useful as he governs an
America which will need to ''reconcile her twin impulses of
missionary zeal and isolationism.'' <
(END)

NN-NN

JAN 22 '93 05:57PM 2123505146

P.3

Friday, 5 p.m.

Henry--

Substantively, the piece is much improved. I have only made some
stylistic suggestions, which I think make it read more smoothly. They
are indicated with slash marks (like this: //). I will be in the
office until about 8 o'clock, then back after dinner for an hour or
two before midnight. I will also be in all day tommorrow, and we can
still make revisions then, as long as they are not too extensive. In
the meantime, I am sending this version to Gina for her inspection.
Talk to you soon.

["JAN 22 '93 05:58PM 2123505146", "IN0606 Kissinger\nVER # 01", "DEPT. IN MWHITA", "BU: HJ: Y 00322 LINES(INCL.HEAD)\nPG: ISSUE: ; 93A\nIN0606 -MWHITA-NWK\nMWHITA ;01/22,16:33", "By Henry A. Kissinger<—", "11111111111111111111111111111111111

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IN0606

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DEPT. IN

"Indeed, Clinton's remarks reflected an old American nostalgia. /As/ the only nation explicit created to vindicate the idea of liberty, /America/ has always believed its values relevant to the rest of mankind. /That/ conviction has had two somewhat contradictory interpretations. One /is/ that these values /are best served/ by concentrating on their perfection at home- this was the basis of isolationism. /The other is a sense of/ missionary obligation to crusade in order to transform the world in our image. Both /approachs were based on a belief/ in conversion, in the notion that adversaries /should/ be brought around to the American point of view.<--

[20]

*/deletion/President Reagan, for example, began by talking about the Soviet Union as an evil empire, but later prided himself on having brought Gorbachev to a perception of democratic values. At various stages of the post-war period, other leaders have been described as having al-

[16]

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DEPT. IN

most converted to the American /view-
point/ that economic cooperation and dem-
ocratic progress /are/ more important
than political gain. It is a fantasy often
played out in American movies: a perni-
cious villain has a sudden illumination due
to illness or some other dramatic event and,
from one day to the next, turns benign.<-

[15]

## Clinton seems to believe in both strands of this tradition—the belief that America should focus more on affairs at home, and that it should promote democracy when it ventures abroad. He /is not unique in that respect. Yet the real issue is not whether he has the necessary /experience/ to conduct a successful foreign policy. He is president now, and much of what he may not know about the fine points of diplomacy he is sure to learn on the job. The deeper problem confronting the new president is to understand that for the first time in its history, America now finds itself in a world which we cannot dominate, but from which we also cannot withdraw.<-

[16]

## The cold war was a period dominated by

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two superpowers. The so-called new world order has five or six power centers of nearly equal strength. Even /the nuclear equation is/ beginning to edge toward parity as START II reduces the arsenals of the erstwhile superpowers into the /numerical/ range of nuclear countries like France, Britain and /deletion/ China. A genuinely multipolar world requires some concept of equilibrium or balance of power-a concept to which America has been traditonal-ly hostile, preferring to treat all nations as more or less interchangeable and subject to /domestic transformation./<--

The American attitude toward the Persian Gulf is a case in point. After the fall of the Shah of Iran, the moderate regimes in the region faced two major threats, neither of which they could handle by themselves: radical, secular Iraq and fundamentalist Iran. When those two nations started fighting eachother in 1980, /after Iraq sought/ to annex Iranian territory, a balance of power approach would have /deletion/ dictated support for the weaker /country, Iraq-so/ long as it was weaker. When Iraq

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["JAN 22 '93 05:59PM 2123505146", "P.8", "IN0606", "Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "won the war, support would have been\nterminated.<-", "[14]", "#The /deletion/ Reagan and Bush admin-\nistrations supported Iraq against Iran out\nof an appreciation for the balance of power,\nbut failed to carry that policy to its logical\nconclusion. /After the war ended, / they\nchose to believe that Saddam had learned\nthe virtues of moderation and that /con-\ntinuing to/ supporting him was not only\nexpedient but right. Hence they /extend-\ned/ support after /Iraq/ had become the\nstrongest power in the Gulf, thereby con-\ntributing to its later aggressiveness,\n/which culminated/ in the annexation of\nKuwait. /Today, / the basic geopolitical\nchallenge in the Gulf remains /how to orga-\nnize/ some outside force to balance Iraq's\ncontinued ambitions and the growing\nstrength of Iran. And I do not believe that\nwe can any longer hope to create that bal-\nance by conciliating Iraq.<-", "[20]", "#The problem of equilibrium presents it-\nself as well in other parts of the world. In\nthe former Soviet Union, the issue is usual-", {"bbox": [722, 1312, 852, 1333], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["JAN 22 '93 06:00PM 2123505146", "P.9", "IN0606 Kissinger", "DEPT. IN", "ly /defined/ as though democracy and free\nenterprise would solve all foreign policy\nproblems. I favor economic help for Russia\nand the encouragement of democracy. Yet\nwe will delude ourselves if we fail to recog-\nnize that a Russia made stronger as a result\nof economic reform could well have far\nmore complicated relations with its neigh-\nbors. Most Russian leadership groups find\nthe disintegration of the old empire diffi-\ncult to accept. A stronger Russia is likely to\nchallenge its neighbors with respect to the\ntreatment of Russian minorities, borders\nand common security concerns /deletion/.\nWe may also /deletion/ see emerge a kind\nof pro-market authoritarian government\nlike that of Pinochet in Chile. The Clinton\nadministration would then have to weigh\nthe traditional American impulse to insist\non democracy against both the danger of\nconflict between the republics and the po-\nlitical future of Russia itself.<-", "The United States therefore urgently requires a long-term strategy /both/ for the evolution of Russia and/ for its potential impact on relations between the repub-", "[25]", {"bbox": [723, 1329, 852, 1350], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["JAN 22 '93 06:00PM 2123505146", "[c]", "IN0606 Kissinger", "DEPT. IN PAGE-7", "lics./ Similarly in Asia, Japan will not in\nthe Clinton period be content with being an\neconomic superpower while remaining po-\nlitically inactive and militarily weak. And\na more autonomous Japan will rattle\nAsia's equilibrium. At the same time, Chi-\nna has the highest sustained growth rate in\nthe world, which is already translating into\nmilitary strength and will do so increasing-\nly in the future. And a Korea with a popula-\ntion of 100 million will begin to rival the\n/stature of/ European nations. /America\nmust seek to promote the healthy evolution\nof relationships between the countries in\nAsia, but it should not (and indeed cannot)\ntry to control it./ <--", "## President Clinton wisely pointed out\nthat there are also new forces in this world\nthat are not encompassed by traditional\ncategories of foreign policy, such as envi-\nronment, population and catastrophic dis-\neases. And the drive towards popular par-\nticipation in government is surely the\ndominant social theme of our age. Never-\ntheless, /the fact that an issue is impor-\ntant/ does not automatically guarantee", "[20]", {"bbox": [724, 1330, 853, 1351], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))"]

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that it can be resolved by American action.
The so-called global problems are still /in-
formed by/ national passions. Commit-
ment to the spread of democracy does not
insure that we understand how to make it
relevant to other societies, /or/ how to sup-
port our convictions with appropriate /pol-
icies./ The slogans of domestic politics are
not automatically transposable into an in-
ternational strategy.<-

## President Clinton's biggest challenge is therefore conceptual: to teach his impatient people goals and strategies for an era whose turmoil /reflects/ the birthpangs of a new international order. He will have to do so, moreover, while being inundated by daily cables that require an answer, and by the pleadings of bureaucracies that will subtly-or not so subtly-try to push him in their preferred directions. Foreign leaders will attempt to descend on him, hoping to establish a personal relationship or to extract assurances or statements that they can use to their advantage later on. If Clinton permits himself to be engulfed by the minutiae of diplomacy, he /risks losing, or

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