INTERVIEW OF HENRY KISSINGER BY IRV KUPCINET
ON KUP'S SHOW, FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1971

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Once again now, this is Dr. Henry Kissinger who is the President's chief adviser on national security and we would like to remind the good Doctor that seven years ago he appeared on this show when he was a mere college professor at Harvard, and I often wonder what happened to you, Doctor, in those seven intervening years. It has been pretty exciting, I would say.

**Dr. Kissinger:** They've been very active.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** You've been on board now two years, I wonder if you can draw an analysis of how the Vietnam situation was when you came on as the President's chief adviser on these matters, and how it is today, two years later.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, when I came on and when the President took over there were 540,000 Americans in Vietnam and the number was still increasing. Today there are around 330,000 and the number is decreasing. It will be down to 280,000 around May 1. At that time we didn't have any particular program for peace; we hadn't put one forward at the negotiations. Now we have a very generous program which we believe as soon as the North Vietnamese are ready to accept would make the basis for a just peace. At that time we had no way by which we could visualize ending the war unless the North Vietnamese granted us a peace. Today we can confidently say that we are going to be able to withdraw our forces over a period of time and leave the South Vietnamese in a position where they can take over and where we can end the war under conditions that achieve the---that give the South Vietnamese an opportunity to determine their own future, and to do this in a relatively--- in a reasonable period of time.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** I know, Dr. Kissinger, that you're sort of under wraps and that you can't discuss everything that we would like to ask you today because of your position in the Administration, but I think there are certain areas we could explore. You once had a two-pronged suggestion for ending the Vietnam war whereby the Vietnam government and the Viet Cong would get together and make some concessions, and there would be a mutual withdrawal of troops by North Vietnam and the United States. Is this coming into fruition? Do you see a possibility of this being worked out?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Let me explain why it is that I don't want to talk too much on substance on your show so that I don't look evasive. My job

- 2 -

with the President is to make sure that every reasonable proposal gets to him. And I don't like to appear as a public advocate of any particular position, and I don't want to make it seem that my particular policy is what makes the system go. Now the article you refer to was written before I had this position, when I was still a professor, and I thought then and I still believe that if the North Vietnamese and the Saigon government could negotiate the political future of Vietnam and we would negotiate with them the problem of withdrawal, that would be a good division of the negotiation. Now, up to now, the North Vietnamese have refused to talk to the South Vietnamese government at all, even though this was agreed to in Paris as a condition of the bombing cessation. So rather than let the negotiations break down, we have not made this absolute distinction that I thought might be the better one when I was a professor, because we thought keeping the negotiations going was important; but as a general view, I would still hold it.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Dr. Kissinger, as a college professor you and many others made many comments about Vietnam. Now you've come into a much more important position where more facts are at your command. Would you say that many of these suggestions being made in the academic world are made without all the facts that should be had? In other words, have you learned many facts in your position that would change your earlier position?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, of course, I have to tell you it wouldn't be easy to convince Harvard professors of the fact that there is any position more important than being a Harvard professor, or that they don't have all the facts or that if any facts clashed with their views that maybe the facts are wrong. (Sic) But the big difference between looking at the problem as a professor and looking at problems as a policy maker is that as a professor you can take all the time you want to make up your mind; as a policy maker every decision has to be made in a very brief period of time and there is a slightly athletic quality. Therefore, if you can't make your decision in the time available, you might just as well not make it. The second thing is that as a professor you can make a pronouncement, and if it turns out to be wrong you can say "I'm going back to the library and write another article or write another book." As a policy maker, you get only one guess and therefore you have to be very conscious, not only of the things that will---of the consequences of success but also of the penalties of failure, and you are responsible for both. So I would think that on many of the tactical issues, professors or academicians may not have enough of the facts. On some of the big philosophical issues of whether you should go one way or another, they do have the facts and there it is a question of judgment.

- 3 -

**Mr. Kupcinet:** I saw a diagram the other day of all the committees in which you are involved which help gather the information for our Government, and it seems like such an overwhelming number I just wonder how you sort out all these ideas that come into your office and the Office of the President, of course. It seems like you need some kind of a computer to keep the information accurate - or straight rather.

**Dr. Kissinger:** The amount of information that flows into the President is enormous because one of the duties of my office is to sort out all the material that comes in from the Defense Department, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and anything that bears on foreign policy, and to get it together in a form that the President, harrassed as he is and pressed for time as he is, can handle. As for the number of committees, the core membership of each of these committees is the same: the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and myself, as Chairman. We're on all of the committees and sometimes we've joked what we'll do is put up a cue card and say "today we are the Verification Panel, tomorrow we are the Defense Program Review Committee."

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Or just change your hats...

**Dr. Kissinger:** But the difference in these various committees is not the quorum--that's always the same. But the other advisers we bring in, for example, when we talk about the defense policy we will obviously have more military represented there. One of the changes that the President made is to make sure that the domestic agencies sit in when we discuss the Defense budget so that we can discuss national priorities. When we discuss the Middle Eastern question, we will of course, then get in the experts in that area. So it's basically one committee with different fringe membership and therefore it is not as formidable as it looks. But still it means that this core group, under one name or another, on one subject or another, meets practically every day for two to three hours. And what it means also is that the staffs of each of these people, and especially my staff which has to do the work for the committee, has to work an enormous number of hours to do the basic work.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** One of the quips going around about you, Doctor - and there are quite a few because you are a very popular man in Washington-- is that your schedule is so hectic that you were quoted as saying "we can't have a crisis next week, my schedule is too full."

**Dr. Kissinger:** Yes, I tell you I wasn't--one of the attributes in Washington--characteristics in Washington is that the society reporters circulate freely at parties and some lady will come up to you at a party and say 'what do you think about this' or 'what do you think' or anything at all, and you answer the question; the next thing you know it's in the

[x]

- 4 -

newspapers. Now I've got most of the society reporters caged and they
can't get away with it. But when I came on I provided unlimited material,
not knowing whom I was talking to.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Let me ask you about that, in just a moment. We have to pause here for a moment for a message and shall be right back with Dr. Kissinger.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** We were talking about the press before we broke with the message. Dr. Kissinger, did former President Johnson once give you a tip on how to handle the press in case there was a leak through your office of some kind?

**Dr. Kissinger:** When I saw President Johnson shortly after I was appointed, he said to me, watch the press leaks. He said it's going to be the most vicious danger you face and he said I'll give you a tip on how to spot the leaker. If a newspaperman says the able and thoughtful Mr. so-and-so, fire him immediately, you can be sure (laughter) he just leaked something.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Have you had to follow that instruction?

D

**Dr. Kissinger:** I tell you, I read the papers every day with astonishment to see who has leaked what.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Are you able to point it out pretty well?

**Dr. Kissinger:** I can always tell who has done the leaking. I can almost always tell from which agency it came by seeing whose bureaucratic interest it serves.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Doctor, how do you and the President work? Now you are one of his great confidants. Some members of the Cabinet said that they didn't have access to him, Secretary Hickel of course. How do you work with him? How is your relationship?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, luckily for that particular charge, I had nothing to do with the Interior Department. So I had next to nothing to do with any requests that Secretary Hickel might have made. The President--- any Cabinet member can always see the President by requesting an appointment; so there is never any question of blocking the Cabinet member from the President. In the case of the Cabinet members with whom I deal principally--that is Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency--the Secretary of

- 5 -

State is maybe the President's oldest friend and they talk to each other over the telephone very often and see each other quite often. The Secretary of Defense has worked with the President for a long time. There is no question of blocking them off. The basic procedure of the President is that he hates to be confronted with a request which hasn't been staffed, because he thinks the issues are so serious that he doesn't want to have somebody come into his office without his knowing what the issue is and then ask him to make a decision right on the spot. So the system he has set up is designed to achieve two objectives: (1) to make sure that if one department makes a request of him in which other departments are interested, that before he makes a ruling he knows what the other departments think of it too; and (2) to make sure that before he talks to a Cabinet member if it's about serious business, he has had a chance to think about what the issue is before he's asked to make a decision. As a general rule when he sees a Cabinet member, we give him an agenda of what the issues are likely to be and what the alternatives are, and what other departments think. But the Cabinet member can always see the President; he can always see him within 48 hours; in the case of the Secretary of State, almost always that day, unless there is an overriding demand for the President's time. So I don't think that it is correct to say that the President is walled off. This is a President who prefers to reflect about his decisions and therefore he prefers to make them on the basis of written documents rather than on the basis of personal conversation, as some other Presidents did. When I deal with him, nine out of ten decisions he makes that come in through my office, he makes in writing, not in conversations with me. And he always makes a written document. Another aspect is any memorandum signed by a Cabinet member always goes to the President. My office doesn't stop those; we may summarize it, but even if we give a summary we attach the whole document so the President can easily check to see whether the summary is fair.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Do you have to call for an appointment too, or because of your position can you be one of the few who can walk in on the President?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, it depends. I have a regular appointment every morning around 9:30. I brief him on the day's events, usually the overnight events, because he's up to date when he goes home in the evening, so I brief him on what went on during the night and give him the difference in time zones--everything seems to happen at our night,--well, also in the Middle East. So I have a regular appointment. Then if I want to see him urgently about something and I know he doesn't have anyone in his office, I would feel free just to walk in. Since he usually has a very

W

heavy schedule, except for my regular appointments, I have to say that I'd like to see him and of course they always fit me in, almost always that day. And quite frequently he calls for me; something is on his mind. So between these various methods of seeing him, I see a fair amount of him.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned how close the President is to Mr. Rogers, the Secretary of State; we know he's close to you. Yet the *New York Times* and other people in Washington keep reporting that there is a friction between you and the Secretary of State; they cite the case of Willy Brandt and the West German effort to work closer with Eastern Europe which Secretary Rogers applauded wholeheartedly, and you issued sort of a luke warm approval, in fact, a little bit hands-off approval. Do you think they are going a little bit too fast in their rap-prochement with the Russians and East Europe?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, Washington is fascinated by power and influence, and one of the favorite past-times in Washington is to see who is up and who is down, and when there aren't any real struggles, then they invent one. Now I am the President's assistant; it is inconceivable that I would take a position different from the President. So whatever position I take, if I take a position, you can be absolutely sure it is based on a written instruction from the President. It's inconsistent with my position to take a public position in general and to take even a private position which diverges in any respect from the President's. Secondly, on the specific issue of the Ostpolitik, I have read these accounts with great interest; I don't know to what they refer. These accounts say I talked to diplomats and newsmen. I would like to see anybody produce either the diplomat or the newsman--

**Mr. Kupcinet:** You're talking about the West German--

**Dr. Kissinger:** The West German Ostpolitik--to whom I expressed such views. I know what the President thinks. Within the bureaucracy I will express the President's views. Beyond that I have not taken a public position or a position to foreigners or a position to newsmen. The Secretary of State has to conduct the day-to-day foreign policy with over a hundred countries. I get involved in the operational side of foreign policy only on those issues that have immediate Presidential concern and those are relatively few. And even then in close collaboration with the State Department, so it simply isn't true that there is friction between the Secretary of State and myself. It can happen now and then that in the Oval Office if the President asks our views, that as men of strong opinions there may be slight shades, but there is no friction.

- 7 -

**Mr. Kupcinet:** This story also said that Bonn was so upset by this
difference of opinion over the attitude that they sent a representative
to Washington to find out which was the American position - the
Secretary of State's or the one you reflected, supposedly.

Dr. Kissinger: This is absolutely...

Mr. Kupcinet: That's not true either.

Dr. Kissinger: This is absolutely ridiculous and whoever put out these
stories ought to be ashamed of himself. The man who came over is my
counterpart in the German Chancellor's Office. He is an old friend of
mine. I have known him for a long time... long before either of us had
high office. As it turned out he is a professor, too, and we have been
corresponding and working together for a long time so he knew-- he had
to know that these charges were wrong if, in fact, he was worried about
them. The reason for his visit was as follows: He was supposed to
come over in October. I was seen to be his principal counterpart be-
cause I have the same job he has, and he made a lot of appointments
around seeing me. Now then, after he had made those appointments,
the President scheduled his visit to the Sixth Fleet so the curious thing
happened--I was very busy. He felt he had to meet his other appointments,
so he did not see me but saw everybody else. We had always agreed that
at the earliest opportunity he'd come over to have the conversation with
me which more or less had been the original purpose of his visit. He
called me, he wanted to come over. When he came there were present
at the meeting myself, the Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs, the German Ambassador, my staff man on Europe, Mr. Emke,
who is the Chancellor's representative andy myself. It was a most
amicable conversation and that particular issue of whether I was opposed
to the German Chancellor never arose. It would be highly inappropriate.
I do not conduct my own foreign policy and I would have refused to see
him if that had been the issue.

Mr. Kupcinet: Let me interrupt at this moment, Doctor, for a message
and we shall be right back.

Mr. Kupcinet: Dr. Kissinger, there have been a lot of books written
about the insulation of the American President, that he does not hear
enough dissenting voices, that he loses the feel of the Nation because he
is surrounded mostly by people who are appointed by him and consequently
they are mostly agreeable to what he says. Do you find that's true? Is

- 8 -

there any strong dissent when you get together with the President
within the meetings you mentioned in the Oval Office?

**Dr. Kissinger:** As a general institutional problem it is of course true
that any man who becomes President is to some extent separated and
because his time is so precious there has to be some mechanism to
filter ideas through to him. But whatever the mechanism is, now each
President has to organize that to fit his own personality. I've seen
President Kennedy in action, President Johnson in action and now Presi-
dent Nixon in action. I feel much closer to President Nixon than to any
of the others and each of them has his own personality, his own style.
Now this President has a very--an almost insatiable desire to learn what
others--what his real choices are. He is trained as a lawyer. He has
a very analytical mind and he does not dominate the conversation the
way some other people that I've known did. It is true once a President
says "I want to go this way" then there is a strong temptation on the part
of his subordinates to get it for him. That is human nature. But this
President doesn't have that characteristic and it would be very dangerous
to conclude from an off-hand remark he makes that that's what he wants,
because he may be just testing you, he may be just playing a lawyer's
role of devil's advocate. So the first thing--what he usually does first is
to ask what are the facts, what are the alternatives? He usually---in
the rarest cases does he say what he wants or, when he says something,
it is a hypothesis. Then he reads the memorandum and then he makes
copious notes on a yellow sheet of paper and then he'll call me in and
he'll call in the Secretary of State and others and he says "Now this is
the way it looks to me. I can do this and it will have those consequences.
I can do that and that is the other consequence." He may go down three
or four choices. "Now if - which of these - have I got this right? Is
there another choice? Or are the consequences wrong?" Then after
we've talked that over, that's when he--- then he begins narrowing it.
But he is a very reflective man who works these things through to an
enormous degree himself. Now, of course, I recognize it may be that
we don't put all the choices before him. But I have often said the un-
forgiveable thing in one's relations with the President, with this President,
is not to give him wrong advice--I wouldn't want to make it habit forming,
but I think he can forgive making a mistake that way. But if a policy
failed on the basis of considerations that you should have put before him,
but didn't, I think that would be an unforgiveable sin. So he not only accepts,
but he demands that choices are put before him; and the debate should
concern the judgments, not the fact that he's insulated.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** I hope this doesn't embarrass you, Dr. Kissinger, but
I'd like to recall that in 1968 you were on the side of Governor Rocke-
feller against Mr. Nixon. Mr. Nixon won the Republican nomination.
At that time you expressed some concern that Mr. Nixon may not be

able to get us out of Vietnam in time. You were concerned and I think
you were quoted as saying you thought his policy was a little bit too
vague or words to that effect. I presume in two years you have changed
your mind.

**Dr. Kissinger:** Well, in 1964 --- first of all, I want to say that Governor
Rockefeller has been a good friend of mine and remains a good friend of
mine and I have no regrets about being associated---having been associated
with him. On the other hand, in 1968 I had never met President Nixon
and all I knew about any of his policy pronouncements was a statement
that was admittedly somewhat vague before the Republican platform com-
mittee. But I had never had any direct contact with him and I, therefore,
didn't know anything about his---the details of his thought. As it turned
out, after joining his Administration, I, he is a man with a very precise
mind, with a very analytical mind, and certainly that particular criticism
would be totally inapplicable.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Doctor, some of the candidates who are planning to run
today---they say we should set a definite, specific time to get all our men
out of Vietnam. I think that you are in favor of withdrawal as the Presi-
dent is naturally. What is the problem with setting a definite time?

**Dr. Kissinger:** We have---our policy is to withdraw from Vietnam as
rapidly as we can. And we are on a course which, as the President said
in his recent press conference, we confidently expect will get us out of
combat and eventually out of Vietnam in a reasonable time period. Now
there are two problem time periods. One is---well, there are two ques-
tions to be answered. One, do we have an internal time schedule?
Secondly, should we give it publicly if we have it? Now with respect to
the former, we have a very clear idea of where we want to go. The
President has said we have a plan, we've been on schedule and we've
met every promise we have made. The second problem is why don't
we give a precise schedule now? Well, the argument that is made for
giving a precise schedule is that there are some vague North Vietnamese
references that this might lead to constructive negotiation. But the North
Vietnamese have said that if we stop the bombing, if we agree to talk to
the NLF, if we did talk to the NLF, if we agreed in principle to troop
withdrawal, if we made a token troop withdrawal, if we withdrew 50,000
men, if we agreed to withdraw 100,000 men, if we withdrew 100,000
men, if we accepted the principle of total withdrawal, if we sent a new
negotiator to Paris---all of this was supposed to lead to constructive
negotiations. All of this we have done. None of it has lead to constructive
negotiations, so that is not an overly persuasive argument with us.

-10-

Counting against it is the fact that we still hope, although the hope is receding, to end the war by negotiation. If we give a precise deadline, all they have to do is to wait for the deadline and we have lost one of the incentives that we have---that we believe we have. We will give deadlines that we believe we can responsibly meet. We will meet all of those deadlines and, as I said, we have a program that is clear and definite and that will achieve the same objective as the people who want us to give a deadline. The difference between us and them, except those who just say 'get out tomorrow,' is really one of tactics.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Let me pause here for just one moment, Doctor, for a message and we shall be with you briefly.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Dr. Kissinger, as you look around the world, do you think America's position is being downgraded around the world? Some people say we're becoming a regional power because of our concentration on Vietnam. Some people say that Russia is emerging as the No. 1 nation. Still others say that Red China, because of its mass land population, one-third of the human beings reside there, is going to be the nation of the future. As you look into the future, how do you analyze this?

**Dr. Kissinger:** The big task that this Administration had before it was to adjust America's role in this world to a condition that we could sustain over an indefinite period of time. We wanted to avoid the ups and downs of oscillating between euphoria and depression, between total commitment and total withdrawal. We recognize that the world had changed enormously between 1948 when we first really made our plunge into the world and 1969 when this President took over. We believe that the policy that we have established---that the Nixon Doctrine which adjusts our possibilities in the world and tries to establish a balance between what we should do and others should do, will enable us to play a more constructive role over a longer period of time. When I came on, the President said to me he didn't want to be known as the man who managed crises, but he wanted to be in a position where we would construct a peaceful world, and that is what we are attempting to do. I believe, and I hope that the historical verdict of this Administration will be that we have moved America in this direction.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** As you look into the future, do you see, as some students say, that China because of its huge population will be the No. 1 nation in the world, say 25, 50 years from now?

**Dr. Kissinger:** No, but I---you know it's hard to speculate about the future. China is a country with a lot of resources and a great tradition, but I don't believe it will be the No. 1 nation.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** May I ask you a few personal questions before I let you go?

Dr. Kissinger: Sure.

Mr. Kupcinet: Is it true that in World War I, when you were serving
as a private, that you had no ambition to become a professor or a
teacher and that somebody steered you into the academic world?

Dr. Kissinger: I hope you mean World War II.

Mr. Kupcinet: World War II, did I say World War I? I'm so sorry.
I apologize for a whole war.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Before World War II I had to go to night school to support my family and at that time I wanted to be an accountant, and I ran into somebody in the Army who...

Mr. Kupcinet: Was the name Kraemer or ...

Dr. Kissinger: Yeh, yeh, that's the one who said that I had a good
political mind, which astonished me at the time, and he urged me to
study political science. That is true.

Mr. Kupcinet: One more personal question. The kidnapping--does
this change your mode of living--or the kidnapping threat rather --your
mode of existence?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it means that I have escorts and on all occasions,
including occasions when I already have other escorts, so it makes my
---it makes certain activities somewhat more circumscribed, but other-
wise I haven't let it affect my life.

Mr. Kupcinet: Let me ask you about the other escorts, because the
press---this may be true and it may be wrong, Doctor, but the press
paints you as the man who dates some of the loveliest persons in
Washington and Hollywood and where else. The Washingtonivo I
think is the popular term. I don't know if this is embarrassing or not
to you, but it is a term used in the press.

**Dr. Kissinger:** It's astonishing to me. I must say I was just as charming the last time I appeared on your program and a lot more resistible. So it's actually---I got this name of---the name of "secret swinger" grew out of one of the society reporters at a party in Washington. A girl came up to me at a party---I didn't know who she was, and she said are you a swinger? I said, "I'm too busy to do any public swinging, but if I tell you I do no swinging you will think there is something wrong with me, so why don't I say I'm a secret swinger." So it turned out she was a society reporter and she printed it, but I suppose some of the names you mention are probably true.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Do you get some good-natured kidding in the White House by the reports of your escorts, as you so gently put it?

**Dr. Kissinger:** Oh yes, I get exposed to that and sometimes they send me little notes in classified envelopes that it turns out are taken from society columns.

**Mr. Kupcinet:** Doctor, I want to thank you ever so much for spending this time with us. We know the limitations of your ability to speak out on other issues. I know you'd like to declare yourself but, as you explained earlier, your allegiances to the President on making such pronouncements. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with us. We'll pause for a message and then we'll be back with some other guests including Melina Mercouri, Jerry Lewis and a whole flock of others.