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# FOREWORD

Henry A. Kissinger

In the second half of the 20th century, the emergence of scores of new states has made international politics and economics truly global for the first time in history. At the same time, technology has made it possible for nearly every country to participate in events in every part of the world as they occur.

Unfortunately, the explosion in information has not been accompanied by a similar increase in knowledge. The continents interact, but they do not necessarily understand each other. The uniformity of technology is accompanied by an implicit assumption that politics, and even cultures, will become homogenized. Especially the long-established nations

FINAL

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of the West have fallen prey to the temptation of ignoring history and judging every new state by the criteria of their own civilizations. It is often overlooked that the institutions of the West did not spring full-blown from the brow of contemporaries but evolved over centuries which shaped frontiers and defined legitimacy, constitutional provisions, and basic values.

But history does matter. The institutions of the West developed gradually while those of most new states were put into place in elaborated form immediately. In the West, a civil society evolved side-by-side with the maturation of the modern state. This made possible the growth of representative institutions which confined the state's power to those matters which society could not deal with by its own arrangements.

Political conflicts were moderated by overriding purposes.

Many post-colonial states have no comparable history.

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Tasks, which, in the West, were accomplished over centuries, must be completed in a decade or two and under much more complex circumstances. Where the common national experience is colonial rule, especially when the state comprises diverse ethnic groups, political opposition is often considered an assault on the political validity of the state rather than of a particular government.

Singapore is a case in point. As the main British naval base in the Far East, it had neither prospect nor aspiration for nationhood until the collapse of European power in the aftermath of the Second World War redrew the political map of Southeast Asia. In the first wave of decolonization, Singapore was made part of Malaya until its largely Chinese population proved too daunting for a state attempting to define its national identity by a Malay majority. Malaya extruded Singapore because it was not yet ready to cope with

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so large a Chinese population or, less charitably, to teach Singapore the habits of dependence if it was forced back into what later became the Malaysian Federation.

But history shows that normally prudent, ordinary calculations can be overturned by extraordinary personalities. In the case of Lee Kuan Yew, the father of Singapore's emergence as a national state, the ancient argument whether circumstance or personality shapes events is settled in favor of the latter. Circumstances could not have been less favorable. Located on a sandbar with nary a natural resource, Singapore had in the 1950s a polyglot population of slightly over a million (today over 3 million), of which 75.4 percent was Chinese, 13.6 percent Malay, and 8.6 percent Indian. It adjoined in the south with Indonesia, with a population of over 100 million (now nearly double that), and in the north with Malaya (later Malaysia), with a population of 6.28

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million. By far the smallest country in Southeast Asia, Singapore seemed destined to become a client state of more powerful neighbors, if indeed it could preserve its independence at all.

Lee Kuan Yew thought otherwise. Every great achievement is a dream before it becomes reality, and his vision was of a state that would not simply survive but prevail by excelling. Superior intelligence, discipline, and ingenuity would substitute for resources. Lee Kuan Yew summoned his compatriots to a duty they had never previously perceived: first to clean up their city, then to dedicate it to overcome the initial hostility of their neighbors and their own ethnic divisions by superior performance. The Singapore of today is his testament. Annual per capita income has grown from less than $1,000 at the time of independence to nearly $30,000 today. It is the high-tech leader of Southeast Asia, the

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commercial entrepôt, the scientific center. Singapore plays a
major role in the politics and economics of Southeast Asia and
beyond.

This volume is Lee Kuan Yew's account of his
extraordinary achievement. He navigated this passage by
understanding not only the requirements of his own society but
the needs and motives of his neighbors. A thoughtful
discussion of Indonesia and the fall of its President Suharto
is matched by Lee Kuan Yew's account of his encounters with
China and its leaders. His narrative of Singapore's abortive
venture into creating a satellite city in Suchow is
particularly instructive on the challenge of melding the
market economics of even so friendly an interlocutor as
Singapore with the political and social realities of a China
midway between Mao and reform.

M

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Lee Kuan Yew would not be true to himself were he less
than frank about his analysis of the difference between the
individualism of the West and the priority for social cohesion
in countries such as his and in much of the rest of Asia. He
does not ask us to change our patterns, only to refrain from
imposing them on societies with different histories and
necessities.

These views have subjected Lee Kuan Yew to considerable
criticism in the West. Those of us who prize our values while
understanding the complexities of a new country in a different
culture are prepared to leave it to history to pass judgment
as to whether there were other options available to him. But,
for a generation, every American leader who has dealt with Lee
Kuan Yew has benefited from the fact that, on international
issues, he has identified the future of his country with the
fate of the democracies. And he has done so not passively but

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# FOREWORD - LKY BOOK

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become homogenized. Especially the long-established nations of the West have fallen prey to the temptation of ignoring history and judging every new state by the criteria of their own civilizations. It is often overlooked that the institutions of the West did not spring full-blown from the brow of contemporaries but evolved over centuries which shaped frontiers and defined legitimacy, constitutional provisions, and basic values.

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Singapore is a case in point. As the main British naval base in the Far East, it had neither prospect nor aspiration for nationhood until the collapse of European power in the aftermath of the Second World War redrew the political map of Southeast Asia. In the first wave of decolonization, Singapore was made part of Malaysia until its largely Chinese population proved too daunting for a Malaysian-state attempting to define its national identity by a Malay

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majority. Malaysia extruded Singapore because it was not yet ready to cope with so large a Chinese population or, less charitably, to teach Singapore the habits of dependence if it was forced back into the Malaysian Federation.

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with Malaya (later Malaysia), with a population of 6.28 million. By far the smallest country in Southeast Asia, Singapore seemed destined to become a client state of more powerful neighbors, if indeed it could preserve its independence at all.

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today. It is the high-tech leader of Southeast Asia, the
commercial entrepôt, the scientific center. Singapore plays a
major role in the politics and economics of Southeast Asia and
beyond.

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AMBASSADOR
OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE
3501 INTERNATIONAL PLACE, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20008
TEL. (202) 537-3100
FAX. (202) 537-0876

9 Dec 99

Dr Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Fax: (212) 759-0042

DEC 0 9 1999

Dear Dr Kissinger

Thank you for giving me the privilege to read the draft of your
foreword for Vol 2 of SM's Memoirs.

I like the thrust of your argument. It is a strong one and as a
Singaporean, I believe it needs to be said.

I have slight amendments to offer on page 4 on the population
figures. In the 1950s, the population of Singapore was over a million of
which 75.4% were Chinese, 13.6% Malay, 8.6% Indian with a combination
of other ethnic groups adding up to 2.4% of the remainder.

On page 5, as you are still in the 1950s, "Malaysia" should be
"Malaya" and its population then was 6.28 million. I have attached the
relevant pages.

With warmest regards,

Enc

But history shows that normally prudent, ordinary
calculations can be overturned by extraordinary personalities.
In the case of Lee Kuan Yew, the father of Singapore's
emergence as a national state, the ancient argument whether
circumstance or personality shapes events is settled in favor
of the latter. Circumstances could not have been less
favorable. Located on a sandbar with nary a natural resource,
Singapore had in the 1950s a polyglot population of slightly
over a million (today over 3 million), of which 75.4% was
Chinese, 13.6% Malay, and 8.6% Indian. It adjoined
in the south with Indonesia, with a population of over 100
million (now nearly double that), and in the north with

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Malaya (later Malaysia) 5
6.28
Malaysia, with a population of 20 million. By far the
smallest country in Southeast Asia, Singapore seemed destined
to become a client state of more powerful neighbors, if indeed
it could preserve its independence at all.

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# FOREWORD - LKY BOOK

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Singapore is a case in point. As the main British naval base in the Far East, it had neither prospect nor aspiration for nationhood until the collapse of European power in the aftermath of the Second World War redrew the political map of Southeast Asia. In the first wave of decolonization, Singapore was made part of Malaysia until its largely Chinese population proved too daunting for a Malaysian state attempting to define its national identity by a Malay

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But history shows that normally prudent, ordinary calculations can be overturned by extraordinary personalities. In the case of Lee Kuan Yew, the father of Singapore's emergence as a national state, the ancient argument whether circumstance or personality shapes events is settled in favor of the latter. Circumstances could not have been less favorable. Located on a sandbar with nary a natural resource, Singapore had in the 1950s a polyglot population of slightly over a million (today over 3 million), of which 70 percent was Chinese, 20 percent Malay, and 10 percent Indian. It adjoined in the south with Indonesia, with a population of over 100 million (now nearly double that), and in the north with

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# FOREWORD - LKY BOOK

In the second half of the 20th century, the emergence of scores of new states has made international politics and economics truly global for the first time in history. At the same time, technology has made it possible for nearly everyone to participate in events in every part of the world as they occur.

Unfortunately, growing interaction has not always led to a commensurate growth in understanding. The explosion in information has not been accompanied by a [similar] increase in knowledge. The continents interact, but they do not necessarily understand each other. The uniformity of

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And since the scope of information is prized more highly than
its depth, it is often overlooked that the institutions of the
West did not spring full-blown from the brow of contemporaries
but evolved over centuries which shaped frontiers and defined
legitimacy, constitutional provisions, and basic values.

But history does matter. The institutions of the West
developed gradually while those of most new states were put
into place in elaborated form immediately, leaving little
scope for improvisation or adjustment to local circumstances.
In the West, a civil society evolved side-by-side with the
maturation of the modern state. This made possible the growth