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# CHAPTER VIII

## The Strategy of Ambiguity -- Sino-Soviet Strategic Thought

What is a revolutionary? Were the answer to this question self-evident, only the most moribound societies would ever collapse and few international orders would be overthrown. For it would then be possible to stifle the party or the state seeking to subvert the existing system at its inception or to remedy the situation that led to its emergence. Instead history reveals a strange phenomenon. Time and again states appear which boldly claim that they propose to recast the existing structure. And time and again, the Powers that are the declared victims stand by impotently while imperceptibly the balance of power is overturned against them. Indeed, they tend to explain away the efforts of the revolutionary Power to upset the equilibrium as the expression of limited aims or the outgrowth of a specific grievance, until they discover -- sometimes too late and always at excessive cost -- that the revolutionary Power had been perfectly sincere all along, that its call for a new order expressed its real aspirations. So it was when the French Revolution burst on an unbelieving Europe and when Hitler challenged the system of Versailles. So it has been with the relations of the rest of the world vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.

How was it possible that from insignificant beginnings these Powers could emerge as the most powerful states of Europe and that the last of these, the U.S.S.R. can bid for the domination of the world less than a generation after a group of die-hards were trying to hold Moscow against enemies converging from all sides?

from any angle.

After a broad of greater scope were trying to go ahead against enemies converging the U.S. and U.K. can pig for the combination of the world forces in a generation could emerge as the most powerful states of Europe and that the fast of these, how was it possible that from institutions demanding these powers world via-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The system of Versailles. So it can been with the relations of the rest of the French revolutionary nation on an underlying Europe and when it is finished, preferred its own. For a new order expressed its real aspiration. So it was when the coat -- that the revolutionary tower had been perfectly sincere and strong, that隙 was made they discover -- sometimes too late and always at excessive elaboration as the expression of limited aims of the outgrowth of a specific tend to explain away the efforts of the revolutionary tower to obscure the impenetrability the defence of power is overthrown against them. Indeed, they again, the powers that are the decimated victims stand by it independently while publicly claim that they propose to recast the existing structure. And time and history reveals a strange phenomenon. Time and again, actions appear which reception on to remedy the situation that led to its emergence. Instead settle the party on the stage seeking to endow the existing system at the international order which would then be possible to evident, only the most mordant societies would ever settle and few

What is a revolutionary? Were the answer to find direction self-

The Strategy of Annexity - Soviet-Soviet Strategic Thought

CHAPTER VIII

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Part of the answer is to be found in the fact that the Powers which represent the status quo tend to confront the revolutionary power with methods they learned in a more secure environment; in the difficulty they find in adjusting to the changed nature of international relations in a revolutionary international order. An international order the basic arrangements of which are accepted by all the major Powers may be called "legitimate"; a system which contains a Power or a group of Powers which refuses to accept either the arrangements of the settlement or the domestic structure of the other states is "revolutionary." A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible; it limits their scope. Wars may arise, but they will be fought in the name of the existing system and the peace will be justified as a better expression of agreed arrangements. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, disputes do not concern adjustments within a given framework, but the framework itself.

Thus while disputes in a revolutionary order may retain a familiar form, their substance has altered significantly. In a legitimate order, disputes are blunted by an understanding that the maintenance of the existing framework is more important than any disputes within it; adjustments, therefore, seek to improve cooperation within a system accepted by all the major powers. A revolutionary order, on the other hand, is such precisely because a major power refuses to accept either the framework of the international order or the domestic structure of other states or both. Adjustments here have primarily a tactical significance: to prepare positions for the next test of strength. Negotiations in a legitimate order have three functions: to formulate by expressing agreements or disagreements in a manner that does not open unbridgeable schisms; to perpetuate by providing a forum for making unnecessary to persuade, to persuade by stating a plausible reason for settlement. But, in a revolutionary period, most of these functions have changed their purpose.

in a revolutionary period, most of these functions have changed their purpose. To perambulate, to perambulate by stating a definite reason for settlement. But, unmitigated agreement, to perambulate by providing a form for making unnecessarily expressing agreements or disagreements in a manner that does not open

Negotiations in a legitimate order have three functions: to communicate by tactical significance; to prepare positions for the next step of strength; domestic structure of other states or both. Adjustments here have primarily a power reserves to accept either the framework of the international order or the revolutionary order, on the other hand, in such precisely become a major seek to improve cooperation within a system accepted by all the major powers. Framework is more important than any dispositions within it; adjustments, therefore, dispositions are limited by an understanding that the maintenance of the existing form, their independence has offered significantly. In a legitimate order,

Time while dispositions in a revolutionary order may retain a familiar not concern adjustments within a given framework, but the framework itself. Agreed arrangements. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, dispositions go existing system and the peace will be justified as a better expression of limits therefor. War may arise, but they will be found in the same of the "revolutionary." A legitimate order does not make collude impossihle; it arranges the settlement on the domestic structure of the other states in which consists a power or a group of powers which refuses to accept either the are accepted by all the major powers may be called "fugitive"; a system international order. An international order the basic arrangements of which adjusting to the changed nature of international relations in a revolutionary they learned in a more secure environment; in the difficulty they find in represent the status quo tend to confront the revolutionary power with methods part of the answer is to be found in the fact that the powers which

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The emphasis of traditional diplomacy on "good faith" and "willingness to come to an agreement" does not apply in dealing with a power dedicated to over-throwing the international system. For it is precisely this "good faith" and this "willingness to come to an agreement" which will be most at issue. Diplomats can still meet, but they cannot persuade each other. Instead, diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to influence and win over public opinion in other nations; their purpose is less the settlement of disputes than the definition of issues for which to contend; they are less a forum for negotiation than a platform for propaganda.

But while this changed function of diplomacy may be clear enough in retrospect, an understanding of it in the face of a revolutionary challenge is inhibited by the very factors which make for the spontaneity, indeed, the existence of a legitimate order. To be sure, no international order is ever stable entirely because it is considered legitimate by its components. The fact that other powers of an international system are sovereign and that their intentions are therefore subject to change imposes a measure of precaution on all policy. No statesman can make the survival of his charge entirely dependent on the continued good will of another sovereign state because one of his most effective guarantees for this will remaining good is not to tempt it by too great a disproportion of power. For this reason, there always exists in international relations the temptation of absolute security, an attempt to bring about a system free from the consciousness of foreign danger. But since absolute security for one power in physical terms is unattainable except by the neutralization of all the others, it can be achieved only by a cycle of violence. The quest for absolute security inevitably produces a revolutionary situation. Nevertheless a legitimate order is distinguished by not pressing the quest for security to its limits, by its willingness to find safety in a

the great risk of security to its funds, by its affinities to funding safety in a situation. Nevertheless a legitimate order in distinguished by not breaching violence. The great for absolute security involves phenomena a revolutionary neutralization of all the objects, it can be achieved only by a close or absolute security for one power in particular, term is unattainable except by the printing of a system free from the consequences of foreign danger. But since in international relations the competition of specific security, an attempt to put too great a handicap on power. For this reason, there exists his most effective guarantee for this remaining need. It is not to be exempted from the continued good will of another sovereign state because one of the most basic. No statesman can make the arrival of the enemy entirely off policy.

The great for specific security involves phenomena a revolutionary neutralization of all the objects, it can be achieved only by a close or absolute security for one power in particular, term is unattainable except by the printing of a system free from the consequences of foreign danger. But since in international relations the competition of specific security, an attempt to put too great a handicap on power. For this reason, there exists his most effective guarantee for this remaining need. It is not to be exempted from the continued good will of another sovereign state because one of the most basic. No statesman can make the arrival of the enemy entirely off policy.

Intention are therefore adopted to change it from a measure of prevention on the part of other powers of an international system are sovereign and that their stable entirety because it is considered legitimate by its components. The existence of a legitimate order. To be one, no international order is ever acknowledged by the very factors which make for the TOMANSHIP, Indeed, the reason, an understanding of it, in the face of a revolutionary challenge is but while this changed function of diplomacy may be clean enough in itself are less a form for negotiation than a platform for propaganda.

Attainment of diabetes than the definition of disease for which to contain; and win over public opinion in other nations; their purposes, if they mean the diplomatic conferences become elaborate stage plays which seek to influence Diplomats can still meet, put them cannot because each other. Instead, this "affinity" to come to an agreement, which will be most of issue, throwing the international system. Now it is precisely this "Good faith" and to an agreement" does not apply in dealing with a power dedicated to over-

The eminent at traditional diplomacy, on "Good faith" and "Affinity" to come to an agreement, etc. does not apply in dealing with a power dedicated to over-

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combination of physical safeguards and mutual trust. It is legitimate not because each Power is perfectly satisfied, but because it will not be so dissatisfied that it will seek its remedy in overthrowing the existing system. The confidence required for the operation of a legitimate order does not presuppose the absence of _all_ tensions, but the conviction on the part of all major powers that the transformations sought do not threaten their national survival. To the extent that this measure of mutual trust is not present, the quest for absolute security will reappear and relations will tend to be based on force and the threat of force, either on war or on an armaments race.

The Powers that represent the status quo are therefore at a profound psychological disadvantage vis-a-vis a revolutionary power. They have everything to gain from believing in its good faith, for the tranquility they seek is unattainable without it. All their instincts will cause them to seek to integrate the revolutionary power into the legitimate framework by "understanding" or by "moderation." They will tend to interpret the motives of the revolutionary Power in the most favorable manner, the manner to which they are used and which to them seems "natural." The revolutionary power therefore gains a subtle advantage especially if it displays any degree of psychological skill. For it can present every move as the expression of limited aims or as caused by a legitimate grievance. The status quo powers, on the other hand, cannot be sure that the balance of power is in fact threatened or that their opponent is not sincere until he has demonstrated it and by the time he has done so it is usually too late. However the physical balance may incline against the revolutionary power, it is more than made up by its psychological edge.

A revolutionary power confronts the legitimate order with a fearful challenge. The condition of spontaneity in a legitimate order is that things

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are what they seem, for if distrust becomes too rampant, a display of force is the only remedy. But against a revolutionary Power tactics of conciliation are self-defeating. Here safety can be found only in a precautionary policy which stakes an assessment against protestations of innocence. The world will never know what horrors it was spared from revolutions that were stifled in their infancy or indeed whether the repression of them was justified. Indeed, since defeated revolutions are usually remembered by their words, their deeds not having been given a chance to mature, they tend to appear to posterity in terms of their own evaluation of themselves.

A long period of peace leads to the temptation to trust appearances and to seek to escape the element of conjecture in policy by interpreting the motives of other Powers in the most favorable manner. Confronted by a revolutionary power, everything depends, however, on the ability to see through appearances and to keep the challenge from becoming overt. Otherwise the revolutionary power will be able to defeat its opponents by their own preconceptions. Napoleon's victories were made possible because the "legitimate" rulers surrendered after a lost battle according to the canons of 18th century warfare which caused the enormity of Napoleon's goals to seem inconceivable. Hitler could use the doctrines of his opponents in annexing Austria because it was believed that his aims were limited by the claim of national self-determination. And the Soviets have expanded into the center of Europe and to the fringes of Asia by coupling their expansion with protestations of peace, democracy and freedom. The psychological advantage of the revolutionary state is that in order to defeat it the status quo powers have to give up the "legitimate" framework, the very pattern which to them makes their existence worth living.

their existence would fail.

To give up the "liberty," framework, the very basis which to them were revolutionary state is lost in order to offset it the opposite one. There are two kinds of freedom: of peace, democracy and freedom. The behavioral characteristics of the European and to the trumps of the Axis pertain with particular importance to the framework with respect to national self-determination. And the States have generated there the concept of liberty because it was believed that the same were linked by the claim of incompatibility. Higher could use the doctrine of the autonomy of Napoleon's Russia to seem of 18th century nature which caused the autonomy of Napoleon's Russia to seem "liberty." States annunciations after a fortuitous economy to the same consequences. Napoleon's victory were made possible because the revolutionary power will be able to label its opponents by their own adjectives and to lend the challenge from preceding ones. Otherwise the revolutionary power, everything defenseless, however, on the ability to act through lives of other Powers in the most favorable situation. Confronted by its end to seek to escape the element of conflict, it will be through this power that the element of conflict will be interpreted and to seek to escape the element of conflictive in itself.

A long period of peace leads to the determination to grant subordination to their own government of the government.

Not having been given a chance to mature, they tend to either to become, in their turn, their seeds their infirmity or indeed whether the repression of them was justified. Indeed, however, what follows it was abated from revolutions that were arisen in which arises an announcement against the profession of innocence. The world will be self-defeating. Here sensitivity can be found in its a presynthetic policy the only remedy. But against a revolutionary power section of the profession are what they seem, for if that profession becomes too rampant, a danger of force is

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In the past, the conflict between a legitimate and a revolutionary order has often had a tragic quality because each side was unconscious of the role it was playing. To be sure, one side attacked the status quo while the other defended it. But both contenders spoke in the name of an absolute truth and they were wont to ascribe their victory to the superior validity of their maxims or their greater resolution rather than to their ability at exploiting the psychological weakness of their opponent. The particular dynamism of the Soviets derives from their combination of revolutionary righteousness and psychological adeptness; they have studied not only the elements of their own doctrine -- which is true of all revolutionary movements; they have consciously sought to place the psychological vulnerabilities of their opponents into their service. The liberal theory of the West preaches tolerance -- therefore the Communists seek to transform their party in democratic states into one of the contending parties and claim for it the equality of status which it will be its first act to deny its opponents should it come to power by parliamentary means. The empiricism of the Free World teaches that resistance is justified only against overt aggression -- therefore the Soviets graduate all moves in such a manner that the balance is overturned by increments and the inward doubts of the non-Soviet world multiplied. The West feels ambiguous about the role of power and the uncommitted exalt peace into an absolute principle, because in their weakness an exaltation of principle is their only protection. Therefore, the Soviets alternate peace offensives with threats of the dire consequences if they are disregarded; during the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India a hydrogen bomb was set off and the timing could hardly have been accidental. The Free World believes that peace is a static condition and that all things being equal economic advance is a more rational objective than foreign adventures. Therefore the Communists appear periodically in the guise of the domestic reformer eager to enjoy the fruits of material advancement.

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For each change of front, the U.S.S.R. has found advocates among its victims, defending its course, not to be sure, on the ground of Communist doctrine but because it fitted in with the preconceptions of a legitimate order. The enormous advance of Communism in the past generation has many causes. Chief among them, however, is a spiritual crisis among its opponents. The inextricable element of policy is the inescapability of escaping conjecture: that after all the analysis of fact there remains a residue of uncertainty about the meaning of events and the opportunities they offer. A statesman can often escape his dilemmas by lowering his sights; he always has the option of explaining away the opponent's moves by assuming that he has peaceful intentions. Many of the difficulties of the non-Soviet world have been caused by its attempt to use the element of uncertainty as an excuse for inaction and the Soviet skill in playing on this tendency: "We say to the other powers" wrote Lenin long ago "you do not know what you want and... you are suffering from what is called a weak will which is due to your failure to understand economics and politics which we have appraised more profoundly than you."¹)

Whatever the validity of Lenin's statement, there is something remarkable about the reluctance of the post-world war I "legitimate" order to believe the publicly announced aims of its declared mortal enemies. Hitler's *Mein Kampf* was ignored for a decade and a half while his intended victims spoke of taming him through the responsibilities of power. And neither Lenin's published works nor Stalin's utterances availed against the conviction of the non-Soviet world that peace was the natural relation among

1. Nathan Leites. *A Study of Bolshevism*. p. 383.

["J. Mains Leibnitz. A Study of Bolshoyism. p. 383.", "conviction of the non-Communist world that peace was the natural relation among neither Communists nor Communists affermed works nor statements assured against the validity of stating this through the reasonableness of power. And", "Hitler's *Mein Kampf* was intended for a decade and a half while the intended\nfoes to be formed publicly announced same or its declared main enemies.", "remarkable about the reasonableness of the post-world war I \"fearless\" order\nwhatever the validity of Communists a statement, there is amending\n(1)", "to measuring economics and politics which we have enumerated more pro-\nYou are suffering from what is called a week which is due to your half-\nthe other powers,\" whose Communists long ago \"you do not know what you want and...\nfor inflation and the Soviet strike in playing on this tendency: \"We say to\nbeen caused by the attempt to use the element of uncertainty as an excuse\nbehind intentions. Many of the difficulties of the non-Communist world have\nthe option of expunging away the opponent, whom by assuming that he has\nsaid and said the difficulties of the non-Communist world would have\nsatisfied intentions. Many of the difficulties of the non-Communist world have\nsaid and said the difficulties of the non-Communist world would have\nsaid and said the difficulties of the

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states and that a problem deferred was a problem solved. In the 1920's the eminent political scientist Florinsky wrote: "The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the result of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate victory of the proletariat."²) In the 1930's, Soviet anti-fascism and the peaceful intentions of the U.S.S.R. were a shibboleth despite the fact that the U.S.S.R. was the first great power to make overtures to Nazi Germany.³) In the 1940's, there was a general conviction that the U.S.S.R. would prefer to concentrate on the development of its own territory rather than engage in foreign adventures. And after the death of Stalin there took place a great deal of speculation that a "basic" change had occurred in Soviet thinking and that "the possibilities of developing nuclear energy would" in Governor Stassen's phrase "serve as a substitute for foreign expansion."⁴) "The Soviet leaders" said Secretary Dulles in 1956" are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance."⁵)

The situation is doubly paradoxical because of the exasperation with which the Soviets have repudiated the notion that a change of tactics on their part implied a surrender of Marxism. "If anyone believes" Khrushchev said at the height of the 'peace offensive' "that our smiles involve abandonment of the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he deceives himself poorly. This will happen when the shrimps learn to whistle."⁶) "We must learn the wisdom of the

2. Quoted in Taracouzio, p. 129

3. See below

4. Harold E. Stassen.

5. Press Conference Feb. 25, 1956

6. Healy. *International Affairs*.

c. Hertz, *International Activities*.

d. Press Conference Rep. 52, 1936.

e. Herlitz F. Stasen.

f. See below.

g. Quoted in Tarsenius, b. 152.

supper when the animals learn to whuffle."(c) "We must learn the wisdom of the
fish when the fish are fed to the fish."(d) "We must learn the wisdom of the
fish when the fish are fed to the fish," he receives himself bonus. This with
the delight of the fish or derivative, "that one smile would be enough of
partly implied a surrender of Mark Twain." It anyone believes, Mark Twain said
which the Soviet have renounced the notion that a change of facts on their
The situation is goodly paradoxical because of the exasperation with
of policy based on violence and injustice."(2)

"The Soviet-fagere," said Secretary Boffin in 1936, "are scrapping thirty years in Governor Stasen's binasse," serve as a substitute for foreign expansion."(1) The Soviet thinking and that "the beautifulies of developing nuclear energy would" place a great fear of antagonism that a "passage" could be occurred in than engage in foreign adventures. And after the death of Stalin there took
coming later to concentrate on the development of its own territory rather
Germany."(3) In the 1940's, there was a General conviction that the U.S.A. was
too that the U.S.A. was the first great power to make overtures to host
and the beautiful intentions of the U.S.A. were a supposed geisha the
ultimate victory of the Professional."(4) In the 1930's, Soviet anti-Tsarism
only more on the result of their fashion than on direct action to achieve the
restitution of any coat have exchanged their awards for money, focus and now
incident, political scientist Fominich wrote; "The former crones for award
states and that a problem determined was a problem solved." In the 1930's the

and the beautiful intentions of the U.S.A. were a supposed geisha the
ultimate victory of the Professional."(5) In the 1930's, Soviet anti-Tsarism
only more on the result of their fashion than on direct action to achieve the
restitution of any coat have exchanged their awards for money, focus and now
incident, political scientist Fominich wrote; "The former crones for award
states and that a problem determined was a problem solved." In the 1930's the

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Bolsheviks," wrote Mao. "When our naked eyes are not enough we must avail
ourselves of the aid of a telescope or microscope. The method of Marxism
serves as a telescope or microscope in matters political and military."⁷)

It is the insistence by their intended victims that they did not "mean" what they so often proclaimed which has given an air of unreality to the relations between the Soviet bloc and the rest of the world. The non-Communist world, for a variety of motives, has been easy prey to every Soviet change of line because of its eagerness to integrate the Soviets into a legitimate system -- the contingency above all others which Bolshevik doctrine explicitly excludes. The inevitable misunderstanding of revolutionary periods, caused by the tendency of terms to change their meaning, became in Soviet hands a tool to encompass their opponent's downfall. Throughout the decades that Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders were proclaiming their devotion to Marxist doctrine, analysts in the West were demonstrating that there was something inherently different about Chinese Communism. And today in many areas of Asia at least, there is a general belief in the _peacefulness_ of the Chinese regime based on no more solid evidence than the desire of the peoples concerned and Chinese skill in using the term "peace" with all the ambiguity it has in Communist doctrine. "The theory of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin is a universally applicable theory," Mao has written. "We should not regard their theory as a dogma, but as a guide to action. We should not merely learn Marxist-Leninist words and phrases, but study Marxism-Leninism as the science of revolution."⁸) Yet it is precisely the revolutionary quality of Chinese Communism that has most consistently been denied, lending color to Mao's

7. Mao Tse-Tung. *Selected Works*. New York: International Publishers, 1955.
I, 222.

8. Mao Tse-Tung, *ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 259.

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contemptous phrase: "We have a claim on the output of the arsenals of London as well as Hangyeng, and what is more, it is to be delivered to us by the enemy's own transport corps. This is the sober truth, not a joke."⁹)

II

What then are the principles which constitute the "science of revolution?" They derive in both Soviet and Chinese thought from Marxism as reinterpreted by Lenin. They assert that political events are only manifestations of an underlying reality which is produced by economic and social factors. In Soviet theory the superiority of Leninism is due to the ability to distinguish appearance from reality and not to be deceived by what are only symptoms often misleading of much more deep-seated factors. The "true" reality resides not in what statesmen say, but in the productive process they represent. This process in all societies, except a Communist one, is characterized by a class struggle between the exploiting classes and the proletariat. To be sure, in the industrially advanced countries the struggle may sometimes be obscured by the ability to exploit colonies. But the respite is only temporary. For imperialism transfers the class struggle to the international scene. The very effort to escape the contradictions of the domestic economy sharpens international tensions and leads inevitably to an unending cycle of wars among the imperialist Powers.¹⁰) Thus all of political life is only a reflection of a struggle produced by economic and social conditions. Statesmen are powerless to alter this fact; they can only guide it or utilize it for their own ends.

9. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 253.

10. See Lenin, *Imperialism, the Last Stage of Capitalism* in Morgenthau and Thompson

["J. M. S. B.", "10. See below, *Introduction*, for the last page of Capitalism in Modern Times and its own end.", "2. *Dip.* Acl. I, p. 527.", "their own end.", "man are now forced to agree with this fact: they can only survive if they reflect on a structure produced by economic and social conditions. These were among the instrumental powers. These aid of political influence is only a dangerous international tension and tends inevitably to an amending state of society. This very effort to escape the contradiction of the domestic economy�. For imperialism promotes the class struggle to the international temporary. For imperialism promotes the class struggle to the

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The existence of a Communist state serves, according to Leninist theory, to intensify the contradictions of capitalism. For a socialist state is not only a symbol of the possibility of revolutionary upheaval, its very existence limits the markets available to capitalism. Thus the larger the Soviet bloc, the smaller the stage on which the tensions of capitalism can work themselves out and the greater the resulting conflicts within the capital-
ist camp. 11) Another consequence is that capitalist states must seek to destroy the Socialist state if they are not to be destroyed by it. Thus the normal relationship between the two camps is one of war and whether it is hot or cold at any given moment is largely a question of tactics. Nor will states-
men be able to escape the operation of these economic laws by an act of will for their role is determined by the economic structure of the society they represent. Conciliatory American statements will therefore appear to Soviet leaders either as hypocrisy or stupidity, ignorance or propaganda. Even when they accept the "subjective" sincerity of American statesmen, they still believe them powerless to deal with the "objective" factors of American society which will ultimately produce a showdown. Soviet statesmen consider diplomatic conferences a means to confirm an "objective" situation and nothing is more futile than to seek to sway them by invocations of abstract justice.
A Soviet diplomat who wished to make concessions can justify them to his colleagues only if he can demonstrate that they resulted from a proper balanc-
ing of risks.

11. This thesis was advanced most explicitly in Stalin's last article in the *Bolshevik* in 1952. For text, see Boris Meissner and John Reshetar, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York 1956. p. 1748

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As a result, relations between the Communist and the non-Communist world will always have some of the attributes of civil war whatever form the contest may take at any given moment. The essence of a legitimate order is the willingness of its components to seek their security in part through the peaceful intentions of the other states. It presupposes the degree of confidence which will keep nations from looking for safety in the maximum development of their power. A revolutionary order, on the other hand, is distinguished precisely by this lack of confidence. Security here can be found only in physical safeguards. This is particularly true in the case of the Soviets who pride themselves on their ability to "see through" the intentions of those whom their system has defined as intrinsically hostile. It is not that the Soviets glorify war for its own sake; it is rather that they believe that the struggle is imposed on them by the task history has set them: "War is a great disaster," wrote Lenin. "But a Social-Democrat cannot analyze war apart from its historic importance. For him there can be no such thing as absolute disaster, or absolute welfare and absolute truth. He must analyze the importance of war from the point of view of the interests of his class -- the proletariat... He must evaluate war not by the number of its casualties, but by its political consequences. Above the interests of the individuals perishing and suffering from war must stand the interests of the class. And if the war serves the interests of the proletariat... it is progress irrespective of the victims and the suffering it entails."¹²) "War," wrote Mao, "this monster of mutual slaughter among mankind will be finally eliminated through the progress of human society... But there is only one way of eliminating it,

12. Taracozio, op. cit., p. 53.

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namely to oppose counter-revolutionary class war by means of revolutionary
class war."¹³)

In this struggle, moreover, the Communists, according to Soviet
theory have two basic advantages: that the course of history inevitably will
bring about the social structure which will make their victory inevitable and
that, contrary to their opponents, they understand this process and can take
advantage of it. For this reason, a study of Marxist-Leninist theory is not
considered an abstract philosophical exercise in Soviet countries, but the
prerequisite to effective action. Therefore, too, the constant reiteration
by Marxist leaders that victory reveals a higher degree of theoretical insight
then that possessed by the opponent.¹⁴) In every Soviet school, whether
technical or professional, a study of Marxist-Leninist theory takes up at
least thirty per cent of the curriculum: "All these members of the Communist
party," wrote Mao "who are fairly qualified to study must study the theory of
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. It is impossible for a party to lead a great
revolutionary movement to victory if it has no knowledge of revolutionary
theory...If there are in our Party one to two hundred comrades who have acquired
a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism which is systematic and not fragmentary, prac-
tical and not abstract, the fighting capacity of our party will be greatly
heightened..."¹⁵)

This image of a constant struggle between the Communist and the non-
Communist world has given a completely different meaning to the Soviet notion
of war and peace. To the non-Soviet world, peace often appears as an end in

13. Mao, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 179.

14. See for example Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, 233; II, 201.

15. Mao Tse-Tung, II, 258.

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itself and its manifestation is the absence of struggle. To the Soviets, by
contrast, peace is a form of struggle. To the nations which are heir to the
liberal tradition of the West, man is an end in himself. To the Soviets, man
is the product of a social experience, a datum to be manipulated for his own
good. The incommensurability between the two positions is all the more
remarkable because both Marxism and its opponent grew out of the same social
experience of the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century. Because the
doctrines of humanitarianism and individual dignity too often hid social
inequality, the Marxists drew the conclusion that they were invented, together
with religion, by clever capitalists as a device to enslave the proletariat.
It did not occur to them that these doctrines might be sincerely held and that
their potency is more responsible for the amelioration of the condition of the
working class than the Communist Manifesto. The image of the cunning capital-
ists devising philosophy, religion and systems of government in terms of their
suitability for oppressing the proletariat has had several paradoxical conse-
quences, however: had the Capitalist Powers been as aware of their interests,
as coolly calculating, as cold-bloodedly manipulating as Communism asserted,
the Soviet state could never have flourished. It was precisely because the
non-Communist powers refused to believe in an irreconcilable antagonism that
the U.S.S.R. has emerged in the center of Europe and China has achieved a
dominant position in Asia. Had the non-Soviet world used its myth merely as
a tool in the class struggle, the colonial peoples would still be subjugated.
It was precisely because the non-Communist Powers did believe in their own
principles that their resistance to independence movements was so indecisive.
Thus the Soviets in some respects constantly overestimated their opponents,
looking for devious manipulation in the most superficial gesture. But, however
incorrect their assessment, it has given an increasing urgency to international

VIII-15

VIII-15. Since the chief burden of some books is that nuclear weapons have altered the means of exercising force and diplomacy, if not thin very nature, are you justified in quoting Lenin on war, as though Soviet concepts on and view of war could not have changed? Simply, "him" not clear and clause, so dangling.

Knowing their own motivations toward the non-Communist world, the Soviets could not credit any assertion of peaceful intention by their declared enemy. Against an opponent possessing the attributes ascribed to him by Soviet doctrine, relations had to assume the form not only of a struggle but of a contest without quarter. "Until the final issue [between capitalism and Communism] is decided" said Lenin "the state of awful war will continue... Sentimentality is no less a crime than cowardice in war."<sup>16)</sup> "We have no use for stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness or morality," wrote Mao. "In order to win victory, we must try our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf..."<sup>17)</sup>

One way of achieving this aim was through an unintended method, the confusion inherent in Communist terminology. Because they saw everything in relation to the class struggle, the concepts of war and peace seemingly so unambiguous, turned into tools of Soviet political warfare. If wars were caused by the class struggle, and if the class struggle revealed an exploiting class, all wars by non-Communist powers were unjust -- by definition. By contrast, all wars of the Soviet Union had to be just since a government which had abolished the class struggle could not fight any other kind. That peace could be achieved by war, that a war by a classless society was a form of peace -- these were paradoxes dear to the heart of dialectically trained Marxists. "The Bolsheviks hold that there are two kinds of war:" wrote Stalin. "Just wars... waged to defend the people from foreign attack or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery or to liberate colonies...Unjust wars, wars

16. Quoted in Leites, *op. cit.*, p. 347.

17. Mao Tse-Tung, *op. cit.*, II, 217.

VIII-16

of conquest to enslave foreign peoples. Wars of the first kind the Bolsheviks support.¹⁸) "Wars in history" wrote Mao following Stalin "can be divided into two kinds: just and unjust. All progressive wars are just and all wars impeding progress are unjust. We oppose wars that impede progress, but we are not opposed to progressive, just wars. As for wars of the latter kind we Communists not only do not oppose them, but will participate actively in them... We aim at peace not only in one country, but throughout the world and we aim not only at a temporary peace but a permanent peace. In order to achieve this objective we must wage a life-and-death war and must be prepared to sacrifice anything.¹⁹)

Thus peace offensives have alternated with threats of war in Soviet strategy depending on the Soviet assessment of the tactical requirements of the moment. Since permanent peace was achievable only by abolishing the class struggle, and since the class struggle could be ended only by a Communist victory, any Soviet move, no matter how belligerent, advanced the cause of peace while any non-Communist policy, no matter how conciliatory, served the ends of war. Thus while Soviet tanks were shooting down civilians in Hungary, it was the United Nations which, in Soviet eyes, threatened peace by debating Soviet intervention. And in 1939, it was the League of Nations which threatened peace by condemning the Soviet attack on Finland. Therefore, too, the constant effort to expand the Soviet sphere and to fill every vacuum because any territory in the possession of a non-Communist state is considered by virtue of its different social structure a danger to the peace of the

18. Garthoff. *Soviet Military Doctrine*. p. 38.

19. Mao, *op. cit.*, II, 199.

VIII-17

Soviet bloc. Therefore, finally, the skillful use of peace offensives and disarmament talks always aimed precisely at the psychological weak point of the non-Soviet world: that it considers peace as an end in itself, an attitude which Lenin once described as the "pitiful pacifism of the bourgeoisie." "The replacement of the slogan 'armament of the proletariat' by that of disarmament" proclaimed a thesis at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern "can serve only as a revolutionary slogan." "The peace policy of a proletarian state in no way signifies that the Soviets have come to terms with capitalism... It is merely another -- in this situation a more advantageous -- form of the struggle against capitalixm."²⁰)

What is striking, therefore, about relations between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world is not the flexibility of Soviet tactics, but that essentially the same pattern of Soviet behavior should time and again raise discussion about its "sincerity" or its "novelty." The Soviets have advanced variations of the same disarmament proposals since the mid-1920's; their peace offensives have always followed the same line that the export of revolution was impossible and their periods of belligerency have had the same justification that a capitalist encirclement was threatening the Soviet bloc. Yet each new Soviet move has been taken at face value and has produced infinite arguments whether the Soviets were preparing for a "show-down" or ushering in a period of peace.

Nothing could be more irrelevant. For the one contingency which Soviet theory explicitly rejects is a static condition. Neither an all-out

20. Taracouzio, op. cit., p. 277.

50. Tropaeleusia, _go._, _eff._, n. 511.

Soviet theory explicitly rejects a static condition. Neither an all-out
Mobilization could be more advantageous. For the one contingency which
in a period of peace.

Arguments whether the Soviets were breaking for a "drop-down" or maneuvering each new Soviet move has been taken at face value and has not produced infinite caution that a capitalistic encroachment was threatening the Soviet peace. Yet was impossible and their periods of delinquency have had the same justification since the mid-1920's; their discussion about its "innocence" or its "novelty." The Soviets have advanced autonomously the same pattern of Soviet behavior should time and again refuse and the non-Soviet world is not the responsibility of Soviet statesmen, but that which is striking, therefore, about relations between the Soviet

tiousness -- form of the structure against capitalism." (50)
with capitalism... It is merely another ... in this attraction a more advanced
professoriate state in no way signifies that the Soviet party come to terms
with capitalism." Proclaimed a theme at the Sixth World Congress of the
Communist "can serve only as a revolutionary beacon." "The base policy of
that of government," proclaimed a theme at the Sixth World Congress of the
Communist which lent once described as the "fundamental beacon of the pom-
ot of the non-Soviet world: that it constitutes bases as an end in itself, an
disarmament drive which should be made precisely at the theoretical weak point
Soviet race." Therefore, finally, the artificial use of base objectives and

AIII-17

VIII-18

show-down nor a permanent peace are part of Soviet theory unless the former
should be forced on them by an all-out attack like Hitler's or the latter
comes about through Communist world hegemony. Rather the Soviet concept is
one of seeking to manage the inevitable flow of history, to bring about the
attrition of the enemy by increments and not to stake everything on a single
contest. "A reckless man relying solely upon enthusiasm" wrote Mao "cannot
but be tricked by the enemy...and consequently he cannot but run his head
against a brick wall."<sup>21)</sup> "To accept a battle when it is obviously disadvan-
tageous is a crime" wrote Lenin.<sup>22)</sup>

The reverse of these propositions is, of course, that failure to
conduct a battle when the relation of forces is favorable is equally criminal.
The nature of Soviet tactics is therefore determined by their assessment of
the relationship of forces for which they believe Marxist theory gives them
an incomparable tool. "The strength of Stalinist strategy consists in its
basis on the correct calculation of the real relation of opportunities,
forces, tendencies, regarding them not as static, but dynamic in development."<sup>23)</sup>
Because Soviet doctrine teaches the inevitable hostility of the non-Communist
world, no potential gain can be sacrificed to an illusory good will: "Any
idea," wrote the leading Soviet theoretical journal in 1953 "of pacifying
the imperialists at the price of giving up sympathy and support of the
liberation movements of other countries or pacifying them with small conces-
sions is merely bourgeois liberalism and a break with the theory of the class
struggle."<sup>24)</sup>

21. Mao Tse-Tung, *op. cit.*, I, 185.

22. Leites, *op. cit.*, p. 495

23. Garthoff, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

24. *Kommunist*, January 1953.

VIII-19

In this struggle, moreover, military actions were but one form of conflict appropriate only to a specific relation of forces. The struggle is unchanging but its forms vary: "We Marxists" wrote Lenin "have always been proud of the fact that by a strict calculation of the mass of forces and mutual class relations, we have determined the expediency of this or that type of struggle... At different moments of economic evolution, and depending on varying political, national, cultural, and other social conditions, different forms of struggle assume preeminence, become the chief form of struggle, whereupon in their turn the secondary and supplementary forms of struggle also change their aspect."

From the Soviet point of view, relations between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world therefore reflect an equilibrium of forces in flux in which the task of the Communist leadership is to tilt the scale by constant, if imperceptible pressure in the direction determined by history. In this contest, neither personal feelings, nor considerations of abstract principle can enter. The Soviets can only be profoundly suspicious of overtures that ask them to demonstrate their "good faith" by a specific concession as a prelude to a permanent settlement. If the forces are calculated correctly a settlement will always be possible according to Soviet theory and if they are misjudged, good faith cannot act as a substitute. Soviet negotiators therefore typically adopt a posture of belligerency or intransigence in order to squeeze the last possible gain from the existing relation of forces; and their professions of good will are always abstract involving no practical consequences. For to Soviet thought a settlement is not achieved by the process of negotiation, rather it is ratified by it. There is no point in making concessions, for either they are unnecessary on the basis of the relationship of forces and therefore a needless surrender. Or else they

VIII-20

reflect the relationship of forces and are therefore not, strictly speaking, concessions. Not to take advantage of a strategic opportunity is to demonstrate not moderation, but weakness. As a result, the Soviets never give up an opportunity to fill a vacuum, real or imagined, to maintain the good will of the non-Communist world. The immense reservoir of sympathy built up during World War II was sacrificed without hesitation to obtain a defensive bastion in Eastern Europe. The Geneva summit conference was used to perpetuate the Soviet position in Eastern Germany and did not stand in the way of the Soviet arms deal with Egypt. Neither the "spirit of Geneva," nor the attitude of the uncommitted proved an obstacle to putting down the revolt in Hungary. In every policy choice, the Soviets identify security with a physical relationship of forces; they cannot have any confidence in the continued good will of Powers whom their doctrine defines as permanently hostile.

The nature of the Soviet challenge is therefore inherently ambiguous. It uses the "legitimate" language of its opponents in a fashion which distorts its meaning and increases the other side's hesitations. The belief in an inevitable historical progress causes the challenge to express itself in a constant pressure just short of the point which the Soviets believe would produce a final show-down. To be sure, Soviet leadership may miscalculate and bring on a holocaust despite themselves. But to the extent they do not, the non-Soviet world faces the dilemma that all dividing lines between war and peace, aggression and the status quo are gradually eroded and in a manner which never presents a clear-cut issue. The combination of caution, persistence, and ambiguity is well illustrated by the Soviet arms deal with Egypt. It was launched at the height of the "Geneva spirit" which was interpreted by the Soviets not as a sign of relaxation of tensions, but as a strategic opportunity. It was negotiated by Czechoslovakia to keep open the Soviet

VIII-21

line of retreat should the Western Powers react strongly and to make it more difficult for the West to react strongly. When the Soviet leaders saw that they could penetrate the Middle East without the risk of war, they gradually increased their commitment by increments so small that none of them seemed to justify military action, until suddenly during the Suez crisis they emerged as a major Middle Eastern Power, a contingency which would have been considered inconceivable a mere two years before.

This strategy of ambiguity can ultimately be countered only by a policy of precaution, by attempting to nip Soviet moves in the bud before Soviet prestige becomes so deeply engaged that any counter-measures increase the risk of war. Yet a policy of precaution is the most difficult of all for status quo powers to implement. For all their preconceptions will tempt them to wait until the Soviet threat has become unambiguous and the danger overt, by which time it may well be too late. The Soviet, therefore, present a challenge to the West which may be even more moral than physical. It ultimately resolves itself into a question of how much the Free World will risk on its assessment of the situation or whether the Soviets can use its quest for certainty to paralyze it. Many of the gains of the Soviets have been due to a considerable extent to a superior moral willingness, to a greater willingness to run risks both physically and morally than their opponents. And despite the intellectual bankruptcy of a theory which every passing year is demonstrated anew, the Soviets have made gains not justified by the relation of forces largely because of the inward uncertainty of their declared victims, an irresolution which expressed itself in a concept of aggression so purist and abstract that it rarely fits any of the issues actually in dispute.

[y]

VIII-22

III

The revolutionary dynamism of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China affects both the conduct of diplomacy and the conduct of war, indeed it tends to blur the line between them. To Leninist doctrine, negotiation is a tool like any other in the conduct of the class struggle, to be judged by its utility in advancing Soviet objectives, but of no higher moral validity. To us, negotiation tends to be an end in itself. To the Communists a conference is a means to gain time to define the moral framework of the next test of strength or to ratify an "objective" situation. To us, a conference is a symptom of reduced tension because we believe that reasonable men sitting around a table can settle disputes in a spirit of compromise. To the Soviets, a settlement reflects a relationship of forces, inherently unstable and not to be maintained if the power balance shifts. To us, a treaty has a legal and not only a utilitarian significance, a moral and not only a practical force. To the Soviets a concession is a phase of a revolutionary struggle: "Marxism-Leninism," wrote Mao "does not allow concessions to be regarded as something purely negative... Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with enemies or allies (emphasis added) should always be regarded as part of the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line..."²⁶) To us, with our legal bias, compromise is the very essence of the process of negotiation and we are therefore psychologically prepared to meet the other side at least part way as a token of good faith.

26. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., II, 263.

SC. UoT-TM, p. 45, II, 303.

certainly prepared to meet the other side of least part way as a token of good
very essence of the process of negotiation and we are therefore備dolog-
reconnoitry fine...
SC)
the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the General
with example on axis.\emph{\textit{Sympathy should always be recharged as part of
revolution, turning to the defensive or offensive action, after in dealing
concentrations to be recharged as something purely negative... Our concession,
the revolutionary strategy: "Marxism-Marxism", does not allow
and not only a practical force. To the effect of concession is to adduce
To us, a treaty use a legal and not only a legislative limitation, a moral
independently imperative and not to be maintained if the power, defence, forces,
reasonable men acting around a table can settle differences in a spirit of
a conference is a symbol of reduced tension because we believe that
of the next step of strength or to rely on "objective situation. To us,
make a conference in a mean to gain time to define the moral framework
positivity. To us, negotiation tends to be an end in itself. To the Com-
pany the utility in advancing Soviet objectives, put of no further moral,
a foot off any other in the conduct of the class struggle, to be judged
to find the time between them. To limit our doctrine, negotiation is
sufficient both the conduct of diplomacy and the conduct of war, granted it
The revolutionary民主ism of the U. S. A. and Communist China

III

AII-SS

VIII-23

Our belief that an antagonist can be vanquished by the persuasive-
ness of argument, our trust in the efficacy of the process of negotiation
reflect the dominant role played in our diplomacy by the legal profession
and their conception of diplomacy as a legal process. But the legal method
cannot be applied in a revolutionary situation for it presupposes a frame-
work of agreed rules within which negotiating skill is exercised. Adjust-
ments occur because agreement is itself a desirable goal, because of a
tacit agreement to come to an agreement. It is not the process of negotia-
tion as such which accounts for the settlement of legal disputes, but a
social environment which permits that process to operate. The legal approach
is therefore peculiarly unsuited for dealing with a revolutionary power.
Law is a legitimization of the status quo and the change it permits
presupposes the assent of two parties. But a revolutionary power is
distinguished precisely by its rejection of the status quo. It will accept
a "legal" framework only as a tool to subvert the existing order. Diplomacy
is based on a degree of confidence in the "good faith" of the other side.
But Soviet doctrine prides itself precisely on cutting through spurious
protestations of good faith to the class relations which alone furnish the
guarantee of security: "With a diplomat," wrote Stalin "words must diverge
from acts... Words are one thing and acts something different... A sincere
diplomat would equal dry water, wooden iron."²⁷)

For these reasons it is futile to seek to deal with a revolutionary
power by ordinary diplomatic methods. In a legitimate order, demands once
made are negotiable; they are put forward with the intention of being com-
promised. But in a revolutionary order, they are programmatic; they represent

27. Leites, op. cit., p. 325

VIII-24

a claim for allegiance. In a legitimate order, it is good negotiating tactics to formulate maximum demands because this facilitates compromise without loss of essential objectives. In a revolutionary order, it is good negotiating tactics to formulate minimum demands in order to gain the advantage of advocating moderation. In a legitimate order, proposals are addressed to the opposite number at the conference table. They must, therefore, be drafted with great attention to their substantive content and with sufficient ambiguity so that they do not appear as invitations to surrender. But in a revolutionary order the protagonists at the conference table address not so much one another as the world at large. Proposals here must be framed with a maximum of clarity and even simplicity, for their major utility is their symbolic content. In short, in a legitimate order, a conference represents a struggle to find formulae to achieve agreement; in a revolutionary order, it is a struggle to capture the symbols which move humanity.

The major weakness of U.S. diplomacy has been the insufficient attention given to the symbolic aspect of foreign policy. Our positions have usually been worked out with great attention to their legal content, with special emphasis on the step-by-step approach of traditional diplomacy. But while we have been addressing the Soviets, they have been speaking to the people of the world. With a few exceptions we have not succeeded in dramatizing our position, in reducing a complex negotiation to its symbolic terms. In major areas of the world the Soviets have captured the "peace offensive" by dint of the endless repetition of slogans that seemed preposterous when first advanced, but which have become common currency through usage. The Power which has added 150 million people to its orbit by force has become the champion of anti-colonialism; the state which has developed

has become the common opinion of anti-colonialists, the states which have developed
nations. The power which has added 110 million people to its credit by force
famines when that advanced, but which have become common currency through
offensive" pay drift of the entire retribution of someone first acquired prepos-
ters. In major areas of the world the Soviet Union has captured the "peace
grammatizing on position, in reducing a complex negotiation to the syndrome
the people of the world. With a few exceptions we have not succeeded in
but while we have been ignoring the Soviet Union, that have been starting to
with special emphasis on the above-mentioned approach of traditional diplomacy.
have nationality been worked out with these attention to their legal content,
attention given to the symbolic aspect of foreign policy. Our position
The major weakness of U.S. diplomacy has been the insubmission
humanity.

a revolutionary order, it is a struggle to capture the symbol which now
conference represents a struggle to find a formula to achieve agreements in
unity, is their symbolic content. In fact, in a legitimate order, a
be formed with a maximum of clarity and even simplicity, on their motor
address not so much one another as the world at large. Proposals here must
but in a revolutionary order the proportionate at the conference table.
sufficient simplicity so that they do not appear as invitations to surrender.
force, be granted with great attention to their substantive content and with
addressed to the opposite number at the conference table. They must, there-
advantage of advocating moderation. In a legitimate order, proposals are
negotiating tactics to communicate minimum demands in order to gain the
without loss of essential objectives. In a revolutionary order, it is good
tactics to communicate maximum demands because this facilitates compromise
a claim for silence. In a legitimate order, it is good negotiating

AIII-54

VIII-25

slave labor as an integral part of its economic system has emerged in many parts of the world as the champion of human dignity. Neither regarding German unity nor Korea nor the satellite orbit have we succeeded in mobilizing world opinion. But Formosa has become a symbol of American intransigence and our overseas air bases a token of American aggressiveness. We have replied to every Soviet thrust like a pedantic professor sure of his righteousness; but the world is not moved by legalistic phrases, at least in a revolutionary period. This is not to say that negotiation should be conceived as mere propaganda; only that by failing to cope adequately with their psychological aspect we have given the Soviets unnecessary opportunities.

As a result, the international debate is carried on almost entirely in the categories and at the pace established by the Soviets; the world's attention is directed toward the horror of nuclear weapons, but not toward the fact of aggression which would unleash them. The Soviets negotiate when a relaxation of tension serves their purpose and they break off negotiations when it is to their advantage, without being forced to shoulder the onus for the failure.

The negotiations beginning with the summit conference at Geneva illustrate these points. We were right to agree to the summit conference and to the subsequent meeting of the foreign ministers. But it was not necessary to permit the Soviet leaders to build up a distinction between the President and the rest of the United States Government so that any subsequent increase in tensions could be ascribed by the Soviets to the fact that the President succumbed to the pressure of his advisors or to the operations of the "objective" factors of the American economy. Moreover, to the extent that the Soviet believed the sincerity of our statements of peaceful intentions, they realized that they might make gains perhaps not otherwise justified by

they realized that they might make some gains not otherwise available by
that the Soviet believed the necessity of our statements of peaceful intentions
the "objective" (factor of the American economy). Moreover, to the extent
President accompanied to the breach of his advances or to the operations of
increase in tension could be sacrificed by the Soviets to the extent that the
President and the rest of the United States Government so that any subsequent
necessity to permit the Soviet feeders to put up a distinction between the
and to the subsequent meeting of the foreign ministers. But it was not
illustrate these points. We were right to agree to the summit conference
the failure.

The negotiations beginning with the summit conference at Geneva
when it is to their advantage, without being forced to surrender the ones for
a relaxation of tension serves their purpose and they break off negotiations
the rest of disagreement which would unnerve them. The Soviets negotiate when
attention is directed toward the horror of nuclear weapons, but not toward
in the categories and at the pace established by the Soviet; the world is a
As a result, the international debate is carried on almost entirely
their psychological aspect we have given the Soviets unnecessarily opportunities
congested as were propagandists: only that by failing to cope adequately with
in a revolutionary period. This is not to say that negotiation should be
righteousness; but the world is not moved by legislative phrases, at least
referred to every SovietOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGOGO
and our overseas air passes a token of American aggressiveness. We have
ing world opinion. But Formosa has become a symbol of American intransigence
German unity nor Korea nor the satellite or else we succeeded in modifying
parts of the world as the champion of human dignity. Neither regarding
have labor as an integral part of its economic system has emerged in many

AIII-S2

VIII-26

the relation of forces. As a result, on the way back from Geneva Khrushchev and Bulganin pledged themselves to maintain their East German satellite and thereby to perpetuate the division of Germany. And shortly after the world learned of the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal which led to the erosion of the Western position in the Middle East.

Having established two de facto governments in Germany, the Soviets could permit the foreign ministers' conference on German unity to fail completely. Indeed the very abruptness of their failure demonstrated our impotence to affect events and laid the basis for a future claim to begin direct negotiations with Western Germany to the exclusion of the Western Powers. And in the Middle East, the Soviets used the peace offensive as a means to advance ambitions sought in vain for centuries by Imperial Russia. In short, what many in the non-Soviet world considered the beginning of a relaxation of tensions was used by the Soviets as a means to attempt to upset the world balance of power.

Thus the canons of traditional diplomacy become a subtle device of Soviet pressure. They enable the Soviets to define the moral framework of most disputes and to shift the debate to issues of maximum embarrassment to us. It is a cardinal principle of traditional diplomacy that negotiations should concentrate on the most soluble problems lest the failure of a conference known in advance to be foredoomed exacerbates existing tensions. But the application of this principle in a revolutionary situation enables the Soviets to contribute to the demoralization of the international order. Since we consider negotiation as inherently valuable while the Soviets refuse to negotiate except when it serves their purpose, fundamental inequality exists in the negotiating position of the two parties. The emphasis on "soluble" problems ensures that diplomatic conferences become means for the

"Since we consider negotiation at immediately advisable while the Soviet resume negotiations, the Soviet attitude to contribute to the democratization of the international order, but the application of this principle in a revolutionary situation enables conference know in advance to be foreseen anticipates existing tensions, should concentrate on the most acute problems first the failure of a new. It is a cardinal principle of traditional diplomacy that negotiations most disputes and to shift the debate to issues of maximum agreement to the Soviet cause. They endue the Soviet to define the moral framework of the world peace. Thus the aims of traditional diplomacy become a simple device of the world peace of power.

Relaxation of tensions was used by the Soviet as a means to attempt to prevent In short, at least many in the non-Soviet world considered the beginning of a means to advance simulations brought in view for consideration by Imperial Powers. Powers. And in the Middle East, the Soviet used the peace alternative as a direct negotiation with Western Germany to the expropriation of the Western obsolescence to affect events and laid the basis for a future claim to begin completely. Indeed the very sparseness of their lives demonstrated our could permit the foreign ministrors' conference on German unity to fall

Having established two of the later governments in Germany, the Soviet Western position in the Middle East, .

resulted of the Soviet-Egyptian armistice which led to the expropriation of the territory to be repossessed the division of Germany. And shortly after the world and Britain pledged themselves to maintain their East German allies and the relation of forces. As a result, on the way back from Geneva launched

AII-5G

VIII-27

Soviets to liquidate unprofitable disputes and to shift all points of tension to the non-Soviet side of the line. The invasion of Egypt was therefore treated more urgently in the United Nations than the repression of Hungary and the issue of Formosa has been more prominently in the consciousness of world opinion than the unification of Korea or of Germany. Diplomacy in this manner becomes an instrument of political warfare which merges insensibly into military measures if the situation warrents it.

IV

The notion that all international relations reflect the class struggle also underlies the Soviet theory of war. War is not a last resort to be invoked if all else fails. Rather it is one form of struggle the use of which is mandatory if the relation of forces warrants it and the employment of which should be avoided if the power constellation is unfavorable. Soviet military doctrine therefore denies the notion that there is such a thing as "purely" military considerations. War like diplomacy is a phase in a total political relationship the success of which is measured in political terms. "War," wrote Lenin "is part of the whole. The whole is politics." "Appar- ances are not reality. Wars are most political when they seem most military."<sup>28)</sup>

These comments were written by Lenin as marginalia to Clausewitz, the Non-Soviet author who has had perhaps the profoundest impact on Soviet military thought.<sup>29)</sup> And the reason is not far to seek. For Clausewitz

28. For a complete list of Lenin's marginalia and the appropriate text, see Bertholdt C. Friedl. *Les Fondements Theoriques de la Guerre et de la Paix en USSR*. Paris, Editions Medicis, 1945.

29. For a brilliant analysis of the impact of Clausewitz on Soviet military thought see Byron Dexter. "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct., 1950.

August, Oct., 1920.

thought see Baron Dieder, "Clemenceaux and Soviet Strategy," Foreign

58. For a pertinent analysis of the impact of Clemenceaux on Soviet military

**Berk** on NEB, Berlès, *Rifles and Medics*, 104.

**Bertolt** C. Fried, *The Consequences of the War of the Three Years*.

59. For a complete list of Leningrad's magnesite and JSC Magnesite text, see

**SS.** For a complete list of Leningrad's magnesite and JSC Magnesite text, see

military thought.

Use the reason if not clear to see: *far* (translators' note: *far* = far left).

These comments were written by Leningrad as magnesite, de Clemenceaux
ences are not reality. Was there some political error when they seem so far left?

**SS.** "War," another Leningrad "is far left" of the whole. The whole is leftist.

far leftist relationship the outcome of which the measured in political terms.

"Dumby," military considerations. Was the efficiency in a sense in a total

written doctrine thereforeogenic the notion itself, there is such a thing as

of which should be a notion if the power concentration is favorable. Soviet

of which is mandatory if the relation of forces-warfare is and the employment
to be involved is all else said. Rather it is one form of stringency the state

of the relation of forces-warfare, therefore it is one form of stringency the state

VI

VI

into military measure if the attraction weakens it.

manner becomes an instrument of political warfare which means inequality

world opinion than the multiplication of force or of Germany. Difficult in this

and the ease of famous plus puch more prominently in the consciousness of
treated more严重ly in the United Nations than the representation of Hungary

to the non-Soviet side of the line. The invasion of East was therefore

Goiwa to liquidate unprofitable debt and to shift all points of tension

AIII-54

VIII-28

despite a ponderous style and a complicated method was the first truly "modern" military theorist. War, to Clausewitz, was not an isolated act but part of a continuing political process in which will, popular attitudes and the nature of objectives play a cardinal role. "War," he wrote "can never be separated from political intercourse and if...this is done in any way all the threads of the different relations are to a certain extent broken and we have before us a senseless thing without object."30) These lines were underlined by Lenin in a volume which he inscribed: "This volume is composed of nothing but fine points."31)

To be sure, the influence of Clausewitz derives in part from the ambiguity of his method which has enabled his followers to find support for many divergent interpretations. This is because he proceeded by first stating an idea in its most extreme form to exhibit to the full its logical implications and then he showed the considerations which modified the application of the pure theory. Thus the most absolute statements regarding the nature of war as an act of pure violence can be found side by side with many profound and common sense observations which mitigated the practice. Thus Clausewitz defined the purpose of war as breaking the enemy's will to resist and many treatises on total war have taken this statement as a point of departure.32) They overlooked that Clausewitz immediately pointed out that to consider the breaking of the enemy will as a purely military problem was hopelessly theoretical; that in practice it depended to a considerable extent on the

30. Clausewitz. *On War*. Vol. III, p. 122.

31. Friedl, *op. cit.*, p.

32. See for example, Dale S. Smith. *U.S. Military Doctrine: A Study and Appraisal*. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1955.

VIII-29

objectives sought, the issues at dispute and the resolution of the protagonists. On the other hand, it is precisely this dialectic quality of Clausewitz' argumentation which attracted Lenin to him. For the essence of Clausewitz is his insistence that relation of states is a dynamic process in which war constitutes only an aspect and where even a period of peace can become an instrument for imposing a nation's will. "With the conclusion of peace, a number of sparks are always extinguished which would have smouldered on quietly when the excitement of the passions abates because all those whose minds are disposed to peace, of which in all nations and under all circumstances there is always a great number, turn themselves completely away from resistance."³³) That the skillful use by the Soviets of peace-offensives has not been accidental is demonstrated by Lenin's marginalia "exactly" to this passage. And this is confirmed by another aphorism of Clausewitz on which Lenin remarked and which has been paraphrased in Soviet thought on several occasions: "The conqueror," it said "is always a lover of peace... He would like to enter our territory unopposed."³⁴)

The passage which most appealed to Lenin and which Stalin in 1946 emphasized as a cardinal tenet of Marxist thought concerned the relationship of war to politics. War, argued Clausewitz, can never be an act of utter violence because it grows out of the existing relations of states, their level of civilization, the nature of Allied relationships and the objectives in dispute. War would reach its ultimate form only if it became an end in itself, a condition which is realized only among savages and probably not

33. Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, I, 28.

34. Friedl, *op. cit.*, p.

VIII-30

even then. For war to rage with absolute violence and without interruption
until the enemy is completely defenseless is to reduce an idea to absurdity;
it is to attempt to conduct as a science what is in reality a calculus of
probabilities. War reveals the impact on each other of two hostile wills,
which are inadequately informed about each other's intentions. This alone
prevents war from being conducted as an abstract science and it is limited
furthermore by the goals which it sets itself. A total war, conducted on
purely military considerations would have been to Clausewitz a contradiction
in terms: "War," he wrote in a passage heavily underlined by Lenin "is
nothing, but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other
means. We say mixed with other means in order thereby to maintain that this
political intercourse does not cease with the war... And how could we conceive
it otherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political
relations between different nations and governments? Is not war merely
another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? It has certainly
a grammar of its own, but its logic is not peculiar to itself... This kind
of idea would be indispensable even if war was perfect WAR, the perfectly
unbridled element of hostility... But this view is doubly indispensable if
we realize that real war is no such consistent effort tending to an extreme...
but a half-and-half thing, a contradiction. As such it cannot follow its own
laws but must be looked on as a part of another whole -- and this whole is
policy... Policy makes out of the all-overpowering element of war a mere
instrument; it changes the tremendous battle-sword which should be lifted
with both hands and the whole power of the body to strike once and for all
into a light handy weapon which is sometimes even nothing more than a rapier
to exchange thrusts and feints and parries. [Emphasis added]... Only through

VII-31

this kind of view does war recover its unity; only by it can we see all wars
as things of *one* kind..."³⁵)

It is this intimate relation between policy and war which Stalin in 1946 described as "having confirmed a familiar Marxist thesis." It has been paraphrased by a leading Soviet military authority: "If war is a continuation of politics, only by other means, so also is peace a continuation of the struggle only by other means."³⁶) And it has been quoted with approval by Mao.³⁷) This accounts for the Soviet preference for indirect attack -- the conflict in which the physical and psychological relationships are balanced in the proportion best calculated to produce the maximum confusion and hesitation on the part of the enemy. Buttressed by Marxist theory, it has been applied to the Soviet military doctrine with its emphasis on morale, deception and a "main thrust" at the enemy's weakest links -- all attributes which seek to place psychology and policy into the service of a theory based on never-ending struggle.³⁸) Therefore too the most substantial Communist contribution to the theory of war has been in the area of limited war -- the conflict in which power and policy are most intimately related, in which everything depends on gearing the psychological to the physical equation.

It is significant that the best theoretical statement of Communist military thought is to be found not in Soviet, but in Chinese writings. This is no accident. The expansion of the U.S.S.R. has been due largely to a skillful use of political warfare and the vast opportunities created by the collapse of German power in Central Europe. Chinese Communism owes its

35. Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, III, 121ff.

36. Garthoff, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

37. Mao Tse-Tung, *op. cit.*, II, 202

38. For a good treatment of operational Soviet doctrine see Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*. See below Ch. VIII p.

VIII-32

entire success, indeed its survival, to its militancy and its ability to
derive political benefits from military operations. The main concern for
Soviet Communism for the first decade and a half was the protection of its
home base; the chief concern of Chinese Communism (led to) the conquest of a
home base. Thus Soviet and Chinese theory illustrates the integral relation-
ship in Soviet thought between peace and war as methods for conducting a
conflict for both the language and the theory of the two tactics is almost
identical.<sup>39)</sup>

Mao's essay on "Protracted War" represents perhaps the clearest
statement of the Communist theory of war. Written in the 1930's at the
beginning of the war against Japan, it is remarkable for its sense of propor-
tion and its skill in adapting the Leninist orthodoxy to Chinese conditions.
It is an important work not only because of the light it sheds on the thinking
of one of the most powerful men in the world today, but also because of the
consistency with which the strategy developed by Mao has been pursued by
Communist Chinese, not only during the civil war, but also in the war against
us in Korea.

Starting from the familiar Leninist doctrine that war was the
highest form of struggle, Mao elaborated a theory of war which combined a
high order of analytical ability, with a rare psychological insight and
complete ruthlessness. The key to Communist superiority Mao found in Marxist
doctrine which he compared to a telescope which permitted the distinguishing

39. See for example Stalin's explanation of the nature of political strategy entirely in military terms, Garthoff, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

entirely in military terms, German, on. c.f. 11, p. 131.

38. See for example Staff's explanation of the nature of political strategy

doctrine which he compared to a telephone which permitted the distributing
complete universality. The key to Communist authority Mao found in Maoist
right order of systematic efficiency, with a rare beneficial incident and
highest form of struggle, also elaborated a theory of war which comprised a
starting point from the familiar Communist doctrine that war was the
war in Korea.

Communist Chinese, not only during the civil war, but also in the war against
correspondence with which the automatically generated data had been processed by
ones of the most powerful men in the world today, put also because of the
It is an important work not only because of the fight it adds to the thinking
tion and its still in adapting the Communist orthodoxy to Chinese conditions,
beginning of the war against Japan, it is remarkable for its sense of prob-
ositement of the Communist theory of war. Written in the 1930's at the
Mao's essay on "Protracted War," represents贯 through the clear and
unified thought.

39) conflict for both the language and the theory of the two tactics is almost
and in Soviet thought between peace and war as methods for controlling
home base. Thus Soviet and Chinese theory illustrates the integral relation-
home base; the chief concern of Chinese Communists fed to the concept of a
Soviet Communism for the first decade and a part was the protection of its
give political benefits from efficiently operations. The main concern for
entire success, indeed its survival, to its militancy and its efficiency to.

AIII-35

VIII-33

of the essential from the irrelevant. He therefore considered a study of
Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist theory a prerequisite to effective action. The
essence of war, Mao asserted, resided in the intimate relation of two hostile
wills which kept secrets from each other.<sup>40)</sup> On one plane no one knew as
much about one's actions than the enemy because correct intelligence is the
key to successful military operation. On the other hand, however, all
pressures combined to obscure the clear view which their own self-interest
enjoined on the commanders. There was not only the confusion of the battle,
the fact that most commanders of necessity knew their own plans better than
those of their opponents, but also the inherent deceptiveness of an analysis
of purely military factors. A war reflected deep-seated factors of social
structure and only by understanding them could strategy make a correct
assessment. Thus theory was the indispensable hand-maiden of strategy;
victory resulted from a higher level of theoretical insight.<sup>41)</sup> Its task
was to bring the "subjective" assessment into line with objective factors.
"Know your enemy and yourself" said Mao paraphrasing an old Chinese proverb,
"and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster."

What then did Mao's theoretical insight reveal to him? It showed
a current revolution sweeping across the world which would receive its
impetus in part from the success of Chinese Communism. "The Chinese
Communist party has led and continues to lead the stupendous, sublime,
glorious and victorious revolutionary war. This war is not only the banner

40. "See Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, 175ff.

41. Mao, op. cit., I, 233.

VIII-34

of China's liberation, but is pregnant with significance for world revolution. The eyes of the revolutionary masses of the world are upon us... We will lead the Chinese revolution to its completion and also exert a far-reaching influence on the revolution in the East as well as in the whole world. Our past revolutionary wars prove that we need not only a correct Marxist political line, but also a correct Marxist military line."<sup>42)</sup> The correct military line Mao summed up in his three prerequisites for victory in war: "(1) to fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain; (2) to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is uncertain; and (3) to avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation."<sup>43)</sup>

Since a decisive engagement in which victory was certain was impossible for Communist China, basic Communist military strategy was defined as protracted limited war. The relationship of forces being unfavorable for an all-out war, the kind of war where absolute power reigns supreme, the Communist goal had to be a series of transformations, none of them decisive in themselves, the cumulative effect of which, however, was to change the balance of power: "People who direct a war cannot strive for victories beyond the limit allowed by objective conditions, but within that limit they can and must strive for victories through conscious activity... We do not advocate that any of our commanders should detach himself from objective conditions and become a rash, reckless hothead, but we must encourage everyone of them to become a brave and wise general... Swimming in an immense ocean of war, a commander must not only keep himself from sinking, but also make sure of

42. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, p. 191

43. Ibid., II, p. 233

13. 1935, II, p. 583

16. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., p. 138

commander must not only need himselt from beginning, but also make sure of
so become a brave and wise general... Gaining in an immediate ocean of war, a
and become a real, relentless fighter, but we must encourage everyone of them
that any of our commanders should detect himselt from objective conditions
must arrive for victory through concentration activity... We do not advocate
the limit allowed by objective conditions, but within that limit they can and
benefit of power: "People who direct a man cannot arrive for victory beyond
in themselves, the cumulative effect of which, however, was to change the
Communist goal had to be a series of transformations, none of them decisive
an all-out war, the kind of war where specific power regions advance, the
can be projected limited war. The relationship of forces� must favorable for
impossible for Communist Chinese Pacific Communist military strategy was defined
since a decisive engagement in which victory was certain was

decisive engagement which reflects the gravity of the nation."(1)

(1) to fight confidently a decisive engagement in every combat or settle
or battle when victory is unattainable and (2) to avoid specifically a strategic
situation when victory is certain; (3) to avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign
(1) to fight confidently a decisive engagement in every combat or settle
military time too long and in the three preferred states for victory in war;
decisive time, put also a correct Maoist military line."(2)

(2) The correct

but revolutionary was proved that we need not only a correct Maoist
influence on the revolution in the East as well as in the whole world. On
the Chinese revolution to its combination and also exert a far-reaching
The effect of the revolutionary measure of the world are upon us... We will see
of China's liberation, put in progress with significance for world revolution.

AIII-34

VIII-35

reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics as laws for directing the war constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war."<sup>44</sup>

Mao's theory of war therefore rejected the notion of a quick, decisive war conducted on the basis of purely military considerations, which underlies so much of American strategic thought. He considered it a sign of weakness to be exploited by skillful Communist strategy; the belief of the opponent in a rapid victory was one of the reasons why, according to Mao, a strategy of protracted war was to China's advantage.

As a result, Mao's writings *about* with exhortations that the psychological equation of war is as important as the physical one; indeed that it is not strength which decides wars, but the ability to use it subtly and to the enemy's maximum disadvantage. Mao therefore mentions with approval examples from Chinese history where a superior enemy was defeated by stratagem. He recounts the story of a Chinese commander who completely disconcerted his opponent by delaying his attack beyond the point when it was expected and who turned a retreat into a rout by always permitting his opponent to withdraw to a position of further disadvantage. He places great emphasis on the ability to create illusions for the enemy and then to strike him with a surprise attack; the ability to launch a surprise attack is in fact considered directly proportional to the ability to bring about illusions. For this reason, Mao never tires of counselling a strategy of maximum ambiguity, in which the enemy's impatience for victory (*was*) used to frustrate him. He expressed this principle in sixteen words: "Enemy advances, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue."<sup>45</sup>

44. Mao Tse-Tung, *op. cit.*, II, 201.

45. Mao Tse-Tung, *op. cit.*, I, 212.

VIII-36

His concern with winning a war through the psychological exhaustion of the opponent led Mao to pay particular attention to the strategic counteroffensive. If part of the confusion of war is caused by the inadequacy of intelligence about the enemy's intentions, one way of reducing this uncertainty was to induce the enemy to advance in a predetermined direction. As the opponent advances into hostile territory he may make mistakes through overconfidence or he may become discouraged about his inability to fight a decisive engagement against an elusive hostile force. Moreover, it will then be easier to deny the enemy the information he requires to act purposefully. Thus during the retreat a point is usually reached where Communist psychological superiority outbalances the physical superiority of the enemy. This is particularly true if it is possible to attack columns on the move. For then the absolute superiority of the enemy can be transformed into a relative inferiority on the battlefield. The art of warfare is to isolate enemy units, however great their combined superiority, and to defeat them in detail: "We defeat the many with the few by defeating the few with the many. We say this to the separate units of the enemy which we meet on the battlefield. This is no longer a secret and the enemy by now is in general well acquainted with our habit. But he can neither deprive us of our victories, nor avoid his losses because he does not know when and where we shall strike. That we keep secret. The Red Army's operations are as a rule surprise attacks."46)

For this reason Mao inveighed against "desperadoism" and "adventurism" -- the tendency to cling to territory at all cost or the quest

46. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, 242, also 144.

MD. Mec Tse-Tum, cp. stf., I, S.C., safe 144.

"abandonment" -- the tendency to cling to territory at all cost or the descent for this reason. Mec invaded against "gehebelbom" and secret.

"The Red Army's operations are as a rule unimpressive attacks."¹⁰d)

Losses because he does not know when and where we shall strike. That we need with our papit. But we can neither derive us of our victories, nor avoid his This is no longer a secret and the enemy by now is in General self-sustained We ask this to the separate units of the enemy which we meet on the battlefield. He does this to the separate units of the enemy which we meet on the battlefield.

defeat: "We defeat the many with the few by deterring the few with the many. enemy units"; however, great their combined superiority, and to defeat them in relative inferiority on the battlefield. The art of warfare is to isolate them from the separate units of the enemy can be transformed into a This is particularly true if it is possible to attack columns on the move, psychological superiority outflanks the physical superiority of the enemy. Truth being the retreat a point it is usually reached where Communist then be easier to deny the enemy the information he requires to act purpose-

obvious advances into hostile territory he may make mistakes through over-estimation of the enemy's intentions, one way of reducing this uncertainty was to induce the enemy to advance in a predetermined direction. As the interference about the enemy's intentions, one way of reducing this uncertainty. It part of the conversation of war is caused by the importance of or the opponent fed Mec to bay particular attention to the strategic counter-

AIII-10

VIII-37

for a quick victory. The strength of Communist strategy was precisely its willingness to accept withdrawals as long as they were related to an over-all strategic plan; the Communist superiority resided in the fact that in a protracted war the internal contradictions of the Capitalist enemy were certain to mature: "The objective of retreat is to induce the enemy to commit mistakes and to detect them... We can skillfully induce the enemy to commit mistakes by staging a feint as Sun Tzu called it, i.e., make a feint in the East and strike in the West..."<sup>47</sup> "In order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavorable to him but favorable to us, we should often engage him when he is on the move and should look for such conditions favorable to ourselves as the advantageousness of the terrain, the vulnerability of the enemy, the presence of inhabitants who can blockade information, and fatigue and inadvertence on the part of the enemy. This means that we should allow the enemy to advance and should not grudge the temporary loss of part of our territory. We have always advocated the policy of luring the enemy to penetrate deep."<sup>48</sup> If necessary, even negotiations can be utilized to magnify the psychological pressure on the opponent or to deprive him of the fruits of his victory.

Like a judo artist, Mao therefore proposes to paralyze the enemy when seeming to be most pliable and to use the opponent's strength to defeat him by attacking him when most off-balance. It requires little elaboration that this strategy advanced by Mao in the 1930's was almost precisely followed during the Korean war.

47. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., I, 217.

48. Ibid., II, 223.

18. T. P. D. H., II, 253.

11. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., p. 118.

the Korean war.

The strategy advanced by Mao in the 1930's was almost precisely followed during the war when most oil-palm. If it requires further elaboration that this to be most favorable and to use the opponent's strength to detect him by attack, like a judo artist, Mao therefore proposes to PARSE THE ENEMY when seeming pressure on the opponent or to defend him at the expense of the victory. Necessarily, even negotiations can be utilized to modify the behavioral always advocated the basis of funding the enemy to penetrate each "48). It and should not trade the temporary loss of part of one's territory. We pose the task of the enemy. This means that we should effort the enemy to advance of interests who can provide information and finance and the assurance on assurance of the terrain, the availability of the enemy, the presence on the move and any fire proof for and conditions favorable to ourselves at the unfavorable to him put favorable to us. We should often encourage him when he is fast and strike in the last..."49). "In order to draw the enemy into a fight mistakes by staking a rent as small as 20mm. Tax calling it, i.e., make a rent in the mistake and to detect them... We can smoothly influence the enemy to commit certain to withdraw. "The object of retreat is to influence the enemy to commit processed war the interest contractions of the California enemy were strategic plan: the Communist under minority, resulted in the fact that in a willingness to accept withgraves so few, such were related to an overall effort for a quick victory." The strength of Communist strategy was precisely its

AIII-24

VIII-38

Thus limited war is not considered by Soviet doctrine as a strategic aberration, but as a strategic opportunity. It is the form of conflict best suited to take advantage of the preconception and inhibitions of status quo powers; it permits the posing of risks in such a manner that they will always seem out of proportion to the objectives in dispute. And this strategy is given an additional impetus by the horrors of modern weapons. For against a Power which is committed to an all-out strategy either by its strategic doctrine or by its weapons system a threshhold is created below which the strategy of ambiguity at which Communists excel can be carried out with considerable chances of success. In fact, this strategy can use the impatience of the Free World for absolute answers as a tool to achieve Soviet ends. Mao's strategy of the protracted war can be effective only against an opponent unprepared either physically or psychologically for limited war; to whom, in short, a war without total victory seems somehow beyond reason. A war against Communist Powers therefore presupposes a subtle ability to relate the physical to the psychological balance of international relations, to find a mode of action in which power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony. Mao understood that in the subtle adjustments of the psychological balance the side least eager for peace has a negotiating advantage because it can outwit, if not outfit, its opponent. Thus in conflicts with Communist Powers above all, it is important to be clear at the inception about the conditions sought to be attained. And no conditions should be sought for which one is not willing to fight indefinitely and no advance made except to a point at which one is willing to wait indefinitely. The enemy side which is willing to out-wait its opponent -- which is less eager for a settlement -- can tip the psychological balance whatever the outcome of the physical battle. This has been the great advantage of Communism, that its doctrine of protracted conflict

been the great advantage of Communism that its doctrine or protected conflict
benevolent influence whatever the outcome of the biennial battle. This has
waited its opponents -- which in less cager for a settlement -- can not do the

one is willing to wait indefinitely. The enemy is the which is willing to out-
fitting so tight indefinitely and no advance made except to a point at which
to be attained. And no conditions should be sought for which one is not

off, it is important to be clear at the inception about the conditions sought
if not outright, its opponent. That in conflict with Communist Powers above
the least cager for peace has a negotiating advantage because it can offer,
undertook that in the subtle sublimates of the benevolent balance the
situation in which power and the willingness to use it the most in harmony. Meo
to the benevolent balance of international relations, to find a mode of
Communist Powers therefore preempts a subtle affinity to refine the political

effort, a war without total victory seems somehow beyond reason. A war against
unwhispered either physics or psychologically for fitted war: to whom, in
estimation of the protected war can be effective only against an opponent

of the free world for absolute answers as a tool to achieve Soviet ends. Mea's
considerable chances of success. In fact, this strategy can use the impatience
aromatety of simplicity at which Communists excel can be carried out with

goodness or by its means system a somehow manifold in created below which the
a power which is committed to an effort-out strategy either by its strategic
is given an additional ingenuity by the horizons of modern weapons. But against
sway seem out of proportion to the objectives in dispute. And this strategy
beyond if it permits the boating of risks in such a manner that they will
suited to take advantage of the preconception and induction of states due
operation, put as a strategic opportunity. It is the form of conflict poet

Thus limited was it not considered by Soviet doctrine as a strategic

AIII-38

VIII-39

made it less uncomfortable with a contest without issue than our belief in the
49) possibility of total victory.

V

But is not a change of course possible? Could the Soviets not be sincere in their protestations of peaceful intentions? Has not the death of Stalin and his subsequent downgrading radically altered the situation? It is difficult to know what sincerity means where self-interest is identical with the preservation of peace. As long as the "relation of forces" is not clearly in the Soviet favor, Marxist theory would counsel keeping the provocation below the level which might produce an all-out war. Peaceful coexistence would thereby become the most efficient offensive tactic, the best means to subvert the existing order.

For what is permanent in Soviet theory is the requirement of struggle, not the form it has to take at any given moment. Conflict between opposing social systems is inevitable; but its nature must be adapted to changing conditions. "Communists," said Stalin to H.G. Wells in 1934 "do not in the least idealize methods of violence... They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class."⁵⁰)

49. This too was the inherent weakness of the British and French attack on Egypt that they did not possess a legitimacy which would have enabled them to continue in possession of the Canal. For even had the military operations been more successful, the framework in which the attack was launched -- to separate the Israeli and Egyptian forces -- would have made it impossible for Great Britain and France to stay once military operations between Egypt and Israel ceased. Nasser had the opportunity of frustrating his opponents by outwaiting them.

50. Quoted in Leites, *op. cit.*, p. 491

VIII-40

Nor is co-existence an invention of the group which succeeded Stalin. It has reappeared in Soviet policy at periodic intervals since 1918. In the 1920's, it was ushered in by Lenin's statement: "We shall make every possible concession within the limits of retaining power."<sup>51)</sup> And it was justified in 1926 by Stalin in the only terms which made sense in Marxist doctrine: that peaceful coexistence was produced by a temporary equilibrium of forces and that it was justified only by tactical considerations: "A certain degree of <u>provisional</u> equilibrium [emphasis added] has been established between our country of socialist construction and the countries of the capitalist world. This equilibrium characterizes the present stage of peaceful coexistence."<sup>52)</sup>

In the 1930's peaceful coexistence had a similar tactical significance. Significantly, it followed an unsuccessful overture to Nazi Germany. This was not because the Soviet leadership preferred Fascist Germany to the Western Powers, but because it was simply that they saw no essential difference between the social structure of Nazi Germany and the Western democracies. The best way to protect the Soviet Union was to set the capitalist powers against each other, to deflect German energies, if at all possible, towards the West. "We are far from being admirers of the Fascist regime in Germany," said Stalin soon after Hitler came to power. "The importance lies not in fascism, if for

51. Quoted in Leites, *op. cit.*, p. 491

52. Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, p. 138. The Soviet notion of the motivations of the non-Communist world is also well illustrated by Stalin's reaction to the Kellogg Pact: "They talk about pacifism; they speak about peace among European states. Briand and Chamberlain are embracing each other... All this is nonsense. From European history, we know that whenever treaties envisaging new wars have been signed, these treaties have been called treaties of peace... Actually they are signed for the purpose of depicting new elements of the coming war." Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

VIII-41

no other reason than the simple fact that fascism in Italy, for instance,
did not prevent us from establishing most cordial relations with that
country. We are oriented as we were before and as we are now only toward
the U.S.S.R. And if the interests of the Soviet Union demand that we
approach one country or another...we shall do so without hesitation."⁵³)

Only when the overture to Germany failed and it seemed that the Soviet Union
might become the first victim of the often predicted capitalist "contradic-
tions" did the U.S.S.R. emerge as the champion of collective security.

Then the League of Nations, only recently derided as an instrument of
capitalist hyprocrisy, became the focal point of Soviet diplomacy. As
always during such periods, the international aspect of Communism was
played down. "The export of revolution is nonsense," said Stalin now,
"each country if it so desires will make its own revolution."⁵⁴)

And once
more eager advocates in the West accepted the Soviet statements at face
values and contrasted the consistent anti-fascism of the U.S.S.R. with
the vacillations of the Western Powers. Had they read Stalin's statement
in 1933, they would have been less shocked about the Nazi-Soviet pact,
the treaty which made inevitable the war so long predicted by Soviet
theory. There was nothing inconsistent about the Nazi-Soviet pact or
anything immoral from the Soviet point of view. It was the logical
application of a policy announced by Stalin a decade previously: "A
great deal depends on whether we shall be able to defer the inevitable war

53. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁵⁴. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

VIII-42

with the capitalist world...until the time when the capitalists start
fighting among each other."⁵⁵) And less than six months before his death,
Stalin, in an article, ushered in the most recent period of peaceful
co-existence precisely on the grounds that a period of detente would
sharpen the conflicts among the capitalist powers whose difficulties had
increased with the growth of the Communist bloc.⁵⁶)

Thus policy which is based on the assumption of a Soviet change
will have the burden of proving that the change now is "real," that the
Soviets are now interested in a basic accommodation. Such an assumption
is tantamount to asserting that the Soviets have ceased being Bolshevik.
The notion of an accommodation assumes a static condition--an indefinite
prolongation of a status quo. But a static condition is explicitly rejected
by Communism. A settlement between the existing social systems would mean
in Marxist eyes the end of the class struggle, to the manipulation of
which the Soviets ascribe their successes. Moreover, while it is easy
to see how the Soviets might refrain from a certain course of action
because the relation of forces seems to them unfavorable, it is difficult
to find a reason for their giving up a theory which has served them so
well. Why should Mao surrender a doctrine which seemed valid when he
was reduced to 20,000 adherents in the mountains of Yemen now that he
rules 400 million and China has emerged as the strongest state of Asia?
Why should the Soviet leaders eschew an analysis which has been taught
in all their schools for over a generation and in whose dogmas their
thought has been steeped for these many decades? Why should they, moreover,

55. Leites, op. cit., p. 501.

56. For text of Stalin's last writings see Boris Meissner, and
John S. Reshetar. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

New York: 1956, p. 199.

VIII-43

when they see how their state has transformed itself within twenty-five
years from an international outcast to a position where in the Suez
crisis it could threaten rocket attacks with impunity?

Nor is there any evidence that they have done so. An article
in Pravda has insisted that the downgrading of Stalin referred only to
the cult of his personality and that it did not affect the ideological
posture of Communism.⁵⁷) And the speech with which Khrushchev opened
the 20th Congress of the Communist party in February 1956, hailed
in the West as opening an era of peaceful coexistence was in fact :
restatement of familiar Leninist doctrine. Its significance resided not
in its invocations of peace, but that after thirty years the non-Soviet
world had still not learned the peculiar Communist use of the term as
signifying victory in the class struggle and as hypocrisy or a tactical
tool in any other contingency. Neither the doctrine of the increasing
contradictions of the capitalist economy nor of the intensified
revolutionary struggle were given up; on the contrary, they were
reaffirmed and bolstered with quotations from Lenin cited previously in
this chapter.⁵⁸) To be sure, Khrushchev did not draw any explicit
conclusions regarding the inevitability of war; indeed, he gave an
ambiguous definition of peaceful coexistence not different in substance
and almost identical in words with the peaceful coexistence theme of the
Twenties and Thirties. But before a group trained in Marxist dialectics,
it was not necessary to draw such obvious lessons. All of them knew,
even if Western readers did not, what would happen if both the domestic

57. *New York Times*, December 24, 1956.

58. Khrushchev speech - current Digest

28. Kunzelevich sheet - current Digest

29. Law and Life Times, December 5th, 1926.

Even if Western readers did not, what would happen if both the domestic
if was not necessary to draw such opinions? All of them knew,
Talents and Thirties. But before a bomb training in Naziist Germany,
and almost identical in words with the beautiful coexistence of the
eminent definition of beautiful coexistence not different in audacity
conclusions regarding the invulnerability of man; indeed, he has an
army chapter. To be sure, Kunzelevich did not draw any explicit
resulted and polarized with quotations from Lenin cited previously in
revolutionsary straggle were given: on the contrary, they were
contradictions of the capitalist economy nor of the international
fool in any other contingency. Whether the doctrine of the increasing
significantly victory in the class struggle and its property or a tactical
world had still not seemed the bestifier Communist use of the term an
in its invocations of these, but that after thirty years the non-Soviet
reassurance of familiar fundamental doctrine. Its significance remained not
in the West as opening an era of beautiful coexistence was in fact
the 50th Congress of the Communist Party in February 1926, passed
byature of Communism.²⁴) And the sheet with which Kunzelevich opened
the cult of his personality and that it did not affect the theoretical
inadequacy has indicated that the understanding of Stalin referred only to
Nor is there any evidence that they have gone so. An article
says if could further rocket attacks with immunity?

Ares from an international outcome to a position where in the past
when they see how their state has transformed itself within twenty-five

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and international contradictions of capitalism matured at the same time. Thus the most remarkable aspect of Khrushchev's speech was not its content, but that after thirty years such shopworn phraseology could still lull the non-Soviet world and be seriously debated as ushering in a new era of Soviet behavior.

Khrushchev's speech began in correct Soviet style with a description of the economic and social conditions which underlay international relationships. He contrasted the constantly improving position of the Soviet economy with a capitalist economy "developing in the direction of a still greater encirclement of monopolies, further intensification of exploitation and the lowering of living standards . . . a sharpening of the competitive struggle between capitalist states, a ripening of new economic crises and upheavals."

He warned his listeners not to be confused by the seeming prosperity of the capitalist economy. Quoting Lenin, he emphasized that the decay of capitalism does not preclude its rapid growth. "Only a temporary coincidence of circumstances favorable to capitalism has prevented the crisis phenomena from developing into a deep economic crisis. The capitalists and the learned defenders of their interests are circulating a "theory" . . . of salvation from economic crisis . . . The representatives of Marxist-Leninist science have more than once pointed out that this is a hollow illusion. The arms race does not cure the disease, it drives it deeper . . . Present-day technology does not remove it, it deepens it . . . Crises are inherent in the very nature of capitalism, they are inevitable." All this has led to increased strikes and stepped-up efforts of social repression.

The consciousness of impending catastrophe has impelled the capitalist powers, according to Khrushchev, to resort to the inevitable expedient of forming aggressive military pacts to restore their position by

["AII-44", "Subject to certain military bases, the Soviet Union, in its position by\nits side of the border, according to the invariant ex-\npression of the formula, has the right to decide, in the\nabsence of the other, the direction of the Soviet economy.\n\nThe economic conditions of the Soviet Union are such that the\ninfluence of the economic interests of the Soviet Union on the\ninternational relations of the Soviet Union is so great that the\ninfluence of the economic interests of the Soviet Union on the\ninternational relations

VIII-45

military means. To be sure, these alliances were justified as defensive. But that argued Khruschev was sheer hypocrisy: "We knew from history that, when planning a redivision of the world, the imperialist powers have always lined up military blocs. Today the anti-Communist slogan is being used to cover up the claims of one power for world domination" Thus Khruschev was echoing Stalin's attack on the Kellogg Pact as "depicting the new elements of the coming war."

However, there existed a basic difference between the position of the U.S.S.R. before World War II and at present: the growth of the socialist bloc "dedicated to peace and progress." This increased the tensions among the capitalist powers which could find no new markets for their products, indeed whose markets were shrinking in direct proportion with the growth of the Soviet bloc. As a result, the capitalist powers were engaged in an ever-sharper struggle to deprive each other of essential markets. The already existing rivalry between the United States and Great Britain would soon obtain renewed urgency with the emergence of Germany and Japan as active competitors. Moreover, the newly emergent peoples in Asia and Africa constituted another counterweight to imperialist war aims and the same was true of the working classes of the capitalist countries. "All international developments of recent years show that large popular forces have risen to fight for the preservation of peace. The ruling imperialist circles cannot but reckon with this factor. Their more far-sighted representatives are beginning to admit that the 'position of strength' policy . . . has failed . . . These leaders still do not venture to state that capitalism will find its grave in another war . . . but they are already compelled to admit that the socialist camp is invincible." 61)

61. Khruschev, op. cit.,

Cf. Kinnacoe, ch. cit.

Submit that the socialist camp is invincible. (cf.)
find its grave in another war . . . put them safely combed to
beginning to absorb that the position of่าง, policy . . . has failed
put neck with this factor. Their more ten-acquainted representatives are
light for the preservation of peace. The ruling imperialist circle cannot
governments of recent years show that large popular forces have risen to
time of the working classes of the capitalist countries. "All international
constituted another counterweight to imperialist war aims and the same was
active competitors. Moreover, the newly emergent peoples in Asia and Asia
southern renewed urgency with the emergence of Germany and Japan as
sincerely existing rivalry between the United States and Great Britain would
ever-thinker attitude to deprive each other of essential markets. The
of the Soviet Union. As a result, the capitalistic powers were engaged in an
incited whose markets were arising in direct proportion with the growth
of the capitalistic powers which could find no new markets for their products,
the capitalistic powers "affirmed to peace and progress." This increased the tensions amount
the U.S. and U.S.S.R. before the Second World War. II and at present: the growth of the socialist
However, there existed a precise difference between the position of
at the coming war."

ending Stettin's effect on the Reformation East as "obscuring the new elements
covered by the claim of the power for world domination." Time Kinnacoe was
fined up differently from those of the anti-communist afgan is being made to
which bringing a result of the work of the imperialist powers have авы
But further signed Kinnacoe was sure: "we know from history that,
unified, one, these alliances were settled as defensive,
AIII-7-2

AIII-7-2

VIII-46

In short, there had occurred another one of those temporary equilibriums of forces which in the past had convinced the Soviet leaders that a period of peaceful coexistence was tactically advisable because long-term trends were favorable to Soviet victory. But as in all past periods of peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev was at pains to point out that this change of tactics did not imply a modification of revolutionary goals: "Our enemies like to depict us Leninists as advocates of violence always and everywhere . . . True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society. It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxists from the reformists, and the opportunists. There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent over-throw of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. . . is inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. . . The implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances. [Emphasis added] . . . The greater or lesser degree of the intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or non-use of violence in the transition to socialism depends on the resistance of the exploiters. . . in countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal the reactionary forces will of course offer serious resistance."62

Thus the capitalist powers were given the option--as indeed they had under Stalin--of surrendering peacefully. It is remarkable that this restatement of familiar doctrine should have given rise to speculation about a change of Soviet course. For only two explanations were possible for Khrushchev's speech: either Khrushchev believed it, in which case, little would have changed from Stalinist days, or he thought his audience believed this particular reasoning, in which case, his freedom of maneuver in making

62. Khrushchev. op. cit.,

VIII-47

a settlement with the West would be severely circumscribed. Moreover, the speeches at the same Congress delivered by other Soviet figures such as Shepilov, Mokoyan and Molotov were, if anything, even more intransigent.

It is possible, of course, that the emerging middle class in Russia may in time ameliorate the rigors of Soviet doctrine. It has happened before in history that a revolutionary movement has lost its messianic elan. But it has usually occurred only when a messianic movement came to be opposed with equal fervor or when it reached the limit of its military strenght. The Turks did not stop voluntarily at the gates of Vienna or the Arabs in Southern France. Rather a line was established because they had been defeated in battle and the decay did not set in until the West had for several centuries exercised unremitting pressure to push them back. In any case, the problem for American policy is to analyze precisely what consequences would flow from a change in Soviet tactics. The history of middle class revolutions, which in Russia would almost inevitably imply a much larger role for the military, is not too reassuring on this point. Napoleon did not lead, after all, a proletarian army, nor was Hitler a Marxist. It can be argued that a middle class deprived of Marxist theory would be even more inflexible than the present Soviet leadership. It could no longer dount on the inevitable triumph of Marxism; it would no longer be able to rely on the ebb and flow doctrine of Communist dialectic. The bastions acquired by Stalin might therefore represent to it the surety of possession. To a military man a radar screen in Central Europe may seem more important than the good will of the Western powers.

To be sure, the opposite is also possible. The new middle class might be reluctant to jeopardize its domestic gains, although in the face of our repeated protestations of our horror of war they may rate this jeopardy

our repudiated protestations of our horror of war they may rate this jargon
might be refused to droop their hands, although in the face of
To be amuse, the obsequious farce possible. The new middle class
of the Western powers.

rager screened in Central Europe, may seem more important than the rest will
therefore represent so to the enemy of posterity. To a military man a
government of Communist despotism. The position acquired by Stein might
triumph of Marxism; it would no longer be able to rely on the end and so
the present Soviet government. It could no longer count on the inevitable
middle class deprived of Marxist theory, would be even more illogical than
 itself, a propagandist army, nor was either a Marxist. It can be argued that a
military, if not too reasoning on this point. Napoleon did not feel, after
which in Russia would almost inevitably imply a much longer route for the
flow from a change in Soviet tactics. The history of middle class revolutions,
problem for American policy is to analyse precisely what consequences would
follow and the decay did not set in until the West had for several cen-
dralized power, when it reached the limit of its military strength. The
it has necessarily occurred only when a revolutionary movement came to be obviated with
in theory, first a revolutionary movement has lost its mechanical form. But
may in time emigrate the victors of Soviet domains. If has happened before
It is possible, of course, that the emerging middle class in Russia

It is possible, of course, that the emerging middle class in Russia
arises, Monckov and Melotov were, if anything, even more inconsistent,
speculating at the same Congress delivered by other Soviet leaders as each as
a settlement with the West would be severely censured. Moreover, the

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VIII-48

as rather low. But an even more important point is raised by the specula-
tions regarding Soviet intentions: the degree to which we can afford to
gear our policy to assumptions regarding the transformation of Soviet society.
The test of policy is its ability to provide for the worst contingency; it
can always escape its dilemmas by trusting in history or the good will of
the opposing states. A wise policy will keep as many factors essential to
survival under its own control and not trust too much to the fluctuating
 domestic structures of other states. This is particularly true in dealing
 with an avowedly revolutionary power like the U.S.S.R. or Communist China
where both the historical record and the often-repeated proclamations
should inspire caution. Moreover, there may be some prices we are unable
to pay even for a domestic Soviet transformation. Perhaps a long period
of peace would alter the Soviet regime. But we cannot give up the Middle
East to purchase it. Perhaps a policy of inactivity on our part will
magnify all the internal tensions of the Soviet system. But it might
also give the Soviets the breathing spell to overcome them and to gather forces
for a renewed onslaught. There is, in short, no means of escaping the
 inextricable element of international relations: in a system of sovereign
 states policy always has somewhat of a "precautionary" aspect. It must
 guard not only against current intentions of another power, but against the
 possibility that these intentions may change. It is risky to trust that
 history will accomplish what the structure of international relations
 imposes as the duty of statesmanship.

In our relations with the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, the
situation is complicated, moreover, by the fact that there is no reason
to have confidence in the current protestations of peaceful intentions,
couched in the conflict image of Bolshevism and advanced by a generation

> You're making a simple idea difficult.

["concerned in the conflict between Russia and advanced Japan a generation\nago have confidence in the current propositions of peace. Intentionally\nabsentation is complicated, however, by the fact that there is no reason\nfor a renewed effort. There is, in short, no cause of deceiving the\nJaps give the Soviet the pretense of being able to overcome them and to gather forces\nmagnanimously to the internal frontiers of the Soviet system. But it might\nnot be sufficient to give them a policy of inactivity on our part with\nthe Soviet would after the Soviet regime. But we cannot give up the Middie\nlot to purchase it. Perhaps a policy of inactivity on our part with\nthe Soviet would after the Soviet regime. But we cannot give up

VIII-49

which has seen great victories achieved by Marxian dialectics. To be sure, the United States would utilize all opportunities to bring about a more moderate course within the Soviet bloc. The U.S.S.R. has every right to be made to feel secure within its metropolitan territories. And in so far as American policy can contribute to this, it should do so. This would be also the most effective appeal to all elements within the Soviet Union, or perhaps even Communist China, who do not wish to risk everything in foreign adventures. But moderation is impossible without strength. The history of Nazi Germany shows that, on several occasions, plots against Hitler's continued rule were thwarted by new Nazi successes in foreign policy. Even staunch opponents of Hitler's continued rule felt powerless to move against him as long as his policy was so patently successful. And it is noteworthy, too, that the last rebellion against Hitler occurred when few doubts could remain about Germany's disaster.

It is therefore unlikely that a really substantial transformation will occur within the U.S.S.R. or in Communist China until all possibilities of continued expansion, however ambiguous the method, are closed to them. Nor should we permit the security of metropolitan Russia to become identified with Soviet rule in the satellite orbit. There exists no right of annexation based on a doctrine of military security. We can reassure the Soviets that a liberated satellite orbit should not be used as a military base against them; we cannot acquiesce in its remaining, against its will, under Soviet political domination. Moreover, while we should always leave open avenues for a basic change in Soviet leadership, we should have few illusions about the degree to which these can be promoted by conciliatory American policy. For when we have been most conciliatory, as after the German summit conference, the Soviets have been most insistent about feeling threatened.

Therefore, the Soviets have been most insatiable and spewing threats. For when we have been most conciliatory, as after the German summit conference, the degree to which these can be promoted by conciliatory American policy.

For a basic change in Soviet leadership, we should have few influences upon political domination. Moreover, while we should always leave open any sense of potential we cannot acquiesce in the remaining, against its will, under Soviet a liberated satellite orbit, should not be needed as a military base against passed on a doctrine of military security. We can assume the Soviets that with Soviet rule in the satellite orbit. There exists no right of annexation nor should we permit the security of a metropolitan state to become identified or continued expansion, however supplementary the method, are closed to them.

Will occur within the U. S. A., or in Communist China until all霸占 territories can remain apart Germany's dragnet.

World's too, too, that the fast revolution against Hitler occurred when few countries were found as his policy was so patently successful. And it is noted - assume opponents of Hitler's continued rule left powerless to move against continued rule were confirmed by new Nazi successes in foreign policy. Even Nazi Germany shows that, on several occasions, Hitler's adventures, but moderation is impossible without strength. The history or phase even Communist China, who do not wish to rile everything in foreign the most effective under to all elements within the Soviet Union, or better American policy can contribute to this, it should do so. This would be so made to feel some within the metropolitan territories. And in so far as moderate course within the Soviet Union. The U. S. A., has every right to be the United States should utilize all opportunities to bring about a more which has seen great victories achieved by Nazi victory. To be sure,

which has seen great victories achieved by Nazi victory. To be sure, the United States should utilize all opportunities to bring about a more moderate course within the Soviet Union. The U. S. A., has every right to be the United States should utilize all opportunities to bring about a more

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VIII-50

And the Soviets are probably sincere in these assertions. Their revolutionary quality derives, however, not from the fact that they feel threatened--a measure of threat is inherent in the relation of sovereign states--but that nothing can reassure them. Only absolute security, our neutralization and the elimination of all influence in Eurasia is considered a sufficient guarantee. And because absolute security for the U.S.S.R. means absolute insecurity for us, the only safe U.S. policy is one which is built on the assumption of a continued revolutionary struggle, even though the methods may vary with the requirements of the situations.

Nevertheless the likelihood of a continued revolutionary conflict should not be confused with the imminence of an all-out showdown. An all-out attack is the least likely form of Soviet strategy either politically or military. Yet this is the kind of conflict for which our military and strategic doctrine best prepares us. Thus the Soviets are given two basic advantages: in the political field, we tend to look for the "pure" case of aggression which their doctrine teaches the Soviets to strain every effort to avoid presenting. And in the military field, it causes us to look for absolute solutions in a contest which the Soviets will seek to transform into a subtle blend of political, economic, psychological and, incidentally, military warfare. We have thus been inhibited by two contradictory motivations: on the one hand, we have refused to take at face value the often-repeated Soviet assertions that they meant to smash the existing framework and have sought to interpret every Soviet maneuver in terms of categories we have come to consider as "legitimate." On the other hand, we have conducted our relations with the Soviet bloc, whether military or diplomatic, as if it were possible to conceive of a terminal date to the conflict. Our diplomats have given rise to the notion that an over-all settlement is at least conceivable and that some day, perhaps after a four-power

VIII-51

conference, "peace may break out." And much of our military thought centers around the possibility of victory in an all-out war which would put an end to international tensions once and for all.

Both contingencies are explicitly rejected by Communist doctrine. As long as the class struggle continues, until, that is, Communism has triumphed all over the world, conflict between the Soviet and the non-Soviet world is considered inevitable, although its forms may vary with the tactical requirements of the situation. Nor would Soviet doctrine council risking everything in an all-out showdown unless the disproportion of power in their favor became overwhelmingly one-sided. Thus both the quest for legitimacy and the search for absolute answers of the non-Soviet world increase its vulnerability to the Soviet strategy of ambiguity: the former by taking at face value every tactical move by the Soviets; the latter by producing an excessive concern with the least likely danger.

A prerequisite for effective action is therefore a psychological attitude: realization that the contest with the Soviet bloc is likely to be protracted, a fact which we cannot escape because the Soviets insist on it. Both in our diplomacy and in our military policy we must be able to gear firmness to patience, and not be misled by Soviet maneuvers or by our insistence on absolute solutions. The basic Soviet advantage has been their understanding that internationals relations were essentially a dynamic process with no terminal points and no final victories, something which the predominance of the legal professions in our diplomacy has prevented us from comprehending as fully. This has given a single-minded momentum to Soviet diplomacy which has seen them score successes not warranted either by the relations of forces or by the intrinsic merit of the Soviet doctrine. Events in the satellite orbit demonstrate that the very doctrine

trine. Events in the satellite orbit demonstrate that the very doctrine
either by the refutation of forces or by the intrinsic merit of the Soviet doc-
momentum do Soviet diplomacy which has seen them come to success not warranted
arised to from compromise as tully. The case has given a single-minded
which the dominance of the political profession in our diplomacy has be-
a dynamic process with no terminal points and no final destinations, something
has been their understanding that international relations were essentially
by our insistance on specific solutions. The basic Soviet advantage
to be gained timewise to patience, and not be mised by Soviet maneuvers or
on it. Both in our diplomacy and in our military policy we must be safe
be protected, a set which we cannot escape because the Soviet must
attitude: realization that the context which the Soviet bloc is likely to
A intermediate for effective action is therefore a dialectical
latter by producing an offensive concern with the least flexibility, danger,
concern by taking at face value every factor which may the Soviet; the
increase its vulnerability to the Soviet strategy of ambiguity: the
infirmity and the search for specific answers on the non-Soviet world
if their favor becomes overwhelmingly one-sided. Time both the great for
risking everything in an all-out confrontation under the disorganization of power
strategic arrangements of the situation. Nor would Soviet doctrine commit
Soviet world to considered inviolable, although its forms may vary with the
tremendous eff over the world, conflict between the Soviet and the non-
We found as the effective consequence, until, that is, Communism has
Both contingencies are exorbitantly rejected by Communist doctrine.
end to international tensions once and for all.
around the possibility of victory in an all-out war which would but an
conference, "becase may break out." And much of our military thought centers

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VIII-52

which gives flexibility and daring to Soviet moves in a vacuum, may produce confusion and rigidity if the disparity between reality and the expectation of it becomes too great. The United States must therefore study the psychology of its opponents as carefully as they studied ours; we must learn that there are no purely political any more than purely military solutions and that in the relation among states, will may play a greater role than power. We must understand that the quest for certainty can only paralyze action because it will play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity. History demonstrates that revolutionary powers have never been overcome until their opponents stopped pretending that they were really misunderstood ligimists.

Everything depends therefore on our ability to graduate our actions both in our diplomacy and in our military policy. To the extent that we succeed in seeing policy as an entity in which political, psychological, economic and military pressures are related to the objective in dispute, we may actually be able to use Soviet theory to our advantage. Soviet and Chinese theory leave little doubt that these are not regimes which would risk everything to prevent adverse transformations as long as their national survival is not directly affected. They are even less likely to stake everything to achieve a positive gain. To be sure, the Soviets have skillfully sought to paralyze opposition by giving the impression that any withdrawal from any territory once occupied by Soviet troops or even where Soviet influence has been growing, as in Egypt, is conceivable, and that any attempt to bring it about may lead to all-out war. But both history and Soviet theory would seem to indicate that this is a form of atomic blackmail. One need only study the abject effort of the Politburo in the weeks before the German attack on the U.S.S.R. to achieve an