Frank C. Schell III
R. Padre João Manuel, 328 - 12.º and.
01411 - São Paulo, Brazil

25th August, 1989

Mr. George H. W. Bush
President of The United States of America
The White House
Washington, D. C.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President:

Ref: U.S. Foreign Policy - India

I am taking the liberty of writing to you to suggest that the time is now right for an activist presidency toward India.

Certain recent developments, external and internal to India, present the United States with a unique chance to construct a new economic, military, and diplomatic order with the world's largest democracy. But to do so, it is necessary to reach the people of rural India, which is where the true political franchise lies for a domestic Indian leader or a foreign head of state.

First, the Soviet withdrawal from central Asia offers a moderating influence, now obviating the need for a resolute and virtually unconditional commitment to Pakistan, an historical enemy of India. Second, recent events in China have severely discredited that country, causing a rethinking of strategic approach by U.S. multinationals, and serving to emphasize India's position as a relatively mature parliamentary system that works. Third, Rajiv Gandhi has liberalized the investment code, with a recent influx of U.S. consumer goods companies (Pepsi, Coke, Whirlpool), computer firms (Texas Instruments, Digital, Hewlett Packard) as well as defense contractors which are known to be looking at Indian procurement requirements.

The United States now has the chance to reverse over forty years of standoff and bad blood with India, going back to the postwar containment days, when priorities were indeed different. It is time to go beyond the legitimate frustrations of both sides with new generations of leadership.

[Lc]

-2-

The commercial value of India to U.S. multinationals may be described as truly vast, in view of population and size of industrial base and diversification of the economy. Indian dogmatism and legendary bureaucracy have been a well-known inhibiting influence in the past, however pragmatism is starting to appear.

The military significance of India is its position as probably the most equipped and formidable force between Israel and Vietnam, having replacement and next generation equipment needs which should be diversified away from the Soviet Union, the historical preferred and lead source. The country is already a regional power, with a standing army of about one million men, and it has a growing blue water navy.

The diplomatic and political value of the country is its moral positioning in the Third World - an offset to idealogues which are hostile to U.S. interests.

Finally, there is much cultural affinity which already binds India and the U.S. I have never met an Indian engineer, accountant, doctor, or scientist who wanted to study in the Soviet Union.

The way for you to reach India in spirit is remarkably simple, if the United States chooses to do so. A presidential visit, with focus on the requirements and conditions in village India, would be of immense value and would even moderate some of the cynics in India. While money and aid, which have limitations set by Congress, are important to the Indians, what is equally important to them is the knowledge that India now lies within the U.S. sphere of influence.

Presidential commissions, task forces, and other missions can always follow. But what is needed now is the acceptance and affirmation of a new beginning and a new order of things. Great individuals, indeed cults of personalities, have dominated the Indian political scene in this century. The power of personal commitment by an American president can be a decisive force.

I hope you will consider this idea and respond to this letter with your assessments. I have had a number of years experience in international and money center banking and am presently Vice President & Representative of The First National Bank of Chicago in Brazil. For over three years I served in the U.S. Peace Corps in India in agricultural and education projects, and I speak Hindi-Urdu. I have had earlier banking assignments in Africa/Middle East and London as well as some experience with a major defense contractor.

DATE 5-8-90 LOG NUMBER 670 FILE Wilfried Scheile [x]

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HAK has original magazine

TRANSLATION - jw

From the Frankfurter Allgemeine Magazin - Sun. April 27, 1990

"When former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger spoke before a group of Hessian businessmen, the Fürth native apologized that he would be giving his lecture in English. The reason for this was a comment Kissinger received during an earlier interview from the German diplomat accompanying him. At the end of the conversation conducted in German, Kissinger asked the diplomat what he'd thought of his remarks. The official politely replied: 'I was fascinated by the simplicity of your words.'"

"Henry Kissinger explained to his Frankfurt audience why, after 50 years in America, he continued to speak English with a strong German accent, while his older brother was able to speak without any accent. When his brother was asked a similar question, Kissinger recalled, his brother replied: 'I'm afraid I'm the Kissinger who's able to listen.'"

"At the conclusion of a long debate, Henry Kissinger was asked whether in view of the current situation in Germany he wasn't tempted to give recommendations to the federal government based on his wealth of world political experience. The answer came without hesitation: 'I don't think anyone in Bonn needs more advice from native Bavarians.'"

H

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To the office of Prof. Dr. Henry Kissinger!

Thank you very much for your message.

We are very happy about it.

Many thanks to Dr. Kissinger

Markus Hörwick

FC Bayern Munich

12. 02. 90

17:19

*FC BAYERN MÜNCHEN

S01

Seite 2

Weltpolitik

Scherers International Tribune

Prof. Dr. Fritz Scherer:

Persönlichkeit,
Repräsentant,
Ratgeber & Freund

Als Präsident des FC Bayern München steht Dr. Fritz Scherer im Blickpunkt der Öffentlichkeit. Sein Wort zählt, man schätzt ihn als Fachmann, Persönlichkeit und interessanten Gesprächspartner.

Von Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker bis Steffi Graf, vom ehemaligen US-Außenminister Prof. Dr. Henry Kissinger (den er zum Mitglied unseres Klubs machte) bis zu Popstar Chris de Burgh - Dr. Fritz Scherer ist mit vielen Größen und prominenten Persönlichkeiten des In- und Auslands bereits zusam-

mengetroffen. Die Bilder auf diesen beiden Seiten zeigen es. Eine kleine Auswahl von Grußbotschaften, die ihm eine Vielzahl dieser Männer anläßlich seines 50. Geburtstags übermittelten, zeigen die Hochachtung vor dem Menschen, Freund, Kollegen und der Persönlichkeit Dr. Fritz Scherer.

Dr. Fritz Scherer und Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker

Fußball mit Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl

Im Gespräch mit Pr. Dr. Henry Kissinger

1985 mit Franz-Josef Strauß

Mit Bundesverkehrsminister Dr. Friedrich Zimmermann

Im Stadion mit CSU-Chef Dr. Theo Waigel

Mit Bayerns Innenminister Dr. Edmund Stoiber

DFB-Ligaausschuß: Mayer-Vorfelder, Scherer

Prost: mit Münchens OB Georg Kronawitter

Gute Zusammenarbeit mit Opel-Chef Louis R. Hughes

Prominentenfußball: Uwe Seeler, Helmut Haller, Dr. Fritz Scherer

Bayern-Präsidenten unter sich: mit Wilhelm Neudecker

JUN 25 1990

FINCENTRO

IL PRESIDENTE

Rome, 20th June 1990

Dear Henry,

I'm writing to you because I would like to inform you of my recent decision to leave my position of Special Commissioner of the Italian Railroads.

After eighteen months of an unusual work, I felt that my experience there had come to an end. In this period, some results have been achieved along the way of transforming the old "Ente pubblico" into a modern, market-oriented company: the "government" of the enterprise is now again under the management's control and responsibility; the recently signed contract of railways workers assumes productivity as the primary target for the next three years (fact that is absolutely new for a public sector entity in Italy); the State contributions to the Railroad balance sheet were in 1989 650 million of dollars less than the previous year.

These results are a pre-requisite for a deeper change of the company. The institutional framework in which our railroads operate, with a very heavy control coming from the Ministry of Transportation, prevents this deeper change.

I have made a reform proposal, outlining an institutional transformation of railroads into a normal company with shares outstanding and with a 80-90% stake in the hands of Government. The timing of Italy's political decisions is "out of my hands", but I am confident that the experience of the past eighteen months will be of some help for Italian political authorities in finding the proper institutional solution. In particular, the reform project that the government is about to present for Parliament approval, follows some suggestions we made, especially as far as management autonomy is concerned.

Now I am going back to my personal entrepreneurial activity in the publishing and communication sector.

The Fincentro publishing group, which I control, is undergoing a medium term strategy of international growth. It is now based in Italy and Spain, and will expand in other European and English speaking countries.

Dieses Buch will eine mehr als vier-
hundertjährige Geschichte durch
die Darstellung der Staatsoberhäup-
ter, der österreichischen und deut-
schen Kaiser, vergegenwärtigen.
Tragende Idee des Bandes ist die
sich heute immer stärker durchset-
zende Erkenntnis, daß das Alte
Reich mit seinen Institutionen, be-
sonders seit dem 16. Jahrhundert,
eine Friedens- und Rechtsordnung
errichten wollte und zeitweise auch
erreichte, die in der Geschichte Mit-
teleuropas einmalig war. Diese Ord-
nung war nicht unangefochten,
mußte mit schweren Erschütterun-
gen und Konflikten fertig werden,
hat aber viele Bewährungsproben
bestanden und ist noch im 19. Jahr-
hundert, nach dem Ende des Alten
Reiches, politisch wirksam gewesen.
Die Spitze und die zentrale Institu-
tion dieser Ordnung war das Kai-
sertum, das bis 1806 als römisch-

Fortsetzung auf der hinteren Klappe

Umschlagentwurf: Bruno Schachtner,
Dachau

Umschlagvorderseite: Wilhelm II. Porträt-
Gemälde von Carl Bublitz, 1900. Berlin,
Johanniter-Orden. Foto: J. Liepe. Bildar-
chiv preußischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin
Joseph II. Gemälde von Joseph Hickel, um
1780. Bildarchiv preußischer Kulturbesitz,
Berlin

Karl V. mit Dogge. Gemälde von Jacob
Seisenegger, 1532. Wien, Kunsthistori-
sches Museum

Umschlagrückseite: Franz II. Büste des Kai-
sers im Krönungsornat in einem von
8 Säulen getragenen Tempel. Im Hinter-
grund allegorische Gestalten um eine Op-
ferflamme. Bildarchiv der Österreichi-
schen Nationalbibliothek, Wien

Verlag C. H. Beck München

deutsches, danach als österreichi-
sches (seit 1871 auch als deutsches)
auftrat. Freilich war die Verwirkli-
chung der Kaiseridee nicht einfach
und geradlinig. Die Kaiser mußten
bei dem Versuch, ihre Ziele zu errei-
chen, auf die jeweilige politische
Lage antworten; ihre individuellen
Tätigkeiten bestimmten dabei mit,
was sich realisieren ließ.

Das Buch vergegenwärtigt in bio-
graphischen Essays alle österreichi-
schen und deutschen Kaiser der
Neuzeit. Wir begegnen dem uni-
versalen Herrscher Karl V., dem
Kunstmäzen Rudolf II., dem
Kaiser des Dreißigjährigen Krieges
Ferdinand II., dem Repräsentanten
des Barock Karl VI., Vater Maria
Theresias, den Aufklärern auf dem
Thron, Joseph II. und Leopold II.
oder den populären Kaisern Franz
Joseph I. und Wilhelm I. und
schließlich den letzten Kaisern Karl I.
und Wilhelm II.

Die Herausgeber haben als Mitar-
beiter angesehene Historiker aus
mehreren Ländern gewonnen. Sie
alle haben unter Berücksichtigung
des neuesten Forschungsstandes
historische Porträts geschrieben, die
auch dem Nichthistoriker anschau-
lich vermitteln, was man heute über
die deutschen Kaiser seit 1519 sagen
kann.

Die Herausgeber:

Anton Schindling, geb. 1947, ist Professor für Neuere Geschichte an der Universität Osnabrück

Walter Ziegler, geb. 1937, ist Professor für Neuere und Landesgeschichte an der Universität Würzburg

Verlag C. H. Beck München

INHALT

<table><tr><td>Vorwort</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Das deutsche Kaisertum in der Neuzeit. Gedanken zu Wesen und Wandlungen</td><td>11</td></tr></table>

Altes Reich

<table><tr><td>KARL V. (1519-1556) von Alfred Kohler</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>FERDINAND I. (1556-1564) von Bernhard Sicken.</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>MAXIMILIAN II. (1564-1576) von Manfred Rudersdorf.</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>RUDOLF II. (1576-1612) von Volker Press</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>MATTHIAS (1612-1619) von Volker Press</td><td>112</td></tr><tr><td>FERDINAND II. (1619-1637) von Dieter Albrecht.</td><td>125</td></tr><tr><td>FERDINAND III. (1637-1657) von Konrad Repgen</td><td>142</td></tr><tr><td>LEOPOLD I. (1658-1705) von Anton Schindling</td><td>169</td></tr><tr><td>JOSEPH I. (1705-1711) von Hans Schmidt</td><td>186</td></tr><tr><td>KARL VI. (1711-1740) von Hans Schmidt</td><td>200</td></tr><tr><td>KARL VII. (1742-1745) von Alois Schmid</td><td>215</td></tr><tr><td>FRANZ I. und MARIA THERESIA (1745-1765) von Alois Schmid</td><td>232</td></tr><tr><td>JOSEPH II. und MARIA THERESIA (1765-1790) von Peter Baumgart</td><td>249</td></tr><tr><td>LEOPOLD II. (1790-1792) von Lorenz Mikoletzky</td><td>277</td></tr><tr><td>FRANZ II. (1792-1806) von Walter Ziegler</td><td>289</td></tr></table>

Napoleonische Ära,
Deutscher Bund und
Nachfolgestaaten

<table><tr><td>FRANZ I. von Österreich (1806-1835) von Walter Ziegler</td><td>309</td></tr><tr><td>FERDINAND I. von Österreich (1835-1848) von Lorenz Mikoletzky</td><td>329</td></tr><tr><td>FRANZ JOSEPH I. von Österreich (1848-1916)<br>von Harm-Hinrich Brandt</td><td>341</td></tr><tr><td>KARL I. von Österreich (1916-1918) von Helmut Rumpler</td><td>382</td></tr><tr><td>WILHELM I. Deutscher Kaiser (1871-1888) von Hellmut Seier</td><td>395</td></tr><tr><td>FRIEDRICH III. Deutscher Kaiser (1888) von Hellmut Seier</td><td>410</td></tr><tr><td>WILHELM II. Deutscher Kaiser (1888-1918) von John C. G. Röhl</td><td>419</td></tr></table>

chen 1990

["6", "Inhaltsverzeichnis", "Anhang", "TABELLEN ZUR REICHSGESCHICHTE von Christoph Bauer . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Verzeichnis

hang

<table><tr><td>von Christoph Bauer</td><td>445</td></tr></table>

Römischen Reichs

<table><tr><td>..................</td><td>445</td></tr><tr><td>Mainz................</td><td>445</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>446</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>446</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>447</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>448</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>448</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>448</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>450</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>471</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>504</td></tr><tr><td>..................</td><td>506</td></tr></table>

nweise

Autorenname und Seitenzahl) zitierte
n den Bibliographien, die den einzel-
dnet sind.

im Ende der einzelnen Beiträge bieten
wichtigsten Angehörigen des Kaiser-
ntafel.

[10]

VORWORT

Wenn hiermit eine Geschichte der Kaiser in der Neuzeit der Öffentlichkeit vorgelegt wird, die weder einen Kranz ausgewählter Kaisergestalten noch die Geschichte einer Dynastie darstellt, auch keine deutsche Geschichte allgemeiner Art, so bedarf dies einer Erklärung. Ein solches Vorhaben ergibt sich aus zwei Anliegen, denen das vorliegende Buch Rechnung tragen will. Zum einen stellen die Kaiser, die hier in chronologischer Folge behandelt werden, die Staatsoberhäupter im deutschsprachigen Bereich der Neuzeit bis 1918 dar. Diese waren niemals rein repräsentative Figuren an der Staatsspitze, wie Monarchien unserer Zeit sie kennen. Als Exekutive stellten sie vielmehr einen wesentlichen Teil der Staatsmacht dar, ja sie leiteten während der größten Zeit bis 1918 sogar unmittelbar die Politik; nicht selten versteht man ihre Regierungsgeschichte auch bis heute als eigene Geschichtsepoch, so etwa das Zeitalter Karls V. Die Kenntnis der Kaiser und ihres geschichtlichen Wirkens ist damit für das Verständnis mitteleuropäischer Geschichte in der Neuzeit unabdingbar. Da sie trotzdem keineswegs allgemein bekannt sind – wer kennt schon die Kaiser Matthias, Joseph I. oder Franz I.!, – da selbst der Fachhistoriker manchmal Mühe hat, deren Bedeutung sich sogleich ins Gedächtnis zu rufen, erscheint eine neue wissenschaftliche Darstellung und eine analysierende Zusammenfassung und Bewertung dessen, was die Spezialforschung über die Kaiser erarbeitet hat, als Desiderat.

Ebenso wichtig ist ein zweites Anliegen. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist zunehmend das deutsche Reich der Frühen Neuzeit, wie es sich seit der Reichsreform um die Wende zum 16. Jahrhundert dargestellt hat und bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts, ja als Idee und Folie bis ins 20. Jahrhundert eine wirksame Kraft blieb, ein Gegenstand besonderen Interesses in- und ausländischer Forscher und Publizisten geworden: Kein Wunder, kann man etwa im Alten Reich oder im Deutschen Bund doch eine Friedens- und Rechtsordnung wenn nicht verwirklicht, so doch ange- strebt und teilweise auch als politische Kraft tätig sehen, die sich von den Kämpfen des Nationalismus im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert positiv abhebt, ja sogar als Vorentwurf künftiger europäischer Ordnungen betrachtet werden kann. Auch die Geschichtsforschung hat die Bedeutung dieses Phänomens bereits in wichtigen Bereichen gewürdigt; vor allem die reichsständische Komponente – insbesondere aus der Sicht der Mainzer Erzkanzlei – und der Reichspatriotismus des «reichischen Deutschland» sind gebührend hervorgehoben worden.

8

Schindling/Ziegler

Dagegen ist die Bedeutung der kaiserlichen Zentralgewalt in diesen Verbänden bisher nicht in gleicher Weise ins allgemeine Bewußtsein gerückt. Es sind bisher weder die borussisch-kleindeutsch-nationale Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts, die das frühneuzeitliche Kaisertum aus Unverständnis abwertete, ja verächtlich machte, noch die habsburgisch-österreichische Geschichtsschreibung, die einlinig und selbstverständlich das Kaisertum für ihre Dynastie reklamierte, ganz überwunden worden; zudem hat die Polemik des 20. Jahrhunderts gegen die ältere monarchische Tradition ihre Schatten auf die gesamte Einrichtung des Kaisertums geworfen, haben einzelne fragwürdige Kaiserpersönlichkeiten solche Polemik scheinbar gerechtfertigt erscheinen lassen. Demgegenüber ist zu betonen, daß das erstrebte neue Bild des Alten Reiches, ja jeder mitteleuropäischen Ordnung, ohne den Bezug zu einem sichtbaren Oberhaupt ein Torso bleiben muß, weil auch die beste verfassungsmäßige Ordnung ohne eine politische Zentralgewalt nicht bestehen kann. Die Geschichte selbst hat dies gelehrt: Als der Kaiser 1806 die Krone des Reiches niederlegte, war das Alte Reich erloschen, als 1918 der letzte habsburgische Kaiser abtrat, war dies ein Zeichen für das Ende der alten europäischen Staatenordnung. Dabei sei betont, daß diese alte europäische Staatenordnung, vor allem das Alte Reich vor 1806, nicht in mitteleuropäischer Selbstgenügsamkeit verharrte, sondern Widerlager im Süden und im Westen Europas hatte und den Osten und den Norden mit einbezog.

Von diesen Überlegungen ausgehend, stellt dieser Band alle Kaiser im Alten Reich und in den <Nachfolgestaaten> von 1519 bis 1918 vor. Der Beginn der Reihe mit Karl V. deutet die endgültige Etablierung des neuzeitlichen Reichssystems an, die Fortführung bis 1918, über 1806 hinaus, soll zeigen, daß das Nachleben des Reiches als politische und als konstitutionelle Ordnung lange Zeit das Denken in Deutschland und in Österreich bestimmt hat und erst in unserem Jahrhundert beendet wurde. Die Gliederung allein nach Kaisern wurde auch dort beibehalten, wo einzelne Politiker den Herrscher weit überragt haben; nur im Falle von Maria Theresia wurde wegen ihrer besonderen Bedeutung auch als Herrscherin ihr Name dem der beiden Kaiser ihrer Zeit hinzugefügt. Vielleicht mag es überraschen, daß die österreichischen Kaiser (1806–1918) den deutschen zur Seite gestellt und mit ihnen gemeinsam behandelt werden. Es dürfte jedoch aus den Darlegungen klargeworden sein, daß hier keine Geschichte des Heiligen Römischen Reiches, Österreichs oder Deutschlands beabsichtigt ist, sondern eine Geschichte der Kaiser, die in diesem politischen Rahmen gewirkt haben. Wie die Römischen Kaiser vor 1806 in diesem Sinne <deutsche> Kaiser waren, obwohl sie offiziell nicht so geheißen haben, so auch die österreichischen Kaiser nach diesem Epochenjahr; ganz speziell trifft dies auf Kaiser

Franz II./I. zu (1792–1835), der zu Kaiser war, sich aber ebenso vor Kaiser verstand.

Schwerpunkt in der Darstellung zum Reich und ihr Wirken im übrigen für Österreich und für die deutschen Kaiserdarstellungen nicht in ersten graphien, wie man sie in den 19. kann. Vielmehr soll im Zentrum des Handels und das Handeln des Kaisers als hungsweise als maßgebliches politisches Bereich vor 1918, sein Wirken als bedeutet, daß der Leser zwar auch in der Stände der Kaiser findet, aber nur in Fakten, die er von einer solchen Eigenheit, der eigenen Land, seine Bedeutung füllt. Verfassungsmäßigen Organen ihrer Funktionieren für den Kaiser weshalb, nicht um Institutionen Charaktereigenschaften und auf Kaiser gerichtet sein.

Schon aus diesen wenigen Bemerkungen, daß ein guter Teil der selbstgestützten Bemühungen sein kann. Nicht bekannt, sie sind vor allem auch kaiserländischer, der genannten Fragestellung fehlte Herausgeber wie den Autoren als nicht nur allgemein als interessant, tanten ihrer Dynastie zu betrachte, sein hatten, nämlich Oberhaupt u.

Den Autoren war bei der Ge Freiheit gelassen, ihren Kaiser so arbeitung der Schwerpunkte und tung im Gesamtbild für nötig hielte keine räsonierenden Essays, son Aufsätze sein wollen, ein untersch Herausgeber durchaus begrüßen. Er überquellender oder fast fehlender Darstellungen vielfach Neuland; für

[LC]

[LC]

Vorwort

9

Ziegler

aiserlichen Zentralgewalt in diesen
Weise ins allgemeine Bewußtsein
borussisch-kleindeutsch-nationale
hunderts, die das frühneuzeitliche
tete, ja verächtlich machte, noch die
richtsschreibung, die einlinig und
ir ihre Dynastie reklamierte, ganz
Polemik des 20. Jahrhunderts gegen
dre Schatten auf die gesamte Einrich-
ten einzelne fragwürdige Kaiserper-
bar gerechtfertigt erscheinen lassen.
das erstrebte neue Bild des Alten
Ordnung, ohne den Bezug zu einem
ben muß, weil auch die beste verfas-
politische Zentralgewalt nicht beste-
dies gelehrt: Als der Kaiser 1806 die
las Alte Reich erloschen, als 1918 der
var dies ein Zeichen für das Ende der
3. Dabei sei betont, daß diese alte
lem das Alte Reich vor 1806, nicht in
keit verharrte, sondern Widerlager
atte und den Osten und den Norden

end, stellt dieser Band alle Kaiser im
staaten) von 1519 bis 1918 vor. Der
tet die endgültige Etablierung des
Fortführung bis 1918, über 1806
des Reiches als politische und als
das Denken in Deutschland und in
in unsere Jahrhundert beendet
aisern wurde auch dort beibehalten,
weit überragt haben; nur im Falle von
er besonderen Bedeutung auch als
iden Kaiser ihrer Zeit hinzugefügt.
daß die österreichischen Kaiser
gestellt und mit ihnen gemeinsam
aus den Darlegungen klargeworden
Heiligen Römischen Reiches, Öster-
tigt ist, sondern eine Geschichte der
Rahmen gewirkt haben. Wie die
gem Sinne «deutsche» Kaiser waren,
haben, so auch die österreichischen
ganz speziell trifft dies auf Kaiser

Franz II./I. zu (1792-1835), der zuerst Römischer, später österreichischer Kaiser war, sich aber ebenso vor wie nach 1806 durchaus als deutscher Kaiser verstand.

Schwerpunkt in der Darstellung der einzelnen Kaiser ist ihr Verhalten zum Reich und ihr Wirken im und für das Reich beziehungsweise in und für Österreich und für die deutsche Nation. Es handelt sich also bei den Kaiserdarstellungen nicht in erster Linie um Lebensbilder oder Kurzbiographien, wie man sie in den bekannten Nachschlagewerken finden kann. Vielmehr soll im Zentrum der jeweiligen Betrachtung das Denken und das Handeln des Kaisers als Oberhaupt des Reiches stehen beziehungsweise als maßgebliches politisches Zentrum im deutschsprachigen Bereich vor 1918, sein Wirken also auf dieser deutschen Bühne. Das bedeutet, daß der Leser zwar auch hier Lebensdaten und Lebensumstände der Kaiser findet, aber keine allgemeine Biographie; manche Fakten, die er von einer solchen erwarten könnte, etwa sein Wirken im eigenen Land, seine Bedeutung für Kunst und Kultur, seine Selbstdarstellung im Hof und in der Dynastie fehlen hier weithin oder werden nur kurz erwähnt. Dagegen stehen im Vordergrund das Handeln als Reichsoberhaupt, in der Außenpolitik, in Krieg und Frieden, in der Zusammenarbeit oder im Gegeneinander mit den Reichsständen und mit den verfassungsmäßigen Organen ihrer Reiche, deren Loyalität und deren Funktionieren für den Kaiser wesentlich waren. Da es sich um Personen handelt, nicht um Institutionen, wird der Blick aber auch auf die Charaktereigenschaften und auf die persönlichen Einstellungen der Kaiser gerichtet sein.

Schon aus diesen wenigen Bemerkungen zu dem Vorhaben wird klar,
daß ein guter Teil der selbstgesetzten Schwerpunkte nur Ziel von
Bemühungen sein kann. Nicht wenige Kaiser sind nicht nur kaum
bekannt, sie sind vor allem auch kaum bearbeitet, an Untersuchungen zu
der genannten Fragestellung fehlt es weithin. Gerade dies aber ist den
Herausgebern wie den Autoren als Ansporn erschienen, die Kaiser eben
nicht nur allgemein als interessante Persönlichkeiten oder als Repräsentan-
tanten ihrer Dynastie zu betrachten, sondern zuerst als das, was sie zu
sein hatten, nämlich Oberhaupt und politisches Zentrum des Reiches.

Den Autoren war bei der Gestaltung ihrer Beiträge weitgehende
Freiheit gelassen, ihren Kaiser so darzustellen, wie sie es zur Heraus-
arbeitung der Schwerpunkte und zur jeweiligen spezifischen Gewich-
tung im Gesamtbild für nötig hielten. So haben die Beiträge, die übrigens
keine räsonierenden Essays, sondern wissenschaftlich orientierende
Aufsätze sein wollen, ein unterschiedliches Aussehen erhalten, was die
Herausgeber durchaus begrüßen. Die Autoren betreten, sei es angesichts
überquellender oder fast fehlender Literatur und Vorarbeiten, mit ihren
Darstellungen vielfach Neuland; für ihr hohes Engagement sei ihnen in

10

Schindling/Ziegler

ganz besonderem Maße gedankt. Der Dank gilt auch dem Verfasser der beigegebenen Tabellen, Herrn Doktorand Christoph Bauer (Würzburg), sowie Herrn Dr. Manfred Rudersdorf (Osnabrück) für mannigfache Hilfe. Nicht zuletzt ist dem Verlag und hier besonders Herrn Dr. Wieckenberg und Frau Dr. Lent zu danken, die mit großer Geduld und kompetentem Rat das Werk betreut haben.

DAS DEUTSCHI
IN DER N
GEDANKEN ZU WESEN

Das Bild Josephs II. und Leopolds II., Batoni 1769 so lebensvoll komponier Erinnerungen an Kaiser und Reich immer noch besetzt mit Karl dem Gr Reichskrone und mittelalterlichen K der Aufklärung entspricht diesen \ Tradition regierte nun die Vernunft, Gemeinschaft war Europa jetzt erfüll gewichtsdenkens. Selbst manch ei Traditionen seines Amtes eher als so Kraft, so Joseph II. 1764 bei seiner miterlebt und in ihrem Zwiespalt : treffend beschrieben hat. Es hat auch sten gefehlt, die im Kaisertum und i einen Abstieg, nur greisenhafte Auf keit des Mittelalters sahen, einen N gen Nationalstaaten des 19. Jahrh der echtes Leben, ja die jetzt allein bens gezeigt hätten. Doch nach der Ideologie und Praxis des Nationalist Irrweg bewiesen haben, ist man h geworden. Man hat erkannt, daß je vorgespiegelt und der Machtstaat hat, weder dem Mittelalter gerecht Geschichte in der Frühen Neuzeit (forschung hat überdies begonnen) Reiches, des «Alten Reiches», wie immer positiver herauszustellen.

Denn auch wenn die Kaiser und
Erfahrungsschatz noch nicht aufg
nicht verankert sind: Sie bezeichn
Erstarrung, sie waren vielmehr h
man muß sogar sagen, daß Kais
debeutender und wirkungsmächt
ihnen, obwohl der äußere Glanz u

MAR 20 1996

THE ROAD MENDERS

Vincent van Gogh, Dutch, 1853–1890

Oil on canvas, 1889

The Cleveland Museum of Art, Gift of the Hanna Fund

Published by

THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART

© 1986 MMA

11-00596-4

FEB 02 1990

STATEMENT BY
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

January 30, 1990

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I want to thank you for your invitation to appear today
before the Committee to assess the dramatic changes in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union and their impact on national
security policy. As members of the Committee may recall, the
issues of European security, of the balance between
conventional and nuclear capabilities and their role in the
deterrence of possible Soviet attack have been close to my
heart for many years. Consequently, the events that have been
unfolding in this past year have had a special poignance for
me. Since the late 40s and the collapse of the wartime
partnership with the Soviet Union, the preservation of a free
Western Europe has been the centerpiece of American foreign
policy. Now that policy has been crowned with success -- and,
in that, we are entitled to take some satisfaction.

Mr. Chairman, let me start with two essential points.

First, international politics has already passed through
an historic watershed. Change continues; indeed, it may well
become more dramatic in the period ahead. By the changes he

[lc]

has initiated, Mikhail Gorbachev -- for it is primarily he -- has altered the world order as we have known it since 1945. He has unleashed forces that he cannot control and did not anticipate. From the standpoint of the Soviet Union, he has opened up a Pandora's Box, and the elements released cannot again be contained. The lines of force that have governed international relations in the post war period have now been permanently altered. To proceed as if tranformation had not occurred would ultimately be self-defeating.

Second, let us be clear about what we have accomplished. America has fulfilled its historic responsibility. We have been steadfast. We have helped preserve the democracies of Western Europe during difficult times -- and have helped create the new, flourishing Western Europe of today. For forty years we have stood the watch. We have won. I say this not in a spirit of gloating but as an historic fact. Indeed, one cannot fail to respect a Soviet Union, which from a far weaker economic and political base, was prepared, in the name of its own ideology, to sustain this challenge to the United States and much of the free world for so long a time. Yet, while we should be magnanimous in victory, we should not fail to celebrate this American

-2-

[fc]

accomplishment. Were Winston Churchill alive today, I believe
that he would refer to the steadfast American role of these
past forty years as -- our finest hour.

However, Mr. Chairman, as a country we must move on. We
must recognize that the international environment has now been
transformed. We must not go on doing what we have done in the
past -- on the premise, why change a successful strategy? Were
we to do so, it would prove self-defeating. We would damage
our international standing and lose the respect of our rivals,
the support of our allies, and the confidence of the American
public. Thus, quite properly, the rationale for our European
deployments is up for review and debate.

The military balance has been radically altered. How
long the Warsaw Pact may survive as a political association is
an open question, but its role as a military alliance and a
military threat has been largely broken. The modest reduction
in Soviet military deployments has been dwarved by the
essential departure of her Warsaw Pact partners as military
allies. Under these circumstances one cannot conceive of a
Warsaw Pact offensive save as an act of supreme folly.

-3-

[Lc]

American deployments in Europe over the years have been justified as a symbol of the American commitment and, since the 70s, as a part of a stalwart conventional capability intended to help deter Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack. Mr. Chairman, that role for the American forces has now been superseded. The new (and substantially reduced) role for those forces is to provide negotiating leverage -- to help assure the substantial drawdown of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. In the present context, however, arms control negotiations raise as many questions as they answer. Events have now begun to outrun the relatively slow pace of negotiations. In some circumstances that can be helpful, and in other circumstances harmful. In the present circumstances, I believe, that requires careful judgment rather than an automatic response.

I pointed out earlier that Mr. Gorbachev has unleashed forces that can no longer be controlled -- and which portend further dramatic change. Among those forces are the changes in government and the process of democratization in Eastern Europe. Already both Hungary and Czechoslovakia have requested the Soviet Union to remove its troops from their territories. In East Germany popular ferment has forced what is now an interim government to move the prospective date for elections forward from May to March. Once a democratically elected

-4-

[L.C.]

government is in place, a request to the Soviets to reduce and
ultimately withdraw Soviet forces is more or less
foreordained. In brief, the process of political change has
already imposed severe pressure on the Soviet Union to reduce,
and perhaps ultimately eliminate, her forces in Eastern
Europe. Given its altered international stance and its
domestic goals the Soviets will find these pressures hard to
resist. Indeed, Soviet leaders have themselves spoken of
withdrawing all their forces from Eastern Europe by the year
2000.

Thus, a process is already underway, more or less
spontaneously, massively to reduce Soviet forces. It would be
ironical and perhaps detrimental, if that process were to be
slowed by lengthy negotiations. It would be worse than ironical
if the CFE negotiations were to result in legitimatizing the
long-term presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe -- that
might otherwise be withdrawn in the absence of such negotiations
and such legitimatizing. It would be far worse, if the nations
of Eastern Europe were to hold the United States or NATO
responsible for the continued presence in their countries of
Soviet forces. In brief, standing firm while negotiations
continue may bring a less than optimal outcome.

-5-

[LC]

I am a long time Atlanticist. You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that during my tenure as Secretary of Defense my principal concern was the rebuilding of our NATO forces, the development of a more persuasive deterrent posture, the creation of a stalwart conventional capability, and the resistance to pressures, such as the Mansfield Amendment, for the reduction of the American presence and commitment. Over the years, former colleagues have called for a downsizing of U.S. forces. Rightly or wrongly, I have always resisted. Given this background, Mr. Chairman, I believe a certain weight can be attached to the following recommendation: we should plan *now* radically to scale back our forces in Europe. The time is now. Implementation may extend over months or years, as circumstances warrant. But the reduction should not be precluded by the ongoing negotiations in Vienna.

Mr. Chairman, over the years this Committee has heard much about burdensharing. As long as the Warsaw Pact threat remained substantial, I thought much of the comment overblown. Now, however, Belgium has announced the withdrawal of its forces from Germany. The Germans themselves have indicated an intended reduction of the *Bundeswehr* by roughly twenty percent. Other European countries are preparing to reduce both forces and spending.

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[Lc]

Mr. Chairman, as long as a sizable Warsaw Pact threat existed, a major American deployment was vital to European security. But, as that threat is reduced, the United States should not be in the position of increasing its share in European security. The time has come, more or less, for Europe to move towards the condition stated by former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt -- Europe should be defended (primarily) by French and German forces.

We must also look ahead. As we move toward German reunification, as almost inevitably we must; as the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are drawn down, and the threat to Western Europe recedes, we shall find that the eagerness and the welcome for American forces in Europe dwindles. The stationing of so large a set of foreign forces on German soil has become a growing irritant to the German public. We have been obliged to curtail low-level flying, night training, and so on. Imagine what will occur when the perception of the Soviet threat, already much reduced, recedes further. Whatever its present inclination, a German government will be obliged to pay heed to public opinion. We should begin to prepare now for that development, already foreseeable.

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[L]

We should begin now to discuss the character of a
residual force that is _desired_ by our European partners. That
force can be a symbol of the abiding American commitment,
insurance against the international environment (despite all
present prospects) turning darker again, and a logistical base
for the return of U.S. forces, if that should prove necessary.
Such a residual force, after the scaling down of the Soviet
presence, would be but a fraction of our present deployment.

At the fortieth anniversary summit of NATO in June
President Bush put forth a proposal for the reduction of
conventional forces, then specifing a ten percent manpower U.S.
reduction. It was a prudent and productive proposal, but in my
judgment time has now overtaken it. Since June a lot of water
has flowed over the dam. Changes in Eastern Europe have made
untenable the continued stationing of Soviet forces at anything
like their present level. In formulating policy now we need to
take these changes into account. We have other needs for our
defense dollar. Given the budgetary pressures that we all
understand, it would be unwise to short-change other, longer
term requirements for defense spending just to preserve for
somewhat longer a NATO force, the role of which has both been
sharply altered and diminished, and the size of which is
transitory.

-8-

[Lc]

In 1815, after the defeat of Napoleon; in 1848, after the revolutionary upheaval in Europe, imperial Russia advanced its forces far to the west -- just as did the Soviet Union in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany. But imperial Russia ultimately withdrew her forces, and now, some forty five years after World War II, the somewhat similar advance of the Soviet Union into the heart of Europe is coming to a close. Events are now forcing the pace of change in Eastern Europe. The Soviet empire and the Soviet threat are receding. Some of our defense people like to speak of the "uncertainties". To be sure, there are uncertainties. But the outcome of these uncertainties will not lead to the reimposition of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe -- nor the restoration of the classic threat that has concerned us since the Berlin blockade. All the king's horses and all the king's men cannot put that particular humpty dumpty together again.

Unless we in the defense community acknowledge that fundamental and irreversible changes have taken place, we will come to seem irrelevant. Our role in Europe and to some extent in the world generally has been altered. Therefore, our forces should now be pointed towards their future role. We will, I feel sure, feel obliged to remain a global superpower. But we should cling neither to past glories nor to past problems. The

-9-

[L]

great American mission in Europe is now drawing to a close. It
has been, in my judgment, America's finest hour. For forty
years we have provided a shield protecting the new and reborn
democracies of Western Europe. But now we must move on to new
tasks -- among them helping to develop the new architecture of
European security.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your attention. I shall
be pleased to respond to any questions.

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DATE 8-8-90 LOG NUMBER 1056 FILE Schlesinger [X]

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COMMENTS:

wait. Diplomatic maneuvers may tend to become ends in themselves, but in these circumstances they are pretty much throwaways.

Second, at this time we lack the military resources in the region. This is only partly our responsibility. Given our role as Israel's chief supporter, the Gulf states have been unwilling either to provide us with appropriate base facilities or even to permit us to be visible. They wanted the U.S. presence to be "over-the-horizon." But "over-the-horizon" is clearly insufficient in these circumstances (a reality Kuwait blithely disregarded). Moreover, the maneuvering inside the Gulf of a tiny naval force, whether in joint maneuvers with the United Arab Emirates or not, is a weak signal—reminiscent of the endless signaling to North Vietnam done in the Johnson years. Such signals may suggest weakness rather than strength and, if so, represent an inducement rather than a deterrent to action.

Given these constraints, three courses of action seem indicated.

1. The first is negative: Don't flail around too much. Posturing may make us feel better and may serve as a smoke screen to hide the regrettable fact that there is no effective policy option available to respond to the seizure of Kuwait. Too much flailing around would underscore our own ineffectualness and will mean that others take us less seriously. What is referred to as "concerted diplomatic activity" may make all of the participants feel better, but is unlikely to impress Saddam Hussein. Conditions for the imposition of economic sanctions are scarcely propitious and may (as economic sanctions frequently do) impose more harm than good.

We are now attempting to persuade all nations not to buy Iraqi oil. Success in that attempt would clearly backfire. Iraq's and Kuwait's production together amounts to 10 percent of Free World output. Iraqi production alone probably exceeds total spare capacity. Thus, truly to cease buying such crude

means a sharp rise in price—until cut off by unemployment. The other industrial nations, less fastidious about their supplies than we, are unlikely to adhere to any such embargo.

Other nations will be buying Iraqi crude at knock-down prices, but that is better than our being successful in our attempt, for that would be devastating. If, however, we wind up being the only ones to deny ourselves Iraqi (and presumably Kuwaiti crude) that would represent an ironic twist on the oil embargo of 1973. Again the United States would be singled out not to receive oil supplies from the Middle East, but this time it would be a self-embargo reflecting our own initiative.

2. It is essential for us to build an effective military deterrent that discourages Saddam Hussein from further action and provides protection for the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. President Bush has already furthered this process by his clear warning to Iraq not to proceed against Saudi Arabia. But his statement needs to be buttressed by further indications to Saddam of the punishment that would be meted out if he crosses the Saudi frontier. Ideally, that serious deterrent would include an American presence that would make unmistakably clear to Saddam that crossing the frontier means an unavoidable clash with American forces. Whether in these altered circumstances, the Saudis may recognize the need to accept such a presence is, of course, up to the Saudis. They must weigh the risk, and they will do so, wondering to what extent they can rely on the Americans—and recalling, as they will, our performance in both Lebanon and Iran. But the Carter Doctrine and the Reagan Corollary (as well as our clear national interest) make the protection of Saudi Arabia central to our post-Cold War international position.

3. Finally, this country should attempt to get serious about energy policy. We shall have to pay for our earlier neglect. We are just now passing the 50 percent mark in oil dependency—a record. In four years U.S. production has dropped by more than 2 million barrels per day. Imports

have almost doubled and are now approaching 9 million barrels per day. Next year our oil import bill will be $75 billion. On our present trends our oil import bill in the mid-'90s will be well over $100 billion—and we would be importing 10 to 11 million barrels a day (if it were available).

Energy policy has been drifting for a decade.

## Saddam must know the punishment that would be meted out if he crosses the Saudi frontier.

Indeed, we have had a de facto policy—of growing dependence on the Gulf and on OPEC. During the Reagan years, all that we had were panegyrics about "the magic of the marketplace." In principle, the Bush administration has taken a kinder and gentler attitude toward the concept of energy strategy than its predecessor, but we are now approaching the second anniversary of Mr. Bush's election, and we still have no concrete manifestation reflecting that change in attitude. Failure to act has its consequences. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait underscores the constraints that growing energy dependency has placed on our ability to act.

The nature of the international system in the post-Cold War world is now being shaped. Whether or not this nation can effectively provide leadership is being carefully studied and remains to be demonstrated. Given the vital stakes, and given our clear commitment under the Carter Doctrine, how we provide security for the Gulf and for Saudi Arabia will provide a critical test.

*The writer, a counsellor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, is a former defense secretary, energy secretary and director of the CIA.*

10/15/90

HAK: Helmut Schmidt's Memoir

A *Die Zeit* envelope arrived bearing Helmut Schmidt's calling card and a copy of the now released English version of his memoir, *Men and Powers*.

Although the book was not inscribed, you may wish to send him a personal note of thanks.

Rosemary

As Chancellor of West Germany from 1974 to 1982 Helmut Schmidt was in a unique position. A formidable statesman and important mediator between East and West, Chancellor Schmidt was a vital link in negotiations with all the leaders of the great superpowers at a time of turbulence and sweeping change, from Nixon to Reagan, from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiao Ping, from Leonid Brezhnev to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Since he left office, the world has awaited Chancellor Schmidt's personal report. In *Men and Powers* he finally presents his trenchant opinions. We are taken behind the closed doors of the Oval Office, the Kremlin and the Palace of Heavenly Peace to witness heated arms control debates, and an emotional Brezhnev relating war experiences. Whether at a casual luncheon or an official confrontation, Helmut Schmidt brings to bear all his insight, diplomacy and intelligence, in a gripping picture of world politics: *Men and Powers* provides the essential background to the momentous events now taking place in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and China.

Translated from the German
by Ruth Hein

HELMUT SCHMIDT

HELMUT SCHMIDT held the portfolios of defence minister and finance minister, before becoming the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1974. He lives near Hamburg.

[LC]

# Preface

This book contains recollections and analyses of my relations with the three superpowers: the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. It is not an attempt at an autobiography, since I have always had my suspicions of political narcissism. Of necessity such life stories tempt the author to present himself as flawless or at least to put himself in a better light than history's judgment will justify. Nevertheless I have always been fascinated by the memoirs of both politicians and artists; I find that they stimulate me to think, to critically review, to supplement or amend the opinions I had previously formed.

In the three major sections of this book I describe my personal impressions of the Russians, Americans, and Chinese, and in particular my encounters with their statesmen. I try to present their views, as well as my own, on the problems that concerned my country and myself and that in part continue to be relevant. Occasionally I cannot prevent a repetition or a second treatment of a topic, when the subject was of equal importance in, say, Washington and Moscow.

During the years I was a member of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, I took part in a fascinating kaleidoscope of human and political encounters: with heads of state, with government leaders and ministers, with artists and scientists, as well as with people

[10]

PREFACE

vi

who were never in the limelight. Much has been written about the isolation of leading politicians and statesmen, but that truism tells only half the truth. In reality my years in government were the source of many friendships, and even more frequently I was granted genuine partnerships.

At the present time profound and sometimes shocking changes are occurring in all three superpowers. They justify an effort to present and evaluate, from a German viewpoint, the epochs that came to an end—or are about to come to an end—in the 1980s in Moscow, Washington, and Beijing. Whether the changes within the three powers will also cause crucial changes in the world cannot be predicted. To me it is still unclear whether Mikhail Gorbachev will succeed in permanently altering the Soviet landscape.

As for George Bush, he will have to address, along with unresolved problems of foreign policy, those resulting from the United States' enormous foreign debt in particular. And it is not Japan, the economic giant, that will carry increasing weight in international politics but the People's Republic of China, which at present is fairly insignificant as far as the world economy is concerned—but whose future course cannot be plainly envisioned. Before we can judge opportunities for the future, we must be familiar with the factors that have determined the present; of course we can only guess whether and to what extent they will affect the future.

I do not claim to offer a history of the contemporary world as I lived it. Rather, I want to pass on some of what I believe I learned or came to understand in the conversations I held with people from other nations. I am not basing these pages on official documents or archives that have since been opened nor on the published works of the leaders I met with. I am not a historian. The dialogues and analyses described here are based on the notes I kept. They are meant to reflect not an objective view of history but the impressions I started out with or thought I should start out with, as well as the impressions and opinions I arrived at.

To deny my own subjectivity or to suppress my identity as a German and a Social Democrat would be unnatural. This is the personal report of a man who was born at the end of the First World War, who as a young man did not—thanks to his family upbringing—become a Nazi but who, being drafted during the Second World War, believed his patriotic obligations were overriding. This book reflects the insights and experiences of a man who, as a twenty-six-year-old prisoner of war, was guided by much older prisoners to become a Social Democrat and

[lc]

PREFACE

vii

who relatively late in his life—thanks to the Western allies, especially Great Britain and the United States—for the first time experienced democracy for himself.

I am more deeply marked by Kant's categorical imperative and Marcus Aurelius' *Meditations* than by Lassalle, Engels, or Marx; but the greatest influences on me were my older Social Democratic contemporaries and friends. The experienced mayors Max Brauer, Wilhelm Kaisen, Ernst Reuter, and Herbert Weichmann and the Bundestag Social Democratic delegation leaders Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid, and Herbert Wehner gave me my education in foreign affairs; and whatever I learned in the realm of economics I owe most of all to Heinrich Deist, Karl Klasen, Alex Möller, and Karl Schiller. I must add, however, that many men and women in industrial and union management, in the sciences, and in public relations, many civil servants and soldiers, as well as people in the other parliamentary parties—the CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), the CSU (Christian Socialist Union of Bavaria), and the FDP (Free Democratic Party)—have influenced my judgment and my actions.

Foreign models and examples also influenced me profoundly. I took my place on the international stage in the second half of the 1950s as a young and insignificant member of parliament—an Anglophile, as was Hamburg, the district that elected me. As the 1950s came to an end, I realized more and more clearly how closely the fate of Germany is entwined with that of the United States. In the 1960s I recognized German-French friendship as an essential precondition of European peace. Throughout the years keeping this peace has seemed to me the overriding political consideration.

During the first millennium of the Christian era the German people settled and flourished in the center of Europe. Unlike many of the other European peoples, Germans live neither on an island nor on a peninsula, nor have they been shielded by natural barriers; they exist in an open, flat land that is comparatively densely populated. We Germans have more foreign neighbors than any other people in Europe. Of all the world's nations, only Russia and China are surrounded by a similar number of countries; but Russia and China are huge. Germany, on the other hand, is small and, as a result of Hitler's totally controlled and totally lost war, is divided in two. Auschwitz and the Holocaust will long cast their shadow on our neighbors' minds—and on everything the younger Germans do.

I have always believed in each nation's right to self-determination. If ever in the course of the next century we Germans are to be reunited,

[Lc]

viii

PREFACE

such an event will not come about against our neighbor's will, nor
without his assurance that he can trust Germany to be a dependable,
constant, peaceful neighbor.

If Germans and Russians still have a long way to go before becoming
good, trusting neighbors, we alone are not to blame. Many European
nations, not only Germany, feel threatened by the Soviet occupation of
Eastern Europe, most especially the Eastern European nations. The
Soviet Union's expansionist strivings for security as well as its efforts
toward the international spread of Communist ideology have brought
about a feeling of insecurity and fear. This situation motivated Western
Europe and North America to join in the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. But many Russians feel equally threatened—without justifica-
tion, at least inasmuch as they see Germany as a potential source of
danger. Nevertheless I understand the Soviet Russians completely; they
lost twenty million people in Hitler's war. The people of the Soviet
Union want peace just as we do. Their Communist leaders share the
same desire.

Because of the latent threat of war, we Germans need alliances with
other democratically ruled nations, with the United States of America,
and with our Western European friends. At the same time, however,
we must make every effort to achieve friendly relations with the Soviets,
with the Poles, and with the other bordering nations in the eastern half
of the Continent. This twofold task is enormously difficult: Pursuing
it relentlessly occasionally triggers a mistrust of Germany—now by the
East, now by the West. This state of affairs will also be addressed in these
pages.

In the early 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany ceased to be a
political midget. Not only did our nation of sixty million people de-
velop one of the greatest, most efficient economies in the world, but
during the 1970s it also learned to play a political role commensurate
with its importance and its geographic and historical position. This was
no simple process. The leaders of many nations, even outside our imme-
diate geographic area, have helped us in our effort—and, in return, have
asked us for help.

In more than thirty years of parliamentary activity—thirteen years as
a member of the German government, more than eight years as chancel-
lor, and ever since—I have made every effort to contribute to an under-
standing among nations. The problem remains monumental and is
posed anew for each generation. Peace cannot be created once and for
all; it must be brought about over and over. I considered it my primary
duty to serve it in my generation. I know my counterparts beyond our

PREFACE

ix

borders felt much the same about their obligation. Nonetheless interna-
tional conflicts of interest, misunderstanding of one's own and others'
interests, and domestic pressures time and again have led to situations
of the utmost gravity. We must therefore remember to recognize the
interests, fears, and hopes of other nations and their governments.
Anyone who pictures others as enemies cannot bring about peace.
Anyone who refuses to sit down and talk with others and who will not
listen to them cannot understand them. This book is first of all the
result of conversations with the statesmen of the superpowers. I am
beholden to them.

Furthermore, I would like to express my thanks for suggestions and
corrections to those who helped me in revising the manuscript: Kurt
Becker, Willi Berkhan, Klaus Bölling, Gerd Bucerius, Jens Fischer,
Manfred Lahnstein, Ruth Loah, Hans Matthöfer, Lothar Rühl, Eugen
Selbmann, Manfred Schüler, Horst Schulmann, Walter Stützle, and my
wife. I did not accept every suggestion; the responsibility for errors,
lapses of memory, and opinions is mine alone.

I began the manuscript in 1984 and, because of other work, have
been able to finish it only now. I hope to have enough time left for
another book, in which I will present my impressions of dealing with
the European nations and their heads, especially France and Europe as
a whole.

HELMUT SCHMIDT

Hamburg, April 1987

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CONTENTS

<table><tbody><tr><td>On the Double Track of the TNF Resolution</td><td>188</td></tr><tr><td>Partial Success in the Middle East</td><td>193</td></tr><tr><td>Carter's Foreign Policy Collapses</td><td>202</td></tr><tr><td>Domestic Reasons for the United States' Lack of International Continuity</td><td>220</td></tr><tr><td>Changing Global Strategies</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>Television Democracy Reagan Style</td><td>241</td></tr><tr><td>The Temptation of <i>Economic Dominante</i></td><td>263</td></tr><tr><td>Helpful, Generous—and Ruthless</td><td>275</td></tr><tr><td>III China—The Third World Power</td><td>285</td></tr><tr><td>Mao Zedong</td><td>293</td></tr><tr><td>Interlude: Hua Guoteng</td><td>309</td></tr><tr><td>China's Strategic Position</td><td>317</td></tr><tr><td>From Revolution to Reform</td><td>324</td></tr><tr><td>From Agrarian Reform to Industrial Reform</td><td>330</td></tr><tr><td>Deng Xiaoping</td><td>340</td></tr><tr><td>Neighbors But Not Friends</td><td>351</td></tr><tr><td>Japan's Limited Role</td><td>354</td></tr><tr><td>IV Concluding Observations of a European</td><td>371</td></tr><tr><td><i>Index</i></td><td>389</td></tr></tbody></table>

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Presumably the Soviets had even more detailed profiles of my predecessor in office, Willy Brandt; his foreign minister, Walter Scheel; and his negotiator, Egon Bahr, who held the office of undersecretary of state. The fact that Scheel moved up to the office of president and Bahr became federal minister in my first cabinet may have appeared to the Russians as a sign of German continuity. Brandt's resignation may, however, have faced them with a political riddle, especially as the new foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was an almost unknown quantity.

One of the crucial factors in developing Bonn's *Ostpolitik* after 1969 was the parliamentary head of the SDP, Herbert Wehner. For thirteen years, working with his counterpart in the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Wolfgang Mischnick, and closely assisted by his colleague in the Foreign Office, my friend Eugen Selbman, he promoted the steady progress of German *Ostpolitik*. Wehner had a major influence especially on our policies toward Moscow and East Berlin; unfortunately neither Soviet nor German public opinion was able to recognize his full importance to this process.

Herbert Wehner was hugely talented in every area of politics. Jean Monnet, Henry Kissinger, later Erich Honecker, and many other observers of German politics understood as much. A former German Communist, he had suffered a great deal in Moscow after 1933, during the Stalin era. He had renounced his allegiance to Communism, and after 1945 he had become a Social Democrat and returned to Germany, where he was received with great confidence by the SPD's Kurt Schumacher. I first met him in 1949, when he was editor of the *Hamburger Echo*, and starting in 1953 I ran into him daily in the Bonn parliament. It was Wehner who in June 1960—after Fritz Erler, Carlo Schmid, himself, and others had planted the ideological seeds—once and for all anchored the foreign policy intentions of my party in the realities already established: NATO, European Community, Bundeswehr.

No fair-minded observer can doubt Wehner's inner ties to Western values, the values of democratic society and individual freedom—although a few domestic critics tried repeatedly to disparage his credibility. Wehner's temperament and his occasional bluntness did at times supply occasion for such criticism; the right wing especially mistrusted his steadfast support for accommodation with the Soviet Union and his unwavering commitment to steps in the direction of a reunification of all Germans. Konrad Adenauer treated him with respect; in spite of a few vehement confrontations, I loved the man. He seemed to me the guarantor of a vigorous synthesis of a social, democratic domestic policy and an *Ostpolitik* based on the close Western alliance. When in 1969 I

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38

his country's economic and technical achievements—for example, the
technology behind a Soviet-made quartz watch, which he gave to me.
(Unfortunately it worked for only a few days.)

The most important point of discussion for Brezhnev was the con-
tinuation of détente. The CSCE negotiations, he said, were taking too
long for his taste. He mentioned his discussions with Nixon on the
subject, and he expressed concern that the bureaucracies were inventing
ever new difficulties, both in the so-called confidence-building measures
and in the human rights portion of the Helsinki Accord. Apparently
many people were eager to use these tactics to prevent a conclusion to
the conference negotiations. I replied that the Federal Republic would
not contribute to such difficulties. As far as the confidence-building
measures were concerned, Bonn was absolutely ready to make contribu-
tions if all parties contributed proportionally. We had only one vital
interest—that the basic principle of the possibility of a peaceful change
in the borders would be given the same ranking as all the other princi-
ples.

On the whole I came away with the impression that Brezhnev had
invested considerable personal prestige in the CSCE negotiations as far
as his relations with his colleagues in the Politburo and the leaders of
the other Communist states in East Europe were concerned. I also felt
he wanted me to know this without his actually saying so. Perhaps
the wish for a balance with the so-called Brezhnev doctrine—that is, the
theory proclaimed after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to the
effect that none of the Socialist countries could rely on its national
sovereignty in questions affecting the common security of all Socialist
countries—played a role. This doctrine was a clear violation of the
principle of nonintervention enunciated in Article 2 of the United
Nations constitution.

A year later, in fact, all of Moscow's European allies took part in the
concluding CSCE session in Helsinki, holding the same rank by proto-
col as Moscow itself. But it was evident that for Brezhnev the CSCE
final conference was also to be a confirmation that the Soviet Union
held the same rank as the United States and that it was thus legitimized
in its predominant position in Europe.

Equal status as a world power also played an important though tacit
role in Brezhnev's presentation of the status of the SALT II delibera-
tions. Two days earlier Henry Kissinger had come to Moscow for this
purpose; Brezhnev reported with a trace of pride that his summary on
the status of the SALT II negotiations had been called a "very good
basis for a treaty" by Kissinger. Of course the question of removing

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American bombers and strategic missiles from the Federal Republic (by which he meant the fighter planes and intermediate-range rockets, which have a relatively short range) was still open. Brezhnev spoke of Nixon and Kissinger with evident respect—he seemed to regret Nixon's resignation—and referred with some satisfaction to SALT I and the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty. "The people of the United States are clever, they know what atomic war would mean. If anyone were to attack us first, or if the Soviet Union were ever to commit such foolishness, all Europeans would perish—perhaps something of Latin America might be left. That is why I refuse to let the thought of the viability of nuclear war arise in the first place!"

Brezhnev spoke with great animation; he was both convinced and convincing. I replied that in my opinion the political elite in none of the world's major states would deliberately accept a nuclear war, regardless of who headed the government in Washington or Moscow. The danger of nuclear war was not, I said, located in Washington or Moscow; but it could not be considered out of the question in small states, as long as there were terrorists willing to die for their cause. However, even threats were dangerous; that was why West Germany was supporting the nonproliferation treaty for SALT I and SALT II. It would be in our own interest and that of Europe for a long-range SALT II agreement to be concluded, extending beyond 1977.

Brezhnev threw in, "I'm certain of it." But in fact his meeting with Gerald Ford a few weeks later in Vladivostok did not lead to a breakthrough—in part because of the Soviet long-range Backfire bomber and the Soviet SS-20 rockets. Only in 1979, when Jimmy Carter was prepared to eliminate nuclear weapons with a Eurostrategic range (therefore including the Soviet SS-20), was SALT II enacted—much too late to advance détente.

I could not know this at the time; but I did see the Soviet nuclear arms pointed at Europe and the Federal Republic. I therefore steered the discussion to balance in Europe. To maintain it, I noted, American troops in Europe were necessary; but on the whole, fewer forces on both sides would surely be sufficient. The key to Europe's security was parity not only with Soviet troops but also with its missiles.

To the best of my knowledge this was the first time Bonn had pointed to the specific imbalance created by the large number of Soviet intermediate-range missiles aimed at European targets and the Federal Republic. I would have raised the threat posed by the Soviet Union's Eurostrategic weapons if only because Brezhnev had at one time mentioned that the Soviet Union was threatened by American missiles

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The question of the three agreements on scientific-technical collaboration, judicial aid, and cultural exchange, which were ready to be signed as early as 1973, during Willy Brandt's chancellorship, was not solved during my time in office. The solution failed because of a lack of flexibility in the two foreign ministries in applying the Four Power Agreement on Berlin.

Domestic conditions kept both Brezhnev and myself from risking an attempt at a political agreement; both in the Politburo and in the Bundestag there were mistrustful champions of each side's doctrine of purity; Argus-eyed, now engaging in subtle hairsplitting, now using the crude weapon of polemical accusation, they saw to it that every compromise proposed became impossible. In 1977 I became convinced it would be best to put the matter on ice for a few years; in the meantime practice would teach us how to circumvent the legal traps even without an agreement.

Although on one occasion I clashed vehemently with him, I always felt great respect for Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister. He was a tireless, persevering advocate of his country's interests as they were defined by whatever leadership was in power. Henry Kissinger is supposed to have said about him that his eyes were alert and melancholy, like those of a hunting dog who must put up with his master's inscrutable moods but who in the end imposes his own will on his master. If this quotation is correct, it is true of many a foreign minister of many a country at many times. What is true in any case is that Gromyko had to go along with many changes of course as well as the changing moods of the Soviet heads of state. Khrushchev openly made fun of him as an apparatchik who would carry out any order, and, as I myself had occasion to witness in 1974, Brezhnev could treat his foreign minister with great anger and without a trace of politeness. But presumably it is equally true that in the last part of his period as foreign minister Gromyko became an increasingly serious factor in determining Soviet foreign policy.

Gromyko was born in 1909. At thirty-four he was ambassador to Washington, at thirty-six permanent representative of his country in the United Nations Security Council. At forty-five he was named foreign minister, a post he held from early 1957 to 1985, almost thirty years, after which he became the formal head of state. The last twelve years he was also a member of the Politburo, thus belonging to the decision-making center of the state. But even earlier he spoke on many foreign policy questions in the Politburo; the premier might have been his superior in a formal sense, but hardly in fact.

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far the most intelligent, most energetic, and most modern leader the
Soviet Union has had for years; but if he should fail because his reforms
do not succeed or because they make excessive demands on his party
functionaries, the probable result will not be a return to the phlegmatic
callousness of the Brezhnev era but more likely a deep relapse into
tyranny by the secret police, into a centrally administered command
economy, and internationally into dictatorship over the client states of
the Warsaw Pact. For a long time to come there would be no thought
of human rights, much less of "democratization."

If some well-to-do person lives next door to a very poor and oppressed
but sometimes inconsiderate family, who look on him with suspicion
or even envy, he has a personal interest in wishing these neighbors
progress and improvement in their living conditions; he may even
decide to help out in this regard. Such is the situation of Germans in
the Federal Republic; we have a high living standard, as opposed to our
neighbor, the Soviet Union, whose tanks and fighter planes are sta-
tioned only minutes from our soil. It is therefore only natural that most
Germans hope that Gorbachev's reforms will be successful. They sus-
pect the new man will be just as unable to overturn the historically
evolved forms of the state and society as Peter the Great was three
hundred years ago, but in their own interest they wish him as much
success as was granted that first great Russian reformer.

All the nations of Western Europe will arrive at this insight. The
clever Chinese must surely feel the same, since they, like the Germans,
live next door to the Soviet Union. Many Americans find it harder to
make up their minds. Some, quite simply, are reluctant to give up their
ideological image of the enemy. Others, like Henry Kissinger, point out
that a Soviet Union that is successful in its reforms and economically
improved will be a more significant power factor in the world than
before. This prognosis may well be accurate; nevertheless, the general
wisdom that a satisfied neighbor is more pleasant than a hungry one
remains true. Whether or not the Soviet Union will subsequently return
to an overall expansionist strategy cannot be predicted. That is why
caution on the part of the West remains advisable: maintaining deter-
rent parity as the basis of Western security and on this foundation
building a many-sided collaboration with the Soviet Union with a view
to its economic, technical, scientific and, simply, civilizing inclusion in
the international scheme.

When I spoke with Gromyko in March 1987, he said, "We are
convinced of the future success of our policy; but it requires a peaceful
domestic and foreign policy."

I offered him my best wishes. "Your success is in everyone's best

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dream of such a thing in Germany; in fact the motorization of the masses did not achieve a similar extent until the 1970s.

They must have read my astonishment on my face. In any case the following day my uncle made me a tempting offer: "Stay here. We'll find you a job in the foundry. We even have an empty house for you. All you have to do is ask Loki and Susanne to follow." There it was again, the heart-warming American spontaneity and a generosity so great as to bowl you over. We could not make up our mind to leave Germany, although at the time we kept a fairly miserable home with four families in a four-room apartment. But we maintained the friendship with my relatives, with whom I share merely a great-grandfather, and with their children.

More American friendships accrued during the 1950s, especially after I was elected to the Bundestag in 1953. At that time I first came to know Henry Kissinger, who was working on strategy as a young associate professor at Harvard; later our acquaintance turned into a firm friendship. In those years I also met Robert Bowie, who later, under Kennedy, headed the planning staff in the State Department; I also met Herman Kahn, Donald Brennan, William Kaufmann, Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Robert Osgood, and Roger Hilsman. I came to understand the role played by Albert Einstein, and I grasped the tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer. In particular I learned about the role of Congress, which differs so thoroughly from that of both the Bundestag and the British House of Commons.

During my travels through the United States I saw for myself the calm, relaxed authority that emanated from President Dwight David Eisenhower. He had ended the Korean conflict and brought the American troops home. In June 1953 he had not intervened in the uprising in East Germany, and he had held back during the disturbances in Hungary as well. He respected the Soviet zone of influence in Europe that existed de facto though it was not specified by treaty. He did not, however, allow Moscow to take precedence over the United States. I trusted him and his balanced foreign policy.

At that time the Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield (whom I met again twenty-five years later, when he was the American ambassador to Tokyo) wanted to bring home the American troops stationed in Europe. Wilhelm Mellies, deputy head of the SPD under Erich Ollenhauer until 1958, and I were among the many who tried in vain in the 1950s to persuade Mansfield that withdrawal would be an error in strategy. I thought Mansfield's idea, which had become an obsession with him, was dangerous because it would of necessity lead to a huge

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1960s, when I made frequent trips to the United States as a Hamburg senator and as chairman of the SDP parliamentary group. This was both during his term as secretary of defense and later, when he headed the World Bank. He always insisted on thinking through all possible strategies, and he exercised the utmost intellectual stringency. As secretary of defense he drew the consequences of the approaching stalemate between Washington and Moscow as early as 1962 and freed the United States from the nuclear strategy of massive retaliation that had been official policy until then.

Even more than his share in the responsibility for the Vietnam War, the Cuban missile crisis has since shaped McNamara's thinking and given him a strong ethical orientation beyond his strategic and economic competence. Once, late in the 1960s, we were talking about Vietnam and Nixon's and Kissinger's efforts to end the war; I asked him why the preceding administration had not made the same attempts. His answer took me by surprise: "Bobby could have done it." But Robert Kennedy had fallen out with Johnson a long time before and left his administration, and in 1968 he too had been assassinated. After John F. Kennedy's death McNamara thought very highly of the equally charismatic younger brother. On the other hand, he held it against Johnson that he had not made any serious effort to end the Vietnam War; this was also the reason he had resigned as secretary of defense in late 1967.

McNamara saw his work at the head of the World Bank as more than a complex multinational chore; it was a moral mission, and he brought all his skills to it. McNamara was the first politician who understood the primary significance of developing agriculture in the developing countries and who explained to them that they were able to feed themselves. He was especially convincing because of his unconditional personal support of the people of the underdeveloped nations. Therefore McNamara, who had not been raised to be a member of the Democratic Party, became for me a symbol of that social idealism that had always marked large segments of the Democratic Party on the East Coast since Roosevelt's New Deal.

It is easy for a German Social Democrat to reject the traditional conservatism of the Southern Democrats but otherwise to feel drawn to the Democratic Party and the labor movement. I felt the same way until, as chancellor, I had to face foreign statesmen and negotiate with them. Then I began to understand: Though affinities on the basis of party membership can be useful at times in foreign affairs, what really matters are the judgment and discernment of one's counterpart in any encounter, his ability to get any given policy enacted at home, his

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launched into a second speech, lasting about three quarters of an hour, completely off the cuff (I was sitting next to him and could see that he was not speaking from notes). The most important man in the Western alliance conjured up in front of our eyes an improvised but nonetheless persuasive picture of the world. He analyzed conditions in Vietnam, the role of the People's Republic of China and its growing significance, the situation of the Soviet Union and the necessity of cooperation with it, especially in order to arrive at a limitation of strategic arms (later called SALT). Nixon spoke about the Middle East and its problems. In particular, he went into detail on the overall strategy of NATO. In effect he did not deviate from the two important plans NATO had adopted in December 1967: on the one hand the Harmel Report and its two-step strategy of combining military security with political détente and on the other the military strategy of flexible response.

I was certainly not the only one to feel instant respect for Nixon's competence. Back in Bonn, I went to see Willy Brandt. He was getting ready for his first visit to Washington as chancellor, and I advised him to take his preparations very seriously so as to be able to represent our German interests and intentions in the general context of Western strategy when he was speaking with Nixon. The American president, I told him, knew his business; in any case he understood a great deal more about strategy in dealing with the Soviets than Johnson, who had disappointed Brandt so badly in Berlin.

Looking back from the perspective of the 1980s, I still cannot understand Nixon's behavior in the Watergate affair and the scandal of the tapes, but I empathize with the reaction of the American public and the Congress all the more. On the other hand, Nixon's foreign policy and defense ideas can stand comparison with those of his predecessors and successors very well. There is more: Nixon's opening to China; the retreat of the United States from Vietnam, which he struggled for and finally achieved—though not without circuitous means and delays; his strategy of balance with the Soviet Union, outstandingly marked by the ABM treaty and SALT I; his understanding of the interests of his European allies; his judgment and capacity to act in international affairs—all of which clearly distinguish Nixon from Johnson, Carter, and Reagan.

Of course his advisers and cabinet officers played a part in his foreign policy practices, *Henry Kissinger* above all. But it is doing Nixon an injustice to think it permissible to interpret him as the executive instrument, as it were, of *Kissinger's* ideas. In the case of the opening to China, reversing a policy that had been chiseled in stone with unusual

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obstinacy for twenty years, it is obvious that Nixon planned it before placing Kissinger—who was brought to him by Nelson Rockefeller—on his staff.

In 1986, twelve years after Nixon's resignation, he and I had a personal exchange of views. We met at his office, located in a New York high-rise and decorated with many historical photographs. The outward occasion was a television interview; Nixon loyally supported President Reagan's position even while he managed to stress his own differing opinion. He seemed more self-assured than I had expected him to be, grandly ignoring the past. His overview of the current world situation was stupendous; he had mastered the important details—an aspect that was even more glaringly evident in private conversation than in front of the rolling cameras. I was impressed and felt confirmed in my judgment that the Western world had lost a significant strategist in Richard M. Nixon—through his own fault.

During the early years of the Nixon administration my immediate counterpart in Washington was Melvin Laird. Right from the start we had a cordial relationship, which continues to this day. At that time Laird was, of course, preoccupied mainly by the Vietnam War. It was his job to promote the "Vietnamization" of the war, an objective Nixon adopted in early 1970, so that American troops could gradually be withdrawn from Vietnam. Because he had served in Congress a long time, Laird was an experienced politician. He suffered from resistance to the war, which was rapidly growing among the youth of America, and he wanted to free his country from this burden.

I followed the step-by-step American troop withdrawals with inner empathy, almost in a state of suspense. But the announcement in the fall of 1972 that universal compulsory military service was being abolished worried me. Laird explained that, given the troop withdrawals, the United States no longer needed so many soldiers, and there were no other projects in which he could use them. It seemed to me, however, that the compelling motive was to calm public opinion in the United States. I feared that in Germany—and in my own party—voices might be heard to demand that we should follow the example of our principal ally, place the Bundeswehr on a voluntary basis, and also abolish the draft. There were already ideas about a short "militia" term.

I was annoyed by all this for two reasons. One centered on memories of the Weimar attempt at democracy, which had failed in part because the Versailles Treaty had forbidden universal compulsory military service and the Reichswehr could therefore not be anchored in the new democracy but developed into a "state within the state." Therefore I saw

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Western Europe in the early 1970s. This feeling was connected not only with the Vietnam War and Nixon's and Kissinger's intense concentration on ending it but also with the SALT negotiations. These bilateral verbal encounters between Washington and Moscow, which largely excluded the European allies, found their resolution in May 1972 in the SALT agreement on limiting the number of strategic missiles and the ABM treaty on limiting antimissile weapons. Furthermore, this sense of insecurity was connected with the catastrophic developments in the international currency system together with the American attitude of "benign neglect" on this subject, announced on August 15, 1971, by Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally.

In April 1973, five months before he was named secretary of state, Henry Kissinger proclaimed the "year of Europe." In Europe this de-clamatory act—which, by the way, had no practical consequences—aroused only disbelieving astonishment, mixed with mockery.

In the meantime, however, the uneasiness and finally the shock of Watergate had reached Europe. People both in the United States and in Europe first began to withdraw some of their confidence in Nixon when his troops marched into Kampuchea in 1970. Beginning in 1969, the mistrust aroused in Europe by the overtly exclusive SALT negotia-tions was understandable; but we felt that there was no justification for the Nixon administration's initial mistrust and obstruction of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, especially the August 1970 treaty with Moscow.

Washington's skepticism was almost entirely washed away in Septem-ber 1971, with the Four Power Agreement (which paved the way for the friendship agreement with the German Democratic Republic of late 1972). Both SALT and *Ostpolitik* followed the guidelines laid down in the Harmel resolution of 1967 for an overall strategy by the Western alliance toward the Soviet Union—an alliance Nixon endorsed at the time he took office. But one thorn remained: Nixon had no personal ties of friendship to any of his European colleagues—possibly with the sole exception of de Gaulle; Nixon never made any secret of his admira-tion for the president of France. For most Europeans, Nixon remained a mysterious figure for his entire term in office.

During the Nixon years I kept in close touch with Henry Kissinger, who was Nixon's security adviser until the middle of 1973 and served as secretary of state until the end of 1976. My reason was not only that we had known each other for a long time; close exchanges were abso-lutely essential if we were to recognize and understand what changes in American policy were setting in or were already in place. Nixon's com-plicated nature, imbued with suspicion of his own administration, had

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mously. We spent several wonderful days together; Obie Shultz (the nickname is probably a variant on her maiden name, O'Brien) is a considerate hostess. We talked about everything under the sun. In the evenings we were generally joined by friends or other guests; Henry Kissinger and Harry Lee Kuan Yew, the prime minister of Singapore, also came to stay for one or two nights. In short, it was a restful meeting of old friends. Every night Shultz and I used to sit and relax in his hot tub in the garden. He asked a lot of questions, which I answered the same way as had always been our custom: candidly, without regard to tactical considerations and prestige. I gave him only one piece of advice: "George, don't forget one thing: Your president cannot afford to name three secretaries of state in one term. You are therefore in a very strong position should there be a difference of opinion on some important problem." My friend merely smiled—and we gazed at the stars in the clear summer sky of the Bay area.

In July 1982 the oil price explosion of 1973-1974 was already almost a decade in the past, but the effects of the oil price explosion of 1979-1980 could still be felt everywhere. When we shifted to an international system of floating exchange rates in March 1973, we had not foreseen these explosions. But in the spring of 1973 we had in any case agreed that developments in the area of monetary and currency policy would have a considerable effect on both international trade policies and the world's energy supply and that therefore they must be considered questions of international politics. In 1973 Shultz and I agreed to raise these questions at future international conferences "under the aspect of their paramount significance for foreign policy." In March 1973 Shultz proposed expressing himself publicly to the effect that general floating of exchange rates was merely a temporary, passing arrangement; the participants were assuming an eventual return to pegged parities. However, the construction of a new international currency system based on pegged but flexible parities presupposed the foreign currency markets' settling into new parity levels beforehand. We also reached an agreement concerning our further way of proceeding: During 1973 and 1974 we intended the development of the new international monetary order to be within the scope of the International Monetary Fund and its member bodies.

But in reality, as a result of the Yom Kippur War, the Arabic leadership of the OPEC cartel, which had not been very successful until then, drastically reduced the amounts of oil it offered for sale in order to force the West to change its policies in the Middle East. Subsequently oil

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