DECLARATION OF ATLANTIC UNITY

180 EAST 52nd STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022 • PLAZA 8-0215

UNITED STATES SPONSORS: William H. Draper, Jr., Thomas K. Finletter, Lithgow Osborne, Adolph W. Schmidt, Hans Christian Sønne

DIRECTOR: Walden Moore ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR: Livingston Hartley

November 19, 1968

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
810 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Mr. Nixon:

I feel sure that all 325 of your fellow signers of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity (listed on the back of this letterhead) would want to join me in sending you warm congratulations on your election as President of the United States. This certainly includes Vice-President Humphrey.

Since we came into being in 1954 we have had as signers former President Harry Truman and Presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, but you are the first of our signers to be elected President of the United States.

It has been a real pleasure to make known to our signers - in this and allied countries your excellent record on Atlantic Unity as a Congressman, Senator, Vice-President, Candidate and private citizen, and we all look forward to the great opportunity for leadership that will be yours after January 20th.

Since 1954 the Declaration has from time to time suggested Atlantic policies to successive Presidents and to their advisors. We shall continue this practice under your Administration but with more hope since we will be contacting "one of our own".

As our signer General George Marshall wrote in 1954:

"All probably agree to the vital importance of Atlantic Unity but few act. This Declaration today is all important and the period fateful."

As you yourself wrote me on March 1, 1966:

"I think that both as individuals and as sponsors of DAU, we should make every effort to influence the President of the United States to address

SIGNERS OF THE SECOND DECLARATION LISTED ON REVERSE SIDE

December 9, 1968

The Honorable William W. Scranton
706 Northeastern National Bank Building
Scranton
Pa.

Dear Bill:

I have carefully followed the press reports on your
current visit to the Middle East and admired the tact and
good judgment of what you have said to reporters.

While my knowledge of that area is limited, I do share
with some better informed people the concern that there may
lie the greatest danger of a Soviet-American confrontation
leading to World War III. I am, therefore, happy that the
President-elect chose West Europe and the Middle East as the
two priority areas for your important missions.

I enclose copies of two letters to "The New York Times"
that appeared during your absence. Each of them has a proposal
that seems to me to have merit, but that is something on which
your judgment will be far better than mine.

One of the things that reassures me about the orientation
of the President-elect on foreign affairs is that all three
advisers he has chosen to date - you, Bob Murphy and Henry
Kissinger - are leading signers of the Declaration of Atlantic
Unity.

With all best wishes, I am,

Faithfully yours,

Walden Moore
Director

Bace.

DR. Leaph:kap

New York, N. Y. 10055
120 East 22nd Street
X Declaration of Atlantic Unity
Director X
Mr. Walden Moore X

Helmut Sonnenfeldt

Sincerely,

latest developments in your field.

Thank you for your efforts to keep us abreast of the

informative talk with your associate, Mr. Hartley.

letter of February 19, I have had a pleasant and
in the meantime, as you know from Dr. Klaasen's,

personally.

have not permitted him to acknowledge these letters
regrets that the preparations for the President's trip
their interesting and useful enclosures. He very much
received your letters of February 3, 2, and 12 with
Dr. Klaasen asked me to let you know that we have
shortly before leaving for Europe with the President.

Dear Mr. Moore:

February 24, 1969

KISSINGER, HENRY V.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1969

MEMO FOR DICK MOOSE

THROUGH: Carol Farrar

Attached items of correspondence sent to us for preparation of draft replies refer to the enclosure of an "important document" and to "attachments." These, however, were not forwarded from your office.

This is a very influential organization--I am told that they tend to circulate correspondence among their membership. As the enclosures are required for formulating a thoughtful reply, would you please check whether you have them or whether the Declaration of Atlantic Unity people forgot to send them.

UNA-USA NATIONAL POLICY PANEL

TOWARD the RECONCILIATION of EUROPE
New Approaches for the U.S., the UN, and NATO

THEODORE C. SORENSEN, Chairman
Partner
Paul, Weiss, Goldberg, Rifkind, Wharton
and Garrison

PETER G. PETERSON, Vice-Chairman
Chairman of the Board
Bell and Howell Company

WALKER L. CISLER
Chairman of the Board
The Detroit Edison Company

PHILIP M. KLUTZNICK
Senior Partner
Urban Investment and Development Company

OSCAR A. de LIMA
Chairman of the Board
Roger Smith Hotels, Incorporated

COL. LAURENCE J. LEGERE
Research Analyst
Institute for Defense Analyses

THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Partner
Coudert Brothers

JOHN J. McCLOY
Partner
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy

RICHARD N. GARDNER
Henry L. Moses Professor of Law
and International Organization
Columbia University

JAMES S. McDONNELL
Chairman of the Board
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation

ERNEST A. GROSS
Partner
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt and Mosle

G. WILLIAM MILLER
President
Textron, Incorporated

EDWIN HUDDLESON, JR.
Partner
Cooley, Crowley, Gaither, Godward,
Castro and Huddleson

EMANUEL R. PIORE
Vice President and Chief Scientist
International Business Machines Corporation

JAMES N. HYDE
Lawyer
Consultant to Rockefeller Brothers Fund

THOMAS C. SCHELLING
Professor of Economics
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

JOSEPH D. KEENAN
International Secretary
International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers

GEN. CORTLAND V. R. SCHUYLER
Commissioner of General Services
Executive Department
State of New York

HENRY A. KISSINGER*
Professor of Government
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Director, Russian Institute
Columbia University

ROBERT KLEIMAN
Editorial Board of The New York Times

JOSEPH E. SLATER
President
Salk Institute for Biological Studies

MRS. ROBERT J. STUART
Formerly, President
League of Women Voters of the U.S.A.

STAFF: MAJ. GEN. H. A. GERHARDT (Ret.)
Project Director

DAVID LENEFSKY
Assistant Project Director

Affiliation indicated for purpose of indication only.

*Dr. Kissinger served as a member of the Panel until his selection by the President-Elect as his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. He did not participate in the drafting of the final report.

CONTENTS

<table><tr><td>Preface</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>I. The New Setting: After Czechoslovakia</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>II. Recent Assumptions in European Policy</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>III. New Measures for Strengthening the Unity of the West</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>The Character and Quality of Consultation in the Alliance</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>The North Atlantic Alliance</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>A Greater European Role in NATO</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Atlantic Financial and Trade Policy: A New "Nixon Round"</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Common Approaches to Common Problems</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>IV. Multilateral Initiatives in the East-West Area</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>The Search for East-West Common Interests through the United Nations</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>East-West Trade</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>V. Initiatives for a Settlement of the German Question</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>A Proposal</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>VI. The United States, the Soviet Union and Europe</td><td>32</td></tr><tr><td>Memoranda of Comment, Reservation and Dissent</td><td>34</td></tr></table>

PREFACE

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG Chairman of the Board,
United Nations Association
of the United States of America

This National Policy Panel has taken a fresh look at what is probably the most important and complex set of foreign policy problems facing the new Administration. This consideration of the new measures required for strengthening cohesion among the countries of the North Atlantic and for moving toward settlement of issues that have kept Europe and Germany divided since World War II could not come at a more opportune time. This is particularly true in view of the high priority given these matters by President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers.

Although the Panel began its work about a year ago, the invasion of Czechoslovakia reinforced the urgency of its re-examination of the premises behind United States policy toward Europe, both Eastern and Western. In my view, the Panel has produced recommendations that merit earnest consideration by top policy makers, both here and abroad.

Important recommendations are advanced on the political and security issues facing the United States and its Atlantic allies in NATO.

New cooperative financial arrangements for the Atlantic countries are suggested.

Urban and technological questions which would benefit from common action have been explored.

Finally — and most important — a significant new approach has been set forth for moving toward an all-European settlement which would satisfy the legitimate security interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and European states, both East and West.

Too little progress has been made during the past two decades in resolving the German question and in establishing stable relationships between the other countries of Western and Eastern Europe. Too little thought has been given as to how the United Nations might be helpful for advancing the common interests of the East and West in Central Europe. This Panel has made valuable contributions toward reducing those long-standing deficiencies.

UNA-USA is most grateful to all of the Panel members for the

4

enthusiasm and commitment with which they performed their work. The Panel members, outstanding leaders in government and in the fields of business, labor and science, have striven to serve the public well in their consideration of this complex subject. In particular, UNA-USA expresses its special appreciation to Theodore C. Sorensen and Peter G. Peterson, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman, who expertly directed the discussion and work of the Panel.

UNA-USA also wishes to express its appreciation to The Ford Foundation for the grant which made possible the work of the Panel.

The Policy Studies Program established with the help of The Ford Foundation is now entering its third year. This program seeks to bring together experienced citizens and scholars to give extended study and consideration and to make recommendations for United States policy on major issues facing our country in the United Nations and in other international organizations.

The UNA-USA Policy Studies Committee, a standing committee of the Board of Directors, takes responsibility for deciding on general issues to be considered, for determining the method most likely to be effective in examining the subject, and for selecting a panel of competence and objectivity. When it decides to establish a National Policy Panel to consider a specific subject, responsibility for the report of the Panel is taken solely by its members. Under these procedures, neither the Board of Directors nor the Policy Studies Committee, nor any officer is asked to endorse panel reports.

The first National Policy Panel established by UNA-USA, chaired by Mr. Robert V. Roosa, a partner in Brown Brothers Harriman and Company and former Under-Secretary of the Treasury, has published two reports on "China, the United Nations and United States Policy". Mr. Frederick S. Beebe, Chairman of the Board of Newsweek, Inc. and the Washington Post Co., was Panel Vice-Chairman.

The second National Policy Panel on "Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons" under the chairmanship of Mr. Burke Marshall, former Assistant Attorney General and now a member of the Management Committee of International Business Machines Corporation, has produced a report which considered how to make the Non-Proliferation Treaty acceptable and durable. Mr. John G. Palfrey, former U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner, served as Vice-Chairman.

Three other Panels are now at work.

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# I. THE NEW SETTING: AFTER CZECHOSLOVAKIA

During the first few years after World War II, relationships between the United States and Europe were directed single-mindedly toward the containment of Soviet power.

The Truman Doctrine and the initiation of the Marshall Plan in 1947, the creation of NATO two years later, and the beginnings of West European supra-national institutions at the turn into the 1950s all proceeded from U.S. leadership, at U.S. urging, or, at the least, with strong U.S. encouragement. The nations of Western Europe were quite literally dependent on the United States not only for their economic recovery but for their very security from the then sharply perceived danger of Soviet military aggression against their territory.

By the late 1950s and increasingly during the 1960s, the sense of common danger which had brought the Atlantic Alliance into being and nurtured it thereafter had begun to erode. The recovery of Western European economies and the growing disbelief in the likelihood of a Soviet attack had permitted if not fostered a resurgence of diverse national interests. Although significant economic integration was taking place in the Common Market, this new trend toward national concerns — and a new turning inward in response to the need for domestic social, institutional and political change — were causing reassessments of the earlier belief that the geographical proximity and economic self-interest of Western European nations would inevitably bring about their regional political unification.

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No real progress had been made in resolving the German question — adding a perturbing sense of frustration.

While the countries of Western Europe were struggling with problems of political fragmentation, a similar process was at work in Eastern Europe. New relaxations of East-West tensions, new ferment among youth and intellectuals, and new pressure for economic and political modernization, were all spurring a search for national identity and propelling these countries toward a more independent set of worldwide relationships. Yugoslavia had already broken many of its ties with the East. Poland and Hungary had undergone limited internal reform. Romania, while keeping a tight rein on internal change, had begun to develop her own foreign policy. A new pragmatism — a new desire to be done with irrelevant dogma — was astir in Eastern Europe.

It was perhaps inevitable, in the light of these developments, that differing convictions should emerge concerning the relationship between the United States and Europe.

Some leaders on both sides of the Atlantic talked of the need for the creation of an "Atlantic Community." Others believed it more realistic for the Western Europeans to establish their own "Third Force" — which could play a genuinely independent role and perhaps make more likely the reunification of Germany. Still others believed the goal should be a stronger Western Europe, economically and politically unified, and in partnership with the United States. The latter has been the view which over the past few years has most often characterized United States policy. It was a view weakened but by no means destroyed by de Gaulle's foreign policy. The failure, however, of both the Europeans and ourselves to agree on clearer goals for our relationships, in the light of rapidly changing circumstances in both Eastern and Western Europe, had led to major ambiguities in U.S.-European relationships.

For several years prior to 1968 it was becoming clear that the predominant role which the United States necessarily assumed after World War II for the security and economic recovery of non-communist Europe was regarded by the Europeans themselves with increasing annoyance. The very security and prosperity achieved by Europe, coupled with mounting misgivings over certain aspects of U.S. domestic and international policy, had bred divergencies with Washington that threatened the Alliance itself.

Deep involvement in the Vietnam War limited the attention the

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United States could pay to the Western alliance and confused its European partners about their place in U.S. world-wide priorities. Lack of visible high level U.S. concern for European problems, congressional and administration suggestions for American troop reductions in Europe, the pressure arising from the adverse balance of payments, and increased Soviet naval strength in the Mediterranean had all added to the profound sense of unease in Western Europe. Yet at the very time that Western Europe has been uncertain about American priorities, queries about new initiatives which the United States could take were often met with the suggestion that any new U.S. moves should wait until *after* Vietnam, or *after* de Gaulle, or *after* the U.S. presidential elections, or *after* the entry of the United Kingdom into the Common Market.

There was, therefore, even before the events of last August, a major need for the United States to re-examine its policy toward Europe, both Eastern and Western, and to consider afresh Europe's place in our global strategy. Similarly, the feeling was emerging in Western Europe that the European members of the Alliance should develop their own more definitive view of their future — and of what their relationship should be to the United States.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia cut across what many had assumed would continue to be an orderly course of bilateral bridge-building between Western and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union's action indicated the limitations which it would, at least in the near term, place on liberalization in the East and on the Western outreach of individual members of the "socialist commonwealth" in Central Europe. The Soviet Union evidently believed it was forced by the situation in Czechoslovakia to take military action to strengthen its bloc structure. But the resulting invasion forced the West, and especially the members of NATO, to reassess their priorities.

The Panel believes the fresh look that is required must be both at Europe and at Europe's place in the global context. The tide of rising expectations in the "have not" areas calls in the future for far greater cooperation and coordination in the effective transfer of resources. But modern technology and communications, and a vast increase in public education at all levels, have helped generate a newly risen tide of expectation as well as increased pressure on the use of resources

9

in the industrialized areas — including those of Western and Eastern Europe.

Young people in particular, both East and West, are restless with the dogmas of the past, distrustful of existing institutional and political structures, assertively anti-establishment, and intent on reform. They find many of our political instruments remote and unappealing. They see national insecurity resulting from competition in nuclear weapons. They see waste in human resources and the steady pollution of our environment. They find too little international effort directed to common approaches to common problems. The disparity between resources being expended on "military security" and on "people" is under challenge.

While historians will differ as to whether the United States is suffering from an "arrogance of power", it is clear that we cannot afford to assume that what is good for the United States, technologically and politically, is necessarily good for the rest of the world.

In this setting, the U.S. must be more alert than in the past to the sensitivities and traditions of our partners in the Alliance; and our European allies, on their part, must not falter in assuming the responsibilities which are rightfully theirs. We can both share in a promising future, if we both have the courage and vision to give it effect.

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## II. RECENT ASSUMPTIONS IN EUROPEAN POLICY

U.S. policy in Europe since World War II has been based on three premises:

(A) The first premise has been that Western European economic integration would in time lead to substantially greater political unity, and that the resulting Western European economic and political unity and independence would be in the interest of the United States.

Thus, following the massive infusion of United States economic assistance through the Marshall Plan and the development of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Treaty of Rome and the Common Market moved successfully to implement the Monnet dream of eliminating trade and tariff barriers, gradually coalescing the six separate national economies, and binding France and West Germany more deeply in common economic enterprise — hoping in the process to build the foundation for political unity.

The economic and financial aspects of the integration envisioned by Jean Monnet and other great "Europeans" were outstandingly successful. On July 1, 1968, eighteen months ahead of the Common Market treaty schedule, all tariffs, quotas and other barriers to trade among its six members were eliminated and a uniform tariff schedule established on imports from the rest of the world.

But handicapped by the fact that many Western European countries had important interests outside the Common Market area, handicapped by a resurgent nationalism — especially in Gaullist France —

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and handicapped by the exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, a variety of moves for creating a truly effective political unity all fell far short of the projected goal.

(B) The second premise of this nation's European policy has been that a readiness for immediate and overwhelming military response to a Soviet attack was fundamental to the security of Western Europe — and essential if the stage was to be set for an ultimate settlement in Central Europe.

While several NATO partners, notably France, have slacked off in recent years from the fulfillment of their Alliance obligations, the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia has charged NATO with a new sense of urgency, virtually assuring that its 20th anniversary in April will be characterized by a new sense of mission. National drop-outs are unlikely in 1969. If the threat of Soviet attack is considered less serious in Europe today, this is principally because the military effectiveness of NATO provided it with the opportunity for economic and political revival — and because military effectiveness and economic and political revival have convinced the Soviet leaders that military adventure into the West would indeed invite disaster.

(C) There is a third principal assumption which has in general characterized United States policy in recent years. The assumption has appeared in various forms. It is that the developing web of bilateral relationships between West and East Germany, between the other countries of Western and Eastern Europe, and between the United States and the Soviet Union, supplemented with increasing relationships through the larger multilateral institutions, could and probably would proceed in an ordered manner to increased detente, a liberalization in Eastern Europe, and perhaps within a foreseeable time-frame, to a drawing together of the two parts of Europe in a context permitting the reunification of Germany. In a more extreme form the assumption has been that the Soviets would accept a weaning away of Eastern European countries if the process were gradual enough.

It is now clear that in the future there will be strict limitations on liberalization in Eastern Europe, and that if there is to be a straight line to detente, it will be a line which for Warsaw Pact countries in Central Europe will be determined largely not in their capitals but in Moscow. It would be prudent for the West to assume that the Soviet power that reacted brutally to the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and sharply to Czech

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developments in 1968, is fully available to defend conservative Soviet-style socialism in Eastern Germany until some quite new and satisfactory agreement is reached on the future of Germany and on a new Central European security system.

This does not mean that the trend toward economic pragmatism in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union itself will not continue; nor that the assault by intellectuals, youth and the new managerial class on established but irrelevant dogmas will not continue. It may in fact mean that the tension between liberalization and raw military power in Eastern Europe will continue at a high level — or even increase, if the Eastern states fail to respond to the new "responsibilities" of membership in the Socialist Commonwealth.

It may also mean, however, that the Soviet Union, deeply aware of its own dilemmas with its allies in Eastern Europe, will conclude that its own best interests would be served by a new effort to resolve the German question. If that question is not resolved it could some day plunge Europe again into bloody conflict.

(D) There is an additional assumption, perhaps not a premise, which has characterized much of recent U.S. policy.

It is that the European status quo is reasonably satisfactory and that Europe can safely be left to evolve on its own timetable and in its own manner.

The Panel believes any assumption that there is safety in the European status quo is highly deceptive.

West Germany, restless over the failure thus far to arrange for more compassionate relationships between the peoples of a divided Germany, and uncertain in her relationships with her neighbors and over her future place in Western defense policy, is no longer content to await the political initiatives of others in seeking detente with the East, or in initiating moves toward reunification. Britain, withdrawn from most of her previous overseas holdings and thus far excluded from the European Common Market, is struggling with critical financial and trade questions. Financial instability has assaulted the franc. Political unrest in Eastern Europe is pushing hard against the doctrines of communist orthodoxy and the reality of Soviet military power.

The social and political dynamics are forcing accelerated change — and that change, from which the Western shore of the "Atlantic river" is by no means immune, calls for fresh and common approaches.

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