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Again, we have full consultations with the
German Government, and we see no point in taking actions now
on the basis of things that might happen in the future and
that it is in our power to avoid and that it is in the common
interest to avoid, and, therefore, almost all of these stories
about tensions between Bonn and Washington, that I have read
in the newspapers, astonish senior officials both here and,
I believe, in Bonn.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned, sir, that a
political decision would have to be made by Moscow in the
SALT talks. When will this have to be made in order that
the SALT talks will not become an 18-nation disarmament
conference?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the Soviet Union has
to judge its own interest. We are not giving the Soviet Union
any particular deadline.

If you look at the way the negotiations have gone,
it would be highly unfair to compare them to simply a debating
forum. First of all, they have elicited from both sides,
and I can say certainly from us, the most searching
examination of the nature of the strategic arms race that
has ever been undertaken, either in or out of the government.

This was understood in the merits of our position,
simply in the preparation of it. I think it has been reflected
in responsible positions on our part and in serious replies
on their part.

The progress has not been overwhelmingly fast,
but it also has not been irresponsible. It has gone at the
pace that you would expect serious people to go. What a
political decision could do is to give it a particular
urgency, and a particular focus.

And if that were made, we believe that an agreement
could be reached fairly rapidly. We think we now understand
each other's position. And we know the general framework
of the negotiations. But I did not mean to suggest that
there was a particular deadline attached to the negotiations,
other than what is inherent in the momentum of the arms
race.

Chuck?

Q May I follow on that particular question? If
the positions are well understood, is there anything more
to be done in the SALT talks in the absence of a political
decision to give it that urgency?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. The basic positions are well
understood. However, the Soviet position has not been put
forth in anything like the detail that ours has been put
forth.

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With respect to both ours and to theirs, there are
many issues that remain to be explored in considerable
detail. So that even in the absence of a political decision,
we believe that further progress is possible at Vienna.

What the political decision would do is to speed
up the process. But even in the absence of that decision,
if the negotiations continue at their present rate, we have
not exhausted the possibilities of exploring the various
points of view.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there are all sorts of reports
and rumors about Soviet activity in Cuba, particularly in
regard to nuclear submarines.

What is the truth about that, and do we have a
new understanding with them or a new definition of the 1962
understanding in regard to that?

DR. KISSINGER: The Secretary of State explained
this yesterday.

And Mr. Ziegler has also explained it. He is
mumbling to me now and the Caribbean seems to be his area.
(Laughter).

Q He mumbled to us when he explained it. (Laughter).

DR. KISSINGER: Let me repeat what Mr. Ziegler said
the other day, and what the Secretary of State said yesterday.

We believe we have an understanding with the Soviet
Union in which both sides know the limits of action in the
Caribbean beyond which the situation would become very grave.
We believe that exists and there can be no misapprehension
about that. Whether any particular activity goes to the edge
of that understanding or not has to be judged from case to case.

We are watching it very carefully. Up to now the
understanding has not been violated. It would, of course, be
preferable if activities could be kept well short of the
limits of the understanding in order to remove any possible
doubts. But all I can say is we are watching the situation
very carefully and, if we believe that the limits of the
understanding are exceeded, then we will, of course, have
to consider what action has to be taken.

Q Is this a verbal understanding or is it a
written understanding?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go any further into it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us if you are
really concerned with the possible resurgence of militarism
in Japan, and if you are, do you see it as sort of a logical
inevitable outcome of the Nixon Doctrine?

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DR. KISSINGER: I must tell you honestly, my colleagues from Harvard battered me so much about the resurgence of American militarism that I haven't been able to give full attention to the problem of the Japanese, the possible problems of Japanese militarism. (Laughter).

We believe that Japan is a valued and important friend. We do not construe the Nixon Doctrine as separating ourselves from Japan. We attempted to conduct the Okinawa negotiations in a manner, for example, that would guarantee a confident, long-term relationship between Japan and the United States. And we will not knowingly encourage nationalistic separate policies in Japan.

So, if there is a resurgence of Japanese militarism, or a danger of one, which I am not affirming, it will develop from autonomous Japanese causes, it will not be knowingly encouraged by the United States.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have gone about an hour now, gentlemen. I think we have time for about ten more minutes. Is that all right?

DR. KISSINGER: I thought you said ten more questions.

MR. ZIEGLER: At the rate of your answers, you would be here an hour.

DR. KISSINGER: Do you want to recognize the people? Why should I make enemies? (Laughter).

Q In that same connection, would you follow on with the economic relations with Japan that seem to be getting much worse?

DR. KISSINGER: OFF THE RECORD, there was a happy period in my life when I never knew a thing about textiles. (Laughter). I am not becoming one of the great bores at cocktail parties because I can talk about a subject that no one else understands.

Economic relations between us and Japan, with the resurgence and build up of the Japanese economy, are undergoing a somewhat complex period. We are involved in textile negotiations with the Japanese Government, which I don't want to discuss now, because they are in a delicate phase.

In general, there is a feeling, on the part of some of our industrial people, that perhaps Japanese economic policies have been unduly restrictive. I know there is a fear on the part of the Japanese that we may be heading into a period of a trade war.

I want to make it clear that the policy of this Administration considers Japan as one of our most important friends and a cornerstone of any relationship that can be built in the Pacific.

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We would guide our economic relations by our political imperatives, not the other way around. We are most anxious to have a liberalization of trade on both sides and if a trade war were to result, we would consider that a great misfortune and it will not be encouraged by this Administration.

The textile problem, as many people know, is in a special category for the time being. But in terms of our general relationship, we believe that the conversations we had here with Prime Minister Sato, as well as our own realization of the necessities of the period, lead us in the direction of encouraging greater liberalization on both sides of the Pacific, rather than encouraging restrictive practices.

So, this is our policy.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there is a feeling among some of the newer of the black nations in Africa that the United States is unsympathetic to their problems. Could you address yourself to that?

DR. KISSINGER: The United States is sympathetic to the aspirations for development, political independence and self-determination of the black African states. In black Africa, as in many other parts of the world, we are attempting to encourage as much self-reliance as we possibly can. And we are attempting to encourage policies which can have constructive consequences rather than policies that are simply made for the record.

But you will remember that the Secretary of State of this Administration was the first American Secretary of State in office to visit black Africa. He made an extensive tour. This is a symbolic gesture. The President gave a dinner for African Ambassadors here, most of whom are black.

Given the availability of resources and the shrinkage imposed on us by the Congress of aid funds, we have to establish priorities within black Africa. So, we cannot support every country and we have to concentrate on a few of those countries.

But it is not correct to say that this Administration is unsympathetic. We consider it an important area, going through a very difficult period in which perhaps our capacity for direct influence is not as great as our sympathy. But if you are talking about our attitude ---

Q I am speaking about tangible things that have happened.

DR. KISSINGER: Like what?

Q I thought I was clear in my question to you without spelling it out.

DR. KISSINGER: Like on the issue of South Africa, for example, or on the issue of black Africa itself?

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Q I am speaking about black Africa itself. I am speaking about Tanzania. I am speaking about the head of government that came here from Africa to try to see the President to speak about the council of government. I am speaking about an attitude.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but let's take the case of the President of Zambia. I don't think a great deal is gained by going into detail.

Q I am speaking about an attitude, not specifics.

DR. KISSINGER: If you are citing that as an example ---

Q That is why I did not want to, you see.

DR. KISSINGER: But we set an appointment. It was changed by the President. We set another appointment. Twelve hours before it was due it was cancelled from New York and we are still not absolutely clear where the communications problem occurred. The President was going on a campaign trip, offered to see him as soon as he came back after the campaign trip, had delayed his campaign trip to make the appointment that was cancelled.

The President had originally offered to see him on a Sunday afternoon. When that was cancelled, he offered to see him on a Monday morning just before he left.

So I really think that the facts in this case do not support the charge. All I can say is there is no hostile attitude towards black African states, and if anything, our tendency would try to be to lean over backward to avoid any slight like the one you have described.

That was one of those unfortunate events where there was a mix up in the communications somewhere and not on our side.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for one more question.

George Sherman?

Q Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned the step up of infiltration during the dry season. Can you give us some idea of the magnitude or some framework where it is centered -- and then give us your initial assessment on the changes in Poland, whichever border you like? (Laughter).

DR. KISSINGER: Let me take the last part first, because I don't want to end on a negative note.

I don't think it would be appropriate for me at this moment to make any comment on the situation in Poland.

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As to the rate of infiltration, there are two things to be said: First, it is always higher at this time of the year. This is always the relatively highest period. I don't have the figures here, you should check it at the Defense Department to make sure. My impression is it is about 30 percent higher than at a comparable period last year and roughly at the level that it was in 1968 in the period just before they launched the second Tet offensive; that is, the offensive that started shortly after this Administration came into office.

This is about the magnitude of it. It is not at the level that it was prior to the big Tet offensive of '67, I would think about 30 percent below that, or roughly about 30 percent above what it was last year at this time.

There are a number of things that have to be weighed, however, in assessing this. One is that since the losses they suffered in Cambodia occurred just before the beginning of the rainy season, they have not yet -- some of these are replacements for those losses.

To make a full assessment of the significance of this infiltration, one will have to wait a few more weeks to see whether it continues at the present rate.

But in any event, it is the highest it has been in two years and if you couple it with the amount of supplies, the increased amount of supplies that is coming down the trails also, which is substantially above what it was, the signs tend to point towards an attempt to launch an offensive.

Q Could we just get how many is the total estimate now of the North Vietnamese prepared to fight in South Vietnam or in Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I really think you ought to get the figure at the Defense Department. I just don't have it here. I just don't want to give it. It is not for security reasons. I think we have given it out before. I just don't want to give you a wrong figure.

Q Are those supplies going into South Vietnam or towards South Vietnam or towards Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: At this stage, it is extremely difficult to say, because their traditional infiltration pattern is that they go down towards Cambodia, even if they go into South Vietnam. They are going through Laos into Cambodia and whether they then branch off into South Vietnam or whether they stay in Cambodia to launch an offensive in Cambodia, on this, there are frankly divided theories. Most people seem to think that an offensive in Cambodia is more likely.

But on this, there is a question of speculation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Doctor.

END

(AT 11:42 A.M. EST)