COLLISION WITH CHINA

The former secretary of State on the complex task of bridging the cultural gap to negotiate with the heirs of the Middle Kingdom. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

# Face to Face With China

AT THIS WRITING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN AMERICAN and Chinese officials are said to be moving toward a climax. The formal obstacle is whether China will continue to insist on an apology or whether it will settle for the expressions of regret of both Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W. Bush. Yet the body language on both sides suggests that neither nation wants a prolonged confrontation. Chinese statements are calibrated to make what the Chinese leadership likes to call its "principled stand" clear to a domestic audience. But the rhetoric does not foreclose an outcome respecting the American view that what occurred was an accident, not a provocation. Since the factual basis for the dispute depends on whether the American plane was over Chinese territory and which plane made the final turn leading to the collision, a reasonable outcome would be the release of the crew and a joint statement reiterating each side's version of events and establishing some fact-finding mechanism.

This follows the precedent of the Shanghai Communiqué, which was the basis for the re-establishment of diplomatic contacts in 1972 after an interruption of more than 20 years. In that document the United States and China stated opposing views on a whole series of issues but came together on some agreed principles. The most notable ones were common resistance to hegemony—a code word for Soviet expansionism—and an American acknowledgment that it was not challenging the view of the

Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that there was but one China (the then official positions of both Beijing and Taipei).

A comparable outcome is likely this time because the leaders in Beijing surely understand that there is a point—and not many days away—at which American public opinion would begin to regard the detained crew members as hostages. After that point, the issue would turn into a confrontation undermining future relations no matter how it was ultimately settled. And it must also be evident that the Bush administration's deft handling of the crisis is giving concrete content to what it has called a "competitive relationship" by including in it significant elements of cooperation.

Precisely because the incident of the reconnaissance plane is likely to mark the beginning of an extended dialogue, it is important to understand the cultural gap existing between the two sides on the way to approach diplomacy.

American leaders are brought up in a society that over its little more than two centuries of history has regarded peace and progress as normal. Hence they emphasize personal good will and personal relationships as important elements in resolving international disputes. In its continuous history spanning five millennia, China has witnessed too many upheavals and tragedies to rely on the good will of individuals who, in the context of history, are by definition transient. The United States has been able to overcome its challenges by a combination of idealism, willpower,

organization and a benign geography. China has many great achievements to its credit, but it has also come up against its limits, encountering problems that could be overcome only by endurance. China's approach to policy is skeptical and prudent, America's optimistic and missionary. China's sense of time beats to an altogether different rhythm from America's. When an American is asked to date a historical event, he refers to a specific day on the calendar; when a Chinese describes his history, he places it within a dynasty. And of the 14 imperial dynasties, at least eight have each lasted longer than the entire history of the United States.

Americans think in terms of concrete solutions to specific problems. The Chinese think in terms of a process that has no precise culmination. Americans believe that international disputes result either from misunderstandings or ill will; the remedy for the former is persuasion—occasionally quite insist-

ent—and, for the latter, defeat or destruction of the evildoer. The Chinese approach is impersonal, patient and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a horror of appearing to be a supplicant. Where Washington looks to good faith and good will as the lubricant of international relations, Beijing assumes that statesmen have done their homework and will understand subtle indirections. This is why in the current dispute the Chinese have insisted that the United States "should"—not "must"—apologize, indicating a strong preference, not a condition. To Americans, Chinese leaders seem polite but aloof and condescending. To the Chinese, Americans appear erratic and somewhat frivolous.

Chinese negotiating tactics also reflect China's historical experience, which in the last three centuries moved it from being dominant in its region to being the humiliated subject of colonialism. Thus Chinese diplomacy exhibits two styles simultane-

CONTRASTING STYLES: Mao with Nixon in 1972

> **China's approach to policy is skeptical and prudent; America's, on the other hand, is optimistic and missionary**

36

NEWSWEEK APRIL 16, 2001

ously. As heirs of the Middle Kingdom, Chinese diplomats can be
ingratiating. The other side is flattered by being admitted to the
Chinese "club" as an "old friend," a posture which makes dis-
agreement humanly more complicated. When they conduct Mid-
dle Kingdom diplomacy, the Chinese maneuver to induce their
opposite numbers to propose the Chinese preference so that Chi-
nese acquiescence can appear as the granting of a boon to the in-
terlocutor. Thus on my secret visit to China in 1971, Zhou Enlai
sought to get me to ask for an invitation for President Nixon to
come to Beijing. We settled on a formula that made a reference to
a general Nixon desire to visit China expressed sometime before
he was elected president and coupled it with a specific invitation
by the Chinese leaders.

But when faced with what it considers a legacy of colonialism, China is prone to bully in order to demonstrate its imperviousness to pressure. Any hint of condescension or sign that Chinese territorial integrity is not being taken seriously evokes strong-and to Americans, seemingly excessive-reaction. Hence the prolonged demonstrations of outrage about the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade and the initial intransigence over the reconnaissance plane.

The contrasting styles of diplomacy produced a confrontational atmosphere in the early stages of the recent crisis. The administration said the American airplane at a Chinese military airport was protected by sovereign immunity and demanded its immediate release. Whatever the legal positions, this implication that the reconnaissance plane enjoyed a protected legal status was bound to produce a strong Chinese response. But once Secretary Powell and President Bush moved the issue to a level of human compassion and practical resolution, the way to a constructive outcome was open.

When that is reached, the crisis
may turn out to lay the basis for a
new, mature and above all stable
relationship. Partly because of the
difficulty the two sides have had in
understanding each other's culture
and code of conduct, they have
rarely succeeded in getting Sino-
American relationships on a steady

course for any extended period of time. In the early 1900s, Ameri-
ca's approach to China was heavily influenced by missionaries and
traders, both largely oblivious to the humiliation Chinese society
felt when subjected to the colonialist pressures of the European
powers. In the 1930s and during the Second World War, China was
idealized as a victim of Japanese aggression and as a heroic demo-
cratic ally. After the communist victory in the civil war, China was
transformed in the American public mind into the incarnation of
ideological and strategic hostility. A combination of Maoist mili-
tant ideology, China's intervention in the Korean War, American
distaste for Beijing's domestic institutions and the interposition of
the American Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait produced a period
of nearly a quarter century in which the two countries had no
diplomatic relations and very little contact of any kind, except mu-
tual vituperation.

Now we are in yet a different era, one that requires stability for long-term strategic and economic reasons. The Chinese landscape is a complicated one. The original Chinese leaders we dealt with in the 1970s were, in their conduct, more in the tradition of the Middle Kingdom than the present leaders, who are running a country whose economy is largely shaped by the market and by modern technology. The next leaders will be more modern still. China faces a number of long-term problems. First, the economic success requires constant political adaptation. Secondly, by 2003 almost all current leaders are required to leave office, which would be the first constitutional change in a communist country. Thirdly, the PLA, which will surely play a major role in the succession debate, is more assertively nationalistic than the other Chinese leaders.

In America, two schools of thought dominate contemporary de-
bate. The view of the Clinton administration was summed up in
the slogans "engagement" and "strategic partnership." Based on
the Wilsonian premise that a world composed of democracies can
hold no enemies—at least none prepared to vindicate their views
with force—the multiplication of contacts on trade, environment,
science and technology is believed to strengthen the forces favor-

ing international cooperation and
internal pluralism.

The opposing point of view re-
gards China as a morally flawed,
inevitable adversary—at the mo-
ment with respect to Taiwan,
eventually the Western Pacific,
and, in time, the global equilibri-
um. According to this school of
thought, the United States should
therefore deal with China not as a
strategic partner but as it did with
the Soviet Union during the cold
war: as a rival and a challenge, re-
ducing trade wherever possible to
nonstrategic items, creating an al-
liance of Asian states to help
America share the burden for the
defense of Asia and to contain
China. Advocates of this point of
view would treat Taiwan as an in-
dependent country and a military
outpost and, in practice, scrap the
"one-China" policy on which
Sino-American relations have
been based since the early 1970s.

The fundamental question for
President Bush is whether either
of these approaches really meets

America's needs. It is one thing to reject a strategic partnership that never functioned; it is another to adopt the cold-war containment policy as it had been applied to the Soviet Union and to act as if China were a permanent adversary. Such a policy would isolate America in Asia and in the world. America will resist attempts by any power to achieve hegemony, as it proved in three wars in the last century. The challenge is to devise a policy open to cooperation but decisive in resisting aggression. Confrontation with China should be a last resort, not the strategic choice. The Bush administration's handling of the crisis over the reconnaissance plane is a good first step in that direction.

A DELICATE DANCE: Kissinger with Zhou Enlai, 1973

The challenge for the new
administration is to devise a
policy open to cooperation but
decisive in resisting aggression

KISSINGER's latest book, "Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century," will be published by Simon & Schuster in June.

APRIL 16, 2001 NEWSWEEK

37

04/09/01 MON 11:01 FAX 1 213 237 4814

LAYS PRODUCTION

001

(LC)

HENRY KISSINGER

4/9/01

# HOW THE UNITED STATES IS BRIDGING THE CULTURAL GAP TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE HEIRS OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM

## EMBARGOED IN NORTH AMERICA

**CAUTION:** This material, originally published in Newsweek, is authorized for publication only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstance be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part.

By Henry A. Kissinger

At this writing negotiations between American and Chinese officials are said to be moving toward a climax. The formal obstacle is whether China will continue to insist on an apology or whether it will settle for the expressions of regret of both Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W. Bush. Yet the body language on both sides suggests that neither nation wants a prolonged confrontation.

This follows the precedent of the Shanghai Communique, which was the basis for the reestablishment of diplomatic contacts in 1972 after an interruption of more than 20 years. In that document the United States and China stated opposing views on a whole series of issues but came together on some agreed principles. The most notable ones were common resistance to hegemony -- a code word for Soviet expansionism -- and an American acknowledgment that it was not challenging the view of the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that there was but one China (the then official positions of both Beijing and Taipei).

A comparable outcome is likely this time because the leaders in Beijing surely understand that there is a point -- and not many days away -- at which American public opinion would begin to regard the detained crew members as hostages. After that point, the issue would turn into a confrontation undermining future relations no matter how it was ultimately settled. And

04/09/01 MON 11:01 FAX 1 213 237 4614

LATS PRODUCTION

003

Americans think in terms of concrete solutions to specific problems. The Chinese think in terms of a process that has no precise culmination. Americans believe that international disputes result either from misunderstandings or ill will; the remedy for the former is persuasion -- occasionally quite insistent -- and, for the latter, defeat or destruction of the evildoer. The Chinese approach is impersonal, patient and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a horror of appearing to be a supplicant. Where Washington looks to good faith and good will as the lubricant of international relations, Beijing assumes that statesmen have done their homework and will understand subtle indirections. This is why in the current dispute the Chinese have insisted that the United States "should" -- not "must" -- apologize, indicating a strong preference, not a condition. To Americans, Chinese leaders seem polite but aloof and condescending. To the Chinese, Americans appear erratic and somewhat frivolous.

Chinese negotiating tactics also reflect China's historical experience, which in the last three centuries moved it from being dominant in its region to being the humiliated subject of colonialism. Thus Chinese diplomacy exhibits two styles simultaneously. As heirs of the Middle Kingdom, Chinese diplomats can be ingratiating. The other side is flattered by

04/09/01 MON 11:02 TAX 1 213 257 4014

LATS PRODUCTION

004

[Lc]

being admitted to the Chinese "club" as an "old friend," a posture which makes disagreement humanly more complicated. When they conduct Middle Kingdom diplomacy, the Chinese maneuver to induce their opposite numbers to propose the Chinese preference so that Chinese acquiescence can appear as the granting of a boon to the interlocutor. Thus on my secret visit to China in 1971, Zhou Enlai sought to get me to ask for an invitation for President Nixon to come to Beijing. We settled on a formula that made a reference to a general Nixon desire to visit China expressed sometime before he was elected president and coupled it with a specific invitation by the Chinese leaders.

But when faced with what it considers a legacy of colonialism, China is prone to bully in order to demonstrate its imperviousness to pressure. Any hint of condescension or sign that Chinese territorial integrity is not being taken seriously evokes strong -- and to Americans, seemingly excessive -- reaction. Hence the prolonged demonstrations of outrage about the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade and the initial intransigence over the reconnaissance plane.

When that is reached, the crisis may turn out to lay the basis for a new, mature and above all stable relationship. Partly because of the difficulty the two sides have had in understanding each other's culture and code of conduct, they have rarely succeeded in getting Sino-American relationships on a steady course for any extended period of time. In the early 1900s, America's approach to China was heavily influenced by missionaries and traders, both largely oblivious to the humiliation Chinese society felt when subjected to the colonialist pressures of the European powers. In the 1930s and during the Second World War, China was idealized as a victim of Japanese aggression and as a heroic democratic ally. After the Communist victory in the civil war, China was transformed in the American public mind into the incarnation of ideological and strategic hostility. A combination of Maoist militant ideology, China's intervention in the Korean War, American distaste for Beijing's domestic institutions and the interposition of the American Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait produced a period of nearly a quarter-century in which the two countries had no diplomatic relations and very little contact of any kind, except mutual vituperation.

04/09/01 MON 11:02 TAX 1 213 237 4814

LATS PRODUCTION

005

[L]

stability for long-term strategic and economic reasons. The Chinese landscape is a complicated one. The original Chinese leaders we dealt with in the 1970s were, in their conduct, more in the tradition of the Middle Kingdom than the present leaders, who are running a country whose economy is largely shaped by the market and by modern technology. The next leaders will be more modern still. China faces a number of long-term problems. First, the economic success requires constant political adaptation. Second, by 2003 almost all current leaders are required to leave office, which would be the first constitutional change in a Communist country. Third, the PLA, which will surely play a major role in the succession debate, is more assertively nationalistic than the other Chinese leaders.

In America, two schools of thought dominate contemporary debate. The view of the Clinton administration was summed up in the slogans "engagement" and "strategic partnership." Based on the Wilsonian premise that a world composed of democracies can hold no enemies -- at least none prepared to vindicate their views with force -- the multiplication of contacts on trade, environment, science and technology is believed to strengthen the forces favoring international cooperation and internal pluralism.

The opposing point of view regards China as a morally flawed, inevitable adversary -- at the moment with respect to Taiwan, eventually the Western Pacific, and, in time, the global equilibrium. According to this school of thought, the United States should therefore deal with China not as a strategic partner but as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War: as a rival and a challenge, reducing trade wherever possible to nonstrategic items, creating an alliance of Asian states to help America share the burden for the defense of Asia and to contain China. Advocates of this point of view would treat Taiwan as an independent country and a military outpost and, in practice, scrap the "one-China" policy on which Sino-American relations have been based since the early 1970s.

The fundamental question for President Bush is whether either of these approaches really meets America's needs. It is one thing to reject a strategic partnership that never functioned; it is another to adopt the Cold-War containment policy as it had been applied to the Soviet Union and to act as if China were a permanent adversary. Such a policy would isolate America in Asia and in the world. America will resist attempts by any power to achieve hegemony, as it proved in three wars in the last century. The challenge is to devise a policy open to cooperation but decisive in resisting aggression. Confrontation with China should be a last resort, not the strategic choice. The Bush administration's handling of the crisis over the reconnaissance plane is a good first step in that direction.

FROM LA TIMES SYNDICATE. AVAILABLE BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT
ONLY

FOR RETRANSMISSION, PLEASE CONTACT GABE GUTIERREZ IN LOS
ANGELES

TELEPHONE: 213) 237-7903 OR BY FAX: 213) 237-3297

HENRY KISSINGER

4/9/01

EMBARGOED IN NORTH AMERICA

CAUTION: This material, originally published in Newsweek, is authorized for publication only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstance be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part.

By Henry A. Kissinger

Chinese statements are calibrated to make what the Chinese leadership likes to call its 'principled stand' clear to a domestic audience. But the rhetoric does not foreclose an outcome respecting the American view that what occurred was an accident, not a provocation. Since the factual basis for the dispute depends on whether the American plane was over Chinese territory and which plane made the final turn leading to the collision, a reasonable outcome would be the release of the crew and a joint statement reiterating each side's version of events and establishing some fact-finding mechanism.

Please deliver to: Suzanne Merarlane

[LC]

A comparable outcome is likely this time because the leaders in Beijing surely understand that there is a point -- and not many days away -- at which American public opinion would begin to regard the detained crew members as hostages. After that point, the issue would turn into a confrontation undermining future relations no matter how it was ultimately settled. And it must also be evident that the Bush administration's deft handling of the crisis is giving concrete content to what it has called a 'competitive relationship' by including in it significant elements of cooperation.

Please deliver to: Suzanne McAllister

[L]

Americans think in terms of concrete solutions to
specific problems. The Chinese think in terms of a process
that has no precise culmination. Americans believe that
international disputes result either from misunderstandings
or ill will; the remedy for the former is persuasion --
occasionally quite insistent -- and, for the latter, defeat
or destruction of the evildoer. The Chinese approach is
impersonal, patient and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a
horror of appearing to be a supplicant. Where Washington
looks to good faith and good will as the lubricant of
international relations, Beijing assumes that statesmen
have done their homework and will understand subtle
indirections. This is why in the current dispute the
Chinese have insisted that the United States 'should' --
not 'must' -- apologize, indicating a strong preference,
not a condition. To Americans, Chinese leaders seem polite
but aloof and condescending. To the Chinese, Americans
appear erratic and somewhat frivolous.

Chinese negotiating tactics also reflect China's
historical experience, which in the last three centuries
moved it from being dominant in its region to being the
humiliated subject of colonialism. Thus Chinese diplomacy
exhibits two styles simultaneously. As heirs of the Middle
Kingdom, Chinese diplomats can be ingratiating. The other
side is flattered by being admitted to the Chinese 'club'
as an 'old friend,' a posture which makes disagreement
humanly more complicated. When they conduct Middle Kingdom
diplomacy, the Chinese maneuver to induce their opposite
numbers to propose the Chinese preference so that Chinese
acquiescence can appear as the granting of a boon to the
interlocutor. Thus on my secret visit to China in 1971,
Zhou Enlai sought to get me to ask for an invitation for
President Nixon to come to Beijing. We settled on a formula
that made a reference to a general Nixon desire to visit
China expressed sometime before he was elected president
and coupled it with a specific invitation by the Chinese
leaders.

Please deliver to: Suzanne Merlano

[L.C.]

Now we are in yet a different era, one that requires stability for long-term strategic and economic reasons. The Chinese landscape is a complicated one. The original Chinese leaders we dealt with in the 1970s were, in their conduct, more in the tradition of the Middle Kingdom than the present leaders, who are running a country whose economy is largely shaped by the market and by modern technology. The next leaders will be more modern still. China faces a number of long-term problems. First, the economic success requires constant political adaptation. Second, by 2003 almost all current leaders are required to leave office, which would be the first constitutional change in a Communist country. Third, the PLA, which will surely play a major role in the succession debate, is more assertively nationalistic than the other Chinese leaders.

[L.C.]

In America, two schools of thought dominate contemporary debate. The view of the Clinton administration was summed up in the slogans ''engagement'' and ''strategic partnership.'' Based on the Wilsonian premise that a world composed of democracies can hold no enemies -- at least none prepared to vindicate their views with force -- the multiplication of contacts on trade, environment, science and technology is believed to strengthen the forces favoring international cooperation and internal pluralism.

The opposing point of view regards China as a morally flawed, inevitable adversary -- at the moment with respect to Taiwan, eventually the Western Pacific, and, in time, the global equilibrium. According to this school of thought, the United States should therefore deal with China not as a strategic partner but as it did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War: as a rival and a challenge, reducing trade wherever possible to nonstrategic items, creating an alliance of Asian states to help America share the burden for the defense of Asia and to contain China. Advocates of this point of view would treat Taiwan as an independent country and a military outpost and, in practice, scrap the ''one-China'' policy on which Sino-American relations have been based since the early 1970s.

(Henry Kissinger's latest book, ''Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century,'' will be published by Simon & Schuster in June.)

(c) 2001, Newsweek. Distributed by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate International.

For immediate release (Distributed 4/9/01)
END

HENRY KISSINGER

4/9/01

EMBARGOED IN NORTH AMERICA

By Henry A. Kissinger

Please deliver to: Suzanne Meravane

[L]

A comparable outcome is likely this time because the leaders in Beijing surely understand that there is a point -- and not many days away -- at which American public opinion would begin to regard the detained crew members as hostages. After that point, the issue would turn into a confrontation undermining future relations no matter how it was ultimately settled. And it must also be evident that the Bush administration's deft handling of the crisis is giving concrete content to what it has called a ''competitive relationship'' by including in it significant elements of cooperation.

Please deliver to: Suzanne McParlane

[L]

Please deliver to: Suzanne Merlino

[L]

[L]

Face to Face With China

Page 1 of 7

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## Face to Face With China

UPI-Corbis

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (left) and Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai (right) take a synchronized sip at a 1973 Chinese banquet

By Henry A. Kissinger
NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL

April 16 issue — At this writing negotiations between American and Chinese officials are said to be moving toward a climax. The formal obstacle is whether China will continue to insist on an apology or whether it will settle for the expressions of regret of both Secretary of State Colin Powell and President George W. Bush. Yet the body language on both sides suggests that neither nation wants a prolonged confrontation. Chinese statements are calibrated to make what the Chinese leadership likes to call its “principled stand” clear to a domestic audience. But the rhetoric does not foreclose an outcome respecting the American view that what

http://www.msnbc.com/news/556392.asp

4/9/01

Face to Face With China

Page 2 of 7

[LC]

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Newsweek

THIS FOLLOWS THE PRECEDENT of the Shanghai Communique, which was the basis for the re-establishment of diplomatic contacts in 1972 after an interruption of more than 20 years. In that document the United States and China stated opposing views on a whole series of issues but came together on some agreed principles. The most notable ones were common resistance to hegemony—a code word for Soviet expansionism—and an American acknowledgment that it was not challenging the view of the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that there was but one China (the then official positions of both Beijing and Taipei).

Newsweek, MSNBC.COM

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4/9/01

Face to Face With China

Page 3 of 7

On the Cover: China: Damage Report

The China-U.S. dogfight started in the sky and soon spread to competing capitals. How the crash happened, the lessons Bush learned in his first crisis and the risks ahead.

*After the Showdown*

The Stakes: Why Americans need to worry more about Beijing's weakness than its strength

*A Crash In the Clouds*

The Dogfight: It started in the skies, and quickly spread to competing capitals. Behind a tense standoff

*Face to Face With China*
Henry A. Kissinger on bridging the cultural gap

*Beijing's Next Big Battle*

The Succession: Why the crisis could tip power to the hard-liners in China

*The New Pacific Danger Zone*

China must tame its militaristic bent and embrace economic cooperation with the United States—or risk feeling America's might

*Fallout for the Bottom Line*

Why U.S. businesses are worried about what's next

4/9/01

Face to Face With China

Page 4 of 7

Americans believe that international disputes result either from misunderstandings or ill will; the remedy for the former is persuasion—occasionally quite insistent—and, for the latter, defeat or destruction of the evildoer. The Chinese approach is impersonal, patient and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a horror of appearing to be a supplicant.

Americans think in terms of concrete solutions to specific problems. The Chinese think in terms of a process that has no precise culmination. Americans believe that international disputes result either from misunderstandings or ill will; the remedy for the former is persuasion—occasionally quite insistent—and, for the latter, defeat or destruction of the evildoer. The Chinese approach is impersonal, patient and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a horror of appearing to be a supplicant. Where Washington looks to good faith and good will as the lubricant of international relations, Beijing assumes that statesmen have done their homework and will understand subtle indirections. This is why in the current dispute the Chinese have insisted that the United States “should”—not “must”—apologize, indicating a strong preference, not a condition. To Americans, Chinese leaders seem polite but aloof and condescending. To the Chinese, Americans appear erratic and somewhat frivolous.

Chinese negotiating tactics also reflect China's historical experience, which in the last three centuries moved it from being dominant in its region to being the humiliated subject of colonialism. Thus Chinese diplomacy exhibits two styles simultaneously. As heirs of the Middle Kingdom, Chinese diplomats can be ingratiating. The other side is flattered by being admitted to the Chinese “club” as an “old friend,” a posture which makes disagreement humanly more complicated. When they conduct Middle Kingdom diplomacy, the Chinese maneuver to induce their opposite numbers to propose the Chinese preference so that Chinese acquiescence can appear as the granting of a boon to the interlocutor. Thus on my secret visit to China in 1971, Zhou Enlai sought to get me to ask for an invitation for President Nixon to come to Beijing. We settled on a formula that made a reference to a general Nixon desire to visit China expressed sometime before he was elected president and coupled it with a specific invitation by the Chinese leaders.

But when faced with what it considers a legacy of colonialism, China is prone to bully in order to demonstrate its imperviousness to pressure. Any hint of condescension or sign that Chinese territorial integrity is not being taken seriously evokes strong—and to Americans, seemingly excessive—reaction. Hence the prolonged demonstrations of outrage about the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade and the initial intransigence over the reconnaissance plane.

4/9/01

Face to Face With China

Page 5 of 7

When that is reached, the crisis may turn out to lay the basis for a new, mature and above all stable relationship. Partly because of the difficulty the two sides have had in understanding each other's culture and code of conduct, they have rarely succeeded in getting Sino-American relationships on a steady course for any extended period of time. In the early 1900s, America's approach to China was heavily influenced by missionaries and traders, both largely oblivious to the humiliation Chinese society felt when subjected to the colonialist pressures of the European powers. In the 1930s and during the Second World War, China was idealized as a victim of Japanese aggression and as a heroic democratic ally. After the communist victory in the civil war, China was transformed in the American public mind into the incarnation of ideological and strategic hostility. A combination of Maoist militant ideology, China's intervention in the Korean War, American distaste for Beijing's domestic institutions and the interposition of the American Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait produced a period of nearly a quarter century in which the two countries had no diplomatic relations and very little contact of any kind, except mutual vituperation.

4/9/01

Face to Face With China

Page 6 of 7

In America, two schools of thought dominate contemporary debate. The view of the Clinton administration was summed up in the slogans "engagement" and "strategic partnership." Based on the Wilsonian premise that a world composed of democracies can hold no enemies—at least none prepared to vindicate their views with force—the multiplication of contacts on trade, environment, science and technology is believed to strengthen the forces favoring international cooperation and internal pluralism.

The opposing point of view regards China as a morally flawed, inevitable adversary—at the moment with respect to Taiwan, eventually the Western Pacific, and, in time, the global equilibrium. According to this school of thought, the United States should therefore deal with China not as a strategic partner but as it did with the Soviet Union during the cold war: as a rival and a challenge, reducing trade wherever possible to nonstrategic items, creating an alliance of Asian states to help America share the burden for the defense of Asia and to contain China. Advocates of this point of view would treat Taiwan as an independent country and a military outpost and, in practice, scrap the "one-China" policy on which Sino-American relations have been based since the early 1970s.

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4/9/01

Face to Face With China

[LC]

Kissingers'
latest book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?
Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, 'will be
published by Simon & Schuster in June.

©2001 Newsweek, Inc.

MORE NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL

STORY After the Showdown

STORY A Crash In the Clouds

STORY Beijing's Next Big Battle

STORY Face to Face With China

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4/9/01

APR 06 '01 09:09AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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CREATOR: JMEACH; 04/05/1, 19:30

PRINTED BY: jmeach; 04/06/01, 10:10 AM
WRITER: DMILLA
FROM: ; 04/05/1
FILE: IN0616-JMEACH-NWK
REVISOR: JMEACH; 04/05/1, 20:05

To: Dr. Kissinger

From: Jon Meacham

Dr. Kissinger:

Here is a draft of your column. I am reachable at 212-445-4584. Many thanks.

By Henry A. Kissinger

It was after midnight in Beijing one day in the summer of 1971. I was there on a secret mission to China; the possibility of a state visit by President Nixon was under discussion. When we had broken up in the afternoon, all that seemed at issue was the timing, but we were left in our guest house for hours awaiting a draft of the Chinese announcement. One finally arrived and produced immediate controversy in our circle. The proposed communique suggested that Nixon had solicited the invitation, and that the Chinese were going to grant our request. We spent the night, and worked deep into the next day, haggling over the formulation.

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It was a classic Middle Kingdom negotiating tactic. Through 5,000 years, the Chinese have been the dominant country in the area. That creates a propensity to negotiate in a way in which they try to maneuver the other side into a position to offer what the Chinese want so that it can then be granted as a boon from the Middle Kingdom to the interlocutor. Moreover, the Chinese have a near-obsession with dignity and "face." Americans must grasp this distinctly Chinese diplomatic and cultural mindset in order to understand why the standoff over the spy plane collision developed, how this crisis may end and what lessons we can draw from the experience for future Sino-American relations.

The Chinese can be maddeningly difficult, for example by simply stating a principle and never moving from it. But overall they try to envelop you in an atmosphere in which you are called a friend, a member of a club of knowledgeable people who know how to handle things and so one rarely gets confrontations with the Chinese.

What happened this time? Both sides took steps very early on that precluded the situation from being handled as a common

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problem to be solved as opposed to a stand-off that threatened to drag on and harm relations. First there was the American admiral on television, before the Chinese had said anything, insisting we had a right to do what

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we did and that the Chinese had no right to enter a plane on their territory. That was a precise challenge to their authority, especially coming from a military man. The Chinese may have felt that we do not take them seriously, particularly coming after the bombing of the Belgrade embassy. The Chinese did not help matters, however, by initially demanding an apology as a condition of resolution. That too was provocative. Two things must happen for resolution. Something has to be done to show respect for Chinese sovereignty. The second is if the issue of principle cannot be resolved, then negotiate for the prisoners not as a matter of right but as a question of magnamity. This would play into the ancient Chinese need to be seen as a nation generously granting an outsider's request.

One possibility is for the Chinese to say they have completed their investigation, and so the Americans can go. This would be followed by an impartial probe into the incident, with the Americans saying in principle they will consider apologizing if the results warrant. //watching this section for news developments etc.htm

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APR 06 '01 09:10AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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Going forward, we must bear larger points in mind if we are to correctly judge the Chinese mind and motives. There are vast cultural differences between the Chinese and American approaches to foreign policy and the changes in the international environment since we first visited Beijing in 1971. American leaders emphasize personal goodwill and personal relationships. In its continuous history spanning three millennia, China has witnessed too many upheavals and tragedies to rely on the goodwill of individuals who, in the context of history, are by definition transient.

The United States, in its national experience of 200 years, has been able to overcome its challenges by a combination of idealism, willpower, organization, and a benign geography. China has many great achievements to its credit, but it has also come up against its limits, encountering problems that could be overcome only be endurance. China's approach to policy is skeptical and prudent, America's optimistic and missionary.

China's sense of time beats to an altogether different rhythm from America's. When an American is asked to date an event, he refers to a specific day on the calendar; when a

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Chinese describes an event, he places it
within a dynasty. And of the fourteen imper-
--- End of column ---
ial dynasties, ten have each lasted longer
than the entire history of the United States.
Americans think in terms of concrete
solutions to specific problems. The Chinese
think in terms of stages in a process that has
not precise culmination. Americans believe
that international disputes result either
from misunderstandings or ill will; the rem-
edy for the former is persuasion—occasion-
ally quite insistent—and, for the latter,
defeat or destruction of the evildoer. The
Chinese approach is impersonal, patient,
and aloof; the Middle Kingdom has a horror
of appearing to be a supplicant. Where
Washington looks to good faith and good-
will as the lubricant of international rela-
tions, Beijing assumes that statesmen have
done their homework and will understand
subtle indirections; insistence is therefore a
sign of weakness, and good personal rela-
tions are not themselves a lubricant of seri-
ous dialogue. To Americans, Chinese lead-
ers seem polite but aloof and condescend-
ing. To the Chinese, Americans appear
eratic and somewhat frivolous.

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Partly because of the difficulty the two sides have had in understanding each other's culture and code of conduct, they have rarely succeeded in getting Sino-American relationships into a stable balance for any extended period. In the early 1900s, America's approach to China was heavily influenced by missionaries and traders, both largely oblivious to the humiliation Chinese society felt when subjected to the colonialist pressures of the European powers. In the 1930s and during the Second World War, China was idealized as a victim of Japanese aggression and as a heroic democratic ally. After the Communist victory in the civil war, China was transformed in the American public mind into the incarnation of ideological and strategic hostility. A combination of Maoist militant ideology, China's intervention in the Korean War, American distaste for Beijing's domestic institutions, and the interposition of the American Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait produced a period of nearly a quarter-century in which the two countries had no diplomatic relations and very little contact of any kind, except formal mutual vituperation.

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APR 06 '01 09:11AM EDITORIAL ADMINISTRATION

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Now we are in yet a different era, one that requires stability for long-term strategic and economic reasons. The Chinese landscape is a complicated one. The original Chinese leaders we dealt with in the 1970s were in many ways more traditional than the present Chinese. These leaders are more modern, and the next leaders will be more modern still. Jiang Zemin's regime has a number of special problems. First, the economic success is creating so many political problems and challenges to the political authority that they are in a constant state of adaptation in a system for which there has been no ideological preparation. Secondly, they are facing a problem of leaving office soon.

Thirdly, in my observation, the PLA is more assertively nationalistic than the other Chinese leaders I know. PLA support will be influential in deciding which group will emerge as the dominant group in 2003.

In America, two schools of thought dominate contemporary debate. The view of the Clinton administration was summed up in the slogans "engagement" and "strategic partnership." Based on the Wilsonian premise that a world composed of democracies can hold no enemies—at least none pre-

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pared to vindicate their views with force—the multiplication of contacts on trade, environment, science, and technology is believed to strengthen the forces favoring international cooperation and internal pluralism.

The opposing point of view regards China as a morally flawed inevitable adversary—at the moment with respect to Taiwan, eventually the Western Pacific, and, in time, the global equilibrium. According to this school of thought, the United States should therefore treat China not as a strategic partner but as it treated the Soviet Union during the cold war: as a rival and a challenge, reducing trade wherever possible to nonstrategic items, creating an alliance of Asian states to contain China, or, failing that, building up

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Japan to help America share the burden for the defense of Asia and the containment of China. Advocates of this point of view would treat Taiwan as an independent country and a military outpost and, in practice, scrap the "one-China" policy on which Sino-American relations have been based since 1971.

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The fundamental question for President
Bush, standoff or no standoff, is whether
either of these approaches really meets
America's needs. It is one thing to reject a
strategic partnership that never functioned;
it is another to adopt the cold war contain-
ment policy as it had been applied to the
Soviet Union and to act as if China were a
permanent adversary. Despite the tensions
of the moment, and the aspirations of some
Chinese nationalists, it need not be.

Managing our long-term relationship with
China will require a sophisticated apprecia-
tion of the nuances of the Chinese mind
while firmly pressing the case for America's
interests. Confrontation with China should
be the ultimate recourse, not the strategic
choice.

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