REAGAN MATERIAL

1. Draft by BH for Wexford Meeting

2. Soviet Negotiations - 9/12

3. The Carter Situation and the Iranian Crisis - 9/12

4. Statement prepared for Reagan people and given to them over the phone - 9/24

5. Iran-Iraq Intelligence Briefing - 10/2/80

6. Additional Questions for Iran-Iraq Intelligence Briefing - 10/3/80

7. The Issue of Arms Control - 10/6/80

THE REAGAN CAMPAIGN

1. To what extent is foreign policy going to be a major element in the campaign?

-- if it is to be subordinated, then the best approach is to attack Carter's handling of major issues (Iran) and not try to spell out alternatives;

-- if, on the other hand, foreign policy and defense are to be major components of the campaign, then there are some implications that follow:

(1) Reagan will have to accept the fact that the Republicans were in office for eight years and have a record; he has no choice but to make a virtue of it, rather than trying to circumvent or ignore it; comparisons between now and four years ago are inevitable; indeed, one of the major points should be that Carter inherited a basically sound position and frittered it away; keep asking are we better off? in Korea? in Nicaragua, in Europe, with Russia? etc;

-- but more basically a decision has to be made on whether to give priority to attacking the Carter record (as opposed to the man), or to presenting an alternative; it is not an easy choice, and on balance, it may be more effective to criticize and to emphasize the necessity for a change rather than trying to present positions on a range of complicated issues (which always leads to the question, what would you do?)

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2. What are to be the foreign policy themes?

--"peace through strength" is tried and ture, and that is
the problem (see below).

The major vulnerability is that Reagan and the Republicans
will be seen as emphasizing only "strength";

-- the answer, of course, is to make the Carter record
the issue, and this means broadening the themes to include
more geopolitical issues as well as some international
economic issues, and to tie this to the major theme of
a change in leadership.

-- in short the themes should be: the present danger
(not a bad phrase, since it has bipartisan credentials)
is a complex challenge (cite Iran) and will last for
several years, but must be addressed now.

The chance for a favorable outcome depends on adopting
a new direction with a new leadership.

* * *

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1. <u>Create the Sense of Urgency</u>

One problem is that the principal themes are not coming
through; in part this is because of interference of side
issues, e.g. Taiwan--but also because no <u>sense of urgency</u>
is being conveyed.

Because Reagan is a conservative, it is expected that he
will be for high defense, against SALT, for the B-1, etc.;
so his major pronouncements along these lines are largely
discounted in advance. Therefore, Reagan <u>must explain why</u>
this is indeed a critical time.

-- One way to overcome this is (a) to explain the trends and adopt the Carter tactic of 1976 and develop a litany of foreign policy horrors prepared under Carter--Ethiopia, Zaire, South Yemen, Afghanistan, Iran, (b) to stress Carter's culpability and not blame only the Soviets; to emphasize that the danger of war will grow if we are not firm <u>now</u>; and (d) to emphasize the need to <u>change</u> the leadership and deemphasize tinkering with defense budgets, or too many specific programs that are difficult to comprehend.

2. <u>Attack the Carter Philosophy, not Carter</u>

The need for a new leader is not just because Carter is
incompetent; this point has already taken its toll of
Carter's strength and speaks for itself in the press; even
Carter is now claiming he is not "the worst." Therefore
the more basic point is that Carter's entire approach to
foreign affairs contributes to, and aggravates the world

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crisis caused by the changing balance of power.

-- what Reagan needs to do is to demonstrate in simple terms
(by a recitation of the record) is that no matter what
Carter says now, his philosophical bent will prevent him
from taking a strong line. e.g., why didn't he resist
before the Red Army was in Kabul when the Cubans went to
Ethiopia, when the Communists took over, when he met
Brezhnev in Vienna?

3. Define the Carter-Reagan Differences Sharply
and

By moving to the right on Afghanistan/on defense issues
(budgets and targetting) Carter is blurring lines and deflating
the charges that he has been "soft." He points to his
latest defense increases and leaks the content of PD-59,
and then emphasizes Republicans defense cuts of ten years
ago. This then enables him to define the defense and foreign
policy issues, as he did in Independence, Mo. and then to
attack Reagan for starting an "arms race."

Reagan has to do two things: (1) stress Carter's break in 1977-79 with continuity of basic foreign policies, e.g. cite Korea, as example of mindless changes; (2) stress the differences in the future between Carter and Reagan, i.e. the coming crisis of 1983-85 -- Who will be willing to cope with the near-term challenge in a way to optimize longer term prospects? Carter, who addresses issues individually, without strategy? Or Reagan who has had a consistent philosophy?

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4. Define the Foreign Policy Agenda

Before much longer, Reagan must say he has a 4 point plan, etc; or at least starting listing questions for debate.

5. Preempt the Probable Course of Events

-- There is a strong probability that Carter, having secured his right flank, will turn to the left, and begin a peace campaign starting at the time of the UN General Assembly meetings; (meeting the world statesmen who inevitably come to New York, is a public relations advantage for Carter in any case; Reagan will have to decide whether to meet some, and if so, which ones or to ignore if altogether

-- in any case, Carter may well arrange some negotiations with the Soviets on theater nuclear weapons in Europe, which would placate the Europeans and make him seem a leader for peace, etc.

-- if so, Reagan perhaps should propose a NATO summit in February to examine SALT III and TNF theater nuclear weapons so that the new American Administration can decide how to proceed; (this also deals with attacks on SALT);

-- the second probability is the release of the Iranian hostages where Carter probably will bring some negotiations to free the hostages by election time;

-- again, Reagan could preempt by stating what he will do if elected: i.e., isolate Iran as an international pariah, expell from UN, having our allies break all relations establish economic embargo, etc., but never apologize.

SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

The Carter Administration apparently plans to launch a new "peace initiative" in the last week of September, when Secretary Muskie meets Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York (possibly on September 25). As a result of this meeting, the President is likely to announce agreement to hold the first "preparatory talks" on the limitation of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The President's willingness to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union, exactly nine months after the Afghan invasion, raises some serious questions about the conduct of American foreign policy under the Carter Administration.

## Background

The negotiations are an outgrowth of the increasing concern in NATO over the Soviet build-up of medium range missiles in the western USSR. The Soviet SS-20 missile is mobile, and is equipped with three separate warheads, being deployed at about 150 installations in Western Russia. This new missile has 3-4000 mile range which permits targetting against all of Western Europe. These missiles are in addition to more than 100 new Backfire bombers which are also deployed against Western Europe. Last December the NATO defense ministers emphasized the gap in long range theater nuclear capabilities was "steadily widening." Clearly a NATO and American counter effort was necessary: particularly since in an era of strategic parity or worse, permitting an imbalance in European theater systems becomes especially dangerous.

Our allies insisted on American guarantees that we would be prepared to deploy new medium range missiles to close the gap. Thus, in early December 1979 NATO agreed to a program to replace 108 U.S. Pershing missiles -- a short range ballistic missile stationed in Germany -- with a new version of greater range and capability. In addition it was agreed that 464 medium range U.S. cruise missiles (still under development) would be deployed in Germany, Belguim, the Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom. None of these deployments would begin before 1983.

Actually carrying out this military program, however, is dependent on the political situation in Europe. First of all, the Germans were afraid of being singled out as the only country where new American missile deployments would be made; they insisted that some other European members of the Alliance on the continent (i.e., not England) also agree to take the missiles. In Belgium and in the Netherlands, where there was an apprehension over the Soviet build up, there were also left-wing political forces that would not support a new

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missile deployment without trying first to negotiate with the Soviets. The upshot was that NATO and the U.S., in agreeing on the new missile deployment, also made an offer to negotiate on the reduction of long range theater nuclear weapons in Europe.

This produced a vicious circle. The Germans would not proceed with deployments without the Belgians and the Dutch; the Belgians and Dutch would not proceed with deployments without first trying negotiations. This permitted the Soviets to operate against the weakest link in the chain.

At first the Soviets violently protested and attacked the NATO decision; then they recognized the opportunity created by the situation in Belgium and the Netherlands and they softened their terms. Next, under the pressure of his own election campaign, the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt--fearing that Belguim and Holland would refuse the missiles--suggested that there might be a moratorium on further deployments on both sides. This would leave NATO with no new weapons whatsoever, while the Soviet build up would stop at about 150 separate missile installations--a very dangerous approach. In any case, the Soviets rejected this probably because they calculated that they could get a unilateral NATO missile moratorium simply by agreeing to negotiate. Accordingly, during Schmidt's trip to Moscow in late June the Soviets told him they were ready to negotiate without preconditions. Schmidt, in turn, urged the U.S. to accept and the Administration in early July began studying the offer "in a constructive spirit". On September 7, Secretary Muskie said that the U.S. was prepared for "technical and preparatory" talks, and to "go forward as early as possible."

## The Implications

The beginning of these negotiations raises four major problems:

(1) The mere fact of negotiations creates a potentially worse situation for NATO than the mutual moratorium proposed by Schmidt; under the Schmidt plan at least the Soviets stopped; but at present what is likely to happen is that the talks will be dragged out and the Belgians and Dutch will refuse to go ahead with deploying any missiles as long as there is some hope of a negotiated agreement. The West will be caught in a self-imposed, unilateral moratorium.

(2) Even if some arrangement is made to limit or reduce Soviet missiles, it may produce a major problem in our China policy. Withdrawing missiles from the Western USSR, or even banning them from this area, is no particular concession

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since the missiles are mobile. On the other hand, if missile
deployments are permitted in the Soviet Far East, the Chinese
will certainly object that we are giving the Soviets a free
hand against them. Some U.S. consultation with China is
certainly in order.

(3) The beginning of talks, 10 months after the Afghan invasion, can only be seen as a ratification of the Soviet action by the U.S. and its Western allies. Indeed, the Soviets will be in several negotiations with the West: in bilateral summits (with Schmidt and Gissard), in the Madrid conference on European security, with Secretary Muskie, and finally with the U.S. on theater nuclear weapons. They can only conclude that their brutal actions in Afghanistan have produced *more* negotiations and contacts.

(4) In fact, the Carter Administration seems to be repeating all the policy mistakes of policy of the past three years.

The issue has never been whether to talk to the Soviet Union about arms control, but under what political conditions. The President, however, puts the entire burden of Soviet-American relations on arms control: he did this in 1977-80 during the SALT negotiating and apparently intends to do so again. The immediate problem we have with the Soviets is not one of controlling arms, as important as this may be, but checking the constant Soviet assaults on international order. Since the communist intervention in Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union has employed proxy Cuban troops in Ethiopia in 1977, subversion and assassination in Yemen in 1978, and finally in 1979 the outright invasion of its non-aligned neighbor, Afghanistan. If this continues, then the danger of war grows accordingly, because sooner or later the United States must resist.

But once again the Carter Administration has vacillated. At first the President withdrew the SALT treaty and announced that the Soviet Union must "suffer the consequences". By July, Secretary Muskie admitted to the press that "the President is constantly pressing us to come up with ways to reconcile arms control with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan" (Washington Post, July 17). And if the talks on theater nuclear weapons begin, they certainly will lead to another round in SALT by the back door.

In short, the President is creating another situation in which arms control is being used as a safety valve, while Soviet aggressive behaviour continues.

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A Reagan Administration will support negotiated arms control: this is evident in Governor Reagan's speeches and the Republican party platform. But a Reagan Administration will oppose negotiations that are totally separated from considerations of Soviet international conduct:

- The first order of business with the Soviet Union is a clear cut understanding that Soviet troops and Cuban proxies will not be used in other countries. Without such an understanding there is no sense in arms control negotiations.

- Even if these conditions are met, a Reagan Administration will negotiate on the limitation and reduction of theater nuclear weapons *only* within the context of NATO agreed military strategy and *doctrines*, and not at the expense of third countries.

- Accordingly, a Reagan Administration favors a pause in the negotiations, until a Western summit meeting can be arranged after the U.S. elections to work out a common objective and a common strategy in conducting all arms control negotiations and a common policy in countering Soviet aggression.

# THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE IRANIAN CRISIS

## I. The Present Situation: Background

On the immediate issue, the fate of the hostages, there is no way to predict what will happen between now and November. The Iranian Parliament seems on the verge of taking up the question. Secretary Muskie's letter to the new Iranian Prime Minister is an obvious effort to start a negotiation. The Iranian's reply was sharp in rhetoric but also left the door open to further exchanges and negotiations.

The key issue in any negotiation may well be how far the Carter Administration is willing to go in "repenting" past American policies, as demanded by the Iranian Prime Minister. The Administration is clearly edging in the direction of making an "apology" of some kind, even while it denies that it is doing so. The Administration used to insist, when the crisis began, that we would never even negotiate until the hostages were released; now it appears that we are offering to negotiate before the hostages are released. The Administration at first insisted that it would never "apologize" for past American policy; now the State Department spokesman states ambiguously (Sept. 10) that the United States is prepared to discuss "anything and everything" with Iranian authorities to win the release of the hostages.*

At the same time, negotiations may founder because the release of the hostages may be beyond the capacity of the Iranian government to arrange without jeopardizing its domestic base. The hostages are a pawn in Iranian domestic politics and an easy rallying point for unifying the various revolutionary factions; releasing them will be a highly controversial decision in Iran.

A Presidential candidate in America has the difficult problem of not wanting to do or say anything that might jeopardize--or might seem to Jeopardize--the possibility of negotiation. Obviously all Americans pray for an early release of the hostages, well before the election.

The best position to take on the current negotiations is to say that one will not comment on them. At the same

* Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1980

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time, a number of key issues can be discussed:

- The damage already done by the Iranian crisis to American and free world interests.

- The Administration's record in the handling of this crisis, and what it tells us about its conduct of foreign policy generally.

## II. The Issues Presented by the Iranian Crisis

### A. The Disastrous Consequences of the Iran Crisis.

Whatever the outcome of the hostage crisis, the United States has already paid a heavy price, not only in terms of international humiliation but also in terms of grave damage to the political, economic, and security interests of the whole free world.

Every President since Franklin Roosevelt has agreed on the vital strategic importance of Iran. The Persian Gulf is a region whose security is vital to the West's security and prosperity. It is a traditional focus of first Russian and then Soviet expansionist ambitions. Iran is the most powerful country in the region in terms of population, resources, and military potential. And Iran has been a close friend and ally of the United States since the end of World War II. Each President has expressed his commitment to Iran. President Carter added his voice on New Year's Eve 1977, when he said that:

> "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world."

The collapse of a friendly regime in Iran in early 1979 was one of the West's most serious setbacks since World War II. A strategic country, once a close ally, was taken over by forces hostile to us. The security of the Persian Gulf and that of our remaining moderate friends in the Middle East were placed in serious jeopardy. The region was radicalized. Iran's new anti-Americanism and its severe oil production cutbacks have radicalized OPEC and are directly responsible for the doubling of the price of oil in 1979 and the gasoline crisis endured by Americans last year.

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B. <u>The Administration's Record.</u>

In this campaign, the Administration repeatedly stresses
a President's grave responsibility for keeping the peace and
protecting the free world. What does the Iranian crisis
tell us about how President Carter is meeting this
responsibility?

The Iranian crisis is the biggest foreign policy crisis
of the Carter Administration, and the President's handling
of it is a legitimate subject of public examination. The
Administration's continuing failures in this crisis are
moreover a symptom of its weakness and misjudgments in all
areas of policy. And indeed its approach to foreign policy
is partly responsible for producing the crisis and for
exacerbating it once it began.

The danger of war, or crisis, does not result from some
single deliberate decision to press a button; it comes from
statesmen losing control over events. It comes from allowing
events to drift out of control to the point where we are
faced with only the horrendous choice between resorting to
military action (always a last resort), or else acquiescing
in some major development that is disastrous to our interests.
Allowing that situation to develop in the first place means
that our policy has already failed. Success in foreign
policy means never letting thing develop to that point.

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape events
at an early stage according to our purposes, only exacerbates
crises. It is the hallmark of impotence, and impotence
means that we will drift into further crisis. The resulting
chaos only leads to disaster. The ability of a statesman
to remain in control of events is the true test of his
stewardship. Mr. Carter has failed this test at every stage
of this crisis.

1. Accelerating the Overthrow of the Shah. When our ally the Shah of Iran came under pressure from fanatically anti-American and anti-Western elements, the Administration treated it as a human rights problem instead of as a potential threat to free world strategic interests. When the crisis in Iran developed in 1978 and 1979, the Administration never had a policy at all.

When Brezhnev warned against American interference
in Iran, the US did not tell him flatly it was none
of his business. Instead the President assured
Brezhnev that we had no intention of interfering in

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Iran, hoping the USSR would do the same. Nothing could have been more encouraging to the forces trying to bring down the Shah or more demoralizing to all the pro-American elements in Iran.

As evidence pours out of the Administration's internal deliberations during this period--including damaging revelations by William Sullivan, President Carter's former Ambassador in Iran--the truth is clear: The President lost control even over his own Administration. At least four different factions with conflicting premises and goals began to compete:

- (1) there were those in the State Department, as Ambassador Sullivan has admitted, who came to the incredible conclusion long in advance that it was in our interest to force our ally the Shah out of office at any price, regardless of the damage to the security of the Persian Gulf or the well-being of the free world;

- (2) there were others who naively wanted to replace the Shah with a coalition government--including the revolutionaries--headed by a moderate even such as Shahpour Bakhtiar;

- (3) there was our Embassy's even more naive plan to form a coalition under a pro-Khomeini figure, such as Mehdi Bazargan, and then strike a bargain with Khomeini;

- (4) there was the President's national security adviser who apparently was toying with a military coup.

The story as confirmed by Ambassador Sullivan is one of constant squabbling, hesitation, confusion, and indecision:

- The President made no firm decisions; all policies were allowed to be pursued.

- Since all of the options involved forcing out the Shah and including the revolutionaries in a coalition, the inevitable result was to demoralize the many groups in Iran resisting the revolutionaries, including all the pro-Western and pro-American elements in Iran.

- Since all of the options involved placating the revolutionaries in some degree, this could only convince them that their victory was only a matter of time.

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-- The radicals wanted total power, not simply sharing it in a coalition. And this is what they got.

Of all the possible outcomes of the Iranian crisis, we ended up with the very worst.

The President must accept the responsibility for the outcome. A clear decision among conflicting choices was required; this is precisely the President's job. And all the conflicting options presented to him by his senior officials showed the philosophical naivete that has characterized this Administration: the impulse to ditch a friend, to seek to appease radical enemies, to focus on the immediate with no apparent consciousness of the enormous strategic interests that are at stake in the long term.

2. Inviting the Hostage Crisis. The same pattern of indecision and ineptitude was repeated after Khomeini came to power:

-- The initial hesitation to grant asylum to the Shah when he first left Iran only advertised our fear.

-- The American Embassy was occupied briefly in February, without any apparent lessons drawn from this by the Administration.

-- Andrew Young, the President's UN Ambassador, called Khomeini a "saint."

-- Later, there were warnings by our Embassy that admitting the Shah for medical treatment would pose a danger. The Embassy takeover came three weeks after Carter's decision to admit the Shah. On November 1, three days before the takeover, Iranian radio broadcast a message from the Ayatollah Khomeini calling November 4 an important anniversary; Khomeini called upon Iranian "students" to "expand with all their might their attacks against the United States" on that day.* During that interval, no precautions were taken to protect the American Embassy.

Again, the same deadly combination of indecisiveness and philosophical self-paralysis. The Administration

* The text of the message may be found in *The New Republic*, Nov. 24, 1979.

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seemed incapable of understanding the challenge that it faced--from a fanatical regime that was a sworn enemy of the United States, of Israel, of the Western world. It naively believed it could charm them by assuring them of our goodwill.

3. **Mishandling the Hostage Crisis.** When the terrorists assaulted our Embassy and took our people prisoner on November 4, once again the Administration's pattern of indecision and helplessness repeated itself.

The President and his Administration, from the beginning, misjudged what they were facing. The radicals seized our hostages for specific reasons:

- to undermine the position of any moderates remaining in Iran, and

- to strengthen the power of the radical elements hostile to America and indeed to all moderate forces in the Middle East.

The seizure of our hostages was thus a challenge to the United States with implications far beyond the human challenge of the safety of our people held captive. America's ability--or inability--to master this challenge quickly and decisively was thus of enormous importance to our strategic position in the Middle East and indeed around the world.

By this measure, the Administration has failed utterly. Even if our hostages come home soon, the United States has already suffered a major defeat and humiliation, of global implications. We are seen throughout the world as an impotent bystander, unable even to protect itself while a radical regime holds 52 innocent Americans without a shred of legality and in the face of repeated international condemnations in the UN and the World Court.

Consider the following:

- In the first days of the hostage seizure, the Administration denied that there was a crisis. We even thanked the Bazargan government for the care it had taken of our hostages. We looked on helplessly as the Bazargan government was then overthrown.

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-- The Administration showed itself utterly naive about negotiating with a fanatical regime. The naming of Ramsey Clark as an envoy could only be read as a blatant signal of appeasement. Clark's sympathies are now well known. It may be a stroke of luck that Clark was never received--indeed he was treated with contempt--when he was first sent as an official emissary of Jimmy Carter.

-- Then, the Administration tried threats; it froze Iranian assets and moved naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Yet its attempt at a strong policy was totally undercut by disavowals of the use of force. Three weeks after the seizure, the White House was telling the press that the President's statements did not in any way imply retaliation or "punitive military action." No wonder the threats had no impact.

-- Then the Administration put its faith in so-called "moderate" forces in Iran--defining as "moderate" those elements that were visciously anti-American for leftist reasons instead of for rightist reasons. At each stage some additional reason was found to do nothing.

-- Never did Iran pay any serious price for keeping the hostages. Never at any point were the radical elements confronted with a hard choice of either releasing the hostages or suffering consequences. No wonder it has dragged on so long.

-- The tragic rescue mission of April confirmed yet again that the Administration was badly divided. The Pentagon's postmortem report on the rescue mission shows that it failed not because of bad luck, but because of bad planning, indeed mismanagement.

Since then we have seen a policy of benign neglect, adjusted periodically to the public opinion polls. There were early-morning announcements of nonexistent "breakthroughs" on the mornings of primary elections; the crisis was used as an excuse to adopt a "Rose Garden strategy" to avoid debating Senator Kennedy. The President profited politically from the natural instinct of patriotic Americans to rally behind their leaders in a crisis. When the rescue mission failed, he simply announced that his problems were "manageable"-- so that he could resume campaigning when his political needs required it. It was a cynical performance.

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In light of the Iranian terrorists' objectives--
to strengthen the forces of radicalism and undermine
the American position--they have succeeded admirably.
Our friends in the Middle East are weakened; our
adversaries are strengthened. Even the Camp David
peace process has been adversely affected by the
Iranian revolution, and the radical PLO strengthened.

C. Where Do We Go From Here?

A Reagan Administration will pursue a firm and
unambiguous policy if faced with a similar crisis. The
President will be in charge of his own Administration.

We will base ourselves on two clear, firm principles:

-- The taking of American hostates cannot be
accomplished with impunity. A price will be
paid. America will never again allow itself
to be humiliated in this way.

-- No country can remain on good terms with the
United States and conduct business as usual
with a terrorist regime holding American
hostages.

America will learn once again to distinguish between
its friends and its enemies. We have already learned
that repudiation of friends, and appeasement of implacable
enemies, do not work.

The maintenance of world peace has been made a
central issue in this election. President Carter has
typically gone so far as to claim that only he can
preserve the peace. But in making this claim, he shows
a misunderstanding of the real nature of peace.

It is not the rash act of a President that leads
to war; every President, including Mr. Carter, will try
to behave as prudently as possible.

The danger of war, or crisis, comes from statesmen
losing control over events. It comes from allowing events
to drift out of control to the point where we are faced
with only the horrendous choice between resorting to
military action (always a last resort), or else acquiescing
in some major development that is disastrous to our interests.
Allowing that situation to develop in the first place means
that our policy has already failed. Success in foreign
policy means never letting the situation develop to that
point.

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape
events at an early stage according to our purposes, invites
crises and exacerbates them. This is the hallmark of the
Carter Administration. That is the threat to the peace
of the world. And for that, President Carter must assume
responsibility.

Let us look at the record:

-- Peace is hardly strengthened by the Carter Administration's

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extraordinary feat of having at one and the same time
the worst relations with our allies, the worst relations
with our adversaries, and the most serious upheavals
in the developing world since the end of World War II.

-- There is no peace in Africa, where 50,000 Cuban troops
and Soviet-bloc advisers are deployed in an arc from
Angola to Ethiopia, threatening friendly countries in
Africa, and even menacing the Arabian Peninsula, from
the Horn of Africa. Since 1977 we have seen two invasions
of Zaire from Communist-held territory; a Soviet military
base in South Yemen; mushrooming Soviet arms depots
in Libya, while Libya threatens Tunisia and sponsors
radicalism everywhere; and we see friendly Morocco under
pressure from Communist-armed guerrillas.

-- There is no peace in Southeast Asia, where the North
Vietnamese continue their invasion and occupation of
Cambodia, with the support of the Soviet Union, and threaten
our ally Thailand.

-- There is no peace in Afghanistan, where 100,000 Soviet
troops are vainly trying to subjugate the Afghan freedom
fighters.

-- And now there is no peace in the Persian Gulf, in
the area of the world that is possibly the most vital
to the security and survival of the industrial democracies,
when Iraq and Iran, two countries hostile to us, have
started a war in which we lose whichever side wins.

The harsh fact is that over the past four years,
international crises have multiplied. Each crisis is

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more dangerous than the one before. And the current crisis
is particularly dangerous, for it threatens the price
and supply of oil, that most precious commodity, and
thereby threatens the economic health of all the
industrialized democracies.

We can see three dangers in the present conflict:

First of all, whoever wins the Iran-Iraq war, the
principal beneficiary will be the Soviet Union. Iraq
is a Soviet client and has been for over 20 years.
Since 1972 there has been a formal treaty relationship,
and Soviet arms have turned Iraq into a substantial
military power that is now bidding for dominance of
the Persian Gulf. It was this trend that caused the pro-
Western government in Iran to seek American arms in 1972,
and while it was in power it was a counterweight to Iraq.
Now, after the collapse of that friendly government in Iran
and the foolish excesses of the Iranian revolution, Iraq
is filling the vacuum of power. The West's nightmare for
the last ten years is about to come true: A radical anti-
Western state is on the verge of becoming the predominant
power in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, as the fighting
broke out, a top Iraqi official rushed to Moscow where
he was demonstratively received by a top ranking Secretary
of the Soviet Party Central Committee.

The second danger is the impact of this conflict on
our friends, the moderates states in the Middle East.

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Their reaction is predictable when they observe two trends; first, that every international conflict in the last three years has been settled decisively by Soviet arms, by Soviet clients, with the support of Soviet friendship treaties; and second, that Iraq now threatens to emerge as the dominant military power in the Gulf. They will not turn to us, as the Carter Administration naively believes. Even Iran may have no choice but to adjust to strategic realities, and either seek Moscow's protection or face disintegration.

The third danger lies in this further, and monumentally serious, demonstration of American impotence and irrelevance.

The President has proclaimed our neutrality, and I am prepared to support this position and not to second-guess his tactical decisions. But he needs to explain his policies to the American people.

-- The President insists on our right of free passage through the Straits of Hormuz, where 100 tankers pass each day. But what is our policy for guaranteeing it? What will we do if Iraqi or Iranian forces close the Straits?

-- And while we may be neutral, we clearly have vital interests in the area, as the President himself has proclaimed. What steps are we taking to coordinate our policies with our allies, who are even more vulnerable to disruption of the oil lifeline? After all, 40 percent of the world's oil supplies pass through the Gulf. This is an area where 8 million barrels a day of Saudi Arabian oil are shipped. Iraq supplies 500,000 barrels of oil every day to France, 400,000 to Brazil, and 200,000 to Japan, to say nothing of the supplies to Europe from other Gulf states.

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Where is the firebreak beyond which the radical assault on the moderate states and our friends will be resisted? If we cannot answer this question, the radicalization of the whole area will be inevitable.

And even if this particular crisis passes, we still face the more fundamental problem of the Carter Administration's failed approach to international affairs:

- The President did not respond in 1977, when the Cuban and Soviets first intervened in Ethiopia.

- The President did not respond, in 1978, when the Communists first overthrew the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

- The President did not respond in 1979, when he accepted a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba that he two weeks earlier had declared "unacceptable," and when our policies accelerated the process by which Iran turned from a key ally into a cauldron of anti-Americanism.

- and he did not develop an effective policy last Christmas, when the Red Army march into Afghanistan.

It is this pattern of vacillation and inaction that produces the threat to world peace. We cannot continue to abdicate our international responsibilities without paying an enormous price.

## The Requirements of Peace

What needs to be done to maintain world peace?

Peace depends on restoring the four fundamental pillars of an effective foreign policy.

First, we must restore the strategic military balance, in both intercontinental and conventional

-6-

weaponry. We cannot permit every major measure of military
power to turn against us without incurring drastic
political losses in a world in turmoil. For it is
American weakness that provokes crises, not American
strength.

Second, we must regain the confidence of our allies
and restore the regional balances of power. Where will
we draw the line in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?
We must build a firebreak against the advance of radicalism
and Communism in this vital area. If we fail to support
and reassure our friends there, then the entire area will
turn viciously against us and against our allies.

The third requirement for peace is to restore, in
Washington, an understanding of what is happening in the
world. We must have a strategy for coping with our future,
instead of the zigzagging and piecemeal decisions that
are the hallmark of the Carter Administration. We simply
cannot improvise our way through every crisis and confronta-
tion, allowing contradictory policies to run simultaneously
because the President can't make a decision. Our long-term
defense policy cannot succeed with a President who declared
in 1976 and 1977 that the defense budget needed to be
cut by $7 billion, and then raised it by $5 billion two
years later. This is political manipulation, and not a
national strategy.

On the basis of these principles,
and only on this basis, must we turn to the question of

-7-

negotiating with the Soviet Union. But it is not possible to concentrate only on measures of controlling arms. The threat to the peace in the recent period has been the continuing Soviet geopolitical assault on the world balance of power. The Soviet Union must therefore be made to negotiate about that, together with the control of arms.

The Administration's misunderstanding of this reality is shown by the President's recent news conference in which, before Secretary Muskie had even met with Foreign Minister Gromyko, the President already announced the outcome; and the outcome is another arms control negotiation, without any reference to the foreign policy context.

* * *

All Americans are united in the yearning for peace. This is not a partisan dispute. What is in dispute, however, is whether the vacillations of this Administration are not inviting crises and contributing to the danger of conflict. That is the issue the American people must face as we enter a decade of new dangers.

9/24

Final

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape
events at an early stage according to *our* purposes, invites
crises and exacerbates them. This is the hallmark of the
Carter Administration. *That* is the threat to the peace
of the world. And for that, President Carter must assume
responsibility.

Let us look at the record:

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## The Requirements of Peace

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* * *

10/2/80

# IRAN-IRAQ INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

## General Considerations

The briefing is likely to be a general one, emphasizing the present military situation. The political questions are far more interesting than the technical details of what intelligence we have. For example, what did we know before-hand and what did we do about it, if anything? And second, what is the assessment of other countries as to the outcome? Did we suffer a setback in the eyes of key countries in Europe, the Middle East and nearby areas? Are the Soviets perceived as the gainers?

It is worth remembering that in the period before the war, i.e., the month of September, the Administration was sending messages to Iran, hinting at negotiations, and making semi-optimistic statements. What was the working assumption about hostilities underlying these actions and statements?

Once the war began, a critical question was the degree of Soviet involvement in resupplying and or encouraging Iraq. Was there a real basis for praising the Soviets for restraint? Soviet "restraint" objectively helped Iraq to prevail. The Soviets stalled in the Security Council until Iraq had achieved its objective. Then it advocated a ceasefire, that is to say, helped Iraq clinch its gain. Were the Soviets actively trying to end the fighting or merely going through the motions while their clients achieved their objectives? And was this the right time to conclude the Muskie-Gromyko agreement to begin negotiations about theater nuclear weapons in Europe? The Governor should keep these issues in mind even if he does not raise them himself.

Finally, there is the question of where we go from here: Is fighting likely to erupt again? Is Iran turning to Moscow? Are we working against Khomeini, etc.? It may be of particular importance to have an official estimate, in light of the volatile situation. Another round of fighting, threats to oil supplies, etc., in later October obviously have an impact on the election campaign.

In sum, what did we know and when, and what do we think will happen now? These are the important questions.

More specific questions are attached.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

1. <u>Early Warning</u>

What degree of early warning was available to the US?
What specific indicators were collected? How were they
interpreted, and what actions, if any, were taken?

-- Usually there is some indication from communications
intelligence (or other technical intelligence or overhead
photography) of impending troop movements, or standdown
of aircraft, protective measures, etc.

-- Were any specific intelligence collection measures adopted
in the past several weeks in anticipation of actual fighting?
What specifically?

-- What do we know of political or military support for or
encouragement of Iraq by the Soviet Union in the weeks
<u>before</u> the fighting began?

-- Were any "Alert Memoranda" prepared for the NSC before
the fighting? If so, what was their conclusion?

Comment: Obviously the outbreak of fighting in this region
should be of major importance for the US. Yet the <u>N.Y. Times</u>
indicated we were poorly prepared on all counts:

"The war between Iran and Iraq exposed serious deficiencies in United States intelligence-gathering abilities in the strategically vital Persian Gulf region, according to senior aides in the Carter Administration and intelligence officials." (N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1980)

If, in fact, the US had some warning, the question arises of what diplomatic action was taken to head off the fighting: Were the Soviets approached? Were the Iranians warned?

## 2. The Course of the War

What were the predictions on the course of the war? Specifically, did we estimate the destruction of oil facilities in Iran and Iraq? Did we predict the probability of Iraqi occupation of the oil regions of Iran? How did we assess the Iranian performance? Did we anticipate the loss of oil production? How much has in fact been lost?

What has been the Soviet role during the war? Specifically: -- Has there been any resupply to Iran of ammunition, weapons, etc.?

-- What has been the diplomatic relationship between Iraq and the USSR during the fighting?

-- What position did the Soviet take in the UN and in talks with the US? What assessment has been made about Soviet policy in the future, specifically about Soviet overtures to Iran, after the fighting is ended?

## 3. What have the various embassies, CIA stations, etc., in the area and in other key countries (Europe and Middle East especially) concluded about the conflict? Is this a setback for the US, a gain for the USSR? How is our performance being rated in various quarters? What assessments of popular opinion have been made

by ICA or CIA?

-- What is the Israeli view? Sadat's?

4. What is the assessment of the impact of the defeat on Iranian politics?

-- Is Khomeini strengthened or weakened? What is the impact on various Iranian political factions?

-- Does the US have any plans for operations inside Iran or in other areas to affect the internal political situation? If so, what are they and their purpose and chances of success?

-- What is the likelihood of the release of the hostages?

5. What is the short and middle-term outlook?

-- Will Iran resume the fighting? Will Iraq? What is likelihood of a blockade of the Straits? Is it feasible with ships or mines?

-- Will both sides need new military supplies, and how much? Is Soviet resupply beginning?

-- What is the likely future relationship between Iran and the Soviet Union? Is a Soviet mediating role possible?

What evidence is there of this?

6. What is the impact on oil supplies and prices?

-- How much damage has been done to Iraq and Iran?

-- What will market trends be?

-- Is the USSR likely to begin buying Iranian oil? Iraqi?

10/3

IRAN-IRAQ WAR: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What is the status of any exchanges or negotiations (direct or indirect) with Iran? (This is suggested by the second Muskie letter which reportedly reassured Iran of our neutrality.)

2. What is the status of U.S. exchanges with other Gulf and Middle East states, including Israel (in addition to Muskie's conversations with the Iraqi foreign minister)? What position is the US adopting in these various exchanges in New York at the UN or elsewhere? What have the individual countries had to report about the war, and what is their evaluation of the future? What is the assessment of President Zia? (According to the press reports, Muskie has ended a round of extensive meetings in New York with the various Islamic and Arab states, after which he announced that the chances of the conflict spreading had "diminished somewhat.")

3. What have Zia or Pakistani sources said to us about Gromyko's offer of "security guarantees" to Pakistan?

4. What is the essence of the exchanges on a proposed allied contingency force to keep open the Gulf? (According to Secretary Muskie, these exchanges are continuing with our allies on a "technical level.")

A-6

Pakistan's Zia, Carter
Meet for Talks Today

By Louis Halasz
Time-Life News Service

UNITED NATIONS — When Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq meets with President Carter and his aides today, questions are likely to be raised about Zia's solicitude displayed toward the Soviet Union during a U.N. speech Wednesday.

With Zia will be his foreign minister, Agha Shahi, and finance minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The Pakistanis expect all the troublesome issues of the region, from the Iran-Iraq conflict through Afghanistan to the Cambodian problem to come up.

According to Pakistani sources, he again will complain about the inadequacy of the promised $200 million in military assistance, which at one time he called "peanuts."

In several instances Wednesday, Zia softened prepared comments about the Soviet Union. For example, in the prepared text he referred to "superpower rivalry" as being behind the "tragic conflict" in Afghanistan, but in delivery he changed that to "colonial legacy," a Third World code phrase for Western powers.

The cumulative effect of these changes was a more deferential treatment of the Soviet Union, and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie was asked in a press conference yesterday afternoon whether he saw "any connection" between the changes and Zia's pending Washington trip.

Without rejecting the idea of a connection, Muskie said, "We better try to make that determination after we have met President Zia and his representatives — he should be the best authority on that."

High-level Pakistani sources, queried in the United Nations, said the changes had been made after Agha Shahi's "very good meeting" with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko last week. As a result, Agha Shahi thought it was advisable to make the references to the Soviet Union "less brusque," these sources said.

In that meeting Gromyko was described as quite understanding about the Pakistani refusal to negotiate directly with the Kabul regime and offered "security assurances" to Islamabad, Pakistanis here said.

Muskie said chances of the Iran-Iraq conflict spreading seem to have

"diminished somewhat," which makes it less likely Western navies will intervene to assure oil shipments from the Persian Gulf.

He also denied Iranian allegations of collusion between Iraq and the United States in the 11-day-old war between the two Persian Gulf neighbors.

Muskie, ending nine days of high-level meetings with foreign government officials attending the U.N. General Assembly, said he hoped Islamic or U.N. initiatives would end the war quickly.

"The risks of escalation and the consequences of escalation obviously pose very difficult problems for all concerned," Muskie said.

"(But) at the present moment hostilities seem to have diminished somewhat," he added. "The broader risks seem to have diminished somewhat and I hope we can continue in that direction...."

Muskie said that there was "evidence of deliberate restraint" in Iran's approach to shipping through the vital Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passageway between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. At the outset of the war, Iran had declared portions of the gulf a "war zone."

"There have been no attempts by Iran to block... or harass that shipping" moving through the gulf, except for one or two instances where an Iranian patrol boat has hailed a freighter "to determine the cargo and destination," Muskie said.

Among the contingency plans reportedly being considered by the United States is creation of an international naval task force to assure the movement of oil through the strait and to the West. Some 40 percent of the West's imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf region.

Asked if it was necessary to mount an international naval force to keep the straits open, Muskie replied:

"Discussions on a technical level and on a contingency basis are under way... With respect to the possibilities of such a contingency arising, they seem to have diminished in the last couple of days.

"There has been no interruption of shipping and... indeed, some evidence of deliberate restraint with respect to that," he added. "So it may well be that the risks of that contingency arising have diminished."

This article is based in part on wire service reports.

10/6/80

THE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL

The Carter Administration is once again resorting to the tactic of "overstatement" (as Jody Powell has acknowledged). This time they claim that the election will decide whether there will be a new "arms race" with the Soviet Union. According to the Administration, only the ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty, signed by Brezhnev in June last year, will avoid a new round of arms escalation.

This approach completely distorts the real arms control issues. The real issues are: Under what political conditions should we consider arms control agreements? And what is the most effective approach to negotiations?

(1) From the very outset this Administration has pursued arms control with the Soviet Union on the wrong basis. It has treated any agreement as an end in itself, regardless of Soviet behavior. Consequently, the Administration became a prisoner of its own mistaken philosophy. Each time the Soviets launched an aggressive probe or assault on the international order, the Administration refused to question whether Soviet conduct was compatible with continuing the SALT negotiations.

Consider the record while SALT was being negotiated:

-- In Africa, 50,000 Cuban troops and Soviet-bloc advisers were deployed in an arc from Angola to Ethiopia, threatening friendly countries in Africa, and even menacing the Arabian Peninsula from the Horn of Africa. Since 1977 we have seen two invasions of Zaire from Communist-held territory; a Soviet military base in Ethiopia and South Yemen; mushrooming Soviet arms depots in Libya, while Libya threatens Tunisia and sponsors radicalism everywhere; and we see friendly Morocco under pressure from Communist-armed guerrillas.

-- We have witnessed the North Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, launched shortly after Hanoi's signature of a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Now our ally Thailand is threatened.

-- In Afghanistan, there was a Communist coup in April 1978; and, of course, an invasion 15 months later.

-- And now a heavily armed Soviet client (Iraq) is fighting in the Persian Gulf, in the area of the world that is possibly the most vital to the security and survival of the industrial democracies.

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The harsh fact is that over the past four years, international crises have multiplied and each has been encouraged or exploited by the Soviet Union. In each case the Carter Administration continued and indeed accelerated the SALT negotiations, arguing that international tensions made them more necessary than ever. In this manner SALT, rather than easing international tensions, exacerbated them. Under Carter's management the negotiations were used by the Soviets as a safety valve for aggressive international conduct.

But even after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration vacillated. At first the President withdrew the SALT treaty and announced that the Soviet Union must "suffer the consequences". By July, Secretary Muskie admitted to the press that "the President is constantly pressing us to come up with ways to reconcile arms control with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." Then, a few weeks ago, Secretary Muskie and Gromyko agreed to start a new arms control negotiation on theater nuclear weapons in Europe, on October 13. The beginning of these talks, 10 months after the Afghan invasion, can only be seen as a ratification of the Soviet action by the U.S.

In short, the President is creating another situation in which arms control is being used as a safety valve, while Soviet aggressive behavior continues.

(2) The second issue is whether to conduct negotiations in order to rectify strategic imbalances, or to pursue them in the name of avoiding another "arms race." The fact is that the United States has fallen beyond in almost every major category of strategic military power. The current SALT treaty will not significantly affect these trends. We have reached a point where these trends can only be checked and reversed by a vigorous American defense effort.

Will this touch off an arms race? Let us examine the record of SALT I.

In 1969, against major opposition from the Democratic Congress, the United States approved funding for its own ABM system, five years after the Soviet Union had begun its deployment. We were told then that this decision would end all hope for SALT; in fact it laid the basis for it. In 1967 at Glassboro, President Johnson had proposed to Premier Kosygin to limit ABM systems. Kosygin had dismissed the offer contemptuously as the most ridiculous suggestion he had ever heard. Only after a Republican Administration insisted on an American ABM did the Soviets agree to talk about it; indeed for a while they would talk of nothing else.

In the next round of SALT, therefore, the US must be
in a position to meet its strategic objectives with or
without an agreement. Whether this produces new competition
is up to the Soviet Union. It is far more likely that it
will create a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to
consider a new and more meaningful agreement.

The alternative, championed by President Carter, is
to continue business as usual; beginning negotiations on
further agreements without regard to aggressive Soviet
behavior, and insisting on the approval of old agreements
regardless of strategic and political realities. This will
cause arms control to fail and encourage more Soviet-organized
crises around the world.

CHINA POLICY

The new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, when it developed in 1971-72, was perceived by both sides as a strategic necessity, not a sentimental reconciliation. Ideological differences remained. But the international environment--the growth of Soviet power and ambitions--has increasingly led China and America to conduct parallel foreign policies. Political consultation and coordination have reached a degree of intimacy that makes us de facto allies on most international issues.

## The Chinese View of the World

The Chinese perceive the world in classical balance of power terms. They see the Soviet drive for hegemony as the world's principal political and security problem. Their views on almost all international issues are colored by their fear or antagonism toward the Soviet Union. (It is not true in all cases. On occasion their sense of ideological loyalty toward fellow leftists, though tempered, has encouraged results that are contrary to their geopolitical interest, for example their support for Hanoi before 1975, or their support for the more militant positions in Southern Africa.) The Chinese are strong supporters of NATO, consistently urging the West Europeans to strengthen their defense efforts and not to be lulled by Soviet overtures

-2-

for European detente. The Chinese likewise encourage
Japan to maintain solidarity with the United States and
the other industrial democracies. The Chinese consistently
urge the United States to build up its defenses, maintain
a strong military presence in both Europe and Asia, and to
be suspicious of Soviet arms control proposals. The Chinese
have always been concerned, moreover, with what they call
the "southern rim of Eurasia"--the region stretching from
Turkey to Iran to Pakistan. These three countries used
to be close friends of both China and the United States;
the Chinese correctly saw the region as a crucial barrier
to a Soviet breakthrough to the Indian Ocean and a check
on pro-Soviet radicalism in the Middle East. The Chinese
were close friends of the Shah of Iran and were horrified
at the spectacle of American impotence during and after
the Iranian revolution. On the Arab-Israeli dispute,
the Chinese support the Arab cause and even the PLO; however,
this support is mostly rhetorical and the Chinese have
generally welcomed American diplomatic efforts as the best
means of eroding Soviet influence.

## What the Chinese Want from Us

The Chinese want the long-term assurance that our
weight is linked to theirs on the scales of the balance of
power, counterbalancing the Soviet Union. Until about 1978,

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(4)

this geopolitical coordination was far more important to them than trade and technical assistance. Today they clearly seek Western help in building their industrial, technological, and agricultural base, but the Chinese undoubtedly continue to believe in the primacy of politics over economics.

If the United States proves weak, or unreliable as a guardian of the balance of power against the Soviets, our value to the Chinese diminishes. If America should, by weakness or vacillation, make itself irrelevant as a power factor, the Chinese may have little choice but to reconsider the option of seeking the best accommodation possible with the Soviet Union.

The Chinese nightmare is US-Soviet collusion. They would undoubtedly prefer that the United States have no dealings whatever with the Soviet Union. Peking would prefer to see us so antagonistic to the Soviet Union that it need pay no price at all for a collaborative relationship with Washington. In such conditions, the protection afforded by the American relationship would be "free."

## The American Interest

In this sense, American and Chinese objectives are not identical. Our objective is not unambiguous alignment with China but a triangular relationship that gives us better options toward either the Soviet Union or China than either has with each other. We clearly must lean toward China in the near

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term because it is the weaker and the more threatened of
the two Communist giants. As Chinese power grows, the
relationship may become more clearly triangular. Our
relationship with Moscow has its own necessities and
dynamics; as the two nuclear superpowers, we and the
Soviet Union must maintain a dialogue on international
questions at a minimum in order to avoid miscalculations.
With the Chinese we may find ourselves in basic agreement
on strategy but in occasional disagreement on tactics.

At the same time we have a vital stake in China's
survival and security. Even in the absence of a formal
defense commitment, a sober geopolitical assessment of
the American national interest leads to the conclusion
that we cannot afford to see China militarily defeated
by the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union should succeed
in destroying China, or humiliating China by a successful
limited military move, the result would be to dramatize
Chinese weakness and alter all perceptions of the world
balance of power. Reducing China to impotence would free
the Soviet Union to throw the whole weight of its military
effort against the West. If we stood by and watched
China smashed, such a demonstration of Soviet ruthlessness
and American impotence (or indifference--the result would
be the same) would encourage accommodation to other Soviet
demands from Japan to Western Europe, not to speak of the
many smaller countries on the Soviet periphery.

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## The "China Card"

Thus the relationship cannot be viewed as a crude attempt to play China off against the Soviet Union. In 1971, it is true, the Soviet Union became more accommodating in both the Berlin and SALT negotiations after our China initiative. But when the Carter Administration expected similar Soviet concessions on SALT in 1978 after the announcement of normalized relations with China--and was so foolish as to predict it publicly--the Soviets dug in their heels, unwilling to fall for the same trick twice.

China is not a "card" for us to play. The Sino-Soviet rivalry has its own origins and dynamics that we are not in a good position to manipulate. Neither Peking nor Moscow is quarreling with the other as a favor to us; they both to some extent seek good relations with us because they are quarreling. We cannot "exploit" that rivalry; it exploits itself. To the extent that we attempt to aggravate that rivalry, we may risk losing our gains. Paradoxically, we might even disquiet Peking by doing so: To speak of a China card implies that for a price we might not play it. The Chinese have often expressed the fear that having achieved our objective with Moscow we might find Peking ex- pendable. Thus, a bald attempt to manipulate Peking might drive China into detaching itself from us, perhaps to

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reexamine its options with the Soviet Union, to gain control
of its own destiny. More dangerously, any move by us to
play the Chinese card might tempt the Soviets to end their
nightmare of hostile powers on two fronts by lashing out
violently in one direction before it is too late--probably
against China, which is weaker and not protected by a formal
American alliance system.

Taiwan

The President-elect's statement of August 25, 1980, should
be sufficient to lay the Taiwan issue to rest as an irritant
in US-Chinese relations. The United States can maintain
its position that, as a matter of principle, we feel a
stake in reunification's taking place by peaceful means; the
Chinese will maintain their position that, as a matter of
principle, the manner of reunification is none of our
business. Since the likelihood of reunification is largely
theoretical, the question is academic at this point. We
have some scope for conducting our relations with Taiwan in
a more dignified manner if we simply do so quietly. Therefore,
the less said about Taiwan the better. Public statements or
flaunted actions by one side will inevitably provoke reactions
from the other, hindering the coordination of policies in the
international arena which should be the priority for both
countries.

CHINA POLICY

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## The American Interest

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## The "China Card"

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Taiwan

[LC]

## SELECTION OF AMBASSADORS

The selection of non-career ambassadors of high quality is an important factor in implementing the President-elect's conditions that:

1) people of excellence be chosen for government service,

2) U.S. foreign policy be cohesive, consistent and in the national interest, and

3) the Secretary of State be the Administration's preeminent foreign policy advisor and spokesman.

The central role of an ambassador in formulating and implementing foreign policy, in coordinating U.S. activities abroad and in representing U.S. interests is a crucial link in the conduct of external relations. He must serve as:

- the central source of information about his post and, most importantly the central source of interpretation and analysis of disparate pieces of information as they impact on U.S. policies and interests

- the chief overseer and coordinator of foreign activities of all other U.S. agencies represented in his post

- the representative of all U.S. interests and policies

- the primary channel through which U.S. policies are implemented by turning decisions into actions

It is obviously crucial that a high priority be given to the careful evaluation of potential ambassadorial appointees. The following recommendations on procedures for selection and qualifications to be met will hopefully facilitate that process.

PROCEDURES FOR THE SELECTION OF AMBASSADORS

In general, ambassadorial appointments should be made as quickly
as possible, but not at the expense of quality appointments.

Resignations of all present ambassadors should already be in hand.

First priority should be given to determining which of the existing
ambassadors are doing an excellent job and which have proven detrimental
to U.S. interests in their posts abroad. Those who present fundamental
problems in carrying out the new Administration's policies should be
removed immediately. In general, it is less harmful to U.S. interests
to allow a mission to function under the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)
for a period of time than to leave an incompetent or disloyal ambassador
at his post. However, the ambassadorial post should not be left
unfilled for more than two or three months.

Jimmy Carter's Advisory Commission on Presidential Appointments (Askew Commission) did not improve the quality of ambassadorial appointments, and it had the additional disadvantage of functioning in a public atmosphere, complicating the already sensitive nature of non-career appointments. Such an approach is to be avoided. Instead, I recommend the establishment of a small, ad hoc group of knowledgeable individuals within the State Department and White House to recommend appointments to the President. This group would assist in the evaluation of potential appointees and in matching up appointees with countries to which they are best suited. It should include some senior Foreign Service officers and should be unpublicized.

No ambassadorial appointments should be made prior to the
appointment of the Secretary of State. The Secretary should receive
notification on all appointments.

2

During the last few administrations, non-career ambassadors have filled 25-30% of appointments. This is an appropriate balance. No country should necessarily be reserved either for career or for non-career slots. (To date the United Kingdom is the only post never filled by a career ambassador.)

I recommend that, in general, the criteria for non-career appointees be stiffer than in the past. The new Administration has an opportunity to improve the quality of non-career appointments by establishing more stringent requirements, both in terms of qualifications and training, for appointees. These requirements should be made clear well in advance:

- as an incentive to top quality, serious candidates who want to make a significant contribution to foreign policy

- as a disincentive to prospective candidates who mistakenly believe that an ambassadorship is a cushy job with a glamorous title

Ambassador Neumann, or some other designee, should request country profiles on all states receiving ambassadorial representation. This should include all information on language necessities, relevant historical data, and current and potential political, cultural, economic and military factors. These should be used to "match-up" relevant talents of potential appointees.

## QUALIFICATIONS

Qualities required for appointment should be derived from both the requirements of the specific post and the general qualities necessary to fulfill the tasks assigned to ambassadors in general.

The country profiles previously mentioned will assist in determining the specialized requirements for certain missions.

The new Administration might consider the classification of

3

countries into various categories to facilitate placement of appointees, keeping in mind that particular types of countries require differing skills.

- **First Priority Countries** — those in which U.S. policies and interests are critical: In high priority countries (e.g., Soviet Union, Israel, P.R.C., West Germany) the ambassador should be automatically consulted on a regular basis. Besides the necessity for representative skills, emphasis should be placed on the analytical capabilities of appointments to such posts.

This category should also include the middle range nations that are increasingly vital to the survival and functioning of the United States, such as the oil and mineral producing countries. In particular, this groups should include: Mexico, Canada, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, South Africa and the Arab oil-producing nations.

- **Second Priority Countries** — those with essentially a passive relationship with the U.S. (e.g., Netherlands, Sweden): Ambassadors to these countries should be skilled in framing reports in conceptual terms.

- **Third Priority Countries** — those receiving ambassadors primarily because they exist: (Burundi, Uruguay, Nepal, New Guinea).

In general, certain characteristics of Ambassadors are particularly desirable, while others should be considered to argue against selection of a particular candidate.

Desirable characteristics:

4

-- a good working relationship with the President and/or the Secretary of State

-- loyalty/discretion

-- an ability and track record of being a thoughtful, innovative person who can make useful input into policy and, when a decision is made, carries it out

-- negotiating skills

-- demonstrated success in managerial skills

-- good "image" as representative of the United States

-- demonstrated understanding of the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy

-- demonstrated understanding of basic economic principles

The President-elect should not consider individuals who have a "lone-ranger" type personality. It is extremely important that ambassadors have the ability to function as a "team" member. Appointment of highly controversial or confrontational type individuals should also be avoided.

The new Administration should also obtain pledges in advance that the appointee would publish no materials without first clearing them through the State Department and would take no files without authorization.

In the past, many potentially valuable individuals have been dissuaded from considering acceptance of an ambassadorial post because of the complicated conflict-of-interest restrictions. The new Administration should review these reporting requirements, with an eye to eliminating those that are not necessary of overly stringent.

5

In considering potential appointees, the new Administration should consider individuals who, in addition to meeting other qualification requirements, have contributed significantly of their time and skills in assisting the President-elect. This should include Democrats whose policy goals are in concert with the new Administration.

## TRAINING

In the past, training sessions for new ambassadors have been insufficient. A three to four week requirement should not be considered too onerous for appointees.

There is an opportunity for the new President and Secretary of State to make an excellent and much needed contribution to the training process. Specifically, I recommend:

- the new Secretary of State should establish a working team to make sure the new ambassadors meet with the relevant people, including heads of Departments and agencies and relevant members of Congress

- briefings for the new ambassadors should not be left solely in the hands of desk officers, but should include briefings by the relevant Department heads and members of Congress mentioned above

- seminars for new career and non-career ambassadors should be expanded and improved

- follow-up training should be planned by the mission for the new ambassador immediately upon his arrival to his post

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- if relevant language skills are not already possessed by the appointee, immediate language training should be undertaken. In addition, an immersion in cultural and political factors would be desirable.

- to the extent possible, training should be tailored to specific countries (e.g., briefings by organized labor should be arranged for ambassadors to West European countries)

- training courses for ambassadors' spouses, tailored to the specific types of problems they can expect to encounter, should be expanded

## EVALUATION

Satisfactory evaluation of ambassadorial performance has been difficult, if not impossible, in the past. Similar problems can only be expected to continue. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State to determine when a particular ambassador is jeopardizing the U.S. interests and should be recalled. He should be the individual to pass this judgement on to the President. Such a situation must be handled discretely and on an ad hoc basis. No standardized procedure is possible.

The new Administration should also evaluate means for acknowledging excellence in service. It should consider the advisability of reinstituting the rank of "Career Ambassador" as an incentive for career officers.

## ENSURING THE PRIMACY OF THE AMBASSADOR

To ensure the primacy of the Ambassador in representing U.S. interests at his post, I recommend:

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- continuing the practice of transmitting a letter from the President to all ambassadors, assigning him responsibility for representation of all U.S. interests in his post

- transmittal of a similar letter from the President to all Cabinet heads, specifying the overall primacy of ambassadors in representing U.S. interests in his post

- reduction of separate reporting channel, where possible, with reports channeled through the ambassador.

## AMBASSADORS AT LARGE

There are currently seven Ambassadors at large. I recommend that these posts be held to a minimum. They should be appointed only for specific tasks and the duration of their appointment should be limited to the time needed to fulfill that task.

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Let us look at the record:

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