OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

FT. LESLEY J. MCNAIR

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT WITH
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GROUP
LOGISTICS DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

21 May 1951

TELEPHONE
EXECUTIVE 7700

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Due to a recent change in our administrative procedures we are now asking all applicants being currently considered for employment to submit the following forms as specified: six signed Security Questionnaires, one completed and signed fingerprint chart. Please make certain that each form and the fingerprint chart are signed. If you will sign the enclosed PSQ forms we shall be glad to complete them here on the basis of the form you previously submitted.

The fingerprint chart may be completed at any first or second class Post Office or at any local police station.

Please give this matter your immediate attention, returning forms and fingerprint chart in the enclosed envelope.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
253 E. Boylston Street
Watertown, Massachusetts

Mission of Proposed Contract with the Governmental Affairs Institute

1. The Governmental Affairs Institute will prepare a plan for research
in the field of military government and related activities.

2. The ultimate objective of the research will be:

a. To specify the primary and secondary source materials now
scattered across the world which must be used as a basis for
understanding and evaluating past experiences in military
government/civil affairs/occupation programs.

b. To review past experiences in military government/civil
affairs/occupation programs with a view to obtaining knowledge
that will be useful in making practical decisions regarding:

(1) planning for; (2) mobilizing for; (3) the conduct of; and

(4) policy control of military government/civil affairs/occupation
programs.

3. The plan for research will

a. Identify generally the major sources of information
(documents, special studies, and personal knowledge) on
military government/civil affairs/occupation programs.

b. Identify the problem areas that are researchable in
terms of the availability of (1) data; and (2) available
analytic methods.

c. Specify in detail the content and range of appropriate methods
for possible individual research projects.

d. Outline the requirements including time, staff, and financial
resources for the undertaking of such projects.

May 23, 1951

From Washington Evening Star, Saturday, June 16, 1951

SH-H-H! THOSE SIRENS RUSHED HUSH-HUSH DATA TO NEW HOME - By Harry Lever

Sh-h-h-h!

The Army used everything but neon lights and a brass band to advertise
the fact it was moving a top-secret agency last night.

The secret of the "secret" move up Connecticut avenue at 50 miles an
hour was known to everybody but the deaf and the blind, as rush-hour crowds
scurried from the path of police cars and promptly called newspapers to
find out why.

The calls lasted until midnight, when the last of about six convoys
carrying equipment and files of the hush-hush Office of Research finally
discharged its contents in front of the former Chevy Chase Junior College
at 6410 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., new headquarters of the research office.

An earlier convoy, one of several carrying classified material, screamed
to a stop with sirens wailing, frightening a bride and groom as they emerged
from the marriage ceremony in a nearby church. They hadn't figured their
wedding called for that much noise.

Connecticut avenue was comparatively quiet until the first convoy made
its dash from Fort Lesley McNair.

It was led by two fast-moving Metropolitan Police motorcycle men, and
rush-hour traffic sought safety. Next came a cruiser of the Armed Forces
Police Detachment, then two big, black and long trailer trucks, presumably
bristling with machine-gunners. Then another AFPD cruiser and more motor-
men. Every vehicle equipped with a siren had it going full blast.

The rumor spread: Atom material going to the National Bureau of
Standards for testing.

Meanwhile, the military remained mum until the calls grew too persistent.
Finally they gave a hint.

At about that time a woman telephoned.

"What's happening?" she asked.

"It's a secret move by the Army," she was told.

"Did you say secret?" she asked incredulously. "Why, all hell's breaking
loose up here."

20 June 1951

TO: W. P. Champlain, Jr.

FROM: Richard U. Sherman, Jr.

SUBJECT: Henry Alfred Kissinger

Kissinger tells me that he has a moral obligation to help
out Bill Elliott on a part time basis in Cambridge during the
next five weeks. Obviously we want to play ball with Bill
Elliott.

The simplest way to handle the situation in my opinion
would be to (1) defer Kissinger's temporary appointment until
1 August 1951 or the time when he has fulfilled his obligation to
Bill Elliott, whichever is the earlier and (2) to put Kissinger
on as a consultant immediately with a per diem rate equivalent to
his proposed ORO salary, i.e. $25 a day.

This procedure has the great advantage of flexibility. It
will enable Kissinger to adjust his plans from week to week with
respect to the number of days he is able to spend at ORO, which
he estimates will average about three days a week during this
period. It is understood that during this five-week period ORO
would pay his transportation to and from Cambridge.

I have discussed this matter with Kissinger and with
Stolzenbach, both of whom concur in the above problem.

RUS:is

RUB:ia

Björkamp, both of whom concern in the above problems.

I have discussed this matter with Klaasen and with

myself the pite transportation to and from Cambridge.

period. If it is understood that during this five-week period ORO
we estimate will average about three days a week during this
respect to the number of days he is able to absorb at ORO, which
will ensure Klaasen to submit his plans from week to week with
this procedure has the greatest advantage of flexibility.

pits proposed ORO annually, i.e. $52 a day.

on as a consultant immediately with a barium rate equivalent to
Bill Elliott, whichever is the earlier and (S) to but Klaasen.
I understand 1961 or the time when he has fulfilled his obligation to
send me to (f) either Klaasen, a temporary appointment until
The simplest way to handle the situation in my opinion

Elliott.

next five weeks. Unfortunately we must to break off with Bill
out Bill Elliott on a part time basis in Cambridge during the
Klaasen's leave me that he has a most efficient to help

SUBJECT: Henry Fritz Klaasen.

FROM: Richard U. Shemans, Jr.

TO: W. B. Champlin, Jr.

30 June 1961

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

6410 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND

OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT
WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

21 June 1951

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
253 East Boylston Street
Watertown, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

The Operations Research Office is pleased to offer you a temporary appoint-
ment for two months as Consultant, subject to the fulfillment of the usual
formal requirements mentioned below, retroactive to 18 June, 1951. Your
compensation will be at a per diem rate of $25.00. In addition, while away
from your usual place of business, you will be reimbursed for the actual
cost of all transportation plus a per diem allowance at the rate of $9.00
in lieu of all subsistence costs. (A supply of forms for claiming reim-
bursement for fees and travel expenses is enclosed.)

You will work in close cooperation with Dr. George S. Pettee and others
and it is expected that, as requested, you will report appropriately on
the progress of your work.

If, in the interest of national security, the Department of the Army should
instruct the University to terminate your employment or refuse to grant or
withdraw full security clearance permitting you to have access to the work
being performed under the cognizance of the Operations Research Office, the
University would, of course, be required by contractual obligations to comply
with such action.

A requirement of your appointment is the execution and return to the Opera-
tions Research Office of the "Agreement Relating to Inventions", two copies
of which are hereto attached, one being for your files.

Another requirement is that you agree that no information developed in the
performance of your work for Operations Research Office shall be published
or divulged in any thesis, writing, public lecture, patent application and
the like without prior written approval of the Director, or in case of his
absence that of the Deputy Director or other designated representative of
the Operations Research Office. Their decision on the matter shall be final.

The Operations Research Office is looking forward to having your help. In
the meantime I would appreciate your signing and returning both the "Agree-
ment Relating to Inventions" and the annexed copy of this letter indicating
your acceptance of this appointment.

Accepted

Witness:

Exhibit B.

AGREEMENT RELATING TO INVENTIONS

(To be executed by Consultants,
other than Faculty members, associa-
ted with the Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity in connection with its Con-
tracts with any of Various Sponsors)

In consideration of the sum of one dollar ($1.00), and of other
good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged,
I agree with the University and its designee as follows:

1) to disclose promptly, completely in writing, to the Johns Hopkins University (hereinafter called the University) or its designee any and all inventions I may make or conceive, either solely or jointly with others, as a result of my association with the University, and relating to the subject matter concerning which my assistance as a Consultant has been requested;

2) to designate, when disclosing each such invention, whether or
not it has been or will be claimed in a patent application; to cause to
be filed, within the statutory period allowed by law as to first publica-
tion, public use or sale, a United States patent application covering each
such invention affirmatively so designated; to deliver to the University
or its designee a properly executed irrevocable, non-exclusive, royalty-
free license to practice and cause to be practiced for the University or
its designee throughout the world each such invention affirmatively so
designated;

3) to deliver to the University or its designee, duly executed,
such instruments of assignment, application papers and rightful oaths,
prepared by and at the expense of the University or its designee, as
are necessary to vest in the University or its designee the sole and
exclusive ownership in and the right to apply for and prosecute patent
applications covering, each invention not affirmatively designated as
aforesaid;

4) I understand that the University is not obliged to file or
prosecute applications for patents for inventions developed as a result
of my activities as a Consultant.

Date June 22, 1957

Date 22 June 1957

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

1 August 1951

Mr. Henry A. Kissenger
253 East Boylston Street
Watertown, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissenger:

Your application for employment with this Agency has
been reviewed with interest by members of our staff.

We should be glad to arrange tests and interviews for
you if you can come to Washington in the near future. This
is not an offer of employment, however, and such a trip would
necessarily be made at your own expense.

Would you please call Mr. Tate on Executive 6115,
extension 2576 to arrange a time for the tests and interviews?

We appreciate your interest in our organization and
are looking forward to hearing from you soon.

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

AUG 2 1951

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

The Operations Research Office is pleased to offer you a temporary
appointment as a senior member of the staff at a salary rate of $475.00
per month, the duration of such appointment to be two months. It is
expected that you will assume duty under the terms of this appointment
on or about 15 August 1951.

As a result of the increased defense effort the Operations Research
Office is now operating on a five and one-half day work week. Since ORO
is exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act, the provisions of the Wage and
Hour Regulations thereunder do not apply to overtime. However, we are glad
to advise you that, in accordance with University policy, you will receive
additional compensation in the amount of $47.50 per month, to cover addi-
tional responsibilities necessitated by the extended work week. This
amount is entirely independent of the salary rate set forth in the first
paragraph and provides additional temporary compensation so long as ORO
operates on the extended forty-four hour week.

If, in the interest of national security, the Department of the Army
should instruct the University to terminate your employment or refuse to
grant, or withdraw, full security clearance permitting you to have access
to the work being performed under the cognizance of the Operations Research
Office, the University would, of course, be required by contractual obliga-
tions to comply with such action. Various formalities incident to assignment
of patents, secrecy oath and other routine matters can be taken care of upon
your reporting for duty.

If you have any questions regarding this appointment or if the Univer-
sity can assist you in any way to become established in this appointment,
if accepted, please let us know. The terms of employment set forth herein
cannot be varied in any way except in writing.

We shall appreciate it if you will confirm in writing your acceptance
of this appointment and indicate the date upon which we may expect you to
report for duty under the provisions of this letter. Your current appointment
as consultant will be terminated as of the day before you assume duty as a
temporary full time member of the staff.

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4200

NOV 2 1951

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

With the termination on 23 October, 1951, of your temporary appointment
as a senior member of the staff, the Operations Research Office is pleased
to offer you an appointment as Consultant effective 24 October, 1951, subject
to the fulfillment of the usual formal requirements mentioned below. Your
compensation will be at a per diem rate of $25.00. In addition, while away
from your usual place of business, you will be reimbursed for the actual cost
of all transportation plus a per diem allowance at the rate of $10.00, in
lieu of all subsistence costs. (A supply of forms for claiming reimbursement
for fees and travel expense is enclosed.)

If, in the interest of national security, the Department of the Army
should instruct the University to terminate your employment or refuse to
grant, or withdraw, full security clearance permitting you to have access
to the work being performed under the cognizance of the Operations Research
Office, the University would, of course, be required by contractual obliga-
tions to comply with such action.

Since you have already signed the "Agreement Relating to Inventions"
repetition of this is not necessary.

A continuing requirement is, as before, that you agree that no information developed in the performance of your work for the Operations Research Office shall be published or divulged in any thesis, writing, public lecture, patent application and the like without prior written approval of the Director or in case of his absence that of the Deputy Director or other designated representative of the Operations Research Office. Their decision on the matter shall be final.

I shall appreciate your signing and returning the annexed copy of this
letter indicating your acceptance of this appointment.

Accepted

Witness:

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1 December 1951

# SOVIET STRATEGY -- POSSIBLE U.S. COUNTERMEASURES

## Introductory Note:

This paper was submitted by Mr. Henry A. Kissinger as an informal contribution to Exercise CAVU. It deals with strategic considerations at the extreme outer edge of CAVU concern. It raises some points in the course of analysis of possible enemy strategy that may have considerable interest and value, and which open several lines of fresh thinking. G.S.P.

## I. The Problem

1. An analysis of long-range Soviet intentions must account for the following post-war developments:

a. The dynamism of Soviet post-war policy despite the exhaustion due to war losses.

b. The aggressiveness of Soviet policy which dissipated a world wide reservoir of good-will, reversed a U.S trend towards complete disarmament and has led to the beginning of West European rearment.

c. The real deterrents to Soviet military expansion.

2. An analysis of Soviet intentions in Europe must account for the following:

a. The failure to occupy Western Europe during its period of greatest weakness.

b. Soviet intentions while the U.S. attempts to restore Western Europe's military potential.

## II. Assumptions

1. Soviet policy operates on the basis of long-range strategic considerations. This involves an analysis of the nature of total power relationships and the relative psychological, political, and economic potential.

2. The Soviet analysis of the world situation is influenced by ideology in its basic orientation to an extent discussed in Section III.

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3. Soviet intentions will be discussed under two headings:

a. The Soviet evaluation of the world situation and the basic motivation of Soviet policy.
b. Soviet policies in specific areas.

### III. Soviet Evaluation of the World Situation

1. Three explanations have been offered for Soviet policies in the post-war period:

a. Soviet policy is conditioned by the element of Marxist-Leninist ideology which emphasized the inevitability of world revolution and the economic collapse of capitalism. This assumes a continuation of the revolutionary elan and the achievement of world-wide Communism as a short-term goal of Soviet policy.

b. Soviet policy represents a continuation of Tsarist policy on a global scale. Soviet expansion constitutes the realization of Imperial aspirations, at the sacrifice of Utopian theory.

c. Soviet policy is essentially defensive in nature, derived from that aspect of Communist ideology which postulates a showdown between two divergent economic systems as historically inevitable.

2. Though all three explanations identify some component of Soviet policy, it is, paradoxically, the defensive element which gives Soviet policy its peculiar intransigence, impatience and dynamism. The conviction of the inevitability of a conflict brought about by the inherent contradictions of capitalism, leads to the incessant attempts to expand the Soviet security belt and the probing for weak spots along the Soviet periphery. It accounts for Soviet inflexibility during negotiations, for diplomacy is not conceived as the definition of continuing relations but the prelude to a final showdown.

3. If only world-revolution and Imperial expansion motivated Soviet policy an accomodation might be conceivable. World-revolution could be postponed for tactical reasons. At least, the conviction of its inevitability might permit a delay in the Soviet time-table until a crisis in the U.S. economy had in fact occurred.

4. The "imperialist" hypothesis would be consistent with a sphere of influence diplomacy and fails to explain the urgency of Soviet policy. It is, moreover, easy to overestimate the role of tradition in Soviet diplomacy. Similar routes of expansion do not indicate identical motivation. Any policy utilizing Imperial Russia as a geographical base must confine itself to the traditional approaches to Russia in its initial stages, whatever its ultimate intentions.

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5. The real urgency of Soviet policy derives from the conviction that the inherent contradictions of Capitalist society will result in a crisis, definitionally resolvable only by foreign adventures. This calls attention to the role of ideology in the determination of Soviet policy.

6. Soviet strategy is influenced by ideology not so much in its short-term goals as in its basic orientation. Communist theory claims for itself insight into the real dynamism of historical change and, moreover, on a scientific basis. Though many portions of Marxism have been sacrificed, the conviction of superior understanding remains a keystone of Communist doctrine. Communists are conceived as soldiers of the revolution, armed with a scientific theory whose explanation of the mainsprings of human motivation enables Marxists to achieve their success. This accounts for the emphasis on indoctrination and for the strenuous efforts to achieve doctrinal purity. (See, for example, the cultural and intellectual purges. A good account of the role of ideology in the USSR can be found in the article by Historicus--Foreign Affairs, January, 1949)

7. Communist ideology presents the following analysis of the international affairs:

a. History is not the outgrowth of human volition, but human volition is itself conditioned by the material structure of the period.

b. Conflict reveals underlying tensions in the economic system, not mistakes of leadership.

c. These tensions are an inevitable concomitant of the Capitalist system. They derive in part from the inherent contradiction between capitalism's productive forces (the organization of the economy for maximum profits) and productive relations (the incidental superstructure of government). They are sharpened by the unequal economic development in the various capitalist countries. To escape their dilemma, capitalist nations engage in a contest for colonies. Imperialism is a symptom of decaying Capitalism and leads to internecine wars which hasten its ultimate collapse. Thus Stalin in a speech in 1946 asserted that World War II was not caused by the irrational impulse of a dictator but occurred as the necessary consequence of an economic system.

d. The existence of a Socialist state breaks the chain of Capitalist economy at its weakest point. It attracts both the exploited workers in the capitalist countries and the oppressed colonial people. Capitalism can therefore never tolerate the existence of a Socialist state. A lasting settlement between the Soviet-

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Union and Capitalist powers is impossible, war is their natural relation; whether cold or hot, a matter of tactics. The Soviet view of Capitalist intentions is well illustrated in the Soviet-Yugoslav exchange leading to the expulsion of Yugo-Slavia from the Comminform. In it the USSR castigates Tito for treating the Soviet ambassador just like his Western colleagues, whose only task was espionage and subversion.

8. This ideology has had the following impact on Soviet post-war policy:

a. Because of the belief in the material source of all motivation Soviet leadership makes no distinction between the forms of government in Capitalist countries. When Stalin in his 1946 interview with Stassen, professed to see no difference between the U.S. and the Nazi economic system, he asserted in effect that economic developments would force aggressive moves on the part of the U.S. just as inevitably as they had in the case of Germany. (This is particularly true if this interview is read together with the speech quoted above.)

b. The belief in the material source of all motivation accounts for Soviet inflexibility in negotiation. Agreements to be lasting must reflect an objective situation. A diplomatic compromise would merely distort real conditions and prove meaningless. For this reason Soviet participation in conferences usually is an aspect of psychological warfare, not the reflection of a desire for accommodation.

c. The belief in the material basis of all motivation further prevented the Soviet-Union at the end of the war from quietly awaiting U. S. disarmament. Soviet opportunities in Eastern Europe and the Far East could not be sacrificed to an illusory understanding with the U.S.

d. The conviction of an inevitable conflict does not result from reactions to U.S. policies--this would deny the insight into the underlying motivations. On the contrary U.S. policies are conceived as the reflection of in any case well-understood economic forces. In Soviet eyes, U.S. diplomatic manoeuvers are designed for internal Capitalist consumption but cannot deceive the Soviet-Union.

e. Equally Soviet fears cannot be allayed by conciliatory U.S. moves or by more accomodating personalities. Even were the Soviet-Union convinced of the subjective sincerity of U.S. leadership, it would still believe that the inexorable operation of funda-

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mental economic laws would force U.S. foreign adventures to avert a domestic crisis.

f. This imparts its peculiar urgency and insistence to Soviet diplomacy. The assertions of U.S. aggressiveness may well be sincere, though only a change in the U.S. political and economic system could allay Soviet fears.

g. Soviet policy in short must attempt to neutralize the U.S.

9. A defensive conception is, of course, consistent also with a long-range view and need not inevitably imply conflict in the immediate future. The emergence of the U.S. as the dominant Capitalist power has, however, added particular sharpness to Soviet calculations. Soviet policy in the period between the two world wars had assumed that skillful diplomacy could exploit the internal tensions of Capitalism and turn them into an imperialist "civil war". This was reflected in the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. U.S. preponderance made wars between major capitalistic powers unthinkable in the post-World War II period. Therefore in Soviet eyes, all contradictions of Capitalism, must inevitably be channelled against the Soviet-Union. The frequent predictions of Soviet writers in the immediate post-war period of an imminent U.S. crisis represented less a hope for U.S. collapse, than a premonition of conflict. (For Communist ideology nowhere maintains the possibility of a Capitalist collapse without struggle.)

For this reason the ERP and the Atlantic pact confirmed Soviet suspicions but did not affect the basic Soviet orientation. The development of atomic armaments compounded these tendencies. (For discussion of this point see Section IV, para. 5.)

10. Soviet basic strategy in the post-war period can be summarized in the following postulates:

a. War is inevitable, not because of U.S. specific policies but because the inherent dynamism of the Capitalist world economy will impel U. S. aggressive moves.

b. Therefore Soviet policy must strive not for an illusory peace but to get into the war under the best possible conditions. Opportunities for the development of a security belt in Eastern Europe and the Far East had to be exploited regardless of the impact on short-term relations with the U.S.

c. This does not mean that the Soviet-Union desires war, but that it does not trust any arrangement which fails to neutralize the U. S. The minimum condition for this involves Soviet domination

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of. Eurasia.

d. The timing of the conflict depends on the assessment of total forces, though this does not imply an insistence on absolute Soviet superiority. It involves a Soviet decision to attack when the relative power constellations appear most favorable.

e. The major Soviet antagonist is the U.S. No Soviet gain is secure until the U.S. is neutralized.

f. Therefore a Soviet move involving the risk of war is unlikely until the Soviet-Union is in a position to seriously hurt the chief sources of U.S. strength.

## IV. Soviet Intentions in Specific Areas

1. The analysis in Section III indicates that Soviet intentions in specific geographic areas are governed by the following considerations:

a. The attraction of specific areas for the USSR derives from their suitability for a world wide strategy. The Soviet-Union will not start a war to gain Europe, but attack Europe when the total constellation of forces seems most favorable for a final showdown with the U.S.

b. Until the USSR has reached this level of military strength, the major deterrent to its expansion will be not the force in being at each threatened point around the Soviet periphery but the threat of a major war with the U.S.

c. After the USSR has reached this position of relative power, its decisions will be governed by tactical considerations of forcing a showdown under conditions of maximum U.S. disadvantage.

2. In the evaluation of this total power constellation the Soviet-Union will be governed by considerations of demography, technological development and economic potential:

a. Demography limited Soviet policy until the man-power losses of World War II were made up.

b. Technological development affects the Soviet-Union's relative position by imposing a time-table on the reequipment of its armies and the production of new weapons. An additional index in these calculations is the rate of Soviet development relative to the U.S.

c. The assessment of the economic potential includes restoration of the Soviet industrial plant and the requisite stock-piling program. The latter factor probably looms particularly large in Soviet calculations in view of the evident U.S. intention to subject the Soviet-Union to severe strategic bombardment.

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3. The Soviet potential relative to the U.S. can be analyzed in terms of three periods:

a. A period in which the Soviet-Union's relative strength did not permit any action likely to lead to war.

b. A transitional period of increasing power, in which war could be risked though only as the least desirable instrument of policy. This period began with the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb.

c. A period in which war will become an instrument of Soviet policy.

4. The immediate post-war period witnessed the following deterrents to Soviet military expansion:

a. The devastation and the psychological exhaustion brought about by the war, the need to rebuild the economy and transportation system.

b. The manpower losses suffered during the German invasion.

c. The need for stockpiling.

d. The necessity of reindoctrinating the war generation with Communist ideology.

e. The priority of consolidating Eastern Europe as a secure base before engaging in military adventures.

f. A technological balance unfavorable to the USSR. This unfavorable technological balance includes not only the U.S. monopoly of the atomic bomb, but the slow development of a Soviet strategic airforce.

5. Special consideration must be given to the role of the atomic bomb in Soviet calculations. The Soviet Union may have been deterred from military moves in Western Europe by the fear of U.S. atomic retaliation, though it is easy to exaggerate this. Equally powerful was the belief, based on the experience of Germany in World War II, that control of Europe would prove useless as long as the major portion of U.S. strength remained beyond Soviet reach. Therefore, the USSR was obliged to exercise a measure of self-restraint till the development of atomic armaments and a strategic air force. The U.S. monopoly may well have been considered a wasting asset by the USSR. Thus the USSR was probably not so much deterred from military expansion by the fear of U.S. atomic attack as by its own inability to deliver a corresponding blow against the U.S.

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6. With the growth of a Soviet atomic stockpile, the increasing strength of its strategic air force and the gradual repair of other deficiencies the USSR felt justified in assuming greater risks. This period was probably ushered in by the invasion of South Korea. It involved a simultaneous Soviet effort to exert maximum psychological and political pressure on Western Europe in order to isolate the U.S. and failing this to get into the war under optimum conditions by making U.S. dispositions determine and choosing the theater of conflict for maximum U.S. disadvantage.

7. Soviet strategy in this period consequently reveals an evaluation of the productiveness of possible theaters of conflict and of the relative power factors of the U.S. and the USSR.

8. Soviet strategy may assume the following U.S. advantages:

a. Technological superiority including the possession of a superior atomic armament both quantitatively and qualitatively.

b. Superior mobility due to command of the sea and exterior lines of communication.

c. A superior logistical system.

d. A better strategic air force.

9. Soviet strategy may count with the following advantages:

a. The existence of a large trained land army in the Soviet Union and its satellites.

b. The possession of interior lines of communication enabling the USSR to concentrate superior forces at almost any single point around the Soviet periphery.

c. The possibility of achieving tactical surprise.

d. The existence in most key countries of Communist parties which present Soviet policies in terms of indigenous interests. This may create a psychological climate favorable for rapids Soviet advances.

10. Major Soviet weaknesses include the transportation system, compounded by the dispersal of industries, the multinational composition of the USSR and the heterogeneous nature of the Soviet bloc containing many traditional antagonists.

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11. Soviet strategy undoubtedly attempts to maximize its own advantages and minimize its opponents'. The relative position can be summarized in the following postulates:

a. U.S. strength is potential, Soviet power in being.

b. The USSR will never be stronger than at the beginning of the war when its transportation system is not yet hampered by aerial bombardment and when, despite the interdiction of communications, an offensive might be kept going on initial momentum and accumulated supplies.

c. Conversely, U.S. relative strength is likely to grow as an increasing proportion of the national income is devoted to military expenditure.

12. Soviet strategy is likely to attempt to achieve major victories in the early stages of the conflict. For this reason the Soviet-Union will attempt to begin military operations when its pile of atomic bombs has passed a certain critical number and when American dispositions have reached the level of maximum yield for Soviet military operations.

13. An analysis of Soviet military tactics discloses the predominant role played by the Red Army in Soviet military thinking. Soviet leadership would probably prefer to entrust its fate to a major land battle. The most favorable area for the employment of the Red Army seems to be Western Europe. Here good communications ease the complex logistical problem of the USSR. Adequate stores of food will permit the Red Army to live off the land. Native Communist parties may be expected to engage in fifth column activities. However, the Red Army would be wastefully employed unless in its advance through Europe it could defeat a major foe. The capture of large numbers of West Europeans would greatly facilitate the Soviet political control of occupied countries.

14. A period of increasing tension would serve the twin purpose of making U.S. technological development determinate by freezing military design and by forcing concentrations of U.S. forces at danger points around the Soviet periphery. The possession of interior lines of communication should then enable the Soviet Union to assemble superior strength at any single point, preferably Europe.

15. If the foregoing analysis is correct, Soviet intentions in Europe and other areas can be summarized thus:

a. The domination of Western Europe by the USSR is required for the neutralization of the U.S. Since this can probably not be achieved by pressure and since anything short of isolation of the U.S. will in time lead to a U.S. attack on the USSR,

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war is inevitable. (See analysis of Section III.)

b. Soviet strategy must attempt to make the U.S. potential determinate by channelling it into the support of a large land army and dispersing the latter on a global scale.

c. A period of increasing pressure, alternated with peace of-fensives to diminish the psychological potential of threat-ened countries might serve as the instrument of this Soviet policy. (Korea may at one stage--after the Chinese interven-tion-have played such a "fixing" role. However, there are limits to the efficient employment of manpower to balance technology. This point appears to have been reached in Korea.

d. In these terms, Europe is conceived as a theater and a tacti-cal goal.

e. The Soviet-Union can be expected to attack in Europe and elsewhere when it possesses a critical number of atomic bombs, and when the Western build-up has reached a point just short of the viable level. 1953 would seem to be the critical year.

## V. Outline of a Possible U.S. Strategy

1. The U. S. can avoid a major war with the USSR in only two contingencies:

a. The complete political and psychological collapse of Western Europe which might force a Soviet pause for the consolida-tion of Eurasia and totally alter the world balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union.

b. The creation of such a U.S. preponderance of strength so rapidly that the Soviet-Union can no longer count on major victories in the early stages of the conflict, nor complete its own build-up in time to forestall it. The vehicle of the latter alternative has been defined as the "policy of containment."

2. U.S. strategy is faced with at least two alternatives each consistent with a policy of containment. A. The physical containment of Soviet moves by the assembly of superior strength at each threatened point. B. The containment of the Soviet Union through the exploitation of total power-

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relationships. This also involves defense of threatened points, but not necessarily at the point of the threat.

3. The following assumptions characterize the strategy of "physical containment":

a. Secretary Acheson's "situation of strength" policy is conceived as the physical containment of the Soviet-Union by the assembly of superior force at every point around the Soviet periphery.

b. U.S. policy is defined in terms of the available military potential in each threatened area.

c. U.S. counter-measures to peripheral actions by the Soviet-Union may be confined to "limited wars" at the threatened point.

4. It is believed that the policy of "physical containment" does not fully exploit the existing strategic or geographic relationships. It makes difficult an integrated policy and threatens to lead to the fragmentation of U.S. political, military and psychological effort for the following reasons:

a. The policy of "physical containment" reflects an unnecessarily defensive attitude and hides the only possible deterrent to Soviet aggression: the threat of a major war with the United States.

b. By attempting to achieve situations of strength at each point around the Soviet periphery as a condition for our policy, the U.S. would in effect allow the Soviet General Staff to deploy the U.S. armed forces.

c. The policy fails to take into account the relative geographical positions. The Soviet-Union's possession of interior lines of communication enables it to achieve local superiorities at any single point. By treating each threat as a limited problem, defined in terms of local conditions, we would enable the Soviet-Union to increase the determinacy of its calculations, to choose points of involvement for major U.S. discomfiture, while retaining complete discretion as to the limit of its own commitments.

d. Militarily, a policy of limited, peripheral wars would involve fighting under conditions of greatest Soviet relative superiority and to minimize U.S. advantage in air-power and mobility. The lesson of Northern Korea might be infinitely repeated: *i.e.* enemy build-up in sanctuary areas, depletion of U.S. reservoir of trained manpower, etc.

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e. The danger of the world sliding into war through a series of bluffs would be magnified. A Soviet move planned as a limited operation may evoke a U.S. reaction under the impact of the moment (such as in Korea). Neither side might then be able to control the course of events.

5. The United States should consequently develop an integrated policy capable of treating Soviet measures as aspects of a pattern, not as isolated incidents confined to specific geographic areas. In these terms, the concept of "situations of strength" is useful as a policy guide only if it takes into consideration total power relationships apart from the peripheral constellation of forces. Such a policy of containment would pose the threat of a major war with the United States as the ultimate deterrent of Soviet aggression, while not committing the United States to fight in theaters of the Soviet Union's choosing. A line should be clearly defined, any transgression of which would involve a major war, though not necessarily at the point of aggression. This would put the question of which areas are indispensable to the U.S. effort into the realm of a total military strategy.

6. A more positive strategy than the defensive attitude of physical containment might prove very fruitful. The conception of the crucial importance of Western Europe need not imply the commitment of the major portion of U.S. land forces for its defense, at least initially. European manpower and industrial resources are sufficient to sustain a vastly expanded defensive effort with appropriate U.S. financial and logistical assistance. This will reflect at least in part, a psychological attitude, a readiness to fight, to be bolstered by limited U.S. ground support, a consistent, self-reliant U.S. foreign policy and a major psychological effort.

7. The Soviet threat against Western Europe possibly could be minimized more effectively by the existence of a compact, highly mobile U.S. strategic reserve, within striking distance of Soviet vital centers, in areas where the terrain maximizes U.S. technological superiority, than through divisions in a stationary defensive posture along the Iron Curtain. This calls attention to the crucial importance of the Middle East:

a. The proximity of the Baku oil fields to the Soviet-Union's southern border will require significant defensive measures if any military strength appears in this area.

b. Turkey's army of 21 divisions if supplied with modern equipment will constitute a threat on the flank of Soviet moves either into the Balkans or in the Middle East.

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c. The terrain would tend to neutralize the Soviet-Union's relative superiority in manpower. The war in the Lybian desert revealed definite limitations to the size of armies supportable in such areas. The Soviet supply problem would be magnified. Soviet and European communications run primarily East-West; the railways feeding the area south of the Caucasus would be excellent targets for a U.S. aerial effort. U.S. technological know-how and aerial supremacy would be at a premium.

d. Control of the Black Sea, by air and sea, would put a tremendous strain on the Soviet Balkan satellites. Moreover it would open the most fertile and potentially the most anti-communist area of the USSR, the Ukraine, to hit-and-run raids and threatened large-scale landings. Under these circumstances significant Soviet contingents would have to be earmarked for purely defensive measures. The Red Army may well consider a major move in Western Europe or Iran too risky while its flank is thus threatened.

8. The United States might accomplish this by the following measures:

a. A highly trained mobile force should be created in conjunction with our British allies to be stationed in the Middle East, not close enough to the Soviet border to constitute an overt threat, but at a distance sufficient to allow rapid concentration in case of war. In view of the possibilities of Soviet agitation in Africa that a loss of the Middle East would entail, South African contingents would seem a distinct possibility. Jordan or Cyrenea would appear possible concentration areas. Ten to fifteen divisions would represent a major force under the terrain features described above and the existence of the Turkish army on the flank. Control of the Mediterranean through the domination of its bordering territories should enable the U.S. to move this strategic reserve more rapidly than the Red Army along its tenuous overland routes. This would imply a defense of Spain, Italy south of the 40°, and Greece.

b. This force might be constituted as a desert training center on the model of General Patton's efforts in California in the last war.

c. Such a force with its air and supporting units could not be ignored by the Soviet Union in the event of major conflict and might well force a battle on terrain where U.S. technological superiority will be maximized and no possibilities for the employment of large ground armies exist.

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d. The U.S. contribution could be found by reducing U.S. commitments in the Far East by re-arming Japan, which would then assume the major burden of its ground defense and, if necessary or feasible by increasing the military establishment. Some additional divisions might spend part of their training period at the projected training center. The objections of exposing U.S. troops to potential annihilation would hardly apply in this area. By taking advanced training in the desert and rotation after a suitable period, a considerable force could be constantly kept in being.

9. The following postulates should characterize U.S. policy:

a. U.S. strategy should attempt to maximize its advantages and minimize the Soviet-Union's.

b. The policy of containment should take account of the total power relationships apart from the accidental constellation of forces around the Soviet periphery.

c. The U.S. strategy should attempt to prevent war by posing a maximum risk to Soviet military moves.

d. If war cannot be avoided, U.S. strategy should seek to avoid crippling losses in its early phases. Points c and d should be consistent and treated as two aspects of the same problem.

e. U.S. technological superiority can be maximized if the Soviet-Union is forced into land-battles on terrain which maximizes U.S. technological superiority and makes the employment of large land-armies unprofitable.

f. This calls attention to the importance of the Middle East and to control of the Mediterranean.

g. If the Soviet effort could be diverted from its East-West axis to a North-South line Soviet logistical problems would be multiplied.

h. This involves the creation of a strategic reserve in the Middle East and control of the territories bordering the Mediterranean as strategic necessities.

i. The consolidation of these territories may be a more effective protection for Europe than U.S. divisions in a defensive posture along the Iron Curtain.

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1 December 1951

## Introductory Note:

## I. The Problem

b. The aggressiveness of Soviet policy which dissipated a world wide reservoir of good-will, reversed a U.S. trend towards complete disarmament and has led to the beginning of West European rearment.

## II. Assumptions

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2. Although all three explanations identify some component of Soviet policy, it is, paradoxically, the defensive element which gives Soviet policy its peculiar intransigence, impatience and dynamism. The conviction of the inevitability of a conflict brought about by the inherent contradictions of capitalism, leads to the incessant attempts to expand the Soviet security belt and the probing for weak spots along the Soviet periphery. It accounts for Soviet inflexibility during negotiations, for diplomacy is not conceived as the definition of continuing relations, but the prelude to a final showdown.

VI/8

3. If only world-revolution and Imperial expansion motivated Soviet policy an accommodation might be conceivable. World-revolution could be postponed for tactical reasons. At least, the conviction of its inevitability might permit a delay in the Soviet time-table until a crisis in the U.S. economy had in fact occurred.

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6. Soviet strategy is influenced by ideology not so much in its short-term goals as in its basic orientation. Communist theory claims for itself insight into the real dynamism of historical change and, moreover, on a scientific basis. Though many portions of Marxism have been sacrificed, the conviction of superior understanding remains a keystone of Communist doctrine. Communists are conceived as soldiers of the revolution, armed with a scientific theory whose explanation of the mainsprings of human motivation enables Marxists to achieve their success. This accounts for the emphasis on indoctrination and for the strenuous efforts to achieve doctrinal purity. (See, for example, the cultural and intellectual purges.) A good account of the role of ideology in the USSR can be found in the article by Historicus--Foreign Affairs, January, 1949)

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e. Equally Soviet fears cannot be allayed by conciliatory U.S. moves or by more accomodating personalities. Even were the Soviet-Union convinced of the subjective sincerity of U.S. leadership, it would still believe that the inexorable operation of funds-

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of Eurasia.

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c. The need for stockpiling.

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10. Major Soviet weaknesses include the transportation system, compounded by the dispersal of industries; the multinational composition of the USSR and the heterogeneous nature of the Soviet bloc containing many traditional antagonists.

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b. Soviet strategy must attempt to make the U.S. potential determine by channelling it into the support of a large land army and dispersing the latter on a global scale.

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c. The policy fails to take into account the relative geographical positions. The Soviet-Union's possession of interior lines of communication enables it to achieve local superiorities at any single point. By treating each threat as a limited problem, defined in terms of local conditions, we would engage the Soviet-Union to increase the determinacy of its calculations, to choose points of involvement for major U.S. discomfiture, while retaining complete discretion as to the limit of its own commitments.

d. Militarily, a policy of limited, peripheral wars would involve fighting under conditions of greatest Soviet relative superiority and to minimize U.S. advantage in air-power and mobility. The lesson of Northern Korea might be infinitely repeated: i.e., enemy build-up in sanctuary areas, depletion of U.S. reservoir of trained manpower, etc.

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a. A highly trained mobile force should be created in conjunction with our British allies to be stationed in the Middle East, not close enough to the Soviet border to constitute an overt threat, but at a distance sufficient to allow rapid concentration in case of war. In view of the possibilities of Soviet agitation in Africa that a loss of the Middle East would entail, South African contingents would seem a distinct possibility. Jordan or Cyrenea would appear possible concentration areas. Ten to fifteen divisions would represent a major force under the terrain features described above and the existence of the Turkish army on the flank. Control of the Mediterranean through the domination of its bordering territories should enable the U.S. to move this strategic reserve more rapidly than the Red Army along its tenuous overland routes. This would imply a defense of Spain, Italy south of the iso, and Greece.

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6410 Connecticut Avenue
Chevy Chase, Maryland

DISTRIBUTION "A"

ORO BULLETIN NO. AD 440

2 January 1952

SUBJECT: ORO TRAVEL REGULATIONS

<table><tr><td>Section I</td><td>-</td><td>General</td></tr><tr><td>Section II</td><td>-</td><td>Definitions</td></tr><tr><td>Section III</td><td>-</td><td>Travel of Employees</td></tr><tr><td>Section IV</td><td>-</td><td>Travel of Consultants</td></tr><tr><td>Section V</td><td>-</td><td>Travel Outside Continental United States</td></tr><tr><td>Section VI</td><td>-</td><td>Travel by Military Aircraft</td></tr><tr><td>Section VII</td><td>-</td><td>Local Travel</td></tr></table>

SECTION I

General

1. These regulations are issued for the guidance of all employees and consultants of The Johns Hopkins University, Operations Research Office, and are the basis for reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with official travel effective 1 October 1951.

2. It is the policy of ORO to limit travel of employees and consultants to a minimum consistent with operating requirements. All travel will be duly authorized in writing in advance, except in emergencies which preclude such action. Travel will not be authorized unless it is essential to the conduct of ORO business. In this connection, no travel expense, including per diem, incurred for personal convenience will be reimbursed.

3. All ORO employees and consultants must comply with pertinent ORO Security Regulations relative to obtaining security clearance for the visit prior to departure. A minimum advance notice to the Security Office of two working days prior to departure is required to permit arrangement of necessary clearances.

(ie)

4. All expenditures under the terms of the contract between The Johns Hopkins University and Department of the Army in the operation of ORO is subject to audit by a government audit unit and by General Accounting Office. The Fiscal Office, ORO, is responsible for ORO expenditures meeting the requirements of the auditors. To this end it is necessary for that office to question items listed on travel vouchers for which insufficient data has been submitted in order to be able to present proper justification to the auditors.

## SECTION II

### Definitions

5. **Official Duty Station.** Official duty station is defined to be as follows:

a. For permanent ORO employees stationed at Chevy Chase, Maryland, the Metropolitan Washington Area.

b. For permanent ORO employees stationed outside Metropolitan Washington Area, the corporate limits of the city, town, or metropolitan area where stationed.

c. For temporary ORO employees, as stated in the letter of appointment.

6. **Official Travel Status.** An employee is considered to enter official travel status as of the hour at which the train, boat, aircraft, or other conveyance used by the traveler actually leaves its regular terminal at the traveler's duty station. Termination of travel status is considered to occur when the public conveyance used actually arrives at its regular terminal at the traveler's duty station.

7. **Per Diem in Lieu of Subsistence Expense.** The per diem in lieu of subsistence expenses is held to include all charges for meals, lodgings, all fees and tips to waiters, porters, baggagemen, bell-boys, hotel maids, dining room stewards, and others on vessels, and hotel servants in foreign countries, laundry, cleaning and pressing of clothing. Accommodations on airplanes, trains or steamers are excluded from the term "lodging" as used above. The per diem allowance starts concurrently with the entry of the individual on official travel status as defined in paragraph 6 above.

a. Current per diem rate is $10.00 while in official travel status within Continental United States.

b. Per diem rates for official travel beyond the Continental United States will be determined by the Administrative Officer for each trip prior to departure of the traveler. Generally, these rates will be as follows:

(1) A transient rate not to exceed $10.00 per day to be applied to travel from and to Continental U. S. and to, from and between temporary duty stations outside Continental U. S.

(2) Destination rates not to exceed $15.00 per day to be applied to temporary duty at the stated localities.

The destination rates vary from country to country and may vary within a country depending on local conditions.

c. Per diem for periods of 24 hours or for continuous travel of more than 24 hours is computed on the basis of the calendar day (midnight to midnight).

d. Per diem for period of less than 24 hours in any one calendar day is allowable at the rate of one-fourth the daily rate for each period of 6 hours or fraction thereof during which the individual remains in a continuous travel status. Such periods of six hours must be consecutive and must begin with the time that travel status begins. In this connection, no per diem is allowable if departure is at or after 0800 and the return is at or prior to 1800 of the same day, or for any absence not exceeding 3 hours. The six hour periods are as follows:

0001 to 0600

0601 to 1200

1201 to 1800

1801 to 2400

e. For any period during which there is a change in status involving a change in rates of per diem allowances, the day will be divided into the above six hour periods and the respective rates of

allowances will be computed upon the actual periods involved in each
status, the new rate being effective with the beginning of the next
successive period.

f. Where for traveler's personal convenience or through
the taking of leave there is interruption of travel or deviation from
the direct route, the total per diem allowed will not exceed that which
would have been incurred on uninterrupted travel by a usually traveled
route.

g. If vacation or special leave begins or terminates while the employee is in official travel status, per diem will terminate or begin at the same time. In this connection, the exact hour of departure from and return to duty status must be shown on the travel voucher.

8. Reimbursable Travel Expense. Reimbursable travel expense is limited to:

a. Cost of airline fare or first class rail fare and lower berth or parlor car accommodations. (See paragraph 9 below).

b. Necessary reasonable local transportation costs.

c. A per diem allowance in lieu of all expenses other than transportation for each day spent in performance of services for ORO away from official duty station. (See paragraph 7 above).

d. Where travel by privately owned automobile has been duly authorized, reimbursement to the traveler will be made at a rate not to exceed 7 cents per mile, based on mileage shown in the Rand McNally Standard Highway Mileage Guide, for all actual transportation costs including gas, oil, lubrication, repairs, towing charges, accident, etc. with per diem for the actual time taken but not to exceed the time required to make such trip at an average of 250 miles per day where such travel is authorized as being for the convenience of ORO. Where such means of travel is authorized as being for the convenience of the traveler, per diem will be paid in accordance with the time required to make such trip by common carrier over the usually traveled route but not in excess of the time required to make such trip by rail. Mileage is payable to only one of two or more employees and/or consultants traveling together on the same trip and in the same vehicle.

LW

e. Where travel by privately owned aircraft has been duly authorized, reimbursement to the traveler will be made at a rate not to exceed 7 cents per mile, which shall be determined by multiplying the actual elapsed time in the air by the rated cruising speed of the particular aircraft for all actual transportation costs including gas, oil, lubrication, accident, hanger fees, landing fees, etc. with per diem for the actual time taken but not to exceed the time required to make such trip at an average of 500 miles per day where travel is authorized as being for the convenience of ORO. Where such means of travel is authorized as being for the convenience of the traveler, per diem will be paid in accordance with the time required to make such trip by scheduled airline. Air mileage is payable to only one of two or more employees and/or consultants traveling together on the same trip and in the same aircraft.

f. Charges for necessary baggage in excess of the weight or of the size greater than carried free by transportation companies will be allowed when transportation by more economical means is not feasible. Charges for excess baggage must be supported by receipts showing weight of the baggage and points between which moved. Necessary charges for transfer of baggage, for storage or checking of baggage when it is solely on account of official business, will be allowed.

g. Telegraph, cable, or radio service used on official business when such expeditious means of communication is essential will be allowed. A statement of the points between which sent, to whom sent, the date, and the amount paid must accompany the travel expense statement.

h. Charges for telephone calls on official business when such expeditious means of communication is essential will be allowed. A statement of the points between which the service was rendered, the party called, the date, and the amount paid must accompany the travel statement.

i. Charges for passports, visas, photographs for either, certificates of birth, etc., required for travel outside Continental United States on official business will be allowed.

j. Miscellaneous expenditures, not enumerated herein when necessarily incurred by the traveler in connection with the transaction

of official business, will be allowed only when approved by the
Administrative Officer or his designated representative.

9. Authorized Accommodations on Trains, etc.

a. Train Accommodations

(1) Sleeping - car accommodations. One standard lower berth when night travel is involved except that the lowest first-class accommodations available may be allowed on certification by the traveler on his travel expense statement that, at time reservation was made, the accommodation, if superior to a standard lower berth, was the lowest first-class available, which certification will be accepted as prima facie evidence. The use of a roomette or similar accommodation may be allowed when required in the interests of security.

(2) Parlor-car accommodations. One seat in a sleeping or parlor car when the continuous rail journey is more than two hours in duration and within the Continental United States. A stop for the purposes of changing trains is not considered an interruption in the journey. If the journey is outside the Continental United States, lowest rate first class accommodations available may be allowed without regard to the length of the journey.

b. Steamer Accommodations. Minimum first-class accommodations when stateroom is included in cost of passage, or where the stateroom is a separate charge, except that a superior accommodation may be allowed under the following conditions:

(1) When certification is made on travel expense statement that an accommodation superior to minimum first-class was the lowest available at time reservation was made, which certification will be accepted as prima facie evidence.

(2) When determined to be in the best interests of ORO by the Executive Director.

c. Sleeper Plane Accommodations. One standard berth on airplanes having sleeping accommodations when overseas night travel, beginning or terminating in the United States, is involved.

d. Extra-fare planes and trains. Travel by extra-fare planes or trains may be allowed only when the use of such facilities is determined to be more advantageous to ORO.

e. Special Tickets. Round trip tickets, through tickets, excursion or party tickets should be secured whenever practical and economical.

SECTION III

Travel of Employees

10. Travel Authorization.

a. Prior to departure and in sufficient time to permit the securing of reservations, normally one week prior to desired departure date, persons required to travel will complete Travel Notice, ORO Form No. ADM 28, a copy of which is attached as Inclosure 1 and, after obtaining the approval of the appropriate official or his duly authorized representative indicated below, submit the notice to the Fiscal Office.

(1) Executive Director for personnel assigned to Director's Office, Administrative Officer, Editor, and Assistant for Personnel.

(2) Deputy Director for personnel assigned to his Division and not assigned to a Project, and Project Chairmen.

(3) Project Chairman for all personnel assigned to his Project.

(4) Administrative Officer for all personnel assigned to his Division.

(5) Editor for all personnel assigned to his Division.

b. Where travel is to be performed by privately owned automobile or aircraft specific authorization of the Administrative Officer or his designated representative must be obtained prior to departure. In this connection, a statement of justification that such mode of travel is for the convenience of ORO must be written

[w]

on the reverse of the form, otherwise such mode of travel will
be authorized as for the convenience of the traveler. Evidence
of suitable liability insurance coverage and compliance with
applicable motor vehicle or aircraft laws must be presented
to and accepted by the Administrative Officer, or his designated
representative, before private cars or aircraft are used on
official business. The above requirements are essential in order
to protect the interests of both the individual and the University.

11. Travel Advances. It is the policy of ORO to advance travel funds which are essential to permit completion of authorized temporary duty. Advances of funds are not a routine adjunct to the performance of official travel and will be confined to the amount reasonably necessary for completion of travel. The request for an advance when necessary will be made on the Travel Notice. Request for an advance will not be honored where outstanding advances to the traveler have not been satisfactorily settled.

12. Submission and Reimbursement of Travel Accounts.

a. As soon as possible upon return to home station, the traveler should submit statement of travel expenses to the Fiscal Office on Form ORO T2, listing all necessary information and supported by required receipts and certificates.

b. Receipts for the following should be obtained and submitted:

(1) First class fares to be supported by Pullman stubs or plane receipts.

(2) Excess baggage charges (Par. 8f)

(3) Telegraph, cable, or radio service (Par. 8g)

(4) Telephone Service (Par. 8h)

(5) Passports and/or visas (Par. 8i)

(6) Extra fare trains or planes (Par. 9d)

(7) Miscellaneous expenditures for which reimbursement is sought. (Par. 8j)

Failure to obtain required receipts must be fully explained on the statement.

(L)

c. Where leave is taken in connection with official travel, the exact hour of departure from and return to duty status must be shown on the travel expense statement and supported by a properly executed leave slip for the period leave is taken.

## SECTION IV

### Travel of Consultants

13. **Policy.** Travel expenses of consultants to be reimbursable must be incurred at the request of and for the benefit of ORO and normally will be only for travel from consultant's home or place of business to the place the services are to be performed and return to point of origin on a one-time basis for each duty assignment. In this connection no per diem will be paid during periods the consultant is visiting his family and/or presumably living at home. The definitions contained in Section II, above, apply to the travel of consultants except that the term "duty station" is modified to be the corporate limits of the city, town, or metropolitan area where the travel begins and/or ends in accordance with Section IV. Per diem rates for travel set forth in Section II hereof supersede any conflicting rates specified in active appointment letters.

14. If the consultant is located at a point other than home or place of business, expenses will be paid for travel from the point at which he is located at the time he is called upon to perform services to the place services are to be performed, and either:

(a) Travel to the point of origin of travel or his base, which ever the consultant elects, or

(b) Travel to a third point for which reimbursement will be limited to an amount equal to the cost of transportation to the consultant's point of origin or base, which ever is less.

15. **Submission and Reimbursement of Travel Account.** As soon as possible upon return to home station, the traveler should submit a statement of travel expenses to the Fiscal Office on Form ORO T2, Rev, in triplicate, listing all necessary information and supported by required receipts and certificates (See Sec. III above).

16. It is the responsibility of the appropriate Project Chairman to insure that the travel by consultants is required in connection with the consultants work for ORO. For this reason all travel statements submitted by consultants must be approved by the Project Chairman prior to reimbursement.

## SECTION V

### Travel Outside Continental United States

17. All official travel outside the Continental United States is performed in accordance with Invitational Travel Orders issued by the Department of the Army.

18. Advance notice of the proposed travel should be submitted to the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, for Research and Development, a minimum of 3 weeks prior to estimated date of departure in order that necessary arrangements can be made. As the content of the advance notice varies according to the area to be visited, the Assistant Administrative Officer should be contacted for the necessary information for each trip at such time as travel outside the Continental United States appears probable.

## SECTION VI

### Travel by Military Aircraft Within Continental United States

19. Travel in military aircraft can be performed only upon invitational travel orders issued by the Department of the Army. Such orders will be issued only for those civilian employees of ORO engaged in activities for the Department of the Army requiring their transportation by air or presence aboard aircraft during flight.

20. As a matter of policy, requests for travel orders for travel within Continental United States authorizing use of military aircraft will be made only for permanent ORO employees who are employed full time as differentiated from part time employees, and consultants. Requests for invitational orders to travel by military aircraft will be submitted to the Assistant Administrative Officer a minimum of five working days prior to date of contemplated travel in order to allow for necessary processing at Headquarters, Department of the Army.

(L)

21. Insurance up to $20,000 covering travel by military aircraft will be procured and paid by ORO at the request of the employee. Application should be made to the Assistant Administrative Officer.

## SECTION VII

### Local Travel

22. **Motor Pool.** A group of motor vehicles is maintained under the control of the Receptionist for use in the Metropolitan Washington Area. All requests for use of such vehicles should be made to the Receptionist *well* in advance of the desired departure time to enable the grouping of passengers for effective economical utilization of the available vehicles.

a. Vehicles should be released upon arrival at destination unless prior arrangement has been made with the Receptionist.

b. Motor pool vehicles are to be used for official business only.

23. **Taxi Cabs.** Taxi cabs may be used on a reimbursable basis for local travel when other means of transportation is not available or reasonable. Requests for reimbursement should be submitted to the Fiscal Office through the Receptionist on ORO Form ADM 29. Copy of which is attached hereto as Enclosure 2.

24. **Use of Privately Owned Vehicles.** In order to protect the interests of the individual and in view of the liability accruing to The Johns Hopkins University, privately owned vehicles will be used for official business only after express approval of the Administrative Officer or his duly designated representative has been obtained. Normally such approval should be obtained through the Receptionist. Evidence of suitable liability insurance coverage and compliance with applicable motor vehicles laws must be presented when requesting approval. For convenience of those members of ORO who have cause to use a privately owned vehicle on official business on a recurring basis, blanket authorization may be granted by the Administrative Officer at his discretion. Reimbursement for use of privately owned vehicle will be made at the rate of seven cents per mile based on actual speedometer readings. Reimbursement should be sought on ORO Form No. ADM 29.

ORO Form No. ADM 29

Date

SUBJECT: Reimbursement for Local Travel

TO: Chief Accountant

*1. Request reimbursement for use of privately owned vehicles on official ORO business as follows:

Arrived Speedometer Reading

Departed Speedometer Reading

Mileage

*a. Travel authorized by ORO Form ADM No. 30, Serial No. ____________.

*b. Travel performed in following vehicle:

Make and body type

Year Model

State & Registration No.

*2. Request reimbursement in the amount of $__________ which the undersigned paid for taxi cab for travel from ____________ to ____________. Travel was required for official business and no other means of transportation was available or reasonable.

**APPROVED: ____________ Traveler

Asst. Administrative Officer

***Vehicle was (not) available from Motor Pool.

* Complete applicable paragraph only. Receptionist

**To be completed only if paragraph 1b is completed.

***To be completed only if paragraph 2 is completed.

ORO ADM FORM NO. 55-130

CERTIFICATE IN LIEU OF DD FORM 441
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY AGREEMENT

The undersigned hereby certify jointly that such services to be rendered by the undersigned consultant as require access to classified information will be performed at, and no classified material will be removed from, the facilities of the undersigned contractor, military installations, or other cleared facilities for which approval has been obtained by the undersigned contractor in accordance with applicable Department of Defense security directives.

Executed at New York on Jan 30 1956

Henry A. Kissinger

Consultant

Executed at Chevy Chase, Maryland, on Feb. 3 1957

The Johns Hopkins University
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE
(Contractor)

By S.B. Hony
Executive Director