ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TIME AND PLACE: December 1, 1971 - 9:30 p.m.
Chinese Room, Mayflower Hotel
Washington, D. C.

PARTICIPANTS: Meeting with the Business Council
(list attached)
Henry A. Kissinger

[Dr. Kissinger was introduced with general biographical remarks.]

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, I certainly appreciate this opportunity to appear before you this evening. You know, in the first two and a half years of the Administration I provided it the dubious service of being the person who was trotted out whenever the protest groups came to the White House as an example of the depth to which human depravity can reach. (Laughter) Let me begin by speaking briefly about some general principles of foreign affairs. I will try to do that in a short manner, perhaps in ten minutes (if I prove to have the capacity to speak only for ten minutes) and then will take questions from the floor. I choose this method because I can remember the days before I worked in the White House when I use to hate being spoken to by government officials who said that they had considered all the alternatives, and chosen the best possible course of action; and that if I only knew what they knew, they wouldn't have to be bothered by the questions I had.

In the first 18 months of our Administration, Vietnam was foreign policy. On the Vietnam war let me now say only one thing: that this war will be concluded, whether by negotiation or by unilateral action on our side. The only disagreements remaining in the United States about our withdrawal from Vietnam relate to the rate of that withdrawal; and those disagreements really narrow down to a concern over few months at most. The key question at the end of our involvement in Vietnam is whether we will end it with the dignity commensurate with the sacrifices we have made there, or whether we will end it on a basis which tears this nation apart. It is not quite clear to me where Chuck Percy's (nodding to Senator Percy) colleagues in the Senate stand on this issue. You know sometimes it seems to me that Cooper/Church must be a hyphenated name. (Laughter) But the basic direction on Vietnam is clear, and that is what I want to leave with you tonight. I will take questions on the Vietnam problems

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

later but now let me turn to more general remarks about foreign
policy.

When this Administration came to power at the beginning of 1969,
we found ourselves in a period with the foreign policy capital of
the post-war era virtually exhausted. That era was one in which
the United States was the sole nation of the non-Communist world
with power sufficient to run foreign affairs. Following the Second
World War the traditional powers were shattered economically and
had domestic structures that would not sustain the active conduct
of foreign policy. At the same time the emerging nations were still
looking for power. They had not achieved it. During that era,
throughout the non-communist world questions of security and
progress depended on answers from the United States. It came
to be the view of the other nations that their security and progress
was of more interest to the United States than it was to them them-
selves. As a reflection of that, foreign affairs for them came to be
little more than lobbying efforts in the United States for action by
our government. This situation, of course, simply could not last.

In the subsequent period we have seen Europe and Japan both grow
enormously in their economic and military potential. Japan by
now has one of the largest economies in the world. During that same
period we have seen the Communist world split; and now, surprisingly
enough, the most significant political split in the world is not between
the Communists and the non-Communists, but within the Communist
world between Russia and China. So the whole international balance
had changed by the time this Administration came into power: first,
due to the growth of the power of our friends, and second, due to the
growth of the power of our enemies.

As an example, in 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, President
Kennedy's supporters were proud to say that the President had gone
to the edge of cataclysm to prevent intrusion in the Western
Hemisphere. At that time, the Russians had some 70 intercontin-
ental ballistic missiles: all were standing in the open, and required
ten hours to fuel. By the time this Administration came into power
in 1969, the Russians had 1200 missiles, all in hard sites, and they
had a constantly growing fleet of missile-armed submarines. So
during this era, decisions about peace and war in the international
area have been taken under circumstances drastically different
from those which prevailed in the 1960s.