TELCON
Albert Wohlstetter
Mr. Kissinger
7-11-69 9:45 AM

K said he did not know if his staff was as incommunicative as he is but K very much liked the memo W did in June and wondered if W would agree to expand the end of it. W said this is one of the things he wanted to talk about. W said he would be in Washington the end of the afternoon for a meeting of the committee at the Pentagon and a meeting tomorrow - could stay on thru Tuesday if he could be of any use. W said he has done a lot more work and he thinks position of the opposition is absolutely ridiculous and on costs they are as crooked as can be. W referred to the compromises and said some would be a resounding defeat and most of those suggested are. W said he thinks it would have a very bad political effect on the President if anything like the Kwajalein solution came. K asked about compromise of no actual deployment of missiles next year. W said it would not change scheduling but would have to be written very carefully. K said that is what we think. W said it would involve manufacture of lot of test missiles and the defeat such as it is would be nominal one - psychologically, one has to do battle for deployment in principle again for the missile but it is not death by any means. K said he thinks that is the only compromise that is being considered. W referred to Aiken's statement yesterday which is no compromise at all - research and development with radars test on Kwajalein - no one would be fooled by it for a second. W said he is convinced there are few people able and active to go over there and really argue this thing. This is something W would like to talk about with K. K said with this trip coming up his schedule is insane. K said first, he would like W to agree to do this paper, review where we stand on SALT and strategic posture things. K said he will arrange that W be given the documents. W asked who on Congressional side is most alive to what is happening and K said Belieu. K said he would be happy to arrange for W to see Belieu. K said he is most anxious to hear from W and get his views even if he can't see him - K reads everything W writes. K said he would try to see W next week.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCONE
Vice President
Mr. Kissinger

7-11-69 10:30 AM

VP said he wondered if he dared to risk public mention of this
Dillinger thing in rather adverse way - he would do this in Charlotte.
K asked what VP planned to say. VP said he would condemn the Gov
for undermining the negotiators and for reasons of personal publicity
risking security of the US. VP said he would really put it on him pretty
hard. K said he would leave out for reasons of personal publicity.
VP said it is not logical for us to risk the kind of adverse exposure
that comes from sending someone who has consistently been against
policy of two Administrations and who stands for indictment
to negotiate this business at enemy's request. VP said four ax or five
letters and phone calls have come in about this thing even though
no one would know VP has feelings on this. K said VP knows his
personal view. VP said yes but wondered if K thought this would cause
a struggle with State Dept. K asked if VP minded if he mentioned it to
the President. VP said no - he is leaving this morning for Charlotte
and K said he will see Pres at 12:30 and get word to VP in Charlotte.
K said his own feeling is that it is good thing to ax say. VP said he
thinks Pres needs to be protected on this and it may be buffer for him
if VP mentions it.

VP said second thing on his mind is national security question generally
with particular emphasis on SALT, ABM, etc. VP mentioned editorial
in National Observer which he thought was pretty well done. K has
not seen it. VP said there were some statements which he wanted
to ask K whether he thought they were accurate enough to use. VP
read para on ABM and K said it was all good except for one sentence
which he would edit a little by saying Russians have already deployed
something and testing new ones. VP mentioned phrase big risk for
peace theory which Senators can indulge but Presidents cannot. VP
said he wanted K's opinion as to how much K thought in any contextual
rearrangement was safe to use and how much was not. K said on risk
he would say what exactly do people mean by risk. VP read para having
to do with Soviet-US arms control discussions. K said it went pretty far
and he would not use it. VP then mentioned phrase about Nixon loping
alongside the Russians until workable agreement is actually signed. K
said it was pretty accurate but he would not use those words.
VP asked whether K thought it was bad to make these comparisons with Kenno
and Cranston and K said no, it was good.

K said he would get back to VP on Dillinger.

im

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
James Reston

Mr. Kissinger

7-11-69 11:12 AM

R asked what kind of issues Thieu statement on the election raises.
R asked if K thought it had a chance of being accepted. K said at this
stage it may be that nothing has a chance of being accepted. K said
he thinks we are all caught in a bind at the moment - will have to leave
SVN somewhat autonomous under any form of government.
K said this is bitter pill for Ho Chi Minh to swallow. K said if
R is asking him if it is something they ought to accept, K thinks they
should. Whenever they are ready to move to a compromise, it is
something they will probably take seriously.

R asked how much trouble the Donovan story caused. K said we are
talking privately. K thinks it is fairly self-evident

K referred to R's column on problem and said he thought it was very good.
R referred to a conversation he had had with Galbraith. K said he had
written to him about this as well. K said if you avow the Galbraith
proposal then you have to pick up and get out or stay in forever.
K said what we are doing is giving them as reasonable a chance as we can
to put their house in order. K asked what Galbraith wanted to do and
R said pack up. K said he did not say that to him - just what he said to R.
K asked whether R thought we had made very excessive statements on that.
R said no. R said he thinks K is getting it from both sides - people like R
who believe we are really trying to get out and people on the other side
who say the Adm just says that and does not mean it and just has Johnson
policy. K said it is funny way of implementing the foreign policy.
K now has Johnson policy - Johnson does not think we are. K said we have to
be given some maneuvering room and this is really the problem.

K asked R to let him know when he would be in Washington. R said he might
get down before K leaves on trip and will call him.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 9/15/06

Telecon
Col. Borman

5:30 p.m.

7/11/69

K said he had to go to a meeting and had kept the people
waiting for some time and wondered how long B would
be here. B said he would be here until he could see K.
K said he would see him at 7:00.

K asked if B had any advise on his statements he made
on his trip. B said he had from the State Dept and from
NASA. K said he should have talked to B before he left.
The President had changed his line slightly although the
State Dept. had not.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCOM

Gov Dewey
Mr. Kissinger

7-11-69 8:25 PM

D said he explored subject with Pres Bush and he says Bob Lovett
is fine mettle and in good physical condition. D said he thinks he is 74
but Bush says he has all his faculties and could undertake this work
without any physical strain. D said he asked how his mind functioned
and Bush said beautifully. D said he asked what Lovett thought about the
ABM and Bush said he had brought this subject up recently with Bob
and he said there was no alternative. K said that is exactly right - it is
only answer one can give. D said when he could not get to K this morning
he called Flanigan on another matter and told him of Lovett's quote.
Flanigan asked D if he thought Bob would help us and D said he thought so.
D said he thinks Flanigan is sending a memo to someone with that quote.

K said we are trying to get a meeting next week with Pres for general
discussion about what he has in mind, etc. D said K does not need him
for that and K said we do. D asked if anyone had called Genl Clay and
K said no, but he would do so on Monday. D said President should do it -
it's very cheap and would only take four minutes. D said Clay is
very, very sensitive Southern gentleman who has many bruises - he
raised money for Rep party for years and no one has ever thanked him.
D said he told Pres this and he said he would see that something was done.
K agreed Pres should call Clay and said he would make sure he did so on
Monday or Tuesday. D said except for Tues night, he is free
and can come down to Washington. K said he would call D on Monday or
Tuesday. D said he thought K could get Bob Lovett although D has
had no contact with him. K said he would talk to Pres about it. Both
agreed that Lovett was first-class.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
The President

11:25 a.m.

7/12/69

President asked if there was anything new. K said only some trip material that he had discussed with Haldeman and Chapin. The floating market seems to take three hours. They could cut it down to 1:55 but the President would be out of communication for about an hour. Unless the President felt strongly about this, K recommend that they not do it. President agreed not to do it.

K said the Thais would like to give a reception and President agreed.

K mentioned that the NLF had turned down Thieu's statement.

The President wanted K to contact Bryce Harlow and have him contact about 70 senators to get them to endorse his statement. K agreed to do this.

K mentioned the New York Times article praising Thieu's statement. They also added what they thought he should do next. It is the most friendly thing they have said for Thieu yet. The President didn't think Rogers's statement got much of a run. K agreed. K said it was good that the President's statement got out before the NLF responded.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Bryce Harlow

11:30 a.m. 7/12/69

K said he had just talked to the President and the President wanted
Harlow to line up about 70 Senators behind Thieu's statement and
the President's endorsement of that statement -- in the light of
the Fulbright and Mansfield statements. K said Hanoi should be
deprived of the idea that they could reject all of our ideas without
pressure building.

Harlow asked if someone could send up some talking points to
use in approaching the Senators.

They discussed the McGovern situation. Harlow was extremely
upset that nothing had been done about this. K said he would be
discussing this with the Attorney General today, about this and other
related situations occurring.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Peter Flanigan

12:35 p.m.

7/12/69

K said that the Ambassador we have in Chile is first class. Given
the fact that there is a Presidntial election early next year it would
be a mistake to move him.

F wanted to know if K got this information from Meyer. K said no,
from Pete Vaky. and also that he had heard it from L.A. too.
F said what he really wanted was a hard and realistic man in his
place. Corey felt that he could move and/my discussions with
Augestine, this is the fellow that would meet Augestine's requirements.
We incurr an obligation to someone and now they want to change it.
K said he didn't know any of the alternatives. He said he had an
independent judgment on Corey. F said State agreed that we would
offer this job to Herd and Meyer dix talks him out of taking it. Now
Meyer apparently has gotten to Vakey. Corey is a very competent
man. K said he didn't recommend keeping him beyond the elections
and he was not pushing. F said the thought was that we would send
him to Venezuela. K said he handled the Anaconda thing very well.

K said if Corey approved it he would withdraw his point. F said he
would see what the status is before doing anything and will check back
with him. K asked about the Martin situation. F said he hadn't
heard after they decided to reconsider. They claim that Martin is
more operational than research. They both agreed that in the I&R
job, we had to have our man in there. Martin seemed to be our man.

They discussed the problems at State. K said that they were 50% low
on their estimates of the Soviet strategic pm missile capability over the
past 5 years. In the Eisenhower period they were about 10% high. K
said he spent 6 hours with the Intelligence people before he got them
to admit that the Soviets have a multiple warhead. He is trying to get
them to explain what is true.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/69

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
12:45 p.m. 7/12/69

K - He wanted to tell the Governor that action had been taken on the Guyana post. They have notified Burman that he will stay there on the basis of Rockefeller's recommendation. After that, he will stay there for a period of about 4 months. After that, it is hard to extend it much beyond because they have already made further assignments. The four months we can do.

R - In that four months, I hope we can get the Venezuela thing straightened out. I feel it was essential. You have an oil negotiation with Venezuela. They have this study on importation of oil. It determines the future of Venezuela. If the decision is to let them continue, then you have them in a position where you say, these days one just doesn't do this kind of thing. Then you explain the Communist being the most explosive thing, they will then have to drop the case. When this is done, the new fellow is going to be o.k. David said you have the situation on the money for Uruguay done.

K - That will be done by July 15. When we meet, I will explain why these things have to be done rather slowly rather than head on.

R - I did not state the Haitian situation. I don't know how we ought to take this up. There is a strategy to be developed.

K - If you could give me a memo in addition to your report it would help. I have to bring a few people along to prevent a head on confrontation. On the Haitian thing, it was a problem of getting it done before the end of the Fiscal year.

R - In the meantime, they sent a delegation to Chase Manhattan Bank. David has sent three men down.

K - They are almost certain to get it from us too.

R - I feel the Communists are out to overthrow some of these countries. I think the timing of the trip was essential.

K - I have talked to Pete Vakey about your report - and by the way, now that he is with me you can trust him. You said you thought there was a chance your report might not be accepted -- It might be done a bit

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

- 2 -

differently but I think in a style that you will be happy with.

R - One psychological point: If we could say that the objectives of the Alliance for Progress are good objectives but over promised, which is what has happened and under-delivered on both U.S. and Latin America's side, that this would be a plan you could come out with a Nixon plan.

K - We are going to use that point in a speech to the Interamerican Press Institute as a vehicle for launching Latin American relations. On AFP, these are things we should talk about. The falling in the NSC is that we should not get committed to the internal policies of these governments. X. If a formulation could be found that each government must find its own domestic balance, that the U.S. would always be a non-Communist, Our view is that we would encourage development and an independent, self reliant state. We would not tell them how to run their State.

R - I talked to Javits. He asked George Woods to support the private enterprise portion of aid program. Would it be o.k. for him to appear before committee.

K - that would be fine. It would help us.

They discussed the implications of the Russian fleet being off the coast of Florida. R said he would have his report in X by August 10.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Gerard Smith
1:10 pm. 7/12/69

Smith wanted to pass on that the GSC Locus is related to Foreign Relations Committee hearings. K said he told Alex that we have no interest where the thing is located. We are offering space but any place would be fine.

K said he talked to the Chairman. He promised he would do what he could but there are three others involved. It may not come out that way. K assumed that he was an honorable man. He said he didn't tell him not to oppose it. They shouldn't use the phrase that it is incompatible with the military community.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Senator Percy

3:15 p.m.

7/12/69

K wanted to talk to Percy about a problem in connection with
Vietnam. Hanoi has reached the
conclusion that if it waits long enough, it can break American public
opinion and therefore it doesn't have to negotiate seriously. We
recognize that any statement is going to have the difficult aspect to
keep the country divided. We believe that from a domestic and
internation point of view, we should make a generous offer, then
Hanoi would know that American people support the position
of the President. We felt it would be helpful if a large number of
Senators would say that they believe a set of responsible
proposals have been made about which one could at least
negotiate and calls on Hanoi to enter serious negotiations. If Hanoi
thinks they can reject everything and sit and wait for pressure
to build up, the war will never be concluded show of anything but a
surrender. We left the details vague in order to invite negotiation.
We are not asking for an endorsement of every detail.

Percey said it was a perfectly sound proposal. He would be happy
to do anything. He would have Scott Cohen in his office work on this
Korea. They discussed strategy of how to do this. Possibly
several statements during the morning sessions and P said even a
joint statement although that might be more difficult to coordinate.

P wanted to know if we had an answer from the Russians on SALT.
He offered to send message to Gromyko if that would help. K said
he was seeing Tchernikov on Tuesday and would let P know if anything
developed out of that meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Senator Percy
5:10 p.m. 7/12/69

Percy had the statement given to him through Tony Lake. He had
two questions (1) he wanted to be sure this was not a preamble to
an escalation of the war and was just to strengthen our hand in
Paris. (2) should this be a spontaneous effort from Senators with
the idea that they submitted it to the WH and the WH agreed that
it would help.

To question (1) K said we are not planning an escalation. He
couldn't promise never but that is not what the statement had in
mind. (2) it would be good as a spontaneous statement.

Percy said he would reword it slightly and get back to Tony for
approval. His idea would be drawing up the statement with as many
signatures as possible and send it to Lodge. Of course a wire like
this would certainly get out to the public. He also wanted to call
Vance and Harriman to see if they would support it. He said it might
be easier to get Democrats to agree to statement with V and H support.
K said he would have to think about that one and would call him back.
Percy thought it would be good to also give this to Yost and have him
distribute it to other countries asking them what they thought they could
do now to support the President and Thieu on their latest proposals.
K thought that might not be a bad idea.

Percy said K mentioned back in 1966 that he thought the war would
just die out and wanted to know if K still felt the same way. K said no
he didn't feel that would be possible now.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon

Bryce Harlow

k 5:25 p.m. 7/12/69

K said he talked to Percy. He explained that Percy wanted to call
Vance and Harriman to get Democratic support. K mentioned that
he knew what V and H would say. Harlow thought that this would be
o.k., if Percy agreed that their reaction would not deter him from
going ahead with progress otherwise.

They agreed to let Percy go ahead and Harlow would call off the work
he started.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Senator Percy

5:30 p.m. 7/12/69

K said he could go ahead with calling Vance and Harriman but mentioned
what he thought their reaction would be. Percy felt that this statement
was broad enough so that they would agree on the basic reasoning
behind it.

Percy asked if any other people had been contacted and if anyone else
had this statement. K said that Harlow probably has done homework
on it as far as getting Congressional support but that no one had the
statement and he (Harlow) wasn't going at it on the same line as Percy.
Percy said he would try to get Dirkson, Goldwater, TX Tower also.

K said again, that this was not going to get support for all the Administration's policies. Hanoi just can't go on rejecting everything we put forward.

Percy said he would work out the wording and call Tony Lake.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E.O. 12958

By

DSNARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
The President
6:40 p.m. 7/12/69

K called the President to inform him of Percy's plan to get
support behind Thieu's and the President's statements.

See the (Missed the first part of conversation)

The President said the VC are going to sit there doing nothing.
K said until they are convinced that our public opinion is not
going to break. Bunker sent a cable thanking the President for
his support of Thieu's statement.

The President said Bryce should call these people and have
them read his statement. It will give them ammunition.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

DSNARA Date

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11:00 a.m.

7/14/69

Laird said he spent the weekend studying the VN strategy problem they had discussed. He thought he would send Wheeler and Adm. Lemos to VN to sit down with Abrams. K thought this would be a good idea and he would tell the president.

Laird said he was having problems with State on the troop with-drawals. State didn't want any more troops going to Okinawa so Laird was sending them to Hana Hawaii and the U.S.

Laird thought the ABM debate was moving along. K said Bryce Harlow was working on that. K said if Laird was happy with it, it was o.k. with him.

K wanted to know if Laird had taken care of rewriting the directive so that it lists things we want him(?) to do. Laird said yes.

K said he had discussed with the Laird's office and suggested that the Seabed thing go to the Undersecretaries Committee. Laird said that would be fine with him.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN
Bryce Harlow

Mr. Kissinger

7-14-69 11:15 AM

H said he had before him letter to Senator Stennis in rough draft which K needs urgently to read before H gives to the President. H said he would send it down. H said he had talked with Karl Mundt who said if Pres goes ahead, he will alienate all his best ~~fellow~~ friends - lose the ABM fight, lose support of Harry Byrd, McCormack will attack openly, etc. Mundt cited President's campaign speech. H said he told Mundt it was part of ploy with other side but Mundt was flat. K said President asked him to see Mundt and asked H if he thought he should still do so. H said yes, but he does not think anything can be done today. H said he has told State to hold until we get it straightened around. K said he is leaning toward doing it when they get back from the trip.

K asked if we should check with Harry Bryd. H said K might talk to Karl.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/66

Telecon
Seantor Percy

11:20 a.m.

7/14/69

Percy said he had discussed the VN statement with Cooper w this weekend. Cooper pointed out that everyone is going to be rather sensitive on this one -- they remember the Bay of Tonkin situation resolution. P told him no one knew what the situation would be a year from now but that all those who were pushing for some light in negotiations now has the responsibility to back the President on this. P also discussed this with Aiken and Mansfield. He thought the statement should be supported by the leadership -- Dirksen and Mansfield and Aiken and Fulbright.

P thought it might help if HAK called Cooper Aiken to emphasize the President's concern. P said he would be more than happy to do the leg work but thought the leadership should do the statement.

K said he would let P know what Aiken said.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/69

TELCON

Senator Aiken
Mr. Kissinger

7-14-69 12:35 PM

K said Percy called him re his conversation with A. K said ourxx concern here is we think the biggest problem we face right now is to get Hanoi to frame of mind that they are willing to talk seriously - they seem to think if they just sit tight, American public opinion will force us into unconditional surrender. K said we are not interested in any endorsement of any specific policy but rather an appeal to Hanoi or some expression that makes it clear that those urging peace have in mind a reasonable peace and beyond that point not only urging their Government but Hanoi to make a contribution. K said we think this would be great national service. A agreed that it was a good thing to do but was not sure how to do it. A said he is not sure a group presentation is the right way. A said a majority was needed or it should be held to two or four. K said that makes sense to him. A said when you get up to 20 or 25 people it looks like that is allxx it was and does not carry the weight. A said he told Percy he thought two or four would be more effective, provided they are the right ones. K asked whom A was thinking of and A said John Cooper, Percy. K asked about Mansfield and A said he does not know - Mansfield wanted more time to think it over. K asked if US Senators as a whole asked them to use their heads and common sense, would lthat be construed as weaken weakness too. A said no. K said what we want to get across to the other side is that it is their turn to be reasonable. A said he would talk to Mansfield some more about it. A said he was opposed to a deadline. A said he agrees they should be given fair warning that present policy is not helping them. K said we have gone a pretty long way toward meeting reasonable demands. A said he agreed and there should be some response. A said he personally thinks the Russians would like to see it over with. K agreed saying if they know how to do it.

K agreed if we could not get sixty it would be better to do it with five. K said if A, Cooper, Mansfield, Percy and one otherxx were to do it, it would be xxx powerful backing. A mentioned Muskie or McIntyre. A said he would talk again to Mansfield.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCORN

Senator Percy
Mr. Kissinger

7-14-69 12:50 PM

P said he has talked to Aiken and he seems very receptive
except if he can't get majority it would then be better to get five or six.
K said he agrees. P said he has impression that Aiken Aiken is
for it - max he is never very explicit but he agreed he would talk to
Mansfield and thinks it is time to put pressure on Hanoi.
P and K discussed Mansfield's nice statement on Surtax.

P said on ABM he has felt we should have leeway for lead time parts - production. P said if you decide to go into production, you have then gained time and if you decide not to, you have lost nothing. P said he would be happy to talk to Packard about it. P said there is attitude of absolutely no compromise on opponents - Senators demanding and insisting funds be cut. P said we have taken position that we do not want to cut funds - just want to define and understand fully what they will be used for. P said they are having a hard time with the ones who want funds cut but he thinks they are beginning to see his point re lead time production. P said if that provides any help to Dave Packard he would be willing to try to work on that aspect. K said he would raise with Bryce H. Bryce Harlow and Pres.

K said we can't expect P to always go along but he has been very constructive force. P said not on some things like the one K really wanted - ABM.
K said it makes P's support very meaningful.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/1966

TELECON

Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger

July 14, 1969 -- 2:30 p. m.

Secretary Laird asked if K had received the paper on verification. K said yes, it's very interesting, and he is getting together a panel on it.

L said he would have the other item on MIRV over to K today or tomorrow at the very latest. He said they had some good discussions on it. L then asked K if he knew the Soviets had one of their largest fleet movements ever, including one of the modern missile cruisers, just off Cuba. It will be watching our Apollo XI. Its purpose in being over here is to go into Cuba on the 20th of the month for some sort of celebration.

L said, having noticed that Dobrynin turned down the invitation to the moon shot on July 16 and L wondered about the possibility of picking up the commander of the Soviet fleet and taking him to Cape Kennedy for the shot. K said he would make that proposition to the President, but pointed out that the President had earlier turned down inviting any other Soviets to attend the launching. He thinks he will say no this time also, however. K said our general strategy with the Russians now is to be cool, to give them an incentive to help with Hanoi. L said he would send over a paper on this particular thing.

lds

TELCOM
Rose Woods
Mr. Kissinger

7-14-69 3:35 PM

W said another person had called with same suggestion about inviting ships into our ports. K asked who did it this time and W said someone from Stock Exchange in NY. K said no, we are against it - if we invite into our ports, we look defensive. We just ignore it.

W asked said re Kiesinger dinner, she understands that K wants Sonnenfeldt and his wife invited. W asked if he had to come to dinner. K said he would appreciate it. W said o.k. she would put them on but they may be crossed off by someone else.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
3:45 p. m., 7-14-69

R said Henry, I just talked to Nelson about his report and thought I
would coordinate with you on it. HAK said I have not talked to
him in a week.

R said I told him I wanted our people to talk to his people before
meeting with the President and particularly about anything that would
become public. HAK said I think that is exactly what the President
wants. R said Nelson thinks they will have two documents - one a
private document to the President with a lot of recommendations and
he does not want to tell what the recommendations will be until he
gives document to President. On the other document, he would like
to talk to us in advance and said that he would get in touch with
Charlie and Samuels.

HAK said if he sends a report in to the President I will get it to you
as soon as it arrives. R said he wants to have something to give
the President which goes directly to the President which is under-
standable. HAK said the President's intention is to put this report
in the NSC machinery if it is at all tolerable. R said in our absence, I
have told Meyer and Samuel to get in touch with Nelson and George
Woods. HAK said I have not talked to Nelson except that he called me
when he got back about the Ambassador to Guyana.

R said I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today.
HAK said how did it go? R said there really was not a hostile question.
R said there was nothing said in a hostile tone of voice. R said you
never can tell but I don't believe there was anything that will cause any
difficulty. HAK said if you can keep it non-hostile it is a great achieve-
ment.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Director Mayo

5:10 p.m.

7/14/69

M said he had the memorandum for the President on the Korean supplement. It was $88 million but the fiscal year outlays would increase by $45 million. The President indicated he didn't want any requests for money to go up to the Hill until after the surtax had gotten more finalized. He thought it would be a bad mistake to do anything about this until the surtax does pass. There is going to be criticism since the total for MAP is going to be greater than the amount in 1969. He suggested deferring it until after the NSC meeting on August 13. (K said there would be no NSC meeting on August 13). He said we could certainly defer it until after the surtax.

M said he had some substance questions as did State; like just how much do you do for Korea. It looks like we are being fancy with Korea as against other things. K said the President feels there is a greater threat in Korea and the decision here is to show the other side that such actions as the EC 121 has some consequence. M said he couldn't apraise that. On the record, we have given quite alo to Korea this year such as arms, etc.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By DS

E.O. 12958
4/15/69

TELCON
Adam Yarmolinsky
Mr. Kissinger

7-14-69 6:00 PM

Y referred to document he gave K on the Council on Foreign Relations
Study group and asked whether K thought it could be made available to
other members at this time. K said he saw no *objection* to that -
he assumes they will not make it public. Kx Y said you have to take
that risk. K said he would like to look at it again from that point of view.
Y said unless K thinks it is o.k. to release, not to bother to call him.
Y asked it K had any observations on it. K said at the time he read it
his general reaction was good. Y said unless he hears from K
he will do *ix* nothing.

K and Y discussed ABM and Y asked if K had read the paper that Teddy
has been *ix* circulating with press release on ABM - gives a new twist
to argument.

jm

TELCORN

Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger

7-14-69 6:05 PM

S asked whether K had seen report from Toyko (#5705). K said no.
Cable has to do with NPT and S suggested White House might want
to send out message to Tokyo.

S said he had report that Hal Sonnenfeldt had talked to McCloy and
said he was being sold a bill of goods on Furnas and should look into
it. S said Furnas went to NY and met with MoG Furnas went
up to NY and met with McC. K said he didx does not know what
Sonnenfelt did but K does not know Furnas and has never laid eyes on
him. Anyone that Alex Johnson and McCloy agree on is more than
satisfactory with K and he would be happy to say that to McCloy.
S said he thinks H takes a great deal on himself to go to McCloy. K said
he could not believe that Hal did that - we have taken position that
unkff staffing is entirely up to McCloy. K said he is not informed
that H did this and he did not do it at K's request. K said he would be
glad to talk with McCloy. S said he thinks the thing for him to do
is to get in touch with McCloy and see what arrangements he wishes
to have. S said he does not quite like p[roper] p[ro]spect prospect of
having man (as he was told) involved in all meetings of ACDA. K said
it seems to go beyond what FIAB does - analyzing product but not
sitting in on meetings.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Dr. Mayer
7/14/69, 8:10 p.m.

M said that he had been told by a Congressman calling for Senator Kennedy that Kennedy was holding hearings tomorrow morning on Biafra and Kennedy was very anxious not to have it cross papers with the Administration if the Administration is planning to do something which could be interfered with by the hearings.

K said if Kennedy could delay until next week. He said we are definitely going to do something this week.

M said the trouble is that the hearings are scheduled for tomorrow. He said Elliot Richardson was going to start off.

K said he didn't want to tell Kennedy what to do. He said we have a policy and we are going to start doing it this week.

M said he would suggest that it would be a wise thing to find some reason to delay the meeting.

K said if Elliot Richardson leads off and gives our policy it won't be so bad.

M said he would suggest that the hearings be delayed unless Elliot Richardson leads off tomorrow.

M and K then discussed having breakfast and K suggested that they try for this Friday, July 18 at 8:00 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/04

TELECON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger

7/14/69, 8:20 p.m.

K asked R if he was going to testify tomorrow on Biafra. R said he was
and K said that was good. R said Roger Morris has been most helpful.

K said the President approved the program which R developed except for
the Congressional consultation. K said as long as the President didn't
have to do it why don't we do it over here and R could present the program.
R said that he thought we should take another look at it after the testimony.
K said the President just didn't want to block out his schedule. R said
he knew but that it just wasn't the same thing for "these fellows" to see
us rather than the President.

R said the reason he called was that he wanted to touch base on the China trade restrictions. K said that the first conversation that Bryce had was with Mundt. K said Mundt hit the ceiling and said it would definitely ruin ABM and that the President has now asked K to see Mundt. K said he was seeing him at 4:45 tomorrow. K said if he could "line him up" we are going ahead otherwise we will wait for August and that it is definitely going to be done. R said if anyone can line him up it was K and "good luck."

R asked K to thank Roger for him. K said that Roger is a first-class fellow.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

Mr. Kissinger

7/14, 10:20 p.m.

K said take the following down. Keep cool. You have not been through a
crisis like this as I have. We have a war of our own now. Handle it well.
We have been on top of the situation. We sent messages on July 8 to the
Presidents of Honduras and El Salvador urging them to go along with the
mediation effort and urging a peaceful solution. Tonight, the OAS, under
the Rio Treaty, met and created an investigative committee and we have
offered them an aircraft to take them down. Z asked if he could say that.
K said yes. K said the President has been fully aware of the situation.
Z said he would say the President has been briefed on the matter by
Kissinger and that he is following it. K said all we have to make sure is
that the telegram was sent to Honduras and not British Honduras (laughter).
Z asked about mediation efforts. K said mediation efforts collapsed. K
said the Rio Treaty calls for consultation and hemispheric solidarity. Z
again asked if he could say all of this. K said yes. Z asked what he could
tell them about U. S. action that has been taken. K said you can say what
I have told you; beyond that point say that we will support the OAS. If
this thing keeps going we will probably try to line up the larger states,
Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and make a joint appeal.

K said the President wanted to know whether Z thought we should put out
a statement. Z said no, we shouldn't put out a statement -- we should just
respond. K said respond that we have been on top of this, support the
OAS and the President sent telegrams to the Presidents of Honduras and
El Salvador last week.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
10:30 p.m., 7/14

The President said that a couple of things occurred to him and that K should give Rockefeller a call and ask him what he thought. P said he might make a telephone call to each of the Presidents. P said we might be able to get a little credit if we could do something to bring about a settlement. Like peacemaker. P also asked K to have his people give a little thought to what we could do besides the OAS. K said we supplied them an airplane and we also supplied an airplane to the mediation team. P again asked if K could think of anything else, maybe a letter to each President or a call, anything of that sort. P said Rockefeller could break the ground for us. K said he would call Rockefeller. P said he wouldn't mind sending a personal message to both sides. If it peters out, maybe we can take a little credit.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON
Gov. Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
10:45 p.m., 7/14

K said here is the problem. Salvador has just attacked Honduras, jumping all over the place. They have attacked seven airfields, and moving across the border. As yet we haven't confirmed the ground action. K said the President wanted him to call Rockefeller to see what he thought. K said last week we helped create a mediation committee composed of Costa Rica, Guatemala, & Nicaragua and we have sent telegrams to the Presidents of Salvador and Honduras urging them to cooperate and settle peacefully. K said the OAS has now formed an investigative committee and we have given them a plane to go down. K asked R if he could think of anything else we should do. R said he just couldn't believe it. He said he could call the President of Salvador tomorrow and ask what the hell he is doing. K said if he doesn't settle it, what would we do then? R said it was fantastic. R also said it would be bad re military equipment thing. K said luckily they don't have jet aircraft. He said at least we won't be accused of giving modern military equipment. R said he could call on a personal basis and find out what the score is. R asked what Salvador and Honduras said. K said so far they have said nothing. K said this thing is bound to peter out. K said he has been a little concerned about our jumping in while the OAS is investigating. R agreed with K 100%. Let's leave it up to the OAS and show our restraint. K said let's leave it on this basis, if you agree. K said by tomorrow morning we should have a clearer picture and if the thing is still going on you might consider calling them. K asked R which one he knew better and R said both. K said you might call them both and R said that is what he was thinking. R asked who was going down for the OAS. K said Dominican Republic, Argentina, Guatemala, US, Costa Rica and Equador. Gallo Plazo (?) is on the team and is the ranking member. R said he is the best bet we have. R said under these conditions I think we should keep out of it. If they can do it themselves, it would be a great thing. R said he would check with K tomorrow. R said he just didn't understand it. He said it was going to be hard on the military equipment program. K said yes. R said psychologically. K said yes. R said this is an indication that we have to stick close to this. K said the President didn't want to move without talking to R and it shows the confidence the P has in R. R said he very much appreciated that.

R asked K if he was going to get up there. K said he would try to Saturday afternoon. R said marvelous. K said he looked forward to it and that it would be like old times.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON
Ron Ziegler

K said he forgot to tell Z that we also provided them a plane last week for the mediation team. Z said okay, but I won't call back on that. K said if Z could treat an important fact like that it was okay with him. Z asked where the investigation people left from. K said they haven't left as yet. We don't know if they accepted our plane as yet. K said the representatives will leave from Washington. We have offered them a plane if they so desire it.

K asked Z if he impressed the news people. Z said "it impressed the hell out of them."

Z asked if H discussed his backgrounder with the President. Z said the President was not going to Florida. K asked if that was definite and Z said yes. Z said he wanted K to raise the matter (backgrounder) with the P tomorrow -- he thought it should be done Friday or Saturday. Z said the European one worked out well and it might be good for him (President?) to do something on Tuesday. K asked of a social nature? Z said yes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.o.12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON

Charles Meyer
Mr. Kissinger
11:00 p.m., 7/14

K said at last we have a war of our own. M said you have made my evening so far. K said we are trying. M said he just talked to the OAS team and that we will probably be able to help them with a plane. He said no one was going to go until tomorrow morning. K asked M if he thought a message from the President would help, the P would be willing to do so. K said his instinct was no. M said he concurred. K said the P also wanted him to check with Rockefeller and he offered to call each of the Presidents. M said he loves Nelson but what could he do that the rest of the world can't. He said he didn't think Nelson could make that much difference. M said he gives him credit and he isn't against him. K said his instinct was to do nothing other than what we have done. M said exactly the same. K said we didn't want to get into a position where we have to settle every war in America(?) M said the plane standing by makes much more sense than hopeful words. K said we don't want to get the President's prestige involved. K asked if M thought this thing could go on much longer? M said let me tell you want the Salvadoran Ambassador said. He said it wasn't going to be a very big war -- just a little shot here and a little shot there. K said he was just trying to respond to the President's request. Should we call in the two ambassadors and express the hope that it will be settled peacefully. M said the Salvadoran Ambassador was coming into the office in the morning. The Honduran Ambassador just called the office about asking transportation for the OAS team. M said the Hondurans are the injured party at the moment and we have not asked them in.

DECLASSIFIED