11 Jeffrey Lane
Lake Success, N.Y.

March 25, 1963

Mr. Max Ascoli
Editor
The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, N.Y.

To the Editor:

The remarkable clarity and seemingly airtight logic of Professor Kissinger's writings sometimes conceal, in my opinion, fundamental defects of conception. In his 1957 work on *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, for example, the fundamental assumption about which he weaves his intricate arguments is that a limited European nuclear (that's right, *nuclear*) war is feasible.

A similar fundamental hypothesis in his article on *NATO's Nuclear Dilemma* is that it's not too important if European nations develop totally independent nuclear forces, since it/that will solve the host of political difficulties and frictions arising out of our present policies toward NATO. But the trouble is that this world has not yet experienced a tripolar balance of nuclear power. Most people can't see yet "juggle" two balls, and will drop one on their first attempt to juggle three balls. But mankind might not get a second try if it attempts to balance three nuclear systems. For this reason I am glad that our policy-makers have not succumbed to taking the easy way out and going along with "genuine" European nuclear independence.

(LL.B. Harvard
Ph.D. candidate
Columbia)

[LC]

28 March 1963

The Editor, The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, New York

To the Editor:

Henry Kissinger ("NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," The Reporter, March 28.) charges the Administration with political unrealism, inconsistency, and a preoccupation with technical matters. But what of his prescription? How, after General de Gaulle's January, will a European nuclear force start from "a common Franco-British" program? How will it grow, as he suggests, by "associating other countries in the control mechanism" to their satisfaction? Yes, "it is difficult to see any President or Prime Minister agreeing to. . . . predelegation of authority." Alternatively, would West Germany be denied strike forces under her own control even if the warheads were manufactured elsewhere? More broadly, how could American assistance to allies that have their own nuclear programs fail to encourage would-be nuclear aspirants?

It is surprising that Professor Kissinger's view of General de Gaulle as a somewhat-more-nationalistic Jean Monnet has survived January. Surely nobody now maintains that there is "a" European view on agriculture or on life-and-death nuclear control. Even if there were, Atlantic interdependence is inescapable. Small nuclear strike forces cannot be thought of "as Sweden and Switzerland think

The Editor, The Reporter

-2-

28 March 1963

of their armies."; "if the Europeans are wrong, the chief penalty" is far greater than "a certain duplication of effort." If Swedish armies fight, friendly nations are not hurt. But if a force de frappe hits Moscow and other Soviet cities, either before the defense of Europe requires a general strike at the Soviet Union or before that strike has to degenerate into city attacks, civilization is further jeopardized. Yet French contempt for conventional defense increases reliance upon risky nuclear threats; her nuclear design is oriented toward city targets; and she, unlike America, spurns allied political guidelines.

True, "we should not judge a mature European program by its beginnings," but design yesterday and today will determine capabilities years from now. One cannot discuss control over triggers apart from where the guns are pointed and whether they can remain unfired but ready under attack. If it is strange to find Professor Kissinger as diplomatic historian sliding so easily around General de Gaulle's January, it is equally strange to find him as strategist so content to put forces first, doctrine second, the surest way to find one's preferred use rendered impossible. A multilateral force can go astray, but it is now open to all in NATO to shape it toward a use that reconciles joint control with responsible global strategy; arms with arms control. Professor Kissinger's alternative is to subsidize those whose established programs defy such reconciliation.

MH:eha

[LC]

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA AT 46TH STREET
NEW YORK 17. NEW YORK
CABLE ADDRESS INTERPAX

COPY

2 April 1963

To the Editor
The Reporter
660 Madison Ave.
New York, N. Y.

Dear Sir:

Henry Kissinger's article, "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," in the March 28th issue, was a thought-provoking contribution to the current debate on US nuclear relations with its European allies. I have no doubt that the volume of response to the article will testify to that. May I, however, seek the hospitality of The Reporter's Correspondence Column for some brief thoughts which diverge somewhat from Professor Kissinger's analysis.

Professor Kissinger has wisely counselled us to view the problem in an political context--a context shaped by legitimate European aspirations for greater control over Europe's destiny and for greater influence on Alliance policies. Pro- fessor Kissinger rightly emphasizes the importance of the new state of affairs re- sulting from Europe's phenomenal postwar revival. However, the new balances in the political and economic strength of the allies imply, inescapably, an extended period of tensions, frictions, and disagreements, across a broad front of common concerns, within the Alliance. The problem of nuclear force is obviously an im- portant issue. However, as our recent experience amply demonstrates, it is not the only issue. We should not expect that, by making accommodations to European wishes with respect to nuclear force, we will ensure harmony in the Alliance. Since we face an extended period of adjustment to the new and developing state of affairs, we should not, for political reasons, accept nuclear solutions which are themselves technically and strategically unsound. To justify a technical and strategic conclusion on the ground that it is politically desirable, without inquiring into its technical and strategic effects, may well create new dilemmas which are bound, in turn, to pro- duce future political difficulties.

Moreover, Professor Kissinger's emphasis on the political virtue of "a European conception" of the role of nuclear force appears to assume that the political problem of controlling nuclear force can be solved in a European context whereas it cannot be solved in an Atlantic context. This may be a correct judgment. However, it is difficult to see why the intrinsically difficult issue of controlling a nuclear force should be much easier for the Europeans to resolve than for us to resolve with them. There is contemporary evidence that the European nations differ among themselves over the important issues underlying the question of nuclear control. Moreover, the German problem, on which Professor Kissinger rightly places much

Moreover, the German problem, on which Professor Klaasinger rightly bases much
among themselves over the important issues underlying the discussion of nuclear control.
resolve with them. There is contemporarily evidence that the European nations differ
nuclear force should be much easier for the Europeans to resolve than for us to
However, it is difficult to see why the intrinsically difficult issue of controlling a
warsera it cannot be solved in an Atlantic context. This may be a correct judgment.
political problem of controlling nuclear force can be solved in a European context
of, 's European conception', of the role of nuclear force appears to assume that the
Moreover, Professor Klaasinger's emphasis on the political airme
once future political difficulties.

strategic effects, may well create new dilemmas which are pound, in turn, to bro-
on the ground that it is politically desirable, without incurring into its technical and
technically and strategically naught. To justify a technical and strategic conclusion
we should not, for political reasons, accept nuclear solutions which are themselves
we face an extended period of adjustment to the new and developing state of affairs,
wishes with respect to nuclear force, we will ensure harmony in the Alliance. Since
the only issue. We should not expect that, by making accommodations to European
portant issue. However, as our recent experience amply demonstrates, it is not
concerns' within the Alliance. The problem of nuclear force is obviously an im-
period of tensions, frictions, and disagreements, across a broad front of common
the political and economic strength of the allies imply, inescapably, an extended
sulting from Europe's phenomenal boatwar revival. However, the new balances in
teaser Klaasinger rightly emphasizes the importance of the new state of affairs re-
control over Europe's destiny and for greater influence on Alliance policies. Pro-
industrial context--a context abided by legitimate European abstractions for greater
Professor Klaasinger has wisely consulted us to view the problem in
somewhat from Professor Klaasinger's analysis.

of The Reporter's Correspondeance Column for some brief thoughts which diverge
reasonab to the article will teatily to that. May I, however, seek the hospitality
U2 nuclear relations with its European allies. I have no doubt that the volume of
March 28th issue, was a thought-provoking contribution to the current debate on
Henry Kissinger's article, "NATO's Unclear Dilemma", in the
Dear Sir:

New York, N.Y.
660 Madison Ave.
The Reporter
To the Editor

3 Abril 1963

CYCLING ADDRESS INTERIM
NEW YORK 13, NEW YORK
UNITED NATIONS BLYSBAY AT 46TH STREET

COBY

- 2 -

emphasis, gives some ground for wondering whether agreement on political control of nuclear force may not be more readily arrived at in a context which allows the United States to be a direct and balancing participant than in a context from which the United States is excluded.

Finally, there is the inescapable question of what effect the alternative policies are likely to have on the political cohesion of the Alliance. Dr. Kissinger argues that the course the United States is following is bound to exacerbate political differences in the Alliance. However, is his preferred alternative any less likely to do so? The basic stimulus to consideration of new nuclear arrangements is that important differences of interest and perspective may arise between Europe and the United States. If a European nuclear force were large enough to make Europe strategically independent of the United States, why would that independence not fortify European inclinations to disagree with us over major issues? Why are equals any less likely to disagree than unequals? The Kissinger argument is that, on the basis of recognized equality, mutual respect will prevail and coordinated policies can result. Perhaps that would prove to be so. However, the salient consideration is that no one is seriously considering a European nuclear force which would make the Europeans strategic equals of the United States; inequality and ultimate dependence would still prevail. There are many important questions to be asked about the strategic viability of the kind of force the Europeans might be expected to develop. Obviously, I cannot conduct such an examination in this letter. However, it seems to me that the dominant argument for a European nuclear force, whether national, multinational, or multilateral, is that it would place a European finger on the American nuclear trigger. Many things might be said about how a European finger on the American nuclear trigger affects the American national interest. I will confine myself to the single observation that it is very difficult to understand how such an arrangement is likely to lessen political differences within the Alliance. Dr. Kissinger points out that: "The real basis of our opposition to national nuclear forces ... is ... that we don't want to be drawn into nuclear war against our will." It seems to me far more likely that European determination to achieve the ability to trigger the American nuclear response--unless it were so unlikely to be workable as to pose no real threat of achieving its objective--would lead to a compelling US determination to disengage itself from that risk. The course Dr. Kissinger proposes is at least as likely as any other to lead to exacerbated political controversy among the Atlantic allies.

Thus, I return to my starting point. Europe's new vigor seems to me to foreshadow an extended period of basic adjustments across the Atlantic. We should be prepared for serious and continuing tensions in working out the necessary new relationships. In confronting these serious problems, we should beware of the tempting belief that any formula is likely to provide a solvent for the tensions we cannot escape.

bc: Prof. Kissinger

Comment on "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma"

The article is a major contribution to the debate on military policy for Europe, the first full-length analysis of the tangled situation which has emerged from the Nassau Agreement and its rejection by France. It proposes an alternative course which appears a promising way forward from a situation of bitter internal conflict which could paralyze constructive policies, or even cooperation, within the Western Community.

But it is marred by defects as striking as its virtues, which render the article, like the Nassau Agreement itself, a poor vehicle for the attainment of the objectives shared by the authors and the great majority of those concerned with NATO. Its discussion of US strategic doctrine is a partisan polemic. It presents a distorted account of the US policy on conventional force and the problems this has created in Europe, and it even resorts to the hackneyed and misleading dichotomy of "technical" military questions versus higher political purposes. It creates a strange demonology which caracatures the European political scene, presenting a black-and-white world in which all left-wing forces are neutralists, while right-wingers are credited with a vision and a sense of responsibility which is not borne out by their policies. An approach which relies on systematic disparagement of the left and idealization of the right can hardly provide a basis for long-range NATO policies. If the policy proposals are sound, this is in spite of, rather than because of, the analysis

which precedes them.

Kissinger's analysis of US strategy has attempted to establish that, while the basic policies of "flexible response" and buildup of conventional forces need not have produced a crisis of confidence, they have done so because they have been pushed to an unrealistic extreme. It is difficult to demonstrate any thesis convincingly by means of a juxtaposition of quotations out of context, especially if the latter are military declaratory statements directed at multiple audiences, but the most natural interpretation of the successive MacNamara statements is that MacNamara, like some of the strategic analysts on whom he relies heavily, has moved from a short-lived exuberance at the discovery that the much-heralded missile gap had in fact given place to a massive US superiority in nuclear power, to a more sober realization that in the long run the US will be unable to destroy "invulnerable" Soviet missiles. MacNamara's recent exchanges with Congress evidence a desire to bury the earlier counter-force doctrine with a certain minimum of discreteness. It is difficult to see how the counter-force aspect of the doctrine can be the source of the present strategic difficulties with the Europeans.

It is not so much counter-force but the desire to be able to fight a controlled war which lies behind the US insistence on centralized control over all nuclear weapons. There are a number of other sources of the US desire for a nuclear monopoly; US reluctance to be responsible for an increase in the number of

[LC]

-3-

nuclear powers and the desire to retain the unquestioned political preeminence that flows from the monopoly of the weapons which provide the basis of Western security. Thus, there is no case at all for the thesis that the difficulties in Europe are produced by the corruption of a sound strategic doctrine by the extremism with which it has been executed by the Pentagon.

Similarly, the tensions which have arisen for the US strategy of a conventional buildup are not the result of America's "pushing valid arguments to such extremes as to defeat our objectives." The US policy on conventional force is the considered conclusion of most US strategic analysts that, in most circumstances, it would not be in the interest of the US or Europe to rely on the use of nuclear weapons to prevent a non-nuclear attack. Virtually all Europeans who have written extensively on the question have come to the same conclusion. Kissinger's statement that "few Europeans agree with our judgment that the feasibility of a purely conventional defense" is thus very misleading. What it does reflect is the reluctance of European governments to go along with the New US strategy, and the outbursts of some European publicists who have reacted to the strategy by questioning US reliability.

But to say that the only relevant question is whether the US would actually use its nuclear forces at the risk of all-out war [as Gallois has recently been saying] is just as facile if uttered by European as by an American. In European governments have been seriously embarrassed by the US conventional strategy

because they have fostered the illusion that the possession of
nuclear weapons could be relied on to prevent war. Like the
US itself in the 1950's they have neglected ground forces, allowing
units to remain under strength and allowing much of their equipment
to become obsolescent. They have too readily accepted the view
that "overwhelming superiority" in Soviet conventional force
rendered any attempt at non-nuclear resistance unrealistic. The new
US strategy, which presupposes a substantial diversion of effort
into improving and increasing European ground force, naturally
meets with resistance, not only because of the cost of such a
program in a political climate much less favorable to
defenses increases than that of the US, but also because it
rudely shatters the previous assumption that nuclear equipment
represents the focal part of future planning and tactics, thus
threatening the vested interests and the status patterns which
have developed as a consequence of this assumption.

The European objections to the US strategy do not spring
from superior appreciation of the realities of conventional war
but from the bureaucratic
self-defensive mechanisms of embattled vested interests.
This is not to say that the European objections have no value at
all. There is a serious question of deciding how much of an
increase in conventional force is necessary to have a good chance
of holding against conventional attack. Some US statements suggesting
no
that an increase is necessary, that improvement in quality
would suffice, that the appear very dubious on the basis of all
published material on the size of the Russian forces. Clearly,

[Lc]

until a strong conventional defense is achieved, a policy which suggests that the West is very reluctant to introduce the use of nuclear weapons does weaken deterrence in some measure. The Americans have assumed in rather cavalier fashion that what is good for defense must be good for deterrence; while this is probably true in the long run, an alliance which is willing to make the effort to deny the Soviets the prospect of a military gain by means of conventional resistance is better placed to deter attack than an alliance which relies on the threat of using nuclear weapons but cannot conceal its reluctance to carry out the threat. There may be, in the short run, in the transition to an effective conventional strategy, a weakening of deterrence.

A different line of objection is that the chances of a Soviet conventional attack are so slight that it is not worth a major effort to provide a force against such an attack. It is difficult to reconcile this argument, however, with the demand for European nuclear weapons, since it is even more difficult to conceive of contingencies in which these would be relevant. In effect, those Europeans who want European nuclear forces have but *no* need for a conventional buildup are saying that it is more important to insure against Europe's being abandoned to its fate by the US than against a Russian conventional attack--that there is more risk of the former than of the latter.

This raises one of the most fundamental questions of the contemporary European defense. It is possible that Europeans should insure against both kinds of disaster--*both* against US

military disengagement and against a /Soviet ground attack. The philosophy behind current US defense policy is that one should prepare against as many contingencies as possible, since, while any given contingency appears highly unlikely, there is no ground for confidence that none of the unfavorable contingencies will come about. Every major post-war crisis has been unexpected, the course of events is surprising. But to do this would require a major increase in the resources devoted to defense, probably in Europe upwards of 25 percent in the next few years. In the present climate of opinion in Europe, when, since Cuba, there is less success/fail sense of an external threat than at any time in the recent past, the chances of such an increase in defense expenditures are very slight. The European governments are confronted with a choice: they can either make a serious improvement in the present conventional forces or work towards effective European-controlled strategic forces. They cannot do both. (given the postulated budgetary constraints)

In this situation preferences tend to polarize, the political Right choosing nuclear force at the expense of conventional, the Left the reverse. There is no ground for the imputation that the Right is genuinely concerned with defense, the Left is really pursuing a goal of neutrality under a cloak of concern for conventional force. Fundamentally, the Right is more concerned with influence in status than with military security, being confident that the US takes care of the security problem. They judge correctly that in the long run a Europe without independence

-7-

[LC]

controlled nuclear forces would have little weight in Soviet-Western relations or world politics, more generally. They give higher priority to securing such influence than to the common strategy of the alliance.

The Left, placing less value on the symbols of power and influence, and being more subject to pressures from anti-nuclear movements, tends to opt for conventional defense. While it would be misleading to place too much weight on the contrast, it is the case that the policy of the Left is in particular the British Labor Party and the German Social Democrats, its accord with the interests in a common military policy for the alliance as a whole, the policy of the Right does not. An effective conventional defense requires the contribution of all members, whereas, as Kissinger points out, European nuclear forces do not in the same way supplement the US nuclear force, which is obliged to assign weapons to cover the targets of the European forces. It is even more misleading to view the policy of the Left as an advance a cloak for neutralism. Gaitskell established his dominance over the British Labor Party precisely by taking a stand on its commitment to NATO, demonstrating that neutralism was a minority view within the Party. The SPD may have placed too much hope in the possibility of achieving a united neutral Germany in the post-Stalin period of "relaxation," but has wholeheartedly supported NATO since Khruschev's policy of pressure created a real threat to Berlin and Germany.

[LC]

Kissinger's idealization of the Right leads him to give support to certain myths currently fostered by the European Right and to greatly overestimate the chance that Britain and France would play the constructive role which he assigns to them. The articles' most serious *offence* in this statement is the claim that Kennedy "made it clear" *that* at a press conference *that* the US would reserve the right to negotiate on Berlin"even without the consent of our allies." Nothing said by Kennedy on this occasion *on May 9, 1962* can reasonably be construed in this sense. But the suggestion lends all the weight of Kissinger's authority to those Europeans who, for their own dubious purposes, foster the notion that the American policy on Berlin was to "do a deal" at the expense of the Germans, that the very act of negotiating, in contrast to *the goals* of tristrionic intransigence, was sufficient evidence of a disposition to surrender vital interests. In fact, common prudence *as well as* the requirements of coalition diplomacy counsel the US to maintain communication with the Soviets on an issue *as potentially explosive as Berlin*. To the extent that *the goals* tactic is an *attempt* to exploit this diplomatic necessity at the expense of the US, French policy has the same equivocal character as, in the opposite camp, that of the Chinese, the *attempt* to profit from the fact that *that* *is* responsible major power cannot project an undifferentiated image of "intransigence." De Gaulle's tactic, *in itself*, is in itself legitimate, perhaps even a desirable form of bargaining: the *attempt* to exploit *it* in intra-alliance in fighting is not.

[L]

III 4

trend in the Soviet Union was ascribed to the influence on one man, the unlikely figure of Marshal Stalin. "Russia will prefer the peace of Europe to its communication," wrote Fortune. "The arguments in favor of this assumption are that Trotsky is dead and that Russia will be too weak for aggression in Europe, even ideological aggression after the war. It is the essence of Stalinism to use Communism as an instrument of Russian nationalist foreign policy; and as a nation Russia, though she has been gradually expanding for centuries is not so much land-hungry as hungry for security on her borders. Given this security she is likely to fix her attention on the development of her enormous internal resources." * Marshal Stalin, moreover, was distinguished from his chief rival in much the same terms as proponents of a "liberal" Khrushchev now compare him to his predecessor: "What will Stalin do after victory?" wrote Sir Bernard Pares. "We have to wait for the victory, but perhaps this sketch will offer some answer. The normal thing for Stalin to do is to return to

* Fortune, supplement The United States in a New World, April 1943.

[L.C.]

A second *myth*, which serves to sustain Kissinger's main policy proposal--that the U.S. should encourage Britain and France to merge their nuclear programs as the first step toward an independent European nuclear force--is the *belief* that Britain and France would readily go along with such a proposal. There are many reasons for doubting that they would have done so even in the relatively favorable circumstances prior to Nassau. If the British were not European enough to realize that *a British initiative along these lines might be needed and that France was to must accept Britain into the EEC, why should it be supposed that a word from the U.S. would transform them? Certainly, the climate of opinion in Britain in late 1962 was highly unfavorable for such an initiative; *the* small amount of comment on the *XENIX* idea was wholly negative. Obviously, a firm U.S. initiative *which had* given the British government a strong incentive to pursue the suggestion, but it is doubtful whether it could have carried British opinion, wholly unprepared and hostile to the idea, open to the objection that *this* was quite unnecessary, *and moved* toward giving the Germans, as well as the French, control over the operation and the British *V-bombers*. If *this* *proposed* had been made a touchstone of *the* British loyalty to NATO, the chances of a politically significant neutralism in Britain might have become for the first time serious. The issue would have lent itself all too readily to irresponsible partisanship, which might well have broken all restraint with the death of Gaitskell.

Even if these developments could have been forestalled, the chances of a genuine Anglo-French nuclear

partnership at the present time cannot be rated highly. Not only
is there a divergence on how closely they are ~~XX~~ prepared to
be coordinated with American nuclear forces, but, of all European
states, the British and French are furthest apart on vital foreign
policy issues, for example, nuclear testing and, most important,
tactics on Berlin. European unity exists more ~~as~~ in aspiration
than ~~as~~ and in present reality. For Britain, joining Europe is seen
primarily as a way of boosting its sluggish economy; for France,
Europe is at present mainly a means of increasing French diplomatic
leverage. Only Germany is wholeheartedly committed to European
integration, because only through Europe can Germany find a
satisfactory role in international politics. The American
assumption that Europeans were sufficiently "European" to give
first priority to long-term integration policies has been
shattered over EDC and ~~of~~ again over British entry.
Kissinger, while dispelling many American myths and prejudices,
perpetuates the myth that Britain and France would act as good
Europeans in the nuclear field at a word from the American
administration.

At the same time, while the short-term prospects for
the Kissinger proposal may not be promising, it may offer a key
for long-term policy. Kissinger argues very convincingly that
a multilateral force in which the U.S. retains a veto and
effective physical control over the warheads is not a stable
solution, but contains the seeds of determined controversy over
control, in which the Europeans would have a strong case (paying

the bill but receiving no real voice in decisions) yet the
~~American~~ Americans--especially Congress--are likely to be extremely
reluctant to accept a majority-decision principle.

However, Kissinger is much less convincing in arguing
that the multilateral force cannot be developed into a separate
European force. (in which the decision problem would arise in a
different, and less objectionable, manner). His first argument
depends on his faulty conception of U.S. strategic doctrine,
which does **not** involve an instantaneous counterforce response
and so can in principle be reconciled with co-ordination with
a second force. The second argument is that the multilateral
force could become European only if the Europeans ask the U.S.
to withdraw from it, which would defeat the purpose of most of its
members, namely to demonstrate Atlantic solidarity. This is a
mechanistic extension of temporary reactions into the future.
The manner of De Gaulle's rejecting Britain's entry into the EEC
could not but be interpreted as a challenge to the U.S.; while
a permanent U.S. attempt to isolate France would be self-defeating,
an immediate reaction of anger and determination to thwart possible
French intentions of creating a separate European military bloc was
probably healthy--a way of scotching heady notions of European
military independence which might have otherwise gained credence.
The passage of time inevitably creates a new situation; if the
U.S. should come to propose a separate European force co-ordinated
with the American there is no inhibition against participation
on the ground that the force is anti-American. Already the
Germans have proposed majority decision procedures for the

-12-

multilater force. The objective of U.S. policy might be to
disengage itself/ from the multilateral force while engouraging
France and Britain to participate on a majority decision basis.

There are several problems here, however. It is very undesirable
that the U.S. should wholly disengage itself from NATO's nuclear forces
in Europe, which implies that U.S. "tactical," if not "strategic,"
weapons should remain in Europe. But the present tendency is to
associate tactical forces with the multi-national part of the NATO
nuclear force (for example, the German tactical air force) and there
are strong arguments for organizing all of the nuclear weapons in
Europe, tactical as well as strategic, in a separate command. If there
should be one single force, with American participation, this would imply
that at least in regard to tactical weapons the US. use of nuclears might
be subject to majority decision. The alternative of majority decision of
a European strategic force, but national or bi-lateral decision (the
latter if the U.S. retains control of the warheads) for the tactical
nuclears might be feasibility/ feasible, but does not appear very desirable
in the long run. Another alternative would be to have two systems at
both the strategic and tactical level, such that all nuclear warheads
would be either under "European" or American control. The Germans, for
example, might in this case have aircraft as part of the European
system, usable according to the directives of the European majority,
and nuclear artillery under a bilateral system, controlled jointly by
the Americans and Germans, or vice versa. The point is not to prescribe
in advance the

optimum system, but to acknowledge that, while an integrated
European strategic force co-ordinated with the American may come
to be very desirable to Europeans, there would be serious
concern if American non-participation in such a force implied
a total withdrawal of American nuclear power from Europe.

The suggestion in Kissinger's concluding pages appears to
be that the U.S. encouragement of a joint Anglo-French force
could be an immediate alternative to the present multilateral
scheme, but this is very doubtful. Quite apart from obstacles
in the form of Anglo-French and U.S.-French tensions, the attempt
to commit Germany to the multilateral force has gone beyond the
point where the offer could be withdrawn; at a time when the
Germany and the U.S. have agreed in principle on contributions
to the cost of the force and on its control in the formation period,
it is too late for the U.S. to withdraw the proposal.

Thus, in the long term, there would appear
to be three choices open to the U.S. First, and probably the
least feasible, is to attract France into the multinational/
multilateral force, and to retain an effective U.S. veto over
the operation of the force. The second would be to disengage
itself from the multilateral force and encourage the
French and British to combine with the other European states
in a supranational force. The third would be to accept a
majority decision principle for the multilateral force, of
which the U.S. would remain a member.

The political cost of the Nassau decision is to
deprive the U.S. of what may come to appear the most
favorable option of all, namely that advocated by Kissinger:
U.S. encouragement of an Anglo-French force developing
into a European force, without the political cost of
disengaging the U.S. from an existing (or even
projected) multilateral force. The U.S. has foregone
this option, of course, through the pursuit of an even
more preferable course from a U.S. standpoint, namely a
continuing U.S. nuclear monopoly. Moreover, while the
Kissinger proposal can be viewed as no more than political
realism, accepting what exists, namely the British and
permanent
French nuclear forces, the existing existence of such forces
is not at all self-evident. Britain, in particular,
evidences a willingness to phase out the British force
(in case of the Labor Party) or gradually to make it a
subsidiary part of the American force, in the case of the
Conservatives. It is not absurd to suppose that a post-
Gau list government, having discovered the cost and
relatively low political payoffs of nuclear independence,
might follow the course of the British conservatives.

In this case, the emerging European political community,
lacking any sort of nuclear responsibility, would be a
couriously impotent body, an unconvincing focus for
loyalties.
European solidarity. It is here that Kissinger's argument
leaves the plane of mere realism; his proposal is that the

[LC]

U.S. should act with vision and magnanimity to an extent unprecedented in the peacetime policies of states. The suggestion is that the U.S. should voluntarily forego the option of preserving its nuclear monopoly among the Western powers, at a time when that issue is by no means foreclosed, and should henceforth instead encourage the formation of a second center of nuclear control. In the short run, this goes far beyond recognizing the inevitable. We have noted that the total absence of constructive initiatives on the nuclear issue from Britain and France. The Kissinger suggestion is not that the U.S. should cease hindering Europe from becoming an independent great power, but rather that the U.S. should take the initiative in showing Europe the way to do so--indeed should work, against the immediate preferences of the relevant European governments, to induce them to create the prerequisites for a military policy of a united Europe.

From this perspective, the confusion and ambiguity in recent U.S. nuclear policy is neither surprising nor reprehensible. The U.S. is a reluctant monopolist, torn between the healthy desire to retain under its own control as much as possible of the power to destroy the world, and a certain willingness to in principle, at sometime in the future, to accept Europe as a nuclear power. The choice is by no means obvious. While Kissinger's policy may be the best in the long run, there is something paradoxical, even presumptuous, in the suggestion that one great power should create another which is

evidently incapable of establishing itself. The case is not
parallel to the earlier of European economic integration, in
which *there was* a question of U.S. support for initiatives from
within Europe, itself. The European movement has shown a slight
interest in military *pogy* policy, leaving the field to the
nationalists; it is scarcely surprising that the U.S. administration
has been reluctant to treat such nation-oriented regimes as the
British and French as *bona fide* Europeans in the matter of
nuclear weapons. To dismiss U.S. policy as a surrender to
"technical" pressures from the Pentagon is to overlook the
historical irony in the U.S. relation to *hypothetical* non-European
great power.

One of the basic factors in the doubt whether Europe
is in reality an embryo great power lies in the European decision
to hold defense expenditures at a level far lower, in relation
to national income, than in the U.S. It may be that this is the
most fundamental question that the European states, especially
Britain, France, and Germany, *will* have to resolve in the near
future. It is not the role of a great power to insist that one
cannot afford the kinds of armed force most relevant to potential
*military* challenges. It is not likely that successive
U.S. administrations *will* engage in the painful and thankless
task of assisting at the birth of a great power unless the
latter shows some genuine signs of greatness.

The RAND Corporation

1700 MAIN ST. • SANTA MONICA • CALIFORNIA

19 March 1963

L-5898

Mr. Max Ascoli
The Reporter
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, New York

Dear Max:

This is a postscript to my other letter of today:

On second reading, I do think Henry is too careless in his references to RAND. He has two such references, and the second reads as follows (page 24): "For many of his [McNamara's] key advisors are RAND 'alumni' and have helped work out the Wohlstetter doctrine."

Actually, the "many" boil down to two, Henry Rowen and Alain Enthoven. Charlie Hitch is also a RAND alumnus, but has had nothing whatever to do with what Henry calls "the Wohlstetter doctrine" before or since joining the Defense Department. Bill Kaufmann, now at MIT, is very close to Rowen, but hardly a "key advisor" of McNamara's. Those who remain at RAND of the persuasion Henry is describing are a very small minority indeed.

BB:mtm

NATO'S NUCLEAR DILEMMA

by
Henry A. Kissinger

The Atlantic Alliance is going through another of those
critical reexaminations which have been recurring at ever shorter
intervals over the past two years. Once again the relative em-
phasis to be given to nuclear as against conventional arms, the
nature of nuclear war and the relationship of various national
nuclear forces to each other are being widely debated. The U.S.
has resurrected its proposal for a multilateral NATO force and
is even urging it as the touchstone of Atlantic solidarity.

The discussions are complicated by the fact that the domes-
tic situation of many of our allies prohibits a clear articul-
ation of the true convictions of their leaders. With a succes-
sion to the Chancellorship imminent in Germany, elections in
the offing in Britain and a political realignment being attempted
in Italy, the voice of Europe reaches us in an extremely dis-

in Italy, the voice of Europe resounds in an extremely di-
theoting in Britain and a political resumption being attempted
sion to the Chancellorship imminent in Germany, elections in
sition of the true convictions of their leaders. With a succes-
tic situation of many of our allies provides a clear action-
tive discussions are complicated by the fact that the come-
isa even urging it as the touchstone of Atlantic solidarity.
has reëarrected its proposal for a multilateral NATO force and
unclear forces to each other are being widely deputed. The U.2's
nature of unclear war and the relationship of various national
bases to be given to unclear as against conventional arms, the
intervals over the past two years. Once again the relative em-
critical reëxaminations which have been recurring at ever shorter
The Atlantic Alliance is doing through another of those

NATO.2 NUCLEAR DILEMMA

Henry V. Kisainder
by

2

torted manner.

This makes it all the more essential for us to understand
what is involved. For the issue before NATO far transcends mi-
litary strategy. At stake is the organization of Europe, the
domestic stability of many allied governments and the future of
the Atlantic Community.

It is not necessary--and it would be incorrect--to claim
that the United States is alone responsible for the present im-
passe. Our vacillations have contributed to complicating a re-
definition of relationships which would have been complicated
in any case. Our penchant for stressing technical solutions to
political problems has turned what would in the best circumstances
have been a difficult dialogue into the shouting match of a
dialogue between deaf peoples. It is no help to point out--as
one could--European shortcomings of comparable magnitude. We
can do less about the policy of other countries that that of our
own. In order to understand why we have acted as we have, it is

3

important to analyze the assumptions behind our NATO policy.

# I. U.S. NATO Strategy

Four major elements can be discovered with various degrees of explicitness in the U.S. strategy for NATO:

a) **"Flexible Response"**. The first component has been identified with the phrase "counterforce strategy." There have been many variations of this theme. It has been argued by Secretary McNamara that even after absorbing a Soviet surprise attack our strategic retaliatory forces would be able to destroy the "entire Soviet target system. Though this statement never made clear just what this target system consisted of, the presumption was strong that it would include the entire Soviet retaliatory force. In other words, we would be able to "win" a general war --even after conceding the first blow--in the sense that after the nuclear exchange we would still possess reserves of nuclear fire-power while the Soviets had expended theirs. R In his more

4

recent pronouncements Secretary McNamara has been more modest.

Now the argument is that our reserve of protected fire-power
will enable us to conduct a "centrally-controlled nuclear war
which provides the opponent a maximum incentive to spare the
civilian population by giving us the option to do likewise.

b) **National Nuclear Force.** If the primary purpose of strategic nuclear forces is to fight a centrally controlled general war against a "single (though unspecified)" target system, national nuclear forces, are, according to the prevalent doctrine, dangerous and useless. They are dangerous because their vulnerability may tempt attack and, if employed independently against cities, they may destroy the Soviet incentive to exercise restraint. They are useless because, if used against military targets, they are too small to make a substantial difference. Thus our official policy has been hostile to the existence of national nuclear forces within the Alliance (other than our

5

own). President Kennedy has described the French force de frappe as inimical to NATO and Secretary McNamara's epithets have been less restrained. Our opposition to the British retaliatory force has been less explicit. Yet the arguments used against the French effort apply here as well. In both cases, the requirement of central control is interpreted to mean that the strategic nuclear weapons of the Alliance must be under U.S. control.

To be sure, we have offered to create a "truly" multilateral NATO force. But we have added the proviso that it had to be "integrated" and "responsive to a single chain of command," in other words, that it had to be an adjunct of the U.S. Strategic Air Command.

c) **Tactical Nuclear Weapons.** Similar hostility has been shown to tactical nuclear weapons. It might seem that if a general nuclear war can be fought with restraint, it should certainly be possible to limit the employment of tactical nuclear

tainly be possible to limit the employment of tactical nuclear
eraal nuclear war can be fought with restraint, it should cer-
know to tactical nuclear weapons. It might seem that it a gen-
c) Tactical Unclear Weapons. Similar povertity be pen

Vir. Command.

other worse, that it had to be an adjunct to the U.S. Strategic
to
"integrated" and "reasonable to a single chain of command," in
NATO force. But we have added the proviso that it had to be
To be sure, we have offered to create a "truly" unilaterally
decUnclear weapons of the Alliance must be under U.S. control.
ment of central control is interpreted to mean that the strate-
rylic effort apply here as well. In both cases, the require-
has been less explicit. Yet the arguments need against the
less restrained. Our opposition to the British retaliatory force
asymmetric to NATO and Secretly McNamara's a fortuitous have been
own). President Kennedy has described the French force de force

6

weapons in a geographically confined area. However, Secretary McNamara and his associates have held the contrary view. Secretary McNamara has repeatedly pointed out that tactical nuclear weapons involve a definite threshold and should not be considered a substitute for conventional defense.

At the same time, the tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas are said not to be really necessary for the kind of strategic exchange envisaged by the McNamara theory. They are not well-enough protected and not easy to control centrally. In Secretary McNamara's statements they are therefore described as a "bonus" which our strategic planning cannot really count on.

d) **Conventional Defense.** If European national nuclear forces are irrelevant and tactical nuclear weapons are overvalued, it follows that the European contribution to NATO should be in the field of conventional defense. This argument has been pressed insistently. "The decision to use tactical nuclear weapons,"

7

Secretary McNamara said in his report to the Armed Services Com-
mittee in January of this year, "should not be forced upon us
simply because we have no other way to cope with a particular
situation." It follows that the most desirable objective would
be to resist a Soviet conventional attack with purely convention-
al means, a task which it is often said is well within the capa-
bilities of the West. Secretary McNamara in his recent testi-
mony indicated that present NATO conventional capabilities were
adequate to deal with any "major incursion." Nevertheless, he
urged that they be strengthened to give us "capabilities for
dealing with even larger Soviet attacks"--in other words, a mass-
ive, sustained Soviet offensive.

To understand the European reaction to these propositions
it is important to compare them with what has been traditional
NATO doctrine. Until the advent of the Kennedy Administration
the ground forces in Central Europe had been considered the

the around forces in Central Europe had been considered the
NATO doctrine. Until the advent of the Kennedy Administration
it is important to compare them with what has been traditional
To understand the European reaction to these propositions

five, sustained Soviet offensive.

desiring with even harder Soviet attacks"--in other words, a mass-
urged that they be strengthened to give us "capabilities for
adequate to deal with any major invasion." Nevertheless, he
moy indicated that present NATO conventional capabilities were
 capabilities of the West. Secretary McNamara in his recent testi-
 nary meager attack which it is often said is well within the capa-
 be to resist a Soviet conventional attack with purely convention-
situation." It follows that the most desirable objective would
simply because we have no other way to cope with a particular
mittee in January of this year, "should not be forced upon us

9

"shield" and the nuclear forces the "sword." It was part of NATO doctrine that a massive Soviet attack on Central Europe would be met with some form of nuclear retaliation practically from the outset. The conventional forces were to deal with minor probes. But it was never considered that a full-scale conventional defense of Europe should be attempted. Most Europeans have been convinced--in large part by the previous U.S. policymakers--that deterrence would be enhanced by confronting the Soviets with the strong likelihood that a major attack on Europe would mean nuclear war.

In the light of this, it is not easy to understand the repeated expressions of outrage by Administration spokesmen about European doubts with respect to the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee. For the rationale of the new strategy is precisely that traditional NATO doctrine has lost some of its validity. Why else did the Nassau communique reverse the origi-

as might be inferred from theCommunique, reverse the origin-
ally that traditional NATO doctrine has lost some of its
unclear guarantees. For the rationale of the new strategy is
Europeans compts with respect to the continued validity of our
beset expressions of outside Administration abeamen spout
In the light of this, it is not easy to understand the re-
Europe would mean nuclear war.

the Soviets with the strong likelihood that a major attack on
belligerents--that deterrence would be enhanced by contriving
benevolent paves been convinced--in itself part by the previous U.S.
conventional defense of Europe should be attempted. Most Euro-
minor propes. But it was never considered that a full-scale
from the outset. The conventional forces were to deal with
would be met with some form of nuclear retaliation practically
NATO doctrine that a massive Soviet attack on Central Europe
"enfield" and the nuclear forces the "sword." It was part of

8

10

own momentum. It has sought by various devices to ensure that
strategy would remain at the service of policy even during hos-
tilities. "We are now arranging our forces and making our stra-
tegic plans," said the President's Special Assistant for Nation-
al Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, on February 16,1963, "on
such a basis as that even if...there should be some nuclear ex-
change we might be able to make such choices of action that it
would still be deeply in the interest of the other side to re-
frain from further attack."

## II. "Flexible Response" Reconsidered.

The important objective of flexible response has, however,
been pushed by the Defense Department and in our NATO policy
to extreme conclusions. In the process, it has been confused
with another strategic notion--that of controlled counterforce
general war. This theory is the product of a series of studies
conducted during the 1950's under the direction of Albert
Wohlstetter at the RAND Corporation. After the Soviets had ex-

Monogrammer at the RAND Corporation. After the Soviets had ex-
conducted during the 1920's under the direction of Albert
BGeneral war. This theory is the product of a series of studies
with another strategic notion--that of controlled counterforce
to extreme conclusions. In the process, it has been continued
been based by the Defense Department and in our NATO policy

The important objective of flexible response has, however,
II. "Flexible Response" Reconsidered.

train from further attack.

would still be deeply in the interest of the other side to re-
change we might be able to make such choices of action that it
would be possible as that even if...there should be some unclear ex-
ist security Attiria, McGeorge Huny, on February 10, 1963, "on
topic business," said the President's Special Assistant for Nation-
tal Affairs. "We are now arranging our forces and making our at-
tratiously would remain at the service of policy even during bus-
ow momentum. It has been by various devices to ensure that

10

11

[x]

exploded a hydrogen bomb, many analysts—including this author—
came to the conclusion that a nuclear stalemate was imminent.

Wohlstetter and his colleagues effectively argued that there
was nothing automatic about the nuclear stalemate. On the con-
trary, the balance of terror was "delicate," depending on such
factors as vulnerability of the bases of the retaliatory force,
the relative state of active and passive defense, the ability
to reach enemy targets and similar factors.

Without going into the fine points of the theory, Wohlstetter's
major thesis was that a general war could be won or lost by the
destruction of the opposing retaliatory force. Nuclear super-
iority was not an empty concept even in the age of nuclear plenty.

A general nuclear war could have as its main objective the elim-
ination of the enemy strategic force—a goal which would be sig-
nificant even if we suffered a surprise attack. In that case,
by destroying the weapons earmarked for a second attack we could
reduce damage and greatly improve our bargaining position.

regardless of what directly underlies our reasoning position.

by destroying the weapons earmarked for a second attack we could
utilize even if we suffered a surprise attack. In that case,

invasion of the enemy strategic force--a goal which would be aid-
V general nuclear war could have as its main objective the elim-
ination was not an empty concept even in the age of nuclear warfare.

destruction of the obsoled retaliatory force. Nuclear under-
major theme was that a general war could be won or lost by the
Without doing into the true points of the theory, Mollweffer's a
to rescue enemy targets and similar factors.

the relative state of active and passive defense, the sparsity
factors as vulnerability of the base of the retaliatory force,
truly, the pendency of terror was "delicate," depending on such
was nothing automatic apart the nuclear asthmate. On the con-
Mollweffer and his colleagues effectively argued that there
came to the conclusion that a nuclear asthmate was imminent.
proved a hydrogen bomb, many analysts--including the author--

11

12

This subtle theory has been accepted almost completely by Secretary McNamara--and not by accident. For many of his key advisers are "alumni" of the RAND Corporation and had previously helped work out the Wohlstetter doctrine.

The first victim of these convictions was the theory of "finite deterrence" according to which the United States required strategic forces only large enough to devastate the Soviet home-land. Instead, the new Administration adopted a program to give us a capability to fight a "controlled general war," a nuclear exchange confined to military targets. By October 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric asserted that we possessed nuclear superiority. In January 1962 Secretary McNamara spelled this out to the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We conclude there is no question but that today our strategic retaliatory forces--bombers, missiles, and Polaris--are fully capable of destroying the Soviet target system even after absorbing an ini-

attacking the Soviet target system even after speaking with in-
forces--pompers, missiles, and polaris--are fully capable of ge-
there is no question but that today our strategic retaliatory
this out to the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We conclude
clearly superiority. In January 1963 Secretary McNamara assured
Secretary of Defense Gilbaric asserted that we possessed un-
excusable continued to military targets. By October 1961, Debuty
we a capability to fight a "controlled general war," a nuclear
land. Instead, the new Administration adopted a program to give
strategic forces only forces enough to devastate the Soviet home-
finite deterrence," according to which the United States required
The first victim of these convictions was the theory of
helped work out the Monogramter doctrine.
Squatters are "summit" of the RVMD Corporation and had previously
Secretary McNamara--and not by accident. For many of his key
to this ample theory has been accepted almost completely by

13

13

tial nuclear surprise attack...and without any help from the de-
ployed tactical air units or carrier task forces which, of course,
have the capability for attacking those targets with nuclear
weapons."

This statement had two implications: (1) it was possible to
win a general war even by striking second; (2) nuclear weapons
deployed overseas were not essential to our strategy. This was
the precursor of the dismantling of our bases in Italy and Tur-
key. The scepticism towards nuclear weapons deployed overseas
extended to tactical nuclear weapons as well. "I for one have
never believed in the so-called limited nuclear war," said De-
puty Secretary of Defense Gilpatric. "I just don't know how
you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nu-
clear hang."

With any nuclear war likely to be all-out, what was the U.S.
strategy for such a conflict? "...Our forces can be used in sev-
eral different ways," said Secretary McNamara early in 1962. "We

ersal different ways," said Secretary McNamara early in 1963. "We
strategically for such a conflict? "...Our forces can be used in sev-
With any nuclear war likely to be all-out, what was the U.S.
clear mind."

You build a limit into it once you start naming any kind of un-
but Secretary of Defense Gorbachev. "I just don't know how
never believed in the so-called limited nuclear war," said De-
extended to tactical nuclear weapons as well. "I for one have
key. The acerbician toward nuclear weapons deployed overseas
the precursor of the diamanting of our bases in Italy and the-
deployed overseas were not essential to our strategy. This was
win a general war even by striking second; (2) nuclear weapons
This statement had two implications: (1) it was possible to
useful."

have the capability for attacking those targets with nuclear
bombed tactical air units or carrier task forces which, of course,
would nuclearrike attack...and without any help from the ge-

13

14

may have to retaliat with a single massive attack. Or we may
be able to use our retaliatory force to limit damage to our-
selves before [the enemy] has launched his second salvos. We
may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our
force as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack..."
Here was the first public distinction between two kinds of tar-
get system: the total Soviet target system including cities,
control centers and industrial installations; and a second one,
confined to the bases of the Soviet strategic force.

These pronouncements were refined in Secretary McNamara's
famous speech at Ann Arbor in June 1962, where he declared that
"the United States has come to the conclusion that to the ex-
tent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nu-
clear war should be approached in much the same way that more
conventional military operations have been conducted in the
past. That is to say, principal military objectives...should be

best. That is to say, principal military objectives...should be
conventional military operations have been conducted in the
clear war should be approached in much the same way that more
tent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general un-
"the United States has come to the conclusion that to the ex-
treme a speech at Ann Arbor in June 1965, where he declared that
These pronouncements were refined in Secretary McNamara's a
continued to the bases of the Soviet strategic force.
control centers and industrial installations and a second one,
det aystem: the total Soviet target system including cities,
here was the first public distinction between two kinds of far-
force as a parading weapon--by threatening further attack...."
may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by making our
selves before [the enemy] has launched his second assault. We
be able to use our retaliatory force to limit damage to our-
may have to retrench with a single massive attack. Or we may

14

15

the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

To pursue this strategy, it followed that all nuclear weapons of the Alliance had to be under tight central control, indeed under a single command, which in effect meant U.S. command:

> "We have consistently stressed the importance of a single, integrated strategic nuclear force responsive to a single chain of command, to be employed in a fully integrated manner against what is truly an indivisible target system," reported Secretary McNamara to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30,1963.

The McNamara doctrine, for all its subtlety and quest for flexibility, contained many ambiguities. For example, Secretary McNamara has never clarified which he considered more important: the attempt to spare cities or the effort to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. He could mean that in case of general nuclear war we would attempt to spare cities but would destroy known

war we would attempt to spare cities but would certainly know
retaliatory force. He could mean that in case of general nuclear
the attempt to spare cities or the effort to destroy the Soviet
McNamara has never clarified which he considered more important:

flexibility, contained many ambiguities. For example, Secretary
The McNamara doctrine, for all its absurdity and defeat for
McNamara to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963.

what is truly an indivisible target system," reported Secretary
of command, to be employed in a fully integrated manner against
tegrated strategic nuclear force reasonable to a single chain
"We have consistently stressed the importance of a single, in-
deed under a single command, which in effect meant U.S. commands;
bases of the Alliance had to be under tight central control, in-
to burake this strategy, if followed that all unclear was-
civilian population."

12

16

strategic bases located near them. Or else he could mean that we would try to avoid ambiguous targets such as civilian airports located near cities. Still another interpretation would be that we would avoid cities under all circumstances, in other words, that we would avoid hitting even military targets if attacking them involved a probability of heavy civilian casualties.

If the first interpretation is accepted, it could transpire that the practical difference between the McNamara strategy and the traditional notions of massive retaliation may be relatively slight. It is likely that a sufficient number of Soviet strategic bases are located close to cities so as to produce enormous civilian casualties.

At the same time, if the Soviets followed the same strategy as we--one of Secretary McNamara's more questionable assumptions--the casualties in the United States might be indistinguishable from those of an attack aimed at the civilian population. As long as our strategic forces are composed in large part of air-

["I found as our strategic forces are composed in large part of air-\nforce and sea forces, that our strategy is based on the assumption that\nthe enemy will attack us from the air. We must be prepared to meet\nthis attack, and we must be able to repel any attack made by the\nenEMY.", "We must be prepared to meet the enemy on theeve", "敵の兵站は、近接に攻撃する敵を、その勢いを、その速さを、その勢いを、その速さで、\nその勢いを、その速さで、その勢いを、その速さで、その勢いを、その速さで

17

planes, a disarming attack would have to seek to destroy all
airports capable of handling strategic bombers. This would be
particularly true if in crisis situations we continue to stage
bombers to civilian airports as was done during the Cuban block-
ade. Given the location of most United States airbases, vast
civilian casualties are inevitable. This in turn is bound to
affect our own choice of targets. In short, Secretary McNamara's
strategy may give the Soviets a high incentive to avoid an at-
tack on the United States; it is much less clear that it gives
the Soviet Union an incentive or indeed a possibility to spare
our civilian population in the unlikely event of a Soviet sur-
prise attack.

If the McNamara doctrine implies that we would spare Soviet
cities in all circumstances provided that the Soviets do like-
wise, a nuclear stalemate is the likely consequence. Given the
very large force we are developing, it is of course not clear

very large force we are developing, it is of course not clear
why, a nuclear atom bomb in the likely consequence. Given the
cities in all circumstances provided that the Soviets do like-
It the McNamara doctrine implies that we would spare Soviet
brieze attack.

our civilian population in the unlikely event of a Soviet an-
tire the Soviet Union an incentive or indeed a possibility to spare
talk on the United States; it is much less clear that it gives
strategically may give the Soviets a high incentive to avoid an at-
sign our own choice of target. In short, Secretary McNamara's
civilian casualties are inevitable. This in turn is bound to
age. Given the location of most United States airports, vast
pompers to civilian airports as was done during the Gulf war-
particularly true it in criteria situations we continue to use
airports capable of handling strategic pompers. This would be
brieze, aPARING ATTACK would have to seek to defeat all

13

18

what incentive the Soviets could possibly have to use their in-
ferior numbers in a surprise attack. However, granting Secre-
tary McNamar's hypothesis, if the Soviets spare our cities, they
will not be able to destroy our retaliatory force. If we spare
Soviet cities, a great part of their force may survive.

The most plausible interpretation of the McNamara theory,
then, is that the need to disarm the opponent will transcend
the incentive to spare cities. However, during the Sixties,
the reliability of even such a notion of counterforce strategy
is certain to decline. As the retaliatory forces multiply and
become more dispersed, it will grow increasingly difficult to
pinpoint the targets precisely or to give the President enough
confidence that their exact location is known, which amounts to
the same thing.

Moreover, as missile systems become more diversified and
sophisticated, some will be hardened, some will be mobile on

acquiescet', some will be purgated, some will be wept on

Moreover, so far as I have seen, some will be purgated and

the same thing.

confidence that their exact location is known, which amounts to
binpoint the targets precisely or to give the President enough
become more clear, it will become increasingly difficult to
be certain to decline. As the retaliatory force multiply and
the relapsitity of even such a notion of counterforce strategy
the incentive to abase cities. However, during the Sixties,
then, it is that the need to disarm the opponent will transpire
The most plausible interpretation of the McNamars theory,
Soviet cities, a great part of their force may survive.

will not be able to destroy our retaliatory force. If we abase
tary McNamars, a побotential, if the Soviets abase our cities, they
tender numbers in a surprise attack. However, drawing Secre-
what incentive the Soviets could possibly have to use their in-

13

19

land, others will be at sea. This will enormously complicate
the problem of coordinating an attack--indeed, in his statement
to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963, Sec-
retary McNamara pointed out that we did not possess any present
capability to target missile-carrying submarines.

Thus, even if the percentage of the Soviet retaliatory force
which we were able to destroy were to remain constant--an unwar-
rantedly optimistic assumption--the absolute number remaining
is bound to increase. Whatever its technical feasibility, the
obstacles in the way of a strategy based on intelligence which
is fragmentary and using large numbers of weapons for which there
is no operational experience in wartime are certain to mount.

Moreover,

The early formulations of the McNamara doctrine had the curious consequence of casting into doubt our nuclear commitment to NATO--and not simply because of the shortsightedness of selfishness of the Europeans. The European concern arose not

settlement of the Eurobese. The European concern arose not
to NATO--and not at all, because of the overconfidence in
accions consequence of casting into doubt our nuclear commitment

The early formulations of the McNamars doctrine had the
Wolfgang

It is no operational experience in wartime are certain to work.

its fragmentary and mindless numbers of weapons for which there

operations in this way of a strategy based on intelligence which

rationally optimistic assumption--the specific number remaining

turns, even if the percentage of the Soviet retentory force

retary McNamars pointed out that we did not base our present
to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963, Sec-
the problem of coordinating an attack--indeed, in this statement
and, otherwise will be at issue. This will of course be

[1]

13

because of the technical doubts expressed above. Their fears
-- among those Europeans who
were bound to be magnified particularly when they accepted Sec-
retary McNamara's assurances of our strategic superiority. For
if we were able to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force even
after we had suffered a surprise attack, it followed that we must
possess an overwhelming superiority if we struck first. If this
was true, our insistence on building up the conventional forces
in Europe--and the ever more explicit implication that we were
envisaging a purely conventional defense--inevitably appeared
as a symptom of our reluctance to launch a nuclear war for the
defense of Europe. If our nuclear superiority was as crushing
as Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric maintained, then it simply
made no sense to envisage a substantial conventional build-up
(as distinct from improving the existing capability).

In that case, the traditional doctrine of the nuclear "sword"
and the conventional "shield" would continue to be effective. The

and the conventional "shield" would continue to be effective. The
In that case, the traditional doctrine of the unclean "sword"
(as distinct from improving the existing capability).

made no sense to envisage a substantial conventional build-up
as Secretaries McNamara and Gribble maintained, then it simply
defense of Europe. If our unclean authority was as crushing
as a symptom of our reluctance to launch a nuclear war for the
enviading a briefly conventional defense---inevitably adhered
in Europe--and the ever more explicit implication that we were
was true, our insistence on building up the conventional force
boreass an overwhelming authority if we struck first. If this
after we had suffered an surprise attack, it followed that we must
if we were able to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force even
retaliate McNamara's assurance of our strategic authority. For
were bound to be wrongies particularly when they accepted sec-
among these Europeans who
because of the technical competence expressed above. Their less-

31

Soviet Union would be deterred from a massive attack on Europe,
for this would trigger a decisive blow by the United States
strategic forces. It could not escape this dilemma by means of
a simultaneous attack on the United States for--by Secretary
McNamara's hypothesis--this would still lead to the destruction
of the entire Soviet target system. If, nevertheless, we re-
versed the definition of the "sword and the shield", the con-
clusion that we were reluctant to use our nuclear superiority
in the face of a massive Soviet attack on Europe was, to say the
least, not farfetched. Our seeming unwillingness to rely on
our proclaimed nuclear superiority did more than President De
Gaulle's declarations to create confusion about our purposes.

This difficulty has led to a reformulation of the counter-
force theory. In his statement at to the House Armed Services
Committee on January 30, 1963, Secretary McNamara emphasized
that a general nuclear war even under conditions of controlled

Committee on January 30, 1963, Secretary McMurdo's emphasized
force theory. In his statement at the House Armed Services

Gunn's declarations to create confusion about our purposes.

our proclaimed nuclear superiority did more than President De-

test, not targeted. Our seeming unwillingness to rely on

citation that we were reluctant to use our nuclear superiority

erased the definition of the "sword" and the "shield", the con-

of the entire Soviet target system. It, nevertheless, we re-

McMurdo's a hypothesis--this would still lead to the destruction

a summitsoneone attack on the United States for--by Secretary

response would still produce casualties numbered in the tens of millions. This was because "even if we were to double or triple our forces we would not be able to destroy quickly all or almost all of the hardened ICBM sites. And even if we could do that, we know no way to destroy the enemy's missile-launching submarines at the same time." Secretary McNamara went on to say that our strategic forces were designed to destroy virtually all of the "soft" and semi-hard military targets in the Soviet Union and a proportion of the hardened sites. No significant capability for destroying missile-carrying submarines would be developed."

With respect to European nuclear aspirations, Secretary McNamara emphasized that they would have to be integrated into a single command and capable of instant response. The President has reiterated these requirements in his press conference of and added that the decision to retaliate might have to be made in five minutes.

has reiterated these requirements in the press conference of
a single command and capable of instant reresponse. The President
McNamara emphasized that they would have to be integrated into
With respect to European unclear subscriptions, Secretary
Armed.

priority for destroying missile-carrying submarines would be de-
and a proportion of the hardened sites. No significant capa-
the soft and semi-hard military targets in the Soviet Union
our strategic forces were deemed to destroy virtually all of
lines at the same time." Secretary McNamara went on to say that
we know no way to destroy the enemy's missile-issuing andwar-
s all of the hardened ICBM sites. And even if we could do that,
our forces we would not be able to destroy quickly all or almost
all millions. This was because even if we were so complete or triple
re Response would still produce casualties numbered in the tens of

our forces we would not be able to destroy quickly all or almost
all of the hardened ICBM sites. And even if we could do that,
we know no way to destroy the enemy's missile-issuing andwar-
s all of the hardened ICBM sites. Secretary McNamara went on to say that
our forces we would not be able to destroy quickly all or almost
all millions. This was because even if we were so complete or triple
re Response would still produce casualties numbered in the tens of

24 23 [Y]

The new version of the McNamara strategy has removed some
of the previous ambiguities, but it has raised issues of its
own. For it is not clear now just what the purpose of our re-
taliation is to be. Secretary McNamara mentions only one "sce-
nario" for general nuclear war. This, significantly, is not a
full-scale Soviet attack on Europe, but a nuclear attack on the
United States.

Given the disparity in the size of strategic forces between
the Soviet Union and the United States, it is hard to see what
would induce even a rash Soviet planner into so foolhardy a
course. According to Secretary McNamara's testimony of January
30, 1963, the United States capability, after absorbing a first
blow, should be sufficient to strike back first at the Soviet
bomber bases, missile sites and other military installations as-
sociated with their long-range nuclear forces to reduce the power
of any follow-on attack--and then, if necessary, strike back at

of any follow-on attack--and then, if necessary, a strike pack at
associated with their long-range nuclear forces to reduce the power
pomper phase, missile sites and other military installations as-
pire, should be sufficient to strike pack first at the Soviet
30' 1963, the United States capability, after absorbing a first
course. According to Secretary McNaught's a statement of January
would induce even a small Soviet planner into a considerably a
the Soviet Union and the United States, it is hard to see what
given the disparity in the size of strategic forces between
United States.

25

24

[N]

the Soviet urban and industrial complex in a controlled and de-
liberate way."

A United States strategic force which can absorb a Soviet surprise attack, strike back at Soviet military targets and still be sufficiently strong to attack urban centers in a deliberate way must be enormously superior numerically to the Soviet's. Moreover, most of our ICBM's will be in hardened sites and the Polaris will be mobile and at sea. It is almost impossible to imagine circumstances in which the Soviets would launch an all-out attack on such a force. If Secretary McNamara's description of our capability is correct, then, in almost every conceivable contingency, the Soviets would seem to have to gain more by waiting than by striking. It is not impossible that the Soviets will act with reckless foolishness; but it is not wise to base all of U.S. and NATO strategy on what might easily be a very special case.

a very specialist case.

to phase all of U.S. and NATO strategy on what might easily be
Soviets will set with reckless coolness; but it is not wise
waiting thus far by attrition. It is not unreasonable that the
continuum of the Soviets would seem to have to dawn more by
of our espied, then in some unassailable
on attack on any force. It is Secretary McNaught's description
wouldn't come across in which the Soviets would issue an all-
Bolsar will be mopile and at all. It is almost impossible to
Moreover, most of our ICBMs will be in paraded sites and the
erstest way what he enormously superior numerically to the Soviet's,
at still be sufficiently strong to attack us and centers in a delip-
ambrose attack, strike pack at Soviet military targets and
A United States strategic force which can spanp a Soviet
Tiberste way."

the Soviet uspans and industrial complex in a controlled and ge-

But assuming the unlikely eventuality of a Soviet first strike against the United States, Secretary McNamara's latest testimony leaves the targets of our retaliatory blow far from obvious. He has emphasized that we could not destroy many of the hardened Soviet sites and practically none of the missile-carrying submarines. Presumably, however, the Soviets would have launched their missiles from the soft sites in their first attack. This would leave empty airbases for our retaliatory "counterforce" blow--and, in any event, airplanes do not constitute a major portion of the Soviet retaliatory force.

Moreover, Secretary McNamara's use of the term "incentive" is very curious. He implies that because we are numerically superior and therefore in a position to spare Soviet cities, the Soviets will have an incentive to do likewise. Of course, Soviet military theorists have consistently denied the possibility of the kind of war outlined by Secretary McNamara. This would not

the king of war outlined by Secretary McMains. This would not
military theorists have consistently quired the feasibility of
Soviets will have an incentive to go likewise. Of course, Soviet
inferior and therefore in a position to abuse Soviet cities, the
to any curios. He implies first because we are numerically
Moreover, Secretary McMains a move of the term "incentive"

into a major portion of the Soviet retreating force.

"Contemptence" (p.111--p.13), in any event, strikes do not contain

This would leave empty stragglers for our retreating

force launched their missiles from the soft sites in their first
carrying ammunitions. Breathtaking, however, the Soviets would

the hardened Soviet sites and practically none of the battle-
opinions. He has emphasized that we could not defeat many of

testimony leaves the targets of our retreating flow far from

strike against the United States. Secretary McMains's latest

This would be a major blow to the retreating force.

be conclusive were it not so in accord with the realities of
the strategic equation. For a war of attrition--even more it
technically feasible--cannot be in the interest of the weaker
side. As we reduced the Soviet retaliatory force, the sensible
strategy for the Soviets would be to begin attacking our cities,
perhaps controlling their response by destroying some smaller
towns first. To be sure, we could retaliate in kind. But what-
ever the significance of the notion of superiority in a war con-
fined to military targets, there can be little doubt that a sat-
uration point is relatively quickly reached when civilian popu-
lations become the objective.

The McNamara doctrine in fact confuses the highly desirable
objective of invulnerability and effective command and control
with a strategy which has as its chief objective the destruction
of the opposing retaliatory force. If both sides achieve the
kind of invulnerability that Secretary McNamara has postulated,
the counterforce strategy envisaged in our public pronouncements

the counterforce stratedly envied in our belliger brounouncements
kind of invulnerability that Secretary McNaumars has formulated,
of the obsoating retaliatory force. It both aimes achieve the
with a stratedly which has as its chief objective the destruction
objective of invulnerability and effective command and control

The McNamars doctrine in fact continues the highly desirable
istions become the objective.

nartion point is relatively quickly reached when civilisn benu-
tined to military targets, there can be little doubt that a est-
ever the significance of the notion of superiority in a war con-
tome first. To be amne, we could retallate in kind. But must-
besbe controlling their reasonse by defeating some smaller
strategically for the Soviets would be to begin attacking our cities,
side. As we reduced the Soviet retaliatory force, the sensible
technically feasible--cannot be in the interest of the weaker
the strategic education. For a war of attrition--even were it
be conclusive were it not so in accord with the resity of

EAD

27

will become less and less reliable. In such an environment, it
may be possible to use the strategic force in a "controlled" way.
Indeed, a capability for flexible response is _always_ in our in-
terest. But flexible response should not be identified with an
integrated attack on the strategic force of the opponent.

This suggests that Secretary McNamara's 'scenario' is much
too one-dimensional. With a well protected force, there should
be much more time available than five minutes to respond to
The instance on a single chain of command thus
became much more problematical. Moreover,
Soviet moves. Quick time of delivery should not be confused
with hair-trigger response. On the contrary, it is to our in-
terest--apart from considerations of Alliance policy--to give
policymakers the maximum amount of time for considering their
response. A rich country like ours may be able to afford pro-
tection against even remote contingencies. If there is even a
small possibility of saving millions of lives, it should be taken.
But it is one thing to develop an option for controlled general
war; it is quite another to subordinate all of our NATO policy

28

[4]

to this effort.

The insistence on a single chain of command for all nuclear forces in the Alliance inevitably came to appear as a United States effort to dictate not only strategy but also the elaboration of the *casus belli*. The theory of flexible response--which has many merits--has been applied so one-sidedly that many of our allies saw in it primarily a rationalization to exclude them forever from any competence in nuclear technology. Instead of facing the very important issues of Allied strategy, NATO debates have thus been frozen in abstract debates about such words as "integration" and "multilateral".

This has been compounded by our equally one-sided analysis of the significance of nuclear weapons. Improving the conventional defenses is one thing; implying that the most desirable goal for NATO would be a capability for a purely conventional defense is quite another.

Aversional defense in quite stronger.

Airforce dose for NATO would be a capability for a purely conventional defense in one kind: implying that the most desirable of the significance of basic means. Improving the conventions

This has been compounded by our equally one-sided sus-
ance which has "integration" and "unification".

NATO depates have thus been frozen in abstract depates spont
inadeq of facing the very important issues of Vietnam strategy,
exchange them forever from any competence in nuclear technology.
many of our allies saw in it primarily a rationalization to
which has many merits--has been abided so one-aidedly that
station of the creme pell. The theory of flexible reresponse--
states effort to dictate not only strategy but also the elapor-
force in the Villessenevits supply came to appear as a united
The inexistence on a single chain of command for all unies

to this effort.

29

[N]

Few Europeans have agreed with our judgment about the feasibility of a purely conventional defense. Most of them believe that a great gap in conventional power exists and that we have adjusted our intelligence estimates to fit our strategic preference. Their judgment may be mistaken but we must remember that we possess no historic advantage over the Europeans in our analysis of conventional war.

In any event, Europeans have had too much experience of the defeat of forces that were thought to be adequate not to ask what happens should our assessment prove mistaken. Even those who favor as a more modest goal a "pause" before nuclear weapons are used--and they are not in a majority--must be concerned about the options available at the end of that "pause".

But the acceptance of our conventional goal and the theory behind it still provides an incentive for the development of European nuclear strength. Europeans are bound to want to have a share in determining their fate if the Soviets do not follow