- 22 -

sufficiently clear that there can be no question of decep-
tion by a Soviet failure to challenge a unilateral U.S.
position.

The first and less significant episode, first
publicly revealed in early December 1975, involves the con-
struction at the Soviet Kamchatka missile test range of a
trainable phased array radar suitable for ABM purposes.
Superficially, this radar appeared to be a direct violation
of the treaty provision requiring that unless new test
ranges were mutually agreed upon, ABM tests must be confined
to those ABM test ranges which were current in 1972. 1/
The
United States had in April 1972 stated, with respect to this
provision:

"The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at
White Sands, New Mexico and Kawjalein
Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test
range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan."

To this seemingly precise U.S. identification of the "cur-
rent" Soviet ranges, the Soviets replied:

"that national means permitted identify-
ing current test ranges."

The United States later listed this ships-passing-in-the
night exchange as a "common understanding" (T:CU:B). But

1/ The significance of whether the new radar is located at a range used for ABM tests in 1972 is that new, as well as pre-existing, ABM radars at such ranges are exempt from the general ABM radar limits, so construction of a new ABM radar there would be consistent with the agreements.

- 23 -

even a superficial reading indicates there was less than a
meeting of minds on the matter.

Persons familiar with discussion of compliance issues relating to the Kamchatka radar have suggested that, in fact, when the United States advanced its list, it knew that the Soviets had already conducted ABM or ABM type tests to Kamchatka -- a well-identified ICBM test range -- as well as on the Sary Shagan range, or had, at least, constructed a radar there with potential ABM capability. That being the case, the U.S. listing of only Sary Shagan as a Soviet ABM test range, omitting Kamchatka, could be regarded as essentially an effort to induce the Soviets to make an uncharacteristically specific statement about their own practices. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets unequivocally, if somewhat oracularly, declined to accept.

The suggestion that the use of the Kamchatka range for ABM tests was already known to the U.S. in 1972 tends to be confirmed by the very low keyed response in 1975-76 to what otherwise would be a quite blatant violation of a clear U.S. unilateral understanding. Both Secretary Kissinger and James Wade, the chief DOD staff representative at the current talks, have treated the issue more as a matter of objecting to Soviet lack of specificity in the discussions than as a violation. For example, Kissinger said in his December press conference, "If the Soviet Union had claimed the

- 24 -

Kamchatka range for itself at that time, there would be no problem." K37.

### 3. The SS-19.

The SS-19 controversy, the alleged Soviet defiance of a U.S. unilateral statement that has perhaps been the most frequently discussed, also seems on close examination to be far more like the Kamchatka radar situation than the SA-5 tests. The background of the SS-19 controversy may be briefly stated. The treaty bans the conversion of silos for "light" ICBM missiles to accommodate "heavy" ICBMs, but it contains no definition of "light" or "heavy" missiles. The Agreed Interpretations and Common Understandings record agreement that missile silos -- presumably for either light or heavy missiles -- may not be increased by more than "ten to fifteen percent of present dimensions". [A:AI:C and A:CU:A]

There was no such agreement with respect to changes in the volume of the missiles themselves. The United States in a unilateral statement [A:US:D] declared flatly that it would regard as a "heavy missile" any ICBM with a volume "significantly greater" than the largest then current light missile, the SS-11. The SS-11 volume is about 67 cubic meters; the U.S. negotiators informed their Soviet counterparts that the U.S. would regard 70 cubic meters as the maximum volume of a "light" ICBM. (CG 32). The U.S. unilateral statement went on to "assume" somewhat opaquely that the Soviets would give "due account to this interpretation."

- 25 -

In fact, the Soviets first tested the SS-19 ICBM
in August 1973, and then began to deploy it in late 1974 or
early 1975, as a follow-on to the SS-11. The SS-19 has a
volume of about 100 cubic meters, but requires only a slight
modification of the SS-11 silo (Wade 251). Thus, its deploy-
ment in SS-11 silos can apparently be accomplished without
violating the agreed 10-15% maximum change in silo dimensions.
1/

Reflecting the concern about the possibility of
heavy ICBMs posing an imminent danger to the U.S. Minuteman
force, considerable attention in the debate on the 1972
agreements was focused on the significance of the limitation
of heavy ICBMs. All the principal U.S. spokesman (with the
apparent exception of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff) flatly stated that the agreements meant that no
missile larger than the largest current light ICBM (i.e.,
the SS-11) could be substituted consistent with the agree-
ment. [Kissinger at the White House quoted in Schlesinger
testimony at 19: Laird Senate Armed Services Committee,
July 24, 1972, Hearings, supra, p. 14, n.1, at 547; Helms
(quoted by Jackson at Schlesinger testimony 8); Smith (Wade
270)]

1/ Apparently, the SS-19 deployment does not test the issue of whether the 10-15% limit applies to volume, or to all linear dimensions (which would permit some 50% volume expansion), since the silo is only deepened, i.e., only one linear dimension is changed.

- 26 -

No indication of any Soviet objection to the U.S.
position was published in 1972, even an indirect one like
the rejection of our listing of current ranges. Thus the
position which seems to emerge appears to be very similar
to that of the "ABM mode" test issue -- a clear U.S. state-
ment, a Soviet refusal to be specific, but no direct rebut-
tal of the U.S. position. Though the SS-19 was not tested
until almost a year after the 1972 agreements, it was, of
course, fully developed by that stage, so the Soviets could
not possibly have agreed to a 70 cubic meter limit. More-
over, it would have been very close to bad faith negotiation
for the Soviets, knowing that they intended to replace the
SS-11's with a missile with a volume of approximately 100
cubic meters, to have sat silent in the face of a U.S.
statement that it interpreted the borderline between light
and heavy as 70 cubic meters without contradicting the U.S.
unilateral statement.

However, a recent article by Gerard Smith, the
chief U.S. negotiator of the first SALT agreements, revealed
a critical fact: *the Soviets did not by silence permit the*
*United States to form a false impression of tacit Soviet*
*acquiescence in the 70 cubic meter limit.* In fact, Smith
writes:

"At Helsinski we had been informally ad-
vised that while the Soviet Union would
be deploying missiles of larger volume
in SS-11 silos, they would not approach

- 27 -

the halfway mark between an SS-11 and the
admittedly heavy missile, the SS-9. I
have seen no claims that the new Soviet
missiles in question are greater in volume
than this halfway mark." 1/

If Smith's statement is true, the deception which was prac-
ticed in 1972 was not by the Soviet on the U.S. negotiators,
but when Administration spokesmen proclaimed to the Congress
as meaningful a unilateral U.S. position which the Soviets
had not only explicitly rejected, but had actually explained
why their already-developed successor to the SS-11 meant
they could not possibly agree.

The subsequent Soviet deployments of the SS-19,
about which they had informed the U.S. negotiators in 1972
thus represents no more than the Soviets carrying out an
2/ intention they made abundantly clear at the time. It can
hardly be regarded as a violation of any "spirit" of the
agreement. Certainly the Kamchatka radar and SS-19 issues do
not provide any demonstration that reliance on "unilateral
statements" is impossible when the statements are truly that
-- a unilateral expression of a specific U.S. position on

1/ G. Smith, "Wrestling with the Plowshare Problem,"
*New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1976.

2/ Arguably, even the "fake"-unilateral statement defining "light" missiles was useful as a way of forcing out the definitional issue for resolution in SALT II. It is also an interesting example of the uncertain contribution of some verification-motivated collateral constraints that further analysis has indicated that volume size limits are a poor surrogate for throw weight controls. Reportedly the definition of a "heavy" missile being developed in SALT II will be directly in terms of throw weight, not volume.

- 28 -

on which the Soviets refuse to be precise. Rather they show
what could hardly have been seriously disputed -- that uni-
lateral positions cannot erase express (if publicly unre-
vealed) disagreements.

4. Mobile ICBMs.

The other two substantive issues -- the III-X
silos and mobile ICBMs -- do not raise the issue of ambigu-
ity in the sense of lack of clarity in agreements terms at
all. Nor do they present problems about unilateral state-
ments.

The first, dealing with Soviet development work on
mobile missiles, can be quickly dismissed: the Interim Agree-
ment on offensive weapons does not constrain mobile ICBMs at
all. The United States, however, indicated that it would
regard the deployment of mobiles during the term of the
interim agreement as "inconsistent with the objectives of
that agreement". [A:US:B] However, it is not contended
that the Soviets have deployed mobile intercontinental range
missiles. The Soviet actions that are the subject of debate
were a continuation of a research and testing program on the
SS-16 missile, already underway prior to 1972 agreements and
long identified as a potential mobile ICBM effort. Therefore,
in this instance there is simply no violation -- not
only no violation of what the Soviets actually agreed to,
but not even a violation of the unilateral U.S. statement

- 29 -

which referred only to _deployment_ and not to development and
testing.

5. III-X Silos

Much more complex is the issue of the status of
facilities, purportedly for command and control, constructed
in holes dug in each Soviet silo group. The U.S. concern is
that these "III-X" holes, even if not presently ICBM silos,
are capable of rapid conversion to serve as such. There is
in this controversy no question of any ambiguity in the
terms of the agreement: No one disputes that the construc-
tion of additional fixed ICBM launchers would violate the
express terms of the Interim Agreement. Rather these holes
themselves are what former Secretary Schlesinger has referred
to as "inherently ambiguous situations". (Sch. 5) That is,
there are good faith reasons on the United States side for
being concerned at what the Soviets are up to, but no evi-
dence of any discussion in the course of the negotiations of
what would constitute a "launchers" as contrasted to some
other underground facility -- and certainly no formal uni-
lateral statement on the subject. There is no reason to
believe that issue was anticipated at all.

The United States response has been to insist that
the Soviets, who claim that the holes are strictly for com-
mand and control purposes, present evidence why the United
States should agree to this interpretation. Apparently the

- 30 -

Soviets have been willing to provide substantial informa-
tion, although none of the details have been made public.
Administrative spokesmen have expressed general satisfaction
with the criteria and evidence the Soviets have offered. If
one can give credence to that satisfaction even this *post
hoc* U.S. effort to insist on additional requirements related
to verification has been reasonably successful.

6. <u>Summary</u>

With respect to substantive issues it seems fair
to say that Soviets have _not_ in fact successfully (i.e.,
over U.S. objections) violated any good faith U.S. unilat-
eral statement with respect to the SALT I agreements.

What they have done is, first, to ignore two U.S.
unilateral statements which were clearly contradicted by
them in the course of the negotiations, those relating to
ABM test ranges and to the definition of a "light" ICBM.
But the U.S. negotiators who were familiar with the expressed
Soviet positions could hardly have thought of these two
unilateral statements as anything other than restatements of
clearly rejected U.S. positions, not an attempt to bring
about a tacit agreement.

Second, the Soviets have also -- in the case of
the SA-5 tests -- acted predictably if worrisomely in prob-
ing hard at U.S. willingness to insist on adherence to the
unilateral statements. This willingness to engage in acts

- 31 -

the Soviets knew the U.S. had said it would view as violations illustrates the need for vigilance in enforcing compliance. But it is equally important, in terms of the lessons for verification of future agreements, that when the U.S. raised the issue (after a long delay occasioned by U.S. concerns about protecting our intelligence sources), the Soviets evidently complied. It seems likely that the availability of a clear unilateral statement of the U.S. view was helpful as a basis for the U.S. protest.

The record, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of Soviet refusal to accept good faith U.S. unilateral statements as a significant element in the SALT process. But it is also clear that the mere reiteration for a domestic audience of a clearly rejected U.S. proposal has no impact on Soviet behavior. In a crucial sense, however, that is not a question of Soviet rejection of a unilateral U.S. interpretation, but acting on a clearly stated Soviet position.

## VERIFICATION VIOLATIONS

The charges of what may be termed verification violations present a somewhat different case.

A crucial precondition of any SALT agreement was U.S. willingness to forego on-site inspection and rely entirely on "national means of verification," i.e., U.S.

- 32 -

1/ Both the Treaty and the Agreement, in iden-
tical language, provide:

"For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with the generally recognized principles of international law."

This provision is arguably subject to two important limitations -- that the national means used must be consistent with international law and that they be used for the verification of the provisions of the agreement, not for general intelligence.

The general provision is supplemented by two prohibitory rules. The parties agree "not to interfere with national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article," and "not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty." This final undertaking is qualified, however, by the statement that "this observation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices."

1/ This is not to say that on-site inspection would have been feasible -- or if feasible particularly helpful in the SALT context. None of the significant substantive violation allegations are such that presence of inspectors at the locations would do much to clarify the situation.

2/ The means used are also required to be "technical" -- I.e., spies are not sanctioned.

- 33 -

These verification provisions, far more than the substantive rules, are full of ambiguities -- what are the "national technical means" covered? What are the applicable principles of international law? What is the status of intelligence aimed at weapons supposedly not covered by the agreements but susceptible of conversion? What was the degree of concealment inherent in 1972 practices and therefore permitted to continue but not be expanded? Nonetheless, in contrast to the elaborate interpretations, understandings, and unilateral statements relating to the substantive terms of the agreement, there is no amplification of these provisions, except for one unilateral statement which merely "emphasizes the importance that the United States attaches" to verification "including in particular [its] application to fitting out or berthing submarines." [A:US:C]

Thus in negotiating the verification clauses, the U.S. passed up the opportunity to place on the record a set of expectations comparable to that employed for SAM tests "in an ABM mode." Such a test could, for example, have specified what national means would be used or indicated types of concealment such as encoding telemetry actions that we would deem a violation.

It is most likely that the failure of the United States to be more explicit in amplifying, by unilateral

- 34 -

statement, its interpretation of the "no interference" and "no concealment" clauses arose from two sources. First, there may have been some fear that presenting the Soviets with a detailed list of what they should not conceal or interfere with would tell them too much about our own intelligence capabilities. Second, it is likely that there was a concern that, given the variety of kinds of interference and concealment methods which can be imagined, any list, no matter how extensive it might appear to be, would serve by implication as an acquiescence in other means of interference or concealment. It does, however, seem reasonable to suggest that the absence of a U.S. amplification of the terms of the "no interference" and "no concealment" provisions has needlessly complicated the task of enforcing compliance with them. In particular, it has meant that the U.S. has no "baseline" of intelligence practices and concealment techniques to refer to in debating claims of violations. A unilateral statement would also have given the U.S. a means of asserting formally its position on the scope of the provision, i.e., on their application to monitoring borderline or unlimited systems.

Soviet actions alleged to violate the limits in the area are jamming U.S. radars used for monitoring Soviet ABM tests, substantially increased use of canopies and other covering on submarine and missile construction, and, perhaps the most important, encoding and encapsulating the telemetry

- 35 -

1/
from Soviet missile tests. It appears that each of these
steps has in fact to some degree interfered with prior U.S.
monitoring capabilities for Soviet forces. Each is, there-
fore, at least prima facie in violation of the verification
provisions.

The Soviet responses to the U.S. charges of violations based on the practices have, insofar as they have been publicized by the American government, relied on the exceptions contained in the verification clauses. Soviets have argued that because of those exceptions there is no ban on interference with monitoring systems that are not directly limited by the agreement. Thus, it is argued that radar jamming that can block U.S. observation of tests of the upgraded SA-5 radar do not violate the bans. The claim is that, because the radar is an air defense radar, it is not subject to the Treaty. On that premise, intelligence directed at the SA-5 tests is not use of national means for "assurance of compliance of the provisions of this treaty," but general intelligence gathering, with which the Soviets remain free to interfere. Similarly, it is argued that the covering of mobile missile test facilities does not violate

1/ The other potential verification violations that have been discussed are the use of decoys to imitate submarines and alleged laser attacks on U.S. surveillance satellites. The latter seemingly never happened, and the former seems an absurdity, to which the appropriate (and wholly sufficient) U.S. reposte, as James Wade suggests, (Wade 265) would be to count all decoys as real.

- 36 -

the "no concealment" rule because what is concealed -- mobile ICBM development -- is not affected by the agreements. By the same argument telemetry denial is consistent with the agreement because the activity involved -- ICBM development -- is not limited.

While the force of the phrase "compliance with the provisions of this treaty" is clearly to prevent Articles V and XII from licensing all technical intelligence activities, the Soviet argument, carried to its logical extreme, is absurd: for it would mean that the mere assertion by the alleged violator that the system being concealed is of a type not covered by the agreement would vitiate the verification clauses as to that system. It is precisely to determine whether the activity being observed is in compliance with the treaty that the verification observations must be carried out. While the logic of the U.S. position seems strong, some prior U.S. position on the difficult borderline situations specific cases, would, it seems likely, have proven useful in discussing this with the Soviets.

Likewise, the Soviets argue that their concealment measures, such as doing under cover work on submarines that was previously done in the open where it was susceptible to relatively easy satellite observation, is simply a continuation of prior practices, necessitated by non-intelligence considerations like protection from weather conditions.
(This argument was advanced by the Soviets in the context of

- 37 -

covering work on submarines, and also by the United States
refuting Soviet charges that the aluminum canopies placed
over Minuteman silos in the process of Minuteman III conver-
sions violate the verification clauses).

Evidently, some of the protested concealment act-
ivities have ceased. (Wade 255) But it also appears from
the public record that the significant increased concealment
has taken place since the agreements. The vague U.S. unilat-
eral statement on this subject merely emphasized the import-
ance the American side attached to the matter: it did not
establish a base line of the degree of concealment practices
which the United States would be prepared to accept as
preexisting.

This analysis of the verification clauses, far
from showing that unilateral statements are a mistake, may
suggest that it is the absence of unilateral statements in
an uncertain area that can be dangerous. For example,
access to telemetry of Soviet weapons tests was an intelli-
gence asset of immense value, for it gave the United States
an insight into qualitative features that optical sensors
could not duplicate. The fact that we were monitoring
Soviet telemetry and could read the signals in a useful way
was regarded as immensely sensitive -- though it is hard to
believe that the Soviets did not assume that we were doing
so, given the detail of our published information on the

- 38 -

characteristics of their weapons. In any event, had the
United States been less impressed with supposed security
considerations, and ready to risk some degree of compromise
of its telemetry monitoring capability it could have in-
sisted on an explicit ban on encoding and encapsulating
telemetry. Such a ban was discussed within the executive
branch in the course of preparing for the SALT I talks. It
is unlikely the Soviets would have agreed explicitly, but a
unilateral statement might have helped deter a change in
their practices.

In short, the fully bilateral but extremely vague
interference and concealment clauses present the clearest
case of Soviet violations of the "spirit" of the agreement
and they serve to illustrate the need for, and usefulness
of, good faith unilateral statements and a complete and
explicit negotiating record.

VERIFICATION ISSUES IN SALT II

Verification questions have played a key part in
present negotiations toward a SALT II agreement. The prin-
cipal issues have been how one determines whether a missile
is to be counted against the 1320 ceiling for MIRV'ed

1/ It is unlikely that the U.S. practice in the period of
encapsulating telemetry on its own tests was a significant
factor in the decision not to press the telemetry issue in
SALT, because the U.S. apparently ceased the practice after
the agreements, presumably to forestall charges of insisting
on greater openness from the Soviets then we were prepared
to tolerate for outselves. Szulc 14.

- 39 -

missiles, and the impact of verification on proposals for
dealing with cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber. As to
MIRV, it has evidently been agreed, at United States insist-
ance, to adopt a "bright line standard." According to press
reports, the Soviets have acquiesced the U.S. position that
any missile ever tested with a MIRV warhead counts as a MIRV
for ceiling purposes.

More complex issues are presented by the proposals
to limit the Backfire bomber, not numerically but by controll-
ing the support elements -- like refueling and artic base
staging -- necessary to give it a significant capability
against U.S. territory. The degree to which these "mission"
constraints can be verified is limited. However, this may
be an instance in which a marginally verifiable provision is
far better than nothing. The Backfire is, on any account, a
marginal contribution to Soviet strategic capability, clearly
not worth sacrificing an otherwise satisfactory agreement on
ceilings and MIRVs for. If, by mutual consent, the Backfire
were defined out of the Soviet strategic force, its political
usefulness, as an element in the strategic balance, would be
reduced. Collateral constraints intended to make the defini-
tion effective might not be wholly effective. But such
things as limits on training practices and basing capabili-
ties involve large numbers of people, and reasonably exten-
sive communication and movement of planes -- activities of
the kind susceptible to random detection.

- 40 -

The case with respect to the verificability of
limits on cruise missiles (CMs) is somewhat different. In
addition to substantive, strategic objections to limitations
on cruise missiles, it has been suggested that all such
limitations are highly suspect because of the difficulty of
verifying the range capability of a cruise missile. On one
hand, this is an issue of largely academic interest. It is
the Soviets who are pressing for a cruise missile limit, not
the U.S. However, there would be obvious difficulties with
a clause which limited the U.S. but, because of unenforce-
ability, left the Soviets able to develop and deploy a
significant long-range cruise missile force, building on
their extensive experience with shorter range cruise missiles.

The verification problems of cruise missile limits
are many. Most proposals would permit short range (say 600
km) CMs -- a provision needed to "grandfather" existing
Soviet SLCMs. They would also set a maximum range even for
the long range cruise missiles that are permitted. Opponents
of such range-based limits contend that by varying payload
and engine characteristics the ranges even of existing
Soviet cruise could be increased by as much as four times.

Still more difficult from a verification point of
view would be agreement on when a bomber counts as capable
of carrying ALCMs and therefore had to count against the
MIRV maximum. Applying the MIRV missile rule (once tested

Presidency

MAGAZINE SUPPLEMENT

By George F. Will

Reckless Concessions

It is passing strange that President Ford, like his predecessor, is anxious to sign an election-year strategic-arms pact. Doing so will focus attention on the Nixon-Ford Administration's negotiating policy of unreciprocated concessions.

That policy bore sour fruit in 1972 when Nixon signed an agreement conceding to the Soviets a 40 per cent numerical advantage in missile launchers. Where the U.S. was behind, in numbers of launchers, the agreement froze the U.S. in inferiority. Where the Soviets were behind, in clusters of warheads (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, MIRV's), the agreement was silent, leaving the Soviets free to surpass the U.S. The next agreement may fit this pattern by severely limiting U.S. cruise missiles and insignificantly limiting Soviet Backfire bombers.

At Vladivostok in 1974 the Soviets granted, and Mr. Ford gratefully accepted, a cosmetic equality. They agreed that the next pact would limit both sides to 2,400 missiles (1,320 MIRVed) and "heavy" bombers. But Soviet missiles have much more power, measured in "throw-weight," the amount of destructive material that can be delivered. (A U.S. Minuteman III carries three MIRV's. A Soviet SS-18 can carry sixteen that size.) So the Vladivostok "equality" is a chimera. And subsequent Administration concessions have brought it to the brink of two reckless concessions.

SLIPPERY DEFINITIONS

It seems inclined to accommodate the brazen Soviet claim that Backfires are not "heavy" bombers. Until recently U.S. intelligence sources agreed that Backfires, like the less competent Soviet Bisons (which count as "heavy" bombers), can strike the U.S. on unrefueled missions. Hence, Backfires, like U.S. B-52s, should count as "heavy" bombers under Vladivostok limits. But suddenly the CIA under George Bush (former GOP chairman) has produced a report, based on partial data, that says Backfires have only about half the range previously thought. This report is politically convenient if the Administration wants to rationalize a concession.

Another concession may concern cruise missiles — pilotless, subsonic, nonballistic winged aircraft. Using them, American bombers could stand off from Soviet targets and still hit them. (The ability of B-52s to penetrate Soviet air defenses is limited and will become more so, especially if we continue to sell

the Soviets sophisticated computers.)

Ballistic, not cruise, missiles were discussed at Vladivostok. But U.S. cruise missiles are superior to Soviet models. So now the Soviets insist sea-launched cruise missiles must have only a 370-mile range. That means few Soviet targets would be in range of U.S. missiles while 125 million Americans would be in range of Soviet missiles.

Worse than that Soviet impertinence was the gratuitous Administration offer to count each bomber carrying cruise missiles against the limit of 1,320 MIRV missiles. This means that unless the U.S. dismantles some of the 1,286 MIRVed missiles deployed or planned, the U.S. can have only 34 bombers carrying cruise missiles. This probably would kill the cruise-missile program.

(Feeling a twinge of déja vu? U.S. antiballistic missiles were much superior to Soviet ABM's in 1972 when Nixon agreed to a virtual ban on ABM's.)

LESS IS ENOUGH

Common sense and self-respect should have led the Administration to insist that Backfires obviously are "heavy" bombers limited by Vladivostok, and cruise missiles obviously are exempt from those limits. But the Soviet demands triggered the Administration's appeasement reflexes, and it began pondering concessions that would substantially accept the Soviet position on both cruise missiles and Backfires.

As the Soviets approach nuclear superiority, the Administration's response is to suggest that "superiority" is meaningless. The Administration is deep in dogmatic slumbers. Its dogma is "mutual assured destruction." According to that, stable deterrence exists if both sides can absorb a first strike and still have surviving strategic forces sufficient to inflict destruction the attacker would consider intolerable. The crucial variables are the potency of the attacker's first strike, and what he considers tolerable losses from retaliation.

Nixon-Ford concessions have hastened the day when Soviet leaders may conclude that their throw-weight advantage (and improving accuracy) will enable them to eliminate a large fraction of U.S. strategic forces with a first strike, while holding back sufficient forces (e.g., ballistic missiles and Backfires) to devastate U.S. cities if the U.S. launches a suicidal retaliation strike. Far from being meaningless, superiority will mean that the Soviets can confront a President

with the sort of choice with which Kennedy confronted Khrushchev during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Secretary Kissinger says nuclear war is unthinkable. The Soviets disagree. Since 1962 they have invested vast sums in civil-defense programs. They think their social infrastructure would survive a nuclear war. Much new industry is away from large cities. Factories are protected by blast shields; machinery is mounted on shock absorbers. Nebraska grain is stored underground. There are plans for evacuations, shelters and post-attack recovery. Obviously Soviet leaders take seriously the possibility of winning a nuclear war.

Most Americans, including their "leaders," cannot bring themselves to think that Soviet leaders are planning for the "unthinkable." But all Americans should at least wonder: "What kind of people do they think we are?" and "Given what they think, how are they apt to behave?" Soviet leaders believe that decline, and a terminal crisis, are inevitable for the U.S. The Nixon-Ford unreciprocated concessions have reinforced Soviet preconceptions about U.S. flaccidity. Such preconceptions are a spur to the aggressiveness that has characterized Soviet behavior during détente.

FORD IN A BOX

The Soviets abetted Hanoi's overthrow of the Paris accords (which the Soviets signed), incited the Arab aggressors in the Yom Kippur war, organized subversion in Angola, all the while secure in their contemptuous (and correct) belief that nothing would slow the flow of U.S. concessions in arms talks.

The deterioration of the U.S. negotiating position has accelerated under Mr. Ford. Soviet intransigence has destroyed the Administration's poise. In a recent seven-month period of Francie improvising the Administration submitted five different proposals, piling concession upon concession, without receiving a serious Soviet response. The Soviets know that things come to those who wait.

If Mr. Ford now suddenly produces an election-eve arms agreement, he will be inviting public scrutiny of the pattern of concessions that produced it. Then he will need uncharacteristic ingenuity to argue persuasively that a Carter Administration would do worse.

Newsweek, 8/23/76

SALT and the Coming Political Year

AS NEGOTIATIONS GO, the strategic arms limitation
talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union — now into
their sixth year — are distinctive in many ways. These in-
clude the highly technical nature of the subject matter, the
high stakes of the outcome and the unusual degree of
secrecy that has been achieved in their conduct. But in at
least one respect the arms negotiations are like all others
of importance that are undertaken by the government:
they are subject to a variety of distortions, pressures and
anxieties related to the quadrennial looming of a presiden-
tial election year. We note in this connection a recent story
by Murrey Marder in The Post giving it as the opinion of the
Ford administration that "it will be politically impractical
to pursue SALT negotiations beyond early 1976, to avoid the
contentious atmosphere of the American presidential
election campaign." This opinion, Mr. Marder reports, has
been conveyed to the Soviet Union.

We have no way of knowing whether this move reflects
(1) a conclusion that SALT is unsafe for Mr. Ford as the
political challenge from his party's right-wing grows this
spring or (2) a tactic to put heat on the Soviets to settle the
thorny outstanding issues of their Backfire bombers and
our cruise missiles or (3) some combination of both. We do
know that in the past the onset of a political year and/or of
some specific political need has variously harmed and
helped the government in pursuit of important
negotiations.

The inexorable approach of November, 1972, for instan-
ce, put great pressure on the Nixon administration to
achieve some kind of settlement in and withdrawal from
Vietnam - But as the deadline neared it also caused the ad-
ministration to make some sloppy and costly
arrangements. Similarly, Mr. Nixon's political desire to
portray himself as the architect of a "generation of peace"
between the U.S. and Soviet Union had its better and worse
SALT effects. It helped propel him to make some genuinely
valuable and momentous accords with the Soviet Union -
and also to make some very defective ones (eg: the un-
derground testing accord now being renegotiated) under
the hot breath of Watergate in 1974.

Our point is, first, that these things cut both ways and
that there is therefore no good reason to set artificial cam-
paign deadlines or cutoff dates in the pursuit of significant
negotiating objectives. This is the more true when you con-
sider that what with one thing and another, it almost never is
not a political year any more; since campaigns for federal
office seem to get under way 18-months in advance, and
since every second year is really a campaign year
(whether presidential or congressional), we could as a na-
tion end up with our negotiating window open for only
three of four months out of every twenty-four. Finally, it is
peculiar to the substance of the SALT talks that
technology, procurement and deployment have a proven
way of going forward on the double during these
negotiating lapses, making the new round, when it begins,
harder than the one that went before.

For these reasons we believe it would be imprudent of the
administration to call an artificial and arbitrary halt to the
process now going forward to reach a SALT II accord. The

achievement of such an accord — which must be, it goes
without saying, verifyable, safe and fair — is especially
worth trying for, because without one by 1977 the SALT I ac-
cord runs out and things automatically become worse than
before. We appreciate both the impulses that have led peo-
ple in the administration to want to get SALT "out of
politics" and the fact that in bending to the force of custom
and tradition in these matters they are hardly suggesting
anything new.

Still, we wonder if those customs and traditions are
worth preserving. Surely something weak and unattrac-
tive is implied in the idea that the U.S. government cannot
trust itself to negotiate an arms settlement in "the conten-
tious atmosphere of the American presidential election
campaign." What is implied is that it would either be
tempted to bring home something glittering but unsafe or
to turn back a chance to reach a sound accord out of fear
that the demagogues would make it politically perilous —
and both implications rest on an assumption that the
American public can't be trusted with the truth. We think
the responsible course for Mr. Ford is to go forward with
the negotiations — to trust his own judgement and that of
the electorate whose votes he will be seeking.

The challenge on SALT

Perhaps the greatest challenge ever now confronts East-West detente. If the United States and the Soviet Union fail to reach a second agreement on SALT the whole policy of detente — already buffeted by severe strains — may suffer an irreparable setback. For the central issue around which all else revolves in Soviet-American relations is the effort to put a cap on the dangerous competition in nuclear weapons.

Time is of the essence. The schedule for a Brezhnev-Ford summit meeting this year already has slipped and there are political roadblocks ahead. The Russians are under the pressure of their Communist Party congress in February (which presumably will either sanction — or reject — the Brezhnev "peace" policy). The Americans, for their part, face the political tensions of an election year. If no SALT accord is hammered out before the end of January, the negotiations most likely would have to be put off until 1977.

This would be an unfortunate development for two reasons. One is that if there is no permanent, comprehensive agreement on offensive weapons by 1977, the U.S. might consider abrogating the ABM treaty, which limits each country's defensive arsenal of antiballistic missiles.

Secondly, in the intervening time both the Pentagon and the Soviet military would be pushing for bigger and better nuclear weaponry to defend their countries. Budgets would climb. Then, when and if the two sides resumed negotiations they would be talking if from a different base and would have to start all over again.

Such an eventuality is not in the interest of either nation, or of the world. What happens (or does not happen) in nuclear disarmament affects not only Moscow and Washington. It will one day influence the policies of commu-

nist China, as well as of that growing number of nations that have a capacity for making nuclear devices. It will hardly be possible to persuade India or Iran or Taiwan to foreswear the development of atomic weapons if the superpowers themselves do not halt the arms race.

The stakes are thus high. Without SALT II, detente — the poorly named process of trying to improve East-West relations and thereby dampen global hostility — is open to further attack by conservative forces in both the Soviet Union and the United States. And worldwide nuclear disarmament becomes an even more elusive goal.

It is to be hoped that this is the general reading in both the Kremlin and the White House — and that both sides will recognize the urgency of compromise. On the face of it, both sides have legitimate concerns at this stage of the negotiations. The Russians worry about the rapid American development of the cruise missile, a pilotless aircraft that can be launched from aircraft, ships or submarines, travel up to 2,000 miles and reportedly drop within 30 feet of a target. The Americans see dangers in the Soviets' supersonic Backfire bomber which, they say, can have long-range capability if refueled in the air.

Neither the cruise missile nor the bomber figures among the arms put under limitations in the Vladivostok agreement, on the basis of which SALT II is being negotiated. Probably each ought to be included.

Whatever compromise proposals have been thought up by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger — and these are now in the hands of the Russians — he will not be able to sell an agreement at home if it is not clear that Moscow also is making concessions. The time has come to reach a middle ground — and both parties will have to walk an equal distance.

SALT in Your Eye

Secretary of State Kissinger has been making public remarks about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that are optimistic on their face but certain to be interpreted pessimistically. His friends in the press are writing that the talks are in deep trouble. This is an almost certain sign that Mr. Kissinger has agreement with the Russians in view, and is now turning his attention to selling it to the Americans.

A false sense of urgency has been one of the hallmarks of the strategic arms negotiations, particularly in selling to Americans the series of agreements that have been milestones along the march toward eventual Soviet strategic superiority. We are now being told that a SALT agreement is needed to preserve detente. At other times we are told that the chief purpose of detente is to reach SALT agreements. And of course, that the agreements are needed immediately because this is our last chance to stop the "spiral" of the "arms race."

The facts are that while of course each side competes with the other, there is no "spiral" and no "race" toward some Armageddon. At least not on the U.S. side. In terms of real dollars, the budget for strategic weapons has now declined to less than a third of its peak total. The aggregate destructive power of deployed weapons has also sharply declined as the weapons have become more accurate. Technologies are now in sight that would allow replacement of nuclear warheads with conventional ones for many targets, but the agreement Secretary Kissinger has in view would probably curtail them.

This false sense of urgency has weighed heavily on the American side of the negotiations. Despite Secretary Kissinger's preposterous claim that the Soviets have made "all" of the concessions, the only arms development any of the agreements has stopped so far is the antiballistic missile, in advanced development by the Americans but not the Russians. Similarly, the salient fact about the Vladivostok agreement-to-agree is that in terms of missile "throw weight," or the lifting power that determines the potential number and size of warheads, the Soviets codified an advantage of roughly three-to-one.

A further and more immediate example lies in the development of negotiations since Vladivostok. The ostensible purpose of these talks is to work out the technical details of the agreement in principle. In fact, the chief Soviet objective has become curtailing an American development not even mentioned in the

Vladivostok communique. This is the cruise missile, a pilotless airplane with super-accurate guidance. This development is the best chance for the U.S. to offset the Soviet lead in throw weight, and also the opportunity to replace nuclear warheads with non-nuclear ones.

How this issue worked its way into the supposedly technical follow-on talks is itself an example of the hazards of haste. The agreement in principle stated that the agreed limitations on total weapons would apply to "air launched missiles" of over a certain range. The range itself is at issue, being variously described in Mr. Kissinger's statements as "600 miles" and "600 kilometers." But the bigger question is whether the term "missiles" means "ballistic missiles," as some American negotiators have privately said they understood, or also includes the air-breathing cruise missile. Not so incidentally, there was not one military adviser in the American party to Vladivostok.

The one unambiguous thing about the clause is that it applies only to air-launched missiles. The clauses on land-based and sea-based missiles specify that the ceilings are on ballistic missiles. So the Soviets are now asking for an interpretation that would count against the ceilings both air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers. First of all, we have the guidance technology within reach, they don't. Second, most of our major cities and many military targets are within 600 kilometers of the sea, theirs aren't. Third, there is absolutely no way to tell from looking at a cruise missile what its range is. On this point we would have to take the Russian word.

Obviously, American assent to such a proposal would be worth a great deal to the Soviet generals. They might even buy it by dropping some of their more outlandish positions on other outstanding issues, maybe even throwing in a cosmetic concession on throw weight to ease Mr. Kissinger's troubles with Congress. On past form, this is the kind of bargain we can expect, one that codifies Soviet advantages while foreclosing ours.

There is no urgent reason to accept such an agreement, no reason not simply to wait until the Soviets are willing to strike a more even bargain. The technologies now on the horizon point not to a vastly more dangerous world, but to a slightly less dangerous one. And no meaningful detente can be built except on the basis of true equality and true reciprocity.

SALT II Threatened...

For thirty years, from the atom bomb to the MIRV multiple warhead, American inventive genius has sought increased security for the country through a series of technological marvels that, when inevitably acquired by the Soviet Union, have heightened the nation's danger. The latest, the cruise missile, has yet to be flight-tested. But it already threatens the negotiations for a historic ten-year Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), placing in doubt Leonid Brezhnev's thrice-postponed 1975 visit to the United States and, with it, the future of détente.

Unless the strategic nuclear arms race is curbed, it is difficult to conceive of détente continuing in its present form. Moreover, Mr. Brezhnev has been counting on his second Washington visit, which was supposed to center around the signing of SALT II, to permit celebration of his American policy—and its favorable economic consequences—as the main theme of the crucial quinquennial congress of the Soviet Communist party in February.

Mr. Brezhnev already has his critics in the Soviet hierarchy and that criticism is likely to intensify if SALT II cannot be completed in the coming weeks, in time for the party congress. President Ford will also find it more difficult to make compromises on SALT during next year's Presidential race—especially since he seems to believe that his main competitor is Ronald Reagan, rather than a liberal Democrat.

Failure to complete SALT II soon, therefore, could blow up the whole treaty in mutual recrimination or, at the very least, put off resumption of meaningful negotiations until 1977. That delay, probably of eighteen to 24 months, could see the continuing arms race destroy the framework for the SALT II treaty which was agreed to at last November's Ford-Brezhnev meeting in Vladivostok; and by 1977 one or both of the leaders who reached that accord may no longer be in office.

...by Nuclear Arms Race

At Vladivostok, agreement was reached to limit the aggregate total of strategic offensive missiles and bombers on each side. What threatens SALT II are two delivery systems that were not discussed at Vladivostok, but have loomed large in the thinking of the military on both sides since then: the new American cruise missile and the new Soviet supersonic, swing-winged jet bomber known as "Backfire."

The issues concerning Backfire—which Moscow insists is a medium rather than a strategic bomber—could be resolved if the Soviet Union will offer adequate assurances that its future numbers and mode of deployment will not comprise a substantial strategic threat to the United States. Soviet training, basing and, above all, aerial refueling capabilities could all be restrained to prove that Backfire's potential use against the United States would be too limited to affect the strategic balance significantly.

American proposals concerning the cruise missile, in contrast, do not provide a basis for negotiation. The cruise missile, a small, subsonic pilotless bomber—which will get its first flight test early next year—can be launched from aircraft and the submerged torpedo tubes of any submarine. It can fly 2,000 miles and land within 30 feet of the target, thanks to on-board computers providing both long-range and terminal guidance.

The American SALT II proposals would place no limits on the deployment of sea- and land-based cruise missiles and would exclude from the Vladivostok ceiling air-launched cruise missiles with ranges under 2,000 miles. This would permit deployment of tens of thousands of nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The Vladivostok ceiling could hardly survive such a deployment. Gone too would be any hope of Soviet restraint in the deployment of its big, new MIRV-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's). With increasing missile accuracy, both sides would ultimately acquire a destabilizing "first-strike" capability against the other's land-based forces.

One way to head off this nightmare would be to halt the development and deployment of long-range cruise missiles through a flight-test ban. Once American flight-testing begins next year, that will become increasingly difficult, a further reason why early conclusion of the SALT II treaty is urgently necessary.

A Soviet commitment to deny Backfire a strategic role and to restrain the rate of deployment of its big MIRV-tipped ICBM's might be exchanged for suspension of American flight-testing of long-range cruise missiles. Other bargains are also conceivable. What is needed is political courage at the top in Moscow and Washington to overrule the military and complete SALT II now before both the opportunity and détente are lost.

["# is under fire; for solutions", "By Dana Adams Schmidt", "Staff correspondent of\nThe Christian Science Monitor", "Washington", "Clouds on the horizon of U.S.-Soviet relations, which have led to the postponement of party leader Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Washington from mid-autumn to early winter, include:", "* SALT. The strategic arms limitation talks have run into complicated differences over limiting \"cruise\" missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber which remain to be worked out.", "* The Middle East. The Soviets see the Israel-Egypt agreement on Sinai as yet another maneuver by the U.S. to squeeze them out of the area.", "* Detente. It is under attack in the U.S. by some, including former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; a former chief of naval operations, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt; and Sen. Henry Jackson (D) of Washington, who is running for the presidential nomination.", "The immediate cause for postponement, which Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger hopes to overcome while Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko is in Washington next month, is SALT.", "The difficulty is that the United States has on the drawing board two kinds of cruise missiles that could be classified as strategic.", "One of these can be fired from a submarine torpedo tube, skimming like a miniature airplane over the water at low altitudes and evading radar detection, to strike distant targets.", "The other is a very long range air-to-surface missile.", "All this raises the familiar question of American and Soviet defense balance. If the United States agrees to limit these cruise missiles what restriction might the Soviets accept in return? Part of the problem is", "★Please turn to Page 13", "By Sven Simon", "visit clouded", "## ★ Why detente is under fire", "Continued from Page 1", "cruise missiles can in principle be converted into long range strategic uses by the medium bomber. But American experience has shown that as a medium bomber, it is possible to use theBackfire, a bomb with a size and range which are as good as a medium bomber.

Charles W. Yost

SALT: ducks vs. dodos

Washington

Almost a year has passed since President Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, meeting at Vladivostok, agreed on ceilings for total numbers of strategic missiles and for missiles containing MIRVs (multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles).

This was a momentous agreement. For the first time it appeared that a limit would be placed on the multiplication of these fearsome weapons containing thermonuclear warheads, any one of which could wipe out millions of human beings in a few minutes.

Unfortunately the agreement at Vladivostok was only a rough draft with all the fine print, so dear to lawyers, bureaucrats, and general staffs, remaining to be filled in. Nevertheless, while some of the points to be negotiated were not easy, it was confidently expected that all would be completed by June or July when Secretary Brezhnev would come to Washington to sign the final agreement.

Now a Brezhnev visit is off entirely for this year. What has happened?

While SALT negotiations are one of the least "open" forms of diplomacy, and the public therefore gets only hints and speculation, it appears that two obstacles have arisen.

The first is that inveterate competitors on both sides, who disliked the Vladivostok agreements from the beginning because they limited the capacity of each to be "second to none," began at once to find flaws in them and to insist that the repair of these flaws be 100 percent leak proof. That of course was practically impossible. Nevertheless, this obstacle seems to have been largely overcome.

The second obstacle proved more serious. Technology, like time and mortality, never stands still. While the diplomats negotiated, the research and development wizards went busily on with their perfection of new and more exotic weapons.

If one is to believe the most credible reports, the two chief weapons which one side or the other now demands be included in SALT are the Soviet "Backfire" bomber and the American "cruise" missile. If these two rabbits can in one way or another be stuffed back into the hat, there are doubtless others waiting to be pulled out.

The chief mistake in this instance was the failure of both sides to decide firmly and finally that the agreements emerging from Vladivostok must be refined and concluded within two or three months, before the next generation of rabbits materialized. Perhaps Secretary of State Henry Kissinger should

have concentrated his shuttle diplomacy here rather than in Sinai.

The more fundamental mistake was and is for all concerned — generals, presidents, and general secretaries — to permit undisciplined technology to lead them blindly into newer refinements of weaponry.

It is high time political and military leaders on both sides began to consider seriously whether their present posture is in fact reinforcing or is undermining national security. The real argument may not be between hawks and doves but between ducks and dodos.

The failure to control the relentless "progress" of military technology means that each side compulsively multiplies the threats not only to the adversaries but to its own national security, because what either side has the other side soon acquires. Since the United States is usually ahead in technology, it is the one that usually develops the new weapon and, unfortunately, deploys it on a large scale rather than seeking agreement to ban it. This is what happened with MIRVs and what threatens to happen with cruise missiles.

The result in each case is in no sense more security but simply a more awesome, versatile, and unstable threat, and of course an astronomically greater financial cost.

Getting back to Vladivostok and SALT II, how long can the U.S. afford to dither and dally? If there is no decision by January, Secretary Brezhnev will be going into his party congress without being able to submit there the proof of the pudding of detente, a strategic arms agreement.

President Ford likewise will be going into his electoral campaign immobilized by the dinosaurs on his right who confuse security with size. Having fired James Schlesinger as Defense Secretary, he may feel he has to lean even further that way to show he is not "weak." Such a posture would probably mean no action until 1977, by which time the military "scientists" would be in full cry after yet a new generation of even less controllable instruments of destruction.

Whatever one may think of detente in other respects, SALT II, not to mention SALT III and IV, is the very heart of national security, worth billions of dollars and perhaps millions of lives. There is no other way home.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

© 1975 Charles W. Yost

CSM

11/13/75

ABM Down...

In the history of the strategic nuclear arms race, there have been only two occasions when massive public resistance has interfered with Pentagon plans. Curiously, both instances have involved so-called "defensive" measures: underground bomb shelters and the anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system.

It is doubtful whether the man in the street in either case ever fully grasped the sophisticated strategic arguments pro and con that raged among civilian and military experts on the theory of nuclear warfare. But there was an almost visceral feeling against taking civilization underground or putting nuclear-armed missiles into urban neighborhoods. Both proposals undoubtedly were also resisted because they suggested preparation for fighting, rather than simply deterring, a nuclear war.

The big shelter program was abandoned quickly, but the ABM program got through the Senate by one vote in 1969—after several changes of mission and rationale—and, at a cost of $5.7 billion, was actually installed at one of twelve projected sites, the one at Grand Forks, N.D. Ultimately, the chief argument used by both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations in gaining Congressional approval was that the American ABM system was an essential “bargaining chip” in inducing the Soviet Union to restrict its ABM system in the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT I).

Disproving this argument remains difficult. But there is ground for skepticism. There is good reason to believe that Soviet scientists and officials were even more impressed by the argument of American scientists that the ABM system would not work effectively and was an enormous waste of money.

Moreover, both in the United States and Moscow, as the debate went forward, there was a growing realization—rejected at first by the Russians, who insisted a “defensive” system favored peace—that the ABM system would have a destabilizing effect on the nuclear balance.

The Soviet Union, in any case, halted deployment of its Moscow ABM system after putting in 67 anti-missile missiles that were obsolete when installed, evidently feeling no need to add further to its bargaining chips during the SALT I talks. Finally, in what was probably the most important arms control agreement reached since Hiroshima, the SALT I treaty in 1972 limited ABM systems on both sides to two sites. Later, a reduction to a one-site limit was agreed.

The Defense Department's decision now, under Congressional pressure, to close down the one/American site at Grand Forks, just as it has become fully operational, brings that era to an end.

JACKSON:

"A fully informed President could not have said, without qualification, as did President Ford on June 25, that the Soviet Union has 'not violated the SALT agreement, not used any loopholes.'"

Even as Dr. Kissinger spoke, the Soviets were continuing to deploy numbers of a new missile, the SS-19. And they were doing so despite the fact that Dr. Kissinger had assured the Congress in 1972 that such a deployment would be regarded as a violation of the agreements. It is not surprising, therefore, that the secretary's statement did little to diminish the controversy surrounding the question of Soviet compliance with the strategic arms agreements.

In the ordinary course of events the American public could rely on the congressional hearing process to resolve such a question. But despite his remarkable claim to have been denied an "opportunity to present the truth," Dr. Kissinger has refused, for more than eight months, to appear before the Senate Arms Control Subcommittee to testify on the concerns about SALT compliance that arose with testimony in February and March from Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby.

The concerns in question have to do with Soviet activity since the SALT I Agreements were signed and the nature of the American response to that activity. Whether the Soviets have "violated" provisions of the agreements is a part, but only a part, of the larger question of whether the purpose and intent of those agreements has been circumvented; and on this issue the weight of the evidence leads to two unhappy conclusions: the Soviets have indeed circumvented the intent of the agreements; and the government of the United States has acquiesced in that circumvention.

In a number of important respects the SALT I agreements are almost impossible to violate. The terms are so ill-defined, the loopholes so numerous, the ambiguities so eminently exploitable that one would have to go out of one's way to "violate" the few precise terms about which a definitive judgment might be made. Only a fool would break down the front door if the back door were left unlocked.

But if one looks at the six or seven areas of Soviet activity that have aroused our concern, it is fair to say that they have, at the very least, found the back door conveniently ajar. The result has been a pattern of Soviet behavior that reflects as much on our lack of good judgment as their lack of good faith.

The outstanding example has to do with a provision in the interim agreement that sought to limit sharply the extent to which the Soviets would be permitted to add to the throw weight, or explosive power, of their missile force. Pyrrhic indeed was the victory. Secretary Kissinger claimed he had won when the Soviets agreed in 1972 that they would not convert launchers for "light" into launchers for "heavy" missiles. For while the Soviets were ready to accept such a provision, they would not agree to a definition of the terms "light" and "heavy."

Determined nevertheless to get an agreement in 1972, the United States offered our own "unilateral" definition of a heavy missile and appended it to the agreement. Moreover, our officials stated clearly that if the Soviets deployed new missiles larger than our definition, we would regard those

missiles as "heavy" whatever the Soviets might consider them to be. I expressed my misgivings to Dr. Kissinger about this unusual formulation at the White House in June, 1972 and was assured that we were adequately safeguarded against the Soviets deploying new "heavy" missiles. After all, putting a cap on the growth of their missile force had been one of our principal negotiating objectives; and the notion that we had succeeded in doing so was the principal Administration argument for accepting the many concessions that we had made in exchange.

The Soviets are proceeding to deploy their SS-19 missiles, nuclear armed rockets that greatly exceed the definition of a "heavy" missile that we solemnly announced to the world in Moscow in 1972.

Whatever happened to the United States' statement —and the Secretary of State's assurances—that we would regard such a deployment as a violation of the agreement? It has been revealed for what it was, and is: a fig leaf in a hurricane.

By acquiescing to the Soviet deployment of SS-19 missiles without a murmur the administration has sent the Soviets an unmistakable message: our own pledges notwithstanding, they are free to circumvent the intent of the agreement to their heart's content so long as they make a graceful entry through the back door. Or perhaps we are to believe that there is still another line, yet to be drawn, beyond which they will not be permitted to go? Against such a background, events in Portugal, in Angola, in the Middle East

and elsewhere in the SALT I agreements become easier to understand.

But is it a violation? Of the letter? Of the spirit? It's both. A violation of our letter and their spirit. And for an agreement that is 90 per cent spirit and 10 per cent letter, we are at least 90 per cent justified in being concerned. A fully informed President could not have said, without qualification, as did President Ford on June 25, that the Soviet Union has "not violated the SALT agreement, not used any loopholes." That statement is false and it matters little how the formal structure of committees, panels, working groups, consultations and briefings is organized, on paper or in fact, if the end result is a President so ill-informed on so important a matter.

The lesson is clear. Any SALT II agreement must be precise. The terms and limitations must be defined. The Soviets must agree to state what weapons they now have and how these and future weapons will be affected by the treaty. There must be no loopholes, no ambiguities; the back door must not again be left ajar. And we must take the time necessary to negotiate an agreement that sets down the letter as well as invoking the spirit of what it is we wish to achieve. We should not have to say again, as Dr. Kissinger said of our ill-fated definition of a heavy missile, that it was "issued by the delegation...the last day of the negotiations, just to finish up the piece of paper."

C-1975, International Dialogue
An occasional series coordinated
by Victor Zorza

Jackson

KISSINGER:

"It is important to understand how the flow of information to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter it can be alleged that information is being kept from the President of the United States."

 Assertions have been made that there have been massive Soviet violations of the SALT agreement; that the Administration colluded with the Soviet Union in masking these violations; that the Administration has not pursued the issue of violations diplomatically; and that senior officials, especially the President, have not been kept informed about the facts with respect to these violations. I will not deal with specific testimony that may have been given except to note that no opportunity was presented to any member of the Administration to present the truth.

Now, first of all, what is meant by a violation? There are several meanings that can be attached to the notion of violation that are being used interchangeably in the current debate. A violation can be a deliberate violation of a SALT limitation, aimed at increasing the Soviet strategic capability in ways which the agreement was intended to proclude.

Second, a violation can be an action inconsistent with the sense of the spirit of the agreement and tending to underrmine its viability even though it is not prohibited by the agreement. There can be borderline situations where a technical violation cannot be established but where the activity strains the interpretation of particular provisions.

There are four institutions to deal with the problem of compliance. There is a special intelligence committee, established by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, which

makes a quarterly report on the problem of SALT compliance.

In addition, there are three other bodies. There is the Verification Panel of the National Security Council (NSC). There is the Verification Panel's Working Group. And there is, of course, the NSC itself.

It is important to understand how the flow of information to the President is handled, because it is a rather grave matter if it can be alleged that information is being kept from the President of the United States.

The President receives daily, unabbreviated and without a covering summary, the President's daily brief and the daily intelligence bulletin of the Central Intelligence Agency. These are placed on his desk together with separate notes from various departments every morning and are waiting for him when he comes to his office. Therefore, any intelligence item that would deal with compliance would come to his immediate attention.

Secondly, any memorandum from a Cabinet member or from the head of an agency is transmitted to the President, usually with a summary by the NSC staff on top of it. But never is the summary alone sent to the President. Therefore any Cabinet member, any member of the Joint Chiefs, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, all have the opportunity, and know they have the opportunity to address the President directly. Never has the assistant to the President held up any memorandum from any of these

individuals, or any other memorandum addressed to the President by the head of an agency.

However, there is no memorandum in the files by any of these individuals, by any chief of staff of any of the services, by any head of any department raising any of the issues that have been alleged in recent testimony.

The reason there have been so few NSC meetings on the subject is because the decisions of the Verification Panel have always been unanimous, and because no member of the panel has ever appealed to the President with a contrary view.

In one instance there were reports of unidentified construction in Soviet missile fields. We received this report on June 20 at a time when Brezhnev was in the United States.

When we approached the Soviet Union within six days of receiving that information in the White House, we were told that these would be command and control silos and that as the construction proceeded it would become increasingly evident that they would be command and control silos. We have since received assurances, and I believe it is the unanimous opinion of all agencies that we are dealing with command and control silos.

The most serious case, which comes closest to the borderline of a possible violation, has to do with the testing of certain antiaircraft radars in what might be considered to be an ABM mode.

We received information that some

testing was going on with respect to the SA-5 radar in 1973. Between April an and June 1974 some more tests took place which raised the problem that the radar might be tracking incoming missiles. That clearly is not permitted by the treaty.

The first decision in December 1974 was, on the recommendation of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, that this issue not be raised because we did not wish to reveal the source of our intelligence.

In January 1975 the Defense Department reversed itself and recommended that the issue be raised. As a result, the issue was raised in February 1975. Since then, within a 17-day period after we had raised the issue, this activity has stopped, has not since been resumed.

There are other issues, some having to do with unilateral American statements which the Soviet Union specifically disavowed. I think it is at least open to question whether the United States can hold the Soviet Union responsible for its own statements when the Soviet Union has asserted that it does not accept that interpretation. Therefore, the issue of SALT compliance has been handled in a serious manner. It stands to reason that no responsible U.S. officials could wish to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and permit the Soviet Union to violate it with impunity. It stands to reason that the United States would not accept noncompliance with an agreement that had any conceivable impact on the strategic equation.