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The two are interdependent, because in the present generation there appears to be a consensus of understanding that progress toward an ideal United States is not likely to be capable of achievement except in a world itself moving (however slowly) towards an ideal state. In both cases, clearly, this ideal picture both of America and of the world is slowly but constantly developing and constantly changing. Presumably the book will never be closed. There is no static conception now, and there is common agreement that the conception should never be static. Each successive phase will open new phases of possibility, of evaluation, of possibility for greater achievement. The "objectives" referred to here are not dogma: they are the present phase of hopeful thinking.

Obviously this "public Consensus" is discernible only in its most general outlines. There is infinite difference and controversy in detail and application. Little in the United States is susceptible of the rigid formulations contained, for example, in the Communist statements, nor in the crystallized formulae which were prevalent in large parts of Europe until the Renaissance and the Reformation. But the consensus is no less real, it is capable of statement in broad outline, and a present statement of it seems essential if the United States is to make itself understood in a world which must at least partially understand her and which she in greater measure than before, must comprehend.

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The Survival of the United States

The United States, like most nations, is resolved to survive as a
national, cultural entity. This self-evident statement is a common ground
which she has with practically every independent nation. It needs restatement
chiefly because the bases of nationalism have changed, are changing, and are
requiring new formulations in world affairs; and incidentally because another
center of polarizing power, the Soviet Union, overtly at least, advocates doc-
trine which (in effect) contemplates that no self-directed nation-state (with
the possible exception of the Soviet Union) shall continue to exist except in
name.

A notable phenomenon of the twentieth century, noted above, has been
the disintegration of the traditional structure of empire and of many nation-
states. The social organization and governmental structure of the United States,
despite the relative youth of the country, is one of the oldest in the world.
The drama of its continuity and strength, in a century of disintegration, has
been heightened by the Communist movement with its claim to universal validity
and its assertion that all structures other than its own are historically fated
to fall in a world-wide revolution.

Survival and the will to survive under substantially present institutions
thus becomes a premise deserving statement.

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# The Development of an Ideal Nation

The United States has continually thought of itself as a country in which individuals and their self-realization were the principal concern of society; but that an individual could only realize himself to the highest by being of service to his kindred, his community and his fellow man. The conception was in origin religious. In early American history, it was Protestant, since historically America in its formative period was a great child of the Reformation. Men, Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, were

> "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

Consensus on this has not changed. Change has occurred in the conceptions of life and what it includes of liberty, and what this implies; and of the pursuit of happiness, and what this means. Enlargement has been steady in these respects and still continues. The objective of achieving an ideal America is still that of maintaining and developing a country in which men and women have more abundant life, greater capacity to use liberty -- which implies growing respect for the rights and liberties of others, and a better equipment, material, intellectual and spiritual to seek happiness. Government exists to forward these needs; its laws, rules and adjustments are constantly subject to criticism and review, and only justified as they do forward these needs.

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Every life thus becomes precious; the totality of the achievements of individuals is the stuff of which America is made and for the present at least will continue to be made.

No dogma of mechanical or social method has ever been crystallized in the United States, nor is there likelihood that it will be crystallized. Such dogma as exists relates to the protection of the dignity and achievements of individuals and to the proposition that government is the servant, not the master, of the governed. Most of this is contained in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of the United States. Even this has never crystallized, the quality of protection has changed and in most respects has been enlarged, decade by decade.

And there has been consensus that the individual justifies himself before his country, his kind and his Creator, as much by what he does for his fellows as for himself. The moral of the seventeenth century Protestant, John Donne,

"No man is an Island, intire of itself; every man is a piece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind ..."

has been consciously or unconsciously a controlling conception for so large a number of Americans that her greatest institutions have been reared on it. The present outline of an ideal America continues to include this conception of interdependence and of a mutual, controlling individual duty between man

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and man as an essential part of American life. It thus is a vital and ineradic-
able element in American society.

Hence the current picture of an ideal nation: a country in which poverty
shall not exist; in which education shall be available as a tool of life and
liberty to everyone who will use it; in which the political state is the servant
and not the master; in which commercial production has as its primary end to
increase the standard of living and range of life-choice of every American,
in which every man may develop to the fullest extent his physical, mental and
moral capacity - in which as he develops he finds fulfillment and joy in sharing
with and assisting according to his capacity his fellow Americans.

This must be emphasized as we approach the problem of foreign
relations. As will appear, this consensus of a free and creative society has
somehow given rise to the greatest tensile strength and on the whole to the
greatest stability of government presently existing in any large society perhaps
in the entire world. Successive attempts have been made by foreign powers
in the past forty years to tear American society to pieces - with almost trivial
results. The Imperial German government endeavored to divide America by
organizing twenty-odd millions of Americans of German blood and ancestry
in 1916 - 1918. The attempt was later repeated by the powerful Nazi propaganda
machine from 1936 on, Fascist Italy made the same attempt at the same time.
From 1928 to the present the Communist movement, based on Soviet Russia,
endeavored to break up the American structure through its doctrine of the

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class-war. These efforts, running through two cataclysmic world wars and one equally cataclysmic economic depression, and backed in some cases by immense amounts of money and skillful organization, yielded no results save to demonstrate the tensile strength of the American synthesis. This is a fact in the international scene of which other nations take note. In large part we believe this tensile strength results precisely from the continuing and developing idealist concept of the United States to which Americans hold. Starting from bare ground, the structure has been achieved within the (historically) short space of about 300 years.

II (c)

The American Picture of an Ideal World

American consensus on the outlines of an ideal world also exists, though it has become accepted only during the twentieth century. Dimly, of course, its basic conceptions and a measure of acceptance was always present in greater or less degree; but the historical record from the second to the sixth decade of the twentieth century appears to have convinced a continuing majority of Americans that no ideal picture of the United States could be realized, -- and indeed that the nation which does exist would be difficult or perhaps impossible to maintain -- save in a framework of world conditions which at least moves towards an ideal picture. Dreams of moralists and idealists

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of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and their hopes of world peace,
world order, world prosperity and world government ceased in the United States
to be merely abstract conceptions from World War I on. They became policy
criteria as well. This happens to correspond with and perhaps is due to,
the growth of a state of affairs, political, military, economic, technical, in
which maintenance of the existing nation and its movement towards its ideal
picture was increasingly difficult in isolation, and probably impossible in any
case unless certain world conditions were present.

The first element in the American picture of an ideal world is that of
peace. Neither the United States nor any other country could be happy or safe
when war occurred.

But peace had to have a content, for peace alone might mean a world
enslaved and held subject by some tyranny or combination of differences. The
American consensus has thus distrusted peace *imposed* irrespective of the
underlying conditions of peoples and human beings; therefore, world peace had
to be worked out under a framework of order which permitted freedom or at any
rate satisfaction to peoples. The conception emerged, and now exists of an
ideal peace organized and maintained through a community of free nations; a
peace of peoples rather than peace maintained by a combination of force, or
even by a "balance of power" which recked little of human worth and dignity.

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Consensus likewise includes in its ideal picture of the world, wide-
spread and growing economic well-being. This is not an end in itself; it is
rather a recognition of the fact that peoples living in perpetual hunger and
misery can not realize themselves and so have little real freedom. Likewise
it is considered that the world will not be permanently at peace unless a
respectable measure of human material needs are adequately met. Again there
is no American dogma as to how this should or can be done in respect of any
given people. There is wide measure of recognition that different people will
work out differing social structures according to their own needs and concepts;
but somehow these must satisfy at least elementary human wants, else any
social structure will not survive, and peace will be interrupted.

Probably the best formulation of this "ideal world" is found in the first
Article of the Charter of the United Nations; this was largely the product of
American thought:

"Article 1. The purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace;

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving inter-
national problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion;"

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III

ENDURING OBJECTIVES IN AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL ACTION

The combination of this vague but forcefully influential ideal of the United States, and of a world permitting its realization, sets up permanent objectives which are the foundation of American foreign policy. So long as the American government is responsive to American public opinion, it must, with greater or less diligence and effectiveness, pursue these objectives or be rejected by American public opinion, and brought once more into line with the American ideal. This is basic. The American ideal itself changes but slowly; short of a change in it, the determinants of American policy can not themselves be changed. A government which fails to act in conformity with these is eventually thrown out by American political process and replaced by one which will.

In result, the United States must necessarily work toward development of a general international order: men can not trade or exchange ideas, let alone realize more subtle aspects of their worth, in a world characterized by disorder, rebellion and war.

International order, like international peace, is not enough by itself; there is order of a kind in a slave plantation or prison; though without order there can not be free minds and free men. Consequently the vague aspirations of the American conscience has been that of an international order based on a

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community of nations achieving the assent and support of sufficient of the
community so that the order maintains itself and rests only incidentally upon
policing or pressure.

As a part of this effort, the United States necessarily has to work

A little
committed
with II-38
to maintain peace, not as an end in itself, but as that state of society which

under ordinary conditions contributes most to the realization of basic human

values. Peace is thus not an abstraction, but the resultant of a number of
elements in balance. Threats to human values imposed by maintaining "peace
at any price" in a given situation must be weighed against those which would

be created by war in the same situation. The American concept of peace,
together with that of the need for order, requires exhaustion of all devices
for maintaining peace before falling back on force as a means of foreign
policy. But it also contemplates use of force when no alternative method exists
for preserving human values and international order in the longer run.

This statement of objectives poses the issue between the American
concept polarized by the United States and the Communist concept as posed
by the leaders of the Soviet Union. Both seek international "order"; but the
bases of that order differ. The American concept seeks order for the purpose
of realizing human dignity and the nature of man providing possibility for doing
so. Under it, if ever humanism is sacrificed to method,--the end justifies the
means-- the humanist end is obliterated and only the inhuman means -- the
power machine -- remains. This Americans consider a universal value and

Eden 9
understand. I am sure we gained this in translation

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consequently international order which must ride rough-shod over human per-
sonality, maintained by oppressive force, is not "peace."

The Soviet theory likewise claims that its ultimate objective is a
humanist order but that during the process of transformation unlimited sacrifice
of humanist values may and must be made. This is, in effect, frank denial
of humanism.

"Marxism-Leninism is in principle against
petty-bourgeois humanism, which operates
under the slogan of defense of an abstract
human being and humanity in general."

(Kommunist - No. 5 1957)

It postpones the dignity of man and the humanist way of life until some distant
Nirvana occurs when the Communist state has withered away.

It is possible that the brutal Communist picture of a world in which
ends justify means, in which no life is valuable, in which order any where
may be wrecked for the purpose of permitting expansion of the Soviet system,
may not survive another generation. The famous "Poem for Adults" was
published by Adam Wazyk in Warsaw's "New Culture", August 19, 1955

(New Leader October 1957):

"We make demands on this earth,
for the people who are overworked,
for keys to open doors,
for rooms with windows,
for walls which do not rot,
for hatred of little documents,
for holy human time,
for safe homecoming,
for a simple distinction between words and deeds.

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We make demands on this earth,
for which we did not throw dice,
for which a million perished in battle;
for a clear truth,
for the bread of freedom
for burning reason,
for burning reason.

We demand these every day,
We demand through the Party."

Clearly it is questionable whether the Communist world will approach the vague but forceful American picture, though she claims a universal value of humanism.

A short-hand attempt to summarize the American objectives was made during World War II under the title "Four Freedoms": Freedom from Fear; Freedom from Want; Freedom of Information; Religious Freedom. They became for a time the battle cry of most of the world. Fundamentally that statement is still valid.

The objectives described are global in the sense that they are the objectives of the United States to be sought generally throughout the world. They are global in two other senses. In their emphasis on order as an instrument to forward the dignity of man, they are thought to reflect the aspirations of men everywhere and are consistent with them, and in most cases they cannot be realized unilaterally but require the cooperative effort of others. Also, some of the forces imposing cooperation with other peoples are elements of the world revolution observable today -- disintegration of the old bases of international order, the revolution of "rising expectations," and technological change. Some of the consequences of these forces should be traced in greater detail.

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International order of some sort, as noted, is essential to the achievement of the fundamental objectives of the United States. Yet the national purposes of the United States would hardly permit it to impose that order by naked fiat, even if it had power to do so. It must therefore, seek consensual basis for that order; that is, an international consensus upon certain common principles, and this will involve cooperative arrangements toward this end.

Similarly if the "revolution of rising expectations" is to be met, there will have to be far greater production and exchange of goods, services and ideas and far greater certainty that this exchange will be uninterrupted than now exists. The factors entering into this wider exchange are not fully worked out, but they too will require a variety of cooperative efforts. Among these are included

(a) A general access to raw materials and sources of energy on terms which do not admit of exploitation by either the landlord or the consumer.

(Exploitation by manufacturing countries of the exporter of raw materials has become a recognized stereotype; the possibility of the exploited consumer, though not so well understood, is just as important to be avoided.)

(b) The adequate development of autonomous techniques of economic organization. It may be through such development that the problem of fair exchange referred to above may be dealt with. Considerable advances have been made along these lines within Europe.

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(c) Guaranteed freedom of essential transport by sea, air, and certain international highways and waterways. This, of course, is related closely to both of the two previous factors.

(d) Uninterrupted communication, with opportunities for all people to participate. (Note: the points on page 16 should ultimately be edited to correspond to the "Conclusions on Policy" at the end of the report. These pages like the conclusions should be re-edited after consultation.)

Although technological change offers possibilities of meeting the "revolution of rising expectations," it requires an order beyond and above that of separate nation states to do so. Under today's conditions productive economic relations clearly require a variety of international arrangements in order to attain complete utility. Even the United States is not self-sufficient in raw materials; it sells about 10% of its agricultural production abroad; it is deeply committed to international trade. This situation is far more true for countries less fortunate than the United States in area and economic resources.

An important force making for a common minimum of objectives among peoples and for cooperative efforts among them is the technical imperative for concerted measures in certain activities which can safeguard and enrich mankind. For example, allocation of wave lengths for radio broadcasting, essential if airwaves are to be used at all, has been achieved through international agreements, which (despite some law-breaking such as "jamming") on the whole have stood up fairly well through the years. These technical necessities

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already run through a wide and increasing range of matters which have not
yet been fully dealt with by international or supra-national action -- for
example, diseases of men, and of the animals and crops on which they de-
pend, safety on the sea and in the air; problems arising from nuclear energy.

This last group of problems is currently before the public in a distorted
form. Most public discussion is concerned with the effects of testing hydro-
gen bombs. It has not concerned itself with dangers connected with the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, for example, disposal of radioactive wastes,
or hazards which would be created if a nuclear power plant got out of control
and "ran away." There are differences of opinion among informed observers
concerning dangers inherent in tests of nuclear weapons at the present level;
but they are all extremely concerned with the problems arising from the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy in populated areas. The nature of these problems
requires for solution some sort of international control. American objectives
in the field of international economy thus are rather more specific than vague
hopes of world prosperity. Also growing pressure of affairs is forcing their
crystallization. Survival of the United States, for example, requires a situ-
ation in which she has access to materials and products not found within
her own borders. Even more important, conditions outside the United States
should be such that no nation or group of nations shall feel that they cannot
survive without seizing the resources of productivity of another country. The
dynamic factors in American population growth will intensify this factor as

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years go by. Taken in connection with the determination to preserve American
values and with the realization that conditions and cultures differ in various
regions, the task of working toward international order is at once essential
and immense. To achieve a tolerable result assumes an immense amount of
sub-structure which can only be achieved internationally. There has to be
the right to exchange, by trade or otherwise. There has to be safe transport.
There has to be absence of interruption of the world highways. There has to
be viability, and little reproach for its fairness, in the processes of finance
and monetary exchange. There have to be minimum norms of conduct for
vast regions, and eventually over the entire civilized world. There has to be
continuing technical communication and cross-fertilization which increases
production adequate to meet the needs caused by increase in population, and
in addition which permits satisfying the "rising expectations" of the peoples
of a great part of the world whose more elementary wants have not yet been
met. There has to be at least a minimal protection from national hazards,
diseases, nuclear fall-out and allied dangers. There have to be common and
cooperative measures by which planes and ships can leave, travel, make port
in safety and regularity.

And there has to be that degree of financial organization which permits
trade or exchange to continue and expand -- this last, a problem for which the
United States in common with the rest of the world is groping for a solution.

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Whether as primary objective or as by-product, American policy has
always envisioned the hope of a world in which armament is limited and the
economic waste of it as well as the dangers inherent in armament, are reduced
to a minimum.

As an objective and possibly even as an end in itself, there is the
enduring American concept of free cultural access to all parts of the world.
Many motives enter into this peculiarly emphatic continuing American desire.
Some are negative: they stem from the feeling that enforced ignorance about
any country, people or part of the world is inherently dangerous, and a threat
to peace. More of them are positive. To be complete, a man should know
a good deal about the world in which he is born and in which he lives and
whose most distant activities affect him. We have discovered that cultures,
including our own, are richer when they are constantly fertilized by ideas
and experiences originating elsewhere: equally, possibility of our contribution
is lessened by ideas and information which cannot be transmitted. At base is
a solid realization that, to the extent that knowledge and information is denied
any individual, the "freedom" of that individual is correspondingly constricted.
Steady establishment and enlargement of channels of communication widening
cultural exchange has been one determinant of American policy practically from
the beginning of the history of the United States.

IV
<u>American Capabilities</u>

What are the capabilities of the United States for moving in the di-
rection of these objectives?

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Capabilities begin with those of the United States as a nation; these
can be mobilized by national action.

They are multiplied by a co-efficient: the ability of the United States
as a nation to induce common or cooperative action outside American boundaries

The national capabilities of the United States (like all capabilities) fall
into two classes: the potential and the developed capabilities. We must deal
primarily with the latter. Both in World War I and in World War II the developed
capabilities, economic as well as military, were vastly increased, just as the
capabilities of the Soviet Union under stress of revolutionary urge, were in-
creased to enormous range. Unquestionably under stress of emotional con-
viction, the United States could develop immensely greater capabilities than
she ordinarily disposes of -- perhaps greater than those she has ever disposed
of. But the interest of the United States is chiefly individual and internal: she
will not, as a rule, convert herself into a nation of world-conquering mission-
aries or propagandists or even (primarily) into a world economic agency save
under pressure of great emergency, or under the drive of some philosophical or
religious motivation, which rarely occurs. (One of the significant facts in
American history is that, as perhaps the first great modern experiment in
republican democracy, she did not undertake to carry her new form of organiza-
tion to other countries. This is in great contrast to the drive of the French Revo-
lution to stimulate similar revolutions elsewhere in the world, and of Communist
Russia to bring about acceptance of her dogma on a world-wide scale.) In the

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main, though it has potential capability for doing both, the United States has
rather consciously refused either to attempt creation of an empire, or to prose-
lyte.

Renunciation of empire and unwillingness to assume the classic
"missions" which the imperial systems claimed to fulfill does not nevertheless
discharge the United States from its obligation. As noted, it is the polarizing
force irrespective of its desire. Its developed capabilities are already so
great, and enter so deeply into the stratum of life of other countries, that they
cannot be safely cut down. Exercise of leadership is therefore not matter of
choice: it cannot be avoided. The task is to use it for the achievement of
American objectives, and this is likely to mean the increase of developed
American capabilities for that purpose.

Primarily, then, we are estimating the capabilities which America has
readily at hand, plus the accretion capable of being mobilized (save in emer-
gency) without undue interruption of, or burden upon, her ordinary domestic
life, or sacrifice of her constitutive values.

IV (a)

The Tensile Strength of American Internal Life

Though not ordinarily reckoned as a "capability" in foreign affairs, the
relative invulnerability of the American governmental and social structure must
be reckoned an asset.

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For one thing, this influences the policy and actions of all foreign countries in any situation in which the United States is a factor. With the possible exception of the more fanatical Communists, the assumption is general that the United States as a governmental, social and economic entity cannot be seriously upset by anything short of huge-scale military action. Even Communist enemies of the United States place their hope in the theory that American capitalism will eventually involve itself (and with it the structure of the United States) in a self-destroying crisis; but the more competent Soviet economists (notably Varga) have come to doubt this. In the community of nations foreign countries may be hostile to the United States; or they may seek detachment ("neutrality") with respect to it. Or they may seek cooperation. But nobody expects the United States to change fundamentally, and certainly nobody expects her to break up, except perhaps as a result of a wholly cataclysmic nuclear war. This is an element of stability in a turbulent world-scene.

Probably no other country in the world (with the possible exception of Great Britain and the English-speaking members of the British Commonwealth; perhaps Scandinavia) commands this acceptance, though because of their comparatively weaker military position, they conceivably might (if parted from the American sphere) be dealt with through war without incurring staggering risks involved in war with the United States.

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IV (b)

Economic Capabilities

The overall productive capacity of the United States -- in manufacturing, America with six percent of the population produces about 45% of all world manufacture -- has become a commonplace in international discussion. Deployment of this capability, however, can be effective in a number of ways.

(a) America as Buyer

Probably the greatest single capability is that least realized in America itself: the power to influence events because of the fact that the United States can buy a great range of products; and because her productivity is great enough and varied enough so that the seller can command a great range of products needed or desired by him. Access to the American market is a highly desired prize for great areas of the earth.

The United States has rarely made use of market access as a tool in international relations as, for example, the Nazis did prior to World War II and as the Soviet Union is doing today. In minor aspects (purchase of copper from Chile, prorating access to the American market among the sugar producing countries), American policy has from time to time used this capability as a means of relieving the economy of other countries, and occasionally of stabilizing political situations. In peacetime as a rule, however, the buying power of the United States has not been used as an instrument of policy, and she has thus far rejected it in principle.

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(b) America as Relief Agency

The productivity of the United States does permit the United States to give away, in one form or another, and on a non-commercial basis, limited but substantial portions of its output. At the close of World War II it undertook to do this on a substantial scale; perhaps the first time in history that any country has ever adopted such a policy. This was frankly international welfare work and intended to be such. Its original rationale was an attempt to repair part of the damage caused by war in various parts of the world and directly to relieve some degree of human misery caused by conditions caused by war, and assumed to be temporary.

To this the "Marshall Plan" theory was presently added a second conception: American resources, freely given, could be used to assist certain peoples, especially in underdeveloped areas, seeking to establish themselves and their institutions on a somewhat higher base than that which prevailed before. This conception has not been well worked out. There are questions as to how it can be done and indeed whether it can be done at all, though good temporary use of the method has been made in certain situations, as for instance, that of contemporary Bolivia, Southern Korea, Vietnam. The sheer novelty of the experience necessarily entailed the gradual understanding of the profound problems involved in such a method. Commercial exchange, exported capital, or direct assistance to a military ally had occurred in history as had occasional grants of relief to countries going through disaster. (The

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famine relief given to Soviet Russia through the Hoover Mission is a famous example.) But almost no precedent exists for a nation consciously endeavoring to present resources to others for the purpose of building and perhaps reorganizing their basic economy. Some of the problems appear which are presented by private philanthropy and which themselves have not been fully solved. The striking fact is that for perhaps the first time a nation has appeared with the resources and capacity, and also the willingness to make available, freely, some parts of its resources to assist other peoples and nations in self-development, and to wrestle with the psychological, philosophical and economic enigmas involved in the process. A new capability in international affairs has thus been uncovered.

The United States has no monopoly on this capability: Great Britain has it in less degree and has used it in one form or another; but in actual and potential mass and weight, the American capability is vastly greater. Its usefulness and extent depends, however, as much on intellectual as on economic capacity: more is involved than making credits available or agreeing to supply certain bodies of material.

(c) America as Capital Exporter

Again, because of its productivity, the United States has the capacity for exporting capital.

Capital can be exported as a gift, as frank international generosity.

But such export is nomially carried on as a matter of international "investment."

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In some degree the United States is economically able to lay down capital goods, or money with which capital goods can be bought, and thus assist in providing other countries with a portion of the capital equipment needed by them to maintain their population or to increase their own productivity, without demanding repayment. The difference between generosity and "investment" is chiefly that, in the first case, no return is required or expected, and responsibility for the handling of the ensuing capital development is chiefly in the hands of the governments of the giving and receiving nations.

The conventional requirement of interest or of profit on loans, commercial or governmental, engages part of the foreign profit created to return to the United States; and the objects and handling of the capital are principally determined by the investing group.

Both of these are great instruments for affecting events. Unfortunately, relatively little is known about the use of foreign capital, received either as gift or as loan. The ability of a country to make modern use of capital, either "given away" or lent, assumes a high degree of industrial development.

Further, use of capital by any foreign people is in substantial measure a resultant of its own culture and cultural process. Capital is used by a people in terms of processes and operations which that people understands; it cannot merely be transplanted. Three successive American attempts have been made to use capital in the development of Haiti. Two of them left little more than monuments to the fact that those particular American -type capital developments

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were meaningless to a Haitian society. There is evidence to suggest that, had
the United States furnished the High Dam for General Nasser, the result might
have been equally unimpressive.

Yet there are unquestionably situations in which transfer of capital to
other countries has been fertile and productive, *provided* there has existed
adequate understanding of the social process, methods and needs of the re-
cipient people. Capital development must fit their culture, not ours; it must
correspond to (or provide) a degree of technical education and of social disci-
pline, capable of effecting and maintaining the resultant construction and
making it useful.

Capital export as private investment has one distinct advantage in
this respect. The American private investor wishing to put capital to work
abroad and to reap a return spends immense amount of time studying the
probable result, which will be achieved, the actual wants or needs to be
met and the technique of conducting the operation so that it will produce,
distribute, and pay out. This is another and rather crude way of saying that
the private investor has a powerful motive for doing a more thorough job
than governments of investigating conditions and meeting them, and of running
the operation well. A disadvantage is that private capital thereupon enters
the social and cultural system of the country of investment, confronting it
with foreigners and foreign influence so that in absence of a high degree of ad-
justment, the recipient country may react in fear or hostility. A further

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disadvantage lies in the fact that, in a disturbed international situation, private capital rarely is willing to take a high degree of risk -- that is, to go abroad at all. Or perhaps to expend a great deal of time on a problem despite the urgent necessity of the country seeking capital where risk is high or profit moderate. Every effort was made to induce American private capital to develop a steel industry in Brazil, without success; the United States government eventually invested the capital and the enterprise, in Brazilian terms, has been extremely successful.

The United States government has never fairly undertaken adequately to estimate its capacity for capital export, or to plan its foreign capital operations, or to integrate the capital investments it was prepared to carry on through government, with capital export operations carried on by private investors.

It is at least possible that capital available for export by the United States in the next period of years will be rather less than that which was available, or apparently so, during the previous decade. The Marxian conception that capital would accumulate in certain countries and then would force its way into foreign markets by war, if need be, is being decisively contradicted by the fact: the American increase in productivity and standard of living and in population is apparently likely to demand much more capital than had been expected. It is thus becoming problematic whether there will be a great deal of American capital available for export save where the

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investment is directly integrated with an internal American need. Even so, the American capability in this field is considerable, and greater than that of any other country, and its efficacy can unquestionably be enhanced by effective and systematic use. Probably new methods and new vehicles will be needed; again, brains are as essential as money.

(d) <u>American Export of Technical Processes</u>

The United States has a capability, (though perhaps less than popu-
larly supposed), to export American technology. A major limiting factor is
the surprisingly small number of Americans who are skilled in dealing with
other cultures than their own. A technological process, to be meaningful
in another country, must be intergrated into that country's own cultural dy-
namics. Some countries (for example, Japan) are extremely skilled in adapt-
ing foreign technological knowledge to their own system; but this is on the
whole exceptional. In other countries there is no reservoir of men trained
to grasp and adapt technical process. In general the United States produces
surprisingly few men equipped to communicate technology meaningfully to
other countries.

Communication indeed requires at the outset a sound judgment of
the respective capacity of the recipient country. It is ridiculous, for example,
to transmit the machine methods of agriculture to populations who have not yet
learned to work with the more highly developed hand tools. Equally there is
danger in under-estimating the capability of a population. Areas which handle

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their local problems on a barter basis find difficulty in dealing with develop-
ments, such as electric power, whose product must be currently paid for in
cash. Arnold Toynbee's generalization that the integration of capital methods
from one culture to another draws after it much of the culture from which the
capital came has proved sound. Transfer capital, where it is not made to a
cultural base able to use that capital, must be accompanied by the business
of building a sufficient base. Some countries desiring to import capital know
that this is implied and desire to develop the necessary base. But others
would like the result of the process without the substratum of habits and
customs without which the capital cannot usefully be employed. Many cultures
are now experiencing the early phases of the nineteenth century industrial
revolution: both in Chile and in Brazil there are steel and electrical industries,
as is the case in India, and as was the case in the Soviet Union which im-
ported technicians on a large scale in the decade from 1920 to 1930. Tech-
nical "know-how" and its handling is unquestionably a part of the capability
of the United States in foreign matters; but it can be over-rated.

IV (c)

Intellectual Capabilities

The capacity of the United States to influence events by communicating
her intellectual product in all fields is probably greater and also more thorough:
misunderstood, than any other single capacity. There has been almost

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insatiable world-wide desire to know what the United States was writing, thinking and doing. In part this is a tribute to American stability and American power. Surprisingly, the interest is probably greater at the moment in the countries bordering on the Soviet Union than perhaps anywhere else. This is true despite the fact that the more organized attempts to "sell America" through information programs and the like have no easily demonstrable results: some even doubt whether they have had great success. Yet throughout the world, Soviet Russia included, there appears to be a general feeling that the United States somehow has the secret of something, and that it might be discovered by closer contact with American intellectual life.

The communication which has taken place and does take place is rendered difficult by reason of the fact that America has little crystallized dogma and wants none; and that few attempts are made to generalize American philosophical, political and economic theory. A Communist can tell you what the Soviet Union is all about and lay down a shelf full of books which explain it. A pluralist system like the United States attempts no explanation; the completest showing we can make is the content of our statistics (in this field the United States probably is ahead of most of the world). But in the field of intellectual life, the United States can only offer a congeries of books and other intellectual output, reflecting no clear overriding philosophical pattern. The United States cannot (under its theory of government) "organize" an intellectual product, either for internal purposes or for purposes of export. Yet, over the years it is probable steady communication of American thought will prove

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to be one of the greatest, if not the greatest, of American resources. Just
as internally the result has been to create a political and economic structure
of great tensile strength, so externally American thought tends to create an
atmosphere of great gravitational attraction. Not the least of this attraction
lies in the fact that American intellectual life tends to seek and rapidly recog-
nize intellectual achievement abroad; the foreigner, as he increasingly finds
his ideas welcomed here, increasingly seeks to find common ground and
foothold in the unorganized, undisciplined but, on the whole, hospitable
American intellectual world. To have been cut off from Western intellectual
life, and peculiarly American intellectual life, was a major cause of the
Polish and also of the Hungarian revolution last year. Ambassador Bowles
has testified to the intense interest in American intellectual life within the
Soviet Union; the cases of Latin America and of Japan are, of course, common-
place.

IV (d)

Military Capabilities

The military potential of the United States is elsewhere reported on.
It may be estimated as roughly equal to that of the Soviet Union; probably
somewhat greater, because of America's vastly greater economic development.
The excess of American productivity over the Russian is balanced in part by
the higher non-military internal needs of the United States; these are not

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merely required to maintain the American standard of living, but are also
themselves part of the economic process (for example, labor requires auto-
mobiles and gasoline to get to its jobs). Possibly also the American econ-
omy is physically more highly vulnerable to attack than the relatively de-
centralized and sparsely flung Russian plants; this, however, is only a
guess.

Potential is one thing; readily available military power is another.
Neither for offense nor defense has the United States made any attempt to
bring its presently available military power anywhere near its potential.
Probably it should not do so. There is, probably, a substantial balance be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States in terms of modern capacity,
and a fair chance that the United States is slightly ahead for the time being
in that respect. Again, no one really knows.

What the United States does not possess, apparently, is readily avail-
able striking power for small-scale action. This is in part due to the fact
that there is no well crystallized military strategy for handling "local"
situations. The United States does not possess any military weapon compara-
ble to the British nineteenth century naval technique for controlling or dealing
with localized situations. Nor, probably, can such technique be developed
in the absence of an overwhelming American superiority in the field of massive
bombing. The British "small wars" of the nineteenth century were possible
largely because, having overwhelming naval preponderance, she could prevent

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intervention by any other power save where geography permitted the latter
to deploy large bodies of troops on land. At the moment, the United States
has no comparable capacity to prevent another power, say the Soviet Union
or, in certain areas China, from intervening directly or indirectly save by
threatening massive retaliation, with the unlimited risk which that implies.
Equally, the United States, despite its obvious power, is not so overwhelm-
ingly superior in massive bombing capacity that she could necessarily in-
hibit intervention by others by direct threat.

Nor, technically, has any means been developed by which the United
States could "defend" any territory outside her own borders. (This is a
crucial point in alliance policy.) What she can do is to counter-attack, and
thereby put an aggressor in great hazard. But this is not the same as being
able to keep an enemy from destroying a particular area. If, for example,
the Soviet Union were to threaten an attack against Great Britain, there is
no present way by which the United States could prevent almost unlimited
havoc there. She could merely take a fearful revenge and, perhaps, win
the ensuing war. There is no uniformity of opinion among experts as to the
result of using "little" atomic weapons in local actions. The only conclusion
is that, at the present juncture of affairs, either attacking or defending in-
volves commitment to risks of unpredictable proportion.

The conclusion must be that the chief present value of American mili-
tary capabilities is negative rather than positive: the existence of her capability,

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as things now stand, tends to inhibit action by the only other power capable of challenging where such action involves risk of general war. On the other hand, in General Maxwell Taylor's words, the existence of such a situation means that the United States, and probably the Soviet Union, as well, will "accept" provocation without going to war which in earlier days neither would permit.

This forces consideration of what is in fact a military capability though not usually so regarded -- "para-military" operations. These at bottom consist in organizing and arming of segments of local populations in other countries for the purpose of enabling them to control the government and resources of such countries. In this form of operation, the Soviet Union and China are obviously far better equipped than the United States in most areas. Creation, in many parts of the world of Communist political organization, accompanied by secret or open supply of Soviet-controlled arms, technicians and guerilla leaders represent a military capacity presently available to the Communist world for which the United States has no adequate counterpart.

The American response has been an attempt to extend her own military capabilities by overt political-military alliances, in which the arms and armed forces of other nations are coordinated with our own. For defensive purposes a high degree of coordination between American armed forces and the armed forces of the other countries of the Western Hemisphere (Treaty of Rio de Janeiro; Canadian-American Defense Treaty) already exists. For defense

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and if need be for striking purposes, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization extending from Turkey to Norway is designed to set up a like coordination. Less directly, support by the United States of the Bagdad Pact countries and supply of arms to them is designed to accomplish such an end. So also do various arrangements in the Far East. Obviously these arrangements are just as valid (and no more) as the conviction among the associates that they must all act together, and their willingness in time of crisis or necessity to do so.

The history of alliances makes it sufficiently clear that too great reliance cannot be placed upon such arrangements where the survival of a component nation cannot be assured. Equally, whether the para-military arrangements worked out in the Communist regime have any greater tensile strength is, of course, questionable. *Prima facie* they would seem to be subject to much the same weakness. The Korean War ended in a stalemate with North Korea holding substantially the area with which she began; but the North Korean state had virtually ceased to exist, becoming (in substance) a province of Communist China. Because the Communist para-military organizations have frequently not been based heavily on nationalism but rather on the spread of Communist dogma, the fact that the "nation" (North Korea, Syria, Indochina or Laos) may not survive, may be less influential in determining action by para-military Communist organizations in those countries. On the other hand, the factor of national loyalty in most areas has a higher "determinative" value; this has proved the case in the Iron Curtain countries and may prove true in the Near East.

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American humanitarianism places the United States at some disad-
vantage in dealing with a system not highly affected by that motive. The
objective of the United States involves not merely her own survival but the
survival of all countries. Dogmatic Leninist Communism would be much
more prepared to sacrifice the entire population of an associated nation --
possibly even a substantial part of its own population -- if its leaders con-
sidered that the result would be to extend the true faith as they see it.
The purely military burden on any group directed by the United States is
thus greater. On the other hand, both Russian-led and Chinese-led Com-
munism is likely to be weakened over the long-run by the willingness of the
central unit to sacrifice other people's lives. Few people are so fanatic
in their devotion to Communist principles that they accept, philosophically,
the possibility of being sacrificed _in toto_ to Communist ends. This may ac-
count in part for the tendency of the Communist group of nations to break;
in any event, it is a subtraction from the ability of either the Soviet Union
or China to increase their own military potential by inducing other peoples
to act in common with them.

In summary, American military capability is great and its potential far
greater. Both have been multiplied up to now by a substantial degree of
ability to induce common action by other governments. The tensile strength
of the areas or groups thus acting or purporting to act together as a military
unit is untested and open to some question. Clearly, American military

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capability (thus multiplied by a factor of assent to common action outside
the United States) is not a "thing in itself": it is a result, both at home and
abroad of a synthesis of ideas and a community of objectives. Men do not
risk the lives of themselves and their families, and the existence of their
countries merely for an "alliance," but rather from deep conviction as to
what makes life worth living. The present problem appears to be to give to
the entire free world a tensile strength comparable to that which the United
States had developed, and to add, as opportunity permits, an increasing
number of peoples to the free world organism.

Judged by current result, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States
has recently made great headway under present conditions. The current test
of the para-military capability of the Soviet Union is probably going forward
in the Middle East now, just as the current test of Chinese para-military
capacity is going on from Malaya to Indonesia and the Far East. Translating
American military capability to para-military tactical force to meet these
tests is one great and unsolved current problem. But this in turn results from
another unsolved problem -- that of attaining a firm consensus with the other
peoples of the free world on values which must be defended to the end.

American objectives are themselves one of the sources of American
capacity in a world of conflict. From them in part is derived the dynamic
force-in-being which is the United States. From them also are derived certain
enduring American objectives in international action. These in turn develop

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American capabilities for international action, economic, intellectual and military. Leadership within the United States, and of the United States on the world scene, can enhance these capabilities.

All of them underline the necessity of wisdom to know, resolution to do, and skill to work out the problems, great and small, of American foreign policy. Unquestionably America has unrivalled potential for moving towards her great objectives. Skill in finding ways and means, in a world groping for new ways and new means as presently will appear, is perhaps a major necessity.

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# CHAPTER III

## TWENTIETH CENTURY REALIGNMENTS IN POWER AND PRODUCTION: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHIC GROUPINGS OF NATIONS

### I

#### Introductory

A result of the deep currents noted in Chapter I, and of the dynamism of the United States noted in Chapter II, and of the polarization exercised by the Soviet Union, has been a remarkable change in the norms of international action. At base, these are probably reactions to the inadequacy of the nation-state unit as a tool for meeting twentieth century necessities. The product has been a series of groupings under various forms and arrangements, dealing with subject matter never before dealt with in modern history.

Until the close of World War II, nations were grouped chiefly by simple geographic constraint or alliances of states. Primarily they were brought together under and into their respective empires, their grouping having been usually compelled by military force or through colonial extension. (The exception was the Western hemisphere with its odd, tenuously held feeling for a Western "community of nations.")

Empires themselves allied for common purposes; the combinations were primarily military, for defense or offense, or both. The Triple Entente (Great Britain, France, Imperial Russia) came into existence to balance the Triple

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Alliance (Imperial Germany, Imperial Austria, Royalist Italy). For practical purposes, each group of empires was able to draw or constrain smaller empires into its general grouping as Germany coerced Turkey into its orbit, or as the natural forces and geography of diplomacy and pressure brought Belgium and Portugal into the British-French sphere; and so forth. The world dealt with and through these units, empires or nation-states, on a flat national plane.

Half a century later the situation has become vastly more complex.

True, nation-states still group together: the Organization of American States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and the Bagdad Pact countries represent such groups. The Soviet Union has purportedly worked out such a group through the Warsaw Pact, though in this case it is not easy to distinguish between the resulting organism and straight old-style empire. Even the Soviet Union has to feel for grouping outside her strictly imperial sphere: in 1956 she made and continues to make an attempt to set up a "community" of Communist nations which would include Yugoslavia and presumably China.

I - (a)

New Bases of Grouping

Many twentieth-century arrangements of nation-states have the appearance of the old nineteenth century nation-state alliance: groups. Analysis

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shows that many of them have other bases as well; also, that quite different
kinds of groups are in formation. Nation-states in a sense are beginning to
slice themselves into functional segments. A grouping for defense (for
example, NATO) does not preclude a slicing off by component states of speci-
fied economic functions (say production of coal and steel) and forming from
the slices a grouping which does not engage the entire nation-state but merely
specific functions of it.

President Eisenhower proposed exactly such a grouping when he advo-
cated a "community" for expansion of peaceful atomic development, whereupon
Europe worked up the project of Euratom. These are merely later developments
of earlier and cruder attempts to accomplish like objectives. The wheat
agreement, the sugar quota agreements, and so forth, are examples. France
or Germany may thus be members of NATO: a nation-state defense grouping.
Segments of them (their coal production, their steel production, and so forth)
find their way into the coal and steel "community" with its capital at Luxem-
bourg, carrying on functions which formerly were reserved to the sovereignties
of states. Persistent pressure exists for the creation of regional currency
unions involving the grant to some non-nation-state authority of control over
banking and credit; and so forth. It is clear that we are entering a phase in
which the nation-state is no longer the sole possible unit. Even more remark-
able, we are entering a phase in which all the attributes of a nation-state

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corporation nor the countries involved can really accept the breakdown of the
system.

The three principal American copper companies, for example, hold
much the same position in respect to copper production in South America
(notably Chile and Peru); the United Fruit Company is in that position in
Central America and much of the Caribbean area. British-controlled copper
companies have a similar relation to parts of Africa. On the continent of
Europe (where the problem is acute because of the multiplicity of nation-states,
their small area, their relatively small markets, and their relative poverty
of natural resource), the great manufacturing companies have been forced into
international groupings, usually by way of cartel arrangements.

Vivid arguments have been made that these arrangements should not
have come into existence; that the sole motive is that of making maximum
profit; that the system is imperialist as well as money-grabbing, and so forth.
There is some historical basis for many of these charges. Yet the fact also
is that no one has yet been able to work out any other solution -- unless the
Coal and Steel Community and Euratom may be said to offer a substitute. Of
many complaints which have been made with or without justification, one has
not and cannot be made: it cannot be said the system of private groupings
through corporations or cartels did not work. It did work. Complaint (other
than by theorists) is commonly directed not to whether these organisms should
exist, but rather to the quality of the performance they have turned in --
everything considered.

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II

## Regional Groups for Defense

Geographic regional grouping of sovereign states is still the primary and most familiar form of international cooperation. Analysis indicates, first, that the controlling reason for their existence has been military and, second, where there is a different reason (usually economic) the regional groupings are smaller.

Under the charter of the United Nations, recognition is given by Articles 51 and 52 to

"the inherent right of *** collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to obtain international peace and security."

and to acceptance of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with

"such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements and agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations."

The Security Council of the United Nations has as yet developed no adequate, reliable method for maintaining international peace and security, though it has worked out measures in certain cases. The field is therefore clear for "grouping for collective self-defense." Under this legal sanction a long series of such treaties have come into existence. Among them are:

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**In the Western Hemisphere:** The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro (international treaty of reciprocal assistance September 2, 1947) binding all of the American countries other than Canada to maintain peace within the American hemisphere for collective defense in the event of attack from outside. This is supplemented by joint Canadian-American defense understanding which substantially completes the Western Hemisphere defense group.

**In the North Atlantic area:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Washington, September 4, 1949), includes in a single group the United States and Canada in North America and Iceland and Great Britain in the Atlantic; Belgium, Denmark and France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Greece and Turkey in the European (and in the case of Turkey, part of the Asian) mainland.

In Europe also is a smaller group under the hegemony of the Soviet Union, the so-called Warsaw Pact which includes besides the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, and East Germany.

**In the Near East:** Here there is a grouping with which also Great Britain is allied -- the so-called Bagdad Pact (the Treaty of Bagdad, November, 1955), consisting of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, of which Great Britain is a member.

Overlapping this, **in the Near East** is the so-called "Arab League" (the Pact of the League of the Arab States, Cairo, 1945) consisting of Syria,

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Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Lebanon, Yemen, Libya and Sudan.

Its purpose is to maintain peace within its group and rather hazily to arrange for common defense in case of need.

**In the Far East:** Here there is the so-called "South East Asia Treaty Organization" consisting of United States, Great Britain, France, Philippine Republic, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Pakistan. Its primary purpose is common defense in the case of aggression from without.

Also in Asia must be reckoned the understanding between the Soviet Union and Communist China with which must be grouped as under special control North Korea and Viet-Minh in Indo-China.

The continent of Africa reflects chiefly groupings effected under the old imperial system. The United Kingdom has such a group (in which, as of now, the Union of South Africa *cannot* be reckoned a member); so have France, Belgium and Portugal.

Overlapping this formal grouping is the greatest single grouping, the British Commonwealth; though this is so loose that its organizing power and strength is anything but uniform throughout the group. For practical purposes, it can be assumed that Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will act together for common defense. Other members conceivably might do so, but there is no certainty of this.

The attached map indicates how large a part of the earth's surface is covered by these regional military groupings based on defense.

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III

## Regional Groupings for Non-Military Ends

More remarkable is the modern trend toward evolution of regional groupings not necessarily based or bound to common defense, but for the purpose of integrating, in greater or less degree, the economic lives of the members. More accurately, perhaps, the groupings recognize that a measure of _de facto_ integration has factually taken place. These economic groups are not geographically concurrent with the defense groups, though there is a certain rough correspondence.

In this field perhaps lies the greatest possibility for immediate and also long-range effective international action, yet a word of caution must be inserted. Regional groups for common economic and political purposes, spectacular as their growth has been, may well be, probably are, only a phase. The deep currents noted in Chapter I steadily drive not only nation-states but whole regions to expand their economic cooperative efforts. Probably the present regional groups are parts of a world community of nations which, in distant future, may come into being.

These non-military groupings also cover most of the world, as shown by the second attached map. They are:

**In the Western Hemisphere:** The Organization of American States (Bogota, 1948). Its object is not only collective defense but also cooperation

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in strengthening the economic structure by collective effort, seeking to achieve "just and decent living conditions" for their entire populations, permitting general education. To effect this there is set up an economic and social council, a council of jurists and the cultural council.

Relatively little has been done to use the facilities thus outlined.

In practice, this group is supplemented by Canadian-American arrangements for cooperation in a number of respects notably development of water-power and economic resources afforded by the Great Lakes, the Niagara and the St. Lawrence Rivers.

**In Europe:** The "Benelux" group consisting of Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg (set up at London, 1944), set up

"to create the economic union of Belgium-Luxembourg-and the Netherlands."

This is now overlapped by the larger "Convention for European Economic Cooperation" (OEEC) which includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey. Its declared purpose is that the constituted countries shall

"join together to make the fullest collective use of their individual capacities and potentialities *** expand their commerce" and otherwise work together for the economic welfare of the area. More recently, this OEEC group has expanded; there is currently before most of these

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countries a treaty designed to create a European common market. Separate treaties set up an European Payments Union, and so forth.

Closer political union is forecast by the so-called "Council of Europe" set up in London on May 5, 1949, designed to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of

"safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress."

The members are Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Great Britain.

**In Communist Bloc countries:** These are the same as those constituting the Warsaw Pact. The extent of formal obligation to work together in economic matters is not known. In practice, the economies of the satellite or captive nations are integrated with the planning and economic life of the Soviet Union to a very large degree.

**In Asia:** Groupings for non-military purposes seem not to exist though Communist China undoubtedly integrates the economies of North Korea and Viet-Minh with her own in considerable measure.

(Colombo Group)

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**In the Middle East:** Effective groupings for economic purposes do not exist. In Africa there is only the remainder of the old imperial organization.

Finally, a new group at a different level is beginning to emerge based, chiefly, on the dim but passionate desire of the non-white races to strengthen and better their position. This is the so-called "Bandung Conference Group" composed of nations which attended a conference at Bandung three years ago. The list ranges widely through Asia, the Middle East and Africa. It remains to be seen whether sufficient community of interest, and sufficient possibility of common action, exists to make of this grouping a positive rather than a mere negative "anti-white" grouping. The attached map of its membership indicates possibilities of strength; the absence of common interest or objective offers doubt as to its future.

* * *

Plainly the struggle for grouping will continue. Given the breakup of the imperial systems, it can hardly be otherwise. Groupings for _defense_ are likely to be affected powerfully by technical developments and weapons; they will survive or vanish depending in considerable measure on the capacity of any group to protect all of its member states. Greater grouping for _peacetime economic purposes_ appears almost inevitable. Modern economics almost compel grouping, and compel an increasing degree of integration within the group. If this is not done through empire, it can only be done through

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Factually, few anti-colonial revolutions have been dominated thus far
by Communists. Russian additions to her system have been primarily the
result of Russian army occupations (mid-European Iron Curtain countries).
The Chinese have thus far succeeded only in taking over, by the same process,
North Korea and probably Viet Minh.

At present the assumed organization of the world consists of ninety
independent sovereign countries, of which twelve are (for all practical pur-
poses) comprised within the Russian and Chinese military empires. The other
emergent states are gradually seeking for regional or economic groupings of
greater or less stability. Obviously they have attained far less structure and
stability than they had as colonies under the predecessor imperial systems.
Yet the economic lives of the peoples of most of these succession countries
literally depend upon their being within some sort of "system." None of them
can defend itself alone, and few, if any, can maintain alone their economic
lives, still less satisfy the expectations generated in their peoples. Much
of the current confusion is rooted in the groping of these countries for some
sort of international structure which will at once assure their safety, recog-
nize their demand for self-determination, and offer hope of attaining that
freedom from want which they believe can be reached.

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that, though in varying degree, demand is being made for new conceptions of
economic order within countries or between nations, or both.

II

THE FALL OF IMPERIAL WORLD ORGANIZATION

Simultaneously with the social economic revolution -- perhaps as a
partial result of it -- came the downfall of the old and recognized methods of
maintaining order and economic exchange in world affairs. Perhaps, no half-
century in history has seen any comparable extent of change. In the calendar
of historical time, what occurred was a cataclysmic cascade of events.

Until the fall of the Spanish Empire in 1898, thirteen empires had ruled
the old world; the new world was a nascent community of nations protected by
the Monroe Doctrine and operating under the hegemony of the United States.
These empires, working on the principle of "balance of power," grouped them-
selves into alliances and counter-alliances. In the main they had maintained
world peace (with minor interruptions) in the century following the Napoleonic
wars. The imperial systems in their areas did provide order, administration,
arrangements for economic exchange. Their diplomacy did provide a means
of adjusting disputes. The system left a great deal to be desired. It was not
aimed at producing world-wide social justice. But as an over-all machinery
it worked.

The balance of power system broke down in 1914. The ensuing war
ended the German, Austrian, Turkish and Russian empires. The Chinese

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empire, long decaying, was already in the throes of the revolution of Sun Yat Sen.

The following twenty years released the energies of the Russian revolution throughout the Soviet Union, and of the Nazi-Fascist revolutions in Germany and Italy. In 1939 these precipitated World War II; and at the close of World War II (and in the ten succeeding years) most of the remaining imperialist system dissolved. Japan's ended with her defeat in 1945. The Netherlands and France were unable to resume the colonies they had lost to Japanese armies when the Japanese invaders drew back. Great Britain saw fit, under pressure of events, to withdraw from much of her empire: successively, India, Burma, Egypt, Ceylon, Malaya and small parts of Africa were granted independence. Indo-China and Morocco split away from France, while the fate of Algeria is still in doubt. Portions of the old imperial systems still remain: Britain has large holdings in Africa and a remaining position in the Middle East; Portugal, Belgium and The Netherlands likewise have holdings. But the system of empire as a means of maintaining world order, arranging world economics and settling international disputes ceased to be valid for practical purposes in 1946.

The chief tool by which empires were destroyed was militant nationalism -- the passionate desire of colonial peoples (or at least of political groups able to energize them) for political independence and sovereignty within national borders. The desire was sufficiently strong so that the empires

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previously in control could not govern and maintain conditions for orderly
economic life in their colonies in the face of armed resistance to them. In
practically every case the nationalist rebellions were accompanied by insist-
ence on the part of their adherents that the sovereign independent govern-
ments they demanded, free from the shackles of any imperial master, and able
to choose their own economic system, could and would gratify in some degree
the popular desire for better economic life.

Philosophically, there was a great deal to be said against colonialism
and there is a great deal to be said for independence. Tragically, however,
the product of the nationalist rebellions is often a nation-state so limited in
area or resources that, by itself, as a tool of economic and social welfare it
is desperately ineffective. Economic productivity of any nation save the very
largest depends in great measure on its ability to obtain materials, its access
to markets, its capability in producing, its technical proficiency, all in a
context of affairs which necessarily involves relations far beyond the borders
of the nation-state. The anti-colonial rebellions, and the men who emerged
as governors of the resulting national-states recked little of this -- save, of
course, in those cases where Communists controlled the process. The Com-
munist-led rebellions proposed as a matter of course to bring the nation-states
created immediately into the orbit of the Soviet Union -- actually, indeed, to
bring them in so completely that the emergent nation would merely exchange
one imperialist master for another.

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organization of regional or world-wide communities. Evolution of these may
well be a large part of the history of the modern world.

Ability of the United States to assist and work with these groups may
also be determinative of her ability to work towards the ideal and, on the
whole, unchanging American objectives.

IV

The World Community

Inevitably certain objectives can only be reached, and even today —
certain present interests can only be served by a functioning world community.

This had led the United States twice in the past four decades to cause
the organization of such a community; first, in the form of the League of
Nations at Versailles in 1919 (which the United States then refused to join)
and second, in the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. Such a community
(this is true of the United Nations today) is chiefly based, first, on ideal-
ism, that is, on an overwhelming passionate popular hope that it may be able
to prevent war and to achieve for its member peoples' immunity from that par-
ticular form of disaster. This is, strictly, a hope; it cannot as yet be a
certainty. Second, on certain realistic necessities, that is, on the fact that
the inestimable that
certain technical operations can only be carried on effectively within a frame-
work of universal, or perhaps in fact, supranational, arrangements: radio

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the spread of communication; civil aviation; prevention of disease spread; possibly also control of atomic contamination.

Increasingly, other realist necessity, for a world-community organization is emerging. One of these is assurance of access to certain materials essential to the lives of a great many nations which do not possess them (for example, oil). A world guarantee seems increasingly essential that certain basic transport facilities be maintained (essential waterways, peaceful seas). The combined drives of population, technology, and increased economic interdependence are almost certain to increase the limited list of operations which by their nature exact action from all or most of the world, and which are considered essential by all or most of the world.

Distinction between the idealist and the realist functions of the world community is essential. The idealist group can only be carried on by long, slow, evolving political processes which presumably will bring institutions into being and equip them with prestige and strength by which they command assent and acceptance for the arrangements they make. The realist group can be and in substantial measure have been embodied in specialised institutions (the World Health Organization; the International Civil Aviation Organization; the Radio Communication conventions, and, though these last are at least partly still in the idealist field, the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International Labor Office).

In its idealized functions, peacekeeping, lifting the burden of poverty, requiring respectable human treatment of populations, and so forth, the United

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Nations can only act (when it can act at all) by bringing about assent of its member nations including the strongest of them to any given solution or course of action. There is clear disparity here between the present organization of the United Nations and its apparent constitution. Its Assembly acts by majority vote. But there is little if anything the United Nations can do if a major power (say, the United States or the Soviet Union, or, if it becomes a member, Communist China) refuses to act in accordance with that vote. The only effective means of compulsion thus far worked out is armed action with the risk of general war, a cure commonly worse than the disease. Further, when a small and impotent nation votes for or urges a course of conduct, it merely expresses an opinion; and that opinion is often dictated by purely domestic or local considerations. When larger nations vote, they assume responsibility and are expected to engage their economics or their armies to make the agreed course of policy effective. Thus there are, in effect, in the United Nations, two classes of votes: votes of opinion or points of view, and votes of "responsibility." Obviously the latter must be given only after far greater and more anxious consideration than required by the former.

In the idealistic field, the United Nations is therefore really a new form of carrying on those diplomatic functions formerly accomplished by the diplomacy of empires. The new form has some great advantages and certain great disadvantages. The outline of the world community is gradually growing; but it cannot (perhaps should not) as yet be effective save as diplomacy; its elevation into anything approaching a world government is very far away.

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Nevertheless the major function which the world hopes it will discharge -- that of keeping the peace -- can only be done through a world community. Greater danger is occasioned to every nation-state, to every people, and indeed to every individual, in case of war today than ever before. Whatever governments may do, or say, or think, there is steadily growing pressure on every government by every people demanding that questions shall be solved without recourse to atom-warfare. Because of this the present United Nations is likely to develop and grow in institutional prestige and, eventually, in power. Indeed if it does not, some other means of bringing about a world community will almost inevitably emerge in a relatively short space of time.

Increasingly the realist and the idealist currents tend to converge. Guided missiles and hydrogen bombs are merely a present illustration of the growing pressure. Regional groups are at present the current, most active, most evolving phase of the phenomenon of international institutions. They are likely to continue to develop until such time as a world community of nations is able effectively to discharge some of their functions. Even then, so large a content of required regional cooperation in problems that are not world-wide will exist as probably to guarantee their continued existence. But it is likely that they will in time cede certain functions to the specialized, and perhaps later to the generalized institutions, of the United Nations. There is no present fundamental conflict between the two; their ultimate relationship must, however, be a constant concern of American policy.