DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.3

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Kay Graham/Kissinger
late afternoon 3/12/71'

G: I looked at this and it's amusing. I thought you might want to know who was coming. Tish and Stu Alsop. Coles, Eagletons, Valentis, Humphries, Rabins and Butler of HEW.

K: He is trying to raid my staff. He gets the best people.

G: What do you think you can do?

K: I will let you know tomorrow.

G: I will hold off because I need extra dames. I think of asking Mary (McGrory).

K: I like here. Let me see if I can produce someone.

G: Sure. If not, I will round up someone. Mathias, Rabin and Butler are coming alone.

K: You need several then.

G: If you have someone you want to bring, fine. Mary won't bother you? What about Sally Quinn? Who's pretty and young, who's in town? You think of someone if you want. Come if you can or after dinner and bring someone if you can. Loved lunch.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA. Date 5/24

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Yehudi Menuhin

9:55 a.m., March 13, 1971

M: Good morning.

K: How are you? I mentioned to the Romanian Ambassador our conversation and, of course, he is going to look into it.

M: I hope something does come off. It would be fascinating for me.

K: I think it would be good.

M: Is there any chance of our meeting?

K: I am not yet sure whether I am going to be here or going to New York. Can I reach you in the afternoon?

M: If you will be in Washington, could you come to lunch here at the Wilkinson's?

K: I'd be glad to.

M: We ourselves are going to New York around 5:00 in the afternoon.

K: I think the way to do it is to call you this afternoon.

M: We will be hoping you can come to lunch. Perhaps if you are not in Washington, we can get together in New York.

K: I will be there just one day. I will call you this afternoon and leave word whether I can come for lunch.

M: Dianna would love to see you.

K: I would love to see you.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.B

HANA Date 5/14

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

10:17 a.m., March 13, 1971

K: Bob, how are you? I wanted to give you the background on the fiasco on these Berrigan people.

H: You are calling on your enemies now.

K: People get so uptight about it. I don't think it's hurting us.

H: I don't know whether it hurts or helps. I don't think it makes any difference one way or the other. Miami Herald carried a story with a big smiling picture of Henry Kissinger on the front page.

K: Though it wasn't deliberately planned, I have to take the credit for it. I have been in touch with Brian McDonnell -- the fellow who fasted in the park -- for a year. He called two months ago -- in case the President asks -- to ask whether I would be prepared to see some people friendly to the Berrigans. He then called a few weeks later saying he would like to bring in seven students from Haverford College where he teaches. I said, 'fine.' I told him assistant would work out a date. Instead of students, he brought in these people. I found out only minutes before the meeting and I went into orbit. They were already in the Situation Room. I talked to Haig and we agreed that to throw them out without hearing them at that late time would be worse than listening to them. At that time, I did not know they were co-conspirators -- I just thought they were sympathetic to the Berrigans.

H: Were they interesting?

K: Honor is not an outstanding attribute of doves. There was an understanding this was to be off the record.

H: I am sure it will go away. J. Edgar Hoover may be upset.

K: I talked to him last night. He said fine -- he is okay. Kleindoinst is a little bit upset.

H: Well, this is one of those stories that comes and goes. It won't make much difference.

K: I don't know whether it hurts us to show humanity toward these people.

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

SVP P NARA Dsno 5/20

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

10:17 a.m., March 13, 1971

- 2 -

H: It doesn't do us any good. It dignifies them. They should be decapitated. People plotting kidnaps we shouldn't see.

K: I don't argue with that.

H: You didn't intend to meet with those anyway.

K: If I had known it two hours before, I would have turned it off.

H: It isn't going to make much difference one way or the other. The story has a little drama to it because of the kidnap thing, but I imagine we will survive that.

K: Will you explain it to the President?

H: Sure.

K: How it came to pass?

H: He may not even see it.

K: He will see it alright. If he doesn't, Bebe will call it to his attention. How is the weather?

HL: K&M Cool and windy, but alright.

K: Is he going to the Bahamas?

H: I think he is, but I'm not sure.

K: If you would mention it to him, I would appreciate it.

H: Okay.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12960, Sect. 3.6

NARA Dsln 5/66

TolCon: The President:HAK
11:40 - 3/13/71

HAK: Good morning Mr. President.

P: Good morning Henry. Where did I find you?

HAK: I am in my office.

P: What is new on your front today?

HAK: They are repositioning themselves in Laos - South across the routes that are coming out of Tchepone.

P: Like 914?

HAK: Yes and 244. They are going to try to get the caches?

P: More than you expected?

HAK: Yes. It is more than . . . . . . . . another 8,000 pounds of rice
. . . . . . . . and small ammunitions.

P: Did you get a confirmation of what Vogt (?) told me?

HAK: They have decided now to stay around Tchepone.

P: Not just sit there.

HAK: That is right. That is too dangerous. They will move across the South until April and then start moving out. This is what they are doing essentially and I think is the right thing to do. The North Vietnamese units which have been pressing them from the North have now pulled back. They have pulled back towards the DMZ so they might have a bloddier nose than what we thought. Part of the reason may be that part of the supply shipment has gone beyond Tchepone and they are no longer defending it.

P: The press yesterday reported to the effect that they were just going to get out right away. It didn't work out that way did it.

HAK: The original plan of last week was to get out of Laos. The press would then play it as another invasion of Laos. What they are now going to do is to position themselves in closer. After about three weeks pull out of pass 611 and be out by May 1.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1293U, Sept. 3.6

S.G. HARA, Dado 5/4-

- 2 -

P: That is fine.

HAK: It is a recoverable situation but the one that has really been screwed up is Cambodia and that is bad. Thieu (?) had it all set up - had the enemy in position for a big battle(?) This new Commander is so undertain that he doesn't want to destroy the enemy's bases.

P: By destroying the enemy is to be on top of them.

HAK: As Laus winds down, more air power will be available for Cambodia.

P: The weather is still not good for this strike but they are still watching it. I told Vogt that no budgetary or any other kind of restraint was to hold this up. As soon as the weather was clear they were to hit it.

HAK: On Thursday they told us there would be four more days of bad weather. I talked to Vogt yesterday after you talked to him. They have three carriers in position and are ready to go.

The military has thrown out the Turkish Prime Minister. They threw him out. They are trying to form a new government. They are friendly at least.

P: On our side?

HAK: Yes.

P: What will be your next move with Mr. D?

HAK: I am going to hand him a redraft of your letter. It takes out some of the precise details about the dates of freeze. . . They can be left for negotiation. It can be too complicated. Just so we can get the deadlock broken. We have to do it. There is no one in the bureaucracy who defends the safeguard system except Laird. I am seeing him on Monday at 4 o'clock.

P: Is Haig going to Saigon?

HAK: Yes, he leaves tomorrow night.

P: Did you see Senator Jackson?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295U, Sect. 3.5

SVC'D NARA Dated 5/6/6

HAK: I am seeing him at three o'clock this afternoon. We shouldn't give
the safeguard away.

P: OK. Very interesting in Laos. They are pulling back. It could be
as you said they have been bloodied up pretty good. Pulling back
or striking somewhere else. They are not quite that strong.

HAK: If they were not in rather bad shape . . .

P: Lets look back at Cambodia. Westmoreland and everyone else
over estimated what they could do. Even Phnom Penh. The
press was saying it every day. We just have to watch the situation
there. Because of our long long war and waste of power that there
were times we over estimated the enemy and said that they would
fight. Westmoreland hit off more than one sanctuary in Cambodia.
I don't really think you can say they were any tougher.

HAK: They fought well but not like the American troops would have.
They took heavy casualties but they inflicted very large ones.
It may run its course like Cambodia did I am beginning to think.

P: If the weather clears up it is important to hit those three supply
bases.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sem. 3.6

S/ C P NARA Dated 5/24

TelCon: HAK:Brian McDonnell

12 Noon - 3/13/71

HAK: Hello Brian. How are you?

Mc: Down on mankind. I am going out this afternoon and sort of get myself together.

HAK: I don't worry about it.

Mc: I am not worried about them. I am worried about you. It was such an awful thing to have happen to you.

HAK: I will have to take the heat for a few days. This will all blow over.

Mc: I am going to send you a letter giving the sequence of facts and what took place. And I would like to send a letter to your boss and apologize.

HAK: No that is not necessary. It might be good to have some confirmation on what took place for Mitchell and Hoover though.

Mc: I will write who was to be invited, the sequence of facts and what took place.

HAK: I thought they were just friends of the Berrigan's.

Mc: Listen. The other thing is that I really feel that you and I are good friends.

HAK: It won't affect our relationship Brian.

Mc: I really feel like a dog.

HAK: You behaved honorably and you trusted your friends which one is suppose to be able to do.

Mc: Sister ______ would also like to extend her apologies to you.

HAK: She behaved in a fine way. I understand some Philadelphia paper is going to blast me tomorrow.

Mc: Sandy -- what is his name?

HAK: I don't know. But if I can survive attacks in the big city papers, then I can survive an attack in the Philadelphia paper. Just relax.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

SK. P. NARA No. 5/24

- 2 -

now. When these things blow up they give the impression they
will never blow away.

Mc: I am not going to talk with Tom again. I can't trust him again.

HAK: That is one of the problems of the peace movements. Don't worry about it Brian. I will see you soon.

Mc: Alice sends her love and she is deeply concerned.

HAK: I will see you soon.

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q. 12050, Sect. 3.6

By. C. NARA, Date. 5/24

TelCon: HAK: Kleindienst

12:10 - 3/13/71

K: Good morning sir.

HAK: Good morning. Did you get my note?

K: Yes sir.

HAK: Was it of any help?

K: I think so. It gives us the information that I think we had to have. At least we know none of the specifics of the Berrigan case were discussed by the people with you. Is that correct?

HAK: That is correct.

K: I don't see anything for you to worry about. If there is for any reason, we will discuss it again.

HAK: I won't go near those people again. I was taken by M06 surprise two ways. They broke their promise and I didn't know I was meeting with that group.

K: Don't worry about it right now.

HAK: Could it affect your trial?

K: No, not one way or another. Don't worry about it now. You have more important things to worry about.

HAK: My apologies.

K: Don't worry. Goodbye.

DECL
E.Q. 12950, Scn. 3.6

NARA. Dsho 5/24

TELECON

Admiral Mourer/Mr. Kissinger

12:14 p.m., March 13, 1971

M: I wanted to touch base on a couple of things. I chatted with Haig. I received a briefing from MACV made up in response to Laird's guidance for withdrawal plans. We are now faced with about three plans so far. (1) In response to Laird's guidance he left in January...

K: I'll bet he left two; I'll bet he has a private one with Abrams.

M: This is the only one I am aware of. (2) Then there is the one dictated by Budget as it now stands. (3) Then there is the one JCS/MACV recommended. The Army has a limitation, with regard to draft calls. They all have to be looked at. Haig's trip will be very helpful in this regard. We will work on them some more over here. We have to look at the mission aspects and increment aspects. Shifting a minute, I think the plan up north -- the Lam Son plan -- is being handled all right. They will stay in there. My prediction is they will stay through the full extent of the dry season.

K: Across roads or horsing around?

M: Fighting -- if they come all the way down through Base Area 611. There will be plenty of opposition. Everybody is itching to go.

K: What is the weather now?

M: There is a static front sitting in there -- just about what it's been, but it should move now in a couple of days. One other thing -- you remember the CIA report noted that from 23 over to the main artery has been opened. This is not so. I talked to Clay, the Air Commandor, and told him to get after the road-builders and any other effort to develop some crossroad that goes from 23 to the main route and work over the construction workers and not let them open that road, and also to put sensors in there. If they have movements, it might be with road machinery. CIA gave the impression it was open. Clay says it isn't.

K: We are not using 23 very much anyway.

M: There's a lot of talk about their end-running us. In any event they will be vulnerable.

NARA. Dato. 5/24

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger
12:14 p.m., March 13, 1971

K: Do you think they have supplies piled up?

M: Hell, yes. There is a lot of tonnage north of Tchepone.
They doubled troops from 14,000 to 30,000; that imposed a burden
supply-wise.

K: Are there still enough supplies in that bomb area?

M: Yes, plenty. If we get weather, it will be lucrative. There
are a lot of trucks, supplies, and POL.

K: That is unusual to be socked in, isn't it?

M: It's the longest sustained period of sock-in I have noticed,
but it will break. It's bound to.

K: It's killing us on something we are trying to do politically.

M: I just wanted you to have a comfortable weekend.

K: I am relaxed.

M: Things are in fairly good shape.

Ids

DECLFIED
E.O. 12950, Sept. 3.6

S. C. F. NARA. Dated 5/66

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Kay Graham

5:34 p.m., March 13, 1971

K: Kay, how are you? You are doing mischief in your office on Saturday?

G: I have to do the undone mail -- the cruddy kind that you let pile up on your desk.

K: I do very little any more. Do you still want me to pick you up?

G: You are nice, but I have changed my mind. Donny called me last night. Since he's in the middle of the Women's Liberation movement (even people like Eileen Shanahan are) and said if I went it would be viewed very darkly. They feel so seriously about the Gridiron they are going to picket it. Donny feels I shouldn't. Do you think I shouldn't?

K: It isn't worth it. If it were a great issue you should do it.

G: I don't feel the way they do about it. I don't really want to thwart them.

K: It's the right thing to do.

G: I had thought about it before and when Donny brought it up, I decided not to.

K: I will see you at Joe's then.

G: Yes, I will see you at Joe's.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By: C. NARA Dsiv. 5/24

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joseph Alsop

6:02 p.m., March 13, 1971

K: As always, you win.

A: Can Nancy come down?

K: I'm afraid not.

A: I am sad, but you will come to dinner. Why not come half an hour early and spend half an hour with Isaiah and Eileen before dinner.

K: I will try.

A: He is one of the most interesting people I know.

K: I know; I like him very much.

A: I know you didn't get to spend much time with them at lunch. Henry is in the category which David Cisler called the "net and trident" host. I will put you next to Eileen at dinner and after dinner next to Isaiah and then you will have a chance to talk properly. How are things going?

K: There is nothing to go at the moment.

A: I'm afraid I may make a little trouble on Monday.

K: You couldn't be making any trouble. Just don't praise me.

A: I don't say anything about you, but I have a great deal to say about the President rescuing us from the State Department arabesques. I also say a few tiny words about Mr. Bergus.

K: I look forward to that column.

A: It's a trouble-making column.

K: It doesn't hurt sometimes.

A: I said he singlehandedly rescued us from these awful people. I said there's much to be said about the Rogers plan providing it is slightly modified.

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sept. 3-6

NAHA Dsio 5/84

K: I look forward eagerly to reading it. I must go to the Gridiron.

A: You shouldn't go.

K: It's my last one.

A: What do you mean?

K: I won't go next year.

A: You should plead a sick headache this year. You will be in the middle of it.

K: That's all the more reason to go.

A: I never saw anything smarter and sharper than inviting that man and the others. Even McGrory was amiable about it.

K: Yes she was. See you tomorrow.

Ids

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

3/15/71 9:20 a.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Z: How was the Gridiron?

K: Pretty good. They let us off pretty easy. The Vice President went after Rogers which was unnecessary

Z: What did he say?

K: He said he had read all these stories about the Secretary of State not being very well known. He said it isn't true; "We all revere Rogers, and his wife Dale and his horse Trigger."

Z: No! I'll bet that drove Rogers right up the wall.

K: he said he wants to confirm the fack that President calls the Secretary of State at least three times a day and he comes to the White House two days a week. It isn't anybody's fault all the crises happen at night. You shouldn't attack your own people. Dole was an unmitigated disaster.

Z: That's what I heard.

K: He was yerribly. Kennedy was outstanding. The skits let us off easy.

Z: The reason I called: There was a big headline here saying Tchepone has been reoccupied by Communist forces.

K: This was a natural occurrance, according to plan.

Z: I understand that.

K: Say there was no enemy pressure when they pulled back -- they are going in a southeasterly direction.

Z: They will ask me "does this mean the ARVN operation is winding up or coming to an end?" Between you and me, what are the facts?

K: Say 'can't tell you for sure.' Hope it isn't and have been assured it isn't. It was always announced as being limited in time and space.

Z: The New York Times had a headline yesterday saying that the operation will be completed in 18 days.

K: That is not true.

Z: No?

K: No, but I would give myself a little escape hatch.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

9:52 a.m., March 15, 1971

K: What is it you want me to do at noon?

F: Have you seen the list of people?

K: I will be on my knees. What do I say?

F: I am looking forward to your future commercial well-being.
Describe for these people where we are in Vietnam and where you
think we will be going in our defense posture.

K: Is that what they want? That's fine. How about a general
review of foreign policy?

F: Specifically Vietnam, but a general review of foreign policy.
We will make it short. I would hope that you would give them time
to ask you questions.

K: Have we an hour?

F: Up to an hour. You can cut it short. You don't have to be late
to impress them.

K: I will talk for 15 minutes and then they can ask questions.

F: We will give them a half-hour for questions.

K: In the Roosevelt Room?

F: In the Roosevelt Room.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Shultz/Kissinger

9:55 a.m.

3/15/71

K: I have my children here right now. Could I try for later this morning?

S: What time would you suggest?

K: How about 3:00 this afternoon? That's absolutely safe.

S: All right.

K: What are the subjects?

S: I want to see where we stand on intelligence review and second, I want to express some concerns about the Defense Dept. and particularly the impact of not being able to do anything about base closings.

K: We have to do something about Defense.

S: I will come to your office at 3:00.

K: You just made my day.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

(not verbatim)

March 15, 1971 10:55 a.m.

jlj

K: Hello Bill. Senator Jackson was in here on Saturday about the Safeguard decision. He is worried that we are going to knock it out from under him in SALT. . . thinking that the President decided . . . NCA zero and 4-Safeguard system and see where we came out. In talking to the President yesterday he said to have Gerry Smith present it hard and not just stuff over it.

R: You are speaking about the standstill now. . . zero and NCA . . .

K: Yes. Not say they can buildup.

R: I call it stand where we are, stay where we are.

K: That is a good way to call it.

R: I will see that he does not do that. He does feel strongly on zero. I feel that it is not quite fair for us to have to give up and let them go on. It would be politically difficult for us.

K: That is what Jackson says. He said that all the people that fought for us will look like fools. Should not be giving it up.

R: I have not been enthusiastic about NCA one. It does not seem fair to me to ask us to destroy all of ours and let them retain what they have.

K: NCA becomes close to becoming zero for us because we cannot get it through Congress.

R: We fought like hell for ABM and then if we have to destroy ours and . . . OK, I will be sure that that is done. Let's see, there was something else. Oh, I am curious about Jackson. Did Mel go ahead and tell him to release that?

K: He talked as though he was taking the credit for the leak.

R: He is a strange fellow.

K: Who, Mel?

R: Yes. I was talking to him before . . . and he was speaking as if he was horror struck that this leak had happened. He said isn't that terrible and how did that happen.

K: The next morning he talked to me - after the NSC meeting - and said, well, we got it out all right, didn't we?

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

He talked if he had gotten it out it would have created a terrible fuse.

R: If that is the plan of action . . .

K: No. The President knew nothing, I knew nothing about it and I assume you didn't know anything about it.

KX R: I wouldn't think the President would want to have Jackson making announcements.

K: No. We have been sitting on it for two weeks. Didn't want to announce it and create a fuse until we got the latest photography.

R: Ok. I will talk to Phil Farley and we that that is done.

K: Thank you Bill.

is taking the credit for the leak.

a strange fellow.

Yea, Al?

Yes, I was talking to him before . . . and he was speaking as if he was struck that this leak had happened. He said isn't that terrible and how bad it would happen.

On the next morning he talked to me - after the NSC meeting - and said, well, got it out all right, didn't we?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

telecon
Secretary Rogers
3/15/71 11:35 a.m.

R: On this Graff appointment -- I think if we could have no more discussion about it . . . he is trying to see Mel too. He thinks and I think it would be better . . . . what else can we say? It's all in the State of the World.

K: This is more about the NSC system, not about substance.

R: But it will turn out that way. He says it is more a decision-making process, but that's been hashed over so many times.

K: I see the point. What we absolutely don't need is a discussion of relative positions of various people.

R: That's how it will come out.

K: He's a very responsible guy and he did a compassionate thing on the Johnson process.

R: What can we say that isn't in the State of the World message. That's as authoritative as you can get. He can't write it without getting back into who's on top.

K: I see your point. Perhaps a different problem is I have turned him off three times.

R: I have too. My point is it's all in the State of the World; there's nothing else to say. Did you see the Leacocus thing about you and me. It's the best article on the subject I've seen.

K: He's a thoughtful person.

R: Yes, what I am going to do is say here is the State of the World, here is our report, here is Leacocum's thing and there's nothing else to say.

K: Let me do the same. The problem is he's a fellow I've known. I will see him briefly, but I won't give him an interview. The one thing I have no interest in is . . . I will not give him a substantive interview without talking first to you and Mel.

R: My real preference is what I've said. If he's a friend, I'd just say we don't have anything else to say.

K: Okay, let me do that. If there's anything else I'll talk to you first.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President
3/15/71 11:45 a.m.

P: Just checking in.

K: There's not much new in Laos.

P: Weather cleared up yet?

K: No. It's the longest...

P: My God! I can't believe it. It was already the longest a week ago. Now it's practically two weeks. We anticipated that it would be...

K: We made a rocket attack on Khesahn today. There were a lot of rockets but not much damage. We've got that pretext...

P: We've still got that but it's got to clear up!

K: They thought they could get it off in 48 hours when you authorized it two weeks ago.

P: I just want to make sure it's the weather. Just tell them I want a report at 8:30 when I get to my office every morning and one at 8:30 at night. Fair enough?

K: Right. Brandt's party took a clobbering in Berlin.

P: What? That's his city. That's amazing.

K: They still have a majority but this used to be a city he dominated/

P: It does indicate some concern about his policies.

K: Right. It will make the Soviets more eager to use our channel.

P: Right.

K: I'm seeing Dobrynin this afternoon.

P: At 4:30?

K: At 4:00. But this won't make any difference.

P: I would put it pretty damn tough. Say here it is fellows; it's not a bargaining position--we've thought it all through.

By. NAIA, Dato 5/26

page 2

If they don't like the deal, fine.

K: They are asking us to dismantle our ABM while they keep theirs and build like crazy while they do nothing. I'll send you down the latest totals picked up in Laos -- they're quite significant. And Abrams sent you a long cable which I will have summarized.

P: You don't need to send it down. I'll be back tonight.

K: It's very positive.

P: He's not jittery?

K: No, he's extremely confident.

P: It's a bigger goal (?) than everyone realized.

K: That's his view. Of course we will have Haig's view when he gets back. These are the major things of interest.

P: What about casualty?

K: 41, a drop of three.

P: So it has cooled off?

K: Yes, and many of those were in other parts of the country. I think it will continue dropping.

P: My plans at the present time may be to go to California on the 29th or the 28th of March, and spend that week out there and...

K: And wind up there...

P: No, not wind up there. I have to be back on the fifth for the Presidential opener and there's ________ on the 6th and the troop statement on the 7th. But I might want to get Abrams and Bunker over.

K: Abrams probably would be reluctant to leave during a military operation.

P: If that's the case we won't do it. I was thinking of having him in California around the first of April. The idea would be to discuss our trbop thing and its results and so forth. That way we would get a double kick out of the thing.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
The President

3/15/71 11:45 a.m.

K: We did get him back during Cambodia.

P: That's right. We can get him back, give the troop statement.
I don't really have to do it. I've got other things to do in California anyway.

K: It might be a good idea.

P: To have him come back at this time -- talk about what we are doing.
Of course if you got everyone there . . .

K: That's the problem.

P K: It wouldn't be particularly helpful. That's the problem isn't it?

K: Yes. But Haig will be back by the 22nd or 21st so you can still make
up your mind then.

P: On the 21st or 22nd we can still plan. I'm going there anyway but
that's one event we might put in if we want.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Kay Graham

3/15/71 5:30 p.m.

K: All the wise people here are of the opinion that it would be a slap if I didn't show up.

G: I agree. You must go. You couldn't and I'm ashamed of myself. I called you in my girlish enthusiasm.

K: Can I drop by after?

G: Yes, please do. You could break loose; you don't have to stay for the entertainment do you?

K: No, it's only entertainment and the reception. But I have a feeling if I don't show on Mrs. Nixon's birthday and if one of the Nixon courtiers points out that I was at your house . . .

G: We'd both be beheaded. But do come if you can.

K: You'll keep going till 11:30 or so?

G: Yes. Just come if you can. You don't have to let me know at all.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Rogers/Kissinger
5:30 p.m. 3/15/71

K: I am not seeing that fellow.

R: I think that's good. I want to talk about a couple of things. On this report we have just about worked it out. The only thing you haven't looked at is the introduction and which we will say is the introduction by the Secy. of State which is a little summary. If you could look at it, we are sending it to Kennedy in an hour or so. It's not the greatest literary work but none are really but make sure nothing inconsistent with the State of the World. I tried to meld them and say it's the President's policy and still make it personal. Any suggestions are welcome.

K: We will not nitpick it.

R: We have maps in there for breaking the script up. One map on the Soviet Union and strategic weapons. There's some figures in the State of the World but it doesn't show throw away so I told them to eliminate the figures. So I think it's pretty well checked out.

K: When will it be released?

R: A week from Thurs. or Friday. If we can get it to the printer tomorrow night or Wed.?

K: Is it long?

R: The summary is about 35 pages. Not very long. I think it will be a useful document.

K: I think they compliment each other well.

R: I tried to say that the President has published State of the World that' sets forth policy and tried to explain why we are doing this.

K: I read through your text and I think it will be a first class reference work.

R: It shows the things we have done which people forget. The other thing is that I am going to have the press conference.

K: Thursday?

R: Tomorrow. President is thinking of having one this week.

K: On domestic things?

R: I don't know. Friday, Zeigler said. I just had a briefing from Defense on

By. NAIA, Dato 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

6:30 p.m. 3/15/71

-2-

R: (cont) Laos.

K: As long as we hold firm on offensive/defensive link.

R: What's the arguement?

K: The Soviet Union wants us to stop building the one thing we are building while they build up offensive weapons and we say they should be brought under control simultaneously.

R: In case of Johnson herecommended ABM separately and they said no and now and our position is sound.

K: I think so. It's the one strategic weapons program we have. Except for MIRV.

R: That's why I don't like to empaheight that because the press says there's MIRV. They are going ahead with MRV's and we are going ahead with MIRVs too. I think they will ask mostly about Laos and the M. E.

K: I think we are together on this.

R: Mel called on the secure phone about the situation in the DMZ. The SAMs in NVN. Wanted to know if we should do anything diplomatically.

K: I think that would be a mistake.

R: Sure. It doesn't look like a prelude to invasion.

K: We have enough ? ? ? ?. If the damn weather lifts.

K: That's all.

K: That's all.

R: Tomorrow, President is thinking of having one this week.

K: Oh, no.

R: Oh, no. Friday, Zengier said, I just had a briefing from

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Prof. Graff/Kissinger

5:45 p.m.

3/15/71

K: I have the following problem. This town is wallowing in the blue bruised feelings on these stories and then there was some roasting in public at the Gridiron Club. So when you requested an appointment with Laird and Rogers they said they wouldn't see you and asked me as a favor not to see you.

G: I talked with McCloskey and I persuaded him I should see Rogers.

K: If you see Rogers I will see you immediately. I am doing this on a human
grounds. I told him I didn't think you were going to draw any conclusions.

G: I have gone over my notes with Elliot Richardson and I think the whole thing is nonsense. I think there are a few number of other things that go into this.

K: No problem with me. If either of the others see you, I will immediately.

G: A question of tactics at this end. If McCloskey says I'm seeing you, because I told him I was --

K: Say that I said I will if Rogers will. Otherwise we can do it in a few months when feelings subside.

G: I want you to know I am greatly obliged to you and your staff for your arrangements. I am sorry this got into this. E. Richardson said this got into everything before anyone knew what was happening. Happened with Bundy and Rusk.

K: Let's stay in touch.

G: In any case, if this is raised in the next week.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

6:22 p.m.

3/15/71

R: On the Eban visit has he asked to see the President?

K: No, but me.

R: How are we going to play that?

K: Why doesn't Sisco come with him, or Atherton? If I don't see him it will look like a cold shoulder. Half an hour visit.

R: If Joe is there then no one can claim a wedge.

K: Joe or Atherton.

R: I think it's ax there's a criticism of Joe building up.

K: Then have Joe. If I refuse to see him it will be a slap in the face. Is that agreeable with you?

R: Yes, that's fine with Joe.

By NAIA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Lady Jackson
3/15/71; 6:35 p.m.

J: I am only here until tomorrow evening. God knows what your life must be like. If you have a moment tomorrow afternoon -- late part of the afternoon -- I would like to come by.

K: How late can you come?

J: Around 6ish.

K: Let's aim for 6:00. Will you call in the late afternoon just to make sure.

J: Listen, Henry, don't feel you have to. . .

K: I think we know each other well enough if for some reason I can't make it. . .

J: I will call around 4:00ish. If you can manage, that will be splendid.

feg

DECLASSIFIED

By. -- NARA Date 6/1/67

Telecon (Tape) March 14, 1971

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Brought in 3/15/71

K: [Conversation began with] ... that I've ever heard.

P: Oh, boy. That's too bad.

K: And Teddy was very good. Very good.

P: What was the trouble with Dole?

K: Well, it was a sort of Chamber of Commerce jokes. Teddy had made some rather intelligent... some good jokes and then had about two minutes of uplift at the end fairly conciliatory to the Administration saying, 'remember, this is our government and we've all got to be...'

P: Yeah. The usual thing.

K: And the sort of thing he foreshadowed to me about two months ago. And then he quoted his brothers. It was rather... and then Dole got up there and just...

P: Dole was second?

K: Yeah, he was second. And he was just a horror.

P: What was the trouble with him?

K: Well, he had nothing but a bunch of tired jokes and he delivered them badly and he was a total bomb.

P: Oh, boy. That's too bad.

K: But Agnew rescued it.

P: How did he do it?

K: He had some very good jokes -- I don't know who wrote them for him -- and he delivered them extremely well.

P: Oh, he's very good at delivering jokes. Well, I'm glad he went.

K: So, it was a good counter-point.

P: How was the program?

K: The program... They made a lot of fun of the Democrats. They let us off fairly lightly. They spoofed the new American revolution, but not in a nasty way.

The President/Mr. Kissinger (Tape)

Brought in 3/15/71

- 2 -

P: Were they pretty hard on Agnew?

K: No, they weren't as nasty as they've been. They had one skit about Rogers and me, but that wasn't bad either. I mean that wasn't wounding. Actually, the Democrats got a little more of the ribbing this year than we did. They had one skit on a press conference which was the usual take-off of saying will you have another press conference in six months; and you say, 'well, I'll take it under advisement' or something like that. You didn't have, of course, the smash at the end that you did last year with Agnew. But that can't be done for a long...

P: Good. I hope you didn't stay up too late. The skits are always delayed up there.

K: Well, I went up to that party afterwards. To the Colts party. I stayed till about quarter to one.

P: Yeah, yeah. How was their temper up there?

K: I thought Harry Byrd... Of course, Harry Byrd is not the best test of it, but he came up and he said, well, he just wants me to know he thinks we are doing an outstanding job to withdraw half of our forces and do better at the end of it than at the beginning, and no one would have ever thought possible...

P: He got a little of that line in. How was your talk with Jackson?

K: I talked to Jackson. He's very, very concerned that he is going to go out there, defend Safeguard, and then have us yank it out from under him. And he said everybody who voted for Safeguard is going to be the laughing stock and he also said that if you start dismantling any of the sites that are being built, it's going to be -- after all the fight we went through -- a reflection. So I told him that, actually, we've put the Safeguard thing into our negotiations position which is right. Smith has been asked to put it forward. And that the only way we could ever consider abandoning it is part of an agreement that also limits offensive buildups -- in which case, the original reason for the thing would have changed. And that seemed to pacify him a bit.

P: Well, that shows you why it is important, though, to have the double-edged thing. The idea of just going along with NCA for Moscow is ridiculous.

K: No -- that would be... The more I think about it the less that I think that is good. And also for domestic reasons, I think the people who have fought with us have a problem there.

P: It will also be an education.

MJD E0 12958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/10/71

Brought in 3/15/71

- 3 -

K: That's right.

P: And yet, I think the Russians would just get us.

K: Well, what the Russians are asking us to do is to stop... The ABM agreement really means that they want us to stop building what we are doing. They can keep what they have, and we don't even have an NCA. In the meantime, they also continue an offensive buildup.

P: That's right. It's all for them now. I just think we've got to play that pretty tough because if one doesn't come off, it won't come off. The way it was left, of course, that would all be negotiable.

K: The way it was left... At this point, they way it is left is that Gerry is asked to put forward... Well, he's already put forward the Washington one. That was already in Helsinki. So, he's now asked to put forward four Safeguard sites as an alternative just to get it into the discussions. In my proposal -- in that draft letter to Kosygin, we proposed the Safeguard sites and not Washington, and what I think we should do in the redraft of the letter which I am going to discuss with him is to say that this should be negotiated... that this should be settled by the negotiators -- which of the two systems. This leaves it open in the alternative. And then we can...

P: I wonder, though, if you put that in the letter and that's made public, then that then means they won't authorize the systems.

K: I haven't put it that way in the letter. The way it's put in the letter is the kind of defensive system is for each side to decide. That which is diplomatic double-talk for us. We've already formally proposed it anyway in Helsinki, so that part of it is known.

P: Yeah. I see.

K: And Jackson is also another thing... He says he's very disturbed by ACDA. He doesn't believe anything they say.

P: Neither does Agnew. He came in to see me briefly after the meeting... Oh, that was the dinner the other night. He said, "Do you trust Smith's people." I said, "Not at all." I just wanted to be sure. Well, of course, you know what they are up to. They are absolutely... I'm glad Jackson sees the point about absolute unilateral disarmament. You know that.

K: Of course. They are a lobby in disguise.

P: Have no illusions. I'll tell you one thing. If we ever get the opportunity we'll dismantle that damn thing. The time will come when we have a free hand

DECLASSIFIED

MWO E12958

By. NARA Date 6/10/71

Brought in 3/15/71

- 4 -

we are going to dismantle it. It's got to be done. It's a lobby. It's $90 million
a year just to have a bunch of God-damned people over there arguing the wrong
way. We'll just cut it to pieces.

K: That's right. They should be in the State Department. They shouldn't be an independent agency. They are not any better there, but at least they can be cushioned a little more.

P: Well; this is the way we will do it -- reorganize it and put it in State.
God, it's perfectly terrible.

K: But actually, this was the mildest of the Gridiron Dinners that I've attended.

P: Yeah, yeah. Well, I've done my last one; you know, they are just a pain in the neck. After you've done... See, I've now done 11 of them, and I just don't want to go to anymore. So, I think last year was a good note to go out on.

K: That was a great note to go out on.

P: So, let them have somebody else. Let Agnew go to them. He does them well.

K: But I thought the mood among the newsmen, for example, in circulating upstairs. They now take it for granted that Laos is a success.

P: You think so?

K: Oh, yes. No nit-picking at all.

P: Were they grinding their teeth?

K: Oh, yes, to me and when they sort of talked to each other. I was talking to Richard Wilson -- of course, he's on our side.

P: Yeah, he's all right, but he's important. What did he say?

K: And he said, well, it looked like a great success which will enable you to maintain your withdrawal program. And I said yes. Then Teddy came over -- he was standing there -- and even he mumbled something to the effect that it's for the best... You know, he is trying to play the statesman now, but that, too, is interesting. Gardner Cowles said he thought it was a very successful operation. Hedley Donovan did.

P: Did he?

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 12 1958

By NARA Date 6/10/71

Brought in 3/15/71

- 5 -

K: And these are people... I didn't go around asking people what they thought of Laos.

P: Yeah, these are people like...

K: ...that came up and volunteered it.

P: Donavan and Cowles. Well, they are both...

K: Well, Donovan said, 'well, it looks as if the President has done it again.' And I said, well, you know, we don't want to crow too early. But it looks as if we are achieving what we are after there.

P: What is the news this morning? Have you had time to call yet?

K: Yes; they are pulling back, but as planned, from Tchepone. They haven't been under attack. And the ground action is very light -- still getting caches along the route.

P: They are starting down the Bien Trang(?)

K: Yeah, they are heading in a southeasterly direction now, and then they are going to stay there for a while and then they will move slowly out through base area 611, getting out during April.

P: Have they actually interdicted 914?

K: They swear that they have two battalions on it, and they've shown it to me on the map.

P: Yeah, well, it's got to be interdicted.

K: That's the only one really that is now open of any consequence.

P: Well, they must have something on it, Henry. Good heavens, they've got so much around there.

K: Oh, yes; I think they have something on it now.

P: How's the weather -- no break yet?

K: No break yet, no.

P: No break in terms of... not at all -- just the same?

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 12958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/10/71

Brought in 3/15/71

- 6 -

K: Well, it's a low that's just been bad luck. It's the longest... I've called Moorer on it yesterday, and he said it's the longest sustained low that he's seen; and he used to be in command of the Seventh Fleet out there. And actually this is the time of the year when the rainy season turns up there usually. But we've just had bad luck there.

P: Well, it'll turn, and maybe it's just as well. We'll crack them again when it turns.

K: Well, that's what I think.

P: It gives us something to do, doesn't it?

K: That's right, and the pile-up of supplies is still going to be there. They can't move all... They are not going to move all that...

P: Well, probably, as a matter of fact, because the weather is bad they are rushing it in there, and it would seem to me that they are probably pouring stuff through as fast as they can now.

K: Right; they can't get it...

P: But the moment it breaks, they can't get it all out of there before they hit it.

K: I saw one interesting statistic yesterday that so far... that is, in the whole dry season, so far, which in other words only has three weeks of the operation in it, their infiltration through the trails is 30% below what it was last year. And last year Sinhanoukville was open.

P: Yet, this time, it is hard to realize it was in ______ last year all through March and April.

K: Well, Sihanoukville Sihanouk didn't get overthrown...

P: That's right; that's right.

K: ... until about the 17th of March and things didn't really turn in Cambodia until April.

P: Good; but I meant we didn't go in until April 30th.

K: We didn't go in till April 30th.

P: So they still had the sanctuaries.

Brought in 3/15/71

K: That's right. So we are definitely cutting in their supplies. The one operation that Haig has to look into when he is over there -- he's leaving tonight--

P: For Cambodia?

K: Is this Cambodia thing. They are not losing anything. The difference a commander makes is...

P: Milling around; milling around. I can understand it. They can change that.

K: Oh, yeah; that can be changed.

P: They've got crack troops in there, haven't they?

K: Well, they're not... They've got the best troops that are left after Laos, but after all, Tri had them moving. [Tape ends here]

DECLASSIFIED

MMD F.O. 12958

By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELECON (Tape)

Mr. Kissinger / The President (continued from previous tape)

Brought in 3/15/71

K: And then, of course, the North Vietnamese started fighting, and the other guy lost his nerve. Well, the one thing the other guy is doing is keeping them from launching an offensive, so we get some negative benefits.

P: It's an interesting thing though that we are not reading a story every day about Phnom Penh ready to fall, are we?

K: Oh, no.

P: The networks have gotten back to running about every week the picture of the oil refinery.

K: That's right. No, the North Vietnamese in Cambodia are fighting for their life. They are just in purely defensive positions now.

P: Well, we've really got to step it up there though, and we are pouring the air in there, aren't we?

K: We, of course, of what we can spare from Laos, but if Laos winds down we can put it into Cambodia. We've got more time in Cambodia.

P: Yeah, up until July.

K: We've got till July, so it isn't. . . There's nothing irretrievable. Nor have we suffered any setbacks. In the rest of the world, there's nothing of any consequence. I checked it this morning.

P: .... marking time.

K: That's right.

P: Well, okay.

K: Right, Mr. President. I hope you are having some good weather.

P: It's been good today. We sure have, and yesterday both -- excellent, excellent. Thank you.

K: Right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Autofill
By: NARA Date 6/10/71

Telecon (Tape)
Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco
Brought in 3/15/71

S: Henry?

K: Joe, I just wanted to check what happened at the Four.

S: Sure. I just walked in. No communique; no agreement; and that's it.
They meet again, regularly scheduled, next Thursday sometime.

K: Right, and no ceasefire proposal?

S: I think ... Yeah, no; at least no formal extension. We'll see what this
means.

K: Joe, you know, I'm very relaxed. I just dropped it into the conversation with the President and a lot of other things.

S: Yeah; I'm relaxed, too.

K: And I think we just...

S: Henry, you know I'm glad he didn't send that little message last night. There's a long 8-page letter that will be coming in later this evening. I may go back in for a while. We're still on this 11:00 deadline with these four airmen.

K: Oh, you poor bastard. That's your area, too.

S: That's my area, too, and so is Pakistan my area. Other than that, I've
got...

K: Joe, I've known a guy who likes heat, but you are ridiculous.

S: It really is, isn't it?

K: Just look -- with all the needling here and there, I'm behind you on this one.

S: I know you are, and thank God for it, Henry.

K: I'm glad we slowed things down a bit this week.

S: Oh, we slowed it down nicely. And, I tell you, Henry, I have a very funny feeling and what I'm trying to analyze and what the hell this all means with these God-damned Russians because, you know, they tould start saying, "well, you Americans, you can't get the Israelis to do anything." And that may be, but tell me why the Russians can't get the Egyptians to buy a reasonably extended ceasefire?

MJD FE 012958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/10/71

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Gen. Vogt/Kissinger
mid-afternoon 3/15/71

K: I have had a call from the President who is getting antsy about the weather.

V: It's lousy. Socked in. No visibility. About 1000 ft.

K: We are going to loose the thing. It's the longest period we have had.

V: The longest for this month. They have been sitting on ready. Our authorization runs out on the 17th. Can it be extended?

K: Yeah.

V: I don't see any possibility of tomorrow.

K: That means two weeks.

V: One stream of lousy weather. We have watched it.

K: They are not look for cloudless skies, are they?

V: No, sir. There's a solid cloud cover. It's hanging right in there. The Laos side is clear. It's right down the mountain chain.

K: He wants a daily report on the weather.

V: We will give it every day.

NARA, Date 5/26

K: Yeah.

K: That means two weeks.

V: We will give it every day.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Ambassador Annenberg

3/16/71 9:50 a.m.

A: I just had a conversation with Sir John Ben, the head of the English Speaking Union. If you are in London on or about June 9 they would be pleased to give a luncheon for you at the Park Lane.

K: Right. What is June 9? Some special occasion?

A: No, he suggested the date. I don't know of any significance.

K: Is he suggesting any time I am in England?

A: He said his understanding was that you would be here on or about that period. If they could get you and have you for luncheon on or about that date they would be delighted.

K: I don't have a fixed date. I would like some excuse to get to Europe some time in June.

A: Why don't you look your calendar over again and give me an approximate period?

K: Okay, who don't we do it?

A: When will you get back to me? I would like to call Sir John. Can I tell him I will have an answer within 4 or 5 days?

K: Yes, I'll get back to you within 4 or 5 days.

3/16/71 11:25 a.m.

A: The officials of the Speaking Union are pointing out that because of the difficulty of getting representative room in June or July the best they can come up with is the Hilton. . . They are having a bar association meeting here beginning in July and going straight on through. There is no room available except the ballroom on June 9.

K: Is that a public speech?

A: Yes, they would like to have a distinguished group. They want it to be a luncheon because they want representative citizens.

K: Is there going to be any press?

A: I don't suppose you can avoid it with 6800 people.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Amb. Annenberg

3/16/71 a.m. page 2

K: My understanding is that they are like these Council on Foreign Relations things, no text and no reporting. I can't maintain my position of not testifying before Congressional committees if I give public speeches.

A: Let me get back to them.

K: There's something wrong here. Some one told me that there is an annual dinner they give.

A: Last year the dinner they had honored Winston Churchill. Senator Scott was the speaker from the States.

K: Someone asked me whether I was interested in doing something similar. But if they are under the impression that they are doing me a favor they are wrong.

A: No, no, they are not under that impression. They thought this would enable them to get an executive and *x* citizens interested in what you have to say together. A luncheon would be easier than a dinner gathering.

K: I have to see when the NATO meeting is. I don't want to be there when the Secretary of State is. I don't want to upstage him.

A: He is coming for the bar association meeting -- that will be some time in July. So I can't see him coming also in June.

K: But he will be there for the NATO meeting also?

A: Maybe; I know he is coming for the SEATO meeting in the latter part of April. The NATO meeting would be in Brussels, not in London I am sure.

L: I will let you know in three or four days. But you say it has got to be on June 9?

A: The problem is to get a decent facility.

K: Okay, I will let you know by next Monday at the latest.

A: Okay, and if you want me to emphasize no reports present I will do my best on that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

10:04 a.m.

3/16/71

K: I was just talking to Ron and I think we should say nothing on troop withdrawal. I know Laird is always spouting off.

R: I can't say nothing.

K: Can't we say the President will make the announcement?

R: Sure, we either have to say -- if my information is correct -- we have to back off what Mel said. You should find out what the President wants to say. If he wants it to be 3000 more per week that may increase this summer and they pushed him on 50,000 at the end of the summer. I can't say nothing because they will be back big news. I should say the President hasn't decided yet. When the President referred to it he meant an average rate.

K: I think you should say that. I just didn't -- it's not directed at you, obviously -- he pre-empts the President and he locks us in and we only get a blip in the newspaper.

R: I only said the President would announce in April.

K: That's how it should be played. We don't gain repeating day after day.

R: How did the President phrase it?

K: Keep that same rate and maybe improve it. 150,000 was at the rate of 12,500 but there were two months we didn't withdraw any.

R: I will try to handle it. I don't want to head on with Mel but I don't think he should announce it.

K: That's my feeling.

TELCORN

Sonnenfeldt/Kissinger

noon-ish 3/16/71

NARA, Date 5/26

S: the language doesn't work with minutemen and Poseidon. Capability is different. Work out replacement all together or say it doesn't preclude ______ on base site. See the point? Your language could be interpreted as preconcluding. I think the simple way to do it to keep replacement in say modernization and ______ within existing categories of weapons on each side. Have other clause in there about not contravening the ______.

K: Yours is too complicated. They would think the President thought it up. What I would have to say is so long as the total number don't increase.

S: That's all right.

K: The ______ trouble is if you say weapons of the same category you can't shift from land-based to sea-based.

S: Then you can't use your language at all and keep it simple and say not modernization and replacements.

K: They were then they are free to go from SS-11 to SS-9.

S: Knock out replacement and put in ______. You can go from land to sea if you re-
placed within category of sea systems ? ? ? .

K: But you couldn't go from Minuteman to sea-based.

S: Yes, we are. You would go from Polaris to Alms.

K: Replacement by weapons of the same category. I will change that. I appreciate that.

S: I have your phrasing, doesn't increase -- that's fine.

K: Annenberg is driving me out of my mind on English Speaking movement.
(Then he proceeded to tell Sonnenfeldt that Annenberg had called and wanted to
have a lunch form him on June.9. Sonnenfeldt said that no, it was supposed to
be an open-ended invitation. HAK said that Annenberg had indicated he wanted
to do a lunch but that that wasn't reason enough for him to go to London. HS
agreed and said he had been dealing with Tom Hughes and that it was for the
Churchill memorial dinner and the date was supposed to be open. He said
obviously it was screwed up and he would try to straighten it out when he
returned. HAK said he would talk with Cromer.)

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger
12:08 p.m. 3.16.71

K: I was a little remiss about the Congressional status of (steno missed this portion due to being interrupted.) However, it may have had to do with CSW and defoliation as Bundy had called about this earlier). He will be prepared to cooperate.

B: Something Congress is doing to legislate Congress. I just saw half your colleagues at the Whitney Young funeral. Take care and I will call McGregor.

KK

TELECON
Secretary Laird
3/16/71 2:08 p.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

L: I'm still at the Senate Armed Services Committee.

K: The President is very anxious that we kill any further talk about the troop withdrawal. He didn't mean every month the same figure.

L: No, the average, the average! I used exactly his quote, word for word. And then I took his transcript yesterday and stayed within his words. I'll send you a copy of the transcript now.

K: I think it's best at this point to say we won't say any more till the President speaks.

L: All I want to do is support the President. I'm not going to walk away from him.

K: Right.

L: I have gone over the State document at some length.

K: Which?

L: The one that's going to the printer's today. I sent over our comments but I guess there won't be meetings on that particular document.

K: We weren't clear about the schedule, but that will be rectified in the future.

L: I don't think it's the greatest workmanship I've ever seen.

K: It has no particular point of view.

L: It doesn't mention the Nixon Doctrine; doesn't mention the Cambodian thrust, makes it look like we are following foreign policy rather than leading it. It doesn't hurt anybody, but it doesn't help either.

K: That's my feeling too.

L: I communicated that, but I think it's better to let it drop now.

K: We thought that with feelings as they were it was best to let it drop. There was going to be a meeting, but I didn't realize we were working within a deadline.

L: Will you get a copy of the statement to the President so he doesn't think I am not following his language?

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELECON
Secretary Laird

3/16/71 2:08 p.m.

K: Right, I'll get the transcript in to him.

L: I'll send it to you right away.

K: Would you? That will help.

L: I wasn't going to go this far. But once the President sets the pattern . . .

K: That's right. I don't think there was any anguish over here. Bill had a press conference today -- he quoted the President and asked for guidance.

L: You make sure the President sees it. You look at the questions and answers; you'll see he's never gotten better support. I think you ought to read the whole thing. I didn't want to go on this thing.

K: I think it generally helpful to go on these things.

L: But I do want to have you read it over. The weather is bad there now. It looks like nothing can go for 48 more hours.

K: And the authority runs out tomorrow?

L: Yes. We'll probably extend it unless there's a good reason not to.

K: What do you think about it?

L: Let me consider. I have been thinking we would just automatically, but let me think about it.

K: Probably ought to extend it 72 hours, but then reconsider it.

L: Okay. I'm disturbed about this other thing.

K: It was not a big flap. The President wants a weather report every 12 hours so we can't just cancel the authority. Let's talk later in the day.

L: In the foreign policy report I was disturbed we didn't talk more about Cambodia. But we got these things cranked in.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

John Carroll/Kissinger
2:55 p.m. 3/16/71

(reporter with Baltimore
Sun)

C: I wanted to confirm with you the Mary McGrory story and get any reflections on it.

K: I don't want to be quoted. Secondly, I am getting a little disheartened because I have been seeing people at the same rate for every week and I have been keeping it quiet.

C: Why do you want to keep it quiet?

K: If it gets public everyone will speak for the record. I thought it was important to establish human rapport and have people who are concerned can be heard by government. If This turns into an exercise that becomes political, I don't know if I can do it.

C: Can you tell me the extent you have had with people?

K: Between student groups or individuals at least one a week.

C: For how long?

K: At least since Cambodia and probably before.

C: In keeping with your policy of not trying to publicize these things, can you tell me which people have been in?

K: I don't want to.

C: Now that McGrory is well publicized how would it come about?

K: We ran into each other at the Radio Broadcaster's dinner and said we should get together. I followed it up.

C: What were the topics?

K: I don't want to go into it. Mary McGrory said I didn't want this. That's not true. I didn't want anyone to think I was trying to accomplish something of a political nature.

C: You don't want to be quoted on what you are telling me. Can I say a source close to Dr. Kissinger?

K: Which part?

C: What you have said about meeting with a variety of groups before and ran into the Senator at dinner.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

John Carroll/Kissinger

2:55 p.m. 3/16/71

-2-

K: You can put it that way.

C: I don't follow what you said about the correction of the article.

K: I don't want him to think I was seeing him on behalf of the President so it wouldn't have political connotations but it doesn't mean the President was against it. He is aware of the general policy and approves it but he didn't clear with him.

C: Who else?

K: He and I.

C: One other personal question. In reading about you recently and talking around I get the impression that you are disheartened

K: Absolutely not.

C: Not true? Still plugging?

K: In great shape. My meglomania is cooking on all cylinders. Ask my staff.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012362
By CNARA Date Stot

TEJCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

3:08 p.m.

3/16/71

K: Say, I can't stay away from you.

D: It's mutual.

K: I just talked here to the President about our conversation. I wanted to make sure that even though you and I -- I will explain the thinking more on Friday -- that we must insist on some organic ______ there. The text is basically the concept on what we have to operate. I don't want you to misunderstand that we will agree to ABM only. He will not unless it's in the context of the letter.

D: As it is now.

K: Right. I confirmed the word changes.

D: The contents as we discussed.

K: That's fine.

D: At last by the end we were clear.

K: What we discussed is exactly confirmed.

K: Nothing new.

K: I don't want you to mistake what I said at the end that our views were less firm.

D: I asked on another question. Philosophical but not on this one.

K: That's what I said. I thought you understood. At the end we were discussing philosophy.

D: Vienna House will be done ? ? ? ? ?

K: As it was in sequence as you described it. See you Friday.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

D: It's mutual.

D: As it is now.

K: That's fine.

D: Nothing new.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Rowland Evans/Kisinger
3:12 p. m. 3/16/71

K: Didn't you call me?

E: Somethis is wrong if you don't get such a letter.* He doesn't know about it.
I called McCloskey.

K: The President wrote me a letter.

E: That was published. When you made your decision on Harvard. I was mis-
informed. I am doing research for the book. I was trying to run it down.

K: Not to the best of my knowledge.

E: Anything with Eban?

K: I don't know if he is the key policy maker. If there's one, I don't know if it's
him.

E: ? ? ? ? it will be the first time done it?

K: MX Yeah.

E: You are coming to dinner on the 15th? I joined forces with Kay Graham.

K: I was planning on vacation then.

E: Do it Friday morning because peple all over the country who want to meet you.

K: And they will all be men too, if I know you.

E: I would like to explore the origin of that. How about breakfast?

K: Next week? Everyx Tuesday?

E: 8:30 in your office? Or the Metropolitan Club?

K: 8:00 at the Metropolitan. The only reason there is to get a different breakfast.
I will be there on the 15th.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
3/16/71 6:40 p.m.

R: I wanted to tell you the report we talked about last night -- we accepted all the suggestions you made.

K: Terrific. I thought it was first class.

R: It's not a great piece of literature.

K: No, but it's a good summary and has a nice warm feeling. It was very constructive and more human than the world report.

R: It fits in and doesn't look competitive.

K: No, it's very good.

R: And on my press conference -- it was not a great success.

K: I thought it was good.

R: It worked out okay. The Laos thing was good.

K: I haven't seen it but my NSC people who follow these things said it was good.

R: The questions were awfully stupid. Look at the transcript.

K: The people here said it was extremely good.

R: The questions were very dead, but on the whole it was all right. No mistakes. I think the President will like the part about Laos. I said it just the way we planned it. No decision yet?

K: On the withdrawal thing?

R: Yes. I pointed out yesterday that it was a success. I gave a lot of reasons. Two of them -- no one mentions that no fighting is going on in Cambodia and in South Vietnam. 92 is cut off; 914 is being attacked and harrassed by the South Vietnamese.

K: The census showed a drop. . .

R: 23 is not being used. Truck kills (?) have lagged. Oil supply line is cut. And fighting in Cambodia as far as Cambodian forces are concerned -- they aren't fighting.

K: One other thing. About 6 weeks ago I was invited to dine with the Iddian Ambassador. I told him I'd reciprocate and invite him to lunch. Do you have any objections to my having him for lunch? Take him to Sans Souci?

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/The Attorney General

7:10 p.m., March 16, 1971

K: I am returning your call.

M: I didn't call you, thank you very much. I tried to get hold of Haig to see if he could find out what happened to this newspaper man.

K: What's his name?

M: Bill Barton, the guy who was shot over there yesterday?

K: Do you want me to find out?

M: I would appreciate it, the 8 pm -- our friends in the press have been trying to find out about it. It was apparently at Tan Son Nhut.

K: What was his name?

M: William Barton, he covered the Justice Department before he was sent over there.

K: Good. See you for lunch Thursday.

M: I just wanted to know all about Gene McCarthy.

K: The bastards now have found that ....

M: You are a softie.

K: I didn't think they would use such publicity.

M: They all find their way to Mary McGrory.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

7:35 p.m., March 16, 1971

K: With respect to this authority, I think -- I have talked to the President about it and it should continue at least for a couple more days, say until Friday evening.

L: Can I go back to Bill, I have kept him informed.

K: You can certainly go back to Bill.

L: He has argued with this but I will just tell him the President wants to do it.

K: I don't want it not done just if the weather is bad.

L: They have authority until 12. They really have 48 hours from 12. It is from the time, you know.

K: Right.

L: They can go ahead on a 72-hour thing. We haven't had any reaction for the past few days, even on the reconnaissance. The reaction thing happened in the latter part of February and we have to stick with that story.

K: On the reaction thing, we have got to.

L: We have got to stick with that. I want to make sure everyone doesn't pull away from it. Have you read the transcript?

K: No, I haven't read it.

L: Goddammit it! I wasn't the one who started that.

K: I know you weren't.

L: I don't like to bother the President with things like that but if people are going to him direct on these things, then I am too.

K: Bill went to Ziegler and Ziegler went to him, instead of coming to me.

L: I gave him the strongest support we can give him. When it goes public, I am going to support it.

K: Right.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

7:35 p.m., March 16, 1971 -- page 2

L: Kennedy called Dan Murphy about the little memo I sent to the President on these contacts we are getting from the White House.

K: I haven't read it yet. I didn't know Kennedy called Murphy.

L: I wish you would look at it. We have got 50 different channels. The memo to the President is just to reaffirm that the channel is through you. We get memos from over there every other day and I am not going to pay any attention to them unless it comes through this channel.

K: I agree and I like it that way.

L: I wrote the memo to the President and really just want that reaffirmed. It is a compliment to you, Henry. I talked to Bill about that report. He really is whetted to it.

K: Frankly he is taking such a beating in the press, I didn't want to ram it down his throat.

L: There are inconsistencies between the President's foreign policy report and ________. They are very numerous and I have made a comparison....

K: Would you send me a copy.

L: I don't want to get into that. We will get cut off on some of those.

K: Next year we will clear all of them through these committees.

L: I will support you, you know that Henry. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs -- I will talk to you about that some other time. Do you have any other problems?

K: No other problems, I will see you soon. I am going to the Irish Reception tonight, are you going to be there?

L: No, I just had a daughter married and she just came home and I am staying home.