DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON

Joe Sisco

4/9/71 9:18 a.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

K: Is Ceylon in your area?

S: Yes, I'm afraid so.

K: I noticed the cable sent saying that the British had sent six helicopters. The next time a cable goes out that involves policy that doesn't go through the White House you and I are going to be in the President's office. This has happened too many times and I have put up with it long enough.

S: What the cable says is ...

K: I don't give a damn what the cable says. This is a matter of policy and it is something/whihh the President is intensely interested. I know what the cable says; I have it here in front of me.

S: What we are trying to do is to get them to produce it.

K: I knew what you are trying to do. I am trying to get the President involved in your bureau. I have been as patient as I can be and this is it.

S: We cancelled out last night on that SRG. Are we rescheduling it today?

K: I'll see about that.

NARA, Date 5/26
BY

TELCORN

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

10:23 a.m. 4/9/71

R: I hope you enjoyed your stay on the West Coast.

K: Very pleasant.

R: I can imagine you have more urgent problems then the M. E. at the moment.

K: I have plenty of problems.

R: I was asked for your comments on certain issues. Not urgent. It can wait
until next week.

K: Let's do it before Wed. next week.

R: I will ask my secretary to work out a time.

K: Good to have a chance to talk. How have you been?

R: Relaxing. Now we let others be worried.

K: Relaxing is not the idea I associate most with you.

By.

NARA, Date 5/20

FELCON
Laird/Kissinger

10:25 a.m. 4/9/71

K: I have over here a suggested question and answer your people want to give at your briefing. I don't usually bother you with this -- residual forces. Down to 43,000. In two parts. First about residula forces and then it ties it to the Korea thing. Then it says less than Korea and Korea is 43,000.

L: That may be for testimony ____.

K: We have to knock off discussion now. We will blow every possible chance.

L: The President has gone to nothing.

K: Whatever the President may have done we should shut up.

L: I will talk to them about it.

K: Can't we say the President has made himself plain and we will not elaborate.

L: Why talk about residual force?

K: They say "? ? ? ? ? on prisoners." We don't want to discuss prisoners now. We want to tie it to the last time he speaks.

L: He has gone beyond that now anyway.

K: We should just stonewall it now.

L: I will say that make no news. They could find old testimony.

K: They want to use what you have said on residual force. The President said ultimately. He kept it open for negotiations.

L: I will talk to them about it right now.

K: They are not to discuss residual forces in any context or President in anyway. Stonewall it.

L: They will stay with the President speech.

K: They shouldn't interpret it. We don't another story on total withdrawal.

L: I don't know where -- out of testimony.

K: It's a good suggested Q&A. They discussed it with my press guy here.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Kay Graham

April 9, 1971 10:45 a.m.

jlj

K: You will be amazed that I am not calling about an editorial.

G: I was just getting my feet on the floor. I was just hanging on to the side of my desk.

K: You can come out from under your desk. I don't know how I got this rather Levantine mission but I know you do Chris Soames?

G: Dimly. Not very well.

K: Let me give you the full story. A friend of mine is dating Chris Soames daughter. Her brother, his son, would like to find summer employment with the Washington Post. My friend says that Chris Soames doesn't want to call you because it would put you in the embarrassing position for not being able to turn him down. He reads your editorials and knows you will not feel badly about turning me down.

G: Has the kid applied. All those things are done but we will just have to take him.

K: I do not know Chris Soames and I do not know the son. If you turn him him down it will be low down on my list of grievances against you.

G: There are about 600 applicants and only 15 jobs. These jobs are usually for journalist students.

K: I think he is a journalism student. Please keep two months job for me when I get booted out of here.

G: These are lush things. I do not feel terribly indebted to him. If he is a jerk I am going to say no.

K: My friend says he is pretty good but I do not know him.

G: There is no point in giving him a job if he is not good.

K: As far as I understand he does want to go into Journalism. When you make your decision if you could drop me a note telling me that you find it easy to turn me down.

G: And I will enclose an addi editorial to prove it. I am in a labor meeting.

K: It doesn't have to be done immediately.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

2

G: I am going to the Reitzman's at 3 this afternoon.

K: Where?

G: Their place in Palm & Beach.

K: I have been invited to several things next week and have been told
that ~~WAM~~ you would be there also. Where are we going next week?
on Tuesday.

G: Joe Alsops, and then there is the one that Rolie and me on Thursday. I started having it for Otis and then Rolie wanted to have one for ________ so we are doing it together. We will see each other on Tuesday and Thursday. I got a wire today that had your name in it. Do you want to hear the story?

K: Sure.

G: I did a BBC interview with a guy from the Observer - in depth type stuff and he asked about the romance with Ted. I told the silly ass story --

K: What was that last word?

G: What? Oh - I told that silly story about guess what move over?
(????)

K: Oh yeh.

G: They must have shown the bloody thing in India because I got a wire from Ken Keating asking if Edward or Henry have the inside track with me. He says that he told them he did - Ken Keating. Isn't that great?

K: Great. That is very great. It would take a convoluted Indian mind to think of something like that.

G: Is that what next week will be like. Together all the time?

K: Without fail.

G: I will put this off and let you know on Monday.

K: There is no hurry. Literally I have no interest except that I have
few women who can say no to me.

G: and who occasionally does although not too often.

K: That's OK - he said through clenched teeth.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird
4/9/71 10:57 a.m.

L: Several things I thought that we ought to. . . Do you have a
couple of minutes?

K: Sure.

L: One of the problems that is developing around here in the past
six to seven months is that there's been a lot of real in-fighting on this
question of the law of the sea.

K: Yes.

L: You've got these private interests and fishing interests and others
doing a hell of a job on this. But I'm afraid national security interests are
not being adequately thought of the protected. Bill is going to this meeting
on Tuesday of next week and he plans to talk informally with Brazil and
some others about the question of the two hundred mile limitation. But once
you bring that up without our policy resolved it causes difficulties. We can
make some changes in our position, but we have to be careful because this
idea that Brazil is going to start taking our boats -- we've got to hard-line
it before we resolve these issues. The right of transit through straits (?)
is important, not only to us but to the Soviet Union too, and before informal
discussions with anyone get started we have got to have a national policy.
I think this is important. I think it is more important than SALT. I know
that for everyong SALT takes the front burner, but our ocean policy from
a long-term point of view is very important. If we don't have the capability
to operate we might as well not have an Air Force or a Navy.

K: I agree.

L: There was a NSSM sent out. . .

K: And then there was some misunderstanding and I held it until we
could talk again.

L: That had to do with the point that's coming up on Tuesday. But
I've been pressing for a year on this. I think it's important.

K: I will do something about it. I think the problem that arose was
that I didn't sufficiently distinguish between the 200 mile policy and the law
of the sea problem. I will do that and get it out today, if you'll back me up
on it.

L: I will back you on it but let me see how you write it.

K: I will. I will get Kennedy to check with General Pursley.

By. NARA, Date 5/20

TELECON
Secretary Laird
4/9/71 10:57 a.m.
page 2

L: Okay. Next thing, it doesn't do any good to get into a hassle with Ford, Scott, Griffin, __________ on what the President did or did not say. These Congressmen are going to unite on their interpretation. __________ for them to get into a big flap on it now. It's Scott talking. To get the White House into a flap with Scott and Ford. . . . Were you there? I wasn't.

K: Yes, I was there. What he said is consistent with both interpretations. The Congressmen are not wrong to draw the conclusion they did that he had a date in mind.

L: They think it is wrong to have the President make a frontal attack on them. For one thing if there's anything that unites guys it's being taken on that way. They say the President said he had a plan but wasn't giving it to them/

K: That's right. He did say that.

L: It would have been better if they had kept their mouths shut, but it's better now if we keep our mouths shut.

K: I think we all should shut up now. We should just stand on the President's speech.

L: That ought to be, but __________ that isn't what happened yesterday.

K: I will see that Ziegler keeps quiet.

L: We are trying to get down into that Congressional fight and I am not going to.

K: Let's just stand on the President's speech, but let's not explain it either.

L: We are going to stay with it, but what's happening over there is that some people are backing away from the President's speech. We have got to just stand on it and then forget it. Scott and Ford and all these guys are going to go all out that he promised a total withdrawal -- let them do that talking. But there's no sense in taking them on. We are the losers if we start doing that.

K: Okay. One thing I wanted to mention. We have a Verification Panel meeting this afternoon on SALT and there are two things: One, the President would prefer to have Safeguard against NCA rather than NCA against NCA in the position . . .

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird
4/9/71 10:57 a.m.
page 3

L: Yes.

K: So if your people can keep that in mind . . .

L: I still think the stop-where-you-are on the Safeguard thing is better than NCA.

K: That is also a possibility. But someone told me that Defense
might propose Xd an ABM only agreement.

L: Who told you that?

K: I don't know.

L: It's a bunch of crap.

K: Well anything that gets to ACDA gets all over town.

L: We don't have a proposal like that, but we may have a stop-where-
you-are rather than NCA, but that would also be tied into offensive limitations.

K: Right.

L: Okay, but the reason I called about this is that Bobby Griffin (?)
has a speech on it today. . .

K: We are not going to say any more.

the law
if you'll back me up

I'll back you on it but let me see how you write it.

BY NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

2:40 p.m.

4/9/71

K: I hope I didn't pull you out of anything.

R: No.

K: We are putting out a directive today addressed to you and Helms and Mel to stop talking about residual forces and the President wanted you to understand as I am sure you will who it was addressed to.

R: I understand.

K: Everyone here knows that security in the dept. has been perfect.

R: On the Ted Shultz article I am sure it didn't come from here. We have been awfully good. On this other I havent said anything.

K: There's not the slightest doubt. Defense today wanted to say that residual force is similar to Korea and Korea is 43,000.

R: It's like a seive. I am proud of State in the last few months.

K: No problem on this end. Another thing I want to ask you about. Last week Sisco sent out cables which reported some changes on Pakistan and Ceylong. Never talked to us. If we could have informal clearances it would make us feel better. We usually agree.

R: I didn't realize that. On Pakistan we were following ? ? ?.

K: I am crabbing at Sisco because your other bureaus there are doing it meticulous

R: I will talk to him about the future and son'e mention the past.

K: That would be good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

April 9, 1971 4:45 p.m.

jlj

L: We are not the ones doing the speculating over here. In some testimony up on the hill we have been giving and it sure doesn't help us. I think it would be a good idea to distribute this around the White House - through Herb Klein's office or somebody.

K: Absolutely, it is a very good point. It was not going to be up but I will try to get that done.

get

L: They were talking about it. . . We have to keep this Congressional briefing thing quieted down not start it up. Some of these things should not be said because it is difficult to go to the Hill and testify then.

K: We are saying no more over here.

L: It would have been better if we had not said anything before. Did you see the New York Times article that says the budget cutters out maneuvered the Secretary. I was on the Hill today and it makes it damn difficult.

K: Which story is that. I did not read it.

L: It is on page C-11. Pentagon Generals and Admirals outmaneuver George Shultz and the Secretary of Defense. Have had put in the budget $2 million more than they need and it should be taken out immediately. That does not help me one Goddamn bit. This comes from the White House.

K: What makes you think it comes from here?

L: It comes from the office of Management and Budget - that is White House.

K: Yes, that is probably true. I will get that memorandum out to my people here immediately.

L: We cannot have everybody around here briefing Joe Alsop and everybody else.

K: I will take care of it. Have a good Easter.

L: Happy Easter to you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Cromer/Kissinger
5:40 p. m. 4/9/71

C: I hope I wasn't inconvencing you.

K: You did a favor. I was so busy. I suppose you will tell me when you are ready

C: It will be at the end of the next week.

K: I want to discuss that matter.

C: You mean your private plans.

K: I need an excuse to get to Europe. A speech is not a reason. Being invited by ISS -- no one would believe that I would go to London for that. Maybe nothing can be done. It's w easy to get there but if there's an excuse --

C: A meeting or a speech would be about the only alibi.

K: Maybe Burt Trent --

C: If you don't mind that.

K: I could set up an NSC type office.

C: That wouldn't embarrass you?

K: Not if it doesn't have a diplomatic aspect. I don't do speeches here unless it's an off the record meeting.

C: I am going over on Monday for a couple of days and I will talk with Burt to see what we can work up.

K: The ideal would be something that would give me more than one occasion which I don't have to do much on but which could get me to Europe.

C: You don't mind Cabinet meetings?

K: I want to get there visibly and do other things too.

C: I thought you wanted something more overt because it provides the pretext.

K: If it were a prestigious group with one meeting a year.

C:: Ditchley?

K: I don't attend meetings of that kind here. It's fixed on a given weekend. The

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

5:40 p. m.

4/9/71

-2-

K: (cont) ideal is something I can move around a bit.

C: Something of a technical aspect between you and the Cabinet officers.

K: Something from the President on paper. Saying this discussed and picking it up and I will come on that basis.

C: And no lable to this.

K: I could say here that you wanted some further discussions on procedure here.

C: Purely technical character and not political. I am on your wavelength and I am sure we can devise something.

K: I may not pick it up but it would be helpful if I could on short notice.

C: On that basis it could be on any basis at all.

K: Then if I am ______ there I can work it out.

C: It would be helpful to have a letter from the PM to the President about what's been discussed.

K: The President is of course aware of this. It would have many advantages. I will see you when you return.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Secy. Stans/Kssinger

10:12 a.m.

4/12/71

S: I don't know if this is in your area but I would like letters from the President on my trip overseas.

K: That's in my area. You will get them. Where are you going?

S: Ireland, Spain, Greece, Iran and Austria.

K: When are you leaving?

S: Sat.

K: Right.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

12:47 p.m. 4/12/71

R: I am shocked by Yost's article.

K: Kx Isn't that outrageous?

R: What I am calling about is his attendance at NSC meetings where VN came up. I know the President is madder than hell. I am not sure it's wise for me to take him on because it will give him flexx visibility.

K: It's only on the Post now.

R: If we take him on we will make enemies. I would like to see a study done.

K: I am doing that here. He was inundating us on memos. Why not on VN? I am looking at his testimony before the Democratic Partisan Committee. I will look at the NSC files.

R: I will do it over here. I am worried about a battle with him now. I

K: The President wanted you to attack him but I have mixed emotions about giving him publicity.

R: Maybe we could get someone in Congress to write a letter. I could answer and set it straight.

K: The first month of the Administration the President made strong public defense of him.

R: No way to explain it. No defense. The President was nice as hell. I gave him a luncheon.

K: I think he hurt himself when this x flap subsides everyone will know why we got rid of him.

R: Everyone in the foreign service ______ and then something like this happens and the President gets mad as hell.

By. NARA, Dato. 5/26

TELCORN

Shirley Temple Black/Kissinger

12:55 p.m.

4/12/71

B: Sorry I bothered you last week and wanted your advice.

K: We have looked into it and think it's perfectly appropriate. We don't know your specific role but I am sure you will negotiate that with the organizers.

B: I am a panelist and rapporteur. The first is easy and I will make sure I am careful on the second part. Another thing. I am going to Saudi Arabia on the 16th. When I was in Geneva in Feb. Amb. ______ who is the UAR Ambassador asked me to come to Cairo. Is this awkward?

K: It would be better if you could go to Israel too.

B: The time is bad but no one has invited me to Israel.

K: That could be arranged. Do you want it done?

B: I am still debating Cairo. Ambassador El Zaib --

K: It cannot be harmful if you don't endorse things but it would only be slightly better if you go to Israel.

B: Sorry I missed you in Washington. I was just going through.

K: Let me know when you are next here.

B: And when you are in San Francisco.

K: I wasn't there.

B: The gossip columns said you were.

K: (Something about he is more concerned about what they report rather than what the fial to report.) Don't believe them. I haven't been there since the visit of the Korean.

B: They put you in every chance they get.

K: Into San. Francisco? I was at the Bohemian Grove but not in the city.

B: It was when the President in San Clemente. I saw it in Herb Kane's column.

K: What was I doing there?

B: I don't remember the young lady.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

S. T. Black/Ki ssinger

12:55 p.m. 4/12/71

K: I am flattered but I've not been there since the Korean visit and not in the Bay area since Bohemian Grove.

B: Shall I advise you if I go to Cairo?

K: And I will tell the Israelis and see if they want to see you.

B: The Rumanian trip was excellent and I wrote 106 pages. Nothing important.

K: Send them. I would be interested.

B: I will have my journal copied.

K: Let me know when you come to Washington. I would love to see you.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Sen. Griffin/Kissinger
1:13 p.m. 4/12/71

G: I am awfully sorry to bother you. I don't know if this makes sense -- in connection with the ANSE meeting this wee I was thinking ex of getting toghether with some Michigan people. The Detroit Free Press, Booth news, and ______. Thinking of cocktails Wed. Any possibility that we could get you to come in and chat with these people?

K: Sure. I will check it out here. If it would -- you really want me to do it?

G: I do. ______ would be well represented -- Mark, Daniels, Knight and ______.

K: I talked with Knight at the Gridiron. He is not with us. What time?

G: In a gorup it might be better. 5:00 at the Shoreham.

K: Not in the newspapers?

G: No, private small group.

K: Let's say I will do it.

G: 5:00 Wed. I will get back to you.
Would

K: At 5:30 be okay?

G: OK. We will firm up the details and get back to your secretary.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Bush/Kissinger

2:16 p.m. 4/12/71

K: The President called for me and didn't relinquish me.

B: I have been thinking since we talked and I think I should send a lett to the editor of the Post. It hasn't been in the Times. I think it will be in the Congressional record but fortunately most of them are out of town. I drafted a letter that will put me on the record in support of the President and answers whether the President is entitled to have a supporter at the UN. It's not argumentative and doesn't tear Yost up. I have talked with some up here. They said if you put out a press release at the UN you are picking a fight and giving notereity to something people here haven't seen. This could be reprinted and say that USUN doesn't feel this way. We believe in the policy.

K: I rather like that. Let me check with Haldeman.

B: (Starts to read letter. Letter is attached to this memcon, verbatim)

K: Say in the apartment you let him use an extra week.

B: "cont."

K: Great letter. I will talk with Haldeman and get back to you.

B: I don't think the Post can say it's denegrating Yost is some way.

Letter to the Editor of the Washington Post.

"The article in Sunday's paper by my predecessor, and by Charles Yost, prompts me to write,

NARA. Date 5/26

I write not because I challenge Mr. Yost's right to speak out now that he is a private citizen, unencumbered by public responsibility; but rather lest anyone feel that Mr. Yost's private views reflect any present differences between Presidential policies and policies here at USUN.

The United States Mission to the United Nations at times has appeared to the public as a separate State Department. This is not good for U.S. policy nor is it fair to the President.

First, I support the President fully in his efforts to get us out of Vietnam. I know from personal conversations of his dedication towards ending the war.

I believe the President is right in stepping up withdrawals. In my judgement setting a "date certain" would slam the door shut on any possible negotiations.

But then there's a second point that goes way beyond the Yost letter. In my view the President is entitled to advocacy here at the UN. His policies deserve to be forcefully presented.

Of course differences may develop, and I plan to express myself on the issues to both Secretary Rogers and the President; but once policies are set, the government is entitled to have an advocate in these important halls.

Though the question of the Vietnam war is not before the UN, It is on the minds of the delegates and Secretariat.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

I think it's important for them to know that this Ambassador strongly supports the President's policies.

I do it because I should do it, and I do it because I believe.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird
4/12/71 2:35 p.m.

L: I want to just check one or two things that might be embarrassing to you and if they are we won't go ahead.

K: To me personally?

L: Well, that might cause problems over there in the White House.

K: Right.

L: First, David is putting on quite a little pressure for a complete briefing for him and his staff on rain-making. I would like to stay away from it.

K: Ed David?

L: Yes.

K: Just skip it.

L: I think it's better not to get into it.

K: These scientists leak like crazy.

L: We just deny the whole thing; I'd like to stay away from it.

K: I'm for that.

L: So if they come complaining to you, I'm the one that shut it off and if they complain too loud we'll do something about it. Let me know if there are too many problems.

K: Right.

L: Okay, second I'm a member of this international prayer group. Harmel goes to the meetings, so does Schroeder and Helmut Schmidt. I met with them when I was a legislator.

K: Yes.

L: You think there's anything wrong with my meeting with them again when I'm over?

K: I don't see why.

L: I did it as a parliamentarian, as a legislator.

TELECON
Secretary Laird

4/12/71 2:35 p.m. pagà 2

NARA, Date 5/26

K: No, I think it's a tribute to you.

L: They want to meet just outside of Paris. It will be all the top parliamentarians. I have met with them on a regular basis. I just don't want to go through all the clearances that I would have to for these meetings.

K: I see no reason why not. What reason would there be against it?

L: I have to get all these clearances for it. I would rather not go through this from ISA and State. I will just call Bill and tell him about it. They pick a different topic for each meeting. For this one it's with respect to law and justice. These papers have to do with violence mostly. It's quite a good list of people. I'll send you a memo about it and talk to Bill but I'd rather not get this listed as anything.

K: I think that's a good idea.

L: Okay.

K: I think it's to your credit that you want to do it.

L: This is a group I've known for a long time. I used to part of it as a parliamentarian. The President was aware of this before I had this job -- I used to give him information about it before he became a candidate. Okay next, you know we're getting a lot of heat now on the budget. They are building up steam on budget cuts and I would like to meet with the Pentagon press corps and put a hard sell on the budget while the Congress is out of session.

K: When?

L: Tomorrow, before the Proxmire hearings start up. I wouldn't refer to the Joint Economic Committee hearings.

K: Okay, as long as you stay away from withdrawal. The President is getting very goosey about terminal dates and so forth, even though he's adding to the talk himself.

L: We haven't been doing that over here. The problem has been this conflict -- Scott went on "Issues and Answers" . . . . .

K: Yes, I saw it in the news summary.

L: They are trying to build up a statement on residual forces thing that I said a long time ago and that the President didn't say.

TELECON

Secretary Laird

4/12/71 2:35 p.m. page 3

NARA, Date 5/26

K: That's just a game they are playing.

L: I know -- they're trying to show that I don't have the President's support. I'm not going to play that game.

K: Another thing. We have the impression that ABM xk isn't being pushed as hard as it should be, in the Pentagon.

L: We have got to start hitting these things on not only defensive but offensive parts of our budget. I would say not only for Vietnam related things but for after Vietnam. On the ABM we've lost / some votes in the last few weeks you know.

K: Who?

L: MacIntire. Now he's not going to go with us. He's going for the es&row thing until after SALT, so we do have a problem there. And it looks like Cook too, but we might get him back.

K: Yes, we might.

L: Scott is okay, I think he'll stay. But we can't afford to lose too many. MacIntire is lost because he thinks he was screwed on Portsmouth.

K: We are selling Portsmouth about six times.

xkkx L: But we're selling it to the wrong people. We didn't get Mrs. Smith on either ABM or SST.

K: You must always give things to ladies without expectation of returns.

L: You're the master.

K: That's the only thing my colleagues recognize me for.

L: That's good. It's a good way to be remembered.

K: I'm having lunch with you tomorrow.

L: Right, at 12:30/

K: I have 1:00.

L: That's okay.

K: Okay, and I'll come over there.

By. NARA, Date 5/24

TELCOM

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

2:45 p.m.

4/12/71

R: I couldn't find you on Friday and I talked to Al.

K: I am seeing you tomorrow today.

R: I thought when I called it would be election period but a few hours later I received a call from back home. It seems it's complicated. I would like the beginning few minutes alone with you. I think I have a little to explain what I will do officially later to you.

K: That's fine. Let's not get too clever because you have to understand the limitations of our bureaucracy.

R: I cannot promise I will not be clever.

K: Your following instructions. I will see you at 5:00.

R: 5:30.

K: At 5:30 and I will arrange that you see me alone for a few minutes at first.

BY. NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Director Frank Shakespeare (USIA)

April 12, 1971 3:12 p.m.

jlj

S: I just wanted to check one thing out with you. My grapevine says that Bob Hill is going to replace Charlie Meyer as Assistant Secretary for Latin America. And that Bill Macomber is going to Spain. We are getting ready to change our public relations man in Spain and I was wondering if you could tip me off.

K: I really do not think this is true.

S: OK. The kind of change we are thing of is a senior man and I might
change my mind about the man I am sending if he was going to work for
Macomber rather than Hill.

K: I have not heard about it.

S: At your level you have not heard anything. That's fine. This was
washroom type gossip and probably is not true.

K: The State Department may be planning something like this but I have
not heard about it.

S: I just wanted to check it out. Thank you.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Sally Quinn

April 9, 1971 4:37 p.m.

jlj

K: I have not been able to think of anything clever to say.

Q: Oh come on. I thought you would stay up all night thinking of something.

K: But you could certainly say something very warm about her.

Q: Henry Kissinger speaks of her with warmth. I had a delightful dinner with Guido Goldman last night.

K: He is one of the world's great people.

Q: He is a nice guy and charming.

K: I think Barbara is one of the great people.

Q: You told me a few things the other night that I can use.

K: I speak of her with great affection and warmth. Most people talk about her because she is brash but she is a good human being. Also fun.

Q: I think of her that way too. She is the most loyal friend I have.

K: That I believe. When am I going to see this? Will you tell me how Guido found you.

Q: Ask him.

K: He is much to descreet.

Q: We went with John Newhouse.

K: I approve of both of your taste.

Q: It should come out in July.

K: Can one see a draft.

Q: Sure. If I ever get it written.

K: You will get it written.

By.

NARA, Date

5/26

TELCORN

Henry Truitt
Mr. Kissinger

5:05 p.m., April 9, 1971

T: Henry, how are you?

K: I just wanted to tell you that the story you heard that on the
day of the speech I asked Rose Woods for the final version of
the speech and she wouldn't give it to me is complete nonsense.

T: That item in the Wall Street Journal? I thought it was but we
wanted to use it for a little bit of color if it was true.

K: No - it is absolutely not true.

T: Has Dave Halperin spoken to you about speaking to the
overseas writers yet?

K: No. But work it out with him and I will do it some time in
May.

T: While I have you on the phone, I have a publication date on
my book about McNamara.

K: Oh yes. I would love to see it. I hope it is sympathetic.

T: Oh yes. I gave him high marks on strategic rationality.

K: Alright Hank, thank you.

mlh

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Admiral Moorer

4/12/71 5:22 p.m

K: We're having a meeting tomorrow of the SRG on Vietnam. I wanted to tell you what I want to get done at that meeting. We going to be using CIA/DIA analyses as a starting point to chart what we have for '72. Then we'll find out what is needed so we don't have a calamity in '72. For example, should we keep Koreans there. . . I think it would be murderously dangerous for us to dance along this year on nothing but theories. This is not an attempt to be a field commander but we have to know where we are heading. So any thoughts you have on this would be helpful.

M: Okay Henry I'll be ready.

K: Good. Thank you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
4/12/71; 9:10 p.m.

K: The President was just talking to me about these things we are lifting. He didn't take the whole package, just four or five items like visa requirements, etc. They had come actually from the Irwin Committee. We had been working with Marshall Green on it so this is something that was not done unilaterally.

R: I wasn't complaining . . .

K: No, no, you weren't complaining except there was no reason why you should know what he was talking about because I don't know what he was talking about.

R: I talked to the President on the Chinese Representation question.

K: He wants to send Murphy out there as he must have told you.

R: That was my recommendation -- he forgets. He apparently spoke to the new Foreign Minister about it, which is fine. It is my thinking we ought to get moving on it. I think this ping-pong thing points up the advantage of doing -- it doesn't have to be Chinese Representation but if he is going to get any benefit out of "generation of peace", we have to move in that direction.

K: That talk with Chow was very helpful because Chow certainly indicated that some change was conceivable. He didn't throw up his hands in horror.

R: I had a one hour talk with him. Christ, what is the choice. They don't have an alternative. I asked if he wanted to proceed as we were. Our interests coincide.

K: I don't expect anything to come up this week. If there is anything, I will be in touch with you.

R: One thing -- I don't understand the business about the defense department putting so much stuff out. It seems to me our position is fairly good now. If we just stand on it . . .

K: Exactly.

R: Why do we have to tell the other side. On the Charlie Yost thing, Alex Johnson called him and really gave him hell. He has been trying to get me and I am not going to talk to him for a while.

K: The testimony before the Platform of the Democratic Party -- everything which we have done.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

R: I don't think we should make an attack on him but we should get the record straight. Maybe we can put something in the Congressional Record.

K: I know he had direct access to the President and we certainly never told him he could not make recommendations on Vietnam. You and I know if the President had not fired him he would still be there with all his thoughts about Vietnam. Have a good trip. When are you leaving?

R: About 10:00 a.m. I will come back -- I have to stay there until Friday and may stay in Mexico Saturday and Sunday -- I will come back if something comes up. I think in Pakistan and Ceylon we are doing as well as we can.

K: Have a good trip!

R: Thank you, Henry.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
McGeorge Bundy
4/12/71; 9:15 p.m.

K: Mac, I wanted to talk to you for a minute about communication from Harris, which I read with intense interest. Let me tell you what the situation is -- this is not inconsistent with what we have been picking up through regular channels but very private channels and we are most anxious for them to stay in these channels. We don't think that business leaders going around making similar noises are going to help this matter -- we want them to stay serious. Any signal that they can get that we are serious that this is the time for major movement would be extremely helpful. Now, how can we get that done? Can you talk to that fellow?

B: Yes, I can.

K: You can do it with more expertise.

B: I can say to Harris on the whole I am interested in what he says and would like to talk to him. Then you might tell me what in particular I can say -- what my feel of what my friends in Washington now thing.

K: You can tell him for example that the Breshnev speech was read with extreme seriousness in Washington -- made a genuinely positive impression.

B: Can I tell them amendments were noticed?

K: Yes, and at very high levels and that we are interested in a fundamental improvement of relations. That we think SALT is a particularly useful subject on which to make progress but that we are open in other areas as well and that you know from personal conversations with me that this is an unusual opportunity.

B: And whether there is some specific area where they think progress is possible. Put the question back to him but with friendly noises.

K: Correct! I think that would be helpful. If the President thought the Soviets were trying to bring pressure on him, he might tend to pull back.

B: That's true of most Presidents. I will play it that way and let you know what happens. I can send this back second-hand, but you want me to show enough interest in talking to this guy. I probably will see him with Harris in order not to break the channel. No problem.

K: I would appreciate it very much.

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

K:
Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
McGeorge Bundy
4/12/71; 9:15 p.m.

B: How are you otherwise?

K: In the middle of our annual hurricane!

B: I get the impression that anti-Vietnam group has shifted from right and wrong and shifted to morality and that we are engaged in destroying South Vietnam. If there anyway of getting responsible account of the actual situation there? The whole thing has shifted from I don't care whether you are right or wrong but you are killing!

K: We have reduced bombing 50%. Statistics are boring but in South Vietnam we have reduced bombing 58% (or 88%, I did not hear it clearly). Over 80% of bombing is in panhandle of Laos where there are no civilians. The only area we are bombing in where there are civilians is in Cambodia. We have asked the Cambodians to give us estimates and those estimates are so low we are afraid to put them out.

B: I suppose you have racked your brains about what can be done about it. I know the Government is not the best witness on these things but I hate to see it go sour.

K: There are almost no refugees in South Vietnam.

B: And you have had enormous amount of resettlement of refugees. Do you have data on this?

K: I will try to get data on this for you. If they catch us in a slight inaccuracy, we have to go back ten spaces. If we could get everybody to shut up for six months, we could get a crack at negotiations.

B: I have always been a pessimist about that but how you make the last jump off the bridge is the hard part.

K: That is what Laos was all about.

B: I understand that.

K: You look at the dove platform of the Democratic Party of 1968. We have exceeded all of that. And what our former colleagues at Harvard said -- we are way beyond that.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

B: Send me what you have in the public domain and I will appreciate it. If I have a brainstorm on how non-government can help, I will let you know. I will talk to that old bird. I don't know if the Harris papers you have mentioned distinct upgrading of Brezhnev.

K: It sounds authentic. Let me know when you come to Washington. I would like to have lunch or dinner with you.

B: Okay, Henry.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

telcon
Gen. Westmoreland/Kissinger
afternoon 4/12/71

K: I have thought with nostalgia and regret of our conversation here many weeks ago. You were right.

W: It's evident.

K: I was uneasy and didn't know what was wrong. I wish you had been wrong.

W: So do I. Formidable undertaking. So much depended on communications and helicopters.

K: I didn't realize they hadn't set up a headquarters for that.

W: They had two generals. Long and Than and then Dong who commands airborne. In retrospect we should have ? ? ? ? ? .

K: Sent one of our guys up.

W: A 4-star on the scene.

K: We came close. The other side wasn't ? ? ? ? ,

W: The operation was still successful. Our losses were heavier than might have been. Our materiel losses are shocking.

K: In helicopters?

W: That is public knowledge but 94 artillery pieces and tanks and EX APC.

K: I haven't seen it.

W: Not revealed and shouldn't be. It gives you a better idea of what happened. The personnel involved -- you left the room. Dong I have no confidence in. The xxx man you named earlier xxx thought Louad fell flat on his face. He was relieved after Tet.

K: How did they think with these guys it could be done.

W: They have come a long way and learned as time has gone on. Give more credit then for running something as complicated as this. We would have been hard pressed to run it ourselves and too much for these little fellows.

K: I remember the briefing you gave to the WSAG a few months ago. If this war doesn't ruin you, it breaks your heart.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

W: It's been an unhappy national experience. In retrospect -- hind sight is always 20-20.

K: You had Atapu pointed.

W: These things have to be planned in advance. We should have pulled advisors before to shake them down so they would have self-confidence. We should have stockpiled airborne, they take terrible casualties. We should be able to replace them. Build up 120% overstrike. These things have to be anticipated. Insufficient attention given to control of airspace where you have ______ on the ground. Complicated problems. If we do it over again these things will be thought through. Such a veil of secrecy Abe was afraid to take steps to ______ it. Too much secrecy in the plan.

K: And not adjusting it to conditions when we hit them.

W: ? ? ? ? ? Not fully appreciate it puts a veil of caution on the whole thing. The operation was successful. Nox Know advisors morale effect.

K: Only reports when it was going on.

W: It was like Tet offensive k in that regard. Materiel losses when you see that it was most indicative thing on disordliness and withdrawal (?).

K: I will get it from Haig. One other thing, I have a Colonel on my staff who is being considered for promotion to Brigadier General. Kennedy. I want to say he has done a superlative job.

W: It would be helpful to have a letter.

K: I wrote to Laord.

W: I have heard good reports on him. To hear from you is helpful. One postscript remark. Abe in the most difficult position you can hear of. Thieu took it over Americans were taken out because Thieu talked to the field commanders. On one occasion we talked Thieu into a course of action and orders send to L who talks with Thieu and reverses it. It's awkward. You have to fully appreciate the position that Abe was in.

K: No problem with Abe. It's a problem of you cannot say you learned from this experience because there will be no other one. I meant to call and tell you that your briefing at the end of Feb. was very clairvoyant.

W: Thank you for calling.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Amb. Rabin

4/13/71 4:09 p. m.

K: How are you doing?

R: Not as good as I would like to be. I got information that Yigal Alon is planning next to be in-New York. He thought it would be a good idea to see you, not to negotiate...

K: No, he's an old friend of mine.

R: I think it would be a good idea for him to talk to you. He will come Monday evening to New York and is supposed to leave Tuesday for Canada. It would be here or New York; it's up to you.

K: I can't come to New York.

R: Can we arrange for next Tuesday breakfast?

K: Yes.

R: Okay, I will tell him he has to adjust his plans and we will arrange the details.

K: And we will keep it informal.

R: Very informally.

K: Will anyone here know he's in town?

R: No, he doesn't know it yet. He will visit with me at my home. He will come Monday night very late and leave Tuesday.

K: Okay, and you will invite me for Breakfast.

R: Right.

K: Okay, and I will bring Haig.

R: Fine.

K: Okay, and on this matter we discussed yesterday. All I can give you is personal advice. I don't care what you submit personally, but if you do it without a fallback position, you're doing it at your own risk. But you are aware of this.

R: Yes I am very aware. Therefore I am glad he is coming. It will be good for you to talk to him in a very clear way.

K: Yigal is a student of mine. I expect discipline from my students.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger

4:24 p.m.

4/13/71

K: What do you think of this PM coming over here?

S: The Morroccan? I gather we are going to have a meeting later on at the Dept. but the complication is this -- I just had a briefing on this. Hassan has a complication because he made a proposal for an Arab summit sometime ago and now there might be a coincidence of time.

K: We cannot refuse him can we?

S: No, since they are very friendly. I will find out later today.

By. NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON

Under Secretary Irwin

4/13/71 5:55 p.m.

I: Have you seen the cables from Rocco on the tendency of the King to back out of the visit next week?

K: Yes.

I: We are talking about it now.

K: He wants to send the Prime Minister over?

I: Yes, Laraki. And the reason apparently, it is now coming out, is that they are having a meeting of the Arab chiefs of state -- don't know when but presumably in the near future. And this was the basis for suggesting the King shouldn't come. The problem is, because of whatever political reasons, they don't want to come to the U.S. just before an Arab summit meeting on the Middle East or whatever. A recent cable, sent to me just 5 minutes ago, section one of two parts, says this kind of thing. Our people feel it important that the President receive Laraki although he has not yet left. He decided either from our ambassador's statement over there or from discussions with the NEA and African Affairs here -- they held up Laraki and are now waiting to see if the President will receive him.

K: Yes, he will. I've checked that. But he doesn't have to come.

I: That was my reaction -- why come? But both Newsome, Atherton and Sisco who are here in my office, feel that it would be a mistake not to let the Prime Minister come.

K: We'll see him. About noon on Thursday is the tentative appointment.

I: He could get here by then I guess.

K: We can be flexible about that. But the problem is if they are going to cancel we had better un invite a lot of dinner guests.

I: I guess we can't be certain till he's here on that, but as far as actually cancelling . . .

K: But you think that's what is going to happen?

I: That's what it appears to be.

K: Well, I've talked with the President and he agrees to this.

By.

NARA, Dato

5/26

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin

4/13/71 5:59 p.m.

I: I just wanted to be clear...

K: Sure, we can shift it to Friday incidentally.

I: We were planning to send a memo over questioning whether he'd receive him or not. And once he had replied we could tell the Ambassador...

K: No need to send the memo.

I: We can call him now and tell him Laraki can come?

K: Yes. If he decided not to we'd be delighted...

I: But we can say we've already asked him?

K: Yes. If you want to keep your records meticulous you can say on the basis of my comment.

I: Okay, thank you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mosbacher/Kissinger

6:40 p.m.

4/13/71

M: I was sitting up in Jack's office when he called you. For what it's worth, I want you to know how I feel. I think they have made excused why the don't want to come for some reason.

K: Our fault?

M: No but I think they will try to pin it on us. Perhaps in our shop and let it be. One thing they have made an issue of which the President should know of. The VP is not going to see him and not play golf with him and not go to the reception.

K: Why not?

M: I don't know.

K: You tell us what we need and we will have him do it.

M: I think the VP should at least go to the reception at their embassy and a drop by at Blair House.

K: I will see to it.

M: Half the Cabinet have declined the reception at their embassy. Maybe because they are out of town but we should try to do something.

K: I will take care of both things. Particularly since he may not come.

M: The President should be aware in case it's brought up.

K: OK.

M: I am meeting with the ambassador in the morning. We are probably going through the motions of continuing to plan the visit. I don't know if you noted -- the coordination of the protection of embassies here -- the one of a member of your staff was involved in a chemical experiment or something outside Dobrynin's.

K: Jewish?

M: No. Marshall Wright's boy.

K: Jesus!

M: The police don't think it's very bad but I thought you would want to know. The other thing is how I hope you can come Sun. night.

K: I will call on Thurs.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012358
By CHNARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dobrynin (Moscow)

7:15 p.m., April 13, 1971

D: Hello, how are you?

K: I just wanted to see whether the line to Moscow are real.
Congratulations on your election to the Central Committee.

D: Thank you.

K: It gives all of us here a feeling of greater confidence in you.

D: Thank you very much.

K: I saw one of the members from your Embassy this afternoon.

D: Today?

K: Today, Voronsov, but that's not the reason I am calling. I am calling just to see whether that number you gave me is any good.

D: ??

K: It is a technical point which you and I had already discussed and just wanted to make sure it was clearly understood.

D: Was it the point?

K: No, I didn't raise that at all.

D: Another point?

K: On the other suggestion having to do with the April 16th meeting,

D: Oh, I see.

K: One other procedural suggestion to make. On the exchange of letters, hoping you have an answer. It is on the suggestion you and I have already discussed.

D: Understood, understood.

K: It is really just to make sure one procedure on which two people might do the talking -- one particular suggestion to make really for convenience on a policy issue will fall.

D: I will see in the morning and give you back an answer.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

7:15 p.m., April 13, 1971

D: Hello, how are you?

D: Thank you.

D: Thank you very much.

D: Today?

K: Today, Voronsov, but that's not the reason I am calling; I am
calling just to see whether that number you gave me is any good.

D: ??

D: Was it the point?

D: Another point?

K: On the other suggestion having to do with the April 16th meeting.

D: Oh, I see.

D: Understood, understood.

TELCON (TAPE)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971

K: Mr. President.

P: Yeah, Henry.

K: I just wanted to mention a number of relatively minor things to you.

P: Yeah.

K: One is the South Vietnamese are launching another one of these raid type operations tonight.

P: Good.

K: This time it's a more sizable one. There is a big sweep inside South Vietnam.

P: Good.

K: And then they are going to land some battalions in Base Area 611.

P: Um-humm.

K: And I think it is very useful to tie down the North Vietnamese.

P: Good. Is it well-programmed, well-supported?

K: It looks well-programmed and well-supported, Mr. President, and I've called Moorer to say that we don't want any significant American losses in helicopters and so forth.

P: Right, right.

K: Secondly, I talked today to Vorontsov from the Soviet Embassy.

P: Right.

K: The reason was that there is a meeting between Rush and Abrasimov --

P: Yes.

K: On Berlin and I just wanted to make sure that they didn't blow -- that they understood which way the channels were going.

P: Yes. He understood that?

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MD E0 12958
 By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCONE (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

April 13, 1971, 8:00 p.m.

K: Oh, yeah, he understood it and he said that Dobrynin was coming back Sunday with new instructions and that we should take the Brezhnev speech very seriously and he was slobbering all over me.

P: Good. We'll see Sunday what he told ______.

K: And then I did something which was a little unorthodox, I told him that Dobrynin had given me his phone number in Moscow.

P: Um-humm.

K: And I had lost it, so he called me an hour later and said it might be a nice thing if I called Dobrynin and congratulated him on his Central Committee membership.

P: Good, do it.

K: In fact I did it. And Dobrynin said we'll have something on that exchange of letters when I come back.

P: He said that.

K: Yeah, but he didn't say what it was.

P: Yeah.

K: And he also said he was coming with new instructions.

P: But not indicating anything on the SALT?

K: No. Well, he couldn't, Mr. President, on an open telephone.

P: Oh, it was open telephone, okay.

K: Yeah, we don't have a secure line -- well, we have the hot line but I didn't want to use that.

P: Right.

K: This was a commercial phone.

P: Good. How did he sound?

MJD F-O 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCOM (TAPE)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971

K: Oh, he sounded -- they are going to do something, Mr. President. And finally, one other thing, I called Mike Mansfield on your behalf and said you --

P: Just a second -- hold it. Go ahead.

K: I called Mike Mansfield and told him that you had asked me to tell him about what you are announcing tomorrow in strictest confidence.

P: Right.

K: And I thought he would appreciate it and he was beside himself, very statesmanlike.

P: Was he?

K: The President has him warm support and congratualtions and he said now he sees what you were talking about when you were hinting at China policy and of course he raised again his going there.

P: Um-humm. Oh, yeah, we have it in mind.

K: And I thought, Mr. President, that tomorrow morning if you agreed that perhaps McGregor might call Ford and Albert. That gives MacGregor a little status and gives him something Dovish to do.

P: Yeah.

K: And let State notify the Foreign Relations Committees.

P: Well, let MacGregor also call Mahon. Mahon is a good man.

K: That's a good thing.

P: And let him -- cause he's the best man on that side.

K: Right.

P: And let's see! -- on our side, Scott.

K: Scott he should call.

P: Yeah, he might as well.

8:00 p.m., April 13, 1971

K: Maybe Griffin.

P: Yeah, Scott and Griffin, yeah. And let's see -- anybody else -- I think that's enough. State can inform the others. Well, MacGregor might call Aiken.

K: He's on the Foreign Relations Committee --

P: That's all right, let him call Aiken. Let State handle the others.

K: Okay.

P: See.

K: Right.

P: Give Aiken a little brush, that's a good idea.

K: Right. Good, Mr. President, I'll get that done immediately.

P: Fine, okay, Henry.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED

MD F.O. 12958

Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCONE (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

April 13, 1971

K: Al, I talked to the President. He wants MacGregor to do this calling.

H: All right, sir.

K: And he wants him to add Mahon and Griffin to the list.

H: Mahon and Griffin, okay.

K: And Ford and Scott. He also wants him to add Aiken but I just think
State is going to have a heart attack.

H: Oh, boy. On Aiken, they will.

K: Well, what do you think, I'll just ignore it.

H: Yeah, ....................................

K: That's rubbing salt into the wounds.

H: You know they called back.

K: Yeah.

H: And they said we feel that if you want to low-key this that it should
be done over here at the Department.

K: They are something. But did you tell them MacGregor is going to
do it, not I.

H: No, I said the President had put a hold on it. I never mentioned
you in the first place, I said the President. Then I will tell them
in the morning that he has asked MacGregor to do it. No sense in
getting him worked up tonight.

K: Yeah, Okay. They are something, imagine last week you couldn't
get them to say a word.

H: That's right, that's exactly right.

K: Okay. I wouldn't tell MacGregor anything tonight, he will leak it
all over the place. Why don't you tell him to come in at 8:00, that
the President wants him to call some Congressmen and you are getting
the stuff typed up for him.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM (TAPE)

Mr. Kissinger/Clark MacGregor

April 13, 1971

M: Henry, Clark.

K: Clark, how are you?

M: Fine, thank you.

K: Clark, we are doing something tomorrow on which I think you will basically approve of -- in fact, which I know you will approve of and which we thought you might be the man to call some of the leading Congressmen and Senators on in a low-key way, we don't want to make a big splash with it.

M: Yeah.

K: But we thought you might agree to call Ford, Mahon, Griffin and Scott. And I am having Haig type out for you what the thing is.

M: Fine.

K: And if you could by at 8:00.

M: Sure.

K: So that you can be the bearer of some good news occasionally.

M: Good, good, I will, I'll be in your office at 8 o'clock, Henry.

K: Good, Clark. If you would be willing to do it, it would be helpful and I think it would help you.

M: Happy to.

K: Good, Clark.

M: Thank you.

K: Right.

M: Bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: MW E0 12958
By: NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCOM (TAPE)

Senator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

April 13, 1971

K: Hello

M: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Senator, how are you?

M: Fine, thank you.

K: The President asked me to call you on a very confidential basis to
let you know that he is going to announce tomorrow a series of
measures easing certain restrictions on Communist China.

M: Good.

K: Specifically that we will let Chinese give visas to Communist
Chinese and then to a number of technical measures which are
important to them such as selling oil to Chinese ships except those
going to North Vietnam.

M: Good.

K: Easing currency restrictions and drawing up a list of goods in which
trades will be -- in which export licenses will be granted and after
that list is drawn up, we will then permit importation of Chinese
goods.

M: That sounds in the right direction, Henry.

K: We also are announcing after this series of steps is completed we
will review them and consider a new set of steps.

M: Good, good.

K: We are trying to keep it low-key, Senator, because we don't want to
have the Russians right up a wall.

M: No, I understand.

K: So we are not going -- of course, we can't control the press but we
are not going to make an enormous fanfare over it but it of course
will be noticed.

DECLASSIFIED

MD 12958
Authorship

By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCONE (TAPE)

Senator Mansfield, Mr. Kissinger

April 13, 1971

M: You know, Henry, the President suggested about a year ago or so ago that I -- if I could, I'd go to China.

K: Well, he mentioned that to me again last week and --

M: I was going to mention it to him again.

K: And as far as we are concerned, you have our strong support anytime you think it's appropriate.

M: Well, good, because I wouldn't do it without his approval.

K: Well, you will have his strong support. We think this may be a very useful thing to consider.

M: We will look into it.

K: Good, and this announcement won't be made until 11:00 tomorrow and we won't notify any other members of Congress until tomorrow morning.

M: Good enough, Henry.

K: Right.

M: Okay, Henry, thank you very much.

K: Nice to talk to you.

M: Good to talk to you.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority MD F.O. 12958
By NARA Date 6/10/71

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Herb Kaplow/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. 4/14/71

K: I wonder what you make out on the table tennis and what weight you give to Chou En-lai today.

HAK: I wouldn't go overboard but it's obviously a carefully planned move. You think that People's Republic of China in the World Report wasn't an accident and other public and non-public moves too which they are responding.

K: Can you give details?

HAK: No. It's not a world shaking -- don't say WH sources said this comment.

K: How about government officials?

HAK: No. Say nothing.

K: How can I say it?

HAK: Making moves. Relaxation of travel and general relaxation in atmosphere.

K: Are we making likely to do something in response to their action and something today?

HAK: We will probably announce -- we will announce today but don't scoop anybody. Some relaxation.

K: Don't you use it until you announce it?

HAK: It's the beginning of a process to be nurtured carefully. It's a tough and complicated problem.

K: Can I use that?

HAK: Yes.

K: Is there any danger that the Chinese might be doing this and nothing beneath it?

HAK: No it's not likely there's nothing beneath it but we have to find out what it is. There's something more than have a table tennis team there.

K: What do they get out of improved relations?

HAK: They have been isolated. May want more normal diplomatic postures. May be worried about the Soviets.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Herb Kaplow/Kissinger

10:40 a.m.

4/14/71

K: Maybe not now but later influencing the VN situation.

HAK: Much further down the road. I don't want to speculate. I hope less
than years. The way they look at things. It will be noticed.

K: Because we are announcing something today we want to show we are interested in picking up and responding?

HAK: We are picking up process we started 18 months ago. Warsaw talks --

K: How can I attribute?

HAK: I may have misled you when I said not so public -- what I meant was
what's been going on in Warsaw and like that.

K: Can I say the administration thinks?

HAK: Yes. Don't say WH sources. Waht would you say?

K: Significantly and real.

HAK: Not significant. The beginning of a process for what we want to get
across.

K: Are there dangers in this thing?

HAK: Shouldn't raise expectations to high. Major problems between us. On the
whole we think this is a constructive development.

K: How will you announce it?

HAK: Züigler.

K: This morning?

HAK: I think so.

HAK: I
May be w

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Robt. Murphy/Kissinger

11:26 a.m.

4/14/71

M: I am surprised to find you on the job so early in the morning.

K: In crisis times I start earlier.

M: Since talking with Gen. Haig I have talked with ~~all~~ company people and I will cancel meeting in Geneva and the Bilderburg conference. I am coming tomorrow at 1:00. Could I call you when I come?

K: What time do you get in?

M: 4:00 on the Metroliner.

K: When How about here at 4:30? I will set up a car.

M: At Union Station.

K: Then we can discuss the time for the other. It's good now to talk with the Generalissimo. The President mentioned the ~~usk~~ fact that he was aksing you to go there to Chow and he couldn't have been more interested.

M: I talked with Chow before and he wanted me to talk with me on business. I will come to your office tomorrow.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

12:50 p.m. 4/14/71

Z: I am going to the other briefing now. Horner got me in the hall. He says there's an indication in his office that Chou En-Lai wants to come for a visit.

K: Just say we have heard nothing. We don't know anything about it. Nothing more.

Z: If they say what do you mean, I know nothing more.

K: It's purely speculative.

Z: OK

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By. NARA Date 6/1/67

TELECON

Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

5:35 p.m., April 14, 1971

R: I've got something from you, you know, to Haig.

K: I haven't seen Haig since he talked to you so I don't know
what exactly ...

R: The idea is that before we... well, he informed us that he
got something about a meeting tomorrow.

K: Oh, yes, that's right. And I just wanted to know whether you
were going to make a proposal then.

R: I think this was the idea. And now, I can get it here before.
It might be that it will be possible to postpone the meeting there.

K: No, you know -- I've got trouble enough advising on our foreign
policy; I can't advise on yours. You know my view.

R: Yeah. Because I thought it might be a good idea to tell... I
think though there will be certain changes. I don't know which ones.

K: Yeah, but as I've been trying to explain to you, I don't much care
what is in the original proposal. I think you are better off making your
changes in the second round rather than in the first. The initial proposal
is of no concern to me as long as you know where you want to go.

R: Well, I hope that... I don't believe that it will be essential at
the present to decide... or at least to know exactly what is the second

K: No; as long as you know to whom you are going to make the move.

R: Yeah; yeah. Therefore, I think I can -- I'm not sure, but I
think that I can -- bring about a postponing of giving the paper from
tomorrow, let us say, to Monday. And, in the meantime, if you want
to see it, I think... not full negotiations -- that's just to have your
comments.

K: It's entirely up to you. Let's see -- what date is this -- the 14th?

R: It will be 17th or 18th.

K: Well, I don't know whether you have decided with whom you are
going to settle this, if you are going to settle it at all.

TELECON

5:35 p.m., April 14, 1971

-2-

R: Well, I think that in the long run -- Hello, in the long run I believe that the idea is to take your advice. The question is the substance not...and when it comes to the substance, I don't believe that ...

K: Well in that case for a reason which I will explain to you when I see you -- you would be better off presenting it as late as possible, say the 18th.

R: I see.

K: And I will explain that to you when I see you. I don't want to do it on the telephone.

R: Fine.

K: But I think it is of some consequence.

R: I see. Uh, then, If I will get it I hope that I will be able to see you in enough time...

K: Then you see me and I will talk to you also about the reason why I am making that suggestion.

R: Fine. Alright, therefore, it might be that tomorrow I will ask to see you if I'll get the paper.

K: That will be fine. I think there is a lot to be said for waiting until, in fact Tuesday might be better than Monday. But, it is up to you.

R: I understand. Alright.

K: And if you get the paper on an informal basis...

R: Very informal, yeah.

K: I'll be glad to comment on it and then let's see.

R: Fine.

K: Good.

R: Alright.

K: Thank you, I will hear from you tomorrow. Is that breakfast on for Monday?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
V.P./Kissinger

5:43 p.m. 4/14/71

VP: What the hell are we doing with the Chinese?

K: We are playing a game with the Russians and Chinese. What the Chinese
are doing is they are scared the Russians will attack them. We had already
decided on these measures today and discussed it with the Taiwanese.

VP: What about ping pong?

K: That's their gig to the Russians. Let me come over on Friday to give you
a rundown.

VP: I think I will be here.

K: You mentioned anytime in the morning?

VP: (Aside: What's Friday morning?) Let's make it around 10:00. I will
see you then.

K: Look forward to it.