b. **Additional Explanatory Remarks -**

(1) An infantry or airborne division weighs approximately 28,000 short tons. The combat echelon of such a division with a limited amount of supplies and equipment weighs 7,000 short tons. The Army is thinking in terms of a division force (division plus supporting units) weighing approximately 14,300 short tons. It would require a fleet of 272 C-133 aircraft to move such a force (14,300 short tons) to Cairo in 10 days. The initial cost for such a fleet would be 2,584 million dollars; the direct operating cost of such a move would be 11.3 million dollars. This division force would depend on a surface LOC. To supply a unit of this size by air alone would require 9,438 short tons being airlifted of a 30-day period at an operating cost of 7.5 million dollars.

(2) A 5,000 short ton Army division possesses a very limited combat potential unless it is provided with logistics support at the rate of 44 lbs. per man per day. The airlift required to deploy the combat echelon of an Army division can be misleading if considered out of context with the logistics support required to maintain its combat effectiveness. Therefore, in the event an Army division is deployed to an area where its required support is not prepositioned, the total aircraft requirements for an Army division must include both the airlift needed for its strategic move from the ZI to its overseas destination and the lift required to provide logistics support at the rate of 44 lbs. per day. When these two requirements are considered together, they present a more accurate computation of the airlift required to deploy an Army division in the event of local aggression. Further, when these two requirements are totalled, they represent a questionable amount of military resources when compared with the effectiveness of combating local aggression, by other means.

3. **QUESTION** - If the Air Force budget were increased by $2 - 3 billion over the level of the FY 57 budget request, how would the increments be applied, i.e., to which budget categories and in what amounts (aircraft and related procurement, other major procurement including electronics and guided missiles, research and development, personnel, maintenance and operations, and construction)?

C

ANSWER -

a. The Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force in their recent appearances before the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, stated that the FY 57 budget was sound and that it will support 137 wing force structure; will permit the Air Force to proceed with its modernization program; will afford a sound level program of research and development; and will enable the Air Force to maintain its facilities on a minimum essential basis. However, if we are to continue to support an Air Force program of this magnitude, there is no escape from a larger budget in FY 58 than the one submitted for this year.

b. In view of the position taken by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force on the FY 57 budget, a determination has not been made as to how an increase by 2 - 3 billion dollars over the level of the FY 57 budget request would be applied.

c. The budget categories to which additional funds would probably be applied are as follows:

Aircraft and related procurement

Procurement other than aircraft

Operations and Maintenance

Military personnel

Research and development

Reserve personnel

National Guard

Military Construction.

d. Because a detailed breakdown of funds by budget category has not been made, I cannot furnish you this information at the present time. In general, however, additional funds made available by the Congress would probably be apportioned at approximately the same percentage among the budget categories listed above as contained in the FY 57 budget request.

Sub-committee II (Strategic Concepts) of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons, held its third meeting on March 8, 1956, at 5:30 p.m. at the Harold Pratt House. Present were: William T. R. Fox, Robert Amory, Discussion Leaders; Joseph E. Johnson, Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Melvin Conant, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; George S. Franklin, Jr.; Caryl P. Haskins; George F. Kennan; Henry deWolf Smyth; Carroll L. Wilson; Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. William Fox opened the meeting's discussion by suggesting certain requirements on conditions which American foreign policy would have to include if this country, and our allies, were to have effective plans and adequate capabilities to wage limited, nuclear war. In listing these, the speaker noted the difficulty -- and danger -- of aiming at limited war as such but that there were certain conditions which would have to exist if limited war were to be feasible. He cautioned that both sides have to have limited objectives; the enemy must regard unlimited war as less desirable than a limited one. The United States must have the resources to make a general war too risky for the enemy. In both the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War the onus for expanding the issue lay on the enemy. Only unlimited objectives will justify unlimited means. He noted the cost involved in preparing to meet limited and unlimited wars. The multiple forms of military preparedness necessary for such a general preparedness, and over a long period imply tremendous costs which will be an important domestic issue. No policy such as adopted apparently in Great Britain where military expenditures have been from 3 to 4 per cent annually after Korea will meet the problem; the American budget would have to be flexible: being in a position to meet all contingencies will be very much more costly than achieving maximum efficiency against a single contingency. The United States must consider, therefore, as the basic conditions to be met:

1. Agreement as to the feasibility of limited objectives.

2. Acceptance by the enemy of the fact that a general war is less desirable than a limited one.

3. Fiscal flexibility in the United States with public understanding of the cost involved in being prepared to meet general and limited wars.

4. If the opponent is to be forced into limited war, it must be made as costly as possible for him to expand it.

5. The prospective enemy must not be able to get the fruits of victory by joining in conflicts or issues within the free world.

6. Our European allies must believe their contribution makes a difference; they have to understand our strategy and agree to it.

7. Be prepared to respect vigorous neutrality -- and help it to remain so -- on every front except the essential NATO one.

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Mr. Fox said that in the Korean war the fighting remained limited because an enlargement of the war would have been unsatisfactory to the U.S.S.R. Nor could we, for our part, have kept our allies had we enlarged it and Mr. Amory suggested we could not be sure we had a real advantage in superiority. Also, there were limited objectives on both sides.

Mr. Kennan, referring to the conditions listed by Mr. Fox, asked if there were any reason to believe any of these conditions were not equally valid ten years ago? Mr. Kissinger suggested that up until two or three years ago we had the theoretical ability to achieve our objectives by a general war at acceptable cost. Mr. Kennan said he had never seen any reason to believe that Russia, since 1945, wanted a third world war or would have started a war if we did not have the bomb. They had just emerged from a devastating experience; Churchill was wrong on the deterrent and West European security; the Soviet could "skin the cat" less dangerously. If we had used our theoretical nuclear advantage what would have been the end -- occupation? Out of the question. Is it reasonable to think that the use or threatened use of the bomb would ever convince the Russians they were wrong? It might make them more prudent. The Soviet would not submit to ultimatums -- they are adept at blackmail themselves. The smashing of North Korea would have been regarded as a tragic reversal but not evidence of their policies were wrong.

Mr. Fox asked if we developed great abilities in meeting subversion and limited wars but were "wide open" in terms of a general war would the U.S.S.R. desist? Mr. Kennan replied the Russians would give greater thought to what they would do once the ultimate weapons had been used; he doubted the Russians would use them. It is essential that the other side understand your objective is limited. We could have used force in the Berlin Blockade if we had made the point clear that the security of our lines of communication were our only objective; if we had kept to our limited objective in Korea and not "liberation" of Korea, the Chinese would not have intervened. Mr. Johnson suggested a major problem here was getting American acceptance of limited objectives: unconditional surrender has become equated with victory. Mr. Kennan thought our experiences in the two world wars were very misleading; our ability to inflict such final punishment on Germany and Japan is not likely to be repeated.

Mr. Amory asked what was meant by "general" war? Do you consider the acreage involved or the weapons used? Mr. Fox replied the enemy's intent, extent of operations and the means used were all pertinent.

Mr. Johnson, in referring to the question of American willingness to risk Chicago and New York for Berlin or Paris, said some French were concerned about our determination in the face of such an alternative. Mr. Wolfers asked if there were a nuclear-SAC balance, would not the advantage lie with the U.S.S.R. in their conventional forces -- they might overrun all of Eurasia.

Mr. Kissinger, referring back to the ultimatum question, suggested that while you cannot convince a man he is wrong by the use or threatened use of superior force, you may cause a transformation in his policies and this they might do if the superior force confronting them had acknowledged limited objectives.

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The costs involved in Mr. Fox's multiple forms of military preparedness are huge, Mr. Kennan remarked. However, he said, we ought not to match the Russians. He added that he was bothered by the liltoralness of military planning, by the insistence on the equality in arms, men, etc; there are so many variables in war. Wars never occur or are fought as you calculate it beforehand. Since weapons have a psychological value in peace -- have some value for the shadow they cast -- we should consider this aspect more carefully and, specifically in the case of Europe, it is and will remain useful to have a small, highly élite ground force regardless of its possible military value. Such a force could accomplish much psychologically and even militarily if genuinely élite. We need badly small highly mobile units which could be sent on short order and which would have a quick punch -- would have been very handy in June, 1950. Mr. Wolfers thought Europeans were skeptical of the value of foot soldiers and if we talk to them about limited wars they may conclude the U.S.S.R. will win through its superiority in waging conventional war. Mr. Kissinger mentioned the reliance of military men in Germany and France on nuclear weapons and massive retaliation resembles our emphasis in 1947. Mr. Franklin added we should put special emphasis on weapons advance in more specialized systems to help give us the flexibility we require.

The meeting adjourned for dinner at this point.

Mr. Robert Amory prefaced his comments on the Soviet Union and its objectives and policies by referring to the two aspects of how limited war and the confrontation of atomic power may look from Moscow:

1. to moves today by us to increase our limited war capabilities and

2. to specific situations in which these enhanced capabilities might be used.

This estimate of these aspects depends upon this evaluation of the contemporary U.S.S.R. and its future within the next twenty years. In making such an evaluation, there are two premises: 1) nuclear, general war is unthinkable; the Soviets are convinced of the appalling destruction which would result and reached this conclusion more fully and swiftly and 2) that peace -- in the minimum sense of the word as the absence of open warfare -- is to their advantage; they have about completed the gigantic job of building their economy. After the losses of the war the last conflict (World War II) "cost two five-year plans;" by mid-1970's their industrial productivity curve will cross our own; why should they alter these conditions? They are fully confident. Yet they remain watchful and suspicious of us and will not, therefore, let their guard down.

The Soviets demonstrated this suspicion when in June, 1953, their troop deployments at the time of the Berlin riots were to defensive positions against an expected allied attack. They were convinced we had pulled the riots off as a prelude to war. A somewhat similar situation occurred in the Tonking Delta when we appeared to be spoiling for a fight. Our attitude towards the offshore islands also appears to be a provocation by us to clean up the Soviet junior partner.

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Soviet military forces appear to be soundly conceived with tremendous chances taken on untested models; this has been particularly apparent in the aircraft they are producing: a B-52 type comparable to ours was produced in four years; it took us eight years. IL28 jet light bombers total some six thousand compared with our few hundreds. Nevertheless we very much exaggerate the percentage of their effort in military fields. They did reduce their forces by 640,000 and now have some 3,500,000 in forces while we have some 2,900,000. They have 1.6 per cent of their population in forces, we have 1.8 per cent. The idea of Russia being an nation in arms held back by the A-Bomb is ridiculous. Their submarine fleet is four times our own; if we did not win an air war they would dominate the Northern Pacific. But in a world-wide sense they do not threaten us.

We are overly concerned with an attack upon Europe, as well as with peripheral aggression. In the last decade Korea was the only case of overt Soviet aggression; at/ miscalculation on the part of the U.S.S.R., and they realize that victory would not come cheaply. Indochina is utterly irrelevant; in early 1954, the highest estimate of Chinese aid to North Vietnam was only 3,000 tons a month of materiel, the equivalent of one liberty ship load every ninety days. On the contrary, the Soviets have shown extreme wariness -- in Afghanistan, for example, -- and they could have done much more with the farther Laos or with East German rearmament than they have. Where is the likelihood of peripheral aggression? Possibly over the off-shore islands this spring (twenty-four hours after the Israeli take on the Syrians.); to the Communists such an operation would be the completion of a revolution, the achievement of a sovereign right. Such a move would not be regarded as expansion but restoration.

What would be the Soviet reaction if we raised the level of our forces? It would be a reaction of grave doubts as to the President's sincerity and what we have been saying about preventive war; the gains for us in raising the levels would not be worthwhile for the Soviets would not why we were raising our forces. As for their reaction to specific crises -- such as a SAC base in Pakistan -- the Soviets might make a counter-move and pull a "Prague" in Kabul; if we supported an exile government and went in militarily their reaction would be sufficient to defeat us. They would move similarly if a coup should take place in a satellite. If our objective is to hold where we are, then the situation will remain as it is; if we try and nibble away then we will meet with a reaction for the Soviets are not going to be pushed around. The Soviets are concentrating intensively, not extensively, on the creation of economic power. They do want disarmament. The real problems are posed by economic development, not by U.S.S.R. bayonets. We have to recognize the gigantic American economy has a world role responsibility and is not for us to enjoy alone.

Mr. Kennan described this analysis as very realistic and penetrative. It is important to underscore the remark of Mr. Amory that the Russians emphasize the development of their own country and they take great pride in their accomplishments. With respect to such areas as Indochina we must acknowledge the Soviets are not responsible for everything; they are not supporting subversive elements there. With respect to the periphery, there is the source of tension and the remarks of Khrushchev are important. The assumption that Communist parties may now come into power by parliamentary means seems an acquiescence to "Titoism" in advance to a kind of left-wing power which is anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, wary of the United States and not really fully under Moscow's dictation. Stalin would never have

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accepted this, he thought in terms of general power. So if the regime has changed, with respect to the periphery, the Soviets will be content to settle for anti-Americanism or the elimination of American influence; complete Soviet domination is not needed. The Soviets would, for example, like to see this in South Asia.

Mr. Kennan and Mr. Amory agreed further that the Soviets are being even more subtle: saying, in effect, "get all the aid you can get from both sides" -- they are not saying you have to be for us or against us; no political or military alliances and not too much encouragement in coups by Communist parties, "go ahead and fight your own problems in parliamentary battles; we don't insist you remain a conspiratorial subversive group." This policy lessens the degree of making them puppets and also increases the danger of local Communist Parties being successful. This will be important to us if we cling to a strongly military posture; that war is the only outcome -- if we do so our prestige is going to plummet. We have to settle for something "fuzzy."

Mr. Altschul asked if this is the policy and program, what does it portend for us in the world conflict; what lines of policy should we adopt?

Mr. Amory replied we still have some chips on our side. No area of the world has opted voluntarily for Communism. If we are willing to stand up and be counted on the humanitarian front as we have on the military, we can beat them hands down. Ultimately, we can look forward to a merger between the two systems. There is a great difference in attitude of many in the U.S.S.R. -- (development of a managerial group, etc.); we have to keep their system from taking over through our default and thereby isolating ourselves. Does the Soviet system "contain the seeds of its own destruction"? It will modify itself into more benign channels -- a welfare state is not at all impossible. Mr. Kennan said he was referring in his article to Stalin's policies and that Brezhnev and Co. are aware of Stalin.

Mr. Johnson said he knew these points had to be stated but that he had a real fear concerning our nuclear situation if the American people were to believe Mr. Amory and Mr. Kennan were right; their reaction to our military defenses would be catastrophic. We may run the danger of a unilateral disarmament scheme -- and it is essential we maintain our nuclear capabilities. Concerning economic assistance, Mr. Johnson expressed the fear that when we do participate in development programs we are charged with economic imperialism. How can we launch a non-military campaign and do it so we don't look imperialist? Mr. Franklin asked to what extent we could give other states the greater initiative in seeking the aid and setting their requirements.

Mr. Amory thought greater use of multi-national groups would help -- giving through the Colombo plan, for example, would help remove the curse. How can the Russians afford a large program? They are not making gifts but postponing payments and accepting "soft" credits. They are also accepting the idea of a rational division of labor -- if someone else can produce rice cheaper, well and good. They can give us a real challenge here; we have to do something about preserving our over-all national interests and stop California from growing rice.

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Mr. Kissinger suggested that whatever might happen eventually about the two systems at the present moment they must act according to their best lights; with reference to aid, our problem has been one of political legitimacy. The Soviets have gained much from the promise of aid, we have gained little from its actuality; we have not developed a political legitimacy or framework in which aid might fit; in the Middle East, for example, the initial impact of economic aid will be unsettling. On the military side, the very fact the Soviets have a certain missile capability has an impact on the periphery even if that capability is never used. Mr. Amory thought the Soviets would resist coups in the satellite areas; Mr. Kissinger asked what our position would be if there were a coup in Iran?

Mr. Amory agreed no charitable "egg-head" program is useful. But relatively small amounts of aid behind a government such as India would be of significant help and avoid an extremist situation; $200,000,000 a year might do it -- we have $175,000,000 in military equipment in Matsu and Quemoy. Libya is holding us up to the tune of $5,000,000 a year to keep its internal air line from the Soviets; on a per capita basis, this would be the equivalent of $5,000,000,000 to India. Also long-range planning is essential: $20,000,000 spread over 10 years may be far more useful than $40,000,000 this year and may be nothing next year. Mr. Amory agreed that until we get proper safeguards, armaments must be matched. As for what would happen in Italy (sic) if Communists took over? We cannot let it go and it won't happen without a legitimate government in exile. We cannot attack a "popular front" and Italy might drift away through such a device.

Mr. Kennan, referring back to Mr. Johnson's question, said the American people must be given the whole story; if they won't support an arms program when the reasons for it are true, then what further course lies ahead? We should make an effort to persuade people we are keeping the weapons reluctantly. The weapons must not creep into our public posture. Concerning Mr. Amory's suggestion, we would do well to recompense every manufacturer "suffering" from our tariff policies and encourage trade through a governmental trading corporation with substantial capital and leeway. We should use our best brains in the process; lay off areas where blackmail is offered -- when that has come up, you have already lost.

Mr. Altschul noted the earlier comments that the Soviet Union has no intention of going to war and is full of confidence for the future; also that their system is being modified and may yet approach our own. If these remarks are true, why should we care about making an effort at all? Yet aren't there some basic values involved? Such as the relationship of the state to the individual? Do we want a world dominated by the Soviet system? How can we prevent this from taking place? Isn't there something else involved, something more fundamental than that implied in a race between two economic systems? We cannot ignore the fundamental, human values; there are these greater values at stake. We must look with misgivings on any further expansion.

Do we have to change our state of mind? Unless the challenge of values is recognized we are not going to respond in the economic domain. If we move from a military challenge and decide there is a challenge in human values and in

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national values we shall have to reorganize our thinking and our methods -- a monumental task of self-criticism which we have not yet accepted.

Mr. Amory replied it is not just a race between Magnitogorsk and Gary; moral values are innate; each has had a great cultural past. The development Mr. Amory envisaged is one in which these things which were suppressed in the cult of hatred will reappear. If we can get through the iron curtain and not try to win everything at once, Mr. Amory was convinced the two systems will move together on a more fundamental level than the economic. More arguments in the Central Committee will lead to something like our House of Representatives and lead eventually to free elections. The breakdown of the Iron Curtain is not a disaster to America. If Harvard students live in Russia and Russian students live in Harvard, you would have the eventual prospect of two societies living together. Also, it is well to remember that our values are not found among all our associates.

Mr. Johnson supported Mr. Altschul's concern. If the trends are in that direction, as described by Mr. Amory, what is the point of an all-out effort on our part for the next fifty years? Mr. Amory replied it may not be necessary if we go at it in the right way. Unless another mad Czar -- a Stalin or another great miscalculation occurs, it may not be necessary. We have to sell the American people on adequate military preparedness but this does not mean we have to have unlimited superiority over Russian efforts. We could live with a mixture of the Bulganin-Eisenhower proposals for inspection. Mr. Smyth added that something in this line is better than nothing.

Mr. Kissinger reverted to his question of Iran. There are some areas we can't let go Communist. If the Tudeh Party takes over, we should have to react. Unless we are willing to do so we shall lose continuously -- the question is still relevant -- how far do we react? Mr. Franklin added we are very much less likely to have war when there is a real danger of both sides being wiped out. If we reduce power, particularly nuclear power, by half, then half, as Mr. Amory suggested, we would be returning to an earlier situation when the possible gains from war would not be ruled out by the possibility of national suicide.

Mr. Altschul asked if there were no place where vital American interests would be at stake and we would be obliged to go to war? Mr. Amory suggested any NATO country including West Germany. Mr. Altschul asked about the Middle East. Mr. Amory replied that the possibility of overt aggression is remote but that in such an event, a vital American interest would be at stake. But our response to an attack upon Syria, Iran or Turkey should be in limited war with every effort to contain it.

Melvin Conant
Rapporteur

March 28, 1956

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

<u>Corrections to digest of second meeting of Mr. Burden's sub-committee</u>

February 15, 1956

Mr. William Elliott has asked that the following corrections be made
on the digest of the meeting of February 15, 1956. Page 10, starting
with paragraph 3 should read as follows:

"Despite this reluctance toward making war, the U. S. is
now engaged in politically "unlimited" war with the Soviet Union
springing from the nature of the two systems of belief. But
within that "cold war" arise issues of limited "hot" war.

Mr. Elliott continued that the limits of war are determined
by each country's appraisal of the relations among its objectives,
capabilities, and intentions to those of the other countries
principally involved. In trying to determine the objectives
of this country, many considerations must be evaluated, among
these the ethical considerations. At this point the Russians
try to close in on the psychological front; however, Mr. Elliott
expressed confidence that the American people will confront all
the risks of any given problem if the situation is well presented
to them. Mr. Burden wondered how many limited wars the American
people will be willing to support. That, Mr. Elliott suggested,
depends in part at least upon the people's estimate of the
effects of general war. General Gavin pointed out that weapons
systems have matured to the point where casualties must be measured
in the millions. The allies of America are much concerned over
the temptation which may arise in this country to save U. S.
lives by expending those of the allies."

The last sentence on p. 10 should read as follows:

"Mr. Elliott asks whether it was perhaps idle to talk of a
limited war in Europe, so long as SAC is maintained in NATO as
a shield over Western Europe; or whether new tactics required
a reappraisal of fundamental strategy?"

On page 11, paragraph 3 should read as follows:

"Dr. Rabi suggested that many Soviet moves are designed

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simply to test the U. S. reaction to particular areas of aggression. In line with this thought, Mr. Price states that the U. S. would respond more quickly to a Korea-type incident now than it would have before Korea. General Gavin noted that the present administration is committed to at least two policies: (a) we will fight where we wish, and (b) there will be no more Koreas. He noted the interplay of domestic political considerations with world events. Mr. Joseph Johnson felt that the situation in Korea, having already arisen to the Russians' disadvantage, is not going to come up again. Admiral Thach stated that if it did the U.S. would react even more quickly than it had previously, and that operation "Firm Link" in the Far East demonstrated the mobility of this nation's forces."

Following is an extract from a letter by Lt. General James M. Gavin also suggesting certain corrections:

"I have reread the paper, and as I told you over the phone, it is surprisingly good when one recalls the amount of discussion back and forth that took place. I would hesitate to make any major changes in the paper at this time but I would like to point out one or two things.

The bottom two lines on page 7 refer to 3 divisions in Libya. This was presented as an assumption, the situation being that we would, as tension increased, build up our forces in the Libyan area. They of course are not there now.

On the top of page 8 there is a reference to the Navy having 2 or 3 marine divisions in North Africa. This, likewise, is an error. The Marines will have, very likely, the major portion of one division with the Sixth Fleet, probably 2 or 3 Regimental Landing Teams. This, I believe, is a very reasonable assumption. Likewise on page 8 there is a reference to 3 divisions in Libya nearing readiness, which is not correct.

On page 6 the lead paragraph discusses the new hyper-mobkle 101st Division. You perhaps have read in today's newspapers about this. Articles have appeared in both of today's Washington newspapers describing the 101st in some detail. The paragraph in your manuscript is technically quite a bit in error but I doubt that it would be worthwhile correcting at this point. The new Division will be considerably lighter than the old -- on the order of about 11,500 troops. Its transportation on land consists of "Mechanical Mules," a very efficient land vehicle that is readily air-transportable. A most interesting aspect of the new Division is that the gross airlift required for it is in excess of that required to lift the air-transportable portion

The fourth meeting of Sub-committee III of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on April 2, 1956. Present were: Roswell L. Gilpatric, Discussion Leader; William Schaub, Discussion Leader; William A. Burden, Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Gerald J. Tell, Rapporteur; N. E. Halaby; James T. Hill, Jr.; Mervin J. Kelly; Col. William Kintner; Roger Lewis; Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay; Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Jr.; Gen. A. P. O'Meara; Don K. Price and I. I. Rabi.

Mr. Burden opened the discussion by reviewing the previous sub-committee meetings. The first, he said, concerned the budget priority and the size of the budget. The second meeting dealt with various forms of limited wars and the great cost required to conduct such wars. Also, the more detailed figures of the cost of air-lifting military forces were analyzed. At the third meeting, William Bundy of the CIA spoke of the capabilities of the Russians. Technical manpower problems were also discussed.

Mr. Burden continued by pointing out that this was the windup meeting for this sub-committee, the subject of which today was the budgetary implications involved in maintaining a force to enable the United States to stay ahead of the Russians. He, then, introduced Mr. Gilpatric.

Mr. Gilpatric: The Budget Outlook

Mr. Gilpatric said that the budget could be considered under two lines of development.

Increase in budget under present planning

First, he said, there will be an increase in the 1958 budget without increasing present military planning, primarily because many savings during the present fiscal year are "one-shot" savings. Developments in Congress indicate that the Air Force is to be held down to a level of appropriations of $16.5 billion. The Air Force first developed its budget to a figure of $20 billion for the fiscal year 1957. This figure was later reduced by the Air Force itself to $18.5 billion. Congress tentatively approved an appropriation of $16.5 billion, which makes a third major reduction. Explana tions for the reduction from $20 billion to $16.5 billion came from several sources. The number of new planes was reduced by 400; this reduction alone accounts for about $1 billion. The R and D budget was lowered by $200 million for 1956 and $300 million for 1957. Operations and maintenance appropriations were cut by $400 million. It is not now clear, Mr. Gilpatric said, how much the Air Force will be allowed for new bases. And still to be provided for is a great part of the 137 wing force.

The Air Force expenditure budget is expected to go up from $15.4 billion in 1957 to $18 billion in 1958. Even at the present level of planning, and without any additional expenditures, the budget for the fiscal year 1958 must go up.

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Mr. Gilpatric pointed out that there are 47 missile programs. There must be an area of overlapping of programs and planning for which we pay a price. The cost of these missile programs can also be measured in personnel because there is a duplication of effort. There is $4 billion available for the missiles program; of this $1.2 billion is appropriated but unobligated; $2.7 billion is obligated but unspent. He concluded that there is no great shortage of appropriations for missiles.

Mr. Schaub pointed out that the total amount of money available for the missiles program for 1957 is $2.9 billion. This figure, however, does not include obligations of contracts already placed.

## Increases to supplement present programs

Mr. Gilpatric said that the second line of development for the budget concerns what increments should be considered to supplement the present programs. He noted that Admiral Thach had indicated that the Navy is aiming for an appropriation of $10 billion per year, if all of its demands are included.

The Army is seeking additional funds. Mr. Gilpatric pointed out that Generals Gavin and Taylor desire 28 divisions in place of the 19 allocated to them. No detailed pricing of the program has yet been developed. Also, the Army wants an additional $1½ billion to modernize its present divisions. Mr. Gilpatric concluded that even an increase of 2 or 3 divisions would mean a 10 to 15 percent increase in the budget of the Army.

The Army is also trying to build up a greater air-lift. The cost to air-lift simultaneously (in one operation) one new light-weight division -- which is about 5,000 short tons -- would be $1.9 billion. According to General Lindsay, if the air-lift were stretched to 10 days the cost would be cut in half. The amount needed to air-lift two divisions is $5½ billion. General Lindsay also said that we would need 500 C130's for an air-lift which could handle this operation. He noted that the C130's are not able to provide an overseas air-lift, but are suited instead for a shorter operation. Therefore, we must provide the Air Force with short C130's for the short lift and C132's or C133's for the over-water lift.

Mr. Gilpatric summed up the Army's requirements by stating that the Army needs a very large increase in terms of billions of dollars, and thus it is asking for substantial increments.

Mr. Burden asked for the actual cost for an air-lift. He thought the lowest figure mentioned for a ten-day assault echelon would be $1.9 billion. General Lindsay said that to air-lift 5,000 short tons to the Middle East would require $0.9 billion in capital cost and a direct cost of $4 million. Mr. Gilpatric said that $1 billion would be the smallest amount and $5 billion the top figure the Army would need for conducting an airlift to the Middle East.

Mr. Gilpatric then turned to the Air Force. He quoted Mr. Quarles as saying that if the Russians could destroy our strategic forces before we could strike there would be cause for grave concern. Mr. Gilpatric declared that

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rather than missiles R and D and manned craft were needed to meet the present problem of resisting attack. This type of expenditure would be our major concern for the next five years. He quoted Mr. Bundy regarding the surprise factor of attack. He pointed out that while dollars could not do anything to avoid surprise attack, dollars could help in preparing for the attack.

Mr. Gilpatric said that the Air Force would probably ask for increases in appropriations for M and O as well as R and D. The Air Force also wants to raise SAC from 11 to 35 wings. Two hundred B-52's would cost about $1 billion.

Dr. Kelly said that research and development should increase by 25 percent which would amount to $\frac{1}{2}$ billion. Mr. Gilpatric concluded that the Air Force would need an increase in its budget of $1/3$ billion. In summary, Mr. Gilpatric declared that we are facing the dark prospects of confronting the fiscal and budgetary authorities for fiscal 1958 with substantial increases in appropriations for military expenditures. Even maintaining our present forces we will need $\$2$ to $\$3$ billion additional expenditures. If we include the increased needs of the Army and Air Force, another $\$2$ to $\$3$ billion is required. Altogether, an overall $\$3$ to $\$6$ billion should be added to the present defense budget. In order to get this money we need a revision of our national planning and should revise our thinking to obtain the additional fiscal resources.

Dr. Kelly brought up the problem of equating the costs of manpower, maintenance and modernization. He noted that operating and modernizing are big additional costs in the total Army budget. He asked if the present budget took care of these costs. He noted that operating costs should go down as modernizing increases. General O'Meara said that modernizing is going to take more money. Besides modernization, the Army is going to need more installations, which means more real estate and housing will be required. General McCormack noted that we cannot plan on how long supporting equipment will last. As offensive weapons change, the supporting equipment will also have to be changed. Dr. Kelly concurred that new gear will be needed to go with offensive weapons.

Dr. Kelly could not understand the Navy's general complacency. He said the Navy should be pushing for more submarines and that they are moving too slowly with their surface craft.

Mr. Schaub: The Operations of the Bureau of the Budget

Mr. Burden introduced Mr. Schaub who remarked that Mr. Gilpatric was conservative in his picture of the Services' requirements. At the present rate of spending the statutory debt ceiling would soon be broken through. Mr. Schaub then read a prepared statement.

## 1. Role of the Bureau of the Budget

With the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Congress established the current concept of the Executive budget, under which the President has the responsibility for transmitting to Congress a budget which

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represents his coordinated plan of action for the Executive Branch. The
Bureau of the Budget was created to support the President in making this
concept effective.

## 2. Problems Concerning the National Security Budget

(a) National Security programs (Department of Defense, military functions; Military Assistance; Atomic Energy Commission; and stockpiling) have accounted for about two-thirds of the Federal spending since fiscal year 1952. Because of its large proportionate size, the level of spending for National Security programs, in a large degree, controls the level of the Federal budget. If any adjustments are made in the level of Federal spending, it would have a major influence on the amount to be spent for National Security. The present upward trends in National Security programs intensify this problem.

(b) All national policies, including National Security policy and the level of expenditures for National Security programs, must be the product of thoughtful coordination between our international, political, economic and social policies and programs.

With the domestic economy at a very high level and conditions of international tension prevailing, strong and contradictory pressures are continuously at work. The level of National Security programs depends somewhat on the willingness of the private economy to yield a share of the gross national product (in the form of manpower and materials) to the Federal Government. This involves also the level of taxation which the people will accept during peacetime.

This continuing problem of how much to allow for security is coupled with the problem of gearing our Defense preparation to meet an uncertain form of expected enemy action. It would not be advisable to plan on a single course of action. The objective, therefore, has been stated to maintain a well-balanced Defense establishment which, within the concept of collective security will deter war or, if necessary, will provide the basis of strength to wage a war if one develops. This objective contemplates developing an establishment which can be maintained over an extended period of uneasy peace without undermining our economy or our fundamental institutions.

(c) The military portion of the National Security program is dependent on (1) the size and mission of forces desired to be maintained; (2) the degree of readiness which these forces should attain and (3) the degree of modernization which is available and practical.

As quality and capability increase, the size of forces conceivably could be modified.

Readiness is a question of judgment and degree. It is difficult to develop a sound approach to a long-range program if requirements-planning and readiness are geared to a fixed D-Day which is relatively inflexible.

The high level of research and development is resulting in the development of new weapons systems with substantial increases in capability

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and quality. From a budget standpoint, these new developments create a serious problem of transition from old, conventional equipment to new. The rate of change and the rate of modernization becomes an important problem in military budgets. It is particularly serious when you realize that long leadtime procurement is for the forces in being 5 to 8 years hence. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to plan with certainty that far ahead. The result is a heavy rate of obsolescence and corresponding new demands. This same problem affects the degree to which mobilization reserves should be established.

Many other problems require consideration in developing military programs, i.e., housing for military dependents, the shortage of skilled workers, the competition for individuals which is being created by the shortage of scientists, and the complex problem of management which exists in the military establishment, particularly under peacetime conditions and standards.

(d) There is an increasing need, if we are to maintain a high level of Defense effort under peacetime conditions, to acquire a full understanding of the economic impact of these large programs and the results due to changes in programs or levels of support.

### 3. Processing the Military Budget

(a) In addition to the role of advisor and coordinator, the Bureau of the Budget is concerned with three major aspects of National Security policy. First, it must insure that adequate information is available when policy is being considered. Next, it must insure that cost and feasibility elements, both present and future, are recognized and related. Third, the Bureau must insure that implementing plans to support policies are realistic and can be subject to adequate review by responsible agencies and officials.

(b) The Bureau's objective is to organize security data which will be the basis for policy decisions by the President and his Cabinet.

(c) The mere size of the military operations does not allow handling in the same manner as other agencies. In order to avoid duplicate demands on busy people within limited time periods, the Military Division of the Bureau of the Budget works with the Department of Defense in the development of the budget, individuals from our staff working along-side staff of the Defense Comptroller in a cooperative effort.

(d) Generally, in May and June, well over a year in advance of the beginning of the fiscal year, development is started on policies that will be applied to the preparation of the budget; that is, the fiscal interpretations, the economic assumptions and the domestic and international forecasts. In June, and where appropriate, the agency ceilings are developed; that is, an amount which will have to be the overall total ceiling in controllable costs for individual agencies as a certain budget objective provisionally established by the President is to be reached. Also, in June, there is a transmittal of this budget policy status to agency heads, and a call for estimates under the policy set forth. The normal date for receipt of these estimates is the 15th of September.

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(e) Ceilings as such are not applicable to the Defense program but tentative targets are developed for planning purposes. Because of the joint arrangement with Defense and the character of the Defense problem, many of the issues and problems are developed and discussed prior to the submission of budget estimates by the Secretary of Defense some time after September 15. When the Defense budget estimates are received by the Bureau, an evaluation is made in relation to existing policies and proposals, and possible modifications discussed jointly with the President, the budget is thus based on policy established by the President after consideration of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense officials and the analysis by the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. Schaub agreed that additional money would be needed if the present Air Force program stands. He said that the Army and Navy will also need additional money. We do not yet know the implications of the new look in the Army. The Navy has asked for $2 billion for construction of the atomic fleet. This sum compares with $1 billion a year ago, and $1/2 billion for 1957. Mr. Schaub noted that not only is there competition between the branches of the armed service for dollars but there also is competition for competent people. The $1½ billion cost for R and D is only part of the story of the program of research and development. If the entire program of R and D is considered, including supporting costs, the total appropriation would probably amount to $5½ billion.

## Budgetary problems of the military

Mr. Schaub stated that the continental defense program and the build-up of combat forces were not in balance. Another problem to be faced is the expansion of SAGE. Which of the services should handle what part of the program is also a complex problem and a source of controversy. There is also the prospect that the ballistic missile program could bankrupt the country.

Mr. Schaub then brought up the subject of the armed forces real estate. He said that present installations amount to $20 billion and these installations are increasing at the rate of $2 billion per year. The branches of the service do not let go of the property they have and money is required to maintain these installations, although many could be deactivated. He said that we need an organized approach. We can not look at the problem on one installation at a time basis, but rather we must take an overall view.

Mr. Schaub noted that the relative strength of the different branches of the service is another source of competition between them. He felt that a system of priorities is needed to control the size of the budget. The Korean War was given as an example of this problem. The original estimate of the services of requirements for waging the Korean War totalled more than 100 billion dollars. $60 billion was actually appropriated, and even this figure was too high. The size of the armed forces must be adjusted and considered in relation to each new development. An objective approach to the overall picture of military dollar requirements is still needed. In order to accomplish this, he suggested that the size of the budget should not be determined on an individual branch of the service approach, for each branch of the service now speaks in a partisan manner regarding its own particular appropriation, and the total budget becomes unmanageable. This would be corrected if the size of the budget were determined from a coordinated plan.

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Dr. Kelly commented that there is no competent elimination scheme for programs such as the missiles program. There is no way to drop a project which appears to be of no value. This also holds true for the reduction of military installations. Mr. Schaub agreed that there is no machinery to bring the proper relationship of what should be spent by each branch of the service into focus. However, some study of the problem is being made. Dr. Kelly said that the biggest need is to disentangle ourselves from useless expenditures. General O'Meara noted that three missile programs have been terminated for more favorable projects.

Dr. Kelly claimed we must increase taxes or increase the national debt to pay for the increases in the budget. Mr. Schaub implied that the above policy would lead to greater inflation and noted that inflation was not the answer.

At this point the figures of the Bureau of the Budget were brought up. General O'Meara pointed out that the increase in the defense and research obligations from $1.3 to $1.5 billions was not the big jump it appeared to be. Actually, it was a transfer of funds from M and O to R and D. Mr. Schaub remarked that the quality of R and D is decreasing because of the shortage of trained personnel.

Mr. Halaby questioned the inability of increasing the budget by 5 to $10 billion in 1958 without causing inflation or increasing taxes. He said that higher productivity could give us the necessary increase. Dr. Kelly remarked that the increase must come from the civilian economy. He noted that his company could only grow at the rate of three percent per year. Mr. Burden said that the economists were not worried by a 5 to $10 billion increase in the budget.

Mr. Halaby asked what expenditures could be reduced in substantial amounts to balance the expected increases in the budget. Mr. Schaub replied that substantial amounts are actually made up of many small items. He pointed out that a billion dollars is made up of a lot of details. He noted that the inventory levels were too high, and substantial reductions could be made in this area. The Army is now cutting down on its inventory. Mr. Schaub felt that Army expenditures were $1 billion in excess, but that the present system is not designed to reduce expenditures.

Dr. Kelly said that we could discontinue 20 percent of the present projects, but we are not able to do so because of the system. General O'Meara remarked that in the last 15 months there has been a considerable elimination of projects. Mr. Schaub said that there are many areas where savings could be made. He mentioned, specifically, the appropriation for the Air Force Academy's runway. He felt that it was possible a nearby Air Force installation (already built) could be used instead of building a special runway at the Academy. General Lindsay noted that the cost of modernizing the neighboring installation would amount to approximately two-thirds of the cost of the new installation. He also noted that other factors were involved.

Mr. Halaby spoke of strategy in relation to weapons systems which in turn should be related to cost. He asked whether the JCS could offer changes in strategy which would enable the armed forces to reduce their appropriations.

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Mr. Schaub expressed his opinion on peripheral wars. He felt that as soon as a peripheral war breaks out we have to prepare for a full-scale war, although it may not turn into a general war.

After dinner, Mr. Burden resumed the meeting by asking the group to discuss whether the budget should be larger than it is at present and, if so, by how much. Mr. Halaby stated there was no inconsistency in reducing the budget by 1 to $2 billion through more efficient operation and at the same time increase the overall budget by 5 to $10 billion.

Dr. Rabi questioned what could happen to our relationships with foreign countries if we increased our military budget under the present political atmosphere. He said that we could not ignore world opinion. Col. Kintner remarked that the increase could be presented as a defensive maneuver. General McCormack noted that the assumption of the role of leadership is not a pleasant nor a popular one. We must determine what we want to do, believe in our decision and go ahead in spite of adverse criticism. Mr. Burden remarked that we are supposed to discuss what we should do to stay ahead of the Russians and avoid, for the present, the political implications.

General Lindsay said that the economy may be ruined by the cost of our military expenditures. On the other hand, we must relate this problem (the possibility of our economy being wrecked) to what would happen if we were faced with a holocaust from our enemies if we failed to act. We are, in a sense, walking a tight rope.

Mr. Lewis stated that we should not try to deal with the problem in terms of dollars. The problem is what do we need to stay ahead of the Russians and we should think of it in terms of programs, not dollars. If we decide on what we need, then what we do not need drops out of the picture. Mr. Schaub said that everybody supports a program which is based on defensive retaliation. The cost of such a deterrent force can be put in terms of dollars. Mr. Lewis remarked that an increase of $5 billion will not solve our problem. We must outline what is essential to meet our problem and then indicate what can be dropped out of the program. Dr. Kelly stated that R and D affects the whole budget. We ought not to expand the budget without trying to drop something off. Mr. Lewis said that the money approach is a fallacious approach to security. In addition, we are trying to solve all the problems. We must be more selective in our planning, and not spread our efforts too thinly.

Dr. Rabi claimed that because of a general principle, that of putting competitive people on one job, we are less effective than if there was just one good team working on a project. General O'Meara brought up the point that even if we maintain a constant level of R and D appropriation, our return from the same amount of money increases because our scientists become more competent with experience.

Mr. Burden remarked that the R and D budget is a relatively small figure. The intercontinental ballistics and B-52 programs are also fruitful areas for discussion. Mr. Lewis claimed that if the B-52 program were increased the problem of replacing the B-52 would become greater when the B-52 becomes obsolete. If we increase expenditures on the B-52 program, we slow down the successor to the B-52. General Lindsay questioned whether there was competition between the production and the development programs. Mr. Lewis said that there

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definitely was. He also pointed out that if we look at the programs the Russians have, on this approach, in order to see what they are doing, and base our programs on this approach we will be led on the road to disaster. In developing our programs we must follow our own capabilities.

Mr. Burden claimed we need B-52's to meet the Russian B-52. He said we ought to look at what the Russians were doing as well as develop our own programs independently. Mr. Lewis said that we cannot take both courses. We should spend more effort on future development to get ahead and sacrifice our immediate strength. Col. Kintner said that this policy would leave our defenses too weak and would entail too great a risk. Mr. Kissinger said that we have to look at our requirements for staying ahead. In creating our own strategic striking power we cannot be guided by that of the Soviets; the crucial relation is not offense vs. offense, but offense vs. defense.

Mr. Schaub remarked that industry will level off its production no matter what quantities are scheduled. Mr. Lewis agreed that the production considerations slowed down the overall efficiency of the program of developing new weapons. Mr. Halaby asked why the B-52 program cannot be stepped up without slowing down the development of its successor. Mr. Lewis replied that the problem was partly psychological; nothing stultifies a program like a backlog of orders. We do better under stress. Mr. Burden asked what were the factors involved in determining which plane finally goes into production. Mr. Lewis replied that a system of controlled competition must be developed for each program. Then, based on the funding method, i.e., how much funds are available, a decision is made on which plane is to be put into production.

Mr. Burden turned the discussion to the problem of peripheral wars. Col. Kintner stated that in this area we must look at what the Russians are doing. The Russians are not committed in their actions. We must cover every possibility since our policy is based on the defensive. Mr. Schaub noted that if we prepare for an all-out war, we have the means to wage peripheral war. Mr. Burden did not agree. He asked Mr. Schaub to discuss our capabilities of waging a peripheral war. Mr. Schaub declared that we are more capable of fighting a conventional war than any nation has ever been in the past. Mr. Kissinger said that we should not compare out capabilities with past history, but with present Soviet strength.

Col. Kintner stated that we have not solved the problem the Russians present to us in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East. Dr. Kelly said that we cannot afford to supply the manpower and necessary weapons to defend the entire world. If we cannot prevent the Russians from taking over the rest of the world, the problem resolves on our willingness to drop the atom bomb. Col. Kintner said that dropping the bomb would not be the solution. With proper mobilization and a concept of United States security we might be able to solve the problem. Dr. Rabi said that to start a program we cannot look at the whole world, but must analyze what is needed for the protection of the United States. Col. Kintner felt that this was military isolation. Dr. Rabi repeated that the defense of the United States should be used as the starting point for a program of weapons development.

Mr. Kissinger stated the solution to a strategic situation is not going to be answered by equaling Soviet technology. The political implications

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of each situation must be considered. Dr. Kelly said that the military forces
do everything they can to meet a problem and develop their program. The
political implications are not their concern.

Mr. Halsey summed up the area of agreement within the group. First, he stated, we are able to spend more for military appropriations. Secondly, R and D should receive the highest priority in the budget. Thirdly, we need better planning and improved systems for selecting alternative programs and courses of action.

General Lindsay asked Mr. Schaub whether he considered the Air Force presentation of its budget in the same light as the other branches of the service. Mr. Schaub replied that he did not. The Air Force has a different concept of war. It plans for a 90-day period.

The Navy presents a highly integrated and deeply thought out budget. When an item is taken out, the whole program becomes imbalanced.

Mr. Schaub continued that the Air Force sells its budgetary plans before anyone thinks of the cost. Part of the trouble lies in not thinking of the amount of dollars involved. The philosophy of the armed forces is: what do we need, and then what does it cost. General Lindsay did not agree. He pointed out that the Air Force first drew up a $24 billion program. The Air Force then reduced this to $21 billion, and then reduced it still more to $18.9 billion. The Secretary of the Air Force presented this last figure to the Bureau of the Budget and the Bureau made further cuts. General Lindsay cited these figures to show that the Air Force itself initiated the cuts in its own budget program.

Dr. Kelly pointed out that the budget is built from small blocks. The next step is for someone to cut down the total. The building starts again, but the total must come within the new ceiling. This process is repeated until the final figure is reached.

The meeting was then adjourned.

Gerald J. Tell
Rapporteur

Personal

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Not for publication

STUDY GROUP REPORTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Sub-Committee II

Discussion Leader: Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel

Chairman: Joseph E. Johnson

Study Directors: Henry A. Kissinger

Rapporteur: Melvin Conant

Fourth Meeting

April 11, 1956

Digest of Discussion

(This digest has not been edited by the participants)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

The fourth meeting of Sub-Committee II of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on April 11, 1956. Present were: Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, Discussion Leader; Joseph E. Johnson, Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Melvin Conant, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul, Hanson Baldwin; John C. Campbell; Col. Lucius D. Clay; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N. E. Halaby; Caryl P. Haskins; Charles P. Noyes; James A. Perkins; I. I. Rabi; Henry deWolf Smyth; William Webster; and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Johnson opened the meeting by noting that it was the last session of sub-committee II. At the end of May or the beginning of June there will be a session of the entire study group to discuss the work of all the sub-committees which have been exploring other aspects of the impact of nuclear weapons on foreign policy. The discussion leader was Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, member of the Planning Board, National Security Council where he represents the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs.

General Bonesteel asked the group to consider his remarks on disarmament in the context of: 1) two diametrically opposed ideologies, 2) the unavoidable fact that nuclear weapons are a permanent part of our arsenal, 3) the understanding that these weapons will always remain at the command of governments and especially of the men who have the power, 4) the impossibility of finding a truly safe way of guarding oneself against a state wishing to use them.

General Bonesteel reviewed the fundamental differences between the West and the Soviet bloc and suggested that neither side, despite the suicidal consequences of a general nuclear war, would surrender its basic positions and ways of life without using every type of power available. Present issues between the Soviet Union and the U.S., on the other hand, are not likely to call for such a decision; the Soviets, aware of their present inferiority are not going to get themselves into a direct show-down with the U. S. General Bonesteel went on to ask whether in such a situation of "effective equilibrium" on the nuclear plane, disarmament would actually help to remove the basic conflicts between the two societies. Is not disarmament now being regarded as an end in itself? Communism is based on military power and the dynamism of one is necessary to the other. Given the ability and willingness of Communists (as compared with U. S. reticence) to stir up trouble by subversive political and military tactics, the removal of the H-bomb from our arsenals may not help to resolve our differences satisfactorily. The U. S. must strive to keep ahead in the arms race and come to the understanding that it will be necessary to live with the problem of a dynamic communist-military power for decades.

However, General Bonesteel agreed that it will not be possible for political and psychological reasons to call off the disarmament talks. Yet we have put ourselves in a dangerous situation: the Soviets have appealed to all wishful thinkers and we are in the curious position that the strongest state of the free world has to come up with some foolproof scheme of control lest public pressures overseas and at home start us down the slippery slope of general disarmament.

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The "open skies" proposal came as a surprise and a shock to the Communists, but it is important to remember that it does not in itself imply disarmament or a full regulation of arms. It was designed to guard against a surprise attack. But even this guard becomes less useful as ICBMs enter the arms picture for it is no longer of such great importance who starts a war, the advantages of surprise attacks are no longer so great for no matter how effective, a surprise attack could probably never eliminate all retaliatory capacity.

The current London discussions are focussed from the U.S. point of view on step by step procedures by means of which the sincerity of disarmament efforts and the effectiveness of inspection may be tested. The reduction of arms can come only after inspection demonstrates that the Soviets intend to carry through the subsequent steps.

Moreover, even if our mutual nuclear capabilities were cancelled out and disarmament were to reduce substantially the conventional armaments of the major powers, a situation could well arise in which the great states would have "disarmed" but their lesser allies would not have. General Bonesteel reminded the group that the Soviets, to date, have not used their own forces in accomplishing their territorial expansion and in acquiring new spheres of influence; they have always used the satellite forces. (Later in the evening Mr. Johnson and others stressed the necessity of a multi-nation disarmament plan including such countries as Great Britain, France, China, etc.)

Dr. Smyth, referring to the Soviet use of their satellites asked why we could not use our own allies similarly. General Bonesteel replied that the history of colonialism in the areas flanking the U.S.S.R. made European intervention and support in the peripheral areas of Asia and the Middle East particularly difficult. In those states where we have been able to work largely "unfettered," on the other hand, such as Korea, it has been possible to build up a relatively effective military force. We did not have such a situation in Indo-China, but are now making progress. Our NATO affiliation has thus had an undeniable and complicating effect on our relations with the new states. Dr. Smyth asked about Europe's progress and the role of allies there. General Bonesteel said that the situation in Europe was quite different; the likelihood of a "local" war in that key area is remote because of existing NATO commitments. In the next five to ten years a local war might be a possibility, but not now or in the immediate future.

Dr. Rabi asked whether "Titoism" remains a factor. General Bonesteel thought that "Titoism" was a useful development while we had the Soviets stopped; but with Korea settled without a real decision, with the Communist success in Indo-China, with the Soviet possession of atomic and thermonuclear weapons and with their recent changes in political and economic tactics, it is debatable whether "Titoism" remains useful for us. If Tito thought the Soviets were regaining strength and influence, he would find some way of accommodating his regime to it. This is all the more true, Mr. Campbell added, if "Titoism" has become an acceptable position from the viewpoint of the U.S.S.R.

General Bonesteel and Dr. Smyth suggested that the non-Communist world may present an effective force against the dynamics of Soviet ideas through some dynamic actions of its own; eventually the Soviet dynamism would weaken and falter. Dr. Wolfers thought it was more likely that neither power would surrender

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its influence over areas it now holds. He asked whether the Soviet bloc, including the satellites, would possess the same advantage if we had total disarmament as they would have with nuclear disarmament alone. In reply, General Bonesteel said he did not know what total disarmament meant. He suggested that the world tends to compare U.S.S.R. "conventional" power with European "conventional" power while the real comparisons must be based on an evaluation of each side's nuclear capabilities. Dr. Wolfers suggested that we should then regard conventional disarmament to be our advantage (and to the Soviet's disadvantage). Mr. Webster asked how much "cheating" there could and might be on both sides in disarmament. General Bonesteel said there were no known safeguards to guarantee an honest accounting of nuclear stockpiles.

At this point, General Bonesteel asked if the free world would not be faced with a special problem of its own if substantial disarmament were to take place. Would the British and American industrial sectors be able to absorb a critical decrease in armament expenditures? Mr. Altschul indicated this might be a problem if there did not occur at about the same time a freeing and expansion of world markets.

Dr. Smith and General Bonesteel discussed the view that "effective nuclear equilibrium," with its implications of mutual catastrophe if nuclear strikes on a large scale were to occur, might in reality be a more practical deterrent to war than a partial disarmament which would reduce the danger now existing but increase the possibility of less deadly, limited war on the periphery of the Soviet bloc. Dr. Rabi, Dr. Wolfers, and Mr. Johnson questioned the argument that disarmament might not benefit either side. General Bonesteel was not sure what "reduction" meant, when the reduction would occur, and in which weapon systems the "20 per cent" decrease would take place. A 20 per cent reduction in some force elements might be real and yet not affect in any basic sense a nation's capabilities.

Mr. Kissinger reminded the group that current disarmament discussions continued to be important in their psychological and political effect. The question is not whether it is really useful for us to discuss disarmament with the Soviets but what we can afford to propose now that we seem committed to such discussions. Even if we cannot achieve disarmament in itself, can we use the negotiations to convey some notions regarding the graduated employment of force which would lessen nuclear tension but preserve the essential military equation until fundamental issues are resolved.

After dinner, General Bonesteel replied to a question of Mr. Johnson's that technological developments could not be stopped -- research on the IRBM and ICBM, earth satellites, etc. would continue regardless of a disarmament plan. Mr. Franklin wondered if it would not be possible that as long as we developed the ICBM at the same time as the Russians whether the added power of these weapons over B-52s might not help preserve the present situation in which neither side dares to strike? As it is, he continued, there is the thought that by maintaining present-day nuclear weapons, general war is less likely; but if we fear that a small war might lead to a general conflict, will we be willing to engage in limited wars? There is, in actuality, a kind of "effective equilibrium of power" all across the board. General Bonesteel said it was dangerous to think of "equilibrium" -- one should rather think in terms of one's ability to retali ate meaningfully.

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Dr. Rabi returned to the earlier discussion of Communist dynamism and asked whether Russia would still be a threat if the Soviets should disappear as the political power while their weapons system remained? Would her national interests and objectives remain as a continuing problem to others? General Bonesteel thought the weakening of the dynamism would lessen our problems. He also warned that there were great changes in power relationships now occuring and one of them involved China with the possibility that China might emerge as a central problem for both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

A member of the group felt that it was necessary to proceed with disarmament discussions partly because of the bad political effect of discontinuing them, and partly because of the possibility that some measure of disarmament might be to our advantage. This again led to the question of general disarmament, one not limited to the United States and the U.S.S.R. alone. Mr. Altschul raised the point as to why the Soviets would agree to significant arms reduction or disarmament; The Soviets know the U. S. will not attack and they have broadened the areas of their operations. Mr. Kissinger added that total disarmament would not answer all our problems; potential power is also important. The geographical proximity of the Soviet-China bloc to key areas and its physical predominance is in itself an important factor.

Considerable discussion followed on the meaning of "percentage" disarmament; the question of the relative importance of conventional vs. nuclear disarmament to the U. S. and to the Soviet Union was debated and the question was also raised as to how much more secure we would be if the U.S.S.R. had only 100 thermonuclear bombs instead of 500. It was stressed that the U.S.S.R. might greatly gain politically if she accepted a degree of arms reduction which might not affect the military equation. Several members urged that settlement of critical issues between East and West should precede disarmament agreements.

The discussion reverted to the American capabilities for fighting general and limited wars and the necessity of developing a deterrent to the latter, such as would be found in a concept for the graduated employment of force. The development and acceptance of such a plan was thought to be the crucial problem, rather than the ability of the U. S. to maintain arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons. General Bonesteel added that it is vital to get our allies to accept the concept as they have accepted the deterrent to general war. What level of disarmament, Mr. Kissinger asked, would be possible and still make limited (and general) war unattractive? What level could we accept and still retain a useful degree of deterrent power?

Melvin Conant
Rapporteur

FRANK ALTSCHUL

730 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK 19, N.Y.

ROOM 1701
TEL. JUDSON 6-5526

October 17, 1956

Dear Henry,

I am not at all sure that I understand
what J. C. Slessor is talking about, but I am sure
that you will understand and you may even be inter-
ested in the enclosure from the London TIMES.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York, N.Y.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Study on Scientific Manpower

Extract from a letter by George B. Baldwin, Executive Assistant to the
Director of the Center for International Studies at MIT:

...You must surely be familiar with deWitt's recently published study Soviet Professional Manpower. While we have high regard for his study, we are convinced that one who relied exclusively on it would not have a completely rounded picture of the Soviet performance in this field. Perhaps the two most important qualifications that one ought to bear in mind in dealing with deWitt's study are these: (1) in his attempt to lay out the quantitative picture of the Soviet educational performance, deWitt has intentionally avoided any extensive attempt to discuss qualitative dimension of the problem, and (2) there is what we suspect to be an exceedingly important sector of Soviet scientific and engineering education which is scarcely mentioned by deWitt—and for the very good reason that we know next to nothing about it in this country. I refer to the network of military academies which had traditionally played a very important role in Soviet scientific engineering education but which, since World War II, have dropped out of view behind an apparently tight and effective censorship. These academies traditionally offered some of the best training in mathematics, physics, cartography, ballistics, geodesy, and related subjects that was to be found anywhere in the Soviet Union. Alex Korol is convinced that these institutes continue to play an exceedingly important, although fully mysterious and unmeasurable role in the production of highly trained technical manpower. You will find an illustrative reference to this class of educational institution in Trilling's discussion of the Zhukovskii Military Air Engineering Academy.

The point just made about our ignorance of the role of the military academies is duplicated by a similar ignorance about an undetermined number of Research Institutes which are believed to be devoted primarily or exclusively to military problems but which nevertheless conduct research of a high order.

Another area about which we know surprisingly little is graduate study, even in those universities and Research Institutes that operate in the open. For example, we know relatively little about the distribution of students among various fields, about the proportion of drop-outs, about the quality of doctoral dissertations, and about similar subjects. Nevertheless, it is of course well known that Soviet higher education (and not just graduate education) is much more heavily oriented to the natural sciences and engineering than is true certainly of this country and therefore of any other country in the world. This fact accounts for the known

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large numbers of scientists and engineers who are being turned out by
Soviet universities and Institutes. We know too that the quality of
secondary school training which Russian students receive appears to be
very good, particularly in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. To this
apparently good secondary preparation must be added the fact that the
university course in the Soviet Union runs for five years instead of our
four. We know too that the quality of Soviet scientific and engineering
textbooks is often very high. This series of cumulative advantages which
the Soviets seem to possess has to be discounted by our ignorance about
the degree of geographical unevenness in the quality of the educational
effort (we strongly believe that the really good higher training and
research is heavily concentrated in four or five cities). Furthermore,
there has been such a rapid expansion in the numbers of students in higher
secondary schools and in the universities since World War II, that it is
hard to believe that standards of teaching and research have not been
affected. Thus we might say that our impression is that while the quality
of Soviet higher technical education has undoubtedly risen since World
War II, it has probably not risen as rapidly or as high as some people
would have us fear. But the fact remains that there are excellent text-
books, excellent teachers, and an attractive system of liberal fellowships
and apparently adequate research facilities and equipment so that the
good student, the man who is capable of going ahead on his own steam even
if the environment should be uncongenial in certain respects, can undoubtedly
get a first-rate education.

One of the most important points to be made is that there may well
be a larger gap between the education of scientific manpower and successful
production of military goods in large quantities than is true in this
country. For example, there appear to be serious shortages of technicians
and skilled labor in the Soviet industry and this would certainly be one
important reason to expect that they may have difficulty in bringing
research results into volume production, but I should like to emphasize
that we have not been studying this particular aspect of Soviet capabilities
and this is certainly not a conclusion of our work; at best, it would be
a suggestion for further research. However, this suggestion really amounts
to saying that the Soviets probably have the"necessary" educational back-
up for a successful scientific arms race with the West, though this may
not be "sufficient."

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Background Paper: Outline Parts 1 a and b

by Carroll L. Wilson

An appraisal of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons seems an
appropriate starting point for this study. We need to imagine the first few days
or weeks of an all-out war with nuclear weapons. As we try to assess the impact
of nuclear weapons on U. S. target areas - urban, industrial centers - we should
have in mind the principal features of such centers. A partial catalogue includes
the following:

1. Great specialization in the skills of people, transportation means, factories, materials supply and distribution systems, professional activities and institutions - schools, hospitals, and in the subdivisions of Federal, state and local government.

2. The use of very large and increasing amounts of fuel energy through machinery - principally electrical and internal combustion - upon which the whole urban-industrialized area is completely dependent. Means of transportation of people and things, communication, production of goods and rendering services are almost entirely dependent upon large uninterrupted supplies of energy for the machines. The energy source - machine - is a central feature of the economy.

3. Highly organized group activity - great elaboration of interlocking management forms to combine such variety of specialties with specialized machinery into mechanisms for the production of goods and services on such a scale that the shares of the fruits of such goods and services among the specialized individuals are many times greater than the share of the generalized individual in a farming-subsistence economy.

4. Concentration in such centers of the most highly developed skilled workers and professional people and the leaders of national industrial and professional life. Most of the leading hospitals, medical schools, many of the universities, most of the banks and credit institutions, most of the exchanges and merchants who form innumerable essential links in the complex structure of the urban-industrialized, free-enterprise economy are located in the Critical Target areas. The places are essential components in the "Nervous System" of our economy. Here is where intelligence is digested, decisions made, actions set in motion, etc.

5. Another important feature is the susceptibility of these centers to dislocation both from physical causes and from psychological causes. New York City is probably the extreme example among these target centers. A dock strike, an elevator operator's strike, stoppage of ground or subway transportation, or even failure of

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street traffic signals can materially slow down the economic machine which is New York. More important still is the confidence of the individual in the machine and the system-- that it will serve and not destroy him. In the depression of '29 the physical plant for production and distribution did not shrink, our people were no less skilled than before but industrial production fell more than 40 per cent, millions were unemployed and the system was in shaky condition. Without the lifeblood of Confidence - Credit - the American urban industrial complex doesn't work.

6. These centers are the source of the "building blocks" for rebuilding or expanding our means of production, transportation, communication and housing. From these centers come the building materials and machinery from which new but specialized urban-industrial centers, such as aircraft factories, were built in World War II. These centers are also our links to other nations - they include the ports through which most of our commerce flows - they have the docks, the warehouses, the railroad yards, harbors, etc. which constitute a necessary bridge for the import and export of men and materials. They constitute a large part of our "fixed capital" and stand on our books at some hundreds of billions of dollars worth of materials, time, energy and intelligence.

There are many other features of these centers which may deserve description but for our immediate purpose these may be sufficient. Our immediate purpose is to assess the impact of an attempted knockout blow by the U.S.S.R. against our Critical Target Areas. Subject to later re-examination it is suggested that we use the planning assumptions of the FCDA as our starting point. Briefly they are summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet Union has the capability of striking any target within the U.S. with nuclear weapons, including thermo-nuclear types delivered by air and detonated above ground during normal working hours. Targets will be our centers of industry and population.

2. Initial attack will include sufficient nuclear weapons to hit all of our critical target areas; to be followed by other less heavy attacks; that a large proportion of all weapons carried will be delivered on the targets.

3. Bomb size will range from a few thousand to millions of tons of TNT equivalent. Any city attacked, with very few exceptions, can be substantially destroyed by one bomb. Atomic bombs of today may be assumed to be as much as 25 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb, i.e., 500,000 tons.

4. The principal city in each of the 92 Critical Target Areas could be struck by at least one bomb. The day-time centers of population will be the aiming points within the city.

5. Any city attacked will need outside support to meet the emergency.

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6. A warning time of one hour in most areas is expected but cannot be assured.

7. Evacuation of people from downtown areas in cities is to commence upon the first warning. It is expected that such people might have moved on an average two miles away from their offices by the time the attack became imminent.

This is the general doctrine for 1955. In effect this says the Soviet Union can drop any size bomb anywhere at any time and by implication we can do the same to the Soviet Union.

Let us first consider the effects of an H bomb on New York. If we use for thermonuclear weapons a 3-mile radius of total destruction, a 7-mile radius of heavy damage and a 10-mile radius of light damage, we can see why even the largest city would be essentially destroyed by one of these weapons. In order to be quantitative we should take a numerical example.

Assume an "Ivy Mike" thermonuclear weapon exploding above Fifth Avenue and 42nd Street during working daytime. The 3-mile radius of total destruction would include all of Manhattan Island south of 96th Street, parts of Jersey City and all of the cities on the west shore of the Hudson up to Hudson Heights and in Queens it would include Long Island City, Hunter's Point and Williamsburg. According to FCDA tables, with warning, the mortality within the area of total destruction (A-Damage) will be about 75 per cent. The daytime working as well as the resident population in this zone of A-damage is at lease 4 million. This would produce 3 million deaths and most of the survivors would be severally injured.

The radius of the B-zone of heavy damage is 7 miles. This circle runs just north of the George Washington Bridge, includes about a third of the Bronx, runs to the east of Flushing Bay, includes perhaps half of Queens and Brooklyn and all of Jersey City. Heavy damage is defined as major structural damage that would result in the collapse of buildings. With warning, FCDA tables indicate about 30 per cent mortality in this area. The population of this region might exceed normal to the extent that persons evacuating the Manhattan area had moved into this zone. Estimated population about 3 million. Mortality at 30 per cent would be 900,000. Surviving casualties would probably number at least 600,000.

The proportions of the disaster to a single city become fairly clear. New York is probably more vulnerable than any other city owing to the extreme density of population. On the other hand, there are large unpopulated areas in the circles we have considered - Central Park, the rivers and Upper Bay, the Jersey Meadows - which would be solid built-up areas in Los Angeles, Dallas, Columbus, etc.

Let us then imagine that World War III is started by a massive Soviet attack on U.S. Targets which is met by a massive counter-attack by the U.S. on Soviet Targets. The FCDA has identified 92 Critical Target Areas with a total population of 68 million. For the Soviet Union to place 92 aircraft on target at the ranges of these targets from their bases may not be an exceptionally difficult undertaking. But there is bound to be some diversion, confusion or interception so let us assume that only 25 of the Critical Target Areas are hit in the first attack, but that these 25 are the largest and most easily identified targets and that each is struck by at least one bomb of appropriate yield. The principal cities within the Critical Target Areas which have been chosen for our study here are the following:

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problems of mere survival of the survivors would become of paramount importance - the prevention of disease, the distribution of food and medicines, the maintenance of law and order.

The scale of destruction of life and property and the degree of immobilization of the remainder of the nation preoccupied with its own survival in the face of further attacks as well as rendering assistance to the survivors and refugees from these 25 cities and their environs is hard to imagine. But it is clear that many of the factors which make the U.S. a world power and a formidable power would have been destroyed. Rebuilding these sinews of strength would absorb the energies of the survivors for years. The physical, political or economic pattern of what might be rebuilt would be very difficult to predict. That it would resemble our cities and systems of today seems unlikely.

This brief inspection has been limited to the U.S.A. The effects upon the principal target cities of Western Europe would be comparable. The much higher density of total population would give these nations less resilience than the U.S.

The effects upon Russian cities should not be markedly different and the mass-effect upon the Russian system could well be as great as upon ours. Perhaps their critical targets are more dispersed - they are certainly less mechanized. But even today there is an almost oriental degree of crowding in most Russian cities - hence high population densities. Their economy is less urban-industrialized than ours. Their industrial war-making potential would presumably be as thoroughly destroyed as ours. The destruction of these parts located in the satellite nations would present awkward decisions for us to make. Their bureaucratic system might have greater capacity than ours to cope with widespread destruction. Their experiences in World War II may make them better prepared to deal with such major disasters.

In this review no consideration has been given to the effects of down-wind fall-out immobilizing large adjacent areas, sabotage by agents, the use of chemical or biological warfare or psychological warfare to stir up confusion, hysteria, etc., but these are matters which this group should consider - especially fall-out. To what degree they would amplify the effects of the attack may be deferred for the moment. The overwhelming impact of an attack without these additional measures seems sufficient to consider as a beginning.

Before proceeding to an appraisal of the defenses against attack - present and prospective - we should consider the area of our agreement as to the effect of a massive nuclear bomb attack upon our cities and upon those of the U.S.S.R. How would it change the status of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as World Powers? What would be the probable duration of such changed status? Are there significant differences in the vulnerability of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.? Are there significant differences in their recuperative capacities? Would longer warning and an enormous shelter plan reduce greatly the impact as described? Would a government sponsored and enforced dispersal plan which dismembered our large cities reduce greatly the impact as described? What is the probability that such a plan, if effective, could be carried out in the U.S.?

17.

routine by which it operates represents a recognition that a society must be able to assimilate, mediate growth. It is the ability to transcend a framework which has come to be taken for granted. The stability of a society depends on its skill in organization which enables it to react mechanically to "ordinary" problems and to utilize its resources to best effect. The greatness of a society, however, derives from its willingness to chart new ground beyond the confines of routine. Without organization, each problem becomes a special case; its energies will then be absorbed in analyzing and identifying each new problem at the expense of constructive thought. Without inspiration a society will stagnate; it will lose the ability to adapt to new circumstances or to generate new goals. The experience of a people tends to be confined to the level of its average performance. But leadership is the refusal to confine action to average performance; it is the willingness to define purposes perhaps only vaguely apprehended by the multitude. A society learns only from experience: it "knows" only when it is too late to act. But a statesman must act as if his inspirations were already experience, as if his aspiration were "truth." A statesman must therefore be an educator. He must bridge the gap between a society's experience and his own vision, between its tradition and its future.

In this task the possibilities are limited because there is an inherent tension between the mode of action of a bureaucracy and the pattern of statesmanship. A smoothly working bureaucracy creates the illusion that it is all running by itself; it will therefore seek to reduce all problems to administrative terms. The basic motivation of a bureaucracy is its quest for safety; the necessary emphasis on routine creates a bias in favor of a policy of minimum risk. A bureaucracy therefore has a tendency to exaggerate the technical complexities of its problems, and it seeks to reduce questions of judgment to a minimum. Technical problems are

22.

achieved to the detriment of both; different service academies, training schools and war colleges inevitably emphasize a particular aspect instead of an over-all strategy in which traditional distinctions should be disappearing, in which the *Army* should begin to approach the mobility of the *Air Force* and the *Air Force* to develop the relative discrimination of ground warfare.

be

It would still be the wisest course to move in the direction of a single service, initially by amalgamating the Army and the Air Force. The *Navy's* strategic problems as of yet are not sufficiently distinct to require integration, and in any case, resistance to complete unification in the Navy would be so bitter as to obviate its advantages. A unified service with a single system of service schools would force officers at a formative stage of their careers into a framework less narrowly addressed to the concerns of a particular service. The loyalty to the organization which is one of the most attractive traits of the military and which now necessarily produces a rigid adherence to a service point-of-view, could in this manner be utilized to help produce an over-all strategic doctrine.

It may be argued, that the officers of all services attend each other's war colleges even now. But it is one thing to attend a service school as an outsider to learn the point of view of another service, at a stage of the officer's career when his general attitude is well settled. It is quite another thing to provide incentives from the earliest stages of an officer's career to consider strategic problems apart from the interests of his service. The quality of a staff officer would then be judged less on the basis of his skill in defending his service's point of view in the coördinating procedure of the Pentagon than by his contribution to an over-all doctrine, or at least by his ability to operate within it. In a single service, loyalty to the organization would be identical with the requirements of doctrine. Doctrine would no longer be a tool of inter-service rivalry but a subject to be considered on its own merits.

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another's field of specialization. To our leaders, policy is as a series of
discrete problems; to the Soviet leaders it is an aspect of a continuing
political process. As a result, the contest between us and the Soviet system
has had
many of the attributes of any contest between a professional and an amateur.

Even a mediocre professional will usually defeat an excellent amateur, not because the amateur does not know what to do, but because he does not react sufficiently quickly or consistently enough. Our leaders have not lacked ability, but they have had to learn while doing and this has imposed a great handicap.

To be sure, many of the shortcomings of our leadership groups reflect the very qualities which have made for the ease of cooperation within relationships in American society. The condition for our limited government has been the absence of basic social schisms, the regulation of many concerns not by government fiat but by "what is taken for granted." A society can operate in this fashion only if disputes are not pushed to their logical conclusions, and if disagreements are blunted by the absence of dogmatism. And in fact the fear of seeming dogmatic permeates our social scene. Most Opinions are usually suggested, and that the proponent is aware of their contingency and also that he claims no superior validity for his own conclusions. This produces a preference for decisions by committee, because the process of conversation permits disagreements to be discovered most easily and adjustments made before positions have hardened. Our decision-making process is therefore geared to the pace of conversation; even departmental memoranda on which policy decisions are ultimately based are written with an eye to eventual compromise and not with the expectation that any of them will be accepted in its entirety.

STUDY GROUP ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Members of Sub-Committees

Sub-Committee I

<table><tr><td>Frank Pace, Jr. (Chairman)</td><td>Frank C. Nash</td></tr><tr><td>Hamilton Fish Armstrong</td><td>Dean Rusk</td></tr><tr><td>Robert R. Bowie</td><td>General Walter Bedell Smith</td></tr><tr><td>Thomas K. Finletter</td><td>Major General R. L. Vittrup</td></tr></table>

Sub-Committee II

<table><tr><td>Joseph E. Johnson (Chairman)</td><td>Major General Richard Lindsay</td></tr><tr><td>Frank Altschul</td><td>Major General James McCormack</td></tr><tr><td>Hanson Baldwin</td><td>Paul H. Nitze</td></tr><tr><td>Lloyd V. Berkner</td><td>Charles P. Noyes II</td></tr><tr><td>McGeorge Bundy</td><td>James Perkins</td></tr><tr><td>Caryl P. Haskins</td><td>Henry deWolf Smyth</td></tr><tr><td>N. E. Halaby</td><td>Carroll Wilson</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>Arnold Wolfers</td></tr></table>

Sub-Committee III

<table><tr><td>William A. M. Burden (Chairman)</td><td>Mervin J. Kelly</td></tr><tr><td>Robert Anderson</td><td>Roger Lewis</td></tr><tr><td>Lt. Genral James Gavin</td><td>Brigadier General A. P. O'Meara</td></tr><tr><td>Roswell L. Gilpatrick</td><td>Don K. Price</td></tr><tr><td>N. E. Halaby</td><td>I. I. Rabi</td></tr><tr><td>James T. Hill</td><td>Oscar M. Ruebhausen</td></tr><tr><td>Earl Johnson</td><td>Colonel William Kintner</td></tr></table>

THE NATURE OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Memorandum to the Subcommittee on the Arms Equation

by Henry A. Kissinger

In thinking about military superiority, it seems important to distinguish two phenomena: physical superiority either in resources or in technology or in weapons systems, and conceptual superiority either tactical or strategic. I have the impression that the latter is not always fully recognized and yet superiority in doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as superiority in resources.

## Tactical Doctrine

Superior tactical doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment (except perhaps for air-power), but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and use of artillery, a superior relationship between fire and movement which is the essence of tactics, furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples would be the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights (in part, of course, also a technological breakthrough), of the Prussian army against the Austrian and French in 1866 and 1870. All these were victories, not of superior resources, but of superior doctrine: the ability to break the frame-work which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all the more complete for facing the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Thus the key to a proper tactical doctrine is the correct understanding of the elements of one's superiority and then to develop the capacity to apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems. In the case of the U.S., it is relatively easy to determine the nature of our superiority -- technology, logistics, etc. -- it is much more difficult to devise means to make it effective. One of the most useful tasks of the sub-committee might be to examine the geographical areas where U.S. technological superiority would be at a premium and the weapons system and the methods of employing it which would put the other side at a maximum disadvantage.

## Strategic Doctrine

The dividing line between strategic and tactical doctrine is not easy to draw, of course, but if tactical doctrine is the application of power on the battlefield, strategic doctrine comes to expression in the choice of battlefield and even more importantly in one's conception of alternatives. If one maintains, for example, that any employment of tactical nuclear weapons will automatically lead to all-out thermonuclear war, then in any crisis

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situation we would weigh our risks in terms of the destruction of New York. In such a case, if the Soviet bloc interprets the utilization of nuclear weapons more flexibly, it may gain a crucial advantage. It has, of course, always been true that the side which could best interpret the meaning of new technological developments would obtain a strategic advantage. Thus the ability to use railroads to concentrate superior forces was the reason of Prussia's military successes in the 19th century. But the problem gains a particular urgency in the thermo-nuclear age: since there does not exist any body of precedent to go on, the only guide for action in crisis situations will be the theories we have developed in advance. It, therefore, becomes of crucial importance for the U.S. to understand properly the significance of new scientific developments and not to paralyze itself by developing a calculus of risks according to which all the dangers would seem to be on our side. Thus one of the key problems in the thermo-nuclear age is to shift the risk of initiating a thermo-nuclear war to the other side by means of alternative weapons systems which have the additional advantage of enabling us to conduct a more flexible diplomacy.

The need for alternative weapons systems can be summed up in two postulates which will have to characterize American strategic thinking over the next generation: 1) that any war will be a nuclear war, and 2) that a nuclear war should be attempted to be fought as something less than an all-out war. Wars will be nuclear for a variety of reasons: the whole procurement, planning and training of the defense establishment is based on the use of nuclear weapons to an extent that will be almost impossible to reverse in another year or so; even if it should prove possible to eliminate nuclear weapons from certain military actions, the war would still be a nuclear war because the military maneuvers will have to be carried out as if nuclear weapons might be used. This is true because the side which concentrates its forces might thereby give its opponent the precise incentive he needs to use nuclear weapons and to sweep all before him. But if forces are dispersed, they will not be able to hold a line with conventional weapons.

On the other hand, it is extremely dangerous to assume that the use of any nuclear device anywhere, necessarily leads to all-out war. The most certain way for such a war to come about is for us never to consider alternatives. If we think in terms of the dichotomy -- thermo-nuclear war or no war at all -- we shall paralyze our diplomacy, for Soviet strategy will surely seek to confront us with situations in which the pressures for solutions short of thermo-nuclear war, will be maximized. To be sure, we shall always maintain that we shall not shrink from fighting if our "vital" interests are threatened. But what is considered vital cannot be treated in the abstract; it always reflects a calculus of risks and as the Soviet nuclear capability grows, fewer and fewer objectives will come to seem vital, in the sense that we will be reluctant to risk the destruction of our major population centers for them. And even if this should not prove to be the case, the frightful consequences of a thermo-nuclear war should still cause us to think of it as a last resort rather than as the sole instrument of strategy.

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I do not think, however, that the situation with respect to the employment of nuclear weapons is quite as bleak as some of our commentators make it out to be. The calculus of risks by which a limited nuclear war would be expanded into an all-out thermo-nuclear exchange is almost the same as the one by which a limited conventional war is expanded into an all-out war. Not even an all-out war, in terms of geography, need necessarily mean the thermo-nuclear bombardment of cities--at least our strategic doctrine should take into account this possibility.

Walter Lippmann's thesis that nuclear weapons have made recourse to force impossible and that therefore diplomacy remains the sole instrument of policy, can only lead to an over-concern with finesse. Force is an inseparable component of diplomacy, and indeed its ultimate form of pressure. This has nothing to do with "rattling the Atom bomb." The capabilities of a sovereign power are a factor in the calculations of other states: the growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile is a form of blackmail even if no explicit threat to use it is ever made. Conversely, the diversification of our capabilities would circumscribe the Soviet field of action. The problems of present day strategy can, therefore, be summed up in two postulates:

1) Diplomacy which is not related to a military policy and to a plausible possibility of employing force will be sterile;

2) the only plausible employment of nuclear power is in a war of limited objectives for no power possessing a thermo-nuclear capability will accept unconditional surrender without employing it and no nation is likely to risk thermo-nuclear destruction except to the degree that it believes its survival is at stake.

Of course, we must have a thermo-nuclear capability superior to that of any likely opponent. But it should be conceived as the *condition*, not as the *end*, of policy. By itself, the thermo-nuclear capability in its undifferentiated form may make merely for paralysis of diplomacy. But if coupled with a proper strategic doctrine, the thermo-nuclear weapons may restore a measure of flexibility to international relations in

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the following way: As long as the United States possessed a
monopoly of nuclear weapons, the USSR could find safety only
by extending its orbit as far as possible. But now, where either
side should be able to keep itself from unconditional surrender
by the threat of employing thermo-nuclear weapons, adjustments
may be possible, provided three conditions are met:

1) that it is possible to generate pressures other than the threat of thermo-nuclear war;

2) that it is possible to create a climate of opinion in which the major powers do not believe that survival is at stake;

3) that the governing groups in the major powers can keep control of their public opinion, should a disagreement arise over whether national survival is at stake.

Thus a diversification of our military capabilities would add to
our diplomatic opportunities and may supply the beginning of an
answer to the most vexing problem in current international relations:
whether the thermo-nuclear age permits a strategy of limited objec-
tives, whether the common fear of mutual annihilation can supply
the frame-work of self-limitation brought about in the 19th century by
an agreement about the "legitimacy" of the international order.

## Physical Military Superiority

The nature of military superiority is particularly complex under modern conditions. This is due to two factors: 1) in the thermo-nuclear period we may no longer be able to count on a period in which we can mobilize our industry in relative safety as in World War I or II, and 2) the rate of technological change is so rapid that weapons in many areas tend to become obsolescent even before they become operational. Up to World War I, and for a considerable period thereafter, a weapons system would be good for a generation at least, but now, it may be out-dated when it has barely passed the blue-print stage. Yet the failure to plan on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons might create a vital weakness in our defense structure at any given point of time. Thus a great premium is placed on "ready forces", on shortening as much as possible the procurement and design cycle, and on correct intelligence, for if an enemy should ever catch us in the wrong procurement or technological cycle, he might have us at a complete disadvantage.

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The situation is further complicated by the fact that military strength depends not on the effectiveness of any one weapon, but on the relation of various capabilities to each other. The importance of the offense-defense mix can be shown by the following example: If one nation places all its bets on strategic air-power, while the other side develops a very large defensive capability, and only moderate offensive air-power, it may happen that the defensive capability of the offensively weaker power will absorb the total offense of the other side, thus freeing the initially smaller SAC for a mortal blow. It can be argued that at low levels of military expenditure, the Soviets have a great advantage in adjusting their offense-defense mix to surpass ours because, at low levels, a great deal depends on correct intelligence and we can assume that their intelligence is superior to ours. One problem for our sub-committee might then be to discuss the proper relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in the U.S. military establishment.

Many of our difficulties stem from the planning of our defense establishment and from our security practices. We are gearing our defense planning to a twelve months budgetary cycle and often on the basis of considerations that have little to do with military effectiveness. This tends to throw our procurement and long-range planning out of line, all the more so, as commitments once made are very difficult to reverse. Ways will have to be found by which defense planning and procurement can be carried out over a longer period, perhaps by making a minimum commitment over, say, a five-year period (in Imperial Germany, the minimum military budget was established over a seven-year period). This problem of planning is compounded by our security practices which seem to me to be based on an out-moded concept. In the 19th and early 20th century, when weapons technology was relatively stable, it was very important to guard a military secret jealously because it might supply a decisive advantage, but in the thermo-nuclear period with its rapid rate of technological change, it is more important to go fast than to play safe. Present security practices tend to lead to compartmentalization, to making it difficult for one agency to find out the work of others and to tap the imagination of private industry.

Another serious problem lies in the field of research and development. In his book "The Decline of the Best", Spengler said that the West will begin to disintegrate when its best people consider it more important to become monks than to become scientists. Even if our best people are not becoming monks, it is not certain that they are becoming scientists. Indeed, all statistics seem to indicate that the Soviets are outstripping us in training technological personnel. It might be useful to consider in the sub-committee what could be done to remedy this situation which in the long run might prove to be as dangerous as military inferiority. As a matter of fact, it may force us into a condition of permanent military inferiority.

The solution of many of these difficulties depends on the willingness of the U.S. people to support adequate defense programs. History abounds with examples of nations unwilling to make a relatively small effort and having to pay for it or failing to survive. The furrow the Roman commander Scipio plowed over the site of Carthage was the penalty for the unwillingness

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of the Carthaginian merchant class to support a larger defense establishment. Conversely, many nations have played an international role out of proportion to their real power because of their willingness to devote a larger share of their resources to military expenditures than their opponents. This is how Revolutionary France defeated all the other nations of Europe; this is in many respects the source of the power of the USSR. One of the most difficult tasks, then, is how to make clear to the American people the nature of the security problem facing them, to explain adequately that it is a long-range problem and that the penalty of failure may be national catastrophe. It is difficult to convey such a mood to a people which has never experienced disaster and maybe our group could give some thought to the problem of gaining public support for a long-range security effort.

## Miscellaneous Problems

In addition to the above problems some of the following questions may be worth discussing:

1. What type of national defense organization will permit an objective consideration of the levels of military strength and of the weapons system to insure a maximum degree of safety?

2. What level of military superiority is of strategic significance? Of what importance, for example, is a more elegant delivery system as long as both get to the target? Of what advantage is an increment to SAC after both sides have the capability of destroying the major cities of the other?

3. What is a significant technological breakthrough? Specifically, what is the significance of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to the arms equation? What is the significance of intermediate range missiles? Will the side that achieves them first have a decisive edge or will other forms of retaliation still have to be eliminated?

4. What is the possibility of the use of other non-conventional weapons such as biological, gas, radiological? Are these inherently more or less reprehensible than nuclear weapons which produce lethal effect through explosive forces? They are less destructive of property and perhaps even less destructive of life.

5. Since tactical superiority rests ultimately on trained man-power and organized resources, is it possible to fall behind in this sector to the extent that a crash program cannot regain superiority? In other words, what is an adequate over-all research and development program? Are there weapons developments which might give us a significant advantage such as SEA DARTS to replace the necessity for long runsays for heavy air transports, cross-country vehicles not dependent on tracks, etc.?

6. What should be the ratio between ready forces and reserve forces in a period of nuclear parity?

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7. What is the significance of the growing complexity of modern weapons to the assessment of national power? Because of this complexity few nations can maintain a modern weapons system (in 1914 many second-string powers could maintain a complete weapons system and therefore had to be counted in great power reckoning).

8. What is the purpose of alliances when most countries will, for all practical purposes, be "priced out" of the power struggle?

9. What is the significance of different intelligence capabilities in the military equation? -- Not only intelligence concerning weapons, but concerning strategies and tactics?

10. What is the significance of U.S. constitutional arrangements and congressional enactments regarding U.S. freedom to fight and to employ certain weapons?

11. What is the significance of the mobilization base in the military equation:

(a) Is there a need for greater readiness?

(b) Greater flexibility?

(c) A need for military support to our allies who are logistically incapable of supporting their armed forces?

12. What are the possibilities of barrier warfare to prevent land excursions into vital territory in the event of atomic weapons are neutralized -- consider mines, rockets, shape-charge projectors, etc.?

13. How can we meet the need for technical experts in the armed forces who require long periods of training and who, in the American system, are hard to retain in the Armed Services after they have been trained?