Henry A. Kiebler

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards.

your lecture in Connecticut?

Could you let me have a copy of

enough.

you cannot defend these views intensely
as I and many other admirers are concerned
feel alone, I want you to know that as far

In the unlikely event that you should

Administration.

put it so it is a reflection on the
troops from Europe. I doubt this is true,
your views regarding the withdrawal of

by the intensity with which you defended
Administration officials was being reduced

The *New York Times* that your influence with

While on the West Coast I read in

Dear Dean:

Washington D. C.
101 Union Trust Building
Covington and Burling
Mr. Dean Acheon

November 22, 1963

DEAN ACHESON

December 15, 1964

Dear Henry:

This letter belongs in the gossip department -- with one call on your memory.

First: I have been reading your book -- *A World Restored* -- with great enthusiasm and giving it to others. I do it slowly as I like to taste it and think about it as I go along. It also refreshes me from the too arid discussions of the present. I also use it, as the quotation from it in the enclosed address shows. A somewhat tiresome and irritating fellow at Amherst, with a nice wife -- Spiro -- told me that the book was your doctoral thesis. If so, it was a damned good one.

Second: Washington has emerged from the drugged sleep of the Eisenhower years and the short narcissistic Kennedy euphoria to a bitter power struggle for the President's political soul -- if "a political soul" is not a contradiction in terms. This makes the scene more lively, but sad; because so much more was possible. The contestants are all good men; though the same equal value cannot be put on their ideas, and ambition seems to play a distinct role.

Third: Your memory. Can you recall where George Kennan published an article on American pre-World War I diplomacy in which

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

[Y]

December 31, 1964

The Honorable Dean Acheson
Covington & Burling
701 Union Trust Building
Washington 5, D.C.

Dear Dean:

How nice of you to write as you did. Your comments about _A World Restored_ meant a great deal to me.

I have been finishing a book on American-European relations which I hope will not pain you too much. What I am trying to say--though not succeeding very well--is that the technical issue of nuclear control seems to me less important than encouraging responsible attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic. In this respect trends in Italy--partly encouraged by us--strike me as a grave long-run danger. I also suspect that Harold Wilson's views will prove to be unhelpful when they are fully exposed. This is why I have been so uneasy about the MLF. It groups the wrong Europeans for purposes which are not sufficiently clarified. In our government it reflects too many conflicting motives for consistent action.

On the other hand, we have staked our prestige on it for so long that I am not happy about the sudden reversal of policy either. Our friends must not be left so exposed. We should not use negotiations to clarify our own thought.

As for the Kennan quote, I have consulted our librarian Maury Feld. We have not been able to discover an article but in _American Diplomacy_ there are two references along the line which you seem to remember. They are on pages 48-49 and more explicitly on pages 90-95 in the Mentor edition.

I almost never come to Washington any more but when I do I hope you will let me call on you. Talking with you always gives me courage.

With warm regards.

Henry V. Kiebler

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

I let me call on you. Talking with you always gives me courage.

I almost never come to Washington any more but when I do I probe you will

pages 48-49 and more explicitly on pages 90-92 in the Mentor edition.

two references along the line which you seem to remember. They are on
have not been able to discover an article put in American Diplomacy there are
As for the Kennedy quote, I have consulted our librarian Henry Held. We
be felt so exposed. We should not use negotiations to clarify our own thoughts.

am not happy about the and then reversal of policy either. Our friends must not
On the other hand, we have asked our prestige on it for so long that I
consistent action.

clarified. In our government it reflects too many conflicting motives for
the MHA. It groups the wrong Europeans for purposes which are not sufficiently
unwilling when they are fully exposed. This is why I have been so uneasy about
long-term danger. I also suspect that Harold Wilson's views will prove to be
In this respect trends in Italy--partly encouraged by na--at strike me as a grave
important than encouraging reasonable attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic.
very well--is that the technical issue of nuclear control seems to me less
will not be in you too much. What I am trying to say--though not succeeding
I have been finishing a book on American-European relations which I have

Restored meant a great deal to me.

How nice of you to write as you did. Your comments about *A World*

Dear Dean:

Washington 2, D.C.
101 Union Trust Building
Covington & Burling
The Honorable Dean Achean

December 31, 1964

[A]

[1C]

For Release on Delivery
8:30 P.M., CST, March 24, 1965.

CYPRUS: THE ANATOMY OF THE PROBLEM

Address By
Dean Acheson

Before the
Chicago Bar Association

March 24, 1965.

Some months ago I agreed -- unwisely, as I am now aware -- to discuss Cyprus with you. The invitation was disarming. It did not call for an appraisal of who was right and who wrong in this tangled affair; nor for a solution, if any there be. Either suggestion would have warned me off. The approach was to be wholly detached and scholarly, as befitted an audience such as this. I was to disentangle and identify the parts which considerations of politics, policy, diplomacy, and international law played in the minds of the multifarious parties. The parties involved include, in the inner circle, Cypriots -- Greek and Turkish -- the governments of Greece, Turkey, and Britain; and in the outer circle those of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Republic, and the officials of the United Nations.

As I state the task, you see and surely sympathize with the complexities facing the lecturer. If he sometimes simplifies beyond the tolerances of the truth, you will not be overly critical.

First a word about Cyprus and its people. The largest island in the Eastern Mediterranean, it lies forty miles off the southern coast of Turkey and something under a thousand miles from Athens. Of its half-million or more people four-fifths are Greek-speaking and of Greek descent, the rest Turkish. Except for the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, the capital and principal city, and two small spots on the north coast, Turks are pretty well mingled with Greeks throughout the island. Recent (1964) inter-communal fighting has concentrated some twenty thousand Turkish refugees into camps near Nicosia.

- 2 -

For a millennium the history of Cyprus has been romantic and turbulent, as its geographical position made inevitable during the decline of the Eastern Roman Empire, the rise of Islam, and the Crusades. In recent centuries it formed part of the Ottoman Empire. Greek Cypriots detested Turkish rule as much as did mainland Greeks. In 1878 the British took over, first, administration of the island and, after the first World War, sovereignty. Under their benign and competent rule the people of the island, for the first time, knew peace, order, and justice under law. But they, like others, put a low value on these supposed blessings, and in 1954 traded them in for the slogan of self-determination. As time went on, the slogan came to mean different things to different Cypriots; but at the time it meant an end to British rule. Turkish Cypriots agreed with this, for British were foreigners. But union with Greece was quite as repulsive to them for the same reason.

The rebellion was bitter and bloody. Organization and propaganda fell to Archbishop Makarios of the Greek Orthodox Church, a political priest with considerable gifts of demagogy and ruthlessness; guerrilla operations were directed by General Grivas, a retired Greek army officer of Cypriot birth. He was and is a brave and able guerrilla leader without much political sense. Greek gun-running armed the whole people of a rugged island. After five years of losses incurred in fruitless operations, fifty thousand British troops had failed to suppress the rebellion, which more and more was aimed by Makarios and Grivas for enosis -- union -- of Cyprus with Greece.

By this time British interest in the island had narrowed to the use of military bases there, as staging areas for operations in the Arabian peninsular and beyond. Cyprus was all that remained for that important purpose, following British withdrawal from the Suez bases. The Greeks were loud, and probably correct, in their assurances that enosis would improve, not impair, this use of facilities on the island.

- 3 -

The British government asked representatives of the Greek and Turkish governments to meet with them at Zurich to devise a solution agreeable to all of them and, it was hoped, to the Greek and Turkish communities. The result of these talks was the Zurich agreements of 1959, and, when Cypriots joined the talks a year later, the London Agreements of 1960. These eventuated in four basic documents, agreed to by the four -- or more properly five -- parties involved, the governments of Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and the representatives of both the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. The last two, as a result of all the agreements, combined to become the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

The four documents were a Treaty of Establishment of the new Republic, its Constitution, a Treaty of Guarantee of the settlement, and a Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey to maintain a joint military command and forces on the island to defend it. A further explanatory word about each of these will bring out the nature of the settlement.

Great Britain transferred sovereignty over the island to the Republic of Cyprus, except for two base areas comprising a little over a hundred square miles. The treaty also vested in Great Britain auxilliary rights to use ports, road, and airfields and to conduct maneuvers and install communication facilities in specified areas.

The Constitution was unique and ingenious. It recognized and gave inalienable rights to the Greek and Turkish communities. Certain actions, both legislative and executive, required the separate concurrence of the Turkish and Greek legislators and the Greek President and Turkish Vice President, respectively. These related principally to defense, foreign affairs, and taxation. Separate municipalities were provided for in the five main towns. Separate courts were to try Greeks and Turks, and mixed tribunals where both were involved. The numerical strength of the armed forces and the percentage of Greeks and Turks in them and in the Civil Service was fixed by the Constitution. Separate Greek and Turkish communal chambers were established to legislate on matters of religion, education, culture, and personal status.

- 4 -

By the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus undertook not to join with any other State, or partition its territory; and to maintain its Constitution. The three other States agreed to prohibit union or partition and to guarantee "the Basic Articles of the Constitution." In case of breach, the Treaty provided that, "in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty."

Finally the Treaty of Alliance set up a tripartite headquarters, with rotational command and a joint force of Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish regular troops stationed on the island to defend its independence and territorial integrity.

Such was the settlement and, from the point of view of intelligence applied to a difficult problem, it was an excellent one. But in Cyprus intelligence is a reed shaken by the wind. The settlement lasted three years. On November 30, 1963, Archbishop Makarios submitted a memorandum entitled, "Suggested Measures for Facilitating the Smooth Functioning of the State and for the Removal of Certain Causes of Intercommunal Friction." It proposed no less than the repeal of everything which the Zurich agreement of February 11, 1959, had called the "basic articles" of the Constitution of Cyprus.

The Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriots refused to discuss these proposals, and the tensions which rapidly built up erupted into violence on December 21. Fighting with the ferocity typical of Mediterranean islands broke out between the two communities. The Turkish population, including children and old people, suffered casualties of between 500 and 1000. Many Turks fled from their homes. Water, food, and fuel were cut off from Turkish villages and quarters in towns and blockades were set up. Turkish Cypriots stopped traffic to Kyrenia on the north coast.

- 5 -

The government of Turkey appealed unavailingly to its co-guarantors in the Treaty of Guarantee to join in common action to reestablish "the state of affairs," created by the settlement. The British government deprecated the breach of the treaties and the Constitution but would not go beyond protests.

The government of Greece in 1964 was not the same government which had signed the treaties. Prime Minister Karamanlis, who had headed that government, had resigned in protest against Queen Frederika's insistence on a royal visit to London over the objection of the government. He not only resigned, but withdrew from politics and from Greece itself, taking up permanent residence abroad. New elections returned the opposition headed by Mr. Papandreou, who had been out of office for over twenty years and had declared during his campaign for the unconditional independence of Cyprus. This was the line he took in 1964, proclaiming that the settlement was "unworkable" and that, by reason of the denunciation of the treaties by the Archbishop's rump government, they had become void. Therefore, he added, if the people of Cyprus should choose to join Greece they were free to do so and would be warmly welcomed by their brother Hellenes. Papandreou undoubtedly believed that this was the course desired by Makarios and hence would eventuate. On the first of these beliefs, at least, it seems quite likely that he was and is mistaken.

Deserted by its co-guarantors and with pressure on Turkish Cypriots increasing, the Turkish government, people, and army concluded that interest and honor dictated that Turkey must act alone under Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee to reestablish the state of affairs created by that Treaty. Accordingly, in February and again in June of 1964 Turkish military and naval forces, with the necessary transport, were assembled at Iskenderun on the south coast of Turkey. On both occasions the Turkish government was dissuaded from action only by the most vigorous representations from the government of the United States, deeply concerned at the possibility of war between two of its NATO allies.

The Turkish position was very simple and passionately held. Even deeper than concern for the welfare of the Turkish Cypriots was the conviction that the national honor had been denegated. Turkey had given and received the most solemn commitments about Cyprus. Almost at once these had been pronounced unworkable and contemptuously repudiated by men for whom the Turks had little or no respect. They found this treatment insulting and intolerable. They rejected utterly the new doctrine that the United Nations could grant dispensations from inconvenient treaty obligations. If particular provisions caused unforeseen difficulty, the remedy lay in renegotiating, with suitable concessions.

The United States authorities discovered, what should not have surprised them, that, in blocking the Turks' use of a claimed treaty right to intervene on the island to restore the status quo ante, they had assumed a grave responsibility. Especially was this so as the situation in Cyprus deteriorated rapidly and adversely to the Turkish position. The Security Council of the United Nations had called on the parties not to use force and had with Cypriot consent put a peace-keeping force ashore under Indian command, composed at first chiefly of British troops with small contingents of Canadians, Danes, Finns, Irish, and Swedes. They were not to use force and could go only where the Cypriot government permitted. It did not permit them to go to certain port areas where infiltration of arms and troops from Greece began and continued on a large scale. Small amounts of both also came from Turkey; but, since the Turks had no control of any port, this was restricted by the necessity of night operation: in small boats on an open coast.

The United Nations also had as political representative on the island former President Galo Plaza of Ecuador and as Mediator Ambassador Tuomioja of Finland, both able men. But they were unable to budge the Archbishop and the Greek Cypriots, who believed that the United States would not permit Turkish intervention and would use force if necessary to prevent it.

[L]

- 7 -

Although our Government vigorously denied any such intention, this did not dispel the belief. Cypriot and Greek attitudes hardened; the arms build-up continued until by mid-summer an entire Greek division with its armament was on the island, an equal number of Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen were organized and armed under the command of General Grivas, and a large but unorganized number of irregulars armed and dangerously trigger-happy.

In this situation President Johnson invited Prime Ministers Inonu and Papandreou, successively, to Washington and proposed to them that they discuss with a representative of his a solution of the dangerous controversy. No "American plan" was put forward. This unusual posture of Americans not bearing gifts aroused Greek suspicions. Prime Minister Inonu accepted the President's offer. Prime Minister Papandreou rejected it. He said that there was nothing to discuss until the unconditional independence of Cyprus was acknowledged by all. Nevertheless, the United States continued its efforts.

The primary concern of the government was over the effect of the Cyprus dispute upon the relations between Greece and Turkey. Despite Greek and Cypriot claims that the treaties had become void by denunciation and, more specifically, that the right of intervention, provided by the Treaty of Guarantee, had lapsed when Cyprus became a member of the United Nations, there was little doubt that from a legal point of view the treaties were binding upon the parties. Several other conclusions were plain also: First, that merely to restrain the Turks from intervention, would be, in fact, to intervene against them; second, that if the Turks should accept this one-sided action, it could, nevertheless, have the most deleterious effect on our alliance through NATO; thirdly, that the Archbishop would not accept any adjudication against him; and, fourthly, that time was running strongly against the Turks, due to the military build-up on the island and the Archbishop's increasing pressure to crush Turkish-Cypriot resistance to his imposed regime.

[L4]

- 8 -

American persistence and the cooperation of Secretary General U Thant and Mediator Tuomioja worked out an ingenious method of negotiation between Greece and Turkey. Here again, as in the 1959-1960 talks, it seemed essential to any hope of success to reach, first, a desire to agree and an understanding between our allies before entering discussions with the Archbishop. His attitude at the time, if one could judge it from conduct, was, though understandable, not conducive to agreement. It was to gain his end -- unconditional independence -- but also to cause as much humiliation to Turkey as possible in the course of gaining it. If successful, he would, of course, decrease the belief of Turkish Cypriots in the power of Turkey to come to their aid.

At length it was agreed that President Johnson's representative should go to Geneva where Ambassador Tuomioja had his headquarters, and there, keeping the Ambassador informed, have talks separately with Greek and Turkish representatives. There were to be no commitments, preconditions, communiqués, or organization. The Turks sent an eminent professor of international law, who was also Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Turkish Parliament, Dr. Nihat Erim; the Greeks, a distinguished diplomat, now Greek Ambassador in London, Dimitrios Nicolareizis. Lord Hood of the British Foreign Office and a long-time friend of Washingtonians kept an eye on British interests.

As the talks opened, one sensed that -- theoretically, at least -- the interests of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus might not be irreconcilable. The Greek interest seemed to pass through the formal stage of unconditional independence to enosis, with guarantees of rights of the Turkish minority, vaguely described as "adequate." The Turks were prepared to accept enosis for some part of the island with Greece, provided there was a compensating enosis of another part with Turkey, a solution called "double enosis." Or they were willing to negotiate an independent Cyprus organized on a cantonal basis, with considerable local autonomy and some shifting of population.

- 9 -

Hope lay in how much give there was in the Greek
position. Trouble lay in Nicosia, where there was
no give. The Archbishop remained adamant for inde-
pendence without strings; General Grivas, for enosis
with concessions.

Our purpose this evening is not to give a de-
tailed account of the talks which went on throughout
the summer of 1964, but to show the interplay of
different and often conflicting considerations.
It soon became apparent that American reluctance
to take a lead had to be abandoned. Both Greece
and Turkey were too wary to risk making proposals.
The risk had to be taken of unifying opposition in
order to feel out the possibilities of concession.

The Turkish idea of double enosis in which a
quarter or more of the island (based on the propor-
tion of Turkish land ownership) should join with
Turkey, was totally unacceptable to Greek Cypriots.
The failure of fifty thousand British soldiers to
maintain British rule made plain that, while any
solution would require some vigorous, even forceful,
persuasion of somebody, coercion must be kept to a
minimum. The same conclusion applied to sufficient
shifts of population to permit a cantonal settlement
alone. But, since the heart of Turkish resentment
was over slight upon their national honor, some
modifications of Turkish demands might be possible.
One also hoped that Greeks in Greece and Cyprus might
be willing to make some appreciable concessions to
Turkey to achieve the union of most of Cyprus with
Greece. But in the light of history one hoped modestly.

If Greece in the end should own the island, what,
one asked oneself, were moderate and legitimate Turk-
ish interests in a place so close to its only open
sea coast and containing so many Turks? An answer
might be adequate provision for the well-being of the
latter, a matter not disputed in theory, though not
easy in practice; and beyond this, a military presence,
to which it already had treaty rights, but unnampered
by the need for tripartite consent at every turn.

- 10 -

[L.C]

A sequestered base for ground, air, and sea forces not only could be a defense for Cyprus but prevent its being used hostilely against Turkey, could defend the sea approaches to the south Turkish sea-ports, and be a constant reminder on the island of Turkish presence and interest.

A period of probing along these lines revealed a willingness in Ankara to accept them as a basis of negotiation. Comment from Athens, however, continued negative and critical without positive suggestion. In an effort to evoke one, the outline of a proposal was, at its suggestion, given the Greek government. All the while, a drumfire of opposition to the Geneva talks came out of Nicosia. The call was for unconditional independence; the military buildup and the pressure on the Turkish Cypriots continued despite the efforts of the United Nations representatives and its peace-keeping force.

The discussions at Geneva had been carried on with complete frankness and -- its necessary counterpart -- secrecy, or to use the fashionable euphemism, security. Many stories had been invented about the talks, but none leaked. Prime Minister Papandreou insisted that, before the Greek government would agree to anything, the Greek Parliament and the Cypriot government would be consulted. But agreement was not near. At this point the talks received two major blows, both from the Archbishop.

In the first place he visited Athens amid popular acclaim. There he was shown the memoranda prepared in Geneva. At an Athens press conference he exploded in indignation over the Acheson plan, which he presented as a betrayal of Greek and Cypriot interests. The Greek left wing, Papandreou's supporters, and their press took up the cry. The Prime Minister was neatly outmaneuvered and cut off from the only approach to settlement with Turkey. The Archbishop then fired his other broadside. This was even more destructive but not so successful -- at least, immediately.

- 11 -

The Greek government believed that it had the Archbishop's word not to start a fight on the island without consultation. Cypriot armed bands had been blockading five Turkish villages in a mountainous coastal strip -- the Mansoura-Kokkina area -- in the northwest. Tension was rising. In early August they attacked the villages and quickly captured all but one; the other held out. On August 7th the Turkish Air Force bombed the attackers with considerable loss of life among the surrounding armed and unarmed Greek Cypriots. Both sides threatened to extend the fighting. On August 9th after intense activity by United Nations people and others a cease fire was arranged. Kokkina remained in Turkish hands.

The eruption of violence complicated further an already complicated situation. The Archbishop became more cautious militarily and more adventurous politically. He had learned the dangers of provoking the Turks, and the limits of the restraints which others would impose. So he turned for help to the Soviet Union and Egypt. Khrushchev replied cautiously, seeing the possibilities of causing trouble but, also, of bringing some on himself. Colonel Nasser readily responded to approaches by Makarios, stirring the agitation against the British bases and giving propaganda support to the Greek Cypriot case. Relations between Greece and Cyprus were strained by Greek annoyance at Makarios's unilateral action and by Cypriot disappointment over the absence of Greek air defense against the Turkish attack -- a very difficult task for the distant Greek Air Force. Finally, the Cypriot communist party took over the organization of demonstrations both in favor of the Archbishop and against Great Britain and the United States. In Athens, too, the left vociferously criticized Papandreou's inactivity during the air attack.

The Turkish public and military believed that the government had called off the air action too soon, leaving the Kokkina situation dangerously equivocal. While the attacks on the village had ceased, the Greek Cypriots maintained the blockade, refused to allow the evacuation of noncombatants and wounded, and refused, also, to withdraw to positions held before the attack. Everywhere nerves were drawn taut. A machine gun burst anywhere could have touched off an explosion.

- 12 -

For a while the tension grew as the Archbishop refused to permit the replacement of 250 Turkish soldiers of the Treaty garrison, whose term of military service had expired -- a replacement the Greeks had been permitted to make a month before -- and played cat-and-mouse with the efforts of the United Nations command to get food, water, and fuel for be-seiged Turks. At length these irritants were removed, the danger of immediate hostilities receded; so, also, did the possibility of a settlement.

Further exploration by the Mediator and the President's representative left the impression that the Greek government had been paralyzed; whether from the effect which the Archbishop, General Grivas, and the press were having on Greek populace and military forces or from the belief that stalemate favored enosis, one could only speculate. At any rate no movement toward a negotiable position was discernible. The Archbishop's withdrawal from extreme provocation, but not an inch further, and his daily denunciation of any settlement but unconditional independence made it pretty clear that he saw stalemate as leading toward his desire. The Turks were quite willing to pick up the discussions at the point where the Kokkina fighting interrupted them. But they saw that in making any further concessions to unresponding Greeks they would merely be negotiating with themselves.

So the attempt to bring Greece and Turkey together soon straggled to an end in sandy deltas of frustration. A new phase began with the missions to Moscow. The Archbishop led off, sending his Foreign Minister to Moscow while he went to Cairo. Out of these visits came assurances of support for unconditional independence. The Soviet Union had always been strongly opposed to enosis, seeing much greater possibility of communist party growth in an independent Cyprus than in Cyprus as part of Greece. Colonel Nasser, too, could hope for an earlier end to British bases on an independent Cyprus than on an island incorporated into a NATO ally. Somewhat vague suggestions of support in the form of communist bloc aircraft transferred to Cyprus and based on Egypt only 250 miles away came out of both visits. These results could not fail to have a chilling effect in Athens where the belief was still held that independence is the path to enosis.

- 13 -

Sometime later, after exchanges of friendly messages, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Mr. Erkin, made his journey to Moscow. There mutual desires were expressed for closer and more understanding relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko explained, earnestly wanted friendship with all its neighbors and especially with Turkey. It had apparently come a long, full circle from 1946, when President Truman sent home in honor the body of the Turkish Ambassador on the battleship *Missouri*, the "Mighty Mo," to underline American support of Turkey in her rejection of Soviet demands to participate in the defense of the straits.

As for Cyprus, Mr. Gromyko had no difficulty in reconciling his statements to Mr. Kyprianou with music to Mr. Erkin's ears. The Soviet Union was opposed to enosis, it supported independence for Cyprus, and would look benevolently on a Cyprus organized on a cantonal basis and with guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority, a principle dear to Russian hearts. He also expressed Soviet opposition to the American proposed multilateral nuclear force in which Turkey was cooperating. Shortly after Mr. Erkin's return home, Turkey withdrew her cooperation.

So drift continues; sometimes with a nudge this way, sometimes that way. Most of the nudges come from the exigencies of domestic politics in one country or another. But for the time being the Archbishop has his ruthless ambitions under control. Like a good golfer, he has learned the dangers of pressing; but for how long? His hopes of support from the General Assembly of the United Nations have been disappointed by the adjournment of that body until next September. Will he still operate on the theory that time is on his side and that restraint is the best policy? If he is foolish enough to push the Turks too far, no one will restrain them again. If not, prescriptive rights from time's grant will accrue from Turkish inaction.

[lc]

OCT 1 3 1966

DEAN ACHESON

October 11, 1966

Dear Henry:

I have been wondering if you have had a chance to give any further thought to whether you are willing to relinquish the young lady you mentioned who might do some further research on the book for me, or have decided that you need her too much for your own work. If the latter is the case I shall be sorry, but shall understand entirely and do not want to press the matter. If from your point of view she is available and you think she would be willing to talk with me about the work, I should very much like to get the matter started. Marina Finkelstein is doing an excellent job and I am counting on her for the great bulk of the work.

If your prospect could work for me for six or seven months, I think that would be just about the help that I need in addition to Marina. If your suggestion is not going to be possible, I think I will have to find someone. Have you any other suggestions?

There is one former State Department official, Florence Kirlin, whom you may know, who would be very helpful and is interested, but unhappily is planning a long trip and I am afraid will not be here long enough before she leaves to get very far with the job.

With kindest regards,

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International
Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Henry V. Klaarner

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards,

Miss Finkelstein.
Assistant that I have ever had, though infinitely less dominating than
I will then let you have per name. She is probably the greatest research
the next day to find out whether she is interested in working for you and
more significant than what she can make to me. I will call her within
than mine, and the contribution the kind lady can make to your properly
Let me listen to tell you that I think your book is more important
the office today.

on a quick trip to Vietnam for the government. I have just returned to
Your letter of October 11 arrived while I was out of the country

Dear Dean:

Washington D. C.
101 Union Trust Building
Covington & Burling
Mr. Dean Adeson

October 24, 1966

November 2, 1966

Mr. Dean Acheson
Covington & Burling
701 Union Trust Building
Washington 5, D.C.

Dear Dean:

I have talked to the young lady I recommended to you. Despite my strong urging, she has decided not to accept the position you mentioned. She is in the process of writing her thesis and she finds that the maximum amount of time she could give to outside work would be ten hours a week; that, she believes, would not be adequate for you. If she is wrong about this, why don't you get in touch with her directly. Her name is Miss Corinne Lyman and she can be reached at 2128 N. Street, N.W., Washington 20037 (telephone: 337-8696). I really cannot recommend her highly enough. She is a somewhat withdrawn person, but absolutely reliable and thoughtful. As I have mentioned before, I would happily take her on myself for whatever time she can spare.

If Miss Lyman does not work out, then maybe another former assistant of mine who is now in Washington could be of some use to you. She is less intelligent and thorough, but she might be quite helpful nevertheless. Will you let me know about it and I will approach her.

With warm regards and every good wish.

Henry A. Klaarner

Sincerely yours,

neverthelesst. Will you let me know spout it and I will approach her.
She is less intelligent and thorough, but she might be quite helpful
as assistant of mine who is now in Washington could be of some use to you.
If Miss Lyman does not work out, then maybe another former

take her on myself for whatever time she can abate.
relisble and thoughtful. As I have mentioned before, I would happily
her highly enough. She is a somewhat withdrawn person, but specially
Washington 20037 (telephone: 337-8999). I really cannot recommend
Corinne Lyman and she can be resded at 2138 N. Street, N. W.,
till a, why don't you get in touch with her directly. Her name is Mias
that, she believes, would not be adequate for her. If she is wrong spout
amount of time she could give to outside work would be ten hours a week.
She is in the process of writing her thesis and she finds that the maximum
my strong side, she has decided not to accept the position you mentioned.
I have talked to the young lady I recommended to her. Deaute

Dear Dean:

Washington 2, D.C.
201 Union Tract Building
Covington & Burling
Mr. Dean Adreson

November 3, 1966