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2557 WORDS

9/21/02

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Senators:

Congress is considering one of the most consequential expressions of its views since the end of the Cold War: what action the United States should take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential growth. President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to rectify the defiance by Iraq of its own resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles and Iraq's agreement to do so as a condition for

ending the Gulf War in 1991. But should it prove impossible to mobilize a world community preferring the risk of a greater threat in the future, what is the wisest course for the United States? (Thus these resolutions, together with a coalition of the like-minded?)

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For all these reasons, the existence and growth of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and stability. The issue is not whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical. Iraq's policy is implacably hostile to the United States and to certain neighboring countries. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. It is working to develop a nuclear capacity. Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by evicting the international inspectors he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community.

By what reasoning can the world community or America be expected to abide by these actions.

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together with those countries that will support it, must deal now
with a danger in which it has acquiesced for a decade.

On September 11, 2001, the world entered a new period in which private, non-state organizations have proved capable of threatening national and international security by stealth attacks.

The controversy about preemption is a symptom of the impact of
this transformation. At bottom, it is a debate between the
traditional

notion of sovereignty of the nation-state as set forth in the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648 and the adaptation required by both modern
technology and the nature of the terrorist threat.

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national
state, though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined
operatives were scattered around the globe, some on the soil of

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7

America's closest allies and even within America itself. They enjoyed financial and organizational support from a number of countries - most frequently from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments. Bases for terrorists have been established in several countries, but usually in areas where the governments could plausibly deny control or were actually not in control, such as in Yemen, Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran.

In this manner, the international system based on the sovereign nation-state is being transformed by a transnational threat that has to be fought on the sovereign territory of other nations over issues transcending the nation-state. Having no territory to defend, the terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not

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9

degree of its relationship to al Qaeda - though Iraq has used
terrorism against its neighbors, against Israel, and as far away as
Europe. Nor is it the precise magnitude of the stockpiles that
constitutes the threat.

By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolution
requiring it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in
effect asserted the right to possess weapons whose very existence
compares magnifies the terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism
cannot flourish except with the support of states that either
sympathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these
countries observe the flouting of U.N. resolutions and the defiance
of America, they feel less restrained in continuing or ignoring these
activities. For the nations of the world to acquiesce in growing
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction where the new form of

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terrorism has been spawned is to undermine restraint with respect
not only to weapons proliferation but to the psychological impulse
toward terrorism altogether.

The campaign in Afghanistan was an important first step. But
if it remains the principal move in the war against terrorism, it runs
the risk of petering out into an intelligence operation while the rest
of the region gradually slides back to the pre-9/11 pattern, with
radicals encouraged by the demonstration of American hesitation
and moderates demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired
Iraq as an aggressive regional power.

At the same time, while reserving the option to act with only
the nations it can convince, the United States is wise to a appeal to
cooperative action of the world community. As the most powerful
nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral

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11

capacity to implement its convictions. But it also has a special
obligation to justify its actions by principles that transcend the
assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be in either the
American national interest or the world's interest to develop
principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption
against its own definition of threats to its security. Thus the case
for enforcement *should* be the opening move in a serious effort of
consultation to develop general principles that other nations can
consider in the general interest.

President Bush's speech to the U.N. was therefore significant
for what it did not say as well as for what it affirmed. The President
did not assert a universal right of preemption; he based his case on
the exceptional character of Iraq's conduct and its defiance of U.N.
resolutions. He did not claim a general American right to impose
a penalty for such behavior for an decade.

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014

regime change on other societies. He did insist that, in the specific case of Iraq, the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own resolutions are almost surely incompatible with Saddam Hussein's continuation in power.

Thus the President has opened the door to a cooperative approach to dealing with the ultimate challenge: how to adapt the international system to the implications of the age of terrorism.

The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a control system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt.

The control system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by Saddam Hussein's evasions and violations. It must prevent any possibility for local authorities to harass informants or to impede free access to the inspectors. It should be backed by

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13

standby authority to remove any obstacle to transparency. In

practice, such a system will almost certainly prove incompétible

with the continuation of Hussein's regime.

In the end, if enforcement of U.N. resolutions prove:

necessary, it is important to couple it with a program of post-
reconstruction for Iraq. Because of the precedent-setting nature of
this war, its outcome will determine the way U.S. actions will be
viewed far more than the way we entered it. And we may find more
nations willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in war, if only
because no country wants to see an exclusive position for America
in a region so central to energy supplies and international stability.

Military intervention will confront the United States with the
question of how to preserve the unity and ensure the territorial
integrity of a country that is an essential component of ar/Gulf

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equilibrium. The conventional answer of a federal solution to enable
the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live together
without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But any
serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent
autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the
Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And
all this would have to take place in the context of a government
with participants capable of resisting pressures from the remnants
of the old regime or from neighboring countries determined to
destabilize the emerging system.

A word must be said about the reaction of traditional allies to
the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. On one level,
the controversy reflects a fundamental change in European
domestic politics. During the Cold War, opposition to American

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policy almost invariably came from the left and was resisted by the
governments in office - usually center-right. Today European
center-left governments are being assaulted with standard anti-
American positions by the left wings of the governing parties,
disaffected because their leaders are conducting centrist economic
policies. And governments reluctant to further inflame their radical constituents stand silent or occasionally join the chorus.

Generational change is a contributing factor. The Atlantic Alliance's first generation of European leaders, though they led countries weakened and impoverished by the war, had their formative experience when Europe was the center of world affairs. They understood that their ultimate choice was the alliance or a kind of neutralism that, while acceptable to some groups on the left, was anathema to center-right governments. No such consensus as

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to the danger exists today. Hence attacks on America as violence-
prone, unilateralist, and emotionally unbalanced - the sloans of
the opposition during the Cold War - have become the standard
commentary of intellectuals and media, feebly resisted, if at all, by
governments.

This trend is reinforced because for European governments,
the dominant foreign policy concern for more than a decade has
been the creation of the European Union - a historic task from
which the United States is, by definition, excluded. And for many
European leaders, European identity has come to be sought in
distinction from and, not infrequently, in opposition to the United
States. Europe is concentrating on the legalistic, bureaucratic, and
constitutional arrangements involved in integrating more than 20
nations with vastly differing histories, languages and, occasionally,

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cultures, while the United States celebrates the exceptional nature
of its established institutions and declares them relevant to the rest
of the world.

The vast gap in military power between Europe and the United
States compounds the difference in perspectives. There is no
precedent for the military dominance the United States has
achieved over the rest of the world. There does not exist now - nor
for the foreseeable future - any country or group of countries
capable of posing a military challenge to the United States. This
situation tempts adversaries to challenge the United States, if at all,
on a level beyond the conventional, such as by terrorism. Some
friendly nations fear that the United States, being able to impose its
preferences, will do so in every situation by the naked exercise of
power.

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must be to devise a system for dealing with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the beginning of the threat of global proliferation. Whatever the views regarding Iraq, the nations of the world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially the major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.

Therefore, urge Congress to support the President in moving in the direction he has so eloquently put forward.

The Senate and the House of Representatives have an opportunity to indicate a system of international order. I urge you to favor the President's plan of action. Together with the world community if at all possible; in concert with the countries of the world if necessary.

Consult and Control: Bywords for Battling the New Enemy

By Henry A. Kissinger

*The Washington Post*

Monday, September 16, 2002

President Bush's speech to the United Nations dramatically set forth American policy in Iraq in three propositions: an account of the threat posed by stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; a description of the precise manner in which Iraq has violated U.N. resolutions in building these weapons, and a strong implication that no solution is workable unless coupled with a removal of Saddam Hussein.

Bush did not offer an American blueprint. In calling on the U.N. to meet the challenge to its authority, he conveyed the idea that, for America, common action is the preferred strategy and unilateral action a last resort. The speech was therefore significant as well for what it did not say. The president did not assert a universal right of preemption; he based his case on the exceptional character of Iraq's conduct and its defiance of U.N. resolutions. He did not claim a general American right to impose regime change on other societies. He did insist that, in the specific case of Iraq, the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own resolutions are almost surely incompatible with Saddam's continuation in power.

Thus the president has opened the door to a cooperative approach to dealing with the ultimate challenge: how to adapt the international system to the implications of the age of terrorism. For on Sept. 11, the world entered a new period in which private, non-state organizations have proved capable of threatening national and international security by stealth attacks. The controversy about preemption is a symptom of the impact of this transformation. At bottom it is a debate between the traditional notion of sovereignty of the nation-state as set forth in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the adaptation required by both modern technology and the nature of the terrorist threat.

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state, though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives were scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and even within America itself. They enjoyed financial and organizational support from a number of countries - most frequently from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments. Bases for terrorists have been established in several countries, but usually in areas where the governments could plausibly deny control or were actually not in control,

2

such as in Yemen, Somalia or perhaps Indonesia and Iran. In this manner, the international system based on the sovereign nation-state is being transformed by a transnational threat that has to be fought on the sovereign territory of other nations over issues transcending the nation-state. Having no territory to defend, the terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not interested in the conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional diplomacy.

By attacking New York and Washington, the terrorists ensured that this transformation would be shaped by the special character of the American nation. For America has never thought of itself as simply one nation among others. Its national ethos has been expressed as a universal cause identifying the spread of liberty and representative government as the key to peace. American foreign policy is more comfortable with categories of good and evil than with the calculations of national interest of European cabinet diplomacy.

European critics holding more traditional concepts have accused America of overreacting because terrorism is a new problem primarily to Americans - one that Europeans overcame in the 1970s and '80s without undertaking global crusades. But the terrorism of two decades ago was of a different character. It was on the whole composed of nationals of the country where the terror took place (or, as in the case of the IRA in Britain, by a group with special national grievances of its own). Though some received foreign intelligence support, their bases were in the country where they operated. Their weapons of choice were mostly suitable for individual assaults. By contrast, Sept. 11 terrorists operate on a global basis, are motivated less by a specific grievance than by a generalized hatred, and have access to weapons by which they can give effect to their strategy of killing thousands and ultimately far more if they acquire weapons of mass destruction.

In the immediate post-Sept. 11 period, this difference in emphasis was submerged in a general shock that brought home to most nations the importance of the United States as the guarantor of international stability in the traditional sense. The intelligence and police aspect of the war against terrorism - the part most compatible with the cooperation among sovereign states - received almost universal support.

Since the attack on the United States was launched from the sovereign territory of a nation-state, the war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan generated widespread cooperation as well. But as soon as the Afghanistan operation was substantially concluded, the next phase of the anti-terrorist campaign was bound to raise the issue of how to deal with incipient rather than actual terrorism.

3

Unlike the Westphalian period, when the movement of armies foreshadowed threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives no warning, and its perpetrators vanish with the act of commission. Hence countries that harbor terrorist headquarters or terrorist training centers cannot take refuge behind traditional notions of sovereignty. If there is a serious prospect of a terrorist threat from the soil of a sovereign country, some preemptive action - including military action - is inherent in the definition of the challenge.

5

It is at this point that the general terrorist threat merges with the challenge posed by weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Perhaps the most important long-term problem faced by the international community is the problem of proliferation of these weapons, especially in the possession of states with no internal checks on their rulers' decisions and moreover when these weapons have been used against the country's own people and its neighbors. If the world is not to turn into a doomsday machine, a way must be found to prevent that proliferation. Cold War principles of deterrence are almost impossible to implement when there is a multiplicity of states, some of them harboring terrorists in position to wreak havoc.

1

The Cold War world reflected a certain uniformity in the assessment of risk between the two sides. But when many states threaten each other for incongruent purposes, who is to do the deterring, and in the face of what provocation? This is especially true when that which must be deterred is not simply the use of weapons of mass destruction but the threat of them. Is the United States to undertake this role on a global basis in every contingency?

Therefore, the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in violation of U.N. resolutions cannot be separated from the post-Afghanistan phase of the war against terrorism. Iraq is located in the midst of a region that has been the hotbed of the special type of global terrorist activity from which the attack on the United States was organized. The challenge posed by Iraq is not the precise degree of its relationship to al Qaeda - though Iraq has used terrorism against its neighbors, against Israel and as far away as Europe. Nor is it the precise magnitude of the stockpiles that constitutes the threat.

6

By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolution requiring it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted the right to possess weapons whose very existence magnifies the terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support of states that either sympathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe the flouting of U.N. resolutions and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained in continuing or

4

ignoring these activities. For the nations of the world to acquiesce in
growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction where the new form of
terrorism has been spawned is to undermine restraint with respect not only
to weapons proliferation but to the psychological impulse toward terrorism
altogether.

By defining the challenge as of a magnitude requiring cooperative
action by the world community, President Bush has affirmed America's
commitment to a new world order. As the most powerful nation in the world,
the United States has a special unilateral capacity to implement its
convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by
principles that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot
be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to
develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of
preemption against its own definition of threats to its security. Thus the
case for enforcement should be the opening move in a serious effort of
consultation to develop general principles that other nations can consider
in the general interest. This surely was the implicit message of the
president's U.N. speech, even if it was not articulated in these terms.

The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a control
system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq - together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt. The control
system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by Saddam Hussein's
evasions and violations. It must prevent any possibility for local
authorities to harass informants or to impede free access to the
inspectors. It should be backed by standby authority to remove any obstacle
to transparency. In practice, such a system will almost certainly prove
incompatible with the continuation of Hussein's regime.

Other nations - especially allies who have been sheltered for a
half-century under the American commitment to world order - should take this
challenge seriously and not subordinate it to domestic politics. A special
responsibility falls on America's traditional allies. In the end, the
United States - like any great power - will reserve the right to act alone.
But it would be an egregious failure of 50 years of Atlantic policy if
matters reached this point. Now that the president has announced his
direction and the administration will speak unambiguously with one voice,
it is hard to believe our allies will jettison a half-century of Atlantic
partnership on an issue ultimately as vital to their interests as to ours.
The Bush administration's concern about terrorism and weapons proliferation
in the Middle East involves one of the fundamental issues of the emerging
international order. It should not be dismissed with comments about
adventurism, and is unlikely to be when the American direction is clear and
European electoral pressures have subsided.

10

Phase II and Iraq

by Henry A. Kissinger

The Washington Post

Sunday, January 13, 2002

As military operations in Afghanistan wind down, it is well to keep in mind President Bush's injunction that they are only the first battles of a long war.

An important step has been taken toward the goals of breaking the nexus between governments and the terrorist groups they support or tolerate, discrediting Islamic fundamentalism so that moderates in the Islamic world can reclaim their religion from the fanatics, and placing the fight against terrorism in the context of the geopolitical threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq to regional stability and to American friends and interests in the region. But much more needs to be done.

Were we to flinch, the success in Afghanistan would be interpreted in time as taking on the weakest and most remote of the terrorist centers while we recoiled from unraveling terrorism in countries more central to the problem.

Three interrelated courses of action are available:

(a) To rely primarily on diplomacy and coalition-building on the theory that the fate of the Taliban will teach the appropriate lessons.

(b) To insist on a number of specific corrective steps in countries with known training camps or terrorist headquarters, such as Somalia or Yemen, or those engaged in dangerous programs to develop weapons

of mass destruction, such as Iraq, and to take military action if these steps are rejected.

(c) To focus on the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in order to change the regional dynamics by showing America's determination to defend regional stability, its interests and its friends. (This would also send a strong message to other rogue states.)

Sole reliance on diplomacy is the preferred course of some members of the coalition, which claim that the remaining tasks can be accomplished by consultation and the cooperation of intelligence and security services around the world. But to rely solely on diplomacy would be to repeat the mistake with which the United States hamstrung itself in every war of the past half-century. Because it treated military operations and diplomacy as separate and sequential, the United States stopped military operations in Korea as soon as our adversaries moved to the conference table; it ended the bombing of North Vietnam as an entrance price to the Paris talks; it stopped military operations in the Gulf after the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

In each case, the ending of military pressure produced diplomatic stalemate. The Korean armistice negotiations consumed two years, during which America suffered as many casualties as in the entire combat phase; an even more intractable stalemate developed in the Vietnam negotiations; and in the Persian Gulf, Saddam Hussein used the Republican Guard divisions preserved by

2

the armistice to restore control over his
territory and to dismantle systematically the
inspection provisions of the armistice
agreement.

Anti-terrorism policy is empty if it is not
backed by the threat of force. Intellectual
opponents of military action as well as its
likely targets will procrastinate or agree to
token or symbolic remedies only. Ironically,
governments on whose territory terrorists
are tolerated will find it especially difficult
to cooperate unless the consequences of
failing to do so are made more risky than
their tacit bargain with the terrorists.

Phase II of the anti-terrorism campaign must therefore involve a specific set of demands geared to a precise timetable supported by credible coercive power. These should be put forward as soon as possible as a framework. And time is of the essence. Phase II must begin while the memory of the attack on the United States is still vivid and American-deployed forces are available to back up the diplomacy.

Nor should Phase II be confused with the pacification of Afghanistan. The American strategic objective was to destroy the terrorist network; that has been largely accomplished. Pacification of the entire country of Afghanistan has never been achieved by foreigners and cannot be the objective of the American military effort. The United States should be generous with economic and development assistance. But the strategic goal of Phase II should be the destruction of the global terrorist network, to prevent its reappearance in Afghanistan, but not to be drawn into Afghan civil strife.

Somalia and Yemen are often mentioned as
possible targets for a Phase II campaign.
That decision should depend on the ability
to identify targets against which local

governments are able to act and on the
suitability of American forces to accomplish
this task if the local governments can't or
won't. And given these limitations, the
United States will have to decide whether
action against them is strategically
productive.

All this raises the unavoidable challenge
Iraq poses. The issue is not whether Iraq was
involved in the terrorist attack on the United
States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially
geopolitical. Iraq's policy is implacably
hostile to the United States and to certain
neighboring countries. It possesses growing
stockpiles of biological and chemical
weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used
in the war against Iran and on his own
population. It is working to develop a
nuclear capability. Hussein breached his
commitment to the United Nations by
evicting the international inspectors he had
accepted on his territory as part of the
armistice agreement ending the Gulf War.
There is no possibility of a negotiation
between Washington and Baghdad and no
basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the
international community.

If these capabilities remain intact, they could
in time be used for terrorist goals or by
Saddam Hussein in the midst of some new
regional or international upheaval. And if
his regime survives both the Gulf War and
the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone
will elevate him to a potentially
overwhelming menace.

From a long-range point of view, the
greatest opportunity of Phase II is to return
Iraq to a responsible role in the region. Were
Iraq governed by a group representing no
threat to its neighbors and willing to
abandon its weapons of mass destruction,
the stability of the region would be
immeasurably enhanced. The remaining

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regimes flirting with terrorist fundamentalism or acquiescing in its exactions would be driven to shut down their support of terrorism.

At a minimum, we should insist on a U.N. inspection system to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, with an unlimited right of inspection and freedom of movement for the inspectors. But no such system exists on paper, and the effort to install it might be identical with that required to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Above all, given the ease of producing biological and chemical weapons, inspection must be extremely intrusive, and experience shows that no inspection can withstand indefinitely the opposition of a determined host government.

But if the overthrow of Saddam Hussein is to be seriously considered, three prerequisites must be met: (a) development of a military plan that is quick and decisive, (b) some prior agreement on what kind of structure is to replace Hussein and (c) the support or acquiescence of key countries needed for implementation of the military plan.

A military operation against Saddam Hussein cannot be long and drawn out. If it is, the battle may turn into a struggle of Islam against the West. It would also enable Hussein to try to involve Israel by launching attacks on it -- perhaps using chemical and biological weapons -- in the process sowing confusion within the Muslim world. A long war extending to six months and beyond would also make it more difficult to keep allies and countries such as Russia and China from dissociating formally from what they are unlikely to join but even more unlikely to oppose.

Before proceeding to confrontation with

Iraq, the Bush administration will therefore wish to examine with great care the military strategy implied. Forces of the magnitude of the Gulf War of a decade ago are unlikely to be needed. At the same time, it would be dangerous to rely on a combination of U.S. air power and indigenous opposition forces alone. To be sure, the contemporary precision weaponry was not available in the existing quantities during the Gulf War. And the no-fly zones will make Iraqi reinforcements difficult. They could be strengthened by being turned into no-movement zones proscribing the movement of particular categories of weapons.

Still, we cannot stake American national security entirely, or even largely, on local opposition forces that do not yet exist and whose combat capabilities are untested. Perhaps Iraqi forces would collapse at the first confrontation, as some argue. But the likelihood of this happening is greatly increased if it is clear American military power stands in overwhelming force immediately behind the local forces.

A second prerequisite for a military campaign against Iraq is to define the political outcome. Local opposition would in all likelihood be sustained by the Kurdish minority in the north and the Shiite minority in the south. But if we are to enlist the Sunni majority, which now dominates Iraq, in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we need to make clear that Iraq's disintegration is not the goal of American policy. This is all the more important because a military operation in Iraq would require the support of Turkey and the acquiescence of Saudi Arabia. Neither is likely to cooperate if they foresee an independent Kurdish state in the north and a Shiite republic in the south as the probable outcome. A Kurdish state would inflame the Kurdish minority in Turkey and

4

a Shiite state in the south would threaten the
Dhahran region in Saudi Arabia, and might
give Iran a new base to seek to dominate the
gulf region. A federal structure for a unified
Iraq would be a way to deal with this issue.

Creating an appropriate coalition for such an
effort and finding bases for the necessary
American deployment will be difficult.
Phase II is likely to separate those members
of the coalition that joined so as to have veto
over American actions from those that are
willing to pursue an implacable strategy.
Nevertheless, the skillful diplomacy that
shaped the first phase of the anti-terrorism
campaign would have much to build on.
Saddam Hussein has no friends in the gulf
region. Britain will not easily abandon the
pivotal role, based on its special relationship
with the United States, that it has earned for
itself in the evolution of the crisis. Nor will
Germany move into active opposition to the
United States -- especially in an election
year. The same is true of Russia, China and
Japan. A determined American policy thus
has more latitude than is generally assumed.

But it will be far more difficult than Phase I.
Local resistance -- especially in Iraq -- will
be more determined and ruthless. Domestic
opposition will mount in many countries.
American public opinion will be crucial in
sustaining such a course. It will need to be
shaped by the same kind of decisive and
subtle leadership by which President Bush
unified the country for the first phase of the
crisis.

*The writer, a former secretary of state, is
chairman of Kissinger Associates, an
international consulting firm.*

© 2002, Los Angeles Times Syndicate
International

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

The Washington Post
Tuesday, March 5, 2002

Henry A. Kissinger

Answering the ‘Axis’ Critics

Not in recent memory has a presidential comment evoked the acrimony, especially in Europe, that President Bush's phrase “the axis of evil” has. Remarkably little of the avalanche of disapproval addresses the substance; its focus is on motives: the imminent congressional election (this from the British foreign secretary); American imperialism (the European Commission foreign policy head); simplistic thinking (the French foreign minister); the trend toward American isolationism and hegemonism (leading German newspapers).

Yet the president has raised an issue central to international security: the “nexus” among large, well-organized and deadly terrorist organizations (such as al Qaeda), states that have used and supported terrorism (such as Iran and North Korea) and states that have developed (and, in the case of Iraq, used) weapons of mass destruction. Until Sept. 11, the United States and its allies withheld military action until after terrorist attacks had, in fact, occurred; constraint was sought via the same principle of deterrence that was applied to weapons of mass destruction in the hands of the major powers: the expectation that rational leaders would avoid actions leading to their own destruction. But when such weapons are within reach of countries that have employed them against their neighbors and their own people (as Iraq), or that at times have made systematic assassination part of their policy and where hundreds of thousands have been sacrificed to death by starvation (as North Korea), or of national leaders who have backed virulent terrorist groups and hostage-takers (as Iran), and if attacks are made by suicide bombers, these constraints may not operate any longer. Especially where covert use and linkage to terrorists are ever possible, preventive action must be considered.

Obviously the three nations cited by the president need to be dealt with by methods appropriate to their situations. Iraq clearly poses the most urgent challenge; Iran will require the most sophisticated policy; North Korea is comparable to Iraq domestically but, in recent years, has occasionally seemed to grope for a new approach. The scope for diplomacy is least with respect to Iraq, greatest, one hopes, with respect to Iran. This is why both the president and Secretary of State Colin Powell have indicated there is no intention to deal with Iran and North Korea by military means. But in the end, the test of any policy will be the degree to which the risk to global security inherent in the possession of weapons of mass destruction by dangerous regimes is brought under control.

The Atlantic Alliance, which has been the keystone of the foreign policy of its members for a generation, cannot any longer avoid this issue. On one level, the controversy reflects a fundamental change in European domestic politics. During the Cold War, opposition to American policy almost invariably came from the left and was resisted by the governments in office—usually center-right. Today

European center-left governments are being assaulted with standard anti-American positions by the left wings of the governing parties, disaffected because their leaders are conducting centrist economic policies. And governments reluctant to further inflame their radical constituents stand silent or occasionally join the chorus.

Generational change is a contributing factor. The Atlantic Alliance's first generation of European leaders, though they led countries weakened and impoverished by the war, had their formative experience when Europe was the center of world affairs. They understood that their ultimate choice was the alliance or a kind of neutralism that, while acceptable to some groups on the left, was anathema to center-right governments. No such consensus as to the danger exists today. Hence attacks on America as violence-prone, unilateralist and emotionally unbalanced—

Do our allies reject the
American definition of the
danger?

the slogans of the opposition during the Cold War—have become the standard commentary of intellectuals and media, feebly resisted, if at all, by governments. The most favorable comment about the United States tends to urge governments to base their policy on “encouraging” moderate members of the Bush administration presumed sympathetic, as if it were a revolutionary government in danger of veering out of control.

This trend is reinforced because for European governments the dominant foreign policy concern for more than a decade has been the creation of the European Union—a historic task from which the United States is, by definition, excluded. And for many European leaders, European identity has come to be sought in distinction from and, not infrequently, in opposition to the United States. Europe is concentrating on the legalistic, bureaucratic and constitutional arrangements involved in integrating more than 20 nations with vastly differing histories, languages and, occasionally, cultures, while the United States celebrates the exceptional nature of its established institutions and declares them relevant to the rest of the world.

The vast gap in military power between Europe and the United States compounds the difference in perspectives. There is no precedent for the military dominance the United States has achieved over the rest of the world. There does not exist now—nor for the foreseeable future—any country or group of countries capable of posing a military challenge to the United States. This situation tempts adversaries to challenge the United States, if at all, on a level

(over)

The Washington Post

Monday, August 12, 2002

How a preemptive war could lead
to a new international order.

Henry A. Kissinger

Our
Intervention
In Iraq

As the anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Center draws near, the administration is facing the most consequential foreign policy decision of the Bush presidency. The president and Secretary of State Colin Powell repeatedly have stated that the United States insists on a regime change in Iraq. In an eloquent address in June at West Point, President Bush stressed that new weapons of mass destruction no longer permit America the luxury of waiting for an attack, that we must "be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty."

At the same time, the administration's formal
position is that no decision to resort to force has
been taken. Ambiguity can help create awareness
without encumbering the discussion with the
need for decision. But when ambiguity reaches the
point of inviting leaks concerning military plan-
ning, congressional debate and allied pressures,
the time has come to define a comprehensive pol-
icy for America and for the rest of the world.

The new approach is revolutionary. Regime
change as a goal for military intervention challeng-
es the international system established by the
1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which, after the car-
nage of the religious wars, established the princi-
ple of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other
states. And the notion of justified pre-
emption runs counter to modern international
law, which sanctions the use of force in self-
defense only against actual, not potential, threats.

Therefore, American military intervention in
Iraq would be supported only grudgingly, if at all,
by most European allies. The Middle East would
be split into an inarticulate group, which would be
weighing relief from radical pressures authored by
Baghdad against the rising dangers from the local
Arab street and radical Islamists. As for other na-
tions, Russia would balance the blow to Arab rad-
icalism against its economic stake in Iraq and the
benefits of American goodwill against its fear of
being marginalized. China would view preemptive
action in terms of its reluctance to justify in-
tervention in its own country against its desire for
a cooperative relationship with the United States
during a period of political succession and in-
tegration into the world economy. The most in-
teresting and potentially fateful reaction might
well be that of India, which would be tempted to
apply the new principle of preemption to Pakistan.

To find our way through this thicket, the admin-
istration needs to establish a comprehensive strat-
egy for itself and a clear policy for the rest of the
world. Nor can a conflict of such import be sus-
tained as an expression of executive power alone.
A way must be found to obtain adequate congres-
sional and public support for the chosen course.

The administration should be prepared to un-
dertake a national debate, because the case for re-
moving Iraq's capacity of mass destruction is ex-
tremely strong. The international regimen
following the Treaty of Westphalia was based on
the concept of an impermeable nation-state and a
limited military technology which generally per-
mitted a nation to run the risk of awaiting an un-
ambiguous challenge.

But the terrorist threat transcends the na-
tion-state; it derives in large part from
transnational groups that, if they acquire
weapons of mass destruction, could in-
flict catastrophic, even irretrievable, damage.
That threat is compounded when these weapons
are being built in violation of U.N. resolutions by a
ruthless autocrat who sought to annex one of his
neighbors and attacked another, with a demon-
strated record of hostility toward America and the
existing international system. The case is all the
stronger because Saddam Hussein expelled U.N.
inspectors installed as part of the settlement of the
Gulf War and has used these weapons both against
his own population and against a foreign ad-
versary.

This is why policies that deterred the Soviet
Union for 50 years are unlikely to work against
Iraq's capacity to cooperate with terrorist groups.
Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations
of jihadist fighters are not those of the Cold War prin-
cipals. And the terrorists have no national base to
protect. Therefore, the concern that war with Iraq
could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a demonstration of
self-deterrence. If the danger exists today, waiting
will only magnify possibilities for blackmail.

BY PAUL LACHINE

There is another, generally unstated, reason for
bringing matters to a head with Iraq. The attack
on the World Trade Center had roots in many
parts of the Islamic, and especially the Arab,
world. It would not have been possible but for the
tacit cooperation of societies that, in the words of
George W. Bush, "oppose terror but tolerate the
hatred that produces terror." While long-range
U.S. strategy must try to overcome legitimate
causes of those resentments, immediate policy
must demonstrate that a terrorist challenge or a
systemic attack on the international order produc-
es catastrophic consequences for the perpetrators,
as well as for their supporters, tacit or explicit.

The campaign in Afghanistan was an important
first step. But if it remains the principal move in
the war against terrorism, it runs the risk of peter-
ing out into an intelligence operation while the
rest of the region gradually slides back to the
pre-9/11 pattern, with radicals encouraged by the
demonstration of American hesitation and moder-
ates demoralized by the continuation of an un-
impaired Iraq as an aggressive regional power.

The overthrow of the Iraq regime and, at a mini-
mum, the eradication of its weapons of mass de-
struction would have potentially beneficent politi-
cal consequences, as well: The so-called Arab
street might conclude that the negative con-
sequences of jihad outweigh any potential benefits.
It could encourage a new approach in Syria,
strengthen moderate forces in Saudi Arabia, mul-
tiply pressures for a democratic evolution in Iran,
demonstrate to the Palestinian Authority that
America is serious about overcoming corrupt tyr-
annies and bring about a better balance in oil pol-
icy within OPEC.

America's special responsibility, as the most
powerful nation in the world, is to work toward an
international system that rests on more than mil-
itary power—indeed, that strives to translate pow-
er into cooperation. Any other attitude gradually
will isolate and exhaust us. Even when, on issues
of ultimate national security such as Iraq, America
acts alone, it is in our national interest to couple

(over)

-2-

such action with a program of postwar reconstruc-
tion, conveying to the rest of the world that our
first preemptive war has been imposed by necessi-
ty and that we seek the world's interests, not ex-
clusively our own.

For this reason, the objective of regime
change should be subordinated in Amer-
ican declaratory policy to the need to elim-
inate weapons of mass destruction from
Iraq as required by the U.N. resolutions. The res-
toration of the inspection system existing before
its expulsion by Hussein is clearly inadequate. It is
necessary to propose a stringent inspection sys-
tem that achieves substantial transparency of Iraqi
institutions. A time limit should be set. The case
for military intervention then will have been made
in the context of seeking a common approach.

At that point, too, America's allies will be
obliged to face the choice they have thus far evad-
ed: between their domestic opposition and es-
trangement from the United States. Dissociation
from U.S. actions will not save the allies from the
consequences of abdication in a world of terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction.

Attention must be paid to the political and psy-
chological framework vis-a-vis the Arab world. An
explanation is needed of why Iraqi weapons of
mass destruction impede the solution to all mat-
ters of concern in the area—not in Western cate-
gories of security, but in terms relevant to upheav-
als in the region. This is why military pressure
must be coupled with a program of economic and
social reconstruction in which allies and moderate
Arab regimes should be invited to participate. At
the same time, the administration should reject
the idea that an Iraqi intervention ought to be pre-
ceded by a solution of the Palestine issue. It is not
true that the road to Baghdad leads through Jeru-
salem. More likely, the road to Jerusalem will lead
through Baghdad. The president has committed
his administration to a three-year program for the
creation of a Palestinian state. He has left no doubt
about his determination to bring progress on this
timetable. But the timetable should not be used to
defer decisions that cannot wait.

If war should prove unavoidable, it will not be
a time for experiments. The longer military
operations last, the greater the danger of up-
heavals in the region, dissociation by other
nations and American isolation. In all probability,
Iraq is much weaker and America orders of magni-
tude stronger than in the Gulf War of 1991. But
planning should be based on the visible availability
of an overwhelming force capable of dealing with
all contingencies, and not on the expectation of a
quick Iraqi collapse. Principal reliance on air pow-
er and local indigenous opposition forces is too
dangerous, for it leaves no margin for error or mis-
calculation. And it might place these local forces in
a predominant political position, foreclosing other
political options. A conspicuous American deploy-
ment in the region is therefore necessary to sup-
port the diplomacy to destroy weapons of mass de-
struction and provide a margin for quick victory if
military action proves the only recourse. It might
also serve to motivate Iraqi leaders considering
the overthrow of Hussein.

In the end, however, Iraq policy will be judged
by how the aftermath of military operations is han-
dled politically. Because of the precedent-setting
nature of this war, its outcome will determine the
way U.S. actions will be viewed far more than the
way we entered it. And we may find more nations
willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in war-
fare, if only because no country wants to see an ex-
clusive position for America in a region so central
to energy supplies and international stability.

Military intervention will confront the United
States with the question of how to preserve the
unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a coun-
try that is an essential component of any gulf equi-
librium. The conventional answer of a federal solu-
tion to enable the Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish ethnic
groups of Iraq to live together without domination
by one of them is surely appropriate. But any seri-
ous planning would have to consider the means to
prevent autonomy from turning to independence,
which, in the case of the Kurds, would put Turkish
support for the military phase at risk. And all this
would have to take place in the context of a gov-
ernment with participants capable of resisting
pressures from the remnants of the old regime or
from neighboring countries determined to desta-
bilize the emerging system.

Military intervention should be attempted only
if we are willing to sustain such an effort for how-
ever long it is needed. For in the end, the task is to
translate intervention in Iraq into terms of general
applicability for an international system. The im-
minence of proliferation of weapons of mass de-
struction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejec-
tion of a viable inspection system and the
demonstrated hostility of Hussein combine to pro-
duce an imperative for preemptive action. But it is
not in the American national interest to establish
preemption as a universal principle available to ev-
ery nation. And we are only at the beginning of the
threat of global proliferation. Whatever the views
regarding Iraq, the nations of the world must face
the impossibility of letting such a process run un-
checked. The United States would contribute
much to a new international order if it invited the
rest of the world, and especially the major nuclear
powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal
with this challenge to humanity on a more in-
stitutional basis.

*The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.*

11

16

9/17/02

Articles on Iraq
(includes those mentioning Iraq)

"Consult and Control:
Bywords for Battling the New Enemy"
DC Post - 9/16/02

"Our Intervention in Iraq"
DC Post - 8/12/02

"Answering the 'Axis' Critics"
DC Post - 3/5/02

"Phase II and Iraq"
DC Post - 1/13/02

"Bring Saddam Down"
DC Post - 11/29/98

"Our Shilly-Shally 'Strategy' on Saddam"
DC Post - 3/23/98

"No Carrots for Saddam"
DC Post - 12/7/97

"No Objective, No Will"
DC Post - 10/6/96

"Hard Choices to Make in the Gulf"
DC Post - 5/5/91

"False Dreams of a New World Order"
DC Post - 2/26/91

"A Postwar Agenda"
Newsweek - 1/28/91

Statement Prepared for Testimony Before
the Senate Armed Services Committee -11/28/90
(Adaptation of DC Post articles of
8/19, 9/30 & 11/11/90)

"A Dangerous Mirage"
DC Post - 11/11/90

"The Dangers of Stalemate"
DC Post - 9/30/90

"The Game Has Just Begun"
DC Post - 8/19/90

"Time to Talk with Iran" (mentions Iraq)
Newsweek - 7/18/88

"Wandering in the Gulf"
DC Post - 6/21/87

"Pressure Points in the Gulf"
DC Post - 2/5/85

THE WASHINGTON POST

Henry A. Kissinger

President Bush's speech to the United Na-
tions dramatically set forth American policy in
Iraq in three propositions: an account of the
threat posed by stockpiles of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, a description of the pre-
cise manner in which Iraq has violated U.N.
resolutions in building these weapons and a
strong implication that no solution is work-
able unless coupled with a removal of Saddam
Hussein.

Bush did not offer an American blueprint.
In calling on the United Nations to meet the
challenge to its authority, he conveyed the
idea that, for America, common action is the
preferred strategy and unilateral action a last
resort. The speech was therefore significant as
well for what it did not say: The president did
not assert a universal right of preemption; he
based his case on the exceptional character of
Iraq's conduct and its defiance of U.N. resolu-
tions. He did not claim a general American
right to impose regime change on other soci-
eties. He did insist that, in the specific case of
Iraq, the rigorous measures required to imple-
ment the United Nations' own resolutions are
almost surely incompatible with Hussein's
continuation in power.

Thus the president has opened the door to a
cooperative approach to dealing with the ulti-
mate challenge: how to adapt the international
system to the implications of the age of terror-
ism. On Sept. 11, the world entered a new pe-

riod in which private, non-state organizations
proved capable of threatening national and in-
ternational security by stealth attacks. The
controversy about preemption is a symptom
of the impact of this transformation. At bot-
tom it is a debate between the traditional no-
tion of sovereignty of the nation-state as set
forth in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and
the adaptation required by both modern tech-
nology and the nature of the terrorist threat.

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territo-
ry of a national state, though his was not a na-
tional cause. Highly disciplined operatives
were scattered around the globe, some on the
soil of America's closest allies and even within
America itself. They enjoyed financial and or-
ganizational support from a number of coun-
tries—most frequently from private individu-
als ostensibly not under the control of their
governments. Bases for terrorists were estab-
lished in several countries, but usually in areas
where the governments could plausibly deny
control or were actually not in control, such as
in Yemen, Somalia or perhaps Indonesia and
Iran. In this manner, the international system
based on the sovereign nation-state is being
transformed by a transnational threat that has
to be fought on the sovereign territory of oth-
er nations over issues transcending the nation-
state. Having no territory to defend, the ter-
rorists are not subject to the deterrent threats
of the Cold War; having as their aim the de-

struction of social cohesion, they are not in-
terested in the conciliating procedures and
compromises of traditional diplomacy.

By attacking New York and Washington,
the terrorists ensured that this transformation
would be shaped by the character of the Unit-
ed States, which has never thought of itself as
one nation among others. Its national ethos
has been expressed as a universal cause identi-
fying the spread of liberty and representative
government as keys to peace. U.S. foreign pol-
icy is more comfortable with categories of
good and evil than with the calculations of na-
tional interest of European cabinet diplomacy.

European critics holding more traditional
concepts have accused America of overre-
acting because terrorism is a new problem pri-
marily to Americans—one that Europeans
overcame in the 1970s and ’80s without un-
dertaking global crusades. But the terrorism
of two decades ago was of a different charac-
ter. It was on the whole composed of nationals
of the country where the terror took place (or,
as in the case of the IRA in Britain, by a group
with special national grievances of its own).
Though some of these terrorists received for-
eign intelligence support, their bases were in
the country where they operated. Their weap-
ons were mostly suitable for individual as-
saults. By contrast, the Sept. 11 terrorists op-
erate on a global basis, less motivated by a
specific grievance than by a generalized ha-

The Washington Post

Monday, August 12, 2002

*How a preemptive war could lead to a new international order.*

Henry A. Kissinger

# Our Intervention In Iraq

BY PAUL LACHINE

At the same time, the administration's formal position is that no decision to resort to force has been taken. Ambiguity can help create awareness without encumbering the discussion with the need for decision. But when ambiguity reaches the point of inviting leaks concerning military planning, congressional debate and allied pressures, the time has come to define a comprehensive policy for America and for the rest of the world.

The new approach is revolutionary. Regime change as a goal for military intervention challenges the international system established by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which, after the carnage of the religious wars, established the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other states. And the notion of justified pre-emption runs counter to modern international law, which sanctions the use of force in self-defense only against actual, not potential, threats.

Therefore, American military intervention in Iraq would be supported only grudgingly, if at all, by most European allies. The Middle East would be split into an inarticulate group, which would be weighing relief from radical pressures authored by Baghdad against the rising dangers from the local Arab street and radical Islamists. As for other nations, Russia would balance the blow to Arab radicalism against its economic stake in Iraq and the benefits of American goodwill against its fear of being marginalized. China would view preemptive action in terms of its reluctance to justify intervention in its own country against its desire for a cooperative relationship with the United States during a period of political succession and integration into the world economy. The most interesting and potentially fateful reaction might well be that of India, which would be tempted to apply the new principle of preemption to Pakistan.

To find our way through this thicket, the administration needs to establish a comprehensive strategy for itself and a clear policy for the rest of the world. Nor can a conflict of such import be sustained as an expression of executive power alone. A way must be found to obtain adequate congressional and public support for the chosen course.

The administration should be prepared to undertake a national debate, because the case for removing Iraq's capacity of mass destruction is extremely strong. The international regimen following the Treaty of Westphalia was based on the concept of an impermeable nation-state and a limited military technology which generally permitted a nation to run the risk of awaiting an unambiguous challenge.

But the terrorist threat transcends the nation-state; it derives in large part from transnational groups that, if they acquire weapons of mass destruction, could inflict catastrophic, even irretrievable, damage. That threat is compounded when these weapons are being built in violation of U.N. resolutions by a ruthless autocrat who sought to annex one of his neighbors and attacked another, with a demonstrated record of hostility toward America and the existing international system. The case is all the stronger because Saddam Hussein expelled U.N. inspectors installed as part of the settlement of the Gulf War and has used these weapons both against his own population and against a foreign adversary.

This is why policies that deterred the Soviet Union for 50 years are unlikely to work against Iraq's capacity to cooperate with terrorist groups. Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihadist fighters are not those of the Cold War principals. And the terrorists have no national base to protect. Therefore, the concern that war with Iraq could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a demonstration of self-deterrence. If the danger exists today, waiting will only magnify possibilities for blackmail.

There is another, generally unstated, reason for bringing matters to a head with Iraq. The attack on the World Trade Center had roots in many parts of the Islamic, and especially the Arab, world. It would not have been possible but for the tacit cooperation of societies that, in the words of George W. Bush, "oppose terror but tolerate the hatred that produces terror." While long-range U.S. strategy must try to overcome legitimate causes of those resentments, immediate policy must demonstrate that a terrorist challenge or a systemic attack on the international order produces catastrophic consequences for the perpetrators, as well as for their supporters, tacit or explicit.

The overthrow of the Iraq regime and, at a minimum, the eradication of its weapons of mass destruction would have potentially beneficent political consequences, as well: The so-called Arab street might conclude that the negative consequences of jihad outweigh any potential benefits. It could encourage a new approach in Syria, strengthen moderate forces in Saudi Arabia, multiply pressures for a democratic evolution in Iran, demonstrate to the Palestinian Authority that America is serious about overcoming corrupt tyrannies and bring about a better balance in oil policy within OPEC.

America's special responsibility, as the most powerful nation in the world, is to work toward an international system that rests on more than military power—indeed, that strives to translate power into cooperation. Any other attitude gradually will isolate and exhaust us. Even when, on issues of ultimate national security such as Iraq, America acts alone, it is in our national interest to couple

(over)

-2-

For this reason, the objective of regime change should be subordinated in American declaratory policy to the need to eliminate weapons of mass destruction from Iraq as required by the U.N. resolutions. The restoration of the inspection system existing before its expulsion by Hussein is clearly inadequate. It is necessary to propose a stringent inspection system that achieves substantial transparency of Iraqi institutions. A time limit should be set. The case for military intervention then will have been made in the context of seeking a common approach.

If war should prove unavoidable, it will not be a time for experiments. The longer military operations last, the greater the danger of upheavals in the region, dissociation by other nations and American isolation. In all probability, Iraq is much weaker and America orders of magnitude stronger than in the Gulf War of 1991. But planning should be based on the visible availability of an overwhelming force capable of dealing with all contingencies, and not on the expectation of a quick Iraqi collapse. Principal reliance on air power and local indigenous opposition forces is too dangerous, for it leaves no margin for error or miscalculation. And it might place these local forces in a predominant political position, foreclosing other political options. A conspicuous American deployment in the region is therefore necessary to support the diplomacy to destroy weapons of mass destruction and provide a margin for quick victory if military action proves the only recourse. It might also serve to motivate Iraqi leaders considering the overthrow of Hussein.

Military intervention should be attempted only if we are willing to sustain such an effort for however long it is needed. For in the end, the task is to translate intervention in Iraq into terms of general applicability for an international system. The imminence of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the huge dangers it involves, the rejection of a viable inspection system and the demonstrated hostility of Hussein combine to produce an imperative for preemptive action. But it is not in the American national interest to establish preemption as a universal principle available to every nation. And we are only at the beginning of the threat of global proliferation. Whatever the views regarding Iraq, the nations of the world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially the major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.

The Washington Post

Tuesday, March 5, 2002

Henry A. Kissinger

# Answering the ‘Axis’ Critics

## Do our allies reject the American definition of the danger?

the slogans of the opposition during the Cold War—have become the standard commentary of intellectuals and media, feebly resisted, if at all, by governments. The most favorable comment about the United States tends to urge governments to base their policy on "encouraging" moderate members of the Bush administration presumed sympathetic, as if it were a revolutionary government in danger of veering out of control.

(over)

Phase II and Iraq

by Henry A. Kissinger

The Washington Post

Sunday, January 13, 2002

2

3

4

The Washington Post
Sunday, November 29, 1998

Henry Kissinger

# Bring Saddam Down

The third crisis with Iraq in a year ended like all the others. Iraq reinstated the inspections system, Washington backed off from military action (this time recalling forces already under-way), and both sides have claimed victory. In a sense both sides are right. We win the battles, but Saddam Hussein is winning the war.

True, after each crisis the inspectors have returned to Iraq. But, equally, each time there has been a hiatus—the last one of three months— without any inspections, enabling Saddam to shuffle equipment and material from sites on which the inspectors were closing in. When inspections resume, months are consumed devel-oping a new database, and by the time it is completed, Saddam has come up with new harassing tactics to degrade it.

In his statement of Nov. 15, President Clinton laid down specific criteria by which compliance with U.N. resolutions will henceforth be meas-ured, and he implied that he would retaliate without warning if these are not met. Similar threats were uttered after each previous crisis, and the administration will not find it any easier to implement them this time. If Saddam reverts to his earlier tactics of raising narrow objections to the composition or specific demands of the inspections team (as indeed he is already doing), the international consensus in favor of retali-ation—and even within our own government—is likely to turn brittle.

Administration spokesmen have talked as if the international support that existed at the time of the aborted raid can be recycled indefi-nitely. This is a dangerous illusion. That consen-sus resulted from a highly evanescent constella-tion of circumstances: Saddam's brazen shutdown of the entire U.N. inspections process, the admin-istration's unexpected electoral performance, the success of the Wye negotiations, the global financial crisis (especially Russia's) and France's temporary preoccupation with European issues.

The cumulative impact of the various Iraqi crises amounts to a strategic setback:

* Each crisis has reinforced a pattern in which Saddam, not we, controls the timing and subject matter of the confrontation.

* With each successive crisis, American policy has become more captive to a fragile U.N. consensus. It is symptomatic that, in his Nov. 15 statement, the president invoked the world com-munity 10 times and the U.S. national interest exactly once.

* Each crisis has eroded our support among the Persian Gulf and other Arab states. Having seen us go to the brink and back down three times, they will be reluctant to believe we are in for the long haul.

* Each aborted military action has weakened the readiness and morale of America's armed forces.

* In each crisis, nations opposed to military action (and the U.N. secretary general) held out the end of sanctions as a carrot for Saddam to return to inspections. Saddam's argument—that the sanctions are the main issue—gains ground.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has described our policy as keeping Saddam "in his box." But that goal is unachievable as the issues are at present defined. UNSCOM (the U.N. Special Commission, the inspection group) is a weak instrument. After years of the world's most intrusive inspections system, the team still does not know whether Saddam has remaining weap-ons of mass destruction.

But should UNSCOM work perfectly and were it in a position to certify that Saddam was disarmed, sanctions would then be "reviewed," the euphemism for being lifted, and the inspec-tions system reduced to caretaker status. We thus find ourselves in a Catch-22 situation. The better the inspections system works, the more rapidly restrictions on Iraq will be ended—and Saddam will be in a position to start rearming.

The administration has not been willing to face the fact that the issue is not UNSCOM but the continued rule of Saddam. While the president on Nov. 15 paid lip service to a policy of bringing down Saddam, he offered no plan for accomplishing this. He seems to have no confidence in a military solution. He justified aborting the military strike on the ground that "if we take military action we can significantly degrade the capability of Saddam Hussein to develop weapons of mass destruction and to deliver them, but that would also mark the end of UNSCOM. So we would delay it, but we would then have no oversight, no insight, no involvement in what is going on within Iraq."

This statement reflects three assumptions: that Saddam is likely to remain in office for the foreseeable future; that our military capacity to degrade Iraq's strategic capability is less useful than inspections; and that Saddam's regime is bound to survive American retaliation. In its military plans, the administration seems wedded to the kind of limited escalation that has been discredited wherever it was tried, most notably in Vietnam.

Unwillingness to face head-on the problem of Saddam's continued rule dates back to the endgame of the Gulf War. President Bush de-serves enormous credit for mobilizing a global coalition against Saddam's occupation of Kuwait (based, by the way, on the world's knowledge that he was prepared to act alone). But we stopped short of overthrowing Saddam because it was believed that, with the freeing of Kuwait, we had outrun the U.N. authorization, that further war-fare would risk the breakup of the country and additional casualties and that, in any case, Sad-dam would fall as a result of his disaster.

When Saddam survived, the United States was left with three policy options: (1) to reconcile with a hopefully chastened Saddam, (2) to keep Saddam "in his box," (3) to make it a national policy to overthrow him.

(over)

The trouble with administration policy is that it—or factions within it—are pursuing all three policies simultaneously. Thus in his Nov. 15 statement President Clinton, after calling off the attack, asked for no more than: "If we can keep UNSCOM in there working and one more time give him a chance to become honorably reconciled by simply observing U.N. resolutions, we see that results can be obtained."

None of our allies in the Gulf or in the area believes in the prospect of an "honorable reconciliation" based on observing U.N. resolutions for a few months. All are convinced that Iraq will bend every effort to rearm as soon as sanctions are lifted and that the United Nations is straining to find pretexts for lifting the sanctions. The countries in the region that rely on us will judge America's relevance by our ability either to depose Saddam or to weaken him to a point where he can no longer represent a potential threat.

Throughout, American military measures in the Persian Gulf have signaled an overriding reluctance to use force. In response to an alleged Iraqi plot against President Bush's life in 1993, a few cruise missiles were fired into a single building that we reassuringly announced had stood empty. In 1996, when Saddam crushed an American-sponsored resistance movement in northern Iraq, the administration responded again with cruise missiles against radar stations hundreds of miles to the south. And it has recoiled before the use of force in each of Saddam's three challenges of the past year.

This irresolution handicaps even our relations with Iran, the largest country in the region. Whatever one's theory regarding Iran's likely evolution, an Iraqi government with which we can work would facilitate our options. Necessary as it is under present circumstances, we will not be able to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf indefinitely against the two strongest states, Iraq and Iran. We cannot discourage an aggressive Iran if we cannot handle even a defeated Iraq. And we will not be able to elicit moderation in Iran if Tehran's leaders see across their border how easy and effective it is to defy the United States.

A more decisive policy against Saddam is blocked by the arguments that we must take our lead from the so-called world community, that we should design our actions in relation to specific Iraqi provocations and that, militarily, unless we can achieve everything, it is better to do nothing. All these schools of thought are represented within the administration.

The result is intellectual confusion and greater concern with placating domestic opinion than with developing a coherent long-range strategy. The reluctance to use force progressively erodes our credibility. Each time we fail to fulfill our threats, we are forced to make a more formidable threat in the next round and a larger mobilization of effort. At the end of this vicious circle we will be left with the choice of abdication or a massive assault that, if Saddam is skillful, may then appear unprovoked.

The argument that unless we march on Baghdad we will be unable to decisively weaken Saddam is poor testimony to the strategic foresight, political will and military capacity of a superpower. To argue that we are unable to destroy Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors and to prevent significant deployments makes us lose on all fronts: Radical adversaries do not fear our posturing, or believe that they can manipulate it to their own ends. Potential friends lose heart at the decline of American credibility. Those on the sidelines see no reason for restraint.

We should beware the siren song that a painless (to us) covert operation can enable us to sidestep the complexities of military confrontation. I favor supporting the Iraqi resistance in principle, but having seen such enterprises from the inside, I would put forward three cautions: They must be run by professionals, not adventurers; they must take into account the interests of neighboring countries, especially Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan; and they require an American willingness to back the resistance movement when it gets into trouble, with American forces if necessary—or else we will repeat the debacle of the Bay of Pigs and of northern Iraq in 1975 and 1996, when most of those we supported were wiped out or exiled. This is a tougher job than Afghanistan. All this suggests the following principles:

* The ultimate issue in the Persian Gulf is not inspections but the government in Baghdad.

* Saddam's next provocation must be viewed not from the point of view of the particular offense but of advancing our broader strategy. Our military response should lead to destroying Saddam's command and control sites, suspected locations of weapons of mass destruction and the Republican Guard (the basis of his rule). On the whole, I consider this a better option than relying largely on the internal resistance.

* If we are serious about backing the Iraqi resistance, we should set about equipping and training it and organizing its command structure, and be prepared to protect it with our own forces.

* As part of a serious effort to bring Saddam down, restraints should be placed on Iraq's capacity to conduct significant military operations, either within the two no-fly zones or against any of its neighbors, by restricting the movement of Iraqi units beyond a certain size.

* The Iraqi people must be given to understand that the principal obstacle to normalization is Saddam and his immediate entourage, and that the Iraqi people are our allies, not our target.

If we are not willing to muster the discipline and determination for such a course, the present policy will collapse, undermining the stability of the Persian Gulf and the entire region.

©1998, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

*The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm that has clients with business interests in many countries abroad.*

The Washington Post
Sunday, December 7, 1997

Henry Kissinger

# No Carrots for Saddam

The crisis over the expulsion of U.N. observ-
ers from Iraq has temporarily eased. But
the way it was handled by the Clinton adminis-
tration has made another, similar, crisis highly
probable.

Though Saddam Hussein is often described
as a madman, his strategy to loosen and
ultimately overturn the restraints placed upon
him by the U.N. inspection system is in fact
quite rational.

On the two occasions on which the Clinton administration used force against Iraq, it resorted to mere pinpricks. In 1993, in response to an alleged Iraqi plot against former President Bush, the administration announced a nighttime cruise-missile attack on an empty building. In 1996, after Saddam virtually eliminated the leadership of the autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq, established and supported by America, the administration reacted with inconsequential raids against radar sites in the south.

Having concluded that he had little to fear
from American military action, Saddam saw a
political opportunity when Russia and France
recently blocked a weak Security Council reso-
lution to put baby teeth into the U.N. inspection
effort. On the basis of this, Saddam was quite
rational to conclude that the political response
to challenging the U.N. restraints would be no
more meaningful than the military one.

The administration's first reaction to Sad-
dam's threat to expel American inspectors was
to warn that the issue was nonnegotiable. Yet it
acquiesced in—if it did not encourage—a three-
man U.N. mission to Iraq, an inherent invitation
to compromise. Saddam probably never sought
the complete elimination of U.N. inspections, at
least not in the first round. Almost certainly, his
real aim was to achieve a veto over the conduct
of inspections, to increase the obstacles to
effective enforcement and to trigger a diploma-
cy that would ultimately undermine the U.N.
effort by weakening the core of the Western
coalition and encouraging a broader Russian
role in the area.

This is why, from the very beginning, Deputy
Prime Minister Tarik Aziz asked only for reduc-
ing the proportion of Americans on the inspec-
tion teams and for an easing of sanctions.
Saddam understood that any change in inspec-
tion procedures or any modification of sanc-
tions under threat would spell success for him,
undermine the confidence of the weak gulf
states, embolden Iran, the chief threat to the
area, and erode American leadership.

Given these stakes, the overarching Ameri-
can objective should have been to bring
about an unconditional return to the precise
inspection system that had existed when the
inspectors were expelled, together with strict
accounting for the diversion of prohibited mate-
rial during the hiatus in inspections. The United
States needed to demonstrate by action, word
and nuance its determination to impose this
solution, if necessary by unilateral American
action together with whatever other countries
would join us. Half-way measures were, in fact,

the most dangerous because they increased the
risk of prolonging the crisis and a blow-up
under circumstances in which America rather
than Saddam has become the issue.

Our reiterated commitment to multilateral ac-
tion and to demonstrating a conciliatory, hence
compromising, attitude ran counter to these
imperatives. Secretary of State Madeleine K.
Albright's traveling party held out the prospect of
"carrots" for Saddam—later disavowed by the
White House, though the disavowal seemed to
refer to the word more than to the substance.
High-level leaks conveyed that we would go along
with a "restructuring" of the inspection teams to
enhance "their effectiveness." Similarly, adminis-
tration spokesmen stated from the first that the
United States, concerned about the people of Iraq,
would not stand in the way of easing sanctions for
humanitarian purposes.

But any change in the composition of inspec-
tion teams, especially one that reduces the
proportion of Americans and increases the
number of Russian and French inspectors,
would politicize the inspection process. And if
we are honest with ourselves, we will recognize
that humanitarian sanctions are a contradiction
in terms. The concept of painless sanctions
reflects the illusion that a form of international
social ostracism will induce a change in Sad-
dam's behavior—a preposterous proposition.
Anyway, to ease sanctions under pressure from
Saddam and Russia would deprive us even of
credit for humanitarian motives.

The hesitation of the former gulf coalition to step up to the crisis was in large part due to doubts about America's ultimate strategy. The various leaders, with their finely honed sense of survival, feared that, after an ineffectual American

response, they would be left alone with a radical
Iraq and, later on, with an even more powerful
Iran. The clear lesson of the Gulf War is that
multilateral coalitions come together when Amer-
ica leaves no doubt about its determination to act
alone if it must; other nations can then affect
events only by joining the coalition.

When the administration blamed Arab foot-
dragging on the alleged intransigence of Israeli
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, it danger-
ously confused this issue. I know no state of the
erstwhile gulf coalition that would encourage
Iraqi domination of the gulf to vindicate the
Palestinian cause—especially when most have
expelled Palestinians from their countries. But
countries that were never part of the gulf
coalition may gleefully use this excuse to
increase pressure on an Israel in open conflict
with its principal ally.

BY T. GIBSON

(over)

Unwilling to face down Saddam, our diplomacy turned to countries such as France and Russia that, having opposed our policy in the Security Council, were assumed to have a standing as mediators. For this we paid in two ways: Any compromise would vindicate Saddam's goal of making sanctions the issue rather than his transgressions; and it would establish opponents of our policies as permanent advocates of Iraq. In the follow-on U.N. diplomacy, Russia has proposed that the inspection agency be assigned five deputy chairmen, one from each of the permanent members of the Security Council, and that the books on nuclear inspections be closed. This would transfer the deadlocks of the United Nations to the inspection apparatus. And France has continued to speak of showing Saddam a light at the end of the tunnel—a euphemism for rewarding intransigence.

It is certainly important to explore the utility of the much-invoked strategic partnership with the new Russia. But not if we encourage it to act as the lawyer of Saddam or to pursue the same policies as those of the old Russia.

The conduct of France raises a more long-range challenge. As Europe adopts a common currency, common political institutions are likely to follow. And there are two schools of thought on how North Atlantic relations should evolve thereafter: France's, which insists on bringing about a European identity by distinguishing its policy from America's; or Britain's, which seeks to develop a common policy through cooperation and consensus—as it demonstrated by its support of the United States throughout the crisis. It is in the American interest and in the interest of the future of the North Atlantic alliance that the cooperative approach prevail. But the diplomacy of the administration has in effect rewarded France for a policy described in the Nov. 2 issue of Etelaat, an official newspaper of the Iranian Islamic regime, which praised the "emerging Teheran-Moscow-Paris axis" as a bulwark against the "world arrogance" of America.

The administration's crisis management machinery in this, its first real crisis, gives rise to concern. To compel an unconditional withdrawal by Saddam, it was necessary for the United States to look ominous. But in the critical week, President Clinton was on the West Coast, National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger in Washington, the secretary of state first in a minor gulf state and then in Pakistan and India, and U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson in the Congo. The dispersal of key personnel made military action extremely implausible, thus dissipating the diplomatic impact of the rapid, efficient and professional deployment of our military forces.

To be sure, modern means of communication enable even far-flung policymakers to make major decisions. But long-range messages cannot substitute for a systematic exchange of opinions. Had all policymakers met regularly, backed by adequate staff work, the following issues might well have been raised, perhaps modifying some of the key decisions:

* The danger that the wishy-washy U.N. resolution banning travel by Iraqi officials impeding the inspection process signaled indecision rather than determination. The American reluctance to put forward a stronger resolution was explained by the desire to avoid multiple vetoes. But would Russia really have vetoed in the midst of its financial crisis, China so soon after the Jiang Zemin visit and France when the chips were down?

* The crisis ended with only four of the six expelled American inspectors returning to Baghdad. Did this not appear as yielding to precisely what Saddam demanded?

* The foreign ministers of the permanent members of the Security Council met at 2 a.m. in Geneva to end the crisis. This obliged the secretary of state to cut short a visit to India to accommodate Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov's scheduled trip to Latin America. Did this not convey loss of mastery over the process and excessive eagerness?

I criticize with regret an administration whose policies on China, NATO expansion and fast-track trade negotiations I have supported. Its past record of learning from experience leads me to hope that the situation is still remediable, especially since, in all likelihood, we have witnessed only the first stage of a longer crisis.

With respect to the immediate situation, any modification of the inspection system or easing of sanctions undermines the long-term ability of the United States to protect the gulf. The United States should therefore reverse the Geneva "compromise," by which the inspectors returned to Baghdad in exchange for a diplomatic process to review the composition of the inspection teams and an easing of the food-for-oil sanction. Specifically:

* We should stick to the proposition that only the Security Council can change the structure, mission or composition of U.N. inspection teams.

* We should refuse any modification in the food-for-oil program until the inspectors have had unimpeded access for at least four months to all sites.

* We should prepare for military action to exact full compliance with inspection procedures. These should be designed to deprive Saddam of the chief elements of his military structure.

The present crisis is the result of years of drift during which the question of our ultimate purposes was deferred while the basis for the existing policy was eroding. A coherent long-range strategy for the gulf must be devised urgently to deal with some questions admittedly not easily answered:

Can dual containment—the policy of basing gulf policy on simultaneous opposition to Iran and Iraq—work? What other countries must be involved? What is the role of Turkey, and how is its role in the gulf to be related to other Turkish priorities? And if the policy is to be modified, toward which country, by what methods and to what end—always keeping in mind that after all that has passed between Saddam and the United States, a settlement with him is impossible for the United States in the foreseeable future?

How do we deal with Russia so that it cannot combine the phraseology of strategic partnership with the reality of an adversarial relationship? How can we rally our allies to a common course and give them a sense of participation in defining it?

The Washington Post

Sunday, October 6, 1996

Henry Kissinger

No Objective, No Will

"When the smoke lifted in Iraq, it became apparent that the box into which we claimed to have put Saddam suddenly included the former safe haven."

The recent crisis in Iraq reveals a wide gap between what the American public is told and how the same events are perceived in the rest of the world. Americans were informed by their government that 44 cruise missiles had sent a message to Saddam Hussein and that he had been put back in his box by this decisive American action.

But what the rest of the world perceives— and especially the gulf states, which are both key suppliers of energy and totally dependent for their security on American support—is that our militaryriposte amounted to pinpricks that could not prevent a significant political victory for Saddam.

There is no blinking at the facts that Saddam's forces entered unopposed a so-called safe haven established under U.S. protection for the Kurdish population in northern Iraq and that American missiles could not save the anti-Saddam forces the CIA established there. At least 100 friends of America were executed, and some 3,000 others have been evacuated to Guam, as far away from their homeland as it is possible to be in this world—presumably because they are unreachable by the media during the presidential elections.

After threatening another round of "disproportionate retaliation," the Clinton administration withdrew the second aircraft carrier designed to reinforce this threat. NATO ally Turkey has dissociated itself from America's Kurdish policy, leaving Saddam as the dominant factor in the erstwhile safe haven. Saudi Arabia refused to make its bases available to U.S. forces because of its leaders' judgment that our attacks would leave the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia unimpaired and its malice enhanced—in other words, that our means did not coincide with our goals.

Our European allies supported our retaliation only grudgingly, if at all, and are working counter to our "dual containment" policy vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq by supporting the easing of sanctions on Iraq and by conducting a "constructive dialogue" with Iran.

Political defeat thus has been coupled with the collapse of the coalition that has heretofore ensured stability in the gulf. It is important to understand how we slid into this situation.

Karl von Clausewitz's dictum that war is a continuation of politics by other means has found few followers in the United States.

Conventional American wisdom holds that negotiations are fueled by demonstrations of goodwill and that military pressure is inimical to diplomatic solutions. This is why we stopped military operations at the beginning

The same attitudes governed the policies that concluded the gulf war. On the eve of victory, President Bush, without whose strong leadership the victorious coalition never would have come about, found himself besieged by advice to stop military operations. The objective of liberating Kuwait has been achieved, he was told from all sides: Further military operations would risk needless casualties, and continuing them after victory was tantamount to "piling on."

Yet it is clear now that victory could not be secure without the removal of Saddam. It also is true that every key member of the present administration, including the president, either opposed the war or reacted with an ambivalence that, if followed, would have allowed Saddam his Kuwait conquest and led to a collapse of order in the entire gulf region.

Saddam's political survival has forced us into the policy of "dual containment" against Iran and Iraq, the two strongest nations in the area. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the gulf states are not strong enough to resist either of these countries alone, much less the two together. Fundamentalist Iran has defined itself as our permanent opponent; outcast Saddam removed Iraq from the strategic equation, and the longer he survived, the more doubts he raised about the reach of American power.

The countries we are protecting are at once very conscious of their dependence on the United States and very nervous about too visible an association with us. With America as the guarantor of all the frontiers and arrangements in one of the most volatile regions of the world, everything has depended on our ability to deal with the likely consequences of Saddam's continued rule—one of the most significant of which has been the situation within Iraq itself.

Immediately after the Western coalition ended the gulf war and saved Saddam from catastrophe, he turned his army against those dissident elements within his country threatening to secede in the Shiite south and in the Kurdish north. The attack on the Kurds produced a flood of refugees into Turkey, which, already beset by pressures for autonomy from its own Kurdish minority, received them ambivalently at best. America's response to Iraqi pressures was to establish a Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq by proscribing both overflights by the Iraqi air force (the no-fly zone) and the presence there of Iraqi troops.

36th PARALLEL

BY OHLSSON

of negotiations for a Korean armistice and halted the bombing of North Vietnam as an entrance price into negotiations rather than as a reward for their completion. In each instance, we paid with years of stalemate and continuing casualties.

(over)

The Clinton administration tried to use the safe haven as a base for overthrowing Saddam. But it failed to recognize that, without a political framework, the restrictions established by its predecessor would turn into wasting assets. As in Somalia, the administration revealed an inability to define a sustainable political objective and a lack of will to use the force requisite for success.

The heroic Kurdish people exist as a minority in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Despite centuries of being an often oppressed minority, they have maintained their fierce aspiration to independence. Yet this passionate patriotism complicates the task of preserving the Kurds' autonomy inside Iraq. An autonomous Kurdish area in northern Iraq without any formal political status creates a vacuum attracting the hostility of all neighbors that view Kurdish independence as a threat to their own territorial integrity. Turkey, Iran and even Syria tacitly support Saddam's effort to reassert his domination—a point recently made explicit by Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller.

The administration therefore was building its covert anti-Saddam base on a shaky foundation as long as it had not reached some political understanding with Turkey that would induce it to cooperate with autonomy for northern Iraq. Instead, the administration glossed over the underlying political problem without solving it and maintained a status quo that depended more and more on military response by a distant America whose public had not been sensitized to the issues at stake.

Another prerequisite for the protection of the safe haven was unity among the Kurdish factions. This objective should have received the highest priority in Washington. When, partly as a result of American neglect, the two major factions began fighting each other, the stage was set for Saddam's re-establishment of Iraqi preeminence.

Cooperating with one of the factions, Saddam struck, and his forces destroyed the entire CIA-supported political structure in northern Iraq, rendering his subsequent withdrawal meaningless. For a permanent Iraqi presence is not required to sustain Saddam's political victory; recent experiences have demonstrated for all to see Iraq's looming capability and the seeming American inability to protect its friends.

The nature of America's military response compounded the problem. American strategic planning in the gulf, concentrated as it is on the defense of Kuwait, illustrates the adage that strategists tend to plan for the last war rather than the next. A direct attack on Kuwait is in fact the least likely contingency; the greatest current threat is Saddam's strategy of showing up the administration's inability to manage the political-military conflict with Iraq.

The Kurdish safe haven, already precariously placed because of the absence of an adequate political structure, could be protected only by unity among the Kurds and a hair-trigger American military response thwarting actual Iraqi intervention. Yet when Saddam moved, the administration's military riposte had the feel of an abstract staff study on air strategy. It was unrelated to the area being contested and overlaid with the excruciatingly academic theory of "signaling," drawn from arms-control seminars.

Only a blow entailing consequences Saddam was unwilling to endure could have prevented his reassertion of control over the Kurdish area. And it had to be done quickly enough to prevent a *fait accompli*. There was no substitute for attacking the forces and support system actually engaged in the aggression.

Damaging or destroying Republican Guard divisions north of Baghdad certainly would have attracted Saddam's attention; it would have weakened the forces operating in the safe haven and, even more important, the constituent elements of Saddam's rule. The argument that the Saudis' refusal to let us use their bases had made such a strategy impossible is an evasion. It would be depressing if our arsenal of B-1s, B-2s and B-52s did not contain a few launchers capable of operating over northern Iraq.

The reason for the administration's restraint was its addiction to the "signaling theory" that proved so pernicious in Vietnam. The key decision a president makes is whether to use force. But once having made it, he should not do so half-heartedly. He must pose risks for the adversary the latter is not willing to confront.

The signaling approach does the exact opposite: It selects military targets not decisive in themselves as a warning of more drastic measures to follow. But the adversary is more likely to interpret restraint as reluctance to run risks, and so long as our military response is endurable, he has an incentive to wait for our next move. Such a pinprick approach usually generates incentives opposite to the intention; gradual escalation becomes more likely than ending matters. When the smoke lifted in Iraq, it became apparent that the box into which we claimed to have put Saddam suddenly included the former safe haven.

Our gulf policy requires careful rethinking. We need to rebuild confidence in our purposes and capabilities in the gulf. We must define a policy toward Iraq that relates our declared objective of overthrowing Saddam to our equally explicit commitment to the territorial integrity of the country. And if we find these irreconcilable, we will have to make a choice. We must relate our policy of isolating Iran to our European allies' reluctance to follow such a course.

In short, we must either elevate "dual containment" from a slogan into a strategy or define a strategy we are capable of implementing.

©1996, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

The difficulty of stationing Western ground forces in the area for an extended period was one reason why sanctions almost surely could not have achieved our objective. It would have been impossible to keep over 400,000 troops in the area for the 12 to 18 months that even optimists thought were needed for sanctions to succeed. But if we started to withdraw any American forces during that time—or to rotate them, as the term of art had it—it would have set off a panic among our Arab allies.

Military equilibrium, however, cannot be the sole aim of American policy in the gulf. It is essential that America learn to become less dependent on oil and generate a viable energy program. We cannot suffer through an energy crisis every decade. We should stress conservation and develop alternative sources of energy, avoiding the self-indulgent attitudes of the 1980s, when plentiful oil caused the search for alternative energy sources to be largely abandoned.

We must also remember the possibility of renewed Soviet designs on the region. For the time being, domestic problems keep the Soviets from running any significant foreign risks. But 200 years of Russian expansionism toward the gulf indicate a certain proclivity. And this drive may be compounded as Moscow's preoccupation with its more than 50 million Muslim citizens grows. After some domestic equilibrium is restored, the Kremlin may become more active in the Middle East—especially in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, which border the Soviet Union. The intensity of that thrust will depend on internal developments within the Soviet Union. If the Muslim republics remain Soviet, Moscow will be wary of Muslim radicalism lest it inflame its own Muslim population. But if the Muslim republics break off and become independent, Moscow may seek favor in the breakaway states by embracing Islamic radicalism—especially if the Muslim world turns more extremist.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a new balance of power will revive prospects for progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A peace process dominated by Saddam Hussein, or heavily influenced by him, would have been a debacle. For it would have taught the lesson that radicalism, terrorism and force are the road to diplomatic progress in the Middle East. This is why President Bush was right in resisting the linkage of the Kuwait and Palestinian problems.

But with Saddam defeated, moderate Arab leaders will gain in stature, America's credibility will be enhanced and Is-

rael will have a breathing space. This new equation should be translated into a major diplomatic effort within a few months of victory. Far from amounting to linkage and a submission to black-mail, such a move, after Saddam has been defeated, should be viewed as an opportunity resulting from the success of the moderate forces.

Progress will depend on a proper perception of the issues involved. The Arab-Israeli problem is usually stated as a negotiating issue: how to convene an international conference that returns Israel to the 1967 frontiers, defines a new status for Jerusalem, induces the Arabs to "accept" Israel and provides international guarantees for the resulting arrangements. I have grave doubts about every one of these propositions.

First, I am very skeptical about an international conference. For the United States would be totally isolated at such a forum. The behavior of France just prior to the gulf war is a small foretaste of what would happen. Instead of being a mediator, America would be maneuvered into the role of Israel's lawyer, while Israel would regard any independent position we took as a betrayal of its interests. No sensible nation would voluntarily throw itself into such a maelstrom. Since everything depends on our influence with Israel anyway, I would much prefer a diplomatic process in which the United States, the moderate Arab countries and Israel are the principal participants.

Second, for Israel a return to pre-1967 borders and the creation of a Palestinian state are not negotiating issues but matters of life and death. The distance from the Jordan River to the sea is less than 50 miles; the corridor between Tel Aviv and Haifa in terms of the 1967 frontiers is about 10 miles wide. It would be difficult to squeeze two states into such a limited area in the best of circumstances. But the PLO has been in mortal conflict with Israel during the entire existence of both groups. How can such an arrangement possibly be compatible with security?

Moreover, a return to pre-1967 borders would still leave almost as many Arabs under Israeli control as live on the West Bank minus Gaza. How is one going to justify that one group of Arabs must live under Israeli rule while other Arabs are entitled to self-determination? Thus a restoration of pre-1967 borders, coupled with the formation of a Palestinian state, could easily turn into the first step to the further reduction of Israel, if not its ultimate destruction.

Third, acceptance of Israel is not only a legal but above all a psychological challenge. And I find it hard to believe that any legal formula can by itself provide for Israeli security. After all, Kuwait lived in a state of legal peace with Iraq without being able to prevent Iraqi aggression. And Saddam attacked Israel in a war from which Israel had kept totally aloof because it calculated that many Arabs would support Iraq against Israeli retaliation, no matter how justified. American leaders understandably felt this danger real enough to advise against retaliation. But when reaction to an unprovoked attack becomes an international issue, Israel is still certified as a pariah and is held hostage for the actions of others.

Fourth, how does one define "credible guarantees"? After all, even in the case of Kuwait, where there was unanimous international support for the victim (something that would be inconceivable with Israel), it took six months to organize resistance while the country was looted and pillaged and the population expelled.

For all these reasons, the peace process as currently conceived is likely to lead to a dead end. It forces each side to accept something they find unbearably difficult: for the Israelis, it is a Palestinian state; and for the Arabs, it is the Israeli state. I know of no conflict between Arab nations—let alone between the Arabs and Israel—that has ever been resolved by the method suggested for the Palestinian issue: namely, with one conclusive negotiation resulting in a legal document intended to last for all time.

A revived peace process should begin by redefining the objectives. A final settlement at this moment seems a legalistic mirage. On the other hand, the status quo will sooner or later sound the death knell for moderates on all sides. As it is, too many Israelis consider the peace process a one-sided means to gain acceptance without sacrifice. They are unwilling to give up any occupied territory, or will do so only if de facto Israeli control is maintained. Too many Arabs, especially in the PLO, see in the Middle East a replay of Vietnam, where peace talks were used to soften up the opponent for escalating pressures leading to his ultimate collapse.

An interim solution might seek to introduce the moderate Arab governments, fresh from the victory over Iraq, as a buffer between Israel and the PLO. It might reduce the amount of territory Israel is asked to give up in return for something less than formal peace. A possible approach, mediated by the United States, might unfold like this:

(continued)

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News week

January 28, 1991

■ A conference would be assembled, under the aegis of the U.N. secretary-general, composed of the United States, Israel and the Arab states allied with America in the gulf crisis.

■ The moderate Arab countries would agree to act as trustees for territories that are returned to Arab control for a specified amount of time, say five to 10 years.

■ The moderate Arab states would also commit themselves to demilitarizing these areas under U.N. supervision. —

■ Israel would give up all of Gaza and the most heavily populated areas of the West Bank, retaining only territories essential to its security. It would be allowed to participate in verifying the demilitarization of any territory it evacuates.

■ Precise government arrangements would be established by agreement, but would not for the interim period lead to a separate state. As a practical matter, the trustee powers would undoubtedly establish an administration containing individuals acceptable to the PLO.

If this particular scenario turned out to be impractical, some other interim approach must be sought to break the deadlock. The aftermath of an allied victory over Iraq will offer a perhaps never-to-recur opportunity. Moderate Arab states are disillusioned with the PLO, which in effect has backed Iraq. They are also dismayed by the fact that the PLO has never unambiguously dissociated itself even from terrorism aimed at the moderate Arabs. As a result, these governments may no longer be prepared to give the PLO a veto over their actions.

As for Israel, it must avoid two possible nightmares. If it insists on holding onto every square inch of occupied territory, it could suffer the fate of South Africa and find itself ostracized, and even ultimately under U.N. sanctions. On the other hand, if it follows the maxims of conventional wisdom and gives up all the occupied territories, it runs the risk of winding up like Lebanon, gradually squeezed to the point of obliteration. For its own sake, Israel must find a middle way. And there is no better moment to do that than when its most dangerous enemy has been defeated.

I do not envy the American negotiator assigned the task of distilling an interim settlement from the confusing passions of the Middle East. Still, with Iraq's military capacity reduced, the moderate Arab leaders, as well as Israel, should be able to turn to the peace process with authority and confidence. President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia—and even King Hussein of Jordan, whatever the maneuvers

imposed by his vulnerability—are unusually intelligent and prudent. Even President Assad of Syria, by no means a moderate, signed an interim agreement with respect to the Golan Heights which has been in force for 17 years and has been meticulously observed. All these leaders might in the end go along with an intermediate approach as the only way to break an even more dangerous deadlock. And there are surely Israeli leaders who recognize that a gradual approach will provide their best prospect for a satisfactory outcome—especially when the moderate Arabs are triumphant and radical Arabs are in retreat.

America should act as a mediator in this effort, having earned the trust of both sides. Our initial challenge may well be philosophical. The best way to produce a successful negotiation is to advance a new concept, to convince both sides that the proposed new course serves their common interest. If that demonstration cannot be made, no negotiating gimmick can serve as a substitute.

In several thousand years of recorded history, the Middle East has produced more conflicts than any other region. As the source of three great religions, it has always inspired great passions. It is therefore unlikely that any one negotiation can bring permanent tranquility to this turbulent area. An Arab-Israeli negotiation will not end all the turmoil, because many Middle East problems are quite independent of that conflict. Fundamentalism in Iran has next to nothing to do with the Palestinian issue, though Teheran has exploited it. And Saddam Hussein would have tried to dominate his neighbors even if the Palestinian problem did not exist. But what the Arab-Israeli conflict has done is to make it difficult for the voices of moderation in the Arab world to cooperate with their supporters in the West. Victory in the gulf will create a historic opportunity to alter that particular equation—and it should be seized. ■

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Mr. Chairman:

It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to speak to you today. To save time I would like to submit for the record the following adaptation of articles published in *The Washington Post* on August 19th, September 30th and November 11th as a basis for discussion.

## Objectives

American objectives have included fulfillment of stated UN goals of restoration of the status quo ante in Kuwait as well as the unconditional release of all hostages. But to contribute to President Bush's objective of stability in the Gulf, any solution to the crisis must also provide for a reduction of Iraq's offensive capability which now overshadows its neighbors. Without addressing this fundamental imbalance, a solution will only postpone, and probably exacerbate, an eventual resolution of Gulf instability.

Were Saddam suddenly to accept the UN terms, he would in fact preserve the essence of his power, although it would represent a huge loss of prestige for him. Iraq would still retain its chemical and nuclear capabilities. Its large standing army would still preserve the capacity to overwhelm the area. Many nations in the Middle East might adjust to the perception that the mobilization of forces from all over the world cannot be repeated every few years.

Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important if US forces are to be substantially withdrawn from the Gulf as I believe they should be. At the same time, it would be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to the temptations of a military vacuum.

## Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which

2

are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is--
were prepared to do in concert; or it could take the lead in
opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support
for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal
burden.

The Administration concluded that anything other than a
leadership role for the United States would have ended with
making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and would lead to the
collapse of the moderate governments in the region including
Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role,
President Bush made another crucial decision. The American
military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and
a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi
oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President
Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They
concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope
of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming
force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if
necessary.

In short, early in America's involvement there was some
argument as to whether American vital interests justified a
massive deployment in the Gulf. That debate has since been
overtaken by the scale of our deployment and the number of
countries that have followed America's leadership in the Gulf.

The perception of American failure would shake international
stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be
gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not
survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of
radicalism and fundamentalism.

Sanctions or Military Action?

The United States is approaching the point in the Middle
East crisis where a choice must be made between a course relying
on sanctions or, as a last resort, on a military course.

The two approaches have been presented as if they were
successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove
mutually exclusive because by the time it is evident that
sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will
probably no longer exist.

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To achieve the proclaimed objectives by sanctions, at least five hurdles must be overcome:

* The sanctions must bite.

* They must be maintained throughout any negotiations.

* Once the UN terms are achieved, arms control objectives must be addressed.

* The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically and diplomatically during the entire course of the negotiations.

* There must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesion.

To state these hurdles is to set forth the practical obstacles to clearing them.

For one thing, upheavals in the Middle East are a way of life. In one recent week, the second highest ranking official in Egypt was assassinated, Syria battled Christian forces in Beirut, and 21 Palestinians died in Jerusalem.

If the sanctions do bite within a time frame relevant to political processes, Iraq is more likely to offer to negotiate than to yield.

In that case, pressures to ease the sanctions will be difficult to resist. Which democracy will want to be responsible for starvation in Iraq and Kuwait once negotiations are under way?

The fundamental dilemma is that the UN terms leave no real room for negotiation--except perhaps the staging of the Iraqi withdrawal. Thus all so-called diplomatic solutions effectively dilute the UN objectives while maintaining Iraq's war-making potential and thus confirming Iraq as the supreme military power of the Middle East.

For example, even if Saddam accepts the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait, he has already hinted--and Soviet presidential aide Yevgeny M. Primakov has confirmed--that he would define Kuwait as excluding a strip of land containing a major oil field as well as two islands controlling access to the Shatt el-Arab. And President Mitterrand has stated that only agreement in principle to withdrawal is needed to bring about a negotiation.

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Saddam's Arab neighbors will surely note that none of the proposals in the public discussion would reduce Iraq's military pre-eminence or restore Kuwait completely.

If they conclude that they will be condemned to live with a dominant Iraq, they will begin their own negotiations. Recent remarks by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan suggest that the haggling may already have begun.

But will the psychological basis for a military option still exist after months of such inconclusive maneuvering? And without a realistic military threat, how can the US/UN objectives be achieved?

And having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms control negotiation.

## A Regional Security System?

Many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations recognize that sanctions will not be able to achieve a balance of power in the Gulf. They propose to protect a settlement by a new regional security system based on a significant American military presence in Saudi Arabia.

I consider this a dangerous mirage. If, after the adamant pronouncements from Washington and the deployment of a large expeditionary force, a regional balance of power could not be reached, no Gulf state would easily entrust its fate to a long-term American presence.

The often-heard argument that America proved its staying power in Korea and Europe misses the point. The issue in Arabia is not American staying power but the host country's domestic stability.

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to domestic stability; in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

A substantial American ground establishment would soon become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. Once Iraq has faced down US and UN terms, such a force would sooner or later become hostage to revolutionary Iraq, fundamentalist Iran and events substantially out of our control.

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Nor can the restoration of the military balance in the Gulf be left to subsequent arms control negotiations. For having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms control negotiation.

In short, the route of sanctions and the military option can be pursued up to a certain point simultaneously. At some point, however, trying to pursue both courses will turn into an evasion incompatible with reaching what should be our objectives. At that point the US must choose a strategy appropriate to its objectives or else choose objectives achievable by whatever policy we are willing to implement.

## What Military Strategy?

If war proved unavoidable it is to be hoped that military strategy remains related to realistic political objectives.

Outsiders should not play field marshal. But America has no national interest in weakening Iraq to a point where it becomes a tempting target for covetous neighbors.

If war does prove unavoidable, our objective should be not to destroy Iraq, but rather to raise the cost of occupying Kuwait to unacceptable levels while reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors.

The destruction of the Iraqi military complex, especially its chemical and nuclear facilities as well as its air and missile forces, would improve the military balance in the Gulf and would speed up the effect of sanctions.

Such a strategy would rely on air and naval power and use ground forces primarily to overawe a response. As the government of Iraq, which is after all a military dictatorship, sees its principal source of power erode, a negotiation more compatible with stated US objectives could result.

Even if one of the compromises sketched above came eventually to be adopted--a contingency I would regret--the setback would be eased by the reduction in the Iraqi military threat. I am extremely skeptical about a full-scale ground assault.

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## Conclusion

In the process of overcoming the current crisis, the United States must not emerge as the permanent defender of every status quo. But the path to peace and progress resides in success in the Gulf.

Afterwards the United States, together with its Arab partners, can demonstrate the benefits of cooperative action in promoting the well-being of the Arab peoples.

Too, the United States should then seek energetically to make progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now that looming disaster might have brought all sides second thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable participants in peace negotiations. But such a move cannot be linked to the resolution of the current crisis for to do so would turn Saddam into a hero in the Arab world.

It is to be hoped that a united America can find a way that avoids both a military strategy of total destructiveness and a diplomatic strategy committed to amassing UN resolutions--the progressive disregard of which will at some point demonstrate the UN's impotence rather than an international consensus.

But whatever our destination, we must arrive at it by design rather than as captives of circumstances.

Henry Kissinger

September 30, 1990 Washington Post

P. 1

# The Dangers of Stalemate

From the initial deployment of U.S. forces to the skillful weaving of international support, the management of the Gulf crisis by the Bush administration has been flawless. But foreign policy is remembered for its endgames, not the opening moves. And the most difficult decisions remain to be made.

Too many commentators are reducing these choices to either a quick strike or successful sanctions. But no serious person favors military action for its own sake; a solution through sanctions would clearly be preferable.

At the same time, rhetoric will not determine whether sanctions can work. Success will depend on Iraqi stockpiles of critical supplies and on the impact of shortages on Iraqi morale. That particular assessment must be made by intelligence experts. But laymen can ask whether, assuming sanctions can work, they will be sustained by the international community, especially among the democratic countries. Sanctions are designed to impose hardship. Iraq's people have been habituated to hardship by a decade of conflict. It is thus possible that only a successful food blockade will work. But what is the tolerance of democratic publics for television and other media depictions of starving women and children? "Humanitarian" exceptions as provided in the U.N. resolution are not the answer; they would be either too little or too much. Food being fungible, any shipment providing significant relief would undermine the effectiveness of the sanctions and contribute to a stalemate.

For economic and political reasons, I doubt that a stalemate can be sustained either by our associates or by the United States for many months. The rise in oil prices has already reduced growth projections in the industrial democracies by 1 percent and greatly increased the danger of inflation. The longer the conflict lasts, the worse the problem will become. A cold winter or sabotage in Gulf oil fields would magnify this rise in oil prices. And the more prices increase, the more oil inventories will be hoarded, accelerating the vicious spiral. No one can know at what oil price support for sanctions would erode. But it would be reckless to ignore the prospect.

On the political front, a prolonged stalemate is likely to undermine the domestic stability of our Arab associates. Large numbers of foreign forces on Saudi soil—however well-meaning—must be grating to a population carefully shielded heretofore from contact with the outside world. As time passes, radical propaganda labeling foreigners as occupiers will become increasingly plausible. Harassment and sabotage will mount—as was the case with the American forces in Lebanon in 1982-83.

We cannot afford to drift into a situation in which we undermine regional stability whether our forces remain in the region or are withdrawn without success. The same factor that led to the rapid

> "In these circumstances, saving Iraq's face is the exact opposite of what is needed."

American deployment—the need to sustain moderate governments in the Gulf—makes it imperative to create the right conditions for an equally rapid withdrawal.

The key decision before the administration is thus to define what constitutes a tolerable outcome. But this is muddled in too much of the current debate, which treats diplomacy as a self-contained exercise equated with compromise and with saving the other side's face. Yet these slogans, drawn from the experience of a society that has rarely known irreconcilable differences, are not relevant to Saddam's Iraq. In the past decade, Saddam Hussein has attacked Iran, annexed Kuwait, declared a holy war on Saudi Arabia and lives in mortal conflict with Syria. Jordan is terrified. Internally, Saddam Hussein has committed genocide against Iraq's Kurdish population with poison gas and by their forced migration. The only neighbor with which Iraq has had tolerable relations is the one that is stronger, namely Turkey.

In the current crisis, Iraq's use of hostages is without precedent. When hostages were first taken two decades ago, the culprits were outlaw groups not avowed even by governments that encouraged them. Terrorism then evolved into tacit government support targeted mostly on government personnel. Saddam has now escalated to overt actions by a head of state against thousands of innocent civilians from all over the world, most of whom had not even resided in Iraq.

The test of that demonstration will not be the cleverness of formulas put forward in columns and talk shows but how the outcome is perceived by actual or potential victims. Early in America's involvement there was some argument as to whether American vital interests justified the deployment in the Gulf. I believe the administration was correct in continuing the policy of two predecessors from both major parties, which commits America to preventing the domination of the Gulf by a hostile nation. In any event, that debate has since been overtaken by the

This international support can only be due to two factors: the other nations either agree with the American analysis of the need to stop the Iraqi aggression or they consider whatever reservations they have outweighed by their need for America's long-term support. The perception of American failure would therefore shake international stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of radicalism and fundamentalism.

President Bush was right in insisting—and the Helsinki communique with Gorbachev in reaf-firming—that no compromise of the U.N. resolu-tions is possible, namely Iraq's unconditional with-drawal from Kuwait, the unconditional release of all hostages and the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Any modification of these terms would amount to an Iraqi gain and a defeat for the United States and its associates.

It is important to keep this in mind in view of the facile argument that the United States must not run risks on behalf of the emir of Kuwait. By insisting on a restoration of pre-invasion conditions, neither the United Nations nor the United States is passing judgment on the emir's qualities. They are asserting that the most repressive regime in the region does not have the right to sit in judgment over the domestic legitimacy of its neighbors. Of course, these traditional governments—all of which are more benign than Baghdad's—will in time change. But their evolution should be guided by their own dynamics, not dictated by a ruthless stronger neighbor.

Indeed, from an analytical point of view the U.N. terms already represent a compromise with what is really needed for the peace of the area and with what is compatible with the massive international deployment. Were Saddam Hussein suddenly to accept the U.N. terms, he would in fact preserve the essence of his power, although it would repre-sent a huge loss of prestige for him. It might even bring home the need for moderation to the Iraqi leadership—especially if Saddam were replaced as a consequence.

But this could easily turn out to be wishful thinking. For the strategic relationship that encour-aged Iraqi aggression in the first place would remain intact. Iraq would still retain its chemical and nuclear capabilities. Its large standing army would still preserve the capacity to overwhelm the area. Many nations in the Middle East might adjust to the perception that the mobilization of forces from all over the world cannot be repeated every few years.

Reducing Iraq's disproportionate military capaci-ty is especially important if American forces are to be withdrawn rapidly from the Gulf, as I believe they should be. To think that the area can be protected by multilateral security treaties is a fantasy. The experience of the defunct Baghdad pact and of SEATO shows the fragility of multilat-eral arrangements in regions where the nations involved have no coherent objectives or means of mutual support and frequently shift allegiances.

Paradoxically, it would be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to the temptations of a military vacuum. The democracies' support for Iraq during the war with Iran was a reflection of their commit-ment to Iraq's territorial integrity. What they are resisting now is having their economies and their peace held at ransom by a megalomaniacal ruler.

For all these reasons, I would feel more comfort-able if the United States sought to strengthen the U.N. resolutions to remove the underlying threat to the peace of the area by insisting on internation-

ally monitored reductions of Iraq's military capabili-ties. But were Saddam to yield to sanctions without war, President Bush might well decide that he could not go beyond the existing U.N. resolutions without which the sanctions would never have been implemented in the first place. Such an outcome would be as understandable as it would be precar-i-ous. It must be entered into—if at all—with the knowledge that it would require a much higher degree of continued vigilance and a larger Ameri-can presence in the area than is basically desirable. On the other hand, if a military clash occurs, the United States should seek an outcome more consis-tent with long-term stability.

The administration must therefore decide at some point how long it is prepared to wait for sanctions to work and how far it is prepared to go without unanimous international support. Outsiders cannot establish arbitrary deadlines. I do not know whether the decision must be made in October or November. I would be very uneasy were it to be delayed into the new year, for I believe that the entire enterprise might then begin to unravel.

How much international support is required for military measures? It is lightly stated that the United States would be isolated in a military crunch. I do not believe this. The moderate Arab states would welcome a decisive American move if it were demonstrably the only alternative to Sad-dam's succeeding. As for our allies, conditions are in fact unusually favorable for an American initia-tive. Britain would agree to such a step. France would probably not want to jeopardize America's role in maintaining the European equilibrium after German unification. Germany has the same goal, if for different reasons. Japan will not lightly jeopar-dize its economic ties to the United States. As for Gorbachev, the economic weakness of the Soviet Union requires a concentration on domestic affairs. In short, the United States is not likely to find itself isolated if it decides after an appropriate testing period that sanctions are not working; indeed, the most likely road to isolation is by way of a protracted crisis.

In the flush of rediscovered multilateralism, the United States must not subordinate all long-range policy to the heady glow of internationalism or to the tactics of the moment. Even though I have consistently urged the inclusion of Syria in the peace process of the Middle East, I cannot repress my uneasiness at the eagerness with which the United States welcomed the movement of a Syrian armored division to Saudi Arabia. Do we know how to make it leave again? Are we in danger of

CLO

P. 3

repeating our mistake of the Iran-Iraq war, when
we focused obsessively on the common foe of the
moment? Would not the Syrian division be better
employed on the Syrian border with Iraq? And
having spent 40 years inducing the Soviet army to
return behind its own frontiers, is it really wise to
tempt a Soviet military role in the Middle East? In
view of two centuries of Russian attempts to
penetrate the Middle East, is that not like handing
a drink to a reformed alcoholic?

In the process of overcoming the current crisis, the United States must not emerge as the permanent defender of every status quo. But the path to peace and progress resides in success in the Gulf. Afterward the United States, together with its Arab partners, can demonstrate the benefits of cooperative action in promoting the well-being of the Arab peoples. Too, it should then seek energetically to make progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now that looming disaster might have brought all sides second thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable participants in peace negotiations. Sometimes platitudes turn out to be true. This is the test of the post-Cold War era. It remains for the administration to reap the benefits of its courageous efforts.

©1990, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

Henry Kissinger

Wandering in the Gulf

Iran and the Persian Gulf have been night-
mares for American policy makers since the
fall of the shah. Confusion over how to define
and defend vital interests brought down Pres-
ident Carter and has blighted President
Reagan's second term. The latest chapter has
seen U.S. policy lurch from clandestine arms
and intelligence support for Iran in its land
war with Iraq to a decision to side with Iraq in
its naval war with Iran by escorting Kuwaiti
ships thinly disguised as American vessels.

Any assessment of what is by its nature an
open-ended commitment in the Persian Gulf
must begin with a discussion of America's
vital interests there.

*Freedom of Navigation:* During the 1970s the interruption of Middle East oil supplies ushered in a decade of inflation, unemployment and severe recession. Another oil crisis—and closure of the Gulf would produce such a crisis because half of the world's oil reserves are located there—would have consequences at least as severe.

To be sure, Europe and Japan have an even greater stake in freedom of Gulf transit than the United States because much more of their oil comes from the Gulf. Under any rational allocation of responsibilities they should carry a major burden in protecting the oil supplies.

Unfortunately the allocation of burdens is not always rational. In the end America is trapped by the reality of its own interests, even if its allies fail to see theirs. Oil is fungible; if Persian Gulf oil is interrupted, Europe and Japan will bid up prices at other sources of supply, thereby regenerating the inflationary spiral of a decade ago. The United States may be obliged to defend access to the Persian Gulf alone. America's allies should have no illusions, however. If the United States is forced to act unilaterally, already strong congressional and public disenfranchment with the allies will be magnified. Still, The United States cannot ask for a blank check; it has the obligation to define carefully in consultation with its allies the threshold at which freedom of navigation is in fact at stake.

The Iran/Iraq War: The fundamental reality of the Iran/Iraq war is that it is against the interests of the industrial democracies (and perhaps of the Soviet Union) for either side to win a decisive victory. A victory by Iran would undermine global economic and political stability. A victory for Iraq—an improbable outcome—would give the secular Baghdad regime an incentive to return to its earlier support for terrorism and pressure on

In what sense does the threat to Kuwaiti shipping involve these three vital American interests? In December 1986, shortly after learning of the clandestine sale of American arms to Iran, friendly Kuwait—closely associated with Iraq—asked the Soviet Union and the United States to help protect its shipping in the Gulf. The Soviet Union responded by leasing three tankers to Kuwait, implying that it would protect their free passage. Some months later the United States agreed to put 11 Kuwaiti tankers under American flags. Simultaneously it beefed up its fleet at the mouth of the Gulf.

The administration's advocacy of freedom of navigation is prudent. But the reflagging of Kuwaiti ships amounts to overt support of one combatant, Iraq, in the Iraq/Iran war. It is by its nature an open-ended commitment. A military tilt toward Iraq would make sense only if there were a new, clear and present Iranian threat to navigation in the Gulf and if the action promised some decisive result. Neither the nature of the naval war nor the statistics on ship losses support such a conclusion.

Since the beginning of the naval war in the
Gulf in 1981, some 320 ships have been
attacked, roughly 220 of them by Iraq. (Very
few of them have actually been destroyed.)
During 1986, 100 ships were attacked by

Washington Post

June 21, 1987

"Military action against Iran . . . can be justified
only if there is a significant escalation of Iranian
attempts to close the Gulf to the free flow of oil."

moderate Arab governments, including Ku-
wait. At heart, then, the Iran/Iraq war poses
two issues for American policy: Is one side
winning the war? And are there means avail-
able to reverse the trend?

Prevent Soviet Domination of the Persian Gulf For over a century Russian imperial ambitions under czar and commissar have been directed at obtaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf. But for British intervention, Iran would have shared the fate of the Central Asian principalities that were conquered by Russia in the 19th Century. But for American intervention in 1946, the Soviet Union would have annexed the Iranian province of Azerbaijan in pursuit of the historic Russian objective of dismembering Iran. The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 was not an aberration. Historically Iran has always been the ultimate prize, and Soviet control of the Gulf has always been the ultimate danger.

both sides at a ratio of 3:2 in favor of Iraq. But
since Iraq also attacked some of Iran's oil
terminals and loading facilities, its interfer-
ence with the global oil supply almost certain-
ly has been greater than Iran's. In any event,
none of the attacks by either side seems to
have had a measurable impact on the global
oversupply of oil or on oil prices.

Thus far in 1987 there have been about 50
attacks with Iraq doing more damage, along
the same pattern as last year. Partly in
compensation, Iran has been reported ready
to install Chinese missiles capable of threat-
ening shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, the
choke point in the Persian Gulf.

Three conclusions emerge:

■ The odd aspect of the crisis is that nothing
significantly new has happened. The rate of
attacks continues about at the level of last year,
when no Western country—including the Unit-
ed States—bothered to protest, and the United

Mr. Chairman:

Congress is considering one of the most consequential expressions of its views since the end of the Cold War: what action the United States should take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential growth. President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of U.N. resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles as well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a condition for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But were the world community, by fudging its response, to opt for the risk of a greater threat in the future, can America and a coalition of the like-minded acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Thus the Committee will need to consider not only the risk of action but also the consequences of inaction.

The Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction will be growing in an international environment in which their danger merges with the threat of terrorism. For on September 11, 2001, the world entered a new period in which private, non-state organizations undertook to threaten national and international security by stealth attacks. The controversy about preemption is a symptom of the impact of this transformation. At bottom, it is a debate between the traditional notion of sovereignty of the nation-state prevalent since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and the adaptation required by both modern technology and the nature of the terrorist threat.

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state, though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives are scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and even within America itself. They enjoy financial and organizational support from a number of states - most frequently from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments. Bases for terrorists have been established in several countries, usually in areas where the governments can plausibly deny control or are actually not in control, such as in Yemen, Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran. Having no territory to defend, the terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; having as their

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[4]

aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not interested in the conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional diplomacy.

Unlike the previous centuries, when the movement of armies foreshadowed threat, modern technology in the service of terror gives no warning, and its perpetrators vanish with the act of commission. And since these attacks are capable of inflicting catastrophic damage, traditional notions of sovereignty have to be modified with respect to countries that harbor terrorist headquarters or terrorist training centers. The problem of preemption is inherent in the nature of the terrorist challenge.

The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in violation of U.N. resolutions cannot be separated from the post-Afghanistan phase of the war against terrorism. Iraq is located in the midst of a region that has been the hotbed of the special type of global terrorist activity from which the attack on the United States was organized. And the consequences of weapons of mass destruction have many similarities to those of terrorism. They can be used without warning; their impact is catastrophic. In some circumstances, their origin can be uncertain. If the world is not to turn into a doomsday machine, a way must be found to prevent proliferation – especially to rogue states whose governments have no restraint on the exercise of their power.

Cold War principles of deterrence are almost impossible to implement when there is a multiplicity of states, some of them harboring terrorists in position to wreak havoc. The Cold War world reflected a certain uniformity in the assessment of risk between the nuclear sides. But when many states threaten each other for incongruent purposes, who is to do the deterring, and in the face of what provocation? This is especially true when that which must be deterred is not simply the use of weapons of mass destruction but the threat of them.

Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihadist fighters are not those of the Cold War leaders. The concern that war with Iraq could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a demonstration of how even existing stockpiles of weapons

3

turn into instruments of blackmail and self-deterrence. Procrastination
is bound to magnify such possibilities.

The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international
peace and stability. The issue is not primarily whether Iraq was
involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of
Iraq is essentially geopolitical and psychological. Its policy is
implacably hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and
to established rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses
growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam
Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population.
Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein
breached his commitment to the United Nations by preventing the
operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on
his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War.
There is no possibility of a direct negotiation between Washington and
Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international
community. By what reasoning can the world community – or America
– acquiesce in this state of affairs?

If these capabilities remain intact, they will become an
instrument - actual and symbolic - for the destabilization of a volatile
region. And if Saddam Hussein's regime survives both the Gulf War
and the anti-terrorism campaign, this fact alone will compound the
existing terrorist menace.

By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring
it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted
the determination to possess weapons whose very existence
compounds the terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism cannot
flourish except with the support of states that either sympathize or
acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe
the flouting of U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms,
and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in
or ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept
the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine

4

The campaign in Afghanistan was an important first step. But if
it remains the principal move in the war against terrorism, it runs the
risk of petering out into an intelligence operation while the rest of the
region gradually slides back to the pre-9/11 pattern, with radicals
encouraged by the demonstration of the world's hesitation and
moderates demoralized by the continuation of an unimpaired Iraq as
an aggressive regional power. In short, the continuation of illegal
proliferation, the global dangers which it involves, the rejection or
infeasibility of a viable inspection system, and the growth of terrorism
require action, preferably global, but as an ultimate resort of
America's, together with those countries prepared to support it.

It is argued that dealing with weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq weakens the war against terrorism. The opposite is more likely to
be true. Eliminating such weapons in Iraq is an important aspect of
the second phase of the anti-terrorism campaign. It demonstrates
American determination to get at the root causes and some of the
ultimate capabilities of what is, in essence, a crusade against free
values. Enforcing U.N. resolutions in Iraq does not compete with the
capabilities needed to pursue the second phase of the anti-terrorism
campaign. In all likelihood, such action will strengthen it by additional
deployments to the region.

Nor should it weaken the cooperation of other countries in the
anti-terror campaign. Assisting in this effort is not a favor other
countries do for the United States but ultimately for themselves. And
what exactly will they decline to support without risking their entire
relationship to the United States? The fight against terrorism will take
many years. To wait for its end before acting is to guarantee that
stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction multiply.

At the same time, while reserving the option to act in concert
with only the nations it can convince, the United States is wise to
appeal to cooperative action of the world community. As the most
powerful nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral
capacity and, indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its

5

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convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by principles that transcend the assertions of preponderant power. It cannot be in either the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security. The case for enforcement of established resolutions should be the opening move in a serious effort of consultation to develop fundamental principles that other nations can consider in the general interest.

The United Nations is therefore challenged to come up with a control system that eliminates existing weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - together with procedures to prevent their being rebuilt. The control system must go far beyond the inspection system negated by Saddam Hussein's evasions and violations. It must prevent any possibility for local authorities to harass informants or to impede free access to the inspectors. It should be backed by standby authority and perhaps a standby force to remove any obstacle to transparency. Moreover, any system of inspection must be measured against the decline in vigilance that accompanied the previously flawed system's operation. Nor can it be achieved at the price of lifting sanctions while Saddam Hussein stays in office. For that would provide the Iraqi regime with the means of rearmament as a reward for ending its violations. Indeed, the rigorous measures required to implement the U.N.'s own resolutions are almost surely incompatible with Hussein's continuation in power.

In the end, enforcement of U.N. resolutions should be coupled with a program of reconstruction for Iraq. Because of the precedent-setting nature of this war, its outcome will determine the way U.S. actions will ultimately be viewed. And we may find more nations willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in enforcement, if only because no country wants to see an exclusive position for America in a region so central to international political and economic stability.

Reconstruction will require dealing with how to preserve the unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an essential component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to enable the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live

6

together without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But
any serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent
autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the
Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And
all this would have to take place in the context of a government
capable of resisting pressures from the remnants of the old regime or
from neighboring countries determined to destabilize the emerging
system.

The United States has put forward a reasoned definition of the
dangers: the possession of weapons of mass destruction by
governments that have demonstrated their willingness to use them,
have professed hostility toward America or its allies, and are not
restrained by domestic institutions. Can the world community reject
that definition of the danger?

However the issue of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is
resolved, the longer-range goal must be to devise a system for dealing
with new attempts by additional countries to acquire weapons of mass
destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the
beginning of the threat of global proliferation. The nations of the
world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run
unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new
international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially the
major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with
this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.

Congress has an opportunity to vindicate a system of
international order. I urge you to give the President the authority to
enforce the appropriate U.N. resolutions together with the world
community if at all possible, in concert with like-minded nations if
necessary.

Page 1

[Y]

Mr. Chairman:

Page 2

2

Cody Williams Senate Restitution Sept 2002 - 8.00c

Page 3

[Y]

3

The existence and, even more, the growth of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq poses a threat to international peace and stability. The issue is not primarily whether Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack on the United States. The challenge of Iraq is essentially geopolitical and psychological. Its policy is implacably hostile to the United States, to neighboring countries, and to established rules that govern relations among nations. It possesses growing stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons, which Saddam Hussein has used in the war against Iran and on his own population. Iraq is working again to develop a nuclear capability. Saddam Hussein breached his commitment to the United Nations by preventing the operation of the international inspection system he had accepted on his territory as part of the armistice agreement ending the Gulf War. There is no possibility of a direct negotiation between Washington and Baghdad and no basis for trusting Iraq's promises to the international community. By what reasoning can the world community - or America - acquiesce in this state of affairs?

By its defiance of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring it to give up weapons of mass destruction, Iraq has in effect asserted the determination to possess weapons whose very existence compounds the terrorist threat immeasurably. Global terrorism cannot flourish except with the support of states that either sympathize or acquiesce in its actions. To the extent that these countries observe the flouting of U.N. resolutions, the weakening of international norms, and the defiance of America, they feel less restrained in acquiescing in or ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the

Page 4

4

At the same time, while reserving the option to act in concert with only the nations it can convince, the United States is wise to appeal to cooperative action of the world community. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States has a special unilateral capacity and, indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its convictions. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by

1987-2009 Annual Report to Shareholders

Page 5

M

5

In the end, enforcement of U.N. resolutions should be coupled
with a program of reconstruction for Iraq. Because of the precedent-
setting nature of this war, its outcome will determine the way U.S.
actions will ultimately be viewed. And we may find more nations
willing to cooperate in reconstruction than in enforcement, if only
because no country wants to see an exclusive position for America in a
region so central to international political and economic stability.

Reconstruction will require dealing with how to preserve the
unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an
essential component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to
enable the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live
together without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But

6

any serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And all this would have to take place in the context of a government capable of resisting pressures from the remnants of the old regime or from neighboring countries determined to destabilize the emerging system.

[c]

Mr. Chairman:

2

3

[ic]

4

[Lc]

5

6

[c]

47

Mr. Chairman:

2

3

[x]

Osama bin Laden's base was on the territory of a national state, though his was not a national cause. Highly disciplined operatives are scattered around the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and even within America itself. They enjoy financial and organizational support from a number of states - most frequently from private individuals ostensibly not under the control of their governments.

Indonesia and Iran. Having no territory to defend, the terrorists are not subject to the deterrent threats of the Cold War; having as their aim the destruction of social cohesion, they are not interested in the conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional diplomacy.

4

5

[Y]

6

Suicide bombing has shown that the calculations of jihad fighters are not those of the Cold War leaders. The concern that war with Iraq could unleash Iraqi weapons of mass destruction on Israel and Saudi Arabia is a demonstration of how even existing stockpiles of weapons turn into instruments of blackmail and self-deterrence. Procrastination is bound to magnify such possibilities.

7

M

8

9

[Y]

or ignoring terrorist activities. For the nations of the world to accept
the existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction
where the new form of terrorism has been spawned is to undermine
restraint with respect not only to weapons proliferation but to the
psychological impulse toward terrorism altogether.

10

[Y]

11

12

interest.

13

14

Reconstruction will require dealing with how to preserve the
unity and ensure the territorial integrity of a country that is an
essential component of any Gulf equilibrium. A federal system to
enable the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups of Iraq to live
together without domination by one of them is surely appropriate. But
any serious planning would have to consider the means to prevent
autonomy from turning to independence, which, in the case of the
Kurds, would put Turkish support for the military phase at risk. And

15

16

destruction or biological and chemical weapons. We are only at the
beginning of the threat of global proliferation. The nations of the
world must face the impossibility of letting such a process run
unchecked. The United States would contribute much to a new
international order if it invited the rest of the world, and especially the
major nuclear powers, to cooperate in creating a system to deal with
this challenge to humanity on a more institutional basis.

To: Henry Kissinger

From: PNAL

U9/Ud/Uc 1U:U1am

PROJECT FOR THE
NEW AMERICAN CENTURY

DIRECTORS

WILLIAM KRISTOL, CHAIRMAN

BRUCE P. JACKSON

ROBERT KAGAN

GARY SCHMITT, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SEP 06 2002

September 6, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO: OPINION LEADERS

FROM: GARY SCHMITT

SUBJECT: Democrats for Regime Change

I want to draw your attention to the following advance copy of a *Weekly Standard* article (“Democrats for Regime Change”) written by staff writer Stephen Hayes. The piece will appear in the upcoming September 16 issue of the magazine and is now available on the Weekly Standard’s website.

The article recounts the hawkish arguments that were put forward by leading Democrats for using military force against Saddam in 1998. Among the most hawkish, current Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle: “we are going to force, one way or another, diplomatically or militarily, Iraq to comply with international law.” In addition, there was wide support for the congressional resolution calling on “the president to take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat posed by Iraq’s refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs.” According to Hayes, co-sponsors of the resolution included Senators Pat Leahy, Chris Dodd, John Kerry and Chuck Hagel.

1150 17TH STREET NW, SUITE 510, WASHINGTON, DC 20036 • (202) 293-4983 FAX (202) 293-4572

To: Henry Kissinger

trom: PNAL

UY/UD/UZ 1U:U1am

Democrats for Regime Change

Stephen F. Hayes

*Weekly Standard*

September 16, 2002

The President mulls a strike against Iraq, which he calls an “outlaw nation” in league with an “unholy axis of terrorists, drug traffickers and organized international criminals.” The talk among world leaders, however, focuses on diplomacy. France, Russia, China, and most Arab nations oppose military action. The Saudis balk at giving us overflight rights. U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan prepares a last-ditch attempt to convince Saddam Hussein to abide by the U.N. resolutions he agreed to at the end of the Gulf War.

Administration rhetoric could hardly be stronger. The president asks the nation to consider this question: What if Saddam Hussein

fails to comply, and we fail to act, or we take some ambiguous third route which gives him yet more opportunities to develop his program of weapons of mass destruction and continue to press for the release of the sanctions and continue to ignore the solemn commitments that he made? Well, he will conclude that the international community has lost its will. He will then conclude that he can go right on and do more to rebuild an arsenal of devastating destruction.

The president's warnings are firm. "If we fail to respond today, Saddam and all those who would follow in his footsteps will be emboldened tomorrow." The stakes, he says, could not be higher. "Some day, some way, I guarantee you, he'll use the arsenal."

These are the words not of President George W. Bush in September 2002 but of President Bill Clinton on February 18, 1998. Clinton was speaking at the Pentagon, after the Joint Chiefs and other top national security advisers had briefed him on U.S. military readiness. The televised speech followed a month-long build-up of U.S. troops and equipment in the Persian Gulf. And it won applause from leading Democrats on Capitol Hill.

But just five days later, Kofi Annan struck yet another “deal” with the Iraqi dictator--which once more gave U.N. inspectors permission to inspect--and Saddam won again.

Of course, much has changed since President Clinton gave that speech. The situation has gotten worse. Ten months after Saddam accepted Annan's offer, he kicked U.N. weapons inspectors out of Iraq for good. We complained. Then we bombed a little. Then we stopped bombing. Later, we stepped up our enforcement of the no-fly zones. A year after the inspectors were banished, the U.N. created a new, toothless inspection regime. The new inspectors inspected nothing. If Saddam Hussein was a major threat in February 1998, when President Clinton prepared this country for war and U.N. inspectors

To: Henry Kissinger

from: PNAŁ

US/UB/UC 10:U1am

were still inside Iraq, it stands to reason that in the absence of those inspectors monitoring
his weapons build-up, Saddam is an even greater threat today.

But not, apparently, if you're Tom Daschle. The Senate majority leader and his
fellow congressional Democrats have spent months criticizing the Bush administration
for its failure to make the "public case" for military intervention in Iraq. Now that the
Bush administration has begun to do so, many of these same Democrats are rushing to
erect additional obstacles.

"What has changed in recent months or years" to justify confronting Saddam,
Daschle asked last Wednesday after meeting with President Bush. Dick Gephardt wants
to know what a democratic Iraq would look like. Dianne Feinstein wants the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict settled first. Bob Graham says the administration hasn't presented
anything new. John Kerry complains about, well, everything.

Matters looked different in 1998, when Democrats were working with a president
of their own party. Daschle not only supported military action against Iraq, he
campaigned vigorously for a congressional resolution to formalize his support. Other
current critics of President Bush—including Kerry, Graham, Patrick Leahy, Christopher
Dodd, and Republican Chuck Hagel--co-sponsored the broad 1998 resolution: Congress
“urges the president to take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the threat
posed by Iraq’s refusal to end its weapons of mass destruction programs.” (Emphasis
added.)

Daschle said the 1998 resolution would "send as clear a message as possible that we are going to force, one way or another, diplomatically or militarily, Iraq to comply with international law." And he vigorously defended President Clinton's inclination to use military force in Iraq.

Summing up the Clinton administration's argument, Daschle said, "'Look, we have exhausted virtually our diplomatic effort to get the Iraqis to comply with their own agreements and with international law. Given that, what other option is there but to force them to do so?' That's what they're saying. This is the key question. And the answer is we don't have another option. We have got to force them to comply, and we are doing so militarily."

John Kerry was equally hawkish: "If there is not unfettered, unrestricted,
unlimited access per the U.N. resolution for inspections, and UNSCOM cannot in our
judgment appropriately perform its functions, then we obviously reserve the rights to
press that case internationally and to do what we need to do as a nation in order to be able
to enforce those rights," Kerry said back on February 23, 1998. "Saddam Hussein has
already used these weapons and has made it clear that he has the intent to continue to try,
by virtue of his duplicity and secrecy, to continue to do so. That is a threat to the stability
of the Middle East. It is a threat with respect to the potential of terrorist activities on a
global basis. It is a threat even to regions near but not exactly in the Middle East."

Iraq and weapons of mass destruction

Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, House of Commons, London, 24 September 2002

Mr Speaker, thank you for recalling Parliament to debate the best way to deal with the issue of the present leadership of Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Today we published a 50 page dossier detailing the history of Iraq's WMD, its breach of UN resolutions and the current attempts to rebuild the illegal WMD programme. I have placed a copy in the Library of the House.

At the end of the Gulf War, the full extent of Saddam's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes became clear. As a result, the UN passed a series of resolutions demanding Iraq disarm itself of such weapons and establishing a regime of weapons inspection and monitoring to do the task. They were to be given unconditional and unrestricted access to all and any Iraqi sites.

All this is accepted fact. In addition, it is fact, documented by UN inspectors, that Iraq almost immediately began to obstruct the inspections. Visits were delayed; on occasions, inspectors threatened; materiel was moved; special sites, shut to the inspectors, were unilaterally designated by Iraq.

The work of the inspectors continued but against a background of increasing obstruction and non-compliance. Indeed, Iraq denied its biological weapons programme existed until forced to acknowledge it after high ranking defectors disclosed it in 1995.

Eventually in 1997, the UN inspectors declared they were unable to fulfil their task. A year of negotiation and further obstruction occurred until finally in late 1998, the UN team were forced to withdraw. As the dossier sets out, we estimate on the basis of the UN's work that there were: up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agents, including one and a half tonnes of VX nerve agent; up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 litres of anthrax spores; and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

All of this was missing or unaccounted for.

Military action by the US and UK followed and a certain amount of infrastructure for Iraq's WMD and missile capability was destroyed, setting the Iraqi programme back, but not ending it.

From late 1998 onwards, the sole inhibition on Saddam's WMD programme was the sanctions regime. Iraq was forbidden to use the revenue from its oil

[c]

except for certain specified non-military purposes. The sanctions regime,
however, was also subject to illegal trading and abuse. Because of concerns
about its inadequacy - and the impact on the Iraqi people - we made several
attempts to refine it, culminating in a new UN resolution in May of this year.
But it was only partially effective. Around $3bn of money is illegally taken by
Saddam every year now, double the figure for 2000. Self-evidently there is
no proper accounting for this money.

Because of concerns that a containment policy based on sanctions alone
could not sufficiently inhibit Saddam's weapons programme, negotiations
continued after 1998 to gain re-admission for the UN inspectors. In 1999 a
new UN resolution demanding their re-entry was passed and ignored. Further
negotiations continued. Finally, after several months of discussion with
Saddam's regime this year, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, concluded
that Saddam was not serious about re-admitting the inspectors and ended
the negotiations. That was in July.

All of this is established fact. I set out the history in some detail because
occasionally debate on this issue seems to treat it almost as if it had
suddenly arisen, coming out of nowhere on a whim, in the last few months of
2002. It is an 11 year history: a history of UN will flouted, lies told by
Saddam about existence of his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
programmes, obstruction, defiance and denial. There is one common
consistent theme, however: the total determination of Saddam to maintain
the programme; to risk war, international ostracism, sanctions, the isolation
of the Iraqi economy, in order to keep it. At any time, he could have let the
inspectors back in and put the world to proof. At any time he could have co-
operated with the UN. Ten days ago he made the offer unconditionally, under
threat of war. He could have done it at any time in the last eleven years. But
he didn't. Why?

The dossier we publish gives the answer. The reason is because his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme is not an historic leftover from 1998. The inspectors aren't needed to clean up the old remains. His WMD programme is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working. The WMD programme is not shut down. It is up and running.

The dossier is based on the work of the British Joint Intelligence Committee.
For over 60 years, beginning just prior to WWII, the JIC has provided
intelligence assessments to British Prime Ministers. Normally its work is
secret. Unusually, because it is important we explain our concerns over
Saddam to the British people, we have decided to disclose these
assessments. I am aware, of course, that people are going to have to take
elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence services. But this is
what they are telling me the British Prime Minister and my senior colleagues.
The intelligence picture they paint is one accumulated over the past four
years. It is extensive, detailed and authoritative.

2

[x]

It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population; and that he is actively trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.

On chemical weapons, the dossier shows that Iraq continues to produce chemical agent for chemical weapons; has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq; has bought dual-use chemical facilities; has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons programme; and has a serious ongoing research programme into weapons production, all of it well funded.

In respect of biological weapons, again production of biological agents has continued; facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been rebuilt; equipment has been purchased for such a programme; and again Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it, pre 1991. In particular, the UN inspection regime discovered that Iraq was trying to acquire mobile biological weapons facilities which are easier to conceal. Present intelligence confirms they have now got such facilities. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. All eventually result in excruciatingly painful death.

As for nuclear weapons, Saddam's previous nuclear weapons programme was shut down by the inspectors, following disclosure by defectors of the full, but hidden, nature of it. That programme was based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. The known remaining stocks of uranium are now held under supervision by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

But we now know the following. Since the departure of the inspectors in 1998, Saddam has bought or attempted to buy: specialised vacuum pumps of the design needed for the gas centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production line of the specification for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual use products such as Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride and fluoride gas, which can be used both in petrochemicals but also in gas centrifuge cascades; a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fibre gas centrifuge rotors; and has attempted, covertly, to acquire 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes, which are subject to strict controls due to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges.

In addition, we know Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, though we do not know whether he has been successful. Again key personnel who used to work on the nuclear weapons programme are back in harness. Iraq may claim that this is for a civil nuclear power programme but it has no nuclear power plants.

3

[x]

That is the position in respect of weapons. But, of course, the weapons require ballistic missile capability. This is again subject to UN disarmament resolutions. Iraq is supposed only to have missile capability up to 150 km for conventional weaponry. Pages 27-31 of the dossier detail the evidence on this issue. It is clear both that a significant number of longer-range missiles were effectively concealed from the previous inspectors and remain, including up to 20 extended range Scud missiles; that in mid 2001, there was a step change in the programme and by this year, Iraq's development of weapons with a range over 1,000 kms was well underway; that hundreds of key people are employed on this programme; facilities are being built; and equipment procured, usually clandestinely. Sanctions and import controls have hindered this programme but only slowed its progress. The capability being developed is for multi-purpose use, including with WMD warheads.

Now, that is the assessment to me from the JIC. In addition, we have well-founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam sees his WMD programme as vital to his survival, as a demonstration of his power and his influence in the region.

There will be some who dismiss all this. Intelligence is not always right. For some of this material there may be innocent explanations.

There will be others who say, rightly, that, for example, on present going, it could be several years before he acquires a usable nuclear weapon. Though, if he were able to purchase fissile materiel illegally, it would only be a year or two.

But let me put it at its simplest: on this 11 year history; with this man, Saddam; with this accumulated, detailed intelligence available; with what we know and what we can reasonably speculate: would the world be wise to leave the present situation undisturbed; to say, despite 14 separate UN demands on this issue, all of which Saddam is in breach of, we should do nothing; to conclude that we should trust not to the good faith of the UN weapons inspectors but to the good faith of the current Iraqi regime?

Our case is simply this: not that we take military action, come what may; but that the case for ensuring Iraqi disarmament (as the UN has stipulated) is overwhelming. I defy anyone on the basis of this evidence to say that is an unreasonable demand for the international community to make when, after all, it is only the same demand that we have made for 11 years and he has rejected.

People say: but why Saddam? I don't in the least dispute there are other causes of concern on WMD. I said as much in this House on 14 September last year. But two things about Saddam stand out. He has used these weapons, thousands dying in chemical weapons attacks in Iraq itself. He used them in the Iran-Iraq war, started by him, in which one million people died. And his is a regime with no moderate elements to appeal to. Read the

4

[c]

chapter on Saddam and human rights. Read not just about the one million dead in the war with Iran, not just about the 100,000 Kurds brutally murdered in northern Iraq; not just the 200,000 Shia Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq; not just the attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 which led to the Gulf War. Read about the routine butchering of political opponents; the prison 'cleansing' regimes in which thousands die; the torture chambers and hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by Amnesty International. Read it all and again I defy anyone to say that this cruel and sadistic dictator should be allowed any possibility of getting his hands on more chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons.

Why now? People ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, that he will use his weapons. But I can say that if the international community having made the call for his disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening will, always draw. That the international community will talk but not act; will use diplomacy but not force; and we know, again from our history, that diplomacy, not backed by the threat of force, has never worked with dictators and never will work. If we take this course, he will carry on, his efforts will intensify, his confidence grow and at some point, in a future not too distant, the threat will turn into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined. The history of Saddam and WMD is not American or British propaganda. The history and the present threat are real.

And if people say: why should Britain care? I answer: because there is no way that this man, in this region above all regions, could begin a conflict using such weapons and the consequences not engulf the whole world.

That, after all, is the reason the UN passed its resolutions. That is why it is right the UN Security Council again makes its will and its unity clear and lays down a strong new UN resolution and mandate. Then Saddam will have the choice: comply willingly or be forced to comply. That is why alongside the diplomacy, there must be genuine preparedness and planning to take action if diplomacy fails.

Let me be plain about our purpose.

Of course there is no doubt that Iraq, the region and the whole world would be better off without Saddam.

They deserve to be led by someone who can abide by international law, not a murderous dictator.

Someone who can bring Iraq back into the international community where it belongs, not languishing as a pariah.

5

[i]

Someone who can make the country rich and successful, not impoverished by Saddam's personal greed.

Someone who can lead a government more representative of the country as a whole, while maintaining absolutely Iraq's territorial integrity.

We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Liberated from Saddam, they could make Iraq prosperous and a force for good in the Middle East.

So the ending of regime would be the cause of regret for no-one other than Saddam.

But our purpose is disarmament. No-one wants military conflict. The whole purpose of putting this before the UN is to demonstrate the united determination of the international community to resolve this in the way it should have been resolved years ago: through a proper process of disarmament under the UN.

Disarmament of all WMD is the demand. One way or another it must be acceded to.

There are two other issues with a bearing on this question which I will deal with.

First, Afghanistan is a country now freed from the Taliban, but still suffering. This is a regime we changed, rightly. I want to make it clear, once again, we are entirely committed to its re-construction. We will not desert the Afghan people. We will stick with them until the job is done.

Secondly, I have no doubt the Arab world knows it would be better off without Saddam. Equally, I know there is genuine resentment at the state of the Middle East Peace Process, which people want to see the international community pursue with the same vigour. Israel will defend its people against these savage acts of terrorism. But the very purpose of this terrorism is to prevent any chance for peace. Meanwhile the Palestinians are suffering in the most appalling and unacceptable way. We need urgent action to build a security infrastructure that gives both Israelis and Palestinians confidence and stops the next suicide bomb closing down the prospects of progress. We need political reform for the Palestinian Authority. And we need a new Conference on the Middle East Peace Process based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state. We can condemn the terrorism and the reaction to it. But frankly, that gets us nowhere. What we need is a firm commitment to action and a massive mobilisation of energy to get the peace process moving again; and we will play our part in any way we can.

Finally, there are many acts of this drama still to be played out. I have always said that Parliament should be kept in touch with all developments, in particular those that would lead us to military action. That remains the case.

6

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# Blair speech leaves Asia unmoved

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HONG KONG, China --British Prime Minister Tony Blair's detailed dossier on Iraq's weapons program and claims it poses an immediate world threat have so far failed to convince the international community of the need to invade Iraq.

The U.S. and Britain have stepped up pressure on the U.N. Security Council to adopt a tough new Iraq resolution before any resumption of U.N. weapons inspections to search for weapons of mass destruction.

Russia says it sees no need for a new U.N. resolution and France has made no secret of the fact it does not believe military action against Iraq is warranted.

Their stance has placed China's in the international spotlight, it being a permanent security council member with veto power along with United States, Britain, France and Russia.

Early indications from Beijing suggest the United States and Britain may secure at least limited support for a military offensive.

China has made its most positive statement yet on the new Iraq resolution being crafted by the United States and Britain that paves the way for an attack should Iraq fail to honour all past U.N. demands.

Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein was facing his "last chance" to avoid giving the United States a legal basis for action against him, China's official English-language China Daily said on Wednesday.

The newspaper, in a strongly worded editorial aimed directly at Saddam, said he must fulfil a promise to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors fully or risk losing support against a U.S. invasion.

"This is the last chance for Saddam Hussein to deprive the Americans of a legal case against himself," the paper said.

"An Iraqi failure to satisfy the inspectors' requests might give Bush the excuse he craves to forcefully carry out his coveted 'regime change' in Iraq," it said.

The Foreign Ministry said China would consider a possible resolution by the United States and

http://cnn.worldnews.printthis clickability.com/pt/printThis?clickMap=printThis&fb=Y&u... 9/25/2002

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Britain to use force if Iraq did not meet demands for weapons inspections.

China has welcomed Iraq's decision to allow the unconditional return of inspectors but is still expected to abstain from any council vote on the use of force.

## Regional reluctance

Malaysia's Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir typified the view of many Asian Muslim nations in urging restraint on the part of the West and the full participation of the United Nations in controlling any action against Iraq.

Mahathir said sanctions must be lifted now that Saddam had agreed to readmit UN weapons inspectors. "Britain and America should listen to the rest of the world," he told a news conference.

The former leader of neighboring Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, said a U.S.-led war against Iraq looked likely, but warned the such a campaign would "complicate" ties between Washington and Muslim countries.

"Few doubt the U.S. will act to remove [Saddam] unless he hands over weapons of mass destruction," Lee said in a speech.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard said Wednesday he thought the Blair dossier was a "strong document" that argued a "very compelling case".

Speaking in London after a meeting with the British leader, Howard said the document supported the line the Australian government was taking on Iraq.

"It's fair to say that our views are very similar," Howard said.

Howard said that while Australia did not want a war with Iraq, the issue of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction had to be addressed.

"It won't go away. If we hide ourselves in a corner it won't be gone the next morning and people who pretend that it will are deluding themselves," Howard told reporters.

## Afghanistan fears neglect

Across the Tasman Sea, the Blair speech seemed to have gone some way towards hardening the New Zealand leadership stance against Saddam's regime.

Prime Minister Helen Clark, a vocal opponent of military action in recent months, said Blair's dossier on Iraq put forward a strong case for disarming the country.

She said it was clear from his speech that he believed Britain should follow a multilateral approach to disarming Iraq and that he was not saying military force should be used immediately.

"He does not set out to persuade the Commons (parliament) that the British should be invading," Clark said.

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"The dossier is useful in that it brings together much information, and reinforces our view that unconditional access by weapons inspectors is required," she said.

"Getting the inspectors in is step one. Destroying what they find is step two."

In Afghanistan, where U.S. and British forces recently drove the Taliban out of power, some officials in the new government have voiced concern that efforts to rebuild the impoverished country could be neglected if the Bush administration decides to launch a military attack against Iraq.

That prompted U.S. Treasury Undersecretary John Taylor to say during a visit to Kabul on Tuesday that Washington will not abandon its commitment to help rebuild Afghanistan, even if it is forced to commit military and humanitarian resources for a possible war in Iraq.

Reuters contributed to this report.

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Sep. 25, 06:35 EDT

China, France sceptical of Blair's Iraq dossier

LONDON (AP-CP) — Prime Minister Tony Blair's warning about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction appeared to win little support outside Ottawa and Washington, with France and China expressing skepticism.

For weeks, talk about a possible U.S.-led war against Iraq had created widespread interest about Blair's long-promised dossier about Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological arsenal.

In it and his speech to a special session of the House of Commons on Tuesday, Blair said the stockpile is not only growing, but that Saddam is prepared to use such weapons of mass destruction quickly. The intelligence dossier also said Iraq has taken steps to develop nuclear weapons.

Blair, U.S. President George W. Bush's top ally, said he wants UN weapons inspectors allowed back into Iraq with no limits on their movements.

But he also supported the U.S. goal of a "regime change" in Baghdad, given how often Saddam has defied the world body's requirements regarding his weapons since losing the Persian Gulf War.

In Ottawa, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien reiterated Canada's support for a tough UN resolution.

"We hope that it will be a new resolution that will be very tight and very clear," Chrétien said.

"We want the inspectors to be there as soon as possible and we want Saddam Hussein to destroy any armaments of massive destruction that he might have in his possession."

Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham said Canada supports the U.S. position that action should follow if Saddam tries to hamper the inspectors.

"We can certainly endorse the United States' position that there has to be clear consequences for a failure to act," he said after a cabinet meeting Tuesday.

Britain and the United States are two of the five permanent, veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, and they have been trying to win the support of the other three — China, France and Russia — for a new resolution threatening Iraq for its continued defiance.

RELATED LINKS

• Gore attacks Bush 'fear' tactics (Sep. 24)

• What happens after Saddam goes? (Sept. 24)

• Conflicting signals from Baghdad (Sept. 10)

• Bush: Why we must attack (Sept. 6)

• Looking for Sept. 11 linkage (Sept. 1)

• Flash: Iraq primer

• A map of Iraq and its neighbours

• Saddam Hussein biography

• U.S. State Dept's Iraq update

• CIA Factbook: Iraq

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Pri... 9/25/2002

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[i]

But the French and Chinese leaders both sounded skeptical Tuesday about Blair's speech and the dossier in comments they made while attending a summit of European and Asian leaders in Denmark.

French President Jacques Chirac said a war with Iraq is still avoidable if the UN Security Council is given a primary role in the crisis. Chirac reiterated there was no need for a proposed Security Council resolution threatening war if Saddam keeps UN arms inspectors out.

"This is not the view of France," said Chirac, adding that only inspectors can provide the needed proof about Saddam's weapons. "I do not think at all that war is unavoidable."

China's prime minister, Zhu Rongji, warned that any attack against Iraq without a UN blessing "will lead to severe consequences."

Calling for a UN mandate in the crisis, he said: "We request that Iraq comply with UN resolutions without any preconditions."

Recently, there has been confusion over Russia's position on the need for a new UN resolution on Iraq, and that remained the case Tuesday.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said that British Ambassador Sir Roderic Lyne met with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanovim in Moscow to discuss Iraq and the Palestinian territories.

During the discussion, Lyne said Blair was presenting the dossier about Iraq to the British parliament and that it would be made available to other countries. But the Russian Foreign Ministry said it did not receive a copy of the report during the meeting, and made no comment about Blair's speech.

As Iraqi officials dismissed the dossier as inaccurate and an excuse for a British and American attack on Baghdad, the White House called its information "frightening" and praised the British prime minister for his strong defence of U.S.-led efforts against Saddam.

Graham said Blair's information should be taken seriously.

In Asia, Singapore's former leader Lee Kuan Yew said a U.S.-led war against Iraq looked likely, but warned the such a campaign would "complicate" ties between Washington and Muslim countries.

"Few doubt that the U.S. will act to remove (Saddam) unless he hands over weapons of mass destruction," Lee said in a speech.

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[L.C.]

(Prepared for delivery)

Contact: Meridith Webster

(202-354-3876)

Statement of Madeleine K. Albright
United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

September 26, 2002

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am delighted
to be here. This Committee is like a second home, and it
is a special honor to be accompanied by my very
distinguished predecessor and friend, Secretary Kissinger.

Mr. Chairman, the President's speech to the UN two
weeks ago paralleled many of the statements I made when
serving as UN Ambassador and Secretary of State. The
details of Saddam's noncompliance with Security Council
resolutions were not new. Nor was the President's
challenge for the Council to respond firmly or face the
likelihood of a forceful American response.

The difference now is that weapons inspectors have
been absent from Iraq for almost four years. The risk
that Saddam Hussein will succeed in reconstituting
deliverable weapons of mass destruction has increased. It
is in the interests not only of the United States, but
also of the entire international community to act.

So I strongly support the Administration's decision
to back the return of UN inspectors to Iraq. The path of
inspections is all too familiar, but it is worth traveling
one last time. If the Iraqis break their promise, the
case for military action will be stronger. If they keep
it, the UN inspection and monitoring regime will resume,
and that is good. Before the inspectors were kicked out,
they had destroyed more weapons of mass destruction
capacity than the Gulf War. Unfettered inspections and
monitoring will make it far harder for Iraq to continue
developing advanced arms.

[w]

2

So we must be willing to take "yes" for an answer.
But we must also be prepared for a negative response.

The President has asked Congress for the authority to
use all means necessary to enforce Iraq's compliance with
UN Security Council Resolutions, the most important of
which requires Baghdad to destroy its weapons of mass
destruction and longer-range missile programs.

The President should have this authority, and members
of the Security Council should join us in the enforcement
effort. I refer particularly to permanent Council Members
France, Russia and China. These are the countries that
most vigorously promote the Council's prerogatives. They
should be the countries most determined to see that its
Resolutions are enforced.

If Saddam continues to behave like Saddam, we have
legitimate grounds for acting on behalf of the Security
Council to bring Iraq into compliance. This answers the
question of "why" a confrontation might be necessary. As
President Clinton said almost four years ago, the Iraqi
leader threatens "the security of the world," and the "best
way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi
government."

This does not; however, answer two other questions.
The first is "how" and the second is "when."

The question of "how" has two parts. One is military,
which I will leave to my friends in uniform. The other is
the problem of planning for the post-Saddam era. This is
complicated because we could be confronted with a no-win
choice. One option might be a prolonged U.S. military
occupation of the country that served as the cultural
capital of Islam during that civilization's Golden Age.
This would hand a new organizing tool to anti-American
terrorists worldwide.

The other option is to withdraw promptly and risk
plunging the country into factionalism and civil war. It
is naïve to think that a peaceful and democratic Iraq will
automatically emerge from the ashes of our invasion. It is
crazy to believe we can run postwar Iraq alone. And it is
essential that the Administration think the consequences of
all this through in advance, which it has not yet done.
One thing is certain. We may be able to win a war against

3

[cc]

Iraq without a broad coalition. But there is no way we can win the peace without help from many others.

As for "when" to confront Iraq, the answer should be at a time of our own choosing. In making that choice, several factors should be borne in mind.

As evil as Saddam Hussein is, he is not the reason anti-aircraft guns ring this city, a Department of Homeland Defense is being created, and the phrases "ground zero," "Let's roll" and "9-1-1" have acquired new meanings.

Saddam Hussein remains the enemy we know. Since the administration of former President George H.W. Bush, each time Mr. Hussein has pushed, we have pushed back. Today, American and British planes enforce no-flight zones over 40 percent of his country and a maritime force prevents weapons from reaching Iraq by sea. Saddam Hussein's military is far weaker than it was a decade ago. And he knows that he will be obliterated if he ever tries to attack another country again. As a rule, people who build statues to themselves are not suicidal.

The more urgent threat remains Al-Qaeda and related groups, because deterrence is ineffective against those who embrace death. More than a year after September 11, only a handful of Al-Qaeda's top leaders have been eliminated. Its funding sources have not dried up. Terrorist attacks continue to take place. And Al-Qaeda members are reportedly filtering back into Afghanistan where thousands of Taliban hide in plain sight, and the international community has failed to establish a meaningful security presence outside Kabul.

Defeating Al-Qaeda is not a part time job. We will need the sustained help of governments everywhere, and especially in the Islamic world. And we must make an undivided commitment of our own military power, diplomatic capital, intelligence and law enforcement resources.

This is not the time or place for short attention spans. The fight against Al-Qaeda must remain our top priority.

In his Memoirs, former Secretary of State Acheson wrote that it is sometimes necessary to over-dramatize a threat in order to arouse public support. This

4

[cc]

Administration is now doing just that by trying to claim September 11 as a primary reason to go to war against Iraq. Officials say that September 11 created a "new reality," which is that terrorists might be able to obtain weapons of mass destruction. That is, of course, a reality--but hardly a new one. And there are perhaps half a dozen other countries that are thought to have weapons of mass destruction programs and links to terrorism that are at least as extensive as Iraq's.

Certainly, the danger is real, but eliminating Saddam will not eliminate the threat, and might even make it worse if anti-American extremists elsewhere are strengthened by an assault on Baghdad.

Unlike the Gulf War, which was paid for largely by others, a war with Iraq will be paid for by us, and could cost anywhere from sixty to two hundred billion dollars in direct costs, not to mention what the mere prospect of war is doing to our economy. Congress should consider whether our country would be more secure using those funds to intensify the pursuit of Al-Qaeda, secure Russia's nuclear arsenal, strengthen homeland defense, improve public diplomacy, and transform Afghanistan into a permanent terrorist-free zone.

As I said, there is a valid case for using force against Iraq, if that is needed to ensure disarmament under UN Security Council Resolutions. But timing matters.

At a minimum, the Administration still needs to develop a coalition, strengthen Iraqi opposition groups, fine-tune military planning, develop a coherent blueprint for the post-Saddam era, and identify the resources required to fund the war. It must also conduct diplomacy aimed at cooling tensions in the Middle East, and make certain that war with Iraq does not result in attacks against Israel and a broader regional conflict.

To buy this time, we should give notice that if UN inspectors are again rebuffed by Iraq, we will destroy without warning any facilities in that country we believe are being used to develop prohibited arms. Even if those suspicions prove wrong, the blame should fall on Iraq for denying access, not on America for enforcing the Security Council's will.

5

Mr. Chairman, in closing, let me say that I expect
Congress to authorize the President to use force against
Iraq. I hope, however, that Senators will continue to
exercise their patriotic duty to ask hard questions. And
that the language of the Resolution will be drawn more
narrowly than the Administration's draft, which includes an
authorization of force unrelated to any specific countries,
threats, American interests or periods of time.

I also hope it will not be necessary to use the
authority in question. America must respond firmly to
Saddam Hussein and it may be necessary to wage war to
remove him. But I do not share the irrational exuberance
for this conflict that is present among some pundits and
perhaps even a few Administration officials. That
enthusiasm is not shared by many in our military or among
professional diplomats. It is not an American trait to
want war. And it is not a sign of sound leadership to
understate the risks of war, or to offer constantly
shifting rationales--as this Administration has--for
undertaking such a venture.

I also question the Administration's wisdom in
publicly adding new and ostentatiously hegemonic language
to our national security strategy. This document brags
unnecessarily about American strength, and gives ammunition
to those who accuse us of pursuing our interests without
regard to international norms.

More than 200 years ago, when the British Empire was
at its height, Edmund Burke wrote, "I dread our own power
and our own ambition; I dread our being too much
dreaded...We may say that we shall not abuse this
astonishing and hitherto unheard of power. But every
other nation will think we shall abuse it. Sooner or
later, this must produce a combination against us which
may end in our ruin."

Mr. Chairman, there is a gathering danger that
America will be perceived as a nation uninterested in the
concerns of others at the precise moment we most need
global cooperation to fight terrorism, proliferation and
menacing dictators such as Saddam Hussein.

We must, therefore, be strong but also smart in
articulating the "why," planning the "how," and choosing
the "when" of actions directed against Iraq and other

[c]

6

challenges we face. And we must be clear not only about
what America is against, but also about what America is
for. We are against terrorism and Saddam Hussein; that is
a given. But we are for democracy and development, the
rule of law and respect for human rights. These
priorities must not be lost amidst the sound and fury of
the present debate.

Thank you for your attention. I will be pleased to
respond to any questions you may have.

John Bentes to accompany

9/25/02 (3)

Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Thursday, September 26th

Washington, DC

**7:30am** Depart NY/LGA via DL #1743

**8:36am** Arrive DC/National
Met by Ray Urrutia
2003 Black Lincoln Town Car, VA# YCB7638
Cell: 703/926-5616; pager: 703/826-0207

**ca.8:45am** Arrive Dirksen office building, use C and 1st Street entrance. You will be met by David Merkel, Sr. Staff of SFRC and shown to an office w/ telephone.
Merkel's Cell: 703/209-6525
Merkel's Office: (direct) 202/224-4348 (main) 202/224-6797
*JB please call Merkel's office when you have left National.*

**10:15am** HAK is shown to Rm. 419 on 4th floor for SFRC hearing.

**10:30am** Hearing begins with introductory remarks from Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of SFRC.

Followed immediately by remarks by Ranking Republican.

Biden will then ask for individual 10-minute statements from both HAK and Madeleine Albright.

Remainder of time spent on Q&A.

**ca.12:00** Hearing over. HAK to National airport.

TBC by HAK

**1:00pm** Depart DC/National via US #2672

**2:06pm** Arrive NY/LGA

OR

1:30pm Depart DC/National via DL #1754

2:35pm Arrive NY/LGA

OR BACKUP TRAIN RESERVATIONS:

1:00pm Depart DC/Union Station via Acela #2166

3:45pm Arrive NYC/Penn Station

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN

PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONNECTICUT
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
RUSSELL O. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN
PAUL O. WELLSTONE, MINNESOTA
BARBARA BOXEN, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, NEW JERSEY
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
GORDON H. SMITH, OREGON
DILL FRIST, TENNESSEE
LINCOLN O. CHAFEE, RHODE ISLAND
GEORGE ALLEN, VIRGINIA
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS
MICHAEL B. ENZL, WYOMING

EDWIN K. HALL, STAFF DIRECTOR
PATRICIA A. MCNEARNEY, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

September 10, 2002

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for meeting with us last week to begin a dialogue on Iraq. We very much appreciate the spirit of the meeting and your desire to engage Congress, the American people and the international community in this critical discussion. We were pleased to learn that you intend to seek authorization from Congress prior to any use of force by the United States Armed Forces to ensure Iraq's disarmament.

Mr. President, we share your conviction that the combination of Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction poses a significant threat to Iraq's people, its region and the world. Simply put, either these weapons must be dislodged from Iraq, or Saddam Hussein must be dislodged from power.

Last month, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began hearings on Iraq and heard from a broad range of expert witnesses. In the weeks since, prominent Americans with decades of experience in foreign and national security policy have expressed their views. In the weeks to come, we look forward to hearing from the intelligence community and policy officials of your Administration in hearings before Congress and from you in the case you make to the American people and the international community.

Mr. President, based on what we have heard to date, there is not yet a consensus on many critical questions. For example, what is the likelihood that Iraq would use its weapons of mass destruction against us, to deter us or to supply terrorists? What are Iraq's links to terrorist groups, including those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001? Can Iraq be disarmed without the use of force? Would attacking Iraq precipitate the very thing we are trying to prevent: the use of weapons of mass destruction against us or countries such as Israel? Can we shift substantial resources to the Iraqi theater without compromising the war on terrorism in many other areas? What would be our obligations to a post-Saddam Iraq militarily and economically? It will be impossible to answer these questions with certainty in advance; however, they must be part of the calculus you make in weighing the various courses of action.

Despite these uncertainties, in our judgement there are several principles that already enjoy broad bipartisan agreement and that would maximize the opportunities for success while minimizing the risks as we move forward on Iraq. We urge you to embrace them.

The President
The White House

The President

Page 2

First, the United States should pursue a policy that has broad international support. Such support is desirable for both substantive and political reasons. Our allies around the world and our friends in the region have important, and possibly even necessary contributions to make to the effort to disarm Iraq. We may need their support for any initiatives we take at the United Nations. Should we pursue military action, we will want them with us and, at a minimum, require basing and overflight rights from several countries. If, in the course of disarming Iraq, we end Saddam Hussein's regime, a massive rebuilding effort will be required that the United States will not want to shoulder alone. We also depend on the active and continued cooperation of many allies in the unfinished war against terrorism. In short, building international support for our Iraq policy must be a priority.

Second, we should make it clear that Iraq is the world's concern, not just our own. For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has flaunted the will of the international community, breaking solemn obligations to disarm. These obligations were made not to the United States, but to the United Nations. In your speech to the General Assembly this week, we urge you to seek a new Security Council mandate requiring Iraq to accept an unconditional weapons inspections regime that gives inspectors the power to go anywhere, anytime. It could set a deadline for Iraqi compliance and make clear that any failure by Iraq to comply will result in the resolution's enforcement. Although we recognize that it will require difficult diplomacy, we believe your Administration can succeed in gaining support for a mandate -- much as President George H.W. Bush did before the Gulf War. Such a resolution would have the merit of putting the focus where it belongs: on Iraq's dangerous and illegal weapons programs.

Third, we must be candid with the American people that Iraq represents a long term commitment by the United States. We urge you to formulate and express a vision for a democratic, unified, post-Saddam Iraq, living in peace with its neighbors. The American people must know the military, financial and human capital the United States would be prepared to commit to help realize that vision. The Iraqi people and their neighbors must be confident that chaos will not follow Saddam Hussein. Moreover, you would help assuage international concerns that the current unsettled situation in Afghanistan may be replicated in Iraq, with far greater strategic consequences.

Mr. President, we thank you for beginning the process of consultation on Iraq. We stand ready to work closely with you on this grave and important issue.

Sincerely,

Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman

Richard G. Lugar

PAUL S. ZARBANES, MARYLAND
CHRISTOPHER J. DOOD, CONNECTICUT
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, WISCONSIN
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, MINNESOTA
BARBARA BOXER, CALIFORNIA
ROBERT G. TORRICELL, NEW JERSEY
BILL NELSON, FLORIDA
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
CHUCK HAGEL, NEBRASKA
GORDON H. SMITH, OREGON
BILL FRIST, TENNESSEE
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, RHODE ISLAND
GEORGE ALLEN, VIRGINIA
SAM BROWNBACK, KANSAS
MICHAEL B. ENZI, WYOMING

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, STAFF DIRECTOR
PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, REPUBLICAN STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

September 24, 2002

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Kissinger
THROUGH: Patricia McNerney
FROM: Skip Fischer
SUBJECT: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Iraq (September 26 at 10:30 a.m. in SD-419)

As you requested, below is a summary of the views expressed by Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chairman Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

1. Secretary Albright

Secretary Albright has been critical of the Bush Administration's handling of the situation involving Iraq. She believes that the threat to U.S. national security from Iraq should be subordinate to the ongoing struggle against international terrorism. As Secretary Albright recently wrote in *The New York Times*: "As evil as Mr. Hussein is, he is not the reason antiaircraft guns ring the capital, civil liberties are being compromised, a Department of Homeland Defense is being created and the Gettysburg Address again seems directly relevant to our lives."

Secretary Albright has criticized the Bush Administration for ignoring the United Nations and pursuing an overly unilateralist approach to foreign policy. Because of her view that the Administration should take its case before the United Nations and at least seek its approval, Secretary Albright applauded President Bush's September 12 speech before that organization.

However, even during her tenure as Secretary of State, her approach to the United Nations was nuanced. As articulated by one of her successors as U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke wrote in the September 7 *Washington Post* (comparing our policy options in Iraq with those faced by the United States during the 1998 crisis in Kosovo):

"... we now faced a simple choice: Act without the Security Council - or don't act at all. The fact that we had made a serious effort to obtain Security Council approval but faced a certain Russian veto was vital; it allowed our European allies, led by Tony Blair, to support NATO action without prior Security Council approval. ... (I)f the administration refuses to try the Security Council route, it will weaken its position and lose support unnecessarily. Even an unsuccessful effort to obtain an airtight resolution will strengthen

international support for Washington, which could then be based on earlier U.N.
resolution that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated."

To reiterate, though, irrespective of the President's willingness to go before the U.N., Secretary Albright still feels that this is the wrong war at the wrong time.

2. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Chairman Biden is considerably more supportive of the Bush Administration's policy toward Iraq than Secretary Albright. While hedging his position through repeated appeals for the President to get his domestic and international ducks in order, and while being somewhat skeptical of the urgency of military action, he nevertheless has expressed the view that the threat exists and must be confronted. The following is from his August 5 appearance on "Meet the Press":

"We have no choice but to eliminate that threat [referring to Iraq's biological and chemical weapons and efforts to develop nuclear weapons]. The question is the means by which we eliminate the threat and the means by which you build support to be able to do that...I think Saddam either has to be separated from his weapons or taken out of power...The American people must be brought along. The world must understand why we must do it."

There is implicit in Senator Biden's comments a clear distinction between his view regarding disarmament and the Administration's pursuit of regime change. While Senator Biden believes the Iraqi regime should be replaced, characteristic of most Democrats, he is less supportive than most Republicans of adopting the steps necessary to affect that outcome, professing concerns regarding the perceived fragility of Iraq and uncertainty about the Administration's willingness to stay in Iraq for the years it could take to rebuild its institutions.

I am also attaching a letter he cosigned with Senator Lugar to the President that sets out his concerns and conditions for support. It was written prior to the President's speech to the United Nations but does give you a basic outline of his ideas.

Should you wish additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me at the Committee.