ADAM WALINSKY

7318 CHURCHILL ROAD
MCLEAN, VIRGINIA

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

It is a little late for notes of congratulation on your
appointment. But it is not late for a note of great
appreciation for the job you are so obviously doing.
After all the years of foolish bombast, after all the
purposeless activity-- which, in a country so great,
must by its very lack of direction have cruel and
terrible effect-- after all this, what a relief, what
a hope for the future, I find in the cool and serious
direction you are bringing to our foreign policy.
It is as if someone had finally opened a window,
somewhere in a house so musty that it was in danger of
spontaneous combustion, or its occupants from suffocation.
You have a long way to go, of course; but the breeze
has begun, and that is a real accomplishment.

Your views, and the directions you are taking, are
.so far as I can gather from the news reports) so
sensible, and so close to my own, that I have no real
addition to offer (which must be a great relief to
you). I do, however, have one thought. For years we
have been making policy (aid policy, arms policy,
what have you) on the basis of assumptions about the
internal dynamics of other societies which amount
to little more than a crude admonition that all
must develop as we did-- or rather, as we think we
did. We make an assumption that development, for
example, (and a particular kind of economic development,
for that matter) must automatically lead to democracy,
and thus to foreign policies in other nations that
must serve the interests of the United States. The
apotheosis of this view, I suppose, was McNamara's
Montreal speech: which managed to omit the fact that
the one great outbreak of "violence" that was Western
in this period, the Second World War, was far more
savage and costly than all the outbreaks associated
with underdevelopment put together.

I have a simple proposal. Why not take the first five
or ten million dollars that would otherwise be spent

DEC 18 1968

SAND DUNE SHANTY
309 TWENTY-FIRST STREET, SOUTH
BRIGANTINE, NEW JERSEY

December 13, 1968

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Please let me congratulate you on your selection as Special
Assistant for National Security in the fine team that Pres-elect
Nixon is putting together.

You will have a vast responsibility in this field which
seems to have been so poorly handled in the last 8 years. Our
safety and indeed our existence as a nation may depend on the
wisdom of what we do henceforth.

In this connection may I call your attention to a meaty
address recently delivered by Mr. William J. Stephens, President
of Jones & Laughlen? I enclose a copy printed in a little booklet.
Please take a few minutes to read it. I don't think that you will
regret it.

Please note his powerful thesis; that we must maintain our
economic strength to maintain our political and military security.
Our dwindling economic strength vis-a-vis the world is shown by the
huge losses of our gold reserves; such losses are both a symbol and
a result of the *Leaking Faucet* of our Policies.

Please tell me if you don't find this address very worthwhile.
I might identify myself as one of those who wrote to every member
of our New Jersey delegation BEFORE Miami and urged each to vote
for Mr. Nixon. With all best wishes in the vitally important work
you are now beginning, I am,

pah
enclosures

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GENERAL OFFICES-1214 ATLANTIC BOULEVARD

ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY

April 27, 1964

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Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman
House Foreign Affairs Committee
House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Congressman Morgan: -

May we urge you to take effective action to stop our continuing staggering loss of gold? We spent abroad over $2 billions more than we received last year. We lost that much gold, so that our gold reserves are now down to the lowest in a quarter of a century. This is the road to economic ruin.

There are definite measures that can and should be taken as soon as possible to stop our present reckless excess of foreign spending over receipts from abroad. This excess must be made up in gold. These are: -

1. Immediate and substantial reduction of the enormous sums we have been giving to other nations in foreign aid. This lavish squandering of our resources beyond our capacity to pay should be reduced further this year; at least to $2 billions. We can help other nations at small cost; by (1) technical help and by (2) gifts of the means to halt the exploding populations which are the greatest cause of their present economic distress. Handing out lavish gifts to nations which allow their populations to expand is like pouring gold down a rat-hole.

2. A steady and important reduction in the size of our enormous military establishments abroad. In this day of expensive ICBMs we cannot also need such extravagant foreign military commitments as we had 15 years ago.

3. A revised budget with federal expenditures brought within anticipated income. Budgetary deficits affect international confidence in the dollar and thus affect the gold flow. We cannot believe that we need to spend now as much as we did in the wartime year of 1944. This will NOT bring prosperity.

4. Definite action to balance the scales between the power of management and of labor to stop the many ruinous strikes and enormous build-up of union wages. Extravagant union wage rates are pricing our products out of the world market. The ruthless power of labor leaders such as Hoffa, Reuther, Bridges, Quill, et als, should be curtailed by (1) extending the anti-trust laws to unions and (2) encouraging right-to-work laws in all states. The misuse of power by selfish union leaders is adding to our huge losses of gold.

Mr. Morgan, we cannot afford to neglect these measures to stop our present ruinous losses of gold. Will you not give them your effective support for action now by reducing the amount of the Foreign Aid Bill HR 10502? With best regards, I am

18

CK!

N.Y. Wall St. Journal

OCT. 14, 1968

REVIEW and OUTLOOK

IMP!

The Collapse of Liberalism

This is an important key to succeeding events. It would have been one thing to walk out on Diem for his offenses against liberalism. But after America had implicated itself in his overthrow and murder, considerations of both morality and international credibility made it quite clearly another thing to walk away without an effort to salvage the resulting situation.

Many of the mistakes in Viet-
nam have been precisely the
mistakes to be expected of men em-
bodying the traits and habits of con-
temporary liberalism. We do not find it
surprising that men who think the Fed-
eral Government can solve all of the
nation's problems should also think the
United States can solve all of the
world's problems. Nor that men who
seek short-cut solutions on the domes-
tic front should seek to solve a war by
such a trick as overthrowing an allied
government.

Nor, to move into the Johnson Ad
ministration, is it surprising that men
of liberal bent would compound the er-
rors by too long trying to have both
guns and butter, or would leave their
war aims hazy by invoking not nation-
al interest so much as a crusade to
bring liberalism to the poor people of
South Vietnam. Without belaboring the
point that liberal Administrations have
led us into all of this century's wars, it
seems quite possible to discern the ef-
fects of liberalism in the mismanage-
ment of this one.

People are not rejecting liberalism,
though, merely for the peripheral part
of its tradition bearing on foreign af-
fairs. It is also being rejected at its
core. Very few citizens any longer be-
lieve the current batch of national
problems can be solved by domestic
policies emphasizing big spending.
Federal bureaucracy and liberal emo-
tions. Indeed, many citizens are start-
ing to suspect that these policies often
make the problems worse.

That suspicion is the reason law and
order has become such a powerful po-
litical issue. It is a liberal Administra-
tion that has presided over not only ris-
ing crime rates but the explosion in the
cities and the unruly deterioration in
public discourse. Many of us believe
this is not mere coincidence.

The Supreme Court has carried re-
form of the criminal process beyond
correcting demonstrable injustices; its
majority pursues abstract liberalism
for its own sake. In public debate the
loud dissenters are steeped in the liber-
al creed. For fear of betraying its
"commitment," a liberal Administra-
tion hesitated with the forceful actions
that might have nipped the spread of

riots. Even after the Administration
had absorbed that lesson, other liber-
als apologized for the rioters and an-
nounced that the real culprits are all
those who proclaim their racism by
wearing a white skin. When the prob-
lem is a decline in public order, is it
unrealistic to conclude that these atti-
tudes will not help?

More broadly, the heavily materi-
elistic underpinnings of New Deal lib-
eralism no longer move many voters.
The tax-spend-elect formula does not
work so perfectly in an age of growing
affluence and growing sophistication.
Too many people feel the taxes; too
many people have learned the mean-
ing of inflation.

As material wants are filled, also,
people will turn to other issues and oth-
er concerns. We find it unfortunate
that so many labor union voters are se-
duced by the appeal of George Wal-
lace, but it certainly means they are
going beyond bread-and-butter issues.
The creative politician will be the one
who takes them even further, who
shows them their non-material con-
cerns can be expressed in a more re-
sponsible way.

Before such challenges, liberalism
can think of nothing better than to fall
back on materialistic appeals and ma-
terialistic answers. Faced with George
Wallace, the labor union bosses babble
about low wages in Alabama. Faced
with the moral implications of the law
and order issue, Hubert Humphrey pa-
thetically offers a "massive" dose of
Federal aid. Their appeals sound em-
try because their creed has grown irrel-
evant to today.

Liberalism finds its old appeals fal-
tering, then, just as it comes under
powerful attack for its management of
both foreign affairs and domestic pol-
icy. If present form holds, that will be
the meaning of the 1968 election. Natu-
rally we do not know how the forces in-
volved will finally work themselves
out. Present form may not hold on
election day. Even if it does, how much
of a watershed the election will prove
depends on the skill and luck of the in-
coming Administration.

One thing we do know, however.
The reasons liberalism is in trou-
ble are ones its critics have long predict-
ed. The naive view of man, the search
for frantic short-cuts, the devotion to
commitment ahead of effectiveness
the exclusive materialism. All these
are no happensan e Liberalism is
collapsing not by chance or bad luck. It
is collapsing under its own deficien-
cies.

In both Republicans and a right-
ward party running strong, many
are talking about a "swing to
right." We find it both more pre-
and more profound to talk about
lapse of the left.

some 35 years New Deal liber-
has been the prevailing intellec-
reed in this nation, embodied in
Democratic Party as the prevail-
 political force. Even allowing for
recovery by election day, that
democratic nominee should fall to
the Gallup poll suggests that
ant new tides are flowing not
in politics but in public thinking.
that have been the features of this
that has dominated political life?
time liberalism has come to
dependence on the powers of
government to solve nearly all
ems. This has stemmed from a
man holding that any evil he
is merely the result of his en-
ment, and that his innate good
released by the simple step of
him ample money, housing and
worldly goods. Thus, the liberal
has come to demand an almost
us "commitment" to using the
ment to uplift the poor; not so
as a way to help the unfortunate,
the answer to all the problems
ainkind.

reputation of this creed, of
it, is presently burdened with the
larity of Lyndon Johnson and
ministration. Since one of the
fonts of that unpopularity is the
Vietnam, some will argue that
arden is an unfair one. They will
that Mr. Johnson's war policy is
irrelevant to liberalism or a cor-
n of the tradition he inherited.

This argument is stressed by two
within liberalism itself. One
is the pacifists, the academics
other dissenters, but they have
been more than handmaidens to
entral liberal tradition carried by
in Roosevelt and his successors.
her group hopes to exploit for its
nature gain the myth of John F.
fly's "Camelot." Therefore it
to keep that myth untarnished by
Mr. Johnson 200% of the blame
 Vietnam.

it seems to us the blame rests
on both of those liberal Admin-
itions. In particular, it is difficult
to imagine a conservative Administra-
vating, as the Kennedy one did, a
had for the coup against South Vi-
rese President Ngo Dinh Diem.

William J. Stephens

The invitation from Robert Taylor, your President, to speak at this 74th Annual Meeting was indeed compelling. I am grateful that you selected your new neighbor to be on this platform. As you know, J&L has made a major investment in a new plant in Hennepin, erected in the corn fields of Illinois, at the big bend in the Illinois River, to serve the fast growing markets of the Midwest. We have faith that sometime in the future the "leaking faucet," which is my subject this morning, will be repaired. The topic of your case study on Wednesday afternoon, "How to Go Down the Drain Without Trying," could also well be used to illustrate my theme.

I suspect that no one in this audience has not, at one time or another, experienced the annoyance and the inconvenience of a "leaking faucet," and also the expense.

In dealing with a "leaking faucet," there seem to be three courses of action.

The first is to do nothing. The thought is that maybe the washer will adjust itself and the leak will go away. When this does not happen, after a lapse of time, depending upon the degree of

1

annoyance and the cost of the wasted water, the
faucet is finally repaired.

The second course of action is to turn the tap
with a bit of extra pressure, perhaps damaging the
threads a little. This stops the leak, until the faucet
is used again, and the process is repeated. Re-
peated enough times the leak becomes a steady
flow.

The third alternative is to face the fact that the
faucet leaks—the leak will not go away by itself,
and the only remedy is to install a new washer and
effectively stop the leak.

Now it might strike this audience as strange that
I have used such an everyday situation to illus-
trate a serious subject of national importance, and
that is the future, long-range, competitive position
of the United States in world trade.

Our antiquated international economic and
trade policies are the cause of the "leaking faucet"
and what is going down the drain, what is leaking
away, is our surplus balance of world trade. The
despairing aspect of this situation is the lack of
response on the part of our government officials
who are charged with this area of responsibility.
They act as if there were no leak, notwithstanding
official government figures which indicate other-
wise.

The favorable experience of the past thirty
years shows we have enjoyed a continuous balance
of trade surplus, on a cumulative trade account of
merchandise exports and imports, totalling $467
billion and $324 billion respectively. Since 1937 we
have been the world's leading trader. Our annual
world exports have grown from $3.4 billion to
$30.9 billion. In the performance and pursuit of
this trade, the United States has also assisted other
countries to reach new levels of economic growth
and development. New channels have been opened
for other areas of American commercial activity

2

abroad. Pestilence, blight and disease have been
reduced; the burden of hunger has been lightened.
The Free World has been strengthened in its abil-
ity to provide an economic and political alternative to communism. This is a record of which we
can be proud, one which seemingly serves as a
striking illustration of your meeting's theme—
"Progress Through Change."

Indeed, on the strength of this record, coupled
with that of our domestic economic performance,
it is easy to understand the optimistic attitude, pre-
vailing in many influential quarters of the United
States, which sees no serious challenge to the
future international economic posture of our
country. This optimistic attitude is not unlike the
feeling of security and the sense of pride in eco-
nomic accomplishment enjoyed by Great Britain
in the past century, those days when "the sun
never set on the British Empire." The country
which was once the world's leading industrial and
political power today finds itself reduced to a po-
sition of secondary influence, fighting through a
mire of economic and trade problems equal to
the challenge of the famed Gordian knot.

It was a sad but honest day, when Prime Min-
ister Wilson announced to the British people and
to the world, on January 16 of this year, his inten-
tion to make devaluation work:

Because until we do, until we are earn-
ing, year in, year out, a substantial surplus
on our overseas payments, we are unable in-
ternally or externally to do all the things
which as a nation we would like to do. But
what this means for the immediate future
is to insure that we cut down our demands
and our ambitions at home and abroad with-
in the limits of what we can currently earn.

Of course, the rise and fall of the British Em-
pire was conditioned upon a great many forces,
but Great Britain's failure to maintain a com-

K

3

demanding and competitive position in world trade figured significantly in her inability to maintain an international position of political leadership and economic solvency.

What happened to Great Britain could happen to the United States. We have no assurance that we can, in the future, achieve a favorable balance of trade as long as the "leaking faucet" lets our surplus trade balance escape down the drain.

We must stop the leak.

Now the United States has maintained an envi-
able balance of trade surplus over these many
years. Will this continue? An affirmative answer is
not assured. In recent years, even though the vol-
ume of trade has continued to grow, our balance
of trade surplus has been shrinking along with our
competitive position in world markets. Mr. Archie
M. Andrews, Deputy Director of the Bureau of
International Commerce for the U. S. Department
of Commerce, laid the problem on the line re-
cently when he said:

Simply stated, the principal problems of
international trade facing this country are:
(1) a declining share of world markets and
(2) a shrinking trend in our trade surplus.

Let's go to the records to get the facts. In just
ten years, our share of free world exports to for-
eign markets has dropped from 23.8 per cent in
1957 to 19.3 per cent in 1967. This is a 19 per
cent loss in market participation. Thus, even
though our exports have reached new dollar rec-
ords for the past four years, they are not keeping
pace with the growth of the world market. U. S.
exports have increased 58 per cent from 1960 to
1967, but, and this is an important "but," they
have not kept pace with the growth rate of our
imports. Imports increased 79 per cent in this
same period. This accounts for our vanishing
trade surplus. Just look at some of our major com-
petitors during this seven-year period. As against

4

our 58 per cent increase in exports, France in-
creased 68 per cent; Germany, 90 per cent; Italy,
139 per cent; and Japan, 158 per cent.

Now I hasten to assure you I will not devote
our time in presenting statistics. We all know sta-
tistics are not unlike a bikini. What they show is
exciting—what they conceal is vital!

You see, the alarming point is this—we are
dealing with sustained trends and not with spo-
radic annual fluctuations. The faucet has long
since started to leak. One has only to look at the
record for the last eighteen months to see that
this decline in our international market participa-
tion has gained momentum. We are told that the
value of our total merchandise imports last year
was $26.8 billion and that of our total merchan-
dise exports was $30.9 billion. This gives us a
balance of trade surplus of $4.1 billion according
to government figures.

Here we must "stop, look and listen" and not
be misled. When we adjust this balance of trade
—imports and exports—to exclude those items
which are government financed, in other words—
the non-commercial exports which earn no for-
eign exchange on current account, the acclaimed
$4.1 billion surplus is reduced to $9.7 million.
Now most of our major trading partners include
the cost of freight and insurance in the accounting
of their balance of trade. If we adjust our figures
on a comparable basis, then last year, the United
States would have run a balance of trade deficit
of $1.3 billion in a year when the U. S. balance of
payments deficit was $3.8 billion. You now see
that a large favorable merchandise trade balance
can be acclaimed, under present official account-
ing practices, by the simple expedient of increas-
ing foreign aid at the expense of the taxpayer's
pocketbook, and also by accounting for the cost
of freight and insurance as we do. I refer you to
"Alice in Wonderland" for the details.

5

Simply stated, a realistic favorable merchandise balance in trade can only be achieved if what this country sells abroad is more than what we buy from abroad. We must look at the figures, without the use of the "Looking Glass" currently employed in Washington for doing so.

The biggest blows to our trade account have occurred in the first half of this year. For the first time since early in 1963, the United States ran a monthly trade deficit. This was not a single occurrence, as the Administration had hoped; this has occurred three times in the last four months during this period. According to the Department of Commerce, the U. S. foreign trade performance in the second quarter of this year was the poorest since the end of World War II. During this quarter, the United States sustained a "real" (their quotes, not mine) trade deficit of $2.2 billion at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. If I may borrow from the third chapter of the Book of Romans, "God forbid that it continue."

It may be by this time you have concluded that I'm about to make "a pitch," and urge all the members of the Central Supply Association to buy and sell only products made in the United States. No such thing. Such an appeal would indicate that I had completely ignored the realities of the market place and should not be taken seriously. The overall import problem on all products cannot be solved solely by "waving the flag." That is like giving the faucet a bit of extra pressure, which gradually will damage the threads and cause a larger leak when the faucet is used again.

I would also make clear that our nation's import problem is not confined to steel alone. It is true that steel mill products constitute a large leak—a trade deficit of $900 million last year, $1.5 billion this year; but even so, steel accounted for only five per cent of the merchandise imported over the last eighteen months.

6

I said earlier what is going down the drain is our surplus balance of world trade. The leak is growing larger with the passage of time. Total U. S. imports are currently running at a growth rate which is more than three times that of exports. The United States is beginning to feel the initial effects of a broad-based change in the competitive conditions of world trade. From a commercial point of view, this is not an attractive prospect. From a monetary point of view it makes the balance of payments problem of the United States that much more difficult to solve. This country has relied for many years on a strong trade position to offset chronic deficits in other accounts in our balance of payments.

The change in our competitive position with respect to the composition of imports is most disturbing. In recent years, there has been a steady but decisive shift from imports of raw materials to imports of manufactured goods. The National Industrial Conference Board reports that the ratios of these two groups to total imports in 1955 were 25 per cent raw materials and 23 per cent manufactured goods. This is in contrast to our experience last year when raw materials dropped to 15 per cent, and manufactured goods increased to 46 per cent. This is a serious reversal and should not be lightly regarded. It means that an ever-increasing amount of our dollars spent for imports is providing more jobs and job opportunities abroad.

With this changing import pattern to a larger percentage of manufactured goods we are indeed exporting jobs. Let me explain—when we sell $1,000,000 of soy beans for export we have provided employment to the extent of a $40,000 payroll. When we import $1,000,000 of cold rolled sheet steel, we have, in terms of our labor costs, foregone a $350,000 payroll. We have bought and sold $1,000,000 worth of goods. In this exchange our labor force received $40,000,

7

but gave up $350,000 worth of labor in the ex-
change. I call that "one horse—one rabbit."

Of the four basic categories which account for most U. S. trade (consumer goods, capital goods, industrial materials, and food), there has been a tremendous surge of imports in both capital equipment and consumer goods. For example—last year for the first time, we had a trade deficit in machine tools. I need not remind you that these are important markets which are now beginning to feel the effect of import competition. Furthermore, these are the areas in which the United States has relied on our technological superiority to provide a special and unchallenged competitive position in world trade.

Looking ahead, I do not see any likelihood of a sustained reversal of these national foreign trade trends without the complete rethinking and overhaul of many of our international economic programs and trade policies. We are fast running out of time to attend to the "leaking faucet," and yet Washington seems unconcerned. I believe we will not be able to rely in the future, with the same certainty as in the past, on our Yankee ingenuity and our technological superiority, to assure the United States the number one position in world commerce, and I do not believe that I am being overly pessimistic.

Severe domestic inflation, one of our "hard core" domestic problems, will seriously impair our international competitive position with respect to both imports and exports. The skids are now greased for additional imports, while the brakes are being applied on exports. Our present fiscal and monetary policies fall far short of being able to cope with this problem. The economies of other countries, largely through the assistance of the United States, either have, or are in the process of developing, a broad-based and efficient industrial infrastructure which enables them to compete

8

vigorously for world markets. Growing inter-
national industrial parity will make it increasingly
difficult, even impossible, in some product lines
for the greater U. S. productivity to offset lower
wage costs abroad.

And finally, many of the political-economic policies of our major trading partners, and other countries as well, are on a direct collision course with those of the United States. These conditions are the waves which are changing the competitive tides of the world trade. Such things as an 11-day dock strike, inventory hedge-buying, and the like, are merely the whitecaps on already troubled waters.

The response of our own government to this situation has been remarkable indeed. Exercising fully their genius for inaction, government officials must have demonstrable proof that there is, in fact, a problem before they move off dead center. Demonstrable proof usually means a crisis. The Administration then wonders why industry after industry appeared at the recent Congressional hearings on foreign trade asking for consideration of its trade problems and relief of same. To add insult to injury, these industries are denounced as self-seeking protectionists and competitive "drop-outs," threatening the ruination of America's position in world trade.

If there is a threat to this country's position in
world trade, then the responsibility for this threat
lies not with those industries seeking solutions to
import and other trade problems, but with the
United States Government. The inclination to pur-
sue "the primrose path of dalliance," along with
its failure to provide a foreign trade policy which
is imaginative and pragmatic, makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for this nation to continue to
achieve the general foreign trade goals of which
we have been so proud.

There is something vitally wrong when Japan

9

can become the world's second largest producer of automobiles, and still claim her industry needs protection, because it is not yet strong enough to meet the challenge of international competition.

Recently The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association proudly announced that for the first six months of 1968 their passenger car exports to the United States increased 61 per cent over the same period last year. There is a reason for this. An exporter of cars from the United States to Japan faces a 17.5 per cent tariff as well as a commodity tax averaging 35 per cent. In comparison, an importer of Japanese cars to our country is accountable only for a 5.5 per cent tariff and a 7 per cent manufacturers' excise tax.

There is something vitally wrong when foreign steel producing countries not only expect, but also demand, free and unlimited access to the steel markets of the United States, while they continue to protect their own markets against steel made in the United States. If we ship $100 worth of pipe to France, we pay in transportation, tariff and taxes a total of $95.72. These same cost items total $40.00 on pipe coming the other way. Thus, our disadvantage is $55.72. On pipe to West Germany our disadvantage is $27.69, to Belgium $28.14, to Italy $22.71, and so it goes.

The strategy of our world trading partners is to erect non-tariff barriers in various ways. Their methods include, but are not limited to, the following:

<table><tr><td>Border Taxes</td><td>Special Steel Taxes</td></tr><tr><td>Import Licensing</td><td>Import Surcharges</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Quotas</td></tr><tr><td>Currency Exchange</td><td>Direct Prohibitions</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Loyalty Rebates</td></tr></table>

I think all of this is called a "restrictionist commercial policy." This is the scheme of our trading partners to appear to knock down the tariff walls,

10

and then to erect non-tariff barricades in their place.

I am not always in agreement with the views of Ambassador William M. Roth, our Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. However, in a speech in Atlanta last month, he included an observation with which I am in agreement. Steel industry spokesmen have been vocal on this part of the foreign trade problem for some time. I quote Ambassador Roth:

> The United States must continue to push hard—*very* hard—for equality of treatment and for genuinely open markets, particularly in the developed countries. We can no longer be the world's economic "Big Daddy." The access we give to our markets must be matched by the access others give us to theirs. It is not only trade that must flow both ways, but investment as well. Equally important, the rules of the game for all aspects of competition must be fair—and they must be observed by all the players.

In the last decade, steel imports have increased at an average annual rate of 25 per cent a year as a percentage of consumption, growing from 1.5 per cent to 12.2 per cent last year. Imports have absorbed more than one half of the domestic market growth, and this is cause for deep concern. This rapid increasing reliance on imported steel is clear to see; 12.2 per cent of consumption last year, perhaps 16 per cent this year—in 1972, if present trends continue, perhaps 30 per cent. No other significant steel producing country in the world allows steel imports to exceed much more than 5 per cent of consumption, and yet our foreign trading partners claim to operate under the banner of "free trade."

An article in the May 27 issue of *U. S. News & World Report* made this interesting observation "... the U. S. of 1968, in its financial position

11

and in its reputation, no longer ranks at the top
of the heap in the same way it did 20 years ago.

"One expert sees the U. S. today as an Atlas
who has become tired from carrying the entire
world on his back for too long.

"Another authority talks of the U. S. as a 're-
verse Horatio Alger—a nation which has gone
from riches to rags—with all the best intentions
in the world, but just an easy mark, a sucker to
nations wanting a free ride.'"

I sincerely believe that the time has come for
the United States to give up its antiquated ap-
proach to foreign trade. I am by no means sug-
gesting that the United States reverse its long-
standing objective to pursue the liberalization and
expansion of reciprocal trade. What I am sug-
gesting is that, as Senator Russell Long put it,
we cease continuing to be "patsies" to the rest of
the world through our foreign trade policies. I
am also suggesting that this generation is respon-
sible to the next, and that the shift in competitive
conditions in world trade today raises five imme-
diate questions for which we are answerable.

First, how would a long-term adverse shift in
the competitive position of the United States in
world trade affect the balance of power and the
ability of this country to maintain its status of
leadership? We saw what happened to Great
Britain.

Second, what impact will the acceleration of
political-economic regional complexes, such as the
emergence of the powerful European Economic
Community, have on the competitive position of
the United States in world markets? Is our foreign
economic policy equal to the challenge of the
regional coalitions?

Third, how do we improve the responsiveness
of domestic and international fiscal and monetary
policies to the changing conditions in world trade?

Fourth, how can our foreign economic policy

12

be structured, so as to provide adequate and effec-
tive machinery to maximize our international in-
terests on one hand, and on the other, to facilitate
a healthy and immediate response to foreign trade
problems as they relate to our domestic economy?

Fifth, how should the relationship between
business and government evolve, both in the plan-
ning of our foreign economic policies and in de-
veloping solutions to foreign trade problems?

It is not my intention to cover ground in each
of these areas this morning. I have merely out-
lined for your consideration certain aspects of
foreign trade, which I think the United States will
be forced to pursue in dead earnest in the years
ahead.

It is not enough that we all know about the
problem and perhaps "view it with alarm." The
overall solution—long range—is that we must
become more competitive in world markets. This
calls for the use of a two-edged sword which I
will describe.

One edge—We must overcome the high labor
value content in our products. In doing so, we
must not jeopardize our high standard of living,
the envy of the world, supported by the highest
wage rate structure in the world. One answer is
a further increase in productivity, and that can
only come through the sincere combined efforts
of both labor and management. This is "easier
said than done." This means new investment in
new technology and new processes. Profit margins
must be increased to justify such investments. It
is not enough to just secure an offset in produc-
tivity to compensate for the rate at which employ-
ment costs are increasing. Industry should have
the opportunity to produce and to price according
to the need, without government interference.
You purchasing officials will determine whether
or not price increases will stick. You always have
made that determination.

13

The other edge—We must also obtain the full understanding of our government in matters of world trade. There must be quick action on major industry problems caused by dislocations in export and import trade. Our government must move away from its antiquated "one horse-one rabbit" policy, and secure for the farmers and industries of our country an equal world trading opportunity. We must find a way to discipline unfair competition. We do not have this today. The record book is full of inequities, favorable to the other side. It seems the exporter to the United States is helped by two governments—his government and ours. This must be corrected. If it cannot be corrected at the conference table, we should call off our "free trade" posture in those areas and look to our own self interest. To do other than this is like playing "Russian Roulette" with all the chambers in the gun loaded.

At stake is the future economic and political position of the United States in world affairs. History teaches very stern disciplines with respect to the balance of power. One lesson is clear. It is impossible for any nation to sustain a superiority of military-political strength without economic power. In short, one is handmaiden to the other. I suggest that we recognize this fact of life and realize that the importance of the role we can play in international affairs is in direct proportion to our world-wide economic strength.

The world balance of power is not as strongly weighted in our favor as it was twenty years ago. At that time we had a monopoly on the atomic bomb and our military superiority was unquestioned. Our advantage was decisive even five years ago. Today the Soviet Union might well be ahead of us in megaton capacity. Perhaps they will have missile parity with us in the next few years. Communist China within four years will no doubt have a significant deliverable nuclear capacity.

Defense Secretary Clifford indicated early last

month, that it is impossible to assure peace or peaceful co-existence unless the military superiority of the United States is maintained. We cannot risk lagging behind. It is also true that in our time, the ability of a nation to influence the balance of power requires an industrial base which is immediately flexible to change and technologically superior to that of our opponents. Its structure must contain offensive and defensive preparedness.

I ask: Is it realistic that a first class power, with global responsibilities, risk increasing reliance for an important part of its steel needs on sources thousands of miles away—sources lying in the shadow of Communist China and Soviet Russia? Steel meets more than 95 per cent of our nation's metal requirements.

Now steel is not the only industry that is important in our national defense posture and also has a major role in our trade balance. I can mention textiles, oil, machine tools, heavy electrical equipment, and many others. I talked more about steel because I know, first hand, the international implications.

We should not jeopardize the progress and growth of steel or any other of our defense related and essential civilian industries, as we are now doing, by exposing their domestic markets to unrestricted imports, while at the same time they are denied foreign markets through devious regulations and procedures. Nor should we expose other industries to unrestricted competition at home, and allow our trading partners to effectively "shut the door" to their products. It is not unreasonable that "free trade" policies should also embrace "fair trade" practices.

We must attack these underlying dangers to our national economic health posed from abroad unless we are willing to be satisfied with a thin veneer of prosperity. We must stimulate those re-

14

15

sponsible for our international trade policies and
make them realize that the only solution available
to us is "progress through change." Which brings
us back to the theme of your meeting.

I hope you are persuaded that the situation
needs attention, your attention. This matter of
trends in world trade and national policies must
be of inescapable concern to everyone, regardless
of the place they may occupy in our society. I
hope you are persuaded that our government has,
for too long, ignored the "leaking faucet." It will
not fix itself. Nor will a bit of extra pressure, in
turning the tap, do the job. We must face the fact
that the faucet is leaking badly and needs a new
washer. The faucet belongs to all of us and so
does the problem!

I thank you.

16

CABLE:
"CHINANEWS"
TAIPAI

TELEPHONES:
DIRECTOR: 22996
EDITORIAL: 22997
BUSINESS: 26607

471 Broadway
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
U. S. A.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I have learned from wire service of your appointment as national security assistant to the President-elect. I wish to offer my heartfelt congratulations.

The President-elect has acquired a valuable asset, but at the same time I hope neither Harvard nor the International Seminar will be losing anything.

I was really disappointed that the planned reunion in Rome fell through. I pray that we will be seeing each other again in the not too distant future.

I have just received your letter of November 22, asking for recommending applicants to the 1969 Seminar. I will write to you again on my recommendation.

With fond memory of my pleasant stay at Cambridge,

英文中國日報
台北市信義路二段一七七號

JAMES P. WARBURG

R.F.D. #3

GREENWICH, CONNECTICUT

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

February 17, 1969.

The Honorable Henry A.Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you for your letter of the 6th. Should you have time to read my paper -- which I hardly expect -- I should be very much interested to learn whether you find any merit in the suggestions it contains. Its main thrust is directed to recapturing from the military-industrial complex the control of our nation's foreign policy and the first step in that direction is, in my judgment, the avoidance of further stimulating the arms race by junking the ABM system, at least until the Administration has a chance to explore with the Soviet Union what can be done to throw the spiral into reverse.

I am helping to organize a Businessmen's Committee on National Priorities which will, I hope, help in this direction. When and if ever you are sufficiently out of the woods, I should very much like to talk to you about this and other foreign policy problems. Meanwhile, my best wishes to you in carrying out your most challenging assignment, compared to which the task of Hercules was child's play.

For the first time since 1947, I have a sense of impending change from obsolete assumptions and policies.

RECEIVED
MAR 5 1969
CENTRAL FILES

DEC 11 1968

JAMES P. WARBURG
30 N. E. ELEVENTH WAY
DEERFIELD BEACH, FLORIDA
305 - 399 - 4703

December 8, 1968.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I do not know whether you are to be congratulated
on your new and challenging assignment, but, based upon
what I know of your writings, I should say that our
country is to be congratulated.

As one who has long contended that our whole concept
of foreign policy needs re-thinking, I welcome your appoint-
ment as a good augury. The enclosed pamphlet was written
recently in the hope of helping to create support for the
thorough-going re-examination which I now feel sure will
be undertaken. It was sent to the President-elect with the
enclosed letter early last month as well as to a few others
who seemed likely to advise him on foreign policy. Next
week I shall send it to each member of the 91st Congress.

If you have any suggestions as to how a second
edition might be improved, I should welcome them. If there
is any other way in which I might be of help, please feel
free to call upon me. I say this because there may well
be parts of this paper that you would like to see further
developed or eliminated, depending upon where you think
the emphasis should lie. I have raised rather than tried
to answer the question: "What do we want the role of the
United States to be in world affairs?"

With every good wish,

CO East 42nd Street
New York, N. Y. 10017
212-867-2815

203-869-1977
203-661-7047

JAMES P. WARBURG
JOHN STREET
GREENWICH, CONNECTICUT 06830

November 19, 1968.

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon, President-elect,
Hotel Pierre,
New York City.

Dear Mr. President-elect:

First of all, congratulations and best wishes!

Although I have been a lifelong Democrat ever since I
was privileged to work for President Roosevelt, I have been
an outspoken dissenter from much of our nation's foreign
policy during the past twenty years. President Eisenhower,
more truly a man of peace, in my judgment, than any other
postwar President, was kind enough to write to me in 1956:

"While, as you are aware, I don't always agree with
you, I am quite cognizant of the very considerable public
service you render by your efforts to further intelligent
consideration of the basic issues that confront us all."

It is in this spirit that the enclosed pamphlet has been
prepared; that is, in the hope of helping to bring all Americans
together in support of the long-overdue re-examination of our
nation's foreign policy which I am sure you will undertake.
I should welcome criticism from those whom you may choose as
your foreign policy advisors and shall gladly be at their
disposal for discussion, if desired. I shall begin by sending
the paper to Bob Murphy for whose wisdom I have the highest
regard. Later, it is my intention to send the pamphlet to the
members of the 91st Congress as well as to leadership groups
and non-governmental citizen organizations.

As stated in the foreword, the paper raises, rather than
attempts to answer, some of the fundamental questions with
which all Americans should be concerned.

With every good wish and assurances of my high esteem,

Enclosure: "Wanted -- A New American Approach to Peace."

A Word of Explanation.

This paper raises rather than answers certain fundamental
questions. It is not a blueprint for a new American foreign policy.
Essentially, it does little more than ask:

*Do we know what we want the role of the United States to be
in the affairs of the world beyond our borders?*

*If our aim is what we say it is, to help create a world of law,
why has so much of our foreign policy run counter to that aim?*

Many of us are troubled about the trends in our own society;
about the things that are taught, and not taught, in our schools and
colleges; about poverty in the midst of our great affluence; about
race prejudice and discrimination—not in South Africa but here
at home; about lawlessness in our supposedly law-abiding society;
and about the recent undemocratic workings of our own democratic
processes. Must not we ordinary citizens ask ourselves whether
we really believe that what we call “the American Way of Life” is
suitable for export to other parts of the world?

This question relates not only to our government's foreign
policy but to the attitude of its representatives abroad and of
private American citizens, be they businessmen enthusiastically
exporting American technology and management "know-how", or
bankers and corporation managers arranging for the investment of
American capital. The question relates even to American tourists
abroad. It reads:

*Are we here to try to understand and possibly help solve the
problems of other people, or are we here to "sell" America?*

Whatever the motivation for American interest in other
countries, pragmatic common sense suggests that the aims of our
government and of private American enterprise abroad can be
attained only if American policy and behavior are such as to cause
Americans to be welcomed as friends, rather than viewed as
powerful movers and shakers in a world which, on the whole,
wishes to be shaken by its own impulses and moved by its own
power.

To what extent does our government's present foreign policy
fulfill these requirements? How can it be re-shaped to fulfill
them more effectively?

JAMES P. WARBURG

Greenwich, Connecticut.

November, 1968.

CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>PAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I. FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;American Postwar Leadership</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Military-Industrial Complex</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;How to Regain Control</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>II. MISTAKES OF THE PAST</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One Irreversible Error</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Failure to Apply Common Knowledge to World Organization</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Brief Sketch of Half-forgotten History</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Precarious Existence of the United Nations</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;America's Share of Responsibility</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Costly Straddle between Three Approaches to Peace</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>III. ESSENTIALS OF A NEW APPROACH</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Ultimate Aims</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Psychological Obstacles</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;1. The Myth of Sovereignty</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;2. Would Russia Cooperate?</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;China</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Three Partitioned Nations</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The Need for Over-all Revision</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Intervention</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The U. S. as a Supplier of Arms</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>IV. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Steps Toward Charter Revision</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Peace-Keeping and Peace-Making</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Control of Arms Traffic</td><td>26</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A United Nations Development Authority</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>V. THE RICH AND THE POOR NATIONS</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>VI. IMMEDIATE GOALS</td><td>31</td></tr></tbody></table>

# I.

## FOREIGN POLICY OUT OF THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL

A growing number of Americans—and especially young Americans—have lost confidence in their government's foreign policy and in the processes by which it is shaped. Their distrust does not arise solely from a sense of having been betrayed with respect to the war in Vietnam or from their opposition to what seems to them a senseless, costly and immoral adventure in a distant land. Their malaise grows out of a deeper suspicion that the nation's foreign policy has escaped from democratic control—from a conviction that this policy is no longer relevant to the needs and true interests of the American people nor consistent with the beliefs and principles upon which the nation was founded.

Over and above these feelings, there is a growing awareness among Americans that, in spite of their government's vast expenditures for "national defense", there is no security for them or for their children—that the tide of events may be out of control and sweeping the entire world toward disaster.

It is not enough to lament this state of affairs. It is time to do something about it. There could be no better time than now, under a new administration, for the American people to regain control of their ship of state and to bring about a change of course.

*From whom* must they regain control? What force or forces have shaped the nation's foreign policy since the day when the last great war ended with the blossoming of two mushroom clouds over Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Broadly speaking, the answer is two-fold: (1) from the relatively small leadership group which guided the nation to victory in war and then failed to guide it to peace; and (2) from a new and powerful force which inhibits change of direction.

### American Postwar Leadership

Four postwar Presidents and their mostly war-trained advisors have, broadly speaking, adhered to a foreign policy adopted at a time when a victorious and invulnerable United States held supreme power and when the chief if not the sole threat to peace appeared to be the aggressive expansionism of a Moscow-directed

One

communist monolith extending from Central Europe to the shores
of the Pacific.

Since then, the communist monolith has disintegrated; empires
have dissolved; new nations have been born; the "revolution of
rising expectations" has swept the world; and nuclear war between
two armed giants threatens not only the peace of the world but
its survival. Military force has lost its force as an instrument of
policy. Diplomacy directed toward coexistence, arms control and
disarmament has become the imperative of foreign policy. And
yet, beyond sporadic, feeble and half-hearted efforts to obey this
imperative, American foreign policy has neither revised its essen-
tially negative aim (of containing communism) nor given up its
reliance upon military power.

Both American and Soviet leaders have tragically proven the
truth of Albert Einstein's wistful remark that "everything has
changed except man's mode of thinking."

So far as the United States is concerned, this failure to adjust
to altered circumstance is due at least in part to the creation of
a political force which acts as a brake upon change.

The Military-Industrial Complex

In order to achieve victory, the American government had
quite deliberately—and quite properly—created and fostered vast
industries to supply the weapons of war required by the Armed
Forces of the United States and its Allies. Because of the failure
to achieve peace, these industries were neither dismantled nor
converted at the conclusion of the war. On the contrary, the
demands of the generals and admirals for newer and ever more
powerful weapons caused the war industries to flourish with
renewed vigor and made them into a powerful force in the nation's
economy. It does not take long for a powerful economic force to
acquire political power.

An old soldier, one of the chief architects of victory in war,
was one of the first to recognize the danger of "a disastrous rise
of misplaced power." In his Farewell Address to the American
people, on January 17, 1961, President Eisenhower said:

"In the Councils of Government we must guard against the
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought,

Two

by the military-industrial complex. . . We must never let the
weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel
the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery
of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security
and liberty may prosper together."

The warning went unheeded, partly because the American
people were neither alert nor knowledgeable. They were not alert
because they were, on the whole, extremely prosperous and because
a large portion of their prosperity derived from the government-
controlled war-industries sector of the economy, which came to
employ something like 10% of the nation's labor force. They
were not knowledgeable partly because knowledge was concealed
from them or, if not concealed, made available only in statistics
that were meaningless to the average citizen. Above all, they were
not knowledgeable because they did not realize that the military-
industrial complex had become a powerful political force—a force
which had become a factor in perpetuating the cold war and the
global commitments of the United States, in stimulating the inven-
tion, introduction and expansion of new weapons systems, and in
blocking the road toward arms control and a de-escalation of the
arms race.

Few if any of the participants in this complex are aware of
its impact. Industrialists, businessmen, labor leaders, workers,
scientists, academicians, and even the military men do not want
war. Most of them ardently desire peace. Yet, because their live-
lihoods depend so largely upon preparation for war, they have
become a powerful lobby that supports any and all military appro-
priations, diverting the nation's resources and the nation's brains
from the quest for peace.

The Defense Budget is the Achilles heel of the military-
industrial-scientific-academic complex. The American people have
it in their power to insist upon a drastic reduction of so-called
defense expenditures. There is ample evidence—much of it from
the Defense Department's own experts—to prove that the United
States possesses more than enough weapons and weapons-systems
to deter attack by any nation that is not ready to commit suicide.

Three

The Congress knows this to be true. It knows, for example, that the Sentinel Antiballistic Missile System for which it has recently appropriated several hundred million dollars is unnecessary, of doubtful effectiveness and almost certain to spur a renewed and highly dangerous escalation of the spiralling arms race. A substantial number of members in both Houses voted against it. Why, then, did the majority approve the measure?

The answer is that Congressmen, too, have acquired a vested interest in the over-production of armaments. Defense plants and related businesses provide profitable contracts and gainful employment wherever they are located. Hence, Congressmen struggle to have them established in their constituencies and the familiar process of log-rolling sets in. Since only a relatively small number of states have received the major benefits from the location of war industries, one might think that the majority of Senators and Congressmen would be sharply critical of the continuously rising defense expenditures. The fact that relatively few have been outspokenly critical is due to the absence of support for such criticism from their constituents, most of whom have considered and still consider it "unpatriotic" to oppose any appropriation for national defense. (This is part of the Stephen Decatur syndrome —"My country, right or wrong"—an attitude which we rightly condemned in the Germans at the Nuremberg Trials.)

## How to Regain Control

Once the American people realize that it is "unpatriotic" to permit the nation's resources to be wasted on arms expenditure that is not only unnecessary but actually counter-productive in terms of assuring the nation's security, their representatives in Washington will soon reflect their awakened common sense. This is how the American people can recapture control of their nation's foreign policy from the octopus which keeps that policy frozen in the pattern of the cold war.

General Eisenhower was right in saying that "only an alert and informed citizenry" could restore foreign policy to the democratic process. Unfortunately, however, the problem is not quite that simple. The democratic process of policy formation, as we know it in this country, is a process of accommodation among conflicting special interest groups, such as organized labor, the farm

Four

bloc, associations of manufacturers, importers, exporters, veterans'
associations, and a host of others. In this process of accommoda-
tion, political power meets countervailing power until some sort of
compromise is reached. The difficulty with respect to the military-
industrial complex is that it marshals a greater array of political
power than any other single interest or group of interests. There-
fore, power can be taken from the complex *only from within*. This
will occur only when a clear majority of the innocent participants
in the political juggernaut are able to see where their true interest
lies; in other words, when workers, farmers, union leaders, busi-
nessmen and even arms manufacturers recognize that peace in the
Nuclear Age cannot be achieved by preparation for war—that it
can be achieved only through the abolition of war.

This having been said, we must bear in mind that the military-
industrial complex has not been and is not the originator of foreign
policy; it has been and is the perpetuator of a policy which, what-
ever its original merit, has now become obsolete and irrelevant.
Recapturing control by emasculating the perpetuating force is only
the first necessary step, beyond which it is necessary to review
past and present foreign policy, to recognize its shortcomings and,
where possible, to remedy them.

II.
MISTAKES OF THE PAST
One Irreversible Error

There is one mistake which cannot be undone, the effects of
which can be remedied only in the context of actions to be
discussed presently.

The United States bears the sole responsibility for the in itself
questionable decision, in August 1944, to use the then newly-
discovered atomic weapon against Japan, and to use it without
prior disclosure of its existence to the Soviet Union and—worse—
without realizing the need for keeping the genie in the bottle of
supranational control.

The latter need was recognized two years later, when the
United States proposed, under the so-called Baruch Plan, to sur-
render its atomic monopoly to supranational control—an imagi-
native proposal amounting to nothing less than the establishment

Five

of world government in the limited sphere of atomic energy
development. By this time, however, a wide rift had already
opened between the Soviet Union and the West and a suspicious
Stalin rejected the overture. Had President Truman, two years
earlier, followed the wise counsel of his Secretary of War, Henry
L. Stimson, it is possible that a nuclear arms race might never
have developed and that we should now be living in a very
different kind of world.*

What might have been is of interest only in a consideration of
what may still be, if other still remediable errors of the past are
recognized and corrected.

It has long been known, even before the advent of the Nuclear
Age, that the advance of science and technology was rapidly
making the world indivisible; that national governments, no matter
how powerful, could no longer fulfill the basic reason for their
existence, namely, to guarantee the security and reasonable well-
being of their respective peoples; and that a world of fully-sovereign
nation-states would eventually become a world of anarchy in which
each successive outburst of violence would become more savage
and more devastating than the last.

It has also long been common knowledge that, through the
centuries, mankind has not been able to devise any method of
restraining violence and maintaining order within any city, state
or nation other than the method of establishing a government
capable of enacting, interpreting and enforcing law.

Yet, with the exception of the belated American proposal for
the supranational control of atomic energy, this common knowl-
edge has not been applied to any of the attempts made to organize
the world for peace.

* Stimson had approved the use of the atomic bombs but had second thoughts a month after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. His memorandum of September 11, 1944, later published in his memoir, *On Active Duty in Peace and War*, warned Truman against talking to Russia "with the atomic bomb on our hip", foreseeing that this might drive Stalin into a frenzied attempt to break the American monopoly. By 1946, it was too late.

Six

There was not under the League of Nations nor is there today
under the United Nations a supranational government empowered
to enact and enforce law upon the hitherto fully sovereign nation-
states. There was and is no world law to prevent the nation-
states from arming themselves with whatever weapons they might
choose—no law to prevent them from attacking each other or
trespassing upon each other’s rights. There was and is no tribunal
to which the nation-states are required to submit their disputes for
adjudication, and no supranational police force to compel com-
pliance.

The United Nations Charter, like the earlier Covenant of the
League of Nations, is merely a compact or multilateral treaty
between sovereign nation-states in which they have made certain
promises to each other—promises which, if broken, cannot be
enforced against any of the major member-nations. The United
Nations as at present constituted has only a rudimentary legislature
which cannot enact law—a legislature in which each member-state
has an equal vote, irrespective of its size, population, power or
importance. The United Nations has a tribunal without compulsory jurisdiction, a Security Council paralyzed by the veto-right
of five member-states, and no police force to compel compliance.

In short, the United Nations lacks precisely those institutions
of government which experience has shown to be necessary for
the maintenance of order and the preservation of peace. How did
this come about?

## Brief Sketch of Half-forgotten History

Relatively few Americans now living recall that the term,
“United Nations”, when first employed in 1942, did not denote
a world organization to be created in place of the defunct League
of Nations; that, on the contrary, it was used to describe collectively the members of the anti-Axis coalition in World War II. In
those days, the three allied leaders were not thinking of a universal
world organization; they were thinking of peace enforcement by
a continuing alliance of the victorious nations, among whom dominant power was to reside in those nations which had made the
greatest contribution to victory. These would obviously be the
United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt

Seven

asked that China be included in the directorate and France was
added at the insistence of Churchill. Thus was born the concept
which developed into a United Nations Security Council domi-
nated by five permanent members whose unanimous approval was
required for any enforcement action.

This concept of organizing the peace clearly meant that power
would not rest in the peoples of the world but in national govern-
ments, and not in all national governments but only in those who
had participated in defeating the Axis, among whom five were to
be predominant. This was a far cry from the creation of a uni-
versal world organization.

Although President Roosevelt had certain universalist ideas, as
witness his proclamation of the "Four Freedoms" for all of man-
kind, his worldmindedness was tempered by political pragmatism
directed toward avoiding a repudiation such as Wilson had suffered
in proposing American participation in the League of Nations.
Moreover, Roosevelt was too much of a nationalist to subordinate
much of American sovereignty to supranational organization. The
same was true of Stalin, whom Secretary Hull persuaded with
some difficulty to accept even Roosevelt's plan.

The weakness of the "Big Five" concept was, of course, that
it rested upon an assumption all too soon to be invalidated;
namely, the assumption that the wartime coalition would hang
together. However, the disintegration of the coalition was not
yet apparent when Roosevelt issued his instructions to the pre-
liminary charter-drafting meeting at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944.
These instructions included the explicit statement that the Security
Council "must have the power to act quickly and decisively, by
force if necessary" and that "it must be endowed in advance with
authority to act." This view was not shared by John Foster Dulles,
advisor at the time to Governor Dewey and to the Republican
members of the bipartisan drafting group which Roosevelt had
appointed. Dulles expressed the following view:

The plan to impose peace presupposes a political unity of
the great powers which has rarely existed and which, if it
prevails, will itself assure peace . . . The force proposals
are little more than scenery.

Eight

By the time the members of the victorious coalition met a year
later at San Francisco, Roosevelt was dead and, with him, had
died what hope there had been for continued friendly East-West
cooperation. Nevertheless, the Charter was drawn and signed on
the optimistic assumption that cooperation would continue.

Mr. Dulles did not draw the conclusion that the rule of Big
Five unanimity would have to be abolished if the Security Council
was to be effective. He, no less than the Soviet representatives,
wanted the great-power veto, as, indeed, did the other members
of the American delegation. Mr. Dulles was not concerned with
putting teeth into the enforcement powers of the Council. Instead,
he worked diligently to transfer the task of peace-keeping from the
Security Council to regional military organizations. It was he who
drafted Article 51 of the Charter which, as he later put it in his
book*, "permits regional military alliances to develop within the
Charter but outside of the veto."

The results of the adoption of Article 51 were far-reaching, not
only in their effect upon the United Nations but in their effect upon
the foreign policy of the major powers, and especially upon the
subsequent foreign policy of the United States and the Soviet
Union. Instead of being forced to iron out their differences in the
United Nations, the two major antagonists were enabled to pursue
their conflicting objectives through regional alliances, which grad-
ually came to confront each other in different parts of the world.

Some of the regional alliances created under Article 51 are
moribund, such as Mr. Dulles' CENTO alliance in the Middle
East; others have served as instruments for American or Soviet
intervention. OAS (the Organization of American States) has
provided cover for United States military intervention in Latin
America, notably in Guatemala, Cuba and the Dominican Repub-
lic. SEATO (Dulles' Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) has
provided one of several excuses for United States intervention in
Vietnam. The Warsaw Pact Alliance has provided cover for Soviet
military intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is evident
that Article 51 has undermined the authority of the Security
Council, especially since Article 53, which prohibits action by
regional alliances without Security Council approval, has been
flagrantly disregarded.

* J. F. Dulles; War and Peace; Macmillan, N. Y.; 1950.

Nine

The adoption of Article 51 was, however, only one manifestation of the tendency of the Big Five to pursue their aims outside of the peace-keeping organization which they had created. Thus, although they had organized the Security Council as a "Victors' Club," the military occupation of the former enemy countries was undertaken without reference to the Security Council and the negotiation of the peace treaties was delegated to a Council of Foreign Ministers created for that purpose.

A feature of the San Francisco Conference which seems strange in retrospect was that the founders of the United Nations seemed almost unaware of the explosive nature of the anti-colonial revolution set off by Japan's defeat of the European powers in Asia. To be sure, a United Nations Trusteeship Council was set up, but this became little more than a facade behind which the colonial powers apparently expected to "carry on as usual" with respect to their colonial possessions. Britain's withdrawal from India, Burma and Ceylon in 1947 and the growing unrest in the French colonies in North Africa marked the beginning of a period of incredibly rapid "decolonization" and of the consequent admission of a host of new Afro-Asian nations to membership in the United Nations. By 1955, all the former Axis powers except Germany had likewise been admitted. By 1965, the United Nations had changed from a small, Western-dominated Victors' Club into something more nearly like a world organization from which only the unhappily partitioned countries of Germany, Korea and Vietnam were excluded, along with the People's Republic of China.

But, while the United Nations had become a world organization rapidly approaching universality, its inadequate institutional structure remained almost unchanged.

## The Precarious Existence of the United Nations

Under the League of Nations, collective security failed because of a lack of collective will on the part of a number of major powers to use the force at their disposal to resist aggression—by Japan against Manchuria in 1931, by Italy against Ethiopia in 1935, by Franco, Hitler and Mussolini in Spain, and, finally, by Hitler in his seizure of the Rhineland, his annexation of Austria and his march into Czechoslovakia.

Ten

Under the United Nations Charter, collective security was made to depend upon the willingness to act in concert of only five nations, three of which were left impotent by World War II, while the remaining two emerged as superpowers with widely differing political philosophies and ambitions.

Small wonder, then, that during the first five years of its existence, the United Nations seemed likely to follow the League of Nations into oblivion. Apart from providing a forum for acrimonious debate between the two superpowers, there seemed to be no function for the General Assembly, while the Security Council, paralyzed by the veto, could act as a keeper of the peace only on those rare occasions when the two superpowers were in agreement. Only the remarkable accomplishments of the Specialized Agencies in combatting hunger, disease and ignorance in what were then called the "underdeveloped parts of the world" seemed to provide the United Nations with a reason for existence.

In these circumstances, it was little short of a miracle that the Security Council was able, in 1946, to bring enough pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union to cause it to comply with a war-time agreement to withdraw its troops from northern Iran. However, the precedent which this success might have established was nullified in the following year, when Greece was threatened by communist revolution and Turkey was subjected to expansionist demands by the Soviet Union. Britain, no longer able to discharge its responsibilities as the keeper of the peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, turned to the United States for assistance and the United States, instead of turning to the Security Council, took matters into its own hands. President Truman's action in undertaking a unilateral intervention in Greece and Turkey constituted a deadly vote of no confidence in the United Nations, all the more so as the action was accompanied by a declaration (the Truman Doctrine) which committed the United States to a global policy of unilateral intervention against communist aggression or revolution.

This response of the United States to the Soviet Union's aggressive expansionism marked the real beginning of the Cold War and the division of Europe into two hostile camps, with the dividing line running from the Baltic Sea through the approximate middle of Germany to the Adriatic.

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In 1948, Britain's withdrawal from Palestine briefly gave the United Nations a new lease on life. Backed for once by both the United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations was able to preside over the birth of Israel and, when war broke out between Israel and the Arab states, to negotiate the armistice of 1949. However, the United Nations Conciliation Commission failed to negotiate a peace and, in the years which followed, the Security Council's inability to enforce repeated orders to Egypt to cease its acts of belligerency caused the United Nations' prestige to sink to a new low, a low from which it was to be rescued by unforeseen and somewhat fortuitous developments in the Far East.

The end of World War II left China, one of the Big Five responsible for the preservation of peace, in a state of civil war. When Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government was overthrown by the Chinese Communists and forced to flee to the island of Taiwan in 1949, the United States refused to recognize the new Communist government at Peking, contending that the Nationalist government in exile was still the legitimate government of China, entitled to China's membership in the United Nations and to its seat as a permanent member of the Security Council. This stand, backed by a majority of members of the United Nations, caused the Soviet Union to boycott the Security Council —an action which had a wholly unintended effect.

In June 1950, communist North Korea suddenly invaded the southern non-communist Republic of Korea. The absence of the Soviet delegation from the Security Council enabled that body to condemn the aggression and to lend the United Nations flag to an American-led international force sent to suppress the aggression. The success of this police action was marred by the later ill-advised counter-invasion of North Korea which brought Chinese Communist troops into the conflict, but it nevertheless re-established the United Nations as a factor in world affairs. The Korean experience also led to the adoption of an American-sponsored United Nations resolution whereby the General Assembly was in the future empowered to act whenever the Security Council might fail to take action with respect to a threat to world peace. The legitimacy of this resolution was attacked by the Soviet Union, which viewed it as a circumvention of the veto likely to place power in the hands of a General Assembly

Twelve

hostile to its interests. (Later developments were to show,
however, that the greatly enlarged General Assembly would fol-
low an independent and often unpredictable course as likely to
be hostile to one power-bloc as to another.) It is questionable
whether the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" of 1950 strengthened
the United Nations. With the vast increase in the number of
member states, each, irrespective of size, population or impor-
tance, entitled to an equal vote, the General Assembly has not
only become unwieldy but has departed widely from the principle
that power and responsibility should be co-extensive. Actions
taken under the 1950 resolution have caused dispute and refusal
by a number of nations to share in defraying their cost, thus
causing a financial crisis in the United Nations which paralyzed
the 19th Session of the General Assembly. On the whole, the
General Assembly has shown itself to be no more able than the
Security Council to deal effectively with threats to the peace.

In 1956, the United Nations was powerless to deal with the
Soviet invasion of Hungary. Yet, in the same year, it reached
the summit of its success in bringing about the withdrawal of
Britain, France and Israel from Egypt and in establishing a
peace-keeping force (UNEF) which was able to preserve a
precarious peace between Israel and the Arab states for ten
years, only to fail dismally in preventing another outbreak of
war in June 1967. From that disaster, the United Nations has
not yet recovered.

Enough has been said, without tracing more fully the "ups
and downs" of the United Nations, to show that it was endowed
at the start with insufficient authority, power and structure to
be able to fulfill its stated mission. Since 1945, there has scarcely
been a year in which "the scourge of war" has not afflicted one
or more parts of the world; and, on at least one occasion, man-
kind has stood at the brink of total catastrophe.

If failure is due in part to the organic structure of the United
Nations, it is due to an even greater extent to the unwillingness
of the major powers who wrote the Charter to make it work or
to amend it. Of the "Big Five" governments that made them-
selves responsible for the preservation of peace, one now sits in
impotence on Taiwan, while the others pursue their individual
aims, habitually ignoring or by-passing the organization which
they created.

Thirteen

## American Responsibility

Whether the United States is more or less guilty than Britain, France or the Soviet Union is not for Americans to judge. The United States is, however, the wealthiest, most technologically advanced and probably the most powerful nation in the world. It cannot alone remedy the mistakes of the past, but it can set an example. In its own interest and in the interest of mankind, the United States must re-examine its policies and adopt a new approach to world affairs. To do so requires very little change in the American rhetoric; ever since the United Nations was founded, successive Presidents and Secretaries of State have declared that the United Nations must be "the cornerstone of American policy," while, under their guidance, the United States has consistently by-passed the United Nations and frequently violated its Charter, overtly in a number of instances, covertly by secret operations in others.

> The United States must bring its actions and its rhetoric into conformity. If the United States seeks to establish the rule of law in the world, it must, first of all undertake to obey such international laws as exist, chiefly in the form of treaties such as the United Nations Charter. If a nation considers an existing treaty to be unjust, outmoded or inadequate, it has the right to propose modifications or amendments or, if necessary, to abrogate the treaty; but a nation which champions the rule of law must never arbitrarily violate a treaty obligation. The United States and the other nations which wrote and signed the United Nations Charter have justified its circumvention or violation on the grounds that the United Nations was impotent, without asking themselves: "Who made it so?"

## The Costly Straddle between Three Approaches to Peace

Since 1945, the United States has wavered between three theoretically possible approaches to the firm establishment of peace.

One approach would be through a more determined effort to create and support a world organization endowed by the peoples of the world with the authority, the power and the institutional structure that would make it capable of enacting, administering and enforcing world law, at least to the extent of abolishing war

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and outlawing the manufacture, sale or possession of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and conventional weapons other than those light arms required for the maintenance of internal order within the separate nation-states.

A second approach would be for the United States to seek an understanding with the Soviet Union (and, later, perhaps with Japan or China) under which the world would be divided into two (later, possibly three) spheres of dominant interest, with each superpower giving a free hand to the other (or others) in its respective sphere.

A third approach would be for the United States to attempt single-handedly to impose a *Pax Americana* upon the entire world.

Throughout the last two decades, the United States has rhetorically professed to be following the first of these three approaches, while in action it has vacillated between the second and third. It has rendered lip-service to the establishment of peace through world organization; it has, from time to time, sought accommodation with the Soviet Union, especially in arms control and in seeking to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in this Hemisphere while tacitly acquiescing at Yalta and Potsdam in the division of Europe. It has, at the same time, made great efforts and expended vast resources in endeavoring to prevent Soviet, Chinese or other communist influence from penetrating what has been euphemistically called "the free world." In this effort, the United States has not sought to create a world empire, but it has come very close to attempting the imposition of a *Pax Americana*.

The straddle between the three approaches has been costly.

It has prevented a serious effort to abolish war. In spite of tacit concessions to the Soviet Union, it has led to potentially explosive confrontations in Central Europe, the Middle East and in the Caribbean. It has distracted the United States from the urgent task of trying to help in closing the gap between the rich and poor nations—a gap which, next to nuclear war, poses the greatest threat to peace on this planet.

Fear of communism has drawn the United States into alliance with dictatorships of the Right, such as those holding power in Spain, Portugal and Greece, with reactionary monarchies in the

Fifteen

Middle East and with ruling "mandarin" cliques in Asia and Latin America. This has made the United States into a defender of a status quo which is unacceptable to the majority of mankind.

The cold war has left the European community divided, with a partitioned, rearmed and resentful Germany at its center. It has made Western Europe into an American protectorate, dependent upon and yet resentful of American protection, while Eastern Europe is dominated by the Soviet Union.

The straddle has led the United States into overt and secret intervention in the affairs of other nations, ultimately involving it in a land war in Asia which it could not win and which has preempted resources badly needed to combat poverty and human degradation at home and abroad. Perhaps worst of all, it has made the United States into a militarized nation with a huge vested interest in the continuation of a spiralling arms race that threatens the entire world with incineration.

Fortunately, the American people have begun to add up the cost of the foreign policy their government has been pursuing. The time is ripe for reappraisal and reorientation.

### III. ESSENTIALS OF A NEW AMERICAN APPROACH TO PEACE

#### Ultimate Aims

Four successive Presidents of the United States and their advisors have, in varying degrees, been obsessed by fear of communism. The first necessary step in adopting a new approach to peace is to understand that in the Nuclear Age war—not communism—poses the lethal threat to the United States and to all of mankind.

*The second step is a firm determination to abolish war.*

It is true that the impulse toward war among the nations cannot be abolished so long as conditions of injustice, inequality and human degradation move men to violence—so long as one part of the world seeks change from intolerable conditions, if necessary by violent means, while another part of the world seeks to preserve, if necessary by violence, a state of affairs in which it enjoys relative freedom, security and prosperity. But, while the impulse

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toward war can only slowly be tempered by far-reaching change, war itself can be abolished. It can be abolished by the establishment of an authority superior to the nation-states—an authority empowered by the consent of all the world's peoples to enact and enforce law upon the hitherto lawless national governments—law which prohibits them from attacking one another and from possessing the weapons of war.

Once these premises are accepted, it becomes apparent that the two major aims of a new American policy must be:

1. To strengthen the United Nations to the point at which it becomes capable of enacting, administering and enforcing world law, at least to the extent of bringing about adequately enforced disarmament of all the nation-states down to the level of such light arms as national governments may require for the maintenance of internal order.*

2. To devote American brains, energies and resources to the maximum possible extent to the elimination of hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance—of injustice and oppression—wherever they exist and, by their existence, move men to violence.

## Psychological Hurdles

The achievement of the first aim—converting the United Nations into a limited world government—will encounter two major psychological obstacles. One such obstacle is the fetish of jealously preserving “absolute national sovereignty,” even though it should by now have become apparent that, except in relation to

* It should be emphasized that the maintenance of internal order does not imply the preservation of the internal *status quo* in any given nation-state. Ideally speaking, the maintenance of internal order implies, not a denial of any change in the relationships between various components of the population, or in the relationship of the people of a nation-state to their government, but, rather, the maintenance of an orderly process of change. As a practical matter, some changes in the economic and social structures of the various nation-states may well be disorderly and even violent. The degree to which violence is suppressed by force within any nation-state remains a matter for the people of that state to decide. The establishment of world law enforcing disarmament down to the level of light weapons for police forces affects the internal affairs of nation-states only insofar as it limits the instruments of violence in the hands of national governments for use against rebellious peoples, and in the hands of peoples to use against their governments. If it is held that such limitation favors revolutionary change, it also tends to promote peaceable revolution.

Seventeen

internal matters, national sovereignty has become a myth. The fetish is part of a primitive, irrational form of nationalism, akin to the spirit of tribalism, which tends to endow the nation-state with moral attributes which it does not possess. The rational awakening must come from the world's peoples rather than from national governments, because most national governments, including our own, suffer from a kind of occupational disease which causes them to resist any diminution of their real or fancied powers.

In a moment of insight, rare in a high government official, President Eisenhower once remarked:

> I like to believe that people in the long run are going to do more to promote peace than our governments. I think the people want peace so much that one of these days governments had better get out of the way and let them have it.

To achieve the goal of abolishing war will, therefore, require that a conscious educational effort be undertaken through private initiative. In the United States, such efforts have already begun through the various world federalist organizations, the World Law Fund and the Grenville Clark Institute for World Law. Similar work is being done in a number of other countries.

## Would Russia Cooperate?

A second major psychological obstacle is the widespread belief that no communist nation would ever agree to the creation of a supranational authority—not even one of strictly limited powers. This belief has been reinforced by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and by the official Soviet justification of that action in the form of a new doctrine asserting the right of the Soviet Union to impose its will upon the internal affairs of the smaller "socialist" states in its sphere of influence. This doctrine is deeply disturbing, not only because it denies the right of self-determination but also because it asserts a Soviet sphere of domination and, by implication, declares that the world is to be divided into great-power areas of influence.

It is important to note, however, that this new Soviet doctrine and its implications were rejected by all the other communist nations, except Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany, and by all the major communist parties in non-communist countries.

Eighteen

tries. Whatever this new doctrine may mean as an indication of
Soviet attitude, it is clearly not an indication of the attitude of
all communist states toward the establishment of a supranational
authority to abolish war.

As for the Soviet Union, the Soviet government repeated,
after its invasion of Czechoslovakia, its previous advocacy of uni-
versal national disarmament. In the past, it has balked only at
supranational inspection and enforcement. The resistance to
inspection may well have more to do with the Soviet government's
obsession with secrecy than with any objection to the principle
of reliably enforced disarmament. The obsession with secrecy
might well be expected to evaporate, once the present or future
rulers of Russia were fully able to realize what it would mean to
be free of all fear of military attack, and once they understood
that a supranational organization limited to the enforcement of
disarmament and the abolition of war would pose no threat to
their internal authority.

On July 22, 1968, the *New York Times* published the trans-
lation of the text of a long essay by Andrei D. Sakharov, identified
as a well-known and respected physicist and academician in the
Soviet Union. This remarkable article urged Soviet-American
cooperation toward world economic development and peace and
prognosticated that, at some time between 1980 and 2000, con-
ditions would be ripe for the creation of a world government.
Only a short time ago, it would have been unthinkable that such
an article would be written in the Soviet Union. The fact that it
was written, even though it was composed prior to the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, indicates that there may well be in the Soviet
Union and in other countries groups of scientists and intellectuals
who are thinking very seriously about the need for establishing
world law enforced by a supranational authority. If this is,
indeed, a fact, one may expect that the ideas of these groups
will spread in ever-widening circles.

Sakharov is undoubtedly right in saying that the achievement
of world government will take time. How long, no one can know.
In the meanwhile, however, if the American people's aim is clear,
a number of intermediate steps toward its achievement lie within
the realm of the immediately possible.

Nineteen

## China

If the aim of the United States is to abolish war and all national armaments, it must change its policy toward the Chinese People's Republic. Instead of ostracizing the government which rules one quarter of the world's population, the United States must seek to draw it into membership in the United Nations and into partnership in the effort to strengthen it. In so doing, the United States will have the support of all the major powers, including India and the Soviet Union, as well as the concurrence of the majority of other members of the United Nations.

The People's Republic is obviously entitled to China's seat in the General Assembly and to its seat on the Security Council, both of which are now occupied by the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. There are a number of possible solutions of this dilemma, the most reasonable of which would appear to be to accord separate membership in the United Nations to a government freely elected by the inhabitants of Taiwan, if independence from China should be their freely expressed desire. Such a solution, sometimes misleadingly called a "two-China solution," will at first be opposed by both the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and the Communist regime on the mainland but, considering all the facts of history, it would seem the most equitable, especially since Formosa, or Taiwan, has been only intermittently an integral part of China.

## The Three Partitioned Nations

The need for all-inclusive membership in the United Nations suggests that the United States should sponsor or at least agree to the admission of the two German states, the two Korean states and the two Vietnamese states, leaving the door open for the eventual reunification of the three unhappily partitioned countries.

The United States has until now opposed the admission to United Nations membership of the two German states proposed by the Soviet Union, supporting the objection of the Federal Republic of Germany (the F.R.G.) raised on the grounds that this would constitute a recognition of the German Democratic Republic (the G.D.R.) and diminish the chances of reunification. This policy should be reversed. It is a fact that the G.D.R. exists. Reunification can come about only from an effort based upon recognizing and beginning from a recognition of existing fact.

Twenty

For the same reason, the United States should favor the admission to the United Nations of North Korea and the Republic of Korea in the south.

The reunification of Vietnam was provided for in the Geneva Accords of 1954, which the United States did not sign but promised to respect. In violation of that promise, the United States interfered with the holding of the all-Vietnamese elections scheduled for 1956. Unless a peace settlement provides for early reunification, the United States should favor the admission of both North and South Vietnam to United Nations membership, pending their reunification.

The fact that North Korea committed aggression in 1950 and that the East German G.D.R. committed aggression by invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 should not disqualify these two states. Neither of them had signed the U. N. Charter; some of the leading U. N. members have violated the Charter, among them the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. The American interest demands that the United Nations become a universal organization; otherwise it cannot enact and enforce world law.

So far as Vietnam is concerned, the American people have made clear their demand that their government end an adventure into which it should never have blundered. Until that demand is fulfilled, the United States cannot become an effective leader toward the establishment of a peaceful world.

## The Need for Over-all Revision

If the United States is to embark upon a new approach to peace, it must carefully re-examine all its foreign commitments, explicit or implied, with a view toward determining (a) their compatibility with the United Nations Charter; (b) their consistency with the true national interest; and (c) their relevance to the creation of a world at peace under law.

## Intervention

The United States has in the past repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of other nations. Some of these actions were undertaken in response to legitimate treaty commitments; others have been unilateral violations of the United Nations Charter.

Twenty-one

Some interventions have been overt; others have been secretly conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

Most of these actions, whether overt or covert, have been inspired by fear of communist expansion—a fear which has caused the American government to regard almost all revolutions, except those within communist countries, as inimical to the interests of the United States.

Among the open interventions, the two which most flagrantly violated both the United Nations Charter and other treaty obligations or commitments were the interventions in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic.

By no means all of the C.I.A.'s secret operations are known to the American people. Among those known to the public, sometimes long after the event, are the operations undertaken in Iran, Laos, Thailand, Cuba and Guatemala. In Iran and Guatemala, these operations resulted in the overthrow of governments. In Cuba, the attempt to overthrow the government failed. In most other cases, the C.I.A's operations appear to have been aimed at preventing revolutions in other countries. Whatever their purpose, all these operations have been conducted in violation of the United Nations Charter.

*If the goal of the United States is to be the creation of a world of law, it must in the future refrain from all interventions, overt or secret, which violate the law.*

Apart from the question of their legality, it would seem questionable whether interventions undertaken to suppress or prevent incipient revolutions serve the purpose of promoting peace.

Our own Declaration of Independence affirms that every people has the right to overthrow its government and to replace it with one deemed to be more responsive to its will. Yet, the United States has frequently helped unpopular governments, particularly in Latin America, to maintain themselves in power by assisting them in the training of their armed forces and by supplying them with weapons, not to defend their countries against external attack, but to enable them to suppress revolutionary discontent among their people.

*Twenty-two*

In the long run, such interventions would seem more likely to promote violence than to maintain peace and tranquility; they would seem more likely to feed than to suppress extremism of the Right or Left. They tend to cause the United States to appear as the defender of the *status quo* in a world of ineluctible change. (Some Americans no doubt want the United States to occupy that role. Do these Americans represent majority opinion?).

## The United States as a Supplier of Arms

The United States is one of the world's chief suppliers of what are euphemistically called the "conventional weapons of war". The Defense Department maintains a high-pressure sales force engaged in promoting the purchase of American-made arms and planes by any country that desires them, unless it be a country deemed to be hostile to the United States. This practice is justified on the grounds that it helps to reduce our deficit in the balance of payments—a deficit caused chiefly by our interventionist policy. It is also justified by the probably correct contention that, if the United States fails to provide the arms or planes desired by other countries, they will be supplied by other arms-manufacturing nations. (Here again, communist suppliers loom in the background.)

*Whatever the rationalization, the fact remains that to be a major supplier of the weapons of war is incompatible with the promotion of peace.*

It has been contended that the preservation of a balance of military power in areas of potential conflict is often a way to prevent the outbreak of war. This, too, would appear questionable. When India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir in 1962, both sides fought with American-made and American-supplied weapons. The attempt to preserve a balance of armaments becomes even more dubious when two arms-supplying countries are engaged in an area of potential conflict, as is the case in the Middle East, where the Soviet Union has armed the Arab states and the United States has contributed not only to arming Israel, toward which it has a commitment, but toward arming Jordan in the hope of preventing that Arab state from buying weapons from the Soviet Union. In the June war of 1967, Israeli-manned American tanks fought American tanks manned by Jordanians!

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The whole matter of arms export, for whatever purpose or reason, is tied up with the much larger question raised at the outset of this discussion—namely, the question of halting the over-production of armaments in the United States resulting from the dominance of the military-industrial complex.

The foregoing sections suggest primarily negative changes in American foreign policy. Affirmative changes are also needed.

#### IV. STRENGTHENING THE UNITED NATIONS

It is now recognized by most of the members of the United Nations that the authority and power given to the world organization under its Charter are incommensurate with the tasks which it is expected to fulfill, especially in the absence of great-power cooperation. The debates in the United Nations Assembly during recent sessions have, however, produced few proposals for strengthening the United Nations; they have been concerned with the various crises that have arisen rather than with the prevention of future crises. Speaker after speaker has bemoaned the inability of the United Nations to deal effectively with threats to the peace and has then usually ended by congratulating the organization upon what little it has been able to accomplish. Few if any member-nations wish to see the United Nations abolished, yet there has been a singular absence of determination on the part of the delegates to make it more effective.

The so-called Big Five are largely responsible. China (Nationalist China) has been concerned with little more than the retention of its anomalous position; Great Britain has been preoccupied with its domestic problems; France under de Gaulle has thinly veiled its contempt for the United Nations; the United States and the Soviet Union have devoted most of their energies to the frustration of each other's real or fancied designs.

It is time for the United States to take the initiative toward remedying the organic weakness of the United Nations by certain steps which can be taken now and by proposing that a Charter Revision Conference be held at some time in the near future.

*Twenty-four*

A number of proposals for Charter revision have been put forward by private individuals and groups in the United States. Among these, the most interesting and the most carefully elaborated is that of the late Grenville Clark in association with Louis B. Sohn. This proposal envisages a modification of the voting rights in the General Assembly under which the smallest mini-state would no longer have the same vote as the largest, most populous and most important nation. The proposal also provides for a system of taxation to provide reliable revenue and for the creation of a standing police force to be at the disposal of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The Clark-Sohn Plan is frankly designed to convert the United Nations into a limited world government, capable of enforcing universal national disarmament. Other proposals have gone further in the direction of expanding the authority and power of a world government beyond the function of preventing war through disarmament.

The two most difficult problems of Charter revision are probably: How to modify the voting rights in the General Assembly; and How to abolish the single-nation great-power veto.

The following is tentatively suggested as a basis for discussion.

1. Adopt a *Bicameral Legislature* in which

a) the General Assembly becomes the Lower Chamber representing *the world's peoples* on a basis of voting rights weighted according to population, but with an upper limit of 30 votes per nation (as suggested by Clark-Sohn) to prevent domination by the most populous nation-states.

b) the Security Council becomes the Upper Chamber representing *the world's national governments*. Governments of the largest nation-states to have one vote each; the medium-sized and smaller nations to be combined in regional groups, with each such group having one vote.

2. Provide that a simple majority in the Lower Chamber and a two-thirds majority in the Upper Chamber be required for enforcement action.

At best, Charter revision will take time and careful preparation, but that is no reason not to get on with the job. *The United*

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States might consider proposing a Preliminary Charter Review Conference to be held in June 1970, on the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. Not only governments but also non-governmental organizations or private individuals might be asked to attend.

Meanwhile, there are a number of steps in the direction of eventual Charter revision that could be initiated or encouraged by the United States.

1. To strengthen the peace-keeping capability of the United Nations, a proposal might be made, perhaps by Canada or Sweden, to create a stand-by force composed of volunteers from various nations in order that peace-keepers be instantly available when needed. Alternatively, separate stand-by forces might be maintained by individual nations and held at the disposal of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The United States should encourage such action, leaving the initiative to the non-nuclear nations, preferably to those not belonging to any power-bloc.

2. While it is important to put out fires, fire-prevention is even more important. The United Nations has not, so far, developed a corps of trained mediators whom it could dispatch to any area where disputes threaten to erupt into violence. Such mediators would be thoroughly trained in the cultivation of the true third-party attitude required for successful mediation.

The United States might propose that an Academy for the training of mediators be established, either by private donors or by government subscription to a special United Fund created for this purpose. Sweden, because of its widely respected attitude of neutrality, and because it has already produced such able conciliators as Count Folke Bernadotte, Dag Hammarskjold and Gunnar Jarring, might appropriately be asked to provide the home for such an institution to be attended by volunteer trainees from all over the world. (Perhaps under the auspices of the existing U.N. Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR))

3. Recognizing that the international trade in arms constitutes a threat to the preservation of peace, the United States might suggest, concurrently with the announcement of a change in its own policy, that a United Nations Commission be established to

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look into the question of policing the trade in armaments. International trade in narcotics has long been policed by the League of Nations and then by the United Nations. Surely, the weapons of war are no less dangerous.

Were the United States to set an example by its own behavior and by proposing international action, it would materially improve the chances of negotiating with the Soviet Union a halt in the Middle Eastern arms race.

4. The United States might propose the creation of a United Nations Development Authority in order to enable the world organization to supply development capital as well as technical assistance. This would serve three major purposes:

a) It would make development aid a function of the whole world community in which donor and recipient nations would cooperate for the common good, while competition among donor nations for political purposes of their own would be reduced and perhaps eventually eliminated.

b) It would make possible the long-term planning and scheduling of capital investment, which is now almost impossible because the flow of aid depends upon the annual decisions of national governments.

c) It would greatly enhance the importance and prestige of the United Nations.

It has been suggested* that a U.N. Development Authority might be constituted with a Board of eleven members. Five seats would be permanently allotted to the industrialized nations as a whole, to be occupied each year by those particular industrialized nations which, in the previous year, had made the largest contributions. The remaining six seats would be occupied by annually rotating representatives of the would-be recipient nations in six regions to be established, each with a Regional Board composed of the representatives of the nations within its region. Each such Regional Board would sift the problems and opportunities within its region and would assign priorities to the projects of which it

* This scheme was proposed by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace in its Tenth Annual Report. (1957)

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approved. Each Regional Board would then, through its annually
rotating spokesman on the parent Authority's Board, present its
approved projects for consideration.

The fixing of priorities among the projects recommended by the
Regional Boards as well as the actual allocation of funds would
be determined by the parent U.N. Authority. A majority of the
five members representing the industrialized nations would be
required for the approval of any project or appropriation, as well
as a majority of the regional representatives.

The U.N. Development Authority would not interfere or compete with the excellent work done by the World Bank and its soft-loan subsidiary. However, the communist nations do not participate in these institutions which are controlled by Western capital-providing nations. The U.N. Development Authority would, on the other hand, be open to participation by all nations whatever their ideology or form of government and irrespective of whether they would be donors or recipients of aid. Thus the U.N. Development Authority would tend to lift development aid out of the cold-war context and would give the nations requiring assistance a voice in the distribution of development aid.

(All of the four foregoing proposals could be adopted by the United Nations by a simple majority vote in the General Assembly, whereas a revision of the Charter would require a two-thirds vote.)

5. Pending the establishment of a U.N. Development Authority, the United States should set an example by pledging a contribution of at least 1% of its Gross National Product to existing multinational organizations for the promotion of economic development. This would be more than twice as much as the United States now contributes through bilateral and multilateral aid.

## V. THE RICH AND THE POOR NATIONS

The record of the United States and the other industrialized nations in aiding the economic development of the poorer, less developed nations is far from praiseworthy. The assistance given has been niggardly, distorted by political and strategic considerations, often mismanaged and frequently counter-productive. As a result, the gap between the rich and poor nations has widened,

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instead of narrowing. This is not only a portent of disaster; it is a moral disgrace.

At the end of World War II, the United States took a bold and constructive lead in extending aid to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of a war-damaged world; it sponsored UNNRA (the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, once the Cold War set in, humanitarianism gave way to anti-communist strategy. The Marshall Plan, conceived by its author as a project to combat "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos," became an instrument of cold-war strategy under the Truman Doctrine. (To say this does not detract from its beneficent contribution to West European recovery.)

It was not until 1949, four years after the war had ended, that any serious thought was given in Washington to those parts of the world in which millions were suffering from hunger, disease, ignorance and oppression. Even then, President Truman's so-called Point Four Program was slow to get into action and starved by inadequate appropriations. Soon, it, too, was engulfed in larger "mutual aid" programs directed primarily at creating or supporting putative allies in the Cold War. Most of the so-called economic assistance in these programs was actually a subsidy given to friendly nations in order to enable them to support military establishments which they could ill afford. What little economic aid remained was usually tied to a stipulation that the proceeds be used to buy goods in the American market. It was only during the last ten years that these restrictive bilateral aid agreements were gradually supplanted by more intelligently planned multinational consortiums and international lending institutions. However, just when the techniques of giving development aid began to show a sharp improvement, Congress lost its taste for the whole business. Even the modest amounts requested by the White House were whittled down each year by a Congress willing to appropriate billions for armaments and the exploration of outer space. When the Congress thought of economizing, it found foreign aid the easiest item to cut, since, unlike military appropriations, veterans' benefits or farm price supports, foreign aid had behind it no voting constituency.

Few, if any, of the other industrialized nations did any better than the United States; some did worse. Soviet aid was given

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almost entirely for political purposes. Britain and France con-
centrated their efforts in former colonial possessions in which they
still had an economic interest. West Germany used its foreign
aid almost entirely to build up its own exports. (By contrast, little
Israel, itself a recipient of aid, showed how much could be done
with small resources to aid the development of some of the African
nations.)

The Peace Corps, which cost the American tax-payer very
little, probably did more to show that the United States was not an
entirely selfish nation than all the American aid programs put
together.

When all is said and done, the grim fact remains that, after
more than two decades, the rich nations are still growing richer
while the poor nations grow relatively poorer. National govern-
ments being what they are, it seems unlikely that there will be any
substantial improvement in the foreseeable future. That is one
reason why it has been suggested that development aid be chan-
neled through a United Nations Development Authority.

There is another reason. On the not too distant horizon, there
is one bright ray of hope. Recent oceanographic explorations have
revealed that the sea-bed and its subsoil contain hitherto untapped
oil, mineral and other resources, including foodstuffs, the exploita-
tion of which could eventually supply more than enough funds to
finance worldwide economic development. Ominously, however,
these explorations have also shown that the sea-bed could readily
lend itself to the extension of the nuclear arms race into a new
dimension.

*What is urgently needed is a treaty demilitarizing the ocean floor, similar to the recently signed treaty demilitarizing outer space.*

Equally urgent is a decision, now being debated in the United
Nations to declare that the ownership of the ocean floor beyond
the Continental Shelf together with its vast resources be vested
in all humanity, and that the exploitation of the ocean resources
be regulated by a supranational authority. (The United Nations
Development Authority proposed above would be the logical
agency for this assignment.)

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Already, private interests are raising objections to the de-
nationalization or de-privatization of the vast lands under the sea;
and already scientists and military experts are exploring the pos-
sibility of installing submarine fueling stations on the ocean floor
and ballistic missile launchers on the submerged mountain ranges.

Few Americans are aware of the choice which must soon be
made by their government. If the choice goes in favor of permit-
ting private or national ownership and exploitation, the arms race
will enter into a wholly new and dangerous dimension, and man-
kind will be deprived of its most promising opportunity to banish
hunger, poverty and degradation forever from this earth.

If ever there was need for "an alert and knowledgeable
citizenry," this is the time.

Immediate Goals

Whether or not the new administration finds merit in all or
any part of the foregoing outline of a new long-range approach
to peace, it would seem desirable that four aims, apart from the
establishment of peace in Vietnam, be energetically pursued.

1. The prompt ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty now before the Senate.

2. Negotiation with the Soviet Union of a mutual cutback in the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and a de-escalation of the nuclear arms race.

3. Negotiation with the Soviet Union of a halt in the supply of arms to the Middle East.

4. Negotiation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact Powers of a General European Security Agreement, involving a mutual thinning out of the military forces now confronting each other. Prior to this negotiation, it might be desirable to discuss with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany the possibility of including an agreement to admit both it and the German Democratic Republic to membership in the United Nations.

None of the foregoing steps could reasonably be held to imply
approval of the recent Soviet action in Czechoslovakia. All of
them would clearly be in the interest of the United States.

Thirty-one

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Nancy and Dick:

Just a short note to thank you for your kind
telegram. I am sorry that the hectic pace
here kept me from writing before I left on
this last trip.

Though the history books may not mention
it, I shall always remember that the warm
hospitality of the Watsons made the some-
times endless rounds of negotiations bearable.
I appreciate your important role in what we
have achieved and your unstinting generosity
and friendship.

Hon. and Mrs. Arthur K. Watson
Orchard Farm, Box 268
New Canaan, Connecticut
06840

jlp:2/8/73

RECEIVED
FEB 21 1973

CENTRAL FILES

13220

The White House
Washington

WHD 019 SPOB 020 WAC346(2219)(2-074596E 023)PDAN01/23/73 2217

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

ZCZC 2039663515 TDMT NEW CANAAN CT 11 01-23 1017P EST

PMS DOCTOR HENRY KISSINGER

WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON DC

CONGRATULATIONS WE ARE THRILLED AND PROUD OF YOU GOD BLESS YOU
NANCY AND DICK WATSON

1973 JAN 24 AM 9 06

RECEIVED
KISSINGER'S OFFICE

FORM OBOS PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

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RECEIVED

DEC 5, 1973
CENTRAL

Camden, Me. 04843
Bayview Avenue
Arthur K. Watson
The Honorary

Henry A. Kieinger

Warm regards,

that you are now in the best of health.
Your hospital stay was not too serious and
which I appreciated very much. I do hope
your note of good wishes on my appointment,
I deeply regret the delay in thanking you for
Dear Dick:

December 3, 1973

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEC 5 1968

## - BEHIND THE MISSIONS -

ARRIVING IN NORFOLK TWO DAYS BEFORE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATO'S NAVAL HEADQUARTERS THERE, THE EDITOR OF A NATIONALLY-COPYRIGHTED PUBLICATION WOULD PREDICT HE WAS ATTEMPTING THE "IMPOSSIBLE". ANOTHER WOULD PHONE A REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE - WHEN HIS IMAGINATIVE ATTACK ON THE OLD "NORFOLK-NAVY" PROBLEM INSPIRED NATION-WIDE INTEREST, EXPLODING INTO A HUNDRED EVENTS IN NAVY TOWNS WHEN FIFTEEN YEARS OF PREPARATIONS PAID OFF WITH THE COLLABORATION OF PUBLISHERS FROM NEW YORK TO HONOLULU. WITH HEADLINES LIKE "SOUTHERN HOSPITALITY FLOWERS ONCE MORE ALONG HAMPTON ROADS!" THE PRESS WOULD CREDIT NORFOLK'S "NEW IMAGE" IN LARGE PART TO THE "NAUTICAL CELEBRITIES" AND SHIP QUEENS WITH WHOM HE HAD SPARKED THE DRIVE WITH OVER 600 APPEARANCES ON PROGRAMS CREATED FOR RADIO, STAGE AND TELEVISION.

WITH ENCOURAGEMENT FROM LEADERS IN BOTH PARTIES POET, PRODUCER AND PHILOSOPHER SYLVAN WATTS WOULD BE FURTHER INSPIRED IN HIS PLANS FOR A DRIVE TO COMMEMORATE AMERICA'S BICENTENNIAL WITH AN ATLANTIC UNION CONVENTION WHEN CONGRESSMAN PAUL FINDLEY ENTERED THE NATIONAL PLANNING ASSOCIATION'S ENDORSEMENT OF ATLANTIC UNION IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ON THE 14TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS MASSIVE DRIVE TO CREATE A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN NATO'S INTERNATIONAL SEA CAPITAL.

WITH DISPATCHES FROM PLACES LIKE NAPLES AND FORMOSA EVEN ADMIRALS WOULD GET INTO THE ACT - AND MORE THAN A SCORE, INCLUDING NATO'S SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC AND THE COMMANDER OF NATO'S NAVAL FORCES IN THE MED, WOULD SEND ENCOURAGEMENT WHEN HUNDREDS OF CLUBS, CHURCHES AND OTHER ACTIVITIES INCLUDING A WHOLE BATTERY OF COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA - THE VIRGINIA-PILOT, STAR, WTAR-TV, WTOV-TV, WCAV, WASP, WGH, WBOF AND WLOW - PARTICIPATED. PLACED UNDER CIVIC AUSPICES BY THE MAYOR AND ENDORSED BY THE CHAMBER AND MINISTERIAL ASSOCIATION, THROUGH NEWS RELEASES TO 2000 SHIPS AND STATIONS THE NAVY DEPARTMENT WOULD GIVE THE DRIVE NAVY-WIDE PUBLICITY.

AT A BIG EVENT COMMEMORATING ITS SECOND ANNIVERSARY HE WOULD BE HONORED BY CIVIC AND NAVAL OFFICIALS AS THE 'FATHER OF THE NAVY'S SAILOR OF THE WEEK, MONTH AND YEAR PROGRAMS' WITH WHICH HE HAD IMPLEMENTED HIS IDEAS AND PHILOSOPHY THROUGHOUT THE NAVY IN A DRIVE LAUNCHED SIMULTANEOUSLY. IN RESPONSE TO A SUGGESTION FROM THE NAVY LEAGUE, WHICH HAD PARTICIPATED IN THESE INCENTIVE AND MORALE PROGRAMS IN NAVY TOWNS EVERYWHERE, LIFE MAGAZINE WOULD PUBLISH ITS "MIGHTY NEW NAVY" ON THEIR 10TH ANNIVERSARY. HONORED BY NUMEROUS OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PUBLICATIONS BUT MOST OF ALL BY THE THOUSANDS WHO PARTICIPATED IN HIS DRIVES, HIS WORK HAS BEEN DESCRIBED "AS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATION" BY PUBLISHERS, ADMIRALS AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

# ATLANTIC UNION MISSIONS

FORMER PRESIDENTS HARRY S. TRUMAN AND DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER HAVE AGREED TO COCHAIRMAN A BIPARTISAN AMERICAN DELEGATION TOANATLANTIC UNION CONVENTION. A PROPOSED RESOLUTION WOULD CALL ON THE PRESIDENT TO INVITE ALL NATO NATIONS. THE RESOLUTION HAS BEEN CO-SPONSORED BY ONE-FIFTH OF THE ENTIRE SENATE AND A DOZEN DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF BOTH PARTIES IN THE HOUSE. ALL OF WHICH TELLS MUCH ABOUT THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE ATLANTIC UNION MOVEMENT AS AMERICA APPROACHES HER BICENTENNIAL.

## Dr. Kissinger:

Congratulations. In moving on to other things - I note from your write up in the Times that you were awarded a doctorate in 1954. It was on June 23, 1954 that I was introduced at a Norfolk event as the "father" of the incentive and morale programs which had been inspired throughout the Navy by my work in NATO'S SEA CAPITAL. This work was dedicated to ATLANTIC UNION, as is the current drive. Recently, Mr. Streit and I met in New York to coordinate efforts. 127 Congressman and 30 Senators now openly back the ATLANTIC UNION Convention Resolution. It has passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Mr. McCormack assures cooperation in getting it to the floor. All five 1968 leading presidential candidates endorsed the Resolution - and the strongest endorsement may have been Mr. Nixon's. Only one president ever ever ever will be mentioned in the same context with Washington and Lincoln. It will be the President who leads us into ATLANTIC UNION. With greatest respect -

Van Watts
6210 Yucca
Hollywood 90028

IN ATLANTIC UNION OUR FOREFATHERS WOULD HAVE RECOGNIZED THE PATH OF FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRACY THEY SO BOLDLY CHARTED AS FAR INTO THE FUTURE AS IT WAS THEN POSSIBLE TO SEE. THE MANTLE HAS FALLEN. LET US BE WORTHY OF IT - SO THAT FUTURE GENERATIONS WILL NOT SAY THAT IN OUR TIME - LIKE GREECE AND ROME - AMERICA LOST HER WAY.