THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
OPERATIONS RESEARCH OFFICE

7100 CONNECTICUT AVENUE
CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND
WASHINGTON 15, D. C.

OPERATING UNDER CONTRACT
WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

TELEPHONE
OLIVER 4-4200

October 16
-September 27, 1956

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Dear Henry,

The enclosed paper is mostly negative. I realize that much
needs to be said on the positive side. I trust you find the atten-
tion to your article flattering.

I'd very much appreciate comment from you on whether I have
made my case clear and reasonable even if not convincing.

Had a fascinating ten weeks in Turkey during the summer,
about which I'd like to tell you sometime.

P. S. Murray Dyer spoke to Phil Mosely about this piece and he undertook to read it and pass it on to Armstrong if he thought FOREIGN AFFAIRS might publish it. I'm sending it to him today.

JEK/at
Enc.

[LC]

for limitation. Either side is capable at any time of exerting force of
such magnitude that the other side cannot defeat or punish it without
enlarging the existing limits.

It seems clear, then, that the outcome of the game of wills
must be determined by a comparison of the "limits" that are tolerable to
either side. We state in advance that we shall counter any aggressive
move our opponent makes and to punish him for making it. As in all
cases of declaratory deterrence the credibility our opponent attaches
to our statement will determine his response. If he does not believe
it at all, as the Red Chinese evidently did not believe Mr. Dulles'
threats in support of the French in Indo China, he may simply disregard
it. Or he may believe that we mean what we say but that we shall lack
the will to go as far as is necessary to stop him. In other words, he may
believe that the broadest "limits" to the action that _we_ will tolerate
will be less broad than the limits that _he_ will be willing or able to
tolerate. In this case, too, he may go ahead with his planned aggression,
and the deterrent will have failed.

Kissinger's critique of our cold war foreign policy comes down
to saying that because of the fear of war, and particularly of nuclear
war, we have not been willing to take the risks required to be effective.
He is disturbed over the President's statement that "there is no alterna-
tive to peace," which seems to him to reflect this national timidity.
But the reason for this fear, which undoubtedly exists, lies in the
recognition that, without effective limitation, any armed conflict in
the nuclear age is pregnant with Armageddon. If we are not to be
deterred from resistance to aggression as much as our cold war enemies
are deterred from aggression some way must be found of limiting war
that offers reasonable promise of success.

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of rational control, what is it that prevents us from establishing as the first "limit" on future war the rule that nuclear weapons must _not_ be used? The argument from inevitability would be more impressive if it were simple, unsophisticated, and went all the way.

We can certainly engineer the circumstances so that any war _we_ fight must be a nuclear war. We can insist upon providing ourselves with forces that cannot fight effectively any other way, we can design our mobilization plans exclusively for nuclear war, and we can deploy our troops in the field in such numbers and in such a manner that they would be certain to be overrun by the enemy if they did not employ nuclear weapons. But these things are subject to conscious and deliberate choice.

All future wars will be fought in the shadow of nuclear power. From now on, any war between the two major alliances into which the world is divided will be fought, if at all, in the shadow of the fact that both sides have the "unlimited" means required to translate the conflict into a war of thermonuclear annihilation. Wars between other powers or groups of powers, or between elements of one alliance or group and powers outside either, as for example, the war that might have sprung from the Suez crisis, will be fought in the same shadow. And as other powers, besides the present three or four, acquire nuclear weapons of their own, the shadow will become only the more foreboding.

This may well mean that "forces will have to deploy _as if_" nuclear weapons might be used," but not in the simple way in which it has been asserted. It is impossible at this time to foresee with clarity the impact of nuclear weapons on future battlefields, whether they are being used or are just casting their shadow. But a reasonable case for the conduct of conventional conflict in the nuclear age can be made.

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conventional weapons. In the nuclear shadow it is almost certain that war will be far more open, that forces in contact will be smaller, and that maneuver will play a larger role. Those who state so confidently that troops deployed for nuclear war cannot fight conventionally seem to ignore the fact that both sides must be so deployed, because both possess the means of nuclear attack.

Perhaps they are voicing their feeling that neither side can hope to win in those circumstances, because of the hit-and-run character of the actions that would be possible. If so, the rebuttal depends on what they mean by "win." They for the most part agree that nuclear war can and must be limited and thereby rule out total victory and unconditional surrender. This means that even if the conflict were nuclear they would accept stalemate on the battlefield, or believe that one side or the other will abandon its aggressive or defending effort if the risk of total war becomes excessive in a conflict that is not "worth" it. Conventional warfare in the nuclear shadow means precisely the same thing, but without the additional risk inherent in the tenuousness of nuclear "limitation."

It will be tragic indeed if the conclusion drawn from the battlefield that no one has ever seen, that conventionally armed troops deployed so as to gain a reasonable immunity under nuclear attack cannot fight "effectively," should cause us to place our hopes for security on the far more doubtful proposition that the employment of nuclear weapons can be limited.

V

The advocates of measured retaliation commonly base their hopes for limiting nuclear war on the possibility of confining nuclear

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No one argues that we should *not* exploit our technical skill to use our manpower to best advantage, and ultimately to save lives, nor that we should beggar ourselves to match the hordes of Russian and Chinese infantry. But it is by no means obvious that a commitment to nuclear war is the best way to gain the highest return from superior technology.

W. W. Kaufmann, for example, suggests the contrary (W. W. Kaufmann, ed., *MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY*, Princeton, 1956, p. 250):

> . . . nuclear firepower is more useful than high explosives precisely because of the broad coverage that it gives. And it is relatively cheap per unit to produce in terms of its effects. Thus, although the use of atomic weapons may produce a stalemate, it may do so only at a very high cost in manpower and a very low cost in productive effort—a combination which, on the face of it, is far less advantageous to the United States than to the Soviet Union and China.

In these terms a war fought with complex and expensive conventional weapons, but with the prospect of a far smaller loss of life than would mark nuclear war—it being assumed that the war must be "limited" in either case—would be to our advantage.

The present Administration has emphasized the need for defense economies, and through its spokesmen has on occasion given the impression that we can economize safely by exploiting the tremendously greater killing power of "modern" weapons. But the Administration is evidently of two minds on the subject. We still do have very considerable conventional military forces.

It has not yet been demonstrated that a defense establishment based upon a commitment to the use of nuclear weapons is less costly than one that is committed only to conventional weapons. The issue turns on the manpower requirements, and on this the experts are divided. The

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