**From:** Gail Fineberg
**To:** Prosser Gifford
**Date:** Tue, Oct 16, 2001 3:59 PM
**Subject:** transcript of tape--with my phonetic spellings of Chinese names--

Henry Kissinger, Kissinger Chair, inaugural lecture, 10/11/01

Henry Kissinger

"It is a great honor for me to have this opportunity to speak here at the Library of Congress about foreign policy. When this speech was planned I had thought of producing a somewhat theoretical discussion on the nature of leadership in the conduct of foreign policy, but so many things have happened in the interval that I will give my remarks a more contemporary cast.

All of us probably remember where we were when we learned of the attack on the World Trade Center. I was in Frankfurt, speaking to a group of businessmen, and I was supposed to go from that speech to the airport to take an airplane to China, and I was just winding up the question period when a

1

journalist, who had sneaked into the group and wasn't supposed to be there,
at that point, and
asked an especially unfriendly question. And the chairman got up and said,
because
that there had just been an attack on New York and Washington, we have to
be would love to end.

break up this meeting and the journalist shouted, "You've got to answer that
And I did.
the journalist stepped me out
question first." (As I was walking out, he said, "You don't really believe
their story if an attack on New York.")

this." And he was right, I didn't ... it was really impossible to believe, and
indeed it was difficult
that attack marks In my view a seminal change in the way Americans will
conceive foreign policy and the way in which the world will conduct foreign
policy, or should conduct, foreign policy in the future.

Had he been

It was a normal evening I would have spoken about the unique character
of Americans' approach to foreign policy; the fact that the United States had
never received a direct threat or experienced a direct threat, the fact that
Americans had never lived with the experience of tragedy caused by foreign
actions in their own country, about the belief that Americans have had that
believe it to be true
in world affairs

we could choose the degree of our participation and withdraw almost at will.

To be sure, and
Of course, at the close of the World War II period we became involved in
with the attitude that we were solving a specific set of problems
world affairs, but the impact of the destruction of downtown New York and
in

2

in which precise time limits

the attack on the Pentagon have had in my view a profound psychological impact, here, and, as it turns out, in much of the rest of the world.

When we look back at the '90s and at the debate on whether politically

history was over and (everything from now on) will be determined by

economics and social policy, it seems further removed than many much

earlier periods. (The debate that was going on between us and some of our

traditional allies, whether Europe could find an identity primarily by

differentiating itself from the United States, that, too, will have a different
content from now on.

The nature of alliances, our relations with Russia, our relations with China, the fact that we are in a coalition, however fragile it may turn out to be in some cases, with countries that only yesterday were considered permanent enemies or long-term adversaries--all of this will have a major impact on the way foreign policy will be conducted here, and the way Americans will look at foreign policy. I have been in this country now for nearly 60 years. I was here at the time of Pearl Harbor and I have seen this government function in

3

[Y]

and defeat
many critical periods. I have never seen a demonstration of defined unity as
in the last month, and I have never seen such a dedication to overcoming the
traditional divisions that have been existing at least since the Viet Nam
period. And all of these will turn out in the long term as assets in the conduct
of our foreign policy.

But let me talk first, say a few words, about the immediate situation.

Terrorism is usually described as a shadowy new form of war, without front
lines, without clear-cut enemies, without stated purposes that one could meet,
a negotiation even if we wanted to.
And that is true. On the other hand, the fundamental
challenge of the attack on the social order and civil society that we have
witnessed here, and that we see in many other countries, is not so elusive.

The terrorists, to be able to operate in a way that undermines social order in a
systematic way, require some bases. Without these bases, they became
random criminals and can be dealt with more or less as individuals. The
fundamental challenge that is posed by the terrorism we have seen, is the
state support, tacit or explicit, that these various organizations receive. Some
of that tacit support derives from fear. There is in several countries a kind of

4

bargain by which the terrorist groups operate with relative safety so long as they don't aim their activities at their host government, or at their host country. ~~Other countries~~ a few countries support terrorism as a method of diplomacy and as a method of warfare. But the key to defeating terrorism is to cut off the terrorists from the bases in other states. If that can be achieved, then the actions of the individual terrorists become much more a police problem and much less an international problem.

And so at this moment the profound challenge that the United States is trying to meet and for which it has found up to now such widespread support is to separate the terrorists from their bases in various countries. I believe that the administration has conducted a wise and strong and decisive policy and I am very impressed, not only by the vision they have shown but by the support we have received from so many countries but especially from our European allies.

~~Now~~ with respect to the immediate situation in Afghanistan, the objective-- and I speak as a private citizen-- the objective cannot be just one terrorist

5

CJA

leader, no matter how many cells he personally has created nor can it be only
the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is my view now that the
operations have started they should not end and leave the Taliban in power.

while learning during
The problem will therefore be whether we can maintain unity, not only in
phase I, which has happened up to now, but whether we can maintain unity in
the organization of some kind of
phase II, because phase II will require the organization of some kind of

structure in Afghanistan, that cannot be based only on the Northern Alliance, yet;
has to include the Pashtun population in southern part of Afghanistan, and to
get it to work carefully not just ourselves but
Do that without getting ourselves drawn into the sort of conflict that anybody
can do
particulars seeking to parry
that tried to govern Afghanistan from the outside has experienced. So an

attempt should undoubtedly be made to create a broad-based structure in
Kabul. But once that has been achieved, the organization of the country will
have to be turned over to some kind of international body, formally perhaps
the United Nations, maybe a contact group composed of all the neighboring
countries that are part of the overall coalition, plus those countries that have
participated in the military operations, and that would then create a kind of
cooperation between countries that have not in the past looked at the stability
of the Middle East as a joint problem. It cannot be the task of the U.S. alone

6

to organize a government in Afghanistan. But it also cannot be that we stop
this operation and leave the matter to total chaos. So this operation should in
my view be continued until the Taliban has been removed, until some
alternative structure has been created, and then we will get to phase III
~~the next phase of the war on terrorism~~ a new
challenge & coalition policy.

And phase III will be what the President has repeatedly affirmed, that any
country that supports terrorism will be treated as an opponent of the United
States. ~~And when we get to Phase III,~~ we will confront the fact that the
coalition that has been so skillfully been created by the president and the
~~for Afghanistan~~ divergent/
secretary of state is composed of many different elements. At this moment, it
is an à la carte coalition in which every member can choose that activity most
~~or stay and do direct action all together.~~
compatible with its domestic structure. But of course it is composed of many
~~purposes and purposes, all surface: same or later to be
different nations, of traditional allies, of traditional adversaries who in this
case share our objectives, of countries that share our purposes but are afraid
to affirm them, of countries that do not share our purposes but use
participation as a means of escaping embarrassing challenges.
we will be able to hold together~~

And the task will be to hold ~~hopefully all of the coalition.~~ But if necessary, ~~through a settlement phase~~ that part of the coalition that is willing to continue, behind the task of dealing with the問題.

7

CYJ

With these various organizations that exist in various countries and which often affirm causes which are very understandable. But the basic principle that must be affirmed is that no historic grievance and no present cause justifies the undiscriminating attack on any segment of the population, whether on civilians whose primary purpose and often exclusive purpose is to disrupt civil order and make civil society untenable, and to undermine any concept of legal government. That is not to oppose this wherever it is used. It is not to take sides in the political or traditional military conflict, and it is not all that difficult to distinguish between guerilla war and terrorism if a determination to do so exists. I believe that the president means what he says, that this is a conflict that we will pursue. And when there is an attack on the territory of the United States and thousands of people are killed within minutes, there has to be a determined American reaction, not just for the self-respect of America but for the safety of all the people of the world who depend on us or depend on some concept of order. That will be the next phase of foreign policy.

It was against the background of the war against Communism, which was a war of elimination of the fundamental challenge that has been posed, but from the perspective of what happened in the immediate post war period at the end of

8

World War II. At the end of World War II, an isolationist America confronted a world that it had in no way had expected. President Roosevelt told Churchill as late as 1944 that any idea of keeping American troops in Europe for more than two years after the war was absolutely out of the question. And then in a great burst to creativity, America in the period following World War II devised a whole series of measures to bring structure and security to the world, and, together with its allies, helped secure democracy in Europe and Japan and laid the basis for the world that emerged in the Union in 1967. In 1990s, in which we thought foreign policy was over, So now we and those countries that can cooperate with us and are willing to cooperate have another historic opportunity. We no longer have one particular enemy. We now have a problem that can appear in many parts of the globe. And we must do something that we have not historically undertaken, namely to build an international structure without a specific national challenge. And in this respect, what has happened has accelerated the changes that are already taking place, but also given them a new perspective.

Three months ago, it would have been considered highly improbable that our European allies would express solidarity on any issue we then knew with

9

such unanimity and with such precision. And therefore the relationship of
such unanimity and with such precision. And therefore the relationship of
America to Europe can be given a new perspective. On the European side it
is perhaps clearer than it was then that there some dangers that still
unite us even in the security field. There is no European country that would
be in position to respond with the same speed and effectiveness to a similar
attack on its own capital or principal cities.

At the same time the question of European identity can be considered from a
perhaps less restricted perspective. To be sure, and no one in America should
reject this, Europe has its own history and will define some of its own
purposes, but I do not believe that in the long run European identity should
be based on what differentiates it from the United States and must include a
major aspect of cooperation. The impact of the British Prime Minister's
behavior and speeches, not just on British-American relations but on the
American attitude towards the importance of allies, has been enormously
significant. At the same time on some of the issues that have concerned
Americans, such as European security policy, we can take another look at
whether it is inevitable that a European security policy that achieves a degree
of separation must inevitably be to the detriment of the United States,

10

because on the issues we have now seen, Europe would be at least as
threatened as the United States. Similarly, the issue of missile defense, which
seemed for awhile to split the alliance, and ironically to split the alliance

can now be seen
more than it threatened our relationship with Russia. I think it is clear now
in a new light. This is from a letter launched with a
that if the explosion in New York had occurred with a missile attack, and that
an attack on

if the American people knew that some technology existed to prevent this,
which

that its government had refused to adopt that technology for a variety of
reasons, primarily public
ideological and political
that would totally undermine confidence in
our government. And for this reason I believe that the issue of missile
defense in the months ahead will find its solution not only in relation with

a close relationship to Russia.

Now that relationship to Russia in any event has undergone a fundamental
deviation from the time of creation
change. It is not only a disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the
defined by the new government of
Communist system, but it is also the attempt by the new government of
surviving back to before the Great
On this

Russia to come to grips with the end of the historic Russian empire and to
survive Russia's
disappearing into the challenge of
find a new relationship to the west and to the rest of the world, how to give

and a new
Russia a place not only in the international system but also in a new

CY2

11

to A possible path to peace in Russia

relationship to the west, without abandoning some of the historic fears that

exist, especially in eastern Europe? How to have a dialogue with Russia

without reigniting some imperial temptations? How to give Russia a status

for Russia

of equality that respects history and its dignity and takes into account the

same time some of the institutions that have developed in the postwar

under NATO.

period--that is a challenge that had been posed even before September 11 and

will respect it

put forward

to which President Putin has given interesting and often very constructive

an important goal

ideas. I believe the issue of missile defense is not one that will divide Russia

and the United States for any extended period. And in fact after I had had a

meeting with President Putin, a Russian journalist asked me what I thought of

the issue of missile defense after talking with President Putin, and I said "we

will probably come to an understanding with President Putin before we come

American media

to an understanding with the New York Times." And the question that is now

being posed by the Russian president, which is a sense of equal participation

in the dialogue between America, Europe, and Russia is one that, in the light

should be looked at from a new perspective.

The temptation has been whether one can in some way squeeze Russia into
the NATO structure and to find some formula by which one can have Russia

12

10 or 20 years from now will become a security threat to the United States
and whether therefore it is wiser to confront it today or to wait until later.

Now, again, there is no present security threat from China, and so the
question arises whether we should organize ourselves in a confrontational mode
for a danger that may not occur ever, and may be more likely if we stimulate
Chinese nationalism, and at the same time we have experienced a number of issues,

from nuclear proliferation to terrorism, where we can define common
objectives and methods of cooperation,

One could go around the membership of the existing coalition and illustrate
my basic point with any number of countries. I do not deny or reject that
there are fundamental grievances in the world that must be met, but those
grievances will require, in many cases, a long-term solution and they cannot
be dealt with, especially in the economic field, without the participation of
the countries that are most affected.

And so to the extent that we can emerge from this current crisis with a global
system, to that degree will we be able also to deal with fundamental issue of
inequality, poverty that are at the root of some of the problems, although it is

14

not the poor people who are producing the terrorism; the people carrying it
out are mostly upper middleclass.

America Iself

Now as far as we are concerned, I served in this city at a period of enormous
division in this country, where what was at issue most of the time was not so
much the individual policies as the motives and purposes of various
administrations. And the bitterness of that debate in many respects has gone
on for several decades, but the experience of the last month has provided an
opportunity to transcend this, and to end the debate that is so
characteristically American, that foreign policy should be essentially moral or
essentially realisitic. No country no matter how powerful can impose all its
preferences on the world without evoking universal resistance and without
overextending itself. Similarly, no nation can insist that its ideals alone are
the criterion by which all others can be judged. Any thoughtful American
foreign policy must realize that on the one hand one of the glories of this
country is the unity and dedication that has been so evident in the last month.

But at the same time, we owe it to ourselves to understand the histories and

15

the cultures of other societies, and to comprehend that the evolution of
different countries have produced various conceptions of what is legitimate
and what can be achieved. That does not mean that we have to give up our
values--our values enable us to persevere in difficult circumstances and to
make hard choices--but it does mean that to create an international system,
the art of the powerful is to create a degree of consensus.

When I was a young professor, I called on President Truman, who had left
office, and I asked President Truman what he had done of which he was most
proud, and he said, "I am most proud of the fact that we totally defeated our
enemies, and then we brought them back to the community of nations as
equals."

Now in a way, we face the same challenge. We have to defeat our enemies,
and we have to defeat them completely. And we cannot stop with some
partial successes in an isolated outpost. But at the same time we must use
this occasion to create a new community and a new sense of participation in

16

the international system. President Truman concluded his remarks by saying, "only Americans would have done that." Now I don't believe that only Americans can meet the present challenge, and so I look at this moment of crisis as a moment of great hope.

Questions and answers

1. In the light of the events of September 11, how would you amend the conclusions reached in your latest book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?

A. That would force me to admit that anything I have written needs amendment, which would be an historic event. I did not foresee in writing this book that an event such as the September 11 attack was conceivable. I did not take account of that at all. I treated terrorism as something that *on other continents* happens on the whole to other people or to Americans abroad, but not to the territorial United States. Secondly, I think I would modify my view about the relationship between America and Europe, if what we have seen from Europe

17

CJD

represents something in addition to simply gaining an influence over actions
that they knew we might take any way. And I think it was more than that.
And the manner in which, after American military action started, the leaders
of France, German, Italy expressed solidarity with the United States I would
not have expected, in light of what I wrote in my book. So I would modify
my analyses of European-American relationships, and so I would also extend
my analyses of Russian relationships. I was indicating the direction that I
outlined here, but I think the process has gone faster than I would have
expected. Before September 11

Q. Rogue states like Iraq and Lybia have done less to radicalize Islam than Saudia Arabia--witness the way they have subsidized Pakistan's Koranic schools. What can we do to change Saudi perspective?

A. I stated in my remarks that as we go through the various phases of the policy the President has announced, no country should be immune and no country should have the privilege of subsidizing terrorism directly or indirectly and for whatever motive. Now I think it is fair to recognize that

18

[Y]

Saudi Arabia has given us strong support on many issues, that many secretaries of state have been grateful, to Saudi Arabia and should be grateful to Saudi Arabia, but I believe that the Saudi government somewhere in this process will have to face the necessity of cutting off the financial support that organizations that lead or support terrorism comes from Saudi Arabia. And I don't think this is a matter of persuasion; they know what the problem is. They are trying to balance the fear of what these groups might do inside Saudi Arabia against the necessities they feel the need to preserve stability in the region. So we should deal with Saudi Arabia with understanding and compassion for their problem, but we cannot let any country escape the consequences of the terrorist policy that it has started.

Q. You have met with Mao Tse Tung, and Deng Shao Ping and Jiang Zemin.

How might China's foreign policy evolve under the next generation of leaders? Do you expect that China's entry into the WTO or the international war on terrorism might radically alter the tone of relations between the U.S. and the PRC?

19

A. We have experienced, in the building of the recent coalition, the necessity of cooperating with countries with which we had disagreements on philosophical and moral grounds. When we began to cooperate with China, it was done on the basis of a common enemy. In the meantime, China has undergone transformations that nobody would have thought possible in the 1970s. The China of today is not the China of Mao. ~~And since you have referred to my writings, I have said that I do not consider China a communist country~~ in the sense of that communism was understood in the Cold War period.

It is a one-party country, but not one that is an ideologically ~~far away from~~ the communist country. I believe that the successors of Jiang Zemin,--Mao brought about the unity of China, Deng brought about ~~beginning of the was annointed by Deng~~ the reform of China, Jiang Zemin has begun to face the consequences of rapid economic change outstripping political adaptation,--I believe that the successors of Jiang Zemin will face the problem of how to adjust their political institutions to a pluralistic economic system. Now how will this affect their foreign policy? The foreign policy of China, except vis-à-vis Taiwan, which they do not consider a foreign policy problem, has been on ~~For this reason they want a decade of peace.~~ the whole restrained. And even with respect to Taiwan it has been

20

substantially restrained. The problem in the next phase of China is whether
nationalism becomes the organizing principle of China to replace the
previous face of communism and how that nationalism will be interpreted.
And therefore I believe it is one of the tasks of American foreign policy to
enable that nationalism to be expressed in some form other than rabid
opposition to the United States. Of course, if should be challenged by it, we
will resist. But I do not think it is inherent in the American foreign policy
years China has no conceivable motive to engage in a confrontation with the

United States; therefore I believe that they will engage in a non-
confrontational foreign policy, provided that there is a thoughtful handling of
the Taiwan problem on all sides.

To what do you attribute the extreme rage of Muslim fundamentalists?

A Scholars whose opinions I respect hold the view, which I tend to share,
that some of this rage results from a sense of historic humiliation, that the
Islamic societies had great empires and were in the vangaard of progress for
long periods of history but in the last few hundred years they have not

21

managed to modernize to the same degree as many of the surrounding societies. And this sense of falling behind is then blamed in part to western materialism, western imperialism, western values, and some of the criticisms even have merit-- although they do not justify the rage with which they have been expressed, and part of it is a combination of falling behind and a sense that the west is weakening, and that therefore there is an opportunity to topple it and find a shortcut to reachving the lost eminence. But of course the hope and the purpose of foreign policy has to be to confine that rage to a small minority and to reduce that minority to less and less significant proportions and in time to eliminate it.

Q. Do you agree with those who say that not finishing the war by getting rid of Sadam Hussein was one of the great foreign policy blunders of the 20th century?

A. Uh, this is going to make me very popular here, I'd say two things. First of all, great foreign policy blunders I would not say. I think was a mistake, but I also remember that President Bush created a coalition and organized the

22

in the face of

resistance against Saddam Hussein against considerable opposition in this country and with great doubt among many of our allies. I remember that I testified on behalf of the administration before the Senate Armed Services Committee, which was holding hearings on whether embargo might not be the better policy. The vote in the Senate that issue was relatively narrow.

So I think when one talks about "mistake" one also has to pay tribute to the administration in office at the time for having recognized the profound danger that this would represent to all the democracies and to all countries if Sadam were not opposed. I believe it was probably a mistake not--if you put the issue in terms of should we have gone on to Bagdad--I don't think we should have gone on to Bagdad, but I think if we had destroyed Republican Guard divisions systematically and thereby undermined the basis of Sadam's

rule, he would have been overthrown and that would have created a demonstration in the area that, even if his successors were far from perfect, not

which they would have been, this would have demonstrated in the area that it was very dangerous & risky for the United States & the country

more decisive accomplishment and it was within our reach. So from that sort of an accomplishment

point of view I think it was a mistake, but it was a mistake by people who had pushed through the right policy and who deserve tremendous credit for

23

having saved the whole region by their decision to resist and to risk

American lives and spend American lives for the safety of the whole area and

of the world.

24

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:38 GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020-493-0834

P. 002

From: Gail Fineberg
To: Prosser Gifford
Date: Tue, Oct 16, 2001 3:59 PM
Subject: transcript of tape--with my phonetic spellings of Chinese names--

Henry Kissinger

"It is a great honor for me to have this opportunity to speak here at the Library of Congress about foreign policy. When this speech was planned I had thought of ~~presenting~~ a somewhat theoretical discussion on the nature of leadership in the conduct of foreign policy, but so many things have ~~would like to~~ happened in the interval that I ~~will~~ give my remarks a more contemporary cast.

All of us probably remember where we were when we learned of the attack on the World Trade Center. I was in Frankfurt, speaking to a group of businessmen, and I was supposed to go from that speech to the airport to take an airplane to China and I was just winding up the question period when a

1

TEL: 0207-493-0834

P. 003

journalist, who had sneaked into the group and wasn't supposed to be there,
asked an especially unfriendly question. And the chairman got up and said
that there had just been an attack on New York and Washington we have to
the break up this meeting and the journalist shouted, " You've got to answer that
question first. As I was walking out, he said, "You don't really believe
this." And he was right, I didn't think it was really impossible to believe and
that attack marks in my view a seminal change in the way Americans will
conceive foreign policy and the way in which the world will conduct foreign
policy, or should conduct foreign policy in the future.

Had it been so, I would have spoken about the unique character
of Americans' approach to foreign policy: the fact that the United States had
never received a direct threat or experienced a direct threat the fact that
Americans had never lived with the experience of tragedy caused by foreign
actions in their own country, about the belief that Americans have the
right to choose the degree of our participation and withdrawal almost at will.
Of course, at the close of the World War II period we became involved in
world affairs, but the impact of the destruction of downtown New York and

2

04-NOV.'01(SUN) 22:58 GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020-493-0834

P. 001

LYJ

the attack on the Pentagon have had a profound psychological impact here, and as it turns out, in much of the rest of the world.

When we look back at the '90s and at the debate on whether politically history was over and everything would even be determined by economics and social policy, it seems further removed than many much earlier periods. The debate that was going on between us and some of our traditional allies, whether Europe could find an identity primarily by differentiating itself from the United States, will have a different content from now on.

3

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:39 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:0207-493-0834

P. 005

Such
many critical periods. I have never seen a demonstration of defined unity as
in the last month, and I have never seen such a dedication to overcoming the
factional in-ence
traditional divisions that have been existing at least since the Viet Nam
to be
period. And all of these will turn out in the long term as assets in the conduct
of our foreign policy.

But let me say the first, say a few words, about the immediate situation.

Terrorism is usually described as a shadowy new form of war, without front lines, without clear-cut enemies, and without stated purposes that one could meet even if one wanted to. All that is true. On the other hand, the fundamental challenge of the attack on the social order and civil society that we have witnessed here, and that we see in many other countries, is not so elusive.

The terrorists, to be able to operate in a way that undermines social order in a systematic way, require some bases. Without these bases, they became random criminals and can be dealt with more or less as individuals. The fundamental challenge posed by the terrorism we have seen, is the state support, tacit or explicit, that these various organizations receive. Some of that tacit support derives from fear. There is in several countries a kind of

4

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:39

GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020 - 493-0834

F. OOC

EYJ

bargain by which the terrorist groups operate with relative safety so long as they don't aim their activities at their host government, or at their host country. Other countries-- fewer countries-- support terrorism as a method of diplomacy and as a method of warfare. But the key to defeating terrorism is to cut off the terrorists from their bases in other states. If that can be achieved, then the actions of the individual terrorists become much more a problem and much less an international problem. [CRIMINAL police]

Now with respect to the immediate situation in Afghanistan, the objective-- and I speak as a private citizen-- the objective cannot be just one terrorist

5

04-NOV. 01 (SUN) 22:39 GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 0207-493-0834

P. 007

leader, no matter how many cells he personally has created nor can it be only
the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is my view now that the *that*
operations have started they should not end and leave the Taliban in power.

The problem will therefore be whether we can maintain unity, not only in
*been the case*,
phase I, which has happened up to now, but whether we can maintain unity in
*And*
phase II because phase II will require the organization of some kind of
*the*
structure in Afghanistan that cannot be based only on the Northern Alliance, *but*

will have
has to include the Pashtun population in southern part of Afghanistan, and to
do that without getting ourselves drawn into the sort of conflict that anybody
has
that tried to govern Afghanistan from the outside has experienced. *So an*
*An*
attempt should undoubtedly be made to create a broad-based structure in

Kabul. But once that has been achieved, the organization of the country will
have to be turned over to some kind of international body, formally perhaps *to*
*or*
the United Nations, maybe a contact group composed of all the neighboring
countries that are part of the overall coalition, plus those countries that have
participated in the military operations, and *that* would then create a kind of
cooperation between countries that have not in the past looked at the stability
of the Middle East as a joint problem. It cannot be the task of the U.S. alone

6

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:40 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:0207-493-0834

P. 005

to organize a government in Afghanistan. But it also cannot be that we stop
this operation and leave the matter to total chaos. So this operation should in
my view be continued until the Taliban has been removed, until some
alternative structure has been created, and then we will get to phase III.

And phase III will be what the President has repeatedly affirmed, that any
country that supports terrorism will be treated as an opponent of the United
States. ~~And~~ *this* When we get to Phase III, we will confront the fact that the
coalition that has been so skillfully *been* created by the president and the
secretary of state is composed of many different elements. At this moment, it
is an *à la carte* coalition in which every member can choose *that* activity most
compatible with its domestic structure. But of course it is composed of many
*不同 nations of traditional allies, of traditional adversaries who in this*
case share our objectives, of countries that share our purposes but are afraid
to affirm them, of countries that do not share our purposes but use
participation as a means of escaping embarrassing challenges.
*together*

And the task will be to hold hopefully all of the coalition, *but if necessary*,
that part of the coalition that is willing to continue, behind the task of dealing

7

04-NOV. '01 (SUN) 22:40 GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020 / 493-0834

that
with these various organizations that exist in various countries and which
that
often affirm causes which are very understandable. But the basic principle
that must be affirmed is that no historic grievance and no present cause
justifies the undiscriminating attack, or for that matter discriminating attack,
① and that those
on civilians whose primary purpose and often exclusive purpose is to disrupt
civil order and make civil society untenable, and to undermine any concept of
will not be tolerated.
legal government. That is not to oppose this wherever it is used. It is not to
for
take sides in the political or traditional military conflict, and it is not all that
difficult to distinguish between guerilla war and terrorism if a determination
to do so exists. I believe that the president means what he says, that this is a
conflict that we will pursue. And when there is an attack on the territory of
the United States and thousands of people are killed within minutes, there has
to be a determined American reaction, not just for the self-respect of America
but for the safety of all the people of the world who depend on us or depend
on some concept of order. That will be the next phase of foreign policy.
But beyond this I look at this period, not just from the point of view of
eliminating the fundamental challenge that has been posed, but from the
perspective of what happened in the immediate post war period at the end of
World War II.

8

TEL: 0207-493-0834

P. 01

World War II. At the end of World War II, an isolationist America confronted a world that it had in no way been expected. President Roosevelt told Churchill as late as 1944 that any idea of keeping American troops in Europe for more than two years after the end of the war was absolutely out of the question. And then in a great burst to creativity, America in the period from 1945 into the 50s devised a whole series of measures to bring structure and security to the world together with its allies. It helped secure democracy in Europe and Japan, and laid the basis for the world that emerged in the 1990s, in which we thought foreign policy was over. So now we and those countries that can cooperate with us and are willing to cooperate have another historic opportunity. We no longer have one particular enemy. We now have a problem that can appear in many parts of the globe. And we must do something that we have not historically undertaken, namely to build an international structure without a specific national challenge. And in this respect, what has happened has accelerated the changes that are already taking place, but also given them a new perspective.

Three months ago, it would have been considered highly improbable that our European allies would express solidarity on any issue we then knew about with

9

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:41

GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020 - 493-0834

P. 01.

such unanimity and with such precision. And therefore the relationship of America to Europe can be given a new perspective. On the European side it is perhaps ~~more~~ clearer than it was then, that there some dangers that still unite us even in the security field. There is no European country that would ~~be~~ in position to respond with the same speed and effectiveness to a similar attack on its own capitol or principle cities.

At the same time the question of European identity can be considered from a perhaps less restricted perspective. To be sure, and no one in America should ~~needs to~~ reject this, Europe has its own history and ~~will~~ define some of its own purposes. ~~But I do not believe that~~ in the long run European identity should ~~not~~ be based on what differentiates it from the United States and ~~must include a~~ major aspect of cooperation. The impact of the British Prime Minister's behavior and speeches, not just on British-American relations but on the American attitude towards the importance of allies, has been enormously significant. At the same time on some of the issues that have concerned Americans, such as European security policy, we can take another look at whether it is inevitable that a European security policy that achieves a degree of separation ~~must inevitably be to the detriment of~~ the United States.

10

04-NOV. 1974 (U) 01-58 (S) 22:41 GOLDBAMMER

TEL: 0207-493-0834

For the issues we have now seen, Europe would be at least as
because with respect to the table
threatened as the United States. Similarly, the issue of missile defense, which
seemed for a while to split the alliance, and ironically to split the alliance
more than it threatened our relationship with Russia, I think it is clear now
that if the explosion in New York had been launched with a missile attack, and that
if the American people knew that some technology existed to prevent this,
but had
that its government had refused to adopt that technology for a variety of
ideological and political reasons, it would totally undermine confidence in
our government. And for this reason I believe that the issue of missile
defense in the months ahead will find its solution not only in relation with
our European allies but in relations to Russia.

the
Now that relationship to Russia in any event has undergone a fundamental
change. It is not only in the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Communist system, but it is also in the attempt by the new government of
Russia to come to grips with the end of the historic Russian empire and to
find a new relationship to the west and to the rest of the world. Yet to give
Russia a place not only in the international system but also in a new

11

04-NOV. '01 (SUN) 22:41 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:020 - 493-0834

ignoring some of the historic fears that relationship to the west, without abandoning still exist, especially in eastern Europe? How to have a dialogue with Russia of its without reigniting some imperial temptations? How to give Russia a status of equality that respects its history and its dignity and take into account the same time some of the institutions that have developed in the postwar period--that is a challenge that had been posed even before September 11 and to which President Putin has given interesting and often very constructive ideas. I believe the issue of missile defense is not one that will divide Russia and the United States for any extended period. And in fact after I had had a meeting with President Putin, a Russian journalist asked me what I thought of the issue of missile defense after talking with President Putin, and I said "We will probably come to an understanding with President Putin before we come to an understanding with the New York Times." And the question that is now being posed by the Russian president, which is a sense of equal participation in the dialogue between America, Europe, and Russia is one that, in the light of recent events can be looked at from a new perspective.

12

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:42 .GOLDHAMMER

TEL:020-493-0834

P. 01: CYS

as a perspective member without quite having it enter NATO, because NATO does not protect its participants against each other. I believe it would be much more creative to create a new political consultative mechanism--that does not pretend that NATO is not fundamentally a military alliance-- but a consultative alliance that makes Russia a participant in major political decisions organic, a political mechanism that includes America, Europe, (however Europe chooses to organize itself, and Russia in some manner whereby the issue of attack from Russia is made hopelessly irrelevant by the intensity of consultation, but where the essential defense mechanisms remain for whatever common military efforts Europe and the United States want to undertake together. Experience in the terrorism issue has demonstrated that we can cooperate with Russia very effectively wherever we feel a common security threat, and with respect to the dealings with each other it is to be desired that politically, the danger of military aggression between Russia and its western neighbors simply does not arise.

And in this manner, there is a whole host of issues we have had a debate in this county on China which has revolved around the question whether China will

13

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:42 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:020-493-0834

P.013

Now, again, there is no present security threat from China, but so the question is whether we should organize ourselves in a confrontational mode for a danger that may not occur ever, and may be more likely if we stimulate Chinese nationalism, and at the same time we have experienced a number of issues, from nuclear proliferation to terrorism, where we can define common objectives.

And so to the extent that we can emerge from this current crisis with a global system, to that degree will we be able to deal with fundamental issues of inequality, poverty that are at the root of some of the problems, although it is

14

04-NOV 011SON 22:45 GULDHAMMER

TEL: 020 - 493-0834

P. 016

Now as far as we are concerned, I served in this city at a period of enormous division in this country, where what was at issue most of the time was not so much the individual policies as the motives and purposes of various administrations. And the bitterness of that debate, in many respects, has gone on for several decades, but the experience of the last month has provided an opportunity to transcend this, and to end the debate that is so characteristically American, that foreign policy should be essentially moral or essentially realistic. No country no matter how powerful can impose all its preferences on the world without evoking universal resistance and without overextending itself. Similarly, no nation can insist that its ideals alone are the criterion by which all others can be judged. Any thoughtful American, take into account, our foreign policy must realize that on the one hand one of the glories of this country is the unity and dedication that has been so evident in the last month.

15

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:43

GOLDHAMMER

TEL:020 -493-0834

P.01

The cultures of other societies, and to comprehend that the evolution of different countries have produced various conceptions of what is legitimate and what can be achieved. That does not mean that we have to give up our values--our values enable us to persevere in difficult circumstances and to make hard choices--but it does mean that to create an international system, the art of the powerful is to create a degree of consensus.

by then

Now in a way, we face the same challenge. We have to defeat our enemies, and we have to defeat them completely. And we cannot stop with some partial successes in an isolated outpost. At the same time we must use this occasion to create a new community and a new sense of participation in

16

04-A01. 01(SUN) 22-43 GOLDHAMMER

TEL 020 -493-0834

P. 01: CYJ

## Questions and answers

A. That would force me to admit that anything I have written needs amendment, which would be an historic event. I did not foresee in writing this book that an event such as the September 11 attack was conceivable. I did not take account of that at all. I treated terrorism as something that happens on the whole to other people or to Americans abroad, but not to the territorial United States. Secondly, I think I would modify my view about the relationship between America and Europe if what we have seen from Europe

17

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:43 GOLDBAMMER

TEL:020 - 493-0804

F. 01-TYJ

more than represents something in addition to simply gaining an influence over actions that they knew we might take any way. And I think it was more than that.

I would not have expected it, but I think we might take any action that is necessary. And the manner in which, after American military action started, the leaders of France, Germany, Italy expressed solidarity with the United States I would not have expected in light of what I wrote in my book, *The General*. So I would modify my analysis of European-American relationships, and I would also extend my analyses of Russian relationships. In my book, *The General*, I was indicating the direction that I outlined here, but I think the process has gone faster than I would have expected.

18

04-NOV. 01 (SUN) 22:44 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:0207-493-0834

P. 020CYJ

Saudi Arabia has given us strong support on many issues, that many secretaries of state have been grateful to, Saudi Arabia and should be grateful to Saudi Arabia, but I believe that the Saudi government somewhere in this process will have to face the necessity of cutting off the financial support that comes from Saudi Arabia. And I don't think this is a matter of persuasion; they know what the problem is. They are trying to balance the fear of what these groups might do inside Saudi Arabia against the necessities they feel also of preserving stability in the region. So we should deal with Saudi Arabia with understanding and compassion for their problem, but we cannot let any country escape the consequences of the antiterrorist policy now that it has started.

19

04-10Y. 01(SUN) 22:44 GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020 -493-0834

P. 02. CY3

A. We have experienced, in the building of the recent coalition, the necessity of cooperating with countries with which we had disagreements on philosophical and moral grounds. When we began to cooperate with China, it was done on the basis of a common enemy. In the meantime, China has undergone transformations that nobody would have thought possible in the 1970s. The China of today is not the China of Mao. And since you have referred to my writings, I have said that I do not consider China a communist country in the sense that communism was understood in the Cold War period. It is a one-party country, but not an ideologically communist country. I believe that the successors of Jiang Zemin, Mao brought about the unity of China, Deng brought about beginning of the reform of China, and Jiang Zemin has begun to face the consequences of rapid economic change outstripping political adaptation. I believe that the successors of Jiang Zemin will face the problem of how to adjust their political institutions to a pluralistic economic system. Now how will this affect their foreign policy? The foreign policy of China, except vis à vis Taiwan, which they do not consider a foreign policy problem, has been on the whole restrained. And even with respect to Taiwan it has been

20

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:44 GOLDHAMMER

TEL: 020-493-0834

P. 022

And therefore I believe it is one of the tasks of American foreign policy to
enable that nationalism to be expressed in some form other than rabid
opposition to the United States. Of course, if ~~should be~~ challenged by it, we
~~must~~
will resist. But I do not think it is inherent. I think that ~~for the next 10 to 15
years~~ China has no conceivable motive to engage in a confrontation with the
~~rather~~
United States; therefore I believe that they will engage in a non-
confrontational foreign policy, provided that ~~there is~~ a thoughtful handling of
the Taiwan problem on all sides.

A. Scholars whose opinions I respect hold the view, which I tend to share, that some of this rage results from a sense of historic humiliation, that the Islamic societies had great empires and were in the vangaard of progress for long periods of history but in the last few hundred years ~~they~~ have not

21

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:45 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:020-493-0804

P.020 [Y]

managed to modernize to the same degree as many of the surrounding societies. And this sense of falling behind is then blamed in part on western materialism, western imperialism, western values-- some of the criticisms even have merit, although they do not justify the rage with which they have been expressed, and part of it is a combination of falling behind and a sense that the west is weakening, and therefore there is an opportunity to topple it and find a shortcut to reaching the lost eminence. But of course the hope and the purpose of foreign policy has to be to confine that rage to a small minority and to reduce that minority to less and less significant proportions and in time to eliminate it.

A: This is going to make me very popular here, I'd say two things. First of all, great foreign policy blunder I would not say. I think was a mistake, but I also remember that President Bush created a coalition and organized the

22

TEL: 0207-493-0834

F 024 CYJ

resistance against Saddam Hussein against considerable opposition in this
country and with great doubt among many of our allies. I remember that I
testified on behalf of the administration before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, which was holding hearings on whether embargo might not be
the better policy. The vote in the Senate that issue was relatively narrow.
So I think when one talks about "mistake" one also has to pay tribute to the
administration in office at the time for having recognized the profound
not opposing
danger that this would represent to all the democracies and to all countries
Sadam were not opposed. I believe it was probably a mistake not to put
the issue in terms of should we have gone on to Bagdad? I don't think we
should have gone on to Bagdad, but if we had destroyed Republican
Guard divisions systematically and thereby undermined the basis of Sadam's

a crucial rule, he would have been overthrown and that would have created a
demonstration in the area that, even if his successors were far from perfect,
which they would have been, this would have demonstrated in the area that
a more decisive accomplishment and it was within our reach. So from that
point of view I think it was a mistake, but it was a mistake by people who had
pushed through the right policy and who deserve tremendous credit for

23

04-NOV. 01(SUN) 22:46 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:020-495-0834

P.02-2

having saved the whole region by their decision to resist and to risk American lives and spend American lives for the safety of the whole area and the entire world.

24