DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
Secretary Sisco
Dec. 4, 1971; 9:15 a.m.

S: I just talked to George Bush. I told him we want to be sure you understand what the President's posture is in the Security Council.

K: Wait a minute. We haven't agreed to take it. . .

S: I have given no word to anybody. Want you to understand we have it tilted toward Pakistan. President wants enough US leadership to show we are not dragging our feet. But not enough we will be held accountable if the Security Council is held inactive.

K: Exactly.

S: I have given no instructions to George Bush. My reaction is this is an official reaction on the part of the Paks. Insofar as the changes in the resolution are concerned I am willing to take them on. One is going to prove difficult. We should take chances and try our best.

K: I saw cable yesterday. We are going to let Bangla Desh people participate. We don't have to agree at all.

S: We have not given any instructions. It hasn't come up. Let's talk about it at 11:00 and find out whether it is going to occur. In the Security Council there is an article, Rule 22, where the Security Council want to consider a case where individuals who something akin to experts. This is a rule that historically has been used for the Council to hear people with information to provide without any implications of recognition. Let's talk about it at 11:00 this morning. I want to focus on it.

K: Let me see whether I can reach the President. To see whether he is willing to go ahead on the basis of this information.

S: You should put this in the most positive terms

K: My instinct is that he will go ahead. I think by noon he will have given his authority.

S: By noon?

K: What difference does an hour or two make.

S: We are now being criticized by the press and the radio.

K: For 14 days we couldn't find out allegedly what was going on. There is no press going to appear for 24 hours.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

S: Henry, OK, you do as you will. You don't want George to begin to collect any guys ...

K: I would like to give the President a chance at it. My recommendation is that of yours I think. We should go. I am practically sure by 10:30 I will have gotten to the President.

S: I think others are moving to the point where we will become submerged.

K: The only policy with which you are connected is not the danger of being submerged.

S: I mean the United States. I just sit here and take orders from you. That's all I do.

K: You son of a bitch. Goodbye.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
The President

Dec 4, 1971; 10:50 a.m.

P: How is the battle going today?

K: On the matter we discussed last evening, how to handle getting it to the Security Council, we followed your instructions and it turned out to be exactly right. It appealed to Bill when he understood he would be way out in front again.

P: On the announcement?

K: Yes. We have agreed to the day's line-up. Take it there about Noon. State will put out an announcement and Bush will call the Council.

P: Good. Well, he took it without complaint?

K: With agreement, so there is no problem.

P: The more I thought about it it was the only way to happen. He is a damn fool to go there. The State Department is trying to think of a way for them to get credit. But you don't get credit except by succeeding. I can see why they got Johnson in such a mess having them run around to all the countries. They don't understand this other thing.

K: Absolutely.

P: Anything new on the fighting itself?

K: It is getting clear the Indians are the attackers.

P: Is that getting through on the press?

K: I am getting with the intelligence people at 11:00 and then getting Scali to put it out.

P: Turn Scali loose on this and on knocking the silly thing Church said down.

K: We have had an urgent appeal from Yahya. Says his military supplies have been cut off - in very bad shape. Would we help through Iran.

P: Can we help?

K: I think if we tell the Iranians we will make it up to them we can do it.

P: If it is leaking we can have it denied. Have it done one step away. Do you have to go through MacArthur to do it?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: I am studying the thing.

P: That would not be safe.

K: I can't give you an answer for a couple of hours.

P: I like the idea. The main thing is to keep India from crumbling them up.

K: Russians have replied to letter. They thought there should be a political solution first. Inconclusive. They will are having a good time. We have informed the Chinese last night we will probably go to the Security Council. No problem with that.

P: Good. Anything new on the Cambodian thing?

K: I got a backchannel from Ladd. Some setbacks, but the annual thing and we should not panic on it. He put it into a much soberer context. He said the situation has already eased and he says an occasional rocket attack aimed at the direction of the airport creates noise, but all the major elements of the North Vietnamese first division have been withdrawn to face the new attack coming from Vietnam.

P: Yes.

K: He says we will get through this crisis and we should not get too excited. We have to get some basic numbers across but will go slowly. He has been pretty eager in the past. I have told Moorer to push whatever can be done on our side.

P: Good. All right. Fine. Well we will go along those lines.
Thanks, Henry.

K: We have been through it before.

P: And we will be again.

K: I think so. We will tell the Iranians we will.

If it is leaking we can have it denied
you have to go through MacArthur to do

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers
11:05 a.m. 12/4/71

HAK: The President just called and I told him what we decided. He said okay.

WR: George said the Britians are cold because we are cancelling everything with the Pakistanians. I said this wasn't true.

HAK: That's right.

WR: I think we are set

HAK: The President was screaming he wants Church taken on.

WR: I was going to take him on. We didn't understand why the President is so upset. It didn't get any play.

HAK: The President saw it in the summaries--there was some play.

WR: It never appeared except UPI Dispatch. We can rebuke Church.

HAK: Let's wait.

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

Telcon
Dr. Hannah, AID
Dec. 4, 1971; 12:00 Noon

H: On this agrucultural oil for wheat deal. Since this is what you and the President want done. Not done on Monday, let's have it done today. Final negotiation for long period of time. No interest. Not get it mixed up with the other stuff.

K: Yes.

H: I told Maury put it on the A B basis. Not something you and the President have got to approve. You can veto it on Monday or Tuesday.

K: OK, let's see do it that way. Good idea.

H: OK.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:15 p.m. 12/4/71

RN: Upon studying these reports on Pakistan--the main thing that needs to be done is the Public relations side of it. As far as the White House, we are weaker than we should be. I want it to be a necessity to get Scali turned loose on what we are doing--what we have done and blame India. The "Libs" can say we brought this on by the arms support to Pakistan. That will be their argument. India will be doing "PR" to make Pakistan look like it caused it. Get the point?

HAK: Yes

RN: Be sure to give Scali free rein. He must understand it.

HAK: I am setting out to do some background.

RN: Let him be responsible about it. State should be pitching it.

HAK: They are being very even handed--they are more interest in
how they look.

RN: Well, I understand. When they were loving it. The Indians are picking up on China's faults. thought the Russians were responsible

HAK: This is the worse setback for two weeks. We have known what is needed and couldn't get it down. We should have they started two weeks ago. when

RN: Going from here, this couldn't or can't go on long.

HAK: India is now waging a full-scaled war on East Pakistan. India will be then moving in on West Pakistan.

RN: What other lines can we go--what about the Security Council.

HAK: At the Security Council, the Indians and Soviets are going to delay long enough so a resolution can not be passed. If it was, the Soviets would veto. UN will be impotent. So the Security Council is just a paper exercise--it will get the Post and Times off our backs. And the Libs will be happy that we turned it over to the UN. The damage won't show up for a few weeks. At the moment we retrench around the world, this proves that countries can get away with brutality.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Page 2
President/Kissinger

RN: Now, what else?

HAK: I think we should get off letters of credit worth 99M---that is underway. We should not be giving any economic aid in India. We gave 60% to economic development to India.

RN: Say I want Scali to blame India.

HAK: I'll get Scali

RN: Let's get some PR out on them--put the blame on India. It will also take some blame off us. Our story about getting off militarily didn't get much play. They will feel the economic one. We have got to help rebuild Pakistan.

RN: Sure--major economic development for Pakistan in a month with when the smoke clears.

RN: The U.S. cannot be responsible for maintaining peace every place in the world. We can use our influence, but may not always be successful. American public will welcome that.

HAK: We won't get blamed. Walters (Barbara) was in the other day and she asked about India/Pakistan and I gave her some facts. She said why not put it out, for god's sake. I couldn't get any of the bureaucrats to do it. We will put out the facts, Mr. President.

HAK

RN: Meantime, we assure that things will continue.....

HAK: If war does continue, give aid via Iran.

RN: Good, at least Pakistan will be kept from being paralized.

HAK: It is the PR that is the important thing--Scali, Bush. We will put in a resolution asking for withdrawal and ceasefire.

RN: How about sanctioning.

HAK: No before we get it--we won't get it thru at all--the Soviets will veto if it gets a majority. Now that Indian will occupy all of Pakistan we will see [x] their real motives. If the East Benglas get [x], if they think Pakistan is brutal, wait till India gets them. India will push the Moslems into a much narrow area than they already have.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
Secy Sisco

Dec. 4, 1971; 12:40 p.m.

K: I have a raging President on my hands. Wants you to background this afternoon. Tilt it clearly towards Pakistan. Wants statement we had ready yesterday out.

S: Does he know it's in George Bush's speech? Remember, you and I put it in the speech.

K: Yes.

S: I will do whatever I am told.

K: The alternative is I will do it.

S: The Secretary is here. If he has no objection I will do it.

K: We will transmit a Presidential Order without somebody saying the Secretary has no objection.

S: What can I do. I am only an Assistant Secretary. I have got to go up there if the Secretary agrees he will do it right away.

K: He wants to make sure the basic facts come out right away.

S: This is why we put it in the George Bush speech. All the changes last night we have edited including that one very strong paragraph where you said war isn't the answer. I thought it was excellent.

K: OK. Well, now. . .

S: One or two things. Call the Secretary, or if you want me to go upstairs. . .

K: Let me call the Secretary.

S: You will call him. OK.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

2:05 12/4/71

WR: In order to try to figure out where we are--the President has issued a statement out of Key Biscayne.

HAK: He has?

WR: Zeigler has said "has ordered us to do this" I have got to get a better understanding of this.

HAK: I haven't seen anything on the ticker.

WR: Take a look at the ticker.

WR:

HAK: I will get it. /There is no election on our part to do what he wants.

WXX HAK: Let me look at it. I will call you back

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Ambassador Bush/Dr. Kissinger

12/4/71 2:30 p.m.

HAK: What time is the Security Council meeting?

GB: Five o'clock. We just came from a meeting of non-permanent members and the permanent members. There was an open clash between the Soviets and the People's Republic of China.

HAK: Don't get in the way of the clashing.

GB: The Russians want a defined ____ on question of East Pakistan, but China said it would not tolerate any internal affairs. PRC phrased the question of India/Pakistan.

GB: This needs some thought Henry. Circulating around are representatives of Bengla Desh saying they are representatives of the government of Bengla Desh and are requesting to be heard. There is a certain way that they can be heard--as individuals

HAK: Clearly resist it. We can abstain if they come in as individuals.

GB: Before our statement we will have a fight as to whom will be represented and then we will make our statement.

HAK: We have put out a statement at Key Biscayne to give you a little to lean on.

GB: Will you be around tonight?

HAK: Yes, either Haig or me. You will call me--What about the meeting on Monday?

GB: There will be no break. It will be all right. They want to do it.

HAK: Just keep in close step with us.

GB: We have no feeling as to what they want.

HAK: The President is delighted with how we are working so closely.

GB: What about this--if we can get a majority vote--what can we support--what about a resolution on withdrawal and ceasefire?

HAK: That is okay.

TELCONE (Home)
Ambassador Afshar (Iran)/Mr. Kissinger

12/4/71

A: This is Ambassador Afshar from Iran.

K: Oh, yes.

A: How are you, sir?

K: Okay.

A: You must be so terribly busy and tired, I'm sorry to bother you.

K: No, no, it's all right. No, I just tried to call you on behalf of the
President. He would be interested on a personal basis to get the
Iranian assessment of the Pakistan situation. Not through channels.

A: Yes.

K: But maybe from the Shah to you and then directly to me.

A: All right, I will do that, Mr. Kissinger. Right away. And as you know
we are very much concerned about the whole thing and when President
Podgornyy was in New York, the Shah talked to him and also the Shah
talked to President Tito. I have delivered the three long pages telegram
from his Majesty to Marshall Tito when he was here in the United States.

K: Yes.

A: To discuss that with the President about the situation in Pakistan. And
we are really very much concerned and now we see a real escalation in
the war and I will send a cable right now to His Majesty.

K: Yes, but we want to keep -- this is a personal message from the President

A: That's right.

K: And we don't want it in regular diplomatic channels.

A: All right.

K: Because we are sympathetic to anything you can do to give help there.

A: Thank you very much. You mean the message is the oral message, yes,
which I have just to deliver.

K: Yes, and give it to me personally and to no one else.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F-O 12958
Author:
By NARA Date 6/4/71

12/4/71

A: Thank you very much. It is not a written message of the President.

K: No.

A: No, all right. I will call His Majesty. I will talk to His Majesty, I will talk to His Majesty and I will be in touch with you personally.

K: Good, thank you.

A: I do that, yeah.

K: Thank you.

A: You are always very helpful. Thank you very much, I hope you can do your best, you know, because they are in a pretty bad shape.

K: We'll do our best and we always stick by our friends in Iran and in Pakistan.

A: Thank you very much, sir.

K: Goodbye.

A: Goodbye, thank you.

MJD F.O. 12958
 Authority
By ____ NARA Date 6/4/71

DECLASSIFIED

MJO FO 12958

Authoritative

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCOM

General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

December 4 or 5, 1971

K: Hello, Al.

H: Yes, Henry.

K: Did you get that straightened out?

H: Yeah, Joe said he didn't know how it could have happened; he doesn't even recall it. And I said, well, just give Van Hollen a call up there because they haven't tabled it yet.

K: Take out the word "political".

H: Take out the word "political" if it's in there.

K: In the fourth paragraph.

H: In the fourth paragraph.

K: Okay, I tell you these crooks are unbelievable.

H: Yeah. You know, I believe him but one of his henchmen might have done it.

K: But how is this thing playing -- his background? The President is calling raving.

H: What about?

K: He wants to cut off all aid; he thinks I'm too soft. (laughter)

H: Well, this is that twilight hour.

K: Yeah.

H: No, I think it is playing very well; it's going very strong against the Indians.

K: Is it? Good.

H: Yeah, yeah.

K: Well, that's what we want.

H: The Paks asked for a copy of Ziegler's transcript. Janka said we never do. I said give them the goddamn thing.

TELCON
General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

K: Okay, fine. Yeah, I think we are gonna put some paws into this operation yet.

H: Yeah, well.

K: Not into the military. If we had acted like this two weeks ago, they would have had second thoughts.

H: That's what I think, that's what I think.

K: Don't you?

H: You have got to move boldly when you move, that's the goddamn problem. And getting those people to do anything over there is just too much.

K: If we had done it two weeks ago when they started, -- when they wanted us to press to release Mujib (sp?).

H: That's right, that's right; that's exactly what their solution was.

K: If we had moved this boldly two weeks ago, if we had cut off economic aid and military aid a week earlier, it might have made a difference. Before she got all committed.

H: That's right, that's exactly right.

K: Okay, fine, thank you.

H: All right.

DECLASSIFIED

M0012958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/9/07

TELCOM

12/4/71 (From the Residence)

President/Kissinger

K: Mr. President.

P: Yes, Henry.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date on what happened. First, we positioned Ziegler with a pretty tough statement for his press briefing to make clear where you stood and on that basis . . .

P: They are all aware of the fact that I am in complete touch with it all the time.

K: Well, that's what I . . . Frankly, State had put out a story this morning that you were just being kept generally aware so we had Ziegler say that you ordered the thing.

P: Which is true.

K: Which is exactly true. You talked to me 6 times yesterday.

P: And a half a dozen times today.

K: That's right.

P: And ordered what? You mean on the cut-off of arms?

K: Oh, on the move to the Security Council.

P: Right, yes.

K: I mean that you gave the go-ahead.

P: Right.

K: And then on the basis of that Sisco gave a backgrounder which I understand is playing very well positioning the thing. We've drafted a very tough speech for Bush.

P: Good.

K: And he's on the floor now. He tells me that at the Preparatory Meeting the Chinese jumped all over the Russians and Indians and apparently the Indians wanted to put on the agenda only the item of problems of East Pakistan and the Chinese said "No, let's call it problems of India." And that's all right if they all brawl with each other.

DECLASSIFIED

 Authority

 By NARA Date 6/4/71

2

P: Good. Let the liberals choose now between China and India. That'll be very good.

K: Exactly.

P: Very good. Boy, this really . . . you know, we don't like this but you realize this is causing our liberal friends untold anguish, Henry.

K: And, Mr. President, actually in terms of the political situation, first of all we won't take any much immediate flak, but in six months the liberals are going to look like jerks because the Indian occupation of East Pakistan is going to make the Pakistani one look like child's play.

P: Yes. Well, the main thing we're not going to do is be suckered by the Indians into a huge aid program. Now that I want clearly understood. You know after they have screwed this thing up, by God, I can't emphasize too strongly how I feel. We told Mrs. Gandhi we're going to cut off that aid and we're going to do it. Has the word gone out?

K: The word has gone out, Mr. President, and on Monday morning - We've already told the banks to hold it and on Monday morning it's going to be effective. I mean nothing can happen before Monday.

P: I see. And you're examining every other possibility of how we can squeeze India right now.

K: That is right, Mr. President.

P: It's to be done. Everything is to be held up. Everything is to be dragged. Everything else. They cannot get away with this and . . . well, they will get away with it, but we can't allow them to without knowing our displeasure.

K: But what we have to reconsider now is whether it is in our interest to be the chief development - source of development capital - of a country that has performed such actions.

P: That's right. Oh, you mean next year's aid program?

K: That's right.

P: That's what I want now, though. The way I want that handled is for people like Passman and some of our friends in the House and the Senate, even the more liberal types, to come out and say cut aid to

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 2958
Authority:
By - NARA Date 6/4/04

3

India. Get my point.

K: Absolutely.

P: Let them take the lead rather than have us take the lead.

K: Right.

P: Can we do that?

K: Certainly.

P: Well, can we put somebody to work on it so that it'll be discreetly done. I just want . . .

K: I've already talked to Passman in that sense.

P: Well, Passman, but there are others - there's got to be a whole plan.

K: Well, Passman thought we should go easy until we've got the present aid program through the budget.

P: Yes.

K: Through the Congress.

P: Yes. And then what would he do? Then he would go after. . .

K: Next year's appropriation.

P: Is that what you're talking about - next year's?

K: I'm talking about what we put into the budget for '73.

P: Well, it's going to be goddamn little that's for sure.

K: Well, that's what we should do, Mr. President. And this year's we can also cut.

P: I want it cut what we are doing now in fact. And as far as next year's is concerned we just cut that, but I don't want to cut Pakistan's. We're going to play this fair now. I just hope we can get someone on the story now. Did you get Scali turned loose so that he has a . . .

DECLASSIFIED

MD FO 12958

By NARA Date 6/1/04

4

K: We gave Scali the facts yesterday, but we couldn't locate him today. But we've been thumping out the facts all day and I think you will find that the combination of the statement we got Ziegler to make, the Sisco backgrounder and what Bush is going to say tonight is going to be quite a massive dose.

P: It will put us on the side of trying to restrain India.

K: That's right.

P: That's what I really feel we've got to get across. Now I haven't been following the editorial comments, what are the *Times* and *Post* and those jackasses saying?

K: Well, the *Times* hasn't said anything yet. The *Post* is bleeding about it's going to the Security Council which we've done.

P: Well, of course, but are they blaming India or Pakistan, or both, or neither?

K: Well, they are trying to be pretty even-handed. They're blaming India. They are blaming India for the military actions and then, of course, they are bleeding about the refugees. But it's beginning to tilt against India.

P: We've got to make it tilt more because we know they are totally to blame. We know that. We know the Paks don't want this.

K: That's right. Well, the Paks don't want it. The Paks accepted every proposal of ours. I told the Indian Ambassador before he left that we would work out a complete program with them for political autonomy within a year if they...

P: You've gotten out the fact that, for example, it may be that you ought to have a backgrounder tomorrow. Are you in New York?

K: No, I'm in Washington.

P: A backgrounder tomorrow where you can point out that we told Mrs. Gandhi that the Paks were prepared to withdraw from the border. And that we said we would be willing to look at this and that, in spite of this they haven't done it. I think it's very important to put the burden on India on this, Henry. I just don't feel that we can. . . now the other side of it that you can say, well, there's 400 million people who have their. . .

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/1/01

DECLASSIFIED

MD F0 12958

By ____ NARA Date 6/1/04

K: Well, but we haven't got them anyway, Mr. President.

P: We've got their enmity anyway. That's what she's shown in this goddamn thing, hasn't she?

K: I mean it isn't that we are losing an ally. They were the ones that made a treaty with the Russians. They are the ones that are now establishing the principle that forces the only method - the principle method for settling disputes and it isn't that we're losing anything. In fact, if we do it the right way, we can still get them to come back to us, to get back in our good graces. The Russians aren't going to give them $700 million in development money.

P: The only thing, it is very important to get the P.R. thing across. I do want you to try to find Scali and get him to work on the thing.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: But he's not in town, you say?

K: Well, I don't know. We've been trying all day. And we are continuing to try.

P: All right. But what do you think about your doing a backgrounder, or is that overkill?

K: I think it'd be overkill tomorrow, but what I might do, if you agree, Mr. President, and we think it's necessary. I worked out with Ziegler a procedure which we've always wanted to try where I step into his briefing. I mean, he calls me in when questions start falling and says, - why don't we get Henry on background on this - and I just step into his briefing.

P: Why don't you do that?

K: Monday morning. By that time. . .

P: I'm having that day with NBC that day. You could pop in and I could say Ziegler could come in and approve it and so forth, I guess.

K: I thought one of the things I might do, Mr. President, I've got ten minutes with you in the morning, to brief you on the India situation.

P: Sure, sure. Or anything you want, I mean . . .

K: I know, but . . .

DECLASSIFIED

MWO EO 12958
Authority

By: NARA Date 6/1/07

P: We're going to play that by ear. It may be 30 minutes, if I decide it. I'm not going to play it by the goddamn television. But, you know what I mean. We'll talk about India and several other things.

K: That's right.

P: Let me ask you about a couple other things. Of course, they can only use a couple minutes in the program but we have got to give them enough, then they'll pick the good things. What is the situation now with Rogers? He's perfectly content to stay out of it, I suppose, because he sees it's a loser. Is that right?

K: Well, he's content not to be - not to have gone on television announcing the thing.

P: That wouldn't have been any good at all because we're not sure it's going to work.

K: No, but it would have been good for him to set up a command post in New York conducting this operation.

P: And working with the Chinese because they wouldn't understand him at all.

K: That's right and that's what the . . . oh, not at all . . . and the Chinese are in any case programmed. They don't want to be involved in our . . . They want to be able to say that they are not colluding with us.

P: I see.

K: So Rogers is happy with this and he did give the backgrounder under great protest. He wouldn't have given it if we hadn't got . .

P: You mean Sisco did.

K: Sisco did. Rogers didn't want it until we put out that statement at Key Biscayne and then he figured he better get State into the act.

P: Oh, that's what did it?

K: Yes.

P: Now Ziegler made a very good public statement, huh? What was Ziegler's statement?

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
By ____ NARA Date 6/10/10

K: Well, Ziegler's statement said the President has been following this hourly. At 10:30 this morning after receiving the latest report he gave the go-ahead to the State Department to take the case to the Security Council. The President is dismayed by the use of Indian troops in Pakistan and then he was asked, "Does that mean you are giving up your neutral role in this conflict?" And he said it means that the Indians have said they are now on an all out invasion of East Pakistan and this we have always said that the American people would not understand. And that played very well, very strong and Sisco is playing off that.

P: Now how did Sisco handle it? Did he do what you told him that I told him he was to do this?

K: Exactly. Well, at first he didn't want to do it and Rogers didn't want him to do it, but then when they saw the Ziegler thing which featured your role then they decided they better get some State Department line out too.

P: Is that what did it?

K: Yes. Which is OK. We don't want them to. . .

P: Of course, you got the Ziegler played, that was very good.

K: Right.

P: And then Sisco did give a good backgrounder?

K: He did give a good backgrounder citing chapter and verse of all the things the Indians have refused to do: no UN observers, no acceptance of the. . .

P: Did he also cite what we have done - that we have given $250 million in aid and all that.

K: Oh yes, oh yes.

P: We're getting all that across, are we?

K: Yes, and anything that needs to be done I can do Monday morning.

P: I think what probably needs to be done, that Monday you may have to give - basically, rather than having a white paper put out; that what you ought to do is look over the facts very, very carefully and then go out and give a hard hitting briefing.

8

K: Yes, but I ought to do that on background.

P: Oh absolutely, on background. On the thing that we've just talked to the President, we've examined the whole thing, now here are the facts. I think that could have an enormous effect.

K: Right. I think that's right.

P: It would pit world opinion against these people.

K: Right.

P: Is that the way you feel about it?

K: That's exactly the way I feel about it. Because that puts us-then we have to have a basis for the actions in the economic field we are taking.

P: Now insofar as those actions are concerned, we haven't had any squeals from the Indians, have we?

K: No, no. See that's again where State was wrong. The Indians have no interest in escalating this with us. Not a squeal. They will start squealing next week when the economic aid is cut off.

P: Now understand, I don't want any nonsense about this. I really want it cut down to - anything that can be cut is got to be cut next week. Anything that can be cut and I want Hannah brought on the carpet. And I want Currans and everybody - so that everything is cut, Henry. That's the only way the Indians are going to understand this - if it all is cut and they know it. Don't announce a thing. Just do it.

K: Exactly.

P: Now is that all understood.

K: That's all understood, Mr. President.

P: And Connally understands it, of course.

K: Connally has played beautiful ball. He knows how to do these things without the knife showing.

P: Incidentally, tell him, if you will - now he's at the gridiron tonight - but in the morning, if he has an opportunity to stick the knife in India in any public statement that he makes, to do it.

DECLASSIFIED

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9

K: OK.

P: That would be a good thing to have done.

K: Because he could do it from a development point of view.

P: That's right. That's right. That we are going to have to reexamine
our aid. I mean I think we should play a very tough game. I don't
think the American people want to aid a country that is an aggressor.

K: Well, and as consistently. It was bad enough when, with our money,
they dragged us around in the UN, when have these bastards ever
supported us?

P: Never.

K: What can they do to us that they aren't doing now? I mean if they
want to be Russian stooges and have the Russians spend a billion
dollars there a year, we can't prevent it.

P: Right. Ok. Well, this is the way to play it. We'll take a look
Monday to see whether we want to have you go. Oh, in reading
the news summary I saw a little squib to the effect that some White
House aide said that the State Department was concerned because
you were on the record on your...

K: Well, that's...

P: Now who the hell puts out a thing like that?

K: I don't know, Mr. President, because after all this is...

P: I didn't hear anything - did anyone from State object?

K: No. No, and you know it played very well in the press.

P: It was excellent, but I mean I just wondered why anybody from the
... well, somebody I guess...

K: Well, there's always some sorehead in the woodwork.

P: Yes. But I thought it played very well. You didn't have any
complaints?

K: I had not a word. Not one word.

P: Because they knew you had to brief on the trip. Who else could?

DECLASSIFIED

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By NARA Date 6/1/04

10

K: Well, I phoned him before I did it and he didn't raise an objection.

P: Well, I wish there was some more we could do here but. . .
They'll run out of gas - both sides - won't they, in about two weeks.

K: Yes, but of course, another thing we have done is to send a back-channel to the Shah from you saying that, trying to find out whether he wanted to give some support to Pakistan and saying if he did we would look to see whether we could find a way of letting, of replacing his. . .

P: Are you sure that backchannel is safe?

K: Yes.

P: I wouldn't do it through MacArthur.

K: No, no, that's why I didn't do it that way and we didn't put it as a message. We put it as talking points so it can be disallowed.

P: Good, well we'll have some fun with this yet. God, you know what would really be poetic justice here is if some way the Paks could really give the Indians a bloody nose for a couple of days. The fighting any report on that?

K: Well, the fighting - we got reports in East Pakistan that the Indians are surprised at the intensity of the Pakistan resistance. But of course they outnumber them there eight to one.

P: How about West Pakistan?

K: In West Pakistan the Indians don't seem to have gotten very far. And there I think they're not going to be able to win except by wearing them down. They outnumber them there five to one. They've been bombing Karachi and burning the oil installations.

P: Isn't that awful. That terrible. The Indians are bombing Karachi?

K: Yes.

P: Oh, for Christ's sake, isn't that. . . and Rawalpindi I notice is on the list, too.

K: Yes. Well, of course, they've been playing a terrific game these last years. Every time one tank was shipped to Pakistan the Indians would carry on like maniacs, but they've been getting big shipments from India, they've been getting big shipments from India, rather their own armaments industry.

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11

P: Well, we've got to get across the point that as far as our aid to Pakistan is concerned that first it was minimal. Second, that our mistake was, and I think that's the thing you want to make in your backgrounder, was that we didn't give more.

K: That's right. Oh, the military aid thing, Mr. President, is so absurd. We gave $3.8 million dollars worth of spare parts.

P: As I look at this thing for the future, Henry, I have the feeling that they're going to try to build it up - again we've got to think of what the media will try to do. End of Tape 1.

Tape 2

P: Let the Indians squeal. Let the liberals squeal. What's wrong with that?

K: Well, uh. . .

P: I'm not sure, I know, you know, that we may not be playing it boldly enough.

K: Well, we can look at that. On Monday morning we can. . .

P: I want to see that kind of a suggestion because I would be prepared to go out and say in view of this action that we regretfully cut off until this action desists all economic aid to India stops, period.

They're in the business of being the aggressors - course they are the aggressors. I really feel - oh, I know all the arguments that well then we're choosing up sides, we're not neutral. Of course, we're not neutral. Neither are the Indians. They're always neutral against us.

K: That's right and you said that's what you'd do.

P: I think we ought to do it.

K: Well, we can certainly, Mr. President, on Monday morning cut off this $100 million dollar slice.

P: Well, but you see all this is salami stuff. I think that what is really needed is a jolt. We have given $10 billion worth of aid to India. So you tell the American people that I'm cutting off all aid to India. Make a bold play. You talk to Connally about that tomorrow.

K: OK.

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12

P: All right, we've got $10 billion and we're cutting off all aid to India until this war stops. That might have some effect.

K: Right.

P: Don't you agree?

K: I think that . . . no, I'm very - I find it very attractive. Our experience has been . . .

P: It'll be very attractive also to the American people.

K: That's right.

P: They would like it. You say, "Look, we've given $10 billion in aid. Now they are going forward with this aggression, we're cutting off all aid to them until they stop."

K: And evacuate any territory they have occupied.

P: That's right. Well, get me a plan like that and I'll go for it, okay?

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: All right.

DECLASSIFIED

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By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCON (Continued)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 4 or 5, 1971

(Same as Tape 2 of previous, gg. 11-12)

P: ..... Let the Indians squeal; let the liberals squeal. What's wrong with that?

K: Well --

P: I'm not sure, you know, we may not be playing it boldly enough.

K: Well, we can look at that.

P: Well, I want to see that kind of a suggestion because I would be prepared to go out to say, "In view of this action that we regretfully cut off, until this action desists, all economic aid to India stops period." They're in the business of being the aggressors. Of course, they are the aggressors. I really feel -- I know all the arguments that well then we are choosing up sides; we're not neutral. Of course, we're not neutral; neither are the Indians. They're always neutral against us.

K: That's right. And you said that's what you would do.

P: I think we ought to do it.

K: Well, we can certainly, Mr. President, on Monday morning cut off this $100 million slice.

P: No, but you see all this is salami stuff. I think that what is really needed is a jolt. We've given $10 billion worth of aid to India, so you tell the American people "I'm cutting off all aid to India." I mean a bold play. You talk to Connally about that tomorrow.

K: Okay.

P: All right, we've cut $10 billion worth of all aid to India until this force stops. You know that might have some effect.

K: Right, right.

P: Don't you agree?

K: I think -- No, I'm -- I find it attractive.

P: You see.

K: Our experience has been --

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TELCOM
The President/Mr. Kissinger

P: It would be very attractive also to the American people.

K: That's right.

K: And, and, and evacuate any territory they've occupied.

P: Exactly. Well, get me a plan like that and I'll go for it.

K: Right, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED

MAY 1258
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By NARA Date 6/10/64

TELCORN (HOME)
Mr. Kissinger/The President

December 5, 1971 - 10:30

K: ...... granted you had got us anything from the Indians.

P: Is editorial opinion building up in India's favor or is it about the same as it was?

K: There is nothing in the *Post*, nothing in the *Star*. There's a sort of a wailing editorial in the *New York Times* that says we are to blame for not forcing Yahya into a political settlement.

P: Well, that comes from the State now. How do we answer that?

K: We answer by listing all the steps we have urged Yahya to take and that he took.

P: Yeah.

K: And that the Indians wouldn't give us three or four months to work it out.

P: Um-humm.

K: Oh, we can kill them. When Yahya -- when the Indian Ambassador left, he came in to say goodbye, I said, "Look, work out a timetable with us for a political accommodation. Our conclusion is that there will be political autonomy. It is just a question that we can not agree to the forcible solution of it."

P: Um-humm.

K: I think we are except -- and then, of course, Mr. President, things will be so much worse in East Pakistan by next summer that the liberals will be totally discredited.

P: Yeah. Um-humm. Oh, boy, it will be worse, won't it?

K: Yes.

P: Well, they may be discredited but on the other hand there will be -- we have to understand they will try to push it off -- they always blame us for whatever goes wrong, Henry.

K: Exactly.

P: So we will probably get blamed for that too. But in the meantime we will have to do some other things. Well, there's nothing further we can do --

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MW EO 12958
 By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELCOM (HOME)
Mr. Kissinger/The President

December 5, 1971 - 10:30

- 2 -

K: No, I mean they are cutting off that aid part of it tomorrow.

P: You mean the --

K: ...

P: ...

K: Well, no, the letters of credit that I mentioned to you yesterday.

P: Yeah. Well, that's nothing public I understand.

K: No, but it will leak out.

P: Yep. The line that may be developed that we have to anticipate in that meeting tomorrow is that well, -- Incidentally, has it been taken up with State about cutting off the letters of credit and what do they say about that? ...

K: No, so far they haven't said anything about it.

P: Um-humm.

K: It's been taken up and it's being done.

P: Okay. Well, I just can't understand this idea though that they are trying to say that we are not -- that we are doing this precipitantly. I don't know what the hell they are talking about. Well, that hasn't come out publicly yet?

K: No, and Mr. President, we have had two WSAG meetings a day where every agency has been represented.

P: Um-humm.

K: We have had four WSAG meetings in the last three days. I mean, I don't know what anyone can say it hasn't been adequately considered.

P: Um-humm. Well, Rogers has had his say and he has indicated what he wants.

K: Well, it's just awfully hard to run these crisis, Mr. President, when you get one Department out to position themselves in opposition to their President all the time.

DECLASSIFIED

CFO 12958
Author

By NARA Date 6/10/71

TELCON (HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 5, 1971 - 11:00

K: Mr. President.

P: Hello. I have here -- it just came in -- a call from Rogers with regard to the Security Council meeting, he wants to talk before 2 o'clock Now, what is the guidance on that? I thought that it was pretty well settled but what is the situation?

K: Oh, the situation in the Security Council?

P: No, what he wants -- he wants to talk to me to see what guidance I want to give before the Security Council meeting.

K: That's right, that's what I'm --

P: So I am going to call him. My point is what do we want to say?

K: Well, here is the issue. There is going to be a ceasefire and withdrawal resolution that the Argentines are putting forward. That one we can support. Then, that will be vetoed by the Russians. Then, it will probably move towards a ceasefire resolution alone and on that one I think we should be very leery. The Chinese will be violently opposed, the Pakistanis are probably going to be opposed but we could conceivably abstain from that.

P: A ceasefire alone.

K: The trouble with a ceasefire alone is that it would leave half of East Pakistan in Indian hands.

P: Um-humm. Well, has that been discussed with Rogers and so forth as to what these issues are?

K: It has been discussed with Bush and it's been -- Rogers has been -- I've discussed it with Sisco, Rogers has been dancing around with me and has not been going into that much detail.

P: Um-humm.

K: I must underline, Mr. President, if we collapse now in New York, the impact on this international situation, we're going to do away with most of the gains of the last two years. The way Rogers keeps putting the issue -- the Russians are playing for big stakes here. When all the baloney -- all the New York Times editorials are said and done if the Soviets and Indians get away with this, the Chinese and the United States will be standing there with eggs on our face. And they will have made

DECLASSIFIED

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December 5, 1971 - 11:00

- 2 -

K: (cont'd) us back down and if we have ordered down our own Resolution from yesterday that had an 11 to 2 majority so that it becomes a pretty incipit thing, our only hope in my judgment, we'll never get it through State, is to become very threatening to the Russians and tell them that if they are going to participate in the dismemberment of another country, that will affect their whole relationship to us.

P: Um-humm.

K: Right now they still want the Middle East from us.

P: Um-humm.

K: And other things. If we just play this in this nice incipit way, we are going to get through this week all right then but we are going to pay for it -- this will then be the Suez '56 episode of our Administration.

P: Um-humm.

K: That is what in view is at stake here now and that's why the Russians are playing it so toughly and if we have made any mistake in the last two weeks it's this -- if we had over-reacted in the first two or three days as we wanted to in the White House, it might at least have scared the Russians off, not the Indians, but it might have scared the Russians off. We are pretty well committed anyway, we can't take the curse off it now. The problem -- I know it will always be put on the ground that we want to save the China trip but these people don't recognize that without a China trip, we wouldn't have had a Moscow trip.

P: No, that's just small stuff. I know what they have put in on that -- that's just sour grapes crap.

K: If the Chinese come out of this despising us, we lose that option. If the Russians think they backed us down, we will be back to where we were in May and June.

P: Well, I'm going to call him right now. The main thing is all I have to know is he pushing for us to back down from our Resolution, that's what I need to know, Henry.

K: Probably. The best would be that we should stick with our Resolution and go back no further than withdrawal and ceasefire.

P: Withdrawal and ceasefire.

DECLASSIFIED
Autbority
By NARA Date 6/4/71

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 5, 1971 - 11:00

K: That any ceasefire should be coupled with a withdrawal.

P: Um-humm. And they have to decide that at 2 o'clock today, huh?

K: Right.

P: Does Rogers have any regrets that he didn't go to New York to make the presentation himself?

K: I don't know; I don't think so.

P: Probably saw the point of that, huh?

K: Right.

P: Yeah. Well, we will --

K: If someone could give me some word what was decided because it is going to be hard for me to monitor Bush.

P: Oh, don't worry, I'll call you back as soon as I find out what the hell he's -- what the point is, I don't know what it is even.

K: Right.

P: I just assume that they were all set in the UN thing tomorrow -- I mean, today, you know. Incidentally, that wasn't discussed at your meeting, huh?

K: It wasn't -- well, no. I discussed it with Bush and Sisco but he is apparently trying to run around me.

P: I see. That's all right, I'll have to find out what the score is and I'll find out.

K: right.

P: And I'll call you back.

K: Right, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD FEO 12958
Authority

By NARA Date 6/10/10

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Vorontsov/Kissinger

4:55 p.m. - 12/5/71

V: Hello.

K: I am sorry to call you on a Sunday, but I was just talking to the President to report our conversation and I mentioned that at the end of our conversation you said that in a week or so it will be over and he said that he would like you to report to Moscow that in a week or so it may be ended but it won't be over as far as we are concerned if it continues to take the present trend.

V: Yes.

H: He wants it to be clear that we are at a watershed in our relationship if it continues to go on this way.

V: I understand.

H: We cannot accept that any country would take unilateral actions like that.

TELCONE (Nome)
Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally
December 5, 1971 (??)

K: Mr. Secretary.

C: Yes, sir.

K: How are you?

C: Fine; I believe I'm going to live.

K: You believe you're gonna live?

C: Yeah. My God, I tell you getting in from Rome on Friday night and as you know we went to that National Symphony Ball and last night I went to the Gridiron dinner and had to make a speech and we had a brunch yesterday and then all our Texas guests left about one o'clock today and by God, I went to sleep.

K: (laughter) I bet you are; I bet you did.

C: I've been a tired Indian but otherwise I feel great.

K: A houseful of Texas guests is a handful by itself.

C: That's right.

K: Without having taken a trip.

C: That's what I figure.

K: John, I wanted to call you because the President is going to assemble a group of the NSC tomorrow at 1:30 about the India-Pakistan situation so if you don't mind, why don't we have our lunch at the White House.

C: That's fine; or we can cancel it, Henry, if you want to. You'll be busy as hell; why don't we just cancel it?

K: Well, because you will be over there anyway. No, I'll have 45 minutes or so.

C: All right or we can do it anytime. I'll be at the White House anyway so hell that makes more sense; I'm going to be there till 12:15 or so. So when I leave the President's office, I'll just come right to your office.

K: Good, but in case I don't -- in case something happens that does make -- cause either of us to cancel it.

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TELCORN

December 5, 1971 (??)

C: Just don't worry about it.

K: Well, let me tell you what the issues are.

C: All right.

K: And where the President tends to be leaning but that's not in any way to prejudice your judgment. The basic problem is now that the Indians have launched a full-scale attack into East Pakistan, how we should tilt. Now the argument that State is making is doesn't make any difference anyway, it's too late. Secondly, we will just drive the Indians into the Soviet arms if we get tough.

C: ...... them I'd like to. Go ahead.

K: (laughter) Well, you're talking my language. The thing that concerns the President and me is this; here we have Indian-Soviet collusion, raping a friend of ours. Secondly, we have a situation where one of the motives that the Chinese may have had in leaning towards us a little bit is the fear that something like this might happen to them.

C: Yep.

K: So that some demonstration of our willingness to stand for some principals is important for that policy. Thirdly, if the Soviets get away with this in the Subcontinent, we have seen the dress rehearsal for a Middle Eastern war.

C: Yep.

K: So our -- what the President's tentative view is to start throttling the economic aid program to India. We don't get a hell of a lot; what do we get from them? We've put $10 billion into it.

C: We don't get a goddamn thing.

K: And when people say that we're driving them into Soviet arms, what does that mean operationally?

C: That's right.

K: What more can they do than what they are doing?

C: That's right.

MMD FO 2958
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TELCORN

December 5, 1971 (??)

K: And I think we have to show that it's too risky to kick us in the teeth.

C: You know I'll agree with that position.

K: Well, you've been so soft in the last few weeks --

C: (laughter)

K: -- that I've just wanted to check around.
of course

C: Well, you know it's a very practical matter. It seems to me that India as an ally is an enormous liability under any circumstances political and economic and military liability.

K: Yeah, yeah.

C: By what ever means we can divorce ourselves from them, the better off we are regardless of where they go.

K: That's right. Well, then where the hell are they going go. They have their reasons to be independent. There is as good a chance that they will try to win their way back into our favor as there is --

C: I agree with that.

K: Because if we -- now, no matter what we do, we can't do as much for them as the Soviets have already done on the thing that interests them which is to rape Pakistan.

C: Yep, yep.

K: So that is the way the issue may come up, it may not come up that way but that's at any rate where the President is leaning at this moment. And he wanted me just to explain why we have done the things we have.

C: All right.

K: And, of course, you will hear the rest of it there.

C: Good.

K: But let's try to get together for lunch. I'd like to hear what happened in Europe.

DECLASSIFIED

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By NARA Date 6/4/74

December 5, 1971 (??)

K: Mr. President.

P: Hello. It's all directly on just what we discussed.

K: And what are they going to do?

P: Stick with the ceasefire and withdrawal and give nothing at all on that. That he says is the Pakistan's position.

K: Exactly.

P: The Somalia Resolution basically.

K: Exactly.

P: And he said that was what we would do and we would stick right with it and I said, "Absolutely ...." He said that was what he was going to do and I said that's what I wanted done. So, that's that.

K: Terrific, Mr. President.

P: Now, I asked him what the hell we could do about the British, the French. He said nothing. So dammit, I think -- well, the British I guess want to get along with India in the future. I said to him that I didn't think there was a hell of a lot that -- he said that the British had to be on the winning side as you said because they figured they had to get along with India in the future. I said, "Well, maybe it means something to them but it doesn't mean anything to us except a $10 billion drag in foreign aid over the last 20 years." I said, "Maybe let the Russians pick up that tab." Well, that sort of shook him. He said, well, we really didn't want to get that out too much because you know it will look ......... I said, no, I'm just referring to what we do and that's what I mean. I don't think even you, Henry, how tough I feel about that aid business. We are not going to aid countries that engage in aggression and then don't do a goddamn thing when we ask them to get out.

K: Mr. President, if we don't act this toughly, I'm completely aboard. This is going to be a dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.

P: That's right, that's right.

K: And I'm much more worried about the impact on the Russians.

P: Right.

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TELCOM (HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 5, 1971 (??)

- 2 -

K: And in fact we ought to consider seriously getting Vorontsov in and telling him if the Russians continue this line, these talks on the Middle East and others just aren't going to be possible.

P: Yeah. Well, get him in. Why don't you send a letter from me to Brezhnev?

K: All right.

P: Why not play it a little tougher and just say that I have very good talks -- I've got an idea, just let me look at it tomorrow -- I had very good talks with Mrs. Meir when we were here and that we can make progress on this matter at our further discussions there possibly. However, I must tell you that in the event that this present situation goes on in Pakistan that that will seriously jeopardize those talks.

K: Excellent, I think you should.

P: And a letter from me to him. Let's see what happens.

K: Or at least a message.

P: Huh? What's that?

K: I think that's right.

P: It may or may not help but let's -- but that will pass on. See, in other words, do it in a way that we are passing on to him that we have made very good progress. Now, Mr. Chairman, we would like to know what you are going to do on this, we are keeping our side but I am very distressed after the talks I've had with Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger has had with Mr. Dobrynin to see what is the developments here in India and Pakistan. Now, the point is, what do we want the Russians to do though? You know, about India and Pakistan.

K: They could get it stopped. They could at least take a more helpful line in the UN.

P: Yeah. Well, how about getting that message to him immediately. Now, that should not be public, you understand. I don't want that to be out in the public.

K: Oh, no, no. We could do that as an oral message.

DECLASSIFIED

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TELCON (HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger
December 5, 1971 (??)

- 3 -

P: An oral message. But to who, that stupid Dobrynin.

K: No, no; to Vorontsov here. Dobrynin DCM.

P: Well, I want it to be from me to Brezhnev.

K: You don't want it in writing, do you?

P: It doesn't bother me, if that will help. Whatever will help the most do.

K: Well, let me draft something and show it to you first thing in the morning.

P: Why, what would be the dis -- well, the main thing -- rather than waiting a day, if it's going to be oral, get him in today.

K: Okay, why don't I get Vorontsov in today.

P: Get him in today and tell him I've just talked with you on the phone; that the President would send this in writing but he wants this oral message to go from him; I don't want to use the hotline; you know, give him a little of that crap and that, Mr. Chairman, we have developed this very good relationship, I'm delighted but I must be very frank with you on first in the Mid-East we made very great progress and I would be interested to discuss this -- Dr. Kissinger will discuss with Dobrynin when he returns. Then, now, on India-Pakistan we find your attitude very hard to understand and what are you going to do? And we have got to play it with that with them on that and the same true, Henry, on the -- it will make them realize that's where our three-day strike is also going to help.

K: Exactly.

P: You see, we have just got to -- and Bill to my surprise, I didn't do any convincing so apparently whatever the WSAG meetings or something, he got ...

K: Oh, yeah, I gave it very hard to Sisco so he got it from Sisco ...

P: He was totally on board.

K: Good.

P: But all he said was, he says I'm glad -- I told him what a good job Sisco had done but that didn't seem to -- he said, well, fine; we couldn't have

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P: (cont'd) done it until now though because we wouldn't have had the public opinion on our side.

K: Yeah.

P: That's wrong, of course, we should have done it earlier.

K: Right, we should have done it earlier.

P: But, nevertheless, it was well worth doing now rather than not at all.

K: Exactly.

P: But, Henry, don't feel that the whole thing is lost yet --

K: Oh, I don't think it's lost if we play it hard.

P: And incidentally, when I say play it hard, let me understand, we are not going to roll over after they have done this horrible thing. They are not going to roll over and say, "Now, India, everything will be like it was and we'll come help you again." And I mean we will cut the gizzard out and let the Russians come help the Indians.

K: Right.

P: The arguments from the New York Times and others will be "we will buy ourselves a century or decades of hatred and suspicion from the Indian people." Bullshit! What is $10 billion of foreign aid bought us?

K: Exactly.

P: But hatred and suspicion from the Indian people.

K: Exactly.

P: Tell me one friend we've got in India, do you know any?

K: Exactly.

P: How about putting it that way? Just as cold as that. Let's start getting some top anti-Indian propaganda out.

K: And that won't be unpopular in America.

P: That's right. I want to be sure that you fill Connally in on this.

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December 5, 1971 (?)

K: I'm seeing him tomorrow morning.

P: Now, I have decided that what we will do is to have a meeting. I'm going to call Haldeman, you don't do anything about it.

K: Right.

P: But I have decided to have a meeting to start at 1:30 so we will have an hour and a half meeting tomorrow on the damn thing.

K: Terrific.

P: I think we better. I think that Connally should be there due to the aid part of it, don't you agree?

K: Absolutely.

P: I don't want Mitchell there; I don't think it's that sort of a thing. I think Laird should be there if he is around. If not, --

K: Packard would be good.

P: Packard, right. And that's it.

K: And Moorer, I guess Moorer.

P: Yes, to report on the military situation.

K: Right.

P: Um-humm.

K: The same group as which we did the Middle East thing with the addition of Connally.

P: Yeah.

K: Connally to replace Mitchell really.

P: Well, now, let's ask -- maybe we shouldn't have Connally, what do you think?

K: I think Connally would be good.

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December 5, 1971 (R)

P: Yeah. Well, I think he would be good for the discussion, yeah, because he will be tough as hell. Yeah. Because this will be a subject for discussion; I'm not going to have those cameras for the whole meeting, only for the first 10 minutes.

K: Right.

P: All right, that's that. On this Trudeau meeting, I guess there's really not much to do there.

K: I have sent down a book for you, Mr. President.

P: Oh, I'm not going to read that book. Hell, I just saw it.

K: There's nothing in there.

P: I mean I am going to read the briefing paper but God, I'm not going to spend -- waste 10 minutes on the damn Canadians.

K: Yeah.

P: The main thing I want to know is what line to take on the economic thing, is that all covered?

K: Yeah. No, Connally is getting a paper over for you first thing in the morning and I think you should stay out of the details. And he is meeting simultaneously with Benson who is their Finance guy. And I think the way to leave it is if there is any problem that those two can't solve, they should report that in to you. The issues are really quite technical and they are not big policy issues.

P: Yeah.

K: There are four issues -- I don't have the paper in front of me. One of them -- it is in the briefing paper that I gave you. One having to do with exemptions for American citizens and so forth.

P: Yeah.

K: And I think we have settled three out of four of them.

P: Yeah. Well, now getting back to this thing on India, there was no question at all -- I mean I didn't lean him at all, I was trying to see what the Position was but Bill is completely on board.

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K: Mr. President.

P: Well, what's the news today on our various adventures.

K: Right, Mr. President. Well, that backgrounder of Sisco's which we finally beat out of them.

P: Yeah.

K: Played very well. I don't know whether you have seen it.

P: No, I didn't look at the stuff; you see, I don't have a news summary down here.

K: It was one of the key items on every television program.

P: Maybe Sisco and Rogers -- Rogers probably wished he had done it, didn't he?

K: Well --

P: Tell me this, are they pleased now they did it?

K: Oh, yeah.

P: State is, good.

K: Oh, yes.

P: And how does it play, it plays good?

K: On front page in the _New York Times_ and _Washington Post_.

P: And what line did they take it?

K: That India is largely to blame for the outbreak of hostilities and it lists all the things the Indians have rejected.

P: Good.

K: And it's just what you wanted.

P: It got across though that who's to blame?

K: Oh, yeah.

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P: And heavily played?

K: And heavily played.

P: Ziegler got his statement out too?

K: Well, Ziegler's statement triggered this one because without -- until
Ziegler put out his statement --

P: They wouldn't say anything.

K: They refused to say anything.

P: Yeah, yeah. That's great, that's great.

K: Where we are now, Mr. President, we had a Security Council meeting.

P: What happened there? I heard something on the radio that the Russians want to blame the Pakistanis.

K: Well, we put in a Resolution of ceasefire and withdrawal.

P: Right.

K: The Russians put in a Resolution which blamed everything on Pakistan and just called for a political accommodation in East Pakistan.

P: Yeah.

K: At any rate, it wound up with an 11 to 2 vote for us with the Russians vetoing it. Only the Soviet Union and Poland voted for the Russian Resolution.

P: Right.

K: Even Syria, Somalia, and so forth.

P: Huh.

K: The Chinese voted with us, for our Resolution.

P: You know, that's pretty good, Henry, to have the Russians get that few votes.

K: That's right. But so now, of course, there is no Resolution.

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P: Right.

K: So they are going back at it again today.

P: To get a Resolution that they can all approve.

K: Right, which will be impossible unless it's anti-Pakistan because the Russians will veto it.

P: I see.

K: If it's anti-Pakistan, the Chinese will veto it.

P: (Laughter) You know, this, Oh, Boy. But anyway, you feel a little better about what our position is.

K: Right. Now, what the Russians this morning have launched a blistering attack on Pakistan in TASS and in affect, have warned the Chinese against getting involved. What we are seeing here is a Soviet-Indian power play to humiliate the Chinese and also somewhat us.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: I think we ought to have a meeting of some of your key advisors tomorrow. I know you've got your day pretty full with the television taping. The reason I mention it is because Rogers has been talking about how we are sacrificing; he's on this Chinese kick again.

P: Sacrificing what?

K: Well, our position to China and he wants a careful consideration; what good do all these moves do. Of course, the opposite --

P: What move would he make then himself?

K: I asked exactly this question. He says he is just raising questions, he's not giving answers; these are questions he wants to have considered.

P: Okay, I'll consider them.

K: I think if we don't, there will be leakages that we just acted impetuously.

P: Well, let's see we could do something around --

K: You've got him on the schedule at 2:30 anyway.

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P: We might move it to 2:00 maybe. Well, we would have that; we wouldn't have the television in on that -- we'll let them take a picture and then get out.

K: I think that's right.

P: Who would you have?

K: Connally, Rogers, Laird, if he is in town; Helms, and Mitchell if you want it.

P: I wouldn't have Mitchell on this one.

K: All right.

P: No, no. I think Connally because it involves some military -- I mean economic and so forth.

K: The basic problem, Mr. President, is it's clear that we can't do anything directly to change the situation but to set it up on the ground that we are sacrificing our friendship to India; there is no friendship left. There is nothing operational we are sacrificing in India by our present course. All we are -- what we are risking is to add the content of the Soviets and the Chinese to a direct challenge in which a country is being dismembered.

P: The point is that I want to see from State what their option is; if they've got a better one, I'd like to know what it is. And you know, I have seen any suggestions of any different.

K: Their suggestion is always to release Mujibur; that's in effect the Russian position.

P: Yeah. Well, but Pakistan won't do that will it?

K: No. Well, now it's outdated; it's too late for that anyway. But it would have been -- the Indians were determined, Mr. President, they attacked at the earliest possible moment they could. There was a rainy season from May to the end of September. Then they had to get their troops into position; then they had to train the Bengali. All this talk about Russian restraint that we heard all summer was complete poppycock.

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