TelCon
Secy. Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

7:59 pm, Feb. 22, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Where are you, at home.

S: I'm in my office slaving away. Very disappointed I'm not going to get sworn in tomorrow.

K: No, and you know, they cancelled the breakfast too.

S: That's what I understand.

K: Because the President doesn't know you are important compared to his.

S: I know it.

K: George, I wanted to ask you this. I feel very strongly the need of hiring some fellow who's more senior than Hormatz and make him a sort of a deputy for--to me to handle international economics. On my staff.

S: Uh huh.

K: But I don't want to--and I have a really outstanding man, Chuck Cooper, and he could pick up a lot of the loose ends around here.

S: Was he in Vietnam at one time.

K: Yes.

S: Yes, I know him.

K: Or, we could hire him jointly. Because I'd be prepared to make him a deputy to me. I'm just not on top now of foreign aid things and a lot of other things. I know that Flanigan probably thinks that's his area.

S: Well, things like foreign aid somehow or other we have to work very closely together on. They are economic dimensions, but they are tremendous foreign policy implications.

2

K: That's right. My understanding is that he would work very closely with you and me.

S: Uh huh.

K: And I wouldn't do that as an exclusive thing. But I just don't follow these economic things consistently now. You take that Vietnamese construction thing. I ought to have somebody here who follows it full time.

S: No doubt about it.

K: Now, first of all I wanted your judgment whether--if I bring in a fairly senior guy, he'd step on too many toes here.

S: Oh no, I think it's desirable. I would like very much to have somebody that I know has your confidence and who can communicate with you so that when I say to him, look we've discuss this and we seem to be going down road A, B, C, now I want to know that Kissinger thinks that's all right and you communicate with him and then you tell me.

K: Well I would like that too. And what I would like also is to have somebody who can bring me up to date well enough. I get a paper today from Flanigan whether we should--wants me to sign a joint paper to the President onwhether we should ask for $750 million compensation for the reverse preferences for Spain and Israel, in the common market. A) I don't think that's the way to handle it, the President cannot approve or disapprove, he doesn't know it well enough. I don't know it well enough. And I would like somebody here who takes a more comprehensive view from the more political point of view, plus economic, and then he could talk to me and to you. I'd consider him practically a joint appointment.

S: I think it would be very desirable. And that isn't to say that Hormatz isn't a good man.

K: And Hormatz can stay and work as his assistand. But Hormatz is just not experienced enough.

S: Cooper I remember from my trip to Vietnam.

K: He's outstanding.

S: And remember him quite favorably.

K: He is outstanding. Now can he come by tomorrow and can you help sell him.

3

That he's got a really responsible and major role in, and that
we'd both work closely with him.

S: Sure.

K: You want to have breakfast on Saturday?

S: I can't I've got to go down to Williamsburg and give a talk.
I'll be gone most all day.¹

K: I don't work at that level.

S: Are you going up to Camp David tomorrow.

K: No, I thought we were all going to meet down here.

S: Well, it's been changed a half dozen times. The last I heard it
was Camp David.

K: The last I heard it 3:00 in the EOB office.

S: Well, I'll relax until about 2:00 and we'll get the final work.
But I'll be glad to see--

K: I hate to see you become so cynical.

S: No, it's just that it's been back and forth, and I'm relaxed about it.

K: Well, you're relaxed about everything. I want you to know,
incidentally, George, that I can take a lot of stuff, but when you
appear on the cover of TIME you're getting into my territory.

S: I know it, I always was hoping that would come out and be gone
before you got back, so it wouldn't bother you.

K: It's not going to be easy to avoid--

S: We had a tough day on the market today, by the way.

K: Oh, really.

S: A lot of tear jaunts (?) 90 dollars at one point, it went way up.

TELCON

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, February 22, 1973

F: Henry, Pete.

K: Yes, Pete.

F: On MFN and this Bill, which I've been waltzing around the Hill.

K: Yeah.

F: And the Jackson Amendment, etc., you should keep in mind it seems to me the following. You're quite right and the Soviets are right that it has a better chance at passing if it's included in the Bill but if my feelings to date are correct, and I've been on both sides of the Capitol a lot, it isn't going to pass without the Jackson Amendment. Maybe we can fudge it but I think you'd have to assume it isn't. It will then come down as part of the Trade Bill which the President would have to sign so he would sign a Bill which would authorize him to give MFN to Romania but not to -- or Hungary but not to the Soviets. Now that I would think might cause some problem with the Soviets. If, on the other hand, we sent it up by itself, and they amended it in that way, he could then veto it and say I'll have nothing to do with that kind of a limited authority; it's wrong and I don't approve. So the Soviet response is not only how we send it up but what happens when it comes back down. You don't want to put the President in the position of having to even contemplate vetoing a Trade Bill if we get a decent one.

K: Well, I've been promised -- Yeah, and we promised to the Soviets that we would put it in very soon.

F: Well, we could put it in, you know, a few days different. They might try to connect it up there but we could perhaps stop that. But as I understand it, you kind of felt we ought to send it up together with the Trade Bill.

K: I want to have it sent up in the way in which we can best fulfill our Soviet commitments.

F: Okay.

K: And what you have just pointed out is a very serious concern.

F: Right. Well, then let me do this, I'm going down to see Mills on Saturday -- he's sick in Arkansas -- and let me probe him and I'll have the whole Hill covered --

K: No, if you are right, then we must do it your way.

F: Right. Cause you wouldn't like to see him sign a bill which --

TELCON

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, February 22, 1973

- 2 -

K: We couldn't. We couldn't do it.

F: Okay.

K: I mean, we'd probably have to do it in the hypothesis you give us.

F: That's right.

K: It would be considered by the Soviets a total double-cross.

F: Well, that being the case, Henry, we ought to send it up separately and have a real fight and a real understanding among our friends that they wouldn't combine it. Okay, I hear you talking and I will --

K: If that's the better way of doing it, I will strongly back it. I just haven't got enough sense of legislative, you know, requirements.

F: Right. But what I want to know --

K: If that is your judgment and if that judgment is right, then I think we should separate the Bills.

F: Okay. Cause the worse thing would be ...... the Jackson Amendment on.

K: The worse thing would be a Trade Bill with MFN for everybody and the Jackson Amendment.

F: Right. Okay. Second item, the part of the Finance Committee anyway under Ribicoff and maybe much of the Finance Committee are going to Japan in March with regard to some preliminary gab meeting. And Ribicoff says and then we'd like to go, if it doesn't cause you any problem, on to China.

K: I don't think the Chinese are going to take them.

F: All right. Now, let's see what that does cause we don't want the Congress getting mad at the Chinese.

K: Well, you know, these Congressional Committees have to get it into their head that this is not a tourist paradise.

F: (laughter) They are invincibly ignorant on that subject. They love to travel and they want us to give them reasons.

K: They are not going to be able to -- Finance Committee is how many Congressmen?

FRAUNHOFER-BUREAU
Authority E012458
BY NARA Date 01-05-1973

TELCON

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, February 22, 1973

- 3 -

F: It's Senators and there will probably be a dozen of them.

K: Plus wives.

F: Probably.

K: Plus staff.

F: Two or three.

K: Plus press.

F: No. Well, I don't know. I don't mind telling them -- Number one, would it cause you an embarrassment? Cause if the answer's yes, we don't think now is the right time, he'll pull off it.

K: Well, I think having just made a big step, we shouldn't immediately deluge the Chinese with hot ideas.

F: And March is pretty close?

K: It's very close. My instinct is now to let this thing settle for a bit.

F: I'll tell him that. I'll tell him we're also somewhat concerned that they wouldn't visas.

K: I'm also somewhat concerned that they'd turn it down. Or that they would delay answering until they were back in the States, after which they'll say pity they just missed them.

F: I think I can talk him out of it.

K: Okay.

F: Good.

K: Bye.

F: Congratulations on your other efforts.

K: Thank you. Bye.

wgh

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, February 22, 1973

Z: Henry, are you set with the Walters thing?

K: I asked Diane to get you to call her.

Z: I called her and set her for 6:30 tomorrow night.

K: Okay, fine.

Z: But are you going to call her back?

K: Why should I call her back?

Z: All right, it's locked for 6:30.

K: Okay.

Z: Should I call her and say it's locked for 6:30?

K: Right.

Z: She's going to ask me can they --

K: But you know if Klein is going to be all over town, I am not in the same
league with Klein. I'm not one of the goddamn hucksters here which you
guys have to get into your head.

Z: I've never considered you to be.

K: I'm just outraged.

Z: Henry, my friend, I do everything in the world I can to work out the thing
in your interest.

K: I know but I am absolutely outraged --

Z: Yeah, but ...

K: ... this goddamned Herb Klein ...

Z: Look, ...

K: ... certified idiot.

Z: Henry, I pick up the phone and I try and work out a time with you. You scream at me. I go into a goddamned morning meeting and I get 8 people screaming at me. Herb Klein comes over whining on my goddamned desk. I'll tell you I'm

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

Afternoon, February 22, 1973

- 2 -

Z: (cont d) fed up with it.

K: Well, I'm sorry.

Z: In terms of screwing around with everyone's problem. I want to work with your situation because I think you'd do a good job for the President and for the foreign policy but I'm getting goddamned tired -- I dial Ehrlichman and talk to him about a problem, he's whining around about stuff. Good God, in Heaven, I can't --

K: All I'm saying, Ron, is that foreign policy is the one area where we've maintained some integrity.

Z: I agree.

K: And we've maintained integrity because I've kept the goddamned flags out of it.

Z: I agree.

K: And if I included you among them, I wouldn't talk to you this way.

Z: I understand that.

K: And now this maniac who's gone around Hanoi taking pictures, which he wasn't authorized to do, is showing them on national television.

Z: Can't Scowcroft call him and tell him from the national standpoint he shouldn't do it. If I call Klein, then I've got to waste two hours with him over in my office wanting to have Scotch and water and whining all over the place. I don't have time for that.

K: I agree with you. I agree. It's locked for 6:30. You know, she may not be able to start filming till 7:00.

Z: That's all right.

K: But that doesn't make any difference.

Z: I'll call her to be in your office at 6:30 tomorrow night.

K: Right. Good.

Z: Okay.

wgh

Authority Eo 12558

By: Tefi NARA Date: 03/26/93

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
McGeorge Bundy
2/23/73; 10:12 a.m.

K: Hello.

B: Henry, how are you?

K: Mac, how are you?

B: Fabulous performance and I don't want to x take much of your time but I wanted just to say how good it is to have you back and I hope you are going on a holiday immediately.

K: Aren't you nice. I plan to go the middle of March.

B: Have you got two minutes for about three operational questions?

K: Of course.

B: One of them not so small.

K: Of course.

if you'll

B: On the help to Hanoi thing, we need a citizens committee or want one I could get George Ball and we would try and reach across and get a coalition of hawks, doves, easterners and westerners when you are ready and when you know what you want.

K: I know we will want it and I think we should wait until the Economic Commission gets formed but then we will want it. And I think this is very, very helpful.

B: Just let me know when you are ready and I will meanwhile get George to work on the other side of the fence.

K: That would be excellent and very helpful.

B: And we'll all keep our mouths shut. And if you get anyone else with the same idea, which you probably will, we can keep it quiet so that it doesn't surface until you are ready.

K: If I get anyone else, I will get them in touch with you if they are worthwhile.

B: Fine.

-2-

B: Second, our man in East Asia -- the head of our East Asian office is a very bright former foreign service officer names Staples -- is going to Saigon and would like very much to go to Hanoi and approach that through our man in Paris if you don't think it is a bad idea.

K: I don't think it is a bad idea. I don't think they are quite ready for it.

B: They may not be ready. We have Woodside here advising us today and he says they would want to do it but they wouldn't quite know who you are at this stage.

K: Yeah, that's my feeling.

B: Well try then.

K: Right.

B: Now, the third thing and it's a trivial thing but I think you should know about it and I am informing the Justice Department in the appropriate channel which is probably Irwin Griswald. I do have a subpoena to appear for the defense in the Ellsberg case and I don't want anyone in Washington to think this is sniping at the Government. I just happen to think the espionage shouldn't be stressed this way and I have told them so and they said would I say so in court and I said I would testify to what I could testify.

K: Well, I think it is courteous of you to let me know but that doesn't affect us.

B: No, I just thought you ought to know. So that you wouldn't be taken by surprise.

K: Well, it's very nice of you to let me know. Why don't we have lunch soon?

B: Are you going on a holiday for a bit, I hope.

K: No, I won't go before March 11.

B: Ah, well, then I will try and I will call your office for any days that you've got and try and come down.

K: It would be very nice.

B: It was just a great trip. It must have been marvelous fun . . .

-3-

K: It was really the best trip to China since the first one.

B: Yeah.

K: And they have all been good. And Hanoi may turn out to be useful.
They are a bunch of paranoids who are now teetering on the brink of which
way to go.

B: This is so clear.

K: So they are not as pleasant to deal with as the Chinese.

B: Are you going to send someone very shrewd and tough to deal with Saigon?

K: We are going to send Graham Martin.

B: Oh, yes, I saw that in the papers. He's able.

K: Saigon -- they may be suffering from hubris.

B: From What? Hubris.

K: Exactly.

B: That's the problem. Graham used to be an awfully narrow hawk. You
will need to instruct the hell out of him and maybe have him get it straight
from the boss before he goes.

K: Oh, he's got to see him.

B: Yes.

K: Before he goes.

B: Well, good luck.

K: Yeah, Mac, and I'll see you soon, I hope.

B: Okay, fine, Henry.

K: Bye.

TELCONE

George Franklin/Mr. Kissinger

2/23/73 11:45 a.m.

HK: Hello.

F: Henry!

K: George.

F: I hate to bother you on a day like this--you must be awfully busy just
getting back--I hear you had a very successful trip.

K: Yes, it was very good.

F: Wonderful. I think our Co____ Commission that you and I have
been talking about may be in trouble. We have heard around the
wings so to speak that the Ford Foundation may not be very enthusiastic
about doing this. We are having lunch with Mac and some of the other
members of the staff today, and I thought if it were possible for you to call Mac
and tell him that you feel this kind of thing is important.

K: Good. I may no be able to get to him before lunch but I can certainly
do it afterwards.

F: Thank you very much.

K: Right. Hope to see you soon.

F: We'd love to see you to see you and you know we don't hesitate to suggest
doing it--when you get a little free time.

K: I hope to see you anyway.

F: Thank you very much.

TELCORN

Jack Valenti/Dr. Kissinger

11:50 a.m. 2/23/73

JV: Henry.

HK: Dr. Kissinger

HK: Jack, how are you!

JV: You're tired.

HK: No.

JV: You're not well that's wonderful. I read your fascinating briefing this morning. It was very interesting. Let me get quickly to the point, Henry, so I won't take up your time. At some point when you have some time which may not be soon, I'd like to discuss with you what the possibilities are if we were to attempt some kind of trade relationship on the basis of film. And see how you think we ought to go about it.

HK: At any rate, however you should go about it is not fast. I mean every bloody American now thinks tomorrow morning, if he doesn't get his letter into Peking he is out.

JV: I understand. That's why I don't want to send letters to Peking--I don't want to do anything. I want to deal with you--

HK: Why don't you come in next week and we'll talk about it.

JV: That's fine. I just wanted to ask go over one other thing--the officials of the Red Chinese embassy in Paris came to see my representative in Paris about four months ago about would we be interested in having a film delegation go there, we said yes, and they had various meetings at my representative's home to discuss this and after December they said they'd get back to Peking for further instructions--the matter is laying there dormant. I've done nothing to push or shove it, I've just let them take the initiative and let them do whatever it is they thought --

HK: If you give me a list of all the requirements--the reason I am so brief is because I have to dash into the President's office to shake hands with the goddamn Egyptians who are here--if I don't do it, they'll accuse me of racial feelings

JV: (laughs) Well go in there and say Ali be praised-- and I'll try to get in touch with you at the end of next week Henry and if you find a moment maybe at lunch or breakfast, coffee maybe we'll have a chance to discuss this further.

Page 2

HK: And remember my intense interest in a movie career.

JV: Naturally.

HK: No quid without a quo.

JV: You and Rachel Welch will be the new Cary Grant and Katherine Helpburn of our time.
I'd like that my self--

HK: That's a pretty pregnant thought.

JV: Now that's a bad word to use. We don't use that--or you'll be in court.

HK: Jack, I must run.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Admiral Moorer
Secure Phone
2/23/73; 12:50 p.m.

(Missed the first part)

M: On a case by case basis.

K: Right.

M: Okay. I would like to take up with you -- I have a complaint. On these NSSM's that you sent out, they were neither addressed to me nor was I sent copies.

K: That's going to change immediately.

M: Consequently I was furnished nothing.

K: I don't know why that was done. You are getting them immediately.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>APRIL 5 1973</td></tr><tr><td>BY: JG MARV. DATED 6/18/73</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 p. m., February 23, 1973

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, you've seen the Chinese note?

S: Right.

K: From which I conclude they're ready to have the French as Chairman.

S: Yes, but I also note that they neglected to make any reference to the ICCS arrangement.

K: Now which may mean that they're --

S: Which may mean that that would still be open.

K: That's right.

S: And I certainly think I should explore that one but they definitely closed out the Security Council.

K: Well, they closed out the Security Council. So it is absolutely essential, Bill, no matter what anyone says that we stay in touch -- that we stay in step with the Chinese.

S: I know, yeah. That came through loud and clear from the ____ this morning.

K: That's right but it may not be loud and clear where it matters.

S: Well, the people who matter are going to be George Aldrich and myself on this one.

K: All right. Well, the Secretary General as Chairman should never be floated by us.

S: Yeah.

K: And I'm counting on you. Now I have a number of messages here from Le Duc Tho. When are you leaving?

S: Well, I was just waiting for this call before I left. What --

K: One is they want to set up the economic commission soonest.

S: Yeah. All right.

Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 p.m., February 23, 1973

K: But they are appointing their Minister of Finance Thach and a Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission.

S: Good Lord, they don't intend it to be a permanent body then?

K: No, no.

S: That's a quite different thing, isn't it?

K: Yeah.

S: Humph. Well, let me talk with Thach about that.

K: Well, that's what I want you to know. Can you tell Thach that with this composition we can't be ready with an announcement by March 1st and can you get that straightened out?

S: I'll try to, yeah. You left them that paper with the sort of thing we had in mind, didn't you?

K: That's right.

S: They just ignored that?

K: That's right.

S: Humph. Well, I'll try to get on that one right away.

K: Well, when are you leaving?

S: Well, I've got to go home and pack. I've got to leave about three but I can drop by over there.

K: Well, why don't you swing by and look at these cables.

S: All right. I'll swing by and look at them. Are you going to be there?

K: Brent Scowcroft will have them.

S: Right. One other thing, I note from both the Chinese and the people that they do have a counterdraft and I think I'll ask for that a the very first item of business.

K: Right.

Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

1:15 p. m., February 23, 1973

S: Once we see that, we may be able to sort out where we're going on this other step. I gather you won't be there when I come by so is there anything else you want to tell me about the others before I read them?

K: Well, a long list of complaints by them.

S: I trust we'll have ours in Paris by Sunday so that we can use it in the Plenary if they come out with theirs.

K: Right.

S: Okay.

K: And they complain about mine clearing but we've straightened that out.

S: Moorer told me he was going to get a lot of activity going as of today.

K: Yeah. I've already informed them of that. Okay, if you'd look at those cables, Bill, I would appreciate it.

S: I'll look at them on the way home.

K: And you stay in close touch with me.

S: Right. Okay.

K: Good.

S: I'll get you through Guay my first day's exercises by tomorrow evening.

K: Right.

S: Okay.

K: Good.

S: Bye, Henry.

wgh

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td></tr><tr><td>By: AH</td></tr><tr><td>PARA. Date</td></tr><tr><td>6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

2:50 p.m., February 23, 1973

K: Bill, we've now heard from the Russians on the Conference.

S: What do they say? They approve the counterproposal draft too?

K: Well, they didn't say this but they said we should work it out with the North Vietnamese. They oppose any role for the Secretary General other than observer.

S: Observer?

K: Yeah.

S: Well, we can knock that down because a participant is a participant.

K: They will not accept the intermediary role between the International Commission and the States participating in the Conference.

S: As an intermediary role for him, you mean?

K: Yeah. But that at least indicates that there is some relationship between the ICCS and the members of the Conference.

S: Right.

K: Can you swing by here on the way to airport or should I send it -- I'll send to Guay.

S: Send it to Guay because I'm going to Dulles from here.

K: Yeah, I'll send it to Guay. They said the final act cannot adopt anything on Laos and Cambodia other than what's contained in the Agreement.

S: Well, that's plenty.

K: Well, that I thought was pretty good. And they don't want any reference to multilateral aid in there.

S: Multilateral, I agree with them but they --

K: Well, they say the question of concrete forms of furnishing assistance should be decided in consultation by the parties concerned. We consider it quite inappropriate that the decisions of the Conference should carry any provision to this effect. And in particular, that an international consultative group be formed as stipulated in the draft.

TELECON
Amb. Porter

2/23/73 5:55 p.m.

P. I think that you approved continued flights in that area from which the passenger plane came from. I just wanted you to be aware that there were two visual contacts in the last three months and there are aircraft poised for action on the coast line.

K: If the Israelis are crazy enough to shoot us down . . .

P: No, it isn't them. It's the _______ and the place the planes come from that are crazier. I wanted to make sure you knew there had been one visual and one radar sighting from the place the plane originated within the last three months, and they are a pretty wild lot.

K: Okay.

P: Okay.

K: Wait a minute. I had something for you. We had a message from the Chinese saying they accept the French ______ but not the Security Council and they left the ICCS open. They said nothing about the ICCS either. They probably are ______ but they agree to the French. We are not violently opposed to France here and there are not many ways that would be better, and the President wants to do something for Pompidou.

P: When ______ lies down on her back and is nice to people going by she gets everything.

K: Okay. They do not want reporting to the UN, to the Secretary General.

P: Do they have a suggestion about that?

K: Yes, we can have the ICCS report to the conference members.

P: Directly?

K: Yes.

P: Directly. That's an alternative anyway.

K: Had a message from the Soviets. They don't want the Secretary General to do anything other than be an observer. They don't want an international consultative group set up for economic aid and we don't want to push that one hard anyway for our own reasons.

P: No, I understand.

TelCon
Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger
6:15 pm, February 23, 1973

K: Joe, they've torn my office apart, I'm filming something.

A: Good, good, Henry. I called about something that might
do the President good.

K: What is that?

A: Briefly the Paley's are dying to go to China and I think it
would be nice, and useful and a sensible thing to do. They
really do represent something.

K: I understand, but the trouble I'm under now is that everyone
wants to go and all my friends think if I don't make a request
tomorrow, I'm not showing my friendship. I want to wait
three weeks before I do anything for anybody.

A: Well, I thought you might think this a special case. He came
to me and I wrote a letter to Mr. ______ saying that I
thought this would be a good investment for China. They are
champing at the bit to get there.

K: I cannot do it for three weeks. I now must clean up the after-
math of the visit and cannot ask for anything personal. As
soon as that is done I am prepared to do this on behalf of
the Paleys--in about three or four weeks.

A: Good, good.

K: Joe, the President--I ______ virtually opposed to saying
this is the "Kissinger Report"

A: I have no intention of doing so unless desired, I don't do
business that way.

K: Good, thank you. Hope to see you soon.

A: Maybe next week we'll have supper. Would you like to see
my family all in one room. My sister is coming down on
Wednesday, she is great fun, it would be good fun to have you.

K: Joe, I won't know until Monday. Can I call you Monday night?

A: Of course.

K: Good, I talk to you then.

A: Good, good.

TelCon
Mr. Trewitt/Mr. Kissinger

6:20 pm, February 23, 1973

K: Hello.

T: Thank you for returning my call and congratulations on the latest coup. You are displaying your colors now, more warmer and more personal. (talking about China)

K: It was more visibly warmer and we know each other better now.

T: Is it true--the story about Col. Kennedy spraining his leg.

K: Sprained his back. He fell down some stairs and after that they had a doctor around all the time. He was given more attention over there than he been given in the three years he's been on my staff.

T: The films of Chou showed him "alive".

K: It was very warm.

T: This trip was more substantive, I had thought before the trip that we wouldn't expect to gain much.

K: In China? Well we expected to go down that road, but not quite this far.

T: Do you want to give me anything---

K: Don't want to speculate, but don't underestimate the force of my personality.

T: How hard should I go...this time it went farther than one could have expected.

K: It went very far, more significant, more substantive progress.

T: Something like the trade delegate, it goes farther than that.

K: And without reciprocity; and the delicate way they handled the Downey thing.

T: How concerned should we be about Laos.

*

-2-

K: Well, everything in Indochina is brewing, the troops and so forth. We'll have to use all our wisdom and luck. Not sure they have made their decision.

T: It's inconclusive, but testing purposes--

K: Well, we did make the ceasefire. This situation about disagreement is irrelevant, if they pull troops out. If they don't pull troops out, no agreement. The acid test is their going to pull troops out. If they do then it is a far better agreement than the '62 one. That is what I would focus on.

T: Is the military reinforce going on now.

K: It's their version of our ENHANCE PLUS on continuing the supply line. We are analyzing it, but we may stop our pipeline after June 27.

T: We are not certain yet.

K: Not yet certain.

T: Is there any color in Hanoi? Heard you visited other things of interest in Hanoi.

K: I visited two museums and took a walk around a lake. It is very rare that in Communist countries they permit the word "constructive" and I heard that four weeks after we stopped the bombing, _______ and in the communique.

T: On the Liason Office, is your luncheon with Duc (?) of any significance.

K: No, he's an old friend. I don't want to mislead you, I don't know what could happen later. But I had this appointment with him for some time, made it long time ago. I'm not guiding you towards it, I don't want to trap you. There's nothing of that kind now under contemplation.

T: On the International Guarantee Conference, do you have a sense of where that's going.

K: No, because the NVM have been slow in developing their position, but Sullivan's over there for preliminary talks.

-3-

T: Do we have people over there.

K: Many of them are in economic office, no military people.

T: Are you making any new statements on the NBC broadcast.

K: Not if I can help it.

T: Reading that Italian thing, I judge that there's just enough reshaping of the language, etc., to give a very strong impression that most of it was totally false.

K: I was afraid I'd get in a debate if I said totally false. This thing of the cowboy was no big event in my life; how can people with no charisma be popular. I said in America you have various kinds of people, movie stars, glamor types, and the Cooper type who acts alone. I've given news conferences for four years, it's not possible that I would load every mistake into one interview. It's incomprehensible that I would say the President was a great factor for my success, it's stupid.

T: She's impossible. Why did you see her, I wouldn't have.

K: That's because you're afraid to take her on. Oh, the Italian Ambassador asked me to see her. All of this part is off the record.

T: Okay, Henry. Thanks.

K: Good. Bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Origin: 6/15/65</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>MARY, Date 6/15/65</td></tr></table>

TelCon
Mr. Rifai/Mr. Kissinger
8:40 pm, February 23, 1973

K: Hello, how are you.

R: Very well, thank you. The reason I called, I just wanted you to know that *my King* is leaving the United States on Tuesday.

K: Would you like to meet on Tuesday in Washington.

R: That is up to you.

K: Good, Let's do it Tuesday. I have nothing new, but we might review the situation.

R: Fine. I want to discuss other things--we need budget assistance and so forth.

K: I will see what I can generate. Well Tuesday, then. We will call you on Monday to suggest a time and place.

R: Good. Then maybe I can fly back Tuesday evening.

K: Good, I'll call you, Bye.

R: Bye, thank you.

TelCon
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

8:50 pm, February 23, 1973

R: Hello.

K: I wanted to call you on the conference. I agree on Waltheim. We can't agree on the UN. I think the proposal that Bill worked out with Tok, could participate but could not sign the document is perfectly feasible.

R: He'd be the only one that would sign?

K: That's what Bill worked out in Hanoi.

R: We are not going to have control of the conference.

K: I've heard from the Chinese, they would go along with the French as chairman. The President is most opposed.

R: We have got to be careful by agreeing to downgrade Waltheim.

K: The North Vietnamese proposed him.

R: There was an agreement with the NVN and ourselves, we all signed it.

K: There's a proposal of having him Executive Secretary. Chinese are adamant, under no circumstance are they going along with that. The Russians also won't go along with that.

R: The British and French will start out and Canada is for Waltheim, they said that. But there's no reason to fight. Must put up suggestions, he would be logical. If everybody agrees on the French, that's fine. Where did you get the information about the Russians.

K: From Vorontsov. The Chinese also feel that way about him but not categorically. Chinese don't want him as Chairman and don't want to continue the UN role.

R: I think we'll have to fight that, he's a participant.

K: I agree, the NVN will get along with that.

R: The French are stupid bastards. Oh, well--

K: Have a good trip,

R: Thanks, bye.

TELCORN

Mr. Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

2/24/73 9:15 a.m.

PF: Good morning, Henry. You got a kind of garbled message when
you were abroad as to what I had suggested for Alchemov, but
forget it because I am not going to bother with it anyway.

HK: Well, what I got was that he was supposed to be sent around Jewish business groups

PF: No, Henry, what was going to happen was somebody like Kendall
was going to give him a dinner in NY and Thornton on the West
Coast--and included would be the business leaders including the
Jewish Business leaders. And then if Max Fisher wanted a call
from those people later because you and he had come to an agree-
ment, it would be a way in which you could get some indirect
pressure on the congressman--some way you could get the leaders
of the Jewish business community to recognize they are doing them-
selves a disservice.

HK: Yeh.

PF: But I wasn't going to be there--it was going to be Kendall, Thornton, Hewlett kind of thing--after all, Ken dall just took the Minister of Agriculture around the US and no one suggested we were doing anything wrong--but any way, Kendall will probably be give him a dinner and maybe Hewlett will anyway and if anything comes out fine and if nothing comes out of it, fine too. But he is a friend of mine, as you know.

HK: Who?

PF: Alchemov. And I would like to give him a dinner and in the normal course of events, I'd ask him to my home the Russians that are coming which include him and 3 or 4 others. I asked you--not you--Scowcroft and Sonnenfeldt and 4 or 5 people from the Administration--

HK: Well, of course.

PF: And I'd ask four or five people from the Hill.

HK: I have no problems with that.

PF: All right for you if I ask some of the leaders from the Hill to come to dinner with these people who are here to discuss US/USSR trade

HK: Of course I have no problem--it was presented to me that they would

Page 2

go around talking to Jewish business groups and I thought that was
insane.

PF: Well at least the report back was accurate, because those were the words that were used, but that was not the thought--the thought was that they would talk to business groups and then business groups in this country obviously include Jewish business leaders who might come to believe that they are engaged in a process that's going to hurt them as well as the rest of the US businessmen--

HK: Well you know I like Don Kendall but subtlety is not his point. What I don't want is a direct Jewish/Soviet confrontation. Because the Soviets will object violently to it and from my judgment of Jewish leaders you don't get them that way. If you give a dinner in which you know one or two Jewish business leaders are included as business leaders, that's another thing. But if Kendall gives a dinner for 90% who are Jewish--that's just nuts.

PF: I agree with you--that was never contemplated

HK: But if you give a dinner for business leaders, that include Max Fishe
as a leading businessman, why not.

PF: Right. Okay. Now I will do the thing with Alchemov. Secondly, I had the month wrong on the Finance Committee in China. The time they would like to suggest is September. Do you have a problem with September?

HK: I think they should wait for 4 goddamn weeks until we get our head
above water, for Christ's sake.

PF: All right.

HK: You have no idea--everybody is now calling in here whether I can't
get them into China over the next 6 months.

PF: Why don't we tell them to wait for 4 or 5--

HK: Let them wait until we get these liason offices on the road and then
there will be a procedure for doing it.

PF: on that basis, if you wait, you have no problem with September.

HK: That depends on the Chinese--I have no problems with it. For Christ
sakes don't turn it into junket--China did not make a revolution so that
Americans could have orgasms there.

PF: (laughs) Is that what you were doing over there?

Page 3

HK: Every goddamn--

PF: --a junket is the description of a Senatorial trip.

HK: If they want to take their wives and newspaper men and do their
usual baloney

PF: Let's let the Chinese tell them--

HK: Let the Chinese worry about it, as long as I don't get involved, it's
fine with me and as long as the WH doesn't get involved.

PF: Fine. I will tell them that--They ought to wait for a couple months
till the representation offices are established and then they're on their
own.

HK: Exactly.

PF: Great.

HK: Good.

PF: Bye, Henry.

TELOON

Mr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer
(Secure Phone) 2/24/73 9:30 a.m.

AM: .... (came in late) planted by a 35-mile rectangle. I told them to go ahead.

HK: Sure, if they are valid targets--when will they do it.

AM: They start tonight at midnight and will finish tomorrow night midnight. We will be getting from Godley a request from operations from Laos, GM-28 near Xiengkouangville for a strike.

HK: Is it a one-time strike?

AM: Yes. We will be getting the request from them so I am assuring you want to do it.

HK: Yes. You think it is a good thing to do?

AM: Yes, those little bastards are taking advantage of air support. They are trying to get T-28 in there.

HK: And they are fighting in there?

AM: Yes, strangely enough, it appears that the North Vietnamese have ordered some troops to stand down. Some have gone out and are shaking hands and exchanging cigarettes. It's a hodge-podge there. We wanted you to know the request from Godley--it's coming in.

TELCONE

Senator Jackson/Mr. Kissinger

12:06 p.m. 2/24/73

HK: Scoop?

SJ: Yeh, Henry.

HK: No sense dealing with a man of integrity--is there.

SJ: Be careful about that integrity business.

HK: All I tell you is if you won't yield on Rowney, we'll just haveto appoint
him.

SJ: Well--

HK: No, we're going appoint him--

SJ: I'll tell ya--

HK: Listen, I am glad you didn't yield--all my assistants panicked when I
sent Moorer to you--they said not he's going to yield--

SJ: You know me--I have the quiet, soft-headed liking--you know my people
were born in Norway--

HK: It's *xxx* coming out just as I hoped it would

SJ: I was very firm with him--he kept pushing me--

HK: I figured this way it'll give him maximum incentive built into it to have
everyone make it succeed.

SJ: Well, that's right. By the way Rowney is coming over this way this week.
I was going to have him up to the office for lunch Monday, if I get back
from Dallas in Time. He's going to be in town--should he see anyone?

HK: He could drop by to see Scowcroft--

SJ: Yeh, I'll have him do that--he probably will stop by and see Haig too.

HK: Good.

Page 2

SJ: Listen I want to mention something to you--Someevening Helen and I would like to have you and a friend come by for dinner and I thought we might ask Margaret Truman and her husband just--

HK: I'd be delighted

SJ: You know I don't like these great big drawn out things--just put our feet up.

HK: ---associate with Democrats--

SJ: (laughs)

HK: At least not with conservative Democrats--No I'd love to

SJ: Let me just say--you know we don't live in Georgetown

HK: Well, now that puts a new complexion on it--where do you live?

SJ: Spring Valley.

HK: Oh no, I can't do that--
If it isn't in Georgetown, Scoop--you'll have to keep it secret--

SJ: We'll transfer to Georgetown

HK: Maybe we could do it at the Rive Gauche--
No, I really enjoy that

SJ: In a couple of weeks--we've had an illness--in a couple of weeks

HK: That'd be great--

SJ: And I'll get ahold of Margaret--she's an old friend--I don't know her husband too well, but he's a pretty decent guy--maybe there is something we can leak to the NYT to help him out--

HK: Well, he is a decent guy--

SJ: He's not a part of that crowd--

HK: No, and any help we can give the decent guys there, one should do. So that would be very nice.

SJ: Okay, we'll fix a mutually satisfactory date--we'll put our feet up and enjoy things a little-- all right, leader, good work on this--took a little while

HK: We broke them down to a point where they are now sending in the recomm
endation of Rowney--so that the records will show it.

Page 3

SJ: Henry, while you are on the phone one minute--you know I've been talking to Schlesinger on this problem we have in Chile with the subcommittee--I think he should talk to you and if necessary

HK: Who Church?

SJ: No, no, Schlesinger--there are some real problems, you know, and I am going to have him up to meet with McCoran (?)--see there are three or four of us on that oversight committee and he may be calling you--in fact I think it is something they ought to talk to the President about--I don't suggest those things, but this is just the tip of the iceberg

HK: Well, I better look into that.

SJ: They could blow the lid on a lot of things--

HK: What we've done down there--I better acquaint myself with that--

SJ: You better get on that one--

HK: I frankly don't know what you are talking about--

SJ: I know--but you've been reading the special subcommittee that's set up to--to--it's been in the paper--linking ITT and the CIA in Chile--

HK: Hmph.

SJ: You've heard about that.

HK: Yeh, I better look into that.

SJ: I strongly suggest that because they are opening hearings and get a hold of Jim--I've been talking with him. And I'll be speaking to him this weekend.

HK: And Scoop, on your trip to China--that's as good as said.

SJ: That'll be this summer.

HK: They tacked a little bit at Buckley because they didn't think well of his brother's reporting from China--

SJ: (laughs) But they gave a clearance to me?

HK: Oh yeh and they'll take Buckley too--

Well, their views are closer to yours--they are a little bit to the right of you Scoop on Defense matters. They are crazy about you--I gave them some of your speeches on SALT--they are just crazy about you. They think you are the only guy who really understands what's going on.

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Barbara Walters

2/24/73 12:30 p.m.

BW: What is troubling you.

HK: The bombing thing is troubling me, because Ziegler was asked to find out whether you asked it.

BW: And what did you say?

HK: I said I don't remember in detail all the questions.

BW: You know the--

HK: Oh, it's already written up--somebody just handed it to me.

BW: It's written up? What is?

HK: Interview by Dr. Henry Kissinger with Barbara Walters NBC news.

BW: But they don't say what's in it.

HK: I got the whole transcript here--

BW: Where did the transcript come from?

HK: I don't know--my eager beaver assistant handed it to me.

BW: Well we have the transcript, yeh, I thought you meant it was in the newspapers.

HK: No, I have the transcript here.

BW: When we left when we daught the plane this morning--the feeling of our people about the comments was well you certainly said that you agreed with the President--that is the way it came out. It came out as support of the President and I don't think you have a thing to worry about.

HK: At any rate, I want you to know--end tape

BW: And that is one thing in which you very diplomatic terms--you made it clear that you wouldn't discuss this--and having said that obviously if I couldn't support it I would resign--which means that you supported it. It shows that you totally backed the President--you said I will not comment about whether I recommend or do not recommend--it is exactly what you want to say--and I don't think the WH will be disturbed--only if you said--if I couldn't do it, I would resign--also you said I refuse to

Page 2

answer these questions so nobody can be angry with you--I think when you
call Bob Haldeman a shit--that was something you shouldn't have
done.

HK: Well, that you can't use because it is a family medium--

BW: (Laugs)

HK: So I am protected on that.

BW: That's right.

HK: I should have talked like Sinatra.

BW: And the part about the Jewish and the part about the Fallaci--
and other sections as well that I have taken out that I think are kind of
--I really

HK: I hate the idea of people sitting there seeing that I --saying the right thing
I mean the people here who are watching it here ~~with stop watches~~

BW: I think the people watching it there will be very pleased with this--they
should be--

HK: When are going to run it on Sunday -- Monday morning?

BW: Between 7:30 and 8:00 at this point--

HK: I probably --I'll get it taped I won't be able to watch it.

BW: That's why we are doing it--because that's the only time we can watch.

HK: I am going to be at Rockefeller's house -- he must have a television.

BW: I would think that he has a television set--

HK: Do you think?

BW: He's got the whole of Rockefeller Plaza--he owns every television set
in kix our building, I would think he would have one at home.

HK: Well, we'll

BW: I would like to know--

HK: I would like to know when you are coming down for a social dinner

BW: You make a big effort--I make a big effort--you go fast, I go fast.

Page 3

BW: I don't know whether I really want to now because nobody asked you for your autographs last night.

HK: You should have been with me the night before--I was really big--

BW: After you have seen it tomorrow night--I'd love to hear from you.

HK: Let me see--Barbara Walters let's see--are you in my book to begin with--

BW:

HK: 265 7229

BW: Isn't that funny, you're not in my book.

HK: You better catch up.

BW: Don't worry about it--by the way when I asked you what the most difficult decision for you was and you said the bombing--is that something I can mention--

HK: Oh yes.

BW: The most difficult decision you were involved in was the bombing

HK: Say the most difficult--if you say that that will help--that I was involved in

BW: Okay. Because as I said Time magazine had called and one of the things they had asked yesterday was could I give them some idea of feeling and some idea of our conversation and I will tell them if that is all right for you

HK: Sure.

BW: If you can't a chance to call

HK: Right.