THURSDAY AFTERNOON, 30 NOVEMBER 1972

CROSBY S. NOYES

WASHINGTON STAR & NEWS 30 November 1972 P15

Everyone Is in the Soup in Viet Peace Talks

With the Paris peace talks suspended, the question is: Who is in the soup? The answer seems to be that everyone is in the soup, but some are in deeper than others.

No one, certainly, is claiming at this point that a breakdown of the talks — even a temporary one — represents a victory for his side. The pressure to reach a settlement of the war is stronger than ever on everyone concerned. And despite the setback, the prospect is that a settlement will yet be achieved.

For the Nixon administration, the failure to reach agreement during the last round of negotiations in Paris represents, to say the least, an acute embarrassment. In the light of what happened, and what is now known of the obstacles that remained to be overcome, the public confidence of the Americans before the last Paris session seems little short of incredible.

By this time, Henry Kissinger should have learned the dangers of setting deadlines in diplomatic negotiations. His flat prediction that a settlement could be wrapped up in one more round of talks lasting no more than three or four days was a mistake that no experienced negotiator would be likely to make. The decla-

ration that "peace is at hand" in Vietnam has put the administration in a box from which it may find it impossible to escape.

The administration, to be sure, is not without options. It indeed has an agreement in hand which it can live with, even if the government in Saigon cannot. If worse comes to worst, Kissinger presumably could return to the original nine-point draft agreement and ignore President Thieu's charges of an American sell-out. Under these conditions, however, the chances of anything resembling genuine peace in Vietnam would be extremely remote.

Thieu's own position, therefore, is equally uncomfortable. He has succeeded for the time being in blocking the nine-point agreement and getting the United States to make additional substantial demands on North Vietnam, including the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South.

These demands not only have been rejected but reportedly have provoked a number of counter-demands from the North Vietnamese negotiators. Kissinger is now in a position to inform Thieu that he tried hard and failed, leaving Thieu facing a painful dilemma. He knows perfectly well that he

has no permanent veto over an agreement between Washington and Hanoi. His strategy is to play for as much time as possible, but he is well aware that time is rapidly running out.

It seems probable, however, that Hanoi's grim negotiators are in the most uncomfortable spot of all. It is they, quite apparently, who are in the most urgent need of a settlement in South Vietnam. Their threat to break off the negotiations in Paris and resume full-scale warfare in South Vietnam is a transparent bluff that no one takes very seriously.

The leaders in Hanoi have made their supreme effort and it has failed. They have blown their entire army in a military offensive that started eight months ago and has yet to achieve any significant results. American intelligence estimates rate Hanoi at the point of military exhaustion. A further significant delay in reaching a settlement would mean more destruction to North Vietnam and, in all probability, an increasing deterioration of the military situation.

It is hard to say how the negotiators from Hanoi read the present turn in the peace negotiations, but it is most un-

likely that they take much satisfaction from it. Undoubtedly, they are furious about the efforts of the Saigon regime to delay a settlement, if only because they are now being made aware that Thieu is not quite the puppet and lackey their propaganda has always insisted he is. The fact that Washington has gone along with Saigon's demands probably is read as a hardening of the Nixon administration's posture in the wake of the recent elections.

What they may do about it is anybody's guess. Clearly, however, the leaders in Hanoi do not share the unshakable belief of American liberals that, once the Americans leave South Vietnam, the regime in Saigon will quickly collapse. They know that to accede to Thieu's demands would be to give up any hope of taking over South Vietnam for the indefinite future. But considering the squeeze they are in, they may have little choice.

And so the pressures on all parties to the Paris talks are enormous. We are the middle-man in a classic oriental bargaining session in which both sides try to appear to be in no hurry to settle and continue to make extreme demands. The actual terms on which a settlement may emerge still are unclear.

LOS ANGELES TIMES 30 NOVEMBER 1972

Bulldozers and Anthills in Vietnam

In the final search for "peace with honor" in Vietnam, there has been a renewed anxiety about safeguards and security. The United States has responded to this anxiety by insisting on more precise definitions of the terms of peace, by a massive buildup of military supplies for the South Vietnamese army, and by increasing the level of aerial bombardment of North Vietnam.

President Nixon has every reason to prolong the negotiations if, by this prolongation, he can win concessions from Hanoi that will make more durable the peace for Indochina.

The strengthening of the South Vietnamese army with the last-minute rush of supplies probably is an inevitable last obligation of the alliance that developed through the years of the war.

But there appears no justification for the prolongation of the brutal air war that already has exceeded, in bomb tonnage, every record of warfare known to man.

American officials have justified the escalation of aerial bombing as necessary to cut off the movement of supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. If that is the real reason, it sounds like another case of using a bulldozer to remove an anthill.

North Vietnam remains blockaded, as it has been since May 11. It supplies its troops with battered trucks crossing reconstructed bridges or packed on

human backs along narrow trails. It can hardly be more than a trickle contrasted with the flood of supplies moving from the United States to South Vietnam through modern port facilities and in a supplementary airlift.

The problem is not military balance. There is today, as in all of recent years, an imbalance, and it is in the favor of South Vietnam.

South Vietnam has more than a million soldiers under arms. The Pentagon counts no more than 150,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in South Vietnam.

South Vietnam remains untouched by enemy aerial bombing. North Vietnam remains under an American aerial attack that, curiously enough, has reached record proportions in the seven weeks since general agreement was reached on the nine-point peace plan.

What South Vietnam needs most is something the Americans cannot provide: it is the spirit, fanaticism, determination, drive that have motivated the North Vietnamese in a war that, for them, has stretched over a quarter of a century.

Nothing that is negotiated at Gif-sur-Yvette can provide safeguards that assure security, not for anyone in Indochina. This is a lesson that should have been learned, if no other, from the failure of this adventure. It is a lesson that makes all the more unacceptable the perpetuation of the bombing of North Vietnam.

WASHINGTON POST

26 NOV. 1972

# What Split in North Vietnam?

WITH THE SHIFT in North Vietnam's position on negotiated settlement, some analysts are suggesting that a struggle between contending factions of the party leadership has ended in a victory for those who favor a strategic retreat from the war in the South. This is only the latest version of the old claims of disunity in the North Vietnamese politburo, which has been argued by Victor Zorza and P. J. Honey for many years.

Since the Paris talks began nearly five years ago, and especially since the death of Ho Chi Minh in September, 1969, Zorza has consistently maintained that Hanoi's leaders are divided between "hawk" and "dove" factions on the war in South Vietnam. His latest analysis, in the Oct. 15 Outlook, claims to see the final defeat of those who have for so long advocated a heavy military commitment in the South.

"The argument that the politburo has been divided by opposing factions has also been pushed for at least a decade by the University of London's P. J. Honey. And Prof. Nguyen Tien Hung of Howard University supports this interpretation in his Oct. 29 Outlook article.

The idea of a power struggle behind the scenes in Hanoi has so enchanted Western observers over the years that it has lured them away from the path of careful scholarship. The methods of Kremlinology used successfully to pinpoint the issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute as well as those dividing Soviet and Chinese leadership groups—interpreting the political significance of differing formulations of ideological principles, changes of emphasis and even omitted phrases — have not been the basis for this interpretation of North Vietnamese politics. On the basis of a misunderstanding of North Vietnam's agrarian policy, some analysts had decided by the early 1960s that there was a split in the politburo between a faction led by Truong Chinh, the party secretary-general until 1956 and now chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and one led by Le Duan, who became secretary-general in 1960.

## False Dichotomies

FOR MANY YEARS, it was accepted as fact that Truong Chinh was "pro-Chinese" because of a land reform program which supposedly instituted the Chinese model and used Chinese advisers. Because of their alleged opposition to the land reform, Le Duan and Vo Nguyen Giap were categorized as "pro-Soviet." On the basis of this supposed cleavage in the politburo, P. J. Honey even claimed in his book, "Communism in North Vietnam," that Truong Chinh's pro-Chinese group

had taken over while Ho Chi Minh was in Moscow for the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in October and November of 1957. The Hanoi press and radio, he said, refused to mention Ho's activities in Moscow, and politburo member Nguyen Duy Trinh resulted his Russian guests by quoting extensively from Mao Tse-tung at a meeting marking the Russian Revolution.

A more careful examination of the documents relating to the land reform program and the 1957 observance of the October Revolution in Hanoi, however, would have dispelled the popular notion of a power struggle between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions of the politburo. The land reform was not an imitation of the Chinese model but was specifically tailored to the Vietnamese political and economic conditions. Nor is there any evidence that it was pushed through over the objections of a "pro-Soviet" faction. Truong Chinh had to step down as secretary-general because of a failure to exercise strict enough supervision over the implementation of land reform and party reorganization, not because he had been responsible for a "pro-Chinese" policy.

"As for the 1957 takeover by the Truong Chinh faction, it appears to have been a figment of Prof. Honey's imagination. In fact, the Hanoi press carried full reports of Ho Chi Minh's activities in Moscow almost every day, and Nguyen Duy Trinh's "Maoist" speech on the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution, the full text of which appeared in Nhan Dan a few days later, did not quote Mao at all.

"The foundation of the factional interpretation is thus a series of misconceptions about the North Vietnamese leadership. On the assumption that Truong Chinh and Le Duan are fundamentally at odds with each other, Zorza, Honey and others have attributed to each of them policy views which are not supported by an objective reading of their speeches and writings. These analysts have constructed a series of false dichotomies of strategy where none exist.

One of the alleged dichotomies is between a "big war" or "quick victory" strategy, which the analysts have associated with Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap, and a "guerrilla warfare" or "protracted war" strategy associated with Truong Chinh. The same dichotomy is portrayed by both Prof. Honey and Prof. Hung in terms of Truong Chinh's emphasis on "political struggle" as opposed to the emphasis by Le Duan and Gen. Giap on "military struggle."

Zorza has written that Truong Chinh's August, 1968, report in which he exhorted cadres to "grasp the motto of the 'long drawn-out fight and relying mainly on one's self,'" was an im-

plicit rebuff to Le Duan and Defense Minister Giap, whom Zorza holds responsible for the Tet offensive. But the same report formulated the tasks of the revolution in the South in such a way as to rule out a defensive strategy: "Strive to wipe out as much of the enemy's strength as possible; powerfully develop our people's armed forces and political forces; cause the disintegration of the puppet army."

In fact, neither Truong Chinh nor anyone else in the politburo has ever asserted that "protracted war" means the repudiation of a general offensive with big-unit warfare. North Vietnamese military theory has never regarded the concept of the "offensive strategy," under which main force units have been committed to battle in the South, as incompatible with the principle of "protracted war."

The complementary relationship between the two principles was discussed in a letter said to have been written by Le Duan in 1966 and captured by U.S. troops in 1967. The author declared that the command was "firmly adhering to the principle of a protracted war, at present and in the future." At the same time, however, he explained that the party's central committee had endorsed the concept of achieving "ultimate victory in a relatively short period of time." The two concepts, he concluded, "are not in the least contradictory with each other," because "at present, we are on the offensive and not on the defensive."

The conflict has remained "protracted," according to Vietnamese military doctrine, not because the balance of forces in the South has been favorable to the South but because the Americans have refused to recognize the fundamental weakness of their strategic position. Although the Tet offensive failed to cause the disintegration of the Saigon army or to hold urban objectives, Hanoi military theorists never admitted going back to the strategic defensive; instead the concept of the "offensive strategy" has become more complex.

## Gradual Steps and Leaps

NOTHING SHOWS MORE clearly the error of viewing the North Vietnamese politburo as divided between advocates of "protracted war" and "quick victory" than the analysis written by Le Duan for the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Lao Dong Party in 1970. The essay reaffirms the "offensive posture" of the revolutionary forces in the South, analyzing the strategy as one of "ever fiercer assaults which assume higher and higher forms, alternating gradual steps with leaps." At times, it concedes, the military struggle "may take on a defensive character, but this is only a temporary tactical move aimed at clearing the way for continuation of the offensive."

The strategy did not emphasize either guerrilla operations or main-force units over the other. On the one hand, the author embraced the motto, "to fight a protracted war, gaining strength as one fights"; on the other hand, he called for the combining of military attack and political struggle to "make very important leaps apt to change the relation of forces and the face of the war."

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(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

BALTIMORE SUN 26 NOVEMBER 1972

# Can Henry and Le find peace?

By SCOTT SULLIVAN

Paris.

At first sight, the task which Henry A. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho sat down to accomplish in the Paris suburbs last week is quite simply impossible.

Any judgment based on the ample public record would conclude that what the top American and North Vietnamese emissaries were trying to do was something like a contradiction in terms—comparable to squaring the circle.

On the record, Mr. Tho, the white-topped Hanoi politburo member who has directed his country's negotiating strategy from the beginning, was committed to obtaining a signature of the draft peace treaty which, according to North Vietnam, President Nixon acknowledged had been "completed" on October 17. All that remained to be done, according to a blizzard of North Vietnamese statements, was to decide "where and when the signature will take place."

## Compromising the Viet Cong

Clearly, there was more give in Hanoi's position than its hard-lining propaganda indicated. But, from a variety of public and private indications, it was equally clear that there was not much give. Mr. Tho might be willing to haggle over some minor questions of "detail," like the "six or seven" mentioned in Dr. Kissinger's press conference of October 26, but North Vietnamese sources insisted with unusual violence that there could be no question of revising "matters of principle" in the draft treaty.

Even had Hanoi been willing to make some substantial revisions, it could hardly have done so without seriously alienating its indispensable ally, the Viet Cong's Provisional Revolutionary Government. The PRG has made no secret; for the past six weeks, of its own feeling

that the treaty—far from giving too much to the Communist side—seriously compromised the future of the southern "liberation forces." Within its own ranks, the PRG was torn by die-hard elements that opposed any negotiated settlement of the conflict, not to mention any worse terms than those already obtained.

## A lurid story

At week's end, a lurid story from the battlefield—possibly exaggerated by the Saigon government for its own purposes—told of an open revolt by the die-harders that had very nearly succeeded in ousting the relatively "moderate" PRG leadership. Any visible concessions granted by Mr. Tho in Paris could only intensify the Viet Cong leadership's difficulties and open wider the gap between Communists of the north and "liberation forces" in the south.

On the other side of the negotiating table, Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon's special advisor on national security affairs, was—again on the public record—committed to ends apparently irreconcilable with Mr. Tho's.

From the moment of his arrival here Sunday night, the American envoy assumed the role of advocate for the views of Nguyen Van Thieu, the South Vietnamese President.

In his arrival speech, Dr. Kissinger borrowed heavily from the Communist vocabulary speaking of the United States' "good will" and "seriousness" in the coming rounds of negotiations. If Mr. Tho showed the same spirit, he said, an early agreement was "probable."

## His commitment

In the same speech, however, Dr. Kissinger significantly publicized his commitment to counsel "frequently" during the talks with Pham Dang Lam, the chief South Vietnamese representative in Paris. Such a promise had never been made before and, in fact, there have been indications that Dr. Kissinger's pat briefings of Mr. Lam were almost insultingly casual.

The promise reflected the new balance of interests among the main parties since North Vietnam published a short-ended version of the draft treaty October 26 and President Thieu began his campaign to get the treaty either rejected or revised out of all recognition.

Mr. Thieu led his campaign with great adroitness. He had shown pluck in the face of his giant ally, had demonstrated a hitherto unsuspected degree of internal support and had skillfully exploited both his country's comparative weakness and President Nixon's long record of statements committing himself to achieving "peace with honor" in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger's airport promise implicitly recognized the truth that peace in Vietnam was hardly thinkable unless it carried the consent of the South Vietnamese government, and that it was up to him, as Saigon's only voice at the negotiating table, to obtain a peace that Saigon would agree to.

It was a promise the American Metternich was to keep. As the week of long negotiating sessions wore on, Dr. Kissinger spent evening after evening going over the record with Mr. Lam and his associates. The meetings between the edgy allies lasted as long as three hours at a time.

## Want troop withdrawal

The implicit criticism of Dr. Kissinger's performance in Saigon's tightly controlled press, meanwhile, became explicit. Saigon Radio accused him of having "overplayed his hand" in agreeing to the draft treaty last month.

In Paris, the large group of South Vietnamese officials around Mr. Lam breathed even more fire than their superiors in Saigon. At least three major provisions of the draft treaty remained totally unacceptable, they told reporters in small "off the record" briefings.

First, they said, there could be no peace unless the treaty included a specific promise by the North Vietnamese to withdraw the 300,000 troops which Saigon estimates Hanoi has sent to the South. Apparently hardening the position previously taken by President Thieu, the delegation here made no mention of the possibility of a partial troop withdrawal coupled with the regroupment of the bulk of northern forces in three well-defined areas. Moreover, they firmly maintained the 300,000 figure, despite repeated assertions by American intelligence officers that there were fewer than half that number of North Vietnamese troops in the south.

The details were, at all events, academic. While some observers felt there was a possibility that Mr. Tho would agree to a tacit understanding on partial troop withdrawal—indeed some observers believed such an understanding already existed—no one close to the situation admitted the possibility of a specific agreement. Since the beginning of the Vietnam conflict, Hanoi has stated the semi-religious conviction that its citizens and soliders are not "aggressors" in the south, only the Americans and their allies merit that description. To admit to alien status for Mr. Tho would be to disown the whole ideological underpinning of the war of national liberation He would not do it.

## DMZ sought

The second major South Vietnamese demand is for the recreation of the demilitarized zone, which was installed under the Geneva accords of 1954, as a demarcation line between the north and the south. This suggestion, which took on prominence as the week progressed, was unacceptable to the North Vietnamese on both military and ideological grounds. Militarily, the recreation of the zone would cut off the "liberation forces" in the northern part of the south from their base of operations. Ideologically, it would be tantamount to recognizing once again the basic division of the country into two separate halves.

Saigon's third pressing demand was for the ceasefire to extend into Laos and Cambodia. There seemed some possibility that the Laotian conflict might wind down simultaneously with the South Vietnamese ceasefire. In Cambodia, where fighting continued to rage between the "red Khmer" forces of former President Sihanouk, backed heavily by China and North Vietnam, and the conservative government of Lon Nol, there seemed no hope for an early settlement.

## Minor problems

A fourth demand of President Thieu that assurance be given that the proposed "National Council" should not

continued next page

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 NOV 1972 (26)

# The cease-fire ball in Washington's court

• By Charlotte Salkowski

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Peace is not at hand — but it still remains a
hope.

From the stucco villa in the suburbs of
Paris, the painstaking effort to achieve a
Vietnam settlement now shifts to the moun-
tain retreat of Camp David, near Thurmont,
Md.

President Nixon confers there with his
peripatetic negotiator, Henry Kissinger, at
Camp David this week. He is also due to meet
with Nguyen Phu Duc, the principal adviser
of South Vietnamese President Thieu. Then,
assuming the scenario proceeds as an-
nounced, Dr. Kissinger will resume talks
with the North Vietnamese in Paris next
Monday.

Amid reports of a serious impasse, the
United States has sought to dampen specula-
tion that there has been a breakdown in the
negotiations. President Nixon said in New
York at the weekend he was confident a
"right kind of settlement," a "long-term
peace," would be achieved. A White House
spokesman said "serious talks are contin-
ing."

At this crucial juncture the ball appears to
be in Washington's court. Hanoi's chief

negotiator, Le Duc Tho, remains in Paris, writing, for they know that if their forces are
suggesting that North Vietnam stands firm
on the basic provisions of the agreement
reached in October and that there is probably
not much negotiating ground.

The question now, apparently, is to what
extent President Nixon is willing to let his
position be swayed by President Thieu, who
is stronger than ever and is clearly trying to
get the best deal possible. The talks at Camp
David may well center on a search for a
formula that would provide a face-saving for
the South Vietnamese leader.

According to reports from Paris, the major
demands of the Saigon government include
the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops
from the South and a revision of the National
Council of Reconciliation, or interim "gov-
ernment," that is supposed to rule in South
Vietnam before elections.

Knowledgeable observers here believe that
it should not prove too difficult to redefine the
council so as to make clear it is not a coalition
government such as Hanoi has sought. But
the question of troop withdrawals would seem
to pose bigger obstacles.

From Hanoi's standpoint, this is an ex-
tremely sensitive issue. While the North
Vietnamese may have agreed verbally to
certain troop withdrawal, say these observ-
ers, they would not put such a pledge in

went out of the process. No scrap of
solid information filtered through the
curtain of secrecy, but the tell-tale signs
which observers of the talks have
learned to watch for suddenly all went
wrong.

Under the summary agreement published
by Hanoi Oct. 26, there would be a reduction
in military numbers of both sides. But a
discussion of this matter would take place
after a cease-fire went into effect and when
there would already be movement toward a
political solution.

A broadcast from Hanoi over the weekend
stated North Vietnam would not discuss this
issue, but it pointed out that the Oct 26
statement included language for a mutual
troop withdrawal and demobilization. Hence
Hanoi does at least expect a force reduction

Where President Thieu is concerned, a
great deal of vituperative language has come
out of Saigon. But it may be worth noting that
he is still telling his people there will be a
cease-fire and to be prepared for it

In any event, a factor weighing for con-
cession on his part would seem to be his
presumed realization that his survival de-
pends on the United States. Whether to
threaten some cutoff of financial or military
supplies may be one of the alternatives with
which President Nixon wrestles at his rural
hideaway this coming week

CAN HENRY AND LE FIND PEACE?.....CONTINUED

develop into a South Vietnamese super-
government—receded in importance as
the week went on. Observers felt the
problem had probably been solved, ei-
ther by a slight rewording of the text or
by a frank admission on both sides that
the jerry-built council was unlikely ever
to function in any case.

A cloud of minor problems, some of
them raised by the Communist side,
some of them brought up by the State
Department and American military
men, complicated the already thorny
situation.

Although North Vietnam had accented
Indonesia—along with Canada, Poland
and Hungary—as a member of the pro-
posed Ceasefire Control Commission,
both Hanoi and the Viet Cong have
expressed deep displeasure over the
flamboyantly “pro-American” stance of
President Suharto. The problem grew
sufficiently serious by midweek to in-
duce Dr. Kissinger to fly overnight to
Brussels for talks with the Indonesian
leader.

Mr. Tho was also believed to be
pressing for a firmer guarantee than
already existed on the fate of the tens of
thousands of civilian political prisoners
in Saigon's jails. Under the draft treaty,
their future was to be left up to the
"spirit of reconciliation" of the warring
South Vietnamese parties. The question
was of acute importance to the Viet
Cong, about half of whose civilian
cadres were thought to be in Mr.
Thieu's jails.

Technical questions surrounding the
organization of the Ceasefire Control
Commission were also reported to have
snagged the talks. Such details as who
would command the commission's
troops, how many troops there would be,
with what armaments, with what duties,
had all been left void in the earlier
treaty draft. American military experts

demanded that they be spelled out in
detail. The future commission members,
especially Canada, made the same re-
quest.

The hurdles to agreement, then, were
monumental—perhaps even logically in-
superable.

And yet. And yet.

The war, some observers contended,
must come to an end sometime. Both
major parties demonstrably wanted
peace. President Nixon must achieve
peace, preferably by Christmas, abso-
lutely by Inauguration Day. The war-
torn North Vietnamese, bombed and
mined into crisis, were in no better
shape. They were under the heaviest
kind of pressure from Peking and Mos-
cow, or so it appeared. And Mr. Thieu
could not hold out indefinitely against
his ally, the strongest nation in world
history (even if for a dozen years, the
Communist side had done so). In the
long run, Dr. Kissinger would do all he
could for Saigon, and having done it,
would announce that the treaty was
ready to sign. Somewhere, somehow, on
one side or another, or on both, the
optimists told themselves, the political
will would emerge to end the war.

The circle, in other words, would be
squared.

From Monday to Thursday, events
gave the optimists some comfort. The
meetings ran long and were fully
staffed. Mr. Tho smiled. Mr. Kissinger
grinned broadly and demonstrated his
good humor by lunching in a posh
restaurant with a lovely blonde. The two
top negotiators strolled frequently to-
gether in the patch of garden at their
"hideaway" in Gif-sur-Yvette. In the
past history of the secret talks, long
meetings had generally meant progress.
Something must be going on.

Then, on Friday, the magic somehow

After four days of long, fully-staffed
meetings—the Thursday session went
six-and-a-half hours—Friday saw the
two principals desert their rural retreat
in Gif for a one-hour tete-a-tete in grimy
Choisy-le-Roi. French sources whispered
about "serious obstacles." Vietnamese
living in Paris with lines into the dele-
gations asserted that Dr Kissinger was
simply repeating every one of President
Thieu's demands. Communist sources

described the situation as gloomy.

And the North Vietnamese, for the
first time since the talks started, issued
a classic propaganda denunciation of the
United States.

And now the talks are suspended. To
be sure, they will resume in nine days.
Neither side, in the current climate,
could afford a complete rupture. But the
buoyancy of the first half of the week
has gone, and no doubt has gone for
good.

Veteran observers of the Vietnam
scene in Paris knew the pattern well
They had seen hopes raised before, and
dashed, watched various peace plans
appear, strut briefly on the stage and
sink to be forever forgotten. learned
that the infernally complex Vietnamese
situation could blunt the best will in the
world and bog the cleverest diplomat in
endless contradiction.

Even those who had let themselves go
with the fantasy that Dr Kissinger
could work, the miracle, if anyone could
that peace indeed was 'at hand' had
by week's end settled down to wait a
little longer, perhaps a lot longer

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE 26 November 1972

# The Making of Viet Nam

**Q.**—What does “The Best and the Brightest” tell us about the decision-making process at the highest levels in Washington?

**A.**—What struck me was the way the government in a way was responding to itself and its own needs and its own perceptions as opposed to whether this was really in the interest of the United States, what it was doing to people in the United States, what would it do to the fabric of American society, indeed, to the fabric of Vietnamese society.

I have a sense of a great isolated government which is aware really of its own needs and its own continuity. One of the things I found out in doing the book was that the men who really were the architects of the war were not men produced by the system, produced by electoral politics.

They were talented men. You might even call them brilliant, altho I have some doubts about that. But they were men who had been altogether very successful. They had triumphed in everything. Their lives were very different from most of our lives.

What was good for them was not necessarily good for the country. What they could understand about American intervention was not necessarily what a blue-collar worker might want, or a Negro might want. I think one of the most telling anecdotes in the book is the one about the first Cabinet meeting when Vice President Lyndon Johnson—who they almost forgot to invite—shows up and just looks around.

He's really mesmerized by these men. He's never seen a group quite as awesome. There's Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who has triumphed over the Ford Motor Co.; McGeorge Bundy, who has come down from Harvard (dean of Harvard College); Secretary of State Dean Rusk, the Rhodes scholar from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Johnson goes back and he tells Sam Rayburn, his great mentor:

> "Sam, you've never seen people like that. Each is more brilliant than the other."

Sam listens for a while and he finally says, "Well, Lyndon, everything you say about them may be true and they may be every bit as bright as you say, but I'd feel a whole lot better if one of them had ever run for sheriff just once."

And I think there's a great deal of truth in that. It's a kind of a footnote to that moment when six years later, after Lyndon has crossed the Rubicon. He knows he's locked in on this war. He's pretending it's going well and his public statements are all upbeat. On a given moment 90 per cent of him believes that all the indices are good.

But there's another part of him, because he is a very good politician, which knows that he is really locked into something very dark. At one moment he takes aside one of his close advisers and says, "You know, I forget that when they came to me with all

Who were the men who went to Washington in the early 1960s to forge a new frontier but left a nation in agony over a bloody war in Southeast Asia? In this Perspective interview, David Halberstam talks about the men and the decisions that led us deeper and deeper into the quicksand of Viet Nam and the legacy they left behind.

Mr. Halberstam is the author of "The Best and the Brightest," a book about what happened when men who were considered the nation's best and brightest went to Washington under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Presently a fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute, he won a Pulitzer Prize for his reports from Viet Nam for the New York Times.

their slide rules, computers, calculations about how easy it would be, how well it would work, I forgot the most basic rule of politics is that 2 plus 2 never equals 4.

"You can never factor in the human equation that people never respond the way you want them to do and I had forgotten that."

**Q.**—Didn't they all forget about the human equation? Wasn't it McNamara's aide John McNaughton who once gave a lecture and had finished talking about cost effectiveness and defense statistics when someone in the audience said, "But where is man in all this?"

**A.**—It was really a great question because it was an antiseptic war in their minds. Certainly, Bundy is not a humanist. McNamara, I think, is a humanist who found that he could only survive and obtain power by being a computer, by being a statistical genius. I think he was a humanist after 6:30 at night. After he had gone home from the office, he would talk about French painting and read the works of Malraux or Camus, but they were not somehow tied to his daily work.

They were not whole men. They were able to isolate what they were doing in their jobs from the greater part of their ethical structure.

**Q.**—Has official lying been escalated to such a point of respectability in the Viet Nam era that it's become a permanent thing that we, in the press, can't touch?

**A.**—Many of the war's architects thought they were really better than the country and, since they were better, they knew what was good for the country. And if you know what was good for the country you were allowed to lie.

I think McNamara is a classic example of that. I think McNamara is a liar. People who were in meetings with him used to say they knew when he was lying. His voice would get quicker and more insistent, more of a chop to it. He would become almost more sure of himself when he was lying.

**Q.**—Did he invent data on the spot?

**A.**—Yes. Undersecretary of State George Ball would go in and make his dissent and he would be talking in reflective doubts about the war and Mc-

Namara would come out in statistical certitude, "Well, we have this, this; and this, and this many men, and this many, etc." And Ball, semidecapitated, would turn to him and say, "God damn it, why don't we [State Department] have stuff like this? Why can't we get these figures?" Ball's staff would start digging and it would turn out that those figures didn't exist.

McNamara did lie to his own colleagues on numerous occasions. I think it was because he felt that he was the best we could get.

He was very good. He had great confidence in himself, confidence that he was somehow controlling the military and I supposed it entitled him to lie, on the grounds that if he didn't do this we'd get a worse secretary of Defense—less of a good guy.

And so one of the things he permitted himself to do was to lie for the good of the team, for the good of the country.

**Q.**—What could the media have done in these events? What could it do in the future?

**A.**—I think the Washington reporting is, by and large, with some notable exceptions, far too close to the government, far too much in insidious ways—not direct ways—an extension of bureaucracy that it covers. I think the newspapers are too unwilling to have their White House correspondents take even semi-adversary relations with the White House. I've watched it. I've watched the New York Times accommodate with the power. They become extensions of the organisms that they're covering.

**Q.**—Did any of those who were doubters of the wisdom of our Viet Nam policy resign or raise their voices? Did they think that they could do better by staying inside the administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson?

**A.**—Yes. McNamara, who had the most doubts and then turned in his viewpoint, fought rather courageously within the government to turn the policy around. McNamara was so much the corporate figure, a man who doesn't have any power of his own. He felt his power was derivative from the President and he worked at the beckoning of the President.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

9-F

NATIONAL OBSERVER

2 DECEMBER 1972

# GIs Take Aim on New Target: A Job

By Paul C. Hood

FROM BAUMHOLDER, WEST GERMANY

"You been in The World lately?" asked the gangly, nervous youngster standing in the midst of a milling crowd of uniformed men here in the biggest U.S. base in Europe. "What's happening in The World?"

"The World," to a GI mired in the life of Army training, PXs, and service clubs in Europe, means the United States.

This soldier's query was the most direct, but crowded around him were hundreds of other uniformed men (and many who seemed more boys than men) who had come for an answer to the same question. Or to sharpen up the question: "What can I do when I get back to the States?"

To provide a few answers, more than 20 representatives of American industry, trade associations, and Government agencies have toured European military bases to bring GIs the word from home.

## Smoothing the Road

This was one stop, the biggest stop, on the Job Information Fair (JIF) tour, designed to brief servicemen abroad soon to be released to civilian life. For nearly three weeks a group of skilled employee recruiters and guidance counselors hopped from base to base across Europe, trying to answer questions and smooth the road back to civilian life.

After hours of sampling the advice available, many a weary GI stumbled out of the JIF sessions still confused about his future. But the counselors had given them a lot to mull over in the days to come and had provided a sense of direction to individual career planning.

Perhaps of equal benefit was the realization that overseas troops have not been forgotten back home.

"The news and other media occasionally have stories that indicate that just maybe the American people don't appreciate what we are doing in the Army," was the way Maj. Gen. Frederic E. Davidson, commander of the 8th Infantry Division, put it in opening the session here. And he pointed out that the appearance of the folks from home demonstrated American industries are not "the cold corporate bodies that some think them to be."

From Mildenhall, England, on through Wuerzburg and Baumholder, West Germany, and to Naples, Italy, the caravan moved. Day after day representatives of major U.S. industries, trade associations, and Government agencies huddled with ever-changing groups in a "county fair" situation. They laid out the job picture in their fields, then faced the GIs' questions.

The most persistent queries:

* ✓ Is there a job for me? Answer: There are jobs to be had in a variety of occupations, depending on your skills, education, and determination.

* ✓ How much money will I make? Answer: It depends on you and your ability, but be prepared to start at the bottom.

* ✓ How can I prepare myself for a specialized job? Between Veterans Administration benefits and Office of Education veterans' programs there are plenty of opportunities for discharged servicemen to go back to school and improve their position in the job market.

* ✓ Do I need a college education to get a job? Answer: The company reps disagree on this one. Advice varied from a flat "No" from Tom Brown of the National

Association of Home Builders, out recruiting building-trades workers, to this word from Don Walsh of International Business Machines: "Essentially a college degree is a key to the door, and otherwise you have to climb the walls."

* ✓ Can I get a job in Europe with an American company? Answer: Probably not.

The questions were of more than academic concern to the primarily youthful groups asking them. With few exceptions, the job fair participants were "short-timers," men who have less than six months to serve before switching back to civvies. And the interest in career prospects was so high that not all short-timers could take part. To pare the crowds to manageable proportions, army commanders gave priority to men who face the biggest problems. Those with above-average education or a job background, making them less of an employment risk, sometimes were excluded.

## Early Sessions Successful

The JIF concept is relatively new. Co-sponsored by the National Committee, Jobs for Veterans, and the Department of Defense, the first was held last spring at several European bases. The prototype sessions proved promising, so another group toured the Pacific in September before this series started in England in late October.

Ralph McDaniel, training merchandising manager for Cummins Engine Co. of Columbus, Ind., was the real veteran of the tour, having made each of the three fair circuits, along with Col. Alfred H. Fierke, the Pentagon's shepherd of the flock. From Europe to the Far East and back to Europe again he has carried the story of possible job opportunities in the diesel-engine field. His specific quest was for engine technicians and parts handlers, to be placed with Cummins distributors, branches, dealers, and customers around the country.

Other companies represented in the traveling fair group included Caterpillar Tractor Co., Borden, Inc., General Electric Co., Xerox Corp., International Business Machines, the Trane Co., Travelers Insurance Companies, Bankers Trust Co. of New York, Mobil Oil Corp., American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., and United Parcel Service.

There were trade associations, unions, and independent groups too, including the National Automobile Dealers Association, the National Association of Home Builders, the American Hotel and Motel Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. From the Government, the Veterans Administration, National Institutes of Health, Office of Education, and Labor Department provided spokesmen and counselors.

While most of the company representatives talked in general terms about jobs and careers, there were a few more concrete propositions. Ronald Bostick of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, for example, carried a computer printout giving city-by-city police employment plans for the coming months. And the Home Builders' Tom Brown was explicit in his pitch for building-trades workers in many areas.

For the foot-loose veteran looking for a place to light, the JIF operators had a rundown of unemployment rates in the major labor areas. They ranged from a

high of 12.3 per cent in Tacoma, Wash., and Muskegon, Mich., to a low of 2.6 per cent in Tampa and St. Petersburg, Fla.

Most of the job-information seekers were young men, in the 19-to-23-year-old range, just finishing their first hitch in the service. But the company representatives agreed that the biggest problems came from the sprinkling of career servicemen, thinking about a transition to civilian life after 20 years or more in the military. These are the men, said the interviewers, who want to step into a management-level job, and few of these are available.

What's the serviceman's reaction to the JIF program? "There were no hags—just information," commented one soldier who spent a day riding in from the boondocks to attend the Baumholder session. And the reactions of the 6,500 attending all the sessions were, overwhelmingly favorable; they urged more fairs in the future.

Out of it all comes one unexpected plus for the Army: When GIs learn more about civilian employment problems, some give a new regard for their secure existence and drop by to talk with military career counselors about signing up for another hitch.

## "VIETNAM" CONTINUED...

Ridgeway had maximized the problems and minimized the benefits, Taylor maximized the benefits and minimized the problems.

It seems to me, somebody could have turned it around. Had you had a figure as prestigious as Taylor or Ridgeway saying, "Mr. President, I'm just going to tell you it's going to take you eight years, a million men, you can't separate bombing from troops, and your bombing isn't going to work, it's a limited weapon."

And every time Johnson would try to change the subject, slapped it down and said, "You're going to have a wartime footing and you're going to have to give us a wartime budget." If somebody had stood there and gone head-to-head with him like that, then we might have had a different ball game.

I've always been intrigued what would have happened in 1969 when Richard Nixon took over, or even before his inaugural, if Bundy and McNamara, who was by then privately turned against the war, had gotten together and said:

"We are the architects, and if this doesn't work, it's a miscalculation, and we are the most responsible but, that being said, it must stop, it must stop, it must stop."

I think it would have changed Nixon's policies. I think that thereupon the continuity that Nixon claimed—you know, four Presidents have done this ... and that might have done it.

## CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

25 NOVEMBER 1972

### B-52 raids heaviest yet

Saigon

American B-52's blasted supply targets for a third straight day in their heaviest raids of the war in North Vietnam, the U.S. Command said Friday. Meanwhile, a Navy fighter-bomber disabled in a landing mishap became the 9th U.S. aircraft lost in Southeast Asia in the last five days. The bomber pilot was not injured.

11-F

WASHINGTON POST 26 NOVEMBER 1972

European Talks Raise Conflicts

By John M. Cosh* o

Washington Post Foreign Service

HELSINKI, Nov. 25—One diplomat calls it “a dialogue of the semi-deaf.” Another, re-sorting to more earthy an guage, likens it to “a pack of 34 dogs warily circling and sniffing at each other.”

Both phrases aptly describe the ambassadorial talks that began here last week with the aim of bringing to life a gran-diose but still vague concept known as the Conference on European Security and Coop-eration.

Tentatively, the formal con-ference is expected to take place sometime during the coming year and bring toGETher the foreign ministers, or possibly even the heads of government, of 32 European states, plus the United States and Canada. The conference is supposed to agree on steps that would end the Cold War and create the basis for peace-ful new East-West relations in Europe.

The problem is that many potential participants have dif-ferent and, in some cases, di-rectly contradictory defini-tions of what "security" and "cooperation" mean. The pre-paratory round of talks here should sort out the differences and attempt to find sufficient common ground to enable the conference to go forward.

When and if the conference does assemble, the major con-flicts are expected to revolve around the West's desire to gain greater movement for peoples and ideas between East and West and loosen Soviet hegemony over the East European countries.

Most of the participating diplomats now seem close to 100 per cent certain that the conference will take place. There is still considerable doubt, however, what it is likely to achieve. There is the chance that it could lay the foundations of a really peace-ful and long-lasting new order ' Europe.

Given the pitfalls looming in the patch of such a result, most people would be happy if 'the conference introduces a few practical improvements into East-West relations. Some, deeply mistrustful of the whole business, would like to see it go no further than the production of some mean-ingless platitudes.

In the view of many, the key to reducing tensions on the continent means a start on dis-mantling the lethal military machines that NATO and the Warsaw Pact have noised against each other in Central Europe. The subject of force reductions, however, has been removed from the agenda of the security conference, and any East-West negotiations on that issue will be conducted separately, with preliminary talks expected to begin in late January.

The security conference therefore, will be left discuss-ing the more abstract nuances of what can be done to lessen tensions in Europe. Unless these abstract ideas can be ap-plied to real issues, the confer-ence could wind up with an agenda that deals only with glittering generalities.

Most participants at the preliminary talks think that it will take another couple of weeks to get the proce-dural ground rules out of the way. Real brass-tacks ne-gotiation on substantive is-sues like the agenda won't begin, they say, until after an antic-pated mid-Decem-ber recess.

Still, the ideas being floated by different delega-tions in these opening days leave little doubt about what points are going to cause conflict.

The differences are sum-med up by a Western diplo-mat in this way: "Does the conference take a picture of Europe as it currently exists and then decide that the de-veloped film looks beautiful and should be left exactly as

it is?

"Or does it decide that there are things wrong with the picture and move in slow, gradual ways to change it by making some changes in the relationships between both nations and individual human beings?"

By this, he means that the Soviet Union, backed by most of its Warsaw Pact al-lies, wants the security con-ference to legitimize the territorial gains made by the Communist bloc in World War II, confer inter-national respectability on East Germany and, most im-portant of all, recognize the permanence of Communist hegemony in Eastern Eu-rope.

To a considerable extent, the chain of interrelated de-tente initiatives leading up to the security conference—particularly the concessions made by West Germany to improve its relations with the Communist bloc—have already made many of these Soviet aspirations a reality.

But the West also has a price that it expects the Communist bloc to pay for this recognition. One West-ern goal is to attempt some easing of the restrictions on human liberty caused by the division of Europe. In par-ticular, the West will seek vastly freer movement of people and ideas—not just from the Western side but from the East as well.

Another goal will be an attempt to force the Soviets to accept restrictions on the Brezhnev Doctrine, put for-ward by the Kremlin to jus-tify its 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. In this re-spect, the West will seek to have all conference partici-pants pledge themselves not to interfere in the internal affairs of any other country, including those with similar political systems.

The trouble is that, at this stage at least, the Commu-

nist bloc shows absolutely no sign of acceding to either Western demand. Instead, the Communists reject both ideas as either an interfer-ence in the internal affairs of individual Eastern states or as a Western attempt at penetration and subversion of the bloc.

As a result, it will require a great deal of firmness and solidarity on the Western side if the Communist bloc is going to be forced into any concession. How strong and how firm the West re-ally is won't be known until the preparatory talks get into the subject of agenda planning.

So far, the United States has been indicating that it plans to be tough in its in-sistence on these points. But, there are signs that some West European gov-ernments are willing to set-up for something considera-ble less.

They are hinting that they would be satisfied with such limited and opaque formulas as discussion of "cultural contacts,"—hoping to in-crease the number of offi-cially approved actors or en-gineers who are allowed to visit the West.

This would probably be acceptable to the Soviets and their partners. It would fall far short, however, of the sweeping steps toward freedom of movement being advanced by the United States.

If that becomes the case, then the fears of those in the West who oppose the concept of a security confer-ence would be justified. It would, as they charge, be-come a propaganda show in which the West gives a lot to the Communist bloc with-out obtaining anything of importance in return.

A Pandora's box at Helsinki

By MICHAEL PARKS

Helsinki,

Will the European security conference backfire on the Soviet Union, its original and strongest proponent?

Some diplomats participating in the conference's planning session, which began here last week, speculate that it may. They reason this way:

* Instead of winning western acknow-ledgement of Soviet paramounty over Eastern Europe, as many diplomats here believe was the Kremlin's original intention, the conference actually may encourage and provide international rec-ognition of the budding independence of Eastern European nations from Moscow.

* The Soviet Union is likely to get

western acknowledgement of post-war European borders—something effec-tively received in a series of agreements involving East and West Germany in the past two years—and a declaration of principles on general European rela-tions, but it will have to pay the price of troop reductions in Europe and increased individual liberties for Soviet and East European citizens.

* Several East European countries are making no secret of their hope that the same declaration will include a strong statement against the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty—the theory that Communist countries have to protect the political systems of their Communist neighbors from coun-ter-revolution, even if it means invading the neighbor as the Soviet Union in-vaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Dangers for the West

American and other western diplomats do not minimize the danger to their own countries' positions — principally that a "phony spirit of detente" will weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion and the western alliance in general —but they say they now feel that Mos-cow has more to lose than the West in the full-scale conference, expected to begin next summer.

"Candidly, neither my government nor Washington would have agreed to this conference even three years ago if it were not for certain developments that increased the odds in our favor," said the head of one delegation, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

13-F

November 27, 1972 (26)

Aerospace Daily

## WHAT'S AHEAD IN AEROSPACE

LAIRD SUCCESSOR: New name enters secretary of defense sweepstakes: HEW Secretary Elliot L. Richardson. Melvin Laird says he knows who's going to succeed him but isn't telling. Appointment of Richardson, former undersecretary of state, would be in line with Nixon's announced policy of shifting cabinet officers to new jobs in his second term. Earlier this month (DAILY, Nov. 3), Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush appeared to be the front runner to get the top Pentagon job. He's expected to end up in a cabinet post even if it isn't at DOD, with the State Department currently being mentioned. Rush is former ambassador to West Germany and has close personal ties with the President, with whom he conferred at Camp David last week. Whatever the outcome, Nixon will have two deputy secretary posts to fill at DOD, Rush's job and a second one approved by the last Congress.

### SEAMANS DROPS SECOND SET OF LAVELLE CHARGES

The second set of charges leveled at Maj. Gen. John D. Lavelle for unauthorized bombing of North Viet Nam was dropped by Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr. The accusation against the former commander of the 7th Air Force and 23 other officers and enlisted men who allegedly helped cover up the missions was made by Sgt. Lonnie D. Franks. He originated the investigation with a letter to Sen. Harold Hughes (D-Iowa). Seamans said an investigation revealed "no new information which would warrant further action." Earlier, the Air Force dropped similar charges preferred against Lavelle by 2d Lt. Delbert Terrill.

## A PANDORA'S BOX AT HELSINKI... CONTINUED

"One of the principal changes was the growing independence of several countries in Eastern Europe. We obviously think now, as a positive trend, and we hope to encourage it as much as we can at this planning session and later at the conference."

Romana made it plain at the start of the planning session last week that it did not intend to be dominated by anyone insisting on full debate on procedural items that the Soviet delegation thought had been settled with the Americans and other major powers. The United States apparently plans to encourage such independence.

### Even Bulgaria differs

Romana and Yugoslavia say they have definite ideas about the political future of Europe. Bulgaria, perhaps the most loyal of Moscow's political yes-men, has outlined views quite different from those of the Soviet Union on the question of troop reductions in Europe, Hungary, Poland and East Germany are already indicating their willingness to satisfy some of the West's goals in return for increased trade in more sophisticated goods and technical cooperation and two East European countries can organized background briefings for western newsmen, candidly answering most questions.

"Each country seems to be trying to establish its independence from Moscow as positively and forcefully as it dare at the outset," said one NATO diplomat. "The Soviets may rein them in if they go too far or too fast. But that would be very embarrassing after the way Moscow has pushed and pushed for this conference, and it would zap whatever hope they have of persisting Western Europe that there is no longer a need for a protective American presence in Europe...."

"Even if Moscow can keep Romania or Warsaw in check on political issues, trade and cultural relations are entirely different. Moscow can negotiate on P-o-

land's behalf on military matters, practically speaking, but not on, say, cultural exchanges."

### First proposed in 1954

All this is far different from what the Kremlin must have envisioned in February, 1954, of one of the coldest years of the cold war, when Vyacheslav M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, first proposed a European security conference and treaty—without American participation—in an effort to forestall West German rearment.

The proposal was kept alive by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies as a backdoor way of gaining western recognition for East Germany and acceptance of Europe's post-war borders. Each time the idea was advanced, it yielded a propaganda dividend for Moscow, and the proposal won increasing acceptance in Europe.

The United States, unwilling to recognize East Germany even tacitly as a separate state or accept the Soviet Union's lordship over Eastern Europe, rejected, outright or indirectly, the various Communist proposals. Two years ago, however, the NATO countries agreed to participate in a security conference—but only after the Soviet Union agreed to guarantee civilian access to West Berlin and rights of the World War II victors in Germany. The Berlin agreement was signed last June.

### What the Russians hope to get

The Soviet Union, judging from its political commentaries last week, still sees the conference, which it hopes will end with a summit meeting, as a way of gaining unqualified western acceptance of East Germany, the present German-Polish borders and Eastern Europe as a Soviet sphere of influence. Moscow has also indicated that it wants to reduce the U.S. role in Europe and inhibit the development of the European Economic Community, which it sees as a

political and economic threat. It is proposing a permanent all-European institution be established to carry on the conference's work.

The United States and its NATO allies have remained wary of a conference that simply produces "atmospherics" and are insisting on concrete practical agreements, both at the conference and in the far more complex talks on troop reductions in Central Europe. "It is going to be a no ticket, novesee situation," a Pentagon official said before the talks started. "No progress in the force reduction talks, no progress at the security conference."

The Western specifies include "the freer movement of people, ideas and information"—diplomatic shorthand for greater political and civil liberties in Eastern Europe—and practical agreements for expansion of trade and cooperation in areas such as pollution control.

### Agenda debate to come

Both the Soviet and American proposals and goals for the conference are already being criticized here although the debate on the agenda is at least a month away. The main critics so far are the East Europeans, some of whom seem intent on becoming the wild cards of the conference.

A Polish diplomat, discussing the Soviet Union's broad goals, called most of them "anchronistic." Moscow, he continues, "is still looking back. We are looking forward."

A Romanian in Moscow recently observed, "the Soviets say they want to freeze the political situation in Europe, but it has been frozen for 25 years. The conference is a way of formalizing the process of detente already under way. The question is whether detente will be accelerated or decelerated, and the next question is who is doing the driving—the superpowers or the people who constitute the majority of Europe, people like us."

14-F

AFP-199

URGENT

NEGOCIATIONS VIETNAM

AJOURNEMENT DES POURPARLERS (DEVELOPPEMENT

WASHINGTON, 25 NOV (AFP)

LA NEGOCIATION AMERICANO-NORD-VIETNAMIENNE DE PARIS A ETE AJOURNEE AU LUNDI 4 DECEMBRE D'UN COMMUN ACCORD ENTRE MM. HENRI KISSINGER, CONSEILLER SPECIAL DU PRESIDENT NIXON, ET LE DUC THO, MEMBRE DU POLITBURO DE HANOI, A ANNONCE SAMEDI MATIN A NEW YORK LE PORTE-PAROLE DU PRESIDENT NIXON, M. RONALD ZIEGLER.

M. ZIEGLER, QUI ACCOMPAGNE LE PRESIDENT A NEW YORK JUSQU'A DIMANCHE SOIR, A COMMUNIQUE CET AUJOURNEMENT AUX JOURNALISTES DE LA MAISON BLANCHE EN TENANT UNE CONFERENCE DE PRESSE TELEPHONIQUE EN MULTIPLEX.

M. KISSINGER ET SON ADJOINT, LE GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG, DU COTE AMERICAIN, ET MM. LE DUC THO ET XUAN THUY, DU COTE NORD VIETNAMIEN, SE SONT REUNIS UNE NOUVELLE FOIS SAMEDI MATIN A CHOISY LE ROI, PRES DE PARIS, A ANNONCE D'AUTRE PART LE PORTE-PAROLE PRESIDENTIEL.

C'EST A L'ISSUE DE CETTE SIXIEME REUNION DE LA SEMAINE, QUE LES INTERLOCUTEURS SONT CONVENUS D'AJOURNER LEURS POURPARLERS JUSQU'AU 4 DECEMBRE. SUIVRA..AFP-JO-%22 16.28

OFFICE OF THE PRESS ATTACHE • AMERICAN EMBASSY • 2, AVENUE GABRIEL, PARIS • ANJ. 74-00

from today's
Paris press radio tv

November 24, 1972

SUMMARY

SELECTED EXCERPTS FOR INTERNAL, UNOFFICIAL USE • NOT INTENDED FOR REPUBLICATION

French-African cooperation after the Pompidou visit to Upper Volta generally shares the headlines and comment with various domestic problems linked with the coming French elections. A front-page headline in Communist HUMANITE runs: "Vietnam: Nixon's dangerous game. According to the American press, he is reneging on the main points of the accord." The other papers merely report that the Gif-sur-Yvette talkathon goes on. FIGARO features a declaration of Prince Souvanna Phouma stressing that a cease-fire in Laos should be enforced very rapidly after the one in Vietnam, to ward off a recrudescence of Communist attacks. Reports from the "Ambassadors' salon" in Helsinki stress the difficulties raised by smaller nations on matters of procedure that are delaying the beginning of the discussions. FIGARO carries a report on the NATO parliamentarians meeting in Bonn stressing "NATO parliamentarians are anxious about the consequences of the Helsinki negotiation. Mr. Findley proposes an Atlantic summit to restore the cohesion of the alliance." Significant factual attention is also given to the mysterious object being hunted in a Norwegian fjord.

## Television

The Pompidou visit to Upper Volta and Togo was given extensive film coverage on all news program Wednesday and Thursday. This included not only the enthusiastic welcome but the banquet incident in Lome over the prit of the French African Community franc. The delicate monetary problem in volved was subsequently explained in detail by specialists. Both nets Wednesday featured reports from Helsinki on the preparatory conference for CSCE which emphasized the extraordinary security measures taken. Bernard Volcker on NET ONE said "the question is to finish with the spirit of Yalta, where Roosevelt and Stalin partitioned the world among themselves. B. Volcker added that "since then, the Americans have done everything to secure their hegemony together with the Soviets". He recalled that NATO did not play any role during the Hungarian crisis, and that during the Suez affair, the Americans made it clear to their European allies that they alone were entitled to make decisions. "Will the two superpowers renounce submitting the world to their power? The success or failure of the conference depends on the answer," he said in closing. NET TWO news Thursday open with a film report on the villa at Gif-sur-Yvette where the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho.talks are underway. The commentator said the villa of the late painter Fernand Leger may be entering history as "the house of peace". The fact that the gate of the villa was opened for the first time for journalists and that Kissinger and Tho posed for photographs was presented as "another significant move". The report ended with the remark that the Gif-sur-Yvette talks will anyway be a major milestone along the road to peace.

## COMMENT

### Kissinger talks

Jean-Emile Vidal comments in a front-page article in Communist HUMANITE: "Four days of negotiations: this was the maximum foreseen by Mr. Kissinger in his Oct. 26 press conference. Yesterday was the fourth day, yet nothing indicates than an agreement is any nearer, on the contrary. Despite the optimism displayed by the White House, the increasingly numerous and precise reports carried by the American press give reason for alarm. It appears that the substance of the peace accord which Mr. Nixon officially declared achieved on October 20 is now being reneged on by Mr.

Kissinger... The new demands reportedly concern notably the presence of North Vietnamese in South Vietnam, the role of the national council of reconciliation and of the international control commission... What Kissinger is now demanding is to introduce into South Vietnam, not a commission, but a sort of occupation force including notably Indonesian military officers!... The Vietnamese have not fought foreign aggression for thirty years to be imposed on after the cease-fire with a constraint that would make the independence of South Vietnam illusory. It looks very much as if by a juxtaposition of terror bombings in Vietnam, mass arrests in Saigon -- thousands of people, the London TIMES says -- and blackmailing talks, Mr. Nixon is still trying to enforce his neo-colonialist objectives by maintaining Thieu in office at any cost. Should Mr. Kissinger persist in that course, opposed to that of a correct peaceful settlement, that is, guaranteeing the population of South Vietnam the exercise of their right to self-determination, then the only thing left for the Vietnamese would be to continue their fight."

## NATO and Helsinki

Jacques Ogliastro reports on the NATO parliamentarian's meeting in Bonn in EIGARO: "Firmness on principles, cooperation between America and Europe, such appear to be for the NATO parliamentarians the imperative requirements as the preparatory conference for CSCE opens. One of them, US Congressmen Findley has gone as far as proposing a summit meeting of the leaders of the member states of the alliance to stem its disintegration and set common objectives for CSCE, SALT and MBFR. This idea is worth what it is worth, but it is to be noted that Mr. Findley is a Republican and one fairly close to Mr. Nixon. We have reason to believe he will meet with Mr. Schumann during a stopover in Paris Saturday. Without going that far, a good many parliamentarians are aware of the need to clarify the situation... Senator Jacob Javits warned against the danger of 'a 'Finlandization' of Europe (involved in CSCE)... It is clear that the warning voiced by Mr. Javits at the opening of the meeting has generally been heeded. What irritates our partners most -- not the least influential ones -- is the independence of decision in matters of defense that France has given herself. The objective is thus to make her return to NATO... The effects of that state of mind are felt in many fields. For example, when Mr. Olivier Giscard d'Estaing pleads for the European satellite launcher, he runs into the opposition of the Americans. While intended to launch innocent communication satellites, the device could also play a strategic role which displeases our friends from over the Atlantic. And as a result, the Germans look anything but pleased by the project. Many other examples could be given. This shows that it is easier to speak of cohesion than to practice it. Since the cohesion is admittedly indispendable, the allied governments should, as one speaker said, not only display good will, but above all apply this good will in agreeing together. This is urgent."

RADIO - TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

RADIO TV REPORTS INC. WASH., D.C., SUMMARIES NOT TO BE QUOTED.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1972 (BROADCASTS OF NOV 22, 23)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

ROGER MUDD, CBS: For the first time, the NVNese have shot down a US B-52, this nation's biggest bomber. The $8 million jet was hit during a bombing run over the port city of Vinh. BOB SCHIEFFER, CBS: The big bombers have logged more than 105,000 bombing runs over IC since 1966, but it wasn't until April of this year that they were flown over the heartland of NVN which is heavily defended by the anti-aircraft missiles.

HARRY REASONER, ABC: Henry Kissinger, after a side trip to Belgium, met for the third time in as many days with NVNese representatives in a Paris suburb. JOHN ROLFSON, ABC: From what we could see outside, the mood seemed different. There was none of yesterday's public display of friendliness.

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC: In San Diego a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee continued its investigation of racial problems aboard the carriers Constellation and Kitty Hawk. DON OLIVER, NBC: One Congressman says he thinks race relations in the armed forces are better than they are among civilians.

MUDD, CBS: Women's liberation wears AF blue. The AF announced plans to triple its number of women and train them for jobs usually held by men, everything except pilot.

REASONER, ABC: In Helsinki officials from communist and non-communist nations met to begin preparations for a full-scale European security conference. GEORGE WATSON, ABC: Thirty-five nations were represented when the security talks on laying to rest Europe's bloody past opened here in this futuristic building outside Helsinki.

CHANCELLOR, NBC: The Laotian Prime Minister told UPI that as long as the NVNese are in his country the American bombing of Laos must continue.

CHANCELLOR, NBC: Samuel Popkin is reportedly the first American scholar ever jailed for protecting sources of information.

MUDD, CBS: While millions of Americans rested and gorged themselves, one American sought the elusive peace in VN for which they could all be thankful. PETER KALISCHER, CBS: The conversation, by way of a NVNese interpreter, was to all appearances, animated, even jovial at times and maddeningly out of earshot.

GARRICK UTLEY, NBC: One American was killed in combat last week in SVN and two others were wounded. TOM STREITHORST, NBC: Reports from Quang Tri.

REASONER, ABC: Americans in relatively small numbers are still arriving in the war zone. FRANK MARIANO, ABC: The irony is that military replacements still arrive while most everyone else in uniform is getting ready to go home.

MUDD, CBS: American servicemen in VN had the traditional Thanksgiving Dinner. FOSTER DAVIS, CBS: The menu is staggering.

UTLEY, NBC: Defense Secretary Melvin Laird who is leaving the administration January, said that his successor has already been chosen.

REASONER, ABC: This week Navy Lt. Norris Charles began granting his first interviews on his experiences as a prisoner. His objective, he said, is to try to draw more public attention to the plight of American prisoners still in NVN.

PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE (SAFAA) AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY ZUBKOFF, OX 52884

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7 PM NOV 22

NVNese Shoot Down B-52

ROGER MUDD: For the first time, the NVNese have shot down a US B-52, this nation's biggest bomber. The $8 million jet was hit during a bombing run over the port city of Vinh.

BOB SCHIEFFER: The Pentagon won't say officially what caused the crash, but AF sources here say the plane was hit by a NVNese surface-to-air missile.

The US has lost eight B-52s in the war previously, all through flying accidents. This is the first to be brought down by enemy fire.

All six crewmen bailed out and were rescued within two hours near the border of Laos and Thailand.

The B-52 is part of a huge US air armada that carried out heavy bombing raids in NVN's southern pan handle during the past 36 hours.

The Pentagon also announced the loss of two smaller planes, including another of the $15 million F-111 No reason given for the F-111 crash, but this is the fourth F-111 to disappear since the controversial bombers were sent to the war zone in late September.

Bob Schieffer, CBS News, Washington.

## Kissinger and Tho Meet Again

MUDD: Henry Kissinger and NVN's Le Duc Tho met again today near Paris. They talked peace for more than three hours and scheduled another meeting tomorrow.

If expressions mean anything the two men emerged from today's meeting grim faced.

Meanwhile, Marvin Kalb at the State Department reports that Kissinger's relations with SVN may be on the skids.

MARVIN KALB: In its private dispatches and in its public propaganda, SVN has now begun to blast Henry

Kissinger, personally and directly, suggesting Saigon no longer trusts him to negotiate an end to the war.

Saigon's official radio has accused Kissinger of going one or two steps beyond his power, overplaying his role as a presidential assistant and hurting the President's prestige. Those are direct quotes.

Saigon also describes Kissinger as hasty, ambitious, overconfident and mistaken. It charges Kissinger was deceived by the communists and then tried to foist his failure on the SVNese people.

Nowhere in this extraordinarily blunt criticism did Saigon attack the President himself. It's aim clearly is to drive a wedge between the President and Kissinger, and then hold out for the possibility of a Nixon-Thieu summit as the only way of resolving the differences between Saigon and Washington.

US officials refused to comment on Saigon's open criticism of Kissinger, adding, there are no present plans for a Nixon-Thieu summit.

Marvin Kalb, CBS News, the State Department.

## Women's Liberation Wears AF Blue

MUDD: Women's liberation wears AF blue. The AF announced plans today to triple its number of women and train them for jobs usually held by men, everything except pilot.

The Director of Women in the AF, Brig. Gen. Jean Holmes said the number would be boosted from 17,000 to 48,000 by 1978.

Gen. Holmes dodged several questions about women in combat. A new constitutional amendment could remove that legal prohibition. Said the general, "Culturally we don't know the answer to that question."

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC-TV 7 PM NOV 22

US B-52 Downed By Enemy Fire

HARRY REASONER: The first American B-52 bomber ever lost in combat was downed in IC.

The Defense Department said the $8 million plane, which had taken part in heavy raids over NVN, was disabled by enemy ground fire and

2 Friday, November 24, 1972

crashed in neighboring Thailand. Spokesmen said all six crewmen were rescued and none was seriously injured.

The B-52s first went into combat in VN in mid-1965. On several occasions in the past the NVNese have claimed to have shot down B-52s, but until today the Pentagon has denied any losses.

## Kissinger Meets With NVNese

**REASONER:** Henry Kissinger, after a side trip to Belgium, met for the third time in as many days with NVNese representatives in a Paris suburb today.

**JOHN ROLFSON:** The negotiators have secluded themselves another day, working on the VN peace settlement in this undistinguished stucco house on a busy French country road.

They're protected by a stone wall just high enough to keep outsiders from seeing much more than their comings and goings, and they are keeping quiet about how they're doing.

Henry Kissinger's day began 170 miles away in Brussels. He flew there from Paris last night and very early this morning conferred in Brussels with another visitor, the President of Indonesia, a country proposed by the US to help supervise a cease fire in VN. A fast trip, and Kissinger was back here in Paris by mid-morning at the Embassy Residence.

In mid-afternoon negotiations resumed at walled-in suburban house owned by the French Communist Party. Le Duc Tho and the VNese, as if playing host, arriving before Henry Kissinger.

From what we could see outside, the mood seemed different. The meeting went 'til darkness but was the shortest so far, three and ahalf hours. There was none of yesterday's public display of friendliness.

Kissinger smiled goodbye; the NVNese went past us without a glance and without smiling. But the diplomat's face is meant to conceal. They've agreed to reveal nothing.

And so what we see is their coming and going, no real sign of how they're doing.

This is John Rolfson, ABC News, in Paris.

## Communist and Non-Communist Nation Representatives Meet in Helsinki

**REASONER:** In Europe another sign of a promising trend toward cooperation between East and West appeared in Helsinki, Finland today.

There officials from communist and non-communist nations met to begin preparations for a full-scale European security conference.

An ultimate objective is to bring about a reduction of both NATO and Soviet-bloc forces in Central Europe.

**GEORGE WATSON:** Thirty-five nations were represented today when the security talks on laying to rest Europe's bloody past opened here in this futuristic building outside Helsinki.

The United States and Russia, the NATO nations and Warsaw Pact countries, were all present and accounted for. Europe's miniscule mini-states were also present, including Lichtenstein, San Marino and Monaco. Only Albania refused to attend.

The talks are starting possibly on an ambassadorial level, but Washington's man in Helsinki, Ambassador Val Peterson, will act only on meticulous instruction from the White House and State Department.

I asked Ambassador Peterson if it were reasonable to expect 35 nations to sit down and solve the problem of divided Europe.

**AMBASSADOR VAL PETERSON:** I think it's reasonable because the alternative is less reasonable. If we don't talk about these things, if we don't make some advance in arriving at solutions, agree to greater opportunities or more peaceful situations, then you're going to have the converse. I think it's a little bit like the question of being alive or being dead.

**WATSON:** So, in this clean, cold and exhilarating environment, it's possible to dream that security talks will succeed and Europe will be freed of its old tensions, crises and conflicts.

But down to earth, the sobering fact remains that the two sides of Europe possess the mightiest armies and most destructive weapons ever

3 Friday, November 24, 1972

assembled. Even Finland maintains a sizable army and compulsory military service. The peaceful and prosperous Finns have not forgotten that Russia invaded their country in 1939 and occupied parts of Finland that will never be returned.

As much as it tries, Europe can not escape its bloody past and bitter memories die hard.

But governments today are more interested in protecting their own stability, and that's why the security conference has a pretty good chance of at least gratifying the status quo.

This is George Watson, ABC News, Helsinki.

## NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV 6:30 NOV 22

### First US B-52 Lost To Enemy Fire

**JOHN CHANCELLOR:** The US lost its first B-52 bomber in the history of the war, apparently to NVNese ground fire. Apparently the big plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile somewhere in the vicinity of Vinh, NVN, and managed to limp back to within 12 miles of its home base in Thailand. There it crashed. Officers said its six crewmen were rescued.

It is the ninth B-52 lost in the combat zone, but the first loss directly attributable to NVNese ground fire.

There had been over 100,000 B-52 missions in IC since the planes began flying there in 1966, and an AF officer said today of this loss, "It was bound to happen."

The loss of the B-52 comes as the cease fire talks in Paris continue through their third straight day.

**LLOYD DOBYNS:** Henry Kissinger was back in Paris this morning after his meeting in Brussels, and immediately held another meeting with the heads of the American and SVNese peace talks delegations.

The SVNese in Paris said after their talks they would have no statement until Kissinger completes this round of negotiations with the NVNese.

The implication was that Saigon might have something to say, but in Paris there would be at least the appearance of unity during this new series of private talks which

started Monday and has continued daily since.

Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho had arrived at the Villa at Gif Sur Ivet when Kissinger followed a few minutes later. By 2:30 this afternoon everyone was inside and presumably talking.

This was the third day of private talks, but the only thing that remains private about these meetings is what's actually being said inside.

So far neither side has given any hint of the issues being discussed or whether any progress is being made.

But in public, at least, both Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho seem in remarkably good spirits.

In the early evening Kissinger came outside for what now seems an almost ritual stroll in the garden. Before he went back inside, he waved to the cameras across the street.

A little later it was Le Duc Tho's turn to take his walk, pacing across the yard for a few minutes. Then everyone went inside for another two hours of talks.

At one time Kissinger said this session should take no more than three or four days, but the White House said somewhat later that it might take a little longer.

There have now been three days of private talks. An American delegation official said tonight he did not know if there would be a meeting tomorrow.

Lloyd Dobyns, NBC News, Paris.

**CHANCELLOR:** And yet when the meeting broke up in Paris, the NVNese did not come out smiling as they did after the first two meetings. The AP describes them tonight as wearing grim expressions in marked contrast to their earlier smiles, and what that means, no one is saying.

### US Must Continue Bombing Laos

**CHANCELLOR:** In Laos today, P.M. Souvannah Phouma told the UPI that as long as the NVNese are in his country the American bombing of Laos must continue, that there is no hope for peace he said, in Laos, before there is peace in VN.

### House Subcommittee Investigates

### Racial Problems Aboard Carriers

**CHANCELLOR:** In San Diego today

4 Friday, November 24, 1972

Ostensibly the hearings relate
to the problems of race and disci-
pline. There are however indica-
tions that the investigation may be
connected with charges that the Navy
is getting too permissive, charges
stoutly denied by the Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt.

Don Oliver covered the hearings
today.

DON OLIVER: The three Congress-
men are here, they say, to investi-
gate racial problems on two aircraft
carriers. They say they want to see
if any legislation is needed to help
solve the problems.

They began by taking testimony
from officers on one of the carriers,
the Constellation. It is being done
with great secrecy. The witnesses
avoid newsmen and sentries guard
the doors to the hearing room.

Outside today were several young
black sailors who were among the
more than 100 who were disciplined
earlier this month for refusing to
board the Constellation in San Diego.

Other than that, the committee
members would say very little about
what they are doing or learning.

CONGRESSMAN FLOYD HICKS: ...as
the officers that are involved.
Certainly we've received impressions
but I'm doing the best I can, and
I'm sure the other members are, to
keep their mind open until we get
all the testimony.

REPORTER: I notice it's been
predominantly white except for Wil-
son, the Chief....

CONGRESSMAN HICKS: It will be
predominantly black, however, when
we start getting the crew members.

OLIVER: This is more than just an
investigation into racial problems
on two ships. It is a severe test
of the new Navy, of the new liber-
alized policies of Admiral Elmo
Zumwalt.

Some Congressmen are critical of
those policies. They say they have
led to permissiveness, to a break-
down of discipline. This, these

Congressmen think, may have contri-
buted to the racial problems.

Don Oliver, NBC News, at the
Naval Air Station in San Diego.

Popkin Begins 18-Month Sentence

CHANCELLOR: Samuel Popkin, a
political scientist from Harvard,
today began serving an 18-month
sentence for contempt of court.

Popkin refused to answer ques-
tions put to him by a Grand Jury
about Daniel Ellsberg and the Pen-
tagon Papers, on grounds that to do
so would betray his scholarly and
personal ethics.

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7 PM NOV 23

Kissinger Meets Again With Tho

ROGER MUDD: While millions of
Americans rested and gorged them-
selves, one American sought the
elusive peace in VN for which they
could all be thankful.

Henry Kissinger met again in
Paris today with NVN's Le Duc Tho,
their fourth session this week.

PETER KALISCHER: Make-believe
peace talks on the Avenue Clebere (?
have been postponed because of
Thanksgiving, but the real ones went
into their fourth straight day be-
hind these green gates, which have
now replaced the Hotel Majestic as
a trademark for VN negotiations.
And there were six hours of them,
the longest session yet, between
Henry Kissinger and Hanoi's top em-
issary, Le Duc Tho. Some in the
villa garden in plain view of camera
men who yesterday were forbidden to
film over the wall, and today were
allowed to poke their lenses through
the wire fence.

The conversation, by way of a
NVNese interpreter, was to all ap-
pearances, animated, even jovial at
times and maddeningly out of earshot.
A situation calling for a lip reader.
But the chummier Kissinger and the
NVNese seem to get, the more suspi-
cious has become the Saigon Govern-
ment.

To Paris today came President

5 Friday, November 24, 1972

Thieu's Kissinger, Special Advisor Nguyen Tu Duc, who had his Thanksgiving lunch at a VNese restaurant called the Gate of Happiness.

Later, CBS News man Tom Fenton asked him:

TON FENTON: Monsieur Duc, what's the reason for your trip to Paris?

NGUYEN TU DUC: I have nothing to say at this time.

KALISCHER: At about this time the gates at the conference villa, 15 miles from Paris, were thrown open for a posed Kissinger-Tho picture.

Newsmen shouted for them to shake hands. Although matters had progressed, they had obviously not progressed that far.

Peter Kalischer, CBS News, Gif Sur Ivet, France.

## US Gls In VN Get Thanksgiving Feast

MUDD: American servicemen in VN had the traditional Thanksgiving Dinner. Some had more reason to be thankful than others, like the two pilots who escaped unhurt after their planes were shot down.

Most said they were thankful they wouldn't be there much longer. One said he was thankful for Kissinger and Le Duc Tho.

And some spent at least part of the day bombing the communists.

Foster Davis has a film report on Thanksgiving at one American base in SVN.

FOSTER DAVIS: If the promise at Paris and the Nixon Administration comes true, you will never see this again, never again see Americans at war in VN on their Thanksgiving Day, flying in combat, rearming their fighter bombers for yet more war. But for now the war goes on and Thanksgiving is just another day of work under the scorching Asian sun, the heat mercifully tempered by a breeze.

Thanksgiving Dinner is a meal sandwiched between the hours of work, a meal a pilot walks to after his latest combat mission. It is a meal served with flair in this mess hall which feeds about 1,000 of the 3,000 Americans still at Ben Hoa. The menu is staggering: turkey, baked ham, roast beef, cornbread dressing, mashed potatoes, candied yams, mixed vegetables, two kinds of

gravy, hot rolls, pumpkin pie, minced pie, fruit cake, fresh fruits, nuts, egg nog, coffee, tea and milk.

But among the men who eat this meal there's no feeling of sympathy that Americans won't be having Thanksgiving Dinner here next year.

How do you feel about the idea of being among one of the last Americans in VN?

SGT. DENNIS BROWN: Well, if we're the last, I like it. If we're not the last, it's no use. It's pretty bad.

ROBERT MILLER: They could have ended this war a long time ago, if they wanted to, they could. In my personal opinion, I don't think they will. I think I'll be here until my -- I won't be the last American here.

HERBERT CAMPBELL: Actually, I didn't realize that it was a Thanksgiving over here until I walked into the chow hall this morning.

DAVIS: You didn't realize that today was Thanksgiving Day?

CAMPBELL: No, I didn't. That's just how the days seem to me, that it just isn't the same over here. The days sort of sneak up on you over here.

DAVIS: After dinner it is back to work, back to the war, back to flying combat missions that may be among the last to be flown here, but then again, may not.

Foster Davis, CBS News, at Ben Hoa Airbase, SVN.

## One American Killed In War

MUDD: The weekly casualty figures are out.

One American was reported killed in the war last week, two were wounded.

SVNese dead were put at 395 and the allies claimed to have killed 1620 VC and NVNese.

## NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV 6:30 NOV 23

### VN Air War Still American

GARRICK UTLEY: One American was killed in combat last week in SVN and two others were wounded.

Three hundred ninety-five SVNese

6 Friday, November 24, 1972

Government soldiers were killed and more than 1300 were wounded in the fighting.

Those figures tell the story about the war on the ground, but in the air it's still very much an American war.

So far this week, one B-52, one F-111, that's the new $15 million fighter bomber, and four other planes have been shot down.

And B-52s carried out 12 raids against NVN and 23 other strikes against SVN yesterday. Many of those bombs were dropped around Quang Tri City. That's where SVNese Marines are trying to drive NVNese out of territory that they've occupied since last spring.

It's a very important drive because if the NVNese still hold onto that area when a cease fire goes into effect, the northern portion of Quang Tri Province, for all practical purposes, will become part of NVN.

TOM STREITHORST: That rumble, some 4,000 yards from the Citadel in Quang Tri City, came from a B-52 strike. The men watching, the US Marine advisors to the SVNese Marine Corps. There are still 50 of them working down to the battalion level in Quang Tri Province, which remains the scene of the heaviest action in SVN.

SVNese Marines are a little bit more comfortable now, more than two months after the reoccupation of the provincial capital.

But despite plastic chairs and flowers, they are still shelled every day and are still taking casualties.

Like Quang Tri City, Quang Tri Province has little to recommend it except history, military history. It was here that the most famous battles of the VN War were fought. Khe Son, Gio Linh, The Rock Pile, Con Thien. All of those places are now in territory controlled by the NVNese.

Maj. Joe O'Brien served at most of those places in 1967 to 68. We asked how he feels now that they appear to be irretrievably lost.

MAJ. JOE O'BRIEN: The policy dictated that we were to be withdrawn from up here and that sort of policy we must follow.

Yes, I was at some loss, but I

don't think we can look back too much on those losses. I think that we've always got to look forward to see what missions we're going to have in the future.

STREITHORST: When cease fire comes, the US Military will have two months to leave VN. Marine advisors say they will stay until the last two weeks. Like most, Maj. O'Brien said he's glad to be here now, but a man can't help remembering.

Tom Streithorst, NBC News, Quang Tri City.

## Laird Says Successor Chosen

UTLEY: Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, who is leaving the administration January, said today that his successor has already been chosen, but Laird didn't say who it is. Guessing centers on Laird's deputy, Kenneth Rush.

And Robert Finch, counselor to the President, has also offered his resignation. He's going back to California. He might run for governor of California.

## ABC EVENING NEWS ABC-TV 7 PM NOV 23

### Americans Still Arrive In War Zone

HARRY REASONER: Within another week as the US troop withdrawal continues, American military strength in VN is supposed to be down to 27,000 men.

Americans in relatively small numbers are still arriving in the war zone, but their role and functions are quite different from those of the soldiers who were committed to the war in the years of heavy involvement.

FRANK MARIANO: Flight 52 Alpha 3, as it's known in military phonetic terminology, was once a daily arrival here; now it's scheduled in an average of twice a week. But despite ever increasing evidence of a cease fire, the cargo is the same -- replacements, not only military replacements, but civilians who, once a cease fire is signed, will step in to take over the American military mission here.

The irony is that military re-

7 Friday, November 24, 1972

placements still arrive while most everyone else in uniform is getting ready to go home. Therefore, it's likely that orders sending these men here were written back in late summer sometime.

And despite the apparent closeness of a cease fire, all have been assigned here for the usual one-year tour. Many are on their second time around, and seem surprised to find the welcoming speech hasn't changed much at all.

WELCOMING OFFICER: I'd like to welcome you here to Camp Alpha and the Republic of VN.

At this time we're gonna give you a very brief orientation, have you fill out some required paper work, and then we'll be turning you loose to get your billets and hopefully some sleep.

MARIANO: The atmosphere is best described as casual, perhaps stemming from the knowledge that soon civilians will be doing all the work and that there's a good chance these men will repack their bags and go home much before their year is up.

So, replacements continue to arrive but in dribs and drabs, not the cannoneers or riflemen or machine gunners of past years, but mostly clerks and technicians.

Men will be instrumental in getting what military is left out of here and men will turn things over to civilians to run once the cease fire is signed.

Frank Mariano, ABC News, Saigon.

## One American Died In War

REASONER: In Saigon the Allied Command listed only one US combat death in its latest weekly casualty report. Two American soldiers died of non-hostile causes.

The SVNese continue to report substantial casualties, including 395 battle deaths.

Enemy losses were put at 1620.

## Norris Charles Gives Interview

REASONER: About two months ago the NVNese released three of the hundreds of American airmen they captured during the course of the US air war against the North.

This week one of the pilots, Navy Lt. Norris Charles, began granting

Today ABC's Dick Shoemaker visited Lt. Charles at his home in San Diego.

DICK SHOEMAKER: Lt. Norris Charles is convalescing here in San Diego after his release from NVN nearly two months ago.

He spent his Thanksgiving like so many others did, watching football on TV, while in the kitchen his wife and daughter checked on the turkey dinner.

Lt. Charles will never forget he was a POW.

LT. NORRIS CHARLES: In the prison, saw what, loneliness, the food was adequate, clothing, shelter and medical care was also adequate.

SHOEMAKER: Looks like you're going to have a good meal today. How does that compare with what you had while you were a prisoner?

CHARLES: Well, you know, we used to say when you have steak and lobster for a long time, soybeans taste fine. But I'm looking forward to this turkey my wife is fixing in there. I'm sure it's going to be nice.

SHOEMAKER: What about the men that are still over there, are your thoughts with them today?

CHARLES: Yes, my thoughts are with them and I could imagine exactly what they're thinking now, you know. Here it is a holiday. And they would also like to be here, home with their loved ones.

This is a time that you might get depressed. You start thinking. You start thinking about home, and your loved ones, America. You say, well, you know, I would like to be there.

MRS. CHARLES: It was all such a shock because I was feeling so depressed and all and then two months later, a little later, he's home. And I really feel for the other families. I hope to God that this is just not another let down that they've had from year to year. I'm very hopeful that it's not, that they will be home soon. And I hope that everybody (unintelligible) that they are home soon.

8 Friday, November 24, 1972

V 1081.
V 108

R

PEACE-1 (WITH PARIS)

SAIGON (AP)-SOUTH VIETNAM'S PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THI FU
MET WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS OF HIS GOVERNMENT AGAIN FRIDAY TO
EVALUATE REPORTS BEING RECEIVED FROM THE PARIS PEACE
NEGOTIATIONS.

THE AFTERNOON MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL BEGAN
ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH REPORTS CIRCULATING HERE THAT THI FU'S
SPECIAL OBSERVERS AT PARIS HAD ADVISED HIM OF NO PROGRESS
IN THE LAST FOUR DAYS OF SECRET TALKS.

THE ADVISERS ARE SAID TO BE RELAYING REPORTS RECEIVED FROM
PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPECIAL ENVOY, DR. HENRY KISSINGER, ON HIS
PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH HANOI'S CHIEF NEGOTIATOR I.F. DUC THO.

SOUTH VIETNAM'S FOREIGN MINISTER TRAN VAN LAM SAID LAST WEEK,
BEFORE THE LATEST ROUND OF KISSINGER-THO TALKS BEGAN, THAT SAIGON
WOULD DESIRE TO HAVE A VOICE BECAUSE OF ITS OBJECTIONS TO THE
DRAFT PEACE PROPOSAL ON WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND NORTH
VIETNAM HAVE ALREADY AGREED. (MORE)

MH 1501GMT NOV 24-72

V 109L
V 109

R

SAGON--PEACE 2

IT WAS ALSO INDICATED EARLIER THAT THIEU MIGHT SEND DUC AS
A SPECIAL ENVOY TO MEET WITH NIXON, AND IN RECENT DAYS THERE
HAVE BEEN RUMORS, APPARENTLY ORIGINATING WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT,
THAT THIEU WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH NIXON HIMSELF.

THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO A SETTLEMENT ARE SOUTH VIETNAM'S
OBJECTIONS TO LACK OF A PROVISION IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR
COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM THE SOUTH
AND RESTORATION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND TO THE EXISTING
LANGUAGE CONCERNING AN INTERIM BODY TO SUPERVISE NEW ELECTIONS.

THI FU CONTENDS THAT AS PRESENTLY DRAFTED, THE AGREEMENT CALLS
FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD USURP THE POWERS OF THE
EXISTING SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT.

TIN SONG (LIVE NEWS), A NEWSPAPER CONTROLLED BY THE PALACE,
SAID THAT AS OF FRIDAY OBSERVERS IN SAIGON SAW NO CHANGE IN
THE SITUATION.

"DURING THE PRESENT TALKS IN PARIS, COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM IS
STILL STUBBORN AND IS KEEPSING ITS UNREASONABLE DEMANDS, WHILE
THE ENTIRE WORLD REALIZES THAT THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM'S
POSITION IS COMPLETELY REASONABLE," IT SAID. (END)

MH 1535 GMT NOV 24-72

AF135

VIETNAM:

PARIS - LA PAUSE DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS ...(DEUX)...

DU COTE D'HANOI ET DU GRP, EN REVANCHE, LE SON DE CLOCHE EST
NETTEMENT NEGATIF. ON Y MET EN DOUTE LA VOLONTE DES ETATS-UNIS DE
CONCLURE.

DU POINT DE VUE NORD-VIETNAMIEN, TOUT ETAIT REGLE PAR LES ACCORDS
DU 22 OCTOBRE. LES ETATS-UNIS AURAIENT DU TENIR LEURS ENGAGEMENTS
ET SIGNER LES TEXTES COMME IL ETAIT CONVENU. M. LE DUC THO EST RE-
VENU A PARIS POUR REPONDRE A L'INSISTANCE DE M. KISSINGER QUI DEMAN-
DAIT A LE RENCONTRER A NOUVEAU POUR ECLAIRCIR QUELQUES POINTS
AMBIGUS ET APLANIR QUELQUES DIFFICULTES DE DETAIL QUI POURRAIENT
ETRE REGLEES EN TROIS OU QUATRE JOURS. OR, APPAREMMENT, M. KISSINGER
A SOULEVE DES QUESTIONS DE FOND QUI REMETTENT EN CAUSE TOUTE LA BASE
DES ACCORDS D'OCTOBRE.

EN EFFET, SAIGON N'A PAS ACCEPTE LES CLAUSES FONDAMENTALES DE
CES ACCORDS. SUR LE PLAN MILITAIRE, LES SUD-VIETNAMIENNES
INSISTENT SUR UN ENGAGEMENT EXPLICITE DE RETRAIT DES TROUPES NORD-
VIETNAMIENNES, EN CONTRE-PARTIE DU RETRAIT TOTAL DES AMERICAINS ET
DE LEURS ALLIES SUD-COREENS. OR, LES ACCORDS SPECIFIAIENT QUE CETTE
QUESTION SERAIT REGLEE ENTRE VIETNAMIENS APRES LE CESSEZ-LE-FEU.

SUR LE PLAN POLITIQUE, HANOI ET LE GRP ONT RENONCE A EXIGER LA
FORMATION D'UN GOUVERNEMENT ''A TROIS COMPOSANTES'' ET ACCEPTE
QUE LES ADMINISTRATIONS EXISTANTES, SAIGON ET GRP, RESTENT EN PLACE
DANS LEURS ZONES RESPECTIVES. MAIS IL ETAIT CONVENU QU'UN ''CONSEIL
NATIONAL DE RECONCILIATION ET DE CONCORDE NATIONALE'' TRIPARTITE
ORGANISERA LES ELECTIONS. SAIGON REJETTE CETTE FORMULE ET CRAINT
QUE CE CONSEIL NATIONAL NE SOIT UN VERITABLE SUPER-GOUVERNEMENT.

ENFIN, AUCUN ACCORD N'A ENCORE ETE CONCLU, SEMBLE-T-IL, SUR LES
MODALITES DU CONTROLE, NI SUR LE LIEU OU SE TIENDRA LA FUTURE CON-
FERENCE INTERNATIONALE.

SUIVRA.../...

AFP/FG %22 13.44

1%00

AFP136

VIETNAM:

PARIS - LA PAUSE DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS ...(TROIS)...

DE TOUT CELA, ON NE SAURAIT CONCLURE QU'ON EST A LA VEILLE D'UNE
RUPTURE, MAIS ENCORE MOINS QUE LA PAIX EST POUR DEMAIN.

CEPENDANT, LA PLUPART DES OBSERVATEURS ESTIMENT, COMME M. KISSIN-
GER L'A DIT A SON ARRIVEE A PARIS, QU'AU POINT OU ON EST ARRIVE,
LES NEGOCIATEURS NE SAURAIENT DECEVOIR L'OPINION MONDIALE ET SONT
CONDAMNES A FINALEMENT REUSSIR. IL EST CEPENDANT TROP TOT POUR DIRE
EN QUOI CONSISTERA LE COMPROMIS FINAL. MAIS IL Y A PEU D'APPARENCE
QU'HANOI ET LE GRP ACCEPTENT JAMAIS DE REVENIR SUR CE QUI FAIT L'E-
QUILIBRE DES ACCORDS D'OCTOBRE, C'EST-A-DIRE QU'A LA CONCESSIO
QU'ILS ONT FAITE SUR LE PLAN POLITIQUE EN RENONCANT AU GOU-
VERNEMENT ''A TROIS COMPOSANTES'' REPONDE UNE CONCESSION SUR LE PLAN
MILITAIRE, C'EST-A-DIRE LE RETRAIT UNILATERAL DES FORCES AMERICAINES
ET ALLIEES.

AFP/FG %22 13.47

XE
V101PSNL(BUN)
VO1

U

BULLETIN MATTER

PARIS - VIETNAM SECOND LEAD 2
(WHICH BY MICHAEL GOLDSMITH)

A COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION, ISSUED A FEW HOURS AFTER KISSINGER AND THO MET FOR THE SIXTH TIME IN SUCCESSION, SAID THO AND HIS FELLOW NEGOTIATOR XUAN THUY "WILL MEET DR. KISSINGER AGAIN ON DEC. 4, 1972".

U.S. DELEGATION SPOKESMAN DAVID LAMBERTSON SAID HE HAD NO COMMENT ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT, WHICH CAME AMID REPORTS OF A CRISIS IN THE MEGOTIATIONS.

IT WAS ASSUMED THAT THE NINE-DAY INTERRUPTION IN THE TALKS WAS MUTUALLY AGREED BY BOTH SIDES AT TODAY'S TWO-HOUR MEETING. (MORE)

MKF1547FSTNOV25-72 NM

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