DEC 2 9 2003

Amanda Henry

From: Stape Roy [staperoy@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, December 25, 2003 7:35 AM
To: Wei Chen
Cc: Christie Neumann; Jessee Incao; Jody Williams; Amanda Henry
Subject: Approved Text of Dr. Kissinger's Remarks to CISS

HAK CISS Remarks
Rev3.doc (64...

Dear Mr. Chen,

Dr. Kissinger was able to review, while abroad, the transcribed text of his remarks to CISS on November 14, 2003 that you sent with your message of December 23rd. A revised text is attached that incorporates the changes approved by Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you very much for your cooperation and best wishes for the holiday season and the new year.

Stape Roy

J. Stapleton Roy
Managing Director, Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor, New York, NY 10022
Tel: 212-759-7919; Fax: 212-759-0042; Cell: 301-520-1771 =================== 1800 K Street,
NW, Suite 1021, Washington, DC 20006
Tel: 202-872-0300; Dir: 202-775-7303
E-Mail: jsroy@kmaglobal.com

Text of original message:

Dear Mr. Amb. Roy:

Attached herewith is the written version of Dr. Kissinger's speech delivered for CISS at Bayi Building on Nov.14. The version has been materialized according to the recording of the speech.

Maj. Gen. Zhang Chengming, Secretary General of CISS, has asked me to convey to you his wish that Dr. Kissinger would be kind to check the version and the confirmed copy be sent to us with his endorsement by December 28. Because the issue of International Strategic Studies, Journal of CISS, carrying Dr. Kissinger's speech will be published on the New Year's Day.

We would be sorry if any inconvenience is caused to you for the holidays.

Looking forward to your reply at your earliest convenience.

Wish you a merry Christmas and happy new year.

Chen Wei
CISS

1

Delivered Nov. 14, 2003

Approved by Dr. Kissinger 12/24/03

Henry A. Kissinger

Speech Script

China Institute for International Strategic Studies, Beijing

It is always a great pleasure and privilege to return to China and see so many of my friends. I have been involved in Sino-American relations now for 32 years, and I have made 39 trips to China. I come here so often because I like the Chinese people and Chinese culture and am fascinated by Chinese history. But what brought me here the first time, and why I have continued this close relationship with China, is because I sincerely believe the fundamental interests of China and the United States are parallel in this period, and the future peace and progress of the world depend on our close cooperation. But let me speak to you from the point of view of a student of foreign policy and discuss some basic principles of our relationship.

Whenever I come to China, I am asked to describe in detail what American foreign policy is in concept and execution. But there is no such thing as a single American foreign policy. Our entire history is shorter than the individual history of most Chinese dynasties. Until 1945, the United States did not have to conduct any significant foreign policy on a global scale. Since the end of World War Two, the international environment has totally changed. I was yesterday in the museum in Shanghai. Afterwards, I said that as far as foreign policy is concerned, America is still in the Shang Dynasty, that is, in an early stage of development.

There are a number of schools of thoughts in American foreign policy today. One is characterized by a missionary spirit that believes foreign policy should be aimed at changing the domestic policy of every country around the earth. This school grew out of the American experience of having most Americans descended from families that immigrated to the United States. Therefore, what many of our friends would consider to be interference in domestic affairs is to adherents of this school the normal exercise of foreign policy.

Then there is a hegemonic school that has developed recently. Proponents of this school believe that America can impose its will throughout the world because of our military superiority. And there is a realist school, whose adherents would like to conduct foreign policy in the way that European nations and China throughout their histories conducted their foreign policies. Then you have an isolationist school, which I can illustrate by a personal experience. During the height of the cold war, I gave a speech in Omaha, Nebraska,

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in the middle of America, in which I spoke of the dangerous situation
in the world in the middle of the cold war. In the question period,
somebody got up and said, "You talked of dangers, but what would
these dangers be for us in Omaha?" The questioner did not take into
account the fact that the headquarters of the strategic air command
was five miles outside of Omaha, which was the second city that
would be attacked after Washington if there was a war.

Now let me talk about the current debate over whether America wants hegemony in the world, and what that would mean for other countries. This debate has a second aspect, which is whether China intends to exercise hegemony in Asia, and what that would mean for the United States. This is a relevant question because there must be a temptation in China and in other countries to prevent American hegemony. There is certainly a temptation in America to prevent Chinese hegemony. If these impulses were to become the dominant theme of the foreign policies of our two countries, then somewhere along the way, crisis would emerge, and, indeed, become inevitable.

I want to explain why it is not necessary to think in those terms.
[In essence this is because] the traditional way of looking at
foreign policy has been overwhelmingly superseded by events. For
the first time in history, foreign policy is global. When China
was a great and powerful empire, its interaction with Europe was
minimal. Until the 19th century, the interaction of the west with
China was also very small. Now, however, we have a truly global
foreign policy. It is characterized by the rise and decline of
nations, a process that produces enormous turbulence. America is
rising militarily. China is rising economically and politically.
India may be rising. Russia is declining compared to what it was
20 years ago. Japan is on the verge of deciding in which direction
to move.

So you have a global situation in which regions with different
characteristics are simultaneously interacting with each other.
Europe and the Atlantic area are marked by globalized growth, in
which military elements play a small role. In Asia, you have a more
conventional situation in which countries relate to each other in
terms of balance of power considerations. China, India, Japan,
Pakistan, and Indonesia behave in their interactions in traditional
ways. In the Islamic world, you have an atmosphere of religious
war. All of these transformations are occurring simultaneously.

It is in this context that one has to analyze the question of American

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hegemony. It is true that America is militarily, right now, the strongest nation in the world. But it is also true that the number of issues where military force can be used effectively is shrinking. Thus, the idea of some Americans and many foreigners that America can impose its will by military force everywhere simultaneously is, in my opinion, wrong.

It is also a historical fact that military empires usually collapse from within. The reason for that is that every problem ultimately becomes a domestic problem, but no country can understand the whole world simultaneously. This is why I have written books and articles for American audiences in which I point out that for selfish American reasons, hegemony is not in the American interest. Statesmanship has to translate power into agreement, into consensus, and consensus requires discussions.

The same considerations apply also to the issue of Chinese hegemony. Those of you who have dealt with America know that there are people in the United States who believe that China will be a great threat to the United States in 30 years, and that we should, therefore, try to curb the power of China. But I have watched the development process in China since 1971, when I first came here. China has achieved its rapid growth through its own efforts without significant foreign aid. The United States is simply not powerful enough to prevent a country that has achieved so much, starting from a very low base, from continuing and accelerating along this road.

So the problem confronting policy-makers is this: the temptation will remain in both China and the United States, no matter what I say about hegemony, to try to counter-balance each other. My point is that we have to view this temptation from a broader prospective. People who have studied military problems all their life, as you have, know that a war between China and the United States would be a huge catastrophe for both countries, just as World War One was for Europe. The suffering and damage would be out of proportion to any conceivable gain. Even strategic confrontation over an extended period would have grave consequences.

Therefore, I think it is vital for our countries to cooperate. Right now, we have a very constructive base for a better relationship. If we take the example of Korea, we see that the strategic interests of many countries intersect in Korea. China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the United States all have important concerns about the

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future of Korea. For all of them, the existence of nuclear weapons
in Korea represents a significant threat. Therefore it is both
natural and very positive that China and the United States have
cooperated, up to now, in such a constructive manner. Now, of course,
every negotiation must have a time limit, because we cannot permit
prolonged negotiations to provide an opportunity for North Korea
to keep building nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is a basic
principle (that) the United States cannot have an interest in
pursuing a military solution at the borders of China, even though
it is a strategic option. Therefore, I am optimistic that our two
countries will find an approach that will take into consideration
each side's dignity and vital interests, and that the question of
unilateral action will not arise. Rather, the problem will be solved
by a common policy.

Now I know that many Chinese and people in other countries are
concerned about some of the statements that the U.S. government
has made about the possibility of preemptive action by the United
States. This issue has two aspects.

The first is whether the United States will try to prevent any other
country from becoming powerful. There are some Americans who believe
this is desirable, but it is neither practical nor realistic. In
my view, that type of preemptive action will not become the basis
for policy.

In addition, there is a second aspect to the issue of preemption
that was demonstrated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
on New York and Washington. These attacks reflected the
privatization of foreign policy and the privatization of security
threats; that is to say, private groups, not states, or groups based
in some states but not acting in the names of those states, can
simultaneously organize threats to the security of a whole range
of countries: of America, of Indonesia, of Saudi Arabia, of Russia,
even of China. These terrorist groups are not states in the
traditional sense. It is an inescapable reality, given the
destructive nature of the means they might employ, that some
preemptive action may be necessary against such groups. I agree
with the American government on that point.

However, I have added a qualification to this aspect, namely that
while preemptive action may be necessary, it cannot be left to one
country to define which types of preemptive action are legitimate
and which preemptive actions are not legitimate. So I have argued

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in America, not just here, that we should work with countries such as China, Russia, and those in Europe to see whether we can elaborate some principles having general validity on when, and under what circumstances, preemptive action can be undertaken.

Beyond these immediate issues, both our countries face a whole set of new challenges. We see India rising, nationalism in Japan, irritated Muslims throughout the Islamic world, and the enormous question of the future of Europe. On all of these issues, it is important for China and the United States to exchange ideas. Let's take the example of China and the United States in Asia. If one were to attempt to organize an Asian bloc, and the other to try to organize an Asian balance of power, we would constantly maneuver against each other. So I was very glad last week, when I was in Texas with our host [General Xiong Guangkai], that former Vice Premier Qian Qichen said specifically that China welcomes the participation of the United States in the evolution of Asia.

My basic view is that China cannot effectively balance America militarily now, and we cannot prevent the evolution of China into a major, and perhaps even dominant country in Asia. So cooperation between our two countries is a necessity that is in the self-interest of both countries. And I am happy to see that this is the approach that is being pursued.

Finally, there is the problem of Taiwan. I do not want to leave this audience without saying something about it. When I spoke in Texas last week before 2,500 Americans in the heartland of American nationalism, I stated three principles, to great applause, that should lie at the core of our relationship with China. First, the United States must support a One-China policy and resist any effort to develop a Two-China or any variation of a Two-China policy. Second, the United States should urge great restraint on Taiwan in carrying out any challenges to this principle. Third, the United States should continue strongly to advocate a peaceful solution brought about by the evolution of relations across the Taiwan Strait. I think principles such as these will bring us to a peaceful resolution that will result ultimately from contacts the Chinese people will conduct by themselves.

Obviously, it is impossible in half an hour to cover the whole range of Sino-American relations, but I want to leave you with one fundamental point. I have described various currents in American thinking, and I've outlined various problems that exist in the world.

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But there is one permanent factor: seven American presidents and four sets of Chinese leaders have all carried out consistently a policy of close cooperation between our two countries. Sometimes, on the American side, a new president will experiment with a different approach, including this president. But invariably, within the space of two years, they come back to cooperation because when one looks at the nature of global problems, one finds that opportunities for creativity and for peace absolutely require Sino-American cooperation.

So you make me feel honored by describing me as an old friend of China, and I like to think of myself as such a friend. But what is more important is that our relationship does not depend on individuals and that we have a destiny to act as old friends regardless of the ups and downs of individuals.

In conclusion, let me thank you for receiving me and for giving me the opportunity to talk to you openly, and to tell you how much I look forward to my next visit, and how much confidence I have in the policies of China, and in the policies of my country, and in our cooperation.

## Q&As

**Q:** Dr. Kissinger, as one of the explorers for the normalization of Sino-American relationship, what's your comment on Secretary of State Powell's statement in a recent speech, quote, "the Sino-American relationship is in the best state since President Nixon's first trip to China". Thank you.

**A:** Good! For reasons of vanity, I attempted not to agree with Secretary Powell. But I basically agree with him. I believe we are now talking across a broad range of subjects in a more systematic way than was possible in the earlier period.

**Q:** Thank you Dr. Kissinger for your wonderful speech. I especially appreciate your viewpoint on the Taiwan question. I'd like to ask a question about it. As I understand, you also recognize the rise of China is inevitable. And I want to add that reunification between the mainland and Taiwan is also inevitable. And I believe reunification between the mainland and Taiwan is not only in the interest of China, but is also in the interest of the United States. Now my question is: why cannot the US government adopt the policy

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of actively promoting peaceful reunification? Thank you very much.

A: Actually, starting with the Shanghai Communiqué and the two subsequent communiqués, and in many other pronouncements, American presidents have stated clearly that they support a One-China policy. On that subject, opinion is not united, as you know, in the American Congress. And American presidents go as far as they believe our democratic system permits them to go, and they will certainly place no obstacles in the way of peaceful unification.

Q: When you see a new US president assuming office, at first he attempts to adopt a hardliner's doubt towards China while immediately before he steps down, (he) usually relaxes such opposition. This almost becomes a common law of the US presidency. Can you give us an interpretation, please?

A: The reason is: during electoral campaigns, extremist groups always make a lot of noise, and the candidates attempt to get their votes. But as soon as they study the problem, they come to the same conclusion as their predecessors. With every decade of Sino-American cooperation, there are more former senior officials who understand the issue and can exercise influence in the media and the Congress to point matters in the direction in which in the end they have always gone.

Q: After the "September 11" events, the international security situation seems to be more complex. Although the United States successfully took military action in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and it also adopted a "preemptive" military strategy, it seems that the threats the United States faces are not reduced. So what is Dr. Kissinger's comment on this phenomenon?

A: The fact is that it is a great threat. It is shown by the fact that you have bombings in Bahrain, in Riyadh, in New York, in Russia. So it is not a local threat, and it is very difficult to reduce the threat. The threat will not be reduced fully or eliminated until countries no longer provide bases of operation for these terrorists. And it is also partly due to the fact that the only country that has taken military action up to now is the United States, and there are terrorist camps existing in many other countries, which the local countries are not adequately suppressing. But it is a very good question and a very big challenge. And we haven't solved it. But it would be a lot worse if we did nothing.

YJ

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Q: Winston Churchill has said, if you want to ensure your place in history, you just make sure that you are the first to write the history books. As we know, you have written so many famous books. What do you think of this question?

A: It's a good question, but I started out as a historian and not as a statesman. And when you write history, you make a big mistake if you try to write in order to influence judgments. What I try to do in my books is to deal with the following contemporary historical problem. If you commit a historian today to looking at all the documents of the American government, he would never get through them, and he would never understand what he was looking at. Everyday there are 4000 cables that arrive in the State Department. So what I attempted to do is to select the documents that reached the president or the secretary of state and to give an absolutely accurate account of what the considerations were. While I have many critics in the United States, they have not yet found any significant factual error. So I wrote more for students and people who want to understand what was attempted, and I cannot dictate my place in history.

Host (General Xiong Guangkai): Time will never be enough when we get together with Dr. Kissinger. Now let's make a conclusion of the symposium. I want to make three points. The first point: Dr. Kissinger is a well-known strategist so today we have learned quite a lot from his strategic views. In this sense, we should say thank you again. The second point: Dr. Kissinger is a very good friend of China and has been to China 39 times. He works for the promotion of the Sino-American relationship. And today, he has come to our institute also for this purpose. In this sense, we should thank you again. Last but not the least, let's say "We wish you long life, Dr. Kissinger," because your health is so important. We wish you long life and good health!

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