12/14/01

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rose

Attached are the East Timor documents now in
circulation.

TAB 1 The National Security Archives website

TAB 2 Suharto at Camp David, July 5, 1975

TAB 3 Your staff meeting, August 12, 1975

TAB 4 Your (unsigned) briefing memo for
Ford

TAB 5 Your and Ford's meeting with Suharto
in Jakarta, December 6, 1975

TAB 6 Your staff meeting of December 18,
1975 as printed in the Hitchens book

TAB 7 Your staff meeting of June 17, 1976

Apart from the Hitchens book, I thought you would

East Timor Revisited

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[LC]

TAB I

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The Kissinger
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by William Burr (New
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515 pp.)

East Timor Revisited

FORD, KISSINGER AND THE INDONESIAN INVASION, 1975.

Ford and Kissinger Gave Green Light to
Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 1975:
New Documents Detail Conversations with Suharto

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62
Edited by William Burr and Michael L. Evans

December 6, 2001

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The New Evidence

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 set the stage for a long, bloody, and disastrous occupation of the territory that ended only after an international peacekeeping force was introduced in 1999. President Bill Clinton cut off military aid to Indonesia in September 1999—reversing a longstanding policy of military cooperation—but questions persist about U.S. responsibility for the 1975 invasion; in particular, the degree to which Washington actually condoned or supported the bloody military offense. Most recently, journalist Christopher Hitchens raised questions about the role of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in giving a green light to the invasion that has left perhaps 200,000 dead in the years since. Two newly declassified documents from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library released to the National Security Archive, shed light on the Ford administration's relationship with President Suharto of Indonesia during 1975. Of special importance is the record of Ford's and Kissinger's meeting with Suharto in early December 1975. The document shows that Suharto began the invasion knowing that he had the full approval of the White House. Both of these documents had been released in heavily excised form some years ago, but with Suharto now out of power, and following the collapse of Indonesian control over East Timor, the situation has changed enough that both documents have been released in their entirety.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/

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Other documents found among State Department records at the National Archives elucidate the inner workings of U.S. policy toward the Indonesia crisis during 1975 and 1976. Besides confirming that Henry Kissinger was the top advisers expected an eventual Indonesian takeover of East Timor, archival material shows that the Secretary of State fully understood that invasion of East Timor involved the "illegal" use of U.S.-supplied military equipment because it was not used in self-defense as required by law.

Although Indonesia was a major site of U.S. energy and raw materials investment, an important petroleum exporter, strategically located near shipping lanes, and a significant recipient of U.S. military assistance, the country—much less the East Timor question—barely figures into Henry Kissinger's memoirs of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Gerald Ford, in his memoir briefly discusses the December 1975 visit to Jakarta but does not mention the discussion of East Timor with Suharto. Indeed, as important the bilateral relationship was, Jakarta's brutal suppression of the independence movement in East Timor was a development that neither nor Kissinger wanted people to remember about their time in power. Therefore, the two decided on a course of action of dubious legality and that resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Timorese may well have also discouraged further reflection, at least in public. No doubt the omissions from Ford's Kissinger's memoirs also reflect the low priority that East Timor had during the Ford administration. For senior officials, the fate of a post-colonial East Timor paled in comparison to the strategic relationship with the anti-communist Suharto regime, especially in the wake of the communist vice in Vietnam, when Ford and Kissinger wanted to strengthen relations with anti-communists and check left-wing movements in the region.(1) But it is not simply a matter of omission; on several occasions Kissinger has explicitly denied that he ever had substantive discussions of East Timor with Suharto, much less having consented to Indonesian plans.(2) The new evidence contradicts Kissinger's statements: Indonesian plans for the invasion of East Timor were indeed discussed with Suharto, and Ford arKissinger gave them the green light. As Kissinger advised Suharto on the eve of the invasion: "it is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly but that "it would be better if it were done after we returned" to the United States.

Although these new documents shed important light on U.S. policy toward the East Timor question in 1975, much more needs to be learned about U.S. policymaking during 1975 and 1976. Unfortunately, most of the relevant sources are classified. The large collection of Kissinger-Scowcroft office files at the Ford Library remains unavailable, as are the records of the State Department's Indonesia desk and the Bureau of East Asian Affairs for the 1970s. The State Department's recent acquisition of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversation transcripts might include important material, although they will probably reflect the relatively low priority that the policymakers gave to the East Timor question.

## Background

The leftist military revolt that overthrew Portugal's authoritarian regime

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April 1974 encouraged nationalist movements in the Portuguese colony East Timor calling for gradual independence from Lisbon—a position initially favored by the new Portuguese government. One of these groups, the Timorese Democratic Union (UTD), had greater support among Timorese elites and senior Portuguese colonial administrators, while the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), with its leaner, social democratic program, had the support of younger Timorese and lower-level colonial officials. In January 1975 the two groups form an uneasy coalition. Increasingly, Fretilin enjoyed the greatest public support and led the push for rapid independence. (3)

Early signals from the Indonesian government indicated that it was prep to support East Timorese independence, (4) but Jakarta soon became interested in turning the region into the country's twenty-seventh province. Fears that an independent East Timor could be used as a base by unfriendly governments or spur other secessionist movements in Indonesia had convinced hardliners in the military to press for annexation of the territory. In February 1975 the Indonesian military conducted a mock invasion of Timor in South Sumatra. (5) Military hardliners also backed the pro-integration Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) with financial assistance and launched a propaganda campaign against the pro-independence groups. (6) Apodeti, however, never had the popular support enjoyed by Fretilin or UDT.

The new regime in Lisbon was preoccupied with its own internal politic controversies and could do little to ensure a steady transition toward independence. During 1974 and 1975 Indonesian authorities hoped that Portuguese would acquiesce in Jakarta's plans to acquire East Timor. At first the Portuguese seemed responsive, but by mid-1975 it had become evident that Lisbon supported self-determination for the people of East Timor. In July 1975 Lisbon rebuffed Jakarta with the issuance of Constitutional Law 7/75, setting forth a timetable for home-rule, including the election of a popular assembly that would determine East Timor's future with Portuguese sovereignty ending no later than October 1978. (7)

Events in East Timor, however, did not proceed in accordance with List's schedule. The delicate UDT-Fretilin alliance had fallen apart in May, in part due to a propaganda campaign launched by the Indonesian government to inflame UTD concerns about Fretilin's alleged communist tendencies. UDT's fears were bolstered in June when Fretilin refused to attend an all party conference on decolonization hosted by Portuguese officials on Mato Grosso do Sul due to the presence of Apodeti representatives. (9) To Fretilin the issue of independence was not up for discussion, least of all with Jakarta. The event of Fretilin's popularity—and thus popular sentiment for independence in Indonesia—became evident in July when the party won 55 percent of the vote in local elections. (10) Convinced by Indonesian intelligence that Fretilin was planning a coup, UDT staged its own in August 1975 in the Timorese capital Dili in an effort to drive out Fretilin supporters. A Fretilin counterattack pushed UDT forces out of the city, however, and by September Fretilin controlled nearly all of East Timor, the Portuguese administrators having fled to the island of Atauro. (11) Despite having

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gained de facto control of the territory, Fretilin ended its call for immediate independence and now supported a plan similar to the gradual independence program proposed in June by the Portuguese. (12)

The Indonesian government did not seize the opportunity to move troops into Dili on the premise of restoring order. Suharto was still concerned about the reaction from the West and needed more time to get the UDT other anti-Fretilin groups to support integration. (13) The UDT, now refugees on the Indonesian side of Timor and in need of food and shelter had no choice but to sign a pro-integration petition drawn up by Indones Meanwhile, in October Indonesian special forces began to infiltrate secret into East Timor in an effort to provoke clashes that would provide the pretext for a full-scale invasion. When these incursions—including the murder by Indonesian forces of five journalists employed by Australian TV—failed to elicit any noticeable reaction from the West, Indonesia stepped-up its attacks across the border. (14)

While Indonesian airborne troops—outfitted with American equipment-prepared to take Dili, Fretilin petitioned the United Nations to call for the withdrawal of the invading forces. Four days later, on November 28, Fretilin declared East Timor's independence—apparently in the belief that the sovereign state would have greater success appealing to the UN, but also thinking that Timorese soldiers would be more likely to fight for an independent state. Indonesia countered the next day with a “declaration integration” signed by Apodeti and UDT representatives and coordinate Indonesia's military intelligence service. (15) The invasion, originally scheduled for early December, was apparently delayed by the visit of Fc and Kissinger to Jakarta on December 6.

Operation Komodo, a general invasion of East Timor, commenced the next day. In the following weeks a series of United Nations resolutions—supported by the U.S.—called for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops (16) An estimated 20,000 Indonesian troops were deployed to the region the end of the month. While casualty estimates vary, anywhere from 60,000-100,000 Timorese were probably killed in the first year after the violence began in 1975. (17) In 1979 the U.S. Agency for International Development estimated that 300,000 East Timorese—nearly half the population—had been uprooted and moved into camps controlled by Indonesian armed forces. By 1980 the occupation had left more than 100,000 dead from military action, starvation or disease, with some estimates running as high as 230,000. (18)

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1

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TAB 2

Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto, 5
July 1975, 12:40 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memorandum of Conversation
Box 13, July 5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto

This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Car
David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor.
Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in Sc
Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d'horizon of East Asian politi
issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international investment, at
Portuguese decolonization. Fearing greater political and ideological feri
in the region following the Communist victory in Vietnam, Suharto saw
ideological concoction "Pancasila" (possibly misspelled "Pantechistita"
the document) as useful, no doubt because its emphasis on consensus
excluded any oppositional political activity.(19) Not taking "consensus
granted, Suharto wanted U.S. help in building up his military machine to
increase its mobility for dealing with insurgent elements, noting that,
"Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are ve
important." Ford proposed setting up a joint commission to scrutinize
Suharto's military request but wanted Kissinger to settle the details.

Suharto brought up the question of Portuguese decolonization in East Ti
proclaiming his support for "self-determination" but also dismissing
independence as unviable: "So the only way is to integrate [East Timor]
Indonesia." Without mentioning Fretilin by name, Suharto misleadingly
characterized it as "almost Communist" and criticized the group for
boycotting the decolonization meeting in Macao. Suharto claimed that
Indonesia did not want to interfere with East Timor's self-determination
implied that it might have to because "those who want independence are
those who are Communist-influenced."

While Lisbon still had legal sovereignty over East Timor, apparently nei
Ford nor Suharto discussed the implications for Indonesian policy.
Although Washington had worked closely with the Salazar dictatorship
ruled Portugal for decades, it was now deeply suspicious of the new soc
democratic regime in Lisbon; with its exaggerated concerns about a
Communist coup, the Ford administration considered the possibility of
expelling Portugal from NATO and supporting an independence movem
in the Azores (where the U.S. had important military facilities). Thus, I
Ford's and Kissinger's perspective in 1975, Portugal's role in the region
was of little interest and did not pose an important obstacle to Indonesia
action. That some left-leaning Portuguese officers had contacts with Fre
undoubtedly made the White House even less inclined to concern itself
Portugal's response to Indonesian action in East Timor.(20)

Document 2

TAB 3

The Secretary's 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting, Tuesday, August 12, 1975, Sec
[excerpt], with cover memorandum on highlights of meeting attached

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Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Transcript of Staff Meetings of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, box 8

Apparently encouraged by his meeting with President Ford, Suharto returned from Washington on July 8 and made his first public statement suggesting that an independent East Timor was not viable. Only days later UDT leaders launched their coup with the hope that they could suppress Fretilin. During an August 12 discussion of the coup, Henry Kissinger, his close advisers were not altogether sure what was happening, but did disagree with Assistant Secretary Philip Habib's statement that the Indonesians would not let a "communist-dominated group," i.e., Fretilin take over. Kissinger, in particular, assumed that an Indonesian takeover would take place "sooner or later." Believing that Australia, a key region ally, would feel "impelled" to support self-determination for the Timorese Kissinger and his advisers wanted to avoid controversy over the issue. They quickly agreed that the State Department should make no comment on the coup or related events.

A few days later, the Australian ambassador in Jakarta relayed a statement by U.S. ambassador John Newsom that summarized Washington's approach but alluded to a problem that Kissinger and his advisers had not specific discussed on August 12. The message noted Newsom's August 16 comment that if Indonesia were to invade East Timor, it [should] do so "effectively, quickly, and not use our equipment."(21) The U.S. ambassador recognized that there was a congressional prohibition on Indonesia's use of military gear financed by U.S. aid for anything but defensive operations. Kissinger would come to understand the problem he did not already, but as document four suggests, he was not willing to hand over to Jakarta.

TAB 4

## Document 3

Memorandum to President Ford from Henry A. Kissinger, "Your Visit to Indonesia," ca. 21 November 1975

## Document 3A

Enclosure to Document 3, State Department Briefing Paper, "Indonesia East Timor," ca. 21 November 1975

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Visit to the Far East Indonesia Nov-Dec. 1975

This Kissinger memorandum, prepared for President Ford some two weeks before the two were to visit to Jakarta, indicates that the administration's larger strategic interests in Indonesia made it unlikely that Washington would make a fuss over East Timor. The eventual fate of East Timor was

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evidently a relatively low priority for Kissinger and his staff—it was the twelfth and final item mentioned in the memo.(22) While Kissinger, in memo, acknowledged that the Indonesians have been “maneuvering to absorb the colony” through negotiations with Portugal and “covert military operations in the colony itself,” he apparently did not expect an overt invasion using U.S.-supplied military equipment. Indeed, his memo and briefing paper on “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor” both indicate that there would violate U.S. law, suggesting that this consideration had induced “restraint” on the part of Jakarta. Moreover, and in contrast to Habib’s view(23) that Fretelin was “Communist-dominated,” the author of the briefing paper more accurately characterized the Front as “vaguely left-wing.”

### TAB 5

THIS IS YOUR AND
FORD'S MTG WITH
SUHARTO DEC 6, '75
WHICH WAS IN
CABLE FORM. I SENT
YOU THE TIMOR
EXCERPT RETYPED.
FULL CABLE AT
THE TAB.

### Document 4

Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975
[Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion], Secret/Nodis(24)

Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A
Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76

On the eve of Indonesia's full-scale invasion of East Timor, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. During his meeting with Suharto, Ford emphasized America's continuing commitment to Asia affairs despite the "severe setback of Vietnam." Discussion then turned to the problem of Communist influence in the Non-Aligned Movement and insurgency movements in Thailand and Malaysia. Ford told Suharto that he would be "enthusiastic" about building an M-16 plant in Indonesia to provide small arms to help Southeast Asian governments counter region insurgency movements. Kissinger also approved of the proposed arrangement "because of its indication of wider cooperation."

### DON'T HAVE

On 4 or 5 December, while still in Beijing, Kissinger received a cable from the State Department suggesting that the Indonesians had "plans" to invade East Timor.(25) Thus, Ford or Kissinger could not have been too surprised, in the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in Thailand or Malaysia, Suharto suddenly brought up East Timor. Suharto noted that while Indonesia "has no territorial ambitions," Fretelin has not cooperated with negotiations and has "declared its independence unilaterally." The current situation, he said, "will prolong the suffering of the refugees and increase instability in the area." Suharto then assured the Americans that "the four other parties" favor integration, with the apparent implication that a mere majority among the "parties" to the conflict—absent a popular referendum—alone constituted an act of self-determination. "We want world understanding," Suharto continued, "if we deem it necessary to take rapid drastic action."

Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intention you have." Kissinger did indeed stress that "the use of US-made arms could

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create problems," but then added that, "It depends on how we construe i
whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation." Thus, Kissinger's
concern was not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively—a
hence illegally—but whether the act would actually be interpreted as
such—a process he clearly intended to manipulate.(26) In any case,
Kissinger added: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly

Indeed, timing and damage control were very important to the Americar
as Kissinger told Suharto: "We would be able to influence the reaction i
America if whatever happens happens after we return. . . If you have m
plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President retu
home." Kissinger also asked Suharto if he anticipated a "long guerilla v
apparently aware that a quick military success would be easier to spin th
long campaign. Suharto acknowledged that there "will probably be a sn
guerilla war" but he was cagey enough not to predict its duration.
Nevertheless, his military colleagues were optimistic; as one of the
architects of Indonesian policy, General Ali Murtopo explained to a U.S
scholar some months before the invasion, "the whole business will be se
in three weeks."(27)

With the U.S. position on the East Timor "business" settled, Suharto tur
to economic problems, especially petroleum investments. With the rece
bankruptcy of the state oil company, the regime needed more revenue ar
Suharto wanted to get it from the oil companies that invested in Indones
Noting that the oil companies were sharing larger shares of their profits
Middle Eastern states than they were with Indonesia, Suharto told Ford :
Kissinger that he wanted to negotiate an "understanding" with them. Bc
Americans were sympathetic and said that he would have their support.
Kissinger, however, noted carefully that whatever Suharto did he should
"not create a climate that discourages investment." The possibility that
East Timor affair could prove to be a disaster for Indonesia and someday
impair the "climate for investment" never seems to have occurred to eitf
Kissinger or Ford.

I INSERTED AT TAB
6 THE ONE DOCUMENT
THAT HITCHENS HAD
IN CHAP 8 IN ALMOST
ITS ENTIRETY. IT
IS YOUR DECEMBER 18
1975 STAFF MEETING
AFTER YOUR RETURN
FROM ASIA AND IN
WHICH TIMOR FIGURED
PROMINENTLY.

Document 5

Secretary of State Kissinger's Daily Schedule, 5 and 6 December 1975

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Trip to the Far East (Follow-Up) Nov-Dec. 1975

This brief schedule details Secretary Kissinger's two-day visit to Indone
with President Ford. So far, no record of Kissinger's meeting with Adar
Malik has been found.

Document 6

TAB 7

Transcript of Staff Meeting, Tuesday, June 17, 1976, Secret [excerpt]

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Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Transcripts of Staff Meetings of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, box 9

Washington's initial response to the invasion was to delay new arms sales to Indonesia pending an administrative review by the State Department, ostensibly to determine whether Indonesia had actually violated the bilateral agreement stipulating that U.S.-supplied arms could only be used for defensive purposes. Military equipment already in the pipeline continued to flow, however, and during the six-month review period the U.S. made four new offers of military equipment sales to Indonesia including maintenance and spare parts for the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations and employed during the invasion of East Timor. (28) The administrative delay and the subsequent offers were the subject of a December 18, 1975, meeting between Secretary Kissinger and his advisers in which he chastised his staff for writing a memo recommending that arms sales to Indonesia be cut off for violating the end-use agreement. While the memo was not widely distributed, Kissinger was angry that word might leak about how "Kissinger overrul his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law." The secretary told his staff that he "took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle not to make any new sales." If Congress asked about the policy, Kissinger said, "We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January." (30)

THE JUNE 17, 1976 MTG

Six months later, and exactly one month before the formal annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, the subject of East Timor again came up during staff meeting between Secretary Kissinger and his State Department burkers. The question was raised as to whether or not the U.S. should send representative to accompany an Indonesian parliamentary delegation to Timor—an invitation declined by most other countries. Robert H. Mille, an adviser from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recommerdesed against accepting the invitation, suggesting that "broader objectives with respect to Indonesia — including overall support to Timor," would be better served "if we don't have high-profile participation." Miller hoped to prevent "Congressional [sic] sentiment with regard to Indonesia from being rekindled." Philip Habib, under secretary of state for political affairs, agreed: "There's no need to take this action . . . Let them go ahead and do what they've been doing. We have no objection . . . They're quite happy with the position we've taken. We've resumed, as you know, all of our normal relations with them; and there isn't any problem involved." In apparent reference to the continuing arms sales, his deception of Congress or possibly to Indonesia's bloody invasion and occupation, Kissinger responded: "Not very willingly. Illegally and beautifully."

## Notes

1. Benedict R. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroad. The Forging of a Nation* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995),

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ELO

40.

2. At a 1995 press conference Kissinger told former East Timorese resistance leader Constancio Pinto, "Timor was never discussed with us when we were in Indonesia" and then qualified this remark by stating the learned about the invasion plans at the airport as the presidential party w about to leave. See "Ask Kissinger about East Timor: Confronting Henrik Kissinger," East Timor Action Network, August 1995

<http://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm>. During a radio interview in 1995 Kissinger continued to treat the discussion with Suharto on East Timor as incidental and nonsubstantive: "We were told at the airport as we left Jakarta that either that day or the next day they intended to take East Timor." See

<http://www.etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/radio.htm/map>

3. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) 198-204, for a fine overview of the East Timor issue.

4. Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik said in June 1974 that "the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor." See Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1974, Part 2 – East Asia* (Washington, D.C., Center for International Policy, 1978), 18.

5. John G. Taylor, "East Timor: Contemporary History, A Chronology of the Main Events since 1974," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239.

6. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn, Australia: Fonta, 1980), 202-203.

7. Ibid. 204.

8. Ibid., 203.

9. Schwarz, *A Nation*, 202.

10. Taylor, "East Timor: Contemporary History," Carey and Bentley, ed, *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239.

11. John G. Taylor, "Emergence of a Nationalist Movement," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 35; James Dunn, "Timor in International Perspective," ibid., 63-64.

12. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Part 2*, 19.

13. McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, 207.

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14. Ibid., 210-11.

15. Ibid., 211.

16. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Part 2, 19.*

17. James Dunn cites a study by the Catholic Church suggesting that as many as 60,000 Timorese had been killed by the end of 1976. This figure does not appear to include those killed in the period between the start of civil war in August 1975 and the invasion on December 7. See James D. 

18. Schwarz, 205; Estimates vary widely. On November 12, 1979, Indonesia's foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, estimated that 120,000 people had died in East Timor since 1975. See Taylor's chronology, "East Timor: Contemporary History," in Carey and Bentley *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 240; Amnesty International estimates that 200,000 died from military action, starvation or disease from 1975-1999. See Amnesty International, "200,000 Dead. Enough is Enough." *New York Times* (advertisement), September 23, 1999.

19. For "pancasila," see Schwarz, *A Nation*, 10, 24, 41-42, 45-46, 292-9.

20. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," Carey ar Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 138-39.

21. The comment is cited in a telegram written by Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott on August 17, 1975 (Cited in Munster, G.J. and Wals (eds), *Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy*, 1968-75 (Sydney, 1980), 200.

22. The memo was drafted by Edward C. Ingraham, director of the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore office at the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

23. See *Document 2*.

24. "Nodis" means "no distribution" without the permission of the State Department's Executive Secretary.

25. The cable, entitled "Plans for Indonesian Invasion of East Timor," remains classified but is cited by title and cable number in a list of cable that Kissinger received while traveling in East Asia. The list may be found in National Archives, Record Group 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Trip to the Far East (Follo

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Up) Nov.Dec. 1975. The National Security Archive has submitted a req
to the State Department for declassification of this and other cables on E
Timor cited on the list.

26. Indeed, later that month Kissinger asked his advisers whether "We can
construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-
defense?" See Mark Hertsgaard, "The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger;
minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger," *The Nation*,
October 29, 1990, at
<http://etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm>.

27. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," Carey ar
Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 137.

28. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Part 2, 19-20*. Max Holland, who co-wrote the Center's report, discovered the State Department's administrative delay and the continued offers of security assistance. The editors thank him for bringing this report to our attention.

29. Carlyle Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.

30. Mark Hertsgaard, "The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger; minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger," *The Nation*, October 29, 1975; <http://etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm>.

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12/13/01

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET / NODIS / XGDS

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

By _lee_ NARA, Date _7/2/01_

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford

President Suharto, President of Indonesia

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for NSA

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for NSA

Mr. Widodo (Indonesian Interpreter)

DATE & TIME:

July 5, 1975 - Saturday

12:40 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

(1:44 Secretary Kissinger joined)

PLACE:

Laurel Cabin, Camp David, Maryland

President: Let me reiterate how pleased we are to have you visit. Secretary Kissinger told me you were here in 1970 when President Nixon was in office. We are just as concerned about our good relations with Indonesia as we were earlier.

Let me say now that we are as firmly committed and interested in Southeast Asia. The events in Indochina have in no way diminished our interest or commitment in the area.

We are committed to detente with the Soviet Union, but it has to be a mutual relationship. We will not let them have a bigger piece of the benefits. We will continue it as long as it is mutually beneficial. We recognize that the Soviet Union keeps assisting and strengthening its friends, just as we do. But they cannot take advantage of us.

In my trip to Brussels, I told my NATO allies that we were committed to them completely, and I want you and the countries in your area to feel the same.

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We want to continue our assistance programs. As you know, that depends on the Congress, which has been cutting our program in recent years. This Congress is interested, but it is my intention to increase aid. We are able to make available some military equipment items to help you in your situation - four naval vessels, which may not be in tip-top condition, some tanks, aircraft such as C-47, and four C-123 transports.

**Suharto:** May I first convey my appreciation and gratitude, Mr. President, for your invitation to visit the United States. And on behalf of the Government and people of Indonesia, may I convey our heartfelt congratulations for the 4th of July. I would take this valuable opportunity and discuss the problems affecting not only Indonesia but all of Southeast Asia in light of recent changes which have swept the peninsula. I had already obtained valuable information from Mr. Habib and from you in respect to furthering American responsibility to its allies in the Southeast Asia region. After obtaining that information and valuable assessment, we have no fear that the United States will abandon its responsibility toward peace in the Southeast Asia region. Considering the bitter and sad experience of the American people in Vietnam, the U.S. has given such great help and to have it turn out so it is necessary to assess why it happened to come out so very badly after such American sacrifice.

If you would allow me, I will elaborate on Indonesia's problems in our struggles for independence against Communism; it will help us understand. It is not the military strength of the Communists but their fanaticism and ideology which is the principal element of their strength. To consider this, each country in the area needs an ideology of its own with which to counter the Communists. But a national ideology is not enough by itself. The well-being of the people must be improved so that it strengthens and supports the national ideology. From the experience of Laos and Vietnam in the past, they seem to have forgotten this national ideology to get the support of the people. Despite their superiority of arms in fighting the Communists, the human factor was not there. They lacked this national ideology to rally the people to fight Communism.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia has been unifying and nationalizing the people to prepare to fight the threats which eventually will be made against our independence. So we are busily engaged in encouraging and consolidating in Southeast Asia this national ideology and cooperating with others in the areas of culture, economics, and so on. This is of course to prepare for any eventuality of an Indochina eventually dominated by the Communists.

What will happen after Vietnam? There are two possibilities: Whether they will apply Communism just within their borders in order to improve the

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conditions of their peoples. If so, we are okay. Ho Chi Minh has always wanted to unify all of Vietnam. We don't know yet what is going on and whether they will unify or whether there will be two separate Vietnams.

**President:** How long do you think it will take for them to decide this?

**Suharto:** I have been trying to find out from the Communists and Tito, and the judgment is that the consolidation will take five years, but by then, they will be unified.

**President:** How about the relations between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?

**Suharto:** Let me explain. As far as Cambodia, they recognize the GRUNK and Sihanouk -- although he is still in exile. I asked Tito why he didn't support Sihanouk's return and he said it would take some time. Tito's reply was that due to prevailing conditions in Phnom Penh, it is not safe for Sihanouk to return. There are still some dangerous elements. But my personal opinion is that they don't want him back yet. My information is that it will take Cambodia about five years to consolidate, so it will be similar to Vietnam. Considering that the time for consolidation is so long -- five years -- they might want two Vietnams and one Cambodia, all three joining a non-aligned world. So they may want to stay separate but with their policies aligned.

Even if it takes some time to consolidate, events will certainly encourage similar elements in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere. Of course, this Communist ideological solidarity will take the form of encouraging these elements to step up their activities among labor, farmers and youth. When they have built up the Communist movements, the Vietnamese will be able to supply the military equipment necessary for them to undertake military activities.

**President:** Are all the Communists working together?

**Suharto:** The Soviet Union and the Chinese don't work together. They are competing to expand their own individual influence in the region.

The second possibility is they may not stay within their borders but seek to Communize the region and the world. If so, we have to find out whether they will support the Soviet Union and China. Right now, I think Vietnam won't take sides, because then it would become a target between the two. Instead it will work for independent national Communist movements. But in any case, these events will have brief impact on the neighboring countries. The question

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is how to counter it. Knowing well the Communist tactics -- infiltration, fanaticism, etc., it is essential for each country to have a strong national ideology -- to strengthen itself in the political, economic and military areas.

We are fortunate we already have this national ideology -- Pantchestita(?). The question is, is it strong enough? Here it is important that we strengthen our economic development so we can support our Pantchestita(?). Therefore if we fail in economic developments, it will create a lack of confidence of our national ideology and create doubts in the people and leave them susceptible to other ideologies.

**President:** You have done very well in controlling inflation. We have had problems in that regard, but we are now making progress. I understand if you don't make economic progress there will be the growth of a Communist ideology in Indonesia.

**Suharto:** The principal factor is creating a national stability principally in the economic and monetary fields. The role of the US in her responsibility toward this area -- the U.S. won't abandon her role, but the American assistance role should be reviewed, both in relation to Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia. Particularly in assisting and supporting those countries in establishing national resilience. That would help in creating a regional resilience and help keep out Communism. But we are running against time because the Communists are working very hard in these countries to convert them to Communism.

The best way of fighting subversion is intelligence and territorial operations, so we can detect Communist activity when it first arises. In carrying these out when the people are participating, we rely heavily on communications. Therefore, communication between areas is very important to knowing when problems emerge, so we can deal with them immediately. If the danger becomes greater and the insurgency becomes greater, we will require mobile units to send to these areas to squelch subversion. To supply and maintain this mobility we will need both sea and air transport so we can put down insurgency before it becomes too big to stop. Especially in the navy field, we need to improve the conditions of the navy -- not big ships but to be able to transport men and materials to be able to carry out these operations. Particularly, ships which can fight any attempts to interfere with these operations to cope with insurgency. Indonesia has many islands so we will need many of these ships with great mobility.

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Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are
very important. We are in a better condition to do this than other Southeast
nations. With American assistance, we have built a national resilience
and we are working hard at building it further.

President: How big a Navy do you have and how big do you need?

Suharto: We have many capable navy men prepared to man the Soviet ships we have -- that were gathered to liberate West Iran. These ships are now mothballed and useless, however.

If you will agree with those principles to strengthen the national resilience -- especially in the military field, we can set up a joint committee to decide what is needed in the Navy, Army and Air Force. We don't need new equipment, just to make them serviceable.

President: I think we should set up a joint commission to decide what is needed and what we can do to supply those needs. I will talk to Secretary Kissinger.

Suharto: But the most important need is not in the military field but in the economic area. This is where we must build the nation. Indonesia can be an example to other countries of the importance of strengthening their national resilience.

President: Our Ex-Im Bank has been working with your people. I would expect we would continue to work with you on providing more credits and grants. It is important that we help with everything we can make available in order to contribute to the essential development you have described.

Suharto: In view of our efforts to accelerate developments, we have four sources: The IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia), international organizations like the World Bank, the Ex-Im Bank, and private banks. These four go from soft to hard terms for loans. We are already obtaining joint Ex-Im commercial loans, and terms are still lower through commercial banks. We hope to continue these loans.

President: In Fortune I saw a ten-page story urging private investment. Is the investment picture encouraging?

Suharto: The figure has now reached $5 billion. What remains is for industry which requires having capital input. Examples of these huge projects are liquefied natural gas ($800 million), nickel ($900 million), copper, and others. These will require the assistance of other countries to get the credits.

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With regard to our efforts to strengthen our national resilience, I want to mention the archipelago principle. This principle has been followed by the Indonesian people for years. The purpose is to force ourselves in as a unified nation without any territorial ambition. From various countries we have gotten favorable response, but I see some hesitancy in the U.S. about this principle. Indonesia doesn't want to create difficulties with other countries establishing this principle in its territory.

**President:** We were encouraged at the progress of the Law of the Sea Conference and we hope for further progress. We do understand your problem. We do have reservations, and we would be happy to meet with your people to work it out. We must have maneuverability if we are to carry out our responsibility in the world. I assure you we will work with your people to try to work out a mutual understanding.

**Suharto:** Talks have been conducted bilaterally between us already. The third point I want to raise is Portuguese decolonization. Starting with our basic principle, the new Constitution of 1945, Indonesia will not commit aggression against other countries. So Indonesia will not use force against the territory of other countries. With respect to Timor, we support carrying out decolonization through the process of self-determination. In ascertaining the views of the Timor people, there are three possibilities: independence, staying with Portugal, or to join Indonesia. With such a small territory and no resources, an independent country would hardly be viable. With Portugal it would be a big burden with Portugal so far away. If they want to integrate into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not possible because Indonesia is one unitary state. So the only way is to integrate into Indonesia.

**President:** Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to make their choice?

**Suharto:** There is no set date yet, but is is agreed in principle that the wishes of the people will be sought. The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced. Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. The Communist elements practically sabotaged the recent meeting in Macao. I want to assert that Indonesia doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia. These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.

**President:** I greatly appreciate the chance to learn your views, especially on the events in Vietnam as they consolidate -- and the thought it would take five years to consolidate.

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I would like to mention OPEC.

[Secretary Kissinger enters.]

We appreciate your not joining the embargo in '73-74. We are concerned about OPEC raising prices in the fall meeting. We are concerned about the effect on the economic recovery of the United States, the world, and the Third World. I know you feel badly about the Trade Bill's penalties against OPEC members. We are trying to get Congress to change that to make the penalties selective, not comprehensive.

**Suharto:** We share with the other OPEC states the view that we should not confront the consumers in this energy crisis. We are also aware that some producers have taken a tough stand. We are a small producer, but the others still listen to us. The September meeting I don't think will focus on a price increase but how to keep the purchasing power of the producers from falling. Therefore Indonesia, with the others, is studying the problem seriously so that oil revenue will benefit the people despite the inflation and recessions which have beset the world.

**President:** We have been through difficult times and we are now coming out of it. The oil price increase would have an injurious effect on our recovery and thus our ability to help the world's economic recovery.

In the past you have sent a special emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger on occasion. I would like that arrangement to continue under me if you agree.

**Suharto:** I fully share the importance of sending an emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger. I haven't done it so much recently because of the problems that both our countries have been facing recently. I would also agree to resuming these contacts so we can maintain a similarity of views on problems, like with Japan and Australia.

**President:** Lunch is ready.

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PROCEEDINGS

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Joe.

MR. SISCO: Nothing.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: Nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Phil.

MR. HABIB: We have had an incomplete series of reports on a coup in Portuguese Timor, which is creating a little bit of flak in Indonesia and Australia. We are not sure what happened, but evidently one of the Timorese Liberation for Independence groups has taken over the government one way or another. We don't know what their intentions are.

The Indonesians are quite upset and are mobilizing some forces very quietly.

When the situation becomes clear, we will know whether or not it is sufficiently serious that the Indonesians will take action. It is quite clear the Indonesians will not let a hostile group -- that is to say a Communist-dominated group -- take over.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But who is that group?

MR. HABIB: As best we can tell, it is a group called the UDT, the Democratic Union of Timorese, which is not a Communist-controlled group. There is another group on the island which has some armed forces which is a

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Communist-dominated group.

If it is the UDT, it may very well be that the Indonesians are behind it and are not telling anybody yet. But from intercept traffic, we are not sure that the Indonesians are that fully clued in. And we will just to have to wait. We should have some more information today.

In any event, whichever way it goes, if it is an Indonesian move, or the Indonesians move against it, I think it is a situation in which we should just do nothing. It is quite obvious that the Indonesians are not going to let any hostile element take over an island right in the midst of the Indonesian archipelago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later.

MR. HABIB: Eventually. That is always expected. The only ones liable to react verbally will be the Australians, who will feel impaled to say something.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why should Whitlam care about the disappearance of a vestige of colonialism?

MR. HABIB: Whitlam has said over and over again they don't mind what happens to Portuguese Timor so long as it is with the consent of the people -- and he has taken

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that high posture, and his party is on record.

As a matter of fact, he said something like that to
you when he was here. And they have assumed that it eventually
if it will be free, the preferable thing would be to let it
stay in Portuguese hands for a couple of years while it sorts
itself out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does "sort itself out" mean in Timor?

MR. HABIB: The answer is until the Indonesians
have organized sufficiently the Timorese into some kind of
pro-Indonesian enosis group.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Aren't you getting carried away a little bit?

MR. HABIB: It is a Greek word I learned from
Tom Enders, who speaks Greek fluently. Or is that Latin you
speak?

But in any event, the important thing is that we
should not get ourselves sucked into this one by having
opinions, unless you disagree -- I mean publicly.

(Laughter)

I think it is just made to order --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You didn't mean that last
phrase at all.

MR. HABIB: Well, subject to your confirmation,

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I have provided the guidance yesterday we should have no comment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our Indian desk takes the news for this week, doesn't it. Why is there a daily comment on what is going on in India about the cancellation of the Presidential trips?

MR. ATHERTON: I have seen one story in the *Times* this morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw another story in the *Times* on Sunday. I didn't even know there was such a study going on.

MR. ATHERTON: There was a memorandum to you on this. That is the only thing.

MR. HYLAND: This intelligence quote -- by Binder.

MR. ATHERTON: There is an intelligence study on internal developments. But on the question of the President' visit, the only thing I know of is the memorandum we had with you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Has that gotten to me?

MR. ATHERTON: I think so.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to hurt Gwertzman's feelings that I have seen a memo before he does.

MR. ATHERTON: Gwertzman's story today refers to

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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THE SECRETARY'S PRINCIPAL'S AND REGIONAL STAFF MEETING,
TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1975

pp 2 - 5 Reports of coup in Portuguese Timor. Habib recommended that the US not get involved. Secretary agreed that we should express no public opinion.

pp 5 - 7 Leaks re question of Presidential visit to India. Secretary referred to Gwertzman article in N.Y. Times. Atherton was certain source was not NEA; he undertook to assure that all hands would keep quiet on this subject.

pp 7 - 9 Argentina sitrep by Rogers. Secretary requested ARA briefing memorandum on dynamics of internal situation in that country.

PP 9 - 12 Panama Canal negotiations. Rogers mentioned favorable reaction to announcement of Bunker's return, and Secretary agreed that Defense group could visit Panama in early September. Rogers discussed Defense desire to play larger role in negotiations. Secretary stated that he would not permit DOD reps to be on negotiating team because of larger considerations related to such a step. Rogers promised Secretary a memorandum on subject.

pp. 13-16 CSCE implementation on maneuvers. Armitage discussed situation with respect to Autumn Forge series of NATO exercises. Secretary agreed with Hyland-Lord view that maneuvers should be notified. Armitage promised memorandum on subject.

p. 17 Secretary said that Somali Ambassador should have appointment with President in order to deliver message from President Siad.

pp 17-20 Rhodesian situation. Mulcahy gave status report on prospective negotiations and South African interest in settlement.

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pp 21-28 Articles in press (e.g., Zumwalt) re allegations of Soviet SALT violations. Hyland suggested possibility of classified "white paper" for selected Congressmen. Secretary approved idea of paper and requested that it deal with origin of agreement as well as question of violations. Secretary said he would not testify before Senator Jackson, but was willing to appear before Morgan.

pp 29-31 Indian situation. Atherton discussed reimposition of pre-censorship and resultant problem for VOA correspondent. Secretary agreed that correspondent should be withdrawn quietly in event of pre-censorship. Secretary requested NEA to get Prime Minister Chavan's visit dates changed to avoid conflict with Japanese Emperor's visit.

pp 31-34 Sitreps by Buffum on Vietnam UN membership issue, Israeli UN expulsion question, and North Korean UN resolution. Habib discussed North Korean desire to negotiate peace treaty with US, noting US requirements that South Koreans and Chinese be included.

pp 35-38 Secretary's speech at UN Special Session. Secretary requested from Enders, by end of day, listing of unresolved issues and general outline of speech. (Needed for discussions with President at Vail.)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Indonesia

Unsigned

## I. PURPOSE

Your Jakarta visit will be a dramatic reaffirmation of the significance we attach to our relations with Indonesia, the largest and most important non-Communist Southeast Asian state and a significant Third World country. In our relations with Indonesia we are seeking to move progressively away from a donor-client relationship and from preoccupation with aid issues toward ties that stress a broader sharing of interests and views. Your visit offers an excellent opportunity to encourage a more mature dialogue with the Indonesian leadership on issues of importance to us and less focused on our aid relationship.

A key mechanism for moving this process forward will be the Joint US-Indonesian Consultative Commission first agreed upon during your Camp David meeting with Suharto, on July 5. We expect that a formal announcement of the Commission's formation can be made during your brief visit, which provides an occasion to make the announcement under the most auspicious circumstances. We expect the Indonesians to welcome this step.

As a result of the Camp David meeting, Suharto is more confident of the steadiness of our commitment to our friends in Asia and our close ties with Indonesia in particular. At the same time, the Camp David meeting may have given the

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Indonesian side an overly optimistic impression of our ability to assist Indonesian development and security programs and an inadequate appreciation of the growing constraints that are acting to depress US aid levels everywhere. Your visit can be helpful in alerting Suharto to the likelihood of a declining US aid level and making him understand the reasons.

Our goal now is to encourage Indonesia's sense of self-reliance, commensurate with its importance to the region, and to focus our dialogue increasingly on broader issues of continuing major interest of the two governments:

- The US role and US interests in East Asia, both for their own sake and to balance Soviet and PRC pressures;

- Indonesia's perceptions of its place in Southeast Asia against this broader backdrop;

- Indonesia's importance in North-South and other multilateral issues and our growing efforts to make a constructive contribution on such issues;

- Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia;

- And our increasingly varied and close bilateral relations.

## II. BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

In the post-Vietnam environment, U.S. interests in Indonesia are based both on its present position in the region and, especially, on its anticipated future role. Indonesia, the fifth most populous nation in the world, is more than three times the size of any other Southeast Asian country and includes within its border about half the region's total population. It is potentially one of the richest. Its geographic location and resources are of major strategic importance in the region. Flanking the Southeast Asian mainland, Indonesia controls the sea passages between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including

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Japan's life line to Middle East oil; its own oil fields provides a significant portion of Japan's oil consumption and a small but increasing part of our own oil imports. Its other major resources -- rubber, tin and tropical products -- are also of some significance to the United States.

On the international scene, Indonesia under Suharto has sought to carve out for itself a somewhat unique diplomatic position as an anti-Communist but non-aligned country capable of carrying on a dialogue with both radical "third world" states and the west while cautiously pursuing policies generally compatible with the latter. The government's desire not to offend politicized Moslem elements in Indonesia, however, influences it to side with the Arab states on certain issues, such as zionism; moreover, it values highly its membership in OPEC and supports OPEC actions, although it has never played a very active role at OPEC meetings.

Within the region, Indonesia is generally recognized as "first among equals" in the five-nation Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and increasingly regards the organization as the cornerstone of its regional policies.

Realization of Indonesia's potential is hampered by severe domestic problems and by economic backwardness which even its increased oil revenues have scarcely begun to overcome. Because of the Suharto Government's decision in the late 1960s to favor economic development over military preparedness, Indonesia's armed forces are poorly equipped and inadequately supplied. At best, it will be years before Indonesia can play a significant regional security role. The speed with which Indochina fell upset Suharto's calculations that Indonesia would have an extended grace period to develop its internal strength before confronting a communist threat from the north. To meet the changed situation following the loss of Indochina, President Suharto appears to have become, if anything, even more convinced in the months since your meeting at Camp David that Indonesia's policies must be based on the maintenance of close ties with the United States -- although not to the extent that its non-aligned image is tarnished.

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### III. US-INDONESIA JOINT COMMISSION

A key aspect of our strategy for the visit will be the announcement of the formation of a Joint US-Indonesia Consultative Commission. The announcement should specify that its first meeting is to be held in Washington next spring. Although the Indonesians have clearly intended that the first meeting be held in Jakarta, your visit and the fact that the announcement itself is being made in Jakarta should help us persuade the Indonesians to agree to Washington as the venue.

As worked out with the Indonesians, the Commission's purpose will be to broaden the range of our consultations with the Indonesian Government on major issues -- the latter to include cooperative programs in various fields, although the Commission will not actually negotiate programs or supervise their execution. The two co-chairmen will be Foreign Minister Malik and Secretary Kissinger, with representation on our side to include Treasury, Defense and such other agencies (AID, for example, or Commerce) as may be indicated by the agenda topics. The Commission is being created for renewable two-year terms and will meet annually, alternating between the two capitals. It will be supported by informally constituted subcommissions, initially a Joint Economic Subcommission and a Joint Security Subcommission, which will meet annually and be chaired on the U.S. side at the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level.

In discussing the Commission with Suharto, you may wish to stress the following points:

- We are especially pleased that agreement has been reached on establishing the Commission, and we look forward to the first meeting in the Spring.

- We see it as a most useful device for broadening the range of consultation and cooperation between our two countries and, on our side, as an indicator of the special importance we attach to our ties with Indonesia.

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## IV. ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

### 1. Indonesia and the People's Republic of China

Of all the non-communist Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has remained the most cautious about establishing (or in Indonesia's case, re-establishing) relations with Peking. Many Indonesians believe the PRC was behind the 1965 communist coup attempt and are highly skeptical of PRC pledges of non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors. They see their problem complicated by a sizeable Chinese minority in Indonesia (more than three million). Although Indonesia will probably normalize its relations with the PRC eventually, opinions differ within the GOI as to how quickly to proceed.

Suharto will be looking forward to your comments on your discussions with the Chinese and will be curious about our own plans for normalization with the PRC. You may wish to pass on any insights gained from your talks in Peking on Chinese intentions towards Southeast Asia (a topic in which Suharto will be keenly interested), while avoiding any appearance of advising the Indonesians on how they should handle their own relations with China. It is not in our interest to push Indonesia toward the PRC.

### 2. US-Soviet Detente

Indonesia's relations with the USSR are correct but wary. The GOI seeks aid from the Soviet bloc and receives a small quantity. (Aid from the USSR itself, terminated in 1965, will be resumed with a $100 million Soviet credit for hydroelectric projects announced in November 1975). The GOI, however, remains innately suspicious of Soviet intentions. Especially in the context of your comments on China, Suharto may inquire briefly about detente. He will be seeking primarily a reassurance that we, too, are careful to keep our guard up in dealings with Moscow.

### 3. Indonesia's Regional Policies

Indonesia's answer to the potential threat by a communist Indochina is to build up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN - pronounced AH-see-an) as a cohesive regional organization (but without provoking Hanoi by portraying it as a defensive alliance); to encourage

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greater "national resilience" in each of the ASEAN countries; to step up its own defenses without diverting excessive resources from its economic development programs; to hold out a wary hand to Hanoi and Saigon (both of whom it recognizes) as an inducement to choose cooperation rather than confrontation with their non-communist neighbors; and to persuade the U.S. to maintain its presence in the region, especially in the form of "over the horizon" forces. As he did at Camp David, Suharto will want to acquaint you with his views of the region, Indonesia's position therein, and perhaps how he envisages the U.S. role. He will probably express concern about Malaysia's growing internal security problems (see below) and possibly about Thailand's as well.

## Your Talking Points

- We welcome Indonesia's lead in developing regional cooperation, particularly through ASEAN. In our view, ASEAN represents an encouraging and constructive Southeast Asian effort to work toward regional self-reliance and security.

- We recognize that ASEAN is, and must remain, an organization of the Southeast Asian states themselves. We want to cooperate both with ASEAN's member countries and with ASEAN itself in way that ASEAN states find useful, but we look to ASEAN itself to give the lead in determining the extent and nature of our cooperation.

- For our part, we intend to maintain an effective presence in the region. We will honor our treaty commitments and we are determined to maintain our close ties with friends such as Indonesia.

- (If Suharto asks) We intend to retain our bases in the Philippines and certain facilities in Thailand with the agreement of the governments concerned.

SECRET

NARA Date 10/1/61

By WSP

WD979508

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LCS

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4. The Malaysian Insurgency

The Indonesians profess great concern over the situa-
tion in Malaysia, where the chronic communist insurgency
has become appreciably more active in the past year.
Indonesia sees this as an opportunity for the Vietnamese
Communist regimes to open a new and (for Indonesia)
dangerous front by moving in with material support for
the insurgents. While Malaysia is among their closest
friends, the Indonesians fault the Malaysian Government
for failing to take the domestic measures Jakarta be-
lieves necessary to minimize the threat -- particularly
an easing of the legal and economic discrimination that
favors the Malay plurality (44%) at the expense of the
wealthier Chinese minority (38%). The Indonesians have
some justification for their concern, but we believe
their fears exaggerated. They are also concerned, but
less immediately, with the insurgent threat to Thailand.

Your Talking Points (if raised by the Indonesians)

-- We share Indonesia's concern over developments that could give the communists an opening to support subversion in the ASEAN region. Thailand and Malaysia appear particularly vulnerable in this regard. We hope that Indonesia, as Malaysia's close friend will help with advice and counsel.

-- For our part, we sent a small military team to both Malaysia and Singapore at the request of those governments to discuss defense equipment needs. We are helping both governments in selecting military equipment and are planning to offer Malaysia credit (about $15 million) for some of the purchases the year.

5. <u>US Security Assistance to Indonesia</u>

At Camp David President Suharto expressed concern to
you about the potential threat of arms smuggled from the
north to support insurgencies in Indonesia's neighbors and
eventually in Indonesia itself. He sought our cooperation
in reviewing Indonesia's equipment requirements.

SECRET

NARA Dukung Pekan

By WDP

Authority
WWD979508

DECLASSIFIED

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## 6. North-South Economic Issues

Indonesia supports restructuring the world economy to bring greater equilibrium between rich and poor countries, but prefers to deal with practical questions rather than ideological confrontation. The Indonesians responded favorably to the U.S. "comprehensive" speech at the UNGA Special Session, but remain skeptical about our willingness to fulfill our promises and differ with us on such fundamental issues as our reliance on market forces to bring about changes in world economic structure. They dislike our criticism of OPEC and the non-aligned.

Indonesia exerts a moderating influence among Third World and OPEC countries. A sustained dialogue with Indonesian leaders could narrow the gap between our differing views of the policies best suited to improve the economic position of the Third World. Indonesian leaders have to be persuaded about the sincerity of U.S. North-South policies. At the same time they should be aware that U.S. domestic public support is essential for policies to benefit the developing countries and that several recent third world actions, particularly in the UN, have endangered that support.

### Your Talking Points

- We sympathize with the Third World desire to bring a better equilibrium between the developed and developing countries, and we also recognize Indonesia's commitment to this goal.

- We have demonstrated the seriousness with which we propose to deal with these issues. Secretary Kissinger's speech to the UNGA Special Session contained more than 30 proposals covering trade, commodities, agriculture, finance, and technology. Many of them should be of particular benefit to Indonesia.

- In some areas we may differ on how best to pursue North-South objectives. We think market forces have a key role to play, for example, and their exclusion leads only to inefficiencies and dislocations.

SECRET

NARA Dakei 10/6

By WSP

Declassified
Authority
WD 979508

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We believe both producer and consumer interests should be taken into account in discussing commodity policies.

-- If we deal with the specifics of these issues we should be able to narrow our differences and reach practical solutions. We hope to discuss these matters with Indonesian policy makers in all appropriate fora: The Joint Commission, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation and elsewhere.

-- Indonesia should also be aware of our political problems in this area. We need the support of the U.S. public to pursue policies to benefit the developing countries. We would welcome Indonesia's help in discouraging Third World positions which can only erode U.S. public support for a forthcoming U.S. posture.

7. Energy Issues

The Indonesians place considerable emphasis on solidarity with OPEC. Nevertheless they have played a passive moderate role at OPEC meetings and during the latest round kept their price increases significantly below those of other OPEC countries. They did not participate in the Arab oil embargo. The United States accounts for the bulk of Indonesia's oil investment (about 86%) and an increasing amount (about 11%) of our crude oil imports are from Indonesia.

There are two energy related issues which the Indonesians could raise in discussions: (a) Indonesian mandatory exclusion (as a member of OPEC) from the 1974 Trade Act benefits and (b) their hope for a favorable FPC ruling which would permit the GOI to go ahead with a major project to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) to California.

Your Talking Points (if the subject is raised)

-- We have noted Indonesia's recent decision to hold its oil price increases below that sanctioned by OPEC. We have also appreciated Indonesia's moderate stance in other issues relating to OPEC. But we believe that in the long run Indonesia stands to gain most from increasing production and sales.

SECRET

NARA DAI

By WMD

WMD979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

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-- The Federal Power Commission will be taking up the Indonesian LNG case in the very near future. Meanwhile, the Administration's Energy Resources Council will be working toward decisions on our overall energy policies, including the question of LNG imports. While we cannot foretell what these decisions will be, we are very much aware of Indonesia's interest in LNG.

-- We favor Congressional action to enable Indonesia to become eligible to receive those tariff preferences conferred by the 1974 Trade Act. However, Congressional concern over OPEC policies will make this difficult.

## 8. US Economic Aid to Indonesia

At Camp David President Suharto emphasized that "Indonesia's most important need was economic rather than military", reflecting the realistic Indonesian view that domestic socio-economic and political problems are the chief threat to the country's stability. Particularly on Java, where 80 million people are already as densely crowded as anywhere on earth, unemployment and grinding poverty are endemic. Compounding Suharto's political problems are signs that despite ten years of development under the "New Order" the gap between the rich and poor is growing, while corruption and maladministration remain widespread.

In response to Suharto's comments at Camp David, you expressed your intention to increase aid to Indonesia. Subsequently you proposed to the Congress an additional $20 million in loans for Indonesia, bringing the total proposed U.S. assistance package of $85 million for FY-1976. (Japan this year is providing almost twice as much, while the other members of the Indonesia aid consortium are providing roughly $230 million). Prospects for future U.S. economic assistance are less clear since there are proposals now under interagency review which could cut our aid significantly as part of worldwide budgetary reductions.

## Your Talking Points

-- We fully recognize Indonesia's continuing need for developmental assistance. We have asked Congress for $20 million in additional development loans to Indonesia this year for a total of more than $80 million in aid, the biggest single increase we have proposed this year for any Asian country.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By WPD

WVD79508

NARA No. 1064

SECRET

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-- We intend, within Congressional limits, to maintain a meaningful aid contribution to Indonesia. At the same time, Indonesia should not gauge U.S. interest in Indonesia solely by bilateral aid levels.

-- Private foreign investment can become an increasingly important source of capital and technology for Indonesia's economic growth. We hope your Government will actively continue to encourage the foreign investor.

-- We also hope that Indonesia will support our proposals at the UNGA Special Session to protect developing countries against cycles in their export earnings, to provide them with better access to western capital and to expand international facilities to finance development, to promote the transfer of technology, and to achieve an international consensus governing relations between trans-national enterprises and governments.

## 9. Indonesia and the UN

Indonesia walks a tightrope in its UNGA voting, maintaining a show of solidarity with the non-aligned majority while attempting to avoid too frequent opposition to the U.S. and the West. This is reflected in abstentions and behind-the-scene efforts at compromise. In 1974 Indonesia worked hard to defend the seat of the Lon Nol delegation. The 1975 record has been mixed: On Korea Indonesia voted for the friendly resolution and abstained on the hostile one; on Zionism, however, it voted with the majority, to some extent because of internal political considerations arising from the pressure of Moslem political parties in Indonesia.

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## Your Talking Points

- Despite the continued tendency of the UNGA non-aligned majority to use its voting strength irresponsibly, we are making every effort to avoid acrimonious confrontations.

- We understand Indonesia's dilemma in wanting to avoid taking issue with the non-aligned majority, and we appreciate Indonesia's support when we receive it.

- If the UN is to retain its importance, however, greater realism and consideration for the actual issues must be injected into the UNGA. It is in the interest of major countries such as Indonesia to ensure that the UN acts more effectively and responsibly. If every country voted forthrightly for what it actually believed, the extremists in the UN would find themselves a small minority.

## 10. Indonesia and the Law of the Sea

Indonesia has long sought international recognition of the archipelago principle, under which all waters within the Indonesian archipelago would be under extensive Indonesian control. We have not accepted the principle, but we have indicated that we could accept an objectively defined archipelago as part of an over-all Law of the Sea treaty which effectively guarantees our transit and over-flight rights through both archipelagos and international straits. After over two years of negotiation, we have narrowed our differences with Indonesia. We are prepared to resume bilateral discussions with the GOI on this subject whenever the Indonesians wish. A short while ago they expressed a desire for bilateral talks, but most recently seem to have backed away again.

## Your Talking Points (if raised by the Indonesians)

- We understand Indonesia's position on the archipelago question.

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WMD 979508

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-- The United States can accept the archipelago principle in the Law of the Sea negotiations as part of a comprehensive treaty protecting our interests in transit through and over archipelagoes and international straits.

-- We are willing to continue detailed law of the sea consultations with Indonesia to find a mutually acceptable solution to this important problem.

## 11. Indonesia and Human Rights

The human rights problem in Indonesia concerns about 35,000 suspected communists still under detention from the 500,000 or so arrested in the chaotic months following the attempted communist coup of September 1965. Held without trial or in many cases formal changes, these detainees have attracted a good deal of world (and Congressional) attention and criticism of Indonesia.

The Indonesians recognize the issue as a serious problem and are troubled by the criticism. They feel themselves in a dilemma. However, they are convinced the wholesale release of the detainees would lead to civil strife and a recrudescence of the Indonesian Communist Party.

We have frequently discussed the issue with the GOI in a quiet, non-accusatory manner, seeking to speed resolution of the problem, and we have alerted them to the human rights provisions of our aid legislation. The Indonesians have been responsive. During a recent US visit by a high level Indonesian delegation headed by General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto's close advisors, the group raised the issue with Members of Congress and told them that they plan to step up the phased release of more detainees.

We believe it would be helpful if you raised this issue in a low key.

### Your Talking Points

-- The matter of the detainees in Indonesia has attracted a good deal of attention and concern in the U.S. and has affected Congressional and public attitudes toward Indonesia.

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NARA Date 10/4/64

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-- The Congress has placed human rights restrictions on both economic and security assistance legislation which could make implementation of these programs more difficult. We understand that the delegation led by General Murtopo (Moor-TOE-poh) discussed this constructively with Members of Congress.

-- Indonesia's release of about 1,500 detainees during the past year and the implementation of what we understand are present plans for the phased release of more detainees has already had a favorable impact on Congress and the U.S. public.

12. Indonesia and Portuguese Timor

Indonesia was content to leave in Portuguese hands the small colony (600,000 people) that shares with Indonesia the island of Timor. With the dismantling of the Portuguese empire, however, Jakarta has become concerned that the backward and resource-poor colony would attain what the Indonesians expect would be a weak, unviable in-dependence leaving it susceptible to outside -- especially Chinese -- domination.

For about a year Jakarta has been maneuvering to absorb the colony through negotiations with Lisbon and covert military operations within the colony itself, showing considerable restraint. A small scale civil war between quarreling Timorese parties has opened the way to wider Indonesian intervention in support of pro-Indonesian factions. Portugal, meanwhile, has almost completely lost control of the colony.

A merger with Indonesia is probably the best solution for the colony if the inhabitants agree. Indonesia use of US-supplied weapons in an overt occupation of the territory, however, would contravene U.S. law. We have quietly pointed this out to the GOI, and it appears to have been a restraining factor.

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NARA Dukung 10/4

By W.D.

W.D. 979508

Authority

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

INDONESIA AND PORTUGUESE TIMOR

Portuguese Timor is a small (population 600,000) hitherto neglected Portuguese colony occupying half the island of Timor. The other half is Indonesian territory. The inhabitants of the two halves are ethnically indistinguishable, although centuries under separate rule have created social and cultural differences. Indonesia does not claim the colony, and the Suharto government has been content to leave it indefinitely in Portuguese hands. The GOI does, however, look with concern at the idea of an independent Portuguese Timor, fearing that its backwardness and lack of economic viability would open it to pervasive outside -- especially Chinese -- influence which could spread into Indonesia.

Background

A small scale civil war broke out between rival political parties in Portuguese Timor last August. Unable to restore order, the Portuguese evacuated their remaining citizens and moved their administration to a small offshore island. Fretilin, a vaguely leftist party favoring early independence, quickly gained ascendency when it won the support (and the weapons) of the 2,000-odd Timorese soldiers from the disbanded Portuguese garrison. The Indonesians, however, have trained and equipped units from the two main rival parties and sent them back into Portuguese Timor with a stiffening of disguised Indonesian special forces troops. The latter have been pressing Fretilin back toward Dili, the capital. Latest reports indicate that hostilities have decreased while the pro-Indonesian forces consolidate their position.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, meeting recently in Rome with his Portuguese counterpart, obtained the latter's agreement to a statement reasserting Portugal's responsibility for the territory and calling for a conference between the Timorese parties and the Portuguese to end the fighting and resume the "orderly" process of decolonization disrupted last August. The statement favors Indonesia, in that it refutes Fretilin's claim to control of the territory and has Fretilin outnumbered in a conference by the two rival parties now under de facto Indonesian control.

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS

CONFIDENTIAL

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Current Situation

Preoccupied with the crisis at home and with their focus on colonial problems limited to agonizing over Angola, Portugal's chief interest is to get out gracefully, leaving behind a semblance of order on which legal factions can agree. The Portuguese have called a conference of the three main Timorese parties, suggesting Darwin as the site. None of the three parties have rejected the proposal, but there is disagreement and bickering over the location.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian UN Mission has circulated a policy statement emphasizing Portugal's continuing responsibility for "orderly decolonization" of Timor, calling for an act of self-determination by the "entire people", pledging to abide by the outcome, and welcoming them to "become independent through integration with Indonesia" if they wish. In a passage aimed at Fretilin, the statement declared that "Indonesia cannot accept a solution imposed by any party through armed force".

Prognosis

A Portuguese sponsored conference of the three main Timorese parties (assuming it is eventually held) could result in a cease-fire call and perhaps a token return of the Portuguese administration to Dili, although an actual restoration of Portuguese authority seems most unlikely. Although the Indonesians would probably give a cease-fire their public blessing, we expect that they will keep up their clandestine pressure on Fretilin until the party is defeated or breaks up. The GOI has displayed patience and some subtlety in its efforts to date, however, and will try to reach its objective with minimum outside impact.

U.S. Interest

We have taken the position that the U.S. should eschew involvement in the Timor situation and leave its resolution to the Indonesians, Portuguese, Australians and Timorese themselves. There are no present calls for our involvement, with the parties concerned in direct touch with each other and none seeking our help.

A particular concern for us has been the possibility of an overt Indonesian military move into the territory, inevitably using US-supplied weapons in the process. We have brought the matter quietly to the attention of the Indonesian leaders, however, and this has been a major factor in restraining Jakarta to date.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORD/KISSINGER - SUHARTO

DECEMBER - 6, 1976

Suharto: I would like to speak to you, Mr. President, about another problem, Timor. When it looked as if the Portuguese rule would end in Timor we sought to encourage the Portuguese to an orderly decolonization process. We had agreement with them on such a process and we recognized the authority of Portugal in carrying out of decolonization and in giving people the right to express their wishes. Indonesia has no territorial ambitions. We are concerned only about the security, tranquility and peace of Asia and the southern hemisphere. In the latest Rome agreement the Portuguese government wanted to invite all parties to negotiate. Similar efforts were made before but Fretelin did not attend. After the Fretelin forces occupied certain points and other forces were unable to consolidate, Fretelin has declared its independence unilaterally. In consequence other parties declared their intention of integrating with Indonesia.

Portugal reported the situation to the United Nations but did not extend recognition to Fretelin. Portugal, however, is unable to control the situation. If this continues it will prolong the suffering of the refugees and increase the instability in the area.

Ford: The four other parties have asked for integration?

Suharto: Yes. After the UDT, Indonesia found itself facing a fate accompli. It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and order for the present and the future in the interest of the security of the area and Indonesia. These are some of the considerations we are now contemplating. We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.

Ford: We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have.

Kissinger: You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems.

Ford: We could have technical and legal problems. You are familiar, Mr. President, with the problems we had on Cyprus although this situation is different.

Kissinger: It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return.

There would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way. The President will be back on Monday at 2:00pm Jakarta time. We understand

your problem and the need to move quickly but I am
only saying that it would be better if it were done
after we returned.

Ford: It would be more authoritative if we can do it
in person.

Kissinger: Whatever you do, however, we will try to
handle it in the best way possible.

Ford: We recognize that you have a time factor. We
have merely expressed our view from our particular
point of view.

Kissinger: If you have made plans, we will do our
best to keep everyone quiet until the President
returns home.

____: Do you anticipate a long guerrilla war there?

Suharto: There will probably be a small guerrilla
war. The local kings are important, however, and
they are on our side. The UDT represents former
government officials and Fretelin represents former
soldiers. They are infected the same as is the
Portuguese army with communism.

Discussion turns to other issues.

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1. FOLLOWING IS MEMCON OF MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT SUHARTO IN JAKARTA DECEMBER 6. ALSO PRESENT WERE SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER, FOREIGN MINISTER MALIK, MINISTER OF STATE SUDHARMONO, AMEMBASSADOR NEWSOM, AND AN INTERPRETER.

2. SUHARTO-I WISH TO EXPRESS MY THANKS AND VERY GREAT APPRECIATION FOR YOUR WILLINGNESS, MR PRESIDENT, TO ACCEPT MY INVITATION TO VISIT INDONESIA. ALTHOUGH THE VISIT IS VERY SHORT, I BELIEVE IT WILL BE MOST USEFUL. THE PROMOTION OF PERSONAL CONTACTS BETWEEN US IS IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT FOR BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES.

3. FORD-MY DELEGATION IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL, MR PRESIDENT, FOR THE SPLENDID ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VISIT. I REGRET THAT THE TIME IS SHORT BUT AFTER ELECTIONS, I HOPE TO COME BACK AGAIN FOR A LONGER PERIOD. THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUCH FACE TO FACE MEETINGS IS ALSO HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR ME. THE CONFIDENCE ESTABLISHED THROUGH SUCH MEETINGS IS IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR POLICIES. I CONSIDERED THE MEETING AT KAMP DAVID TO BE MOST FRUITFUL AND I AM CERTAIN THAT THIS CURRENT VISIT

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WILL EVEN FURTHER ENHANCE OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO CONTINUE A STRONG INTEREST IN AND INFLUENCE IN THE PACIFIC, SOUTHEST ASIA AND ASIA. AS A WHOLE, WE HOPE TO EXPAND THIS INFLUENCE DESPITE THE SEVERE SETBACK OF VIETNAM. OUR COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS ARE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE POLICIES.

4. AS YOU KNOW, I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM CHINA WHERE WE HAD DISCUSSIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND AN IN DEPTH REVIEW OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO THE EXPANSION OF ANY NATION OR COMBINATION OF COUNTRIES. WE HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. WE VALUE OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA AND RESPECT YOUR REGIONAL AND NON-ALIGNED RELATIONSHIPS.

5. SUHARTO-WHAT ARE YOUR IMPRESSIONS OF CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA AFTER VIETNAM?

6. FORD-THEY WILL VIGOROUSLY EXPANSIONISM. BY OTHERS INTO ASIA. IN THIS THEY THINK PARTICULARLY OF THE USSR. THEY DON'T APPEAR TO HAVE AMBITIONS OF THEIR OWN.

7. KISSINGER-WE BELIEVE THAT CHINA DOES NOT HAVE EXPANSIONIST AIMS NOW. WE CANNOT PREDICT WHAT THE SITUATION WILL BE IN FIVE YEARS. RIGHT NOW THEIR FIRST CONCERN IS THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR SECOND VIETNAM.

8. FORD-I HAD THE IMPRESSION OF A RRESTRAINED CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY LARGELY DIRECTED AT MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF RUSSIA AND VIETNAM.

9. SUHARTO-AT CAMP DAVID WE DISCUSSED THE QUESTION OF UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM. THAT SEEMS NOW TO BE MOVING AHEAD. LAOS AND CAMBODIA SEEM ALREADY UNDER VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE. DOES THE UNITED STATES BELIEVE THE THREE WILL BE INCORPORATED INTO ONE COUNTRY?

10. FORD-THE UNIFICATION OF VIETNAM HAS COME MORE QUICKLY THAN WE ANTICIPATED. THERE IS, HOWEVER, RESISTANCE IN CAMBODIA TO THE INFLUENCE OF HANOI. WE ARE WILLING

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TO MOVE SLOWLY IN OUT RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA, HOPING
PERHAPS TO SLOW DOWN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INFLUENCE
ALTHOUGH WE FIND THE CAMBOODIAN GOVERNMENT VERY DIFFICULT.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS IS DISTURBING AND APPEARS TO DE-
MONSTRATE AN ACCELERATED INTEREST ON THE PART OF NOTTH
VIETNAM.

11. KISSINGER-IT IS INTERESTING THAT IN LAOS SOUVANNAVONG IS NOW IN A SUBORDINATE POSITION. THE CHINESE WANT TO USE CAMBODIA TO BALANCE OFF VIETNAM AND ARE KEEPING TROOPS IN CONNECTION WITH ROAD BUILDING IN THE NORTH. WE DON'T LIKE CAMBODIA, FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN MANY WAYS IS WORSE THAN VIETNAM, BUT WE WOULD LIKE IT TO BE INDEPENDENT. WE DON'T DISCOURAGE THAILAND OR CHINA FROM DRAWING CLOSER TO CAMBODIA.

12. SUHARTO-THE FACT REMAINS THAT SIHANOUK, DESPITE SUPPORT FROM CHINA, HAS NO AUTHORITY AND THE KHMER ROUGE LEADERSHIP IS CLOSER TO HANOI. THEY ARE GUIDED BY THE WILL OF HO CHI MINH.

13. KISSINGER-LE OOC THO USED TO TELL ME THAT THEIR AMBITION WAS ALL OF INDOCHINA AFTER WHICH THEY WOULD PROCEED TO TAKE OVER SOUTHEAST ASIA.

14. SUHARTO-IN RECENT POWER POLITICS THE THREE INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES ARE TRYING TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM THE BIG POWERS AND BECOME MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. CAMBODIA AND LAOS ARE MEMBERS ALTHOUGH HANOI IS NOT YET A MEMBER. THIS CAN CAUSE NEW PROBLEMS FOR THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT. SEVERAL COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. NOW WANT TO BE NON-ALIGNED. YUGOSLAVIA, CUBA AND ROMANIA ARE EXAMPLES. NOW AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES THERE ARE NO CONSISTENT POLICIES AND NO SOLID BLOC.

15. ONE OF INDONESIA'S MAIN CONCERNS IS THE DANGER FROM INDOCHINA WHETHER THERE IS ONE STATE OR THREE. THIS DANGER APPLIES TO ALL OF THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

16. FORD-FROM PAST HISTORY IT IS CLEAR THAT INDOCHINA
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OF OPINION. THAILAND AND MALAYSIA, WITH A COMMON BORDER WITH INDOCHINA, SAW NO IMMEDIATE THREAT AND WANTED TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH HANOI. INDONESIA ADVISED THEM THAT EVEN THROUGH THERE WAS NO PHYSICAL THREAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THERE WAS AN ABSENCE OF DANGER. THE LOCAL INSURGENCES REPRESENT A GREATER DANGER THAN WOULD AN OVERT PHYSICAL THREAT. THE ASEAN LEADERS HAVE NOW CONCLUDED THAT THE INSURGENT ELEMENTS HAVE STEPPED UP THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE ASEAN LEADERS WILL SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR ACTION IN THE FORTHCOMING ASEAN SUMMIT. THE AGENDA WILL INCLUDE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS AS WELL AS SECURITY.

18. ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL RESILIENCE. IT IS IMPORTANT TO COOPERATE CLOSERLY TOGETHER SO THAT NO COUNTRY IS A WEAK LINK. IN THIS CONNECTION THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WISHED TO TAKE A COMMON STAND ON TRADE RELATIONS AND AVOID COMPETITION AMONG THEMSELVES. A RELATIONSHIP NOW EXISTS WITH THE EEC AND CONSULTATIONS ARE CONDUCTED THROUGH A SPECIAL COMMITTEE CALLED SCAN. INDONESIA WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIONS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS BY ASEAN WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES. HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED. INDONESIA IS THE LEADER OF THE GROUP TALKING WITH THE EEC AND THE PHILIPPINES WILL BE THE LEADER OF THE GROUP IN DISCUSSIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. (THIS POINT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY CLARIFIED WITH GENERAL SUDHARMONO.)

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FORTRESSES. THIS REQUIRES SUBSTANTIAL SMALL ARMS, THAILAND AND INDONESIA ARE STUDYING THE MEANS OF PROVIDING SUCH ARMS. BOTH MALAYSIA AND THAILAND ARE INTERESTED IN SMALL ARMS PRODUCTION BUT FOR SECURITY REASONS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEE THIS PRODUCTION IN INDONESIA. WE WOULD LIKE TO BUILD A PLANT TO PRODUCE M-16 RIFLES, WOULD THE UNITED STATES CONSIDER ASSISTING IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SUCH A PLANT?

28. KISSINGER-WE WOULD FAVOR THIS AS A GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF ITS INDICATION OF WIDER COOPERATION.

29. FORD-WE WOULD BE MORE THAN SYMPATHETIC, WE WOULD BE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT SUCH A CONCEPT.

30. SUMARTO-WE ARE NOW TAKING FORMAL STEPS. HE LEADERSHIP ON THE PROJECT IS LEFT TO INDONESIA.

31. FORD-WE WERE NOT ANXIOUS TO WITHDRAW FROM THAILAND AS RAPIDLY AS THE THAIS WANTED.

32. KISSINGER-WE WILL KEEP UTAPAO AIR BASE.

33. FORD-WE ARE STILL IN THAILAND. WE ALSO HAVE HAD SOME CONTACTS WITH MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE ABOUT INCREASED MILITARY AID.

34. SUMARTO-INSURGENCY HAS NOW REACHED THE CAPITALS IN BOTH THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO FACE THIS INSURGENCY. FOR ONE THING, THERE ARE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN BOTH THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. THE RECIDUAL PROBELMS IN MALAYSIA ARE AN EXAMPLE. THE COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO SUBVERT BY CUTTING LINKS BETWEEN THE ASEAN COUNTRIES. THEY WANT TO CUT MALAYSIA FIRST.

35. FORD-WHERE ARE THE INSURGENTS COMING FROM?

36. SUMARTO-MAINLY FROM CHINA. 40 PCT OF THE POPULATION IN MALAYSIA ARE CHINESE. VIETNAM AND THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT STAND STILL IF THEY FEEL THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES IN MALAYSIA. WE NEED TO FORTIFY MALAYSIA BUT THIS IS NOT EASY TO DO BECAUSE OF THE CHINESE INFLUENCE IN MALAYSIA.

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THIS CAUSES GREAT CONCERN TO SINGAPORE WHICH WOULD BE IN DANGER IF MALAYSIA FELL. WE ARE CONCERNED BECAUSE IT WOULD BRING THE COMMUNISTS RIGHT TO OUR THRESHHOLE.

37. FORD-IS THAILAND THREATENED BY VEITNAM?

38. SUHARTO-YES. THERE IS A LONG HATRED BETWEEN THAILAND AND VIETNAM.

39. I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK TO YOU, MR PRESIDENT, ABOUT ANOTHER PRBelM, TIMOR. WHEN IT LOOKED AS IF THE PORTUGUESE RULE WOULD END IN TIMOR WE SOUGHT TO ENCOURAGE THE PORTUGUESE TO AN ORDERLY DECOLONIZATION PROCESS. WE HAD AGREEMENT WITH THEM ON SUCH A PROCESS AND WE RECOGNIZED THE AUTHORITY OF PORTUGAL IN THE CARRYING OUT OF DECOLONIZATION AND IN GIVING PEOPLE THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS THEIR WISHES. INDONESIA HAS NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS. WE ARE CONCERNED ONLY ABOUT THE SECURITY, TRANQUILITY AND PEACE OF ASIA AND THE SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE. IN THE LATEST ROME AGREEMENT THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WANTED TO INVITE ALL PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE. SIMILAR EFFORTS WERE MADE BEFORE BUT FRETELIN DID NOT ATTEND. AFTER THE

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FRETELIN FORCES OCCUPIED CERTAIN POINTS AND OTHER FORCES WERE UNABLE TO CONSOLIDATE, FRETELIN HAS DELARED ITS INDEPENDENCE UNILATERALLY. IN CONSEQUENCE OTHER PARTIES DECLARED THEIR INTENTION OF INTEGRATING WITH INDONESIA. PORTUGAL REPORTED THE SITUATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS BUT DID NOT EXTEND RECOGNITION TO FRETELIN. PORTUGAL, HOWEVER, IS UNABLE TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. IF THIS CONTINUES IT WILL PROLONG THE SUFFERING OF THE REFUGEES AND INCREASE THE INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.

40. FORD-THE FOUR OTHER PARTIES HAVE ASKED FOR INTEGRATION?

41. SUWARTO-YES, AFTER THE UDT, INDONESIA FOUND ITSELF FACING A FATE ACCOMPLI. IT IS NOW IMPORTANT TO TERMINE WHAT WE CAN DO TO ESTABLISH PEACE AND ORDER FOR THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE SECURITY OF THE AREA AND INDONESIA. THESE ARE SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS WE ARE NOW CONTEMPLATING. WE WANT YOUR UNDERSTANDING IF WE DEEM IT NECESSARY TO TAKE RAPID OR DRASTIC ACTION.

42. FORD-WE WILL UNDERSTAND AND WILL NOT PRESS YOU ON THE ISSUE. WE UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM YOU HAVE AND THE INTENTIONS YOU HAVE.

43. KISSINGER-YOU APPRECIATE THAT THE USE OF US-MADE ARMS COULD CREATE PROBLEMS.

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NATIONAL
DEFENSE
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RRM FORD-WE COULD HAVE TECHNICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS. YOU ARE FAMILIAR, MR PRESIDENT, WITH THE PROBLEMS WE HAD ON CYPRUS ALTHOUGH THIS SITUATION IS DIFFERENT.

45. KISSINGER-IT DEPENDS ON HOW WE CONSTRUE IT? WHETHER IT IS IN SELF DEFENSE OR IS A FOREIGN OPERATION. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WHATEVER YOU DO SUCCEEDS QUICKLY. WE WOULD BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE REACTION IN AMERICA IF WHATEVER HAPPENS HAPPENS AFTER WE RETURN. THIS WAY THERE WOULD BE LESS CHANCE OF PEOPLE TALKING IN AN UNAUTHORIZED WAY. THE PRESIDENT WILL BE BACK ON MONDAY AT 2:00 PM JAKARTA TIME. WE UNDERSTAND YOUR PROBLEM AND THE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY BUT I AM ONLY SAYING THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF IT WERE DONE AFTER WE RETURNED.

46. FORD-IT WOULD BE MORE AUTHORITATIVE IF WE CAN DO IT IN PERSON.

47. KISSINGER-WHATEVER YOU DO, HOWEVER, WE WILL TRY TO HANDLE IN THE BEST WAY POSSIBLE.

48. FORD-WE RECOGNIZE THAT YOU HAVE A TIME FACTOR. WE HAVE MERELY EXPRESSED OUR VIEW FROM OUR PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW.

49. KISSINGER-IF YOU HAVE MADE PLANS, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO KEEP EVERYONE QUIET UNTIL THE PRESIDENT RETURNS HOME.

50. DO YOU ANTICIPATE A LONG GUERILLA WAR THERE?

51. SUHARTO-THERE WILL PROBABLY BE A SMALL GUERILLA WAR. THE LOCAL KINGS ARE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, ADN THEY ARE ON OUR SIDE. THE UDT REPRESENTS FORMER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND FRETELIN REPRESENTS FORMER SOLDIERS. THEY ARE INFECTED THE SAME AS IS THE PORTUGUESE ARMY WITH COMMUNISM.

52. I WOULD LIKE TO SAY A WORD ABOUT TRADE RELATIONS. THERE ARE SEVERE ECONOMIC PRESSURES ON OUR COUNTRIES.

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WE MUST DO ALL WE CAN TO MAXIMIZE OUR INCOME. IN THIS CONNECTION THERE IS AN IMBALANCE OF PROFITS BETWEEN THE OIL COMPANIES OPERATING IN INDONESIA AND TOSE OPERATING IN THE MIDDLE EAST. INDOESIAN COMPANIES MAKE AS MUCH AS $2.50 A BAREL WHEREAS THE PROFITS IN THE MIDDLE EAST ARE UNDER $1.00 A BARREL.

53. FORD-ARE' THEY REINVESTING AND EXPANDING OPERATIONS?

54. SUHARTO-YES, WE DON'T WANT TO INTERFERE WITH THAT BUT WE BELIEVE THEY CAN STRETCH OUT THEIR PROFITS. WHAT WE DO SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS NATIONALIZATION. WE ARE SEEKING AN UNDERSTANDING AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDER WAY. PROSPECTS ARE ENCOURAGING. WE ALSO WANT THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE USG HOWEVER.

55. FORD-THEY SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THAT THEY ARE TREATED WELL HERE IN INDONESIA, MUCH BETTER THAN IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES. I HOPE THAT YOUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM WILL BE BENEFICIAL AND THAT THEY WILL SUPPORT YOUR EFFORT.

56. KISSINGER-OUR MAIN CONCERN IS THAT 'WHATEVER' YOU DO DOES NOT CREATE A CLIMATE THAT DISCOURAGES INVESTMENT. BASICALLY THE MATTER IS BETWEEN YOU AND THE COMPANIES. WE ARE NOT INVOLVED IN SUCH PROBLEMS.

57. SUHARTO-WE HAVE TAKEN THESE VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT AND EVERYTHING THAT WE DO WILL BE BASED ON EXISTING LAWS. WE WANT TO FIND WAY OF OBTAINING REVENUE WHICH WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE FAIR PROFITS FOR THE COMPANIES.

58. KISSINGER- WE APPRECIATE YOUR CLARIFICATION OF THIS MATTER.

59. FORD-LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT WE UNDERSTAND YOUR SITUATION, WE HAVE NO PARTICULAR RECOMMENDATIONS.

60. SUHARTO-ONCE MORE, I THANK YOU FOR THIS VISIT. WE ARE A COUNTRY THAT HAS MANY NEEDS AND WE CONTINUE TO LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES TO HELP US.

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Confiscated
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

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PAGE 04 JANUARY 14 1945 03-0F-03 061837Z

YQM FORC-WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN. OUR PROBLEM IS TO CON-
VICE CONGRESS WHERE WE HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTIES. ALTHOUGH
PROSPECTS MAY BE A LITTLE BETTER THAN WE HAD THOUGHT EARLIER.
ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE, WE ARE SEEKING TO OBTAIN THE MAXIMUM
AMOUNT WHICH IS IN THE VICINITY OF $80 MILLION THIS YEAR.
WE WILL ALSO TRY TO GET CONGRESS TO MODIFY THE TRADE ACT
WHICH EXCLUDES OPEC COUNTRIES FROM GENERALIZED PREFERENCES.
WE REALIZE THAT INDONESIA DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE OIL
EMBARGO. CONGRESS HAS, UNFORTUNATELY TREATED ALL OPEC
COUNTRIES IN THE SAME FASHION.

62. I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION ALSO, MR PRESIDENT, THAT I WANT TO MAINTAIN A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP. IF YOU HAVE ANYTHING SPECIAL, I HOPE YOU WILL COMMUNICATE WITH ME DIRECTLY BY WHATEVER MEANS SEEMS APPROPRIATE. NEWSOM

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CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

101

officials, bound by law, were likewise bound to conclude that United States aid to the generals in Jakarta would have to be cut off. Their memo summarizing this case was the cause of the tremendous internal row that is minuted below, in a declassified State Department transcript:

SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants:
The Secretary [Henry Kissinger]
Deputy Secretary [Robert] Ingersoll
Under Secretary [for Political Affairs Joseph] Sisco
Under Secretary [Carlyle] Maw
Deputy Under Secretary [Lawrence] Eagleburger
Assistant Secretary [Philip] Habib
Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker
Date: December 18, 1975
Subject: Department Policy

The Secretary [Kissinger]: I want to raise a little bit of hell about the Department's conduct in my absence. Until last week I thought we had a disciplined group; now we've gone to pieces completely. Take this cable on [East]Timor. You know my mind and attitude and anyone who knows my position as you do must know that I would not have approved it. The only consequence is to put yourself on record. It is a disgrace to treat the Secretary of State this way....

What possible explanation is there for it? I had told you to stop it quietly. What is your place doing, Phil, to let this happen? It is incomprehensible. It is wrong in substance and procedure. It is a disgrace. Were you here?

Habib: No.

...

102

THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

ug

**Habib:** Our assessment was that if it was going to be trouble, it would come up before your return. And I was told they decided it was desirable to go ahead with the cable.

[Kissinger]: Nonsense. I said do it for a few weeks and then open up again.

Habib: The cable will not leak.

[Kissinger]: Yes it will and it will go to Congress too and then we will have hearings on it.

Habib: I was away. I was told by cable that it had come up.

[Kissinger]: That means that there are two cables! And that means twenty guys have seen it.

Habib: No, I got it back-channel - it was just one paragraph double talk and cryptic so I knew what it was talking about. I was told that Leigh thought that there was a legal requirement to do it.

Leigh: No, I said it could be done administratively. It was not in our interest to do it on legal grounds.

Sisco: We were told that you had decided we had to stop.

[Kissinger]: Just a minute, just a minute. You all know my view on this. You must have an FSO-8 [Foreign Service Officer, Class Eight] who knows it well: It will have a devastating impact on Indonesia. There's this masochism in the extreme here. No one has complained that it was aggression.

Leigh: The Indonesians were violating an agreement with us.

[Kissinger]: The Israelis when they go into Lebanon - when was the last time we protested that?

Leigh: That's a different situation.

Maw: It is self-defense.

[Kissinger]: And we can't construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defense?

Leigh: Well...

[Kissinger]: Then you're saying that arms can't be used for defense?

Habib: No, they can be used for the defense of Indonesia.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS 103

[Kissinger]: Now take a look at this basic theme that is coming out on Angola. These SOBs are leaking all of this stuff to [New York Times reporter] Les Gelb.

Sisco: I can tell you who.

[Kissinger]: Who?

Sisco: [National Security Council member William] Hyland spoke to him.

[Kissinger]: Wait a minute - Hyland said...

Sisco: He said he briefed Gelb.

[Kissinger]: I want these people to know that our concern in Angola is not the economic wealth or a naval base. It has to do with the USSR operating 8,000 miles from home when all the surrounding states are asking for our help. This will affect the Europeans, the Soviets, and China.

On the Timor thing, that will leak in three months, and it will come out that Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law. How many people in L [the legal advisor's office] know about this? [italics added]

Leigh: Three.

Habib: There are at least two in my office.

[Kissinger]: Plus everybody in the meeting so you're talking about not less than 15 or 20. You have a responsibility to recognize that we are living in a revolutionary situation. Everything on paper will be used against me.

Habib: We do that and take account of that all the time.

[Kissinger]: Every day some SOB in the Department is carrying on about Angola but no one is defending Angola. Find me one quote in the Gelb article defending our policy in Angola.

Habib: I think the leaks and dissent are the burden you have to bear.

[Kissinger]: But the people in charge of this Department could have lacerated AF [Bureau for African Affairs].

104

THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

*Ingersoll:* I was told it came from up the river.

*Eagleburger:* No way.

*[Kissinger]*: Don't be ridiculous. It's quoted there. Read Gelb. Was
[Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William] Schaufele
called in and told to get his house under control? This is not minor
league stuff. We are going to lose big. The President says to the Chinese
that we're going to stand firm in Angola and two weeks later we get out.
I go to a NATO meeting and meanwhile the Department leaks that
we're worried about a naval base and says it's an exaggeration or aber-
ration of Kissinger's. I don't care about the oil or the base but I do care
about the African reaction when they see the Soviets pull it off and we
don't do anything. If the Europeans then say to themselves if they can't
hold Luanda, how can they defend Europe? The Chinese will say we're
a country that was run out of Indochina for 50,000 men and is now
being run out of Angola for less than $50m. Where were the meetings
here yesterday. Were there any?

*[Kissinger]*: It cannot be that our agreement with Indonesia says that the arms are for internal purposes only. I think you will find that it says that they are legitimately used for self-defense.

There are two problems. The merits of the case which you had a duty
to raise with me. The second is how to put these to me. But to put it into
a cable 30 hours before I return, knowing how cables are handled in this
building, guarantees that it will be a national disaster and that tran-
scends whatever [Deputy Legal Advisor George] Aldrich has in his
feverish mind.

I took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle
[Maw] not to make any new sales. How will the situation get better in
six weeks?

*Habib:* They may get it cleaned up by then.

*[Kissinger]*: The Department is falling apart and has reached the point
where it disobeys clear-cut orders.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS 105

**Habib:** We sent the cable because we thought it was needed and we thought it needed your attention. This was ten days ago.

[Kissinger]: Nonsense. When did I get the cable, Jerry?

Bremer: Not before the weekend. I think perhaps on Sunday.

[Kissinger]: You had to know what my view on this was. _No one who has worked with me in the last two years could not know what my view would be on Timor._ [italics added]

Habib: Well, let us look at it – talk to Leigh. There are still some legal requirements. I can't understand why it went out if it was not legally required.

[Kissinger]: Am I wrong in assuming that the Indonesians will go up in smoke if they hear about this?

Habib: Well, it's better than a cutoff. It could be done at a low level.

[Kissinger]: We have four weeks before Congress comes back. That's plenty of time.

Leigh: The way to handle the administrative cutoff would be that we are studying the situation.

[Kissinger]: And 36 hours was going to be a major problem?

Leigh: We had a meeting in Sisco's office and decided to send the message.

[Kissinger]: I know what the law is but how can it be in the US national interest for us to give up on Angola and kick the Indonesians in the teeth? Once it is on paper, there will be a lot of FSO-6s who can make themselves feel good who can write for the Open Forum Panel on the thing even though I will turn out to be right in the end.

Habib: The second problem on leaking of cables is different.

[Kissinger]: No it's an empirical fact.

Eagleburger: Phil, it's a fact. You can't say that any NODIS ["No Distribution": most restricted level of classification] cable will leak but you can't count on three to six months later someone asking for it [sic] in Congress. If it's part of the written record, it will be dragged out eventually.

106 THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

[Kissinger]: You have an obligation to the national interest. I don't care if we sell equipment to Indonesia or not. I get nothing from it, I get no rakeoff. But you have an obligation to figure out how to serve your country. The Foreign Service is not to serve itself. The Service stands for service to the United States and not service to the Foreign Service.

Habib: I understand that that's what this cable would do.

[Kissinger]: The minute you put this into the system you cannot resolve it without a finding.

Leigh: There's only one question. What do we say to Congress if we're asked?

[Kissinger]: We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January.

The delivery of heavy weapons for use against civilian objectives did indeed resume in January 1976, after a short interval in which Congress was misled as advertised. Nobody, it must be said, comes especially well out of this meeting; the Secretary's civil servants were anything but "pristine." Still it can be noted of Kissinger that, in complete contrast to his public statements, he:

1. Forebore from any mention of Goa.

2. Did not trouble to conceal his long-held views on the matter, berating his underlings for being so dense as not to know them.

3. Did not affect to be taken by surprise by events in East Timor.

4. Admitted that he was breaking the law.

5. Felt it necessary to deny that he could profit personally from the arms shipments, a denial for which nobody had asked him.

Evidently, there was a dialectic in Kissinger's mind between Angola and East Timor, both of them many miles from US or Russian borders but both seen as tests of his own dignity. (The "surrounding states" to which he alludes in the Angolan case were apartheid South Africa and General

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NAI D 989505
By MAF NARA Date 6/11/91

SEC-

19

MR. LEIGH: It's out of the question to say we're studying assistance.

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: That too. A loan is a loan in the Central Bank for Industrialization.

MR. ROBINSON: They're small businesses. It creates employment.

MR. ROGERS: This is a loan to the needy and it's no loan to us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, will it be defeated if we vote against it?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: Yes, I think it will.

MR. ROGERS: I'd like to call Collins and tell him about this. I think he's been getting the full signals from his Charge here with respect to Parsky, but I think I'll call Collins and Harry Greenwood.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Anything else, Harry?

MR. SHLAUDEMAN: No, sir.

MR. MILLER: Mr. Secretary, we have a troublesome, little problem on which we're seeking your decision on whether to accept an invitation to send a diplomatic representative at a Political Officer level with a diplomatic-observer group to accompany an

SECTION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 999505
By M.A. NARA Date 6/1/61

SEC

20

Indoensian Parliamentary Delegation to East Timor.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who's going?

MR. MILLER: We.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean which countries have accepted?

MR. MILLER: Well, as of now, practically no countries have accepted. All the EC 9 have turned it down. The UN Security Council President is going to turn it down; the Secretary-General of the UN will turn it down.

There will probably be a couple of ASEAN countries that will accept. Japan will probably accept if we accepted. Australia's position is not yet known. The last time, when it was a Provisional Government of East Timor invitation, the Australians decided at the last minute not to accept.

I think our general feeling here -- EUR, IO, and EA have sent you a memo to continue with L and H --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You're against it.

(Laughter.)

MR. MILLER: I think the common recommendation, sir, is that we -- since we would be quite isolated and since our participation would be rather high profile,

SEC

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 999505
by MAB NARA Date 6/1/91

SECRET

Reproduced at the National Arch...

LLOI

21

that we would recommend against accepting -- explaining to the Indonesians that we think we can obtain a broader base of support here in this country for, let's say, our broader objectives with respect to Indonesia -- including overall support to Timor, if we don't have high-profile participation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, how about low-profile participation?

MR. MILLER: Well, we would intend, at the most, to send only the Political Counselor. We would not send an Ambassador. On the other hand, it now looks like there will be very few countries that do participate. So I think that regardless of what level of officer we send, it will be fairly high.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Am I wrong in assuming if we don't send somebody there will be some story out of it showing its disapproval of the United States action in regard to Timor?

MR. HABIB: Some of the countries won't be going.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like who?

MR. HABIB: Singapore won't attend -- probably Thailand.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 999505
By MAF NARA Date 11/1/91

SECRET

22

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why is it in our interest to? I'm just trying to understand the rationale.

MR. MILLER: Well, I don't think, sir, we think in terms of it weakening the Indonesians in Timor; but it's trying to keep, let's say, Congressional sentiment with regard to Indonesia from being rekindled -- which we think now is a fairly satisfactory condition.

MR. HABIB: There's no need to take this action. The Indonesians are trying to get an international -- and especially U. S. and other blessing -- before they've done it. Let them go ahead and do what they've been doing. We have no objection. We've not objected in UN Security Council debates. They're quite happy with the position we've taken. We've resumed, as you know, all of our normal relations with them; and there isn't any problem involved.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not very willingly-

MR. HABIB: Sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not very willingly. Illegally and beautifully.

MR. MILLER: There's no question that the Indonesians will participate. This will undoubtedly be mentioned in Malik's conversations with you.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 999505
By M82 NARA Date 6/1/01

SECRET

Reproduced at: the National Archive

23

MR. HABIB: If we were to go pell-mell
in the absence of really anybody else, I think that that
could reopen the question of whether the Indonesians are
acceptable.

MR. HABIB: The Japanese didn't go last time
and they're hesitant to say who's going. The Australians,
I'm fairly sure, are not going to go, on the basis of
what we know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why don't we ask the
Australians?

MR. HABIB: They'll tell us it's under
consideration.

MR. MILLER: The Australians asked either the
Security Council or Waldheim to send a representative,
and that hasn't succeeded. So I think I would agree with
Phil that they're not likely. They dropped out at the last
minute the last time, and they're likely to drop out
this time.

MR. HABIB: It's a political problem.

MR. MILLER: We can ask them directly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, why don't you
ask them?

MR. HABIB: We will.

SECRET