DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

(not verbatim)

January 12, 1971 8:15 a.m.

j1j

R: Hello Henry. I understood that Dobrynin saw you before he left and I was wondering what it was about.

K: Who saw me?

R: WXX I understand Dobrynin saw you before he left Washington.

K: Who? Oh Dobrynin you mean. I only talked to him about these bombings and I have been talking to Irwin on that. It was about these goddamned bombings.

You mean the Embassy bombings?

R: Bombings? / He did not come in to see you?

K: No he did not come in to see me. I talked to him and xpoligave gave him an apology for the bombings but he did not come in to see me.

R: OK. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

K: As soon as I come back, I have talked to the President, and I have worked out a way to keep you fully informed.

R: When are you coming back? I want to talk to you again about the Ivanov case.

Thursday or Friday.

K: I had no discussion with him about that. The last I talked to him was about the bombings.

R: Nothing about Cuba or Berlin? K The paper said he stayed over an extra day to see you and I was wondering what it was all about. How is your vacation out there?

K: Very pleasant. I was back for the weekend for some parties for Ambassador Fxxk Freeman.

R: I missed the Freeman parties. How were they?

K: The one Sunday night was a disaster. You couldn't tell who was there because they had it in a restaurant which was partitioned into many rooms. Andx No mood or anything.

R: He is a nice fellow.

K: A very nice human being.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The Attorney General

1/12/71 8:45 a.m.

M: About our friends in the JDL and the State request for injunctions of various types.

K: Right.

M: Al Haig called about the President's notation on the brief but I wonder if he has fully considered the consequences . . .

K: Probably not.

M: There are a lot of disadvantages to this picture. There are some advantages too but the advantages may be short-lived and the disadvantages may come back to haunt us like in the Scranton Commission. I don't want to be in a position of disagreeing with the President but we've got problems here beyond State's approach. For one, Helms tells me this will affect the Israelis materially if we take this action because of his opinion that the Israelis will look with disfavor on the publicity that will come from it as we being anti-Jewish. Second, I think this will have an adverse political impact. Third, if we go into court for an injunction we'll have a coalition of all these liberal groups who will fight us in court on the grounds that we are trying to impinge on free speech. It will result in a prolonged court battle which will be on the front pages of the newspapers for a long time. From a legal procedural point of view we will have to subpoena newspaper reporters and we'll have to have Russian witnesses and there's a question of whether they will provide them. And there's a question of whether we can make the case without the Russian witnesses. And, it's a questionable precedent for the future as far as the Russians and Arabs are concerned. If we get such a court order we may not have the means of enforcing it in the federal establishment. We have only federal marshalls with many other duties and they could not properly enforce it. The only facility the government has is the federal troops and if we get into a position of obtaining a federal court order which we fail to enforce we are just in more difficulty with our Soviet friends.

There are some half-way measures which might be brought: an injunction against harassment aspects of it.

K: Let me tell you the thing we are above all interested in. The Russians are complaining bitterly, and in conjunction with other things we are doing, that there is no legal action being taken at all. If we can just show something is happening . . .

M: Do you feel that convening a grand jury to investigate this with respect to the commission of federal crimes would solve the problem?

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
The Attorney General

1/12/71 8:45 a.m. page 2

K: That would help a lot. I have no interest in any particular remedy and consider the arguments you make quite conclusive. If you really think there is a disadvantage I would think if you can do any other legal thing showing the Administration is having recourse to its powers you would serve our purpose.

M: And I am sure that somewhere along the line in the Soviet establishment they realize the federal government has been in these activities.

K: To them this is a combination of things: they want to make an issue of it and therefore anything we do doesn't make any difference. They may be some group thinking this thing can't happen without government con-nivance. For them it's hard to take that there's nothing getting actions into motion. If you could assemble a grand jury to check whether a crime has been committed I would have no objections.

M: Let me wrestle with State on this.

K: Yes, but fairly soon?

M: I hope to get it resolved today.

K: If not, just do it anyway.

M: Well, they still want the grand sweeping injunctive action.

K: Let's start with a grand jury and then it can go to an injunction, can't it?

M: Yes, if it is found to be a crime.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Director Helms
1/12/71 9:03 a.m.

H: After our conversation of yesterday regarding Cushman's possible return to the Marine Corps I walked in and since last night he had received a call from General Dan [Don?] Hughes putting up several names for his replacement.

K: God damn that Hughes!

H: I said why don't you hold on for a while, first because [this is not certain yet] and second I am not sure that the President ought to go the route of getting another Marine Deputy. The Marine Corps has gotten the idea that this is their slot and that not necessarily the case. It seems to me that if this change does take place it might be desirable for you and me and the President to sit down and think about what we want.

K: Absolutely! Just tell sit tight on it. Who did he name?

H: General Robert __________, he's an Air Force general and has been put up several times for this.

K: Yes, I know him. I wouldn't consider him.

H: The other was General Phillips, in the Apollo program.

K: I don't know him.

H: But I think this can wait till after your return . . .

K: Absolutely. We should keep it quiet.

H: Yes, I don't want to make him a lame duck before his time. And I am under the impression that this should await Laird's return.

K: That's right. Just say that I told you to sit tight on it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Amb. Gerard Smith/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 12, 1971 9:55 a.m.

jlj

S. Say has any decision been made on the budget question of Safeguard?

No.

K: /I do not know if Laird is playing funny games or not.

S: I think this decision is one of most important in connection with SALT.

K: What is your recommendation?

principals sit

S: ... principles involved in SALT should set down with you and see if we can get an agreed recommendation on security interest and what is best with SALT.

K: I agree with you. I cannot get it down before Friday.

S: Will anything be done before then by the President?

K: No. That is I cannot be sure that Laird did not push something in while I was in Washington but I would know it if it came in in regular channels.

S: I don't think so. I thought that DOD and OMB were going to present something . . .

K: I will check on it. OMB should not be in it but they may not know any better.

S: I have only surmised that - I have no direct evidence.

K: Jerry, I am having Gen. Haig send to you on a personal basis a piece of paper which bears on your surmise yesterday on the source of these reports. It doesn't state directly . . . does not mention the particular piece of information which you discussed . . . don't want to discuss on the phone.

S: I had a confirmation because a certain individual was told that by that source - not a pressman.

K: I will have that sent to you.

S: We will wait for you to call a meeting then.

K: I will have it Friday or Saturday morning.

BY. NARA, Date 5/26

Attorney General Mitchell/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 12, 1971 3:10 p.m.

jlj

M: Henry. We had a meeting with Irwin and the State Department and in accord with the suggestion that I made to you earlier decided to proceed immediately, probably on Thursday, with the Grand Jury approach. . . . judicial processes in New York has picked up Cahain (phonetic) and a couple more of his people. They brought an indictment against him today and other indictments which are going to be brought down and I have talked to Frank Hogan (phonetic) . . . and expecting all of their activities. I think this will satisfy State Department and the Russians.

K: Excellent.

M: One other thought Henry. The thing that you were involved in personally - there has been an indictment handed down and your name was mentioned. I thought it was better that you were named rather than keeping it quiet and then having it all brought out and there was some information out on it - the kidnapping plot - so I didn't think you would mind.

K: That is fine. John, when we get back on Friday I would like to meet with you and go over a few things. How does your schedule look?

M: I don't know but I will make time.

K: Maybe we can have lunch?

M: That would be good, let's see.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Amb. William Sullivan
1/13/71 9:15 a.m.

S: We got a groundswell of support in this building for the Berrigan brothers' plan to end the war.

K: I heard there was a report that I had been kidnapped to Hanoi and you people recommended the immediate resumption of the bombing.

S: Two things: You have seen the <u>news</u> Ellsworth cable? Said he wanted to be there as of February 1.

K: I haven't seen it, but that's okay with me. I thought it might be a good way to review things.

S: Did you get a chance to read the other cable on the initiative in Paris?

K: Yes and the considerations the other fellow had . . .

S: Which make it sound like nothing is going to happen. The question is whether you feel strongly enough about stimulating it to send something back.

K: How would we do it? Send it through You?

S: Yes, something from here saying we still think it is a good idea.

K: I think you should do that, don't you?

S: Well, Habib is quite unhappy when I talked with him this morning. He thinks it would be helpful. And in U.S. public opinion <u>it</u> would be helpful. Why don't I draft something and send it to you for clearance?

K: Good. Also I had a chance to talk with the President about the other problem (the one where you reported Marshall Green's views). As I expected, he feels less strongly about it than Green. He is also less inhibited about the outcome.

S: We can do that in the 40 Committee thing at some point or take it elsewhere when he comes back.

> One other point. The Australians suggested on another TCC (Troop Contributors Meeting). The most likely time frame would be April 23 -- shortly before the SEATO meeting which will be taking place in London the next week. Ron Ziegler said we would make the next troop announcement around the 15th. If it could be held a week it would make a better appearance.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
William Sullivan (State)

1/13/71 9:15 a.m. page 2

K: Ijatexx Okay, I will keep that in mind and get it into the
President's head. He will probably make the ultimate decision on that
on the basis of domestic decisions. The problem is as soon as some
cabinet members know, they will claim credit for it. I don't mean
anyone in your department. We have two courses: tell the TCC or not
tell the Cabinet.

S: But there's nothing rigid about the 15th?

K: No, it would not be impossible to slip it to the 25th.

S: Okay.

By.

NARA,

Date 5/26

Secretary Packard/Mr. Kissinger

(not verbatim)

January 13, 1971 11:50 a.m.

jlj

K: I just read the article that Stu Alsop wrote. What in hell is Alsop talking about? What is NSSM 36?

P: You should learn not to read the papers, Henry. We will have a paper on Safeguard today and I was wondering if it might be well to distribute just to principals and have a meeting first on it to see what we can make out. You know there are a lot of different points of view and perhaps it would be better to try and sort some of them out.

K: I agree with you about that. I was going to suggest a meeting Saturday morning briefly.

P: If you can get some time on your calendar we would have a meeting.

K: Saturday would be the best for me.

P: I will have copies distributed to Jack Irwin, Dick Helms -

K: Gerry Smith.

P: - Gerry Smith, Roy Alson (phonetic) from our office and then they can read it before Saturday and that we will discuss it before it is finalized.

K: Exactly right. That is very good. When is Mel coming back?

P: I talked to him yesterday. He is working in Honolulu - working on statements. I think he is planning on coming by San Clemente on Friday and report to the President.

K: Statements? If he does he would not see the President because he won't be here.

P: When are you coming back? He would probably prefer to come back here and see the President and make his report.

K: Do you think that we could moderate any statements he makes before he sees the President? He certainly has been popping off in every continent.

P: Oh --- no he hasn't. I talked to him about it and didn't get very far. He said he would say what he wanted to say.

K: No, I know you have done what you can. Don't want to put you on

By. NARA, Date 5/26

the spot. This is a new administrative theory. I know you can not do
anything.

P: It is between you and the President. I will get into it if you want
me to but -

K: No. The President had Ziegler shoot back and if that does not
do it then . . .

P: We will handle things that way unless you have some second thoughts.
(regarding Safeguard paper and meeting)

K: No, that is fine.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Joe Sisco

1/13/71 12:07 p.m.

S: Thought I'd give you a current reading. And tonight I will try to put it all together so you have a composite report rather than . . .

K: Good.

S: Not too much has cahnged, but the Israeli proposition has been put to the Egyptians. They are considering it. We at the moment are under a very strong pressure campaign from the Egyptians. With Sadat hitting us on the head . . . They are talking about a Security Council operation. If the move is there in the next week or 10 days the Egyptians are not very serious themselves about the negotiations. But we are keeping the feet to the fire. We have asked the British and the French to try to elicit a positive response. The Secretary feels very strongly that there should be no deviation from the central direction we are trying to achieve. We have doubts about whether this crowd in Cairo is trying to do any serious business.

K: What is your judgment?

S: I think they are not serious. They want the Security Council and the four powers to do the thing for them. If it gets to the Security Council I think we will exercize the first American veto on this problem. But we are doing all sorts of contingency planning. I wanted you to have a feel as to where we are. We will be sending to you a suggested reply from the President to that message from Sadat. We're holding off because we didn't like the Present to have to send something when this guy Sadat is hitting us publicly.

K: Exactly.

S: But they are crying for a response.

K: But how much of that is Bergus and how much is theirs?

S: That a very good question.

K: When are we going to tell Bergus to stop knocking me to the Egyptians?

S: Is he still doing that? There were only two fellows with black hats in this mentioned by Sadat. You know who they are?

K: You and me?

S: Yes.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Joe Sisco

1/13/71 12:07 p.m. page 2

K: How has he even heard of me?

S: Everyone has heard of you.

K: But knowing about my views on the Middle East?

S: They make a presumption about you as they make one about me.
I will always be suspect. I was Goldberg's right hand man . . .

K: I see.

By NARA, Date 5/26

January 13, 1971 3:15 p.m.

jlj

R: Henry, I was talking to Bob Haldeman a little while ago and found out that the President offered OAS post to Mosbacher. He said that [and Rockefeller] the President talked to Mosbacher and that you talked to him [and] God damn it Henry I did not even know about it. What the hell is going on?

I assumed you were aware of it.

K: I have nothing to do with these appointments. [Mosbacher went to see the President. I was not present. My understanding was that Haldeman was going to talk to you about a series of appointments. Mosbacher asked my opinion about the job.]

R: Did you tell him to go to Rockefeller.

K: He wanted to go to Linowitz and I thought that was a disaster. Point is that Rockefeller knows quite a lot about Latin America.

R: Point is that I did not know anything about it and if you want to have a hand in appointments then I will just stay out of it altogether. I was told [in a letter from Sen. Goldwater] that you were going to get Strausz/Hupe another job.

K: I offered him nothing. He came on strong about a promise that had been made to him before. I stay out of these appointments.

R: You do not if you talk to people Henry.

K: Not out of my initiative. I assumed all the clearances were completed when someone comes to me and asks my opinion. Strausz-Hupe said that when he took the job he was told by somebody, I think it was Eliott Richardson, that he would be considered for something else. I did not tell him anything. I do not know what he was told.

R: Simple Goddamn thing. . . idea is if you are going to be involved then I am going to stay out of it. And you cannot be not involved if you are going to talk to people. . . . talked to Peter Flanigan and President and you and had not had a chance to talk to him.

K: I had assumed that you knew about it. I probably should have talked to you about it. But I am not involved in appointments.

R: I think it is a miserable idea. He is the least qualified for this position. Don't get me wrong. He is a good man in some areas but he doesn't speak Spanish and this is a handholding job with nothing to do except talk and preferably in Spanish. Concerned because in eyes of Latin Americans . . . He doesn't know anything about Latin America. Holdridge (sounded like this but did not get the correct name) is a good man . . .

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: I heard about it when Haldeman told me he had talked to you.
Mosbacher asked me for my view and I gave him my opinion.

R: When I asked him he said he did not want anything. He said he
would go back to his oil business.

K: I do not even see the list of things which will be discussed with
you. How it came to me with this was Mosbacher calling me and
asking me what I thought of the job.

R: How did he call Rockefeller?

K: I did not call Rockefeller on his behalf.

R: On the letter from Barry Goldwater regarding
Strausz-Hupe. . .

K: I think that Eliott Richardson made this commitment and he reminded me of it. Regarding Strausz-Hupe I have only seen him for 5 minutes since he had this job and then he gave me song and dance about how his wife hated Guatemala and how she had to leave.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
George Shhltz

1/13/71 4:00 p.m.

K: The President is going with the original plan on the thing: one sum.

S: Then that's just the way we were?

K: Yes, one other thing. He would like to add the five hundred million
to the Defense budget on the grounds that the Russians are beginning to har-
rass us more.

S: I don't know where he'd put it.

K: All I think if you gave them 80 they'd find a way of spending it.

S: Yes, but they'd have to scratch their heads.

K: He doesn't want to close any more bases.

S: That's a different decision entirely. Keeping the bases opened
depletes strength. It siphons off manpower and you are spending money
where . . .

K: Speaking as a friend, you know as well as I do what he has on his mind.
He's got a ______ more than he thought he had.

S: He's messing around with these numbers. We've got to put it back.

K: My understanding is that the 75.5 doesn't include the pay raise, that
is in fact 76.

S: Except that the three hundred million dollars are not included in the 75.5.

K: Plus two hundred million on the MAP?

S: Where do you get that? That's what it's been bumped up to but . . .
Are you suggestion if we can take what's there and make more out of it that's
what you want?

K: My understanding is that the 75.5 is a net increase of one billion over
what we had. 300 million on a pay raise and 200 million of additional MAP
funds not counted in the 75.5.

S: The MAP funds are all counted in the 75.5. Cost of living index to
retiring military personnel . . . . but that's something you do when you
get to it -- it's not included in it.

*

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

George Shultz

1/13/71 4:00 p.m. page 3

3

Second, to what extent are we locked in on various things because of the budget and the answer to that is that the budget is budgeted right up although if he wanted to do something like that or delay base closings to it would run the Budget up some but we could probably handle it.

K: But delaying the base closings doesn't seem the sum you do not save there come out of something else?

S: We could sent up a supplemental or something. The problem with the base closings is he won't be able to close them in an election year and then we've got a billion dollars worth of drag on the military with keeping them open. This is not a positive thing. All this stuff they don't want dragging them down and they can't get rid of it.

K: So you are telling me that you don't want to change the budget?

S: That's right.

K: I'll talk to the President and be back to you.

S: The only thing I can think of -- it's hard to change it at all at this point, to change it in a manner that won't break into Defense and say you get half a million more now.

K: That's impossible.

S: That is literally scattered through all these accounts. I don't know that it is shown in the budget particularly. Really I think it best to leave it alone.

K: I tend to agree with you.

S: It's always possible at the last minute -- I would never say we couldn't But it would delay the publication of it at this point.

K: I am afraid the stories of your going back to the Pentagon and asking them for more than they asked for would be bad. It would have been a cinch two weeks ago. Let me talk to the President and be back to you.

S: Okay, thanks.

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

January 13, 1971 4:10 p.m.

jlj

(not verbatim)

K: I have just been talking to the President on defense budget and he would like to add $500 million to it and the damn thing is practically locked up. He also wants not to have any base closings announced in the next month.

L: (long pause) Got to pick up $300 million on cuts in the modernization, $150 million cut in OMA. $300 million in reductions in order to make that cut but I was going to blame it on the Congress.

K: How can we add $500 million to Defense budget at this point? The President said he would put something into the contingency fund which I know was disapproved but I know you only asked for $100 million.

L: They screwed us up on military assistance and they waste bookkeeping and only cut $100 million. You know what they did to us on the supplemental nitpicked we have only $100 million in supplemental in expenditures column. Well, I can figure out something and I will call you back. I have the budget papers here in my room and I will go down and get them and call you back right away.

K: I have not discussed this with George Shultz so don't call him.

L: I will call you in 15 minutes. I will look at the papers and see what we can do. How is the other matter?

K: It looks like Friday afternoon right now.

L: In that case I guess I will have to refuse to talk to any newsmen at the airport and go right to the White House to make my report to the President. This would be good, I don't really want to have to answer their questions. As far as Ron is concerned it would put more emphasis

K: It would help.

L: I would like to do that then I would not have to talk to the press at the airport. You will let me know.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 13, 1971 4:45 p.m.

K: First of all on the appointment, it looks like Saturday again.

L: OK. I have the budget now before me. We could go $500 million and we could still go more . . . put in OMA to slow down base reduction package and the rest would not be in aggregated procurement production. The rest in delayed purchasing, that is the contracts we have not been able to get out because of our budget problems . . . 1973-1974 purchases.

K: Would it help the economy? How much . . . $300?

L: $300 there and $200 in the other. Then I can get Bob Moot and he can work out the details.

K: Shultz wants to slide it into the volunteer army but this does not help the economy.

L: I am going to have a lot of problems with this volunteer army. I know we want it and I will work for it but it is going to be difficult. A lot of that is not going to be approved. We will have to fight committees - you understand what I mean. . . . billion dollars approved but no more - between both committees it will be difficult. I will do everything I can to get it through.

K: I will call Shultz.

L: In this area it will have the greatest impact at the greatest rate.

K: I will talk to Shultz and then to the President.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Sisco

8:00 p.m., January 14, 1971

K: How are you?

S: Pretty good, pretty good.

K: Saunders told me about that message that went back there. Where
did I get you?

S: I'm at home, you can speak freely.

K: May I tell you as a friend, don't you get caught in the middle.

S: That's right. Happily, I asked someone to send it over to you for
your information.

K: Apparently they are cranking up again like it was in September.
What was the point of the message?

S: The point of the message was to tell these guys they are going down
________.

K: Which you agree with?

S: 102%, it is fine. You will like the message, I just thought you ought
to see it.

K: Right. You know my personal goodwill towards you. You are in a
curious assignment, I just don't want you to get caught in the middle.

S: Well, Henry, I want to tell you that I am increasingly more uncomfortable
but I am going to do my job and do the best I can. I want to do what
I can to help, what I did here this evening -- I don't want to cause any
difficulties.

K: You are not causing any difficulties.

S: My feeling is this is the sort of thing you wouldn't have had an iota
of...

K: You can't send a message to Cairo without it coming from the
President.

S: It was a personal message from the Secretary.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Sisco

8:00 p.m., January 14, 1971 -- Page 2

K: There's no such thing. I promise you this thing is going to resolve itself.

S: Well, we can resort to that message that we had about a year ago. Start getting it over to you, keep it informally.

K: Going to work it out, I promise you.

S: Henry, we have got two long years of hard work ahead of us ...

K: Maybe 6.

S: I don't know how many of us could survive it, I have been Assistant Secretary for 5 1/2 years ...

K: You won't be Assistant Secretary for six years, I can see to that.

S: Right.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Frank Lindsay/Kissinger

9:37 a.m. 1/15/71

L: I called about an activity that started with a group of students and junior faculty at MIT. We are concerned about the state of the world but don't want to drop bombs. Want to have contact with business establishment. I have been in conference between kids and ______. Some SDS kids had a total outlook. These kids got ______ excited. Howard Johnson has met with them and got quite involved. We have a session Jan. 29-31 at Ithicat (?) House.

K: When does it meet?

L: 5:00 Friday evening and ending Sun. between 3:00-4:00. People include
Cayoto (?), Vance, Everby,

K: Are you asking me to participate?

L: Yeah.

K: Problem is this. I am taking my children to the moon shot. I had planned to go to the Cape on the 29th. What I am now thinking -- Maybe I could come up the evening of the 29th and leave in the morning with the children and I loose only a couple of hours.

L: The students also very much want you. People coming all the way from
San Francisco.

K: I would want a Q&A format. I might talk for 15 mins.

L: That's great. I asked John Price to talk on the domestic side on Friday.
But we could put him off until Sat.

K: Friday is the only time I can consider it.

L: I would like that.

K: I will let you know Monday.

L: We will do what we can to facilitate your travel. I think it would be
worth your time.

K: I will do my best. What time?

L: 5:00 is ideal but we could give a little bit.

K: I don't think John Price is on my level here. So if you could do it Sat.
morning.

L: So if you could do it at 5:00, great. It would be talk and Q&A before dinner and review after.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Dean John Dunlap/Kissinger

10:07 a. m.

1/15/70

D: I am in Washington at the Labor Dept.

K: I tried to reach Pusey and you yesterday and then I was in transit to Washington. I was on the W. Coast. Just trying to explain why I couldn't call back.

D: I have a date on constructions problems here on Monday.

K: I wrote a letter to Pusey indicating I could not come back in February.

D: Persuant to our earlier conversation.

K: Yes, but I didn't say that.

D: No need. You will be wondered about the press side.

K: Here they said they would release a statement to that effect tomorrow but primarily in the form of a letter to me by the President indicating his pleasure that I am staying without comment on the Harvard situation. Any problem?

D: I will get on the phone to Nate but I see no reason why not.

K: I will not release the letter to you. You can but it's not appropriate for me.

D: It will have to go through the corporation.

K: I don't plan to meet with the press at all. Just be informed I am staying on. And pleased about it. If you think it desirable I could sit in on the press and indicate the close feeling I have for Harvard to put at ease any <u>considerations</u> of Harvard.

D: My preference as an individual is to have you do that because there has been some misunderstanding but I will not say you ought to.

K: I will do it unless you think it inappropriate.

D: No and I prefer you do it.

K: I will not want to be there when they release the letter but I will step in and say there are many news stories in relations to my feelings on Harvard. I will say I have warm feelings.

D: You will be <u>wouldn't say anything about the vote of our government colleagues</u>.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Prof. Newstadt/Kissinger

10:15 a.m.

1/15/71

N: I was thinking about that Kennedy Institute affair to which I am looking forward. I wanted to raise this issue with you. The sequence is that I talk for 15-20 minutes on VN and panel will talk with me on China. I told Jerry if my recollection of these meetings is correct the last half hour is on general concerns. The VN issue bothers me because everything that can be said has been said a thousand times and I don't know how to keep people from being sore. We are facing a 51-49 decision on which both sides have a good case. We are talking intangibles. I just wonder what we accomplish. I have agreed to it and willingly but I just wonder what we can obtain.

N: Two things we talked about -- I suggested the panel discuss China and you in on that and not bring in VN. I think it's unrealistic.

K: I don't know a great deal on China.

N: No but a chance for you to talk.

K: You think they insist on talking about VN.

N: I am not sure. I will try it the other way.

K: I wonder -- if my recollection of the meetings is correct they want to hear the senior person from Washington and don't want to talk among themselves. My listening won't be enough. They will probably want to hear from me. But does it have to be VN? I think it makes it immediately emotional.

N: Can you talk about general Far East issues? Maybe I ought to think about it for a minute.

K: I am prepared to do it. I would talk for 5-10 minutes and then answer questions in compassionate way.

N: The format has changed.

K: Who are the 35 people

N: Members and fellows. First come, first served situation. Here in institute building.

K: I understood it would be at the Faculty Club. Get it striaghtened out and let me know.

N: Well, maybe something has happened. Format has been talk during cocktails and carried on during dinner and afterwards.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

Neustadt/Kissinger

10:15 a.m. 1/15/71

-2-

K: Still seems to be the case.

N: If we could make it VN over cocktails and break it off.

K: I could talk about SALT and how the government is run. But if it's VN we will just have to be understanding of each other.

N: My feeling is like yours.

K: Or let me bring it in as an illustration of something else. If we don't think we were right we wouldn't do it. I think it's inappropriate for an assistant to appear broken from the President.

N: Right and I don't want a VN evening and put you on the spot.

K: If I come as a spectator, it will be unnatural.

N: I will check this with Jerry and check location. I will get back to you. My instinct is "Are you satisfied with the NSC organization?"

K: I could and use VN as illustration of the ambiguity of the situation. I talked to a group of Harvard students who were harder on me then anybody in the Institute would be. I don't mind doing it. If you, after reflecting on it, want me to do it, I will do it.

N: I will be back to you today or tomorrow. This ought to be the way if there were no VN.

K: Also, basically the problem in VN is too far down the road. We are either going to succeed or fail but unless we get out tomorrow there's not a lot of discussion.

N: Far East ahead of us. SALT is --

K: In the formative stage.

N: Germany -- Are you scared of Willy Brandt?

K: I have another call.

N: I will be back in touch.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Dr. John Dunlop/Mr. Kissinger

10:25 a.m., January 15, 1971

D: Nate is in New Orleans at the Carnegie Commission. There is nothing wrong with what we talked about. According to Smith, the Crimson this morning carried a story about this. It apparently was a leak through the senior members of the Government Department.

K: I have never talked to any of them.

D: I know. I just wanted you not to be surprised.

K: If I should be asked a question, I will say I know nothing -- that it is entirely up to the department.

D: It was a friendly story, and was not critical in any way.

K: They must have gotten it from the department people.

D: In fairness to you, I thought I should tell you that. Otherwise, it's fine.

lds

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Neustadt

11:53 a.m., January 15, 1971

N: I have now gotten briefed on the physical arrangements. It is at the Faculty Club. Knowing what I do now about the arrangements, I think you ought to plan to spend 15 minutes talking about Vietnam early-on in the sense of looking ahead a couple of years; i. e., "if Administration policies are successful, we think it is reasonable to project...; the level of violence; the nature of relationships vis-a-vis China in Southeast Asia. If our policies are not successful, then here are the problems I see."

K: How secure is your group? Will it get into the Crimson? Or are they apt to talk to the Crimson?

N: No. It is faculty and Fellows.

K: Which faculty people?

N: It was moved to the Faculty Club because Jerry has quite an elaborate panel on the Far East. With 20 people in addition to the guests, they wouldn't have been able to take them. The faculty entitled to come and those who have accepted so far includes Paul, Stanley Hoffman, Graham Allison, Reischauer. We haven't heard from Bob Solow or Kistiakowsky yet. There are a couple of economists -- I don't remember which ones. It's a grown-up group, and there will be nothing on the record. There will be one Republican from Illinois, named Bradford, who has been talking to us about coming on as a Fellow.

K: I'm not so concerned about that.

N: We say it's off the record, but it is like talking to Senators. Keep a forward pitch. Jerry has a theme and panel set up for the evening just in case you got stuck at the last minute.. You should contribute to his theme in terms of Southeast Asia. You don't have to say, 'we know we are going to succeed.' But do it early over drinks.

K: Do people sit down while drinks are being served?

N: If we can get space in the club, people will have a chance to sit down in one of those side rooms and then carry the conversation on to dinner in the library. If we don't get the Esther rooms, it will be a short drink session and then carry drinks on to the table. In either event, it will be one circle sitting down.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Neustadt

11:53 a.m., January 15, 1971

K: Why don't we do it as planned. I will give a 15-minute talk on Vietnam and then answer questions for half an hour.

N: I will put this to Jerry.

K: And then we can go on to China. I have always had the sense when I was on the receiving end that people had things on their minds they wanted to say. Maybe there could be 30 minutes at the end where people could talk about anything. Everybody could stay, but I leave that to you. I would like to leave by 10:00.

N: The organized part of the proceedings will be over by 9:00. Then if you can stay around, we will just talk.

K: I can handle myself in a bear-baiting exercise. If we can avoid a confrontation, it would be just as well.

N: I would be very surprised -- although, of course, judging by discussion in the department on the other issue, which includes a lot of the people most upset about Vietnam -- I would be surprised if anyone would want a confrontation.

K: I will be there at 6:00.

N: It's lovely of you to come.

K: You never come down here any more?

N: Not since the time we had lunch.

K: If an invitation by me can make you come, come have lunch one day soon.

N: I am not avoiding you. It is this stove up here. I have to get down in February some time. Maybe I can spend an extra day.

K: Good. It's nice to talk. See you next week.

lds

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon

Hugh Sidey

1/19/71 12:00 noon

S: We're doing a cover story on the Berrigan brothers. It will be on the whole story of bombings and extremists. Any your name comes into it.

K: You mean has it had any effect on my life?

S: Yes.

K: Except for the Secret Service guys -- that makes it a little constraining. But people tell me literally no more about this than you read in the papers. And I don't want to know more. If I start changing my life on the basis of threats . . . I'm not worried about it or thinking about it or doing anything I wouldn't normally do.

S: But you've got a couple of guys who go with you?

K: Yes.

S: When did that start? The end of the summer?

K: About October I think. I had people with me before then twice for two or three week stretches when there have been special threats.

S: What do you do with threats?

K: I don't even read these letters any more. I used to look at them but haven't for eight months. So I can't help you on that.

S: I just want to avoid ______ anyone.

K: I do my business both social and official as if this thing didn't exist. Of course it makes it hard to live up to that swinger reputation. But my staff has a new lease on life; there may be a terminal point for their suffering.

S: What would they demand in return for you?

K: My staff?

S: No, the kidnappers.

K: I don't know. I understand my staff has written to the President warning him against any ransom. Don't use that.

S: Of course not. But there haven't been any incidents?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Hugh Sidey

1/15/71 12:00 noon

page 2

K: There were these two priests who came up to me in a restaurant. But they wanted to talk. They were very friendly, Irish priests, who served in Biafra. There was no incident. These were very kind people.

S: What did the Secret Service man do?

K: Nothing, he was there.

S: And nothing else has happened.

K: I got a call at a restaurant at night saying "I'm going to get you" and that kind of thing. But it was just a nut. But I would prefer that you not write that kind of thing; it just gives people ideas.

S: I understand. There is a request for a picture of you with your two guys.

K: I'd rather not do that.

S: I understand. I just wondered if there was a time when it could be done.

K: I better check with the Secret Service. Maybe on the street some time.

S: One other thing. George Hunt, do you know him? He used to be editor of *Life*. He is doing a major thing on military strategy. He would like to chat with you. He's been to the Pentagon and met a lot of strategists there. Could you see him some time next week?

K: The week after would be better.

S: Okay, I'll have him give a call to your office for the week after.

K: Okay, and if you could keep the sotry in a low key. . . Because really, except for having these men follow me around there's nothing I'm doing differently from before.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
D. Chapin/Kissinger
12:18 p.m. 1/15/71

C called and said that Rogers was calling the President. He told Rogers that the President was tied-up for about an hour with people on an open hour. K said that C should check with Haldeman but that he thought that there should be as little contact as possible today and if there were anything, he should be in on it too.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Herb Klein/Kissinger
3:00 p.m. 1/15/70

HAK: I just wanted to underline with you that what happened this morning had nothing to do with you. A blow up with Rogers and I wanted to say it was at that meeting at 8:00.

K: I didn't have my feelings hurt.

HAK: I wanted to be sure that our public relation's people didn't know about it in case there's a problem. I have the highest regard for you. Are you coming to Chicago with me?

K: Yes. We will combine the papers and have a good session.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Under Secretary Irwin

4:18 p.m., January 15, 1971

K: I have just become aware in greater detail of the oil problem. You remember we talked about it last week. I just wanted you to know, after discussion with the President, I am sending a directive to move it into the NSC system.

I: There have been some other developments. We were just about to come over and I wanted to ask for a few minutes with you afterwards. I am going out tomorrow as the President's emissary to talk...

K: I am aware of it -- ex post facto.

I: It just happened this noon.

K: I know how it happened. It is an unacceptable procedure, but that is between me and the Secretary.

I: It certainly wasn't my idea to nominate myself to go.

K: You should get out of the line of fire when the firing starts. I just wanted you to know I am sending out a directive on how it is to be handled in the system from now on -- which doesn't affect you much. We can talk about it briefly. I didn't want you to get the directive without your being told about it.

I: Depending on when I leave tomorrow morning which depends on when they want me to arrive out there, I don't know whether or not I can attend the 10:00 meeting tomorrow morning. If I don't, Alex will come. In either case, I have heard it's just principals. From our point of view, if we could bring Ron it would be very helpful. Alex hadn't planned to go and it...

K: I will call you about it. I will consider that.

I: Thank you.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Kirk Douglas
1/15/71; 7:20 p.m.

(I missed the first part of this conversation -- Mr. Douglas mentioned
the name Rona Barrett.)

K: Rona Barrett?

D: She had you with a very pretty blond girl. I don't remember her name.

K: I was at a dinner party and they seated me next to her. I tell you she
will not win any IQ prizes (laugh).

D: Where can I reach Billy Graham?

K: I don't know but I can find out for you.

D: If you find out where he is, tell him that I plan to call him.

K: Can you tell me what about?

D: I am going to do a TV special on spiritual involvement in religion. I'll
have Johnny Cash, Mohamed Ali (Islamic Religion) and George Harrison,
a great singer and writer of religious songs and I was wondering if Billy
Graham would want to . . .

K: Why don't you wait until early next week. I will try to reach him over
the weekend. I don't know where he is, but I just ask the White House to
get him for me.

D: Would this be a problem for you?

K: No, I like him. He wrote me a nice letter and I want to acknowledge
it anyway.

D: I think this would be something very interesting for him to do because
he relates to young people.

K: Have you ever been to one of his meetings?

D: No, but I have watched him on television

K: I have his address here: Montreat, North Carolina 28757 and we will have
the operators check his phone number. I went to two of his revival meetings.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger/Kirk Douglas
1/15/71; 7:20 p.m.

- 2 -

K (continued):

His speech itself still leaves me pretty cold but at the end he spoke in
a very soft voice and it is really unbelievable how they all started to
come up. It is to me very moving.

D: That's the point. He has an impact over all the youth. I would love to see him in person.

K: You ought to go to one of his revival meetings. When those people step forward, it lasts as long as his speech was. His speech is very strong and traditional but he talks in a much gentler way when he asks them to come forward.

D: Were you ready to go forward?

K: No, but I was very impressed.

D: I don't know if you are aware of the tremendous religious movement there is. The top selling record of religious songs that talk about Jesus Christ, the Lord, God -- it manifests itself in different ways, not like Catholic or Protestant. That's why I have been thinking about this program for quite a while.

K: I will get in touch with him.

D: How is everything going?

K: I just got back. Marlo Thomas is a bright girl.

D: I never had a chance to talk to her before and she is a bright girl. If you are around here on the 26th, we are going to have an interesting dinner party.

K: I would love to come but I don't know where I will be.

D: But we will definitely see you at the end of the month at Cape Kennedy.

K: I will let you know his phone number by noon tomorrow.

D: I will be right here in Los Angeles over the weekend. (213-878-0844)

K: Give my love to Anne.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Don Oberdorfer (Wash. Post)

7:35 p.m., January 15, 1971

O: I couldn't find the damn paper.

K: That's okay, I was not through editing it. Is there still time to give
you changes?

O: Yeah, sure, I'm still writing this piece. I'll probably be writing it
in the morning.

K: Can I give you a few changes, are you going to quote this ....

O: I won't take anything out of context.

K: In the second paragraph where it says "great role" -- I would prefer to say "great sense of participation and responsibility." In the next sentence "unless you feel the world is part of their own making ..." -- you've got the essence right, I'm just trying to clarify it. Nevertheless it is in every part of the world at every moment of time and end the sentence here. Drop off paragraph on the next page "the other countries foreign policy". Then we went to -- just drop the words "in the previous period."

O: All right.

K: In "instead it is also desirable" could we say "it is almost an end in itself". Commitments was a possible rather than a positive course.

O: It was argued that should be "is".

K: I would like to take out the sentence about Kennedy. It's fair but I think it is in bad taste for me.

O: ________ was indivisible it was said.

K: That's all right. That's good. Then when you said "when we got into
Vietnam we were faced with a world ..." What I meant to say was "centrally
directed guerrilla war".

O: All right.

K: Leave out Morocco and as it happened in Vietnam. Then I would like "regardless of importance of any particular country" that sentence to read "we had to defeat ..."

O: Take ....

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Don Oberdorfer

7:35 p.m., January 15, 1971

NARA, Date 5/26

K: How to defeat _______ war regardless of importance of any particular country. Drop the next sentence not because I didn't say it but because it could be read very wrong in Vietnam. Our interest was in stopping aggression wherever. Now we are attempting to start back the other way. In some other countries we have commitments, don't say two countries. Not equally important in terms of countries so that it is read in relation to ....... Our position is to align commitments with our interest not the other way around. Did you ever get the figures we got for you?

O: Yes I did, I got them this afternoon. I hope this doesn't cause any problem for you but I called following up on how the Vietnam policy was made. [I tried to call Mort Halperin and then] I called Ellsbery (sp?) to tell me what happened on that thing and he got very excited and said, Oh, Christ.

K: Drop his name.

O: No, No -- he asked is this being said to embarrass us and I said, No for Christ's sake -- I asked Henry what happened and I explained it to him so he told me a little bit about this.

K: Just drop his name -- he can align himself on this option on a total line-out option if he wants to.

O: Read an article to Mr. Kissinger -- December '68 when Henry Kissinger was recruited ........." Is it finally signed or something?

K: What do you mean, settled?

O: Can you say in here whatever the resolution of this is?

K: Can you call me by noon tomorrow?

O: All right, sir, I'll do that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Kirk Douglas

7:55 p.m., January 15, 1971

K: He can be called on Area Code 704/669-8031. The White House rules don't permit them to give out the home numbers but if you call the White House (456-1414) they will put you through to Billy Graham. They are the experts. If you could wait until next week, I will have talked to him then ...

D: I'll wait but if you do have a chance ...

K: I'll talk to him next week (laughter)

D: Why are you laughing?

K: We are practically going steady.

D: Yes but look what you are doing on the religious, spiritual revolt in the country. I don't know if you really are aware to the extent this is taking on.

K: I don't know if I am.

D: Are you behaving yourself in Washington?

K: I play on the West Coast, I behave myself in Washington.

By.

NARA, Date

5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Alice McDonnell (Brian's wife)

8:48 a.m., January 16, 1971

K: How are you, Alice? I'm stuck here.

AMc: We thought you would be.

K: I got so busy yesterday -- it was my first day in the office.
How's Brian?

A: Fine. We both felt you would be terribly tied up. He is
really not expecting you.

K: Weren't you going to be up there?

A: Brian is already there. I had to stay and work on a project
I was working on here. I am going up later today.

K: Where are you staying in case I am up theretomorrow.

A: We can be reached at 535-2261.

K: You will be there through tomorrow?

A: Yes.

K: If I get into town, it will be very late tonight. I will call you
tomorrow. I would love to see you. Can't you come down here
sometime?

A: After we get a little settled. I told Brian about your invitation
to come down. I think we will be able to in two to three weeks.

K: Great. Good, Alice. It's nice to talk to you.

lds

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Ambassador Ellsworth/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 16, 1971 9:05 a.m.

jlj

E: Thanks for taking my call and for the invitation to stay over and meet with you either yesterday or today. I am sorry that I couldn't do it but I already had an appointment in Brussels with George Mahon of the House Appropriations Committee. Henry, I have three points I wanted to tell you.

K: That is important. Yes, Bob.

E: About handling my return to private life. You should have opportunities to express your interest in my successor and I would like an opportunity as a private citizen to work with you in whatever capacity you would like.

K: Have you thought about how it could work?

E: No. Because of these things I have not submitted a written resignation yet. If I did it would go through the bureaucracy and the Secretary of State would find out . . .

K: You will not do it before June will you?

E: I will do it as soon as you say it is all right to submit it. I would like to submit it so that I can leave sometime this spring - at his convenience. I was thinking of submitting it around March 1st.

K: Let me talk to the President right after the State of the Union message. I have mentioned this to him and that you did not ask for anything, in fact we would have to do a selling job to make you change your mind. He noted it and said we will talk about it after the first of the year. Selfishly, I would like to maintain a relationship with you. Do you want to give it some thought. What kind of a relationship we could have.

E: One last point, until I send my letter in I think that we both think that holding it all closely is very important.

K: God yes.

E: I have had to respond to questions on this and I have just said that I would stay here as long as the President wants me.

K: Nothing has come out of my office.

E: It is just something to watch out for. You think it timely for the letter to come sometime after the State of the Union Message?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Stu Loory

9:06 a.m., January 16, 1971

K: How are you? I won't be able almost certainly to see you.
Does that story have to close today?

L: It's been hanging fire a long time. I've been writing it for the last 3-4 days. The problem is the longer we wait, the more revisions we have to make, instead of writing it properly the first time.

K: And what is it on?

L: On Sontay and the whole intelligence problem. It goes into
the whole question of how much was planned.

K: Today, the most I would have is 15 minutes and that would
have to be squeezed. Let's schedule it Monday, Tuesday or Wednesday.

L: Can I count on that, Henry?

K: Before the end of Wednesday. You can count on it.

L: In the meantime, I am going to plow ahead writing it. Wednesday is a little late. They are talking about wanting to use it before the State of the Union.

K: That has no bearing, but you will have to decide that. I will
do my best.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

9:55 a.m., January 16, 1971

L: Why don't you come on over for a light lunch?

K: I have a lunch date, but I will be glad to come over there
around 3:00 rather than have you come over here.

L: I think it's better. I didn't want to get tied up with the White
House press group. I wanted to lie low until Monday.

K: I think that's best. I'll be happy to come over.

L: Come at 3:00 or whenever you want to come.

K: How much time should we have? About 45 minutes? I'll
come at 3:00 since I have something to do at 4:00.

L: All right, Henry.

lds

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELECON

Henry Brandon/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 a.m., January 16, 1971

K: You wanted to offer me some schnitzel?

B: I wondered when we could have a strategy session on the book.

K: It can't be next week; perhaps the week after.

B: I would like to make a decision.

K: I haven't gotten clear idea from the President. From that and letting you see documents is a big step.

B: It is also a much longer route.

K: Besides why should I cut into the sales of my book?

B: You said yours would be quite different.

K: Mine will be illustrated. Once people understand what I am saying, I lose my reputation for profundity.

B: Shall we set something for the week after?

K: I will have someone call you next week. I had a call from Xandra this week. She keeps saying all the arrangements she is making with you. Whatever you do with her, you do on your own. Don't do it as a favor to me.

B: We don't know yet that she is coming. There has been some negotiation with Muffie about an agreeable date.

K: It's fine with me. I just want to make clear that it is between you and her and not between you and me. She sometimes gets a little exuberant.

B: Her last letter was disillusioned.

K: I would be delighted to see her.

B: I think Muffie said come anytime you feel you want to.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Henry Brandon/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 a.m., January 16, 1971

K: We will get together sometime next week. The party at your house was very nice.

B: You gave it the piece de resistance.

K: I thought the Sunday night party was an absolute shambles -- for people like the Freemans to be sent off with such a party.

B: I will see you next week after next.

K: Yes; good-bye.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Robert Pierpoint/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 16, 1971 11:45 a.m.

jlj

P: I don't know whether to congratulate you or commiserate. That was a very nice letter from the President. Could I possible talk you into doing a TV interview for tonight's show. It would just be a couple of minutes on your resignation from Harvard. Personality type of thing. Are you going to stay for two years? I will not ask you the good questions like are we going to go back into Cambodia. It would just be a personality interview.

K: Where would you do it?

P: Anyplace you want. The studio, your office.

K: It would just be a minute or two?

P: We would talk more than that but on the air would not go more than two minutes. It would take us about 20 minutes to set up the technical equipment in your office or if it was outside your office and then you come in and tape it.

K: I will tentatively say yes. About 2:30 p.m. I would prefer to have it in my office. I have to leave the office at 3:00 p.m. Where are your studios.

P: 2020 M Street

K: If it makes no difference to you I would prefer to have it in my office.

P: The men will be over at 2:00 p.m. to set up and then we will shoot at 2:30.

K: Good.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Under Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 16, 1971 11:55 a.m.

jlj

I: On the reports. Secretary and I were talking and he asked some specific questions.

K: What reports?

I: Report you are preparing and ultimately we will prepare. When is the plan to publish it?

K: February 18.

I: I told the Secretary that we had chatted about this and I told him that you said we would have the draft about a week from Monday. He asked how long we would have to work it over.

K: You will have 10 days to 2 weeks with it. But please don't hold me to the exact day I said.

I: The secretary asked how much of that time will we have to work together on it?

K: All that time.

I: I think the Secretary has two feelings on this. He wants to be able to review the paper and have the State Department put something into it and then he wants to look at it in a way in which if he were to do something and discuss it with the President - the whole formulation of foreign policy. It would be difficult for him if he has not had a chance to participate in preparing this report. Does not want it to be solely a White House report and solely a State product.

K: What does that mean in practice?

I: When we get it in a week from Monday we will give you our comments and the Secretary will talk to the President on general policy formulation of foreign affairs.

K: You might suggest to the Secretary that he talk to me sometime because sooner or later this always comes back to me.

I: Henry, I did not mean he would not talk to you.

K: Fine. Just tell him fine, I understand.

I: OK

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

12:00, January 16, 1971

(On IO -- missed first part)

H: I can't imagine there was any agreement on this unless it were a specific thing where Rogers talked to him and confused him into approving it. Did the President know about it?

K: No; he still doesn't know about it.

H: I would guess it would be the right thing to make a point on.

K: Unless he had an understanding with the President to do this. Once this is over there and once he challenges me, and once I lose, my position here will be untenable.

H: Is it better to do that or better to wait and force the thing on a general basis rather than one specific thing, and use that specific thing as a back-up item.

K: I will think about that.

H: It might be better. The problem is -- I can't imagine there is any agreement that would cover this. On the other hand, I can see the President if Rogers came to him on a specific issue -- how you resolve it rather than how you confront it.

K: I am determined to make him knuckle under. We have Dobrynin coming back next week. I'm not seeing him again until I know what Rogers is going to do.

H: I think that is right.

K: I will add this to the list. There's not much we can do before the State of the Union. If I change my mind, I will let you know.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Mat Storin/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

January 16, 1971 12:55 p.m.

jlj

S: The <u>Harvard Crimson</u> had a copy righted story in that <u>WORCESTER</u> ???

K: This is a matter of the Government Department. I would have
no say in this.

S: In your letter to Dr. Pusy you . . .

K: I just resigned. I made no reference to returning or asking them
to make any decisions on holding position available. It is with enormous
regret that I resigned. Harvard meant a great deal to me.

S: Do you have a desire if possible at some future time to return to Harvard?

K: I don't really want to try and say anything which would pin them
down but I would like to return to Harvard if it is possible. If I return
to academic life as I plan to do I would want to do nothing to press
to be at Harvard but I would be pleased and proud to be at Harvard.

S: Is your letter to Pusy private or could we get a copy.

K: If Harvard wishes to release it is all right with me. It is a
warm letter. I have the warmest feeling for Harvard.

S: I presume not being chosen President of Harvard has not upset you?

K: I felt a temporary disappointment. However, I was prepared as my
name did not appear on the list of about 60 possibilities.

S: One last question. Have you made any commitment to the President
on time.

K: No. Because I do not think you should make a treaty with the
President and he should be in a position where I will serve for a
period of time as he wants me.

Bob Oberdorfer/Mr. Kissinger

January 16, 1971 1 p.m.

jlj

(not verbatim)

By. NARA, Date 5/26

O: Can we say something about your decision?

K: Yes, I have resigned today. It was announced here at the White House by the press secretary. I thought that was why you called.

O: Were you present at the briefing?

K: I was not present.

O: The Press Secretary announced it and released a letter that the President had written to me. I imagine it was a hard decision to make from your point.

K: Very difficult.

O: You told me 2 years was the longest leave they give at Harvard.

K: Yes. I have the warmest feelings about my colleagues and Harvard. My resigning reflects nothing but the rules of Harvard.

O: Do you have any expectation of how long you will remain with the President?

K: No.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Jim Naughton/Mr. Kissinger
January 16, 1971 2:50 p.m.

jlj

(not verbatim)

N: I just wanted to ask you about your resignation from Harvard.
Were you in the briefing this morning?

K: I thought it would be self-serving and I did not want to come in.

N: Is the speculation correct that you have had informal assurances
that you would be welcomed back at Harvard at some point.

NXX K: These things cannot be informal. Yes, I think it is reasonable for me to assume that I will be welcome but that is in no sense formal nor would I want that to be used to try to push them into something formal.

N: I am sure they could not make a formal promise as it is a rule
at Harvard. . . How long are you going to stay with this Administration -
I presume 4 or 8 years.

K: I will stay as long as I am being useful.

N: 4 or 8 years.

K: I do not want to say any time figure. I have not thought about
the second term as it seems to far away I have not even thought
of it. I wouldn't want to speculate on time.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Adm. Moorer/Kissinger (secure phone)

2:00 pm 1/18/71

K: We are going to discuss teach you politics before this is over. Getting these people lined up one at a time. Your boss went out a message this weekend putting off the second operation based on a discussion with me this weekend. Loas. I said we wanted to go after the world report. I misunderstood. I thought it wasn't ready before the 20th.

M: They just came up with the new date.

K: We want it to go earlier if feasible. Dates you gave are what the President wants. Late January or early February. We hold you personally responsible. No changes in orders are correct unless you hear from me.

M: I understood we would go ahead.

K: Make sure Abrams knows. Laird told me that he told Abrams that said it should go after the 20th of Feb. I said that when I thought it was slated to go on the 20th to discuss free up the President's State of the World. But if it can go earlier in Feb. we don't want to wait. We can hold up the TV address more easily than winning the war. Make sure it goes on the earliest possible date.

M: I will work on it. I am going to talk with him now.

K: You will make sure that goes?

M: Right.

K: Excellent.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
1/8/71 3:45 p.m.

P: Couple of things. With regard to what we talked about today and
Ziegler's comment on this . . .

K: As it turned out he didn't comment.

P: Okay. I want you to watch very closely now and over the next few
months on this. Let's keep Ron out of it. Have him stonewall it; say no
comment. Have him turn it over to State. I'll be having about one press-
conference per month and I'll handle it. Here's the point: no matter how
well we think it out, let some of the other guys make the hard plays once
in a while.

K: I already gave him your instructions on this at noon. He didn't say
anything today.

P: Good. And you're getting out the memo on the Bureau of the Budget?

K: Absolutely, this afternoon.

P: Just put this out as coming from you.

K: Or maybe I could talk with Shultz and he could put it out.

P: That's better. Say Laird raised it with me and the way we feel on
this is "nothing without the President's approval." My guess is that Schlesinger
did this

K: Or someone on his staff.

P: No, he's loyal; it was probably someone on his staff. Yes, that's
much the better way to do it. You could tell Shultz the President got taken on
by Laird on this and from now on Shultz should insist on discipline. One thing,
I was teed off at that article in Time or Life or something about State being
downgraded. What kind of thing is that to say?

K: It was in the Times and what it is a whole series of leaks from State
that are false. They said they had the idea for the Annual Review. But this we
did in the memo by which you established the system on January 20.

P: And something about that DeGaulle thing I proposed. Of course I did it.

K: You wrote it by hand!

P: Do they think I'm going to just sit there and parrot them?

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Telecon
The President

1/18/71 3:45 p.m. page 2

K: And for them to say is it true the President is not well-liked by the Department but he has done nothing to improve his image here.

P: But it was an anonymous source, right?

K: Yes.

P: They really are squirming.

K: And then they have a whole series of nit-picking things.

P: I just read the first page and thought the hell with it. I think this is just a newspaper guy trying to make trouble. But the problem is they are making the Secretary look bad when they don't need to. The thing is I do more in foreign policy than Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson. And the reason is because I know more about it than they did. But look at how much I delegate. This morning I said okay Bill, you and Hardin work it out.

K: But they should be in the business of building you up.

P: It's okay. It doesn't hurt us in the country.

K: I talked with Safire and he said it was a kamikaze impulse on the part of them

P: We are now well-positioned on the State of the Union and I think it wise to put off the other for a week. By that time there will be more interest in it.

K: And I think it is going to be a very good report.

P: I will come out with a constructive statement and maybe take a few questions and on it.

K: I think the best thing is for you to present it on the TV and have a press conference the next week to take questions on it.

P: The only thing about that is if you present it there has to be some news. They will say what is the news in this report? You have got any idea on that?

K: Let me think for a day or two. I think it is the most comprehensive statement -- that's its impact.

P: But the State of the Union is also comprehensive. We have got to pick out something -- I can't go on TV just to say I have put it out without a . . .

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

1/18/71 3:45 p.m. page 3

Got to have some news. I would read the statement for 10 minutes and then take 30 minutes from the press. They are going to nitpick anyway. I could present it and then have a press conference limited to foreign policy.

K: We have at the end of each chapter a part marked "Agenda for the Future."

P: That's what makes the news. A 10-minute statement would include the agenda for a generation of peace as follows. . . . . There's no hurry on this, plenty of time. But the important thing is we've got to keep everybody in line, like on this operation today. One of the reasons Bill and Mel are willing to go on this was Cambodia.

K: What happened was Moorer and some of our people worked it out and then you brought Laird along on it. He brought Rogers along. He was very negative but the fact that he knew you were willing to take the risk was why he came along.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
1/18/71; 7:10 p. m.

K: On that personnel matter that we discussed today, the President suggested that you stick with ______ and advance him to Commandant with the understanding that he give Cushman the Deputy job in June.

L: I can handle that. Henry, I can handle anything if I get a little time.

K: Can we tell this to Cushman if we tell him to keep quiet about it?

L: Chappy is coming back. I would like to work it out with him.

K: Then we won't say anything to Cushman until you tell us. If we do it that way then we . . .

L: I will get you dates and everything but let me talk to Chappy first. He will not be back until the end of the week. We can keep everybody happy this way.

feg

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
FonMin Luns/Kissinger
9:30 a.m. 1/19/71

L: I have just told the (Ambassador?) that I set aside 25 gilders to buy you out if something happens to you.

K: That's very nice of you.

L: Yes, just like Luns. I want you to know if you ever come to Holland I would like to see you.

K: I would like to see you. When you come to Washington do let me know so we can get together.

L: I have been here only one day. I hope to see you in Bildenburg.

K: I hope to come.

L: Ernst rode over with me. He was extremely touched when he talked with you.

K: I have so many friends in the Netherlands. Do let me know when you are next in Washington and we will get together no later than Bildenburg.

L: And you can lie at the feet of the President.

K: Yes. I won't introduce you because you will probably get another landing right.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Dorothy Zinberg/Kissinger

10:55 a.m.

1/19/71

K: Where are you?

Z: In my office. We have a new dialing system so we have our own number.

K: We got through so quickly.

Z: I won't see you I gather.

K: I don't know -- what did --

Z: Dianne told me you are spending an hour with the children and then going to the meeting at the Faculty Club.

K: That's right.

Z: What a day!

K: What?

Z: Increased activity in Cambodia is starting to rumble around more.

K: Everytime I come we discuss Cambodia.

Z: Did you see the articles on the front page of the GLOBE and TIMES?

K: No -- oh, the TIMES says "___".

Z: And the article about you at the bottom of the front page.

K: Naturally, that I have seen. You think it will be bad today?

Z: No. It's just interesting.

K: The thing to do is to watch the trend and we are getting out. The other thing is just tactics. We have gotten out and reduced casualties after, last year, and we are doing the same this year. We are not going into Cambodia and it's hysteria to fret about it.

Z: You will have a chance to put it into x words today.

K: I have no question about it.

Z: It's a panel on China?

K: Yes, but they will start with VN first.

BY

NARA

Date 5/26

D. Zinberg/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 1/19/71

-2-

Z: It's a closed group anyway.

K: It has to be judged when it's over. I am fairly optimistic it's going to work.
so --

Z: I hope so.

K: I think, Dorothy, we may have to take a beating again for a few weeks.

Z: I hope not. Are you heading back right afterwards?

K: Yes but I might be up there a week later for something at Endicott House.
And let me know when you are in Washington.

Z: Of course, and good luck tonight.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Hugh Sidey

11:25 a.m., January 19, 1971

K: How are you? I wanted to tell you I appreciated your letter. This is one of those things that happens with no malicious intent. There is one thing I wondered whether you could do. I appreciate your putting the letter in there. If you could ask the editors of TIME to send me any letter they get on the article, I can personally apologize.

S: I don't think there will be that much mail.

K: If there isn't much, my secretaries will like that even better. But I really feel I owe this to these people. It doesn't affect our relationship.

S: But I will be much more careful.

K: I can see how it happened. It may be fairly amusing.

S: Under that context, I didn't understand it. Now that I think about it more, I see the unfortunate element there. I am in Atlanta right now, but when I get back I will do this.

K: I recognize that. Do it when you get back.

S: I don't think there's any problem on that.

K: Many thanks.

lds

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

TELCOM
Amb. Rush/Kissinger

1:42 pm

x12x 1/19/71

R: I am sorry I didn't get your call earlier.

K: That's all right. The President wanted me to check on one thing. The conversation with Muskie and Brandt this weekend. Why wasn't there a report from the Embassy?

R: He didn't want anyone to go with him. This has been true everywhere because it's a private affair.

K: I understand. No one there from the Embassy.

R: That's right.

K: That's the reason then.

R: They talked about it afterwards and nothing very exciting took place. I had a good talk with him and went into Ost-Politik and troop levels in Germany. He was very receptive to troop level here and Harriman ? ? ? and Muskie is re-thinking the entire issue.

K: You are not coming over here soon?

R: No. I am sorry I missed you.

K: Anything outstanding happen today at the meeting?

R: No. I think the Russians are trying to make an agreement. ______ wanted to see me for dinner last night. I XXX saw him in Sept. He came over and stayed until 2:00 and we canvassed everything. You will get a full report on that. No progress made today but he stayed after the other ambassadors left but I think they will be getting edgy. If we can hold our position and not let it out of hand we will get an unfreezing.

K: It's my thought and the President. We admire the job you are doing.

R: Thank you. I protested quite strongly the interference with civilian and US traffic. He threatened worse if we to have provocation in Berlin. (Break in the connection -- HAK hung up but Rush came back saying: so conciliatory after that that he is under instructions for an agreement, I think. Notetaker indicated Mr. Kissinger had to go off the line and would call back.)

Conversation continued: 2:27 pm

K: I was called to the President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Amb. Rush/Kissinger

1:42 pm

1/19/71

R: That's a good reason. Give him my best regards.

K: We were pretty well finished. You were telling me that you thought there might be some progress.

R: No progress in talks themselves.

K: But psychologically you thought.

R: There are blank spots in your words.

K: I can hear you.

R: Psychologically they make me feel that ______ is under orders to make agreement but no indication today. He stayed on after the meeting this afternoon and continued to want to talk about Berlin. Quite a bit of unease on interruptions of the autoban. I said these jeopardize the talks themselves. I have the feeling that there's a bit of hast in their desire to get an agreement. As I mentioned earlier six if we can hold firm and not give in to these that are weak, we will do fine.

K: You are under no pressure from us.

R: I know. The worst pressures are from Bahr. Ehmke is apt to panic under pressure on this issue. Bahr has panicked and does not reflect Brandt's feeling. The Chancellor has been in accord with what we have done. That's it.

K: I just talked to the President and we both admire what you are doing. I told him of your conversation. Look in when you are back.

R: I will and if you want me back or want to call, do. It's good to have you there and I am pleased to have you there. You are a source of great strength.

K: If you say it a year from now, we have broken the back of this thing.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January 20, 1970

K: Mel, how are you?

L: I have gone over the transcript of yesterday; I thought I should read it. It's a hell of a long transcript.

K: Of Ziegler's?

L: Yes.

K: The President says he gave specific instructions to do it. But I told Ziegler to stay off Defense business.

L: He says I have given authority to go into close air support, and that is something new. We always state we are giving air support. I suppose I have to come out now and say I have given some authority for close air support.

K: The President wants to say what we are doing; he doesn't want to hide it. But he doesn't want to go into new or old authorities.

L: I think it's a mistake. We should hardline it and say we use air power the best way we can use it. They get into a discussion between the kinds of helicopters. That is screwed up. What do you think I should do? It goes on page after page.

K: I don't know why we got into that. He should have said, 'Defense will give you the details.'

L: I got in touch with Saigon and told them to keep their mouths shut.

K: I would say the situation is there are no new authorities. Tell the truth. What we are doing changes from time to time as the tactical situation changes. The targets change -- not the authorities.

L: We were flying more sorties a while back.

K: On June 30, the President did say we would not give logistic and air support.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

10:30 a.m., January 20, 1971

- 2 -

L: We were flying air sorties.

K: But we were calling them interdiction.

L: Well, we will stonewall it.

K: Don't get into the question of new authorities. Make the
distinction between new targets. We hit targets that weren't available
as their defensive develops. Don't you think?

L: Yes, I do. I think that is the way to handle it. You will get
some commander out there and he will say we didn't give any new
authority. It creates a credibility gap.

K: Just tell what we are doing. But I know you will get that
all screwed up.

L: Anything else?

K: That is all I have

lds

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

TELECON

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

K 11:28 a.m., January 20, 1971

K: Brian, how are you?

M: Fair to middling. I have a job -- I'm going to get a paycheck.

K: Terrific; but saints have no business earning money.

M: They obviously aren't encouraged to. The job is interesting.

K: What are you doing?

M: I am the Community Service Coordinator for the largest Community Service organization in Philadelphia. It is very much 'community' -- it is community-based. It lets me give technical assistance. It's the place to be at this point. Alice is doing well.

K: I talked to her last week. I was delighted to hear that. I didn't get up. I had to speak to some Republican Congressmen who were getting briefings.

M: I have a couple of things.

K: I am expecting the Attorney General to drop by shortly and I am going to raise the Berrigan issue. Frankly, it may get you into trouble.

M: They have already bothered all of my friends -- where I was, when, etc. It's disheartening, bothering people with no relationship to me. They get people excited without any kind of information.

K: You can be sure I am not talking to anyone.

M: The whole scene of the indictment is whacked out. While there might be evidence, there is some disproportionate kind of thinking. Now this is official -- let's put on our official hats. What I suggested to some of the people named as co-conspirators -- they called me and I know them very well --

K: Should you discuss this on the telephone?

M: I guess not. You are right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

11:28 a.m., January 20, 1971

K: I would be delighted to hear it, but I don't want to get you into trouble.

M: You won't get me into trouble, but I was worried it might get you into trouble.

K: It won't bother me.

M: The meeting last night was very open to anyone who wanted to come.

K: I didn't know there was a meeting.

M: It was/good meeting. XEXW One of the things that came up is they would like to sit down with you as a man who has been threatened.

K: Of course, I will do it. The co-conspirators?

M: Yes. I think it would be very good.

K: I am willing to do it. Let me check with the Security Service first.

M: Do that, and do some thinking about it.

K: Like who? The nuns?

M: Particularly two people: Tom Davison, ex-religious; and Bill Davidow.

K: In principle, I am happy to do it.

M: First, I would like you to do a check with security, and two, think about the ground rules you would like.

K: The only ground rule is they cannot come out and say they talked to me. They are the same rules as I had with you. If it's a personal dialogue, I would be happy to do it. If it is a publicity platform, I won't do it. I don't want them to say anything. I take it they consider this a human problem. If they want to establish a human contact, I am happy to do it.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

11:28 a.m., January 20, 1971

M: That is exactly what my feeling was.

K: If they want to step out of the White House and say they assured me they didn't mean to kidnap me...

M: The only assurance I can give you will be that I will ascertain to the best I can that this will not happen.

K: That's fair enough.

M: They have been open and honest with me. Consequently, I feel they would say they want the press. And then I can say, 'Henry would say no.' I think there is a need for them and also for you to have that personal contact. Let me let you get back to the security people. The time and that sort of thing we can work out. The other problem -- when I called this morning I asked to be transferred to Winston and asked for a copy of your thing that is published -- the report in San Clemente.

K: It doesn't exist yet. You will get it, of course.

M: How are you doing? And how are the children? It was good to see you get the place and have a chance to think in San Clemente. As far as my own safety, I feel very safe and it has even brought my brother close to me.

K: On this conspiracy?

M: He said, 'if you have any problems, I will help any way I can.'

K: But you couldn't be part of it, judging it on human grounds.

M: I can honestly say the things I know about in regard to talk about your being kidnapped -- which I brought to you -- was true. The people are so confused.

K: I have never told anyone what you said. They got the information from other sources.

M: If they are looking for information, they will not use you. I have no problem with that.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

12:06 pm

1/20/71

K: Did you get them screwed up?

L: Yep.

K: Good.

L: I hope they can -- in that transcript yesterday Ron indicated that the Nixon Doctrine didn't include air support. We have to clear that up.

K: I will see to it that he stays out of this. It's out of the question.

L: We don't have to go that far. Shouldn't get that all screwed up now. With due and proper respect for the WH. That was tough.

K: Don't go overboard. I don't get any attacks from your building.

L: They can point out when they brief Ron, whoever does it in your shop --

K: He is great but he never refused to answer questions.

L: Sometimes you have to. I have never even got a question on the POW thing.

K: At Harvard yesterday one of my senior colleagues on Son Tay said that we knew there were prisoners there and we wanted them to get killed so we could escalate the war and they knew what we were planning and didn't want to escalate the war so they pulled the prisoners out. I said I never heard such a convoluted mind. They are more convoluted than you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Atty. Gen./Kissinger

12:50 p.m. 1/20/71

K: Bob, Geo. Shultz and John Ehrlichman and I are having a meeting at 4:30 today on a problem we discussed with you.

AG: We discussed that but they said they changed the time to 9:30 tomorrow morning.

K: If that's true, fine. They didn't get to me. The last I had was 4:30 today.

AG: Maybe we have meetings mixed up.

K: I will straighten it out and get back to you. Anyway, I am delighted you are coming.

AG: Glad to be there.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
2:50 pm 1/20/71

L: I have several things that we are ready to present and I -- part have been presented and I have talked with the President informally about them but I think we should present them. Dave has this CINC thing with commanders and chiefs and we have the joint chiefs aboard. I think we should submit it in writing and brief the President.

K: After the State of the Union. Next week.

L: Yes. The other item I talked with the President about. Hearings will start mid-February and we haven't got list of all names but probably around 25 witnesses. A couple have g backgrounds as Defense Attaches. They are out of the service but have volunteered to tell about some things they have done in various foreign countries.

K: Very helpful.

L: We have it worked out so we bring the civilian control but don't run tactical intelligence. I haven't presented it to the Chiefs yet because I wanted to give it to the President first. I talked with him generally about it in Dec. We will tell the Chiefs. They will oppose what was in process because of the J-2 function but we maintain that but they don't know that yet because I felt first I should tell the President.

K: I was writing you today. The President has ordered Shultz to look at intelligence organizations.

L: That's Schlessigner's deal and I know what he recommends.

K: He wants nothing done before he looks at it.

L: I have to do this.

K: Why?

L: Because we have to put in civilian line up.

K: You said you were putting investigative functions under civilians.

L: The intelligence gathering is now under SecDef but the ______ is under ______. Put the intelligence gathering in attaches working in civilian communities abroad we will have no trouble.

K: That's not approved here.

L: The President was told and he understands.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

2:50 pm

1/20/71

-2-

K: To run something by in his office is not an approval.

L: We have to do it before the hearings. It's a weakness and we have to admit it.

K: What is it?

L: To establish that civilian control involved.

K: I didn't know the issue.

L: The military can investigate civilian people in foreign countries without authority. That's the same problem as domestic intelligence. It will be continued but we need better control. It's worked out. The President should see it first.

K: And the Chiefs.

L: I don't want the Chiefs to know until I told the President he would see it first.

K: Why don't you send it over and I will ask the President what he thinks.

L: I think I should talk to the President. It will be a political problem.

K: Will you send over what you are proposing todo?

L: I will send a memo on the direction we are going. We have ______ on BOB on this. We cannot make reductions in intelligence.

K: I agree on that.

L: What Schlessinger is considering -- I had Froeke sit down with Schlessinger and explain it. I think the discussions were very adequate and I don't think the President should do anything before I talk with him.

K: Send us a memo. Just to the President.

L: Could I do this? Geo. Anderson has made comments. Could Froeke w sit down with him?

K: Sure.

L: Then I will sit down with the Chiefs. Just w so we can maintain what we are doing.

K: If you could give me a piece of paper and I will discuss it with the President and then we will bring you in. But we will not do anything wisk with out you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

-3-

K: (cont) I knew nothing about this until now. We won't take action before you talk with him.

L: Let's not get BOB in it.

K: No, this was on budget thing but this conversation is --

L: Good. One other thing. Do I understand we should brief Sullivan and Green on this?

K: Let Johnson.

L: They wanted to brief our briefers over there today but I cut it off with Bill but said we would do it over here.

K: Exactly right.

L: I thought you should know in case of feedback.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

WELCON

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

3:24 pm

1/20/71

K: On this Annual Report business. We are getting our drafts now into a shape that in a day or two they can be looked at. The President has changed the date to Feb. 25. That's for us and 3 weeks earlier for you. So that gives your people 2 weeks before it goes to the printing printer. The stuff that bothers you can be changed. But 2 good weeks of working time. What I would appreciate if you could set up a system so it doesn't leak all over town so every country director doesn't look at it. The reason we haven't shown you anything is because the drafts have been so bad there's no reason for decision until it's been good. We have your report.

J: Sure thing.

K: What we will know do when our stuff is in good shape, I will have Cargo sit in on resolving drafts. They won't be final but we will proceed from criticism.

J: He has a good feel for this.

K: He did a fine job last year. I just wanted you to know our feeling. I will call him tomorrow when we know where we stand.

J: Fine. Thanks.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Alex Butterfield
1/20/71; 7:35 p.m.

B: Bob thought I should check with you and Ehrlichman on seating for the State of the Union on Friday. From Connally and Bush on, we have gone from seniority. Do you have strong feelings? Some people feel we should have the Mayor of Washington in the President's box. You sat there last year, too.

K: Yes, that's right.

B: Before Bob passed final judgment he wanted your input.

K: Can I bring Jill St. John?

B: Yes. Ehrlichman is not going to be there. He thought Ray Price should take his place.

K: And I am hurrying back from Chicago to make it because I thought the President's feelings would be hurt.

B: He says he is going to be out of town. They have Dr. David -- is Dr. David senior to you. After the Ass'ts we plan to have Ray Price & Klein.

K: Set me up for the motorcade, etc. Thank you, Alex, it was very thoughtful of you.

feg

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger
morning 1/20/70

H: 4:30 is fine. I suggest we consider including Mitchell.

K: Delighted and wanted that done but thought it should stay in the WH.

H: I talked with him this morning and he thinks it's a good idea. Have you asked Shultz?

K: Have you?

K: I left it to Haig.

H: I question Shultz.

K: Only because he said he would use the OMB on this thing. I leave it to you.

H: If we get Mitchell in we have consultation thing effectively and use Shultz on working it out afterwards.

K: I will come over for a few minutes.