Statement from the
Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs
London, 3-7 September, 1962

We scientists from 36 countries, assembled at the Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, are united by an awareness that the scientific revolution has created a radically new situation for humanity, endowing man with an unprecedented capacity for creation and destruction. We have come to London to seek the most effective ways to ensure that science shall be a blessing to mankind and not a curse.

Our chief concern is to prevent war and to relieve humanity of the fearful anxieties and the grave economic burdens caused by the arms race. A general war with nuclear weapons would be a disaster of unimaginable magnitude. It would destroy a large fraction of the people now alive and jeopardise the conditions of life of the survivors.

Throughout the world competition in armaments absorbs an immense amount of talent and resources. This is wasted because so far from giving security, it increases the risk of war. Against global rockets with thermonuclear war-heads there is no effective defence. In this situation, the traditional view of war, or the threat of war as an instrument of policy is obsolete. War must be eliminated from the life of mankind. General and complete disarmament, with effective means of preserving international security, is the most urgent issue in world affairs.

Disarmament and a stable peace are essential conditions for making a new society in which poverty could be abolished.

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The prospect of such a world is no longer Utopian. The technological and scientific triumphs of our own times have already far outstripped the boldest dreams of recent generations and knowledge increases ever more rapidly.

In our Conferences we have therefore concentrated attention on the complex problems of disarmament. These have included: the steps by which disarmament could be achieved, and measures to ensure the confidence and security of states during the process; the measures needed to keep the peace in a disarmed world; and the economic problems which might be encountered while disarming. Our discussions have led us to believe that solutions may be found for all these problems.

We have also paid special attention to the problem of stopping nuclear tests, and to proposals on this subject made at Geneva by non-aligned nations. Novel suggestions were made at the Conference for improving the effectiveness of the means of detecting nuclear tests by automatic sealed seismic stations. These would be put in places in agreed numbers by the host nation after being sealed by an international authority and would not, we think, endanger the security of any country.

We have reached the conclusion that in the process of general and complete disarmament, the early elimination, with adequate and effective verification measures, and within a short period of time, of the means of delivery of the weapons of mass destruction would constitute a satisfactory beginning when linked with substantial reductions of conventional military forces and armaments and with the solution of the problems arising from the presence of troops and bases on foreign soil.

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The experience of our Conferences leads us to believe that scientists have a special contribution to make to the solution of these problems. Informal discussions between scientists contribute to the understanding of different points of view.

We consider that our Conferences have been useful, but we are in a period of immensely rapid change in which new problems are constantly emerging. Scientists should therefore increase their efforts to bring about disarmament and conditions of lasting peace. Scientists of all nations have a commanding duty to help their fellow citizens to understand that war is obsolete and what steps can ensure peace. They should, we believe, recognize their responsibilities to promote disarmament and should invite Governments, learned societies and other institutions to support them in this task.

Increasing confidence between nations is an essential element in progress towards disarmament and stable peace. As a contribution to mutual understanding we have therefore also considered constructive proposals for many kinds of international collaboration in science. These have included proposals for large-scale cooperation in pure science and international efforts for the application of science to the advancement of the newly developing nations.

We are now at a stage in which general statements of principles are not enough; action is needed. Some proposals to promote disarmament and human welfare need detailed study

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to assess their implications; others could be implemented
immediately. We reassert our conviction that the goal of full
disarmament and permanent peace is realistic and urgent. This
work is truly to be seen as a part of a long struggle for the
progress of mankind, and it is one in which scientists have a
responsible part to play. We call upon scientists everywhere in
the world to join us in this task.

London, 3-7 September, 1962

Report from the Standing Committee on Future Activities

At the first plenary session of the Tenth International Pugwash Conference a standing committee was charged to recommend future activities. The Standing Committee received advice and many excellent proposals from Conference participants. The selection of proposals was governed by the limited financial and staff resources of the Continuing Committee. In addition was the requirement that all proposals be faithful to the following principles:

1. The goal of full disarmament and permanent peace is realistic and urgent, and all activities of the Pugwash movement should be directly related to this goal.

2. Pugwash is an association of scientists, and the criterion of work should be that it is scientific or technical in itself, or represents a problem which can be tackled by the application of the scientific method.

3. Pugwash must not duplicate the work of other international agencies, but this does not exclude examination of questions being considered by these agencies.

4. Pugwash conferences must be non-governmental, although scientists serving in official capacities are welcome.

5. The conferences as a general rule should be small.

6. All conferences should be directly concerned with achievement of disarmament and permanent peace. Subjects less directly relevant to this goal may be included on the conference agenda. It is recommended that it would be desirable to rotate the participants in order to broaden the representation from various countries.

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## Future Conferences

1. The International Continuing Committee shall convene conferences at its discretion.

2. It is recommended that, in response to the invitation from our Pugwash colleagues in India, a conference should be held in that country. The programme would consider the uses of science in assisting developing nations, the possibilities of international collaboration in this endeavour and its significance for the achievement of permanent peace.

3. In response to an invitation from Yugoslavia, it is recommended that a conference be held in Yugoslavia on the "Role of the Smaller Powers in Achieving the Goal of Disarmament and Permanent Peace." Although participants from the larger powers should be invited, the major working papers should be prepared by the smallernations.

4. The Committee on Future Activities welcomes the invitation from Czechoslovakia.

5. It is recommended that the Continuing Committee expand its activities so as to include regional conferences. It is proposed that a conference be arranged with the participation of scientists from India and Pakistan in order to promote contacts and co-operation in science. The regional conferences should be in accordance with the spirit and organization of the international Pugwash Conferences.

## Agenda Items to be Included in Future Conferences

The Committee felt that according to the principles outlined in the introduction of this report the following items did not individually merit the attention of a full conference, but considered them of sufficient importance to be included as agenda items.

1. An assessment of the biological and environmental consequences of possible nuclear wars and the peacetime releases of radioactive materials.

2. Implementation of the specific proposals made at the Seventh Conference on international collaboration, and any new proposals

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which might arise. If indicated, either in the working group of a conference, or by other developments, interim study groups should be arranged to forward specific proposals.

3. The general problem of keeping the peace in a disarming and disarmed world should be an item on agenda in future disarmament conferences. Working Group IV of the Ninth Conference described several aspects of this subject.

## Pugwash Projects

### 1. Study Groups

a) It was agreed that preliminary discussion under Pugwash auspices among a small group of East and West scholars should begin on the topic "Fear and Mistrust as Barriers to Disarmament and Stable Peace".

b) National Pugwash study groups should be encouraged to undertake investigations on particular problems and any new approaches which may contribute to disarmament conferences and the maintenance of peace, e. g., the question of whether a nuclear disarmament zone is feasible in Central Europe and what measures of control might be required. A second subject might be the study of the limited zone of disarmament as a test zone for control procedures.

c) It is suggested that the Continuing Committee encourage the formation of other groups in relation to the Pugwash movement, based on the same pattern of East-West scientific collaboration, to deal with such subjects as education, aid to developing nations and other matters.

### 2. Publication

The International Continuing Committee should fulfil two responsibilities in the area of publications and communications. The first task is to keep Pugwash scientists informed of one another's work and activities. The second task is to inform the public.

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To carry out the first task, the Committee recommends a private Pugwash newsletter to be issued about four times a year. The copyright should be held by the International Committee and the circulation limited to Pugwash participants and supporters. The Secretary-General should be Editor-in-Chief, and should delegate responsibility to an editor. An editorial board should be established under the jurisdiction of the International Committee. The newsletter should contain, in addition to short reports and articles, a bibliography of all published material which the Editorial Board believe should be brought to the attention of Pugwash scientists. It would be desirable that all publications bearing the Pugwash name should appear simultaneously in English and Russian.

To fulfil the second task of informing the public, the national Pugwash groups should be encouraged to undertake wide distribution of approved material. The Secretary-General should be empowered to give such approval. The Committee recommends that past efforts which included publication of Pugwash Conferences papers (with the author's permission) in magazines and journals throughout the world should be increased. Every working group from Conferences and all study groups (national or international) should inform the Secretary-General whether they agree to general publication.

### 3. Fund Raising

The Committee supports the general rule that financial assistance is welcomed from any individual, foundation, or government, provided that no strings are attached. Financial contributions should not imply any right of participation at conferences or other activities.

National groups should explore systematically new sources of funds and continue to support the travel of their members to international conferences. In addition national groups should assume a share of the operating costs of an international office.

The efficient functioning of Pugwash activities internationally requires that a systematic effort be made to acquire adequate finances. The Secretary-General may employ a suitable individual or utilise the services of a small group of interested

Cambridge, 1962.

IX.WG.1.14

Final Report of Working Group 1

Problems of reduction and elimination under inter-
national control of weapons of mass destruction and
of their means of delivery

Having considered the official disarmament schemes pre-
sented to the Committee of 18 since the last Pugwash meeting at
Stowe, we have been able to agree that a first stage which aims
at the elimination during a short period of time of the means of
delivery of weapons of mass destruction would constitute a satis-
factory beginning to the process of general and complete disarma-
ment, when linked with certain other measures in the field of con-
ventional armaments. For some of us these measures would include
the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawl of
troops from foreign territory. Others did not consider it essenti-
al to link in the first stage these measures with the elimination
of the means of delivery.

We are not agreed, however, as to the extent of the initial
destruction of these delivery systems. Admittedly, the problem is
complicated by the difficulties encountered when attempting to de-
fine in detail what is meant by "the means of delivery". It is
clear enough when long-range missiles are considered. It is made
more difficult by the existence of small dual-purpose guns and
aircraft. If for no other reason, it is clearly essential that
elimination of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction
shall be linked in time and extent with substantial reductions in
conventional armaments.

Two main proposals have emerged. The first requires the
complete destruction during the first stage of all systems capable
of delivering nuclear weapons, together with verification of the
destruction process, and dismantling of factories declared to be
relevant by the nation possessing them and presenting to the
International Disarmament Organisation such data on the military
production of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons as are
necessary to accomplish the measures envisaged at this stage.
The second requires a very substantial destruction of delivery
systems down to a minimum level which would maintain the balance
of force between the two sides. This would be followed by a later
reduction to zero as adequate means were provided to enable all
nations to convince themselves in a reasonable manner that dis-
armament was in fact proceeding according to the terms of the
treaty and that adequate measures existed to prevent rearmament.
We also considered briefly a third proposal which will be menti-
oned at the end of our report.

Whatever procedure is adopted, it is important to take
into account the uncertainties involved in any verification pro-
cess. These uncertainties are a highly technical matter relat-

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IX. WG.1.14

A point of view was expressed that some form of zonal sampling, possibly combined with the complete isolation of inspection personnel from contacts outside the International Disarmament Organisation, might meet this stringent requirement. We agreed that if reasonable suspicions would arise that other factories were engaged in clandestine activities such suspicions could be checked by appropriate procedures which could be worked out.

The relation between the destruction of the means of delivery on the one hand, and the elimination of foreign bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil on the other, was broadly discussed. The view was expressed by some that since bases were capable of being used for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and since ballistic missiles were intended in part to balance the existence of foreign bases and the presence of foreign troops, the complete elimination of bases and the complete withdrawal of troops from foreign soil must accompany the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. It was attempted to make a distinction between bases capable of delivering nuclear weapons and those intended merely for the use of conventional forces and armaments. The general elimination of the means of delivery would of course include the elimination of systems mounted on foreign bases. However, the view was expressed that all bases were capable of delivering nuclear weapons of some kind. The question of foreign bases is also linked to the general problems of the elimination of conventional forces and armaments considered by Working Group II and to which we have already drawn attention.

Biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction have destructive powers and delivery systems which parallel rather closely those of some atomic weapons. We were therefore able to agree without difficulty that these should be treated in much the same manner as atomic weapons so that, for example, a complete elimination of delivery systems in general would go a long way towards rendering them useless for practical purposes.

A variant of the above proposals was suggested by some participants and a possible scheme which might deserve further and more detailed study and was discussed briefly. It has been introduced partly in an attempt to deal with the point of view that, whereas larger weapons are most easily controlled by eliminating the means of delivery, there comes a point at which smaller weapons might more easily be controlled by the elimination of fissile material. Some overlap between what has hitherto been called stages 1 and 2 is thus envisaged. The first stage of this new scheme consists in the reduction of delivery systems down to a minimum level determined by the uncertainties of the initial verification process, let us say ten per cent for the sake of argument, although it would be rather less for large systems such as submarines and long-range rockets and rather more for the smaller means of delivery. The second stage would contain two operations: the elimination of nuclear stockpiles down to the

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IX.WG.1.14

uncertainty level of, say, 20 per cent, and the complete elimination of the remaining delivery systems. Thus, the second stage would end with there being no delivery systems and only 20 per cent of the nuclear stockpiles. Only at this point would the locations and types of the remaining nuclear weapons be declared. The final elimination of this remaining stockpile would then be done in stage 3 under conditions of completely open control and inspection.

We had no time to discuss other schemes such as zonal disarmament which, it was suggested by some, might be of value either as alternatives, or in combination with the schemes discussed above.

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IX WG 2.8

Final Report of Working Group II

Working Group II first considered which countries would have to be included in agreement on conventional disarmament. The point was made that if the People's Republic of China were not part of such an agreement, this fact would have to be reflected in the total forces the United States might retain. The working group agreed on three general principles:

a) It would be desirable for the People's Republic of China to participate in disarmament negotiations concerning conventional forces.

b) If the People's Republic of China - or other significant military powers - do not participate this fact will have to be taken into account in the ceilings to be established for conventional forces.

c) The nuclear powers can discuss first steps- particularly in the nuclear field - even without the participation of the People's Republic of China.

The working group took account of the presentation of Academician Topchiev at the opening plenary session to the effect that reductions in forces on a percentage basis tended to favour the side enjoying superiority in a given category. It was therefore agreed that conventional disarmament was most effectively approached by fixing ceilings not only in terms of manpower but in terms of absolute number of weapons to be retained, particularly in the categories of tanks, self-propelled artillery, heavy and light artillery, machine guns and mortars.

The group believes that the first stage of conventional disarmament should take place during a stage of nuclear disarmament leading to the point where no massive nuclear attack by one side on the other can take place and all foreign strategic nuclear bases are withdrawn. We agree that at some stage in the process of conventional disarmament all troops should withdraw to their own national boundaries; we are not all of the same opinion as to when in the process of disarmament this withdrawal should take place. Those who favoured an early withdrawal held that foreign bases suitable for regional defense might be retained until the end of disarmament, provided they contained no foreign troops, nuclear weapons or means of delivery and were under national command.

The group agrees that at each stage of disarmament, a balance between conventional forces should be established both globally and regionally. Further, the group is of the view that the ceiling on forces

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IX WG 2.8

and types of equipment can be established regardless of whether there
has been an agreement about the deployment of foreign troops for the
purpose of regional defense.

As to methods of verification of disarmament it was agreed that:

(a) At the beginning of the disarmament process, all states should specify the forces including reserves, both in manpower and military material, to be demobilized in order to reduce these forces to agreed ceilings.

(b) During the process of disarmament, the International Control Organ should be given access to relevant statistical data, including budgets and to production records of plants that have been producing conventional arms.

(c) The International Control Organ should also have the right to observe the demobilization of the units to be disbanded as part of the agreement as well as the destruction of the agreed quantity of weapons. It should also have the right to observe the conversion, dismantling and reduction of capacity for the production of conventional arms.

It was agreed that inspection can be less detailed for residual conventional forces than for nuclear forces: with conventional forces a much greater amount of violation would be required to achieve a decisive advantage.

Several possible methods were considered:

a) Inspection on the basis of sampling.

b) Inspection of limited zones on either side of the frontier so as to guard against surprise attack by residual forces.

c) Inspection at major communication centres, including airports, in an area larger than that envisaged under (b)

IX G 3.11 [LO]

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2) The Group supports the recommendations of the Seventh meeting of COSM on international collaboration in the cosmos. It notes particularly the symposium of COSPAR organized in 1962 and the increasing exchange of scientific information which is taking place. It welcomes the efforts of the UN Committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, the proposed agreement between the USA and the USSR for collaboration in particular fields, and the programmes of collaboration between countries for peaceful exploration of space.

The Group suggests that the forthcoming Tenth Pugwash Conference should devote considerable attention to questions of international collaboration on scientific space research, taking account of the Stowe recommendations.

3) The technical possibilities of using space for military purposes presents a serious threat to mankind, particularly in view of the development of new kinds of weapons. Although we recognise that the demilitarization of space can only be achieved completely in conditions of universal and complete disarmament, nevertheless we consider that it would be valuable to begin negotiations now to prevent the fitting of spacecraft with military nuclear equipment.

The Group further recommends that steps be taken immediately to prevent the use of space for experiments which endanger human life or which change the space environment to an extent that the possibility of obtaining important scientific information concerning that environment is jeopardized. On rare occasions a major experiment of such a type may be of such great importance that it may prove to be desirable from the scientific point of view; but before it is performed it should be discussed by qualified scientists internationally and cleared by an appropriate procedure. The Group recommends the establishment of an international mechanism for attaining this objective.

4) The Group considers it necessary to draft an international statute which will protect the interests of all countries in relation to cosmic bodies. The statute might be similar to the antartic treaty.

5) The Group considers it necessary in the interests of the space research of every nation, that there should be an agreement providing for the return of cosmonauts and all equipment which may accidentally land on foreign territory as a result of space experiments.

6) The Group considers that scientific research in space should be given high priority and that there should be international agreement stating that such research will not be interfered with by other uses of space. Any experiment that might cause such interference should only be undertaken if it has been cleared by the procedure suggested in paragraph (3).

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3.

IX WG 3.10

7) The Group recommends the aims of every launching of an object into space be made widely known.

8) The Group considers it necessary, when agreement has been reached on the destruction of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, that effective measures of control should be worked out over the type of load carried by the remaining rocket resources for the peaceful uses of space.

# THE PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION

## 1. A Conference on Communication

The problem of communication is most urgently a problem of mutual comprehension by governments and leaders of public opinion. Such mutual comprehension is made easier once specific and practical proposals are clearly stated, and it is the endeavour of Pugwash to do this.

Nevertheless, Pugwash may be able to contribute directly to the promotion of a better understanding of world problems by people generally. The rapid development in science -especially in nuclear and space science- has given new importance to the "cultural lag", the time needed to make people in general aware of what goes on.

It is necessary to make people everywhere conscious of this scientific and technological development and its impact on relation between peoples. Special mention was made of the importance of youth in any programme of education or communication of ideas. This problem, how to really reach the whole people, is a problem in which social scientists could help.

The sub-committee hopes that the Tenth Pugwash Conference, in discussing plans for the future, will pay due attention to this question and will consider whether it will be possible to convene a special conference of social scientists and other scholars who could contribute to solving this problem.

## 2. Pugwash Publications

During its discussion of the difficulties which stand in the way of communication between East and West, Working Group 3 noted with approval that the Continuing Committee has under consideration several plans for publications, including a quarterly journal on disarmament, and collections of articles. The Working Group also noted the suggestion of a book sponsored by Pugwash. The Working Group wishes to emphasise that an essential aspect of all publications sponsored by Pugwash should be their simultaneous publication in Russian and in English on both sides and their wide distribution. It would also be desirable to publish in French, German and other languages.

The Working Group hopes that these plans, which have been under discussion for two years, will soon come to fruition.

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IX WG 3.10

## 3. Exchange of Views

The Group considers as important a growing flow of information and opinion between nations, including both increased reprinting of articles originating in one country by newspapers and magazines of other countries, and increased possibilities for the presentation of views between countries.

### POLITICAL MEASURES· LIKELY TO REDUCE TENSION

#### 1. Stabilization

Under the conditions of the scientific revolution, avoidance of war is imperative. In order to achieve this aim and to facilitate disarmament, the Group considers it advisable for all nations to adopt as the paramount purpose of their foreign policies, the avoidance of situations which accentuate the danger of war and stimulate the arms race. From this point of view, stabilization now of existing frontiers, or neutralization of certain geographical areas, should be considered as taking precedence over the winning of political conflicts in this or that area on the globe. The Group welcomes, therefore, the settlements of conflicts in Laos and West Irian as indications that nations accept this approach.

It is not possible or desirable for any nations, including the major ones, to guarantee the continuation of existing regimes everywhere, since this would often require interference with the internal affairs of a country. It is, however, possible and desirable for nations to avoid stimulating such internal conflicts and fanning them, for example by providing military assistance and advisers. In this way, internal struggles within smaller nations could in most cases be separated from major power conflicts.

#### 2. Positive Opportunities presented by Scientific Revolution

The Group points out that the scientific and technological revolution, in addition to creating the danger of an all-destructive war between nations, also creates unprecedented constructive possibilities, which can be utilised cooperatively by all nations in the interest of spiritual and material advancement of mankind as a whole. The group suggest that a much wider and more systematic pursuit of cooperation in various scientific and technological enterprises, in which all nations could participate, is possible, and that such cooperation could contribute much to the creation of common interests, to growth of international trust, and to relaxation of tensions between nations.

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5.

IX WG 3.

It was pointed out in the group that increased technical assistance to developing nations would be beneficial. If this assistance were arranged by cooperation, for example through the medium of the united nations, rather than primarily from national contributions, it would not become an additional source of international distrust and conflict.

The Group recommends that the Pugwash committee should establish a continuing Study Group on International Cooperation. Some of the many topics which would fall into the scope of this study group were outlined in the report of the 7th Conference in Stowe. We think that the proposal in that report regarding the establishment of a World Centre of Scientific Research should be examined by this continuing study group, which could also consider the possibility and merits of locating such a centre in Berlin.

### 3. Denuclearization

The Group recognises that one of the greatest if not the greatest current danger of war lies in the unsettled situation in central Europe.

Most members of the Group believe that denuclearization of central Europe including Poland, Czechoslovakia and both parts of Germany would be an important contribution towards reducing tension, allaying apprehensions and diminishing the danger of war in central Europe. It would also help to prevent new nations from joining the "nuclear club".

Denuclearization could be applied to other areas, amongst which the Balkans, Africa and the Far East were specifically mentioned.

It was further agreed that denuclearization of central Europe can and should be carried out in the framework of a more general settlement which would assure that its effect would not be to upset the now existing balance between the strength of the two main military groups in Europe.

### 4. Collective Security

This Group recognizes that political solutions can assist agreement on disarmament. Simultaneously with disarmament negotiations there is required the working out of a satisfactory international system which could provide collective security in a progressively disarming world. Indeed the success of current disarmament negotiations may well depend on how satisfactorily and expeditiously this can be realized. For this purpose, the constitution, the organization and the role of existing international bodies require early formal review, as provided for in the United Nations Charter. This may involve definition of the responsibility and privileges of nonaligned nations and their role in collective security.

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IX WG 3.10

The Group recognizes that in addition to the conflict between the two major political camps, there are other conflicts involving or of concern to nonaligned nations. The Pugwash approach may with advantage be applied to these, and the Group recommends consideration of this possibility by the Continuing Committee.

## 5. Prevention of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

One possible early agreement which might reduce the future threat of a nuclear war would be a treaty signed by all the nuclear powers pledging themselves not to give nuclear weapons, or information required for their development, to any non-nuclear nation or group of nations.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 3.11

## Minority Opinions

While the possibility of denuclearization of central Europe deserves serious consideration as a possible means of reducing the danger of war in this area, I am not certain whether taken alone denuclearization would not make more likely the outbreak of non-nuclear hostilities or of popular violence endangering international peace.

E. Rabinowitch

The discussion in Group 3 included a matter omitted from the final report. The corresponding statement was at the beginning of Section 3 "Denuclearization", and read:

> "Agreement should be reached on the frontiers of Germany, particularly with Poland and Czechoslovakia".

We regard this matter as of great importance to the easing of tension in Central Europe.

L. Infeld

E. Rabinowitch

Considering that one of the main sources of tension in Europe and throughout the world is the absence of a peaceful solution of the German problem, several members of the Working Group consider it advisable to stress the need to conclude a peace treaty which will affirm the inviolability of the frontiers of the two existing German states, including, of course, the frontiers established by the Potsdam Agreement. This will ensure that the situation in West Berlin will become normal in such a manner that its population can choose the social and political system they prefer, the military occupation will end, and normal ties be established with all countries.

L. Infeld

V. Frochazka

V. Khvostov

Inozemtsev

The Group discussed whether the demilitarization of space can be achieved before the achievement of universal and complete disarmament. It was pointed out by me that in my opinion this was possible at this time particularly since space was so far used only in defensive systems. I felt that postponement of this measure will make agreement more difficult at a future date. I suggested that if the two sides are keen to provide for only peaceful exploration and use of outer space, (including the collection of information that can be used only as a warning system against a missile attack), this is now technically possible under a treaty providing effective controls and inspection without violating secrecy on missiles and conventional armaments located on national territories.

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IX WG 4.7

Ninth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

Final Report of Working Group IV

The group noted the report of Working Group IV of the Eighth Conference and continued the discussion of the topic.

We interpreted our terms of reference to contain the assumptions that general and complete disarmament has been achieved and that there is confidence in all countries that the terms of the disarmament treaty have been implemented everywhere. We discussed the problem of the stability of the world in these circumstances.

We agree that the fact of disarmament will by itself result in a changed climate, and will make the solution of many international disputes easier because it will have removed the fear of sudden aggression, it will have eliminated the preoccupation with strategic objectives, and will have reduced the element of mutual distrust.

It is understood that each country will retain police forces for keeping internal order, and that these will be equipped with light firearms (including machine-guns). Hence the physical possibility of waging war will have been substantially reduced, but not completely eliminated.

We must expect that there will remain, and there will arise in future, many disputes and conflicts of interest between nations, including some which will be regarded by the affected nations as of vital concern, and which will therefore tend to build up dangerous pressures if they are left unresolved for long.

Wherever possible, such disputes should be settled by direct negotiation between the nations concerned, but it would be unrealistic to expect this to be possible in all cases, or even in the majority of cases involving major conflicts of interest. In the past success of bilateral negotiations has sometimes been due to the fact that they were conducted in the knowledge that failure to agree would lead to the use of force by either side or by other nations; in a disarmed

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IX WG 4. 7

world this particular element of compulsion will be absent.

Some disputes may be referred to the International Court. Its jurisdiction is not, however, accepted by all nations without reservation, and while nations may find it easier, in a disarmed world, to accept the jurisdiction, it would not be realistic to expect universal acceptance to be an automatic consequence of disarmament. (A proposal that the implementation of the disarmament treaty should be contingent on all nations promising unqualified acceptance of the jurisdiction at a suitable stage did not find much support in the group.) In any event, the Court can only interpret international law, not make new law, or rule on the merit of situations not covered by existing law or treaties.

It cannot be excluded that important disputes will remain which can be settled neither by bilateral negotiations nor by reference to the International Court. Such disputes might arise, in particular, from a report that a country was violating the terms of the disarmament treaty. It is assumed that the disarmament treaty would establish international control authority with the right of unlimited inspection, including aerial surveys. This authority would function without a veto.

Some disputes may be matters for the Security Council, including, in particular, reports from the control authority of attempts to rearm. If the permanent members of the Council fail to reach agreement on the action to be taken, the Council may not be in a position to take any action. Most of the members of the group were agreed that one should not press for the abolition of the veto right in the Security Council. It is, however, debatable whether the present list of member states possessing the right of veto is the right one, or whether it should be altered by agreement in accordance with the provision of the U. N. charter. One would hope that the climate of a disarmed world may make possible also other changes in the procedure and functions of the United Nations which would strengthen and extend its authority.

We recognize the likelihood that some conflicts of interest will remain which cannot be resolved by any of these means, and the question how this can be remedied requires further study.

We do not think it would be possible or desirable to attempt to lay down in advance rules that would cover all possible situations; impossible because they could never by made acceptable to all, and

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IX WG 4.7

undesirable because they would tend to preserve the status quo
and freeze the present relative positions of different countries.
The world must be allowed to develop.

Unresolved conflicts may tempt some states to resort to
force (using their police forces, or resorting to illegal re-militarization and rearmament) and therefore the need for an international
police force is agreed. Some members of the group consider that
such a force should be a separate body of individuals organized by
the United Nations; other members prefer that it should consist
of national contingents.

The International Police Force should be equipped with light
arms and such other equipment as the Security Council may from
time to time find necessary for an effective enforcement action in
accordance with the United Nations Charter. The International
Police Force should however have no nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction.

On the question of the command of the International Police
force, it would not be realistic to expect at present agreement on
command by a single person. Another proposal was a command
consisting of representatives of the three major groups of powers
now existing in the world who would act by mutual agreement. This
in the opinion of some members of the group would have the disadvantage of sometimes failing to agree, and therefore failing to
command. The group discussed other possible arrangements which
might solve the problem of command and suggests further study.

It is agreed that the international police force must not
interfere in the internal affairs of states, except where internal
actions violate the Disarmament Treaty or endanger international
security. Some difficulty is anticipated in the interpretation of
the concept of internal affairs.

In case of an attempt to change a government by force (revolu-
tion or counter-revolution) the military intervention by police forces
of another state in favour of either side in the civil strife would be
regarded as armed interference and would be prohibited.

For the stability of a disarmed world it is important to
prohibit war propaganda and to eliminate incitement to rearmament.
Appendix I contains a discussion by some members of the group
of the means to achieve this.

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IX WG 4.7

The prospects for the stability of a disarmed world would be favoured by improvement in the international climate, and for this, as for other reasons, we are convinced of the importance of increasing further international co-operation in scientific, technological, educational and other fields.

## War Propaganda

IX WG 4.7a

One approach to the problem of war propaganda would be to leave this matter to national legislation and enforcement. Nations might then undertake a general obligation to deal with this problem, but the detailed content of the relevant laws and the machinery of enforcement would be at the discretion of the national authorities.

This approach would make the drafting of the relevant clauses in the treaty very easy, but the group felt that there was the danger that such laws might not be effectively enforced, particularly in countries involved in acute controversy with their neighbours. In circumstances in which emotions tend to get involved, the prohibition of incitement to violence is of particular importance.

Alternatively, one could envisage a treaty which would lay down conditions with which the legislation and enforcement machinery would have to conform, so that complaints could be brought before some international authority against a nation which did not meet these obligations.

Or there could be an international law against incitement to rearmament or aggression to be enforced by an international criminal court.

The last two solutions would be more effective than the first, but would require a very careful study of the definition of dangerous propaganda, to avoid arguments about the distinction between dangerous propaganda which should be prohibited, and the expression of opinions, however misguided, which should be allowed.

Some members of the group would be reluctant to support an enforceable treaty, or the jurisdiction in this matter of an international criminal court without being satisfied that suffic-

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IX WG 4. 7a

IX WG 4. 7b

iently clear definitions can be given, but saw in the concept of "clear and present danger", which occurs in American constitutional law, the hope that a sufficiently clear distinction may be worked out.

## National Police Forces in a Disarmed World

In connection with the question of the national police forces remaining in the disarmed world certain members of the group submit the following considerations.

The police forces have two functions, to keep internal order within each country, and to supply contingents for service in international peace-keeping operations at the request of the Security Council or other international authority. It was agreed that the contingents designed for international service will require different training from the rest of the police force, and probably different weapons also.

It was agreed that the purely domestic police forces should be numerically small and equipped with light weapons only. The requirements of different countries for police weapons differ considerably. In England police are customarily unarmed. In certain countries, on the other hand, the police force might require armed aircraft for the control of tribesmen in inaccessible mountainous areas. If certain countries are to be allowed to maintain heavier police weapons than others, these heavier weapons must be strictly supervised to see that they do not create a threat to neighbouring countries. In no case will domestic police forces be allowed nuclear weapons.

One member of the group expressed the opinion that the domestic police forces should be allowed weapons of heavy calibre such as fixed Maginot-line fortifications, anti-aircraft guns and rockets, provided that these weapons were made immobile so that they could not be used except for purely defensive purposes. The rest of the group objected strongly to this suggestion. The view of the majority was summed up in the following words: international security in a disarmed world must not be based on national defence but on the power of an international authority.

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IX WG 4. 7c

Addendum

Authority for International Police Force

The functioning of an international police force is subject to
two requirements which are difficult to reconcile:

a) To exclude the possibility of the force being misused, or becoming a political influence.

b) To give all nations, particularly small ones, the confidence that they would be protected from aggressive action by their neighbours.

Certain members of the group believe that it would be useful to study whether the difficulty of reconciling these requirements could be eased if the Security Council could delegate to some subsidiary organ power to take limited and precisely defined measures which would involve no threat to any state and no interference with any internal affairs. An example of such a measure would be to provide, at the request of a nation which feels threatened by its neighbours a force to guard its frontiers. If this force was prohibited from crossing the border and from taking action against any individuals other than those attempting an illegal crossing of the border it could not represent a threat to security and could therefore be dispatched speedily and on delegated authority.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG.5.5.

Final Report of Working Group 5

Economics of Disarmament

"All the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures. There should thus be no doubt that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions. The achievement of general and complete disarmament would be an unqualified blessing to all mankind."

These words were unanimously agreed by the United Nations Study Group on the Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament at the conclusion of a long and detailed study. We wholeheartedly endorse them.

The arms race is an unprecedented waste of resources. It is estimated that in total about $120 billion a year is now devoted to military expenditure. Scientific and technical talent is wasted on a vast scale on military research and development. The greater part of military expenditure is undertaken by the advanced industrial countries of the world; but in the poor countries arms and armies absorb resources which might otherwise be devoted to economic development; they are a harsh burden.

The diversion of these resources to peaceful uses could bring great benefits to all nations undertaking disarmament. It would provide a unique opportunity for the rich countries to increase aid to the underdeveloped nations of the world.

The way in which the resources are used will be a matter for each nation to decide. Broadly speaking, it can apportion the resources between increases in personal consumption, increases in social expenditure, such as health, education and housing, and increases in productive investment that will accelerate the rate of economic growth.

General disarmament does not mean that everyone who contributes to military production will have to change his job. Those who produce food, steel, nuts and bolts and many other items now used for military purposes would stay in the same jobs; their products would be needed for peaceful purposes. But quite a number would have to change jobs. These would mainly be those now employed in the military services themselves (apart from those retained in residual forces and in international inspectorate and police forces and those employed in industries which have been abnormally swollen by military demands— notably the aircraft and ship-building industries and the production of nuclear weapons. The transfer of manpower and machines, however, can be smoothly accomplished provided three conditions are met:

(a) The general level of demand and production is maintained.

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IX WG.5 5

(b) Measures are taken to ensure that alternative jobs are provided in regions where defence industry is now concentrated, or aid is given to workers to move elsewhere.

(c) Retraining facilities are provided for those whose skills become redundant or are inadequate for civil life.

We believe that these conditions can be satisfied by appropriate national policies. The experience of demobilization after World War II (and of the reduction of military expenditure in the mid 1950's in many countries) shows that if these conditions are fulfilled there is nothing to fear. Indeed the changes required are no different from those that take place anyway as the economies of every nation grow and the patterns of consumption and production change.

The main tasks and problems are outlined in the following paragraphs. It should be noted that the economic policies required for disarmament - for example policies for regional unemployment and policies to promote research - are policies that are needed and, in many cases, are being introduced anyway.

**(a) The general level of demand**

In centrally planned economies reconversion and the provision of new jobs will require the adaptation of existing economic plans. The smoothness with which this is conducted will depend on the efficacy of the planning machinery.

In private enterprise and mixed economies, such as America and Britain, the problem will be to regulate the general level of demand. As military expenditure is reduced, peaceful demand can be increased either by reductions in taxation, which leave industry and consumers with more money to spend, or by increases in government spending. To the extent that tax cuts are made, they will have to be rather larger than the amount of expenditure they are required to induce; those who benefit will not spend all the extra income they gain. For this reason it may be necessary to plan for smaller surpluses or for deficits in public budgets. Most countries are likely to choose some combination of tax cuts and increased government spending on those civil projects that have been neglected in the face of the competing claims of defence.

**(b) Regional policies**

Defence industries are often concentrated in particular areas. In most countries, however, policies have already been evolved for influencing the location of industry and meeting local unemployment. In the Soviet Union national planning is in any event done in regional terms. In Britain, development area policies have been applied since the war. In the United States new legislation for this purpose has recently been passed. We believe that, if these established types of policy are vigorously applied at the time of disarmament, it will be possible to overcome the regional problems

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IX WG.5.5

into techniques that are suitable for use in underdeveloped countries, as well as for a larger supply of teachers and technicians to help those countries.

### (e) International trade

We agree with the conclusion of the United Nations Study Group that if the conversion of the major industrial economies of the world was undertaken smoothly (i.e. without any serious dip in production), there would not be any significant damage to international trade in the transition; demand for raw materials and food would not generally decline, although special assistance might be required for producers of some raw materials. On the other hand, disarmament might benefit international trade in two ways. In the first place, as resources are transferred to increased capital investment and increased civil research and development, the general pace of economic growth should quicken. Secondly, the easing of international tensions at the time of disarmament should help to remove the strategic and political obstacles which now restrict trade between East and West; it will create a better atmosphere for international trade and economic cooperation.

### (f) Aid to developing countries

The underdeveloped countries of the world have great potential needs for economic aid and technical assistance. When military expenditure is reduced we urge that the rich countries should use a substantial part of the freed resources to meet this need. It would be necessary to increase the flow of aid and technical assistance progressively, fitting it in with expanded plans for development in the recipient countries. The fact that disarmament will be a special opportunity to give more aid does not mean, however, that more could not and should not be done in the meantime.

#### Obstacles

There is obviously considerable fear of disarmament in the world. This is partly the result of political mistrust and the tensions of the Arms Race. But it also has economic origins. Economic fears are an element in the opposition of professional military personnel to the curtailment or abolition of the services to which they belong. More commonly they arise in the minds of those whose wages or profits are dependent on military production. For example, when military contracts are curtailed there is an immediate and visible threat to the income of workers and shareholders in the firms concerned. It would be wrong to exaggerate economic fears of this kind, but it must be admitted that they are widespread. They must be dispelled. Fortunately all governments contributing to the United Nations Study Group expressed their confidence in their ability to realise the economic benefits of disarmament and to handle the problems of transition. We too are unanimous in the view that this can be done, provided the right policies - on which nearly all economists agree - are put into effect.

#### The time scale

Finally, what about the speed with which economic redeployment could be achieved? Judging by post-war experience, we would estimate that it could, at the minimum, be done in 2 years. That would be a rush. Three or 4 years would be comfortable. More than that would make the task look smaller, but we do not believe it would really make it much easier. The problems would still arise. You would have

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IX WG.5.5

more time to think about them and get used to them, but that would not necessarily
make it easier to take action or to persuade other people to do so.

## Conclusion

It is important that people should be brought to understand the economic benefits of disarmament and to overcome any fears of it that they feel. The general nature of the problem and lines along which it can be solved have been agreed by the UN Study Group. We believe that the conclusions of that document should be widely disseminated, perhaps by means of a popular edition. But generalizations agreed at an international conference are not enough. People will only be convinced when the problems of their own nation have been studied and their governments have shown that they know what to do and are willing to do it. So we believe it both vital and urgent that, in each nation, detailed studies be made of the economic and social steps which will have to be taken when disarmament starts. Moreover, we believe that these measures should be made public. Then the electorate of each nation will see that disarmament, far from injuring them, will be of great national and international benefit.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 1.8

Why we cannot agree with the American disarmament plan

Professor V. Emelyanov

On April 18, 1962 the USA put forward for discussion by the Committee of Eighteen States a document on disarmament, entitled "draft of basic formulations for a treaty on universal and complete disarmament in conditions of peace throughout the world" (Re-translated from the Russian).

The American draft envisages stage by stage disarmament. This draft sees disarmament as being carried out in three stages. During the first stage, which is to last 3 years, specified categories of arms are to be curtailed by 30 per cent, including a 30 per cent reduction in the means of delivery of nuclear weapons.

At the second stage, which is also to last three years, arms are reduced by 35 per cent, and at the third stage the remaining 35 per cent reduction is carried out. True, the length of the third stage in the American proposals is not laid down.

Why are there such strong objections to these proposals? What are the reasons why there cannot be agreement with the American proposals?

To answer this question, it is necessary in the first place to study attentively what it is that the United States proposes to curtail. The US proposed draft suggests a reduction of conventional types of arms and means of delivery - tanks, armoured equipment, armoured transport carriers, artillery, minesweepers and so on. As regards nuclear weapons, the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles is made dependent on the conclusions to be reached by the experts, who are supposed to work during the first stage.

It therefore follows that all the stockpiles of nuclear weapons will remain untouched during the whole of the first stage.

The specific measures proposed in the American disarmament plan with regard to nuclear weapons deal not with the destruction of such weapons, but with bringing to light the capacity and siting of the atomic industry of the Soviet Union and of its stockpiles of nuclear arms.

[10]

Cambridge 1962

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IX WG 1.8

During the first stage, in offering to reduce conventional types of weapons and means of delivery by 30 per cent, the American draft envisages the cessation of the production of fission materials for military use and the establishment of control over all the nuclear industry of states.

The US suggests that this measure is effected at the very beginning of disarmament, at a time when nuclear weapons remain in toto in the countries which they control.

In this way, having studied the nuclear industry of the Soviet Union and having established the siting of industrial enterprises during the first stage (for which three years is allowed), the US suggests moving on to the second stage, during which information must be furnished on the quantity of fission materials accumulated by countries. At the end of the second stage, the quantity of nuclear weapons they will have must be furnished.

All this will make it possible for the United States to obtain a full picture of the nuclear defence resources of the Soviet Union.

It therefore follows that for a six-year period the stockpiles of nuclear weapons will remain wholly untouched.

At the World Congress for Universal Disarmament and Peace, N.S. Khrushchev pointed out that "in the opinion of authoritative scientists - Western atomic scientists - the potential of nuclear death" in the modern world can be calculated as at 250,000 megatons, i.e. 250,000,000,000 tons of T.N.T. This means that every inhabitant of our planet is threatened by at least, on an average, over 80 tons of explosive. This product, it turns out, is now in abundant supply for the inhabitants of the world."

To agree with the American proposal for a 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons and means of delivery of nuclear weapons over a three-year period means that all the inhabitants of the world will live with the fear that a world nuclear war might break out, since the world is so well supplied with nuclear weapons that even if only 10 per cent of them are left, nonetheless the danger will not disappear and does not, in essence, lessen. Suffice it to recall that two large Japanese cities were destroyed by no more than two atomic bombs.

Cambridge 1962

- 4 -

IX WG 1.8

but is considerably increasing it, improving the quality of its arms and thus increasing its military might. By so doing, the attention of the public on problems of disarmament is blunted and the illusion is created that a practical realisation of disarmament has begun, a fact impossible if the American draft for disarmament is accepted.

If this suggestion had been made at an early stage in the production of nuclear weapons, when the number of atom bombs could be counted on the fingers of one hand, it might then be possible to speak of stages. If one or another country had possessed a few nuclear bombs this might have constituted some danger, of course (but this danger would only have existed for a limited number of towns) and mankind might have witnessed a few more tragedies like those of Hiroshima or Nagasaki but life would not have ceased on earth.

The particular danger which has arisen in our days is that the development of science and technology has led to the creation of weapons of enormous destructive power and industry has produced them in such quantities that already existing stockpiles already go far beyond the quantity necessary to destroy the whole of mankind's civilisation, and this despite the fact that weapons are quite unnecessary for the progress of mankind's culture.

Anatole France, in his novel "La Pierre Blanchs"(?) says, through his hero, "a study of the past makes it possible to imagine that war is not one of the necessities of the life of society". It is clear to any sensible person that no-one in the world needs bombs. What we are discussing is something else - it is how to prevent the possibility of a world catastrophe, the danger of which continues to grow, since the stockpiles are already bursting at the seams with nuclear weapons, and the outbreak of a universal war depends on so many factors, including the fortuitous. All these points require the immediate resolution of the problem of disarmament. It is impermissible to drag out disarmament for several years.

As is known, the Soviet Union has suggested that nuclear weapons should be totally destroyed from the very first stage and that there should be a cessation of production of such weapons. This Soviet proposal has been transferred to the second stage in the Soviet Union's draft treaty in view of the fact that the United States and its Western allies categorically refused to agree to this proposal for the first stage.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 1.8

- 5 -

What needs to be done, therefore, to render nuclear weapons harmless ?

Speaking at the World Congress for Universal Disarmament and Peace N.S. Krushchev said: "In putting forward a programme for universal and total disarmament the Soviet government proposes at least the rendering harmless of nuclear weapons during the very first stage of disarmament, its paralysis and the destruction of all means of delivery to its target. We are proposing the elimination at one fell swoop of rocket planes, surface vessels and submarines, means of carrying nuclear weapons, atomic artillery equipment, and also an end to all foreign military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal therefrom of all foreign troops."

In this manner the Soviet government's proposal at once removes the danger of world catastrophe as a result of the outbreak of a world war through use of nuclear weapons.

The American proposals say nothing at all about the time at which total disarmament will be concluded, in addition to the fact that disarmament is drawn out over a long period of time. The only time defined is that for the carrying out of the first two stages on disarmament - six years.

The American proposals virtually leave nuclear armaments untouched for all time, since the "draft of basic formulations for a treaty on universal and complete disarmament in conditions of peace throughout the world" does not exclude the possibility that international armed forces might be equipped with nuclear weapons. On questions of the organisation of international armed forces the US holds to a viewpoint whereby large international armed forces should be created, these forces being in the hands of the Western powers and serving the aims of their policy.

In putting forward its proposals for stage by stage disarmament the USA clearly seeks to weaken the defence of the Soviet Union since it is well known that the Soviet Union has achieved considerable successes in the production of very powerful rockets. A thirty per cent disarmament plan is precisely what the USA is aiming at, thus weakening the most powerful military potential the Soviet Union has, while retaining at the same time its own military potential.

As is known, the USA has been working on rockets for a long time and supplying their army with such rockets of limited range.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 1.8

- 6 -

These rocket bases have been set up in a number of countries bordering on the Soviet Union and their navy has also been equipped with them. Thus many countries in the world have become the military and naval bases of the USA, while warships, armed with rockets with nuclear warheads, sail the seas and oceans. A system of this kind creates great privileges for the USA. In the first place it compensates in some measure for the lagging behind of the USA in the development of powerful rocketry construction, and places part of their military expenditure on the countries in which American military bases are to be found. At the same time there are some American commanders who apparently consider that, should there be American aggression, the answering strike will be not against the USA but only against those countries in which these bases lie. They are therefore not prepared to give up their bases or withdraw their military units either at the first or during the second of the stages and want to maintain them to the very end of the disarmament process. But even in conditions of complete disarmament (the end of which is not even mentioned in their proposals) the USA intends to use some of the existing foreign bases as strong-points for international armed forces.

It therefore follows that the proposals on stage by stage reduction of conventional weapons and the means of delivery of weapons are directed to the retention, not far from the frontiers of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, of US military bases and American military units, thus lowering the defence capacity of the Soviet Union in its effective aspect - powerful rocket weapons.

There is only one sensible way, therefore, of rapidly eliminating the danger threatening mankind - the immediate destruction of all means of delivery to the objective of nuclear weapons, the ending of bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom. Such a measure would remove the direct threat of the possibility of the development of any armed conflict into a world war. Means of delivery, insofar as may be judged, have not yet grown quantitatively to an extent where they could not rapidly be eliminated. If time is wasted then the resolving of this problem, too, will be made considerably more difficult.

The situation which has arisen in the world is a very dangerous one and we must make haste.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG.1.9

Progressive Geographical Disarmament

F. J. Dyson

This contribution is intended as a response to questions 10-12 in the Discussion Outline for Working Group 1. Since I am officially connected with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, it is necessary to state clearly that my proposal has not been approved by the Agency and is not consistent with official U.S. negotiating positions.

I propose a compromise between the U.S. Draft Treaty Outline and the Soviet Draft Treaty, guided by the following three requirements:

(1) The end-result of the treaty is to be general and complete disarmament.

(2) The armaments retained during the process of disarmament are not to be inspected.

(3) The degree of uncertainty in the level of retained armaments is to be progressively reduced as disarmament proceeds.

The basic idea of my proposal is quite flexible and could be embodied in many different kinds of treaty. For definiteness I propose one particular treaty as a basis for discussion. The treaty consists of the following nine clauses, with the necessary elaborations of detail.

(a) Each country signing the treaty shall destroy in each of ten years one tenth of the armaments existing in that country at the beginning of the ten years.

(b) Production of new armaments of all major types is prohibited.

(c) Verification of disarmament under clauses (a) and (b) shall be carried out by Russian-style inspection only, i.e. by inspection of the destruction of weapons and of the dismantling of factories.

(d) Each country signing the treaty shall completely disarm and demilitarize during each of the ten years a zone of its territory. Each disarmed zone shall contain at least one tenth of the area and one tenth of the population of the country in which it lies.

F. J. Dyson

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IX WG.1.9

(e) The zones disarmed in each year shall remain disarmed in subsequent years.

(f) The choice of zones, and the sequence in which the zones are to be disarmed, are to be decided by the country to which the zones belong.

(g) Verification of disarmament under clause (d) shall be by inspection of the disarmed zones only. Inspectors shall be free to travel within the disarmed zones and to conduct detailed inspections on the ground anywhere within the disarmed zones. Inspection from airplanes in flight will not be permitted.

(h) Inspectors shall have the right to enter any closed site or building within the disarmed zones, after giving one week's notice of their intention to inspect it.

(i) In the later stages of disarmament, an international police force shall be created which shall help to patrol international frontiers as the territory adjacent to the frontiers becomes demilitarized.

The main points of this draft treaty are self-explanatory. The following remarks are intended only to point out some advantages of the proposal which may not be so obvious.

(1) The reduction of armaments by uniform percentages in clause (a) is in no way essential to the scheme. Reduction by categories or by other more complicated methods could be substituted for clause (a) if desired.

(2) The major countries will presumably choose to disarm initially zones remote from frontiers and not containing critically sensitive military installations. Thus their national security will continue to be protected by their existing military establishments until a late stage of disarmament. The transition from national to international guarantees of security will be postponed to a time at which experience of the process of disarmament will have created some degree of international confidence and trust.

(3) Inspection of the disarmed zones can be carried out in a relaxed manner and without hurry. Since there will be plenty of time for removing all moveable weapons from the disarmed zones before the inspectors arrive, the inspectors can carry out their task at leisure. Any country carrying out the provisions of the treaty honestly need not fear that the inspectors will learn any military secrets. And conversely, any violation of clause (d) of the agreement will be automatically punished by loss of military secrecy if any important weapons are discovered in the disarmed zones.

F. J. Dyson

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IX WG.1.9

(4) Clause (h) of the treaty guarantees the personal, commercial, and political privacy of the population in the disarmed zones. During the one week of waiting before the inspectors enter a building, dirty linen can be privately washed and blood-stains on the wall can be painted over.

(5) Clause (i), dealing with the international police force, is left deliberately vague. The problems of political organization in the disarmed world are of course the same in this scheme as in any scheme which pretends to end with general and complete disarmament.

Comments and criticisms are invited.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 1.10

Scientists must evaluate disarmament plans

N. Talensky

I would like to draw your attention to the way in which the problem of preventing total thermonuclear war is dealt with in the Soviet and American disarmament drafts. I shall begin with the American plan and will try to show, by quoting examples, how the problem of the elimination of the danger of thermonuclear war is resolved.

According to a statement by Mr. Macnamara, US Secretary of State for Defence, the United States plans to have, within the next five years:-

<table><tr><td>Intercontinental rockets 'Minutemen' warhead ½ megaton</td><td>800 units</td></tr><tr><td>'Atlas' and 'Titan' warhead 5 megatons</td><td>231 units</td></tr><tr><td>On atomic submarines the 'Polaris' rocket warhead ½ megaton</td><td>656 units</td></tr><tr><td>Total of strategic rockets, excluding out-of-date ones</td><td>1687 units</td></tr><tr><td>In addition - strategic bombers carrying nuclear weapons</td><td>1200 units</td></tr></table>

In accordance with the American disarmament plan, rocket weapons will be reduced by 30% during the first stage. As a result, at the end of the first stage, that is, at the end of the third year of disarmament, there would remain:

<table><tr><td>Rockets 'Minutemen'</td><td>560 units</td></tr><tr><td>'Atlas' and 'Titan'</td><td>161 units</td></tr><tr><td>'Polaris'</td><td>460 units</td></tr><tr><td>Total of strategic rockets remaining</td><td>1181 units</td></tr><tr><td>Strategic bombers</td><td>840 units</td></tr></table>

By the end of the second stage, that is, at the end of the sixth year after disarmament has begun, remaining weapons will have been reduced a further 50%. There will therefore remain:

<table><tr><td>Rockets 'Minutemen'</td><td>280 units</td></tr><tr><td>'Atlas' and 'Titan'</td><td>80 units</td></tr><tr><td>'Polaris'</td><td>230 units</td></tr><tr><td>making a total of strategic rockets</td><td>590 units</td></tr><tr><td>420 units of strategic rockets bombs will also remain.</td><td></td></tr></table>

Talensky 1962

2.

IX WG 1.10

These calculations do not include out-of-date rockets which could be used for a nuclear strike. Tactical rockets are not included either, neither are medium bombers and fighter bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons or transport planes, equipped with nuclear weapons. All these, too, can be used for war.

It therefore follows that, in accordance with the American disarmament plan the possibility of the unleashing of a total thermonuclear war is retained not only at the end of the first stage, but still remains at the end of the second stage, that is, until the end of the 6th year after disarmament has started. We cannot say what will happen thereafter, since the plan contains no definite time with regard to the third stage. If one assumes that this stage will also take three years, then the danger of thermonuclear war will only be removed at the beginning of the ninth year after disarmament begins.

What the figures which I have cited on the rocket and nuclear weapons which will remain during the first two stages of disarmament mean may be seen if they are set against American data which describes the use of nuclear weapons.

I would like to cite some data from a 1959 report made to the US Congress Joint Atomic Energy Committee ('Results of nuclear war' - Report by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy). It is estimated that an average nuclear attack only requires 263 bombs with a total power of 1446 megatons. More than two-thirds of these bombs are intended for destruction of military objectives and the remaining third would be used to destroy populations and industrial centres.

In such a situation a strike of this size in the USA would produce losses of 42 million persons killed and over 17 million injured. i.e. a total of nearly 60 million people (40% of the entire population, according to 1950 census figures). The reserves of nuclear means of destruction and their strategic carriers (inter-continental rockets, strategic bombers, submarines with 'Polaris' rockets) alone, therefore, are such that the USA could effect the following number of strikes of the following power:

<table><tr><td>at the beginning of disarmament</td><td>up to 10</td></tr><tr><td>at the end of the 1st stage of disarmament i.e. at the beginning of the 4th year</td><td>about 7</td></tr><tr><td>at the end of the 2nd stage i.e. at the beginning of the 7th year</td><td>over 4</td></tr></table>

This is only a rough analysis, of course, but it shows sufficiently convincingly that the danger of total thermonuclear war, remains to the end of the second stage and to the beginning of the third stage (that is,

N. Talensky.

3.

IX WG 1.10

to the beginning of the 7th year from the time disarmament begins) if the American disarmament plan is followed. Further perspectives of the elimination of the danger of thermonuclear war are quite unclear since the disarmament process is not really worked out, either in essence or on dates.

In contradistinction to this the Soviet disarmament draft provides for the total elimination of absolutely all means of delivery of nuclear weapons to their objective at the first stage i.e. by the end of the second year after disarmament begins. The danger of a thermonuclear attack is thus immediately eliminated and nuclear weapons virtually decay in the stockpiles.

By the end of the second stage, that is, by the end of the third year of disarmament, all stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be wholly eliminated. This would totally remove the danger of any type of nuclear war. May I recall that, by this time, following the American plan, the possibility of seven nuclear strikes still remains, strikes of a medium size which would kill up to 60 million people. The second important advantage to be gained from the Soviet draft lies in the fact that, from the second stage, the danger of an unleashing of a war by conventional means decreases sharply. Conventional armed forces numbering 1.7 million people or even 1.9 (as was suggested as a compromise by the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs), are obviously not large enough for unleashing large-scale war.

In accordance with the plan proposed by the USA government, however, not only is there to be a higher level of conventional forces (2.1 million people until the fourth year of disarmament, but also 70 per cent and 35 per cent to the seventh year) of rocket nuclear tactical weapons will remain. This is more than enough for war, with a destructiveness which exceeds many thousands of times that suffered during the Second World War.

How can this be called disarmament? This is no more than a prolonged postponement of disarmament.

The principle of balanced disarmament is infringed in the American plan. The whole of this plan is directed towards the creation of a strategic advantage for the West from the very first steps of disarmament. This arises because a reduction is sought of the most powerful rocket nuclear weapons in the American plan while the system of American military bases on foreign territories, bases surrounding the USSR and socialist countries, is left untouched. Moreover, with a reduction in strategic rocket nuclear weapons the role of the bases grows substantially, if they are armed with medium-range rockets and bombers carrying nuclear weapons.

How can the Soviet Union agree to a clear increase in the danger arising from American military bases on foreign territories!

[L]

N. Talensky

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IX WG 1.10

The system of proportional reduction itself will lead to armaments control. From the viewpoint of ensuring the best conditions for control the Soviet disarmament draft has undoubtedly advantages since it envisages the total elimination of the decisive factors in an armed struggle during a clearly defined and short period and it makes possible the exercise of effective control of all destructive weapons. This is real control over disarmament. The Soviet draft at once puts an end to any armaments race from the moment disarmament begins.

Those gathered here are neither diplomats nor government officials. They are scientists - used to evaluating the true quality of facts. We can provide an unprejudiced and accurate evaluation of the disarmament drafts suggested and we must make such an objective evaluation.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG.5.4

Report - Working Group 5

Economics of Disarmament

General disarmament does not mean that everyone who contributes to military production will have to change his job. Those who produce food, steel, nuts and bolts and many other items now used for military purposes would stay in the same jobs; their products would be needed for peaceful purposes. But quite a number would have to change jobs. These would mainly be those now employed in the military services themselves (apart from those retained in residual forces and in inter-

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IX WG.5.4

national inspectorate and police forces) and those employed in industries which have been abnormally swollen by military demands - notably the aircraft and ship-building industries and the production of nuclear weapons. The transfer of manpower and machines, however, can be smoothly accomplished provided three conditions are met:

(a) The general level of demand and production in maintained.

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IX WG.5.4

(b) Regional policies

Defence industries are often concentrated in particular areas. In most countries, however, policies have already been evolved for influencing the location of industry and meeting local unemployment. In the Soviet Union national planning is in any event done in regional terms. In Britain, development area policies have been applied since the war. In the United States new legislation for this purpose has recently been passed. We believe that, if these established types of policy are vigorously applied at the time of disarmament, it will be possible to overcome the regional problems that may arise. It is important in the meantime that when particular defence contracts are completed or cancelled governments should take steps to ensure that temporary compensation and alternative employment are provided. In this way they can demonstrate that they are capable of dealing with the problems that will arise at the time of disarmament.

(c) Retraining

Retraining is not a big problem, except for officers and men with specialized military training. Generally speaking, numbers of modern armed forces are equipped with skills that are valuable in civil life; and most workers in military production can turn their skills to civil production.

After the last war, and also in those instances when the armed forces were reduced more recently, most countries provided compensation and retraining facilities for demobilized officers and men. Generous schemes of this kind are the way to deal with the problem at the time of disarmament.

For workers in military production who become redundant there will be a need for temporary compensation and for retraining facilities. In most countries retraining facilities exist and redundancy schemes are spreading. It is recognized that both are needed as an aid to the mobility of labour. If developed on a reasonable scale, they will meet the needs of disarmament.

(d) Scientists and technicians

Very large sums are now spent on military research and development. A big part of this expenditure goes on the production of experimental equipment and prototypes by production workers with everyday skills.

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IX WG.5.4

But a considerable number of scientists and qualified engineers is employed too. The way in which they are redeployed at the time of disarmament is of special importance. They can make a great contribution to the advance of peaceful technology.

All governments already accept responsibility for promoting and financing research. Much research cannot, or should not, be financed out of private funds: the cost of many projects is too great; the ideas and benefits often cannot, or should not, be reserved to the owner; and in many fields, for example, medicine or nuclear techniques, innovation must in some measure be a public responsibility. At present quite a lot of civil research in America is financed out of military budgets for lack of other support; and in every country military research has some civil applications.

To meet the needs of disarmament governments must find ways of financing and organizing peaceful research directly instead of through military budgets. It is desirable that they should begin to develop programmes of this kind now so that they have experience on which to build at the time of disarmament.

There is an obvious temptation to go for increased expenditure on space research, civil aircraft and peaceful uses of atomic energy. The government is used to financing work in these fields and military research teams could probably be diverted to them with comparative ease. On the other hand, there are great fields for increased research in industry, transport, energy, automation and other everyday economic activities, which have hitherto been neglected. And there is a case for more research into techniques that are suitable for use in under-developed countries, as well as for a larger supply of teachers and technicians to help those countries.

(e) International trade

We agree with the conclusion of the United Nations Study Group that if the conversion of the major industrial economies of the world was undertaken smoothly (i.e. without any serious dip in production), there would not be any significant damage to international trade in the transition; demand for raw materials and food would not generally decline, though special assistance might be required for producers of some raw materials. On the other hand, disarmament might benefit international trade in two ways. In the first place, as resources are transferred to increased capital investment and increased civil research and development, the general pace of economic growth should quicken. Secondly, the easing of international tensions at the time of disarmament should help to remove the strategic and political obstacles which now restrict trade between East and West and to create a better atmosphere for international trade and economic cooperation.

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IX WG.5.4

(f) <u>Aid to developing countries</u>

Obstacles

There is obviously considerable fear of disarmament in the world. This is partly the result of political mistrust and the tensions of the Arms Race. But it also has economic origins. Economic fears are a subsidiary element in the opposition of professional military personnel to the curtailment or abolition of the services to which they belong. More commonly they arise in the minds of those whose wages or profits are dependent on military production. For example, when military contracts are curtailed there is an immediate and visible threat to the income of workers and shareholders in the firms concerned. It would be wrong to exaggerate economic fears of this kind, but it must be admitted that they are widespread and that they must be dispelled. Fortunately all governments contributing to the United Nations Study Group expressed their confidence in their ability to realise the economic benefits of disarmament and to handle the problems of transition. We too are unanimous in the view that this can be done, provided the right policies - on which nearly all economists agree - are put into effect.

The time scale

Finally, what about the speed with which economic redeployment
could be achieved? Judging by post-war experience, we would estimate
that it could, at the minimum, be done in 2 years. That would be a
rush. 3 or 4 years would be comfortable. More than that would make
the task look smaller, but we do not believe it would really make it
much easier. The problems would still arise. You would have more
time to think about them and get used to them, but that would not
necessarily make it easier to take action or to persuade other people
to do so.

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IX WG.5.4

## Conclusion

It is important that people should be brought to understand the economic benefits of disarmament and to overcome any fears of it that they feel. The general nature of the problem and the lines along which it can be solved have been agreed by the Report of the UN Study Group. We believe that the conclusions of that document should be widely disseminated, perhaps by means of the preparation of a popular edition. But generalizations agreed at an international conference are not enough. People will only be convinced when the problems of their own nation have been studied and their governments have shown that they know what to do and are willing to do it. So we believe it both vital and urgent that, in each nation, detailed studies be made of the economic and social steps which will have to be taken when disarmament starts. Moreover, we believe that these measures should be made public so that the electorate may see that disarmament, far from injuring them, will be of great national and international benefit.

IX WG.I.12

Interim Report Draft Working Group I

Considering the official disarmament schemes put forward since the Stowe meeting, it has been agreed that a first stage of disarmament which aims at the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons during a short period of time might constitute a satisfactory basis for further discussion. Two proposals have emerged. One is for the complete destruction of all delivery systems with the verification of this destruction and the dismantling of relevant factories. The other is for a substantial destruction of delivery systems down to a low level which should maintain a balance of force, followed by a reduction to zero level provided that adequate means could be found to enable all nations concerned to convince themselves in a reasonable manner that disarmament was in fact proceeding according to the terms of the treaty.

We have succeeded in specifying certain problems which now require further discussion in more detail, the solution of which might lead to a larger measure of agreement between all sides than we have at present.
The problems are as follows.

(1) If the initial step is the reduction of the means of delivery down to a low level, but not to zero, then the magnitude of this level requires careful consideration. In this proposal the required verification procedures during the final elimination of delivery systems would be more comprehensive than during the initial phase.

[x]

Working Group I

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IX.WG.I.12

(2) The verification procedures must include the full inspection of all factories declared to be producing, or to have produced, delivering systems, and careful analysis of their production records by the International Disarmament Organisation. We shall continue to discuss means for inspection to be extended to factories for which a reasonable suspicion exists that they are engaged upon clandestine production of delivery systems. Zonal sampling was also suggested as one form of verification procedure that might be worth discussing. Some of us have expressed the opinion that verification procedures could be devised which would not lead to a significant reduction in the security of the state in which verification is taking place. These might include the adoption of some form of zonal verification, possibly combined with the complete isolation of inspection personnel from contacts outside the International Disarmament Organisation.

(3) Further discussion is required on the definition of what is meant by "means of delivery". It was agreed to accept as a basis for this discussion medium and long range bombers and missiles, nuclear artillery, and any other means capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to a distance beyond its range of effectiveness.

(4) Further discussion is also required on the relation between the destruction of the means of delivery on the one hand, and the elimination of foreign bases and the withdrawal of troops from foreign soil on the other. It has been suggested that a distinction could be made between bases from which weapons of mass destruction can be delivered, and those merely used for conventional forces.

[c]

Working Group I

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IX.WG.I.12

(5) It was considered that a suitable reduction in conventional forces and armaments should be associated in the first stage with the elimination of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(6) In addition to what is discussed above, it has also been suggested that we might discuss, either as an alternative, or in some combination, other schemes such as zonal disarmament.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 4.4

Working Group IV - Chairman's
Progress Report

R.E. Peierls

We interpret our terms of reference to contain the assumption that general and complete disarmament has been achieved. We are to discuss the problem of the stability of the world in these circumstances.

We agree that the fact of disarmament will by itself result in a changed climate, and will make the solution of some international disputes easier because it will have removed the fear of sudden aggression, it will have eliminated the preoccupation with strategic objectives, and will have reduced the element of mutual distrust.

It is understood that each country will retain forces for keeping internal order, and that these will be equipped with light firearms (including machine-guns). Hence the physical possibility of waging war will have been reduced, but not completely eliminated.

Wherever possible, such disputes should be settled by direct negotiation between the nations concerned, but it would be unrealistic to expect this to be possible in all cases, or even in the majority of cases involving major conflicts of interest. In the past bilateral negotiations have sometimes been successful because they were conducted in the knowledge that failure to agree would lead to the use of force by either side or by third parties; in a disarmed world this element of compulsion will be absent.

Some disputes may be referred to the International Court. Its jurisdiction is not, however, accepted by all nations without reservation, and while some nations may find it easier, in a disarmed world, to accept the jurisdiction, it would be realistic to expect universal acceptance to be an automatic consequence of disarmament. (A proposal that the implementation of the disarmament treaty should be contingent on all nations promising unqualified acceptance of the jurisdiction at a suitable stage did not find much support in the group.) In any event, the Court can only interpret international law, not make new law, or rule on the merit of situations not covered by existing laws or treaties.

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IX WG.4.4

We expect, therefore, that important disputes will remain which can be settled neither by bilateral negotiations nor by reference to the International Court. Such disputes might arise, in particular, from a report that a country was violating the terms of the disarmament treaty. It is assumed that there would exist an international control authority with the right of unlimited inspection, including aerial surveys. This authority would function without a veto.

Some disputes may be matters for the Security Council, including, in particular, reports from the control authority of attempts to rearm. If the permanent members of the Council fail to reach agreement on the action to be taken, the Council may not be in a position to take any action. Most of the members of the group were agreed that one should not press for the abolition of the veto right in the Security Council. It is, however, debatable whether the present list of member states possessing the right of veto is the right one, or whether it should be altered by agreement. One would hope that the climate of a disarmed world may make possible also other changes in the procedure and functions of the United Nations which would strengthen and extend its authority.

We recognize the likelihood that some conflicts of interest will remain unresolved, and we have no suggestion how this can be remedied.

We do not think it would be possible or desirable to attempt to lay down in advance rules that would cover all possible situations, impossible because they could never be made acceptable to all, and undesirable because **they** would tend to preserve the status quo and freeze the present relative positions of different countries. The world must be allowed to develop.

Unresolved conflicts may tempt nations to resort to force (using their police forces, or resorting to illegal remilitarization and rearmament) and therefore the need for an international police force is agreed. We have not yet discussed the question whether such a force should be a separate body of individuals organized by the United Nations, or whether it should consist of national contingents (parts of the national police forces already mentioned).

The international police force will have only light firearms at its disposal, and it will not be strong enough to intervene against either of the major powers. Many members of the group therefore feel that there is no need to envisage action by the police force in the event of a violation of international law by a major power. The view was, however, expressed by some that the appearance of the international police force in the area in which a violation was taking place, or was about to take place, would by itself have a strong moral effect.

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IX WG.4.4

On the question of the command of the international police force, it was agreed that it would not be realistic to expect command by a single person, such as the Secretary-General, to be acceptable to all. The alternative favoured by the Soviet delegates, a "Troika" command, would, in the opinion of many other members of the group, have the disadvantage of frequently failing to agree, and therefore failing to command. The group discussed other possible arrangements which might solve the problem of command, but has not so far come to one which would receive substantial support within the group.

It is agreed that the international police force would not interfere in the internal affairs of nations, except where internal actions affect international treaties (as in the case of re-militarization or the manufacture of arms). Some difficulty is anticipated in the interpretation of the concept of internal affairs.

In this connection the question was raised of one country fostering a violent change of government (revolution or counter-revolution) in another. It was agreed, at one end of the scale, that it would be impossible and undesirable to outlaw propaganda, and at the other end that the military intervention in favour of either side would be regarded as armed interference and would require action by the international police force. We had no conclusive discussion as to where the line is to be drawn between these extremes.

The prospects for the stability of a disarmed world would be favoured by improvement in the international climate, and for this, as for other reasons, we are convinced of the importance of increasing further international cooperation in scientific, technological, educational and other fields.

The group did not discuss, and is not proposing to discuss, the situation which would arise if, for a considerable time after the disarmament treaty had taken effect, there remained in some nations the suspicion that other nations might have succeeded in retaining clandestine stocks of weapons of mass destruction, since this problem seemed to be outside our terms of reference.

Cambridge 1962

IX WG 3.7

NINTH PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS

DISARMAMENT AND THE THIRD FORCE

Vikram Sarabhai

1. The "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations" of September 20, 1961, forms the basis of the current talks at Geneva. It is generally agreed that in spite of these talks and the many other negotiations which preceded them, the arms race is in fact getting worse and the long term security of the peoples of the world is being increasingly jeopardised. Delay in reversing the trends is likely to make it more difficult to reach a satisfactory solution.

2. I believe we should examine whether the "Joint Statement" and the general approach to the problem as reflected in official negotiations at the present time, constitute a basis for making progress towards increased security and disarmament. I will briefly indicate the factors which prompt me to question this.

a) The preamble to the "Joint Statement" indicates "that all States abide by existing international agreements". I do not believe that anyone seriously suggests that freezing present conditions on the earth, supported in most cases by existing agreements, can provide a basis for either security or of future development on acceptable social values. Sohn has discussed some aspects of this problem. The absence of at least a consensus on how one should tackle international agreements which are perceived by one of its parties to be outmoded must constitute a serious block to the success of the Geneva discussions.

b) Clause 5 of the agreed principles in the "Joint Statement" states that "all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced and that at no stage of the implementation of the Treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all". When the two major states involved, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., have in fact adopted widely differing measures for what each considers necessary and possible for its security; when secrecy or prevention of espionage is considered by one to be essential to its security in the transitional stage; when the measures adopted for security are dependent on dissimilar given conditions imposed by geography, economic development and political systems; can practical steps be undertaken which would be perceived as representing a balanced change of the military capabilities?

c) What is the real relevance to the security of the world of an understanding on disarmament at Geneva, if this was attained, with China excluded? The importance of this problem is all the more in a disarmed world where the capability of mobilising a large conventional army would

Cambridge 1962

2.

IX WG 3.7

itself tilt the balance of power in favour of the highly populated countries.

I suggest that all these handicaps in the present attempts are so basic
that real progress at Geneva on the implementation and phasing of disarmament
by itself is most unlikely.

3. I believe that parallel consideration of political factors at the Pugwash Conference and at Geneva is a prerequisite to agreement on general disarmament.

I would indicate briefly the directions in which I think a solution may
be possible.

a) We have to accept that in view of the essential asymmetry of the military postures of the two blocs, comprehensive agreement on balanced disarmament is impossible. (I have in mind the impasse created in the problem of controls and inspection considered by each side as crucial to national security. The insecurity which is reflected in inflexibility in negotiations is hardly likely to yield to logical arguments advanced by either side.) It is then necessary to create a third international force properly armed with the latest weapons before countries would consider that their security is not endangered by adopting measures of national disarmament. What is most important is that confidence in the controlling body of the Third Force would have to be built through experience. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. could actively help in arming the Third Force. It may be inconsistent with national sovereignty or security to locate such an armed force on the territory of nations. The Artic and the Antarctic may be possible sites.

b) Some procedure would have to be agreed for the limited surrender of sovereignty by nations in areas involving international conflicts. This involves the question of the international organisation which could tackle this responsibility. There are problems of the veto, of countries not represented in the organisation and the voice to be given to nations in relation to the size, the population, the regional or economic groupings and development.

4. I do not suggest here the discontinuation of the Geneva talks - rather that they should cover simultaneously the other political areas. A limited test ban not involving underground explosions or international inspection may be capable of early realisation.

IX.II.7

Second Draft Report of Working Group II

The first issue to which Working Group II addressed itself concerned
the countries which would have to be included in agreement on conventional
disarmament. The point was made that if the People's Republic of China
were not part of such an agreement, this fact would have to be reflected
in the total forces the United States might retain. The working group
agreed on three general principles:

c) The nuclear powers can discuss first steps - particularly in the nuclear field - even without the participation of the People's Republic of China.

The working group took account of the presentation of Academician
Topchiev at the opening plenary session to the effect that reductions in
forces on a percentage basis tended to favour the side enjoying superio-
rity in a given category. It was therefore agreed that conventional
disarmament was most effectively approached by fixing ceilings not only
in terms of manpower but in terms of absolute number of weapons to be
retained, particularly in the categories of tanks, self-propelled
artillery, heavy and light artillery, machine guns and mortars.

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IX.II.7

The group believes that the first stage of conventional disarmament should take place during a stage of nuclear disarmament leading to the point where no massive nuclear attack by one side on the other can take place. Those who favoured an early withdrawal agreed that foreign bases suitable for regional defense might be retained until the end of disarmament, provided they contained no foreign troops, nuclear weapons or means of delivery. We agree that at some stage all troops should withdraw to their own boundaries; we are not all of the same opinion as to when in the process of disarmament this withdrawal should take place.

The group agrees that at each stage of disarmament, a balance between conventional forces should be established both globally and regionally. Further, the group is of the view that the ceiling on forces and types of equipment can be established regardless of whether there has been an agreement about the deployment of foreign troops for the purpose of regional defense.

As to methods of verifying of disarmament it was agreed that:

(a) At the beginning of the disarmament process, all states should specify the forces, both in manpower and materials, to be demobilized in order to reduce these forces to agreed ceilings.

(b) During the process of disarmament inspectors should be given access to relevant statistical data, including budgets and to production records of plants that have been producing conventional arms.

(c) Inspectors should also have the right to observe the demobilization of the units to be disbanded as part of the agreement as well as the destruction of the agreed quantity of weapons. They should also have the right to observe the conversion or dismantling of the facilities for the production of conventional arms.

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IX.II.7

As to the control of conventional forces, it was agreed that since
the amount of violation required to achieve a decisive advantage was
large, inspection had to be less detailed than for nuclear forces.
Several possible methods were considered:

Cambridge 1962

IX WG.2.3

<u>The reduction and elimination of conventional weapons</u>

<u>N. Talensky</u>

1. The Soviet draft of a treaty for universal and complete disarmament provides for the elimination under strict international control of all types of conventional weapons and military technology, the stopping of their manufacture with the exception of the production of a strictly limited number of agreed types of light weapons for arming the police (militia) left to the state after the accomplishment of a universal and complete disarmament.

This task is to be put into practice in three stages:

1st stage provides for the reduction in the number of the armed forces for the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. to a level of 1 million men (a level of reduction for other states is to be worked out). Conventional arms, military technology and supplies, means of transport and auxiliary forces which are in units, and stores are to be cut by 30% each out of types of every category.

The reduced arms and military technology and stores are to be abolished, and the means of transport and auxiliaries either abolished or turned over to be used for peaceful purposes.

2nd stage provides for a further reduction in the level of the number of the armed forces of U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. to 1 million men (the level of other states is to be worked out). Conventional weapons, military technology, supplies, auxiliaries and means of transport to be reduced by a further 35% from the previous level and in the order set out in the first stage.

In the 3rd stage total elimination is to be completed of all armed forces, of all types of weapons including conventional ones, all types of military supplies, and arms technology and their manufacture, leaving only strictly agreed contingents of police (militia) armed with light weapons. All measures taken for disarmament in the field of conventional weapons are to come under strict international control.

N. Talensky 1962

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IX WG.2.3

2. The American plan basically provides for similar principles for the elimination of conventional weapons. The main difference consists: in the numerical level of the armed forces remaining at the end of the first stage (in the American plan 2.1 million men would remain) and also in the length of the stages. There is also a different system of control. One should suppose that the difference in the levels of the armed forces by stages can be removed on the basis of a compromise. The attainment of agreement on a system of control will be defined by the conditions of the elimination of the fundamental objectives of disarmament, means of delivery and nuclear weapons.

3. The volume of operations in the elimination of conventional weapons will be extremely great. It will be necessary to eliminate tens of thousands of tanks and self-propelled weapons, aircraft and helicopters of a military type, hundreds and thousands of machine guns, millions of rifles and automatics, a vast quantity of artillery of different calibres and types, and literally mountains of supplies.

The process of the elimination of weapons will be extremely complicated and it will be intermingled with aspects of a political, strategic, technical, and economic kind. There is no doubt that opponents of disarmament even after the signing of the treaty will cling to any opportunity to hinder its accomplishment and for this they will use at the first opportunity the difficulties of the actual process of disarmament. Society and, above all, scientists would be able to render substantial help to international organs and national governments in the study of all aspects of the elimination of arms under international control, and in the working out of necessary recommendations in a practical plan.

4. It is now already possible to plan certain principles for the elimination of arms including conventional ones.

From a political point of view the process of the elimination of arms and military technology must answer the demands of the fullest and most precise observance of the treaty on general and complete disarmament and exclude every possibility of its omission in whole or in part. Strict international control, precise working of the controlling body, supplemented by a broad system of social control on an international and national scale, will serve as a sufficiently reliable guarantee in this respect.

In the strategic and military aspect, the process of the elimination of arms, including conventional arms, should flow in such a way that all steps taken strictly comply with the principle of symmetry and mutual balance. Not one of the participants in the process of disarmament in all its stages must get any strategic or technical military advantage in

[Lc]

N. Talensky 1962

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IX WG.2.3

comparison with the other participants: the balance of forces, including that of conventional weapons, which will exist when a treaty on universal and complete disarmament is signed must not have its stability impaired.

The danger of the resurgence of aggressive forces in any form must be consistently reduced until such time as it is brought to nothing.

Political, strategic and technical principles defining the process of the establishing of a disarmament treaty must be the same for all participants. As far as the economic side of this process is concerned, here the following principle must be subscribed by all participants; in the elimination of weapons and technology, in no case whatsoever must there be a retention of the possibility of their military use.

It follows that those types of weapons which are destructive must be so dealt with that there is no possibility of their being used destructively, i.e. they must either be physically destroyed or rendered completely useless for military purposes.

Such technology as is used, perhaps without the danger of abuse for military aims, might be transferred to corresponding organs or persons for peaceful purposes.

The majority of conventional means of destruction can hardly be used for peaceful purposes and must be eliminated. To a known extent supplies of explosive substances could be used for peaceful work such as those found in stores and extracted from shells, mines and bombs. Control over these does not present difficulties.

Those aspects of military technology which are not destined for direct destruction and are auxiliaries such as: means of transport, communications, buildings, roads and so forth can be used almost totally for peaceful purposes. It is quite possible that a part of this equipment can be transferred to those economically under-developed countries which may be in need of them. For example communication supplies in modern conventional armed forces are such as can be used to meet requirements over wide spheres. The peaceful use of such military technology demands certain adjustment for its new conditions of use, but apparently it will be expedient to do this rather than to destroy expensive apparatus which is valuable to people.

Such a principle can be adopted in the process of eliminating ships of a military and auxiliary kind. Those of them that could be used for peaceful purposes should be preserved and transferred to corresponding organizations for peaceful purposes, the remainder should be destroyed.

[L]

N. Talensky 1962

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IX WG.2.3

5. Conforming to the principles of the elimination of arms and military technology, fundamental positions could be worked out for the discontinuing of production for war of conventional arms and scientific discoveries, of the eliminating or breaking up for peaceful purposes of corresponding undertakings, workshops, institutes, laboratories and so on.

6. Despite the complication of the process of arms elimination, it should in no way serve as a hindrance to the immediate drafting and signing of a treaty on universal and complete disarmament under strict international control, based on the principles agreed between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. and approved by the XVI Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization.

---

ROOM ASSIGNMENTS
---

FOR PARTICIPANTS STAYING IN HARVEY COURT AND 'K' STAIRCASE

ADAMS Mrs Ruth (USA) A33
ALCOCK Dr. N. Z. (Canada) A10
ARTZIMOVITCH Acad. L. A. (USSR) J26
BAZANOV Dr. N. I. (USSR) K10
BESEDIN Dr. G. P. (USSR) K3
BLACKETT Prof. P.M.S. (UK) C23
BLAGONRAVOV Acad. A.A. (USSR) C31
and wife
BOGOLUBOV Acad. N. N. (USSR) G20
and wife
BRENNAN Dr. D. G. (USA) C24
BROWN Harrison Prof. (USA) and wife J31
BUCHAN Hon. Alastair (UK) C22
BURKHARDT Prof. G. (Germany) A23
BURTON Dr. John (Australia) J1
DOTY Prof. Paul (USA) C30
DUBIN Acad. M.M. (USSR) C34
and wife
DYSON Prof. F. (USA) C33
EMELYANOV Prof. W. S. (USSR) J32
FELD Prof. B. T. (USA) E23
FLOWERS Prof. B. H. (UK) G32
GENEVEY Monsieur P. (France) A35
GLASS Prof. Bentley (USA) J34
GOMER Prof. R. (USA) E13
HIEBS Dr. Albert (USA) E11
HOWARD Mr. Michael (UK) F32
HULUBEI Acad. H. (Rumania) F23
IMSHENETSKY Acad. A.A. (USSR) J24
INFELD Prof. L. (Poland) and wife K6
INOZEMTSEV Prof. N. (USSR) G21
KARGIN Acad. V. A. (USSR) wife C20
KATZ Mr A (USA) F35
KHVOSTOV Prof. V. M. (USSR) and wife F24

KISSINGER Dr. H. (USA) D10
KOFOED-HANSEN Prof. O. (Denmark) A16
KORNEEV Dr. S. (USSR) K11
KOZHEVNIKOV Prof. F. I. (USSR) K1
KUZIN Prof. A. M. (USSR) J33
LEGHORN Mr. R.S. (USA) and wife F34
LEIPUNSKI Prof. A.I. (USSR) K2
LEONTIEF Prof. W. (USA) A20
LEVITT Dr. W. (UK) J35
LONG Dr. F. A. (USA) D11
MENZEL Prof. E. (Germany) A24
MUNK Dr. W. (USA) and wife J16
NADJAKOV Prof. G. (Bulgaria) A12
NEMEC Mr. Theodor (Czech) A13
NERLICH Dr. O. (Germany) A11
NOEL-BAKER Rt. Hon. P.J. (UK) J11
OREAR Prof. Jay (USA) E11
PAVLICHENKO Mr V. (USSR) B31
PENNEY Sir William (UK) J4
PEIERLS Prof. R. (UK) and wife G31
PERRIN Prof. F. (France) A21
POWELL Prof. C.F. (UK) J14
PROCHAZKA Acad. V. (Czech) A14
PRICE Mr B. T. (UK) H10
RABI Prof. I.I. (USA) D12
RABINOWITCH Prof E. (USA) and Victor A31
RIZNICHENKO Prof. U.V. (USSR) G22
ROLING Prof. B.V.A. (Netherlands) G30
ROSENSTEIHL Prof. Pierre (France) A22
ROTBLAT Prof. J. (UK) J13
RUEINSTEIN Prof M. (USSR) K12
SALA Dr. Oscar (Brazil) G24
SALAM Prof. A. (Pakistan) J12
SARABHAI Prof. V. (India) B24
SEITZ Prof. F. (USA) F21
SOHN Prof. L.B. (USA) and wife B25
STRAUB Prof. F.B. (Hungary) A25

Read

IX: 3

"General Problems of Disarmament"

Louis B. Sohn

On September 20, 1961, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the United Nations a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations", which was later approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It might be useful to analyze that statement in the light of later developments.

In the main paragraph of the preamble, the two parties affirmed that "to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means."

This statement defines the proper climate for disarmament negotiations. It would be much easier to reach agreement on disarmament if states were willing to act in accordance with the rules listed here. These rules were previously embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, in a slightly different form, and one of the reasons for the failure of fifteen years of disarmament negotiations is the lack of adherence to them. One cannot, for instance, have faith that the disarmament treaty will be properly executed when the principal states of the world accuse each other of violations of existing international agreements and are not willing to accept the jurisdiction of an impartial international authority to determine once and for all the validity of these accusations. Similarly, many activities of the USSR are regarded by the United States as aggravating international tensions, while the USSR alleges that United States officials and newspapers add fuel to the fire of international conflicts. While they both talk about the need to settle disputes by peaceful means, the arms race continues and preparations are made for a war which might destroy not only them but the rest of mankind as well.

This does not mean, of course, that all international disputes must be settled and that all tensions must be reduced before we can have meaningful negotiations on disarmament. But one cannot

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expect our negotiators to discuss calmly the grave issues that confront them while their governments conduct a "cold war" in all other areas. There must be a general reduction in the intensity of the disagreements which have arisen in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America before a more reasonable approach to disarmament problems can be expected. As long as the arms race is being accelerated in order to cope with new crises all around the globe, it is difficult to talk seriously about disarmament. The agreement on Laos, the relative quietness of the Berlin situation, the arrangements for technical cooperation in outer space point in the right direction. If both sides could enlarge the area of peaceful settlement, and at least start to improve the atmosphere, the task of the disarmament negotiators would be easier. Many of the problems which cause international tensions are too complicated to permit an easy solution, but an honest attempt to approach them in a spirit of cooperation rather than antagonism would contribute greatly to more meaningful negotiations.

An improvement is also needed in the method of the disarmament negotiations themselves. The first round of the 1962 disarmament negotiations in Geneva was devoted to an explanation of the positions of the two sides and to a criticism of the treaty drafts presented by the other side. The emphasis was primarily on the correctness of the approach of one side, and the dangers inherent in the other side's proposals. It is true that an agreement was reached on a large part of the preamble and on most of the general obligations included in the introductory parts of the two proposals, and that there was a fleeting agreement on a declaration concerning war propaganda. But there was no real attempt to negotiate on questions of substance, or to try to reach a compromise on any of the basic issues. In particular, the Soviet delegation has shown no interest in appointing any of the many working parties or study groups which have been suggested on numerous occasions by the Western powers and the noncommitted nations.

Perhaps it is too early to think in terms of drafting a disarmament treaty. Some basic decisions must be made first by the principal governments concerned with respect to the actual implementation of the Joint Statement of September 20, 1961. The main difficulties relate to three questions: the method of disarmament, the scope of the verification process, and the strengthening of the peacekeeping machinery.

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In the September Statement, the United States and the USSR accepted the twin goals of general and complete disarmament and of effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace, but the dispute still rages about the questions how "complete" disarmament must be and how "effective" should the peacekeeping machinery be. For instance, it was agreed that the arrangements for a United Nations peace force "should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations." It was also agreed that such a force "be equipped with agreed types of armaments." But when the United States proposed at Geneva that the United Nations Peace Force be progressively strengthened "until it had sufficient armed forces and armaments so that no state could challenge it", the Soviet Union complained that the existence of such a force was not compatible with "complete" disarmament. It also contended that the United States proposal to equip the force "with agreed types of armaments" did not preclude the use of nuclear weapons by the Peace Force and thus revived the nuclear danger in another form. The position of the United States was defended by the argument that no inspection system could be effective enough to provide a complete assurance that all nuclear weapons have been eliminated, and that at least during a transitional period the United Nations Peace Force might have to be equipped with a minimum quantity of nuclear weapons sufficient to deter any state which might have hidden some such weapons. Of course, the use of nuclear weapons by the Peace Force would be carefully restricted to cases where a nation has actually used or threatened to use such weapons against any other nation or the Peace Force itself. The weapons themselves might be in civilian control and would be made available to the Peace Force only on request of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations.

This particular issue, on which the position of the two sides might not be as firm as it seems, is but one example of the difficulties relating to the more general problem of strengthening the peacekeeping machinery. The Peace Force -- to be effective -- must be independent from all the blocs and should be able to act when necessary. The Soviet requirement that the command of that force must make all decisions "by agreement among its members representing the three groups of States", would permit the rep-

[y]

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representatives of the Western powers, the Soviet bloc and the non-committed nations to bloc any decision by that command. If such a veto were retained in the final text, it would be doubtful that the force would be able to "suppress any threat or use of arms" as agreed in September 1961. The Soviet proposal is thus a step backward from the Joint Statement. This problem will have to be solved in some other manner than the one proposed by the USSR, but the United States "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty" is silent on the subject. It would seem dangerous to leave the command of the Peace Force in the hands of a single individual to whom the members of the force might develop a strong allegiance. Perhaps it might be possible to entrust that command to a group of five persons representing the main geopolitical areas of the world: Africa and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia, Eastern Europe and Western Europe. To avoid competition for seats in the command between the major powers, all of them might be excluded from it, as they were excluded from the United Nations forces in Egypt and the Congo. Their interests would be safeguarded by other means, e. g. by their participation in the political control over the Peace Force which would be exercised by the Security Council, or a special subcommittee of that Council, functioning without veto. Other possible limitations on the freedom of action of the Peace Force might be specified in the "rules of international conduct related to disarmament" which the United States proposed in its Outline of April 18, 1962. Such rules could define in a precise manner the circumstances in which the Peace Force would be permitted to act, and might leave in independent hands the determination whether such circumstances have actually occurred. For instance, the United Nations Peace Observation Corps could play an important role in this respect by furnishing reports on "any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace."

The Joint Statement provides that disarmament must be accompanied "by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes." It recognizes thus that both in a disarming and a disarmed world disputes between states will continue to exist. Unless such disputes are solved by peaceful means, they might lead to conflict, and conflict might lead to rearmament and even nuclear war. While some such conflicts might be stopped by an "effective" Peace Force, too frequent use of that force might unduly strengthen its influence and

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increase the danger of its dominance over the nations of
the world. Consequently, it seems desirable to develop
effective means for settling disputes in their early stages,
before they develop into threats to the peace. The Soviet
Draft Treaty of March 15, 1962, merely provides that disputes
should be settled not by force but by "the procedures provided
for in the United Nations Charter", and that the United Nations
be strengthened "as the principal institution for the maintenance
of peace and for the settlement of international disputes by
peaceful means." The United States Outline contains more pre-
cise proposals for action in this area. In the first stage, all
"disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
<u>/Disarmament</u> Treaty" would be subject to referral by any
party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice for final
decision. In the second stage, the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice over all international legal disputes would be
accepted by the parties, and additional arrangements would be
made for the just and peaceful settlement of political disputes.
Finally, in the third stage, the parties would put into effect such
arrangements as might be necessary to provide for peaceful
change in a disarmed world, thus ensuring that disarmament
should not be used as a pretext for permanent maintenance of
the present <u>status quo</u>. No official details are available as to the
arrangements which will be needed for the just settlement of
political disputes and for proper adjustment to change, but many
private suggestions have been made about the institutions which
are needed here. In particular, in the 1930's, the New Common-
wealth Institute under the able direction of Lord David Davies
made many studies of the applicability of rules and procedures
of medieval equity courts to the present international situation.
When there is no international legislation and when existing
international courts feel bound to apply the existing law, whether
it is just or not, some other means need to be devised to temper
law with justice. Some states do not believe that the present
system of international law, developed mostly by Western nations,
reflects universal justice. Though these contentions are often
overstated and an impartial examination of existing rules of
international law would easily show that they conform to the
need of orderly international intercourse, one must admit that
not all the rules of international law and not all the treaties
binding upon states are perfect. Any changes in existing legal

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situations, and any political disputes involving a transfer of ex-
isting rights and obligations, which in the past resulted in wars
and use of force, must in the future find a peaceful solution.
The Charter of the United Nations gives to the Security Council
the power "to recommend such terms of settlement as it may
consider appropriate", and empowers the General Assembly to
"recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situ-
ation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the
general welfare or friendly relations among nations." It would
seem, however, that decisions in this area should not be made
on a purely political basis by delegates acting on governmental
instructions and pursuant to bloc alignments, without adequate
consideration of the merits of each dispute. This could be im-
proved if a special independent body were established to which
the General Assembly and the Security Council could refer mat-
ters for an advisory opinion. Such a body could be composed of
elder statesmen and other persons having a worldwide reputation
for impartiality, knowledge of international affairs and famili-
arity with United Nations processes. After a careful investiga-
tion of each situation referred to it, such a body would present
to the United Nations its opinion relating to the adjustment of the
situation in most proper and equitable manner. While an ordinary
court could only decide what are the legal rights and duties of
the parties to the dispute under the existing law, a tribunal
looking for a just and equitable solution would be able to depart
from existing law and remove inequalities and injustices. In-
stead of being limited to a simple "yes" or "no" answer, such
a tribunal could devise a compromise which would give some
concessions to the losing party, thus saving its face and enabling
it to accept the decision more gracefully.

The opinion of the tribunal would only be advisory, unless
the parties in advance accept it as binding. Ordinarily, the
General Assembly and the Security Council would follow the opin-
ion of the tribunal and would recommend to the parties to the dis-
pute that they accept it. Sufficient pressure of world public opin-
ion might then build up behind these recommendations to force
the parties to comply with them. In this way threats to the peace
might be removed before they become too dangerous and lead us
back to the slippery road of rearmament.

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Another area of peacekeeping in which improvements are necessary is the area of developing rules of international conduct relating to disarmament. Disarmament is not going to last very long if states should take advantage of it for the purpose of conquering other nations by nonmilitary means. Those who would be on the losing side would not accept that fact with equanimity, would start to rearm, and would try to restore the balance by the use of force. Alternatively, there would be frequent resort to the United Nations Peace Force either to stop the expanding nations or to prevent the rearma- ment of the dissatisfied ones, with the ensuing danger that the Peace Force would start playing a decisive role in the gover- nance of the world. These dangers can be avoided only if an agreement can be reached in advance on the rules by which all the states would be willing to abide. Such rules would have to proscribe not only military aggression, by direct or indirect means, but also other forms of pressure designed to change the government or the political, social or economic system of an- other state. Adequate arrangements would have to be made also to ensure that complaints about a violation of these rules would be impartially decided, and that any actual violations would be quickly removed.

Before leaving the peacekeeping problems, it is necessary to point out that it is not contended that these problems must all be solved before reaching an agreement on general and com- plete disarmament. They should not even stand in the way of the implementation of the early stages of such an agreement. But it must be clear by now that the final stage of disarmament cannot be put into effect without an agreement on an effective peacekeeping machinery embodying at least the institutions and arrangements outlined above. To put it another way, the deeper the cuts in national armaments, the more it will be necessary to rely on peacekeeping machinery. Consequently, while the first stage of the American proposals for progressive disarma- ment could be implemented without the establishment of the peacekeeping machinery, the Soviet proposals for the abolish- ment of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage would immediately require the establishment of a strong United Nations

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Peace Force equipped with a minimum number of such vehicles needed to deter any violator who might have hidden a significant number of such vehicles. In turn, it would be necessary to strengthen the United Nations immediately to enable it to control the Peace Force, and to establish rules of international conduct to govern the action of that force. It follows that if there is a reluctance on the Soviet side to contemplate a buildup of peacekeeping machinery in the early stages of disarmament, this would require an acceptance by the USSR of more limited disarmament steps in the first stage. From that point of view, the United States proposals appear to be much better balanced.

Similar problems arise with respect to the inspection process. The quicker the Soviet Union would like to disarm, the faster must be the buildup of the inspection system. On the other hand, if only limited steps are proposed in the first stage, the amount of inspection need not be large. The Soviet Union agreed long ago that controls should be closely related to disarmament, i. e. that "Each disarmament measure shall be accompanied by such control measures as are necessary for verification of that measure." This has been interpreted, however, to mean that the verification would be limited to watching over the destruction of armaments and the closing of arms factories. Anything else is considered by the Soviet Union as control not over disarmament but over armaments, and consequently as espionage. The United States, on the other hand, believes that the extent of inspection during each disarmament stage should be "related to the amount of disarmament being undertaken and to the degree of risk to the Parties to the Treaty of possible violations." Some assurance must be provided not only that certain armaments have been destroyed and factories have been closed but also that the remaining armaments do not in fact exceed agreed levels and that new weapons are not produced at clandestine factories.

To take a simple example, suppose that the two sides agreed to destroy all their nuclear delivery vehicles by the end of Stage I; that the Soviet Union declared that it had 2400 bombers and 1200 missiles, and that its bombers and missiles were manufactured in twenty factories; and that the United States made a similar declaration, listing 1500 bombers, 1800 missiles, and thirty factories. The agreement might provide further that one twelfth of the

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delivery vehicles should be destroyed each month so that all
of them would be destroyed within a year. In such a situation,
the Soviet method of inspection would permit the stationing of
international inspectors at the twenty factories in the Soviet
Union and at the thirty factories in the United States; it would
also allow the inspectors to watch the destruction each month
of 200 Soviet and 150 American bombers and of 100 Soviet and
150 American missiles. But the Soviet method would provide
no guarantee that the original declaration disclosed actually
the total stockpile of bombers and missiles and that there were
no additional factories still producing missiles or bombers at
some secret location. To guard against this, the original
Western proposals envisaged a check of the complete inven-
tory at the beginning of the disarmament process. Only if
there were such a detailed check of all national armaments
and of all factories in which they might be produced would
there be a complete assurance that the declaration was accu-
rate. Against these proposals, the accusation was made that
they resulted in complete inspection without disarmament,
and that there would be no guarantee that once all military se-
crets were thus disclosed the two sides would actually start
disarming. To meet this objection, the new United States
proposals suggest, for example, that the inspection process
could be more closely related to disarmament by the progres-
sive zonal inspection method. According to this method,
each disarmament step would be accompanied by the opening
to inspection of one zone of each nation's territory, and the
whole territory of a nation would become subject to inspection
only at the end of the disarmament process. While each
nation would be permitted to divide its own territory into as
many zones as may be agreed upon (thus having a chance to
spread its military secrets as evenly as possible among the
zones) it will have no advance notice of the selection of a par-
ticular zone for inspection. As the original declaration of
the weapons to be reduced would specify their general dist-
ribution among the various zones, the inspection of any zone
would provide a measure of assurance that the declaration as
a whole seems to be accurate. Of course, there might be a
risk that only a few zones contain the exact amount of declared
weapons, that other zones contain a dangerous number of un-
declared weapons, and that by accident a zone belonging to

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the first category was chosen thus engendering a false sense of security. But the consequences of such a successful evasion in the early steps are not too dangerous as each nation would at that time still retain a large percentage of its deterrent strength. With each subsequent selection the risk diminishes, however, as the luck of the evading state is not likely to last throughout the successive disarmament steps. By the time the deterrent forces have been reduced to a minimum, the whole territory of each nation would be opened to inspection and the risk of evasion would consequently be close to zero. Any element of risk that would still remain at the end of complete disarmament would be taken care of through simultaneous strengthening of the United Nations Peace Force which by that time should be able to guarantee the security of all nations against a surprise attack by a country which has succeeded in evading the controls.

If we continue with the example previous used, this method would require each nation to open one twelfth of its territory during each one-twelfth cut in armaments and to permit in that part of its territory such inspection as might be necessary to ascertain that no weapons subject to reduction have been hidden and that no such weapons are being produced clandestinely in that zone.

If the objection is raised against this method that it would permit espionage with respect to weapons which are not being reduced in the early stages, this could easily be remedied by including reductions of all important weapons and military forces in these early stages. Of course, this would require some lengthening of these early stages in order to provide sufficient time for instituting adequate verification methods and for the destruction or conversion of weapons and military facilities to peaceful uses.

Once an agreement is reached on the proper relationship between disarmament and inspection, other difficulties might be solved more easily. They relate to the length of the stages, the transition from stage to stage, and the amount of disarmament in each stage. As pointed out above, the last question is closely related to the amount of inspection. The current United States proposals are based on the assumption that the Soviet Union would accept only a limited amount of inspection in the early stages. If, however, the Soviet Union would agree to speed up the progressive zonal inspection process so that it could cover

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more areas more rapidly, this might persuade the United States
to agree to a more speedy reduction of armaments. This would
require, however, a faster buildup of the peacekeeping machinery
and a concession by the Soviet Union on that point.

The problems outlined here are thus interconnected. It is
not enough to insist that one of them be solved in accordance with
the wishes of one group of states, if that group is not willing to
make simultaneous concessions in the interrelated areas. As
national security of all the countries is involved, no one can be
expected to make all the concessions; the problems can be solved
only by reciprocal accommodations. In Geneva we saw the ex-
position of the initial points of view of the two sides; it may be
hoped that with more vigorous help from the noncommitted nations
the process of real adjustment will start soon. The problems are
difficult but they are not insoluble What is needed is willingness
to look in more unbiased fashion at the proposals of the other side,
to look more critically at the weaknesses of our own proposals,
and above all to abandon puny propaganda skirmishes in favor of
a real effort to find a solution acceptable to all. If we want to
save humanity from the threatening disaster, we must take the
necessary risks, always keeping in mind that the risks involved
in any effective disarmament plan are much smaller for both sides
than those involved in the present arms race.

STATEMENT FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1962

Prepared by
Eugene Rabinowitch and submitted to
the International Continuing Committee

We, (300) scientists from (50) countries, from the East, West, North, and South, are united in awareness of what science can do to utterly destroy mankind, and what it could do to make life abundant and rewarding for all men on earth.

Science has put in man's hands a destructive power beyond his wild-
est dreams. For the first time, destroying has become infintely eas-
ier than building; killing infinitely cheaper than bringing up a new
generation. The capacity to destroy all higher life on earth, if not
yet achieved, lies within the grasp of man. Attempts to preserve the
institution of war in this age of nuclear weapons and earth-spanning
missiles, threatens the very survival of mankind. Traditional beliefs,
such as that "wars have always been with us, and will always remain,"
that "wars provide the outlet for the natural aggressiveness of man,"
that "to every new offensive weapon, a defensive weapon is bound to be
found," have lost their validity as the potential destructiveness of
war has increased a millionfold with the fission bomb, and a billionfold
with the fusion bomb.

With the development of these weapons, war has ceased to be a ra-
tional means of achieving political aims; weapons have become instru-
ments of mutual terror, built in the hope that they will never be used,
but nevertheless threatening to destroy mankind in an uncontrolled par-
oxysm of power politics. The arms race has become an obsession, an
incubus that rides the nations toward oblivion.

London Statement -2-

Peoples and their governments must make the choice between using science for the pursuit of narrow and contradictory power interests, thus pushing mankind ever closer to the brink of destruction, or using science constructively for increasing understanding and mastery of nature.

Mere prohibition, or even destruction, of the weapons of mass destruction, would not be enough. As stated four years ago in the Vienna Declaration of September 19, 1958, the knowledge how to make nuclear weapons will be with mankind from now on for all future. What science has learned, cannot be unlearned. Any war in future, even a war started with sticks, stones and slings, may soon develop into a war of nuclear bombs, nerve gases and bacteria. What must be abolished, is war itself. We therefore call, not only for complete and universal disarmament, but also for the establishment of international institutions adequate to guarantee and maintain this disarmament, and to exclude war permanently from the intercourse between nations.

As scientists, we respect facts and trust logics. We are realists, not dreamers. Objective facts of our era make the abolition of armaments and the establishment of a permanently peaceful world a matter of realistic necessity, not a wishful dream. What has been realistic in the past--nations or groups of nations advancing their purposes by war or threat of war--has become in our time a dangerous, wishful dream.

* * *

The advance of science has brought about this new situation. For fifteen years, scientists have tried to impress on the world leadership and public opinion the need to end wars and abolish weapons. But great technical and political difficulties stand in the way. In the field of technology, the problem of controlling the actual destruction of weapons,

London Statement -3-

and preventing their secret hoarding and re-acquisition, is a grave one. As scientists, we are aware of both the possibilities and the limitations of various technical approaches to this problem. We know that absolutely reliable, objective controls are impossible; but we believe that satisfactory control procedures are feasible, which would make retention and production of illegal weapons riskey and unprofitable. We are aware that concealed armaments will increase in importance as the amount of "legal" armaments will decrease; and that therefore the controls would have to increase in reliability and the international authority in strength, as disarmament progresses, until all nations will be able to accept the ultimate lack of all national armaments without risking their survival. But to make this possible, nations will have to give disarmament the highest priority in their policies, and be willing to sacrifice to its achievement other, traditional but now largely illusory, aims, such as achieving national security through superior military power, or through successful concealment of its armaments.

In the past COSWA conferences, including the just concluded Ninth Conference at Cambridge, we have discussed the various control problems as objectively as possible, and have tried to devise--with some measure of success--possible solutions to these problems. We intend to continue and expand this cooperative study, as a service to our nations and to mankind.

* * * *

We realize that progress toward disarmament requires increasing mutual trust, and that this trust cannot be obtained by decree or treaty, but must grow from increasing awareness of the community of interests of nations, and from their experience in successful, constructive co-

London Statement -4-

operation. All nations have one common interest--that of avoiding war; and this common interest, mutually realized, could provide a first foundation for trust. But it is not enough. Every time a political conflict flares up anywhere in the world, nations become sharply aware of the conflict of their interests, and mistrust flares up anew, swamping whatever progress may have been achieved before. We therefore call on all nations to exercise restraint in their policies, and to avoid exacerbation of political conflicts. All nations cannot be satisfied with the existing state of political affairs everywhere in the world; and spontaneous changes in this situation cannot be prevented; but what is possible, and should be attempted, is to avoid stoking the fires. Stability should be considered desirable by all nations, even if it may mean renouncing a political success and a possible accretion to own national power. The loss of trust, and thus of chances for disarmament and stable peace, must be considered an excessive price to pay for a political success.

Unrestrained ideological warfare, name-calling and threats contribute to distrust, even if unrelated to concrete political developments. The conflict of political and economic ideals is a basic reality in our time. Deep beliefs and loyalties are involved in this conflict, and nobody can expect it to be easily resolved; but no valid aim can be achieved by threats and invectives, by prophecies of utter destruction of the other side, and by denial to it of human motivations and decency. Both sides in this conflict proclaim that they are willing to be judged by their success in fulfilling human needs for satisfactory and rewarding life. We call on all nations to implement this proclaimed belief by refraining from provocative and offending verbal attacks on each other.

London Statement -5-

* * * *

There is one more important trust-building influence, which should be added to that of political stability, avoidance of ideological abuse, and common concern with disarmament: This is constructive cooperation in a wide variety of nonpolitical areas. Here, more than anywhere else, science can provide an important contribution. Scientific research has always been a cooperative international activity. Formerly underdeveloped nations are now entering the scientific civilization. As science becomes increasingly important in the affairs of man, the significance of this worldwide international cooperation grows. Never in the past have so many outstanding individuals of all nations, and an increasingly significant part of their national resources, been devoted to a worldwide, cooperative effort on behalf of all humanity. Despite temporary deviations, during which science of one race, nation or creed, was declared independent or even opposed to the science of other races or creeds, the internationalism of science cannot be destroyed, because it lies in its very nature. Not only in fundamental, but also in applied science, the need and possibility of international cooperation is becoming more and more obvious. Attempts to keep great scientific developments a property of a single nation or group of nations, are doomed to failure, as was shown by the collapse of attempts to restrict the mastery of atomic energy to one nation. Such attempts only lead to duplication of efforts, and could be fruitfully replaced by constructive collaboration. The secret and competitive character of such scientific programs as space exploration, may provide an outlet for national competitive spirit, similar to that of the Olympic games; but the cost of such competition is staggering, and it slows down the progress of science. Two runners would not run faster if they run together, instead of running

London Statement -6-

against each other; but nations working together on a space explora-
tion program would reach their aims much faster than if they duplicated
their efforts in separate developments.

The possibility and fruitfulness of international cooperation in the
exploration of our planet has been demonstrated during the International
Geophysical Year. In the Seventh COSWA Conference in Stowe, Vermont,
in September, 1961, we have explored the possibility of other inter-
national scientific undertakings of similar and even larger scopes. In
the present statement, we would like to draw particular attention to
three of them. One is a logical continuation of the IGY: it calls for
worldwide cooperative study of the atmosphere, the ocean, and the earth's
crust, their mineral and biological resources, the dynamics of their
motion and the exchange of energy and matter between them. The second
program suggests the creation of one (or several) "clusters" of global
research laboratories, with equipment too expensive to be developed in
a competitive effort, by individual nations or groups of nations: par-
ticle accelerators much more powerful than those being built or projected
now; computer systems permitting to undertake enormous projects such as
the determination of the structure of millions of different proteins,
nucleic acids, and other biologically important molecules.

The third area in which international cooperation could be of world-
wide importance, is technical advancement of new nations: education of
qualified technical personnel, development of agricultural, technologi-
cal, nutritional and hygienic processes specially adapted to the needs of
these countries. Through this cooperation, technical assistance could be
deprived of its competitive political and military implications, and be-
come a common effort of all technically advanced nations.

London Statement -7-

International cooperation in basic and applied science, and in assis-
tance to developing nati ns, is a task to which all of us in this con-
ference--and we are certain, the scientific communities of all nations--
could and would dedicate themselves with great enthusiasm. We call
upon all nations and their governments to join in giving science this
possibility to prove what it can do to make this earth a better place
to live for all men.

The revolutionary impact of science on human affairs imposes on
scientists a new responsibility: to help mankind to fully understand
the fateful implications of scientific progress, and to orient itself in
the new and bewildering world. Time has passed when scientists could
isolate themselves from human affairs. The future of science itself is
tied up irrevocably with the use mankind makes of its discoveries. We
call on scientists everywhere to accept this new responsibility, and to
discharge it with humbleness and dedication.

discharge it with impudence and dedication.

call on scientists everywhere to accept this new reasonability, and to
tied up inextricably with the use mounding machine of its discoveries.
Isolate themselves from human affairs. The future of science itself is
the new and developing world. Time has based when scientists could
the useful implications of scientific progress, and to ensure itself in
scientists a new reasonability: to help thinking to fully understand
The revolutionary lack of science in human affairs fuberses on
so live for all men.

possibility to prove what it can do to make this earth a better place
upon all nations and their governments to join in giving science this
culd and would dedicate themselves with most enthusiasm. We call
reason--and we are certain, the scientific communities of all nations--
to developing nation, if a task to which all of us in this con-
International cooperation in science and applied science, and in science-
London Agreement.

- London Agreement -

The first issue to which Working Group II addressed itself concerned the countries which would have to be included in agreement in general disarmament. The point was made that if Communist China were not part of such an agreement, this fact would have to be reflected in the total forces the United States might retain. The working group agreed on three general principles:

a) It would be desirable for Communist China to participate in NEGOTIATIONS concerning conventional forces in disarmament agreements

b) If Communist China - or any other significant military powers do not participate, this fact will have to be taken into account in the ceilings to be established FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES

c) The nuclear powers can discuss first steps - particularly in the nuclear field even without the participation of Communist China.

The working group took account of the presentation of Academician Topchiev at the opening plenary session to the effect that reductions in forces @n a percentage basis tended to favour the side enjoying superiority in a given category. It was therefore agreed that conventional disarmament was most effectively approached by fixing ceilings in terms of absolute numbers of weapons to be retained, particularly in the categories of tanks, self-propelled artillery, heavy and light artillery, machine gun gun and mortars.

As to the phasing of conventional disarmament, it was the view of the group that it had to be related to the process of nuclear disarmament. For purposes of discussion it was assumed that the hypothesis of conventional

- 2 -

disarmament be considered in relation to an agreement to reduce strategic
nuclear forces and delivery vehicles to agreed minimum levels. (These
were defined by General Talensky as depriving each country of the possibility
of launching a decisive attack.)

The rest of the ensuing discussion dealt with the issue of whether an
agreement on an over-all balance in conventional forces also需要 insured
a local balance. Specifically, how could the security of Europe be assured
under the hypothesis of substantial nuclear disarmament. Views on this
problem were split. The Western participants on the whole were of the
view that it was desirable to treat the NATO and Warsaw pack forces as a
unit and not to specify their deployment on a national basis as part of a
disarmament agreement. They also argued that it was desirable to seek to
distinguish between US. strategic bases located in Europe and troops
stational in Europe for purposes of local defence.

---

DIVISION
---

The Soviet participants were generally of the view that these distinctions
were impossible. While the total forces should be fixed on the basis of
the existing alliances, the agreement should also prohibit the stationing of
troops on foreign territory. They agreed that if Europe unified and became
one country this prohibition would no longer apply, as to the case of the new military forces.
However, pending this,
agreement on conventional disarmament had to proscribe the locations of
troops on foreign territory. The Soviet participants were willing to face
the fact that this might involve larger national contingents than would be
the case in an integrated NATO and Warsaw pack basis. This issue was left
for further discussion on Wednesday.

The afternoon session dealt with methods of verifying disarmament.

- 4 -

participants, while agreeing that the methods of verification for
conventional disarmament had to be less detailed than for nuclear disarma-
ment, on the whole were of the view that there had to be some degree of
sampling inspection of retained forces. General Talonsky introduced the
notion of a system of regional inspection. On Both sides of the dividing
line in Europe for a distance of five hundred miles would be completely
open to inspection.

The discussion on Monday morning dealt primarily with the speed of
disarmament. It was argued by some that the faster nuclear disarmament
proceeded, the less difficult the problem of the control of conventional
disarmament might become. Others maintained that this issue, while important
was not the only criterion and that excessive speed might bring about a
disequilibrium.

The following issues were left for later discussion:

(a):{nal limitations.}''

(b) Methods to reduce tension by adopting non-threatening military positions.

(c) The relationship between:al limitations and deployments on
foreign territory.

(d) Measures to control retained forces.

The first issue to which Working Group II addressed itself concerned
the countries which would have to be included in any agreement on general
disarmament. The point was made that if Communist China were not part of
such an agreement, this fact would have to be reflected in the total
forces the United States might retain. The working group agreed on three
principles:

a) It would be desirable for Communist China to participate in
disarmament agreements

b) If Communist China - or other significant military powers do not participate, this fact will have to be taken into account in the ceilings to be established.

c) The nuclear powers can discuss first steps - particularly in the nuclear field - even without the participation of Communist China.

The working group took account of the presentation of Academician
Topchiev at the opening plenary session to the effect that reductions in
forces on a percentage basis tended to favour the side enjoying superiority
in a given category. It was therefore agreed that conventional disarmament
was most effectively approached by fixing ceilings in terms of absolute
numbers of weapons to be retained, particularly in the categories of tanks,
self-propelled artillery, heavy and light artillery, machine guns and
mortars.

- 2 -

As to the phasing of conventional disarmament, it was the view of the
group that it had to be related to the process of nuclear disarmament. For
purposes of discussion it was assumed that the hypothesis of conventional
disarmament be considered in relation to an agreement to reduce strategic
nuclear forces and delivery vehicles to agreed minimum levels. (These were
defined by General Talensky as depriving each country of the possibility of
launching a decisive attack.)

The rest of the ensuing discussion dealt with the issue of whether an
agreement on an over-all balance in conventional forces also insured a
local balance. Specifically, how could the security of Europe be assured
under the hypothesis of substantial nuclear disarmament. Views on this
problem were split. The Western participants on the whole were of the view
that it was desirable to treat the NATO and Warsaw pact forces as a unit and
not to specify their deployment on a national basis as part of a disarmament
agreement. They also argued that it was desirable to seek to distinguish
between U.S. strategic bases located in Europe and troops stationed in Europe
for purposes of local defence.

The Soviet participants were generally of the view that these distinctions
were impossible. While the total forces should be fixed on the basis of the
existing alliances, the agreement should also prohibit the stationing of
troops on foreign territory. They agreed that if Europe unifed and became
one country this prohibition would no longer apply. However, pending this,
agreement on conventional disarmament had to proscribe the locations of

- 3 -

troops on foreign territory. The Soviet participants were willing to face the fact that this might involve larger national contingents than would be the case in an integrated NATO and Warsaw pact basis. This issue was left for further discussion on Wednesday.

The afternoon session dealt with methods of verifying disarmament. There was agreement that at the beginning of the disarmament process the countries concerned should declare the size of their forces and an inventory of their arms. Inspectors should be given access to relevant statistical data including budgets and appropriate production figures for basic products used in the manufacture of conventional arms. Inspectors should also have the right to observe the process of demobilization of units to be disbanded as a result of the agreement, as well as to be at the process of destroying the agreed quantity of weapons. It was agreed also that the methods of verification for conventional disarmament had to be less detailed than for nuclear disarmament, since the advantage to be gained by violation was less.

There was disagreement as to the right to inspect a sample of the retained forces. The Soviet participants argued that the measures outlined above were adequate to control conventional disarmament. The Western participants on the whole were of the view that there had to be some degree of sampling inspection of retained forces. General Talensky introduced the notion of a system of zonal inspection on both sides of the dividing line in Europe to a degree of five hundred miles to be completely open to inspection.

- 4 -

The discussion on Monday morning dealt primarily with the speed of disarmament. It was argued by some that the faster nuclear disarmament proceeded, the less difficult the problem of the control of conventional disarmament might become. Others maintained that this issue, while important, was not the only criterion and that excessive speed might bring about a disequilibrium.

a) Zonal limitations.

b) Methods to reduce tension by adopting non-threatening positions.

c) The relationship between zonal limitations and deployments on foreign territory.

London, 3-7 September, 1962

Report from the Standing Committee on Future Organization

The term of reference of this committee was to discuss the kind of organization which was needed to carry out the future activities of the Pugwash Conferences, and thus, the report is in part dependent upon what future activities are agreed. In general it was, however, accepted that a large organization with formal membership was not advisable. An extension of the present informal group, with the Continuing Committee as the administrative and directive body, was found acceptable.

The standing committee supported the recommendation of the Continuing Committee, that the new Continuing Committee be established with fourteen members as follows: three each from the USA and USSR; two from the United Kingdom, two from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; one from Asia, the Chairman, Lord Russell, and the Secretary-General. Additional members might be added to the Continuing Committee to represent China and regions which are not represented or are under-represented, such as Latin America and Africa, whenever active participation in the programme by countries in these regions warrant such a step.

The Committee has not felt it necessary to outline the exact procedure for election of the Continuing Committee in the future, but suggests that advantage be taken of the wide representation present at the Tenth Conference to elect a new Continuing Committee. For the sake of continuity, it is deemed inadvisable to replace a majority of current members of the Continuing Committee at any one time.

We recommend that the present members of the Continuing Committee be re-elected but since this Standing Committee is not representative of all the national groups, and has not the knowledge necessary to nominate candidates for the new members of the Continuing Committee, it was thought advisable to ask the national and regional groups present to discuss suitable nominations from their group to be presented for consideration by the Conference. The following members of our Committee have agreed to receive suggestions: for Western Europe, Dr. Burkhardt; for Eastern Europe, Professor Straub; and for Asia, Professor Yukawa.

-2-

It is understood that representatives of the U.S.A., U.K. and U.S.S.R. can be changed at any time through the will of their respective national groups. Changes in the representation from other regions will be considered by the Continuing Committee seeking advice of the group in that region.

Since the Pugwash-COSWA programme and activities are those of scientists, all members of the Continuing Committee as well as its officers should themselves be scientists. To maintain contact between its members it is advisable for the Continuing Committee as a whole to meet at least once a year. It should act as the directive as well as the executive co-ordinator of the programme.

On occasions when matters of special significance and importance to one or more of the national groups are to be discussed by the Continuing Committee, representatives of those national groups will be invited to meet with the Continuing Committee.

In the interval between meetings of the Continuing Committee the work should be carried out by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. The Secretary-General should be nominated by the Continuing Committee for election by the Conference as a whole. Should a vacancy arise in the interim period before the next large Conference the Secretary-General can be appointed by the Continuing Committee for a term lasting to the next General Conference, i.e., usually four years. Re-appointment is not excluded. The Secretary-General should be a scientist, preferably active in research. He should have the authority to act in matters of urgency according to policies and principles of the Continuing Committee, and is responsible to the Continuing Committee. On account of its size the new Continuing Committee should consider the desirability of appointing a smaller Executive Committee (comprised of members of the Continuing Committee) to advise the Secretary-General during intervals between meetings. Members of the Executive Committee could be appointed for a shorter term, e.g., one year, to ensure balance and attendance.

The Standing Committee received a suggestion that a separate committee be set up to give direction to Pugwash activities, without being involved in the organisational work of the Continuing Committee. The Standing Committee felt that this would be unnecessary but that the Continuing Committee should be able to set up committees on any special subject for which they needed competent advice.

-3-

SECRETARIAT

There should be an adequate Secretariat to relieve the Secretary-General of business details, to serve as a clearing house of information between the national groups, and to manage public relations. A full-time Assistant to the Secretary-General, a Public Relations Officer, and auxiliary staff are needed. All members of the Secretariat should be appointed by the Secretary-General to whom they are responsible. The Secretary-General is responsible to the Continuing Committee for the Secretariat.

The problem of financing such a Secretariat must be seriously considered by the next Continuing Committee at the first opportunity. The Standing Committee felt that the members of Pugwash should be responsible for the continued financing of the Secretariat. To give financial stability a decision should be made that funds should be provided by the national groups according to an agreed upon formula, at the same time recognizing difficulties arising from currency problems. It was felt that financial support for the Secretariat should be from within the movement to maintain its independence. The financing of special projects such as Conferences and study groups could be from outside sources.

Name: This Committee recommends that the official name of the organisation be "The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs". National groups should be free to abbreviate this name, or use any particular part of it.

London, 1962

Tenth Pugwash Conference

# A Travelling Virologist's Reflections on Perplexing World Affairs

Albert B. Sabin

More important than all the diseases afflicting the human race are the imminent dangers of nuclear warfare and the continuing, extraordinary increase in world population, resulting from the growing success in "death control" without adequate "fertility control." The continuing, rapid growth of population in the economically most depressed areas, which is destined to nullify the attempts to overcome the miseries of hunger, poverty and despair, can itself provide the spark for nuclear warfare - for it is the competition of the great nuclear powers among the hungry and miserable peoples of the world that carries with it the greatest danger of ultimate catastrophe.

Everywhere in the world people want peace and the opportunity to utilize the new forces of science and technology for building a better life - and yet the nuclear arms race continues without any new approach to breaking the impasse. In the U.S.S.R., as in the U.S.A., the people believe their responsible leaders when they tell them that they are working for peace and disarmament, and that it is the other side that is putting up all the obstacles. It is frightening to think that the horrible consequences of nuclear warfare may destroy the educationally and economically most advanced countries of the world simply because their political and diplomatic thinking has not caught up with the realities of the new era created by science and technology.

An approach to world affairs along the lines used in the study of disease, leads me to think that the world leaders are devoting their energies and summit conferences to dealing with the symptoms of the disease, e.g. Berlin, East Germany, Viet Nam, Congo, Laos, Cuba, etc., and the nuclear arms race, rather than in attempts to arrive at an understanding of the basic causes, which alone can give hope of breaking the dangerous impasse. The crux of the matter seems to me to lie in the fact that the U.S.A. regards as inadmissible the export by the U.S. S.R. of communism to other parts of the world by revolutionary methods, while the U.S.S.R. regards as inadmissible the export by the U.S.A. of counter-revolution by direct or indirect military support of governments resisting social and economic changes.

X Comment 1.

London, 1962

- 2 -

X Comment 1.

It would seem almost self-evident that as long as the mutual distrust and suspicions continue, there can be no basis or hope for cessation of the nuclear arms race. Disarmament can only follow international trust and not be the primary instrument of achieving it. It seems to me that the great nuclear powers, the U.S.A. and the USSR, and their allies, must arrive at a new philosophy of international relations based on the concept that neither capitalism nor communism will conquer the world - that capitalism will remain in some parts of the world and capitalism in others, and that both in fact are undergoing important revolutionary changes. The common danger to the "have" nations - whether they be capitalist or communist - is in the recklessness that may be bred by despair in the economically underdeveloped nations, who do not wish to wait 100 years or more to escape from the miseries of hunger and poverty. While sophisticated diplomats and political scientists may regard it as sheer, day-dreaming idealism, it seems to me that not only humanitarianism, but prudence and self-interest, should lead the "have" nations to stop their competition among the "have-not" nations, and join in a common effort for stamping out hunger, poverty and despair not only among those who will pledge to follow their own brand of economics or politics but wherever the need may be - and do it through the United Nations whose main function should be to help those who cannot help themselves. Let this be the testing ground of good faith, for only by saving those who are helpless and impatient in their misery can we hope to save ourselves. Only by finding some such common ground for cooperative action, can the nations hope to lay the foundation for the mutual trust and faith that are now lacking, and thereby bring some hope for success in the cessation of the potentially catastrophic nuclear arms race and ultimate disarmament. Only by international cooperation in this most important of all challenges facing mankind, can we look forward to a world better by far than any we have yet known rather than to a return to barbarism and misery - by comparison with which the problems of disease seem minor and insignificant.

LONDON 1962

COMMENTS X5

# THE SCIENTIFIC BASE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By P. C. MAHALANOBIS

## Summary

The need of economic and technical aid for the economic development of the less advanced countries is now widely recognised, in principle, although programmes of giving such aid are still inadequate or partly ineffective. This note draws attention to the need of giving scientific aid. The rise of capitalism in the "western" countries during the last three or four hundred years reveals the scientific foundation of economic and social progress. The emergence of the "eastern" socialist countries during the last thirty or forty years is also based on the progress of science and technology. The coexistence of both "western" countries with free enterprise and "eastern" socialist countries with a planned economy has become indispensable to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war. The very existence of the underdeveloped countries has to be seen as a continuing threat to peace. The rapid economic progress of such countries is therefore necessary not only on humanitarian grounds but also as an essential condition for enduring peace. It is stressed that establishing a scientific base is essential for a rapid transformation of the social and economic conditions of the less advanced countries. The production of an adequate supply of research scientists and the creation of social conditions in which they can work fruitfully are therefore crucial to economic growth and enduring peace. Ways and means of giving scientific aid to promote the growth of science are then briefly discussed.

## 1. Phases of Economic Development

1.1. The essential characteristic of an underdeveloped country is an extremely low level of living, that is, inadequate supply of food, clothes, housing, drugs and other consumer goods, and also lack of facilities for education, care of health, social security, cultural amenities, etc., for the nation as a whole. It is possible to make available small quantities of consumer goods by direct imports or by domestic production, on a small scale, with the help of imported machinery. In most of the underdeveloped countries it is, however, not possible, for lack of necessary foreign exchange, to import or to produce, with imported machinery, enough consumer goods for the people as a whole. In India, the first textile mill was established in 1817; and India gradually became the second biggest producer of textiles, next only to America. One hundred and fifty years later, India would still remain underdeveloped. The production of textiles or small quantities of other consumer goods for a small part of the nation cannot, by itself, lead to industrialisation and economic development.

1.2. Economic development can occur only by increasing the per capita production of the nation as a whole, through an increasing use of machinery driven by steam or electricity as a substitute for human and animal labour. In countries with appreciable natural resources, it is necessary to establish the basic engineering and power industries to enable the manufacture of both consumer and capital goods within the country. Establishing a minimum complex of such basic industries would take at least ten or fifteen years for which planning must start ten or fifteen years in advance.

1.3. To increase modern industrial production would call for an increasing supply of engineers, technologists, and technical personnel. The only way to ensure this would be to establish and increase the number of schools, training colleges and universities and to train teachers for such institutions. This would take at least fifteen or twenty years; so that planning for this purpose must start fifteen or twenty years in advance.

1.4. The best way of utilising the raw materials and natural resources available within the country, for both domestic consumption and for exports, can be found out only through applied scientific research. Applied research, in its turn, must be based on advances in fundamental research. Also, to establish an adequate base for applied research it is necessary to promote the spirit of pure research and supply the stimulus of scientific criticism. This would be possible only when at least a certain minimum number of scientists are engaged in fundamental research, and opportunities for pure research are becoming increasingly available. It is therefore necessary to promote the advancement of both applied and fundamental research. To establish a minimum base for scientific research would take more than a generation of twenty-five or thirty years; this, being the most slowly maturing sector, must be given the highest priority.

## 2. The Scientific Base of the Advanced Countries

2.1. The scientific base of the modern age can be appreciated by even a brief review of the recent history of the advanced countries. Four hundred years ago the generally accepted view was that the earth was at the centre of the universe; the position of human beings was unique and supreme; and the highest sanction of truth was either divine revelation or abstract logical reasoning in the mind of man. In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the concept of an objective world of physical reality gradually took shape through the endeavours of gifted astronomers and scientists; the earth was seen as a small planet moving round the sun; and the method of empirical observations and experimentation was gradually established in both physical and life sciences. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) pointed out that the only valid method in science was to proceed from particular sense observations to wider generalisations. He also recognised that "the true and lawful goal of science is ... that human life be endowed with new discoveries and power." The rate of advancement of science increased progressively in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; and during the last few decades new frontiers have been opened up with unimaginable possibilities.

2.2. The advancement of science prepared the ground for the industrial revolution in Europe in the eighteenth century, first in spinning and weaving, next in the use of iron and steel, and then of electricity in the nineteenth century, which stimulated the growth of the capitalist economies in West Europe and North America. The spread of the scientific outlook also prepared the ground for the age of reason and the French revolution, which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century, and promoted the growth of nationalism in Europe, in its modern sense, in the nineteenth century.

2.3. The industrial revolution increasingly replaced human and animal power by steam or electricity to drive machinery for the increasing production of both consumer and capital goods. The development of engineering techniques led to a close linkage between science and technology; and during the last hundred and fifty years, industrial development is being stimulated by a scientific discovery or a scientific discovery is being stimulated by industrial needs.

2.4. For the last five or six thousand years, or more, the average per capita production remained more or less constant or fluctuated within narrow limits. The industrial revolution changed all this, and led to a spectacular increase in the variety and volume of goods produced. As a consequence of such increasing production the standard of living of the advanced countries of West Europe and North America reached a level far higher than the rest of the world. Also, the advancement of science, technology and industry, made it possible for the western countries to become strong military powers; and, because of such military supremacy, the west was able to bring a large part of the world either into direct colonial rule or into conditions of economic or political subjugation.

2.5. The last forty years have also seen the rise of U.S.S.R., as another world power, rapidly growing, through the promotion of science and technology, in economic, industrial and military strength with a continuing increase in the level of living. The monopoly of scientific and technological knowledge and the unchallengeable military supremacy of the western countries have now gone. The increasing parity between the "western" and the "eastern" countries in science, technology, industry, and military power is a most significant fact of the present time. Because of the unprecedented destructive power of atomic and nuclear weapons, it has become absolutely necessary to avoid a nuclear war which would be catastrophic for both sides and the whole world. Coexistence of both the "western" and the "eastern" powers has become indispensable.

2.6. There is no intention on either side to make a direct attack. The advanced countries pose no special problems because it is not possible to hold such countries indefinitely in subjugation. However, so long as there are underdeveloped areas, both power groups are likely to try to extend their influence over the less advanced countries; and this would remain a continuing source of potential conflicts. The very existence of underdeveloped countries should, therefore, be seen as a threat to peace. Rapid transformation of all the underdeveloped countries into modern viable societies is an essential condition for peaceful coexistence. Such a transformation would promote the enlightened self-interest of both power groups, and would also create conditions favourable for the advancement of human and cultural values on a world-wide basis.

2

### 3. The Role of Science in the Modernisation of the Less Advanced Countries

3.1. Modernisation of the less advanced countries through rapid industrialisation is thus an urgent need of the whole world. Is such modernisation possible or can a modern society with a viable economy, with expanding social and political freedom, and cultural amenities be sustained without establishing a sound scientific base? This is a question of crucial importance for the present age.

3.2. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to appreciate the deeper changes in human thinking which were brought about by the emergence of science. In every sphere of organised activity in human society, authority has always been associated, and must always be associated with a system of hierarchical levels. This applies to primitive societies, matriarchal, patriarchal, or tribal; successive levels of feudal lords; organised churches and religions; military, police and administrative systems; enterprises, business and commerce; and law. A law court of appeal may reverse the decision of a lower court; but the decision of the court of appeal is itself subject to change by a still higher court. The decision of the highest court, to which a case has been actually referred, has to be accepted not because such a decision is necessarily right, but because it is the decision of a superior authority. Society must accept this authority principle for stability and orderly progress, even in organised revolutionary activities.

3.3. This very authority principle must, however, be absolutely and completely rejected in the field of science. Modern science is based on a patient accumulation of facts, on the study of processes and their interrelations or interactions which can be discovered by the human mind. The findings of the most eminent scientists are subject to critical check by their professional colleagues and by the youngest scientific workers, and must be rejected if there is no satisfactory corroboration. Science can advance only through free criticism on a completely democratic basis with every research worker of competence enjoying equal status. The theoretical or conceptual framework of science must be continually revised to find a proper place for all known facts. A single new observation may call for a more comprehensive theory. The older accumulated knowledge continues to remain valid; later discoveries must, however, be integrated with the earlier knowledge. The accumulation of scientific knowledge is increasing through the efforts of all scientific workers of the world. A new fact may be observed or a new theory formulated by any worker, however young, and in any country where research has been established. International collaboration is, therefore, an indispensable condition for the progress of science.

3.4. Authority derived from status is irrelevant to science. Science has introduced a new concept of "scientific", or "objective validity" which has its foundation in nature itself and which cannot be upset by any authority based on status or by supernatural powers. The transformation of all the advanced or rapidly advancing countries has been based on accepting, in an increasing measure, a scientific or rational view of life. This is the foundation of the modern age.

3.5. It is essential in every country to establish and strengthen the outlook of science, a way of thinking which becomes more and more powerful as it is more widely adopted, and which replaces dogma, superstition, and outdated customs. This scientific outlook cannot be established by force. It must depend on acceptance through proper understanding. In practical affairs, the important point is that a wise policy and programme of action should be increasingly adopted on the basis of rational argument, supported by relevant factual evidence, and should not be rejected because of emotional bias or formal dogmas or conventional rules of procedures.

3.6. It is scarcely necessary to point out that there is no conflict between the scientific and rational view of life and aims and objectives based on moral or cultural values. On the contrary, moral and cultural values which are truly universal, and are not narrowly sectarian or nationalistic in a restricted sense, must have an objective and rational basis.

3.7. The advancement of science and the growth of the scientific outlook must be recognised as an essential condition for the modernisation of the less advanced countries. It is necessary for each country to have, as quickly as possible, a sufficient number of men with a scientific outlook to influence the thinking of the nation. The actual transformation must be brought about from within each country. Scientific aid from the advanced countries can, however, be of great help in this process.

3

4. Present Programmes of Technical Aid

4.1. The need of technical aid has been recognised for some considerable time. Bi-lateral or multi-lateral and international technical aid has often taken the form of either offering educational and training facilities to young workers from the less advanced countries or sending technical or scientific experts to such countries. Considerable benefit has no doubt accrued through such aid but it is necessary to recognise that much effort has also been wasted.

4.2. Scholars from the less advanced countries are usually selected on the basis of results of examinations; success in examinations not being a necessarily reliable indicator of scientific or technical ability, the very process of selection is inefficient. Some of the young scholars have difficulty in adjusting themselves to the pattern of living in the advanced countries. Some of them do not do well in their studies. Some pass the examinations successfully but have no aptitude for scientific work. Some of the more able scholars prefer to live and settle down in the advanced countries, especially in the U.S.A., because of the higher level of living or greater opportunities for scientific work. Some scholars of ability, when they return to their own countries, are unable to find suitable openings for a scientific career; and some of them go back to the country where they were trained. In applied science and technology, and especially in social sciences, many young scholars, who had often studied problems or learnt methods which are appropriate for advanced countries but totally irrelevant to their own native countries, are unable to adapt or develop methods to suit local conditions. Out of the large number of scholars who go to advanced countries for training, only a very small number of really able scientific workers ultimately become available for fruitful work in their own country. The cost of giving scientific or technological training in an advanced country is also very high. Giving training to individual scholars in advanced countries (whether the expenses are provided in the form of foreign aid or met by the scholars themselves or by the country of origin) have been, therefore, extremely wasteful in terms of both men and money.

4.3. There has been also continuing difficulties in finding suitable individual experts for the less advanced countries. Competent scientific workers are reluctant to accept such assignments partly because of the lack of facilities for their own work in the less advanced countries and partly because their scientific or academic career is likely to be adversely affected through their absence abroad. In consequence, assignments sometimes have to be given to persons who are not fully qualified for the job, with unsatisfactory results. To create suitable conditions for scientific work in the less advanced countries is an indispensable condition for attracting competent scientists to go out to such countries.*

4.4. Programmed technical aid on a group basis has been more effective. A team of young engineers from a less advanced country can receive most valuable training in an advanced country when such training is oriented to specific technological projects. Teams of experts from advanced countries have also been of very great help in establishing factories or in starting new projects in the less advanced countries. Such technical aid, especially in engineering, technology and applied sciences, should be continued and expanded. Special projects for establishing technological and research centres in the less advanced countries have also been taken up by some of the international agencies. This type of aid can be of great value provided a sufficient number of scientific workers in the less advanced countries can be trained to work in such centres, and also provided necessary conditions are established to enable them to do their work properly.

5. Need of Direct Aid for Research

5.1. It has been argued in the earlier sections that for modernisation it is necessary to establish a foundation for scientific research and the social appreciation of science in the developing and less advanced countries. Every path-finder in a new field of research must work in the first instance by himself; if he is successful, other persons gradually get interested in the subject. Such path-finders always had, and will always have to overcome much opposition and even hostility until the new subject becomes a recognised part of the "established" field of science. But it is only a few scientists of outstanding ability who can work in isolation. Most research workers require the stimulus of free interchange of views and ideas and of appreciation among professional colleagues.

* Professor P.M.S. Blackett has discussed this question in considerable detail, *Nature*, 3 February, 1962, 416-420.

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5.2. The community of scientists has a structure of a series of widening circles similar to the structure of scientific subjects or of science as a whole. When a top scientist speaks appreciatively of some work in his special field, other scientists or lay men accept his evaluation and pass on the information to others. The social appreciation of science gradually emerges as a result of the diffusion, in widening circles, of the views of scientists, who are experts in specialised fields of research, to scientists in related and associated fields, then to scientific workers generally, and finally, through persons of position and standing who have contacts with scientists, to the general public. The speed with which such appreciation can spread increases rapidly with the increase in the number of scientific workers and improvements in the channels of communication. In the advanced countries, the awareness of the importance of science is increasing rapidly which, in its turn, is raising the social status of scientists and is promoting an increasing flow of resources for research.

5.3. The whole process is extremely slow in underdeveloped countries. The number of research scientists is very small; and channels of scientific communication are non-existent or meagre. Scientific workers usually receive lower pay and have a lower status than the administrative staff in government or in business concerns; and have to work in a rigid system of hierarchical authorities. Promotion may depend, not so much on the high quality of the scientific work done, but on success in pleasing those who are higher up in the official hierarchy. Even permission to apply for posts elsewhere is subject to the discretion of superior officers. There is a continuing tendency to bring scientists and scientific work under stricter control of the administrators, partly, perhaps, from an unconscious fear of rivalry of power. Even if the right of criticism is accepted in principle, it is restricted in practice because scientific workers are often afraid, rightly or wrongly, of giving offence to persons holding higher posts. In consequence, many scientists in underdeveloped countries suffer from a lack of self-confidence, and are afraid to take up original lines of investigation. There is little possibility of a proper evaluation or appreciation of scientific work within the country. This leads to an exaggerated dependence on the opinion of foreign scientists and gives rise to much imitative work. Also, when there is lack of appreciation in the advanced countries, there is sometimes a tendency to ascribe the unfavourable view to racial or national prejudices, and there is resistance against collaboration with foreign scientists.

5.4. In underdeveloped countries there are very few, sometimes only one or two individuals of outstanding ability in scientific research or in any other scientific field. As leadership can be supplied only by individuals of high ability and as such persons are few in number, it is much more difficult in underdeveloped countries to utilise the services of individuals of average ability and qualifications. The advanced and advancing countries have a double advantage. They have a large number of persons with qualities of leadership and can, therefore, utilise in a fruitful way a very large number of persons of average ability. This is why many scientific workers from underdeveloped countries, who are unable to do much useful work in their own native country, can often do very good work in the environment of a higher state of organisation of research in an advanced country.

5.5. The aim of scientific aid must be to create in every underdeveloped country, as quickly as possible, a sufficient number of research scientists to form a community of professional workers which would be sufficiently large to facilitate an independent evaluation of scientific work through free criticism and frank exchange of views. It is, therefore, necessary to focus attention on identifying and giving support to persons who have the ability to undertake research work of high quality and to try to increase their number as quickly as possible, and at the same time to offer opportunities for training to persons of average ability whose services would be equally essential in supplying a wide base for the pyramid of scientific work.

5.6. There is urgent need of fostering the spirit of objective scientific criticism through free expression and exchange of views and opinions. One effective way of promoting this would be to make it easy for scientific workers to migrate from one post to another and give an absolute guarantee of such freedom to migrate. Any scientific worker who feels, rightly or wrongly, that he has not enough opportunities for fruitful work in one place would be free to migrate to some other place. Such migrations or the possibility of such migrations would have an indirect but most important selective effect on scientists at all levels.

5.7. It is necessary to recognise that the social value of an individual scientist of high ability is far greater in a developing country because of the leadership he may be able to supply. This is why it is particularly important in developing countries to identify

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such individuals, at first very few in number, and give them necessary facilities and encourage-
ment to continue their work in their own country.

5.8. Science advanced both from progress at the highest levels of research, at the top, and from the wide diffusion of education, at the bottom, in the highly developed countries. The same strategy may be adopted with advantage in the less advanced countries. What is urgently needed is to lay the foundations, with as wide a base as possible, for a country-wide system of school education and, at the same time, to develop advanced studies of science and technology and research at the highest level. The school system must fit into the economic life of the general mass of the people and have its grass roots in the villages. It must offer facilities for training technicians and technical personnel for science and technology and also supply candidates of outstanding merit for admission to higher scientific and technological institutions.

## 6. Need of Direct Aid for Science

6.1. I shall offer, briefly, a few suggestions for giving direct aid for the develop-
ment of science in the less advanced countries. I have stressed the need of building up
a system of school education with a definite orientation to science. It would be a fatal
mistake to establish an expensive system of education on the model of the advanced
countries which would have little relevance to local needs and would be beyond the means
of the national economy. It is necessary to evolve a system, through experimentation
and trial and success, which would be within the means of the national economy. The
approach must be therefore to use teaching aids which are easily available or can be made
available on a large scale at low cost. As most of the pupils will be living in villages, it would
be of great advantage if agriculture and some of the rural industries can be adopted as a
base for the teaching of science. The programme may consist largely of nature studies,
observations and experiments which can be done with the help of simple articles, specimens,
etc., likely to be locally available or which can be constructed with local materials.

6.2. There would be still some need of supplying teaching aids and materials from outside which would have to be specially designed to reduce costs. It is essential also to prepare books of instructions and text books to suit a fairly wide range of needs. These are difficult tasks which would call for extended study and research by scientists of the highest ability who also have a serious interest in problems of science education. As basic conditions in underdeveloped countries are likely to be similar to a large extent, it may be possible to evolve broad general methods for science education which would be capable of being adapted without much difficulty to suit differing local conditions in different countries. In any case, concrete studies and progress in one underdeveloped country is likely to throw up ideas which would be useful in other countries.

6.3. A great deal of pioneering research would be necessary for this purpose for which the help of advanced countries is indispensable. Although preliminary studies and some preparatory work can be done in the advanced countries, a good deal of experimental studies will have to be undertaken under conditions actually prevailing in underdeveloped regions. Fortunately, even one, or two scientists can start the work in one single country. In the beginning, the studies would have to be organised on a small scale with the help and support of the local authorities and of such teachers and scientists as may be available to cooperate in the venture in the underdeveloped country itself. The project can be gradually extended, in the light of experience, to cover different subject fields at different educational levels, and also from one underdeveloped country to another. The important point is to make a beginning at the earliest opportunity.

6.4. I may now mention a second type of programme. Certain facilities for scientific research are already available in India and other developing countries. In most of these countries, scientific work is being hampered for lack of small replacement parts, additional accessories and instruments, and supply of essential consumable stores which have to be imported from the advanced countries. It is often difficult to secure import licences on account of shortage of foreign currency, although instruments and equipment are sometimes imported which are not adequately utilised. This difficulty can be overcome through a simple plan of direct gifts of replacement parts, instruments and equipment, stores, books and journals and reprints or microfilm of scientific papers etc., to be arranged through non-governmental committees of scientists. Such a committee, which can be set up in an advanced country through or in cooperation with appropriate scientific organizations

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or societies, would try to secure suitable grants from Government and donations or gifts in kind from other sources. In a developing country where scientific research has already started, a counterpart committee of scientists would also be set up, preferably, at a non-governmental level and with a majority of scientists from universities and non-governmental scientific institutions. All arrangements would be made with the concurrence of the government of the less advanced country, but decisions relating to gifts for scientific work must be made by direct consultations between the two scientific committees. A scheme of this type can be usefully started, on an experimental basis, for a few selected countries, at a low cost, with gifts to the total value of perhaps one or two hundred thousand dollars per year. The amount can be increased if the experiment proves successful.

6.5. Another important form of scientific aid would be to arrange for competent research scientists from the advanced countries to work for a year or two in existing research units in the less advanced countries or to help in establishing high level research units in such countries. The less advanced countries can offer challenging problems and opportunities for research in many fields of science, which cannot be duplicated in the advanced countries, for example, in geology, meteorology and geography; biology, botany, and zoology; agriculture; medical science and public health; economics of development; linguistics, archaeology; and historical and cultural studies of various kinds. In some of the developing countries there would be also increasing opportunities for active participation in research in mathematics and statistics, physico-chemical and technological sciences. In establishing research units in underdeveloped countries it would be desirable to keep one broad aim in view, namely, to encourage joint studies by active collaboration between the different units. This would help in developing a community of research cells or units which, in its turn, would foster the growth of the spirit of scientific criticism and appraisal among wider circles of scientific workers.

6.6. To attract competent visiting scientists it is necessary to offer them facilities to pursue or start fruitful research in the less advanced countries; sometimes special equipment may have to be provided for this purpose. Secondly, the assignment in a less advanced country, would have to be treated as deputation in the same way as participation in scientific expeditions, and which would be recognised as a part of normal duties and also as a possible qualification for promotion. The visiting sientist must receive sufficient compensation in his home currency to meet his continuing home commitments during his absence abroad. Living and other local expenses should be normally met by the institution or by the government of the country in which he would work. Such sharing of costs would promote effective cooperation in the less advanced country and would reduce the total cost appreciably.

6.7. An important part of the responsibilities of a visiting scientist would be to give training to the scientific workers of the underdeveloped countries. When necessary, the visiting scientists would be able to select, for further training in an advanced country, the right type of persons who can be depended upon to go back to their work in their own country. It would be also possible to give aid in the form of equipment and instruments in an effective way on the basis of objective appraisals of needs and possibilities by the visiting scientists.

6.8. A fourth programme could be to send young scholars from advanced countries, who have just finished their education in universities or higher educational institutions or have already done some research, to start or continue suitable lines of research for about two years or so in existing institutions or in research units to be established for this purpose in underdeveloped countries. The common participation in research projects of young scholars from the advanced and the underdeveloped countries would be of great help in establishing scientific traditions and an atmosphere of scientific criticism. It would promote self-confidence among the scientific workers of the underdeveloped country if the visiting scholars from advanced countries take higher degrees from institutions in the less advanced countries.

6.9. All the above forms of scientific aid can be started, if desired, on a small scale and at low cost, and, if successful, can be expanded in the light of experience. Also, these forms of scientific aid would not in any way overlap or hamper bigger programmes for gifts of expensive equipment or large projects for the setting up of national or regional centres and institutes for scientific research in the less advanced countries. On the contrary, the modest programme described in this note would prepare the ground for bigger projects.

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7.1 Conclusion

7.1. In conclusion I may refer, very briefly, to some recent developments. After the second world war the movement for terminating colonial rule gained rapidly in strength; and one country after another in Asia and Africa has won political independence. It is being increasingly realised, however, that independence is not enough for economic development. The need of economic and technical aid is also being increas-ingly appreciated. Both the "western" and the "eastern" powers have started helping in the economic development of the less advanced countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but still without an adequate impact. The time has come to recognise that economic aid is essential but is also not sufficient.

7.2. Revolutions to capture political power have been occurring throughout human history and are even now occurring in many of the politically independent countries in Latin America or in most of the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. Such revolutions do not automatically promote rapid economic development, because purely political revolu-tions do not lead to any fundamental transformation of the old society based on the principle of authority associated with levels of status. It is becoming increasingly clear that rapid economic development cannot be achieved without developing a structure of society in which decisions would tend to be made more and more on grounds of reason, that is, in accord-ance with the principle of objective validity instead of authority. It is relevant to note that the French Revolution was preceded by the age of reason; the American War of Independence had the support of influential leaders inspired by the spirit of science; and the socialist government which was established after the 1917 revolution in Russia made great efforts to build up a countrywide system of science-oriented education and to promote scientific research and was successful in modernising the whole society leading to rapid economic development.

7.3. One thing is quite clear. In the absence of rapid economic development, political conditions in the less advanced countries would remain unstable. In many or most countries there would be one revolution after another tending to get the two power groups involved directly or indirectly in the struggle. The world must get out of this vicious circle. There are only two possibilities. One is for a new type of revolution to occur which would suddenly change the whole structure of society to make it fit for rapid development of science and economic progress. The other alternative is deliberately to build up the foundation of science-oriented education and research to promote the modernisation of society in a peaceful way and make conditions favourable for economic development.

7.4. Aid for scientific and economic development from either the western or the eastern countries, even when given in a spirit of competition, would be cooperative in effect. In any event, competition in constructive tasks of building up scientific foundations in developing countries is less dangerous and is likely to be far more useful than competition in the methodologies of warfare. Also, collaboration in promoting education and research in pure science can be pursued without any threat to national security or national interests, and would be of great help in promoting a rapid advance of the underdeveloped countries and in fostering better understanding among the nations of the world. The advanced countries have a great opportunity for peaceful cooperation in giving aid for science.

Note: I have considered some of these questions in *Science and National Planning*, Address at the National Institute of Sciences of India, 8 January 1958 (Sankhyā, 20, 69-100); *Industrialisation of Underdeveloped Countries—A Means to Peace*, Pugwash Conference, Kitzbühel-Vienna, September 1958 (Bull. Atom. Sc. Amer., 15 (1959), No. 1, 12-17 also Sankhyā, 22, 173-182); *Next Steps in Planning*, Address at the National Institute of Sciences of India, 20 January 1959 (Sankhyā, 22, 143-172), *Scientific and Technical Manpower for Economic Development*, radio broadcast in India, 23 September 1959 (reprinted in *Talks on Planning*, Indian Statistical Institute, 1961); *Recent Developments in the Organisation of Science in India* (Indian Statistical Institute, September 1961); *Note on Problems of Scientific Personnel* (circulated in India, 1959); and *Role of Science in Economic and National Development*, lecture at Sofia University, 4 December 1961 (Ind. Journ. Pub. Adm., 8 (1962), No. 2, 153-160).

Professor Stevan Dedijer has made a penetrating analysis of some of these problems in *Scientific Research and Development: A Comparative Study (Nature*, 6 August 1960); and in *Research and the Developing Countries—Problems and Possibilities* (Stockholm, TVF 33 (1962), 1. pp. 1-20).

Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta-35.

20 June 1962

Eka Press-Calcutta.

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London, 1962.

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# Tenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

## "Science and World Security"

### A. V. Topchiev

Prevention of a new world war is the most urgent task of our times. Wars grew in scale and in destructiveness at an appalling pace. Whereas at the time of the First and Second World Wars there were vast areas on earth where the flames of war did not reach (the Americas, the greater part of Africa) now the development of rocket-nuclear weapons has placed the remotest corners of the globe within the reach of weapons of death and destruction.

That is why prevention of a new world war and preservation of peace have become the common cause of all sections of the population. This is a very important feature of the present stage of the fight for peace, which distinguishes it from the anti-war movement at the preceding historical stages.

To safeguard the world peace, to prevent unleashing of a thermonuclear catastrophe by the imperialist groups - these are the desires of the broadest popular masses, the goals of the progressive scientists fighting for peace. The threat of atomic war is very imminent. Militarists are brandishing atomic and hydrogen bombs trying to balance on the brink of nuclear war. The bellicose reactionary groups in the West bank on the use of force in international relations, without realising the horrible consequences of this policy.

The most radical method of prevention of war is general and complete disarmament under strict international control. I dwelt upon this problem at length at the conference in Cambridge a few days ago. The delegates who were not present in Cambridge are referred to my report entitled "General and Complete Disarmament". Now, avoiding repetitions as much as possible, I would like to discuss, along with the problem of general disarmament, two aspects of the movement of scientists for peace and general disarmament: struggle for outlawing of aggression and struggle for collective security.

In the struggle for peace, as in some other phases of public activities consciousness somewhat lags behind reality.

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This finds its expression either in the underestimation of war threats, in the feelings of fatalism and doom or in the failure to realise or understand the possibilities and ways of combatting the dager of war. In this connection the role of the progressive social forces in the struggle for world peace and security, naturally, becomes even more important. A prominent place among these forces must be taken by science. Scientists can turn their energy against the production of the weapons of mass annihilation of people and destruction of material values. It should be noted that science is not a mere accumulation of facts; it draws from such facts objective laws which make it possible to foresee future development of mankind, understand more clearly the ways and means of the struggle for social ideals, and in particular, for a lasting world peace.

In a number of Western countries science is placed at the service of war on an ever increasing scale. Many research institutions and even colleges and universities have become mere appendages of War Ministries. Such state of things could not but retard the development of those sciences which are of no military value.

In the Socialist countries, science is one of the most active and progressive forces of society fighting for world peace and security. The whole world admits that the successes of Soviet science in the field of Mathematics, physics, chemistry, technology, outstanding achievements in the exploration of outer space are a great contribution to the cause of peace,

Under the influence of the ever-growing popular movement for world peace more and more scientists take an active part in the struggle for general peace and security. Thus, for example, a new social organization "Congress of Scientists for Survival" has been founded in U.S.A. in 1962; this organisation, which includes various scientists, physicists, scholars of medicine, etc., proclaimed that it intended to use specialised knowledge of various sciences for implementation of a positive programme of general disarmament and peace.

Scientists in various countries are taking an active part in the struggle for the solution of the key international problem of our times - the problem of disarmament.

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Prior to the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace which was held in Moscow in July, 1962, the Soviet committee for promotion of this Congress published a statement signed by many Soviet scientists. "To find the way to disarmament and peace and rid the peoples of the threat of a destructive nuclear war - says the statement - is a noble task of all honest people who fully realise the grave importance of the present moment.... Today common sense also suggests the effective means for wiping the spectre of war from the face of the earth."

The peoples of the world are actively fighting against the danger of a nuclear holocaust. New ways must be found to unite all mankind for vigorous actions aimed at banning nuclear weapons for ever in the whole world. The year of 1962 can and must witness a general agreement on the first real measures for disarmament to be reached by the governments to meet the demands of their peoples. General, complete and controlled disarmament is a most imperative demand of our times.

The urgency of disarmament is now strongly underscored by many scientists. A significant feature of the present time is that sharp criticism of the apologists of the arms race is voiced more and more often even in the countries of the West. A striking example of this fact is the joint statement of a group of prominent American scientists exposing the scientific fallacy of the militaristic conceptions preached by the American physicist Edward Teller whose devotion to the cause of preparation of atomic war has won him an unflattering title of the "father of the H-bomb". In 1962 Teller published a book entitled "Hiroshima Heritage" permeated through and through by the misanthropic ideas about the speeding-up of the preparations for unleashing a thermonuclear war.

Publication of this militaristic book has evoked profound indignation among the American scientists who are well aware of the deadly consequences which the course favoured by Teller spells to mankind. In their answer to Teller, published in May, 1962, a group of American scholars in the field of physics, biology and electrical engineering emphasised that the majority of Dr. Teller's colleagues did not in the least agree with his appraisal of the situation. The scholars show convincingly in the present environment that disarmament and stopping of the production of lethal weapons is the only rational course. They

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express their full support for the demand of millions of people to do away with the deadly arms race. The world is ripe for disarmament - write the scholars - and what is more, it cannot afford not to disarm. Controlled disarmament is not only possible but it is necessary in the national interests of both sides. Thus, as we can see, the appeals to reason resound more and more loudly the world over.

The scientists are undoubtedly destined to make a great and positive contribution to solving such an important question as the conclusion of an agreement on ending nuclear tests. At present the agreement on this question is obstructed by the position of the Western Powers who maintain that underground nuclear explosions cannot be detected by the national means. It is well known that this view is not shared not only by Soviet scientists but also by many physicists in the West.

In the recent period this issue has been repeatedly discussed in the American press by the well-known seismologist Don Lit, Professor of Geology at Harvard University. He accused the committee appointed by the U.S. Government to study the problem of detection of underground nuclear explosions of using in its work a method which is anything but dependable. Don Lit believes that underground explosions, including those with a power below 20 kilotons can be well detected by seismological methods and that the position which the Western powers took at the Geneva negotiations on the basis of the conclusions reached by the U.S. Government committee is untenable. He writes that there is no reason to believe that a reliable system of detection of nuclear tests cannot be worked out and states positively that the national means available make it possible not only to detect an explosion but to distinguish it from any natural phenomena, earthquakes included.

It is well known that resumption of American nuclear tests in the atmosphere at a time when the 18-nation committee began its work in Geneva was strongly condemned by the scientists. In this connection a group of Soviet scientists wrote: "All progressive mankind protests against nuclear tests on the Christmas Island... By carrying out explosions at a time when the 18-nation committee is in session the U.S. and Britain deliberately undermine the possibility of the nuclear tests ban, coming out, in their insanity, against the vast majority of mankind." 97 professors and lecturers

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of Cambridge University voiced their protest against the series of tests in the atmosphere and sent a letter to MacMillan, the Prime Minister of Britain, demanding that nuclear tests should be stopped. American nuclear tests were severely criticised by Professor Yasui Kaoru, a well known Japanese scientist, the chairman of Japan's Council for Banning Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons.

Along with this, the scientists of many countries level their criticism against American strategic experiments in outer space. Everybody knows about the disapproval with which the broad scientific circles met the so-called "Ford project", i. e. the plan to create a belt of copper needles round the earth which may considerably impair radio communication and cause other harmful effects.

At the present time, many scientists rightfully protest against powerful thermonuclear explosions carried out by the United States in space. Eleven American scientists sent a message to President Kennedy asking him to postpone the proposed explosion of hydrogen devices in space. They stress that space directly surrounding the earth is not an appropriate area for potentially destructive experiments to be performed by some individual or country. No single man and no single country have the right to upset the balance of nature, write the scientists.

In May 1962 the high-altitude nuclear tests carried out by the United States were criticised by the World Federation of Scientists. The statement signed by the President of the Federation, the prominent British physicist Professor Powell, mentions the harmful after-effects of such experiments and suggests that the U. N. set up a special committee to assess the effects of such tests.

Bernard Lovell called the U. S. high-altitude nuclear tests a black page in the history of mankind and an insult to the civilised world. He said that the verbal assurances of the United States that it favoured the employment of cosmic space for peaceful purposes looked now like a screen which can be thrown away whenever the American militarists and the scientists who toed their line saw fit.

Such actions by the scientists are directed in effect against bolstering war preparations. They prove that the opinion of the

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scientists can and must play its role in the fight for the stopping of the deadly arms race.

In July, 1962, the Soviet Government issued a special statement in which it pointed out that the new series of nuclear tests, in particular the tests in space, are carried out by the U.S. Government in an "attempt to gain military supremacy over the Soviet Union".

It is quite clear that the Soviet Government would fail to live up to the trust of its people, to show concern for the future of the Soviet State if it did not draw the appropriate conclusions. Therefore, in answer to the series of American tests, the Soviet Government was forced to take a decision to test the latest types of nuclear weapons.

Each impartial and honest man must agree that the United States was the first to start the tests and carried out many more tests, together with its allies, than the Soviet Union which was compelled to conduct its nuclear tests solely as a counter-measure. Taking this into consideration the Soviet Union "has the right to be the last in the world to end the nuclear tests".

The Soviet Government has always offered and still offers to sign forthwith an agreement on stopping completely and for ever tests of all types of nuclear weapons. I believe that this offer will be supported by all people of good will.

Peaceful aspirations of the Soviet scientists and of the whole Soviet people have been convincingly demonstrated by the bold storming of the Universe by the Soviet space craft Vostok-3 and Vostok-4. Our victories in outer space are a great gift to all mankind, to the cause of world peace. When the sons of the Soviet people say "Good morning" and "Good night" from the depths of the Cosmic ocean to all people on the earth, the nations of our planet need not worry: these are the wishes of peace, friendship, prosperity. If the Americans, instead of atomic explosions in space, would send together with us their craft for exploration of space, we would applaud the United States as all the people are applauding the USSR these days. There is enough room both in space and on earth for great and small deeds. Only peaceful deeds and peaceful aspirations are worthy of intellect, honour, reason and conscience of each man and all mankind.

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World security lies, of course, first and formost, in the real prevention of war through general and complete disarmament, reduction of the armaments and armed forces, abolition of military bases on foreign territories, establishment of atom-free zones, etc. But this is not all; world security lies also in outlawing of agression, peaceful settlement of international disputes and conflicts, setting-up of a system of collective security, i.e. mutual assistance of states against agression.

World security is inconceivable without peaceful co-existence of states on the basis of equality, non-interference into the domestic affairs, respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Scientists of various specialities can make a valuable and constructive contribution in all these fields.

The Soviet scientists who work unswervingly for the prevention of a world-wide thermo-nuclear catastrophe voice their protest against those who try to disturb international tranquility.

Many scientists in the West point out quite rightly that peace can be preserved only by developing wide and comprehensive international cooperation and demand, therefore, that the use of force in international relations be forbidden and that peaceful means be used for settling international disputes.

Various international scientific organizations are carrying on an active struggle for peace and peaceful co-existence and for peaceful settlement of international problems.

Of no small importance to the cause of peace is the implementation of a number of partial measures connected with disarmament and conducive to the easing of international tension and to increasing the confidence between states. Among such measures great importance attaches to the creation of atom-free zones. As you know in 1957 the Government of the Polish People's Republic took the initiative in suggesting the establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe and then worked out a detailed plan for the creation of such a zone. Since that time, the Socialist countries have repeatedly suggested and still suggest the creation of atom-free zones in Scandinavia, the Balkans, in the Adriatic, in Central Europe, in the Far East, and in the Pacific area. The proposal to establish atom-free zones was backed by the United Nations and was welcomed by social and political figures as well as by progressive scientists

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of many countries.

The Soviet scientists and the scientists of the Socialist countries give their full support to the proposal to create atom-free zones. A number of scientists in various countries of the West also stated their approval of the proposal.

Disarmament remains the main demand of peace-loving forces. However, one must not underestimate the importance of collective security against aggression as a means for preservation of peace. A system of collective security is designed to unite the efforts of various states for solving such major problems as preservation of peace, prevention and elimination of aggression.

At the present time the powerful forces which safeguard peace have sufficient means at their disposal to bridle the imperialist warmongers. However, the bridling of the aggressors and preservation of peaceful coexistence cannot be accomplished automatically by the mere existence of such forces. These forces must carry out active struggle for promotion of peace and maintenance of world security.

Striving for the solution of the problem of safeguarding peace scientists cannot keep aloof from the struggle which the progressive forces are waging for strengthening collective security - both in the form of a worldwide system - the United Nations - and in the form of a regional system.

Because of the fact that the United Nations, after its membership has changed, has adopted a number of decisions aimed at doing away with colonialism, at supporting the peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, the anti-democratic forces in several countries have started an open campaign for the liquidation of this organisation. Especially active in this respect is Portugal whose colonial policy was censured by the United Nations. Salazar declared that the UN is not only useless but harmful. Regretful as it may be, some British spokesmen also made attacks on the United Nations. In the speech delivered on December 28, 1961, in Berwick-on-Tweed, the British Foreign Minister Lord Hume asked if the days were not gone by of those United Nations which were contemplated by the authors of the Charter. We cannot agree with Lord Hume's opinion. The attacks on the United Nations are also supported by some bourgeois scientists in the West. Certain Western scientists in their works speak of the crisis in the United Nations and demand that the goals of that organisation be changed.

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Ignoring the principles of State sovereignty, non-interference in the domestic affairs of states, the principles of equality and self-determination, embodied in the U. N. Charter, such scientists demand that the United Nations be turned into a "World Parliament". There are other proposals for changing and actually liquidating the United Nations. Such proposals meet with a rebuff from progressive scientists. Thus, many scientists in the USSR devoted their works to theoretical substantiation of the necessity to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations in safeguarding peace. A number of scientists in the West likewise expressed their opposition to the idea of changing the United Nations as a collective security body. For example, one of Western jurists Willcox, referring to the plans for reorganisation of the United Nations, says: "This is not a realistic approach. It will open Pandora's box."

Many scientists of all specialities speak about the necessity to strengthen the United Nations. The scientists of all countries of the world must resolutely emphasise the necessity to strengthen the United Nations as an instrument of safeguarding peace and settling peaceful disputes by peaceful means.

Along with the strengthening of the United Nations measures must be also taken to ensure regional security. Here, the problem is to replace the alignment of forces now existing in Europe and Asia by a system of collective security. Unfortunately there are yet many scientists in the countries of the West who maintain that the existing split between the states is a normal occurrence, that not only it presents no threat to peace but, allegedly, the equilibrium of blocs can safeguard peace, and that to promote security states with a similar ideology must unite against other states. The demand for unification of states belonging to one social system to oppose the other system will result in the world being split into opposing hostile alignments.

Realising the danger which is involved in the existence of opposing blocs for the cause of peace many scientists demand that the blocs be liquidated and that a single regional system of collective security be created in Europe and Asia. For example, a French scientist J. Leon-Kahn speaking at a session of the Polish Academy of Science, devoted to the problems of collective security in Europe, stressed the necessity for Europe not to be split into two parts, so that there would be only one camp which

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would include all sovereign European states and so that mutual
assistance would be rendered automatically regardless of the
internal structure. Scientists state that the creation of an all-
Europe security system is not a Utopia, but a feasible task.
A prominent Czechoslovakian scientist V. Soljak stated at a
session of the International Scientific Conference on the
Problems of Security in Europe that real conditions were on
hand for ensuring security in Europe.

The main task of the scientists in the struggle for general
security, regardless of whether it is natural, technical or
social sciences, is to voice their protest against all designs
and actions of the aggressive forces and to make constructive
proposals for prevention of war and promotion of world peace
and security.

London 1962

X 5:4

# Xth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

## "Experiments that Affect the Environment of the Planet"

H. Bondi and E.H.S. Burhop

The extension of man's control over nature has given him the power to change the environment in which he lives. Technical innovations which benefit one individual or group of individuals may produce environmental changes that have an adverse effect on others. For example, the industrial revolution which enabled some to amass great wealth and led to a spectacular overall improvement in living standards, certainly had the effect of despoiling parts of the countryside and acted to the disadvantage of some.

Usually in the past the effects of such changes have influenced only the environment in which people in the one country live. Sometimes, however, they have affected peoples in neighbouring states. We recall the bitter disputes that have occurred between neighbouring riparian states over the diversion of river waters. Today, for example, irrigation schemes in India affecting the upper waters of the Indus and the Brahmaputra have caused anxiety in Pakistan and remain a source of friction between the two countries. Similarly, the building of the Aswan Dam will flood areas of the Sudan, and was a source of contention between the Egyptian and Sudanese governments until the matter was settled by agreement. Nobody would deny that the rational way of settling such disputes between states arising from artificial environmental changes is through agreement reached after negotiations involving all those countries that will be affected.

In recent years man has been carrying out experiments, however, which have much more far-reaching consequences than those discussed above and which can have the effect of altering the environment of the whole planet. The best known of these are the tests of nuclear weapons which have the effect of increasing the level of radioactivity to which man is exposed. The dangers

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of these tests have been the subject of many discussions at
previous Pugwash conferences. They constitute a possible
threat to our own and future generations that is none the less
objectionable because the extent of the threat is subject to con-
siderable uncertainty.

In this paper, however, we wish to draw attention to a
different kind of consequence of changes produced in the
course of certain types of experiment which seriously handi-
cap future studies of a geophysical, astrophysical or astro-
biological nature.

One example of such an experiment that has been handled
so far in a satisfactory way concerns the possible biological
contamination of space. The study of any form of life on
other planets or the occurrence there of macromolecules of
importance to living matter is of great significance to our
understanding of life on earth. It is of the utmost importance
therefore that any objects placed on the moon or planets in
the course of the development of space studies and of space
travel, should be completely sterile biologically in order to
avoid contamination by organisms present on the earth. This
problem has been discussed on appropriate international
committees such as COSPAR and it appears that the necessary
stringent precautions to prevent such contamination have been
taken in shots at the moon and the planets so far carried out.

In some other respects, however, the position is much
less satisfactory. For example, the so-called 'needles'
experiment, in which a girdle containing many hundreds of
millions of short pieces of very thin wire are placed round the
earth to facilitate radio communication has been embarked
upon without taking proper account of the possible consequences
for certain types of scientific research. Of course, prelim-
inary experiments involving the placing in orbit of a temporary
belt of needles of low concentration and which will gradually
descent into the atmosphere and be destroyed would probably
not be so serious, but it seems something more permanent
is contemplated. It appears that girdles of such needles of
the magnitude contemplated will certainly have a serious

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effect on the future development of radio astronomy and may
also make more difficult certain studies in optical astronomy.
The magnitude of these effects have been assessed in recent
articles by A. C. B. Lovell and M. Ryle and by D. E. Blackwell
and R. Wilson (Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical
Society, vo. 3, no. 2, pp. 99-114 (1962)).

Several protests have been made to the United States
government about the needles experiment. For example,
the International Conference of Scientific Radio in 1961 expressed
its concern. The Council of the Royal Astronomical Society
passed the following resolution:

" The Council of the Royal Astronomical Society views with greatest concern the reported intention of the U. S. National Aeronautical and Space Administration to put into orbit a large number of reflecting dipoles.

Such a step would begin to shut off one of the few
wavelengths available to radioastronomy to further
our knowledge of distant regions of space. At the
present stage of development of radioastronomy it is
quite impossible to say that a particular wavelength
could be dispensed with and it would be scientifically
a grave disaster if this project were permanent.

It seems inconceivable to the Council that a drastic
step so gravely affecting any science could be even
contemplated without the fullest consultation with all
astronomical and other bodies likely to be concerned."

Similar considerations apply to the series of very high
altitude tests being carried out in the Pacific area by the
American government (the so-called 'rainbow bombs'). Quite
apart from any effects due to radioactive fall-out, these high
altitude tests appear likely to destroy or seriously to deplete
the inner van Allen belt. Several different estimates varying
from a few weeks to many tens of years have been made of
the time taken to replenish the belt. Some observers predicted
that these high altitude tests would gravely interfere with
studies of upper atmospheric phenomena, others that they

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would assist such studies. The calculations on which an
objective assessment of the effects of the tests could have
been made were not generally available for security reasons.
Whatever may be the correct assessment the fact remains
that by unilateral action the environment of our planet has
been affected, with important implications for future
scientific investigations. In fact it has now been reported
('The Times', August 20th) by Dr. van Allen that the high
altitude test explosion has resulted in the production of a
huge new radiation belt in the lower reaches of the original
van Allen belt. This belt has been detected by its emission
of radio frequency signals which might interfere with some
aspects of radio astronomy. The radiations from the test
explosion have already interfered with scientific experi-
ments being carried out using satellites, by damaging the
solar cells used for supplying power to the system.

We believe it to be necessary to affirm that no nation
or group of nations has the right to take action affecting
the environment of the whole planet, and therefore involving
the peoples of all nations, without proper consultation with
their representatives. In cases where such actions are
likely to affect future scientific observations of natural phe-
nomena, the approval of the appropriate international
scientific bodies should be sought. Discussions with such
bodies could ensure that any experiments of this kind are
carried out under conditions designed to create the minimum
interference with future observations.

To facilitate such consultations we propose that the
International Council of Scientific Unions should be asked
to constitute an authoritative Advisory Panel of Scientists
which should assess the likely effects of all such proposed
experiments from the point of view of future geophysical,
astrophysical or astrobiological investigations.

London 1962

X 6:1

Abstract: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AID OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

A. Salam

The paper will discuss the need for greater organisation
in scientific and technical aid to the developing countries,
many of whom have only a vague idea of what precisely it is
that can be achieved and still vaguer notions of how to go about
it. One should clearly recognise that most of the science needed
in developing countries is of an unglamorous variety, and that
the calling for and the providing of technical services is at
present left too much to private enterprise, often causing waste.
The paper will discuss the tremendous role the coming U.N.
Conference on Science and Technology can be expected to play
in providing a "World Supermarket for Science and Technology"
(Blackett) and following on it, the possibility in an organised
manner of associating more of the active world scientists with
the scientific and technical efforts in the poorer countries.

London 1962.

X.3.1

The Position of the Scientist in the Community

Prof. V.S. Emelyanov

The real aim of science since its emergence has been to promote social progress and to struggle for human happiness. The progress of the human mind in harnessing the forces of nature knows no bounds. The awareness of the unlimited potentialities of the human genius inspires scientists to achieve noble exploits in the name of peace. To deliver all men from hard manual work, to prevent the enslavement of human beings by the burden of poverty and starvation, to make the joy of creation and the enjoyment of cultural and spiritual values available to each individual - such is the great humanitarian idea underlying the very basis of science regardless of the social views and political beliefs of different epochs.

The social advances of scientific development may become the greatest blessing, open up unprecedented vistas and translate into reality the loftiest ideals of all generations. By no stretch of the imagination can one anticipate the future achievements of the human genius. And yet, the products of science may be used against man himself and may become the greatest social evil serving the destructive causes of war with its disastrous consequences.

At present we are witnessing a great new revolution in science and technology. Science is increasingly becoming an instrument for the domination of emancipated man over the forces of nature and a direct productive force. Without science or knowledge no progress is now conceivable in any sphere of human endeavour. Becoming an ever more powerful productive force, science is transforming natural processes into industrial ones and is embodied in the tools of labour. Science is acquiring a truly great significance; the role of the scientist who is fully aware of his responsibility to society for the use of scientific achievements, for social progress, is becoming an increasingly great and noble one.

The progress of production and the development of science are interdependent. Technology depends on the state of science, on the degree of its adaptation to production while "...science depends on the condition and requirements of technology. If a technological need arises in society, it advances science more than a dozen universities." (Engels).

At the present stage the main line of the development of Soviet science is the elaboration of the knowledge

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necessary for the material and technical basis of Communism, for the creation of material and cultural foundations, for the ending of social, cultural, technical and professional distinctions between human beings, and for the education of people in the spirit of scientific philosophy and advanced humanitarian ethics.

During the full-scale construction of communism science is becoming part and parcel of man's productive endeavour, so that production becomes "an experimental/science, a material, technical and exact science" (Marx). The process of integration in science and the rapid development of new branches of knowledge called upon to revolutionize production required a precise and scientifically substantiated co-ordination of research within the framework of the international co-operation of all scientists.

The rate of growth in national income is becoming increasingly dependent on the capacity of research and planning centres and the efficiency of their work, which in turn largely depends on the availability in this or that country of specialists with college education and the amount of funds allocated for the creation and provision of the scientific and technological basis. At present an efficient research centre is often equivalent in its economic results to several major industrial enterprises.

Science is an essential element in solving the age-old problem of raising the productivity of labour. Technology itself is the embodiment of scientific thinking and one of the products of science.

The scope and economic efficiency of scientific work largely depend not only on the absolute number of scientists engaged in the development and introduction of new technology but also on the equipment of the research worker and designer with laboratory and experimental facilities and the budgets available for research, designing and planning.

Data from the U.S.S.R. illustrate what I have been saying. The number of research workers, designers and planners engaged in the development of production is approximately 200,000 (while the total number of people engaged in scientific work is about 400,000), and their potentialities may be estimated at least at 60,000 million roubles of additional income per annum (4.3% of the actual national income in 1960). The end product of the development of natural and applied sciences is a growth in the productivity of labour and increased income per man-hour.

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X.3.1.

There is a direct link between the progress of science and the rate of growth of industrial and productive potential. Any industry is simultaneously tackling three inter-related basic problems: what to produce, how to produce and what to produce it with? It is easy to see that science and knowledge play the leading role in solving all these problems.

During the past few decades the role of science in society has grown immensely. This is due to the accelerated rate of development of scientific and technological progress. Each technological achievement emerges in a field previously cleared by scientific research. Thus, growing out of the need to develop production, technological progress makes it imperative that science should take the lead. On the other hand, it results from the progress of scientific research.

The unique role of science in socialist society is determined by the specific features of the development and advancement of a new social and economic formation. Under socialism science has become an instrument for the revolutionary transformation of society, an instrument for domination by emancipated man over the forces of nature.

Soviet science has done a great deal to develop the productive forces of Soviet society, to promote the culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and improve the health of the Soviet people. Soviet scientists were the first in the world to solve the problem of the peaceful use of atomic energy, to launch a man-made satellite and to develop space rockets and interplanetary space-ships. In co-operation with engineers, technicians and workers they developed the wonderful Vostok space-ship which carried the outstanding son of the Soviet people, U.A. Gagarin, into space, thus opening up a new page in the history of civilization.

The high rate of scientific development and the vast scope of scientific research in our country are determined by a number of objective factors. The advantages of the socialist planning of economy make themselves felt in the progress of science as well. The planning and co-ordination of research on a nation-wide scale make it possible to co-ordinate the efforts of scientists on the problems of financing scientific research as rationally as possible, avoiding duplication. The planning and introduction of new technology make it possible rapidly to build up productive capacities on the basis of a profound knowledge and accurate estimate of objective needs and with maximum efficiency. Thus, in 1960

[w]

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alone in the enterprises of the U.S.S.R. more than 2,800
automatic, semi-automatic and mechanized assembly and
conveyor lines were put into operation, about 70,000 machine
tools and other technological units were modernized; the
output of machine tools in 1959 exceeded the level of prod-
uction in the U.S.A. by 3%.

Scientists in the U.S.S.R. work in large research centres
and laboratories. Some of the research centres were recently
turned over to industry, thus radically improving the
utilization of scientific achievements and considerably
reducing the period between a scientific achievement and its
practical application. The tendency is growing to integrate
research, designing and experiments into a single process.
Science in the U.S.S.R. is acquiring a mass character and is
based on extensive personnel, while the general progress of
education provides unlimited opportunities to increase the
number of scientists and establish closer contacts between
scientists and workers. Thus, in 1961 the number of people
who went to school in the U.S.S.R. amounted to 56,000,000 of
which 36,000,000 attended schools for general education. This
means that one person in four is attending school in our
country. In the same year colleges and universities including
correspondence and evening schools were attended by 7.6
million people.

The emergence of an intelligentsia numbering many
millions from among the people, over a brief historical
period was a tremendous achievement of the socialist cultural
revolution, while in Tsarist Russia there were 290,000
specialists with higher, incomplete higher and secondary
education out of 159 million (i.e. 0.21% of the population
and some of them did not work) in 1959, according to the
census, the total number of intellectuals amounted to 20.5
million (approximately 10% of the entire population).
Approximately 1,200,000 qualified engineers are now employed
in the national economy in the U.S.S.R. This is twenty-five
times as many as in 1928, and 2.5 times as many as in the
U.S.A. at present.

The number of scientists in the U.S.S.R. is 35 times
greater than in pre-revolutionary Russia. A whole network
of research centres equipped with up-to-date facilities has
been created. Major scientific centres have been estab-
lished in all the national republics and local personnel
have been trained for them. At present there are more than
3,800 scientific institutions in the U.S.S.R. The relative
proportion of fundamental theoretical problems within the

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X.3.1.

whole perspective of scientific research has grown like-
wise.

The practical value of scientific achievements has grown enormously. Thus, for example, the development of medical science and the improvement of living standards have made the mortality rate in the U.S.S.R. four times lower than in pre-revolutionary Russia, while the infant mortality rate is eight times lower. In 1896-1897 in fifty provinces of European Russia average life expectancy was only 32 years, while in 1957-1958 it had risen to 68 for the entire territory of the U.S.S.R.

Under socialism science has for the first time been freed from the restricting influence of craft and narrowly utilitarian interests, of the predominance of private profit considerations and other social limitations inherent in the preceding stages of historical development. The socialist organization of science provides the necessary conditions for the maximum concentration of forces and funds for long-range research. The wonderful achievements of the Soviet country in solving such complex problems as, for instance, the building of space-ships and the organisation of their successful flights, and the industrial use of nuclear energy which is beginning to make headway, bear eloquent proof of the complete emancipation of the intrinsic potentialities of science and the rational and planned utilization of these potentialities.

If we try to determine the main trend of social development it would probably be most satisfactory to point to the aim expressed in human domination over the forces of nature in society, in the necessity of rational control over living conditions. An abundance of material and cultural values and their national and fair distribution constitute, in our view, a great humanitarian ideal that can be attained as human power gross, as well as human ability to control the forces of nature according to plan. The power of man rests on the profound knowledge of laws and conditions of natural and social development and the use of this knowledge in practical activities. It is in this area that what has been defined as freedom since Spinoza and Kant, comes to the fore. It is not an arbitrary process or chaos, it is not slavery or violence, but a sense of purpose and cohesion, knowledge and rational actions that provide the degree of efficiency meeting the interests of contemporary social progress based on the growth of the power of man over the huge forces of nature. It is the great task of our epoch that this power be retained and strengthened, that everything should be done to prevent the death of civilization under the impact of the forces of nature

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X.3.1.

released by it, that the great tendency of freedom be
developed and consolidated.

In this context science and the activities of
scientists in the broadest sense of the term find a precise
and strictly determined place. Science is synonymous with
accurate and tested knowledge, knowledge that is necessary
to promote the power of man and well-being, knowledge with-
out which freedom becomes an empty word. But here scientific
creation acquires a profound social and optimistic signific-
ance, becoming a powerful vehicle in the promotion of human
well-being. In the final analysis the unlimited advancement
of scientific knowledge and the technical application of
science today testify to the objectiv e process of the
integration of the social avenues of development and science
and to the fact that the activities of scientists are included
in the social sphere as an indispensable component of it.

Science provides mankind with a great tool of cognition
which makes it possible to reach unprecedented heights of
abundance and equality. This determines the most important
and fruitful aspect of the social role of science and as a
result the social responsibility of scientists is growing.
A scientist can not be a "pure" mathematician, biophysicist
or sociologist for he cannot remain indifferent to the fruits
of his work, to whether they will be useful or harmful to
mankind. An indifferent attitude as to whether people will
be better or worse off as a result of scientific achievement
is cynicism, if not a crime.

A scientist as a citizen has a social duty to perform,
and this duty makes it imperative to struggle for the improve-
ment of activities, for the abolition of poverty, diseases,
violence, oppression, for joy and happiness on our planet.
A scientist is capable of fully realizing that a world
populated by thinking beings must be beautiful and must be a
beautiful place and he should fight for it. Bertrand Russell
was absolutely right in our view, when he said in his recent
book "Has Man a Future?" and "it is within the power of man
to create a world of sparkling beauty and extraordinary glory".
On the other hand, it is difficult to subscribe to the view
that "we find the reason for the activities of most scientists
in the pure joy of creation". One cannot believe that
Pasteur, Koch, Mendeleyev and Einstein were not inspired in
their activities by a desire to serve mankind. John Bernal¹
is justified in saying that "scientists in the great periods
of progress were inspired by the belief that they were
working for the common benefit of society and that there was
a danger that this inspiration could disappear in the
conditions of culture whose aims are private profit and war,

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X.3.1.

and these aims have now obviously lost any justification
they might ever have had".

Scientific activity does not of itself determine the
ways in which it will be socially used- however, a scientist
cannot remain indifferent to the aims and activities of
society, particularly when it is a question of his own results
being used.

If a scientist develops and perfects an instrument for
penetrating into the mysteries of nature, he is entitled to
know how this instrument is going to be used, and to advocate
the way that he considers correct. For the definition of the
correctness of the way likewise depends on a scientific
analysis. The role of science is becoming universal, and
society is realizing this more and more clearly. In socialist
society the only aim and goal of a scientist's activity is
to promote national well-being, but this relationship is a
two-way process: society in turn provides all the conditions
necessary for fruitful scientific work. The role of a
scientist in the Soviet Union is an enviable one; universal
-esteem, consideration and support is by no means the
characteristic attitude to scientists on the part of public
organizations, States and peoples everywhere.

There are special reasons for this attitude apart from
respect for the scientist's intellect. Experience of the
planned organization of economic, political and cultural
life acquired in the Soviet Union convincingly demonstrates
that in contemporary conditions social development based on
the tremendous achievements of production, can proceed
unhampered and efficiently only if it stems from a scientific
analysis of reality. At the same time scientific analysis
embraces all branches of knowledge and all spheres of human
endeavour. Science warns us against erroneous, practically
and theoretically incorrect conclusions and actions. It
shows the way to optimal results. There is no doubt in our
minds, therefore, that knowledge and social action, theor-
etical and practical results are organically inter-related.
Science plays a paramount part in the socialist social system
like that of a searchlight on board ship, or Ariadne's thread
in the hands of Theseus.

As regards the contention that planned organization
exerts an adverse influence on the spontaneous manifestation
of the spiritual qualities of the individual, and bars the
way to the free development of science, one could recall in
this connection the old argument between the British

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scientists Price and Priestley. In reply to Price's statement that materialism is incompatible with the concept of freedom and rules out the independence of the individual, Priestley said: "I ask you where you can find more energy of thought, more activity, more power and determination in pursuing the most important aims than among the proponents of the theory of necessity?" If necessity equals public welfare, the elimination of starvation, diseases and social inequality, what could be loftier and nobler than service to this cause? It is well known that science in the Soviet Union is developing enormously and this is the best possible proof of the correctness of the path it has taken, the path of service to society. Can there be differences between scientists and society as long as their aims are identical and as long as a single principle is applied: scientists for society - society for scientists. This principle is well expressed in the relationships of teamwork and mutual aid between scientific, social and State organizations, as well as in the fact that not a single social measure is taken without a most profound and comprehensive study by scientists and practical workers.

Socialist society recognizes the great industrial, technical social and cultural significance of scientific research, that the aim of this society is to establish social harmony on the basis of human domination over natural and social forces. We have in the main overcome refined scepticism about the aims of social progress and the social value of scientific research and arrived at general conviction that in order to gain freedom people must make a profound and comprehensive study of laws of development, natural and social relations. In our time we cannot agree to the demand for arbitrary fluctuations of human endeavour, if we aim at co-ordinated objectives for the development of production, common well-being and new phenomena, such as space flights. Society is most effective when all its forces of knowledge and action are united. The role of the scientist, therefore, grows to that of a public figure, and scientific control extends to all the functions of the social organism. Therein lies the reason for the fact that the responsibility of scientists under socialism is constantly increasing, for the results of their work are the starting point for collective action, thus objectively consolidating the basis for increased confidence in and attention to the activities of scientists and providing the most favourable conditions for scientific progress.

Contemporary scientific activities have a mass character, science has joined hands with production and

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X.3.1.

can develop only as a result of large-scale investments; the advancement of science is, therefore, largely pre-determined by the objective social system. To assume that science can perform its historical function regardless of the social conditions existing in each country is to have an incorrect view of social activity. Thus, the work of scientists is closely connected with social and economic events. Material results may now have either a constructive or a destructive role. This imposes definite obligations on scientists themselves. For science to fulfil its function and avoid the danger, scientists need to recognize the interconnection between science and modern life. Any scientific achievement now bears a relation to politics; every scientist personally, and scientists as a whole, therefore, bear a responsibility for the existing state of affairs.

In this connection, science is closely interwoven with ethics, even though it might seem on the face of it that there is no connection between ethics and science. Science investigates the objective laws of the material world. It is an area of facts and logical concepts. Ethics deals with standards of human behaviour, with the assessment of human conduct. Nevertheless, as far as the aims and results of science are concerned, science cannot be free from the moral world; it has no right to permit its experiments to be made at the risk of human lives, and the results of scientific discoveries to jeopardize the existence of civilization itself. The new position acquired by science with the discovery of nuclear energy brought home to scientists the fact that the direct results of their work were beginning to play a great role in the most important military and political developments, in the destinies of the peoples. The scientist cannot but ponder, therefore, over the consequences of the use to which the results of his discoveries are put.

Scientists cannot remain indifferent to the purposes for which scientific achievements are utilized, to whether they serve the cause of progress or the cause of war. In contemporary conditions of increased danger, a scientist cannot take an indifferent or neutral stand with regard to problems of war and peace.

The utilization of scientific achievements is a matter of concern to the scientist's conscience. The scientist cannot ignore it behind the screen of "objective" or pure science; just as there is no "pure" hydrogen bomb, there is no pure science.

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This has become particularly obvious during recent years. Problems of moral responsibility for the use of scientific data are invading the life and activity of scientists.

It is not only politicians who are preoccupied with the problem of the present and the future. Which way, mankind? What is the role of scientists in social progress? These questions are causing concern among the broadest sections of society.

Scientists take different views as to the role of science in society, but the vast majority of them are agreed that it is the duty of the scientist to fight for the truly humane purpose of science - service to the people, progress and peace. The problems of the personal moral responsibility of the scientist are becoming particularly acute today. The scientist as a man of knowledge performs an important social function - he determines the conditions and avenues of social activities in a specific natural and social environment. It should be borne in mind, however, that the work of a scientist has no independent meaning of its own, it is determined by social needs and interests. We also take into account the fact that it is the people creating material and cultural values who constitute the basic force in social progress and that it is only by knowing the needs of the people and reflecting them in his work that a scientist can effectively perform his social function.

It would be erroneous to believe that control over the utilization of science may be accomplished by "lone wolves", that the scientist can influence the social utilization of science without stepping out of his study, and without joining in the mass movement for peace. The present day condition of science and technology makes it possible to use almost any discovery for military purposes. It is absurd to define the problem as "control over science"; it is necessary to control the activities of the people on whom the utilization of science in society depends.

Science today has mastered or has come very near to the mastery of the knowledge of intrinsic natural processes whose utilization could bring about a real revolution in social production. Mankind has now entered an epoch of a scientific and technological revolution. However, the process of "materialization" of knowledge acquired by science goes beyond the framework of science itself as a given form of social knowledge. This process is determined by the character of social relations. In the conditions of the transition to

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communism, science is becoming a direct productive force, the entire population is interested in its development, the process of "materialization" of knowledge is exerting an ever more essential and fruitful influence on the social productivity of the labour of workers free from exploitation. The development of science and the application of its results in industry are an important means of raising the skill of manual workers to the level of engineering workers.

There are no objective reasons in the U.S.S.R. for this or that scientific discovery not receiving an immediate and extensive practical use in improving labour productivity, since the entire society is interested in it. However, there are a number of subjective reasons why the application of scientific discoveries may encounter some difficulties. To overcome these difficulties a number of steps have been taken, special organizations have been established responsible for the utilization of scientific achievements in production. Thus, in agriculture this is one of the main functions of the Ministry of Agriculture and its agencies, including model farms.

The problems of science in the U.S.S.R. are solved not only in scientific institutions by scientists, but also by ordinary workers, by the most experienced workers and "innovators". Thus, the question of re-examining vital problems of farming was first raised by a collective farm innovator, T.S. Maltsev, and is being solved by him in the fields of his collective farm. On the basis of his work the Shadrinskaya experimental station was established, and he is in charge of it. The most important problems of science are submitted to nation-wide discussion attracting the attention of the mass of the people to them. It was in the Soviet Union that the unity of scientific and industrial work was first implemented; the scientists and workers began to together tackle the same problems. This is particularly the case in the automation of farming and the development of machines for the comprehensive mechanization of agricultural production. Leading agricultural workers submit valuable proposals, test machines and improve them. The "innovator" movement frequently provides a new basis for the development of science, and it is then given support by scientific institutions and academies. During the past few years a number of steps have been taken in the Soviet Union to consolidate the links between science and production, notably the establishment of scientific councils to deal with inter-related problems, with the participation of outstanding workers and the transfer of agricultural colleges and experimental stations and former ministries of Agriculture directly to the agricultural areas.

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Soviet science is characterized by the examination of theoretical problems with a view to their practical application, in the course of the solution of questions raised by practical work. Thus, the theoretical problems of plant nutrition, the elaboration of theories of the biological nutrition of plants, are solved in connection with the practical questions of the rational use of mineral and organic fertilizers and the improvement of crops. One of the most important duties of science in socialist society is the generalization of advanced experience.

The need to develop this or that scientific or technical problem in the Soviet Union assumes the form of a social request addressed to the entire people, to all scientists and practical workers.

Particularly developed in the U.S.S.R. are the most effective methods of scientific research - teamwork and the co-ordination of the efforts of specialists in different fields. Joint teams of scientists not only elaborate problems but check, discuss and participate in the utilization of the results of research and discoveries. It is on this basis that individual capabilities are displayed most fully. The active and purposeful efforts of people determine the utilization of the fantastic powers of science and technology.

The more power science gives to man the more important is the question of how it is going to be used, what purposes it will serve. Scientific achievements may be used constructively but they can also be used for destruction. The powerful "Lenin" ice-breaker and the nuclear bomb that destroyed Hiroshima are based on the same theoretical principles .... A scientist does not merely serve science, he serves peace or war, progress or obscurantism, good or evil. Each scientist should be aware of his responsibility to society for his activities and for the use of scientific discoveries in any branch of science.

Genuine science has always served mankind. People who have openly and deliberately placed their capabilities and knowledge at the service of the cold war and the arms race have no right to call themselves scientists.

The problem of the scientist's responsibility is, of course, certainly not a new one. But in new conditions it presents itself anew.

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Genuine scientists have always lived and worked with full awareness of their responsibilities and have been guided by the vital interests of society and their conscience, and not by selfish considerations. However, the fact that the reactionary forces have succeeded in obtaining powerful weapons of destruction to implement their bellicose designs practically without any serious opposition from the scientists, has shown that very often such concepts were inadequate, vague and contemplative, that it is essential for scientists to realize their responsibility more profoundly. Numerous facts and the evidence of scientists themselves show the tragedy of the scientist when "thousands of individual actions based on a lofty concept of conscience ultimately resulted in an act of collective contempt for conscience, horrifying in its scale" as R. Young says in his book "Brighter than a Thousand Suns".

For some scientists the problem of genuine responsibility to society presents itself as the need for a certain re-evaluation of values, and those ethical principles that used to be considered an indispensable characteristic of "a servant of truth", "a high-priest of pure science".

According to the traditional liberal concepts of the responsibility of scientists and the dictates of his conscience, it is his duty effectively to solve scientific problems, and it is theoretical problems that comprise his sphere of competence. It is asserted that the division of labour in society has singled out this specific field of activity for professional scientists and that they should not go outside its limits into the field where the practical utilization of theoretical discoveries takes place. A scientist, it is said, is outside politics, outside the struggle of parties and classes.

The very spirit of science and technology, the very spirit of untiring pioneers is characterized by an onward march from the known to the unknown, and therefore the great stimulus of scientific activity lies in the very process of cognition, in the effort not only to solve the mysteries of nature, but also to test one's conclusions. It is precisely this fact that can, above all, determine the scientist's attitude to his work.

In contemporary conditions the inadequacy of such concepts of duty becomes more evident than ever before. The conscience and responsibility of the scientist, since he realizes better than anybody else the significance and potentialities of modern scientific knowledge, cannot be

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confined to the narrow limits of purely theoretical research.

Scientific activities cannot be separated from social activities for peace, progress and genuine humanity. Appealing to public opinion, opening the eyes of the mass of the people, joining in the mighty movement of our time for peace and socialism, the scientist contributes to the common cause and complies with the dictates of his own conscience.

It is only by participating in social struggle and in the mass social movement that a scientist can perform his duty as a scientist to strengthen man's domination over nature.

¹ Bernal, J.D., "Science and Social Life", 1956, p.682 (Russian Edition)