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1969 article in Foreign Affairs:

-- "The present state, and future course, of our negotiations is too complicated and sensitive for detailed discussion here.

-- "What is important is that we understand that this war is substantially different from any other we have fought. Our success depends in large measure to our ability to interrelate our economic, political and military policies into a coherent whole.

-- "Also, the Paris negotiations themselves are an important factor, since they have such an impact on the expectations of the Vietnamese populace.

-- "This administration proposes to make Vietnam the first test of the new NSC structure. Very early on we will, after full consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other senior Presidential advisors, present the full range of options to the NSC for consideration.

-- "The NSC task will be to make a rational whole of all our programs, and to end the tendency to make policy by answering cables from Saigon and Paris."

Among the more eminent individuals who expressed an opinion on Vietnam was Walter Lippmann, who lunched with HK on Wednesday December 11 and met with Nixon and HK on Friday, December 13. Lippmann told the President-elect that he believed the U.S. was overcommitted in the world and he believed we should get out of Vietnam, concentrating on the objective of mutual withdrawal in the Paris negotiations.

On the same day, December 13, HK met with Lee Kwan Yew at the Plaza Hotel. Lee told HK that if Thailand, which he called the "linchpin of Southeast Asia," fell to the Communists, the whole area would be in serious trouble. HK said this sounded as if the new Administration had written off South Vietnam; HK stressed that we had not done so. Lee replied that if the U.S. disengaged from Vietnam, it should do so only after allowing a new national leadership to emerge there. So long as the U.S. was tied to an Air Marshal (Ky) and a general (Thieu), the U.S. was in trouble. Lee urged that the U.S. try to bring about a popularly-elected government in South Vietnam, and that the U.S. withdraw carefully in stages.

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On December 21, Henry Cabot Lodge wrote a handwritten note to HK from Beverly Farms with a unique suggestion that the real issue in Vietnam was rice supplies. He suggested:

> "That the GVN pledge (perhaps by treaty) regular annual exports of rice from the Mekong Delta to North Vietnam on an equal basis with the rice consumption of South Vietnam both as to quantity and price, the US to provide substantial financial help. Once US-GVN agreement had been reached, the above plan would become a trump card in the Paris negotiations. . . . Do not many experts believe that one reason North Vietnam is so anxious to conquer South Vietnam is because North Vietnam needs the rice (which they now get largely from mainland China)?"

At some point in December 1968, Charles Yost, Nixon's designee as UN Ambassador, wrote to offer his thoughts on Vietnam. He analyzed what he thought were the "minimum objectives" of each side and felt that if these could be identified, a negotiation in those terms could, by persistent effort, reconcile the two sides. He concluded that the Communists were not interested in immediate reunification and therefore seemed to be seeking mainly an "assured position for the NLF in the political life of South Vietnam." The evidence was ambiguous on whether they would only be satisfied with a coalition government; the proposition could only be tested by "bold but patient negotiation."

Yost suggested a two-track approach: the US and DRV to negotiatate on issues of concern to them and the GVN and NLF to negotiate the basic political issues. In the meantime the US should exert pressure behind the scenes "to help bring into being a new government in Saigon, more broadly representative of the major non-Communist elements there." A new government of this type would then hold new elections. Once this newly elected government was in place and a political settlement concluded, a ceasefire would be easily obtained.

Some thoughtful observations came from Robert Shaplen, who wrote on December 23 to congratulate HK on his appointment:

> ". . . I do not share the feeling of most of our spokesmen that 'things are now really worked out with Thieu' and that all is best in the best of all possible negotiatory worlds. We have a long road ahead, and we are getting less rather than more patient, I'm afraid. I shall be curious to see what President Nixon, with your help and that of others in the new Administration,

-38-

come up with regarding troop withdrawals adjusted to other vital matters. We could lose it all if we're not careful, and, if we are careful, I think we could still salvage quite a bit."

General Vernon Walters sent HK a set of memoranda on December 31, one of which contained some general observations on Vietnam:

"Vietnam is perhaps a commitment which we should not have undertaken, although I am not sure this is so."

/He cited Indonesia.\" The real issue at stake in Vietnam is not what government rules in Saigon or Hanoi, rather it is the central issue of the credibility of the United States as an ally and a guarantor. . . . NATO cannot be saved or revivified by throwing South Vietnam to the wolves for the sake of a temporary arrangement."

Of greater importance were two long memoranda to HK from Harriman and Vance, the two principal U.S. negotiators in Paris. Cyrus Vance, in his lawyer-like way, offered HK in a letter from Paris on December 31, 1968, "suggestions on the main points on which the new negotiators will need immediate guidance:"

"There is, of course, the possibility that we will be still bogged down on procedural matters. . . . If it is resolved before the 20th, then the new administration need be concerned only with the questions of substance. If not, then the new administration will have to pick up the argument over procedures with the GVN.

"If, despite all efforts of persuasion, the GVN continues to insist on a position which postpones negotiation on matters of substance, we will have to consider alternatives. One alternative which should be high on the list is to seek to open bilateral negotiations with the DRV on such matters as the DMZ, withdrawals, prisoners of war, Laos, postwar relations between the US and the DRV, etc. We would remain ready to engage in full plenaries with all parties concerned but would try to make progress bilaterally on matters of substance which directly affect the United States. . . .

"If it is possible to overcome the procedural impasse and to get into plenary sessions on matters of substance,

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then the initial negotiating instructions should contain clear
guidance on the following questions:

a) Will we follow one or two tracks? As you know, I strongly favor two tracks.

b) What is our policy concerning troop withdrawals? Must they be mutual, and over what time period should they be phased? What is the maximum number of troops which we should seek to take out before the end of 1969?

c) If the GVN dig in their heels, what items of leverage should we use, e.g., troop withdrawals, ceasefire, etc.? How far can we go bilaterally, or perhaps trilaterally (include the NLF), under such circumstances?

d) What is our position on reducing the level of hostilities? Are we going to follow a policy of all-out pressure on the ground? If so, what part will U.S. forces play? If we do not follow a policy of maximum pressure, what kinds of de-escalation should we propose?

e) What is our position on a ceasefire?

"With all these questions in mind, I suggest that the negotiating instructions define specifically the basic objective along such lines as the following:

'To negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem under conditions which will provide the people of South Vietnam the opportunity to determine their own future free from external aggression.'

"In terms of specific objectives, the initial negotiating instructions should speak to the following:

a) Restoration of the DMZ.

b) Withdrawal of external forces from South Vietnam.

c) Reduction of the level of hostilities—including the question of a ceasefire and phased de-escalation.

d) The creation of a situation in which the contending Vietnamese forces within South Vietnam can work out a political settlement.

e) Prisoners of war.

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"There are in existence policy papers on these issues, but they should be reviewed, reaffirmed, or modified.

***

"Finally, I would like to stress that the negotiating instructions should be stated in over-all objective terms and the maximum flexibility should be left to the negotiators to operate within such broad guidelines. We should seek to avoid a situation in which every move the negotiators wish to take must be approved in Washington and Saigon. The general rule should be maximum flexibility on tactics consistent with the over-all policy objectives.

"Warm regards,

"Cy."

Averell Harriman wrote a memo on Vietnam on January 7. (Dick Holbrooke was scheduled to give HK a copy a few weeks later, but Dan Davidson furnished HK with a bootleg copy on January 13.) The text of this memorandum is provided in full at Tab E. Its main features are a useful benchmark against which to compare Harriman's later insistent and escalating demands of U.S. withdrawal:

- Harriman insisted on mutuality of withdrawal, including withdrawal by Hanoi of all its military forces, both regular army units and cadres and fillers for VC units.

- The DMZ should be reestablished.

- Withdrawal of US and allied forces "would be completed six months after we were satisfied all North Vietnamese military personnel had been evacuated, and agreement reached on no further infiltration into South Vietnam" (a stiff version of the Manila Formula).

- "Some U.S. forces may have to remain in Vietnam for a considerable period until we are satisfied that all the North Vietnamese have been withdrawn."

- Harriman expected that "some pressure" by us on the GVN and by the USSR on Hanoi would be necessary to induce the two Vietnamese sides to achieve a political settlement.

- Harriman stressed, however, that we did not "have an obligation to retain the present government. An agreement could provide for amendments to the present constitution, or a new constitution, and conditions for a

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new election could be negotiated among the Vietnamese."
He urged that the U.S. not "escalate our objectives"
beyond this during the course of the conflict, as we
had in the Korean War.

-- Harriman also placed importance on US-DRV postwar relations, because there was "no chance of peace surviving in Southeast Asia" unless the North Vietnamese stopped interfering with their neighbors. He saw an interest for Hanoi in keeping independent of Peking and Moscow and in participating in a program for economic development of Southeast Asia.

-- Harriman believed "the Soviet Union wants to see a strong Southeast Asia developed as a check to Chinese expansion to the South."

President-elect Nixon wrote a note to HK on January 8, 1969 focusing on the NVA sanctuaries on the *Cambodian-South Vietnamese border* and expressing determination to change the present U.S. policy of unilateral restraint:

"In making your study of Vietnam I want a precise report on what the enemy has in Cambodia and what, if anything, we are doing to destroy the buildup there. I think a very definite change of policy toward Cambodia probably should be one of the first orders of business when we get in."

Andy Goodpaster drafted a reply for HK with information on the extent of the NVA base areas along the Cambodian border. He reported that:

"our field command in South Vietnam is convinced that the vast bulk of supplies entering Cambodia come in through Sihanoukville. . . . What we are doing about this is very limited. There is some air reconnaissance and very restricted ground re onnaissance, the latter along the border only. . . . Under the current rules of engagement, U.S. forces when fired upon from across the border are authorized to return fire in self-defense. Such occasions are very infrequent. . . . The command in the field has made several requests for authority to enter Cambodia to conduct pre-emptive operations and in pursuit of with-drawing forces that have attacked us. All such requests have been denied or are still pending without action."

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(Whether the above memo was actually sent is not clear.)

Maxwell Taylor sent HK his analysis in a memo on January 13, 1969. Taylor explained that there were three types of withdrawal proposals: (A) a token unilateral U.S. withdrawal, (B) a limited bilateral withdrawal negotiated with the DRV, and (C) a limited unilateral withdrawal with GVN concurrence. Taylor concluded that the disadvantages of (A) outweighed its advantages (e.g., it would look like U.S. weakness and whet appetites in the U.S. for further withdrawals). Taylor felt alternative (B) should be tried, and alternative (C) could be discussed with the GVN toward the end of 1969 if no general settlement was in sight. He urged that we make a hard evaluation of the ARVN, first, and take whatever steps were necessary to strengthen them to carry the burden before we left them on their own. Taylor also advised HK that the war in Laos was relevant to Vietnam and should not be ignored.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS - 1969

I. THE SETTING

US-Soviet relations on Inauguration Day 1969 were characterized
by an abortive and undeveloped SALT dialogue, the bad odor
of the Czech invasion still in the air, no ongoing negoti-
ation on any issue, and the absence of regular economic or
other bilateral relations.

SALT: LBJ used the signing of the NPT on July 1, 1968, to announce that the two governments had agreed to "enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction" of offensive and defensive strategic arms. Before the Czech invasion stopped SALT dead in the water, the Johnson Administration labored to produce a single, simple integrated SALT proposal. Reportedly shaped by the Halperin group in ISA and negotiated with the JCS, the proposal that emerged was a three-to-four page document, in essence the outline of a treaty, which proposed: equal numbers (un-specified) of ABM launchers on both sides; a freeze on ICBMs and SLBMs at existing levels; no limits on bombers or MIRVs; a ban on mobile missiles; and a ban on freedom to mix. A joint statement was scheduled for August 21, to announce the beginning of talks on September 30, perhaps at a summit between LBJ and Kosygin in Leningrad.

STRATEGIC BALANCE: The US had halted its strategic forces buildup years earlier at 1000 Minuteman, 656 SLBMs in process of conversion from Polaris to Poseidon, 54 Titan, and 646 strategic bombers, for a total of 4200 deliverable warheads. The Soviet force consisted of 900 ICBMs, 45 SLBMs, and 150 strategic bombers, totaling 1200 deliverable warheads. The rate of increase of Soviet ICBMs was accelerating, but Clark Clifford estimated in his Posture Statement of January 1969 that "the rate of increase will be considerably smaller over the next two or three years.

The first flight tests of (MIRV'd) Poseidon and Minuteman III
were conducted on August 16, 1968. The Soviet SS-9 triplet
was flight tested on August 28, 1968.

The Johnson Administration's Sentinel ABM program had been
announced in a McNamara speech of September 18, 1967; it was
a thin area-defense based on 15 to 20 emplacements of the
Spartan long-range interceptor missile, with five Sprint
short-range missile sites for point defense along the northern
border of the US. The Soviet Union was deploying an area
defense in a ring around metropolitan Moscow, consisting of
100 Galosh long-range interceptor missiles.

- 2 -

**EUROPEAN SECURITY:** The Harmel Report to NATO of December 1967 had spoken of detente, as well as defense, as the "two main functions" of the Atlantic Alliance. The NATO Communique of June 1968 expressed interest in MBFR, but progress on this too was rendered impossible when the Soviet Union and its allies invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21. On November 12, 1968, Brezhnev, at the Polish Party Congress in Warsaw, elaborated on the principle that "proletarian internationalism" entitled the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of any member of the "Socialist Commonwealth". This came to be called the "Brezhnev doctrine", although other Soviet commentators had already fore shadowed it.

The US had leaned over backwards not to involve itself in the Soviet-Czech tensions leading up to the invasion; the US even formally protested Soviet accusations that the US was stirring up the Czechs. Only after the invasion did LBJ give his "dogs of war" speech on August 30 warning against further Soviet military actions in Eastern Europe (against Romania or Yugoslavia). This US hands-off posture was criticized by NAR before the invasion; it was widely criticized in Europe after the invasion. The only US retaliation was to postpone the SALT talks.

**ECONOMIC RELATIONS:** LBJ made repeated overtures to the USSR and Eastern Europe to improve bilateral ties. In speech on May 23, 1964, he said "we will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid." He reiterated his hopes for better relations in his State of the Union on January 4, 1965. In February 1965 he appointed a Special Committee chaired by J. Irwin Miller to reexamine US trade policy toward the USSR and Eastern Europe. The Miller Committee reported back in April 1965 urging selective changes in the US's discriminatory trade policy, including giving the President authority to grant MFN as a bargaining tool. On October 7, 1966, LBJ suggested removal of trade barriers, improved communication and possible mutual troop cuts in Europe. This overture was rebuffed by Brezhnev who said on October 16 that the US labored under a "strange and persistent delusion" if it thought relations could be improved while the Vietnam war continued. (So it was Brezhnev who started the linkage.)

Theodore Sorensen, George Ball, and Walter Mondale were very active in 1968 urging modification of the discriminatory legislation. Mondale submitted resolutions, and Senate hearings were held on East-West trade in June-July 1968. The Export Control Act of 1949 was due to expire on June 30, 1969, and the liberals geared up to change the law -- a campaign not at all deterred by the Czech invasion.

Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-1964

Public Papers of the Presidents

Remarks in Lexington at the Dedication of the
George C. Marshall Research Library.

May 23, 1964

Today we work to carry on the vision of the Marshall plan. First, to strengthen the ability of every European people to select and shape its own society. Second, to bring every European nation closer to its neighbors in the relationships of peace.

This will not be achieved by sudden settlement or by dramatic deed. But the nations of Eastern Europe are beginning to reassert their own identity. There is no longer a single Iron Curtain. There are many. Each differs in strength and thickness—in the light that can pass through it and the hopes that can prosper behind it.

We do not know when all European nations will become part of a single civilization. But, as President Eisenhower said in 1953: "This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations can find its way to peace that is neither partial nor punitive."

We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian aid. We do this for four reasons:

First, to open new relationships to countries seeking increased independence yet unable to risk isolation.

Second, to open the minds of a new generation to the values and the visions of the Western civilization from which they come and to which they belong.

Third, to give freer play to the powerful forces of legitimate national pride—the strongest barrier to the ambition of any country to dominate another.

Fourth, to demonstrate that identity of interest and the prospects of progress for Eastern Europe lie in a wider relationship with the West.

We go forward within the framework of our unalterable commitment to the defense of Europe and to the reunification of Ger-

many. But under the leadership of President Truman and President Eisenhower, and our late beloved President Kennedy, America and Western Europe have achieved the strength and self confidence to follow a course based on hope rather than hostility, based on opportunity rather than fear. And it is also our belief that wise and skillful development of relationships with the nations of Eastern Europe can speed the day when Germany will be reunited.

We are pledged to use every peaceful means to work with friends and allies so that all of Europe may be joined in a shared society of freedom.

Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965

STATE OF THE UNION, Jan. 4, 1965

AMERICA AND THE COMMUNIST NATIONS

Yet we still live in a troubled and perilous world. There is no longer a single threat. There are many. They differ in intensity and in danger. They require different attitudes and different answers.

With the Soviet Union we seek peaceful understandings that can lessen the danger to freedom.

Last fall I asked the American people to choose that course.

I will carry forward their command.

If we are to live together in peace, we must come to know each other better.

I am sure that the American people would welcome a chance to listen to the Soviet leaders on our television—as I would like the Soviet people to hear our leaders on theirs.

I hope the new Soviet leaders can visit America so they can learn about our country at firsthand.

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly beginning to assert their identity. Your Government, assisted by the leaders in American labor and business, is now exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with these countries and with the Soviet Union. I will report our conclusions to the Congress.

503 Remarks in New York City Before the National Conference of Editorial Writers. October 7, 1966

Mr. Clendinen, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, members of the Conference of Editorial Writers, ladies and gentlemen:

I am a little baffled by this room. It makes a speaker have to talk out of both sides of his mouth.

Since the Secretary took you on a quick trip around the world, I hope you will pardon me if I just ask you to go across the Atlantic with me.

I remember some years ago President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed the Daughters of the American Revolution. His opening words were not his usual, "My friends," but instead he said, "My fellow immigrants."

And he was right, because most of our fathers came from Europe—east or west, north or south. They settled in London, Kentucky; Paris, Idaho; and Rome, New

York. Chicago, with Warsaw, is one of the great Polish cities of the world. And New York is the second capital of half the nations of Europe. That really is the story of our country.

Americans and all Europeans share a connection which transcends political differences. We are a single civilization; we share a common destiny; our future is a common challenge.

Today two anniversaries especially remind us of the interdependence of Europe and America.

- On September 30, 17 years ago, the Berlin airlift ended.

- On October 7, just 3 years ago, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was ratified.

There is a healthy balance here. It is no accident. It reflects the balance the Atlantic

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allies have always tried to maintain between
strength and conciliation, between firmness
and flexibility, between resolution and hope.

The Berlin airlift was an act of measured firmness. Without that firmness, the Marshall plan and the recovery of Western Europe, of course, would have been impossible.

That hopeful and progressive achievement,
the European Economic Community, would
never have been born.

The winds of change which are blowing
in Eastern Europe would not have been felt
here today.

All these are the fruits of our determina-
tion.

The Test Ban Treaty is the fruit of our
hope. With more than 100 other cosigners
we have committed ourselves to advance
from deterrence through terror toward a
more cooperative international order. We
must go forward to banish all nuclear weap-
ons—and to banish war itself.

So a just peace remains our most im-
portant goal. But we know that the world
is changing. Our policy must reflect the
reality of today—not yesterday. In every
part of the world new forces are standing
at the gates: new countries, new aspirations,
new men. In this spirit let us look ahead to
the tasks that confront us today in the At-
lantic nations, as I will look ahead a little
later to the tasks that confront us in another
part of the world as I travel 25,000 miles in
the Pacific area.

Europe has been at peace since 1945.
But it is a restless peace that's shadowed by
the threat of violence.

Europe is partitioned. An unnatural line
runs through the heart of a very great and
a very proud nation. History warns us that
until this harsh division has been resolved,
peace in Europe will never be secure.

We must turn to one of the great unfin-

ished tasks of our generation—and that un-
finished task is making Europe whole again.

Our purpose is not to overturn other gov-
ernments, but to help the people of Europe
to achieve together:

- a continent in which the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe work shoulder to shoulder together for the common good;

- a continent in which alliances do not confront each other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a framework in which West and East can act together in order to assure the security of all.

In a restored Europe, Germany can and
will be united.

This remains a vital purpose of American
policy. And we reiterated it and reaffirmed
it to Chancellor Erhard just a few days ago.
It can only be accomplished through a grow-
ing reconciliation, because there is no short-
cut.

We must move ahead on three fronts:

- First, to modernize NATO and
strengthen other Atlantic alliances.

- Second, to further the integration of the Western European community.

- Third, to quicken progress in East-West relations.

Now may I speak to each of these in turn.

I.

Our first concern is to keep NATO strong,
and to keep it modern and to keep it abreast
of the times in which we live.

The Atlantic Alliance has already proved
its vitality. Together, we have faced the
threats of peace which have confronted us—
and we shall meet those which may confront
us in the future.

Let no one doubt ever for a moment the
American commitment. We shall not ever

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Lyndon B. Johnson, 1960

Oct. 7 (1951)

unlearn the lesson of the thirties, when isolation and withdrawal were our share in the common disaster.

We are committed, and we are committed to remain firm.

But the Atlantic Alliance is a living organism. It must adapt itself to the changing conditions.

Much is already being done to modernize its structures:

- we are streamlining NATO command arrangements;

- we are moving to establish a permanent nuclear planning committee;

- we are increasing the speed and certainty of supply across the Atlantic.

However, there is much more that we can do.

There is much more that we must do.

The Alliance must become a forum, a forum for increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns—from East-West relations to crisis management.

The Atlantic Alliance is the central instrument of the entire Atlantic community. But it is not the only one. Through other institutions, the nations of the Atlantic are now hard at work on constructive enterprise.

In the Kennedy Round we are negotiating with the other free world nations to reduce tariffs everywhere. Our goal is to free the trade of the world, to free it from arbitrary and artificial restraints.

We are engaged on the problem of international monetary reform.

We are exploring how best to develop science and technology as a common resource. Recently the Italian Government has suggested an approach to narrowing the gap in technology between the United States and Western Europe. That proposal, we think, deserves very careful study and consideration. The United States stands ready to

cooperate with all of the European nations on all aspects of this problem.

Last—and perhaps really most important—we are working together to accelerate the growth of the developing nations. It is our common business to help the millions in these developing nations improve their standards of life, to increase their life expectancy, to increase their per capita income, to improve their health, their minds, their bodies, to, in turn, help them really fight and ultimately conquer the ancient enemies of mankind: hunger, illiteracy, ignorance, and disease. The rich nations can never live as an island of plenty in a sea of poverty.

Thus, while the institutions of the Atlantic community are growing, so are the tasks that confront us multiplying.

## II.

Second among our tasks is the vigorous pursuit of further unity in the West.

To pursue that unity is neither to postpone nor to neglect for a moment our continuous search for peace in the world. There are good reasons for this.

- A united Western Europe can be our equal partner in helping to build a peaceful and just world order;

- a united Western Europe can move more confidently in peaceful initiatives toward the East;

- unity can provide a framework within which a unified Germany can be a full partner without arousing fears.

We look forward to the expansion and to the further strengthening of the European community. Of course, we realize that the obstacles are great. But perseverance has already reaped larger rewards than many of us dared hope for only a few years ago.

The outlines of the new Europe are clearly discernible. It is a stronger, it is an increas-

1127

ingly united but open Europe—with Great Britain a part of it—and with close ties to America.

### III.

Finally, thirdly, one great goal of a united West is to heal the wound in Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother.

That division must be healed peacefully. It must be healed with the consent of Eastern European countries and consent of the Soviet Union. This will happen only as East and West succeed—succeed in building a surer foundation of mutual trust.

Nothing is more important than peace. We must improve the East-West environment in order to achieve the unification of Germany in the context of a larger, peaceful, and prosperous Europe.

Our task is to achieve a reconciliation with the East—a shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful engagement.

And I pledge to you today that Americans now stand ready to do their part.

Under the last four Presidents, our policy toward the Soviet Union has been the same. Where necessary, we shall defend freedom; where possible, we shall work with the East to build a lasting peace.

We do not intend to let our differences on Vietnam or elsewhere ever prevent us from exploring all opportunities. We want the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe to know that we and our allies shall go step by step with them just as far as they are willing to advance.

So let us—both Americans and Europeans—intensify, accelerate, strengthen our determined efforts.

We seek healthy economic and cultural relations with the Communist states.

- I am asking for early congressional action on the United States-Soviet Consular Agreement.

- We have just signed a new United States-Soviet Cultural Agreement.

- We intend to press for legislative authority to negotiate trade agreements which could extend most-favored-nation tariff treatment to European Communist states.

- We have just concluded an air agreement with the Soviet Union.

Today I am announcing the following new steps:

- We will reduce export controls on East-West trade with respect to hundreds of nonstrategic items;

- I have just today signed a determination that will allow the Export-Import Bank to guarantee commercial credits to four additional Eastern European countries—Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. This is good business. And it will help us—it will help us to build the bridges to Eastern Europe that I spoke of in my address at VMI only a few months ago.

- The Secretary of State is now reviewing the possibility of easing the burden of Polish debts to the United States through expenditures of our Polish currency holdings which would be, we think, mutually beneficial to both countries.

- The Export-Import Bank is prepared to finance American exports for the Soviet-Italian Fiat auto plant.

- We are negotiating a civil air agreement with the Soviet Union, which I referred to. This will, we think, greatly facilitate tourism in both directions.

- This summer the American Government took additional steps to liberalize travel to Communist countries in Europe and in Asia. We intend to liber-

1128

alize these rules still further in an attempt to promote better understanding and increased exchanges.

-In these past weeks, the Soviet Union and the United States have begun to exchange cloud photographs that are taken from the weather satellites.

You can see in these and many other ways the ties with the East will be strengthened—by the United States and by other Atlantic nations.

Agreement on a broad policy to this end, therefore, should be sought in existing Atlantic organs.

The principles which should govern East-West relations are now being discussed in the North Atlantic Council.

The OECD can also play an important part in trade and in contacts with the East. The Western nations can there explore the ways of inviting the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries to cooperate in tasks of common interest and common benefit.

Hand-in-hand with these steps to increase East-West ties must go measures to remove territorial and border disputes as a source of friction in Europe. The Atlantic nations oppose the use of force to change existing frontiers. That is a bedrock, too, of our American foreign policy. We respect the integrity of a nation's boundary lines.

The maintenance of old enmities is not really in anyone's interest. Our aim is a true European reconciliation. We so much want to make this clear to the East.

Further, it is our policy to avoid the spread of national nuclear programs—in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

That is why we shall persevere in efforts to try to reach an agreement banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We seek a stable military situation in Eu-

rope—one in which we hope that tensions can be lowered.

To this end, the United States will continue to play its part in effective Western deterrence. To weaken that deterrence might now create temptations and could endanger peace.

The Atlantic allies will, of course, continue together to study what strength NATO needs, in light of the changing technology and the current threat.

Reduction of Soviet forces in central Europe would, of course, affect the extent of that threat.

If changing circumstances should lead to a gradual and balanced revision in force levels on both sides, the revision could—together with the other steps that I have mentioned—help gradually to shape an entire new political environment.

The building of true peace and reconciliation in Europe, of course, will be a very long process.

The bonds between the United States and its Atlantic partners provide the strength, though, on which the entire security of this world depends. Our interdependence, therefore, is complete.

Our goal, in Europe and elsewhere, is, first of all—always—a just and a secure peace. It can most surely be achieved by common action. To this end, I pledge my country's best efforts:

-best efforts to achieve new thrust for the Alliance;

-to support movement toward Western European unity;

-to bring about a far-reaching improvement in relations between the East and the West.

Our object is to end the bitter legacy of World War II.

Let all of those who wish us well, and all

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[503] Oct. 7

others also, know that our guard will be up
but our hand will always be out.

The American people love peace and they hate war. We do not believe that might makes right. So in pursuit of peace, history is aware of our commitments—the Marshall plan, the Truman doctrine, and to NATO and to SEATO. We have been tested in Berlin and in Korea, and in the Dominican Republic, and our brave men are being tested at this hour in Vietnam.

In every instance, our purpose has been
peace, never war. Self-determination in-
stead of selfish aggression. We believe that
moral agreements are much to be preferred

to military means. The conference table
instead of the battlefield. But Americans
will never close their eyes to reality. We
back our word with dedication, and we also
back it with the united resolve of a patient,
of a determined, of a freedom-loving and a
peaceful people. Together we shall never
fail.

NOTE: The President spoke at 1:34 p.m. at the Carnegie Endowment Building in New York City. In his opening words he referred to James A. Clendinen, President of the National Conference of Editorial Writers, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, and Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United Nations. Later he referred to Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Encouraging the Rule of Reason in Eastern Europe
and the Middle East

Address by President Johnson¹

In a time of troubles I am glad to be with those who have known trouble and who still treasure the spirit of man.

The proverb says: "A friend loveth at all times, and a brother is born for adversity."

You have been my friends, and some of you have been like brothers to me. So in the words of the proverb, we were born for these times.

Adversity is in the air that we breathe. The tanks have rolled again in Europe. The virus of anti-Semitism threatens again to infect nations which should have learned its awful lessons a generation ago.

The road to peace in Southeast Asia is long and hard. The fires of unreasoning hostility tonight burn in the Middle East. Democracy in our own country, Mr. Prime Minister [Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon of Israel], and elsewhere seems to be beset by the extremists of the right and the left.

In such a time it is quite fashionable to despair over our prospects. To some people the events of 1963 prove that there never can be a peaceful accommodation between nations or between races or, indeed, between generations.

To others, the solution lies in a radical change of policy. Exactly what is never quite said, except that it just must be radical.

I can assure you, my friends, that I am not in the least complacent about these events. There have been a great many charges, complaints—columnists and commentators have made obser-

vations and laid them at my door during these past 5 years, as some of you have observed. But I do not think that complacency has ever been among any of them.

But if I am not complacent, neither do I despair. For I believe that the great American people face the adversities of 1963 far stronger, far wiser, than any people before them, including their fathers and their grandfathers.

Their strength comes from an economy that has provided more jobs, more employment, and more profit than any economy in human history. It comes also from a moral commitment to eliminate racism and injustice, and to eliminate it from the face of this earth that we live on.

Their wisdom comes from the experience of three decades which has taught them that appeasement—appeasement—does not yield peace; that they cannot be secure in this country if there is not security in other countries, if they, in their cowardice of the moment, turn their backs on free men; and they cannot protect themselves behind a wall of influence from the tumult of a world that is raging with want and disease.

This knowledge, which all Americans have gained at a very heavy cost, is a priceless asset in meeting the adversities of today and, surely, those that lie ahead.

So tonight I want to speak to you as I spoke earlier this afternoon in New Orleans, Louisiana,² about the quest for peace, specifically

¹Made before the 125th anniversary meeting of B'nai B'rith at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 10 (White House press release).

²For text of President Johnson's address before the American Legion, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1963, p. 325.

OCTOBER 7, 1963

345

about conditions in Eastern Europe and the
Middle East that really quite threaten the peace,
and also what I believe must be done to change
those conditions.

Conditions in Eastern Europe

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia just a
few days ago has set back the course of peace.
It rejects the very idea that better understand-
ing and more human contacts—and a relaxation
of tensions—can lead to more peaceful ways of
coexistence on this small and yet this very dan-
gerous planet.

We hope—and we shall strive—to make this
setback a very temporary one. But I assure you
that will not be easy. It will require calm de-
termination on the part of us and on the part
of all of our allies. It will also require the con-
sidered second thoughts of those who lead the
Soviet Union.

These men, who bear with us the terrifying
responsibility of an immense military power,
must come to realize that the ideals of peaceful
men and women just cannot be smashed by force.
They must come to understand that peace—
peace based on respect for human dignity—
offers to all people, including their own people,
the only real hope for security in the world.

Some leaders of Eastern Europe have sought
to indict those of Jewish faith for spreading
ideas of freedom among their people. Well, this
is shocking, not only because it is a very thin
disguise for anti-Semitism but because it really
suggests that freedom is the cause and the pas-
sion of just one people alone.

So tonight let there be no doubt in anyone's
mind about who cares for freedom. Mankind
itself cares.

We have worked now for more than 20 years
not only to protect Western Europe but to try
to promote a peaceful understanding with the
countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.

It was nearly 2 years ago that I proposed a
series of European initiatives.³ I hoped to
achieve better understanding with our allies. I
hoped to have more and freer exchanges with
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, because
only through such an improvement of the politi-

cal atmosphere, as I stated then, could we ev-
truly hope for peace in Europe, a coming to-
gether of Germany, and a healing of the de-
wounds across the entire face of Europe.

We have taken in this country a series of in-
portant steps in that direction. Last June I am
posed to the Soviet Union and the countries of
Eastern Europe a program of balanced and
mutual force reductions. We had made some
what similar proposals to the Soviet Unic
alone during the very first month that I co
cupied the Presidency.

Our offer threatens no legitimate interest of
any state. It rests on the respect for the equi-
rights of all states to their territorial integrity
and to their political independence.

In the discussions that we have proposed for
the reduction of tension in Europe, no topic
whatever would be barred from those discus-
sions. These proposals represent the only sourc
approach to the problems of peace and security
in Europe. All of these proposals have been re
buffed for the moment.

The leaders of the Soviet Union seem to have
decided that a movement toward a humane ver-
sion of communism in a small, friendly country
is a threat to their security, despite the fact that
the Czechs remain their ally in the Warsaw
Pact.

So new military and political risks have now
arisen from this aggressive act which demand
ever closer cooperation among the Western
allies. For our part, I made it unmistakably clear
that the use of force and the threat of force
will not be tolerated in areas of our common
responsibility like Berlin, because the use of
force generates fears and stimulates passions
whose consequences no man can predict or
control.

As I said the other day in San Antonio, "let
no one unleash the dogs of war."⁴ Europe has
suffered enough—enough in this century.

The Soviet Union tonight can still return to
the only road that really can lead to peace and
security for us all. That is the road of reducing
tension, of enlarging the area of understanding
and agreement. It can still change—if not un-
do—what it has done in Czechoslovakia. It can
still act there and can act elsewhere with the
prudence and the confidence which characterizes

³ For President Johnson's address before the National Conference of Editorial Writers at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 7, 1966, see *ibid*., Oct. 24, 1966, p. 622.

⁴ For excerpts from President Johnson's address before the Milk Producers, Inc., convention, see ibid. Sept. 23, 1968, p. 309.

346

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The conduct of any great nation, because it is never too late to choose the path of reason.

Every man of sanity will hope that the Soviets will act now before some new turn of events brings the world back to the grim confrontations of Mr. Stalin's time.

B. U.S.-Soviet Relations

President Johnson used the signing of the NPT on July 1, 1968, to announce that the two governments had agreed to "enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction" of offensive and defensive strategic arms. Before the Czech invasion stopped SALT dead in the water, the Johnson Administration labored to produce a single, simple integrated SALT proposal. (Shaped by the Halperin group in ISA and negotiated with the JCS, the proposal that emerged was a three-to-four page document, in essence the outline of a treaty, which proposed: equal numbers (unspecified) of ABM launchers on both sides; a freeze on ICBMs and SLBMs at existing levels; no limits on bombers or MIRVs; a ban on mobile missiles; and a ban on freedom to mix.) A joint US-Soviet statement was scheduled for August 21, to announce the beginning of SALT talks on September 30 at a summit between LBJ and Kosygin in Leningrad. This announcement was aborted by the Czech invasion.

Yet moves toward a Johnson-Kosygin summit continued to be made, even after Czechoslovakia and even after the U.S. Presidential election. On November 14, 1968, Dobrynin told Walt Rostow that "his government felt it was important not to lose momentum in the missile talks, and that it was equally important that we create a good atmosphere for passage of the non-proliferation treaty. He felt that it would be a great contribution to the future of US-Soviet relations if President Johnson could get these talks started very soon, because it would lay a basis for moving rapidly with the next Administration." Rostow replied that the continued presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was a problem, but the two then turned to a discussion of the desired outcome of a summit meeting.

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This conversation was two days after Brezhnev in his speech on November 12 at the Polish Party Congress in Warsaw expounded the principle that "proletarian internationalism" entitled the Soviet Union to intervene in the affairs of any member of the "Socialist Commonwealth." Other Soviet commen-tators on Czechoslovakia had argued the same principle, but this speech earned it the name of the "Brezhnev Doctrine."

On December 8, 1968, Robert Ellsworth on behalf of the President-elect met with Soviet chargé Chernyakov to explain that the President-elect would not look with pleasure on a summit meeting before January 20. On December 18, Chernyakov handed Ellsworth a Soviet reply at the Palm Court Plaza Hotel in New York. The Soviet note recounted the evolution of the summit idea: The American side had raised the matter first in July, then again in the middle of September and again at the end of November. The Soviets said they assumed that Mr. Nixon had been kept informed of the matter; now that "the situation in this respect" had been "clarified," it was "difficult" for the Soviet side to judge the United States' intentions and "hence / it was difficult for them to judge / how successful it could be under present circumstances. Mr. Nixon is of course in a better position to judge this." Thus, in effect, they were deferring to Nixon. Chernyakov added orally that if there was any reply to this from Mr. Nixon, he (Chernyakov) could convey it to Moscow.

Walter Lippman lunched with HK on December 11 and told him he thought a summit was "totally irresponsible and should be stopped." John McCloy passed a message to LBJ (on Nixon's prompting) conveying his advice that a summit would be a bad idea. Dean Rusk called McCloy back to tell him not to worry because the chances were slim. Nevertheless, Clark Clifford on Face the Nation on December 15 strongly urged a US-Soviet summit meeting.

On December 12, 1968, was HK's briefing for the new Cabinet. The talking points prepared for that briefing (Tab D) reflect HK's view that US military programs and allied military strength were the Soviet Union's principal incentive to negotiate in SALT and to observe "detente" in Europe:

"Introduction

-- "Soviet attitudes in the years to come will be affected by disparate fears, desires and preconceptions.

-- "Pressures for conciliation with the West will come from a rising tide of desire for consumer goods, from the

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fear of war, and perhaps from those who hope for a
relaxation in police-state controls.

-- "Pressures for continued confrontation with the US will come from Communist ideology, suspiciousness of leaders, and the Party apparatus, which sees itself as the principal bulwark against the outside world. They will come, as well, from the military, and from those who fear that any relaxation of tensions can only encourage the satellites to try, once again, to loosen the Moscow apron string.

-- "Moscow's foreign policy since the August invasion of Czechoslovakia has focussed on two issues:

1. Czechoslovakia itself, and the effects of the invasion on the rest of the Communist world;

2. How to cut losses elsewhere--especially how to hold down damage to US-Soviet relations.

-- "As the invasion showed, the security of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, and the preservation of the status quo there count for much more than the good opinion of the outside world.

-- "But it's also clear that Moscow believes its interests would be seriously damaged by a rupture of East-West relations, or if the possibility of a dialogue with the US on certain issues were lost.

-- "For now, the Soviet aim is to ensure and re-enforce its authority in Eastern Europe, while keeping lines to the West as open as possible.

-- "In terms of the US, the Soviets seem particularly anxious to keep open the possibility of talks on strategic arms limitations.

"Soviet Purposes in Negotiating with the US

-- "A real desire to lessen tensions?

-- "As a tactical device to gain respectability.

-- "As a device to split the Alliance and isolate the US and/or the FRG.

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# "Why the Soviets Want Strategic Arms Talks

-- "Continued escalation can become an extremely expensive proposition for them.

-- "It may be that they believe a reasonably stable relationship between Soviet and US capabilities to be inevitable and have therefore decided to try to hold at the present level.

-- "Or, it could be that they are on the verge of a technical breakthrough, and want to keep us where we are while they see what they can do to develop the breakthrough.

-- "But it is more likely that they think we will make a technical breakthrough if we continue to test and build, and want to avoid this.

-- "Finally, talks with us now would demonstrate that they need pay no permanent price for Czechoslovakia, and that they are still respectable people.

# "Issues

-- "If this is truly to be a period of negotiation, not confrontation, we must look carefully at what is the most effective way for us to negotiate. We must have clearly fixed in our own minds exactly what issues we want to negotiate about.

-- "Our past policy has often been one of 'confidence building' for its own sake, in the belief that as confidence grows tensions will lessen.

-- "But if one takes the view that tensions arise as a result of differences over concrete issues, then perhaps the real way to approach the problem is to begin working on those differences.

-- "There is also a widely held view that we must make a choice between a policy of 'detente' and a policy of support for a strong Western Alliance.

-- "But this is a false choice. Certainly the Soviets are prepared to use 'detente' as a tool to weaken the Alliance. Our task is to coordinate our East and West European policies, being careful not to sacrifice basic US interests for what may well be illusory and often temporary gains."

-46-

On December 18, the same day as the Soviet reply to Ellsworth above, HK met at the Hotel Pierre with Boris Sedov and enunciated the new Administration's philosophy of linkage. Sedov, nominally Counselor of the Soviet Embassy but probably KGB, was a slippery-looking Russian who had tagged along with the Rockefeller campaign. HK told him (1) that the Soviets would "find that the President-elect is open-minded, precise, and interested in lasting settlements based on the real interests of both countries;" (2) the new Administration was "very interested in serious talks." However, "on the strategic missile talks /HK continued/ Mr. Nixon is intent upon an assessment of our strategic position before moving into the negotiation stage. Our analysis of the issue, however, will be influenced by Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously on other questions -- particularly Vietnam and the Middle East."

HK made this linkage more explicit in a second meeting with Sedov, held at his request at the Pierre on January 2, 1969. HK repeated his earlier observation "that we did not believe that political and strategic issues could be completely separated. The Nixon Administration wanted to see more progress in Vietnam and the Middle East before committing itself to strategic arms talks." At this meeting Sedov read an oral note in reply to HK's presentation in the December 18 meeting. The Soviet oral note read:

"1. Moscow has carefully watched the election campaign which, though a US internal affair, has world-wide significance.

"2. Moscow does not have the pessimistic view expressed in many parts of the world in connection with the accession of the Republicans to power.

"3. It is not true that Moscow makes its attitude dependent on which party is allegedly more to the right.

"4. The key concern of Moscow is whether statements of great powers are animated by a sense of reality.

"5. Moscow noted with satisfaction Mr. Nixon's cable to President Podgorny to the effect that the American and Soviet people work together in a spirit of mutual respect and on the basis of a special responsibility for the peace of the world. This wish is considered an encouraging sign of the interest of the American side to proceed further in a solution of those problems outlined in bilateral contacts.

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"6. On the other hand, Moscow is very worried by statements that there is a desire on the part of the US to operate from a 'situation of strength.' If this theory dominates, and if a new round of armaments starts, the USSR is capable and willing to match the US effort. The world will be reduced to the worst days of the Cold War.

"7. Moscow realizes that there are theoretical and practical differences between our two countries. These should not interfere with the gradual achievement of agreements on a number of problems. That of disarmament is in the first place.

"8. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to develop mutual trust. On the part of Moscow, it is willing to make important steps in this direction, but wishes that the new Administration act in the same spirit.

"9. The Soviet leadership will do their utmost to find ways of solving at least some important problems of disarmament, and to ensure ratification by states of the non-proliferation treaty.

"10. The US and USSR must find a way to disarmament, or the consequences will be extremely dangerous for in this connection one has always to keep in mind that disarmament is specifically a Soviet-US problem.

"11. The Soviet leadership is determined to continue a policy of peaceful coexistence.

"12. Mr. Nixon's statement of November 11 to continue keeping open channels to the USSR did not pass unnoticed in Moscow. Great attention was paid to the part where Mr. Nixon, speaking of President Johnson's foreign policy, confirms his desire to keep open channels of communication to Moscow.

"13. It goes without saying that the future of Soviet-American relations would be favorably affected by settlement of the Vietnam problem, a political solution of the situation in the Middle East, a realistic approach to the situation in Europe as a whole, and the German problem in particular. (Oral comment: 'The Soviet Union has special interests in Eastern Europe.')

"14. Moscow hopes that even before inauguration Mr. Nixon indicates interest in betterment of relations with the Soviet Union."

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Sedov added that the USSR was "very interested" that the Inaugural Address contain some reference to open channels of communication to Moscow. HK replied that it would be easier if Moscow showed some cooperation on Vietnam. Sedov replied that he would try to have an answer by January 10th.

HK informed the President-elect by memo dated January 4 of this communication from Sedov. The President-elect marked down his approval of (a) including some such reference in the Inaugural Address but (b) waiting, as HK recommended, until about January 17 before telling Sedov that this would be done, to see what further message he might bring first.

On January 14, HK sent a memo to the President-elect with a draft of the foreign policy section of the Inaugural Address. He wrote: "Some version of the underlined sentences on page three should be in for the reasons we have discussed." The passage in question read:

> "To those who, for most of the post-war period, have opposed and, occasionally, threatened us, I repeat what I have already said: Let the coming years be a time of negotiation rather than confrontation. During this Administration the lines of communication will always be open. But we owe it to our peoples not to confuse form and substance. The test will be the content of what the lines carry -- not the fact that they are used."

N.B. The "East-West" section of the Inaugural Address, as actually delivered, follows. The phraseology that the Soviets wanted was included, along with a line about seeking "a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation," which undoubtedly referred to China:

> "After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.

> "Let all nations know that during this Administration out lines of communication will be open.

> "We seek an open world--open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people, a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation.

> "We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy.

-49-

"Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition--not in conquering territory or extending dominion, but in enriching the life of man.

"As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together--not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared.

"With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry.

"But to all those who would be tempted by weakness, let us leave no doubt that we will be as strong as we need to be for as long as we need to be."

The Soviet leaders were not the only ones pressing for a start of arms control negotiations. A Defense Department briefing book prepared for the President-elect described the current and projected US-Soviet strategic balance:

"The Soviets have continued their recent ICBM buildup and within two years may have 1200 of these systems operationally deployed; they could have 1500 ICBMs and a few hundred mobile ICBM's by the mid-1920's. The Soviets have a substantially smaller sea-based force and bomber force than the U.S., but they have recently initiated a new submarine construction program which could give them a force comparable to our present Polaris fleet by the mid-1970's. They are estimated to be about four years away from deploying MIRV's.

In spite of this growth, the Soviet stragetic force was not seen as a major problem by the authors of the DOD briefing. The U.S. was expected to enjoy a four-to-one advantage in warheads under current projections for the mid-'70's, not counting whatever new U.S. systems were later procured. US strategic forces were seen as capable of producing 40% fatalities among the Soviet population, and the U.S. analysis of assured destruction considered 25% fatalities to be an "adequate deterrent."

Against this background, Charles Yost sent HK a memo in January 1969 summarizing the proceedings of a Council on Foreign Relations discussion group on the Deployment and Control of Arms which met five times in New York between October 1968 and January 1969. Carl Kaysen was chairman and Yost was secretary. HK participated in some of the discussions; other participants were: Robert Bowie, Harold Brown, Abram Chayes, Hedley Donovan,

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Paul Doty, William C. Foster, Roswell Gilpatric, Gen. Ginsburgh,
Morton Halperin, Malcolm Hoag, Joe Johnson, Prof. Kistiakowsky,
Frank Long, Henry Rowen, Jack Ruina, Marshall Shulman, Helmut
Sonnenfeldt, Senator Symington, Albert Wohlstetter, Capt. Robert
O. Welander, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, and George Franklin.

The CFR discussion group made a strong pitch for commencement of SALT talks and for reductions of U.S. forces in Europe and worldwide:

-- On strategic arms, the discussion group stated the view that "both the United States and the USSR are at a technological turning point, that the best place to stop the strategic arms race would be as close as possible to where we are now, and that, if the present level is significantly exceeded, a prolonged, costly and dangerous escalation is probable." The group endorsed the premise that the US had often overreacted to Soviet weapons developments and that US pronouncements spurred a corresponding Soviet overreaction. (The missile gap was cited.) "Now we are again overinsuring by proceeding with an ABM system and may soon be in a less favorable situation to stop the strategic escalation than we were a year ago." A US-Soviet agreement was "imperative" also because without it further proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities was "almost certain." On-site inspection was not considered essential.

-- The CFR discussion group therefore recommended that the scheduled 600 interceptors for the Sentinel ABM system be reduced to 100, because the 600-interceptor system could be "thickened" too quickly. The group recommended a freeze on numbers of ICBM's and SLBM's and a ban on mobiles, on the ground that the second-strike damage-inflicting capability of both sides was "already sufficient." The group recommended prohibition of any new missile systems and, if possible, agreement on mutual monitoring of tests. If all the above were agreed, the group urged that the U.S. not deploy MIRV's, but limit itself to continuing development.

-- As for general purpose forces in Europe, the CFR discussion group recommended that the status quo be maintained in Europe "for the present," in the wake of Czechoslovakia. However, if the situation remained

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quiet "over the next year," the group urged that we negotiate with our allies modest reductions in ground forces (e.g., one division, or the logistical tail of several divisions), and "sound out the Soviets" on larger mutual reductions. The group urged that we "discuss promptly with our allies" removal of tactical nuclear weapons from aircraft and a possible reduction in the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons retained for Pershings. The group recommended that "most" of the U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe should be retained in CONUS in the ready reserve.

-- As to U.S. general purpose forces outside of Europe, the group urged examination of a "1-½-war" contingency plan instead of the current planning for "2½ wars." The group urged that if North Korea did not appear threatening, we should build up ROK forces to the point where U.S. forces could be phased down to tactical air support and a "token" U.S. ground force. After a Vietnam settlement, we should phase out U.S. combat forces from Thailand and also reduce the Seventh Fleet to its pre-Vietnam size.

On the other hand, John McCloy, who met with the President-elect on December 20, advocated (according to HK's talking points for Nixon) that the USG undertake a thorough assessment of the strategic situation before getting into any arms control talks with the USSR.

EUROPE - 1969

I. THE SETTING

Alliance relations with Western Europe were in some disarray in 1968, largely because of European reaction to pressures from the United States for several years on such issues as European unity, military strategy, non-proliferation, and economic competition.

POLITICAL RELATIONS: A grave crisis occurred in the Alliance, probably the gravest since 1949, when President de Gaulle removed France from the NATO Command and ordered NATO out of France in March 1966. De Gaulle had reacted badly to US attempts to impose notions of European unity and military coordination on the Allies, and to US hostility to the French and British independent nuclear forces. De Gaulle's attitudes were shared in other countries in Europe, such as the FRG, where leaders were less willing or able to state them publicly.

US-FRG relations had been cool, particularly during the Adenauer period. The young men of the Kennedy Administration were convinced that old men like de Gaulle and Adenauer were anachronisms and disparaged their conservatism and nationalism. This was the age of allied "interdependence", as JFK proclaimed in a July 4, 1962, address. The Kennedy Administration seemed more comfortable with the left in Europe, and encouraged the "opening to the left" in Italy, whose purpose was to isolate the Communists by carrying out a major role for the Socialist Party.

The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, led by George Ball, were ardent advocates of European unity on the federal model, and attacked notions of unity that fell short of it, such as de Gaulle's "Europe des patries". If our allies were to "share the burden" with the US, Europe had to make itself into a counterweight roughly comparable in power (so that the two sides of the Atlantic would fit the model of a "dumbbell"). Walt Rostow in a speech on December 4, 1968, listed among his disappointments on leaving office: "We regret that Europe has not been able to make more progress in this period toward that effective unity which is required for its own stability and progress as well as for Europe to fulfill the world role of responsibility it should carry."

12.

**MILITARY POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL:** NATO adopted "flexible response" at its Ministerial meeting in December 1967, after years of US salesmanship. While correct as a strategy, it was used by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations as a charter to demand a greater contribution by the allies in general purpose forces and disparage national nuclear forces. By a rational, "cost-effective" division of labor, independent allied nuclear forces made no sense to systems analysts.

To accommodate allied desires for a share in nuclear decisions, the Nuclear Planning Group was formed in December 1966. In addition, the Kennedy Administration had proposed a Multilateral Force, a multinationally-manned fleet or ship sharing control over nuclear weapons. (Initially proposed as a submarine force, it was later tried out on a surface ship.) This proposal could not satisfy allied desires to share in nuclear decision-making, could only whet their appetites, was militarily irrelevant, politically contentious and probably unworkable in practice. President Johnson dampened US pressures for the MLF and it died quietly, after disrupting alliance relations over a 3-4 year period.

The USSR, UK, and US signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty on July 1, 1968. This was the major arms control initiative in the period after the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty. This imposed no limits on US and Soviet forces except a general promise to pursue their own strategic arms limitation measures; its sole impact was on allied nuclear development. It took five years to negotiate because of the complexity of alliance deliberations. The French refused to join and the Germans understood it was directed against them. There were fears that it would hinder development of peaceful nuclear energy on which Europe was placing great hopes of reducing dependence on imported oil.

**ECONOMIC RELATIONS:** The US balance of trade deteriorated sharply in 1968 although the overall balance of payments in fact improved over 1967. Europe's growing economic strength after ten years of the Treaty of Rome was an accomplished fact. The chronic US deficit, accounted for partly by the stationing of US troops in Europe, was a source of political tension. The troop question in particular gave rise to the principle of "burden-sharing" --

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-- Leslie Lipson (Dec. 5): "What delights me particularly is that I regard you as a man whose external priorities are primarily concerned with our relations with Europe, which is the view I too share. It seems to me that during those last four years our foreign policy has been badly led astray by the Asia Firsters, who misled us into this political and military insanity of fighting a land war against Asians on the Asian continent."

-- Raymond Aron (Dec. 10): "Mes Félicitations pour votre entrée dans la grande politique."

While HK was the repository of high hopes, he was also the recipient of contradictory advice. John McCloy met with the President-elect in New York on December 20. No memcon exists, but the talking points indicate that McCloy was strongly anti-deGaulle, believed that Germany was the key to Europe, and welcomed Nixon's pledges to strengthen NATO ties.

HK met at some point during the transition with Antoine Pinay, former French President. On December 21, 1968, HK received a letter from Ambassador Lucet reporting President deGaulle's interest in meeting HK:

"Upon his return to Paris, former President Pinay was received by General de Gaulle and told him about the conversation he had with you.

"I am being instructed by [Foreign Minister] Mr. Debre to let you know that if by any chance you were coming to Paris in the near future, the President of the French Republic would very galdly receive you."

General Vernon Walters sent HK a thoughtful memo on December 31, 1968, on the subject of France, predicting that de Gaulle might be willing to turn a new page in US-French relations with the new U.S. Administration:

"I know of no NATO exercise which shows that Western Europe can be held without the use of French real estate and resources. If this is so then we must draw the necessary consequences therefrom.

***

"The events of last May showed that the French Armed Forces can wield considerable influence on the life of the nation. We should do all we can so that when de Gaulle passes from the scene, this influence will be exercised in a direction favorable to the security interests of the United States and its allies.

"I believe we should move vigorously at the outset of a new administration. De Gaulle is basically well disposed towards the President-elect. He regards him as a man of strength, courage and tenacity. He may make concessions to Mr. Nixon that he would never have made to Mr. Johnson. I am not sure but this is possible. He may really want to turn a new page in Franco-American relations."

Although the texts are not available, the record shows that
on January 11, 1969, President-elect Nixon sent warm letters to
President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Wilson, Chancellor Kiesinger,
and NATO Secretary-General Brosio, presumably affirming his
dedication to Atlantic ties. Later messages were also sent to
Prime Minister Sato, President Tito, and Pope Paul VI.

MIDDLE EAST

## Background

**French Position:** Days in advance of the inauguration, the French privately (note to USG-Jan 16) and publicly renewed their call for a Four Power conference to discuss "establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." Reportedly, this forum would not impose a peace but would work with U Thant to "define the conditions in which Resolution 242 could be implemented. The only item mentioned for possible discussion was the Soviet December 30 plan. Thus, one of the first issues that the Nixon Administration would face would be the reply to the French call, and not without attention to plans for an early Nixon-DeGaulle meeting in Paris.

The French proposal dated back before the 1967 war and was a reflection of DeGaulle's general approach to global or "big power" (of which France would be one) solutions to international problems. In the period of trying to defuse tensions prior to the war, Goldberg had told the UNSC that the US would be willing to participate in Four talks as proposed by the French while the Soviets had rejected the idea on May 30. After the war, the French encountered little support but renewed their appeal from time to time. Substantively, Paris conceived of its position as balanced - support for Israel within pre-war lines but rejection of the acquisition by force of the occupied territories. As variously stated, the French appeared to favor a settlement based on the evacuation of the territories, and end of all belligerency and recognition of each of the states involved by all other states. On the other hand, DeGaulle had blamed Israel for initiating hostilities (June 21, 1967), publicly linked tensions in the Middle East with those in Vietnam (then Premier Pompidou returned from Moscow in July 1967 with a communique calling for withdrawal of troops from both areas), gave more of a disadvantage to Israel in its arms embargo and suggested in November 1967 that the UN could play an active role in laying down "exactly the frontiers, conditions for life and security of both sides, the fate of the refugees and minorities and the details of free navigation for all in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal." At the UNGA in October 1968, Debre said that France supported a Soviet plan for four-power guarantees which had been suggested.

Israeli suspicions of French attitudes and positions were maximum. The Israelis were sensitive to the evolution in France's Middle East policies under DeGaulle. France's "independent" policy was seen as anti-Israeli and pro-Soviet. Israel would continue to resist any notion of "outside" influence on the negotiations and especially, throughout 1969, any serious effort to revive the Four Power context.

**UK Position:** The UK was fairly supportive of US concerns, letting the US take the lead. They had no special initiative on the table in 1969.

**Soviet Position:** Without attempting an indepth history of Soviet attitudes towards the Middle East and surrounding the 1967 war, the following points should be made: The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean dramatically increased in the late sixties and the Soviets strongly re-armed their Arab clients following the 1967 war. They roundly supported SC and UNGA solution demanding total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories as essential for a settlement, backing the Arab position that this was a pre-condition. There appears to have been little agreement at Glassboro (late June 1967) on the Middle East or Vietnam; Kosygin stated that an Israeli withdrawal as well as a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam were essential ingredients for world peace. (An exception in the Soviet "camp" was Romania which as early as July 24, 1967, called for a more moderate Arab stand against the Israelis. Romania and Israel later upgraded their relations). The Czech invasion in the summer of 1968 might also be taken into account.

On the substantive side, press reports of late September 1968 described a "compromise" Soviet peace plan including Israel's withdrawal to pre-June lines, a revived UN presence in areas evacuated, end to the state of gelliberqy and a Four Power guarantee of peace. Questions of the arms race, the Suez Canal and other issues would be discussed at a later date. (Debre responded to the Four power aspect on October 7). On December 3, 1968, Pravda described the Soviets as being "deeply convinced that despite all difficulties the Middle East crisis can and must be settled by political means," and that it "will do everything necessary to facilitate a political settlement in the Middle East and it will not permit a new dangerous flareup in that area." Later press reports described a Soviet peace plan of December 30, 1968 that outlined the following elements: the parties would confirm their acceptance of 242 and willingness to work with Jarring on a timetable for its execution; the Israelis would withdraw from occupied territories, to be followed by documents signed by Israel and the Arabs recognizing an end to the state of war and independence and sovereignty of all states; agreement would guarantee freedom of navigation in the region's waterways and a just solution to the refugee problem. Demilitarization of the occupied territories or UN presence was proposed. [Do not have authorized text in files. Copy of text appearing in press is at "Soviet Plan" tab.]

**US Position:** Two major statements of US policy made by LBJ were reaffirmed in the post-war period as the basic tenets of American policy. On June 19, 1967, Johnson, in a speech to the Department of State, outlined the following principles affirmed by the US:

> --"the first and greatest principle is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live and to have this right respected by its neighbors..."

--"...another basic requirement... is a human requirement.... justice for the refugees... there will be no peace for any party.... unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all and certainly primarily by those who are immediately concerned..."

--"...maritime rights must be respected,... the right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations...."

--"...this last conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle East arms race of the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area but upon the larger states outside the area....We have always opposed this arms race, and our own military shipments to the area have consequently been severely limited...I should like to propose that the United Nations immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of all military arms into this area and to keep these shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe...."

--Fifth, "the crisis underlines the importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all states of the area.... only on the basis of peace between the parties.... what they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security.... Further, there just must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem...."

--"...Certainly, troops must be withdrawn; but there must also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political independence and territorial integrity..."

--"...the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace.... [But].... We have been first in our support of effective peacekeeping in the United Nations and we also recognize the great values to come from mediation.... Yet, the main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region..."

On September 10, 1968, LBJ delivered a speech to B'nai B'rith on Eastern Europe (after Czechoslovakia) and the Middle East. On the latter, he outlined the following "principles for peace":

--First, each nation's right to live must be recognized. A major step would be for each party to issue promptly a clear, unqualified public assurance that it is now ready to commit itself to recognize the right of each of its neighbors to national life.

Second, the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area must be assured. We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw the lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace. There must be secure and there must be recognized borders. At the same time, "it should be equally clear that boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest."

Third, Jerusalem is a critical issue. "No one wishes to see the Holy City again divided by barbed wire and by machineguns."

Fourth, all nations, including Israel and the Arabs, must participate directly in a massive program to help the refugees.

Fifth, the maritime rights must be respected. Also, no enduring peace settlement is possible until the Suez Canal and Straits of Tiran are open to ships of all nations and their right of passage is effectively guaranteed.

Sixth, the US has exercised restraint in the arms race while recognizing the legitimate needs of friendly governments. "But we have no intention of allowing the balance of forces in the area to ever become an incentive for war." Reiterates need for a new understanding on arms limitation in the Middle East.

In the post-war years, the US in the UN context worked to moderate various anti-Israeli UN resolutions (many relating to the cycle of raid and reprisal across ceasefire lines) while also maintaining long-standing positions on such issues as Israeli activities in the occupied territories (which accounted for the spread of positive or abstention votes). A-4 delivers to Israel were begun in late 1967, with a promise of sympathetic consideration for the Phantoms throughout 1968. On October 9, 1968, LBJ announced authorization to negotiate the sale of F-4s. The LBJ Administration also reaffirmed its policy to supply arms to friendly Arab states. Toward the end of the LBJ Administration, certain "Rusk proposals" were put forward on aspects of a settlement. (Not available - will research further). Publicly, the USG continued to reaffirm the basic principles outlined in LBJ's speech of 1967 and 1968.

The strategy of the LBJ Administration in the post-war period has been described as a more "passive" policy -- the US would hold out for a full settlement with the hope that forces at work in the region would lead to that result, rather than through the application of active US involvement. [The 1967 war had strengthened the Israeli conviction that outside efforts of the past had failed and that time would convince the Arabs that Israel was "there to

stay."] While less active diplomatically, several conclusions appear to have been drawn from the 1967 war and recognized by the Johnson Administration: That Israel must remain strong (this would help minimize future US involvement); that Israel should not withdraw until "real peace" was established - no return to the unstable status quo; that Israel could use its territory to bargain its way to peace. While the US outlined some major principles, it did not become involved as a mediator. Rather, US activity focussed mainly on support for the Jarring mission. A central issue for the Nixon Administration would be whether this approach should be maintained or a more active policy pursued on the part of the US.

**Israeli Position:** Israel emerged from the 1967 war totally committed to direct negotiations with the Arabs, totally opposed to any outside efforts to bring peace, opposed to return to the pre-war lines and to any withdrawal in the absence of recognition and "real peace" from the Arabs. Security of the territories being its only alternative, the Israelis set about developing settlements in occupied territories and enlarging on their definition of future security requirements (Allon Plan and others for West Bank security line, need for presence at and land connection to Sharm al Shaykh). The Israeli conviction remained that the Arabs, foremost Nasser, were determined to "destroy" Israel. The proclamation of the Khartoum conference - no peace, no recognition, no negotiations with Israel -, Arab backing of fedayeen terrorism and the daily violations of the ceasefire lines reinforced what Helms would later describe as Israel's "no budge" position. On Arab military actions, the Israeli position was clear: Typical of Dayan's warnings (made October 29, 1968) - "Neither aggression on the ceasefire lines with Jordan and Egypt, nor demonstrations in the towns of Samaria can ever compel us to accept settlement we do not want....if Egypt continues to violate the ceasefire she must be prepared for severe military blows..." On terrorism, Meir would later say that responsibility for such acts "rests squarly on the shoulders of those governments and states from whose territories the saboteurs went forth..." Reprisals were justified. In early February 1969, Israeli sources reported that there had been 1,288 acts of sabotage and terrorism between the 1967-war and December 1968: 920 on the Jordan border, 166 on the Egyptian border, 37 on the Syrian border, 35 on the Lebanese border and 130 in Gaza. Israeli losses for the same period were reported as 234 dead and 765 wounded among military and 47 dead and 330 wounded among civilians.

While the Israelis made numerous statements relating to their substantive position, Eban made a major speech to the UNGA on October 8, 1968 which is illustrative of the Israeli position and which was reflected in various Israeli replies given to Jarring in the course of his "contacts" to promote peace. Eban's "nine-point" plan called for: (1) the establishment of "peace;"

(2) secure and recognized boundaries; (3) pledge of mutual nonaggression; (4) open frontiers; (5) free navigation; (6) solution of the refugee problem; (7) confessional responsibility for holy place in Jerusalem (although it was clearly understood the Israelis would maintain sovereignty over a united city);

(8) recognition of sovereignty and national life and (9) regional cooperation. Eban said Israel continued to be ready to exchange ideas or clarifications on certain matters of substance through Ambassador Jarring. Israel's reply to Jarring (see below) in early 1969 - as part of his final fade-out - made clear Israel's requirements for a contractually binding peace, secure borders to be agreed upon by the parties themselves, its definition of an end to the state of belligerency; withdrawal would follow agreement on a package settlement and would not be to pre-war lines. [Israeli reply to Jarring at "Replies to Jarring-1969" tab]

Israel's distrust of Nasser was overwhelming. Israel's basic argument in the post war period was that no one - including outsiders - should do for Nasser what he *could not* do for himself, i.e. make peace; this would be a victory only for Nasser and the Soviets. On the other hand, Israel had different feelings about Jordan (though they remain troubled by his joining the 1967 war) and they engaged in secret talks with Hussein on a possible solution on that front. [Note: There is no back-up on these talks. If necessary, this could be explored separately.]

**Egyptian Position:** While accepting Resolution 242, Nasser's position was that *total* Israeli withdrawal must precede implementation of other aspects of a settlement and rejected any direct negotiations with the Israelis. On July 3, 1968, it was reported that Egyptian For Min Riad said that Cairo accepted the "reality" of Israel and in the course of contacts with Jarring various proposals were advanced. In August 1968 the NYT reported and Egyptian plan calling for the internationalization of Gaza, free Israeli passage through the Strait of Tiran, a demilitarized Sinai, with UN observers not subject to Egyptian recall, the waiving of repatriation rights of Palestinian refugees and interminable passage through the Suez Canal *following* Israeli withdrawal; no direct negotiations. In an interview with Newsweek in February 1969, Nasser laid out five points for discussion to take place after Israeli withdrawal: declaration of non-belligerency; right of each to live in peace; territorial integrity of all nations behind secure borders; free navigation in international waterways; just solution for the refugees. Egypt spelled this position out in its reply to Jarring's last round of questions, in early 1969, and reaffirmed its commitment to 242. Basic to the Egyptian perception was the belief that 242 was somehow self-implementing, with Israeli withdrawal to take place followed by settlement of other issues and with Egypt have little or no dealings with Israel.

While putting forth these substantive positions, Nasser was being heavily rearmed by the Soviets. On April 29, 1968, he told the Egyptian Armed Forces that another war with Israel was inevitable and that peace efforts had failed since Israel rejected 242. Heykal wrote frequently on the inevitability of a new war. On November

6, 1968 (as Eg-Israeli clashes along Suez were escalating)
Nasser was reported as saying that Egypt would expand its air
defense system to cover the entire country. In December he
described Egyptian troops along the Canal as eager for battle
and that "the Egyptian front is the greater danger to Israel."
He said that battle must await the proper moment but that he
would also accept a peaceful settlement if it were honorable.
On January 20, 1969, Nasser made clear that he would rather
fight than cede territory, "nor will we ever sit to negotiate
with an enemy." He paid tribute to the Palestinian fedayeen
"at whose disposal the United Arab Republic unconditionally
places all its resources."

[A related aspect was the state of play of US-Egyptian relations which had a long and complicated history under Nasser and was reflected in his on-again off-again attitude towards resuming ties with the US in the early Nixon years. In the sixties, Egypt and the US had clashed over the war in Yemen, the Congo and over US conditioning of food aid on Egypt's policies. Convinced that Israel's strength was a direct function of its ties with the US, Nasser had charged both the US and UK of participating in air raids on Egyptian positions during the 67 war, leading to the break in relations. The charge was later denied (1968) then revived at Nasser's convenience in 1969. It would be alluded to in Nasser's pre-inaugural message to Nixon. Always, Nasser seemed to be seeking a "peg" on which he could hang any resumption of ties with the US; thus the problem of who would take the first step.]

Others' Positions: **Jordan** is the special case. Hussein accepted Resolution 242 having been assured in the course of discussion with the USG prior to passage of the Resolution that the US was "prepared to support a return of the West Bank to Jordan with minor boundary rectifications" and that we were "prepared to use our influence to obtain for Jordan a role in Jerusalem," and he held secret talks with the Israelis. At the same time, there was the serious question of whether Hussein was able to make peace, given the growing fedayeen threat mounted from Jordan against Israel. As the Israeli statistics show, roughly 75% of the clashes across ceasefire lines between the 67 war and December 1968 occurred on the Jordan front. For its part, Israel was rapidly expanding on its perception of future security needs on the West Bank. The Palestinian fedayeen declared their intentions as the establishment of a "free, open, nonsectarian, nonracist society in Palestine," (Fatah statement 10/19/68) and broadened the battlefield to include hijackings of commercial Israeli aircraft or other aircraft suspected of carrying Israelis. They were roundly backed by Arab radicals such as Syria and Iraq which had flatly rejected 242 as well as Arab moderates, Saudis and others, who provided financial aid. While the Arab moderates had backed Nasser in the war (including with cut-off of oil), they nonetheless urged a peace settlement in the past-war period.

United Nations: Jarring's mandate to promote "contacts" towards a settlement flowed from Resolution 242. He began these contacts in late 1967, visiting the parties and putting to them questions designed to develop some common understanding on implementation of the resolution. If he could not bring them together, he hoped at least to elicit their views. Jarring's initial effort (November 1967-April 1969) foundered on three central issues:

- The old procedural issue of the type of talks that would take place (direct or indirect);

- The general substantive approach to be taken. As Jarring explained in a report through U Thant to the Security Council in early 1970, "on the one hand, Israel regarded the Security Council resolution as a statement of principles in the light of which the parties should negotiate peace, and, on the other hand, the UAR considered that the resolution provided a plan for settlement ... to be implemented by the parties according to modalities established by the Special Representative."

- The crucial difference over the withdrawal provision of the resolution. The Arabs said it applied to all territories occupied since the 1967 war and the Israelis claimed it applied only to the parties agreeing on secure and recognized borders. There were also serious differences over the obligations of "peace" as well as on a settlement of the refugee problem.

Faced with a procedural and substantive impasse, Jarring spent much of his time shuttling between Jerusalem, Cairo and Amman posing questions and receiving reformulations of the parties' basic positions. As mentioned earlier, he posed a final set of questions on a trip to the area in March 1969, eliciting the same answers if nothing more than for the record.* Concluding there was nothing more he could do by April 1969, Jarring stood down between that time and June 1970 while the Four and Two power talks tried their hands at working out some basis for talks under his auspices.

**The Atmosphere - Militarily:** The Israeli statistics give some indication of the level of action across ceasefire lines in 1967 and 1968. The noise level was high and escalating. On the Israeli-Egyptian front, incidents since the post-war ceasefire caused U Thant to establish an observer team along the Canal. Egypt and Israel were warned against cross-canal firings in an SC resolution in September 1968. In November the SC met again in emergency session to discuss the escalation of major aerial battles over the Canal. [In response to Egyptian commando and other attacks against the Israeli positions on the East Bank,

* Last round of replies to Jarring from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon - containing standard replies - at Replies to Jarring-1969 tab.

the Israelis at this point were responding with attacks on bridges on the Nile which US Jewish press described as "deep penetration" inside Egypt and speculated that the Soviets might be concerned about Israeli attacks on Aswan.) Fedayeen attacks from Jordan led to an especially serious situation on that front. By early 1968, the Israelis were warning both Jordan and Syria that stronger retaliatory raids would be in order if these countries failed to control the fedayeen. Israeli air force attacks on suspected guerrilla bases in Jordan were commonplace throughout 1968 as were Syrian/Israeli clashes across ceasefire lines. On December 28, 1968, the Israelis conducted a major retaliatory raid against Beirut International airport in response to the latest attack on an El Al airliner in Athens; the raid was consistent with Israeli policy that Lebanan and other governments were responsible for harboring terrorists. Israel was unanimously condemned by the UNSC for its actions.

The high level of activity in the area meant innumerable SC and UNGA sessions and resolutions and thus policy choices for the US on the way in which it should vote. The prominent issues were the Israeli retaliatory raids, Israeli activities to annex Jerusalem, Israeli actions in creating facts in the occupied territories and "violating" the rights of Arabs therein, terrorism against civilian air travel and - dramatized by the Iraqi hangings of mostly Jewish "spies" in early 1969 - efforts pushed by Israel in behalf of Jewish persons in Arab countries. A thumbnail sketch would show the US splitting from Israel on resolutions mainly affecting our long-standing positions on the status of Jerusalem and on activities of an occupier in occupied territories.

Nixon: Major *Nixon* campaign statements on the Middle East are of special interest for their focus on the US-Soviet aspects of the Middle East situation, as well as his call for a more active Middle East policy and the commitment to Israel's strength:

April 21, 1968 (to American Israel Public Affairs Cmte)

> "...Outside of the cauldron of the Middle East itself, this new danger to regional and global peace can be traced directly to Soviet policy in the area - and indirectly to the absence of an effective American counter-policy....the Soviets were the losers in the six-day war...but...they are the principal beneficiaries of the uneasy post-war truce; and United States interests have suffered to the same extensive degree that Soviet interests have advanced. Their naval manpower in the Mediterranean has been augmented five-fold since the war...they have stiffened the spine of the militants.... established naval bases on the south shore of the Med....For the first time in history they are in the Med in power and solidly entrenched on the World Bridge...No American policy

at all in a region of the world where a single chance
spark could ignite a local conflict that could bring
the great powers hurtling together in a major confron-
tation.... The first urgency is for America not to allow
the balance of power to shift in favor of the militant
Arab states.... see to it that Israel's military strength
is never at a level vis-a-vis the Arab militants that
will invite a war of revenge... Second, the United States
must deal directly with the Soviets.... Third, the United
States must take the diplomatic lead in forging an
acceptable settlement.... solid guarantees that currently
occupied territories will never again be used as bases
of aggression or sanctuaries for terrorism...ships of
all nations through the re-opened Canal and the Straits
of Tiran should be guaranteed; it should include recoq-
nition of Israeli sovereignty, its rights to exist in
peace and and end to the state of belligerency. With
regard to the occupied territories, it is not realistic
to expect Israel to surrender these vital bargaining
counters in the absence of a genuine peace.... However,
it is also my view that for Israel to take formal and final
possession of these occupied areas would be a grave mistake...

September 8, 1968 (to B'nai B'rith)

"Four fundamental facts of life are evident in the Middle
East today. First, the danger of war increases in direct
ration to the confidence of certain Arab leaders that they
could win that war. Second, the Soviet Union has the
definite aggressive goal of extending its sphere of infl-
luence to include the Middle East. Third, the United
States has a firm and unwavering commitment to the national
existence of Israel....Fourth, the foundations for a permanent
peace will be laid when hunger and disease and human misery
have begun to disappear.... the Soviets...their goal [in
rearming Egypt] was not to restore a balance of power; their
goal was to further Soviet ambitions.... they have introduced
new and more sophisticated weapons.... the free world must
act to maintain a balance of power.... Israel must possess
sufficient military power to deter an attack. As long
as the threat of Arab attack remains direct and imminent,
'sufficient power' means the balance must be tipped in
Israel's favor. An exact balance...would run the risk
that potential aggressors might miscalculate. too much of
a temptation.... I support a policy that would give Israel
a technological military margin... If maintaining that margin
should require that the U.S. supply Israel with supersonic
Phantom F-4 jets - we should supply those Phantom jets....
In the Middle East and the Mediterranean, along the
southern flank of NATO, we have been witnessing the
advancement of Russian imperialism.... Mediterranean com-
plement of Soviet ships has more than quadrupled - from

11 to nearly 50 ships. And for the first time in
60 years, the Soviets have moved a fleet into the
Persian Gulf....the American response has been un-
certain and ineffectual....Short-range, we must
counter the military build-up....We must take the
initiative for near-term settlements. Looking ahead,
we must deal directly with the Soviets on the subject
of the Middle East .....the United States must take the
lead in forging an acceptable settlement [he repeats
standard views on elements of settlement as expressed
above]...."

D. <u>Middle East</u>

HK's appointment as national security adviser was warmly
welcomed by HK's Israeli friends. <u>Moshe Dayan</u> (Defense Minister)
sent a telegram:

"Warmest congratulations on your important nomination. I am confident that your ability and competence will help to solve the vital security problems of the United States and of the whole world."

<u>Yigal Allon</u> (Deputy Prime Minister) wrote:

"I was delighted to read in the paper that you were appointed . . . Knowing you a good number of years I am sure that this appointment will place the right man at the right place, in a very crucial period in the international arena. Your penetrating knowledge and balanced views in the various conflicts of global significance will provide the President with wise advice."

-54-

HK's handwritten notes exist of a Nixon meeting with
**Robert O. Anderson** in December 1968. Anderson had recently
met with Nasser and had warned Nasser of the dangers of
another war. Anderson told Nixon he felt "an Arab is at heart
an anarchist." Nasser could not sign a peace treaty with the
Israelis, Anderson felt, but he would sign one with the UN.
Nasser had said he would like to "turn over a new leaf" with
the Nixon Administration; Anderson said he suggested to Nasser
that he "write Nixon a letter and pour your heart out." Nixon
told Anderson in their December meeting that he did not want
to tie U.S. policy to Israel: "Israel must be looked at in
terms of the security of the United States" and "our commit-
ments must become viable."

HK had for his December 12 Cabinet briefing some talking
points on the Middle East that sound like they were written by
Hal Saunders. The talking points highlighted the dangers of
the current situation:

-- "If nothing changes in the present state of conditions in the Middle East, it seems reasonably certain that the Arabs and Israelis will once again go to war some time during the new Administration's tenure in office.

-- "Soviet interests and involvement in the area have expanded to the point that, should there be another war, there will be a strong likelihood of some form of direct Soviet intervention.

-- "Despite our own efforts, and despite UN mediator Jarring's efforts to get the two sides together, there has been no real progress since the June 1967 war.

***

-- "Recent indications are that Israel's territorial aims are much more than "minor modifications."

***

-- "The basic Arab dilemma is that the governments are probably too weak to make a settlement on their own, though they might be able to accept a settlement imposed on them from outside.

***

-55-

-- "Husayn is fighting for his life. His efforts to prevent Palestinian terrorist organizations from becoming the major political force in Jordan have led to a number of recent bloody clashes between terrorists and the army.

***

-- "So long as Husayn can maintain his Bedouin support and keep the terrorists in line, he can probably hold out. But a major crackdown on the terrorists would make his chances slim indeed.

***

-- "In the next year or so, Soviet deliveries will probably bring Arab weapons inventories (especially aircraft) somewhat above pre-War levels.

***

-- "The Russians now have some 3,500 military advisers-- (down to Bn. level) in the area (against 1,000 before 1967).

-- "While the Soviets continue to advise against seeking a military solution to the Arab-Israel conflict, they have not put any pressure on their clients to settle.

-- "The 'no-war, no-peace' situation permits them to expand their military and political presence. They would probably like to see this situation continue."

Then the talking points laid out the issues for the United States, in a way that reflects some of HK's views:

"The Middle East could become the Balkans of a new international crisis. Intense local rivalries far overshadow local concerns for the maintenance of peace between the great powers.

-- "Can we in some way separate the Arab-Israeli conflict from US Soviet rivalries?

-- "Given the traditional interests both powers have in the area, and its strategic importance, it is almost certain that US and Soviet interests will clash.

-- "The Soviets certainly like the fact that a Middle East crisis presents the US with very serious problems, but at the same time it is probable that they are as

-56-

interested as we in avoiding a great power confrontation not of their choosing.

-- "If this is true, a first task of the new Administration must be to examine strategies for separating the Arab-Israeli confrontation from a US-Soviet confrontation. One possible strategy would be to include the Middle East in US-Soviet negotiations on outstanding issues.

"Is there any step, or series of steps, we can take that might make it easier for the Arabs and Israelis to reach a settlement?

"It would appear that we have little leverage over either side, but we ought to make our own study of the tools we may have.

"One thing is clear. The Arabs are convinced that we have it in our power to force Israel to settle. We must make them understand that this is simply not the case.

"What are the costs and dividends to a resumption of diplomatic relations with the Arab States?

"A new Administration can more easily move toward normal diplomatic ties with Cairo, Baghdad, etc. We ought to look at the pros and cons of this possibility."

Early December was the occasion of the Scranton mission. Former Pennsylvania Governor William W. Scranton, as President-elect Nixon's personal envoy, spent nine days in the Middle East. On December 4, he visited the Shah of Iran and Iranian Foreign Minister Zahedi; on December 5 he visited Beirut where he met with Lebanese President Helou, Prime Minister al-Yaffi, Foreign Minister al-Uwayni, and four Palestinian representatives. On December 6 Scranton arrived in Cairo for talks with Nasser. On December 7, on departure, he told a press contingent at Cairo Airport that he hoped diplomatic relations between the UAR and the US would soon be resumed; he then departed for Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

After crossing the Allenby Bridge from Jordan into Israeli-held territory on December 9, Scranton told reporters in Jericho "it is important [that] U.S. policy become more even-handed" in the area. He went on to say that by "even-handed" he meant dealing "with all countries in the area and not necessarily espouse one." He then arrived in Israel where he met with Prime Minister Eshkol, Deputy PM Allon, Foreign Minister Eban, Defense Minister Dayan, and Sheikh al-Jabari, a spokesman for Palestinian Arabs. Scranton arrived in Rome on December 11 where he told

-57-

reporters that the Nixon Administration would draw up a new "peace plan" for the Middle East. The President-elect's press spokesman, Ronald Ziegler, said in New York on December 12 that Scranton's remarks about an "even-handed" policy and a new "peace plan" were his own and not necessarily those of Mr. Nixon.

Governor Scranton met with Nixon at the Hotel Pierre on December 13 to report on his fact-finding mission. At a press conference after his meeting with Nixon, Scranton repeated his statement, first made at Jericho on December 9, that the U.S. should have "a more even-handed policy" in the Middle East.

On December 13, William R. Polk of the Adlai Stevenson Institute wrote to Nixon sending along memcons of his November visit to the Middle East, including a conversation with Nasser. He reported Nasser as being almost completely inflexible:

"We cannot give on any element of territory /Nasser said/. . . . Egypt could not agree to the diminution of the Arab cause in any particular. We went point by point on the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai. On each of these he was completely flexible and emphasized again that there could be no change of territory."

President-elect Nixon and HK met on December 13 with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, accompanied by Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin. Nixon thanked Dayan for having received him in Israel. Dayan pointed out that news reports that Israel was displeased with the Scranton visit were untrue; Israel, he said, felt that Scranton left with "a better appreciation of the issues." Nixon asked Dayan if he thought any Arabs were willing to make peace. Dayan replied that perhaps Jordan was willing, but (according to HK's memcon) "he indicated no great enthusiasm for this prospect."

On December __, Nixon met with the Amir of Kuwait. The Amir invited the President-elect to visit Kuwait. He asked Nixon what the US's plans were after the UK vacated the Gulf in 1971. Nixon replied that we would have to study the matter. The Amir asked what US intentions would be if, for example, Iraq attacked Kuwait. The President-elect responded that we were interested in the territorial integrity of all states in the area, but the tactical measures we adopted would depend on circumstances.

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On December 24, 1968, Hal Saunders of the NSC staff wrote HK a briefing memo on "The Middle East: Arab-Israeli Issues -- U.S. Options 1969-70." The memo sketched Saunders' analysis of the situation, the parties' positions, and the options for U.S. policy:

"The strategy of peacemaking. The Israelis believe that time is on the side of peace. Their theory is that the closer the Arabs get to another war with the prospect of inevitable defeat, the closer they will come to facing up to reality, to accepting Israel and to making peace. We doubt seriously that the Arabs will come in under that sort of pressure. They may be rational this time and avoid a war they can't win, or they may do something foolish and provoke a 1969 or 1970 version of June 5, 1967. But as long as the present situation continues, we believe support for terrorism will increase and another clash will become increasingly likely. What we really fear is the day when 60 million Arabs will have acquired enough military proficiency to take advantage of their tremendous numerical superiority over Israel. Therefore, we find it hard to accept the Israeli strategy of sitting tight until the Arabs crack.

***

"How do we deal with Nasser? The Israelis believe that no peace is possible while Nasser continues in power and that we should not prolong his reign by resuming relations with him. Some of us are inclined to agree that Nasser just isn't capable of making an honest settlement and turning his energies toward the UAR's pressing development problems. But we are much less sure than the Israelis that resumption of US-UAR relations will be a major factor in deciding Nasser's fate.

## "The Tactical Choices

"The first choice: Should we take a more active role in trying to negotiate a package settlement along the lines of the November 22, 1967, UN resolution? Or should we continue our present supporting role, leaving the main responsibility to Jarring and to Israel, Jordan and the UAR?

***

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"The second choice: If we take a more active role and fail, or if we choose a less active role, the second range of choices will develop around the question: Should we try for a partial settlement?

"One of the principles we have followed since mid-1967 has been trying to negotiate all elements of the November 22 resolution as a package--withdrawal, boundaries, end of belligerency, free passage, refugees. These issues are interrelated, but there may be one that could be treated separately and serve as an entering wedge on others. The British tried opening the Canal as a partial step, and the Israelis refused flatly. However, the refugee issue might lend itself better to separate treatment. It is hard to envision a refugee settlement without a territorial settlement. But the special humanitarian angle might just make this issue enough different to lend itself to a special approach.

"... To many Arabs, a just refugee settlement would be Israel's symbolic admission of a past injustice and Israel's symbolic offer to live in peace with the Arabs. It is not surprising that Nasser has often linked the Canal to a refugee settlement, partly because the Canal is the other side of this Mid-Eastern symbolism. Israeli passage would symbolize Arab acceptance of the State of Israel."

Charles Yost was named US Permanent Representative to the UN on December 20. Yost, who had served as Ambassador to Syria and Morocco prior to his retirement in 1966, offered HK his views on the Middle East in a memo sometime in late December. Yost pushed strongly for a US initiative. Yost was convinced that the US could easily draw up a fair settlement, that the UN was the best forum for the Big Four to bring "their full influence to bear," and that if it failed, we would be "no worse off than we are now."

Yost started from the proposition that leaving the problem to the parties to settle had not worked and would not produce a settlement or prevent further conflict. The violence, he pointed out, had only increased. But "it is by no means impossible to draw up terms of a settlement, based squarely on the November 22 resolution, which would be fair to both sides." This would include:

- (1) an international compact reaffirming the status, sovereignty and frontiers of Israel (an international

-60-

agreement for the Arabs to sign rather than bilateral agreements with Israel),

-- (2) international guarantees,

-- (3) demilitarization of Sinai, with a UN presence at Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza,

-- (4) demilitarization of the West Bank, and "minor boundary rectifications in Israel's favor,"

-- (5) Jerusalem as a single entity but divided into "boroughs," with a special status for the holy places,

-- (6) free navigation through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran,

-- (7) on refugees, Israel to accept a token number as returnees and to compensate the rest, with US assistance,

-- (8) the Golan Heights to be under Israeli occupation until Syria is ready to settle, and

-- (9) a substantial UN Observer force to remain "indefinitely."

Yost believed that the interested powers (the Big Four) should "endeavor to work out a detailed implementation of the November 22 resolution which would be fair to Israel, the UAR and Jordan and which these three could be persuaded to accept." The UN would be the best vehicle. The Big Four would "bring their full influence to bear to obtain the consent of the parties." "Even if it succeeds only partially," Yost believed, "we will have made a significant advance. If it fails, we will be no worse off than we are now."

On December 30, Soviet charge Chernyakov handed Robert Ellsworth copies of two lengthy Soviet notes on the Middle East, saying that "a Soviet-American exchange of opinion on this would be advisable." (Sedov explained to HK on January 2 that these copies were passed to Ellsworth because HK had warned him against any "surprises.")

The first Soviet note explained that the UAR had come out for implementation of 242 and had made a constructive reply to Secretary Rusk's "Seven Points" of November. The USSR put the blame on Israel for its lack of flexibility. "Real progress" in the Middle East as well as in Vietnam would "undoubtedly

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affect in a most positive way the entire world situation and
would create more favorable conditions for development of US-
Soviet relations." The "negative position of Israel" was the
"main obstacle."

The Soviet note contained a draft of a plan for a "time-
table and an order for withdrawal of Israeli troops" and an
"agreed plan" for implementation of the rest of 242. The
Soviet plan suggested that the contacts through Jarring should
aim at "simultaneous declarations" of readiness to end the
state of belligerency and attain a peaceful settlement. (See
Appendix to Rosemary's paper on 1969.)

HK evidently asked Hal Saunders for a rundown of the US-
Soviet exchanges on the Middle East. On January 3, 1969,
Saunders forwarded a long documentary record of US-Soviet ex-
changes on the Middle East from September through December 1968.
Included were cables summarizing a number of meetings over this
period between Dobrynin and Eugene Rostow and between Deputy
Foreign Minister Semenov and Bill Buffum of USUN. Saunders'
analysis was as follows, and he promised to keep an eye on
State:

"The Soviet position -- leaving aside various shifts in nuance -- remains essentially this: Their main objective is to secure Israeli withdrawal. They started out by pressing for withdrawal before other issues are settled. Recently they have begun to recognize that the settlement of all these issues is interrelated. Their latest note /Dec. 30/ opens the door to contacts through Jarring for this purpose but is ambiguous on just how serious a negotiation would be required. They write as if they assume a return pretty much to the status quo ante.

"The Israelis will not buy this because, above all, it smacks too much of a return to the situation of May 1967. It also contains too little Arab commitment to live at peace with Israel. Although they have become a little less rigid in insisting on direct negotiations, they still hold to the position that the 'parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace.' We would have a hard time persuading them that we and the USSR should now get into the act to the extent of negotiating the outlines of a settlement.

"State has not reached consensus on how to reply /to
the Soviet note/. The problem is that no reply has much

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meaning until we have the Israelis with us. Yet some
kinds of approach to the Israelis could have implications
beyond January 20. The current plan is to respond in two
phases:

"1. Give the USSR an interim response early next week. The main purpose would be to keep a desirable channel open and to be able to say we've answered. ...

"2. Try to bring the Israelis aboard on a substantive response or even a peace plan of their own that they might give Jarrying. We don't know how far they might go with us. We do know that they will be hard to move from their present position. We have given the Israelis the latest Soviet memo and said we would not answer substantively without knowing their views. This weekend we will be drafting a paper of our own, but State still isn't clear on exactly how to use it.

"An interim response to the USSR would not narrow options after January 20. A major approach to the Israelis, depending on its purpose, could begin to shift US policy. Some of the people in State understand this; others do not. I will be close to this process and will do my best to keep any doors from being closed."

On January 5, 1969, Nasser sent President-elect Nixon a lengthy (15-page) letter on the Middle East problem, congratulating Nixon on his election. In the letter Nasser hinted at his desire for better US-UAR relations, and hoped the US would assume a role of leadership in the Middle East. But Nasser also reiterated his hackneyed charges that the US had been involved militarily against Egypt in the 1967 war. HK and Nixon concurred in State's recommendation to defer replying to this letter because of its unacceptable portions. A brief non-substantive reply was later sent in March. (See Rosemary's 1969 paper for fuller discussion.)

DOVES' POSITIONS ON VIETNAM -- 1967-68

1. ROBERT F. KENNEDY

Robert Kennedy in his book *To Seek a Newer World* (November 1967) offered a proposal for negotiations:

- a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam,

- international supervision (by the UN, ICC, or other international organization) of "large" troop or supply buildups,

- negotiations, to include all parties to the conflict, including the NLF, and

- an understanding on both sides that neither would "substantially" increase the rate of infiltration or reinforcements during the negotiation period.

In addition, Kennedy urged during his 1968 Presidential campaign:

- turning over the major burden of the fighting to the South Vietnamese.

In a February 1966 speech he also urged:

- giving the NLF and other discontented elements in Vietnam a share of power and responsibility, as the best hope for a negotiated settlement.

2. EUGENE MCCARTHY

McCarthy's proposed Vietnam plank for the 1968 Democratic Platform stated the following premises: (a) There is no prospect of a military victory or a military solution, and (b) the only possibility of peace lies in a negotiated settlement between the four principal parties: the US, GVN, DRV, and NLF.

McCarthy's plank proposed the following steps:

- an immediate halt to the bombing of North Vietnam.

- an immediate reduction in the level of conflict in the South by halting search-and-destroy operations and other offensive tactics by air and land which result in widespread destruction of the Vietnamese countryside.

- no further widening of the war, either by increasing forces or extending the war geographically.

- the establishment by negotiations of a new government in South Vietnam containing all major elements of the population including substantial participation by the NLF. This government will prepare for elections. International supervision and guarantees of the election process will be invited. If the present leaders of the GVN refuse to agree to such a broadly-based coalition, we will withdraw our support and forces.

-2-

- Following the formation of a new government, elections will be held for the permanent government of South Vietnam. All groups, including the NLF, will be free to participate and campaign. Prior to the elections, all US and North Vietnamese forces will have withdrawn, and there will be a general cease-fire under international supervision.

- The government so selected will be free to determine its own future.

Source: CQ Weekly Report, August 23, 1968, pp. 2232-34

### 3. GEORGE McGOVERN

- Halt to all bombing of North Vietnam.

- Unilateral withdrawal of 250,000 US troops.

- Halt to US offensive bombing in South Vietnam and search-and-destroy missions. US troops in South Vietnam should fire only in self-defense.

Source: NY Times, August 20, 1968, p. 26

### 4. EDWARD M. KENNEDY

His speech at Worcester, Mass. on August 21, 1968, (attached) called for the U.S. to undertake as soon as possible:

- "First, to end unconditionally all bombing of North Vietnam;

- "Second, to then negotiate with Hanoi the mutual withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces, both allied and North Vietnamese;

- "Third, to accompany this withdrawal with whatever help we can give the South Vietnamese in the building of a viable political, economic and legal structure that will not promptly collapse upon our departure; and

- "Fourth, to demonstrate to both Hanoi and Saigon the sincerity of our intentions by significantly decreasing this year the level of our military activity and military personnel in the South."

- "Under this plan, neither Hanoi nor Washington will try in Paris to either require, or rule out, a coalition government; to either supervise or suppress election procedures; or to name, portfolio by portfolio, the occupants of individual ministerial posts."

### 5. THE-MCCARTHY-MCGOVERN-KENNEDY MINORITY REPORT OF THE PLATFORM COMMITTEE

The joint plank offered by the combined forces of the dovish candidates (which was defeated by the Administration plank

-3-

supported by Humphrey and Muskie) proposed:

- an unconditional halt to all bombing of North Vietnam,

- negotiation of a phased, mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam,

- encouragement of South Vietnam "to negotiate a political reconciliation with the National Liberation Front looking toward a... broadly representative" government for South Vietnam,

- reduction of U.S. offensive operations in South Vietnam, "thus enabling an early withdrawal of a significant number of our troops,"

A prolonged demonstration erupted at the Convention on August 28 after Pierre Salinger declared that the late Senator Robert Kennedy would have supported the dovish plank had he lived. A chant of "Stop the War" spread from the New York and California delegations to other delegates and into the galleries. The Convention was brought to order with difficulty. After a three-hour debate the vote was taken, and as it was announced that the minority plank had lost by a vote of 1567 3/4 to 1047/4, a protest rendition of "We Shall Overcome" arose from New York delegates wearing black armbands.

Source: Facts on File 1968

* * *

ANALYSIS

Only McCarthy ever proposed imposing a coalition government. Ted Kennedy specifically ruled it out. The joint McCarthy-McGovern-Kennedy minority plank only encouraged the GVN to "negotiate a political reconciliation" with the NLF.

All the doves advocated mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops. McCarthy urged this to take place prior to the elections for a new South Vietnamese Government. McGovern and Ted Kennedy urged a substantial or "significant" initial unilateral withdrawal as proof of our "sincerity", as did the joint minority plank, but mutual withdrawal was a main feature of both Ted Kennedy's Worcester speech and the joint minority plank of all three doves.

All the doves urged an end to the bombing of the North. Robert Kennedy (in late 1967) had included, however, an understanding that neither side would "substantially" increase infiltration or reinforcement while negotiations proceeded. This was omitted in the 1968 dove proposals.

DEMOCRATIC

PLATFORM

1968

**Vietnam and Asia.** Our most urgent task in Southeast Asia is to end the war in Vietnam by an honorable and lasting settlement which respects the rights of all the people of Vietnam. In our pursuit of peace and stability in the vital area of Southeast Asia we have borne a heavy burden in helping South Vietnam to counter aggression and subversion from the North.

We reject as unacceptable a unilateral withdrawal of our forces which would allow that aggression and subversion to succeed. We have never demanded, and do not now demand, unconditional surrender by the Communists.

We strongly support the Paris talks and applaud the initiative of President Johnson which brought North Vietnam to the peace table. We hope that Hanoi will respond positively to this act of statesmanship.

In the quest for peace no solutions are free of risk. But calculated risks are consistent with the responsibility of a great nation to seek a peace of reconciliation.

Recognizing that events in Vietnam and the negotiations in Paris may affect the timing and the actions we recommend we would support our Government in the following steps:

**Bombing**—Stop all bombing of North Vietnam when this action would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field; this action should take into account the response from Hanoi.

**Troop Withdrawal**—Negotiate with Hanoi an immediate end or limitation of hostilities and the withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces—both United States and allied forces, and forces infiltrated from North Vietnam.

**Election of Postwar Government**—Encourage all parties and interests to agree that the choice of the postwar government of South Vietnam should be determined by fair and safeguarded elections, open to all major political factions and parties prepared to accept peaceful political processes. We would favor an effective international presence to facilitate the transition from war to peace and to assure the protection of minorities against reprisal.

**Interim Defense and Development Measures**—Until the fighting stops, accelerate our efforts to train and equip the South Vietnamese army so that it can defend its own country and carry out cutbacks of U.S. military involvement as the South Vietnamese forces are able to take over their larger responsibilities. We should simultaneously do all in our power to support and encourage further economic, political and social development and reform in South Vietnam, including an extensive land reform program. We support President Johnson's repeated offer to provide a substantial U.S. contribution to the post-war reconstruction of South Vietnam as well as to the economic development of the entire region, including North Vietnam. Japan and the European industrial states should be urged to join in this post-war effort.

For the future, we will make it clear that U.S. military and economic assistance in Asia will be selective. In addition to considerations of our vital interests and our resources, we will take into account the determination of the nations that request our help to help themselves and their willingness to help each other through regional and multilateral cooperation.

We want no bases in South Vietnam; no continued military presence and no political role in Vietnamese affairs. If and when the Communists understand our basic commitment and limited goals and are willing to take their chances, as we are, on letting the choice of the post-war government of South Vietnam be determined freely and peacefully by all of the South Vietnamese people, then the bloodshed and the tragedy can stop.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Democratic Convention - 9

# PLATFORM APPROVED AFTER LANDMARK DEBATE ON VIETNAM

The platform that was adopted Aug. 28 by voice vote of the Convention was a document that met the demands of the Democratic party's liberals word for word in almost every section except that which dealt with U.S. policy in Vietnam (For story on platform, see p. 1024).

The platform did not satisfy the liberals on the issue they considered paramount—the Vietnam war. The war was the issue on which the pre-Convention campaign was fought, by Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy first and then by Sen. Robert F. Kennedy and finally by Sen. George S. McGovern, and it was the issue that made the 1968 Democratic National Convention one of the most chaotic in history. It was the issue that dominated the deliberations of the Platform Drafting Subcommittee, of the full Platform Committee and finally of the assembled Convention of 2,622 delegates.

Although the opposing positions on the war had been stated many months earlier, the first formal proposal for the platform's language on the subject was not released until Aug. 17. That proposal was made by McCarthy. It formed the basis for another statement of policy that was developed in a meeting on the night of Aug. 22 between McCarthy representatives, supporters of McGovern and unaligned delegates such as Ohio Senate candidate John J. Gilligan. The plank released by this coalition on Aug. 23 called for immediate cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and of the offensive search and destroy missions by American combat units, for a negotiated withdrawal of troops by opponents in the hostilities and for a negotiated coalition government that would include the Communists.

This was generally the position that the liberals had espoused through the primaries and up to the Convention, and the position of their opposition, Vice President Humphrey, supporting the Administration's policies, was equally clear. So it was not surprising that the Platform Drafting Subcommittee spent only 15 minutes Aug. 25 discussing and voting on the issue. As was expected, the McCarthy-McGovern Vietnam plank was rejected by voice vote. Subcommittee members reported that five or six of their number had voted for the minority position; the membership of the panel appointed Aug. 22 by Platform Committee Chairman Hale Boggs (La.) totaled 22.

## Minority Loses

The minority on the subcommittee lost to a majority which voted for a Vietnam plank that endorsed in clear terms the precepts of the Johnson Administration's policy in Southeast Asia. The majority's statement supported a bombing halt only when it "would not endanger the lives of our troops in the field," did not call for a reduction in search and destroy missions and advocated a new government in Saigon only after the war had ended. It was reported by many newspapers that a milder plank, advocating an immediate bombing halt to test Hanoi's intentions, had been vetoed by President Johnson.

In its only roll-call vote, the Platform Committee Aug. 25 sustained the action of its subcommittee by a 62-35 margin. A minority report, recommending the language of the McCarthy-McGovern plank, was filed. The plat-

form's text was released in the early morning hours of Aug. 27.

## Issue Goes to Floor

Then the issue went to the floor of the Convention. Managers of the meeting tried to bring the matter up at 1:03 a.m. (C.D.T.) Aug. 23, but tumult on the Convention floor forced adjournment of the session. McCarthy sources said they wanted the debate to take place when television viewers would watch it, not after they had gone to bed.

The Convention's two hours of debate on Vietnam began at 1:03 p.m. on Aug. 28. The time was divided equally between the two factions, and Senators, Governors, blacks and whites, McCarthy backers and Humphrey delegates spoke on each side of the issue. At 3:52 p.m. the roll call began, and at 4:39 the results were announced and the issue was settled: the minority report had been rejected 1,048-1/4 to 1,567-3/4.

It was a debate that had no parallel in American convention politics, and the vote was a record of party opinion that could not help but influence the party's eventual nominee, Hubert Humphrey. That 40 percent of the delegates had voted against his position was a signal that he would have grave difficulty in holding his party's vote in November.

## Black Armbands

After the result was announced, members of the New York delegation and others slipped on black armbands and sang "We Shall Overcome." Some 350 people met at a downtown Chicago Hotel to plan the course of the "new party." Ohio delegate Gilligan said that supporters of Administration Vietnam policy could no longer claim their opponents were a small minority of beatniks, hippies and draft-dodgers. On Aug. 26, one influential anti-Administration delegate, former White House aide Kenneth P. O'Donnell, had sounded an optimistic note: he said the tone of the final Vietnam plank indicated that "they want out."

If the Vietnam plank was not satisfactory to the liberals, most of the rest of the platform was. O'Donnell praised its other sections as "the most forward-looking" positions on domestic affairs that the Democratic party had approved in many years. One section which did not gain the full support of liberals, however, concerned gun control; the liberals attempted to strengthen it in the Platform Committee but were defeated. A vote in the Committee did amend a section on repeal of welfare restriction to the liberals' satisfaction.

Boggs, the Committee Chairman, was praised by all factions for fairness in handling of hearings, which began in Washington Aug. 20, and of executive session of the drafting subcommittee and the full Committee in Chicago. His appointment as chairman was approved by the Johnson Administration; he controlled the time of the majority during the Vietnam debate and delivered the final speech for the majority on that issue.

1968 CQ ALMANAC—1021

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 1968

Vietnam

The Administration's Vietnam policy has failed—militarily, politically, diplomatically, and with relation to our own people.

We condemn the Administration's breach of faith with the American people respecting our heavy involvement in Vietnam. Every citizen bitterly recalls the Democrat campaign oratory of 1964: "We are not about to send American boys 9-10,000 miles away from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." The Administration's failure to honor its own words has led millions of Americans to question its credibility.

The entire nation has been profoundly concerned by hastily-extemporized, undeclared land wars which embroil massive U.S. Army forces thousands of miles from our shores. It is time to realize that not every international conflict is susceptible of solution by American ground forces.

Militarily, the Administration's piecemeal commitment of men and material has wasted our massive military superiority and frittered away our options. The result has been a prolonged war of attrition. Throughout this period the Administration has been slow in training and equipping South Vietnamese units both for fighting the war and for defending their country after the war is over.

Politically, the Administration has failed to recognize the entirely novel aspects of this war. The overemphasis on its old-style, conventional aspects has blinded the Administration to the fact that the issue is not control of territory but the security and loyalty of the population. The enemy's primary emphasis has been to disrupt orderly government.

The Administration has paid inadequate attention to the political framework on which a successful outcome ultimately depends. Not only has the Administration failed to encourage assumption of responsibility by the Vietnamese, but their sense of responsibility has been in fact undermined by our approach to pacification. An added factor has been a lack of security for the civilian population.

At home, the Administration has failed to share with the people the full implications of our challenge and of our commitments.

To resolve our Vietnam dilemma, America obviously requires new leadership—one capable of thinking and acting anew, not one hostage to the many mistakes of the past. The Republican Party offers such leadership.

We pledge to adopt a strategy relevant to the real problems of the war, concentrating on the security of the population, on developing a greater sense of nationhood, and on strengthening the local forces. It will be a strategy permitting a progressive de-Americanization of the war, both military and civilian.

We will see to it that our gallant American servicemen are fully supported with the highest quality equipment, and will avoid actions that unnecessarily jeopardize their lives.

We will pursue a course that will enable and induce the South Vietnamese to assume increasing responsibility.

The war has been conducted without a coherent program for peace.

We pledge a program for peace in Vietnam—neither peace at any price nor a camouflaged surrender of legitimate United States or allied interests—but a positive program that will offer a fair and equitable settlement to all, based on the principle of self-determination, our national interests and the cause of long-range world peace.

We will sincerely and vigorously pursue peace negotiations as long as they offer any reasonable prospect for a just peace. We pledge to develop a clear and purposeful negotiating position.

We will return to one of the cardinal principles of the last Republican Administration: that American interests are best served by cooperative multilateral action with our allies rather than by unilateral U.S. action.

Our pride in the nation's armed forces in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world is beyond expression.

In all our history none have fought more bravely or more devotedly than our sons in this unwanted war in Vietnam.

They deserve—and they and their loved ones have—our total support, our encouragement, and our prayers.

TEXT OF SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY'S AUG. 21 ADDRESS (1968)

Following is the complete text of Aug. 21 remarks by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D Mass.) before the Worcester Area Chamber of Commerce in Worcester, Mass.: (For story, see p. 2229.)

I come today to Worcester, to the heart of my home, a state that has supported the efforts and shared the sorrows of my life. I thank you for your reception. I thank this state and its people for everything you have done—and everything you have meant—for all the Kennedy family.

Our thoughts today are with General Eisenhower, who has served his country gallantly—as the head of our armies and of our country. We pray that he will prevail in this, his ultimate struggle.

For the last 10 weeks I have not been active in public life. I have concerned myself with my family. I have spent much of my time with the sea; clearing my mind and spirit; putting the past behind, opening a way to what lies ahead.

Some of you have suggested that for safety's sake, and for my family's sake, I retire from public life. To those who have so written me—my deep thanks for your kindness, and for your concern. But there is no safety in hiding. Not for me; not for any of us here today; and not for our children, who will inherit the world we make for them. For all of us, the only path is to work, in whatever way we can, to end the silence, and the hatred, and the divisions that threaten us all.

So today I resume my public responsibilities to the people of Massachusetts. Like my brothers before me, I pick up a fallen standard. Sustained by the memory of our priceless years together, I shall try to carry forward that special commitment—to justice, to excellence, and to courage—that distinguished their lives.

This is a time of intense political activity. But I have not come here to speak for partisan interests. I have come here to speak of things that concern every citizen of these United States.

I am concerned, first of all, with the divisions among us—of views, of where we live, of the color of our skins; and I am concerned about the quality of our lives.

I am concerned particularly that so many of the young and the poor have felt impelled to defy the very basis of our system, through demonstrations and disruption, because they see no other way to share in the decisions that govern their lives—in the ghetto, or in the university, or in the foreign policy of the nation.

For a while this year, there was new hope that the voice of the individual could be heard through the time-tested process of American political democracy. Hundreds of thousands of Americans worked in primaries and party caucuses throughout the country, in a new politics of citizen participation. Surely this was the most hopeful development of a difficult year. It would be tragic now, if all the dedicated efforts of those who worked for change in both political parties should count for nothing in the final choice of policies presented to the electorate in November.

I am concerned, deeply concerned, about crime, about respect for law, about the violence and dark disorder that so afflict our lives. Yet I am also troubled by the fact that we seem to be surrendering to the wrong answers to these problems. We have less understanding than fear; less cooperation than separatism. Guns and gas are being stockpiled against crime and riots, but the basic causes of crime and riots—bad schools and housing, no jobs and an inadequate passion for justice—these are being neglected.

Some say that only force will bring order. But arms alone will never bring quiet or security to our streets. All our people—not just those of us who are comfortable, but also and especially those who live in want and fear and pain—all our people must know that the forces of law and order are also the forces of justice; that there is a place for them in this society; that this is also their country.

## Tide of Fear

While every government must protect the lives and property of its citizens, we will not promote law and order by attacking our courts. We will not meet the problem of crime by turning our backs on the Constitution. And we cannot let the new leadership of this country be swept into office on a tide of fear. This is a nation of confidence and compassion and high purpose. That is the only way we can live.

All these are vital concerns. There is another. It is the war in Vietnam. This war is the tragedy of our generation. Like most of you, in the early years of our involvement I hoped that we could help the South Vietnamese to help themselves; that a modest program of American advisors, equipment and aid would enable the government of South Vietnam to build a nation and a government capable of attracting the support of its own people, and of achieving a political victory over the Viet Cong. But those hopes are gone. They have foundered in a morass of miscalculation and self-deception. They have been stymied by the stubbornness of the foe; but above all they have been buried by the overwhelming incompetence and corruption of our South Vietnamese ally—a government that has consistently proved incapable or unwilling to meet the needs of its own people, a government that has demanded ever more money, ever more American lives to be poured into the swamp of their failure.

We, to our sorrow, have met almost every demand. Nearly 200,000 Americans have been killed or wounded. Twenty-five thousand have died. Over 100 billion tax dollars have been spent. Here were the resources to have fulfilled the promise of American life in our generation; here were the young men to have given leadership to a nation. Here were the energies and the labors of a government of dedicated men. Here was progress to dream of, and to work for, and to hand down to our children. Here was an America ready to give leadership to an entire world. Old allies and new friends, former enemies and present adversaries—all might have looked at our country with warmth and respect and the sure knowledge that this must be their model of the future. It was all here, but now it is gone.

It is gone, that is, unless we now resolve to make an end to this war, which is long past any useful purpose it once might have been thought to serve. And the end must be not five or ten years from now; not after the expenditure of another $100 billion and the lives of another 25,000 of our finest sons; but as quickly as it is physically possible to reach the essential agreements, and to extricate our men and our future from this bottomless pit of our dreams.

## Specific Steps

Specifically, our Government should undertake as soon as possible:

* First, to end unconditionally all bombing of North Vietnam;

* Second, to then negotiate with Hanoi the mutual withdrawal from South Vietnam of all foreign forces, both allied and North Vietnamese;

* Third, to accompany this withdrawal with whatever help we can give the South Vietnamese in the building of a viable political, economic and legal structure that will not promptly collapse upon our departure; and

* Fourth, to demonstrate to both Hanoi and Saigon the sincerity of our intentions by significantly decreasing this year the level of our military activity and military personnel in the South.

These steps would enable us to end our participation in this war with honor, having fulfilled our commitment to prevent a North Vietnamese military takeover of the South and having left the future of South Vietnam to the self-determination of the South Vietnamese people. Under this plan, neither Hanoi nor Washington will try in Paris to either require, or rule out, a

COPYRIGHT 1968 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. Aug. 23, 1968—PAGE 2233
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Kennedy Text - 2

coalition government: to either supervise or suppress election procedures, or to name, portfolio by portfolio, the occupants of individual ministerial posts.

I would not urge a cessation in the bombing of North Vietnam if that would cost American lives. But two facts are un mistakeably clear:

1. While the bombing has made more difficult the movement of North Vietnamese men and materiel to the South, it has never reduced it. The Secretary of Defense confirmed this fact just last week.

2. An end to the killing in Vietnam can never be negotiated as long as the bombing of North Vietnam continues.

## Negotiations

Halting the bombing would thus save many more American lives than it would ever endanger. It would make less likely Hanoi's initiation of new death dealing assaults. It would test their willingness to begin serious negotiations.

Those negotiations, as I have indicated, should be concerned primarily with the withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Vietnam. The intrusion of large numbers of North Vietnamese combat units into South Vietnam was a principal justification in 1965 for dispatching large numbers of American combat units. The withdrawal of all such troops, by both sides, should be the goal of the negotiations in Paris once the bombing has stopped. If we continue instead to insist that our withdrawal be conditioned upon the cessation of all violence in the South, or based upon the readiness of South Vietnamese troops to take over, or tied to elaborate plans for international peace forces, I am very much afraid that we will remain there indefinitely. My objective is much simpler: as Hanoi withdraws her troops, we withdraw ours.

## Saigon Regime

I am not unmindful of the difficulties our withdrawal would create for the rulers of a Saigon regime. But Saigon has yet to demonstrate either popular support or a desire to commit that nation fully to that struggle. We can in the course of our disengagement take steps to assure the safety of those whom encouraged to stand, up against a Communist military takeover. We can help construct a cohesive society as a substitute for our military presence. But the most important spur that we can provide to the Saigon government—to persuade it to broaden its base, increase its appeal, and negotiate an accommodation with the National Liberation Front—is to make clear our intention to withdraw from the South as Hanoi withdraws, and our complete unwillingness thereafter to bear the burden of their responsibilities and to pick up the pieces of their failures.

The government in Saigon must not be given a veto over our course in Paris, our cessation of the bombing, or our mutual withdrawal of troops. They must be given clear notice that their chief prop will be taken away as soon as we can conclude such negotiations with Hanoi. In short, as we negotiate so must they negotiate with their adversaries—without having achieved a military victory. They, too, will have to make concessions. They, too, will have to work for peace.

Finally, by lowering immediately and significantly the level of our military activity and personnel in the South, we would make clear both the seriousness and good faith of our intentions—not only to Hanoi, thus hopefully spurring the willingness to work out a mutual withdrawal with us, but also to Saigon, thus hopefully spurring their desire to talk peace with the National Liberation Front.

It may be asked: does this fulfill our commitment? Is this indeed an honorable way out? To both questions, I believe the answer is yes. Few nations have given to another what we have given to South Vietnam. With all we have done—and with all the efforts of our brave soldiers—with all this, surely it is clear that a government with any desire or ability to meet the needs of its own people would have triumphed long ago.

We have done for them all that one nation can do for another; indeed we have tried to do more. But the outcome of that struggle depends today, as it has always depended, on the will and conviction of the people of the South.

If we follow the steps I have outlined today, I believe we can put this war behind us—and reach out once again for the country we know we should be.

For if we are distracted by war, divided by race, deflected from our proper course, we will remain a people of great and enduring promise: as Lincoln once said, "the last, best hope of mankind." That hope is in every one of us.

## Robert Kennedy Campaign

If there was one great meaning to Robert Kennedy's campaign, one ideal that fired the conscience of this nation in 1968, it was that voting every four years was not enough to make a citizen—and not enough to satisfy a man. Rather each of us must take a direct and personal part in solving the great problems of this country. Each of us must do his individual part to end the suffering, feed the hungry, heal the sick, and strengthen and renew the national spirit.

It is that profound, personal, moral commitment that we seek to reaffirm today. It is a commitment to passion and action, in the service of our fellow man and the nation we love; to the simplest and most evident of laws: the Golden Rule, reminding ourselves every day that but for the grace of God, it would be our own children, starting out of our television screens with the gaunt faces of starvation, the permanent pain of injustice.

So let us resolve that all the sacrifices—from our earliest forebears, to the young man in the jungles of Vietnam, to the Presidential candidate who also gave his life—let us take from the meaning of their lives a new courage, a new conviction, a new resolve that all this shall not have been in vain, and that in our firm and unswerving determination we can yet serve the end that he so tenderly sought for us all—"to tame the savageness of man, and make gentle the life of the world."

PAGE 2234—Aug. 23, 1968
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Reproduction prohibited in whole or in part except by editorial clients

# HAK VIEWS ON VIETNAM 1965-69
## Summary and Analysis

Following are the main themes of HK's views on Vietnam
from the period of his 1965 trip to Vietnam to the January 1969
**Foreign Affairs** article:

1. The inevitability of a negotiation. Even in the summer of 1965, at the very early stages of the American military buildup, HK's focus was on the necessity and terms of a negotiated solution (1965 trip, p.1.). At a CINCPAC briefing on the way to Vietnam, HK was struck by the fact that "no one could really explain to me how even on the most favorable assumptions... the war was going to end" (1965, p.5). The LOOK magazine article in August 1966 highlighted "the inevitability of negotiation." A purely military solution was impossible, not only because of the situation within Vietnam but also because the interests and prestige of so many major powers were engaged (LOOK, col.2).

In the Pennsylvania exercise in 1967, HK stressed that the channel should not be broken off lightly, because Hanoi took it seriously (1967, p.3). Rockefeller argued in his July 13, 1968 speech that "we must end the war through negotiations as quickly as possible on just terms" (NAR, p.1). In **Foreign Affairs** in January 1969, HK pointed out that Tet "had made inevitable a... commitment to a political solution and marked the beginning of the quest for a negotiated settlement." He pointed out that the two sides had "rarely been out of touch" since the American buildup began (p. 216).

2. The necessity of a political strategy, a clear definition of our negotiating objectives. The US was offering "unconditional negotiation" as if that were an end in itself; but HK believed that most likely a negotiation would be the beginning, not the end of our difficulties (1965, p. 2, 14). Because a negotiation was inevitable, the US had to define its own negotiating objectives (1965, pp. 2,3). We had to know what were our own political goals (1965, p. 2). If we did not define them in advance of a negotiation, together with the South Vietnamese, we would be forced to do so under pressure once talks began, which might shatter South Vietnamese morale (1965, p. 3). On his trips in both 1965 and 1966, HK consistently urged US military and political officials in Saigon and Washington to prepare themselves for a negotiation; if a negotiated settlement seemed very risky, then they should define the conditions that would permit a reliable settlement (1965, pp. 7, 9, 11; 1966, pp. 1, 4). In the 1967 Pennsylvania exercise, HK urged LBJ to choose what outcome he wanted (bombing halt or no bombing halt); the US should either use the channel to pursue a negotiation or break it off gently to preserve its future use (1967, pp. 3,6). Rockefeller criticized the Johnson Administration in 1968 for not having "a coherent strategy or program for peace" (NAR, p.1).

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In 1969 in *Foreign Affairs*, HK saw that the "basic problem has been conceptual" (pp. 211-12). "Our diplomacy and our strategy were conducted in isolation from each other" (p. 214). A negotiation, indeed, would have to focus on "ultimate goals first" and then "work back to the details to implement them" (p. 229). Hanoi understood that "the way negotiations are carried out is almost as important as *what* is negotiated" (p. 218).

The USG had an obsessive desire to avoid taking any positions before a negotiation in order to remain totally "flexible" once it started. This approach left the initiative to the other side; without a sense of our own pruposes we could easily be drawn into traps by a purposeful adversary (1965, p.3; *Foreign Affairs* p. 221).

3. *US military strategy should be geared to negotiating objectives.*
It was essential even in 1965 that US military strategy should be geared to our negotiating objectives (1965, pp. 1,6). An effective pacification program was essential because the political structure of South Vietnam was the main issue; our military effort had to be combined with long-term political construction (1965, p.4). The key to the Viet Cong's success was its effective political organization in the countryside, which showed no signs of being rooted out (1965, p.7). More US military effort should be directed to the pacification problem because of its bargaining importance (1966, p.3). Yet the US military machine was not suited to this kind of role (1965, p.6). In 1967 HK argued that our decision on a bombing pause was tied to our strategy for a negotiation (1967, pp. 3,6). The "primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military" (LOOK, col. 2).

4. *Need for a political program for South Vietnam.* We needed a positive political strategy for South Vietnam as well as for negotiations. In late 1965, HK suggested linking US and Vietnamese universities and engaging Vietnamese students in positive tasks in the countryside, to create some positive political program for South Vietnam (1965, pp. 11-12). Our strategy and diplomacy should aim at splitting off some elements from the NLF and reducing the NLF to its hard core (1965, p. 14). A political program was "crucial" because "military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to build political structures" (LOOK, col. 2). In October 1966, HK and Habib worked out a National Reconciliation Program, a joint US-GVN political initiative to be launched at the Manila Conference; the aim was to seize the initiative and offer a positive alternative to the NLF (1966, p.5). "A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure that can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people" (LOOK, col.2).

5. *Pessimism about South Vietnam's political cohesion.* HK was convinced that South Vietnam's political viability was the pivotal question and he was profoundly pessimistic about the prospects even in 1965. In 1965 he was struck by the number of people who said South Vietnam was not even ready to withstand

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the demoralizing effect of the commencement of a negotiation (1965, pp. 3,4,7). If the US withdrew, the regime would certainly collapse (1965, p. 12). A "structure of legitimacy" had yet to be developed (1965, p. 2). HK viewed South Vietnamese society as "in an advanced stage of decomposition" (1965, p. 9). Yet the Vietnamese had to be given a sense of responsibility for what was being done or nothing could work (1965, p.2; 1966, p.6). Western societies had taken centuries to achieve political cohesion, and none had had to do it while under the overwhelming stresses of civil war like Vietnam (1965, pp. 10,11; 1966, p. 2; LOOK, col. 2; *Foreign Affairs*, p. 215).

6. The importance of consultation with the GVN. HK was struck by the USG's "disdain" for South Vietnamese views in 1965, for he believed that the GVN had to share responsibility for the war effort and even more importantly in a peace negotiation (1965, pp. 2,3,7-8; 1966, p. 6). HK criticized the Johnson Administration's policy of open confrontation with Saigon before the bombing halt; we could not simultaneously insist on Saigon's status as an independent government and force it into a negotiation with the NLF whose very existence challenged that of the GVN (*Foreign Affairs*, pp. 224-225). Likewise, imposing a coalition government was tantamount to shattering the non-Communist political structure (*Foreign Affairs*, pp. 227-229).

7. Skepticism about US military claims of success. HK was deeply skeptical that US military efforts were relevant to the political problem. While the US buildup had averted military defeat (1965, p. 13), the US was unprepared if the enemy reverted to small-unit guerrilla action (1965, pp. 5,6). US strategy was not addressing the problem of control of the countryside (1965, pp. 5,6-7; 1966, p. 4; LOOK, col. 2; *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 215-16). The enclave strategy was inadequate (1965, pp. 1,6). The US did not even have adequate criteria for evaluating the situation in the countryside; military statistics showing success were meaningless because military criteria of security were irrelevant to a villager's criteria of security (1965, pp. 6,7,8,11,13; 1966, pp. 2,3,4). The criteria were subjective, and there were incentives to build 'Potemkin villages' (1966, pp. 4-5). HK was dubious because Westmoreland argued in 1966 for more forces, predicting the same results he had predicted the year before for the present level of forces (1965, p. 6; 1966, p.2). Pacification "progress" from one year to the next was so slight as to be discouraging rather than encouraging (1966, pp. 2,3).

8. "De-Americanization" of the war. HK argued from the beginning that the Vietnamese had to be given greater responsibility and that the enormous US administrative presence was more than Vietnam could absorb (1965, pp. 2,11,13; 1966, p.6; LOOK col.3; NAR, p.5). We should begin to "de-Americanize" the war even while negotiations continued (NAR, pp.1,2). The Vietnamese should be given more responsibility, equipment, and training (NAR, p.5). This was an alternative strategy to pursue if Hanoi did not negotiate; it would also enhance our bargaining

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position because it would persuade the North that it could not
win its objectives by force of arms (NAR, p.4; <u>Foreign Affairs</u>,
p. 233-34). Reducing US casualties would also strengthen our
bargaining position (NAR, p.4; <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, p. 233).

9. Withdrawal of US forces. HK was looking, even in 1965, at the question of what circumstances would permit withdrawing some US forces (1965, p.5). NAR proposed in 1968 that a unilateral US withdrawal could begin as ARVN strength improved (NAR, p.5). In preparation for this, US strategy should be re-directed to protection of the populated areas -- not enclaves, but to ensure that our forces served the political objective of protecting the majority of the population (LOOK, col. 2; NAR, p.5; <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, p. 233). "If Hanoi proves intransigent and the war goes on, we should seek to achieve as many of our objectives as possible unilaterally" (<u>Foreign Affairs</u>, p. 233).

10. US constancy. The key issue to HK was US constancy. The commitment of so many American forces settled the question of whether Vietnam was intrinsically important (1965, pp.8,9,10, 14; LOOK, col.3; <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, p.218). (HK had doubts of Vietnam's "geopolitical importance" <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, p.218.) Our "reliability" was "thus much more at issue than our technical competence" (1965, pp.3,8). The global credibility of the US was being tested and could not survive a total collapse of such a major US commitment (1965, pp.6,7,8,10,12,14; 1966, p.4; LOOK, col.1; <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, pp.218-19). The political alignments of other countries such as Japan and India (and India's decision whether to go nuclear) would be affected by an American collapse (1965, p.14; LOOK, col.1); the effects would be felt also throughout Southeast Asia (LOOK, col.1) and in the Middle East, Europe and Latin America (<u>Foreign Affairs</u>, p.219). A victory for the North Vietnamese would "strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world" (LOOK, col.1). While there were occasional such hints of the importance of defeating this test case of the theory of revolutionary warfare, more often the point was a statement of a minimal US objective: the aim was to <u>get out</u> under honorable conditions (<u>Foreign Affairs</u>, pp.230-31).

11. North Vietnamese determination. HK had no doubts of Hanoi's determination to outlast us. Hanoi was not counting so much on defeating us as on waiting for us to give up (1965, pp.6,12,13,15). In 1965, HK was afraid we had no solution to this kind of strategy (1965, p.13); he feared that the "large-unit mentality" of the US military strategy practically invited the danger of "psychological exhaustion" (1965, p.5). "The guerrilla wins if he does not lose" (<u>Foreign Affairs</u>, pp.213-14).

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12. North Vietnamese weaknesses. HK assessed Hanoi's weaknesses as well as strengths. Hanoi had to be given reason to fear that the price to it would go up the longer a negotiation was delayed (1965, p.4). It was always useful to keep a threat of further damage (e.g., renewed or intensified bombing) in reserve as a threat to Hanoi (1965, p.9). HK did not believe North Vietnam's "third-class economy can just pay any price indefinitely, that they are completely impervious to normal strain" (1965, p.15). North Vietnam was a "third-class Communist peasant state" (LOOK, col.1). Hanoi had to be given an incentive to negotiate, such as an effective pacification campaign reducing the VC infrastructure (LOOK, col.2), a "clear-cut" negotiating plan and strategy restoring the American public's "unity on objectives" (NAR, p.2), Hanoi's fear of the consequences of a violation of an understanding (Foreign Affairs, p.224), or the systematic strengthening of the South Vietnamese (1966, p.3; NAR, p.4; Foreign Affairs, pp.233-34). Hanoi's inability to defeat the US military meant Hanoi would have to negotiate for our withdrawal (Foreign Affairs, p.230). Hanoi, finally, was vulnerable internationally in that the Sino-Soviet conflict threatened to leave Hanoi "high and dry" (Foreign Affairs, pp. 229-30).

13. HK's approach to negotiation. The US had to understand the psychology of the other side, i.e., Hanoi's perceptions, political history, fears and suspicions (1967, pp.4,5). HK made the same points in the Foreign Affairs article (pp. 217,219,220-21). A settlement was bound to contain ambiguity in that "both sides /must necessarily/ think they have a chance to win or at least to avoid losing" (Foreign Affairs, p.233). It was important to be conciliatory in tone whatever our substantive positions; indeed it was all the more important when our position was tough -- to maximize the chances of acceptance or to be in the best public posture if it broke down (1967, pp. 1,2,4,5).

14. Separating the military and the political issues. As long ago as the 1966 LOOK article, HK suggested that the US try to "separate the issues into their component elements, each to be settled by the parties primarily involved" (LOOK, col.3). NAR in July 1968 proposed that the South Vietnamese parties should settle the "internal arrangements of South Vietnam" after an agreement by the US and Hanoi to withdraw outside forces (NAR, p.2). This two-track approach was spelled out at greater length in Foreign Affairs January 1969 (pp.230-32).

15. Likelihood of tragedy. As early as 1965, HK feared the worst. Civil wars were inherently difficult to settle; every civil war in the post-war period had ended with the predominance of one side or the other (1965, p.3). He admitted he had no "brilliant remedy," and he had to "say with great sadness" that the optimistic possibilities were "hopes, not realities" (1965, p.10). Vietnamese society was "in an advanced stage of decomposition" (1965, p.9). He quoted the prescient lament of a Vietnamese official who predicted the US would abandon the country after a settlement was achieved (1965, p.7). Vietnam

HAK 1965 TRIP TO VIETNAM

(October 15 - November 2, 1965)

1. Consultations Before the Trip

A meeting of senior Harvard and MIT scholars was convened on Wednesday, August 4, 1965 in the International Legal Studies building of Harvard Law School. Attendees were Professors Kissinger, Katz, Kaysen, Pye, Cohen, Fairbank, Hughes, Huntington, Wiesner, Craig, Pool, Feld, Emerson, Doty, Shulman, Cavers, and Padelford. HK made a long presentation as a framework for discussion, focused on the question of negotiating a solution.

HK first posed a number of questions addressed to the relationship of military operations to negotiations: Should negotiations await some change in the military situation? Can military operations be geared to support the object of bringing about negotiations? What non-military measures can we take during military operations to support the objective of negotiations? Second, there were procedural questions raised by any negotiation, such as who should initiate proposals for a negotiation and who will participate. Thirdly, he posed questions about the substance and purpose of negotiations: First, what are we trying to achieve? (To show that wars of national liberation won't work? To curb Chinese expansion? To exploit the Sino-Soviet conflict? These were not mutually exclusive. President Johnson and Secretary Rusk said we were seeking to preserve free choice for the people of Vietnam. Are we fighting against a certain method of change or the fact of change?) Second, can we give content to the phrase "a free and independent South Vietnam"? Would South Vietnam alone be the subject of a negotiation, or should other problem areas be included? Third, what guarantees are needed, and who must participate in the guarantees?

Later in the discussion HK argued: "We cannot enter negotiations unless we know what our objectives are, at least within broad limits. We must know (a) what is desirable from our point of view and (b) what is bearable. I am not interested in establishing enclaves --'new Hong Kongs.' They would only be a perpetual irritant. If it comes to that, we should get out."

On September 7, 1965, in advance of his trip scheduled for October, HK wrote a long letter to Henry Cabot Lodge in

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Saigon offering "some of my current reflections even though they are still highly tentative." Again he focused on negotiation and the crucial importance of preparing both ourselves and the South Vietnamese. The problem was political, not military. The political structure of South Vietnam was fragile; we had to build it up and take care lest a negotiation undermine it. Yet, we had to clarify our own concrete negotiating objectives before a negotiation started, or we would have to do so under pressure. U.S. "reliability" was "more at issue than our technical competence:"

-- Further upheavals and coups would be "unfortunate because it will further undermine the structure of legitimacy which we must make every effort to develop."

-- "In both DOD and State -- but particularly in the former-- I was struck by an attitude of disdain toward the Government of Vietnam." My queries about Vietnamese conceptions of the conduct of the war "were treated with tolerant amusement." Such an attitude is "profoundly unhealthy" in the long run because it could "undermine the political basis of our effort. It should be our objective to prevent the war from becoming entirely American; the Vietnamese should feel a real responsibility for it. This applies even more strongly to the conditions of peace; otherwise negotiations could undermine whatever political structure exists."

-- The fundamental issue was our own goals in Vietnam. "This can be expressed perhaps in the answers to questions as these: How do we conceive of 'success' in Vietnam? What military and, even more important, political goals would we have to achieve? What kind of political structure should we encourage and/or build? In case of negotiations, what terms would we consider desirable? What terms are we willing to settle for?"

-- "The difficulties raised by the much-used word 'negotiations' illustrate my point. Many of our public pronouncements -- and some of the documents I have seen -- give the impression that the purpose of our military operation is to bring about unconditional negotiations. As a public relations posture, this has considerable merit. If this is its only purpose -- if, in other words, we lack a concrete program -- it also involves considerable dangers:

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"(a) It puts a floor under the risks the Communists run...

"(b) Unless carefully handled, it may demoralize the Vietnamese government and people...If the Vietnamese leaders should come to believe that they have become expendable -- or even that a Laos type settlement is being prepared -- they will begin to maneuver in the new context. They will try to obtain reinsurance at every level -- including by direct dealings with the Viet Cong... Our reliability is thus much more at issue than our technical competence."...

"(c) This is all the more urgent because the Communists will surely not enter the negotiations with any intention of 'settling' but with the aim of winning at the conference table the prize which eluded them on the battlefield. They will strive not for stability but for victory. And by then the context will be largely psychological.

"When I was connected with the Berlin task force, I was struck by the reluctance of the Department to commit itself to a position in advance of negotiations because of the desire to retain flexibility. I can understand this attitude. But it also involves risk that we become the prisoner of events or even of our own slogans. 'Unconditional negotiations', 'ceasefire', 'tacit mutual concessions' are useful phrases if some concrete meaning attaches to them. Otherwise they can be turned against us, and confuse and demoralize our friends."...(for example, such phrases as "ending foreign intervention," or "ceasefire." Specific questions have to be answered about the type of ceasefire, who is party, and how it is policed.) "A ceasefire which effectively divided South Vietnam, leaving major territories under recognized Communist control would, in my view, be the beginning of the end.

"Whatever the validity of this judgment, I believe that it is time to spell out our ultimate goals more concretely. And we will have to start a dialogue on war aims with the Vietnamese. Otherwise questions such as those raised here will have to be answered under pressure. Negotiating tactics will predominate over long term strategy. The psychological and political framework will be dominated by the other side."

"Civil wars seem to me the most difficult to end by negotiations, and 'settlements' which preserve a rough equilibrium are likely to be fragile. This is no accident. Civil wars usually evoke the most intense passions. Involving people of the same backgrounds and culture, inhabiting the same area, the terms are extremely difficult to enforce. This is why those civil wars which have ended since World War II have usually been concluded with the predominance of one side or the other...as in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines,

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or China -- without formal acknowledgment by the defeated side. Formal settlements as in Laos or Cyprus have almost invariably been the starting point of new conflict...It seems to me that an outcome in which we achieve a major pacification without a formal settlement might not be the worst result of the Vietnamese war, provided we can couple military success with long-term political construction.

"This is not to say that I am opposed to negotiations. If we have a clear program this can be constructive. But we must recognize that they begin a new phase of the struggle rather than mark its end. The stakes remain high and the conduct of affairs grows more complicated because it depends on so many intangibles. Negotiations require as careful and thoughtful preparation as do our military campaigns."

Lodge replied on September 14 thanking HK profusely for this "remarkable contribution" from someone who had never been there, and "thrilled" by the thought of what HK would be able to do after he visited Vietnam.

HK spent September 13-14 and Sept. 28 in Washington reading documents and conferring with Bill Bundy, Admiral Raborn, Yarmolinsky, McNaughton, Walt Rostow, Len Unger, Maxwell Taylor, Averell Harriman, Lucien Pye, Carl Kaysen, Alex Johnson, Goodpaster, Barnett, Allen Whiting (INR), Chet Cooper, George Carver, Hubert Humphrey, Clark Clifford and Dean Gullion. HK asked them questions about possible outcomes, which none of them had given much thought to. Unger expressed the consensus when he said the South Vietnamese government still lacked cohesion and would be demoralized by a negotiation; he felt that operational people in Washington were spending all their time in day-to-day matters, and if we were suddenly dragged into a negotiation we would be in enormous difficulty. Alex Johnson observed that the South Vietnamese had a "Samson complex: pulling the temple down around themselves."

HK's briefing book for his Vietnam trip included 8 pages of detailed questions to be asked of our Embassy, MACV, the Vietnamese, etc. HK was concerned with possible outcomes, including "uniltareal outcomes" as well as "negotiated outcomes." He jotted down some random notes including:

- "Even if DRV is negotiating partner, why not threaten them that price goes up if they delay?"

- "Why do we not squeeze North Vietnam with negotiating pressures and indicate that the price goes up the longer they delay?"

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-- "What can we make DRV fear?"

-- "Lindbergh baby good case of too many cooks can destroy negotiation."

HK had a CINCPAC briefing in Honolulu on October 11, 1965. He jotted down "some general observations" afterwards, reflecting some of what would be his recurring concerns: skepticism about the conduct of military operations, concern that if the enemy reverts to small-unit and guerrilla actions we had no concept for dealing with it, shock that no one on our side had a concept of how the war would end, and fundamental concern that Hanoi's strategy was simply to outlast us. In short, a failure to synchronize political concepts and military objectives. He also wondered under what circumstances one could foresee withdrawing some American forces:

"Some general observations: I was impressed by the singlemindedness with which the plan for the current concept of operations is being carried out. The planned deployment of American forces is extremely impressive and I have no question that it will succeed in preventing the Viet Cong from operating in large, organized military units. It is less clear to me that this concept is useful if the Viet Cong go back to the Stage II type of guerrilla activity -- that is, assassinations, and company-sized units. It does not seem to me there is any concept for pacification or any clear focus of responsibility."

"2. I was impressed by the fact that no one could really explain to me how even on the most favorable assumptions about the war in Vietnam the war was going to end."

"When I get to Vietnam I must look into three problems: (1) How many forces it will take to maintain the present favorable situation; (2) under what circumstances can one foresee withdrawing some American forces; (3) What we will do with our present force structure in Vietnam, if the Viet Cong go back to the Stage II type of guerrilla action."

"I am quite convinced that too much planning in the government and a great deal of military planning assumes that the opponent is stupid and that he will fight the kind of war for which one is best prepared. However, I am struck by the recent long statement of the Chinese Communist leaders in which they emphasize that the essence of guerrilla warfare is never to fight the kind of war your opponent expects. [Probably Lin Piao's manifesto] Having moved very many large units into Vietnam, a course with which on the whole I agree, we must not become prisoners now of a large-unit mentality. Otherwise, I think we will face the problem of psychological exhaustion."

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"Our buildup has been conducted in a masterly way technically." But HK felt: "However, I do not think we have even begun to solve the basic problem which is psychological. It seems to me that the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese must be saying to themselves that even though their hopes for a victory this year were disappointed, there is a possibility, even a probability, that if they can prolong the war sufficiently they will exhaust us. How does one convince a people that one is prepared to stay indefinitely 10,000 miles away against opponents who are fighting in their own country? After all, in Algeria the French had many things going for them..."

"I do not understand how little enclaves of government territory can indefinitely exist surrounded entirely by Viet Cong territory. In short, the political side of our action does not seem to me in gear with the military side..."

"If we fail in our Pacific operations it will not be because of a failure in the technical realm, but because of a difficulty of synchronizing political and military objectives in a situation for which this, enormously complex military establishment is not designed."

## 2. Tour of South Vietnam October 15 - November 2, 1965

On October 15, 1965, HK arrived in Saigon. "I have rarely, perhaps never, seen a more handsome people than the Vietnamese." Then he was given an "idiot briefing" at MACV. The briefer told HK that the US objective was to secure and clear an area. HK asked: What if the main force Viet Cong don't want to fight and simply melt into the population? The briefer replied: "Then we have achieved our objective."

General Westmoreland told HK he needed 400,000 troops altogether; with this he could bring 80% of the country under GVN control within 18 months, with the possibility then of withdrawing some units another six months later. HK was struck by the total preoccupation with large-unit actions. forces in the Delta because the area was unsuited to large-scale operations, even though it was one of the chief recruiting grounds for the enemy. Teachers' salaries and economic aid programs, HK learned from a Vietnamese official, were all diverted to Viet Cong use in the VC-controlled areas. Barry Zorthian told HK the US was swamping the South Vietnamese with experts and advice, and a burden they couldn't possibly bear indefinitely. Another problem was the unreliability of reporting. Official reports claimed only 25% of the population was under VC control;

-7-

but CIA and General Lansdale felt that 50% were under "substantial" VC control in the sense of operating in villages at night and the ability to impose thier will selectively. Of the rest, a substantial portion was under "varying degrees of VC influence." The key was the VC political organization. There was no proof that even where there were US base areas, the VC hold was being broken; there was not even an increase in information.

HK was moved by the comment of a Vietnamese official at dinner on *October 17* who "said that when peace is achieved you will suddenly lose interest in us and you will leave us to our own devices; you will reduce your aid; you will bring back your people, and then what are we going to do? It is tragic and pathetic [HK concluded] that a country that has now been torn by war for 30 years cannot face the prospect of peace."

HK met with the Embassy Political Section on *October 18*, who were "absolutely horrified at the prospect of any negotiation on any terms." They were certain that a negotiation would wreck the GVN, and if Prime Minister Ky attempted to negotiate there would be a coup within 72 hours:

"I then pointed out to the group that they simply would not be able to support a position against negotiation in Vietnam in the abstract unless they could specific more precisely what they opposed and what the consequences of certain conditions were. I mentioned six items which would be the subject of any discussion, explicit or tacit: [(1) a bombing halt, (2) a halt to military operations in the South, (3) the internal status of the GVN, (4) the international status of the GVN, (5) policing machinery for the above, and (b) the eventual position of US forces]."

The group picked #3 to discuss and developed the conditions that would be necessary. The unanimous opinion was that it would take at least nine months to have a government stable enough so that one could mention negotiations, and 3-5 years to strengthen the political structure to compete with the Viet Cong peacefully.

On *October 19*, HK flew to Nha Trang. At the airport he saw 25 caskets draped in American flags going from the military terminal to the civilian terminal to be shipped home -- "It was a chilling sight." HK met there with Prime Minister Ky. He told Ky "that what was going on in Vietnam was of concern to free people everywhere. He was aware of the fact that a lot of people were talking about negotiations and it was only prudent to consider what a satisfactory outcome might be, rather than

-8-

be surprised by events and become their prisoner." Ky said
it was "absolutely out of the question to enter political
competition with the VC at this moment." "I asked him what
did he foresee as the greatest need for Vietnam. He said
governmental stability and American constancy."

On October 20, Ambassador Lodge was drafting a cable to Washington and asked HK what was the most important issue. "I said that the most difficult task that America had was to maintain a reputation for reliability. Other nations could not gear their policy to the expectation of cleverness; they had to be able to count on our constancy. Lodge said that he agreed and that his experience had been that lawyers were incapable of understanding this point."

On October 21, HK visited Vinh Long and realized the
fundamental U.S. misperception of the security situation:

"It is obvious that there are two separate wars going on here: (1) reflected in the army statistics about security of military units; and (2) that which affects the population. The two criteria do not match. For the army a road is open when it can travel in convoy along it. For the villager a road is open when he can travel it without paying taxes. For the army a village is secure when it can station its forces there. For the population a village is secure when it has protection not only from attacks by organized VC units but also from VC terrorism."

On this tour HK was in a boat that nearly capsized. It
was explained to him that the current was very strong and
even a slight wind in the opposite direction produced very
violent waves. HK wrote: "In many respects this incident was
symptomatic of Vietnam: a placid surrounding charged with
dark undercurrents and with a certain element of sinister danger."

HK also noted on October 21:

"One startling figure of the briefings is that the ratio of killed and wounded to weapons captures is always 10 to 1. This simply cannot make any sense. The only assumption one can make is that either counts of killed and wounded are wrong or, more likely, that many civilians are being killed and are then counted as VC's."

-9-

On October 24, HK expressed enormous pessimism about the prospects of South Vietnam. After some harsh comments about the Saigon intellectuals he had met, he wrote:

> "All this may give the impression that the Vietnamese are an unattractive people, but this is far from true. They have great dignity... The skill of the VC indicates that they possess enormous ingenuity. The difficulty is that we are watching a society in an advanced stage of decomposition and it is not easy to put things together again."

On October 30, HK had a conversation with Lodge and Clark Clifford, who was visiting Vietnam for LBJ. Clifford asked HK whether there was any formula for a ceasefire that could be conceived. Lodge was upset by the question because he feared a ceasefire would not work. HK replied that one should separate the questions of ceasefire in the South and bombing in the North. With respect to the South, we should take the position that the GVN was free to move on its own sovereign territory where it chose. As for the bombing, he felt we might be able to agree to end the bombing of the North if the following conditions were met: (1) if there were a time limit on the ensuing negotiations, (2) if Hanoi withdrew its regular units from South Vietnam through international checkpoints, and (3) if during the negotiations, activities by organized VC military units would cease. Most useful would be to study the conditions of negotiations for South Vietnam in light of the realities of the Vietnamese situation.

Clifford asked what HK thought of the idea of expansion of the war to Hanoi and Haiphong. HK said he wasn't clear about Haiphong but bombing Hanoi would be a mistake at this moment for two reasons: (1) it was always useful to keep in reserve a threat of further damage, and (2) so far Soviet aid had been ineffectual, except for missile sites around Hanoi, and we should not humiliate the Soviets so much and force them into a demonstration of impotence unless they step up their commitments to Hanoi. "However, I felt strongly that the issue of Vietnam was vital for the future of the United States."
"Clifford asked me whether I thought the Vietnamese were worth saving. I said that was no longer the issue."

After his visit, HK wrote a summation of his experience, concluding that the South Vietnamese political structure was far weaker than he expected, yet American credibility was irrevocably committed because of the scale of our involvement. He had no "brilliant remedy":

-10-

"I came with the conviction that it was the most important area in which the United States was now engaged, if only because so much of our honor had been staked on it. I am still convinced of this. I also came with the expectation that while the struggle might be difficult, with patience and fortitude we would be able to see it through. I had expected the Vietnamese administration to be inefficient, but I had thought that there would be some people in the country dedicated to the cause for which they were fighting and who might, with patience and understanding, become the basis of future efforts. Indeed, I was worried that the major problem was the mercurial attitude of Washington, rather than the Vietnamese. It would be idle to deny that the visit here has been a shattering experience from this aspect."

"I believe we have to come out honorably in Vietnam. I think we should not kid ourselves about what honorable is. No matter how clever our solution, five years from now if a Communist government exists in Saigon or in South Vietnam, no one will ever trust the United States again. Even our present critics will have to remember that we made our most solemn commitment and we engaged over a quarter of a million American forces..."

"And yet committed as I am to success here, it would be idle to deny that the problems are enormous,..."

"P12-15" (natural draws)

All this is a grim picture, which is not relieved by the fact that I cannot think of a brilliant remedy. I suppose that at this point having gone this far, we have no choice except to go down the road further. It is not impossible that our military superiority will simply overwhelm the Viet Cong. Also, if we deal perhaps directly with the provincial administration on major subjects, we can impose some standards of performance. The Lansdale operation might bring fruit. Yet I have to say with great sadness that all of these are hopes, not realities. If I were a dictator here I would not know where to begin, because it is not simply a matter of giving orders, it is also a matter of building a nation in the middle of a vicious civil war... Today I think we need understanding, wisdom and fortitude."

HK met with a group of reporters for a background discussion in Saigon on November 1. Some of HK's pessimistic views appeared in an article by Jack Foisie in the L. A. Times the next day (attached). HK had to deny these views and also to deny that he was a presidential emissary.

-11-

3. After the Visit

In a letter to Lodge on November 23, after three days of meetings in Washington (with the Bundys, McNaughton, Yarmolinsky, Unger, McNamara, Adm. Raborn, and the Chiefs), HK warned Lodge to do some thinking about negotiation because Washington was committed to it even without having a position:

"Washington is intellectually unprepared for negotiations but committed to them as soon as the DRV asks for them. When this happens you will be confronted with a series of very concrete issues. These include:

"(a) Forum for negotiations

(b) Participants in a conference

(c) Conditions for ending the bombing of the DRV

(d) Conditions for a ceasefire in South Vietnam

(e) Internal status of South Vietnam

(f) International status of South Vietnam

(g) Presence of US troops

" When negotiations start, it will not be fruitful to argue about their desirability. Disaster can be avoided only by a concrete [Embassy] Saigon position."

HK wrote a long letter to Lodge on December 3, 1965, giving his analysis and suggestions on the pacification effort, which he felt was crucial to the U.S. bargaining position in any negotiation. His political analysis was gloomy:

" Because the security map is geared to military and not to pacification criteria, we, as well as the GVN, are in a real sense flying blind...

" Our exploding bureaucracy leads to a proliferation of programs which may overtax the slender resources of Vietnamese manpower and which makes it difficult to establish criteria for success or failure...

" Overshadowing everything is a social or maybe even philosophical problem: The Vietnamese have a strong sense of being a distinct people but little sense of nationhood. Our deepest challenge then is to discover how a nation can be built when the society is torn by internal schisms and in the middle of a civil war. All new countries have had the problem of achieving political cohesion; none have had to do so in the face of such overwhelming pressures as Vietnam."

In a separate letter to Lodge the same day, HK suggested establishing ties between various faculties of Vietnamese and US universities, to "help break down the sense of isolation of

-12-

the Vietnamese intellectuals," to give Vietnamese students
projects to do in the countryside:

"The fundamental problem is to develop an ideology
which can enlist popular and especially intellectual
support. We cannot defeat the VC only by administrative
or economic measures. There must be something to affirm,
not only to reject. This is the reasoning behind my
recommendation to enlist Vietnamese students for work
in the countryside."

Addressing the *Joint Arms Control Seminar* at the MIT
Faculty Club on January 12, 1966, HK repeated his view that the
South Vietnamese structure was fragile, yet America's world
position was now involved. What we needed was both political
insight and staying power:

-- "There is also an issue of the symbolic effort of our
withdrawal. If it gave the impression that a Viet
Cong takeover was imminent and expected, it could lead
to the collapse of the South Vietnamese regime."

-- "...if we accomplish nothing in Vietnam, it will hurt
our reputation in the rest of the world for knowing
and being able to serve our own interests. It is
essential that there be a political program to advance
national social revolutions, and to separate them from
Communist revolutions.

-- "It was not clear why we couldn't get our intelligence
to infiltrate the Viet Cong except that in order
to recruit defectors to do so, we need some expecta-
tions of victory, and some sense of constancy on our
side.

-- "Our world position was now involved, and must be weighed
in addition to events purely within South Vietnam.

-- "Perhaps they [the VC] are more patient than we are, or
feel more exhilaration for the period of struggle than
for its completion. We must frustrate their expecta-
tions that they can outlast us, by showing a staying
power rather than merely chasing after quick crash
programs."

In a *talk* at Fletcher on February 3, 1966, HK gave what is
an excellent summary of his impressions from his visit:

-13-

-- "I think but for the introduction of American combat troops last summer, South Vietnam would today be Communist... Secondly, I think it is inconceivable that the United States will be militarily defeated in Vietnam.

-- "It is very difficult to conduct a war when one side is fighting it on the basis of military criteria and the other side is fighting it on the basis of political and psychological criteria.

-- "The goal of the [VC] monsoon offensive was generally stated to be an attempt to cut Vietnam in two and to perhaps establish a provisional government in the Central Highlands. I believe that this certainly was a mistake...I am absolutely certain that the one thing the Vietcong will not try to do is cut the country in two. Why should they try to cut it into two when they have already cut it into about 75 pieces?... Secondly, the last thing the Vietcong want is a territory which is unambiguously theirs which they must therefore defend or which we could retake at will.

--"They have no intention in my view of overwhelming us militarily; they have every intention of wearing us down to a point where we decide that it is not worth it. And how to fight this particular kind of operation is not yet solved.

-- "I think it is not incorrect to say that most Vietnamese leaders are suffering from a Samson complex; that is, they would rather pull the temple down over their ears than make compromises that may seem trivial to us... [M]ost of the civilian leaders in South Vietnam have no other following than each other.

-- "I think the impact of the highly bureaucratized Western society on an underdeveloped country is in any case somewhat pernicious and may have the consequence of encouraging all kinds of disintegrating features in that society and encourage a kind of dishonesty that our reporting system makes necessary. It is impossible for the Vietnamese administration to fulfill honestly the requirements for reporting that the various American bureaucratic agencies have."

-14-

-- "Too much of our discussion gives the impression that the beginning of negotiation is going to be the end of our difficulty. I would say that the beginning of negotiation, unless we are very well prepared, is going to be the beginning of our difficulties.

-- "So in many respects what we are facing in Vietnam is a Greek tragedy -- a situation into which we slipped step by step, a problem of gearing our concepts to attainable political objectives, of...conducting a foreign policy semi-publicly and semi-privately, of fighting a war and conducting a diplomacy simultaneously. And whether that is possible at all under modern conditions with our rigid bureaucracy and the kind of public debate that is going on, I frankly don't know. But this is really the big problem.

-- "Today if the United States collapses or falls on its face after mounting such a major effort the danger is not that a civil war will start in Cambodia. The danger seems to me to be that the validity of any undertaking would at least be questionable. And if you consider the latent xenophobia which exists in India, Japan, or any anti-Western nation, a demonstration of such total impotence by the West must affect the political orientation of those countries in a profound way, so I would consider that to be at least as important as whether we are going to have this style of guerrilla war. I don't think this particular intensity of guerrilla war is easily started.

-- "This doesn't, on the other hand, mean that we have to clear every last square mile of Vietcong troops. In my view that is impossible. But it does mean, you know, that these notions that we can simply pull out or that we pull out under a very thin guise, that, I consider out of the question.

-- "I would think that it is not out of the question...that if we behave skillfully we might be able to split some people off the National Liberation Front and reduce the NLF to its Communist core. If we can do that and re-integrate the non-Communist element of the NLF into the political life of South Vietnam, then we would have reduced them to a clearly foreign-controlled sectarian group which would still be very potent. That I think would be a major achievement. This frankly is where I think we ought to be heading in our diplomacy..."

LOS ANGELES TIMES

November 2, 1965

Viet Regime Shaky,
Johnson Envoys Find

Selfishness,
Immaturity
Reported

BY JACK FOISIE

Times Staff Writer

SAIGON — Recent emis-saries from the White House are reporting that there is an almost total lack of political maturity or un-selfish political motivation among the current leaders of the South Vietnam gov-ernment.

Although they themselves are not talking, these are known to be the findings of Prof. Henry Kissinger, the noted political scientist, and Clark Clifford, the Washing-ton lawyer and adviser to Presidents — both of whom have been recent visitors in Saigon.

Clifford and Kissinger were sent here by President Johnson to make indepen-dent appraisals of the direc-tion American political poli-cy should take in South Viet-nam.

Kissinger's Opinion

There are authoritative re-ports that Kissinger will tell the White House that there is not yet a cohesive national government here primarily because nowhere among the

national leaders is there a true sense of dedication to the nation. Kissinger's stu-dies indicate there is loyalty to the family and the clan before there is any sense of responsibility to the country.

The United States is thankful that the present government of Prime Minis-ter Nguyen Cao Ky, "operat-ed" behind the scenes by Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu—who is the real pow-er behind the throne—has remained stable and effec-tive for the past four months.

The Long View

But in the long view, the present government is in no sense democratic or repre-sentative. The peasants on the land, who constitute 80% of the population, have little or no voice in the Saigon government.

It is pointed out, for exam-ple, that in caring for re-fugees from the Viet Cong, the Ky government has not established a responsible chain of command that pro-vides food and housing for the refugees. The actual aid reaching those who fled from the Viet Cong is "dilut-ed" to the point of ineffec-tiveness by administrative inefficiency or outright graft, according to the U.S. observer team.

There is also a growing feeling that Vietnamese offi-cials are cleverly playing one U.S. relief agency against another to get con-

Please Turn to Pg. 9, Col. 1

HAK 1966 TRIPS TO VIETNAM

(July 19-29; October, 1966)

1. Planning for the Visit

On July 1, 1966, HK wrote to Embassy Political Counselor Phil Habib that he had been asked to visit South Vietnam again. His focus, he told Habib, would again be the political aspects:

"The major use of my visit as I see it, in addition to whatever impact it may have on your operations, would be to enable me to speak with some authority in Washington on matters in which the Saigon view might perhaps be dismissed as parochial. As you know, my view and that of the Embassy are very close indeed. (I would say indistinguishable.)

"I thought I might look into the following areas: (1) the political constellation in Saigon and how it might evolve over the next few years, (2) the impact of military operations and pacification on the political evolution, (3) constitutional development and (4) the whole complex of negotiations."

Lodge praised HK later in Saigon, saying at a Mission Council meeting that the Saigon Embassy was the only Embassy of the U.S. that had an Ambassador in Washington!

2. Tour of South Vietnam, July 19-29, 1966

On July 18 HK met with an Army group, was struck by the unreality of their planning, and gave them some advice:

"I...spent an hour and a half with an Army group planning for a post-hostilities situation. Their expectations were totally unrealistic, assuming the presence of very major American forces. I told them that the only realistic assumption was that if any American forces would be kept in Vietnam after a peace settlement they would be relatively small. I also urged them to work out various options in order to increase the acceptability of what they were doing in the Pentagon and not to stake everything on one rather technical assessment."

-2-

HK had lunch on July 18 with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and discussed the problem of nationbuilding in South Vietnam. HK asked why North Vietnam was cohesive and South Vietnam was so fragmented. Was it a difference in character, or Communist ideology? Tran Van Do replied that it was Communist ideology and organization. "Plus the fact that South Vietnam had been under authoritarian rule for a decade or more, and a weak authoritarian rule at that, and that it since then had had no constitutional base. He said there was a sad dilemma in South Vietnam. People were saying that one needed democracy in order to have freedom. But it turned out that if you gave democracy to South Vietnam you would have anarchy and you would lose freedom. I said that this was the classical dilemma of political theory which was not peculiar to Vietnam and which also in the West had required many decades, indeed centuries, to balance out."

On July 19, HK met with Dan Ellsberg of Gen. Lansdale's group, who "painted a grim picture of the situation in the countryside." Ellsberg felt the GVN's new cadre program was "almost totally useless." He felt there had to be an improvement in the security against the guerrillas and in the quality of provincial administration. The GVN needed to recruit better leadership by widening the base from which top personnel were drawn. Ellsberg also felt there had to be an improvement in the Vietnamese Army and in the ARMY'S attitude toward the population.

HK dined with General Westmoreland tete-a-tete on July 21:

"I was alone with Gen. Westmoreland and we reviewed the situation, his plans, and his needs for a buildup. I was struck by the fact that last year he was arguing for a build-up of forces to the present level with many of the arguments he is now using for a build-up to new levels. Last year he told me that if he got the forces he is now getting he would have a victory within a year or at most two. Now he is saying that he can, with present forces, avoid defeat, but he cannot guarantee anything except a very slow progress."

On a visit to Vinh Long on July 22, HK had a startling presentation from the province chief:

"Eight months previously when I had visited Vinh Long I asked him what percentage of his province was pacified. The province chief said 80%. This time I asked him what the situation was and he said enormous progress had been made since I had last been there. I asked him how much of the province was now pacified. He said 70%!"

the province chief

-3-

At dinner July 24 in Danang with General Walt, HK participated in a discussion of military strategy, and was concerned about its relationship to a negotiation:

"Most of the conversation was devoted to the Marine concept of military operations, which differs from the Army's in that it lays much greater stress on rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure and on civic action. The Army in general makes an effort to find main force units and destroy them and does not use its troops in general on pacification measures. The Marines concentrate on pacification and will go after main force units only if they interfere with their task. The line is not sharp, but there is a difference in concept. As a concept I would lean toward the Marine operation, because it would give a tangible pawn into our hand for the purpose of negotiation, while the Army concept -- if it is interrupted too early -- will confront us with nothing tangible achieved, because if a ceasefire should be established the Viet Cong may be able to restore their main force units and the Viet Cong infrastructure in the villages would be essentailly untouched. I would say this in the abstract, but having seen the progress of the Marines in their pacification mission and the enormous casualties they are suffering, I cannot be sure which is the right procedure."

On July 25, HK talked with Bishop Chi, the leader of the Catholics in the Danang area, who was convinced the security situation in his area was much improved. HK was depressed:

"He would not have dared to sit in his chancery, where we met, six months ago, even though it was located in the Marine headquarters in the Marine airstrip; but at least that area had been secured and he thought more progress would be made. This is another miracle to me. I cannot notice any progress, and if there is progress it is so slight as to be discouraging to me rather than encouraging, but it is rare to find Vietnamese who will make that admission."

Constituent assembly elections in South Vietnam were coming in September, and HK -- sensitized to the extremely delicate political situation in South Vietnam -- was amazed at Washington's propensity to meddle. On July 26 he noted:

-4-

"In the afternoon I spent an hour with Lodge, who had received some absurd cables from Washington regarding the elections, and helped him to draft a rather stiff reply. It is amazing what a difference in assessment exists in Saigon and Washington and how doctrinaire the Washington approach is to the situation here."

### 3. After the Trip

HK reported to Lodge in a letter of August 18, 1966, that he was trying to ensure a hearing for the Embassy's views in Washington:

> "With respect to negotiations, I have urged
> Bundy that Saigon be brought in at the formative stage of
> any program He has agreed to this."

The same day, August 18, HK wrote another letter to Lodge on pacification. He saw the Vietnam effort as "vital", but he saw little progress being made in pacification:

> "I always find it inspiring to visit Vietnam. I can imagine no more vital assignment in today's world. Vietnam has become the hinge of our national effort. If we fail there, I foresee decades of mounting crisis. If we succeed, it will mark a historic turning point in the postwar era. Just as the Cuban-Berlin confrontation may have convinced the Soviets of the futility of seeking political breakthroughs by military means, so Vietnam can put an end to Chinese expansionism by the use or threat of force.

* * *

> "The Situation in the Provinces: Candor compels me to say that I did not find any substantial change in the provinces with the possible exception of Binh Dinh. It may be that the "secure" areas are more so -- though security is a relative concept. (For example, whenever I asked our advisers in how many hamlets listed as 'secure' they would be prepared to sleep, they would list at most 25% of the so-called pacified areas.) The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me as follows:

> "The criteria for pacification require further elaboration. The official MACV criteria include too many subjective elements and lead to over-optimistic conclusions...

* * *

-5-

"Some areas listed as pacified may be so because the VC find it convenient to leave a source of supply undisturbed. It seems to me essential to make a survey of how much of each province is subject to VC taxation -- especially in the Delta provinces with respect to rice...

* * *

"Priorities should be firmly established. We can wreck the effort by trying to do too much as surely by trying to do too little. The Vietnamese administrative resources permit only a limited number of projects to be carried out at one time. To ask too insistently for too broad a spectrum is to encourage the tendency to build Potemkin villages."

HK offered a few other recommendations such as strengthening local government, making RF and PF organically part of the pacification effort, creating an inspection corps under Bill Porter to survey the provinces, etc.

## 4. Second 1966 Trip to Vietnam

HK made a quick second trip to South Vietnam in October 1966 to work with Phil Habib on a "National Reconciliation Program" -- a joint US-GVN political initiative to be launched at the Manila Conference, set for October 24.

HK set forth the rationale for this political initiative in a letter to Lodge drafted in Saigon on October 19. He cautioned: "I am becoming increasingly concerned that in Vietnam it is relatively simpler to figure out *what* to do than *how* to do it." He listed the program's objectives:

a. It is designed to separate the problem of the internal structure of Vietnam from its international aspects. This will reduce the danger that the Vietnamese political evolution is discussed in forums which have a minimum understanding of the complexity of the local situation or of its tolerance to stress.

b. Such a program would greatly improve our diplomatic position. We could take an affirmative stance on the issue of the role of the NLF. Those members of the insurrection -- at all levels -- prepared to participate in the reconstruction of the country will be given an opportunity for doing so. By the same token, those who persist in military actions have clearly indicated their commitment to violent methods.

"c. If successful -- the consensus of agencies here is that it can be -- it might roll up the VC infrastructure. This in turn will reduce the Main Force units to poorly armed conventional troops, which can be fairly easily detected."

HK wrote to Lodge from home on October 28: "I have also left a memorandum for the Manila contingent in Washington, urging them to give [Embassy] Saigon an opportunity to develop the program consistent with Vietnamese realities." He wrote again to Lodge on November 21, 1966, expressing fear that Washington would plunge ahead blindly with a proclamation unless Lodge offered Washington a carefully-constructed political program:

"Effective implementation has struck me all along as more crucial than running a race with a self-imposed deadline. Finally, such a program to be meaningful must be truly Vietnamese. You can be sure that I am making these points in Washington now.

"Nevertheless it is difficult to have these views prevail right now. You may recall my comment in Saigon that something in this area would almost surely be done -- the only choice was whether it would be done in Saigon or in Washington. I am afraid that recent events have shifted the balance toward Washington...All of this has produced a state of affairs where there will be increasing pressure from Washington to show some 'progress'. In my judgment this can be dealt with best by in effect running with the ball yourself. To this end I would suggest that you send a cable at an early opportunity... It would also help to suggest that a program of this delicacy requires careful preparation, [and saying that] for these reasons you believe a realistic program is better than a proclamation which falls flat. ....With such a document I would be in a much stronger position to urge Washington to give you an opportunity to implement your program without too much second-guessing."

Meanwhile, on October 22, 1966, Governor Harriman in Manila sent a cable to Dean Franklin Ford of Harvard:

"The United States Government deeply appreciates Harvard's making Professor Kissinger available for his extremely successful mission to South Vietnam. That mission was of great importance, could only have been carried out by Kissinger and had to be completed prior to the Manila Conference."

VIETNAM?

LOOK MAGAZINE

AUGUST 9, 1966, p. 26

HENRY KISSINGER

Professor of government, Harvard, and member of
The Center for International Affairs;
consultant to the National Security Council
under President Kennedy; author of
The Troubled Partnership,
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, etc.

"We are no longer fighting in
Vietnam only for the Vietnamese.
We are also fighting for ourselves
and for international stability."

THE WAR IN VIETNAM is dominated by two factors: Withdrawal would be disastrous, and negotiations are inevitable. American policy must take both of these realities into account.

1. The impossibility of withdrawal. An American withdrawal under conditions that could plausibly be represented as a Communist victory would be disastrous for these reasons:

Within the Communist world, Chinese attacks on Soviet "revisionism" have focused on the Russian doctrine of peaceful coexistence. A victory by a third-class Communist peasant state over the United States must strengthen the most bellicose factions in the internecine Communist struggles around the world.

In Southeast Asia, it would demoralize those countries—especially Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand—that have supported our effort.

The long-term orientation of such countries as India and Japan will reflect to a considerable extent their assessment of America's willingness and ability to honor its commitments. For example, whether or not India decides to become a nuclear power depends crucially on its confidence in American support against Chinese nuclear blackmail.

A demonstration of American impotence in Asia cannot fail to lessen the credibility of American pledges in other fields. The stability of areas geographically far removed from Vietnam will be basically affected by the outcome there.

In short, we are no longer fighting in Vietnam only for the Vietnamese. We are also fighting for ourselves and for international stability.

2. The inevitability of negotiation. Historically, the goal of a war, for the United States, has been the destruction of enemy forces. Negotiations could start only after the enemy had been crushed. But the primary issue in Vietnam is political and psychological, not military.

What makes the war so complicated is the existence of a Communist "shadow government," permeating every aspect of Vietnamese life. A favorable outcome depends on the ability to create a political structure that can command the loyalties of the Vietnamese people.

A purely military solution is impossible also because Vietnam directly engages the interests and the prestige of so many major powers. Finally, the Administration has stressed its unconditional readiness to respond to any overture by Hanoi for negotiations.

In these circumstances, the political program—both within Vietnam and for negotiations—is crucial. Military victories will prove empty if they are not coupled with an effort to build political structures. Negotiations will be sterile or dangerous unless we enter them with significant areas of the country substantially free of terror.

**Where do we go from here?**

1. Negotiations are likely when Hanoi realizes that its political apparatus in the countryside is being systematically reduced, and that this process will accelerate the longer the war lasts. It follows that the primary goal of military operations should be the creation of secure areas. It is better to have 100-percent control in 40 percent of the country than 40-percent control in 100 percent of the country. This is not to say that we should adopt a static "enclave" theory, which would leave us with three Hong Kongs and two Berlins in the midst of hostile populations. Nor does it mean that we must write off all the territory that we cannot securely control. We will always retain a capacity for preventing the consolidation of Communist control even in areas that we do not control ourselves. It does mean that the highest priority must be given to creating "secure" zones that contain a maximum of population—zones that can be expanded if the war continues and that will give us reliable negotiating counters at a conference.

2. We must understand that political instability in Vietnam reflects the transformation of an essentially feudal structure into a modern state—a process that took centuries in the West. Such a process involves a profound shift of loyalties—a task that would be searing in the best of circumstances, but is compounded by the pressures of civil war. This imposes two requirements on us: (a) We must have compassion for the travail of a society that has been wracked by war for two decades and not use its agony as an alibi for fail-

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ing in our duty; and (b) we must give special em-
phasis to building political structures from the
ground up.

3. The notion drawn from our experience in Europe, that economic assistance automatically produces political stability, does not apply in Vietnam. On the contrary, there is a danger that our enthusiasm and our concern with technical refinements will overwhelm slender administrative resources and compound political demoralization. The test should be, whether a program can enlist local support and thus give the rural population an incentive to defend it. Efforts should be concentrated in areas of maximum military security and spread out from there.

4. It may prove impossible to settle the war at a large conference that deals with all issues simultaneously. If the negotiations are conducted in a forum consisting of many nations that are already rivals (e.g., the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, or the U.S. and France), energies may be dissipated in political jockeying that is peripheral to the central problems in Vietnam. It may be wiser to separate the issues into their component elements, each to be settled by the parties primarily involved. A larger conference could then work out guarantees for settlements already achieved in other forums.

5. The war in Vietnam is a crucial test of American maturity. In the lives of nations, as of individuals, there comes a point when future options are limited by past actions. The choices of 1966 are not those of 1961. We must recognize that to be on the defensive often forces us to be engaged in places chosen by opponents for their difficulty and ambiguity.

We do not have the privilege of deciding to meet only those challenges that most flatter our moral preconceptions. If we cannot deal with political, economic and military problems as an integrated whole, we will not be able to deal with them individually.

HAK PARIS MISSION 1967 ("PENNSYLVANIA")

Rather than recite the long and detailed history of
all the exchanges (which is set forth fully in the notebook
"Notes on a Mission"), this paper focuses on instances
towards the end of the exercise which illuminate HK's own
views on US Vietnam policy and his approach to negotiation.

On Aubrac and Marcovich's first trip to Hanoi July
21-26, Pham Van Dong stated that "we are ready to talk at
any time provided that actions against the North are un-
conditionally ended." He hinted that talks could begin
immediately, secretly, and the US bombing need only be halted
de facto, without announcement. The USG authorized a reply,
transmitted August 25 on a second visit by Aubrac and
Marcovich to Hanoi, expressing willingness to have secret
and direct discussions covering all subjects, including the
issue of bombing. The US was willing to halt the bombing
"with the understanding that it would lead promptly to
productive discussions," and the US "would assume" that the
DRV would not take advantage of the bombing halt.

Hanoi replied September 11 rejecting the U.S. proposals
on the gournds that the escalation of attacks on Hanoi just
preceding the message constituted an "ultimatum" and a form
of "pressure." Hanoi reiterated its insistence that the
bomb halt be unconditional; only then could the DRV negotiate.
Mai Van Bo continually emphasized Hanoi's interest in preserving
this channel.

On this occasion HK called McNamara and Ben Read from
Paris "recommending a calm reply and an opportunity to give
the channel a chance; after all, Hanoi has its own record to
make." Instead, Washington forwarded a "rather querulous"
reply reciting a long list of North Vietnmaese terrorist acts,
etc. HK reclama'd to Washington recommending instead of these
"debating points" a calm reaffirmation of the US offer of
August 25. HK sent an interim reply September 14 denying that
the US message constituted either threats or conditions. HK
dictated a set of unsigned notes to Marcovich giving HK's
"comments" on the US proposal, pointing out that the "spirit"
of the US message was unconditional and that the bombing near
Hanoi (not in Hanoi) was due to the fact that DOD was not
privy to the discussions in this sensitive and important channel.
The revised formal US message was passed September 16 denying
any "conditions or threats" and reaffirming the offer of August
25 which "remains open."

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On September 23 the DRV replied in a long statement complaining of US bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Vinh Linh. Washington was conducting a "double policy:" The US wanted to talk but escalated the bombing; the bombing of Hanoi was stopped but intensified elsewhere. HK asked Marcovich to ask Mai Van Bo to clarify the DRV's understanding of Pham Van Dong's remarks in Hanoi in July about willingness to accept a de facto bomb halt and to begin talks without delay.

Before leaving Europe, HK conveyed another personal message from HK: there was no point in trading charges and countercharges; the US was offering to stop all bombing and this was sincere. The exchange indicated that Washington and Hanoi had great difficulty understanding each other and this showed that direct contact was necessary. US military actions in the North reflected in part the extreme secrecy with which this exchange was handled in Washington. HK thought the gap between the two sides was narrow: Hanoi had implied that an end of the bombing would in fact bring about the result that the US asked. Could Mai Van Bo confirm that this was Hanoi's position? HK then called Ben Read who obtained Rusk's and Katzenbach's agreement with HK's message, which could now be considered official.

HK told McNamara on September 25 that the question was whether we were prepared to end the bombing. If we were, HK recommended that we inform Hanoi (1) that we would end it in 2-4 weeks from the date of communication, and (2) that we would reduce it immediately to the July levels. McNamara said he doubted we could go this far. In late September, Read and McNamara both told HK that "impatience" was building up in Washington and there were pressures to bomb Hanoi. LBJ was attacking McNamara and Katzenbach for being "too soft."

On September 28 Read called HK with a new message urging that Hanoi reply to the message of September 23 and reiterating US interest in preserving this channel. One paragraph pointed out that "there is no commitment not to bomb Hanoi." HK felt this was "jarring and unnecessary," and got it deleted; Marcovich could add it as his own "interpretation."

On September 29, Read called and said the President would include two sentences from the August 25 offer in his speech in San Antonio, which would be a formal public commitment to a bombing halt. HK called Marcovich to convey the two sentences to Mai Van Bo. Then HK watched the speech and "was appalled. The two sentences were part of a paragraph which explained why negotiations were fruitless. The whole tone of the speech was in terms of an analysis likely to be considered anything but conciliatory by Hanoi." Two days later Marcovich

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called and said the North Vietnamese had had exactly the same reaction. After talking to Read, HK called Marcovich back and pointed out that the American press was focusing on the two sentences and praising the speech as conciliatory.

Meanwhile, still awaiting for Hanoi's reply, Bo reiterated on September 30 that until the bombing stopped, Hanoi would not talk to any official or any officially-validated American." (Washington had been trying to get Bo to meet directly with HK.) Ben Read, learning of this remark, told HK "this would probably knock the bottom out of the barrel." The White House was convinced the President was "getting screwed" and was eager to wind up the channel and would probably go back to bombing Hanoi. HK "said that it was not clear to me how we were getting screwed when the sole restraint we had exercised was in a ten-mile radius around Hanoi." Read and Rusk agreed to do their best to hold things steady.

On October 2 Marcovich called HK from Rome to say that Bo had indicated various scenarios and had said that talks among officials could begin almost as soon as the bombing stopped. He promised a fuller report in writing. On October 3 HK spoke with McNamara who "seemed very discouraged. LBJ had given him hell the day before. He doubted that the channel could be kept open."

On October 3 HK joined a lunch in Washington with Rostow, Katzenbach, Bundy, Harriman and Read. HK told the group that the issues were: (1) whether Marcovich's call from Rome changed the situation (we could only wait to hear Marcovich's report), and (2) whether the bombing should be resumed:

> "All I could say was that I was not aware of my contact with Hanoi which they had nurtured so persistently... As to the second issue...it seemed to me we should be clear about what was involved. I did not know whether Hanoi wanted to talk, but if this channel failed, we would know that Hanoi was not interested in talks until after (or just before) the United States election. (I bet on just before so that both candidates would be committed to peace talks.) If this channel broke, I did not see that a bombing pause would be anything other than a public relations gesture; or, to put matters another way, either this contact led to a pause or the pause could not produce negotiations. To my surprise, Bundy agreed.

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"Rostow said he thought we had explored the contact far enough. Hanoi's primary purpose was to keep itself from being bombed. One could look at this entire exchange as a sophisticated attempt to reduce pressure on Hanoi. I said this seemed to me highly improbable. The channel was inaugurated before Hanoi was bombed.... Moreover it seemed to me that the most that Hanoi could achieve through stalling tactics was a three-week respite....

"I said that I was not certain that Hanoi wanted only to talk. Even if they did, it was in their interest to act tough. We had to recognize that we presented a problem to them. Vietnamese were congenitally suspicious; being Communists too this trait was no doubt compounded."

On October 4, Marcovich's letter arrived recounting his meeting with Bo on October 2. Bo was sketching alternative scenarios -- a publicly declared bomb halt, a private declaration through the special channel, or a cessation followed by a private official declaration. When Marcovich called Bo back to confirm his understanding, Bo disavowed the whole discussion. HK exploded at Marcovich, saying he doubted whether we would ever trust this channel again. Bo then reaffirmed the original discussion offering the various procedural alternatives.

On October 6, Bundy brought a text of a note to Hanoi coupling an offer to end the bombing with clauses ("prompt," "productive" talks) already declared objectionable by Hanoi. It also said it was in accord with the note of August 25, which Hanoi had already rejected as conditional. HK told Bundy this would "produce endless difficulties." Rusk, McNamara and Katzenbach agreed with HK but said the President was "adamant" and it would be easier to modify the text after Hanoi rejected it.

On October 8, Bo, as HK expected, rejected the message as unacceptable because it was conditional. Aubrac pleaded for HK to come to Paris. HK told Harriman on October 10 that an immediate trip by himself to Paris was unwise and he should go the following week. We should give Bo a few days advance warning. This would spur an answer from Hanoi, or, if rejected, put us in the best possible public posture. HK told Read the next day that he "strongly opposed the bombing. I did not expect this channel to succeed any longer, but it seemed to me that we had everything to gain and little to lose by leaning over backwards. In the best of circumstances Hanoi required 10 days to make a response. If we bombed now we would be accused of having wrecked another peace initiative by our impetuosity."

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On October 13 Read called to say Washington wanted one last message summing up the history of the channel, calling attention to DRV actions along the DMZ, and indicating an end to restraints on bombing Hanoi. "I pointed out that we need not announce the end of restraints. Our correct attitude was to lean over backwards to demonstrate our willingness to settle. ...If this brought no response, we could return to the bombing policy in the best posture."

On October 17, Mai Van Bo handed Marcovich a note which said that the DRV cannot receive HK or comment on proposals in that channel while the US is pursuing escalation. When the US has stopped the bombing, talks can take place. HK was struck by the fact that the refusal to talk was tied only to the case of escalation, and that if the bombing stopped, talks "can" take place instead of the usual "could."

Rostow was convinced it was all a ploy, and Hanoi's last response was a flat refusal. "I said I did not think Hanoi's mind worked that way. Their behavior seemd to me consistent with an attempt to get into talks rather than the opposite. I saw little point in their teasing matters along like this if a flat 'no' was in their mind."

On October 18 HK was invited to Washington to join a principals' meeting at State that evening. HK dictated a Memorandum to the Principals stating his reading of Hanoi's psychology and his recommendation:

"(1) The policy of Hanoi reflects the internal stresses of a group of men largely cut off from world affairs, concerned partly with reconciling differing views and partly with building a record for the contingency of failure. ...

"(2) Whatever the ultimate decision, Hanoi's course is not likely to be clear-cut but tortuous and complicated, groping rather than definite, and seeking to keep open as many escape hatches as possible.

"(3) Whatever our reading of Hanoi's intentions, the minimum US interest with respect to the present channel should be to demonstrate that we have gone to the limit to test Hanoi's willingness or ability to negotiate, especially if this can be done without paying an appreciable price."

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When HK arrived in Washington, Ben Read told him that when the President heard about the principals' meeting he moved it to the White House. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room and included LBJ, Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Katzenbach, Taylor, Clifford, and Fortas. HK was worried that Clifford, Fortas, and Taylor had not seen any of the previous documents and would therefore miss the element of movement in Hanoi's position and would be able only to judge by the literal meaning of the last message.

After a discussion, the President asked HK's views of what should be the next move. "I told him that it would depend on where he wanted to go. If there was to be a pause in the next 4 or 5 months, this exchange could be used to lead up to it. ...If he wanted to terminate the channel, Option 2 was indicated" [i.e. summing up in a message the history of the exchanges in a conciliatory and non-argumentative fashion and asking Hanoi to confirm our interpretation or tell us where it is mistaken. A 10-day time limit would be conveyed orally] HK argued that this channel had been more productive than others, there had been a "noticeable drop in the level of acrimony between Hanoi's note of September 11 and the message of October 16, and one could interpret the latest message in a favorable sense."

Katzenbach argued strongly for Option 1 (to move toward a pause). Clifford, Fortas and Taylor argued strongly against a pause, saying the President had been humiliated and a pause would demoralize our troops.

Rusk suggested that we need not terminate the contact, nor send a message. HK could just go over to Paris and say more in sorrow than in anger that we had nothing more to say.

McNamara took the floor and said a pause during the next year was inevitable both for international and domestic reasons. If this was true, to give up this channel would be to transform a later pause into a PR exercise.

Rostow made the same speech as the day before, saying that this was a ploy by Hanoi.

LBJ said he accepted Rusk's recommendation. He said nothing about bombing, but the implication was that the existing restraints would remain in force a little while longer. He called for another meeting the next day on the question of a pause.

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At dinner at State, Rusk said the situation at the DMZ was grave. In fact, Hanoi had escalated while we had observed restrictions. On the way out, Katzenbach and Read took HK aside and said "Get us the words 'will negotiate' and we'll be in business."

HK went to Paris October 19. He told Marcovich of the impatience in Washington and of the importance of a clear statement from Bo that the DRV "would" negotiate if the bombing ceased. "It might sound like a fine nuance, but a great deal depended on it. Things would now go either one way or the other rather dramatically."

At 9:30, Aubrac called in great distress. Bo had refused to see them. In HK's presence at 10:30, Aubrac and Marcovich phoned Bo, who said: "There is nothing new to say. The situation is worsening. There is no reason to talk again."

Marcovich and Aubrac were distraught. HK thanked them for their dedication and meticulousness. "The channel failed not for lack of goodwill or imagination but because Hanoi either could not or would not talk." Marcovich said that at least we had learned what Hanoi meant by 'unconditional.' I replied that no serious person could believe in an absolutely unconditional relationship. Our concerns had really been minimal: to make sure that Hanoi would talk promptly; that the talks would be serious; and that Hanoi would not take advantage of the situation. Aubrac and Marcovich agreed."

HK, Aubrac, and Marcovich met again the next day, October 21, to review the history of the effort. Aubrac said his impression was that one group in the U.S. wanted peace while another was reluctant. The resultant compromise gave US policy "its appearance of uncertainty. I agreed that there was something to that, but it was also true that the absence of the slightest encouragement from Hanoi complicated matters. If any of our messages had been received with even a hint of encouragement, many things would have been possible. But that was neither here nor there."

Nelson A. Rockefeller

A PROGRAM FOR PEACE IN VIETNAM

New York July 13, 1968

The tragedy of Vietnam has distressed and divided the American people more than any conflict in our modern history. Twenty-five thousand Americans have died there. And the war has come to trouble the very bases of American security and American society.

I believe -- and have repeatedly stated -- that the Administration's policies, both political and military, have not worked. The war has been conducted without a coherent strategy or program for peace. It has been manned by a draft that holds millions in needless doubt of their future. It has been financed by a headlong inflation that imperils our economic life.

I believe, therefore, that a new and constructive Vietnam policy is essential and urgent.

We must learn the stern lessons of this war.

We must end the war through negotiations as quickly as possible on just terms.

We must de-Americanize the war in South Vietnam even while negotiations continue.

If nominated and elected, I pledge to work with all my strength and ability to achieve these ends.

II

The representatives of the United States and North Vietnam have been meeting for two months in Paris for preliminary peace talks. The only agenda item has been the cessation of bombing. Previously, six weeks were required for selecting a site. Before substantive talks can begin, there will have to be agreements on who will participate in the formal conference, as well as an agenda for such a meeting.

We know the cost of such slow progress from past history. In the Korean War, we suffered more casualties while negotiations were going on than before they began.

I believe that there are now two serious obstacles to progress in Paris.

The first is the hope, in Hanoi, that our November Presidential election may somehow improve their bargaining position.

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The second, is a lack of mutual trust about ultimate aims.

These obstacles can be reduced if America affirms now a concrete
plan for peace.

I want to remove any doubt in Hanoi's mind about America's unity
on objectives. I want to speed negotiations and save lives.

The present Administration has avowed, again and again, that we
are ready to withdraw our forces if Hanoi is ready to do the same.
In the Manila declaration, the Saigon Government and our other allies
agree. Yet no specifics have been given.

I am, therefore, now setting forth a detailed four-stage plan
for peace in Vietnam.

This plan has three essential elements.

## First:

A mutual pull-back and ultimate withdrawal of all outside forces. (U.S. and its non-Vietnamese allies on one side and North Vietnam on the other). This pull-back would be monitored by an international peace-keeping force which would initially act as a buffer between the outside forces and ultimately replace them.

## Second:

A settlement of the internal arrangements of South Vietnam by the people of South Vietnam on the basis of the principles of self-determination through free elections to be supervised by the international peace-keeping force. Every group that is willing to abide by the democratic processes and is prepared to renounce force -- including the National Liberation Front -- should be free to participate in these elections.

## Third:

A de-Americanization of the war to enable us to reduce, substantially, American forces -- whether or not Hanoi cooperates.

Such a clear-cut plan cannot possibly weaken our negotiating position in the preliminary talks about the cessation of bombing which are now taking place. On the contrary, we can only strengthen our position in the substantive discussions to come, by such specific testimony to the integrity and force of our will for peace.

### III

The program I anticipate entails realistic steps toward peace
through four logical stages.