This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

CONTENT OF THIS
BRIEFING MAY BE
ATTRIBUTED TO ADMINIS-
TRATION OFFICIALS.
DIRECT QUOTATION
IS NOT PERMITTED.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 7:48 P.M. EST

APRIL 7, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The ground rules are the same as you are by now familiar with. You can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says this evening, in response to your questions, to White House officials, without direct quotation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President says the South Vietnamese and ARVN forces have fought effectively in Laos. Isn't it more of a mixed result for the ARVN forces in Laos? And whether they are able to hack it or not once we get out of there, and the dichotomy of Saigon versus Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: I feel almost at home. Dichotomy I haven't heard since I left Harvard.

The situation with respect to effectiveness as we understand it, as the President mentioned in one of his interviews, is -- our information is that 18 out of the 22 battalions were engaged effectively, that of the four that had major difficulties, one was in difficulties that were due to a very complex local situation, in which it lost its battalion commander and deputy commander in the first hour of the military action.

Our judgment is that overall the ARVN fought effectively in Laos, and with the experience it has gained, the statement that the President has made is justified.

Let me make one general observation about this. We have undertaken as painstaking an analysis as we can of where we are, because we are now getting to a level where we would only be fooling ourselves if we made claims that in the event would not be justified. Of course, a painstaking analysis does not guarantee that it is correct, but this represents our best judgment.

No one can be interested, neither we, nor, for that matter, our critics, in bringing about a situation in which these judgments should turn out to be totally wrong. I am not saying our critics would be bringing about the situation, but I am just trying to tell you that we have made every effort to make sure, insofar as analysis can do that, that what we have said here will bear the test of the limited amount of time in which it will be certainly tested, given the rate of withdrawal that we are projecting.

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Q Would you check us on the figures? If you take 100,000 more out between May and December 1, what is the figure you say that will leave on December 1?

DR. KISSINGER: 184,000. It is a rate of, I think, 14,200 a month.

Q In this withdrawal, do we anticipate that 184,000 Americans will still have a combat role on December 1?

DR. KISSINGER: The definition of what is a combat role is extremely complex. We are very reluctant to make flat statements that then shade into ambiguous situations. What will happen increasingly is that the American forces will concentrate more and more on the security of the base areas in which they are located, which does not mean they will stay in static defense positions, but that this will be their principal mission, while the principal mission of the South Vietnamese will be the overall combat responsibility for the security of the country.

Also, as these forces diminish, the combat forces, and, for that matter, the number of maneuver battalions will diminish, so all of this will have its inevitable impact on the degree to which the American forces can engage and will engage in offensive combat activities.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, will the bases be consolidated as time goes on, brought farther down?

DR. KISSINGER: I would not draw that conclusion.

Q Would you repeat the question?

DR. KISSINGER: Do you want me to repeat the questions?

Q Please.

DR. KISSINGER: I will repeat them from now on.

Q Do you anticipate that air action will go down as ground action goes down?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a few comments about air action. One of the points that is often made is that we have increased air action as ground action has gone down, that we have purchased the reduction in ground combat by an increase in air combat and by an increase in civilian casualties.

I think a number of figures here would be of interest. One is the number of tactical air sorties in Southeast Asia has decreased, comparing January-February, 1969, with January-February, 1971. The decrease of tactical air activity has been 50 percent. The decrease in B-52 activity has been 45 percent.

Within South Vietnam, the decrease in American air activity has been 88 percent. That includes everything, reflecting the fact that the war has substantially moved out of South Vietnam, and South Vietnam is the most populated area.

Within Laos, the total reduction -- and that includes Lam Son -- has been 14 percent.

Q Are you using the same base dates for all those categories?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, January-February.

Q And this is 1969-1971?

DR. KISSINGER: We are taking the period January-February, 1969, compared to January-February, 1971.

Q Can you give us those figures in terms of tonnage instead of sorties?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not have them in terms of tonnage.

Q Can you give them for Cambodia and North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't have them for North Vietnam but there is not a great deal for North Vietnam.

For Cambodia, of course, there was nothing in 1969. I don't know whether I can give the total number of sorties,

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but, of course, there is an increase there. The total
figure I gave you, and the major point I want to make --
I don't want to be drawn into a discussion which the Pentagon
will have better details on -- the major point I want to make
was in response to the question of are we reducing air
activities.

The answer is yes, we have reduced tactical
operations in Southeast Asia by 50 percent and B-52
activities by 45 percent.

We expect that the basic policy of reduction will
continue, but it will continue at a slower rate with respect
to air activities than with respect to ground activities.

Q Why 1969 instead of 1970, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: Because that is when we came into
office.

Q But why not 1970 rather than 1969?

DR. KISSINGER: We tried to compare what it was
when we came into office with what it is now. But there has
been a decrease as compared to 1970, also. I just don't have
the figures here.

I have looked at the figures for 1970 and there
is a decrease in every category between 1969 and 1970 and
between 1970 and 1971. The only reason was I didn't want to
bore you with giving each of the years.

There is, to be fair, for February 1971, a slight
increase in Laos over February 1970 because of Lam Son. But
if you take the total you will find a proportionate decrease.
You will find the curve going down. There is no hidden
meaning to it. It was just that we gave the beginning
date and the end date.

Q With regard to future draft calls, sir, will
it mean considerably fewer men drafted this year than last
year?

DR. KISSINGER: I would prefer to have the Pentagon
answer that question because I do not know what the precise
impact on the draft will be. My estimate is that it would
affect it in the direction of reduction of draft calls, but
to what degree I can't say. I really don't want to say some-
thing which I haven't looked into.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what effect will this have on
the withdrawal of allied forces, such as the Koreans, if
any? Is there going to be a coordination of withdrawal or
are they going to remain?

DR. KISSINGER: We are talking to the other troop-
contributing countries, and we are generally aware of the
plans of reduction of some of the other troop-contributing
countries. But I don't want to speak for the other countries.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what do you see beyond
December 1 in the way of troop withdrawals?

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DR. KISSINGER: The withdrawal beyond December 1? I will not speculate as to numbers because we will be judged by the results. The President has committed himself to the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. The President so far, when we have come to the end of every withdrawal period, has indicated a further withdrawal.

What the rate will be, over what period of time, I think is premature to speculate on now, except that we are serious about our policy and we expect to be judged by it.

Q Would you compare your figure of 14,400 a month withdrawal rate with the present rate, giving us the figures on that?

DR. KISSINGER: The present rate is 12,500 a month. Let me make this point about it: When we say rate, this is the average rate per month over the period. It doesn't mean that there were 12,500 every month of the last increment.

For example, the last few months it was a higher rate and the first few months it was a lower rate. We are not saying there will be 14,200 a month being withdrawn each month. Some months it will be more; in others, it will be less. But the average rate will be 14,000.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page two of the President's speech, in the next to the last paragraph, the last two lines, he says, "Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization."

How does that jibe with his promise to keep some American forces there as long as there are American prisoners of war in the North?

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DR. KISSINGER: What the President means is, at the point when we have reached whatever number will be judged necessary to talk about the prisoners, when our forces are there only for bargaining purposes, this is when we feel we have achieved the Vietnamization goal, when they are not needed primarily for the local role.

Q Dr. Kissinger, at what point will you be able to go to an all volunteer force in Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: This is a question to which you can be sure we have given the most careful consideration. The problem with announcing that ahead of time is the anguish it causes to people in the interval. We would prefer to wait with making that announcement when we can implement it, rather than to make it ahead of time.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what does the term residual force mean to you when you talk about it? Without necessarily giving a specific number, can you give us the range of what you mean by residual force?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on the number. A residual force is a force that, in itself, is not subject to a significant, constant draw down, for whatever reasons there may be.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you give us the reasoning that went into the limitation of the seven month withdrawal now, especially in view of the fact that the President, I believe, in one of the interviews, said that the Laotian campaign would decide the withdrawal for next year?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but those two things are in no way ---

Q Can you give us the factors or reasoning?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. The reasoning that went into the seven months was as follows: We have a withdrawal program which we had projected into early next year. The reason for picking that particular increment was two fold: One, as you get down to these lower numbers, each additional increment you withdraw is a greater percentage of the total and, therefore, its relative impact on the situation can be greater.

Secondly, we had picked the period for early next year because one can usually gauge the rate of infiltration and logistics re-supply, and the scale of efforts that the North Vietnamese want to make, by November-December of any one year.

That is, when the dry season has begun and when the first inflows through the system begin operating. Our analysis of the Laotian operation indicated -- and I am speaking now about the purely military analysis. I am not making any of the psychological or political judgments.

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On purely military terms our analysis was that within
the time period that we had originally projected, a sustained
major offensive by the North Vietnamese was improbable. It
does not mean that there cannot be high points and it does
not mean that there cannot be even attacks of several
regiments over a period of days or weeks. But a sustained,
major offensive over several weeks.

This being the case, we felt that we could shorten
the period over which the withdrawal had been projected,
and also we felt that regardless of what the level of
infiltration would be in November, October-November, its
major impact in South Vietnam could not occur, say, before
March. That is the same in each area.

I am just giving you a rough idea of the sort of
analysis that was made.

So, we believe that we will be able to assess in
November what is ahead of us next year and what the impact
would be. What we did, therefore, was to take roughly the
same increment and shorten the time periods to which it
would apply.

Q Dr. Kissinger, several weeks ago when he was
interviewed on ABC-TV, the President said the next troop
withdrawal announcement would give some indication as to
the end of the tunnel. I don't see it. Could you tell us
about that, where it is?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say we started with drawing
troops on July 1, 1969. If anyone had predicted on July 1,
1969, that by December 1, 1971, we would have withdrawn
365,000 troops, that we would have reduced air operations
by nearly 50 percent and that the military situation would
be better than it was on July 1, 1969, we would have been
accused of wild optimism.

I think anybody would then have known that we were
engaged on a road that was pretty self-evident.

I would think, having gone this long on this road,
that the direction in which we are going, coupled with the
rather explicit language of the President, is perfectly
plain. We are not prepared to give a terminal date for many
reasons, of which the desire to prolong the war doesn't happen
to be one of them. I just will not go any further than what we
have said. To us it seems that the end of the road should be
fairly clear from our actions, from the rate of our casualties
and from our general performance and from our promises.

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DR. KISSINGER: It depends, of course, at what stage of the process we are talking. We had intensive discussions after Secretary Laird returned from his trip to Southeast Asia about the projected rate and our long-term objectives.

Let me, however, not go through every single discussion that may have gone on. The people most closely consulted, of course, were Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, General Abrams and Admiral Moorer. In addition, there were special studies made by the intelligence community in order to determine what was ahead of us this year and next year, and what the impact of recent military operations was on the future.

The President then spent a great deal of his time in San Clemente going over these studies. He had memoranda from all his senior advisers. Then he made the decision over the weekend, essentially, of the rate that he felt was sustainable.

Q How would the President react if the Congress asked him to have a complete withdrawal from Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The President has made his view clear as to what his thinking on that matter is. He does not believe that this is the correct policy for the United States.

Q Doctor, can you or Mr. Ziegler give us the reaction of the bipartisan leaders to this program?

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Ziegler is mumbling something to me which, I take it, means I shouldn't answer that. But I don't think it would be appropriate for me to answer.

My experience with Congressional leaders is that they are not reluctant to express themselves. This has been my experience lately.

Q Was Mr. Boggs at the meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Boggs was not at the meeting.

Q Do you know why not?

DR. KISSINGER: I have no idea.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President said in the third paragraph from the end of his speech, "I pledged to end American involvement in this war. I am keeping that pledge. You should hold me accountable if I fail."

The only time the voters can hold him accountable is 1972. Does he mean, "If I fail in 1972," by the election day to end American involvement in this war, that they can

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hold him accountable?

DR. KISSINGER: I suppose this would be a fair reading or one reading that would certainly occur to one.

MR. ZIEGLER: This will have to be the final question.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how many of the 100,000 troops will be ground combat troops?

DR. KISSINGER: I think you should get the break-down from the Pentagon. I don't have it.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Doctor.

END (AT 8:10 P.M. EST)

FOR RELEASE AT 9:00 P.M. EST

APRIL 7, 1971

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF A RADIO AND TELEVISION ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
ON ADDITIONAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES FROM
SOUTH VIETNAM

Good evening my fellow Americans. Over the past several weeks you have
heard a number of reports on T.V., radio and in your newspapers on the
situation in Southeast Asia.

I think the time has come for me as President and as Commander in Chief
of our Armed Forces to put these reports in perspective, to lay all the
pertinent facts before you and to let you judge for yourselves as to the
success or failure of our policy.

I am glad to be able to begin my report by announcing that I have decided to
increase the rate of American troop withdrawals for the period from May 1 to
December 1. Before going into details, I would like to review briefly what I
found when I came into office, the progress we have made to date in reducing
American forces, and the reason why I am able to announce a stepped-up
withdrawal without jeopardizing our remaining forces in Vietnam and without
endangering our ultimate goal of ending American involvement in a way which
will increase the chances of a lasting peace in the Pacific and the world.

When I left Washington in January of 1961, after serving eight years as
Vice President under President Eisenhower, there were no American combat
forces in Vietnam. No Americans had died in combat.

When I returned as President eight years later, there were 540,000 American
troops in Vietnam. Thirty-one thousand had died there. Three hundred
Americans were being lost every week. There was no comprehensive plan
to end the United States involvement in the war.

I implemented a plan to train and equip the South Vietnamese; to withdraw
American forces; and to end American involvement in the war just as soon as
the South Vietnamese had developed the capacity to defend their country against
Communist aggression. On this chart you can see how our plan has succeeded.
In June of 1969, I announced a withdrawal of 25,000 men; in September 40,500;
in December 50,000; and in April of 1970 -- 150,000. By the first of next month
we will have brought home more than 265,000 Americans, almost half of the
troops in Vietnam when I took office.

Another indication of the progress we have made is in reducing American
casualties. Casualties were five times as great in the first three months of
1969 as they were in the first three months of 1971. South Vietnamese casualties
have also dropped significantly in the past two years. One American dying in combat
combat is one too many. Our goal is no American fighting and dying anyplace
in the world. Every decision I have made in the past and every decision I make
in the future will have the purpose of achieving that goal.

Let me review now two decisions I have made which have contributed to the
achievement of our goals in Vietnam.

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The first was the destruction of enemy bases in Cambodia. At the time of that decision, many expressed fears that we had widened the war; that our casualties would increase and our troop withdrawal program would be delayed. I do not question the sincerity of those who expressed these fears. But we can see now that they were wrong. American troops were out of Cambodia 60 days, as I pledged they would be. American casualties did not rise after Cambodia; they were cut in half. American troop withdrawals were not halted or delayed. They continued at an accelerated rate.

Now let me turn to the Laotian operation, undertaken by South Vietnamese ground forces with American air support against North Vietnamese troops which had been using Laotian territory for six years to attack American and allied forces in South Vietnam. Since that operation was completed, there has been a great deal of understandable speculation -- as there was after Cambodia -- as to whether it was a success or a failure, a victory or a defeat. But, as in Cambodia, what is important is not the instant analysis of the moment but what happens in the future.

Did the Laotian operation contribute to the goals we sought? I have just completed my assessment of the operation. Here are my conclusions:

First, the South Vietnamese demonstrated that without American advisers they could fight effectively against the best troops North Vietnam could put in the field.

Second -- the South Vietnamese suffered heavy casualties. But, by the most conservative estimates the casualties suffered by the enemy were far heavier.

Third, and most important, the disruption of enemy supply lines and the consumption of ammunition and arms in the battle has been even more damaging to the capability of the North Vietnamese to sustain major offensives in South Vietnam -- than were the operations in Cambodia ten months ago.

Consequently tonight -- I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded. Because of the increased strength of the South Vietnamese, because of the success of the Cambodian operation; and because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos I am announcing an increase in the rate of American withdrawals. Between May 1 and December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South Vietnam. This will bring the total number of American troops withdrawn from South Vietnam to 365,000 - over 2/3 of the number who were there when I came into office - as this chart shows. The Government of South Vietnam fully supports our decision.

Let us look now to the future:

As you can see from the progress we have made to date and by this announcement tonight, the American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization.

We would infinitely prefer to reach it even sooner -- through negotiations. You will recall that on October 7 in a national T.V. broadcast, I proposed an immediate cease-fire throughout Indochina; the immediate release of all prisoners of war in the Indochina area; in all Indochina Peace Conference; the complete withdrawal of all outside forces; and a political settlement. Tonight I again call on Hanoi to engage in serious negotiations to speed the end of the war. I especially call on Hanoi to agree to the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war throughout Indochina. It is time for Hanoi to end the barbaric use of our prisoners as negotiating pawns and to join us in a humane act that will free their men as well as ours.

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Let me turn now to a proposal which at first glance has a great deal of appeal to the American people: If our goal is a total withdrawal of all our forces why not announce a date now for ending our involvement? The difficulty in making such an announcement to the American people is that I would also be making that announcement to the enemy. And it would serve the enemy's purpose and not our own.

If the United States should announce that we will quit regardless of what the enemy does, we would have thrown away our principal bargaining counter to win the release of American prisoners of war; we would remove the enemy's strongest incentive to end the war sooner by negotiation; and we will have given enemy commanders the exact information they need to marshall their attacks against our remaining forces at their most vulnerable time.

The issue very simply is this: Shall we leave Vietnam in a way that -- by our own actions -- consciously turns the country over to the communists? Or shall we leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a free people? My plan will end American involvement in a way that would provide that chance. The other would end it precipitately and give victory to the Communists.

In a deeper sense, we face the choice of ending our involvement in this war on a note of despair or on a note of hope. I believe as Thomas Jefferson did that Americans will always choose hope over despair. We have it in our power to leave Vietnam in a way that offers a brave people a realistic hope of freedom. We have it in our power to prove to our friends in the world that America's sense of responsibility remains the world's greatest single hope for peace.

Above all, we have it in our power to close a difficult chapter in American history, not meanly, but nobly -- so that each one of us can come out of this searing experience with a measure of pride in our nation, confidence in our own character, and hope for the future of the spirit of America.

I know there are those who honestly believe that I should move to end this war without regard to what happens to South Vietnam. This way would abandon our friends. But even more important we would abandon ourselves. We would plunge from the anguish of war into a nightmare of recrimination. We would lose respect for this nation, respect for one another, respect for ourselves.

I understand the deep concerns which have been raised in this country, fanned by reports of brutalities in Vietnam. Let me put this into perspective.

As one who has visited Vietnam many times and as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I feel it is my duty to speak up for the two and a half million fine young Americans who have served in Vietnam. The atrocity charges in individual cases should not and cannot be allowed to reflect on their courage and their self-sacrifice. War is a terrible and cruel experience for a nation and particularly for those who bear the burden of fighting.

Never in history have men fought for less selfish motives -- not for conquest, not for glory but only for the right of people far away to choose the kind of government they want.

While we hear and read much of isolated acts of cruelty, we do not hear enough of the tens of thousands of individual American soldiers who have built schools, roads, hospitals, clinics, and, who through countless acts of generosity and kindness, have tried to help the people of South Vietnam. We can and should be proud of these men. They deserve not our scorn but our admiration and our deepest appreciation.

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The way to express that appreciation is to end America's participation in this conflict, not in failure or in defeat, but in achievement of the great goals for which they fought -- a South Vietnam free to determine its own future and an America no longer divided by war but united in peace.

That is why it is so important how we end this war. By our decision we will demonstrate the kind of people we are, and the kind of country we will become.

That is why I have charted the course outlined tonight. To end this war -- but to end it in a way that will strengthen trust for America around the world, not undermine it; in a way that will redeem the sacrifices that have been made, not insult them; in a way that will heal this nation, not tear it apart.

I can assure you tonight with confidence that American involvement in this war is coming to an end.

But can you believe this? I understand why this question is raised by many honest, sincere people. Many times in the past in this long and difficult war, actions have been announced from Washington which were supposed to lead to a reduction of American involvement in Vietnam. Over and over these actions resulted in increasing American forces in Vietnam and higher American casualties.

Tonight I do not ask you to take what I say on faith. Look at the record: Every action taken by this Administration, every decision made has accomplished what I said it would accomplish. They have reduced American involvement. They have drastically reduced our casualties.

In my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to end American involvement in this war. I am keeping that pledge. You should hold me accountable if I fail.

Often I am asked what single thing, above all others, I would rather accomplish as President. I always give the same answer -- the answer I give you tonight. I want peace for America. Not just in Vietnam. But in the Middle East, in Europe, in the world. And not just peace for our time, but peace for a generation -- a full generation of peace, something Americans have not known in this century.

Tonight, I am confident we are on the way to achieving that goal in Vietnam and in the world. With your support we can, and will, build that kind of peace.

# # #

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

April 8, 1971

AT 9:45 A.M. EST

DR. KISSINGER: Why don't I just go ahead. If there are any questions on the speech or line of thinking that develops as a result of the speech, on the general topic of it --

Q A lot of people think that American security is threatened by the attack on J. Edgar Hoover. Have you any comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: No, my competence begins outside the three-mile limit.

Q What is the Administration's thought on the size of a residual force that we would need? Wouldn't the enemy know that size of force?

DR. KISSINGER: No, but our policy has been to say nothing and to promise nothing that we are not absolutely sure we can deliver. I think if you look over the last two years, whether you agree with what we have done or not, I think you will have to find that we have kept or exceeded every promise we have made.

Therefore, to tie ourselves to one specific figure, before we know exactly where we are going in precise detail, doesn't seem to us right.

Secondly, moreover it is not crucial, because the margin, whether it is 10,000 or even 25,000, is not the decisive point, not the decisive issue at that point.

Secondly, we have talked about this before. We have not given up on negotiations, and we would like to keep open the ultimate disposition of our forces, partly for

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purposes of negotiation so that we have a chance of perhaps
ending the war more quickly than any of the deadlines that
people are talking about.

We believe that much of this talk of deadlines
is running a race with ourselves. It can do us no good
with Hanoi, and it should be solved by having some con-
fidence in an Administration that has kept every promise
and that has made its destination absolutely clear.

Q You made some estimates last night on the
reduction of the Air Force. Why was that not covered?

DR. KISSINGER: The President felt he had a number
of points to get across. We had to get across the
fundamental direction of American policy in Vietnam. He
didn't want to answer every criticism that had been made,
state the criticism and then answer it.

Therefore, while there was a temptation and,
indeed, perhaps an even earlier intention to give
statistics, he thought that what the American people were
concerned above all with is where we were going rather
than what we had already done. This is why he decided not
to include it in his speech.

Actually, what these figures show -- and you are
all familiar with them. Well, do you mind if I run through
them very quickly again?

The figures have to do with the number of U. S.
Air Force sorties in Southeast Asia. As you know, the
charge has been made that we are substituting an increase
in air operations -- allegedly substituting for a reduction
in ground operations and; secondly, an increase in civilian
casualties as a result of Vietnamization.

The fact of the matter is that tactical air
sorties have decreased by 50 percent since we came in.
That is all over Southeast Asia -- in Cambodia, Laos and
South Vietnam. The B-52 sorties have decreased by 45
percent since we came in. This is over a two-month period.

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I am comparing January-February, 1969, with January-February, 1971.

Then if you do it by country, all air operations in South Vietnam have decreased by 88 percent, U. S. air operations in South Vietnam have decreased by 88 percent which is due to the fact that the war has essentially moved out of South Vietnam and that there aren't many large actions going on. Air operations in Laos have decreased by 14 percent. That figure is probably too low because this takes January-February of 1971, including the Lam Son period, and I am sure if you took the non-Lam Son, Laos, figure, I think it would be something like 26 percent.

The vast preponderance of the sorties -- I haven't worked out the percentage yet, but 22 out of 7,000 -- about 20 percent of all air sorties are in Laos. In other words, in the unpopulated part of Southeast Asia.

So it is highly improbable to believe that the number of civilians killed by air operations has gone up. It is extremely difficult to get reliable figures on the number of civilians killed.

The one area in which the number of air sorties has obviously gone up is Cambodia, because in Cambodia there weren't any air operations, and there are some air operations now.

But even with Cambodia there are still fewer air sorties in Cambodia than in Laos -- much fewer than in Laos and fewer than in South Vietnam.

We tried to get the number of civilians killed in Cambodia. We went to the Cambodian Government and we went to our Embassy there. They gave us a figure which I frankly don't believe so I am not putting it out. The figure they gave us was they could only find 364 civilians that had been killed by air actions in this whole period. This is not a figure you should use.

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I am telling you that we are trying to find out and we are trying to be responsible about it. The percentages I gave you are firm and reliable. The figures of civilians killed are not reliable and are very hard to come by.

But simply on the basis of reasoning, if 70 percent of the air operations are in the panhandle of Laos, and since there are no civilians in the panhandle of Laos, it cannot be true. And if the bombing in South Vietnam has decreased by 88 percent, it must be true that the number of civilian casualties due to bombing is dropping.

Q How about the bomb tonnage figure?

DR. KISSINGER: I am trying to get that. Somebody asked that yesterday. I don't believe the bomb figure could have dropped much because we haven't changed the type of airplane. Somebody asked me that at the press briefing yesterday. I am trying to put it together. If that should change, I will let you all know.

But since we haven't introduced any new types of planes, since their carrying capacity couldn't have increased much, I would think that the bomb tonnage ought to reflect these percentages. If it is wrong, I will let you know.

Q Have you increased the gunships?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we have increased the gunships. We have about doubled the gunships. Again, this is based on the Lam Son operation. If you include the Lam Son operation, we have increased the gunships. But they don't drop bombs. Most of those are used on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Most of the increase has been used on the Ho Chi Minh Trail to interrupt truck driving.

Q These reeuctions relate to a reduction in the strength of the Air Force in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. They are a result of our policy, and our policy leads to a reduction. We are reducing the strength of the Air Force and we are doing it

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[LC]

as part of a deliberate policy to reduce our involvement.

The number of wings, and you can get the exact figure,-- the number of air wings in Southeast Asia has been reduced by a significant percentage. I don't know what it is.

Q The Tac air reduction has been compensated by an increase in the South Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: No, not exactly. The South Vietnamese -- well, to give you an example, between January and February, in terms of numbers, 1969, we flew some 53,000 Tac air sorties. I don't know whether these figures aren't classified, but I just want to give you a feel for it.

In January-February, 1971, we flew something like 26,000. So that is a cut in half. In that same period, the South Vietnamese went from 3,800 to 6,500. In other words, we dropped by 27,000 and they went up by 2,500. They went from 3,800 to 6,500. In other words, they took up 10 percent of our reduction.

We went down by 27,000 and they went up by 2,800.

They cannot operate in the foreseeable future at the scale at which we have operated, and they have to look for other means of interdiction than we do. They cannot operate in the future at the profligate scale that we are used to.

Secondly, it means also that the replacing of Air Forces is a much more slower process than the present placement of ground forces, partly because of the material and partly because it takes longer to train them.

But we are not attempting to replace them one for one. It will be a more complex war for them from that point of view. It is less complex technically and more complex strategically.

Q Can you go into the residual force?

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[LC]

DR. KISSINGER: I would think that the over-
whelming majority of what would be left would be Air Force
and logistics.

Q You haven't mentioned the Navy.

DR. KISSINGER: Navy sorties are included. This
includes everything of the U. S.

Q There is some reference to using our bombers
out of Thailand. (Inaudible tape.)

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on
what may be possible further down the road. The shape of
the debate in this country is changing with such extra-
ordinary rapidity. I remember three years ago it used to
be considered the height of enlightenment to believe that
negotiations were a useful way of ending the war.

Today, it is considered by many the height of
obtuseness to believe that negotiations can still be
a means of ending the war.

There used to be a time when it used to be said
that we should substitute Vietnamese for Americans. Now
that is under attack.

So I don't want to speculate what would be the
position.

The view that the President has taken is this:
There is nothing that has been given more prayerful
attention than how to end this war. There is no glory for
anybody in ending this war except if we can have a society
that can continue to function after the war. We have never
given up the hope that there will be some point along the
way where reasonable people in this country will conclude
that while they may disagree with this or that tactic, we
have moved in the direction that responsible individuals
can subscribe to, and that we have kept, in general, the
promises that we have made, and those that we may for some
reason be not able to fulfill, which hasn't happened yet,
would be due to overwhelming circumstances that couldn't
be foreseen.

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[Lc]

We believe that we have to give the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to stand on their own feet, and that what would happen to the American body politic if an American President, after seven years of war and 40,000 casualties, consciously turned the country over to the Communists, would be something from which we would suffer for many years, even if there is a temporary feeling of relief in the immediate aftermath of such a settlement.

We cannot be responsible for all eternity for the survival of a government in Saigon. What we can do is to leave it in a condition where, with good conscience, reasonable people can say, "They ought to be able to do it."

That is the difference between us and some of our critics. Some of our critics feel, "Just turn it over." We feel we want to give them a reasonable chance. We cannot guarantee it for the indefinite future.

We think we are within sight in a measurable period of that objective. Whether that will take, at that particular point, bombing from Thailand depends partly also on what Hanoi is going to do.

It is true that in the early part of the war we grossly underestimated Hanoi's determination and capacity. But it is also true that at this juncture of the war we are at a point where Hanoi's capacities, at least, are not what they used to be.

It isn't a foregone conclusion that South Vietnam, with American materials of the kind that have been used, should not be able to prevent itself from being overrun after the interim period we are still now talking about. This is what this is all about.

I know this is an evasive answer. I don't know what the situation will be.

It is one thing to have the President under attack on unemployment or the normal debate of American politic. It is another to have the credibility in such an anguishing problem under constant attack.

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[L.C.]

We still haven't given up the hope that somewhere along the road we are going to find a consensus again on what surely isn't a partisan problem. The Vietnam war just isn't a partisan problem. It is a national tragedy.

Q Dr. Kissinger, at the last news conference the President was asked whether the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, United States withdrawal, was contingent upon the enemy withdrawing from Laos and Cambodia.

Our own problem cannot be told until the enemy is out of those neighboring countries.

Can you explain the significance of that?

DR. KISSINGER: I said until we get the consensus we have to do what is right, because we have to be able to live with ourselves afterwards. This is the basis of the President's policy on Laos and Cambodia.

The President was talking about a negotiated settlement. We believe, as we expressed in our October 7th speech, that a final settlement in Indochina would have to embrace Cambodia and Laos.

On an OFF-THE-RECORD basis, the southern part of Laos is of more central importance to the future of South Vietnam than the northern part of Laos. This has been well-established over the record of the last 10 years.

For example, if we had a cease-fire, which is part of our proposal, only in South Vietnam, but the war in Cambodia continued, what would happen or could happen is that the North Vietnamese would put all their forces into Cambodia, knock over Cambodia, reestablish their supply lines from the sea to the sanctuaries, and then having reestablished their supply position which gave them the strong position prior to our incursions into the Cambodian sanctuaries, then turn back into South Vietnam and break the cease-fire there.

This is why a cease-fire in both places has to be an integral package. We think the same about withdrawal of forces if it is part of a negotiated settlement. If it is not part of a negotiated settlement, then we would leave

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[Lc]

under conditions which are foreseeable, in which the South Vietnamese would have a capability to protect themselves even against remaining North Vietnamese forces, and enough of a capability to prevent those North Vietnamese forces from reestablishing sanctuary areas in conjunction with whatever Cambodian forces are available. So we have those two tracks.

The Cambodian war is a tough one for the North Vietnamese to fight unless they have a port which they can operate, because it is a 600-mile supply line, while the South Vietnamese have a 50- to 100-mile supply line.

On the other hand, until they have secured Cambodian bases, their conduct of the war in Military Regions 3 and 4 is very complex. This is why we think on purely military grounds the Hanoi situation is not all that brilliant.

We are not saying that they are going to be defeated. We are saying they are getting into a position where they may not be able to win in a manageable period.

Q Sir, would you discuss the August and October elections of South Vietnam in the light of what Senator Stevenson has lately said and what is being said of the USIA, in brief, that we are supporting the Thieu Government and that it is an illegitimate government, and Big Minh is the answer to all this? Have you heard this?

DR. KISSINGER: At the risk of weakening my tenuous relationship with the Senate, I must confess I haven't read what Senator Stevenson has said.

Are you telling me that USIA has put out that Big Minh is our hope?

Q Mr. Stevenson has accused USIA of campaigning for the sitting regime. I went over there and they said no.

DR. KISSINGER: USIA said that?

Q A person of USIA just back. This is off the record.

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[Lc]

DR. KISSINGER: Just get me his name so I can get at it.

Let me be serious about it. Our position is that we want the election as free as it can possibly be; that we do not, as a Government, take any position in favor of one candidate or the other.

You gentlemen have been in Vietnam and you know the facts of life. I do not exclude that there are some people in some departments there who favor one fellow and some who favor another fellow. So I cannot guarantee that as you go around Saigon you cannot meet officials, some of whom say Thieu is the only man to run the government, and others who say Big Minh is the hope for the future. I can't exclude that.

As a government, no one has any authority to take any side in the election, and I am not aware of anything that is being done.

Let me make the comment not in reply to Senator Stevenson since I haven't read what Senator Stevenson has said. Insofar as an Ambassador is accredited to the functioning government, it is fairly common that he tends to be accused of favoring the existing government, because that is the government he deals with.

No doubt those are the people that on human grounds he knows best, and no doubt if you went around the world the majority of the Ambassadors prefer the status quo to which they are used.

Q The exception being Chile.

DR. KISSINGER: They are not used to it yet. Give it six years.

Well, there are obvious exceptions. I don't know whether Bunker privately would prefer Thieu. I am not aware of anything that we are doing that is deliberately beyond the normal government contact that favors Thieu.

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[Lc]

Having said this, let me make some qualifications of, I think, what has to be a fair judgment.

I think all of you who know Vietnam recognize that the incumbent in Vietnam has unusual advantages, with or without the American Ambassador. In Vietnam, the tendency seems to be that a government is popular because it is strong, it isn't strong because it is popular. Therefore, a man who governs and controls the administrative apparatus has some advantages.

I think this is inherent in the situation, and I don't deny that. Therefore, I don't even know how we would go about intervening beyond the advantages that he already enjoys.

But we want the election with this qualification, about which we can't do anything: to be as free as possible, with the widest possible participation.

As far as Washington is concerned, we will not favor any American intervention. Is Big Minh the hope? I don't want to express an opinion on that. I think we will just stay out of the election campaign.

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[Lc]

Q Doctor, I would like to ask you about on page two of the President's speech last night where he rates the impact of the Laos operation as being more disruptive of the enemy supply lines and their capability of sustaining major offenses than were the operations in Cambodia. That is a little startling in some ways considering the highly descriptive terminology used on the South Vietnamese retreat. Can you tell us what is behind this statement?

DR. KISSINGER: I know I have talked to Marquis about it. We have, over the last three weeks, tried to make as thorough an analysis of the impact of the Laotion operations as we could. We are reaching a point now in our withdrawal policy where, first of all, every increment of withdrawal becomes a larger percentage of the total.

Secondly, where we are reaching margins where, if our judgments are wrong, we are going to pay a dramatic price. We have no safety nets into which we can fall.

Thus, we believe that it isn't in the interest of this country -- we are not talking now about the Administration -- to suffer another calamity, like Tet, in which three years of effort are exposed as an inadequate understanding of the situation, not because of the future of this Administration, which would also be affected by it, but because of the future of confidence in the Government itself.

Therefore, we have spent the last three weeks making the most thorough analysis of which we are capable. This doesn't guarantee that it is right. I just want to tell you that we are not flippantly going at this. I don't want to bore you with how we did it.

What we tried to do, just to run through it very quickly, is we tried to determine the requirement of the North Vietnamese in conducting their level of military operations in South Vietnam in 1970, how many supplies they needed.

Q 1971?

DR. KISSINGER: No, what impact they consumed in 1970. We analyzed then where they got those supplies from,

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[Lc]

the portion that came in through Sihanoukville, the portion
that was bought on the open economy, and the portion that was
brought down the trail. We then looked at how they had
to meet these requirements.

Q Can you give us that breakdown?

DR. KISSINGER: The percentage? I don't want to give
you the figures but I can give you the percentage. Eighty
percent of the ordnance -- let me tell you what they had to repla
I won't go into the figures. They had to replace several
thousand tons of ordnance that came in through Sihanoukville,
and another several thousand tons of purchases on the open
market.

You have to consider also that in order to get one
ton into Cambodia or South Vietnam we calculate they have to
put three or four tons into the pipeline when it comes down the
trail because they lose some of it to bombing, and they consume
the rest of it on the way in the form of POL and rice.

In order to get one ton out at the other end, that
is pretty well established, that they need three or four
tons at the upper end of the pipeline.

This is why Sihanoukville was so important to them,
because every ton they put into Sihanoukville was a
genuine ton. 100 percent or 98 percent of what went into
Sihanoukville reached their depots, while only 25 to 30
percent of what entered the trail reaches the bottom.

And finally, after the Cambodian operation they
kept 20,000 more in anticipation of Lam Son, and we can't
claim Lam Son except for the anticipation of it. And in
anticipation of Lam Son they kept 20,000 more troops in
Laos than they had last year, which meant that a big
slice of what was put into the trail was consumed in
Laos and never left.

We then attempted to compute the caches that were
picked up in the Lam Son operation, the consumption of
supplies to support the Third Division in six weeks of
combat during the Lam Son operation.

Some very rough estimates of bombing damage in which

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[lc]

3

I am sure our estimate is very low because we through out all ridiculous assertions.

I will give you an example of that in a minute.

We came up with the conclusion that the total of all of that is actually, in terms of tonnage, greater than of Cambodia. But it isn't the tonnage that matters so much. Let me put it in other terms.

We now believe, and we may be wrong -- you know, this is just telling you what our judgment is -- that if they operate the trails at full capacity until the end of May, and if you assume that these trails have not been affected by six weeks of combat across them, and if you assume that the rainy season doesn't begin until the first of June, under all these favorable assumptions for them they will barely get in supplies for a protracted warfare strategy for the year 1971.

Q Would you repeat that? I didn't quite get that.

DR. KISSINGER: They will just meet their requirements to maintain the '70 level of combat in '71.

But this gives them a lot of favorable assumptions. Let me tell you what assumptions we made that favor them for us to come to this conclusion.

We assumed, for example, that we are not destroying any more by air of their trucks than we did last year, which was probably wrong.

We are assuming that the mix of cargoes is the same as it was last year, when in fact probably they have to carry a lot more gasoline now because of the destruction of the pipeline.

We are assuming that they could use the roads again from the day the South Vietnamese troops withdrew until the end of May. And we are assuming that they can use the roads until the end of May at full capacity.

In those circumstances we believe they can just meet

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[lc]

- 15 -

the requirements for protracted warfare through 1971.

Let me put this into perspective. That doesn't mean they cannot have high points, because they can forego protracted warfare in one military region and pour it all into another military region.

They are under no requirement to keep up protracted warfare at a uniform level throughout the country. All we can say is it reduces their flexibility. It doesn't reduce some choices.

They cannot cut protracted warfare below a certain level for this reason: We have an indicator here of governmental pacification that is somewhat more rigorous and complex than the official one. It doesn't matter why it is more rigorous. At any rate, it is more rigorous.

We have found that if, by our indicators, governmental control in an area gets to be more than 75 percent, that then the North Vietnamese problem becomes very tough because then they can only fight conventional war. Then they have to give up guerrilla war. Then they cannot coordinate guerrilla and conventional war effectively.

They may not pick it out by those percentages, but their strategy has to be to keep governmental control below the 75 percent level.

One of the great achievements of the last year which cannot get reported in newspapers because there is no dramatic announcement to be made is that in military regions three and four the vast majority of the provinces now have a control level above 75 percent, or at least the majority of the provinces.

The result of this is if they step down their protracted war level too low, if the government makes spectacular pacification gains, when they come back they can only come back with a general offensive and they may not even be able to do protracted war. So that is their problem.

This is what the President had in mind. We believe

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[L]

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through the rest of this year they cannot do a general offensive in military regions three and four, and they probably cannot do many high points.

We believe they can probably not do a general offensive in military regions one and two, but they can do a series of high points. We expect a series of high points in military region one and two this summer.

They will have to spend a good part of next year's dry season, assuming there is no interruption, building their stockpiles if they want to launch a general offensive in 1972.

This is the basis for the President's assertion. Of course, we paid a heavier price to get these achievements, but without the Laotion operation we believe that they would have been in a position to do a general offensive in military regions one and two, and some high points in military regions three and four, with no general offensive.

Q: This year?

DR. KISSINGER: This year.

Q: Do you feel that the President's speech has somewhat or substantially altered the debate over Vietnam in the United States or is likely to in the coming months?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know. I really don't know. What the President has said is that if this doesn't do it, he doesn't know what else he can do. All he can do is to tell the American people what, in his best judgment, is needed for the peace of the country and for the peace of the world. He isn't doing it because there is any great glory in this war. He isn't doing it because it is not painless for him, to put it mildly. But he feels that we would be ashamed of ourselves as a people if we succumbed now to a policy that has no clear direction, and that after a momentary period of relief if the war were just wound up, and the full implications of what we have done sank in on us, we would be torn, as he said --we would substitute

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the agony of recrimination, or whatever it is, for the agony
of war, and that would be a more permanent scar.

He feels this because he also believes we are
close to achieving what we said, and he has put his political
position on the line. That is the test of a democracy. We
don't know whether it will work or not. What we all hope for
here is that it is to end the war as a united people, and to
see whether there is some way of stopping the constant
escalation of oppression. But we can't be sure.

Q You said something earlier about hoping that
reasonable people would accept the Administration's policy
or the reasoning behind it. Is it feasible, politically,
at any point for you to reduce the rate of withdrawal?

DR. KISSINGER: We have always tried to reach a rate
of withdrawal that we had some confidence in being able
to sustain. I tell you, I think that if we came to the
conclusion that something were necessary, what the President
feels is that after all this country has gone through now for
seven years, when you take some of the debates about with-
drawal rate -- we can play with numbers as well as the next
guy. We are now at 14,300. Well, why not 16,275, or
18,103? You can juggle these figures to a fair-thee-well.

Our judgment is, on these withdrawal rate, there
are only two positions: Either you get out now or you get
out responsibly. The worst thing you can do is to play
around.

I don't want to say getting out now wouldn't be
responsible. We obviously think it isn't. But you
either get out now or you get out in the way that we
believe will achieve the objective of giving the South
Vietnamese a reasonable chance.

The worst thing you can do is to invent a
withdrawal rate that gives you great headlines for the
day, and the process unravels the situation in South Vienam
and makes it impossible for you to have achieved your
objective.

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Then you will have combined the disadvantage of a relatively slow rate -- because it doesn't speed it up that much. You will have combined the disadvantages of a slow rate with the disadvantages of a failure.

We do not now foresee that we have to change it, but we don't want to commit to it. I think if we come to the conclusion, what we have put before the American people up to now is something that in our conscience we believe we could sustain, and being that close to the end we would like to keep that record.

I believe what we would do if we came to that conclusion, which isn't probable, is we would expect to go to the American people.

Q (Inaudible)

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Wilson, you know, of course, that I will never admit this. It is one thing I will not admit. I may admit mistakes, but I won't admit we haven't given consideration to something. That is the job of my office.

Historians might say whether the fastest way of ending the war at some point might be never to withdraw until you have a satisfactory settlement. That is not an outrageous proposition to make.

I remember it is now way down the drain in terms of public opinion, but about two and a half years ago when we first came in a number of my dovish friends from the academic community were arguing that one should not withdraw but negotiate, and one should just sit and use the troops to negotiate. And, of course, I have to tell you honestly this is the race we are running, that the rate of withdrawal itself may have turned out to be impossible. In this sense we have to relate what is domestically bearable to what is possible. We believe we have struck a balance here, but it is going to be a close one. It is going to be a very close race.

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[Lc]

Q I think the President has created some confusion with respect to the residual force, which would in no way mean we were out of there in total. But in the absence of a negotiated settlement, in your judgment, is a Korea-type of solution feasible and is it a logical or reasonable type of solution if we get no negotiated settlement at all?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, in Korea, of course, you had a residual force as a result of a negotiated settlement and you didn't have casualties of any substantial size.

I am just not an expert on what the American people will support, as an individual, not speaking for the Administration.

I think in three or four years -- don't say a White House spokesman said this, or an ex-professor -- we will look back on this period and wonder what had possessed us all. I think this will look to us as a period in which there was a sort of mass obsession suddenly. This is why it is important for government to hold steady.

Q Don't you think (inaudible)

DR. KISSINGER: We are not aiming for that. I just don't want to speculate. You know what I am doing. I once said the difference between the European press and the American press is the European press asks the conceptual questions, and the American press engages me in a contest to see whether they can get me to say something that I don't really want to say.

You know I don't want to say anything about terminal dates. Therefore, we may be engaged in a game of skills to see whether I will give a terminal date.

Q But the fact is the President has engaged in terms of terminal dates. He has set a goal, which would indicate a terminal date. Yet in the light of everything you said, is that attainable under a situation which would give it a reasonable chance to work?

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[lc]

DR. KISSINGER: If it were not for the prisoners. We believe that somewhere in the next year a point can be reached. If you are asking me simply can they maintain themselves, I don't want to get to the time when that is feasible.

Can we have two more questions? I am late to a meeting of the new Committee of International Economic Policy.

Q (Question inaudible.)

DR. KISSINGER: This may be true. We may have gained more time. You gentlemen are in a much better position than I to judge that. I know for a fact that nothing the President said yesterday, no decision he made, was in any way affected by his reading of the Calley thing.

In fact, the outcome may be affected by the Calley thing, but the general direction in which he was going to go, and even the specific were quite independent of the Calley thing. Even if it turned out that it has the impact that you describe.

Whenever you want to, get to the last question.

Q Have you anything on the prisoners of war?

DR. KISSINGER: Really none. I don't want to talk about gut feelings and impressions. None on the prisoners separate from other issues, anyway. As all of you know, I have always believed that somewhere along the line there would be a negotiation. There was a chance of a negotiation. That is a view that, if anything, I have now strengthened. This, I know, is not the common view.

I have been told by some people who deal with the prisoner thing that they detect a slight possibility now, but I don't want to say anything because, really, I have been meeting with the wives of the POWs, and I am conscious of what they have gone through. I think their hopes have been raised too often.

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[Lc]

I think the next time we say something we ought to say something positive. So I cannot tell you that I have anything on that.

Mr. Wilson?

Q (Question inaudible.)

DR. KISSINGER: Well, look, I am not here to give a press conference of my personal philosophy. If any of you want to pursue that at some point, as long as it is clearly understood that this is I speaking as an individual, as a philosopher of history, which is what I started at, I would be glad to do it. But I really would prefer not to do it when it gets mixed up.

You know, it is a tragic period in our history. I would say that you can't run a society on victories, on reconciliations. We have to ask ourselves where we want to be at some period. There has to be a margin or ambiguity in every tough decision in government. You cannot prove that you make it. This is what makes it tough. If it were self-evident, everybody would know.

In societies which have a measure of cohesiveness, there is enough confidence to give a government the margin that is necessary, that is inherent in the ambiguity of complex decisions.

And when that is constantly under attack, then it may be that the whole problem of government becomes unmanageable. This is independent of the correctness of any individual policy.

I would like to go into this issue, and if any of you want to, as long as it is clearly understood I am speaking for myself, and it is a long subject. It is the key question, in my judgment, of our time. If anyone wants to ask a last substantive question, I will take it.

Q At the time the President made the last announcement prior to last night, he indicated that in April (inaudible)

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[lc]

Last night he didn't say anything beyond December
1. We were able to speculate, most of us (inaudible)

What will be our thinking as to after December 1?
Will there be a Thanksgiving announcement as to where we
will stand through the following six months? Where do we
go from here?

DR. KISSINGER: In the past, there has always been
an announcement about two weeks, give or take a week,
before the end of one period. So if that pattern is
followed -- well, I don't want to speculate. Every time
one of these announcements draws near, everyone starts
escalating them. I would hope it is reasonable to assume
that in that time frame the President would say how he
envisions the next period with which he would proceed.

Q (Inaudible.)

DR. KISSINGER: I am sure that you will find many
people in this town who will be eager to answer that
question. But I really don't think it serves any purpose.
In the past, we have maintained the rate of withdrawal
we have established, but we want to make a judgment when
it draws nearer.

At this point when we have just completed an
investigation of what we can do over a foreseeable
future, it would be irresponsible for me to speculate on
what we will do at the end of this year.

Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

April 8, 1971

AT 9:45 A.M. EST

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The vast preponderance of the sorites -- I haven't worked out the percentage yet, but 22 out of 7,000 -- about 20 percent of all air sorties are in Laos. In other words, in the unpopulated part of Southeast Asia.

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I am telling you that we are trying to find out
and we are trying to be responsible about it. The per-
centages I gave you are firm and reliable. The figures
of civilians killed are not reliable and are very hard to
come by.

DR. KISSINGER: I am trying to get that. Some-
body asked that yesterday. I don't believe the bomb
figure could have dropped much because we haven't changed
the type of airplane. Somebody asked me that at the
press briefing yesterday. I am trying to put it together.
If that should change, I will let you all know.

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, we have increased the gun-
ships. We have about doubled the gunships. Again, this is
based on the Lam Son operation. If you include the Lam Son
operation, we have increased the gunships. But they don't
drop bombs. Most of those are used on the Ho Chi Minh
Trail. Most of the increase has been used on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail to interrupt truck driving.

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