EICJ

# SOME RESULTS OF ECONOMIC PLANNING IN POLAND

Extracts from Mr. Gomulka's speech to the VIIIth Plenum
of the PZPR (Polish Communist Party) Central Committee
on October 20, 1956

My reservations to the VIIth Plenum resolutions as regard the evaluation of the past cover economic and political problems. The reservations concern both the merits of the evaluation as well as the responsibility of people for the errors and distortions committed, a responsibility stemming from this evaluation.

The Seventh Plenum resolutions refer to the achievements attained and errors committed in the course of the Six Year Plan. The resolutions cite the extensive expansion at that time of the productive capacity of our industry, especially of heavy industry, as the most important result of the Six Year Plan, outweighing all others.

I am far from belittling any of the achievements of our country. All of us, just as the entire nation, rejoice at the increase and growth of the production of our industry. I have no grounds to doubt the given indexes of increase of industrial production. I accept them as true. There are however certain "buts" which force me to make a reappraisal of the evaluation of our economic achievements during the past Six Year Plan.

Let us examine the achievements of the Six Year Plan in coal mining. In 1949, that is in the last year of the Three Year Plan, coal production amounted to over 74 million tons. In 1955, that is in the last year of the Six Year Plan, the corresponding figure was 94.5 million tons. These figures indicate that coal output went up by over 20 million tons, and this could really be deemed a considerable achievement if this rise meant an increase of the mining industry's productive capacity.

But statistical data reveal that in 1955 miners worked 92,634,000 hours overtime, and this constitutes 15.5 percent of the total number of hours worked in this time. Calculated in terms of coal, this amounts to 14.6 million tons of coal extracted outside normal working hours.

Let us go further and see what labor productivity was like in mining at that time. In 1949 coal output per working day per worker throughout the industry amounted to 1,328 kilograms. In 1955 it dropped to 1,163 kilograms, that is, by 12.4 percent. If we compare coal output per worker employed underground, this drop mounts to 7.7 percent per working day. In relation to 1938, which for various reasons cannot be taken as a basis of comparison but illustrates the present state of the coal mines, output per working day per person employed in the mining industry dropped in 1955 by 36 percent.

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The economic policy in relation to the mining industry was marked by unpardonable thoughtlessness. The system of work on Sundays was introduced, and this could not but ruin the health and strength of the miners, and at the same time made it difficult to maintain colliery installations in proper working order. The practice was also introduced of employing soldiers and prisoners in some of the collieries. Mining personnel has not been stabilized and changes every year in a vast percentage. This policy could not but undermine the coal extraction plan; it could not but lead to the present state of the collieries.

Comrades, here is a second example. At the cost of tremendous investments, we built an automobile factory in Zeran. New industrial establishments have come into being, establishments which produce at disproportionately high production costs only limited numbers of automobiles of an old type which consume plenty of fuel, automobiles which today hardly anyone produces in the world. Can the construction of an industrial establishment of this kind be called a contribution to the productive capacity of our industry? What kind of benefits can the national economy draw from this?

Generally speaking, after the conclusion of the Six Year Plan, which according to its premises was meant to raise high the standard of living of the working class and of the entire nation, we are faced today, in the first year of the Five Year Plan, with immense economic difficulties which are growing from day to day.

We contracted important investment credits for the expansion of industry, and when the time came for the payment of the first installment, we found ourselves in the situation of an insolvent bankrupt. We had to ask our creditors for a moratorium. In the meantime a considerable part of these credits in the shape of machines and installations has so far found no application in production and will not find any such application for long years to come, and part of it must be considered irretrievably lost.

The balance of payments in the Five Year Plan shows a considerable deficit despite the moratorium granted us and the postponement until the next Five Year Plan of the payment of one half of the sums due to be paid during the current Five Year Plan. In this situation the reality of the Five Year Plan which has been worked out is greatly impaired. We know the danger of the lack of a sufficient number of marketable goods on the domestic market in relation to the amount of monetary means.

Do the resolutions of the Seventh Plenum speak of all that? They do not. Of course, the fact that the resolutions give a milder appraisal of the past is not of the greatest importance. What is essential is that a precise economic analysis is indispensable for a correct working out of the plans for the future. Such facts as have been cited can in no way be passed over in silence, for it should be said clearly that the whole nation--and in the first place the working class--has to pay for a bad economic policy.

The Central Committee of the Party has failed, at least, to draw the necessary Party consequences with regard to the people who hear the responsibility for this state of affairs.

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In the agricultural sector of the national economy, whose definition at the Seventh Plenum has caused reservations in my mind, we also find phenomena on which every responsible man should reflect profoundly and from which he should draw the necessary conclusions.

Beginning in 1949, that is in the course of the past six years, the Party began the campaign for the collectivization of agricultural production. During that period, some 10,000 cooperative farms were set up, affiliating some six percent of peasant farmsteads. In our conditions, just as in the conditions of every country which does not have a surplus of land at its disposal, rural policy should be characterized by a sustained effort to intensify agricultural production. Poland can nourish its population from its own resources only through increasing yields, through increasing agricultural production per hectare of land.

Let us see what is the value of the overall product, calculated in constant prices per one hectare of land in all sectors of our agricultural economy, that is, in individual economy, on cooperative farms, and on state farms under the Ministry of State Farms. All data quoted pertain to 1955. There was 78.8 percent of farmland in the possession of individual farmsteads. Income-dividing cooperatives were in the possession of 8.6 percent, and the state farms of 12.6 percent of the total area of farm land owned by these three types of farms. The overall produce as produced by these farms, taken as 100 is divided as follows: individual 83.9 percent, cooperative farms, including cottage allotments, 7.7 percent, and state farms, including auxiliary holdings of agricultural workers, 8.4 percent.

The results of livestock production on cooperatives and state farms were particularly unfavorable. Taking total livestock production as 100, individual farms produced 91 percent, cooperatives 4 percent, and state farms 5 percent.

When estimating the value of overall production per hectare of arable land, we arrive at the following picture: Individual farms 621.1 zlotys, cooperative farms 517.3 zlotys, and state farms 393.7 zlotys, at constant prices. Thus the difference between individual and cooperative farms amounts to 16.7 percent, while in comparison with state farms, individual farm production was higher by 37.2 percent.

When comparing the obligations of individual and cooperative farms from the point of view of the quota deliveries for the state and of land tax, we find that these obligations, estimated per hectare, are smaller on cooperative farms than on individual farms, particularly with regard to land tax. The difference in these obligations to the advantage of the cooperative farms constitutes an actual state grant for cooperative farms.

Another item is represented by the additional payments for services given by the state machine stations to cooperative farms. The total of these additional payments in the years 1952 to 1955 amounts to about 1.7 billion zlotys.

It follows from the annual reports of cooperative farms for the year 1955 that in fixing the workday wage the principle was adopted that it was necessary to establish a certain minimum income as a workday wage regardless of the economic

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results of the given cooperative farm. The average workday wage on all cooperative farms in the country is about 25 zlotys, the produce-making part of the workday wage being estimated at free market prices. Differences between various cooperative farms with regard to the scale of the workday wage are not great, particularly with regard to the part of the wage paid in kind.

Since not all cooperative farms were able to pay the accepted workday wage minimum--for the results of their production prevented them from doing so--a comparatively simple solution was found: payments, or parts of payments, arising from other obligations of the cooperative farms with regard to the state and due in 1955 were delayed and transferred to the following years. The financial means which should have been used for these payments were allocated to the workday wage fund. On the national scale this sum amounts to over 500 million zlotys. In this way this distribution in some cooperative farms was radically increased, which made it possible to raise the workday wage by some 27 percent.

Irrespective of these forms of state assistance, the cooperative farms received important credits from the State. Long- and medium-term obligations to the cooperative farms amounted on December 31, 1955, to over 1.6 billion zlotys, and their short-term obligations to over 900 million zlotys.

It can be added that the cooperative farms availed themselves of preferential treatment also in the purchase of artificial fertilizers. This is in brief an outline of the economic picture of cooperative farms. It is a sad picture. In spite of great outlays, they had smaller results and greater costs of production. I do not mention the political aspect of the problem.

It is for the above reasons that I have reservations as to the resolutions of the VIIth Plenum as regards the part concerning the agricultural policy of the Party, mapped out at the Vth Plenum of the Central Committee.

When examining our economic reality we find in it also other features giving cause to profound concern. The practice of the implementation of the Six Year Plan was that on certain selected sectors a maximum of investment outlays were concentrated, without taking into consideration other fields of economic life. And yet, the national economy constitutes an integral whole; it is impossible to favor excessively certain branches of the economy at the expense of others, for the loss of proper proportions causes harm to the economy as a whole. Particular concern must be aroused by the housing problem in the countryside. Whereas in towns and settlements, where the housing situation is also very difficult, a great effort is being put into new housing, house repairs and maintenance in the countryside are simply an alarming matter.

During the period of the Six Year Plan, about 370,000 rooms were built in the countryside, of which some 260,000 were built individually with the means of the house owners, and some 110,000 were constructed under the socialized building scheme. In 1950 we had over 2.69 million houses in the countryside with over 7.5 million rooms. On the assumption that the average life of a building--considering its postwar condition--is 50 years, we should every year build 150,000 rooms in the countryside in order to maintain the number of rooms existing in 1950. This amounts to about 900,000 rooms for the Six Year Plan, while only 370,000 were built. It must be concluded that during the Six Year Plan about 600,000 rooms fell in ruin or are now in a state of ruin.

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The result of our former practice of planning and management is that we did not implement in the scheduled time the envisaged tasks of the privileged sector, that we froze and wasted tremendous means there, and that we did not create conditions for the liquidation of the economic gaps on those sectors which had been consciously restricted before.

The position is not much better in the field of public services, health resorts, or sanatoriums.

I wish to stress once more: I am far from belittling the achievements of the Six Year Plan. But the appraisal of these achievements must be based on the actual situation, that is, we should view these achievements from the economic position which was our starting point for the Five Year Plan. And this start is accompanied by very great difficulties.

All of us are faced with the problem of how to solve these difficulties, what to do and where to begin in order to overcome all the difficulties and to march forward along a road which would be ever less rough. Much will have to be changed in our former practice in order to reach this goal.

The key to the solution of these great difficulties is in the hands of the working class. Everything, both present-day and future prospects, depends on its attitude. And the attitude of the working class depends on the policy of the Party, as mapped out by its leadership; it depends on the skill in governing the state on the part of the Government and all the supreme organs of the state.

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CONFIDENTIAL

ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND

WHICH LED TO THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

This paper was written at the end of October 1956, within the week following the VIIIth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party, by a Polish observer who actively participated in the events he describes.

The footnotes were added later by the Secretariat, in order to bring up-to-date certain of the information it contains.

Although the movement toward democratization in Poland is a direct consequence of the XXth Congress and of the deep changes which we have witnessed during these last few years in Soviet politics, it has nevertheless a specifically "Polish" character, placing it in the forefront of similar developments in the communist world.

This is due to the following reasons:

(a) it was started within the Party already in 1955, that is before Khrouchtchev's revelations contained in his second report;

(b) the existence of opposing tendencies within the Central Committee of the P.Z.P.R. (Polish Communist Party);

(c) the leadership of the fight for democratization was taken over by young people already brought up in People's Poland who were until recently completely under the influence of the Party's leadership.

Concerning (a) - The processes of democratization began with the V Plenum (during Bierut's lifetime) when the Party decided to tighten its control over the Security organs and act against bureaucracy within the Party and the Unions. This was, however, hidden from the nation which could only acquaint itself with the comments printed in "Trybuna Ludu." Nevertheless the forces within the nation (and also within the Party) which realized the impasse of the economic policy and which wanted a greater margin of individual freedom, took the offensive.

It seems that this was the moment when the Party, or to be more precise its leadership, lost the game. For instead of taking over the lead of the new budding forces in the nation and becoming the champion of the democratization within the socialist framework, the Party leadership, contrary to its own decisions, which started it all, took refuge in indecision. Lower down the ladder, many Party officials openly opposed the application of the decision of the V Plenum.

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As a result, popular pressure in favor of democratization operated in opposition to the Party instead of under its auspices. The Party, which started it all, was pushed into a defensive position. In these conditions, the relatively widespread distribution of Khrouchtchev's second report not only shook the people and caused a more or less serious collapse of the more intelligent and honest Party members, but it became the decisive factor which turned the pressure for liberalization into a spontaneous and elemental movement, making rapid progress and escaping the control of Party leadership.

It is difficult therefore to speak -- as certain Western papers do -- of the possibility of the Party "stopping" the democratization in Poland or of a comeback of Stalinist methods. This is so because -- at least in present-day conditions -- it is an elemental force, to which the Party tries to adapt itself but which it does not control. (1)

Concerning (b) - Popular pressure, the difficult economic situation and finally the events in Poznan, had varying effects on the Party leadership. A division appeared between those in favour of the growing political and economic democratization, and those opposed to it. The dividing line was not as clear cut as the Western press pretended. Moreover, while the discussions within the Central Committee went on, some of the opponents of democratization changed sides (more or less sincerely).

These discussions at the top, together with the now open discontent of the nation voicing its claims brought about a period which could be called "laisser faire, laisser passer." To cover up this lack of control by the Party, it was said that the Party was "expecting initiatives from below." This "initiative," which is nothing else but a popular pressure on the Party, started coming from all directions. Many factories came out against old organizational forms, putting forth proposals inspired by the Yugoslav model. At the present moment, hundreds of factories already operate on the basis of financial autonomy. Their experience will be transmitted to other concerns. This movement is apparent in every field. (2) People want change, which will first of all bring an improvement in living conditions and constitutionally acknowledge the existing freedom of expression. There are no forces in the nation, however, which would strive for a return to pre-war conditions. The Communists succeeded in making the word "socialist" distasteful to many people, but nevertheless nobody put forward demands for structural reforms. (3)

(1) The extensive purge of Stalinist elements which started in November continues unabated.

(2) Since October, this movement has spread throughout Polish industry.

(3) This is still true today.

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During these last few months, the differences of opinion within the Central Committee began to center around the person of Gomulka.

The deepening split within the Party leadership enabled the forces within the nation striving for liberalization to use the breach and achieve new successes.

It is significant that the whole of the Party's leadership, irrespective of its opinions, started bidding for popularity. This could only be done by appearing to be in favor of liberalization, and both its supporters and its opponents started competing against each other. This in turn stimulated people's ambitions and permitted the enlargement of bridgeheads in what is called the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Concerning (c) - Although in the present situation it is difficult to single out the force or social group which leads the struggle against the present Party leadership, as well as against the prevailing forms of Sovieto-Polish relations, young people of the age group 20-30, that is, the generation which was already brought up by the regime and steeped in Marxism, Leninism, undoubtedly lead in Poland the great movement in favor of changes. Leading representatives of this generation went through varying lengths (up to three years) of Party schooling.

These young people, whose less valuable members have become demoralized, were by no means starry-eyed idealists. It should be borne in mind that the young intellectuals who first gave the signal were recruited in the great majority from the working class. Their discontent with the regime resulted, on the one hand, from a moral hangover due to a disparity between theory and practice, and, on the other, from the deep dissatisfaction felt by their families and by the whole of the nation.

It seems, therefore, that it is not by chance that the popular pressure for liberalization was centered and crystallized around the Youth weekly "Poprostu." Young people always have a keener sense of wrong and a healthier moral backbone. The communists were unable to destroy it. "Poprostu" seemed to have as its motto the poem of Wazyk: "a poem for grown ups." Of course, one should bear in mind the possibility of publishing such a magazine, which did not exist some four years ago, and which was brought about by the international situation, the changes in Soviet Russia, the V Plenum of the Central Committee of the P.Z.P.R. (Communist Party), and finally by the serious differences of opinion within the Committee itself.

The working class as well as the whole of the nation gave the youth movement full support. Criticism became part of every conversation, of every meeting, private or public. Now as before it was passionate criticism, such as had seldom been witnessed in Polish history, a criticism which was even forgetful of the undoubted communist successes in various economic and social fields since the war. To oppose such criticism would be as hard as opposing a flood.

Nearly the whole of the Warsaw press and some of the provincial papers (although these remained more cautious, being closely controlled by regional

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Party authorities), followed in the footsteps of "Poprostu." This concentrated attack by the press on the shortcomings of the regimes finally convinced the people that criticism is safe. Numerous Party leaders, however, confused cause and effects. During the previous Plenum the majority of speakers considered it a duty to attack the press as responsible for the present unrest, even holding it responsible for the Foznan events. They did not understand that the press gives but a pale reflection of the situation and of the very real discontent of the nation.

Some of the Party leaders tried to intervene through the censorship, which in turn exasperated the press. The September meeting of the Central Board of the Polish Journalists Union passed a resolution requesting the abolition of political censorship and generally restricting it to military matters.

It is characteristic that the countryside and the Church played a relatively minor role in spite of having been for years the target of the propaganda of "Free Europe" and of the "Voice of America." It seems that changes were too rapid for a naturally conservative peasantry to follow. Again, the government's policy, originated nearly three years ago, of helping agriculture, begins to bear fruit. The standard of living of the peasants is certainly rising, and today is higher than that of average workers. In order to get the full range of reasons why feelings in the country are quieter, we should mention a considerable slowing down of collectivization, and even the official disbanding of defective kolkhoses, the maintenance of the same quota of contributions in kind unchanged over two years, as well as large credits for agriculture.

Nevertheless, some of the leaders of the United Peasant Party which not long ago was a complete puppet in the hands of the communists, started trying to regain independence. It is difficult to say, however, to what extent their plans will be backed by the peasants, as the prestige of the Party is negligible. The more active peasantry, seeking avenues of political activity, joined the P.Z.P.R. (Polish Communist Party).

As regards the Church, it seems that the hierarchy, for the sake of peace took an opportunist line, while the regime avoided poking its finger into an ant-hill.

It should be stressed again that it would be wrong to assume that the edge of the liberalization process is directed against the structural forms of the regime. What is more, it is likely that if anybody from outside called for the reintroduction of capitalism in Poland it might result in the regrouping of the younger generation, such as the "Poprostu" crowd, and of an important part of the nation around the Party and its leaders, in defense of the regime. The nation is convinced that, within the framework of the regime, constitutional guarantees of individual freedom, of democratic control of public life, and a substantial betterment of living conditions can be obtained. Twelve years of communist rule has left its mark.

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Reasons for the change of attitude of communist leaders toward Soviet Russia

The communist bloc, as well as all communist parties throughout the world, are at present in the midst of a deep ideological crisis, perhaps the greatest since 1904, when the Russian social-democracy split into menshevik and the bolshevic factions. The revision of the fundamental tenets, considered so far as unquestionable, reaches the very basis of communist ideology. The fundamental doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat has been shaken.

For a non-communist, these things might seem secondary. He should remember, however, that Communism is the contrary of the pragmatic approach, for it means action along lines indicated by theory. If the theory is considered false, then decisions become chance results of composing forces and are no longer a single-minded effort. This is the underlying reason of the crisis afflicting all communist parties and also the Polish United Workers' Party.

But there is another very important element, which is simply the "human factor." It seems that it has a paramount influence on stiffening the attitude of the Party leadership toward Moscow.

Contrary to prevailing opinion in the West, the majority of communist leaders of all levels in Poland are men who in their own way are idealists. These people till recently believed in the greatness and in the truth of their creed. They really believed it was right to discard morality in the fight for the realization of their beliefs.

Khrouchtchev's report, however, was an eye-opener. It proved not only that single acts done for the good of the Party and Socialism were immoral, but that the whole system rested on a huge falsehood. These people therefore gave the best years of their lives, and what they thought to be their most honest efforts, to lying to themselves and to others. Those from "Free Europe" and their like broadcasting about the crimes of Stalinism were right.

The moral and ideological bankruptcy of Stalinism became so evident that only the blind, or thorough opportunists, could deny it (such people exist, but they cannot disregard the feelings of the masses). The outwardly most violent protest came from the young generation, which has so far stood in the forefront of Stalinist formations. They feel most strongly that they have been taken in. But the same feeling was shared by top leaders, although naturally their outward reactions were more moderate and more cautious. Ochab, for instance, in his first speech, as Secretary of the Party, at the Plenum of the Warsaw Committee openly talked of his bitterness, of the time when, as a young man, he fought for Communism, which he thought to be a "good, straight road to a radiant future," and which turned out to be "neither straight nor good."

We might complete the picture by adding that very many Polish communists after the prohibition of the Party in 1938, were sent to Soviet jails and murdered, and that the majority of the present leadership spent some time in Soviet camps.

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Today they know that their arrests and the murder of their friends were not a judicial mistake, nor Beria's provocation, but the result of a system of which they were and still are an integral part.

It seems therefore that a good many communist leaders, while remaining communist in so far as social ideology is concerned, would really like to come out in favor of the generally accepted moral standards. The Foznan trials would tend to prove it. Contrary to Moscow's open accusations of provocation and foreign intervention, Warsaw maintained its own version claiming responsibility for the events. For this is what the trials boil down to. It happened with the consent of the majority of the Party leadership. Otherwise the trials would be organized differently, which should not mean, however, that they would be "shows" of the Moscow type. Again, it would have been easier to stop the trials and proclaim an amnesty, which would be more convenient for the regime than having to bear with the accusations of the witnesses and of the defense at the trials.

It seems that here lies the most important difference between the liberal and the authoritarian tendency. The latter would concede to the masses only as much democratization as necessary to maintain the status quo under another name. In other words, they stand for a relative morality while the liberal wing tends toward an objective morality independent of the social structure. Since this tendency conforms to the desire of the masses, the liberal wing of the Party for the first time in many years is not afraid of appealing to the masses and seeking their support.

The fact that such people as Cyrankiewicz, and even Ochab, who until recently were completely estranged from the nation, when they fought for even a partial liberation of Polish Communism from Russia, became popular among the masses, can be of great importance for the future. This is illustrated by their being able to distribute arms to Warsaw workers. It means that they do not fear the workers, and are sure of being defended in case of a Russian coup or of an attack by the pro-soviet group in the present Central Committee.

In this respect the imposed control over the security apparatus is equally indicative. The whole security system looks like being the major support of the liberalizing wing. The change-over in their organization is not yet completed and there is still the possibility of a conflict between the new Party-imposed leadership of the police and the lower officials who, because of their past and fear for their crimes, are linked with the Soviet regime. However, these people, in order to ingratiate themselves with the masses, might well choose to be in the forefront of the struggle for independence from Moscow. (1)

All this should not lead us to conclude that the communist leadership would like to get Poland out of the Russian alliance. In spite of all adversities,

(1) Widespread purges followed, and a wholesale reorganization of the Security system was undertaken. This risk therefore seems greatly reduced.

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they share the same ideology and they are in need of Russian political and military support, mainly because of the German question. One might have reservations concerning the way the Oder-Niesse frontier was established, but it must be recognized that whatever happened is irreversible. It touches the very existence of the Polish nation and its place in Europe. It is no longer a question of Polish or German nationalism. The present policy of the Bonn Government is disturbing to the Poles. This policy has moreover the backing of the Western powers. Only Russia offers a guarantee of the Oder-Niesse frontier and it causes Poles to take a realistic view of the Soviet alliance.

Who knows however whether, if the present trend in Poland continues, Russia will not make a deal with Bonn at Polish expense? The Warsaw "rebels" would thus be punished and German gratitude would be won. Today such a hypothesis is remote. If it ever happened, however, it would be an equal blow for Poland and for the West.

It might be added that the changes occurring in Poland are extremely dangerous for Russia, for the existence of its empire and for Khrouchtchev's position as author of de-stalinization. He was certainly unaware -- over-estimating the strength of the Soviet apparatus in the whole of the communist bloc -- that his report would release forces over which he would lose control; and which in fact nobody can any longer control. The second act of the October revolution began, and Moscow does not know how it will end. The pressure of the masses is breaking through all accumulated dams.

## Various problems

### The Gomulka story

The group which was backing Gomulka for power in July and August was the so-called Natolin group, which was anti-liberal and pro-soviet. It seems they were acting on Moscow's orders. It included at the time Zenon Nowak, Mazur, Klosiewicz, Witaszewski. Its opponents were in favor of liberalization and counted in their ranks many Poles of Jewish origin, and many intellectuals, and the Natolin group therefore started an anti-semitic campaign and also an attack against intellectuals, and in particular against journalists. An added incentive was the anti-semitism of Khrouchtchev, well-known in Poland. Khrouchtchev, after the death of Bierut, personally intervened against Zambrowski, a Jew, becoming first secretary of the Party.

The Natolin group (now a thing of the past) believed that by helping Gomulka to power it would achieve three things. It would calm down the country, it would enable them to control Gomulka who would feel indebted and would follow Russian instructions, and finally, in return for their backing, Gomulka, whose chances were in any case growing daily, would forgive them their previous hostile attitude to himself.

At the same time (July-August), the liberal wing with Cyrankiewicz, the Prime Minister, at its head, were rather opposed to Gomulka, fearing on his part an adventurous policy both in respect of Russia and of the Stalinist at home.

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In September, the situation underwent a change. First of all, Gomulka refused discussions with the Natolin group and turned toward the liberal wing. On the other hand, the popular demand for Gomulka's return to power increased. At the same time, both Cyrankiewicz and Ochab began to realize that they would not improve the difficult economic situation unless they won the confidence of the nation. This could best be achieved through some spectacular measure and this prompted them to hold conversations with Gomulka. As a result of all this, the Natolin group began to fade, many of its supporters withdrawing into neutrality. Witaszewski, the head of the political department of the Army, remained as the principal diehard.

Moscow, which originally backed Gomulka and hoped to reach an agreement with him, started taking a hostile attitude. It proved, however, to be too late. Gomulka's coming to power was unavoidable. Ochab had his last decisive talks with him in September, and practically relinquished power in his favor. One of Gomulka's first decisions, still carried out by Ochab, was the nomination of his friend General Komar, former chief of the Counter-Intelligence, arrested and cruelly tortured during the years 1952-55, at the head of the Internal Security Corps. This unit, which is now separate from the Security and is directly under the Minister of the Interior, is an independent corps, composed solely of young Party members of working class origins, and is considered the elite of the armed forces. It is independent both of Rokossowski and of Witaszewski. Its function is to maintain order in case of large-scale disturbances. The frontier guards are subordinate to its command. This explains the clash between the frontier guards near Szczecin with the Soviet forces which tried to enter Poland on the 19th September.

Everything, moreover, points to the fact that, in case of Soviet-Polish conflict, the army, in spite of being under orders of Rokossowski and Witaszewski, would side with the Party leadership. The opposition to direct Soviet interference among the soldiers and officers even of higher grades is very lively. In Poznan, after initial hesitation, the army might have opposed the riots, but in this case the population acted against the government and the Party. In the present situation, the army would never follow Moscow's orders against its own government, and that is why Russia preferred to send its own forces rather than try to start a civil war -- a possibility which is not yet completely ruled out.

It is difficult to say what kind of man Gomulka is. One does not know what marks were left by his arrest, how strong are his anti-soviet feelings and grudges, and what complexes he now has. It seems he has remained an authoritarian, with dictatorial leanings, who can still cause some surprise to the liberal wing, and also a communist -- though of the national and not of the Soviet type.

His present popularity in Poland is immense. Never before has a communist leader been so popular. This popularity might also extend to the Party.

Gomulka's coming to power will not, however, stop rivalry within the polit-bureau. Differences of opinion resulting from the difficult internal situation between, for instance, Gomulka and Ochab or Cyrankiewicz, cannot be so easily

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bridged. The Soviet Union will undoubtedly try to use the possibilities of blackmailing individual leaders by disclosing former connections with Moscow, Beria, etc. The fight with Gomulka is not yet finished.

## The Trade Unions

We shall deal with two distinct questions: the position occupied by the Unions, and the discussion concerning the part they should play in the future.

So far, their role consisted in helping (not very effectively) to get workers to increase their efforts. Usually a factory council was an obedient agent of the local Party committee, which was responsible for the fulfillment of the plan. In these conditions, the Unions' authority was practically non-existent.

In spite of this, the Unions formerly had enormous legal powers. For instance, a year ago, all factory inspection was in their hands, which meant that they could impose penalties in case of infringements. The Unions did not use these possibilities, and, divorced from the masses, were an annex of the Party.

The situation began to change in the middle of this year. Under pressure from the people, who were not afraid to voice their criticism, the Unions started gradually to defend workers' interests. More and more frequently directors were fined by the Unions for infringing factory regulations. In some cases, the Unions even succeeded in closing factories, if conditions of work were particularly unhealthy. This happened, for instance, in a Tin works in Boleslawiec, an important industrial and strategic center; which was closed for several weeks in spite of the ministry's opposition, until proper air conditioning was introduced.

However, these were isolated cases, and the gulf between the workers and the Unions continued.

At the time of Poznan and during the following months, a new development occurred. In several factories, workers believing themselves to be wronged by the management in the fulfilment of their labor agreements started electing their own delegates, by-passing the Unions. This even happened at Union meetings. It was an original form of workers' councils. In July, for instance, Ministries in Warsaw were simply besieged by such delegations, which as a rule courageously defended their claims, being sure of the workers' backing.

Some of the leaders of the Polish Trade Union Council, scared by the extent of the movement and by the complete loss of authority of the Unions, tried to prevent the election of such delegates. The Unions' paper "Gos Pracy" took up their defense, and by publishing articles openly raised the subject.

At the time (about the end of July or beginning of August), the leadership of the Unions reacted, knowing that otherwise they would become useless. The Committee of the Unions began putting forth one proposal after another for widening the Unions' powers, i.e., the possibility of controlling production planning

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by the factory council, the abolition of labor discipline, the abolition of per-
sonal files kept by employers, etc.

At present, fundamental changes are being prepared in the structure of the
Unions with a view to making the Central Committee a coordinating body of other-
wise independent Unions. Even now, in practice, in spite of the old organization,
individual Unions take little notice of the Central Council. The individual
Unions are naturally closer to the working classes, and being more under their
influence, tend to become their spokesmen. For instance, by the end of September
the Miners' Union, and a few days later the Chemical Workers' Union, officially
renounced the collective agreements with the Ministries putting forth new demands.

It seems that the effectiveness and the possibilities of the Unions will be
substantially increased. In some factories, workers having no confidence in the
present Union leaders are electing new representatives often recruited from among
those who took part in the earlier so-called "wild" delegations.

In the Unions' press, articles appear with increasing frequency, stating
that conflicts between the Unions and Party leaders on the factory level are not
only unavoidable but useful, since the Party is concerned with long-term political
and economic aims, while the Unions have the duty to defend the immediate inter-
ests of the workers. Dialectical progress should result from these contradictions.

At the present moment, an issue of particular importance for the Unions ◦
concerns new forms of economic life. In numerous factories, workers claim finan-
cial autonomy, Union-controlled participation in profits. . . etc.; many concerns
already operate on these bases. Support for these ideas came at the summer meet-
ing of economists, at which the majority wanted to go back to the "law of values"
(free price system). Previously discarded as a capitalist invention, it must be
officially acknowledged if the factories are to consider seriously possibilities
of profit and have any possibility of calculating it. So far, there has been no
theoretical possibility of calculating in a precise manner whether any business
is making a profit or a loss. The advocates of a return to the free price system
and its consequences resulting from the law of supply and demand were the old
professors of economics from the liberal capitalist school.

At the present moment, we hear opinions requesting the Central Council
of the Unions to set up a special scientific Institute which would help workers
in their experiments with new economic forms.

Altogether, the Unions could achieve great importance in the near future.
With the help of the international contacts they have or could have, there is
every possibility of influencing their reshaping.

The Congress of the Trade Unions is due to meet next year, and is scheduled
to introduce important changes in the Unions' status, and probably to overhaul the
present leadership of the Central Council. Its present leader was previously

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closely linked with the Stalinist group; after his visit to Yugoslavia, he wants to become a propagandist of Titoism in Poland. His popularity in the Unions is non-existent. (1)

## Forms of aid and collaboration with the West

1. The present propaganda of "Free Europe should be more intelligently differentiated. Communists should not be attacked "en bloc" but instead, differences of opinion should be emphasized, and people in Poland should be "fertilized" with subjects for discussion. First of all, a way should be found of speaking to the new generation, even these groups which are a source of fermentation in the Party. So far, for the young people of the "Poprostu" kind, the very name of "Free Europe" is a synonym of something blatantly reactionary and imperialist.

2. Contacts with Poland should be increased through visits of journalists, delegations of all sorts reaching all social groups and all trades, and by inviting similar delegations to all kinds of meetings in the West.

3. New contacts should be devised with every kind of Western organization, such as the Confederation of Free Trade-Unions, avoiding in this case as far as possible giving even indirect support to official Unions' authorities. It seems that certain forms of contacts could be formed. For instance, larger firms in the West or Trade-Unions could invite delegates from individual Polish factories and then return the visit.

4. To feed the ferment among young people, it might be useful to find ways of sending them books and periodicals concerning ideological problems. These people at present feel an enormous hunger for such publications.

5. The common denominator of it all must be the wish to refrain from putting external pressure on the Poles in favor of some form or other of political or economic democracy. One should bear in mind the well-known sensibility of the Poles in this respect, and also the need for restraint and caution on the part of the Party leadership toward Moscow. (cf. American help after the Poznan events was rejected with the nation's agreement, which did not want to be treated as Pakistan or some other under-developed country. Everybody, however, agreed the necessity of seeking economic help in the U.S.A. which could at least be clothed in some semblance of trade relations.) The crazy sensibility of the Poles should never be forgotten.

6. Of enormous help would be a wide and full dissemination in other popular democracies of information concerning all that happens in Poland, so that they could follow in its footsteps, and thus prevent Moscow from concentrating its attention on Warsaw.

(1) The person in question, Klosiewicz, has already been thrown out and a new council has been formed with new people in all the key positions. The purge of old elements continues.

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