Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Vice President/Kissinger
9:46 a.m. 6/22/71

VP: I had a call from Kennedy in Hong Kong and he said he is sending Rex Beach back here and sending him to Korea with me to brief me on textile because he says the Koreans are trying to win me over, and that the govt is okay with that.

K: I will check with Porter.

VP: Kennedy thinks Porter may not be favorable. Beach has this to say for me --

K: Kennedy doesn't report -- he has a way of conducting diplomacy that's unheard of. The first Presidential emissary in Korea who was not seen off by any govt official. I don't know if you want to get with him on a goodwill mission. On Sat. he wanted to blast Korea while he was there. I heard about it indirectly and I ordered him not to do it. I will check on it and call before end of the day.

VP: I understand my briefing books from State are in the Council and I would like the first couple to met working on this.

K: You will have them tonight.

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Governor Rockefeller
6/22/71, 10:00 a.m.

R: Henry!

K: Nelson, how are you?

R: I hope you win those suits.

K: We didn't have much choice. You can't let people steal 47 volumes of material and not fight it. There are a lot of foreign governments and you can influence those thoughts that are now going through their minds. And if people have to worry about their memoranda being made public they will never write anything more. By the way, I am going off to England tomorrow.

R: I thought what Brandt said about the articles being published was good.

K: What did he say?

R: He said he used to be a newspaper man so he can see their point of view but he is now in the Government office and he can see their problems. Has anyone looked them over to see if they are in fact secret?

K: Yes, of course. And it makes the Democrats look appalling because it is taken totally out of context. There are some people I know to be Doves who are made out to be Hawks in the articles.

R: It is unbelievable. Listen Henry, I called to ask you what you think of Cy Vance. Is he a tough guy?

K: No. Are you thinking of him for that Commission?

R: Yes.

K: He won't do anything against Lindsey. I think Vance will look at this very much from the point of view of 1972. He is a decent guy but not what I thought he was.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

R: Did you ever run across Bill Martin?

K: Yes, I know him. He is not as smart but would do a job.
I like Vance but you would not want him out in front.

R: Henry, you gave me just what I wanted. Thank you and
the very very best of luck.

K: The best of luck to you Nelson.

mlh

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON

Amb. Annenberg/Kissinger

10:08 a.m.

6/22/71

K: I will be s-eing you soon. I wanted to call about one thir
I have a specific reason for going over there. I will explain
to you the problems but let me decide what meetings the embassy
sits in on and which not. It's worked out by Heath and the
President when he was here. You will be told what's going on.
The lunch meeting on Thurs, everything is fine. After talking
with Trend, I will let you know.

A: I do feel I should be with you on Thurs. morning before the
PM's lunch.

K: What do you mean?

A: There's a meeting with Burk Trend and a luncheon for you by
the PM.

K: You certainly -- meeting at 11:00 which of course you are π
than welcome to attend and you are coming to the lunch. I do w
a little time alone with Trend when I get there.

of course.

A: /You will arrive Wed. I am going to Osford for a Kenya day
I will be back late Wed. and I will see you early Thurs. Anyth
else we can do?

K: Nothing I can think of.

A: Re the dinner on Friday, 22-24 people. It's not easy to ge
people on Friday evening in London because people go to the
country-but we will have an attractive group.

K: I look forward to that.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC U

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Rogers

6/22/71 10:50 a.m.

R: That was quite a party last night.

K: I thought you made a charming speech. What the hell was the latter?

R: I asked him and he said 'I haven't any idea.'

K: I thought your reply was terrific.

R: He was joking, tryint to make it look like I had leaked.

K: In the first place you don't leak; in the second you wouldn't do it in a letter. So it was obvious that whatever it was it wasn't a leak.

R: I'm calling about the proposed trip. I gather Keating said he had to get back because he had an important visitor coming. I was asked about it and said that the Indian Foreign Minister had said I should come, but no decision has been made on that for me or anyone else. I think the Vietnam and Thailand part is a good idea, but I have serious reservations about India and Pakistan.

K: The intention is to have it low-key and informational, not confined to that issue.

R: But the governments won't let you. They'll really try to make something of it. There is some suspicion that they are trying to put the onus of the international community, especially the U.S. . . . .

K: Well, the trip by you and the trip by me would be entirely different.

R: Why don't you go to Indonesia or some other place like that. I don't understand the logic of it. Does the President have a message for Yahya?

K: It came up when Bunker had the idea that I should do the other. He is also concerned and may have in mind a message to Yahya on this issue.

R: I am talking to him now; he's not here, he's in the other room.

K: Whom?

R: Bunker.

the
K: He didn't have anything to do with/India, Pakistan part of it. The idea of my going out came up when the President was looking for an excuse to get o his own trip.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

6/22/71 10:50 a.m. p. 2

R: That part is fine.

K: And then he hooked on the other things. I haven't had a full opportunity to discuss this other; I don't know his thinking.

R: I think the Vietnam and Thailand trip is a good idea.

K: Well, if there's one thing I don't need it's a trip.

R: On the other I have lots of reservations. And if you try to low-key it makes it look clandestine, which would make it worse. Well, give some thought to that Henry. Keating apparently had word on it and told the press. T Boston Globe is asking and UPI.

K: He was in to see the President and said it would be a good thing if someone came out there and the President said . . . at any rate, I won't do anything about it till the President gets back.

R: Okay, I really think you are going into a hornets' nest.

K: If there are any people I detest it's the Indians.

R: On the other, I guess it's been handled as well as possible.

K: Which is essentially to drop it if they lose.

R: Make it available to Congressional leadership and continue the declassification.

By: KLW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELECON

Senator Dole/Mr. Kissinger

11:00 a.m., June 22, 1971

D: Did Bill Timmons send this Pastore Amendment to you yet?

K: How many geniuses are going to offer amendments?

D: Probably 100.

K: I'm in favor of Whitson/____ 1974.

D: Pastore says it is harmless and, in effect, says 'It is hereby declared to be the sense of the Congress that all U.S. forces be withdrawn by July 4, 1972...' We want to change the date to "as soon as practicable."

K: What is the rest of the language?

D: Subparagraph b says 'The President is urged to take such steps as necessary in subparagraph a, above.' Subparagraph c says, 'The Congress urges the Government of North Vietnam to cooperate with the President to end hostilities in Indo-China, and the prompt release of all prisoners held by that government...' As I said, we wanted to change the date to "as soon as practicable," and use it to head off the Cook/Stevens and Mansfield Amendments.

K: Why is this any more harmless than the Mansfield Amendment? If you took the date out of the Mansfield Amendment?

D: If you took the date out of that, it would be harmless.

K: Basically, all these things are disastrous. It is the most irresponsible performance I have ever seen for public short-term political gains. I have to start with that. I cannot say any of them are acceptable because they are basically not. In the Pastore one, to say "as soon as practicable"... we can all play tremendous games here. The problem is what Hanoi will say. The Democrats can say 'in six months.' We can say whenever we want to. If Hanoi is thinking it's over now, this is not the time for us to be put under more heat. These people are prolonging the war. I happen to believe that. The Mansfield thing without a date and without a public deadline is the least harmful of the ones I have seen so far. I don't like the phrase 'as soon as practicable.' And then the phrase about asking the Government of North Vietnam to cooperate -- this is a unilateral move. At least the Mansfield thing asks us to negotiate a ceasefire.

By: KM V

NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Senator Dole/Mr, Kissi:

11:00 a.m., June 22, 1971

D: Timmons' office will send this over to you. We don't want Cook/Stevens. We are not helping the President by fixing a date.

K: The people who are doing this are going to kill our negotiations. I am absolutely... I can play games. You could come up with five formulas. Any bright fellow can do that.

D: Sure. Is it better to lose on Cook/Stevens than to fall back?

K: The earlier version of that -- to first release prisoners and nine months later we get out. That we could have more lived with.

D: It has a section which would have a fund cutoff in it.

K: That is out of the question.

D: Cook and his co-sponsors are willing to take it out. That is a special section which can be removed quickly. They say "policy of the United States." I say it is not because it would involve the President. We cannot say it is policy.

K: I would rather lose than... If they want to do this to the President...

D: We don't want to clean it up if we are going to lose anyway. We may not beat Mansfield. The Democrats feel they have to KILL NIXON to portray dragging Nixon out of Vietnam. That will be their platform next year.

K: They can't make it stick. I guarantee that.

D: They see it now as a way of putting pants on the President. Anything we do plays into the hands of Hanoi.

K: That is the trouble, Bob.

D: But we are going to keep on here until somebody passes something -- even if it is accidental -- which would embarrass the President.

K: The embarrassment we can stand. Being wrecked we cannot stand.

D: I will visit some more with Griffin. Maybe we can figure something out.

By KHC

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Bill Timmons

6/22/71 11:00 a.m.

K: I just raised holy cain with Dole.

T: Have you seen the copy of it? I sent you over one.

K: No, but he read it to me. We can play this game till ...

T: That's right.

K: There are a hundred geniuses in the Senate and each can get
several variations on the same theme. Once you accept those, they'll
kill you. I tell you we will look better being defeated.

T: Did you convince Bob?

K: I don't know. He said he is going back to Griffin.

T: All we can do is hang tough. Screw them.

K: Yes, we may have to get Mansfield in and talk tough.

T: Yes.

By KHC

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin

6/22/71 11:22 a.m.

K

K: I have had a repeated request from the President to get some
development program for Vietnam in case the President wants to make some
sort of longer term commitment to Thieu. We are getting stonewalled all
over the place by the community. Nooter in AID says we can't get a paper.
If we can't get it out of the bureaucracy, we'll have to do it here at the White
House and everyone will scream White House interference. I wonder if you
could get Bill Sullivan to come up with some sort of . . .

I: Who is your man working on this?

K: Bob Sansom.

I: Okay, let me look into it. When will you be back?

K: Sunday.

I: Good, I'll see you this afternoon.

K: Good, I appreciate it.

By KHC

NARA, Dato

TELCORN

Sen. Griffin/Kissinger
11:24 a.m. 6/22/71

G: I wanted to give you an up-to-date reading as I saw it on o
situation. We had a meeting with Clark McGregor and Timmons la
night. I imagine you had a report on that and had Cooke and
Stephens in to see if we can back them down. Couldn't do anyth
They are confident they have the vote today and I think they ma
It looks like a Mexican stand-off with 48-48 with 2 undecided.
They are Jordan <u>ANONYMOUS</u> of Idaho and Talmadge. Miller has an
amendment to it and he will vote for it. So it's that close.
I don't know what we can do about it. The only hope on this
Cooke/Stephens thing which <u>we</u> vote on at 4:00 is that some Demo
<u>may</u> have a hard time getting a <u>reading</u> or will vote against b
they will vote for Mansfield.

K: What effectively does Cooke/Stephens say again?

G: Designated (?) to terminate all forces in Indochina as soon
as possible and not to exceed 9 months. All military forces an
equipment from SVN. Cut off of funds after 9 months after <u>an</u>enactment.

K: How different from McGovern/Hatfield?

G: After 60 days if President cannot get firm commitment of NV
of release of Prisoners then he reports and it becomes inoperat
I am not for it and not suggesting anyone should be.

K: These things -- I wish I could -- I am always the SOB. I h
never seen anything like this. Last chance of negotiation and
sit in Hanoi. If it were <u>that</u> next Jan. <u>we</u>-1, what the hell, we
are in <u>anxious</u>=election time but now I can't tell you -- I can't
go with it. If they do it, they do it.

G: We have 3 in a row and <u>each one is worse.</u> If the
Cooke/Stephens looses then we have Mansfield. Then Pastore has
with a "Sense of the Senate."

K: I have seen it.

G: Withdraw by July 4, 1972. President urged to take steps to
implement policieis in Section A. Asks _________ to cooperate
with the President and release all POWs of govt and forces alli
with it. It does have the date of July 4. My guess is one will
pass. We may not get to Pastore which is nothing but an expres

K: So be it. I am violently opposed and these people are doir
damage they don't know. Everyone who has cooperated in this wi
regret it. They have stabbed us in the back at the last moment

G: We have a policy luncheon with all the Republicans at 12:30
Do you want someone to come and make a pitch on this. We will

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

K: Who? Me?

G: It's a possibility. Maybe you want to send Rogers or
Laird -- I don't think he's the one. You might be. Check it
and see if someone shouldn't come. Our biggest problem with
our own side. It's erosion.

K: I will talk here.

By KM U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

6/22/71 11:50 a.m.

D: I would like to check one thing which we discussed yesterday. I received call from our Ambassador there where the gentleman which was yesterday . . .

K: I understand.

D: Our Ambassador spoke with a third man who was here, not in our meeting . . .

K: I know excatly what you are saying.

D: That gentleman told our Ambassador the meetings, three of them, on the 21st and 23rd of this month will not take place.

K: They will next week. There was a misunderstanding between the third man and the man you met yesterday. He said to fix the first three days he was back, and he thought they were next week.

D: So it will be next week.

K: Yes.

D: The second man will not arrive at the capital at all? He will go to the four powers next week.

K: They will meet three times.

D: But when are the four . . . ?

K: Be on the 25th. The four are going to the meeting.

D: Then I guess he is going still to that. But he will meet next week on the 29th, 30th and 31st.

K: But they will meet next week on the 29th, 30th and 1st.

D: Can I tell him that for his own information.

K: Yes, tell him it was a technical misunderstanding.

D: Yes, and you better check with that third man to make sure he will tell our Ambassador.

K: Okay.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECOF
Ambassador Dobrynin

6/22/71 11:50 a.m. p. 2

D: And then the second point, this third man when asked what was going to do about [councilor?]. . .

K: That we haven't told him yet. We have to straighten that out.

D: You will?

K: I will do that today.

D: Good, because I received a telegram.

By KHL

NARA, Dato.

5/12/04

TELCOM

Sen. Griffin/Kissinger
noon 6/22/71

K: The consensus here is it isn't good for me to come up there but I tell you that it will be a terrible mistake and I am not doing it for partisan reasons. All of your members will agree me. I couldn't care less about politics of it. They can take the responsibility but it couldn't come at a worst moment and couldn't be less helpful to ending the war. If you give me a l I will call them.

G: Just a moment. I will give you some names. I don't know i you have spoken with them already. Jack Miller.

K: You give me the easy ones. I tried to get Miller to vote f Rockefeller at the Republican convention. Packwood?

G: That would be one we are not expecting to get. Pierson.

K: He said he would be with us. I will call again.

G: We have 3 we don't know about this week. We are afraid tha if we skim through on Cooke/Stephens, we will loose (on one of others).

K: How's Mathias?

G: Against us. Can we get him?

K: I doubt it.

G: Howard Baker.

K: I will call him.

G: If he will vote with us on the next two. That will do.

K: Anything else, let me know. It's better I don't go up ther because it makes it a partisan issue. And a defeat for the President on --

G: OK.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Ehrlichman/Kissinger
12:05 p.m. 6/22/71

E: Your Laird did it again. He stole both announcements. They will declassify the 47 volumes and move them to the Hill.

K: I told the President a thousand times if he isn't willing to get blood he will have to take the consequences. We are not declassifying the 47 volumes, are we?

E: Yes. You were on that. Announce to the court that we will go on declassification of these today.

K: I understood we are going to review declassifying them. If say in court then it's a disgrace.

E: We are looking at them to see what can be declassified.

K: I wouldn't have done that either. Anytime a thief can get things into the newspapers --

E: I know. It's the bad part. But you are not hiding Johnson's wrong-doing.

K: It's cheap. Saves you an editorial and doesn't get anything. I would give to the Senate under security restrictions and say/a general review these documents will be looked at.

E: I think I can do that.

K: If you go further then that we go through a great exercise and then cave.

E: In context of general directive.

K: If we can keep our moral view. I just don't think we can come out with any stature.

E: We will do our best.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN
Sen. Packwood/Kissinger

±2:23 p.m.

6/22/71

K: I always call when there are difficult things coming up so you can be sure it's close and critical. I try not to call except when I feel strongly myself. I am calling about and of the war amendments. Our view and my view is that anyone who comes up with an amendment. Then someone can say it's a great deal. We don't need urging. Our overwhelming concern the impact on Hanoi and it's a most delicate period. Right now reasons I cannot go into, it will be extremely damaging. I understand that a lot of things have been said on VN and in light of things published in recent weeks it's not a good time to ask abstract confidence but our last chance will be destroyed if they are adopted. We will be able to back this up when our records are stolen! I am not a good lobbyist.

P: I don't know how I will vote today. I voted for the Childs and if I don't vote today for this I don't see how I can explain the difference.

K: I will undermine my credibility by saying I don't recall it.

P: Pull out by June 1.

K: You are right, but the only way to rationalize it is to say it's been a vote and infinite variations and one can keep voting and they will give the administration a few months.

P: There will be an amendment adopted which the administration won't like or the variations will be defeated and Congress will have to do something else.

K: It's a question of judgment on how you do things that need to be done. It's a case of my absolute conviction where it can do a lot of harm. There are a lot of things that one -- where serious people will differ. You have two audiences -- Hanoi and the administration. We don't need it. The second is the impact on Hanoi right now could not be less fortunate.

P: Why?

K: I believe, while I don't accept Clifford where there's a gimick for solution, I do believe they are looking at the better and the problem of future they will settle for no guarantee of communist govt. and the only guard we have is our troops there. If it's knocked out it will go to a bloody conclusion. If they believe we will have to get out in 9 months, it's not that it's a certainty that other will work but from a political point of view we can say if everyone does this bears responsibility but what good if we score points against each other?

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Packwood/Kissinger

12:23 p.m.

6/22/71

K
P: You make good points.

K: We are all sick and exhausted and it always happens that a year later we ask what happened.

P: This will be an insignificant issue in '74.

K: I will answer to you in 6 months on our intentions but I can't go into it further.

P: I find there's a Congress that is unwilling to accept responsibilities and wants to go to the President.

K: This is not the way. This is not the way of sharing responsibility. In 2-3 months it may be very appropriate to do it joi

P: I appreciate your *kakax* taking the time to call.

TELECON
Senator Griffin

6/22/71 1:30 p.m.

By KML

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

G: I just made our pitch and I indicated as strongly as I could how important this was. Jack Miller has asked could he see Henry Kissinger before 4:00.

K: Absolutely. Tell him to bring along anyone else too.

G: The other possibility is, could you come up to Scott's office?

K: My only concern is my fear that . . . You know the press is always running loose there.

G: In other words, he could come to see you.

K: Without any question, and I'll send a car for him.

G: And he could bring others?

K: Sure.

G: Could you give a time?

K: 2:45 or anything else that he wants. If you think it essential I will come up. But my instinct is that it would create problems to sit in Scott's office and talk to Senators. But let me talk to McGregor. At any rate I'll see Miller.

1:38 p.m.

G: Can you have a car here at 2:15?

K: Okay, where?

G: Bottom of the Senate Steps.

K: Okay. Who will be there?

G: Miller, Prouty, Brock, and maybe several others will be along. They'll be there at 2:30. I'll try to get some others.

By KCL-WS

NARA, Dato

5/12/94

TELECON

Alex Butterfield/Mr. Kissinger

1:55 p.m., June 22, 1971

B: The President has a full afternoon -- he would like to put it off until tomorrow.

K: I am going to London.

B: Today?

K: Tomorrow morning. I am seeing some Senators at 2:30, but I will change anything else today.

K

B: I will see if I can get you 20 minutes.

K: Thank-you.

lds