REMARKS BY JAMES H. WEBB, JR.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
WASHINGTON, DC
JANUARY 13, 1988

Countless commentators have already marked 1988 as a threshold year, and certainly we are in a period of rather uncomfortable transition as a nation, a period whose dynamics we do not yet fully comprehend. Certain realities are more apparent than others, however, and I would like to talk to you today about my view of the realities facing the Navy and the U.S. military as a whole. Reality seems to indicate that we need to make some adjustments in our military posture around the world, and the good of the country mandates that we do so in the best way that will serve our future as a nation, not merely as a service or as a Defense Department.

First, the realities.

-- We are not as rich, compared to other nations with whom we are allied, as we were when we sketched out the basic framework of our international military presence just after World War Two. In the decade following that war, our country consistently produced more than 40 percent of the world's Gross Domestic Product. In recent years, that figure has been about 25 percent.

-- Nor is the Defense Department as well off as it was even a year ago, and the future looks equally difficult. As most of you know, last month the Department of Defense was required to reduce an existing fiscal 1989 budget by more than 33 billion dollars.

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-- We are being told in no uncertain terms, and from many different fronts, that due to fiscal realities the U.S. military of the future must be smaller and more efficient.

-- We are also hearing, quite frequently and with equal fervor, that in the aftermath of the INF agreements the conventional threat in Europe will be larger, and that conventional force structure there should receive more emphasis.

-- We also know, and there is no question about this, that our future as a nation is very closely tied to Asia in economic and political terms, and that we must do a better job of attending to the economic, political and security issues here in our own hemisphere.

-- And the overriding reality is that it should be obvious that a smaller United States military, no matter how efficient, cannot attend to all of these matters by itself, at least not in the same way that it has over the past 42 years.

The key question for our national leadership as it struggles with these realities is not one program or another in the budget, as has so often been the case, but whether, and how, the United States can maintain its commitments throughout the world, while at the same time reducing the size and force structure of its military.

It is a little bit easier to point out what we cannot do. The first answer is that we cannot do it at all without a great deal of risk, in both diplomatic and military terms. The second, and I have been saying this for much longer than I have been Secretary of the Navy, is that it would be impossible to do it with any degree of effectiveness and at the same time reduce the size of our Navy. And the third

answer is that we cannot do it without the increased cooperation and
help of our allies.

The only clear answer to our dilemma is for us to take a fresh look at
the world and our place in it, and to seriously debate the posture of the
U.S. military in that context. In other words, we need to "zero base"
our military commitments, and to justify to ourselves the force
structure, roles and missions, and location of our military units based
on a reassessment of where things stand in the world. This debate
would be most helpful to us if it began immediately. It needs to be
done honestly, absent the usual parochial veil that surrounds even the
most minor of such discussions. It should flow from certain logical
principles, from an examination of our history, and of the evolving
relationship of the United States with the rest of the world. National
resources, changes in world economic structure, recent political
changes, and the improved capabilities of many of our allies, dictate
that we must, perhaps for the first time since the late 1940s, seriously
debate the posture of the U.S. military around the world, and the roles
and missions assigned to our military services.

We all know that our worldwide posture was undertaken in a
different era. While it may be correct to term that period as one of
unprecedented strength for the United States, a more accurate
description may be that it was one of unprecedented weakness for
many nations who historically have been strong, and who had either
been ravaged or exhausted by World War Two. We held things
together while they got back onto their feet. We continued to hold
things together after they got back onto their feet. They now have
regained their strength, almost without exception due to the

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generosity of this nation under the Marshall Plan and other economic recovery programs, and under the umbrella of our military protection.

The extent of our military involvement around the world since we undertook these obligations has been unprecedented in our history, particularly with respect to long-term, static defensive positions that have drained both our economic and military resources. It can be fairly argued that the economic recovery of other nations has not uniformly been met with a complete reassumption of their obligation to join us in protecting the way of life, and the values, that we share.

This is not to suggest that major changes could take place immediately, but rather that we must establish the guideposts that will take us into the next century. The current defense posture has been important to worldwide stability for more than 40 years. But the world is changing, and if we do not address these changes, and others yet to come, then events will rule us rather than the reverse.

I mentioned logical principles. I would like to lay out what I believe are the most important premises, the touchstones, if you will, for any analysis of what our defense priorities should be, and thus where our military forces should operate, and at what level. There may be disagreement with portions of what I am about to say, but allow me to advance the following thoughts as an analytical beginning.

First, although a great deal of energy and money is dedicated to our NATO alliance, and although this alliance is one of the keystones of our military structure, we need to remind ourselves from time to time that we are more than a European nation. We are a global nation with largely European antecedents, continuing European interests, and

5

national loyalties to Western Europe's fundamental objectives. We
must remain strong in Europe, but we also have the obligation to view
the Soviet military threat in global, rather than regional terms, and to
address that threat worldwide.

The United States and the Soviet Union must face each other at
many other points on the globe. Many of the most critical points of
tension, and certainly many of the evolving areas of confrontation, are
far from Europe. The United States has a requirement, contrary to
European nations, to view the Soviet military threat in Europe through
more than a European prism. And to be fair to the other areas in which
we must operate, there is no region better equipped through its
resources, large population base, strong economy, and military
tradition to reassume a greater share of the burden of its own defense
than Western Europe. Logic, then, should call for a greater responsi-
bility by the Western Europeans for their own defense.

Second, the United States is becoming more intertwined with Asia,
and the issues involving Asia are moving to the forefront in the world
community. In 1986 the United States did 219 billion dollars gross trade
in Asia, 75 percent more than its gross trade with the Atlantic nations.
In economic, cultural and political terms, we are becoming increasingly
more tied to Asia, and it is imperative that we match those ties with
the military capability to protect our interests and honor our
obligations to friends and allies in the region.

Asian strategy is more difficult to define and to resource than
European strategy. The countries of Asia are at great variance in
economic, political and cultural terms. Vast ocean areas separate them.
Still-evolving political structures left over from the colonial era cause

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the sort of turbulence that has claimed more than 100,000 American
lives in Asia since World War Two. But East Asia is an indispensable
part of our country's future, and it requires the same careful
development of friendships and alliances that we have cultivated in
Europe. Nor should we forget that it provides the only point in the
world where the direct military interests of the Soviet Union, The
People's Republic of China, The United States, and Japan converge.

The Soviet Union is also placing a greater emphasis on East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Southern Asia. While Soviet force structure in Europe has remained relatively constant over the past decade, they have made marked advances in Asia. The Soviets have achieved the historic Russian dream of owning a warm water port in the Pacific, and on any given day two dozen Soviet ships are in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, as are fighter, bomber and long range reconnaissance aircraft. They have increased their Far East Command by ten divisions over the last ten years, and now have 530,000 ground troops in East Asia, in addition to another 200,000 spread through Mongolia, the Transbaikal, and Central Asia. The Far East military region has 85 Backfire bombers, and nearly 2,500 combat aircraft. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is now the largest of its four fleets, with 840 warships as opposed to 750 a decade ago. These ships include two Kiev class aircraft carriers, a Kirov class nuclear guided missile cruiser, 41 percent of the heavy surface ships in the entire Soviet navy, 37 percent of the combat aircraft in Soviet naval aviation, 40 percent of all their SSBNs, and extensive amphibious capabilities.

The Soviets are militarily entrenched in Vietnam. They are said to be
looking for naval bases in North Korea. They have pursued in recent

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months a defense relationship with Thailand. They have for three
years running attempted to offer a dry dock facility for the Australians
in Perth. They have become active in Polynesia and Micronesia. They
have continued a close defense relationship with India that began in
1971, during which the Indians have increased their Army by 150,000
men to a size of 1.1 million -- much larger than the United States Army -
their air force by 35,000 people to 115,000 and by 136 combat aircraft
to a total of 761, and increased the force structure of their Navy to
include two aircraft carriers, 11 submarines, 21 frigates, and 18
minesweepers. Just recently, the Soviets committed themselves to
providing the Indians a nuclear submarine.

And they have done all of this while pursuing vigorously a
rapprochement with the People's Republic of China.

Clearly, we cannot allow force structure reductions to affect our
commitment to the most dynamic and volatile area in the world. In
fact, our responsibility to meet Soviet pressure globally might logically
dictate an increase in our Asian presence that would match their
obvious shift in priority.

One element in this equation, obviously, must be the responsibility
of the Japanese as a friend, ally, and world power to assume a greater
portion of the regional military responsibility in Asia. Most of us are
fully aware of the dynamics of this issue, and I will not dwell on the
intimate details. We know and are sensitive to apprehensions in the
region due to Japan's activities 50 years ago. We understand the
emotion that surrounds the constitutional provision regarding
Japanese self defense, and the famed "one percent" threshold
regarding defense spending. But we also know that the Japanese have

[LJ]

8

fully recovered from the spiritual and economic devastation of World
War Two, and that most of our countrymen believe it is time for the
Japanese to assume more of the burden of defending the way of life
we now share together as allies.

The Japanese have made measurable progress on this score, and
have increased their defense spending for several years in a row.
Regional security demands that they do more of this. Japan clearly has
the resources and the national interest to pick up more of the defense
load in Asia. Japan is becoming the largest creditor nation in the
world. More than half of the oil that passes through the Straits of
Hormuz goes to Japan. I personally recommended as early as 1973 that
Japan include the defense of its sea lanes, even as far as the Indian
Ocean, in its constitutional interpretation of "self-defense." Ocean-
going activities of that sort would aid in our alliance without inciting
the concern of other nations in the region that attended its land
occupations of forty-five and fifty years ago.

Third, we must consider the Soviets themselves. No analysis of our
own future defense priorities can leave them out. There has been
considerable discussion of late regarding changes taking place within
the Soviet Union. It would be inappropriate for me, and beyond the
scope of this speech, to address these changes in any detail, but two
observations seem inescapable. First, Soviet conventional force
structure around the world has been growing, and if force structure
cuts are to occur in our own military, we must be careful to signal to
the Soviets that this is a refinement of our capabilities, rather than a
reduction of them. And second, an improved situation in Europe,

9

absent a stand-down of conventional forces taken out of that theater,
may well increase rather than decrease Soviet pressure in other areas.

Fourth, we must pay greater attention to our own hemisphere, and
to the Third World as a whole. I mentioned that we are becoming more
intertwined with Asia, and the same is true with Latin America. This
nation's principal movements, in economic, cultural and political terms,
are west and south. The changing ethnic makeup of the country itself
shows this. Fully 86 percent of our legal immigrants over the past ten
years have been from either Asia or Latin America, 42 percent from
Latin America itself. And these, as I said, are the legal immigrants.
Latin America's problems are rapidly becoming our problems, and we
have been pushing them to the back burner at great peril. The Soviets
and Cubans have been more adept at understanding that than many of
our own policymakers.

In the Third World as a whole, the Soviet Union has long emphasized
a policy of using "cooperative forces" of Third World allies, along with
Soviet and other advisors, in order to take advantage of age-old
rivalries, and to assist so-called revolutionary movements which
invariably end up as totalitarian regimes. In Latin America, the Soviets
operate roughly 7600 military personnel in Cuba, and another 230 in
Nicaragua and Peru. During 1986 alone the Soviets provided more than
600 million dollars of equipment to the Sandinista regime as well. The
Cubans contribute another 2500 troops in Nicaragua. Discounting our
Southern Command in Panama, the United States has some 2300
troops in Guantanamo Bay Cuba, and 932 operating personnel
elsewhere in 27 Latin American countries, 643 of those in Honduras.

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Through troop presence and arms transfers, the Soviet Union and Cuba are heavily involved in Africa. The Cubans maintain military and technical personnel in 17 African nations, with major combat units in Ethiopia, Algeria, Congo, Angola and Mozambique. The Soviets now maintain a continuous naval presence off the coast of west Africa.

Additionally, key water routes and bases around the world continue to be at risk. American basing rights will be subject to negotiations in the near future, including those in Panama, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and the Philippines. It is reasonable to assume that we will lose our lease in Guantanamo Bay in 1999. The southern reaches of the Red Sea have been bracketed by the Soviet influence in Ethiopia and its presence in the People's Republic of Yemen, particularly on the island of Socotra, which dominates the Gulf of Aden. Nor do I need to spend a great deal of time today on the importance of protecting international waterways into and inside the Persian Gulf. This essential lifeline to Europe and Japan is now benefiting from the strength of American resolve, and the manifestation of American seapower.

The analysis I have just offered is by no means exhaustive, but it does indicate the enormity of the responsibilities that our military forces will continue to face. For those of us who view the Soviet threat seriously, and who believe we must improve our efforts in assisting the Third World, this is a very full plate. It will require extremely careful use of a reduced United States force structure, as well as a more enthusiastic participation by other friendly nations, in order for us to meet such challenges. It will also require, quite frankly, that we modify

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the architecture of our defense structure over time, creating the best combination of air, ground, sea and space assets to do the job.

The overriding guidepost for the future is that our conventional force structure must provide us the most utility and the most capability in the global arena. This requires versatility in terms of military mission. It means that forces dedicated to static defensive missions must be scrutinized and altered when possible in favor of units that can deploy and fight wherever they are needed. An example of this type of unit is the Third Marine Division on Okinawa, forward deployed not for the local defense of Okinawa, but as a maneuver force available for immediate commitment throughout Asia.

A world environment with many demands for the use of our forces, ideally in correlation with the forces of other nations but potentially alone, requires this sort of maneuverability. To the greatest extent possible, forces of the future should be free to deploy and to maneuver, to concentrate at a crisis point and project military force at that point, without the necessity of negotiating base rights or the unavoidable involvement in local conflict that such base rights imply. A smaller U.S. military force structure demands, by logic, that a greater percentage of that force structure be available to do more things.

Consequently, post-INF thinking that conventional forces in Europe be increased because conventional forces in Europe are arguably more at risk without the intermediate nuclear shield does not necessarily mean that this should be a U.S. buildup, or for that matter that such a buildup should occur in Europe at all, or even that it be a land-oriented buildup. In fact, given the resource reductions clearly facing this country's defense establishment, just the opposite might be true.

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Strategy does not dictate that pressure applied by an adversary at one point be countered at exactly that point. The regional preoccupation that produced the strategy of the "Maginot Line," and of the "Schlieffen Plan" is seductive in Europe, but history has repeatedly demonstrated its incompleteness. If the interests of the United States and its allies are threatened or attacked by the Soviet Union in one part of the world, the United States could and probably should react at the point most beneficial to its own strengths, anywhere in the world.

And this of course is the great strength of seapower, and why we should recognize its validity in terms of our geopolitical place in the world. We are not a continental land power, except on our own continent, and we never have been. It simply hasn't been necessary, given our existence as a maritime nation. We have never even fought a true continental war, except the War Between the States. This is one reason MacArthur warned against land campaigns in Asia, but it is true elsewhere as well. Our armies have been most effectively used in history in combination with other armies. We tipped the balance in World War One, but only on the margins, at the very end of the war, and at the expense of some 55,000 combat dead, while the French lost 1.7 million dead, the British Empire lost almost a million, and the Germans lost 1.8 million dead. In World War Two, we fought essentially a rear guard action on the ground, losing 290,000 servicemen of all services in all theaters, while the Germans lost 3.7 million and the Soviets lost 7 million -- soldiers, dead.

By contrast, our place in the world has been guaranteed by our maritime power, particularly during this century. We are a maritime

13

nation by virtue of our geographic position, economic necessity, and
political commitment. American seapower maintains unimpeded
access to world markets. It denies our adversaries the use of sea lanes
for expansionist or imperialistic reasons. It maintains international
security and stability, including protection of those nations whom we
count as friends and allies during crisis. It enables us, when war comes,
to reinforce allies, to multiply the effectiveness of their armies, to inject
our own ground forces when appropriate, to become supreme on the
land through control of the sea. It provides us the single greatest
deterrent to nuclear war, with a nuclear submarine force that fields
one-half of our nuclear capability at one-fourth of the overall cost for
the strategic nuclear Triad.

A credible seapower, which means a naval force that can deploy
immediately, stay for as long as necessary, and fight at whatever level
of conflict the situation demands, can affect world events quickly and
decisively. Our navy and Marine Corps meet those criteria. Aircraft
carrier battle groups coupled with an amphibious power projection
capability can represent the interests of the United States at the exact
point of crisis without the necessity or expense of negotiating base
rights, and without the vulnerability that so frequently attends static
defensive positions. This is exactly what we will need more of in the
future, if our commitments unfold as I have just described them.

The Navy and Marine Corps are structured, and essential, across the
full spectrum of military use, from forces in being through low
intensity conflict all the way to nuclear war. At every step of the way,
a large percentage of the Navy and Marine Corps force structure is
available, on a task organized basis, to perform. Furthermore, while

14

the Navy and Marine Corps participate along with the other services in exercises designed to test wartime readiness, they also are continually participating in real world operations that are essential to keeping the peace -- today. They were in Lebanon. They have operated repeatedly off the coast of Libya. They have been in the Indian Ocean since 1979. They were off the coast of Iran throughout the entire hostage crisis. They are on duty even as I speak in the Persian Gulf. At this moment, of our total fleet of 569 ships, which includes the naval reserve, 157 are at sea, 112 outside of their local operating areas, 91 are forward deployed at potential hot spots around the world. These numbers are actually a bit low, due to the respite of the holiday season.

And we need not speculate on what would happen if we cut back naval force structure. Those who claim that the last seven years have shown the greatest peacetime buildup of the U.S. Navy forget that the decade that preceded this buildup gave us the greatest evisceration of the Navy in its history. When I was commissioned in 1968 there were 931 combatants in the U.S. Navy. By the time we inherited the Indian Ocean commitments in 1979, the greatest navy in the world had been cut in half, to a force of only 479 combatants. Operational commitments, so often driven by national command authority needs, did not decrease.

The navy did it with less, and the result was a hemorrhaging of manpower and material the likes of which this country has never seen. Aircraft carriers deploying to the Indian Ocean commonly spent four months and longer at sea, without so much as seeing land, much less visiting a liberty port. The Nimitz spent 146 days continuously at sea. The Independence went 210 days, with only nine days ashore. By 1980,

15

the navy was short 22,000 noncommissioned officers. The standard joke among my contemporaries was "make Commander and get your divorce," because you were going to spend the next four years at sea, away from your family.

I'm not sure we'd be lucky enough as a service to survive that sort of misfortune again. And yet, in an ever more complex world environment, and with a U.S. military force structure that we are told will be smaller, we can expect national command authority commitments, or what the budgeters euphemistically call "unprogrammed contingencies," to at least remain the same, and perhaps to increase. It would seem illogical to reduce the size of our sea services at the very moment in history when they should be assuming an even greater role in our international security posture, unless our leaders wish to consciously acknowledge that we will be unable to meet the contingencies of the future.

I would hope that a different decision will be made. I would hope that we will instead have the courage to fully debate the nature of our obligations, as well as the nature of our allies' obligations to us, and to sort out exactly what it is we are defending and how this defense can best be accomplished.

Thank you.

Forbes

OCT 28 1988

Forbes Building
60 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10011
212 620-2200

October 26, 1988

The Honorable Kenry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

I have enjoyed many of your recent columns, but felt
I had to write to tell you what a particularly good one
I thought was the October 16 Los Angeles TIMES article entitled,
"As the Kremlin Shakes, the West Must Be Wary." It is a
most welcome, but unfortunately novel, view of our current
relationship with the Soviet Union, which many seem to feel
has to proceed at a head-long pace no matter what. It is
another example of how our fellow countrymen seem to be
able to do nothing by halves: we have to run everything
to the extreme.

In any event, it is a splendid column, and I may even
crib part of it for use at Forbes!

With warm good wishes, and I hope to see you soon.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305

SEP 6 - 1988

DEPARTMENT OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN
BUILDING 260

August 22, 1988

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
55 E. 52nd Street
New York, NY 10055

Dear Henry:

I always call soccer fans by their first names, so why should you be an exception? We have more in common than a love of soccer, we both fled Germany, where I had been a youth player for Werder Bremen.

I also once thought about becoming Secretary of State, so that I could get good seats at World Cup games, but I chose the easier road of journalism and managed to cover six World Cups. You may have read some of my articles in Soccer America; perhaps you even subscribed to the Globe Kicker of which I was chief editor, presenting the games of "Soccer Made in Germany", which I was instrumental in bringing to this country and on PBS.

Aside from these important matters, we are also both interested in history and literature (you don't make a living writing soccer articles) and I would like to ask you not only to read the inclosed article on soccer in the U.S. in the French magazine *Mondial* but also a book that is scheduled to be published by Twayne Publishers in a 2-volume set in March 1989. The title is: *The Subversive Tradition in French Literature, 1721-1971*. Not much soccer in it, except that I compare Napoleon to one of those marvelous dribblers who brings the crowd to its feet but who ends up further back than where he started.

If you agree, we would send you the uncorrected galley proofs, probably in November, and ask you to write a non-diplomatic endorsement for the cover. I should warn you that I am saying some very nasty things about the foreign policy of one of your predecessors, John Foster Dulles, and that I am often critical of U.S. policy in general; however, I spared you, since the study does not go beyond the May '68 events in France.

A word from you would be much appreciated; even a postal card with a simple "OK" will be fine.

Yours in soccer, history, and literature,

LJ

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FRENCH WRITERS AND POLITICS

The Literary Opposition, 1721-1971

(Alternate Title: HOW TO MAKE REVOLUTION WITH A PEN)

French Subversive Writers, 1721-1971

by

Leo Weinstein

This book stands French history on its head. Viewed
through the concave mirror of opposition literature, 250
years speed by as great authors make the mighty fall.

Louis XIV in his late years is seen by Montesquieu as
a vain and capricious ruler, Louis XV's support of a papal
bull is caricatured by Crébillon fils in a Japanese tale,
Voltaire's *Candide* proves that kings can be dethroned, and
Beaumarchais gives the *coup de grâce* to the tottering
*Ancien Régime*.

The Revolution loses its glamor under the poetic
thrusts of André Chénier, and Napoleon meets his match in
Mme de Staël and is taken off his pedestal when Anouilh
compares him unfavorably to Louis XVIII over 200 years
later. The Restoration reels under the hammerblows of
Béranger's songs and Stendhal's novels, which also take the
measure of the July Monarchy, while the Second Empire and
Napoleon III tremble from the vitriolic denunciations of
Victor Hugo's *Les Châtiments*.

The Third Republic comes under attack from the right
and the left: from conservatives or fascists, such as

2

Maurice Barrès and Drieu La Rochelle; or from communists, such as Aragon, who depicts World War II the way Henri Barbusse had chronicled the experiences of the first World War.

Sartre and Anouilh produce subversive plays right under the eyes of the German occupation censors, and Anouilh goes on to condemn De Gaulle for having permitted the excesses of post-World War II purges. Finally, an American author, James Jones, demystifies the pretensions of the May 1968 uprising.

The author traces the fascinating and courageous efforts of great French writers in political opposition, their battles of wits with repressive governments and censors, the wager they won to make politics an integral part of fiction, and the effect they have had in shaping French history.

In the process of this study, the works of these authors take on new and greater meaning, and new interpretations evolve. Why did Voltaire choose to end *Candide* in a garden? Was Crébillon fils a licentious novelist or a moralist? Are Stendhal's heroes cold opportunists or young, sensitive people lost on the wrong road? Are Aragon's novels propaganda works or do they have considerable literary value? Is Anouilh's *Antigone* just another play of his or does it contain a message to the French during the German occupation? What makes people

3

become communists or fascists? Can Americans learn
something from French history? And should we perhaps take
a more critical look at the heroes of history?

These are questions of timeless interest as are the
experiences of fictional characters, who turn dry and often
abstract historical facts into the eternal story of human
sufferings and joys. Montesquieu's Persian travelers,
Beaumarchais's Figaro, Stendhal's Julien Sorel, the
provincial characters of Barrès, Aragon, and Zola, and the
Greeks of Sartre and Anouilh tell us movingly what we shall
never find in books on French history.

Leo Weinstein fled his native Germany in 1938, served
in the Psychological Warfare Service of the U.S. Army
during World War II, and obtained his Ph.D. in 1951 from
Stanford University, where he taught French and comparative
literature until his early retirement in 1985. He is the
co-author of *Ernest Chausson: The Composer's Life and
Works* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1955; rpt. Greenwood
Press, 1973), and has published *The Metamorphoses of Don
Juan* (Stanford University Press, 1959; rpt. AMS Press,
1967), *Hippolyte Taine* (Twayne, 1972), and articles on
Franz Kafka, Stendhal, Flaubert, and Jules Laforgue. He
also edited *The Age of Reason: The Culture of the
Seventeenth Century* (Braziller, 1965), and translated *Pelé
by François Thébaud* (Harper & Row, 1976). Mr. Weinstein is
a Professor of French, Emeritus of Stanford University.

1

# CONTENTS

Page

Introduction: L'Art de rouspéter...................

## PART ONE: FROM LOUIS XIV TO LOUIS XVI

### Chapter

1. A Persian in Paris..................
The Last Years of Louis XIV and the Regency
(1685-1723) - Chronological Table - I.
Montesquieu: 1. How Can One Possibly Be a
Persian? Montesquieu: Lettres persanes - 2.
Milking Two Sacred Cows: Religion and Royalty-
3. Louis XIV and Absolute Monarchy - 4. Law's
System and the Nobility - 5. The Courts and
Women - 6. Montesquieu's Wit

2. A Religious Loyalty Oath..................
The Reign of Louis XV (1723-1754): The Bull
Unigenitus - Chronological Table - 1. Oh! Those
Mad Japanese! Crébillon fils: L'Ecumoire - 2.
Keys to the Characters - 3. Political and Erotic
Symbols - 4. Criticism of Church and Nobility-
5. A Call to Revolution

3. A Philosophical Gardener..................
The Reign of Louis XV, cont. (1755-1774)-
Chronological Table - Voltaire: I. Theater-

2

II. An Idea Never Disproved Except by the Facts:
[Candide] - 1. What Voltaire Attacked - 2.
Voltaire's Satirical Devices - 3. The Positive
Aspects of [Candide] - III. Voltaire's Personal
Commitment

4 Of Servants and Masters..................
The Reign of Louis XVI (1774-1789)-
Chronological Table - Beaumarchais: Le Mariage
de Figaro - 1. Of Servants and Masters - 2.
Censorship, Prohibition, and Performance - 3.
The Plot of the Play - 4. Themes and Attacks-
5. On the Road to Revolution

PART TWO: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE SECOND EMPIRE

5 Martyrs, Poets, and a Superwoman..................
The Revolution and Napoleon (1789-1814)-
Chronological Table - Censorship - I. How to
Kill Your Best Poet: André Chénier: Lambes-
II. The Great Woman and the Great Man: Mme de
Staël: Delphine and Corinne - III. Who's Afraid
of Napoleon? Chateaubriand: Les Martyrs de
Dioclétien - IV. The Big King and the Little
King: Béranger: Le Roi d'Yvetot

6 Songs, Kings, and Social Climbers..................
The Restoration (1814/1815-1830) - Chronological
Table - I. Béranger: 1. His Influence and

3

Trials - 2. Songs against Louis XVIII - 3.

 Songs against Charles X - II. Stendhal: 1. The

 Ideal Political Novelist - 2. The Dangers of

 Social Climbing: <u>Le Rouge et le noir</u> - 3. The

 Character of Julien Sorel

7 Much Ado about Kings, Umbrellas, and Petty Tyrants.

 The July Monarchy (1830-1848) - Chronological

 Table - Stendhal: I. A Halt in the Mud: <u>Lucien Leuwen</u> - II. The Pompous Prince of Petty Parma: <u>La Chartreuse de Parme</u> - III. The Evolution of

 Stendhal's Young Heroes - IV. In Search of the

 Ideal State and Statesman

8 Napoléon le Petit..................

 Second Republic and Second Empire (1848-1870)-

 Chronological Table - Victor Hugo: 1. His

 Opposition to Napoleon III - 2. Napoléon le

 Petit: <u>Les Châtiments</u>

PART THREE: THE THIRD REPUBLIC

9 Seven Characters in Search of a Republic.........

 The Third Republic: The Early Years (1871-1894)

 - The Boulangist Movement (1886-1889)-

 Chronological Table - I. Maurice Barrès: 1.

 Seven Characters in Search of a Republic: <u>Les Déracinés</u> - 2. <u>L'Appel au soldat</u> and <u>Leurs Figures</u> - 3. The Myth of True France - 4. The

4

Character of François Sturel - 5. The Disciple Syndrome - 6. Barrès and Stendhal - II. Boulanger as a Stendhalian Character

10 And Justice for All..................
The Third Republic (cont.): The Dreyfus Affair (1894-1899--1906) - Chronological Table - I. Anatole France: The Opinions of Monsieur Bergeret: 1. *L'Anneau d'améthyste* and *Monsieur Bergeret à Paris* - II. Emile Zola: 1. And Justice for All: *Vérité* - 2. Zola's Novel and the Dreyfus Affair

11 How to Become a Communist..................
The Third Republic (cont.): The Dawning of War (1906-1914) - Chronological Table - Louis Aragon: 1. *Le Monde réel* - 2. The Story of Two Women: *Les Cloches de Bâle* - 3. The Story of Two Brothers: *Les Beaux Quartiers* - 4. The Infernal Machine: *Les Voyageurs de l'impériale* - 5. A Love Story: *Aurélien* - 6. How to Become a Communist - 7. The Double Men of Capitalism

12 War Is Hell..................
The Third Republic (cont.): World War I (1914-1918) - Chronological Table - Henri Barbusse: 1. War Is Hell: *Le Feu* - 2. Reactions to the War Experience: a) Drieu La Rochelle; b) The Soldiers of the 231st Infantry Regiment - 3. The

5

Members of the Squad - 4. Monotony and Death
5. The War Profiteers - 6. Corporal Bertrand's
Vision of the Future - 7. An Exceptional War
Novel

13 How to Become a Fascist..................
The Third Republic (cont.): The Interwar Years
(1919-1939) - Chronological Table - Drieu La
Rochelle: **Gilles** - 1. Comparisons with
Characters in the Past - 2. Master and Disciple
- 3. Gilles' Politics - 4. His Contradictions
and Sex Life - 5. How to Become a Fascist - 6.
The Lesson of **Gilles**

PART FOUR: FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

14 The Phony War..................
The Third Republic (concluded): World War II
until the Fall of France (1939-1940)-
Chronological Table - Louis Aragon: 1. The
Phony War: **Les Communistes** - 2. The Levels of
War Recital - 3. Aragon's Design - 4. The Ideal
Couple - 5. The Communist Heroes - 6. The
Communist Religion - 7. Aragon's Theses - 8.
The Dangers of Relevance

15 The Greek Connection..................
Occupation and Resistance (1940-1944)-
Chronological Table - I. Jean-Paul Sartre: 1.

6

A Nativity Play for Prisoners of War: Bariona-

2. A Model Existentialist: Les Mouches - 3.

Sartre's Intentions - 4. Critical Reactions - 5.

How the Play Got By the Censors - II. Jean

Anouilh: 1. An Offer You Can Refuse: Antigone

- 2. Critical Reactions - 3. The Great

Confrontation - 4. The Human Borderline - 5.

Political Implications

16 The Head Hunters......................
Provisional Government and Fourth Republic (1944-1958) - Chronological Table - Purging: The Case of Brasillach - Jean Anouilh: I. The Head Hunters: Pauvre Bitos - 1. Critical Reactions- 2. The Point of the Play - II. Musical Chairs: La Foire d'empoigne - 1. Napoleon and De Gaulle - 2. The Lesson of Louis XVIII - 3. Tweedledee and Tweedledum

17 The Children's Crusade..................
The Fifth Republic (1958-1971) - Chronological Table - I. Colonial Wars: André Stil: 1. Torture in Algeria: a) Nous nous aimerons demain; b) Le Foudroyage - II. Revolt on the Left Bank - Literary Productions - A. A Crowd on the Top: Robert Merle: Derrière la vitre - B. James Jones: 1. Three's Company: The Merry Month of May - 2. The Unchaining of the Demons

MAY 19 1988

The Continental Companies
Developers/Owners/Operators
of Distinguished Hotels.

Office of the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer

May 9, 1988

Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 "K" Street, N.W.
Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I wanted you to know how much I enjoyed our conversation at the recent **American Express luncheon** in Ft. Lauderdale. As I mentioned to Lou Gerstner, after the lunch, I learned more about world affairs in our one and a half hour conversation, than I could have learned, if I devoted myself to a year of reading. Your views on the Israeli situation are most disturbing, unfortunately, I share your pessimism about the outcome of the current instability.

I continue to consider your provocative question on what we could use as a "trade off" with Russia for a "hands-off" agreement on Cuba. I confess that, I have not yet, arrived at a viable answer. If a more intellegent thought should strike me, I will advise you.

Since you were kind enough to inquire about my hotel business, I am taking the liberty of enclosing some of our "propaganda" about our company. You will, I am certain, notice the list of our hotels at the end of the brochure, and if, at any time, I can be of any personal help to you in any of our areas of coverage, please do not hesitate to call me. **We would be honored to have you stay as our guest at The Grand Bay Hotel in Coconut Grove (Miami) when you return to South Florida, or at our Grand Bay Hotel at Equitable Center in New York City.**

Let me again thank you for the gracious and informative dialogue, and be assured that it was a highlight for my week. With my profound respect and kindest personal regards.

smw:gn
enclosures

3250 Mary Street / Miami, Florida 33133 / Telephone (305) 445-4220

M]

HK:

Debbie Welch, Staff Development Director of
the Leadership Institute for Educators (LIFE)
program in northern Colorado, asks if you'd
be willing to assist program participant
Trudy Nocella towards accomplishing her
program goal of learning more about political
systems. In working on their goal, partici-
pants are to choose leaders who've made a
difference in their lives. Dr. Nocella,
Director of Guidance for Poudre R-1 School
District in Ft. Collins, CO, has long
admired your leadership qualities, and Welch
asks if you would either respond to a letter
from Nocella focusing on leadership questions,
or if a time could be arranged for Nocella
to talk to you on the phone.

Not interested; regret ____

Agree to TF call; Yvette to set up ✓

Suggest Dr. Nocella send her questions
in a letter ____

Prefer ____

\#303/772-4420

Jody

BOCES
NORTHERN
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

St. Vrain Valley Re1J
Thompson R-2J
Estes Park R-3
Weld County Re-4

Joining forces to enrich
educational opportunities for Colorado.

830 South Lincoln Street
Longmont, CO 80501
303-772-4420
Denver line: 442-2197

March 28, 1988

APR - 4 1988

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Former Secretary of State
Suite 400
1800 K. St. NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am writing for Dr. Trudy Nocella, Director of Guidance for Poudre R-1 School District in Ft. Collins, Colorado, and a participant in the Leadership Institute for Educators (L.I.F.E.) program.

I am the director of Staff Development for the L.I.F.E. project. The L.I.F.E. project is a leadership development program in Northern Colorado funded by six school districts and the Colorado Department of Education. Participants identify an organizational and personal goal for a nine month period after dialogue with their supervisor and people they supervise. We then identify a training package consisting of a variety of different resources to help each participant achieve his or her goals. Participants attend training sessions, shadow other leaders, have consultants who observe them and provide feedback, listen to nationally recognized speakers, and digest written and audiovisual material pertinent to their goal.

As part of the program we encourage participants to reflect upon leaders who have made a difference in their lives. Dr. Nocella is working on a goal of gaining knowledge about political systems. She has frequently mentioned you in our discussions as a leader who is able to balance actions and integrity. She admires your ability to work with diverse political systems, manage phenomenal breakthroughs, and still stay honest.

I am hoping that you would have a few moments of time to help Trudy obtain more information toward the accomplishment of her goal. This could be accomplished by: a) Trudy writing you a letter and you responding, or b) setting time when Trudy could call you for a 20-minute phone

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 29, 1988

Mr. Chris F. Westbury
2010 Lambert Closse Street
#8
Montreal, Quebec
H3H-1Z8 CANADA

Dear Mr. Westbury:

Dr. Kissinger is presently traveling and has asked me to respond to your recent letter on his behalf. Dr. Kissinger appreciates your invitation to contribute to your current project, but unfortunately, extensive commitments as well as a book of his own do not allow him the time to do justice to your request.

On Dr. Kissinger's behalf, thank you for writing and best wishes for a very successful book.

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300
TELEFAX (212) 753-7248

[L]

#8, 2010 Lambert Close St.,
Montreal, Quebec,
H3H-1Z8 CANADA

AUG 10 1988

Henry Kissinger
Suite 400 1800 "K" St. N. W.,
Washington D. C.,
20006,
U.S.A.

8/4/88

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am a Canadian free-lance writer. I am beginning a new project, and am writing to ask if you would
contribute a short statement to my new book.

This book will contain a collection of beliefs written by a large number of prominent citizens in many areas of human endeavour. I am in the process of contacting hundreds of well-known people all over the world to ask them to write a few paragraphs on what they consider to be the most important of their beliefs. I am convinced that many people will share my own interest in learning what it is that drives people like yourself and what advice you might offer to others trying to find their way through life. What advice do you feel is most important in your approach to living? What observations would you like to have the opportunity to share with others? I am interested in gathering together a collection of advice on living which does not consist of the empty clichés and platitudes that are so often offered. I believe that this book will offer a unique and varied perspective on life today.

I have enclosed a stamped, self-addressed envelope to facilitate the return of your response, should you
decide to reply.

When the book reaches publication, I will certainly send a copy to all contributors. I hope that you will
be as interested in reading the collection as I am.

I look forward to hearing from you. Thank you.

Sincerely,

JUN. 16 '88 10:26 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

Text of letter to Lally Weymouth, to be delivered to Kay Graham
to be read at birthday party tonight:

June 16

Dear Lally:

Unfortunately, Nancy agreed a year ago to attend the first
Nelson Rockefeller Public Service Award dinner tonight, and
I will be in Sweden to take part in the celebration of the
700th anniversary of the Wallenberg firm, which I also agreed
to do nearly a year ago.

Nothing less would have kept us away from telling you personally
how much we love you.

Warm regards,

Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress

AUG 25 1988

Washington, D.C. 20540

August 15, 1988

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates Inc.
55 E. 52nd Street
New York, New York 10055

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am sending you a copy of the study, "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior, 1979-1988: New Tests for U. S. Diplomacy," that I prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. It is a continuation of my previous study published in 1979 by the Committee under the title, "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U. S. Diplomacy."

The principle objective of the current study, like that of its predecessor, is to examine the style, purposes and effects of Soviet behavior in diplomacy and negotiations in historical perspective, largely from the American point of view. It encompasses new themes and develops an expanded conceptualization in the context of contemporary history from the June 1979 Brezhnev-Carter Summit meeting in Vienna to the eve of the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit meeting in Moscow during May-June 1988, a period of profound change. The study concludes with implications for U. S. diplomacy in the context of present and future Soviet-American relations.

I hope you will find this useful in your study of international relations.

Joseph G. Whelan
Senior Specialist in
International Affairs

Committee on Foreign Affairs

For Immediate Release

August 10, 1988

For Further Information Contact:

Bob Huber (202) 225-5021

Gorbachev Negotiating Strategy Poses Opportunities, Challenges for U.S.

The accession of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader has brought about major changes in the Soviet approach to diplomacy and negotiations with the United States, changes which have improved the possibilities of establishing a new and more enduring long-term relationship between the superpowers.

This was the main conclusion of a major study released today by Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The study, which revises and updates a study on this subject released by the Committee in 1979, traces Soviet behavior at a number of negotiating fora including the SALT II negotiations, summits between Gorbachev and President Reagan, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations and various economic, scientific, commercial, and cultural negotiations.

"This study is one of the most exhaustive ever undertaken concerning the way the Soviet Union negotiates with our country on a whole host of foreign policy issues," Fascell commented. "It tells us what has changed in Soviet negotiating behavior since Gorbachev came to power, what has not changed, and what it means for the conduct of U.S.-Soviet relations."

The changes cited in Soviet negotiating behavior as a result of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign policy include:

- The elimination of nuclear war as a viable Soviet policy option and a new emphasis on global interdependence that dictates an intensified search for mutual economic, ecological, political, and strategic cooperation rather than seeking unilateral advantage in negotiations with the United States, an attitude which led Gorbachev to accept an INF agreement on largely American terms;

- The need for arms control agreements to provide a "breathing space" for Gorbachev's economic reform program so that the Soviet Union can be more than just a military superpower;

- A recognition that the growing diffusion of power away from the superpowers in the international world requires the Soviet Union to seek improvements in its relations with the People's Republic of China, Japan, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America;

- The deemphasis on Marxist-Leninist ideology in the formulation of arms control positions and foreign policy generally in order to deal more successfully and find parallel interests with non-Communist countries;

- A recognition that the economic and political costs of imperialism in the Third World has sometimes become prohibitive in a period of economic stagnation, leading to such actions as the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan;

- The formulation of a new military doctrine, referred to as "reasonable

sufficiency," which deemphasizes offensive characteristics of past doctrine and force building and implies a reduction in military force structure;

- A revitalization of the Soviet foreign policy establishment in the Communist Party, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and government think tanks in order to professionalize their ranks, exemplified by the appointment of former U.S. Ambassador Anatolii Dobrynin as head of the Party's foreign policy department, in order to give "pragmatism and realism their upper hand over ideology," and promote "practical, dynamic, effective, and militant diplomacy;

- A more personalized diplomacy demonstrated by the growing personal relationships between Gorbachev and Reagan, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and between working levels of American and Soviet diplomats.

At the same time, the study points to continuity in Soviet negotiating behavior that has survived Gorbachev's rise to power. These include:

- A deep emphasis on historical experience, including fears of foreign invasion which can produce xenophobia, suspicion, and rigidity in bargaining;

- A tough-minded approach to negotiation, including the use of negotiating devices such as "agreement in principle," "comprehensive agreements," and forcing continual revisions in the adversary's negotiating position so as to force the opponent to "negotiate with himself;"

- The use of summits and "back channel" meetings between principal policymakers to establish understandings that may concede crucial points of negotiation to the Soviets;

- Continued commitment to Marxism-Leninism as an overarching policy prism through which negotiating partners and their motivations are viewed, even while increasing pragmatic solutions to stalemates in negotiations;

- A resort to propagandistic, unverifiable proposals when stalemate develops in an effort to appeal to public opinion rather than making serious compromises on the substance of negotiations;

- The traditional element of expansionism in Soviet foreign policy, which while arrested for the moment, is demonstrated in a firm commitment to a global foreign policy, and a major continued commitment to political radicalism and military assistance to Third World client states;

- Inevitable national interests which diverge with that of the United States in Western Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

"This study is an indispensable guide for American policymakers and negotiators in their dealings with Soviet leaders," Fascell concluded. "It will better enable the executive branch and the Congress to ferret out what in Soviet negotiating behavior offers opportunities for negotiating progress and what is a ruse for one-sided advantage." "Gorbachev's new style and sometimes new substance makes a deep understanding of the new ball game in Soviet diplomacy essential."

Copies of the study, entitled "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior -- 1979-88: New Tests for U.S. Diplomacy," are available from Room 2169, Rayburn House Office Building, (202) 225-5515.

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September 22, 1988

SEP 23 1988

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a letter addressed to the President and Mrs. Reagan by the wife of the former deputy head of the South Vietnamese delegation to the peace talks in Paris in the early '70's. Both Phong and his wife were very good friends of mine when I covered the peace conference during the late '60's and early '70's. He was the chief South Vietnamese spokesman at the peace talks and an extremely strong supporter of the United States position at the peace talks. He was also a close personal friend of David Bruce who, when Ambassador in London, came to Paris to be best man at his wedding to Elizabeth.

Phong called me in Rome the day before he left Paris to return to Saigon and told me he had been summoned back by the President. I pleaded with him to ignore the summons, warning him that he might never get out of Saigon before the North Vietnamese took over. He said he realized that, but he felt that he had to respond to the President's summons.

He was one of the first of the pro-American South Vietnamese to be seized by the Communists. David Bruce did everything he possibly could to secure his release and appealed to the French government to intervene on his behalf. But the French Foreign Office took the position that French intervention would do more harm than good.

I do hope something can be done. I do hope some influence can be exerted on the Vietnamese government to let him leave the country and rejoin his wife and children in Paris.

With thanks for your consideration and good wishes,

JKS/gs
Enclosure