QUESTION:

Are you worried by the supplies, by the arms supplies
that are coming into Syria right now?

MR. SISCO:

Well, again, I don't want to get into the question of
arms supplies in any specific sort of way. I would only
reiterate what I said a moment ago that the Soviet presence
in the Middle East is a reality. While it has been reduced
in Egypt, the Soviets are significant in the area and this
is a fact of life, a fact of life which I think is recognized
by countries in the area as well as the major powers who
have an interest in the area.

QUESTION:

Do you see in the foreseeable future any settlement
between Israel and Jordan?

MR. SISCO:

Well, up to now the priority has been to try to
work out in the first instance an agreement between Egypt
and Israel. I believe that priority continues to be key.
Obviously, before there is durable peace not only do the
Egyptian-Israeli aspects of the problem have to be dealt
with but also those relating to Jordan and Syria. But
I would say the Egyptian-Israeli aspect continues to be
the priority item.

QUESTION:

Mr. Sisco, the United States has spoken time and
again against an imposed settlement in the Middle East,
this policy continues I understand.

MR. SISCO:

It does continue. It is unrealistic to believe that
any major power can impose its will on the Middle East. The
Middle East, Israel as well as the Arab states, are sovereign
countries, and I don't believe any major power has this kind
of capacity. But more important, I think if the peace is

going to be a durable peace it has to be something considerably more than what it was at the end of the Suez crisis in 1956. You will recall that the United States was the third-power repository of the understandings which were achieved between Egypt and Israel. When we talk about a peace agreement today, we're talking about obligations which each state would undertake in relationship to one another rather than to a third party. Perhaps we can be helpful, perhaps we can play a role of constructive catalyst, but this does not mean that we believe or have any desire to attempt any kind of an imposition of a solution or that we intend to substitute ourselves for an agreement between the parties.

### QUESTION:

Will this hold true after the elections in the United States as well?

### MR. SISCO:

Well, I think it will, and I think as far as we're concerned it's important that a negotiating process begin. We have an interest and we have a role if the parties want us to play a role, but the principal focus has to be negotiations between the parties.

- 10 -

### QUESTION:

Mr. Sisco, many people in Israel are still haunted by the famous Rogers Plan. Is this plan going to direct American policy in the future or perhaps have things changed that much that you feel the plan could be dropped now?

### MR. SISCO:

Well, I really can't add or subtract to what has been said in terms of our policy. We have in the past had views as to ideas that might meet legitimate concerns of both sides. But even on the basis of any substantive ideas that we have developed over the last three or four years, our whole approach was still based on the assumption that the key features of any agreement had to be negotiated between the two sides. Now, I think we will just have to wait and see how the situation evolves. I think the process of negotiation is the first step. As I say, if we can play a helpful role, we're available. But in terms of what the situation will be two months from now, five months from now, I think one will have to see.

### QUESTION:

Does this mean the Rogers Plan still is the United States plan for the Middle East?

### MR. SISCO:

Well, I would again repeat what I said a moment ago, I'm in no position to either add or subtract to what has been said with respect to our policy. What will come out in the Middle East in my judgment, assuming a negotiating process can begin, will be, I hope, some understanding on the principal elements of the November 1967 resolution. This means really, a binding peace, peace commitments between the two sides; the question of the opening of the Suez Canal is one. The resolution also called for withdrawal. It did not call, as you know, for total Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines. The whole assumption of Security Council Resolution 242 was that the final lines would be negotiated between the two sides. Moreover, the whole problem of refugees, it seems to me, has taken on a much more politicized context here in 1972 than was the case in 1967. So what I'm trying to say is this: There's one thing that one can say about the Middle East and that is it's not static, it's forever changing and the situation in 1973 will be different than what the situation was say in 1969, when our substantive ideas were publicized for the first time. 1973 will be a period, for example, when the Middle East will have experienced almost three years of a cease-fire. It'll be a situation where hopefully there will be a context of less possibility of confrontation.

And the Middle East is very considerably affected by what
has gone on this past year. We've seen a remarkable opening
at the summit level between the United States and Communist
China. We've seen concrete agreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union that obviously have an impact,
not only on the Middle East but elsewhere in the world. If
one looks, for example, at the communique that was
adopted in May in Moscow, in addition to support and
confirmation on the part of the major powers for a peaceful
solution based on the November 1967 resolution, an important
set of principles was agreed on; namely, that each side would
try to avoid a confrontation, that each side would resort to
peaceful means, that each side would try to resist the
temptation to derive unilateral advantage from one given
trouble spot as against another.

QUESTION:

Mr. Sisco, I would like to go back to the Rogers Plan if you will permit me. 242 says that Israel should not withdraw from all territories, the Rogers Plan, as far as I remember it, does -- regarding Egypt, I mean.

MR. SISCO:

Well, let me first of all say something about 242.
242 contains the principle of withdrawal and you know this is
not very clearly understood, strangely enough, and it calls
for the principle of withdrawal and in a subsequent paragraph
of the Security Council Resolution it talks in terms of so-
called secure and recognized borders. It did not endorse the
1967 lines as the final lines, but it did not preclude those
lines, either.

QUESTION:

You've got me all mixed up. As far as I know, the
Rogers Plan speaks about withdrawal to the '67 boundaries
regarding Egypt and Israel.

MR. SISCO:

Well, but that is subject -- it talks in terms of the
international boundary that has existed, but what is normally
forgotten is the fact that the withdrawal to that border is
linked to negotiations between the two sides on three key
issues. First, that a satisfactory agreement would be
achieved between Israel and Egypt on the key point of Sharm
al-Shaykh. Secondly, that satisfactory agreement would be

achieved as a result of negotiation with respect to demilitarization in the Sinai. And, third, Gaza, both in terms of what the security arrangements would be as well as the resolution of the problem of sovereignty. What's normally forgotten about the Rogers Plan is that these three key points were left completely open for negotiation, there was no substantive judgment made one way or another and this is really in my judgment the key issues of security in any peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. But as I say, I don't want to go beyond that, I'm not really in a position to add or subtract to policy statements that have been made, and I'm not interested in making news as a matter of fact.

**QUESTION:**

You've never considered dropping the plan -- scrapping it?

**MR. SISCO:**

Well, I don't want to say anything more now. I think I've tried to answer your questions to the degree to which I can.

**QUESTION:**

You have said a few moments ago two things, one is encouraging, and I find it encouraging that although the Rogers Plan exists a solution should be found -- the emphasis should be on negotiations between the sides, if I read you correctly, this is one thing, the other thing is that we're going to face a new obstacle in '73 -- the Palestinian problem.

**MR. SISCO:**

Well, the Palestinian problem is not a new obstacle. There's no durable --

**QUESTION:**

In sharper focus, I mean.

**MR. SISCO:**

Well, yes it's in sharp focus, and the Palestinian problem has been a problem for many, many years and there isn't

any doubt that if you're going to get a durable peace in
the area it's going to have to meet the legitimate concerns
not only of Israel and the established Arab states but of
the Palestinians. Now, I don't really think that the Black
September Group represents either the majority view of the
Arab states or, for that matter, the majority view of the
Palestinians. I'm convinced on the basis of the discussions
that I've had over the last four years that the preponderant
majority of the Palestinians want a peaceful solution and
I think it would be a mistake to lump a small group of people
that are dedicated to the use of force and terrorism,
terrorism, largely outside the area because the guerrilla
movement hasn't been effective in the military sense in the
Middle East. I think it would be a mistake to equate this
very small group with the majority view on the Arab side.
I think the majority of the Arab people today want a peaceful
solution and are prepared to face up to the idea of co-
existence with Israel.

QUESTION:

Another burning issue is the economic fee on Soviet
Jewry --

MR. SISCO:

Right.

QUESTION:

----- The ransom. In view of the action taken by Congress, the Jackson amendment --

MR. SISCO:

Yes.

QUESTION:

----- and the commercial ongoing talks with the Russians, do believe, do you believe, do you see in the foreseeable future anything that the Soviets would cancel or eliminate this fee?

MR. SISCO:

Well, again, I'm not in the business of predicting and I'm not about to. What I can say and will say is this. First, this is a deep emotional issue, not only with Israelis but it is a matter of very deep concern for all Americans. Secondly, we have made clear that this matter has been taken up and will continue to be taken up, at all appropriate levels. We're convinced that to be effective the avenue of private diplomacy has to be pursued. We described, for example, just the other day to your Foreign Minister just what we are going privately, and I think there is an appreciation and understanding both in your country and our own, that we are doing everything that is possible. We will continue to pursue this matter quietly in what we consider to be the most effective manner. It's very easy to make a lot of public statements on this kind of thing and thereby not achieve any results. We're convinced that the most effective way is to pursue this matter privately and directly, which is what we are doing. I would make this added point: I'm also convinced that to the degree to which discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, broadly speaking, result in concrete understandings, result in a diminution of tension between the two major powers, this

- 15 -

[10]

should help improve the atmosphere and should have a positive
and a salutary effect on the question that you raised.

QUESTION:

You would not reveal to us what Gromyko told you in
that meeting?

MR. SISCO:

No, I don't think so. If you're going to pursue private
diplomacy, I don't think you begin to reveal on television
or anywhere else just what was said.

QUESTION:

Let me ask you for the end of our short interview a
few personal questions. After so many years of trying to get
to a solution, aren't you a little discouraged sometimes?

MR. SISCO:

Oh, no. We all get discouraged from time to time, but I'm basically an optimist. I'm the sort of individual who looks at a glass and says that its half-full of water rather than half-empty. That's been my philosophy in my life and it has been my approach to the Middle East problem. There were those who said a year and a half ago, for example, that a cease-fire in the area wasn't possible. I believe that history of the Middle East in many respects has been a history of lost opportunities and anybody who writes the history will see that there were important junctures at which opportunities were lost. I think that a peace in the area is doable, I think a peace is achievable. I think that the minimal conditions in the Middle East exist for diplomacy. Terrorism is a problem in the Middle East and elsewhere; the fact that the war ended in 1967, and there's been no substantial progress towards a peaceful settlement is also complicating. On the other hand, people are in the habit of living their lives without the daily incidents across the Suez Canal, and I think this is a positive psychological factor in the area. I think both sides recognize that the political option is much to be preferred to the military option. The military option makes no sense from anybody's point of view.

QUESTION:

And the Egyptians are --

- 16 -

MR. SISCO:

Oh, I think there's greater realism in the Arab world in this regard than in the past. This is confirmed by the fact that not only has the cease-fire been maintained but also the framework of the November 1967 resolution has been maintained. There are, of course, certain extreme elements in the Middle East that are not dedicated to a peaceful solution, but I'm convinced that the voices in favor of moderation, the voices in favor of a political solution, still have an upper hand and as long as that is the case I think there's opportunity. And being the optimist that I am, I think peace is achievable. I believe it has to be achieved primarily by the parties. I believe the United States can play a helpful role, but its role by no matter of means should become a substitute for the parties themselves.

PRESS
STATE
DEPARTMENT OF

Public
Statements

October 19, 1972

No. 266

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. IRWIN II
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WILMETTE, ILLINOIS

October 18, 1972

3,4

Robert Burns' belief that an ability to see ourselves "as others see us" would save us from many a blunder and foolish notion was set forth in the rather modest context of his poem "To a Louse, on Seeing One on a Lady's Bonnet at Church, 1786." The context of this series of luncheon meetings that I have the pleasure — rather unexpectedly — of inaugurating is larger; it embraces the entire world. Yet Burns' dictum is even more relevant in foreign affairs than in personal life — and the blunders and foolish notions into which we might fall are of incalculably greater importance.

But "as others see us" is only the second part of the quotation; the first part talks of seeing ourselves — and seeing or knowing ourselves is the beginning of wisdom. A large part of our job, in the foreign affairs business, from the President on down, involves bridging the gap between these separate visions — finding ways to reconcile how others see us with how we see ourselves and in the process often changing both.

## The Changing Environment

It is by now almost routine to say that we are in the midst of a sea-change in international affairs, but any discussion of the present or the future must start from those great shifts that have been taking place in the outside world — and in our own country — over the past decade or so:

- The deceptively simple image of bi-polarity in the world has yielded to a much more complex picture — which is also often oversimplified — of multiple power centers and high levels of interdependence. The movement away from bi-polarity seems a healthy one, but it has confronted us with a situation of much greater complexity than the one with which we dealt during the 1950s and early 1960s.

For further information contact:

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- The nation-state, the traditional unit of international relations, is also being subjected to stress. Although I do not expect radical changes in the next decade, we must realize that new international entities — ranging from regional groupings, the most significant of which is the European Community, to the multinational corporations to specialized agencies of the United Nations — are assuming an ever more important role. Sub-groups and nationalities are seeking some form of international personality. Traditional concepts of sovereignty are not always fully appropriate to some of the issues, such as environmental problems, that confront us.

- Closely related to these changes is the gradual erosion of the barrier between domestic and foreign affairs and the greater involvement of the general public in foreign policy. We have learned that Turkish poppies, Japanese trade surpluses, international terrorism, and oil spills by tankers, whatever the ownership, all have real and direct meaning for us as Americans. Although there has been some talk of neo-isolationism as a response to the slings and arrows of an unruly outside world, such ideas are simply not realistic for a country so deeply and irrevocably involved in the outside world as we have become. While there is undoubtedly much sentiment for a reassessment of our role abroad, we can only anticipate a more active role for the American people in the foreign policy process over the next years.

- A reassessment of our role is a matter of central concern. Changing conditions have permitted us to begin to shed part of the unnaturally heavy burden that we have carried since World War II, at a time when our society is turning necessarily and intensively to domestic ills. Not only have we need to assess our resources and review our priorities; the recognition of our own shortcomings has also bred a healthier degree of skepticism as to our own ability to solve the problems of others.

- Lastly, there are new sets of problems that confront us in international affairs: the proliferation of sovereign entities, population pressures, the threat of pollution to the biosphere, a geometric increase in demand for a finite amount of natural resources, to name only a few.

Some propose extreme responses to these new issues while others feel that we can carry on "business as usual" and survive. Perhaps diplomacy disposes us to look for the reasonable middle ground, but it is also very much in the tradition of this country to react moderately. We do not offer radical prospects for reform. Not that this means we believe all is going smoothly in the best of all possible worlds. What it does mean is that we try to match the need for change with the need for continuity and stability. Let me illustrate this with a few examples.

## Viet-Nam

Southeast Asia, and especially Viet-Nam, has posed the most painful policy problem for this country, at least since World War II and in some ways perhaps since our own Civil War. You are all familiar with what

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has been done in the past years with the double objective of terminating American involvement in the conflict and allowing the people of South Viet-Nam to shape their own future free from outside interference.

Today, as you are all aware from your newspapers, is a particularly delicate moment for any speculations. I can only emphasize that this Administration continues a determined effort to bring about a peaceful settlement. The future of Viet-Nam and all of Southeast Asia could be bright; we stand ready to contribute to the development of the region, leaving it to the component states themselves to determine their ultimate direction.

## The Middle East

The Middle East has remained relatively quiet for the past 27 months as a result of a cease-fire that the United States sponsored, but it also remains the greatest potential danger spot in the world today. Intensity of bitterness, intractability of attitudes and interests, involvement of the great powers, and strategic importance all come together in this land bridge joining three continents. Despite strong rhetoric on both sides, a possibility of peace in the Middle East remains. Again, however, it is the parties directly involved who must find the way to peace. We have on several occasions sought to build bridges between the parties, or at least to suggest some shallow spots that might be forded, and we will continue to do so whenever our advice and assistance seem helpful. We do not, however, seek to impose solutions either unilaterally or in concert with other outside powers. Solutions must be found by the people who have to live with them.

While the U.S. has a special concern with Israel, we do not accept the view that our relationship with Israel must polarize the Middle East or jeopardize our relations with other states in the region. Despite various points of difference with Arab countries, we are fortunate to have a long history of good relations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon. Two other Arab countries — the Yemen Arab Republic and the Sudan — have reinstituted diplomatic relations with the United States in the past year; and in Egypt and Algeria, day-to-day business is carried on in our mutual interest despite the absence of formal diplomatic ties.

We also foresee greater European involvement in Middle Eastern matters as the European Economic Community builds its ties to the nations of North Africa and the Middle East. We see such involvement as a healthy sign of diversification and depolarization in the region, although we would be seriously concerned if it were accomplished in a way which discriminated against us by, for instance, the creation of a preferential trading bloc.

## Oil and Energy

Another element in the Middle East situation is the question of oil. In the recent past it has been gratifying to see interested parties moving from contention and mistrust through negotiation toward settlement on a basis of interdependence. Any matter of such importance as oil will

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inevitably breed disputes and misunderstandings, but the statesmanlike moves by both the producing countries and the oil companies toward a new relationship have been of extraordinary importance.

Energy, and especially oil, is one of those areas where all producers and consumers — that is to say, nearly everybody — must exercise a maximum of creativity if supply and demand are to be kept in balance. Demand, as you know, is increasing at a phenomenal rate. While we are assured of an adequate supply for some years to come, we must now assume our responsibility to future generations to find ways of guaranteeing an adequate energy supply. There is an urgent need for an energy policy that is comprehensive in dealing with all types of energy and with all producing and consuming countries. Planning has already begun; more will be done in the coming years.

## South Asia

Another region has occupied much of our attention in the past year — the subcontinent of South Asia. Recent upheavals there have created a new nation, truncated an old one, and greatly enhanced the regional power status of a third — and all three, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, are among the world's ten most populous nations.

Since the end of British rule in South Asia, we have made major contributions to all of the countries in the region. Our friendship and, within available resources, our economic assistance have been available to those who need it. We maintain our interest in the future of South Asia, but our role must be consonant with the realities of the situation. The preponderant power of India in that area is a reality as are the legitimate concerns of Pakistan, Bangladesh and the smaller states of the region. We have no desire to gain a special position of influence for ourselves nor to interfere in the process by which the South Asian states find a modus vivendi that will permit them to pursue the urgent tasks of development free from fear of outside intervention. At the same time, however, we would wish to receive treatment equal to that accorded other external powers.

## Our View of the Third World

Today there is often emphasis on five major powers: the USSR, China, Japan, Europe in the form of the European Community, and the United States. But we recognize fully that the world is not a pentagon of five powers; the countries of the third world form a vital and integral part of the world neighborhood in which we live. Means must be found to ensure participation by these nations in the prosperity of the northern half of the globe and ensure them a political role appropriate to a contemporary world.

Three themes run through our policy toward Africa, Asia and Latin America:

- We remain willing to help them in their economic development and to aid them in other fields when they seek our assistance. The pressure on our resources and those of the other more affluent

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nations is great, but the affluent nations must find ways of providing more help lest we create a world in which a poverty-stricken southern hemisphere is arrayed against a defensively affluent north.

As I have noted previously:

- We are aware of the limitations on the ability of any outside power — including the United States — to decisively influence the future of other nations. Neither we nor the Soviet Union nor China can or should seek to be the arbiter of developments in the third world.

- And, as President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev set forth in the Moscow statement, neither we nor the Soviets should seek unilateral advantage at the expense of the other.

## The Larger Powers

Without diminishing our interest in the third world, many of our principal foreign policy concerns, over the next decade at least, will be with two other groups of states:

- The nations of Western Europe and Japan which share with us a high level of affluence and for the most part are bound to us in ties of alliance, or at least friendship and familiarity;

- And the large socialist states, China and the USSR, whose relationship with us is still adversarial and likely to remain so for some time to come.

There have been dramatic changes in our relationships with both of these groups of states over the past several years. The clear patterns of black and white that characterized relationships in the post-war world are less distinct and President Nixon has made it a major element of his foreign policy to reorder our relationships in ways that correspond to these new world realities. In the coming years we will want to consolidate the progress already made — and, most important, to ensure that momentum is not lost. We simply cannot afford to recede from the era of negotiation that the President has launched back into an era of confrontation.

We have moved from the black and white situation of earlier years, but the shades of grey are still distinct and will remain so. We know who are friends are and we know that we must take care to maintain these friendships.

The reasons for the shades of grey seem to me to be twofold:

- The obvious decline in bi-polarity in international affairs, and

- Less obviously, the growth of world-wide interdependence across a broad range of issues.

The two are of course interrelated — perhaps the different sides of the same coin.

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The Decline in Bi-Polarity

A major element in the decline of bi-polarity has been the emergence of new power centers on the world scene — Western Europe, Japan and China. The first two of these owe their new-found roles in large part to their economic growth — a process in which the United States can be proud to have played a vital part. The expanded Western European community is the world's largest trading entity with a combined gross national product of about $800 billion — some three-quarters of our own and steadily heading upward. Japan has now become the world's third largest producer of goods and services, following only the United States and the Soviet Union. Its gross national product is $250 billion and some economists expect it to reach our own current level of some one trillion dollars by the end of this decade.

The third newcomer is China — among the poorer nations of the world when judged on a per capita basis, but in terms of population, military strength and political influence one of the major actors on the world stage. Recognition of China's new status was symbolized by its entry into the United Nations last year.

The rise of new power centers by definition relates to the decline in the bi-polar structure of the world. Even within what used to be called "blocs," power has been diluted; China rivals the Soviet Union politically — Western Europe and Japan rival us economically. It is a fact of life that the U.S. and the USSR have declined in relative influence over the past years, and this devolution of power is not a healthy phenomenon.

At the same time, another manifestation of the decline in bi-polarity has been the gradually emerging detente between the United States and the Soviet Union — and in a somewhat different sense, between the United States and China. The President's Peking and Moscow visits were major benchmarks. We have no illusions that all problems with these great nations are behind us or that the nuclear balance has ceased to be a central fact in world affairs. In pursuit of detente, we can only move with deliberate speed — there are still many uncertainties and dangers — and a strong and effective military posture is an indispensable part of the search for detente.

Interdependence

President Nixon has set the goal of "a structure of peace to which all nations contribute and in which all nations have a stake." What this means quite simply is that the burgeoning sets of interactions among states should lead to a structure of interdependence in which each state has a greater interest in the smooth functioning of the overall structure than it has in taking any action in its unilateral advantage that would put the structure in jeopardy.

In our dealings with the Soviets and Chinese we see interdependence fostered by trade and exchanges of persons. Cooperation on such problems as pollution and law of the seas also contributes, but Soviet and Chinese involvement in the growth of interdependence is much slower and more fitful than the corresponding growth within the non-Communist world.

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An important element in our relations with the Soviet Union — and, we hope, ultimately with China — is the recognition of mutual advantage in reducing rivalry at the strategic level. The first round of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, culminating in the treaties signed by the President in Moscow, was a major step in this direction. We were able to slow down some aspects of this fruitless competition while still ensuring that our vital security interests are fully protected. A major item on the agenda for the future will be the next series of SALT talks which should begin soon.

Generally speaking, enhanced interdependence with the Communist countries seems only a plus in the ledger. The great expansion of interdependence among ourselves, the Europeans and Japanese, while equally welcome and necessary, brings with it new problems. We must accept the fact that any relationship, as it grows in intimacy, will force both sides to make adjustments that are often uncomfortable.

The economic arena is the scene of particularly difficult problems. The monetary and trade structures that were created after the Second World War lacked the capacity to adapt to the tremendous changes of the past decade. On August 15, 1971, President Nixon moved forcefully toward the creation of new structures that would protect our legitimate interests and correspond to the realities of the 1970s. This initiative was essential in preventing a decline into economic anarchy where each major economic unit would feel compelled to cultivate its own interests with little concern for others. I can conceive of no more severe blow to the fruitful interdependence that has grown among the economically advanced states in recent years.

The corner is being turned, however. President Nixon's and Secretary of the Treasury Schultz's speeches at the joint annual meeting of the IBRD and IMF last month were extraordinarily well received. The meeting accepted the need for a serious effort to reform the world's monetary system, and we are scheduled to begin comprehensive trade talks in 1973. Without expecting rapid agreement, we are determined to build durable structures that will include reduction of trade barriers among the advanced countries while offering substantial advantages to the less developed.

In the political area, we together with our European friends will probably soon embark on two vital sets of negotiations that should strengthen our mutual ties while further engaging Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These are the related negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Important strides have been made in recent years towards a normalization of affairs in Europe -- notably in German Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* which we have supported. In the CSCE, we look for agreements that will respect the legitimate interests of all concerned and reduce tensions in Europe.

The talks on force reduction are related to the core of our security posture -- the NATO alliance. Two elements are of particular importance: the relationship of forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries and, ultimately, the composition of the NATO forces. We are firmly committed

[L.C]

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to keeping the necessary American forces in Europe. The maintenance of these forces is costly to us and over time we count on Europe's assuming a still greater share in the burden of defense, consonant with its increased capabilities. We enter the MBFR negotiations, therefore, with the hope that they will result in a stable balance of forces on the Continent that will contribute to a "structure of peace." Even more important, we enter the negotiations knowing that the security of Europe is one of the foremost of our vital national interests.

Although interdependence in Asia is not as far advanced as it is in Europe, the signs are also apparent. The legacy of World War II has been put behind as the nations of Southeast Asia find that economic and political cooperation can pay substantial dividends, Japan is experiment-ing carefully in establishing a mutually satisfactory relationship with the nations of the region and we expect that China will follow suit. We, too, are involved and will remain involved even after a Viet-Nam settle-ment, albeit in different and more productive ways. The potential of Southeast Asia is great and stands its best chance of being realized if all concerned powers approach the region on a basis of mutuality.

One could easily devote a speech much longer than this one to the specific manifestations of interdependence: the growth of multinational corporation, the concerted action necessary for dealing with problems of the environment, the spread of the youth culture, the tremendous upsurge in international tourism and the many other indices that show how in many regards the world has indeed become one.

What I have said today projects an outline of our present and future foreign policy. I believe there exists a broad basis for consensus on the future of the world — both within this country and with other countries, whether they be adversaries, allies or neutrals. The task of articulating and giving form to this consensus will engage the efforts of many for much more than the next four years. It is a task in which you, concerned citizens, and we, Government officials, should both participate because it is the future of our country and our world that we will be shaping.

* * * * * * * *

Thj: Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1584

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:42 A.M. EST

OCTOBER 31, 1972

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President is working in his EOB office this morning. He met with John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman this morning, and other members of the staff, including about an hour and 15 minutes with Dr. Kissinger.

The President is in the Oval Office now, and as you know, Governor Rockefeller is in town and was asked to come over to the White House to meet with the President briefly, perhaps for an extended period, but at least to meet with him this morning. So the President is with Governor Rockefeller at this time.

The rest of the day the President will probably be working in his EOB office and working on staff matters and on the series of radio addresses that he has planned, and also the television address that he has planned for later this week. I will give you those details in just a moment.

We have had a request or two to have a Presidential signing of one of the final bills that we announced a decision on yesterday, so we may do that today in the Oval Office.

The President will make three additional radio addresses to the Nation this week. This Wednesday at 12:07 the President will deliver a radio address on the CBS, Mutual and NBC networks, and in that radio address will discuss urban policy.

The President will also make a radio address on Friday at 12:07 p.m. and we will announce the topic and the networks to you later this week.

An additional radio address by the President -- all of these are live, incidentally -- is scheduled for this coming Saturday, November 4th. We will confirm the time and the subject of that address as soon as it is set.

The Wednesday, Friday and Saturday radio addresses are scheduled at this time to be delivered from the White House. If there is a change in that, we will let you know, but that is the schedule at this time.

We are also announcing today that the President will address the Nation in a live television and radio broadcast this Thursday night at 7:30 p.m. The President will, in the live television broadcast, look to the future and discuss his hopes for the future of this country, and will do that also from the White House. The NBC Television Network will carry the address. It will also be broadcast on radio, and we will provide you later, when it is set, the radio networks that will be used. The networks probably will be CBS, Mutual and NBC.

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A How about contacts with other countries?

MR. ZIEGLER: I won't discuss that.

Q Is Dr. Kissinger still here, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: He was walking around the office this morning, and I saw him going into the President's office.

Q How long ago did you see him?

MR. ZIEGLER: He is here, Fran.

Q Does the President have a view you would like to share with us on the release of the Palestinian terrorists by the Germans?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have no comment on that.

Q Is Secretary Rogers in town or does he have travel plans for this weekend?

MR. ZIEGLER: Secretary Rogers is in town and has no travel plans, as far as I know, for this weekend.

Q Ron, Dr. Kissinger said there were no secret parts of this agreement that had not been made public by the White House. There is a plan to reconstruct Vietnam and there is a price tag apparently in this agreement. Are the American people going to be told what that is?

MR. ZIEGLER: Helen, I am not prepared to discuss the contents of the negotiations.

Q Ron, yesterday's Washington Post had a letter from Congressman Pete McCloskey in which he said the Administration should be rejected November 7th unless there is a disclosure on Watergate and Segretti. In the light of that letter, are you reassessing your disclosure policy; and secondly, what is the White House view on what voters in McCloskey's district might feel about his candidacy?

MR. ZIEGLER: I couldn't assess Pete McCloskey's position, and I have nothing more to say on that subject.

Q Can we take Governor Rockefeller as a spokesman for the Administration in his speech at the Press Club today on foreign policy? Is he going to be a surrogate?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think you should take Governor Rockefeller as the Governor of New York. He is supportive of the re-election of the President. Governor Rockefeller always speaks in his own right, and in that context has been supportive of the President and supportive of his foreign policy.

Q Isn't he a surrogate, though?

MR. ZIEGLER: He has been talking around the country and the State of New York on behalf of the President, certainly.

Q What are they meeting about, Ron?

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MR. TREWHITT: Mr. Secretary, speaking of the election, you are holding out the possibilities of an end of the war in Vietnam in spite of some troubles they have had in the next few weeks, before the end of the President's term, I would say. You have started a process of detente with Moscow and Peking which obviously is a major step forward in foreign affairs, no matter what the ultimate outcome is.

act

How are you going to top that in the second four years? How do you expect affairs to go in the next four years, assuming your boss is reelected?

SECRETARY ROGERS: I don't think the conduct of foreign affairs requires you to top yourself. I think the initiatives President Nixon has taken provide a foundation for peace and we are going to continue to build on that foundation. It is not necessarily a process that requires dramatic action at every step of the way, but it does require continuation of the policy that has been successful. For example, we are going to take part in the European Security Conference next year, including all the European countries and Canada. We will take part in a negotiation on Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction in Europe. We will continue the SALT talks, Phase Two of the SALT talks, so we will have a series of on-going negotiations with the Soviet Union and with other countries in Eastern Europe and we will continue to support the commitments that we have undertaken in the Pacific and we will have this Indochina Conference I referred to, dealing with Indochina and we will continue to improve our relations with Japan and certainly with the PRC.

I believe because President Nixon's foreign policy has been successful -- and I think everyone agrees that it has been successful -- that he has provided a foundation for a generation of peace and we are going to do everything we can in the second term of this Administration to make that possible.

MR. TREWHITT: Mr. Secretary, you did not mention the Middle East, which is one in which there has been very little overt movement beyond the establishment of a cease fire two years ago. What do you intend to do about that?

SECRETARY ROGERS: Well, Mr. Trewhitt, I am glad you mentioned the cease-fire, because that is I think a major achievement. There isn't as much attention focused on peace as there is on war, but we have had a cease-fire in the Middle East now, for about 27 months.

We are going to do what we can diplomatically to see if we can get negotiations started between Egypt and Israel, and very soon now we will be very active in discussions of that kind to see if we can get negotiations started. We think: that the Security Council Resolution 242 has to be implemented fully, but we think that a good beginning is to attempt to work out an agreement between Egypt and Israel that would open the Suez Canal, have a partial withdrawal and have a commitment to full implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.

MR. SPIVAK: Gentlemen, we have less than four minutes.

Mr. Secretary, Sargent Shriver, the Democratic Vice Presidential candidate, challenged President Nixon's Administration to say what the American role in Vietnam would be in the event that a peace agreement, once made, broke down. Once we are out of Vietnam and our prisoners are returned, are there any circumstances under which we would return? What would our position be?

SECRETARY ROGERS: We are not going to, of course, answer hypothetical questions of that kind, but we expect that the agreement, when completed, will be observed. We recognize there will be problems develop, but we don't expect they will be military problems. We are going to contribute substantially to the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of that area and in that way we think we can contribute to peace in Indochina.

MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Secretary, this isn't hypothetical. Once we are out, we are out.

SECRETARY ROGERS: Yes, we are out. I expect the agreement we will sign to be controlling in so far as the future of Indochina is concerned.

MR. ROSENFIELD: A technical question, Mr. Secretary, which might be of some political importance. This agreement that you speak of and hope for, would it be an agreement, an executive agreement, or would it be a treaty subject to Senatorial approval?

SECRETARY ROGERS: No, it will not be a treaty. It will be an executive agreement and I don't believe there has been any request that it be treated as a treaty. I would like to say, Mr. Rosenfeld, one other thing. There has been a lot of discussion about whether this was all done as part of some election process, whether it was a gimmick for the election, and of course if you look at the release from Hanoi you can see

This Copy For
file p.4
in News C

NEWS CONFERENCE

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:00 A.M. EST

NOVEMBER 15, 1972

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President today is sending a memo-
randum to heads of departments and agencies extending for one
year, through December 31, 1973, and asking the Administration to
focus on the Federal Safety Program. That is self-explanatory.

That is the only announcement we have to give you
today. I should call to your attention that the President's
memorandum to the heads of departments and agencies announcing
this new Federal Safety Program is in the Presidential Documents
of November 2, 1970. We have a copy of that original memorandum
for those of you who would like to look at that.

The President this morning is continuing his work at
Camp David, meeting with various members of the Administration.
Vice President Agnew is meeting with President Nixon this morn-
ing. This is the first meeting they have had since the Novem-
ber 7th election. We will let you know the length of that
meeting. They started at about 10:00 o'clock this morning.

As you probably know, Vice President Agnew has been
in the Washington area since the November 7th election, and
flew up to Camp David today for this meeting, which is the
first meeting they have had since the election.

Q What specific topics?

MR. ZIEGLER: No specific topics other than the
fact that they will be talking about the reorganization and
restructuring.

Q The Vice President's staff comes under that,
just as the White House staff, I presume, a reorganization of
the Vice President's staff.

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know what the Vice President
will have in mind for his staff, but the purpose is not to
talk specifically about the Vice President's staff. It is to
talk to him about a number of matters in this transition period
prior to the next term, but also, I am sure they will be
covering the subject of reorganization.

Q Were the members of the Vice President's staff
required to put in pro forma resignations?

MR. ZIEGLER: Those who were Presidential appointees.

Q Are they discussing a different role for the
Vice President, or expanded role?

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MR. ZIEGLER: We will announce in advance when Dr. Kissinger will meet with the other side.

Q Has work started on the Inaugural speech?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, it has not.

Q Will you also announce where the meeting will be?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, we will give you the details.

Q Ron, did Dr. Kissinger have breakfast yesterday with Moshe Dayan?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. I can confirm that he did have breakfast yesterday with Moshe Dayan.

Q Can you tell us anything about the conversation?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I don't have anything to give you about the conversation. I would say this: I would not read anything special into General Dayan's visit which, as you know, was only a stopover in Washington while he is in the country for fund-raising activities.

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Q Ron, in his column this morning, Jack Anderson gives the text of a Justice Department memo indicating that the White House's role in the settling of the Armco Steel pollution case was quite a bit more extensive than came out in Congressional hearings. Do you have any comment on that?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't, only to tell you and remind you that that matter was fully answered in material that was entered into the Congressional Record in March of 1972.

Q Ron, on the question of reorganization and restructuring, can you tell us how the President is proceeding? That is, does he feel he has to decide on new structure before he decides on new personnel or does he approach it in the reverse direction?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think he is concentrating on the restructuring and reorganization portion first of all. Then, following that, he will consider who would hold the responsibility within a new structure. As I have told you over the last few days, I don't know how broad in scope this will initially be, but the President has been spending time in Key Biscayne and also Camp David examining this whole area to see what he feels should be done and see what he feels can be done. That is the process they are going through. Interwoven into all of these discussions, of course, is the question of the intent of individuals who served in the first term. As I have said before, some have already expressed their desire to leave government after the first term. Some have expressed a desire to stay, and will. Others have indicated their desire to be reassigned to other areas of responsibility.

So, the President will take all of these factors into account and has been as he goes through this process.

Q Is John Dean discussing legal matters in his capacity as investigator of the Watergate incident?

MR. ZIEGLER: As I mentioned earlier, there were some legal questions that relate to the reorganization and restructure.

Q Is John Connally scheduled to meet with the President this week?

MR. ZIEGLER: I was asked that question yesterday. There is nothing firm on that yet, but there is some discussion of Governor Connally meeting with the President at Camp David this week. It is not set yet. We will let you know when it is.

Q Can you tell us what that is about?

MR. ZIEGLER: Not specifically. I would imagine that it relates to the reorganization and restructuring. The President would want to get his views on that subject.

Q What job is Connally in line for?

MR. ZIEGLER: I didn't say it related to that. I meant to say it related to the overall subject of reorganization and restructuring. As you know, Governor Connally served on the Ash Council in 1969 and 1970. That is, indeed, when the President and Governor Connally got to know one another well.

Q And they haven't been the same since, right?
(Laughter)

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NEWS CONFERENCE

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

12:45 P.M. EST

DECEMBER 11, 1972

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: This morning President Nixon has asked me to announce that Dr. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Counsellor to the President from 1969 to 1971, and now a professor at Harvard, will be returning to the Administration as United States Ambassador to India.

I think most of you are well acquainted with Dr. Moynihan and familiar with his background, and the biographical information we will give you will complete that knowledge.

In New Delhi, Dr. Moynihan will be succeeding Ambassador Kenneth Keating, who served as Ambassador to India from May 1969 until he resigned in August.

I should also point out that, of course, the President is gratified that Pat Moynihan will be rejoining the Administration in the next term and that Dr. Moynihan's basic academic training is concentrated in the field of international affairs. Even though he has been absorbed in domestic affairs in recent years, his interest and experience have continued to involve him broadly in the world community.

Those are all the announcements we have today. We will brief here at 3:00 o'clock.

Q We have several questions we need to ask. Is General Haig still in town?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, he is. Let me just anticipate some of your questions and tell you that the meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho began in Paris at 3:00 o'clock Paris time this afternoon, which is 9:00 Eastern time.

I have been involved in the briefings here, so I have not been able to get a report as to whether or not the meetings have concluded, or any further report on that. Hopefully at 3:00 o'clock I can be more informative.

Q Does a cease-fire agreement seem more imminent?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not prepared today to characterize the talks in any way at all. By referring to "not prepared today," I am making the point that I have not been in the past, and that holds true now.

Q Did General Haig meet with the President today?

MR. ZIEGLER: General Haig talked with the President by phone this morning, but has not seen him personally.

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REPORTING TO THE PRESIDENT AND MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS, AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS. I AM MEETING WITH YOU TODAY BECAUSE WE WANTED TO GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THEY STAND TODAY.

I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT I CANNOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OF PARTICULAR ISSUES, BUT I WILL GIVE YOU AS FAIR AND HONEST A DESCRIPTION OF THE GENERAL TREND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS I CAN.

FIRST, LET ME DO THIS IN THREE PARTS: WHAT LED US TO BELIEVE, AT THE END OF OCTOBER, THAT PEACE WAS IMMINENT; SECOND, WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE; THIRD, WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

AT THE END OF OCTOBER WE HAD JUST CONCLUDED THREE WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS

WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. AS YOU ALL KNOW, ON OCTOBER 8TH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESENTED TO US A PROPOSAL WHICH, AS IT LATER BECAME ELABORATED, APPEARED TO US TO REFLECT THE MAIN PRINCIPLES THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS ENUNCIATED AS BEING PART OF THE AMERICAN POSITION. THESE PRINCIPLES WERE THAT THERE HAD TO BE AN UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF AMERICAN PRISONERS THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA; SECONDLY, THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CEASE-FIRE IN INDOCHINA BROUGHT INTO BEING BY VARIOUS MEANS SUITABLE TO THE CONDITIONS OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED; THIRD, THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES UNDER THESE CONDITIONS IN A TIME PERIOD TO BE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON; FOURTH, THAT WE WOULD NOT PRE-JUDGE THE POLITICAL OUTCOME OF THE FUTURE OR SOUTH VIETNAM, WE WOULD NOT IMPOSE A PARTICULAR SOLUTION, WE WOULD NOT INSIST ON OUR PARTICULAR SOLUTION.

THE AGREEMENT, AS IT WAS DEVELOPED DURING OCTOBER, SEEMED TO US TO REFLECT THESE PRINCIPLES PRECISELY. THEN, TOWARD THE END OF OCTOBER, WE ENCOUNTERED A NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES. NOW, AT THE TIME, BECAUSE WE WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE ATMOSPHERE LEADING TO A RAPID SETTLEMENT, WE MENTIONED THEM AT OUR BRIEFINGS, BUT WE DID NOT ELABORATE ON THEM.

NOW LET ME SUM UP WHAT THE PROBLEMS WERE AT THE END OF OCTOBER.

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IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WAS IN PREPARATION A MASSIVE
COMMUNIST EFFORT TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM
TO BEGIN SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE WOULD HAVE BEEN
DECLARED, AND TO CONTINUE FOR SOME WEEKS AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE
CAME INTO BEING.

SECOND, THERE WAS AN INTERVIEW BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRIME
MINISTER HIGH IMPLIED THAT THE POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT WE HAD
ALWAYS INSISTED WAS PART OF OUR PRINCIPLES, NAMELY, THAT WE
WOULD NOT IMPOSE A COALITION GOVERNMENT, WAS NOT AS CLEARLY
AS OUR RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS INDICATED.

THIRDLY, AS NO ONE COULD MISS, WE ENCOUNTERED SOME SPECIFIC OBJECTION
S FROM SAIGON. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, WE PROPOSED TO HANOL THAT THERE
SHOULD BE ONE OTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS TO CLEAR UP THESE
DIFFICULTIES. WE WERE CONVINCED THAT WITH GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES,
THESE DIFFICULTIES COULD BE RELATIVELY EASILY SURMOUNTED AND THAT IF WE
CONDUCTED OURSELVES ON BOTH SIDES IN THE SPIRIT OF THE
OCTOBER NEGOTIATIONS, A SETTLEMENT WOULD BE VERY RAPID.

IT WAS OUR CONVICTION THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO BRING TO AN END
10 YEARS OF WARFARE, WE SHOULD NOT DO SO WITH AN ARMISTICE,
BUT WITH A PEACE THAT HAD A CHANCE OF LASTING. THEREFORE,
WE PROPOSED THREE CATEGORIES OF CLARIFICATIONS IN THE AGREEMENT.
FIRST, WE WANTED THE SO-CALLED LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES CLEARED
UP SO THAT THEY WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE SEED FOR UNENDING DISPUTES
AND ANOTHER ERUPTION OF THE WAR. I WILL SPEAK ABOUT THOSE IN A
MINUTE.

SECONDLY, THE AGREEMENT ALWAYS HAD PROVIDED THAT INTERNATIONAL
MACHINERY BE PUT IN PLACE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE
WAS DECLARED. WE WANTED TO SPELL OUT THE OPERATIONAL
MEANING OF THE WORD "IMMEDIATELY" BY DEVELOPING THE
PROTOCOLS THAT WERE REQUIRED TO BRING THE INTERNATIONAL
MACHINERY INTO BEING SIMULATENOUSLY WITH A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT.
THIS, TO US, SEEMED A LARGELY TECHNICAL MATTER.

THIRDLY, WE WANTED SOME REFERENCE IN THE AGREEMENT, HOWEVER
VAGUE, HOWEVER ALLUSIVE, ILLUSIVE, HOWEVER INDIRECT, WHICH
WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE TWO PARTS OF VIETNAM WOULD LIVE IN

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PEACE WITH EACH OTHER AND THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD IMPOSE
ITS SOLUTION ON THE OTHER BY FORCE. THESE SEEMED TO
US MODEST REQUIREMENTS, RELATIVELY EASILY ACHIEVABLE.

LET ME NOW TELL YOU THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SINCE THAT TIME.
WE ALL KNOW OF THE DISAGREEMENTS THAT HAVE EXISTED BETWEEN SAIGON
AND WASHINGTON. THESE DISAGREEMENTS ARE, TO SOME EXTENT,
UNDERSTANDABLE. IT IS INEVITABLE THAT A PEOPLE ON WHOSE
TERRITORY THE WAR HAS BEEN FOUGHT AND THAT FOR 25 YEARS HAS
BEEN EXPOSED TO DEVASTATION AND SUFFERING AND ASSASSINATION
WOULD LOOK AT THE PROSPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT IN A MORE DETAILED
WAY, IN A MORE ANGUISHED WAY, THAN WE WHO ARE 10,000 MILES
AWAY. MANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT INEVITABLY
WERE SEEN IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT IN VIETNAM THAN IN WASHINGTON.

I THINK IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT WE FACE, WITH RESPECT TO BOTH
VIETNAMESE PARTIES, THIS PROBLEM. THE PEOPLE OF VIETNAM, NORTH
AND SOUTH, HAVE FOUGHT FOR SO LONG THAT THE RISKS AND PERILS
OF WAR, HOWEVER DIFFICULT, SEEM SOMETIMES MORE BEARABLE TO THEM
THAN THE UNCERTAINTIES AND THE RISKS AND PERILS OF PEACE.

NOW, IT IS NO SECRET, EITHER, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT
AGREED WITH ALL THE OBJECTIONS THAT WERE RAISED BY SAIGON.
IN PARTICULAR, THE UNITED STATES' POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE CEASE-
FIRE HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR IN OCTOBER, 1970. IT HAD BEEN REITERATED
IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF JANUARY 25, 1972. IT WAS REPEATED
AGAIN IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL OF MAY 8, 1972. NONE OF THESE
PROPOSALS HAD ASKED FOR A WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES.
THEREFORE, WE COULD NOT AGREE WITH OUR ALLIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM
WHEN THEY ADDED CONDITIONS TO THE ESTABLISHED POSITIONS AFTER
AND AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED THAT REFLECTED THESE ESTABLISHED
POSITIONS.

AS WAS MADE CLEAR IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE HERE ON OCTOBER 26TH,
AS THE PRESIDENT HAS REITERATED IN HIS SPEECHES, THE UNITED STATES
WILL NOT CONTINUE THE WAR ONE DAY LONGER THAN IT BELIEVES
IS NECESSARY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WE CONSIDER JUST AND FAIR.

SO, WE WANT TO LEAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FACT THAT IF AN
AGREEMENT IS REACHED THAT MEETS THE STATED CONDITIONS OF
THE PRESIDENT, IF AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED THAT WE CONSIDER JUST,
THAT NO OTHER PARTY WILL HAVE A VETO OVER OUR ACTIONS.

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BUT I AM ALSO BOUND TO TELL YOU THAT TODAY THIS QUESTION IS MOOT BECAUSE WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED AN AGREEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERS JUST AND FAIR. THEREFORE, I WANT TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE PROCESS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THEY RESUMED ON NOVEMBER 20TH AND WHERE WE ARE.

THE THREE OBJECTIVES THAT WE WERE SEEKING IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS WERE STATED IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26TH, IN MANY SPEECHES BY THE PRESIDENT AFTERWARDS, AND IN EVERY COMMUNICATION TO HANOI SINCE. THEY COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A SURPRISE.

NOW, LET ME SAY A WORD FIRST ABOUT WHAT WERE CALLED LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES" WHICH WERE CALLED THESE IN ORDER NOT TO INFLAME THE SITUATION. HOW DID THEY ARISE? THEY AROSE BECAUSE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PRESENTED US A DOCUMENT IN ENGLISH WHICH WE THAN DISCUSSED WITH THEM. IN MANY PLACES THROUGHOUT THIS DOCUMENT, THE ORIGINAL WORDING WAS CHANGED AS THE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEEDED AND THE PHRASES WERE FREQUENTLY WEAKENED COMPARED TO THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION. IT WAS NOT UNTIL WE RECEIVED THE VIETNAMESE TEXT, AFTER THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONCLUDED, THAT WE FOUND THAT WHILE THE ENGLISH TERMS HAD BEEN CHANGED, THE VIETNAMESE TERMS HAD BEEN LEFT UNCHANGED.

SO, WE SUDDENLY FOUND OURSELVES ENGAGED IN TWO NEGOTIATIONS, ONE ABOUT THE ENGLISH TEXT, THE OTHER ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE TEXT. HAVING CONDUCTED MANY NEGOTIATIONS, I MUST SAY THIS WAS A NOVEL PROCEDURE. IT LED TO THE VIEW THAT PERHAPS THESE WERE NOT SIMPLY LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES.

NOW I MUST SAY THAT ALL OF THESE, EXCEPT ONE, HAVE NOW BEEN ELIMINATED. THE SECOND CATEGORY OF PROBLEMS CONCERNED BRINGING INTO BEING THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY SO THAT IT COULD ORERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE AND SO AS TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE THE CEASE-FIRE, RATHER THAN BRING PEACE, WOULD UNLEASH ANOTHER FRENZY OF WARFARE.

SO TO THAT END WE SUBMITTED ON NOVEMBER 20TH, THE FIRST DAY THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED, A LIST OF WHAT ARE CALLED PROTOCOLS, TECHNICAL INSTRUMENTS TO BRING THIS MACHINERY INTO BEING. THESE

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PROTOCOLS -- AND I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THESE

PROTOCOLS -- THEY ARE NORMALLY TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS AND OURS WERE
CERTAINLY INTENDED TO CONFORM TO NORMAL PRACTICES, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THIS OCCURRED FOUR WEEKS AFTER WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT
THIS WAS OUT INTENTION AND THREE WEEKS AFTER HANOT HAD PRESSED
US TO SIGN A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE REFUSED
TO DISCUSS OUR PROTOCOLS AND REFUSED TO GIVE US THEIR PROTOCOLS,
SO THAT THE QUESTION OF BRINGING THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY
INTO BEING COULD NOT BE ADDRESSED.

THE FIRST TIME WE SAW THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PROTOCOLS
WAS ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER 12TH, THE NIGHT BEFORE I WAS
SUPPOSED TO LEAVE PARIS, SIX WEEKS AFTER WE HAD STATED WHAT
OUR AIM WAS, FIVE WEEKS AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE WAS SUPPOSED TO
BE SIGNED, A CEASE-FIRE WHICH CALLED FOR THAT MACHINERY TO BE
SET UP IMMEDIATELY.

THESE PROTOCOLS WERE NOT TECHNICAL INSTRUMENTS, BUT
REOPENED A WHOLE LIST OF ISSUES THAT HAD BEEN SETTLED, OR WE
THOUGHT HAD BEEN SETTLED, IN THE AGREEMENT. THEY CONTAINED
PROVISIONS THAT WERE NOT IN THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT, AND THEY
EXCLUDED PROVISIONS THAT WERE IN THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT. THEY
ARE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF BEING DISCUSSED BY THE TECHNICAL
EXPERTS IN PARIS, BUT SOME EFFORT WILL BE NEEDED TO REMOVE THE
POLITICAL PROVISIONS FROM THEM AND TO RETURN THEM TO A TECH-
NICAL STATUS.

SECONDLY, I THINK IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE PERCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY AND OUR PER-
CEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY IS AT DRASTIC VARIANCE, AND
THAT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IS AN UNDERSTATEMENT.

WE HAD THOUGHT THAT AN EFFECTIVE MACHINERY REQUIRED,
IN EFFECT, SOME FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND OUR ESTIMATE WAS
THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND PEOPLE WERE NEEDED TO MONITOR THE MANY
PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PERCEPTION
IS THAT THE TOTAL FORCE SHOULD BE NO MORE THAN 250, OF WHICH
NEARLY HALF SHOULD BE LOCATED AT HEADQUARTERS; THAT IT WOULD
BE DEPENDENT FOR ITS COMMUNICATION, LOGISTICS, AND EVEN
PHYSICAL NECESSITIES ENTIRELY ON THE PARTY IN WHOSE AREA IT WAS
LOCATED.

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SO IT WOULD HAVE NO JEEPS, NO TELEPHONE, NO RADIO OF ITS OWN; THAT IT COULD NOT MOVE WITHOUT BEING ACCOMPANIED BY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE PARTY THAT WAS TO BE INVESTIGATED, IF THAT PARTY DECIDED TO GIVE IT THE JEEPS TO GET TO WHERE THE VIOLATION WAS TAKING PLACE AND IF THAT PARTY WOULD THEN LET IT COMMUNICATE WHAT IT FOUND.

IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THE MEMBERS OF THIS COMMISSION WILL NOT EXHAUST THEMSELVES IN FRENZIES OF ACTIVITY IF THIS PROCEDURE WERE ADOPTED.

NOW, THIRDLY, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT. THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE NOVEMBER 20TH REALLY HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN TWO PHASES. THE FIRST PHASE, WHICH LASTED FOR THREE DAYS, CONTINUED THE SPIRIT AND THE ATTITUDE OF THE MEETINGS IN OCTOBER. WE PRESENTED OUR PROPOSALS. SOME WERE ACCEPTED; OTHERS WERE REJECTED.

BUT BY THE END OF THE THIRD DAY WE HAD MADE VERY SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS, AND ALL OF US THOUGHT THAT WE WERE WITHIN A DAY OR TWO OF COMPLETING THE ARRANGEMENTS. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT DECISIONS WERE MADE IN HAND AT THAT POINT, BUT FROM THAT POINT ON, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE HAD THE CHARACTER WHERE A SETTLEMENT WAS ALWAYS JUST WITHIN OUR REACH, AND WAS ALWAYS PULLED JUST BEYOND OUR REACH WHEN WE ATTEMPTED TO GRASP IT.

I DO NOT THINK IT IS PROPER FOR ME TO GO INTO THE DETAILS OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES, BUT I THINK I SHOULD GIVE YOU A GENERAL ATMOSPHERE AND A GENERAL SENSE OF THE PROCEDURES THAT WERE FOLLOWED.

WHEN WE RETURNED ON DECEMBER 4TH, WE OF THE AMERICAN TEAM, WE THOUGHT THAT THE MEETINGS COULD NOT LAST MORE THAN TWO OR THREE DAYS BECAUSE THERE WERE ONLY TWO OR THREE ISSUES LEFT TO BE RESOLVED. YOU ALL KNOW THAT THE MEETINGS LASTED NINE DAYS. THEY BEGAN WITH HAND WITHDRAWING EVERY CHANGE THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO TWO WEEKS PREVIOUSLY.

WE THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WEEK GETTING BACK TO WHERE WE HAD ALREADY BEEN TWO WEEKS BEFORE. BY SATURDAY, WE THOUGHT WE HAD NARROWED THE ISSUES SUFFICIENTLY WHERE, IF

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THE OTHER SIDE HAD ACCEPTED AGAIN ONE SECTION THEY ALREADY HAD AGREED TO TWO WEEKS PREVIOUSLY, THE AGREEMENT COULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED.

AT THAT POINT, THE PRESIDENT ORDERED GENERAL HAIG TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON SO THAT HE WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MISSION, THAT WOULD THEN FOLLOW, OF PRESENTING THE AGREEMENT TO OUR ALLIES. AT THAT POINT, WE THOUGHT WE WERE SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE SO THAT EXPERTS COULD MEET TO CONFORM THE TEXTS SO THAT WE WOULD NOT AGAIN ENCOUNTER THE LINGUISTIC DIFFICULTIES WHICH WE HAD EXPERIENCED PREVIOUSLY, AND SO THAT WE COULD MAKE SURE THAT THE CHANGES THAT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED IN ENGLISH WOULD ALSO BE REFLECTED IN VIETNAMESE.

WHEN THE EXPERTS MET, THEY WERE PRESENTED WITH 17 NEW CHANGES IN THE GUISE OF LINGUISTIC CHANGES. WHEN I MET AGAIN WITH THE SPECIAL ADVISOR, THE ONE PROBLEM WHICH WE THOUGHT REMAINED ON SATURDAY HAD GROWN TO TWO, AND A NEW DEMAND WAS PRESENTED. WHEN WE ACCEPTED THAT, IT WAS WITHDRAWN THE NEXT DAY AND SHARPENED UP. SO WE SPENT OUR TIME GOING THROUGH THE 17 LINGUISTIC CHANGES AND REDUCED THEM AGAIN TO TWO.

THEN, ON THE LAST DAY OF THE MEETING, WE ASKED OUR EXPERTS TO MEET TO COMPARE WHETHER THE 15 CHANGES THAT HAD BEEN SETTLED, OF THE 17 THAT HAD BEEN PROPOSED, NOW CONFORMED IN THE TWO TEXTS. AT THAT POINT WE WERE PRESENTED WITH 16 NEW CHANGES, INCLUDING FOUR SUBSTANTIVE ONES, SOME OF WHICH NOW STILL REMAIN UNSETTLED.

NOW, I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS OR INTO THE MERITS OF THESE CHANGES. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY THAT WE NOW FACE IS THAT PROVISIONS THAT WERE SETTLED IN THE AGREEMENT APPEAR AGAIN IN A DIFFERENT FORM IN THE PROTOCOLS, THAT MATTERS OF TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION WHICH WERE IMPLICIT IN THE AGREEMENT FROM THE BEGINNING HAVE NOT BEEN ADDRESSED AND WERE NOT PRESENTED TO US UNTIL THE VERY LAST DAY OF A SERIES OF SESSIONS THAT HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED TO DISCUSS THEM; AND THAT AS SOON AS ONE ISSUE WAS SETTLED, A NEW ISSUE WAS RAISED.

IT WAS VERY TEMPTING FOR US TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS

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WHICH IS SO CLOSE TO EVERYBODY'S HEART, IMPLICIT IN THE MANY MEETINGS, OF INDICATING GREAT PROGRESS, BUT THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT WE COULD NOT ENGAGE IN A CHARADE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

WE NOW ARE IN THIS CURIOUS POSITION: GREAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, EVEN IN THE TALKS. THE ONLY THING THAT IS LACKING IS ONE DECISION IN HAND, TO SETTLE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN TERMS THAT TWO WEEKS PREVIOUSLY THEY HAD ALREADY AGREED TO.

SO, WE ARE NOT TALKING OF AN ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE THAT IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

SECONDLY, TO COMPLETE THE WORK THAT IS REQUIRED TO BRING THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY INTO BEING IN THE SPIRIT THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AN INTEREST OF NOT ENDING THE WAR IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT IS JUST THE BEGINNING OF ANOTHER ROUND OF CONFLICT. SO, WE ARE IN A POSITION WHERE PEACE CAN BE NEAR, BUT PEACE REQUIRES A DECISION. THIS IS WHY WE WANTED TO RESTATE ONCE MORE WHAT OUR BASIC ATTITUDE IS.

WITH RESPECT TO SAIGON, WE HAVE SYMPATHY AND COMPASSION FOR THE ANGUISH OF THEIR PEOPLE AND FOR THE CONCERNS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. BUT IF WE CAN GET AN AGREEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERS JUST, WE WILL PROCEED WITH IT.

WITH RESPECT TO HANOI, OUR BASIC OBJECTIVE WAS STATED IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26TH. WE WANT AN END TO THE WAR THAT IS SOMETHING MORE THAN AN ARMISTICE. WE WANT TO MOVE FROM HOSTILITY TO NORMALIZATION AND FROM NORMALIZATION TO COOPERATION. BUT WE WILL NOT MAKE A SETTLEMENT WHICH IS A DISGUISED FORM OF CONTINUED WARFARE AND WHICH BRINGS ABOUT, BY INDIRECTION, WHAT WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID WE WOULD NOT TOLERATE.

WE HAVE ALWAYS STATED THAT A FAIR SOLUTION CANNOT POSSIBLY GIVE EITHER SIDE EVERYTHING THAT IT WANTS. WE ARE NOT CONTINUING A WAR IN ORDER TO GIVE TOTAL VICTORY TO OUR ALLIES. WE WANT TO GIVE THEM A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A POLITICAL STRUCTURE, BUT WE ALSO WILL NOT MAKE A SETTLEMENT WHICH IS A DISGUISED FORM OF VICTORY FOR THE OTHER SIDE.

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THEREFORE, WE ARE AT A POINT WHERE WE ARE AGAIN PERHAPS
CLOSER TO AN AGREEMENT THAN WE WERE AT THE END OF OCTOBER,
IF THE OTHER SIDE IS WILLING TO DEAL WITH US IN GOOD FAITH
AND WITH GOOD WILL. BUT IT CANNOT DO THAT IF EVERY DAY AN ISSUE
IS SETTLED A NEW ONE IS RAISED, THAT WHEN AN ISSUE IS SETTLED
IN AN AGREEMENT, IT IS RAISED AGAIN AS AN UNDERSTANDING AND
IF IT IS SETTLED IN AN UNDERSTANDING, IT IS RAISED AGAIN AS
A PROTOCOL. WE WILL NOT BE BLACKMAILED INTO AN AGREEMENT.
WE WILL NOT BE STAMPED INTO AN AGREEMENT, AND, IF I MAY
SAY SO, WE WILL NOT BE CHARMED INTO AN AGREEMENT UNTIL ITS
CONDITIONS ARE RIGHT.

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND FOR ALL OF US WHO HAVE BEEN ENGAGED
IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, NOTHING THAT WE HAVE DONE HAS MEANT MORE
THAN ATTEMPTING TO BRING AN END TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM. NOTHING
THAT IT HAVE DONE SINCE I HAVE BEEN IN THIS POSITION HAS MADE ME
FEEL MORE THE TRUSTEE OF SO MANY HOPES AS THE NEGOTIATIONS IN
WHICH I HAVE RECENTLY PARTICIPATED. IT WAS PAINFUL AT TIMES TO
THINK OF THE HOPES OF MILLIONS AND, INSTEAD, OF THE HOPES OF MANY
OF YOU LADIES AND GENTLEMEN WHO WERE STANDING OUTSIDE THESE
VARIOUS MEETING PLACES EXPECTING MOMENTOUS EVENTS TO BE OCCURRING,
WHILE INSIDE ONE FRIVOLOUS ISSUE AFTER ANOTHER WAS SURFACED IN
THE LAST THREE DAYS.

SO, WHAT WE ARE SAYING TO HANOI IS, WE ARE PREPARED TO
CONTINUE IN THE SPIRIT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WERE STARTED
IN OCTOBER. WE ARE PREPARED TO MAINTAIN AN AGREEMENT THAT
PROVIDES FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF ALL AMERICAN AND
ALLIED PRISONERS, THAT IMPOSES NO POLITICAL SOLUTION ON EITHER
SIDE, THAT BRINGS ABOUT AN INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED CEASE-FIRE
AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN FORCES WITHIN 60 DAYS. IT
IS A SETTLEMENT THAT IS JUST TO BOTH SIDES AND THAT REQUIRES ONLY
A DECISION TO MAINTAIN PROVISIONS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCEPTED
AND AN END TO PROCEDURES THAT CAN ONLY MOCK THE HOPES OF HUMANITY.

ON THAT BASIS, WE CAN HAVE A PEACE THAT JUSTIFIES THE HOPES
OF MANKIND AND THE SENSE OF JUSTICE OF ALL PARTICIPANTS.

NOW, I WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER SOME OF YOUR QUESTIONS.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHAT IN
YOUR MIND YOU THINK HANOI'S MOTIVATION WAS IN PLAYING WHAT

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YOU CALLED A CHARADE?

DR. KISSINGER: I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ON HANOI'S MOTIVES. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT BEFORE TOO LONG WE WILL HEAR A VERSION OF EVENTS THAT DOES NOT EXACTLY COINCIDE WITH OURS. I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GIVE YOU AS HONEST AN ACCOUNT AS I AM CAPABLE OF. I BELIEVE -- AND THIS IS PURE SPECULATION -- THAT FOR A PEOPLE THAT HAVE FOUGHT FOR SO LONG, IT IS PARADOXICALLY, AND PERHAPS EASIER TO FACE THE RISKS OF WAR THAN THE UNCERTAINTIES OF PEACE.

IT MAY BE THAT THEY ARE WAITING FOR A FURTHER ACCENTUATION OF THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN US AND SAIGON, FOR MORE PUBLIC PRESSURES ON US, OR PERHAPS THEY SIMPLY CANNOT MAKE UP THEIR MIND. BUT I REALLY HAVE NO CLUE TO WHAT THE POLICY DECISIONS WERE.

Q DR. KISSINGER, FROM YOUR ACCOUNT ONE WOULD CONCLUDE THAT THE TALKS ARE NOW ENDED IN TERMS OF THE SERIES YOU COMPLETED. IS THAT TRUE? SECONDLY, IF IT IS NOT TRUE, ON WHAT BASIS WILL THEY BE RESUMED?

DR. KISSINGER: WE DO NOT CONSIDER THE TALKS COMPLETED. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE A RELATIVELY SIMPLE MATTER TO CONCLUDE THE AGREEMENT, BECAUSE MANY OF THE ISSUES THAT I MENTIONED, IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26TH, HAVE EITHER BEEN SETTLED OR SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLING THEM HAS BEEN MADE.

THEREFORE, IF THERE WERE A DETERMINATION TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, IT COULD BE REACHED RELATIVELY QUICKLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POSSIBILITIES OF RAISING TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS ARE ENDLESS.

SO, AS LE DUC THO SAID YESTERDAY, WE WILL REMAIN IN CONTACT THROUGH MESSAGES. WE CAN THEN DECIDE WHETHER OR WHEN TO MEET AGAIN. I EXPECT THAT WE WILL MEET AGAIN, BUT WE HAVE TO MEET IN AN ATMOSPHERE THAT IS WORTHY OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE ENDEAVOR. ON THAT BASIS, AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED, THE SETTLEMENT WILL BE VERY RAPID.

Q DR. KISSINGER, YOU HAVE NOT DISCUSSED AT ALL THE PROPOSALS THAT THE UNITED STATES MADE ON BEHALF OF SAIGON WHICH REQUIRED CHANGES IN THE EXISTING AGREEMENT THAT WAS NEGOTIATED. CAN

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YOU DISCUSS WHAT THOSE WERE AND WHAT EFFECT THEY HAD ON
STIMULATING HANOI, IF THEY DID, TO MAKING COUNTER -- PROPOSALS OF
ITS OWN?

DR. KISSINGER: AS I POINTED OUT, THERE WERE TWO CATEGORIES OF
OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF SAIGON, OBJECTIONS WHICH WE AGREED WITH,
AND OBJECTIONS WHICH WE DID NOT AGREE WITH. THE OBJECTIONS THAT
WE AGREED WITH ARE ESSENTIALLY CONTAINED IN THE LIST THAT I
PRESENTED AT THE BEGINNING AND THOSE WERE THE ONES WE MAINTAINED.
ALL OF THOSE, WE BELIEVE, DID NOT REPRESENT CHANGES IN THE AGREE-
MENT, BUT EITHER CLARIFICATIONS, REMOVAL OF AMBIGUITIES, OR SPELL-
ING OUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED POSITIONS.

IN THE FIRST SEQUENCE OF MEETINGS BETWEEN NOVEMBER 20TH AND
NOVEMBER 26TH, MOST OF THOSE WERE, OR MANY OF THOSE WERE
TAKEN CARE OF. SO THAT WE HAVE LITERALLY, AS I HAVE POINTED OUT
BEFORE, BEEN IN THE POSITION WHERE EVERY DAY WE THOUGHT IT
COULD AND INDEED, HAD TO BE THE LAST DAY. (MORE COMING) ITEM.
USINFO WASHDC

THE COUNTER-PROPOSALS THAT HANOI HAS MADE WERE AGAIN
IN TWO CATEGORIES. ONE SET OF CHANGES THAT WOULD HAVE TOTALLY
DESTROYED THE BALANCE OF THE AGREEMENT AND WHICH, IN EFFECT,
WITHDRAW THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS THEY HAD MADE. I DID
NOT MENTION THOSE IN MY STATEMENT, BECAUSE IN THE PROCESS OF
NEGOTIATION THEY TENDED TO DISAPPEAR. THEY TENDED TO DISAPPEAR
FROM THE AGREEMENT TO REAPPEAR IN UNDERSTANDINGS AND THEN TO
DISAPPEAR FROM UNDERSTANDINGS TO REAPPEAR IN AND THEN TO DISAPPEAR
FROM UNDERSTANDINGS TO REAPPEAR IN PROTOCOLS. BUT I SUSPECT THAT
THEY WILL, IN TIME, AFTER THE NERVOUS EXHAUSTION OF OUR TECHNICAL
EXPERTS, DISAPPEAR FROM THE PROTOCOLS AS WELL. SO, THERE WERE
MAJOR COUNTER-PROPOSALS WHICH WE BELIEVE CAN BE HANDLED.

BUT THEN THERE WERE A WHOLE SERIES OF TECHNICAL COUNTER-PROPOSALS
WHICH WERE ABSOUTELY UNENDING AND WHICH HINGED ON SUCH PROFOUND
QUESTIONS AS WHETHER, IF YOU STATE AN OBLIGATION IN THE FUTURE
TENSE, YOU WERE THEREFORE LEAVING OPEN THE QUESTION OF
WHEN IT WOULD COME INTO OPERATION, AND MATTERS THAT REACHED THE
METAPHYSICAL AT MOMENTS AND WHICH, AS SOON AS ONE OF THEM WAS
SETTLED, ANOTHER ONE APPEARED, WHICH MADE ONE BELIEVE THAT ONE
WAS NOT ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO SETTLE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
BUT IN A DELAYING ACTON FOR WHATEVER REASON.

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NOW, THOSE ISSUES CAN BE SETTLED ANY DAY THAT SOMEBODY
DECIDES TO BE SERIOUS. NOW IT IS CLEAR THAT THE INTERPLAY
BETWEEN SAIGON AND HANOI IS ONE OF THE COMPLICATING FEATURES
OF THIS NEGOTIATION, BUT THE BASIC POINT THAT WE WANT TO MAKE
HERE IS THIS:

WE HAVE HAD OUR DIFFICULTIES IN SAIGON, BUT THE OBSTACLE TO
AN AGREEMENT AT THIS MOMENT IS NOT SAIGON, BECAUSE WE DO NOT
HAVE, AS YET, AN AGREEMENT THAT WE CAN PRESENT TO THEM. WHEN
THAT POINT IS REACHED, THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HE
WILL ACT ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HE CONSIDERS JUST; BUT HE HAS
ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT HE DOES NOT WANT TO END SUCH A LONG WAR
BY BRINGING ABOUT A VERY SHORT PEACE.

Q CAN A USEFUL AGREEMENT BE MADE OPERATIVE WITHOUT SAIGON'S
SIGNATURE?

DR. KISSINGER: WELL, THIS IS A QUESTION THAT HAS NOT YET HAD
TO BE FACED AND WHICH WE HOPE WILL NOT HAVE TO BE FACED.

Q FOR THE AGREEMENT TO BE JUST, ACCORDING TO THE PRESIDENT'S
TERMS, MUST THERE BE SUBSTANTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS FROM THE SOUTH?

DR. KISSINGER: THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES IN THE
SOUTH HAS THREE ELEMENTS: THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES NOW THERE,
THEIR FUTURE, AND THE GENERAL CLAIM THAT NORTH VIETNAM MAY MAKE
WITH RESPECT TO ITS RIGHT TO INTERVENE CONSTANTLY IN THE
SOUTH.

WITH RESPECT TO THE LAST QUESTION, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSITION
THAT NORTH VIETNAM HAS A RIGHT OF CONSTANT INTERVENTION IN THE
SOUTH.

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST QUESTION, OF THE FORCES NOW IN THE
SOUTH, THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE THREE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS
SINCE OCTOBER 1973, ALL OF THEM BASED ON THE DE FACTO SITUATION
AS IT EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE CEASE-FIRE, ALL OF THEM APPROVED
BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THEREFORE, WE DID NOT ADD THAT
CONDITION OF WITHDRAWAL TO OUR PRESENT PROPOSAL, WHICH REFLECTED
EXACTLY THE POSITIONS WE HAD TAKEN ON JANUARY 25TH AND ON MAY

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8TH OF THIS YEAR, BOTH OF WHICH HAD BEEN AGREED TO BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE AGREEMENT THAT HAS BEEN
NEGOTIATED IS IMPLEMENTED IN GOOD FAITH, THAT THE PROBLEM
OF THE FORCES WILL TEND TO LOSE ITS SIGNIFICANCE, OR AT LEAST
REDUCE SIGNIFICANCE, PARTLY BECAUSE OF DE FACTO WITHDRAWALS
THAT COULD OCCUR, AND PARTLY BECAUSE IF THE PROVISIONS WITH
RESPECT TO LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND NO INFILTRATION ARE MAINTAINED,
THE CONSEQUENCES IN ATTRITION WILL HAVE TO BE OBVIOUS.

Q ARE WE BACK TO SQUARE 1 NOW, DR. KISSINGER, WOULD YOU
SAY?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT THAT IS 99 PERCENT
COMPLETED AS FAR AS THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT IS CONCERNED.
WE ALSO HAVE AN AGREEMENT WHOSE ASSOCIATED IMPLEMENTATIONS
ARE VERY SIMPLE TO CONCLUDE IF ONE TAKES THE BASIC PROVISIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION THAT ARE IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT,
PROVISIONS THAT HAPPENED TO BE SPELLED OUT IN GREATER DETAIL
IN THE AGREEMENT THAN ANY OTHER ASPECT, AND. THEREFORE, WE
ARE ONE DECISION AWAY FROM A SETTLEMENT.
HANDI CAN SETTLE THIS ANY DAY BY AN EXCHANGE OF
MESSAGES, AFTER WHICH THERE WOULD BE REQUIRED A CERTAIN AMOUNT
OF WORK ON THE AGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOT VERY MUCH, AND SOME
WORK IN BRINGING THE IMPLEMENTING INSTRUMENTS INTO BEING.

Q WOULD YOU TELL WHAT THAT ONE PERCENT IS?

DR. KISSINGER: WELL, YOU KNOW, I HAVE FOUND I GET INTO TROUBLE
WHEN I GIVE FIGURES, SO LET ME NOT INSIST ON ONE PERCENT.
IT IS AN AGREEMENT THAT IS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED, BUT I CANNOT
GO INTO THAT. BUT THAT ALONE IS NOT THE PROBLEM. THE PROBLEM
IS AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IT IN MY PRESENTATION.

Q I AM A LITTLE CONFUSED, DR. KISSINGER, AS TO WHETHER WHAT
REMAINS YOU WOULD DESCRIBE AS FUNDAMENTAL OR ONE OF THESE
TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, BECAUSE YOU HAVE RANGED BETWEEN THE TWO
AND I AM LITTLE LOST AS TO WHAT IS LEFT.

DR. KISSINGER: THE TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTING INSTRUMENTS THAT
THEY HAVE PRESENTED ARE TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE FOR THE REASONS

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WHICH I GAVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I CANNOT REALLY BELIEVE
THAT THEY ARE SERIOUS. WHAT REMAINS ON THE AGREEMENT ITSELF
IS A FUNDAMENTAL POINT. IT IS, HOWEVER, A POINT THAT HAD BEEN
ACCEPTED TWO WEEKS PREVIOUSLY AND LATER WITHDRAWN. SO WE ARE
NOT RAISING A NEW, FUNDAMENTAL POINT. WE ARE RAISING THE
ACCEPTANCE OF SOMETHING THAT HAD ONCE BEEN ACCEPTED.

Q IS IT A POLITICAL ISSUE?

DR. KISSINGER: I REALLY DON'T WANT TO GO INTO IT.

Q WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE PARIS PEACE TALKS?

DR. KISSINGER: I THINK THAT THE SORT OF DISCUSSIONS THAT HAVE BEEN GOING ON IN THE PARIS PEACE TALKS ARE NOT NOT AFFECTED BY SUCH TEMPORARY UPS AND DOWNS AS THE PRIVATE PEACE TALKS, SO I AM SURE THAT MINISTER XUAN THEUY AND AMBASSADOR PORTER WILL FIND MANY SUBJECTS FOR MUTUAL RECRIMINATION. (LAUGHTER)

Q DR. KISSINGER, ISN'T THE FUNDAMENTAL POINT THE ONE YOU RAISED ABOUT THE RIGHT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES TO INTERVENE IN THE FUTURE IN SOUTH VIETNAM?

DR. KISSINGER: I WILL NOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

Q DR. KISSINGER, YOU ALREADY MENTIONED A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT IN WHICH YOU SAY IT IS THE U.S. INSISTENCE THAT THE TWO PARTS OF VIETNAM SHOULD LIVE IN PEACE WITH EACH OTHER. IS THAT NOT THE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT HERE?

DR. KISSINGER: AS I SAID, I WILL NOT GO INTO THE DETAILS. I CANNOT CONSIDER IT AN EXTREMELY ONEROUS DEMAND TO SAY THAT THE PARTIES OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT SHOULD LIVE IN PEACE WITH ONE ANOTHER, AND WE CANNOT MAKE A SETTLEMENT WHICH BRINGS PEACE TO NORTH VIETNAM AND MAINTAINS THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

Q BUT ISN'T THEIR POSITION BASICALLY THAT VIETNAM IS ONE COUNTRY, AND THAT THIS PEACE AGREEMENT IS SUPPOSED TO RATIFY THAT POINT?

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DR. KISSINGER: AS I SAID, I WILL NOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE DISCUSSIONS, AND I REPEAT: THE ISSUE THAT REMAINED
WHEN WE SENT GENERAL HAIG HOME IS ONE THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN
AGREED UPON ONCE, SO IT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN SOMETHING THAT
HAPPENED BY OVERSIGHT.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, WAS HANDI MESSAGED AHEAD OF TIME THAT YOU WOULD TALK TO US?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. BUT I SUSPECT YOU WILL GET THAT MESSAGE TO
THEM VERY QUICKLY.

Q. WAS THERE ANY UNDERSTANDING IN PARIS BEFORE YOU LEFT THAT
EACH SIDE WOULD BE FREE TO EXPRESS ITSELF WITHOUT DEMANDING
THE POSSIBILITY OF FUTURE TALKS?

DR. KISSINGER: NO. DUC THO CORRECTLY STATED OUR AGREEMENT AT
THE AIRPORT: THAT WE WOULD NOT GO INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
TALKS. NOW, I RECOGNIZE THAT WHAT I AM DOING HERE GOES TO
THE EDGE OF THAT UNDERSTANDING -- (LAUGHTER) -- BUT THE PRESIDENT
FELT THAT WE COULD NOT PERMIT A SITUATION TO CONTINUE IN WHICH
THERE WAS DAILY SPECULATION AS TO SOMETHING THAT WAS ALREADY
ACCOMPLISHED, WHILE THE RECORD WAS SO CLEARLY CONTRARY: THEREFORE,
WE OWED YOU AN EXPLANATION NOT OF THE PARTICULAR ISSUES, BUT
OF THE PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND EXACTLY WHERE THEY
STOOD.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, I AM NOT QUITE CLEAR ON A TECHNICAL POINT.
YOU TALKED ABOUT AN AGREEMENT, UNDERSTANDINGS AND PROTOCOLS.
ARE THERE IN FACT THREE DIFFERENT SETS OF DOCUMENTS UNDER
NEGOTIATION? WHAT ARE THESE UNDERSTANDINGS?

DR. KISSINGER: THERE ARE AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS AND PROTOCOLS.
IT ALWAYS HAPPENED IN A NEGOTIATION THAT THERE IS SOME
DISCUSSION WHICH IS NOT PART OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH ATTEMPTS
TO EXPLAIN WHAT SPECIFIC PROVISIONS MEAN AND HOW THEY ARE GOING
TO BE INTERPRETED. THIS IS WHAT I MEANT BY UNDERSTANDING. THE
PROTOCOLS ARE THE INSTRUMENTS THAT BRING INTO BEING THE INTER-
NATIONAL MACHINERY AND PRISONER RELEASE. THEIR FUNCTION IS USUALLY,
IN FACT ALWAYS, A PURELY TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PROVISIONS
OF AN AGREEMENT.

THESE PROTOCOLS DO NOT, AS A GENERAL RULE, RAISE NEW

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ISSUES, BUT RATHER THEY SAY, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH RESPECT TO PRISONERS, IF THE PRISONERS ARE TO BE RELEASED IN 60 DAYS, THEY WOULD SPELL OUT THE STAGING, THE POINT AT WHICH THEY ARE RELEASED, WHO CAN RECEIVE THEM, ET CETERA.

SIMILARLY WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY, THEY WOULD SAY WHERE THE TEAMS ARE LOCATED, WHAT ARE THEIR FUNCTIONS AND SO FORTH. OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE PROTOCOLS, AS WE NOW HAVE THEM, RAISE BOTH POLITICAL ISSUES, WHICH ARE INAPPROPRIATE TO IMPLEMENTING PROTOCOLS, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES, WHICH ARE INCONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION.

WE HAVE OTHER PROTOCOLS THAT DEAL WITH PRISONERS AND WITHDRAWALS AND MINING THAT ALSO PRESENT PROBLEMS, BUT WHICH I DON'T MENTION HERE BECAUSE THOSE ARE NORMAL TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS THAT YOU WOULD EXPECT IN THE COURSE OF AN AGREEMENT.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU. END. ROGERS

NOTE BY OCT: POUCHED SUVA.

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NEWS CONFERENCE

#1628

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

12:15 P.M. EST

DECEMBER 21, 1972

THURSDAY

(Key Biscayne, Florida)

MR. ZIEGLER: The President is working over at the office at his residence this morning. He has had a number of extensive phone conversations this morning with members of his staff, including Dr. Kissinger.

General Haig will be arriving at Homestead Air Force Base tomorrow morning at 7:00 o'clock. He will be meeting with the President and Dr. Kissinger at some point tomorrow morning to report on his recent trip, so that will be on the President's schedule tomorrow.

The President will continue to work through the remainder of the day at the residence. As I said, he has been in his office this morning talking with members of his staff by phone.

The President has asked me this morning to announce his intention to nominate Richard Helms to be Ambassador to Iran. Dick Helms will succeed Joseph Farland in that post, who will be returning to Washington to receive an assignment to another important position. So Dick Helms will be nominated by the President to be Ambassador to Iran, and Joseph Farland, the current Ambassador, will be returning to Washington to receive an assignment to another important post which we will announce in the near future.

The President is also designating James Schlesinger, currently Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, for nomination to succeed Mr. Helms as Director of Central Intelligence.

The President, as you know, met with Director Helms at Camp David on the 20th of November, shortly after the election. At that time, Director Helms reminded the President and discussed with the President the fact that the CIA had a general policy under his leadership of having officials retire when they reach the age of 60. Dick Helms, who will be 60 in March of next year, expressed the feeling that he should follow the same retirement policy which has been in effect at CIA.

The President and Director Helms talked about that for a period. The President requested that Dick Helms remain in Government and offered him the position which I have announced this morning. Dick Helms has accepted it.

MORE

#1628

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 29, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Kiev, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

PRESS CENTER - DNIEPRO HOTEL

10:50 P. M.

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger's remarks will be on the record. He will go directly to your questions.

Q. On the trade matter, you really expected before you went to get a trade agreement, did you not, regardless of whether it was linked with Vietnam? You really had hoped to get an agreement. Everybody said so before you went. Can you give us a little more background?

DR. KISSINGER: Ron's instructions are to say it is obvious to you you were not at the morning briefing.

Q. I read it word for word.

DR. KISSINGER: The original or the translation? (Laughter)

We never expected to get a trade agreement here. We never even attempted to negotiate a trade agreement here. The trade issue has several components. There is the sale of grain on a long-term basis. There is the maritime issue. There is the issue of credits. There is the matter of granting the most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, and there is lend-lease. There is the repayment of lend-lease debts.

We never intended to wrap all of these up into a trade agreement. Then there is another issue, namely, the development of natural gas resources in Siberia, which is a very large project in which the Soviet Union is interested, and about which it has been talking to various American private concerns.

We never expected or ever intended to wrap all of these up in Moscow. What we expected to do is to set up the economic commission within the framework of which they could be systematically addressed, in which the various parts could be related to each other. We always expected that when Secretary Peterson comes over here during the course of the summer that the major progress would be made.

In relation to the total package, there were some peripheral issues which I pointed out this morning in which we thought some progress could be made, such as the grain deal and the maritime issue. Those are linked because the grain deal depends in part on the solution of the shipping problem and in part on the nature of the credits that can be extended.

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On lend-lease we made considerable progress, and we settled, in effect, all issues except one. We expect to make further progress on that during the next months, and we expect to make substantial progress on the total package during the course of the summer. So we are substantially on schedule and we have done the key part of it, which was to set up the Economic Commission within the framework of which all these parts could be related to each other.

Q. What does the President plan to discuss with the Shah of Iran? What problems do we have with him, if any?

Q. That is a quick switch.

Q. The man is smart. He can switch.

DR. KISSINGER: Ron gave me instructions, and then changed his mind. Will you stand in front of me so I can see your lips move? (Laughter)

We expect to have a general review of the world situation, particularly developments in the Middle East and in South Asia, since Iran is really a bridge to both of these countries, and no doubt some of the issues of the Persian Gulf will be discussed, including some of the oil problems.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in a recent interview, Secretary of State Rogers said on public television, "So, as effectively as we can, we are going to assure the Soviet Union on this trip that the new U. S. policy toward China is not an anti-Soviet move." Did that come up in the private talks in that way?

DR. KISSINGER: As I said this morning, our basic position with respect to both of these large Communist countries is that we will not discuss one of them in the capital of the other. We recognize that they have serious differences with each other on a number of issues in which the United States is not primarily engaged, one of them being the border dispute, the other one being an ideological conflict over the interpretation of Leninist doctrine with respect to which our competence is not universally recognized. (Laughter)

So, therefore, we do not discuss the bilateral Sino-Soviet issues in the respective capitals. We have made clear both publicly and in private talks that our policy toward the People's Republic is in no sense directed against the Soviet Union: that we have no interest in threatening legitimate Soviet interests, and that we are pursuing our policy toward the People's Republic in order to solve the bilateral issues that exist between us. I think that has been made clear.

Q. Henry, could you possibly give us some additional information in detail, and if it is not possible in detail, in general, on the essence of the conversations that the President had with Mr. Brezhnev, covering the extent, the number of hours, and we would like to know how many hours and how it broke down in time. What I would like to know in particular is, were they here essentially reviewing the post-World War II history of U.S.-Soviet relations?

DR. KISSINGER: You mean all the conversations put together?

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Q. Yes, or were they concentrating on immediate problems? What can you tell us in terms of the scope and range of the discussions?

DR. KISSINGER: There were several types of meetings with Soviet leaders. There were three private meetings with Mr. Brezhnev that extended over a considerable period of time. Then there was an equal number of meetings at which Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny were present with the President. Then, of course, there were three planary sessions. You can check these because they were announced. I may be off by one on each of these.

To answer your question, there were both general discussions and specific discussions. There were at least two occasions that I remember in which there was a general review of the world situation, of the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relationships, but with particular emphasis on the future of what role these countries could play toward each other for the preservation of world peace and stability. For the rest of the time, there were specific topics.

As we told you, for example, on Tuesday both the afternoon and evening session dealt with SALT. The evening at the dacha was primarily devoted to Vietnam. Some of the topics that were discussed between the President and the Soviet leaders were then followed up by Secretary Rogers or myself in other conversations. Secretary Rogers had several extended meetings with Prime Minister Kosygin. I had several meetings, first on SALT with Deputy Prime Minister Smirnov and later on other issues with Gromyko. Therefore, the answer to your question, Murray, is that the talks were extensive, they were very frank and they covered both the general and the specific.

Q. May I ask why there was this joint declaration as a separate document, and why it was not simply included in the communique, and who it was that initiated that idea?

DR. KISSINGER: I covered part of that this morning, but let me answer it again. The original idea was to have some general principles stated in the communique, just as we did in Peking. Then it was suggested that if our relations moved forward on as broad a front as they seemed to be moving, and if we made one or two really significant agreements, that perhaps it would be appropriate if we marked what at least we intended to be a departure in U.S. Soviet relations by something other than a section of a communique, by a somewhat more formal declaration. When this idea was first advanced, it was noted and put aside in order to see whether our relations, in fact, justified attempting to express some basic principles on which to base relations, and while a general outline of what these principles might be existed, it was left open whether they would be folded into the communique or whether they would be made as a separate declaration.

Then the Soviet leaders and the President decided that we could responsibly and indeed should responsibly have a separate document, given the fact that we had moved forward on a broad front, and given also the fact that it was at least our intention -- and we hope, of course, the reality will not belie this -- to mark the transformation from a period of rather rigid hostility to one in which, without any illusions about the differences in social systems, we would try to behave with restraint and with a maximum of creativity in bringing about a greater degree of stability and peace.

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DR. KISSINGER: It did not hang in the air in that sense. In trying to understand these discussions, what I think is striking about them is that here are two countries that conduct a global foreign policy and, therefore, do not have to prove to themselves constantly that they are engaged in this part of the world and that part of the world; that they can talk about particular problems and still be conscious of the fact that there are other problems in the world, all of which they have an interest in at some time, a more or less equal interest.

So it would be incorrect to say that Vietnam was the unspoken assumption of every conversation.

Q. What about the Middle East, Henry, how did that come up and do you have a feeling that there was a better understanding of our position than previously?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Middle East was fully discussed. I know the Middle East was fully discussed. The degree of the understanding that was achieved will have to wait developments.

I was asked this morning are there secret understandings; is this or that going to happen, just as I was asked on the occasion of my visit here, "Did you have a secret deal with the Soviet leaders"? This is not the way these things happen.

When two great powers deal with each other, one of the best things they can do for each other is to make absolutely sure that they understand each other's point of view. What actions they then take, based on the understanding of that point of view, only the future can tell. Therefore, I don't want to speculate.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us, please, sir, can you expand on what happened with the mention of the Soviet-Jewish problem, please, sir, in any way, shape or form?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't go into the detail of any of these things except to repeat again what I said before: This is a particularly complex issue to raise in a country that is bound to consider it an internal problem.

Q. Did you come away with the feeling that the Soviet Union could live with the mining of the North Vietnamese harbors?

DR. KISSINGER: I would have to say that I don't want to speculate on what the Soviet Union will do about particular American actions. Certainly a full opportunity existed for the expression of these points of view and we certainly made clear why we have taken certain actions and why we believe we have to continue them.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said there is one lend-lease issue that remained unsettled. Does that issue have a dollar sign in front of it and if so, can you give us a rough amount?

DR. KISSINGER: If it is unsettled, how can I give you an amount?

Q. What is the issue?

DR. KISSINGER: All the issues of lend-lease concern the terms of repayment. This is one of them. I don't think the amount is the most unsettled issue.

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Q. The President, before he left, cautioned us all against overblown expectations out of the summit. Would you characterize in a few words what you feel and what the President feels came out of this in terms of its success in meeting the minimal expectations that you and he went with?

DR. KISSINGER: What we attempted to do at the summit was to bring together negotiations that have been conducted on a broad front over a period of a year and to see whether they could be formed into a pattern of US-Soviet relationships rather than simply a series of individual actions.

Secondly, and very importantly, we attempted to conclude the SALT negotiations because we do believe that to put the central armaments of both sides for the first time under agreed restraint is an event that transcends in importance the technical significance of the individual restrictions that were placed on various weapon systems.

Thirdly, we wanted to see whether, as major powers, we could take account of the fact that we are living in a period which has some of the characteristics of traditional diplomacy in the sense that you are getting more states that are being active but with one important difference: in traditional diplomacy the aim was to, through an accumulation of small advantages, to gain a qualitative edge over other countries. In the nuclear age, the most dangerous thing to aim for is a qualitative edge over your major rivals.

Therefore, the constant attempt to accumulate petty advantages creates such an atmosphere of insecurity and such an enormous danger that the world may not be able to live with it.

So what we attempted to do was to see, through the SALT agreement and the other agreements, and, above all, through the many conversations across the broad spectrum, to see whether it is possible to express the policies of these countries that do have this great responsibility in some form that recognizes these realities.

This is why these principles should be something more than just platitudes. Now, again, I must repeat: we are not naive. It is perfectly possible that six months from now it will turn out that we are again in a period of extreme hostility.

If that has happened, both countries will have lost an opportunity and the world will have lost an opportunity. So we think the achievement is that we have made these agreements, that SALT has been concluded and that at least there has been a recognition for the first time on both sides not just that this or that problem has to be solved, but maybe that a new style of international relations has to be developed.

How successful we will be in implementing that, only the future will tell.

Q. As we sit here in Kiev talking about this, then, you have met your goals?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we essentially met the goals we set for ourselves. You can still argue with us -- unusual as that would be for Newsweek -- that the goals were not the right ones to set, but I have to say that we more or less met the goals we set for ourselves.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you give us a general idea of the schedule for the European Security Conference and MBFR and is it realistic?

DR. KISSINGER: Realistic for what?

Q. That the conference can take place this year.

DR. KISSINGER: Another realistic what?

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Q. That the conference can take place this year?

DR. KISSINGER: Our belief is that both these conferences should be very carefully prepared. We are prepared to engage in preparatory discussions on the European Security Conference and on MBFR this year. We expect the more realistic date for both of them, certainly for the European Security Conference, will be next year. That is, at least as far as we are concerned, the plan on which we are operating. MBFR, as I pointed out, this morning, is a subject of enormous complexity in many ways. It is of much greater complexity than SALT because the weapons are so different. The reinforcement problem is new and you are dealing with an alliance. But we have done a lot of work on it and we will be ready to engage in exploratory talks in the reasonably near future.

Q. Henry, was that exploratory talk on the Security Conference or on MBFR?

DR. KISSINGER: Both.

Q. When Syria got out of hand, when we got worried about activities in Cuba, when we felt we had to mine -- we have had, after all, a pattern of quick consultation, an explanation of what we are doing, in some cases bringing about a change. The President complimented the Russian leaders on finally turning to restraint in the Middle East. You and Ambassador Dobrynin ironed out a reaffirmation of the Cuban agreement. This thing has been going on for sometime. What is so new about the Statement of Principles that would give us a different course?

DR. KISSINGER: We have, in the past, dealt with a series of crises which, when concluded, were expressed in some statement relevant to that crisis. We have not in the past attempted to lay down general rules of conduct ahead of the crisis by which the basic relationships of the countries could be defined.

In fact, you could argue that many of the crises that arose were crises into which one side or the other or both stumbled through a series of events in which they had either not been in sufficient contact, miscalculated each other's reactions, or attempted to achieve some advantage.

Now, again, Max, no one can be so naive as to say that if they built another submarine base in Cuba, that the most telling argument will be the third principle of this declaration. What one would have to hope is that for both sides, before such a step is taken this gives us a possibility for an exchange and possibilities for restraint and arguments for restraint within each government that might not otherwise exist. So, this is to act with foresight on matters that in the past we have had to solve through crises.

Q. What I was really asking is: Haven't these principles really already governed our conduct in many areas?

DR. KISSINGER: It is very rare in foreign policy, Max, that you can say -- and we would not maintain -- that as of this day something totally new, that has never happened before, arose.

Some of these principles have governed our conduct, usually ex post facto after a crisis, and it is true that both sides have on the whole refrained from pushing crises to the extreme. They may have governed our conduct during crises.

What we are not attempting to do is see whether they govern our conduct to prevent crises.

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, as a result of these talks, is any change imminent in our policy of bombing North Vietnam and keeping the mines armed?

DR. KISSINGER: This is an essentially tactical question. What we want in Vietnam -- to which the matters to which you refer are means -- what we want is a serious negotiation leading to a rapid end of the war and, therefore, the end of the operations to which you refer.

It has to be seen in the context of a negotiation and not in the context of actions taken unilaterally. We do not intend to take unilateral actions.

Q. To follow up Max's question, after Mr. Brezhnev's trip to France, there was a statement of basic principles involving relationships between France and the Soviet Union. Following Mr. Podgorny's trip to Turkey, you also had a similar statement of basic principles which follows up the statements of basic principles between the United States and the Soviet Union signed today.

Was that a Soviet initiative that follows in a pattern and how do you relate our statement of basic principles to the other two?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, it makes some difference whether the two great nuclear powers, whose rivalry has characterized the postwar period, sign such a statement than when it is signed by countries which, whatever their importance, do not have the means to affect global policy.

Secondly, it is of no doubt true that the Soviet Union has attempted, for a variety of purposes, to codify its relationships to many countries.

Thirdly, the idea that principles should be expressed at the end of the visit was a joint one. After all, we had them in our Peking summit. The idea to make them a separate declaration was initially a Soviet proposal which we shelved pending an examination of whether we could make a really meaningful statement.

Now, again I want to make clear: We are not saying that these principles can be a cookbook to which you need merely refer to have a guide for future actions; nor are we saying that it is not perfectly possible that these principles can be broken almost immediately: nor am I rejecting the possibility at all that they are intended as a tactical device to lull certain people. All of this is possible.

If any of these events happen, particularly the last event, then we will act with, I believe, a firmness that we have shown in the crisis to which Max has referred, and in that case I would say a great opportunity has been lost and then some other leaders somewhere along the line will have to address the problems to which these principles address themselves, namely, the problem of how to have a peaceful world in an age in which a cataclysm depends on the decisions of men.

So we have laid out a road map. Will we follow this road? I don't know. Is it automatic? Absolutely not. But it lays down a general rule of conduct which, if both sides act with wisdom, they can, perhaps, over a period of time, make a contribution. At this point it is an aspiration. We would not have signed it if we did not believe there was a chance for implementing this aspiration.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, after the non-proliferation treaty was signed, many of us who were trusting and naive believed the defense appropriations would go down. Instead, the Russians' went way up and ours went way up. Can you

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believe that our defense appropriations will go down and there will be a substantial reappropriation of resources, and if not, isn't all of it a waste?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I believe in certain categories the defense appropriations will go down somewhat. I also believe that we will have to continue major programs in those fields in which negotiations are still going forward and in which agreement has not been achieved, because if these negotiations prove anything, it is that it was our unwillingness to disarm unilaterally that has made it possible to get this bilateral agreement.

A substantial reduction of defense expenditures can be a byproduct of disarmament agreements, but the justification for this agreement is that for the first time it levels off the arms race; that in significant categories one can at least see a ceiling from which one can move to other areas instead of a constant multiplication of other weapons which produce their own problems and never give the statesmen an opportunity to see what could be done.

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Incidentally, nobody who had really analyzed the arms race could assume that the non-proliferation treaty would lead to a substantial reduction of armaments, because it affected other countries: it didn't really affect us.

Q. You know, Senator Jackson has said that the Russians now have a 50 megaton missile, and he questions whether the SALT agreement will really give us protection. Can you tell us, first of all, whether he is correct that they have this super-missile; and secondly, whether this agreement cuts off the SS-9s at a safe level? What do you think?

DR. KISSINGER: I wouldn't go into a discussion of the megatonnage of individual Soviet weapons, but it is clear that the Soviets have weapons of substantial explosive power and that they are probably building some that are even more powerful than the ones we have seen.

I would maintain that the argument you have mentioned to us confuses two separate issues: One, the size of the explosive power on warheads of existing weapons; and two, the growth of the arsenal of these weapons. This agreement does nothing about the size of the warheads. This will have to be done, if at all, in a follow-on agreement. It does do something about the number of launchers on which these warheads can be built.

Therefore, the SS-9 is frozen at its current level of 309, but in this category nothing will prevent the Soviet Union from putting larger warheads on those weapons that they have. The argument that some criticism are making, that therefore, the agreement is dangerous, is fallacious because we would face the problem of these larger warheads, plus additional missiles, without the agreement. That is the argument.

We admit we have insisted at a time when most of our critics were denying it that -- and we have always said it -- the SS-9 is a threat to our retaliatory force, and it remains a threat to our retaliatory force. What this agreement does is to freeze the number of launchers. It does not affect the size of the warhead. On the other hand, if there were no agreement, there would be more launchers and more warheads, and therefore, we have reduced the danger by the margin of the number of weapons that would be built were it not for this agreement.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, on the Vietnam issue, did either side advance proposals which the other side indicated that it would respond to at a future time, or is the dialogue at a high level on this issue suspended for practical purposes?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not want to go into the details of the Vietnam negotiations or discussions because I do not think it would serve any useful purpose, except to say that the discussions were very extensive.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said earlier that the Middle East issue was fully discussed, but did either nation offer any contribution toward achieving some tangible progress, to the talks?

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DR. KISSINGER: A great deal depends here on how you would define "tangible progress," because anything that keeps the situation from becoming more inflamed is at least a negative sort of progress. There was a rather full exchange of views, which I think can contribute to at least this negative progress I mentioned.

Q. At the bottom of the negotiations is the degree of trust between the people involved in them. Can you dwell on the measure of trust that may have developed between the President and the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends on what you mean by "trust". If you mean by that that the leaders have suddenly grown extraordinarily fond of each other and that they will do for each other things just because they have concluded that they are regular fellows, that obviously cannot happen between serious people. On the other hand, usually these leaders deal with each other through cables, and what is filtered through the machinery takes on an increasingly abstract quality as it travels to the higher level.

Now, I think that in the future when a communication of one to the other arrives, they will understand the intangibles of the communication infinitely better than they did before because they will be able to refer to some very detailed and concrete discussions that have taken place. The President has always approached these meetings, if you look at his press conferences, from a totally unsentimental point of view, and he has not had the illusion that he could charm leaders, who have been brought up on their belief of a superior understanding of objective factors, by his personality.

So in the sense that there is now a better understanding of what both sides are really talking about, in the sense that they will now at least have the raw material from which they can assess communications to each other in terms of the motivations and basic attitudes, I think trust has developed, but not to the point that it could survive a major challenge that one side would put to the other that affects its own estimate of its vital interests. So I would put the answer within that limitation.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, another one of the arguments that is made with regard to the strategic arms agreement is that it may have the effect of directing, or redirecting rather, the arms construction effort. What reason is there to think this can be controlled?

DR. KISSINGER: This agreement, if it is not followed on by other negotiations, will, over a period of time, permit a qualitative race or a race in the weapons systems which are not frozen by the agreement.

We have, in this agreement, however, covered a broader range of weapons, because the definition of land based intercontinental missiles and sea based intercontinental missiles, is rather sweeping, if you read it.

I believe, and we believe, and the Soviet leaders agree -- in fact, we have expressed this in our public declaration -- that we should start follow-on negotiations as soon as possible in order to reduce the danger to which you refer. The danger to which you refer is real; it is not imminent, but over a period of time it would definitely exist.

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[lc]

Q Dr. Kissinger, I believe somewhere in the communique, it said that the two powers recognize the present boundaries in Europe. In a sense, does that mean that we recognize them as they exist in the permanent division of Germany, and do we, in a sense, therefore, return to the old style diplomacy of spheres of influence?

DR. KISSINGER: It seems to be my fate to have to answer the charge of old style diplomacy. We use the phrase, relations should be based -- I don't have the text in front of me -- on certain principles in which inviolability of frontiers was one of them. We did not use the adjective to which you referred.

Secondly, the phrase we used is somewhat less strong than the one that the German government has used in its treaty with the Soviet Union, and it is, of course, somewhat difficult for us to be more German than the Germans on the issue of German unification.

So what we have interpreted this statement, these principles, to mean, is that we do not favor the use of force in changing boundaries, and that we believe the foreign policy ought to be conducted on the principle of territorial integrity, but we do not preclude negotiations.

We do not believe it has anything to do with spheres of influence, because if you look at it, I think it is the 11th principle, you will see that both sides have renounced any claim to special spheres of influence, and we consider that one of the positive aspects of the communique.

Q. Henry, at the risk of your not wanting to write our stories for us, as you have said before, would you admit to any disappointments in the course of this summit conference? Is there anything that you came to get that you didn't get?

DR. KISSINGER: I think, you know, it is a sort of silly answer to say that we achieved essentially what we came to achieve, in that the agenda we had set ourselves and the possible goals were more or less realized.

Now I have to say right away that serious people can quarrel with the goals. Maybe we didn't set the goals high enough. I think I read somewhere early in the Johnson Administration, if you define the miraculous is the attainable, you can perform miracles every day.

It really would be psychologically better if I told you there were two things that we failed at, and of course, perhaps, you know, we didn't conclude the Maritime agreement, though the problem was more on our side than on the Soviet side.

But I would have to say, unbearable as that may make us sound, that essentially what we had planned to do, what we had expected to achieve, was more or less achieved, give or take ten percent.

Q. May I follow that up and say was there anything that was broken through or resolved here, other than the exchange of views on such a high level, that you can point to, that was not expected?

DR. KISSINGER: You see, this summit has been really very painstakingly prepared over a long period of time, and one of the things we said to each other early was, don't let us surprise each

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other at the summit, because when Heads of State suddenly present something unexpected to the opposite number, you can, of course, say maybe you have achieved something spectacular, but more likely you will produce an impasse or an attitude of, "Good God, what am I dealing with here!" Because each leader has his own constituency at home, however you define it, and therefore, we very painstakingly worked out this agenda ahead of time.

Now this doesn't mean that the results were clear ahead of time, but the possible results were understood and they depended, of course, on the kind of conversations that the President had with the Soviet leaders.

"We think that the leaders ought to know what the basic position is they are going to face, roughly what they attempt to achieve, because it is tough enough for Heads of Government who have myriads of other concerns, to gear themselves to each other, without being burdened by the danger that they will suddenly confront something that could be very embarrassing or extraordinarily difficult."

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Q. Dr. Kissinger, I have two brief questions. You spoke of trust, the measure of trust.

DR. KISSINGER: As I defined it in relation to Peter's.

Q. Yes. I would like to relate that to an earlier remark when you said there was discussion, whether it was possible for both sides to bring a rapid end to the war. The question is: As of now, is there any measure of encouragement or optimism that we are -- that is an emotional question, I realize, but I ask it anyway. That is my first question.

DR. KISSINGER: I applied the word trust to the relations between us and the Soviet leaders. I applied "The attempt to bring about a negotiation towards a rapid end of the war," to our relations with Hanoi. So we are talking here about two separate problems. Are we more optimistic about a rapid end of the war as a result of these discussions? I just do not want to speculate about what the impact will be, how Hanoi will interpret this situation. What other things may be done by us, by Hanoi and others just has to be seen as one has seen so many predictions on the issue of Vietnam that we would really now rather concentrate on the results.

Q. The other question is a separate question. I am pursuing an earlier question. We know, of course, that the problem of the Soviet Jews is an internal problem. We know that. But you did say in Salzburg that the President would seek an opportunity to bring it up. And my question is, did he find an opportunity to bring it up?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, he mentioned the problem.

Q. A procedural question. Does this end the President's overseas travel this year?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not aware of any others, but then Mr. Ziegler has not briefed me on that issue.

Q. May I quickly follow up this last question. You said he brought up the Jewish question. Did he bring it up with Brezhnev?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into anything further on that question. The Soviet leaders are aware of our position on the problem.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have one announcement to make. We will have the schedule, which will take you through Warsaw, available in about ten minutes. The baggage call is about 8:30 in the morning.

The President will lay the wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at 9:55 and the schedule will show the bus departures.

One final thing. In the pool report that was prepared from the Soviet aircraft today, there is a little confusion in the first paragraph. It says, "The pilot's name is" and states the name, and then goes on to state "He is the best pilot in the country." I was making remarks about remarks made to me of the Minister of Aviation, whose name is Bugayev, who is the Minister of Aviation. The pilot who flew the plane is a very good pilot, but the remarks referred to in the first paragraph referred to the Minister of Aviation.

Murray Mardar asked how many hours the leaders spent together. In formal sessions, they spent 20 hours and 22 minutes together; 16 of

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Far East

NEW YORK TIMES
March 1972

[Lc]

# Text of 1954 U.S. Treaty With Taiwan

NEW YORK TIMES

1 March 1972

## PEKING GIVES CHOU ROUSING GREETING

Welcome Is Seen as Sign of Chinese Satisfaction With Outcome of Nixon Visit

By JOHN BURNS

The Globe and Mail, Toronto

PEKING, Feb. 29 — Premier Chou En-lai received a triumphant welcome at the Peking airport this afternoon on his return from Shanghai, the last stop on his brief tour of China with President Nixon.

A few hours after Mr. Nixon landed in Washington to an enthusiastic welcome, the Premier stepped from his Ilyushin-18 turboprop to a drum-beating, cymbal-clashing reception from a crowd of 5,000.

The welcome, which far exceeded anything Mr. Chou normally receives on return from the provinces, was seen here as a mark of the Chinese leadership's satisfaction with the outcome of the Nixon visit as contained in the joint communiqué.

With the Chinese press continuing to withhold comment on the communiqué, diplomats here seized on the banners carried by the crowds at the airport for an indication of what the official line would be.

Among the banners were several proclaiming "Long Live Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Diplomatic Line," a slogan that has come into general use only since China began the process of thawing the long-frozen hostile relationship with the United States by inviting an American table tennis team to visit last April.

Diplomats viewed the airport reception as confirmation of their assessment that the visit was an unqualified success for the Chinese, particularly in the concessions they obtained from

Following is the text of the mutual-defense treaty between the United States and Nationalist China, negotiated under President Dwight D. Eisenhower and signed on Dec. 2, 1954, which is at issue in the current debate over the American defense commitment to Taiwan:

The Parties to this Treaty, Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which brought their two peoples together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against Imperialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the West Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

## Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

## Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty, the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

## Article III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts toward these ends.

## Article IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

## Article V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

## Article VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific un

der its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

## Article VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

## Article VIII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

## Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

For the Republic of China:

GEORGE K. C. YEH.

The shape of all Asia, influenced in large measure by the U. S. ever since World War II, is being changed in ways that will have profound effect on every major power for years to come.

What is starting to emerge is a delicate balance of power in which no one nation is to be predominant—neither Russia, Japan, Red China nor the U. S.

Results to the U. S. will be tangible, in time: a chance to cut back sharply on America's costly and seemingly unending commitment in Asia without abandoning the area to any single nation.

Long-term conciliation with China—the object of the Nixon visit—was vital to this strategy. In his week of face-to-face talks with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier Chou En-lai, the American President pressed home the idea that enduring peace in Asia could be achieved only with an end of U. S.-Chinese hostility.

The impact on Asia is bound to be far-reaching—not only among the big powers but also in countries such as India, Korea, Nationalist China and the whole of Southeast Asia. Already, these nations are being forced to re-examine their policies.

All this transcends the immediate, publicized results of the President's historic journey. On some day-to-day issues between the two conferring nations, a narrow opening wedge was driven. On other issues—a sudden end to the Vietnam war, a quick answer to the problem of Taiwan—no magical solutions were found, nor expected.

It was the very fact of the meeting itself that was important, both sides agree. It not only set the stage for a continuing "dialogue" between Peking and Washington, but symbolized the basic change coming in Asia.

**Change of roles.** What that change is likely to mean, in further detail:

In the new Asia, a lesser role is foreseen for the U. S. than at present—and a bigger role for China and Japan. Russia will face new constraints in its push for more power.

For the U. S., there is no thought of complete withdrawal. Neither South Vietnam nor South Korea is to be abandoned. Nor would Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government on Taiwan. The U. S. would maintain an interest in the independence of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. And it would continue to hold a protective nuclear shield over Japan as well as retaining close economic relations with that country.

The hope is, however, that

it's American interests in

Americans, since World War II, have paid a high price—in lives and dollars—in attempts that have not proved very successful in shaping Asia in an image that Washington desired. In two major wars—in Korea and Vietnam—79,279 Americans have been killed and 406,064 wounded. The cost of waging war

in the new Asia the danger of another war involving U. S. can be lessened.

**Peking's fears.** For China, the big factor in its dealings with President Nixis Russia. The Chinese fear the Soviets. They are convinced that Russia is trying to contain, isolate and encircle China.

* **UNITED STATES:** Determined to achieve a balance of power in the region with China's help, while cutting back forces from Korea to Thailand. Will maintain only enough strength so no single nation can easily upset the balance. Support for South Vietnam will continue. But involvement with Nationalist China, Japan, India, others will be less intense.

* **CHINA:** Ready for historic changes if they will help counter growing Soviet threat. U. S. already has been replaced by Russia as chief military menace in Peking's eyes, and by Japan on economic and political front. Will keep pressing hard for first-class status, remain unpredictable.

* **SOVIET UNION:** Intensifying activity in Asia. Aim is to continue wooing Peking's neighbors and encircle China. Already is chief source of war supplies for North Vietnam—and North Korea and India as well. Would like to wreck postwar alliance between the United States and Japan, is bitterly opposed to U. S.-China effort at conciliation.

* **JAPAN:** Suddenly fearful of losing ground in big-power race, uneasy about American intentions. While ties with U. S. may loosen somewhat, those with Russia and China are not likely to strengthen. Gravest possibility: that Tokyo will feel increasingly isolated, decide to "go nuclear."

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SMH -- HHS

Anyone interested in keeping
the attached?

FYI the Shanhai communique
and other Peking public statements
are clipped on left inside cover of
our public statements file if you
ever need them. (Reason they
on left is that they don't directly
bear on ME). If you want the
attached, I will add it with Shanghai
statement.