[L.C.]

pressures.

Now, in the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, it is quite possible that my imagination does not soar to the elevation of a public debate. But I have great difficulty understanding what exactly a Palestinian delegation is, that is not P.L.O., and yet has status that will achieve for Hussein what he wants, namely, a cover for a negotiation or a legitimization for a negotiation. I have great difficulty understanding what that will, what, who these Palestinians could be. If they're genuinely not related to the P.L.O., they will have no status. If they are related to the P.L.O., whether they have membership cards or not, seems to me a secondary question.

So I think it is important that we get this sort of issue discussed before we go very far down the road. And I do not believe at this moment that there are very good prospects for a definitive peace on the West Bank. I believe some adjustments might be negotiated, of a military type; some limited arrangements; but I am not, from what I have read up to now, very optimistic about the future course of these negotiations. And, of course, I have always been opposed, in office and out-of-office, to Soviet participation in an international conference.

-8-

[L.C.]

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, might we discuss one or two of the more difficult subjects: the settlements of the West Bank, which you have written much about? I quote the Israeli Government aims: for a de facto annexation eased by a modicum of self-government for the Arab inhabitants. Egypt and, if we are honest with ourselves, the dominant trend within our own State Department, seeks to nudge the talks in the direction of a Palestinian entity.

Surely, there are deep feelings on the West Bank. Israel sees it as important for its security, a biblical mandate, which they call Judea and Sumaria. On the other hand, there are those who feel that the overwhelming majority of Arabs in this territory represent a physical threat.

How would you reconcile these differences, ensuring security for Israel and determination for the Arabs?

DR. KISSINGER: What you are quoting was written in 1982, shortly after the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, and when the Israeli military position was very strong.

I always believed that the optimum moment for negotiations was one when Israel appeared strong, the

-9-

radicals appeared weak, the moderates could demonstrate that only by cooperating with the United States and negotiation with Israel could any progress be made. And I thought that condition existed in '82. In all candor, I'm not sure this condition exists in 1985, and I think I perform my best service to this group by telling you exactly what I think. Now, in 1982, I believed, and I still believe, to some extent, there is this problem with respect to the West Bank.

If Israel goes back to the 1967 borders, it will be in an indefensible position, and it will also be, suffer a psychological blow, similar to that of Czechoslovakia after Munich, from which I believe it would be the beginning of endless harassment and a mortal threat to the future of Israel. So I have never believed that it was possible to return to the '67 borders.

On the other hand, I also do not believe that it is possible for Israel in the long-term to maintain its rule over 800,000 Arabs, because the two choices are equally unacceptable. If they become full-fledged Israelis, they will have a weight in Israeli politics that could destroy the nature of the Jewish State. If not, Israel could wind up in a position internationally

-10-

[L.C.]

like South Africa. So I have felt that the ideas represented by the former-Deputy Prime Minister, Egal Alon, in the so-called Alon Plan, represented the best combination between returning the majority of Arabs to Arab rule and the requirements of Israeli strategy, and for that we have to have a map to see how his view was that Israel should maintain defensive positions along the Jordan and that a core area in which most of the Arabs lived should be returned; but the major strategic areas which were not heavily populated by Arabs should be retained by Israel. Now, my view was also that that territory should be returned to Jordan.

I have never favored the various expedients of establishing a P.L.O. entity on the West Bank, in any form, because I believe that a P.L.O. entity must inevitably turn first on Jordan and then on Israel, and will therefore be an endless source of upheaval. It is a view I have always stated publicly and it is independent of what the P.L.O. may pronounce in any given circumstance about Resolution 242. I do not believe there is room on the West Bank for a P.L.O. entity. That being the case, I think it should be faced/phased, even though I favor that those areas that are most heavily populated by Arabs be returned to some Arab control. But I must

-11-

[L]

also say, under present circumstances, this is much
more difficult than in 1982.

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, you did mention
Jerusalem. The Jewish Community is celebrating the
18th Anniversary of the "return of Jerusalem,"
eighteen an important number in Jewish life: kh'ai.
We Jews have left many cities in our history. Jerusalem
is not just an-other city. We took a pledge two thousand
years ago — : (in Hebrew): "if I will ever forget you,
Jerusalem, may my right hand wither." We have heard
expressions of internationalization of Jerusalem, sacred
to all faiths. I'm not sure that it has equal sanctity
to all faiths. To the Muslim world it is first Mecca
Medina and then Jerusalem. The Christian world has had
its holy cities in Antioch, Constantinople, Rome, the
Vatican.

Just two weeks ago, at the very platform on
which you're standing, bothyour friend, Dr. Elie Wiesel
and Ambassador Netanyahu said: Israel will never negotiate
on Jerusalem. Somehow the feeling is that if all other
problems were solved, Jerusalem would be insoluble.

What is your approach on Jerusalem, and yet
recognizing the feelings of other religions and faiths?

-12-

[c]

DR. KISSINGER: I substantially agree with my friend Elie Wiesel. I could imagine that at the end of a negotiation in which everything else were satisfactorily arranged, that some arrangement be made in which the holy Arab places be given some special status in which, which is compatible with the religious feeling of the Muslim community and maybe the same for some of the Christian holy places, but I do not believe that the issue of sovereignty over Jerusalem as such is negotiable. (Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: At one time your Deputy and subsequently Secretary of State, General Haig, at this very platform, now Jewish Town Hall, stated: "If we are true to Israel, then we are true to ourselves as Americans. It is moral to support the right of the Jewish People to their own State. Israel is a lively democracy, sharing our basic political values and is the strongest power in the Middle East. Some say our obligation to Israel is purely moral, but Israel represents a geopolitical and strategic value to the United States."

Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with this analysis of a special relationship between America and Israel; and what American policy would you like to see implemented to strengthen this alliance?

-13-

[L]

DR. KISSINGER: I agree with this analysis, and there has been a special relationship between Israel and the United States, I must say, in every administration, sometimes with varying degrees of intensity, but substantially there has always been a special relationship, and I can't really add anything to what my former colleague, General Haig, has said.

I would make one point, though, that is important, I think, for the Jewish Community. The United States cannot be strong only in the Middle East and weak every place else. If we had to be strong in support of our principles and our friends in the Middle East, we have to be strong in support of our principles and friends in other parts of the world, too. (Applause). It cannot be selective.

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, every day we learn that terrorism has become a deliberate political weapon of states. We heard last week of an exchange of over 1,000 Arab prisoners held in Israel for 3 soldiers held by Syrian terrorists. As Americans we have been the greatest victims of terrorism. Forty percent of all victims have been Americans in Lebanon, Iran. At this moment there is the issue of the captives held in Lebanon, vis a vis Kuwait.

-14-

[L.C.]

Do you agree with Israel's posture in this exchange? Is it a reversal of their position of negotiating with terrorists? What must be the international response to this raging plague of terrorism?

DR. KISSINGER: The present Israeli Government and, for that matter, all previous ones, has been headed by people I respect greatly and who are close personal friends of mine — Sharon, Peres, Itzak Rabin: these have all been friends of nearly a lifetime. So I say with some pain that I find this decision incomprehensible. And I cannot agree with it. When I was Secretary of State, I prohibited any negotiation with terroristss, and we had one ambassador who negotiated the release of some captured Americans and paid a ransom for it, and I called him home when he expected to be decorated and I fired him. I believe that there are so many Jews and so many Israelis and so many potential victims, Americans all over the world, that once the principle is established that one ngotiates with terrorists, it is very difficult to put an end to it.

Now, one of the great assets of the Israeli State up to now has been that never was it possible to engage in an act of terrorism in Israel and either survive or be the subject of negotiation.

-15-

[L]

I was in Israel with Golda Meir during the Mahlot terrorist attack, where a large number of children were held at ransom by terrorists in return -- and demanded the release of other terrorists. Golda did not hesitate. She stormed or she had the Israeli Army storm that schoolhouse. I think at least <u>fifteen</u> <u>children</u> were killed, and I find it painful, having been there at that time and having seen the anguish, to see that two of the surviving terrorists were released.

I think it was a great mistake. It was a great mistake for Israel, it was a great mistake for anti-terrorism all over the world. (Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: What is spoken of as Operation Peace in Galilee — do you feel it has achieved its goals of security for the Galilee? Has it brought about the destruction and impotence of the P.L.O.? Are you satisfied with its attainments? What do you believe will now occur after the withdrawal; and has the Lebanon issue brought about some type of revival of the present: Peace Talk?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think the Operation Peace in Galilee has achieved everything it set out to do, but I would, again, state, say, that: Israelis and Jewish People should be very careful about wallowing in a

-16-

[L]

defeatist atmosphere. It was bad enough when the United States did it to itself, but the United States is a superpower, with a great margin of survival. For Israel, its strengths and its toughness have been one of the guarantees of its survival, and I am somewhat restive about some of the self-flagellation that I see with respect to Lebanon.

Now, with respect to Lebanon, leaving aside, nobody asked my opinion, I will analyze it as follows. I think the P.L.O. was, suffered a very heavy blow. It has contributed to its fragmentation. It has reduced its military effectiveness. And it has contributed to the moves towards peace that the P.L.O. is now making, however inadequate they may be, and whatever reservations I may have expressed, they?are certainly a step away from previous intransigence. I believe it was a mistake to attempt to achieve the unity of Lebanon under ?Vallen- -- rule, with Israeli military power, partly because Lebanon has not been unified for 2,000 years, and because this — or at least not since the Crusades, for a thousand years — and because this imposed on Israel a permanent military requirement.

It is also true that the only way this could be achieved was by a kind of military pressure that the

-17-

[L]

international situation and American actions did not permit. So, that objective was not realized. And the subsequent American intervention, that more or less accepted the Israeli objective, without Israeli power and without American power, they have both failed; so the situation in Lebanon is, has great complexities. In addition, again, speaking very frankly to you, the first withdrawal of Israeli Forces in the face of Arab pressures is not a trivial event. It has never happened before and there is no sense in deluding ourselves that this does not place expectations and maybe hopes in some of the radical Arab countries: that it would be better if they did not exist! So, the final outcome of Lebanon is a mixed, is mixed. And I think it is absolutely imperative that Israel and the Jewish Community not engage in an orgy of self-flagellation over that issue now; and rather address the future; and nor were the results as entirely negative as is sometimes presented.

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, in terms of national self-flagellation, this year marks the 10th Anniversary after the Fall of Saigan. The appraisal of the Viet Nam War is an issue that has seriously divided our country not only while the war was in progress but even ten years later.

-18-

[L]

Was it, as some claim, a military defeat for
America, or was it a just war, halting the further spread
of Communism in Asia?

You have written, and I quote: "If Viet Nam
is to leave any useful legacy, America owes it to
itself to make a fair assessment of the lessons of that
tragedy." The lapse of a decade should enable us to
face its past and reflect on the future.

My question might be: what is the lesson of
Viet Nam for future American policy; and reflecting on
ten years after Viet Nam, what would you have done
differently?

DR. KISSINGER: First, it is important to
remember that, speaking about what I might have done
differently or what might have been done differently,
it's the Administration in which I served; came into
office when there were already 535,000 Americans in
Viet Nam, when the war had already been going on, for the
six years or even seven years, if you count the arrival
of the first 20,000 troops. We were handed a bombing
halt that had been negotiated by our predecessors in
the last months of the war, of that period in office,
and we were then asked to deal with this problem.

At that time, also, there was, as many of you

-19-

[L.C]

will remember — there were violent divisions in the Democratic Party, whose leadership had ended the war; and the question that the Administration faced, in which I served, was: what does the United States do when it has committed so many forces, so far away, in a country in which the population, whatever its shortcomings, in its vast majority, did not wish to be Communist. It was our view that you cannot turn off such a conflict as if it were a television program and simply switch to another channel. We believed that since the security of hundreds of millions around the world depended on their faith in American constancy, that we could not simply destroy the government with which our predecessors had made formal agreements, and which were the only terms that were ever offered to us; and we believed that we owed it to all the people that relied on us to try to negotiate an honorable settlement, and our definition of "an honorable settlement" was one in which the people of South Viet Nam were given a reasonable opportunity to determine their own fate.
We found ourselves in an impossible situation.

A large percentage of the people who had got us into the war joined the Peace Movement within months of leaving the war, as if they had no further responsibility.

-20-

[L.C.]

The Administration in which I served accepted the minority platform of the Democratic Party, about which there had been so many riots, and had been rejected less than a year earlier, that did not bring us peace, domestic peace. And we therefore found ourselves in this dilemma. In order to keep demonstrations from getting out of control, we had to make constant concessions. Every concession we made convinced the North Vietnamese that we had no staying power. So every once in a while we lashed out at the North Vietnamese. Every time we lashed out, it was taken as an example of our, quote, 'war-like' tendencies.

With all of this, and with terrible anguish, we managed to bring about a settlement that, in my view, could have lasted. Nobody could count on the collapse of Executive authority that was brought about by Watergate.

We read a lot of so-called investigative journalism, that says we made secret commitments to preserve the peace treaty. What kind of nonsense is this? When the United States fights a war for six years or eight years and makes a peace treaty, does it then have to make a secret commitment that it's going to preserve it? If this is the case, no ally of ours is safe, because

-21-

[L]

that would mean that as soon as we signed a peace treaty
we wash out hands of the future of our allies.

The Congress cut aid to Viet Nam from $2.4
billion in 1973 to $700 million in 1975, at a time when
oil prices were going up as a result of the oil crisis.
It legislated a prohibition against the use of any
military force, in the words of the legislation, "in,
near or over" Viet Nam; and it prohibited any extension
of economic assistance to North Viet Nam. In those
circumstances we were deprived of both the carrot and
the stick, and the collapse of Viet Nam was inevitable.
And the saddest part of it is that we did it to ourselves.

Whether we should have gone in there to begin
with is another issue. But I would say, as a general
proposition, when you ask me, "What are the lessons?":
the lesson is, the United States should prayerfully
and carefully consider its national interests before it
commits its military forces. When it has determined,
however, that its national interests is involved, it has
no choice except to prevail in the enterprise that it
has undertaken. (Applause). And this constant attempt
to turn what was a matter of life and death for tens of
millions of people into a subject of domestic bargaining,
this self-righteousness in which one group of people

-22-

[L]

claimed a monopoly on morality and accused the United
States of immorality!

Our media wrote profound articles and some of
our officials made searching comments on the fact
that this particular leader was likely to be dedicated
to peace. If he was old, they said "old men are not
adventureous"; if he was young, they said "young men
would want to redo the economy." We had the strange
phenomenon that Mr. Andropov, who had been head of the
Soviet Secret Police for 15 years, suddenly emerged on
the op-ed pages of some of our leading newspapers as
a "closet dove." (laughter). Now, I do not believe any
of this. I do not believe that you get to be General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party by being a
choirboy. (laughter). I do not believe that they
appointed him, any of them, including Gorbachov,
because they thought he was highly unorthodox. I believe
that for the next year or so he will be heavily pre-
occupied with domestic problems. They have a govern-
mental apparatus that is reminiscent of Medieval
feudalism (laughter) in which people grow old together.
No Soviet General Secretary has ever retired voluntarily.
(laughter). In fact, all except one died in office,
and that one made the mistake of going on vacation without
his colleagues. (laughter).

-23-

[L.C.]

Nobody has retired voluntarily. Nobody has retired from the Polit Bureau with honor. You cannot run a governmental system this way.

Secondly, the Soviet economy is in great difficulty, partly because you cannot run a modern economy in which every article in commerce moves by governmental allocation, in which the cost of nothing is known and the price of everything is fixed by State authorities. That must lead to endless corruption.

But it also leads to this dilemma:

> If he wants to change the system, whoever the General Secretary is, he has to reduce the influence of the Communist Party, which means he must rely more on the military. If he wants to improve the performance of the system, he has to use Stalinist Secret Police methods.

But if he wants to move in the direction of the incentives, he must attack the machinery.

For all of these reasons, even if Gorbachov wanted to negotiate, seriously, he would first have to establish his domestic position, and this is why I think the eagerness with which we are soliciting a Summit meeting is premature. I'm not against a Summit meeting at the right moment.

Now, you ask me, "What is it we should ask of

-24-

[C]

the Soviet Union?

Right now, all the negotiations or most of the negotiations concern arms control. Arms control has the same characteristic that an issue that in the Nineteenth Century was called the Schleswig-Holstein question has, about which Lord Palmerston said the following; he said: "Only three people had ever understood it. One was dead. The second was in a lunatic asylum," and he was the third, and he had forgotten it.

Now, arms control is of great importance but it is a subject of enormous technical complexity in which political leaders are subject or dependent on the advice of experts that are deeply divided, as you can find out for yourselves by reading the daily press.

And, therefore, there is a great danger that the negotiations turn into what Lord ?Carrington called 'nuclear accounting.'

I believe there is at the heart of our political tensions with the Soviet Union a fundamental political problem and that political problem can be expressed very simply. The Soviet Union has established a principle, that anything that once is Communist remains irreversibly in the Soviet sphere; anything that is non-Communist is subject to pressure, subversion and all

-25-

[L.C.]

kinds of destabilization. On these groundrules, we will inevitably be pushed back, step by step. It isn't possible to defend a periphery of this size with equal skill at every moment of time. And it is a fact that many guerrilla groups, many terrorist groups, if not most, have direct or indirect support from the Soviet Intelligence services. I think this state of affairs has to end. It isn't asking the Soviet Union too much for the Soviet Union to stay within the country that already has the largest land area in the world.

We are not talking about a little country like Israel where you can see the frontiers from most places. We're talking about a huge empire. So, it seems to me, that together with arms control, which is important, there must be negotiations on political restraint, and on political rules of conduct. And if they are not observed, and if they are not carried out, then we can have temporary periods of relaxation, but sooner or later there will be new periods of tension, which will then be aggravated by the fact that many of the arms control schemes that now exist do not really relieve the military situation in any except a symbolic way. (Applause).

-26-

[L]

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, talking of the Soviet Union, world Jewry will forever be grateful to you for your efforts in easing the plight of the Jews behind the Iron Curtain. We are well aware that you played a monumental role in having the Soviet Union revoke the head tax for education.

As we know, 100,000 Jews engaged in a demonstration in Solidarity Day Parade. Do these demonstrations have any value? Does the Soviet Union listen; are we talking to ourselves; or better yet, what do you propose as the most effective means to advance the cause of religious freedom for Russian Jewry?

DR. KISSINGER: Whether the Soviet Union is listening or not, I'm afraid, nobody can say. During the period that I was in office, we managed to increase the flow of emigration from about 400 a year to about 45,000 a year, within a four-year period, by making it clear to the Soviet Union that we would pay serious attention to what they were doing, and that we considered this an important contributing element in our overall relationship.

So I think that it is important for the Soviet Union to understand that this is not an issue that will go away, and that will be kept alive.

-27-

[L.C]

Now, what method is most appropriate at any one moment, that is something that one should discuss in close consultation with our government, which I believe is sympathetic to the encouragement of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union.

But, at any rate, it is not up to the Jewish Community to forget its brethren in the Soviet Union. (Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, uppermost in the minds and hearts of people everywhere fairly recently was the visit of President Reagan to Bitburg.

Your friend, Dr. Elie Wiesel, whom you admire very much, as indicated, has said that Bitburg was "a denial of our past and a disregard of Jewish agony."

Two weeks ago, from this very podium, he said: if the President went there, despite the resolutions in Congress, indicating that he should not, he was really saying to the American Jew that "he does not count."

You were born in Germany. You were part of the Liberation Forces which entered the Concentration Camps and saw the unspeakable horrors. You have said that 13 members of your family died in Concentration Camps; and you found the S.S. aspect repugnant.

-28-

[L]

My question is: how does one undo the damage
of the President's visit to Bitburg? Should he have gone?
Will this give new feelings to those who want to forget
and not remember?

DR. KISSINGER: As you have pointed out,
Elie Wiesel is a close friend of mine. There are few
people I admire as much as Elie, and, indeed, I wrote a
letter supporting his nomination for the Nobel Peace
Prize. So, I have the greatest admiration and love for
Elie Wiesel.

The issue seems to me to have been this.
Nobody who lived in Germany in the thirties, as I did,
or who has seen concentration camps, as I did, can have
anything but loathing for the S.S.

Secondly, I am not sure a symbolic reconciliation was needed or that a military cemetery of this particular war which had such genocidal aspects, even without S.S., was the ideal place in which to celebrate a reconciliation.

On the other hand, it seemed to me that the
decision had been made by leaders on both sides of the
Atlantic who were fundamentally friendly to the Jewish
People. It had been made by subordinates who clearly
did not understand the historic significance of their
action.

-29-

[L]

And, therefore, by the time it reached the top level, they were caught in an extraordinary, difficult situation. Chancellor Kohl found a vote of 400 to 23 in his Parliament in favor of the continuation of the visit, and the 23 who voted against it were in their vast majority, if not in their exclusivity, professional neutralists and anti-Americans who knew what the reaction would be.

President Reagan felt that he did not wish to humiliate Chancellor Kohl and it is true that Germany is now a key element of the defense of the West, and that if it moved towards neutralism or nationalism, the freedom of all of us would be much more difficult to maintain.

So, the problem at that point was not the intrinsic merit of the visit, which I do not believe either of these two gentlemen, if they could have done it over again, would have done again. I said then and I say now, the Germans cannot ask us to forget what happened during the war. They have no moral claim to that. The Germans do have a right to ask us to judge them on the basis of their behavior since the war. And on this point, I think Elie and I have an identical view.

In the circumstances in which I spoke, which was the last ten days before the visit, it was my view

-30-

[L.C.]

that to cancel the visit, given all the circumstances I have described, would do more damage than good. I do not agree that this meant that people were indifferent to what the Jewish community felt. I believe the Jewish community had every right and every duty to be especially sensitive to this issue. I do not believe, however, that going through with it meant either that the S.S. was being legitimized. It was a difficult situation in which there was only left a choice among evils and I do not think one helps the situation by accusing President Reagan, with whom I have not always agreed, of not being sensitive to the Jewish community, because his record on this issue has been good.

And, therefore, while, I repeat, I did not like the choice of the site - it evoked very many painful memories for me - in the circumstances which existed in the week or so before the visit, I thought there was no practical possibility of canceling it, that would not do more damage to everybody concerned; and I have great respect for all of those who are in this room who will disagree with me. (Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, in your book *Years of Upheaval*, you describe at great length the last agonizing hours of President Nixon before his

-31-

[LC]

resignation. The very letter of resignation was given
to you as Secretary of State.

Could you share with us what transpired during
this harrowing, emotional period? You said, "I think he
will go down as a very considerable President. He had
a great ability to go to the heart of the problem.
He made great mistakes that led to his (unintel word) but
I think that the punishment was out of proportion to the
sin."

Stepping back and looking at President Nixon,
how would you judge his place in history?

DR. KISSINGER: On the last night I spent with
President Nixon before he retired -- and, needless to
say, he was very distraught and any other attitude would
be incomprehensible; there have been many sensational
stories written about what it was like, but obviously
when a man's dreams and life work have been shattered,
it is not an experience to be taken anything but greatly.

I told him then that history would treat him
more kindly than his contemporaries. He, being of a
more skeptical turn of mind than I, said it depended
entirely on who writes the history. (laughter).
I still believe that history will treat him more kindly
than his contemporaries.

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[L.C.]

He made many great mistakes in his handling of the Watergate situation and in his handling of many human beings. But I do not think he deserved this unremitting pursuit to which he was subjected, and, above all, leaving aside that historical event, I think, especially in the field with which I'm familiar, in the field of foreign policy, he made his decisions with great courage and with great fortitude and he created a framework which in its essence has lasted to this day, and for this he is deserved well of our country.

(Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, you have recently written: "President Reagan's landslide victory coincides with a period of extraordinary opportunity in American foreign policy." Actually, this President could go down as a "great president" if he can get through his second term without a crisis."

Dr. Kissinger, what specifically are the great opportunities facing President Reagan? And are you prepared to hazard a guess on the place of the present President in history?

DR. KISSINGER: President Reagan is a personality that drives intellectuals and writers up a wall. (Laughter/Applause).

-33-

[L.C.]

This is due to the fact that he operates very intuitively (laughter), and, nevertheless, the fact remains that in every political situation in which President Reagan has found himself, he emerged as the dominant figure. He dominated California politics for eight years, against all predictions, and he's dominated American national politics for 4-1/2 years, and I have noticed that many foreign leaders who used to tell jokes about how he read his remarks from cue cards are now coming to Washington to try to figure out how he does it. (laughter). So, I think President Reagan has an unusual opportunity, even in foreign policy.

I think, in domestic policy, he has already left a major mark in reversing trends of several decades. (Applause). In foreign policy, it now remains to be seen how he plays the very strong hand, which his own fortitude in his first term gave him, vis a vis the Soviet Union; when all the furor is over, I think we are in a very strong position.

In the Middle East, at the end of the day, we are the key element without which no significant breakthroughs are possible.

In Southeast Asia, the nations, the free nations there, are advancing; and China is moving in very unexpected

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[L.C.]

ways, towards an incentive system. So the overall international situation is favorable.

Now, whether he will go down as a great President or simply as a good President depends on how he plays that hand. But if you judge by the previous record, you would not bet against Reagan. (Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: Dr. Kissinger, you have been privileged to meet so many of the world's leaders who have shaped and molded our generation. You knew these personalities as few others did, some of the most powerful and influential people on this Planet called Earth.

Might you share with us your appraisal of a few world leaders: Golda Meir; Anwar Sadat; presently Izh-Hasad; Moshe Dayan; and Gromyko.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me begin with Golda Meir.

Golda Meir looked and acted like the "earth mother,"
and she treated me in public like her favorite nephew.
I must tell you, on the other hand, she was not a joy to
negotiate with. (laughter). She was a tough lady.
(Applause)! She knew that if Israel once got the
reputation of being easy to deal with, that the demands
would never stop. And, therefore, she made every
concession as difficult as she could, and I admired her
for it.

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[d]

At the same time, she fought with her Cabinet
once she was convinced of the necessity of acting,
with the same courage with which she confronted the
United States. She was a great lady! (Applause)!
And she did not try to maneuver for the next day's head-
lines. I was appreciative that she understood my
special problem, introduced by my origin. Somebody once
said to her, "What I don't like about Henry Kissinger
is that he's an American first, Secretary of State second
and a Jew third." She said, "That doesn't bother me.
I read from right to left." (an echoing laughter/Applause!)

<u>Sadat</u> — <u>Sadat</u> was a very remarkable man:
a very great man.

I must tell you, we did not take him very
seriously for a long time, we in Washington, because he
kept making what seemed to us grandiloquent statements on
which he never followed up. But he understood, he finally
understood, or maybe always understood -- at any rate,
at some point he understood that there could be no peace
unless there was trust; there could be no peace through
Russian military pressure; and that he required American
cooperation to achieve peace.

When I met him the first time, the Egyptian
Third Army was trapped, and everybody in the world was

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[LC]

saying Israel should withdraw ten miles and open up the
route to the Third Army, and he asked my opinion, and
I said, "Israel, by its domestic structure cannot
make two major withdrawals. If it withdraws now it
cannot make a withdrawal later. So I think, if you
want a disengagement agreement along the Suez Canal, we
should leave the situation as it is, and permit resupply
through U.N. checkpoints, and then let us see whether
we can get a disengagement agreement, and that will take
three months."

He had the courage -- he never met me and he
knew nothing about the Israelis -- He had the courage
to gamble on this, and it worked, and it was the
beginning of, it led to another agreement and eventually
to the peace agreement. Sadat had some 'mystical'
qualities. He was not very good at abstract conversation.
He was very good at making some key decisions. At one
point in the negotiation that I remember, the issue was:
how many tanks the Egyptians could put across the Suez
Canal after the agreement; and I don't think I'm telling
you any secrets when I tell you, the opening Israeli
position -- 'Israeli' caharacterized in those days by an
excess of generosity -- So I think they proposed something
like thirty.

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[L.C.]

And when I brought this to him, his military commanders had an absolute uproar; and he took me into another room and asked me whether I thought the Israelis meant it, and I had to tell him I thought he could do better; but it would take a long time.

So he said, "I'll accept it, because the issue is trust and whether I have 300 or 30, it doesn't really make all that much difference." Finally we settled on, I forget, 90, I think, and then he said, 'Now that I have established the principle, I won't put any tanks across the Suez Canal, in order to establish the right climate.'

He was a very great man but too far ahead of his time, but one of the really great people that I have met.

Hasad — Hasad, quite different. Tough, calculating, very witty, absolutely ruthless, one of the most brilliant leaders I met, but where Sadat had a great historic vision, Hasad has primarily a tactical vision, geared to Syrian national requirements.

It was maddening to negotiate with Hasad. I told Hasad once that I had seen negotiators who went to the edge of the precipice; I'd seen even negotiators who put one foot across the precipice to show how tough

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[Lc]

they were. He was the only one that I knew who jumped
into the precipice hoping there'd be a treee there to
break his fall. But I will say this for him. The
agreement that was negotiated in 1974 between Syria and
Israel on the Golan Heights has been meticulously kept
to this day and it is a very complicated agreement
because it requires the positioning of forces in such
a way that they cannot reach the front line of the other
and it meant separate agreements for every separate
weapon, and I think the Israelis will tell you that it
has not been violated in the 11 years of its existence.
Hasad, in my view, wants Syrian hegemony in the Arab
world, or he identifies Arab unity with Syrian leadership.
I do not think it's possible to do with Hasad what was
possible with Sadat. I do believe, however, that it is
possible with Hasad to make arrangements that appear
to be military rather than political, and partial rather
than total, and that for interim periods. That is not a
bad achievement but it will be very, very difficult
and he is a very tough customer and he will never be
impressed by demonstrations of weakness and, therefore,
the outcome of Lebanon does not help Israeli relations
with Syria.

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[L]

Now, Gromyko. Gromyoko had survived for thirty years in the Soviet hierarchy and he's been a member of the Polit Bureau only for the last 13 years. That means he survived for about 20 years by being only Foreign Minister and not part of the top political leadership group. Now, how do you survive in a bureaucracy?

In general, in a bureaucracy, you never get penalized for not foreseeing an opportunity, because nobody can ever prove that the opportunity existed. But you'd certainly get penalized if something bad happens that you didn't foresee and against which you didn't want. Now, nothing has happened in the Soviet Union for 30 years against which he did not want. He is one of the great nit-pickers of the modern period. He is an expert at the detailed negotiation. He's always well-prepared, by Soviet standards, which I admit are not the highest in the world; reasonably reliable, that is, you can usually count on what he tells you; he is not a man of sweeping imagination. I do not think that breakthroughs when they occur will be designed by the Soviet Foreign Office or by the Soviet Foreign Minister. He will meticulously carry out the instructions he receives and in the process he will drive a succession of American Secretaries of State to the edge of nervous

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[c]

exhaustion. (laughter).

One reason why he is not a good negotiating partner in the Middle East is because one of his negotiating methods or his key negotiating method is to come up with some document that has five principles, ten subprinciples, thirty additional points, and then schlog his way through them, day after weary day, until when he deals with a westerner, people say: for G-d's sake, give him this point already! And you do this for a period of months and he accumulates quite a few seedling nuances.

In the Middle East, where people are more passionate, and the margin of survival is narrower, that sort of frustration can lead to an explosion or, at a minimum to a stalemate. So I have great respect for Gromyko as a technician but I don't think the key to peace will be found in his office. (Applause).

RABBI KAHANE: Let us all remain in our seats. It is our custom to conclude at ten o'clock. I know I speak for everyone here, Dr. Kissinger, in expressing our gratitude and appreciation for your presentation, and we all regard you truly as a giant-among-men, one of the towering personalities of our age.

While it is a custom of Jewish Town Hall never

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[LC]

to have a speaker more than once, in order to get a
diversity of opinion, we do hope that you will join us
in the future so that we can once again become the
beneficiaries of your fine thinking. (Applause)!

We wish to acknowledge the presence of Mrs.
Nancy Kissinger. (Applause)!

We will all remain in our seats until those
on the pulpit will reach the rear of the synagogue.

This is the third in our *Jewish Town Hall*,
which, as we know, is the concluding lecture of this
season. We want to express firstly our gratitude to
the benefactors of the series, Kenneth and Lucille
Gladstone. (Applause)!

We thank the mass media, TV, radio and the
newspaper reporters, who have helped bring our message
to every corner of the globe. And as we know, it is
our practice to conclude the series by joining together
in the chanting of the Y'aitz Ch'aim prayer. As we see
on our Ark, this is the very motto of our synagogue.
For those who know the Hebrew, know that it might be a
mistaken nomenclature. "y'aitz" is singular, 'ch'aim'
is plural: a tree of lives; it should be Y'aitz Kh'ai,
and the *Talmud* tells us: Torah has the unique capacity
to be alive everywhere. Some trees can only flourish in

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warm climates, others in cold climates. The wisdom of
our people can flourish everywhere. If we need proof
for this, I believe Jewish Town Hall is the finest
example. When we started the series there were many
who were skeptical about its ultimate success. Just
this very season we have had, conceivably, close to
fifteen thousand in attendance. The tapes and the
transcripts have been sent to colleges and universities
throughout the world. They have become courses at
leading universities and adult education classes.
And, therefore, as the Cantor will lead us in the
chanting of the Y'aitz Ch'aim, we once again renew our
pledge of loyalty to G*d's Torah.

Let us rise.

(With the conclusion of the Congregation's
prayer, the forum adjourned at ten o'clock p.m. on
Monday evening, June 3, 1985: 14 Sivan 5745).

[L.C.]

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