Cyt

# THE ATLANTIC WORLD, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

## INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

### Need for a Settlement in Europe

Twenty-four years after the close of World War II the confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union over a divided Europe still remains the single most serious threat to world peace. The failure to settle the major political issues of that war, principally the status of Germany, has led the two great nuclear powers to concentrate their military forces in the center of Europe to back up an uneasy *status quo*. For a generation the division of Europe into two military alliances and political blocs has created an environment in which both the NATO and Warsaw Pact powers have exercised sufficient restraint to avoid large scale war. But the Panel does not believe that the *status quo* in Europe is either stable or satisfactory. Indeed, the very concept that there is a *status quo* is deceptive. Great changes are taking place in both halves of Europe and in their relations to the two Great Powers which make it essential to re-examine the goals and premises of present U.S. policy towards Europe and to inquire whether new political, military, and economic relationships are needed to meet the emerging problems of the next generation.

The Panel believes that the time has come for the United States to make the promotion of a European settlement a matter of the highest priority.

As the recent surprise invasion of Czechoslovakia reminds us, the danger of war in Europe through miscalculation is still great. The tension over Europe still accounts for the principal military commitments of the two great nuclear powers including not only the divisions located on the continent

- 2 -

but the intercontinental nuclear delivery systems deployed in the United
States and the USSR as well. The prevention of the spread of nuclear
weapons to other countries for deployment in other areas of tension ultimately
requires ending the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race. Substantial progress on
this, however, depends upon the development of an alternative security system
in Europe.

Moreover, the very political and economic changes in both halves of the
continent, which, in the view of the Panel, now open the way towards a
European settlement, also pose dangers to the stability of the industrialized
world if the countries concerned do not evolve a rational policy to deal with
them. The Panel does not believe that we can count on drifting into better
arrangements for Europe. A security system within which we can make progress
on the problems of divided Europe and the principal tensions of the cold war
will require facing up to crucial and difficult decisions. These decisions
cannot be safely postponed.

The Panel believes that relations among the nations of Western Europe
and the United States should be re-examined in the light of the possibilities
for a settlement in Europe. The moves toward economic integration in Europe
have constituted a major achievement of the twentieth century. The economic
and political cooperation of the advanced industrial nations, including such
ancient enemies as France and Germany, has been an important positive develop-
ment. It is vital that the basis for close cooperation be continued and
strengthened.

We believe, however, that such cooperation among the NATO countries was
never an end in itself. A united West confronting a divided Europe and a
chaotic world beyond offers neither security nor the opportunity to attack

- 3 -

the major human problems of the century. Today, more than ever before,
the unity of these nations which comprise what some have called the "Atlantic
Community" can contribute to world peace and stability only if it ultimately
leads to a wider community among nations. Any attempt to unify and keep
secure the Atlantic nations as an island in the midst of widespread misery
would be unworthy of the effort and would be bound to fail.

Moreover, the Panel believes that unless the efforts of the Atlantic
nations are directed more actively towards the achievement of wider
community and towards the relation of problems beyond those which immediately
affect relationships within the West, the NATO nations will continue to
drift apart. Many of the problems of greatest concern to the members of the
alliance, notably the achievement of greater security in Europe and progress
towards the solution of the German problem, cannot be solved within NATO.
If the existing structures for cooperation within the NATO alliance do not
hold out prospect for the solution of the principal problems of interest to
the members, then we must expect that these countries sooner or later will
try other approaches outside of the alliance. The Panel believes that in
order to avoid the dangers of competitive nationalism and divisiveness, the
NATO nations should immediately set as a first priority for the alliance the
development of a common understanding and common approaches for the negotiation
of a European settlement.

## A Changed Europe

There are three essential elements of a European settlement: First,
the establishment of clearly defined, appropriate relationships of the
United States and the Soviet Union to the continent, particularly with
respect to the maintenance of military security. Second, a framework within

which progress towards a satisfactory solution of the problems of divided
Germany and Berlin can be made. Third, arrangements which will improve
military security on the continent and will minimize the possibility that
one nation or group can achieve a significant military advantage over
another.

The Panel believes that merely continuing present policies will not
achieve any of these essential elements of a settlement. It has been
clear for several years that the responsibility which the United States
assumed right after the Second World War for the security and economic
recovery of non-communist Europe is no longer necessary nor welcome. The
United States must continue to exercise certain responsibilities towards
Europe, but these must change with the times.

Europe has recovered economically beyond the most optimistic expectations
of the early postwar planners. Despite heightened anxiety arising from the
inexcusable Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the NATO nations rate the
likelihood of a Soviet military attack on themselves as improbable. Thus
the sense of common danger, which brought the alliance to life twenty years
ago, is not strong enough to keep it vital. The recovery of national
economies and the growing disbelief in the Soviet attack on Western Europe
against which the alliance was formed have encouraged a resurgence of national
independence. France, which has ceased all significant cooperation with
NATO but still claims its protection, has attacked U.S. "hegemony" on the
continent. Other NATO countries, while far more circumspect in their
opposition, have also expressed concern at the extent of U.S. political
and economic influence in West Europe. The United States, sensing the
desire of the nations of West Europe to play a more independent role in

- 5 -

questions of European security and world politics, has encouraged NATO countries to take more initiative in these matters. But just as the West European nations resent U.S. domination, they fear U.S. abandonment. Because of its overwhelming economic and military power the United States must take the lead in defining and communicating its own goals with respect to a European settlement before the European governments are likely to devote the energy necessary to develop concrete proposals for new security arrangements.

In Eastern Europe, too, great changes have occurred since the birth of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The members of the Soviet-dominated alliance have been struggling to achieve a level of independence. While the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dramatized the limits of change, it is clear that the nations of Eastern Europe have achieved a degree of economic recovery and political identity which would have been unthinkable a few years ago. The efforts of such nations as Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to establish closer economic and political relations with the West, including the ancient enemy West Germany, has further eroded the tight Soviet control of East Europe's characteristic of Stalin's day. It seems increasingly evident that the Warsaw Pact, never much more than an institution for maintaining Soviet control of the defense of Eastern Europe and the approaches to the Soviet Union, is as obsolete as NATO. Neither alliance in its present form can meet the primary needs of its members. Neither now looks like the best conceivable arrangement for avoiding war. Neither can hope to offer protection against devastation in the event of war. Neither can hope to amass sufficient power to negotiate a European settlement on its own terms.

- 6 -

The awareness that the world has changed radically since 1949 has encouraged an interest in detente in both East and West. Despite the grave complication of the Vietnam War, which has shaken the confidence of the NATO allies in American leadership and has set definite limits on Soviet initiatives towards detente, and the Czech invasion, which has revived some old fears, there is an emerging consensus in Europe that it may now be possible once peace in Vietnam is restored to move towards a solution of the major political problems arising out of the last war. The challenge facing the United States, the Soviet Union, and the nations of Europe is to devise an approach to a settlement that will not only resolve the problems left over from the last generation, but will also confront the problems of the next generation.

## New Priorities for NATO

NATO has declined as a vital institution because its members sense its irrelevancy to the crisis of the late 1960's. Proposals for the reconstruction of NATO with a view to the promotion of a European settlement must therefore take account of the staggering problems besetting human society as we prepare to enter a new millennium. The NATO nations represent the largest aggregation of wealth and power in history. An important goal of any new security arrangements or political relationships should be the release of these resources to deal with two sets of challenges: The crises of the industrialized world and the crises of underdevelopment.

The United States and the NATO allies have paid dearly for their present security arrangements. In the last nine years the NATO countries have spent approximately $624,717,738,000 on armaments. In the same period serious

- 7 -

problems arising within their societies have been slighted because the
military and political confrontation absorbed their energy and resources.

Affluent societies have created a new set of expectations for their people but have fallen short in fulfilling them. The abundant economies have promised the abolition of poverty. But the poverty that remains can no longer be hidden nor adequately explained and is a source of explosive discontent. The modern democratic state has promised more freedom, yet their people feel stifled by increasingly centralized bureaucracies. A significant segment of the next generation senses the loss of individualism most keenly. Raised on a democratic tradition and a rhetoric of freedom, the youth of advanced countries are increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of life in the modern affluent society. They have challenged its authority structures--the police, the military, the university, even the state itself--because they have failed to deliver on their promises to create and administer the just society. Similar stirrings are taking place in the Soviet Union and the communist world.

There is an urgent need for innovation of political forms to fulfill the economic and political expectations of people who have yet to share either the fruits of abundance or the fruits of democracy; the legitimacy and hence the security of the modern state depends upon how well it can meet the psychological, social, and political--as well as economic--needs of its people.

Nor has the modern democratic state been able adequately to manage its technology. Cities are decaying. Highways are glutted. Education is inadequate. Managerial skill is lacking. Air and water are polluted. We know that we are robbing the next generation of essential resources, yet

- 8 -

so far we are powerless to stop. Thus the Panel believes that the problems
of development within what we have perhaps been too quick to call "the
developed world" are absolutely pressing, so pressing indeed, that we can
no longer afford the major military expenditures that we have borne for
a generation. The present serious political and social problems in the
United States are evidence enough that even the most powerful nation
cannot maintain a mammoth military establishment and at the same time give
adequate attention to the development of its own society.

As critical as are the crises of the industrialized world, those of
the non-industrialized world are even more urgent. The decolonization of
the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America will probably be recorded
as the major event of this generation. It has been accompanied by civil
strife, competitive intervention by large powers, and accelerating misery.
The economic gap between the rich and poor countries is widening. For the
many countries with expanding populations and bare subsistence economies,
this is literally a death sentence for millions of their people. The Panel
believes that the prospect of mass starvation, political oppression, and
violent revolution in the shadow of a continuing nuclear arms race, is the
Number One security problem of the next generation.

We have tended to view the problem of development primarily from the
perspective of the Cold War, i.e. whether one nation or another might exploit
the chaos of the underdeveloped regions for its own purposes. But the world
can no longer afford a power struggle over the former colonial world. The
urgent need is for a cooperative struggle to help them liberate themselves
from the effects of outmoded political structures and feeble economies. The
Panel believes that it is vital to the long range interests of the United

- 9 -

States and the developed nations of Europe, including the Soviet Union, to
solve the immensely difficult problems involved in transferring technology,
managerial skill, and capital from the developed to the underdeveloped world
without compromising the independence of the weak. If the developed nations
are to find security, it is essential to reverse the present dangerous
trends which threaten to keep major portions of the globe in a high state
of tension and dispair. We have not yet developed adequate institutions
for promoting development. This extraordinarily difficult task will be
accomplished only by imaginative innovations in present policies of inter-
national trade, finance, education, and aid. The Panel believes that a
principal purpose of a European settlement and reduction of the major tensions
of the Cold War is to create a political environment in which it will become
possible to mount a cooperative assault on the towering problems now
threatening to overwhelm the next generation.

ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT

Redefining the U.S. Relationship to Europe

For twenty years U.S. relations with Europe have rested on a series
of explicit premises. Any approach to a settlement must determine whether
these premises are still valid (or in some cases ever were) and, if valid,
whether alternative security arrangements are consistent with them. The
basic premises were that unity of the North Atlantic countries was essential
to discourage Soviet military aggression against the West, that the building
of NATO strength offered a real hope, and the only one, of reuniting Germany
within the West, that the United States could build an effective Atlantic

- 10 -

Community through political consultation and economic cooperation, and
that Soviet ideological and political control of East Europe was complete
and irreversible.

We know now that the unity of the Atlantic nations was always incomplete;
the emergence of separate interests and priorities among the members occurred
at the very beginning of the alliance and have become more visible as the
sense of common peril has become less acute.

It now appears that the nation still commands the most powerful loyalties.
This is not really surprising, nor need it be discouraging to the search for
peace and world order. It means only that the security arrangements we seek
to build must be consistent with this reality. The faith of the late forties
that regional integration held the prospect of European unity and security has
proved to be overly optimistic.

The military function of the NATO alliance has been to insure against
possible temptation to aggression by counterbalancing Soviet military power
in Europe. Whatever were the real risks of Soviet invasion of Germany in
the late 1940's, that has been a remote threat for many years. But it is
equally clear that whatever strength and unity NATO can muster, it will be
insufficient to force the Soviet Union to permit the reunification of Germany
on western terms, or, indeed, to remove their troops from Czechoslovakia.

The assumption that Eastern Europe was a monolithic Soviet empire has
been revised to take account of the significant moves towards liberalization
and greater independence in that region as well as the loss of Soviet claim
to exclusive ideological leadership of the world communist movement. The
net effect of these changes has been to reduce the cohesion of both blocs
and to heighten interest in detente.

- 20 -

revolutionary activity in France and West Germany is part of a consistent pattern; the Kremlin has normally opposed the overthrow of established governments by radical movements except where it has been in a position to install a communist government with its own army, as in Eastern Europe. There is nothing to suggest that the Soviet Union now has either the hope or the interest of coercing Western Europe by force of arms into accepting communist governments. On the other hand, a substantial military imbalance in Europe unfavorable to the West could conceivably tempt the Soviet Union to press its advantage and to extend its sphere of influence by force. That, at least, is the only prudent assumption on which to plan for security.

It has been Soviet policy for a generation to seek the dissolution of the NATO alliance not so much because they actually feared an attack (although the fear inspired by German rearmament was deep) but because the very aggregation of such vast power in a tightly knit alliance was itself felt to be a threat. Just as the West was alarmed by the presence of Soviet armies on the periphery of a war-weakened and defenseless West Europe, so the Soviets have viewed as a threat aimed at them an alliance comprising the world's most advanced and productive nations, among them their mortal enemy of the Second World War. Although the Soviets fear a tight hostile alliance centered in a close U.S.-West German collaboration, they would also be concerned about a total withdrawal of U.S. power from the continent which would leave West Germany free to act alone. An alternative security arrangement in Europe must take account of these deep-seated Soviet security concerns.

It is the Panel's view that the invasion of Czechoslovakia makes it more urgent than ever to find such alternative security arrangements. Although the deployment of Soviet troops on the Czech-West German border

- 21 -

marginally improves Soviet offensive capabilities against NATO, the invasion, in the Panel's view, stems from defensive concerns with Soviet security rather than increased aggressive intentions towards the West. In Soviet eyes, the recent diplomatic initiatives of the West German government to build closer relationships to the countries of East Europe and the Czech governments' readiness to explore economic relations with the West threatened continued Soviet control of the area. Against a background of a world-wide ideological challenge to Soviet leadership, a liberalization process in Czechoslovakia that had run far ahead of Kremlin directives appeared to undermine the Soviet security system in the vital approaches to Russia itself.

The Panel believes that there can be no lasting security in Europe until the aspirations for freedom of the Czechs and others are fulfilled. One of the prime purposes of an alternative security system would be to create a political climate in which no nation would feel threatened by the growth of freedom in another. There is a rational prospect that if Soviet security concerns in Europe were relieved, specifically, if arrangements were made under which the fear of West Germany were reduced, the Kremlin might tolerate greater liberalization in Eastern Europe. It must be pointed out, however, that the fast moving events in Czechoslovakia may have also posed an internal security problem for the Soviet leadership. While the Soviet Communist Party in recent years has appeared more ready to accept liberalization in other communist countries and cautiously to promote it within the Soviet Union itself, the fear that these developments might move so fast as to endanger their control of their own population may

- 22 -

well have been a factor in their behavior. The August 1968 invasion was a desperate act which has cost the Soviets heavily in prestige around the world especially within the communist movement. Conscious of the costs of the Hungarian invasion of 1956, the Soviets must have foreseen this result and concluded that the risks of inaction were too great. The same panic among Soviet leadership that prompted the invasion is likely to cause them to view any proposal for an alternative security arrangement with great suspicion. Yet it seems also true that important segments of Soviet leadership would like to reduce the tension over Europe and thereby make it possible to divert resources from the military competition to the vital task of political and economic reconstruction of the Soviet Union.

The Panel believes that it may now be possible to devise arrangements that will satisfy legitimate Soviet security concerns and at the same time improve the security of the West. We are confident that the NATO nations can advance concrete proposals in their common interests without misleading the Soviets or anyone else as to their outrage and concern over Soviet behavior in Czechoslovakia.

- 23 -

The Future of Germany

We believe that the German problem can be moved towards solution only
in the framework of a European security arrangement. Since 1961 a number
of developments have occurred which in our view make the _status quo_ less
satisfactory but also improve the prospects of a settlement. First,
although the Berlin Wall is an ugly symbol of the human tragedy of a di-
vided Germany, by halting the mass emigration of earlier years, it has per-
mitted the remarkable economic recovery of East Germany. Today the Democratic
Republic of Germany ranks ninth among the industrial nations of the world in
productivity. The recovery of East Germany with the consequent rise in the
morale of her people has brought stability to the regime. While the Ul-
bricht government has a deplorable record on civil liberties and shows no
inclination to liberalize its rule as some other communist regimes of Eastern
Europe have done, it has gained in confidence and strength to a point where
it can deal with the Federal Republic on a basis at least approaching equal-
ity.

Second, most political leaders in West Germany have come to accept the
fact that reunification of Germany followed by its integration into the West
is not going to happen, for the Soviets have strong incentives not to permit
it and the West lacks the power to compel it. The only hope for reunification
is through an evolutionary process. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has tem-
porarily stalled progress on talks at the ministerial level between the two
German governments on economic and cultural matters of mutual concern, which
were about to begin. But the common interest in moving towards a normaliza-
tion of relations remains.

Third, the Federal Republic has revised its earlier policy of non-recog-

- 24 -

nition of the East European communist regimes and has developed closer rela-
tions with certain Warsaw Pact countries. While the new German foreign poli-
cy has reduced tensions between the Federal Republic and such countries as
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland, the attempt to "build bridges" to the
East has recently aroused Soviet anxieties and a hostile reaction. Further
significant progress towards the normalization of relations between West
Germany and Eastern Europe depends upon a reduction of tension between the
Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.

Fourth, although the Soviets have not fomented any major crisis over
Berlin since 1962, morale in West Berlin has suffered, and young people are
leaving.

In summary, the Panel believes that these developments affecting the
two Germanies have created a new situation in Europe requiring constructive
initiatives from the West. Changing attitudes within both the NATO and
Warsaw Pact countries make new coordinated approaches to the German problem
and European security not only possible but, in our view, essential. The
present atmosphere of drift, with the United States preoccupied in Asia,
the Soviet Union hard pressed to hold together its postwar empire, France
committed to a revival of nationalism, and Germany disillusioned with achiev-
ing reunification through NATO, is a dangerous situation which one nation or
another might be tempted to exploit to its own advantage.

The Panel believes that the only road to a German settlement is a step
by step reconciliation between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic
Republic. The process can develop through a broadening of contacts in the
fields of education, culture, trade, science, technology and other areas
with the greatest possibility for improving the quality of life for the

- 25 -

entire German people. We do not believe that this road is a short one; the
distrust of a generation is not overcome easily. While some have argued that
the process may take another generation, we do not believe that the pace of
reconciliation can be adequately predicted. Developments such as the Czech
invasion will retard it. Each successful relationship established will speed
it up. It is not necessary to establish either time limits or overly con-
crete expectations. The task is rather to develop a framework which will en-
courage as rapid progress as possible but will permit flexible adjustment to
political realities as they evolve.

The starting point in any such process is a joint recognition by the na-
tions of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts and, specifically, the two German govern-
ments themselves, that the present demarcation between the Federal Republic
and the German Democratic Republic is provisional, and that its ultimate
juridical status will be determined by direct negotiations between the two
German governments subject to the final approval of the Four Powers respon-
sible for a German peace treaty under the Potsdam Agreements of 1945, the
United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

Essential to this approach is an acceptance by the two German govern-
ments of the present de facto German-Polish frontier, the Oder-Neisse line.
Within a framework leading to acceptable relations between the two German
governments the principal West German objection to recognition of the Oder-
Neisse line would disappear; acceptance of the de facto frontier has been
deferred primarily as a bargaining point to be used in just such negotia-
tions.

The precise constitutional nature of the new German relationship cannot
be determined in advance of the negotiations itself. There have been a num-

- 26 -

ber of proposals for a confederation of the two Germanies, and that may well
be an accurate description of the relationship that would emerge. But the
difficult task of the negotiators will be to spell out specific arrangements
between the two Germanies on such questions as currency, legal reciprocity,
and travel. The German negotiators should report regularly on their pro-
gress to the Four Powers.

An important element in any such negotiations is the status of Berlin.
The Panel believes that although the former German capital is still under
occupation status, the Four Powers should, without, of course, renouncing
such status, encourage the two German governments to negotiate the question
of guaranteed access to both parts of the city for all Germans as well as
other issues related to Berlin that have been a source of tension. Later
in this Report the possibility of a UN role in Berlin is discussed.

## Security Requirements for the 1970's

The quest for security is the chief incentive for striving for a
European settlement, but it is also the chief obstacle to achieving it. To
reduce tension over the continent and to avoid such crises as the Berlin
blockade and periodic Soviet threats to interfere with Western access to
Berlin are clearly important goals for the United States and its allies. To
prevent West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons, forging a tight alliance
with the United States, and amassing sufficient power to threaten Soviet
interests in Eastern Europe are primary Soviet goals. Progress towards a
European settlement would help both sides achieve these important security
objectives. However, in the present atmosphere of distrust, each nation will
carefully weigh the risks entailed in any proposal for altering the present
military environment.

- 27 -

The Panel notes that the NATO nations in the past have resisted proposals for arms control or military disengagement in Europe because such proposals appeared to offer less security than existing military arrangements.
We believe that the time has now come to re-examine the security requirements of the United States and its allies to determine the circumstances under which a European security system in which the nations of East and West both participated would assure greater security than the present confrontation of rival alliances.

Such a reexamination should begin with a reassessment of the very concept of security itself. The Panel believes that we have tended too much to equate armament and security. A fundamental development of the postwar period has been the diminishing utility of military power for achieving national objectives. Despite the possession of the greatest arsenal in history, American society could be utterly destroyed should the Soviet Union ever make the irrational decision to launch a nuclear war. Thus nuclear weapons can serve no other national purpose than to deter others from using them. Despite the launching of a major military campaign in Vietnam at a cost of over $100 billion, the United States has been unable to achieve its political objectives there. The same paradox applies to the Soviet Union. At a time when its military power is at a peak, its own sense of security appears to be declining. The application of military power to the Czech political crisis has further undermined the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and beyond. Neither the military effort in Vietnam nor in Czechoslovakia will settle the political unrest that occasioned its use. Increasingly, when Great Powers resort to such military operations, they reveal their weakness rather than their strength.

- 28 -

The overemphasis of the military aspect has weakened other important bases of national security. One is economic health. No nation can afford to neglect adequate investment in its own society without undermining its security. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, in the Panel's view, have suffered adverse internal effects from their investments in the arms race. These investments include not only money but time, talent, and energy needed for the solution of the urgent problems of industrialized societies. International peace and unity, which are obviously indispensable to national security, require a rational allocation of resources.

It is becoming clearer, in our view, that the Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in limiting and eventually ending the arms race. The limited nuclear test ban, the agreements against nuclear weapons in orbit, and the non-proliferation treaty are steps in this direction. The most hopeful initiative in many years are the proposed U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks on limiting offensive and defensive missiles. The Panel believes that despite the adverse impact of the Czech crisis on U.S.-Soviet relations, it is in the interests of the U.S. that these talks proceed as soon as possible. Progress on the U.S.-Soviet intercontinental arms race would, in our view, ease the security problems of both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and would improve the climate for negotiation of a European settlement.

The NATO nations have several specific security objectives in Europe. Most of them are related to the diminution or the elimination of a specific Soviet military capability. The concentration of Soviet divisions in forward positions in Eastern Europe sustains the fear that, despite their apparent lack of intention to do so as well as the great risks involved, the Soviets might under certain circumstances launch an invasion of West Germany. Agree-

- 29 -

ments between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries regulating troop levels and deployment could, by limiting capabilities for an attack, provide mutual reassurance that no such attack would occur.

The Soviet Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile force targeted on the principal cities of West Europe is another major military threat that could be reduced through negotiations.

The Czech invasion dramatized the fact that surprise military operations can be carried out under the cover of ordinary maneuvers. Agreements for observer teams to monitor maneuvers and large troop movements and overlapping radar screens to provide warning of surprise air attack could increase security on both sides.

Agreements not to deploy foreign troops in certain areas of Europe might also restore some of the confidence that was shaken by the Czech invasion. The Panel believes that an effort should be made, within the context of the European security proposals outlined in the Report, to negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union for the permanent removal of Soviet occupation troops from East Europe (other than Germany) in exchange for a U.S. undertaking not to deploy combat troops in Latin America.

The principal Soviet security interest centers on Germany. In the military sphere their paramount concern is preventing the Federal Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons. Their primary political objective with respect to West Germany is to discourage the rise of nationalist forces which might pursue a provocative policy towards East Germany. To the Soviets, the most plausible spark of a major war in Europe is a West German intervention in the event of an uprising in East Germany. It would seem that the Soviets would be willing to alleviate certain security concerns of the West in return for

- 30 -

agreements restricting German acquisition of nuclear weapons and renouncing
the use of force to change the present borders of East Germany. Although the
Germans are already under treaty obligations with respect to nuclear weapons
and have made unilateral declarations not to use force to alter present fron-
tiers, the Soviets would, in our view, derive increased confidence if such
obligations were integrated into a European security system all members of
which, including the Soviet Union, shared enforcement responsibilities.

The Panel believes that the agreements discussed above could be appro-
priately negotiated in a European Security Commission which would include an
agreed number of member states from the NATO and Warsaw Pact organizations
including the Four Powers and the two German governments. The final sec-
tion of this Report outlines a framework for negotiations for such a Euro-
pean Security Commission.

An essential agreement to be negotiated within the European Security
Commission would be a collective security treaty under which the member
nations, including specifically the United States and the Soviet Union, would
pledge themselves to come to the aid of any victim of aggression on the con-
tinent. Thus the principal functions of the two rival defense organizations
would eventually devolve upon a single European-wide security organization
aimed at no single enemy but at potential disturbers of the peace from either
East or West.

In such an arrangement, the Panel believes that European forces other
than those of the Soviet Union should play a more prominent role, although
U.S. forces should continue to be deployed on the continent for the forsee-
able future. Integrated into the European security system, such forces would
symbolize the U.S. commitment to guarantee the collective security arrange-

- 31 -

ment. The assumption of greater defense responsibilities by the European nations themselves and progress towards negotiated limitations of troop strength in the European Security Commission would, in our view, make it possible eventually for the U.S. to effect substantial reductions of its forces on the continent. But such troop reductions should reflect the improved security climate. Disengagement of U.S. forces other than in the context of an alternative security arrangement should normally be avoided since the NATO nations regard U.S. troop withdrawals as a symbol of declining U.S. commitment to European security.

How fast U.S. troops might be withdrawn to the United States and in what numbers depends in our view upon two developments. The first is the nature of the evolving military environment. The greater progress on arms control and negotiated reductions the European Security Commission is able to make, the more all members, including the United States, can cut their military contributions. Technological advances, including improved airlift capabilities, will also play a role in determining the number of U.S. troops that should remain in Europe.

Of even greater importance in determining the composition of future defense forces in Europe, however, will be new perceptions of security requirements. The Panel expects that if a European Security Commission begins to operate effectively and progress is made on both arms control matters and the German problem, the security issue will come to look very different to the nations of Europe from what it is today. Some of the heroic dilemmas that have beset NATO from the start will begin to disappear as the confrontation eases. As long as NATO planning has centered on resisting a massive Soviet invasion, the strategy has raised hypothetical questions for which there is no satisfactory answer. No combination of American declarations or troop

- 32 -

deployments can fully satisfy anxious Europeans as to the reliability of the U.S. commitment when the fulfillment of that commitment would almost surely result in a devastating Soviet nuclear attack on continental United States. No arrangements for consultation among allies nor device for symbolic cooperation such as the once proposed Multilateral Force can satisfactorily solve the conflicts surrounding nuclear weapons within NATO, for these conflicts are inherent in the political relationships. The United States is the only NATO country with a nuclear force that can match the Soviet force. Despite its clear commitment to European security, the United States has its own interests and priorities and has no intention of relinquishing or sharing the final authority to determine when its nuclear force shall be used. If the security climate in Europe improves as a result of East-West agreements, some of the insoluble questions that have divided NATO will look increasingly obsolete, and the elusive answers for which the NATO countries have been searching will seem increasingly irrelevant.

A true security community is one in which no nation feels the need to arm against the other. It would be a long time before such a community can be achieved in a reunited Europe. But important steps can be taken in that direction by developing a less threatening military environment on both sides and by opening up the possibility of closer cooperation in non-military areas among the nations of both halves of Europe.

## THE ROLE OF THE U.N. IN A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

While the North Atlantic Treaty was always intended to operate within the framework of the United Nations and derived its legal basis from Article 51 of the Charter, for practical purposes NATO has been viewed as a substitute for the U.N. with respect to European security. NATO was organized because of the fear that a Soviet veto in the U.N. would immobilize any de-

- 33 -

fensive action the nations of West Europe might seek to take through the world
organization.

As NATO developed, a faith in regionalism as the most effective approach
to security developed with it. Until the serious strains of the last few
years appeared in the alliance, it was the policy of the NATO nations to
promote regionalism as the principal approach to world security. The basic
assumptions were that while the individual nation was too small and weak to
play an independent role in bringing order and stability to international re-
lations, the UN embraced such hostile forces within it that it could not act.
Thus a group of nations bound by a common historical tradition and cultural
heritage, common economic interests, and geographical proximity appeared to
constitute the most effective international unit for achieving security. Af-
ter an effort of twenty years, it has become clear, in the Panel's view, that
while regional organizations have played a useful role, they have fallen con-
siderably short of earlier expectations and hopes. NATO has been unable to
settle diplomatic disputes between Greece and Turkey, two members of the al-
liance. It has been unable to discourage the rise of national feeling in West
Europe; the hope that West Germany because of its dependence upon the other
Atlantic nations for economic and security needs would subordinate German
nationalism to a new regional allegiance has not been fulfilled. The belief
that political, economic, and military integration on a regional basis would
be mutually reinforcing has also given way to a more complicated reality. It
has turned out that there may be strong incentives among members of a region-
al community for economic cooperation at the same time their interest in
military cooperation flags. Finally, the assumption that a tightly organized
regional organization could act in concert outside the region overlooked the

- 34 -

fact that the United States has assumed global interests and commitments which
the other NATO nations do not and cannot share.

The effort to promote regionalism among the North Atlantic nations has
yielded important supra-national institutions such as the Common Market,
the European Coal and Steel Community and the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development. The military integration and cooperation achieved
in NATO has been an impressive development. We do not denigrate the remark-
able achievements of the last generation in pointing out the need to develop
new approaches for the next. The Panel believes that we must now recognize
the limits of regional organizations in solving the crucial problems of a
world in which the technology of transportation and communication is making
geographical proximity far less significant.

For these reasons, the Panel recommends that the development of a regional security system embracing both halves of Europe be integrated as closely as possible with the security concerns of the rest of mankind through the United Nations. It is our view that the process of negotiation for a European security arrangement, including a framework for progress on a German settlement, should from the start establish a relationship with the United Nations. Such a commitment by the most powerful developed nations will lend needed strength to the world organization. Because of the importance of the European security issue to world peace, the European Security Commission should undertake to report regularly to the United Nations on its progress. We believe that the facilities of the United Nations could also be useful at the outset in providing a forum for consultation on some of the critical procedural decisions which must be made before a satisfactory framework for negotiation can be established. Increased consultation of the NATO countries within the U.N. setting, for example, could help to

- 35 -

achieve mutual agreement and understanding for distinguishing those issues
which are appropriate to U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiation and those which
require consultation in the West in advance of discussions with the Warsaw
Pact countries.

The United Nations could also serve as a forum for developing closer
economic and social ties between the two halves of divided Europe. While
the NATO structure itself, especially the North Atlantic Council, should be
used more than it has been used to discuss approaches to East-West detente,
there are inherent limitations in relying on the NATO machinery for this
purpose, since its primary function is military defense against the Soviet
Union. While the situation in our view does require simultaneous planning
for defense and planning for detente, the two functions are difficult to
carry out in the same organization.

New initiatives for detente are appropriate matters for consultation
and negotiation within the United Nations. Indeed, this process is already
well under way. The nations of Eastern Europe have used their membership
in the United Nations to promote better relations with western and neutral
European countries. Thus Romania in 1961 took the initiative for a UN
agenda item calling for "actions on a regional level with a view to improv-
ing good neighborly relations having different social and political systems."
The sponsors of this resolution, which was passed in 1965, include Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Romania, Sweden, and Yugosla-
via. This so-called "Group of Nine" has been meeting regularly ever since
to examine ways of promoting East-West relationships. The Panel believes that
the activities of this group, many of whom represent nations with the greatest
interest in loosening the two blocs and promoting detente, should be intensi-
fied and that it be asked by the United Nations to provide ideas and proposals

- 35 -

- 36 -

for consideration by the proposed European Security Commission.

One useful initiative which the Group might take would be the planning of an East-West Institute devoted to studying the technical, political, and economic obstacles to closer relationships between nations with different economic and political systems. The Institute might, for example, sponsor studies of the technical problems involved in a possible confederation of the two Germanies and thus be in a position to present alternative models for consideration by the European Security Commission. The Institute might also take up some of the central philosophical and political questions which are of growing interest to East and West such as the role of the individual in the industrialized state, the problems of bureaucracy, the reconciliation of freedom and order, and the dangers of centralization and authoritarianism. Serious joint confrontation of these questions by scholars and men of affairs from both East and West would in our view improve the climate for detente and could yield new insights for the solution of critical problems of common concern to both the communist and non-communist worlds.

The United Nations has an important role to play in the administration of a European settlement. Because of the anomolous geographical and political position of Berlin, a divided former capital deep within East Germany, it has sometimes been suggested that the U.N. should administer the city pending a settlement. While we believe that Western access rights to Berlin should be reconfirmed at an early stage in any negotiations for a European settlement, we have doubts that United Nations administration of Berlin or West Berlin is the most practical solution. Past U.N. efforts to administer cities or territories, such as Trieste, have not been particularly successful. In addition, a detachment of Berlin or a part of it from the two Germanies would complicate the solution of its ultimate juridical status.

- 37 -

On the other hand, some U.N. presence in Berlin would be extremely use-
ful. It might be appropriate to locate some existing U.N. instrumentalities
in the city or possibly some of the new institutions for promoting a European
settlement that have been recommended in this Report. Making Berlin an im-
portant center for negotiating new relationships in Europe could improve the
morale of Berliners by giving to the city which for a generation has symbo-
lized the Cold War an active role in the search for peace. Other U.N. func-
tions related to Berlin might include the stationing of guards or observers
on the access routes and the arbitration of disputes that might arise between
the city administration and the Four Powers.

The U.N. should also play a role in the administration of the security
aspects of a European settlement. The proposed European Security Commission
should become a U.N. organ symbolizing the fact that the security system for
Europe is a part of a wider security system. The U.N. might train and in
some cases recruit personnel to serve inspection or police functions on the
continent. While it does not appear practical to replace NATO and Warsaw
Pact troops with U.N. police contingents at an early date, such a possibility
might come to look more realistic in time as the confrontation between the
two blocs eases. In the meantime, the principal responsibility for inspec-
tion of the arms control and deployment restrictions would devolve upon the
NATO and Warsaw Pact organizations operating under the European Security
Commission. At least in the early stages of a security arrangement, each
side is likely to have more confidence in an adversary system of inspection
where each side checks on the other in preference to inspectors from neutral
countries or the U.N. secretariat.

The United Nations should in the Panel's view play an expanding role in
promoting closer economic relationships between East and West in Europe. The

- 38 -

Economic Commission for Europe established by the U.N. in 1947 has for many years been promoting East-West trade by arranging bilateral and multilateral consultations. It is the appropriate body to encourage an expansion of economic ties. Significant progress in East-West trade will require certain changes in U.S. policy towards trading with communist countries. Many of these needed changes are embodied in the East-West Trade Bill submitted to the Congress by President Johnson. The Panel believes that it is in the interests of the United States that these changes be promptly made.

The Economic Commission for Europe might also concern itself with other economic relations in addition to trade. It could sponsor training programs for managerial and entrepreneurial personnel from both East and West including exchange visits to acquaint managers from one economic system with the problems of the other. As the East European countries move in the direction of "market socialism" in which plant managers have greater discretion to determine production quotas and prices in accordance with their analysis of market requirements, a forum for exchanging views on common problems of management and production will become increasingly useful. At the same time, the Commission should concern itself with the principal obstacles to closer economic ties between communist and non-communist Europe. Perhaps in collaboration with the proposed East-West Institute discussed above, the Commission might undertake continuing studies of the limits and possibilities of East-West collaboration in improving the workings of the world economy.

Finally, the Economic Commission for Europe should anticipate the economic problems that an East-West detente may pose for the underdeveloped world. The present competition in aid programs is wasteful and permits recipient countries to play one donor off against another, but it does provide a polit-

- 39 -

ical incentive for the countries to continue aid. A possible unfortunate con-
sequence of a growing U.S.-USSR detente might well be a slackened interest
throughout the industrial world in assisting the poor countries. If the U.S.-
Soviet confrontation abates and the U.S. and the nations across Europe turn
to needed tasks of internal reconstruction, there is some danger that Peking's
analysis of world politics might in some sense turn out to be right: A U.S.-
USSR detente could lead to a tacit understanding among the Great Powers not
to disturb the *status quo* in the poor countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. An important function of the Economic Commission, therefore, should
be to develop programs for joint economic policies, including, for example,
U.S.-Soviet aid consortia, which will help close the gap between the rich and
the poor. Although it appears that such economic cooperation is only a dis-
tant prospect at present, the institutions for planning and developing rela-
tionships that might evolve through a European settlement should begin work
as soon as possible.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Panel believes that the development by the United States of a policy for improving the prospects of a stable peace and security in Europe is a task of the highest priority. NATO in its present form has become obsolete and is not adequate to the security requirements of the 1970's. A practical policy for strengthening strained relationships among NATO nations and improving European security requires the United States to make some crucial decisions promptly. The risks inherent in the European situation are far too great for the United States to continue its present passive policy towards Europe. We cannot expect to drift into a solution of the world's most complex and critical security problem.

- 40 -

2. The Panel notes that an end of the Vietnam war is a prerequisite not only to satisfactory solutions to the current strains in NATO and the promotion of detente in Europe, but even to a serious confrontation with these issues. The problems of U.S.-European relations cannot be adequately approached if our major energies are directed elsewhere. For the protection of vital U.S. security interests, we believe it imperative that the Vietnam war be ended as promptly as possible.

3. NATO should be strengthened in such a way as to improve its capabilities for promoting a political settlement in Europe that would bring a reduction of tensions and added security for its members. Although NATO must maintain its military strength until such time as alternative security arrangements can be made, efforts to develop military and political strength in the Atlantic Alliance should be specifically directed to these positive goals.

4. Consultation on future NATO policies and how such policies might promote European security should be initiated at once. The agenda of such discussions should include: a) measures to increase European participation in and responsibility for the defense of West Europe, including the possible appointment of a European as Supreme Commander, and the development of a European Defense Organization capable of taking over some of the United States' present responsibilities for strategic planning; b) a clarification of views with respect to East-West negotiations, specifically, identification of those issues for which bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiation is required, those issues appropriate for discussion between the two German governments, and those which should be negotiated in a multilateral framework. It is important for NATO unity that the United States make a prompt policy decision at the highest level as to its own position on these questions.

- 41 -

5. The United States and the nations of West Europe can improve their relationships by increasing cooperation in non-military areas such as medicine, oceanography, pollution control, communications, and the development of managerial skills necessary for operating industrialized economies. A North Atlantic Organization for Science and Technology jointly supported by NATO governments could make a useful contribution to these efforts.

6. The NATO nations should substantially increase their commitment to promote development of the non-industrialized world. To this end, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development should strengthen its efforts to promote multilateral aid programs to be administered under the United Nations and other international agencies. At the same time, the NATO nations should review their present policies on international trade and investment to determine whether changes might be made to ease the flow of capital to poor countries and to support the price of raw materials on which their economies depend.

7. The Panel believes that efforts to reach a settlement of the conflicts arising out of the division of Germany should be resumed. The path to settlement requires direct negotiation between the two German governments subject to the supervision of the Four Powers responsible for Germany as a consequence of World War II,--the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. The goal of such negotiations would be to devise a plan for the reunification in stages of the German people. The premise of such negotiations would be a recognition by all powers concerned that 1) the present western and eastern frontiers of the two Germanies (subject to minor modifications agreeable to neighboring countries) are permanent; and 2) the demarcation line within divided Germany is provisional. How fast such direct negotiations between the two

- 42 -

German governments would proceed would depend upon the evolving relationships between them as well as the general climate for negotiation in Europe. In authorizing the commencement of such negotiations the Four Powers would declare their intention to promote, in conjunction with their allies and other concerned states in Europe, a European security system which would facilitate progress on the German question.

8. The Panel recommends that a European Security Commission, consisting of an appropriate number of member states of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts, including the Four Powers and the two German governments, be promptly established as a permanent body of the United Nations, with the following functions: 1) preparation of the general principles of a European settlement; 2) proposals for specific initial steps towards a settlement; 3) creation of a permanent secretariat to maintain continuing contact between the two alliances, to assure rapid exchange of information with respect to any crises or incidents, and to assist the Secretary-General of the United Nations in efforts to resolve any disputes between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that involve the danger of conflict.

9. The United Nations should play an important role in the search for new security arrangements and detente in Europe. The Panel recommends increased efforts in the European Economic Commission to promote closer trade and other economic relations between East and West Europe. An East-West Institute under the auspices of the United Nations should be established to study the technical, political, and economic obstacles to closer relationships between nations with different economic and political systems.

10. The European Security Commission should be the body for negotiating arms control arrangements for improving the security of the continent. It

- 43 -

should work closely with and make periodic reports to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, as well as to the United Nations. The Commission should negotiate arms control arrangements based on the following principles:

1. The NATO and Warsaw Pact powers shall immediately agree not to increase their present force levels or make major shifts in troop deployment without advance notice.

2. A schedule for proportional reductions of forces throughout the European security zone, an area wider than but including the two Germanies, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, shall be promptly negotiated and put into effect not later than one year after the establishment of the Commission.

3. An observer team to report to both sides on maneuvers and large troop movements shall be promptly established. The inspection system shall also include overlapping radar screens to warn against surprise attack. A continuing function of the Commission will be to search for additional agreed measures to increase mutual confidence that no hostile actions, including massive surprise attack, are being planned by one side against the other.

4. NATO and Warsaw Pact countries shall take early measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war in Europe by making substantial cutbacks in nuclear warhead stockpiles located within the security zone. The process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in maintaining European security shall proceed as rapidly as confidence develops in the alternative security arrangements.

- 44 -

5) The Commission should seek the limitation of intermediate range nuclear weapons located on the continent. Such discussions should be coordinated with any U.S.-Soviet bilateral negotiations on intercontinental offensive and defensive weapons. The Panel is strongly of the view that the Czech invasion, deplorable as it is, has made these bilateral discussions, as well as the other proposals for easing the U.S.-Soviet confrontation discussed in this Report, not less urgent, but more so.

6) Negotiations within the Commission should culminate in a collective security treaty under which the member nations, including specifically the United States and the Soviet Union, would pledge themselves to come to the aid of any victim of aggression on the continent. Thus the present functions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact organizations should eventually devolve upon a single European-wide security organization aimed at no single enemy but at potential disturbers of the peace from either East or West.