by heat and blast damage. The thermo-nuclear weapons, on the other hand, do not possess this relative discrimination. Their explosive power is theoretically unlimited. A 20 megaton weapon, which is easily within the range of our capabilities, has a lethal radius of 8 miles; its area of total destruction is 48 square miles. Within that area at least 75 percent of the population would be killed and all the remainder severely injured. Depending on the nature of the terrain, the radius of heavy damage would extend from 10 to 16 miles. Heavy damage is defined by the Federal Civil Defense Authority as major structural damage that could result in the collapse of a building. Within this area, mortality due to blast, heat and the immediate effects of radiation would be at least 30 percent and most of the remainder would have severe injuries. A third zone of relatively light damage, ranging from broken windows to houses (particularly those of wooden construction) set afire by the heat, would extend from 16 to 32 miles from point zero. A 20 megaton weapon dropped on Manhattan with a day-time population of 4 million would at a minimum cause 3,000,000 deaths and 1,000,000 surviving casualties.

Symington Hearings, p. 900

Syracus University Herring, b. 6/00

population of 4 million would at a minimum cause 3,000,000 deaths and zero. A 50 megaton weapon dropped on Manhattan with a day-time set fire by the heat, would extend from 10 to 35 miles from both broken windows to houses (particularly those of wooden construction) injuries.

A third row of relatively light damage, resulting from least 30 percent and most of the remainder would have severe blast, heat and the immediate effects of radiation would be at in the collapse of a building. Within this area, most likely due to Defense Authority as major structural damage that could result 10 to 16 miles. Heavy damage is defined by the Federal Civil

nature of the terrain, the radius of heavy damage would extend from killed and all the remainder severely injured. Depending on the Within that area at least 75 percent of the population would be of 8 miles; its area of total destruction is 48 square miles.

easily within the range of our capabilities has a lethal radius power is theoretically unlimited. A 50 megaton weapon, which is hand, do not boasee this relative discrimination. Their explosive by heat and blast damage. The thermo-nuclear weapons, on the other

Nor are the damage or the casualties exhausted by the direct effects. Even within the area of relatively light damage, the survivors, unless they take extreme precautions, will receive severe doses of radiation, which may prove fatal or increase susceptibility to disease or shorten life expectancy. Moreover, the fire-ball of a megaton weapon, if it touches the ground, sucks up particles of earth and buildings and deposits them downwind. This produces the radioactive fall-out which, depending on metereological conditions, may cover an area of 10,000 square miles. As a conservative estimate, then, a multi-megaton weapon exploded over a typical urban area can be expected to cause about 50 percent direct casualties and another 20 percent of latent injuries together with a total destruction of the center of the city within a diameter of between 6 to 8 miles. A successful attack on 50 percent of the most important metropolitan areas of the United States would bring under fire 40 percent of our population, 50 percent of our key facilities and 60 percent of our most important industry.

Symington Hearings, p. 299; p. 307 (Testimony of General Partridge). For a fuller discussion of the effects of weapons and their implications, see below Chapter IV.

33

At this scale of catastrophe, it is clear that the nature of
war has altered. Our traditional insistence on reserving ourselves
for unambiguous threats but then to defeat the enemy totally may lead
to paralysis when thermo-nuclear war augurs social disintegration
even for the victor. During the period of our atomic monopoly, it
was comfortable to believe that our nuclear stockpile deterred all
forms of aggression because we could inflict punishment without fear
of retaliation. But in the face of the new-found Soviet capability
to inflict devastating damage on the United States, our reluctance
to engage in an all-out war is certain to increase. To be sure, we
shall continue to insist that we do not want peace at any price. The
price of peace cannot be determined in the abstract, however. The
growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile is certain to widen the line
between what is considered "vital" and what is "peripheral" if we
must weigh all objectives against the destruction of New York or Los
Angeles, or Chicago.

It may be argued that the reluctance to engage in all-out war

nuclear age: whether a given transformation is "worth" unleashing
a thermo-nuclear holocaust. At every stage it will provide us with
an incentive to defer a show-down to a more propitious moment in or to
a clearer provocation. An all-or-nothing military policy will there-
fore play into the hands of the Soviet strategy of ambiguity which

seeks to upset the stragegic balance by degrees and with which
combined political, psychological and military pressures to produce
the greatest degree of hesitation by the opponent. Moreover, to the
extent that we become dependent on the most absolute applications of
our power, even the secondary states may blackmail us with their rivalries

is relatively useless against minor powers or else because we will be
inhibited from using it because we fear world opinion or the danger
of unleashing all-out war. A major reliance on all-out war may

therefore come close to a Maginot line mentality: the belief in a
strategy the efficacy of which may never be tested but which meanwhile
nevertheless prevents the consideration of an alternative.