November 16, 1956

ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND, INC.

SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT

OVERALL PANEL

Rockefeller, Nelson A.
Chairman

President
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.

Kissinger, Henry A.
Panel Secretary

Director of Special Studies
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.

Anderson, Robert B.

President, Ventures, Ltd.
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense

Berle, Adolf A., Jr.

Law Practice
Former Ambassador to Brazil

Bowles, Chester

Former Ambassador to India
Former Governor of Connecticut

Clay, Lucius D.

Ch. B., Continental Can Company, Inc.
Former Comdr. in Chief, U.S. Forces in Europe and Mil. Gov., U.S. Zone, Germany

Cowles, John

Ch. B., Minneapolis Star & Tribune

Dart, Justin W.

President, Rexall Drug Inc.

Dean, Gordon

Vice President and Director
General Dynamics Corporation
Former Chairman, AEC

Dickey, John S.

President, Dartmouth College

Gardner, John W.

President, Carnegie Foundation of New York

Granger, Lester B.

Executive Director
National Urban League, Inc.

Haskins, Caryl P.

President
Carnegie Institute of Washington

Herter, Christian A.

Governor of Massachusetts

Hesburgh, Theodore M.

President, University of Notre Dame

Overall Panel -2- November 16, 1956

Hickey, Margaret A. President, National Conference on Social Welfare

Hobby, Oveta Culp President, The Houston Post
Former Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare

Josephs, Devereux C. Ch. B. and Director
New York Life Insurance Company

Katz, Milton Director, International Legal Studies
Law School of Harvard University

Killian, James R., Jr. President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Luce, Henry R. Editor in Chief, Time, Inc.

McCabe, Thomas B. President, Scott Paper Company

McCormack, James, Jr. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Percy, Charles H. President, Bell & Howell
Director, Fund for Adult Education

Potofsky, Jacob S. President, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America

Rosenberg, Anna M. Labor and Personnel Consultant
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense

Rusk, Dean President, Rockefeller Foundation

Sarnoff, David Ch. B., Radio Corporation of America

Spofford, Charles M. Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland & Kiendl
Former Deputy Representative NATO

Teller, Edward Physicist, University of California Berkeley

SUBPANEL I - U. S. INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Rusk, Dean
Chairman
President, Rockefeller Foundation

King, John A.
Panel Secretary
Secretary, International Legal Studies
Harvard Law School

Rockefeller, Nelson A.
President, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc.

Sarnoff, David
Ch.B., Radio Corporation of America

Davis, Saville R.
American News Editor
The Christian Science Monitor

Free, Lloyd A.
Director, The Institute for International
Social Research

Johnson, Joseph E.
President, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

Millikan, Max F.
Director, The Center for International
Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology

Mosely, Philip E.
Director of Studies
Council on Foreign Relations

Nason, John W.
President, Foreign Policy Association

Stanton, Edwin F.
Former Ambassador to Thailand

November 19, 1956

SUBPANEL II - U.S. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

<table><tr><td>McCormack, James, Jr.<br>Chairman</td><td>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Hoopes, Townsend<br>Panel Secretary</td><td>J. H. Whitney & Co.</td></tr><tr><td>Dean, Gordon</td><td>Senior Vice President and Director,<br>General Dynamics Corporation<br>Former Chairman, AEC</td></tr><tr><td>Luce, Henry R.</td><td>Editor in Chief, Time, Incorporated</td></tr><tr><td>Teller, Edward</td><td>Physicist, University of California,<br>Berkeley</td></tr><tr><td>Altschul, Frank</td><td>Board of Trustees, Institute of<br>International Education<br>Vice President, Council on Foreign Relations</td></tr><tr><td>Anderson, Frederick L.</td><td>Former Deputy U.S. Special Representative<br>in Europe</td></tr><tr><td>Fisk, James B.</td><td>Executive Vice President, Bell Telephone<br>Laboratories, Inc.</td></tr><tr><td>Gaylord, Bradley</td><td>President, The Pennroad Corporation</td></tr><tr><td>Gilpatric, Roswell L.</td><td>Cravath, Swaine & Moore<br>Former Undersecretary of the Air Force</td></tr><tr><td>Johnson, Ellis</td><td>Director, Operations Research Office,<br>Johns Hopkins University</td></tr><tr><td>Lincoln, George A.</td><td>Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military<br>Academy, West Point</td></tr><tr><td>Nash, Frank C.</td><td>U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly<br>of the United Nations</td></tr><tr><td>Wilson, Carroll L.</td><td>President, Metals & Controls Corporation</td></tr></table>

(A revised list will be furnished when subpanel is completed)

November 19, 1956

SUBPANEL IV - UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY

McCabe, Thomas B.
Chairman

Manning, Bayless A.
Panel Secretary

Associate Professor of Law,
Yale University

Josephs, Devereux C.

Ch. B. and Director,
New York Life Insurance Company

Granger, Lester B.

Executive Director,
National Urban League, Inc.

Rosenberg, Anna M.

November 19, 1956

SUBPANEL V - UNITED STATES UTILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES

Killian, James R., Jr.
Chairman

Hechinger, Fred M.
Panel Secretary

Associate Publisher, Bridgeport Herald

Gardner, John W.

Haskins, Caryl P.

President, Carnegie Institute of
Washington

Hesburgh, Theodore M.

Hickey, Margaret A.

November 19, 1956

SUBPANEL VI - U.S. DEMOCRATIC PROCESS - ITS CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY

<table><tr><td>Dickey, John S.<br>Chairman</td><td>President, Dartmouth College</td></tr><tr><td>Thomson, Charles A. H.<br>Panel Secretary</td><td>The Brookings Institution</td></tr><tr><td>Clay, Lucius D.</td><td>Ch.B., Continental Can Company, Inc.,<br>Former Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces in<br>Europe and Military Government, U.S. Zone,<br>Germany</td></tr><tr><td>Dart, Justin W.</td><td>President, Rexall Drug, Inc.</td></tr><tr><td>Hobby, Oveta Culp</td><td>President, The Houston Post<br>Former Secretary of Health, Education and<br>Welfare</td></tr><tr><td>Percy, Charles H.</td><td>President, Bell & Howell<br>Director, Fund for Adult Education</td></tr><tr><td>Cantril, Hadley</td><td>The Institute for International Social Research</td></tr><tr><td>Elliott, William Y.</td><td>Department of Government, Harvard University</td></tr><tr><td>Goodpaster, Andrew J.</td><td>Colonel, C.E., U. S. Army</td></tr><tr><td>Perkins, James A.</td><td>Vice President, Carnegie Corporation of<br>New York</td></tr><tr><td>Pike, James A.</td><td>Dean, The Cathedral Church of St. John<br>The Divine</td></tr><tr><td>Price, Don K.</td><td>Vice President, The Ford Foundation</td></tr><tr><td>Rostow, Walt W.</td><td>Center for International Studies,<br>Massachusetts Institute of Technology</td></tr><tr><td>Sayre, Wallace S.</td><td>Department of Public Law and Government,<br>Columbia University</td></tr><tr><td>Smithies, Arthur</td><td>Graduate School of Public Administration,<br>Harvard University</td></tr></table>

November 19, 1956

November 14, 1956

# MAJOR ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PANEL

## THE IMPORTANCE OF A FRAMEWORK OF NATIONAL PURPOSE:

There can be little doubt that we are living through a revolutionary period.

On the physical plane, the power of modern weapons has grown so great as to bring major changes in the relationship of force and the objectives for which it might be employed. As a result, at a moment of unparalleled strength we find that some of the restraints upon the use of our strength are produced by the implications of our own weapons technology. Moreover, the rapid rate of technological change is in itself a factor of instability. Each scientific advance impels us and other nations into a further, more intense, technological race. We must therefore stay ahead of our competitors over an indefinite period and in every strategically significant category and the penalty for failure to keep up is national catastrophe.

On the political plane, many of the newly independent powers continue to inject into their foreign relationships the revolutionary fervor that gained them independence.

On the economic and social plane, there has occurred what has been called the revolution of rising expectations, which causes the peoples of the world to rebel against standards of living, as well as social and racial barriers, which have remained virtually unchanged for centuries. This ferment is fed by newly awakened hopes for freedom and human

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dignity and by the rapidity with which the aspirations of hitherto inarticulate
peoples can be communicated.

And these factors, of themselves explosive enough, are manipulated
by the Sino-Soviet bloc, organized to exploit all hopes and dissatisfactions
for its own ends.

This raises immediately one of the cardinal problems of our time:
the changed nature of international relations in a revolutionary period. The
temptation of a nation absorbed as ours has been primarily with domestic con-
cerns is to treat the manifestations of a revolutionary period primarily as
calling for mechanical or technical solutions and to seek to deal with them
by "ordinary" diplomatic methods. However, diplomacy, the art of
restraining the use of force and the settlement of disputes by negotiation,
presupposes a framework considered reasonable by all parties. In its
absence, diplomatic conferences turn into sterile repetitions of basic
positions and endless wrangling over what constitutes a "reasonable" demand.
The emphasis of traditional diplomacy on "good faith" and willingness does
not apply in dealing with a power dedicated to overthrowing the international
system. For it is precisely this lack of "good faith" and this willingness
to come to an agreement which distinguish the revolutionary policies of the
Sino-Soviet bloc. Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade each
other. Diplomatic conferences therefore become elaborate stage plays which
seek to influence and win over public opinion in other nations; their purpose
is less the settlement of disputes than the definition of issues for which to
contend; they are less a forum for negotiation than a platform for propaganda.

-3-

In the great periods of diplomacy between the Congress of Vienna and World War I negotiations were effective because there was a general acceptance of the framework of the international system (and because the powers which disagreed with it, such as the colonized peoples, were not strong enough to make their protest effective). This did not prevent disputes but it limited their scope; wars occurred but they were fought in the name of the existing order and the peace was justified as a better expression of agreed arrangement. In a revolutionary period, on the other hand, disputes do not concern adjustments within a given framework but the framework itself.

The attack on the framework of the international order takes two forms: the drives and aspirations of the former and present colonial peoples which attack the international system because it does not live up to its own values; and the Communist assault which seeks to overthrow not only the structure but also the values of the traditional international order. The formerly subjugated people and those still in colonial status are in ferment precisely because they have accepted the Western concepts of freedom and human dignity; because they have in a sense been converted to the principles of Judeo-Christian civilization. Their challenge to the West is to live up to its own values.

The Communist challenge on the other hand is an attack on the very basis of our values. They propose to order the world anew on the basis of irreconcilable principles. Unless there is a fundamental change in Soviet outlook, relations between us and the Soviet bloc will therefore tend to be based on force or the threat of force.

-4-

As for the revolution of the newly independent powers, there is every
possibility of constructive action, for here there is a large area of agreement on
fundamentals, at least potentially. Most of the leaders of colonial uprisings
were educated in the West and drew their revolutionary inspiration from its
teachings of the value of the individual and the "right" to self-government.
The task of colonial governments was relatively simple only so long as the
colonial peoples accepted their rule. However, when the ideals of the French,
British and American revolutions became diffused, partly through the very
spread of colonialism, the seeds were sewn for the destruction of colonial
government itself. The growing community of values with respect to the worth
of the individual and human dignity prevented the continuing maintenance of
foreign rule. As a result many of the newly independent powers are playing
roles drawn from a Western script. Even so the revolution of the newly
independent peoples is not solved simply by understanding their new-found
hopes and aspirations. For while dissatisfactions in these areas have united
in a protest against existing orders, no clear substitute has been proposed.
The revolution of the newly independent nations can therefore be constructive
only to the extent that their hopes and resentments find a sense of direction.

A sense of direction is not something that can be developed or imparted
in the abstract, however. For our contribution to be constructive it must flow
from our national purpose and national purpose to be vital must spring from the
genius by which a people grew. A society, in short, cannot assume a position

-5-

of leadership abroad unless it can develop a sense of direction for itself. It
cannot project abroad values different from those which distinguish its domestic
performance, a truth well recognized in the early days of the Republic. For both
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were, above all, the
expression of our national aspiration and values. Although written for a
specifically American context, they were conceived as guideposts of universal
applicability proclaiming the dignity and brotherhood of man, concepts derived
from our Judeo-Christian beliefs.

The challenge to the United States domestically is of a different order,
however, from that confronted by any other society. Where the rest of the
world is oppressed by the disparity between its aspirations and reality, the
United States faces the paradoxical problem that in many areas of our national
life reality has become at one with our aspirations. We have achieved a
standard of well-being, opportunity and freedom for our citizens that would
have been considered unattainable even a generation ago and we have done so
while expanding the area of individual freedom. Yet we should not feel
complacent about our success for a society cannot stand still without
stagnating. If it loses its dynamism it will also lose its cohesiveness for the
problems which confront it never stand still. Ahead of us are unparalleled
opportunities produced by the scientific revolution, the expanding economy and
the possibilities of an increasingly educated citizenry. Our domestic challenge
then is to our imagination and, our vision: to define the society in which we wish
to live in keeping with our national tradition.

- 6 -

This need for a national purpose in turn directly poses one of the basic problems of international relations: how to relate one nation's national purpose to the national purpose of others. Domestically, the actions of a nation are limited only by the national purpose and (especially in a free society) by what will be accepted as just by most citizens. To itself, a nation appears as an expression of justice because people will accept laws voluntarily only if they believe them to be in the *general* interest. (Even totalitarian states find it necessary to obtain the acquiescence of their peoples. Their methods are two-fold: an intensive indoctrination to convince their citizens of the merit of their policy and a secret police apparatus to liquidate those who cannot be convinced.)

But internationally a people may be challenged as to the universality of their own notion of justice since another factor is added, the will of other sovereign powers. For this reason sovereign nations can never regard each other in the same terms as they look at themselves and the international order depends on the reconciliation of different national purposes. If the objectives and the domestic structure of the states comprising the international order are sufficiently similar, the challenge may not become apparent. In a revolutionary situation, such as exists in the world today, however, national purposes of different nations will clash and their conflict will underlie all relationships. In these circumstances, problems become insoluble unless there exists a generally accepted code as to what constitutes justice among all nations.

Thus, both domestically and internationally the definition of a national purpose is a prerequisite to effective and integrated action. In this task, the

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U.S. confronts particular difficulties. Until the end of World War II, the primary concerns of our society were domestic. Because American society was sure of its values, they were rarely elaborated. Domestically, our tasks seemed set to us by the impulse to develop a continent. And, internationally, our objectives with respect to the rest of the world were primarily motivated by a desire to be left alone by it. To be sure, there occurred a steady outpouring of missionaries and American business was becoming increasingly active internationally. But until the end of World War II our foreign involvements were either explicitly idealistic or explicitly economic. Foreign policy, perhaps outside of Western Hemisphere relations, was not conducted as long-range strategy but as a response to a developing situation and, in practice, was confined to dealing with overt threats and only challenges to our national existence were in fact considered overt threats. Until the end of World War II, the security conferred by two great oceans and the existence of the British Navy created the illusion that the nature of our foreign commitments was entirely up to us.

The temptation of our history, then, is to treat most problems as primarily technical because the vision which formed America has been so much taken for granted among our own people that it was rarely made explicit. Moreover little thought was given and there appeared little need for reconciling it with the hopes and aspirations of other peoples. But narrowly conceived nationalism is no longer possible. Two world wars have demonstrated the impossibility of physical isolation and the power and speed of modern weapons have removed our traditional invulnerability. Moreover, our economic well-being has become inevitably connected with that of the rest of the world through

- 8 -

the dependence of our economy on foreign sources of raw materials. Above all,
the challenge of the present revolutionary period is not technical but moral; it
is to strengthen our sense of direction domestically and to unite it with
humanity groping for a new definition of itself and of its purpose. We therefore
cannot avoid a more explicit consideration of our values.

Major Issues

November 19, 1956

## - Questions -

### I. Problems and Opportunities

A. What major problems will the United States have to face, at home and abroad, during the next ten to fifteen years?

B. What major opportunities will be available to the United States at home and abroad during the next ten to fifteen years?

### II. Moral and Spiritual Values

A. What are the basic moral and philosophic beliefs which motivate the United States?

B. Are these values sufficiently universal in their application to reflect the hopes and aspirations of peoples who are born to non-Western religions and philosophic beliefs?

C. What factors today militate against our moral values and what challenges do they face from other conflicting systems?

D. What degree of diversity of values can be encompassed in a more general system of purpose?

E. What set of values can unite societies of different cultural patterns?

Major Issues
Questions
November 19, 1956

- 2 -

### III. National Purpose

A. Is there a basic and irreconcilable conflict between our moral values and our material values or are they in reality compatible?

B. Do we have a basic sense of purpose as a nation and a people related to our sense of values which can and should make possible the development of a framework of concepts and motivate our policies?

C. Can U.S. interest be defined in terms of a set of values of universal application?

D. If so, how can these values and the policy concepts derived therefrom be related to day-to-day decisions and actions?

Major Issues - I

November 15, 1956

# SUBPANEL I - U. S. INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

## -The Need For -

In seeking to deal with the twin revolutions of this period -- that of the Sino-Soviet bloc and that of the colonial peoples -- the prerequisite is a clear understanding of our national purpose. The expression of purpose is the objective to which it is directed and without which effective policy is impossible. However, the effective implementation of objectives and policy require a framework of concepts within which we can relate the various forces to give them meaning in terms of purpose. The revolt in colonialism, for example, is likely to take many forms over the next decade and a half. But these individual manifestations are not manageable unless we have a clear concept of the future and are clear where we want to be in relation to these areas at the end of that period. The international objectives of a people must have two characteristics: they should be related to the national purpose of those concerned and they must be related to what is possible. What is possible is in part a technical problem; in part, it depends on the national purpose and the international objectives of other powers. An international order where the objectives of the component states are reconcilable will conduct its relationships spontaneously with a maximum of confidence and a minimum of threats of force. If international objectives appear irreconcilable, force or the threat of force play an increasingly important role.

-2-

Moreover, even in the best of cases, international relations
can never be freed entirely from considerations of power. For domestically
a nation's objectives are limited only by what is considered just by most
citizens, but internationally a nation's objectives are affected also by the
will and therefore the notion of justice of other sovereign states. And because
sovereignty implies an independent will, another state will always have some-
what the character of a force to be balanced and international relations are
inseparable from the problem of security. Could a nation achieve all its
wishes with respect to security, it would aim for a world free from foreign
danger and where all problems have the manageability of domestic issues.
But such absolute security for one power is attainable only by reducing the
other powers to impotence. Since it involves absolute insecurity for all
other states, it is never obtainable as part of a voluntarily accepted settle-
ment. An international order which is accepted and not imposed will there-
fore always appear _somewhat_ insecure to any one of its components in the
sense that it does not satisfy _all_ their aspirations of security. For were
any power _totally_ secure from the military point of view, all others would
have to be _totally_ insecure and a revolutionary situation would ensue.

Security, therefore, is always relative in a physical sense. What
confers real security is the consciousness that most disputes concern
adjustments within an accepted framework and that the objectives of other
powers are compatible with continued national existence and the continued
ability to live basic values. To the extent that the feeling is absent,
every state will strive for physical security which, because of its very
unattainability will merely heighten the tension of the revolutionary period.

- 3 -

Thus the international objectives of a power reflect a dual set of aspirations; for security and for the realization of its national purpose for justice. (In the world of Judeo-Christian tradition, this aspiration for justice has taken the form of freedom and respect for the dignity of the individual.) And these goals are closely connected: What is considered just will depend, in part, how secure states feel and what is considered secure depends, in part, on how compatible states consider their aspirations.

Thus Britain did not feel threatened by the growth of the U. S. strategic air-force or we by that of Britain because our international objectives were commensurable. But the U. S. S.R., no doubt, considers our military strength a source of peril because of its belief in the irreconcilability of its purposes with ours. The U. S. S. R. is, therefore, probably sincere in its protestation of feeling threatened; but this is not what makes it a revolutionary power -- for measure of threat is inherent in the relations of sovereign states. The Soviet bloc is revolutionary because nothing can reassure it. Only absolute physical control is considered by it an adequate guarantee. And because absolute security for the Soviet bloc means absolute insecurity for everybody else, the relations between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the rest of the world are revolutionary.

In dealing with the twin revolutions of this period, that of the colonial peoples and that of the Sino-Soviet bloc, the U. S. confronts two tasks. With respect to the non-Soviet world, the U. S. should seek

- 4 -

to create the widest international consensus, for the greater the shared
aspirations the more constructively and spontaneously will change take
place. With respect to the Sino-Soviet bloc, unless there occurs a change
in the domestic control apparatus, relations will tend to be based on force
or the threat of force or substitutes, such as economic and psychological
cold war measures.

The task of creating an international consensus is complicated by
the existence of the Soviet bloc which, for over a generation now has pro-
claimed the incompatability of its institutions and objectives with those
of Western civilization and which has built a domestic control apparatus
on the myth of a permanently hostile outside world. Our international
objectives must therefore be defined against the background of these
questions: Which of the contenders can identify itself with the aspira-
tions of humanity? Which can create the widest basis of justice?

There is no reason however why we should be afraid of a struggle
for the allegiance of humanity. America was a vision before it was a
great power and we can remain great only if we retain the genius by which
we grew. Nothing is more important therefore than to recapture the
spiritual elan which has made this country the hope of the world through-
out our history. If we become too concerned with preserving what we
have rather than helping humanity fulfill its hopes, the rest of the world
will become convinced we are primarily concerned with conserving our
wealth, that we are indifferent to the fate of others and therefore
undeserving of co-operation. If we fail to identify ourselves with the
hopes of the rest of the world, we will inevitably be isolated not only

- 5 -

physically but also spiritually and not by Communism but by the loss of
our own spiritual dynamics. The spontaneity of our institutions and our well-
being must therefore become an inspiration and source of strength to the
world rather than an object of envy. The American experience in these
terms would not be the happy accident of a fortunate people but the example
of what freedom can achieve through social co-operation and a sense of
purpose.

This connection between security and justice and between justice
and the domestic structures of various states demonstrates that it is no
more possible to speak of "purely" military than of "purely" political
objectives. The concept of national strategy is defined in the area where
these two meet: justice without security will be futile, but security
without justice will be sterile. Nor is it possible to "sell" a policy by
words alone; psychological strategy in these terms is not a task of
relating words to common aspirations but one of identifying actions with
the hopes of humanity. For this reason international objectives and the
policy to implement them will be considered here as indivisible,
including a psychological strategy, security, and economic measures in
addition to what is commonly considered "political". The objectives de-
fined by the subpanel to be valid should therefore hold equally for the
subpanels on Security and Economic Objectives and Policy, and for the
subpanels dealing with a strengthened national life.

It is against this background that the subpanel might address
itself to some of the following problems.

MAJOR ISSUES - I

November 19, 1956

## - Questions -

A. What are the major problems the United States has to face in the international field during the next ten to fifteen years?

B. What are the major opportunities with which the United States may be confronted or can create relating to the international field during the next ten to fifteen years?

### II. National Purpose: Basis of U. S. International Objectives and Strategic Concepts *

A. How can we relate our national purpose and moral values to our international objectives and strategic concepts?

B. Can they be reconciled?

C. Are there any difficulties inherent in the nature of the democratic process that militate against the definition of long range objectives and consistent strategic concepts?

* Some of the questions listed under II, III and V will be dealt with primarily by other Subpanels (Question II C, II D and V by Subpanel VI; III C by Subpanel III; III D by Subpanel II). They are listed here to illustrate the interrelationship of the various Subpanels.

Major Issues - I
Questions

- 2 -

D. What is the relationship between public opinion and the
national leadership in formulating national objectives?

1. Specifically, to what extent should the nation as a whole participate in this process and what scope does public opinion leave the national leadership?

### III. U. S. International Objectives

A. What are the basic factors that determine American interests abroad and what are the natures of these interests?

1. Do they derive largely from self-preservation?

2. From religious and moral beliefs and a sense of mission?

3. From a wish for isolation?

B. How can the U. S. implement internationally its concepts of freedom, opportunity, and respect for human dignity and racial equality?

C. Is an expanding free world economy essential to the preservation, strength and vitality of our own domestic economy and should it be one of our major international objectives?

D. What is the role of power in international relations?

1. What is required to maintain military superiority and what is the nature of military superiority in the nuclear age?

Major Issues - I
Questions

- 3 -

E. How can the United States most effectively provide sustained, consistent, direct leadership politically, economically and morally throughout the free world?

IV. Strategic Concepts

A. Is there an irreconcilable antagonism between the U.S. and the Communist bloc or is it a policy of accommodation both possible and feasible in terms of basic U. S. interests?

1. What is the meaning and future possibility of recent developments within the Soviet orbit?

2. What is the relationship between Soviet internal developments and foreign policy?

3. What changes in policy may we expect once the Soviets have attained relative nuclear parity?

B. Considering military, political, and psychological factors, what should be the role and nature of alliances in which we engage?

1. To what extent can we establish common goals and objectives with our allies?

2. To what extent are the alliances valuable for other than military reasons and how can this value be enhanced?

3. To what extent will the rapid evolution of weapons systems make alliances, from a military point of view, progressively less important?

Major Issues - I
Questions

- 4 -

C. To what extent can the United Nations deal with the contemporary revolution?

1. Can we foresee for the United Nations a role of growing strength and prestige in terms of international order, justice and freedom, and if so, what can be done to foster its growth?

D. Can the American values and institutions continue to flourish in a system of nation-states?

1. Is a different vehicle both more desirable and more suitable for the attainment of American objectives?

2. Specifically, should we seek to promote regional and international political and economic organizations?

3. Can regional organizations be made more effective and give greater strength to the United Nations?

E. Is it possible to adopt a single policy towards colonialism or is it necessary to adjust our policy to the various historical forms from which colonialism developed?

1. What are these forms and how should they affect U. S. attitudes and policies?

2. What are the implications for the metropolitan powers of the emergence into statehood of the remaining colonial peoples?

Major Issues - I
Questions

- 5 -

3. What are the implications for the United States of the emergence into statehood of former colonial peoples?

a. In this connection what is a nation?

b. Must the boundaries of new states necessarily follow the lines of former colonial rule?

4. Can the United States play a really important and constructive role in relation to the preparation for and attainment of freedom and self-rule by colonial peoples?

5. Can the colonial peoples be prepared for freedom and self-government in such a way as not to weaken further the prestige and economic strength of the metropolitan powers?

6. Can the U. S. play a part in such a program without further compromising its position of moral authority or allied relationships?

7. Could it be done in such a way as to stop and even reverse the rapidly growing trend toward a split between the Afro-Asian and white races?

8. Are there other ways of reversing this trend?

Major Issues - I
Questions

- 6 -

F. To what extent have social, cultural and psychological factors become increasingly important in international relations?

1. Do we understand sufficiently the socio-psychological forces that influence the international aspects of public opinion in the various areas around the world?

2. Can we more effectively identify the U. S. in a positive way with the hopes and aspirations of peoples throughout the world?

G. What problems and opportunities may confront us in:

Europe

Latin America

The Middle East

Africa

Asia

1. Can the U. S. develop objectives and strategic concepts relating to these areas that will further our own interests and at the same time reflect the hopes and aspirations of their peoples?

2. Can the U. S. policies in these various areas be so designed as to supplement and support each other?

Major Issues - I
Questions

- 7 -

V. U. S. Government Organization

A. Is the Executive Branch of the Government organized
to permit the President effectively to carry out his responsibilities
in relation to the increasingly complex role of the U.S. in the world?

B. Does the relation between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch permit the necessary freedom and continuity in developing long range objectives, strategic concepts and policies to permit the U. S. to carry the role in world affairs that lies ahead of it?

C. Can the U. S. effectively reconcile the conflicts that develop between its overall international interests and various segments of its domestic economy within the present government structure?

Major Issues - II

November 19, 1956

SUBPANEL II - U. S. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

In the space of less than ten years, the world has experienced a
whole series of technological revolutions: the development of nuclear
weapons was followed by the discovery of thermo-nuclear processes,
which represented as much of an increase in destructive power compared to
nuclear weapons as the nuclear weapons had over "conventional" armaments.

This was accompanied by an equally rapid development in delivery systems
of great sophistication and high speed: the transonic and supersonic air-
plane and the ballistic missile which will soon achieve international range.

The speed with which discoveries have succeeded each other, coupled
with the power of modern weapons, has posed dilemmas never before
experienced. In the past, a weapons system might be good for a genera-
tion at least; today, it is often outdated when it has barely left the blueprint
stage. Yet failure to plan on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons
may at any one moment create a vital lag. Traditionally, there was a
certain relationship between the cost of a weapon and the amount of damage
it could inflict; today, a single weapon, relatively easy to manufacture,
can destroy a whole city. For the first time, mankind has the possibility
of destroying itself and this at a moment when the whole world is in ferment.

Moreover, until World War II, the relatively stable weapons technology
enabled policy makers to take for granted a matrix of power and seek to
adjust policy to changing political and social conditions. Today, technology
changes at a rate which sometimes outstrips comprehension of it.

Major Issues - II

- 2 -

This paradox that the greater our power, the stronger becomes our reluctance to use it has given a frustrating quality to our quest for a military policy. And this has been compounded by our reluctance to think in terms of doctrine. Because we have won two world wars by out-producing our opponent, we have tended to equate military superiority with superiority in resources and technology. Yet history demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as superiority in resources. Superior doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare.

Superior mobility and the use of artillery, a better relationship between fire and movement furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples were the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights. All these were victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine: the ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all the more complete for facing the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Thus the key to a proper doctrine is the correct understanding of the elements of one's superiority; and to develop the capacity to apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems.

Major Issues - II

- 3 -

But our effort to assess the meaning of the new technology has been inhibited not only by our past, with its seeming lesson that security could be absolute, but also by the complexity of modern military technology. Traditionally weapons which were useful for offense were broadly useful for defense as well. But today this equation no longer holds to the same extent, because the new technology has brought about an unparalleled specialization of function. A superior tank could dominate the battlefield; but a superior bomber does not necessarily dominate the sky. For bombers do not fight each other. Their performance can be compared only in terms of their ability to reach the target. The test of a modern weapon is not so much whether it is superior to its equivalent on the other side but whether it can perform its strategic mission. The technological race, therefore, is not between weapons which have the same mission; rather it is between offensive and defensive capabilities. And because the offensive and defensive weapons systems have different characteristics one of the most important problems for strategy is the weight to be assigned to either and to decide on the "mix" which will provide the greatest flexibility.

The defensive systems, moreover, include passive defense measures as well as weapons. For the offense of one side is pitted not only against the military defense of the other but also against its vulnerability, both physical and psychological. A power the entire steel industry of which is concentrated in one or two target areas is more vulnerable than an opponent which has a greater degree of dispersal. A society which is aware of the

Major Issues - II

- 4 -

nature of thermo-nuclear war will be better able to withstand the shock of an attack than a less well prepared opponent. Thus the ability to withstand attack, both physically and morally, is itself a deterrent because it reduces the gains an aggressor can hope to achieve by surprise.

The complexity of these relationships and of weapons systems has inhibited the development of doctrine because it has put a premium on inter-service rivalry. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II the division of functions between the services followed logical lines. The Army was powerless on the sea beyond the range of its coastal artillery and the Navy could not project itself inland; the Air Force was not yet independent and the range of planes was sufficiently short to permit the functions of Naval and Army Air to follow roughly the division among the senior services. But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the incomparable destructiveness of weapons have almost obliterated the traditional boundaries among the services. The notion that the primary task of the Air Force is to control the air, that of the Navy to control the seas and of the Army to fight on land -- which could still serve as the basis of the Key West agreement of 1948 governing the division of functions among the services -- has become next to meaningless. Is the sea controlled by bombing shipyards from carriers or by destroying the enemy's industrial potential? Is a land battle possible without having won the air supremacy and is it necessary after the air battle has been won?

Major Issues - II

- 5 -

In the absence of a strategic doctrine each service will give its
own reply. And the reply will be not in terms of theory since theory
has no immediate budgetary pay-off, but in terms of weapons development
which results in appropriations. Is anti-aircraft analogous to artillery
or to aerial warfare? -- this is the contention between the Army and the
Air Force. Is the carrier a naval weapon, a part of our strategic striking
power, or do the resources devoted to it detract from our long-range
striking force? -- this is the argument between the Navy and the Air Force.
Is a 1,500 mile ballistic missile a tactical or strategic weapon? -- in the
absence of an answer each service is frantically pushing its own develop-
ment in the hope that the service which gets there first will also control
the weapon system.

Without a notion of the kind of war we will in all probability have
to fight, each service will give its own answer and the conflicting strategic
advice will in each crisis inhibit the actions of policy makers. And the
lack of doctrinal agreement among the services exists to an even greater
degree between us and our allies. We tend to look at our strategic
problem with the Sino-Soviet bloc in terms of an overall strategy which
guarantees ultimate victory. Eventual victory is meaningless to our allies,
however, if in the meantime they have suffered the physical and moral
ravages of Soviet occupation. Their fate depends on the first battle not the
last. On the other hand there is the problem of the military importance of
allies when the advent of missiles may make our overseas bases dispensable

Major Issues - II

- 6 -

and when most countries will for all practical purposes be "priced"
out of the weapons race. This again is insoluble until we have resolved
the dispute in our strategic doctrine about how to prepare for all-out war
and whether the most serious strategic problem confronting us is in the
area of limited or peripheral war; about the nature of limited war and the
compatibility of it with the employment of nuclear weapons. Such an
understanding is all the more important, so that negotiations about the
reduction of armaments which will be an increasingly important aspect of
diplomacy over the next few years, do not lead us into a trap and so that
we can make proposals in this field which do not weaken our basic posture.

Enough has been said to make clear that the basic security problem
confronting the U. S. concerns development of strategic concepts as much
as developing weapons systems: to achieve an agreed viewpoint about the
nature of our most likely dangers, about the proper strategy to employ and
about the availability and use of new weapons systems. This is all the
more important because, except for the explosion of new obsolete bombs
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, none of the new weapons have ever been
used in war. For this reason the impact of the new technology on strategy,
on diplomacy, indeed on survival, depends to a large extent on our inter-
pretation of its significance.

Major Issues - II

November 19, 1956

# SUBPANEL II - U.S. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

## - Questions -

A. What are the major foreseeable problems the U. S. will have to face in this area during the next ten to fifteen years?

B. What are the major opportunities that can be foreseen during this period?

### II. U.S. International Security Objectives

A. What is the role of force in the nuclear age?

B. Is force a feasible solution for international differences in the nuclear age?

1. For what kind of differences?

2. If not, what are the alternatives?

C. What are the technological trends in weapons' systems over ten to fifteen years?

1. What is the relation between these technological trends and our political-military requirements?

D. Are military alliances likely to add to U.S. security or to impose unbearable demands upon our strength?

1. Are alliances compatible with the theory or actuality of all-out nuclear war?

E. Is there the possibility of a reliable inspection system based on foreseeable knowledge which would permit more than a reduction in armaments?