News week

January 28, 1991

■ A conference would be assembled, under the aegis of the U.N. secretary-general, composed of the United States, Israel and the Arab states allied with America in the gulf crisis.

■ The moderate Arab countries would agree to act as trustees for territories that are returned to Arab control for a specified amount of time, say five to 10 years.

■ The moderate Arab states would also commit themselves to demilitarizing these areas under U.N. supervision. —

■ Israel would give up all of Gaza and the most heavily populated areas of the West Bank, retaining only territories essential to its security. It would be allowed to participate in verifying the demilitarization of any territory it evacuates.

■ Precise government arrangements would be established by agreement, but would not for the interim period lead to a separate state. As a practical matter, the trustee powers would undoubtedly establish an administration containing individuals acceptable to the PLO.

If this particular scenario turned out to be impractical, some other interim approach must be sought to break the deadlock. The aftermath of an allied victory over Iraq will offer a perhaps never-to-recur opportunity. Moderate Arab states are disillusioned with the PLO, which in effect has backed Iraq. They are also dismayed by the fact that the PLO has never unambiguously dissociated itself even from terrorism aimed at the moderate Arabs. As a result, these governments may no longer be prepared to give the PLO a veto over their actions.

As for Israel, it must avoid two possible nightmares. If it insists on holding onto every square inch of occupied territory, it could suffer the fate of South Africa and find itself ostracized, and even ultimately under U.N. sanctions. On the other hand, if it follows the maxims of conventional wisdom and gives up all the occupied territories, it runs the risk of winding up like Lebanon, gradually squeezed to the point of obliteration. For its own sake, Israel must find a middle way. And there is no better moment to do that than when its most dangerous enemy has been defeated.

I do not envy the American negotiator assigned the task of distilling an interim settlement from the confusing passions of the Middle East. Still, with Iraq's military capacity reduced, the moderate Arab leaders, as well as Israel, should be able to turn to the peace process with authority and confidence. President Mubarak of Egypt, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia—and even King Hussein of Jordan, whatever the maneuvers

imposed by his vulnerability—are unusually intelligent and prudent. Even President Assad of Syria, by no means a moderate, signed an interim agreement with respect to the Golan Heights which has been in force for 17 years and has been meticulously observed. All these leaders might in the end go along with an intermediate approach as the only way to break an even more dangerous deadlock. And there are surely Israeli leaders who recognize that a gradual approach will provide their best prospect for a satisfactory outcome—especially when the moderate Arabs are triumphant and radical Arabs are in retreat.

America should act as a mediator in this effort, having earned the trust of both sides. Our initial challenge may well be philosophical. The best way to produce a successful negotiation is to advance a new concept, to convince both sides that the proposed new course serves their common interest. If that demonstration cannot be made, no negotiating gimmick can serve as a substitute.

In several thousand years of recorded history, the Middle East has produced more conflicts than any other region. As the source of three great religions, it has always inspired great passions. It is therefore unlikely that any one negotiation can bring permanent tranquility to this turbulent area. An Arab-Israeli negotiation will not end all the turmoil, because many Middle East problems are quite independent of that conflict. Fundamentalism in Iran has next to nothing to do with the Palestinian issue, though Teheran has exploited it. And Saddam Hussein would have tried to dominate his neighbors even if the Palestinian problem did not exist. But what the Arab-Israeli conflict has done is to make it difficult for the voices of moderation in the Arab world to cooperate with their supporters in the West. Victory in the gulf will create a historic opportunity to alter that particular equation—and it should be seized. ■

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PERISCOPE

Why weren't the Israelis ready? American Patriot

ISRAEL

Missing Missiles

Following the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Tel Aviv and Haifa, the United States hurriedly sent several batteries of American Patriot anti-missile missiles to Israel. Patriots could have stopped the incoming Scuds, but the Israelis had none at the ready. Why? In the mid-1980s, Israel rejected the Patriot in favor of its own anti-missile missile, called the Arrow; more than $150 million has been spent on

development. Israel banked on the Arrow because it covers a much wider area than the Patriot. The Arrow's first test launch this fall was less than successful: it was destroyed when it turned toward the test site. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Israel decided it couldn't wait and secured two Patriot batteries in October. Before the latest shipment, Israeli technicians were taking a crash course in how to operate them. But American experts have come along to handle the new Patriots, which will be immediately operational.

REAGAN WATCH

In the Know

Ronald Reagan may be out of office, but he's not out of the loop. He was on a short list of people to whom President

Bush gave advance word of the air attack on Iraq. Reagan's son Michael, who hosts a daily radio show in San Diego, called Dad before air time on Wednesday afternoon for his opinion on

the prospect of war. But Nancy refused to put her husband on the phone. A few hours later, war began. After the show, Michael confirmed with Nancy that Bush had in fact called to brief Reagan about the action.

Briefed

KUWAIT

Getting Ready
to Rebuild

The Kuwaitis are already making plans to rebuild their oilfield operations once the conflict is over. "Anything that had any value was stolen by the Iraqis—street lamps, stop signs, window shades— and all the equipment," says Larry Flak, of Houston's OGE Drilling Co. The Kuwaiti-owned Santa Fe International Corp. has reportedly purchased wellhead equipment from Ingram Cactus Co. and stored it in Houston warehouses for shipment to Kuwait when the war ends. Kuwaiti officials have also had discussions with several Texas firms about supplying consultants, oilfield workers and equipment for the recovery effort. "We've been asked for quotes, but we haven't any orders yet," says a company official.

Stockpiled parts: Kuwaiti oil rig

Masked: Saudi women

SAUDI ARABIA

Under the Veil

Habit is a very hard thing to shake in Saudi Arabia— even in times of crisis. Conservative Saudi women veil their faces at all times while in public. Last Friday a missile scare sent everyone in the crowded Dhahran International Hotel scurrying into the basement air-raid shelter, where they were told to put on gas masks immediately. Two Saudi women, covered head to toe, then confronted a decidedly new difficulty: how to put on a gas mask in a large crowd without revealing their faces. The women managed to solve this problem somewhat unsatisfactorily by asking a relative to shield them as they faced a wall, then slipped the masks under their veils.

THE MIDEAST

After War,
Geopolitics

Since the first Operation Desert Shield deployment, the Bush administration has been grappling with the problems of a postwar Middle East, NEWSWEEK has learned. Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell's staff has met weekly with Mideast experts to consider the political repercussions of different war scenarios. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, head of the U.S. Central Command in the gulf, has had his staff poring over think-tank papers on the political impact of his war tactics. And the State Department has held "war gaming" sessions where staffers have practiced responding to simulated postwar situations. Aides to Jim Baker, for example, have played the roles of Arab leaders reacting to political turmoil after the war.

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WATCH

Desert Storm Edition

The overall CW on the prospects in the gulf war changed from a strong up arrow at the outset, to something more like a sideways. But hawkishness is still in.

PLAYERS

Conventional Wisdom

George Bush

War critic? Who, me? Mr. President, the CW was *always* your biggest backer.

Saddam Hussein

Overtrated, cruel, despised, dangerous—and still a hero to Palestinians.

Israel

Iraq's missiles a terrifying PR bonanza. A new Israeli-Egyptian coalition?

U.S. Air Force

Old CW: Drained our national treasury. New CW: Terrific surgical accuracy.

Scud Missile

Mobile, but inaccurate. The Scud's a dud—except as a political weapon.

The Democrats

Support troops but not policy. Huh? If war ends quickly, so will '92 hopes.

4 NEWSWEEK: JANUARY 28, 1991

CLOCKWISE FROM TOP: DOWNING-NEWSWEEK, LANGEVIN-SYGMA, REICHERT-SABA, BERMAN-SIPA

WAR IN THE GULF

# A Postwar Agenda

## A new balance of power could create prospects for progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

When I first heard that the war had begun, I thought of President Bush. In a movie, people run around during a crisis, picking up telephones and yelling instructions. In a real crisis, the top people are very much alone. Many officials head for the foxholes, occasionally throwing out memoranda designed to absolve them of responsibility for their actions. Usually there are only two or three people willing to make tough decisions. President Bush has earned the nation's gratitude for his fortitude in holding the coalition together during the months of buildup, gaining Congressional backing and steering the country to the point where allied and domestic support coincided. But even in the best-planned operation, there are hours in which a leader in his position must wonder why he ever expended so much time and effort trying to get elected.

I also thought of the challenges the President will have to face once the war is over. After all, the purpose of victory is to ensure a lasting peace. To that end, the United States should move to implement a number of measures in the immediate aftermath of the war:

* An arms-control policy for the gulf to prevent a recurrence of the weapons race that contributed to this conflict.

* Some kind of agreement on economic and social development under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which embraces the nations of the gulf. Other Arab allies of the U.S. could join this effort, which would be designed to defuse the argument that this is a conflict of rich against poor.

* A process to address the original Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. Direct negotiations between the two countries would be inherently unbalanced, because of the disparity in

their size, which has only been compounded by Iraq's invasion and pillaging of its neighbor. But some issues are susceptible to legal determination, such as drilling rights or the location of the boundaries. These could be put to the International Court of Justice, while remaining issues are handled within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

* An international program for imposing tough sanctions against terrorism. The world must not again stand impotently

transfixed by thousands of hostages. Countries harboring terrorist groups must be confronted with severe reprisals, including military measures if other pressures fail.

Over the long run, our biggest challenge will be to preserve the new balance of power that will emerge from this conflict. And

that will not prove easy, given conventional American thinking about foreign policy. Today, it translates into the notion of "a new world order," which would emerge from a set of legal arrangements and be safeguarded by collective security. The problem with such an approach is that it assumes that every nation perceives every challenge to the international order in the same way, and is prepared to run the same risks to preserve it. In fact, the new international order will see many centers of power, both within regions and between them. These power centers reflect different histories and perceptions. In such a world, peace can be maintained in only one of two ways: by domination or by equilibrium. The United States neither wants to dominate, nor is it any longer able to do so. Therefore, we need to rely on a balance of power, globally as well as regionally. We must prevent situations where the radical countries are tempted by some vacuum every few years, forcing us to replay the same crises over and over again, albeit with different actors.

This is why, in the final analysis, all of

the so-called diplomatic options would have made matters worse. Each would have left Iraq in a militarily dominant position. None addressed the root problem of the gulf's lack of security, which drew 415,000 Americans into the region in the first place—a deployment that certified the gap in military capability between Iraq and the moderate Arab countries. Any diplomatic solution that did not produce a dramatic reduction of Iraq's military power would have been a victory for Saddam Hussein. From then on, he would not have needed to engage in actual physical aggression. He could have let Iraq's demonstrated superiority speak for itself, progressively undermining the governments that supported the United States. He would have

An Israeli soldier with Hawk anti-aircraft missiles near the Jordan Valley

THE WAR
LOOKING
AHEAD

44 NEWSWEEK: JANUARY 28, 1991

BAITEL-HIRES—GAMMA-LIAISON

A revived peace
process should
begin by redefining
the objectives

been able to exploit his position within
OPEC to achieve an increase in oil prices,
as well as a greater share of production.
These two steps would have given Iraq vast
additional resources to increase its already
huge military buildup, including nuclear
and missile programs. The United States
would have been left with the choice of
keeping major ground forces in the gulf, or
of destabilizing the region by withdrawal.
The practical result of the military opera-
tions now in motion will be to bring into
balance the military capability of Iraq
against its neighbors in the gulf.

Yet ironically, maintaining equilibrium
in the region requires us to navigate
between a solution that leaves Iraq
too strong and an outcome that would
leave Iraq too weak. After all, one of the
causes of the present crisis is the one-sided
way the Western nations rushed to the

defense of Iraq in its war against Iran,
forgetting that if Iran was excessively
weakened Iraq might become the next ag-
gressor. It would be ironic if another bout
of tunnel vision produced an Iraq so weak
that its neighbors, especially Iran, seek to
refill the vacuum.

Ideally, one military goal should be to
pull the teeth of Iraq's offensive capability

without destroying its capacity to resist
invasion from covetous neighbors. We
should take care that Scud missiles are not
reintroduced. We should prevent Iraq from
importing high-technology equipment, in-
cluding high-performance aircraft with
long ranges, and from reacquiring the
means to manufacture biological and nu-
clear weapons. However, Iraq's capacity to
defend itself with conventional weapons
against ground attack from its neighbors
would in the long run not be a threat to
stability but a contribution to it.

The new balance of power in the region
cannot be based on the permanent pres-
ence of American ground forces. This was
the weakness of diplomatic solutions that
would have kept Iraq's military preponder-
ance intact. A major Western ground force
in the area would inevitably become the
target of radical and nationalist agita-

NEWSWEEK : JANUARY 28, 1991 45

WAR IN THE GULF

tion. The cultural gap between even the best-behaved American troops and the local population is unbridgeable. After a brief period, American ground forces would be considered foreign intruders. There would be a repetition of our experiences in Lebanon, including terrorism and sabotage. American ground forces in the area should be withdrawn after victory; residual forces should be stationed beyond the horizon—at sea or perhaps at a few remote air bases. Any monitoring of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait should be done by Arab members of the coalition.

The difficulty of stationing Western ground forces in the area for an extended period was one reason why sanctions almost surely could not have achieved our objective. It would have been impossible to keep over 400,000 troops in the area for the 12 to 18 months that even optimists thought were needed for sanctions to succeed. But if we started to withdraw any American forces during that time—or to rotate them, as the term of art had it—it would have set off a panic among our Arab allies.

Military equilibrium, however, cannot be the sole aim of American policy in the gulf. It is essential that America learn to become less dependent on oil and generate a viable energy program. We cannot suffer through an energy crisis every

decade. We should stress conservation and develop alternative sources of energy, avoiding the self-indulgent attitudes of the 1980s, when plentiful oil caused the search for alternative energy sources to be largely abandoned.

We must also remember the possibility of renewed Soviet designs on the region. For the time being, domestic problems keep the Soviets from running any significant foreign risks. But 200 years of Russian expansionism toward the gulf indicate a certain proclivity. And this drive may be compounded as Moscow's preoccupation with its more than 50 million Muslim citizens grows. After some domestic equilibrium is restored, the Kremlin may become more active in the Middle East—especially in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, which border the Soviet Union. The intensity of that thrust will depend on internal developments within the Soviet Union. If the Muslim republics remain Soviet, Moscow will be wary of Muslim radicalism lest it inflame its own Muslim population. But if the Muslim republics break off and become independent, Moscow may seek favor in the breakaway states by embracing Islamic radicalism—especially if the Muslim world turns more extremist.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a new balance of power will revive prospects for progress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. A peace process dominated by Saddam Hussein, or heavily influenced by him, would have been a debacle. For it would have taught the lesson that radicalism, terrorism and force are the road to diplomatic progress in the Middle East. This is why President Bush was right in resisting the linkage of the Kuwait and Palestinian problems.

But with Saddam defeated, moderate Arab leaders will gain in stature, America's credibility will be enhanced and Is-

grave doubts about every one of these propositions.

First, I am very skeptical about an international conference. For the United States would be totally isolated at such a forum. The behavior of France just prior to the gulf war is a small foretaste of what would happen. Instead of being a mediator, America would be maneuvered into the role of Israel's lawyer, while Israel would regard any independent position we took as a betrayal of its interests. No sensible nation would voluntarily throw itself into such a maelstrom. Since everything depends on our influence with

Israel anyway, I would much prefer a diplomatic process in which the United States, the moderate Arab countries and Israel are the principal participants.

Second, for Israel a return to pre-1967 borders and the creation of a Palestinian state are not negotiating issues but matters of life and death. The distance from the Jordan River to the sea is less than 50 miles; the corridor between Tel Aviv and Haifa in terms of the 1967 frontiers is about 10 miles wide. It would be difficult to squeeze two states into such a limited area in the best of circumstances. But the PLO has been in mortal conflict with Israel during the entire existence of both groups. How can such an

arrangement possibly be compatible with security?

Moreover, a return to pre-1967 borders would still leave almost as many Arabs under Israeli control as live on the West Bank minus Gaza. How is one going to justify that one group of Arabs must live under Israeli rule while other Arabs are entitled to self-determination? Thus a restoration of pre-1967 borders, coupled with the formation of a Palestinian state, could easily turn into the first step to the further reduction of Israel, if not its ultimate destruction.

Third, acceptance of Israel is not only a legal but above all a psychological challenge. And I find it hard to believe that any legal formula can by itself provide for Israeli security. After all, Kuwait lived in a state of legal peace with Iraq without being able to prevent Iraqi aggression. And Saddam attacked Israel in a war from which Israel had kept totally aloof because it calculated that many Arabs would support Iraq against Israeli retaliation, no matter how justified. American leaders understandably felt this danger real enough to advise against retaliation. But when reaction to an unprovoked attack becomes an international issue, Israel is still certified

ERIC BOUVET—ODYSSEY-MATRIX

Iranians parading in Teheran before Friday prayers

## If Iraq is left too weak, Iran may seek to fill the vacuum

rael will have a breathing space. This new equation should be translated into a major diplomatic effort within a few months of victory. Far from amounting to linkage and a submission to black-mail, such a move, after Saddam has been defeated, should be viewed as an opportunity resulting from the success of the moderate forces.

Progress will depend on a proper perception of the issues involved. The Arab-Israeli problem is usually stated as a negotiating issue: how to convene an international conference that returns Israel to the 1967 frontiers, defines a new status for Jerusalem, induces the Arabs to "accept" Israel and provides international guarantees for the resulting arrangements. I have

46 NEWSWEEK: JANUARY 28, 1991

as a pariah and is held hostage for the actions of others.

Fourth, how does one define "credible guarantees"? After all, even in the case of Kuwait, where there was unanimous international support for the victim (something that would be inconceivable with Israel), it took six months to organize resistance while the country was looted and pillaged and the population expelled.

For all these reasons, the peace process as currently conceived is likely to lead to a dead end. It forces each side to accept something they find unbearably difficult: for the Israelis, it is a Palestinian state; and for the

Arabs, it is the Israeli state. I know of no conflict between Arab nations—let alone between the Arabs and Israel—that has ever been resolved by the method suggested for the Palestinian issue: namely, with one conclusive negotiation resulting in a legal document intended to last for all time.

A revived peace process should begin by redefining the objectives. A final settlement at this moment seems a legalistic mirage. On the other hand, the status quo will sooner or later sound the death knell for moderates on all sides. As it is, too many Israelis consider the peace process a one-sided means to gain acceptance without sacrifice. They are unwilling to give up any occupied territory, or will do so only if de facto Israeli control is maintained. Too many Arabs, especially in the PLO, see in the Middle East a replay of Vietnam, where peace talks were used to soften up the opponent for escalating pressures leading to his ultimate collapse.

An interim solution might seek to introduce the moderate Arab governments, fresh from the victory over Iraq, as a buffer between Israel and the PLO. It might reduce the amount of territory Israel is asked to give up in return for something less than formal peace. A possible approach, mediated by the United States, might unfold like this:

AL JAWAD—SIPA

Syrian troops driving a tank from Damascus to Lebanon

## Even Assad, hardly a moderate, might go along with an interim approach

NEWSWEEK: JANUARY 28, 1991 47

["SR2304\nVER # 00", "DEPT. MWHITA", "CY", "BU: HJ: Y 00454 LINES(INCL.HEAD)\nPG: ISSUE: ; 91A\nSR2304 -MWHITA-PVT\nMWHITA ;01/18,13:45", "By Henry A. Kissinger+", "[1]", "When I first heard that the war had be-\ngun, I thought of President Bush. In a cri-\nsis, and I have been in many, the top people\nare very much alone. When you look at\nmovies, you see people running around,\npicking up telephones, yelling instruc-\ntions. In fact, in a real crisis they get very,\nvery quiet. Many bureaucrats head for the\nfoxholes, occasionally throwing out memo-\ndations & absolute item if\nranda that in effect duck any responsibility\nfor the consequences. Usually there are\nonly two or three people who are willing to\ncarry the burden. President Bush deserves\nenormous credit for his fortitude during\nthe months of build-up-for holding the\ncoalition together, gaining congressional\nsupport and steering us to this point. But\neven in the best-planned operation, there\nare hours in which a leader in his position\nmust wonder why he ever spe-\ntrying to get elected +", "[21]", {"bbox": [782, 1434, 918, 1459], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))))"]

["SR2304", "DEPT.", "into an aggressor. We do not want the re-\nverse situation now - We do not want to\nmake Iraq so weak that its neighbors, espe-\ncially Iran, may be tempted to refill the\nvacuum. To be sure, we should take care\nthat Iraq's Scud missiles are not reintro-\nduced into theMiddle East,lest the connec-\ntion be误made every effort to pre-\nvent them from importing high-technology\nequipment, including high-performance\naircraft with long ranges, and from reac-\nquiring the means to manufacture biologi-\ncal and nuclear weapons. But Iraq's capaci-\nty to defend itself against ground attack\nfrom its neighbors should be maintained\nwithin a limit\nlimin\nlimin\nlimin\nlimin\nlim

SR2304

DEPT.

everything on one ~~throw of the dice.~~ One can appeal to his understanding of the balance of power. As long as he is not tempted by vacuums, he is likely to behave with prudence.+

[18]

We must also not forget the potential for renewed Soviet designs on the region. For the time being, ~~because of their~~ domestic problems, the Soviets ~~are in no position to~~ run any significant risks outside their borders. But over the long term, they will become more and more preoccupied with the 50 million Moslems that are now part of the USSR. After they have restored some domestic equilibrium, they may become more active day-to-day players in the Middle East-especially in the countries like Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey that border the Soviet Union. After a while, this process might conceivably drive them toward the goal of restoring the internal equilibrium in Middle East countries. If the Moslems stay inside the Soviet Union, Moscow will be wary of the radical Arabs for fear that they will inflame the Soviet Moslem population. But if the Soviet Moslem republics break off and become independent, then Moscow may begin to support radical Moslem republics.

(((MORE))))

["SR2304", "DEPT.", "altitudes of\nthe 1980s, when oil seemed plentiful and\neverybody forgot about an alternative en-\nergy policy. +", "[17]", "Finally, and most importantly, a new\nbalance of power will revive prospects for\nprogress on the Arab-Israeli conflict. With-\nin a few months or even weeks after an\nAmerican victory, I strongly favor a major\ndiplomatic effort on this front. This should\nnot be seen as linkage. The issue of linkage\nwould have arisen only if we had purchased\nSaddam's withdrawal from Kuwait by\nmeeting other demands that had nothing\nto do with his original aggression. Now that\nwe are on the way toward forcing Iraq out of\nKuwait by military means, we will have to met the\nunresolved issue of linkage at a later date.\nThe issue of linkage no\nlonger exists. But the process depends on a proper\nperception of the situation involved.", "[15]", "Nor do I think the appropriate way to\naddress the Palestinian issue is with a so-\ncalled international peace conference. I am\nagainst such a forum on merit. At such a\nconference, the United States would be to-\ntally isolated. Instead of being a mediator,\nwe would be maneuvered into the position", (((MORE))))", "[Y]"]

[Y]

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 1/18/1991

The Arab-Israeli problem is usually stated as if it were a negotiating issue: how to convene an international conference that gets Israel to return to the '67 frontiers, defines a new status for Jerusalem, induces the Arabs to "accept" Israel and provides international guarantees for the resulting arrangements. I have my doubts about every one of these propositions.

First, I am very sceptical about the utility of an international conference. It was taken for granted that at the end of the Gulf conflict a peace conference of some kind would be created. And the only question remaining was how to go about pretending that something that was in fact being lied about was not. And, de facto, it would have been Saddam who

SR2304

DEPT.

of being the lawyer for Israel, even though
Israel would consider any position we took
as betraying its interest. We would be
caught between all parties. If we look at the
behavior of France, for example, in the last
phases of the diplomacy before war broke
out, it is just a small indication of what
might happen at an international peace
conference.→

□In fact, I believe the entire Palestinian
issue has been misstated. It is always put in
terms of who is going to make what conces-
sions. Rarely do we ask the right question:
what are we really trying to achieve? Ev-
erybody seems to think we want a return to
pre-1967 borders and a new status for Jeru-
salem-and that the only problem is how to
maneuver all parties into accepting this.
But I am not sure this is the right way to
look at it. After all, few Arabs seemed to be
happy with the pre-1967 borders at the
time. And Israeli withdrawal from the oc-
cupied territories would still leave as many
Arabs under Israeli control as live on the
West Bank, minus Gaza. Over time, how is
one going to explain that those Arabs must
live under Israeli rule while other Arabs

[16]

( (( MORE )) )

["SR2304", "DEPT.", "are entitled to whatever emerges from the negotiating process?+", "There is another problem with the so-called pre-1967 solution. It forces the Israelis to accept a Palestinian state, which is unbearably difficult for them. And it forces the Arabs to ratify and explicitly endorse the existence of Israel, which is unbearably difficult for them. We have to remember that most of the Palestinians that support the PLO do not come from the West Bank. They come from inside the pre-1967 borders of Israel. This approach to peace talks has aborted from the beginning because it arouses such tremendous passions on all sides. I know of no conflict between Arab nations-let alone between the Arabs and Israel-that has ever been resolved in the way it is suggested the Palestinian issue should be settled: namely, with one conclusive negotiation resulting in a legal document that is supposed to last for all eternity.", "[20]", "[21]", "Instead, we need to begin a process not seek a settlement on the key psychological negotiations that will move the Arab Israeli issue forward. This means that Israel", (((MORE))))"]

SR2304

DEPT.

The moderate Arab states would commit
themselves to demilitarizing these areas
under UN supervision.

[3]

Israel would give up all of Gaza and the
most heavily populated areas of the West
Bank, retaining only areas it considers es-
sential to its security. But it would be al-
lowed to retain some way of verifying the
demilitarization of any territory it
evacuates.

[7]

The nature of the governments in these
areas would be established by the trustees.
As a practical matter, they would undoubt-
edly put into power individuals acceptable
to the PLO, or even PLO members, but they
would probably be moderates.

[6]

In short, what is needed is the willing
to take intermediate steps. If this par-
ticular scenario turns out to be impractical,
then we must come up with some other way
in which we can find a solution that
will avoid the theological disputes that now
arise around this problem. The aftermath of
an allied victory over Iraq will offer a rare
opportunity. To begin with, the PLO will
have lost much of its influence over the
moderate Arabs. Arafat has already made a
mistake in not choosing a leader who is
(MORE TO COME)

[y]

SR2304

DEPT.

And Saddam Hussein would have tried to dominate his neighbors even if the Palestinian conflict didn't exist. But what the Arab-Israeli conflict has done is to make it difficult for the forces of moderation in the Arab world to cooperate with their supporters in the West. A victory over Iraq will present a historic opportunity to alter that equation-and it should be seized.

(((END)))

[22]