November 19, 1957

Subject: Reorganization of the Department of Defense

## INTRODUCTION

The National Security Act, which provides the basic organization of the Department of Defense, is ten years old. Experience under that Act indicates that the existing organization, based upon separate ground, sea, and air forces, continues to be inadequate on two main grounds: one, inadequate to permit the development of a unified doctrine to guide the preparation of military plans and the unified direction necessary for the carrying out of operations; and, two, inadequate to permit the application of many sound business principles to the functions of a logistic and administrative nature.

Presented below is a series of recommendations for reorganization of the Department of Defense which, taken together, provide an improved concept of defense organization aimed at overcoming the inadequacies cited above. The improved concept includes (1) realignment of operational forces under truly unified commands in accordance with the major military missions of the nation, (2) establishment of a chain of command over operations from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified commanders, (3) strengthening the professional staff available to the President and the Secretary of Defense by providing a unified staff to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (h) preservation of the military departments

as the agencies of the Department of Defense responsible for logistic and administrative functions, and (5) strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the research and development functions carried on in the Department so that he may obtain the most productive utilization of research and development funds, personnel, and facilities.

We believe that the adoption of the recommendations set forth below will eliminate the basic weaknesses in defense organization which must be corrected before it will be possible fully to solve other problems, present and future, relating to defense. In making these recommendations, we are limiting them to the most important improvements needed. It is realized that, as these key improvements are installed, many additional details of organization and relationships will have to be developed. Our belief is that they can follow readily and within the framework here proposed.

In discussing each recommendation, we indicate the basic steps necessary for implementation. It will be seen that these steps often combine legislative and administrative actions, usually the elimination of existing legal barriers or prohibitions followed by positive administrative action by the President or the Secretary of Defense. The last recommendation proposes an approach to the manner in which they might be presented to the Congress. Tab A lists the major statutory changes needed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation No. 1 -- That the operational forces of the nation be organized under truly unified commands (to be established or changed by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, from time to time as needed), rather than through the three military departments as at present.

At the higher levels of command, missions must be stated in broad terms which combine the traditional functions of ground, sea, and air forces. A serious weakness of our command structure is that current defense organization is based upon the assignment of combatant functions and roles and missions according to the mode of travel (on the ground, at sea, and in the air). That organization is incompatible with the establishment of higher commands which necessarily must employ all those modes.

Except in occasional isolated situations, there is no longer any such thing as a separate ground, sea, or air battle. Recognition of that fact demands that operational forces in the field be aligned under unified commands. This is the greatest signle organizational lesson learned from our nation's military experience since Pearl Harbor.

We do not today have truly unified commands. The authority of the unified commander over his supposedly subordinate component commanders is not clear. The unified commander may fully command the units from his service in his command, but the units from the other services are commanded by their own officers and are under the unified commander only for operational control. "Operational control" is a

dangerous concept since it implies something less than full command.

The separate service elements in a unified command are separately administered and largely separately supplied.

To establish truly unified commands it is necessary to remove the separate military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force) from direct responsibilities for military operations. All operational forces should be under unified commands established by the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President. Those commands should be changed from time to time as the evolving requirements of national defense dictate. Their number should be kept small, possibly not exceeding five or six at a time. Basically, the missions assigned to the commands should represent the major military objectives at any given time. Combatant functions and roles and missions should be assigned directly to those commands by the Secretary, with the President's approval, not to the separate services as at present. The commanders should accordingly report directly to the Secretary of Defense and receive their orders from him.

Each unified commander should fully command those military units regularly assigned to him; they should be organic to his command and not simply placed under his operational control. In addition to those elements organic to his command, the commander would probably have other elements attached from time to time, either from a general reserve or on detachment from another command. When elements are so attached, he should likewise command them until they are removed from his command.

by order of the Secretary of Defense. By the assignment of organic units and the attachment of others, an optimum deployment could be made at all times, combining stability of command with flexible arrangement of units.

The military personnel in a unified command would be from the several military personnel systems — Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The commander would have full command over the personnel in his command, including the authority to discipline them in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Each commander would be expected to adopt special insignia symbolic of his mission and require the wearing of such insignia by all personnel in the command.

**Implementation - Recommendation No. 1 can be accomplished by**

(a) Legislation to amend those sections of law regarding the combatant functions of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and to grant authority for the Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the President, to establish unified commands and to adjust their combatant functions from time to time.

(b) Legislation to remove the responsibilities of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for command over operations.

(c) Administrative action by the Secretary, with the approval of the President, to realign the command structure following enactment of authorising legislation. Among the administrative actions would be revision or replacement of the directive on roles and missions of the armed forces.

Recommendation No. 2 -- That the chain of command over operations be from the President through the Secretary of Defense directly to the commanders of the unified forces.

Command organization is most effective when there is a minimum of organisational levels between the Commander-in-Chief and his major operational commanders. Each intervening level courts delay, duplication, indecision, reinterpretation of reports and commands, and confusion of authority. The Secretary of Defense, as principal assistant to the President, rightfully belongs in the chain of command next below the President. The interposition of any other intervening layer can only weaken and confuse the relationship which the President should maintain with the commanders. This means removal of the secretaries of the military departments and their military chiefs from the chain of command.

To make command effective at the highest level of the national government and to assure that the exercise of national command by the legally and politically responsible officials is fully supported by professionals with technical competence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported, as proposed in Recommendation No. 3, by a unified military staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff managed by him, would be made responsible by the Secretary to serve as the Department of Defense's executive agent over all the unified commands. This does not mean that the Chairman would exercise command over the unified commanders, but that he would make effective the commands of the President and the Secretary of Defense. He would manage, among other things, an operations division on the unified staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and using

it as a national command post would transmit orders to, and receive reports from, the unified commands over operational forces. All orders transmitted to the unified commands would be under the authority of, and in the name of, the Secretary or the President and would state: "By direction of the Secretary of Defense" or "By direction of the President."

The Chairman, placed in such a role regarding the unified commands, should not serve as the Secretary's executive agent over the three military departments. The civilian heads of those departments would continue in the same relationship to the President and the Secretary of Defense as at present. Directives from the President and the Secretary to them would be issued as at present and not by or through a uniformed officer.

To promote effective operations under the unified commands in the field, the commanders should be able to request personnel and logistic support which in their view is necessary to carry out their missions. Such requests could include the assignment of specific officers to serve in the command. Requests would be made to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would be the task of the Chairman to review the requests, using the unified staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense based on a balancing of requirements for, and requests from, all commanders of operational forces.

Requests approved by the Secretary of Defense would be communicated in a directive from the Secretary to the head of the appropriate military department. The entire procedure should be so geared that the approval or veto of a request from an operational commander would be made only after balancing his requests against needs elsewhere and that no military department, for service reasons, could deny the commander the materiel and men he needs.

### Implementation - Recommendation No. 2 can be accomplished by

(a) Legislation to amend existing laws so that the military departments, their civilian heads, and military chiefs are removed from responsibilities for command over operations.

(b) Administrative action by the Secretary, with the approval of the President, to make effective the command relationships described above, including a revision or replacement of the directive on roles and missions of the armed forces.

### Recommendation No. 3 -- (a) That the role and responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be substantially strengthened;

(1) by placing the Chairman in full control over the professional staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense [Responsible for strategic plans, intelligence, military personnel, operations, supply and logistics, and installations, and similar matters];

(2) by organizing such staff on a truly unified, not joint, basis,

(3) by taking steps to make service on the unified staff under the Joint Chiefs of Staff the most sought after duty in any military career; and

(b) That the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as presently composed, be retained, and in their corporate capacity advise the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS on requiring broad military experience and mature professional judgment.

If the military departments are removed from direct responsibilities over military operations and are restricted to functions of a logistic and administrative nature, it is possible to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, with the authority of the Chairman strengthened. He should be authorized to control fully the staff under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which should be organized as a unified staff. The Joint Chiefs as a body would be concerned with providing to the President, the Secretary, and the Chairman professional military advice which would aid in giving strategic direction to the armed services.

Actions should be taken so that service on the unified staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be highly attractive to military officers. One step in that direction would be to give automatic temporary rank promotions to all personnel who serve satisfactorily for six months on the staff and, when they leave after 18 or more months of satisfactory service, to revert them to their former ranks but at the top of the promotion lists.

The staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has always been weak in bringing to bear non-military factors (scientific, economic, psychological, etc.) in their staff work. Accordingly, the Chairman should be given a special responsibility to see that competent civilian advisers are adequately consulted on nonmilitary aspects of problems by the staff. Such civilian specialists should not be integrated into the professional

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military staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They should be available
to advise the Secretary, the Chairman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Implementation** - Recommendation No. 3 can be accomplished by amending the provisions of law relating to the functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and various military personnel statutes.

Recommendation No. 4 - That the three military departments be continued as agencies of the Department of Defense responsible for functions of a logistic and administrative nature.

The three military departments, each with a civilian head, would continue to function as important elements within the Department of Defense. The military departments would continue to be composed of both military and civilian personnel. The civilian heads of the military departments would continue to report to and be directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Chairman should in no way be imposed between military departments and the Secretary of Defense.

With the removal of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force from direct responsibilities for military operations, the heads of the military departments would be in much better position to concentrate on their vital roles as executives for the logistic and administrative programs of the Department of Defense. In terms of the broad concept, the military departments would function as the legally fixed, permanent agencies of the Department of Defense for the execution of programs whereby the United States Government mobilises the armed forces

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of the nation ready for operational deployment; the unified operational commands, on the other hand, would be the flexible military machine of the nation in being, organised by executive action according to the military missions of the time.

Removed from responsibility for operations and with their relationships to their top military officers clarified and simplified, the heads of the military departments would be better able to assist the Secretary of Defense in the application of sound business practices in the manpower and materiel functions of the Department of Defense. Each civilian head of a military department would continue to administer, with the assistance of a military chief, those present units of the military department which exercise cognisance over the procurement, organisation, and supply of military manpower and materiel.

There are several ways of drawing the line between the functions of the unified commands and the military departments, and detailed plans would have to be provided. In any event, they would not be entirely novel. Somewhat similar arrangements exist today in the Navy Department between the fleets and the shore establishment, and in the Department of the Air Force between the Strategic Air Command and the rest of the Department. Much of the World War II experience of the War Department should also be pertinent in the development of such arrangements.

We have given consideration to whether the civilian heads of the military departments should continue to be Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force or should be changed to Deputy Secretaries of

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Defense for Army, Navy, and Air Force. **Alternative:** Our conclusion is that they should continue as at present. The positions of Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force have attained acceptance and provide proper titles for the civilian heads of the three military departments. If their titles were changed to Deputy Secretaries of Defense, a number of new and confusing issues would be raised which are extraneous to the basic reorganization which we are proposing. For example, an awkward matter would arise as to whether the present Under and Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force could be continued and, if so, with what changes in their titles?** **Alternative:** Our conclusion is that they should be changed to Deputy Secretaries of Defense. Such a change would emphasize that those officials are in fact officials of the Department of Defense, not the heads of separate agencies. Moreover, this change would increase their salaries and be a promotion in protocol.

**Implementation** - Accomplishment of Recommendations Nos. 1, 2, and 3 would automatically result in accomplishment of Recommendation No. 1.

**Recommendation No. 5** -- That the statutory authority for all research and development functions in the Department of Defense be transferred to the Secretary of Defense; that all research and development funds be appropriated to the Secretary; and that the Secretary, aided by an Assistant Secretary of Defense, take steps to assign projects and allot funds, personnel, and facilities among the research and development programs of the military departments and to establish a centralized Defense Department research and development program so as to obtain the most productive utilization of resources for research and development.

The purpose of this recommendation is to place the Secretary of Defense in full authority over the research and development functions, funds, personnel, and facilities in the Department so that he may

In making this recommendation, we have used the standard phrase "research and development." However, that phrase often embraces three distinct types of activities; namely, basic research, applied research, and development — each of which may require different organisational arrangements. A great deal of activities would be expected to be undertaken by the military departments and the operational forces aimed at the development of new methods, techniques, and tactics related directly to their basic assignments. The operations of a central research and development office in the Department of Defense should certainly take these factors into account.

**Implementation** - Recommendation No. 5 can be accomplished by

(a) Legislation to transfer to the Secretary of Defense all authority for research and development functions in the Department of Defense,

(b) Amendments to the appropriation structure of the Department to provide direct appropriation of research and development funds to the Secretary of Defense,

(c) Administrative action by the Secretary to assign responsibilities for the research and development activities throughout the Department,

Recommendation No. 6 — That legislation be proposed by the President to the Congress (a) to remove existing statutory prohibitions and (b) to provide any necessary authority to permit a reorganization of the Department of Defense in accordance with the concept embodied in the above five recommendations.