Cambridge 20, Mass.
& Divinity Ave.
cc: Dr. Kieزلger

T. B. Wainwright

Sincerely,

Set together?

or send me a cable from Paris, to let me know when we can
will you give me a call when you arrive in the States.

Have you stay overnight with us.

Come up on the 12th, my wife and I will be very happy to
York City by car, and it you and Mrs. Kieزلger can come to
on August 13 or 14. Eaton is a 2½-hour drive from New
in Eaton, Connecticut, where I am staying for the summer.
Factory and I will meet as an alternate date a discussion
return date to the States, however, this may not be possible
in New York on the evening of August 11. In view of your
I will have the three of us might have dinner together.

Receive the brochures John von Neumann Institute.

an abonnement with you for Edward Teiler and myself to
I understand you are expected on August 6, pending to make
on August 10. I am writing you in Paris, therefore, where
learn that you are in Europe and expected pack in Boston
I tried to reach you by phone this morning, only to

Dear Henry:

Paris, France
Hotel Mont Royal
Dr. Henry V. Kieزلger

August 1, 1960

Cambridge 38, Mass.

cc: Dr. Kießinger

which of the above places would suit him better.

I am looking forward to hearing from you about

date.

on August 11. Perhaps he could see you there on that

alternatively, Edward Teller will be in Boston

thus afternoon.

my summer piece, just in case you see some to come

beyond. I'm enclosing a map giving directions to

from Boston by car, almost all of the distance by
time for us to go there. Reason is only 3½ paces

August 14, in Boston. Connection would be the best

aftersily, and it now appears that roughly afternoon,

since that writing,iane paves been changed

Institute.

and we letter this month to discuss the John von Neumann

I wrote you on the title of the month about the

Dear Henry:

Patty, Mance
Hotel, Ponte Vedra
Dr. Henry V. Kießinger

August 2, 1960

DR. EDWARD TELLER'S SCHEDULE
EAST COAST VISIT 11 to 17 AUGUST

Thursday, 11th
Arrive New York City. Stay at Biltmore Hotel.
(Reservation confirmed)

Friday, 12th
Breakfast at 0800 with Messrs. Walkowicz and Nunziato at Biltmore. 0907 train from Grand Central to North White Plains to visit Nuclear Development Corporation of America. NDA will provide car. Return to NYC on completion of visit there. Mr. Nunziato will accompany you to NDA.

Saturday, 13th
Noon - New London with Admiral Rickover

Sunday, 14th
Admiral Rickover to provide car to take Dr. Teller to Easton, Connecticut where he will meet with Mr. Walkowicz.

Monday, 15th
0947 Allegheny flight 921 from Bridgeport to Washington, D. C. with J. Saville. Arr. 11:38A

Meeting with Electronic Teaching Laboratories. They will have a car to meet you at the Allegheny counter at the airport.

Meeting with Allen Dulles in afternoon.

Tuesday, 16th
*of Thermo-Electron Corp.
1820 depart for Boston via American Airlines flight 356 arriving 1955. Stay overnight at Ritz-Carlton (reservation made). On arrival, phone Elias Gyftopoulos* - Eliot 4-7505; Home: Mission 3-7414 to arrange date for Tuesday morning (not date, but rendezvous place)

Rockefeller N19T Beechcraft plane to pick up at Bedford Airport (Civilian Terminal) at noon and fly to Amityville, L. I.

1300 GASL (General Applied Science Laboratories) car will pick up at Amityville Airport and drive to Westbury, L. I. for visit with Dr. Antonio Ferri and Mr. B. J. Driscoll at GASL.

Dinner with Thiokol group in evening.

Wednesday, 17th
Taxi to LaGuardia for American flight 202 at 0755 to Boston (reservation confirmed). Arrive 0900. GCA (Geophysics Corp. of America) car will meet you for visit with Milton Greenberg of GCA. GCA car will return you to airport for American flight 517 at 1555 to Idlewild at 1710 for connecting flight via United flight 801 at 1815 to San Francisco (arriving 2100 in SFO (reservations confirmed))

September 25, 1961

Mr. T. F. Walkowicz
30 Rockefeller Plaza
Room 5600
New York 20, New York

Dear Ted:

Many thanks for your letter
of September 6th. It was very sweet of you
to write.

As for my personal decision,
it is being made for me by our policies.

Maybe we can have a talk when
I come to New York next, or conversely, when
you come to Boston I hope you will let me know.

Kind regards.

30 Rockefeller Plaza

New York 20, N.Y.

Room 5600

March 7, 1962

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
AND
Dr. Edward Teller
University of California
Lawrence Radiation Laboratory
Berkeley 4, California

Dear Edward and Henry:

Ferenc Nagy, former prime minister of Hungary, has talked to me about a seminar series which he has arranged, having to do with the future of Europe in general, and Central Europe in particular. These seminars take place here in New York City, across the street from the UN Building, and he is hopeful that you will both agree to participate in one which can be scheduled at your mutual convenience sometime around May 30 or 31.

This is just a note to tell you both, what you already know, that Mr. Nagy's ideas and objectives surely would appeal to you both, and that I hope you will find it possible to accept his invitation. If you should, I would like to get in an early plea that we plan to spend a half a day and an evening together when you are both in New York City, just talking about the future. I have nothing specific in mind, just the thought that whenever two great minds like yours get together in the presence of a good recording secretary, something useful is bound to come of it. Besides, it is always good to see the two of you any time.

All best regards to your wives and to the two of you.

March 20, 1962

Dear Edward:

Regarding yours of March 15, I am forwarding copies of your schedule to Menke in White Plains, and Greenberg and Hatsopoulos in Boston, with the thought that they can contact Gen Greteman and each other directly, to arrange the most appropriate scheduling of your time. When Gen Greteman has a program laid out with these gentlemen, I would appreciate her calling Mrs. Marlow and letting us know, so that we can rendezvous with you at some point.

Regarding your letter of March 12, Mr. Nagy is delighted that you will participate in his program on May 30 or 31, but we have not heard from Henry yet. With the 30th a holiday, perhaps the 31st would be best. We will let you know as soon as Henry gives us some response.

I am circulating the rest of your letter of March 12 as appropriate, and will be in touch with you in due course.

cc: Messrs. Greenberg
Hatsopoulos
Menke
Kissinger

March 30, 1962

Mr. T. F. Walkowicz
Room 5600
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Dear Ted:

Thank you for your letter of March 20.
I may be in Europe at the time of the meeting.
If I am here, I would prefer the 31st of May
to the 30th.

I hope you will keep me posted on this,
and I in turn will let you know if it turns
out that I will be out of the country.

Kind regards.

[Y]

April 30, 1962

Dear Ted:

Many thanks for your note of the 28th.
Unhappily, I will be leaving for South America on
the 28th or 29th of May and will be sorry to miss
doing the Nagy program.

Kind regards.

[lc]

August 30, 1962

Dear Edward:

Thanks for your letter from Los Angeles.

I am sorry I can't meet with you Saturday evening, September 15, since we will still be in the country. Sunday evening, the 16th, is perfectly suitable and I have learned that Dave Griggs is willing to stay in New York an extra day in order to be with us.

We will write to Henry to see if he can join us.

Look forward to seeing you next month.

cc: Drs. David T. Griggs
Henry A. Kissinger✓

August 31, 1962

Dear Mr. Walkowicz:

This will confirm a telephone conversation I had today with someone in your office answering your telephone during your absence and that of your secretary.

Your letter of August 30th has arrived in Mr. Kissinger's absence. He is not expected back in this country until the 15th or 16th of September. I, therefore, consider it highly unlikely that he will be able to attend a meeting with you and Edward Teller on the 16th. As he is travelling in Europe, it may be difficult to convey your message to him. However, I will try to do so, and there is a possibility that you will hear from him directly one way or the other before his return.

December 30, 1963

Aviation DAILY

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# THE MCNAMARA ADMINISTRATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (Analysis--Part II)

As the Johnson Administration takes shape, Washington observers who believe many Cabinet changes are inevitable seem to think Defense Secretary McNamara may continue indefinitely in his post. McNamara himself has publicly pledged to stay "as long as I can administer defense policy to the President's satisfaction."

Assuming his continuance in the job, it is in order to review his first three years under Kennedy, and a month under Johnson. The McNamara performance to date may provide grounds for speculation about how the business of defense will be conducted in an election year, under a new chief executive obviously still enjoying the advantages of his honeymoon period in office and who just as plainly has been running for election every second since assuming the reins of government. Under Johnson's hand the administration of cabinet posts, including Defense, is likely to assume more political overtones. Whether this fact will run counter to McNamara's president-of-the-corporation concepts of his job remains to be seen.

"POLITICAL" AS A TERM applied to Pentagon administration tends to be oriented to internal, in-the-executive-family maneuvering, rather than to more obvious party politics. Essentially, and instinctively a politician, Johnson has proved adept at both brands in the past. Nor does the new President believe that politics per se has any undesirable connotations. Where Kennedy tended to submerge himself to his view of the public interest, to Johnson politics is synonymous with the public interest--he runs to meet it as a practice of the subtle "art of the possible."

Despite its attempts to publicize innovations and new approaches to defense, a review of McNamara Pentagon administration indicates almost no bold technological advances--in systems or weaponry development. Quite the contrary has been the case. Cost-effectiveness and extreme technological conservatism have been stressed.

"Program definition phase" has been given a prominent place in Pentagon jargon--and pushing weapons development beyond state-of-the-art technology is in plain disfavor. Instead of "enterprising," the term most often applied to DDR&E Director Harold Brown and his family of civilian development people has been "cautious"--to stop just a short step this side of the word "stodgy". Studies and re-studies have delayed any really new technological advance in weaponry in the interest of authorizing only concepts whose performance seems 99.9% assured. This is hardly a policy that can be described as pushing the borders of a "bold new frontier."

All the most imaginative departures in the family of U.S. military weapons systems today were conceived and carried out under a prior regime. These include the entire family of ICBMs, the Polaris submarine and its missile, and the basic concepts for the Nike Zeus anti-missile missile. Even the ill-fated XB-70 and Dyna-Soar were conceived and the programs begun long before the advent of McNamara. Their innovations were branded tenuous, if not impractical. The controversial TFX design which the current Pentagon regime claims as its own was accepted primarily on the basis that it "provides something for everybody" all in a single neat package. But even in this instance the design chosen was short of all the really new, imaginative technological development available.

ALTHOUGH NUCLEAR PROPULSION of major surface vessels is a demonstrated success, the Navy has been directed to accept a conventionally powered carrier following the nuclear-propelled Enterprise and nuclear design for other ships in the fleet has been slowed almost to a standstill. These decisions have been based on cost-effectiveness considerations--despite the fact that lifetime fuel costs for a new conventional carrier were left conveniently unmentioned in comparing its cost with the currently more expensive nuclear-propelled vessel.

Only two major new manned aircraft have been authorized for development and production during the three-year McNamara regime--the all-purpose TFX and the cargo-carrying C-141, which McNamara himself has characterized as a strictly state-of-the-art design. In a ballistic missiles area, the current Pentagon administration has confined its efforts almost entirely to buying a larger supply of missiles such as Polaris and Minuteman, conceived and built as major technological breakthroughs by a prior regime.

An inkling of a possible new move toward technological innovation and progress, the decision to proceed with development of Gemini X/MOL has generally been found encouraging. But again in

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December 30, 1963

Aviation DAILY

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MCNAMARA (Cont.)

this instance, widely hailed as the belated entry of DOD into military space development, the entire problem of space rendezvous (manifestly pushing the state of the art) has been cautiously by-passed for the time being. But nevertheless, the decision to pursue active development of a military manned space station is the first real indication the McNamara regime wishes to engage in pioneering research directly related to a system at long last.

Cost-effectiveness has dictated the cancellation of many development programs since the advent of McNamara Pentagon management. For the Air Force this meant: (1) cessation of ANP development in which $511.6 million had been invested; (2) a halt of the Snark program after $667.4 million had been spent; (3) cancellation of Skybolt after expenditures of $440 million; (4) stopping mobile Minute-man development upon which $108.4 million was spent; and (5) the recent halting of Dyna-Soar, a program expected to cost $420 million through costs of cancellation.

NAVY LOST THE EAGLE missile after an investment of $53 million; and its Sugar Grove large radio antenna device was cancelled after $70 million was spent. Army was directed to cancel development of its AN/USD 5 drone after investing $103.3 million; the Nike-Zeus program was deemed unprofitable in terms of ultimate production authorization and reoriented as the Nike-X, with the introduction of a new Sprint missile, The Advent communications satellite concept was also removed from Army development, downgraded to a medium-altitude orbiter, and given to the Air Force.

In many cases these cancellations were prompted by an attempt to avoid sending more funds down the drain in programs showing little potential. Discontinuing them was part of the McNamara regime's attempt to put weapons development on a sound fiscal basis--to eliminate "technological risk" wherever possible. The aim has been generally to tighten up management and administrative procedures. Most of the sweeping McNamara changes in DOD have furthered this objective.

Purchase of routine supply and maintenance items has been placed under the centralized Defense Supply Agency. A similar inter-service coordination was achieved with the creation of a new Defense Intelligence Agency. Budgeting on a five-year projection of DOD needs, packaged without regard to service department boundaries, is now an accepted fact--although it has been superimposed on the old, legally mandatory system of annual line-item budgets broken down into allocations directly to the three armed services and DOD itself.

The greatest technological progress attributable directly to the McNamara regime has also, characteristically, been related directly to "management" considerations. Notable progress has been made toward direction of the entire mix of the nation's weapons systems through initial work toward establishing a truly national command-and-control system, instantly responsive to Presidential order throughout every level of the command pyramid. In justification of its unwillingness to relate development demand-ing real technological breakthroughs directly to any specific system effort, the McNamara regime has argued that such pre-development research is being conducted--largely to provide the sound technical "building blocks" that will later be incorporated in systems--whose initiation is apparently still far in the future.

IN SUMMARY, THEN: McNamara and his associates have proved themselves able managers, willing to work long hours and invest detailed personal involvement in an effort to streamline defense management and make it more efficient. On the positive side, their administration has undoubtedly made the nation better defended than when they took over--particularly in the areas of limited, conventional war, where airlift augmentation and a concentration on new limited war logistics and weapons was badly needed.

Budgeting and contracting reforms show every prospect of eliminating unnecessary duplication and waste and their effects can be expected to be increasingly felt. These changes will continue--with the possibility that ultimately legislative changes will recognize in law the changes achieved purely by administrative directive to date.

Because DDR&E's vaunted technological "building blocks" approach to needed breakthroughs tends to keep progress in technology under wraps, assessments of its true enterprise or quality will have

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December 30, 1963

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## MCNAMARA (Cont.)

wait--presumably until DOD decides to incorporate such findings directly in actual systems development. Gemini X/MOL may turn out to be the first major step in the direction of more technological enterprise. To date the McNamara regime has been largely content to leave much of the "far out" scientific effort to its civilian cousin, NASA.

History may rule that McNamara and his people were entirely right in taking three years out to do a complex, badly needed and largely thankless job of reorganizing Pentagon management. Maybe their intelligence information tells them these were the opportune years--a period when they could afford to "coast" technologically, using up the scientific capital developed for them under the "crash" ICBM and Polaris programs of a prior administration--programs which undoubtedly saved the nation during one of its most trying periods of readjustment.

No new crisis of the magnitude of Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, the flight of the first sputnik, or the development of Russian ICBMs has confronted the Pentagon during McNamara's tenure. Whether the nation's vital defense is entirely amenable to "fiscally sound, sensible" development procedures is not yet apparent. Only history will tell whether the three years since 1960 were occupied to the best advantage in DOD. Did McNamara consolidate earlier gains that were monetarily too costly, to the nation's advantage? Or should we have continued to seek new technological breakthroughs at any cost, to increase the margin of superiority over the Soviets?

History is likely to show that the first three McNamara years produced DOD managerial reforms amounting to genius. Will it be equally kind in the matter of research and development progress? Most observers in the scientific community are inclined to say "no."

* * *

## CONTRACTS

### NAVY

**IT&T Corp., Industrial Laboratories div., $1 million for R&D on an image-handling mechanism to be employed by surveillance systems. Work will be done at Fort Wayne, Ind.**

**E.W. Bliss Co., Aircraft Launching & Recovery Equipment div., $600,000 for development of jet aircraft catapults as a modification of Marine Corps Short Airfield and Tactical Support (SATS) program. Work to be done at Drexel Hill, Pa.**

### U.S. COAST GUARD

**IT&T Corp., New Jersey div., $750,000 for development of a precision radio altimeter for use in helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. Work to be performed at Nutley, N.J.**

* * *

## AIRBORNE RADAR SYSTEM'S 48-DAY TEST CALLED SUCCESSFUL

North American Aviation's Autonetics division's airborne radar system, which underwent a coast-to-coast demonstration between Nov. 2 and Dec. 20, was reported to have performed free of failures for more than 1500 hours of the test. The system which has the capability of automatically guiding high-speed aircraft over rugged terrain at a pre-set low altitude while giving the pilot directional information, features a data processor with solid-state electronic circuits.

Using a CV-240 for the tour, which included representatives from DOD, the Air Force and major defense industries, Autonetics engineers said the modified R-14 NASARR radar is the first system with simultaneous automatic terrain following, manual terrain following and manual terrain avoidance capabilities. The automatic terrain following mode guides the plane at a prescribed altitude while manual terrain avoidance gives the pilot a broad radar view of the terrain ahead, permitting selection of flight path alternatives. The radar system has four displays--plan position indicator (PPI), three-dimensional terrain, elevation angle and manual terrain following.

* * *

BOEING'S AERO-SPACE DIV. reports that 4000 persons have completed its value engineering training program since it was inaugurated in June 1962.