December 20, 1960

Dean Acheson, Esq.
Covington & Burling
Union Trust Building
Washington 5, D.C.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

Thank you for your nice letter of December 14th and
your kind words about my article.

I was extremely distressed by your paragraph about the
first chapter of my book. Nothing was further from my mind than
to give you pain. In rereading the chapter, I can see where some
passages might lend themselves to the interpretation that I was
making no distinction in the conduct of our foreign policy over
the last fifteen years. However, in listing the constructive
achievements during this period I have drawn every example from
the Democratic Administration. Similarly, every specific policy
I criticized was in the Republican Administration.

It did seem to me that the relative decline in the
American position can be perhaps most dramatically illustrated
by comparing our situation in 1945 with that in 1960. It may be,
however, that in striving for dramatic effect, I gave an impression
completely contrary to my convictions.

If there should be a second printing of my book, I will
make sure that this misunderstanding cannot possibly arise in any-
one else's mind. But above all I would like you to understand that
the implication was unintentional.

With admiration and kind regards.

Henry V. Kreeger

Sincerely yours,

the implication was unintentional.
one else's mind. But above all I would like you to understand that
I make sure that this misunderstanding cannot basically arise in any
way comparing our situation in 1942 with that in 1960. It may be,
American position can be perhaps most dramatically illustrated
It should be a second printing of my book. I will

however, that in striving for dramatic effect, I have an impression

that I will completely contradict my convictions.

I criticized was in the Republican Administration.
the Democratic Administration. Similarly, every specific policy
achievements during this period I have drawn every example from
the last fifteen years. However, in relating the constructive
making no distinction in the conduct of our foreign policy over
passages might lend themselves to the interpretation that I was
to give you pain. In reading the chapter, I can see where some
first chapter of my book. Morning was further from my mind than
I was extremely distracted by your paragraph about the
your kind words about my article.
Thank you for your nice letter of December 14th and

Dear Mr. Acheson:

Washington 2, D.C.
Union Trust Building
Covington & Burling
Dean Acheson, Ed.

December 30, 1960

COVINGTON & BURLING

UNION TRUST BUILDING

WASHINGTON 5, D. C.

December 22, 1960

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I did not suspect you of wishing to cause me pain, nor did I wish to distress you but merely to raise a point which I thought had escaped your notice.

Is a comparison of 1945 with 1960 a really relevant comparison? In 1945 we were at the peak of our wartime power, as Lincoln had made us in 1865. Would any sensible foreign policy have attempted to maintain that complete mobilization? In 1945 we had the most ephemeral of all advantages, a lead in scientific knowledge on nuclear fission. No one expected it to last more than a decade. It lasted less than half of that.

Two great states, substantially equal in population, resources and technology, would I suppose approximate equality in power over any substantial period of time. To strive to give "dramatic effect" to this tendency seems to me to distort historical and natural processes and to miseducate people about the purposes and capabilities of foreign policy. It is a sort of criticism by association.

So I was not being "touchy", in raising my question, but truly "academic."

With all good wishes.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

April 20, 1962

Mr. Dean Acheson
Covington & Burling
701 Union Trust Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

A few weeks ago, you were kind enough to suggest that I might call on you on one of my next visits to Washington. It appears now that I will be there on May 17th, and I would very much appreciate an opportunity to see you. Recent events in foreign affairs have left me somewhat depressed, and I would be grateful to be able to discuss them with you.

All good wishes.

DEAN ACHESON
UNION TRUST BUILDING
WASHINGTON 5, D. C.

[cc]

April 24, 1962

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am sorry to say that I
will not be in Washington on
May 17, but at the Bilderberg
meeting in Sweden. I shall be
gone from May 6 to May 27th,
then come home for three days
of meetings of the Civil Rules
Committee. After June 1st I
expect to be here throughout
the summer, and if you are go-
ing to be here at any time
from the first of June on, I
should be delighted to have a
talk with you about our mutual
state of worry and depression.

With kind regards.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

April 27, 1962

Mr. Dean Acheson
Covington & Burling
Union Trust Building
Washington 5, D.C.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

Thank you for your note of April 24th. I will
be away most of June, but will take the liberty of
writing to you in July.

Kind regards.

June 25, 1962

Mr. Dean Acheson
701 Union Trust Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Acheson:

Some time ago we corresponded about
the possibility of meeting on one of my visits
to Washington. It now appears that I will be
there on July 9th and 10th. I wonder whether
there might be any chance of my calling on you.
The 10th is freer for me, but if this is not
possible for you, I am sure I could suit myself
to your convenience on the afternoon of July 9th.
I look forward to hearing from you about this.

I was rather distressed by the account
of my *Foreign Affairs* article in the *Washington
Post*. My intention was to support strongly a
conventional build-up, considerably beyond the
levels now being proposed. Indeed, I would like
to think that the thrust of the article was in
the direction you charted last year, with the
exception of my views on the French nuclear
program.

I look forward to seeing you. With
high regard.

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
8:15 P.M., EST,

November 18, 1963.

THE DILEMMAS OF OUR TIMES

Brien McMahon Lecture
delivered by
The Honorable Dean Acheson
at
The University of Connecticut

November 18, 1963

Unhappily amity is not the inevitable result of close relations between either people or peoples. Marriage and war lock both into close embrace. Sometimes the parties live happily ever after; and sometimes they don't. So it is with allies. That relationship, too, can turn out to be thoroughly unsatisfactory to all concerned. Certainly, from the American point of view this was true of our relations with the late government of Viet-Nam; and Madame Nhu has left us in no doubt that the other side entirely shared our sentiments. It is not surprising, then, that periodically we have a great debate in this country on the issue of reversing this or that major tenet of our foreign policy.

That delightful and mysterious wit and sage, Mark Epernay, whose penetrating observations have happily now been rescued from the files of *Esquire Magazine* and preserved in book form, has told us that the essence of foreign policy is to act in any situation as nearly as may be as one has done before. That is, the essence of foreign policy as practiced by the professionals in the State Department. But the professionals in politics, in the press, and in the new university departments of foreign affairs (or their older ones of government) usually put a reverse spin on their formulation of doctrine. To them, all too often, foreign policy is born in misconception -- if something has not gone wrong with my metaphor -- and continued in unimaginative stubbornness. In other words, they believe that official policy usually misses the point. *Look Magazine* underlines this view in a recent article entitled, "Our Foreign Policy is Paralyzed," when it announces that in contradistinction to official Washington, "To Kennan, Europe is a political problem." This particular flash of intuition was obviously thought not to have illumined more pedestrian minds.

- 2 -

The Great Debate of 1963-64

The debate of the coming winter seems likely to be a repetition of the so-called "Great Debate" of the winter of 1950-51. In each case a Republican ex-President led off the debate -- Mr. Hoover in 1950, General Eisenhower in 1963, though in 1950 General Eisenhower was on the opposite side of the argument. Each debate concerns the strength of American forces in Europe, but the implications of each are and were political, in no pejorative sense of the word.

In its review of world affairs in 1951 the Council on Foreign Relations found the explanations of that debate -- as I believe they are today -- "in the realm of national psychology and the exigencies of political life," though the effects "were primarily international in character and were of a nature to cast doubt for a time on the vitality of the Atlantic alliance." Our current debate could have the same consequences.

"... The mood which prevailed in many quarters at the time,"

said the Council,

"found typical expression in an address by ex-President Herbert Hoover (December 20, 1950) decrying the nonsupport of American policy by hitherto friendly nations, recommending a virtual halt in American aid to Europe, and suggesting an alternative world policy based on withdrawal from the Eurasian continent and, if necessary, to the Western Hemisphere."

This same longing to return to the womb is discernable in the recrudescence of the same debate. "We lived for more than a hundred years," says Mr. Kennan, "on principles of withdrawal from the mainstream, and maybe this should be done again." Without the forthrightness of former President Hoover, Mr. Kennan's method is to advocate "rethinking" positions, "considering" alternatives, "reviewing" attitudes, conducting "searching reexaminations," and to stress "misgivings." As an example, he believes ". . . we could usefully rethink our position on the problems of Germany and Central Europe. The same applies to the complex of problems surrounding Communist China, Taiwan, and the Japanese Peace Treaty. We ought to review

- 3 -

carefully our attitude toward General Charles de Gaulle
and see whether, under his concepts, France could not
assume more of the burden of leadership in Western
Europe and protection of Western Europe against Com-
munist pressures. There ought to be searching reexami-
nation and clarification of our policy toward eastern Europe.
The same applies to various neutralist countries in
Asia, Africa and Europe." "He thinks," says *Look*,
"getting out of South Vietnam is a possibility to be
considered . . . he adds, 'the Chinese Communists are
not yet a substantial naval or air power. It does not
bear the same military implications as Russia taking
over. On the contrary there is such a thing as over-
extension.'"

The Delphic oracle made quite a reputation by
utterances of this sort, even though its customers
often got the wrong steer with disastrous results.
The oracle is now a ruin.

The Council on Foreign Relations concluded that
the 1950-51 episode represented a "stage in the slow
evolution of the American outlook." The conclusion of
the matter was a reaffirmation by the United States
Senate on April 4, 1951, that

"... the security of the United States and
its citizens is involved with the security of
its partners under the North Atlantic Treaty,
and the commitments of that treaty are there-
fore an essential part of the foreign policy
of the United States." (Sen. Res. 99, 82nd
Cong., 1st Sess.)

and the decision to maintain in Europe the ground, air,
and naval forces which are there today. In 1963, too,
the conclusion of the matter will doubtless be the same
reaffirmation and decision.

If we examine the realities of our position, no
other conclusion is tenable. Internal political pres-
sures or lures may lead political figures to talk as
though we had a choice between continuing or reducing
our involvement in European affairs (for, at the moment,
we are speaking of Europe). But that is an illusion,
and a dangerous one. To be sure, orders can be issued
to military formations in Europe to return to the United
States, and be obeyed. But this will not reduce our
involvement in European affairs. It may actually in-
crease it. We can no more extricate ourselves from

- 4 -

involvement in Europe than Germany can. This is
nothing new.

The Nature of American Involvement in Europe

We Americans, all North Americans, have been caught up in European affairs for over three hundred years -- with European successes and failures, brilliant discoveries (including the hemisphere we live in) and (to us) senseless quarrels, with all -- to use General Washington's phrase -- the combinations and collisions of their friendships and enmities. Almost continuously from 1688 to 1815 enmities between European nations involved North Americans in bitter fighting on our shores. Then for a century, from 1815 to 1914, we succeeded in staying clear of European collisions, until the Civil Wars of 1914-1945 once again drew us in, as they did almost every other part of the world.

These Civil Wars of the twentieth century were not only the most wide spread and disastrous in human experience, but they marked the destruction of a world order and the end of an epoch. The old European-oriented world order of the nineteenth century crashed amid the wreckage of the great empires and their colonial dependencies upon which it rested. The United States reluctantly emerged from isolated absorption in its own and hemispheric affairs, and, equally reluctantly and at first almost unaided, accepted responsibility for preserving an environment in which free societies could exist and flourish.

"One World's" end left Europe divided; one-half, occupied by Soviet troops and political agents; the other half, on the verge of economic, social, and political collapse. Africa and Asia, with colonial ties disintegrating and nationalism stimulated by the Russian and Chinese revolutions, plunged toward self-rule, confusion, and disorder.

Only two centers of power remained. The Soviet Union had suffered tremendous losses of population and property during the wars. With unbelievable power of recuperation and under the ruthless drive of Stalin's monolith, within a decade it had greatly exceeded its pre-war power and the combined power of all of Europe. Europe, without this self-regenerative capacity to recover, needed and received massive outside help.

Its economic recovery has been phenomenal; but has not
been translated, as in the case of the Soviet Union,
into the military constituent of power.

For eighteen years Americans have stood guard in
Europe to prevent another attempt by a European power
to achieve by force of arms hegemony over the others.
During this time, also, they undertook by the Marshall
Plan to provide the resources for the economic res-
toration of Europe, and, by the North Atlantic Treaty,
to bind Europe and North America together to provide
essential military security for both.

The idea that there are national, or European, or
North American interests which can be safely pursued
in disregard of their common interest belongs to that
past which has brought us all such loss and suffering.
The truth is that the task of preserving, nourishing,
and enlarging the environment for freedom is too great
for either North America or Europe alone. It requires
their combined and jointly managed efforts. If they
should drift or be driven apart, the problems of both
would become unmanageable.

The Meaning of Europe and of European Unity

The European Civil War left unresolved an issue
involving the very heart of European stability. That
issue was the future and fate of Central Europe,
including -- as the various forces were disposed at
war's end -- the division of Germany. Stating it more
broadly, of what was Europe to consist? Was European
policy to be devised for the territory west of the
Helmstedt line? Was it possible that for the long
run such a Europe could be politically viable? Or
was it to be a Europe in which a redrawn but integral
Germany would be united with her western neighbors, a
Europe which, with North America, would form a larger
entity for the purposes which neither Europe nor America
could achieve alone?

Declared allied policy has been clear and consis-
tent on this matter from the time that Berlin was
established as a symbol and promise of the end of the
occupation and of a united Germany. "As long as Ger-
many is divided," said Prime Minister Eden in 1955,
"Europe will be divided. Until the unity of Germany
is restored there can be neither confidence nor security

- 6 -

in this continent." And this summer President Kennedy stated once more the necessity of "a united Berlin in a united Germany, united by self-determination and living in peace."

Nothing could be more mistaken than to consider the reunion of East and West Germany as a mere territorial readjustment in behalf of German national interests. Mr. Eden's statement indicates that. But its importance goes even further than he suggests. Its achievement is an integral and essential part of the creation of the united Europe which joined with North America could mark the great achievement of this century in the preservation of peace and the assurance of material and non-material benefit for the free world.

From the very beginning of the reconstruction of shattered Europe with the Marshall Plan it was clear to many in this country (General Marshall at their head) and in Europe that the needs created by the destruction of the old world order could not be met by building on the basis of national interests, or even by grouping these together into a league of national interests. The new and imaginative leaders in Europe -- Schuman, Monnet, Adenauer, De Gasperi, Franks, and Spaak -- charted the course of European unity by insisting upon the common consideration of concrete common problems to reach solutions in the common interest. Their innovations of political ideas and methods were as startling as those taking place in physics. Their conception of supra-national and irrevocable rules administered by common institutions empowered to make decisions binding upon individuals and member countries was as far-reaching as the conception of nationalism in the fifteenth century. They saw that a unified Europe created in this way would be different from and greater than the sum of its parts.

These innovations had consequences even beyond the intentions of their authors. Raising the level of judgment and action from purely national to common European considerations had the direct effect of raising the power and prosperity of Europe. But it did more. It enlarged European vision and aspiration beyond the old national drive for hegemony on the continent. In this larger view problems presented to Europe and to North America could be seen as requiring joint action to reach solution in a still larger community of interest.

- 7 -

Erosion from Within and Without

The very success of the new European policies --
in which French leadership of the Schuman period
played so leading and brilliant a part -- seems to have
led through economic revival to a reversal of policy
by the present French Government. Under this new ap-
proach nationalism seems to be the dominant motif.

A loose grouping of countries joined together
by traditional ties between independent countries,
L'Europe des patries, is a far cry from the integrated
European Community foreshadowed by the Coal and Steel
Community, EURATOM, and the Common Market. It is a re-
turn to a Europe of divisions and rivalries, precluded
from acquiring the strength needed to play an eminent
and constructive role on the world scene. The old lure
of hegemony by a dominant European power has appeared
again. This is particularly evident in the nuclear
field. Instead of a common approach to the nuclear
problem, as reflected in the proposed multilateral
force, which would be open to all participants equally
and jointly, a national approach is proposed. This
national approach divides the European Community; it
makes the unity of Europe and a close Atlantic connec-
tion difficult to achieve. It is the logical reflection
of a policy which focuses on the nation state, rather
than on a united Europe, as the mainspring of effective
action.

The fallacy of the quest for national hegemony
has been recognized since the end of the European
Civil War. Former Prime Minister Michel Debre in
his recent book repeatedly exclaims, "If we were only
a hundred million Frenchmen." We in America know that
a hundred and ninety million Americans must find com-
munity of interests with societies beyond our own to
meet the dangers and opportunities, the challenges and
the hopes, of a world which we share with so many
others -- some well disposed, some ill disposed.
Since this is true for us, a nation of fifty million
people is courting disappointment, if nothing worse,
in setting out to establish an independent power base.

The effort to do so constitutes an erosion on one
side of the Grand Alliance, while, at the same time,
its principal opponent, the Soviet Union, causes erosion
on the other side. The Soviet Union, by alternating
hostility with relaxation, eases the pressure of external
threat and the incitement to unity and action within

- 8 -

the alliance. Present French policy, on the other hand, increases the difficulty of action within the alliance by opposition to joint and integrated measures designed to advance common interests and solve common problems. Neither of these policies springs from an enduring change of national objectives; so, though both are harmful, they need not be fatal.

Twice since the war we have experienced the Soviet tactic of alternating the relaxation of a peace offensive to the tension of cold or hot war, once through the Stockholm Peace Proposals and, again, through the spirit of Camp David. Neither heralded the dawn of the millennium, or even a change in Soviet aims.

We are now undergoing a third application of the same treatment. The present is said to be a period of détente, of relaxation of tensions. The test ban treaty -- wholly desirable in its strictly limited way -- is cited as a "first step" to broader agreement. Even before the Russian harassment of our neighbours to Berlin, this view was wholly unsupported by evidence, as the British-American-Soviet talks disclosed. Eager to find common ground with our French friends, one can heartily endorse this statement by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville:

> "In the three months that the talks have gone on, nothing has been concluded, no basis of agreement has been found. I will not be risking much if I say that no basis of agreement, even for the time being, seems likely to be forthcoming . . .

> "... we do not intend to participate in them. As I have already indicated, the subjects under discussion are unfortunate and the first conversations immediately revealed that they raised all the problems relating to Germany on which the respective positions remain unchanged, the only result being that a state of uneasiness and alarm has been created in the Federal Republic -- a result in which we really can see no advantage."

The Russians would obviously gain a great deal by getting others to believe that they could safely relax. A supposed détente might temper such opposition to the Soviet East German policy as was stated by President

- 9 -

Kennedy in Berlin, might decrease defense budgets in the West, and increase friction between the United States and Germany, as the French Foreign Minister foresaw. Of course, Mr. Khrushchev could never have dared to hope that it could revive talk of reducing American forces in Europe! Insofar as the test ban treaty contributed to the least of these results, it was all gain for the Russians because the treaty cost them nothing.

## Erosion from the West

Added to these erosions of western strength and unity caused by friend and foe, comes new erosion from the Great Debate in the west. Europeans are now hearing urged, as desirable American policy, the very withdrawal of forces from Europe which for over a decade has been denounced as "unthinkable," when the possibility was whispered by them. It all goes to show that to think the unthinkable is not so hard as we thought. Furthermore, as the current and the 1951 discussions both show, it is easier when we get the impression that our allies are not doing their share, have regained their critical faculties, and have so lost their sense of propriety and inter-allied etiquette as to impose a duty on our chickens.

By the same token, it is not so hard as we think for our allies to think the unthinkable, particularly when it seems to be the fashion to do so and when they hear the sort of statements that are already being made, and will doubtless continue to be made, in this country. We seem to be bemused by the fatuous belief that what is said here is inaudible across the Atlantic, and that since, when all the chatter is over, present policy will continue, no harm will have been done. I wish it were so. It is true that what is at stake is the vast political, economic, and security gain made over the past twenty years. It is true, also, that no sensible people would put this at hazard for the satisfaction of a gesture of annoyance. But all experience and drama join to teach us how fragile is confidence under repeated suspicion.

Consider for a moment what is being said, and start with this from Mr. Kennan:

- 10 -

"It wouldn't have hurt the Germans to have had at least 20 years of demilitarization.'

"Kennan would like to see a unified but neutralized Germany possessing only weapons of defense. 'None of this can be changed overnight. The West Germans are members of NATO, and we have to respect that status. I'm talking about a disposition to change some of these arrangements if, and only if, the Russians will make some compensation -- only as part of a deal.'"

One wonders whether Mr. Kennan has forgotten that it was this very attempt to impose twenty years of demilitarization and neutralization upon the Germans after 1918, and the sense of humiliation and discrimination induced by it, which destroyed moderate government in Germany and opened the way for Hitler and his bid for hegemony in Europe. And what does he mean in the age in which we live by "Germany possessing only weapons for defense"? What weapons? And for defense against what?

Mr. Kennan speaks with pride of his thirty years of diplomatic experience. Has this experience led him to believe it permissible to suggest that Germany's allies in NATO must respect her status as one of them only until the Russians are willing to "make some compensation -- . . . as part of a deal" -- to downgrade her? Even the much defamed Florentine would have been more discreet.

Sometimes Mr. Kennan, like a magician out of practice, attempts to make a large and awkward fact disappear with notable lack of success. This happens when he asserts that no one's independence would be endangered by withdrawing troops from Europe and "points to the Austrians: 'They didn't go down on their knees. The Finns have done nothing of the sort.'" Both Austrians and Finns are most courteous people. One can imagine them saying, "A thousand pardons, Mr. Kennan. We wonder whether one of us has not overlooked something. We were not aware that the American forces had been withdrawn. We believe that they are right here in Central Europe. Every Austrian, Finn, and German is infinitely comforted and strengthened by this belief. Are you telling us that we are wrong?"

- 11 -

At the very time these and other European friends
and allies hear talk of a Europe denuded of all but
token formations of American and British troops and
of Germany neutralized and degraded, they hear or
read Mr. Khrushchev. He is always clear and intelli-
gible. Asked during this very month why Soviet troops
are in East Germany he tells why.

"We [Soviet troops] are not there
[East Germany] for reasons of any economic
advantage. On the contrary, from the
economic standpoint, the stationing of
our troops in Germany costs money . . .

"The reasons are entirely political
. . . I can say that if the Socialist
revolution should win in West Germany --
and I cannot say when that will happen --
then I would have considerable hopes that
Germany could be reunited.

"But should the question of socialist
revolution in West Germany be somewhat pro-
longed -- and it is only the matter of the
settlement of the issue being dragged out
somewhat -- until that time the question
probably will not be solved." (Washington
Post, Nov. 7, 1963, p. A19.)

Mr. Khrushchev's answer is brutally frank. Soviet
troops are in Europe for a political purpose. So are
ours. Never more than today and never more than with
the Soviet Union, the correlation of military power is
a major factor in the resolution of political issues.
The Soviet purpose is to undermine the Bonn government,
detach the Federal Republic from the western alliance,
and attach a new all-German regime to the Soviet bloc.
Our purpose is far more than to prevent this resolution
of what the Russians call the German problem to make
them dominant in Europe. To prevent it is essential.
But it is no less important to preserve and carry on
all the progress which has been made toward a counter-
solution. This progress has been toward a strong
and united Europe with immense power of attraction, a
Europe, stable and at peace by having within it a
united Germany, a Europe which, closely linked with
North America, can make possible a vibrant, healthy,
and secure environment for free societies. This
progress, as we have seen, has been checked. The
checks are largely temporary or have temporary elements.

- 12 -

For instance, the spurious détente is already being shown to be such; General de Gaulle is both a mortal man and one who will recognize the force of a current if it is strong enough. Temporary checks have to be endured in order to be surmounted. In this situation the order of the day should be to throw in reserves and press where we can. To waver, to rethink, to blame our allies (even justly), to fall back and regroup will endanger the whole front, and could bring on a rout. Let us look at our problem more closely.

## A Priority for Action and Speech

My thesis is that in making political and military judgments affecting Europe a major, and often the major, consideration should be their effect on the German people and the German government. It follows from this that the closest liaison and consultation with the German government is an absolute necessity. This does not imply any change or diminution of our other allied consultations. Unexpected or unexplained action nearly always causes consternation in Germany. Sensible decision after careful consultation, even when there has been some difference of view, rarely does.

The reasons for urging this priority can be stated shortly.

Germany is the point of contact between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet bloc. The division of Germany and the continued occupation of eastern Germany by Soviet troops, as Mr. Khrushchev has brutally pointed out, is for the purpose of bringing all Germany under Soviet influence. Such a result would destroy the Atlantic alliance and make Russian will dominant in Europe.

Germany's division and occupation threatens the stability and peace of Europe, as Mr. Eden (now Lord Avon) said, and the security of the United States.

Germany's geographical position and strength make that country indispensable to the existence of both a united Europe and a European defense.

Germany has surpassed all the other large European countries in steadfast support of the principles and institutions of a united Europe and of the defense forces and system of NATO. In this all of her major parties are united and clear.

- 13 -

Germany is the most sensitive and responsive of all European countries to American action, whether or not we wish it or even anticipate it, and for good or ill. This, of course, is the natural concomitant of Germany's exposed position and the use made, or not made, of America's great power.

Germany is not only the most sensitive of the large countries and reacts most vigorously to American action, but German reactions are important, far-reaching, and possibly decisive. The other large countries either do not react, or react less, or their reactions have less effect than Germany's.

If my priority seems to you supported by the reasons given for it, a few simple "don'ts" and "dos" might serve as guides in acting on it.

## First Don't

Don't decrease our fighting strength in Europe; and don't talk about doing it in the mistaken belief that this sort of wind from the west exhilarates or frightens our allies to greater efforts. Talk does only a little less harm than the actual withdrawal itself.

I shall not use any of our time tonight discussing whether we can "afford" the cost of our forces abroad or, stating it differently, whether any supposed necessity of balancing our foreign accounts requires bringing them home. No such necessity exists. Many other ways of dealing with balance of payments problems make it possible to state categorically that payments considerations need not affect decision on any major defense requirement.

General Eisenhower has told us that in 1951 he tore up a draft statement refusing to run for the Presidency, because he felt that the defense of the free world depended on American troops in Europe. He has also told us that after he had reached the White House he thought that "a reduction of American strength in Europe should be initiated as soon as European economies were restored," but that his associates persuaded him that the matter was "too delicate a political question to raise." His associates were right then, and their advice is sound today. The General would have done well to have continued to follow it rather than to have just remembered it. Instead he is seduced by a cliche of his youth. "One American division in

- 14 -

Europe," he writes in the *Saturday Evening Post*, "can 'show the flag' as definitely as can several."

But the purpose of the American forces in Europe is very different from that of T.R. when he sent the "Great White Fleet" to "show the flag" (and itself) around the world. The NATO army, of which the American contingent is, and should be, a substantial part has a military mission of the greatest importance to the political purposes of NATO. Earlier in this address I attempted to explain what that purpose is and why it is just as important to us in North America as to our friends in Europe. We cannot disentangle our fate or our security from theirs. Our troops are in Europe not as a favor to Europeans until their economies recover, as General Eisenhower inexplicably now seems to believe. They are there to furnish to NATO forces that stiffening and strength from across the Atlantic which leaves Moscow in no doubt that to engage them will and must bring into action this country's colossal nuclear power.

This deterrent against major attack is by no means the whole mission. For alone, it would not be enough to prevent a more gradual erosion of the alliance and the imposition on Europe of Russian will. Before stating what this other purpose is, let me ask some questions, the answers to which throw light upon it. Consider the recent Russian interference with access to Berlin and the earlier threats of it. Do you think these interferences can be met more favorably or less favorably to the NATO allies if five of our divisions are withdrawn? Would they be met more favorably or less favorably if NATO succeeded in its plan for increasing NATO forces, including the six American divisions, to the level of Russian forces on their western front?

Your answers are predictable. Weakness is not strength; and equal power is better than unequal power. It is also true that different kinds of power may not be equally useful and usable in certain situations. We have many examples of the truth that nuclear power is too great, too destructive, too catastrophic to be used in any but the most serious contingencies. Hence, if one side has a considerable superiority in what is called conventional power and the other in nuclear power, it is foreseeable that the greater nuclear power will deter the lesser power from major aggressions. But it is also foreseeable that the greater nuclear power is not usable, will not be used, and

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hence will not deter aggressions which the superior
conventional power judges correctly will be below the
point of provoking nuclear retaliation.

For this reason our great nuclear superiority
did not deter the building of the wall in Berlin.
This was a very considerable shock to the Germans,
not only those in the west but to our friends in
eastern Germany as well. They and all our friends
and allies began to reappraise the *usable* strength
of the United States in the struggle which has been
going on for fifteen years in Central Europe. Their
calculation will be profoundly affected, as will the
outcome of the struggle, if we persevere in our fixed
design (using de Tocqueville's phrase) to increase
NATO forces and deprive Russia of her conventional
advantage on her western front and her tactic of
slicing the baloney thin. But our friends will stop
calculating, for the outcome will be clear, if we for-
get the magnitude of our own interest and, out of
pique with our allies, take our soldiers and go home,
leaving the flag as a symbol of our inability to perse-
vere.

## Second "Don't"

Don't continue the British-American-Soviet
talks about Germany: The uneasiness and suspicion,
they cause in Germany far outweigh the massed cliches
about keeping contact, doors open, and avenues explored.
Suppose a hundred years ago the British, French
(Napoleon III), and Russians had kept talks going on
the "Confederate question" in America -- need I go
further!

## Third "Don't"

Don't help the French nuclear program. To help
will not cause General de Gaulle to deviate in the
slightest from any of his policies which are now
eroding the unity of Europe and the alliance with
America. But to support separate and, supposedly,
independent British and French nuclear programs,
while offering Germany a different -- though intrin-
sically better -- multilateral one, both denigrates
the offer to Germany and gives ground for a charge
of discriminatory treatment. This puts another obstacle

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in the way of moderate government in Germany. It
also plays against the excellent possibility that
after further experience with their own programs and
with the factor of obsolescence in them, the multi-
lateral proposal may be regarded more favorably in
both London and Paris. In Paris earlier this month
160 members of the de Gaulle dominated National As-
sembly voted against funds for the French program.

Four Do's

In four fields essential for the development
of both European and Atlantic unity only the closest
joint collaborating between the German and American
governments can produce any progress in this period
of the deep freeze. Lack of progress means retro-
gression.

All four are equally important and should be
tackled at once. Military progress is stymied un-
til something is done about allied association in
the nuclear arm. The most helpful road to this end,
both militarily and politically, is the multilateral
force, where all willing to come in are to man the
ships and join in the planning and command. The
German government is eager to get on with the job,
willing to pay its share of the expense and to pro-
vide its share of the crews. Others have showed
interest and entered the talks. The greatest in-
citement to interest is to get the project under way,
if only on a trial basis; and to do this, we would
be wise to work closest with the most enthusiastic,
those most eager to have the plan succeed.

Then there is agricultural policy, where
troubles can arise -- and have arisen -- certain
to cause grave trouble, both among the six members
of the Common Market and between the Common Market
and the rest of the world, including the United
States. If the Common Market follows French policy,
it will become a closed, self-sufficient, agricul-
tural unit. "It is not worth talking of the European
Community," said General de Gaulle in July, "if it
must be understood that Europe does not obtain its
food essentially thanks to its own agricultural
products, which can be largely sufficient." This
runs counter to the interests of Europe's suppliers
of agricultural commodities, and also of Germany,
which must buy abroad in order to sell abroad. There
is sufficient mutual interest here to make possible

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an understanding on purposes between Germany and the
United States which could shape policy within and
with the Common Market.

The same is true of the broad tariff negotia-
tions soon coming up at Geneva. Here again the
issue will be whether the Common Market will follow
France into a policy which is autarkical and self-
absorbed, or will accept its responsibility for a
system of international trade in the free world
which will not divide and weaken allies and will
permit the participation of the developing nations.
Both German and American interest lead to support
of the broader view. The great preponderance of
German foreign trade is with nations outside the
Common Market. Here again, it is of utmost impor-
tance that the two governments concert their strat-
egy and tactics.

There remains agreement between us on speed and
method in modernizing international monetary arrange-
ments. Vast changes have occurred in the past twenty
years in the volume of international payments and
in the time required for great industrial nations
to adjust their economies to changes affecting their
balance of payments. The arrangements of Bretton
Woods are no longer adequate. The present Washing-
ton fashion is to worry about our balance of pay-
ments, usually for the wrong reason. A lot of
otherwise sensible people are urging reversal of
most of the wise policies which have brought pros-
perity and security to the West, because we have
been losing gold, though our reserves are still
large. A recent Brookings Institution publication
shows how this situation will in adequate time cor-
rect itself if the nations, largely our allies, who
have been acquiring our gold and dollars will be
willing to accept an end to the inflow and a begin-
ning to the compensating outflow.

The chances of their being willing to do this --
which begins a drain upon their monetary reserves --
is small, unless international monetary arrangements
are improved to supplement gold and American dollars
as international reserves. This is not difficult
to do. The so-called Group of Ten has already agreed
to get on with the task. But it is very hard to
get technicians and bureaucrats started -- and
especially monetary technicians and bureaucrats.
To be done, the job needs an infusion of vigorous

November 22, 1963

Mr. Dean Acheson
Covington and Burling
701 Union Trust Building
Washington 5, D. C.

Dear Dean:

While on the West Coast I read in *The New York Times* that your influence with Administration officials was being reduced by the intensity with which you defended your views regarding the withdrawal of troops from Europe. I doubt this is true, but if so it is a reflection on the Administration.

In the unlikely event that you should feel alone, I want you to know that as far as I and many other admirers are concerned you cannot defend these views intensely enough.

Could you let me have a copy of your lecture in Connecticut?

Warm regards.