KISSINGER, HENRY A.

August 3, 1971

Dear Max:

Many thanks for your letter of July 12. I
was glad to have your article on "Transatlan-
tic Partners" as I had missed it when it ap-
peared.

Setting together for lunch sounds like a good
idea and it is long overdue. At the moment,
however, it appears that I will be with the
President in California from the middle of
August until after the first week in September.
Do you have any other plans for coming to
Washington? If not at the moment, let us stay
in touch and make arrangements to have lunch
together at the next opportunity.

Mr. Max Lerner
New York Post
210 South Street
New York, N. Y. 10002

Why don't you come down just for lunch if we can't
match our schedules any other way.

jlp:7/30/71

# Max Lerner

## TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERS

Despite my disagreement with Sen. Mansfield's determined drive to get half the American troops out of Europe, and whatever its final outcome, I am glad he has stirred the slumbering issue to life.

Unexamined assumptions are dangerous, in public policy as in private life. Mansfield has made me, for one, dust off my own encounters with the NATO problem, my travels and conversations in Europe, to rethink the Europe-America partnership.

That's what it is. Make no mistake about it. The Senators and commentators who treat troop cuts just as a matter of saving some money, and getting soldiers back to Kansas and away from the sin-places of Europe, are ripping a single thread out of a whole coat.

* * *

The coat is nothing less than an alliance system, stretching far beyond the military, between Europe and America. It is probably the most crucial alliance system in the world, since it links two creative continents, Europe and America—two culture clusters very much in ferment, two power structures which are unequaled by any other combination in the world. Don't give it up or let it be broken too cavalierly.

The heart of the alliance—NATO, the defense system—came into being 25 years ago. It isn't anywhere near the whole Europe-America story, which includes the business investments, the currency exchange system, the trade

union relations, the scientific and technological exchange, the intellectual interplay.

But the common defense of Europe, and through it the defense of America, is part of it. We have all but forgotten that millions of young Americans died in two monster wars because European stability broke, and its breaking engulfed America.

In his pre-Nixon phase, in 1965, Henry Kissinger wrote a sharp analysis of what he called "The Troubled Partnership" (Anchor Paperback). I should myself call it the Tired Partnership. A 25-year marriage is a long marriage, between continents as between a man and a woman, but in neither case do you opt out just for the hell of it. As in a marriage also, there have been neurotic interactions between these transatlantic partners.

The Europeans went into NATO to resist Russian invasion; they have stayed in it to get the umbrella of American nuclear protection. They make their contribution to the NATO conventional forces grudgingly—just enough to keep American forces there, but not so much as will make the nuclear umbrella unnecessary.

America in turn wants the ground and air resistance to be more than a token, so that a Soviet attack will meet "multiple options" and a "flexible response," instead of triggering a nuclear response automatically.

To freshen the alliance I am all for putting more pressure on the Euro-

pean partners to carry their weight and do more to achieve adequate force levels. I am also for helping them move forward an independent European nuclear deterrent, if possible, to get them free of dependence on America. And obviously I am for talks with Russia and the Warsaw Pact group about mutual troop reductions on both sides, which is the only thing that makes sense.

But we must change the psychology of the partnership. It's time for the U. S. to drop its old habit of having the commander of the NATO forces always an American, and time also to cut the top European group into consultations on nuclear policy. Finally it is time to recognize that while NATO itself can't become a bargaining unit for a European detente — a thaw in relations with the Russians— its members can do it bilaterally.

* * *

That is just what Chancellor Brandt has been trying to do in his Ostpolitik, and he needs more encouragement from the State Dept than he has had. For continued peace in Europe depends not only on a military power balance, which NATO has supplied, but also on a sense that the congealed waters are running again and the sap is flowing again in the trees.

Brandt made it clear, in a sharp statement on the Mansfield sortie, that the Germans must be sure of America's presence in Europe if they are to bargain effectively for a detente with the Russians.

Nixon brought out an array of bigwigs to back up his anti-Mansfield drive. For me what counts is not so much their authority as the witness they bear to the long partnership, which has kept the peace too well to be unraveled in a fit of alliance fatigue.

Max Lerner

STATE OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON.

Along with prison riots trouble inside the Army is now emerging as one of the prime arenas in the struggle over authority which is a major mark of our time.

The recent press reporting on the "New Army" (the latest is a series running in the Post) seems to agree on what is happening: rising desertions and AWOL cases, mounting instances of insubordination and "fragging" (terrorizing officers, usually non-coms, with grenades and such); the spread of drug use, in and out of combat zones, especially of heroin, hashish and opium; the increase of anti-war and anti-Army feeling among soldiers, some of it quite open; multiplying cases of racial clashes and of militant black unrest; the efforts at "working out" the infractions of discipline, instead of cracking down on them with futile punishment; the effort to educate the men on the twin diseases of racism and drugs.

* * *

I haven't done the kind of research on the Army that you will find in the recent investigative reports. Nor do I know it at first hand, except for a spell as war correspondent in World War II in Europe, in an army that now seems very far away and long ago. But the recent changes in the Army need to be put in a larger frame—not only what is happening to the soldiers but what is happening to their commanders and to the plans for an army of the future, and even more, what is happening in the American society itself.

One thing is clear enough: the Army's

tensions reflect the society's tensions. Once the Army was pretty much a closed society, but that day is over. When you draft young men for a war no one really wants in the society outside, they will bring with them, from outside, all the ills no one wants in the Army.

Gen. Westmoreland says bravely, perhaps wishfully, that the Army will emerge all the stronger for its present rocky experiences. If there is any Army at all, some of the more caustic GI draftees or some of the gloomier "lifer" non-coms would probably add. As between the traditional crackdown and the newer "working it out," the Army commanders have little choice. It has to be the latter, and to put the best face on it they have to say (perhaps some believe it) that the burst of indiscipline and the new techniques of working-out will clear the air.

Unsuccessful wars hit armies in different ways. The wars in Indochina, Tunisia and Algeria hit the French army chiefly by pushing its higher officers—the colonels and generals—militantly to the right, where de Gaulle found them, used them, and then crushed them. The tradition of the American officer elite, unlike the French, is non-political.

My own experience with them, in talks at several of the military colleges in the past weeks, has again impressed me with their quality, their alertness to broad historical and social forces, and their open-mindedness to ideas. But they have not been politicized.

A large number of the rank-and-file, among the draftees and the re-enlisted men, have been scarred by drug use and racial tensions. They have reflected a questioning of authority which goes beyond the historical GI griping, and has become politicized and open. But the officer elite, preparing itself for the higher commands, tends to see the broad picture steadily, with a tough-minded liberalism that has surprised me.

* * *

Given the initial disastrous decisions on the Vietnam war, and given the disruptions in the larger society, the wonder is that the tensions haven't completely destroyed the Army while the phasing-out is going on in Vietnam. Actually while drug use is found almost equally in combat and non-combat zones, the insubordination, racial tensions and fragging are understandably worse in the rear-line and the "logistical tail" of the Army than in the fighting areas.

American soldiers — whites and blacks, draftees and volunteers—have coped well with the messy war we have given them to fight, and they deserve better than the kind of treatment they are getting as they come back to their home towns, look for jobs again, and try to orient themselves to a jarring, civilian life.

President Nixon is waging a hard fight to get the draft extended for the remainder of the phasing-out and transition period, before the volunteer army is given its coming test. Actually the debate that has raged for several years, as between the conscript and volunteer armies, is no longer a real contest. No matter what its cost, the volunteer army is the only possible choice—if it can in fact be raised. For another draft Army will prolong or repeat the agony that is being suffered in handling this one.

Max Lerner

I REMEMBER HUGO

WASHINGTON.

It was in mid-September, 1937. President Roosevelt, in his second term, was riding high as he tugged the reins to change the direction and complexion of the Supreme Court, much as President Nixon is doing now. To fill a welcome vacancy he made the unlikely choice of Hugo Lafayette Black, Senator from the redneck Alabama hill country, radical New Dealer. More distinguished for his political militancy than his judicial temperament and experience.

Roosevelt didn't mind riling the opposition. He was heart-deep and spleen-deep in a battle to change the voting patterns of the Court, not just in his own time but for years to come. He enjoyed the frustration of his enemies at having to seat on the Court the youngest of a brood of eight of a Confederate dirt farmer, a nominee as radical as Louis D. Brandeis, around whose confirmation a storm had swirled in 1916. But FDR knew that a Democratic Senate couldn't turn down a Southerner and one of their own.

I was political editor of The Nation, too young for mellowness, drinking delight of battle as a New Dealer and a champion of Black's positions in his Senate brawls. Naturally I hailed the appointment.

Then the cyclone hit. A muckraking journalist, acting on a good tip, did a beautiful job of digging up the fact that this fervent New Deal Senator, now a month old as Justice, had been a Klansman, having joined the hooded ones in Birmingham in 1923.

It was like learning that William Kunstler had been a Black Shirt once or Bella Abzug had tried a twirl as George Wallace's mistress. My fellow editors on the Nation were ready to throw Hugo to the wolves to save the liberal sleigh. I counseled cool. I learned that Black, on a London vacation, was seeing my friend Harold Laski, so I wrote Laski about how the garbage had hit the fan in New York and offered to fly to London. Laski cabled to sit tight and meet Black's boat at Newport News. I did.

So did a couple of hundred other press and radio characters, all in quest of a mass interview with Hugo. I felt lost and surrounded. But I had read Lincoln Steffens and felt like the compleat liberal sleuth. Black sent out word to the frustrated pack of media hounds that there would be no interview. I must have bribed a steward, but I got a note into the stateroom, and back came word on how to make a getaway. The tide of media humanity, sulphurous with balked virtue, swirled about him, but we extricated ourselves and I soared lighthearted down the gangplank with Hugo and Josephine Black and off to Alexandria.

He talked. Why had he refused the press conference? Because he had learned in politics never to meet an attack on the enemy's ground. He would go on the air and answer in his own way, on his own terms.

And the answer? He told me of his Alabama boyhood, of devouring all the books, of the Southern Populist tradi-

tion which had caught him up in its twisted contradictory roots, of his struggles as a young politician fighting the moneyed interests, of identifying with the sharecroppers, (small farmers and workers, of finding himself joining the Klan in his young naivete and dropping it with finality when he learned more about it.

I guess I believed enough in redemption to be convinced. Even if I hadn't known his Senate record, the man himself would have been enough. He rang better than true: he had cast the bell and thrown away the mold. He was all of a piece—self-taught, with a primitive directness, at once literal-minded and intellectually subtle—and there was no other like him.

We talked very late. I stayed the night and came home ready for the fray. A New York Times reporter, speaking of Black's coming radio talk, said I was helping him with the speech. It wasn't true, as anyone could tell from the text itself, with its naive "some of my best friends are Jews" note, which made Easterners wince. But the rest of the talk was strong and direct. When I wrote my commentary I didn't try to defend him: he had done that himself. I was more interested in his future than his past, and I went out on a long limb to predict that he would be one of the great ones of Supreme Court history.

Happily my wild guess turned out true. Some of the same people who lambasted me then for running afoul of their liberal fanaticism later became his claque. More recently they cooled to him again because he followed his own direction—not theirs—on sitdowns and demonstrations. Now, at 85 and ailing, he has resigned, and Nixon has a third vacancy to fill. But the Hugo I remember will live forever in the Court opinions the young will devour.

# Max Lerner

## THE GREAT POWERS IN MOTION

### WASHINGTON.

One thing President Nixon's China initiative has already done: it has set the great powers in motion, with going and coming in every capital.

President Nixon is boning up on a select reading list about Chinese politics, psychology and national character, and Henry Kissinger has been re-reading the 150-page transcript of his conversations with Chou En-lai. While the policy-makers here don't quite share James Reston's belief in Chinese salvation and redemption there is a surprising confidence among them that the Chinese have faithfully held to the arranged script, that they have been punctilious about their word, and that the Nixon visit will come off as planned.

As we move farther away from the surprise Nixon announcement in mid-July, and closer to the trip itself, the motives on both sides emerge more clearly. They are long-range motives, and the objectives between the two powers are also long-range. The Chinese of course want technology from the West, and they have trade to offer in return. They also want to reclaim Taiwan. But the stakes are greater than any of these.

Of the four great peoples that China faces and fears—Russia, India, Japan and the U. S.—it is the U. S. that it fears least. The fact is that America is far away, and will soon be disengaging from its Asian outposts. Even the fact

of America's immense power, when taken along with its antiwar mood and internal discords, means that the power is unlikely to be used.

The Chinese are obsessed with the danger from Russia, as the Russians are obsessed with the danger from China. And rightly or wrongly—probably wrongly—the Chinese fear Japan's growing economic power and the single-mindedness it has shown in the past. They find it diplomatically useful to portray Japan as a danger, and—who knows?—they may even believe it.

As for America, it finds the Russians more of a problem than the Chinese, and it is willing to risk temporary differences with India and Japan over its China policy—and is confident enough of its ultimate ties with both. What it is bargaining for is friendly co-existence with China, in place of the long hostility. The assumption is that China is not hell-bent on a UN victory this year, but has longer perspectives. On both sides there is a feeling that the move was a historical necessity.

One might have thought that the Russian response would have been a hardening of policy all down the line. Instead it has resulted in a burst of diplomatic flexibilities, with a cyclone of travel by heads of governments.

The Willy Brandt trip to the Crimea, and Brezhnev's shirtsleeve-and-motorboat conference with him, is surely one of the products of Russia's new flexible diplomacy. Egon Bahr, Brandt's Kis-

singer, encountered hard going when he spent a week with the East Germans, trying to iron out their resistances to the four-power Berlin agreement. The Russians may be of help on this, and they seem very pleased with their new closeness to the West Germans, whom they used to attack continuously as reactionary "revanchists."

They are of course anxious to have the Communist regimes legitimized in East Europe. At the same time they are aiming to break up NATO by establishing bilateral negotiations with its members. They figure that the general European security conference with its talk of troop-reductions on both sides, will make this more possible.

None of the policy-makers in Washington are particularly delighted with the prospect of the weakening of NATO, any more than the Russians are delighted with Nixon's trip to Peking. Thus the Russian detente with West Germany and Western Europe seems to balance out the American detente with China—and the other way around too.

As for myself, I like two detentes better than none. I feel they offer a better chance for world peace, even if they generate some tensions.

The real enigma in this total picture is the Russian nuclear build-up. I have heard no explanation of it, its pace is faster than the missile-watchers, many of them liberals, are willing to admit or believe.

Someone remarked that if the U. S. were launching a similar nuclear build-up the outcry here—and worldwide— would be one for the books. Maybe it is the anchor the Russians are throwing out, as the price they pay their hawks for the new diplomatic mobility.

# Max Lerner

## WHAT KIND OF PEACE?

Even in the last stage of reaching for peace there are different negotiating styles, as witness Hanoi's, Saigon's and Washington's.

Hanoi's style was brusque and abrasive to the U.S., breaking the news of the agreement unilaterally, going over President Nixon's head to reach the American people directly and get them to pressure President Thieu into accepting the peace terms fast. Thieu's style was belligerent, asserting that peace between the two Vietnams was for him to make, not for the U.S., and that there would be no peace agreement until he signed it. Washington's was couched in the calm, precise, yet confident language of Henry Kissinger's press briefing.

The fighting that continues is an effort on each side to position itself for the peace it expects, to have as much territory as possible to govern when the ceasefire comes. I feel it will come. When it does it will be a great historic event, the end of an ordeal, not only for America which lost so many lives, but for both Vietnams which lost many more and confronted each other with greater hatreds.

It isn't the best peace that any of the three governments in the struggle could have hoped for. Hanoi wanted the guarantee of a coalition government in South Vietnam even before a ceasefire, and it wanted Thieu sent packing. It got neither. Saigon wanted the withdrawal of North Vietnam's forces from the South, just as Washington did. Neither got it. Both also feared the possible emergence of a coalition government, especially Thieu. But

such a government may come. Kissinger must have been unable to marshal much evidence for Thieu that it wouldn't.

But while it isn't the best peace for any of the three ruling groups, it is likely to be a good ending for a bad war for all their people. It will stop the killing, it will start the maneuvering for a supervised election in South Vietnam, and it will start the postwar reconstruction of both Vietnams.

When Richard Nixon calls it a "peace with honor" as against a "peace with surrender" he is arguing for political advantage, and he oversimplifies the differences. Yet most detached observers, like the rather cool-headed diplomats in the UN, are surprised at how well America comes out in the peace agreement. Everyone had expected that America's naked humiliation would be only thinly covered over by some rhetorical figleaf. That hasn't happened. The fact of the military ceasefire coming before the political settlement, and the fact of the salvaging of the Saigon government, at least for the preparatory period before the elections—these are far more than figleaf or face-saving.

If you look at the peace from that angle, then Sargent Shriver's charge that it is all a maneuver for election advantage seems a shrill evaluation. To George McGovern's credit he doesn't make that claim. He does say that it is a settlement that America could have had at any time in the last four years. I doubt it strongly. It can't bear the weight of the evidence that Henry Kissinger piled up against such a view

when he discussed Hanoi's switch in its peace position on Oct. 8. McGovern's claim that the antiwar movement must take considerable credit for presuring the Administration into peace is on firmer ground, although not the whole story.

The real count against Nixon is that in maneuvering for almost four years to get a "peace with honor," he is getting it—but at what cost?

There is little doubt about the skill with which Kissinger pursued his "linkage" theory—that the China and Russia and SALT and Vietnam segments of American policy were all linked. The American bombing and mining weakened the Hanoi offensive of the spring, and the deals with China and Russia increased Peking and Moscow pressure on Hanoi, and Nixon's Great Powers policies strengthened him against McGovern in the election campaign, and the reality of Nixon's voter strength and McGovern's voter weakness finally crashed through to Hanoi.

Put them all together and you get a whole parallelogram of pressures that led Hanoi to its Oct. 8 concessions, and thus to the ceasefire.

But again one must ask: at what cost? At the cost of four additional years of war, with its tens of thousands of deaths and maimings in all the camps, its desolation of families, and its destructiveness of social ties and the human spirit.

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger know power. They know how to use it in confronting ruthless enemies, and they handle its nuances with skill. The rulers of Hanoi, as well as of Moscow and Peking, must respect that skill. But the haunting question persists. How many people have had to pay how much so that Nixon and Thieu and the Politburo at Hanoi could carry on their game of power?

Max Lerner

WOOING PEACE

If war is a fierce maiden, peace is a
coy one, but well worth the wooing she
exacts. The long-awaited ceasefire still
seems just beyond grasp. But when it
comes it is bound to mark the end and
beginning of an era, and bring joy to
many, and mixed blessings to a few.
The joy is clear, not only to the PW's
and their families, and to families on
both sides of the lines, but to countless
people who have waited for years for
some signs of the ending of this brutal
never-ending conflict.

The mixed blessings are also there. I talked with a young writer who has given everything to the McGovern campaign. "If peace comes," he said. "I have to be happy about it. But why does it come now, and not four years ago, or after the election? I have done nothing else since March except work for McGovern, and I thought we were beginning to turn the corner, and now it all collapses." He isn't alone in his rage over the timing of the drive for a ceasefire.

But Nixon and Kissinger couldn't
have staged the drive by themselves.
Hanoi had to collaborate. The Ameri-
can settlement terms have been pretty
clearly known, and little about them
has changed in the last months. Hanoi's
peace strategy was also pretty clear,
and there was little to do except wait
for Hanoi to decide that Nixon wasn't
about to be thrown on the ash heap of
history by the American people. When
Hanoi finally convinced itself that
Nixon was bound to win the election, a
new climate emerged for the bargain-

ing, and Nixon and Kissinger were
swift to follow it up.

Hanoi had to change its mind on
several scores. It had said that there
could be no ceasefire without a political
settlement first. It had said that Presi-
dent Thieu would have to go. Both
turned out to be hard-line rhetoric, and
the American negotiators must have
known it all the time.

Yet Thieu's role, not only as person
but as symbol, gathers into a single
knot all the difficulties that still re-
main on the hard road to an actual
peace. I don't think Hanoi has ever
underrated Thieu's ability, his tenacity,
and his capacity for maneuver, but
many Americans have.

Neither he nor his ruling group wants
to give up the power they have strug-
gled to win and to hold on to. But
since their lives have made them con-
vinced anti-Communists, they put little
faith in the tripartite interim regime
for Saigon that Kissinger and Le Due
Tho have agreed to. Thieu has studied
what happened in Eastern Europe in
the 1940s, and he knows something
about Asian Communism. He believes
that, whether by force or guile or both,
the Communists will manage to con-
vert the tripartite regime into a unitary
one, outwardly neutral, inwardly and
actually Communist. If he has to travel
that tripartite road—and the chances
are strong that he will have to—he will
be dragged kicking and struggling.

If he is a realist he will know that
historically it was in the cards. The key
is American power. Without American
power he would have been no one. The
night before the military junta chose
him as President (so goes the story)
he told his wife he had no chance, and

he resigned himself to defeat. It was
the junta that chose him over Gen. Ky,
but the Americans came to rely on him,
helped build him up, sustained him by
their military power. The Americans
used him to build a viable Saigon
government. But they have had enough
of the war, and—within the frame of
American guarantees—Thieu and his
people will have to be largely on their
own.

This is what happens to a client
state, when it has to depend on its
patron state. America has the "or else,"
the power to withdraw military sup-
port from the Saigon government, and
Thieu has to recognize the stark reality
of that "or else." He may nurse a
grievance against Nixon, and feel that
after the long, arduous road they
traveled together Nixon finally con-
ceded too much to Hanoi, and at the
wrong time. But in the end he must
recognize the reality principle.

Thieu does have one weapon still—
Nixon's fear of a backlash inside the
U.S. if the notion spreads that there
has been a betrayal of the South Viet-
namese regime. Nixon and Kissinger
have all along feared a passionate
"stab-in-the-back" myth that might tear
the fabric of the civil society inside
America. This is one reason why they
have refused for years to settle with
Hanoi on what would have been too
clearly Hanoi's terms. A determined
Thieu might appeal to the American
backlash vote even before the election,
much as Hanoi has all along tried to
appeal to the anti-Nixon and anti-war
vote.

If he can get reelected, which is
strongly probable, he will come on as
a triumphant leader whose political
strategy has been vindicated. He will
thus be stronger in negotiating to turn
a ceasefire into a real peace, and
stronger also in meeting the potential
backlash.

Max Lerner

THE WAR AGAINST KISSINGER

ABILENE, Texas.

While waiting for Kissinger-Godot, in the shape of further news about the sustained round of secret Paris talks on ending the war, we might turn to the larger frame of the Nixon-Kissing-er diplomacy of which it is part. There is a last-ditch war being waged against this "new diplomacy" by the far left which feels that Kissinger has sold out to Nixon and that Russia and China have traded their revolutionary mission for a mess of American grain and technology.

The same war is being waged by the far right. You can trace its trajectory from a diehard segment of New York's Conservative Party (even the Buckleys dislike Mr. Nixon's great power diplomacy although they lump it) to some of the hard-line areas here in Texas, to Presidential candidate Schmitz of the American Party, who couldn't carry his Congressional district in California but is running for president of the paleoliths on the grandiose proposition that a great groundswell against Nixon as an extreme liberal is preparing in America.

Hurrah for the lunatic fringes that add so much color and verve to the texture of American life. What would America be without its wildmen, left and right? I sat with H. L. Mencken, back in 1948, in the press section of the convention of Henry Wallace's Progressive Party, after an inimitable succession of hot-eyed advocates had pleaded their kooky causes before the platform committee, and I recall how joyously the misanthrope seer of Baltimore greeted their antic follies.

Although Texas went for Humphrey in 1968, it will go Republican on the Presidency this year because of the basic anti-McGovern feeling, including an over 60 per cent rejection of his Vietnam views. But a moderate Democrat like Barefoot Sanders, who used to work on LBJ's staff, stands a good chance for the Senate against conservative Republican John Tower.

Speaking here in an academic setting on the new diplomacy, I find that opinion on the Nixon-Kissinger policies is about evenly split, with greater approval among the college young, although they are puzzled at the irony of Nixon as the carrier of the new doctrine. The interesting fact is that Sen. Tower, always a hard-liner on foreign policy and a critic of Mr. Nixon's SALT agreements as being too soft on the Russians, has had to keep his peace about the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policies. Such are the vagaries of politics.

I doubt whether many Texans have heard of Henry Paolucci, a lively politics professor and former Conservative Party candidate, who storms fitfully against Kissinger on the op-ed page of the New York Times, most recently for having "tutored" Richard Nixon into becoming an Alger Hiss in his basic foreign policies. Shades of Whittaker Chambers and other former Nixon mentors! But I take more seriously the attack from the McGovern left, mounted by David Landau's psychology, "Kissinger: The Uses of Power."

Critics of Kissinger have made a to-do about the baleful influence of Nixon's tutor's own tutor, William

Yandell Elliott—on his Harvard graduate student. It happens that Elliott and I were colleagues at Harvard somewhat earlier, and lustily at loggerheads. He was a Southern conservative, but one who stood by his liberal colleagues in their ordeals with the Harvard administration. He had done an important book on "The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics," and Kissinger might have absorbed some of his teacher's antidoctrinaire belligerence. But his own experience with Hitlerism had already taught him the dangers of ideologies and given him the tough-minded bent he has retained.

There are perils in psychobiography—which I define in this case as a study of a man's mind-psyche pattern in his past in order to explain his present and predict his future. It isn't a mature enough science yet—if it will ever be—and it will require a more sophisticated hand than David Landau's, despite his devoted and detailed research. There have been several psychologists of Mr. Nixon whose faces must have reddened after his Peaking and Moscow journeys and his SALT agreement.

As for Kissinger, it is far too early to write off his role in the great powers diplomacy, even in the Vietnamese war and peace, and certainly too risky to predict (as Landau does) that he might back up the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Hanoi to make it submit to the Nixon peace formula.

The Machiavelli and Metternich in Kissinger has been stressed, but the humanist is there, too.

His striking amalgam of qualities is an event in the history of American foreign policy not to be written off in a niggardly fashion. He was an actor ready and waiting for a role on the stage of history. Whatever Richard Nixon's faults (and they are many), don't ignore his having provided Kissinger with that role.

# Max Lerner

HENRY KISSINGER

You are Henry Kissinger. Life in the past four years has been a dizzying succession of undreamt tasks, journeys, conferences, negotiations, communiqués. You have never been elected head of state, never been appointed foreign minister, never led a coup or revolution. Yet you sit with the men who are in the seats of power, and it is you that the spotlight headlines follow from world capital to world capital.

You are Henry Kissinger. Your design for winding up the Vietnam war and extricating America from it is finally and incredibly being executed. The truce teams are in the field, trying to tame the beast of last-minute fighting. The 12-power conference you envisaged four years ago, to give legitimacy to the peace, is convening in Paris.

All the best and brightest of your former colleagues and current critics mocked your chances of seeing it through. There were breakdowns in the talks. There was a series of Perils-of-Pauline brinkmanship decisions, on both sides. But the cease-fire came through.

You are Henry Kissinger. This is an hour of triumph for you. You have journeyed to the enemy capitol at Hanoi, then to Peking and Tokyo. You spent more long hours in almost non-stop talk with the Chinese leaders, including Mao, than any recent foreign visitor. The Chinese have peppered their party paper with your picture, and released the TV tape of your meeting with Mao. You

feel you must have done something right.

You are Henry Kissinger. You love power and are obsessed with it, but you have few illusions about power. The curious path that brought you where you are now was compounded of hard work, insight, stratagems, luck. You figure your business is power, and you don't pretend to play either the innocence game or the purity game. Yet even those who fear you have come to respect you for being in command of your material and for playing fair in your briefings.

You are Henry Kissinger. You might have been a considerable scholar, but your drive was toward translating your insights and dreams into actual political policies. For a time you tried to do it as a government consultant, but the power was will-o'-the-wisp, and you wanted substance, not shadow. You hitched your wagon to Nelson Rockefeller's Presidential star, but it proved a falling star, so you unhitched the wagon and hitched it again to Nixon's constellation. The two have stayed hitched to each other, despite the almost daily wishful predictions that they would fall apart.

You are Henry Kissinger. You are caught between the world of thought and the world of action. You cannot and dare not cut your ties wholly with the academic community, which is overwhelmingly liberal. Yet your only hope for translating your ideas into policies is linked with President Nixon, who is still the bogey of most academics. You

walk a tightrope between them—one that was stretched taotest on the Cambodian decision, the mining decision, the Hanoi bombing decision. In the end you feel that Nixon and his enemies must judge you by results.

You are Henry Kissinger. The Left regards you as a Dr. Strangelove, the Right as a debauched Hellogabalus. You feel wryly amused at both, happy to be immune enough to live an independent life, which a politician can scarcely do. You are aware that you have an ego that needs bridling if it is not to run away with you, and you even make disarming jokes about it, just as you joke about the "swinging" life you are supposed to be leading.

Yet there has been little room for ego and little time for starlets recently. They are marginal. What is central is the task you have entered with the President, for which only four years remain, and for you probably less.

You are Henry Kissinger. You know that the building of a new power structure with China and Russia may decide what the world will be like for decades. There will be problems with Congress, as shown by the current response to the idea of American aid to Hanoi. There will be problems with the bureaucracy, whose massive weight can crush even the most promising beginnings. You distrust triumphs. You have learned how frail and unfinished the opening gambits may be in a game of power.

You are Henry Kissinger. You know how fickle fortune can prove, with a grand vizier, a king's favorite. Despite the jester's mask you have experienced tragedy, and you guess that the tragic is built into life. Behind the press headlines and the plaudits of the crowd you suspect that anything can happen, and if it does you will have a quip ready for it.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

MERVYN LEROY

January 21, 1971

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Cannot tell you how nice it was to hear from
you - especially with all you have on your
mind these days.

I had lunch today with Joanna Barnes. We
were talking about her book. Naturally the
conversation got around to you. As you know,
I have known Joanna for a long time, and she
is quite a girl.

If I do get to Washington, it would be a pleasure
to look you up.

I can only say that I enjoyed meeting you too,
and hope to see you again soon.

RECEIVED
JAN 27 1971
CENTRAL FILES

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1 Apr / 7/7

Dianne:

Patricia Roberts, of the Council on Leaders and Specialists, who is program officer for Prof. Henry Lesguillons, of the Universities of Tours and Paris, is here on a State Dept international visitors program grant. Will be here til mid of next week and would like to see HAK to talk about US-Common Market-European Community relations. He is attached to the Ministry of Education; is President of Europe-Universite.

Miss Roberts says, according to the French Embassy he is very much a comer, in his early thirties. He is Secretary General of the Commission for the Study of the European Community, an association of law professors.

Miss Roberts is on 298-7450.

Mary

*Council on Leaders & Specialists of the Experiment in International Living, 818 - 18th Street, N. W.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 17, 1969

Dear Henry:

I considered it a great honor to receive your generous letter of
November 29 enclosing your photograph. You were very kind to
write.

While I cannot honestly say that my short term of service on the
National Security Council staff was an unmixed pleasure, I assure
you that it was an exciting and stimulating ten months for me.
I hope that I was able to provide some assistance to you in the
awesome task you assumed last January. I am particularly
grateful for the confidence you showed in accepting me on your
staff -- especially in view of my suspect State Department
origins!

Your photograph with its warm inscription will be a constant
memento of a unique experience for me. I too hope that
our paths will cross again some day in the future.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED

DEC 2 0 1969

CENTRAL FILES

NOV 29 1969

Dear Don,

I would like you to know how much I have appreciated and valued the superb contribution you have made to the MSC staff during your assignment here. Although I could not always tell you so personally, I was keenly aware of your extraordinary productivity and of the mature judgment that marked your approach to the numerous problems with which you dealt.

I am confident that you have a brilliant senior career ahead of you and I hope that our paths will soon cross again.

The attached picture will, I hope, remind you of a rewarding experience. I will look back to our association with the greatest pleasure.

Enclosure

Mr. Donald A. Leah
3604 Husted Drive
North Chevy Chase, Md. 20015

cc: Director General of the Foreign Service

H.Sonnенfeldt·mn 11/13/69

RECEIVED

DEC 9 1969

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

AUG 6 1970

Dear Don:

Thank you for your letter of July 24. I regret
your decision but understand it and appreciate
your honest reply.

I wish you well in your new position.

Mr. Donald R. Lesh
Office of Congressman Abner J. Mikva
Room 1532, Longworth House Office
Building
Washington, D. C. 20515'

j1p:8/5/70

RECEIVED
AUG 7 1970

OFFICIAL, jlp, 6/30/71
Type of Request & Date

LETELIER
(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: The Chilean Ambassador (Letelier)

Request: Would like to pay a courtesy call on Mr. Kissinger.

Contact Miss Barba, 667-0746

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: 7/23- check w/ Ernie

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information: Coered Ernie 7/24 + asked for a memo.

Resolution:

RECEIVED

JUL 26 1971

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /

NOV 1 1 1971

Dear Mr. Levine:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the now-
famous Associated Press wirephoto from my
recent visit to China. I appreciate your
thoughtfulness and am pleased to have this
copy of the picture for my files.

I regret that time does not permit me to write
a detailed answer to your question about the
Prime Minister. In this brief space, I might
just say that he, and all of the Chinese we met,
were most cordial and impressive people.

Thank you for writing.

Mr. Ted M. Levine
Development Counsellors International Ltd.
20 East 46th Street
New York, N. Y. 10017

jlp:11/10/71

RECEIVED
KISSINGER'S OFFICE

The White House
Washington

WHA087 WH-W-WA150

BR INTRA NL REG PCC TEL W WASHINGTON DC 69 04-2 NFT

DR HENRY KISSINGER

CARE WHITE HOUSE /WASHDC

I AM HERE IN WASHINGTON TO CELEBRATE SPRING. MY FATHER REQUESTED THAT I CONTACT YOU TO WISH YOU AN ENJOYABLE HOLIDAY AND ALSO TO THANK YOU FOR ACKNOWLEDGING HIS LETTER CONCERNING MY BROTHER.

I SHALL BE TOURING THE WHITE HOUSE ON TUESDAY AND WOULD LIKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY PROVIDED OF COURSE THAT YOU HAVE THE TIME . SINCERELY.

KATHERINE LEVITCH(922 24 STREET NORTHWEST APT 609 PHONE 965-5661)).

/4143427163/

[L]

FORM 0805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

1443451182

KATHERINE LEVITCHGSS 54 STREET NORTHWEST AP 809 PHONE 262-2621).

THE OPPORTUNITY TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY PROVIDED OF COURSE
I SHALL BE TOURING THE WHITE HOUSE ON TUESDAY AND WOULD LIKE
TO THANK YOU FOR ACKNOWLEDGING HIS LETTER CONCERNING MY BROTHER.

THAT I CONTACT YOU TO WISH YOU AN ENJOYABLE HOLIDAY AND ALSO
I AM HERE IN WASHINGTON TO CELEBRATE SPRING . MY FATHER REQUESTED
CARE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

CARE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

DR. HENRY KIRRINGER

82 INTRA INL REG BCC TEL W WASHINGTON DC 29 04-5 NEI
WHAO68 WH-V-WAT20

CHAIRMAN • Hobart Lewis

EXECUTIVE

FG 227

KISSINGER, HENRY A. / L A

October 4, 1973

Dear Henry:

This is a belated congratulations not only
to you, but to the country. Your appointment is in the opinion
of everyone I know the best thing that has happened to the
United States in many many months.

I know that you have a thousand things more
pressing, but I hope that sometime you will have a few minutes
to think about the role of the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Information and the possibilities of its being helpful to you in
your mission.

As you may know, I have the honor to be
chairman of that commission. The members are: James Michener,
the novelist; George Gallup, of the Gallup Poll; J. Leonard
Reinsch, formerly chairman of the commission; John Shaheen,
whom you know.

The commission meets monthly in Washington,
and we are all most hopeful that you could spare time for
luncheon or dinner with us in the near future.

Our next meeting, but one, will be on Sunday
and Monday, December 2 and 3. We will meet for dinner on
Sunday, and we will also meet through the day on Monday. Could
you possibly have dinner on Sunday, or, failing that, breakfast on
Monday, or, failing that, luncheon on Monday?

As you may imagine there are a great many
matters of mutual concern, and I know that Jim Keogh shares my

RECEIVED
DEC 1 1973
CENSUS FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A./L*

WASHINGTON REPORT

Washington, August 25, 1969

WR 69-33

THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA STORY

If a majority of the member nations in the UN had their way the world would be at war this year over one of the least known and most misunderstood areas of the globe—South West Africa.

Led by propaganda and political pressure from the communist bloc states and fed by a combination of misconceptions and demagoguery from the so-called Afro-Asian bloc of nations, the United Nations has very nearly committed itself to launch a military campaign to oust the white man—specifically the Republic of South Africa—from administration of the territory.

For 50 years, South Africa has run South West Africa under terms of a League of Nations mandate to administer the one-time German colony that was the Kaiser's pride before World War I.

What is more, even the most critical observers of South Africa's administration concede South West Africa has been run well and has prospered far beyond reasonable expectations.

Despite drought, limited communications through sparsely settled country, and the great diversity of its people, South West Africa's post-World War I bankruptcy has been converted under South African supervision to a point which allows the country today to export capital.

During the days when the British ruled South Africa and, consequently, South West Africa, the level of real output (1920-1945) doubled. Since South Africa became a republic and cut loose their ties to the British crown the growth rate has been even more remarkable. For example, during the period 1961-1965, when the population of South West Africa was rising at a rate of about 2.4 percent per annum, gross domestic output in the territory increased on an average of 12.6 percent per annum. This has been reflected in a per capita income growth rate to the non-white population of the area an estimated five to ten times that of most of the non-white administered states of the African continent.

Its tribal peoples have known a peace, stability and progress which they never enjoyed for periods of more than a decade prior to the end of World War I.

Only because the West, and particularly Britain, France and the United States, have no intention of waging war against the South Africans; only because the Soviet Union is unwilling to commit its own military might to such an adventure, and only because the Afro-Asian countries are unable to do so, has aggression against one of the most peaceful portions of this violence-plagued earth been averted in 1969.

RECEIVED

SEP 1 2 1969

CENTRAL FILES

ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE NATION'S SECURITY

2

Because it may not be averted in the future, it is important that the facts of South West Africa's story be known so the myths may be exposed before it is too late.

## Geography and People

Facing on the Atlantic side of southern Africa, South West Africa shares a northern border with Portuguese Angola, an eastern border with Botswana and the Republic of South Africa and a southern border with South Africa. It has a limited frontier contact with Zambia in its extreme northeast.

The territory is slightly larger than Texas and Louisiana combined, consisting of some 318,000 square miles. Fifteen percent of its total area is virtually useless except for one currently very important consideration—defense. This region is the Namid, a desert of dunes between the pounding waves of the Atlantic and the country's central plateau that varies in width from 50 to 80 miles along its entire west coast.

The Namid is formidably hot, utterly arid and a frightening obstacle for any would-be invaders from the sea. It is perhaps the earth's most desolate piece of real estate.

An inland excarpment which is known as the Central Plateau, covers more than half of the territory and also stretches from South West Africa's northern border to its southern border. It ranges in altitude from 3,200 to 6,500 feet above sea level.

The plateau offers a diversified landscape of rugged mountains, rocky outcrops, sand-filled valleys and gently rolling plains, has minimal amounts of rainfall and is sparsely inhabited.

The remainder of the area is known as the Kalahar, covering the eastern, northern and north-eastern parts of South West Africa. It includes what is called the Caprivi Strip—a thin corridor penetrating the southern heart of Africa between Botswana on the south and Angola/Zambia on the north (the Caprivi Strip was carved out of British Colonial

holdings in 1908 to grant German South West Africa access to the Zambezi River. It was named in honor of the then German Chancellor, Count von Caprivi.)

Though most of the Kalahari is also deficient in rainfall, parts of it such as the Caprivi Strip are well watered and well developed agriculturally.

The entire country is inhabited by less than 630,000 people and about one-sixth of that number are white. Most of the whites are of German and South African (Afrikaner) or English origin.

The largest non-white group is the Ovambo tribe, living in a virtually autonomous region of the north, Ovamboland, adjacent to Angola. They number well over 270,000. Then come the Damara people (50,000), Herero (40,000), Nama (40,000), Okavango (32,000), East Caprivians (18,000), Basters (14,000), Bushmen (13,000), Tswana and much smaller other tribes (20,000). The so-called "coloreds," Asians or products of white - non-white inter-marriage, are a group unto themselves and number some 15,000.

## Tribal Distinctions

The biggest misconception much of the world has about all of Africa is that all non-white populations are as one in terms of ethnic origins, color of skin and level of social, political and intellectual advancement. On top of this, of course, comes the second biggest misconception —namely that since the white man runs the governments of southern Africa in Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, in Rhodesia and in South and South West Africa, the non-white populations are being oppressed.

That is a convenient theory to espouse wherever ignorance is deemed blissful but it is hopelessly out of line with the facts in southern Africa.

If one considers the white man as a tribal grouping in South Africa, for instance, the fact is the white tribe arrived in that area about the same time many of the Bantu (black) tribes arrived from east and central Africa following great migrations brought on by the pressures

3

of war, famine and the Arab slave trade
persecutions.

The settlement of southern Africa—in
terms of today's major population groups
—occurred in the sixteenth to nineteenth
centuries. The white man arrived in 1652
to form the first settlement at the Cape
of Good Hope. However, European ex-
plorers and adventurers from Portugal,
England and Spain had made landings
and become familiar with some of the ter-
rain of South and South West Africa
since Portuguese Captain Diego Cao land-
ed in 1485 just north of what is today,
South West Africa's principal port, Wal-
vis Bay. Two years later the only other
modern South West African port—Lude-
ritz—was a beachhead landing for explor-
er-geographer Bartholomew Diaz. Diaz
then proceeded around the tip of the con-
tinent to discover the Cape, in 1488.

Only the Hottentots - now extinct as a
race or tribe - and possibly the Bushmen,
were indigenous to this part of Africa.
Such a famous tribe as the Zulus migrated
into the eastern portion of South Africa
and became important only in the 18th
and 19th centuries.

Though the United Nations and many
of the most vocal of those countries now
seeking the white man's scalp in southern
Africa make the black man's experience
in southern Africa sound like that of the
Indian in America, there just are no paral-
lels to be found.

Thanks to the white man's success (by
the end of the nineteenth century) in put-
ting an end to the non-white wars of
tribal genocide, the non-white population
of South and South West Africa today is
four to six times greater than that of the
white man.

In South West Africa, there are very
wide differences to be noted among the
tribal groupings. The Bushman is a Stone
Age man — hopelessly outclassed physi-
cally and mentally by the sophisticated
Ovambos, and Okavangos who similarly
have little in common with the warlike
Hereros and Namas.

In terms of language, customs, family

and community relationships and tribal
organization—each group in South West
Africa, including the “coloreds,” differs
widely.

The United Nations has also insisted
that South Africa's continued administra-
tion of the League mandate in South West
Africa amounts to an "illegal occupation".

The World Court reviewed this entire
issue as recently as 1965 and concluded
—in effect—that the UN had no jurisdic-
tion in the matter, that there was no evi-
dence that South Africa had violated the
League mandate and that the subject was
not germane. The case was initiated at In-
ternational Court of Justice by Ethiopia
and Liberia yet the highest tribunal in in-
ternational law found that neither coun-
try had been hurt by South Africa's ad-
ministration of South West Africa and
neither country even shared a common
boundary with the area in question.

Yet, the UN Security Council—earlier
this year—was asked by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations to consider
the use of armed intervention to make
South Africa release its administrative
hold on South West Africa. The fact that
there was no demand from the peoples of
South West Africa to do this and the fact
that the UN was acting in direct conflict
with the World Court opinion led South
African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr.
Hilgard Muller, to comment: "We are oc-
cupying nobody and nothing. The people
of South West Africa possess and occupy
their own territories and they live in
prosperity under our protection."

"We have been in South West Africa for fifty years already and I want to state clearly that we intend to remain in South West Africa legally because the inhabitants want us there and also because it is our intention to prevent any aggression from outside against the territory or any of its population groups ..."

Most importantly, the major non-white
tribal groups in South West Africa to-
day live on the very homelands they orig-
inally occupied when they migrated south
from other parts of the continent. They
have not been dispossessed of their real

4

estate holdings. They continue their tribal
life in an unbroken pattern.

They choose their own chiefs in the way
their people have chosen them for cen-
turies. They run their own affairs. The
white man interferes just enough to bring
them schools, hospitals, agricultural
know-how and, as indicated earlier, peace.

Yet the real irony of the South West Africa story is that an independent and objective survey made among the non-white groups of South West Africa suggests that any attempt by the outside world to enforce the United Nations or Communist and Afro-Asian claims against South Africa's administration of the country would be as stoutly resisted by the allegedly exploited natives as by their so-called white masters.

Despite the heavy dosages of Communist-directed and financed propaganda that seeks to infect black Africa with revolutionary fervor and despite the Afro-Asian bloc sensitivity to the real and imagined affronts to their brethren in South West Africa, any attempt to use force to impose the UN's will would be the height of folly.

Furthermore, it would be a reprehensible exhibition of double standards on the part of both the non-Communist world and the UN, so long as they seemingly tolerate the truly illegal occupation of Czechoslovakia, the real persecution of Hungarians and the demonstrated fifty-year oppression of millions throughout the Communist world.

EDITORIAL BOARD

<table><tr><td>John M. Fisher</td><td>Editor and Publisher</td></tr><tr><td>Anthony Harrigan</td><td>Managing Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. James D. Atkinson</td><td>International Politics Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky</td><td>Economics Editor</td></tr><tr><td>William Gill</td><td>National Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Frank J. Johnson</td><td>Foreign Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Walter H. Judd</td><td>Radio Editor</td></tr><tr><td>William K. Lambie, Jr.</td><td>Associate Editor, Research Director</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>John F. Lewis</td><td>Coordinating Editor, Radio Producer</td></tr><tr><td>Edgar Ansel Mowrer</td><td>News Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Lee R. Pennington</td><td>Internal Security Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Herminio Portell-Vila</td><td>Latin American Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Stefan T. Possony</td><td>Strategy and Military Affairs Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper, USAF (Ret.)</td><td>Associate Editor, Technology Editor</td></tr><tr><td>R. Adm. Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)</td><td>Law & Space Editor</td></tr></table>

NATIONAL STRATEGY COMMITTEE

Robert W. Galvin, Chairman
Co-Chairmen
Admiral H. D. Felt, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Willard F. Libby
General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.)
Dr. William J. Thaler
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF (Ret.)
Loyd Wright
General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.)
Dr. Harold M. Agnew
Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)
Bennett Archambault
Dr. James D. Atkinson
G. Duncan Bauman
Peter Bruce Clark
Charles S. Craigmile

Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.)
Henry Duque
Honorable Elbridge Durbrow
Patrick J. Frawley, Jr.
Fred M. Gillies
Vice Admiral Elton Watters Grenfell, USN (Ret.)
General Paul D. Harkins, USA (Ret.)
Clifford F. Hood
Dr. Montgomery H. Johnson
James S. Kemper, Jr.
William H. Kendall
Honorable William F. Knowland
Vice Admiral Fitzhugh Lee, USN (Ret.)
General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF (Ret.)
Vice Admiral R. E. Libby, USN (Ret.)
Honorable Clare Booth Luce
A. B. McKee, Jr.

Admiral Ben Moreell, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Robert Morris
Dr. Nicholas Nyaradi
Dr. Stefan T. Possony
General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.)
Brig. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, USAF (Ret.)
Ira G. Ross
Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
Major General Dale O. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, USN (Ret.)
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. A. B. Suttle
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Kenneth Watson
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA (Ret.)
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)

The American Security Council Washington Report is published weekly by the American Security Council Press. Annual subscription rate $12.00. Additional copies available at 25¢ each postpaid for non-members and 10¢ each postpaid for members.

Copyright © 1969 by American Security Council. All rights reserved except that permission is granted for reproduction in whole or in part if context is preserved, credit given and two copies are forwarded to the American Security Council Executive Offices.

AMERICAN SECURITY COUNCIL

Executive Offices and Research Center: 123 North Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60606
Washington Bureau: 1101 - 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036

PRESS 9/9/71

LEWIS

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

VISSINGER, HENRY A. / L. *

Name: Paul Lewis, London Financial Times

Request: New bureau chief and would like to see HAK on a general
background basis and to pay a courtesy call. Anytime is fine except Sept.
21-25.

Miss Kuhn 347-4920

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: NO - 9/23

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: 9/28

Additional Information:

Resolution:

RECEIVED

SEP 2 9 1971

CENTRAL FILES

PRESS

LEWIS April 18 & 19

(Last name and pending date)

GENERAL

FGG-11-1 KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Tony LewisNYT, London

Request: Will be in town next week on April 18 and 19th and would like to see Mr. Kissinger. This request originated from Max Frankel's office. When you had lunch with Mr. Frankel you indicated you would be interested in meeting him. Mr. Lewis could make arrangements to come to the States on the 17th if the 18th and 19th were not good days for you.

JTH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time: 4/19/72 - Lunch w/ Frankel & Lewis

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

APR 26 1972

CENTRAL FILES

Resolution: