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Taking out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary, it may prevent a remote contingency from turning into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive tasks.

France and Great Britain must know at least as well as we--though we can hardly expect them to advertise this fact--that using their nuclear forces independently would be a desperate last resort. Whatever they may say now, they will learn that they must think of their nuclear forces much as Sweden and Switzerland think of their armies. Neither country is able to withstand a full-scale attack by a major power. Both have built military forces to give them the possibility of posing risks that an aggressor may consider out of proportion to the objectives to be achieved.

For this limited task, the British and French nuclear forces are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. For one thing, Europeans living on a crowded continent are not so impressed by the benefits of discriminating targeting as United States strategists able to deploy

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their forces on a continent. To most Europeans, victory in a general war
has little meaning. To them it seems impossible to establish in de
Gaulle's words a relationship between "one kind of death and another."
Rightly or wrongly, the capability for nuclear war is judged not in
terms of victory but of deterrence. And in this respect neither the
British nor ultimately the French nuclear force is entirely negligible.

The ratio of the combined British and French forces to those of
the Soviet Union is more favorable than was that of the Soviet Union
vis-à-vis the United States in the Fifties. Despite the overwhelming
strategic superiority of the United States, no one would maintain that
the Soviet strategic force had no deterrent value.

Of course, the Soviets could launch a pre-emptive blow at the
bases of European nuclear forces. However, such a course would be
extraordinarily risky. As long as the NATO treaty retains any
validity, it would be extremely foolhardy for the Soviets to make a
full-scale nuclear attack on Europe without taking into account the
high probability of American involvement.

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technology has produced an often crude strategic doctrine. The attempt to restore France's sense of purpose has led to an exaggerated insistence on autonomy. American pressure has evoked theories which emphasize divergent interests. But these theories are subject to the same evolutionary process as they have been in the United States. A mature European program should not be judged by its beginning or its ultimate doctrine by theories developed in part as a reaction to the pressures of a senior partner.

This is not to say that the United States needs to accept every strategic theory advanced by Great Britain and France--even less that it should urge them to stay in the nuclear field, if they should decide to leave it. It would involve an end to the pressure--official and semi-official--against their nuclear programs and a willingness to treat them not as unavoidable nuisances but as legitimate parts of a common NATO strategy.

Obviously we do have interests with respect to the nuclear programs of Britain and France which it is in our interest to promote. The following United States interests seem important: (a) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used

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precipitately because of their vulnerability. (b) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction. (c) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response. (d) They should be co-ordinated with our forces.

Thus a strong case can be made for some assistance to Great Britain and France in enhancing the invulnerability of their forces and improving their command and control procedures--providing they agree to a common NATO strategy. It will be argued that if this course were followed, every European country would acquire nuclear weapons of its own--especially Germany. Any survey of the European scene--outside of Germany--is likely to show the opposite. Italy has neither the resources not the domestic structure for a national nuclear program. The smaller European countries have shown great hesitation even about participating in the MLF. None of them would consider undertaking a national nuclear program.

This leaves the problem of Germany. Under the impact of the pressure for the MLF, and the statements of some American spokesmen, some Germans have lately begun to speak of the "discrimination" inherent in British and

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have its own nuclear force or that Britain and the Federal Republic should not be encouraged to believe that whether it acquires nuclear weapons of its own depends on its unilateral decision. NATO could scarcely survive a national German nuclear program--a fact which it is essential that all parties recognize. Moreover, the MLF opens up the prospect of some form of German participation in the nuclear field. Indeed this is now its chief of utility.

If the MLF becomes primarily a device to enable Germany to participate in the nuclear field, its emphasis would have to be modified. It would no longer be the centerpiece of United States NATO policy. It should not be advertised as the chief means of restoring Atlantic solidarity, regaining the impetus towards European integration or opening the way into Europe for Great Britain. It should no longer be the centipede of United States nuclear policy. Its goals would be more modest: to give those allies wishing to participate in the planning and conduct of strategic nuclear operations an opportunity to do so within a multilateral framework. As a result, there would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States

but an individual judgment of the various governments.

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force, of the French force de frappe, the MLF and sufficient American units to enable it to perform this specific mission by itself.

Such a separate strategic force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO strategic command for deep interdiction and counterforce operations. This would provide at least a "firebreak" in the command structure and closer political control of the decision to engage in deep penetration of

hostile

Soviet territory.

In 1963, an attempt was made to bring about an Inter-Allied Force composed of national contingents, its functions being mainly defined as those of a sort of inter-allied action, although the attempt failed, which was to have some of these functions. However, the effort foundered because it was presented as a subterfuge to force France into "integration" and because of the opposition of some Americans who thought that the "right of withdrawal" inherent in such a force was inconsistent with their preference for a completely integrated strategy.

But too much has been made of this theoretical "right of withdrawal." To debate it as a right leads to deadlock; to face it within the framework of agreed joint planning may permit a reasonable discussion of probable

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strategic use of nuclear weapons. Early in the Kennedy Administration, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war.¹ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven ~~rejected the notion that even the smallest nuclear weapon was in a distinguishable category.~~ He insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons ~~was~~ crossed, no obvious "firebreak" exists short of large-scale thermo-nuclear war.² Secretary McNamara has spoken deprecatingly of a limited nuclear war ~~that is~~ some "ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange."³ He has also insisted that the United States strategic forces are alone sufficient to perform ~~any~~ nuclear mission:

> There is no question but today our strategic retaliatory forces of bombers, missiles and Polaris are fully capable of destroying Soviet targets, even after absorbing an initial nuclear surprise attack. Allowing for losses from an initial enemy attack we calculate that our forces would destroy virtually all Soviet targets without any help from deployed tactical air units or carrier task forces which, of course, have the capability of attacking these targets with nuclear weapons.⁴

1. Press Conference, June 6, 1964, *New York Times*, June 7, 1964

2. Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," *Survival*, V, 3, May-June 1963, p. 96

3. Robert S. McNamara, "The United States Air Force in the Cold War," *DOSB*, December 16, 1963, XLIX, 127, p. 917.

4. *Address by the President*, Speech on Feb. 17, 1962, to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1962.

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strategic use of nuclear weapons. Early in the Kennedy Administration, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war.¹ Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain Enthoven rejected the notion that even the smallest nuclear weapon was in a distinguishable category. He insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no obvious "firebreak" exists short of large-scale thermo-nuclear war.² Secretary McNamara has spoken deprecatingly of some "ill-defined threshhold of strategic exchange."³ He has also insisted that the United States strategic forces are alone sufficient to perform any nuclear mission:

1. Press Conference, June 6, 1964, *New York Times*, June 7, 1961

3. Robert S. McNamara, "XLIX, 127, p. 917." *DOSB*, December 16, 1963,

4. Chicago, *New York Times*, Feb. 18, 1962.