didn't know such things were going on, they said.

In the conference room of the Univer-
tarian Universalist Association building
on Beacon Street in downtown Boston, a
portrait of abolitionist William Channing
frowns down on Arnold Tovell, Robert
West, and me. Windows look out
onto a wide view over the Boston Com-
mon. A sound truck drives up the street;
a voice muffled by distance calls citizens
to an antiwar rally.

West: Since we brought out the papers I've traveled all over this country. Support for what we did is solid in our [Universalist and Universalist] congregations. It was in October—four months after the papers had become public when Senator Gravel read them into his subcommittee record and distributed all 7,000 pages to the press—that we published our edition. Yet the FBI created an aura of wrongdoing and criminality around us in the public mind. Recently, for example, six people applied for a post of secretary here in response to a *Globe* advertisement that just gave our telephone number. Five of the six bowed out when they heard it was for the UUA. They said they didn't want anything to do with our organization. And this in a liberal, intellectual community like Boston.

Tovell (after handing me a Pentagon
Papers information kit that explains why
Beacon published the Gravel edition and
why the UUA is resisting the govern-
ment's investigation): The Pentagon
Papers haven't affected the war. The pub-
lic doesn't read them. Our congregations
have donated sets to libraries. Sometimes
the first volume is taken out and looked
at; the other three never leave the shelf.

West: The publication was turned into
a news event and a legal battle. It became
only too easy for the people of this coun-
try to forget that the Pentagon Papers
are not a news event; they are a *book*.
There is no short cut to *reading* them.

Professor Howard Zinn and I sit at a
corner table at the University Luncheon-
ette on Commonwealth Avenue, Boston.
I tell him of my conversation with Neil
Sheehan.

Zinn: I agree with Sheehan that the main benefit of publishing the papers is suspicion of government, awareness of government treachery. The concrete points spelled out in the papers can be sorted out only through real study. Who is going to bother with that? People don't want to wade through all those pages. There has been a sad failure to digest them in print, to popularize them, bring them out as a juvenile—anything.

I: No coincidence, either. Even the
paper that helped break the silence, *The
New York Times....*

Zinn: As you know, journalists are
trained into some kind of middle-of-the-
road neutrality. In the end, no paper and
no network is going to publish or broad-
cast anything that might shake the basis
of this society. Think of the Bay of Pigs
blackout. It isn't thought control, and it
isn't a conspiracy. Of course not. It's
more subtle and indirect. There are built-
in controls and brakes that let us go just
so far. Things here are always carried

up to a point. Of course, if we go on like
this, we may soon not even have an Ells-
berg or a Sheehan or a Beacon Press.

I: But we had all three in June 1971—
and nothing happened.

Zinn: It was a drop in a vat. The gov-
ernment throws a bucketful of informa-
tion at us, day in, day out. Our knowl-
edge of facts in this country gets so
diluted that it cannot be translated into
action. ☐

Waiting for
Nixon Slightly
Below the
Summit

BY ALAN LEVY

SALZBURG, Austria—The hills were alive with the news of Nixon—booked into Salzburg to fight jet lag for a weekend on his way to the summit meeting in Moscow. Locally, there was talk that the President would take time out to treat himself and Mrs. Nixon to the American Express “Sound of Music” tour, advertised all over Salzburg thusly: “Revitalize the famous movie. Admire our charming city. See picturesque landscape”—and locations. In short, the tourist was invited to see the original set minus the original cast. To make up for the lack of Julie Andrews and Company, the tour was offering the movie sound track piped into an air-conditioned autobus. Price: $6.60. Duration: approximately three hours. As it turned out, the President didn’t have the three hours to spare.

As the great day neared, the look of
the city altered: Helicopters appeared on
rooftops, black Cadillacs on the streets,
immense 707s on runways too small to
hold them comfortably. The normally
nonchalant natives grew restless. In a
small, pink cottage on the grounds of
Klessheim, the big, pink White House of
a palace where the Nixons would be stay-
ing during their Austrian stopover, my
hostess said: "This is the last little bit of
paradise left—and now the Americans
are invading it."

It was May 13, a week before the
Nixons were due to arrive, and my host-
ess was Silvia Reinhardt, the wife of
Gottfried Reinhardt, who is in turn the
sor. of the famous German stage and film
director Max Reinhardt. Silvia and Gott-
fried—a movie producer in his own right
who is now writing a biography of his
father—are both American citizens.
When they moved into their idyllic pink
cottage after the Second World War, the

In Salzburg, Nixon learned to say
"Danke" and slept in the palace where
Hitler planned to celebrate victory.

Reinhardts had the old wallpaper re-
moved and, as a result, discovered at least
one suspicious fixture in every room. "At
first we thought the house was bugged,"
said Silvia, "but the fixtures turned out

SR/JUNE 10, 1972

15

SR-UP FRONT

to be loud-speakers, not microphones. Later we learned that our cottage was where Martin Bormann stayed when Hitler invited people like Mussolini and Albert Speer to Klessheim, and he must have eavesdropped on the guests in the big house." (In postwar years Klessheim has served as a guesthouse for Queen Elizabeth, King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola, and Nikita Khrushchev.)

Bormann's eavesdropping equipment had long since been deactivated when, a fortnight before the Nixon visit, helicopters started dropping onto the nine-hole golf course that forms part of the palace grounds and men with walkie-talkies began patrolling the grounds. Then all sorts of workmen appeared on the scene. For the President's security some of them started to build a new road bypassing the palace. The Reinhardts, feeling that their strategic retreat in Austria was being somewhat Vietnamized, had promptly consulted their lawyer. "We have every right to drive past the palace any time we want to," Silvia insisted. "That's part of the charm of living here."

Gottfried Reinhardt related what happened next: "The lawyer said we were absolutely right. And he said that, if I ever try to use the old road while the Nixons are here, I'll probably get thrown into jail. But I'll win my case eventually." The Reinhardts prudently decided to use the bypass.

Inside Klessheim castle—where Hitler once dreamed of dictating peace terms after he had beaten the Allies in World War II—the activity was even more fervorish than the roadwork outside. A couple of laborers who had previously worked for the Reinhardts dropped in to say hello. After they left, Gottfried Reinhardt said that they had told him they were building a connecting doorway between Mr. and Mrs. Nixon's adjoining bedrooms. "Otherwise," one of the workmen explained, "they would have to go out into the hall and then *in* again to get to each other."

"Wouldn't it be easier," someone asked, "if they would just sleep together?"

Later, a USIA man whom I consulted about this matter denied that any walls had been broken through. On the other hand, he also denied that the bypass, which I had seen with my own eyes, had been built. He went on to volunteer, with a chortle, that Henry Kissinger had been awarded a double bed at Klessheim.

Picking out beds and, perhaps, knocking out walls were only a minor part of the preparations that took place in Salzburg. For two weeks the Salzburg airport's runways, which normally handle only two-engine jets, became practice grounds for four-engine Boeing 707s like the presidential Air Force One. Rita

Koehler, who used to be Orson Welles's secretary and now represents an Italian stage director here, couldn't get her phone fixed, "because we're putting in the hot line." Since the Nixons would be arriving on Saturday night, May 20, and leaving early Monday morning, several stores announced they would be open that Sunday—in case, as one merchant put it, "Mrs. Nixon wants to go shopping for a dirndl. She and her daughters are definitely dirndl types." But the forty-two-hour work week, rigidly protected by Austrian trade unions, prevailed. The merchants were forced to close up shop Saturday noon. Still, the security types and White House advance men were snapping up dirndls in certain sizes—for a Sunday sampling at Klessheim, some hinted.

Salzburgers viewed the impending event with mixed feelings. Pride in a presidential visit to their city was likely to be diluted by resentment caused by the attendant annoyances and either further diluted or recharged depending on the individual's personal emotions toward Nixon. Two antiwar demonstrations were scheduled for Saturday—the Communists' at 4:00 p.m., the non-Communists' at 7:30 p.m., three hours before Air Force One was scheduled to land. The Communists applied for and were given a permit for their demonstration; the police say that the other protesters failed to apply for permission and that their demonstration was therefore illegal. A student told me: "I'm no Communist, but I think I'll join their demonstration so I'll have time to get out to the airport to cheer Nixon." Another young man who attended the afternoon demonstration was Peter Kreisky, the twenty-eight-year-old son of Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky.

One day, shortly before young Kreisky protested a war being waged by the man whom his father officially welcomed to Salzburg, Silvia Reinhardt strolled past the sprawling hotel Oesterreichischer Hof, which used to be U.S. Army of Occupation headquarters in Austria. In front of the main entrance she noticed an unusual sight: a line of seven Cadillacs manned by men with walkie-talkies. Affecting an Austrian accent, the New York-born Silvia asked one of these men, "Vott are you tooing mit those dings?"

The man at the wheel also feigned an Austrian accent: "Choost making a leetle survey." This astonished her because he was black.

"Vott kind of survey?" Silvia asked. "Against bad people?"

At which point, the man with the walkie-talkie lapsed out of accent: "There are no bad people in Austria, ma'am."

There are no bad people in Austria.

On the Sunday before Nixon, a Salzburg priest preached a sermon against abortion—a concept so offensive to him that, although he made perfectly clear what he was against, he couldn't bring himself to use the word. He concluded his sermon by saying: "Now, if you think back to those days, Hitler certainly had more concern for motherhood than the present generation does."

There are no bad people in Austria. Three New Year's eves ago, Austrian citizen Robert Jungk—pacifist, futurist, and author of *Brighter Than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists and Children of the Ashes*—took his wife, Ruth, and seventeen-year-old son Peter, both American citizens, to dine at the Oesterreichischer Hof. An elderly Salzburger came over to their table and told Peter: "Unless you cut your hair, you'll never amount to anything."

Dr. Jungk rose to the lad's defense: "This is my son. Why are you saying such a thing to him?"

The old man, according to the Jungks, let out a commanding yelp: "Take this man away!"

Dr. and Mrs. Jungk, both European-born Jews who had fled the Nazis and spent part of World War II in detention camps (he in Switzerland, she in Portugal), looked at each other with shock and recognition. Dr. Jungk spoke first: "Well, I know who you are. You are an old Nazi. People like you were responsible for taking away six million Jews."

The old man—a wealthy trucker who had prospered in Hitler's day—brought suit against Dr. Jungk for publicly offending his honor. In the trial it was established that he did indeed have a Nazi past and had served some time in prison for his sins. But the burden of proof was put upon Jungk, and he lost the case and was fined $16. He will, however, also have to pay some fifty times that much in court costs if his still-pending appeal is turned down. "To win my case, though," Jungk concedes, "having said what I said, I must prove that this man's trucks were used to transport at least some of those six million Jews. But it's most paradoxical to me that in the 1970s I am the accused and he is the accuser."

Thus spake the futurist confronting the past. I had dinner with Dr. Jungk on the eve of Nixon's arrival. The next night he and his son were going to the evening rally—"to demonstrate against Vietnam," Jungk told me, "not against Nixon. I think Nixon is an innocent man who inherited a mess. And I think of Henry Kissinger [who from time to time has been an academic colleague of Jungk's] as a restraining influence on him. Henry is a rational man, even to the point of being a cynic."

16

SR/JUNE 10, 1972

The next night's rally became a roundabout, five-mile march to the airport—and Robert and Peter Jungk went along. The scene that the father described to me (and some of which I saw from press bus and press stand) had the same unreality as the more melodramatic episodes of *The Sound of Music*. The helmeted Austrian police and crew-cut U.S. Secret Service men, the men in dark raincoats with German shepherd dogs all looked like hired extras. The floodlights, barricades, and opensided police wagons might have been rented from Twentieth Century-Fox for the occasion. And the protesters had such innate respect for law and order that, every time the police halted them, they turned away—to find a detour around the police lines.

"It was very romantic," said Jungk, who is a ruddy fifty-nine, "going through fields by moonlight and down a railroad track and through a meadow and getting our feet wet. A sixteen-year-old girl named Traude, whom we know, joined hands with my son and me. But it wasn't our feelings about Nixon or Vietnam that united us—just the feeling of being together, hundreds of us, in the middle of the night."

"And all of a sudden," said his son, "we were standing on the runway of Salzburg Airport an hour before Nixon was due."

The police, with a loud-speaker car, ordered them back onto the grass. According to the Jungks, the demonstrators all complied. After all, nobody wants a 707 to land on top of him. Then, after a few minutes of silent confrontation, the Jungks say, the police attacked the crowd.

Robert Jungk, who found himself in the front row of demonstrators, was clubbed on the head and had to be treated for three separate head injuries at a Salzburg hospital. (The cruel joke around town the next day was: "Now he has seen the future.") His son, Peter, escaped injury. Traude, was grabbed by three Austrian policemen, who broke her glasses and then spanked her like a little girl.

Because the police had to double-check the runway in the wake of the riot, Nixon's pilot landed Air Force One eight minutes late. After the President had done his charming little "Here I am" dance routine, he, Mrs. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger, and entourage were whisked off into seclusion at Klessheim. When the President and Dr. Kissinger reappeared the next morning, they strolled about the grounds, then ventured into a crowd of 100 Austrians outside the main gate. To make the obligatory joke about his administration's male sex symbol, the President struck up a conversation with a young lady and promptly informed Kissinger: "She's not married. She's a pretty

"IN 1968, WE CUT THIS FOREST TO THE GROUND!"

And some very well-meaning people got upset. Because they just didn't know what we were really doing.

You see, we clearcut for a reason—young pine trees don't prosper in the shade of old trees and heavy underbrush. And if we don't clearcut, Nature will. With a wildfire. That's Nature's way of continuing this species; I think our way's a lot more efficient—and a lot more productive.

Now, I'm not saying that a clearcut is pretty, not at first. But with replanting and professional forest management, in three or four years you have a stand like this, well distributed over the whole area. And all our clearcuts *are* replanted, so people who are concerned about ecological aesthetics can see a whole new forest growing if they'll just take a close look.

I don't mean I don't appreciate the concern for our forests—I care,

too, or I wouldn't have followed my father into the forestry profession. And I wish more people would remember I'm not about to jeopardize something that means so much to me.

F. E. "Buck" Stabler

Buck Stabler, Forester
Scott Paper Company
Alabama

Are we running out of forests? You'll find the answers in "Forests USA," a full-color, 16-page booklet. For your copy send 25¢ to AFI, 1619 Mass. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Name

Address

City

State

American Forest Institute

Zip

R4

Responsible forest management to keep America green.

SR/JUNE 10, 1972

17

SR-UP FRONT

girl." Then, turning back to the girl, the President told her: "He's been to China, Russia, and Hollywood."

Further along on the same promenade, when a small boy presented the President with a cluster of buttercups, all that homework at Camp David proved of no avail. Nixon was forced to consult Dr. Kissinger. "How do you say thank you?" he asked.

The German-born adviser's reply was right on target: "Danke."

Robert Jungk's airport clobbering cost him a personal visit from Henry Kissinger. A mutual friend (Wayland Young, author of *Eros Denied*) had suggested a meeting, and, soon after he'd arrived at Klessheim, Kissinger had rung up the Jungks. Robert had retired with

cold compresses, but his wife did not mention the demonstration. Ruth Jungk simply invited Kissinger over for Sunday-night supper, and he accepted. She then spent a sleepless night worrying about her husband's health and whether she had enough fresh asparagus to go around. The stores would be closed on Sunday, and Ruth didn't want to go down in Henry Kissinger's little black book as the hostess with the leastest.

The next morning, however, Kissinger found out about Jungk's role in the demonstration and, through their mutual friend, sent his regrets and canceled the visit. Because today's politics alienate, two brilliant men of good will, who might have had something useful to say to each other, did not meet. ☐

ted, numbering from fifteen for Wallace to ten times that for McGovern, they are the sturdy bargains of the current campaign.

Steve Doyle is a case in point. My first encounter with him was on a plane ride from Milwaukee to central Wisconsin. Steve was sprawled across two of the three seats in the crowded Humphrey jet, leaving the aisle seat for me and forcing an ABC-TV correspondent to seek another place. No, he couldn't move his recording gear, Steve said politely, because he had to work. Which he did, listening to tapes and splicing together snippets from the speeches of the senator from Minnesota as we cruised high in the clouds.

As he worked, I learned from Steve that he wanted to be an astronaut, but didn't have the background and that he'd put off his last semester at DePauw University to travel with the campaign. He said, even though he missed his pals in the Phi Gamma Delta house and his girl friend back in Greencastle, "I knew it was a great experience, a chance to see what it's like in the world. Man, I made the right decision. If I'd passed this up, I'd be the dummy of a lifetime!"

Several weeks later, after George Wallace was gunned down while campaigning, Steve had some more sobering thoughts about his job.

"When we went to the hospital, that's when it sunk in. I saw a couple of younger Wallace aides with staff buttons on. Those poor kids. There was the candidate they'd been flying around with, lying on the ground. I tried putting myself in their place and couldn't believe it. Then I thought, Jesus, I'm in a crowd situation with Humphrey, too. I thought, Jeepers, let's not get too close to him.

"It's kind of scary. I'll probably think about it a lot now," he said. Then, after a moment's reflection, he added, "But that's silly. What the hell, you've got a job to do."

Steve said he often finds himself scouting the crowd while he's on the podium with Humphrey. "I kinda feel like an agent. Isn't that childish? I've always had this vision of seeing the hand come out of the crowd with a pistol in it. I've always thought of how I'd push Humphrey down on the ground if anything happened. And how I'd keep the tape recording running," he added.

The next time I saw Steve was in Philadelphia, when the HHH Convair 600—a smaller plane—swooped down two hours late and Steve piled off, slightly less exuberant than before, and clambered onto the waiting press bus. At a jammed auditorium at the University of Pennsylvania, he grinned at me sheepishly from a corner, valiantly holding his Sony microphone up to an amplifier

# Here Come the Political Groupies!

BY LYNN SHERR

## WITH THE HUMPHREY CAMPAIGN

—Steve Doyle, twenty-one years old, a slender, soft-spoken Minnesotan with a wispy mustache and blond hair that hangs over his right eye in front and just brushes the collar of his Bill Blass suit in back, is a groupie. No, not the kind of groupie that chases after rock singers. Steve's serious. He *works* for his idol, and his idol happens to be a presidential primary contender (who wins some and loses some) by the name of Hubert Horatio Humphrey. Steve is Humphrey's sound-and-tape man, which means that in exchange for a pittance of $10.75 a day to cover his meals and taxicabs, he tape-records everything of significance that the candidate says and feeds bits of it out to radio stations all over the country twice a day.

Steve is one of a breed that has become visible all along this year's campaign trail. I call them political groupies. They're young, they have attached themselves to one or another of the candidates, and they turn up everywhere—frequently ahead of reporters like myself.

For instance, I've run across an intense twenty-four-year-old Radcliffe graduate complaining that she had not been able to look in on Chicago's Art Institute because she'd been too busy rounding up Illinois delegates for Edmund Muskie.

I stood at the elbow of George McGovern's traveling shirt-and-shaving-gear toter in a Boston hotel while he decided whether to buy his boss clam chowder or cream of leek soup.

The new groupie picks a political idol instead of a folksinger...

And an Alabama law student, at twenty-two working on his third Wallace campaign, "Yes, ma'am-ed" me incessantly when I asked if it was true he'd drummed up 10,000 fans for a Wallace rally in Detroit one Saturday night.

I suppose the main difference between the youthful campaigners of 1972 and, say, the Children's Crusade of 1968 and their predecessors is that today's young people in politics seem a little older, a little more homogeneous. Mostly they are white and middle-class. After all, who else could afford to drop out of school or out of a job and survive on as little as free peanut-butter sandwiches or as much as $30-a-day expenses, not knowing when the candidate himself might just announce he, too, was dropping out? The political groupies are also incredibly mobile—a floating network of doorbell ringers and rally arrangers and glorified valets who have racked up as much air mileage as some airline stewards, and who reel off campaigns they've worked the way some kids reel off courses they've taken. Serious, commit-

22

SR/JUNE 10, 1972

JUNE 10, 1972

9

The Nixon Watch

Plus for the President

Warsaw

The wisest thing said by anyone in Richard Nixon's entourage during his eight days at the Moscow summit and his homeward visits to Kiev, Tehran and Warsaw was uttered by Henry Kissinger in a saloon. In order to escape the international hubbub and the complexities of obligatory Russian-English translation at the press center in Moscow, Kissinger turned up once in the American Embassy snack bar and twice in the ghostly twilight of a closed nightclub to explain the mysteries of the summit to reporters who accompanied the President from Washington. The only place available in Kiev for Kissinger's fourth performance was an Intourist bar.

The summit conference had produced a treaty and an interim agreement to limit US and Soviet nuclear armaments, six lesser agreements, a joint communiqué and a statement of "basic principles" which throbbed with peaceful intentions. Some indications that the two governments had got at least a little closer than they had previously been to helping each other bring about a negotiated end of the Indochina war also emerged. The reporters wanted to know whether thisogy of accommodation was ephemeral or whether it really did signal the beginnings of what the communi-qué called "a more stable and constructive foundation . . . for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the USSR." It was midnight. Through a window at Kissinger's back, his questioner could see the lights of the lovely city winking out along both banks of the curving Dnieper River. Kissinger's dumpy figure sagged and his deep voice occasionally shook with fatigue as he leaned on a portable lectern and framed his reply. His answer dealt mostly with the "statement of basic principles," but it was clearly intended to encompass the whole gamut of summit agreement and discussion. Condensed and slightly tidied up for clarity, here it is:

"We are not naive. It is perfectly possible that six months from now it will turn out that we are again in a period of extreme hostility. If that has happened, both countries will have lost an opportunity and the world will have lost an opportunity. We think the achievement is that we have made these agreements, that SALT has been concluded, and that at least there has been a recognition for the first time on both sides, not just that this or that problem has to be solved but maybe that a new style of international relations has to be developed. How successful we will be in implementing that, only the future will tell. We are not saying that these principles can be a cookbook to which you need merely refer to have a guide for future

action. Nor are we saying that it is not perfectly possible that these principles can be broken almost immediately. Nor am I rejecting the possibility at all that they are intended [by the Soviets] as a tactical device to lull certain people. All of this is possible. But if any of these events happen, then we will act with firmness, and some other leaders somewhere along the line will have to address the problem of how to have a peaceful world in an age in which a cataclysm depends on the decisions of men. We have laid out a road map. Will we follow this road? I don't know. Is it automatic? Absolutely not, but it lays down a general rule of conduct through which, if both sides act with wisdom they perhaps can, over a period of time, make a contribution. At this point it is an aspiration. We would not have signed it [the statement of principles] if we did not believe there was a chance for implementing this aspiration."

The chief American aspirant at the summit, Richard Nixon, buried himself most of the time in the magnificent caverns of the grand Kremlin Palace, where he and Pat Nixon and Kissinger and a few assistants were quartered. The reporters in his press party saw more of the President on Soviet television than in the flesh, and it was not until he left Moscow, after a spectacular farewell reception for him, that a few stories of how he handled himself leaked out. Sparse though the accounts were, and designed as they naturally were to do the President credit, they told something of him at a peak of hope and effort.

Nixon in Moscow took his penchant for conserving his time and energies to lengths never before observed by his assistants. In Washington, a 15-minute appointment might be stretched to 30 or 45 minutes if the subject interested him. In Moscow, his assistants understood that 15 minutes meant 15 minutes and less if possible. Mainly preoccupied though he was with summit affairs, he never loosened his grip on the White House operation at home. Each day in the Kremlin began with the President's staff chief, H. R. Haldeman, collecting instructions for telephone relay to George Shultz, John Ehrlichman at the White House, John Connally in his last days at the Treasury. They proposed but Nixon, in Moscow as in Washington, disposed. Whether in the Kremlin or aloft in a Soviet Ilyushin-62 enroute to Leningrad and Kiev, his control of the nuclear command system was as clear and total as it would have been in Washington.

After Nixon and his principal Soviet host, Leonid Brezhnev, signed the proposed ABM treaty and the interior offensive arms agreement late on Friday night in Moscow, the President retired with Mrs. Nixon and a few assistants from the domed and gold crusted Vladimir Hall at the Kremlin to the room he used for an office. There Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger and others who drifted in and out talked quietly and shared a modest round of drinks. A reporter to whom it all seemed mighty restrained on such a great occa-

10

THE NEW REPUBLIC

sion asked one of the assistants whether the President seemed to be even mildly elated. "Sure he was," the assistant replied, "but when he is he doesn't dance a jig you know."

The President's instructions about Vietnam to Press Secretary Ziegler, Communications Director Herbert Klein, and one or two other assistants who were made available to reporters reflected the extreme sensitivity of the Vietnam issue and Nixon's desire to discourage speculation to the effect that he had serious hopes of persuading the Soviet leadership to do what it could to push the Hanoi leadership toward a more relaxed and amenable negotiating stance. The instructions were that nothing whatever was to be said about Vietnam beyond what Nixon and Kissinger had already said—that Vietnam of course had to be and was on the summit agenda—until the summit was over and the agreed official statements were made. I judge from what was said and implied then in the formal statements and by American and Soviet officials that Nixon hopes but still cannot be sure that his Soviet hosts will work quietly with him and Kissinger to persuade the Hanoi government that in the end it may benefit more from a negotiated settlement on terms acceptable to the President than it can from indefinite warfare in South Vietnam with continued American bombing in North Vietnam and continued mining of the entrances to North Vietnam's harbors. Henry Kissinger said at the summit's end, "There were long, sometimes difficult and very detailed discussions on this subject. Whether the two sides understand each other better or whether what they have understood provides the basis for a constructive evolution only the future can say, and I wouldn't want to speculate on that." My impression is that he doesn't want to speculate on it because he awaits a favorable turn in Soviet policy without any Soviet admission that it has occurred, and knows quite well that any official American indication to that effect could wreck whatever prospect there may be of its actually occurring.

The explanations that accompanied publication of the Arms Control Treaty and Interim Agreement were interesting chiefly for their defensive tone and their indication that the President is acutely aware of the vulnerable points. Kissinger, who of course was the principal explainer, labored with all the eloquence and brilliance at his command, along with a dash of sardonic humor, to minimize the vulnerabilities. The essence of his argument, the argument soon to be heard in Congress, was that the continuing nuclear advantage allowed the Soviet Union in offensive missilery, including submarine-launched missiles if it exercises all of the options permitted by the treaty and the agreement, will at the very worst be less than it would have been without the treaty and agreement at the end of the first five years of negotiated restraint.

His overall contention that the great and promising thing is the undertaking of the two major nuclear powers to limit both offensive and defensive nuclear armaments in some degree seemed to me unassailably right.

Throughout the trip, from Moscow to Tehran, the crowds along Nixon's infrequent public routes were curious, passive, never demonstrative. Even at Kiev, a warmer city (in the human sense), the thousands who watched him arrive and leave at the inevitable 50-mile-an-hour speeds of Soviet motorcades were so silent that one American reporter called the lively capital of the Ukraine a city of the dead. In Tehran, where the Shah whom Nixon was visiting certainly wanted to show his ally and friend every courtesy, the crowds seldom cheered. Terrorists setting off bombs near a shrine that he visited later, and beside the local USIA building, and a belly dancer climbing onto Henry Kissinger's lap at a press party provided demonstrations of a sort, but not the kind that Nixon laps up. That would come in Warsaw, if at all, and one would have thought that Nixon, busy at the summit though he was, would have spoken occasionally of the enormous welcome that he received here when he came as Eisenhower's Vice President in 1959. Assistants who saw him every day in Moscow said he never mentioned his memory of that visit to them and never suggested that Warsaw had been put on his itinerary in the hope that its people would give him another public triumph on his last stop before flying to Washington. This may have been because his staff and presumably the President didn't know what to expect this time. The Warsaw embassy and the President's advance men reported up to the day he left Tehran that they didn't know whether the Polish government would encourage or discourage a repetition of the frantic 1959 welcome by a quarter-million Poles that led Nixon to call it afterward "a message to free people and to those throughout the world who yearn for freedom, telling them that the torch of freedom still burns in the hearts of millions of Poles despite 14 years of Soviet occupation and Communist rule."

Communist Poland in 1972 was different from the Poland of 1959—a little less repressed, a good deal less subservient to Moscow—and the welcome to Nixon was different. Scores of thousands turned out, and cheered, and chanted and sang their pleasure at having Nixon in Warsaw. But, unlike 1959, the authorities were ready for it. Police lining the seven-mile route from the airport into the city prevented the surges into the streets that blocked Nixon's car and overwhelmed the few police on duty then. This time the note was one of friendly curiosity, a sense of being honored, rather than of protest and yearning. A hundred or so youngsters, shouting "peace now! peace now!" seemed militant in a way that most of the cheering, singing, laughing people around them didn't. An hour after Nixon first passed through the city's center,

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the crowds were still out, chanting and singing. Nixon, holed up with Polish Communist officialdom, must have thought it a useful prelude to his return and report to Congress on the Moscow summit.

John Osborne

## "Law and Order" Cases

### Powell's Day

A "'law and order' judicial mood," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in *Johnson v. Louisiana* on May 22, 1964, is causing "barricades to be lowered" which had in the past protected the accused in criminal trials. The Court held, 5-4, in the *Johnson* case and in a companion case from Oregon that unanimity was not required for conviction by a jury in state criminal trials. A vote of 9-3, as in Louisiana, or of 10-2, as in Oregon, is enough in noncapital cases.

On the same day, dividing 5-2 in *Kastigar v. United States* and *Zicarelli v. New Jersey Commission of Investigation*, the Court held that the tender to a witness of so-called "use" rather than "transactional" immunity from prosecution is sufficient to compel him to testify in circumstances in which he would otherwise have been entitled to remain silent by claiming his Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Transactional immunity, held to be unnecessary, means that the government undertakes never to prosecute the witness for the offense—the "transaction"—concerning which he was required to testify. Use immunity means that the government may not in any future criminal case use against the witness the information now provided by him, or any leads directly or indirectly derived from his testimony, and must, if it is ever to prosecute him in the future, affirmatively show that the prosecution is based on independently gathered evidence.

The jury opinions were written by Justice White, with the full concurrence of the Chief Justice and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell made the majority, but he rested his conclusion on grounds substantially different from Justice White's. The dissenters, in addition to Justice Douglas, were Justices Brennan, Stewart and Marshall. In the immunity cases, Justice Powell wrote the opinion, and he was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, White and Blackmun, with Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissenting. Justice Brennan, who would probably have been in dissent, judging by his past record in similar cases, disqualified himself for reasons which, as is usual, he did not make public. Justice Rehnquist was also disqualified, no doubt because he had worked on the

*Kastigar* case while in the Justice Department. It is a fair guess that he would have joined the majority.

If it was a law-and-order judicial mood that produced the jury decision, as Justice Douglas thought, it produced precious little law and order. It is a common-sense surmise that without the need for unanimity there will be fewer hung juries. So there will be more convictions. And some more acquittals, too. But the additional convictions will be very few, a drop in the bucket, statistically barely measurable. Besides, no more than ten percent or so of criminal cases go to trial. Most are disposed of on pleas of guilty. And most crimes never become cases because they are never solved. There's the real rub.

There is, in any event, no evidence of any law-and-order mood in either Justice White's opinion or Justice Powell's, which is the decisive one. Even though jury unanimity is not mentioned in the Constitution, the Court in the past, wrote Justice Powell, "has presumed that unanimous verdicts are essential in federal jury trials, not because unanimity is necessarily fundamental to the function performed by the jury, but because that result is mandated by history," the history of the Sixth Amendment. This mandate of history Justice Powell proposed to respect. But it affects only federal, not state criminal trials. With respect to the states, the decision is a free one, and the question is whether it is necessary to impose on them uniformity in conformity to federal practice. Reverting to the view firmly held by the late Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in some measure also by Justice Fortas, and at times espoused as well by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart. Justice Powell concluded that uniformity should not be compelled, and that if a state legislature wished to abandon jury unanimity, as has been done in England, and as is recommended by some though not all professional opinion, the Supreme Court had no call to say it nay.

Strong arguments can be made against the Court's result, and the dissenters, particularly Justice Stewart, made them. It is an entirely legitimate worry, for example, as Justice Stewart wrote, that the confidence of heterogeneous communities in the criminal process will be "corroded under a system in which a defendant who is conspicuously identified with a particular group can be acquitted or convicted by a jury split along group lines." But under the rule of unanimity juries can be and have been publicly deadlocked by splitting along group lines. Yet even if, after discount, such a consideration as this does not seem conclusive, what is there of decisive weight the other way? Efficiency? Not a great deal. All there really is the other way is the judgment of a couple of state legislatures, which runs counter to a clear and ancient national tradition.

The history of the Sixth Amendment convinced Justice Powell that its framers meant the rule of unanimity to prevail in federal jury trials. The history of the Four-

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teenth Amendment, which is the law applicable to the states, not the Sixth, carries no such message. But tradition and popular understanding do, and the matter being, on its own merits in the present state of our knowledge, fairly in balance, the traditional common understanding might in this instance have been valued higher than the freedom of the states to experiment. Despite these doubts, there is a lot of good sense in Justice Powell's protest against the imposition on the states in every detail of a uniform code of criminal practice conforming to federal practice.

May 22 was altogether Justice Powell's day. In the immunity cases as in the jury cases, his opinions are deliberate, thoroughly professional. They reflect what in the early days of the Republic used to be called a candid mind. The result in the immunity cases is wholly persuasive. A plea of the Fifth Amendment does not earn amnesty for the witness. If the government succeeds in gathering some evidence of the offense concerning which the witness refused to testify, a prosecution can be instituted. There is no good reason why, if the witness has been forced to testify under immunity, the consequence should be amnesty. The testimony he was forced to give should not be used against him, directly or indirectly. That was the law before now, and it remains the law. But if the government is able to uncover other, independent evidence, why may it not be used? No doubt there will be

problems of proof. Was the new evidence on which a prosecution is based independently obtained or does it actually derive from leads provided by the compelled testimony? The government ought to be held to a very strict standard, as it is when similar problems of proof arise in similar contexts. It bears, Justice Powell held, the burden of proof, and must discharge it affirmatively.

Experience may conceivably show that Justice Powell's decision opens up too many opportunities for evasion by prosecutors. If so, it will need to be reconsidered. For the moment, however, the answer to fears that there will be endless abuses of what is otherwise a sensible and fair rule is the answer Justice Holmes once gave: not while this court sits, and not while the rest of the federal judiciary sits.

Alexander M. Bickel

## "We'll All Have a Good Time"
### Street Party

Austin, Texas

On April 21, after Austin police had used clubs and tear gas to break up a demonstration against the Indo-China war, a few hundred students gathered on the mall in front of the administration building on the University of Texas campus. A student speaker called for another organizing meeting at seven o'clock. One girl said that there had already been some serious injuries, medics would be present that evening, those who had helmets should bring them. A young man who seemed to be chief spokesman took the microphone and said that demonstrations shouldn't presuppose violence, that it was contrary to the nonviolent spirit of what they were doing. "Get your friends to come along," he said, "tell them to bring some beer and we'll all have a good time." That drew cheers and some spontaneous cries of "Street party!"

That night a crowd gathered at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs next to the LBJ Library. It seemed to be mostly curious onlookers and students on a lark. There were a few isolated serious discussions in small groups and a good many plainclothesmen.

Some rocks were thrown, breaking three or four windows of the LBJ School. Most of the crowd, probably 80 percent, ran or began walking away. Someone with a bull horn called them back saying that there was no trouble. Most returned. The voice on the bull horn suggested that everyone move back to the main mall. When I got there I saw about 20 or 25 people sitting on the steps of the main building, but there was no crowd. I walked back to the steps on the east side of

"By George, they have taken a turn to the right."

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13

flicted wounds. It may be profitable to remember that our criminal law is a good deal like our foreign policy in that we are free to reduce our commitments to match our capacities. We can allow our people - as we should allow nations - to choose their own roads to hell if that

is where they want to go. I should have thought that to be the most important lesson of liberalism.

Herbert L. Packer

MR. PACKER teaches at the Stanford University law school.

## The Nixon Watch

# The Pressure of Fear

### Moscow

The Soviet journalists who are assigned to spend their evening hours with the reporters in the President's press party find it easier to answer the question that we are continually asking them than we find it to answer the question that they ask us most often and with the greatest intensity. Our question is, why was Mr. Nixon allowed to come to Moscow after he affronted and aggrieved the Soviet government with his Vietnam speech on May 8, and the actions that he took and is still taking to bar Soviet military and other supplies from North Vietnam with military force? The question that we are asked is, why did the President do it then, just when the summit conference that he and the Soviet leadership had labored so hard and so long to arrange was about to occur? The Soviet answer, stilted in form but somehow believable when it is elaborated, is that "it was the will of the people" that the affront be ignored and the summit proceed as promised and planned. The best answer to the Soviet question that I have been able to think up is two-fold. It is that Mr. Nixon cannot tolerate the appearance of defeat in Vietnam, and that he simply reacted in character when he felt that he had been backed into a corner.

When the "will of the people" line was first thrown at me, I dismissed it as the kind of simplistic propaganda to be expected from journalists who are also the servants and spokesmen of their government. But the elaboration of the line, at group receptions and in quiet conversations, convinced me that along with the propaganda, I was getting some interesting and worthwhile insights into the Soviet regime and Soviet society. At this writing, on the third of Mr. Nixon's eight days in the Soviet Union, when nothing officially told us so far about the summit adds much of value to the knowledge and impressions we brought from Washington, the content and nuances of the informal

chitchat seem to me to be more worth reporting than the stuff fed to us in the guise of news. Here, then, is a summary of the impressions that have been derived from conversations with men who are, I am well aware, required by their government and party masters to do what they can to persuade me that the truth is their truth.

The foremost impression is that Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Communist Party's Central Committee and the Soviet leader with whom Mr. Nixon is principally engaged, is under tremendous pressure to make this conference a real success. It is a pressure that arises from circumstances much more compelling than the Soviet government's specific need for specific agreements on strategic arms limitation, expanded trade with the United States and cooperation in such areas as space exploration, environmental control and public health. The central source of the pressure is fear—the literal fear of nuclear war and nuclear annihilation. One gathers that this fear is infinitely more acute and more alive in the Soviet Union than it has been in the United States since the late 1940s, when Americans as a people seemed to conclude that there was no use worrying about a possibility that appeared to recede with time and familiarity. The possibility and then the announced certainty of a Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting was received in the Soviet Union as something far more than the prospect of public entertainment, an interesting exercise in big-power diplomacy. It eased the fear. It raised the hope, a hope that became a compelling demand, that nuclear conflict with the United States be removed from the realm of serious possibility.

That accomplished, the fear of nuclear conflict with Communist China would remain, of course. The degree and depth of this apprehension cannot be appre-

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ciated in the United States. I have yet to hear it openly and clearly expressed in Moscow. But it is discernably present, it is constantly implied in conversations of the kind upon which I am drawing here. The net effect is to increase, not diminish, the demand for accommodation with the United States that presses upon Brezhnev and his fellows in the Soviet leadership. The thrust, quite explicit and not left to implication, of conversation on this point is that Brezhnev and the leaders with whom he had to consult after Nixon delivered his May 8 speech would never have tolerated the affront to Soviet pride and the challenge to Soviet policy if they had not been convinced that they would be inviting serious and possibly unmanageable domestic trouble for themselves if they canceled the promised summit. The visitor does not associate unmanageable domestic trouble with this society and this regime. When I indicated some such thought, more by a look than in words, one of the Soviet journalists who had been talking along the foregoing lines said with seemingly genuine scorn, "Do you believe that our leaders are totally divorced from public sentiment? If you do, you are foolish." Maybe I was foolish to believe him, but I did.

The feeling that this meeting had to occur, that nothing could be allowed to prevent it once it was agreed upon, is accompanied by a show of profound astonishment and puzzlement. The posed question is not merely why but how Mr. Nixon could have done what he did on May 8 and afterward. The idea that any President of the United States could believe that the American interest in Vietnam and in the outcome of the Vietnam war is real enough and important enough to justify the risk to the Moscow summit that Mr. Nixon took is beyond the ken of the men whose attitudes I am reflecting. In their professed opinion, it was a very serious risk. They say now, with no evident sense of contradicting their major point, that they did not see at the time how Brezhnev and his fellows could avoid cancellation of the invitation to Nixon, notwithstanding the predictable effect at home. They doubted then, in short, that Brezhnev and the associated leaders could swallow their own pride and their sense of national pride and tell Mr. Nixon to come on. One of the editors, who said that he was sick with fear that the summit would be canceled, told a family story to make his point that only the most insistent pressures could have led the leadership to let the conference proceed. The editor said that his wife and daughter were enraged by the Nixon speech and are still arguing with him that the invitation to Moscow should have been instantly withdrawn. They are by no means alone in that view, he said, but he thinks Brezhnev and the leaders who sided with him in the decision to go ahead with the conference read the predominant sentiment accurately.

The way in which the journalists whom I am echoing

speak of their leaders interests this newcomer to the Moscow scene. They are editors at the second level, sophisticated men, fluent in English, skilled in the arts of persuasion. I doubt that if I were a reporter stationed in Moscow I'd pay them more than the limited and rather casual heed the resident correspondents accord them. One suspects that their knowledge of what goes on at the peaks of Soviet power is at least as modest as that of their professional equivalents among the American correspondents stationed in Washington. But they know enough to perceive, and are brave enough to suggest (with a care for anonymity), that their Brezhnevs and Kosygins are fallible men, capable of error, divided amongst themselves in their secret councils, driven and guided more by circumstance than by ideology. The suggestion is that if this last were not true, Richard Nixon would not be in Moscow, housed in the splendor of the Kremlin Grand Palace and dealing with pragmatists who match him in his readiness to surmount principle when principle gets in the way of desired results. One of the results desired by the President is more Soviet assistance than he has previously obtained in bringing the Hanoi government to the point of productive negotiation in Paris. By productive negotiation, of course, the President means negotiation to end the Indochina war on terms that will leave to him at least a shred of the honor that he keeps talking about. Henry Kissinger, withdrawn from the limelight in Moscow while the President shares it with Brezhnev, didn't bother to equivocate when he was asked to confirm the patent fact that Vietnam is on the summit agenda. In Salzburg, where Nixon paused for a cautionary rest on the way to Moscow, Kissinger said with dry understatement that the Vietnam problem would be discussed but would not overwhelm the occasion. It predictably will not be allowed to do that. But it may be said with confidence that the President will consider his Moscow venture an unalloyed success only if his Soviet hosts are persuaded to do all they can—and that admittedly may not be a great deal—to convince their ruling friends in Hanoi that Richard Nixon is perfectly willing to leave them in peace with a fair and perhaps better than fair chance to take control of South Vietnam after a decent interval.

Three agreements announced during the first days of the visit solemnized and slightly expanded previously negotiated understandings that the US and the USSR would cooperate in space research and exploration, environmental research and protection, and medical and public health research. The ceremonial signings and the judiciously timed announcements were largely window dressing, designed and arranged beforehand to further the impression that Nixon, Brezhnev and their lesser companions in summitry were accomplishing a lot. But Henry Kissinger had a point when he said in Salzburg that the signing

JUNE 3, 1972

15

at the summit would have an importance that goes beyond the agreements themselves. It was a demonstration of mutual acceptance of the proposition that agreement to cooperate in a plethora of relatively small matters can hasten progress toward a relationship between the superpowers that diminishes the dangers of conflict over the big issues. The big issue in discussion here, with a hope of concrete and constructive agreement, is strategic arms limitation. That agreement probably will be of sufficient scope to give Brezhnev the appearance of success that he needs in order to justify his submission to Nixon's military measures in Vietnam. If the President has paid a price for the submission, for the permitted summit, and perhaps for Soviet assistance in bringing about a Vietnam settlement that he is capable of accepting, it will be evident when the details of the arms agreement are published and analyzed.

Results aside, the fact that dominates the occasion is that Richard Nixon is here, buddying up with the leaders of the world's greatest Communist power and visibly enjoying his stay in the Kremlin, the cluster of domed temples and palaces and rather shabby office buildings which during most of his career was for him the capital and symbol of detested Communism. The quality of pioneering adventure, of a break from the past that attended his visit to Peking in February is lacking. But the observer must pause at times and succumb to the wonder that this man, this seeming model of mediocrity, should be the first

President of the United States to do what he has done this year, within four months, in Peking and now in Moscow. The people of Moscow pay little attention to his presence. The reporters in Nixon's wake decided that 100,000 people stood along his route from the airport to the Kremlin, but there was no way to count them and many of them appeared to be out for a stroll when the President happened to pass. When he put a wreath on the grave of Moscow's Unknown Soldier, the watching crowd consisted mostly of pedestrians who were forbidden to cross the nearby streets while he was there. Patricia Nixon attracts gangs of the curious when she visits schools, stores, the subway. But Moscow's residents and hordes of tourists from the provinces, reveling in the year's first warm and sunny week, huddle around any person or happening that seems unusual. Four Japanese monks in saffron robes, standing in Red Square before Lenin's tomb, drew a crowd comparable to the ones that Mrs. Nixon draws. One has the impression, though, that this is not indifference and certainly not an ordered show of indifference. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders are using the occasion to invite maximum attention to their association with Nixon. Brezhnev, Kosygin and their fellow dignitaries preen and posture with unmistakable pleasure when they appear with Nixon on Soviet television, signing agreements and toasting with champagne. No doubt about it, the Soviet hierarchy is glad that the President is here and probably all of us should be, too.

John Osborne

Little Money for Research

Black Scientists

by Richard Nemec

Your department exists only on paper and your laboratory will have to be in your head.
Booker T. Washington to George Washington Carver when Carver joined Tuskegee Institute

When the noted black scientist who eventually revolutionized agriculture in the South, George Washington Carver, began his 47-year association with all-black

RICHARD NEMEC holds a master's degree from Northwestern University and has worked on daily newspapers in Los Angeles, Las Vegas and Chicago.

Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, he was forced to create his first laboratory from junk found in trash barrels around the campus. Similarly, when the famous chemist Percy Julian accepted a faculty position at all-black West Virginia State College, he started as a one-man chemistry department with an ill-equipped laboratory. Both Carver and Julian emerged renowned scientists. Their success, however, has not made it much easier

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for today's black scientists or significantly improved the biomedical curricula at most of America's 126 four-year minority colleges and universities, 95 of which have predominantly black enrollments.

Along with most of our prominent black scientists, Carver, Julian and their colleagues from the past graduated from white institutions.

Carver got his master's degree from Iowa State University and stayed on to teach there early in his career; Julian earned a bachelor's in chemistry at DePauw University, a master's from Harvard and a PhD from the University of Vienna; Dr. Daniel Hale Williams (1858-1931), the black physician who pioneered open heart surgery, is a product of Chicago Medical School; and Dr. Charles Drew (1904-50), the black doctor who pioneered modern methods of blood preservation, went to Amherst College and McGill University's medical school in Canada. Of more recent vintage, chemists Henry A. Hill and Lloyd A. Hall received most of their college education at prestigious white schools.

More than a century of "emancipation" has done little to change the inferiority of the science programs in black schools. In the biomedical sciences, there's an appallingly small pool of black physicians and scientists: one of every 36 American physicians is black; one of every 420 American PhDs is black.

"Black institutions are faced with a historic inadequacy of resources," President Nixon said in 1971, outlining expanded opportunities for higher education. "To help these institutions compete for students and faculty with other colleges and universities, the combined help of government at all levels, other institutions of higher learning and the private sector must be summoned."

The federal government's initial response in the biomedical sciences is the Minority Schools Biomedical Support (MSBS) program, which begins in June with a relatively modest $2 million from the Health, Education, and Welfare Department's multi-billion-dollar budget. HEW's Research Resources Division in the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which is charged with distributing the MSBS money, will award grants ranging from $30,000 to $500,000 each year over a "possible five-year support period." It does not take a PhD to realize that four $500,000 grants would exhaust the money available. Seventy-nine minority institutions have been scurrying around, filling out the federal government's voluminous grant request forms, each hoping for a piece of the pie. The grants may be used to support faculty research or research training activities, to expand one or more science departments, or to expand all the health-related science curricula at a minority school. Grants will be limited to one for each institution.

The government's goal is to equalize the opportunity for minority schools to participate in biomedical

research programs, which have been heavily subsidized by NIH grants among the predominantly white schools. The intent is also to encourage more minority students to enter the health sciences. With this in mind, administrators and scientists from 90 schools met in nine area meetings last fall to formulate guidelines for the MSBS program. Twenty-five minority schools were surveyed to determine needs and priorities.

Many of the needs are found at Virginia State College, a school of 3200 students (90 percent black) in Petersburg, Va. Its biology department chairman, Bernard R. Woodson, was one of three NIH consultants who helped create MSBS. "A large majority of these schools have wonderful facilities and strong faculty," he says. However, "administrative attitudes, strained budgets and large classroom demands make it almost impossible to accomplish anything representative in the way of research. White institutions grant time for the organization of ideas, they have the expertise for writing grant proposals, they have the inside track on government contracts. One has to have time to sit and reflect, or to converse with colleagues, to come up with meaningful ideas." MSBS makes provision for grants to give black scientists more "release time" from classroom responsibilities, allowing them to concentrate on research and participate in important national scientific meetings. Funds can be used for new research equipment, summer research programs, recruitment of more professional staff in the biomedical fields and support of long-range research projects. It also is available for sharing of resources among neighboring black institutions.

But two million dollars is a "very small amount when you compare it to the NIH 1971-72 budget [$600 million]," Woodson says. "But if you compare it to zero million, then it is a very large amount. Only a small number of minority institutions will be helped, if at all. Howard and Meharry Universities [America's two largest predominantly black schools] can come up with enough requests to use the total $2 million. Tuskegee Institute, Atlanta and Southern universities also could possibly do the same. And there are other strong black institutions that could demand a large chunk of this very small pie, but I am afraid they may be left out."

Woodson mentions only schools with predominantly black enrollments, but there are 30 other eligible schools with a majority of Mexican-American, Puerto Rican, Indian, oriental or Hawaiian students. Do they have a chance for any of the biomedical funds?

Robert J. Gibbs, chief of NIH's general research support branch, says yes: "Institutions founded for blacks constitute the major group eligible for the MSBS program, but the other ethnic minority institutions have similar needs and capabilities which can and will be served." Critics caution that it is doubtful that $2 million will stretch that far.

FOREIGN MEDIA TREATMENT

OF

MOSCOW SUMMIT MEETING

Summary as of June 1, 1972

## Abstract

President Nixon's long-awaited visit to the Soviet Union held top or prominent place in foreign press, radio and television news, and the declared intention of the U. S. and the USSR to seek peaceful solutions in an atmosphere of cooperation won general editorial approval.

Exceptional interest in the second big-power meeting in four months was sharpened by doubt on the eve of the talks that they could take place in the face of North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam and U. S. mining of North Vietnamese harbors. Commentators greeted with relief the decision to favor consultation over confrontation and to proceed with the summit meeting.

The sheer productivity of the first sessions--five agreements signed in rapid succession--provided daily headlines and raised expectations for the SALT agreement and the uncompleted trade agreement. It also produced expressions of impatience with "minor" results in a summit setting.

The SALT agreement was called "historic" and "epoch-making" but observers warned that many obstacles remained in the path of disarmament.

Foreign media approval of the concluding declaration of principles and the communique was qualified by concern that the parties might not live up to their expressed intention to cooperate, disappointment that no apparent progress had been made on Vietnam or the Middle East, and the feeling that the two had announced their own success in terms of big-power interest and summit perspective.

In the view of many observers, the Moscow summit meeting marked another significant step in the ordering of a new world power structure in which peace might be possible, but change was certain.

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On the Eve of the Summit: Doubt, Relief, Anticipation

Foreign media interest in the Moscow summit meeting was reflected in positive comment from the date of first announcement. On the eve of the second big-power meeting within four months--an event exceptional in itself--intensity of interest sharpened to an unusual degree because it became a "cliff-hanger." Many observers doubted that a friendly visit was possible after the North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam and the mining of North Vietnamese harbors by the U.S.

Almost eleventh-hour confirmation that the meeting would take place as scheduled brought expressions of relief that the decision of the two powers was in favor of consultation rather than confrontation. In the eyes of foreign observers, this deliberateness of choice in an exceedingly delicate situation served to underline the seriousness of purpose on both sides. This general picture emerged in foreign media comment:

--Aware of the hazards of failure to seize this planned opportunity to defuse potentially explosive issues, both the U.S. and the USSR were seen to be purposefully adopting "low-key," "businesslike" and "restrained" public positions. Observers felt this augured well for useful discussion.

--Much more than U.S.-Soviet relations was at stake. Italy's left-of-center La Stampa (Turin) said on May 19: "It would be a tragedy for the whole world if a visit which could change the course of postwar history should conclude with no positive result."

--The USSR especially could not afford an aggravated confrontation when a SALT agreement appeared within reach. Elite Le Monde (Paris) said: "Washington and Moscow have too many interests in common and too many negotiations under way to stop halfway... If he had canceled the meeting, Mr. Brezhnev would have surrendered to his Chinese rivals the exclusivity of the dialogue with the U.S..." The London Economist said Mr. Nixon could "reckon that the Soviet Union has more to lose from a breakdown of the present negotiations than America has..."

"A Shower of Agreements"

Focused on Moscow and avid for copy, foreign media noted the "cool but correct" airport reception upon Mr. Nixon's arrival but quickly canceled

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out this portent by accounts of the first Nixon-Brezhnev meeting and the
Nixon-Podgorny exchange of toasts on the first evening of the visit. "Off
to a good start" was a view widely expressed.

Hopeful forecasts were sustained by the signing of the first two agreements. The independent *Times* of London headlined, "Nixon Visit Bears Its First Fruit." A few commentators, however, suggested that such "minor agreements" did not justify a Presidential trip.

Subsequent signing of three more agreements produced mixed reactions. On the one hand, it was seen that the agreements betokened long contact, successful spadework and harmonious working-level relations; the London *Financial Times* headlined, "Nixon Keeps Pacts Rolling Out." On the other hand, many observers expressed misgivings that the issuance of agreements actually completed before the summit began could mean that little else would be forthcoming.

Bonn's *General-Anzeiger* considered both views, saying that the five agreements should not be underestimated, "although it may appear that the daily shower" of accords was designed "to distract public attention from the difficulties of the summit." It concluded that the agreements "are important as atmospherics and in substance... If applied conscientiously, they force joint action on a long-term basis."

## On the Outside Looking Up

While such comment did not bulk large in the over-all favorable attention given the summit talks, a current of uneasiness was stirred by a feeling of exclusion as the two sides continued their deliberations. Midway through the talks, moderately conservative *Figaro* (Paris) said, "The major problems, the great difficulties, the major confrontations, the partitioning of the world, the gendarme aspect of the two superpowers--all are concealed behind the scenes."

Noting the President's banquet remark that "we should recognize that it is the responsibility of great powers to influence other nations in conflict or crisis to moderate their behavior," leftist-nationalistic *Excelsior* (Mexico City) commented: "Our hopes wane before such testimony to insincerity, when at summit conferences the warlike powers parade as

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the champions of peace and try to make the small countries look guilty."
Independent-conservative *Algemeen Dagblad* (Rotterdam) observed: "Two
giants talk in Moscow and the world watches anxiously without being able
to exert any direct influence."

## The SALT Agreement

Foreign media commentators almost universally hailed the signing of the SALT agreement on May 26 as "historic" and "epoch-making" but immediately warned that it was only "a first step" and that many obstacles remained, including problems of inspection and participation of other nuclear powers in disarmament efforts. It was regarded as the single greatest achievement of the Moscow meeting.

Pro-Christian Democratic Muenchner Merkur (Munich) said that "now everything depends on how the parties honor their commitments. The Soviets have so far refused on-the-spot verification. Concessions by Nixon on this point would make the cost of his trip seem excessive."
French TV said the SALT agreement failed to place a limit on the number of warheads, that it did not include China, and that its effects on Europe were not known. Japan's NHK-TV said China and France must participate in nuclear talks.

The conservative Sunday Telegraph (London) said: "The great nuclear race has thus been halted, and that is the first stage towards reversing it. Nor, on present evidence, is there anything to suggest that President Nixon, in his eagerness to reach this agreement, has compromised either America's own security interests or those of his NATO allies."

## Mr. Nixon on Soviet TV

Mr. Nixon's televised address to the Soviet people drew prominent news coverage. What comment there was focused more on the event than the substance: Pro-Christian Democratic Rheinische Post (Duesseldorf), for example, said that for millions of Russian viewers, "it was unusual to hear a desire for peace and cooperation voiced by the U.S. President, whose country is described by Soviet propaganda as the arch enemy and incarnation of aggressive imperialism."

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## Communique and Declaration; Over-all Assessments

General foreign media approval of the concluding declaration of principles and summit communique was qualified by expressions of concern that the undoubtedly wholesome intentions would not be lived up to and that the atmosphere of cooperation would not prove durable. Most commentators expressed disappointment that no apparent progress had been made on the problems of Vietnam or the Middle East. As it had throughout the talks, critical comment argued that the two superpowers had announced their own success in terms of big-power interest and summit perspective.

Approving comment followed these general lines:

> "The visit has not merely been a great success but may well represent a turning point in the relations between Washington and Moscow and thus in the balance of power. What stands out from the series of agreements... is the evident desire of the Soviet Union and the U. S. to move from coexistence to cooperation on a broad front" (independent London *Financial Times*, May 30).

West German television's Moscow correspondent said "the 12-point declaration gives the impression of an instruction manual for better relations between the big powers over the coming years." Gaullist *La Nation* (Paris) said, "The world can only welcome watching the Americans and the Soviets bury the hatchet." Seoul's *Joongang Ilbo* judged that "the most significant outcome" was that "Washington and Moscow reconfirmed peaceful coexistence between them for the first time since the Cuban crisis." The *Jerusalem Post* said "Brezhnev and Nixon have prepared the way for long-term understanding between their countries."

Critical comment emphasized the fragility of "nonaggression pacts" and accused the two powers of conducting business of international concern on a level to which the rest of the world had no access.

The conservative *Daily Mail* (London) said the declaration of principles "may well set the tone of Western affairs for a generation... or it may be torn up as swiftly as other nonaggression pacts." Moderate-right *Aurorê* (Paris) said the declaration was "primarily a nonaggression pact," the major advantage of which is that "it relieves the world of the fear of

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total war," but is a "major hypocrisy" in that "it continues, in the name
of fidelity to alliances, to feed the arsenals of enemy nations and to sow
death by the proxy of allies."

<u>Kompas</u> (Djakarta) asked, "Is the rapprochement of the superpowers only useful to themselves, or will it also be useful to the countries in which they are struggling for influence and interests?" The <u>Canberra Times</u> recommended "a healthy cynicism towards the Moscow agreements; they have been dictated by considerations of bilateral self-interest rather than by a genuine desire for peace..."

## <u>National and Regional Concerns in a New World Order</u>

Comment appearing since the summit talks ended has been in part devoted to restatement or reiteration of national and regional concerns as a new world order is seen to emerge from events such as the Moscow meeting.

## <u>Western Europe</u>

Calls for European cooperation and coordination in the wake of the Moscow summit appeared principally in France. Pro-EEC <u>Combat</u> (Paris) said yesterday: "Only European nationalism will be able to hold in check the upstart Soviet Union and the effete aristocrat, the U.S., in the competition for hegemony." Elite <u>Le Monde</u> warned that "for lack of political unity and sufficient coordination in defense matters, the Old Continent is likely to let the important negotiations on force reduction slip into the hands of the Americans and the Soviets."

## <u>Asia</u>

Tokyo's leading <u>Asahi</u> said on May 30 that "through these talks, an atmosphere has developed in which European tension has been eased, for the present, while the Asian situation will not further deteriorate. In terms of future Japan-Soviet relations, it is impossible to say definitely whether this is advantageous or disadvantageous for our country." The nationalistic <u>Manila Chronicle</u> said yesterday that "the question... that still nags the Asians, including those in our country, is the apparent failure of the talks on the sensitive Vietnam war..." The independent-conservative Melbourne <u>Age</u> wrote on May 27, "To provide more breathing space, this meeting must make some progress in defining the spheres of influence for which both nations are vying in the fluid areas of southern Asia and the Indian Ocean."

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Middle East

The Jerusalem Post summed up on May 30: "There was no stepped-up involvement in the Middle East... The chief progress made in Moscow is philosophical in nature, rather than direct political deals..."

Cairo radio declared on May 29 that "the U.S. has not forgotten to speak repeatedly about the desire for peace, as Nixon did yesterday in his speech in Moscow. Perhaps this will give us the best confirmation of the kind of peace Washington wants and seeks to bring about in the Middle East. It is a U.S.-Israeli peace which imposes capitulation on the Arabs..."

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FOR RELEASE AT 6 P.M. TODAY

JUNE 5, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

HERBERT G. KLEIN, DIRECTOR

President Nixon's historic journey to the Soviet Union received heavy editorial comment and was prominently covered by foreign press, radio and television news.

In the view of these foreign observers, the Moscow Summit Meeting marked another significant step in the ordering of a new world structure in which the chances for peace would be improved.

Many foreign news organizations were represented by their own correspondents in Moscow. Results of the talks won general editorial approval.

Attached is a compilation of foreign media reports, commentary and reaction appearing during the President's 13-day journey to Austria, the Soviet Union, Iran and Poland.

WESTERN EUROPE

Summary

West European media gave heavy, sustained coverage to the
President's trip. Editorial reaction has been predominantly favor-
able. Most observers welcomed the Moscow accords, especially
the SALT agreement, and concluded that the talks established a
cooperative new spirit between the two countries which favored
progress toward a more stable world order.

At the same time, a considerable number of writers and broadcasters stressed the limited nature of the SALT accord; expressed disappointment over the apparent lack of progress on Vietnam; saw a need for European unity as a counterbalance to U.S.-Soviet power, and voiced suspicion of summitry as serving the interests of the big powers at the expense of smaller nations.

***

London

Independent London *Financial Times* stated in an editorial on
May 30:

"The visit has not merely been a great success,
but may well represent a turning point in the
relations between Washington and Moscow and
thus in the balance of power. What stands out
from the series of agreements... is the evident
desire of the Soviet Union and the U.S. to move
from coexistence to cooperation on a broad
front."

In spite of a lack of agreement on issues such as Vietnam and
trade, the paper said, "It is clear that the summit is intended as a
first step in closer relations with the continuation of talks on trade
and finance high on the agenda, and with President Nixon's invitation
to the Soviet leaders to make a return visit providing an incentive for
further progress on other issues.

WE-2

"No major world problem has been solved by the summit, but an atmosphere has been created which offers hope for the future."

The paper reported from Washington that "the achievements of the Moscow summit... have reinforced President Nixon's reputation at home as a realistic, businesslike man who had made great strides in improving relations with the Communist world and lessening international tension."

On May 27 the conservative London *Daily Mail's* foreign editor wrote of the SALT agreement, "The world this morning is a saner, if not safer, place... Optimists will agree on the drawbacks, but stress the agreement shows America and Russia have finally decided to start making peace instead of war."

The weekly *Spectator* of London wrote on June 2:

"After Moscow, the world is entitled, at the least, to breathe a little more easily, to look forward to somewhat less instability, and to hope that the chief statesmen are beginning to move towards the creation of a concept of nation-states which reflects the true interest and the true strengths of those participating."

The weekly *Economist* of London asserted in an article on June 2 that Mr. Nixon "has pushed America's European policy through a striking and determined week...

"The Americans give the impression of knowing what they are doing. But for Western Europe... the outcome of Mr. Nixon's week shows the need to do its homework. Almost every known project for European negotiations between East and West now lies on the table for early discussion in a way that it did not one week ago."

WE-3

## Paris

Roger Massip, in a front-page commentary on May 30 in moderately conservative *Figaro*, said the failure of the two sides to find a solution to Vietnam "should in no way weaken the significance of the Moscow summit.

"The latter unquestionably marks a turn in the history of postwar international relations insofar as it enabled the U.S. to decide that permanent negotiations will now have the supreme objectives of peace. The Moscow meeting, a few weeks after the Peking meeting, completes the process that has marked 1972 in a lasting manner and makes it a milestone on the long and difficult quest for a peaceful equilibrium between the empires that dominate the world."

Elite *Le Monde* asserted on May 31 that many problems "are going to arise which Europe is scarecely prepared to approach.

"The Ten still do not have a common position on how to approach the all-European conference. And for lack of political unity and sufficient coordination in defense matters the Old Continent is likely to let the important negotiations on force reduction slip into the hands of the Americans and the Soviets."

## Rome

Socialist *Avanti* said on June 2 of the summit, "The trend to autonomy, despite Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, is growing in resistance to American and Soviet hegemony....It is useless to deny it. Both want a 'new Yalta' and reveal that fact daily..."

WE-4

"It cannot be claimed that the coexistence codified at Moscow is multilateral; it is strictly bilateral...

"The problem for Nixon and Brezhnev is that the two world gendarmes...are overloaded with atomic bombs and missiles but are powerless against people who know how to defend themselves."

## Belguim

Widely-read Catholic _Gazet van Antwerpen_ commented:

"What the real consequences of the frank confrontation in the Kremlin will be, only time will tell. But it is clear already that in Moscow, as earlier in Peking, the leaders of the biggest powers have measured each other and...are seeking to coexist on a more realistic basis. How long it will take before real mutual trust develops from this is another matter, but the road is open."

On June 1, influential Catholic _De Standard_ of Brussels stated that "more important than the question of what form MBFR talks will take is the question of whether the two superpowers will not be tempted to also settle troop cuts in Europe between themselves. Secretary Rogers has repeatedly assured the NATO partners during the past two days that the U.S. would only act through NATO as far as this issue is concerned, but only the coming months and years will show to what extent medium and small-sized countries will have a say in this very complex matter."

## Stockholm

Liberal _Dagens Nyheter_ of Stockholm spoke on May 30 of a "contradiction" between the call in the declaration of principles for restraint vis-a-vis other nations and the "interventionist policies" of the U.S. and the USSR in Indochina. The paper repeated its contention that "neither Nixon nor Brezhnev are politicians of the sort needed in today's world, a world caught up in tumult and change," but concluded that the Moscow documents "represent a step forward."

WE-5

Conservative Svenska Dagbladet of Stockholm commented:

> "If the meeting in Moscow already stands out as surprisingly promising and full of hope for progress, it would truly be crowned by success if the talks there brought peace in Vietnam any closer."

Oslo

Conservative Aftenposten, Norway's largest paper, declared on May 30 that "there can be no doubt that the world seems brighter" after the President's Moscow trip. It continued:

> "President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow have improved the international situation. It is one of the odd twists of history and politics that Nixon was the American President who created new ties between the U.S. and China and the first American Chief Executive to visit the Soviet capital. This has been an extremely praiseworthy, active labor for peace..."

Ottawa

Major Canadian dailies voiced approval of the results of the Moscow summit.

The independent Ottawa Citizen, which is frequently critical of American foreign policy, titled its lead editorial on May 30, "Welcome Start by Big Powers." It said:

> "These momentous achievements mean that from now on the world's superpowers are more likely to cooperate for their mutual good, and inevitably that of the world, than to rashly embark on dangerous confrontation and possible conflict."

WE-6

West Germany

Pro-Social Democratic Neue Rhein Zeitung of Duesseldorf found the Moscow documents "in part reassuring and in part disquieting." Those whose exclusive interest is peace in Europe, the paper said, will pass favorable judgment on the conference. However, it noted, "in pledging to work jointly for world peace, the two powers tacitly reserved the right that each may continue to beat, torment and destroy the other's little brother -- the one by direct military intervention, and the other by arms supply."

Influential weekly Die Zeit of Hamburg said in a representative commentary on May 31:

"The Moscow summit demonstrated a surprisingly high degree of agreement. Both parties apparently have realized that crucial national interests no longer permit doctrinaire and aggressive confrontation. However, the necessity and common desire for a consensus diminishes in peripheral areas where the two countries continue to be rivals and where, free from the nuclear risk, they hope to wring advantages from each other.

"Nixon and Brezhnev built a bridge in Moscow. The American contribution was the experience of over-engagement and resultant weariness. The Russian contribution was a new self-assurance based in finally-conceded equality. This self-assurance contains both cooperative and expansive energies, and this means that the bridge stands connecting Soviet-American relationships, but the gap remains."

Popular independent Der Abend of West Berlin said on May 31 the Moscow communique "saved the NATO conference a major headache." The elements of conflict between the superpowers "have been reduced considerably, at least on paper," it said, with the result that the NATO alliance "now has a clear marching route..." The editorial added that while some of the phrases in the Moscow documents "gave the impression the President was carried away on a wave of euphoria," the fact that no trade agreement was signed "indicated the President could be adamant..."

"Nixon's trip to the USSR has provided a beginning for long-term detente... from which the allies of both sides as well as uncommitted states will also profit. But all parties involved will have to show a maximum degree of readiness for compromise lest this development remain stuck in the starting blocks."

WL-7

Vienna

Semi-official *Wiener Zeitung* noted on May 31 that Mr. Nixon faces
elections this autumn and commented:

"His visit to the Soviet Union has been such a success that none of his rivals really has a chance in November. In all probability Nixon and Brezhnev will meet again at the conference table.... Continuity in world affairs is thus assured."

On May 30 Hugo Portisch declared in independent *Kurier* of Vienna:
"The Moscow summit and the accords reached there have not only confirmed the equality of the Soviet Union, but they have also strengthened America's leading role in the non-Communist world."

WE-8

West European TV and Radio

BBC radio and television's Moscow correspondent on May 30 summed up the Moscow summit as "certainly a success, even if it did lack the drama of the Peking visit. The arms limitation agreement is a big step forward, as is the agreement on trade which, however, needs Congressional approval. There has also been improvement in the areas of space, science and the environment -- but Vietnam is still the big stumbling block."

Publicly-owned Italian television on May 30 used extensive film footage of the departure from Kiev and the arrival in Iran. The report stressed that "more than a half million people lined the streets of Tehran" to welcome Mr. Nixon.

Italian TV on May 29 covered the President's departure from Moscow and his arrival in Kiev. The network's Moscow correspondent asserted that "the Soviet-American summit ends on a promise of improved relations," but he noted that "the final two-hour talk still did not reveal any possibilities for a solution to the two major causes of tension, Vietnam and the Middle East."

French commentators said over the weekend of May 27 that the SALT agreement failed to place a limit on the number of warheads, that it did not include China, and that its effects on Europe were not known.

A defense expert interviewed on Radio Luxembourg declared that the accords "establish the status quo since they retain considerable arms stockpiles... The SALT agreement is to the advantage of the USSR militarily, but politically advantageous for Mr. Nixon's re-election."

A military analyst said on commercial Europe One radio that the agreement "has no significance for disarmament -- the number of missiles is limited, but not the warheads." He contended that "the arms race will simply be switched from quantity to quality."

The studio anchorman for the second French TV network characterized the meetings as "a will for peace and recognition of the necessity for peaceful coexistence, with big differences on Vietnam."

WE-9

The network's Washington correspondent said "Americans as a whole consider the meetings a success," and that "only a few realize that the agreements could have been concluded without Nixon's presence." He observed that President Nixon was beginning to realize his 1968 campaign promise to replace confrontation with negotiation, and that this would be an asset in the 1972 campaign. He concluded:

> "Americans must now learn that their country is no longer the unrivaled Number One in the world."

The West German TV network's Washington correspondent reported on May 30 that the great majority of American people and Mr. Nixon's political opponents as well "see the Moscow agreement as the greatest success of President Nixon's foreign policy."

The Moscow correspondent of West Germany's second television network reported on May 29 that the Soviets seemed more pleased with the results of the summit meeting than the Americans because the Soviets "do not look at Vietnam" in the same manner as the Americans. Vietnam and the Middle East, he said, are "regional problems of limited duration" in the Soviet view, subordinate to the "existential and economic problems of the nuclear arms race." The USSR was satisfied with the SALT agreement, he said, because it met their goal of recognition as a power of equal status and their desire for security. He continued:

> "The 12-point declaration gives the impression of an instruction manual for better relations between the big powers over the coming years. The term 'peaceful coexistence' has been redefined. Certainly it was not coincidence that Nixon's hosts declared frequently that the USSR wants not only peaceful, but also friendly relations with the U.S. That, of course, makes mutual trust necessary, and as yet, no one can say if the summit has been a success in that respect."

ME-1

MIDDLE EAST

Middle East media followed summit conference events with considerable interest, but editorial comment interpreted its results as reinforcing previously held positions: Israeli media were relieved that no decisions were made in Moscow to increase the superpowers' involvement in the Middle East, while Cairo judged the U.S. continued its support of Israel.

***

Tel Aviv

Influential-independent Haaretz of Tel Aviv on June 1 ran an article on the Moscow communique's statement that both sides support a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Agreement by the superpowers, the article said, "must not bring in its wake political and diplomatic passivity."

"If Israel remains inactive, there is a danger she will be caught unaware with a forced solution imposed upon her.... Now is the time to show initiative in proving to the Egyptians that it is possible to negotiate with us. The U.S. leadership will not take such efforts amiss."

Semi-official Davar of Tel Aviv wrote in an editorial on May 31 that "as expected, there was no deal at the summit in regard to the two arenas of conflict--the Middle East and Viet-Nam."

"The mutual guarantee to avoid direct or indirect confrontation means there will be no forced solutions.... Israel can therefore definitely be pleased--even if only in the short run--that there were no secret deals."

Israeli papers generally concluded on May 30 that the U.S. and the USSR had agreed to avoid military confrontation and nuclear war in spite of ideological differences.

ME-2

In a representative comment, the independent Jerusalem Post declared:

"The summit meeting has come to a fairly successful conclusion... There has been no sudden ending of the Viet-Nam war, but it is at least possible that the conflict might embarrass both sides.... There was no stepped-up involvement in the Middle East..."

"The chief progress made in Moscow is philosophical in nature, rather than direct political deals.... Brezhnev and Nixon may have prepared the way for long-term understanding between their countries."

## Cairo

Semi-official al-Ahram of Cairo declared in an editorial on May 30 that the principles of peace set forth in the Moscow declaration could not be fulfilled without elimination of trouble spots, like the Middle East, which the paper declared to be the most explosive of all.

On May 29, the paper ran a correspondent's report from Moscow that Soviet leaders had informed President Sadat they would be "very careful to preserve Egypt's interests" in the summit talks.

## Beirut

Pro-Cairo al-Youm asserted on June 2:

"Moscow is undoubtedly the one that gained from the summit. The ratification of two nonaggression pacts by Bonn and the American pledge to hold the European security conference are great triumphs for Brezhnev's policy. All this is in addition to an arms limitation accord that has relieved Moscow of a huge burden of armament costs."

"As for Nixon, his only gain was that he secured his re-election."

ME-3

Pro-Cairo, leftist as-Shaab of Beirut commented on May 31:

> "Nixon's upholding of the Security Council on the Middle East is a big gain for the Arabs' cause because one who asks an aggressor to withdraw from all territories it occupies by force cannot possibly supply it with more arms and instruments of destruction without being branded a hypocrite and a liar."

## Middle East Radio

Radio Jerusalem's Washington correspondent, reporting on June 2 President Nixon's address to the Congress, said an Israeli diplomat told him the President's statement on the Middle East was "the first time in history that a U.S. President, on such an official and ceremonious occasion," expressed America's commitment to the continued existence of Israel.

Radio Cairo, commenting on the President's address on Soviet television, said the kind of peace the U.S. is working for in the Middle East is one "which imposes capitulation on the Arabs and places Israel in a position of domination..."

Commenting on Mr. Nixon's Moscow TV address, Cairo's domestic radio service said on May 29:

> "The U.S. has not forgotten to speak repeatedly about the desire for peace, as Nixon did yesterday in his statement in Moscow. Perhaps this will give us the best confirmation of the kind of peace Washington wants and seeks to bring about in the Middle East. It is a U.S. -Israeli peace which imposes capitulation on the Arabs and places Israel in a position of domination and control to remain capable of threatening the freedom, independence and progress of the area's peoples."

S. Asia - I

## SOUTH ASIA

### Summary

Indian papers reviewed the Moscow summit in generally favorable terms. Pakistan's Dawn (Karachi) approved the prospects of detente.

***

### India

The National Herald of New Delhi and Lucknow observed June 1 that "the agreement on nuclear arms limitation, which has to be studied carefully, is among the compulsions of the nuclear age. Nuclear power is inconsistent with national sovereignty, but till nuclear disarmament becomes possible, even limited agreements like the one reached between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are to be welcomed. The Moscow agreements have at least made possible steps toward security in Europe, which has provided the main battlegrounds of two World Wars."

An editorial entitled "So What" in independent-moderate Hindusthan Standard of Calcutta asserted on May 31:

> "Both Moscow and Washington seem to be more interested in the two birds in the bush than the one in hand. They are keen on a European detente and a halt to the arms race... but they have agreed to keep both the Indochinese and the West Asian cauldrons boiling.... Apparently both will continue to stoke the fire in Vietnam and be ever ready to rekindle it in West Asia if the occasion so demands. It is strange that it has occurred to neither that their practice is grossly at variance with their professions of peace."

The influential Statesman of Calcutta stated May 30 that "the results of Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit seem likely to be an even greater domestic triumph for him than were those of his previous visit to Peking; and the Russians may be well content that this should be so... What they want is a man with whom they can deal and an arrangement which will offset the previous results of Chinese 'ping-pong diplomacy.' They would seem to have got both..."

S. Asia - 2

Pakistan

Independent Dawn of Karachi declared May 27 that "the world will view with satisfaction and relief the steps that are being taken towards a detente between the two superpowers, even though the agreements arrived at do not even pretend to remove any of the main causes of mankind's anxiety for the future."

EA-1

# EAST ASIA

## Summary

Media in East Asia, while welcoming the new era of negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, expressed general disappointment that there was no apparent progress toward solving the Vietnam problem. A number expressed some bitterness at what they saw as a willingness of the two superpowers to use smaller countries to fight their wars by proxy. Papers in Australia and New Zealand were considerably more favorable in assessments than other countries of the area.

***

## South Korea

The afternoon Seoul press June 2 gave wide coverage to President Nixon's return home and report to Congress. Headlines read "President Nixon Says the Postwar Era Has Come to an End," "Moscow Trip Lays Foundation for New Washington-Moscow Relations," and "Danger of War Markedly Diminished."

Leading Donga Ilbo of Seoul said in an interim assessment May 26 that an "abundant harvest of five agreements" had already been reaped, giving "bright prospects for further fruitful negotiations" on other important issues. However, it said, dramatic settlement of the more difficult questions, the Vietnam war and the Middle East, "can hardly be expected."

## Malaysia/Singapore

An editorial titled "Vietnam Mystery" on May 31 in the influential Straits Times of Kuala Lumpur and Singapore asked:

"Was there any indication throughout the long, sometimes difficult and very detailed discussions (Dr. Kissinger's description) that any progress had been made at all toward closing the gap? Only events would show what happened, said Kissinger. The official spokesmen have flatly said there were no secret agreements. Then what did Kissinger mean?"

LA-2

Thailand

Middle-of-the-road Chao Thai of Bangkok commented June 2:

"The Moscow talks and the many pacts concluded will be beneficial for all peoples of the world. The only exception on which no agreement could be reached is the Vietnam issue.

"Should Russia continue giving aid to Hanoi in the form of modern and powerful armaments and no effort is made to prevent that aid from reaching North Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine to help various nations protect themselves would be a total failure. The Communists would swallow up all free countries in the Pacific region, one by one, until the U.S. would find itself completely encircled in the end."

The British-edited Bangkok Post in an editorial, "No 'New Age' for Vietnam," declared May 31:

"The Soviets could have done better by perhaps indicating a greater willingness to persuade Hanoi to curb its political adventures in Southeast Asia. This would have made for a more meaningful pact. . . . By so doing it could also have created a lot of goodwill between Moscow and other Southeast Asian countries plagued by terrorism directed from Hanoi.

"If Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev had agreed on a settlement in Vietnam it could have led to the neutralization of Southeast Asia and such an area would be one in which both Moscow and Washington could benefit."

Indonesia

Indonesia's army paper, Angkatan Bersendjata of Djakarta, said June 2 in a discussion of the Moscow summit that "it is time to stop placing hope in the two superpowers for a settlement in Vietnam. Asian and Southeast Asian countries that see the war posing a direct danger to them must now give thought to ending the conflict."

EA-3

The Protestant Party Sinar Harapan of Djakarta May 31 asserted that "the weapons now used to destroy human beings in Vietnam were never touched upon in the Moscow summit meeting."

Independent Pedoman, also of Djakarta, noted that "the positions of the two superpowers on Vietnam do not change" and judged, "A 'war by proxy' will continue in Vietnam."

Golkar Party's Suara Karya declared May 31 that "hopes for a quick peace in Vietnam" had declined, and continued:

> "From one aspect, this can be regarded as proof that the great powers like the U. S. and Soviet Union can no longer function as worldwide police -- a fact that is encouraging even though this also means that these great powers, for fear of a nuclear holocaust but yet wishing to defend their own interests, will let wars disastrous to local people, like the Vietnam war, rage on."

## Australia

The independent Australian of Canberra May 31 praised the establishment of communications between the U. S. and the Soviet Union and continued:

> "Most importantly, the summit should remind us all that our old assumption that the two powers must necessarily always be in a state of semi-belligerence is not valid just because it has been unchallenged all this time."

The paper posed the question of the ability of the powers to settle the Vietnam and Middle East problems and said that "if the answer is no, the achievements of Moscow -- welcome as they are -- are still severely limited."

The independent Canberra Times May 30 called the Moscow agreements "a retreat from the edge of the nuclear precipice." It added:

> "It is important, however, to retain a healthy cynicism towards the Moscow agreements: They have been dictated by considerations of bilateral self-interest rather than by a genuine desire for world peace..."

EA-4

## Philippines

The nationalistic *Manila Chronicle* asserted May 31 that while it "may be too early for jubilation over the success of the Nixon visit ... definitely it was many leagues better than his appeasement venture to China." It added:

> "The question, however, that still nages the Asians, including those in our country, is the apparent failure of the talks on the sensitive Vietnam war...."

> "It may be the Vietnam crisis which, in a few weeks or months from now, will determine the success or failure of the Moscow summitry. For despite their denials, the U.S. and the USSR are engaged in some form of hostility, perhaps not in manpower, but with their tanks, their Migs and other weapons of destruction that have been fanning the embers of war in embattled Vietnam."

An editorial in the same day's nationalistic *Daily Mirror* of Manila, often critical of U.S. policies, was titled, "Making the World Safe for Russia and the U.S." It stated, "What has just taken place is the sealing of a virtual alliance between Nixon and the Soviet leaders to advance their interests at any cost to the smaller powers."

The generally pro-U.S. *Philippines Herald* was more positive. It commented that "despite the failure of the Moscow summit to produce an amicable settlement of the Vietnam conflict, there is no denying that it was a success in more ways than one."

EA-5

New Zealand

The Press of Christchurch on June 1 welcomed the outcome of the
Moscow summit, but said "the ideological struggle continues.

"Russia and the other Communist countries will undoubtedly go on pursuing the subtler courses of moral and intellectual subversion of the free world. Nevertheless, President Nixon has completed, as he promised, a remarkable round of negotiations across Communist frontiers in the interest of world peace. This has been no small achievement on behalf of the U.S. Perhaps it means even more to the rest of the world."

The leading *New Zealand Herald* of Auckland declared on May 30,
"The Moscow meetings have ended much as they began -- with un-
resolved uncertainty and anxiety about the wider effects and local
outcome of intensified war in Vietnam." However, it judged that
"on any objective assessment, the past week's catalogue of Soviet-
American accords is impressive."

New Zealand's NZBC, which rarely uses TV satellite receptions,
ran seven minutes of NBC news film of the President's Moscow arrival
with an opening commentary noting that this was the President's "second
journey for peace."

Japan -

JAPAN

Summary

Japanese media gave extensive and continuing coverage to the summit meeting. Commentators generally welcomed the U. S. - Soviet agreements as a step in reducing tensions in Europe but expressed some doubts as to their effects on Asia. Satellite-relayed video tapes and reports from TV network's own correspondents in Moscow were sustained and prominent throughout the visit.

***

Two leading Tokyo dailies said June 2 that the Moscow summit had cleared the way for NATO agreement to open negotiations on the convening of an all-European security conference and reduction of forces in Europe.

Business-oriented *Sankei* said, "This will mark the beginning of the era of full-scale relaxation of tension in Europe."

Top-circulation *Asahi* asserted that "relaxation of tension in Europe should not lead to transfer of the surplus power of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to cause Asian tension."

Newspapers in Japan concentrated post-summit comment on the implications of the Moscow talks for the war in Vietnam and future Asian peace.

Independent-liberal *Asahi*, Tokyo's top-circulation daily, declared May 31:

"In looking at the U. S. - Soviet joint communique from the standpoint of ending the Vietnam war and of Asian peace, there is a strong feeling that Vietnam has returned to the starting point. This is because the 'big-power solution formula' which has been pursued by the U. S. seems to have reached a deadlock...

"The result is that there is no other choice but to return to the Paris talks for negotiations among the parties concerned."

Japan - 2

Independent-moderate Mainichi of Tokyo the same day took a similar approach:

> "The failure to reach agreement on Vietnam showed that the Vietnam issue cannot be solved through private bargaining among the superpowers. The only way to break the deadlock in Vietnam apparently is to reopen the Paris negotiations."

The May 30 Tokyo newspapers led with reports on the Moscow communique. Headlines included top-circulation Asahi's: "...Complete Disarmament of World Is Ultimate Goal; Still in Confrontation Over Vietnam; Stabilization of Co-Existence Envisaged." Editorially the paper said:

> "Through these talks, an atmosphere has developed in which European tension has been eased, for the present, while the Asian situation will not further deteriorate. In terms of future Japan-Soviet relations, it is impossible to say definitely whether this is advantageous or disadvantageous for our country. It is thought, however, that the Soviet Union will now be able to turn its eyes toward Asia."

The paper said also that the summit talks "have shown, in the Vietnam example, that there are problems which cannot be solved, no matter how much the leaders of the two countries pledge to cooperate. This shows that there is a clear limit to 'big power' diplomacy."

Business-oriented Sankei of Tokyo declared May 30 that "a little time is needed to evaluate accurately the results..."

> "There may have been secret understandings or discussions on the Vietnam and China problems which were not announced formally, and international developments must be awaited before these come to the surface."

Moderate Yomiuri said May 27 that by reaching agreement on SALT, Mr. Nixon "will be able to return home with a 'present' for the November Presidential election, while the Soviet leaders will be able to work for relaxation of European tension and provide an image to the entire world to the effect that the U.S. and the USSR, not the U.S. and China, are running the world."

Japan -

Japanese Radio and TV

Publicly-financed NHK-TV said the President stated that his visits to Moscow and Peking have "deepened understanding with the Soviet Union and China," and that he called upon the Congress for ratification of the SALT agreement.

NET television said the President reported that a general U.S. - USSR trade agreement is expected to be reached before the end of the year.

The networks also reported on issuance of the U.S. - Poland communique at the conclusion of the Warsaw talks, and emphasized the provision for establishing of a commission to promote trade between the two nations.

All Japanese TV networks May 30 gave top coverage to reports on the communique. Most used video tapes via satellite of the signing and of the President's departure for Kiev.

In a special program on publicly-financed NHK-TV May 29, commentators noted that both President Nixon and Brezhnev appeared "relieved" and in a happy mood. One commentator said the talks were "quite successful, although some points should be deducted because of the failure to agree on Vietnam."
Another declared:

> "It is doubtful as to whether the problem can be solved if both sides merely understand each other's feelings on Vietnam."

NHK also carried the reaction of a Soviet citizen to the Nixon speech over Moscow television, stating the Russian said he was surprised at the eloquent manner in which the President spoke and that his wife was moved to tears when the President mentioned the case of Tanya.

TV networks gave major play to the SALT accord. Reaction was favorable, although NHK warned that there are problems for the future "because China and France...must participate in nuclear talks in order to realize disarmament."

NHK-TV and other leading networks reported on the signing of the pollution and medical cooperation agreements, using videotapes of satellite relays. They also used tapes of Mrs. Nixon visiting a school and riding the Moscow subway.

An NHK commentator expressed some doubts about the success of the summit because "while President Nixon and Party Secretary Brezhnev are shaking hands with the right hand, they are fighting with the left hand."

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# LATIN AMERICA

## Summary

Latin American media comment on President Nixon's Moscow visit ranged from full commendation and praise of the President to the opposite extreme, that small countries are "mere pawns in the games of the big powers." Most opinion expressed satisfaction that the world "had been made safer" due to U.S. -Moscow rapprochement. Minority views were disbelief in the effectiveness of the agreements because Vietnam remained unsettled and suspicion that the destinies of "third-world" countries were being secretly decided for them against their best interests.

***

## Mexico

Moderately progressive *El Universal* wrote May 30:

> "Messrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgorny have just softened by their presence and their applause of the Nixon thesis all the virulence of Marxist traditions. From now on capitalism will be a fellow-traveler of Communism and vice versa."

Conservative *El Heraldo* of Mexico City stated May 30:

> "The call of the U.S. Chief Executive to influence less important states to avoid a tragedy of universal proportions can only be effective... if China, the USSR and the United States are fully disposed to change their policies of intervention for or against countries that adopt a particular form of government, are settling matters with their neighbors, or are attempting to protect themselves from the occasionally flagrant blows of imperialism that come from one or the other side."

Moderate *Novedades* said on May 29 that few documents had awakened so much hope for peace "since the Charter of San Francisco." It added that many countries had lost faith in international treaties and summit meetings, but "this is the opportunity to overcome this skepticism."

## Brazil

Conservative *O Estado de Sao Paulo* wrote May 30 that what the joint

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U.S. - USSR communique did was to confirm "the solemn responsibilities both nations assumed 27 years ago when they signed the United Nations Charter." However, it said, since the agreements failed to clear up "basic... disagreements on the Middle East and Vietnam... we do not believe the summit has changed the structure of international conflicts. Prospects for the future are dim."

## Chile

Independent-conservative _El Mercurio_ of Santiago stated in an editorial May 30 that the agreements achieved in Moscow "not only signify a clear advance for peaceful coexistence but also a defeat for the Soviet hard line."

On May 26 it asserted:

> "Ideological differences remain but are no obstacle to cooperation in limited fields. The USSR will continue to send aid to North Vietnam but is not inhibited about negotiating with the man who ordered renewal of the bombing of Hanoi."

## Venezuela

The weekly news magazine _Bohemia_ of Caracas maintained (in its issue of the week of May 29) that "North Vietnam is merely a romantic cause for the Kremlin and cannot be compared with the achievements that could be gained from an ample understanding with the United States."

> "Once more, the small countries are shown to be mere pawns in the games of the big powers, no matter who they are."

## Peru

Government-controlled _La Cronica_ of Lima noted in an editorial May 30 that the Moscow agreements have been "received with satisfaction by the peoples of the world because they constitute... an important factor in removing 'the sword of Damocles of nuclear war.'"

The editorial added that the accords "could be the beginning of an 'escalation' toward achieving a true arms limitation throughout the world."

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Panama

Matutino of Panama City, although frequently critical of the U.S., carried on Thursday, May 25 a column that praised Mr. Nixon for venturing to the summit. It said in part:

> "The visit to Moscow is a new demonstration of the personal courage and the constructive intelligence with which the Republican President has been able to break through the traditional walls of Red totalitarianism, opening roads of understanding and peaceful coexistence and thawing out the cold war which cast threatening shadows of nuclear war over the horizons of mankind for many years."

## AFRICA

### Summary

In sparse comment, African newspapers welcomed the efforts at detente but were disappointed in the summit's failure to bring about solutions in the Middle East, Vietnam and southern Africa.

### Nairobi

Kenya's liberal *Daily Nation* said on May 30:

> "If America and the Soviet Union with all the military and economic power at their disposal can see sense and logic in cooperation and friendship, how much more is it sensible for developing nations--struggling to develop and industrialize--to avoid the costly pursuit of war and international confrontation?"

The moderate, pro-West *East African Standard* commented on May 31 that the results of Nixon's visit to Moscow have been "intangible rather than firm commitments." The paper deplored that nothing concrete had developed on settling the war in Viet-Nam. Of the communique it said:

> "There was an overdose of equivocal platitudes about hopes for peace.... but both sides stood by their interests in Viet-Nam..."

### Lagos

The Government-owned *Nigerian Observer* of Lagos said on May 31 of the agreements reached at the Moscow summit that "they could be of global value only if they are seen to be reflected in the return of peace to the Middle East, Vietnam and southern Africa--the three areas in the developing world hardest hit by the international military and political confrontation."

### Uganda

The conservative, English-language *Argus* of Uganda wrote on May 29 that the Moscow talks "should augur well for the future of world peace." But on the negative side the paper declared: "When the world's two superpowers meet, the rest of the world expects much more than the Moscow summit has produced."

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EASTERN EUROPE

Moscow media gave very full and positive news coverage to events
on Mr. Nixon's program throughout the summit talks, but generally
refrained from initiating comment (highly favorable) until after most
of the pieces had fallen into place.

On May 30, TASS reported: "Letters and telegrams warmly approving the results of the Soviet-American talks are being received by the Pravda editorial board from all parts of the Soviet Union... Soviet men and women assess the signing of the treaty and agreements between the USSR and the U.S. as a big victory for the Party and all the people in the cause of relaxation of international tension, safeguarding conditions for peace and tranquility on earth."

On June 1, TASS reported official endorsement of the "popular" approval already registered by the media. It announced that the Politburo, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers had examined a report by Party chief Brezhnev "on the results of the Soviet-American summit talks, and wholly approved the important work carried out by the delegation of the Soviet Union during the talks."

It said the talks "and the joint documents signed in the course of the talks are of great international significance and constitute an essential step in the development of Soviet-American relations, promoting the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and the peace and security of the peoples."

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Warsaw Pact countries generally followed Moscow's lead in hailing the outcome of the summit talks as a tribute to the policy of "peaceful coexistence" set by the Soviet Union and endorsed by the whole "socialist camp."

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prague CTK International Service in English 0821 GMT 31 May 72

(Text) Prague May 31 CETEKA--The talks in Moscow brought fruitful results which will undoubtedly serve well the cause of peace, the Czechoslovak Communist Party daily RUDE PRAVO said today.

"These days, when Soviet-American summit talks were in progress in Moscow, we realized again what transformations had taken place in the world, what a high level of prestige the forces of socialism had achieved, and what a historic role in defence of peace had been played by the Soviet Union.

"It was the Soviet Union that introduced into international relations, by virtue of its peaceful foreign policy, those principles of peaceful coexistence which the world reaction accepted only with extreme reluctance, or--more precisely--which it was forced to respect by the course of history. That is why it is nothing else but corroboration of the correctness of the Soviet peace policy that the idea of peaceful coexistence was explicitly defined as the only possible basis of mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, in the 'basic principles' made public yesterday.

"In its negotiations with the American President, the Soviet Union proceeded from class positions. It conducted the talks in full accordance with the foreign policy of the socialist countries, previously agreed upon, in accordance with the peace-loving aspirations of the world. As it was expressed in the interview granted RUDE PRAVO by Gustav Husak, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee, the Czechoslovak public gives full support to the outcome of the talks, and voices its full solidarity and sympathy with the Soviet Union," RUDE PRAVO says.

## BULGARIA

Sofia BTA International Service in English 0839 GMT 31 May 72

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Sofia May 31 (BTA) -- The results of the Moscow talks are the subject of editorials and signed commentaries carried by the Sofia newspapers today.

Emil Aladjemov, the foreign news analyst of OTECHESTVEN FRONT, emphasizes that the joint Soviet-American communique is "a realistic balance-sheet" of what was achieved in the Soviet capital during this "historic" week. "At such important talks which are of a really historic significance, it is necessary to lay stress on the common stands and agreements. What is more, they are of an extremely great importance for both bilateral relations between the USSR and USA and world peace. But in such a case for justice's sake one should say once again that for more than a quarter of a century, since the end of World War Two, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have acted consistently and energetically, convincingly and successfully, and continue to act for the triumph of these principles in international relations.

NARODNA ARMIYA (editorial): "The strategic arms limitation pact and the executive agreement, concluded in Moscow, are a considerable contribution to the improvement of the international atmosphere. They are a step forward along the road toward the restriction of the danger of a rocket and nuclear war and in the armament race and will set free enormous material resources. There is no doubt that they correspond to the vital interests of all the peoples in the world."

The NARODNA MLADEZH newspaper writes (editorial) that the Soviet-American talks "will undoubtedly contribute to the development of mutual relations in different fields of the economy and cultural life. The advance in this respect has and will have significance for the establishment of a spirit of trust and mutual understanding among different countries and peoples. And this on the other hand is one of the most important prerequisites for the establishment of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems -- an objective necessity for the development of mankind."

## EAST GERMANY

East Berlin Voice of the GDR Domestic Service in German 1705 GMT
30 May 72 L

(Albert Reisz commentary)

Much has been said and written about U.S. President Nixon's visit to the USSR, and it is quite certain that much more still will

be said about it. The result is now at hand and of all the questions and expectations, both hopeful and skeptical ones, which were raised while the Moscow meeting was in progress, there is one which undeniably rates above all others. The question: Has the meeting benefited world peace or has it not? Are its results such that they promote an easing of tension and understanding or are they not? Or to put it differently: Have we come a step closer to peaceful coexistence or have we not?

The answer produced by a sober analysis is bound to be "yes." Nobody expected a proclamation of universal and perfect concord from this meeting. This was and is beyond the bounds of possibility. As far as peace and understanding are concerned, we are not immodest. Nor are we unrealistic. A realistic assessment must take into account that the successful conclusion of the SALT negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna required some 30 months and 127 sessions before the present result was achieved. This should serve as a reminder of the amount of work and perseverance which must be invested in disarmament, which ranks among the most important aspects of peaceful coexistence, if not indeed as its most important component altogether. Though not in complete agreement with what LE MONDE has to say, I nonetheless concur when it speaks of a breakthrough that has been achieved in the sphere of disarmament.

But to return to the question: Has there been a step forward in the field of disarmament, relaxation of tension, a step forward toward better conditions for the struggle for peaceful coexistence? An unreserved "yes."

## 4. POLAND

Warsaw PAP International Service in English 1604 GMT 27 May 72 L

Warsaw 27 May -- An agreement on strategic arms limitation was signed in Moscow yesterday by the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. The whole world has received this step as an important political event.

A PAP correspondent has asked Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski for a statement on this subject, for information about the Polish stand.

"We are of the opinion," Minister Olszowski said, "that the signature of the agreement was a momentous event and will have considerable and positive consequences for the development of the whole

international situation. First of all, the limitation of rocket and nuclear
strategic armaments reduces the danger of a nuclear war. To prevent
such a war, to save humanity from such a terrible threat is one of the
basic tasks of the common policy of the socialist countries. This task
has also been recognized as a historic mission of the international
communist and working class movement, which has emphasized in
documents adopted by conferences of this movement.

"Secondly, the agreement signifies a halt to strategic armaments and thereby is of essential importance for checking the arms race in general. To put an end to this race is also a common aim of the socialist countries. In pursuing this goal, we strive to eliminate this source of tension from international relations and to reduce the economic and social effects of the arms race.

"Thirdly, the achievement of this momentous agreement itself has a positive influence on the easing of international tension, is conducive to progress in detente and cooperation, to peaceful settlement of disputes.

"We have been following with great interest the to-date course and results of the Moscow talks. The importance of the agreements concluded there so far goes far beyond the Soviet-American relations. These agreements will undoubtedly exert a great positive influence on the development of the world situation, including the situation in Europe. They constitute a great success of Soviet policy and are fully concordant with the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, which are common foreign policy principles of the Soviet Union, Poland and other fraternal countries of the socialist community. We fully share the satisfaction of the international public at these agreements."

## HUNGARY

Budapest in Hungarian to Europe 1900 GMT 30 May 72 L

(Magda Halasz commentary)

In Moscow 8 extraordinary days have passed. The two greatest and strongest powers -- the USSR and the United States -- have assured the world that everything will be done to prevent atomic war. The Moscow summit took place in a difficult international situation, with extremely sharp conflicts in some parts of the world. The differences in many important areas cannot be bridged, and this is not concealed by the communique issued on the talks. But however great the differences -- and even in this moment filled with hope one must say it --

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however unforgivable is the role of American imperialist circles in
the present conflicts, the permanent and greatest problem of our time
is that we are living in the atomic age.

Today such large stockpiles of nuclear armaments have been
assembled that they are capable of virtually eliminating life on earth.
The extraordinary importance of the Moscow summit is that the two
strongest military powers -- on whom special responsibility rests for
the fate of the world -- declared their intention to do their utmost to
avoid military confrontation, to strive to save humanity from the
danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

The document on the fundamental objectives of Soviet-American
relations was drawn up in this spirit, which is served by the agree-
ments aimed at limiting strategic weapons and paving the way for
cooperation in various scientific and technical fields.

The success of the Moscow summit first of all justified the
principles of Soviet policy formulated over many years, the struggle
and tireless effort to work out cooperation in the interests of peace
on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence with countries
of a different social system. The consistent Soviet peace policy has
become successful because it appealed to those forces in the United
States which are capable of soberly facing the realities and forces
that have evolved in the world...

RUMANIA

Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Rumanian 24 May 72

(Florin Undrea article "In the Spirit of Detente, or Normalizing Inter-
state Relations")

Nowadays the international press is attributing special significance
to the visit of U.S. President Richard Nixon to the USSR as well as to
the talks between the Soviet state leaders and the U.S. President. The
present visit in Moscow of the U.S. President -- the first visit to the
Soviet Union in peacetime by a U.S. President -- is rightly considered
an event of major importance on the world scene.

The significance of the top-level Soviet-American meeting is
many-sided. First, let us point out the prevalence of realism in foreign
policy. The talks in Moscow confirm the certainty that the path of
peaceful coexistence, of actions toward detente and cooperation, is the
only accessible one; that in our days it is the only rational way of
eliminating mistrust and of promoting the interests of peace in the world.

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In the light of this, the top-level talks between the USSR and the United States are also an impressive component of the international dialog which is nowadays experiencing a development unequalled in history. They once again confirm the validity of the method of negotiations -- including those between the most authoritative state leaders -- for finding ways and means to resolve disputes.

In this context, the successes attained by the Soviet Union in building socialism and communism and its important contribution toward enhancing the strength of the world socialist system, the anti-imperialist front and the forces of progress and peace are highly regarded.

Public opinion in our country welcomes the top-level Soviet-American talks with satisfaction. Rumania actively and consistently militates for promoting peace and cooperation between peoples, for detente and international security. Rumania considers that the important problems contemporary mankind is confronted with need the active participation in international life of all states, large or small. These problems impose the promotion of contacts and negotiations as a method of smoothing conflicts, of finding political solutions with a view to eliminating hotbeds of tension and of consolidating world peace. In this spirit, Rumanian public opinion expresses its conviction that the top-level Soviet-American meeting will make a remarkable contribution to both improving the relations between the USSR and the United States and to freely developing cooperation among all states in the world, to establishing a climate of trust and sound understanding among peoples and to promoting detente and security throughout the world.

## YUGOSLAVIA

Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 29 May 72

(Belgrade radio commentators on Soviet-American documents signed in Moscow on 29 May)

The reactions of our foreign political commentators deal with Vietnam, the Middle East and Europe. The Vietnam war was manifested as the most disputed problem. Here is a brief comment by Nikola Vitorovic:

"Concerning Vietnam, what happened 3 months earlier in Shanghai, where the Chinese and the Americans maintained their old positions, is repeated in Moscow. Nobody could expect a different outcome of the American-Soviet talks, at least concerning what was announced

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publicly. An indication of the complexity of this problem, which, nevertheless, does not burden the Soviet Union and the United States to the extent that they could not trace further paths of their cooperation, was made by Washington press spokesman Ziegler when he said that the Vietnam problem exceeds the frameworks of Moscow-Washington relations and, accordingly, the two countries could not agree without consulting other interested sides, or rather all interested sides.

"Which are these sides? Primarily, the peoples of Indochina as well as Peking, in whose immediate vicinity the war is being waged, a war in which the Americans greatly participate, just as the Soviet Union."

The Middle East is another battlefield which was dealt with in this historic meeting. Here is a talk by Milutin Milenkovic:

"The Middle East is portrayed in these documents in brighter colors than Vietnam. First of all, the two superpowers, which are directly interested and present in the Middle East, have not singled out their separate views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, as they did concerning the Vietnam war. Therefore, concerning the Middle East, the two superpowers have essentially the same attitude in their strategic-political approach. This approach is an appeal to a political solution of the conflict; they refer to the UN Security Council resolution 242, and to Gunnar Jarring's mission.

"The Israeli Government will be affected by this, because it factually rejects Jarring's mediation and does not want to reply to his questionnaire from last February. However, the general tone of the Moscow documents does not encourage, at least at first sight, the Arab rejection of direct talks with Israel, nor does it increase the basis for the so-called imposed solution, with which the big powers would force Israel to withdraw. The restraint of the Soviet Union and the United States in all areas of conflict is stressed and special rights and advantages in world problems is denied to all countries, including the aforementioned superpowers. In connection with this point, Israel will most likely seek support for its theses on local negotiations and a local solution of the crisis."

CUBA

Havana Domestic Service in Spanish, May 31, 1972

(Guido Garcia Inclan commentary: "Letter from Freddy")

Yesterday we received from Florida via the fastest way a letter
from our dear friend upon his return from the Soviet Union, where he
went to cover Nixon's trip to Moscow on orders from his newspaper...

Dear Guido: We are back home again. It is wonderful to be able
to say this after such a long and tiresome trip. We moved around very
little, but wrote a lot...

The newspapers and radio over there reported somewhat more
about Fidel's trip through Europe than about Nixon himself. Just as
the rest of the world, you are probably eager to learn about the great
solutions made by the powerful ones. But, that is the big question
being asked in the newsrooms of all newspapers. You must have read
about the agreements -- the limitation and control of aggressive weapons --
but that is all. The world -- the humanity that rises every morning and
wants to know what is going on -- wants to learn about peace in Vietnam,
but little was said about that. Very little was learned, even though we
journalists believe that a lot must have been said about it. This is a big
war. It is not a small war now. It affects everybody because of the
criminal actions that are taking place. We all agree that this war must
come to an end. It is a war in which the summit meeting players have
a role to play. It is a war whose discussion was postponed for Paris,
where the talks have been boycotted by the Yankees. At first glance,
this is very odd. But behind the curtains there must or should be some-
thing essential because diplomacy played a great role during the summit
meeting...

COMMUNIST CHINA

PRC media first mentioned the Moscow summit only on June 2.

Peking NCNA Domestic Service in Mandarin

(Text) Peking, 2 June 1972 -- U.S. President Nixon returned to Washington on 1 June after visiting the Soviet Union, Iran and Poland.

At the invitation of the Soviet Government, President Nixon visited the Soviet Union 22 through 30 May and held talks with Soviet leaders Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin on "basic issues related to Soviet-U.S. relations and the current international situation."

After the talks the Soviet Union and the United States issued "the Soviet-U.S. joint communique" and "the principles governing the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States." The two sides also signed seven agreements on anti-missile missile systems, certain measures for limiting offensive strategic weapons, the prevention of marine accidents, scientific and technological cooperation, space cooperation, health cooperation and the protection and improvement of man's environment. They also decided to set up a Soviet-U.S. joint trade committee.

After concluding his visit in the Soviet Union, the U.S. President visited Iran on 30 and 31 May. He held talks with Iran's Emperor, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and they issued an "Iran-U.S. joint communique."

The President visited Poland on 31 May and 1 June. He had talks there with Edward Gierek and Jaroszewicz. The two sides issued a "Polish-U.S. joint communique" and also signed an agreement on the consular affairs of the governments of the two countries.

President Nixon left Washington 20 May. On his way to the Soviet Union, he stayed in Austria, where he held talks with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky.

NORTH VIETNAM

North Vietnamese and Viet Cong media have never acknowledged the summit meeting. But a long denunciation of President Nixon carried in the June 2 Party daily, Nhan Dan, referred to "boasts" he made "at a party" (the Kremlin banquet, but not so identified) about "creating a more peaceful world for all nations." The article similarly alluded to Mr. Nixon's Moscow TV speech, without identifying it: "Nixon also shamelessly spoke of love for children. He recalled the tragic story about a child whose parents died because of the Fascist Hitlerite aggression."

And, as other Hanoi media had earlier, the paper spoke of Mr. Nixon's presence in Austria and Iran, without explaining why he was there:

"Recently, upon his arrival in Austria, Nixon had to flee in the face of the people's anti-U.S. demonstrations. For two consecutive days, thousands of Austrians took to the streets and staged seething demonstrations, shouting: 'Nixon the murderer,' 'Nixon, Nuremberg' and 'victory belongs to Vietnam.'

"Later, in Iran, Nixon narrowly escaped death amid a series of bomb explosions that vividly reflected the people's indignation over the cruel crimes committed by the Americans who bombed Hanoi and Haiphong and mined DRV harbors."

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang KCNA International Service in English

[Text] Pyongyang May twenty-third (KCNA)--The U. S. President Nixon arrived in Moscow on May 22 for a visit to the Soviet Union, according to a TASS report from Moscow.

He was met at the Vnukovo Airport by Nikolay Podgornyy, president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Aleksey Kosygin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and other official personnel. [A similar report was broadcast by Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean at 0100 GMT on 24 May]

[Text] Pyongyang May twenty-sixth (KCNA)--The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Government of the Soviet Union arranged a luncheon in the Kremlin on May 22 for the U. S. President Nixon on a visit to the Soviet Union, according to a TASS report from Moscow.

Invited to the luncheon from the U. S. side were Nixon's entourage.

Present there from the side of the Soviet Union were L. Brezhnev, N. Podgorny, A. Kosygin and other official personages.