Jessee Incao

From: Lai David Civ AWC/DFS [David.Lai@MAXWELL.AF.MIL]
Sent: Tuesday, November 02, 2004 10:04 AM
To: 'Dr. Henry A. Kissinger'
Subject: Chess vs. Weiqi (Go)

East Meets West Global Game 11.pdf
Go vs Chess.PD... (778 KB)

NOV 2 2004

Dr. Kissinger,

It is always a great pleasure reading your works, and no exception with your new article on "America's Assignment" in the latest Newsweek magazine.

In the final section of your article, the "Long Challenge," you mention a recent writing comparing the difference in the diplomatic style of China and the United States to their intellectual games--the West's chess and Chinese weiqi. I believe that you are referring to my work "Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi." However, the spelling of the Chinese game is incorrect. It should be "weiqi" but not "neiji." I am wondering if Newsweek can correct it.

Weiqi was created in China about three thousand years ago. It is the world's oldest and perhaps the most sophisticated and viable board game. The Chinese call it "weiqi," literally, a game of encircling territory, a very essential element of a nation-state. The game was introduced to Japan during the Tang Dynasty and has become Japan's national game. In fact, Japan has dominated this game for well over the last six hundred years. The Japanese call it "Igo." Americans dropped the "i" and call the game "go."

When my monograph appeared at the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Web site, it caught much attention in the defense and diplomatic communities. Reuters defense correspondent had an interview with me and sent out a top world news about my work. BBC World Service had a radio interview with me. The State Department and Pentagon also invite me to present my work. I am very delighted to see that it also caught your attention. I am currently turning my work on this idea into a book.

Enclosed please see the link to my monograph at the Army War College SSI and my earlier article on the same topic (co-authored with my student, Lt Col Gary Hamby). You can find more discussion of the differences between Go, Chess, and Poker and their influences on international interactions in this article. Moreover, I hope you will also enjoy another article of mine, co-authored with my student from the State Department. It is "Football vs. Soccer," comparing two war paradigms.

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=378&CFID=80305&CFTOK
EN=13018448

<<East Meets West Go vs Chess.PDF>> <<Global Game 11.pdf>>

As a former Chinese diplomat, who grew up in China when you and President Nixon made your historic visit to China, I always appreciate your thoughts and writing.

It is a great pleasure having this communication with you. I really hope to hear from you.

Very Respectfully,

Dr. David Lai
US Air War College / DFS
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112

(334) 953-7427 (O)

East Meets West:
An Ancient Game Sheds New Light
on US-Asian Strategic Relations

David Lai and Gary W. Hamby

Abstract

It is widely shared that Pacific Asia is emerging as the powerhouse of the 21st century. This region has the enduring Sinic culture that holds profound philosophical, political, and strategic thoughts that set the nations in this region apart from the rest of the world community, especially the US-led West.

The United States seeks to establish a strategic edge and productive relations with the nations in this region. For this foreign policy to bear fruit, the United States must, among other things, follow Sun Zi's advice to learn more about Asian society. In one particular aspect, the United States will be better served to supplement its traditional Western approach, one that is under the influence of poker- and chess-like logic, with a wei qi-based Asian strategy of international relations. A little knowledge of the ancient board game wei qi will take US national leaders a long way in achieving the US foreign policy objectives.

The game of wei qi is a significant part of many Asian cultures and greatly influences their geopolitical thinking and behavior. It bears striking resemblance to international relations and warfare. The wei qi-based strategy to international affairs follows clearly an Asian way that emphasizes the interplay of yin and yang. It also exemplifies the Chinese military classics to a remarkable extent. The wei qi concept is not available in Western military strategic thought and literature. It is, after all, a different game.

The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002

248 East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations

An ancient yet challenging Asian strategy game is riding the tide of information revolution across the globe. This is the game of *wei qi* (pronounced as [wei ch'i]); it is called *igo* in Japanese, *baduck* in Korean, and *go* in the United States and other places). Created in China several thousand years ago, *wei qi* is the oldest and most enduring board game in the world. Thanks to the spread of the internet, players in all corners of the world can now log on to an internet go server (IGS) at popular web sites such as Yahoo to play this game with the state-of-the-art computer-designed features.

While it is a national game of China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, *wei qi*'s popularity and the recognition of its usefulness in understanding Asian culture is spreading. In 1993, at the first Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting in Seattle, NBC news anchor Tom Brokow observed that the game was a useful tool for understanding Asian strategy, especially Asian business strategy. He also pointed out that many business schools in the United States offered *wei qi* as an elective course to students who wanted to specialize in international business, particularly in the Asia Pacific area.

Indeed, the American Go Association has chapters in thirty-six of the fifty states. In 1999 when the US Go Congress held its annual convention in San Francisco, it offered a record number of tournaments and workshops, and a national school-based network that taught almost 5,000 American children to play *wei qi*. San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown proclaimed the week from July 29 to August 8 the "Go Congress Week in San Francisco."¹

Played between two people on a board of 19x19 intersecting lines, the rules and objectives are amazingly simple, yet the strategic interactions and complexities from this simple game are almost limitless. The basic objective is to secure more territory on the board than your opponent does. The board starts empty. The two players take turns to place black and white stones at the intersections on the game board. Once played, the stones cannot be removed unless captured by the

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force or any other US government agency.

1 US Go Congress report available at http://www.usgo.org/congress/.

David Lai and Gary W. Hamby

249

opponent. Each piece carries the same physical weight, yet each has varying immediate and potential power. The game is like a large-scale war with multiple campaigns and battlefronts or complicated international affairs with different levels of interactions. There are local as well as global connected and seemingly disconnected battles and engagements on the board. The play is over when both players pass, agreeing that there is no more advantage for either on continued play. The winner is the one who has secured more territory, even if by only one intersection.

Unlike chess where computers can challenge masters, *wei qi* is far more complex than even the best computer's ability. In a 1998 match-up at the *American Association for Artificial Intelligence*, a state-of-the-art *wei qi*-playing computer program called Handtalk was given a 25-stone handicap (an unheard of advantage) against a 27-year-old American *wei qi* master from New Mexico named Janice Kim. Amazingly, Ms. Kim defeated Handtalk, even with 'such a huge handicap. Losing a game despite a 25 stone handicap puts Handtalk in the same league as a beginner human player with a couple of month's practice.²

In 1997, IBM's supercomputer Deep Blue defeated *Chess* master Garry Kasparov, with no handicap at all. Yet the designers of Deep Blue also admitted that they could not write a program to beat a *wei qi* master—it is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Alternative moves are said to be way beyond a billion in a game. Programmers have yet to figure out the way to make the computer "think" like a human *wei qi* player.

Western strategists often compare geopolitics and international relations to chess- or poker-like situations. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski provides a good example in his book *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basicbooks, 1997).

While certainly a game of intricate strategy, chess is a game of domination where the board starts full, with the pieces in their designated positions. Each piece on a chessboard carries different weight—an hierarchy of power and rank reflecting a political entity. The status of the game (i.e., who is winning or losing) can be determined by

2 David A. Mechner, "All Systems Go," *The Sciences*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1998), p. 1.

250 *East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations*

comparing the number and strength of the pieces on the board. For the winner, victory is absolute, and so is defeat for the loser. While the pieces can coordinate their attacks, each piece's ability and value stay the same.

Chess undoubtedly has great political and military applications. Perhaps the most important ones are its influence on the strategy to focus on the central target on the chessboard, the king, and the quest for zero-sum victory—a complete destruction of the opponent. While this is the strength of chess, however, it is also its weakness. A decision-maker who follows strictly the chess-like strategy tends to be single-minded and always seeks absolute victory. Unfortunately, such absolute gain or victory in international relations is rare. More often than not, international interactions result in relative gain or loss. Engagement and confrontation are direct as well as indirect. A well-rounded national leader should learn to deal with both situations. Here the game of *wei qi* can offer some insight.

Poker, arguably America's favorite analogy for geopolitics, adds chance and the art of bluffing to the strategic interaction.³ Poker players have no control over what appears in their hands. Risk-taking and bluffing are the best strategies to make the most out of whatever hands are dealt. These strategies also find their frequent application in international affairs and conflict situations. However, we should bear in mind that these strategies have their limitations. In international interactions, it usually takes calculated and long-term-based strategies to achieve foreign policy objectives. Once again, *wei qi* offers this kind of strategic thinking.

The game of *wei qi* is a perfect information game in the sense that all the moves, past and future, are known to the two players, although the number of alternative future moves is large and at the present even beyond the reach of supercomputer. Chance and gamble still have their place in the game due largely to the many possible future moves, but calculated and more importantly strategic moves are the rule. *Wei qi* has many other special features that are not readily available in chess or poker. Most of the strategic moves fit nicely into the thoughts of the Chinese military classics. Learning a little *wei qi* will certainly help in

3 See John McDonald's classic *Strategy in Poker, Business & War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1950).

David Lai and Gary W. Hamby

251

getting a better understanding of the subtle strategic concepts in Sun Zi's
*Art of War* and other ancient Chinese military classics.

Although not everyone in the Asian cultures plays *wei qi* (neither is the case for chess or poker in the Western societies), it is becoming increasingly clear that *wei qi*-, chess-, and poker-based mindsets belong to different cultures and have different bearing on the thinking and behavior of different people. Decision makers usually think in terms of these different concepts. A little knowledge in the game of *wei qi* will take the US leaders a long way in understanding the Asian strategic thinking.

Wei Qi: Its Origins and Evolution

*Wei qi* originated in ancient China, but there is no solid record of when or how it was created. *Wei qi* scholars generally rely on three main sources of reference to speculate its origins and evolution. The first sources are the comments on *wei qi* and reference to the game by early Chinese philosophers such as Confucius and Mencius in their classics, and in the *Zuo Zhuan*, the first chronicle in world history on the change of government and warfare between the Chinese state of Lu and its neighbors during the Spring and Autumn epoch from 722 to 481 BC. If *wei qi* could catch the attention of these prominent thinkers, so goes the speculation, its existence and popularity are self-evident. Indeed, reference to *wei qi* also appeared in written matters. Since the game bears close resemblance to military affairs, early Chinese military strategists included *wei qi* in the Chinese military writings.⁴ By the Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 AD), there were even special books about *wei qi* such as *Wei Qi Fu* by Ma Rong and *Wei Qi Ming* by Li You.

The second sources are the archeological discoveries from unearthed
ancient burial sites in China. At one ancient burial site in Gansu province,
scholars found some well-carved designs with intersecting lines on the
pottery unearthed. These images contain ten or twelve intersecting lines.
They are indicative of the early form of the *wei qi* gameboard.

At another burial site of the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD) in Hunan

4 Sui Shu: Jing Ji Zhi (Sui Dynasty, 581-618 AD) has mentioned *wei qi* in Chinese military works.

252 East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations

province, archeologists unearthed a squared *wei qi* gameboard with fifteen intersecting lines.

One finding at a Liao Dynasty (916-1125 AD) burial site in Inner Mongolia is rather interesting. Archeologists found a *wei qi* game table ten centimeters high and forty centimeters wide on each of the four sides. On the tabletop is a 30x30 centimeters square with 13x13 intersecting-lined *wei qi* gameboard. On the board is an unfinished game with 71

black stones and 73 white ones on the board as well as some extra stones by the side. It seems that the owner of this tome was a *wei qi* fan and he probably could not let go of this particular game so his family buried it with him by his side.⁵

Finally, there are the stories of the two legendary Chinese sage kings Yao and Shun creating the *wei qi* game and teaching it to their sons in an attempt to improve their intellect.⁶ This source remains legendary since the Chinese have not yet found any hard evidence about the existence of Yao and Shun and the other sage kings prior to the Xia Dynasty (a somewhat documented historical culture in north central China around 2200-1670 BC).

While the creation of *wei qi* remains a puzzle to be resolved, evidence of its evolution throughout the Chinese history is readily available. Indeed, *wei qi* is one of the four main Chinese ancient and enduring arts—music, board game, calligraphy, and painting.

From the Spring and Autumn and Warring States epochs (722-474 and 475-221 BC) on, *wei qi* had been a popular game in the Chinese culture. During the next two thousand years many Chinese emperors and senior political and military officials were *wei qi* masters. The list include Liu Bang, founder of the Western Han Dynasty (206 BC - 24 AD),

Figure 1

5 Run Tu, *History of Wei Qi*, available at http://www.weiqi361.com/ygsm/do63/d063-01.htm

6 Zhang Hua, *Bo Wu Zhi* (Encyclopedia), Jin Dynasty, 265-420 AD.

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Cao Cao, head of one of the Three Kingdoms (220-265 AD), Sun Che, Lu Fan, Zhuge Jin and Lu Shun, all high-ranking political and military officials of the Wu state of the Three Kingdoms, Jin Wu Di, founder of the Western Jin Dynasty (265-316 AD), Wang Dao, Premier of the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420 AD), just to name a few.⁷

The popularity of *wei qi* game reached an all-time high level during the Tang Dynasty (618-907 AD). The Tang government established a high-ranking position for *wei qi* affairs at the same level with painting and calligraphy in the Imperial Academy. It was during this time that *wei qi* master Wang Jixin put forward one of the *wei qi* classics, the *Ten Dictums of Wei Qi*.⁸

Another milestone in the evolution of *wei qi* is the emergence of *Qi Jing Shisan Bian* (Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi) in the Song Dynasty (960-1279). In this work, the author made a penetrating analysis of the strategic significance of *wei qi*, comparing it to the art of war. The author might have consulted Sun Zi's *Art of War* because his work, like the *Art of War*, also has thirteen chapters. More importantly, the *Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi* has incorporated rich Chinese philosophical, political, and military thought. The philosophy of yin and yang, the ideas of Daoist Yi Jing, and Sun Zi's military thoughts are all well-blended into the art of *wei qi*.⁹

While *wei qi* continued to excel in China, it had also been introduced to other cultures. *Wei qi* made its way to India very early on. It is also played in Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. *Wei qi* is believed to have reached Korea during the Chinese Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220 AD). By the seventh century, and during the Chinese Tang Dynasty time (618-

7 Run Tu's *History of Wei Qi* is perhaps the most extensive study of *wei qi* game and its evolution. He has documented episodes of *wei qi* throughout the ages up to the Qing Dynasty at the turn of the twentieth century. This work is in Chinese. It is available at http://www.Weiqi361.com. Run Tu has listed well over one hundred ancient history references that carry stories of *wei qi*. Unfortunately, he has not provided detailed information about the publications and page numbers. Nevertheless, concerned *wei qi* scholars and players should consult this work. In fact, much of this section draws heavily from Run Tu's work.

8 The text is available in Chinese both in bookstores and online in many of the *wei qi* web sites. I have not seen an English translation yet.

9 *The Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi* is available online in many of the *wei qi* sites. I have not seen an English translation.

254 *East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations*

907 AD), *wei qi* was widespread in Korea.

It was also during the Tang Dynasty that *wei qi* entered Japan (around 754 AD), brought there by Japan's envoys to China. Initially a game of the nobility, it quickly reached all ranks of the Japanese military by the thirteenth century. Wide social communities in Japan developed an interest in *wei qi* with skill at the game a sign of social finesse. So great was the reverence for the game that great players were frequently summoned to homes of nobles for demonstrations and exhibitions. The study of *wei qi* also became part of the Japanese government policy and led to the formation of the Go Academy. It flourished in Japan with the best players competing before the shogun year in and year out.

*Wei qi* has also reached Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia. In the sixteenth century, Portuguese sailors to Japan learned about *wei qi* and brought it back to Portugal. But *wei qi* did not become popular in Europe until after the nineteenth century.¹⁰

**Wei Qi: The Art of Strategy and Competition**

*Wei qi* is a game of strategy and competition. It is also a test of will and skill. Two players take turns to place black and white stones on the intersections (not the open squares) of a 19x19 line matrix on a playing board. By rule, the one who plays black stone goes first. Once played, the stones remain in place unless captured and removed by the opposing player. Diagram 1 contains the initial five moves of a recent game between two professional players, a Chinese 5-dan and a Korean 4-dan, in Chungqing, China (July 1, 2001), as they competed for the title of a major *wei qi* tournament between China and Korea. In this game, the Chinese player played black stone.¹¹

The basic objective of the game is to secure more of the board (or territory). The players do so by encircling more territory (intersections). The competition for more territory thus leads to engagement,

10 For more on the history of *wei qi*, see Run Tu, *History of Wei Qi*, available at http://www.go361.com and Chen Huaxin, Ye Jiabin and Xu Xu, *Story of Wei Qi* (Shanghai: Cishu Chuban She, 1999).

11 The five diagrams are from www.flygo.net. The tournament started on July 1, 2001. The winner was the one who won the best of five games.

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confrontation, and war fighting. As the game unfolds, it becomes a war with multiple campaigns and battlefronts. Or in the terms of international affairs, it is a competition between two nations over multiple interest areas.

Wei qi starts with the board completely open. Because the two players must wait for their turns to place one stone at a time on the board, they must make the best out of each stone (each player has about 180 stones). In wei qi, the first fifty-some

moves are called the initial-stage moves. At this stage, the players will develop their strategic plans, adjusting constantly to the new situation created by the opponent's moves. Strategic moves, diplomatic posturing, and "testing each other's waters" are the hallmarks of the initial stage of the game.

Experienced wisdom suggests that the corners are easier to secure (you only need to build two walls to surround a corner, but three walls to secure a side, and a complete circle to secure a piece of territory in the middle). Thus out of strategic necessity, the two players will always start with attempts to occupy the corners. The first three moves in Diagram 1 are of this kind. However, the fourth piece is a special move. It is slightly off from the strategic position in the lower left-hand corner. This is a choice that could easily make a computer confused, but it is White's strategic design. Black saw it an opportunity and immediately placed a black stone in the same corner.

Let's visualize the situation before white put the 6th stone on the board. By playing the 5th stone in the lower left-hand corner, Black has created a grand posture on the right-hand side of the board by loosely "claiming" the three corners and the area they bound. It is critical now that White try to frustrate this grand design. The 6th stone does exactly this. By placing the 6th stone inside Black's posturing sphere of influence, White has changed the situation instantly. Of note is that stones 4 and 5, 3 and 6 are close to each other but not directly in touch—they keep an "arm's length" from each other. This is a typical wei qi.

Diagram 1

256 East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations

qi style of engagement and posturing.

In Diagram 2 we see that the two players have exchanged a few more moves. The lower left-hand corner is now evenly divided between the two players. Both have also made their control more secure. This is a typical win-win situation in *wei qi*. Following the division of the corner, black stone 15 took a good "jump," protecting the corner group on the one hand, and making an attempt to isolate white

stone 6. By doing so, Black has resumed his strategic posturing for the right-hand side of the board.

White answered Black's move with stone 16. By doing so, White has also made a claim to the territory on the left-hand side of the board.

Black stone 17 started an attack on the lone white stone 6. How White handles this situation has a great impact on the game.

Diagram 3 shows that White has not only handled it well, but also successfully penetrated into Black's posturing territory, reducing Black's claim. Instantly, the situation looks more promising for White, for he has enlarged his posturing on the upper left-hand side.

Please note that so far the moves are very "enlightened and civilized" — there is no heavy engagement or fight-

ing between the two players. But we can see that every move changed the outlook on the board instantly.

Connection is a key concept in *wei qi*. The stones are placed on the intersections. They are connected through the lines. In Diagram 3, we see that black 7 is separated from the black groups at the bottom. Adjacent stones such as black 5 and 13, 17 and 19 are solidly connected. However, at the early stage of the game, this kind of connection is ineffective. In

Diagram 2

Diagram 3

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order to make strategic claims to large areas, players need to make big jumps such as stones 15 and 16.

When it comes to more direct engagement, they make smaller jumps such as the white stones 20, 24, and 22. These jumps are made with the expectation and confidence that the stones can be connected later, even if they are under attack. The ability to assess the situation of all stones on the board and then jump far enough to influence the maximum amount of territory while avoid overextending one's reach hence creating a vulnerability is a critical element in the art of *wei qi*. Black 21 and 15 are close and *potentially* connected. White 24, however, poses a threat to cut off the line of connection between these two stones.

Some stones are placed in greater distance from established home base. Some go deep into the opponent's posturing territory. These moves are made with the expectation that they can be connected or rescued, or make life in enemy's claimed territory.

To remain alive, a stone must be adjacent or connected by their unit to an empty intersection, called a liberty. Stones can be captured if the opponent eliminates all their liberties or open intersections adjacent to them. As a rule, the player who threatens to capture the opposing player's stone(s) gives a warning by calling "atari," a Japanese term for such function. The opponent may or may not respond to the call, to rescue the threatened stone(s), depending on the situation. In chess one does not warn the opponent when poised to capture a piece, but when attacking the opposing king calls "check," and the opponent must avoid the attack or lose. The *atari* of *wei qi* is a different call.

Diagram 4 contains such a call. The unit composed of black 25 and 15 is surrounded by white stones and there is only one liberty left (the intersection of line L and 3). Since White only has to play one more stone (on the intersection below white stone 36) to capture this unit, White makes an *atari* call. If Black does not respond by playing on the intersection L-3 but chooses to play elsewhere, then White can play on this

Diagram 4

258 *East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations*

intersection and remove those two black stones. This would result in White cutting a big hole in Black's claimed territory, a result unacceptable to Black. But Black can respond to this call by putting a stone right below white stone 36, making an *atari* call on 36. If White tries to rescue 36 by extending it one more stone to the right, Black can then turn downward and call *atari* on 34. This way, Black's 15 and 25 can be connected back.

And this is the way the game unfolded with the two players getting into a battle even before the initial stage was completed (the upper part of the board was still open for grabs). This game, therefore, moved early into the midgame stage (usually between the 50th to the 150th moves) where the bloody battles are fought.

Diagram 5 shows this midgame stage with separate groups and several separate battlegrounds in the making. The groups are the black group in the middle, the white group on the right, the black group at the bottom left-hand side, the black group at the lower right-hand side, and the white group on the left.

Diagram 5

Note that each color is separated into two groups at the disconnect where the four stones 25, 26, 27, and 36

are located. Since groups cannot be connected diagonally, black 25 and 27 are not connected and neither are white 26 and 36. This disconnect was the result of the battle fought at this place. Both Black and White face some uncertainty about their survival. The battle between these two groups would wage on.

The black group in the middle has an "eye" in the middle of stones 27, 33, 39, and 41—a critical liberty for survival. By the *wei qi* rule, it takes at least two "eyes" for any group to survive. Black has secured one eye. Black 47 is leading the group toward the open middle ground. There will be plenty of space for black to make the other eye. Therefore, this group is in good shape.

The white group on the right has the shape of one eye around 44, 48, and 6. White 40 and 58 are also leading the group toward the upper part

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of the board. The battle is between
these two groups to see who can make
life and gain more territory.

Diagram 6 shows that Black left
this battle unfinished and turned to
make some moves on the left-hand
side. This is again a typical *wei qi*
way of war. Multiple engagements in
various stages of completion are a
common element in *wei qi* play. With a
few moves, Black has brought the lone
stone 7 back to life. In *wei qi*, there is a

saying that a stone never dies or no stone is useless. Black 7 was quietly
waiting for the right moment to make its impact. On the far left, three
white stones surround black 63. White has obviously called Atari. Black
63 may or may not die. It all depends on what the two players do with it
later.

Diagram 6

After about another thirty moves,
Black has connected the left and
middle groups through the stones 97,
77, and 79 (Diagram 7). Black has
penetrated into White's claimed sphere
of influence or potential territory,
greatly reducing White's space.

In addition, Black has also thrown
three stones (91, 93, and 95) deep into
White's claimed territory and instantly
put White's three stones 84, 94, and 98
in danger. If Black can derail White's
attempts here, the entire upper part

would be Black's secured territory. That would be a slaughter, but it is
difficult for two players of close rank to make that kind of landslide
victory.

Diagram 7

Once again, we see how the situation of the game changes with a few
critical moves. The upper right-hand part looks promising to Black.
However, celebration for Black is too early. Black's "troops deployment"
in the upper right-hand corner is too thin. There is plenty of room for

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Wei Qi: The Art of Diplomacy and War

*Life Magazine* noted in 1942 that *wei qi* "is a favorite game of Japanese soldiers and a source of inspiration for Japanese military strategists" and that the way the Japanese "play go bears a striking resemblance to the way they fight their wars."¹³ Indeed, Figure 2 shows Japanese soldiers playing *wei qi* against a background of ruins in China. The fact that soldiers brought *wei qi* game set to the battlefront emphasizes the impact the game has on their culture.

When Japan recovered from its World War II destruction, *wei qi* also regained its prominence in Japan. As more and more Japanese play *wei qi*,

especially high-ranking officials, it has become truly Japan's national game. Today, Japanese employ *wei qi* concepts to promote their business. In his book *Go: an Asian Paradigm for Business Strategy* (Tokyo: The Ishi Press, 1995), Yasuyuki Mirura has made perhaps the best account of Japan's *wei qi* culture in the business world. Moreover, because of his extensive overseas experience in the Middle East and the United States, Mirura has also offered some excellent comments on international affairs from the *wei qi* perspective.

Back in *wei qi*'s home country, Mao Zedong was also a *wei qi* strategist. His theory about the protracted war against the Japanese was partly based on the *wei qi* concept. Scott A. Boorman's book *The Protracted Game: A Go Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy* remains to this day the best account of Mao's using the *wei qi* concept to lure Japanese troops deep into China's inland and attack those overextended troops.

*Wei qi* and Chinese military classics both prospered during the

Figure 2

13 "Wei Qi: Japs Play Their National Game the Way They Fight Their Wars," *Life Magazine*, May 18, 1942, p. 92.

262 *East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations*

Spring and Autumn and Warring States eras. The two share much insight in diplomacy, confrontation, and war preparation and fighting. The *wei qi* classic, *The Thirteen Treaties on the Art of Wei Qi*, has incorporated much Chinese classical military wisdom. Sun Zi's *Art of War* is very much reflected in this *wei qi* classic. In 1996 Roy C. Schmidt published his translation of a Chinese *wei qi* master Xiaochun Ma's book *The Thirty-Six Stratagems Applied to Wei Qi* (Santa Monica, CA: Yutopian Enterprises, 1996). This was the first book to apply Chinese military classics to explain the line of thought in various *wei qi* games. It was an excellent attempt and a great success.

*Wei qi* had been a popular game in China for thousands of years. However, during the waning years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the prominence of *wei qi* also took a down turn. During the years from the first Opium War of 1840 to the end of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, *wei qi* culture has suffered many setbacks in China. In the last twenty years, however, *wei qi* has taken a new lease of life in China. The number of *wei qi* players has increased greatly. Under the leadership of Nie Weiping and several other *wei qi* masters, China is now narrowing its gap with Japan and Korea. Because of its close connection to Chinese military thought, *wei qi* is bound to become more influential in China's military and foreign policies.

For today's international environment, *wei qi* has many features that are readily applicable to international relations and conflict situations. Perhaps the best way to discuss these features is to compare them with the characteristics of chess and poker, both of which have influence in international interactions. *Wei qi* concepts would be valuable additions to the art of diplomacy and war.

Perhaps the first and foremost difference between *wei qi* and chess is the philosophy behind their strategic thought. The philosophy behind chess is to win decisively. Both players have the same clear, overriding objective—capture the opposing king—and accomplish this objective by decimating whatever opposing forces stand in the way. The "balance of power" is clear and players frequently concede when losses are too substantial. Chess grand master Garry Kasparov puts it best when he says, "the only goal in chess is to prove your superiority over the other guy. And the most superiority, the most total one, is superiority of the mind. I mean, your opponent must be destroyed, fully destroyed."¹⁴

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Wei qi is a much different game with a significantly different philosophy. At its heart, wei qi reflects Oriental philosophy of the dynamic interplay of opposites (yin and yang); the dynamic tension between those opposites provides balance. The basics of the game effectively prevent a player from totally removing their opponent from the board. Denied "total victory," a wei qi player must settle for a relative victory. Therefore, wei qi strategy seeks to limit the opponent while building one's own positions. Opponents need not be defeated or removed from the board, only contained and minimized. Without a "king" to capture and with near-infinite possible combinations of stones, the simply stated objective to control the majority of the board becomes a swirling tangle of engagements.

Prolonged and complex, wei qi also focuses on building or creating versus chess's emphasis on removal and destruction. If chess portrays tactical engagement, then wei qi is the "panorama of an entire campaign or complex theater of war" where "comprehensive strategy and only comprehensive strategy makes victory certain."15 Due to its complexity, wei qi will "enable strategic maneuvers on a much larger scale than possible in chess, and it lends itself to positional conceptions of greater depth."16

Another influence of these games on international thinking is from the different abilities and uses of the pieces. In chess, each type of piece on the board has different power and capability. The queen is the superpower; she can move in any manner. However, the pawn's power is very limited. There is a clear hierarchy of capability among the pieces. Moreover, the pieces are like one's weapon stockpile. Having more is clearly advantageous. Losing a piece in chess or unevenly trading pieces can be very significant, making it difficult to catch up with the opponent.

In wei qi, however, each piece has the same tangible power, but their

14 Rudolph Chelminski and Jeff Seaver, "In the Game of Chess 'Your Opponent Must Be Destroyed'," *Smithsonian*, Vol. 28, No. 10 (January 1998), p. 47.

15 O. Korshet, *The Theory and Practice of Go* (Rutland, VE: Charles C. Tuttle Co. Publishers, 1965), pp. 6-7.

16 Edward Lasker, *Modern Chess Strategy with an Appendix on Go* (Washington Square, PA: David McKay Company, 1945), p. 374.

264 East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations

intangible or potential power, based on the near-infinite combinations and uses, is situational and limitless. Each piece's potential power depends on the grand strategic design. A *wei qi* player can use any piece to attack strongly fortified enemy territory. The player can put any piece in whatever ways he sees fit in the battle.

This difference in pieces tends to reflect different cultural views on individuals and groups. In chess, as in Western culture, individual pieces are important as individuals with each having its own independent power and capability. Chess is a "knightly struggle where victory or defeat was decided more through the exceptional virtue of a single noble or group of nobles than through the mass action of the commoners as part of an overall strategy."¹⁷ In *wei qi*, as in Asian culture, there is more emphasis on the group and overall situation where each piece's power is relative. Taken in isolation, a stone is meaningless and has very little power. Viewed from the overall situation, every piece has an impact on the game. Sacrificing small groups in exchange for bigger gains is thus a key *wei qi* concept that flows from this cultural difference.

The influence of these differences on international relations is rather significant. Under the influence of chess one tends to analyze conflict situations in terms of military balance. This in fact is rather typical in US military analysis with examples including General MacArthur's miscalculations of the Communist Chinese during the Korean War or the current tensions between the US and China over Taiwan. General MacArthur, from a Western and chess point of view, simply did not believe China would intervene due to its poor economic conditions, limited military capabilities, and untrained military manpower. Chess-like thinking focusing on military balance may have cost the United States dearly in this example.

The same line of thinking is still common in the current US view on the "hollow" Mainland Chinese threat to use force against Taiwan. Today when US strategists look at the China-Taiwan situation, they tend first to analyze the military balance across the Taiwan Strait and then add the weight of US intervention. Based on any military balance analysis, it would make no sense for the mainland Chinese to use force

17 O. Korschelt, *The Theory and Practice of Go* (Rutland, VE: Charles C. Tuttle Co., Publishers, 1965), p. 6.

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against Taiwan. This conclusion follows closely the chess concept of balance of power. Unfortunately, it may be off the mark if the Chinese are thinking in terms of the *wei qi* concepts. From a *wei qi* viewpoint, a military loss could easily support the political, cultural, or economic aspects of a larger, long-term gain.

A third influence of these games on international relations is the difference in approaching the opponents. In chess, except for the knight, every piece moves in a straightforward fashion. The objective is to trap the opponent's king. The approach is to capture more and more pieces and eventually the king. In *wei qi*, however, the stones are round shaped and flow like water. As described in the Thirteen Treaties on the *Art of Wei Qi*, the *wei qi* board is squared and secured; the stones are half-spherical therefore are good for maneuvering. They flow like water. Thus under the influence of *wei qi* concepts, one tends to be indirect, subtle, and always prepared to move in different directions. (Does this ring a bell on Sun Zi's ideas on strategy?)

Encirclement of an area takes many stones. The mirror part of this feature in international affairs is the many efforts one has to make to achieve a foreign policy objective.

Table 1 is an attempt to highlight the key concepts in chess, poker, and *wei qi* and put them in perspective.

## Wei Qi: Game of the New Century between the US and China

As Asia continues to grow and factor large in the US national interests, the United States is shifting more and more of its attention to this region. Among the nations in Asia, China is no doubt the most challenging one to the United States. In fact, the United States and China are already deeply engaged in and at odds with each other over a wide range of issues. These are the issues such as the China-Taiwan question, China's human rights conduct, Chinese way of government, the Tibet issue, religious freedom, and China's external conducts such as arms sales and nuclear proliferation, and the South China Sea disputes. In the *wei qi* perspective, China and the United States are already involved in multiple engagements.

There has been heated debate in the last ten years about what the US

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strategy should be toward this rising China. President Clinton adopted an engagement policy after failed attempts to getting tough with China in the initial years of his first term. This approach has come under heavy attack from the conservatives in the last couple of years. The main criticism is that this approach is too nice to the Chinese and it offers no leverage for punishing China for its "wrongdoings." Conservatives believe that the best way to make China change is through discipline. Containment therefore is their proposed policy choice to achieve this goal.

A recent policy recommendation from the influential RAND Corporation contends that engagement and containment taken in isolation cannot achieve US objectives with China. It calls for a policy of "Congagement," a combination of containment and engagement.18 This policy recommends a modified engagement with China, one that is less solicitous to China's sensitivities on the issues mentioned above; strengthening US ties with China's neighboring countries; and dealing with the Taiwan issue in a much more straightforward manner. Moreover, by incorporating "punishment" elements of containment policy, the proposed congagement approach will have both the carrots and sticks that the United States can deal with China more effectively from a position of strength.

The RAND report bases its analysis on the assumption that "a China that approached or equaled the United States in power would presumably seek to vindicate its territorial claims and could strive to attain regional hegemony, increase its status in global terms, and alter the rules of the international system to its advantage." Although some developments could lessen the prospects for such a negative outcome, such as China's turning democratic along the way of its economic development or collapsing like the Soviet Union, such hopes are uncertain. The United States would be better served to pursue a policy that would guarantee its success even with the worst scenario.

From the Chinese perspective, the US has been pursuing this congagement policy toward China for some time. From their *wei qi* perspective, congagement is tantamount to encirclement. Chinese

18 Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., *The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1999).

268 *East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations*

leaders are rather convinced that the Bush Administration will continue this policy toward China. They charge that the United States has "built" a ring of encirclement around China. This ring begins in Japan, stretches south through Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea to include the Philippines and Australia, moves west through Thailand and Singapore to the US increasing involvement with India. It continues up through Pakistan and finally into Central Asia through the activities of US energy interests.

Recent geopolitical developments would seem to support China's perspective. The recently revealed "Bush doctrine"¹⁹ on Asia along with the US's moves to create stronger bonds between the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia²⁰ have been labeled by the Chinese government as strategic maneuvering aimed at the containment of China.²¹ Other actions that reinforce China's feeling of being encircled include US-Japanese agreements on Theater Missile Defense; increased US arms sales to Taiwan and significantly fewer ambiguities in the US commitment to Taiwan's defense; strengthened US military relations with the Southeast Asian nations such as Thailand and Indonesia;²² US agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand to allow US naval ships to enter these countries for repair and logistic support; mutual efforts to improve relations between the US and India, including possible lifting of US sanctions;²³ and frequent US participation in military exercises with countries around China such as Japan, Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and Australia. Perhaps the boldest action was the recent (August 2001) and unprecedentedly large US Naval exercise (two aircraft carrier battlegroups instead of the usual one) in the South China Sea symbolically responding to a large-scale Chinese military drill off the

19 Greg Sheridan, "The Bush Doctrine Is Good for Asia," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, August 20, 2001.

20 David Lague, "A U.S. Security Shake-Up in Asia," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 30, 2001.

21 Craig Skehan, "Australia Dancing to US Tune, Mocks China," *Sydney Morning Herald*, August 2, 2001; *Chinese People's Daily* "Bumpy Road for Sino-US Relations," June 26, 2001.

22 Jane Perlez, "U.S. to Renew Relationship with Military in Indonesia," *New York Times*, August 12, 2001.

23 Alan Sipress, "U.S. Seeks to Lift Sanctions on India," *Washington Post*, August 12, 2001.

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southeast coast opposite Taiwan.

China appears to respond to these putative US encirclement actions with a *wei qi* countermeasure strategy. On the Korean peninsula, China's *wei qi* strategy is to promote a neutralized united Korea (assuming the unification is going to take place). The logic of this approach is a *wei qi* "relative win" outcome where no one gains complete victory in this battle. This could be in the form of a compromise between the United States and China. The United States would withdraw its troops from Korea and China would not seek a pro-China Korea—an outcome acceptable to all four great powers in the region, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.

Taiwan is no doubt the thorniest problem between the United States and China. Using chess terminology, Taiwan's president Chen Shui-bian insisted that he would not let Taiwan to become a pawn in the great power game between the United States and China. From a chess perspective, this would mean China will not allow Taiwan to become an instrument against China or to be sacrificed attacking China. However, from the *wei qi* perspective, Taiwan is a battleground—crucial territory to be struggled for and acquired rather than a pawn to be used. Instead of being an instrument of action, it becomes the object of the action. While the US may be trying to mold Taiwan into an effective instrument against China, China is trying to win Taiwan entirely. The mind-set difference here is clear. Pawns are small pieces of little value that can be sacrificed and lost with little impact—a short-term, “what’s in it for me” view. Something (such as territory) you want to acquire and make part of your nation is inherently valuable and worth careful thought and preservation—a much more cautious, reasoned, and long-term view. Pawns cannot “change color” while territory can be won over—a critical point that may rudely surprise the US.

China's actions toward Taiwan support this *wei qi* perspective. As in *wei qi* where you surround or isolate your opponent's stones (troops) to eventually absorb or neutralize them, Mainland China has been slowly isolating Taiwan. For more than two decades since 1979, China has kept Taiwan isolated in the international diplomatic circle. China has frustrated Taiwan's attempts to become a member of the United Nations and only allows Taiwan to participate in international organizations where statehood is not required (e.g., the International Olympic

270 East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations

Organization, the World Trade Organization, etc.). In 1998, the Chinese leaders even got President Clinton to endorse this approach.²⁴

While isolating Taiwan from non-Chinese influences, China has been steadily increasing its own influence. In recent years, China has promoted economic integration with Taiwan at an escalating rate. At the same time, China has also courted the Taiwan opposition parties in an attempt to isolate President Chen Shui-bian. Many former high-ranking Taiwan government officials have visited the mainland. In July 2001 even a group of recently retired Taiwan military general officers came to the mainland for a goodwill visit.

In its Olympic bid, China mobilized Taiwan popular support to co-host the games. Now that China has won the contest, in the next seven years, China would escalate its effort to implement this strategy. However, past US efforts to frustrate China's attempts to host the Olympic games handed the Chinese leaders the material to portray the United States as a common cultural adversary of the Chinese. In China's controlled media, which is widely available in Taiwan, US opposition to China's hosting the Olympics became US prejudice against all Chinese (Taiwan and mainland)—a situation that not only helped unite Taiwan with China, but also helped distance Taiwan from the United States.

Eventually China hopes to regain Taiwan without the use of force. This would be the biggest gain for China and perfectly fits a *wei qi* mindset. Gently pry the object of value away from your opponent so that you may gain it without damage or the loss of its value.

In Southeast Asia, China is also pursuing a *wei qi* strategy. China clearly sees that Southeast Asian nations prefer a peaceful Southeast Asian region free of great power confrontation. China's suggestion is to create a neutralized Southeast Asian region. This approach attempts to set a check on the US moves in the area.

China's relations with the Southeast Asian nations, however, are being hampered by its territorial disputes in the South China Sea with some of the Southeast Asian nations. China thus far has pursued a *wei qi* strategy to deal with each dispute separately rather than signing on to

24 President Clinton made a "Three No's" statement while in China. The three no's are no support for Taiwan independence, no support for one China, one Taiwan, and no support for Taiwan's membership in international bodies in which statehood is required.

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the code of conduct created by the ASEAN nations. Although no final
solution of the disputes is anywhere in sight, China has made some
progress with Vietnam and the Philippines. It also hopes that eventually
this *wei qi* approach of incremental, individual "wins" will ultimately
produce a *wei qi* "win"—settling the South China Sea disputes
predominately in its favor.

On the South Asia subcontinent, China is facing a much formidable
challenge—the rise of India. During the 2000 US presidential election
campaign, Condoleeza Rice made a public call at the Republican Party
convention to play India to counterbalance China. The fact of the matter
is that since Clinton's second term, the United States has been quietly
trying to improve its influence on India. President Clinton paid an
unprecedented visit to India in March 2000 and India's Prime Minister
A.B. Vajpayee visited Washington in September of the same year. More
recently, General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made
another unprecedented visit to India (July 2001).

China took note of these developments. Its strategy is to respond
with a *wei qi* "get there early" move (a *wei qi* terminology) and try to
improve its relations with India. While the US-China diplomatic
competition for India continues, China has found a new way to improve
relations with India: the cross-border trade. Made-in-China products are
now flooding Indian markets.

With respect to Central Asia and Russia, China has scored big points
by creating the Shanghai Five coalition. Originally called the Shanghai
Five and composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan. They added a new member, Uzbekistan, on June 15, 2001 and
changed its name to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This
organization combines security, economic, political, and cultural affairs
and is the only regional organization in the world that has no US
involvement. Although China and the rest of the group claim that this
organization is not against any outside powers, their hidden agenda is
rather obvious—it is their attempt, especially China's attempt—to get
out of the shadow of US dominance in world affairs.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States factor
into China's approach in central Asia. The suicide terrorists who
destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center and heavily
damaged the Pentagon were followers of the Islamic *jihad* leader Osama

272 *East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on US-Asian Strategic Relations*

bin Laden. Bin Laden operates terrorist training camps and orchestrates
worldwide terrorist attacks from bases in Afghanistan (central Asia).

From a *wei qi* perspective, the US war on terrorism and specifically
the full-scale military operations against bin Laden and the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan on China's northwestern borders present China
with both an opportunity and a threat. The opportunity lies in using the
American war as an excuse for China to "more firmly secure its area of
the board" by tightening control on the Muslims in China's Xinjiang
province. The threat is that US operations may give the United States an
opportunity to "place stones" in this region and establish a stronghold
presence. Increased US activity in the area, combined with the reshuffled
alliances between the US, Pakistan and India, could become a strategic
nightmare for the Chinese.

Elsewhere in Asia, China continues to follow *wei qi* strategies by
moving into "empty" areas. To the south of India, China has quietly
made some headway in one neglected place, Myanmar. In recent years,
China has significantly increased cross-border trade with Myanmar. The
Chinese are helping Myanmar to build a highway from the China-
Myanmar border across to Myanmar's Indian Ocean seashore. China
clearly sees the strategic value of its moves in Myanmar. In fact China has
already established its presence in the Indian Ocean by setting up a
military monitoring facility off the coast of Myanmar.²⁵

But China is not limiting its maneuvers to its immediate
neighborhood. China is "throwing stones" worldwide. Its efforts that
impact US interest include Chinese companies installing fiber optics to
improve Iraqi command-and-control capabilities against US planes in
Operation Southern Watch; ongoing relations with and support to
Cuba and Iran; increased relations with South American countries;
and perhaps most alarmingly a strong commitment to information
warfare. Uniquely suited to a *wei qi* perspective, information warfare is a
field where China can subtly but directly influence US interests and
significantly raise the cost of US involvement in areas of Chinese interest.

It appears that the United States and China have already entered a

25 A. B. Mahapatra, "Commanding the ocean," Indiareacts.com, May 16, 2001. Editorial, "Imagining a New Role for China," The IRRAWADDY Publishing Group, Interactive Edition, Vol. 8. No. 6 (June 2000).

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wei qi-like environment of multiple simultaneous interdependent engagements. Of note is that American may be dealing with China in chess-like confrontation style whereas the Chinese are responding with the *wei qi*-based strategies. Moreover, the US may be playing *wei qi* without the benefit of fully understanding the rules and the logic of this Asian game (See Figure 3).

From a *wei qi* perspective, some of the US dealings with China are questionable. China's most favored nation (MFN) status is a good example in point. In the years since the Tiananmen Square massacre, the United States, especially the Congress, has been trying to use MFN as a lever to improve China's behavior in human rights conduct, proliferation of arms to "rogue states," nuclear proliferation, and so on. From a *wei qi* perspective, the US appears to be poorly executing a condition called *ko*.

In *wei qi*, the rule of *ko* occurs when stones are played in a critical area of the board such that the act of removing one of your opponent's stones puts your own stone in atari. This results in your opponent's being able to take your stone, but in turn having his own stone in *atari*. Rather than have a game stopping in an "infinite loop," the rule of *ko* is invoked preventing your opponent from taking your stone on the turn immediately after you have taken his. In *wei qi* strategy, both players recognize the importance of this area of the board and desperately want to "win *ko*" and gain the area. Given *wei qi*'s complexity, however, winning the *ko* does not guarantee winning the game, so the cost of winning *ko* must be balanced against the threat to other areas. Each player must therefore threaten his opponent elsewhere so that he must respond instead of filling the intersection left open by your captured stone and winning the *ko*. To be effective, your *ko* threat to another group or place must be credible and specific. Your opponent must be able to weigh the cost and gain to decide whether he would concede to your threat.

In this example, US-China trade is the area of the board, the two sides trying to win MFN is the *ko*. China wants to win *ko* by gaining MFN. The US wants to win *ko* by getting improved Chinese human rights in exchange for MFN. The US threat to terminate MFN (to "win *ko*") with demands on China to improve its human rights conduct. However, the US call was not clear and specific enough to be effective. The US was unable to narrow the "improving human rights" into a

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seen clearly from the *wei qi* perspective. China won the trade area of the board without significant damage to its positions elsewhere.

From a *wei qi* viewpoint, the US needs to learn the art of long-term strategy, indirect moves, and relative victory. Instead of seeing pawns that do not change sides and can be sacrificed at will, the US should see valuable territories that deserve, indeed demand, careful, calculated, and integrated strategies. Well-intentioned efforts such as opposition to China's hosting of the Olympic games may play directly into Chinese leadership' plans. As evidenced by the internal propaganda on the US naval EP-3 collision, Chinese leadership portrayed America as hostile and arrogant to China.

## Conclusion

*Wei qi* concepts and strategies are well suited to today's globalized and interconnected international environment. Multiple engagements in various stages of development across numerous fields characterize modern geopolitics. Nations' power more and more rests on economic might and less on military strength.

In a world where market share is king and the Pacific Rim is the next emerging powerhouse, US leaders would be well served to learn the combative co-existence skills taught by the protracted, complex, and uniquely Asian game of *wei qi*. Adding *wei qi* skills to chess and poker abilities would help American leadership shape what happens instead of leaving them wondering what happened.

With respect to US-China relations, *wei qi* is even more relevant. With its huge size and 5,000 years of history China is too big and well entrenched to expect "total" victory. China is not the Soviet Union of yesterday and has the benefit of observing and learning from the Soviet experience. Moreover, China has been sufficiently alarmed by the putative US encirclement and is taking countermeasures. Given all of these, a chess- or poker-based approach alone is inadequate. Policies typically based on zero-sum and complete victory is ill conceived. The concepts of *wei qi* such as gradual encirclement, broad influence and mutual "wins" (including coexistence) must be added to our chess and poker-based toolbox.

# The Global Game

WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE QUARTERLY

Number 11 • Spring 2004 • www.theglobalgame.com

## In the next war, should we handle ball at line of scrimmage?

Surprising, to say the least, is to discover a series of articles on football in the *Armed Forces Journal International*. We do not read, however, how U.S. armed forces might apply knowledge of soccer cultures to community- and nation-building projects in areas in which they work. Rather, the focus of discussion is also fascinating: the obsession of U.S. military thinkers with gridiron football as an analogue for how the United States should fight—and win—wars. That is, the authors of the original study write (see our interview with **David Lai** and **Joel Cassman** on page 2), the U.S. military should move “like a giant football team” and consume and occupy territory with overwhelming force. The fascination with American football, which long has proven a training ground for U.S. military and political leaders (Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gerald Ford, etc.), extends now into the White House office of national security adviser **Condoleezza Rice**. Lai and Cassman open their study by quoting Rice's attraction to the similarities between American football and war, to “the use of strategy and the goal of taking territory.”

Would switching to a soccer mindset in military matters have practical effect? We do not possess such strategic expertise, although we agree that such conversations can be productive. “The United States needs to reorient its thinking about war,” Lai and Cassman write, “not as a series of discrete battles (‘plays’) marching down a field to victory, but rather a continuous struggle, part of the human condition that will require continual effort over many years.”

The authors' reconception has al-

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## Review Essay

RUNE BACKS | BALL PRODUCTIONS FOR THE FORBIDDEN TEAM

PEACEFUL COMBINATION: 'THE OTHER FINAL' AND 'THE FORBIDDEN TEAM'

We had intended to discuss *The Other Final* and *The Forbidden Team* separately, on their own merits, but much pulls them together. These are world-bridging documentaries demonstrating the integrative potential of football. Both build toward unlikely international friendlies, each featuring—seen from the Western point of view—an Asian side with Buddhist mystique. Both capture the ritualistic aspects of the sport unfettered by modern spoils.

Of the two projects, **Forbidden Team** (Ball Produc-

tions, directed by **Rasmus Dinesen** and **Arnold Krøigaard**, 2003) is the most overtly political and the most concerned with elucidating Buddhist principles. This is not surprising, given that much of the film transpires in misty Dharamsala, India, the refuge of the Dalai Lama since 1959, and focuses on the organizational efforts of the Tibetan national team. For the Tibetans, even the seemingly mundane task of obtaining travel documents becomes a politically charged activity; they must rely on India's graces for permission to reenter the country once they return from Copenhagen from a planned friendly with Greenland, and many are denied the proper approvals, despite team manager **Karma Ngodup**'s efforts at negotiating the New Delhi bureaucracy. Told that he will not be able to make the trip, goalkeeper **Thenzin Thinlay** breaks down in front of the cameras, realizing that his dream of playing for Tibet will remain unrealized.

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THE GLOBAL GAME: WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE • SPRING 2004 • PAGE 2

# Rethinking the American way of football—and war

"[O]ur recommendation for the United States is to develop a soccer strategy that uses finesse, patience and steady pressure to look for opportunities to dominate and eventually control terrorism.'

PHOTO ILLUSTRATION COPYRIGHT © 2004 THE GLOBAL GAME

The interview below follows from a discussion that began in the monthly *Armed Forces Journal* International. In a November 2003 article, "*Football vs. Soccer*," authors *Joel F. Cassman* and *David Lai* argue that U.S. military strategy could be better conceptualized through the metaphor of world football—that is, soccer—rather than through American gridiron-variety football.

In brief, they state that "football thinking" has dominated the U.S. military for far too long and that using soccer as a paradigm for "decentralized control, decentralized execution" would be far more effective in meeting threats posed, for example, by terrorist organizations.

One wonders if Cassman, a career Foreign Service officer, and Lai, a native of China and a professor at the U.S. Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, foresaw the coming storm. In March and April the journal has printed spirited rebuttals by authors relectant to jettison the American-football metaphor. "[B]efore the U.S. cashiers its 'football' approach to warfare for the more continental nuances and fluidity of

STATEMENT FROM DAVID LAI
AND JOEL CASSMAN

First of all, we are very delighted to see a debate about strategic thinking and U.S. military strategy taking place. We want to thank **John Roos**, editor of the *Armed Forces Journal*, for his insight in this debate and for carrying the articles in *AFJ*. We would like to see more responses to our article. The following are the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. Department of Defense, Department of State, or any other agency of the U.S. government.

> soccer, Americans should recall the qualities that endear us to football—qualities that keep the United States the top-ranked team" (C. J. Krisinger and Martin Hertz, "The Football Advantage," April 2004, p. 48).

**GG:** To make your own position clear, is the importance of the "football vs. soccer" distinction purely metaphorical, or is there practical significance on the ground when one takes a soccer versus a gridiron-football approach to armed conflict?

**DL & JC:** As demonstrated by the 9/11 Commission hearings, it is clear

that the U.S. government needs to undertake a fundamental paradigm shift in the way intelligence, military, diplomatic and law enforcement agencies interact and coordinate in order to face the asymmetric threats posed by the terrorists. Our position is that military strategy based on legacy thinking—summarized as the “football mind-set”—simply cannot adequately organize, train or equip our armed forces, law enforcement agencies or intelligence services to meet the current challenges posed by non-state adversaries. The football mind-set—with its limitations of centralized control and execution and compartmentalized functions of “players”—does not provide the speed of intelligence sharing, mobility and deployability called for in current defense planning. Our approach is that a new paradigm based upon soccer principles would address the problems in interagency coordination that the 9/11 Commission has identified.

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THE GLOBAL GAME: WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE • SPRING 2004 • PAGE 3

>> continued from page 2

There is a world of difference between American football and soccer in theory and practice. Our article has highlighted the main differences. Today's terrorists are trained to fight like soccer players. It is the way asymmetric warfare is being conducted today against the United States. We need to learn as much as possible about the terrorist strategic thinking—that is, how the terrorists are trying to neutralize the overwhelming U.S. military superiority.

As a football team, U.S. military has no peer competitor. It is superior for fighting against well-defined nation-state enemies. Yet it is ill-suited to fight against dispersed terrorists. Our article is a think piece. We expect military and diplomatic practitioners to learn from this think piece and work out their operational plans.

**GG:** What is your reaction to the two critiques of your article that Armed Forces Journal has published to date (Timothy Malcolm, "Football vs. Soccer: Gridiron Approach Is a Winner," March 2004; Krisinger and Hertz, "The Football Advantage: Soccer Can't Match Its Power and Flexibility," April 2004)? Specifically, Malcolm argues, "for the soccer-mentality fighters, loss of human life is not an issue at all, so they freely expend people to combat technology." Is this argument valid?

Krisinger and Hertz state that the soccer model lacks the ability to assess the "big picture" in wartime and, later, in a more metaphorical vein, that the objective of conflict should be massive victory: not a 1-0 result, but a "49-0 drubbing." Is this an example of a mentality that needs to change?

**DL & JC:** The two critiques show that our article struck a sensitive nerve among many readers of the *Armed Forces Journal* who adhere to legacy thinking of the football paradigm for the use of force. In our view, soccer strategy, as a model of decentralized control, decentralized execution, is a much better way to get the interagency coordination piece right in defending the United States against non-state adversaries. The

soccer strategy is simply more appropriate to organize, train and equip interagency anti-terrorist teams, which need flexibility, speed and actionable intelligence against potential threats. As stated by CIA Director George Tenet in his testimony to the 9/11 Commission: "It will take another five years to have the kind of clandestine service our country needs to combat al-Qaida and other terrorist threats."

We hope he reads our article and incorporates some soccer strategy and tactics in the changes to his organization.

We don't see Malcolm's point that soccer mind-set does not care about loss of life (players?). What will he say about football?

Removing the impediments to effective law enforcement/military/intelligence coordination will require a fundamental shift in the way government works. We need to match resources with our available means.

While the "football" mind-set would seek an elusive, absolute victory against terrorism ("the 49-0 drubbing" quoted by Krisinger and Hertz), our recommendation for the United States is to develop a soccer strategy that uses finesse, patience and steady pressure to look for opportunities to dominate and eventually control terrorism. It is a more realistic approach.

**GG:** No doubt these reactions in the Armed Forces Journal represent debates taking place elsewhere. What in the way you framed the question—"football vs. soccer"—has stirred such passion in the armed forces and attached communities?

**DL & JC:** Legacy thinkers, whether in science, economics or politics, often fiercely oppose fundamental paradigm shifts. Clearly our article stirred passions among persons who do not share the vision of a thorough transformation of the U.S. military to meet the new threats and continue to think in terms of conflicts with peer-competitor nation-states. The differing "corporate cultures" of the U.S. military services and law enforcement

>> go to page 4

Hanna Ljungberg (top) of Umeå IK and Victoria Svensson (below) of Djurgården/Alvsjö appear on stamps as part of the celebration of the Swedish Football Association's one-hundredth anniversary. It is not clear if this is the first time that women footballers have been recognized in philatelic circles, although The Global Game, in issue 7 (August 2003), pictured part of a stamp that China issued in 1986 including female figures playing tsu chu, the ancient ball game documented on frescoes from the Later Han dynasty. The Svensson and Ljungberg stamp issues form part of a series of six, which also includes former Sweden players Nils Liedholm and Thomas Ravelli and current stars Henrik Larsson of Celtic and Fredrik Ljungberg of Arsenal. All are available online at www.posten.se.

THE GLOBAL GAME: WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE • SPRING 2004 • PAGE 4

In Freetown, fighting to move forward

ADAM NADEL | POLARIS IMAGES

Team captain M'byo Conteh, center, trains during a storm in Freetown, Sierra Leone, preceding an August 2003 tour of the United Kingdom. This image, part of an extended documentary series on the amputee team from Sierra Leone, won first prize in the 2004 World Press Photo contest in the "sports features, singles" category. Photographer **Adam Nadel**, in notes to the series, writes that the team formed in 2001 among players wounded during a decade-long civil war. "All the players occupy their country's lowest financial strata, have little opportunity for employment, and have been stigmatized by society, thus further prohibiting economic and personal advancement. The tour's goal was to bring attention to their plight. The players also wanted victory on the pitch." Nadel's work, among other World Press winners, will be on view as part of a traveling exhibition that opened on April 26 in Amsterdam. It will visit the United States—the Corcoran Gallery of Art in Washington—from May 4–July 8.

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and intelligence agencies make coor-
dination difficult. We are proposing
fundamental changes that challenge
the long-held ways of doing things—
those barriers that prevent effective
intelligence sharing. Defenders of the
status quo may feel threatened by
these profound changes.

**GG:** From a personal point of view, how has soccer come to shape your thinking so that you thought to relate the game

to military doctrine? Do you have a long
history of watching, teaching or playing
soccer?

**DL & JC:** Joel Cassman has played both American football and soccer, and enjoys watching the professional and college games. He grew up in Nebraska and remains a lifelong fan of the Cornhuskers. During his Foreign Service career, Cassman lived in a variety of South American countries where soccer is the national passion, including Colombia, Ecuador, Chile

and Argentina. He is a huge fan of
soccer.

David Lai is from China where soccer is also a national game. Now a U.S. citizen, Lai is also an American football fan (his greatest passion is with the **John Elway** and **Mike Shanahan** dynasty). While we take pleasure with the games (watching and playing), we also connect these games to war and diplomacy. Sports, as we put

>> go to page 5

THE GLOBAL GAME: WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE • SPRING 2004 • PAGE 5

Choosing sides for Middle East peace

COPYRIGHT © 2002 FOOTBALL 4 PEACE PROJECT

Where intractable conflict exists, peace initiatives arise alongside. This is certainly true in Israel, where the "Football 4 Peace Project" enters its fourth year. Seven hundred children between the ages of 10 and 13, from seven Jewish and seven Arabic communities, are scheduled to take part this summer—one project of team-building and football instruction exclusively for girls. The University of Brighton in the U.K. works in association with the British Council in Israel, drawing on students from Brunel University, St. Mary's College Twickenham and Southampton University, who help lead the camps and gain teaching experience. "This was a project to see if it was feasible to use soccer coaching and social education to bring together young Muslim, Jewish, and Christian Israelis, with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and friendship across religious and ethnic boundaries," write Gary Stidder, John Sugden and John Lambert of the University of Brighton.

>> continued from page 4

it in our article, are reflections of and substitutes for conflict and war. They are civilized competitions.

**GG:** *Other than Sun Tzu, are there others whose concepts about battle might be related to soccer or to other field sports, or is not chess generally considered the most appropriate strategic analogue to military planning?*

**DL & JC:** Lacrosse, ice hockey and even tennis are sports that require a combination of surprise, finesse and speed. They could also be considered as strategic models for how to deal with terrorist and non-state actors. These sports could provide insights on the fundamental changes needed to restructure U.S. military, law enforcement, and intelligence forces to deploy, win and recover much more quickly than in the legacy football model that emphasizes power over all else. But we think that soccer offers the best strategic model for the asymmetric threats we face today due to its worldwide popularity.

Americans liken international relations to chess play. Not all Americans play chess, but many act under the influence of the chess mind-set. Former national security adviser Zbigniew K. Brzezinski wrote a book called *The Grand Chessboard*. He intentionally

uses the chess analogy to characterize international relations and discusses the future of geo-strategic relations in chess schemes. Dr. Lai has a monograph coming out of the Army War College Strategic Studies Institute in

April 2004 (see "Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi"). It is about a Chinese strategic analogue to military and diplomatic planning and tactics. It will be an eye-opener to many American military and political leaders, and hopefully, will make the debate more engaging.

**GG:** Would you add to your recommendations about soccer's relevance to war planning and to the paradigms governing U.S. armed forces a statement about understanding its cultural importance? Would not cultural

understandings about soccer be of use to troops abroad or to anyone serving the U.S. government in a foreign posting?

**DL & JC:** We agree that understanding soccer tactics and strategy would greatly assist U.S. policymakers and military/diplomatic/intelligence personnel both domestically and abroad. We need to "get into the mind" of our adversaries in order to understand and respond to the threats we currently face. In our view, legacy "football" thinking will not defeat terrorism—it will just multiply those threats and dissipate scarce U.S. resources. We need to fundamentally change our thinking to win the war on terror. American leaders will do themselves a great service by learning the strategic significance of soccer.

> 'Lacrosse, ice hockey and even tennis are sports that require a combination of surprise, finesse and speed. They could also be considered as strategic models for how to deal with terrorist[s]. . . . But we think that soccer offers the best strategic model for the asymmetric threats we face today due to its worldwide popularity.'

THE GLOBAL GAME: WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE • SPRING 2004 • PAGE 6

FARTLEK TRAINING 101

The following appeared as one among
several anniversary messages celebrat-
ing "A Word a Day," a website and,
now, book devoted to words, word ori-
gins and usage. The site, created by
Anu Garg, is perhaps best known for
sending daily vocabulary-building
e-mails to more than 550,000 people
in some 200 countries. More anniver-
sary messages appeared in AWADmail
Issue 116 (20 March).

On the occasion of the 10th an-
niversary of AWAD, I need to
thank you for this wonderful service.
It was AWAD that salvaged my daugh-
ter's sense of humor during a very
trying time. I thought you'd like to
know the effect that your words have
on people.

At the end of the first week in Aug-
gust, 2002, my 17-year-old daughter
was a freshman in college and expe-
riencing her first-ever college soccer
preseason camp, in which the soccer

team arrives at school three weeks
before the rest of the students arrive
so they can endure 21 days of condi-
tioning and practice three times a
day. Allison was away from home for
the first time, still experiencing pain
from a severe ankle sprain sustained
four weeks earlier, completely alone
in her dorm with no friends. She was
lonely, unhappy and sore. She had
no television, no car, and was on a
not-yet-open college campus in a
very small town.

Her computer was her only link
with the real world. My daughter
and I have always shared a love of
words, so as a going-to-college gift, I

had signed her up for AWAD to give
her something to look forward to
every day—and a reason to think of
me! During one of the practices, the
team was told to alternate sprinting-
jogging-walking across the field. On
their third time across, the coach
said, “If anyone can tell me what this
exercise is called, I’ll end this prac-
tice. Otherwise, you can do two
more times across.” At that Allison
said, “It’s a fartlek.”

He stared at her in disbelief and
said he couldn't believe she knew it.
She called home the minute she got
back from practice, and sounded
happy for the first time.

"Fartlek" was the word of the day
on 8/13/02. Thank you for making
my daughter smile.

—SARA BLAKE
Albany, New York

EXCERPTED FROM A.WORD.A DAY

HTTP://WORDSMITH.ORG/AWAD
USED BY PERMISSION

COPYRIGHT © 2003 KESSELSKRAMER

>> continued from page 1

Such moments make both movies dramatic, yet peace-
ful, viewing. At the start of *Forbidden Team* we are greeted
with the Buddhist sensibility. Tibetan forward **Sonam**
**Wangyal**, who seems mostly progressive in outlook, never-
theless keeps to the monks' instruction to "pray for all liv-
ing things." Later, we see another member of the Tibetan
entourage, in Denmark, move a snail from a concrete walk-
way into nearby underbrush. Conditioned to Western
modes of behavior—especially male behavior, and espe-
cially the behavior of male athletes—these scenes restore
faith in a different way of being. Even the visiting Western-
ers seem to be affected, either by the mountainous envi-
ronment or by the Tibetans' commitment. **Jens Espensen,**

the Danish coach imported to train the Tibetan side before
its friendly, laments during a weather delay concerning the
team's poor quality: "[S]ome of these players will make
fools of themselves if they play in Denmark for their na-
tional side. Tibet won't be taken seriously as a football na-
tion." After a pause, he adds, "It's interesting to reflect
upon as the rain pours down and the fog blankets northern
India."

At the same training site—actually a road, often occu-
pied by cows, that Espensen compares to “Flanders during
the First World War”—the film crew meets a Tibetan monk
equipped with sophisticated medical gear, with which he
scans a player’s swollen knee. The monk also holds forth,
somewhat inscrutably, on the correlations between ball
control and the purging of negative thoughts. There’s not
enough here with which to compose a systematic treatise,
but seekers get something to chew on. As **Johan Kramer,**
director of *The Other Final* (KesselsKramer, 2003), says in
*an interview*, all Buddhism would seem to require is to play
with passion and to keep one’s mind on the chosen path.
One lama said he did not approve of his students playing
football “because Buddhism calls for few desires and a sim-
ple life and I was afraid that playing the game would affect
their religious study and cause negative comments from so-
ciety” (“*Kicking Around on the Roof of the World*,” *China
Daily*, 8 December 2003). But **Lobsang Qoinpe** of the
Sera Monastery in Lhasa said he secured a promise from
one of the older students that football would not interrupt
their meditation. “We believe playing football is for physi-
cal exercise and entertainment and it will not change our

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THE GLOBAL GAME: WORLD FOOTBALL, MEDIA & CULTURE • SPRING 2004 • PAGE 8

Above: The Brazilian women's national team stretches before a friendly April 24 against the USA.

O Futebol

... Parafusar algum João

Na lateral

Não

Quando é fatal

Para avisar a finta enfim

Quando não é

Sim

No contrapé

Para avançar na vaga
geometria

O corredor

Na paralele do impossível,
minha nega

No sentimento diagonal

Do homen gol

Rasgando o chão

E costurando a linha

Parábola do homem comum

Roçando o céu / Um / Senhor
chapéu

Para delírio das gerais

No coliseu

Mas

Que rei sou eu

Para anular a natural
catimba

Do cantor

Paralisando esta canção
capenga, nega

Para captar o visual

De um chute a gol

E a emoção

Da idéia quando ginga...

COPYRIGHT © 1989 CHICO BUARQUE

Football

... To stitch up a defender

On the wing

No

When it's fatal

To warn and feint

When it isn't

Yes

On the other foot

To go forward in the free
geometry

The speedy player

In the parallel
of the impossible

In the perceived diagonal line

Of the target-man

Ripping the ball upfield

And sewing it back with neat
one-tws in the stadium

The parabola of the common
man

A flick over the defender's
head

Makes the crowd delirious

Clears the sky

But

What king am I

To cancel the natural
malice

Of the singer

Bringing this limping song
to a halt

To capture

A kick at goal

And the emotion

Of the idea when it swings...

TRANSLATION COPYRIGHT ©
2002 ALEX BELLOS

>> continued from page 1

ready drawn hostile fire from the publication's
interlocutors, who read in Lai and Cassman's
model too great a willingness to surrender nu-
merical superiority and to accept casualties
or—dare we suggest it?—the dreaded draw.

In truth, our own view is a cynical one. The photographs accompanying this *Armed Forces Journal* series—primarily stock military frames of camouflage-clad trainees plunging onshore, tanks bristling with short- and long-range canons or attack helicopters plowing up dust—should keep one aware that the debate has an unseemly side. We'd rather see these infantry men and women having kickabouts and unloading bags loaded with footballs from the armored-personnel carriers, showing their willingness to learn the local soccer culture rather than outflank enemy militias in a 4-4-2. Is it really a "continuous struggle," as Lai and Cassman say?

In the other major component to this issue, we extend the "war and peace" theme by writing of two peace-seeking football documentaries. At the same time, we extend the discussion from issue 10 on football and cinema. Notice that we have yet to review the 67-minute cinema piece, *David*, directed by *Sam Taylor-Wood* and on view at London's *National Portrait Gallery*. Do we have volunteers?

—JOHN TURNBULL

PUBLICATION DETAILS

*The Global Game* is published quarterly by JZ
Editing & Publishing, 629 2nd Ave., Decatur,
GA 30030, USA. All material is copyright © JZ

Editing & Publishing, unless otherwise noted. The publication is distributed at no cost on the World Wide Web at **theglobalgame.com**. E-mail

submissions and letters are welcome, with the
understanding that these materials may be
used, with attribution, in future issues. *The
Global Game* cannot provide remuneration for
submissions and does not guarantee that such
submissions will be acknowledged. The writer
or artist retains proprietary rights to material
on submission, but agrees to acknowledge *The
Global Game* for future use.

The author sincerely thanks Eric E. Fox, Lt Colonel USAF, for coining the title of this study—*Learning from the Stones*.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air Force, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by e-mail at Rita.Rummel@carlisle.army.mil

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-158-X

ii

FOREWORD

Most of the ideas that form of the foundation of American
defense policy and military strategy today were once new and
untested concepts at the far edge of strategic thought. It took
thinkers of vision and creativity to give them life and refine them to
the point they could be adopted by the defense community and used
for strategy and force development. This is a never ending process:
new strategic concepts constantly emerge, some fade away, a few
pass the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability and make it
into the mainstream.

To help with this process of identifying those new and untested
strategic concepts that merit further examination, the Strategic
Studies Institute is publishing a special series called "Advancing
Strategic Thought." This provides a venue--a safe haven--for
creative, innovative, and experimental thinking about national
security policy and military strategy.

The following study by David Lai is the inaugural publication
in the Advancing Strategic Thought Series. In it, Dr. Lai uses the
ancient game of Go as a metaphor for the Chinese approach to
strategy. He shows that this is very different than the linear method
that underlies American strategy. By better understanding Go,
Lai argues, American strategists could better understand Chinese
strategy.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to officer this unique
and creative analysis as part of the Advancing Strategic Thought
Series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DAVID LAI is on the faculty of the U.S. Air War College. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Colorado in 1997. Prior to his graduate study at the University of Colorado, Lai was a diplomat in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Lai's teaching and research interests are in international relations theory, war and peace studies, comparative foreign policy, Asian security affairs, and Chinese politics. He has published widely in his teaching and research subject areas and is currently writing on issues related to the China-Taiwan question, U.S.-Asian relations, and Chinese strategic thinking.

iv

SUMMARY

Most U.S. political and military leaders are aware of the difference
in strategic thinking and international behavior between the United
States and China. Many have also studied Sun Tzu's *Art of War* and
can recite the Chinese master strategist's famous saying: "Know
the enemy and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never
be in peril." However, few really understand the essence of the
difference.

The author introduces a new approach to learning about the
different ways of strategic thinking and interaction in Chinese
culture. It is through learning the Chinese board game called go. This
game is a living reflection of Chinese philosophy, culture, strategic
thinking, warfare, military tactics, and diplomatic bargaining. The
author also sheds light on the remarkable connection between go
and the strategic concepts in Sun Tzu's *Art of War*.

A modest claim is made in this writing that a little knowledge of
go will take U.S. leaders a long way in understanding the essence of
the Chinese way of war and diplomacy.

V

LEARNING FROM THE STONES:
A GO APPROACH TO MASTERING CHINA'S
STRATEGIC CONCEPT, SHI

In its July 2002 report to Congress, the China Security Review Commission states, "Chinese strategic thinking and military planning differ markedly from our own, underscoring the need to study such differences more carefully." The report also warns "the possibilities of miscalculation, miscommunication, and misunderstanding are high, given the substantial differences in each country's thinking and planning, and require far more attention from U.S. policymakers and the Congress."¹

Coincidentally the Department of Defense (DoD) also released its annual report on Chinese military power in July 2002. The Pentagon report calls attention to several knowledge gaps in the U.S. understanding of China's strategic thinking. Particularly, it mentions a concept, *shi*, putatively a strategy China uses to exploit the "strategic configuration of power" to its advantage and maximize its ability to preserve its national independence and develop its comprehensive national power. The Pentagon report notes:

> There is no Western equivalent to the concept of "shi." Chinese linguists explain it as "the alignment of forces," the "propensity of things," or the "potential born of disposition," that only a skilled strategist can exploit to ensure victory over a superior force. Similarly, only a sophisticated assessment by an adversary can recognize the potential exploitation of "shi."²

Indeed, *shi* is such an important concept that Sun Tzu, the Chinese grand master of military strategy, uses it for the title of a chapter in his *Art of War*, the world's oldest military treasure.³ In this chapter, Sun Tzu has discussed four key aspects of *shi*. First, it is the idea of *qi* and *zheng*. *Zheng* is the regular way of doing things, or in military terms, the regular order of battle. A commander deploys troops in regular (*zheng*) ways. However, the commander must mobilize his troops to engage the enemy in extraordinary (*qi*) ways. *Zheng* is, in essence, a given. It is open knowledge to friends and foes. Yet *qi* is a

1

variable and its variation inexhaustible. The second aspect of *shi* is
about creating an overwhelming force with irresistible unleashing
power (a grindstone against eggs, and the strike of a hawk at its prey).
The third aspect of *shi* is about developing a favorable situation with
great potential to achieve the political objectives. Finally, *shi* is about
taking and maintaining the initiative. As Sun Tzu puts it, "those
skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to
which he must conform."

These aspects of *shi* are also found in Sun Tzu's discussion of
other key concepts in the *Art of War* such as deception, stratagem,
intelligence, deterrence, and so on. Sun Tzu maintains that these
key concepts are vital to victory; one must study and master them
during peacetime; and it will be too late to consult experts (books or
specialists) when grave occasions arise. In essence, Sun Tzu suggests
that national leaders, political and military alike, make strategic
thinking and employment of tactical skills part of their second
nature.

How does one nurture this second nature? Learning and practice
are the ways to go. The author offers a new approach to learn
and practice Sun Tzu's strategic and operational ideas—through
learning the game of go.⁴ Go is of Chinese origin and is the world's
oldest board game, yet still remarkably popular and viable. It is
probably the most sophisticated game as well. This game bears
striking resemblance to the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. Its
concepts and tactics are living reflections of Chinese philosophy,
strategic thinking, stratagems, and tactical interactions. This game,
in turn, influences the way Chinese think and act. This work brings
to light another important feature of this game—its connection to the
Chinese military classics. The four key aspects of *shi* in Sun Tzu's *Art
of War* are also guiding principles of go.

In the American culture, many liken the American way of war
and diplomacy to the games of chess (power-based fight), poker
(bluffing and risk-taking), boxing (force on force), and American
football (in many ways, resembles the American war machine). The
game of go is different from chess, poker, boxing, and American
football in many key aspects. While the American way of war has its
strengths, a little knowledge and experience of the game of go will be

2

a valuable addition to the American political and military wisdom;
and it will take U.S. political and military leaders a long way in
understanding the Chinese way of war and diplomacy.

CHINESE WAY OF WAR AND DIPLOMACY

A popular saying in the Chinese diplomatic and defense
communities is about the Chinese way of war and diplomacy and
its difference to that of the West: Chinese place heavy emphasis
on strategy and stratagems whereas the West relies more on
overwhelming force and advanced capability. By many accounts,
this is an accurate characterization. The Chinese even go so far to call
China the birthplace of stratagems. After all, China has the world's
first comprehensive military classic, the *Art of War*, and the largest
number of ancient military writings. While these military writings
address many aspects of military affairs, they all emphasize strategy
and stratagems.

Among these military classics, Sun Tzu's *Art of War* is undoubtedly the epitome of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. In this work, Sun Tzu expounds on many key thoughts on warfare and the conduct of war. Three of them are of great significance: a broad conception of the art of war, an emphasis on strategy and stratagem, and a dialectic view on the way to fight.

In the *Art of War*, Sun Tzu treats the political, diplomatic, and
logistical preparation for war, war fighting, and the handling of the
aftermath of war as integral parts of the art of war. In this broad
framework, the art of war is, in essence, the process of diplomacy;
war fighting is only diplomacy by other means.

Sun Tzu's emphasis on strategy and stratagems follows from his
prudent view on war — it is a vital matter of the state, survival or ruin.
Sun Tzu is especially cautious on the cost of war — while waging war
can advance a state's interest, it can bring a state disaster as well. As
an old Chinese saying goes, when you kill 10,000 enemy soldiers,
you are likely to lose 3,000 lives as well. Hence, as Sun Tzu puts it, a
farsighted ruler thinks about warfare carefully; a good commander
exploits the art of war fully; if there is no benefit, advantage, or real
danger, a state must not set the war machine in motion. "Thus those

3

unable to understand the dangers inherent in employing troops
are equally unable to understand the advantageous ways of doing
so." Preserving the vital interest of a state without the use of force
therefore is the first principle in Sun Tzu's Art of War. To achieve
this goal, Sun Tzu places great emphasis on strategy and stratagems.
Thus in the Art of War, Sun Tzu treats warfare, from its preparation to
execution and termination as first and foremost a contest of wisdom.
Use of force is secondary. From Sun Tzu's perspective, a winning
side uses force to consolidate assured victory, whereas a losing side
uses force only to make a gamble or a desperate attempt for survival,
neither of which is a good strategy of war.

Adding complexity to the battle of wits is Sun Tzu's remarkably
sophisticated dialectic view on nature, warfare, strategy, and
stratagem. The Art of War is full of observations about the dialectic
nature of strategic concepts such as weak vs. strong, more vs. few,
defense vs. offense, regular vs. extraordinary (qi and zheng), direct vs.
indirect, division vs. unity, laboring vs. resting, advance vs. retreat,
far vs. near, and the relativity and mutual transformation of these
strategic situations. Sun Tzu's teaching is to exploit the opposite of
the enemy's strategy and action.

Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When
near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you
are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike
him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong,
avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and
encourage his arrogance. Keep him under stress and wear him down.
When he is united, divide him. Attack when he is unprepared; sally out
when he does not expect you.

Sun Tzu's dialectic views are in complete harmony with the
philosophies of Yin and Yang and Daoism. Sun Tzu and Lao Tzu,
the intellect of the Daoist School of thought, particularly liken the
character of the military and the way of war and diplomacy to the
flow of water. Water is perhaps the best example of the dialectic
nature of things. It has no constant shape. There is nothing softer
and weaker than water, yet nothing is more penetrating and capable
of attacking the hard and strong. The flow of water, carrying with it
the shi, can wash away anything standing in its way.

4

With over 2,000 years of influence from Sun Tzu's teaching, along with the influence of other significant philosophical and military writings, the Chinese are particularly comfortable with viewing war and diplomacy in comprehensive and dialectic ways and acting accordingly. Indeed, many of these observations have become proverbial components of the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. The most notable ones are *bing yi zha li* (war is based on deception), *shang-bing fa-mou* (supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy), *qi-zheng xiang-sheng* (mutual reproduction of regular and extraordinary forces and tactics), *chu-qi zhi-sheng* (win through unexpected moves), *yin-di zhi-sheng* (gain victory by varying one's strategy and tactics according to the enemy's situation), *yi-rou ke-gang* (use the soft and gentle to overcome the hard and strong), *bi-shi ji-xu* (stay clear of the enemy's main force and strike at his weak point), *yi-yu wei-zhi* (to make the devious route the most direct), *hou-fa zhi-ren* (fight back and gain the upper hand only after the enemy has initiated fighting), *sheng-dong ji-xi* (make a feint to the east but attack in the west), and so on. All of these special Chinese four-character proverbs are strategic and dialectic in nature. All bear some character of flowing water.

This Chinese way of war and diplomacy is in striking difference to the Western way of war from ancient Greece to the United States today. In the Western tradition, there is a heavy emphasis on the use of force; the art of war is largely limited to the battlefields; and the way to fight is force on force. As one observer puts it, "the Greeks developed what has been called the Western way of war—a collision of soldiers on an open plain in a magnificent display of courage, skill, physical prowess, honor, and fair play, and a concomitant repugnance for decoy, ambush, sneak attacks, and the involvement of noncombatants." With respect to stratagem, Alexander the Great said, when he was advised to launch a surprise night attack against the Persians:

> The policy which you are suggesting is one of bandits and thieves, the only purpose of which is deception. I cannot allow my glory always to be diminished by Darius' absence, or by narrow terrain, or by tricks of night. I am resolved to attack openly and by daylight. I choose to regret my good fortune rather than be ashamed of my victory.⁵

5

The Western way of war finds its comprehensive theoretical expressions in the Western military classics of Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini. It has also made its impressive footprints in battlefields throughout the ages and across the globe. Today, the American way of war has become a more popular term for the Western way of war. As described by military historian Russell F. Weigley, the American way of war uses massive power, excels in advanced technology, and pursues total victory.⁶ Backed by U.S. mighty military power, the American way of war has put on impressive shows in wars in Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan. In the most recent war on Iraq, the 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the United States used a "leaner force" (smaller in number as compared to the massive buildup against Iraq in 1991), yet faster in maneuver, armed with sharper precision firepower, and advanced with surprise attacks. Some observers call this revolution in the Western way of war.⁷ However, one can see that the fundamentals of the Western way of war remain unaltered. The revolution has only made it more powerful.

Comparing the Chinese and Western ways of war and diplomacy, one cannot but wonder which one is better. The Chinese believe their strategic traditions are superior to those of the West, both ethically and effectively. Chinese strategists tend to stress the significance of culture and end up stereotyping U.S. and Western ways of war.⁸ While a good answer to this question is difficult to qualify, one has to see that the West has dominated world politics with its superior comprehensive power over several centuries. The Chinese are aware of this fact. They also understand that without solid and credible capability, the play of strategy is empty. That is why the Chinese are so determined to develop China's comprehensive national power.

That said, one must see that while the Chinese are doing their homework (developing their capabilities), the West should spend some time learning about Chinese strategic thought and stratagem skills. As Sun Tzu puts it, "know your opponent and know yourself, in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."

6

LESSONS FROM THE GAME OF GO

In many ways, the game of *go* resembles the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. This game has its origin in China about 4,000 years ago and is the oldest board game in the world. The original Chinese name of this game is called *weiqi* (pronounced wei ch'i); literally, encircling territory, an essential component of a nation state. Two players compete for territories. The one who acquires more wins.

The game board is conceived to be the earth (back in ancient times, people believed the earth was flat and square). The board is square, representing stability (See Figure 1). The four corners represent the four seasons, indicating the cyclical change of time. The game pieces, the stones, are round, hence mobile. The spread of stones on the board reflect activities on earth. The shape of the stone engagements on the board is like the flow of water, an echo in Sun Tzu's view that the positioning of troops be likened to water: "as water varies its flow according to the fall of the land, a military varies its method of gaining victory according to the enemy situations." Sun Tzu also uses stones to describe military affairs: rolling boulders create *shi*.

The two players take turns to place black and white stones on the intersections (but not the open squares) of a 19 x 19 line matrix, one piece at a time. The black and white stones engage with one another in the game, exemplifying the concept of *yin* and *yang* and penetrating each other's territories as the flow of water.

Figure 1.

7

The stones have equal physical power (there is no almighty queen or little pawn as in chess), resembling the relatively equal physical size of individuals. Yet the importance and potential of the stones in the game are beyond imagination, resembling the boundless creativity of human individuals. Even a super computer today cannot map out their alternatives. Of note here is that in 1997, the IBM super computer Deep Blue finally defeated the chess grand master Garry Kasparov. Yet at the celebration ceremony, the designers of Deep Blue also admitted that they could not write a program to beat even a mediocre go player, not any time soon.

The game of *go* starts with the game board completely open. This special design allows for creative strategic thinking and interaction. By game rule, the one who plays Black goes first. Once played, the stones stay in place unless captured *and* removed by the opposing player. The game will become more complicated as the two players put more stones on the board (unlike chess, where the further the game goes, the fewer pieces on the board, hence simpler).

The basic objective of the game is to secure more space on the board (or more territory). The players do so by encircling more space on the board. The competition for more territory thus leads to invasion, engagement, confrontation, and war fighting. Sun Tzu's thoughts and the essential features of the Chinese way of war are all played out in the game. As the game unfolds, it becomes a war with multiple campaigns and battlefronts. Or in terms of international affairs, it is a competition between two nations over multiple interest areas.

Figure 2 shows the initial five moves of a game between two Chinese professional players.⁹ In the game of *go*, the first 50-some moves are called the opening-stage moves. At this point, players develop their strategic plans, adjusting constantly to the new situation created by the opponent's countermoves. Strategic moves, diplomatic posturing, and testing each other's waters are the hallmarks of the opening of the game. These early moves set the stage for the entire game, affecting the battles and campaigns 50 to a 100 moves later and throughout the game (long-term and calculated strategy is a key aspect of this game).

8

Figure 2.

Black 3 and 5 have created a firm command of the corner, securing a "theater" in the lower right side of the war plain. Working in concert with Black 1 at the top, the three black stones make a large claim of "sphere of influence" on the right side of the board.

White must respond to Black's claim. But at this early stage with only a few stones on the board, it is difficult to locate the "center of gravity" or "decisive point" (in Clausewitz and Jomini's terms, respectively). Sun Tzu's teaching to attack your opponent's strategy comes into play. In Figure 3 we see that White immediately placed stone 6 on the board to counter Black's posturing. White 6 instantly changed the *strategic outlook* on the board. The three white stones in turn have made a much larger claim of sphere of influence on the left-hand side. Both players have tried to develop an advantageous situation that is consistent with Sun Tzu's third aspect of *shi*.

Black did not let White's claim stay long. Black 7 struck deep into White's claimed sphere of influence. It went also as an attack on White's strategy (Sun Tzu's teaching), interrupting White's strategic outlook instantly (Figure 4).

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Black 7, however, is a very subtle move. It engages White 4 but does not pose a life-threatening situation to White. It is in White's claimed sphere of influence but keeps an arm's length from White 4. At its position, Black 7's strategic potentials are open to imagination. This is a move of long-term and calculated strategic interest.

Black 7 is a typical *go*-style engagement, one that serves to test White's intention (whether White wants to keep the corner or compete for the center). It is also characteristic of the Chinese calculated strategic thinking and behavior. One Chinese act in the 1960s is a good example. During the 1960s, China made much effort to solicit African support for its quest to become a member of the United Nations (UN) (African countries formed a large voting block at the UN General Assembly). One of the Chinese efforts was to build sports stadiums in many African countries. This seemingly unconnected act went a long way to help China get the African votes at the UN (China won the fight and became a UN member in 1971).

The thought and play on Black 7, however, is rather uncharacteristic of American mindset and behavior. Generally, Americans are more straightforward. When Americans take action, they expect immediate return. U.S. policy toward North Korea, for instance, emphasizes reciprocity. Because quick and desirable response from North Korea is difficult to obtain, U.S. decision makers often feel frustrated and tend to see their policy as a failure. South Korea, however, pursues a Sunshine policy toward the North. This policy takes its title from an Aesop fable about "The Sun and the Wind."¹⁰ It counts on long-term and gradual efforts to promote change in North Korea. Americans, not surprisingly, have no patience for such a policy. South Korean leaders in the last several years have been calling on the United States to show more patience and understanding towards their Sunshine policy. Unfortunately, both are in short supply on the American side.

A play like Black 7, which promises no immediate and concrete response from White, is difficult for Americans to make. But this game offers Americans the opportunity to nurture such sensibilities.

In Figure 5 we see that the two players have exchanged a few directly engaged moves. These are standard moves in a situation like this (in Sun Tzu's terms, they are regular engagements, *zheng* moves; and in *go*, they are, *joseki*).

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Figure 5.

Consistent with the subtle thought on Black 7, these early engagements are not for the kill, but a testing of the other's reaction and intention. White reinforced his hold on the corner. Black took an outward posturing. The two players exchanged messages: White went after tangible interest (territory) in the corner; Black created a *shi* to pursue interest in the center.

This is also a "live and let live" play. Both are satisfied with the outcome. There has been much writing in Japan about this kind of engagement. The Japanese compare this engagement to the competition for market share between firms.¹¹ In go, as well as in business, it is difficult to have all the gains and profits. Although there is a natural tendency for one to seek landslide victory, a player should guard against this temptation and be prepared to settle with a win-win outcome. Overly aggressive usually leads to disaster.

Black troops 7, 9, and 13 have formed a creative stronghold. This group of three has room to make a secure base along the left-hand side, making this group invincible and able to expand into the center (a good implementation of Sun Tzu's strategy: you must first make yourself invincible and then wait for the enemy to show signs of vulnerability and launch an attack from your secured base).

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Black 11 took the initiative to engage White 2 on the upper left-hand corner. Now the reader should look at the overall situation as shown in Figure 5 (looking at the whole picture is a typical Chinese way of assessment). Black's strategic design is clearly on the center and the right side of the war plain. The four groups of Black stones stand in dynamic echoing positions. A promising strategic design is taking shape. Yet it is still premature for Black to celebrate victory at this moment. Indeed, White is waiting for every turn to frustrate Black's strategy. The two white stones 2 and 12 are already eyeing the open area in the center. White 6 at the bottom occupies a critical strategic position. It keeps White's reach into the center wide open. This is a critical countermeasure White made at the early stage of the game against Black's strategic design. Its potential grows as the game unfolds.

At this point, one can say that the two players score fairly in their opening-stage strategic designs. Black has a secured corner on the lower right-hand side. White's countermeasure is a similar sized corner on the lower left-hand side. White 2 and 12 hold part of the upper left-hand corner. Black 11 is waiting for the right moment to penetrate into the corner. Therefore it is a shared claim on the upper left-hand side. On the upper right-hand corner, Black 1 occupies a key strategic position. However, there are wide-open areas on its two sides, making Black's claims vulnerable to challenge from White. During go games, players constantly make this kind of assessment till the end.

Figure 6 shows a well-matched engagement between the two players. White 14 has strengthened White 6's strategic claim at the bottom and reinforced White's determination to compete for the center (or to frustrate Black's strategy for the center). At the upper right-hand side theater, White has successfully made an invasion deep into Black's claimed area. Black fought back and effectively separated the white troops into two unconnected groups, while securing its hold on the corner. This is a perfect example of divide and rule, another key feature of go. The two white groups have room to maneuver and secure a foothold for survival locally. However, at this moment, they are still vulnerable to attacks from Black.

13

Figure 6.

Of note is another key feature in the game of go—the relativity of offense and defense. In Figure 6, while the three Black groups focus on attacking the two White groups, from the left, in the middle, and from the right, the three Black stones at the top (11, 17, and 27) are under a pincer attack from the White groups on their left and right. Who is attacking whom? It is a matter of perspective.

In Figure 7 we see the battle over the fate of the White groups at the top turned bloody. The line of Black troops 21, 43, 45, 53, 49, 39, and 57 threatens the survival of the White group. The battle hinges upon a fight over a *ko* at the intersection of M-14.

*Ko* is a unique feature. There is no equivalent in other board games. Here is how it comes about and affects the course of the game. The last move on the board is Black's 57. This play removed a White stone from the intersection M-14. By playing this move, Black 57 immediately finds itself surrounded tightly by the three White stones 42, 44, and 46. White can recapture the intersection by removing Black 57. However, this recapturing will then result in an endless play of capture and recapture between the two players. To avoid such a vicious circling play, *go* creates the concept of *ko* and sets a rule that White cannot immediately recapture Black 57, but must make a move elsewhere and give Black a chance to decide if 1) he wants to close the *ko* by filling the intersection with another

14

Figure 7.

black stone, or 2) if he wants to respond to White's move elsewhere, allowing White to recapture the *ko* at the next move. In fighting for the *ko*, a player's move elsewhere is always a threat to the opponent's other battle group or territory bigger or equal to the one under siege in the *ko*. As such, the opponent is compelled to respond to the threat, unwillingly allowing the player to recapture the *ko*. The threats are explicit and measurable. It is a fair bargaining game.

This aspect of *ko* can shed some light on the U.S. failure to get China to come to terms with the U.S. demand on changes in China's human rights conduct in order to have its most-favored nation (MFN) trade status continued during the 1990s. Three problems made the U.S. threat a failure. First, human rights conduct covers a wide range of issues. It was difficult to single out changes and relate the cost of failing to make such changes to the cost of losing MFN. Second, and making the all-encompassing concept of human rights conduct worse, the United States kept moving the goal post; that is, the changes it wanted China to make. Finally, a termination of MFN cut both ways—China and the United States were both losers if MFN was discontinued. The *ko* in this case was not well-established. The result was that the United States continued to make ill-defined threats; China continued to show defiance; and the MFN continued

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to be renewed every year.

The *ko* in Figure 7 is well-established. The stakes are clear and high for White. In winning the *ko*, Black would capture the entire White group on the upper side, turning the huge upper side into Black territory. Black could then easily expand this victory into the center. White would have to throw in the towel and concede defeat. For White, this *ko* is a life and death situation, a must-win fight.

In Figure 8 we see that White played 58 at the top, a move that threatens the two Black stones 51 and 27. Black responded with 59, keeping the two White stones under Black's control. If Black does not respond to White's threat (White 58) but chooses to close the *ko*, White will capture the two Black stones 51 and 27. This result will allow White to make a secured garrison at the upper side. If this scenario happens, the Black stones to the left of the White garrison, Black 11, 55, and 17, will be in danger. This is clearly not Black's intent to start this *ko*—Black wanted to profit from this bargaining.

After the exchange between 58 and 59, White turned around to recapture the *ko* by removing Black 57 and placing White 60 into the intersection. It is now Black's turn to make a move elsewhere to continue this *ko*. In Figure 9 we see that Black played 61 (close to the edge on the right). White did not respond to Black's threat to the White group on the right, but chose to eliminate the *ko* by playing 64 at the top to remove the two Black stones 45 and 53. In so doing, White has saved the White group at the top and gained a passage to the center through White stone 60 (resembling a canal). The White troops 42, 44, and 46 are now free of the death threat and are ready to fight in concert with the White troops at the bottom for the open area in the center.

Black followed through with the *ko* threat to remove White 32 by playing Black 65 (on the intersection S-11). In so doing, the line of Black troops 31, 37, 61, 65, and 35 has trapped the five White stones 36, 38, 18, 28, and 30 inside Black's encirclement (they are now prisoners inside Black's territory). White paid a heavy price for the *ko*. The loss of the White group on the right-hand side has become a huge expansion of Black's territory from the upper right corner to a large portion of the right-hand side. At the same time, White 34 has become helplessly isolated. This situation has a remarkable resemblance to the China-Taiwan case. The *go* concepts can inform us how the mainland Chinese view the Taiwan situation.

16

From the go perspective, one should not try to rescue the lone stone 34. There is not enough space for White to build a survivable garrison around White 34. But if White sends a rescue team to reconnect with 34, Black will attack this rescue team from both sides. In doing so, Black will acquire more territory through the offense. The most sensible strategy therefore is to play 34 as a bargaining chip in another ko situation.

This is exactly what the mainland Chinese believe the United States has been doing with Taiwan throughout the years—it is a leverage to hold against China from time to time. This is also what China tells Taiwan: you are only a bargaining chip on a go board (or a pawn in the U.S. chessboard).

However, Taiwan has also been a liability for the United States—it carries the risk of involving the United States in an armed conflict with mainland China over the fate of Taiwan. From the go perspective, many Chinese would ridicule Americans for their lack of understanding of this geo-strategic situation between Taiwan and mainland China—it is a lone stone against a huge mass. The United States, believing in its ability to project power in the Western Pacific, nevertheless dismisses China's view. However, the cost of defending Taiwan must not be underestimated. The go perspective provides a theoretical and strategic insight into the costs.

Returning to the game here, we see that Black took advantage of the huge shi from the upper side, and working in concert with the stronghold of Black 3 and 5 at the bottom, launched a campaign to expand into the center from the right.

The closure of the ko also concluded the first mid-game battle. Black was a clear winner in this first fight. In an attempt to turn this disadvantage around, White made an advance at the bottom with White 66. This move has expanded White's territory at the bottom. It also posed a threat to the Black stronghold of 3 and 5. This move also signified the start of the second mid-game battle in a separate theater.

Black answered White's threat by reinforcing the stronghold and building a "wall" with stones 3, 77, 5, 73, 79, 87, and 89. Through these efforts, Black has effectively consolidated the control on the entire right-hand side. The two White stones 34 and 82 have become captives.

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White, however, was able to reinforce the hold at the bottom part (with white stones 66, 70, 88, and 6 lining up a border). During the engagement, the two players have both separated a portion of the other's troops from the main forces (divide and rule). The three baseless White 84, 86, and 90 are trying to reconnect with the White group in the middle. The Black troops 71, 85, 69, and 91, however, are in a different mindset. They worked in concert with the Black troops 87 and 89 to chase the fleeing White troops. This is clearly an example of "the best defense is offense." While attacking the fleeing White group, Black 91 also occupies a key strategic position to reconnect with the Black group on the left if it is under attack. This situation shows a key aspect of warfare—the *yin* and *yang* and relativity of defense and offense.

With Black 91 on the board, the second mid-game battle came to a truce. The two players then turned to the left side and started another mid-game battle. As shown in Figure 10, the two opponents have started another *ko* battle. This *ko* holds the fate of the two groups, Black 16, 95, and 97 on one side and White 92, 96, and 98 on the other. From *go* players' experience, whoever wins this *ko* wins the game.

Figure 10.

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In Figure 11 we see that Black has captured a fairly large portion of the center. Black has also captured the fleeing White 84, 86, and 90 and three extra White stones 72, 78, and 80 (those White stones have been removed, leaving the vacated intersections in Black's territory (L-9, L-8, M-8, N-7, N-6, and O-7). Black has obviously gotten more territory out of the fight over the *ko*.

Figure 11.

In Figure 12, those "dead" stones are removed to provide a better view of the settled territories. The borders are all sealed. These irregular lines of border happen to look like real-world national borders. We see that Black has the entire right-hand side territory. This black territory then expands into the center area. There is a self-sustained black territory at the top. The sum of these areas is Black's hard-earned territory (the borders and open space inside inclusive.)

White has the left-hand side, but it is narrower than Black's territory on the right. White also has about two-thirds of the bottom side. In addition, White has a self-sustained group on the upper middle part.

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Figure 12.

There are two ways to count the points. One is the Japanese way that counts the open intersections inside one's secured territory. The other is the Chinese way of counting all the intersections, occupied and open. The two ways of counting come to the same conclusion. The one who has more points (intersections) wins. In this game, Black won by having 3 3/4 intersections more than White has.

The presentation in this section gives the reader a taste of go. It really shows how patient the Chinese are in playing strategic games.

This discussion of the game is focused on the strategic level of engagements. Go is very rich in tactical operations as well. Studying and practicing the tactics in local life-and-death situations are equally challenging in go. There are many books about go in English at all levels nowadays. Interested readers should check out the *American Go Association* web site. You can find the most basic books about go and learn about the latest development in go-related activities.¹²

## SHI IN ACTION

China is home to Sun Tzu. There is also a long tradition of strategic thinking in China. However, this cultural heritage was laid

21

aside during the early turbulent years of the People's Republic. Since
China embarked on the mission of national development in 1978,
there has been a revival of interest in Sun Tzu and other classical
Chinese military thoughts in China. The proliferation of publications
in China on studies of classical Chinese military thought and
reprints of the original military classics is a good testimony.¹³ There
is also ample indication that China is following the wisdom of its
classical strategic thought to make impressive progress in pursuing
its national objectives, particularly the objectives to develop China
and retake Taiwan. A noted success in China's strategy is its efforts
in creating the *shi* for its missions.

Developing the *Shi* to Secure a Home Base.

In 1978, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders launched the now acclaimed economic reform in China. The Chinese leaders were determined to turn China into a true great power in 50 to 100 years. To achieve this goal, China needs a favorable internal and external environment.

Internally, Chinese leaders follow the model of economic
development under authoritarian rule. Externally, they take a three-
pronged strategy to create a favorable environment for China's
development. First and foremost, Chinese leaders seek a constructive
relationship with the United States. Second, they mend fences with
China's neighboring countries. Third, they aggressively integrate
China into the global community.

In all fairness, this strategy has born fruit. On the home front,
economic reform has reached all corners of China. Chinese
government has loosened control on pricing, labor market, housing,
and many other areas. A flourishing market economy has taken hold
in China. Economic reform has also come to China's financial and
banking industries. With its entry to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as a catalyst for bigger changes, China is expected to
accelerate its economic reform and become completely integrated
into the world market economy.

On the external front, one cannot dismiss China's three-pronged
efforts. In the last 10 years, China has gradually built a "ring of
friends" around its borders. It has normalized relations with Russia

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(1991), the Central Asia former Soviet republics (1992), South Korea (1992), Laos (1989), Indonesia (1990), Brunei (1991), Vietnam (1991), and Singapore (1990).

China has also settled border disputes with Laos (complete), Vietnam (all except for the South China Sea islands), Russia (97 percent borders delimited), the three Central Asian former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, and Tajikistan (all complete), and stabilized border disputes with India and Bhutan.

Through these internal and external efforts, China has secured a firm home base, and a sound strategic *shi* to pursue its national objectives.

## Developing the *Shi* on Taiwan.

Recovering Taiwan is China's historical mission. China's objective is to take Taiwan whole and intact. To achieve this goal, China tries to follow Sun Tzu's teaching to win without resorting to force. Developing the *shi* thus is a critical strategy. This strategy has three components. The first is economic and social integration; the second is to establish a credible deterrence against attempts inside Taiwan to make a desperate run for independence; and the third is to hold the United States committed to the one-China policy.

By many accounts, China has been successful in executing this strategy. Perhaps the biggest achievement of this strategy is in developing the *shi* through the cross-Strait economic and social integration. As the numbers in Table 1 show, since the late 1980s, cross-Strait trade has a cumulative amount of $302.8 billion. According to another Taiwan government statistic, the share of annual cross-Strait trade in Taiwan's total trade has grown from less than 1 percent in 1983 to 15.39 percent in 2002.¹⁴

China has also attracted a large amount of capital investment from Taiwan. The cumulative sum is over $30 billion from 1991 to 2003. It is 44.53 percent of Taiwan's total foreign investment over this period.

Between 1988 and 2003, over 28 million Taiwan visitor entries to the mainland have been recorded. Many Taiwan people, most of them business executives, high-tech gurus, and people with high-demand skills, have relocated to the mainland. Shanghai alone has housed over 50,000.

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<table><thead><tr><th>Item</th><th>Current Month</th><th>Year to Date</th><th>Cumulative</th><th>Source</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>The Cross-Strait Indirect Trade</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Total (U.S.$100 million)</td><td>May 2003<br>35.4 (12.8%)</td><td>Jan-May 2003<br>172.9 (25.7%)</td><td>1987-May 2003<br>3,028.0</td><td>Hong Kong</td></tr><tr><td>Exports</td><td>27.1 (8.4%)</td><td>132.8 (22.1%)</td><td>2,527.0</td><td>Customs,</td></tr><tr><td>Imports</td><td>8.3 (30.1%)</td><td>40.1 (39.4%)</td><td>501.0</td><td>Ministry of<br>Finance (ROC)</td></tr><tr><td>Trade Balance</td><td>18.8 (0.9%)</td><td>92.7 (15.9%)</td><td>2,026.0</td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Indirect Investment to Mainland</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Cases</td><td>May 2003<br>138 (1.0%)</td><td>Jan-May 2003<br>797 (56.0%)</td><td>1991-May 2003<br>30,075*</td><td>Investment<br>Commission</td></tr><tr><td>Amount (U.S.$100 million)</td><td>3.17 (4.0%)</td><td>17.34 (44.0%)</td><td>313.1*</td><td>Ministry of<br>Economic<br>Affairs (ROC)</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Reference Statistics by Mainland</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Projects</td><td></td><td>Jan-Mar 2003<br>1,040</td><td>1979-Mar 2003<br>56,731</td><td>Ministry of<br>Foreign Trade<br>and Economic<br>Cooperation<br>(PRC)</td></tr><tr><td>Contracted Amount<br>(U.S. $100 million)</td><td></td><td>16.9</td><td>631.6</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Realized Amount<br>(U.S.$100 million)</td><td></td><td>8.9</td><td>340.0</td><td></td></tr><tr><td><strong>Exchange of Visits</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Taiwan Visitors Arrivals in<br>Mainland (1,000 persons)</td><td>Apr 2003<br>108.5 (-68.4%)</td><td>Jan-Apr 2003<br>909.8 (-22.0%)</td><td>1988-Apr 2003<br>28,144.4</td><td>China Monthly<br>Statistics</td></tr><tr><td>Mainland People Visit</td><td>May 2003<br>3,654 (-71.0%)</td><td>Jan-May 2003<br>55,544 (-12.3%)</td><td>1988-May 2003<br>914,600</td><td>Bureau of<br>Immigration,<br>Ministry of the<br>Interior (ROC)</td></tr></tbody></table>

Notes: 1. Numbers in () stand for growth rate compared within the same period of the last year.

2. "Taiwan People Visit Mainland" monthly figures are not available since May 2000.

The statistics are replaced by "Taiwan Visitors Arrivals in Mainland" which is from China Monthly Statistics published by China Statistical Information and Consulting Co. Ltd. (Beijing).

Source: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, August 7, 2003.

Table 1. Preliminary Statistics of Cross-Strait Economic Relations, May 2003.

Many factories have also been relocated from Taiwan to the mainland. China has become such a "giant sucking ground" for Taiwan's business, capital, and talented people that Japan's "Mr. Strategy" and business guru, Kenichi Ohmae, predicts that by 2005 Taiwan will have to submit to unification with China. Or, if Taiwan refuses to accept this fate, it will become "Taiwan passing, Taiwan nothing!"¹⁵

Ohmae's call may sound too demanding. The rapid and large-scale cross-Strait economic and social integration surely suggests a virtual unification is possible in 10 years.

On the military front, China has gradually built up several rings of missiles along its eastern seaboard since the early 1990s. These missiles pose a credible threat to Taiwan. In addition, China has also strengthened its overall air and naval capabilities. This military *shi*

24

has reinforced China's resolve to keep Taiwan in the fold.

On the U.S. front, China has strengthened ties with the United States. The U.S.-China relationship was at low ebb when President Bush took office. It hit an all time low when the two countries found themselves in a standoff over a military aircraft collision on April 1, 2001 (the U.S. EP-3 spy plane and Chinese J-8 fighter jet collision incident over the South China Sea). Later in April 2001, following the release of the 24 EP-3 crew members from China, President Bush authorized a large sale of weapons to Taiwan and promised to "do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend themselves."¹⁶ Chinese leaders, however, made much effort to reverse the downward trend in the U.S.-China relations afterwards. By July of 2001, China had Secretary of State Colin Powell visit China. Powell was all smiles in Beijing, calling China a friend. Then came the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Chinese leaders jumped on the opportunity to cooperate with the United States in its war against terrorism. With its hands full with heavy involvements in the Middle East and North Korea, the United States clearly values the U.S.-China ties more than distractions from Taiwan. A *shi* is clearly established in China's favor.

Against this backdrop, Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian started to push aggressively for two referendums in Taiwan, one on the issue of a nuclear power plant, and the other on Taiwan's quest to become an observer to the World Health Organization. Although many see these proposed referendums as Chen's attempt to create issues for his reelection in March 2004, the real purpose for is Chen's agenda to have a referendum for Taiwan's formal independence.

This hidden agenda has the potential to trigger an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. In the past, China would have taken up the issue with Chen Shui-bian and intensify its threat to use force against Taiwan's attempts. But this time China was looking on with folded arms. The United States was more concerned with this issue. An armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait would involve the United States because of its commitment to Taiwan's defense through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. However, the United States had no desire whatsoever to have an armed conflict with China over Taiwan at this time. Thus as a precaution, U.S. representative to Taiwan Doug Paal (a *de facto* ambassador) expressed concern to Chen. The

25

latter unwillingly had reassured the United States that a referendum
on Taiwan independence would not come up in the upcoming
presidential election. China did not have to fire missiles this time. Its
*shi* was working.

Chen, however, did not give up his efforts. As Taiwan's
presidential election campaigns intensified during the final months
of 2003, Chen proposed to hold two more referendums on the
election day in March 2004 (one "defensive referendum" against
China's missile threat and another referendum to amend Taiwan's
constitution). Chen's controversial efforts made the United States
more concerned. Thus at a joint news conference with the visiting
Chinese premier at the White House on December 9, 2003, President
George W. Bush bluntly stated that the United States opposed
Taiwan's attempt to unilaterally change the status quo of the Taiwan
Strait.

Having President Bush take such a clear stand was clearly a
score on the Chinese side. However, the Chinese would not just sit
back and relax. They continued to maintain the *shi* over the Taiwan
issue. As explained by People's Liberation Army (PLA) Lieutenant
General, Li Jijun:

The extensive and profound Chinese culture has nurtured an oriental military science that is unique and has lasting influence. Ancient Chinese military science was one that exalted resourcefulness, stratagem and prudence in waging any war or resorting force. This military culture based on reflecting on war, having evolved from war's primitive form of fighting each other, later reached the stage where a strategist is not a militarist. It showed the beauty of philosophic wisdom. Because of this culture, unification war planners, while structuring their strategies, would follow the principle that, "in drawing up a military strategy, importance should be given to stratagem." The objective was "complete" victory without having to resort to force. To this end, they would comprehensively analyze the strategic situation, carefully structure their strategic policies, set proper strategic objectives, correctly choose their strategic course, specifically plan their strategic moves, and properly employ strategic means.¹⁷

STONES FROM OTHER HILLS

U.S. political and military leaders are familiar with games such
as chess, poker, boxing, and American football. These games to a

26

large extent reflect and in turn influence American culture, strategic thinking, and the American way of war. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's thought on *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives* is a prime example.¹⁸

The common feature of these favorite American games is the centrality of physical force and its application. While these games and the American way of war have much strength, they also have weaknesses. The strong aspect is the American and the West's edge on capability. The weak point is the lack of sophisticated skill on strategy and stratagem. The Chinese way of war and the game of *go* have much to offer in helping the Americans overcome their shortcomings. As a Chinese proverb goes, stones from other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one. American leaders will do themselves a great service in learning about *go* and the Chinese way of war. The following discussion highlights the key features of the American favorite games, their influence on the American way of war, and their differences to *go* and the Chinese way of war.

Chess is a game of power-based competition. Each piece on the chessboard carries different weight—a hierarchy of power and rank reflecting a political and military entity. The outcome of the game can be predicted by counting the pieces and their strength on the board. *Go* is a skill-based game. In the game of *go*, each piece has the same tangible power, but their intangible and potential power, based on the near-infinite combinations and alternative ways of engagement, is situational and limitless. The stones on the board work collectively and always in concert with one another to fight battles. It is difficult to predict victory with a casual look at the individual pieces.

Under the influence of chess with heavy emphasis on capability, Americans tend to pay more attention to the balance of military power in conflict situations. Many conclusions also come from the analysis of military balance. The analysis of military balance across the Taiwan Strait is a prime example. Repeated studies and reports show that China does not currently have sufficient military power to launch an invasion on Taiwan. Some would then dismiss China's threat on Taiwan and encourage Taiwan to pursue its agenda.

Another difference between chess and *go* is in their different designs for committing fighting resources. In chess, all the fighting

27

resources are lined up at the beginning of the war. The two players eliminate each other's resources (pieces) to death. In *go*, the two players start with the battlefields open and then deploy troops in the theaters at the early stage of the game. They initiate a fight here and there at the mid-game stage, constantly making decisions as to where to commit troops and how much more resources (more stones) for such commitments. If they sense a losing battle or that a particular operation is not feasible, they will stop committing more resources there (recall the discussion on the Taiwan example resembling an isolated stone in Figure 11). Thus a chess mindset-guided military analysis focuses on what one can achieve given limited resources at the moment, whereas a *go* player thinks about what he can bring to bear with additional resources.

The philosophy behind chess is to win decisively. For the winner, victory is absolute, as is defeat for the loser. In chess, both players have the same clear and overriding objective—capturing the opposing king—and accomplish this objective by decimating whatever opposing forces are standing in the way. In *go*, total victory usually happens between two mismatched players. That kind of victory, as Sun Tzu puts it, is not the pinnacle of excellence. In a *go* game between two well-matched players, the margin between win and lose is usually very small, often decided by only a few points. The philosophy behind *go* therefore is to compete for relative gain rather than seeking complete annihilation of the opponent forces. It is dangerous to play *go* with the chess mindset. One can become overly aggressive so that he will stretch his force thin and expose his vulnerable parts in the battlefields.

In chess, the focus is on the king. All the moves are geared toward checking the king. In designs to capture the king, chess players always try to eliminate the powerful pieces such as the queen, knight, castle, and bishop. Chess players typically focus on these powerful military units as the "center of gravity" and "decisive point" (in Clausewitz and Jomini's terms). Naturally, chess players are single-minded. In *go*, it is a war with multiple campaigns and battlefields. There is no one single focus on the board. A *go* player must always keep the whole situation in mind. Attacking the opponent's strategy therefore is much more appropriate in *go*. As a prolonged and complex game, *go* players focus on building or creating rather than chess players'

28

emphases on removal and destruction.

Another favorite American game is poker. This game also has
strong influence on U.S. foreign policy conduct. The key features of
poker are risk-taking and bluffing. Poker players have no control
over what appears in their hands. Risk-taking and bluffing therefore
are the best strategies to make the most out of the cards in hand.
Typical manifestations of poker-type foreign policy are threats
and ultimatums. Most of these acts are short-term and gambling
approaches. While poker-like international interactions do exist,
calculated and long-term-based strategies to achieve foreign policy
goals are clearly more important. Go is probably the most calculated
game in the world. When players put their troops (stones) in
uncertain situations, they do so by placing their troops in places
where they will have a good fighting strategy to make a foothold
locally or reconnect with the home base. Testing water rather than
bluffing is the way of go. Go players set up negotiation as in the case
of ko but do not utilize a risky ultimatum as in poker.¹⁹

Still another sport that resembles the U.S. use of force is boxing.
Boxing is a fight of hard force on force. Boxers meet incoming
punches with punches. The more powerful boxer wins the fight.
The Chinese counterpart to boxing is *Taiji Quan* (Tai Chi Chuan).
Taiji practitioners never meet incoming hits with forceful returns.
Instead, they always try to deflect incoming hits and then return
with a seemingly soft but powerful push. Taiji is perhaps the best
example of the Chinese philosophy of *yi-rou ke-gang* (use the soft and
gentle to overcome the hard and strong). It is in complete harmony
with the philosophies behind go and Sun Tzu's *Art of War*.

Finally, American football also embodies the U.S. use of force.
Football is a game of intense violence. It has powerful players on
the field. Forceful collision known as the tackling is the hallmark
of football plays. The running back's quick hitter charging into the
line of defense is perhaps the best example of the concentration
of forces and the philosophy of force on force competition. U.S.
armed forces and their emphasis on the use of overwhelming force
greatly resemble American football. As National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice puts it, American football is deeply embedded
in the American psyche of competition; it is the U.S. national
pastime and an important American institution. Dr. Rice has made

29

repeated remarks that she would like to become the commissioner of the National Football League after her service at the National Security Council.²⁰ Indeed, U.S. military has incorporated football terminology in its combat language and vice versa. Football has its "blitz," "trenches," and "bombs," while the U.S. military named some of its tactics in the Persian Gulf War as the "Hail Mary maneuver" and "Operation LINEBACKER" in Vietnam. In the most recent war on Iraq (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), U.S. commanders used the term "red zone operation" to describe their advance into downtown Baghdad. In Lieutenant General David McKiernan's words, "I came up with the term, 'the red zone,' kind of based on that analogy that, you know, you get inside the 20 yard line and maybe it gets a little harder to move the ball. And you got to pound it out a little bit then."²¹

American football has no "peer competitor." Although the National Football League has tried for years to promote football overseas by having some pre-season games in foreign soils, no other country has been able to adopt this sport. American football does have a counterpart. It is soccer, which has a completely different paradigm of war that relies on skills and maneuvers rather than force on force play. Soccer is also a national game of China. In fact, soccer-like sport also has a long history in China. In many ways, soccer is also a paradigm of Sun Tzu's way of war. It does not seek annihilation of the opponent. Instead, it uses strategies and tactics of surprise, finesse, and continual movement of the ball in attempts to create strategic opportunities for goals.

Another key feature in American football is its clear division between offense and defense. When the team is on offense, the offense lineup is in charge. When the opponents are on the offense, the defense lineup comes in to play. The strategies and plays in offense and defense are completely different. In soccer, go, and Sun Tzu's teaching, offense and defense are a dialectic whole. Soccer players constantly switch between offense and defense. In the game of go, there is no clear-cut frontline—defense or offense is relative; it is a matter of perspective. Operating in the American football mindset, one is single-minded.²²

The above comparisons and the analysis in this monograph drive home a point: a clear difference exists between the Chinese

30

and American (Western) ways of war and diplomacy. The question
is whether the Chinese way is worth learning. After all, as a popular
saying in the West goes, with superior force, a lousy general can
win a war. As long as the United States and the West maintain their
capability edge, they have nothing to worry about. The answer from
this author, as this monograph has built the case, is a resounding
yes. This answer stands on three good reasons (and can certainly
have more). First, ever since warfare came into being part of human
affairs, it has been a contest of physical force as well as wits. In the
evolution of warfare, the battle of wits has become more important
than the actual use of force to achieve war aims (political goals).
Today, we call the battle of wits, "strategy." It is about the ways to
use force. The United States is the most powerful country in force
capability terms, but less so in resourcefulness. The Chinese way of
war and diplomacy can be a great supplement to American power. If
one looks at American power as the *yang* (the upfront force) and the
Chinese stratagems as the *yin* (the behind-the-scene wits), it is only
natural that the two should complement each other. The Chinese are
determined to improve their capabilities; Americans should improve
their strategies and stratagems.

Second, as Sun Tzu suggests, use of force is only diplomacy by
other means; if we only focus on the use of force, we miss a big part
of diplomacy. American and Western conception of strategy, in the
words of Clausewitz, is "the use of engagement for the object of
the war."²³ This focus is inadequate. International politics contains
war as well as nonwar interactions. The Chinese way of war and
diplomacy will help the United States strengthen its leadership in
the whole process of diplomacy.

Finally, it pays to learn about your opponents. The world knows
the United States is the most powerful nation in the history of
mankind. Other nations also understand that confronting the United
States directly is an invitation to defeat and humiliation. How can
weaker countries deal with the United States? They will resort to
"unrestricted warfare" strategies and tactics. The Chinese way of
war and diplomacy is about strategy and stratagems; it is about how
one can win from the position of the weak. The two Chinese senior
colonels who wrote the controversial book, *Unrestricted Warfare*,

31

followed Sun Tzu's teaching closely to develop their thoughts in this book.²⁴ Terrorists and weaker powers can employ those unconventional approaches to frustrate the superpower. They can also employ the *go*, *Taiji*, and soccer strategies to maneuver with the United States. Americans will do themselves a great service to follow Sun Tzu's dictum to learn about the Chinese way of war and diplomacy, and as this writing suggests, learning from the stones is the way to go.

ENDNOTES

1. China Security Review Commission, *Report to the Congress of the United States*, July 2002.

2. Secretary of Defense. *Annual Report to the Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, July 2002, p. 6. Pentagon's 2003 report reiterates this observation.

3. The international publishing community is now using the *pinyin* spelling system. This article also follows this new practice. However, I keep the traditional spelling of Sun Tzu in this writing. The quotes from Sun Tzu's *Art of War* are from Samuel B. Griffith's translation, Oxford University Press, 1963, unless footnoted otherwise.

4. The Chinese name for *go* is *weiqi*, pronounced as *wei ch'i*. Literally, it means a game of encircling territories. Japanese call the game *Igo*, Koreans call it *Baduk*, Americans call this game *Go*, so goes it in the rest of the world.

5. Roger D. McGrath, "The Western Way of War: From Plato to NATO," *Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture*, February 2001, pp. 13-15.

6. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.

7. Max Boot, "The New American Way of War." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003.

8. See Andrew Scobell, *China and Strategic Culture*, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. For an articulation of Chinese strategic culture by a leading Chinese military strategist, see Li Jijun, *Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China*, Letort Paper No. 1, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.

32

9. This sample game is taken from Qisheng Daochang, an Internet *weiqi* site www.tom.com. It is a national tournament game between two Chinese professional players, Chen Linxin and Zhou Junxun, played on August 7, 2003. Chen played black and won the game by 3 3/4 stones.

10. "The Wind and the Sun," Edna Johnson, ed., an Aesop's fable in *Anthology of Children's Literature*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959, p. 114.

11. Miura Yasuyuki, *Go: An Asian Paradigm for Business Strategy*, San Francisco: Ishi Press, 1995.

12. Check out the web site at http://www.usgo.org/.

13. A search on the World Book Catalogue through the First Search engine will show the numbers.

14. Mainland Affairs Council, Republic of China, www.mca.org, 2003.

15. Kenichi Ohmae, *The Emergence of the United States of Chunghwa*, Taipei: Business Weekly Publications, 2002.

16. Interview with ABC Good Morning America anchor Charles Gibson, April 24, 2001.

17. Li Jijun, "The Unification Belief of the Chinese Nation," *Liao Wang*, a Beijing-based magazine, December 8, 2003, No. 49, p. 1. Li is a leading PLA figure in the promotion of Chinese strategic culture and the Chinese way of war and diplomacy. His 1997 speech at the U.S. Army War College, which was subsequently published as an Army War College Letort Paper entitled "*Traditional Military Thinking and the Defense Strategy of China*," stands as a leading publication on China's view on its strategic culture.

18. New York: Basicbooks, 1997.

19. See David Lai and Gary W. Hamby, "East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on U.S.-Asian Strategic Relations," *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Spring 2002, for an in-depth discussion of the difference between *go*, chess, and poker, and their influences on international relations.

20. Interview with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, *Sports by Brooks*, April 17, 2002. Rice also made these remarks at the Meet the Press with NBC's Tim Russet.

21. Interview with CNN, June 29, 2003. Lieutenant General McKiernan was the commander of the Third U.S. Army, a main force in the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

33

Kissinger Kissinger - Laingen letter in WT

**From:** "Academy of Diplomacy" <academy@academyofdiplomacy.org>
**To:** "Academy" <aadiplmcy@aol.com>
**Date:** Mon, Apr 12, 2004 12:48 PM
**Subject:** Laingen letter in WT

Letter to the Editor
America's other army

Washington Times

April 10, 2004

APR 12 2004

Nicholas Kralev's sixth article in his series on today's Foreign Service ("Embassy bombings spur security boost," Page 1, Monday) is another important contribution to better understanding by the public of "America's other Army" — the Foreign Service of the United States. He deserves our thanks.

This article, on diplomatic security, includes a comment by the deputy security officer in New Delhi noting the critical need for cooperation from host governments if embassy security is to be effective. Those of us taken hostage by student terrorists in Tehran in 1979 occupied a chancery building with security arrangements sufficient, in our view, to dub it "Fort Apache."

All that security proved useless, however, when the terrorists overran the place; despite prior assurances from the government then in power, it proved unable or willing to respond.

BRUCE LAINGEN

Ambassador Laingen was the senior hostage during the Iran hostage crisis
1979 to 1981.

Bethesda

HENRY A. KISSINGER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

May 18, 2004

Dear Bruce:

Before a distinguished senior foreign service officer attacks a former Secretary of State as disingenuous, I would have thought it polite to give him an opportunity to reply. My article was not an exegesis of the President's letter but a contribution to a constructive American approach which is essentially the administration's long-term position. But for doctrinaires, nitpicking is more important than trying to define the direction of a desirable policy. Demonizing Sharon will not get us a negotiation; moving matters step-by-step towards the goals I outlined may.

There is no need to reply, and I do not want to continue a public controversy.

The Honorable
L. Bruce Laingen
President
The American Academy of Diplomacy
1800 K Street, NW
Suite 1014
Washington, DC 20006

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

Kissinger Kissinger - Harrop responds to Kissinger

Page 1

**From:** "Academy of Diplomacy" <academy@academyofdiplomacy.org>
**To:** "Academy" <aadiplmcy@aol.com>
**Date:** Fri, May 14, 2004 4:02 PM
**Subject:** Harrop responds to Kissinger

(Referring to the May 9 article in WP)

MAY 17 2004

At two points in his article, referring to President Bush's commitments to the Prime Minister in his letter of April 14, 2004, Dr. Kissinger cites limitations placed by President Bush upon Israeli actions. Unfortunately the text of the President's communication to Prime Minister Sharon does not appear to bear out this interpretation.

Dr. Kissinger's article:

"But he [Bush] not only accepted a change in the dividing line; he also limited the extent of the change. The settlement blocs accepted by U.S. policy are those discussed by the parties at Camp David in 2000 and during related negotiations in Taba, comprising some 5 percent of West Bank territory in the context of Israel's yielding to the projected Palestinian state a comparable amount of its current territory."

President Bush's letter:

"In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities."

In a reversal of 37 years of U.S. policy, the Bush letter recognizes new facts on the ground created by illegal Israeli settlements. Nowhere does the letter refer to 5% of West Bank territory, nor to the settlement blocs discussed at Camp David and at Taba, nor to the ceding of a comparable amount of Israeli territory. It is an essentially open-ended approval of Sharon's negotiating position.

Dr. Kissinger's article:

"Sharon abandoned the formal Israeli demand for renunciation of the Palestinians' right of return in exchange for a promise by the United States to use its influence to confine the return of refugees to the territory of the proposed Palestinian state."

President Bush's letter:

"The United States is strongly committed to Israel's security and well-being as a Jewish state. It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair, and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel."

PSI: William C. Harrop, Chairman, PSI Board of Directors

Page 1 of 1

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William C. Harrop
Chair
PSI Board of Directors

During a career of 39 years as a Foreign Service Officer, Bill Harrop served as United States Ambassador to Guinea, Kenya, Seychelles, Zaire and Israel. He was Inspector General of the State Department and Foreign Service, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, a member of the State Department's Policy Planning and Coordination Staff, and Deputy Chief of Mission to Australia. He served also in Italy and Belgium.

He was elected Chairman of the American Foreign Service Association, and holds the State Department Distinguished Honor Award and the Presidential Distinguished Service Award. He received the 2001 Foreign Service Cup. He retired from government service in 1993.

Harrop was born February 19, 1929, in Baltimore. He holds a bachelor's degree from Harvard and did graduate work at the University of Missouri School of Journalism and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. He served in the United States Marine Corps during the Korean War.

He is now associated with a private foundation. A member of the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs and of the Foreign Affairs Council, he is a director of the American Foreign Service Association, the American Academy of Diplomacy, the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, the Senior Living Foundation of the American Foreign Service, American Diplomacy Publishers, Population Services International, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Humane Society of Washington DC and the Harry T. Fultz Albanian American Educational Foundation. He was elected president of the Spring Valley-Wesley Heights Citizens Association in the District of Columbia in February 1997, and continues to serve in that capacity.

He speaks French and Italian. He and his wife of 49 years, the former Ann Delavan, have four sons and six grandchildren.

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5/17/2004

Kissinger Kissinger - Laingen Letter in NYT

From: "Academy of Diplomacy" <academy@academyofdiplomacy.org>
To: "Academy" <aadiplmcy@aol.com>
Date: Mon, Jun 14, 2004 11:47 AM
Subject: Laingen Letter in NYT

New York Times

June 11, 2004

To the Editor:

Sitting presidents care about American citizens held hostage abroad. In 1981, a week into his administration, Ronald Reagan welcomed the returning hostages from Iran with the explicit warning that if such an act were repeated, anywhere, there would be "swift and effective retribution."

Yet in 1985-86, frustrated with lack of success in getting Beirut hostages released and looking for a political opening with Tehran, President Reagan got himself caught up in the arms-for-hostages affair, putting himself in perhaps the worst political crisis of his presidency. Yet by publicly admitting his misjudgment, he saw his popularity rebound in due course.

BRUCE LAINGEN

Bethesda, Md., June 9, 2004

The writer was chargé d'affaires in Tehran during the 1979-81 hostage crisis.

JUN 14 2004

Laird on military service in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

Jody Williams

From: Academy of Diplomacy [academy@academyofdiplomacy.org]

Sent: Friday, November 05, 2004 3:20 PM

To: academy@academyofdiplomacy.org

Subject: Laird on military service in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel

NOV - 8 2004

"Choose to Serve"

By Melvin R. Laird

Published in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Thursday, October 28, 2004

Melvin R. Laird, a member of the Academy, was secretary of defense from 1969 to 1973 and represented Wisconsin's 7th Congressional District for nine terms.

In September 1972, I oversaw the end of the military draft in my role as secretary of defense. At that time, the Vietnam War was winding down after dividing our country and scarring our military.

I believed then that we did the right thing by ending conscription and instituting an all-volunteer military. In addition, as the so-called "Father of the All-Volunteer Force," I believe it even more strongly now.

Today, in the midst of a heated political campaign, some people are trying to scare our youth and their parents with the prospect of another military draft despite repeated denials and the staunch opposition of President Bush, the secretary of defense and a near-unanimous majority of Congress.

The military manpower draft is not coming back — period. We don't need it. Nevertheless, since I was there to see its demise, it is probably worth revisiting how we came to adopt the all-volunteer force in the first place and why it was so essential.

When President Johnson first expanded the Vietnam War, he faced a gap between the manpower needed for operations in Vietnam and the size of the military at the time. Instead of boosting recruiting levels or activating the Reserves and the National Guard, the decision was made to rely on the draft instead.

Of course, not everybody stood an equal chance of being drafted and serving, particularly when many received college or hardship deferments. Some even avoided service by leaving the country. Because service was mandatory and for fixed periods, pay was less than if the military had been forced to compete on the open job market.

As we made the transition to an all-volunteer force, the Laird-Packard team, with the support of the Congress, eliminated deferments and instituted a lottery.

As a congressman representing my Wisconsin district during the 1960s, I watched the Vietnam War steadily escalate and the number of draftees, as well as casualties, greatly increase. Visiting constituents in my Wisconsin congressional district convinced me that the draft was unfair and not serving our country or our military very well.

A young congressman from Illinois felt the same way and was one of the first to press for an all-volunteer force. His name was Donald Rumsfeld.

America, for much of its history, had maintained a skeletal standing Army that expanded quickly in wartime to absorb vast numbers of conscripts. These draftees, after a modicum of training, would be rushed out to join regular units engaged in combat, usually with mixed results and high casualties.

It did not seem to make a lot of sense, particularly with this short-term service and the required training or new technology used by the services. It was expensive, unfair, and it was not doing the job as our county might have hoped.

11/5/2004

Page 2 of 2

In 1970, a prestigious commission, established with President Nixon's approval, concluded that the country and the military would be much better served with an all-volunteer force.

At the time, there was considerable opposition to that idea within government and the military. Some government officials feared that ending the draft would convey a message of weakness to the Soviet Union in the middle of the Cold War.

Some commanders worried that the Army would become desperately and dangerously short of troops. Others worried that the military could not compete with the private sector and other governmental agencies for qualified manpower because of the costs to maintain comparable compensation and benefits.

My Pentagon team was convinced that those concerns were misplaced. We were able to convince Nixon and the Congress to support the all-volunteer service, which officially came into being on Jan. 1, 1973. After some early fits and starts, it was proved to be one of the most decisive and positive changes in our military's history.

That professional all-volunteer force ultimately helped win the Cold War against a Soviet force made up mostly of conscripts. In rapid fashion, the same volunteer force freed Panama from the grip of Manuel Noriega, Afghanistan from the rule of the Taliban and Iraq from the brutality of Saddam Hussein.

The demands of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have led some people to contend that we will need more troops to sustain the war on terrorism, which, in turn, has led others to talk about the draft. Even if significant numbers of extra troops are needed in the future, this can be accomplished through expanded recruiting and incentives for the all-volunteer force. We must be competitive for manpower and womanpower with the private sector of our society.

Consider that at the peak of the Reagan defense buildup in the 1980s, the active military grew to 2.2 million volunteer troops. Presently, we have 1 million fewer in our regular forces.

The taxpayers of this country have shown again and again a willingness to increase pay and incentives to attract qualified men and women in the regular forces, the Reserve and the Guard. They will do so again, as compensation has dropped below many comparable private-sector jobs.

In the early 1940s, my two brothers and I volunteered to serve in the Navy during World War II. We made that decision shortly after the unprecedented attack at Pearl Harbor, when fanatics and fascists with global ambitions threatened our country.

Today, our nation faces another global struggle that once again calls upon the service and sacrifice of our people. Throughout the years, I have had the privilege to meet many of our young men and women in the armed forces. A conflict as complex and unpredictable as the global war on terrorism requires a force of highly motivated, trained and skilled people that only an all-volunteer military can provide.

Motivation is, indeed, important, but the quality of life for the men and women and their families must not be overlooked.

Thirty years ago, many people wondered and worried if the all-volunteer force would suffice to meet the unexpected challenges of the coming decades. That question has been answered resoundingly as our military today is a model for the world.

While there are always ways to improve the total force, it would be foolish to temper with its fundamental strength — the talent and motivation of those who choose to serve.

For

11/5/2004

D.C. Everest Senior High School

6500 Alderson Street, Weston, WI 54476
715-359-6561 Fax 715-355-7220

Thomas W. Johansen, Principal
Todd J. Bohm, Assistant Principal
Mark L. Holbrook, Assistant Principal

November 8, 2004

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger and Associates
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Enclosed you will find four oral history books compiled and written entirely by junior and senior high students at D.C. Everest Schools in Weston, WI. The students were very excited to hear that Mr. Laird thought so highly of their work that he would send it out to you. Please enjoy these complimentary copies of our work. Each book took approximately two years to produce. The interviews were compiled in 8th, 10th and 11th grade U.S. History classes. The Oral History Club, which meets twice a week, did the layout and production of the books. Thank you so much for taking the time to exam and read these student works. Thank you.

Enclosures
PA:vap

Kissinger Kissinger - Lake and Ivo Daalder on Iraq in WP

**From:** "Academy of Diplomacy" <academy@academyofdiplomacy.org>
**To:** "Academy" <aadiplmcy@aol.com>
**Date:** Fri, Apr 16, 2004 1:33 PM
**Subject:** Lake and Ivo Daalder on Iraq in WP

Focus on Iraqi Politics
By Ivo Daalder and Anthony Lake

APR 16 2004

Washington Post

April 16, 2004

Ivo Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and was director of European affairs for the National Security Council from 1995 to 1996. Anthony Lake, Academy member and professor at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, was President Bill Clinton's national security adviser from 1993 to 1997.

It is time for a fundamental reassessment of our policy on Iraq -- not because of the spiral of violence in recent days but because the current approach is simply not working.

Many now argue that the ideological naiveté that led us into Iraq with no real plan and no understanding of that country has left us with no good options. This is indeed the greatest strategic blunder in at least a generation. But it is not enough to moan about the mess and wish we weren't there. If we pulled out, the regional consequences of the ensuing civil war would be huge and the withdrawal would put a bull's-eye on the back of every American in every tough corner of the world.

Nor does the president's repeated insistence in Tuesday's news conference that "we will stay the course" provide an answer. What "course" are we on? On the central issue -- presiding over the creation of a legitimate government that can manage Iraq after we leave -- the administration has been making it up all along and now seems to have no plan at all. With just 10 weeks to go before the deadline for restoring sovereignty to the Iraqis, it has no answer to this critical question: Who are the Iraqis to whom we will entrust their nation's future?

As in Vietnam, the heart of the strategic dilemma is political: How do we form and support a government that can gain popular legitimacy in the face of a growing nationalistic reaction against our presence and thus, to some degree, against any Iraqi group we explicitly support? Not easily. But victory will be achieved only through the presence of such a government. The military defeat of our opponents is a means to that end, not victory itself. Our soldiers are fighting bravely and well. But all their efforts will be in vain if we fail to reach the central political goal of a stable Iraqi government.

The fashioning of a serious course in Iraq must be seen through the lens of its effects on Iraqi politics. Doing so suggests a five-point approach:

First, we should delay the handover of sovereignty past June 30. Yes, this would exacerbate suspicions among Iraqis about our ultimate intentions there and offer a pretext for more violence. But there is not now, nor will there be by June 30, a functioning Iraqi government -- let alone a viable state --

to transfer sovereignty to. None of the conceivable governing entities that
might be set up by then will have the necessary legitimacy. Indeed, the
interim constitution that is to form the basis of post-occupation governance
has been rejected by the most powerful political figure in Iraq, the
relatively moderate Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who holds sway over the
majority Shiite population. And even after a handover, the most basic
governing functions will remain the responsibility of the United States.
Crucially, U.S. troops will continue to call the tune -- and all Iraqi
security forces will remain under U.S. command. Under these circumstances,
Iraqi sovereignty will be a sham and the Iraqi people will know it.

Second, we should pledge instead that the turnover of sovereignty will come
as soon as a legitimate national assembly is formed after national elections
(one hopes by early next year). The assembly would be responsible for
appointing a transitional government and drawing up a new constitution. This
should reassure Ayatollah Sistani and give him a stake in helping to create
a situation conducive to the elections. It should also strengthen his hand
against Shiite radicals, such as Moqtada Sadr, who are benefiting
politically from military confrontation with the United States.

Third, rather than pulling back or reducing our forces, we should reinforce them. Elections will require security. Even if our military commanders and their Pentagon civilian leaders (who have consistently underestimated the necessary force levels) decide to keep some of our troops there rather than rotate them out, it is clear that deterrence of future attacks on foreign forces, and the provision of real security for Iraqis throughout the country, require far more military force than we have now. No political solution is possible without this security.

Fourth, we should use our own willingness to commit more troops as leverage
in seeking additional military contributions from other nations or, at the
least, to stiffen the backbones of current contributors who may be going
wobbly. More important in gaining their support would be, at long last and
perhaps belatedly, a request that NATO command the military operation.

Fifth, our effort to gain more military support must be part of a broader
push to involve the international community more in running the country. The
Coalition Provisional Authority is an American-run affair. It would have
been far better if it had been international from the start. President Bush
should convene a summit of major countries in Europe soon and ask for their
help in remaking Iraq. While committing U.S. resources, he should propose
that an ad hoc consortium of countries take control of the CPA, putting a
non-American in charge. We need the expertise, energy and expenditures of
other countries to help make Iraq a success -- not least through broadening
the international support and thus the legitimacy of any new Iraqi governing
structure.

This change in policy might look like poison to the president's domestic
political advisers. It would require implicitly admitting that the course
the administration has been on is failing -- something the president showed
no sign of wanting to do during his prime-time news conference this week.
But he should understand that it is Iraqi politics, not ours, that will
determine whether we have any chance of success there. And he should
remember that in the end, even in this age of spin, it is good policies
abroad that produce good political results at home.

Kissinger Kissinger - Lake and Prendergast on Sudan in Boston Globe

**From:** "Academy of Diplomacy" <academy@academyofdiplomacy.org>
**To:** "Academy" <aadiplmcy@aol.com>
**Date:** Thu, May 20, 2004 11:11 AM
**Subject:** Lake and Prendergast on Sudan in Boston Globe

Stopping Sudan's slow-motion genocide
By Anthony Lake and John Prendergast

Boston Globe

May 20, 2004

MAY 2 0 2004

Anthony Lake, Academy member and professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, was President Clinton's national security adviser from 1993 to 1997. John Prendergast is special adviser to the president of the International Crisis Group.

TEN YEARS AGO, Rwanda was a month into its genocide. It is right that there should now be so much attention to what should or could have been done during that 90-day slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans. But it is wrong that so little attention is paid to the lessons we should have learned. The first lesson: Pay attention when hundreds of thousands are at risk.

Three times more people have died over the last 20 years of war in Sudan than were murdered in Rwanda. Most of those deaths have occurred in the south, where populations of African descent follow Christianity and traditional religions. And 400,000 more African Muslim Sudanese from the west of the country may well die by December in a famine created by the Khartoum government's military tactics and obstruction of aid.

Sudan is Rwanda in slow motion.

The government in Khartoum and the murderous militias it sponsors are responsible for creating the worst humanitarian crisis in the world (well over a million displaced in the western region of Darfur during the last six months), the second-largest death toll since World War II in southern Sudan, and the world's largest forgotten emergency (thousands of children abducted in northern Uganda by the Khartoum-supported Lord's Resistance Army). If we do not act now, in 2014 we will have to face another 10-year anniversary of shame.

In eerie similarity to 1994 Rwanda, the United Nations Security Council, not wanting to disrupt ongoing peace efforts, cannot even muster a statement of condemnation while the Sudanese government flouts the already agreed cease-fire, delays at the negotiating table, starves the displaced, and continues to support its killer militias.

The situation is dire. There is not enough food in Darfur nor enough government-approved access to have an appreciable impact on the humanitarian situation. While aid agencies have access to perhaps half of the internal refugees, they don't have nearly enough resources even for those people to whom they do have access. The rainy season is fast approaching; malnutrition and water-borne diseases are a clear and present danger.

The international community needs to demand the government's consent for humanitarian access -- unimpeded and monitored -- via the rail line and road routes. Given the unlikelihood of that consent being granted, the United

States and the European Union or NATO need at the same time to commence
planning -- in coordination with the UN Security Council -- for the use of
military assets to create safe havens that would protect the internal
refugees and create corridors to deliver aid to them. In response to
concerted diplomacy, neighboring countries should provide logistical support
for such an endeavor.

On the diplomatic front, the Security Council must become more directly
engaged, pursuing the equally important tasks of dealing with the Darfur
crisis and simultaneously finalizing a peace deal between the government and
the southern-based rebels. To do this, the international community must
threaten strong measures against the Sudanese government if it persists in
holding the prospect of a deal in the south hostage so it can get such a
free hand in Darfur. The lives of so many in Darfur must not be lost out of
a fear of losing a nascent peace agreement in the south. It is time to
insist -- clearly and forcefully -- on peace in both. If the government in
Khartoum fails now to move forward on both issues, a number of steps should
be taken.

The UN Security Council should press for the deployment of human rights
monitors to accompany the displaced and ensure their safety, impose an arms
embargo on the country with appropriate enforcement measures, and lay the
groundwork for eventual accountability by developing the case for war crimes
abuses perpetrated by Sudanese government officials and the killer militias
they have sponsored. In addition, the United States and EU should impose
sanctions against the Sudanese officials most directly responsible for war
crimes in Darfur.

To promote an end to war throughout Sudan, we must understand that coddling
the Khartoum regime over Darfur makes a successful final settlement between
the government and southern-based rebels less likely, not more. All the
substantive issues in those talks have effectively been settled for some
time now, but there have been endless delays in getting to a final peace. It
is time to force Khartoum to make a political decision as to whether it will
accept that peace or not -- while putting a stop to the rape of Darfur.

Let us remember Rwanda by acting now on behalf of the victims of this new
nightmare.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

June 24, 2004

Dear M. Lambroschini:

I would like to express my most sincere regret over the
cancellation of our lunch meeting in Paris on June 10 and to
explain personally why I felt I had no other choice.

Before my scheduled arrival in Paris, I was in southern
Germany with my brother and planned to depart early June
9th for France. Unfortunately, that morning my brother fell ill
and was admitted to a small local hospital. The doctors
thought it important that a member of his family remain with
him, and therefore it was necessary for me to stay until his
wife arrived from the United States. I deeply regret that I
had to cancel our lunch meeting, aware that at such a late
date it would cause great difficulty for the host as well as for
those who had planned to attend. Hopefully I will be given an
opportunity to meet with you in the future.

Monsieur Charles Lambroschini
Le Figaro
37, rue du Louvre
75002 Paris

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
FACSIMILE (212) 759-0042

TRANSLATION - jw

15 April 2004

Dear Henry:

This letter is going to you, since you organized the lovely evening for Nancy that we were able to attend! Otto and I greatly enjoyed being there, being so specially seated, the conversations with interesting people, the elegant atmosphere and – not to be overlooked – the lovely and stylish women.

Topping all of this, however, was to experience a happy and intact family, for which Otto and I congratulate you both.

With all good wishes for Nancy, whom Otto holds in his heart,

Alexandra Lambsdorff

"Der Krieg im Irak war richtig"

Page 1 of 2

DIE WELT

Henry Kissinger über die Entwicklung in Bagdad, die Lage im Nahen Osten und den Terror gegen Saudi-Arabien

von Michael Stürmer

DIE WELT: Nach all dem, was man gegenwärtig aus dem Irak hört: War der Krieg ein Fehler?

Henry Kissinger: Ich denke, der Einmarsch war geostrategisch die richtige Entscheidung. Die strategische Begründung war unausweichlich, die politischen Begründungen gingen gelegentlich über die strategischen Ziele hinaus. Die Vorstellung, der Irak könne zu einer Modelldemokratie gemacht werden, und das noch in einem Zeitrahmen, der sich in die amerikanische Innenpolitikagenda fügen sollte, ging zu weit. Dasselbe gilt auch für die Idee, durch die Demokratisierung des Irak die gesamte Region zum Besseren zu bekehren.

DIE WELT: War es das falsche Ziel oder nur zu ehrgeizig?

Kissinger: Es war das richtige Ziel, sofern man unbegrenzt Zeit hat.

DIE WELT: Wann hat man in der Politik schon unbegrenzt Zeit?

Kissinger: Denken Sie an die Besetzung Deutschlands. Vier Jahre lang gab es keine Zentralregierung, zehn Jahre keine volle Souveränität, und selbst danach blieben noch wichtige Rechte in der Hand der Alliierten. Im Vergleich dazu sind die Ziele jetzt zu ehrgeizig. Jedenfalls waren die erklärten Ziele zu hochfliegend.

DIE WELT: Wie wichtig war die Frage der Massenvernichtungswaffen? Ging es um eine Verweigerungsstrategie oder um eine Strategie der Erzwingung.

Kissinger: Das strategische Argument für den Krieg war, dass wir und alle vernünftigen Kräfte in der Welt am 11. September angegriffen worden waren aus dieser Region. Nicht durch einen Staat, sondern durch eine nichtstaatliche Gruppe mit Wurzeln in der gesamten Region. Mitten in dieser Region eine Diktatur zuzulassen mit der größten Armee, von erwiesener Brutalität und vollkommener Willkür, dazu aktiv arbeitend an Programmen für Massenvernichtungswaffen, das war nicht möglich. Die Administration war überzeugt, dass das Regime über Massenvernichtungswaffen tatsächlich verfügte ...

DIE WELT: ... das glaubte nicht nur die US-Administration, sondern alle Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates.

Kissinger: So ist es. Auch die Inspekteure waren davon überzeugt. Dieses Machtzentrum sich selbst zu überlassen wäre unverantwortlich gewesen. Daher bin ich der Meinung: Die grundlegende strategische Entscheidung war richtig.

DIE WELT: Und wo gingen die Dinge schief?

Kissinger: Zuallererst einmal: Es ist nicht klar, dass die Dinge völlig schief laufen. Sicherlich unzutreffend war die Analyse, dass eine Zivilverwaltung nach dem Modell der Besetzung Deutschlands eingerichtet werden und funktionieren könne. Auch gab es keine klare Strategie gegen die Bedrohung durch die Partisanen, jedenfalls keine zutreffende Einschätzung dieser Gefahr.

DIE WELT: Sprechen wir über den weiteren Nahen Osten. Muss es zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern erst schlechter werden, bevor es besser wird?

Kissinger: Es gibt für mich keinen Zweifel, dass Ariel Scharon mit seiner Initiative einen außerordentlich mutigen Schritt vollzogen hat, den vor ihm kein israelischer Ministerpräsident wagte.

DIE WELT: Gilt die Erfahrung, dass nur ein Mann des rechten Flügels die damit verbundenen schmerzlichen Zugeständnisse machen kann?

Kissinger: Ja, so sieht es aus. Scharon will Gaza räumen und vier oder fünf Siedlungen. Er wird einige große israelische Bevölkerungszentren auf der Westbank halten. Implizit in diesem Plan ist die Bereitschaft, Siedlungen auf der anderen Seite der Sperranlagen zu räumen. Das hat entscheidende Auswirkungen auf die Sperranlagen zur Westbank.

DIE WELT: Die Grenzen von 1967 sind nicht wiederherstellbar, und die zu Grunde liegende Resolution 242 verlangt das auch nicht.

Kissinger: Das ist richtig. 242 spricht von "besetzten Territorien", nicht von "den besetzten Territorien", aus denen sich Israel zurückzuziehen hat. 242 gesteht den Israelis "sichere Grenzen" zu. Das kann nicht die Waffenstillstandslinie von 1967 sein. Hier

http://www.welt.de/data/2004/06/03/286102.html?prx=1

6/3/2004

Page 2 of 2

gibt es Spielraum.

DIE WELT: Scharon erhielt von Bush Unterstützung. Bush sprach aus, was allen, die den Verhandlungsstand verfolgen, nicht überraschend kam: Das von den Palästinensern geforderte "Recht auf Rückkehr" und die Preisgabe aller Siedlungen sind unrealistische Forderungen.

Kissinger: So ist es in der Tat. Bush hat nur ausgesprochen, was jeder weiß, und hat damit dem Prozess nicht geschadet, sondern ihn vielmehr auf die Basis der Realität gestellt. Ich halte es für durchaus denkbar, dass ungeachtet aller terroristischen Störversuche es in absehbarer Zeit eine palästinensische Administration und eine Anzahl moderater Staaten geben wird, die an die früher erreichten Verhandlungsergebnisse anknüpfen.

DIE WELT: Vor einem Jahr kam die so genannte Genfer Initiative, verbunden mit den Namen Abed Rabbo und Jossi Beilin auf.

Kissinger: Bei genauer Betrachtung sind die Grundvorstellungen der Genfer Initiative und des Verhandlungsergebnisses von Camp David und Taba 2000/2001 ziemlich nah beieinander. In beiden Fällen geht es um Gebietsaustausch, Endstatus von Jerusalem in einer beiderseits auskömmlichen Weise, die allerdings auf beiden Seiten Verzichte erzwingt. Dazu auch eine sehr zurückhaltende Sicht der Israelis auf das "Recht auf Rückkehr", weil sonst der jüdische Charakter des Staates einer schnellen Erosion ausgesetzt wird.

DIE WELT: Wie weit entfernt sind Scharons Vorstellungen von denen seiner Vorgänger?

Kissinger: Nicht so weit, dass es nicht zu einem historischen Kompromiss kommen kann. Es ist paradox, dass Scharon viel gescholten wird, aber selbst oder durch die von ihm bewirkten Umstände die Basis geschaffen hat für einen Durchbruch in Richtung Frieden.

DIE WELT: Sprechen wir von Saudi-Arabien. Wie instabil zeigt sich das Königreich?

Kissinger: Kein Zweifel, dass die saudi-arabische Monarchie wie über einer Lavamasse manövriert. Sie hat ihre Schwächen und ihren großen Reformbedarf, der zumal seit dem 11. September von der US-Administration angemahnt wird. Aber allen möglichen Machtkonkurrenten ist das Regime der Prinzen bei weitem vorzuziehen, nicht nur für den Westen, sondern wohl auch für die arabischen Nachbarn. Das saudi-arabische Öl, das enorme Einkommen daraus, die heiligen Stätten, die Waffen, das alles zusammen in der Hand terroristischer Islamisten wäre eine schwere globale Bedrohung. Das würde die Welt zu unserem Nachteil entscheidend verändern.

DIE WELT: Bisher hat Saudi-Arabien sich in der Irak-Frage wie beim Ölpreis verantwortlich gezeigt.

Kissinger: In der Tat, aber dies geschah nicht ohne erhebliche Kritik von anderen Arabern, und es diente und dient auch dem Terror als Argument gegen die Regierung der Prinzen.

DIE WELT: Die Nato-Häupter kommen in vier Wochen in Istanbul zusammen, und der weitere Nahe Osten wird sich in die Verhandlungen drängen. Wird die US-Administration eine Nato-Beteiligung im Irak zur Bündnisfrage machen?

Kissinger: Das wäre keine kluge Politik, und ich halte das auch nicht für wahrscheinlich. Zehn Nato-Staaten sind ohnehin im Irak beteiligt, und die übrigen werden wahrscheinlich nicht so weit gehen und Truppen stellen. Aber es gibt viel anderes zu tun.

DIE WELT: Man hat selten einen so wichtigen Gipfel kommen sehen, vor dem die großen Gestaltungsfragen so wenig gemeinsam vorbereitet werden wie in Istanbul.

Kissinger: Meine politische Erfahrung sagt mir, dass es gefährlich ist, Doktorfragen auf die Tagesordnung internationaler Konferenzen zu setzen, statt sie durch politisches Handeln zu entscheiden. Es lässt sich nicht durch Kommuniqués feststellen, dass Amerika die Führungsmacht sein soll oder nicht sein soll. Alle europäischen militärischen Anstrengungen, speziell ESDP (European Defense and Security Policy), bestätigen nur, dass wesentliche europäische Operationen auf amerikanische Mittel angewiesen sind.

Das Gespräch mit dem ehemaligen amerikanischen Außenminister führte Michael Stürmer.

Artikel erschienen am 3. Juni 2004

Artikel drucken

© WELT.de 1995 - 2004

6/3/2004

Sir:

[ ] Could you provide some language so that I may draft a response for your signature on Monday? (I have been waiting for a copy of the *Atlantic Times* which Count Lambsdorff discusses and have asked Maggie to attach a copy when it arrives for your reference.)

k
3
↓
l

tc

Draft a response saying:

October 19, 2004

Dear Henry,

it was very good to see you in New York. Thank you for the lunch in Brooks Club. I enjoyed the company of Stapleton Roy and again liked the atmosphere of the place.

The AIG-meeting was of course overshadowed by the "Eliot Spitzer event". Sitting close to Hank I could watch the nervousness. Knowing about the business of insurance-companies and brokers I do find some of the accusations difficult to understand. Every broker in the world tries to get a commission as high as possible from his insurer. Of course he has to represent the interests of his client. If he does violate this by providing more expensive sham offers from third insurers he has to accept criticism. But only if that can be proven of course. However such criticism goes to the broker and not to the insurance company.

Whatever will be the result of the G.A.'s step: The damage in the capital market-value of AIG is enourmous. I'm afraid that is also true for the reputation of the company with its clients. It is a sad affair for Hank Greenberg.

You told me that H. Schmidt has announced to you a "suprising" statement. Did he mean his article in the "Atlantic Times"? That is not surprising but very conventional. I accept every word. But he surpasses the real issue in German-American relations. Your contribution does not and I think that is a more helpful

...

STRÄSSCHENSWEG 7 53113 BONN TEL: 0228-23 60 61 FAX: 0228-23 60 69
E-MAIL: O.LAMBSDORFF@t-online.de

approach. We will not solve the problems if we don't address them clearly. Maybe H. Schmidt did not want to mention the mistakes of the chancellor who has contributed a well-polished piece.

The new paper "Atlantic Times" will have no future. It is (well intended) propaganda. Alexandra's comment: "That could have been published by the Bundespresseamt". She is right.

I try to contact Mr. Rühle the author of the article on NATO in "Die Welt".

All the best to you and warm regards,