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annual tortuous negotiation with the Germans to try to find ways of off-setting -- or, failing that, concealing -- the flow of dollars into German hands. During the last two years this exercise has resulted in more concealment than off-set, and there is reason to doubt whether even concealment (the purchase of US Treasury obligations by the Bundesbank) will be acceptable to the Germans or to us in the future. At the same time, the achievements of the Kennedy Round have been dissipated in no small measure by a rising climate of protectionism on both sides of the Atlantic. The interdependence forecast in the early 1960's has not only failed to become an accomplished fact, but US-European economic relationships since then have been marked by a quite surprisingly high degree of acrimony.

The unease created by this economic imbalance has of course been reflected in the political sphere as well. Combined with the predominant American military and technological role, it has given rise among Europeans to an attitude of resentment and dependence, and a feeling that their governments have little influence over the course of events. This is scarcely a healthy US-European relationship. And these same factors have produced within the US Congress and within important sectors of American opinion a different form of resentment, one based upon the premise that at a time when domestic demands upon resources seem more urgent than ever the United States is seriously "over-extended" abroad, and that the Europeans should "do more" for their own security.

It is, indeed, becoming increasingly difficult to maintain any degree of Congressional support for the continued presence of large American forces in Europe. There is considerable sentiment, especially in the Senate, for

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requiring the return to the United States of nearly all US forces now in Europe. These Congressional attitudes are so strong that even if there were a sudden and drastic reduction in Southeast Asia expenditures, the next Administration will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain forces in Europe on anything like the scale of the past decade-and-a-half.

Even if Congressional sentiment were less demanding, the next Administration will inherit widespread popular misgiving regarding the scale of American international commitments. One of its major tasks will be to secure public acceptance of the premise that, regardless of the outcome in Vietnam, America's involvement in the world will continue to be extensive. This task will be made easier if US presence overseas were restructured in a manner which better reflects the increasing capabilities of the other developed countries, and our and their changing perceptions of the threats that they face. Our Western European allies, in particular, must be seen by the American people to be taking more responsibility for their own defense, and to be bearing a larger share of the burden of providing for the defense of weaker nations.

These domestic considerations argue strongly for a reduction in the level of American forces in Europe. Yet the international considerations -- those relating to the health of the American-European relationship -- are at least equally compelling, and from the perspective of national interest they are of greater importance. Neither set of concerns, however, should lead the new Administration to take steps to reduce US force levels if such reductions would significantly decrease the security of our European allies.

## II. THE MILITARY BALANCE

NATO and the Warsaw Pact are now approximately evenly balanced in the numbers of men each could commit to immediate combat following the sudden

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outbreak of conflict on the Central Front. More important for present purposes, however, is a comparison between the number of men the USSR could commit to such a conflict and the number which could be committed by the Western European members of NATO (including France, but minus the United States). This comparison is as follows:

| | Western European NATO | USSR |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| M Day | 442,000 | 288,000 |
| M + 15 | 662,000 | 338,000 |
| M + 30 | 687,000 | 668,000 |
| M + 90 | 822,000 | 948,000 |

This comparison is unrealistic as a representation of a potential outbreak of conflict because it assumes that neither US nor non-Soviet Warsaw Pact troops would take part. Clearly some non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would take part, but their reliability in any offensive operations against NATO -- especially the reliability of the Czechs, the Rumanians, and the Hungarians-- would not be great. And on the other hand, even substantial reductions of American forces in Europe would leave there a US force of military significance. More important, the fact that Soviet reinforcements would outnumber West European forces only after more than 30 days of combat indicates that the likelihood is great that substantial American reinforcements from outside the theater would long before have been introduced into the conflict, even in the unlikely case that there would have been no prior "political warning." Added to these considerations is NATO's superiority over the Warsaw Pact both in tactical air capability (and US air reinforcements would arrive especially quickly) and in logistic support capability. In short, NATO forces, even with fewer Americans present at the outbreak of warfare, would be able to hold their own against Warsaw Pact forces under

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any even remotely likely scenarios of conflict. US reductions, therefore, would subject neither our Allies nor ourselves to unacceptable military risks.

The Western advantage would be even more pronounced if both we and the Europeans were to develop further our capability to mobilize and deploy reserve forces at an early stage in the build-up of political tensions that would precede the outbreak of any large-scale conflict in Europe. For the United States this would include not only mobilization of reserve forces, but the rapid deployment to Europe of active-status forces stationed in the United States.

### III. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM

During its first months in office the new Administration will have a unique opportunity to confront the problem of the relationship of the United States to the security of Western Europe unencumbered by much of the residues of past rhetoric and past policies. It should seize this opportunity. If it does not, it will find that at NATO meetings and in the constant bilateral conversations which take place between European and American leaders it will begin to compile a record of rhetoric of its own which will, with the passage of time, make sharp departures from the status quo considerably more difficult. At a very early stage, then, the new Administration must decide

- if, when, and in what manner US force levels in Europe should be reduced;

- the nature of the rationale which should accompany any reductions;

- the form which future Western European defense arrangements might take, and the degree to which the United States should become involved in shaping them.

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To every proposed initiative, moreover, it must apply two tests. These are:

- Does it leave Western Europe as "secure" as do present arrangements and dispositions of forces?

- Does it make more firm, rather than undermine, the complex of political relations between the United States and the nations of Western Europe?

There are, of course, right and wrong ways for the new Administration to approach the opportunities it will have in its opening months. The wrong way would be to nibble away at US force levels, making a small reduction in combat forces immediately in order to placate Congressional critics, hoping that such a reduction would be sufficient but nevertheless remaining ready, when pressures returned, to make further reductions. Such behavior would resemble too much our past behavior, whose political costs to our relationships with Western Europe have been considerable. In the reckoning of our European friends, more important than US force levels is certainty regarding them.

The right way to approach the problem would be to tell the European governments that we intend to make substantial reductions in the levels of our combat forces in Europe, but that we will still leave in Europe a sufficient number to make a substantial contribution to European security and to demonstrate the extent of our interest in the welfare of our European partners. We should aim at the outset at reductions down to a level at which, regardless of other international events and of domestic demands, the balance-of-payments and budget costs will be at levels we could tolerate for the indefinite long-term future. In order to reduce budget costs as well as balance-of-payments costs, we should aim at eliminating forces from active status, not simply redeployments to the United States.

Underlying this approach is the assumption that the combined military capabilities of the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany

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are sufficient to supply the bulk of the forces needed in place in Europe to assure the security of Western Europe, and that the outbreak of any large-scale conflict will be preceded by a period of mounting tensions which will supply political warning. Reductions in American force levels can therefore be undertaken regardless of whether or not they are part of a process of mutual force reductions. Reductions of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe would obviously be desirable, but they are not necessary in order to allow for American reductions with no significant increase in the threat to Western European security. This point should be clearly kept in mind. The Administration should be aware, moreover, that in opting for unilateral reductions of US forces it is sharply reducing the possibility of an agreement for mutual reductions (which could only have been achieved, if at all, through protracted negotiations). It is not, however, foreclosing the possibility that the Soviets, who also have alternate uses for the resources tied up in maintaining large forces abroad, might eventually follow the US example and correspondingly reduce their force levels in Poland, Hungary, and the GDR.

Early in his Administration, therefore, the incoming President should write to the heads of the British, French, and West German governments and declare his intention to withdraw substantial American forces from Europe. He should make clear from the outset that this is his intention, but that the timing of the withdrawals, their size, and the means (if any) by which the Europeans might continue to help the United States to meet the balance-of-payments costs of US forces retained on the Continent would be the subject of far-reaching discussions among the four governments. If the President does not at the outset assert his intention to withdraw forces, but were merely to propose, for example, a NATO study of the problems involved in maintaining US forces in Europe, he

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would run the risk of getting involved in interminable negotiations and not achieving the outcome he desires. By stating his intention at the outset he assures this outcome and at the same time assures that his *demarche* would have greater effect in moving the Europeans themselves to take the necessary compensatory steps to preserve their security undiminished. Among the points which should be made in the President's letter, as well as in a subsequent message to Congress, are the following:

1. After a careful examination, he has concluded that the United States must substantially reduce its combat forces in Europe. However, substantial US forces would remain, and their level would be maintained for the indefinite future barring only an East-West security agreement or an agreed resolution of the political problems dividing Europe.

2. On the basis of an analysis, the elements of which would be shared with the three Allies, the USG is convinced that provided the Allies take certain measures themselves, the American reductions would in no way weaken the security of Western Europe.

3. At the heart of these measures we would envision a more far-reaching cooperation and coordination in defense matters among the Europeans themselves, particularly among the three leading European powers, the UK, France, and the FRG.

4. We would not presume to suggest to our Allies what form these arrangements among themselves would take, but we will make available to them all intelligence information and planning proposals which might assist them in their efforts.

5. So far as the United States is concerned, every aspect of NATO is open to re-negotiation except the Treaty itself. If the Europeans desire to continue with a unified Military Command, we believe that, befitting the larger European role, SACEUR should be a European.

6. Among the matters subject to negotiation between the United States and its principal Allies is the timing of the force withdrawals and the size of

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the US force to be retained in Europe. The willingness of the American people to sustain the continued presence of US forces in Europe will depend on the degree to which the Europeans themselves can arrive at defense arrangements and strategic doctrines which would seem to be able constructively to employ American military assets.

7. The American strategic nuclear commitment to NATO and to its members remains unaltered. The United States is willing to leave intact all existing arrangements concerning consultation regarding nuclear matters, including, if the Europeans wished, the Nuclear Planning Group.

8. The United States would not object to any cooperation among the Europeans in the nuclear field which is consonant with existing bilateral agreements and with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States would be prepared to consider giving aid and support to the British and French nuclear forces (or to a combined force) provided that arrangements for the deployment and use of these forces were satisfactory to the FRG, and consonant with the NPT.

9. The United States would like to reduce the number of its nuclear weapons stationed in Europe to a level appropriate to the reduced level of US combat forces stationed there, and appropriate as well to NATO strategy. The US would be prepared to leave in Europe nuclear weapons earmarked for allied forces. Appropriate command arrangements would have to be developed based on an agreed structure of defense forces in Europe.

10. Regarding strategy for both the nuclear and conventional defense of Europe, the United States would expect the UK, France, and FRG to take the lead.

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11. All these arrangements have been proposed with the aim of bringing US force levels in Europe more in line with the changed nature of the threat to Western Europe's security, of world-wide American involvements, and of the capabilities of our European Allies. They are not meant to imply the slightest diminution in American interest in European security, or in the realization that American security and European security are intimately related.

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