DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

000139

Good Morning America

WJLA TV
ABC Network

July 17, 1980 7:50 AM

Washington, DC

Interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger

DAVID HARTMAN: Yesterday, before Ronald Reagan selected George Bush as his running mate, I had a discussion with Dr. Henry Kissinger, our former Secretary of State, about the possibility that he might have a job in the possible future Reagan government of the United States. Here is that conversation.

Dr. Kissinger, if Mr. Reagan is elected, becomes President, if he were to ask you to become the Secretary of State, would you, could you accept?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: Well, I could accept. Whether I would accept would depend on so many circumstances at the time.

I don't think it's going to happen. I think he'll get elected. I don't think he's going to ask me. I believe, also, that a candidate should not ever discuss this with others. He will know -- Governor Reagan will know what he needs only after he's been elected. And I'm supporting him because I think it's in the national interest. And I have never had a discussion with him about any of these problems, and never will have.

HARTMAN: But you've said here this week that you basically support him, you endorse Mr. Reagan. You're compatible, your views are basically compatible. And yet it seems, at least on the surface, that your views, your basic gut views, particularly about America's relationship with the Soviet Union -- it doesn't seem as though your views are compatible.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you have to remember that we come at it from two totally different environments. I had to conduct the foreign policy of the United States while we were extricating ourselves from a war, while arms races were continuing, while we

AUG 7 1980

2

had tremendous domestic divisions, and while we had a constitu-
tional crisis. Mr. Reagan has been a candidate seeking office
and attacking, at one period, an incumbent Republican President.

Obviously, I was more aware of the complexity of the
day-to-day problems. A candidate reduces things to relatively-
simple issues.

Now that Governor Reagan has to take seriously the
possibility of governing, he has to begin to look at things from
a different perspective.

HARTMAN: What is your opinion of the quality of foreign
policy advice that Mr. Reagan is getting now?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, he does not have, at this moment,
that I'm aware of, a group of senior advisers. He has a group
of able, thoughtful intellectuals who are writing position papers
within a very -- in a fairly narrow band of the spectrum of thin-
king. And it has not been extremely broad. And within that band,
it is an extremely able, thoughtful group, many of whom I respect --
all of whom I respect and many of whom are personal friends of
mine.

HARTMAN: The platform calls for striving for what they
call military superiority over the Soviet Union, which suggests
the possibility of some kind of massive arms race, suggests that.
And at the same time, the platform talks about arms reduction
talks.

How can you realistically have a massive arms buildup
and at the same time tell the Russians, "Okay, we really want to
talk about not having an arms buildup"? Is that possible?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the Soviets have been building
up arms for the last 18 years. They've been increasing their
military budget at the rate of five percent a year. So we are
in an arms race, in that sense.

I think there is a paradox, which would be true with
any President, that we have to build up our arms and be prepared
to negotiate about the reduction of arms. This is a complicated
thought to hold in somebody -- in our heads. But that is a fact.

HARTMAN: So it is a paradox. It is difficult to pur-
sue both.

DR. KISSINGER: Absolutely. It's a paradox. But that
is what a President has to do.

HARTMAN: Does he understand that now, do you think?
Does Mr. Reagan understand that paradox?

3

(L)

DR. KISSINGER: I think he understands that paradox. In fact, it's a subject we discussed yesterday. And I am convinced he understands it.

HARTMAN: The European allies have criticized, certainly, the Carter Administration and President Carter. But they also seem to be expressing some concern about a President Reagan.

What would you say today to reassure our Western allies that they needn't be skittish or concerned...

DR. KISSINGER: I would say to our Western allies that the concern that any American President will be trigger-happy is wrong. No President would be trigger-happy. The problem is, which President is most likely to avoid the crises that will gradually slide us into confrontations that neither side may see. And in this respect, I think the record of this Administration is close to disastrous. There are crises in every part of the world, many of them sliding out of control.

That is what has to be ended.

HARTMAN: Let's take one of those areas, briefly, in Afghanistan. A lot of the critics of President Carter are saying that he, the Administration, our government, should have in some way prevented the Russians from going into Afghanistan. Is that realistic?

DR. KISSINGER: There were a whole series of events. There was a Cuban expeditionary force commanded by a Russian general in Ethiopia two years before, which -- for which we made the Soviets pay no price in our relationship. There was a Communist coup in Afghanistan 18 months before the takeover, followed by 4000 Soviet advisers, followed by 5000 troops. None of this affected any of our relationships. No warnings were issued. No penalties were paid.

So the Soviets could have gotten the idea that this is something we have conceded to their sphere of influence.

Six weeks earlier, we had declared that a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba was unacceptable. And two weeks after having declared it unacceptable, by the President and the Secretary of State, we accepted it.

Now, it is this pattern that must have contributed to the Soviet decision that they could get away with Afghanistan. So it isn't any one thing. It's a series of things.

HARTMAN: All right. What about now? I mean here sits Pakistan on the border between warm-water ports and Afghanistan

4

and the Russians.

DR. KISSINGER: In the immediate aftermath of the Afghan crisis, the President, in a speech before the Congress, announced that Pakistan was a vital country to our security in that area. Then he sent his National Security Adviser out there and offered then a hundred million dollars of military aid for a year for two years. Here the Pakistanis are sitting, facing eight Soviet divisions, when a modern airplane costs between five and 10 million dollars, and you offer a hundred million dollars of military assistance. It doesn't convey the impression that this is a serious effort.

Therefore, the Pakistanis have now decided that impotent neutrality for them than military relations with the United States.

HARTMAN: Are you saying that we should offer the Pakistanis more help right now?

DR. KISSINGER: I am saying that it is hard to conceive a defense of the Persian Gulf without the cooperation of the most populous country in that area; and that if we want Pakistan assistance, we -- Pakistan cooperation, we have to talk in terms of assistance that makes sense.

But what we cannot do is to declare them vital, talk of assistance, and then make a specific offer that is irrelevant to the danger they're facing. So we have to go one way or the other.

HARTMAN: Consistency.

DR. KISSINGER: We have to have consistency in concept.

HARTMAN: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Late last night, or very early this morning, I spoke with Dr. Kissinger on the telephone. He said that George Bush is a plus for the Reagan ticket as the vice presidential nominee. And he said that Mr. Bush's presence on the Reagan ticket would reassure our allies about a Reagan presidency.