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will now act as a brake. At this time, it would be natural
to repudiate de Gaulle, to become Europeans, to advocate
France's return to NATO, etc. The American national interest
and that of France itself are not found in going too fast and
too far in that direction. It is probable that French
nationalism, stirred up by de Gaulle and, in his days, acting
like the devil of French politics, has now become a wise
counselor advising against drastic change and preaching
continuity. But there is the danger of an anti-Gaullist
reaction, allying itself to the Left and finding a puppet
in Poher, and doing away in one big sweep with de Gaulle,
his Constitution, his policies. In other words, French
nationalism, in its present phase, should be encouraged.

3.- The policy which the Nixon Administration will follow
can thus be predicted with some certainty:

(i) If elected, Poher will confront a constitutional crisis
which will take time to resolve itself. Upon assuming office,
Pompidou will also need time to find his balance: he will
bring in new collaborators and formulate policies to achieve
continuity as well as change, and that too will require time.
Since the United States also needs time to end the Vietnam war
and to wait for the results of the German election (and,
hopefully, a change of government in England), the West is
heading for a new waiting period--which the Nixon Administration
will welcome (instead of exercising "leadership," etc.)

(ii) Some pressure is likely to arise in the United States
from the Atlanticists for a clear-cut repudiation of Gaullism
and a return to NATOist idealism.

That movement will get nowhere, first because it will
never get off the ground and gather momentum, and secondly

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because US policy towards Europe has already been firmly set
by Nixon and his chief advisers. The US refusal to repudiate
Gaullism will encourage Pompidou to cooperate quietly with
the Administration on questions of common interest and in
an atmosphere of pragmatic good faith.

(iii) More difficult to resist will be the pressure from
the European idealists and Atlanticists. The United States
will resist any attempt from that source to force America to
take side and to become entangled in European politics. One
of the reasons for that American neutrality will be a desire not
to meddle in the German election. On the other hand, the United
States is in a better position than ever before to encourage an
active cooperation between France and its European Allies,
Britain included.

(iv) The change initiated under de Gaulle in French strategic thinking will be continued. If France will renounce to its massive retaliation concept, the United States should be willing to reassert the principle of nuclear deterrence and to purge the flexible response doctrine of McNamara's anti-nuclear dogmatism.

(v) The French position on the Mideast is likely to weaken
and Nixon might find himself in the queer posture of having
to pressure de Gaulle's successor to accept what he himself
was forced to accept from the former President of France. Or
will Nixon repudiate the enthusiasts of a pro-Arab settlement
and shift the emphasis of his diplomacy away from the Big-4
to cooperative assistance to the parties to the conflict ?

## II.—THE FUTURE OF CHINA POLICY :

The future of American policy towards China is one of the important decisions which the Nixon Administration will have to make in the near future. To Sen. Kennedy and to other critics of present US policy, it could be granted that the US posture is still determined by decisions made in the 50's by Dulles and Eisenhower: the "liberation" concept and the various mutual security treaties concluded at the time with SEATO, Japan, Formosa, etc., and by the Formosa Resolution of 1955 —a public law of the United States still in force.

Dulles compared those treaties to the fingers of the hand: the various treaties are independent from one another, yet American power is not divided and the fact that the US is a party to each one of the various treaties binds them together. The analogy used by Dulles and the resulting strategy (emphasis on local defense, on mobile power, on peripheral bases, etc.) remain valid. Is China, however, still to be considered as an immediate and as a global threat to the United States —a threat that requires united action ?

While the juridical framework and the strategic implementation of the old policy remains unchanged, moral commitment and public support from it have been withdrawn; SEATO is considered as a dead organization, the US is pinned down in Vietnam, the situation has fundamentally changed and there has been no authoritative restatement of US policy towards China in the past ten years. The statement made by the President in his first press conference on the issue of recognition sticks to the old line, but could have been improvised. Or is Nixon going to pour new wine in old bottles ?

1.— One has grounds to fear that that old policy could become counterproductive.

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(i) The hope that the Kremlin will play a useful role in ending the war in *Vietnam* and the priority given by the Administration to a disengagement from that war tend to bring the US and the USSR together in forming a common front against China.

Although the containment of China is a "common interest" of the two superpowers, however, their Far Eastern partnership is, so to speak, a one-sided affair:

—on the part of the United States, Soviet assistance in ending the war in Vietnam is a *short-term* speculation which may or may not succeed; and the US is forced to act, at present, at least, as if it sought *long-range* accommodation with Russia, i.e. as if accepted the reality of Soviet power, its increasing influence in many areas of the world, and the consolidation of its grip over Eastern Europe.

—on the part of the Soviet Union, however, the "common" Russo-American interest in the successful containment of China will never become a reason why the Kremlin ought to make significant concessions to America or to the West.

(ii) A policy of total opposition to China and of accomodation with the Soviet Union does not do justice to the fundamental differences that exist between the respective posture of the two superpowers vis-à-vis Red China:

—Except for the containment of Chinese aggressive tendencies from its present policy of total opposition the United States is not in a position to benefit. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Chinese crisis is not a pure liability for the Soviet leadership but also an asset: Chinese aggressivity has cost the life of Soviet citizens and the Kremlin is in a position to stir up nationalist feelings at a time when it has reasons to fear internal tensions inside the USSR itself. Secondly, the Chinese crisis gives increased

-8-

prestige and influence to the Russian military (and if the
Russian military influence on national policy is downgraded
by a reaction of the Communist Party or of the "politicians"
in the Soviet Union, to any strong national leader) : new
security needs have arisen, the Chinese "threat" gives new
reasons for enforcing the current line of Soviet policy, etc.
Thirdly, the Chinese crisis gives to the USSR the possibility
of scoring gains in two ways: using the US policy of total
opposition to China as the anvil, the USSR can beat China
up in a variety of ways: if the occasion offers itself, the
USSR could, f.i., strike a surprise blow against Chinese nuclear
installations; it could use its traditional salami-tactics and
take advantage of China's political weakness to make limited
territorial gains or to encourage the break-up of China into
semi-autonomous satrapies or zone where the USSR could become
influential; or it might aim at changing the political
leadership of China --in whole or in part. But the USSR could
also play up the Chinese threat to the security of other
nations --such as India, Japan or Formosa-- to become more
active diplomatically and advance its own interests all across
the board.

----The United States is China's No. 1 enemy, yet it is not as
directly implicated in the Chinese struggle as the Soviet Union is. As the leader
of the Communist world, the USSR is deterred from assuming a
straight anti-Chinese posture. Yet it is actually engaged in
limited conventional actions with China. Chinese nuclear arms
will increasingly act as a deterrent against any radical
Soviet action against China (except a strike against Chinese
nuclear installations). Consequently, Chinese nuclear arms
will guarantee the nuisance-value of anti-Russian incidents

and the credibility of Chinese conventional forces.

The nature of comparable anti-American incidents and the objective which the Chinese Communists could pursue in providing them are so intrinsically different that it can be concluded that the US has here a definite advantage over the Soviet Union. The main use which the Chinese are likely to make of their nuclear power will be political and anti-Russian; it does not require a strong national Government nor a coherent policy: as long as the Chinese nuclear force remains small (and therefore manageable) and under the control of the national Government, China can make a successful political use of its nuclear power --even if it is politically on the brink of disintegration. The ideological success of Maoism in the West is due to decadence in Western society itself: it is an internal threat which is not directly connected to the "Chinese threat."

2.- In view of those and other considerations, US policy in the Far East should be reviewed along the following guidelines:

(i) US policy towards China should not be the captive of Soviet policy. The United States has other things to do than to serve the interests of the Soviet Union.

(ii) The Administration could return to the Dulles' policy of bilateral commitments to Korea, Formosa, Japan, SEATO, etc. and continue its strategy of peripheral defense, but it should deliberately de-emphasize the unity that exists *de facto* between those various commitments, i.e. not to speak as if the United States confronted the same threat everywhere in the Far East. The "Chinese threat" should, in other words, become mentally and diplomatically broken up *into* its several fronts.

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(v) Most important, however, is it to understand that the real stakes are in Europe:

----The acid test of the Russo-American détente of Nixon's first 100 days is coming: It is difficult to dismiss the hypothesis that the downing of the US spy plane by North Korea was concocted by someone in the Kremlin (even without the consent of the top political leaders): the coincidence of that incident with the sequence of events in Prague and the presence in the area of Soviet ships with orders to offer condolences, etc. is too perfect not to suggest that theory. In any event the possibility of a Soviet deception must be examined and balanced against the hope that the USSR will play a useful role in ending the war in Vietnam (perhaps the only real hope to end the war inexpensively). Such a deception would be extremely costly for the Nixon Administration and do tremendous harm to its diplomatic posture.

----The consolidation of the Russian position in Eastern Europe suggests that there was a great deal of wishful thinking in the hope that the European satellites would be able to use Russo-Chinese tensions to win some independence from the Kremlin. But it would be disastrous wrong to reach the oversimplified conclusion that the Chinese threat to Soviet security has no bearing at all on the situation in Eastern Europe. Should the Soviet Union succeed in ending the Chinese threat and make substantial gains in the Far East ---while achieving superiority over the United States in strategic weapons---, it could then turn again towards Europe (and in the Mideast) in what could appear to them as the final phase in achieving world hegemony.

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48104

April 19, 1971

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I've just finished making my plane reservations for a trip to Washington next week (when the straits are programmed to follow the freaks' weekend), and asking Adam Yarmolinsky for advice on this letter.

I'm writing anyway, although adam's advice was that nothing turns you off quite as completely as a reference to your German origin, because it's all I've got to go on for possibly turning you on.

So here goes my try at talking to you any time during the week of April 26-30 (when I've got a return reservation out of International at 5:30 p.m.)

Yes, I'll be spending the family's money and a week of neither wife & mothering nor proposal-writing & researching, in order to join the Interfaith Council for Peace's effort to "talk to Washington." So maybe that, by itself, is enough to make you throw my letter into the wastebasket right now.

But also, Adam and I discovered that we share our comparatively unique academic stance for keeping the ROTC at the biggest and best universities, which he wouldn't have suspected, although he's approved of me as a wholesome friend for Harriet since his AVC days.

So, just perhaps, maybe we can find some common ground after all, and I must admit that this is just about my last try at keeping Henry Kissinger on my list -- along with Mike Nicholls, Herb Kelman, Gerhardt Weinberg & Edie Pelz -- when I start boasting about the something special about the late 1930s German Jewish immigration which adolesced and was academically finished in the U.S. (I'm sure there are more of us, If I ever sit down to make a complete list; but those are the nationally and locally -- at the University of Michigan -- best-known names with which I have been wont to enjoy associating myself.)

I guess the last time I mentioned The Blue Card, Inc., to which you may or may not be contributing something every Passover and anniversary of your naturalization, was when I enthusiastically described this favorite little charity of mine ($100,000 total budget last fiscal year) to Dr. Klaus Riegel, ex-Hitler Youth member of our Department. He asked me please to

-2-

get him on their solicitation list, because he shared my delight in the
tiny recipient list and the sorts of things our money goes to: "The widow,
whose husband had borrowed on his insurance just before he died -- Social
Security keeps her minimally housed and fed, but all the dalies with whom
she plays bridge go to Florida once a year for at least two weeks; The
Blue Card sends her for maybe a week every other year. And her son has a
scholarship to Harvard, for of course, but he ought to have enough pocket
money to take his girl friend, once in a while, to the same restaurant that
his room-mate takes his girl to every month..."

Yes, that's my first ploy for trying to titlate you out of an hour
of your time, or a lunch hour next week, although I've just faced the prob-
lem that I don't remmber ever having read that you were born, as I have
been assuming, a German Jew?

I can try a few others: How about the study I'm currently doing of
all the individuals, male and female, who ever earned a PhD in Psychology
from the U. of Michigan, co-sponsored by the Department and the U's Commis-
sion on Women? Jean Campbell, director of the U's Center for Continuing
Education of Women, and wife of Angus A. Campbell, director of the Insti-
tute for Social Research and my husband's boss, is on my advisory committee,
and has insisted on my adding to the questionnaires I'll be tailoring for
various sub-groups (men&women who have&have not been married and/or pro-
duced children) a set of questions on the highest earned academic degree
of the women the men (all UM PhDs, remember) have divorced....

Try #3: I'm an active Democrat, But last week, when our local radio
station (Waam for Ann Arbor, Michigan, of course) reported a speech to the
local Rotary by Wendell Hulcher, our city's previous mayor before we Demo-
crats took= the office in 1969 and kept it this year for Robert J. Harris,
Professor of Law and the first Jewish mayor I think we've ever had--wow!!

My husband sometimes tries to correct, but always despairs at the
length of my Germanic sentences, and I remind him that English is, after
all, my third language, after German and Hebrew, with French and Latin
thrown in before I landed in Brooklyn at twelve...

So I'll start again on try number 3: WAAM reported that Hulcher,
Deputy Director of the Office of Intergovernmental Relations, spoke last
week to the Rotary about "Federalism '76", funded by "foundations"...

-3-

So I found the friends with whom Wendell was staying, suggested he call me about his group's relationship to Common Cause and the National Association of Responsible Patriots (the latter, a figment of my imagination that I always meant to interest Adam in co-founding, which would redefine patriotism from "my country, right or wrong" to "it's our job to help God men her every flaw," sometimes familiarly thought of, again by me alone, as the NsingleA), and gave him just the kind of feedback he was looking for when I confided that I'd like to know the names of the foundations, be reassured there was neither Hunt or Welch nor CIA involved, wondered what happens to Jefferson when "Federalism" rings a Hamilton Bell, and agreed to see what all of us could do together toward 1976.

And one final try: dxw Have you seen Phi Beta Kappa's call for "books of broad scope dealing with the cultural crisis of our time, and, in particular, with the responsibilities of the intellectual in that crisis"?

"Applications must be received before October 15, 1971. Awards will be made in December 1971....in order to sponsor a series of books, to appear before or during 1976, with the general title MAN THINKING IN AMERICA."

I'm hoping to get some funding, via this route, for a course on American Values in the mixing bowl (**not** the melting pot) of our culture, to climax in a book to be edited by the two faculty members, but written by the undergraduates we'd hope to recruit and select in such a way as to represent, among us, both ends of all the dichotomies I can think of: black&white, fale&female; social&physical science; young&old;Jew&Gentile, parent&single; foreign&native born, etc.

O.K. That's my try.

If I sound worth an hour of your time, you can use any of the following phone numbers to let your secretary tell me where and when to meet you:
Until Sunday night, April 25 at home: (313) 662-2111 (my kids take messages)
or, if no answer, office: (313) 764-6337.
From Monday morning on, I'll be bedding down, and hope to get messages re-
layed at EITHER: c/o Pelz, Silver Spring (301) 946-5262 OR c/o Bennet (D.C.)
(202) 723-0206.

And if I never get a call or message at any of those numbers, we'll understand each other too: I'll be in the wastebasket.

Gruess Gott,

Edith B. Pelz

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE SPORTS COMMITTEE, INC.

98 CUTTER MILL ROAD • GREAT NECK, N.Y. 11021 • Phone (516) 482-5158

August 24, 1973

Dr. Leonard Milton
President

Pres. Richard M. Nixon
Honorary Chairman

OFFICERS

Dr. Leonard Milton, President
Dr. John S. Davis, Vice Pres.
Philip O. Krumm, Vice Pres.
Charles R. Rambo, Vice Pres.
David Gerstein, Secretary
Patrick Clifford, Treasurer

DIRECTORS

Mortimer M. Caplin
Gary Crocker
Dr. John S. Davis
Albert Gaynor
David Gerstein
Bert Klineburger
Seymour Milstein
Dr. Leonard Milton
John M. Olin
Jesse Owens
Charles S. Payson
Charles R. Rambo
Eugene Rodin

DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL

Vice Pres. Spiro Agnew
Hon. J. H. Blatchford
Hon. Peter J. Brennan
Hon. Claude S. Brinegar
Hon. Earl L. Butz
Hon. John B. Connally
Hon. Frederick B. Dent
Hon. John Eisenhower
Hon. Robert Finch
Sen. J. W. Fulbright
Michael Doud Gill
Sen. Barry Goldwater
Sen. Edward Gurney
Hon. James D. Hodgson
Sen. Jacob K. Javits
Sen. Edward Kennedy
Austin Kiplinger
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Hon. Elmer T. Klassen
Mayor John V. Lindsay
Cong. Clarence Long
Gov. John A. Love
Capt. James Lovell
Hon. James T. Lynn
Cong. Both Mathias
Sen. George McGovern
Cong. Lloyd Meeds
Hon. Rogers C.B. Morton
Amb. Emil Mosbacher, Jr.
Cong. Claude Pepper
Sen. Wm. Proxime
Gov. Ronald Reagan
Hon. Elliot L. Richardson
Gov. Nelson Rockefeller
Hon. William P. Rogers
Hon. George W. Romney
Col. Stuart A. Roosa
Hon. Donald Rumsfeld
Hon. William E. Simon
Sen. George Smathers
Hon. Maurice H. Stans
Hon. A. Burks Summers
Sen. Stuart Symington

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

On Thursday, August 9, your People-to-People Sports Committee had a fight---and I mean a fight!!! 6,125 people came to the Nassau Coliseum to witness the Championship Boxing Matches between the German National Boxing Team and the USA Boxing Team.

Col. Don Hull, our Executive Director, conceived the program and was in complete charge of this international sports exchange. To highlight this famous international friendship through sports program and to add inspiration to both teams, your People-to-People Sports Committee flew in Max Schmeling from Hamburg and Joe Louis from Las Vegas. These two World Champions, who each won a victory in their furious matches, have remained close friends and epitomize the great friendships and international good will developed through sports.

Joe Louis came to Kennedy Airport to greet Max Schmeling on his arrival and the national and international press and TV coverage was overwhelming. Each of these Champions served his country well and was the best in his time. Their popularity after 35 years has not diminished.

A pre-fight reception for Joe Louis and Max Schmeling was attended by James A. Farley, an original founder director of People-to-People Sports. Also attending were the Hon. Ralph G. Caso, Nassau County Executive, officials of the German Embassy, representatives of Lufthansa, Coca-Cola, international and local sports and political dignitaries.

In keeping with our tradition of distributing sports equipment, your Committee donated a generous supply of boxing equipment to the German Team from the ring.

I am sure you will agree that we have completed another good People-to-People Sports event that will long be remembered and which will do much to broaden friendship, good will, and understanding between our country and Germany.

LM:sc

RECEIVED

SEP 7 1973

SPORTS COUNCIL

Roone Arledge
Arthur Ashe
Richard Bailey
Avery Brundage
Donald Budge
Michael Burke
Dick Button
Ed Carter
Billy Casper
Bob Considine
Fred Corcoran
Bing Crosby
Melvin Dawley
Dorald Dell
Jack Dempsey
Gardner Dickinson
Douglas Fairbanks
Bruce Fleisher
Leo Fraser
Peter Fuller
Joe Garagiola
Col. Edgar Garbisch
Tudor Gardiner
Frank Gifford
Curt Gowdy
Wm. Halsey
Tom Harmon
Eddie Herr
Bob Hope
Col. Don Hull
Hayes Jones
John B. Kelly
Northrup Knox
Bowie K. Kuhn
Carl Lindeman
George H. Love
Mickey Mantle
Alistair Martin
Mark McCormack
Wm. C. MacPhail
Keith Morris
Jack Nicklaus
Arnold Palmer
Ara Parseghian
Clifford Roberts
Pete Rozelle
Stan Rumbough, Jr.
Chris Schenkel
Red Smith
Ed Sullivan
Dick Sylvester
Billy Talbert
Bill Toomey
Gene Tunney
Johnny Weismuller
Andy Williams
Ted Williams
Joe Yancey

LADIES COUNCIL

Patty Berg
Peggy Eagan
Peggy Fleming
Eileen O. Ford
Tenley Albright Gardiner
Gladys Heldman
Billy Jean King
Virginia Kraft
Carol Mann
Eugene E. Marron
Ethel E. Marshall
Hilda Milton
Carol Pistell
Betty Rawls
Sylvia deb Sichel
Barbara Walters
Kathy Whitworth
Mickey Wright

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