6

P: Yes, but then, you see, one of the reasons that I want this meeting even from my standpoint is that I want it to appear, I want to be sure the Right Wing hears, and all say that we sold out and all that crap. Of course, you can brief and you can convince the --

K: No, the meeting---

P: with our enemies, the two of them. You understand that both the Left and the Right would be disappointed with this. And because the less for the reason that will want to find what is wrong with it, in any event, they have a vested interested in defeat, and the Right because they will honestly believe what Thieu says.

K: Well, but I think it's going to go like the SALT agreement. That once we got it, it's going to be an overwhelming--

P: I think so too, but I meant the point is--the symbolism is though of his going along graciously is something. If he goes along ungraciously it's all right, but I think we should tell Duc that, look just going along here but having statements leaked out that they are going along reductantly will make it more difficult for me to keep my commitments to get the Congress on military aid and the rest because the Congress will look for excuses.

K: That's right. I'm going to tell them that it must be a settlement, that the American people feel proud of--

P: Oh, yes, it must be a settlement that the American--that particularly--their strong supporters in the Congress, the Right Wing, so that they will feel, will not be a let down. You see Henry, don't worry about the Left. The hell with the Left and the Democrats and the rest. They don't--we could have the most great settlement in the world. Our concern now is the Right here. It's a real problem. The thing to do therefore is to get this across to this fellow that therefore that is why they're going along has to be in some sort of a gracious manner or it will be very difficult for us to get this money from the Congress. And it really will. If the South Vietnam drags its feet.

K: Right. I will make these points.

P: There are a couple of other points. We will talk about it in the morning. Two other points. When I talked to you about the Connally thing, I want that on an urgent basis followed up on.

K: I've got a call in to him Mr. President.

P: Mr. Connally. Fine. Because we want him to be basically without any portfolio because he represents various elements of both groups but he is the guy that could put this deal together. I don't want it done

UNCLASSIFIED

AUTO #212-266-855

BY DAVID W. DAVIS 10/10/84

7

under Commerce because if the government gets into it, we'll have to be choosing between Arnold--between Hammar and Elysee Gass, and we'll be in one hell of a spot. Id rather have Connally do the brokering. Do you see my point.

K: Right.

P: I want us to stay out of it totally. I don't want anybody in Commerce, I don't want anybody in the government to talk to any of the people on this. You tell those people over there that.

K: Right.

P: The other thing is, on another note, I just want to be sure because I made a commitment for him to do it, I want to be sure that you let the Chinese know that we would like to have Bob Hope's application be considered.

K: I've already done that, Mr. President.

P: You have. You see, Dave Mahoney got over there and that stirred Hope up a little. He said what the hell---

K: No, no, I've done it on a number of occasions. They've just answered us saying they can't do it now, but if he applies again in a few months they'll consider it.

P: All right, well then--

K: I've gotten in touch with Hope already and said that we've made an effort--

P: Be sure that he knows that you got to him at my request after my conversation that the Chinese had a special problem at the moment but that we have another front burner and you personally will follow up. Will you do that.

K: Absolutely.

P: Cause he's been a great friend. I mean when all of the other stars out there came along reluctantly, he's been pushing it, and we've just got to go for our own people now.

K: I couldn't agree more.

P: Okay, we'll see you tomorrow.

K:q Right.

BRIEFING

August 27, 1966

BASBANKING 101

TelCon ALEXIS John
Sec. Rogers / Mr. Kissinger

10:22, December 1, 1972

K: Hello.

J: Yes, Henry, I'm returning your call.

K: I just wanted to check with you on that idea I had that Al tried out on you yesterday.

J: Well, I gave him--

K: Do you think this will work? I mean *x* legally.

J: Oh, legally, there's no problem with the thing. It's not so much a legal problem as it is a protocol problem.

K: No, but how does it work in practice. Doesn't everybody sign every document.

J: No, no. You have four parties sign four documents, and they each exchange documents.

K: So in other words, each party then holds three documents.

J: Each party has three documents, that's right. I have this, now, all written out. I can get it right over to you.

K: I would appreciate that very much, yes. Don't you think that's a rather ingenious formula.

J: I think it's an ingenious way of doing it. My old friend here, Charlie Bevins agrees, and he is the one that comes up with ideas like this. And I showed it to the Secretary this morning as well as to Bill Sullivan and he sees no--

K: But just before you guys start leaking again we thought of the idea. You guys thought of the formula.

J: That's right. I entirely agree.

K: Before it get started into the news papers how you saved us again.

J: Okay, all right, all right, all right.

K: The formula you think will work, then.

J: The formula will work if the parties will buy it.

K: Well I think it gives the communists three quarters of what they want.

DECEMBER 1, 1972

2

KJ: The formula will work if they will buy it. Now it seems to me it saves the South Vietnamese entirely. I don't see how they could have any objection to it. It's only the other side who could have any objections to it. Now and what you can do of course--

K: The other side though can get our name on a PRG document and we can then make a unilateral statement saying we only recongize --

KJ: We can do that. You know, each party can put virtually anything they want into the preamble--I mean they can word it in ways to suit them. The essential thing is that they sign the substance, and exchange it. I can get this right over to you.

K: I'd appreciate that.

KJ: Okay. Henry regard to our other talk yesterday on the ticker

K: The Secretary talked--

J: Oh, he has?

K: About the possibility of Ambassador at large.

J: Well, but

K: And Saigon.

J: Vietnam. I talked to my wife last night. Maybe it's the moth being attracted by the flame, but if this thing's going to hold together at all, and we should be able to see that shortly, I'd be glad to, we'd both be glad to go back there. You know, if that's what the boss would like to have me do. It's going to be an interesting job.

K: It's going to be a God damned interesting job and it takes somebody who knows us and who knows--

J: Yes, and I would be glad to go back there, assuming of course Ellsworth wants to go which--

K: Yeah, he definitely wants to go. There's no question about it.

J: If the thing holds together. If the thing falls apart completely, obviously there'd not be much point in my staying around.

K: But our hope you know we want someone there who will hold it together.

J: And I think maybe on that maybe I'd have something to contribute.

CLASSIFIED

August 12, 1966
BOSA DAVID 11/05/66

K: I think you'd have a hell of a lot to contribute.

J: They know me and they know my background. That might be some help to them also, so I'm prepared to do it, my wife is too. I'll have to--a little problem--I'll have to talk to my doctor about it and I might have to get out fairly frequently to a cooler climate, and there'd be no golf or anything of that kind in that heat. But subject to that, and I'm going to talk to him today, I'd be prepared to take it on. Now the Secretary's idea, I think, has some merit--an Ambassador at Large for the next couple of months while negotiating the--and getting things in place and all that type of thing. But with it known that this is going to be my responsibility, Ellsworth staying on as long as he wants to, my--

K: Ellsworth wants to leave at the end of January.

J: I'd like to have about 30 days leave before I go out.

K: I'm sure we can extend him.

J: Yes, I think that ought to work out. Well, all I wanted to pass on to you is I told the Secretary this morning I'd be prepared to do this.

K: Good, well I appreciate this, and I'll talk to the President.

J: Subject to my doctor, and I'm going to talk to him today, but I think I think he'll let me do it if I handle things within reason.

K: I'll talk to the President tomorrow.

J: All right. Okay Henry I'll get this right over to you.

K: Right.

J: Bye.

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan

12/1/72 11:02 a.m. (Tape began in middle)

PF: ...committed to the Taiwan government that we would assemble these Northrop planes in Taiwan.

HK: Not if I can help it.

PF: Well your guy Pickney--Piinkney--Pinkney.

HK: He isn't mine--he's a State Department guy.

PF: I understood he was NSC.

HK: No. I think so anyway.

PF: He works for Holdridge.

HK: Oh really--

PF: We think this is a lousy deal from an economic point of view. If we made a commitment of course we have to live up to that--

HK: Mel Laird has been pushing it but I frankly have been trying to drag it to be on January 20 and get it killed after he leaves.

PF: We've got it over here now, why don't we kill it--unless Pinckney claimed that either you or the President considered this--and what is meant by sympathetic consideration is yes we'd do it.

HK: Baloney.

PF: Baloney?

HK: Yeh.

PF: We can't find anyone really who thinks we should do it.

HK: Let me talk to Haig to see if there is any history there which I don't know about.

PF: The reason we're against it is it doesn't save us any money, it costs the Taiwanese 10M bucks, but they want it because it puts them in the airplane business. Northrop wants it because it ties them to Taiwanese.

HK: Well I don't want it because I don't want to drive Peking out of a ____.

DREASSIFIED

Author: ERI2958-
Date: 12/1/72
B-58

TELCOM

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

1:37 p.m., December 1, 1972

K: Hello, Bob.

T: I was just wondering if I would have a chance to see you down here or are you going to be really bushed?

K: Well, it's not a question of being bushed -- I'm going to spend a lot of time with the President and I might leave right after that. But I'll keep it in mind.

T: Okay. Because it's kind of difficult at this point -- I'll tell you the problem I have in doing this profile point is obviously the blueprint of your thinking pre-Administration is clear from what you've written. The question of how much of the tactics that have been used can be ascribed to sort of your thinking. That is, did you follow out the tactics that you had thought would be effective or were these significantly modified as you went along?

K: With what?

T: In terms of Vietnam.

K: You mean from the beginning?

T: Yeah.

K: Yeah, that's an interesting question.

T: Yeah, you know, I conclude roughly that say 90% of what was laid out in your previous writings in terms of strategy.

K: Yeah.

T: But the tactics is kind of difficult. The other thing, Henry, was whether or not you can give any guidance on the present situation. I gather the reports that it may be coming unglued are all wrong.

K: Yes.

T: And was the *Times* story accurate? Because JCS was signed on yesterday to the settlement?

K: I haven't read the *Times* story.

T: Well, the gist of it was that they were called together to ratify or to agree formally to the terms of the settlement that have now been worked out.

OCTOBER 13 1972

TELCORN

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

1:37 p.m., December 1, 1972

K: I just don't want to discuss that.

T: Okay. I'm kind of puzzled at all the time that you and of course
the President has spent with Phu Duc and it's either a good massage
conference or something serious is up. I gather it's the former
though.

K: Well, the Vietnamese are pretty time-consuming.

T: [Laughter]

K: North and South.

T: [Laughter]

K: It's a great deal of the former.

T: Of the former, right. Can we expect in terms of your meeting
on Monday that this is going to be a sort of a resumption of the final
session? Is that kind of phraseology . . .

K: That's exactly right.

T: How long would you expect it to last?

K: Dare I say three or four days.

T: You dare. [Laughter] And after that you're going to have to go to
Saigon?

K: Then we will have to see how it comes out. Okay, I've got to run.

T: Okay. Thanks. Will you call me if you can make it?

K: Yeah.

wgh.

TelCon

Gov. Connally/Mr. Kissinger

1:47, December 1, 1972

C: Henry?

K: Hell, Mr. Secretary.

C: Doctor, how are you?

K: Good. I'm calling you about that gas thing that you discussed with the President yesterday.

C: Right, right.

K: I wanted to get a clearer picture from you just what it was. I know the gas project, but I didn't know exactly what your relationship to it was.

C: Henry, my relationship at the moment is that I'm sitting astride two different groups that are negotiating with the Russians. We've got to, at all costs, try to keep the Russians from rip sawing these two groups of people.

K: I couldn't agree more.

C: And, so what I want to do and what the President suggested was that to the effect, warn Dobrynin, in effect say that I was, for all practical purposes, the man that would say to Dobrynin how when we are going to function, vis a vis, these two groups of people.

K: Now what are these two groups?

C: These two groups are, one is Texas Eastern Gas Transmission, and CINGO, Tennessee Gas Transmission, and Brown & Root-- that is one group. The other group is El Paso Natural Gas Company and they are joined with a minority interest by Dr. Hammar as Occidental Petroleum.

K: What's the routes--one is in--are they both in the same field.

C: No, the contract started with the first group--the Texas Eastern group, trying to get both projects. Then the field, and the one in the western part of the country that they call an All Star project.

K: Right. I know them both. I negotiated the general framework with Brezknev when I was there, so I know the---I haven't gotten in with the companies, of course.

DREASFIELD
Authorizing Agent
B-84
SINCE DECEMBER 1, 1972

2

C: El Paso then comes in and they are primarily interested in the field with the Japanese. Now the question is whether or not we combine these two groups so that there are five companies operating in both fields, or whether or not it is better for the United States interest for one group, the Texas Eastern group, to take the North Star project, and the El Paso group to take the Nutrus,ke field.

K: Well, I feel strongly about two things. One, we shouldn't be a bit soft, secondly I would like to use this Cass deal enforce some political compliance with them.

C: I understand that. I'm at the present time sitting on top of it, and I will keep you informed on everything that happens.

K: And therefore I'd like to sort of stage these things to fit into our political strategy. Only if this is a good argument to have one man in charge of it.

C: All right.

K: I'd be delighted to talk to Dobrynin about this. Could we have a talk too so that I can give you the political side of it. I'm not interested at all in the commercial side.

C: Yes, sir. I'll come up whenever you get back.

K: Good, let's do it that way, and you can be sure that I will make clear to Dobrynin whom to deal with.

C: Okay, that's great. We'll phase it in, that's precisely the purpose of my visit.

K: Good.

C: So we can phase it in so you can use whatever leverage there was for your political purposes.

K: I'll call you the day I get back.

C: That's fine. Thanks Henry.

K: Good, bye.

C: Bye.

DILASCHIEDO

Autogene F 12 26-55
BASI GANDE 10/5

TelCon

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

2:15, December 1, 1972

K: Hello.

MK: Henry, Hi. I just wanted to ask a question or two of you. Could you tell me at this point--I can't believe the CBS report out of Saigon this morning.

HK: What is it?

MK: Well, there was a report that Dick Wagner did quoting South Vietnamese sources to the effect that we have--going to put one of those proposals to Thieu that either he signs or he gets no aid, and it just sounded wrong to me, I just wanted to double check with you.

HK: I just don't want to go into the discussions between us and the South Vietnamese.

MK: Do you have any sense of greater confidence now that you have Saigon on board.

K: I think we are making progress, yes.

MK: Is there any prospect in your mind, Henry, of a--of we signing without them.

K: I don't think--that's going to happen. I don't think that's probable.

MK: Right. Is it possible to have something by the end of this year?

K: Definitely. I mean definitely possible.

MK: Okay. Do you--has the North ever accepted the principle of withdrawal?

K: Well, I would have to go through a very complicated analysis of provisions which I can't do. Withdrawal has not been part of any American proposal since October 1970. All those were joint proposals with the GVN. You are talking here about a ceasefire, not a final settlement. I think the total accumulation of the provisions of this agreement are bound to bring about a substantial reduction of North's forces in the South.

MK: And that is something that obviously they would not have gotten on board if they didn't intend to carry out, do you feel?

2

K: Well, of course they can violate it. In that case, adding one more
provision that's going to be violated doesn't help any.

MK: But, how would you explain the problem of not getting the South on
board if the question of withdrawal is not really the key?

K: I think the real problem is the psychological problem of their
suddenly being left by themselves. You know, an attempt has
been entirely different from what they've gotten use to over 12
years.

MK: That's right.

K: I think that's at the heart of the problem, but that cannot be allowed.

MK: That's one of the things I remember you saying is that one of the
most difficult things would be to persuade them that they can exist
without it.

K: That's right. That's the key to the problem. I mean I think that
is the essence much more than any particular provision because if
it weren't one there'd be another that is objected to.

MK: Right. Henry, are you likely to try and initial anything next week.

K: No, no.

MK: And you are still planning to go to Saigon, aren't you.

K: There are good signs of it.

MK: Yeah. Listen Collingwood is going to be in Paris next week and I
think he's going to take the liberty of calling you. I'm just alerting
you.

K: Good.

MK: Good.

K: Good, Marvin, and I'll call you when I get back.

MK: Good luck, Henry.

K: Thank you, bye.

MK: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Author: F. 12. 65-

Date: 10. 1. 65
By: B. J.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

2:36, December 1, 1972

P: Mr. President.

P: How did your meeting go.

K: Mr. President I had about a three hour meeting with these guys and the first two hours went fine. We were talking about how to implement a ceasefire, and went into detail and answered a lot of questions. I'm going to see them again at 3:30 this afternoon with Intelligence and DOD people. In the last hour, we got back to the--what they told you Wednesday and what they told you yesterday.

P: Yeah. We said that we'd just go ahead and they will go their way.

K: Well, they don't ever quite say this. They just say it's going to be impossible as long as there are North Vietnamese forces there. I'm beginning to worry, that they may have psyched themselves to a point where they just can't get it off. There is nothing inherently in this agreement that can't be carried off.

P: Yeah.

K: And we did make progress in working out details of the ceasefire arrangement. I've checked with--they actually haven't had any new instructions, so they are probably just following their old brief.

P: Yeah.

K: They've leaked to the newspapers that you've given them an ultimatum. It was on CBS this morning.

P: Uh huh. Well you can't tell, it might have come from other sources too.

K: No, they said it came from the Palace. At any rate, it came from Saigon.

P: Uh huh. Well--the question is whether anybody should be sent out there.

K: I don't think so. I think--if they can't take it from you there's no one else who can be more convincing.

P: Yeah.

2

K: I think the only other think that can happen now is a meeting between you and Thieu. I don't think any lower level--

P: Yeah, but a meeting before we make the deal?

K: I think a meeting before--after the next round with the North Vietnamese, but before we conclude the agreement.

P: Yeah, but, you mean where he basically sits down and haggles about this whole thing.

K: No, no.

P: You agree we can't do that.

K: I agree completely.

P: I mean, there is no way--

K: No way.

P: Maybe he just wouldn't have a meeting if there is nothing further to negotiate.

K: What I think is going to happen, Mr. President, is that they are going to let us make the deal, they won't take any responsibility for it and after it is concluded they'll join saying they had no choice. In that context, I think he'll meet you. It's not a very--

P: Well, you've got to tell them that this seriously jeopardize my efforts to get these adequate aid programs.

K: Well, I --

P: That is, I can--to get the Congress to pass AID is always hard. But if they go along with this in a way that it appears that they bare negative, they are just going to play in the hands of their Congressional enemies.

K: I've told them that it is absolutely essential that we end this in a way that Americans can be proud of it and feel that something worthwhile was accomplished. Then we have an interest in preserving it. But if they go along with it in this grudging attitude they are going to make it very tough for us to support them.

JANUARY 1975

AUG 21 1975

Not because of intention, but because of the Congress.

P: What does Haig think about all this?

K: He's totally convinced that we should go ahead as we are going.

P: Sees no other choice, huh?

K: No. He's concerned about the fact as I am that they may be flacking themselves too much. What they did up to a certain point to extort better terms made sense, but it's reaching now the point where they are doing damage only to themselves.

(change of tapes............)

P: ......that if we don't get what they have laid down as their minimal conditions, that we then would continue the war, and that's an impossibility. We have told them. It's made so clearly, and it happens also to be totally true, no way we can continue it. No way. If the North Vietnamese come along on those three fundamental points, which they have done, unless they back off from the people in South Vietnam---

K: I don't think they will. Well, they have backed off but I think we can get that back.

P: Uh huh. Well, what are you going to tell them at 3:30?

K: At 3:30 we are just going over ceasefire maps.

P: Oh, for Christ sakes. As far as putting it out that I gave them an ultimatum, I---

K: We denied that.

P: Well, we denied that, but I mean, well we did give them an ultimatum. But my point is that as far as putting it out I don't think that hurts you a little in dealing with Hanoi.

K: No, that helps with Hanoi.

P: The only problem it does, it makes it difficult with our hawks here at home. I'm not sure but Mel Laird is convinced, and he really is, that all the hawks, Jerry Ford too, they want to get it over now. We don't have hawk support--I mean as far as Congress is concerned you've got a few nutheads--Agnew, did you see his letter.

K: Yes.

P: What did you think of that?

4

K: Well, he's--

P: The one that this POW wife sent in.

K: He just isn't very bright.

P: But you will talk to him, and

K: Absolutely, I will talk to him before I

P: Totally abort on this. He's to know that, I do that is important if you can get him this afternoon, Henry, and say now look, the deal is made, it's a good one--so that he can talk positively to the hawks. Will you do that?

K: I'll call him this afternoon, Mr. President

P: That will be helpful. Well, don't get discouraged--

K: Oh, no, I think we are going to make it.

P: We've been going around and around, and My God, I must say I don't know what more we could do to--

K: Well they didn't survive for 2000 years by being easy to get along with.

P: Yeah.

K: I think we are going to get it. But--

P: Yeah, but getting him reluctantly, Henry, I am very serious in saying that we--when we have to present those AID requests, it's going to be tough. You know what I mean, it hinges on the agreement.

that

K: Well if the human language can convey, we've done it. But I think the trouble is that these two fellows here are convinced, but is this little punk kid in the Pallace--

P: Have him to come over.

K: Well, we asked him to come over, he wouldn't come. He went as far as Paris and brought his instructions and then he went home. I checked with Bunker again and he thinks that it's absolutely the best we could have gotten. In fact, better than he thought we would get.

5

P: Uh huh. Did we talk to this kid.

K: No. This kid is really, that's a real tough case. He's also very young.

P: Well.

K: Twenty-nine years old, he's suddenly been elevated, he was a press officer and he suddenly becomes a key adviser.

P: Yeah. I wonder if Thieu can't be so foolish to think that he's going to--that I don't mean what I say.

K: Oh, no, I've made that again clear to them. I think--

P: You should also make it clear this afternoon that it is very painful for me to have to take these positions. But I've never said anything that I don't mean. Never.

K: Well, he's going back tomorrow and he'll be talking to Thieu personally. I believe that by the time we have this settlement worked out with the North Vietnamese next week, these fellows are going to come along.

P: But then, they ought to be on the basis that they--just as soon as it's worked out that he and I meet, but we meet for the purpose of our arranging -- for what purpose do we meet? For me to talk about the commitments?

K: That's right, and to discuss future of our relations there.

P: Future of our relations and also to discuss our interpretations of the agreement.

K: That's right. That part, of course, couldn't be made public.

P: Only after we sign it.

K: That's right.

P: I know, but I figure the way I interpret the agreement, I think that's the point you should make. That would be the purpose of it. We cannot change it. We'll discuss how we are going to interpret it.

K: Exactly.

P: And that's very important. Saigon and the rest--I want to be sure that Saigon--hell that's all they need to know, like they raise the

6

point where the agreement doesn't provide for basically trip wires,
God, it's full of trip wires.

K: It's full of trip wires, that's nonsense.

P: Henry, let me ask you a question on another subject. Tricia
was talking to Haig and Haig was raising questions about her
including Egypt, Jordan and Israel in their trip because of the
Paris problems, frankly they don't have to go there, they'd like
to--do you think there is a serious problem, do you think they
should not do it?

K: Well, there isn't one in Israel, but that's a good point about Egypt.

P: Well, they can't go to Israel without going to the other. I don't want them to go to one without the other.

K: No. They can't go to Israel without going to the Arab countries.
Let me just check with the CIA--

P: Well, I think Haig has done that, but---

K: I think that is a problem. I don't think we should take a one percent
chance of kidnapping, or--

P: Well, actually we've told them not to--why don't we just tell them
not---

K: I think it would be better, Mr. President. Jordan would be great
if they wanted to go there, it's a spectacular place anyway. And
that wouldn't have this difficulty.

P: Okay, byeHenry.

K: Thank you.

BRAISED IN

AUG 22 1979 ZF 9:01:05

B. J.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
6:02, December 1, 1972

P: Hi Henry.

K: Mr. President.

P: Have you had the meeting yet?

K: Yes, we've just finished it.

P: I figured it would be an hour too long.

K: It's tough going.

P: How does it stand, the same?

K: Well went over the details of the ceasefire, and that's working beautifully.

P: Oh, yes, I know, but that's not a problem.

K: But then at the end of it I told him about our telephone conversation, and spoke to him very seriously, and I said to him again it was something that the Americans have to feel some pride in. He gave me the same song and dance, that they can't provide the settlement and they won't sign it and--my impression is that he hadn't got any new instructions and he's just repeating his old ones. At any rate, we haven't picked up any new instructions and we usually get them.

P: Well, okay.

K: I think, Mr. President, we have no choice but to do the very best we can in Paris next week and then--you've done everything we can. I mean it's a tragedy.

P: Anybody else advising--have you talked to Laird.

K: No, I can't.

P: Well, I don't know if it would mean much. I wonder if we should Laird there ostensibly to check the ceasefire?

K: Well, we can do it. I just don't see how---

P: Well, my talking to him is one thing--I don't know. I think it's getting the message through to this fellow himself.

DECLASSIFIED

AUDIT FEB 12 76 B4444 9/10/76

7

2

K: Well--

P: But, I'm getting the cold turkey message that politically we cannot
wheat the deal unless they want to go along and that's it. Because
if they are going to @*&¢ on it, we are going to have to turn on
him. It's going to be unpleasant, but we'll just have to do it.
I can't go down to that Congress and say, here they won't sign the
agreement but we want $4 Billion for AID, Henry, it won't work.

K: Yeah.

P: As much as we would want it to.

K: Of course, I think also they are playing chicken with us, Mr.
President. I think--I frankly don't see what Laird can add to
what you've said, and it might give an impression of great in-
security. Nothing could be--I mean, more forceful of more
ominous than you have said, and --

P: Well, shall I write him another note.

K: No. I think we ought to ride with where we are now

P: Uh huh. Well, do you think you'll be down tonight, will you?

K: Yes. We can think about it and talk about it tomorrow.

P: Fine. What time will you be in the morning?

K: I'll be in tonight. So any time you want me in the morning.

P: Well, suppose you--you'll be at the 240 house I think, so that will
give you a little security and then you come--suppose we say, what
time do you think you'll be up because I have no problem, I have
nothing on in the morning.

K: Oh, I'm sure I'll be up by 8:30.

P: 8:30, well, let's say 9:30, how's that?

K: Fine.

P: 9:30, that give you a little time to sleep in a little, get ready for
the bout next week.

K: Right.

P: Well, as a matter of fact, we've gone the extra mile on the thing.

CLASSIFIED

AUG. 22 1967

BOSCHDRUKKERS

3

I suppose that if you want to regain, our problem is we've got
these guys out on the hook too early, and then had to--but how
were we to know.

K: That's probably true. Although we got from the North, I think, what they ever going to give.

P: Not going to get any more in the way of a settlement, no. Because they can't give any more than that and survive. They've got a problem too.

K: Yeah.

P: Incidentally, I hope you didn't give to him that backup position that you think we might try to negotiate.

K: No, no.

P: Then sign a separate agreement, or one without--I know that what you have in mind.

K: Well they will sign a different preamp---

P: Did I get the preamble?

K: No, I haven't done that yet.

P: Well, that's something we can sort of hold in reserve.

K: Yeah.

P: And you were through with this--- the fact that it's going to make it very difficult to get the aid. I mean, even if they go along reluctantly it's going to make it tough. How does it stand at the present time with regard to his meeting me or what have you.

K: I told them we had to have an answer and he just says he hasn't any instructions. And I gave him the---

P: Well, look, we are not going to meet him if he's going to be reluctant. Don't you agree?

K: Absolutely.

P: On that score, I imagine that we've just got to cold it right out, because I think that the American people when they see those three items--my only thought is that one call you might make if you've gotten Agnew yet by any chance?

DECLASSIFIED

AUTOMATED

DATE 7-12-69

BY J. B. SMITH

4

*

K: No. But I'll call him within the next hour.

P: Yes.

K: I have talked to Connally.

P: Yes, oh you did, good, on that other matter.

K: Yes.

P: And so, with regard to Agnew I just want him on board, just tell him what decision--if there is any of that whining just say, look, it's been decided. Will you do that.

K: Absolutely.

P: Now the other point is--the only other one is worth talking to is Laird just so that he reinforces the political judgment on it, you see. Now, here it is, what is your opinion on the political side.

K: Right.

P: Don't you think so?

K: Right.

P: Fine. At our meeting of course, Abrams just sat there like a clam as usual. Does he ever say anything.

K: No, he's not the most articulate nor the most heroic guy.

P: I don't mind the articulate, but I do mind the heroics.

K: He did the same thing in Saigon. We got him out there, and he sat there like a toad, he made one intervention after half an hour which was slightly off the subject.

P: I'll be damned. Too bad Haig isn't there now, isn't it.

K: Yes.

P: We made a mistake there.

K: Well, no, we couldn't make him feel--

P: I know, but yes, we could have. We could do a little--

K: No, I think he should be made Chairman when Moorer leaves.

UNCLASSIFIED

Author: E212 958-

Date: 6/10/93

5

P: Yep, yeah, we jumped him right off.

K: I think so.

P: Well, don't get discouraged. My own feeling is that this just one of those things like the others, that it's really no more difficult in a sense to me than--we know what is right and we know the other side is--that's the way it is, we get better as best we can and we fly.

K: Exactly.

P: I think as far as the American people are concerned, most of them don't give one damn.

K: Well, Mr. President, if you explain this agreement to the American people and say they don't come along, and just bleeding hard, we've done everything we can, we have to go it alone. I think you'll get very great support.

P: Well the support will be also to drop him.

K: Well, that's what I mean.

P: That's the problem, isn't it?

K: And it won't be that we have sold out, we have maintained our honor. It's a disaster.

P: Well, I can't believe looking at the facts as they are that he can allow it to go to that point.

K: No, or that his colleagues will.

P: Is Bunker just in his dotage, is that the problem.

K: Bunker has no real stroke there.

P: Well I think--

K: The real problem I think, Mr. President, is that Thieu has no confidence that he can win a political contest.

P: I understand.

K: And therefore, he--

6

P: Abrams saw that. He doesn't think he can walk alone.

K: Therefore he wants to be able--what he needs is unconditional surrender. A smashing victory. It isn't a victory, it is a com-promise.

P: It is a victory. We know that, it's a victory in terms of everything they've insisted on before.

K: energetic
Any/leader can play it into a victory. When I went there at the end of October, this is where--we would welcome this and play it into a victory.

P: Particularly when he was going to stay in power.

K: That's right. And this is no different from any of the provisions we've made before. It isn't that--

P: Well, I think, that--did Buckley come through with a column or not, are any of these people on our side, are any of them?

K: Well Alsop did a few weeks ago, Don Rhodes--not very influential--wrote a very good one today, and Buckley told me he would write one--

P: Well, get a hold of Joe and tell him he's got to write a tough one.

K: But Joe's in China, won't be back for a while.

P: Well get a hold of Jim and tell him he's got to write a tough one.

K: Okay.

P: Get Wilson--use your friends.

K: I think we'll manage it, Mr. President.

P: Well, we'll see. The main thing is that we'll just continue to go on and you keep in good shape, get down here and get a good night's sleep. Incidentally 9:30, if you don't wake up, we'll make it 10:00.

K: Right.

P: We'll say between 9:30 and 10:00 o'clock. By, Henry.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Autobiography

5-6-72

BAS

10/1/72

TELCONE

Roy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger

7:55 p.m., December 1, 1972

K: How are you? How nice to hear from you.

J: How nice of you to call back. I'm very well. How are you?

K: You always come when I'm in a crisis.

J: You're in a crisis are you?

K: [Laughter] No, no, I mean --

J: You've been in one for some time.

K: Last time you were here was during the India/Pakistan uproar.

J: I was indeed and we dined at the Bruces.

K: Yeah.

J: You're going away I imagine on Monday, are you?

K: Sunday. But you'll be up here next week -- down here next weekend won't you?

J: I'm going to be down here next weekend. Would you be back by then?

K: Well, If I'm not, I'll be in deep trouble.

J: Well, I hope very much I might see you then. I tell you what -- I called because I had a word with David Bruce in London last week.

K: Yes.

J: And asked him what he thought and he said he had spoke to me since I last called you and I hadn't seen the President for about 2 1/2 years.

K: Yes.

J: And I wondered whether there was any chance of having a short talk with him. I would more or less like to talk to him about how he sees some ______ policy now in relation with the EC.

K: Well, and that would be during the period that you are down here.

J: Well, I would in / normal way be down from Friday evening until Sunday evening next week.

CLASSIFIED

Published: 12/2/75 -

Date: 12/1/75

TELCOM

Roy Jenkins/Mr. Kissinger

7:55 p.m., December 1, 1972

- 2 -

K: Yes.

J: And, of course, I would come down especially during the week if that were easier for him.

K: Yes. Well, let me raise it with him. He's for all practical purposes in retreat right now.

J: I know it. It's not an easy time and ....

K: No, but I think he should see you. How long will you be in the country?

J: I'll be in the country until next Sunday night. That's 9 days from now. I must fly back to London on the quarter of eight o'clock plane on Sunday night.

K: Well, let me see what I can do.

J: Sunday week night. And obviously if one could do it the weekend when I'm in Washington, that would be better but equally I would come down.

K: Well, I will see what I can do.

J: But I haven't seen him for nearly three years and would like to very much. Particularly on this particular aspect at the present time. Thank you very much.

K: Right. He's not at this moment focusing on substance as much as he will in another week or so.

J: No, quite. No, he's focussing on appointments.

K: Exactly.

J: But I hope very much it's possible to see you.

K: Oh, certainly -- Yes, I've planned on.

J: Good. Look forward very much then. And I'll be here at this number, which you got in New York City. Except I go away tomorrow night to stay with the Harrimans in the country for 24 hours.

K: Good.

DREASPHONE

TELCONE

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 p.m., December 1, 1972

S: Henry.

K: They're naming a street after me in Saigon.

S: [Laughter]

K: Did you know that?

S: Ah -- Where? That's great! That's great. Well, the Editors in their ultimate wisdom and judgment have decided to name the President and you as men of the year.

K: Jointly?

S: Yeah.

K: O-h-h-h-h-h.

S: Yeah, really!

K: Well, I didn't really want this job after all.

S: [Laughter] I think we can do it --

K: Can you sort of make my picture infinitesimal?

S: [Laughter] Well, we'll as you say, we'll do it with dignity and --

K: Can I be on a horse?

S: [Laughter] Oh, you're terrific. Yeah, I think so. Riding into the sunset.

K: I can tell you -- as I told you yesterday or as I told somebody yesterday -- there's one part of a horse's anatomy that I've learned very well here.

S: [Laughter] Yeah, I thought that was a pretty quick recovery there. Well, I --

K: Well, I appreciate it. You know, I'm very flattered; it isn't going to help me here but to put it mildly.

S: Well, I talked with Ron and Hugh talked with Ron and I guess he'll --

TELCONE

Jerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 p.m., December 1, 1972

K: It's going to make my life unshirted hell.

S: No, it won't really.

K: Can you at least write the goddamn thing to make my subordinate position clear?

S: Yes, sir, really. I mean, that will be very clear. And that's really why I wanted to get to you because I know -- I just thought that if I could assure you and reassure you that it's going to be done in a tasteful and dignified way which I hope expresses --

K: Look, I'm enormously flattered and pleased but you know the atmosphere it courts --

S: Yes, sir. Well, [laughter] -- I think we'll be able to work it out and there will be a letter coming down from Krunwald (sp?) I think that will explain, you know, just exactly how we see this to make it clear that it's the President who is after all the decision-maker and policy-maker and as you say, your position is subordinate to his.

K: Right.

S: But it's still a very exciting relationship.

K: Oh, it's a, you know, good relationship.

S: I think that's what we want to emphasize and talk about it in terms of, you know, how you've carried out his policy.

K: Well, I guess I better give another interview to put things in perspective.

S: [Laughter] Well, I hope we'll get a chance to talk at some point later on, huh?

K: Right.

S: Good. Thanks a lot.

K: Okay. Are you going to be over there next week?

S: Yes, sir.

K: Good. Well, I'll see you then.

TELCORN

Hedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger

8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972

K: Hedley, sorry to bother you.

D: Very well.

K: I had a call from Jerry Schecter who told me that <u>Time</u> is going to make the President and me joint men of the year.

D: We've talked about that some, yes.

K: And while I'm really extremely flattered, I think anything that could be
done to avoid that honor would really help me enormously.

D: [Laughter]

K: You know, it's rather delicate relationship.

D: Oh-h-h.

K: I don't know whether that's a proper request to make.

D: Well, it's a proper point to register but I'll have to reserve some thought about it. I have to confess to you I'm the originator of the thought.

K: [Laughs] Well, I'm touched by it, Hedley. I really am very touched by it. I think it will create a very complex situation here and that is before I've talked to anybody. I don't know what their view is.

D: I'm sorry, Henry, what?

K: That is before I have talked to anybody. I mean, no one has mentioned it to me.

D: No.

K: But I have a pretty good estimate of what the impact will be.

D: Well, I think it's quite an accurate statement.

K: Well, I'm in no position to judge that. I'm more thinking of what it will do to my future usefulness.

D: Well, I'm not sure I share that point of view.

K: Well, maybe on the outside. On the outside probably not.

TELCORN

Hedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger

8:30 p.m., December 1, 1972

- 2 -

D: No, no, no, no; I don't think that.

K: Well, I think you understand my point, Hedley.

D: Oh, I do but I also think that the President takes great pride in your presence in his company and performances with some reason.

K: Well, I have not had a chance -- You know, I don't know what his reaction is or will be. I don't even know whether he knows about it.

D: I'm not sure that he does either.

K: But all of my immediate colleagues who know about it think that his pride has limites, if it takes that form.

D: He had it last year.

K: I beg your pardon.

D: He had it last year.

K: Yeah.

D: To the extent that he would be a very logical candidate this year. You're so intermingled with that --

K: Well, I'm not, you know --

D: . . . appeal to the idea of the both.

K: Hedley, I'm sure you've never had this sort of request before.

D: Well, perhaps once before. [Laughter]

K: Well, I want you to know that I'm really very flattered but that if it should transpire that he would be the sole man of the year, I would not be offended

D: No, I'm sure you would not be.

K: To put it mildly. Indeed I would be much relieved.

D: How would you feel about the other way?

K: Oh, no; that would now be impossible.

D: [Laughter]

TELCORN

Hedley Donovan/Mr. Kissinger

8:30 p. m., December 1, 1972

K: I don't know how I could disavow it but I would have --

D: ... it is not up to you.

K: Humm?

D: Fortunately, it is not up to you.

K: Yeah. No, the other way would really be very painful.

D: Well, the press is notoriously irresponsible.

K: Well, I think I've made my point. It's not really a decision that I can
make.

D: The best way to get off, which I hope doesn't happen, is for the
settlement not to be wrapped up.

K: [Laughter] Well, you've given me an idea!

D: [Laughter]

K: Okay.

D: I'm sure your sense of public interest will rise above that.

K: Well, I'll tell you I carried it beyond the election but it's --

D: Yep, you did.

K: No, I think we -- Unless both Vietnamese parties take leave of their
senses completely, we really ought to wrap it up now.

D: Yeah. Well, it would be wonderful.

K: It's just too close.

D: It must be desired.

K: Yeah, well, we're down to really issues that are so small compared
to what we started with.

D: Oh, yeah.

K: That it's almost, you know, it would be one of these tragic jokes almost
if it failed now. Well, I don't expect that.

Telecon
Richard T. Kennedy
Ambassador Dobrynin
12/6/72; 8:30 a.m.

D: Hello.

K: Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Oh, good morning, Colonel.

K: How are you, sir?

D: Thank you very much. You are up half the night.

K: The nights get shorter and the days get longer.

D: Through the winter it should be longer.

K: That's exactly right.

D: Is it the second session or is it still one?

K: No, I think it is the same one that started this morning.

D: I heard they had lunch together.

K: I suspect, yes. Sir, I have a message from Henry. He received the one that we discussed last night and he wanted me to tell you -- and let me read this, may I?

D: Is it a long one?

K: No, no, it's quite short. But let me read it and then we can go back.

D: All right.

K: Please tell Ambassador Dobrynin that he may misunderstand that the character of the situation here. It is not our side which is seeking to change substance and the character of the agreement but rather the other party. This is true specifically of the provisions of Articles 5 and 8(c).

D: Article 5?

K: And 8(c).

D: 8(c). 8(c) it was clear. Please read it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By N.M. DeSoto - 00304

-2-

K: This is the one on the civilian prisoners.

D: I know. It is not our side.

K: That's right. He says these changes are major and change the whole character of the agreement. Our side is seeking only an elaboration of these articles which in no way changes the character or principle. That's the message. You know what Article 5 is?

(c)

D: I remember very well what Article 8 because we discussed it several times with Henry when he was here. But I do not recall immediately . . .

K: Article 5 is the one which concerns withdrawals. And what is involved here is apparently a demand that it include the withdrawal of all American civilian personnel that had to do at all with the South Vietnamese military.

D: We didn't discuss this issue. We discussed withdrawal of American -- I mean withdrawal of North Vietnamese -- but we didn't discuss about withdrawal of Americans.

K: Yes.

D: So then, what they, of course, I am sure

I understand. First Article 5 and then Article 8(c).

K: Should I read it again?

D: Well, please.

K: All right. He said to tell you that -- tell Ambassador Dobrynin that he may misunderstand the character of the situation here. It is not our side (that's the US side) which is seeking to change substance and the character of the agreement but rather the other party. This is true specifically of the provisions of Articles 5 and 8(c). These changes are major (which the other side wishes) and change the whole character of the agreement. Our side (that is the US side) is seeking only an elaboration of these articles which in no way changes the character of principle.

D: Article 8(c) I know by heart.

K: Article 5 calls for the withdrawal of -- well, let me just read it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055404
By: N.W. Smith, 5-26-04

-3-

K: I'll just read it quickly. Within sixty days of the signing of this agreement there will be total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions and war materiel of the United States and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and with the Republic of Vietnam. Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and police force will also be withdrawn within the same period. Now, the North Vietnamese insist that this include all US civilian advisers as well -- that is civilian advisers which would be with the military.

D: Withdraw all. I understand. As I understand you mention there is no big trouble with the other provisions.

K: Yes. Well, ...

D: 8(c) I did anticipate because I said to Henry this is one of ______ with them. I did discuss ... if it would be restored to the October ______. We discussed it this way.

K: What the North Vietnamese want to add in is simply words that say you will withdraw all the military personnel including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program and they would simply add something that would read like and civilian personnel associated with military training, supply, maintenance, storing, use and repair of war materiel.

D: ____________________________________________________

K: Yes, that's right. Training, supply, maintenance, storing, use and repair.

D: I understand ____________________________________________________.

K: Oh, well, that is not the case.

D: For this we will discuss with Henry. ______ hope will/discussion and they will find a way out. Now I understand. I know last week that they did raise this question.

K: Yes, but ...

D: But never discussed it so I didn't specifically pay much attention to this one but now I understand. All right, I will mention this to Moscow. They have to know. But that is the reason for the timebeing and more specifically . . . because as he understood when mentioned by Henry when we talked he said ______ come back as it was in October then he will agree practically with the other three issues. That was his formulation, really. Okay, I will tell it to Moscow. Am I correct to say that as to the other ______ not big trouble on the other issue

K: This I cannot say because of course this was given to me just a little while ago this morning. I am sure they are discussing now.

D: You didn't talk with him he was in a meeting?

K: No, I talked to him but they were at the meeting, I believe.

D: Oh, I see. If you have a chance to speak with him briefly

Are they going more or less, of course, I am sure maybe they have some because I remember when he told me -- he said Article 8(c) is very important. This is important for Moscow to know. As for now -- what about these other things -- more or less all right.

K: All right, sir. I will let you know as soon as I reach them.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Thank you very much, sir. Bye.

D: Bye-bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: NARODNAYNA

Telcon

11:50 p.m. 12-6-72

Kennedy/ "D"

K: Hello.

D: Yes, Good Evening sir.

K: Good evening sir, how are you? I am sorry to be troubling you again.

D: Well, that is alright.

K: We seem to do all our business at night. Sir, I have another message which Henry wanted me to give to you. Can I read it so you can write it down?

D: Is it a long one?

K: Well, not too long, a little bit.

At this point Col Kennedy dictated HAKTO 18 to D as follows:

BEGIN QUOTE:

At tomorrow's session both sides are committed to presenting their minimum requirements. It is now obvious that Hanoi will attempt to extract major changes for any changes which the U.S. seeks. They invariably react in an extremely imbalanced way to require modifications which alter the fundamental character of the agreement. Nevertheless the U.S. must achieve the following rock-bottom alterations:

(1) obtain the proper Vietnamese phrase for "administrative structure."

(2) Provide for the establishment of a target date of three months for the demobilization provision to provide the period during which the parties will do their utmost to resolve this question. This will make this provision parallel to the ones covering the other tasks included in paragraphs 8 (c) (South Vietnamese prisoners) and 12 (a) (resolution of the political problems.)

(3) Provision of some reference in the agreement which relates to the integrity of the territories of North and South Vietnam or establishes the principle of the non-use of force between the North and South during the post-settlement period.

(4) Provide for the implementation of a ceasefire in Laos within 10 days vice 30 days.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01 2255
By N.W. Page 56

The above are the rock-bottom U. S. positions. Failure to achieve
any of them must result in the termination of the talks. These are a
drastically distilled final position which is unalterable and cannot be
subject to modification. Nor can we accept counterbalancing changes
demanded by the other side which fundamentally modify other features
of the agreement.

END QUOTE:

K: Now let me see if I can check that 30 days business.

D: And I will read this back for myself, okay. I will just read
through.

[pause]

K: Hello

D: I'm just reading for myself, just once again with out loud,
because out loud I don't understand what I am reading.

[pause]

When is it are they to presenting their views, ahh, this is
position ...... either point, or he does it for observations.
I don't understand it, the first sentence.

K: Both sides are committed to presenting their minimum require-
ments?

D: Yes, that means that either one to present their minimum requirements, or Henry does have some reservations?

K: No, I think he is saying this, that each will do this.

D: Oh, they agree that one. [pause]

Yes, I read it. Well quite frankly I could do this way. If Except
for number one, all that we will discuss with me -- for me and
for my government we'll do the completely in your paragraph.
I don't think that for you as much as ______ a problem or not.
But we can discuss this paragraph with ______. Bo--

K: Except for the first one.

D: Yes, so for me a new one in this sense that I must prepare to
even give a command because I have to look in ______
and look how they are. We can discuss with him the phrase.
So I give for my government on anything but ______
We discussed as I mentioned to you fourth paragraph.

K: Yes, the four points.

DECLASSIFIED
 authority E012055
 By: W.A. Spurr

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012054
By W. M. Pauley 005404

D: Also, reasons - there really is only one. Just one and very indirect way it is paragraph 2 bothers. But it all accounts with __________. You see it in a different context.

K: Yes.

D: So, my present reservations, of course I will report to my government what you just mention for them to know. Second I am sure it will be rather difficult for them to act on this particular message because neither __________ nor I know anything specific, I should say, because they have to consult. And they will be in touch with __________. It is more difficult. Because on a __________ something at this stage, everything was clear, I got remind them what was told by Henry and they already knew everything by heart.

K: Yes.

D: This is a little bit more complicated you see. You understand now we are in a discussion of the questions we didn't even discuss with you at all.

K: Yes.

D: I would like you to understand with Henry.

K: Yes.

D: I promise to send it to Moscow but on the other hand it will be much more difficult for my leaders to __________ look now because for them this particular paragraph will be different. I'm sure they give it special __________. They will give a new one.

K: Uh huh.

D: This is a second observation and if you would rather, we can discuss all the things with them. Henry promised to me not to give them any difficult. __________ And this looks more like a __________ really. It is more important for out with communications with Hanoi to __________ demand all these. But I don't know how my government will settle this subject, the last one. But I promise I will send to Moscow right away.

K: All right, sir.

D: And in any case, now in Paris it is 8 o'clock--in Moscow I mean. What I will write them, send them, they will refuse on the grounds Noon. At noon in Paris it will be 2 hours difference, it will be 10 o'clock.

3

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EAI2057
By: MW, Myles 5-20-94

K: Yes.

D: It will be less than four hours. We can't soon do anything in four hours to communicate with Hanoi, because we have write and receive it here. They each other write cables. So, I put it this way, it is my personal observation, I will do second give them the major things, the third one now Henry will patiently, both of them,

This is the situation as I look realistically. For me Moscow yes I say, I will send this off. It is not so easy for me to act on this one, on this particular last message. I sure it will be very helpful for them to understand in Moscow what the situation now is really concentrate, because now--up to now, there was really rather feeling about the fourth paragraph as the major one, and they consider it, and may make rather a new one. They may say the same demand but a little differently way. It's now easy to compare it right now ________. So this is kind of difficult as I am sure you understand.

K: Yes.

D: This message, really, I will send it immediately and hope everything is all right. ________

Rather I should say in general in all the details I'm not sure, a little bit personally, you know sometimes it is better to sit down and discuss them.

K: Yes.

D: On this four, they discuss all, including the top men. Now it is a new one thing. So i hope he will look, but he may not. Tomorrow-- it is not easy--give them time to look and time to get into Hanoi, but immediately. I do hope that they will find on the basis of what we discussed, that they will find out. But I will send this right away. This I promise. Keep in touch tomorrow, okay.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

4

Takeon

11:50 p. m. 12-6-72

Kennedy / "D"

K: Hello.

D: Yes, Good Evening sir.

D: Well, that is alright.

D: Is it a long one?

BEGIN QUOTE:

At tomorrow's session both sides are committed to presenting their minimum requirements. It is now obvious that Hanoi will attempt to extract major changes for any changes which the U.S. seeks. They invariably react in an extremely imbalanced way to require modifications which alter the fundamental character of the agreement. Nevertheless the U. S. must achieve the following rick-bottom alterations:

(1) obtain the proper Vietnamese phase for "administrative structure."

3

D: Also, reasons - there really is only one. Just one and very indirect way it is paragraph 2 bothers. But it all accounts with ____________. You see it in a different context.

K: Yes.

D: So, my present reservations, of course I will report to my government what you just mentioned for them to know. Second I am sure it will be rather difficult for them to act on this particular message because neither man they nor I know anything specific, I should say, because they have to consult. And they will be in touch with ____________. It is more difficult. Because on a ____________ something at this stage, everything is clear. I got round them what was told by Henry and they already know everything by heart.

K: Yes.

K: Yes.

K: Yes.

D: I promise to send it to Moscow but on the other hand it will be much more difficult for my leaders to tell him now because for them this particular paragraph will be different. I'm sure they give it special ____________. They will give a new one.

K: Uh huh.

D: This is a second observation and if you would rather, we can discuss all the things with them. Henry promised to me not to give them any difficult. ____________. And this looks more like a ____________ really. It is more important for us with communications with Hanoi to ____________ demand all these. But I don't know how my government will settle this subject, the last one. But I promise I will send to Moscow right away.

K: All right, sir.

DERASSIFIED

Author: E. P. Stetson

B-59 (S/M) DEC 14 1968

Telcon

D/Kennedy

8:00 p.m.

12/7/72

K: Sir, I have another message from Henry. I wonder if I could do this -
I have someone here with some business from the President. I wonder if
Cdr. Howe can read you the message.

D: Is it long?

K: About the same as last night.

D: I would like you to tell privately to Henry. We have had two discussions
already with the North Vietnamese and based on information you give to
me on the last one or the previous one it was quite a meeting. They are
complaining that the negotiations with Henry are very difficult and they
are very tough. They don't know whether it will go or not but maybe there
will still be agreement. I hope the talks will go alright but I am not so sure.

K: This is Moscow or North Vietnamese?

D: We hope.

K: Oh, you hope, I see.

D: The North Vietnamese continue to complain that negotiations with him
are very difficult and he is very tough. He gave example of position and
how it was presented. The morning session of yesterday . . . . After
yesterday's morning session. I don't have second part yet, probably
tomorrow. Could Cdr. Howe read me the message now?

K: He will give it to you.

H: Mr. Ambassador, I will go ahead and give you the gist of it and then --

D: Give me gist of it and I will write it down.

H: Reads cable.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: N.W. St. Date: 12/7/72

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: N.W.APR. 003404

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kennedy

9:11 p.m., December 7, 1972

K: Mr. Ambassador, please excuse me for being so late in getting back to
you.

D: No, no; I do understand. You are engaged in quite an operation.

K: We're a little busy. (laughter)

D: I understand. I haven't chance to read this but yesterday there was four
points. Now it's only three points. What is left? I don't have yet exactly
yesterday's.

K: Now let me see what we had yesterday.

D: Yesterday you mentioned only four.

K: Let me see now -- Let me get that. So many papers.

D: The best way to burn all of them and then to burn all the copies.

K: I think that's exactly --

D: Yes, and then everybody is so happy. [Laughter]

K: Ah, December 7th. Here we are.

D: That means it is still __________, yes?

K: It began at tomorrow's session.

D: No, I mean, yesterday it was ....... instructions too, yes? No, I am
just looking in today's message from Henry he mentioned three points.
Yesterday it was four points.

K: Yes, I know, I am just looking.

D: Oh, I see, okay, go ahead.

K: He said yesterday there were the four rock bottom alterations.

D: Yeah. Now fortunately all this rock bottom has really disappeared.
[Laughter] It became shorter.

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kennedy
9:11 p. m., December 7, 1972

- 2 -

K: Let's see now, what did they take care of. They took care of the -- I think when he says "With respect to the change on Laos and Cambodia . . ." they made a modification they found acceptable.

D: But yesterday there was no Cambodia.

K: No, no; that's right. But they did have the one about Laos, which was the fourth point.

D: It was Laos, it was yesterday I think. So maybe it's about instead of 30 days it said something should be 10 days.

K: That's right. Could you wait one second while I put this down -- to get something else. Yes, I think that's right. I think that's what he was saying in his message to you. I think he was saying this. That that was the fourth point; they took care of the fourth point.

D: Yeah, I think this was really about Laos.

K: Uh-huh, that's right. Then, let's see, the second point was -- Well, the first point of the four yesterday -- the Administrative structure.

D: It remains.

K: It remains.

D: Yeah.

K: We change the word however of the name of the thing, you see.

D: He phrases it in the first point number one ... you had objected to the title administration and settled for council. What does it mean? I don't quite understand.

K: Oh, he means in the text it is called -- I'll read the text.

D: Okay.

K: Here we are. It says in the text it is called the National Administration I think. At one point they had called it National Administration of National Reconciliation. Now they have changed it and use the word council. It would be the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord.

D: But the Concord was there too?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012955

By N.M. Laing

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kennedy

9:11 p.m., December 7, 1972

- 3 -

K: Yes, at one point. But I think they were changing it to "Administration."

D: Oh, I see. It was called and now they call -- But this was what the Council was originally in the October 26, Council for Reconciliation and so on.

K: Yes.

D: This is exactly --

K: But then someone --

D: Is it the same Council?

K: I think so.

D: Oh, I see. But he said you had objected to the title and settled for Council. But for Council it was settled in October and last week they settled for Council, so what is new? I don't quite understand.

K: Apparently in the meantime they changed it.

D: And then come back again?

K: Yes.

D: That could be.

K: Now let's see -- Now they say -- I think what he's saying here, we accepted the phrase because of its meaning in English. They used a Vietnamese translation --

D: I know this. ...

K: But you see, what he's saying is that's not a correction.

D: I know this. As far as the first, I could understand quite clearly. The only thing on which I'm not clear is phrase which said we had objected to title administration and settled for council. This was not quite clear because my impression -- I know about the phrase which you try to clear but why it is mentioned in the text -- but it doesn't matter. On the second, it is quite clear.

K: Let's see -- the second point.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
Date: 12/01/1972
By: WW

- 4 -

D: Practically the same.

K: I think that's right.

D: Yeah. Except he's a little bit -- if I'm not mistaken --

K: The three-month target date for discussion on the demobilization.
Which is again what he was asking for.

D: It was in yesterday's. It was a little different there but --

K: But it's essentially the same. So I think what he's saying is that they
did not agree. They did not agree to the one that we asked for which was
number two.

D: Which was number two?

K: Number two yesterday.

D: Yes.

K: They did not agree.

D: Yes, well, they -- it just shows that on allowance there was agreement or
I guess it's one way or another, yes? Because Henry didn't mentioned --

K: They did agree. They did agree, you see.

D: Specifically on Laos.

K: Yes.

D: And that's all, for the others they did not.

K: On these others in this thing they did not, that is correct. These other
three things they did not.

D: Three out of four left.

K: That's correct.

D: So this is my understanding, yes.

K: This is correct, that's right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: N.W.aga 5/26/74
J.304

D: What is the general situation? I mean, is there --

K: Well, they're going to meet again tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow, yes.

K: Yes.

D: Tomorrow, yes. Tomorrow will be Friday.

K: That's right. They will meet tomorrow afternoon again about 3 o'clock.

D: I see.

K: Now as we have said, if they're still talking, they have something to talk about.

D: Yeah. [Laughter] Well, I think both sides continue to talk because I understand both sides press their own issue. It's negotiation, so to speak.

K: Yes, that's right.

D: And rather hard one and that's why the North Vietnamese complaining on Henry, that he is making a very difficult negotiation and he is ..... [change in tapes]

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: W.N.aga 5/20/72
Date 05/04/72

- 6 -

K: That Moscow had a discussion with the North Vietnamese

D: They consider the situation very difficult because they are complaining - as I mentioned to you -- the morning session, yesterday's morning session. And they said from the beginning it was only, there was discussion as they put it on political prisoners. The whole session dealt with political prisoners and there was very little changes or communication. This for them was very difficult to accept - so this was the discussion but nothing else. They told me all the other things were discussed in the second part of yesterday's meeting. This I presume because I have - as I mentioned - up to including yesterday's morning session. So this is it - they feel that Henry is too tough for them. Tomorrow he will likely be in touch with the President and he said they will be going to continue discussions today. So this is the idea. We discuss with them and they explain our position and we explain them again. So this is as the situation stands now. It depends on both sides, quite frankly. I am sure you have your points and they have their points. This is so. This is as I mentioned up to yesterday.

K: My own impression is that the North Vietnamese are being very tough indeed.

D: Well, they are. They are, you see what really happened, because in October they make two or three major concessions in one day. They give just for the sake of signing the agreement before on the target date to reach a settlement on the 30th or 31st. For the sake of the meeting of the second day we discussed with them at this point and of course we knew what it was about and we discussed with them. Well they said alright we are prepared to do it because . . . for the sake of political prisoners. They were prepared to accept this, do you remember? So without really. . . and Henry Got mad. So when Henry came back from Saigon. . . . Quite frankly we were not expecting them to accept so soon. But they made it a decision in two days, I guess it was. It was a new demand you asked them to do and they accepted. They mentioned in October that they are really doing best to finalize the war and have a peaceful ending. I got the impression that really they meant it. For the sake of signing the agreement. So I hope everything will be alright. I don't envy Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By: N.V. Sato
Date: 12/04

TelCon:2:45:12/9/72

Mr. Kennedy/
Minister Vorontsov

V: Hello.

K: Minister Vorontsov, how are you sir?

V: Colonel Kennedy.

K: Yes.

V: How are you Colonel?

K: I am fine thank you Mr. Minister. I was just sort of alerting you all - General Haig will be back in Washington tonight rather late and called me and would like very much to meet with the Ambassador tomorrow morning - later in the morning.

V: I see. The Ambassador will be here so it could be arranged easily.

K: Good, I just wanted to be sure that you know - that he would be aware of this.

V: Right. I will warn him and he will be in the Embassy. What time approximately?

K: Well, I would think, it is going to be so late when he gets in he will want to get a little sleep.

V: Yes, certainly.

K: So, I would think it would be later on in the morning. I am sure sometime after 10:00, maybe even later than that.

V: 10:00 or 11:00.

K: Is that alright?

V: I think it is alright. The Ambassador will be here and his plans were to be here in the Embassy.

K: Very good.

V: So, I will alert him and we shall hear from you?

K: Right. We will call in the morning then.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12057504
By: N.M. 5-7-80

TelCon:12/10/72 (Approx. 4:00 pm)
General Haig/ Ambassador Dobrynin

H: Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes. Hello General.

H: I just wanted to confirm to you - I talked to Henry and he has moved Monday's meeting - from 10 o'clock in the morning til 3 o'clock. That will give us a little more time.

D: Yes, but it is still awfully tight.

H: Awfully tight - I told him.

D: Because you could calculate by yourself ____ Washington to Moscow, Moscow to Hanoi, and Paris.

H: Yes.

D: ____ better in the afternoon then in the morning.

H: Well, I told him that - to be patient.

D: Yes. OK.

H: Fine Mr. Ambassador and thank you.

D: Thank you.

H: I will stay here tomorrow. Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: N.M. DeSoto-00304