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'87.04.20 08:47

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HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, April 26, 1987

(c) 1987, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Ennio Caretto,
Washington correspondent of La Stampa.

Q: In some parts of Europe, there is a feeling that President Reagan's standing has suffered because of Iranscam and difficulties with Congress, and at the same time there is a feeling that the stature of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev is increasing. Do you think that this is so, and do you think that this has changed or is going to influence some way the relationship in between the two countries in the next year?

A: President Reagan has suffered some losses in prestige in the United States, primarily because of the difference between his public position and his private position. That is to say, he publicly said he was against arms to Iran and privately he sold arms to Iran. This was contrary to how Americans thought of President Reagan. Also, the Ayatollah Khomeini is one of the most unpopular men in America. However, I believe that this a temporary phenomenon.

Unless something new is discovered, I believe that the worst of the Iran crisis is over, and within a year it will be difficult to remember exactly what the crisis was about. I'm talking now about inside the United States. If there's no economic recession, the standing of President Reagan with Americans by this time next year will again be very high.

As to the increase in Gorbachev's prestige, there is no doubt that he is the most skillful man in public relations that the Soviet Union has ever had, and so he is getting more attention, especially in Europe. That does not affect the bargaining position of President Reagan because I think that on any major issue the American public will support President Reagan.

The defeat on the highway bill has to do with domestic politics. That bill was skillfully constructed so that enough senators had something to gain in their states that a vote against it was a very difficult decision. It was not a decisive element.

Q: What about Mr. Gorbachev's policies? Do you see any similarity to Mikita Khrushchev? Do you think he'll be staying longer in power?

A: People forget that Khrushchev stayed nearly 10 years in power. One has to remember two things: Gorbachev's policies domestically have many similarities to Khrushchev's. Secondly, Khrushchev pursued the most aggressive foreign policy in the postwar period, so therefore there is no inevitable relationship between a reformist domestic policy and a calm foreign policy. I think that it will be very difficult for Gorbachev to succeed domestically, and that paradoxically may make it

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difficult for him to make real concessions internationally. The present
arms control negotiations have the unfortunate characteristic that they
benefit the Soviet Union more than the West and therefore one cannot
judge Gorbachev's goodwill from these negotiations. One can judge his
tactical skill. He has used Western proposals for what I consider the
disadvantage of the West.

Q: On the issues of the disarmament, there has been disagreement in the Western alliance. Do you think this division can be overcome?

A: First of all there are several divisions within the Western
alliance. There is a division between military technicians. Some
Europeans want an automatic coupling of Europe and the United States by
placing American strategic missiles in Europe. Some Americans want to
make sure that the United States has the final decision and those
Americans have a tendency to combine with neutralist Europeans to pull
nuclear weapons out of Europe. Then, too, the broad detente element in
Europe and the neutralist element believes that the United States has
been too inflexible, and conservative Americans think that the
Europeans have been too soft.

The fact of the matter is that there's a big difference between the
rhetoric of the Reagan Administration and its policies. The rhetoric
has been very tough. The policies have not been so tough. To overcome
these differences, there must be first a clear strategic view in the
United States. What is the strategy with which the West is going to be
defended? Secondly, it requires greater European unity so that there is
a clear-cut political and strategic view in Europe. It is unnatural
that an issue as important as the nuclear defense of Europe should be
negotiated by Moscow and Washington without the presence of Europeans.

Q: Some Europeans are afraid that it's very difficult to get results
on deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative and they see SDI as a
stabilizing factor.

A: Many Europeans are against the Strategic Defense Initiative.
They're also against an American counterforce capability like the MX or
the Pershing. At the same time they're in favor of a nuclear defense of
Europe as long as it is conducted from America or from the sea. Now I
would like them to explain to me how these views can be reconciled. If
we cannot limit damage to ourselves by a counterforce strategy, and if
we are excluded from having a defense, that means that we are committed
to a strategy of national suicide. And why should Americans be willing
to accept devastation in defense of Europe that Europeans are not
willing to accept in their own defense? That is the dilemma. Now what
do they mean when they say that the Strategic Defense Initiative will
create tension between the United States and the Soviet Union or
between the West and the Soviet Union? Why should it create a tension?
Why is it wrong to have weapons that are aimed at weapons, but
desirable to have weapons that are aimed at people? In a rational
world, you would say that you should negotiate a balance between
offense and defense of a kind that makes aggression unrewarding for
either side. In an irrational world, you would say that you gamble
everything on mass extermination and then you have created a situation
worse than World War I which started because people could not get
control of their mobilization schedules and killed 20 million people
over an issue that two years later nobody could any longer explain. Now
we would kill 200 million people in a week on both sides. So if we say
it creates tension, what we're really saying is that the Soviets have

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achieved a veto over Western nuclear defense strategy. And if the
Soviets have a veto over Western defense strategy, we must not be
surprised if the proposals they're pushing are disadvantageous to the
West.

Q: People also are saying that because of the presence of a Strategic Defense Initiative the political autonomy of Europe would diminish or would disappear.

A: Again that is something that I have great difficulty understanding. First of all, the technology that produces a defense for America can produce the same kind of defense for Europe. Secondly, I do not understand why a defended America makes Europe less autonomous. I would have thought that a defended America is a better guarantee for European security at least as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. SDI can be applied to European circumstances. There could be an umbrella for Europe or they could share the same umbrella. The physical principles are the same. The technicians tell me that it is relatively easier to do it with missiles aimed at Europe than with missiles aimed at the United States.

Q: Should the Europeans be aiming for a zero option on short-range missiles, too?

A: The discussion of these missiles shows the trap we are in because the Soviets have said they will not agree to our building them up. So we face a choice between a Soviet advantage or zero, and both are bad choices. The Soviet advantage is a bad choice for obvious reasons, but zero is another bad choice because if we remove both medium-range missiles and short-range missiles we would be left with nuclear weapons that can devastate only one country -- Germany. In the end, people in Germany will say they will not be the nuclear battleground -- and you will notice Gorbachev has already proposed a denuclearized zone in the center of Europe -- so we are now tending toward the denuclearization of Europe. Now for 40 years European defense has relied on nuclear weapons. Stigmatizing nuclear weapons is much more disadvantageous to the West than to the Soviet Union. One, because the Soviet Union has a conventional advantage and, two, because the Soviet Union doesn't have to worry so much about its public opinion. The zero option for short-range weapons will be another disaster.

Q: If the Soviet aim is denuclearization of Europe, what about the
french and the British nuclear forces?

A: The Soviets will permit the British and French nuclear forces to continue for a while because it will elaborate a distinction between Britain and France on the one side and the Federal Republic and Italy on the other. Then the Soviets undoubtedly will link them to the strategic discussions. What I would like to see Britain and France do is to set a minimum is coordinate their forces and form such a tight political union in Western Europe that the credibility of the use of British and French nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic and Italy becomes greater. Europe has to start with greater coordination of nuclear weapons and then reinforce conventional forces.

Q: If in a couple of months, even less, there's going to be a summit of the seven powers, what would you suggest they give the precedence on their agenda?

A: Well, the economic summit is really not well suited for military issues because Japan is a member, but I think a major topic should be the growth of the developing countries and particularly the

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International debt question. We have incipient trade wars. We have
heavy indebtedness, both in the developing countries and in the United
States. We have the currency of the largest economic unit in the
industrial world falling. Up to a certain point that makes sense, but
beyond that certain point it can produce a recession first in Europe
and Japan and then spread into the United States. And if the dollar
falls too far, we have to raise interest rates here. That will
contribute to a recession. Falling exports will produce a recession in
Europe and Japan. Raising interest rates will produce a recession in
the United States. Raising interest rates will make the international
debt question even more difficult, so we have the makings of a huge
financial crisis.

Q: Is there still time to prevent an economic crisis?

A: Yes, but they cannot keep waiting. Certainly on the debt question they have to make a political commitment to economic growth. On the issues between the industrial democracies, I think we have to agree on trade deficits that are politically tolerable between Japan and the rest of the world and then let Japan figure out how to handle that.

Q: There was great difficulty in forming a united front against terrorism. Do you think it is possible to achieve something more in that field?

A: Well, I think by now there is more of a unity on terrorism. I believe that fundamentally on terrorism three elements are needed: No negotiation with terrorists. Secondly, penalties against the terrorists where possible. And third, penalties against countries that encourage terrorism. Now what these penalties should be -- economic, political, military -- that is hard to define in the abstract.

Q: Do you feel that Italian foreign policy is more active now than in the past?

A: I think Italian foreign policy is more active and actually Italy has played a very constructive role in recent years, and I think will continue to do so after the election, no matter what happens.

Q: Do you feel they have a special role in the Mediterranean as some would want them?

A: Well, I think that as Italy conducts a more active part in politics, its geographic location obviously will play an important role.

Q: Do you think there is a danger that the United States policy in Central America is going to be paralyzed?

A: Well, it will be very much more difficult because the administration wants to aid the contras, the Congress has now one more justification in its mind for not aiding the contras, so there's a great danger that both elements of our government will paralyze each other, that enough will be done to keep us involved but not enough to make a difference. If there's no pressure on the Sandinista government, we will find that negotiations will also not work, and I'm in favor of a negotiated solution that removes the Cubans and limits the Nicaraguan armed forces. I think the United States should be more modest in trying to effect domestic transformations in other countries, either with governments of the left or with governments of the right. So I would focus on the foreign conduct of governments more than on their domestic conduct. But I think it will prove very difficult to have an adequate negotiating solution also as the pressures diminish.

Q: You don't agree with President Reagan's view of a messianic

[L.C.T]

APR 16 1967

HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW
With Ennio Caretto of La Stampa

Q: In some parts of Europe, there is a feeling that President Reagan's standing has suffered because of Iranconam and difficulties with Congress, and at the same time there is a feeling that the stature of General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev is increasing. Do you think that this is so and do you think that this has changed or is going to influence some way the relationship in between the two countries in the next year?

A: President Reagan has suffered some losses in pretence in the United States, primarily because of the difference between his public position and his private position. That is to say, he publicly said he was against arms to Iran and privately he sold arms to Iran. This was contrary to how Americans thought of President Reagan. Also, the Ayatollah Khomeini is one of the most unpopular men in America. However, I believe that this is a temporary phenomenon.

Unless something new is discovered, I believe that the worst of the Iran crisis is away, and within a year it will be difficult to remember exactly what the crisis was about. I'm talking now about inside the United States. If there's any economic reduction, the standing of President Reagan with Americans by this time next year will again be very high.

As to the increase in Gorbachev's prestige, there is no doubt that he is the most skillful man in public relations that the Soviet Union has ever had, and so he is getting more attention, especially in Europe. That does not affect the bargaining position of President Reagan because Gorbachev's standing in the United States has not gone up all that much, and I think that on any major issue the American public will support President Reagan.

Q: What about Mr. Gorbachev's policies. Do you see any similarity to Nikita Khrushchev? Do you think he'll be staying longer in power?

A: People forgot that Khrushchev stayed nearly 10 years in power. What one has to remember is two things: Gorbachev's policies domestically have many similarities to Khrushchev's. Secondly, Khrushchev pursued the most aggressive foreign policy in the postwar period, so therefore there is no inevitable relationship between a reformist domestic policy and a calm foreign policy. I think that it will be very difficult for Gorbachev to succeed domestically, and that paradoxically may make it difficult for him to make real concessions internationally. The present arms control negotiations have the unfortunate characteristic that they benefit the Soviet Union more than anyone else and therefore one cannot judge his goodwill from then. Negotiations. One can judge his tactical skill. He has used western proposals for what I consider the disadvantage of the West.

A: First of all there are several divisions within the Western alliance. There is a division between military technicians. Some Westerners want an automatic sampling as Russia and the United States.

EYESWORN 84-15-87

round 1

Some American want to make sure that the United States has the final decision and those Americans have a tendency to combine with neutralist Europeans to pull weapons out of Europe. That's the sort of transactional element in Europe and the neutralist element believes that the United States has been too infloxible, and conservative Americans think that the Europeans have been too soft.

The fact of the matter is that there's a big difference between the rhetoric of the Reagan Administration and its policies. The rhetoric has been very tough. The policies have not been so tough. To overcome those differences, there must be first a clear strategic view in the United States. What is the strategy with which the West is going to be defended? Secondly, it requires greater European unity so that there is a clear-cut political and strategic view in Europe. It is strange that an issue as important as the nuclear defense of Europe should be negotiated by Moscow and Washington without the presence of Europeans.

Q: Some Europeans are afraid that it's very difficult to get results on deployment or the Strategic Defense Initiative and they see SDI as a destabilizing factor.

A: We're coming into a very strange situation. Many Europeans are American counterforce capability like the MX or the Parshing. At the same time they're in favor of a nuclear defense of Europe as long as it is conducted from America or from the sea. Now I would like them to explain to me how that is possible? If we cannot limit damage to our solvents by a counterforce strategy, and if we are excluded from having a defense, that means that we are committed to a strategy of national annihilation. And why should Americans be willing to accept devastation in defense of Europe that Europeans are not willing to accept in their own defense? That is the dilemma. Now what do they mean when they say that the Strategic Defense Initiative will create tension between the United States and the Soviet Union or between the West and the Soviet Union? Why should it create a tension? Why is it wrong to have weapons that are aimed at weapons, but desirable to have weapons that are aimed at people? In a rational world you would say that you should negotiate a balance between offense and defense of a kind that makes aggression unrewarding for either side. In an irrational world, you would say that you gamble everything on mass extermination and then you have created a situation worse than World War I which started because people could not get control of their mobilization schedules and killed 20 million people over an issue that two years later nobody could any longer explain. Now we would kill 200 million people in a week on both sides. So if we say it creates tension, what were really saying is that the Soviets have achieved a veto over Western defense strategy. And if the Soviets have a veto over Western defense strategy, we must not be surprised if the proposals they're pushing are disadvantageous to the West.

INTERVIEW 04-15-07

PAGE 3

European unity. EDI can be applied to European circumstances. There could be an umbrella for Europe or they could share the same umbrella. The physical principles are the same. The techniques will show that it is relatively easier to do it with missiles aimed at Europe than with missiles aimed at the United States.

A: The discussion of these missiles shows the trap we are in because the Soviets have said they will not agree to our building them up. So we face a choice between a Soviet advantage over us, and that would have choices. The Soviet advantage is a bad choice for obvious reasons, but zero is another bad choice because if we remove this medium range missiles and short-range missiles we would be left with nuclear weapons that can devastate only one country Germany. In the end, people in Germany will say they will not be the nuclear battleground and you will notice Corbachov has already proposed a denuclearized zone in the center of Europe so we are now tending toward the denuclearization of Europe. Now for 40 years European defense has relied on nuclear weapons. Etiamatizing nuclear weapons is much more disadvantageous to the West than to the Soviet Union. One, because the Soviet Union has a conventional advantage and, two, because the Soviet Union doesn't have to worry so much about its public opinion. The zero option for short-range weapons will be another disaster.

Q: If the Soviet aim is denuclearization of Europe, what about the French and the British nuclear forces?

A: The Soviets will permit the British and French nuclear forces to continue for a while because it will elaborate a distinction between Britain and France on the one side and the Federal Republic and Italy on the other. Then they will bring them in to the strategic discussions. What I would like to see Britain and France do at a minimum is coordinate their forces and form such a light political union in Western Europe that the credibility of the use of British and French nuclear weapons in the defense of the Federal Republic and Italy becomes greater. Europe has to start with greater coordination of nuclear weapons and then reinforce conventional forces.

Q: If in a couple of months, even less, there's going to be a summit of the seven powers. What would you suggest they give the precedence on their agenda?

A: Well, the economic summit is really not well suited for military issues because Japan is a member, but I think a major topic should be the growth of the developing countries and particularly the international debt question. We have incipient trade wars. We have heavy indebtedness, both in the developing countries and in the United States. We have the currency of the largest economic unit in the industrial world falling. Up to a certain point that makes sense, but beyond that certain point it can produce a recession first in Europe and Japan and then spread into the United States. And if the dollar falls too far, we have to raise interest rates here. That will contribute to a recession. Falling exports will produce a recession in Europe and Japan. Raising interest rates will produce a recession in the United States. Raising interest rates will make the international debt question even more difficult, so we have the making of a huge financial crisis.

Q: Is there still in time to prevent an economic crisis?

INTERVIEW 04-15-87

PAGE 4

A: Yes, but they cannot keep waiting. Certainly on the debt question they have to make a political commitment to economic growth. On the issue between the industrial democracies, I think we have to agree on a large deficit that is politically tolerable between Japan and the rest of the world and then let Japan figure out how to handle that.

A: Well, I think by now there is more of a unity on terrorism. I believe that fundamentally on terrorism it requires three elements. No negotiation with terrorists. Secondly, penalties against the terrorists where possible. And third, penalties against countries that encourage terrorism. Now what those penalties should be -- economic, political, military, that is hard to define in the abstract.

Q: Did you feel that Italian foreign policy is more active now than in the past?

A: I think Italian foreign policy is more active and actually fairly has played a very constructive role in recent years, and I think it will continue to do so after the election no matter what happens.

Q: Do you think there is a danger that the American policy, the United States policy in Central America is going to be paralyzed?

A: Well, it will be very much more difficult because the Administration wants to aid the contras, the Congress has now one more justification in its mind for not aiding the contras, so there's a great danger that both elements of our government will paralyze each other, that enough will be done to keep us involved, but not enough to make a difference. If there's no pressure on the Contras, the Contras will find that negotiations will also not work, and I'm in favor of a negotiated solution that removes the Cubans and limits the Nicaraguan armed forces. I think the United States should be more modest in trying to effect domestic transformations in other countries, either with governments of the left or with governments of the right. So I would focus on the foreign conduct of governments more than on their domestic conduct. But I think it will prove very difficult to have an adequate negotiating solution even as the pressures diminish.

Q: You don't agree with President Reagan's view of a messianic Nicaragua, a messianic Cuba.

A: No, I believe that to some extent there's a messianic Nicaragua, but if all the Cubans were removed from Nicaragua, and if its armed forces were reduced, I think it would be less able to be messianic.