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The third meeting of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, January 12, 1955, at 5:30 p.m. Present were: Paul Nitze, Discussion Leader; Gordon Dean, Chairman; Carroll L. Wilson, Research Secretary; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hamilton Fish Armstrong; Hanson W. Baldwin; William Diebold, Jr; Thomas K. Finletter; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N.E. Halaby; Joseph E. Johnson; Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Jr.; Charles P. Noyes, 2nd.; Frank Pace, Jr; James A. Perkins; Don K. Price; I.I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; David Rockefeller; Oscar M. Ruebhausen; and Arnold Wolfers.

The opening portion of the meeting was devoted to a review of the draft notes on Part I of the Study Outline prepared by Mr. Wilson after the first two meetings. (This draft is attached hereto.) There were several suggestions made pertaining to the exact language of the draft and Mr. Wilson expects to consult with Mr. Dean and circulate a revised outline shortly. A number of observations were made, however, which seem to be of more general interest to the members of the group, and these are recorded rather briefly below before the main portion of the digest of Mr. Nitze's prepared remarks.

## Findings of Fact

Mr. Finletter suggested that the area of blast destruction mentioned might be an underestimate, and that according to his understanding the blast damage from a 20 MT bomb was "destructive" with a 10 mile radius and heat damage was destructive within a 20 mile radius. He noted Mr. Dean's caution that as far as maximum size of bang is concerned, the only thing that can be said is that an H-bomb of "X" size has been developed, but felt that at least the paper should contain the caution that the present size does not represent the maximum bang foreseeable.

Mr. Baldwin felt that the term "full energies" was an overstatement as used to describe the portion of US effort that would be absorbed by the business of survival after an attack. He noted that the fact that the civilian population might be reduced to disorganized status would not preclude effective retaliatory action by SAC.

A number of persons objected to the term "arsenal of democracy," (2b-1) on the grounds that not only does the nature of nuclear war demand that the materials of attack be already in hand, but that the term itself is left over from World War II, and carries an implication of American neutrality.

Mr. Baldwin stated that sections 1 a,b, and c give the erroneous impression that the Soviet Union is less vulnerable to nuclear attack than this country, while he felt the contrary to be true.

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Mr. Halaby suggested that the role of the FCDA in reducing fatalities is not covered adequately. Some estimates indicate that with proper warning and defensive action the population of Washington, D.C. for instance, could be evacuated so as to reduce deaths from 900,000 to only 3,000. If this is true, the CD factor is important.

There was some discussion of the SAC base structure. General McCormack admitted that the base complex is vulnerable to attack and to subversion, but that rotation of planes and various other devices are helping to decrease this vulnerability. Mr. Finletter felt that the SAC bases structure needs to be expanded. He also thought that some mention should be made of TAC.

Mr. Dean felt that while a comparison of vulnerabilities of the US and the USSR, as noted in the last sections of the outline, is valuable, there is some danger in thinking of the two countries as comparable in a linear sense. After all, no attack is ever perfect, and furthermore, the Russians have a certain advantage in that they may choose the time of a surprise attack since the US is restrained by many factors from initiating nuclear war except under special circumstances.

## Stalemate: Feasibility of Either Side Commencing Nuclear War

Mr. Dean noted that the first two meetings had emphasized the many aspects of weapons effects and performance, and that Mr. Nitze had prepared a few comments which would serve to shift the discussion from hardware to politics. Mr. Nitze commenced by noting that he had been asked to address himself to the problems under sections 2b, and 4a and b of the preliminary outline, i.e., the feasibility of either the U.S. or the USSR initiating a nuclear war, and the implications of new weapons for systems of alliances. He felt that these two problems are so closely entwined as to be almost inseparable, but for the purpose of organizing his talk he proposed to discuss section 2b first.

As Commander-In Chief the President clearly has the technical capacity to initiate nuclear war. If he were to give the order, surely this order would be carried out by SAC. Congress has specifically stated through the AEC Act that the President shall decide whether or not to make weapons available to the military, and even if Congress were to pass an act forbidding the executive to make use of nuclear weapons -- and if such an act were to be held Constitutional -- there is doubt that it would be possible to deny to the President the effective power to initiate nuclear war under all conceivable circumstances. Perhaps subsidiary commanders could involve the country in a nuclear war in the absence of a responsible governmental decision. Naturally, Congress could declare war, but such declaration is likely only upon advice or demand of the President. Such being the case, it seems adequate for the purposes of the study group to concentrate upon the types of issues which are likely to be considered by the President and his advisors before he can make a decision or a recommendation involving the initiation of nuclear war.

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These issues may be grouped under six general headings;

1. The nature of the affront.

2. The type of war involved.

3. The effectiveness of taking the initiative in preventing retaliation.

4. The amount of damage likely to be absorbed domestically.

5. The likely further evolution of the war.

6. The existence of non-nuclear alternatives.

The important problem of gaining popular domestic support for a decision to initiate nuclear war is closely tied to the nature of the affront against this country, and is concerned with such intangibles as national prestige and honor. Perhaps the matter can be visualized best as a spectrum of situations running from the dark end of the band -- all-out attack with conventional weapons by the USSR, with success of the venture certain, through many shades of gray -- to the light end of the band -- a forseeable worsening of the general power between us and our enemies. There can be little doubt that a decision to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of an attack at the dark end of the band would receive public support, and it is probable that there will continue to be some point beyond which this country cannot be pushed without initiating nuclear warfare. The other end of the spectrum is less clear, however, although both recent administrations have had to deal with decisions of that order. For instance, the Truman administration faced the problem of nascent Russian nuclear development, and this implied power shift was exacerbated by the Korean war and by Chinese intervention, by pressures in Europe and Asia, etc. So far it has not been politically feasible to commence a nuclear war as long as the provocation remains at the light end of the spectrum, and with the constant increase in Soviet nuclear potential the point at which this country will contemplate nuclear retaliation is moving closer to the dark end of the band.

Naturally the most difficult questions to answer are in the middle of the band, for instance, a blockade of Berlin and subsequent local ground engagements in which it seemed likely that the US would suffer defeat and humiliation if nuclear weapons were foresworn, or an attack upon Formosa beyond the power of the Seventh Fleet to control. Many of such possible interactions contain the danger that once the countries become committed to a course of action, the events will flow almost automatically toward nuclear war, just as the complex actions of separate states ended at Pearl Harbor.

The second group of issues, the type of war involved, also runs on a spectrum from all-out nuclear war to the limited use of tactical atomic devises. This band is composed of three subsidiary bands: The band of weapons size, from say a few KT to maximum bang; the band of target choice, from military to civilian; and the band of geographical location, from isolated tactical use to blanket target coverage.

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This second area of choice includes an important dilemma, for, if the decision is in favor of attack toward the lighter end of the range, then the enemy is left with the prerogative of responding with maximum strength; on the other hand, immediate use of full potential may bring domestic and foreign political and moral repercussions. It seems then that action in terms of the middle band of this spectrum of attack is the most likely alternative, with nuclear strikes limited to the Russian SAC and other retaliatory military forces. This country is limited somewhat in its choice of geographic areas where the bomb might be effective, since many areas such as Asia are not under full coverage of the American base structure. Furthermore, if the US decided to limit the use of nuclear weapons to some battle area in China, for instance, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would refrain from either direct retaliation or at least the indirect provision of weapons to the Chinese. While some persons hold a contrary view, Mr. Nitze felt personally that unless an American strike in China or some other isolated area were of such force as to "scare the Russians stiff," then the net result of such a limited use of nuclear weapons would be the provocation of Soviet attack.

Further differences of opinion surround the set of issues having to do with the effectiveness of an initial strike in crippling the Soviet power to retaliate. Some observers feel that the first US blow could eliminate the Soviet SAC as a coordinated group, and that the resulting disorganized thrusts against this country could be almost completely rebuffed by the ADC. Naturally these estimates deal with conventional carriers, not ballistic weapons. Others maintain, however, that American intelligence sources are not good enough to locate all the bases of Russian striking potential, thus making it impossible to prevent retaliation even with a strong initial attack. Obviously this is one point at which more information is necessary before a determination can be made whether the advantages of initial action make for a situation of instability, or whether the lack of advantages of surprise attack tends toward a situation of relative stalemate.

A fourth band of issues for the President to consider is the probable amount of damage which would have to be absorbed by this country in the event of attack. The major part of the American urban population and economic potential is concentrated in 100 target areas, and over half of this total is found in 30 of the largest; only two or three of these areas would require bombs of over 500 KT for "substantial destruction." Taking Mr. Kelly's estimated rate of kills (80 per cent), and applying this figure to estimates of present Soviet atomic stockpiles, it becomes apparent that more than enough bombs are available to the enemy to enable it to destroy one half of this country's potential power.

The fifth consideration concerns the possible future course of a nuclear war. If, as Clausewitz postulated, war tends to degenerate toward maximum violence, the initial limiting of the scope of attack in terms of size, target systems, or geographical area may only give an added advantage to the enemy who is at liberty to disregard such self-imposed limits. There is the additional problem of determining a conclusion to any war after all available targets and bombs have been mated. How is the winner determined?

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The sixth set of issues involves the possible alternatives to nuclear war which may be at hand. There are perhaps three main groups of alternatives, which are not mutually exclusive: To resist with non-nuclear weapons, to go to all-out mobilization, to accept a certain degree of local loss. It must be noted that turning to full mobilization increases the risk of provoking the enemy to attack first, but at the same time increases the capacity of the country to withstand such attack.

Since Mr. Nitze's presentation had apparently raised many questions among the other group members, he decided to delay his exposition briefly to allow discussion. Mr. Noyes inquired how the development of an IBM might affect the factors considered by Mr. Nitze. Mr. Nitze stated that obviously the power to destroy the Soviet SAC would be reduced to nearly zero, since while he assumed that an IBM launching site must be bigger than a flatcar, it need hardly be so big as an airfield; the intelligence problem would seem then to be unsurmountable.

Mr. Rabi wondered what the decision process might be if the President were forced to decide between losing 30 American cities through enemy air action, or losing West Germany through ground action. Mr. Nitze pointed out that Formosa is perhaps a clearer example of Mr. Rabi's point. If the Seventh Fleet were to be overrun, then the US would have to decide to deliver a total blow against the Soviet Union. In terms of prestige and power relations both, this country could not afford to absorb the loss of Formosa. Mr. Price and Mr. Perkins, however, voiced the opinion that even assuming that the US could paralyze Russia with one blow, the moral implications of attacking a country which is not directly participating in the struggle seem forbidding. Mr. Dean added that it would be necessary to determine the nature of Soviet intentions in such an event before taking action, but Mr. Nitze stuck to his contention that en evaluation of both the long and short prospects of such a situation led him to the conclusion that this country would have to strike at the heart of the combined enemy. Mr. Perkins observed that Mr. Nitze seemed to be answering the questions raised in his groups of issues numbers two and five by saying that any war will be an all-out war.

Mr. Rockefeller suggested that such a line of reasoning might lead to espousal of preventive war, but upon hearing Mr. Nitze's negative answer to this suggestion, concluded that there must then be some doubt that an initial attack by the US could succeed in destroying the Soviet potential for retaliation. Mr. Wolfers suggested that if the President makes a decision to go to war, then he must conclude also that it will be a nuclear war before it ends. The problem then is to determine whether or not the first blow is much better than the second blow. In other words, if there is no great advantage to the initiator of nuclear war, then the counterforce of this country poised in readiness may deter enemy nuclear attack, or at least render it unnecessary for this country to make the first move.

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Mr. Dean interposed that the group did not have sufficient information about the ability of the US to cripple Soviet power, and that since such information is not only hard to evaluate but also highly classified the group had better discuss the problem in terms of the reasonable alternatives. Mr. Wolfers noted that there is a great deal of danger to the rational discussion of such a vital problem because of the secrecy involved, and Mr. Nitze added that the values involved are so great that they make all possible decisions "loaded". Mr. Wolfers suggested that perhaps the group had better work on the assumption that the enemy is fairly intelligent, and that such being the case he for one could not conceive of any nuclear strike being so well prepared and executed that it would destroy the retaliatory power of a major country. He stressed the danger in the obverse conclusion, and wondered if this country could afford to gamble on one guess.

The value schemes of this country have changes in recent years, Mr. Rabi suggested, and he felt that the words "honor" and "prestige" as used by Mr. Nitze have meanings today which they had not had before in history. Mr. Altschul called attention to the fact that this country might be limited in its actions by moral considerations.

## Effect of These Issues Upon America's Allies

Mr. Nitze began the second half of the meeting with a discussion of the ways in which the allies of this country might be affected by the same considerations he had outlined above. He noted first that certain American allies tend to be more belligerent with respect to the enemy than this country itself, and he listed Korea, Formosa and Turkey as examples. Furthermore, most of this country's allies feel themselves to be more openly exposed to Russian attack than America is, although, recalling the damage that this country might have to absorb with even the maximum number of defense kills, it is difficult to agree that any country is more vulnerable than America. If London can be destroyed by three bombs, but at the same time the Russians are capable of delivering at least thirty bombs over targets in this country, then one can hardly say that England is more vulnerable than the US. (For a more complete discussion of this problem of the "marginal utility" of additional bombs, see Mr. Nitze's correction to the 2nd. digest.)

Mr. Rabi countered that not only is this country's warning system superior to that of any ally, but that our 80 per cent kill ratio should have a demoralizing effect upon enemy pilots. Mr. Nitze noted, however, that at least 50 per cent of the Kamakazi pilots had found targets during the last war, and that also the attrition rate had been high for the US 8th Air Force without adversely affecting morale. Mr. Wolfers suggested that the whole question seems to boil down to one of the Russian priority system for European and American targets. Mr. Pace felt that there really is no problem -- the US is number one. The political situation in the US today is such that an attack upon Europe would be answered in kind from American bases, and the Russians know this. Mr. Perkins felt, that Mr. Nitze's point was well taken, and that this country and its allies

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are today equally and absolutely vulnerable. Mr. Nitze buttressed his point by noting that long before the five year date at which Mr. Kelly has said the kill ratio might attain 80 per cent, the Russians will be able to launch from one to ten thousand sorties with appropriate atomic or nuclear devices; even though these sorties might not be simultaneous, they could within a short space of time hit all the major targets in Europe and the US.

Mr. Nitze continued that besides the similarities of vulnerability between the US and its allies, there is at the top levels of decision a similarity of purpose. While Mr. Pace did not agree, and stated that the peoples of the various countries have differing understandings of the implications of nuclear warfare, Mr. Nitze contended that the courage of the allies should not be underestimated. Under the same set of circumstances which might force an American President to initiate nuclear war, he felt that the leaders and peoples of the US allies could be counted upon to concur.

Mr. Rabi wondered how US allies could be worse off if they proclaimed a policy of strict neutrality. For instance, France might try, and indeed very nearly has tried, to eschew any sort of complete alliance with the US for military purposes. Mr. Halaby pointed out, however, that France would lose not only its peace of conscience, but its colonies under a policy of neutrality, since the rest of the Western powers could hardly be expected to allow France to shift the power balance so unfavorably. But Mr. Rabi insisted that if certain of the weaker allies were to remove themselves from the defensive orbit for fear of Russian nuclear attack against US bases there, for military reasons they could still expect to remain under the protection of the US. Mr. Price posed the problem more concretely by postulating that if the USSR were to prepare to occupy Europe, these preparations would become evident to the NATO nations, and that France might well be caught between the alternatives of concurring in a nuclear attack or being occupied by Russian ground forces. Mr. Franklin noted that it would put our alliances under a great strain if the Soviet Union started an all out nuclear attack on the US and at the same time announced that it would grant immunity to our allies in return for their neutrality.

Mr. Wolfers suggested that there might be grave danger to Europe in a situation in which the US and Russia exchanged crippling blows, for Russia would then be in a relatively advantageous position in terms of renascent ground strength, and could eventually take over Europe. The best hope for Europe then is that there will be some sort of atomic stalemate, and that, even if the Russians march to the sea, the American forces will be able to liberate Europe by virtue of superior logistic supplies and tactical nuclear weapons. General McCormack noted that General Gruenther has stated publicly that tactical nuclear weapons are a part of the European defense structure, and that there have been no dissents from this proposal by Europeans.

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## The USSR And Surprise Attack

The same chain of considerations applies to the Russian decision about initiating a nuclear war as to the American decision, Mr. Nitze said, except that the point of view differs. Furthermore, Malenkov is likely to have to consult with more persons than the President before pushing any buttons, and there is a great deal more likelihood that the order will bog down in the Russian command chain.

Perhaps one major difference in the thinking processes of the two countries is that if the facts indicate that a surprise move will actually produce a significant advantage, then there is greater likelihood of the Russian carrying his thoughts to a strictly logical conclusion. Mr. Nitze continued that the Russians would seem to have a higher degree of control over the satellites than this country does over its allies, and that the Soviet political system lends itself more readily to full mobilization, or to compression of the civilian economy. He called attention to the important fact that if indeed the USSR can take necessary defensive and other measures which are not politically feasible in the US then there may be no such condition as an atomic stalemate.

Mr. Wilson noted that there might be some differences between the alternatives open to the two countries under item six of Mr. Nitze's set of issues. For instance, subversion and infiltration might very well pay off for the Russians, particularly if they were fully checkmated on the military front.

General McCormack suggested that perhaps the Soviet task is easier in that the USSR needs to prepare only for the sort of war that it contemplates starting, while the US must be ready to fight many sorts of wars. He added that delivery capability does not "keep" well, but needs to be constantly refurbished, thus adding to the US burden of preparedness for any eventuality.

The General wished to make the further point that the action of the US in supporting Western Europe through NATO mechanism is gradually building the European sense of responsibility for their own defense, and is heading toward an eventual position of strength from which the allies may be able to hold their own against a Russian land assault. Of course he wanted to stress that at present the NATO force is too weak to withstand a Russian onslaught without American strategic bombing aid, and that in the future the strength of NATO will always be linked to the free use of tactical nuclear weapons. In his opinion, the major present weaknesses in the Soviet potential for war are Malenkov's leadership system, and the satellite coersive alliances.

Mr. Wolfers suggested that even if it becomes apparent that Soviet potential is too great for the US to destroy in an initial attack, and this country therefore refrains from using nuclear weapons, there is no reason to believe that the Russians will seize upon the opportunity to get in the first crack. He suspected that there are several reasons why this might be so. First, the Russians have had vast experience in

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land maneuvers and seem to have faith in their conventional weapons. Second, the Soviet Union is in a very real sense a technocracy; ideologically it has evolved from a Marxist oriented bolshevick regime into an organization whose god is what it has built with its hands. If society and the machine are one and the same, the Russian leaders will not risk the destruction of their dams, factories, and buildings. General McCormack agreed with this interpretation of what Mr. Wolfers called the "dream of the backward area."

Mr. Noyes agreed with this point and suggested that the USSR might be more prone to take calculated risks throughout the world than to initiate a nuclear war. This likelihood places on American shoulders the responsibility for determining at what point Soviet conventional war or subversion will have to be countered with nuclear weapons. Mr. Wolfers insisted that the US can, if it chooses, meet conventional attack with conventional weapons; hence the emphasis upon massive retaliation has certain dangers. He wondered, however, if the US is prepared to wage conventional war. Mr. Noyes inquired if it is better to win with conventional arms than to win with nuclear arms.

Mr. Pace suggested that NATO would hardly admit the ground weakness implied by the resort to nuclear weapons unless the situation were hopeless otherwise. He stressed that Russia cannot be allowed to occupy Western Europe. Mr. Dean suggested that perhaps the nuclear and atomic weapons have been so thoroughly integrated into the NATO force that they are no longer separable.

Mr. Pace stated that the effects of nuclear attack can never be so grim that this country can allow Europe to fall, but Mr. Wolfers felt that if the nuclear exchange is one in which the US will emerge with a net loss, then the bomb can hardly be considered an advantage.

Mr. Johnson pointed to the "moral line" in terms of world political opinion, which the Soviet Union would try to get the US to step over first in the event of war. Mr. Altschul asked if there can be any doubt that if Europe were attacked the US would respond with a SAC blow aimed at Russia. Mr. Nitze answered tentatively, "Yes", but did not elaborate.

Mr. Pace stated that total destruction of the US does not follow as the certain result of the 20 per cent bombs on target, and felt that this country had to determine first just what might be an acceptable level of destruction. Also, as far as alternatives are concerned, the following questions must be answered: Can the US stop Soviet forces on the ground with conventional weapons? Can tactical weapons be separated from strategic weapons? Can tactical weapons alone preserve Europe? If the answer to either of the last two questions is "No", the US cannot afford to surrender its right to massive retaliation. Mr. Dean thought that this raised an important series of points, and suggested that for the next session the group might consider, say, three different situations as regards area, weapons, tactical or strategic use, etc. to see just how the answers work out.

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Implications of Nuclear Weapons for Systems of Alliances

Mr. Nitze returned to his presentation with the consideration of
point 4 in the preliminary outline. He asserted that the way in which the
three subsections of point 4 are phrased implies that allies are important
to this country only in so far as they are of value in a war. He wished
to take exception to this interpretation of the interrelations of nations.
If, as the Constitution requires, foreign policy is to be an instrumentation
of national policy, then it has as its primary goal the fostering and dev-
elopment of an international climate in which nations dedicated and orien-
ted as ours is oriented can survive and prosper. Military policy then
becomes in turn a support for our foreign policy, and while never being
entirely a secondary consideration, is certainly not a primary one. Inter-
preted in this way, the American position in Berlin, for example, is taken
not as an expedient in a hot war, or a necessity in a cold war, but rather
as an acceptance of responsibility of leadership in an alliance of freedom
loving men.

Naturally a traditional problem of coalitions has been the pro-
vision for orderly ways of making decisions requiring united action, (4a-1).
It should be noted that neither Mr. Truman nor President Eisenhower has
delegated in any way the right of decision about the uses of nuclear weapons.
However, the right of this country to use foreign bases or the right of
flyover is quite dependent upon the maintained good will and cooperation
of its allies. Mr. Rabi and several others expressed some surprise that
explicit provision has not been made regarding the right of the US to launch
strikes from overseas bases. The resulting discussion of the exact nature
of certain base leases soon grounded on the shoals of security. It was
pointed out, however, that even if a country refuses to let our planes take
off, it might well be subject to Soviet nuclear retaliation, since it
would be almost impossible for the Soviet Union to tell where the planes
attacking it came from.

Mr. Nitze summed up his views on this particular point by saying
that the isolationist argument that the President is limited in his decisions
by the allies is not valid. Furthermore, to the question posed in 4a-2 of
the outline, (Does atomic stalemate make allies less necessary) he gave
a negative answer. In the first place, it is yet to be proven that a stale-
mate does, or even can exist. Even if such a condition is possible -- if
the bases in Europe multiply the effectiveness of SAC by two or three times
as some observers feel they do -- then the power of the US to maintain a
stalemated condition diminishes as the bases are contracted. Soviet hege-
mony over the Eurasian land mass and South America is hardly apt to conduce to
stalemate.

Item 4a-3 raises the question whether our new weapons make
allies less important because "our principal military power instrument to
support allies is unusable," on the theory that its use might mean the
loss through retaliation of at least 30 major American cities. Mr. Nitze
pointed out that if this country had never developed nuclear power, it still
would have had the responsibility of protecting its allies, and that, if
the more efficient nuclear weapons are going to be ruled out for any reason,
the obligation remains to discover perhaps more expensive non-atomic ways
of maintaining the security of the country and its allies.

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Item 4a-4 asks whether "we must greatly reduce our commitments of strength because our main source of military strength is neutralized." Mr. Nitze pointed out that in a bi-polar world such as that of today, any reduction in commitments by one side is likely also to result in a reduction of the strength of that side, and a corresponding increase in the strength of the other camp. Thus if the nuclear weapon becomes neutralized (which Mr. Nitze was not prepared to concede) it behooves the US to seek out areas of replacement strength, of which an important one would be a **strengthening** of alliances.

The implication of item 4a-5 is that this country cannot risk aiding an ally because it cannot risk becoming involved in a nuclear war. Such a position is logically possible only if it is first agreed that world hegemony by the USSR is preferable to running any risk of nuclear war.

The argument advanced by 4a-6 is that long-range delivery systems operating from North America eliminate the need for overseas bases, and thus for allies. Without discussing the dubious point that a concentrated long-range delivery system is more effective than a mixed long and short-range system, Mr. Nitze felt that here again the unfortunate implication is that allies are war partners only. He had already expressed his views on the importance of preserving a world climate conducive to American growth. But even in terms of war partners, the value of allies extends beyond the need for bases. After all, destroying the enemy urban areas is not a conclusive stroke in war -- there must be some sort of follow through. Also, in terms of cost, the maintenance of a division is much lower for those of the allies than for an American division based overseas. Mr. Pace agreed with this last point, and added that the fighting effectiveness of allied armies must not be underestimated.

Mr. Halaby suggested that there may be some area between all-out nuclear war and a condition of stalemate. For instance, the US might use nuclear weapons against Communist China, but remain stalemated with the USSR. Mr. Nitze agreed that it is important to search for such middle ground. General McCormack noted that if the group followed Mr. Dean's suggestion it would discuss at the next session several possible permutations of the situation, of which at least one might be such a middle case. He wished to emphasize, however, that the actual decision making process involves a series of ponderables which cannot be wholly predigested. In other words, the group could serve a useful purpose by working through specific problems which might arise, but it cannot expect to predict the exact nature of all eventual decisions.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

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The third meeting of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, January 12, 1955, at 5:30 p.m. Present were: Paul Nitze, Discussion Leader; Gordon Dean, Chairman; Carroll L. Wilson, Research Secretary; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hamilton Fish Armstrong; Hanson W. Baldwin; William Diebold, Jr.; Thomas K. Finletter; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N.E. Halaby; Joseph E. Johnson; Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Jr.; Charles P. Noyes, 2nd; Frank Pace, Jr.; James A. Perkins; Don K. Price; I.I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; David Rockefeller; Oscar M. Ruebhausen; and Arnold Wolfers.

The opening portion of the meeting was devoted to a review of the draft notes on Part I of the Study Outline prepared by Mr. Wilson after the first two meetings. (This draft is attached hereto.) There were several suggestions made pertaining to the exact language of the draft and Mr. Wilson expects to consult Mr. Dean and circulate a revised outline shortly. A number of observations were made, however, which seem to be of more general interest to the members of the group, and these are recorded rather briefly below before the main portion of the digest of Mr. Nitze's prepared remarks.

## Findings of Fact

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Mr. Halaby suggested that the role of the FCDA in reducing fatalities is not covered adequately. Some estimates indicate that with proper warning and defensive action the population of Washington, D.C., for instance, could be evacuated so as to reduce deaths from 900,000 to only 3,000. If this is true, the CD factor is important.

Mr. Dean noted that the first two meetings had emphasized the many aspects of weapons effects and performance, and that Mr. Nitze had prepared a few comments which would serve to shift the discussion from hardware to politics. Mr. Nitze commenced by noting that he had been asked to address himself to the problems under sections 2b, and 4a and b of the preliminary outline, i.e., the feasibility of either the US or the USSR initiating a nuclear war, and the implications of new weapons for systems of alliances. He felt that these two problems are so closely entwined as to be almost inseparable, but for the purpose of organizing his talk he proposed to discuss section 2b first.

As Commander-In-Chief the President clearly has the technical capacity to initiate nuclear war. If he were to give the order, surely this order would be carried out by SAC. Congress has specifically stated through the AEC Act that the President shall decide whether or not to make weapons available to the military, and even if Congress were to pass an act forbidding the executive to make use of nuclear weapons -- and if such an act were to be held Constitutional -- there is doubt that it would be possible to deny to the President the effective power to initiate nuclear war under all conceivable circumstances. Perhaps subsidiary commanders could involve the country in a nuclear war in the absence of a responsible governmental decision. Naturally, Congress could declare war, but such declaration is likely only upon advice or demand of the President. Such being the case, it seems adequate for the purposes of the study group to concentrate upon the types of issues which are likely to be considered by the President and his advisors before he can make a decision or a recommendation involving the initiation of nuclear war.

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These issues may be grouped under six general headings:

1. The nature of the affront

2. The type of war involved

The important problem of gaining popular domestic support for a decision to initiate nuclear war is closely tied to the nature of the affront against this country, and is concerned with such intangibles as national prestige and honor. Perhaps the matter can be visualized best as a spectrum of situations running from the dark end of the band -- all-out attack with conventional weapons by the USSR, with success of the venture certain, through many shades of gray -- to the light end of the band -- a foreseeable worsening of the general power between us and our enemies. There can be little doubt that a decision to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of an attack at the dark end of the band would receive public support, and it is probable that there will continue to be some point beyond which this country cannot be pushed without initiating nuclear warfare. The other end of the spectrum is less clear, however, although both recent administrations have had to deal with decisions of that order. For instance, the Truman administration faced the problem of nascent Russian nuclear development, and this implied power shift was exacerbated by the Korean war and by Chinese intervention, by pressures in Europe and Asia, etc. So far it has not been politically feasible to commence a nuclear war as long as the provocation remains at the light end of the spectrum, and with the constant increase in Soviet nuclear potential the point at which this country will contemplate nuclear retaliation is moving closer to the dark end of the band.

The second group of issues, the type of war involved, also runs on a spectrum from all-out nuclear war to the limited use of tactical atomic devices. This band is composed of three subsidiary bands: the band of weapons size, from say a few KT to maximum bang; the band of target choice, from military to civilian; and the band of geographical location, from isolated tactical use to blanket target coverage.

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This second area of choice includes an important dilemma, for if the decision is in favor of attack toward the lighter end of the range then the enemy is left with the prerogative of responding with maximum strength; on the other hand, immediate use of full potential may bring domestic and foreign political and moral repercussions. It seems then that action in terms of the middle band of this spectrum of attack is the most likely alternative, with nuclear strikes limited to the Russian SAC and other retaliatory military forces. This country is limited somewhat in its choice of geographic areas where the bomb might be effective, since many areas such as Asia are not under full coverage of the American base structure. Furthermore, if the US decided to limit the use of nuclear weapons to some battle area in China, for instance, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would refrain from either direct retaliation or at least the indirect provision of weapons to the Chinese. While some persons hold a contrary view, Mr. Nitze felt personally that unless an American strike in China or some other isolated area were of such force as to "scare the Russians stiff" then the net result of such a limited use of nuclear weapons would be the provocation of Soviet attack.

Further differences of opinion surround the set of issues having to do with the effectiveness of an initial strike in crippling the Soviet power to retaliation. Some observers feel that the first US blow could eliminate the Soviet SAC as a coordinated group, and that the resulting disorganized thrusts against the United States could be almost completely rebuffed by the ADC. Naturally these estimates deal with conventional carriers, not ballistic weapons. Others maintain, however, that American intelligence sources are not good enough to locate all the bases of Russian striking potential, thus making it impossible to prevent retaliation even with a strong initial attack. Obviously this is one point at which more information is necessary before a determination can be made whether the advantages of initial action made for a situation of instability, or whether the lack of advantages of surprise attack tends toward a situation of relative stalemate.

A fourth band of issues for the President to consider is the probable amount of damage which would have to be absorbed by this country in the event of attack. The major part of the American urban population and economic potential is concentrated in 100 target areas, and over half of this total is found in 30 of the largest; only two or three of these areas would require bombs of over 500 KT for "substantial destruction." Taking Mr. Kelly's estimated rate of kills (80%), and applying this figure to estimates of present Soviet atomic stockpiles, it becomes apparent that more than enough bombs are available to the enemy to enable it to destroy one half of this country's potential power.

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5

The sixth set of issues involves the possible alternatives to nuclear war which may be at hand. There are perhaps three main groups of alternatives, which are not mutually exclusive: to resist with non-nuclear weapons, to go to all-out mobilization, to accept a certain degree of local loss. It must be noted that turning to full mobilization increases the risk of provoking the enemy to attack first, but at the same time increases the capacity of the country to withstand such attack.

Mr. Rabi wondered what the decision process might be if the President were forced to decide between losing 30 American cities through enemy air action, or losing West Germany through ground action. Mr. Nitze pointed out that Formosa is perhaps a clearer example of Mr. Rabi's point. If the Seventh Fleet were to be overrun, then the US would have to decide to deliver a total blow against the Soviet Union. In terms of prestige and power relations both, this country could not afford to absorb the loss of Formosa. Mr. Price and Mr. Perkins, however, voiced the opinion that even assuming that the US could paralyze Russia with one blow, the moral implications of attacking a country which is not directly participating in the struggle seem forbidding. Mr. Dean added that it would be necessary to determine the nature of Soviet intentions in such an event before taking action, but Mr. Nitze stuck to his contention that an evaluation of both the long and short prospects of such a situation led him to the conclusion that this country would have to strike at the heart of the combined enemy. Mr. Perkins observed that Mr. Nitze seemed to be answering the questions raised in his groups of issues numbers two and five by saying that any war will be an all-out war.

6

The value schemes of this country have changed in recent years, Mr. Rabi suggested, and he felt that the words "honor" and "prestige" as used by Mr. Nitze have meanings today which they had not had before in history. Mr. Altschul called attention to the fact that this country might be limited in its actions by moral considerations.

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7

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8

The General wished to make the further point that the action of the US in supporting Western Europe through NATO mechanism is gradually building the European sense of responsibility for their own defense, and is heading toward an eventual position of strength from which the allies may be able to hold their own against a Russian land assault. Of course he wanted to stress that at present the NATO force is too weak to withstand a Russian onslaught without American strategic bombing aid, and that in the future the strength of NATO will always be linked to the free use of tactical nuclear weapons. In his opinion, the major present weaknesses in the Soviet potential for war are Malenkov's leadership system, and the satellite coercive alliances.

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10

Mr. Nitze returned to his presentation with the consideration of
point 4 in the preliminary outline. He asserted that the way in which the
three subsections of point 4 are phrased implies that allies are important
to this country only in so far as they are of value in a war. He wished
to take exception to this interpretation of the interrelations of nations.
If, as the Constitution requires, foreign policy is to be an instrument-
ation of national policy, then it has as its primary goal the fostering
and development of an international climate in which nations dedicated and
oriented as ours is oriented can survive and prosper. Military policy then
becomes in turn a support for our foreign policy, and while never being
entirely a secondary consideration, is certainly not a primary one. Inter-
preted in this way, the American position in Berlin, for example, is taken
not as an expedient in a hot war, or a necessity in a cold war, but rather
as an acceptance of responsibility of leadership in an alliance of free-
dom loving men.

Naturally a traditional problem of coalitions has been the pro-
vision for orderly ways of making decisions requiring united action, (4a-1).
It should be noted that neither Mr. Truman nor President Eisenhower has
delegated in any way the right of decision about the uses of nuclear weap-
ons. However, the right of this country to use foreign bases or the right
of flyover is quite dependent upon the maintained good will and coopera-
tion of its allies. Mr. Rabi and several others expressed some surprise
that explicit provision has not been made regarding the right of the US to
launch strikes from overseas bases. The resulting discussion of the exact
nature of certain base leases soon grounded on the shoals of security. It
was pointed out, however, that even if a country refuses to let our planes
take off, it might well be subject to Soviet nuclear retaliation, since it
would be almost impossible for the Soviet Union to tell where the planes
attacking it came from.

Mr. Nitze summed up his views on this particular point by say-
ing that the isolationist argument that the President is limited in his de-
cisions by the allies is not valid. Furthermore, to the question posed in
4a-2 of the outline, (Does atomic stalemate make allies less necessary) he
gave a negative answer. In the first place, it is yet to be proven that a
stalemate does, or even can exist. Even if such a condition is possible --
if the bases in Europe multiply the effectiveness of SAC by two or three
times as some observers feel they do -- then the power of the US to maintain
a stalemated condition diminishes as the bases are contracted. Soviet hege-
mony over the Eurasian land mass and South America is hardly apt to conduce
to stalemate.

Item 4a-3 raises the question whether our new weapons make
allies less important because "our principal military power instrument to
support allies is unusable," on the theory that its use might mean the loss
through retaliation of at least 30 major American cities. Mr. Nitze pointed
out that if this country had never developed nuclear power, it still would
have had the responsibility of protecting its allies, and that, if the more
efficient nuclear weapons are going to be ruled out for any reason, the ob-
ligation remains to discover perhaps more expensive non-atomic ways of
maintaining the security of the country and its allies.

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The argument advanced by 4a-6 is that long-range delivery systems operating from North America eliminate the need for overseas bases, and thus for allies. Without discussing the dubious point that a concentrated long-range delivery system is more effective than a mixed long and short-range system, Mr. Nitze felt that here again the unfortunate implication is that allies are war partners only. He had already expressed his views on the importance of preserving a world climate conducive to American growth. But even in terms of war partners, the value of allies extends beyond the need for bases. After all, destroying the enemy urban areas is not a conclusive stroke in was -- there must be some sort of follow through. Also, in terms of cost, the maintenance of a division is much lower for those of the allies than for an American division based overseas. Mr. Pace agreed with this last point, and added that the fighting effectiveness of allied armies must not be underestimated.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

C
O
P
Y

FRANK ALTSCHUL

730 Fifth Avenue
New York 19, N.Y.

January 13, 1955

Dear Gordon,

Some things that were said in the course of a most interesting
meeting last night left me quite confused.

If I understood Paul correctly, it was his view that, should
Formosa by subjected to an attack which the Seventh Fleet was unable to
fend off, a conceivable response on our part might be the unleashing of
SAC on the Soviet Union. When, toward the end of the meeting, I asked
Paul whether he did not believe that an all-out attack by the Soviet Union
on the Continent of Europe would result in immediate retaliation by SAC,
he replied in the negative. Is not there a curious inconsistency in these
positions?

The suicidal nature of all-out war under modern conditions is
now so well understood, in the West at least, that I would be inclined to
think that we would seek to avoid it, unless the threat to our survival as
a free and independent nation was so clear that it left us with no accep-
table alternative. Should a threat of this nature develop, then it is my
conviction that we would accept the risk in terms of loss of life and
material destruction, however great we might estimate this to be. Unless
I misjudge our mental and moral makeup, we would consider no sacrifice too
great to maintain our survival as a free and independent nation. In other
words, we will never concede Soviet hegemony without, if need be, an epic
struggle to prevent it.

Regardless of what we might do on the basis of the Formosa
assumption -- and I rather feel that moral considerations would prevent
us from attacking the Soviet Union in response to a Chinese aggression
whether we felt it Soviet-inspired or not --I have no doubt whatsoever
that we would look upon an all-out attack upon Europe by the Soviet Union
as a mortal threat to ourselves and would respond with every weapon in
our arsenal.

Let me go a step further. I believe that this must be as clear
to the masters of the Kremlin as it is to me. Therefore I would not expect
an advance on the Continent of Europe unless it were preceded, or at least
accompanied, by a surprise attack upon ourselves. On this account, I
think that the most urgent task before us today is to do our utmost to
reduce the prospective damage of such a surprise attack. At an earlier
meeting, it became perfectly clear that we are doing far less in this res-
pect that adequate appropriations would permit us to do. This leads me to
suggest once again that the group might well consider for a moment whether
this is not an aspect of the problem to which it should devote some thought.

-2-

I would not wish to be misunderstood as holding the view that a surprise atomic attack on us is highly probable. I would be inclined to think -- in any event to hope -- that even the Moscow Communists must know by now that nuclear warfare -- which must inevitably lead to incre- dible destruction for victor and vanquished alike -- can hardly be re- garded as a sane instrument of policy. Yet the possibility of miscalcu- lation in this respect should not be ignored. Accordingly, no effort should be spared to reduce the potential damage to an absolute minimum. I would imagine that just to the extent we move along this course, we reduce at the same time the danger of miscalculation. For the one thing most likely to invite atomic aggression would be the conviction that the chances of delivering a decisive blow warranted accepting whatever risk there might be in retaliation.

And in closing, returning for a moment to the Formosa case, this points, if anything, to the necessity of maintaining adequate conventional strength, which we cannot afford to sacrifice for the benefit of SAC or atomic defense. The latest version of the "new look" should be carefully reexamined.

Mr. Gordon Dean
Lehman Brothers
1 William Street
New York 4, N.Y.