TELCORN

Marquis Childs/Kissinger

9:36 a.m.

10/1/71

K: Look I called you -- I didn't have a chance to return your call the other day with the foreign ministers here but I don't want you to misinterpret my silence. There's no letter from Chou En-lai.

C: An Asian with good sources told me.

K: If I don't tell you, no one else knows. They are scrupulous.

C: And if a letter you would know about it and no one else. What's happening over there?

K: We don't really know.

C: It's fantastic.

K: It's funny. Chou En-lai is very much in evidence.

C: Met in the evening with Parliamentarians. In the last analysis it was Mao himself who approved the visit?

K: We have reason to believe that.

C: If he is dead or ill it was his sanction that put it over.

K: We have no evidence that there's a problem about visit. Some evidence on the other side.

C: I have not heard from the Chinese at all. I don't think they have let a person in since the NY Times. Safer of CBS got in because he was a Canadian. The Chinese were furious. Eric Severeid told me. Because he worked for an American company.

K: They have a strong sense of honor.

C: I heard from ______ last night.

K: He is an incredible man. Don't write that story. I am doing it for your protection.

TELECON

The President

10/1/71 10:15 a.m.

P: I missed one point on the India-Pakistan thing. The talk with Home was revealing and disturbing. I hope to Christ we are doing everything that can be done to pull the teeth of some of that. Is it as bad as Home points out?

K: Yes, but's that bad, but it's all India-instigated. And he is wrong about the location of the guerrilla actions. I'll show you the maps. Ninety percent of it is within 10 miles of the frontier. There are practically none deep in East Pakistan. But all the main arteries/within 10 to 20 miles of the frontier. They are cutting roads and preventing distrubution and bloying up ships. But the Bengalis are not training frogmen by themselves. That is highly sophisticated training and equipment. Ninety-five percent of their problems are India-instigated.

P: Can we get State to work on it? The message for the 15th isn't going to solve it.

K: It would if those bastards would let the stuff move in. The only other thing is to tell the Indians that if they don't stop we'll resume arms supplies to Pakistan.

P: . . . hanging over them the threat of Chinese . . .

K: The danger is that as the Pakistani army runs down a little the moderate Indians may get the idea that it is a good chance to settle scores. I think that when Mrs. Gandhi comes . . . I don't think they'll do anything decisive before then.

P: We ought to have a more aggressive policy with regard to getting the Indians to cooperate anyway.

K: Why don't I get the Indian Ambassadoe in now?

P: Home got the same impression as I did; he was very good.

K: Yes, his analysis is basically the same as ours.

P: These Indians are sanctimonious. What is State doing? Are they on salvo?

K: Yes, they're on salvo with pushing the refugee issue. I'll call Sisco.

P: Give him the bit in his teeth.

K: I'll call him right now.

P: Good.

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin

10/1/71 10:25 a.m.

K: I was talking to the President who is in Key Biscayne and he had a talk with Home yesterday in which he expressed some concern about the India-Pakistan situation and the aggressive attitudes of India. He wonders whether you or Sisco could call in Jha and express sympathy, but tell them this harrassment has to stop or we will do other things.

I: Okay. What Home . . .

K: He was talking about ships being blown up. He wants to use influence with the Pakistanis . . .

I: In the political situation.

K: Yes.

I: We can certainly do this and will. The problem is the inability to control the guerrillas.

K: They are organizing them.

I: I am sure they are in part. In other part they aren't. Fine Harry.

K: I suggested we get together tomorrow morning. And I understand that is your preference.

I: I said I could do it tomorrow or today.

K: I slightly prefer tomorrow.

I: Okay.

K: 10:00 in my office?

K I: Good.

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

9x x 10/1/71 11:35 a.m.

DK: I need some personal guidance. I want to take a couple of weeks off. Is there anything of significance prior to the November 15 speech coming up?

K: When do you want to take your vacation?

DK: It depends on what's occurring here. It's flexible.

K: You may miss the Peking trip. Does that make any difference?

DK: It sure does. But I don't think you're serious.

K: I am not. You'll get plenty of warning on that.

DK: How much, a week?

K: I think you'll get a hell of a lot more.

DK: Good.

K: I don't know, but it wouldn't be our style. . . we don't believe in tearing everybody off like that.

DK: So if I took two weeks in October are there any great risks of mission any major foreign policy stuff?

K: I don't want to comment on these things.

DK: Well, I need a few weeks of vacation, but I don't want to miss out on China or anything of consequence coming up, and I just don't see anything coming before November 15.

K: I don't see anything like a trip coming up.

DK: So the last two weeks in October would be . . .

K: Pretty safe. If anything comes up it would not have been programmed, and if I decently can give you a warning I will.

DK: And it would be in reaction to an unpredicted event?

K: I don't expect anything like that in the last two weeks of October.

DK: Okay, and I am still assuming that Kosygin and the President won't get together.

TELCONE

D. Frost/Kissinger

11:37 a.m.

10/1/71

DF again raised the possibility of HAK doing a conversation with him on his show. HAK said perhaps later this year and he will keep it in mind. Then Frost asked about getting together on 10/8 and HAK said that the A. Harriman's had moved a dinner date to that date in order that he could attend. HAK asked how long Frost and Diahann Carroll (who is doing a performance at Kennedy Center on the 8th) would be in town. Frost indicated he would be coming in that evening and returning to NY the next day. Miss Carroll would be here a couple of days prior to her performance. Then HAK suggested after the show and his dinner, DF indicated that the Tunney's were giving a small supper for them after the show and he could arrange to have HAK invited. They agreed on that and Frost said he would let HAK's secretary know the arrangements.

TELCOM

Leonard Firestone/Kissinger

11:45 a.m.

10/1/71

F: When you were here we talked about the possibility of --

K: I remember very well.

F: Will that work out?

K: I have not seen the President's reaction. I think yes but I don't think let me let you know Monday.

F: I am going to the hospital for a check up. Let me talk with your secretary.

K: Call on Tues.

F: The reaction to your lunch talk was terrific. Tuttle and the conservatives could not be higher in their praise. I hope you can do the same in Texas and other places where the conservatives have questions.

K: Haldeman is the man who arranges these things.

F: He knows how effective it was. When does Taft get back?

K: Next week.

F: Did you leave the house in good shape?

K: With the invasion of assistants I can't be sure.

F: I will say I checked it after you left and it was all right and nothing
anything that happened, happened after you left.

TELECON
Ambassador Rabin
10/1/71 11:50 a.m.

R: It seems according to various correspondents that . . . might
appear next week, publicly and not publicly, is the U. S. position.

K: Oh well. . .

R: This is what you get as a result of a briefing yesterday at State
with the Secretary.

K: Nothing would surprise me.

R: Because, as a result of it, it seems, judging what comes up as
a result, everyone thought the U. S. has committed itself, according to the
State Department, to crossing of the Canal by Egyptian forces and something not
about extent of withdrawal, but other issues.

K: The President hasn't, but you never can be sure what some of
our subordinates do in their enthusiasms.

R: I will get some questions from Israel about this.

K: Why don't you come in tomorrow for half an hour.

R: All right, and I would like to discuss . . . Have you got
a half hour tomorrow?

K: Yes, let's say 11:30.

R: Find, at the usual . . .

K: Yes.

R: All right. I will come alone. I have got some ideas.

K: And I also want to talk to you and you are going to keep your Foreign
Minister quiet?

R: He did marvelously. He didn't relate himself to any particular problem.
He got a lot of publicity. It was good for him and not bad for me.

K: Just make sure he produces no __________.

R: No, he will not. . . . going to see the Secretary Monday.

K: Okay, then I need to see you.

TELCONE

Amb. Steossel/Kissinger

12:16 p.m. 10/1/71

K: Wlxxx How are you?

S: Not too good.

K: This situation, Walt, is this. I went along with it enthusiastically.

S: I appreciate it.

K: The President now feels he would like to have a non-career man in that
job. It's nothing personal against you.

S: Do you think it's definite?

K: No. Relax and let me see if I can raise it again. If you trigger a fight over
it it will be definite. Let me try.

S: Is it Brosio?

K: I think so. It happened right after him. It's not been that anyone I went
along with was turned down by him. It was right after Brosio.

S: (I know he feels that way.)

K: He asked who was the man. I recalled and he remembered you. It's nothing
against you. After Key Biscayne I will raise it with WExX him.

S: Nothing then to press here.

K: Your colleagues have a way of lousing things up. And keep it out of the
papers. Or it will be turned down.

S: A good point can be made for a career man in this situation.

K: I talked with Goodpastor when I thought it was in and he thought it was a good
idea.

S: Seriousness of purpose and so forth.

K: Let's sit on it for a few days.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01250
By LDNARA Date 05/01/71

TELECON

Dobrynin

10/1/71 12:25pm

K: There are several things. I have talked to the President about our
discussions and he thinks matters are moving in a positive direction. There's
a number of things he wanted to make sure of. The second item we discussed,
he wanted to make sure you understood that it was not a formal proposal
but the direction of our thinking.

D: Oh yes, you made that clear.

K: I thought I did.

D: You were thinking in that direction; not formalized, but outline.

K: But one thing I wanted to make clear on a problem we have with
your friends. When we are thinking about something, they go and make a
public announcement in the same direction. They have to talk to us or to the
New York Times; they have to decide. If they put something out now publicly,
we will disavow it and say that no such thing is true. If they want to talk
we will be serious. Within this spirit we are prepared to be as constructive
as possible. If this process doesn't get anywhere by the end of this year,
then negotiation isn't the way to do it.

D: You made that clear.

K: And on that point he asked me to reaffirm . . . . . . and also
about the timing. The ______ of your colleague to how the timing might
be handled.

D: You mentioned the first ______ stage? and the Second ______ stage.

K: . . . . thinking out loud, but this was an idea he thought had merit.

D: Fine. I will mention that.

K: And finally, I forgot to thank your Foreign Minister for the package he
sent.

D: I will do it for you.

K: And tell him it was greatly appreciated.

D: Certainly. I think this will help . . . . yesterday's meeting was good
in all senses.

K: That was my impression, and the President was very pleased with
my report about it. Give my best regards to your Minister.

D: All right, I will.

TELECON

Dobrynin

10/1/71 12:25pm

K: I thought I did.

D: You made that clear.

D: You mentioned the first ____ stage? ______ and the Second ______ stage. ______

D: Fine. I will mention that.

D: I will do it for you.

D: Certainly. I think this will help . . . yesterday's meeting was good
in all senses.

K: That was my impression, and the President was very pleased with
my report above of it. Give my best regards to your Minister.

D: All right, I will.

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger

12:33 pm

10/1/71

K: What has been the decision?

H: I walked in while he was talking with you. He was talking afterwards. He agonizes on it. No thought that we not go ahead. I poked it to see if he was having second thoughts to do something different.

K: The more we think about it here the more we think it has to be.

H: So does he. No thought of doing other then we talked about. No other way to handle the other problem then by my calling him. He feels strongly I shouldn't call before Sunday. Wants him to know before the speech but doesn't him to call this weekend. He wants to be out of touch. He can hold off for two days. I said you needed to start talking. He was against that so I backed off.

K: We have to let the Japanese know.

H: Maybe the day before.

K: We can't do that. But Sunday will be enough time.

H: We have to ? ? ? .

K: Walters is seeing the contact on the otherside tomorrow for a read-out on the Gromyko meeting. In case they have bad news -- no reason to suppose this--

H: No reason to get this in the fire too.

K: We have to tell him this is it.

H: His view is that argument I make if it had not been for Gromyko meeting we might have considered it but with the Gromyko meeting, we can't do it.

K: He expects the President to make a fight. He wants to punish us by not doing it. The President must fight. The press is speculating that the President may go at the end of Nov. and no one has said anything about that. He is just making a big affair of it. Bush will take the procedure while I am there. If Rogers calls me I will say I haven't heard the final word from you.

H: Yeah.

K: I will have to lie to him. Otherwise --

H: That's right.

TELCON
President/Kissinger

12:40 p. m.

10/1/71

K: We have just had word from the Japanese that they may be giving. Kishi wants to come next week. Prepared to settle it. Wants assurances on surcharge. We should stop all talk of trading with the enemy act which kills them. He wants to arrive Monday and we will see him Tues.

P: You can fit him in on Tues. Make sure Connally and Peterson are informed. On the surcharge thing, I don't think it's insurmountable because it's not too late.

K: Particularly if they settle with you. As Kishi will settle only with you.

P: On the next surcharge thing before going into talks, let me know what I can give.

K: By the time you return Monday we will have a proposal for you. Peterson is aboard. Kennedy has been called in London and he knows the situation so no one will say the wrong thing over the weekend.

P: Also Alex Johnson.

K: I have called him.

P: It will let them feel we are trying to avoid the other thing. Play a part too.

K: I called him. Dobrynin just called and said Gromyko considers these the most constructive he has had. Visit good in every conceivable way.

P: It's good they are prepared for the announcement on Tuesday.

K: I haven't told them the date.

P: Play that very low key. I don't think there should be a lot of confrontation.

K: We have to tell the Japanese. We can do it Monday.

P: And on the basis that it's routine and fully for the purpose of doing the trip.

K: On Monday we will send something only for Sato. They will build up Sato. And if it leaks, no tradgedy.

P: And I don't think others need to be informed.

K: The Nationalists.

President/Kissinger

12:40 p. m.

10/1/71

-2-

P: Of course.

K: And the Australians. I will call in Plimsoll

P: Very routine and I think the say the trip is handled and fact there is no press is --

K: Because I think we can take a few questions on background to keep speculation down. To say when there are no diplomatic relations there are complex problems and this is better way to settle it. This will keep it low profile. Otherwise there will be speculation on developments in China.

P: If I said there would be announcements on appropriate times?

K: We have managed to set this in the right framework when we had to.

P: ON Pakistan, I don't know what can be done there. We are doing every thing we can?

K: I have talked with Irwin and he will call in the Indians. The things Pakistan can do without collapse are slow. They have put in a <u>mmxx nun</u> - military <u>______</u>. They have allowed UN in ? ? ? and on ships and to see that no arms are sent. All within their country. The Indians claim everything is insufficient.

P: Before Mrs. Gandhi gets here there has to be work done on the Indians.

K: Their Ambassador has asked to see me next week and I will <u>put it to him.</u>

P: Supporting them against the Chinese is not in our plan.

K: And this exercise gives us a chance to determine the Chinese view a little bit.

P: Glad to hear about Kishi.

TELCON
A. Johnson/Kissinger
1:37 p. m. 10/1/71

K: Just talked with the President. There's a slight problem on Wed. because he might give a press conference on Thurs. night. Not announced yet. So he suggested Friday afternoon but I just checked his schedule and he is going to W. Va. which he forgot. You think it shouldn't go beyond Wed.? All I need is a determination.

J: I don't think it should go beyond Wed.

K: Then I will take the responsibility to go with it. How much time? He shouldn't do the negotiating.

J: We have to take with him first here. I think he has to speak with David, Peter, or the Secy. or me.

K: If after that he knows what's going on, he knows better then me. We don't war the Presidentix involved unless we see an agreement. I will explain to the President and set an hour on Wed.

TELECON

Stewart Alsop

10/1/71 p.m.

K: Most newsmen call me; you make me call you.

A: Interested... you were wrong and I was right. I told him to give
that message to you. Did he?

K: No, because he was wrong.

A: No, it was I who said that. This was my view.

K: No, I think you were probably right, but if you were in my shoes
you would still have played for it.

A: Of course. Do you have a free lunch date next week? Meet at Sans Souci?

K: Next week I can't, but I would love to meet you at the Sans Souci for
lunch. Can we do it the week after?

A: Yes. I qu'de you in my next column, from "Nuclear Weapons and
Foreign Policy."

K: ... How about lunch on Wednesday of next week? I find
I am free.

A: Fine, where?

K: That depends. If you'll let me pay so I have you indebted let's make
it Sans Souci.

A: Let's make it that and charge it to Kay Graham.

K: Okay. How are you?

A: I'm fine. I had a blood test today and the good guys seem to be
winning. It's extraordinarily bad because I had a bad low point a week ago. Everything
seems to look good. How would you feel about having Rowland Evans join us?
He has been nice to me.

K: I like him; he's a decent guy.

A: And he's making an effort to pull me back into the reporting business
since I was sick. How would you feel about him joining us at Sans Souci?

K: I like him.

A: Let's make it three then if it's all right.

K: I like him very much. Just as long as you aren't doing it to avoid being
attacked for being seen alone with me.

TELECON
Secretary Connally
10/1/71 p.m.

K: What did I do to get you gripped off again?

C: There have been so many bad pictures of me and good ones of you . . .

K: You've had your day now. Incidentally, I hear friendly things about your speech yesterday. It was just right and puts the London thing in the right perspective. You'd never have had that reaction if you'd ______ in London. What's interesting is the reports from people who were crying about you 10 days ago. Barber, Mr. Filler - very friendly. You achieved what you set out to do.

C: They can't ______ gripe? and it's not in their interest to.

K: But I think they are on the road there.

C: I do too.

K: The offset proposal -- Rogers wants to make it to the Germans. He sent a memo over saying he was going to do it on his own. We have stopped it.

C: Good. We can get more than he's asking.

K: Didn't stop it for any personal reason. We stopped it pending your and Laird's reaction.

C: Okay, give me a day or two to look at it.

K: You think we can do better?

C: Hell yes. If he would hold to a firm position we'd have no problem. In the first place, you shouldn't negotiate with them every year anyway. We ought to say we expect so much offset every year, and not have a new agreement every year.

K: And it gets us fighting on subjects that aren't really very high level.

C: Exactly right.

K: We will help hold on. Second, we have had word from the Japanese they are ready to move on the textile issue. Kishi is coming to settle, but only with the President. They want from us assurances on the surcharge, and to stop talking about trading with the enemy. I am suggesting to Peterson, pending your recommendation, that he call a meeting tomorrow or Monday to see what we are prepared to give.

C: I have no objections. That's a good idea. The Japanese are ready to move. Let's not trade off too much for textiles. While they are moving let's give them a shove.

TELECON
Secretary Connally

10/1/71 p.m. p. 2

K: Did anyone ever tell you you are a mean negotiator?

C: No.

K: Oh, milk of human kindness.

C: Oh I'll tell you one thing -- If I ever get into a negotiation with you I'm going to run in the other direction. In all seriousness, these fellow are so scared and upset. Let's not give too much for textiles. We can get more and we've got to.

K: One other thing. Do you remember that trip to China? Have you got anyone on your line.

C: No. Never.

K: You remember that trip to China?

C: Right.

K: We surfaced it with Bill this week and now he objects on the grounds that the UN debate will be at the same moment and we'll take a beating. On the other hand, if we try to change . . . The other side really has acted in good faith. We proposed the date in July, and they came back to us with another date but still in July, before the UN schedule was known. How bad a beating do you think we'll take?

C: I don't think bad at all, providing we're candid enough to say this was laid on a long time ago. That it is a happenstance of timing, and no significance should be given to it.

K: Actually, the other side has the same problem.

C: Sure.

K: And we can, if Bush gets to work on it, delay the vote till next week after I am back.

C: I would make him get to work, but if you delay the trip because of the debate, it highlights the debate, and if we lose it, as we may, then we have suffered. If you go ahead with the trip, they draw the conclusion that we are setting out to establish a new relationship.

K: And if we delay till after the vote . . .

C: Then when you go you go as a defeated man.

TELECON

Justice Arthur Goldberg

10/1/71 p.m.

K: How are you?

G: At the moment I'm furious, and since you are involved, I'll tell you what it's about.

K: How can I be involved in anything that could get you furious?

G: This morning I received through the mail a forged document that's being sent around. It purports to be a letter from me to Abba Eban. You are prominently featured so let me read it: "... metter of our interest . . . despite some differences of opinion . . . our people are united when it comes to vital questions . . . Richard Nixon has a chance to win . . . sure you approve of Nixon . . . he is not a personality who would ______ the best interests of this country, but the best person for our goals . . . Dr. Henry Kissinger is the most suitable man . . . highest skill and deepest devotion to our sacred cause . . . direct influence upon the chief executive . . . undoubtedly Henry is quite competent man -- that's Chinese Henry -- and he will have no trouble with ______ of the State Department . . . as you know, Henry is on good terms with Rockefeller . . . his well-known pro-German feelings [mask our cause] . . . all of us will ______ in our efforts for Israel.

K: To whom is it addressed?

G: Abba Eban.

K: Well, I appreciate your efforts in my behalf . . .

G: Isn't that something? I will brand it as a forgery, and ask the government to investigate it, as should be done.

K: Of course. Why don't you write a formal letter asking for that?

G: I intend to, but I just got this. I don't want to wait to deny it.

K: Last year they had an alledged pledge I made to the American Jewish Cong.

G: About supporting them?

K: Yes, and giving them $20,000. I have never even had $20,000.

G: D______ Price . . . . . replied he didn't believe it. I see no choice but to brand it a forgery.

K: Oh absolutely. The President is calling me on the other line.

TELECON
Justice Arthur Goldberg
10/1/71 p.m. p. 2

G: Will you tell him about it, and tell him it is not true?

K: We know. You are a gentleman and you would not do this.

G: I do not express myself about a President of the United States this way, or even a potential President.

K: Thank you for calling. I would like to see you some time. Let's get together for lunch.

TELCON

President/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

10/2/71

P: I had a report from Bob on -- he talked with me last night. I don't know if it's later. Know anything else on the textile thing?

K: Peterson is traveling so he has his information from me. The latest is that there's a possibility of getting the Hong Kong and Taiwan agreements on Monday. The possible to get the 204 of agricultural adjustment act and then don't have to apply trading with the enemy act and better position with the Japanese and looks like the Japanese are weakening.

P: He said it looks like the Japanese are coming along but the problem is getting the industry to go along. I said I would not have Kishi here and then have the textile industry turn it down.

K: We are working on the textile industry now.

P: Who's we?

K: Peterson said he will work on it. Good test for the Hong Kong-Taiwan agreement. That's what we will apply to Japan.

P: Do we have Korea?

K: Not yet but they are coming along.

P: We have to have all three.

K: It's now thought two is enough but Korea will also seem to be falling into place.

P: If it comes out, you have to give Kennedy credit. State running him down and saying he can't negotiate.

K: Everyone knocks Connally and basically he plays it right. Without the shock treatment in London no one would have taken him seriously. Then the small group of 4 when we agreed with a positive program in the next phase and now we have one. The finance ministers know it's domestically unpalatable. Similarly textiles. ? ? ? ? ? The guy who makes them scream will be unpopular.

P: Let's assume we get action from the Russians on the M.E. Remember how they screamed because I layed it into them?

K: You made it come true. Sidey had breakfast with me today and he said we should be embarrassed about what we did to the President on Cambodia. Cambodia saved it. And next year Laos will be the same.

President/Kissinger

10:42 a. m.

10/2/71

-3-

K: He has told Beam and Hillenbrand that you have turned over the European Security Conference to him and he has the same carte blanche as on the M. E. It could screw up NATO.

Kx P: It could. We have to give him things to do. I said we do not want the conference. If anything to be done let me do it directly and I would like Beam and Hillenbrand out.

K: It's awfully high level.

P: But he will have these decisions. They want this conference and we have to stiff arm on this.

K: I would like to see it drag out before the summit. We can't hold out after summit. Let it come out of the summit as something you did.

P: Rogers is not for the conference.

K: I wouldn't bet on it.

P: That's what he said.

K: What he wants is an operation on something.

P: Let's play a double track game on this. We have settled with Gromyko and Dobrynin has word to handle it through channels and also preparations for the summit. You have to give State things to do. On the summit and China thing have them prepare papers for me. I would like positions we should take and items that are coming up.

K: I discussed that on China with Alex Johnson.

P: Over a period of time, best brains. Gives them something exciting to do. We have to plan summit and not let them do a thing. But let them do papers.

K: And work on trade, travel and things they love.

P: We have to sit down before Russian and China and determine what we want from both and what they want and what we can do. While it didn't come up I bet one thing the Russians will want is what they did at the opera house in Vienna. Interesting they mentioned to you --

K: It was a very profound remark.

P: He wanted to hear it but not raise it. On the security conference I would

President/Kissinger

10:42 a. m.

10/2/71

-4-

let
P: (cont.) like them do it. It's high level but you can't be in a position where
they will do nothing.

K: I will not get in the way.

P: On the other hand, I want Dobrynin to understand that he can talk with
Rogers but I will make the decisions.

K: I will get out a directive for an interdepartmental study and he can draw
on that.

P: And Laird on it too.

K: What to talk about. No good agenda now. Gromyko mentioned to me that
Rogers talked to him. Talk technical issues at State and policies with the
President.

P: Let Bill think he is doing something at that level. Remind him of the
fact that the President wants him to do it because we do not want to get
stuck into it.

K: In a dilatory way.

P: Plenty of time to do it and and consult with allies. Like SALT.

K: And break it at the summit if you want to.

P: The European security conference -- three things the Russians want.
European Security Conference, M. E., trade, and guarantees against China.
4 things. They must pay a price and nothing given before they know what
we want. We raised VN and Pakistan with them. So what's in it for us. We
can't give them a summit and give them 4 things.

K: On the M. E., I will drag it out to see how they behave on VN.

P: Be sure with regard to European Security Conference that Rogers is aware
we are sending out a directive.

K: It's normal. We do it for every visit. To every agency.

P: Explain to him so he doesn't think we are trying to undercut his position.

K: He doesn't have a position.

P: But he said he wanted to talk about it. So say it's an internal study.

President/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

10/2/71

-5-

K: It doesn't mean we would do the talking here. We have this on MBFR. We are not talking out of the WH. Irwin doing next week in Europe. He talks for State.

P: No, that's a public statement about this. We have not taken a position for or against conference. Decide at a later time when we have a decision. No public decision.

K: Important to do it diliatorily because it could wreck NATO.

P: I asked Bill why Russians wanted it. Because it will do in the NATO. He knew it. That's what I meant when I said countries (1) for it.

K: Walters was invited to lunch by the Chinese today. Never warmer and went out of their way to make laudatory references to you. I sent them a message last week on the flap on UN and said you are holding together the left wing and right wing.

P: You haven't informed them of the announcement?

K: We will tell them a week from today. We told them today an invitation received. I told them in August that as soon as Berlin agreement there will be an invitation.

P: Doing it in steps.

K: Next Fri. or Sat.

P: Also say we wouldn't accept theirs before __________.

K: I told them and said it again today. Very meticulous with them.

P: I want something very well prepared in your office or by Price. Gromyko mentioned another letter.

K: No, the one you have seen.

P: I thought I would reply to that. He said Brezhnev would like to hear about matters brought up here. He would like a letter on a private basis on the conference with Gromyko and say as much as we can on high level that it's important our two countries hold the key and ______ we have to be responsible. Critical thinking time. Talked in that spirit and we will both talk that way and an historical significance like WW II alliance.

K: I told Gromyko we would have something in two weeks.

President/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

10/2/71

-6-

P: Something marked personal so we have Nixon/Brezhnev correspondence for the administration. I think that's essential.

K: I hope you have decent weather.

P: It's great. We are trying to get out our problems on domestic thing right now. I told Bob I want Ehrlichman to announce the designation of Whittier and call it the Insititute of World Peace or Something like that. About the 15th of Nov. it would be a good touch.

K: Not Irvine?

P: The library will be in the vicinity of Irvine but this at Whittier. Quakers and all that yakity-yak. When you consider what we gave done and what we may do even if we get 2/3 of it nothing before like this done. On VN the Senate passes resolutions on VN. We will do that and make those miserable and change the whole thing on the M.E. and V.N. and Berlin.

K: The M. E. is cool. We can string them on something. We will settle that and have a SALT agreement. This is going to go down as the outstanding period of foreign policy.

P: Ambizing it can have such impact on the peace of the world. ______ was weaker then it has been.

K: No domestic support.

P: Or in the Senate.

K: With the whole establishment screaming at us.

P: That would be Hammered home. Lack of support.

K: I think we will crack VN this year.

P: I know you do. It will crack or we will crack them.

K: After China trip we have to go against your enemies. Russians can't foul you up. Summit and then if we go the M. E. route they need you to follow it out. That's why ??.

P: ?? ? ?

K: And European Security conference in such shape that only you can carry through.

President/Kissinger

10:42 a. m.

10/2/71

-7-

P: Keep European friends and not let them push us.

K: We have always gained when dilatory.

P: They have gained too.

K: I think Breshnev will really put on a reception for you. It's in his
own self-interest.

P: It will be interesting. The way you left VN thing they will be supposed
to carry a message to them. When delivered to them?

K: A week from yesterday. Walters will ask for an appointment Monday.

P: And China announced Tues.

K: Delivered on Friday and ask for meeting Nov. 2 in Paris for their reply.

P: I think that has to be stated in a way in that Thieu offers it but that he will
do it now if they will do that.

K: I won't put in Thieu business in. I will put in that he will resign but not
that he will not run.

P: I don't want this put in that Thieu will resign. They will leak it. We will
? Z? ? ? ?. They say we will put him down. Better then to say Thieu has
offered to resign.

K: Right.

P: I think it's an awful long shot. It's too much to negotiate. Then what do we
do about the elections.

K: Just what will they do about themselves.

P: Start another offensive.

K: They started one on the Cambodian border and gotten their brains beaten out.

P: By Cambodians?

K: No, SVN.

P: Accurate report?

-8-

K: Yes. Tried for firg base, got over 100 killed and broke off fight. If they
had taken a firebase it would have been two columns headline in the Post.

P: Wehn we have a 3 day strike it will be an 8 column headline in NYTimes.
We must stiff arm. We can't go the Mansfied route. 9 months if we get
prisoners. We must get them now. We will crack them.

Telcon

Oct. 2, 1971 :10:55 a.m.

Robert McNamara

M: Sorry to bother you. Paul Mark Henri, UN in Pakistan, borrowed by U Thant to run the relief program over there is back here today. Holding a meeting on Pakistan. Brought him back to support need for additional emergency aid. I haven't seen him yet. I understand he has some interesting information. If you have 10-15 minutes and can talk to him.

K: How do I get in touch with him?

M: You can get him through me. I can have him call your secretary and give a number.

He

K: //won't be there Monday?

M: I don't know.

K: I was going to get in touch with you next week. $75 M is the absolute limit you can do. We were hoping you might get up to 85.

M: You might have to see what the others will support. I wouldn't object to that. I am not sure what the others will do.

K: If we can show some response to $10 million it might be good.

McNamara - 11:25 a.m.

M: I am not in the Pak meetings, but regarding your request on the 85, I called our people out and we are not yet sure whether we can get agreement on 75. We are going to propose 75. The Paks are going to propose 125. I have given my people authority to settle at 90.

K: Good.

M: I don't want to mislead you.

K: No. But they made a personal appeal to the President yesterday.

M: Hell, Henry, $10-15 million is not important in this kind of situation.

K: That's right.

M: Well, that's the way we will start it and we will try to follow it. I will let you know.

TELCON

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:33 a. m.

10/2/71

J: Sam Berger and Chuck Whitehouse. Sam is agreeable and the Seyc is agreeable. The only open issue is Ellsworth. We should doxx touch base with Ellsworth in some way. Here?

K: I think so. Mention my name if you want to.

J: I can mention your name.

K: I am not asking you to.

J: He and Al discussed it?

K: I think so.

J: I will confirm with Al. Better do something the President wants without dragging my feet.

K: we would like a good post for Sam. It's without prejudice to Sam.

J: I understand he has other ideas and possibilities. The good posts have gone to Peter's people. First think I think of is Brussels. But Flanigan wants that one and I can't think of another at the moment. I will schoff it. New problem. Sent over to you Armin Meyer's talk with Kishi. He is waffling on when he will come.

K: They will trigger the President into a wild act against them.

J: He expects textiles to be settled before he comes. Dave Kennedy is on his way in to see me. He says he has an offer -- Shultz on something. Very promising offer from the Japanese.

K: Fukuda mentioned there's an envoy over here talking to Shultz. I may get into your business but it's one central focus.

J: David is coming in to see me. We can wnat until we see how to handle it.

K: Peterson wants to chair the meeting and he will be back Monday night. So on Tues.

J: We can wait.

K: On ceasefire, I would be delighted if Bill could pull together some ideas on ceasefire. But not a more restricted group. Maybe principles of the group.

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:33 a. m. 10/2/71

-2-

J: No problem with that and neither does he. I will tell him to go ahead.
He is comign with a letter to Thieu.

K: The President thinks it's a good idea.

J: We will have something for you in the course of the afternoon.

K: Good.

Telcon
Under Secy Irwin
10/2/71: 12:30 pm

I: On Panamanian negotiators. I understand there is an Eliot-Kissinger memo in your office.

K: I know. I sent it in. That is what I thought, but it hasn't come out yet.
I thought it had already been turned down.

I: We don't know about the turn-down.

K: I don't know about it.

I: It would be helpful. It could make quite a significant difference toward a treaty if you are willing to do it.

K: I have recommended it. Let me check on it next week.

I: This type of thing could make quite a difference I think.

K: Good.

I: Thank you, Henry.

TELCOM
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

12:35 p.m.

10/2/71

K: I just want to tell you we are thinking of giving you the Australian billot in the hope you will put Berger in there.

J: That's brilliant.

K: I will recommend it to the President on Monday.

J: I would like to check with the Secy.

K: This would be the most painless way of doing it.

J: No place else for the man there?

K: Rice? No! He has done enough damage. NATO maybe?

J: That's just what we need!

K: That's my recommendation. I don't know if it will work. You are aboard on that?

J: I am completely aboard.

TELCON
President/Kissinger

1:22 p.m.

10/2/71

K: Sorry to bother you again. We put off Kishi to Wed. Alex and Connally thought it better. Negotiations with Hong Kong and Tawan coming to a head on Monday and Tuesday and then we can use the Agricultural act with Japan so you don't have to use the trading with the enemy act. I mentioned the trip problem to Connally. I asked his political opinion on the problems on impact. He feels it would be a disaster to put it off.

P: The problem is going afterwards in my opinion. After they drive Taiwan out it will be terribly sticky. We have to get China trip set. You told him about the Russian thing too?

K: Yes, and he thinks we have to go full speed ahead and his judgment is good.

P: Politically.

K: He will explain to the conservatives. He says it's our policy and we continue to fight justice hard. He said we absolutely have to go with it. If we wait for that it will build up the UN vote beyond what it is now and if we lose, it will be worse.

P: After the vote there may be some pressures to re-consider if we should go to China. We should nail that down. Will announcement of date come before your going.

K: In Nov.

P: Not before the vote.

K: No.

P: Maybe it should. Why postpone?

K: Maybe Chinese won't agree. We can still settle on that before I go.

P: When you return they will say -- what have you got to announce?

K: We could have it before the vote.

P: I think it will be well to -- think about it -- have the date out of the way or nothing to say when we finish.

K: Just say it will be announced in the next few weeks now and a few technical items. If you want to delay it. We don't have to settle it before or until we go.

President/Kissinger

1:22 p.m.

10/2/71

-2-

P: I don't know if stringing the date out is good. It seems to me the majro reason for the trip is to arrange the date. People want to know when you are going.

K: If they are agreeable, we can settle the date we want and do it.

P: I am inclined to do that so it's concrete. They will talk about the date. So it doesn't appear it looks like another step in a long negotiation. I think if you are coming back and we say we will announce the date in 2-3 weeks, they might have some -- announcement of date after vote might be bad. Get it over with and let the vote go.

K: We should get Bush's judgment on date of the vote. Don't want it the day of the vote.

P: No, I was thinking of the day of your return. Like the other.

K: That was about 3 days afterwards. We will have to get a reading on the date of the vote.

P: We will have to get a reading before. We will have to work that out.

K: We have two weeks on that. We can play it as you prefer.

P: Only problemon Kishi thing Wed. is that I will have the economic thing I will be working on Wed. and Thurs.

K: Let's do it Friday morning then.

P: What is the feeling there? Do it as quickly as possible?

K: We could delay until Friday. I am positive.

P: I have to prepare on Wed. and Thurs.

K: I will check with Alex.

P: I could do it Friday. Friday afternoon. I may make the announcement Friday noon. Thurs. or Friday noon and they will talk at least an hour.

K: Why don't I tell Alex you prefer Friday afternoon and if they can't then you will do it Wed. I think you should try to keep your mind free if you can.

TELCONE
Irwin/Kissinger
1:41 p. m. 10/2/71

K: We have approved this Panamanian delegation.

I: Attending? Received by the President?

K: Yes. He will do it with the next credential group for 10 mins.

I: We will wait.

K: Whenever there is a group coming through.

I: It will help in the long run.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
10/4/71 8:50 a.m.

K: I was wondering how fixed the China part of your speech is.

R: It's 10 minutes away from being released. What's the problem -- I'll
see if I can correct it.

K: My problem is the gratuitous slaps at the communists and the
principle of universality and where it keeps referring to Taiwan which they
will construe as going for two Chinas.

R: On universality, we don't adopt it, we say the UN . . .

K: I've only got in here at 2:30 in the morning when we weren't exactly working.

R: I will make any changes that are critical. Which ones do you want?
Try to give the ones you think most important and I'll try to make them.

K: Well you say "... and less to what the PRC might do." I think
that is gratuitous.

R: Okay, why don't I just say what the UN should do. And on universality,
everyone has said that. I don't say this is what we are supporting, just what the
UN is doing. Do you have any other? We'll cross that out about what the
PRC might do.

K: Then there's a paragraph which says: "... representation of all the
people or it can take action to expel a member" I would just tone that way down.
Have you any objection to that?

R: This is our thesis, that we don't want to expel a member.

K: But making a ______ toward representation of all the people . .
that's the universality part.

R: I'll leave that out.

K: And "... population greater than 2/3 of the population of all the
UN members. . ." Again I have no precise recommendation . . .

R: This is our whole policy. I will take those two parts out; anything else?

K: Only other thing was on the European Security Conference, but you are a
better judge of whether this will commit us more than we want to be committed.

R: No it doesn't. In fact the British are afraid that we backed away too much.

K: "I am all nations can be assured of their place in the world community."

R: Okay, I will leave that out. The rest is pretty butter plate and makes
a good argument for it . . . . Okay, I will leave this out.

TELCORN
T. Schreiber/Kissinger

11:02 a.m.

10/4/71

Kx

HAK thanked TS for the use of his house and expressed concern that the <u>safety</u>
safe that was put in the <u>dan</u> may have damaged something. Schreiber assured
him that everything was fine and he was completely unaware that a safe had been
there. TS said that HAK's meeting with the group at lunch had been a great success.
They hadn't expected the conservatives -- their supporters were enthralled --
and the conservatives couldn't believe how they had misread things. He suggested
that HAK should do more of that kind of briefing because it makes the conservatives
not only understand but realize that there are other issues they should shut up on
because they don't have all the facts. He said that Len Firestone was writing to
Haldeman and when he had some more come-back he is going to write too, suggesting
that HAK do more of these briefings. HAK agreed they were worth doing.

TS then indicated that anytime HAK wanted to come out there would be a place
for him. He indicated that he had many friends who were always coming and going
and he could arrange for HAK to use any of their places. He mentioned that
Firestone has an apartment and will be in Europe during the first part of Nov.

At the end of the conversation HAK told Schreiber to let him know when he would
next be in D. C. and they would get together for lunch.

TELECON
Under Secretary Johnson

10/4/71 11:15 a.m.

K: I have just found out that Holdridge by mistake has already told Jenkins what's coming off. I'm afraid he'll go blabbing around the department. Holdridge told him to be discrete, but I'm afraid he'll talk.

J: I'm sure he won't, but I'll make sure.

K: Could you, and fairly soon?

J: Right now.

K: Okay then. Holdridge will come and talk to him informally and then we'll all meet here this afternoon.

J: Okay.

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:24 p.m.

10/4/71

K: I just called you -- returning my call?

H: Yes.

K: Wanted to check how things are going.

H: Fine. He came back again from the island yesterday afternoon and I filled him in on the conversation with Rogers. He said fine. He read it in the paper and it didn't bother him.

K: He is totally wrong. Rogers gave his UN speech without clearance here. The part on China was intolerable and I got him 5 mins. beforehand and changed it. On the M. E. it will screw us up. There's not a member of my staff who knows my views who isn't appalled by what he said Sat. I have talked with Alex.

H: Have you started notification?

K: Some this afternoon. Rogers will do some. I want your judgment -- I think I should call Scott and Mansfield at 8:00 tomorrow morning. Unless the President wants to.

H: We probably should so they don't get stirred up.

K: Better not to let them get riled up. They have agreed to the personnel we want.

H: Including the low-level people?

K: Yes but that was before we read -- they won't call off the trip. But if it isn't undercontrol they will let in the other party for insurance.

H: What do you think is happening over there?

K: Chou getting control of the situation and we should shut up.

H: Based on National Day activities?

K: And being so eager to get us there. When you coming back?

H: 7:00. He hasn't set a time.

K: Arriving or leaving?

H: Leaving here.

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:24 p.m.

10/4/71

-2-

K: He won't want me tonight will he?

H: I don't think so.

K: Where is he today?

H: At the house.

K: Maybe I will call him this afternoon.

H: We came back from the island later yesterday afternoon. Talked with him this morning. He raised the question of Arthur Burns. Wants you allied with us on getting him under control again.

K: You don't have to worry about getting me allied with you.

H: Actively involved. I think you can do more then we can.

K: I will raise it at lunch with Connally today.

H: He is trying to get Connally at every turn just as he did with Shultz.

K: Connally handled it beautifully. Brutal in London and handling it ______ here.

H: Arthur is trying to make everyone happy.

Connally

K: He/is strong and in contrast with the other guy, once you have an agreement, that;s it.

H: Herhought you could be helpful because Arthur giving in to other people.. Connally holding tight for our long range interest.

K: xlfxx As you know, I am going to Chicago next week. I was going to do some media briefing. Kupcinet is bugging for me to go on his show. I have no desire but if you want it, I will.

H: It gets into what we are talking about. When you go on TV.

K: My instinct is not to do it. I think I should wait for a big shot.

H: And at the right time.

K: And with the imminent China trip --

H: I think you should not. Unless you think you should.

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:24 p.m.

10/4/71

-3-

K: No, I want to be sure you don't have a feeling for Kup.

H: Further down the road but it should be an hour with Howard K. Smith where you get into what -- who has the staff to get an interview and the audience to pay it off. The position you are in I wouldn't do anything the President wouldn't do and take President-type shots.

K: Then I will stay with my refusal. Media okay?

H: Sure.

K: After we announced and lay the framework.

H: That will be fine.

K: See you tomorrow. I will call the President in the afternoon just to be sure all bases are touched.

TELCONE
Sen. Mathias/Kissinger

12:34 p. m.

10/4/71

K: I have read this amendment that you were thinking of introducing. I understand from Winston that at least you would listen to my suggestion. If something has to pass, I prefer this to anything I have seen but I would prefer nothing right now. So if you want my preference, I would have to say not having it introduced.

M: Let me wet up the opposite side of the question. Mike holds a sword of Damacles over our head. Cut the string and down it comes. I don't have to introduce this today or tomorrow or Wed. but I would like to get the language into shape. We have been working on itXxX since sending it to Win and will send over the changes.

K: Have problems with the second 50,000.

M: I agree that should probably go. You notice it's a maximum drawdown. It gives the option that it's what maximum is. I don't want that. Let me send you a further draft and we will see how we far we should go with it.

K: That's fine.

M: We will get it down today.

TELECON

Secretary Rogers
10/4/71 2:37 p. m.

R: I was just talking to Alex and he said you were not putting a date in the announcement, just saying the last of October.

K: That's all that's agreed on, the last half of October.

R: I thought you told me you had a specific date.

K: We can get an agreement for an exact date in October within a week.

R: Well, I'm afraid it will look like we've been euchered. When you talked to me you told me you had dates certain. I thought if we leave it indefinite it will look like it's planned to coincide with the vote. We've got to be careful so it doesn't look like we're getting out-maneuvered on everything. I thought the text was specific.

K: I thought I showed it to you.

R: Maybe you did. Anyway.

K: We can say that it is likely to be in the first half of that period without giving an exact date.

R: I think you have got to do that. We've got a lot of suspicious here. We have to be careful not to look like we're double-crossing Taiwan.

K: How did your speech go?

R: It seemed to go pretty well. A lot of people said it was good.

K: That's very rare in that outfit. I don't shrug that off.

It will be interesting to see the press reaction, but it wasn't too critical. It had a good tone. It was easy to make because there have been so many big accomplishments. On universality we came out all right -- didn't plump for it. The other thing is if in the announcement of who is going, if you could have the State Department representative listed first so it is clear it's a joint effort.

K: I intend to put this out and I may take a few questions on a background basis, and the only person I am going to name is the State person and just list the others by categories. And on the other part I will say no precise date has been set but in all likelihood it will be in the first part of that period.

R: Okay.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Bob Haldeman
10-4-91; 6:30 P.M.

K: I just wanted to get some guidance from him about what to do about the Senators in the morning on this announcement.

H: Will you be in your office after you have dinner?

K: I will be going to the Kennedy Center with some friends -- call me and I will be reachable.

H: If I can catch him before he gets on the helicopter I will tell him you wanted to catch him on that.

K: Also, I wanted to tell him about some of the conversations today.

H: You won't want to talk to him on the plane, then.

K: No.

H: Then you can talk to him in the morning.

K: If that is the case, I must talk to him first thing in the morning.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
10/4/71; 6:55 p.m.

K: I just wanted to make sure about this date that you had word in New York.

J: I had not had subsequent exchange. I have not been able to reach him.
Do you want me to?

K: I don't think he leaks but could he keep Pederson under control. We
would like to win UN vote, but it is not the purpose . . .

J: Have you heard about Blount this afternoon?

K: . . . already disavowed him.

J: I told Bud Krogh it would be best to disavow Blount.

K: You do it first. If it plays very big, we will disavow him.

J: I won't make a formal statement -- in response to to queries, we will disavow him.

K: Good!

TELCONE
Billy Graham/Kissinger
morning 10/4/71

G: The reason I called -- yesterday Mr. Diminich (?) who is the political advisor to Golda Meir, came to see me directly here. I will tell you what he wants and you tell me what your reaction is. They are deeply concerned about the Phantom. They want 2-3 a month for the next few months. Aslo concerns about Mr. Sisco's ideas on the Suez Agreement. They know I can get to the President and I have a long-standing personal relationship with Mrs. Meir. The thing that really concerns them is that she wants to come to the U.S. to accept some invitations she has been extended.

K: Very unwise. I have told them many times.

G: Oh, you've talked with them. Should I tell them that as the President's statement?

K: Yes. Very unwise to bring it to a head. Where are you?

G: In NY.

K: Let me think about it a couple of hours.

G: I will be in the NY Hilton at 586-7000, in Rm. 3238 under T.W. Wilson.

TELECON
Speaker Carl Albert
10/5/71 9:00 a.m.

K: The President asked me to call you. We are making an announcement at 10:00 this morning. We would appreciate keeping it confidential until then. Let me read it to you. [HK reads statement.]

A: Okay, thank you very much.

K: It's just a way of getting arrangements put into final shape. It's not a world-shaking thing, just a sign of further progress, and we didn't want you to be surprised.

A: Okay, thank you.

TELECON

Senator Mansfield

10/5/71 9:06 a.m.

K: You know we finally have a date for my going to Montanna.

M: Really?

K: April 14,

M: Good.

K: 14 or 16, not definite yet.

M: That's a beautiful time of year.

K: I'm looking forward to it, if you'll just defend me against your colleagues. It's the only public speech I'm giving in my four years here. Please defend me if someone criticizes me for popping off in public. I'm looking forward to it very much.

M: So are we; I'm delighted.

K: That's not the reason I called you. I called in order to tell you about an announcement we are making in an hour, at about 10:00, which we would like to hold until then. Let me read it to you: [HK reads statement]. So I am going to make an announcement over with mostly technical people and one or two substantive people. So, it shows things are moving ahead on their side.

M: I'm delighted. This gives real reassurance. Thank you.

TELECON

Senator Brooke

10/5/71 9:12 a.m.

K: I am calling you at the request of the President, and also as a former constituent, to let you know about an announcement we are making in 45 minutes which we would appreciate your holding until then. May I read it to you?

B: Certainly.

K: [reads]

B: Marvelous.

K: I just wanted you to know about it. You have been a very good friend to all of us.

B: I appreciate that and I am elated. That's marvelous. I am sure some good will come of it. Full speed ahead! Henry, we are debating whether to debate with Jim Buckley on this ________ target capability. He may not even cart (?) ________ it up to a vote. But if you think it would be useful I will cancel some other things and do it.

K: It's an unfortunate issue to debate. We have no strong view one way or the other. I mean we ________ do it.

B: I don't want to give it too much. He may not even press it to a vote anyway.

K: There is no need on our side.

B: Okay, thank you.

TELCOM
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger
9:17 a. m. 10/5/71

K: I just wanted to check if everything is on course with you.

J: On course.

K: Any setback?

J: No. Armin had to fly to Kushu to tell Sato. He was in the most remote spot in Japan.

K: I have talked with Albert, Mansfield, Brooke, Ford and Fulbright and Scott in a moment. Don't want to give him a head start. McGregor calling Aiken and others and I said a senior State official coming. Mansfield particularly appreciated that. I talked with Cromer and Dobrynin. He said it's diplomacy on a grand scale. The Secretary --

J: Did his stints up there.

K: I will give Jenkins the specific mention you suggested. I will let you know what happens. We will be in close touch. You will know everything we know immediately.

J: You are still going at 10:00?

K: Yes.

J: I will listen.

TELCON
Fulbright/Kissinger
9:27 a.m. 10/5/71

K: I wanted to call you to read an announcement we are making at 10:00.'
Let me read it to you and see say a word about it. "The Govt. of the
People's Republic of China and the Govt. of the U.S. of America have agreed
Mr. Kissinger will visit China the end of October to make arrangements for
the President's trip to China." Announcement will be in an hour. Taking
a group with me including a State Dept. man and one on my staff and technical
people. It looks like the trip is on course.

F: Good. '

K: We wanted you to know about this. We are trying to find a mutually
convenient time for me to go to China with your committee and I will do it
before we go off.

F: It sounds very encouraging. Do you know what's going on that people
think there are changes in plans regarding this visit.

K: We really have no reliable information. In terms of exchanges with us there
has been no alteration since crises started and if anything it's speeded up.
So whoever controls their cables has been changed. If I had to give a horse-
back opinion based on no more information then you have, it's that Chou En-lai
wants to get rid of his hard liners before the new phase starts. Staying down
the next their AF has been one and chief of staff was one of their toughest,
Chou En-lai has had a lot of visibility. ON TV every day. We don't really
know. They have told us Mao is alive.

F: You are going at the end of the month?

K: Later part.

F: I think's good.

K: It's just for you. Toward the early part then the latter part.

F: I won't make any statements about it.

K: My people are trying to work out a time and we will meet with your
committee before I go.

F: Going to Arkansas this week. Away until next Tues. 100th Anniv. of my
alma mater.

K: I won't do it without you. How about the 14th, Thurs.

F: It looks free.

Fulbright/Kissinger

9:27 a.m. 10/5/71

-2-

K: We will get it set today. Good. Nice to talk with you.

F: I hope you get that war over.

K: They can break your heart in more ways than you know.

F: I am so ashamed to be a part of it.

K: We couldn't have screwed it up like that if we tried. It takes a Vietnamese

F: I am tired of hearing about it.

TELECON

Congressman G. Ford.

10/5/71 9:35 a.m.

K: I wanted to let you know about an announcement we will be mak-
ing at 10:00. Let me read it to you. It should be held until then.
[HK reads statement.] I think it is rather self-explanatory.

F: That's great.

K: It should put to rest some of the speculation.

F: In other words, everything is going all right.

K: Yes, and for your information this is how it's been planned all
along.

F: Okay, you want a bag-carrier?

K: That makes you number 9834.

F: Any new word on ________?

K: Yes, we approved another $______ for the Swindler-Dressler
thing. I don't know whether that is in your area?

F: No, it's not.

K: We stopped the other things because of the damned Mack Company.

F: Well, keep me posted.

K: You will get advance warning.

F: I didn't get back until 2:00 this morning . . . .

K: What's what I heard.

F: But we are doing okay . . . .

TELCON
H. Scott/Kissinger
9:40 a.m. 10/5/71

K: I wanted to call you about an announcement we are making at 10:00 which we would like to hold till then. I have tried to reach you but you have been on the phone. I just wanted you to know. "The Govt. of the People's Republic of China and the Govt. of the U.S. of America have agreed Mr. Kissinger will visit Peking to make arrangements for the President's visit to China." I think it's rather self-explanatory.

S: That's very interesting.

K: It indicates we are on course.

S: The press will immediately ask me does this mean the President is going in the near future. How do I handle it?

K: The date will be worked out then and hope to announce it in a reasonable time period but doesn't mean it will be in the near future.

S: Worked out there. I will be pressed and don't want to embarrass you. The press will be after me all day long. May I say that one thing you are working out is the date?

K: That's permissible. That's one subject to be discussed. I am a State person and one or two members of my staff. and some technical people -- communications and advance men.

S: I will say there will be some people and ask Dr. Kissinger.

K: Just wanted you to know.

S: We will do our best on the Rhodesian chrome sanctions. The Mansfield Guardian and the XXX NYTimes say that we want it continued but the WH doesn't.

K: NOnsense.

S: It is and I told them. A group of us here say it's just the State Dept. stuff and the President doesn't want us to vote for sanctions. They are taking it off and getting a pro-Rhodesian vote. We need some help or the British will believe what they read in the Guardian. You can tell him John is working up here but we could use some other help too.

Kx

TELCONE
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

10/5/71

K: The press thing went well. Not one question on the UN.

J: Good.

K: I mentioned Jenkins as I said I would. In the most prominent place. Said he would come along. They didn't know if Al or Alfred. I said Al Jenkins one of the foremost China experts at State. I mentioned after me and mentioned to the Senators this morning. This is the way we should do it.

J: Did they press on the date?

K: No. We will send over -- the only think we had to do was put it on the record. It's ridiculous to put it on background when everyone knows I am going and I am the only one who can talk on it. Want to know how to reconcile with what the Secy. said this weekend. I said they have been meticulous and no change. When there's a change we will face it but no change and it's what the Secy. said this weekend. True, easy, and no special attention to it. One way to get to the Chinese.

J: We are launched.

K: The consultation was beautifully handled. I saw the cables Ted Eliot sent. It's a pleasure to do business with you.

J: Same to you.

TELECON

Bill Baroody, Sr.

10/5/71 11:25 a.m.

B: Two things: First, at the Hoover Institute at Stanford the Board of Overseers meets twice a year, once on the east coast and once on the west. This year the eastern meeting will be in Washington in our shop. There are 35 to 40 members, a pretty solid group. We wanted to do it in December and I wonder if you are available for off-the-record remarks at the lunch. We're talking about Friday, December 10 or any day during the following week.

K: Could you work with my assistant. In principle I will do it, but I don't have my schedule. Could you get someone to work with Coleman Hicks?

B: Okay. And have you had any chance to think about our debate program and the handling of the Nixon Doctrine. We're trying to find an articulate, responsible person . . .

K: How about Bill Kintner?

B: He has worked with us, I know him. We are looking for someone who wouldn't project . . .

K: I know what you mean. I will be back to you, really, within the week.

B: Wonderful, and I'll talk with Hicks about this other.

K: Okay.

TELCONE
Ehrlichman/Kissinger

11:25 a. m.

10/5/71

E: I have an invitation to dinner from the Chinese Ambassador.

K: Nationalist?

E: What else? For the 13th. What should I do?

K: Accept it. You will get a superb meal and they need massaging.

E: And you want me to?

K: We are doing enough to them as it is.

E: Maybe between now and then someone could drop me a note saying what the line is.

K: I will do it. I was there last week.

E: Don't want to get corss wires of what you are doing.

K: I appreciate it.

E: What are you doing on the advancing of your trip?

K: I am not --

E: I mean the President's trip.

K: Some low level advance fellow is coming along and ther will be a regular advance and I don't know how that is being handled.

TELECON

Dave Kraslow

10/5/71 11:25 a.m.

DK: I need some guidance on a question.

K: I'm getting out of the country so you can go on your vacation.

DK: Son of a gun! You knew this.

K: Yes, but what could I tell you.

DK: The question is in your meeting with our editors the question was raised whether the President would say something about . . .

K: I don't remember that. Why?

DK: Do you anticipate that before the President leaves he'll address the American people?

K: The best I can say is that it's conceivable, but we don't have a fixed plan.

DK: Has it come up?

K: Not that I can remember. Either he'll say something or I'll give an extended backgrounder.

DK: But you think it would be a good idea?

K: Yes.

DK: But there's been no discussion on it.

K: No.

DK: May I speculate that the message channels you have used are Ottawa and Romania?

K: I don't want to give an answer, one way or another.

DK: Would you dissuade me if I said those two?

K: You will narrow me down one way or another. They have been so honorable with us about this that I don't want to say it one way or another.

DK: Okay, thanks Henry.

TELECON

Mike Wallace

10/5/71 11:34 a.m.

W: I was going to call last night and then I said, no, I didn't want to bother him. Then you wake my colleague up who's mad as hell. I listen to the radio and what do I hear, the son of a bitch is flying off again.'

K: Is she mad at me?

W: She's amused and says she's got one on you.

K: Why has she got one on me?

W: Because you call her and wake her up and don't tell her.

K: If she continues to insist that a personal relationship with me entitles her to advance information she's going to have trouble with me.

W: If you think you have trouble with her, you should see the trouble we have. What I was going to call about last night was, when do you leave?

K: What?

W: Why shouldn't the 60 Minutes camera crew accompany Dr. Kissinger, on the plane, film him when he gets off, find out what goes on.

K: We told them we wouldn't bring any press. If you can get them to let you in that's their problem.

W: But there's to be no press?

K: No.

W: Will you go on 60 Minutes before your departure?

K: I doubt it, but Mike I am pushing for you, I really am. My colleagues here want me to do something, but not for 10 minutes. They want half an hour or an hour.

W: How soon are you going to do it?

K: November.

W: The television thing, not Peking.

K: No, I mean TV.

TELECON

Mike Wallace

10/5/71 11:34 a.m.

W: After you come back.

K: Yes.

W: Well, we'll keep a light in the window for you.

K: If you can get people in Ottawa, just don't use my name. But we never have people on the plane but try Ziegler or Haldeman. But I doubt it.

W: I shall try.

K: There is a slight chance that maybe they'll let you in and let you photograph it there. They'll take some film.

W: That's the point. And if I can get in will you talk to me there?

K: I don't want to speculate on that, maybe two or three minutes.

W: Okay. I'm glad you're keeping me in mind.

K: I am. I have put you at the top of the list to do it. They want me on some network. I have been meticulous about not getting into the decision and discussions myself.

W: Who is doing it? Is that the Saturday Morning group?

K: I'm not sure. Haldeman makes the final decision.

W: Okay, when are you leaving?

K: It's hasn't been decided yet. We'll announce it next week.

TELECON

Max Frankel

10/5/71 11:50 a.m. p. 2

K: That is one thing I would be able to say better when I get back. They are staggered by the size of our Presidential press corps. They are establishing a precedent that no huge masses of outsiders may descend on Peking.

F: You got any indication of how you are going?

K: We are going by Hawaii, stopping for a day because of the time change.

F: But no India-Pakistan thing?

K: No and we're going on one of our planes.

F: Seriously, if anything develops on the notion of some press accompanying you, we are most interested.

K: Okay.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Taft Schreiber
10/5/71; 3:20 p.m.

S: Hi, Henry,

K: Taft, how are you?

S: Very good. Henry, I hate to bother you about this but there is a report in the New York Times and somebody I have been working with tried to get some friends some help and said is it true that there is some movement on the Soviet thing and I said I don't know and don't think anybody would tell us. And I just refused to ask -- answer him but apparently this fellow is very interested in this kind of situation and I . . .

K: We just can't talk about any of this.

S: No, I just wanted to . . .

K: No, no, I understand the question and I've been talking to people about it here.

S: All right. Well, I shall not bother you. Are you coming up this week end or something?

K: I wish I could.

S: You are just working hard.

K: I am working away. When are you going back?

S: We are not going to leave here until Thursday on the afternoon plane so if you feel like having dinner . . .

K: Let's leave it that when -- if I come to New York I will let you know.

S: All right. You are important enough that if you can come I will cancel other dates.

K: Aren't you sweet.

S: Okay?

K: Good. Okay, bye.

CLASSIFIED

Authentic
30/7/58

B
SANDERSON

B/10/61

TELCONE
Kraemer/Kissinger
4:39 p. m. 10/15/71

HAK: I want to leave with you a thought before you leave on your next trip that we meet before that.

HAK: It's several weeks.

K: I didn't get it straight here. Are you (snowed under) by too many cables from this country? I am virtually on one country.

HAK: I stack them up and read at one time. I want them. I see 3/5 of what you send.

K: That's good. I had one yesterday of 7 pages. It's under a single cover. Let them give that to you.

HAK: We will meet before I go.

K: Somewhere before you go. Also to discuss and I will call you when fire
burning on that --

HAK: It cannot be helped.

K: That's not it. The protection that must be given to his successors.

HAK: Let's discuss that soon.

TELCORN

Rowalnd Evans/Kissinger

4:57 p.m.

10/5/71

E: Will you talk with me for a minute and a half?

K: Whose phone number do you want now?

E: Have you been involved in the VP trip to Greece?

K: Not really.

E: Why was it changed? Two months ago he wanted to stop in Greece and State said no.

K: But by promising it to him now.

E: Do you think it's smart with the situation there now?

K: If you have a Greek VP you are under some restraints.

E: You couldn't do anything.

K: It's easier without a Greek V. P.

E: Gives crowds a chance to solidify itself. Did you see in the TIMES where they are curtailing embassy personnel from getting in touch with former Parliamentarians?

K: We are having lunch tomorrow, right?

E: Stu hasn't been in touch with me.

K: He won't be seen with me. Alone. Won't see me in the office.

E: My secretary just told me it's lunch tomorrow.

K: She listens in on the phone!

E: All our doors are open. I read you are going to China. Taking any reporters with you?

K: No.

E: Joe Kraft going in?

K: I don't know.

Rowland Evans/Kissinger

4:57 p.m.

10/5/71

-2-

E: They won't take in anyone until the President.

K: They have been restrictive.

E: Except Scotty.

K: Thy can only handle so many President a year and after Scotty's lofty attitude --

E: Did I tell you about ______ on that? Arthur asked him if w he was working for ______ or against it. He said just say two consenting adults.

K: Let me say what you are doing for Stu Alsop is wonderful.

E: I love him, you know.

K: (Well, what you are doing is great and I want you to know. Of course, I am not surprised.)

E: Well, I think he is better. He is mending.

TELECON

Lloyd Shearer

10/5/71 6:35pm

S: Do you have, without revealing anything, a time schedule when you will be back in this country? We are thinking that New York wants to spend a lot of time promoting the Parade thing. Will you be back after the 24th, by the 24th or before?

K: More likely after than before. It's not fixed. What do you prefer?

S: We prefer you to come back the day the story breaks, the 24th. That is the perfect combination if you arrive that day.

K: You would rather have me in China or back when you have that story out?

S: No, they want to say . . . there will be several radio and TV stations . . . and they want to say something about Henry Kissinger. The best timing would be when he sets foot again on American soil.

K: For that I would have to come back on a Sunday.

S: We wanted to find out when is the closest to that.

K: What do you prefer?

S: It would be better to come back after than before.

K: To come back after the 24th would be safer than after the 31st because that's the end of the month. I can't tell you k but x by the terms of our announcement I would have to be back before the 31st.

S: Then I am right to assume you will be back some time in the week of the 24th to the 31st?

K: Yes, of course these things can slip. You are not writing about this now?

S: No, it's finished. There is nothing we can add to what you've seen.

K: You can't take out that word "love."?

S: You must have at one time.

K: That makes it a little strong.

S: There are all kinds of love; surely you love her as the mother of your children.

K: I'm more likely coming back after the 24th than after the 31st, but I don't want you to hold me up if it slips.

TELECON

Lloyd Shearer

10/5/71 6:35p.m. p. 2

S: But between the 24th and 31st is a fair bracket.

K: It's quite conceivable. To me, the 24th is a safer date from your point of view.

S: That's the best one can ask and do. Take care of yourself and have a good time. Stop back through California and see us.

K: I don't think I can do that, but I'll see you at the end of November.

6:43 p.m.

10/5/71

K: I want to apologize to you for not calling you back.

G: I want to Congratulate you on going back to Peking.

K: I got involved with preparations for that. The President said you talked with him.

G: I hope you didn't mind that.

K: I am glad of it. If we can avoid the meeting here now, we would prefer it. It would stir everything up.

G: I have conveyed that.

K: You can assure them the WH is their friend.

G: One of their arguements is that she has stacked her political life on her agreement with the President. She is upset. I didn't call the President yesterday. He was returning a call of mine from Sunday.

K: The President would discuss this automatically with me. And I with him.

G: I am embarrassed that they came to me but they felt I could get to his ear.

K: It was a service you raised it with him and I preferred this in addition to me. He may think they come to me for obvious reasons so on matters like this I welcomed it went this way.

G: I made the point you made that it would be a inopportune time for them to come and they understand that.

K: When you come through Washington let me know and it will be a pleasure to see youl

TELCONE

Secretary Connally/Mr. Kissinger

8:11 p.m., October 5, 1971

K: I know what I am doing to you, you are going to go wild.

C: Look what you are doing to poor Ziegler in just the headlines.
I have never seen him more puzzled, quizzical look on his face.
He doesn't know what's happened. You have got him stunned.
Have you seen the evening paper?

K: I had him to read it awfully slowly to get the import of it.

C: I'm keeping up with you. Going to have to have a press conference
this week.

K: Silver standarding.

C: Anything to make news!

K: I have seen jealous people before, we are coming back next week
you know.

C: Will fire one last go home to Texas.

K: After your press conference, you won't be out of the news.

C: Goodbye, you look great! The Green Monster of jealousy
unfortunately trails me too often.

K: Just knew it would trigger you into some heroic act.

C: Goodbye, Henry.

K: Goodbye, John.

TELECON

Ambassador Rabin

10/5/71 6:07pm

K: How are you?

R: As you can imagine, we are not happy after the speech yesterday.

K: I was told you were delighted. Your Foreign Minister expressed appreciation for its fairness.

R: It's not correct, and it might be he did not express in strong words our position but ________ made it clear it is not acceptable to us.

K: Yeah.

R: And while it's true we told ________ continue to maintain contacts . . .

K: With whom?

R: Because yesterday in the meeting basically nothing came up. The Secretary did not ________ or force even strongly his points.

K: Let us see. Mitchell is talking to the President today. Let's see what comes from that.

R: Okay. The reaction from Israel will be strongly anti.

K: You are a sovereign government. You must consult your own interests. And I mentioned to the President what we discussed. I should have answer for you by next week.

R: Okay.