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Dr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street NW
Suite 400
Washington, D.C.
20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

On behalf of Daniel Schorr and Cable News Network, I would like to thank you for taking the time out of your busy schedule for an interview. The hour program turned out to be one of the best, and certainly one of the most informative in regards to foreign policy.

Enclosed you will find a transcript of the show for your records. Again, thank you very much, and hopefully the opportunity for a repeat performance will occur in the not too distant future.

JUN 11 1984

W

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MR. SCHORR: Once every year we go over the world with Dr. Henry Kissinger. This time, later than usual because by the time we were hoping to do it, he was heading a Commission on Central America. Welcome late, but welcome, Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: It's always a pleasure to be here.

MR. SCHORR: I'd like to start first with what is timeliest, and that is the situation in the Persian Gulf. Let me ask the question this way. You have once expressed fear that the United States has become irrelevant to some of the world's great problems. Is the Iran-Iraq war and the Persian Gulf situation one of those situations?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it is -- I can't accept the proposition that the United States and the industrial democracies have become irrelevant. They are in danger, however, of acting as if they were irrelevant. There is -- it is an amazing situation. The health of the industrial democracies depends on uninterrupted supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. Here two utterly irresponsible nations are fighting a war, a murderous war, with each other. Everybody agrees that the cutoff of oil would have disastrous consequences. It's nonsense to say that it affects primarily Europe, but we may want to get into that later. For everybody, everybody agrees that an Iranian victory would -- might unravel the whole Middle East. Yet I have heard nobody put forward a proposition of what might be done about it. Everybody stands there like a --

MR. SCHORR: But the Reagan Administration suffers now from what you might call a "Lebanon Syndrome," the fear of going in and then under Congressional or other domestic pressure being forced out and leaving the situation --

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not saying -- I'm not saying they should go in as a unilateral act and then have an endless debate domestically, and people will start. If, indeed, we should go in together with other nations, we'd better not

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again undertake a military measure that does not succeed, and in which
we cannot define the objective ahead of time and/or know how we are
going to achieve it. There's no question about that.

MR. SCHORR: Well, define the objective and how do we get in?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, let me first define the problem. There are
in the world today maybe three or four million
barrels a day of excess oil capacity that are
not being produced. The total production in the Persian Gulf is about
11 and a half million barrels. If the -- if the flow of oil from
the Persian Gulf is reduced by, say, seven million barrels, that means
there will be a global shortage, again, of three to four million barrels
a day, and we will be back to the situations of 1973, 1979, rapid
rise in oil prices, inflationary pressures, recessions that will affect
the stability of all governments and the health of the democracies,
of the industrial democracies.

MR. SCHORR: Okay. You've defined the problem. Solve it.

DR. KISSINGER: That is the problem.

MR. SCHORR: Solve it now.

DR. KISSINGER: With all respect, I'd like to make two propositions
here. Whatever my solution may be and whatever
my arrogance, I consider it conceivable that seven
or eight big governments, putting all of the resources of the intellects
they've assembled to work on this problem, might come up with a better
solution than I can come up as an individual without access to intelli-
gence information. So I would say the first thing that has to happen
is the definition of objectives. What is it we're trying to achieve?

I think there are two things we ought to try to
achieve. One is to prevent a gradual cutoff of the flow of oil. Second
is to prevent an Iraqi defeat in the war, not to achieve an Iraqi
victory, but to prevent the collapse of Iraq, murderous, repulsive
regime as it is. Those are the two objectives. Now, I refuse to
believe that the combined power of the United States and the other

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industrial democracies cannot find a way of doing it. It cannot be
beyond the will of man to arrange for air cover in the Persian Gulf
when the Iranian air force is reliably reported to be down to 45 airplane
and the Iraqi air force has its limitations.

MR. SCHORR: Would you do that even though it's not been re-
quested by the Saudis or the other Gulf states?

DR. KISSINGER: I would -- you see, I don't know enough about all the maneuvers that are going on. I would consider it, yes, consider it.

MR. SCHORR: Just go in with our Air Force to provide air cover?

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not saying with the American Air Force. I would think the other industrial democracies have a big stake in this, too. I would consider providing air cover for the oil flow in the Persian Gulf, yes.

MR. SCHORR: One of the very great problems --

DR. KISSINGER: I would consider it.

MR. SCHORR: Consider it?

DR. KISSINGER: I mean then people have to study what Congressional support can we get; what is the technical feasibility of it; and similar measures. But the consequences of permitting the present situation to escalate are very serious,

and maybe this is something that should be discussed at the Economic
Summit that will meet soon of the industrial democracies, and hopefully
they can come to some common view on the matter, since this is something that affects them all.

MR. SCHORR: President Reagan seems to be extremely cautious
in this case, partly because in an election year
he doesn't want to be viewed as flexing American
muscle unnecessarily or incautiously. Would you advise him to be
less cautious about this?

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not running for reelection. I don't have to

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deal with the Congress. I'm an outsider that can state what the
national interest is. I believe the national interest requires an
uninterrupted flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. I believe also
the national interest of the Europeans and the Japanese requires that,
as well. So if we can ever achieve united action with our allies,
that ought to be an area in which we do not have to act alone. So
at what point the supply of oil is sufficiently threatened to take
joint action is very difficult to judge, but if that point is reached,
I would think that regardless of the election it must be considered.

MR. SCHORR: Do we have to worry about the Soviets who have already denounced our sending "Stingers," anti-aircraft missiles, to the Saudis and say anything we send, anything --

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think the "Stingers" to the Saudis are basically a symbolic action that indicates we have a major interest in the area.

MR. SCHORR: The Soviets want to keep us out of there.

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets would like to -- what is happening is great for the Soviets because what is happening, it's threatening the industrial democracies'

economic, and therefore political, health. One interesting phenomenon is that no government that was in power when the Shah of Iran fell and the last big oil crisis occurred, no democratic government survived the subsequent series of events. If they were conservative governments, they were replaced by Socialist ones. If they were Socialist ones, they were replaced by conservative ones. In other words, a crisis had occurred in the Persian or Persian-Arabian Gulf -- I don't want to offend the Arabian listener -- a crisis occurring in that area had consequences lasting for five to six years that impoverished many of the industrial democracies, undermined their political stability, and the same could happen again. I'm not saying that point has yet been reached, but I'm saying that point must be considered.

MR. SCHORR: The Soviets seem to be sending a lot of aid to Iraq.

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DR. KISSINGER: And the Soviets, of course, like this.

MR. SCHORR: The Soviets are sending apparently massive aid to Iraq, including apparently SS-21 missiles. Does that concern you?

DR. KISSINGER: That is an ironical situation. Apparently the Soviets have concluded that for their reasons, they do not want an Iranian victory. I believe for our reasons we also do not want an Iranian victory. When this war started, I was asked at a press conference what I thought of it, and I said my only regret is that only one of these countries can lose the war. So we have no interest to promote the victory of either side. We should do nothing to make Iraq win the war. Our limited objective should be to have enough of a balance on the battlefield so that Iran does not win the war because if Iran won the war and then if Iran took Basra, Kuwait would be wide open, and then Iran might be in a position to impose fundamentalist governments and restrictions in oil production on the whole Gulf area, with the consequences we discussed. That is the issue.

MR. SCHORR: Okay. We have to take a break here, and we'll be back with the Soviet-American relationship.

## SEGMENT II

MR. SCHORR: Returning to our conversation with Henry Kissinger, Dr. Kissinger, at a recent news conference President Reagan appeared to be unconcerned about the freeze in relations with the Soviet Union. He didn't seem bothered by Soviet claims to have deployed nuclear submarines off the American coast; the fact that there are no productive nuclear arms negotiations going on; the Olympics, all of the rest of that, and the President indicated that "just wait until after the next election. The Soviets will have no recourse but to come back and talk to us." (a) Do you think that's likely to happen, and (b) what does it cost to have to wait?

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from the opposite end of the spectrum. So the heads of government
are forced to make decisions on highly complicated, technical points
that affect the fundamentals of their relationship. I think what
we need is to have a discussion with the Soviets about where we want
to be two, three, four years from now; what the responsibility of
the nuclear super powers is; and then work back from there so that
instructions can be given to the technical negotiators. Otherwise
we're going to put a weight on arms control and on technical issues
that those issues cannot -- cannot bear. So very soon after the elec-
tion, I would hope to see a major statement from the President, the
Secretary of State, and maybe that would also be the time for this
emissary idea, which was tried out with General Scowcroft under not
very auspicious circumstances.

MR. SCHORR: For those who don't know what you mean by that, let me just say that Brent Scowcroft went to Moscow with a group of arms control people and was not able to deliver to Chernenko a message from the President of the United States, something quite unprecedented.

DR. KISSINGER: That's correct, but still I believe perhaps something with a little less publicity --

MR. SCHORR: That had no publicity until after it happened.

DR. KISSINGER: Right, but I had no -- I think it took the Soviets somewhat by surprise. I believe that the Soviets would have rejected it no matter how well prepared

it was because it does not fit into this year's strategy or in maybe
this year's domestic necessities to appear to have a serious dialogue
with the United States, and maybe they're too suspicious to think
that a dialogue, once started, would survive our election. But after
the election that suspicion would no longer exist.

MR. SCHORR: Okay. I want still to talk about Europe, and
perhaps we even have time for Central America when
we come back.

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SEGMENT III

MR. SCHORR: We're returning to our around the world discussion, I guess we can call it, with Dr. Henry Kissinger. Now since we've touched on it already, let's move on to Europe. You stirred up things a little bit among our European allies by taking a view of the NATO Alliance that didn't sit well with some of the people over there. You talked about a fundamental review of the status of that alliance, of the Europeans taking a greater share of responsibility for their own defence, and that if that didn't work, to spur them on a little bit to efforts by reducing by, say, half the strength of American troops in Europe. Are you satisfied with the response you got?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes, I got the response that I expected. It was obvious that the governments concerned would not agree with a fundamental revision of both the NATO structure and allocation approach because if they did, they would have done it. I thought that I, born in Europe, a friend of the Atlantic Alliance, could put into the -- into the discourse ideas that I believe will inevitably have to be raised over the next four or five years and with the attitude of maintaining and strengthening the Atlantic Alliance rather than as an isolationist trend in the United States.

MR. SCHORR: Interesting you said that because this was going to be my next question. I've known you for a great many years as a person who tries to look at extremes and find out what is the middle position that can be defended against both extremes.

DR. KISSINGER: Correct.

MR. SCHORR: And it seemed to me when you said, "Okay, if we don't have them all, we'll have half," that you really are partly -- what you partly are doing is that you perceive a tendency in this country to pull away from Europe --

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I was surprised when you became the head of the President's Commission on Central America.

DR. KISSINGER: So was I.

MR. SCHORR: So were you. Among other reasons, because from what I know of you, it was not really very -- one of your great central interests, Soviet-American, great things like Europe and all of the rest of it.

DR. KISSINGER: It is now, but it wasn't then.

MR. SCHORR: It is now, all right. Let me recall one of the points you made when you brought in the report of this Commission calling for $8 billion in aid of various kinds backing up the government of El Salvador. You made one point, and that was that you could think of arguments for doing nothing at all and you could think of arguments for doing sufficient things, but what you could not dream was that there was any argument that could be made for doing something halfway and not enough.

DR. KISSINGER: That's correct.

MR. SCHORR: Are you seeing that worst scenario now being enacted?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think -- I think the President has accepted the report of the Commission, and what I don't think is fully understood is that this was a bipartisan commission, including such well known admirers of President Reagan as Lane Kirkland, the President of the AF of L-CIO, Robert Strauss, the former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and there were other Democrats, which reported unanimously. So this was not a report to support any particular administration. It had parts in it that the administration did not at first embrace -- in fact, publicly rejected. It has now been accepted by the President. If that report is enacted, I believe we're doing -- we will be doing enough.

MR. SCHORR: Well, you're talking --

[i]

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who believes it has a constitutional -- a constitutional obligation to defend the national interest, which is squeezed and harassed on each individual item, you may find that it does something to achieve its objective. What that something is will never be enough. It will always look somewhat inadequate. It may be a little silly when it becomes public. So while I do not think that that was one of the more brilliant moves that were -- were made, I have sympathy for -- for the goal that was attempted to be achieved, and I think --

MR. SCHORR: When you hear that money has been put into the Salvadoran election and some of it used to try to get Duarte elected and that's exposed, do you think that's a mistake?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the exposure is a mistake. I'm not offended by the United States attempting to support the leader in Salvador who's been considered by every outside observer as the most democratic leader of the existing -- of the existing candidates and in a situation which the other side is putting vast resources behind his opponents. There are over 30 orders of the Salvadorian guerrilla groups around the world. They surely are not financed from inside Salvador.

MR. SCHORR: I understand that you think it's terribly important to sustain Salvador, especially now with the Duarte Regime. Is it equally important, do you think, to harass the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua?

DR. KISSINGER: I think -- let me state the objective that I believe should be achieved, which I think is more or less what our Commission recommended.

We believed that conditions should be created in Salvador in which a reasonable person can be -- can be convinced that the guerrillas have a fair chance at the political process, and we proposed an electoral commission in which they participate, in which together with perhaps the Contadora countries, the Arista countries, the surrounding countries of the area, to assure security during the next elections

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which will take place next year for local -- for local government and, I think, for the parliament.

With respect to Nicaragua, I believe the principal objective should -- must be or should be the reduction of the military capabilities to Central American proportion. The Nicaraguan army is approaching 100,000. Vast amounts of military supplies are shipped in there. I believe that the best solution would be a reduction of all armed forces, those on our side as well as the Nicaraguan, to something like 1979 levels, a low ceiling on the shipment of foreign arms, including ours, into the area, a withdrawal of all foreign advisors. There are 10,000 foreign advisors in Nicaragua. That's as much as Samosa.

MR. SCHORR: Do you achieve that by harassing Nicaragua --

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MR. SCHORR: -- or by negotiating Nicaragua --

DR. KISSINGER: I'll tell you. Our Commission took the position by a vote of ten-to-two. That was the one point that was not unanimous, that we should not reduce existing pressures, except for a quid pro quo. We did not take a position on the issue of whether we should have started it or not because we didn't want to get into the whole area of covert operations in an open report.

MR. SCHORR: Do you think in his own country Duarte's going to make it with the pressures on him from Army and so on?

DR. KISSINGER: It's going to be very difficult. I believe that the democratic forces in all Central American countries are confronted by two great dangers: by the pressures from the right and by the pressures from the left. And whether it is possible to rescue a democratic middle ground from the authoritarianism and death squad tendencies of the right and the totalitarianism of the left, I don't know this, but this is what we

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ought to try to do.

MR. SCHORR: We have to take a break here. When we come back, I would like to talk to you a little bit about America.

## SEGMENT V

MR. SCHORR: We're back with Dr. Kissinger, and I said we were going to talk about America, which may seem a strange subject to a foreign policy expert, and yet foreign policy has to spring from a country somewhere.

DR. KISSINGER: Absolutely.

MR. SCHORR: There is -- there seems to be an American irresolution, an inability to grab hold of situations like the Persian Gulf, as we discussed before. Do you think is there a fundamental problem in this country as to make our way in the world?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know. I don't think there's irresoluteness, as such. I think the American people is a rather strong and rather tough people. I think that our leadership groups are severely divided between different approaches to foreign policy, and that they break down on a sort of a 53-47 percent fluctuating back and forth so that among our leadership groups, there is lacking the consensus that existed in the post-war period. There are some people who believe that the United States should vindicate its vital interests by -- primarily by power or large or importantly by power. There are others who believe that the United States must, above all, be a moral example and that it will achieve its objectives by its domestic performance and by the purity of its morals or whatever Now these are important -- it's an important philosophical distinction, and the two groups have the capacity to checkmate each other so that we have lacked a clearcut direction in a series of administrations now that have enabled us to pursue either one or the other course consistently. This is what I would say our problem is, but among

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question. Is it enough to be a super star and be rich being a super
star, or do you want to go back into the government at some time?

DR. KISSINGER: I have given up my house in Washington, and I no longer have a domicile in Washington. I think that makes clear what my priorities are at this moment.

MR. SCHORR: Not at all, not at all. I mean I cannot believe that the influence that comes from private advising, speech making and all the rest in the end can ever fully satisfy you because you really love -- loved at least --

DR. KISSINGER: That may be true.

MR. SCHORR: -- being inside with all of the sources of intelligence.

DR. KISSINGER: That may or may not be the case. The fact is I have not volunteered advice to any administration since I left office, and I will maintain that position.

MR. SCHORR: But for a long time, you know, you were the "bete noire" of the right wing in the Republican Party. I remember four years ago there was a question of whether you'd be allowed to even speak to the Republican National Convention, whereupon you ended up being a mediator there towards the end of it, so that nothing is forever. And here you are. You've headed an important Commission for the President, a President who once campaigned against you.

DR. KISSINGER: Well --

MR. SCHORR: Aren't doors now opening up?

DR. KISSINGER: And I will support him for reelection, but that doesn't mean that I'm -- that I'm looking for a governmental position.

MR. SCHORR: No, not looking for. You cannot be in a position of looking for. You're too big and too famous

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to look for. The question is: are you ready for the call when it comes?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't expect to be called. I am content with my present -- with my present life, and I think my most useful role now is that of an elder statesman who is available for emergency duty, but who is not looking for permanent position in the government.

MR. SCHORR: I have some suspicion that emergency duty may arise shortly after the next election, if President Reagan is reelected. Meanwhile, thanks. I hope next time we can talk again towards the end of the year and that there'll be no commission to stand in the way. Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much for appearing on this special mid-year broadcast of what should have been a year end roundup.

I'm Daniel Schorr, CNN, in New York.

[End of broadcast.]