<table><tr><td>TRANSCRIPT</td></tr><tr><td>All copyright and right of copyright in this transcript and in the broadcast are owned by CBS. This transcript may not be copied or reproduced or used in any way (other than for purposes of reference, discussion and review) without the written permission of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.</td></tr></table>

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT

"The Changing War in South Vietnam"
as broadcast over the
CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

Sunday, February 21, 1971

10:00-11:00 PM, EST

With CBS News Chief Foreign Correspondent Charles Collingwood

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS

PRODUCED BY: Bernard Birnbaum and Philip Scheffler

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Ernest Leiser

1

CHARLES COLLINGWOOD: As the war widens to include all of Indochina, it has drastically changed. It bears four faces now. The first face, the big conventional war we were once used to, is now being fought outside Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia. And on the ground, at least, it is being fought by Vietnamese and not by Americans. That's one change.

GENERAL TRI: The first change is in the spirit of the fighting. People from inside and from outside, cannot say that it's not a Vietnamese war...

COLLINGWOOD: The second face of the war is in South Vietnam itself. It is a war of small government units fighting small Viet Cong units, methodically expanding the area of government control.

JOHN VANN: Most of the fighting that now goes on is down at this level as these people are moving out. It more and more has become essentially a rifleman's war, and one where the contest is very local and very personal.

COLLINGWOOD: The third face of the war in Vietnam is also a change: a new recognition of the need for economic reform and social transformation.

PHAM KIM NGOC: So many lives have been lost, so many things have been destroyed, things won't be the same, no matter how I like it. So people are asking for a change. They want something. They want social justice; they want a better life.

COLLINGWOOD: The war's fourth face is political. This is an election year in South Vietnam in which every aspect of the war will be up for judgment. A powerful figure from the not-too-distant past, General Minh, is emerging as a challenger to the incumbent President, General Thieu. Thieu is campaigning hard, but the election may be close.

NGO CONG DUC: I don't believe President Thieu will win the coming election unless with cheating and with the helping hand of the U.S. The Vietnamese people would surely be deeply disappointed at seeing President Thieu remain in power for four more years.

COLLINGWOOD: The war in Vietnam is clearly entering a new phase, militarily, economically, politically. These changes and their meaning are the subject of our broadcast tonight. I'm Charles Collingwood.

ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS News Special Report, the second of two broadcasts on the war in Indochina. Tonight, "The Changing War in South Vietnam." With CBS News Chief Foreign Correspondent Charles Collingwood.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

2

COLLINGWOOD: Five nights ago, in the first of these two broadcasts, we discussed the widening war in Laos and Cambodia. Tonight we're going to concentrate on what is happening inside South Vietnam itself. But first, let's get an up-to-date report on the invasion of Laos which is running into difficulties. Last week Secretary of Defense Laird warned that there might be heavy fighting ahead and that the South Vietnamese could not be expected to win every battle. He did not overstate the prospect. Bert Quint reports.

QUINT: If the Allied command thought the move into Laos would be like last year's joint South Vietnamese-American thrust into Cambodia, it's finding out now just how wrong it was. For the South Vietnamese, supported by American air power but going it alone on the ground, this has been no triumphal push.

Right along, it's been tough for Saigon's troops, and for the American helicopter and airplane crews supporting them. Much tougher, indeed, than the men who planned this operation must have believed it would be. The South Vietnamese attitude then was - it doesn't matter if we are outnumbered. American air power will make up for it. Well, American air power has gone into action. Apparently it's not enough. Not only has the South Vietnamese drive been stalled for several days, but now at least one South Vietnamese Ranger position has been overrun.

As for the Americans, more and more of their helicopters are being shot down - at least four today. And there is more fighting for US. ground troops on the Vietnamese side of the border in I Corps than there had been for many months. The helicopter crews, and the medics who treat the casualties when they are brought out of Laos can tell you just how tough it's been.

How is it over Laos?

PILOT: Very bad.

QUINT: How so?

PILOT: There's a lot of weapons fire. We got rockets... a lot of ships are getting shot down.

QUINT: Has this been worse than you've seen during most of the war?

PILOT: Yes, sure has, as a matter of fact. About the worst I've been in yet, and I've got - just a small amount of time to go. I just pray I make it.

QUINT: How do you feel about this operation in Laos?

AIRMAN: I'm not all for it and I wish we could stay out because we're going to wind up getting more people killed if we keep going across the border. That's what we did today and I was just as scared. I couldn't hardly move, talk or do anything.

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QUINT: In short, at a time when the war seemed to be phasing out for the Americans, U.S. and South Vietnamese troops are suffering casualties greater than any they have had in a long time.

Bert Quint, CBS News, near the Laotian border.

COLLINGWOOD: For the last few days as the North Vietnamese gathered for their counterattack, the Administration has been brandishing its options - up to and including a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam. It remains to be seen whether it will be thought necessary to widen the war further in order to protect the offensive in Laos and the Allied position in South Vietnam.

For however much the war has expanded and may expand still farther in other parts of Indochina, it is still about South Vietnam. The rationale for both the Cambodian and the Laotian incursions has been to cut enemy supplies and kill enemy troops heading south and thus to gain time. Time for the undisturbed withdrawal of American troops, time for Vietnamization and for the pacification of the countryside.

One place where time is working well for the South Vietnamese is in the Delta, the rich alluvial plain where 3/4 percent of the nation's population produces 80 percent of the nation's food. There the South Vietnamese on their own are steadily pushing the Viet Cong out of what was once his heartland.

The technique is not based on big operations by regular units any more, but rather on territorial forces operating out of these little triangular outpost fortresses. These outposts are the new feature of the Delta landscape. Hundreds of them have been set up as the government pushes ahead and the greatly expanded regional and popular forces build the outpost, occupy it, provide security for the neighborhood and then repeat the process further up the road.

You can see the effect in Kien Hoa Province, which for more than a generation was the Viet Cong's stronghold, show place, most invulnerable base in the Delta. Now he's having trouble maintaining even a toehold in Kien Hoa. At an outpost, way out at the end of the line, close to the Viet Cong's last hideouts near the South China Sea, I talked with Albert Kotzebue, who watched the change in his more than two years as province adviser.

Well, it was a pretty tough province when you came in 27 months ago, wasn't it?

KOTZEBUE: It was pretty tight, it still is a little bit, but a hell of a lot better shape than it was then.

COLLINGWOOD: What are the main changes that you've seen?

KOTZEBUE: Well, the biggest thing I've seen is the fact that I can drive down here to Tan Fu District from Bien Tri. When I came here

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I made myself a vow that before I left I'd be able to drive to the south island of Kien Hoa, and drive it by myself in my own vehicle, which I'm now able to do.

COLLINGWOOD: How deep were the VC roots here in Kien Hoa?

KOTZEBUE: Well, quite deep. The National Liberation Front was proclaimed in Lo Chi District in 1960. Madame N.T. Binh, who is the NLF representative on the peace talks, is from Kien Hoa. They have regarded this as their breadbasket for many, many years. There's a large population base from which they could recruit. The province has been extremely valuable to the VC. We feel, I feel personally, that if they lose Kien Hoa, if we really completely control Kien Hoa, that their grip on the countryside in the Delta is gone completely. If they can't hold it here they can't hold it anywhere.

COLLINGWOOD: There's one village in Kien Hoa, An Thanh, that the Viet Cong made uniquely their own. Now even it is back in government hands. I asked Nguyen Manh Hung, head of pacification in the Kien Hoa Province, if the village and especially its council house didn't have a special history.

HUNG: Yes, and a matter of fact, in 1968, when the first talk in Paris, the National Liberation Front delegation had shown pictures of this house and tell everybody that this is their headquarters in South Vietnam.

COLLINGWOOD: Was it really their headquarters?

HUNG: It was a show place for the National Liberation Front. Through years that we do not have any control in this area.

COLLINGWOOD: They even have a graveyard here, don't they?

HUNG: Yes, they have a graveyard here with 275 graves with mark, and it's still here now, even when we pacify this place, we still keep that place.

COLLINGWOOD: Next door to Kien Hoa Province is one called Vinh Long. It, too, used to be full of Viet Cong bases, but now they've been squeezed down so much they call them mini-bases - small, heavily booby-trapped areas in which the Viet Cong are secure enough to operate from. Since the main thoroughfares in the Delta are the canals, it's along their banks that the VC mini-bases lie and along their banks that the government is thrusting its outposts. On a boat trip down a canal with Major Gene C. Shaw, the Tam Binh District adviser, it's easy to see where the government's control reaches and where it does not.

5

COLLINGWOOD: Major Shaw, tell me about this area that we're going through now, how long has this been pacified?

SHAW: This has been pacified, I would say about a year. This particular area. This is Cho Ton District, which is the northern district above mine, the one I work in. Because of the number of people in Cho Ton District and the province town, there are, of course, more people who move into a pacified area. Now this area is still very much pacified. The children will always stand out there and wave at the Americans as they go by.

COLLINGWOOD: Well, now we're getting into an area where there are a good many fewer houses, less cultivated, why aren't the people back here?

SHAW: Well, it takes a while for them to really know that they're in a secure area. As a matter of fact, we've had our information service going out and telling them about some of the more pacified areas, hoping that we can get some people back in because that's one of our big problems now. Sometimes, even when you tell them, they won't believe you. They just don't believe you, until they start moving forward. And this will happen here on this canal, where we've had many houses we've just passed, and they will continue to move forward. One man builds a house and someone else says, "There's land on the other side." So he builds just a little bit farther. And it's a progressive thing.

COLLINGWOOD: How long has it been since this area we're going by now has been opened up?

SHAW: I would say - since we've opened the area?

COLLINGWOOD: Yes, well, since it became relatively secure?

SHAW: I would even hesitate to say that it is relatively secure yet, I really would.

COLLINGWOOD: Does this outpost mean that we're beginning to get into what you call Indian Country?

SHAW: Yes, sir. This is almost like St. Louis on the movement to the frontier. This is just about the end of it, and you can see, looking out now, that there is very, very little up to the front except trees and wide-open country.

The area on our left here, is an example of the desolation in this portion of the Tam Binh District. The stumped palm trees are the result of the B-52 strikes - the many B-52 strikes that were put in this area, I think the latest was October '69. And it shows a pretty good picture of what it's really like around here, at least this portion of Tam Binh District.

6

It just stops and starts. As I said, the area that we went through
before with the people and with the children, is of course, right
there, it's pacified. And then all of a sudden the curtain is
drawn; it's bare. From pacified to unpacified. And another
indicator of pacification is children on the banks. If I ever go
down a canal with my people in a boat and I don't see any children
along that canal, I turn around and go back. Because that's the
indicator that something is wrong.

COLLINGWOOD: At the farthest outpost along the canal was John Vann, who as the senior American civilian adviser in the Delta, gets everywhere. After years in the Delta, no one knows what has happened there better than he.

The war in Indochina is changing, Mr. Vann. How do you analyze what is happening?

VANN: We have gone from the big unit war, the regular units fighting out in the jungle, to the much less dramatic but probably more productive and tedious part of the war, of expanding government controls, moving population back to the areas that had formerly been evacuated, trying to re-establish the economy, planting the rice. This outpost here is an example of the process we go through. You've just come down the canal from the pacified area to this newly occupied area, where we have first put the outpost here, then we've gone along trying to clear the banks of the canal, and this will be followed, as you've seen earlier, by the grass-roofed and tin-roofed houses going in, and then in three to four months' time, the fields will begin turning green as the rice goes in.

COLLINGWOOD: Things seem to be going pretty well with this
technique. Is there any reason why we shouldn't have tried it
before?

VANN: Well, first we have profited, I think enormously, by
mistakes that we made earlier, by our lack of understanding and
knowledge of the type of war and what was important and significant.
I think to some extent, we tried vainly to substitute sophisticated
weaponry and gadgetry in place of getting down and doing the hard,
tedious job that you have seen along this canal. I think we did
not place sufficient importance upon the development of a local
infrastructure at the village and hamlet level. All these factors
have been susceptible of being exploited. The exploitation has
taken place.

First, the Government of Vietnam mobilized after Tet; it was rather
ridiculous that they hadn't mobilized long before Tet, but it was
after Tet that they mobilized. Secondly, they responded to the
need for village and hamlet government by decentralizing some
authority to the villages and by allowing village and hamlet
elections. Third, when they made the decision to expand, they gave
cognizance to the rather obvious fact of the war that the important
thing is a rifleman in a hamlet.

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COLLINGWOOD: Would it have become so if it had not been for the big main battalion efforts earlier?

VANN: Well, for years, the strategy and tactics in Vietnam are certainly going to be debated. One thing is obvious, the enemy got by largely on rifles and was reasonably effective. I think that what we see is a recognition that this rifle is probably the most important weapon in the war because what is really meaningful is the security for the population. It may, of course, be essential to have the bigger weapons to win the conventional battles in the jungle, but when it comes to winning the population it's the presence of a man with a rifle in a hamlet at two o'clock in the morning that's important. Not a large unit with big guns somewhere else.

COLLINGWOOD: Would you say that the war has now been won down here in the Delta?

VANN: The term "won" I think is not appropriate. What has happened is that the government of Vietnam, with our assistance, has certainly achieved overwhelming military dominance. But from here on out, although the enemy has lost control of the population, he does have a small hardcore that's ideologically motivated, they've been fighting the war for forty years, they think in terms of decades and they look at this as a temporary setback. And that small hardcore will be here. They'll be largely engaged in sabotage and political subversion, trying to proselyte secret cadres, looking for a more favorable time and climate in which to come surging back forth, an opportunity to profit from the mistakes of the government may make, or a change in the overall international balance of power that would generate more opportunity for a success for them.

## (ANNOUNCEMENTS)

COLLINGWOOD: Not everything in the Delta war is the slow, step-by-stp outposting and elimination of the Viet Cong mini-bases by South Vietnamese territorial forces. Down in the Camau Peninsula, the Communists still have one big conventional base area left, the legendary U Minh Forest, in the past impregnable, defended by two North Vietnamese regiments and a main force regiment of the Viet Cong plus local guerrillas. The U Minh Forest is now the scene of the biggest South Vietnamese military operation now going on within South Vietnam. It is an operation by the regular Army. The whole of the South Vietnamese 21st Division - one of their best - has gone into the U Minh. It's difficult terrain - more a swamp really, than a forest, half drowned in water even during the dry season. That's one reason the Viet Cong have been able to stave off repeated government offensives. This is the fourth time in two years that South Vietnamese troops have gone into the U Minh Forest. Three times they came out again. But this time they say they are here to stay.

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The key to their strategy is the establishment of three permanent
fire bases in the most difficult parts of the forest - like this
one where the ground is so wet it has to be reinforced with sapling
trunks cut from the forest and driven into the mud. It takes 2700
trunks to support the platform for one artillery piece. No pile
drivers out here, just manpower.

Farther to the North another fire base is being built on firmer
ground but it's still hard work. There's a regiment in each of these
bases and while one of its battalions builds the fortifications, the
other two are out on operations.

The 21st Division gets as much Vietnamese air support in the U Minh
as can be mustered, but it still needs a good deal of American air
support as well. These are American helicopters lifting in a South
Vietnamese battalion from the field. The 21st Division claims it
has already eliminated a thousand - one-third - of the estimated
main force North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the forest. In the face
of the offensive, the enemy seems to be changing his tactics. I
asked General Nghi, who commands the 21st Division, about that.

NGHI: They have difficulties to recruit, to replace their casualty,
so now they change tactics, using a small group of people. But now,
if they hide, disperse and operate in small groups, we have to change
our tactics in small operation too.

COLLINGWOOD: That, of course, is precisely what the South Vietnames-
ought to be doing, but American advisers say they aren't doing it
often enough. One of them is Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Holderman,
with the 21st Division's 33rd Regiment.

HOLDERMAN: Well, I think one of the things is the fact that they
have to recognize they're going to have to operate in smaller units.
The VC have broken up into smaller units and they'll have to do
the same thing, break their units up into - battalions up into
company-size operations, and platoon-size operations in an attempt
to locate the VC.

COLLINGWOOD: Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese are sure that,
in one way or another, they are getting at the Viet Cong and will
drive him out of the U Minh Forest once and for all this time. If
they do, it will be because of these fire bases. From here they
plan to spread outposts into the surrounding wilderness, push the
North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong out, bring the people back to
work the land and secure this area. If they can do this and open
up the U Minh Forest, then there won't be any big place left in
the Delta for the Viet Cong to hide.

(ANNOUNCEMENTS)

ANNOUNCER: Here again is Charles Collingwood.

9

COLLINGWOOD: If the Delta success story were to be repeated all over South Vietnam there would be solid grounds for optimism. But it is not. The farther north you get, the deeper the Viet Cong are dug in.

Let's take the Province of Binh Dinh on the central coast of South Vietnam, about 250 miles northeast of Saigon. A million people live here, including the 3rd North Vietnamese Division, about 2,500 top level Viet Cong cadre and twice that many at lower levels. In terms of pacification, Binh Dinh ranks in the lower third of South Vietnam's 44 provinces. "We're two or three years behind the Delta here," says one U.S. senior official. There are still plenty of places around the provincial capital of Qui Nhom where you can't go.

One place you can still go to is a hamlet called Tinh Giang which I first visited in 1965, just after it was reoccupied after years of Viet Cong control. It was a marginal place then, and it's pretty bleak today.

But in 1967, when I was back there, the government presence seemed to be taking hold and Tinh Giang was a fairly bustling place. In 1967 the market place was full of people buying and selling. The local defense forces were providing security. A new school had opened and the hamlet kids were learning their lessons.

Tinh Giang is not like that today. The school is closed and the kids have learned a different kind of lesson. One day in 1968 the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong came down off the mountain which looms above the hamlet, took over the place, and told the kids if they ever went back to that school house they'd be killed. To this day, the classrooms are empty and the kids go to school in a nearby hamlet. Tinh Giang's market place is vacant now as well, abandoned under Viet Cong pressure. The people take their produce and buy their supplies in another village these days.

Until last November the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese friends used to come in here every week or so and go from house to house collecting taxes, spreading propaganda, and a little terror. Then a regiment of the South Vietnamese 22nd Division started an operation around Tinh Giang. The operation is still going on and the troops slogging through the hamlet lanes are a regular sight. They say they paid for these ducks, but the South Vietnamese Army has a reputation for living off the land.

Anyway, security is better now in Tinh Giang than it has been since '68 and the people are beginning to come back again, rebuilding the houses they had left. They are working again the rich rice lands which have always been Tinh Giang's excuse for existence. It's a beautiful spot and you can understand why the people stubbornly return. But the villagers are still apprehensive, there in the shadow of the mountain. Asked why more people weren't living in Tinh Giang now, an old man said, "They're afraid of the mountain."

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I asked Major Arts, the District adviser, whether they had reason
to be?

ARTS: Well, according to the hamlet evaluation system, it's not a
very secure place. VC are present on a hill we have behind here.
A battalion headquarters and one company of sapper, the Echo 2
Bravo Group is present and they do exert an influence over the
people in this hamlet.

COLLINGWOOD: Well, what happened, because when I was here before it
was - it had a rather higher rating and was more prosperous and
bustling than it is now certainly.

ARTS: Well, many things have happened. Essentially, there's a
withdrawal of U.S. troops. Although there weren't very many here,
the presence of the U.S. withdrawing is being felt. The ARVN and
the regional force and popular force are taking over some of the
role, but it'll be a little time before they can be as effective
a fighting force as the United States troops are.

COLLINGWOOD: Does the hamlet chief sleep here?

ARTS: Yes, he stays here at night. Although I don't know if I
would, if I were he, but he does stay here.

COLLINGWOOD: Thus in the five years or more that I've known it, the
hamlet of Tinh Giang has had its ups and downs, and that's true of
the whole province of Binh Dinh. I asked Frank Corry, the Deputy
Senior Province Adviser, why Binh Dinh has proved such a tough
nut to crack.

MR. CORRY: Well, you've got a combination here in Binh Dinh, of
a people used to political insurgency, with a long political history,
and a situation of homegrown, indigenous Communist revolution.
Now during the '45-'54 period, the French never controlled this
area - controlled Binh Dinh, they just flat didn't control it. And
during that period, an apparatus was built that descended right
down into hamlets and into the wards of the city, Qui Nhon, that
the Communists had utilized to great effect today.

COLLINGWOOD: What are we doing to try and eliminate it?

CORRY: Well, we run the whole gamut of pacification activities
from conventional military operations against known enemy military
units, to applying pressure to known enemy political leaders, the
Communist apparatus. We're attempting to identify the Communist
apparatus and root them out one by one. And this is a big job.
The Cong have been around here a long time. Practically everybody
has known the Communist leadership. They've all made their private
little accomodations at one time or another. They've done things
in the past that they don't really necessarily want aired, so
consequently, there is less than vigorous prosecution of the war
among an awful lot of people.

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COLLINGWOOD: What is the attitude of the people of Binh Dinh
towards the government?

MR. CORRY: Well, this is a tough question for an American adviser to answer. I would say that the present government of Vietnam does not have a sweeping mandate in Binh Dinh.

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Corry, Qui Nhon, the biggest city in Binh Dinh
has been the focal point of a number of anti-American demonstrations.
Why is that?

CORRY: Well, the city itself - it's swollen by 300 percent with refugees. They're packed in little squatter shanties on public domain living in conditions that even in the worst American slum conditions would be considered appalling. You've got a large American troop presence. You have periodic cases of thoughtless behavior on the part of Americans. You've got a certain nationalistic xenophobia that just seems to be inherent in the Vietnamese character that they resent a big presence of a big foreigner just holding to itself perogatives that really should go to the people. Qui Nhon is kind of like a tender box. And your spark may not set it off, but if the ingredients are right and particularly in this an election year there is the possibility. There are people that are prone to play upon these incidents for what they can get out of them, including the Communists.

COLLINGWOOD: And of course, the Americans are a rather abrasive
presence are they not?

CORRY: Oh, boy. Generally not. But they can be. The Americans work pretty hard. The average GI in his civic action work in building his hospitals and trying to be nice to the kids and helping with the orphanages is a good fellow. He wouldn't do this sort of thing. You know, he wouldn't do this sort of thing that would alienate the population if he thought about it. But the thing is, that an awful lot of GI's just don't think about what they're doing and how their actions actually affect the people that they're dealing with. As you're riding along in the truck, you know, slapping the girl on the street corner on the fanny may make you feel fine, but it sure irritates everybody that's watching. I think...Maybe I just better stop commenting here. Anybody who's been in Vietnam knows the situation. I don't want to expound at too great lengths on it.

(ANNOUNCEMENTS)

COLLINGWOOD: As Frank Corry, the senior U.S. civilian in Binh
Dinh Province, says, anyone who has been in Vietnam does know the
situation. There have been an increasing number of incidents
between Americans and Vietnamese arising out of American
thoughtlessness, carelessness, or gratuitous American violence.

12

To a real extent these things are caused by a perceptible erosion
of American military discipline and a decline in morale as American
troops are pulled out of combat and prepare to withdraw. Top
American commanders in Vietnam say their first priority and
principal concern now is not combat but relations between Americans
and Vietnamese. It has gotten that bad.

The conduct of American troops shows less and less regard for
Vietnamese sensibilities at a time when those sensibilities are
becoming increasingly frayed. Thus, anti-Americanism has become
a real factor in Vietnamese politics these days. Activist students
who oppose President Thieu's regime have come to equate being
anti-government with being anti-American.

Morton Dean asked one militant student, Miss Va Thi Dung, why demonstrations against Americans had suddenly sprung up now that they're leaving.

MISS DUNG: Well, the anti-American movement has increased now, thanks to the movement of students that have been able to voice out injustices of the government and also, it increases because of the increase of atrocity committed by the U.S. troops and not only the U.S. but the Allied troops in South Vietnam.

DEAN: How far are the students willing to go in carrying out a
violent anti-American campaign?

MISS DUNG: We do not know how far it goes, but the action of the students will increase as long as the Americans will stay in South Vietnam and cause damage to the South Vietnamese people.

DEAN: What is your view of the Thieu-Ky government in South Vietnam? Is it a good government? Do you support it?

MISS DUNG: It is a very corrupt government. It is just an instrument of the U.S. Government. And it has managed to remain in position thanks to the U.S. support.

COLLINGWOOD: The students find plenty of occasions to demonstrate against the Americans and against the government. Some of the students and others active in the peace movement do get arrested, but the government does allow more criticism than it used to and the opposition does dare to speak.

I asked Madame Ngo Ba Thanh, who has been twice imprisoned for her participation in the peace movement, what she thinks is the main damage the American presence has done to Vietnamese society.

MADAME THANH: When we have a country in which the national sovereignty is lost, then we have nothing left. Outside of that, we have no economic independence. People are living miserable conditions of life. All our social ethics, all our national culture has been completely destroyed.

13

COLLINGWOOD: So you think that it would be best if the American forces here were to leave as soon as possible?

MADAME THANH: Definitely. Definitely.

COLLINGWOOD: Can the various political parties who are in opposition to the government get together on a single candidate to oppose President Thieu?

MADAME THANH: I think that this kind of solution would be - would have a positive answer because the only thing that our people are really eager now is for somebody who would be able to actually bring peace to them

COLLINGWOOD: Many people have talked about General Minh as a possible candidate. Would you and those who think like you support him were he to be a candidate?

MADAME THANH: Well, I think that he's certainly the one that most of the people think of in terms of solving the Vietnam issue.

COLLINGWOOD: If General Minh were to be the opponent of President Thieu, do you think he'd win?

MADAME THANH: Providing that the election would be fair.

COLLINGWOOD: Another opposition leader, Representative Ngo Cong Duc, also supports General Minh.

REPRESENTATIVE DUC: I think that General Minh, liberal and moderate anti-Communist general, who has won much confidence and support from the majority of Vietnamese people will certainly win the election if the U.S. does not interfere into the internal affairs of South Vietnam and if President Thieu accepts a fair election.

COLLINGWOOD: General Duong Van Minh - Big Minh - the hero of the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem, is more and more emerging as the principal challenger to President Thieu. He hasn't thrown his hat into the ring yet as a candidate in the Presidential elections seven months from now, but he is certainly acting like one. Despite an undistinguished performance when he briefly ran the country after Diem, Minh would be a powerful candidate. He is popular in the country and still has some military backing. The peace movement would back him, so would the politically adept An Quang Budhists - so, probably, would the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front, though secretly.

In spite of Minh's strength, President Thieu seems anxious to take him on. Thieu is already campaigning vigorously all over the country. Even up here on the Laotian border with his troops, Thieu seems as interested in politicking as in surveying the military situation.

14

In any head-to-head contest with Big Minh, Thieu would have
significant advantages. He controls the whole government
apparatus. There are a million and a half in the military and
civil service, plus their dependents, say six or seven million
people, which is more than a third of the population. As the
incumbent, he has to hand powerful instruments of persuasion.
Even if the election were clean as a hound's tooth, some experts -
notably Thieu himself - think he can't lose. Big Minh's supporters
naturally, are sure the elections will not be as clean as a hound's
tooth.

If the election is fair, and if it does come down to one between
Thieu and Minh, it is likely to be close. It may well turn on
more mundane issues than the great one of war or peace. The
Vietnamese peasant certainly wants peace, but he also wants enough
to eat and President Thieu's government will be judged on its
success in raising the standard of living and keeping prices stable.

South Vietnam's Minister of the Economy, London School of
Economics-trained Pham Kim Ngoc, understands that very well.

NGOC: I said to the President that in '71, you know, price stability is the number one question politically, and if he wants to be re-elected, he better be careful about that.

COLLINGWOOD: At present the United States is supporting South Vietnam's economy to the tune of about $700 million a year, but the country's long-term viability depends upon its ability eventually to manage its own economic affairs. The economic portents, like most others for South Vietnam, are mixed.

On the surface, South Vietnam appears to be economically thriving. City streets are congested with traffic, blue with exhaust fumes. In the Saigon area alone there are more than 350,000 licensed motor bikes, and nobody knows how many without licenses - most of them imported from Japan, all of them bought with hard currency from the United States.

The markets are full of goods, and people are buying them. In
fact, there is precious little you can't get in Saigon these days -
if you can pay for it. That's the rub. For years the South
Vietnamese have been racing to keep up with a galloping inflation
that has raised prices by 468 percent since 1965. This has worked
great hardship on many people and greatly contributed to the
dissatisfaction with President Thieu's government. But last fall,
the Economic Minister devalued the currency and instituted a series
of reforms which have, at least temperoraily, put the lid on
inflation. I asked him how important it is to keep prices stable.

NGOC: If I can use the past experience, something I have said to
the President, that's why Nationalist China was lost to the
communism because the people was demoralized. Because the

15

government at the time, the Nationalist Government, thought it
could solve all problems by printing press. We must not commit
that same error. That we will not be defeated by the force of arms
of the Communists, but by inflation.

COLLINGWOOD: As long as South Vietnam has to keep more than a
million men of its 17 million population under arms, its economy
is going to be dependent on American aid. Therefore, the evidence
of South Vietnam's new concern with economic affairs and its
growing sophistication in economic management is welcomed by
Americans.

We asked Charles Cooper, the Economic Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon whether South Vietnam can continue to keep inflation under control.

COOPER: They've got the determination and they've learned, as we've
seen in the last half year, the kinds of things that can cope with
it. So I think that they'll continue to mount an effective
stabilization program.

COLLINGWOOD: American officials have made optimistic forecasts
about South Vietnam's economy in the past, sometimes over-optimistic
ones. What reason do we have now to believe the situation is really
better?

COOPER: Well, first of all, I think that the Vietnamese economy
has performed fairly well, and that some of the optimistic
statements that have been made about it in the past have been true.
It's true that there have been a lot of price increases. On the
other hand, there have been some very substantial gains in the
economy, even in the middle of the war. For example, we have
reversed the down trend in rice production. This year, 1971, there
will be modest rice imports, very much smaller, and that will be
it. From now on, based on peak levels of production, Vietnam is
self-sufficient in rice. There are more pigs being grown and sold,
slaughtered. More vegetables being produced. More fish being
caught. We've done pretty well in maintaining rural production.

Today, if you travel through rural Vietnam you see many changes
and you'll see that the countryside is in the middle of the
agricultural transformation that has characterized many other
developing countries in recent years. Incomes are rising, techniques
are changing, productivity is increasing, there are new roofs on
buildings, people have sewing machines, and they have new clothes
and it's made a difference in their life and they know it.

In the cities, the problem is - the situation is less clear. Inflation
in recent years has hurt much more in the cities than in the
countryside and also the cities, of course, because they have grown
so rapidly, the social conditions in the cities are by no means
satisfactory and by no means pleasant. This has been true in many
other underdeveloping countries, even without war, but it's
certainly true in Vietnam. So I think economic issues are less
clear cut in urban areas than in the countryside.

16

COLLINGWOOD: Mr. Cooper, how long after the end of the American combat role in Vietnam will the United States have to sustain the South Vietnamese economy with substantial transfusions of American economic aid?

COOPER: That depends very much on what happens to the war. If the war is - were to terminate with the withdrawal of our forces, the period during which we would have to sustain Vietnam's economy, in the way that we're now doing it, this level of magnitude, would only be several years, three or four years. Then you'd see, I think, very substantial reductions in aid. But if the Vietnamese have to maintain the kind of defense effort that they now have and maybe even have to step it up in order to replace the American soldiers and continue their own war, then the economic support is going to be required.

COLLINGWOOD: The only way this American economic support can eventually be replaced is by domestic and foreign investment in South Vietnam's economy. This industrial park at Bien Hoa, just outside Saigon, is supposed to be a pilot project for attracting investment. Theoretically, there are 25 plants in operation here, 18 more under construction. But the theory is more impressive than the fact. There is little actual production yet.

One of the few flourishing operations at Bien Hoa is the Vicassa steel mill, one of two in South Vietnam. It produces low-grade steel rods for construction purposes. The technology is not as impressive as the agility of the workmen. By Western standards, this is a primitive steel mill, but it is as close to heavy industry as anything South Vietnam can boast. One of the mill's advantages is that it feeds on scrap metal and, since the war has turned large areas of South Vietnam into vast junkyards, this is a commodity of which there is no shortage. You could read the history of the war from the junkpile.

But other industries established here are not as active as the steel mill, like this plant trying to make insecticides. They are stymied by government red tape and import restrictions. It is still true in Vietnam that as long as the war goes on, it is easier to get something from the United States on credit than to make it yourself. But if and when the war ever ends, the experts think that South Vietnam has the assets to attract the necessary investment to put the country on its feet. There is the incredibly fertile Mekong Delta, where almost anything will grow. There are vast stands of hardwoods in the mountains - not all of which have been defoliated, in spite of alarmist reports - and the rest of Asia is hungry for timber. Much of Asia is hungry for fish, too, and South Vietnam is surrounded by one of the world's great fishing grounds. Already, a significant proportion of the modest investment coming into South Vietnam is going into trawlers and seafood freezing plants. As exciting as any postwar prospect are the promising indications of large offshore oil deposits in South Vietnamese waters in the Gulf of Siam.

17

To support rapid postwar expansion, South Vietnam will also inherit from the long American involvement there the kind of infrastructure that other underdeveloped countries dream of - a ready-made network of highways, seaports, airfields, telephones and television, not to mention a working force accustomed to dealing with modern machines and advanced technology. With all these assets, South Vietnam clearly has the potential for economic progress if peace comes.

I asked Minister Ngoc whether the government is willing to break South Vietnam's ancestral patterns and pursue economic growth.

NGOC: So many lives have been lost, so many things have been destroyed, things won't be the same. No matter how I like it. So people are asking for a change. They want something. They want social justice, they want a better life, that's what we must develop. Like I said, a farmer, you took him away from the farm, put him in the Army, now he command a battalion, he command 400 men, 500 men he's in command. He did very well. I can't put him back into the economy behind the two buffaloes. The economy must grow, because otherwise they will shoot us, they will fight us.

COLLINGWOOD: Things won't be the same in South Vietnam, says Mr. Ngoc, and that is true. Too many lives lost; too many things destroyed. The question is, what will be the changes, and under whose auspices. For all the time since the United States first backed into a war we did not understand at a cost we did not even contemplate, there has been one consistent American war aim: to create the conditions under which a non-Communist government in South Vietnam could survive - not to guarantee its survival, but to give it a chance.

As Americans withdraw, South Vietnam's survival capacity is about to be tested in all the areas we've been discussing - militarily, economically, politically. What are its prospects?

Militarily, its position has certainly improved inside the country, although more so in the south than in the northern provinces. The territorial forces are no longer a joke and are beginning to fight the kind of war the situation demands. The regular forces have become bolder and more professional although the pounding they're taking in Laos shows that even with American air support, they still have their limitations.

The economy, while still sick and dependent on heavy doses of American aid, shows signs of struggling out of its inflationary fever. While by no stretch of the imagination can South Vietnam be said to have achieved broad or deep political democracy, there is an election ahead this year which is likely to offer real political alternatives.

What it all adds up to, in this reporter's judgment, is that South Vietnam does now have a chance - not a certainty, but a chance - to stand on its own feet without a continuing powerful American presence. The United States has paid a heavy price in lives, in

18

money, in doubt and disillusion to reach even this modest objective of American policy. It has cost the people of Indochina more dearly still. It will be argued for years to come whether the policy was worth the price. History may well judge that it was not. But the price has largely been paid now. The United States has done for South Vietnam all that another country can do to ensure its survival. The time is at hand when South Vietnam must go it alone.

This is Charles Collingwood. Good night.

(ANNOUNCEMENT)

ANNOUNCER: This has been a CBS NEWS SPECIAL REPORT: "The Changing War in South Vietnam," the second of two broadcasts on the war in Indochina.

Cerami - Open

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Charles A. Cerami, 298-6400
Foreign Editor, Kiplinger News Letter

Request: Lunch with discussion group (usually about 8 people) of foreign affairs, defense, and foreign economic types (including Austin Kiplinger). They have been having a series of Cabinet people and agency heads to lunches during the past year. Entirely background; nothing ever quoted

These lunches usually held on Friday, but any day will be fine.
Austin Kiplinger will be leaving for trip in about five weeks.

Lunch would be held at 1729 H Street, the Kiplinger office.

JTH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: NO - 2/26

Date and Time:

Party Contacted: 3/4

Additional Information: Cerami asked HAK about lunch at Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs luncheon about a week ago. Austin Kiplinger also asked him at time of President's European trip. Cerami says HAK agreed to do it sometime.

RECEIVED

MAR 6

CENTRAL FILES

Resolution:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1970

Dave --

Mark Chadwin, Governor Harriman's assistant, called to ask if the Governor could pick up a rain check from last Monday's lunch and come in for lunch next week on any day except for the 26th or 29th or on any day the following week except for the 3rd or 5th. If lunch during either week is impossible, the Governor would be interested in coming in for an office appointment. Could you let Chadwin know after working out an appointment or lunch (or no appointment and no lunch) with HAK?

T. L.

GENERAL

FG6-11-1/1 KISSINGER, HENRY A.
KISSINGER, HENRY A./*

Dear Alun:

Many thanks for your kind letter of June 9. I
am sorry that my many and far-flung travels
have prevented me from writing back to you
more promptly.

I was honored that you thought of me in connec-
tion with the documentary you are making for
the BBC. It sounds like a fascinating project
and were my time a little more my own I would
like very much to consider the idea with the
hopes of being able to join you.

As I am sure you have imagined, however, these
days are hectic and probably will grow more so
as the election draws closer. I am therefore
reducing drastically the number of commitments
I make and feel that it would not be wise for me
to try to plan on working with you on this.

I was pleased that you wrote to me and hope that
you will keep me in mind should such a documentary
series ever be done again,

The Rt. Hon. The Lord Chalfont
27 Ormonde Gate
London S. W. 3 England

jlp:7/6/72

FROM: RT. HON. THE LORD CHALFONT, R.C. O.B.E. M.C.

27 ORMONDE GATE
LONDON SW3 4EX
01-352 1063

BY HAND

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
c/o Mr. Anthony Acland,
Private Secretary to the
Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Downing Street West,
London S.W.1.

8th May 1973

dear Henry,

I have only just learned that you are to be in London for a few days, and I write to send you my good wishes and to wish you a successful visit. I was, of course, sorry that we could not get together on my idea of a documentary film, but I fully understand the reasons.

I imagine that you will have a very full schedule while you are in London, but if you should have half an hour to spare I should be delighted to see you. Apart from purely personal reasons, I have agreed to write a series of articles for the London Times on grand strategy and the problems of International Security, and I should very much like to have a few minutes of informal (and purely background) talk with you about your Atlantic Charter speech.

If this should prove to be possible, perhaps you would get one of
your staff to telephone me here. I could come to see you at any time
on Thursday except between 11.30 a.m. and 1.00 p.m. If there is no
chance of a meeting this time I wonder if it would be possible for me
to come, some time in the fairly near future, to Washington for a day?

In any case, let me repeat my good wishes for the success, not only
of your visit to London, but for the President's forthcoming, and
absolutely vital, trip to Europe.

With best wishes,

(CHALFONT)

RECEIVED

MAY 16 1973
CENTRAL FILES

Charles F. Chamberlain
6th District, Michigan

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C. 20515

May 20, 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

One of the high points of the Day in Washington for the group of Michigan businessmen yesterday was certainly your fine presentation. As one of my guests said so well, "Dr. Kissinger was powerful"!

Realizing how busy you are, all of the men were particularly appreciative for your willingness to meet with them. There was no question but that they found your remarks most stimulating and that you gave these men a great deal to ponder.

With my deep gratitude, I am

Charles E. Chamberlain

CEC:AC

RECEIVED

JUN 4 1970

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY

A.C.

JUN 17 1970

Dear Otis:

Many thanks for your June 9 note enclosing the
<u>Times</u> editorial on Vietnam. You will not be
surprised to hear that, while "peace is the goal
that unites us," I cannot agree with the means
of achieving it that your editorial urges.

Failing agreement on Vietnam policies, all I
can ask is that you and your dinner partners
continue to speak well of me personally!

Mr. Otis Chandler, Publisher
Los Angeles Times
Times Mirror Square
Los Angeles, California 90053

jbp

WL:jlp:6/16/70

RECEIVED
JUN 19 1970

CENTRAL FILES

up. For openers, actor Dan Roberts ran around the balcony of Pomona's appropriately battered Holmes Hall shouting the

prophet Tiresias Miss Self was haught to the brachium, and not a little dangerous.

Her husband, actor Scott Paulin, was absurdly con-

Playhouse Offers 'Rashomon'

There are magical moments in "Rashomon" at the Huntington Beach Playhouse, thanks to the sensitive direction, careful lighting and evocative sound effects provided by Ron Albertsen and a cast which seems totally devoted to the task at hand.

HBP is literally a barn, set back from a bleak, unlighted section of Main Street. Inside, the audience (abundant and pleased at Friday night's performance), surrounds three quarters of the simple stage. It all proves appropriate for Fay and Michael Kanin's adaptation of Ryunosuke Akutagawa's stories, which infrom, as does Pirandel-

and a Wife. Did he rape her? Was his death murder? Suicide? Accident?

Whatever their character's credibility, the actors speak and stylize with winning intensity. Wayne Beauvais is your basic big, virile bandit (a little forced); Aaron Patton, the Samurai-Spouse; and Sally Brown the attractive, effective wife. The Kendo

## 'RASHOMON'

Fay and Michael Kanin's play based on stories by Ryunosuke Akutagawa, presented weekends through May 15 at the Huntington Beach Playhouse, 2110 Main St., Huntington Beach. Director Ron Albertsen. Lights and sound Albertsen. Set Joy Lobell. Costumes Jean Kyler. With Bob McCaa, Joe Carr, Bruce Campbell, Les Payne, Wayne Beauvais, Aaron Patton, Sally Brown, Candy Hinterberger, Crystal Payne.

Official - mlh (May 11, 1971)

Chang - before Friday, May 14th

Type of Request & Date

3 PM
(Last name and pending date)

Name: Major General Woo ju Chang

Request: General Chang was visiting General Hershey this morning. General Hershey called our office for General Chang and asked if Mr. Kissinger could meet with General Chang sometime before Friday at 3 PM at which time he will be leaving Washington. General Chang has been attending the Harvard Business School for the past year. He also translated Mr. Kissinger's book, "Limited War and Nuclear Weapons" into the Korean language.

General Chang is a reserve Major General in the Korean Army.

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information: RSVP: Colonel Kim, 483-7383 (who is handling General Chang's schedule while he is here).

Resolution:

I believe firmly in the principal of Vietnamization as explained by President Nixon and this wise policy, in my opinion, is the only practical way of reducing America's involvement in the current conflict in Southeast Asia. Enabling our allies to shoulder their own defense without reliance on us will also reduce our exposure to involvement in possible future wars.

If successfully carried out this policy will reduce the dependence of our allies on U. S. power. Only then can they establish a sound base for over-due social, political and economic reforms.

Unfortunately, military forces are required for stability. The Russians and Chinese continue to arm select nations who intimidate their neighbors. Therefore, if Vietnamization is to succeed without the use and pressure of U. S. forces our allies must be provided with weapons comparable to those possessed by their Communist neighbors.

I have just read the amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Act. Section 7 of this act has received most of the interest in the press, but there are other sections which deserve your attention. Sections 8, 9 and 10 either individually or collectively will, in my opinion, severely limit the President's options in equipping our allies to successfully defend themselves. It seems to me that these amendments, if passed, will jeopardize the President's program of getting Americans out of Asia.

Please let me have your thoughts on this.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.J.C.*

AUG 28 1970

Dear Hilton:

Thank you for four letter of August 5. It was
good to hear from you again. Please do call
my office if you come to Washington this Novem-
ber. I would enjoy seeing you even if a few
minutes were all your schedule and mine would
permit.

Mr. Hilton Cheong-Leen
Human Rights Council of Hongkong
G. P. O. Box 14790
Hongkong

jlp:8/19/70

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1970

CENTRAL FILES

THE LAWYERS
CO-OPERATIVE
PUBLISHING CO.

Rochester, New York 14603

Seymour Fogel
Vice President, Finance

March 25, 1971

Mr. Richard Salant, President
CBS News Division
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
524 West 57th Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Salant:

As a long-time viewer and admirer of CBS News, I must
express my dissatisfaction with your presentation of "The Selling
of the Pentagon". It was so biased and argumentative that it went
beyond the bounds of responsible reporting. Specifically, your
reference that "wars are not fought in front of a grandstand" at best,
was irrelevant; at worst, it was misleading and prejudicial. Your
failure to attribute the "Colonel's" remarks as a quotation from the
Premier of Laos (as incomplete as it may have been) was not only
a distortion but completely misleading. Throughout the whole pro-
gram, I found myself disagreeing with the validity of Roger Mudd's
conclusions. I see nothing wrong with the Pentagon demonstrating
to the American public, either through their displays or through
their personnel, the role, function and capabilities of our Armed
Services. In fact, their failure to do this would warrant criticism
of being secretive and uncommunicative. Furthermore, your re-
buttal at the end left much to be desired. To me, the excerpts from
Congressman Hebert's letter was not responsive to his criticism; of
more relevance would have been precisely, under what pretense did
you obtain the film? More importantly, you left unanswered his criti-
cism dealing with the false impression that his TV interview was initiated
by the Pentagon. I assume, therefore, that his criticism was valid.
Also, the fact that the Colonel's quote was incomplete did not justify
CBS's failure to mention it as a quote.

It is ironic that you are guilty of the very same thing of which
you accuse the Pentagon. What is significant here is that with respect

Mr. Richard Salant, President

- 2 -

March 24, 1971

to "propaganda," the news media's responsibility is far greater. I agree that freedom of the press is vital to a free society. But that freedom carries with it a certain responsibility. Obviously, a free society cannot long remain free if people (especially those that have a public trust) do not act responsibly.

Your distortion and innuendos on that program was not in keeping with what I have come to expect of CBS News. It was a disservice to the profession and skirted the bounds of responsibility and propriety.

Yours truly,

SF/il

2

Errol Estate

P.O. Box 1208, Apopka, Florida 32703 (North of Apopka on US 441) Telephone (305) 886-3030

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /C

*-CHEURIER, MONIQUE*

December 2, 1972

Doctor Henry Kissinger
White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

You've heard of Oysters Rockefeller. It's an impressive name and not because of Oysters. Well, why not Oysters Kissinger?

We've been told by those who know you, that your name would be equally impressive to your fellow business leaders. So we'd like to name a dish after you.

Why the name dropping? Errol Estate Inn and Country Club has been designed for Captains of Industry like you. Our rates are competitive with other resorts and we do give our guests more than their money's worth in terms of location, luxury, service, elegance and prestige. (Captains of Industry are noted for their ability to get more than their money's worth.)

We'd like to make our business leader image even better by putting a respected name on our menus. (Yours.)

Of course, you might be allergic to Oysters. How about:

Crab Cakes Kissinger
Egg Foo Kissinger

Steak Diane Kissinger
Crepes Farci de Poulet
a la Kissinger

The choice of dishes is endless; the choice of a first class resort is limited (to Errol Estate). The next time you are planning a convention or meeting, stop in, let us show you our facilities, and the new facilities to come. Who knows, if you don't want a dish named after you, maybe naming one of the new Villas or function areas after you would be appealing. (The Kissinger Suite!)