17

the Germans as hopeless pedants and proclaimed a future ruled by Britons, Russians and Americans. These were the peoples who possessed the grandeur to produce men of superhuman stature. These Britons, these Russians, even these Americans were of course Europeans, destined to guide the future of mankind.²² Perhaps even more significantly, Hegel before Tocqueville had argued that the world spirit would one day seize upon the Russians and Americans to guide man in his future evolution.²³

## 5. The Slavic Ingredient of German Culture

The appearance of the Russians in these prophetic utterances suggests another facet of Germany's relation to Europe, and that is her deep involvement in the *Slavic* world. In the Western perspective Germany has largely been seen as the antagonist of the Slavic peoples and their aspirations. The eastward thrust of the Austrian, Prussian and Saxon monarchies in the generations after Westphalia has blurred the historical vision. More particularly has it obscured the fact that Germany is herself a partly Slavic country and her people have emerged from a mixture with Slavic cultural elements. Indeed, German history can, in this perspective, be described in terms of two great processes of cultural

19

adaptation and interpenetration: its first part down to
1500 characterized by the amalgamating of Germanic and
Latin elements and producing the distinctive culture of
late medieval German city life; the culture of Frankfurt
and Augsburg, of Cologne and Nürnberg, of Hamburg and
Strassburg. The second part of this complex process
was initiated in the later Middle Ages and brought a
mixture of this Western German culture with its Eastern
component, containing significant Slavic elements. The
University of Wittenberg which provided Martin Luther
with the main setting for his prodigious intellectual
labors was a focal point of this process of acculturation;
Breslau and Koenigsberg were to follow. But even more
important, Slavic elements entered into and became part
of the German tradition in Saxony, Bohemia and the several
parts of the Hapsburg realm. Indeed, in many ways the
distinctive features of Saxon and Austrian as well as
Bohemian contributions to German culture were the result
of such Slavic ingredients, whether in music, poetry or
law. Many "German" place names are of Slavic origin, as
are the names of German families, including those of
great noble families. It may come as a surprise in this
connection to learn that e.g. the two volume family history

of the Bülows proudly starts with giving their original
*Stamvater* as a West Slavic chieftain in the ninth century.
It is altogether a most unfortunate distortion of the
historical situation to talk of a permanent conflict
between Germans and Slavs in the centuries before the
modern era. To write, as a recent study does, that
"the German-Slav battle through the ages had been a grim
and barbarous struggle for life and land,"²⁴ is quite
misleading and amounts to an anachronistic backward
projection of later nationalist relations. In the Eastern
kingdoms, whether under Slavic or German rulers, many
nationalities lived peacefully side by side, intermingled
and yet retained their separate cultural traditions.
How else could one explain the fact that the Poles chose
the king of Saxony to be their ruler even as late as
the eighteenth century? Of course, national sentiment
played its role in such conflicts as the Hussite wars
or the Bohemian war with which the Thirty-Years War
commenced; but did not Czechs, Slovaks and Germans of
Protestant persuasion heartily cooperate in fighting the
Hapsburg rulers and in electing Frederick V of the
Palatinate their king?²⁵

20

These are just hints to suggest the intense
symbiosis and the lasting cultural relationship between
Germans and other Slavic peoples throughout the territories
which are at present within the Soviet orbit. Basically,
they are all part of Europe and a large percentage of
their peoples consider themselves Europeans.

It is therefore no accident, but the fruit of
deeply rooted historical antecedents that most of this
world now belongs to the Soviet orbit. Germany tends
to think of herself as the heart of Europe precisely
because she has for long been ready to see the Slavic
peoples as an integral part of Europe. To change
similes, Germany for all her antagonism to Slavdom which
is richly reciprocated by Poles, Czechs and other
Western Slavic peoples is nonetheless the bridge between
East and West. In recent years, that link has been
concentrated in the German Democratic Republic's intimate
ties with the Soviet Bloc, but it extends far beyond
this temporary political situation. 26

It is a curious and highly significant feature of
German history that the large and expansive states of
Austria and Prussia were formed in this context of the
intertwining of Germans and Slavs, this "Slavic Germany."

More especially the divisions of Poland are evocative of
the essentially trans-national character of these two
states. They both lay beyond the confines of the old
Germany of the Holy Empire and their elites were schooled
in ruling over "alien" populations. Hence both were
characterized by an emphasis on the military and coercive.
The deep suspicions which the enthusiasm for national
unification evoked in such men as Metternich were closely
bound up with the multinational character of their
political orders. Austria and Prussia were states built
upon imperial dominance rather than national consensus.
With the forward march of democratization, both lost
the raison d'etre of their existence. In the case of
Austria, the fact that Slavic nations remained intact
within the imperial framework enabled these separate
peoples to break away and form independent states,
leaving a German rump to reconstitute itself as a
separate entity. It was rather natural that this entity
should have sought to "re-enter" Germany and become part
of the political order that was Germany. Only the
determined veto backed by arms could prevent this
**Anschluss**. It was afterwards forcibly brought about by
the Austrian Adolf Hitler, only to be undone again by

external force. It is necessary to recall this background
in order to appreciate the complex position of a neutralized
Austria vis-a-vis a new Western Germany within the
European unification process. For within a unified
Europe the ancient issue might eventually be resolved,
if both participated in supra-national community. Only,
it would give the "Germans" two votes rather than one in
a federal senate based upon the equality of component
states.

Even more important is the fate of Prussia. In
the days of the Weimar Republic, some of the democratic
leaders who appreciated the inherently anti-democratic
implication of Prussia's very existence like Hugo Preuss,
advocated its dissolution. Purely expedient considerations
vis-a-vis French annexationist policies and Rhineland
separatism prevented such views from prevailing. Even
so, the constitution of the Weimar Republic greatly
weakened Prussia's role and set in motion an evolution
which was to dissolve Prussia into its component parts,
an evolution which was consummated by force of Allied
dictate after World War II.<sup>27</sup> Hitler had, however,
already destroyed the identity of Prussia. This was
logical enough, considering how remote his demagogic

24 23

mass movement with its emotional paraphernalia was from
the puritanical discipline of the Black-and-White
tradition of the Prussia of Frederick the Great. This
great admirer of the French *esprit*, fluteplayer and
military genius would have had nothing but contempt for
the great "drummer" from Austria and his brownshirted
followers. The sober and hard-headed Prime Minister of
Prussia throughout the Weimar days, Otto Braun, was much
more nearly a man of his ilk, as are indeed some of the
key men of present Social democracy. But Frederick had
been an utterly lonely man; the military and the
bureaucratic elite who had ruled Prussia under him were
based upon the land-owning gentry. The term *Junker* has
become so sloganized in Western propaganda that one
hesitates to use it in this connection; yet properly
understood and recognized in its opposition to much that
Frederick and his successors stood for, this "class"
in the term's most precise meaning constituted the rock
upon which the political order of Prussia was built. It
was also the rock upon which the ill-constructed ship of
the Weimar state foundered. This ruling class of officers,
administrators and their imitators in business and
industry remained in power after 1918, reinforced by their

25

numerous following in intellectual life and the universities.
They did until the advent of Hitler.²⁸

6. The Old and the New Elites

It is little appreciated that the National
Socialist leadership was of a very different cast.
They not only were not drawn from these former elite
cadres, but they made short shrift of what opposition
developed. When the conservatives first persuaded the
aged president, Field Marshal Hindenburg, to allow
Hitler to form the government in January, 1933, they
had done so in the expectation that they would be able
to manipulate him as they had the disunited party leaders
of the Weimar Republic. Little did they appreciate the
autonomous power that democratic procedures offer a
leader who has a solid backing behind him. Even less
did they realize the ruthless, revolutionary determination
which animated Hitler and his lieutenants. The National
Socialists proceeded at once to liquidate the former
strongholds of Germany's Prussian and Prussian-inspired
masters. In short, they made up for the failure of the
moderates who had organized the Weimar Republic.²⁹ This
revolutionary transformation of the ruling elites, in a
sense democratizing or perhaps more correctly popularizing

what had formerly been a strongly aristocratic ruling
helps to
incidentally, the decisive role which
group explains, the role which
Prussian officers and administrators played in the
several resistance plots, and more particularly their
share in the attempt at killing Hitler and overthrowing
his regime on July 20, 1944. The strontly moral cast
of the conscious motivation of its leaders reflects the
clash of values and convictions which separated the
National Socialist movement from the elites of Germany's
past. The blood bath which Hitler ordered after the
attempt on his life had failed and was accompanied by
violent denunciations of the old aristocracy. It also
was given a macabre form by the especially humiliating
methods employed in executing men of the older order who
with all their faults had cherished convictions of honor
and gentlemanly behavior utterly alien to the proletarian
Hitler. 30

The task which the National Socialists had begun
and which culminated in the execution of over two thousand
suspected participants, many of whom were scions of the
old ruling class--this typical revolutionary enterprise
of physically destroying the old elites--was completed
by the victorious red armies when they swept across most

27

of Prussia to the Elbe river in the spring of 1945. The drama of Hitler's suicide in the Berlin bunker amidst the ruins of his adopted capital has overshadowed the politically much more important destruction of the Prussian land-owning class and their military and bureaucratic following. Not only were the estates burned and the land divided and collectivized, but many thousands perished or fled as virtual paupers to the West, men, women, and children. Being the able and hard-working members of a genuine aristocracy, they have since been integrated into the busy life of Western industrial Germany. But as a class, they have been destroyed as the French aristocracy was destroyed by the Great Revolution. One highly competent observer has recently asserted that the old class structure has passed away.³¹

In their stead, a very different elite formation has been emerging, or rather re-emerging in Western Germany. It is the ancient elite of Germany's city culture, long submerged by the Prussian predominance. If one goes through the "Who is Who" of the Federal Republic, he is confronted with a group of men who belong to the tradition of the great cities of Western Germany: Hamburg, Bremen and Cologne, Frankfurt, Augsburg and

Nuernberg. Reinforced by the leadership of the German Social Democrats, until 1945 the only solidly democratic group in Germany, these men have rapidly constituted themselves as a new elite far different in their values and beliefs from the old ruling class.³² At the same time, the German business leadership which formerly inclined to follow the military and bureaucratic rulers in outlook and behavior has now come to be oriented toward American traditions. For the typical German businessman today the American, even if he is not as yet a partner, tends to provide the image by which he shapes his own conduct. Such an orientation is often combined with sharp criticism of American business practices--just as the German businessman of former days often was sharply critical of military and bureaucratic leadership, even while he adopted their values and modes of behavior.³³ The consequence of this striking transformation has been a very different conduct of German government and diplomacy than characterized them in the past. Gone is the pre-occupation with prestige and the minatory gesture--the proverbial arrogance of the Prussian --and in their stead one finds readiness to compromise, concern with the substance of political advantage and a

striking caution in the face of the many Hobsonian choices
with which German politics is confronted. The desperate
impotence in the face of the country's forcible division
which seems to provide a perfect seedbed for the emotional
mass nationalism of the Fascist type has actually
persuaded this new elite to adopt a policy of European
and world-wide cooperation and accommodation. 34 It is a
policy with a sound anchorage in Germany's historical
past, and it provides one of the mainstays for America's
policy of containment in Europe. At the same time it
offers the Germans a practical and appealing goal for
political activity which may yet in the end provide the
setting for a solution to the "German problem." To the
detailed elaboration of the *analysis* of this policy we
must now turn. It needs to be discussed on three levels:
the level of foreign policy, the level of domestic
politics, and the level of popular participation through
organized and unorganized effort.

7. The Division of Germany as a Bridge
Between East and West

As far as the foreign policy level is concerned,
the Adenauer government since its inception in 1949
pursued a steady course. This course was characterized

by the search for rapprochement and eventual friendship
with France through close cooperation with the United
States as the essential preconditions for full participa-
tion in European political activities. ³⁵ The forward
march of this foreign policy and the realization of its
goals have been remarkable and far exceeded what could
be expected at its start. It may be divided into several
phases. The first of these phases covers the period
until 1954, when full sovereignty was recognized; its
primary European aspects were Germany's entry into the
Council of Europe (1951), the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community (1952), and the struggle
over and eventual failure of the European Defense
Community (1953). The second phase, after recovery from
the depressing effects of this failure had been achieved
at Messina, culminated in the establishment of the
European Economic Community and its counterpart for
Atomic Energy (1957/1958). The third phase is dominated
by the working out of and unexpected success of the
Common Market, testified to by British efforts to join,
but halted by the rejection of these plans (January,
1963); and the fourth and most recent phase, characterized
by diplomatic maneuvers to overcome the shock and

negotiate a political union.

Germany's foreign policy has throughout these four phases been directed toward what might be called a maximum of Europeanization. In the first phase Germany favored a more active Council; she cooperated vigorously in building the E.C.S.C. under and after Jean Monnet; she accepted the Defense Community and the proposed Political Community.36 In the second phase, she vigorously exerted herself on behalf of the *relance*, and she accepted very serious disadvantages especially regarding France, in order to facilitate French acceptance of the European Economic Community, afterward providing steady support for its German chairman, Professor Walter Hallstein, who next to Jean Monnet has become the most effective protagonist of European unification.37 During the third phase, Germany also supported British entry with all the means at her disposal, yet when de Gaulle imposed his will in rejecting the British, Adenauer who had been the dominant architect of Germany's foreign policy, proceeded with the Franco-German treaty of friendship and won parliamentary support, in spite of the indignation aroused among his own followers, as well as the opposition by the French president's one-sided action.

In the general discussion, the commitment of Germany to a policy of European unification was the key argument for seeking to overcome the conflict which de Gaulle's decision had precipitated.<sup>38</sup> Finally, in most recent months Germany's foreign policy has repeatedly been actively seeking to overcome the obstacles in the way of progress toward a political unification which is stymied by the conflict between French determination to proceed without Britain, and Dutch and Belgian determination to keep the door open for British entry. A number of issues have created difficulties and the tensions between France and Germany, due to Germany's determination to maintain the closest working relation with the United States even in the face of French challenges to United States leadership in the West.<sup>39</sup>

8. Foreign Policy Developments and the U.S.S.R.

The entire course of this complicated policy of German adherence to European unification must be seen also in its juxtaposition to the Soviet Union's persistent efforts at interfering with this development.<sup>40</sup> In this connection Germany's participation in NATO is of crucial importance. Soviet propaganda has continually stressed the "danger" of Germany, and in view of past events such

views find a ready echo not only among the Russian masses,
but also among the satellites and throughout Europe.

Actually, the Soviet Union is of course not afraid of
the few divisions of Germany, armed to the teeth as the
U.S.S.R. is. But the Germans when working in close
cooperation with the United States, Britain and France
are another matter. By attacking the weakest link, by
a never-ending repetitive propaganda campaign, the
Soviets have been hoping to break the chain of Western
containment and continue to do so. Germany's participa-
tion in Europe and European unification is only a part
of this over-all Western orientation of German foreign
and defense policies, which the Soviet Union has been
at pains to counteract at every turn. From Stalin's
proposal for an independent united Germany in the spring
of 1952, *presumably* intended to disrupt the negotiations for a
European Defense Community, to the recent pressures for
the international recognition of the Ulbricht regime in
Eastern Germany, the Soviet Union has put forward one
proposal after another that she had no intention of
implementing and which she dropped as soon as there
appeared any significant inclination in Germany or among
the other Allies to take it up. 41

34

In Germany, as in other European countries, there
is a lively sense that this European integration is by
no means only or even primarily a response to the threat
of Soviet domination. There is a general awareness that
besides the paramount need of larger markets in an age
of advanced industrialization, the disintegration of
European colonial domination has not only deprived
Europe of dependent markets, but in its sequel has
brought the emergence of new political units of vast
size and great potential power. There is notable through-
out the world a trend for comprehensive cultural units
to consolidate into groupings of a more or less closely
knit federal kind. Germans are more and more conscious
of these trends. The challenge of assisting the under-
developed countries has met with considerable response,
especially among the younger generation. The trend has
been further stimulated by de Gaulle's constant reminders
that Europe must cooperate in order to play an effective
role in the world at large--a line of argument which he
manages to combine in skillful oratory with older senti-
ments of nationalism. Paneuropa thus fits into a world-
wide agitation of pan-movements all of which seek wider
horizons than the older parochial order of national states
could provide.⁴²

35 34

This study is not the place to analyze this policy
of shadow boxing in any detail; the elaborate maneuvers
in Berlin alone would carry the analysis beyond the scope
of this discussion. But some comments are in order. The
original proposal for the establishment of a "free"
city, not of Berlin, but of the Western sectors of
Berlin, was so patently not put forward with any
expectation that great powers would accept it--it did
not offer any *quid pro quo*--that the question of why it
was made is a very real one. No doubt the belief on the
part of the Soviets that they had achieved a nuclear
balance encouraged them. In any case, it seems clear in
retrospect and after all the threats have been revealed
as hollow ones that the purpose was to advance the
recognition of the East German so-called Democratic
Republic and to disrupt NATO. For NATO was at the time
exhibiting very serious weaknesses and internal disagree-
ments which the Soviets might well have hoped to aggravate
by throwing the apple of discord which was the defense
of Berlin among them. It must be remembered that de Gaulle
had only recently become president of France and might
therefore (especially in light of his role in 1944/1945)
be expected by the Soviets to refuse to defend a city

which in French ears had had a very minatory sound. The
ruse did not work and in fact NATO was temporarily
strengthened by this frontal attack of the Soviets. Yet
the D.D.R. (German Democratic Republic) unquestionably
achieved greater international status, including the
recognition by Tito, even though formal recognition by
the Western Allies did not occur. 43 There can be little
question that Moscow's handling of the Berlin issue, and
especially the forcible erection of the "wall" in contra-
vention of solemn commitments, have had the effect of
making the division of Germany into two states, if not
three, seem more and more permanent as the years have
passed. But this procedure, while producing some voices
in Germany and throughout Europe in favor of plans which
would terminate Germany's participation in Europe, have
for most Germans and Europeans had the opposite effect
of hardening their determination of seeking in and through
a united Europe the eventual peaceful solution to this
Soviet-enforced anomaly of the two Germanies--an anomaly
which at least the Poles should realize cannot last. 44

37 36

## 9. Domestic Politics: The Strange Case of the S.P.D.

Berlin and its trials are the key to the Social Democratic Party's complex attitudes toward the European policy of the government. That policy itself has been centrally shaped by the need of defending the freedom of Berlin. But the Socialists had special reasons to be concerned. The city, or rather its Northern, Western, and Southern parts under Allied occupation, has been governed by a coalition of both parties under Social Democratic leadership. First Ernst Reuther, then Otto Suhr and finally Willy Brandt have provided a succession of outstanding men who have played a dominant role not only in the Berlin government, but also in the councils of the party for which two of them have actually provided the leaders. It is therefore natural that NATO and the Community of Six should have become increasingly part of Social Democratic thinking, as they in turn became involved in the defense of Berlin.⁴⁵ The invidious "wall" stands as a symbol not only of Communist failure in Eastern Germany, but also as a symbol of the strength of the West and especially the emerging Europe. Berlin has, in a sense, served to integrate the German Socialists into a general outlook that sees Germany as a part of Europe.

38

37

At the same time, the very anxieties of the Berlin situation, and the constant confrontation with the realities of the D.D.R. as part of the Soviet Bloc have induced the Social Democrats to be promoters of a broad conception of Europe which includes Britain and the Scandinavian social democracies along with conservative France and the other countries of the Community of the Six.⁴⁶ This trend is apt to be reinforced with a Labor Government in power in Britain, especially if that regime can be won over to a more positive approach to European unification than British Labor has been inclined toward in the past. The *appertura a sinistra* in Italy has served the same purpose and Jean Monnet's Committee for a United States of Europe has done its share in aiding this re-conversion of German party and trade union leaders to a position which historical antecedents and inherent logic predisposed them toward anyhow.⁴⁷ The internal evolution of German Social Democracy toward a less Marxist and ideologically dogmatic position which was consolidated by the Codesberg Party Congress in 1959 has greatly aided this reconversion; for it necessitated a more constructive approach toward foreign policy in general and the rapidly developing European ties in

12

47

49

EPOötSHEFISSTOT

[Lc]

particular.⁴⁸ Efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to interrupt this evolution only served to hasten it. The ill-conceived denunciation of Socialist leaders as helpmates of German Fascists could, in the light of the role German Communists and Stalin had played vis-a-vis Hitler, only reinforce these trends.

The rapidly increasing links between German, French, and other European business concerns did their share in "Europeanizing" German labor; for wherever such a business merger or even close cooperation occurred, the workers in the plants were not slow in establishing corresponding contacts for effective cooperation. Recent research has been able to show the numerous specific steps that were taken in these contexts to further especially Franco-German trade union cooperation. One key observed noted a number of years ago that "a far greater degree of ideological cohesion has been achieved by labour than is true of the trade associations," although it would of course be too much to assert that "all pre-existing national differences among unions have been blunted and that a supranational ideology has emerged..." In fact, the really important forward step has been accomplished, when the workers in particular

plants through their union representatives have established
cooperative arrangements. Typically, the French unionists
have been concerned in such situations to sharpen the
ideological awareness of their German comrades, while the
Germans have urged greater concern with working conditions
and wages in French factories. Significant differential
wage increases have been the result.⁴⁹

Similarly, it has become quite usual for
representatives of labor in the several countries to
take part in the meetings of the national parties and
unions. Such fraternizing ought not, of course, be
overestimated in its political implications. A breakdown
in the E.E.C. could seriously damage such links. But
Germany and France are reaching a point where these
bonds are also becoming of such strength that a breakdown
may be prevented by vigorous counteraction in the
political field.⁵⁰

10. The Popular Level of Participation

Popular interest in European integration and a
measure of popular participation have been strong from
the beginning. In saying this, one should not assume of
course that every man in the street is enthusiastically
in favor of uniting Germany with other European countries.

41

40

There are, however, substantial bodies of telling evidence to support the general proposition. Even before there was any official link of the Federal Republic with the emerging European institutions, the constitution adopted in 1949 and cautiously called Basic Law by its makers provided in its Article 24 that the new republic was prepared to cede any powers associated with sovereignty to a European government which other European nations were willing to transfer. The discussion of this particular article in the constitutional convention shows that it was non-controversial, except for technical juridical aspects and was broadly supported.⁵¹ In keeping with this early start, it has been good electoral politics for a candidate to public office to present himself as a good European. Indeed, few and far between are the instances of men who in electioneering found it advisable to oppose European unification, and even fewer are those who with such a plank succeeded in getting elected. As the saying now goes: everybody is for Europe. An examination of the German press since 1950 yields a similar result. The Communists apart--and they constitute a very small percentage of the German electorate --every newspaper has found it desirable to appeal to its

42

readers in terms of European unity. There are, of course,
degrees of concern and enthusiasm and some leading
editorial writers have from time to time preferred to
counsel caution.⁵² In recent years, the formula of
General de Gaulle who has spoken of Europe in terms of
fatherlands (Europe des patries) and who generally
inclines toward a policy which leaves the national
sovereignties intact, has been supported by some German
papers and magazines.⁵³ But when the French president
decided to reject British entry into the Common Market,
the general German reaction was one of dismay and sharp
criticism. This constellation represented a curious
reversal of the days at the start when French political
opinion inclined to feel that France could only afford
to participate in a Europe in which Britain would be
available to counter balance Germany. In recent months
the German public and its press have fairly generally
supported the Erhard government's recurrent efforts at
forwarding political unification.

## 11. European Movement

To these general attitudes correspond more
specific organizational activities. The European Move-
ment which unites a considerable number of more specialized

43

groupings which share a common concern in the unification
of the continent has always had a substantial German
branch. Its major shortcoming has been its tendency
simply to echo the government's line of approach, instead
of developing a more outspoken position which would
support the government, but would also urge the government
on to more far-reaching efforts. There have, of course,
been smaller organizations, as in other countries, which
have been prepared to do this kind of work, but their
success has been limited by the rather stodgy tendency
of the main organization. Though provided with ample
means and possessed of branches throughout the country,
the German branch of the European movement has been in-
clined to resist rather than to stimulate popular support
for the kind of approach which would build a United
Europe from the "grass-roots."⁵⁴ For a number of years
a further difficulty arose from the Social Democrats'
reluctance to support a policy which might jeopardize
the chances of German unification (see below). Thus
the men who were the most logical advocates of European
unity often held back, arguing that those who were
claiming to promote Europe failed to realize its
revolutionary implications. Even so, there were groupings

44

of German Socialists who in cooperation with their comrades
in other countries maintained the more radical federalist
position.

55

Generally speaking, the general public and its
press were, as in other countries, not so much divided
on the question whether to unite Europe, but on that of
the pace and the form of such unification. This debate
is typically cast in terms of whether Europe should be
federal or confederal, and whether in seeking either a
federal or a confederal Europe one should proceed
"functionally" that is to say by developing specific
fields of common activity, or constitutionally, that is
to say by devising a general structure. In this many-
faceted debate which is likely to continue for quite a
while, the federalists are apt to be constitutionalists,
while the functionalists are usually confederalists.

56

The Germans with their long and rather checkered experience
with different kinds of federal order are in this debate
in an odd position, as far as party lines are concerned.
For on the whole the conservatives are, as in other
countries with a federal system, inclined toward "states'
rights" while the progressives (if this more inclusive
term may be allowed here) are for strengthening central

[L.C]

45

44

authority. This is logically the position of those who seek to extend the range of collective activity. Yet, in regard to Europe the roles tend to be exchanged.

The progressives, realizing the difficulty of forwarding socialism on a European level, incline toward retaining a maximum of decisional authority for the national states, while the conservatives, aware of the relative weakness of European governmental organs, incline toward the transfer of authority to them. There are many exceptions to this general rule--notably de Gaulle is one--and it may radically change, if a majority of European countries are governed by Socialists. Yet at the moment, it has broad application to the approach of Germans toward European unification. In any case, there is as yet no solid majority in German public opinion for a federal and constitutional approach to European unification, even though it is gaining ground. 57

Another specific of the German attitude, arising from their own experience, is the tendency to attach major importance in the federalizing process to administrative, rather than legislative procedures. German and Swiss federalism, in contrast to American and much other federalism, has always sought to reinforce federalism

47

direct personal contact between universities was infrequent.

The old gag about the international character of scholarship held true only for the sciences and medicine. In the humanities and social sciences, the romantic notion of national cultures reigned supreme, with contact abroad confined largely to the particular specialists, Romance languages, say--or Slavists. A radical change has been taking place in recent years and constitutes an important part of the background for saying (as politicians are now fond of doing) that one can be a good European while being a good German. To the Germans, this kind of formula appeals more readily because for many years it has been applied inside their federal country: to be a good Bavarian or Saxon did not prevent him from being a good German. But such general sentiments are reinforced, especially among the younger generation, by close personal contacts among faculty and students. Reinforced by an agreement on cultural relations (<u>Kulturabkommen</u>), French and German universities are starting to recognize each other's academic degrees, and accept the prior schooling of each other; they also permit students to "count" periods of study spent in the other country. Beyond that, each German university is liked with a French one in a

48

jumelage or sisterhood, e.g. Munich and Paris, Heidelberg and Montpelier, Frankfurt and Lyon. These bonds lead to a continuing and lively exchange with delegations of faculty and deans visiting each other and exploring common problems. None who has personally participated in these recurrent encounters can doubt their efficacy in completely changing the atmosphere among faculty and students. Especially the younger generations incline, as a consequence, to break down the barriers of "national" scholarship. This is of course especially important in such fields as history and politics, but it is bearing fruit in law and sociology and many others as well.⁵⁹

As a natural consequence of this development, there is an increasing inclination in German universities to call scholars from other lands to their academic chairs.

At Heidelberg, full professorships are now occupied by scholars from Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, Italy, and the United States; others will no doubt follow. Germany has perhaps gone further than any other European country in this direction of opening up its academic halls to European influence and cooperation. Fortunately, its federal decentralization of cultural policy which places the universities under the authority of the respective

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Land ministries stimulates experimentation and allows for a measure of diversity which the fixed and centralized systems of France and Italy have been slow to follow (in neither country can a non-national hold a professorship to this day). This dispersion of cultural authority has, of course, also its serious difficulties; the above-mentioned cultural agreement was held up for many months because the right of the Federal Republic's foreign office to conclude such an agreement was contested by several Lander and agreement between them had to be sought before it could become effective. Yet the advantages on the whole outweigh the disadvantages and the Europeanization of Germany is helped by her federal diversity.

To the jumelages of universities correspond similar sisterhoods among cities and towns. The movement for such a building of Europe from the grass-roots was initiated some fifteen years ago by a Swiss local government enthusiast, Professor Gasser, and the great European and mayor of Lyon, Edouard Herriot. It led to the founding and rapid development of the European Association of Municipalities (Europaeischer Gemeindetag). This all-European organization is, of course, especially

strong in the Community of the Six, notably in Germany and Italy. The strong tradition of local self-government prevalent in some parts of Germany and only temporarily submerged by Hitler's centralist state has, as a matter of fact, had the effect of stimulated demands for greater local autonomy in France and Italy, especially since it is reinforced by the tradition in the Low Countries. What is more, the overall organization is reinforced by linking towns in the several countries, and particularly towns in France and Germany in a permanent *jumelage* which offers the chance to build a common sentiment and European consciousness through continuing exchange of persons and ideas. Often the *jumelage* of town and university parallel each other, as in the case of Heidelberg and Montpelier. But town linkages are much more numerous in all to date, and they vary greatly in vitality and significance. Where the towns match each other in social structure and political outlook and orientation, the *jumelage* is more apart to work satisfactorily. It is obvious, or ought to be, that two mining towns like Herne and Lens-Henin-Lietard have more to say to each other, than if one were a center of agricultural trade. Two cities with a socialist mayor,

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like Frankfurt and Lyon, are more apt to find common concerns to talk over and work out in mutually fruitful discussions than two towns in which the leadership belongs to opposite camps. A curious problem arises where a Communist mayor in France confronts a non-Communist in Germany; this happens because the Communist party is outlawed in the Federal Republic. In some of these towns there exists, to complicate matters further, a *jumelage* with an East German city. It is only natural that the French Socialist and the German Socialist may engage in fairly sharp, even if comradely exchanges, but the experience in Amiens and Dortmund seems to suggest that they too contribute to a widening of European horizons, thus resembling the trade union contacts described above. ⁶⁰

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Something in between the links of cities and universities is provided by the *stages* or work conferences which have been organized by the International Center for European Education in which Germans vigorously participate. These conferences of a week's duration bring together Europeans of various professional backgrounds, teachers, lawyers, engineers, and so forth for discussions of their particular problems in relation to

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the emerging European community. Along with numerous institutes, established at various German universities, and devoted to the exploration of European problems in terms of several social sciences, quite a few adult education centers specifically concerned with educating members of the several professions in an understanding of European problems, these conferences contribute to the rapid expansion of the number of those Germans who have more than a tourist's notion of the several European countries and their problems. It would take many pages to list and describe all the organized activities which today devote themselves to making Europeans out of Germans, many of them the result of private initiative. The only major sector of German life which has not as yet been to any marked extent Europeanized is the farming population. This failure to include farmers has recently produced very serious difficulties for the German government in connection with negotiating the decisions needed in the agricultural field of the Common Market.⁶¹

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13. Germany's Role in European Institutions

The numerous activities and movements discussed
in the preceding paragraphs are reinforced by the partici-
pation of Germans in the various European institutions.
No detailed studies have attempted to identify any
distinctive "national" contributions to these institutions,
but it is to be assumed that these vary to some extent
at least in terms of the particular national traditions.
In legislation, in administration and in adjudication,
Germany's traditions differ from those of France, Italy,
and the Benelux countries. In all three areas, a considerable
process of acculturation is going forward, as Germans
find themselves obliged to work with their European
confreres. They come to the task trained only for German
official work which means predominantly a legal training
with the Continental European emphasis on formal juris-
prudence. There can be little doubt that in due course
the Germans will have to reform their training program
for the public service along lines which have already
been tested in France, including a substantially larger
amount of the social sciences, especially political
science and economics in their curriculum. It is, of
course, a great advantage of the E.E.C. that all six

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countries belong to the civil law tradition; it has rarely been sufficiently considered what problems would be presented by the addition of Englishmen trained in the Common Law. Clearly, only the analytical social sciences offer an eventual opportunity for resolving some of these difficulties.

There is general agreement that in both administrative and parliamentary institutions the Germans have cooperated fully and effectively. The outstanding leadership provided by men like Hallstein, Brentano, Carlo Schmid, Furler and Erler, to mention only a few who have occupied key posts, is matched by the quiet work in commissions and offices performed by hundreds of parliamentarians and officials on all rungs of the hierarchy. These German participants in the work of building a united Europe have been praised and blamed, and there is no need for quoting these appraisals here in extenso. A detailed scholarly analysis of the cultural issues presented by multinational operations remains to be developed, though some stimulating beginnings have been made. On the whole, Germans have not found it more difficult than others to enter into supranational activities; indeed, for many of them the European symbolism has been

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more appealing than the national one, so deeply dis-
credited by their recent history.

14. The Two Germanies and the Future of Europe

So far we have largely discussed the problem
"Germany and Europe" as if the Federal Republic
constituted all of Germany, although in historical back-
ground references the larger Germany including the people
of the German Democratic Republic (D.D.R.) was implied.
It is vain to speculate about what the attitudes of
East Germans might be toward these developments of
European unification. There are some indications that
they are concerned, lest such unification might deepen
and make more permanent the division of the country and
their separation from the rest of Germany. Also, in the
Draft Constitution for a European Political Community,
provision was made for the eventual reunification, and
there can be little question that if ever such reunifica-
tion of the B.R.D. and the D.D.R. became feasible--that
is to say would be permitted by the U.S.S.R.--it would
create very serious issues for the relation of Germany
to Europe, both within the Community of the Six and the
Council of Europe; but so would the possibility of Poland
or Czechoslovakia rejoining Europe. One should not forget

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under-developed Africa, provides the more adventurous
and enterprising among them a very large field for
peaceful activity for many years to come. As part of
the vast new melting pot that Europe is becoming, they
may well be turned away from their unfortunate and in
many ways tragic past, dominated as it was by their
Eastern monarchies with their military-bureaucratic
elites. Instead, an older and in many ways saner
tradition, cosmopolitan and commercial, as epitomized
in Goethe's Frankfurt, is re-emerging to provide Germany
and Europe with a leadership embodied in the men of
politics, economics, labor and culture who have cooperated
fully in building the new Europe.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
(As Notes)

¹Quoted in "European Union in Theory and Practice" in *Internationalism and Democracy: Essays Personal, Historical, Political in Memory of Charles E. Payne*, 1949, p. 158.

²Edward H. Litchfield, "Emergence of German Governments," Carl J. Friedrich and Herbert Spiro, "The Constitution of the German Federal Republic," Richard M. Scammon, "Political Parties" in *Governing Postwar Germany*, ed. Edward H. Litchfield, 1953; Peter H. Merkl, *The Origin of the West German Republic*, 1963.

³Cf. Ludwig Erhard, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik*, 1962, pp. 189ff., 450ff., 530ff. and *passim* for an authoritative voice. For a general analysis, cf. J. Stohler, "Neoliberalism und Europäische Integration," *Europaarchiv*, 1962, pp. 99-118.

⁴Karl Dietrich Bracher, "The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany" in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Foreign Policies in a World of Change*, 1963, pp. 115ff. especially at pp. 131/2, 138/9.

⁵Math. 21, 42.

⁶Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke-Beitraege zur Deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhundertst*, 1951, especially pp. 119ff. and 130ff. Cf. also J. B. Duroselle, "Europe as a Historical Concept," in *European Integration* (ed. C. Grove Haines, 1957), pp. 11-20, and Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and the Integration of Europe," *ibid*, pp. 21-34. The problem was treated from three different perspectives in papers by Marcel Beck, "Europa als historische Einheit," Carl J. Friedrich, "Die Einigung Europas in amerikanischer Perspective," and Russell Kirk, "Das gemeinsame Erbe Europas und Amerikas," in *Europa-Besinnung und Hoffnung* (ed. Hunold) 1957; these papers are found on pp. 29-88. For contrast and comparison see Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945*, 1955, especially Chapters VII-X, wherein the author shows how European thought was intertwined with German expansionism.

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Die Sudetenfrage, 1953.

<sup>25</sup>See for a general account Ch. VIII "The Eastern Dynasties..." of my *The Age of the Baroque 1610-1660*, 1952, and the further literature cited there.

<sup>26</sup>This aspect of German history has never been adequately developed, except in the field of literature.

<sup>27</sup>Merkl. op. cit. pp. 4ff.

<sup>28</sup>Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy-The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815*, 1958, *passim*.

<sup>29</sup>Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Gerhard Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung*, 1960, pp. 207ff., 490ff., 732ff.; Hans Bernd Gisevius, *Adolf Hitler*, 1963, *passim*.

<sup>30</sup>Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, 1948, much expanded German edition 1958; Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die Deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, 1954, abbreviated English edition, 1959; G. v.S. Gaevernitz, *They Almost Killed Hitler*, 1947; Hans Royce, Erich Zimmermann, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.) *20. Juli 1944*, Fourth Edition, 1961. Cf. also Wolfgang H. Kraus and Gabrield A. Almond on the resistance in *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany*.

<sup>31</sup>Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie-Deutschland von draussen gesehen*, 1960, p. 421. He is primarily speaking of the middle class. Cf. Marion Graefin Doenhoff, *Namen die Keiner mehr nennt-Ostpreussen-Menschen und Geschichte*, 1962.

<sup>32</sup>Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, 1959. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, 1959.

<sup>33</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, 1963, especially Ch. ____

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³⁴This new elite is typified by Konrad Adenauer and his followers; perhaps the most adequate assessment to date is Fritz Rene Allemann, *Bonn ist nicht Weimar*, 1956. A collective approach is found in Walter Stahl (ed.) *The Politics of Postwar Germany*, 1962; cf. especially B. Vogel and W. Kralewski, "State and Society," pp. 1-24, and P. D. G. Brown, "How Enduring is the Present Democratic System?" pp. 277-284. Cf. also A. J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*, 1961; Elmer Plischke, *Contemporary Government of Germany*, 1961; Alfred Grosser, *La Democratie de Bonn*, 1958 (German ed. 60); William Henry Chamberlin, *The German Phoenix*, 1963, Ch. XIII of which contains a sound appraisal of the first work cited.

³⁵A competent overall assessment is found in Karl Dietrich Bracher, "The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., *Foreign Policies in a World of Change*, 1963, 115-148. Gerald W. Freund, *Germany Between Two Worlds*, 1961.

³⁶Cf. *Europaarchiv*, January, 1956, pp. 8509ff. Arnold Bergstraesser, "Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa."

³⁷For this phase see e.g. the German review *Aussenpolitik*, 1956, and later which represents a kind of semi-official voice. Along with it, the pages and editorials of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in this period are instructive.

³⁸H. von Brentano, "Kontinuitaet und Dissonanzen der deutschen Politik nach dem Abbruch der Verhandlungen ueber den Beitritt Grossbritanniens zur Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft," *Europaarchiv*, 1965, pp. 119-125.

³⁹Alfred Grosser, "France and Germany in the Atlantic Community," in *The Atlantic Community-Progress and Prospects* (ed. F. O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr.) 1963, pp. 32-55.

⁴⁰Freund, op. cit. (footnote 35) and Allemann, op. cit. (footnote 34). Cf. also Drew Middleton, *The Supreme Choice-Britain and Europe*, 1963, and U. W. Kitzinger, *The Politics and Economics of European Integration-Britain, Europe, and the United States*, rev. ed. 1963, especially Ch. V.

gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit einordnen; er wird
hierbei in die Beschraenkungen der Hoheitsrechte einwilligen,
die eine friedliche und dauerhafte Ordnung in Europa und
zu den Voelkern der Welt herbeifuehren und sichern.

⁵³This is particularly true of men like the chief
editorial writer of Die Welt, Hans Zehrer, and of Die
Zeit, Graefin Marion Doenhoff.

⁵⁴Cf. Andre Fontaine, "De Gaulle: Frankreich soll Frankreich bleiben," *Aussenpolitik*, XIV, 1963, pp. 739ff.; Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," International Organization, XVIII, 1964, pp. 1-28; Michael P. Haegele, "Deutschland-Frankreich im Jahre 1963," *Aussenpolitik*, XIV, 1963, pp. 151ff.

⁵⁵Typical for the more radical "federalist"
opposition is the journal *Der Foederalist*, edited by
Dr. Schoendube since 1951; its basic approach is closely
related to that of the Italian UEF, as set forth in the
writings of Altiero Spinelli, especially

⁵⁶See above Birkelbach as cited in footnote 14.

⁵⁷Haas, op. cit. (footnote 50) pp. 19ff.
Friedrich in *Federalism, Mature and Emergent* (ed.
MacMahon) 1955, Ch. 26. Recent federal theory has been
increasingly inclined to transcend this dichotomy by
adding a dynamic dimension and treating it in terms of
a "federalizing process." On this, cf. Friedrich,

⁵⁸Carl A. Ehrhardt, "Staerkung oder Rueckschritt
fuer Europavertraege?" in *Aussenpolitik*, XV, 1964, pp.
231-242.

⁵⁹Cf. C. J. Friedrich and R. H. Guttmann, "The
Executive" in *Studies in Federalism*, 1954, Ch. 2 (also
in French, etc.)

⁶⁰Daniel Villey, "Erziehung zum Europaeischen
Denken" in *Europa-Besinnung und Hoffnung* (ed. Hunold)
1957. (Other references to follow.)