II - 2

A wrong strategic doctrine can lead to disaster. An excessively rigid strategic doctrine can absorb great energy in the attempt to reconcile what happens with what is expected. If it is too complicated, it can break down under the stress of decision-making. The Schlieffen Plan Germany's military design for World War I, provided for every contingency except the psychological strain on the commander. It failed largely because the German leaders lost their nerve. In the face of Russian advances into Eastern Germany -- foreseen by the Schlieffen Plan -- they rushed reinforcements from the West weakening their offensive power at the crucial moment. It adds to the irony of the situation that these reinforcements were in transit when the decisive battles in both the East and the West were being fought.

But if there is no doctrine at all and a society operates pragmatically, solving problems "on their merits" as the saying goes, every event becomes a special case. More energy is spent deciding where one is than where one is going. Each event is compartmentalized and dealt with by experts in the special difficulties it involves without an adequate understanding of its relation to other occurrences. This is the risk United States policy has been running since it undertook the stewardship of the Free World.

To be effective, a strategy must fulfill several requirements. It must be able to win a domestic consensus, both among the technical and the political leadership. It must be understood by the opponents to the extent needed for effective deterrence. It must receive allied endorsement if

CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC DEBATE

## Background: The Change in United States Strategic Doctrine.

Structural problems inevitably emerge as policy issues. Debates, which really concern political evolution, can easily appear as a strategic challenge to strategic doctrine.

So it has been with the debate about strategy within the Atlantic Alliance. To be sure, disagreements about strategy have been real enough. But their urgency is due to the fact that something deeper than the analysis of weapons systems is involved. Disputes have grown particularly intractable because the United States and its European critics have rarely talked about the same thing.

The United States has stressed the technical adequacy of its strategic views and the analytic accuracy of its strategic assessments. Our European critics have emphasized the political and psychological framework within which these decisions had to be implemented. The United States has reiterated its legal and moral commitment to the defense of Europe. Our European allies have less confidence in even the most solemn undertakings, too many of them have betrayed allies of their own not to be concerned that the stress of events might

[Y]

II - 6

Effects of strategic nuclear war to make itself felt. Tactical nuclear weapons would be an integral part of whatever local defense might be attempted.

As a result, large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe under the so-called double-veto system, which required the consent of both the United States and the host country for a nuclear weapon to be used. Moreover, the definition of "tactical" was such that SACEUR (The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) was to be able to destroy all Soviet weapons capable of attacking Europe. The nuclear arsenal in Europe thus included weapons of a range and destructiveness indistinguishable from some of those in the arsenal of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). They could be called "tactical" only in the sense that they were stationed in Europe and not in the United States and that they were commanded by SACEUR and not by the commanding general of SAC.

According to this strategic concept, conventional weapons played a minor role. Their function was to deal with minor incursions or to determine that a full-scale Soviet attack was taking place. Though there was some talk of a "pause" before nuclear weapons might be used, the logistic system of NATO made clearer than any public declarations where the real emphasis of

[4]

II - 8

These policies were drastically and suddenly changed with the advent
of a new United States Administration in 1961. Starting early in 1961 and
continuing with increasing insistence, the Kennedy Administration developed
a four-pronged strategic theory which has remained essentially unchanged under
President Johnson.

a. Flexible Response: When it took office, the Kennedy Administration found itself confronted with a strategy for general war which emphasized a single all-out response. The goal of general nuclear war, if it was forced upon us, was to destroy the opposing society essentially in one blow.

The Kennedy Administration sought to replace this conception with a
more differentiated approach. It attempted to develop the maximum number of
options even for the contingency of general nuclear war--a strategy summed up
in the phrase "flexible response." This strategy was summed up as follows by
Secretary McNamara in 1962:

...our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retali ate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack. In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give

II - 9

an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World.¹

Administration statements about the purpose of this capability for a flexible response have fluctuated and have not always been consistent. When criticizing the nuclear forces of Britain and France, Secretary McNamara has argued that the United States proposed to rely on a counterforce strategy confining its attacks to military targets:

> The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.²

Throughout 1962 Secretary McNamara insisted that the United States would be able to destroy the entire Soviet military target system even after

1. Robert S. McNamara, Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962. Quoted in

2. Robert S. McNamara, Address at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 16, 1962.
See also statement on RS-70, *The New York Times*, March 16, 1962.

II - 12

[Y]

are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U.S. is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

1 6

President Kennedy described the French nuclear program as "inimical" to NATO. Secretary McNamara called European nuclear forces "dangerous," "expensive," "prone to obsolescence" and "lacking in credibility." Under Secretary Ball has criticized these nuclear forces because "the road towards nuclear proliferation has no logical ending."

2 7

At first, these attacks were directed against the French nuclear program alone. However, they logically apply also to the British strategic forces which have been in existence for over a decade. Robert Bowie, one of the most eloquent defenders of official nuclear policy, has made this

90

1

Robert S. McNamara, University of Michigan, June 16, 1962, op.cit.

2

George Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1964, p. 211.

Red关键词

Suggested rearrangement of Pages II-14 and II-15

On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons do not really fit the Administration's strategic concept.

Tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of front line units are extremely difficult to subject to the highly centralized central command and control envisaged by the new doctrine. If used for local defense they would be likely to pass rapidly beyond the control of governments or high level commanders. Repeated Administration statements have stressed the danger of such escalation. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric put it, "I, for one, have never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nuclear bang." And in the spring of 1961, Secretary McNamara said that in his concept, limited war in effect excluded the use of *any* nuclear weapons. "I think by 'limited war' we simply mean war that is carried on for the most part with non-nuclear weapons...." Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense said on February 10, 1963: [insert quote] Secretary McNamara pursued a similar theme when he spoke without much confidence of the prospect for tactical nuclear war: [insert quote]

In sum, if any use of nuclear weapons was likely to lead an uncontrolled general nuclear exchange, it followed that the Administration's strictures against independent nuclear forces applied also to tactical nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe, even if intended solely for use in local defense. Other Administration statements made clear that the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe were not needed to deter or to fight a general nuclear war, in part because they are too vulnerable to serve as reliable second-strike weapons.

II - 20

[Y]

The opposite is likely to be more nearly correct. As long as NATO strategy was nuclear and the United States had no obvious alternative to nuclear retaliation, the Europeans were ready to acquiesce in the hegemonic position of the United States. They reasoned that this was the price to be paid for the automatism of the American response. However, one of the essential characteristics of the doctrine of flexible response was that American nuclear reaction would occur--if at all--deliberately and in stages.

The very qualities that made the new doctrine desirable for Americans were bound for Europeans to raise issues of sovereignty and questions of how the American commitment would be interpreted under the stress of nuclear war.

This, in turn, brought to a head a difference in perspective between the American and the European conception of NATO which had existed since its beginning. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was that the advent of a new, highly analytical American Administration coincided with the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe and the deliberate policy of President de Gaulle to assert a more independent role.

The basic psychological problem was that throughout the existence of NATO, the military establishment on the Continent was seen in symbolic terms

II - 22

[Y]

With so many American troops permanently stationed in Europe, it was
only sensible to try to give them some meaningful military mission. Even
*in the period of the doctrine of massive retaliation*, NATO forces were
larger than the prevailing strategic concept seemed to demand. Indeed, the
number was somewhat inconsistent with it. Despite the United States commit-
ment to a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation, we constantly pressed for
a European contribution of ground forces. The Europeans, though they agreed
to a succession of NATO force goals, never really believed in the doctrines
used to rationalize them. Rather they considered their military contribution
*our allies*
a form of fee paid for United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed
to our requests. But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions
*only*
would be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military establish-
ment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative to nuclear
retaliation. They were opposed to giving the conventional forces a central
military mission; but they also resisted any hint of American withdrawal.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in United
States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to strengthen

[Y]

II - 23

conventional forces had the paradoxical consequence of bringing to the fore
the issue of nuclear control which for many Europeans had always been the
crux of the matter. For the first time, U.S. strategic views were publicly
challenged, at first hesitantly, then ever more explicitly. Europe had now
gained sufficient self-confidence so that the mere enunciation of an
American policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The pre-emptory way in
which the United States proceeded added ruffled feelings to substantive concerns.
And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings
their most extreme formulation.

But if French policy has deliberately sharpened conflicts, the United
States tendency to turn an essentially psychological issue into a technical
one has unintentionally exacerbated disagreements beyond their intrinsic
significance. United States spokesmen often leave the impression that dis-
agreement is due to the ignorance of our allies and that it is destined to
yield ultimately before extensive briefings and insistent reiteration.

But the real issue is not that the Europeans fail to understand the
- though they do have trouble with some of its subtle applications. However,
notion of flexible response. They simply reject it for themselves. (When
its applicability for themselves,

[Y]

II - 24

the issue is Asia or Latin America, Europeans favor an even more flexible
"options"
response than the United States. With respect to the defense of Europe,
their attitude is more rigid. Europeans are likely to agree with the premise
about Soviet intentions which was offered by Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze
(then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs):

Communists demonstrate both a proclivity for bold political actions against a background of impressive military force and also careful calculation of risks and a staunch desire to keep events under their own control. Because they can be expected sensibly to avoid high risks of nuclear war or events leading to it, their military actions against the West at any one moment are likely to be controlled in size and aimed at limited objectives. Emphasis added. In such circumstances, NATO will surely wish to have the choice of avoiding immediate use of nuclear weapons; it would be neither wise nor credible for us to build our doctrine and our forces on the premise that every pinprick must be met by nuclear war.¹

The problem is that most Europeans refuse to consider an attack on Europe as
confined to limited objectives. If Secretary Nitze is correct in his view that
the Soviets recoil before a high risk of nuclear war, then a limited attack
in Europe is likely only if the American nuclear guarantee has lost some of
its credibility. The European reaction to this state of affairs is more likely

1

Paul H. Nitze, Address before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2, 1963, Department of State Bulletin.

[Y]

II - 25

to be to provide themselves with nuclear forces of their own than to build
up conventional strength as the United States Lesung.
build-up of

The American response has been to argue that a build-up of conventional
forces, far from weakening the resolve to use nuclear weapons, in fact demon-
strates by the Europeans - indeed, a specialization by the Europeans in conventional weapons -
an increased readiness to resort to nuclear weapons. Said Secretary
McNamara: I should first have to be told what the problem was.

If we have shown ourselves able and ready to engage in
large-scale non-nuclear warfare in response to a Communist
provocation, the Soviets can hardly misconstrue two
things: first, that we regard this provocation as a chal-
lenge to our vital interests; and second, that we will
use nuclear weapons to prevail if this becomes necessary.¹

This estimate has left many Europeans unconvinced. There is no
question that increasing the reserve of conventional divisions in the United
States by three or four divisions does enhance the credibility of nuclear
threats for the defense of, say, South East Asia because it gives us the physical
means to commit our prestige. In Europe, however, where the United States is
already physically committed, a few additional divisions may appear as too

Robert A. McNamara, Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962.

[Y]

II - 27

Soviet means of retaliation at first at minimum, later at acceptable cost.

This superiority enabled us not only to prevent an attack on the United States but also to protect our allies by what amounted to a unilateral American guarantee. The Soviet Union did possess superior conventional strength. But it could not use its ground forces because such an action might have triggered the Strategic Air Command. It could not attack the United States at the same time as Europe--even after it became technically feasible--because, while this would have increased American losses, a Soviet defeat would nevertheless have been inevitable. Throughout its history, the security of NATO led thus depended essentially on the ability of the United States to destroy the Soviet retaliatory power--technically speaking, on the American capacity to conduct a counterforce strategy.

Any prudent planning for NATO in the 1960's was bound to start from
- in the sense of an ability to respond effectively to
the assumption that the utility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of
is Europe was bound to decline. Indeed, Secretary McNamara's statements in 1962
at the time they were made about the efficacy of a counterforce strategy, while technically correct, was
foreseeable in the years ahead.
misleading about the real state of affairs. It is possible to accept the

II - 28

statements of American defense leaders that the United States is superior in strategic striking power and intends to remain so. But the strategic and political significance of this superiority is certain to diminish. For the immediate future--as long as the Soviet missile force remains relatively small--a counterforce strategy may remain technically feasible. This situation should be treated, however, as a temporary respite permitting an adjustment to inevitable realities, not as an excuse for continuing to depend on traditional policies.

For one thing, if a counterforce strategy is to retain any chance of success, the location of the targets must be known in advance. This is particularly true of missiles, which cannot search for their objectives. However, Given the nature of Soviet society and the vastness of Soviet territory, our knowledge of Soviet launching sites is likely to be incomplete. Moreover, the more sophisticated missile systems, now in operation are dispersed, thus preventing one attacking missile from destroying more than one on the ground.

Also, many missiles are protected in hardened underground sites, thus requiring more than one attacking missile to destroy a defending one. Other missiles

[N]

II - 29

will be mobile or based at sea, creating the need for coordinating many dif-
ferent forms of attack. These factors will greatly magnify the force required
for a successful counterforce (strike).

The constantly growing complexity of staging a missile attack is bound
to reduce the political utility of a counterforce strategy--perhaps even faster
than is warranted by purely military considerations. In the face of risks which
are certain to mount dramatically, it will grow ever more difficult to con-
vince political leaders that they should rely on a strategy based on intel-
ligence which is fragmentary and using large numbers of weapons for which there
is no operational experience in wartime. Even if the percentage of the opposing
strategic force(s) which we are able to destroy, remains constant throughout
the 1960's--an unwarrantedly optimistic assumption--the absolute number which
is left will rise. Thus, the Soviet capability to devastate NATO countries
in a counterblow will inevitably increase.

To pretend that these factors will not reduce any President's readiness
to initiate general war would be sheer irresponsibility on our part and a
convenient delusion for some of our allies. Even our best efforts will not

II - 36

intentions: the pronouncements of our highest defense officials or the disposition of our forces?

Assuming, however, that it is possible to make a clear determination of that NATO's conventional forces are being overwhelmed, this only *shifts* the concern back to the issue of nuclear control. If nuclear weapons were to be used only when NATO forces were at the point of being defeated, what was the sense in the nuclear establishment in Europe? If we assume that both sides have tactical nuclear weapons in adequate numbers and sizes, it is far from clear that the employment of these weapons would favor the defense at that stage of a battle. *After* a breakthrough has been achieved, battlefield employment of nuclear weapons may well favor the offense, whose units can by then be dispersed while the defense has to move its units into predictable areas. In short, if nuclear weapons are to be used tactically at all, it is likely that the optimum, perhaps the only appropriate, moment is early in military operations, or at least while the ground forces are reasonably intact and Soviet reserve forces have not yet appeared on the battlefield. If nuclear weapons are not to be used tactically, what is the sense of increasing

II - 38

[Y]

often been won when forces were roughly equal. (Germany, after all, achieved
its victories in World Wars I and II with numerically inferior forces.)

The stress on conventional defense also emphasized crucial political factors. European history is replete with examples of the brittleness of alliances. In too many wars—including World War II—the collapse of one national contingent led to the defeat of all others. Europeans cannot forget that an alliance can be no stronger than its weakest link. Whatever effort individual countries may make in the conventional field, they will—if they are serious about national defense—consider the consequences of the collapse of one or more of their allies. This will turn their thoughts to obtaining reinsurance, and, among the available means, some form of nuclear autonomy is likely to suggest themselves.

These questions were all the more acute because
This will be magnified by the fact that the choice between nuclear
and conventional war is no longer entirely up to the West. Whatever its
preference, NATO has to prepare for the introduction of nuclear weapons by

1

For a splendid analysis of this problem of the conventional defense of Europe see Bernard Brodie, *The Price of Conventional Capabilities in Europe* The Report - MAY 23, 1963. pp. 25-34.

II - 40

involved," Europeans prefer to force us to make our response as automatic as
possible.

This problem has little to do with whether the United States could
afford to give up Europe. It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and made
more acute by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bowie, one of
the most eloquent spokesmen of the dominant school of U.S. thought, criticized
British nuclear policy before the Assembly of the Western European Union as
follows: "Britain has retained its national command structure and the right
to withdraw them at its option. This means that they certainly could not be
counted on by any of the others to be available in case of need." (Emphasis
added.) If this concern is real regarding British nuclear forces, which are,
after all, assigned to NATO, it must be even stronger regarding U.S. strategic
forces which remain under exclusive American control.

At the same time, the rigid adherence to past doctrine on the part of
some European critics and the deliberate tendency of others--especially the

1
Proceedings of Western European Union Assembly, Ninth Ordinary Session,
December 3, 1963.

[Y]

II - 41

put to most possible construction from our actions, French--to score debating points has not helped matters. The growing strength of Soviet retaliatory power was bound to affect a strategic doctrine based on the concept of Western nuclear hegemony. Whatever the validity of American strategic views, the tendency to treat established NATO doctrine as sacroscant is dangerous. European ambivalence is reflected in the demands for increased responsibility which are not coupled with an equivalent readiness to assume commensurate burdens. United States proposals for a strengthening of conventional forces have been treated with the same panic as later hints that some American troops might be withdrawn. Most Europeans do not want to give conventional force a larger role because they fear it will diminish the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. But they also have resisted a reduction of United States forces because to many Europeans these represent the surest guarantee of American nuclear protection. It is just as difficult for Europeans to face the fact that, in the long run, these attitudes are incompatible as it has been for Americans to admit that increased emphasis on local defense is incompatible either with United States hegemony on nuclear matters or with undiluted American sovereignty.

II - 42

The problem can then be summed up as follows: Exclusive U.S. control
of nuclear strategy is politically and psychologically incompatible with a
strategy of multiple choices or flexible response. The European refusal to
assign a meaningful military mission to conventional forces in Europe is
incompatible with the indefinite retention of large U.S. forces there. If the
United States prizes a conventional response sufficiently, it will have to
concede Europe autonomy in nuclear control. Or else it will have to move to
an effective sharing of sovereignty. If the Europeans want to insist on an
automatic nuclear response, a reconsideration of our conventional deployment
on the Continent will become inevitable. Refusal to face these facts will
guarantee a perpetuation of present disputes and increasing disarray within
NATO.

II - 44

Starting in 1961 United States policy, which had been tolerant of the nuclear programs of its allies, grew increasingly hostile. The French nuclear program was described as irrelevant and harmful to the Alliance. The same criticisms, if more muted, were applied to the British nuclear program.

The tension inherent in an attack on major defense programs of two close allies exacerbated the debate about other aspects of NATO strategic doctrine --particularly the role of conventional weapons.

United States opposition to the British and French nuclear programs took the form of the following major arguments: There was no strategic need for national nuclear forces other than those of the United States within NATO, since all significant targets were already covered by United States strategic forces. National nuclear forces were divisive because only distrust of United States intentions could induce a country to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own. They were wasteful and would divert resources from the conventional build-up which should be the primary NATO effort. They would promote nuclear proliferation. Just as France imitated the example of Britain, the argument ran, so Germany would follow the lead of France. Italy and other

II - 45

European countries would then not be far behind. Finally, it was argued that national nuclear forces would make impossible the flexible response which was the key to United States strategy, for general war. National nuclear forces were too small and too vulnerable to concentrate on military targets. But if they struck population centers, the enemy in rage and frustration would retaliate against the civilian population of the United States.

Regardless of the merits of these arguments, they made a bitter, divisive debate inevitable. A full-scale theoretical onslaught on major programs of close allies impelled their governments to elaborate a doctrine to justify them, and this was bound to stress differences in perspective with the United States. The impact of United States views thus went far beyond the technical arguments in which they were couched. To ask a government to confess the bankruptcy of a policy which has been pursued for over a decade at heavy expense is to undermine its domestic position and to produce reactions of hostility. We might ask ourselves how we would react if an allied government publicly and repeatedly insisted that a major U.S. program be "divisive," "dangerous" and "useless."

II - 47

continental extent like the United States. In densely populated Europe, the distinction between military and civilian targets grows more ephemeral. While not objecting to such a strategy as one possible option, our European nuclear allies see no compelling reasons to subordinate all considerations to what may well be a very remote contingency.

This is all the more true because United States pronouncements are postulating a scenario for general nuclear war that hardly appears as the most probable danger. In his presentation to the Armed Services Committee in 1963, as well as in 1964, Secretary McNamara described only one contingency for general nuclear war: a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and (perhaps) Europe concentrating on military targets. The United States would then respond in kind.

But it is not clear what could possibly tempt even a rash Soviet planner into such a course or why the Soviets would pursue a counterforce-miracle strategy if they did. As long as the present disparity in numbers between Soviet and American strategic forces remains, there is no conceivable gain for the Soviets in launching a blow against the United States strategic

[N]

II - 48

forces. Even if every Soviet missile destroyed an American one, the Soviets
would have disarmed themselves while attacking and find themselves con-
fronted with a large residual American force, presumably underestimated
by any Soviet threat.

If it is argued, however, that the United States would resort to a
an as yet non-nuclear
counterforce strategy first in response to a major provocation, such as a
full-scale conventional attack on Europe, then it is far from evident that
the Soviets would have the incentive to spare United States cities on which

1
American doctrine seems to count. For the strategy outlined by Secretary
McNamara cannot be an optimum strategy for both sides. Soviet military

1. In fact, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committees in January 1964, Secretary McNamara has usually associated the defense of Europe with **tactical**, not **strategic**, nuclear weapons should the conventional forces prove inadequate. Thus, in his report to the Armed Services Committees in January 1964, Secretary McNamara said:

"A large-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe . . . would be extremely dangerous to our own security and would compel us to respond immediately with whatever force was needed to halt the onslaught, even with **tactical** nuclear weapons, if necessary."

And a little further on, when discussing General Purpose Forces,
Secretary McNamara said:

"(1) The forces envisioned in NATO plans for the end of 1966 . . . could hold an initial Soviet attack on the central front using non-nuclear means alone. (2) Until these requirements are met, the defense of Europe against an all-out Soviet attack, even if such an attack were limited to non-nuclear means, would require the use of **tactical** weapons on our part."

II - 49

theorists have consistently denied the possibility of the kind of war described by Pentagon officials. This would not be decisive if it not in accord with the realities of the strategic equation. For a war of attrition, even if it were technically feasible, cannot be in the interest of the weaker side. As the United States reduced the Soviet retaliatory force, the sensible strategy for the Soviets would be to begin attacking American cities, perhaps "controlling" their response by destroying some smaller towns first. To be sure, we could retaliate in kind. But whatever the significance of the notion of superiority in a war confined to military targets, there can be little doubt that a saturation point is reached relatively rapidly when civilian populations become the objective.

This is why the allies of the United States have been so unenthusiastic about the argument that national nuclear forces are dangerous because they are unsuitable for discriminating targeting. As has been frequently pointed out by Pentagon spokesmen, the Soviet delivery vehicles aimed at Europe far exceed in number those deployed against the United States. It has also been emphasized that even a "controlled" nuclear war would produce far greater

IV - 6

that a separate NATO force would only complicate the unitary strategy which was the preferred solution. The preferred and hoped for solution was the designation of the President as the executive agent of the Alliance for nuclear weapons. In order to meet these concerns, in 1961-62, in pursuit of these objectives, the Kennedy Administration offered a number of schemes which sought to combine assurances about the availability of American weapons with undiluted American control. From the point of view of central control over the conduct of military operations these proposals had great technical merit. However, the basic issue raised by the American insistence on unitary control of strategy was not technical but political: a centralized military strategy was possible only if the United States was prepared to yield at least some of the sovereignty that it was asking its allies to give up. Technically, we could not reserve to ourselves a monopoly over the physical possession of nuclear weapons as well as the sole discretion about the decision to go to nuclear war and the method of conducting it.

The issue of nuclear control emphasized that NATO required a mechanism for managing political crises in addition to a military staff for planning a war.

17

18

1970

[Y]

Failure to meet this issue head-on led to a highly theoretical, almost like scholastic, dispute over such legal formulae as "earmarking" and "assignment" weapons to NATO. Since that was illegal and went against NATO guidelines which exacerbated the concerns which had given rise to the issue of nuclear control in the first place. Thus in May, 1961, President Kennedy formally offered to "commit to NATO ... five--and subsequently still more-- Polaris submarines ... subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use." This pledge was declared fulfilled by Secretary McNamara at the Athens ministerial meeting when he announced that five Polaris submarines had already been "committed" to NATO with more to come. In his report to the House Armed Services Committee of January, 1963, Secretary McNamara announced that the United States had "earmarked a fully operational "Polaris force to the NATO command."

These measures did little to alleviate the situation; in some ways, more than paper work involved, they made the disputes, if anything, more acute. For what precisely was the significance of the

1. John F. Kennedy, Address to the Canadian Parliament, _DOSB_, Vol. XLIV, 1145 (June 5, 1961), p. 841.

2. _New York Times_, March 6, 1962.

3. Hearings on Military Posture, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 298.

IV - 8

assignment of submarines? Did it mean that there was a stronger obligation to use submarines "assigned" to NATO than SAC in the defense of Europe?

What was one to make of the phrase in the communique after the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens in May 1962 to the effect that the United States and Great Britain had given "firm assurances that their strategic forces will continue to provide defense against threats to the Alliance beyond the capability of NATO committed forces to deal with."

1 Did this imply that there were two "thresholds" in NATO strategy: one between conventional and nuclear war and another between the strategic forces assigned to NATO and the rest of SAC? If so, this would mean either that the counterforce strategy on which the Administration had staked so much would have to be abandoned or that the strategic forces under the control of SACEUR would have to be vastly increased--at least to match the Soviet MRBM's stationed in Eastern Europe. In practice these questions were moot because assignment is largely symbolic. NATO headquarters--as has been noted--

1 Text of communique, *New York Times*, May 7, 1962.

[Y]

II - 51

The strategic debate between Europe and the United States on nuclear matters has thus had some of the attributes of what the French call "a dialogue to the end of time" and one-sided arguments of its own. The issue of the deaf. "Misunderstanding has been persistent because the two sides have spoken of different things. Frustration has mounted because within its real problems and conflicts even if some of the advocates of framework both partners have been right. The United States has by far the limited points of view are magnified. better of the technical arguments. Efficiency is indeed promoted by a division within anelle conducted as a unit. of labor. On strictly strategic grounds, the United States doctrine is probably more nearly correct than the alternative of its European critics. What the United States has overlooked is that NATO is not a single political unit, nor is it likely to be one in any foreseeable future.

The blind spot of the United States has been its unwillingness to face the political implications of its strategic views: an Atlantic area strategyally integrated, as we propose, requires a merging of sovereignty far larger measure of its own freedom of action than anything possible so far beyond anything proposed so far. It is impossible for the United States to be so far from her own possible future demand that its allies give up what has, heretofore, been considered a chief attribute of sovereignty--the possibility of an autonomous defense--while the United States jealously guards its complete freedom of decision. The

IV - 12

the years 1961-62 proved largely irrelevant. And the refusal--largely on theoretical grounds--to make a distinction between tactical and strategic weapons caused most United States proposals to deal with the SACEUR forces suitable for deep penetration while little effort was made to develop a mission for the large and growing arsenal of shorter-range "battlefield" weapons; this laid the ground-work for further controversy.

Thus even before de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, a stalemate in the debate about strategy had occurred. Europeans had been reluctant to respond to American pressures for an increase in conventional forces. The United States proposals for sharing nuclear control had not met the real concerns of those Europeans asking either for a greater share in nuclear decisions or for greater autonomy with respect to them.

In order to escape this impasse, the United States--starting early in 1963--began ever more urgently to press a scheme for a NATO nuclear force, the so-called Multilateral Force (MLF).

II - 53

ready to differ with our views perhaps on a global scale. A Europe which continues in the state of dependence of the Fifties may develop another form of Third Force policy: based on the resentments of the impotent and the manipulations of the irresponsible. The challenge to Atlantic policy then is whether a responsible mode of cooperation, consistent with the self-respect of all partners, can be devised. This is not primarily a problem of strategy; it is, above all, a challenge to the political conceptions of the West.