Classical Diplomacy: The Congress of Vienna

Henry A. Kissinger

[headnote]

Any international settlement represents a stage in a process by which a nation reconciles its vision of itself with the vision of it by other powers. Could a power achieve all that it wishes, it would strive for absolute security. But absolute security for one power means absolute insecurity for all others; hence it has never a part of "legitimate" settlement, and can be achieved only through conquest. For this reason, an international settlement that is accepted and not imposed--as with the pact fashioned by the Congress of Vienna--will always appear somewhat unjust to any one of its participants. Paradoxically, diplomacy has for one of its objects the distribution of dissatisfaction evenly and thereby the creation of a stable equilibrium. Were any country totally satisfied the others would in all likelihood be totally dissatisfied and a revolutionary situation would develop. The foundation of international security is the relativistic security--and therefore the relative insecurity--of all members of the international system. This case study tells how one particularly durable balance was attained through skillful diplomacy nearly 150 years ago.

attained through skillful diplomacy nearly 120 years ago.

system. This case study tells how one partially durable balance was

-- and therefore the *relative insecurity*-- of all members of the international
develop. The foundation of international security is the *relative security*
in all likelihood be totally dissatisfied and a revolutionary situation would

opjects the distribution of dissatisfaction evenly and thereby the creation
to any one of its participants. Paradoxically, diplomacy has for one of its
fashioned by the Congress of Vienna--will always appear somewhat unmet

national settlement that is accepted and not imposed--as with the pact
ment, and can be achieved only through conduct. For this reason, an inter-

insecurity for all others; hence it has never a part of "legitimate" settle-

Headnote

Henry V. Kleingger

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It was clear that British independence was advanced primarily as a

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If the international order could be constructed with the clarity
of a mathematical axiom, powers would consider themselves as factors in a
balance and arrange their adjustments to achieve a perfect equilibrium
between the forces of aggression and the forces of resistance. But an
exact balance is impossible, and not only because of the difficulty of
predicting the aggressor. It is chimerical, above all, because while
powers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, the
appear domestically as expressions of & a historical existence. No
power will submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however
"secure," which seems totally to deny its vision of itself.

"secure," which seems totally to deny its avion of itself.

power will supply to a settlement, however well-balanced and however
aboard domestically as expressions of a historical existence. No
bowers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, the
predicting the aggressor. It is numerical, above all, because while
exact balance is impossible, and not only because of the difficulty of
between the forces of aggression and the forces of resistance. But an
balance and arrange their adjustments to achieve a perfect equilibrium
of a mathematical axiom, bowers would consider themselves as factors in a

It the international order could be constructed with the clarity

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CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Any international settlement represents a stage in a process by which a nation reconciles its vision of itself with the vision of it by other powers. To itself, a nation appears as an expression of justice, and the more spontaneous its pattern of social obligations, the more this is true. For government functions effectively only when most citizens obey voluntarily and they will obey only to the extent that they consider the demands of their rulers just. To others, it appears as a force or an expression of will. This is inevitable because foreign policy must be planned, at least in part, on the basis of the other side's capabilities and not merely of its intentions. Could a power achieve all its wishes, it would strive for absolute security, a world-order free from the consciousness of foreign danger and where all problems have the manageability of domestic issues. But since absolute security for one power means absolute insecurity for all others, it is never obtainable as a part of "legitimate" settlement, and can be achieved only through conquest.

For this reason an international settlement which is accepted and not imposed will always appear *somewhat* unjust to any one of its components. Paradoxically, the generality of this dissatisfaction is condition of stability, because were any one power *totally* satisfied, all others would have to be *totally* dissatisfied and a revolutionary situation would ensue. The foundation of a stable order is the *relative* security--and therefore the *relative* insecurity--of its members. Its stability & reflects, not the absence of unsatisfied claims, but the absence of a grievance of such

absence of unassisted claims, put the absence of a Grievance of such
the relative insecurity--of its members. Its stability & reflects, not the
The foundation of a stable order is the relative security--and therefore
pave to be totally disassembled and a revolutionary situation would arise.
stability, because were any one power totally disassembled, all others would
paradoxically, the generality of this disasquisition is condition of
not induced will always appear somewhat unrelated to any one of its components.
for this reason an international settlement which is accepted and
through conduct.

as a part of "legitimate" settlement, and can be achieved only
means absolute insecurity for all others, it is never obtainable
of domestic issues. But since absolute security for one power
of foreign danger and where all problems have the manageability
for absolute security, a world-order tree from the consciousness
tions. Could a power achieve all its wishes, it would arrive
past of the other side's capabilities and not merely of its in-
because foreign policy must be planned, at least in part, on the
aboard as a force or an expression of will. This is inevitable
that they consider the demands of their nature just. To others, it
most citizens open voluntarily and they will open only to the extent
the more this is true. For government functions effectively only when
of justice, and the more spontaneous its pattern of social obligations,
it by other powers. To itself, a nation abides as an expression
of which a nation reconciles its vision of itself with the vision of
the international settlement represents a stage in a process

CONGRESS OF AMERICA

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magnitude that redress will be sought in overturning the settlement
rather than through an adjustment within its framework. An order
whose structure is accepted by all major powers is "legitimate".
An order containing a power which considers its structure oppressive
is "revolutionary". The security of a domestic order resides in the
preponderant power of authority, that of an international order in
the balance of forces and in its expression, the equilibrium.

But if an international order expresses the need for security
and an equilibrium, it is constructed in the name of a legitimizing
principle. Because a settlement transforms force into acceptance,
it must attempt to translate the requirements of security into claims and
individual demands into general advantage. It is the legitimizing
principle which establishes the relative "justice" of competing claims
and the mode of their adjustment. This is not to say that there need
be an exact correspondence between the maxims of legitimacy and the
conditions of the settlement. No major power will give up its minimum
claim to security--the possibility of conducting an independent foreign
policy--merely for the sake of legitimacy. But the legitimizing principle
defines the marginal case. In 1919, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dis-
integrated not so much from the impact of the war as from the nature of
the peace, because its continued existence was incompatible with national
self-determination, the legitimizing principle of the new international
order. It would have occurred to no one in the eighteenth century that
the legitimacy of a state depended on linguistic unity. It was incan-
ceivable to the makers of the Versailles settlement that there might be
any other basis for legitimate rule. Legitimizing principles triumph
by being taken for granted.

by being taken for granted.
any other parte for legitimate rule. Legitimating principle triumph
 capable to the makers of the Versailles settlement that there might be
 the legitimacy of a state depended on linguistic unity. It was incan-
 order. It would have occurred to no one in the eighteenth century that
 self-determination, the legitimizing principle of the new international
 the peace, because its continued existence was incompatible with national
 integrated not so much from the impact of the war as from the nature of
 defines the marginal case. In 1919, the Austro-Hungarian Empire qit-
 boltich--merely for the sake of legitimacy. But the legitimizing principle
 claim to security--the possibility of conducting an independent foreign
 conditions of the settlement. No major power will give up its minimum
 be an exact correspondence between the maxime of legitimacy and the
 and the mode of their adjustment. This is not to say that there need
 principle which eternally departs from the relative "justice" of competing claims
 individual demands into general advantage. It is the legitimizing
 it must attempt to translate the requirements of security into claims and
 principle. Because a settlement transforms force into acceptance,
 and an equilibrium, it is constructed in the name of a legitimizing
 But it is an international order expresses the need for security
 the balance of forces and in its expression, the equilibrium.

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Although there never occurs an exact correspondence between
the maxims of the legitimizing principle and the conditions of the
settlement, stability depends on a certain commensurability. If there
exists a substantial discrepancy and a major power which feels dis-
advantaged, the international order will be volatile. For the
appeal by a "dissatisfied" power to the legitimizing principle of
the settlement creates a psychological distortion. The "natural"
expression of the policy of a status quo power is law--the definition
of a continuing relationship. But against a permanently dissatisfied
power appealing to the legitimizing principle of the international
order, force is the only recourse. Those who have most to gain from
stability thus become the exponents of a revolutionary policy. Hitler's
appeal to national self-determination in the Sudeten crisis in 1938
was, in terms, then considered legitimate, an invocation of "justice".
This contributed to the indecisiveness of the resistance. It induced
the Western powers to attempt to construct a "truly" legitimate order
by satisfying Germany's "just" claims. Only after Hitler annexed
Bohemia and Moravia was it clear that he was aiming for dominion, not
legitimacy; only then did the contest become one of pure power.

The major problem of an international settlement, then, is so to relate the claims of legitimacy to the requirements of security that no power will express its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary policy, and so to arrange the balance of forces as to deter aggression produced by causes other than the conditions of the settlement. This is not a mechanical problem. If the international order could be constructed

mechanical problem. If the international order could be constructed
by causes other than the conditions of the settlement. This is not a
and so to arrange the balance of forces as to deter aggression produced
no power will express its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary boîlch,
so to relate the claims of legitimacy to the requirements of security that
The major problem of an international settlement, then, is to fix
legitimacy; only then did the context become one of bare power.

Bohemus and Moravia was it clear that he was aiming for dominion, not
by satisfying Germany's "just" claims. Only after Hitler annexed
the Western powers to attempt to construct a "truly" legitimate order
This contributed to the inadequacy of the resistance. It induced
was, in terms, then considered legitimate, an invocation of "justice".
aboard to national self-determination in the Second World War in 1938
stability time become the exponent of a revolutionary boîlch. Hitler's a
order, force is the only recourse. Those who have much most to gain from
power abetting to the illegitimate principle of the international
of a continuing relationship. But against a permanently dissatisfied
expression of the policy of a state due power is law--the definition
the settlement creates a behavioral distortion. The "natural"
aboard by a "dissatisfied" power to the illegitimate principle of
advantaged, the international order will be volatile. For the
exists a substantial discrepancy and a major power which feels dis-
assetment, stability depends on a certain commensurability. If there
the maxime of the illegitimate principle and the conditions of the
Vithoughly there never occurs an exact correspondence between

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with the clarity of a mathematical axiom, powers would consider
themselves as factors in a balance and arrange their adjustments
to achieve a perfect equilibrium between the forces of aggression
and the forces of resistance. But an exact balance is impossible,
and not only because of the difficulty of predicting the aggressor.
It is chimerical, above all, because while powers may appear to
outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, they appear domestically
as expressions of a historical existence. No power will submit to
a settlement, however well-balanced and however "secure", which seems
totally to deny its vision of itself. No consideration of balance
could induce Britain to surrender the maritime rights or Austria its
German position, because their notion of "justice" was inseparable
from those claims. There exist two kinds of equilibrium then: a
general equilibrium which makes it risky for one power or group of
powers to attempt to impose their will on the remainder; and a partic-
cular equilibrium which defines the historical relation of certain
powers among each other. The former is the deterrent against a general
war; the latter the condition of smooth co-operation. An international
order is therefore rarely born out of the consciousness of harmony.
For even when there is an agreement about legitimacy, the conceptions
of the requirements of security will differ with the geographical
position and the history of the contending powers. Out of just such
a conflict over the nature of the equilibrium the Congress of Vienna
fashioned a settlement which lasted for almost exactly a century.

taughted a settlement which fasted for almost exactly a century, a conflict over the nature of the duiliprism the Congress of Vienna position and the history of the contending bowers. Out of that ency of the requirements of security will differ with the geographical for even when there is an agreement about legitimacy, the conceptions order is therefore rarely born out of the consciousness of harmony. war: the latter the condition of smooth co-operation. An international bowers among each other. The former is the deterrent against a General polar equilibrum which defines the historical relation of certain bowers to attempt to impose their will on the remainder; and aarti- General equilibrum which makes it risky for one bower or group of themselves to act. There exist two kinds of equilibrum then: a General-balance, because their notion of justice was inapplicable could be done Britain to surrender the maritime rights or Antruria its totally to deny its alone of itself. No consideration of pience a settlement, however well-balanced and however "secure", which seems as expressions of a historical existence. No bower will submit to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, they abate domestically It is chimerical, as prove all, because while bowers may be abet to and not only because of the difficulty of predicting the aggressor. and the forces of resistance. But an exact balance is impossible, to achieve a perfect equilibrum between the forces of aggression themselves as factors in a balance and arrange their adjustments with the clarity of a mathematical axiom, bowers would consider

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The statesmen at Vienna faced a problem characteristic of the end of a general war. The primary negotiating powers--Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria--had just recently been allies in a war to prevent the domination of Europe by France. They had been united to avert a common danger. But as this peril had receded their own more narrow interests came to the fore again. The problem at Vienna was how to relate the general interest of preventing aggression to the particular interests of each country. In this, Great Britain and Austria were generally conserving states; they wanted little for themselves except a period of tranquillity. Russia was expansionist hiding its aims behind the religious mysticism of its strange Tsar. The Tsar claimed the major part of Poland for himself including a part which had been Prussian before the Napoleonic wars. This forced Prussia to look for compensations elsewhere particularly in Saxony, thus threatening the equilibrium within Germany.

However, neither the claims of the acquisitive powers nor the resistance of the conserving states were of the same order. Russia's demand of Poland threatened the equilibrium of Europe; Prussia's insistence on Saxony merely imperilled the balance within Germany. When Castlereagh spoke of the equilibrium, he meant a Europe in which hegemony was impossible; but when Metternich invoked the equilibrium, he included a Germany in which Prussian predominance was impossible. Castlereagh was interested in creating a Central Europe which would be strong enough to resist attack from both the West and the East; Metternich desired the same thing, but he was also concerned about Austria's relative position within Central Europe. To Castlereagh the Continental nations were aspects of a defensive effort; but to the Continental nations the general

of a tentative effort; a put to the Continental nations the General
within Central Europe. To Caslereregh the Continental nations were abject
same thing, but he was also concerned about Austria's relative position
to reset attack from both the West and the East; Metternich desired the
was interested in creating a Central Europe which would be strong enough
a Germany in which Prussian predominance was impossihle. Caslereregh
was impossible; but when Metternich invoked the�illiprium, he included
Caslereregh spoke of the edulliprium, he meant a Europe in which hegemony
statement on Saxony merely imperilled the balance within Germany. When
demand of Poland threatened the edulliprium of Europe; Prussia's in-
resistance of the conserving states were of the same order. Russia's
However, neither the claims of the acquisitive powers nor the
the edulliprium within Germany,
for combinations elsewhere particularly in Saxony, time threatening
been Prussian before the Napoleonic wars. This forced Prussia to look
claimed the major part of Poland for himself including a part which had
its time behind the religious medicine of its strange Tarz. The Tarz
selves except a period of tranquillity. Russia was expansionist riding
Austria were generally conserving states; they wanted little for them-
particular interests of each country. In this, Great Britain and
how to relate the General interest of preventing aggression to the
narrow interests came to the fore again. The problem at Vienna was
avert a common danger. But as this barrier had received their own more
prevent the domination of Europe by France. They had been united to
Prussia, Russia and Austria--and just recently been allies in a war to
the end of a General war. The primary negotiating powers--Great Britain,
The statements at Vienna faced a problem characteristic of

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II

Rarely has a diplomatic conference been conducted by men of such strong personality. And their encounter became all the more poignant because in many ways the personality of each diplomat epotomized the aspirations and the problems of his country. Like the state whose foreign minister he was for forty years, Metternich was a product of an age in the mmxx process of being transcended. He was born in the eighteenth century of which Talleyrand was to say that nobody who lived after the French Revolution would ever know how sweet and gentle life could be. And the certitude of the time of his youth never left Metternich. Contemporaries might sneer at his invocation of the maxims of sound reason, at his facile philosophizing and polished epigrams. They did not understand that it was an accident of history which projected Metternich into a revolutionary struggle so foreign to his temperament. For like the century that formed him, his style was adapted better to the mm manipulation of factors treated as given than to a mm contest of will, better to achievement through proporiton than through scale. He was a Rococo figure, complex, finely carved, all surface, like an intricately cut prism. His face was delicate but without depth, his conversation brilliant but without ultimate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in the Cabinet, graceful and fumik facile, he was the beau-ideal of the eighteenth-century aristocracy which justified itself not by its truth but by its existence. And if he never came to terms with the new age it was not because he failed to understand its seriousness but because he disdained it. Therein too his fate was the fate of mm Austria.

he obtained it. Therein too his fate was the late English Anvil.
It was not because he failed to understand its seriousness but because
but by its existence. And it he never came to terms with the new age
eighteenth-century arbitrariness which justified itself not by its truth
the Cabinet, Graceful and Kanki tacile, he was the _beau-ideal_ of the
put without ultimate seriousness. Equally at home in the salon and in
briar. His face was delicate but without debility, his conversation brilliant
figure, complex, finely carved, all surfaces, like an intricately cut
achievement through proportion than through scale. He was a Socoo
factors treated as given than to a MM contest of will, better to
formed him, his style was adapted better to the MM manipulation of
struggle so foreign to his temperament. Not like the century that
an accident of history which projected Metternich into a revolutionary
occurring and bolled up epigram. They did not understand that it was
his invocation of the maximum of sound reason, at his facile bull-
of his youth never left Metternich. Contemporaries might see at
how sweet and gentle life could be. And the certitude of the time
that nobody who lived after the French Revolution would ever know
He was born in the eighteenth century of which Tallebrand was to say
was a product of an age in the human process of being transcended.
the state whose foreign minister he was for forty years, Metternich
ebbecised the abstractions and the problems of his country. Like
botswana because in many ways the betrothal of each diplomat
of such strong betrothal. And their encounter became all the more
Rarely has a diplomatic conference been conducted by men

II

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Napoleon said of him that he confused policy with intrigue, and Hardenberg, the envoy of Hanover at Vienna, wrote the following analysis of Metternich's diplomatic methods at the height of the crisis of 1812: "Endowed with a high opinion of the superiority of his ability...he loves finesse in politics and considers it very essential. Since he does not have sufficient energy to mobilize the resources of his country...he attempts to substitute cunning for strength and character....It would suit him best if a fortunate accident--the death of Napoleon or great successes of Russia--were to create a situation where he could let Austria play an important role."¹ Friedrich von Gentz, for long Metternich's closest associate, has left probably the best capsule description of Metternich's methods and personality: "Not a man of strong passions and of bold measures; not a genius but a great talent; cool, calm, imperturbable and calculator par excellence."²

¹Oncken, Wilhelm, *Oesterreich und Preussen im Befreiungskriege*, 2 Vols. (Berlin, 1880). Vol.II, p.88. This report, written to the Prince Regent of Great Britain (who was, of course, also Elector of Hanover and eager to align Austria against Napoleon), is perhaps as significant for the light it throws on the frustration which Metternich's careful machinations inspired in some of his contemporaries as for its comment on Metternich's methods.

²Srbik, Heinrich von, *Metternich der Staatsmann unde de Mensch*, 2 Vols. (Munich, 1925). Vol. I, p.144.

(Munich, 1932). Apl. I, b.144.

S�p, Heinrich von, *Mettlerich der Staatssammlung zu Nürnberg*, 3. Abl. *Munich, 1932*.

Instituted in some of the earlier contemporaries as for its comment on Metternich's
first attempt to clear the way for Metternich's eventual maculations
to his fellow-States against Napoleon), it became so significant for the
of Great Britain (who was, of course, also the father of Hanover and Prussia
(Berlin, 1880). Abl.II, b.38. This reprint, written to the Prince-Regent
Ocken, Milberg, Oesterreich und Breusen im Refertümskriptze, 3 Abl.,

cool, calm, indurated, and calculation of excellence."²

baseless and ofoid measures; not a су現 but a great talent;
ot Metternich's methods and herownity: "Not a man of strong
closest associate, but left dropply the past cab能力 description
an important role."¹

Erichrich von Genta, for long Metternich's
Russia--were to create an situation where he could let Austria bleed
fortunate accident--the death of Napoleon or great success of
comming for strength and character....It would suit him best if a
to mobilise the resources of his country...he attempts to appease
consider it as essential. Since he does not have sufficient energy
underlying his ability...he forces himself in politics and
right of the create of 1813: "Endowed with a high opinion of the
the following analyses of Metternich's diplomatic methods at the
intrigues, and Hardanger, theenvoy of Hanover at Vienna, wrote
the following: Napoleon said of him that he continued to work with

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Similarly, Castlereagh epitomized the Britain of his time. Born in Ireland of an old, if undistinguished, family, he had undergone the typical education of the British landed aristocracy at a time when contacts with the Continent were tenuous and foreign affairs confined to makeshift coalitions. ~~against the revolutionary~~ His career had been solid but unspectacular. His first public acts were connected with putting down the Irish Rebellion and abolishing the Irish Parliament, acts which helped to establish his reputation as an ogre to liberalism. He has served as Secretary of War under Pitt, and this association was to lay the foundation of his later policy. For the greater part of this period he was overshadowed by the more brilliant Canning. In 1809, after an unfortunate duel, both men had to retire from public office. Castlereagh returned in 1812, as Foreign Secretary and leader of the House of Commons, in the Cabinet of Lord Liverpool which was not expected to last more than a few months. So well established was Canning's "expertise" in foreign affairs that Castlereagh offered to relinquish to him the Foreign Office provided he could retain his position as leader of the House of Commons. But so dismal seemed the prospects of the Liverpool Cabinet that Canning refused, not to attain his goal for another decade. Castlereagh's place in history thus came about almost as an afterthought, as unobtrusively as his personality.

No man more different from his great protagonist, Metternich, could be imagined. Metternich was elegant, facile, rationalist;

No man more different from his great antagonist, Metternich,

apout almost as an afterthought, as unpropertly as his personal quality.
His goal for another decade. Castlereagh's place in history time came
broadcast of the Liverpool Cabinet that Canning refused, not to attain
position as leader of the House of Commons. But so did he seemed the
to relinquish to him the Foreign Office provided he could retain his
was Canning's "expertise" in foreign affairs that Castlereagh offered
not expected to last more than a few months. So well established
the House of Commons, in the Cabinet of Lord Liverpool which was
Castlereagh returned in 1813, as Foreign Secretary and leader of
unfortunate duel, both men had to retire from public office.

overawarded by the more brilliant Canning. In 1803, after an
of his later policy. For the greater part of this period he was
of War under Pitt, and this association was to lay the foundation
his reputation as an ogre tolipanism. He has served as Secretary
and apothing the Irish Parliament, acts which helped to establish
public acts were connected with putting down the Irish Rebellion
His career had been solid but unspectacular. His first
affairs confined to make ends meet in coalitions against the revolutionary
at a time when contacts with the Continent were tenuous and foreign
undergone the typical education of the British landed aristocracy
Born in Ireland of an old, it unduly培养ed, family, he had

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Castlereagh, solid, ponderous, pragmatic; the former was witty and eloquent, if somewhat pedantic; the latter cumbersome in expression, although effective in debate; Metternich was doctrinaire and devious; Castlereagh, matter-of-fact and direct. Few individuals have left behind them such a paucity of personal & reminiscences. Icy and reserved, Castlereagh walked his solitary path, as humanly unapproachable as his policy came to be incomprehensible to the majority of his countrymen. It was said of him that he was like a splendid summit of polished frost, icy, beautiful, aloof, of a stature that nobody could reach and few would care to. It was not until his tragic death that the world was to learn the price of solitude.

As for Tsar Alexander, Napoleon had once said of him that he had great abilities but that "something" was always missing in whatever he did. And since one could never foresee which particular piece would be missing in any given instance, he was totally unpredictable. Metternich described him as "a strange combination of masculine virtues and feminine weaknesses. Too weak for true ambition, but too strong for pure vanity".¹ At the same time mystic and cunning, idealistic and calculating, he presented an ambivalent mixture of universal principles justifying specifically Russian gains, of high motives supporting aspirations considered selfish in lesser men. He was capable of great self-abnegation, as he proved repeatedly during the period of the Holy Alliance. But he could also be cruel and

1 N.P. I, p.316r.

¹Metternich, Clemens, *Aus Metternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren*, 8 Vols. Edited by Alfons von Klinkowstrom. (Vienna, 1880). Vol. I, p.316f. Henceforward referred to as N.P.

forward referred to as M.B.

*Edited by Viktoria von Klinkowstein. (Vienna, 1880).* Vol. I, p.35t. Hence-
*Metterlich*, Clemens, *Die Metterlich*, a Mecklenburgese譯版*, 8 Aols.
M.B. Klauss*.

the period of the Holy Village. But he could also be cruel and
was capable of great self-spensation, as he proved repeatedly during
motives underpinning aspirations considered selfish in lesser men. He
universal principles justifying abjectly Russian base, of fish
ideality and calculating, he presented an implausible mixture of
but too strong for purevanity."¹ At the same time artistic and cunning,
masculine virtues and feminine weaknesses. Too weak for true ambition,
predictable. Metternich described him as "a strange combination of
bribe would be missing in any given instance," he was totally un-
whatever he did. And since one could never foresee which particular
had great abilities put that "something" was always missing in

As for Tar Alexander, Napoleon had once said of him that he

tragic death that the world was to learn the brute of solititude.
Nobody could reach and few would care to. It was not until he
summit of bolled桥, to, ically, beautiful, aloof, of a stature that
of his countrymen. It was said of him that he was like a splendid
abroadable as pie policy came to be incomprehensible to the majority
respected. Castlereagh walked his solitary bath, as humanly un-
pending them and a benefit of bereavement & reminiscences. Ich und
Castlereagh, matter-of-fact and direct. Few individuals have left
although effective in debate; Metternich was doctrinaire and deviant;
element, it somewhat bedantic; the latter compeersome in expression,
Castlereagh, solid, bonyerous, pragmatic; the former was witty and

Castlereagh, solid, bony, bristling; the latter compeersome in expression,
 Castlereagh, solid, bony, bristling; the latter compeersome in expression,

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treacherous. "He was not for nothing the son of (the mad) Tsar Paul," Talleyrand said of him. That he was convinced of the identity of his goal with the claims of universal justice cannot be doubted. That these claims generally coincided, at least during his early period, with the national interest of Russia is even less open to question.

Then there was Talleyrand, the spokesman for Bourbon France. He was of all his contemporaries the one most similar to Metternich. He possessed the same nonchalance, the same subtlety and an even more trenchant wit. This was no accident. Both Talleyrand and Metternich were products of the eighteenth century, grand seigneurs caught up in a contest they could not but consider gross and even loutish. Both were sufficiently aristocrats to be concerned not only with the substance but with the form of their achievements. Both identified tranquillity with balance and proportion.

Still the similarities hid basic differences. For fate had not been kind to Talleyrand; it had not given him the opportunity to live his values. To be an aristocrat is not a dogma but a fact; but in Talleyrand there was always an incongruity between his professions and his performance. Forced into the priesthood as a young man, he became Bishop of Auteuil, only to renounce the Church during the Revolution. After breaking with the Revolution, he had become Foreign Minister of Napoleon; and when the Allied armies were approaching Paris, Talleyrand was working for the Restoration of the Bourbons.

Paris, Telfreyrand was working for the Restoration of the Bourbons.
Minister of Napoleon; and when the Villedames were approaching
Revolution. After breaking with the Revolution, he had become foreign
became Bishop of Antwerp, only to renounce the Church during the
and his performance. Forced into the breastwork as a foreign man, he
Telfreyrand there was always an inconvenience between his protests
and values. To be an aristocrat is not a dogma but a fact; but in
been kind to Telfreyrand; it had not given him the opportunity to live
still the similarities had basic differences. For late had not

Both identified tranquillity with balance and proportion.
only with the abatement put with the form of their achievements.
Intuitively. Both were sufficiently aristocrats to be concerned not
caught up in a contest they could not put & consider gross and even
Metternich were products of the eighteenth century, Grand seigneur
more trenchant wit. This was no accident. Both Telfreyrand and
He possessed the same nonbalance, the same subtlety and an even
He was of all his contemporaries the one most similar to Metternich.
These were some Telfreyrand, the spokesman for Bourbon France.

question.
period, with the national interest of Europe is even less open to
that these claims generally coincided, at least during his early
of his goals with the claims of universal justice cannot be adopted.
Paul," Telfreyrand said of him. That he was convinced of the identity
of theories. "He was not for nothing the son of (the mad) Taut
træcherons."

- 10 -

- 11 -

It is possible, of course, to find a certain consistency in this
behaviour, an effort to balance by his changes of side the excesses
of his contemporaries, Still one cannot blame his contemporaries
for distrusting Talleyrand, because they had to judge him by his actions,
not by his explanations of them. To be sure, in more tranquil times,
Talleyrand would have found more conventional outlets for his talents.
But there are two ways of defeating turbulence, by standing above
it or by swimming with the tide; by principle or by manipulation.
Talleyrand failed of ultimate stature because his actions were always
too precisely attuned to the dominant mood, because nothing ever
engaged him so completely that he would bring it the sacrifice of
personal advancement. This may have been due to a sincere attempt
to remain in a position to moderate events; outsiders may be forgiven
if they considered it opportunism. Thus Talleyrand's greatest strength
always lay in the dexterity of his manoeuvres, in the manipulations
of the principles of others, in devising formulae for achieving an
agreed goal.

Finally there was Hardenberg the Prussian negotiator. He was
stolid and unimaginative, eager to slow his capacity for finesse but
unable to sustain such a policy. By instinct conservative, he was
forced into an essentially expansionist policy. Eager for friendship
with Austria, he yet did not know how to prevent a clash with it.
Of all the negotiators he proved least able to impress his stamp on events.

Of all the negotiators he proved least able to impress his stamp on events. With Vyachesla, he yet did not know how to prevent a dash with it. Forced into an essentially expansionist policy, he was unable to sustain such a policy. By instinct conservative, he was solid and unmarginal, eager to slow his capacity for linesee put finally there was Hardenberg the Prussian negotiator. He was agreed so.

of the principles of others, in devising formulae for achieving an
always lay in the dexterity of his manoeuvres, in the manipulations
if they considered it opportunist. Time Tafleyrand's greatest strength
to remain in a position to moderate events; outriders may be forgiven
bereauvoir advancement. This may have been due to a sincere attempt
engaged him so completely that he would bring it the sacrifice of
too precisely assumed to the dominant mood, because nothing ever
Tafleyrand failed of ultimate stature because his actions were always
it or by swimming with the tide; by principle or by manipulation.
But there are two ways of defeating turbulence, by standing above
Tafleyrand would have found more conventional outlets for his talents.
not by his explanations of them. To be sure, in more tranquil times,
for distracting Tafleyrand, because they had to judge him by his actions,
of his contemporaries. Still one cannot place his contemporaries
behaviour, an effort to balance his changes of side the excesses
It is possible, of course, to find a certain consistency in this

- 11 -

- 12 -

As the plenipotentiaries were assembling in Vienna, however, it was still thought that the settlement would be rapid, that France would appear as but a spectator, that the rest of Europe would only have to ratify an instrument drafted in relative harmony. Prussia appeared to content for Saxony, Russia for Poland, Austria for the German equilibrium, Castlereagh for that of Europe, and Talleyrand for French participation in European affairs. Nobody seems to have believed that these positions might prove incompatible.

In the process of bringing about a reconciliation of the contending aspirations, the Congress of Vienna went through five phases: (a) an initial period dealing with the essentially procedural problem of organizing the Congress around the anti-French Coalition; (b) an effort by Castlereagh to settle the outstanding problems, particularly the Polish-Saxon question, first by a personal appeal to the Tsar and then by attempting to rally the powers of Europe against him; (c) a complementary effort by Metternich to separate the Polish and Saxon problems and to create a combination of powers united by a consensus of historical claims; (d) the disintegration of the anti-French Coalition and Talleyrand's introduction into the Allied deliberations; (e) the negotiation of the final settlement.

French Coalition and Talleyrand's introduction into the Villedelipera-
a consensus of historical claims; (d) the disintegration of the anti-
and Saxon problems and to create a combination of powers united by
(1) a complementary effort by Metternich to separate the Polish
to the East and then by attempting to rally the powers of Europe against
particularly the Polish-Saxon question, first by a beneficial appeal
(p) and an effort by Castlereagh to settle the outstanding problems,
problem of organizing the Congress around the anti-French Coalition;
bases: (a) an initial period dealing with the essentially procedural
contending abstractions, the Congress of Vienna went through five
In the process of bringing about a reconciliation of the
believed that these positions might prove incompatible.

for French participation in European affairs. Mopidy seems to have
German equilibrium, Castlereagh for that of Europe, and Talleyrand
abferred to content for Saxon, Russia for Poland, Austria for the
have to ratify an instrument drafted in relative harmony. Prussia
would appear as put a spectator, that the rest of Europe would only
it was still thought that the settlement would be rapid, that France

As the béninoctentaries were assuming in Vienna, powers-

III

- 13 -

- 13 -

Castlereagh left Britain with three misconceptions: He still hoped that Alexander might be restrained by exhibiting the unreasonable-ness of his claims. If persuasion failed, he preferred to assemble the requisite force against Alexander _within_ the anti-French Coalition and he thought this a relatively simple matter, at least as simple as demonstrating the threat to the equilibrium represented by Russia's possession of Poland. Finally, in case a contest was unavoidable, he believed that he could use France as a reserve to bring forward when a stalemate was reached, as if France would be content with so passible a role. The lengths to which Castlereagh was willing to go were revealed in a dispatch on 7 August to Wellington, who served as British ambassador to Paris. Wellington was instructed to inquire "whether France was prepared to support her views on the (Polish) question by arms" and to ask for French support in urging Prussia to resist Russian claims in Poland.¹ On 14 August, Castlereagh suggested that on his way to Vienna he stop at Paris for an exchange of views with Talleyrand.

"The situation of the world," Wellington replied to this proposal, "will naturally constitute England and France as arbitrators of Europe, if these powers _understand_ each other; and such an understanding may preserve the peace."²

¹Castlereagh, Viscount, _Correspondence, Dispatches and Other Papers_, 12 Vols. Edited by the Marquess of Londonderry. (London, 1848-52). Vol. X, p.76, 7 August, 1814. Henceforward referred to as C.C.

¹C.C.x,p.76, 7 August, 1814.

2C.C.x,p.93, 18 August, 1814.

20C.x.b.93.18 August 1814.
1 August 1814.

Edited by the Marquess of Londonderry, (London, 1848-52). Aof. K. B.1c.
¹ Castlereagh, Alconnt, Correspondence, Dispatches and Other Papers, 13 Aofe.
brerserve the peace."

If these bowers understand each other; and such an understanding may
"will naturally constitute England and France as arbitrators of Europe,
"The situation of the world," Wellington replied to this proposal.
A view he stob at Paris for an exchange of views with Talleyrand.
in Poland. On 14 August, Castlereagh suggested that on pie way to
ask for French subport in asking Prussia to resist Russian claims
breasted to subport per views on the (Polish) question by arms, and
to Paris. Wellington was instructed to induce "whether France was
in a dispatch on 1 August to Wellington, who served as British ambassador
a role. The length to which Castlereagh was willing to go were revealed
a stalemate was reached, as it France would be content with so base a
believed that he could use France as a reserve to bring forward when
boeseascon of Poland. Finally, in case a contest was unavoidable, he
as demonstrating the threat to the equilibrium represented by Russia's
and he thought this a relatively simple matter, at least as simple
the reduceite force against Alexander within the anti-French Coalition
ness of pie claims. It berassation telfed, he biterred to asample
poohed that Alexander might be restrained by expiring the unreasonable-
Castlereagh left Britain with three misconceptions: He still

- 13 -

- 13 -

Castlereagh left Britain with three misconceptions: He still hoped that Alexander might be restrained by exhibiting the unreasonableness of his claims. If persuasion failed, he preferred to assemble the requisite force against Alexander within the anti-French Coalition and he thought this a relatively simple matter, at least as simple as demonstrating the threat to the equilibrium represented by Russia's possession of Poland. Finally, in case a contest was unavoidable, he believed that he could use France as a reserve to bring forward when a stalemate was reached, as if France would be content with so passive a role. The lengths to which Castlereagh was willing to go were revealed in a dispatch on 7 August to Wellington, who served as British ambassador to Paris. Wellington was instructed to inquire "whether France was prepared to support her views on the (Polish) question by arms" and to ask for French support in urging Prussia to resist Russian claims in Poland.¹ On 14 August, Castlereagh suggested that on his way to Vienna he stop at Paris for an exchange of views with Talleyrand.

"The situation of the world," Wellington replied to this proposal, "will naturally constitute England and France as arbitrators of Europe, if these powers understand each other; and such an understanding may preserve the peace."²

¹Castlereagh, Viscount, Correspondence, Dispatches and Other Papers, 12 Vols. Edited by the Marquess of Londonderry. (London, 1848-52). Vol. X, p.76, 7 August, 1814. Henceforward referred to as C.C.

²C.C. op. to. 7 August 1814.

2C.C.XI, p.93, 13 August, 1814.

- 14 -

Castlereagh arrived in Vienna on 13 September and immediately began discussions preliminary to the formal Congress which was to open on 1 October. He still hoped that the basic decisions might be taken before that date and that he could use the fact of his sojourn in Paris to bring the Russian minister to terms.¹ As things turned out, however, most the preliminary discussions were taken up by procedural questions. It soon became apparent that Castlereagh's overture to Talleyrand had been premature and that the other powers were willing to admit France into their concert only as a last resort and after all other combinations had failed. For the memory of wartime still provided the impetus for international relationships. Unity was still considered an end in itself; harmony the cause, not the expression, of amity. And since the wartime unanimity had been produced by the threat of France, the Allies dealt only hesitatingly and ambiguously with the most fundamental problem of a "legitimate" order: whether it can construct spontaneous relationships or requires the myth of an enemy as a motive force. They agreed that decisions would be taken by the "Big Four", but that they would be submitted to France and Spain for their approval and to the Congress for ratification. If the Allies were in accord, opposition would be of no avail. What would happen in case of disagreement was not even considered, because it would have represented an admission that the requirement of unity did not supersede all other considerations. The

outright of unity did not emerge all other considerations. The
considered, because it would have represented an admission that the re-
avail. What would happen in case of disagreement was not even con-
cation. If the Villes were in accord, opposition would be of no
to France and Spain for their approval and to the Congress for ratifi-
would be taken by the "Big Four," but that they would be met and admitted
the math of an enemy as a motive force. They agreed that decalcated
order: whether it can construct autonomous relationships or requires
and amplynally with the most fundamental principles of a "legitimate"
produced by the threat of France, the Villes dealt only peaceminably
the expression, of smity. And since the wartime unanimity had been
Unity was still considered an end in itself; harmony the cause, not
wartime still broadened the agenda for international relationships,
and after all other complications had failed. For the memory of
were willing to admit France into their concert only as a fast resort
overture to Talleyrand had been premature and that the other bowers
up by procedural questions. It soon became apparent that Castlereagh's
turned out, however, most the preliminary discussions were taken
according in Paris to bring the Russian minister to terms. As things
be taken before that date and that he could use the fact of his
open on 1 October. He still hoped that the basic decalcations might
pertain discussions preliminary to the formal Congress which was to
Castlereagh arrived in Vienna on 13 September and immediately

- 15 -

only dispute arose over the manner in which this procedure was
to be made effective, whether it should be embodied in a formal
resolution by the Congress, as Prussia proposed, or simply carried
out as in informal arrangement as Castlereagh preferred. ¹ At
this point, on 23 September, Talleyrand arrived in Vienna, prepared
to use the legitimizing principle of the anti-French Coalition in
order to dissolve it.

For if "legitimate" rulers represented the guarantee of
for the repose of Europe, no reason existed for excluding a Bourbon
France from the discussion. And if "legitimate" rule was sacrosanct,
Prussia had no "right" to dispossess the traditional King of Saxony
by annexing his territory. To be sure, the Allies had developed an
ingenious suberfuge for this violation of their legitimizing principle
by accusing the hapless King of treason for his failure to join the
Allied side in time. But Talleyrand had no difficulty exposing the
tenuity of this argument: "Treason", he said acidly, "is evidently
a question of dates."

Talleyrand's heaviest fire was concentrated on the Allied pro-
cedural scheme, however. He protested against the exclusion of France
and the minor powers from the deliberations of the Congress. He
denied the legal existence of the "Big Four", and he threatened to

¹ For full discussion of prodedural questions, see Webster, Sir Charles, *The Congress of Vienna*, (London, 1934), pp. 149-65.

The Congress of Vienna, (London, 1934), pp. 149-62.
I for full discussion of procedural questions, see Neuberger, Sir Charles,

denied the legal existence of the "Big Four", and he threatened to
and the minor powers from the deliberations of the Congress. He
coherent scheme, however. He protested against the exclusion of France
Tallietrand's heaviest fire was concentrated on the Villedieu bro-
a question of dates."

culty of this argument! "Treason," he said acidly, "is evidently
Villiers aside in time. But Tallietrand had no difficulty exposing the
by annexing his territory. To be sure, the Allies had developed an
Brussels had no "right" to dispositions the traditional King of Saxony
France from the discussion. And it "legitimate" rule was across the
for the resumption of Europe, no reason existed for excluding a Bourbon
for it "legitimate" rulers represented the France which

order to dissolve it.

to use the legitimising principle of the anti-French Coalition in
this point, on 33 September, Tallietrand arrived in Vienna, prepared
out as in informal arrangement as Castlereagh preferred.¹ VC
resolution by the Congress, as Brussels proposed, or simply carried
to be made effective, whether it should be embodied in a formal
only disbands arose over the manner in which this procedure was

- 12 -

- 16 -

transform France into the advocate of all the secondary powers
chafing under their direction. But despite his brilliance and sarcasm,
Talleyrand achieved only a few minor concessions. It was decided to
adjourn the formal opening of the Congress until 1 November and in
the meantime to have the pending questions examined by the eight
signatories of the Treaty of Paris, the "Big Four" plus France, Spain,
Portugal and Sweden. The "Big Four" left no doubt, however, that they
intended to continue their private discussions and to treat the "Eight"
merely as a ratifying instrument or to settle peripheral issues.

Talleyrand's first sally failed, because a logical inconsistency
is not sufficient to dissolve coalitions. A mere appeal to a legitimizing
principle is of no avail against the united opposition of all other
major powers acting as if the appealing government still represented a
threat to their existence. There existed in fact two relationships,
that within the Coalition and that of the Coalition towards France, which
was an ambiguous mixture of distrust and pretence of normality, which
could not decide whether to rely on force or on legitimacy. Only after
the claim of special righteousness, which is characteristic of coalitions,
had disappeared in a conflict of the Allies among each other, could
Talleyrand emerge as an equal partner. But first one more test of the
efficacy of the "internal legitimacy" of the Coalition had to be made.
It still remained to be determined whether the Tsar could be induced
to limit his claims without the threat of force. So when well had
Castlereagh established himself as the prime contender for the European
equilibrium that it was he who entered the arena to try the Tsar's resolution.

equilibrium that it was he who entered the arena to try the Tzar's resolution.
Cæsarڵæsh established himself as the prime contender for the European
to limit his claims without the threat of force. So much well had
It still remained to be determined whether the Tzar could be induced
efficacy of the "internal legitimacy" of the Coalition had to be made.
Tallébrand emerges as an ednal partner. But first one more test of the
had disappointed in a conflict of the Villes among each other, could
the claim of exceptional righteousness, which is characteristic of coalitions,
could not decide whether to rely on force or on legitimacy. Only after
was an ambiguous mixture of distrust and pretence of normality, which
that within the Coalition and that of the Coalition towards France, which
threat to their existence. There existed in fact two relationships,
major powers acting as if the abneging Government still represented a
principle is of no avail against the united objection of all other
is not sufficient to dissolve coalitions. A mere appeal to a legitimizing
Tallébrand's first easily failed, because a logical inconsistency
merely as a ratifying instrument or to settle peripheral issues.
intended to continue their private discussions and to treat the "Eight"
Portugal and Sweden. The "Big Four" left no doubt, however, that they
signatories of the Treaty of Paris, the "Big Four," binary France, Spain,
the meantime to have the pending questions examined by the eight
adjourn the formal opening of the Congress until 1 November and in
Tallébrand achieved only a few minor concessions. It was decided to
chatting under their direction. But despite his brilliance and assurance,
transform France into the advocate of all the secondary powers

- 16 -

- 17 -

IV

All efforts to induce the Tsar to state the nature of his goals in Poland had heretogore proved futile. It was known that he wanted to re-establish a kingdom of Poland with a liberal constitution, connected with Russia only through the person of the monarch; but nothing could be learned either about its territorial extent or the nature of its internal arrangements. This secrecy was not only a crafty bargaining device to delay a final decision until France had been eliminated as a factor in the balance and Britain had disinterested itself in the Continent. Nothing in the Tsar's complex make-up ever worked so simply. When the Tsar demanded a free hand in Poland to fulfil the pledges of his youth, he was undoubtedly sincere; but this made a legitimate order all the more difficult to establish. When Alexander insisted on the major part of Poland, not on grounds of expediency but as a moral "right" in he was not raising the issue to a more elevated plane, but posing a dilemma which might unleash a new round of violence. For a "right" is established by acquiescence, not by a claim, and a claim not generally accepted is merely the expression of an arbitrary will. Moreover it is the essence of a moral claim that it cannot be compromised, precisely because it justifies itself by considerations beyond expediency. Thus, if the Tsar was "really" sincere in his protestations of moral duty, he was making a revolutionary contest--a contest based on the mere assertion of force--inevitable. This is

- 18 -

the paradox which the fanatic, however well-intentioned and however sincere, introduces into international relations. His very claim to moral superiority leads to an erosion of all moral restraint.

There ensued a strange and unreal series of interviews between Castlereagh and Alexander; strange, because their bitterness was accompanied by protestations of undying friendship, and unreal, because Alexander and Castlereagh could never agree on basic premises. In order to obtain a framework for negotiation, the protagonists constantly shifted positions, pretending to agree with the other's principles, but interpreting them in a manner which reduced them to absurdity. That Alexander proposed to rest his claims on the sanctity of his maxims became apparent on the occasion of his first interview with Castlereagh on the day after his arrival.¹

For the first time, he was explicit about his Polish plans. He proposed to keep all of the Duchy of Warsaw with the exception of a small portion to be ceded to Prussia. These claims, Alexander argued, were not the result of ambition, but the outgrowth of a moral duty and motivated by the sole desire of achieving the happiness of the Polish people. In short, since they were not advanced in the name of security, they could not threaten anyone. Castlereagh, in reply, urged the threat represented by a constitutional Poland to the tranquillity of Austria's and Prussia's remaining Polish provinces, and he added the dubious proposition that an independent Poland would

¹ Castlereagh's report. See B.D.,p.197f,20ctober,1814

Castlereagh's report. See B.D., b.1811, October 1814

and he added the quipونe proposition that an independent Poland would
transparency of Units' and Prussia's remaining policies.
urged the threat represented by a constitutional Poland to the
of security, they could not threaten allies. Castlereagh, in reply,
polluted people. In short, since they were not advanced in the name
and motivated by the sole desire of achieving the happiness of the
were not the result of ambition, but the outgrowth of a moral duty
small portion to be ceded to Prussia. These claims, Alexander argued,
proposed to keep all of the Duchy of Warsaw with the exception of a
for the first time, he was explicit about his polluted plant. He
of his first interview with Castlereagh on the day after his arrival.
claims on the sanctity of his maxims became apparent on the occasion
reduced them to spandigity. That Alexander proposed to rest his
the other's principles, put interpreting them in a manner which
tagonists constantly amended positions, retending to agree with
brawls. In order to obtain a framework for negotiation, the bro-
because Alexander and Castlereagh could never agree on some
accompanied by protestations of unending friendliness, and unreal,
Castlereagh and Alexander: strange, because their bitterness was
there envenomed a strange and unreal series of interviews between
moral superiority leads to an erosion of all moral restraint.

of his first interview with Castlereagh on the day after his arrival. I
claims on the sanctity of his maxims became apparent on the occasion
reduced them to spandigity. That Alexander proposed to rest his
the other's principles, put interpreting them in a manner which
tagonists constantly amended positions, retending to agree with
brawls. In order to obtain a framework for negotiation, the bro-
because Alexander and Castlereagh could never agree on some
accompanied by protestations of unending friendliness, and unreal,
Castlereagh and Alexander series of interviews between
moral superiority leads to an erosion of all moral restraint.

There envenomed a strange and unreal series of interviews between
moral superiority leads to an erosion of all moral restraint.

moral superiority leads to an erosion of all moral restraint.
sincere, introduces into international relations. His very claim to
the paradox which the fanatic, however well-intentioned and however

- 18 -

- 19 -

be generally welcomed, even by Austria and Prussia, but that a
Russian appendage extending deep into Central Europe would constitute
a constant source of disquiet. But the Tsar left no doubt that he
was not prepared to withdraw from his Polish possession and to create
a truly independent Poland. The first interview between Castlereagh
and Alexander had merely served to demonstrate the duality of the
Tsar's nature and the incommensurability of the two positions.

The contest was renewed, on 13 October, with Alexander attempting
to refute Castlereagh's assertion that the possession of Poland re-
presented a threat to the equilibrium.¹ Although he did not admit
that the requirements of security limited his moral claims, Alexander
was quite prepared to invoke them when they seemed to support his
designs. He therefore advanced the curious argument that his Polish
scheme, far from extending Russian power, would actually ameliorate
it by leading to a withdrawal of Russian troops beyond the Niemen.
But when Castlereagh pointed out that security depends on the total
strength of states, not on the position of their armies, Alexander
retreated again to his moral duty. It was in vain that Castlereagh
emphasized Alexander's inconsistencies; his moral claims on one side
of the partition line but not on the other; his duty limited by the
claims of Russian national interest. When Castlereagh declared that
it "depends exclusively upon the temper (of) your Imperial Majesty
...whether the present Congress shall prove a blessing to manking
or only exhibit...a lawless scramble for power," he merely revealed

1 Castlereagh's report, B.D., p.206f., 14 October, 1814.

I Castlereagh's report, B.D., b.202t., 14 October, 1814.

or only exhibit...a lawless scramble for power," he merely revealed ...whether the present Congress shall prove a pleasing to manning it "debate exclusively upon the matter (of) your Imperial Majesty claims of Russian national interest. When Castlereagh declared that of the partition line put not on the other; his duty limited by the embarrassed Alexander's inconstatencies; his moral claims on one side retreated again to his moral duty. It was in vain that Castlereagh strength of states, not on the position of their annuity, Alexander but when Castlereagh pointed out that security depends on the total it by leading to a withdrawal of Russian troops beyond the Women's scheme, far from extending Russian power, would actually ameliorate designs. He therefore advanced the curions argument that his power was quite prepared to invoke them when they seemed to ambuscade his that the requirements of security limited his moral claims, Alexander presented a threat to the despotism.¹² Vittoth he did not admit to relate Castlereagh's assertion that the possession of Poland re-

The consent was renewed, on 13 October, with Alexander attempting

Tear's nature and the incommensurability of the two positions.
and Alexander had merely served to demonstrate the quality of the
a truly independent Poland. The first interview between Castlereagh
was not prepared to withdraw from his position, possession and to create
a constant source of friction. But the Tear left no doubt that he
Russian abbandage extending deep into Central Europe would constitute
be generally welcomed, even by Russia and Prussia, but that a

- 19 -

- 20 -

the exasperation induced by their inability to agree on what con-
stituted a reasonable claim. When the Tsar replied that the Polish
question could end only in one way since he was in possession, it
was clear that a statemate had been reached.¹ The dispute between
the Tsar and Castlereagh had thus made it evident that persuasion
would prove unavailing and that relations would have to be based
on force or the threat of force.

1

The exchange continued through October with an exchange of memoranda, Castlereagh to the Tsar, 12 October, 1814, W.S.D. IX, p.332; the Tsar's reply; October 30, W.S.D. IX, p.386; Castlereagh's reply, 8 November, W.S.D. IX, p.410.

W.B.D. IX, b.410.

reply: October 30, W.B.D. IX, b.386; Castlereagh's reply, 8 November, Castlereagh to the Tear, 13 October, 1814, W.B.D. IX, b.332; the Tear, a The exchange continued through October with an exchange of memorands, 1

on force or the threat of force, would prove unavailing and that relations would have to be passed the Tear and Castlereagh had time made it evident that persuasion was clear that a statement had been reached.¹ The debate between question could end only in one way since he was in possession, it instituted a reasonable claim. When the Tear replied that the Polish the exasperation induced by their inability to agree on what could

- 30 -

- 21 -

While Castlereagh was negotiating with the Tsar, he made every
effort to assemble such a force. As an abstract problem in diplomacy
his task seemed simple. If the Tsar's pretensions threatened the
European equilibrium, the obvious counter-measure was to marshal the
resources of Europe against him. But although the equilibrium may
be indivisible, it does not appear so to its components. The Tsar
could not be resisted without a united front of the rest of Europe,
but the powers of Europe were not at all in accord regarding the real
danger. They did not wish to see the general equilibrium overturned,
but they were not prepared to resist at the sacrifice of that part
of it on which their mmz historical position depended. A strong
Russia might dominate Europe, but a too powerful Prussia would
outstrip Austria and a united Germany might mmz menace France.

So it came about that Castlereagh, the representative of the
insular power which had no Continental position to defend, was the
only statesman contending for the general equilibrium. Hardenberg,
the Prussian Minister, was more interested in Saxony than in Poland;
Talleyrand was almost as afraid that the problem of Poland would be
settled *without* him as that it would be settled *against* him; and
Metternich's attitude was as complex as the dilemmas confronting
Austria: Austria could not be indifferent to the extension of Russia
into Central Europe, because this threatened Austria's European position;