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[LC]

its part, to continue to seek common ground with East Germany
and with the other countries of Eastern Europe.

New security arrangements in Central Europe involving arms
limitations and controls can play a useful part in achieving a
settlement if they do not disturb the stability of the military
balance in the area. Whether this military balance takes into account
the policing role of the pact forces is a major problem for the Kremlin-
and the western powers. The ultimate objective should be a normal
border between East and West in Europe achieved through a process
of persistent multilateral negotiation and a controlled reduction of
armaments. The negotiating process should include special
machinery for crisis management.
NEW ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE

The Panel believes the place to begin is with the Four Powers
who share a special responsibility for Germany. After an eight-
year hiatus, the time is approaching for the Four Powers to devise
the principles and framework for a European settlement.

## A Proposal

The Panel proposes that the Four Powers establish a
European Security Commission composed of West and East Germany,
Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and the
United States and the Soviet Union. The Commission would prepare

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New security arrangements in Central Europe involving arms
limitations and controls can play a useful part in achieving a
settlement if they do not disturb the stability of the military
balance in the area. Whether this military balance takes into account
the policing role of the pact forces is a major problem for the Kremlin
and the western powers. The ultimate objective should be a normal
border between East and West in Europe achieved through a process
of persistent multilateral negotiation and a controlled reduction of
armaments. The negotiating process should include special
machinery for crisis management.

## A Proposal

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## Legere

Delete first and second full paragraphs from "The Panel... Germany as provisional."

Substitute the following:

The Panel also believes that the Council of Foreign Ministers should propose that West and East Germany negotiate between themselves for a step-by-step program which would have as its goal the eventual reunification of Germany -- based on announced agreement that, in return for the West's accepting the Oder-Neisse line as the eastern frontier of Germany, the East was accepting the division of Germany as provisional. The negotiations would be monitored by the Council of Foreign Ministers in accordance with their basic responsibility and would, of course, be followed closely by the European Security Commission.

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the principles of a European settlement and propose to the Council
of Foreign Ministers and the governments of the Four Powers initial
steps in that direction. The Commission would also create
machinery for crisis management and negotiate, for the approval
of the Four Powers, the military strength of NATO and Warsaw Pact
forces in a zone wider than but including the two zones of Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Panel also believes that the Council of Foreign Ministers
should propose that West and East Germany negotiate between
themselves for a step-by-step program which would have as its goal
the eventual reunification of Germany, based on an announced
reaffirmation that the current division is provisional. The negotiations
would be monitored by the Council of Foreign Ministers in accord
with their basic responsibility and would, of course, be followed
closely by the European Security Commission.

The starting point for any fresh attempt to resolve the German-
question must, the Panel believes, be based on a fundamental equation.

This would be that in return for the West accepting the Oder-Neisse line
as the eastern frontier of Germany, the East must accept the division
of Germany as provisional.

The exact form of the relationship between the peoples of
Eastern and Western Germany could only be determined as a result

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The Panel also believes that the Council of Foreign Ministers
should propose that West and East Germany negotiate between
themselves for a step-by-step program which would have as its goal
the eventual reunification of Germany -- based on an announced
reaffirmation that the current division is provisional. The negotiations
would be monitored by the Council of Foreign Ministers in accord
with their basic responsibility and would, of course, be followed
closely by the European Security Commission.

The starting point for any fresh attempt to resolve the German
question must, the Panel believes, be based on a fundamental equation.
This would be that in return for the West accepting the Oder-Neisse line
as the eastern frontier of Germany, the East must accept the division
of Germany as provisional.

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Legere

Delete second full paragraph and third paragraph lead into "these negotiations".

Substitute the following:

The following principles could govern the negotiations within the
European Security Commission concerning reductions in the military forces
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact:

In subparagraph (a) add "perhaps in some form" before "consultation".

Delete subparagraph (b).

Substitute the following:

Reductions, proportioned in both zones would begin at a fixed time after
agreement to reduce is reached -- perhaps one year."

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of long and persistent negotiations. The political framework that emerged, indeed, might not resemble any of the political formulations of the past. The arrangement might provide, with the approval of the German people, for certain international forces to be stationed in Central Europe in substitution for the nuclear and conventional confrontation of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces, that now exists in Germany and Central Europe.

The Panel believes that the forthcoming negotiations on strategic weapons, to which both the Soviet Union and the United States have in principle agreed, underscore both the need for a new approach to a European settlement and the need of there being an agreed mechanism through which the consultations can take place.

The reductions in the military strength of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces would be negotiated in the Commission for the approval of the Five Powers and the other governments involved. The following principles would govern these negotiations:

(a) No increases in forces above present level would be made without advance notice and consultation.

(b) Reductions, proportional in both zones for all national contingents stationed there, would begin one year after agreement is reached.

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of long and persistent negotiations. The political framework that emerged, indeed, might not resemble any of the political formulations of the past. The arrangement might provide, with the approval of the German people, for certain international forces to be stationed in Central Europe in substitution for the nuclear and conventional confrontation of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces that now exists in Germany and Central Europe.

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Legere

Subparagraph (c) line 1. Change "12 month" to "first waiting".

Subparagraph (e). Delete "is impossible". Substitute "is as nearly impossible as ingenuity can contrive."

First full paragraph (1. 18). Delete "keep the North Atlantic Council informed". Substitute "fully inform and consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council."

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(c) During this 12-month period, a system of mutual inspection by observer teams on both sides -- with authority to observe all maneuvers and other large troop movements -- would be established either on an adversary or four-men-in-a-jeep basis.

(d) Subsequent cutbacks across the board would follow at intervals to be determined.

(e) Overlapping radar screens would be a part of this inspection system, the objective of which would be to assure a situation of confidence and detente by providing both sides with the knowledge that massive surprise ground or air attack is impossible.

(f) The establishment of this feeling of confidence should enable gradual cutbacks in nuclear warheads stockpiled in the zone.

The European Security Commission would be established by and report to the Four Powers. The Western members would of course keep the North Atlantic Council informed.

It might, however, in view of the importance and general character of the issues involved, be desirable for the Commission to have the same kind of relationship to the United Nations as the

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Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. This would facilitate
relationships with the ENDC and at the same time permit opportunities
for the emerging security pattern for Central Europe to be considered
in the broader context of general arms reduction and control.

Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference. This might facilitate
relationships with the ENDC and at the same time permit opportunities
for the emerging security pattern for Central Europe to be considered
in the broader context of general arms reduction and control.

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## Legere

Delete last 10 lines from "The USSR ---- Soviet Union".

Substitute the following:

It would be foolhardy to underestimate the negative impact of the Czechoslovakian invasion on prospects for East-West detente. However, the Panel believes it would be shortsighted to rule out the possibility that the policy planners in Moscow, chastened by the dissension within the "socialist commonwealth" and within Western Communist parties that their August action provoked, may conclude that the time has come to address that set of questions which, if unresolved, could again plunge Europe into major war.

But whether or not such considerations are exercising the Kremlin, the Panel believes that the time has come for a new initiative by the West. We have suggested a course of action and several new measures which we believe could move East and West toward a new and effective effort to establish security in Central Europe.

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The United States, the Soviet Union and Europe

The Soviet response to liberalization in Czechoslovakia has made it likely that Europe will be divided more harshly in the next five years than in the five just passed. The DeGaulle's nostalgie dream of a Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, is not to be realized in any time-frame that can now be envisaged.

But neither, the Panel believes, is the cold war, as that term came to be understood, likely to return.

Europe, East and West, as we have pointed out, is astir with new challenges of irrelevant dogma, with a new appreciation of the need for economic and industrial pragmatism, and with a new recognition of common problems of urbanization and environmental preservation and resource control. The Soviet Union itself is not immune from these challenges.

The USSR has underscored its concept of Eastern European security with the use of its army and that of four of its Warsaw Pact allies in Czechoslovakia. The Western response has been a new sense of purpose and unity in NATO. The Panel has suggested certain measures which it believes would strengthen the Western alliance.

But the Panel does not believe that the long-run future in Europe lies in U.S. and Soviet divisional political and nuclear hegemony. It has suggested a strengthening of Western Europe institutions and the development of a European caucus in NATO. It believes that the changes in Eastern Europe ultimately will convince the Soviet Union

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The Soviet response to liberalization in Czechoslovakia has made it likely that Europe will be divided more harshly in the next five years than in the five just passed. DeGaulle's nostalgic dream of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is not to be in any time-frame that can now be envisaged.

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T.C.S.

[L.C.]

that it cannot continue to respond with the use of military force to the tensions and dilemmas -- many of which are exacerbated by the unresolved question of the future of Germany.

It would not be surprising if the foreign policy planners in Moscow, faced with the dissension which has accompanied their recent repressive response in Czechoslovakia, should conclude that the time has come for a new effort to resolve that set of questions which if unresolved, could again plunge Europe into a major conflict. The resulting chaos, even if confined largely to Eastern Europe, would not be in the U.S. interest.

But whether or not these considerations are exercising the Kremlin, the Panel believes that the time has come for a new initiative by the West. We have suggested a course of action and several new measures which we believe could bring both the East and West into a new and effective effort to establish security in Central Europe.

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