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CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations

Draft Outline - Version II

Diagnosis
=========

The traditional transatlantic partnership is eroding. Although exacerbated by diplomatic missteps on both sides of the Atlantic, mounting transatlantic tensions have structural roots - the disappearance of the common threat that bound Europe and America together, the emergence of a deeper, wider, and more independent European Union, and the divergent trajectories of domestic politics in the U.S. and Europe. Europe and America do share common values and have robust economic ties. But policymakers should not place false confidence in the ability of shared values and economic linkages to keep the Atlantic bond intact. Indeed, the transatlantic divide that opened over the Iraq war was a stunning affirmation of the secular erosion of the Atlantic Alliance. That traditional allies like France and Germany sought to thwart the United States on a matter Washington deemed to be of vital interest made clear the serious and unprecedented nature of the current crisis in Atlantic relations.

Choice between types of world

Despite these obstacles to transatlantic cooperation, the Atlantic link remains central to
international peace and prosperity. The U.S.-Europe partnership has been the anchor of
the international system for decades - neither party can afford to let it atrophy.

 policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic therefore need to establish a new foundation
for Atlantic cooperation. To do so, they must recognize that the old order is gone for
good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic community, and map out a strategy for
realizing that vision.

 D European Sch

Objective, Vision, Strategy

A vision of a transatlantic partnership for the future must aim at locking in the three historic achievements of the post-World War II era: 1) the establishment of a democratic Europe at peace; 2) the creation of a security community between North America and Europe - an Atlantic zone in which war is unthinkable and balance-of-power dynamics muted, if not eliminated; and 3) the establishment of a transatlantic partnership that serves as the central vehicle for promoting global stability and managing an open international economy.

The first objective is close to completion; democracy and prosperity have taken root in Europe's west and are in the midst of doing so in Europe's east. The second objective has been attained for now, but both sides of the Atlantic must ensure that security community does not unravel and give way to geopolitical rivalry. The third objective - continued Atlantic partnership - will be the hardest to sustain and is the one that will require the most innovation and determination.

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In pursuing these objectives, the Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, America and Europe will no longer move in lock-step on matters of security. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

At least in the near term, this new strategic landscape will lead to the emergence of a new division of labor, in both geographic and functional terms. In geographic terms, Europe will focus its primary attention and its core military assets on consolidating peace in Europe while America concentrates its power and purpose primarily on promoting stability and meeting threats in other parts of the world. In functional terms, America will bring to the table its war-fighting capability, while Europe's main contributions will be in the areas of nation-building and peacekeeping.

The United States should remain engaged in Europe even as it focuses its attention on other quarters. And the EU should more regularly backstop America's global engagement by increasing its involvement in nation-building, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention in areas outside Europe. Furthermore, as Europe's institutional and military capacities evolve over time, the EU could down the road become a more complete partner of the United States on a global basis. Nonetheless, during this critical decade, a strategic division of labor seems inevitable.

Although this division of labor takes advantage of the complementary nature of American and European strengths, it does represent a strategic separation between the United States and Europe. This separation is a logical consequence of the changing threat environment and Europe's limited ability to project power beyond its own neighborhood. It is precisely because transatlantic unity will no longer be driven by geopolitical imperative that both America and Europe must now work harder to sustain their partnership. So too does this strategic separation reinforce the need for America and Europe to cooperate closely on a host of other fronts, including disrupting terrorist networks, managing the global economy, expanding democracy, and promoting health and economic growth in the developing world.

If a new transatlantic bargain is to emerge along these lines, the United States must reassure Europe of its commitment to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. America's international dominance remains unchallenged, making it both possible and necessary for the United States to wield its power with restraint, adhering to the practice and spirit of multilateralism in order to win the consent of others. Washington should also resist efforts to exacerbate intra-European divisions, instead welcoming a more unified Europe - provided that the EU does not adopt an anti-American identity and cast itself as a counterweight to America.

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In return, even as Europe focuses on consolidating a peaceful continent, it must do more to recognize the new strategic environment and help address new threats. In particular, the EU should seek to forge with the United States a common approach to the new security agenda, updating both practice and principle to the challenges posed by terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the potential need for preventive war.

By granting Europe more autonomy and voice, America is likely to find in Europe a partner more willing to share the burdens associated with international stability. By more readily working with Washington to meet new international threats, Europe is likely to find in America a brand of leadership more to its liking. Nonetheless, differences of approach will no doubt continue to emerge, necessitating that both parties better learn how to tolerate disagreement and prevent it from compromising a broader sense of amity and common purpose.

The Task Force recommends a three-prong strategy for realizing this vision and putting Atlantic relations on a more sound foundation: *preserve comity, recast the defense partnership, and define a new agenda for concrete cooperation.*

## Preserving Comity

Although it will not be possible to sustain the tight alliance of the Cold War, the Atlantic democracies can do much better than let decades of partnership give way to acrimony. If the current drift is left unaddressed, a common identity and sense of affinity could be replaced by mutual suspicion among rising generations of both Americans and Europeans. Policymakers must urgently seek to arrest the tearing of the Atlantic community's social fabric and lock in a stable, even if looser, partnership.

Preserving comity and maintaining the transatlantic community as the anchor of the international system requires:

* Recovering a harmonious and constructive spirit of diplomacy and consultation. Absent geopolitical imperative, effective diplomacy will prove essential to maintaining solidarity.

* Mapping out new rules of the road.

  * Developing a common approach to preventive action and counter-proliferation.

  * Addressing the appropriate role of international institutions and the appropriate means of legitimating joint action.

  * Dealing with disagreements (opting out rather than actively resisting, following the model of the Concert of Europe rather than the Iraq war).

* Ensuring that political differences do not spill over into areas of trade and finance.

* Building a new transatlantic institution that spans the political, economic, and security realms. This new institution should substantially deepen formal U.S.-EU contact in step with the EU's own institutional evolution.

## Recasting the Defense Partnership

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NATO has lost its centrality and its ability to serve as the anchor of the Atlantic partnership - hence the need for a new, more encompassing institution. At the same time, NATO remains an important forum for joint military planning, for preserving peace in the Balkans, for encouraging reform and integration on Europe's periphery, and for carrying out peacekeeping missions outside Europe. Adapting NATO to new conditions and maximizing its relevance entail:

* Deepening and regularizing EU-NATO military links, especially as the EU broadens its defense responsibilities.

* Maintaining more than a token U.S. military presence in Europe - even as a drawdown proceeds - in order to preserve military-to-military contacts and encourage interoperability.

* Enlarging NATO's role in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction; expanding its capacities in policing and peacekeeping.

* Revising NATO's unanimity rule in order to ensure effective decision making.

## Defining a New Agenda for Concrete Cooperation

With the Atlantic zone enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many of the challenges which America and Europe must address together are in the developing world. Mapping out a joint transatlantic strategy for dealing with these challenges will enhance global stability and serve as a pragmatic means of breathing new life into the transatlantic partnership.

* Facilitating further liberalization of U.S.-EU commercial relations and the global economy; eliminating tariffs on and subsidies of textiles and agricultural goods is of particular importance because of the benefit to developing countries.

* Continuing and deepening intelligence, law enforcement, and financial cooperation on disrupting and dismantling terrorist networks.

* Deepening cooperation on stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and containing nascent nuclear programs, such as those in Iran and North Korea.

* Greater coordination of efforts to reach a peace settlement in the Palestine-Israel conflict.

* Mapping out a long-term strategy for promoting health, economic growth, and political liberalization in the Middle East and the developing world more broadly.

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Draft Outline – Version I

I. The Transatlantic Rift - Gravity and Causes.

* The current deterioration in relations is not just another round of irritation. The rift runs deep and jeopardizes decades of transatlantic partnership.

* The underlying causes of the rift are structural in nature.

  * The end of the Cold War and the disappearance of a common threat.

    * America no longer needs to remain Europe's protector.

    * Europe is less reliant on the U.S. for its security.

  * The evolution of the European Union as a more mature and collective polity.

  * September 11 and diverging threat perceptions.

* Leadership, rhetoric, and style are also contributing to the rift. The behavior of governments on both sides of the Atlantic has reinforced structural tensions, adding to the ill will. Matters of tone and style are not underlying causes of the divide, but they complicate the task of adapting and adjusting to new conditions.

* Europe and America do share common values and have robust economic ties. But policy makers should not place false confidence in the ability of shared values and economic linkages to keep the Atlantic bond intact.

* Restoring cooperative Atlantic relations should be a top priority for Europeans and Americans. The stakes could not be higher. The U.S.-Europe partnership has been the anchor of the international system for decades. Neither side can afford to let it atrophy.

* This report sets out a strategy for keeping the Atlantic link strong and vital.

II. Guiding Principles

* The Atlantic Alliance in its traditional form cannot be restored. Too much has changed.

  * Europe and America are no longer central to each other's security.

  * Generational and demographic change is proceeding on both sides of the Atlantic.

  * The two sides of the Atlantic no longer share a strong sense of common identity.

* A new type of Atlantic partnership is, however, both highly desirable and feasible. America and Europe still share common ends even if they at times differ on the means. If America and Europe work together, they are far more likely to realize these common ends.

* A new transatlantic bargain entails:

  * Europe must do more to recognize the new strategic environment and help address new threats. In particular, it should demonstrate a willingness to

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engage the United States in a dialogue about how to advance the struggle against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As part of this effort, Europe must be willing to forge with Washington an understanding on the principles and practice of preventive war. The new security strategy recently approved by EU leaders is an encouraging first step.

* The United States must seek to ensure that its international leadership is exercised in a multilateral spirit. While reserving the right to act alone when necessary, Washington must reassure Europe of its willingness to adhere to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. In the words of Tony Blair, the United States must lead through persuasion rather than command.

* As the EU evolves, European leaders should articulate a vision of a Europe that retains vital ties to the United States even as it grows stronger and more independent.

* As it has since World War II, the United States should support the continued integration of Europe, including the EU's efforts to build a common defense policy, provided that the EU does not adopt an anti-American identity and cast itself as a counterweight to America. In this respect, Washington should welcome the institutional reforms proposed by Europe's recent convention.

### III. The Future of NATO

#### Why NATO Remains Relevant

* A Europe at peace and America's shifting strategic priorities have deprived NATO of its former centrality. Nonetheless, NATO continues to fulfill important functions and the interests of America and Europe alike would be compromised if the Atlantic Alliance erodes.

* NATO remains the premier forum for U.S.-European consultation on security matters. It is within NATO that the United States and Europe should seek to forge a meeting of the minds on the full range of security threats.

* Although Europe's lack of power projection capability has diminished NATO's relevance to America's new security concerns, Europe's capacities in peacekeeping and nation-building complement well America's war-fighting capacity. NATO provides a vehicle for utilizing the complementary nature of European and American strengths.

* Although the bloodshed has ended in the Balkans, there remains much unfinished business in the region. Even as the EU gradually assumes from NATO increased responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, NATO must stay engaged to prevent backsliding and help address residual political and territorial issues.

* NATO remains an important institution for encouraging reform and integration on Europe's periphery, particularly in Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. Even as the

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United States focuses on the struggle against terrorism, it must not neglect the importance of consolidating peace in Europe's east and south.

## How NATO Should Be Adapted To New Conditions

* As the United States draws down its force levels in Europe, the EU must prepare to assume more responsibility for managing European security. As Europe's defense capacities evolve, NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized to ensure continued transatlantic consultation.

* NATO must find the right balance between out-of-area missions and its traditional focus on European security. Washington should not seek to turn the alliance into a vehicle for global force projection. At the same time, NATO should maximize its contribution to ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

* Future conflicts may well be fought by coalitions of the willing rather than a collective NATO. Nonetheless, Washington should maximize pre-war consultations within NATO in order to facilitate the involvement of the alliance in post-war stabilization and reconstruction.

* NATO should develop its capacities in the areas of military police and peacekeeping.

* [Perhaps include a reference here to coalitions of the willing and the potential reconsideration of NATO's unanimity rule? A possible formulation: As NATO continues to enlarge, reconsideration of the unanimity rule will be necessary to ensure effective decision making within the alliance.]

## IV. Trade and Finance

* The U.S. and the EU account for roughly 40% of global GDP. They remain the engines of global growth and the stewards of the global economy. U.S.-European partnership continues to be vital to global economic stability.

* Commercial relations across the Atlantic remain strong. Political tensions have affected trade only at the margins; matters of commerce tend to be compartmentalized from those of security. But this segregation also means that strong commercial relations will not on their own preserve robust security links.

* If political tensions across the Atlantic continue to mount, they do have the potential to spill over into the commercial realm. At a minimum, American and European trade negotiators will find it more difficult to pursue further liberalization of the global economy if they are operating against the backdrop of a transatlantic rift.

* Specific initiatives that the U.S. and Europe should pursue include the following:

  * Coordinate diplomacy to ensure successful conclusion of the Doha round.

  * To be determined (LS, Gordon Brown, etc.)

## V. The Global Agenda

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* With the Atlantic zone enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many of the challenges which America and Europe must address together are in the developing world. Identifying these challenges and mapping out a transatlantic strategy for dealing with them will enhance global stability and serve as a pragmatic means of breathing new life into the transatlantic partnership.

* The greater Middle East will continue to present the most pressing and imminent threats to the common interests of the United States and Europe. As efforts to realize the road map intensify, the United States and Europe must step up efforts to coordinate their diplomacy. Similar convergence of strategy should be pursued toward Iraq and Iran. Specific steps include:

  * Expand the use of the Quartet in developing and implementing regional initiatives.

  * The United States and EU should close ranks on a diplomatic strategy for halting Iran's nuclear program.

  * Washington should enlist greater European involvement in Iraq, even if doing so entails a more prominent UN role.

  * Other initiatives to be determined.

* The United States and Europe also need to develop a long-term strategy for fostering economic development and political liberalization in the Middle East and Africa. America and the EU urgently need to map out a program that succeeds in maximizing their diplomatic leverage and speeding aid and trade. Specific steps include:

  * Eliminating trade barriers in the areas of agriculture and textiles.

  * Supporting local organizations and programs that promote the deepening of civil society.

  * Expanding the Bush administration's efforts to tie aid to good governance while harmonizing conditionality with the EU.

  * Enhancing cooperation and funding on HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment.

  * Enhancing joint efforts to prevent and halt civil wars and ethnic conflict in countries such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, and Congo.

  * Deepening transatlantic cooperation to promote basic education and health care systems. At relatively low cost, the U.S. and Europe have the potential to markedly expand access to education and health care, both of which are critical to social and economic development.

* Through the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and less regularized channels, the EU is enlarging its diplomatic and economic presence in East Asia. This development provides an opportunity for enhanced U.S.-European cooperation in the region. Top priorities include resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula and drawing China into international markets and institutions.

* Washington's decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change continues to sour transatlantic relations. To remove this irritant and to address looming environmental crises, the United States should come forward with its own set of policy proposals.

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VI. New Institutional Initiatives

* In this final section of the report, we might take up some of the proposals for institutional reform that were discussed in the task force. These include:

  * The establishment of a standing Contact Group (Ash).

  * The formation of a caucus of democracies within the UN (Slaughter).

  * Other UN issues, such as reform of the Security Council or the General Assembly.

  * Changing the structure/composition of U.S.-EU summits, especially in light of the institutional changes likely to take in place within the EU at the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference. In this respect, if the EU is soon to have a single foreign minister and an elected president of the Council, the United States should prepare to deal more regularly with a collective EU rather than with its individual member states.

  * Should the report mention the dispute over the ICC?

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# CFR Transatlantic Task Force Report

## Summary of Findings

### Diagnosis

Despite these obstacles to transatlantic cooperation, the Atlantic link remains central to international peace and prosperity. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic therefore need to establish a new foundation for Atlantic cooperation. To do so, they must recognize that the old order is gone for good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic community, and map out a strategy for realizing that vision.

### Vision and Strategy

The Task Force endorses a vision of a transatlantic relationship that is much looser, but also much broader in scope, than that of the past. It will be looser because formal alliance is giving way to ad hoc coalition; absent the Soviet threat, America and Europe will no longer move in lock-step on matters of security. It will be broader because the Atlantic democracies now face a wider, even if more ambiguous, array of threats from terrorism, WMD, and instability and impoverishment in the developing world.

The key features of this vision are:

* A new division of labor. Europe will focus its primary attention on consolidating peace in Europe while America concentrates primarily on promoting stability and meeting threats in other parts of the world. America's strengths in war-fighting will be complemented by Europe's strengths in nation-building and peacekeeping.

* A new bargain. The United States must reassure Europe of its commitment to the habits of consultation and cooperation that are the foundation of partnership. In return, even as Europe focuses on consolidating a peaceful continent, it must do more to recognize the new strategic environment, help address new threats, and backstop U.S. engagement in areas outside Europe.

* Greater tolerance. Differences of approach will no doubt emerge, necessitating that both parties better learn how to tolerate disagreement and prevent it from compromising a broader sense of amity and common purpose.

### Preserving Comity

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With the Atlantic zone enjoying an unprecedented level of peace and prosperity, many challenges which America and Europe must address together are in the developing world.

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Draft Outline - Version II

Diagnosis
=========

Despite these obstacles to transatlantic cooperation, the Atlantic link remains central to
international peace and prosperity. The U.S.-Europe partnership has been the anchor of
the international system for decades - neither party can afford to let it atrophy.
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic therefore need to establish a new foundation
for Atlantic cooperation. To do so, they must recognize that the old order is gone for
good, articulate a new vision of the transatlantic community, and map out a strategy for
realizing that vision.

Objective, Vision, Strategy

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## Preserving Comity

  * Developing a common approach to preventive action and counterproliferation.

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# CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations

## Draft Outline - Version I

### I. The Transatlantic Rift - Gravity and Causes.

### II. Guiding Principles

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### III. The Future of NATO

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## IV. Trade and Finance

## V. The Global Agenda

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