STATEMENT BY ANDREW W. CORDIER, PRESIDENT OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,

CONCERNING THE EXTENSION OF AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN

SOUTHEAST ASIA

I join with millions of Americans, including students and faculty on this campus, in expressing shock over further American involvement in the Vietnam war through the extension of military activity into Cambodia and the renewed bombing of North Vietnam. These steps were described as necessary to provide for the continued withdrawal of American men, but this argument is contradicted by past experience. In fact, these steps are more likely to lead to still further American involvement in the conflict as well as an increase in the number of participating parties.

Although military victory has not been explicitly stated as the end objective of American action in Vietnam, it is clear from the character of the steps taken that this is the goal being pursued. But this objective is untenable.

We must of course make a moral judgment about any military action we undertake and in addition to this we should not forget that the older concepts of military victory, and of the fruits of victory belong to societies of the past. This is particularly true in heterogeneous societies, like Vietnam, cursed by deep and bitter social divisions and lacking the benefits of well-developed social and political institutions. If territorial advantage gained at some point in the military effort is to be preserved, it must be followed by decades of costly and unpopular occupation. Such occupation is self-defeating since it shores up artificially the strength of weak regimes and in fact delays the ultimate time

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when a nation must stand on its own feet and build indigenous institutions to
insure the stability and progress of the country. Thus, a long-range view of
Vietnam's predictable future, at least as related to external military aid,
leads to the conclusion that the American military effort in Vietnam is and
will remain futile. It is a quagmire from which we should free ourselves.

The conflict is for the Vietnamese a disaster, and the expenditure
of American lives and resources in that conflict is totally unwarranted. Our
men must be brought home. The squandering of their lives in Vietnam and
Cambodia must stop. The massive resources used day by day in support of
American military involvement should be redirected with all possible speed
to support major programs in our own crisis-ridden cities.

Vast changes are taking place both in domestic and in world society.
It is a matter of elemental wisdom to respond intelligently to these changes
and in fact to anticipate them. In world society we shall find ourselves
frustrated and defeated unless we respond on a broad front to the peaceful
challenges that exist in that society. Here the soil is rich for the achievement
of a new and justifiable national pride different from the national pride based
on military achievement which we have seen over the last 190 years.

We should as a nation make clear that we join in a common cause with
an ever-widening circle of other nations in the pursuit of a wide and enlarged
range of peaceful objectives including the economic, social, and educational
advancement of all peoples, and therefore of their political stability. The
world is yearning for this acceptance by America of a vibrant and effective
role in the world community. In turn, America's engagement in this role

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would make her more effective in alleviating the tensions of international disputes. I crave for our country a full understanding of our prospects for leadership and partnership, and a wholehearted acceptance by our government and people of these objectives.

Such multilateral participation in non-military objectives stands in strong contrast to our largely unilateral military efforts in Vietnam. When our nation withdrew from the Geneva conference on Vietnam in 1954, we began to follow a course of action that has never been reversed and which has from the outset weakened those cooperative international diplomatic efforts that could have been marshaled to avoid the tragic consequences of the Vietnam War.

For generations Americans have believed that we could achieve anything to which we directed our interest and attention. This is a fantasy. While our resources are great, they are not unlimited. It is therefore a matter of extreme necessity for us to shape our priorities, and direct a much larger share of our resources into domestic areas where acute problems are in fact becoming steadily worse. In a nation that has become largely urban, the problems associated with our cities become more severe. New housing is not keeping pace either with increasing population or as replacement for obsolete housing. If equal opportunity for minority groups is to become a reality, massive financial support will be required. The problem of unemployment, particularly the training of great numbers of people for effective employment, is a matter of deep national concern. To make our homes and streets safe for our people, more resources must be devoted to the causes and prevention of crime. The tragic increase in drug abuse requires careful scientific study, effective law enforcement, and

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therapeutic programs far beyond their present scope. Education at all levels from the kindergarten to our graduate schools, in urban communities and in rural areas, will require much greater support. These and other matters of profound concern to the American people call for greatly increased public funds. Resources now committed to our intervention in Vietnam and Cambodia should be redirected.

The extension of American military operations into Cambodia reveals once more how difficult it is to contain such military conflict and the ease with which it can be extended. It has been previously the stated aim to quickly seek out the enemy in his protected sanctuary and destroy his headquarters, but this goal has proved elusive. From the beginning this has been an unconventional war, marked by unfixed battle fronts and sporadic and frequently accidental occasions of conflict. Under these circumstances the presence of American troops in Cambodia is likely to be prolonged beyond the proclaimed intentions. If so many lives will be lost, more resources will be dissipated and further involvements will be risked.

It is necessary that we express our views on this vital concern to the American people and at the highest levels in the Federal Government. I hope that all of us who feel strongly about ending this tragic war will act in such a way as to honor our goal and hasten its fulfillment. I believe millions of Americans, many quietly and in their own ways, share our concern. Let us act so as to draw them to our cause and bring peace to our land.

May 4, 1970

Clarence K. Street

## On Second Thought

# Road Paved for Atlantic Union Lead by Nixon

“WE HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME a President-elect who is committed to the concept of Atlantic Union—and to me that is a tremendous milestone in human history, one that promises great progress in the days to come.” I quote Rep. Paul Findley (R., Ill.), addressing the opening lunch of the Federal Union Convocation in Memphis, Tenn. Nov. 8. As proof, he read the full text of Richard M. Nixon’s statement of Sept. 1, 1966 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urging it to approve this resolution.

It calls for nothing less, or more, than a Convention of NATO nations to explore the possibility of agreement to declare that their “eventual goal” is to transform their obviously unreliable alliance into a “federal union” and set up a timetable and machinery to achieve the transition in time to save the free from the dangers of monetary crash, depression and war that more and more menacingly confront them. (For the Findley text, with the Nixon statement at its end, turn to p. 17).

**Roper Agrees With Findley.** Elmo Roper, pioneer pollster who lost none of his prestige in the election, gave the Findley view significant support in the Convocation's final panel discussion on Nov. 10, televised locally.¹

Here are excerpts from the election analysis given by Roper—who noted that he himself is a “registered Democrat”:

> “I’m very optimistic about what the elections mean for Atlantic Union. I haven’t been optimistic since the election of Kennedy in 1960 . . . Nixon not only used words that indicate a belief in Atlantic Union—in federation—but he has a record of having actually done something . . . I have talked with him on more than one occasion [since then] about the whole concept of Atlantic federation . . . It’s my guess that he will give the restoration of Atlantic unity a high priority, and will certainly not put any road-blocks in the way of the passage of the proposal to explore Atlantic Union but will be very helpful in getting [it] passed.”²

### 4. Atlantic Union Milestones in 1968.
The milestone which Findley and Roper stressed is the greatest of four major ones which Atlantic Union has passed in 1968. Since all four were ignored or buried by the mass media, let us note the other three, too.

1. Because of an earlier milestone, Atlantic Union couldn't lose the election: For another historic first, the proposed Convention to explore Atlantic federation was, by

June 1968, backed strongly by all six top aspirants for the White House—not only both Nixon and Humphrey, but Rockefeller, Romney, McCarthy and the late Robert F. Kennedy.

2. A month later, on July 2, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the Zablocki resolution for such a convention with only nine of its 36 members dissenting. As Paul-Henri Spaak, former NATO Secretary General, said in his Second Kefauver Lecture to the Federal Union Convocation on Nov. 9:

> "It is, indeed, the first time in 20 years that a Committee of Congress has approved a resolution inviting other nations to a Convention to explore with the U.S. the possibility of their uniting in a 'federal union.' This is obviously an event of the first importance." (See our next issue for text.)

3. For the first time in recent years, an outstanding champion of European Union came out strongly for the Atlantic Union Convention despite the State Department's opposition to it on the grounds that 1) Europe isn't interested in exploring Union with us, and 2) European political Union must first be made. The leader who thus undercut State's position was none other than "Mr. Europe" himself —Paul-Henri Spaak, father of the Common Market. He told the Federal Union Convocation that "one should at least attempt that which appears possible—Atlantic federation," made clear that Europe (except, he stressed, Gaullist France) would welcome the Convention, and ringingly declared: "Those who favor Atlantic federation are, beyond all question, indubitably right" . . . it "is audacious but not unreasonable" nor "above our possibilities." (For more, turn to p. 10).

### 4. Big 1968 Events Paved Way to 1969 Atlantic Union Convention.
While this plan was passing those four milestones in 1968, four major events³ were paving the way toward decision in 1969 to convoke the Convention to explore it. They were:

1. President Johnson's March announcement that he would not seek re-election but would move, as he has done, to open peace talks on Vietnam, has served to end the long U.S. concentration on that war by not only his Administration but Senators Fulbright, McCarthy, and others—to the dangerous neglect of NATO.

2. Meanwhile, throughout 1968, Russian re-arming of the Arabs against Israel, and naval expansion in the Mediterranean have been increasingly threatening (as we have long and often warned) a “return” Cuban nuclear confrontation in the Mideast—this time with logistic and other advantages on Moscow’s side.

3. In August came Russia's rape of Czechoslovakia, advancing abruptly, amid its peace talk, massive military forces to its NATO frontier there. With it burst the illusory hopes of freedom peacefully co-existing with communist dictatorship within the Red Empire, and of trustworthy detente between it and free Atlantica—and LBJ's even fonder dream of agreement with Moscow, at that very time, on a summit arms limitation talk. That dream showed how badly informed he was. His clinging to it even after a Moscow move so brutal as to be condemned by the main Red parties in western Europe proved his judgment, as wrong on Russia as it had been on Vietnam. While the invasion's technical perfection and speed en-

¹This kind of news doesn't interest national TV; it hasn't yet reported even Nixon's 1966 endorsement of the Atlantic Union Convention.

²For Roper's full election analysis, and that of Ambassador Theodore Achilles (who reports a softening in State Department opposition to the proposal) and my own view—both of us agreeing with Roper—see page 25).

³For Mr. Spaak's illuminating comment on these events, turn to his Kefauver Lecture, p. 9.

November-December 1968

hanced Russia's military prestige, NATO's fell because of the manifest surprise it suffered and its slow reaction.

4. Then in November the world monetary danger hit page 1 again, as the storm which threatened early this year to wreck the system and bring on another world depression broke—after an illusory calm—with renewed fury. This time it centered on the French franc and the German mark, with the pound and dollar quaking on the edge. And this time it was President de Gaulle, of all men, who won the system another respite—one likely to be even shorter than its predecessor. This was the third world monetary crisis in the year since the devaluation of the pound in November 1967. Its one hopeful aspect was the evidence it brought of wide disillusionment with gimmick stopgaps, and of rising ripeness for the basic remedy that Atlantic Union offers.

Rare Opportunity Awaits President Nixon. All four of these major events share this hopeful effect—they made many more Europeans and Americans aware again that their future, and Freedom's, does not lie in Vietnam, or *detente* and accords with Moscow now, or in European Union, but in effective unification of Atlantica. They combine with the four milestones to give President-elect Nixon a rare opportunity to start his Administration with the call for the Atlantic Union Convention—which, with such statesmanlike foresight, he urged LBJ to take in 1966.

The fate that has since befallen LBJ gives Mr. Nixon still another reason to resist the rashly cautious among his advisers, have the courage of his convictions and follow in 1969 his 1966 advice. Meanwhile, Atlantic Unionists can welcome the New Year with far greater hope than they ever had before.

## Nixon's Needed Inaugural Move

ALL U.S. PRESIDENTS begin office with a honeymoon period; not even the landslide victor can count on it lasting very long. As a plurality President, Richard Nixon must expect the "let's-give-him-a-chance" mood to be shorter than usual. He needs to take-off in January as impressively as the rocket scheduled to leave Cape Kennedy Dec. 20 for the Moon. The pressures he is under now to pick the best persons for his Cabinet and top staff, and meet the other myriad necessities of an incoming President, conspire to divert him from this, his No. 1 need. If he lets the urgent crowd out the essential, it will continue to, in the ever-steeper uphill struggle that results, and he risks ending among the many U.S. Presidents whom History rates as mediocre men.

**Needed: One Great Move—Not Lots of Middlings**

For the Nixon Administration to go far, he must start with enough of the majesty of a rocket leaving Earth, and avoid a mistake many Presidents make. He must not diffuse his efforts and take the people for children, start off like Santa Claus with a bagfull of gifts aimed to attract a multitude of conflicting interests with a wide variety of tastes. He must aim instead at winning them by a single dramatic move, uncluttered, immense, straight-forward and far-reaching as the rocket to the Moon. He must aim at a move which, to quote Lord Acton, "captivates the imagination by its splendor and the reason by its simplicity." It must be capable of even more—of captivating not only the imaginings and minds but the common sense and the hearts and souls of the myriad men and women whom the other approach seeks to gain by a shower of 2d, 3d, and lesser-rates.

**Giant Handful of Tests to Meet.** The opening Nixon move should aim at meeting this handful of the challenges are gigantic:

1. It must electrify a doubting people and world—even hungrier than men long have been to have their spirits truly lifted. Significantly, all the liturgies from ancient time lead off with what was chanted in Latin, *sursum corda*, and in English now, "lift up your hearts!" There is no season when this yearning is so widespread as now when the darkening days caused the heathen, before the Christians, to prove the deep human need for faith that light would return. The President needs to begin in these darkening times with a move that is bold, creative, enlightening—great enough to make a powerful immediate

and enduring impact on the country and world, as can only faith, deeply renewed.

2. At the same time, the President's move must be prudent enough to satisfy the practical, down-to-earth side of human nature. Being reputed much more a practical, cautious politician than an audacious, constructive statesman, Mr. Nixon comes to bat on Test No. 2, with the advantages of a Babe Ruth, and seems to start on Test No. 1 with two strikes against him.

3. He needs an opening move that will put the opposition—both his enemies in the country and its foes abroad—on the defensive, on the run, off balance. To win in war one must take the enemy by surprise; to win against war, to win enduring peace, one must take not only the enemy but one's people and oneself by surprise. To outdo this enemy, we must first outdo ourselves.

4. Though this move should stand out like the sun, it should also (without being a panacea) be capable of affecting favorably a number of major matters bring them under harmonious control as the sun its planets. In other terms, its effects must be broad enough to bring under control, directly or indirectly, a number at least of the major dangers of today, both foreign and domestic—solve in this orderly, natural way what the routine approach seeks to do by compounding confusion with chaos, and mistaking medley for Mozart.

5. Finally, this inaugural Nixon move should be such as to be assured in advance of prompt support.

**Too Much to Hope For?** Many will say that I ask much more than one can dream of. I doubt that this will be Mr. Nixon's own reaction, at heart. He is a realist. He knows he does face severe tests and does need to open with a move of this calibre. He is, I think, bolder and more creative than most of his friends believe. He knows that Mr. Spaak is right when he says: "To be bold today is to be reasonable...Today it is by looking far ahead that we will have a realistic view."

Moreover, he knows something which the mass media doesn't, but I do—that he *does have* at hand an opening move that would meet *all* that giant handful of tests—and meet them far more certainly and strongly than any other.

In our January issue I shall spell out why he can meet each of the above five tests merely by being true to his own best judgment—and urging, as President, the adoption of the Findley proposal for a Convention to explore Atlantic Union which Nixon urged unanswerably in 1966.

# U. S. Election Makes Elmo Roper "Very Optimistic"
## Nixon Will Give Atlantic Union Convention Lead

### Convocation Panel Text

Elmo Roper: I'm very optimistic about what the elections mean for the cause of Atlantic unity, on the one hand and, specifically, the Atlantic Union possibilities, on the other. I haven't been optimistic about it since the election of Kennedy in 1960. He was not very Europe-minded, and while he made some awfully nice speeches on the subject, nothing happened except that NATO began to disintegrate. The disintegration continued under Johnson— again we got some nice words about the importance of Atlantic cooperation, but it wasn't possible to get a thing done.

Now, Nixon has not only got a record of having used words that indicate a belief in Atlantic Union—in federation, but he’s got a record of actually having done something. I remember one morning in 1960 when a vote was due on the bill to have the U. S. Citizens NATO Commission appointed to an Atlantic convention. Lyndon Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, called me up, before I left my hotel. He told me he thought that it was in very serious trouble because Senators Sam Ervin of North Carolina and Ev Dirksen had joined together to kill this bill, and it was short of votes in his opinion—particularly short of Republican votes.

### Nixon's Action for Atlantic Convention

I went over to see first Senator Clifford Case [R., N. J.] and then we went over to see Nixon [then Vice President]. He entered into the spirit of trying to get it done and in a very eager way. He was extremely useful. In the first place, we figured out a very strong statement from him which he authorized Clifford Case to use, as of that morning. Then he called a number of other Republican Senators and told them he had authorized this statement and, if he were in the Senate, would vote for the bill, and hoped they would.

So, it wasn't just a matter of his being willing to issue a statement to be quoted; he actually got in and worked on this thing that morning. I suppose we must have been in his office for, well, three quarters of an hour, while all this was going on. The result was that the bill got, as some of you may

> "HOW DOES THE U. S. Election Affect the Proposed Convention to explore Atlantic Union?"—this was the subject for the Convocation's final panel discussion, held Sunday morning, Nov. 10. Elmo Roper, a pioneer in public opinion polling, served as moderator, with former U. S. Ambassador Theodore Achilles, co-editor of the Atlantic Community Quarterly, and Clarence Streit, editor of Freedom & Union completing the panel. A condensation of the discussion, transcribed from a tape recording, follows.—Editors.

remember, some votes from the Republican side of the aisle that we had not expected—enough to win. [51 to 44.]

Nixon has kept in fairly close touch since then. I have talked with him on more than one occasion about the whole concept of Atlantic federation; he feels pretty badly about what has been allowed to happen to NATO and to our relations with Europe. It's my guess that he will give the restoration of Atlantic unity a high priority and will certainly not put any road blocks in the way of passage of the proposal to explore Atlantic federation, but will be helpful in getting it passed.

On the Democratic side of the aisle, I think the current Atlantic Union proposal is in pretty good shape—it didn't lose any Senators at least who had been favorable to Atlantic Union. I believe that's a fair statement, isn't it, Clarence"?

Clarence Streit: Well, Senator Lausche was a sponsor, and he was defeated.

Roper: Yes, in the primaries. Well, we've had some friends leave, for one reason or another, from the Senate. But Frank Church (D. Ida.) who is a proponent of this proposal, is back in the Senate for a 6-year term, which means, in the parlance of the Senators, that he can be a statesman four years before he has to become a politician again for two more. Bill Fulbright [chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee] has six more years, and Alan Cranston [D., Calif.] was elected on the Coast. I don't know whether he is going to be an Atlantic Unionist or a United World

Federalist, but the point is that he's for doing something.

So, on the Democratic side of the aisle, the proposal hasn't lost any supporter through the election; it's in the best shape, as I analyze the thing, in the White House than it's been for a long, long time; and I would be willing to guess that it'll be in better shape in the Secretary of State position than for a long, long time. I think that would about summarize my feelings; all in all, I'm quite optimistic. It seems to me that there was very little that could have been done during the last four years, in the way of political activism. The fire has been kept burning, and I think the Convention idea is now ready to go forward again. Clarence?

Streit: I would agree with all that you said. I have known President-elect Nixon since 1951 when, acting in my private capacity as a citizen, I asked him to co-sponsor the Kefauver bill. At that time he told me, "I want to think this over very carefully; come back and see me in 10 days." At the end of 10 days, he said, "I'll go on the bill." And he has been very steadfastly for this idea of a Convention to explore an Atlantic Federal Union ever since.

As Vice President he could do very little about it, of course, but in the 1966 campaign, while he was out campaigning, and building the base for his remarkable comeback in this election, he paused long enough—he was the only one at that level who took the time to send a statement to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which he strongly endorsed the current resolution. As late as three weeks ago, I had a note from him that strengthened my hopes that he will go ahead.

I, too, believe the political situation is very favorable in that regard. The fact that the Congress is controlled by the Democrats and the White House by the Republicans seems to many people—and in some situations it could be—a very difficult set-up. But on this particular issue, since it is strongly bi-partisan, the proposal really is in a more favorable position with Congress—especially the House—in Democrat hands.

It happens that the top Republican

Freedom & Union

24

Elmo Roper, pioneer public opinion pollster, tells Convocation—
as moderator of panel on "How Election Affected Atlantic Union"
—why he is "very optimistic" that Nixon will lead way to Con-

vention to explore it. Former Ambassador Achilles (r.) reported a
softening in State Department's opposition. The other panelist,
Streit, said Democratic control of Congress helps proposal.

on the House Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee who would be chairman if they
were in control, was one of the nine
dissenters when the Committee this
summer approved the bill. Dr. Thomas
Morgan, the Democrat who will remain
chairman, was a sponsor before he
became chairman and remains favor-
able. The No. 2 man on the Democratic
side is the bill's key sponsor, Clement
Zablocki of Milwaukee. So, its sup-
porters are in a good position there.
fauver's time.

Also, I believe that Speaker McCor-
mack is sympathetic. And I know that
Hale Boggs, the Whip, was one of the
chief sponsors of this resolution in Ke-
fauver's time. Thus, on the Democratic
side, the resolution has very good sup-
port.

Now, the President-elect will, I think,
need to start his Administration with
some big act—a big move. I know of
none where he can be so assured of
strong bi-partisan support as on this
particular issue. On the Democratic
side, Vice President Humphrey is a

longtime supporter of the proposal. Eu-
gene McCarthy is its chief Democratic
cosponsor in the Senate, and the late
Robert Kennedy strongly endorsed it.
Then, on the Republican side, there are
former President Eisenhower and Sena-
tor Goldwater, Governors Rockefeller
and Romney, former Governor Scran-
ton—they’ve all endorsed this bill,
thanks to its chief GOP sponsor, Rep.
Paul Findley.

Findley has had a spectacular
vote-getting success since he began
campaigning for Atlantic Union....
in once isolationist Illinois. He was
elected this time by a 60,000 ma-
jority and ran way ahead of Nixon,
Dirksen, everyone in his district.
In 1966 he won by 40,000; in
1964, by 20,000; and in 1962
when he first came out for Atlan-
tic Union, by 10,000. Think of it
—10, 20, 40, 60 thousand! His
record of ever-increasing majori-
ties speak volumes to politicians.

*See p. 17 for full text of it.

Paul is very bipartisan on this issue. He withdrew his own resolution and got behind the Zablocki version, which is substantially the same, when it was passed by the House Committee. In that regard, too, the proposal has come out of the election very well. Our educational efforts have borne good fruit.

Roper: Thank you, Clarence. Ted, can you rouse yourself to a dissenting vote?

**Theodore Achilles:** Not dissent, but perhaps a slightly questioning one. As you said, Elmo, we've had a great many fine statements from Presidents about the importance of Atlantic unity. President Kennedy stated that it was his conviction that Atlantic Union was the true course of history, that he was confident that America would fulfill its part in that destiny. President Johnson said that he was prepared to do everything to strengthen NATO and the Atlantic community, but we had very little White House action to back this up.

I think the important thing now will

November-December 1968

25

be to get concrete evidence that the new Administration really means business about this. I think the situation is—as you and Clarence both say—more favorable than it has been in the past. In 1960, when President Kennedy was elected, the question was one of getting the Paris convention [to explore greater NATO cooperation.] The convention was held, and no action was taken after that. In 1965-66, the current resolutions were pending, but they did not have anywhere near their strength now.

There is a complex interplay of factors here. If Mr. Nixon when President were to give some indication of support to the Congress, as he has done before he was elected, that will rally a good deal more Congressional support. More Congressional support, in turn, will strengthen the hand of the White House, and it will certainly influence the State Department. It's all a matter of interplay, but I think the conjuncture is developing very favorably.

**Streit:** Ted, as Ambassador you're our expert on the State Department on its top level. I hope you will comment on the Department's attitude following the election, in this regard.

**Achilles:** I would very much like to know who will be the next Secretary of State, but I don't believe Mr. Nixon himself has decided that. I have reason to believe, he is anxious for new men— not necessarily one of the older ones who have been figuring in the speculation, but quite possibly some younger man not thought of now.

I think that changes in the State Department will produce a more sympathetic attitude toward the Atlantic community. In recent years, the Department has had almost a fixation on the importance of strengthening not merely the economic but the political unity of the Six countries of the Common Market. There has been some feeling that any movement toward Atlantic unity before the Six have achieved complete political unity would somehow interfere with that. I think that feeling has been changing, partially due to the difficulties the Six themselves have run into, in advancing toward greater economic or political unity; perhaps also from a feeling that to concentrate solely on pushing European into unity may not be taking into full account our American interests. The important thing from the American point of view is what Europe does together with us, rather than what Europe does without us. I would be optimistic of this trend toward a greater appreciation of the American

interests in Atlantic Union developing in the next few years in State.

**Roper:** Just for the sake of the record, Ted, let me point out that the vote on the NATO Citizens Commission—the Paris meeting—did not come during the Kennedy Administration. It came prior to it. And during the Kennedy Administration nothing happened to implement its recommendations.

**Streit:** If I might comment on what you said, Ted, it's true that the two main objections which the State Department brought against the resolution at the hearings in 1966 were entirely on the European side,—that the Europeans were not interested in exploring federation with us, and that a European political union must be achieved before one could advance seriously toward Atlantic unification. I believe that we have contributed a good deal here in Memphis in the last few days toward dispensing that view.

Mr. Spaak's very strong statements here in favor of calling the convention and his assurances that there would be a very strong welcome for it in many countries in Europe—these have, I believe, helped the cause in that respect. Since he is sometimes called "Mr. Europe," as is Monsieur Monnet—the two are called "Mr. Europe",—I think he may have a good deal of influence with the European unionists in getting them to the proposed Convention.

**Roper:** Well, I think it idle at the moment to speculate on the State Department as such because, whoever is Secretary of State, there is going to be an awful lot of people in the Department who have grown up with this feeling of omniscience of the professionals and the total inability of the amateurs to think in world terms at all. That's going to continue.

Yet—I can't remember who (this was a couple of years ago) I can't remember whether it was Nixon who said it, or Bob Finch (now Lieutenant Governor of California) who said it in Nixon's presence but, if so, it got no strong protest from Mr. Nixon—one of the things the next President would have to do was to find a way of doing away with the so-called omniscience of the State Department.

**Achilles:** Elmo, I must lodge a word of protest, as one who spent a good many years in the Foreign Service.

**Roper:** I've been trying to get an argument going here, Ted. (Laughter)

**Achilles:** I don't think that there is any feeling of omniscience there. Our State Department is full of highly intelligent, dedicated and capable people.

**Roper & Streit:** Hear, hear!

**Achilles:** One difficulty is that when you get more than three of them around a table you begin to get a certain dilution of opinion. By the time you get anything cleared throughout the Department, it is watered considerably more. By the time it has gone through the Treasury, Commerce and Defense Departments, often-times there isn't very much left. If there is anything left, everyone is determined to fight for it—they're tired of arguing about it.

The favorable trend in the State Department is due to two things: One, to an increasing realization on the part of the professionals at the middle and working levels that European unity in itself, regardless of who is in it or how it is oriented, is not, neccesarily, in America's interest, and that what the Europeans do about Europe is up to them. But the American interest is in what they do together with us.

Second, there has not been a change at the top for several years. Secretary of State Rusk has been primarily preoccupied with Vietnam. He left European affairs practically to Under Secretary George Ball. George Ball is one of the most extreme advocates of complete, rapid political unity of the Six Common Market Nations. I have known him for a number of years and I respect him. He felt that any move toward greater Atlantic unity merely tends to dilute, weaken and delay the movement for complete unity of the Six. I have never believed that this was correct, but that was George Ball's position. Since he left the State Department there has been more of a tendency on the working level to be willing to act in accordance with U.S. interests and get Atlantic unity.

**Roper:** I accept the correction; instead of "omniscience" I should have said "impotence." (Laughter)

**Achilles:** I am not sure that I can buy that either, but there is certainly frustration in the State Department. It is always hard to get any new constructive idea approved by all the people who have to approve it.

**Roper:** Don't you both have the feeling that either the new Secretary of State is going to be a person who, insofar as the relations of Europe and the U. S. are concerned, shares Nixon's ideas, or that

Freedom & Union

Nixon will be his own Secretary of State?

Streit: I would certainly agree.

Achilles: Yes. He has very strong ideas himself. I am confident that anybody he would name as Secretary of State would be someone whom the President believes fully shares his own views.

Roper: We have a couple more assets, Clarence. After all, Javits has six years before re-election. The other asset is Robert Finch. I don't know what job he may get in the Cabinet. I hope it isn't the only one I know he won't take—Attorney General. I think he is bound to be important in this Administration.

Streit: Elmo, since the Republicans are in a minority in both Houses of Congress, I wonder—would Nixon shift any Republican Senators to the Cabinet?

Roper: No, I don't think he would.

Streit: There are going to be two or three places open on the Republican side in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It comprises now seven Republicans and 12 Democrats. Since the Republican gain in Senators was—what was it? Five?

Roper: Five.

Streit: That would mean there would be at least one Republican added to it; since Frank Carlson and Bourke Hickenlooper retired from it, that would mean three seats to fill. Javits might well be shifted to the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Percy. I don't know—there's going to be a dog fight over those seats. I believe that the influence President Nixon will have will be very strong in his own party there, and that he would want to strengthen his own policy in the Foreign Relations Committee. What do you think?

Roper: I would think unquestionably so. I think, however, that he shouldn't throw his weight around too much in the Republican party the first year. After all, while we Democrats have managed to achieve the largest and bloodiest scars, there still are some Republican scars. I should think that in this particular instance, outside of passing the word to a couple of friends, he would let the normal procedure of the Senate take care of those three.

Streit: Incidentally, perhaps Barry Goldwater will get on the Foreign Relations Committee. He has endorsed this

resolution and he carries a great deal of weight with many conservatives through the country. That could be very helpful.

Roper: Do you think they might restore his own seniority on the ground that it was just a temporary and inevitable vacation? (Laughter)

Streit: I doubt if they would change the Senate seniority rule.

Roper: Does anyone in the audience want to ask the three Unwise Men any question?

Walter Weber (Florida): How about Senator Gurney of Florida? He is the only Republican that far South.

Roper: I don't know about him. Clarence?

Streit: He was a Congressman and a co-sponsor of the Findley resolution.

John Mathews (Virginia): Former Congressman Robert Ellsworth is one of the star players on Nixon's staff; he cosponsored the resolution when in Congress.

Streit: Yes, that is true. He was National Political Director in the Nixon campaign. I feel sure he will have a high post in the coming Administration."

Richard Givens (New York): From this exercise in crystal ball gazing, I deduce there is a real chance for doing something next year. If strong sentiment is built up among the citizens it will give a firm foundation on which the President and those Congressmen and Senators who support the proposal will be better able to answer the opposition. This increases our responsibility considerably in the educational field. It seems to me the Washington situation is very promising.

Roper: I think that is quite true and I hope a number of you at least will share my feeling. I got so tired batting my head against the hard wall of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations that I practically stopped working for Atlantic Union. I am going back now to work full time for it. (Applause)

A Question: Would you say a little more about Scranton's feelings on this?

Roper: Clarence, I think you know more about him than I do.

* He has since been named a special assistant to the President for foreign and domestic affairs.—Editors

Streit: Let me put it this way: The first, time I met him was when he was Governor of Pennsylvania; his first words to me in his office were: "I have a copy of your book, *Union Now*, in my library which is very heavily marked." He had read it as a student, I think, at Yale, and apparently it had made quite a lasting impression on him. He has endorsed the Findley resolution. I think he should be helpful to this idea.

Mrs. Julie Tamarkin (St. Louis, Mo.): There's been a great deal of talk here about Nixon's favorable attitude. But what if Nixon's not the man? (Laughter)

Roper: If Nixon isn't the man, then I think that a suggestion John Mathews made to me [that an effort be made to get Vice President Hubert Humphrey, after his term expires, to lead actively for Atlantic Union] would be very much in order, for consideration either as regards him or someone else—it might be Governor Rockefeller. Perhaps you think that, as a registered Democrat, I have spoken entirely too strongly about this Republican, President-elect Nixon. I'm reminded of a story that former Congressman Brooks Hays, across the river in Arkansas, used to tell about a man from my home state, Nebraska—William Jennings Bryan—when he was running for the Senate.

It seems that Bryan was a very short man; he never liked to stand before a crowd and look up at those big six-foot farmers around the state. He always wanted to be on a platform. If he got into a little town where there was no platform, he'd get a packing box and stand on it. Well, he arrived in a town once, and there was no platform and no packing box—there wasn't anything elevated except a manure-spreader. He figured it might cause some ribald jokes if he spoke from a manure-spreader—but still his desire to be elevated a little was too much for him, and he got up on the manure-spreader. He opened his speech with this statement: "Ladies and gentlemen: This is the first time I have ever spoken from a Republican platform." (Laughter)

Today may be the first time I've ever spoken from a Republican platform.

Richard Givens: Nixon's action is going to be very important. I think that if as President he moves forward [with the Atlantic Union Convention idea] the country would support him—but that we have to help him to see his way clear to do that.

November-December 1968

27

FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA 15213

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Oct. 14, 1969

Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

By this time you are probably not sure whether it is better
to be besieged at Harvard or in Washington. Be that as it may;
since I know that you worry about these things and take
notice of them, the Pittsburgh situation is, on the sole
question of the war, not significantly different that anywhere
else that I have been.

-- almost no one has confidence that Nixon
is doing anything different;

-- it is impossible to convince them that he might
in fact be;

-- the modd is cynical and turning towards resentment;

-- the consciousness of the people is that they have
been a gainst the war for 1½-5 years: the khung change
in President makes less political difference than
one might suppose.

I am as scared of a right wing reaction as you are (not quite;
you once promised that you would protect me when fascism came).
There is the equal and perhaps even more dangerous long term
effect of center and left cynicism. The two are even mutually
self re-enforcing. Violence is less of a problem though more
visible.

I still have notes on 180; I also remember what you admire
about Bismarck; I question the relation of volition to
bureaucratic morasses.

As ever; hello to N.McG, if appropriate.

PRESS -- 6/25/71 (lds)

STROUD -- July 8 or 9, 1971

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Kandy Stroud, Women's Wear Daily

Request: Would like to get together with Mr. Kissinger on July 8 or 9 -- and suggests either a 12:00 or 6:00 appointment. She said they had discussed a "funny interview on frivolous things."

965-1832 (However, during week of June 28, Miss Stroud will call us -- she will be in New York while her mother undergoes surgery. The number there is 212/FI 8-4270)

DRH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Kissinger:

Kandy Stroud would like your approval to do a picture piece and ask a few non-substantive questions of some of your staff members. (Her letter and list of members is attached.)

She asked that you call her with reference to same or have me call with your approval or disapproval.

I will call Kandy Stroud
Call Kandy and tell her she may do the piece

Call Kandy and tell her I do not approve her doing it.

MAR 2 1973 Irene

CENTRAL FILES