11/4/119

so much more than seating space for an individual. Nothing, for instance, is being said in this argument about the problem of water shortage in the shelters. Nothing has been said about purification of air; about hospital facilities and food facilities. This would not only require more space but it would put up the price per square foot. The people that I've been talking to are in our school of design in Harvard, I have no first hand knowledge of it at all. Their estimate is about three people to a car. I thought that they were being a bit luxurious. I thought I would put six people to a car. People may have to sleep in a shelter.

I think that one easily arrives at an estimate of say between 500 and 1,000 dollars, per head for shelter. I can't be precise about it, but I've talked a good deal to people about it and I'm just advancing another point of view. If one thinks of sheltering the whole population, I personally hate the idea of a discriminatory selective shelter. It seems to me everyone must be in them; and there must be shelter for everyone. If you do get to a shelter program, you need a capital sum of perhaps $100 billion dollars. You compare that with the total annual output of the construction industry which is $30 billion. It is conceivable that a shelter program to be adequate would require three years of the construction activity of the U.S. and would possibly require mobilization effort something of the mobilization effort of World War II, or something between that and Korea. I feel, just on the basis of conversation with people and no expert knowledge that this is a problem of that order of magnitude and I think we ought to think about it in those terms.

MR. MOSES: We haven't even talked about the source of materials,

cyj

11/4/120

the amount of work to be done, the availability of surveyors and contractors, ...

DR. SMITHIES: Well, typical construction in the U.S. was $33 billion for last year.

MR. LUCE: I think about your last remark where you said that you just didn't think the population would ever take this seriously, that you have to tell us as to whether Bob Moses takes this problem seriously. You say the population won't take it seriously; that is, if you don't take it seriously. I would like to make just one other remark. You are thinking of the devastating end of it.

MR. MOSES: You are a publisher. You are in touch with more people than I am. I don't presume to know more about the public reaction.

MR. LUCE: You just explained that you don't know anything about atomic energy or atomic bombs to begin with. You started off by saying that you didn't know anything about this and ended up by saying that the population of the U.S. just will not take it seriously. But the person who first challenged us on this subject of what Dr. Johnson calls "passive defense"--what we call shelters as a part of the whole thing--was a great atomic scientist, Dr. Teller who was discussing the overall questions of atomic war. In envisioning the whole problem of war he came to the conclusion that as a part of the problem of atomic war, we should have much more passive defenses than we have. Now this is an atomic scientist talking, at least an atomic scientist, a very great one, who does not think that it is silly to talk about this kind of defense.

11/4/121

MR. MOSES: What would make him an authority on costs, practicability, on the reaction of public officials?

MR. LUCE: I didn't say that makes him an authority on anything but the possibility of national annihilation--the act of defense--they don't seem to be very optimistic about that. I would have thought we could have been a little more optimistic perhaps than Dr. Johnson's remark about "active defense." I will lead you back to my original question. At a meeting like this, a committee like this study group, what we have to be concerned with is first of all, what ought to be done. Then we could connect what ought to be done, ideally, with what can be done. What possibility is there? But leadership for the American people, whether it is at the White House or in Washington generally, locally, or in any such voluntary group as this, leadership isn't being good unless it tells the people what ought, or what perhaps should be done. And then let them decide whether they will do it or not.

MR. MOSES: I don't agree with that at all. To begin with let me say this--if we have any place here, it is simply to emphasize the concepts, course, aspects, and practical difficulties in a program which has already been given to us in the form of notes, of a memorandum. That's the only reason why we are here at all. I'm glad to be here; it's very nice company. A very good day--let's assume that is the only usefulness that we have here. You ask me as an individual what I think of your approach, I don't agree with you in the least. But I don't say that that has any validity, or anything to offer.

[y]

11/4/122

VOICE: What is your approach?

MR. MOSES: My approach is this. That we are not going to change our civilization by going underground or doing any of the things that have been proposed here. That would be the greatest confession of weakness in the world, and the greatest encouragement to our enemies. That's how I feel about it, as an individual.

VOICE: Then you disagree with the national policy on active defense too.

MR. MOSES: No.

DR. JOHNSON: It has been proved conclusively in other studies that passive defense is the best and you are saying that that doesn't make any difference. We can't take a practical solution because "I don't want to do it". That is what you are saying.

VOICE: Dr. Johnson, this is the first time that I've heard that the active defense wasn't worth anything.

DR. JOHNSON: A passive defense is the best defense; and the cheapest one. A good active defense that will do the same thing against intercontinental missiles is going to cost you $15 billion a year. You've got your choice--you can make an active defense at a much higher cost if that's the way you want to spend the country's dough. But if you want to get a timeless defense which has a capability of reducing the casualties of the U.S. population, then you can find a way of solving the difficult problems you have outlined and you

11/4/123

can do it at about 1/10th of the cost. If you prefer to spend 10 times as much to do it and with less probabilities, fair enough. But let's agree whether or not we are going to try to protect the population or not. And if we do agree, let's use the best and most economical method.

MR. MOSES: I'm afraid we are never going to agree.

MR. WILSON: We are proceeding on certain assumptions within this group which bear on ground covered at some length in our past discussions. They relate to the question of the effectiveness of atomic defense. We have examined with some of the experts here, extrapolated the problem of an active defense and are no longer concerned with the interception of manned bombers. The problem of intercontinental missiles poses a whole different kind of active defense, and this is part of what Mr. Johnson is saying. Projecting some years ahead, saying with the advent of ICBMs, the kinds of defenses which are being erected today will become relatively ineffective and looking at that period the passive defense looks like the best place to put your money. This is a background which we should have explained to you.

MR. MOSES: Who gave you that conclusion?

VOICE: Everyone has.

DR. JOHNSON: Anyone who has any professional knowledge has come to that conclusion.

VOICE: We've had a lively discussion here and have illuminated some-