Stephen S. Rosenfeld

# Dissolving the Kissinger-Schlesinger 'Partnership': A Mistake

What is most troubling about President Ford's changes in his national security team is that he has shown not the slightest awareness that momentous policy issues are at stake and that his rejuggling of personnel may have a crippling impact on them.

He has the right, of course, to exercise his presidential prerogatives and to pick people whom he is comfortable with and who he thinks may help his reelection but these seem to me to be considerations of insufficient weight to justify the apparently unwitting trifling with the national interest which he has now done.

For Ford does not seem to realize what a delicate international moment this is and what the foreign policy consequences of his personnel changes may be.

The moment is delicate, not to say pivotal, because the United States and the Soviet Union are probably at the point of no return on detente. Unless the moderates on both sides get greater payoffs on strategic arms control and economic cooperation, then detente—defined with proper modesty as the restraint of super-power rivalry over time—risks losing its joint political base. It's that simple.

So often presented as adversaries on the detente issue, Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger in fact—under the mumbles—have essentially agreed on it. Where they have differed is on tactics. Schlesinger, with a defense minister's preparedness bias, has thought that the stick of a strong defense posture would more likely induce Soviet reasonableness. Kissinger, with the foreign secretary's problem-solving bias, tends to believe that the carrot of perceived political and economic self-interest would help do the trick.

I would argue that this two-tracked approach served the American interest well. Only liberals who have not reviewed the strategic facts in 12 or 15 years, since the Kremlin began its great strategic

buildup, still contend that Kissinger's initiatives alone could reap good results. Others understand that the toughness represented by Schlesinger is what makes these initiatives attractive to Moscow.

Similarly, only conservatives who have not reviewed the political facts in the period since American primacy and invulnerability disappeared, still argue that toughness alone will suffice. Others understand that Kissinger's diplomacy is what redeemed Schlesinger's defense posture.

In brief, the two have been not so much adversaries as role players, partners in a process no less valid for being better known in used-car lots than in the corridors of power. Moreover, since both are serious men, they knew it, I think.

Ford has now destroyed their "partnership."

By dumping Schlesinger, he has removed the most sober and respective conservative element in his administration and abandoned the con-

servative high ground to the military brass, whose strategic apprehensions can be challenged as crude special pleading, and to other politicians, whose alarms are invariably suspect on political grounds.

The bureaucratic and political advantage thus seemingly accorded Kissinger, however, will be eroded by public restiveness over the fact that Schlesinger is no longer around to keep him honest, and by Ford's presumably continuing determination to avoid the kind of SALT agreement that would expose him to political attack from the right.

At one stroke Ford has diminished the responsible conservative position and the responsible liberal position. He has broken up the team that ensured (1) that strategic policy would be shaped carefully within the administration and (2) that strategic policy would be accepted by the public, whose ambivalence about detente has found comforting expression in the Schlesinger-Kissinger dialogue.

Ford has also forced a large new question mark to be placed over Soviet policy. Kremlin hardliners unsympathetic to a good American-style detente of equals may be tempted now to push all the harder to exploit the advantage perceived in Schlesinger's disgrace and Ford's lightheadedness.

Nor is there any evident reason why either Moscow or Washington might choose at this moment to slow the pace of the new weapons—the American cruise missile and the Russian Backfire bomber—which are causing terrible new complications in the SALT talks. The "mad momentum" of the arms race is no respecter of either White House or Kremlin politics.

In sum, it looks to me as though, for pitiably insubstantial reasons, Gerald Ford has jammed the arms control balance wheel and thereby committed the largest national-security mistake of his presidency. If we're lucky, I'm wrong.

Victor Zorza

Kissinger: 'Down But Not Out'

When President Ford was asked how he would view the changes he had made at the top of his administration "if you were Mr. Brezhnev," he ducked the question. "I won't speculate," he said. But Brezhnev and his analysts have to speculate about it, for the Kremlin's own policies must depend on its view of the Washington changes.

An attempt to reconstruct the Kremlin's analysis of the Washington changes must start from the prevailing Soviet view of the Washington policy-making process as a struggle between hawks and doves, led respectively by James Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense and Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. Those Soviet analysts who are committed to that view would tend to conclude that Schlesinger's departure signifies a victory for Kissinger, but there are also those in Moscow who would argue the contrary.

Some would maintain, as do so many Western commentators, that the removal of Schlesinger removes also the obstacles

he had put in the way of Kissinger's attempts to negotiate a SALT agreement. By this reckoning, the surrender by Kissinger of his position as the President's national security adviser is only a minor concession, since Gen. Brent Scowcroft, his successor in that position, is supposed to be "a Kissinger man."

But those Soviet analysts who believe in applying the skills of Kremlinology to the Washington scene would not rest content with this interpretation. They would begin by going through the transcripts of all the remarks made by Kissinger on the subject. They would soon find a number of hints and even quite clear indications by Kissinger that he believed his post of national security adviser to be essential to the successful conduct of foreign policy by him even as Secretary of State.

The Soviet analysts would then go through the transcripts of Mr. Ford's press conference with a fine-tooth comb and would find that the President expressly

rejected the criticism that Scowcroft was "a Kissinger man." He had known Scowcroft "intimately" for 14 months. The general, he said, "speaks an independent mind—I know it personally— so I don't think that that criticism is valid."

What Mr. Ford's words might suggest to the analyst is that he not only knows but wants Scowcroft to be independent of Kissinger—and that one purpose of the reorganization was to secure a truly independent national security adviser. It is said that Mr. Ford's first choice to replace Kissinger in that post was John Marsh, perhaps the hardest of the foreign policy hardliners on the White House staff, and that the President dropped this intention only when Kissinger strongly objected to it. If this is true, it would show the direction of Mr. Ford's thoughts, and his wish to clip Kissinger's wings—even though for the present he might be content with plucking just a few feathers from them.

A Soviet analyst who tries to read bet-

ween the lines would note Mr. Ford's ominous explanation that Kissinger's "dominant role" in the field of foreign policy was determined by his responsibilities as Secretary of State—and that it would be balanced in the military field by the "dominant role" of the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. In other words, the two would be equal, and Kissinger's previously dominant role in the SALT negotiations, which made it possible to secure progress in the face of Pentagon objections, is at an end.

For the Kremlin, this is the crux of the matter—and not only for the Kremlin, for the SALT negotiations have for a number of years constituted the main highway of U.S. foreign policy, linked as they were with the whole question of detente and of East-West relations generally, not just U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Soviet analyst, searching Mr. Ford's remarks for clues to his attitude toward SALT, will pay particular attention

to the President's refusal to hurry as contrasted with Kissinger's belief that time is of the essence. Kissinger fears that, if there is no SALT II agreement before the Soviet Party congress in February, then the possible retirement of Brezhnev and the U.S. election campaign might play havoc with further progress. But Mr. Ford objected repeatedly to the notion that the United States was under any "time pressure" to conclude the SALT II negotiations.

The drama and the shock of Schlesinger's dismissal made it seem as if this were the main element of Mr. Ford's reshuffle. The Kremlin's first impressions were no doubt the same as those of Western observers, as summed up by the headline over a New York Times editorial—"'Kissinger Up.'" But in Washingtonology, as in Kremlinology, there is no substitute for the study of texts when the decision-making process is so secretive that public statements are the only source of information, as happened in

this case. The Kremlin's more considered analysis would therefore lead it to the conclusion that Kissinger is down—but not out.

How long Kissinger stays may well depend on how much progress there is in the coming months on SALT II. If he can bring off an agreement before the Soviet Party congress in February, this could prove to be the crowning achievement of his career—and a good time to retire, of his own free will, in a cloud of glory.

It may be that this is why he is staying on, at a time when his power is being whittled down. The paradox of power has caught up with the practitioners of power. Mr. Ford may feel no "time pressure" although both Kissinger and Brezhnev, facing the possibility of early retirement, must feel the pressure keenly. But the prospect of retirement also saps their political power and makes it more difficult for them to respond to the pressure.

© 1975, Victor Zorza

N4T 11/6

[LC]

# Drumming Up Détente as the Spirit of '76

By Ronald Steel

NEW HAVEN—Now that the surprise has worn off, the changes in the Ford Cabinet can be seen for what they were: Not an argument about policy, but a battening down of hatches for the coming elections, in which the President will have only one campaign issue—détente.

Although the President presented his moves as an effort to strengthen his Cabinet, what they revealed was quite the opposite: his inability to control his own subordinates.

By nominating for key positions men who owe him their personal loyalty—Donald H. Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary and George Bush as Director of Central Intelligence—he hoped to end the infighting undermining his shaky image as leader.

Normally a President can be expected to be able to mediate between two strong-minded Cabinet officials and impose his own judgment on his subordinates. But this requires a man with force of will, a set of convictions. Gerald Ford is not that man.

Rather, he is a harried officeholder who wants family peace In order to concentrate on the one objective that really matters: election to the post he inherited.

While the dismissal of James R. Schlesinger as Defense Secretary has resulted in a great victory for his arch-rival in the bureaucracy, Henry A. Kissinger, that was not its purpose. Rather it was to salvage détente as the only issue that Mr. Ford has for his 1976 campaign.

It may be fragile, ephemeral—even a delusion. But it is all he has. An amiable grin and an outstretched arm

are not quite enough for an election blitzkreig. Mr. Ford desperately needs an issue for campaigning. With over 8 percent of the labor force unemployed, it can hardly be the economy; the "do-nothing Congress" ploy has fallen on its face; New York's financial woes can be flagellated only so long without appearing sadistic.

Foreign policy, by a process of exclusion, is the issue on which he hopes to win election. Mr. Ford will present himself as the man who brought us détente and Middle East peace.

In this effort he needs Secretary of State Kissinger, who not only has a good deal more prestige across the country than Mr. Ford himself but who has a policy that he has made virtually his own personal property. Détente and Kissinger go together. Even if no one can be sure quite what détente means, few openly oppose it. Despite Mr. Ford's Congressional career spent muttering about Communist plots and greasing cold-war arms programs, he has now become a convert to accommodation with the Russians.

All his life Mr. Ford has been a politician who has ridden with the prevailing winds. Persuaded that the public is sick of cold-war gamesmanship with the Russians, he has readily seized upon détente as his best—indeed his sole issue.

But Mr. Schlesinger stood in the way. With his warnings of grave national peril if a single penny were cut from the military budget, he posed a living reprimand to détente as a slogan.

His resistance to a compromise with the Russians over strategic nuclear weapons was imperiling the tentative accord reached at Vladivostok last year by Mr. Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev. If détente is to be any more than a

slogan, the long-stalled second round of agreements on the limitation on strategic arms will have to be signed soon. Mr. Schlesinger was messing up the works, and by taunting Congress in recent weeks with scare talk, he forced the issue. This provided the fulcrum to eject him.

Even though Mr. Kissinger now wears one fewer hat, having passed the national-security-adviser post to his own faithful deputy, Lieut. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, he has won a great victory. He is the undisputed master of foreign policy.

Mr. Rumsfeld, however ambitious and talented, is personally loyal to Mr. Ford and can be expected to go along with whatever policies Mr. Ford decides upon.

Those policies to an even greater degree than before are now in Mr. Kissinger's hands. We have had Presidents who were their own Secretaries of State. Now we have a Secretary of State who is acting as his own president.

Although Mr. Schlesinger is gone and détente (whatever it might mean) is presumably saved, it would be wrong to interpret this as presaging a less-militant foreign policy.

Mr. Kissinger is no less an exponent of power politics than the rival he helped depose. It was not the size of the military budget he objected to, or the way American military power has been used, as he demonstrated during the four years he helped orchestrate the war in Vietnam.

Rather, it was that Mr. Schlesinger posed a powerful counter to the policies on which Mr. Kissinger has staked his prestige—and Mr. Ford his election. Now Mr. Kissinger probably will have his strategic-arms accord, which will

be signed ever so coincidentally just before the New Hampshire primary. This will no doubt be followed by another round of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Then, if the American people can be persuaded that these essentially peripheral arms agreements and these ritualistic meanderings somehow represent a great victory for peace, they will gratefully elect Gerald Ford to the office he has learned to love.

Ronald Steel is author of several books on foreign policy.

Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak

Schlesinger:
Intolerable
Dissent

The terminal disagreement over budget policy between Gerald R. Ford and James R. Schlesinger not only reflected underlying incompatibility but stripped bare some harsh realities about this President and his administration.

As Secretary of Defense, Schlesinger simply refused to rubber-stamp deep military spending cuts essential to President Ford's political package of tax and budget reductions. That he should place his highly-informed view of national security above Mr. Ford's political imperatives was intolerable to the President.

But that was only the last straw. Equally intolerable were Schlesinger's prickly insistence on dissent, his semi-public airings of disagreements, his lack of congressional cloakroom good-ole-boy conviviality, his refusal to be a team player.

When repeatedly asked at Monday night's press conference why he had summarily fired perhaps the nation's best qualified and best-performing Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ford refused his reasons. Thus, both the prelude and aftermath of Schlesinger's sacking suggest that the Ford White House, which advertises openness and candor, closely resembles the Nixon White House in abhorring dissent and diversity.

Schlesinger's rumpled appearance and superior professorial tone displeased Mr. Ford even in his congressional days. But while the White House has been spreading the story that Schlesinger was doomed by poor congressional relations, the truth is that probably nobody in the Ford administration stands higher with Congress. Schlesinger's problem was not getting along with Congress but getting along with Jerry Ford.

Schlesinger's sardonic humor did no entrance the President. A high-leve defense lobbyist, viewing Schlesinger a the best Defense Secretary he had seen in two decades, calls him "arrogant, abrasive, a cold fish." That Mr. Ford let the latter defects outweigh the former qualities may reflect the congressional mind's emphasis on congeniality.

But Mr. Ford might have tolerated

Schlesinger's uncongeniality had he kept his views to himself. That the Secretary of Defense should suggest the President's detente policy—as structured by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger—was less than perfect was no more tolerable to Mr. Ford than it would have been to Richard M. Nixon.

Even last Saturday after the President decided to sack Schlesinger (but had not informed him), senior White House aides accused Schlesinger of leaking to the press disagreements with Kissinger over European defense deployments; in fact, he had leaked nothing and so informed the White House. But to the White House, Schlesinger was incorrigible in publicly debating high policy better kept behind closed doors.

The final straw did not involve Schlesinger's serious objections to detente policy but, ironically, support for Gerald Ford's old congressional speciality: strong national preparedness.

Under constant attack from the Kremlin and American liberals for his insistence on

adequate defense, Schlesinger was ill-prepared for the White House request that he slash $7 billion in defense as part of the President's $28 billion tax-budget reduction. Although this mirage-like package is an election-year gimmick that will never be enacted, Schlesinger feared voluntarily cutting back Pentagon spending would have long implications. So, he said, he would not do it.

Schlesinger was outraged that Budget Director James Lynn wanted $7 billion out of the defense budget for the next fiscal year below the level already set by Congress. To Schlesinger (an ex-budget bureau official himself), Lynn is the most politically oriented Budget Director in memory and dedicated only to Mr. Ford's election. So, to appeal over his head, Schlesinger asked for an appointment with the President last Saturday.

If Lynn's Pentagon slash were approved, Schlesinger told the President that morning, he could not support it in Congress. Mr. Ford had already decided to fire him but gave no such indication to

Schlesinger, who mistakenly thought he had convinced the President and departed from the White House in what an associate called "a buoyant mood."

If a defense expert with Dr. Schlesinger's credentials felt the cut endangers national security, why did the President neither dispute him nor accept his argument? Is the answer that Mr. Ford simply wanted to install faithful presidential aide Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, guaranteeing no interference with election plans? That suspicion was heightened by the President at his press conference. Defending Rumsfeld's specific qualification to be Defense Secretary, Mr. Ford cited his experience as a "naval aviator."

The President clearly was not interested in military or management qualifications, but in the fact that Rumsfeld was one of "my guys." Schlesinger, whose combination of high intelligence and character is extraordinary in the Ford administration, never could meet that cloakroom standard.

Field Enterprises, Inc.

[LC]

WV

11/6

Hobart Rowen

Rockefeller:
His Beliefs Didn't Fit

It was inevitable, once the President
decided New York City must go the
bankruptcy route, that Nelson
Rockefeller's political relationship with
Mr. Ford had to come to an end.

Mr. Ford's economics and Mr. Rockefeller's economics just didn't mesh, especially in the last several months when the President had openly moved to the right to meet the challenge from Ronald Reagan.

President Ford has emphasized the need for reducing the role of government, balancing the budget, and enhancing the strength of the private enterprise sector. While Rockefeller has publicly gone along with the conservative rhetoric, it became increasingly hard for him to take.

Ironically, President Ford's one recent excursion out of the conservative economic pattern—approval of the Rockefeller $100 billion energy program over a 10-year period—made Rocky's position within the administration uncomfortable.

This extraordinary and bold move had been fought tooth and nail by the dominant bloc of economic advisers led by Treasury Secretary William E. Simon, Economic Council Chairman Alan Greenspan and Budget Director James Lynn. They lost that battle—presumably because Mr. Ford at the time needed a dramatic program to capture public attention.

But it demonstrated that in the terms of
this administration's real basic beliefs,
Rockefeller was "far out"—a man who
didn't fit and whose views were held
suspect by most of the Ford entourage.

The feeling ran so deep and bitter that
Rockefeller at one point suggested that
administration advisers who didn't like the
$100 billion program ought to be silent, or
quit.

Like all Vice Presidents, Rockefeller
chafed under the minimal and largely
ceremonial role assigned to his office.

But it was the New York City crisis that separated the two men. Rockefeller was systematically excluded from discussions of the issue among the President and his economic advisers. On the morning that President Ford went to the National Press Club to announce that there would be no pre-bankruptcy aid forthcoming, the Vice President's most intimate aide, Press Secretary Hugh Morrow, did not know the content of the speech.

When President Ford emotionally

condemned all New York political figures
of the last decade for their share in
creating New York's fiscal crisis, he took
no pains to exclude former Governor
Rockefeller.

In an interview with this reporter published in The Washington Post and other newspapers on October 18, the Vice President made it plain that his differences with Mr. Ford on New York City were more than "minimal"—the phrase the White House had used.

The differences were very basic. Where
Mr. Rockefeller had said that once New
York balanced its budget, it should receive
federal aid, President Ford had declared
that if New York achieved a balanced
budget "it hardly seems necessary for the
federal government to get involved."

Rockefeller plainly believed that the administration was inviting national economic disaster by its posture of inaction. "There are those who say it (a default) won't be serious and those who say it will," Rockefeller told me then. "I'm of the school that believes you take action, so that if you need to (act), you're ready."

In effect, Rockefeller implied that the
President did not understand the serious
national implications of the New York City
problem. And Simon, the Vice President
said, was taking "a big gamble for the
country" by assuring the President that a
New York default "would be tolerable and
temporary."

Without a doubt, the Vice President's
views on New York City and the potential
nationwide impact of a default were
heavily influenced by his brother David,
who heads the Chase Manhattan Bank.

Like many major bankers, David Rockefeller takes an exceedingly grim view of what a default means. "It would be interpreted in this country and around the world," he told this reporter, "as a major calamity, with a shock effect on the bond market, possibly on the stock market, with a ripple effect that will slow down the rate of growth in the economy as a whole."

That's what Nelson Rockefeller
believes, too. But whatever limited ability
he had to bring that view into Ford's
councils is finished. Speaking of Donald
Rumsfeld (to be the new Secretary of
Defense) and Ambassador George Bush
(to be head of the CIA), Mr. Ford said:
"These are my guys that I wanted."
Clearly, Nelson Rockefeller wasn't one of
Ford's guys.

Ford aide denies Kissinger
engineered Schlesinger's fall

By MURIEL DOBBIN

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The White House yesterday flatly denied that President Ford sought the advice of Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, before reaching the decisions that resulted in this week's top-level administration staff changes.

"No one, including Mr. Kissinger, had any role in those decisions. The President made them, after a period of deliberation," Ronald H. Nessen, the White House press secretary, declared.

His statement conflicted with the general view that the influence of Mr. Kissinger, who was known to differ with James R. Schlesinger, the recently deposed Secretary of Defense, contributed heavily to Mr. Schlesinger's downfall.

Meanwhile, in response to rumors that he, too, might be about to step down, Mr. Kissinger was quoted as saying that he had had "no discussions of any kind about leaving, with the President or with anyone in the administration."

There have been reports that Elliot Richardson, now ambassador to Britain and Mr. Ford's choice for secretary of com-

merce, is likely to become Mr. Kissinger's successor as secretary of state.

The comments by the White House and Mr. Kissinger and the announcement that Vice President Rockefeller, who withdrew Monday as Mr. Ford's running mate, will hold a news conference today, intensified the argument continuing in the nation's capital over the reasons behind the staff upheaval.

The three major radio and television networks—NBC, CBS and ABC—said they will provide live coverage of the news conference, which starts at 10 A.M.

The abrupt firing of Mr. Schlesinger and William E. Colby, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, dubbed "the Sunday night massacre" in ironic parallel with the dismissals that became known as the "Saturday night massacre" of the Nixon administration, provoked debate over whether Donald H. Rumsfeld, the new Secretary of Defense, or Mr. Kissinger, had achieved a power play.

Little credence appears to be attached to President Ford's insistence that the shakeup was no more than his reaching a final choice of his own team, and Vice President Rockefeller's withdrawal increased the impression of disharmony within the administration.

John Mulliken, spokesman for Mr. Rockefeller, offered no details about the scheduled news conference, where questions are certain to be asked about major differences of opinion between the President and the Vice President.

Mr. Nessen yesterday spent much of his news briefing fending off questions about whether Mr. Rumsfeld's accession to the chief post at the Department of Defense would mean an intensified effort to achieve detente with the Soviet Union at the risk of upsetting China shortly

before a visit planned by Mr. Ford to the People's Republic.

According to Mr. Nessen, Mr. Rumsfeld would be "forceful" and the China trip was still scheduled, despite rumors to the contrary.

William E. Simon, the Secretary of the Treasury and a survivor of the Ford housecleaning, offered a wry comment when asked in Chicago yesterday about the shakeup.

"I've lived through the Saturday night massacre and the Sunday night massacre. Only Butz [Earl Butz, the Secretary of Agriculture] and me are left. We'll probably go on Monday," he said.

[LC]

# How NATO sizes up Ford's Cabinet shuffle

By Takashi Oka
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

London

Can the Atlantic alliance keep up its military guard while practicing political detente in a climate of world recession? Are democracies equipped to do so?

These are some of the tough, self-reflective questions being asked in European chancelleries as they assess President Ford's dramatic Cabinet shifts this week.

The interest in European capitals is twofold: First, the security of the Western alliance vis-a-vis Moscow. Second, American politics and the run-up to the presidential election next year.

But this latter interest ties in with the first: The United States is the linchpin of Western security, and who becomes its president next

year (and who does not) is a matter of vital importance to every European ally.

European defense ministers who met in The Hague Nov. 5 originally to discuss how to promote standardization of equipment and to make defense procurement a two-way street across the Atlantic, had an added topic: The effect that the replacement of James Schlesinger by Donald Rumsfeld as Defense Secretary would have on the alliance, on strategic arms limitation talks with the Kremlin, and on the whole question of whether detente favors the West or the East.

At an embassy reception the day Mr. Schlesinger's dismissal was announced here, Chinese military attaches circulated through the crowd in their buttoned-up tunics, dispensing their familiar advice that the Europeans must look to their defenses against Moscow. China, one distinguished Western diplomat commented, has become an "honorary member of Nato."

If Mr. Schlesinger's departure does indeed mean that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's line promoting detente is to prevail, then Peking cannot welcome it. Moscow, conversely, could be delighted.

- West Europeans confess to ambivalence in their feelings toward Dr. Kissinger, who was Mr. Schlesinger's great rival in the Cabinet. They admire the Secretary of State's achievements in the Middle East and his negotiating skill on matters as complex as the limitation of strategic arms. But they have felt frequently that he tended to go over their heads in direct dealings with Moscow on matters which intimately affected their security. Mr. Schlesinger's presence in the Cabinet was seen by many as a counterbalancing force, arguing continuously the need not to bargain away the substance of military adequacy that alone kept detente from becoming illusory.

Dr. Kissinger, it is conceded, made no bones about the need for adequate military defense nor about the fact that detente was possible only as the Western alliance kept its powder dry. In terms of the public image of the Ford Cabinet, however, many here felt it was useful to have one strong man, Dr. Kissinger, making the running for political detente, while another intellectual giant, Mr. Schlesinger, emphasized the military underpinnings effective detente would require.

[L.C]

# Brezhnev watching U.S. Cabinet shift

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

Leonid I. Brezhnev will be closely watching what effect the ouster of Secretary James R. Schlesinger will have on the strategic-arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Communist Party leader is widely believed to want a SALT agreement this year so that he can make a triumphal visit to the U.S. before the 25th Soviet Communist Party congress next February.

Generally, the Soviet Union seems pleased by the departure of Mr. Schlesinger, but it has been cautious in assessing the removal of an American policymaker it has long regarded as a hard-liner.

In the short term, there is probably some optimism on SALT.

One Western diplomat commented: "In the long term the Russians probably see [Mr. Schlesinger's fall] as reconfirmation of a moderate course by the U.S."

The most authoritative Soviet comment on President Ford's Cabinet shifts came in a Washington dispatch in the government newspaper Izvestia Nov. 4.

Izvestia referred to differences between Mr. Schlesinger and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger over detente and the SALT negotiations. With evident satisfaction it reported President Ford's explanation at his press conference that Dr. Kissinger would continue to play the dominant role in American foreign policy — and that the U.S. would continue its policy of detente and its SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Izvestia report and all other Soviet news accounts omitted Mr. Ford's remark that there would be no artificial deadlines in the SALT talks.

In conversation Soviet officials are guarded in expressing new expectations about the American SALT position. They have viewed the Pentagon — and Mr. Schlesinger — as stiffening the American negotiating position this year after the basic Ford-Brezhnev SALT accord in Vladivostok last November. By implication, they hope that Mr. Schlesinger's departure will reverse this trend.

As viewed from Moscow, the SALT issues that would be affected involve the Soviet Backfire bombers and the new U.S. "cruise" missiles. The other major issue — verification of multiple independent warheads on missiles — was settled by a Soviet concession last summer to count all rockets of a type tested to carry these MIRVs as actually having the multiple warheads.

The Soviet press has written little on the Backfire bombers,

which the U.S. insisted on counting within the agreed limits on strategic delivery systems only after the Vladivostok accord. It has objected bluntly, however, to American exclusion of the American cruise missile from these agreed limits.

Thus, the current issue of Ogonyok, the weekly published by Pravda, states that at Vladivostok the U.S. presented the new low-flying subsonic cruise missile as a tactical weapon with a 600-kilometer (375-mile) range. Now, Ogonyok charges, the U.S. is turning that missile into a strategic weapon with a range of 2,000 miles but still excluding it from the agreed ceiling on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles.

Behind the Soviet's specific objection to the cruise missile, some observers say, lies a fear that the U.S. may be reneging on the basic concept of the first strategic arms agreement of 1972. That concept was stability through a rough parity in American and Soviet nuclear forces. In this view the cruise missile's superior target-finding and propulsion threaten to upset both parity and stability unless these missiles are limited in some way.

# Schlesinger to Quit Before Rumsfeld's Confirmation

## Clements to Run Defense Department Temporarily; Colby Will Stay at CIA Until Congress OKs Bush

BY RUDY ABRAMSON
Times Staff Writer

Nov 5

WASHINGTON—Ousted Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger is leaving the Pentagon almost immediately, declining to remain on the job until Donald H. Rumsfeld is confirmed by Congress as his successor.

White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen said, however, that William E. Colby, who was fired as CIA director a few minutes before Schlesinger was relieved as defense secretary, would continue to run the intelligence agency until George Bush was confirmed to succeed him.

Reins of the Defense Department will be turned over to Dep. Secretary William Clements, who will be acting secretary after Schlesinger departs to take accumulated leave time. The principals in the Ford Administration shakeup followed the lead of the President in his Monday night news conference in not discussing the background of the upheaval.

Though the President said he had planned the changes in advance and had taken the initiative so he would have his own "guys" handling national security affairs, the Administration had not yet dealt with lower level changes forced upon it by the cabinet shifts.

Lt. Gen. Donald Graham, who resigned Monday as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, termed himself a "Schlesinger man," on Tuesday. Other Pentagon resignations were expected.

A Rumsfeld associate said that the White House staff director was beginning to prepare for confirmation hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee and had not been in contact with Defense Department officials.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, relieved of his title as the President's national security affairs advi-

ser, had his usual morning meeting with the President Tuesday and officials said that he would not move out of his White House offices until Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft had been sworn in as his successor.

Schlesinger was at his Pentagon offices, preparing to move out and meeting individually with members of his staff to thank them for their service. A Pentagon spokesman said that Schlesinger planned to leave at the end of the week.

Questions left open at the White

House included the exact role Richard B. Cheney will play when he assumes Rumsfeld's post. Rumsfeld has been both White House staff coordinator and counselor to the President. Cheney had been Rumsfeld's chief assistant.

Nessen said it had not been determined whether Cheney would be the White House contact with the Ford campaign organization. Also left open was the question of the future role of Robert T. Hartmann, once Mr. Ford's closest adviser, whose influence was limited by Rumsfeld's organization of the White House staff.

While it was widely expected that Rumsfeld would be confirmed easily, there were indications that Bush's nomination to the CIA would be questioned because of his lack of experience in the intelligence field.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of the Senate committee investigating the CIA, told reporters that he expected to vote against Bush's confirmation.

Church and another Democrat, Sen. William Proxmire of Wisconsin accused the President of violating a fundamental principle of keeping politics out of intelligence.

Bush was a Republican Texas congressman and chairman of the GOP national committee before becoming

U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and heading the U.S. liaison mission in Peking.

Saying that there had been a custom of keeping politics separate from intelligence, Church said the President "has turned that custom on its head. He has appointed such a man to the least political and most sensitive position in the government."

Proxmire said that "placing a former national committee chairman as director of Central Intelligence—be he from the Democratic or Republican Party—violates the cardinal rule of the intelligence business, separation of all political influences from the intelligence process."

White House officials said Tuesday that Bush would remain in Peking until a successor was chosen to replace him. Speculation centered on Sen. Hugh Scott (R-Pa.).

Nessen told reporters Tuesday that Mr. Ford still planned to visit China before the end of the year. It had been expected that he would leave a day or two after Thanksgiving, but questions have arisen and a U.S. advance team, originally scheduled to leave for Peking Monday, was still in Washington Tuesday night.

Nessen attributed the delayed departure to a mixup in scheduling.

Sources said, however, that questions had been raised about the trip because of White House plans to shorten Mr. Ford's stay in China so he could make two other stops.

12 Part I-Wed., Nov. 5, 1975

Los Angeles Times

HOW SECRETARY ROSE TO POWER

# Kissinger Loses Intelligence Conduit

BY OSWALD JOHNSTON
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—By most outward signs, the first Tuesday after the big shakeup was very much like any other day, and State Department officials obviously were eager to keep up that appearance.

"No changes have gone into effect as of this time," Henry A. Kissinger's spokesman explained in a patiently uninformative reply to reporters' questions.

Secretary of State Kissinger still travels between the White House and the State Department's basement garage in a chauffered limousine befitting a Cabinet officer, escorted by a dome-lighted station wagon full of Secret Service bodyguards.

He made the trip twice Tuesday, once to brief a breakfast meeting of Republican congressmen on the Administration's foreign assistance program, once to meet for an hour and a quarter at mid-morning with President Ford.

Kissinger's daily hour with the President often is described as the secret of his success in the Washington power game.

No time has been set for Kissinger's former aide, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to be sworn in as the secretary's successor as Mr. Ford's national security adviser. Kissinger still occupies the corner office in the West Wing on his daily White House visits, and Scowcroft, who has used the office when Kissinger was out of town, has made no effort to move in.

"The secretary is totally relaxed," said Robert Anderson, the State Department spokesman.

And the rest of Kissinger's official schedule Tuesday seemed almost calculated to bear this out: at 1 p.m., lunch with Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi, a date arranged more than a month ago; at 4 p.m., a ceremony to receive an award from the 9th Armored Division Assn., at 4:30 p.m. a meeting with Italian Budget Minister Giulio Andreotti.

As time passes, however, the significance of the change ordered by President Ford last weekend could be profound.

When Kissinger was named secretary of state in August, 1973, during the Watergate crisis of the Nixon

Presidency, he already had gained effective control of the foreign policy apparatus of the United States through the office he is now slated to relinquish.

During his confirmation hearings that September, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) pointed this up in a revealing exchange with the secretary-designate that consisted merely of Symington reading off the list of National Security Council committee chairmanships that Kissinger held.

"The Washington Special Action Group," the Senator intoned. "I understand you chair that. Correct?"

Kissinger replied: "That is correct, senator."

"And then the Senior Review Group. I understand you chair that." Again, Kissinger replied, "That is correct, senator."

Symington proceeded to name them all: the Verification Panel, the Defense Program Review Committee, the Intelligence Committee, The Fortty Committee. Each time, Kissinger replied, "That is correct."

Many of these National Security Council subcommittees were institutions of Kissinger's making. And during the first Nixon term, they became the vehicle for an unprecedented transfer of foreign policy decision-making from the State Department to the White House.

During that period, the heyday of the National Security Council apparatus, the basic policy-making documents of the U.S. government were Kissinger-ordered study and decision memoranda that sometimes numbered in hundreds and ran hundreds of pages.

With the removal of Kissinger's main office to the State Department, that elaborate structure of paperwork virtually collapsed, and many of the ablest National Security Council aides also moved to the State Department.

Now that Kissinger no longer is to command that White House apparatus, it may, under Scowcroft, disappear.

But it could also be revived, if it is nourished by the indispensable ingredient of bureaucratic growth in Washington: presidential attention. From now on, it will be Scowcroft's office—not Kissinger's—that is only

three dozen paces from the Oval Office.

There is another, perhaps crucial, source of power that Kissinger will be yielding. After moving finally from the National Security Council post, Kissinger no longer will be the man through whom the intelligence community communicates when the CIA and its counterpart agencies report to the President.

"Henry alone will no longer sit astride all those intelligence channels—and that could be very important for him," a former high-ranking intelligence official remarked, "especially if Scowcroft begins to show some independence."

To a skilled bureaucratic insurghter like Kissinger, for whom the slogan "knowledge is power" is taken almost literally, control of those highly classified intelligence channels hardly can be overestimated.

A good bit of the mastery Kissinger was able to exert over the State Department when William P. Rogers was still nominally secretary of state derived directly from this control of information.

By the end of Rogers' tenure, an unusual and embarrassing file had been built up that consisted of memoranda, signed by Rogers' executive secretary, Theodore L. Eliot Jr., requesting from Kissinger "a copy of the memorandum of conversation you may have had prepared" of talks between the national security adviser and foreign diplomats and leaders.

The secret diplomacy that was a hallmark of Kissinger's White House years was, of course, his main policy-making advantage over Rogers, and it is believed that few, if any, of those memoranda from Rogers' aide received a positive response.

One of the first personnel changes that occurred after Kissinger took over at the State Department was the removal of Eliot to the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan, not exactly in the mainstream of modern diplomacy.

The National Security Council director's control of intelligence channels also placed in Kissinger's hands control over the only possible external access to his secret diplomatic conversations.

More often than not, a foreign embassy here would prepare its own

memorandum of a conversation between Kissinger and its ambassador and send it to its foreign ministry.

More often than not, informed sources contend, the CIA or the National Security Agency would intercept the message and send it through channels to Kissinger's office.

Such interceptions, as a matter of course, would be given the highest

possible secrecy classification and be sharply limited in distribution. But, intelligence sources say, Kissinger took special care that these memos never were delivered to the State Department, lest Rogers see them.

After Kissinger moved into Rogers' office, the same order is said to have gone out again, to make sure that only National Security Council Direc-

tor Kissinger, rather than Secretary of State Kissinger, ever received them—in case an indiscretion should ever occur in the large State Department bureaucracy and the information should leak out.

Now it is Scowcroft to whom sensitive traffic of this sort will be routed and who will have technical control of its distribution.

[LC]

Administration: Comment

C-6

# The President's New Team
(Editorial, condensed, *Chicago Tribune*)

In print, over the air, and in conversation, there has already been voluminous comment on President Ford's revised executive team consisting of his "guys" more than before. The cast changes. But the play goes on. The rolling boil at the apex of government never boils over into hard news once and for all, for the last time. The biggest gap is that left by James Schlesinger. But too much can be read into his replacement. His replacement, Donald Rumsfeld, offers the President such telling advantages over his predecessor as congressional experience and political sure-footedness, in addition to being one of Mr. Ford's guys. Though Mr. Rumsfeld lacks Mr. Schlesinger's emphatic record as a hard liner, he has no record as a soft liner, either. He already is mentioned as a likely new principal rival of Secretary Kissinger for White House influence.

Replacement of Dr. Kissinger as the President's national security adviser by Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft satisfied a valid criticism of having one man in two positions of great responsibility. As Mr. Kissinger's deputy and alternate during his frequent absences from Washington, Gen. Scowcroft is an experienced teammate. His promotion into a position of his own removes a wrinkle without a suggestion of any disruption.

Elliot Richardson's return from London to be Secretary of Commerce brings back one of the Republicans most attractive to liberals. His presence in the Cabinet will be some consolation to those who deplore Vice President Rockefeller's step towards the background. Mr. Richardson is both attractive enough and unobjectionable enough to be talked about as a possibility for Vice President.

The CIA has had far more and more unfavorable publicity of late than the executive branch could wish, and departing director William Colby may have been too responsive to questioning to please, say, Dr. Kissinger. Besides the agency has fence building to do, and that usually means new faces. The inexperience in the intelligence field of George Bush, brought back from Peking, may under present circumstances be a positive advantage. He means a fresh start, at least at the top.

At the White House, Mr. Rumsfeld's successor, Richard Cheney, has never worked in government for anyone but his predecessor and sponsor. Yet there is quite a distance in function and mood between the White House and the Pentagon. What Mr. Cheney will do once on his own cannot be inferred from his record in Mr. Rumsfeld's shadow. But he means continuity.

Ford's Shakeup
---
(Editorial, condensed, C.S. Monitor)

As the dust settles on the upheavals in Washington, it is
still not crystal clear why the shakeup happened and how it
happened. The explanation that seems most plausible is that
President Ford is asserting himself. How much Mr. Ford will
benefit politically from these bold moves remains to be seen.

As to the new team itself, two points should be made: First,
the appointees deserve a chance to prove themselves before being
judged. Second, since all of the new executives, except General
Scowcroft, have political ambitions for the vice-presidency, they
must lean over backward not to give the impression that they are
politicizing their new departments.

In general, the appointments raise some challenging questions:

* Can Mr. Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense learn his job quickly enough to be an effective voice for the military establishment in this crucial period of the SALT negotiations? Mr. Rumsfeld may fall into line with the President's own thinking on nuclear arms control. But it may prove harder to sell a SALT agreement to Congress without Schlesinger at the helm.

* The detachment of Henry Kissinger from his job as national security adviser was long overdue -- but has he been detached? Naming Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft to the post of security adviser is hardly a break with past practice. It is only a weak effort to convey the impression that some power has been stripped from the Secretary of State and that the President is to that extent more independent.

* There is little question that William Colby had to be replaced eventually in order to rebuild the image and respect of the CIA. It was thought, however, that it would take a professional of stature to revive the agency. This gives George Bush the task of overcoming his inexperience in intelligence matters and keeping himself and the CIA free of politics.

Mr. Ford's shakeup creates some new problems. The President has made some admirable Cabinet appointments in the past and demonstrated his commitment to quality and independence of thought from his subordinates. He now risks that record if his new appointees fail to demonstrate that they place good government above personal loyalty and politics. -- (11/5/75)

Ford, Kissinger and Schlesinger
---
(Editorial, condensed, NY Post)

The question of who did what to whom in the behind-the-scenes struggles that preceded President Ford's changes in his "team" will invite long, conflicting speculation. There will be equally feverish diagnosis of Vice President Rockefeller's surprise disclosure that he does not want Ford to consider him for the role of running mate next year.

The dismissal of Secretary Schlesinger climaxed many months of widely publicized hostilities between him and Secretary Kissinger. Beyond their personality clashes, there were deep, serious disputes about the pursuit of detente, the urgency of the SALT talks and ultimately the search for broader disarmament accords.

We believe Kissinger recognized that the split between him and Schlesinger was creating growing uncertainty about the solemnity of avowed American commitments to a new era in US-USSR relations and, on a larger scale; to reversal of the calamitous arms race.

In those terms the President's decision to retain Kissinger and oust Schlesinger has unmistakable symbolic impact. Above all it must be construed as a clear acknowledgement that American opinion is overwhelmingly responsive to Kissinger's attempts to overcome ancient deadlocks and dogmas and win mankind an authentic repreive from the threat of nuclear war.

This does not mean Kissinger has finally prevailed. The President himself often sounds instinctively closer to Schlesinger's view on the priority of military budgets. Donald Rumsfeld is an ambitious, talented, mercurial figure whom Ford may privately visualize as a "balance" to Kissinger.

Yet overall the most crucial aspect of the shakeup is unmistakably a setback for the Pentagon legions and an expression, in Ford's words, of "continuity and stability" in foreign policy. But we can most plainly measure the meaning of what has happened by imagining how Washington would be viewed around the world today if it were Kissinger who had been fired and Schlesinger who had been retained. -- (11/4/75)

PRESS TREATMENT AND LEAKS

[10]

1. Newsweek, November 2:

Kissinger a political liability; not responsive to domestic political needs; fumbled
China trip; "President has less need for Kissinger these days... he could get along
without him." Source: Presidential Advisors; sources close to Gerald Ford.

2. Gelb, NYT, November 2:

Kissinger made Schlesinger's removal the condition for his giving up his NSC hat.
Source: White House officials.

3. Lou Cannon, Washington Post, November 4:

Rumsfeld diminished Kissinger's authority; Kissinger's daily private meeting
will be eliminated in favor of a "team approach." Source: White House official

4. Helen Thomas, AP, November 4:

Kissinger "lost great power;" loses hiw White House office; will have his access
to the President "severely reduced;" Richardson may have accepted Commerce with
the expectation he would replace Kissinger -- perhaps even before the elections.
Source: Administration officials.

5. Growald, UPI, November 4:

Ford has stripped Kissinger of his prize power source -- his morning meeting.
Kissinger will see him once a week, with Rumsfeld and Bush. Source: WH officials

6. Nick Daniloff, UPI, November 5:

Kissinger trying to "maneuver" Hyland into NSC or CIA job. Kissinger has lost
great power and will see President once a week. Source: High Administration officials

7. UPI, November 5:

Richardson to replace Kissinger within a year. Source: Informed Administration
sources.

8. Keatly, Wall Street Journal, November 5:

Kissinger will no longer have his daily hour alone with President, but will have
Committee meetings. Source: Early word from the White House

9. Dana Adams Schmidt, CSM, November 5:

Kissinger's real power reduced because his access to the President will be
shared with Rumsfeld, Bush. Source: "analysts"

10. Sperling, CSM, November 5:

Richardson has moved one step closer to "higher things." Source: WH Sources

Newsweek

100

# Signs of a Big Shake-up

There was strong evidence last week that Henry Kissinger's position in the Ford Administration was undergoing a significant change. President Ford, NEWSWEEK learned, has personally asked the Secretary of State to give up his "second hat"—his job as head of the National Security Council. Kissinger agreed to consider the request, and some Administration sources indicated that the question was all but settled.

Indeed, there was a report in Washington at the weekend that the NSC switch might be part of a larger shake-up of the Administration's entire national-security apparatus. One source told NEWSWEEK that Defense Secretary James Schlesinger would leave his Cabinet post. NEWSWEEK also was told that Kissinger would be succeeded as national-security adviser by his loyal NSC deputy, Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

It was not immediately clear what might have triggered the reported shuffle. Nor was it clear whether Kissinger had suffered a loss of power and influence. What was clear was that there has been a great deal of jockeying within the Administration. Kissinger and Schlesinger have long been at each other's throats. And White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld, Ford's top political adviser, has been eager to clip Kissinger's wings by forcing him out of his NSC post.

**Criticism:** The prospective realignment came at a time when the Administration faced a host of problems in foreign policy and domestic politics. Ford is under strong challenge from Ronald Reagan on the Republican right, and Kissinger's policies on the Middle East and détente with Russia and China have become increasingly controversial. Schlesinger, too, has become a focus of criticism, particularly from liberals on Capitol Hill, for his tough line on defense issues and military spending. (Gerald Ford himself once remarked that Jim Schlesinger knows more about defense than anyone on Capitol Hill, but the trouble is that he goes up there and insists on telling them just that.) At the weekend, a spokesman for Schlesinger said: "I have heard nothing to indicate that there is any truth whatsoever in rumors that James Schlesinger is leaving the Department of Defense."

Kissinger's China policy was under new strain last week. When he went to Peking three weeks ago to make plans for Ford's trip, Kissinger assured his hosts that China would be the only country on the President's itinerary. But Kissinger was stung by the chilly reception he received in Peking (NEWSWEEK, Nov. 3). As soon as he returned to Washington, he notified George Bush, the U.S. repre-

sentative in Peking, that Ford would downgrade the China trip by stopping in Indonesia and the Philippines as well.

Since he did not want to lengthen the trip, Ford could squeeze in Djakarta and Manila only by trimming his stay in Peking. The China trip was reduced from five or six days to four. Peking had not commented on the change by late last week. But the Chinese, already deeply disturbed by Washington's pursuit of détente with Russia, were certain to be

unhappy with an abbreviated visit and with Ford's other stops. One high-ranking State Department official predicted last week that the China trip would yield only a brief and generalized communiqué, a sign that nothing substantive had been achieved.

At the White House, Kissinger was accused by some of fumbling more than just the China trip. He was charged with giving Ford bad advice on declining to meet with exiled Russian dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. The search for an over-all peace settlement in the Mideast seemed to be stalled at least temporarily. Détente with Russia, the cornerstone of his diplomacy, was going slowly—but much too fast. Ford's people noted, for Republican conservatives. And some Presidential advisers complained that Kissinger was not responsive enough to domestic political needs, particularly in the demands he had been making on Ford's travel time.

**Prelude:** Kissinger may already have seen the handwriting on the wall. Before going to Peking, he asked three friends whether he should give up his NSC job. Last week he reportedly discussed that possibility with Scowcroft and Robert McNamara, the head of the World Bank. He also has made disparaging remarks recently about the NSC job, possibly as a prelude to relinquishing it. "Who the hell remembers who was head of the NSC under Eisenhower?" he has asked friends.

As some sources close to Gerald Ford saw it, the President has less need for Kissinger these days. "Ford has a great respect for Kissinger," said a man who knows both of them well, "but the relationship is not as warm as it was. Ford is feeling more independent of the Secretary. He has no intention of doing it. I'm sure, but if Ford decided he needed or wanted to get rid of Kissinger, he could get along without him." Both politically and diplomatically, that position was open to question. All that available evidence, however, indicated that Kissinger intended to stay on as Secretary of State, and it would be out of character for him not to seek to preserve every scrap of power and prestige he now possesses.

Kissinger: Time to relinquish a 'second hat'?

President Richard M. Nixon

—RUSSELL WATSON with BRUCE VAN VOORST & THOMAS M. DEFRANK in Washington

(10)

AND COLBY AND ASKS
KISSINGER TO GIVE UP HIS
SECURITY POST

MOVES A SURPRISE

Rumsfeld Is Seen as
New Defense Chief—
Bush for C.I.A.

By LESLIE J. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2—

President Ford has dismissed Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and William E. Colby, Director of Central intelligence, in a major shuffling of his top national security posts.

Administration officials said that the President had also asked Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to relinquish his post as the national security adviser in the White House, but to stay on as head of the State Department and that Mr. Kissinger had all but agreed.

White House officials said that Mr. Schlesinger would probably be replaced by the White House chief of staff, Donald H. Rumsfeld, and that Mr. Colby's likely successor would be George Bush, the present head of the American liaison office in China.

Mounting Criticism

All these moves were acknowledged by officials and were generally viewed as a political face-lift by the President in respect to what he and his closest advisers regarded as mounting attacks on the Administration from the conservative wing of the Republican party and from Congress.

Administration sources said that the President had offered Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby other posts in his Administration but that both had declined.

Close associates of Mr. Schlesinger said that President Ford called the Defense Secretary to the White House this morning and told him that his resignation was wanted immediately.

The apparent reason for the dismissal, according to associates of Mr. Schlesinger, was friction between the Defense Secretary and the Secretary of State. The associates suggested that the price exacted by Mr. Kissinger for dropping his White House job was removal of Mr. Schlesinger, but this could not be confirmed.

Mr. Schlesinger, who had a meteoric rise from a job in the Budget Bureau to head the Atomic Energy Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency and then the Defense Department, was reported by close friends to be resigned and philosophical about his abrupt dismissal, which came as a surprise to him.

As he sat down for dinner this evening in his suburban home in Arlington, Va., with his family and a few close friends, Mr. Schlesinger was reported by one associate to be taking the attitude: "Well, it's been done."

Jackson Criticizes Move

Senator Henry M. Jackson, Democrat of Washington, is a friend of Mr. Schlesinger, issued a statement on what he called the Defense Secretary's removal.

"This abrupt removal indicates that the Administration cannot tolerate any further resistance from the resolute and serious lines of political authority," Senator Jackson said. He called Mr. Schlesinger "a man of courage, integrity and

honor." His clear implication was that Mr. Kissinger had been behind the Administration's ouster, but this could not be substantiated.

"Reached by telephone at his home, Mr. Colby declined to comment. It was said any announcement of his resignation would have to come from the White House.

To soften the blow for Mr. Kissinger, officials said, Mr. Ford plans to name Lieut. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, currently Mr. Kissinger's hand-picked deputy on the National Security Council staff, to the top job. It is known that Mr. Kissinger does not see General Scowcroft as a type of person to build his own power position from which to oppose the Secretary's policies.

It was in the position of adviser to the President on national security that Mr. Kissinger, in effect, virtually directed the nation's foreign policies for almost five years before he was appointed Secretary of State in September, 1973, replacing William A. Rogers.

White House sources acknowledge that the reason for the President's decision to take away Mr. Kissinger's prized Security Counsel position had more to do with politics than with policy differences. As a result, it "could give you a lot of reasons, but the best two are New Hampshire and Florida, the first two Presidential primaries, and our concern that Reagan will beat the President in both."

Former Gov. Ronald Reagan, according to a member of his staff, considers foreign policy a major issue in the campaign and has been particularly critical of Mr. Kissinger's policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Mr. Reagan and many others have also argued that Mr. Kissinger's control of the National Security Council and the State Department has given him a virtual strangle-hold over Presidential decisions in foreign affairs.

The changes come at a time when Mr. Kissinger has been awaiting the critical Soviet response to the latest American proposal on limitation of strategic arms in year-long negotiations that both the Secretary and his critics see as center to the future of détente, comes, according to the White House officials, after months of maneuvering by Mr. Ford to crack the Soviet power, targeting for destruction the occasions when the President is a political liability to the President.

Effect on Policy Seen

A State Department official who would not confirm the reports said: "Assuming it is true, it might start as a cosmetic way of protecting Henry Ford from the baying walls but it could readily develop into a serious stagnation in our foreign policy."

The White House official said that Mr. Ford broke news to Mr. Kissinger last week, but refused to say exactly when.

In any event, Mr. Ford's decision to ask Mr. Kissinger to give up his second post, or Mr. Kissinger's apparent willingness to accede, represents a clear shift from their previous public positions on the matter.

Months ago, as pressure was building to reduce Mr. Kissinger's responsibilities, Mr. Ford publicly that he would not do so because Mr. Kissinger's talents were unique because he was receiving a client alternative advice on policy from other quarters. At the same time, Mr. Kissinger is known that he would not such a request as a vote of

NYT 11/3

101

# Rumsfeld: Silent Architect
Chief of Staff Seen as Force Behind Shake-up

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

White House chief of staff Donald Rumsfeld, considered the master maneuverer of the Ford administration, was widely credited yesterday as being the silent architect of the President's dramatic Cabinet shake-up.

The soft-spoken, hard-driving former Illinois congressman emerged as the big winner from the Byzantine battle for power that went on behind the closed doors of the supposedly open Ford administration.

Not only did Rumsfeld wind up with an important Cabinet post and equal access with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger to President Ford, but he also left behind him in the White House as chief of staff his deputy, Richard B. Cheney, who is considered highly capable and totally loyal to Rumsfeld.

While Kissinger retains enormous power and prestige within the inner councils of the administration, it was clearly Rumsfeld who gained power yesterday and Kissinger who lost.

Rumsfeld left no fingerprints on any of his internal recommendations that helped produce the shake-up within the White House.

He was not even around Sunday when Mr. Ford fired Secretary of Defense

James R. Schlesinger and Central Intelligence Agency Director William E. Colby. Instead, Rumsfeld took a rare day off and went to the Washington Redskins football game.

The official White House position, stated curtly by Mr. Ford in his press conference last night, was that Rumsfeld did not have any input in the Cabinet changes.

"I did it totally on my own," the President said.

Mr. Ford said repeatedly at the press conference that he desired to form his own team after 15 months in office. He said he did not change foreign policy assignments when he became President in the interest of maintaining continuity with the Nixon administration.

Privately, however, a variety of administration officials were saying that Rumsfeld accomplished the dual purpose of diminishing Kissinger's authority and finding a job for himself at the same time.

He also presumably made himself available for the vice presidential vacancy that was created yesterday by the withdrawal of Nelson Rockefeller from the 1976 GOP ticket.

The precise reasons for the timing of the President's decision were not known. But it was known that Schlesinger argued vigorously in behalf of the Pentagon's request for $97.8 billion in new obligatory

The President had held separate and private discussions during the past two weeks with Rumsfeld and Kissinger to discuss changes in Cabinet assignments relating to foreign policy. He did not discuss his plans with Schlesinger, who has clashed repeatedly with Kissinger on strategic nuclear policy and detente policy.

In fact, Mr. Ford was described as ready to get rid of Schlesinger months ago. A Senate source recalls that Mr. Ford quizzed Schlesinger sharply at National Security Council meetings over Schlesinger's optimistic estimates of congressional action on the defense budget.

On Oct. 21, Schlesinger called a news conference—his first in four months—to denounce "deep, savage, arbitrary cuts" that were made in the defense budget by the House Appropriations Committee.

This attack angered committee Chairman George H. Mahon (D-Tex.), who is a friend of the President's and who played golf with him a couple of days later.

Yesterday, Mahon took the news of Schlesinger's firing with equanimity and said, in words similar to those used by many White House officials:

"An administration has to speak with

See SHAKE-UP, A16, Col. 1

ense authority at a Saturday budget
conference.

When Mr. Ford said that Congress will
vote a lower budget. Schlesinger said he
might not be able to support a lower figure
and left the White House. The next day he
was fired by Mr. Ford.

one voice...I'm not greatly surprised. They
(Schlesinger and Colby) were not Ford's
men. Every President has a right to pick
his own people."

Mr. Ford has a reputation of finding it
difficult to fire anyone, a tendency that
drew critical attention in the first months
of his presidency when he kept Nixon
holdovers far longer than expected.

In the case of Schlesinger and Colby, it
was clearly the President's intention not to
arbitrarily dismiss them but instead to
offer them substantive appointments,
which would be announced as transfers
rather than firings.

Colby was offered the post of am-
bassador to NATO and Schlesinger
reportedly was to have become head of the
Export-Import Bank. Both men turned
down the offers in conversations with Mr.
Ford before he flew to Jacksonville, Fla.,
Sunday morning.

According to well-placed White House
sources, the Rockefeller letter announcing
he did not wish to be the vice presidential
nominee next year was scheduled for
announcement yesterday morning. The
announcement of the Cabinet shake-up
was scheduled for Wednesday.

"But leaking of the Cabinet shake-up
screwed up the timing," said one high
White House official, who added that Mr.
Ford had no choice but to announce the
Cabinet changes last night.

The President knew that the Rockefeller
letter was coming. White House press
secretary Ron Nessen said the two men
had discussed it late last week.

But it was possible that Rockefeller and
Mr. Ford also had talked about it Oct. 22,
when a scheduled 15-minute meeting
between the two lasted for more than an
hour.

In political appearances in the Midwest
in the two days after this meeting,
Rockefeller repeatedly left the impression

it didn't matter greatly to him whether he
was on the ticket in 1976.

He said in an interview with The
Washington Post at the end of the trip that
he agreed completely with Mr. Ford that
the decision should be made at the
Republican convention next August.

The withdrawal of Rockefeller was
widely viewed by White House officials as
a plus for Mr. Ford in his impending battle
with Ronald Reagan, for the GOP
presidential nomination.

For this reason, it was considered
desirable to release the news of
Rockefeller's withdrawal before the firing
of Schlesinger, who is popular with con-
servatives for his advocacy of big defense
budgets.

But the leaking of the Schlesinger firing
on Sunday ruined this timetable and
conceivably may have hurt Mr. Ford more
with the conservatives than the
Rockefeller withdrawal will help him.

"I think it's a sop to keep us from raising hell," said one prominent conservative officeholder. "But I'm still going to raise hell because this is more important than politics."

A private adviser to the President
believes that Mr. Ford's decision to make
the Cabinet changes crystallized during
the three days of Oct. 20-22 when he was
confined to his residence with a severe
cold.

"It may just be that while the President
had a cold that slowed him down for 15
minutes it gave him time to think about the
stresses and strains in the ad-
ministration," this adviser said. "There's
never an ideal time."

Mr. Ford's most controversial and
difficult decisions, most notably the Nixon
pardon, were closely held and discussed
with only a few persons before an-
nouncement.

This policy of the President's of avoiding
wide discussions of his planned policy
changes gives an enormous advantage to
those few aides who do know about
them—and it was the general opinion in
the White House that Rumsfeld was the
chief beneficiary of this.

Even the nomination of George Bush as

CIA director could conceivably benefit
Rumsfeld if Mr. Ford seeks a vice
president from within his administration.

The CIA directorship probably would be
a political liability for Bush, who was
second choice for vice president at the
time Mr. Ford chose Rockefeller. And by
taking over as director before the
congressional investigations of the CIA are
completed, Bush conceivably could be put
in the position of having to defend past
excesses of the intelligence agency.

But there were other substantive
reasons for appointing Bush, presently

as chairman of the Republican National
Committee from late 1972 until September,
1974.

"What is needed is an outside guy, nationally known, who can work with Congress," said a high White House official. "You've got to have support on the Hill."

The big benefit for Rumsfeld in the
Cabinet shake-up is the equal access he
will enjoy with Kissinger on foreign policy
matters.

Ever since Mr. Ford has become
President, he has spent an hour each day
with Kissinger in private conversation, a
personal access enjoyed by no one else in
the administration.

The President also has spent 20 minutes
each day with Brent Scowcroft,
Kissinger's deputy who will become staff
director of the National Security Council in
Kissinger's place.

Both of these daily private meetings will
be eliminated.

Instead, as a White House official put it,
Mr. Ford will now adopt "a team approach" and schedule a one-hour meeting
each day with top foreign-policy advisers.

Mr. Ford indirectly confirmed at his
press conference that Kissinger's access
will be reduced. He added, however, that
Kissinger "will have the dominant role in
the formulation and the carrying out of
foreign policy."

Later in the press conference Mr. Ford
used the same "dominant role" phrase to
refer to Rumsfeld and defense policy. He
also said that Rumsfeld, a former director
of the Office of Economic Opportunity and
a former NATO ambassador, was
qualified for his new post because he had
"worked with the Department of Defense
as a naval aviator."

Kissinger was described by informed
sources as being unhappy with the changes
but prepared to accept them. He was said
to believe that the move was a concession
to GOP conservatives.

Government sources said that Kissinger
was opposed to the removal of Schlesinger.
Kissinger's relations with Rumsfeld, who
has been suspected of trying twice before
to reduce Kissinger's status, were
described as "restrained" and as "not
antagonistic, but neither are they frien-
dly."

One source said that Kissinger also was
unhappy about Rockefeller's decision to
leave the ticket. Kissinger and the former
New York governor are close friends, and
the source said that Rockefeller's leaving
reduces any chance that Kissinger might
remain during a full Ford term.

A former high-ranking CIA official said
that the new setup was a definite setback
for Kissinger.

Both Kissinger and Rumsfeld will attend
these meetings.

This official said that Scowcroft will
forward his intelligence report to the
President, who will read it privately and
call Scowcroft in if he has any questions.

A former high-ranking CIA official said
that Kissinger had "won a pyrrhic victory
in getting rid of Schlesinger."

"First, he loses his job as head of
National Security Council. something he
has said he would never give up," this ex-
CIA official said.

"This means he will no longer be in
charge of reorganizing the intelligence
community when Ford gets around to that.
It also means he can no longer duck his
battles with (the) Secretary of Defense by
pushing one of his pet schemes through the
NSC."

Additionally, Rumsfeld is likely to be a
far more formidable opponent for
Kissinger in the sense that he has the
confidence of Mr. Ford.

And Rumsfeld, who favors a strong
defense policy, is likely to pick up
Schlesinger's fallen standard and fight
against congressional slashes in the
defense budget.

White House officials purported to be
unconcerned about the impression of
confusion and uncertainty that the slowly
leaked story of the shake-up caused over
the weekend.

It was referred to jokingly by some aides
as "the Sunday morning massacre" or
"the weekend wipeout." And there was no
unusual atmosphere of tenseness. Nessen
said he had "never seen the President in a
better mood."

Officially, at least, the view of the White
House is that the shake-up would wind up
as a considerable plus for the Ford ad-
ministration.

One official said that the new Cabinet
lineup would clear congressional con-
firmation hurdles by Christmas and give
the President a stronger administration in
the election year.

"The whole thing is obviously a bold
move: it's Ford's feeling that he
ultimately strengthens his hand both in
Congress and the country," this high-
ranking official said.

A025

R. R.

SHAKEUP II-5

DAY LD

BY NICHOLAS DANILOFF

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER IS RESISTING POSSIBLE DOWGRADING OF HIS WHITE HOUSE INFLUENCE BY PRESIDENT FORD AND IS TRYING TO MANEUVER HIS OWN MAN INTO THE DEPUTY POST AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OF CIA.

HIGH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DISCLOSED THAT KISSINGER WOULD LIKE HIS STATE DEPARTMENT INTELLIGENCE CHIEF WILLIAM HYLAND, TO BECOME DEPUTY TO LT. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT, FOR HIS NEW ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL

SECURITY AFFAIRS.

KISSINGER RELINQUISHED THE SECURITY AFFAIRS POST IN THE CABINET SHAKE-UP ANNOUNCED BY FORD MONDAY.

AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THE SOURCES TOLD UPI, KISSINGER IS THINKING OF HYLAND AS A POSSIBLE DEPUTY FOR GEORGE BUSH, WHO FORD NOMINATED TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO REPLACE WILLIAM F.

COLBY.

BUSH, NOW THE U. S. REPRESENTATIVE IN PEKING, PRESUMABLY WOULD HAVE TO APPROVE SUCH AN APPOINTMENT, WHICH WOULD BREAK WITH THE TRADITION OF NAMING A MILITARY MAN AS CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR.

HYLAND SERVED AS A SOVIET AND EUROPEAN EXPERT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1969-1974 AND AT THE CIA IN 1954-1969.

ONE KNOWLEDGEABLE ADMINISTRATION SOURCE SAID, "IF SCOWCROFT IS THE CRAVEN IMAGE OF KISSINGER, HYLAND IS EVEN MORE SO." A CONGRESSIONAL SOURCE FAMILIAR WITH THE REPORTS ABOUT HYLAND SAID, "WHATEVER POST HE GETS, THAT INSTITUTION WILL BE KISSINGER'S CREATURE."

THERE WAS NO CONFIRMATION FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE CIA ABOUT A NEW ASSIGNMENT FOR HYLAND.

SOME ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID KISSINGER HAD LOST GREAT POWER IN THE CABINET SHAKE-UP AND THAT INSTEAD OF MEETING AN HOUR A DAY PRIVATELY WITH THE PRESIDENT HE NOW NORMALLY WILL SEE FORD AN HOUR A WEEK.

THEY SAID THE REORGANIZATION WAS AIMED AT PUTTING PRESIDENT FORD'S PERSONAL STAMP MORE CLEARLY ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND ACHIEVING GREATER BALANCE BETWEEN KISSINGER AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. FORD NAMED DONALD RUMSFELD, HIS TRUSTED WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF, TO REPLACE JAMES SCHLESINGER WHOSE BRASHNESS OFFENDED FORD AND WHO DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY WITH KISSINGER ON HOW FAR TO TRUST THE RUSSIANS ON DETENTE POLICY.

FORD, HOWEVER, STATED PUBLICLY IN HIS MONDAY NIGHT NEWS CONFERENCE THAT KISSINGER WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY "THE DOMINANT ROLE IN FORMULATING FOREIGN POLICY."

A VARIETY OF SOURCES IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, INCLUDING THE INTELLIGENCE AREA, AND ON CAPITOL HILL DOUBTED THAT KISSINGER HAD LOST ANY SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF POWER.

"I THINK THE REAL POINT IS THAT I WOULD BE VERY SURPRISED IF RUMSFELD TURNED OUT TO HAVE THE INTELLECTUAL OPPOSITION TO KISSINGER'S POLICIES THAT SCHLESINGER DID," ONE SOURCE SAID, "AND ALTHOUGH KISSINGER AND RUMSFELD DO NOT SEE EYE TO EYE, SCHLESINGER S LOSS IS STILL KISSINGER S GAIN."

SOME INFORMATION

RICHARDSON, CURRENTLY U. S. AMBASSADOR TO LONDON WHO NOW WILL BE FORD S COMMERCE SECRETARY, MIGHT SUCCEED KISSINGER WITHIN A YEAR.
RICHARDSON SAID IN LONDON TUESDAY HE "SUPPOSED" HE WOULD ACCEPT THE POST OF SECRETARY OF STATE OR VICE-PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING MATE TO FORD IN THE 1976 ELECTION IF THE POST WAS PROFERRED. " BUT I DON'T WANT TO MUDDY THE WATERS BY IDENTIFYING MYSELF AS A POSSIBILITY," HE ADDED.

KISSINGER, CLEARLY AWARE OF THE REPORTS SWIRLING ABOUT HIM, JOKED ABOUT HIS REPORTED LOSS OF POWER. HE APOLOGIZED TO KEY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT A WHITE HOUSE MEETING TUESDAY MORNING FOR BEING LATE, SAYING HE WAS "BUSY COUNTING THE JOBS I LOST."

OTHER SHIFTS WHICH CAME TO LIGHT TUESDAY:

-- ARMY LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, HAS ASKED TO BE RETIRED AT AGE 50. PENTAGON SOURCES DISCLOSED. FIRST REPORTS SAID GRAHAM WAS IDENTIFIED CLOSELY WITH SCHLESINGER AND WAS LEAVING BECAUSE OF THE SHAKE-UP. BUT A PENTAGON SPOKESMAN SAID LATER THAT GRAHAM WAS SEEKING RETIREMENT FOR "PERSONAL REASONS."

-- ROBERT ELLSWORTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, WAS REPORTED BY CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES TO BE RETIRING, NOT UNEXPECTEDLY BECAUSE OF LONG-STANDING FRICTIONS WITH KISSINGER.

UPI 11-05 02:14 AES

An Exit Near for Kissinger?

By ROBERT KEATLEY

WASHINGTON—The long run of Henry Kissinger is not yet over, but the pace is slowing and the end is finally in sight.

Seven years ago, a fairly obscure Harvard professor was ushered into Richard Nixon's suite at the Hotel Pierre in New York and hired as the President-elect's assistant for national security affairs. Soon he became Secretary of State—first in fact, eventually in name. Since then, no important U.S. foreign policy move has been made without Mr. Kissinger's acting as investigator, implementer or manipulator, if not all three.

It has been a remarkable run. A maze of relationships with the Soviet Union has been created, perhaps firmly enough to lock the nuclear superpowers into a lasting, if suspicious, state of peace toward each other. Political relations with China are developing. The first serious moves toward a Mideast peace have been achieved, however far away a final settlement remains. Vietnam involvement finally has ended, though as a total defeat for American policy.

Through all this Mr. Kissinger was the dominant figure. Now, in the aftermath of President Ford's personnel shifts, the Secretary of State's role appears to have been changed, if only in degree. As the election nears, Mr. Ford may be retreating a bit from any statesmanlike ideas he entered, and becoming even more of a politician seeking votes. There may be decreased interest in trucking with foreigners, particularly in controversial ways which his chief foreign policy expert might advise.

This doesn't mean Mr. Kissinger's influence has ended, or that he is relegated to secondary status. "... Secretary Kissinger will have the dominant role in the formulation of and the carrying out of foreign policy," President Ford said Monday night. He also emphasized that there will be "stability and continuity in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy," as designed by the Secretary. It's said that Mr. Kissinger remains serene about this week's administration shakeup, and that he expects to retain the presidential ear—even if he has fresh competition from Mr. Ford's political loyalists.

But it's possible to argue that the President has looked at 1976, and seen much potential trouble ahead in foreign affairs. Thus he may be putting a little political distance between himself and that subject, along with the man mainly responsible for its management.

If the early word from the White House is correct, Mr. Kissinger will no longer have his daily hour alone with the President, in which he pushed his diplomatic ideas and batted down contrary thoughts served up by other bureaucrats. Though Mr. Kissinger's only intellectual rival in the administration—James Schlesinger—is leaving the Pentagon, the new man, Donald Rumsfeld, is an ambitious politician whose advice most likely will be more concerned with winning votes now than with historians' respect later. The new man at the Central Intelligence Agency, George

Bush, is another upward striving office-seeker who is unlikely to tell the President things he doesn't want to hear.

In addition, Mr. Kissinger's longtime friend and sponsor, Nelson Rockefeller, has just bailed out. A convinced internationalist, the Vice President concluded he

> Mr. Kissinger has had a gaudy string of successes, but now the administration's emphasis seems more on domestic politics than on imaginative foreign diplomacy.

had no political future with President Ford and so decided to leave on his own terms. Though this is much more a matter of domestic politics than foreign affairs, it must be dispiriting to Secretary Kissinger and another indication that the President's people aren't necessarily his kind of people.

For Henry Kissinger is a confirmed believer in strong, imaginative leadership. Those who make executive decisions must practice "the refusal to confine action to average performance," he has written, and must have vision enough to "define purposes only vaguely apprehended by the multitude." There are few around Washington who would call such traits the hallmarks of Gerald Ford's career, or of those he chooses as associates.

Instead, Mr. Ford may believe strong leadership during the next 12 months will bring him nothing but problems. Despite some diplomatic good beginnings and interim successes, little of a lasting nature has been accomplished and major reverses are all too possible. A foreign setback could help either Mr. Ford's opponents on the right, endangering his chances for the Republican nomination, or his adversaries on the left, endangering his chances to be elected President.

The potential trouble areas include most major aspects of American foreign policy:

* **DETENTE.** Whether future Soviet-American relations can be amicable depends largely on the two countries' abilities to restrain weapons competition and avoid nuclear showdowns. But the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are stalled. There are differences within the U.S. administration, and with the Russians, about how to handle certain weapons programs.

Mr. Kissinger has apparently won the immediate internal battle, now that rival Schlesinger is leaving. But if his views are accepted by the Russians in a SALT agreement, loud and angry protests could erupt from would-be Presidents (perhaps with Mr. Schlesinger testifying before Congress against a pact). Therefore, rather than do something on Mr. Kissinger's advice and risk controversy, President Ford might instead choose to do nothing about SALT before election time. "... We're under no time pressure," he noted Monday night, even though his Secretary of State believes

the two superpowers must act quickly to prevent dangerous consequences.

The President has particular reason for caution. There is a widespread public belief that, in detente, "they" are getting the better of "us," and that this must be stopped. Both Democrats and Republicans seem ready to exploit this attitude politically, to Mr. Ford's disadvantage. Thus, the President's interest in taking political chances must be dissipating quickly as 1976 nears, despite whatever counsel he gets from Mr. Kissinger.

MIDEAST. Three interim agreements have nudged Arabs and Israelis toward a final peace settlement, though nothing is yet guaranteed. The American public is also accepting the idea that supporting Israel's short-term demands isn't necessarily the best way of assuring its long-term survival. Mr. Kissinger receives and deserves the credit.

But what to do next is the problem. The U.S. is trying to arrange a new pact between Israel and Syria, two nations which thoroughly distrust each other. The effort could easily fail at any time, leading to little skirmishes or big war. Then there would be political pressure to give Israel massive support again. Mr. Kissinger might counsel caution so that recent American gains in the Arab world wouldn't be lost, but Candidate Ford would find that hard advice to follow.

CHINA. The opening to Peking was another success, but now the relationship is fraying. China apparently is losing confidence in American willingness to stand up to the Soviets, and therefore is losing interest in being good friends with the chief capitalist state. Peking now may cancel the Ford visit scheduled for the end of this month. Again, a campaigning President could well prefer to let things slide rather than make tough decisions about Taiwan or other subjects which divide Washington and Peking.

None of this should be construed as Mr. Kissinger's diplomatic epitaph. He emerges from the recent shakeups as the only top man with extensive experience in, and knowledge of, complex diplomatic and intelligence affairs. The President will still need him.

But it would seem that President Ford's elevation of two ambitious politicians into defense and intelligence jobs previously held by professionals must also inject more politics into decision-making. White House reports say a little committee that includes Messrs. Kissinger, Rumsfeld and Bush will soon begin meeting often with the President to set major policy lines, replacing the old system whereby the Secretary of State had daily private access.

Years ago, historian Kissinger gave his opinion about committees. They are "concerned more with coordination and adjustment than with purpose," he explained, and act as "consumers and sterilizers of ideas, rarely creators of them." With the election approaching, a little sterilization may be exactly what Gerald Ford has in mind.

Mr. Keatley, a member of the Journal's Washington bureau, covers foreign affairs.

Kissinger loses more than National Security

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Almost every morning since early 1969 a black limousine has stood outside the west wing of the White House with a stationwagon full of Secret Service men close behind. It was Henry A. Kissinger's limousine as Assistant to the President for National Security; he spent half of the day at the White House, including

an hour briefing the President personally.

Now Dr. Kissinger's limousine may not be there so often ... and when it is, it will be there for shorter periods.

Analysts here conclude that a close examination of President Ford's Cabinet shake-up indicates that Dr. Kissinger's real power in foreign affairs has been reduced.

Until now, Mr. Ford has been meeting with Dr. Kissinger for an hour or so each day on foreign policy. While it is not clear whether

Council post

Dr. Kissinger will be meeting with Mr. Ford from now on each and every day (the White House says exact details have yet to be decided) the analysts expect that Dr. Kissinger's preeminent access to Mr. Ford will now be shared with Donald Rumsfeld (new Secretary of Defense), George Bush (new CIA director) and Lt. General Brent Skowcroft (who will take over the daily duties of briefing Mr. Ford as White House national security adviser).

In effect, Dr. Kissinger will have to compete with these men, as he has not had to do before.

Along with his second hat as Assistant to the President for National Security, Dr. Kissinger lost the chairmanship of subcommittees of the National Security Council which control the many strands of the intelligence community.

These subcommittees are:

- The Senior Review Group whose far-flung tasks extend to analysis of the defense budget and arms control issues.

- The Washington Special Action Group, which coordinates policy during crisis and presents options to the President.

- The Intelligence Committee, and the 40 Committee, which coordinated CIA and defense intelligence.

Dr. Kissinger's control of this National Security Council machinery, led a senior Kissinger aide to remark that the Secretary's power was based not on his position as Secretary of State but on his position as adviser to the President and his daily access to the President.

He also once said that the Secretary would rather some day leave office quietly rather than wait until he was taken out and "shot."

But it was Dr. Schlesinger, not Dr. Kissinger who was fired. Nonetheless Dr. Kissinger appears to have lost his daily access and more, and some observers are wondering whether he might not be looking for the opportunity to leave quietly.

Rumsfeld, or Bush, likely
Ford choice for V-P spot

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

President Ford has narrowed his vice-
presidential candidates down to two — Donald
H. Rumsfeld and George W. Bush — and he
has put them into prominent positions where
either would be viewed as a logical choice for
the No. 2 spot.

This evaluation comes from a Washington
source who has for years had access to Mr.
Ford's thinking on political issues.

"George Bush was Ford's original No. 2 choice, next to Rockefeller," this source says. "Then came Rumsfeld, close to Bush."

This informant was involved in the "screening" of Nelson A. Rockefeller before Mr. Ford named him Vice-President. He checked with GOP leaders around the United States and found there would be no serious objection raised to such an appointment.

However, a White House source, who agrees
with the thesis that Mr. Ford probably would
give these two men the "first look" when he
gets around to naming his running mate, sees
Mr. Rumsfeld as more likely to get the nod
than Mr. Bush.

This source contends that Rumsfeld, not
Bush, was the next man on President Ford's
list for the vice-presidential selection, after
Rockefeller, and that Bush was third.

In 1972, when Congressman Gerald Ford
was part of an effort to displace former Vice-
President Spiro T. Agnow on the national
ticket, he let it be known that his first choice
then was Rockefeller and his second choice
Rumsfeld.

Mr. Ford and Mr. Rumsfeld have come
even closer together during the last year in
their President: chief of staff relationship.
Hence speculation that gives the new Secre-
tary of Defense the inside track on the vice-
presidency, with the new head of the CIA a
close second.

Sources here also say that Elliot L. Richardson has moved one step closer to "higher things" by accepting the Commerce Secretary slot. But they contend that Mr. Richardson is being groomed for secretary-of-state service — not the vice-presidency.

Mr. Richardson, it seems, might alienate
some of the very people that were most
unhappy about Nelson Rockefeller — the
conservatives.
*Please turn to Page 11

*Please turn to Page 11

★Ford's V-P choices

*Continued from Page 1*

George Bush, as GOP national chairman,
steered a careful course of loyalty to Richard
Nixon, even though he was known to hold
private misgivings about Mr. Nixon's depart-
ment in Watergate.

He might be the preference for vice-
president among the conservative-oriented
Nixon loyalists — over Mr. Rumsfeld who is
viewed by many Republicans as a "moder-
ate."

Where does Ronald Reagan fit into all this? The implication in the opening up of the vice-presidential slot by Mr. Rockefeller's announcement is that a Ford-Reagan ticket now is a possibility.

Perhaps. But not too likely, as seen here.
Mr. Reagan already has said he is not
interested in being Mr. Ford's running mate.
And while he doesn't say so — and will not
until the last minute — the President's own
preferences lie elsewhere.

The outcome of primary contests between
Messrs. Ford and Reagan could cause both
men to revise their views on a Reagan vice-
presidential slating.