For Immediate Release

NBC NEWS TRANSCRIPT of an interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger
with NBC News Correspondent Edwin Newman

Please Credit NBC News

WEDNESDAY, March 15, 1978

MR. EDWIN NEWMAN: Dr. Kissinger, would the Israelis have been wiser not to do what they did, not to have struck back?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: I think they had to strike back for two reasons. First, there has to be a resistance to terrorism in which innocent civilians are being used for political purposes on matters in which they cannot possibly effect. Second, there have been too many attacks from this area against Israel itself, so that some sort of retaliation was inevitable.

MR. NEWMAN: As a practical political matter, could an Israeli government refrain from retaliating?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think they could and I don't think they should.

MR. NEWMAN: Of course, this has gone far beyond retaliation -- the scope of the Israeli operation is much larger than the Palestinian raid. Does that weaken Israel's position, does it seem to you? Obviously, this is an operation that was in the works for some time.

DR. KISSINGER: I'm not sure that the operation has been in the works for some time. The plan must have been in the works for some time.

For at least six years, there have been terrorist operations from this area, almost invariably directed against civilians and against the type of civilians that could not affect political decisions in any event. I don't think one can look at this retaliatory action by Israel in the context of one incident. It has to be looked at in the context of years of operations that have been going on.

MR. NEWMAN: Does it seem logical to you and acceptable to you that Israel should, as it says, temporarily occupy an area of Lebanon?

Please Credit NBC News

-2-

DR. KISSINGER: My understanding is that what Israel has suggested is its willingness to return this territory to anybody except the Palestinians, who afterall, are invaders there in their own right. I do not think that it should become an Israeli-occupied territory.

I think that negotiations should be started to find some
acceptable organization that could take it over. For example,
the Lebanese Army. The reason the Lebanese Army has not been
in that area was because of its reluctance to fight the
Palestinians. Now the Palestinians have been evicted, I think
negotiations should be started to put the Lebanese Army in
there and then the Israelis ought to withdraw.

MR. NEWMAN: Do you see this as the end for the Palestinians
as a military force?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I don't think it's the end of the
Palestinians as a military force, but it may be the end of the
Palestinians as a terrorist force. It weakens further their
claim to become a major political spokesman in any peace
negotiations with Israel.

MR. NEWMAN: If the Arab nations wanted to come to a settle-
ment with Israel, could the Palestinians prevent it?

DR. KISSINGER: Again, one has to make a distinction between
Palestinians and the PLO. Any peace settlement has to take
into account the aspirations of Palestinians. There are,
after all, a million Palestinian Arabs living in Palestine.
That cannot be ignored.

The question is whether the PLO should be the spokesman
for all the Palestinians, given its terroristic attacks over
a decade, and the fact that last summer they refused a sug-
gestion by the United States, in which the United States would
have prepared to talk to the PLO, if the PLO had only accepted
the existence of Israel.

Under those conditions, I think the PLO as a negotiating
partner becomes substantially out of the question.

MR. NEWMAN: Can you foresee an accommodation between the
Palestinians, not necessarily the PLO, but the Palestinians
and Israel?

Please Credit NBC News

Please Credit NBC News

-3-

DR. KISSINGER: I think it should be possible to work out a negotiation in which King Hussein will negotiate with Israel about the future of the West Bank. Hussein, after all, governed the West Bank until 1967. Until the wrap-up decision of 1974 there was never any question but that Hussein would be the negotiator on that subject.

I think as the peace process develops, Hussein could well play that role. How then, whatever emerges, how its leadership is selected is a matter for the future to decide. That should be left to the election of the Palestinians concerned.

MR. NEWMAN: Dr. Kissinger, have you a theory as to why this happened now -- why the PLO did what it did at this stage?

DR. KISSINGER: The PLO is interested in making the Sadat initiative fail. It belongs to the so-called rejectionist group in the Arab world that does not want the current type of peace negotiations. In fact, there is no evidence that they want any type of peace negotiations, since they have rejected in their program the existence of Israel and refused to accept our suggestion last summer that they enter the negotiation on the basis of accepting Israel.

What the PLO attempted to do with its raid last weekend, in a way, was to trigger an Israeli reaction which would force the other Arabs to support it and perhaps start a sequence of events that would make it impossible to proceed with the peace process.

MR. NEWMAN: Do you think the PLO will succeed, then, in that?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think the PLO will succeed. I think that President Sadat has taken a tremendous initiative which, in a way, is irreversible. The sequence of events that was started by the PLO, in a way, underlines the wisdom of Sadat's initiative. All the PLO raid has achieved is an Israeli reaction in which the Syrians, who are after all, part of the more radical group, had to stand idly by while the Israelis were fighting the PLO. It demonstrated that there is no military solution to this conflict, which is what Sadat has been saying all along.

I believe that if the negotiations now are handled with

Please Credit NBC News

Please Credit NBC News

-4-

wisdom, if a force is put into that border area replacing the
Israelis, other than the PLO, then next week when Prime
Minister Begin comes to Washington some formula will be
found. One should be found which combines the proposals of
Egypt for return of occupied territories with the Israeli
concerns for security, which Sadat has recognized in principle.

I'm really still quite hopeful that a solution will be
found.

MR. NEWMAN: You think that there will be an Egyptian-Israeli
agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that there will be an Egyptian-Israeli agreement and that there will be a West Bank negotiation. When all of this is in train, I don't even exclude that Syria will begin to join the process.

MR. NEWMAN: Why has there not been an Egyptian-Israeli
agreement to this point, given the impetus that Sadat gave the
business when he went to Jerusalem?

DR. KISSINGER: Part of the problem is that nations that haven't been talking to each other for 30 years find it extremely difficult to develop a common language. The Sadat approach is intuitive, sweeping, somewhat poetic. The Israeli approach is somewhat legalistic, precise. To marry these two approaches is, in any event, difficult.

The second problem is to determine to what degree there
has to be a relationship between West Bank negotiations and
Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. As I understand the Sadat
position, it is that if there are some general principles that
apply to him as well as to other Arabs; that he would then be
prepared to negotiate the details of his own situation separately.

It cannot be beyond the wit of man to find some general
principles that encompass both the aspiration to the return of
territories and Israeli concern for security which will then
be negotiated and applied to each circumstance. Obviously, in
the Sinai, where there's a lot of territory, security has one
aspect. On the West Bank, where the old border ran within
eight kilometers of the major Israeli population centers of
Tel Aviv and Haifa, it has a different context. This cannot
be beyond the wit of man to find some formula that recognizes
this reality.

Please Credit NBC News

Please Credit NBC News

-5-

MR. NEWMAN: It did look as though the Egyptian-Israeli talks were not getting anywhere.

DR. KISSINGER: In every negotiation that I have participated in, there's always a period of seeming deadlock. Maybe this negotiation will fail, but the historic opportunity is so unique. If this negotiation fails, the alternative is with so little prospect that I believe both sides will make the necessary adjustments. I believe that next week's visit of Prime Minister Begin will get the process started again.

MR. NEWMAN: What I was wondering about was why, if the PLO did want to and did act in such a way as to sabotage what Sadat was trying to do, it shows a moment when the negotiations appeared to be in the doldrums, getting nowhere.

DR. KISSINGER: Because they probably calculate that the negotiations are going to start up again after Begin's visit to Washington. When I negotiated the second Sinai Agreement, just as I was visiting Egypt for that negotiation, there was an attack on a hotel in Tel Aviv. This is not all that unusual.

MR. NEWMAN: If Prime Minister Begin goes to Washington next week, as he is scheduled to do, does that amount to United States' overt approval of what Israel has just done?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think it is a question of approving every detail tactical stat. I think there is a general international problem which is that an end must be put to the exploitation of innocent civilians for political purposes and for purposes that those civilians cannot possibly affect. In this sense, all nations have an interest in putting an end to terrorism as a form of political and military warfare, and that requires that we show some understanding for this particular Israeli action.

We will have enough other things to argue about with Israel on the peace negotiations. Secondly, I think efforts should now be made to find some force other than the Palestinians to take over that strip of territory which the Israelis have occupied, such as the Lebanese Army.

MR. NEWMAN: Is the Lebanese Army capable of that, by the way?

Please Credit NBC News

Please Credit NBC News

-6-

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Lebanese Army is probably capable of doing this, provided the Palestinians aren't there. Now that the Palestinians have been driven out, so it's just a question of getting the Lebanese in.

MR. NEWMAN: Dr. Kissinger, if you had been in office when this had happened, you would not have intervened or suggested to the Israelis that they not strike back?

DR. KISSINGER: It's always very difficult to judge what one would have done when one is in office. I have no criticism to make of the actions of the United States Government in this situation.

MR. NEWMAN: Probably a vast majority of people who know anything about this would have preferred the events of the last few days not to have happened. Do you think that what has happened may contribute to the prospect for peace?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that what has happened in the last few days must have shown all the parties how precarious the present status is, and that the time has come to create a new reality. If Egypt and Israel can come to an understanding, if Jordan can be induced to join the West Bank negotiations, and especially if Egypt and Israel can come to an understanding, that will create a new reality to which others will have to adjust. And one should remove the temptations for hard-liners on all sides to take drastic measures to prevent what is a moment that may not recur.

MR. NEWMAN: And President Sadat's position, you think, is not weaker than it was?

DR. KISSINGER: I think President Sadat is a great man, and his initiative must succeed. I do not believe that in the long term, his position is weaker. I think what has happened is a form of vindication of his basic statement that the people in the area must learn to live in peace, because the military actions they take against each other are bound to be inconclusive.

-30-

Please Credit NBC News

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

4435 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 244-3540

FOR NBC

PROGRAM The Today Show

STATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE May 12, 1978 7:00 AM

CITY Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT An Interview with Dr. Kissinger

TOM BROKAW: Standing by in Washington with "Today" correspondent [sic], former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is there with Bob Abernathy this morning. And gentlemen, there is no shortage of subjects for you to talk about.

Bob?

BOB ABERNATHY: Thank you, Tom. Good morning. Welcome, Dr. Kissinger. Welcome back here.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee split 8 to 8 on the Middle East arms deal package yesterday, so the proposal has not yet been defeated. But let's assume that the sales go through. What effect will that have, if any, on getting peace negotiations going again in the Middle East?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: I don't think it will have any direct effect on peace negotiations in the Middle East. But Egypt and Saudi Arabia have represented the moderate wing in the Arab world. And I have favored the sale to them on the ground of showing the other Arab countries our support. Of course, I also very strongly favored an increased sale to Israel.

ABERNATHY: In this arms deal, the U. S. is proposing for the first time to sell warplanes to two Arab countries. Why shouldn't the Israelis be worried that this indicates a weakening of our traditional special relationship with them?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't think it represents a weakening of our special relationship to Israel, which goes back through seven presidencies now. Obviously, it creates a new situation, and this is why some of us had favored an additional allotment of

OFFICES IN: NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • CHICAGO • DETROIT • AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES

Material supplied by Radio TV Reports, Inc. may be used for film and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.

-2-

planes to Israel to take care of this special concern. But
there can be no weakening of it.

ABERNATHY: Do you favor even more planes than the
administration is now proposing?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I had favored some additions
to the package, including F-16s, simply in relationship to pre-
vious discussions that took place in the previous administration.

ABERNATHY: According to the NBC News/Associated Press
poll, three out of five Americans oppose not just this arms deal,
but all arms sales. Do you see any real possibility that we can
at least do a lot less of that?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I do not believe we can do a lot
less. Under present circumstances where the Soviet Union is
sending arms to so many additional countries, we cannot both
not commit our own forces, which I support, and not arm our
friends, because otherwise the whole world will collapse.

ABERNATHY: On that kind of thing, John Stockwell, a
former CIA official involved with U. S. activities in Angola a
few years ago, alleges that you and others misled Congress about
the extent of U. S. military involvement in Angola, that we had
American military advisers in Angola itself.

Would you comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let's look at the
situation we faced. We had a major Soviet power play, that in
the period of six months they introduced more arms into Angola
than all the rest of the world was introducing into all the
rest of Africa put together. In a year of intelligence in-
vestigations, in a year where we had withdrawn from Vietnam,
neither President Ford nor I were eager to take on any new
adventures.

But we felt that if we did not resist in Angola, then
the Cubans and the Soviet arms would spread all over Africa,
which they did.

Nobody deliberately misled the Congress to my knowledge.
There were so many restrictions put on by the Congress that it is
conceivable to me that some of the operators in the field cut
corners. But what should -- although I do not know this from my
own personal knowledge. But what should be investigated and what
should be looked into is the question of how the United States can
conduct foreign policy under the challenges that we confront, with
the restrictions, and then every low level person puts out his
version of events.

-3-

We briefed, or the CIA briefed congressional committees twenty-four times, eight different committees. I cannot believe that there was any deliberate misleading.

ABERNATHY: Let me turn back to some current problems, other current problems. Last week, all thirty-eight Republican senators accused the Carter administration of, quote, "inexperience and inept leadership, compromising America's ability to defend itself."

Do you also fear that the administration is permitting the Soviet Union to grain real and potentially decisive military superiority?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say this. When you've been in high office, as I've been, you develop maybe greater compassion for the problems of your successors, particularly when your successor is as distinguished a person as the incumbent Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. I have not agreed with all the policies of the administration, and I have said so when the occasion arose. I have never felt that I wanted to engage in a blanket condemnation across the whole range of policies, and, in fact, I've supported the administration when I thought they were right.

There is a trend in the military balance that has many origins, including the war in Vietnam and the budgetary strin-gencies also at the time, which is worrisome if we do nothing to rectify it as far as the military balance is concerned. So I agree with their statement. But I would generalize and say we have a national task to rectify this military balance.

ABERNATHY: Our time is almost up, but I want to ask you if there is anything that you can think about that this country could do about terrorism, terrorism in Italy?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think there's anything we can do about terrorism in Italy, except to participate with other threatened countries in the exchange of information and the exchange of techniques and to express our profound sorrow and sympathy at this barbarism that is taking place there, which is really a modern version of fascism. It's the excitement of middle class young people who attack all the Institutions and all the values.

ABERNATHY: Dr. Kissinger, many thanks. It's good to talk to you. Back to Tom.

BROKAW: Thanks, Bob, Dr. Kissinger.