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Mr. Nitze felt that under certain conditions it would be expedient to consider Soviet cities as primary targets along with SUSAC. He reasoned that if the United States could hit all Soviet bases it might so enfeeble SUSAC that Soviet response, even against US population centers, might be repulsed. Mr. Wolfers argued that if one assumes that SUSAC can be flattened with the first blow, as Mr. Nitze seemed to be assuming, then there is no need to strike against Soviet cities which could be taken care of at liberty if the necessity should arise. Mr. Noyes doubted, however, that the Russians would feel inclined to limit their blows to military targets. Mr. Wolfers replied that it seems more prudent for this country to concentrate upon Soviet bases and strike against cities in retaliation only, for striking the cities first would in no way inhibit a Russian strike against American cities, while a policy of restraint might encourage then to reciprocate in terms of restraint.

In order to demonstrate the thin line between strategic and tactical uses, Mr. Nash quoted a problem which had been put to General Greunther in a recent press conference: If a city of sixty thousand persons is in enemy hands and is a prime railroad center occupied by three thousand enemy troops, would a bomb dropped upon it be labeled "TAC" or "SAC?"

General Gavin offered a number of comments upon the problem at hand. First, if the United States ever attacks SUSAC, American intelligence is so faulty that the Soviet power to retali ate could not possibly be eliminated. Second, even if all the Soviet cities are atomized, the Red Army would still be rolling. So far, Russia is doing rather well in its program of conquest without using atomic weapons.

The General continued that it would be hard to have a limited war in Europe, and that, furthermore, outbreak of war in Europe would be accompanied by actions in the Middle or Far East. It is difficult to predict the nature of such a war since the pattern of operations would necessarily be set by the first engagement. As for the distinction between TAC and SAC, he observed that SAC is coming to be thought of as an extra long range TAC.

The General stated that conventional fire power within the land forces has risen 80 percent in the last five years, and should increase another 100 percent in the next ten years — without atoms. He felt that the group must not underestimate the extent to which combat power has increased through greater mobility and fire power. He conceded that the USSR can strike at a variety of means with deep penetration, but that the NATO defensive zone would be able to absorb penetrations as deep as 150 miles. In his opinion, the United States could whip the Soviet Union without using any atomic devices, by virtue of its superior fire power. Therefore, he concluded that as long as the US is willing to expend its conventional forces, it might be in its own interests not to introduce the atom as a weapon. Mr. Noyes agreed that this is the only sort of limitation which makes sense, but General Lindsay disagreed that the job could be done conventionally.

Mr. Nitze asked General Gavin what he thought needed to be done. He replied that Europe is getting a bad "nuclear neurosis." He felt that there are many ways to do a precise job of meeting Soviet aggression, and if the United States does this job or demonstrates its capability to do so, it can do much to alleviate European fears while at the same time counteracting certain tendencies toward neutralism.

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The Turks, on the other hand, are in a good position to take care of themselves. Present power conditions offer the best opportunity which Russia has ever had to seize the Straits, but the situation is certainly not hopeless.

In the Eastern quadrant the Soviets could move into Iran from north of the Caucasus, placing eight to twelve divisions at the Zagros Mountains within days and six to twelve divisions at Suez within months unless opposed by outside power. The Russian troops bearing upon this area are in good condition and know the terrain from previous experiences.

The US could marshal approximately the following support from the Middle East: six to twelve Greek divisions within thirty days, eighteen Turkish divisions, perhaps six divisions in Iran, very few troops in Iraq, and eight divisions in Pakistan, although these troops pose a considerable problem of modernization. The United States is giving aid to all these forces, but it must be remembered that these divisions are not entirely comparable to Western divisions.

General Gavin turned to the problem of defining the term "conventional force." He observed that it certainly cannot be defined in terms of men marching in close-order drill; preoccupation with the atom bomb has tended to cover up the developments of the air age and its greater mobility. Combat power is the product of fire power times mobility, and tends to advance in an almost geometric progression. New types of weapons and fire power have been given a strategic lift by greatly improved helicopter and fixed-wing craft, and transitors, television, miniaturization, and other improvements in the techniques of war have increased conventional potentials.

General Gavin produced a series of charts for the group to illustrate the changed nature of war. In the first instance, a typical defensive sector in terms of 1943 capabilities showed troop and supply densities ranging from 4,000 to 599 men per five square kilometers. (The grid of five square kilometers is based upon the approximate vulnerability of troops to a fifty KT device.) In this World War II defensive scheme, communication and supply lines were monolithic, and could have been paralyzed by a blow at the central command area. In the second instance, he showed a schematic view of an optimum defense designed to shield against atomic attack to a depth of 125 miles of controlled dispersion. This plan included alternate command headquarters, with all communication and logistic lines following a grid pattern to allow for maximum independence. Troop density in the second example reached a maximum of 1500 men per five square kilometers.

The modern defense is designed to contain the effects of long-range weapons, mainly through greater mobility. Under this scheme, seventy-five miles of penetration would be normal as compared with five miles under World War II expectations. The history of the battle line represented on the charts goes back to the beginnings of military history, and traditionally crossings of this line have involved the movement of troops to within one night's march of the river, where a convenient forest has provided cover until a fully-assembled force could make the final march and assault. Under the new scheme, advance would have to be made from deep positions in distant mountains by self-contained battle groups preceded by parachute and infiltration raids. These battle groups constituting the main force would move by helicopter and amphibious tracked vehicles across the line, engage the enemy, seize the area.

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and disperse quickly to the positions of optimum defense previously outlined. It is important to notice that these tactics would be necessary even without the threat of atomic attack by the enemy; they are made possible and necessary because of recent developments in conventional fire power and mobility.

General Gavin stressed that if in the future the need arises to defend the Middle East, this defense must begin where the Middle East begins, the defense to follow the pattern described above. He expressed confidence that a non-atomic threat could be met successfully in the area, and that an atomic threat probably could. He commented upon efforts to force the Middle East into some sort of treaty arrangement with the West -- some sort of a METO -- and noted that the West must recognize the desire of these nations to accommodate themselves to a difficult power situation, which makes neutralism an inviting course. Any mutual defense organization for the Middle East must come from within, although as a practical necessity it would probably need US staff officers.

He examined briefly the consequences of hostility. Oil is a primary consideration, for seventy-five percent of the world's proven reserves is in this area, and seventy-five percent of Western European oil comes from these fields. If it is assumed that a Soviet move in the Middle East is not met by US force within forty-eight hours, the use of strategic bombing on the Soviet Union could not prevent its occupying the Middle East. However, one NATO division from Europe within forty-eight hours, and one from the United States within four days, might contain a Soviet push at the Zagros Mountains. At that point, there would be a choice between using atomic devices and inviting Soviet retaliation against the oil fields, or containing the aggression with limited resources. If it is assumed that the USSR pushed to the oil fields and Suez, the length of time required would give the West a reasonable prospect of containing them there. Under these conditions, it would seem logical to do without atomic support, the use of which might in the long run cause the loss of Europe and set off World War III.

The General suggested that the view of the Army toward the atom could best be explained by recalling that the Army is tied to the land, and that to a certain extent the Air Force is also, for, in the words of Billy Mitchell, an airplane is a weapon which is "inversely effective as the distance to target." To stay close to the target requires the continuing good will of the allies, which is to say that the United States must be able to attack the USSR without reducing the allies to ashes. There is a strong desire in the Middle East to defend the area without resorting to ultimate weapons, which seem to have no advantage for either the natives or the Americans. The task is to go after the Soviets with greater fire power and mobility. Freedom begins where men are willing to fight for it, and the men of the Middle East will stand as long as they know that Americans are willing to stand and fight with them.

Mr. Nitze observed that it might not be possible for the United States to divert a division from Europe, for an attack in the Middle East might preclude a general attack. General Gavin replied that technically it is possible to transfer a division from Europe, but whether or not such an action would upset the general defense picture is a more serious problem. He noted that NATO is in the process of assembling an airborne division which should increase the flexibility of Western forces. He reiterated the importance of the Middle East as a land bridge, and the crucial position of Suez and North Africa along main lines of communication.

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General Lindsay felt that he could endorse the main points in General Gavin's analysis, except that he believed that Middle Eastern oil could be reserved for the West only so long as a war remained extremely limited. In the face of general war the refineries might prove to be more vulnerable to the ordinary actions of war than the fields themselves would be. Of course, if Russia does over-run the fields, the US could easily prevent their being of use.

General Lindsay continued that placing a US force in the Middle East would require an intensive operation by surface or air transport; for this and other reasons Western policy is to maintain local forces of sufficient size to draw the enemy into target-size concentrations. The United States has the capability to make local manpower effective, and because of such factors as pay-scale differentials — 26¢ per month in the Greek Army as compared with $85 per month in the American Army — this is the most economic way.

As far as the Air Force is concerned, bases are available for operations either within the NATO frame or from the continental US. Units of TAC could be brought to bear within four days, but if the Air Force is called upon to bring up TAC at the same time that it must carry land forces to the area, its capability might be strained. He conceded that the Air Force probably cannot provide as much lift as the Army would like to have available. SAC could be very useful in cutting the enemy's lines of communication in the mountains north of the area where the terrain forces the lines to constrict. Of course, the local Soviet forces have a high capability for living off the land, but still they could not operate so effectively if their supply lines were disrupted. However, to make really effective use of air strength in the area, the United States would probably have to employ atomic devices. The main problem is one of equalization of force; if enough conventional force can be applied to meet Soviet aggression promptly, use of the atom might be avoided.

General Gavin noted that a frequent question is whether or not the Army can employ small yield atomic weapons. He stated that the Army has a comprehensive atomic arsenal which it would like to be free to use so long as such an action did not trigger a nuclear war. He cautioned that the Soviet Union has a good atomic capability also. General Lindsay felt that there is a better chance of limiting an atomic war in the Middle East than in Europe, and Mr. Noyes agreed that the defensive use of the atom in the mountains of the Middle East is easier than in the populous areas of Europe.

General Gavin noted that as far as the tactical use of these weapons goes there is an advantage in surprise attack, but he cautioned that the Soviet Union has a higher mobility now than this country. Soviet technical capabilities must not be underestimated. Pictures of the May Day Parade of one year ago showed helicopters ideally suited for movement of men and equipment in full operation, and of a design which is still superior to any operational planes of this country. While the US chases after SUSAC, the Red Army can be on the move everywhere. Defense against such conventional operations can be tightened somewhat at local levels, but there are complex questions of liaison. A battle plan of controlled dispersion allows for flexible contact with the enemy according to on-the-spot tactical decisions. Mr. Kissinger inquired if the decision to resist a conventional movement in Iran, for instance, would be made considering the local force levels. General Gavin noted that in the case of Korea decision to resist had been made, with the expectation that a division could be flown over, but the Army succeeded in

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getting over only two rifle companies. The full airborne division was not sent because Washington feared that Korea was only the initial stage of a general Soviet push. The presence of US forces in the Middle East, however, would have a strong morale and psychological impact upon local troops.

Mr. Noyes raised a doubt that the United States would commit a division without deciding in advance to use atomic support. General Gavin felt that the military might very well make such a commitment in the face of the inadequacy of a policy of massive retaliation for dealing with limited wars, but he noted that democracy is a very flexible political entity and needs a flexible strategy to give it power at the council table. There may be a graver problem in the future if public opinion continues to recoil from the thought of using any atomic device, but the problem of Soviet conventional nibbling must be faced up to.

Mr. Wolfers felt that the US need not refrain from using tactical A-bombs in the Middle East simply because the USSR might retaliate against Middle Eastern oil, because the US could do even greater damage to Soviet oil. General Gavin agreed that the Soviet Union probably doesn't need Middle Eastern oil since it has the Ploesti and other fields. The US could destroy 50 percent of Soviet oil production, while for the USSR to destroy 50 percent of Middle Eastern production would require a high effort.

Mr. Wilson wondered if local forces would be considerably stiffened through the use of small yield atomic weapons. General Gavin thought so, and added that of course HE weapons don't spare cities or civilians. He felt that the Army's tactical weapons, of the atomic variety, would be efficient if used against military targets. However, he did not feel that the United States should publicize its intentions of defending allied areas with atomic weapons.

Mr. Altschul wondered if a Soviet drive to the Gulf could be localized. General Gavin thought that it could. The choice of whether or not to localize the aggression rests with the US. However, it is just as likely that the Soviet might move into Iran under cover of a non-aggression treaty and set up a puppet regime. Actually, it is not in the Soviet interest at this time to use naked force. Mr. Altschul suggested that a move to the Gulf would be considered in this country as an attack upon the United States. Mr. Nitze wondered if this country would respond to such a move with full mobilization. General Gavin thought that it is better to have a multi-facet policy with high mobilization instead of a single strategy based upon full mobilization and a weapons system which the Soviets might neutralize by choosing less overt means of aggression.

Mr. Nash inquired about the role of the Navy and the Marine Corps in the defense of the Middle East. General Lindsay said that the airborne Marine divisions are designed to be used in air assault operations rather than in long-range attacks. The Navy would not be able to bring its carriers very close nor keep them very long.

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Mr. Franklin believed that the US might resist aggression in the Middle East first with conventional weapons if these promised a reasonable chance of success. If not, then it would have to resort to atomic devices. He did not see how this country could accept the loss of the Middle East without using such weapons.

Mr. Noyes felt that the Middle East is tied to NATO through Turkey, but General Gavin felt that although Turkey would support Iran and other nations of the Middle East, NATO would not necessarily become involved. He added that the USSR would not just drop bombs and come in, that there would be no clean-cut case of aggression.

Mr. Nash wanted to know if the military is making its plans on the assumption that atomic weapons will be available to them. General Lindsay felt that the answer to this question depends upon the area of the world involved. Mr. Noyes noted that if the United States decides that it cannot use tactical A-bombs against open aggression moving into Iran through a sparsely settled area, against Caucasians, and in the interests and perhaps at the request of the natives -- thus eliminating many of the political objections to using atomic devices -- it would never be able to use them. Mr. Nitze felt that if a political decision must be made it should be based upon a complete military opinion. If the Middle East is lost, NATO and other alliance structures might very well collapse. A major question to be decided then, is whether or not the Middle East can be successfully defended without the atom.

Mr. Altschul wondered if Soviet attack toward the Gulf would result in a US decision to initiate all-out war. Mr. Nitze asked for a consensus of group members on this point. Mr. Moore felt that it might bring a greater response in this country than an attack on Quemoy and Matsu, but he doubted that it would trigger all-out war. Dr. Warren agreed that there is considerable popular concern in this country over the dangers of all-out war, and he felt that there is less chance of such a thing happening now than there had been earlier. Mr. Price agreed, but he thought that this public hesitancy is less a question of saving US cities than of calculating possible adverse world-wide reaction. Mr. Pace did not believe that the Russians intend to give a clear-cut provocation in the Middle East, but he felt that if they do the people of this country would not support an all-out war.

Mr. Altschul wondered if Mr. Pace had meant to imply that this would be the case even if it seemed certain that the Middle East would be lost. Mr. Pace observed that in Korea the original intention had been to defend south Korean interests with units of the American Air Force and Navy, but that the surprise offensive had forced the prompt insertion of UN troops. He suspected that in any such similar situation in the Middle East the military will equivocate and arrive at no clear-cut decision until after the Soviets have been successful in their policy of creeping aggression. The Soviet Union is not likely to allow itself to get into the position of an obvious aggressor, and in the absence of such a clear situation it will be difficult to persuade the American people that a Middle Eastern quasi-crisis necessitates precipitating total war.

Mr. Nash felt that if the United States will back to the limit its commitment to the Middle East, then it must declare publicly its intention. Such action may be able to guarantee that the USSR will refrain from overt action, but it will not inhibit Communist infiltration tactics.

The Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held its seventh meeting on November 14, 1955, at 5:30 at the Harold Pratt House. Present were: Gordon E. Dean, Chairman and Discussion Leader; Henry de Wolf Smyth, Discussion Leader; Carroll L. Wilson, Research Secretary; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hamilton Fish Armstrong; William A. M. Burden; John C. Campbell; Melvin Conant; William T. R. Fox; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N. E. Halaby; Caryl P. Haskins; Col. William Kintner; Major General James McCormack, Jr.; Colonel Daniel V. MacDonald; Philip E. Mosely; Frank C. Nash; Paul H. Nitze; Charles P. Noyes II; James A. Perkins; Don K. Price; David Rockefeller; Oscar M. Ruebhausen; Peter Scoville; Major General R. L. Vittrup; Shields Warren; Arnold Wolfers; Ben T. Moore.

The first meeting of the Study Group for the years 1955-56 was opened by Mr. Dean, who introduced those persons who had not previously attended meetings of the Group.

Mr. Dean reviewed the topics of previous meetings of the Group, noted that Mr. Kissinger had sent a letter outlining his reactions to the early meetings to all the members of the Group, and suggested that it would be useful for Mr. Kissinger to summarize the replies of Group members as a basis for discussion of the program for the coming year.

## Agenda for This Year's Study

Mr. Kissinger pointed out that while the technical aspects of nuclear weapons were important, the most difficult problems confronted by the Study Group were in the area where power acts upon policy, and alternative programs are formulated. As a point of departure, Mr. Kissinger discussed the thesis recently advanced by Walter Lippmann that recourse to force having become impossible, all that is left is the conduct of diplomacy. Mr. Kissinger argued that force and diplomacy were not discrete realms, that on the contrary the military capabilities of a nation determined its conception of alternatives in the international field. To be sure, in certain periods of history the power element was not made explicit, but this was because it was so well understood that the diplomats always had it in the back of their minds.

Mr. Kissinger illustrated these observations by two examples: the current argument about Soviet "atomic blackmail" and the crisis of our system of alliances. He referred to a discussion of another study group which talked of atomic blackmail as if the threat always had to be explicit. But in an international system composed of sovereign states the capability of another power constitutes an implicit threat. Thus blackmail has two components: the capability of a power and the belief of the other states that this capability may be used. From this point of view the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal coupled with the Soviets' reputation for ruthlessness is itself a form of blackmail. Similarly the crisis in the U.S. system of alliances is caused not so much by a failure of diplomacy as by the inability of our allies to see the military significance of their own contributions.

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the politico-military; historical study of Russian diplomacy to determine the
use made of the technique of limited war; atomic blackmail.

Mr. Kissinger announced that some of the studies the staff is undertaking
will be ready by January. These include an analysis of Soviet strategy, a
number of case studies of wars of limited objectives in the past, and the
reactions of America's allies, particularly Britain, France and Germany to the
nuclear problem. He said that he also is preparing an historical essay on
limited wars and objectives, based upon the inter-relations of war, interna-
tional power systems, and theoretical concepts of the past. Mr. Dean proposed
that some of these subjects, such as international control, might best be
handled by a sub-group composed of those members with relevant experience in
the various fields who could then place well-developed ideas before the full
panel. He added that naturally all working papers would be distributed to
the full Group as they were completed.

Mr. Noyes dissented from the proposed plan of action, noting the possible
danger of leaving final conclusions until too late in the year, after allowing
too much energy to be expended on details. Mr. Wilson explained that he feels
that a division into sub-groups is the best system under which to get definitive
results. Since the group is not aiming at a panel report but is to help Mr.
Kissinger get his ideas in order, the proposed system seems to him to be the
best way of defining the problems being considered.

Mr. Dean thought it wise to outline the possible sub-groups. He felt
that one might examine Soviet strategic doctrines; another, the American exper-
iences in Korea and Indo-China; a third, the arms equation between us and the
U.S.S.R. Mr. Armstrong suggested that besides studying the arguments that had
been advanced for limiting the war in Korea, the same viewpoint might be
applied to Formosa, and with equal relevance to Quemoy-Matsu. Mr. Kissinger
felt that the problems of control and regulation might be considered by the
first sub-group, while whatever ways in which the Soviet Union may have a
strategic superiority could be considered by the whole panel.

Mr. Smyth observed that the object of any report that the Group writes
is not unanimity but thoroughness; the actions of the Group members should be
calculated to inform and stimulate Mr. Kissinger in the preparation of his
study.

Mr. Kissinger thought that the Group might be interested to hear his
proposed schedule. The first chapter, largely historical, will be ready for
presentation at an early meeting. The manuscript should be completed by July;
it might be necessary to have additional meetings of the Group next fall. He
felt that the sub-groups could begin their work by December, and that most
of the studies and reports of the sub-groups would be available before a
February meeting of the full panel. Naturally, papers and reports would be
distributed to the members as they developed.

Mr. Kissinger read the main topics from an outline he had prepared
setting forth the aims of his study. Since the outline in its entirety will
be distributed to members shortly, these topics will not be listed in the
digest.

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Mr. Halaby entered a general dissent to the program outlined thus far, which he suggested might be in conflict with the original purposes of the discussion group. He said that the ends of the Group should be to create a constructive body of thought, enable the members to remain informed, clarify their own thinking on the subject, and provide a forum for an exchange of ideas. He felt that the best means toward these ends are to hold general discussions while sub-groups concentrate on major points of the outline. He felt that it would be an unwise policy to postpone meetings of the whole group, which should meet at least every six weeks to review the points covered by the sub-groups. Mr. Wilson pointed out that the progress of the sub-groups will generate the timing for the group as a whole.

Mr. Dean expressed his willingness to leave to Mr. Kissinger the determination of which points in the outline the full panel might take up with profit. Mr. Wilson observed that the staff is well aware of the great importance of disseminating information to the members, and Mr. Dean felt that the expected documents from the staff would help to generate discussion. Mr. Halaby said that he hoped that the emphasis could be placed upon discussing and thinking. Mr. Dean observed that everyone concerned with the study group was going to have to do lots of thinking under any condition, and added that a thorough ordering of various ideas should prove helpful. In addition, Mr. Wilson noted that the group had a certain obligation to spread its conclusions beyond the confines of the Council meeting room.

Mr. Franklin agreed that the staff work would assist in organizing the thoughts of the group, and that if Mr. Kissinger is to be successful in his difficult task he must draw upon the experience of the members wherever possible. On behalf of the staff, Mr. Dean promised to get the papers out fast, and set up the sub-groups soon.

## The Smyth Report on Disarmament

Mr. Dean noted that a major point not previously covered in meetings of the group is disarmament and international control of nuclear devices, so he had asked Dr. Smyth, who has been particularly concerned with these matters for a number of years, to present a brief resume.

Dr. Smyth said that he wished to concentrate on the technical problems of control and on the changes in these problems since the birth of the bomb, for he felt that these would be of more interest to the group than a history of the various disarmament discussions, which history is better known to other members of the group anyway.

In 1945-46 the situation was briefly this: The United States had a monopoly consisting of a very small number of bombs which were produced by a process not particularly diffused in terms of either geography or technical knowledge. There were three principle sources of ore, the Belgian Congo, the Great Bear Lake in Canada, and Czechoslovakia, plus small but undeveloped deposits in the Colorado Plateau and South Africa. While it was known that more sources would be discovered, at this time the control of ore at the source would have been easy. It would have been simple to control the production of atomic devices by controlling the sources of uranium. for it is as true now as it was then that a source of uranium is basic to production of an atomic bomb.

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Processing, or what might better be called purification of the ore, took place only in the United States at a few places and on a small scale. The converting of ore to explosive material was then taking place either through the plutonium process at two plants at Hanford, embracing three reactors, or at Oak Ridge where 235 U was being produced. This fabricating process did not require major production facilities, which actually were limited in both type and number.

At what stages would control and inspection been feasible at that time? Mining is an activity difficult to hide, and may be detected by simple inspections such as aerial surveying. Processing of the ore is hard to detect. The explosive plants themselves, at least as evolved in the U S., are large, although the only indication of what goes on at Oak Ridge would be its large use of electric power. Hanford, however, might be detected by its distinctive processing plant sitting in the middle of the desert, although the reactors themselves could have been hidden. Chemical processing plants are subject to detection from their radiation. Mr. Stassen spoke recently of setting scientific minds to work to find mysterious new detecting devices, but Dr. Smyth averred that the only fool-proof way to inspect a possible processing area is to go into it with a long screwdriver.

The United States felt at the time that the only way to prevent misuse of the atom was by having an international agency own and operate world plants, and control fissionable materials from their source to their end use. It was also felt at that time that such an agency would have to give considerable research and development responsibility to its employees in order to attract competent personnel for the more menial inspection tasks. Dr. Smyth observed, however, that there are now so many competent technicians throughout the world that recruiting inspectors today would be much easier.

The object of this proposed line of control was "absolute," in that no weapons could have been made nor have become available without the consent of the international agency. While this scheme was at the time technically feasible, political difficulties of setting up the agency proved insurmountable.

The Baruch Plan may have been idealistic, but it is important even though rejected. Americans can rightly be proud of their altruism. In an effort to gain acceptance of the Plan, the United States in the early years talked of implementing it in stages, but these stages were never designated until 1952 through various working papers in the State Department. A similar list of stages for implementation were suggested in the Cohen Report of 1953. The first stage would include disclosure of the military machine, with the information to give a clear index of strength, a verified report of size, and a listing of product facilities. The second stage would detail the organizational plan of military and armament units. The third stage would provide detail on armaments except those of a "novel" type not employed regularly during World War II, while the fourth stage would include detailed information of these novel arms. The last stage would provide for detailed disclosure of the kinds and amounts of atomic weapons, as well as plans and specifications.

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The rationale of the program is that negotiations could have broken down at any stage without giving a military or intelligence advantage to any one nation. Soviet response, of course, consisted of a series of plans either vague or inadequate.

Dr. Smyth confessed a certain perplexity over a recent article in the *New York Times* headlined "Molotov Attacks Eisenhower Plan" for he thought that the article fails to recognize adequately the extent to which Soviet views expressed recently in the UN and at Geneva have shifted from their original position of obstruction, although, of course, this shift falls far short of making any effective control possible. While Russia has always insisted upon prohibition of the bomb as prelude to international control, it is now saying that the reduction of 25 per cent in conventional armaments could precede the prohibition of nuclear weapons. While this is not a dramatic shift of policy, nevertheless it represents a conceivable bargaining point.

Even though American-Russian differences of opinion on the disarmament subject may be decreasing, the subject remains largely academic since it is not probable that any sort of control could be set up retroactively because of inherent difficulties in locating completed weapons, etc. Mr. Dulles has spoken of effecting retroactive control, but Dr. Smyth said that he doubts that any fool-proof way of doing so can be found.

He outlined some of the technical problems involved in controlling the atom at this stage of its maturity. He again stressed that screwdriver inspection is the only guaranteed means of detection. Even with complete access to records it is impossible to tell if fissionable material has been secretly diverted. The records of the AEC, which certainly are no less accurate than those of any other country, begin when the ore is mined by determining the approximate amount of uranium in the ore through sample analysis. Mr. Wilson injected at this point the hope that this sampling process is as accurate as the AEC thinks it is, since it forms the basis of payment for the ore. Dr. Smyth continued that in the purification process a perfect materials balance is never achieved. That is, the amount of uranium in the tailings added to the amount of pure end product never equals exactly the assumed amount of uranium in the ore. While one may speculate about the amount of material which may get stuck in pipes or go down the drain somewhere, one can never know that a missing percentage of material actually has been lost; diverting small but steady portions of uranium during the manufacturing process would be simple.

Shipping uranium in several stages to Oak Ridge or Hanford to make plutonium or U235 has disclosed other ways in which material may get lost, although discrepancies throughout the fabricating process may only show up manufacturing inefficiencies. This same thing holds true in the later stages of production in which, for example, despite floors of special composition, recovery of chips, if machining is necessary, is not always successful. When the entire process from ore to bomb is considered, it is impossible to account for all materials.

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After the recess for supper, Dr. Smyth discussed some of the changes in technology which have an effect upon control problems today. He noted that the same steps in the manufacture must be followed but instead of the original three sources of raw material many mines have been opened in the Colorado Plateau; there are two large ore producing areas in Canada, and additional deposits are being worked in Australia, France, French Morocco, and other countries. There are many more production facilities today, principally in the United States, Russia, Britain, France for plutonium, and other countries, and these sources will be proliferated by plutonium by-products as power reactors become more common. It seems patent that as peace time uses of atomic energy become more clearly understood it will be impossible to deny the right to maintain reactors to even the smallest country, so that in the near future smaller and perhaps less politically responsible nations may produce weapons on a small scale to enhance their own power with regard to their neighbors. The political situation in Latin America might tend to breed this sort of development.

Dr. Smyth observed that the only true answer to control is a radical one -- next down all plants having to do with fissionable materials. Obviously, it is easy to detect at some point in the production line facilities which are being used to produce fissionable materials, but it is extremely difficult to measure the amounts being produced, or the uses to which end products are being put. This radical answer would not adversely affect peacetime uses of atomic energy, for present stockpiles could provide a long time power source. For example, a 20 MT bomb can release an amount of energy equivalent to roughly one-twentieth of the electrical energy consumed in the United States in one year. Naturally, the difficult political question of international ownership would remain to be solved, but at least such a cessation of production could provide some extent of control over the uses of end products.

The only point at which the picture is now more simple than it was in 1946 is that the recruiting of personnel for any kind of inspection scheme is made easier by the multiplication of competent technical personnel throughout the world. There is also the very slight advantage that the world now knows that the Soviets have been able to explode a bomb, which fact at least prevents the Russians from pretending that they have no knowledge or facilities to disclose.

The question to be answered today, Dr. Smyth thought, is one of redefining the objects of control. In other words, is some control better than none? Dr. Smyth made it clear that he was not making a personal recommendation of action, but he said that it seems to him that the logical ends of any control system must be to limit future use, close production facilities and turn them over to international ownership, and finally, to vest an international agency with ownership of existing supplies of fissionable materials.

Dr. Smyth raised the additional point of whether it is wise to continue large-scale testing of atomic devices in view of the criticism that testing has a deleterious effect on world health. He went so far as to suggest that at the present advanced state of the art in this country the United States would lose relatively little advantage through multilateral ending of tests. On this subject, Mr. Dean said that, assuming U.S. leadership in research, any agreement

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of this sort would serve to maintain U.S. technical supremacy, with the added
advantage that any violation of a no-test rule can be detected easily and quickly.
Mr. Noyes felt that this sort of action has importance only as a part of the
larger picture of control of the atom, and Dr. Smyth conceded that the value is
largely psychological. Regarding the effect of off-lation by-products on the world
health level, Dr. Warren observed that real knowledge is scant, and while he
agreed with Mr. Scoville that there has been no detectable ill-effect to date,
no one can tell how many more explosions can take place before there are ill-
effects. Mr. Wilson pointed out that quite obviously the reaching of any such
danger point in the explosion of test weapons would limit every kind of use
of the bomb.

General McCormack, while noting that testing involves many types of
activity other than setting off large reactions -- such as arranging small
missiles for tactical use -- felt that if mutual concessions are to be had
from the Soviet Union they are worth considering, but he observed that past
experience augurs badly for success. Mr. Halaby, addressing the scientists
present, inquired if paper can replace practice in advancing the art. Dr.
Smyth felt that the point at which this will be true is approaching. However,
Mr. Burden said that if advancement of the art no longer depends upon tests
there is very little reason to try to limit them. Dr. Smyth again alluded to
the intangible, psychological and health advantages which might accrue. Mr.
Wilson thought that if it be true that the United States has a technical lead,
ending tests has a positive advantage, but Dr. Smyth admitted that the United
States can never know with certainty whether it has a lead.

Colonel Kintner warned that ending large-scale testing on the basis
that it constitutes a health hazard might result in opening the door to the
Soviet "ban the bomb" program, which from the Western point of view is diametric
to a real control of the atom for peace. Mr. Wilson questioned that these steps
would serve the cause of over-all control.

Dr. Smyth was of the opinion that most other countries prefer bilateral
agreements with the United States to obtain the wherewithal for peacetime applica-
tions of atom energy, but he felt that an international set-up in this area might
serve as a functional pilot study for international weapons control. Mr. Dean
at this point made some observations about the relation of peaceful uses of
the atom to the foreign policy picture.

## The Atom as a Diplomat

Mr. Dean set forth some of the facts which will determine American policy
regarding the dissemination of information and materials for peacetime uses of
atomic energy. First, regardless of what the United States does the United
Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Canada, can make their bombs from scratch, and France
will at least have a supply of plutonium. Second, other countries such as
Norway, India, Australia, and Brazil should be able to produce bombs within a
few years. Third, the present United States policy consists of a series of
bilateral agreements for the purpose of establishing research reactors. Under
the terms of these agreements, the United States is to provide, at least once,

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using this plutonium to make weapons and this problem will be magnified as
more and more nations obtain plutonium from their power reactors.

Colonel Kintner wondered whether or not such a development might be the
forerunner of the emergence of a third force in world politics, and suggested
that it also might make some of the weaker Western European allies feel a
greater sense of responsibility and accomplishment toward NATO. Mr. Dean
was more pessimistic, however, since the French might use the bomb in
some future Moroccan crisis, or some other nation in a Latin American border
incident. Mr. Noyes observed that at least such use would lead to the bomb
being considered a conventional weapon. A number of persons seemed to feel
that it already is.

Mr. Halaby suggested that without control everyone is going to have an
atomic bomb, and Mr. Wilson speculated that when and if other nations are in a
position to upset the American-Soviet balance, the two nations may see a
common interest in establishing international control. He thought that at
this point there is a strong connection between Atoms for Peace and control.

Mr. Ruebhausen supposed that one way of selling this joint "Pax-Romana"
would be as a way toward freeing atomic power. Mr. Wilson said that while it
might give America and Russia their first mutual interest in some time it is
also possible that their competitive instincts might override any mutuality.
Mr. Perkins said that history favors competition. Mr. Kissinger said that he
failed to see the mutuality of interest between us and the U.S.S.R. on control-
ting the smaller powers, since the Soviets were in any case able to control
their satellites when the possession of atomic weapons by either Israel or
Egypt, for example, could only multiply our problems.

Mr. Noyes wondered if an international agency could stop local manufacturing
efforts without exercising complete control. Dr. Smyth thought that this could
happen only if such an agency could provide arrangements more attractive than
private deals. Mr. Noyes added that one condition of a country's right to
participate in any such scheme would have to be its surrender of the right to
make bombs, and Mr. Wilson thought that such an arrangement would seem
attractive only insofar as it enabled countries to reach their power require-
ments soon.

Mr. Fox observed that even if an international agency has its own supply
of disciplinary atomic bombs, these have to have some geographic location, and
so will be ultimately subject to the control of the nation in which they reside.
Mr. Wilson thought, though, that even under these conditions future atomic peace
has a better chance. Mr. Dean said that an international agency for peacetime
uses of the atom could indeed have many inducements. If, for example, there
were distributed appropriately around the world about five production facilities
and reprocessing plants for power elements, the amount of money and inconvenience
to be saved would provide a strong attraction to most nations to join the power
scheme. Unfortunately, such a system would do nothing to answer the question
of what to do with those nations which already have a supply of bombs. In
answer to Colonel Kintner, Mr. Dean pointed out that such a system would not
be just the same as the present one under which the United States is the sole
purveyor of enriched materials, for the proper distribution of the Agency

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facilities as would make the whole business of obtaining ready-made reactor material much easier for small nations than providing it themselves would be.

Mr. Kissinger warned that the Soviet Union may be in favor of continuing the present system of bilateral agreements between the U.S. and various countries in the hope that tension may be generated within the free world by almost inevitable differences of opinion on the distribution of materials. He raised the possibility that advocating international control as a means of preventing the Soviets from using their supply of bombs in a surprise attack may be focusing on the wrong point. General McCormack observed that it is easier to see delivery vehicles than bombs, and Mr. Scoville agreed that, while bombs cannot be controlled, delivery means can.

Mr. Dean proposed one possible system: Bomb stocks in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might be kept under Agency control, so that even if the Soviets were successful in withholding 10 per cent of their stockpile from view, the withheld portion would not give them the wherewithal to start a war. He observed that this is just one of a number of systems which might be devised to prevent a nation from beginning to wage war without first telegraphing his punch to the world. In other words, such a system could "buy warning."

Mr. Wilson recalled that one object of the Baruch Plan had been to avoid surprise attack. Dr. Smyth agreed that if a UN agency had its own stocks of bombs in various countries, surprise attack might be avoided. Mr. Scoville still thought it a better idea to watch delivery systems, but Mr. Dean felt that he would just as soon keep an eye on the stockpile sites.

Getting back to the 10 per cent that the Soviet Union might be able to syphon off each year by fudging on its production figures, Mr. Halaby pointed out that enough 10 per cents eventually would give them strength to make an initial strike, at which point, having already tipped their hand, they would simply take over the rest of the international stocks of bombs within their territory. Mr. Dean pointed out the mathematics are not quite this simple for the Soviets since large numbers of their initial small striking force would be intercepted, and since there would be presumably some intelligence warning of their preparation to launch the attack. Dr. Smyth said that any system is better than nothing, and Mr. Dean noted that any initial move by the Russians would release the bombs in this country for use by SAC. At this point, Mr. Scoville posed the question of whether or not the United States can itself afford to give up the atom bomb as a defensive weapon. Mr. Kissinger pointed out that the control schemes advanced so far might make it more difficult to limit wars once they break out because they would force each nation to react to any utilization of the atomic stockpile as if its purpose were to use it for a strategic attack. Both Mr. Dean and Dr. Smyth made it clear that despite their discussion of international control they were not necessarily personal advocates of the various schemes they had proposed.

Mr. Perkins wondered if this sort of action might tend to neutralize the atom, and, further, he asked, if such a thing would be to the U.S. advantage. General McCormack, who had sounded a generally pessimistic note about control schemes during the evening, observed that it is one thing to be pessimistic about these systems and quite another to be pessimistic about the future. He said that he has hope for the future because the likelihood of war depends in part upon Soviet calculations of their own profit and loss, and the United States retains the means of destroying the Soviet empire if attacked.

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12

Mr. Halaby thought that if the bomb cannot be controlled, it had better be used to the advantage of the United States, but Mr. Nitze interposed that American use is likely only in retaliation. Mr. Dean felt that some sort of plan might provide a guarantee against surprise attack, but Mr. Noyes thought that such a guarantee could come only as the end result of a total disarmament program. Mr. Dean argued that a limited control plan might be the only thing to be had, but Mr. Franklin said that such a plan was likely only if conventional armaments are controlled as well. Mr. Dean insisted that the least that could be gained would be a warning of surprise attack; Mr. Campbell could not see how that would be very useful in the event of a limited war.

The meeting was adjourned slightly after the usual hour.

The first meeting of Sub-committee II (Strategic Concepts) of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Council on December 20, 1955. Present were McGeorge Bundy, Discussion Leader; Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay, Discussion Leader; Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Melvin Conant, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; John C. Campbell; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N. E. Halaby; Paul H. Nitze; Charles P. Noyes II; and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Kissinger restated the purposes of the sub-committee -- the exploration of certain major problems inherent in the relationship between nuclear weapons and American foreign policy. If we may assume that in the past force has been the ultimate pressure in diplomacy -- and been an implicit factor in negotiations -- how have nuclear weapons affected the conduct of diplomacy? There are two postulates we must consider: 1) that any war will be a nuclear war, and 2) that a nuclear war should be attempted to be fought as something less than an all-out war. What pressures can modern diplomacy use? What kinds of strategic doctrines may be employed? How may we conduct a diplomacy of limited risks with unlimited weapons? The doctrine of massive retaliation, if considered to be an answer to all problems, is an inflexible approach to a variety of situations in which the maximum use of nuclear weapons is clearly unnecessary or inadvisable. The possibility of developing a concept for the graduated employment of force, and disarmament proposals will be explored in later sessions of the sub-committee. (Digests of meetings of the other sub-committees will be circulated.)

**General Lindsay:**

The Air Force plan on the use of force in two contingencies: in the event of a general conflict and 2) a local conflict. From the military point of view, the general conflict could take place and in planning for such an eventuality, it is relatively simple to determine military requirements, arrive at a strategic doctrine, select targets, etc. The problems of a local conflict are more complex. In considering them, it is essential to remember that the Strategic Air Command is the key element of our offensive force and its integrity must be preserved. Its force cannot be significantly weakened or diverted from its central purpose. SAC is the major element in a thermo-nuclear war -- it has the greatest ability to deliver but it is also of basic importance to remember we have a growing nuclear capability in all tactical forces and weapons systems. In short, we are getting greater nuclear flexibility.

In considering, first, the general war, the Air Force plans on a critical, initial period -- the Air Battle -- in which the side which emerges with capabilities for further operations will have the ascendancy; the war would not necessarily be over at the end of the Air Battle but that side with the ascendancy would have the ability to achieve its objectives. The major part of our resources must be devoted to preparation for such a battle and this requires a careful and proper balance between offensive and defensive forces. As for the defense of vital land areas in Europe, Africa and the Western Pacific, it is obviously important to prevent the enemy from overrunning them. This is largely a defensive problem but in this phase of a general war, theatre air elements would undertake offensive operations. Above all, we must do nothing which will impair our ability to wage an Air Battle successfully, even if it is regarded as a last resort.

In considering local war contingencies, the Air Force has always believed that in meeting the requirements of a general war we would have, as a by-product, the means of fighting local wars. However, since the Air Force may be restrained

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in its choice of weapons, important questions arise which affect the planning of each service. Not only must the service be flexible in weapons capabilities, but they must be prepared to fight in diverse areas of the world under a variety of military, geographic and political conditions.

Two recent experiences are pertinent to the problem of localized wars: Korea and Indochina. In the former, the USAF was prepared to use atomic weapons and believed it militarily advisable to do so. Had they been used, the war would have been appreciatively shorter and might not have seen Chinese troops involved. The targets involved in the initial stages of the war would have been found in Korea itself; once the Chinese were involved, the target area became very much greater with additional problems as a consequence. As it was, the USAF did inhibit the flow of supplies but the effectiveness of our air effort was lessened by inactions on the ground front.

A number of questions were raised at this point on whether there were military aspects which limited USAF actions as well as the more publicized "political" decisions. Mr. Nitze said the State Department had considered the possible use of atomic weapons and had considered whether it was militarily advisable to do so. At no time in his experience had the military raised the question. Mr. Wolfers asked if the possibility of atomic retaliation against U.S. forces had been a factor in our decision to use non-atomic weapons. General Lindsay replied it was a possibility but Chinese capabilities in this type of response were very low at the time, practically non-existent. Mr. Nitze suggested the air forces based in Manchuria were 40% USSR and General Lindsay replied that this had never been proven. Mr. Halaby asked if Army and Navy views had played a part in the decision not to use atomic weapons. Would the Chinese ground retaliation have been uncontrollable? Mr. Nitze added a question concerning the size of the American atomic stockpile in the event the war should spread. Could the USAF at that time have operated in Manchuria, Siberia and the Shanghai area? Could the USAF have cut the Trans-Siberian railway and isolated the USSR from the Far East? In other words, were there in fact crucial military agreements against using atomic weapons, assuming the war could not then be waged on the Korean peninsula alone? General Lindsay's view was that these were all factors in the situation but that the USAF had been prepared to use atomic weapons in a short period of time. In Indochina and Korea, where there were many opportunities to cut supply lines, SAC could have been used effectively with atomic weapons or high explosives of the more traditional type. However, it would require a great many aircraft using H.E. and their use would affect seriously our Air Battle capabilities. While there are a great many situations in which H.E. could be used, a large aerial campaign utilizing it would put unacceptable demands on the wings now available to SAC.

General Lindsay referred to an estimate of air force requirements in the defense of Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu. If high explosive bombs were used the number of missions required to do the damage of a high yield nuclear attack would be in the order of 1000:1; some seventy thousand sorties were assumed necessary, compared to seventy with nuclear weapons. Time would also be a factor; and, of course, the ratio holds true for the other side. Would not the political repercussions within China be very much greater if the nuclear attack were mounted? What would the capabilities of the Chinese be in this type of action -- the net effect after a nuclear exchange?

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There was further discussion of the value of H.E. in a localized war or the use of "low yield" nuclear weapons and the key targets to be selected. Certain tactical objectives could be dealt with by using napalin bombs or rockets. Certain rearward targets (supply lines, bases, communication points, etc) could also be attacked with H.E. Furthermore, there may be important political differences between H.E. and nuclear weapons which would be significant not only in Asia but in Europe as well. General Lindsay thought we should no longer draw a line between H.E. and nuclear weapons but discuss "yields" in terms of blast, power and radiation -- the effects we seek, not the means. A number of the sub-committee thought there were important political, psychological and even military reasons why there is a valid distinction between H.E. and nuclear weapons (even though there might be no distinction between atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons in political and psychological terms). Two important considerations would have to be studied, however, in selecting weapons. First, and already referred to, is the consideration of the numbers of aircraft which would be necessary and the inevitable drain on SAC resources; secondly, Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Wolfers asked if the enemy knew your potential -- nuclear attack -- would he react to your H.E. attack with H.E. retaliation or would the enemy react to your potential? Mr. Noyes suggested the enemy's reaction might depend to some extent on the area involved. If the region were not strategically vital, the enemy might respond to H.E. with H.E. If the enemy sees SAC approaching an important target system, he might be forced to assume the worst and react accordingly. Mr. Altschul remarked that all these considerations would have to be reviewed and against the background of Soviet nuclear air capabilities in the strategic sense as well. Americans have no monopoly in nuclear air capabilities.

General Lindsay suggested the feasibility of a "graduated deterrence." In the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu estimate, there were five phases of increased action in each of which the character of the enemy response would determine our next move. For example, in the event of an attack against Quemoy or Matsu, islands immediately adjacent would be attacked. We could be asking, in effect, whether or not Quemoy and Matsu are your objectives? If the character of the response indicates a larger objective, then invasions or assembly points would be hit. If another phase is indicated, then a major attack on the enemy's bases would be launched.

Mr. Wolfers asked if the enemy might not respond with an atomic attack on some key point far from the immediate war area, Tokyo for example. While this might happen, it would in itself constitute a key response and inform us that the local area was not the objective of the enemy and we would no longer be dealing with a local situation.

Mr. Kissinger referred to the forces which would determine response to each stage and questioned whether it would be possible to limit a nuclear war unless some clear means were found in advance to inform the enemy of our use of graduated deterrence. Mr. Campbell and Mr. Nitze referred to the allied declaration on our response in the event a Korean war began again. There can be no question but that a new move in Korea would be considered a first step to a general war and our forces could react in areas and with weapons of our choice. General Lindsay reminded the group that we are in a worse position in Korea today given important air capabilities of the enemy. In responding to a Korean situation with nuclear weapons we would have to expect the Air Battle -- and whether this would or would not actually occur, it constitutes the crucial factor in the calculus of risks. General Lindsay continued by saying there are a great variety of possible local wars and the

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preparation we should make to meet all contingencies is extremely complex. What we should seek is a maximum capability of rapid movement for each service and continuing planning on possible points at which local wars might begin with attentions to the great variance in local conditions which would affect the amount of force we would apply and the weapons which could be used. Such factors as geography, location, terrain, available communications, indigenous forces, degree of industrialization, etc. must all be considered. In response to a question from Mr. Kissinger as to whether the best *strategic* concept is local conflicts fought locally, General Lindsay replied that he was only stressing the complexity of the problems involved in preparing to fight local wars. Mr. Kissinger asked if we should fight local wars, if possible. General Lindsay replied affirmatively. Mr. Kissinger pursued the point: should we attempt to localize a war geographically even if nuclear weapons are used? General Lindsay replied affirmatively. Mr. Noyes suggested our response would depend in part on the geographic area involved. Mr. Wilson remarked that this provided us with a range of possible actions and we were not restricted to an absolute.

Mr. Franklin returned to the retaliatory aspect. Could we use a 20 megaton bomb and not expect the enemy to do so also? Mr. Kissinger suggested it would be probably to the enemy's advantage at least not to use a greater weapon.

Mr. Altschul noted that we must be prepared to take the risk of a general war or we shall be paralyzed in our response to a local conflict. Mr. Kissinger agreed and said the problem again is one of deciding insofar as possible if any limits can be set to nuclear war once a nuclear weapon is used. Must not the enemy, for his own security, assume he deals with our ptoential? Mr. Altschul asked, in view of this, if we were not becoming increasingly dependent on a weapon we are increasingly reluctant to use? This is critical, Mr. Noyes suggested, in the case of Indochina where conventional forces on our side are not important -- unlike Formosa -- and where our response to aggression must take the form of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Noyes, Mr. Franklin and Mr. Nitze concluded this part of the discussion by asking if there were ways in which our reliance upon SAC -- or the absolute use of nuclear weapons -- might be reduced to lessen possible "paralysis" of our diplomacy in future actions.

Mr. Carroll Wilson introduced the second discussion leader, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, who reviewed the rationale behind the policy of alliances -- what it is we want the system of alliances to accomplish.

Mr. Bundy began by emphasizing the vast extension of American commitments since World War II. Of all the alliances created so far, the key one is NATO. There have been two premises on which this alliance has been based:

1. There is in the NATO area, a fundamental community of political interests -- a substantial area of agreement which results in basic mutual understanding. It has seemed "natural and proper" for NATO states to work together, even without the pressures of an external threat. There has been considerable experience in cooperation and it is important that the first large area of cooperation was economic; it laid a basis for the more taxing problems of military cooperation which came later.

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2. There is in the NATO area, a common harmonious over-all strategic concept without which one may question the value of an alliance. There must be, and there has been in NATO, a remarkably clear and explicit strategy. This is not to say the strategy has been static. On the contrary, originally American atomic monopoly was regarded as the shield with a local, conventionally armed defense behind it to prevent any cheap adventuring and as protection against internal subversion. This local defense, and the atomic shield gave a kind of psychological protection which would prevent, paraphrasing Queille, "the liberation of a corpse." In the current phase of transition, we may ask if NATO states still share in an over-all strategic concept. This question may be important in view of the many pressures upon NATO governments which tend to encourage disunity. There is the continuing problem, for example, of West Germany's place in NATO -- has the character of the alliance been modified importantly with West Germany's inclusion? Will nuclear weapons be fed into NATO defenses with NATO support of the implied changes of strategy? Have the implications of an atomic strategy been presented, explained and understood by alliance members? If there is limited public understanding of the implications, this could be serious. With respect to the American role, the alliance is connected by so many binding political interests that limits placed on us by the fact of our membership are acceptable.

A different pattern of alliances is found in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. There is in those areas a dual approach symbolized by SEATO and a host of bilateral agreements. The SEATO pact is a very puzzling one -- there is not the same NATO emphasis on a community of political purposes; there is heavier emphasis on problems of subversion. Puzzling is the limitation placed on aggression, to Communist aggression. In its occurrence, parties to the pact agree to do what is necessary but there is no real military organization. The United States said in advance that we would commit no specific forces but rely on mobile, striking power. The treaty includes not just the territories of its Asian members or those holding Asian territory, but Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, in effect underwriting the territorial integrity of a trouble spot.

Mr. Bundy asked if the SEATO treaty were based on either the community of political interests or had a base of a common strategic concept. The answer must be no: the area of common action does not seem large and very important states are not associated (India, Burma, Indonesia, South Korea, Formosa or Japan). Does the signing of agreements for limited and in completely explored purposes become merely a way of masking failures to solve serious issues? It is just as serious that we are driven to bilateral undertakings as it is that we are unable to make any arrangements with Burma, India and Indonesia. Would it not be better not to pin everything down so that the degree of your differences is apparent? In economic programs we participate more generally in the Colombo plan, for example, and in other ways. Moreover, we have a clear and substantial political and strategic interest no matter how hard to define. If it is necessary to contract obligations, to what degree are SEATO and bilateral agreements useful instruments to get the support of people in times of stress? For example, Mr. Bundy was inclined to think our position is fortified because South Vietnam is not associated with us in the treaty.

With respect to the Middle East, there is now a "Northern Tier" treaty in which we are not now a member. Does the attempt to name names and state conditions not give rise to more questions? Does the definition of the problem correspond to the actual difficulties to be faced? Is there in the Middle East agreement on

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a common strategy -- a unifying concept? In NATO, you have a very large machinery, however great the strains. There the community of interest and the shape of the objectives are clear enough to be manageable. In the Middle East, the relationships of the parties is ill-defined in terms of political sympathies, etc. Such considerations pose serious questions about the "technique" of alliances.

Mr. Bundy concluded with a general proposition: the strategic objectives of the United States are 1) to avoid obliteration in a thermo-nuclear conflict and 2) to contain communist-controlled powers. Large objectives require large power to achieve them -- and a wide geographic base. From the point of view of our deterrent strength, even beyond the strategic concern (represented by bases) there is the political community of interests. We can't resist the U.S.S.R. by assuming there are no other very large centers of power -- centers which will increase in power with further developments in weapons and their greater availability. The importance of these other centers is very great and we should accept limits in order to have an association with them on the premise we can develop with them a successful policy of deterrence based on stability.

However, we also have to educate our allies. Korea and the use of atomic weapons is a case in point. To the degree that there had been a clear understanding of the consequences of using them, and the restraint and control to be exercised by the United States, our freedom of action would have been increased. We have now a sixteen nation agreement if further aggression occurs in Korea. A high level of communications on these problems with those to whom we are bound can remove certain arbitrary hindrances to our actions. The character of the strategy of a coalition is strongest when there is communication and understanding of the basic concepts; such an understanding is possible in NATO, difficult to achieve in SEATO and at present almost impossible in the Middle East.

Mr. Wilson asked if the transition in NATO strategy was due to Soviet atomic and hydrogen achievements and that further modification may be necessary with British and French nuclear capabilities. Mr. Bundy referred also to our own commitment of atomic arms to the European theatre. Mr. Kissinger suggested the Germans had been willing to enter NATO but important issues were involved with the apparent assumption of a strategy which would employ atomic weapons.

Mr. Nitze said there was a community of interests with our allies and we can discuss it with them. Difficulties do arise, however, in the substance of the questions -- are we clear in our own minds; if we are clear, we could talk more effectively. Mr. Bundy referred to the dominant United Kingdom strategic thought of a terrifying deterrence saving West Europe -- the massive retaliation concept -- but lacking communications, the concept did not result in a common strategic approach. Mr. Nitze referred to the pressing economic difficulties which faced the British at the time they advanced the idea (1952). We said it was militarily unsound because it was politically unsound. Now we have to explain this to the Germans. Mr. Noyes thought the British had originally intended to have the doctrine apply to NATO only but we have applied it generally.

Mr. Kissinger commented perhaps the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. do have a common interest: keeping any other nation from developing nuclear capabilities. Hence, ban further tests: keep China, for example, dependent on the U.S.S.R. Mr. Wilson thought that the gains and opportunities for exploiting differences were greater for the U.S.S.R. than any gains from joining with us.

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Mr. Noyes asked if it weren't crucial that we have an understanding with our allies on atomic weapons. Without such an understanding how much can any alliance be worth? Mr. Nitze suggested it was a case of putting confidence in the leaders who must bear the brunt of decisions rather than in the participation in making the decision itself -- do we have, in fact, a general agreement on strategy?

Mr. Noyes asked if we can move from the threat of massive retaliation in one area to a refusal to use it in a war in which the enemy does employ it? Mr. Nitze replied we are not in a position to do a selling job now, to which Mr. Noyes added that we must get into such a position.

Mr. Campbell asked if it wouldn't prove something if the system of alliances were global. Mr. Bundy thought it would be useful only to the extent that the alliances were meaningful in their areas.

Mr. Nitze said that Mr. Bundy's estimate of the Middle East was correct. When the United States first encouraged MEDO we had no idea what position we would take. We were unable to figure out a good strategic position other than in a general war. In the case of the Middle East, bilateral agreements would have been better. Mr. Campbell suggested we might have devised a United States strategy for the area without even tying us down specifically in bilateral or multi-lateral contracts. Mr. Wilson asked if this could be done without British participation? Mr. Campbell said this could not be done now without their participation. Mr. Bundy suggested the concept of a "Northern Tier" was valid but Mr. Wolfers thought that in our action we have antagonized others -- are we now, in effect, splitting the Arab world? Yet these considerations never seem to figure largely. Could we have achieved our purposes more anonymously?

Mr. Kissinger asked if an alliance "draws a line" but has no force, would not a unilateral declaration be even better? Mr. Bundy thought there was an indeterminate but real benefit in having other countries express the view or line which has been drawn; it is possible that we could get such an expression without tying it to a military alliance.

Mr. Wolfers, in referring to common understanding of strategic concepts, said that Europeans have gone along with United States policy without public discussions. At SHAEF, there is harmony. However, could the governments remain in power if the question went to the public; this may be a problem for the United States -- but how much greater a problem it is for others. Mr. Noyes suggested there were serious questions of leadership and confidence involved.

Mr. Nitze asked if "there is no alternative to peace" were not a sure prescription for defeat. Mr. Bundy suggested the contrary view was also questionable. Mr. Nitze rejoined by asking what the consequences will be if Europeans think we are bluffing? Is it not ridiculous for the British to fight a thermo-nuclear war? The Russians are going to find out if our policy is based on SAC and through a series of tests we can lose everything. Mr. Bundy asked if such matters were unmanageable. Can we not devise a concept for the graduated application of power? It is essential that we find some flexible policy -- something more useful than defeat without war or Armageddon.

Mr. Kissinger said the U.S.S.R. has conventional weapons and may force us to use thermo-nuclear ones in the event of a conflict, if we do not possess conventional armaments as well. How can we shift the onus to them for nuclear

employment? As it is, they can force us to take the risk -- is New York worth
Cairo? -- if the answer is no, then Russia gets Cairo. We seem to have no other
doctrine but a thermo-nuclear one. General Lindsay suggested that a graduated
concept is possible and might be based on an understanding of targets with the Air
Battle concerned with air fields, defense establishments and atomic installations.
"Open cities" could be used and concentration could then be on essentially military
targets of immediate consequence to the decisive battle. The future with IBM may
make such a policy impossible but it is worth considering in the light of current
capabilities. When Mr. Kissinger asked how Idlewild would be classified, General
Lindsay said the targets would have to include those capable of use as well as
those actually in operation. Mr. Nitze suggested that this would require a care-
ful civilian control to insure that installations, capable of use and near large
cities, would, in fact, not be used. If a "pattern" for war could be devised,
asked Mr. Noyes, would there be mutual confidence in it? Mr. Altschul replied
that unless we are willing to accept great destruction we are defeated. Mr. Nitze
added that we must be sure our "last gasp is really our last one" and we must use
every means to increase the areas where we have real support for our diplomacy.
Mr. Wolfers said that if we are never willing to take the total risks, then things
will never be vital and we shall eventually find ourselves isolated. We should
say that we will defeat an enemy attack wherever it occurs, on an appropriate
scale; we should stop refusing the challenge of a general war. Mr. Wilson em-
phasized the need to consult with our allies in the event of such a crisis --
agreement in advance is essential. We have to have such agreement so that a move
into West Berlin would be a signal for something known in advance; it is not nec-
essary for a total reaction from us -- unconditional surrender is not our goal.
Mr. Kissinger stressed that this concept must be developed in peacetime; it must
be plausible and considered fully in advance by other staffs. We should have a
graduated list of SAC targets with SAC use, the ultimate weapon. We have to get
credibility into the plan and thereby break our paralysis. We return to the
original question on our alliances. Most of our discussion has been based on the
assumption of United States action, with little reference to our allies. Mr.
Franklin suggested there does not have to be acceptance on both sides of fighting
under less absolute conditions than is implied in thermo-nuclear war as long as
our statements and actions are sufficiently plausible. Mr. Nitze remarked that
there was no agreement on the possibility of limited wars including atomic weapons
but that the question is certainly worth exploration.

Melvin Conant
Rapporteur

Personal

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Not for publication**

STUDY GROUP REPORTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Sub-committee III

Discussion Leaders: Roswell L. Gilpatric
James T. Hill, Jr.
Mervin J. Kelly
Study Director: Henry A. Kissinger
Rapporteur: Kelsey Marechal

First Meeting
December 21, 1955

Digest of Discussion

(This Digest has not been edited by the participants)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

The First meeting of Sub-committee III on the Military Equation of the
Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, was held at the Harold Pratt
House on December 21, 1955. Present were: William A. M. Burden, Chairman; Roswell
L. Gilpatric, Discussion Leader; James T. Hill, Jr., Discussion Leader; Mervin J.
Kelly, Discussion Leader; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Kelsey Marechal,
Rapporteur; Gordon E. Dean; N. E. Halaby; Earl Johnson; Col. William Kintner;
Roger Lewis; Ben T. Moore; Brig. Gen. A. P. O'Meara; Don K. Price; Isidor I. Rabi.

After making a few introductory remarks, Mr. Burden turned the meeting over to the first discussion leader of the evening, Mr. Hill. Referring to the first topic on the prepared agenda for the sub-committee's series of meetings, he said that he wished to set forth a few of the ideas that need to be considered in an examination of the argument that an atomic or thermo-nuclear stalemate exists in a condition of parity or approximate parity. He felt that this subject has a special relevance for discussion since the new Russian "line," reported in the *New York Times* of December 20th, is that an atomic (the Russians seems to use atomic and nuclear inter-changeably in their public pronouncements) stalemate exists.

He noted that moral considerations are often brought into discussions of a
possible stalemate. It is certainly true that the United States will not use the
ultimate weapon wantonly. However, comparison of present conditions with those
of World War II in which poison gases were held in reserve but never used does
not prove that American restraints are always based upon solely moral reasoning,
for a large part of the argument against US use of poison gas was purely tactical.

Mr. Hill continued that he felt that the main significance of the recent
Soviet attitudes comes as a part of their theories on atomic disarmament. These
theories, based upon a realistic appraisal of U.S. capacity for retaliation, tend to
promote anything which will slow American atomic development, thus increasing the
significance of the Russian's advantage in conventional strength. Dr. Rabi expres-
sed the opinion that even without its atomic striking force the free world, drawing
upon combined United Kingdom, Europe, and US resources, has a greater conventional
strength than the Soviet Union. Mr. Hill accepted this appraisal, but wondered if
the U.S. will be willing to accept the financial burden of maintaining a conventional
arms level sufficient to counter the Soviets'. Dr. Rabi admitted that this action
is not likely.

Mr. Kelly asserted that the Russians are only "acting" in this instance, for
they really would not like to see a genuine ban on atomic weapons. Mr. Kissinger
asked if this meant that the Soviet Union has more to gain from the power of the
atom than the West. Dr. Rabi answered "Yes," for by using threat of a global
holocaust the Soviets might be able to blackmail Europe into denying America the
use of bases on the continent. Furthermore, the Soviets need an opportunity to
continue the testing of atomic devices much more than does the U.S.

The U.S.S.R. has an advantage, as Mr. Burden pointed out, in that it may
be more willing to initiate atomic war. Col. Kintner countered that the free world
has an advantage arising from its greater population, higher degree of mobility,
and more extensive base system. Mr. Hill said that the major risk lies in the
possibility of a small atomic war being spread, or in the achievement by the Soviets
of sufficient nuclear power margin to enable them to launch a surprise attack.

At this point Dr. Rabi raised the question of whether or not a stalemate
really does exist. When Mr. Burden asked if anyone in the group did not feel that
there is a stalemate, there were a number of affirmative responses. Dr. Rabi felt

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that in purely military terms, if the moral aspects of American policy are tempor-
arily suspended, the U.S. has a considerable weapons advantage. Mr. Hill, however,
noted that the possibility of preventive war must be ruled out on the American
side of the equation. Mr. Gilpatric suggested that the situation could be summed
up by saying that the U.S. is stalemated by its own moral force, while the U.S.S.R.
is stalemated by American military superiority. Mr. Kelly insisted that the
moral restraint of American policy must not be ruled out, for of course this coun-
try will never wage preventive war.

Col. Kintner challenged these ideas as they apply to the actual tactical
situations which have arisen in the last two years. He felt that military decisions
in this country have been the result not so much of a moral persuasion but of a
lag in the democratic process's response to Soviet challenges. Mr. Price pointed
out that of course a democratic alliance is going to have political problems which
get in the way of concerted action. Mr. Burden said that he gathered then that
the Russians are wrong when they speak of the military parity.

Mr. Halaby noted that as far as a mutual capability for destruction is concerned, a fair case can be built for the existence of a military parity, but he agreed with Mr. Burden that the relative strengths of the two weapons systems are less likely ever to be in balance. He suggested that assumption (a) of the agenda outline -- that a condition of stalemate is indefinitely stable and continuing -- can hold true only in that both countries are likely to remain strong enough to destroy each other.

Mr. Kissinger noted that even this parity of mutual destruction might dissolve if one country were to make a technical breakthrough in defense systems that would allow it to exercise its offensive strength with relative impunity. Mr. Kelly, while affirming the current U.S. technical lead, suggested that the gap between the two countries is likely to become narrower, and wondered if under these changing conditions the Soviet rulers might behave differently. That is to say, since the U.S. will retain its moral restraints while the U.S.S.R. may manage to remove the restraint of American superiority, can it be argued that the stalemate is in any realistic fashion of a lasting nature?

Mr. Hill turned to section (b) of the first question on the agenda: The assumption that "... if hostilities should break out on a limited or local war basis, the side which is losing will accept defeat and will not resort to every effective weapon at its command." He noted that the answer to this problem depends upon the objectives of the losing side. He felt that while the U.S.S.R. would generally be less inhibited about resorting to the ultimate weapon, even the U.S. might be faced with a situation in a local war in which the national objectives could be so threatened by the local situation that using a big bang would be preferable to losing the war. Mr. Kissinger felt that any such decision would have to take into account the likelihood of spreading the atom conflict, with subsequent dangers of destruction to the mainland U.S. Mr. Halaby proposed that if the American strategy is patterned solely along these lines, and if the U.S. restrains itself from using the bomb in a local war for moral reasons, it is in effect handing over to the enemy the choice of weapons. For example, in a hypothetical renewal of the Korean conflict, if the ROK and U.S. forces were about to push the North Koreans across the Yalu the Chinese Communists and the Russians would have an almost free choice of whether or not to use a tactical atomic weapon.

General O'Meara said that the limiting of a war depends mainly upon geograph-
ical and other factors. Mr. Kissinger noted that at least one Air Force general
had said that a major war can be fought without destroying cities. While Mr. Halaby

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felt that there is little chance that a realistic distinction can be made between tactical and strategic targets, in a nuclear war. Mr. Kelly reminded the group of the growing dependency on tactical nuclear weapons in possible limited wars and the narrowing choice of conventional weapons. Mr. Gilpatric felt that there is a danger of U.S. leadership falling into a Soviet trap by coming to believe that the implications of the nuclear age are such that the sole alternatives are to use only conventional weapons, or to disarm.

## Budgetary Limitations on U.S. Capabilities:

Mr. Gilpatric delivered some comments on Section 3 of the Sub-committee agenda, which deals with defense spending and priorities. He said that following the end of the Korean war the annual rate of U.S. defense expenditures was reduced from over $43 billion (in Fiscal Year 1953) to under $35 billion (in Fiscal Year 1955) at which level the Defense Department is attempting to stabilize its outgo for Fiscal Year 1956 and Fiscal Year 1957. There will be a slight upturn in the latter year to reflect increased labor and material costs and pay raises. During the same period, i.e. 1953-55, our gross national product has gone up over $50 billion so that, while the dollar figures remain about the same, what we are now spending on defense acturally represents a decreasing proportion of our total national income.

He noted that in the same time span several new factors besides increased labor and material costs have been injected into the Defense program with the effect of adding substantial expense items not budgeted for in previous years. For instance, there has been a general rise in the unit cost of military equipment, due to technological advances and greater complexity. Supersonic aircraft, missiles, and other new types of armament are uniquely expensive to build and maintain. Guided missile projects for all three branches of the armed services are reaching the production stage. Great expense has been involved in the unprecedented installation of elaborate Air Defense systems such as DEW, SAGE, Texas Towers, Picket Ships, and radar-equipped aircraft.

The net effect of these factors is that the U.S. is probably spreading its defense dollars more thinly than it did two or three years ago, with the result that the level of combat-readiness has been lowered. Mr. Gilpatric said that he knew this to be particularly true in the case of the Air Force where the number of flying hours has not increased in proportion to the rate of the wing build-up, and where modernization of equipment has not kept pace with obsolescence. The wing build-up has also outgrown the Air Force base structure, which has become inadequate with regard to dispersal and other security considerations. Generally speaking, the wing build-up has been achieved by absorbing the customary backlog of orders, despite the long Air Force carryover. Naval air strength has been achieved at the expense of the Navy's anti-submarine function -- at a time when the Soviet Union is constructing unprecedented numbers of submarines.

If the air arm is measured not in terms of the number of planes, but according to the air lift it can provide, there has been a general cut-back. The impression of increased air strength is given by an increase in the number of planes of the latest type, but current available air lift capacity could accommodate no more than two divisions at one time. This capacity does not provide anywhere near the mobility which is supposed to be compensating for the one-third over-all cut in armaments since Korea.

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Mr. Gilpatric summarized the current deficiencies in the defense establish-
ment which he thought should be remedied if the proper balance is to be maintained
between the U.S. and possible enemies. He listed the following areas of considera-
tion, without assigning priorities: 1) There must be a step-up in the moderniza-
tion and development of air atomic weapons, which can be brought about through
greater expenditures for research and development, a shortening of the development
period even at the risk of making modifications, and crash programs for
ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered planes. 2) The present base program must
be completed more quickly than is currently expected. This base program could
provide a strong bargaining point if negotiations are ever reached with the U.S.S.R.
However, even the present plan, conceived three or four years ago, is now short
of completion by some three billion dollars' worth of bases; the entire plan is
about 1.5 billion dollars under-funded. The need for haste is amply demonstrated
by the current North African political situation which may shortly force increased
dependence on the as yet uncompleted Spanish bases. There is also a need to in-
crease base security by means of greater diversification. Perhaps one answer to
the African problem will be to renovate World War II bases for use five years from
now.
3) The U.S. should contribute to building a more complete atomic defense
mechanism in Western Europe and possibly Japan and the Philippines. While the
U.S. has contributed to an AC&W network for NATO, it has as yet made no provision
for Nike protection of these areas.
4) It is important to increase over-all air
transport capacity, providing six or more additional wings, and bringing up to
date transport-type planes such as the D-132 and D-133.
5) Two or three more
Army divisions are needed for continental defense, both active and civil. The
lesson of the recent New England floods is that the present two divisions avail-
able in the United States are inadequate to meet even a localized emergency. In
the event of a land invasion over the Pole, lacking an increased mobility, avail-
able defense manpower is inadequate.

Mr. Gilpatric said that, without allocating it specifically, the cost of
these necessary increases in defense levels would run between four and five
billion a year. This figure would be divided in roughly equal parts to provide
the Army with increased manpower and air lift, and to meet the requirements of
the Air Force and the Naval Air Force.

He noted that the order of magnitude of this increase is not excessive
when compared to current defense spending. The Air Force budget announced last
spring called for an expenditure of 16.5 billion dollars per year to maintain
137 wings -- this figure did not include the DEW system, ballistic missiles, or
nuclear air craft, so a total sum of $18 billion is not excessive. The total
budget would be raised from 35 to 40 billion, which Mr. Gilpatric felt is the mini-
mum figure to maintain the current balance of power. He conceded that such an in-
crease could not be made available until 1958, but he felt it important to get the
obligational authority now, in view of the long carryover for many items under
consideration.

Col. Kintner noted that there are other areas in which additional military
expenditures are needed. For instance, he suggested that the U.S. may have to
increase its military aid commitment on the Northern Tier or risk alienating the
signatories to the Baghdad Pact. Korea, Formosa, and Indo-China all stand in
need of increased economic and military aid, as do other countries, such as
Turkey. He felt that there is an unfortunately wide gap between commitment and
expenditure in these areas.

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Mr. Kelly seconded Mr. Gilpatric's plea for greater research and development expenditure, noting that there are presently a number of magnificent technological opportunities which cannot be pursued under the existing budget. He cited ballistic missiles and nuclear aircraft as two gadgets which are presently ripe for development. He stated emphatically that the limit of research in these areas should be set by the availability of competent personnel, not by the availability of dollars. In addition, he said that various items of defense should be rushed to completion as quickly as personnel limits permit without imposing a financial limit on research. Among the projects with a high defense potential are the extension of the range of the Nike, and development of a nuclear war-head for this missile. Several Navy projects should have high priority. As long-range plotting by radar improves, the Texas Towers will have to give way to migratory radar platforms. An intermediate range ballistic missile to be fired from carriers should be high on the development list, as should nuclear-powered submarines because of their high deterrent strength. As the budget shapes up now, there is not enough money to make these projects possible.

If effectively manned, the research and development projects could absorb 25 per cent of Mr. Gilpatric's proposed increase. A collateral effect of this expenditure would be the increasing of America's capacity for scientific development.

Mr. Halaby brought up the question of the whole defense program. Mr. Kelly said that the SAGE project being developed by the Lincoln Laboratory is replacing the manually-operated warningsystem, the DEW line is on schedule, and the Texas Towers and Navy flying radar stations are progressing satisfactorily. He noted that the F 89 C, while it has some defects, is sound in its over-all conception. However, he noted that it has certain basic functional limitations, such as an altitude limit, which follow from the fact that it is an aircraft, subject more to the limits of the pilot than the machine. It will be replaced eventually by the ballistic missile.

General O'Meara commented that U.S. plane prototypes are considerably more expensive than European ones. Mr. Gilpatric, in answer to a question by Mr. Moore, said that his estimates are based on his knowledge of previous budgets and certain specific uses. Mr. Kelly noted that, besides buying military deterrents, America's European aid gives evidence of its continuing interests in the defense of Europe.

## The Technical Break-through:

After supper, Mr. Kelly commenced with a few observations on Sections 4 and 9 of the outline. On the question of what constitutes a technical break-through, he listed fission, fusion, and the transitor. He noted that the ICBM is not a technological break-through because it is only an extension of relatively ancient knowledge of ballistics. He conceded that it is important to possess a practical ICBM and to be prepared to use it, but he noted that it is not accurate enough as a weapon to be the determining factor in a war. Naturally, the importance of the ICBM increases if only one side in a conflict possesses the weapon. While the U.S.S.R. may have a present advantage in the fields of aero-dynamics, propulsion, and guidance, they do not yet have a capability for delivering the biggest size of bang. It is necessary that the U.S. achieve a greater capability, and it can also gain enormous tactical flexibility, by developing intermediate range missiles which can be fired from submarines or cruisers.

[1c]

6

## 8. Form and Content of FSO Training

Mr. Langer noted that the stress of Armed Forces training is on technical and organizational subjects. The Foreign Service is concerned with different matters. It is difficult to nail down precisely what the FSO should be taught. However, it would appear that such fields as history, political science, and economics would be of major importance. Yet there is much in the courses described in the FSI catalog that pertains to language training, government operations, and implementation of foreign policy. This may not be exactly what is required.

Mr. Jessup said that considering the many courses dealing with aspects of the American scene, one wonders to what extent FSI training ties in with the provisions for home-leave.

Mr. Hoskins indicated that the Department complies with the provisions for home-leave by bringing an officer back for training. Ideally, however, the FSI should be able to bring an officer back to the United States for training purposes and pay him all expenses involved, including salary and per diem allowances. Upon completion of training, the officer should be sent back to his post. The entire operation should be entirely unrelated to home-leave. At present, however, this procedure would become too costly.

Mr. Wriston observed that once the Department has sufficient personnel, the FSI policy might be to keep a constant percentage of the Foreign Service force in training at all times. This might considerably ease the budgetary and administrative difficulties.

Mr. Hoskins asked whether the Discussion Group felt that the figure of 6 per cent of the force in training could be regarded as reasonable.

Mr. Dickey suggested that perhaps the most important aspect of the problem of training is not so much the need to keep a constant percentage of the force taking courses, but rather keeping the entire force in training constantly. This need does not arise in as acute a form for those individuals who pursue their careers in the United States. The Foreign Service Officer, however, lives a life that tends to build new and different educational and cultural concepts. Bringing an officer back to the United States on home-leave is a mere gesture, indeed, a modest response to the basic inadequacy of sound career development. The correct training concept is not just formal training for 3-6 months, but training at all times. The purely professional development of the FSO comes with his work and experience. What the officer does not receive in his training, but must have, is guidance in how best to organize his life abroad so that it does not become an entirely artificial experience. In concrete terms this calls, for example, for providing the officer with training media, such as books, journals, newspapers, etc., that will permit him to maintain contact with the cultural life back home. The basic problem, in essence, appears to be the lack of awareness of the importance of developing all the dimensions of the FSO as a professional.

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Mr. Burden raised the question of the importance of a defense lead. Mr. Kelly said that he thought that this lead is important, but not sufficiently so to cause a diversion of money from offensive development. The kill ratio may get high, but it can never be perfect. Mr. Halaby noted that the kill ratio tends to vary with the Mach number. Mr. Kelly pointed out that the rate is essentially flat within the manned range, but that it would be raised by the use of ballistic missiles. Mr. Halaby thought that by 1975 a nuclear aircraft would be flying at Mach 2, but the ballistic missile would be traveling at Mach 5 to 10, so that as a defensive weapon the BM would raise the kill ratio.

Mr. Kelly ventured the observation that in a conflict using the weapons of today the United States would suffer considerable loss of life, but would survive as a nation and go on to destroy the U.S.S.R. He said that the Soviets seem to recognize American deterrent psychology. Mr. Price noted the distinction that must be made between a possible limited war and a prolonged war, pointing out that with a close-in war, small tactical weapons, high mobility rates, and various other factors increase in importance. Mr. Kelly felt that he would go along with this statement in the event that a massive attack turned out not to have been decisive. In such a case, the emphasis would tend to fall on the advantages of wider dispersion, better communications, etc. Col. Kintner said that he could not see any way of avoiding physical contact in Europe in the event of a war.

Mr. Kissinger felt that any nation tends to relate a weapons system to its particular philosophy of war. Mr. Kelly observed that if the enemy continues at anything like its present build-up rate, the U.S. is never going to be in a position to start a large-scale ground war. General O'Meara conceded that this observation might be correct any time the U.S. tries to match man for man with the U.S.S.R. However, he felt that a properly conceived U.S. army of shock troops could halt any aggression.

Mr. Kelly turned his attention to the question of whether or not the U.S. will be able to stay ahead of other countries in atomic capability. For the present, his answer war "yes," but he said that the gap is narrowing. As far as delivery capacity goes, he observed that the U.S. is getting along well in its development of a nuclear aircraft, but that, while he has no intelligence data on similar Soviet developments, he must assume from the disclosures made at Geneva that the Russians are making progress also.

In discussing the base structure, Mr. Kelly said that it is necessary to look ahead to a day without overseas bases; this possibility requires that considerable emphasis be placed upon the ICBM and the nuclear aircraft. Domestic bases need to be moved farther from major population centers, for it is not safe to assume that the U.S.S.R. will restrict an initial attack to SAC bases alone.

Col. Kintner noted the present tendency to remove dependents of military personnel from European bases. He raised the question of whether or not it would be wiser to keep close to and protect the base structure. Mr. Kelly agreed that, even with the ICBM, the nearer bases to target, the better. As techniques are advanced, portable launching sites will become guarantees against the political loss of bases.

Mr. Halaby noted that there are quite a few dispersal considerations which arise with the possibility of ballistic warfare. Mr. Gilpatric pointed out that the Navy is doing its best within its limited budget to build mobile launching sites,

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but he felt that this is being done at the expense of anti-submarine strength. On the subject of the anti-submarine problem, Mr. Kelly noted that there have been great technical advances in a long-range detection of submarines, which, coupled with atomic devices, should give a satisfactory kill potential.

Mr. Kelly turned to a discussion of the measures necessary to speed up the research-development production cycle, particularly with regard to ballistic missiles. If the U.S. can't put up enough dollars to buy the people necessary for scientific development, the program is obviously going to take longer. He felt that a "crash" program could very definitely get ballistic missiles into production earlier than might be expected from the usual lead time of military devices. He emphasized the need to increase the technical competence of the society as a whole. The military establishment must be able to know what it needs, and then set its sights for development within the society's limits of research. Some of these problems are so complex, however, that even with a surplus of dollars a development program may take five years.

Mr. Kissinger wondered if there would be an opportunity of taking advantage of any of the mobilization plans once a conflict had started. Mr. Kelly couldn't see any answer to that question, except a certainly negative one if the enemy starts off with a big bang.

Mr. Burden brought up the problem of manpower. Mr. Kelly observed that for both effective deterrent or positive winning power, the biggest item is technology, the advantage going to a competent society with the best science, dollars, and planning. He felt that the scientific community in America is trying to solve its recruiting problems, but that the whole subject needs greater exploration. Mr. Halaby suggested that even if the Soviet Union could train more technicians and had greater resources to devote to military development, it still would not necessarily produce a military product of the highest quality. He pointed out that the long-range incentives for technology are better in the U.S. than the U.S.S.R., but Col. Kintner recalled that the Soviets have the advantage of being able to merge political and military planning decisions at the highest level. Mr. Kelly said that in his opinion, the U.S.S.R. trails the U.S. in solid state physics and atomic energy, while making startling progress in aero-dynamics. However, the U.S. still has the potential for keeping its technological lead. There is a serious danger that it is becoming less socially desirable to enter a scientific field in this country. He called for an increase in scientific recruitment of 50 per cent.

There was general agreement at the meeting that the problem of scientific manpower deserves further study by the group. Mr. Burden suggested that a future session be devoted to an evaluation of intelligence data on Soviet scientific progress, tying this subject in with a general discussion of the personnel and budget aspects of scientific manpower in America.

The meeting adjourned at the usual hour.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

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Notes
James T. Hill, Jr.

In Connection with Atomic-Thermo-Nuclear Stalemate Discussion
Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
Subcommittee No. III, December 22, 1955

I. The meaning of "atomic stalemate."

Those who use this expression seem to postulate a condition in which there is approximate parity between the U. S. and the Soviets in atomic-thermo-nuclear inventory and in delivery capability or, at least, that each side has a capability (in atomic-thermo-nuclear weapons plus delivery system) approaching the absolute, notwithstanding opposition air defense, aborts and the like, to inflict paralyzing destruction and punishment on the other side, in either case, such that neither side, acting rationally, would dare to initiate global atomic war. The proposition of stalemate is further refined and developed to include the notion that superiority ceases to have meaning and significance once a certain point has been reached. This point is referred to as the point of atomic "absolute," beyond which relativity is irrelevant.

The conclusion which is advanced as necessarily following is that atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons will thus be "neutralized" and remain forever pure cyphers in the military equation (just as in the case of poison gas in World War II) and thus cease to have any deterrent effect.

Certain of those who make this argument point to Korea and to other past World War II provocations where the U. S. did not use atomic weapons, as supporting their argument.

II. Does a parity exist today?

The best indications we have would seem to indicate that we are ahead of the Soviets but that they may be catching up and are making every effort to catch up. Our failure to use atomic or thermo-nuclear weapons to date has not resulted from the deterrence or stalemate posed by the Soviets counter threat but is attributable to calculated forbearance for reasons of our own choosing.

III. Assuming a condition of approximate parity is reached, does it necessarily mean that a stalemate will then exist?

The answer to this is no.

A. In the first place it is more than a little doubtful whether either side would ever be entirely confident as to the accuracy of its intelligence estimates as to the other side's capability or as to the claims of the other side. There is thus likely to be doubt and uncertainty as to the existence of parity.

B. Leaving aside any consideration of the accuracy of intelligence estimates, the determination of whether or not parity existed would involve weighing a complex of many and complicated factors, including possibly certain imponderables. Thus, again, it is doubtful whether there could ever be the mathematical certainty which the atomic absolute implies.

C. Element and danger of the surprise thermo-nuclear attack.

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D. Atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons introduce a radically new element and yet represent another (however large) step in the progression toward more efficient methods of destruction. Historically, new and more effective weapons have always been employed where strategy or tactics so dictated. No reason, in experience or logic, to expect different result here. Analogy to gas warfare not apt: non-employment in World War II probably tactical and not moral decision or one based on Geneva Convention.

IV. Examination of moral or humanitarian issue. Assumption: we will not resort to preventive thermo-nuclear war.

V. Significant that new Russian line (e.g., recent statements by Bulganin, Khrushchev, etc.) appears to be that stalemate exists.

Possible reasons for this new line:

1. Mislead us as to their purpose to achieve air-atomic supremacy; in-
duce us to slow down our efforts while they intensify their efforts.

2. Attempt through psychological means to neutralize our deterrent force and discourage use of nuclear weapons, thereby endowing them with a very considerable excess of mobilized military power in terms of conventional weapons and forces.

3. Paralyze the will of our Allies and thus deny to us overseas bases.

VI. Assuming a condition of parity should one day exist, would the threat of global thermo-nuclear exchanges preclude use of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons in local war situations? That is, is it inevitable that use of atomic weapons of various types and powers in limited or local application will lead to exchanges of atomic weapons in ever increasing volume and over an expanding area until the state of all-out thermo-nuclear war is reached?

VII. Overhanging danger of a Russian sneak or surprise thermo-nuclear attack if either

1. the Russians believe they can knock out or adequately limit or absorb our counter-attack capability, or

2. the domestic Russian condition is one of deep trouble and the Kremlin, in extremis, decides to risk everything on a surprise attack on the United States.

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The second meeting of Subcommittee II (Strategic Concept) of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy began at 5:30 PM, January 26, 1956 at the Harold Pratt House. Present were: Col. Richard C. Leghorn, Discussion leader; Joseph E. Johnson, Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; James M. Murphy, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hanson W. Baldwin; John C. Campbell; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N. E. Halaby; Caryl P. Haskins; Maj. Gen. Richard C. Lindsay; Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Jr.; Paul H. Nitze; Charles P. Noyes; James A. Perkins; Henry deWolf Smyth; and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Johnson began the meeting by saying that he was sorry he had not been able to make the first meeting. He and Mr. Kissinger, he added, had discussed certain questions about the organization of future meetings which he would bring up after dinner.

This afternoon, he continued, he was happy to introduce Col. Richard C. Leghorn, with whose writings on the impact of weapons development on foreign policy, he was sure, the group was familiar. He had asked Col. Leghorn to lead the discussion before dinner on the military aspects of the problem and turn to the political aspects after dinner. He then turned the floor over to Col. Leghorn.

## REMARKS OF COL. LEGHORN: THE POLICY OF GRADUATED DETERRENCE

Col. Leghorn said that he wanted to spend a few minutes summing up the principles and the premises of the system of graduated deterrence.

In the first place, he said, we have just about abandoned the idea of an unlimited objective. Some even suggest, he added, that the definition of our objective be limited to the work of repelling aggression; this, he felt is the minimum objective. Secondly, he went on, the "all-or-nothing approach" although some still consider it the best deterrence, even to a limited Soviet aggression, is not good enough. He and others challenge this notion, he said, because, first of all, it is too risky. An error in calculation by our side might easily lead to catastrophe. And secondly, we may be losing more, by frightening our allies and limiting our flexibility than we are gaining by deterrence of the Soviets.

In the second place, he went on, what we are trying to do is present an aggressor with the expectation that he will suffer a loss greater than any gain he may hope to achieve. This requires not only the capability to deter, but also the will. Secretary Dulles is concerned about the second factor -- the will to deter -- and Col. Leghorn said he wondered if this was not receiving perhaps too much stress at the present. At any rate, he pointed out, the will to deter is almost certain to weaken and hesitate if "deter" means only the pursuit of unlimited destruction.

Finally, Col. Leghorn said, the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides makes it almost inevitable that they will be used in any war. On each side there is the powerful momentum of atomic research and weapons development, as well as the desire to achieve maximum power at the least cost. Now if each side has tactical nuclear weapons, it implies that each side must deploy its troops in expectation that the other side will use them: the point of no return is passed. To defend an area, we must disperse our troops; but to use dispersed troops effectively, we must use our optimum weapons. And this development will be forced on us and on the enemy even in case of a small war.

Col. Leghorn said that most of these points are being accepted today and consequently many are looking to the idea of graduated deterrents as a solution. Some raise related point -- that is, whether we possess the ability to pursue a policy of graduated deterrents -- but Col. Leghorn said that he would not concern himself with that aspect at this meeting.

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The nature of limitations is crucially important. Col. Leghorn said that his thinking on the problem had led him to the following three stages of limitation as a guide:

1) Against an aggression making use of conventional weapons we would use nuclear weapons to bomb the enemy only after they had penetrated into our territory and then only on those forces within our territory.

2) We would not employ a nuclear attack against the enemy's cities unless our cities have been the target of such an attack.

3) We would not use radioactive attacks -- which will be defined below -- unless such attacks were first directed at us.

Col. Leghorn went on to say that there is a question not only of why such a policy should be adopted -- which he treated previously -- but how such a policy should be adopted. Should such limitations as these three points involve be the subject of a battlefield decision by the military commander; should it be the decision of Congress, or should it be in the hands of the policy-making officials of the State Department? Whatever the answer, Col. Leghorn maintained, the implications of each of these alternatives must be thought out and the problem settled before the emotionalism and the confusion that come with an outbreak of hostilities. Of course, he added, we must not over-limit ourselves or box our policy within too rigid a framework. Some delegation of decision for example, must be reserved for the field commander. But even in this case we must anticipate the attitudes of these commanders and educate them out of the "all-or-nothing" attitude toward victory which, he implied, was inconsistent with a proper use of graduated deterrence. We must not risk the possibility that our action will be dictated only by circumstance and get beyond our control, or that dissension will spring up between us and our allies because we did not think out this question of limitation beforehand.

For these reasons, Col. Leghorn thought, we should strive to clarify our ideas on limitation before a possible future war by something like the following course of action:

1) Intensive study and public debate on the entire proposal of limitation. The debate should be public in order to secure the support of the nation for such a policy.

2) The announcement of our intention to limit our power; the publication of the principles upon which we intend to act.

3) The making of promises that, given a specific type of challenge, we will reply with a specific response.

4) The attempt to secure international agreements on the plan of graduated use of nuclear weapons listed above.

In response to a request from Mr. Johnson to elaborate his ideas, Col. Leghorn said that the entire notion of graduated deterrence which he sketched was an attempt to provide some political framework within which the military could operate. At present, the military are inclined to develop the full potential of their striking power -- to push to its logical limits the central notion of military action, the destruction of the enemy. The people involved in Sagebrush, for example, are thinking in terms of a hundred per cent probability of, and duration of kill. Now it might be better, Col. Leghorn pointed out, to take a lower probability and duration of kill, given specific political circumstances. A short war, for example, implies such limitation -- we would not attack the labor force, for example, or use bacteriological warfare; even the optimum massive attack on the Soviet Union does not seek to make it a charred plain.

[L]

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Then, too, he added, even if limitation were to break down in warfare, a political advantage would have been achieved by following a course of action which seeks to effect some limitation. The longer a breakdown of limitation can be stalled off -- the longer a conventional or non-strategic warfare in one theatre can be confined to that theatre -- the greater the chances will be of a cessation of hostilities before catastrophe.

Turning to the first category of limitation which he described -- that we would use nuclear weapons only after the enemy had penetrated out defense -- Col. Leghorn said that such a policy would enable us to deal with superior forces without having to wipe out vast areas, or maintaining enormous potential. Korea, he mentioned, was an example of what he had in mind here. Had we employed some tactical nuclear weapons against Communist forces advancing in South Korea, we would not have had to destroy South Korean cities and we would have gone far to clear up the war.

With regard to the second limitation -- the pledge not to attack with nuclear weapons any open city areas, unless ours were attacked -- Col. Leghorn offered a definition of "open city area." It implies, he said, a freedom from any specified military targets. Such a lack of targets would have to be proved by inspection; without some form of inspection, any such attempt to exempt open cities would break down.

"Radioactivity," as used in the description of the third limitation, would have to be defined as an unacceptable level of radioactivity. From his discussions with weapons effects people, Col. Leghorn said, it is feasible to specify a limitations on radioactivity effects by limitations on the types of nuclear weapons used and the height of burst.

Col. Leghorn then said that he would welcome questions and discussion from the members, of the points he made.

Mr. Johnson said that he wished to open the discussion by raising the question of whether there is agreement in the group that military action should be limited to only the resistance of aggression. This assumption, he felt, should be explored. Mr. Nitze suggested that, if we did get into a war of resistance to an aggression, and if this war, as Col. Leghorn anticipated, involved the use of nuclear weapons, we would not want simply that the status quo ante be the objective we fight for. A minimum objective for our policy, he thought, would be the assurance that this sort of thing would not happen again. Mr. Kissinger questioned whether this would be the minimum or the maximum objective; Mr. Nitze reiterated that he thought it would be the minimum. Col. Leghorn, however, said that he believed our minimum objective would be the repelling of aggression, and that a definition of the maximum would include free elections, and, on the highest level, control of atomic weapons.

Mr. Nitze said that what our war aims would be in a clash with the Soviet Union is very difficult to anticipate. All those who worked on the problem were agreed that we did not want the absolute destruction of Russia but rather only the exercise of the minimum force necessary for a political settlement. And then, it must be considered, that if the forces were evenly balanced after the first exchange, it might be better to take an armistice and stalemate, than an attrition that would simply punish both sides without expectation of success. In short, it is almost impossible to anticipate what would be the circumstances that would dictate the settlement we might seek in such a war.

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Mr. Altschul asked Col. Leghorn what he meant by the term "repelling aggression." Did this mean that nuclear weapons would be used only in the theatre in which the aggression took place, or would it admit the retaliation in some other area? Col. Leghorn said that he had not given this particular question too much thought, and had not arrived at a solid opinion. When he drafted the first degree of deterrence, he had been thinking mainly of the Korea-type situation, in which we would use the nuclear weapons against enemy forces after they had penetrated our lines. Gen. McCormack asked if this policy would not be a very difficult one to sell to our allies, and invaded, friendly nations. Mr. Baldwin said that for his part he could not conceive that any friendly or allied nation would accept this use of nuclear weapons as a principle of defence. Mr. Nitze said that the question is difficult to speculate on without reference to specific cases. He did not see, for example, how nuclear weapons could be made use of in this way to punish an assault on Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Johnson said that he wanted to pursue further the idea that repelling aggression should be the only basis for the use of nuclear weapons. He felt that our policy cannot be so negative -- rather, it must lead to some positive accomplishment, like the negotiation of a treaty. How does one know when the aggression is repelled? Mr. Nitze said he was in agreement with this exception. The question raised by Mr. Johnson was precisely the one we had to consider in relation to the 38th parallel. We would have been happy to accept a truce when we had advanced to this line, but when the enemy did not offer one, we could not simply sit tight and permit them to consolidate their position on the other side. Mr. Campbell said that it is necessary to make a calculation on the merits of the circumstances peculiar to each case. He felt that we cannot establish a formula that ignores the variety of the prices we would have to pay in different cases. Mr. Smyth asked whether we do not have to consider also, the idea that we would wish to punish the aggression as well as repel it.

Mr. Baldwin asked how aggression would be difined with respect to a case like Indo-China, where the Chinese supplied staff and experts. Is not the threat of staff aid and subversion the real problem that is involved in small wars, he inquired. We do not expect the Soviet Union to march in to take up the part of the Communists in areas like Indo-China. Mr. Kissinger felt, however, that this was a problem of definition, and not of what action we should take when we have decided that our definition of aggression is satisfied. It is a tricky problem, he agreed, of whether the dispatch of ten thousand Chinese leaders constitutes aggression, but once having decided, we could apply the action we have decided on. Col. Leghorn agreed.

Mr. Noyes asked if the view presented by Col. Leghorn does not presume that the opposition will not use the weapon because we have stated that we will use it only defensively.

Mr. Baldwin said that he firmly believed that Russia will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that this is a basic point to consider. With Mr. Baldwin disagreed with Col. Leghorn's contention that the use of nuclear weapons would have made an important difference in Korea. He felt that the Chinese Communists would not have quit the war if we had used a half-dozen atomic weapons even in addition to our conventional weapons. Mr. Nitze said that there is another question involved in this. Even supposing that six tactical nuclear bombs would have made the Chinese Communists withdraw, is there any reason for supposing that they would cause them to make a peace? If they were forced to withdraw behind the 38th parallel, they would then escape further punishment from nuclear weapons and be able to sit tight. Mr. Kissinger asked, however, whether that was not what happened anyway. Col. Leghorn suggested Mr. Kissinger's point. He said that he believed we would have achieved the same result in less time. Mr. Johnson said that he agreed with Mr. Nitze's criticism; if they are permitted to withdraw and we content ourselves with sitting them out, we would probably lose such a "sitzkrieg."

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Mr. Wolfers asked whether the group was not again presuming that we will be presented with situations in which we will have the nuclear weapons but the enemy will not. This kind of situation, he thought, will not occur. If the enemy knows we have relatively few men and many nuclear weapons, he will take appropriate action. He did not believe that we can assume that the enemy will commence an aggression with conventional weapons unprepared for receiving a nuclear counterattack, with the possible exception of Quemoy and Matsu. Mr. Johnson, however, said that he agreed with Mr. Baldwin. The aggressor will almost certainly try to push us into the first use of the nuclear weapons.

Mr. Kissinger suggested then that there are two questions involved: 1) can such a war be limited and 2) can we win it. He said that he had understood from conversations with military experts that unless we used nuclear weapons in resisting a small aggression we would be at a disadvantage. Mr. Nitze pointed out, however, that such a view would not obtain in all cases; Formosa, for example, can be defended without resort to nuclear weapons, presenting us with at least one opportunity of defending without using atomic power.

Mr. Noyes asked Col. Leghorn whether his view would not put us in a bad military position: that is, limiting ourselves to the use of nuclear weapons only for the purpose of repelling aggression, and permitting the aggressor to make use of his nuclear power after we have set the precedent. Mr. Perkins suggested that what Mr. Noyes remarked is true, but that with this possible military disadvantage there comes a political advantage by obtaining the support of world opinion. Mr. Noyes agreed, but added that military disadvantage is a dangerous thing, perhaps incommensurate with the political factor of world approval. Mr. Nitze stated that his feeling is that if these weapons are to be used, we must make perfectly sure that we use them to our real military advantage, in order to compensate for the political disadvantage. Mr. Campbell said he was in agreement with Mr. Nitze's point, but added that even a limited use of nuclear weapons -- that is, taking something less than the full military potential they offer -- can have the effect of repelling an aggression. He added that, presumably, the Soviet Union would be hesitant about beginning such an unpromising aggression.

Col. Leghorn said that he viewed the system of graduated deterrence as not only a scale of responses to different types of aggression, but also as a means by which to prevent a limited war from raging into an unlimited war. Assuming, he said, that the members support some kind of limitation of objective, how could we go about insuring that some kind of control will exist to prevent a limited war from expanding into an unlimited clash? Mr. Nitze said that he agreed that the questions raised by Col. Leghorn should be discussed. But he added that it was his opinion that the administration and the Joint Chiefs must first work out the technical questions and agree on them in order to provide precision and detail on this subject in advance of the public debate on the principle. Mr. Johnson said that there seemed to be two questions involved: are we going to be precise about our use of the nuclear weapons in advance, or are we going to wait for hostilities to begin and then make our decisions on the basis of circumstances; and second, presuming that we reach some policy precision beforehand, are we going to announce it. Col. Leghorn said that he had outlined four steps in a process of clarifying our intentions regarding the use of nuclear power. He said to Mr. Nitze that he presumed the latter would go as far as the second stage he outlined -- public debate -- but would not go on to announce promises of avoiding certain uses of atomic power or to secure international agreements.

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Mr. Smyth said to Mr. Nitze that he challenged the latter's statement that we must use the nuclear weapons on a large scale because it is a drastic step and must be made worth the political disadvantage. Mr. Smyth said that he did not believe this view is necessary. If we used atomic artillery against enemy troops, he thought, we would not suffer politically, or lose our moral position. Mr. Nitze said that he knows the issue is complicated, but he felt that when we use the atomic shell we give the enemy a choice of making peace or using the atomic weapons they have. Mr. Smyth suggested that they might also use them in a limited way. Mr. Nitze said only that "perhaps they might."

Mr. Baldwin said he thought that even one atomic shell dropped on Orientals would have a tremendous effect, going beyond military implications. He thought that the problem must be approached theatre by theatre.

Mr. Kissinger asked whether it would not be the best thing now to give fair warning to the world of how we can limit the use of nuclear weapons. As he understood it, the basic objective of the graduated deterrence idea is not so much to avoid using nuclear weapons, but rather of using them in the most humane and most politically rational way. Col. Leghorn agreed, saying that he viewed the graduated deterrence idea as an attempt to give political guidance to the military.

Mr. Kissinger went on to say that the problem seems to be one of getting some agreement on the categories and conditions of graduation of deterrence before war breaks out, when decisions can not be made carefully or coolly. As for the more humane use of the atomic weapons, he noted that, after Mr. Baldwin's articles on Sagebrush, the low yield bombs had been made still weaker, down to one kiloton and below. Mr. Baldwin said, however, that the key question is how to knock out the European airfields; this will be the overriding military necessity in the event of hostilities. And in this matter, he said, he agreed with Mr. Nitze: we have to be absolutely sure that the airfields are knocked out. Now it is impossible to do this without using high yield thermonuclear weapons; high burst low yield bombs would be insufficient to do the job, and the use of such small weapons to crater the airfields would produce radioactive fallout. If we use high-burst, high yield bombs, however, it will mean the certainty of overkillling, for most airfields are located next to metropolitan centers. It might be possible, he conceded, that we might make less use of these weapons against troop formations or on some limited area, like an island.

Mr. Baldwin said that he challenged Col. Leghorn's contention that we cannot defend Europe by other than nuclear weapons. He said he thought this was a kind of box American policy we had been forced into by too much concentration on the atomic weapons. Mr. Baldwin contended that he did not believe we have examined other strategies sufficiently. Col. Leghorn, he continued, has stated that we would have to disperse in expectation of a nuclear attack, and would therefore have to use nuclear weapons in offense. Mr. Baldwin said he does not think this follows. He added that he did not believe that small yield bombs would be very effective if we engaged the Chinese in North Korea today. Mr. Wolfers raised the question of why a massed attack should ever take place again since both sides will expect the use of atomic weapons. Gen. McCormack said that these considerations are the reasons why he is opposed to planning strategy until we see the deployment of the enemy. As far as Mr. Baldwin's reservations about concentration on the bomb, Gen. McCormack said that he was in full agreement; we should have at our disposal as many strategies as we develop. We must remember, he pointed out however, that the price tag on a full assortment of available strategies is very high.

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Mr. Johnson declared that we have the advantage of knowing -- if we do know -- that the enemy will not use nuclear weapons first. This fact, he said, makes it seem all the more important to him not to give away to the enemy our intention of not using them first. In this way, they will never be certain that they can move in mass, and will be forced into some compromise with mobility. Mr. Smyth said, however, that they are probably making the same guesses as we are. Mr. Baldwin stated that there is a time element to consider in relation to the question of announcing our intentions. He agreed that it would be dangerous now to state flatly that we will not use nuclear weapons first, but perhaps in the future, with a rearmed Germany and a different military picture, we could say openly to the Soviets that we will not use these weapons in a war unless they do. Mr. Altschul pointed out, however, that Gen. Gruenther's statement of our military policy in Europe declared that we will use them in defense of Europe.

Mr. Wolfers declared that there is a political aspect to the use of nuclear weapons in Europe. The Europeans, he said, have not yet caught on to the entire idea of nuclear war. It may be, he thought, that Europeans do not want to fight that kind of war; it may be they would rather give themselves up to the Russians. He was not claiming that this is the prevailing temper, he added, but rather that nuclear war simply makes little sense to Europeans.

## DEFENCE OF QUEMOY AND MATSU

Mr. Halaby referred to Mr. Nitze's belief that Formosa could be defended against Communist invasion by conventional weapons. He added, however, that fliers he has spoken to who have returned from this area are most concerned, not with the defense of Formosa, but with the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. He did not possess the full details, he said, nor did he assume this was more than the limited view of pilots who do not have the whole picture, but their general impression seems to be that, given the worst situation from the Seventh Fleet's point of view -- heavy land-based air support and extremely bad weather -- even a junk fleet attacking Quemoy and Matsu could not be stopped. Unless met by air attacks from the Seventh Fleet's planes, which would be impossible under such conditions, the Chinese forces would be able to make a landing. Mr. Baldwin agreed, adding that the only security against this possibility would be very well dug in troops on Quemoy and Matsu. General Ridgeway even proposed once that American troops be sent there. Mr. Halaby went on to ask whether the United States would look upon this hypothetical, successful invasion of Quemoy and Matsu as an attack on Formosa. Mr. Baldwin said that this line of thought leads to the basic alternative of using sufficient American troops to take care of the situation, or using the nuclear weapons because we do not have the forces in readiness. Mr. Halaby said that he believed the issue raised two questions; first, do we have the conventional forces to put into the area in order to make the use of the bomb unnecessary; and, second, how do we go about arriving at our decision? What he was thinking of, he said, was the possibility that the commander in the area might report back that he was unable to stop the invasion without using nuclear weapons, and receive for this action an approval that was dictated only by the pressing military needs of the moment, and not part of a well-thought-out previous plan. Mr. Wolfers asked whether the entire discussion did not raise the question of whether we should be committed to holding these islands. And he added that also involved is the problem of whether Formosa can be defended if Quemoy and Matsu are lost. Gen. Lindsay said that he was certain that it could be defended successfully in such a circumstance. Mr. Halaby said that if Quemoy and Matsu are given up, our problem will then be whether we have enough troops on Formosa to resist the attack successfully. The concept of the Seventh Fleet patrolling the waters of the straits shooting junks out of the sea, he thought, was all wrong. The Seventh Fleet is not even in the Formosa

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straits at the present. Mr. Baldwin pointed out that destroyers and small craft would be on patrol engaging in naval action with a junk invasion fleet, and that larger ships would not be necessary. Mr. Halaby asked, however, whether it is not likely that the Chinese would use atomic weapons in the second phase of their assault, that is, from Quemoy and Matsu to Formosa. Mr. Baldwin said that whatever the circumstances, he felt confident that we could hold Formosa.

Gen. Lindsay said that he was more concerned with the critical question of the political situation on Formosa if Quemoy and Matsu are lost. At the moment we are presuming that it is up to China to hold Quemoy and Matsu, and we have seen to it that they have been equipped with a great deal of hardware. Mr. Baldwin said that the garrisons on these islands have improved significantly. When General Ridgeway asked for the stationing of American troops here, the islands were thinly garrisoned and morale was weak.

Gen. Lindsay asked what effect the loss of Quemoy and Matsu would have on Nationalist China, replied that he believed it would weaken the will to hold out. Mr. Halaby asked if a greater United States commitment could in some way make up for such a loss; Gen. Lindsay answered that it would. Mr. Halaby added, however, that such a commitment would involve politically unpleasant factors like an increased draft call at home.

Mr. Kissinger asked what he felt to be the key question: if it is known in advance that we will use our nuclear power, having publicly offered our cooperation on limitation of nuclear weapons, are we not better off than if we had no clear intentions and no proposal on limitation? Mr. Johnson remarked that he presumed that Mr. Kissinger was referring to general announcements of intentions, not detailed specifications of plans. Mr. Kissinger stated that it is difficult to see how, with our nuclear power, we would be able to get involved in and maintain a purely conventional-weapons conflict. Mr. Baldwin said that he strongly felt that in the military field there must be available to us a multiplicity of strategies, and that in Formosa, we lack such multiplicity.

Mr. Halaby said that he presumed that any statement by us to the effect that the Nationalists are our allies and that we are helping to defend their homeland with nuclear weapons would cause London, and perhaps other European countries immediately to disassociate themselves from our intentions. He felt that we would not gain by such circumstances. Mr. Kissinger countered by saying that a multiplicity of strategies, such as Mr. Baldwin referred to, means not only a capability in both conventional and nuclear power, but also a variety of strategies within the nuclear family -- the very aim of graduated deterrence. To Mr. Halaby, Mr. Kissinger replied that the British are worried mainly about the bombardment of their cities and chary of the use of atomic power because they feel that their own country is a prime target in any interchange. If we presented the action in Formosa which Mr. Halaby described as being a limitation of the kind of power they fear, they probably would not take too much exception. Mr. Franklin stated, however, that Mr. Baldwin's point that air bases are close to cities, makes it impossible to exclude the bombing of cities from our or any nuclear attack. Mr. Kissinger replied that we cannot do both; we cannot use massive retaliation to achieve a limitation of objective. Mr. Johnson said that we would have to remember that any declaration such as Mr. Kissinger mentioned would have implications for England, because of its influence on India. Mr. Baldwin said that he did not see how we could announce whether we will or will not use atomic weapons.

Mr. Franklin wondered if it might not be advisable to get out of our commitment to Quemoy and Matsu, and asked what effect this would have on the Nationalist Chinese. Mr. Baldwin said that such action would, in effect be a bargaining away of Nationalist territory and would be a terrific blow to us in Asia. Gen. Lindsay added that there are hundreds of thousands of overseas Chinese fence-sitters who have not yet chosen

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sides between the Nationalist and Communist regimes. They might well choose the latter if we backed out of Quemoy and Matsu. And Mr. Campbell pointed out, further, there is a declining possibility of getting some kind of arrangement, such as a guarantee of Formosa, which would permit us to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. Chiang is less and less inclined to accept it and England probably would not support it anyway.

Mr. Perkins said that there have been two areas in which the situation has seemed to outrun our ability to meet it by conventional weapons -- that is the Quemoy-Matsu group and Europe. He felt that, somehow, we do not seem to worry about our inability to defend Europe without nuclear weapons or SAC. Does the existence of these two problems imply that there are other areas to which we are committed, but which we cannot defend by conventional weapons, he asked. Mr. Baldwin and General McCormack have maintained that we must hit airfields in Europe with maximum force to insure their destruction as a minimum necessity, and Mr. Halaby has implied we would have to use nuclear weapons to repel an invasion in the Formosa area. We should explore the possibility; he thought, that there are other situations in which our response would be similarly limited.

Col. Leghorn asked if our air defense weapons could not neutralize a Communist air cover and permit us then to deal with the junk fleet attacking Quemoy and Matsu. Gen. McCormack said that there are many factors to consider. It is certain, however, that atomic warheads in anti-aircraft shells do not solve the problem -- they are not one hundred per cent effective. But, Col. Leghorn asked, would not such a determined anti-aircraft action so weaken the air cover that the attack could be dealt with successfully? Mr. Baldwin stated that this was an important aspect. It is not his opinion, he stated, that we cannot defend Quemoy and Matsu without nuclear weapons, but that we must be ready to pay extra for a conventional weapons resistance. With Honest John and Corporal missiles, and the 280 mm. atomic cannon, he thought, we could lay waste an attacking force against these islands, bad weather or good.

Mr. Johnson asked whether we might not try to shift the world's emotional values and concentration away from simply the use of nuclear weapons and back to the prime factor of starting the war in the first place. He felt that we seem to have been boxed in -- put into the quandary of wondering how to avoid the use of nuclear weapons by a world opinion that disapproves more the use of nuclear weapons than it does the commencement of hostilities. Mr. Smyth thought the point well taken. It is his impression, he said, that the Japanese -- the only people to suffer the devastation of a strategic nuclear attack -- are not embittered toward the United States because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

In response to Mr. Johnson's invitation, Col. Leghorn then proceeded to summarize the thesis of graduated deterrence in the light of the comments made thus far. He said that it seemed to be everyone's conviction that between now and the time of total disarmament, the Communists will probably try another aggression. When they do, it is to be expected that we will not want to yield the territory, nor will we want to resort to a massive attack. As his first point, therefore, he held that we will want to have available at that time some form of limited response to their limited aggression. Now everyone has in mind a different kind of limitation, he stated: some even want different limits set in the same area. But when we consider, he continued, that we have before us the job of getting the support of the country and our allies for whatever limits we choose, it becomes a folly to sidestep the decision, it becomes necessary to work the problem out in advance, establish what kind of limitation we want, and seek to gain for it the support of the free world.

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Secondly, he went on, we must consider Mr. Baldwin's point -- that they will not use nuclear weapons first, and that, if we choose to pay for it, we can conventionally deter their conventional aggression. Col. Leghorn noted, however, that they do possess nuclear weapons and might choose to offer an atom-powered aggression. Moreover, he said that, for his part, he did not believe that we can in all cases provide conventional deterrents to a conventional aggression. But if we do employ nuclear weapons in meeting an aggression -- as these points indicate -- we must remember that these weapons have a political and moral aspect, and take some steps to graduate their use so that we will not suffer the disadvantages of becoming the villain in the world's opinion.

The third point he wished to make, he said, is tied up with the question of disarmament. At this point, disarmament seems technically impossible because of the enormity of the inspection problem. The control of possession of nuclear weapons is impossible -- because they can be secreted -- and the control of development is only a slight possibility. This leaves open as the only possibility, the control of use. Now historically, the restriction on the use of any weapon, he noted, has always depended on the existence of a deterrent, that is, the ability of the party against whom the use would be made, to retaliate so forcefully that the initial attack would be seen beforehand as impractical and not mounted. It is only on this type of control -- the control of use -- and by this means -- deterrents -- that we can depend.

Fourthly, he said, if we are presented by the prospect of a stalemate, do we not have to accept as a fact that we can not achieve aims of foreign policy by military action -- that we cannot impose our will without catastrophe. Lester Pearson, in his Princeton lectures, has hinted at the analogy between this situation and the laws governing self defense which permit as lawful, actions graduating in violence depending upon the violence of the attack. Col. Leghorn said he believed this analogy is one we should study as a guide to our policy in this matter.

Mr. Johnson said that he wished to summarize three issues on which he thought the problem rests. First, the timing of the decisions on a method of deterrence, and by whom that decision is made; second, the question of giving publicity to the decisions, if any are reached beforehand; and third, the question of who must participate in making the decision outside of those in our own government. Should our allies, or even prospective enemies -- in the case that inspection of open cities were involved -- be parties to the work of settling on agreed graduations of deterrents.

## SELECTIVE DISARMAMENT: THE POSSIBILITY OF BANNING DEVELOPMENT OF THE ICBM

Col. Leghorn said that he wanted to suggest one possible action we might take in disarmament policy, that is, propose a ban on the development of the large rocket missiles. In order to have a military capability in these weapons, he said, it is necessary to have about one thousand test firings. Now a test firing is relatively easy to detect. But in ten years, when the development of the missiles is complete, the launchers will be deployed and it will be a practical impossibility to find them. Because the missiles give almost no warning, an effective defense against them is most unlikely. Then, too, if we are serious about disarmament, the place to begin is with the weapons we do not have, rather than with those in being which could be hidden by either side. Of course, one cannot stop the advance of science, and some form of inspection system would have to be worked out analogous to the Baruch plan of ten years ago. Such a proposal, he added, would give the United States a great propaganda advantage in the world.

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Mr. Perkins said that he presumed Col. Leghorn was not referring to all rockets, since many were already in production. Col. Leghorn said that the 1500-mile missiles are already too far developed to catch, but that the control he suggested could be exercised over the development of the 5000-mile variety about which there exist certain special, and as yet unsolved, technical problems.

Gen. Lindsay asked if such a proposal would not be interpreted by our allies as a request for a ban against the only weapon that can touch us, writing off the possibility of banning the shorter-range missile which can destroy the Soviet Union from European sites and Europe from Soviet sites.

Mr. Franklin said that he questioned whether the world would be better off if the ICBM were not to come into existence. It would not present a threat of more widespread destruction, for even the forces in being now are capable of wiping out both the Soviet Union and the United States. At present, however, it is still feasible to destroy the possibility of retaliation for a sneak attack by destroying the airfields, since intercontinental atomic bombing can now be accomplished only by airplane. The possession of ICBM capability on both sides, however, would make it impossible for one side to destroy the retaliatory power of the other, and hence make any initiation of an attack a matter of suicide. Col. Leghorn said that, assuming we achieve this position in another decade, how could we continue indefinitely with this Damoclean sword suspended over international affairs. Mr. Franklin said that this is largely the situation today; it would be only a question of the degree of impending destruction, and the present degree is awful enough. Mr. Haskins asked if by increasing the very volume of an atomic ICBM attack the aggressor would be able to eliminate the possibility of retaliation. Mr. Franklin said that if this were the case, his argument would, of course, fall, but he did not think it is so. In any event, he thought, even the thirty minutes or so of warning to the attacked nation would be enough to permit the launching of a retaliatory attack.

Mr. Baldwin said that he did not think that the location of guided missile launchers could be kept a secret. Both sides would find out the location of the sites on the other side. Col. Leghorn's proposal, he said, appears to recommend itself from the psychological point of view. With the exception of President Eisenhower's proposals, he thought, we have lagged behind in taking the propaganda initiative. On the other hand, he said, there is a possibility that we might not profit from such a proposal. If we were ahead of the Soviet Union in this matter, or equal with them, such a proposal would be accepted at face value; but because we are behind them in rocket development, the proposal might be seen as merely an attempt to isolate and outlaw the one weapon in which the Soviets surpass us. Mr. Franklin did not agree. President Eisenhower's proposal, he said, was not interpreted as devious self-interest on our part, or as an attempt to discover the state of Russian atomic development. Mr. Nitze suggested that such proposals could be coupled with an offer to join in a ban upon the further testing of nuclear devices. This is something that they have been asking for, and could probably turn down only with difficulty. Gen. Lindsay said he believed the implementation of such a scheme would be difficult: the march of science, as Col. Leghorn has said, cannot be stopped, and conceivably we might ban one weapon only to see another develop. The earth satellite is an example: given the solution of a few more technical problems -- such as that of reentry -- we might find ourselves back where we started. Col. Leghorn said, however, that he understood there are technical differences between the reentry problems of the 1500-mile and the 5000-mile missiles and questions about the latter which can only be solved by tests. And these tests, he added, could be detected. Gen. Lindsay said that he understood the difference is more a matter of degree, and not so radical as Col. Leghorn implied.

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Gen. Lindsay went on to say that, apart from the ICBM and its much discussed horrors, there is also the likelihood that ten years or so from now there will exist atomic-powered aircraft capable of staying in the air almost indefinitely. Of course, they will be as vulnerable as any other aircraft, but they will be able to serve as a permanent patrol and a balance to the ICBM. Mr. Baldwin added that they would also have the ability to fire missiles themselves. Col. Leghorn said, however, that a system of ICBM development inspection would require so many planes that those remaining would not be enough to destroy a retaliatory capability. Mr. Haskins remarked, that without a knowledge of the total required for inspection, it would be impossible to estimate this.

Mr. Johnson said that he did not see that any such disarmament proposal as Col. Leghorn proposed for the ICBM would get us any further than where we are now. Even assuming that some kind of inspection system could be arranged for the 5000-mile missile development; it would still leave uncontrolled all those capabilities which already exist and not, of course, take account of those devices yet to be developed. Mr. Baldwin said he agreed with Mr. Johnson's point; that this was the fallacy of qualitative disarmament. Even so, he added, such a proposal would have a favorable propaganda effect. Mr. Kissinger asked Col. Leghorn if the inspection he proposed would contribute to the applicability of graduated deterrents. Col. Leghorn replied that it would facilitate the designation of the open cities.

Mr. Kissinger then said that the possibility of inspection brings up the question of how we would react to a violation of the agreement that is being policed. Would not such a violation make an all-out war more likely? Col. Leghorn said that we already have an analogous situation in the early warning system: presumably if this system is alerted, our forces are unleashed. Mr. Kissinger then noted that an inspection system might make limited aggression more likely; and Gen. McCormack, agreeing, said that small wars would be the kind to expect if we had an inspection system in operation. Col. Leghorn said that the Soviets, putting themselves in our place, will know we do not intend to engage in massive retaliation and will know that we will be ready for such small aggressions. Mr. Campbell said that we would be better off if we had capabilities to handle both small and big wars.

Mr. Baldwin said that his opposition was based on the belief that we should not freeze our present rocket situation when the Russians are ahead of us; it would cripple our attempts to catch up. Gen. McCormack agreed; he thought that banning of testing can wreak havoc on a development program. Mr. Smyth pointed out, however, that a lack of tests will not stop development. We developed the atomic bomb from scratch without tests, and went for three years at one period before setting off a hydrogen bomb.

## GRADUATED DETERRENCE AND FLEXIBILITY

Mr. Smyth said that the discussion so far had been in strictly military terms. But what, if anything, could we do if France or Italy some day went Communist and invited the Russians in?

General McCormack said that in the first meeting of the group he had put forth a plea that the greatest service that could be rendered by a group such as this is the support of those developments which permit greater flexibility for those who have charge of operations. From our indefensible position in Quemoy and Matsu, he thought, we learned, perhaps, how not to get boxed in like this in the future -- and this

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constitutes a new flexibility. To have a choice of military capabilities takes the shackles off those who have to direct diplomacy. With respect to the proposal of graduated deterrence, he said that he saw it as a commitment in advance to stop aggression with whatever means are necessary and in whatever areas we think it must be stopped. Mr. Johnson agreed that one of the things the group is most anxious to do is provide greater flexibility. Mr. Kissinger, however, said that if we fought with bows and arrows rather than nuclear weapons, our position on Quemoy and Matsu would still be bad. We cannot make a bad political situation into a good one, by the use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Nitze said that each side is deterred, but that each side also has to make an estimate of the other's will and at every step can hold on to wait for the other side to back down. Mr. Noyes added that another important factor is the realization that one's allies are waiting to see who will back down first. Mr. Wolfers referred to the Quemoy-Matsu situation in this connection: if the Communists do not need to use the nuclear weapons they have, they can say to themselves that we can not use such weapons, and they do not have to use them. Mr. Nitze said that, for a moment, perhaps we should consider the situation from the standpoint of the Chinese; they must look on us as the fellows who are possibly going to miscalculate and it might be serving to box them in since they cannot be certain of our will. Mr. Wolfers asked why we have this curious will to do risky things like commit ourselves to Quemoy and Matsu. At the moment we are closer to them and can hurt them more than they can hurt us. But this, he felt, is a temporary advantage: if and when they can threaten New York for Quemoy and Matsu, we will wish we never had got out on this limb. Mr. Kissinger said, however, that he did not think one should make a connection between using nuclear weapons on Quemoy and Matsu and having our own cities bombed. It would take great blunders over a long period for us to get into this situation. Mr. Wolfers replied that, if we can hurt their coastal cities, they will have to develop the ability to hurt us equally in order to insure that we will not use the bomb against them. This would produce a stalemate. Mr. Kissinger said that there have been times in history when forces have been equal, but, for various reasons, victories have been possible. There seem to be, he continued, two reasons for fighting a war: to win it and to punish so greatly the advances of the other that he does not succeed, and a standoff results. Applying the second alternative would mean that we would keep Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. Nitze said that if we look as the "ground rules" of a future war as dictating that each side gives better than it gets, we must presume that there will be no limit to the destruction. Mr. Franklin noted, however, that this would lead to a strong pressure for settlement. If so, Mr. Nitze said, this would mean that each side, despite their avowed intentions, will not commit their full increment of power to each stage of retaliation. Mr. Altschul pointed out, however, that the geographical factor comes in strongly: it is not simply a question of balancing forces.

Mr. Kissinger said to Mr. Nitze, moreover, that to judge from our past experience in Korea and Indo-China, we have not been forced to go to the limit. It is possible to place the enemy in a position from which he cannot extricate himself without a mass attack -- which he will not engage in for fear of retaliation. Mr. Johnson said that he could not see how a system of graduated deterrence, whatever its advantages in other areas, increases the variety of our choices and our flexibility. Gen. McCormack said that if we had only the strategic air capacity and the ability of massive retaliation, we would be restricted. But if we possess an arsenal of graduated deterrents ranging down to stink bombs, then we have the opportunity of making more different choices. Mr. Noyes said that he agreed, if graduated deterrents include more than reliance on one weapon.

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Mr. Perkins said that the toughest problem is how to get flexibility within the variety of uses of atomic power. Mr. Nitze suggested that this might be the subject of the next discussion. We could assume that both sides will use atomic weapons and then try to see how the application of this weapon can be controlled so that the beginning of a war would not be the beginning of the end. Mr. Smyth said that he thought too much absolute thinking has been employed in the past. If we destroy each suggestion by citing examples of the inapplicability of the suggestion, he thought, we are losing sight of the goal of flexibility.

Mr. Wolfers said that he saw it as a problem of how to hurt the enemy so that he will stop his aggression, and yet not hurt him so much that he must reply with greater power. It can be looked upon as a continuum from premilitary action to total destruction. On the lower level we are now inclined to look upon conventional warfare as mild -- although it certainly has not always been thought as such. As we move into nuclear war, we find that there is a limited and unlimited tactical use of atomic weapons, and beyond that, a limited and unlimited strategic use of atomic weapons. What we must seek to do is prevent the situation in which the enemy dictates what degree of hurt or punishment we inflict, for we must try not to have to face the alternative of either precipitating total devastation, or backing down because further steps would set off the chain of circumstance leading to catastrophe. The trouble is, as he saw it, that we do not feel we can win future wars by conventional weapons. Mr. Leghorn added that the pace of nuclear war would be so fast that we must be sure to get the "rules" established first. If we do not think our position through, first by taking counsel among ourselves, and then perhaps, getting some agreement with the Soviet Union, we might find ourselves pushed to the limit in a whirlwind of action once fighting has broken out.

Mr. Johnson turned to the question of the next meeting. He understood, he said, that Sir John Slessor would be in New York on February 2nd and in Boston on the 13th. He asked if it was the feeling of the group that he should be invited. Mr. Perkins said he had found him a disappointing speaker. Gen. McCormack said that he had certainly spoken his own mind at the War College, Mr. Baldwin said that he believed he has stimulating ideas and is worth listening to. Mr. Franklin asked who would be able to come to a meeting on February 2. When few signified that they could attend, the proposal was dropped.

After some discussion, February 29th was chosen as the date of the next meeting.

James M. Muphy
Rapporteur

Personal

Not for publication

STUDY GROUP REPORTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Sub-Committee III

Discussion Leaders: Lt. General James M. Gavin
Maj. General Richard C. Lindsay
Rear Admiral John S. Thach

Chairman: William A. M. Burden

Study Director: Henry A. Klassinger

Rapporteur: Kelsey Marechal

Second Meeting
February 15, 1956

Digest of Discussion

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Phase One is a period of infiltration, during which highly trained, skilled "drifters" take up residence in an area in numbers depending upon the permissiveness of the local situation, for the purpose of establishing cells of activists.

During the second phase, which might be called a period of consolidation, the infiltrators recruit local organizations from Communist sympathizers and dissident elements within the society. The cells are expanded, and "friendly" persons are placed in positions of responsibility in the government, labor unions, and various other important areas of the culture. This phase is also often a time for the hardening and testing of the loyalties of personnel.

The third phase, which is not always necessary, involves the use of force either through revolution or assault from without under one or another "liberation" guises. The fourth phase, naturally, is a period of reconstruction of the area into a socialist society.

The first two of these phases may take from five to thirty years. Everyone is familiar with various indications of the operation of phase two in the United States. Admiral Thach noted one instance which had come to his attention as far back as 1927, when a Bolshevik group had circularized the crew of a Navy vessel entering San Francisco harbor. He related the way in which it had been possible for the Navy to acquaint the members of the crew in advance with the content of these propaganda circulars, and to counter various lies with the truth so effectively that all the leaflets were discarded by the men who received them.

Among the many techniques used by the Communists during phase two is the fomenting of riots, strikes, and civil disorders, but even these overt actions are usually conducted in such a subtle and seemingly unrelated fashion that it is difficult to alert the potential victims of a Communist coup to their danger. Admiral Thach suggested that the Communist plan of operation for a particular area might very well look like a giant chart board on which each seemingly insignificant subversive activity is recorded in red until eventually the entire board takes on a sufficiently deep hue to set the stage for phase three.

Phases one and two are the best areas for the application of some preventive medicine, and even if force is eventually needed to redeem the liberty of the area, certain early preparations can be invaluable. For instance, if the U.S. or the U.N is called upon to counteract Communist aggression in a remote area of the world, it needs to have battlefield intelligence, and, unless U.S. missions train with the indigenous forces of an area, there may be no accurate intelligence system in the event of war. It seems logical that the U.S. must at least pave the way for adequate communications with local troops, overcoming language barriers with symbols, if necessary, and organizational differences with proper liaison.

During phase three, that is, outright assault, U.S. ability to move its forces rapidly is of the essence. It need hardly be said that if the United States had been able to bring to bear a considerable force immediately in Korea the war might have gone much differently.

Admiral Thach turned his attention to the ways in which wars may be limited. He said that the limits of any war depend upon the desires of each party to the war.

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Warring nations may choose to limit their actions in terms of geography, the force they are willing to commit, or the type of weapons which they decide to use. For example, in Korea UN forces elected not to cross the Yalu, while the Communists did not choose to contest UN air superiority, nor to attack UN bases. Admiral Thach suggested that the lesson of history is that wars can be fought within inherent limits which are stronger than the imposed limits of treaties.

## THE NAVY'S CONTRIBUTION TO LIMITED WAR

Picking out the potential trouble spots of Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Pakistan, Admiral Thach stated that the U.S. could not resist Communist aggression without depending upon the traditional mobility of Naval and Marine units. He noted that the Navy's mobile forces may have several uses in modern diplomacy: to make a show of force, to call an enemy bluff, or to provide military pressure.

Prompt, effective action is necessary to counter Communist aggression. Especially in less developed areas of the world, such as those mentioned above, a military force needs a capability for amphibious landing where ports do not exist, and air support where bases have not been built. The Navy's close support task force has a unique capability for early and sustained support.

The Navy's air support is the equivalent of several complete mobile "air bases." Modern planes demand, of course, a supply and maintenance complex infinitely more refined than just a simple landing strip. The Navy's close support task force arrives as a complete unit with a smooth supply and maintenance establishment prepared to go instantly into full performance. It carries its own defense mechanisms; it need not upset the balance of strategic air deployment. Because of the balanced nature of its armaments and vehicles, the task force is adaptable to either limited or general war situations. In answer to a question by Mr. Burden, the Admiral said that the Navy was prepared to handle several simultaneous local wars. He suggested that the 6th Fleet is capable of handling any difficulties in the Mediterranean area, and the 7th Fleet is similarly prepared to act with regard to Formosa and perhaps Indo-China.

Admiral Thach said that his conclusion is that the Navy's flexibility gives it a capability of being involved in a limited war with the constant readiness to turn to the atomic weapons in its armaments. Mr. Kissinger inquired if this meant that the Admiral was distinguishing between limited and total war on the basis of the type of weapons used. The Admiral replied that of course it is difficult to draw a clear line. It is difficult to imagine any war in Europe staying limited. One line of reasoning holds that any war in which U.S. troops contact Soviet forces, or any action in which Soviet submarines attack U.S. supply lines, cannot stay limited. The Admiral did not feel, however, that the use of nuclear weapons especially differentiates limited and total war. He reiterated that the limiting of war depends on the terrain, locality, strength of indigenous forces, and the methods by which the Communists choose to conduct their aggression. A largely guerilla action in Malaya stands a better chance of staying a limited war than any

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kind of action in Europe does. Since the type of action to be expected in the Pacific areas is somewhat different from the traditional pattern of military operations, there is a definite need for the SEATG countries to evolve an appropriate means of organizing their forces at the company and squad levels instead of divisionally.

Mr. Hill asked if there is any Navy plan to keep a limited war capability regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons can be used. Admiral Thach felt that it is not necessary for the Navy to maintain special limited war forces since it is in the nature of these forces that they are flexible. He added that while the role of the Navy changes there still can be no war without it.

Mr. Earl Johnson said that the task force concept in composition and magnitude meets all demands from limited to total war. Admiral Thach added that a great weakness of the Communists, especially the Soviet Union, is that they have never conducted an amphibious operation. They seem to be trying hard to remedy this weakness with their program of building large submarines. They have, however, no capability with sea based aircraft, and consequently could not provide high performance air support for any operation in Indo-China. The United States should exploit this weakness.

## LIMITING AN AIR WAR

General Lindsay agreed that wars are limited by the goals of their participants. The goal of the United States in the event of Communist aggression is limited to punishing that aggression and stopping the war as soon as possible. The operations of the Air Force are designed to try to punish aggression and halt the war by means of a series of steps. First attack would be against directly involved forces. If these forces are organized and grouped, they would probably present targets for nuclear weapons. Initial targets would include staging areas immediately behind front lines, and enemy air fields offering direct support. All attacks would be simultaneous to maximize shock. If initial enemy aggression were against an island like Formosa, enemy naval vessels might also be targets.

If these steps are not successful in halting the aggression, the Air Force will institute a second stage of attack. It will penetrate deeper into the enemy strength, striking supporting elements of the front line, assembly points, ports, air staging fields, and previously attacked forward fields which have been rebuilt. The Communists have demonstrated a high capacity for rapid manual rehabilitation of bombed facilities; effective intelligence is necessary to determine when the objectives of attack are being reached.

There are many strikes within the Soviet Union itself which might not involve the civilian population, such as transportation lines, marshalling yards, etc. The first two stages of attack would not involve urban areas to a very great extent.

In the event that the first two stages of attack are unsuccessful in halting the aggression, the ultimate step is to strike the industrial strength of the enemy. Naturally any action of this depth tends to lose its resemblance to limited war.

General Lindsay pointed out that the application of such an air campaign to such varied areas as Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia cannot always be similar. For instance, if the Russians go into Azerbaijan in a drive through Iran to the Caspian, the U.S. could effectively apply the first two steps of the outlined air campaign. However, General Lindsay felt that it is hard to visualize a

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limited war in Europe, for if the satellite forces move, the result is likely to be total war, particularly in view of U.S. obligations to NATO. Perhaps an action in Austria might remain limited, but even that would be a violation of neutrality guaranteed by the Western powers.

Turning to the problem of what forces need to be added to the present air level to insure a limited war capability in the Air Force, General Lindsay stated that the Air Force, as currently trained and designed, is considered to be capable of handling either a limited or a general war. A tactical force for limited war action is in the planning stage. This experimental task force concept was tested in Operation Sage Brush, and is designed to provide additional instantaneous punishment for aggression at its source.

Mr. Burden suggested that it is necessary to place more emphasis on logistic strength of the Air Force. General Lindsay estimated that to lift one division of 7,000 short tons, an air lift capacity equivalent to ten and one half wings of C-130's is necessary; the 507 planes involved have an initial cost of 5.5 billion dollars. They can begin to move a division within days, and have it in place within a week. The present Air Force all up-lift capacity is sufficient to move one division, but would necessitate suspending all other air operations with the exception of SAC.

Mr. Burden asked the General to speculate about the way in which costs will be affected by the larger cargo planes now in planning. General Lindsay estimated that the present C 130's in strength to lift one division would cost about $45 million per month to operate, or roughly $0.5 billion per year. This annual fixed cost would remain about the same if the C 132 and C 133 are used to provide the same lift, since the larger planes require about a 40 per cent higher capital outlay but cut operating costs by about the same percentage.

The General pointed out that the amount of lift that he had been discussing is enough to handle only the "air born" portion of a division, and that 30 to 35 thousand tons of equipment -- about one month's combat requirement -- must be carried by some subsidiary means.

General Quesada asked what alternatives might be available if the cost of getting this lift is prohibitive. General Lindsay felt that there are no practical alternatives if future requirements of the armed forces include swift action to counter aggression.

Mr. Earl Johnson noted that the purpose of these task forces of mobile troops is not to follow through on a general war in Europe, for example, but to provide small but efficient forces for limited wars. Mr. Elliott and Admiral Thach agreed that the extent of mobile force needed at any particular point depends largely on the size and depth of any enemy aggression. General Lindsay added that troop deployment has to be largely a function of the base structure; in areas which are without bases for Air Force operations the Navy will have to bear the brunt. The Air Force can use its long leg to a limited extent, but it cannot do so to an extent that will jeopardize the SAC capacity for operation should a general war result from some limited operation. Mr. Gilpatric noted that of the present 137 wings about 11 are designed for lifting. As General Lindsay pointed out, these 11 wings are composed of the C 130's plus the 124, 123, and 119 type crafts. Mr. Elliott observed that if a test comes on two fronts in limited war actions the U.S. would have to call upon reserves, and the effort would exhaust the logistic support of the country. Admiral Thach added that in a Marine air wing it is expected that resupply will run about 167 lbs. per day per man.

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TOWARD A MORE MOBILE ARMY

General Gavin reported that experimental Army divisions such as the 101st are stressing hyper-mobility. The organizing priority is (1) air mobility, and (2) sustained combat capability. The Army expects to cut the weight of its divisions by as much as one-half of the present 7,000 tons. The light division will be comprised of 17,000 men plus about 85% of the usual combat personnel, all the division's weapons, none of its armor, and about three days' ammunition supply.

He noted that the character of the Army is changing radically, and as yet the final significance of new weapons techniques are not thoroughly understood. Many persons feel that the structural change taking place now will be in the end more revolutionary than the appearance of the tank in 1940. It is hoped that it will be possible to cut the present equipment weight of a division by about two-thirds through the use of such devices as expendable jeeps with a life expectancy of 1,000 miles. This reorganization of the Army means that it is going to reverse its usual priorities system, and sacrifice sustained capability for higher mobility.

After the usual break for dinner, General Gavin launched into a discussion of types of limited war. He suggested that wars are limited either in the amount of force brought to bear, by the percentage of a country's GNP devoted to pursuit of the war, or in terms of the geography of the area of combat. The greatest guarantee against expansion of a war is provided by the limits of geography. He noted also, that if one defines a general war as any war which is not limited by one of the above forces, there have been no general wars except World War II.

In terms of trying to limit a war the European scene presents the most problems, while an isolated area like Indo China presents the fewest. An area like the Middle East, which is a perennial trouble spot, falls somewhere in between these two extremes. The Middle East, which is the land bridge to Eurasia and Africa, presents a changing picture depending upon the time in the future that trouble might break out, for all the forces in that area are in a state of evolution.

The structure which the Army is trying to evolve in the changing character of armaments is more like an amorphous biological cell than it is like the old pyramid. The new divisions are going to be something of an "air cavalry." Atomic weapons will be integrated into these units. Regardless of Soviet progress along reorganizational lines, which some experts feel is lagging considerably behind that of the U.S., this country must be first in its readiness to fight the "new" kind of war. The army expects to integrate atomic weapons on all levels from battalion to field army.

The latest techniques of communication must be used to maintain communication lines in the area with low density coverage running to as much as a 100 mile depth of controlled dispersion in order that a division can absorb an atomic attack by the enemy. Considerable dependence will be placed upon the whole missile family; success in this area will be measured by the extent to which the Soviet long-range bombers can be destroyed without even being sighted. High kill ratio depends upon the thorough automation of detection and firing apparatus of all the armed forces.

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General Gavin noted that the pattern of Soviet armament is changing also. They are doing well in the job of revamping their air and sea arms for modern warfare. The Soviet Army, on the other hand, is not reorganizing but is trying to add new techniques on top of its old line organization. It is hoped that they will not be successful in doing this.

## PROBLEM STUDY: LIMITED WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

General Gavin said that he felt that it would be useful for the Group to consider a hypothetical future disturbance in the Middle East, and the way in which the U.S. might respond. He proposed that at some future date the U.S. would be continuing military and economic aid to Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. It might have an atomic task force in the Po Valley reinforced by indigenous troops. The Air Force might be training in Libya.

At the same time, the Soviet Union, extending the events of the last few years into the foreseeable future, would be supporting Egypt by sending tanks in the hundreds, and aircraft of the T-34, MIG, and perhaps even T-54 types. The Soviets expect to establish a nuclear laboratory in Egypt. Assuming that this relationship continues, Egypt will send officers for training to the Soviet Union, and they receive tactical nuclear weapons.

The U.K. owes some £300,000,000 from the last war to Egypt, so the U.S.S.R. may step in with financial assistance. The U.S. is giving $200,000,000 through the World Bank and $75,000,000 in economic aid to Egypt, which might also accept $60,000,000 from the U.S.S.R. Soviet technicians will flow to Egypt by the thousands. It may be assumed that the Egyptian Army prefers Soviet support. The Suez Treaty expires in 1968; General Gavin asked the Group to assume that by that year English and French influence has continued to wane. Diplomatically, the U.S.S.R. will go to bat to give the Suez to Egypt.

Continuing his examination of the hypothetical case, General Gavin assumed that in the future Jordan and Saudi Arabia will continue to have a political association with Egypt. Pressure would mount on Iraq, forcing it within two or three years to abrogate the Bagdad Pact. Israel, in its anxiety, becomes neutral.

Taking 1959 as a likely year for the trouble to commence, General Gavin suggested that in this year Iraq alleges that Iran has made border raids, mobilizes, and attacks Iran. The U.S. takes the matter to the U.N., where the matter is killed in the Security Council by a Russian veto in the midsummer of '59. Within 30 days Turkey, alarmed by the movements in the area has placed a corps on its border. This move stimulates the Arab states to attack Turkey. Both Egypt and Turkey use tactical atomic weapons in lieu of medium artillery, for within four or five years these weapons will be commonplace.

Within ninety days the situation has reached the point that the United States must decide between several courses of action. The Joint Chiefs decide that Iran can hold out for thirty days, there is more turbulence in Morocco, which immobilizes French assistance in the area, Pakistan becomes lost, as does two-thirds of the oil reserves in the area. The U.S. has three divisions in Libya, the Navy in the Mediterranean is ready, NATO countries are alerted, there

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are tactical A-weapons in the inventories of these troops, the Navy has two or
three Marine divisions in North Africa, and SAC is alerted to hold Soviet SAC
at bay.

Under these conditions the Joint Chiefs have two courses to recommend to the President. The first is that the U.S. sit tight. The result of this course would be no general war, total loss of the Middle East, and a general war at a later date under circumstances less favorable to the U.S. The second course is for the U.S. to move into Egypt, take Cairo and the Suez area, and driving through with tactical atomic weapons clean up the aggression at its source within thirty days.

It must be expected that five days after the United States takes action
of this sort, the U.S.S.R. will invoke its 1919 Treaty with Iran; the danger of
general war naturally arises at this point.

Dr. Rabi wondered just what was meant by "tactical atomic weapon."
General Gavin explained that to him this term meant an appropriate weapon to use
at any target right up to the Soviet border, from the smallest rifle propelled
device to a sixty-foot missile. He noted also the possibility that the war
might still be limited for other reasons even if Soviet troops became directly
involved.

Mr. Burden wondered what would happen to these assumptions if the U.S.S.R.
became strong enough to make a general war unattractive to the U.S. General
Gavin thought that the Russians might feel the U.S. is not willing to take the
risk of using SAC. Mr. Burden wondered if the Soviets want to start more limit-
ed wars. General Gavin felt that they do, and noted that they have the initiat-
ive. Dr. Rabi noted that one obvious solution to the problem is to stop Soviet
supplies to Egypt now, and General Gavin agreed that this would be desirable.

The General continued that despite the fact that his speculations about
the Middle East above are hypothetical, the U.S. will soon have the capability
in the area that he had referred to. There are three divisions in Libya nearing
readiness. There will be six divisions of atomic field armies for general use.
In addition to the three divisions in North Africa, the U.S. would need three
more in Tunis to carry out the sort of program he had outlined, and it would be
necessary to call up six National Guard divisions on ninety-day training orders
and direct full mobilization of industry.

Mr. Burden wondered if the total situation holds more danger for the U.S.
or the U.S.S.R. Mr. Halaby cited the extent to which SAC could devastate the
U.S.S.R in the event of general war. Dr. Rabi raised the question of whether
or not Egypt really can become an atomic power within four years. He noted also
that while the Soviets have some thirty or forty thousand tanks, they are not
likely to give Egypt more than five or six hundred of these. General Gavin com-
mented on the difficulty this country might have in fighting two or three limited
wars at once. He thought that being prepared for any eventuality demands a force
level of twenty-eight divisions plus appropriate production and reserve levels.

Mr. Earl Johnson recalled that Germany had gone into Czechoslovakia and
Austria with impunity, but that after that the "prize" had become too big. He
wondered if the prize is too big in the Middle East. Admiral Thach suggested

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that if the U.S.S.R. plans a Middle East push by 1959, it may start losing a limited war somewhere else to divert American energy and attention. Mr. Hill wondered if U.S. public opinion would support a Middle Eastern operation.

General Gavin said he felt that it is more likely that the Soviets would start a limited war in the Middle East than a general war. A Soviet motive might be to force the Western allies into neutrality, and cut the Western line of communication to the Far East. In response to a question by Mr. Halaby, the General declared that the sort of operation he had outlined could be accomplished by some 1,500 sorties from the continental U.S. using C-133-4 planes, without redeploying NATO forces except to augment the Turks. He noted the extent to which the United States can become involved in limited wars through the treaty provisions of NATO, bi-lateral agreements with Korea and Japan, and non-military pacts such as SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact. He noted that these agreements extend around the periphery of the Soviet orbit, and that the time-space factors of modern diplomacy require military reserves in depth. He suggested that force requirements in Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and North Africa, plus the five divisions committed to NATO, an atomic task force for Turkey and the Po Valley, and a mobile reserve at home gives a total requirement of twenty-eight divisions.

Admiral Thach noted that the Navy's degree of expansion has not been as great as that of the Air Force or the Army. Since the build-up of tension in Korea and the Far East area, the Navy has been forced to move ships from the Atlantic. Nearly all the Navy's units are being forced to maintain too high a level of mobility, with the result that many good men are being kept out of that service by the hardships of exceptionally long tours of duty away from their families. When asked by Mr. Hill if the Navy has the support capability to handle twenty-eight divisions, Admiral Thach said that he felt that in any situation short of general war the answer is yes.

The question of the dollar cost of these expanded forces was raised by Mr. Burden, who noted that the overall price tag would be higher than the figure discussed at the last meeting. General Gavin said that he could not estimate the number of dollars required, but he could say that the total is considerably less than the American GNP can comfortably stand. When Mr. Halaby noted the procurement problem of the new type of army, General Gavin responded that this country had better spend the money or quit now. The Soviet Union is spending money building a whole new weapons family,

Mr. Hababy became more specific. He asked what additional spending would be needed if the Congress gives new obligatory authority of $8 billion for three years. General Gavin replied that $14.5 billion is a good estimate of the cost for the twenty-eight divisions. It would cost on the order of $1.5 billion to renovate existing divisions. He emphasized that the country which will survive in event of war is the country whose armed forces are two-thirds on wheels and one-third in the air. Every division must have several hundred aircraft to provide lift, attack and defense, plus many small craft for the necessary reconnaissance to give the optimum dispersion level. Besides dollars, vision is needed to revolutionize the Army.

Mr. Hill raised the question of whether the increased U.S. capability for limited war would deter the U.S.S.R. from starting limited wars, or would actually encourage Russia to engage in local aggression because an expanded U.S.

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limited war capability might indicate a decreasing reliance on massive retaliation. Admiral Thach noted that Russia is currently engaged in a program of limited wars, despite the U.S. retaliatory power, but if the U.S. meets Soviet aggression on the local level it will force the U.S.S.R. to reappraise the profits to be gained from limited war. The Admiral continued that the U.S. must maintain both limited and general war capabilities.

Mr. Elliott averred that "psycho-politics" is replacing geo-politics. He noted that this change has considerable effect on the extent of readiness in this country. For example, Americans seem to take for granted the continental defense system, but the time schedule for continental defense has not been brought into line. This defense requires a ready reserve, which is not likely to exist under present or future political conditions in this country. It would take one year to reach full mobilization under present statutes.

He continued that the present defensive position is causing maldeployment of forces without any reserve backup. He noted, too, that military plans seem frequently to ignore the role of assassination in Communist politics. Besides key figures in shaky Middle Eastern governments, there is the possibility of assassination of U. S. leaders as well. There is the additional danger that Americans are waging "psycho-warfare" on themselves. People may be tempted to ask if any political end result, even enslavement, can be worse than nuclear war. The American people by tradition are not ready to move toward a war situation.

Despite this reluctance toward making war, the U.S. is now engaged in unlimited war with the Soviet Union springing from the nature of the two systems of belief.

Mr. Elliott continued that the limits of war are determined by each country's appraisal of the relations among its objectives, capabilities, and intentions. In trying to determine the objectives of this country, many considerations must be evaluated, among these the ethical considerations. At this point the Russians try to close in on the psychological front; however, Mr. Elliott expressed confidence that the American people will confront all the risks of any given problem if the situation is well presented to them. Mr. Burden wondered how many limited wars the American people will be willing to support. That, Mr. Elliott suggested, depends upon the people's estimate of the effects of general war. General Gavin pointed out that weapons systems have matured to the point where casualties must be measured in the millions. The allies of America are much concerned over the temptation which may arise in this country to save U.S. lives by expending those of the allies.

However, General Gavin defined the American as an unusual animal -- the symbol of a man who is "for" something. Still, there are those in the U.S. who are "against" something, and in favor of withdrawing to a bastion America. Therefore, wherever the U.S. has an alliance with those of common interest, it must back up these mutual interests now, and if this forthright action leads to limited war the U.S. must be venturesome enough to maintain the boundary of democracy where it is now found.

Mr. Elliott states that it is idle to talk of a limited war in Europe. SAC must be maintained as a shield over Western Europe.

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Mr. Joseph Johnson took note of four definitions of limited war that had been proposed during the evening. It was his suggestion that most of the Group feel that a war limited in terms of arms, economies and mobilization, must be ruled out as far as Europe is concerned. Talk of limited war outside Europe seemed to have exposed enough different situations to suggest that there may be no general definition of limited war.

General Lindsay felt that it might be helpful to differentiate between limited and local wars: local war is a war limited by geography. Mr. Burden objected that war can be limited only by the fact that Russia is not willing to start a general war. Mr. Price declared that a real limited war can take place only when the two opposing power centers do not seek to destroy each other for fear of retaliation.

Dr. Rabi suggested that many Soviet moves are designed simply to test the U.S. reaction to particular areas of aggression. In line with this thought, Mr. Price stated that the U.S. would respond more quickly to a Korea-type incident now than it would have before Korea. Mr. Elliott raised the question of whether or not a present day Korea would be fought with or without limits. General Gavin noted that the present administration is committed to at least two policies: (a) we will fight where we wish, and (b) there will be no more Koreas. He noted the interplay of domestic political considerations with world events. Mr. Joseph Johnson felt that the situation in Korea, having already arisen to the Russians' disadvantage, is not going to come up again. Admiral Thach stated that if it did the U.S. would react even more quickly than it had previously, and that operation "Firm Link" in the Far East demonstrates the mobility of this nation's forces.

Mr. Kissinger proposed that the risk of a general war is becoming so prohibitive that local conflicts are becoming less likely to turn into general war. Mr. Burden inquired then as to why the Russians are not starting a new limited war. General Gavin suggested that perhaps they already have in the Middle East.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

The first meeting of Sub-committee I (Limited War) of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House at 5:30 on February 21st, 1956. Present were: Frank Pace, Jr., Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger, Study Director; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Robert R. Bowie; Gordon Dean; Admiral Robert L. Dennison; William Foster; General Richard Lindsay; Dean Rusk; Kenneth Stiles; Major General R.L. Vittrup.

The Chairman, Mr. Pace, proposed that the sub-committee meet two or three times to discuss some of the following subjects:

1) An historical assessment of U.S. experience in limited war.

2) An evaluation of the benefits and liabilities of these limited war experiences.

3) A sorting out of certain principles of action arising from previous experience in limited war, and the application of these principles to current problems, such as the Middle East.

He felt that during these discussions two questions would be considered: how can wars be limited? and how can a war be handled if it expands? Admiral Dennison cautioned the Group on applying the lessons of Korea too literally to any potential conflicts, because, he felt, there has been an "exponential increase in war capability."

Mr. Rusk agreed with the Admiral's caveat to the extent that the considerations of the Group are limited to military operations only, but he noted that in diplomatic or political terms the long American history of limited action for war is still apposite. For example, American aid to Greece and the Berlin air lift were basically problems of limited war with the Soviet Union itself; these political situations were closely related to the policies of limited war.

Mr. Pace noted that despite the long history of limited war in the United States, military planners in this country have devoted insufficient time to planning in this area. Mr. Rusk felt that none of these ideas about limited war are new to the military mind, but he did agree that during the period after World War II and before Korea they received insufficient attention. Mr. Dean pointed out while there are many historical examples of limited wars in which the United States commenced an action which it knew could not but be limited, under the conditions that prevail today most limited war situations have an indefinite potential for expansion. Mr. Bowie agreed that there is a considerable difference between wars which are limited by the relative weakness of one of the adversaries -- such as a U.S. Marine expeditionary force landing in Nicaragua -- and the situation which prevails today in which two major powers stand ready to become engaged on many fronts. Mr. Pace added that the geographical limitations to war which applied throughout the 19th and into the 20th century have, of course, been vanquished by the development of long-range aircraft.

Admiral Dennison suggested that there has been a change in the history of limited war. As absolute military power has increased, the likelihood of a purely military solution has decreased, tending to emphasize the political,

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economic, psychological, and moral forces in total strategy. He suggested that as both atomic power and approximate parity grow, the types of wars which may take place tend to fall into six categories, which he listed in the ascending order of magnitude.

1) Cold war: no shooting.

2) Limited war: objectives or meanings rigidly proscribed.

3) Expanding limited war: potentially explosive action such as might take place in the Middle East.

4) Restricted general war: weapons proscribed.

5) General war: protracted strategic deployment, with advance warning.

6) General war: strategic and tactical attack, without advance warning.

Admiral Dennison said that he felt that the more military force increases, the less likely it is that the types of war towards the end of his list would occur.

Mr. Kissinger emphasized the political aspects of collective security, noting that under such systems there is a tendency to draw nations into conflict in areas outside their direct spheres of interest, having the obverse effect of tempting such nations to try to limit the liabilities of the collective security system.

General Vittrup thought that it might be a good idea to examine traditional Soviet attitudes toward limited war, and to discuss the problem of initiative. Mr. Pace agreed that every consideration of alternative American strategy must take into account Soviet capabilities and motives. General Vittrup felt that the Group might profitably discuss the nature of Soviet philosophy and the objectives of world Communism. Mr. Pace noted that in discussions of the Korean experience the Group might speculate on these topics.

Mr. Stiles proposed that even such a general war as World War II was fought with many limits, e.g., bacteriological and chemical warfare capabilities were not tapped. Admiral Dennison noted that World War II began as a limited war in terms of its objectives, but he pointed out that these objectives underwent a gradual transformation until by the end of the war the Allied demand for unconditional surrender represented an abandonment of the previous limits.

Mr. Pace proposed that the limits of war depend upon the limitations on weapons, objectives, and geography. Therefore, limited war might be defined as a war in which both sides seek a limitation in terms of their total political objectives, their total potential for geographic expansion and possibly their total weapons strength.

Mr. Bowie suggested that the U.S. must try to generate conditions under which, in a war situation, it can avoid the total destruction of the U.S. and perhaps of the Soviet Union by limiting war in the three areas cited by Mr. Pace. He continued, however, that perhaps geography is the only area of limitation likely to be mutually acceptable to both sides. Mr. Pace hoped that the committee would be able to consider the two related questions of how to avoid limited war, and how to prevent limited war if it should occur from spreading into general war. Mr. Foster felt that the problem of preventing general war is really a question of keeping out of even a limited war, considering the likelihood that any war will spread.

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Mr. Pace agreed that it is certainly in the interests of the U.S. to avoid any sort of war, but if the country gets into a limited war it is important to know how to keep the war from spreading without sacrificing national objectives. Mr. Kissinger reported that it is the conclusion of the sub-group on political questions of war that a general war is an extremely wasteful way of obtaining the national objectives. Admiral Dennison, however, felt that this statement could not be applied to limited war situations, for a limited war may be able to halt the erosion of the free world, thus forestalling a future general war.

The problem arose of distinguishing between limited and local wars. Mr. Bowie defined local war as any conflict having objectives of lesser political purpose than the total destruction of the enemy. He noted that these objectives might be carried out by means of limited weapons systems, or in some areas, Formosa for example, might be accomplished by unlimited weapons systems if a clear declaration of intention not to destroy the power of Communist China is made. General Lindsay noted that an eventuality of this sort depends upon what the Communists choose to do and believe about U.S. intentions.

Admiral Dennison felt that the U.S. can pursue a limited war only if it employs unlimited power, limited political objectives, and swift action. Mr. Rusk disagreed, stating that a limited type of war can be fought only if it is fought for limited political objectives, but with less than the full weapons potential of both sides. Mr. Dean suggested that the questions of how to limit a war, and whether or not such limiting is useful, are largely questions of how a war may be localized. Mr. Pace observed that the world situation may reach the point that the U.S. will have less to lose through a limited war than it would lose by political loss of an area of the free world.

## THE KOREAN EXPERIENCE

Mr. Pace directed the attention of the group to the series of questions prepared by Mr. Kissinger on the subject of the Korean War. Mr. Rusk undertook to explain the origin of the term "police action" as applied to the Korean War. He suggested that the term had been selected intentionally to express the limited objectives of the United States in going to the assistance of the South Koreans, for at that time it was not known what the Communist reaction to this support might be and it was hoped that the Soviet Union would be reassured by this express limitation to the extent that Russia would not throw its full weight behind the North Korean attack. It was especially desirable at that time not to have a declaration of war by the Congress, but rather to handle the situation under the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief, and subsequently under the auspices of the U.N. Mr. Pace observed that the domestic political reaction to the Korean War, particularly during the 1952 Presidential campaign, would lead to the hope that in the event of any future limited war action a more appropriate term might be applied to the efforts of the United States. Mr. Rusk agreed that a more popular presentation of a police action would have been then, and would be in the future, desirable. He felt, however, that at the time of the North Korean attack there was no other alternative to

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the type of limited action set out upon by the U.S., especially considering
that the armed forces were not in a state of readiness which would allow them
to undertake a general war. Mr. Rusk conceded that if the situation were to
arise in exactly the same way again, on the basis of the Korean experience,
the wisest course would be to insist upon Congressional support of the action,
while still endeavoring to make clear the strict limiting of American political
objectives. Mr. Dean noted that the strict limitation from the outset of the
Korean War made the U.S. position more palatable to the bulk of U.N. members,
and, he continued, that the impact upon world opinion of similar action by
the U.S. remains important. Indeed, Mr. Foster described the term "police
action" as a stroke of genius, be he added that it should have been built
into an exercise of the war powers of Congress.

Mr. Pace wondered if, from the perspective of five years, the group
members felt that the cooperation of the U.N. was actually helpful. Mr. Rusk
replied that then and now Korea makes sense only in terms of an international
action designed to prevent a general war. Many persons look upon Korea as
the last clear chance the free world was going to have to prevent Communist
aggression. It was never felt, however, that the intervention of the U.N.
would become habitual; Korea was designed to be a final stop sign to aggres-
sion. Unfortunately, the police action effect has been mitigated to some
extent by the indecisive conduct of affairs in Indo-China, to the point where
it is very likely that the Soviet Union may not believe that all cases of
future aggression will be met with collective resistance.

Mr. Pace questioned whether or not unilateral action by the U.S. could
have had the same impact on Russia, and Admiral Dennison noted that the action
of the U.N. in Korea tended to legitimatize the motives of the U.S. in entering
a war in which it was not directly involved initially. Mr. Rusk suggested
that the participation of the U.N. may have made a greater impact upon the
Soviet Union than one might imagine, for it must be recalled that Russia is
highly sensitive to world opinion. An index of this sensitivity is that while
the Soviet Union frequently attacks Western members of the United Nations for
their conduct, and even for the way in which they use the provisions of the
U.N., the Soviet delegation has never spoken cynically of the U.N. Charter
itself. He continued that the effect of world opinion probably had much to
do with the lifting of the Berlin blockade. In the initial stages of the
Korean conflict it was not only highly important to the United States to receive
world approbation for its actions, but it was also necessary in terms of domestic
politics to enable the American people to act toward Korea with a good conscience
For these reasons, participation of the U.N. contributed to the moral basis
of the U.S. action in Korea and provided a long-range political gain. Mr. Bowie
agreed that when the use of force involves the fantastic risks which obtain
today, a country must make clear that the cause in which it uses force is strict
limited, and it must reassure not only its allies, but its own citizens as to the
legitimacy of the undertaking.

Mr. Rusk noted that similar action today would be much more difficult
since with the Russians in the Security Council a veto would be the foregone
conclusion, and the high likelihood of a fairly evenly split vote in the Assembly
destroys much of the potency of collective action. Mr. Bowie insisted, however,

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that generally speaking even risking defeat in the Assembly is preferable to
not having the matter taken up at all by the U.N. Mr. Pace observed that while
he could agree that it is desirable to have U.N. sanction to any sort of action
designed to counter aggression, there might be situations under which the U.S.
would be faced with a political veto in a situation where it is crystal clear
that the U.S. must take action. He posed the further problem of the extent
to which participation of the troops of many nations is a help or hindrance
to the major effort of American troops. General Vittrup admitted that the use
of U.N. troops can complicate organizational problems of a campaign through
communication and training differentials, and most insidiously in the doubts
the troops of one nation may have about the reliability of the troops of another
nation guarding their flank. However, the Korean experience provided an
extremely valuable overall lesson in the relative efficiency of the troops
engaged on the U.N. side. For example, American estimates of the Greek and
Turkish forces rose immeasurably as the soldiers of these countries proved
that "they didn't mind killing and dying." Mr. Pace agreed that such things
as the outstanding bravery of the French troops had had the effect of develop-
ing an even greater capability of fighting in the American forces. Mr. Pace
took it to be the consensus of the group then that the conduct of the war under
U.N. auspices provided a clear political advantage, and a somewhat lesser
military advantage.

Mr. Kissinger pointed out that one potential drawback of an alliance
system is that the actions of the collective group may present problems for
member states with weak domestic governments. Mr. Pace wondered if a prolif-
eration of active members causes the group's capacity for decisive action to
decrease. To be more concrete, could the U.N. have crossed the Yalu River
if this had seemed a wise strategy to the Joint Chiefs? Mr. Rusk pointed out
that to have gone beyond the Yalu might have meant depleting the forces of SAC
in return for a small strategic gain. Mr. Bowie recalled that in Germany during
this period there was considerable fear of U.S. responsibility in the Korean
action, which attitude from a country which was not an ally of the U.S. at the
time implies that friendly countries need not be directly involved in a limited
war in order to become alarmed. Mr. Rusk reiterated that the decision not to
cross the Yalu had been based upon sound military factors as well as political
considerations. Mr. Pace then asked if in a purely unilateral action the U.S.
could make a basically sound military move which nevertheless would damage its
alliance system in other parts of the world. Mr. Bowie thought that it could,
for even though this nation's allies are not active in a particular campaign,
the U.S. is so powerful that any action it takes is likely to affect all its
friends. There was general agreement with this formulation.

## DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS

Turning once more to the political realm, Mr. Pace wondered whether or
not a public opinion poll in the U.S. today would show many Americans favoring
a united action in some future limited war in which the United States felt
called upon to become involved. Members of the group made a number of desultory
remarks about public opinion polls, after which Mr. Foster pointed out that if
the United States is defending the honor of one of its allies, that ally at least
had better be in the fight too. Admiral Dennison reminded the group that there

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are several mutual defense treaties, outside the framework of the United Nations under the terms of which the United States is bound to consult the other signatory states before acting. Mr. Rusk said that he could go so far as to state unequivocably that the U.S. did not make any single decision about the conduct of the Korean War in concert with its allies that it would not have made if it had been going it alone. The sub-committee indicated that it agreed with Mr. Rusk.

Returning to the series of questions about Korea prepared by Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Rusk answered the second half of the first question, "Was it wise to tie Formosa to our decision to intervene?" He answered that the 7th Fleet received the orders it did because at the time the shooting broke out the President did not know whether or not the North Korean invasion signaled the beginning of a general war. Mr. Pace recalled that the Congress also was talking in terms of a probable general war, and General Lindsay agreed that such a likelihood was in the front of the military mind during this early period.

General Lindsay continued, in answer to the written question on what was meant by "punishing aggression" in Korea, that the military objective at the beginning of the Korean War was to restore the status quo, and to endeavor to end the war when the 38th Parallel had been regained. There would have been great political benefits to a successful adherence to this concept, and there was at the time no plan to exploit in any other way a defeat of the North Korean army in the field if that had come about. Mr. Kissinger wondered at what point the U.N. forces began to contemplate a complete victory over the North Koreans, but Mr. Pace felt that since the best military minds did not hope to succeed with the Inchon landing there was really no time at which the U.N. forces were able to think much farther ahead than survival and the eventual regaining of lost territory. Mr. Bowie emphasized that there was an initial decision to confine the war since it was in no way to U.S. interests to expand it. Admiral Dennison cited the original U.N. resolution in which the member nations sought to "repel" the armed attack and restore international peace in the area."

Mr. Pace raised the question of whether or not it is politically feasible for the U.S. to pursue a limited war goal of restoring the status quo ante-bellum, for he felt that the American character holds deeply to the proposition that a wrong-doer must be punished. Admiral Dennison agreed that this is a problem area since to his mind the limiting of a war depends upon making clear to other nations that the U.S. is not attempting to upset the overall power balance. Mr. Bowie noted that it is quite possible to make an aggressor sorry for his aggression without taking territory from him, and Admiral Dennison stated that the outcome of a limited war, almost by definition, must always be a negotiated peace. He cited American policy on Formosa, which has been to guarantee the integrity of the island without suggesting any attempt at conquering the mainland.

Mr. Pace then asked if, since limiting objectives to restoring the status quo is the most desirable policy to follow in keeping a war limited, this idea can be made palatable to the American public. Mr. Rusk observed that during the Korean War there was no pressure from Congress to expand the war and it was only during the negotiations for an armistice that the idea of possible expansion

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position was morally and legally correct, that it was important that the free
world take firm action then or never, and that in some cases the allies had no
alternatives. Mr. Rusk felt that this latter reason applied to Australia and
New Zealand, that the NATO alliance was anxious to demonstrate its willingness
to cooperate with the United States in return for what it hoped would be an
equal willingness on the part of the U.S. to support the free world in Europe,
and that the allies in general were anxious to confirm their belief in the
benefits of collective security.

Turning to the question of whether or not the U.S. could have taken any
action which would have forestalled Chinese intervention in the war, Mr. Pace
and Mr. Bowie agreed that everyone in a policy position was convinced by the
arguments of General MacArthur that the Chinese would not intervene under any
conditions. Mr. Rusk stated that it is his opinion that MacArthur and Truman
misunderstood each other at the Wake Island meeting for the following reason:
MacArthur was working under the assumption that if the Chinese Communists did
intervene it would be as part of a general war situation, while President
Truman listened to MacArthur's analysis under the impression that they were
both talking in terms of a limited war. Mr. Rusk said he feels that there was
a genuine misunderstanding on this point.

Mr. Foster asked where MacArthur could have gotten the idea that the U.S.
would allow itself to get involved in a general war with Communist China. Mr.
Rusk pointed out that one month before the Korean War started it would have been
hard to imagine that if the Communists and the U.S. made physical contact in
Korea the U.S. would not be at war with Communist China. Mr. Bowie declared
that General MacArthur also underestimated Chinese Communist capabilities. Mr.
Pace commented upon the poor quality of the intelligence upon which MacArthur
based his conclusions.

The group considered the outline question, "Could we have avoided Chinese intervention?" Mr. Rusk suggested that that question is related to the question of when the Chinese Communists made their initial decision to support the North Koreans. He said that personally he feels that Mao and Stalin decided during December of '49 and January of '50 that the Chinese would take supporting action. If this is the case, and the Chinese had decided six months before the outbreak of the Korean War one set of problems is involved, while another set is involved if the Chinese made their decision only because U.N. forces came within 35 miles of the Yalu. Mr. Bowie pointed out that if it is assumed that the Chinese gave assistance to the North Koreans in planning the war, it must be assumed that the Chinese did not believe the U.N. would engage in a limited form of war. Mr. Rusk replied that he could see no rational reason for the Chinese to fear that the U.N. might cross the Yalu. Mr. Bowie suggested the possibility that the Chinese felt that the U.N. crossing of the 38th Parallel vitiated the original limiting of the U.N. objectives.

Mr. Rusk offered the opinion that the best chance for the U.N. forces to
have avoided Chinese intervention would have been through a different deployment
of General MacArthur's forces. If the 8th Army had been consolidated instead of
spread out, it could have presented a formidable solid front at the thin neck of
Korea, which would have discouraged the Chinese from attacking or have held them

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if they had entered the war. Mr. Bowie thought that this particular development in the Korean War emphasizes the difficulty of maintaining a concept of limited objectives within the framework of necessary military action. Mr. Rusk agreed that maintaining this concept becomes even more difficult if the enemy ignores a country's most solemn pronouncements. Mr. Bowie observed that it is particularly difficult to deal with an enemy which traditionally "uses" words to serve its own ends. He wondered if limited war is really possible if the Russians are never going to believe the things the U.S. says about its objectives.

Mr. Pace disagreed that a deployment as suggested by Mr. Rusk could have prevented Chinese intervention, for he said that they would probably have come in anyway. Mr. Rusk conceded that the Chinese had the same problem of trying to restore the *status quo* after the U.N. crossed the 38th Parallel that the U.N. had had during the early part of the fighting. Mr. Pace did acknowledge that from a military point of view, assuming that the Chinese might intervene, the deployment of U.N. forces near the Yalu is not defensible. General Vittrup insisted that the local command was following the established military principles of pursuit, and General Lindsay agreed that these tactics were correct as long as the commanders accepted the estimate that the Chinese would not intervene. Mr. Rusk said that the mistake was two-fold. Politically, the estimate that on balance the Chinese would not enter the war was in error, and militarily the impact of Chinese intervention was improperly evaluated. These two errors tended each to compound the seriousness of the other.

Mr. Pace answered the question from the outline about the attitude of the allies during this period by saying that the cooperating countries agreed in principle to operating north of the 38th Parallel, but would not condone crossing the Yalu. In fact, the British proposed that the U.N. halt its advance thirty miles short of the Yalu as a demonstration of good faith.

Taking up the next question on the outline, Mr. Pace observed that after the Chinese intervention, the U.N.'s military objectives in Korea remained the same as before; political objectives reverted to the minimum position of a *status quo* settlement at the 38th Parallel. In answer to another question from the outline, he noted that the reaction of U.S. allies after the Chinese intervention was one of perturbation, but that they did not bring any pressures to bear against the U.S.

Mr. Pace brought up the much-discussed question of the Chinese "sanctuary" across the Yalu. He took the view that from a military point of view the U.S. had much to lose by breaking what seemed to be up to that time a tacit agreement to avoid strategic bombing in the Korean War theatre. There was no certainty that an air strike across the Yalu would not provoke direct Soviet participation in the air battle, and in view of the non-existent air cover for the Pusan area and the inadequate air protection for Japan, it was thought unwise to give the Russians any excuse to make use of their heavy air strength in the area. Mr. Rusk dissented from this view at two points. He felt that the U.N. planes could have followed the doctrine of hot pursuit without involving a crossing of the Yalu, and he also felt that if the question had been put to the allies in a less hypothetical way there would have been fewer objections. Mr. Pace agreed that the military supported the idea of hot pursuit, but not of strategic bombing.

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Furthermore, the question of appropriate actions to be taken against mainland China was considered carefully and it was proposed that a blockade of the mainland China was considered carefully and it was proposed that a blockade of the mainland be instituted, but that no direct action be taken against the civilian population. It was decided, however, that reprisals against China proper would alienate friends of the West in Asia, and would have very little real effect on the conduct of the war. These steps, therefore, were not taken.

Admiral Dennison reminded the group that the U.S. was itself operating from a sanctuary. Mr. Pace noted that in the type of war fought in Korea, strategic bombing was not particularly effective, and Mr. Rusk noted that a blockade of China would have involved less than one percent of the Chinese economy. Mr. Pace observed that the U.S. had as much if not more to lose than the Chinese in any stepping up of the pace of the war. Mr. Rusk added that the U.S. had no real military capabilities with which to back up any alternative policy, and Mr. Pace inserted the familiar phrase "lead time."

General Vittrup stressed the extent to which a country's degree of readiness enters into its thinking on the subject of limited war. Mr. Pace agreed that the old theory of fight first and mobilize later is a thing of the past. Mr. Rusk emphasized these points by stating that if the U.S. had had one airborne division in Japan it could have stopped the North Korean aggression within one week instead of letting the enemy titillate itself for three months with dreams of pushing the U.S. into the sea. Mr. Pace noted that the quotation attributed to General Bradley, "The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time," applied to a war in China, not to the original action in Korea as the next question in the outline implied, and Mr. Pace continued that the Korean War was really a war at the right place and time.

The next question in the outline concerning the possibility that the Soviets can be provoked into an all-out war when they are not ready for it drew from Mr. Pace the observation that Soviet readiness is somewhat beyond U.S. ken. Mr. Bowie observed that as far as the Korean War was concerned, the Soviets had a higher capability for extended limited war than the U.S. did, and Mr. Rusk pointed out that the President always has the final responsibility for the consequences of any limited war action. President Truman had to accept the risk that the Russians could be provoked into a general war over Korea even though they were not ready for it.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the group members thought the U.N. could have beaten the Chinese in Korea if an armistice had not been arranged. Mr. Rusk merely observed that U.N. casualties during the progress from the 38th Parallel to the Yalu had amounted to 60,000 men, and that the State Department had received estimates from the military that to fight back to the Yalu during the period of the armistic negotiations would have cost 400,000 casualties.

## THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS AND AFTERWARDS

In answer to the outline question, "What induced the Chinese to enter armistice negotiations?" Mr. Rusk said, "Russia." In his opinion the Soviets

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were doing all the thinking at this point. At the time of the stalemate along the 38th Parallel both sides seemed willing to negotiate a peace, but as it later developed the Communists were talking about drawing the demarcation line precisely at the 38th Parallel, while the U.N. was thinking in terms of the actual battle line, and the U.N. developed an interest in the disposition of prisoners of war. Generally speaking, the length of the armistic negotiations is due to the introduction of these two new issues; it seems likely that the Communists made more concessions in the end. Mr. Pace asked why the Russians favored peace in Korea. Admiral Dinnison pointed to the considerable financial drain on the Soviet Union to no apparent advantage, and suggested also that there may have been signs of tension in the Peiping-Moscow axis.

This response prompted Mr. Pace to inquire whether or not the USSR would rather see the U.S. at peace or at war. Mr. Bowie, pointing to the collateral effects of the Korean War such as strengthening of the Western Alliance system, and the drain on the energies of the Soviet orbit, felt that the Russians quickly reached a point where they had little to gain through this war. Mr. Pace recalled the axiom that America is tougher when it is at war.

Mr. Rusk felt that the Soviet Union had not expected the U.S. entry into the Korean conflict. Furthermore, the Soviets must have been aware by the time the U.S. reached the 38th Parallel a second time that the U.S. was not going to give up its objectives in Korea short of general war. Therefore, Russia had to decide either to prepare for general war or settle the Korean conflict on whatever terms were available.

Mr. Pace renewed his attack upon the questions in the outline:

Q. What were our military objectives during these negotiations?

A. Get the war over with.

Q. Did we consider using A-weapons during the negotiations and if so why were they not used?

A. They were no more valuable then in a military sense than they would have been before.

Q. Why did we permit such protracted negotiations?

A. (by Mr. Bowie) It is hard for a democracy to conduct a strong military campaign when an armistic seems to be in sight, but the UN forces did try to continue pressuring the enemy.

A. (by Mr. Rusk) There was little inclination to expend 50,000 U.S. troops to force the enemy to let 50,000 Chinese prisoners decide where they wanted to go.

A. (by Admiral Dennison) Once the armistic negotiations had been commenced it would have been politically impossible for the U.N. to continue fighting in force.

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Q. What was the role of our allies during this period?

A. (by Mr. Rusk) They were kept informed.

LESSONS OF THE KOREAN WAR

The Group discussed what the lesson of the Korean War is with regard to the force level required for a limited war. Admiral Dennison stated that the massive retaliatory power of SAC and a general war capability is needed in a limited war regardless of whether it is used or not. Mr. Rusk felt that it is useful to think of ways of preventing limited war. He observed that if the U.S. had left a regular combat team in Korea after the Second World War, this token force would have given clear warning to the Communists of U.S. intention to protect the integrity of South Korea. Also, if the U.S. has, say, two to four divisions of highly mobile troops with the necessary air lift to move them quickly, the enemy is put on notice that it cannot safely engage in aggression. Without this potential for waging limited war, however, the U.S. is likely to be forced to choose between initiating a Hydrogen war or surrendering its objectives in one local area after another. Mr. Pace agreed that the U.S. should be prepared to deploy unlimited power, for readiness plus power plus a token force in an area gives a clear demonstration of U.S. willingness to prevent aggression. In addition to these advantages of readiness, General Vittrup pointed out that a mobile striking force enables the U.S. to choose an appropriate place for demonstrating its alertness, and evidence of power in one area may affect many other problem spots.

In answer to another question on the outline, Mr. Pace felt that it is not inevitable that a return to the basis of the status quo will be the outcome of any limited war, but he said that this is the most probable and the simplest solution. Admiral Dennison affirmed this view, stating that if one country tries to change the power balance it runs the danger of increasing the scope of a limited war.

"Who on the balance gained in the Korean War?" Mr. Pace answered this question from the outline by stating that while Russia made short term gains, history will show that the U.S. made a long term gain by showing the willingness of the free world to fight for principle. Admiral Dennison thought that an insight into this particular question could be gained from asking what would have happened in the world if without a Korea the USSR had gone directly to its present policy line. Mr. Rusk agreed that if there had been no Korea, the present pressure of Soviet competition would be far harder to combat. He noted that, of course, if the war had been completed successfully the first time, the U.N. drove to the 38th Parallel it would have meant an infinite boost in the prestige of that organization; subsequently much of the effect of the U.N. action was vitiated.

Mr. Pace adjourned the meeting by asking a question of his own: "In the next few years, will Russia intentionally promote another limited war?"

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

Personal

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Not for publication

STUDY GROUP REPORTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY
Sub-committee III
(Arms Equation)

Discussion Leaders: William Bundy
                 Roger Lewis

Study Director: Henry A. Kissinger
Rapporteur: James Murphy

Third Meeting

March 7, 1956

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

Sub-Committee III (Arms Equation) of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign policy, held its third meeting on March 7, 1956, at 5:30 p.m., at the Harold Pratt House. Present were: William Bundy, Roger Lewis, Discussion Leaders: William A. M. Burden, Chairman; Henry A. Kissinger; Study Director; James Murphy, Rapporteur; Eli Ginzberg; Caryl P. Haskins; James T. Hill, Jr.; Mervin J. Kelly; Alexander Korol; Ben T. Moore; Don K. Price; Leon Trilling; Dael Wolfle.

Mr. Hill opened the meeting by suggesting that the date for the next meeting of the subcommittee be set tentatively for March 22.

At this evening's meeting, he continued, two topics will provide the basis for discussion. Mr. Bundy of the Central Intelligence Agency will serve as discussion leader for the first subject -- an intelligence estimate of Communist striking power and war potential, and ability to resist Western attack. The second half of the meeting will be devoted to a consideration of our technical manpower problem, and what quantitative or qualitative shortages we may face vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the discussion being led by Mr. Lewis of Pan American World Airways. Remarking that, of course, none of the discussion is for attribution, he turned the floor over to Mr. Bundy for a discursive estimate of Communist capacity and an appraisal of whatever factors may limit our intelligence effort.

## REMARKS OF MR. BUNDY: SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Mr. Bundy began by saying that in this assessment he was holding a long sector in thin force. Unlike many of the members, he was not an expert on some of the more technical subjects. He said, therefore, that he would concentrate, in this discussion, on the broad picture of this subject.

## Soviet Strategic Striking Power:

The first consideration he would deal with, he went on, was the Soviet capacity for general war, of which the first element was its strategic striking power. He said he could not, of course, deal with the question of atomic stockpile in any detail but added that recent Soviet atomic tests have been impressive. They now have weapons in being and a considerable supply of fissionable materials; their stockpile is growing very rapidly and may provide them in two or three years with a substantial thermonuclear capability, even before they have adequate delivery facilities. They have apparently tried to avoid a narrow base for their nuclear arsenal. They have indicated an interest in low-yield weapons, presumably for tactical use, and although it cannot be ascertained just where or on what type they are laying emphasis, it is to be assumed that they have, like the U.S. tried for a broad line of development across the board.

With respect to their delivery capacity, he went on, the Soviets have shown us, notably in demonstrations over Moscow, two main types of aircraft for delivering nuclear weapons. The four-jet, Bison heavy bomber is comparable to our B-52. It is apparently a good aircraft with a range on the order of

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5,000 miles and a speed on the order of 500 mph. Without refueling, its ability to reach the U.S. on two-way missions is limited, however, The second aircraft type, he continued, is an intriguing aircraft. The so-called Bear is a turbo-prop heavy bomber with a longer range (7,000-8,000 miles) than the Bison and can reach most of the U.S. from forward bases without refueling. With refueling, it could reach anywhere in the U.S.

These estimates, he said, referred to two-way missions from the forward Soviet bases in the Polar areas. The location of these bases, however, creates serious problems for the Soviets, including difficulty in taking maximum advantage of refueling tactics. In order to refuel in flight, their bombers would have to seek safe areas on route where they would be less vulnerable to interception. This would mean a detour which, in turn, would tend to reduce or even cancel the advantage of refueling. Hence, Mr. Bundy felt, even the development of refueling techniques for the Bison would not remove the necessity of planning considerably on the basis of one-way missions, an argument that lent support to the speculation that the Soviets might accent development of the long-range Bear type. Moreover, weather in the northern Soviet areas is often bad and rapidly changing, presenting difficulties in the location of forward bases in these regions. For this reason, also, the Russians might see advantages in developing the longer-range plane. The speed of the Bear is, to be sure, only on the order of 450 miles per hour, but this is not so far below that of the Bison as to be an overriding factor in the choice. Mr. Bundy stressed that one could only speculate whether in fact the Soviets were concentrating on the Bear, but that the above considerations did seem to make the speculation an intriguing one. The Soviets had shown us fewer Bears than Bisons, so the evidence to date did not support the speculation.

In addition to the heavy bomber types, the Soviets have a considerable number of Badger aircraft, comparable to our B-47, and though their production of this item is in the hundreds, it is still only a fraction of ours, so that we retain a clear numerical lead. The Badger has a range on the order of 3,500 - 4,000 miles without refueling, and since refueling from the forward bases, because of the detour problem, increases the range of this plane only to a limited degree, it must be considered mainly as a one-way weapon in any attack against the United States.

In shorter-range aircraft the U.S.S.R. apparently has a very substantial number of so-called Beagles: a light jet bomber with a 600-700 mile radius. A large supply tending to surplus is indicated by the fact, for example, that some of these planes figured in the Egyptian arms deal. It is reasonable to suppose that the Soviets are developing a successor to the Beagle having higher speed and a radius of about 800 miles. Such a plane, Mr. Bundy said, would be capable of reaching many of our key overseas bases, including all those in Europe except for Spain, and could therefore be a vital weapon in an attack aimed to destroy our retaliatory power.

Finally, he stated, the Soviets now have on hand substantial numbers of the so-called Bull or TU-4, modeled on the US.B-29. Although this is a good aircraft for its time, it is slow, largely limited to one-way missions against the U.S. and generally of limited effectiveness.

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Mr. Bundy noted that, in predicting the numbers of bombers the Soviets would have in their strategic air force over the next five or six years, the problem arose of relative emphasis between aircraft and missiles. Roughly, the issue was whether they would in the intervening years develop their heavy bomber force -- built around the first two types listed above -- to maximum feasible levels, or would set their sights lower, so far as aircraft production went, while moving ahead with an all-out crash program on the ICBM. The difference in the cost factor between a high and a moderate development of strategic air forces would be great, and Mr. Bundy stated that while we must assume they would aim for the higher goals, the other alternative must be borne in mind and is supported by a considerable, though minority, body of opinion, particularly in some U.K. circles.

If the U.S.S.R. should choose to stress the development of a heavy bomber force, it is to be expected that she will achieve over the next three or four years a good capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the U.S., although, because of the limitation of the Soviet air base structure, the Soviet capacity would not equal that of SAC in extent or flexibility (at least barring drastic change in the availability of the U.S. overseas bases).

## Supporting Elements of Air Striking Power:

The Soviet base structure has severe geographical limitations; whereas U.S. tactical possibilities are enormous at present, Russia's are restricted. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that the U.S.S.R. is going ahead with a considerable base construction program in the forward areas, and that it has air fields adequate to accommodate modern aircraft there. Elsewhere in the Bloc, notably in East Germany, we know that they have built runways over past years that were much longer than needed, and that seem clearly designed for the future. As to numbers and dispersal of bases, it is possible that the Soviets now have a somewhat greater number of strategic air bases than the U.S., at least within the U.S.S.R.

The status of Soviet base development has an important relation to the warning problem. If, as we assume, the advance bases are not now fully developed, then it would be inevitable that any large-scale air strike would require several months of preparation and might be detected. On the other hand, when the advance bases are fully built up, which might be expected in the next three to four years, the maintenance of constant movement to and from these bases would leave us no detectable clue to a possible preparation for attack.

As to inflight refueling, Mr. Bundy said that it must be assumed that the Soviets have mastered the techniques involved, which the USAF considers not to be very difficult given adequate tanker aircraft. Even if the Soviets do not now have the technique, it must be assumed that they will develop it in the near future. However, because of the problem of detour from their forward base areas, refueling inflight probably would not play the same important role in Soviet striking power that it does for the U.S.

Mr. Bundy noted that the British have at times been skeptical about the quality of the training of the Soviet strategic air personnel. He himself felt that Soviet training can hardly be comparable to that of SAC, but that on the other hand it is probably broadly adequate. Soviet meteorology is certainly

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about as good as ours, and there is every reason to believe that their navigation-
al techniques and performance are satisfactory. By U.S. standards the Soviets
may well be weak in bombing accuracy, but the radius of the destruction of
nuclear weapons substantially diminishes the importance of this element of train-
ing.

In *transport capacity*, the Soviet air force is very greatly inferior to the U.S., in that its standard types have only a fraction of the carrying capacity of the U.S. types; however, because of their wholly internal base system, the Soviet strategic air force has less need for air transport than SAC.

Mr. Bundy said that he could only speculate on the electronic facilities of the U.S.S.R. He assumed the Soviets have a good knowledge of our warning system. In jamming operations directed against our broadcasts, the Soviets have displayed high competence, and they have generally shown the ability to take over and use -- sometimes even to improve -- U.S. electronic equipment. In general, he judged that their capacity in the electronic field was good.

## Guided Missiles and New Types of Aircraft:

Mr. Bundy did not think it likely that the Soviets would introduce any new heavy bomber aircraft, in operational quantities, over the next three to four years at least. Contrary to Senator Kefauver's public statement, we have no real indication of a supersonic heavy bomber, nor did it seem likely that the Soviets have gotten beyond the drawing boards with development of an atomic-powered aircraft. On the whole, it was to be expected, therefore, that over the next three years or so the Soviet Union would concentrate on the bomber types they have already displayed as the core of their delivery capability.

With respect to guided missile development Mr. Bundy said there is every indication of great Russian emphasis on the field, perhaps on a crash scale. We have seen installations near Moscow that may be designed to accommodate surface-to-air missiles comparable to our Nike. Such a weapon certainly appears within Soviet capabilities, and over a period of three years or so could be deployed so as to be a considerable weapon of local defense for Soviet cities.

In addition, the Soviets have probably carried through German developments so as to have a surface-to-surface missile with a range on the order of 300-400 miles. As to the longer ranges, a reasonable guess would be that the Soviets would have operational quantities of ICBM's within the next five to eight years. Shorter range ballistic missiles capable of attacking allies and overseas bases can, of course, be expected much earlier.

As to the place of long-range missiles in the total delivery picture, Mr. Bundy said that the dominant view was that expressed by Secretary Quarles that it would be a long time before aircraft were replaced even by the ICBM. Mr. Bundy noted that, whatever the situation for the U.S. itself, a considerable argument could be made that the Soviets -- hampered as they are by their base structure -- would see greater relative advantage than us for the ICBM and would play it up more heavily. Moreover, the Soviets might well see great

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value in the intermediate-range missiles, on the order of 1,500 miles, first for attack on our overseas bases, and secondly for the psychological effect upon major allies of the U.S. Even a missile with ranges less than 1000 miles could have enormous psychological impact upon Europe, placing it square-ly in the Soviet gunsights and subjecting it more acutely to what was loosely called "atomic blackmail." In assessing the total importance of the shorter range missiles these political effects might be more important than the spe-cific military consequences.

## Other Forms of Offensive Action:

For the present at least, Mr. Bundy declared, other forms of delivery would be secondary to aircraft in any Soviet attack. The U.S.S.R. is building up rapidly its fleet of long-range submarines capable of launching guided missiles equipped, at least in time, with nuclear warheads. However, any large-scale employment of submarines would be likely to be detected by our various forms of reconnaissance, so that it was unlikely that a surprise attack would contain a major submarine element. Following an initial attack, of course, submarines might well be used in substantial numbers for supporting attacks.

Clandestine delivery, the components having been introduced through the diplomatic pouch or otherwise, was another possibility, although here also the danger of detection seemed to make large-scale initial employment unlikely. Nonetheless, the possibility that a few key targets would be attacked in this way could not be discounted, and the problem fully warranted the most intensive detection effort by the U.S.

As to Bacteriological Warfare (BW) and Chemical Warfare (CW), BW appeared to be the greater threat since it lent itself readily to clandestine operations and could be very effective, particularly against livestock. Radio-logical warfare in itself -- apart from the fall-out problem -- did not appear a major threat for the present.

## Soviet Defense Capacity:

With respect to Soviet ability to defend herself against attack, Mr. Bundy said, the conclusion of intelligence is that although Russia is doing and can do much to diminish the effectiveness of a United States attack, it would not be able to blunt such an attack effectively, at least for the next three years. In the MIG-15/F86 and MIG-17/F-100 equations, they probably outnumber us now, and may have the numerical preponderance, also, in super-sonic craft. There is evidence, moreover, that they are accenting the super-sonic and all-weather types of planes. They have good anti-aircraft in several ranges, electronically sighted guns, and it is presumed that they would encircle Moscow and Leningrad with surface-to-air missiles. Their radar-tracking equipment, comparable to our CPS-6, is good, and is scattered over large areas.

On the other hand, the factor of geography and the nature of our delivery facilities, mean that the Russians could not expect to have more than two hours warning in case of an attack, except for small areas of the interior. Two

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hours, Mr. Bundy asserted, is considered the absolute minimum for mounting a defensive operation -- it is simply not enough to eliminate the surprise factor. This is the expectation even if they develop electronic notification systems comparable to ours, as they may have already done to a certain extent.

Mr. Bundy stated that it is not known how heavily the Soviet Union is going to go into air defense development. A concerted defense attempt would cost two to three times the present expenditure in a few years and constitute a heavy proportion of their defense budget. In addition such an effort would drain the resources of their electronics industry. Moreover, even if this all-out development were pursued, it would not drastically reduce our ability to get through in the next four to five years.

## Other Aspects of Soviet General War Capabilities:

Recent Soviet maneuvers in Germany, which we have been able to follow closely, indicate that considerable stress is being placed on tactical adjustments to the use of low-yield nuclear weapons in infantry engagements. It is hard to say, Mr. Bundy thought, what will be the total effect on Russian ground strength. There is evidence that they have indeed made good to some extent on their recent and vaunted reduction of 640,000 men in the ground forces: but this reduction has been effected largely by transfers, cutting out of deadwood, and discharges resulting from organizational economies. The mobilization pattern has not changed for the Soviet Union, and the number of troops in the forward areas -- particularly Germany where about 24 divisions or roughly 400,000 men are still stationed -- has not been diminished.

There is evidence that the Russians are stepping up developments in armor -- tanks and tank weapons.

With respect to their navy, the Russians have not gone in for the development of capital ships, but rather have accented long-range submarines. It is to be expected that they will develop an atomic-powered submarine, for such technology is within their competence. From a logistical point of view, the Soviet Union has at present two main weaknesses, so far as a general war is concerned. Their merchant fleet is inadequate and they face a considerable shipping shortage. But this would constitute a critical deficit only in the unlikely event of a long war in which they would be required to supply distant points. Second, there are still substantial inadequacies in the Russian rail and road net within their borders. This weakness, however, can be reduced in the next few years.

Finally, Mr. Bundy stated, as far as the general war picture goes, two key factors must always be considered:

### a. Surprise

Over the past year there has been an interesting spate of technical literature in the U.S.S.R. indicating great concern with the factor of surprise -- a notable shift from the attitude cultivated under Stalin that emphasized the underlying economic and other factors of strength and that particularly sought to de-emphasize the Nazi victories of 1941. In considering this surprise problem, Mr. Bundy discussed U.S. warning capabilities. If the Soviets were to employ full mobilization, we might be able to get very substantial warning. Moreover, even a massive air attack alone without

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of other elements would probably now require detectable preparations. However, over the next three years this picture could change very rapidly and our strategic warning time might be reduced to a matter of hours. He did not believe the U.S. warning capabilities were primarily a matter of greater expenditures of money: the greatest single improvement, extended air reconnaissance, involved drawbacks other than budgetary.

## b. Technological Breakthrough

This possibility must always be considered, particularly in connection with the ICBM. The development of this weapon would at least substantially alter the situation, and if one side got it in large quantities before the other, such superiority might be deemed decisive. Other possible technical breakthroughs might also seriously alter the comparative prospects for general war.

## Soviet Capabilities for Limited War:

Mr. Bundy noted that almost all the capabilities already discussed could be applied in some degree in limited wars. In addition, in a consideration of the prospects of limited war we must take into account the assets of the allies of the U.S.S.R., whose strength is not such a key factor in the general war picture. The Chinese appear to be going ahead with military preparedness; they are maintaining 2,500,000 men under arms, and have around 2,000 aircraft, including several hundred jets. Their naval strength, moreover, has gone up recently; with several submarines probably received from the Soviets -- some of them long-range -- they could probably outfit Nationalist naval forces and might be able to play havoc in the Formosa Strait. The Chinese forces in North Korea have been cut down from 900,000 to about 300-400,000; but the troops which have been pulled out have not been withdrawn very far. The forces north and south of the 38° parallel in Korea are now about equivalent: the North Korean forces number about 300,000, plus 300-400,000 provided by the Chinese, compared to the South Korean army of about 600,000. At present, it appears that neither side can successfully jump the other, but the principal deterrent remains the threat of U.S. action.

On the east coast of China, the Communist forces outnumber the Nationalist garrison on Formosa by about two to one, and have the ability to send from 100,000 to 200,000 into the battle if they succeeded in making a beachhead on Formosa. There has been a considerable buildup of capacity for jet strikes against Formosa; the Communists have about 50 jet light bombers and a considerably built up naval force, both of which constitute a formidable threat. To the west and north of China, in the Soviet Far East, the Russian forces number about thirty divisions and about 5000 aircraft -- enough to enable this area to keep fighting even if Russia is cut in two by an attack.

The force of the Viet Minh -- about 250,000 men, well armed and trained in their weapons -- easily outnumbers and is superior to the approximately 150,000 troops of South Vietnam. At best, given an attack by Ho, we could expect only that Diem's forces would be able to provide thirty-day delaying action.

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Discussion

Mr. Burden began the discussion by asking Mr. Bundy whether our intelligence indicated that the Russians have a date that they are working for. Mr. Bundy replied that there is no indication that they are developing their resources for a specific date. He went on to say that if they choose to develop their heavy bomb-ing capacity rapidly, they will reach in 1958 or 1959 the ability to deliver an enormous blow at the United States. He did not see any way that they could pre-vent devastating retaliation by us for the next five years or so -- assuming that they would not be able to get through to our SAC bases.

Mr. Haskins asked about the numbers and range of the Soviet submarine fleet. Mr. Bundy said that they may have about 300 submarines with a range of at least 5000-6000 miles, and that this may increase to 500 or more. This fleet constitutes a formidable threat, he declared; but added that he would downgrade it as a major element of a surprise attack, because of its vulnerability to detection. It is reasonable to suppose that the Soviets are attempting to develop an atom-powered submarine.

Mr. Burden returned to a consideration of the American capacity for increas-ed reconnaissance to detect a surprise attack. He asked Mr. Bundy whether the vio-lent reaction to our weather balloon program is an indication of Soviet sensitivity to our reconnaissance efforts. Mr. Bundy agreed that it is, and that the present propaganda would be small compared to the reaction to a concerted and sustained drive to step up American reconnaissance. The Soviets had shown they were prepared to attack aircraft even approaching their borders. Mr. Price asked whether any-thing more could be said by the United States about our balloon program. Mr. Kelly remarked that he believed we are approaching the day when a too strenuous re-connaissance program gives the Soviet Union too much of an opportunity to make propaganda capital.

Mr. Kissinger asked Mr. Bundy whether we know enough about the location of Soviet nuclear weapons plants to make inspection feasible. Mr. Bundy said that we have some idea, but that we could not spot them in the Soviet Union with complete security that we were not missing any. Mr. Kissinger then asked about the impact of nuclear weapons on the Russian army -- whether the Soviets are revamping their entire military structure. Mr. Bundy said that the Russian forces are training in methods involving wide dispersal and similar tactics geared to use against atomic tactical weapons. Mr. Kissinger said he asked because some of Bulganin's remarks indicated that the Soviet staff may be thinking along the tactical lines they followed in their days of glory during the Second World War. Their slowness to change, some United Staes officers have suggested, may enable us to adopt revised tactics and, so to speak, steal a march on them. Mr. Kelly said that he believed we are clearly ahead of the Russian ground forces in our possession of the newer ground forces' weapons and their rate of accumulation, but added that such an advantage could be wiped out quickly. Mr. Moore asked whether the Soviet forces in East Germany are developing counter tactics to our ability to use tactical nuclear weapons. Mr. Bundy said that he assumed they are.

Mr. Kelly said that he has been impressed by the high ratio of American test firings to Russian test firings. Since he knew from experience that we did not engage in any of our tests unnecessarily -- that each was required to find out something -- the relatively low number of shots the Russians have set up indicates that they do not have the versatility or range of nuclear weapons that is at our

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disposal. This is, of course, on the assumption that we have been able to detect all their test firings. Mr. Bundy agreed that the Soviets probably do not have the versatility in their atomic arsenal that we have. On the other hand, Mr. Bundy pointed out, they do seem to have covered the spectrum of atomic weapons categories, even if their maximum bang is not as big as ours. Mr. Kelly said that this lack on their part may indicate that they have engaged in development with a view to obtaining greater versatility rather than maximum blast.

Mr. Hill asked Mr. Bundy what he thought the Russian intelligence knew about our striking capacity. Mr. Bundy said that he believed the Russians knew our strength in this respect very well. Mr. Kelly suggested that from what he had seen in the papers -- he mentioned the Alsop column in particular -- the Russians should have no difficulty in knowing our capacity; we have put it on the line for them.

Mr. Lewis asked Mr. Bundy about American utilization of technical intelligence. Mr. Bundy said that his agency had been going into some new fields. The report of the trip made by American automation experts, he said, was extremely interesting. These representatives saw the details of a full-scale automation assembly line in the Soviet Union and reported that Soviet computers are in general good, and only two-three years' behind ours in development. It is said, Mr. Bundy remarked in passing, that the Soviets achieved their present computer technology by giving the best man they had in this field the men and money that he needed and telling him to go to work. They accomplished this development, moreover, in only two or three years; although slow to get started, they were ready to go down the line once they had decided on the merit of a particular development.

Mr. Bundy went on to note, for example, that there exists in the Soviet Union an institute which evaluates new machine tool techniques and supervises the technical development throughout industry. Now this kind of arrangement, he said, has its weaknesses concomitant with bureaucracy; but, on the other hand, it permits the widespread utilization of technological innovations once accepted. Their steel industry, for example, has been found by British observers to have profited greatly by technological improvements. Mr. Ginzberg asked Mr. Bundy why the Soviets are accenting automation: are they trying by means of automation to cut through a possible skilled worker shortage or bottleneck? Mr. Bundy replied that automation processes are more efficient and economical, and that Russia probably does not enjoy a surplus of engineers or particularly of skilled mechanics. Mr. Kelly said that automation processes would enable them to spread the skills they do have to other industries. He added that he thought that the Russians have much less.

## Improvement of American Intelligence

There was discussion of the problem of improving American intelligence services. Reference was made to the adequacy of funds and to the needed improvement of technical devices of various types. Mr. Bundy noted that one thing that would aid our activities would be continued relative freedom of travel in the Soviet Union. The automation experts' mission mentioned above was particularly helpful. If the right people are sent on such missions -- people who have a technical knowledge and an ability to talk to Russian technologists -- they not only learn more but establish rapport with their Soviet counterparts. A great deal more can be accomplished, he thought, by further technical contacts between East

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and West: The Geneva atomic energy conference proved that we can learn a great deal without getting to the area of classified material. Of course, what we learned was not directly related to military applications, but still was valuable fill-in. Mr. Kissinger asked whether Mr. Bundy had heard the statement that the Russians had learned a great deal from us at Geneva, but that we had learned little from them. Mr. Bundy answered that he knew that feeling exists, but that, so far as straight intelligence goes, he believed we got the better of any exchange at Geneva. Mr. Kelly said that since the Russian scientific effort has been behind a screen for so long, conferences like the one held at Geneva give us at least an opportunity to make judgments on how good the Soviet development is.

Mr. Trilling said that he had found the advanced yearbooks of the Soviet aeronautical industry to be particularly illuminating on the details of Russian plane development and asked Mr. Bundy if this source were being exploited by American intelligence. Mr. Bundy declared that his agency screens all such material, and that he did not believe it was missing any bets. He added that it might be desirable for the U.S. to copy and apply to Russian technical literature the Soviet system of translating all U.S. technical publications and making them available to industry.

Mr. Ginzberg asked Mr. Bundy whether the prospect of Europe's being within the Russian gunsight in five years has been explored in papers or discussions in the intelligence service. Mr. Bundy said that this problem has been the subject of much study in his agency. Mr. Kelly said that he believed the psychological aspect of the guided missiles will be the major one to consider; for his part, he noted, there is a great deal more to be done before the ICFM becomes a reality, but since it has caught on in the popular mind and has become a psychological factor, we must not relax or ignore it as only a weapon in development.

Mr. Hill asked Mr. Bundy for his opinion of the Soviet tendency to rely upon local wars over the next five years, supported by a nuclear threat. Mr. Bundy replied that with their increased striking power the Russians would clearly be in a position to pursue such a policy within 3-4 years. Popular opinion assumes that the so-called nuclear stalemate is here already. When the Russians have placed Europe within the gunsights of a 900-mile missile, they will have set up these western powers for "atomic blackmail"; it will become harder and harder for us to hold a western line against Russia in any local war she might unleash. There would then be an even more serious chance than at present that if we used atomic weapons in any such war, we would find ourselves fighting alone. In short, Mr. Bundy declared, the Soviet capacity for general war could be used greatly to reinforce Soviet capacity for local war.

Mr. Haskins asked Mr. Bundy what the situation is in Russian agriculture. Mr. Bundy said that this brought up another example of the usefulness of technical missions: the American Agricultural delegation reported that Russian attempts at dryfarming were not so hopeless as was thought, and included techniques to avoid the possibilities of a dust bowl. On the other hand, the Russians have had to divert a vast amount of manpower to their agricultural programs and still face great difficulties. Their food supply at present is still good, but a few bad years might change the picture considerably. In general, Mr. Bundy said, it is his opinion that Russian agriculture will keep pace with the growing population,

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but the rate of progress will still have important political implications. Khrushchev is presently identified with the agricultural program, and should there come a few drought years, which could not be passed off as low-level incompetence, he would be seriously embarrassed, and there might be repercussions.

Mr. Hill asked whether a budgetary squeeze is a limiting factor in the Soviet capacity to develop her defenses. Mr. Bundy said that he believes it is. They could extend their defense costs to 18 to 20% of their national income, but this would be purchased at the price of lessened growth rates.

Mr. Ginzberg asked whether the agricultural situation in Russia constitutes an outside limiting factor on Russian development. Mr. Bundy said that it does represent a drag, but that he did not believe that it could be classed as an outside limiting factor for the next five years at least.

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# REMARKS OF MR. LEWIS; PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SUPPLY OF TECHNICAL SKILLS;

Mr. Burden next turned the discussion over to Mr. Lewis for his remarks on the technical manpower situation in the United States.

Mr. Lewis said that he first wished to disqualify himself as an expert; his airforce experience did not directly concern research and manpower problems, and he intended in his comments only to provide a framework for the group's discussion on this topic.

He suggested, as a definition of the problem, that we are basically concerned with having the technicians and scientists to produce superior weapons and to maintain their superiority for an indefinite period. This statement of the problem raises three questions: First, are we short of technical manpower now or will we be in the future? This involves the further point of the allocation of technical personnel to military and to civilian tasks. It is assumed that if we could take all technical talent presently employed in civilian industries and put them into military work, there would exist no competitive problem with the Soviet Union, or at least, the requirements of our defense establishment would be met easily. Secondly, there exists the question of the way we are employing technical personnel in our military development. Mr. Lewis said that he believed it is clear that we have a very wasteful way of using engineers by a tendency to over-engineer rather than employ experimental techniques of development. Government procurement policies are, moreover, somewhat responsible for this engineer shortage: to a certain extent, also, it is a result of the American industrial system. Our defense plants sell themselves to the public and to Congress as competitive industries, when, in fact, they operate only on the relatively risk-free basis of the cost-plus contract. There follows from this situation a tendency for every industry to build up its engineering and technical personnel to a point where not defense needs, but perhaps possible future competitive position of the industry is served. Mr. Lewis said that he sometimes has wondered whether our picture of an engineering shortage is not drawn from the enormous mass of advertising by industry in the help-wanted columns. When it is remembered that the costs of this advertising and competition are borne by the government letting the contract-- Mr. Ginzberg mentioned that only one per cent of this advertising cost is paid for privately--it appears that the temptation to compete for unnecessary engineers, and then not make proper use of them is an evil connected with the cost-plus basis of operations. The third general consideration, Mr. Lewis continued, concerns the question of deciding in which scientific or technical fields we face a shortage, what is the extent of that shortage, and to what extent that shortage will increase or decrease over future years.

The requirement of engineers will depend upon the size of the military establishment and the degree of readiness it must maintain. The role of the scientist, moreover, will be conditioned by the kind of weapons we want; that is, whether we are involved with small problems of model changes or major questions of basic development; whether we are seeking mainly the

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people to initiate changes or the people to maintain already developed types. In this respect, Mr. Lewis suggested, there are natural limitations to continued change. It is a fact, he said, that the more engineering is lavished on a project, the longer it takes to get a basic change. We tend to increase our lead time, and to decrease our capacity to come up with the new developments at the right time because of overengineering. Throwing in more engineers to the military establishment, without their proper utilization may become a deficit.

Mr. Lewis said that he felt we often tend to obscure our present situation by an illogical concern over the technical production of the USSR. They started their technical development later than we did, and it is only to be expected that they would concentrate upon technical education. Mr. Lewis felt that it would be a mistake to determine our policy by what we think they are doing in Russia. Rather, we must analyze the Russian technological effort and take into consideration the differences between the systems, to see which areas are comparable and in which areas comparisons are dangerous. In short, Mr. Lewis asserted, we must beware of the pitfalls of a technical race.

Finally, Mr. Lewis said, we must examine the problem of how to get into technical service the people we want, which involves the consideration of the incentives of money and prestige. If we establish national goals and programs, he added, we must be prepared to stay with them in his experience we have created problems for ourselves by our cyclical demands. He said that it was his opinion, too, that further examination would show that it is not a question of numbers but a problem of finding and utilizing the small number of exceptional people--not so much a problem of manpower as it is of brainpower.

## DISCUSSION: THE PROBLEM OF OVERENGINEERING

Mr. Burden thanked Mr. Lewis, saying that the latter had raised many provocative questions.

Mr. Wolfle said that he would like to comment on one of the questions raised by Mr. Lewis; that is, do we have a shortage of engineers and are we likely to have. There have been many claims of present and future shortages he said, but he did not think the discussion of the prospect could advance far without answering the question: shortage of what kind, for what use. If we add up the demand of employers, he thought, there is a shortage now and no doubt always will be. If, on the other hand, one uses as a base line what the employers of the nation are willing to pay, then the picture is different. To be sure, engineering graduates command a higher salary than arts graduates, and engineering salaries have risen in recent years: but the rise has not been disproportionate to the general price and wage rises. Finally, if the base line is defense needs, then no measurement of possible shortage can be made unless it is decided how to evaluate the utilization of scientific manpower presently employed in industry. If the

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standard against which we measure the degree of shortage is what we project
as a desirable level of supply for the country, we then run into complexities
that arise from the other values in our society. If we use as a yardstick
the potential of the country, then we are clearly not measuring up; there
is a great potential which we are not utilizing. Therefore, Mr. Wolfle
concluded, the answer he sees to Mr. Lewis' first question is "it all depends."

With respect to the future, Mr. Wolfle went on, past history has
indicated a steadily rising reliance on technical skills and an increasing
number of individuals so trained. Any estimate for the future would con-
clude that the number of technical jobs will continue to rise.

A basic question, according to Mr. Wolfle, is the quality of education
available to the children and youth of the country--whether it is of a
kind that will enable and influence young people to pursue further technical
studies, or whether it is such as to cause them to avoid this field. Our
school system, particularly on the primary and secondary levels, has achieved
its aim of taking in practically everyone and, understandably and forgivingly,
has not made all the qualifications and distinctions that are necessary
for the fullest development of different abilities. The situation in the
long view--not the proximate period of five or six years that Mr. Bundy
spoke of--depends upon the quality of instruction we are going to provide
not only as preparation for technical work, but as inducement for young
people to go into scientific higher studies in the first place. Finally,
he pointed out, in the United States, England, and Scotland--probably all
over Europe--there is concern about the future supply and quality of en-
gineers to meet the increasing demands of technological society. And
there is, too, the feeling that we may be cutting off this future supply to
some extent by limiting, in the interests of maintaining our defense establish-
ment, the stimulating basic research that develops future scientists.

Mr. Kelly said that both speakers had brought up significant considerations.
With respect to Mr. Lewis' mention of the waste of engineering talent in
the military program, Mr. Kelly agreed that there is a great deal of waste,
but that he did not see how this situation could be corrected quickly. Im-
provement is being made slowly, and this is the best that can be done at
the present. Now all kinds of duplication and triplication can be found in
the national defense industry, he said; but this is the case because the
technological demands of the defense establishment have grown so extensively
and so quickly that it has simply outrun the civilian framework. It must
not be thought that a dishonest competition is at fault. The operation
is now so vast that one cannot squeeze out the admittedly unnecessary
duplication. At this time, Mr. Kelly said, he is straining to find the
personnel to put on the ballistics missile program, in the face of demands
from Washington for equally justifiable programs for other missile types.
Although this organization recruits vigorously, he is experiencing difficulty
in finding the manpower; there is a problem in replacing retirements, and
his shop has not been able to accommodate for growth.

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The important pressure, he went on, is budgetary and this consideration will have to yield. He did not see how an adjustment could be arrived at unless there is a limitation of the civilian effort. If he were an autocrat, he thought, there is no question but that he could liberate some people. But the only practical way to get the new equipment designed and produced, he said, is to add more dollars--and even this does not provide the complete answer.

The American society, is becoming more and more dependent upon science and technology. And although he did not believe that we would not get the necessary manpower, he also declared that he had no fear of training too many scientists and engineers. We do have a shortate in numbers, he said, and the quality of our people has not kept pace either. The universities will probably have to raise their level of instruction: four years is not enough to prepare an engineer for modern technical problems. We must, moreover, maintain a decent status for the academic man in our society; Mr. Kelly said that he had just hired a recent Ph.D. graduate for a salary higher than that paid to the associate professor under whom the young man did his doctoral thesis. The problem involves not only bringing up the pay level of academic personnel, but the larger one of keeping the promising students in school to develop their abilities on the graduate level.

Mr. Ginzberg said that he believed we must not fall into the vulgar error of equating national security or policy with the supply of scientific talent—a poor secretary of state can cancel out some of the advangage of a strong scientific position. Mr. Kelly said, on the other hand, that any secretary of state must talk from a position of strength; regardless of what the policy may be, it must be backed up by the ability to command resources. Mr. Ginzberg said that he did not intend to say that the technical power was unimportant, but rather that it is not the only element in a power complex; Hitler, for example, vitiated his considerable military strength by a blundering policy. A weapons system is only part of the story.

Secondly, Mr. Ginzberg went on, he believed that Mr. Kelly had excused the services too much, and that the operations of the services has been costly and unnecessarily wasteful. Mr. Kelly agreed that the operation is not economical, but added that he did not see how it could be corrected. We must let the military run their show, he said, and he did not see any way out of this.

Mr. Ginzberg said that he felt there has been a great deal of confusion about professional and subprofessional categories of personnel. Putting it another way, he asked whether our shortage of engineers is rather a shortage of technical personnel on a lower, subprofessional level. More attention should be paid, he said, to the development of the subprofessional group of skilled foremen and supervisors.

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Mr. Ginzberg went on to note that the value system of our society is in-
volved in this problem. Becoming good at anything requires work -- and hard
work. In an increasingly soft society that venerates leisure and seems to be
shedding the nineteenth century glorification of labor, fewer people can be found
who are ready to forego the opportunities for ease to do the work. The marriage
age, he pointed out, is being lowered each year, which means that many young men
are choosing to take the quick job, rather than spend the valuable years of
their twenties in further education. Now if 50 percent fail out of our engineer-
ing schools, he continued, and many of these schools are not all they should be,
we are facing a serious situation at the very base of the industrial framework.
A gross quantitative comparison with the Soviet graduations is, moreover, in-
adequate, since it does not show the quality of their effort. Mr. Ginzberg said
that he is impressed with the upset of the balance between research and develop-
ment, on the one hand, and the ability to use the new weapons, on the other.
Planning must take note of the ability to use the superior weapons, as well as
the ability to develop them.

The horror literature on the quality of mathematical instruction on the
lower level, Mr. Ginzberg said, is only one aspect of a general weakness of the
educational system we must deal with: a group of historians or literature pro-
fessors would raise the same complaints about the deficiencies of their under-
graduates in these fields, and we cannot deal with this problem on a unilateral
basis. It is not simply a matter of tightening up the math courses.

Mr. Ginzberg said that, in his opinion, there is a great deal of double
talk about this whole problem -- although we talk at length about the competit-
ive situation in the sciences vis a vis the Russians, we do not really seem to be
impressed by brainpower. If we think only of the competitive situation, he
thought we might lose sight of the obstacles which are involved in the American
society. Unless we rethink the university organization and quality of American
instruction, we may lose out: he said that he certainly is in favor of more and
better scientists, but that we must be careful not merely to treat symptoms. He
said, in conclusion, that he believed we should do more worrying than we have
done over the question of poor utilization of the talent we have. Mr. Burden
said that those like him who are involved in the business end of American science
are as pessimistic about the chances of ridding industry of duplication as Mr.
Ginzberg is about the chances of rehauling the educational system.

Mr. Wolfs said that a specific need for engineers has been indicated by
the BLS for the aeronautical industries. For his part, he said, he had no fear
about creating an oversupply of engineers. Finally, he noted, he was in agree-
ment with Mr. Ginzberg's view that we are presented not so much with the problem
of getting more scientists, but of improving the entire educational picture.
Mr. Kelly said that the British are up against this problem having fallen behind
the United States and Germany in technical training, and are going to spend
$100 million to improve their facilities. Mr. Trilling said that the aeronautics
industry furnishes a case study of the contrast between the United States, Germany
and probably the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and the United Kingdom on the other.
We started teaching aeronautics in the 1920's; the British and French did not,
but were able to get by for some time because of the relatively simple machinery
and very good fundamental engineering background. But in the Second World War,

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the Russians and the Germans and the United States kept pace, but England and France lagged behind particularly in airframe design. The result is that the British have excellent engines, and no planes to put them in; their airframes cut 80 to 100 miles an hour from maximum speed. An integrated planning of curriculum that covers all possibilities is a necessity. Mr. Kelly said that the British do not have the counterpart of the *technische hochschule* or the American technical university like MIT or Cal Tech. Mr. Korol said that the figures published in the papers of Russian educational levels are not to be taken uncritically: the statement that they have 15,000 technical schools is exaggerated. They do have among these schools, for example, a number of two-year high schools concentrating on technical subjects. Even so, it is to be expected that they will be able to graduate 140,000 to 150,000 engineers and technicians by 1958, compared to our current output of 20,000 from our two-year technical institutes. Mr. Kelly said that we must consider the differences in educational pattern also. Now, at present, many American industries provide on-the-job training to high school graduates which is equivalent to a two-year technical course. Mr. Korol agreed, but noted that the Soviet Union appears to be taking all measures to step up its technical training.

Mr. Burden asked what was the view of academic people on the prospects of improving our training of engineering personnel. Some, he said, seem to agree with Mr. Ginzberg that the situation is almost hopeless and requires a general overhaul. At the same time, Mr. Burden stated, he felt a less general but important improvement could be obtained by, say, making physics and chemistry college requirements. Mr. Korol said that one specific suggestion is to raise the college entrance requirements, which, in turn, would be translated by parents into concrete demands that grade school and high school instruction be tightened up to enable their children to gain admittance to college. Mr. Lewis said that he believed we are not making enough of our obvious opportunity -- to pay more. The pay off in the aeronautics industry, he said, is by manhour; with this basis in a large organization the real aim soon develops to keep people employed, and this very often means improvement of model A rather than the undertaking of the development of model B, which involves risk. Even the bonus list reflects this situation; it is heavily weighted by people in sales or management, and seldom includes many people in engineering. Mr. Lewis said that he believed we must shift the emphasis in contracting procedures to a recognition and reward of creative ability, even though this will come up against great obstacles in Congress and management. He felt that an increase in the number of engineers cannot be stimulated unless the field is made more attractive in terms of money and participation in management. At present, the organization of industry does not encourage creative engineering; such encouragement would in turn attract more people to the field. Mr. Kelly said that this may be true with reference to the airframe industry which is a war baby, but that the aircraft industry is not a good yardstick for the judgment of utilization of engineers in industry at large. It is true, he thought, that the aircraft firms do not use their technical people efficiently, but they also contribute little to the peacetime economy. Mr. Lewis agreed that this is the case. He went on to point out, nonetheless, that although no one could receive a contract unless he had a plant, it is possible to receive a contract without the engineering brains to put the project through. What happens in this case is that the engineer-poor firm simply raids its competitor. Now, Mr. Lewis maintained, he is not against competition -- but after the Korean War, he recalled, bomber producers wanted to go into fighter production, and this kind of attrition could be cut down. Today, he thought the engineer is not very pleased with his position and probably is not selling it to prospective recruits from the next generation. He believed that the engineer should get a better shake, and that it could be given to him in better conditions.

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Mr. Korol said that the military has assumed a great responsibility and influence on academic policies by their research contracts to graduate schools which in turn have become a guiding factor for university research. Now the military sometimes confuse research and development, and their interest in the latter may have caused that factor to receive too much emphasis in the schools. Mr. Kelly suggested that the way to counteract this is to get the funds for the more original projects, and here the National Science Foundation is doing its best work. It is necessary to keep our good men in the graduate schools, and to do this we must get more money to them for basic research, or disguise the basic projects so they have more immediate promise. Mr. Hill said that, considering our $40 billion defense expenditure, something like $600,000,000 in scholarships would not be excessive if it would pull in all the people who could be trained in the scientific fields. Mr. Lewis said that such a disbursement could be supported; in fact, a central technical institute could be set up by the federal government, along the lines of West Point. Mr. Hill said that he believed the money would be better spent by being spread around among the many already existing technical universities. Mr. Kelly agreed; the technical universities of the country, he said, are first class, and it would be an error to set up a central institute to compete with them. He added that he believed that our democratic system was moving in the right direction, if slowly.

Mr. Trilling suggested another pool of manpower that is being utilized by the Russians -- the highly skilled foremen who get on-the-job training and sometimes additional academic instruction leading to engineering degrees. Mr. Kelly said that this type of program is already being followed in the United States; at least 70 percent of our industry is giving extra training. Almost every major city he added, has institutions like New York's Polytechnic Institute or Cooper Union to provide after-hours training leading to the professional degree. Mr. Korol agreed; much of the Russian figures on technical education may be a Potemkin's village. We tend to be overwhelmed by their statistics, and forget the great unrecorded projects being pursued in American industry. Mr. Kelly agreed, but added that the superb quality of Russian technology when it is good, is, itself, a matter of concern for us, and should occasion some extensive soul-searching. Mr. Burden wanted to know how physics and chemistry were dropped as required subjects in our high schools. Mr. Kelly thought that it was the work of that type of mind which flourishes in the school of education and which is dedicated to the impossible idea that it is not only a possibility but indeed a science to teach a subject you know nothing about. Even in this area, however, Mr. Kelly again expressed confidence that the evils are being recognized and the efforts made to remedy the situation in the interests of competence.

James Murphy
Rapporteur