HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
GUSTAV F. PAPANEK
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

October 25, 1968

Mrs. Pauline Neff
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.
Washington D. C. 20036

Dear Mrs. Neff:

I am enclosing my revised article. I have had the pages with the most changes retyped but I am enclosing them so that you can see what I did.

I am sorry about the delay but the Post Office defeated us by not getting the manuscript to me on time. I know the headings are too long now but I need them to make my point. I have tried to accept your editorial suggestions.

I assume there will be no other changes without consultation.

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[Y]

events in Asia. When, in the late 19th and 20th Centuries, the European powers were extending their influence throughout the world, the effective decisions remained with a few great European capitals. Today, statesmen face the unprecedented problem of formulating a policy toward well over a hundred countries. Every nation, no matter how insignificant, participates in international affairs. Ideas are transmitted almost instantaneously. What used to be considered domestic events have world-wide consequences.

The revolutionary character of our age can be summed up in general statements: (a) the number of participants in the international order has increased and their nature has altered; (b) the technical ability of these participants to affect each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of states purposes has expanded.

Whenever the participants of the international system change, a period of profound dislocation is inevitable. This change can occur because new states enter the political system, or it can originate in a change in values as to what constitutes legitimate rule. Finally, it can come about because of the reduction in influence of some traditional units. In our period, all of these factors have combined. Since the end of the Second World War, several scores of new states have come into being. The emergence of even a few new nations in the 19th Century produced decades of adjustment. The post-World War I world never assimilated the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Our age has yet to find a structure which matches the responsibilities of the new nations to their aspirations.

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As the number of participants has increased, technology has multiplied the resources available for the conduct of foreign policy. A scientific revolution has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy. It has magnified insecurities because it has made survival seem to depend on the accidents of a technological breakthrough.

This trend has been compounded by the nature of contemporary domestic structures. As long as the states' ability to mobilize resources was limited, the severity of their conflicts had definite bounds. In the eighteenth century custom restricted the demands rulers by "divine right" could make upon their subjects; a philosophy of minimum government performed the same role through much of the nineteenth century. Our period has seen the culmination of a process started by the French Revolution: the basing of governmental legitimacy on popular support. Even totalitarian regimes are aberrations of a democratic legitimacy; they depend on popular consensus even when they manufacture it through propaganda and pressure. In such a situation, the consensus is decisive; limitations of tradition are essentially irrelevant. It is an ironic result of the democratization of politics that it has enabled states to marshall ever more resources for conflict.

Ideological conflict compounds these instabilities. In the great periods of cabinet diplomacy, diplomats spoke the same language, not only in the sense that French was the lingua franca, but more importantly because they tended to understand intangibles in the same manner. A similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy -- it may even be a precon- dition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, diplomats can still meet,

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but they lose the ability to persuade. More time is spent on defining
contending positions than in resolving them. What seems most reasonable
to one side will appear most problematical to the other.

When there is ideological conflict, political loyalties no longer coincide
with political boundaries. Conflicts among states merge with divisions
within nations; the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy begins
to disappear. At least some states feel threatened not only by the foreign
policy of other countries but also, and perhaps especially, by domestic
transformations. A liberalized communist regime in Prague -- which had
in no way challenged Soviet pre-eminence in foreign policy -- caused the
Kremlin to believe that its vital interests were threatened and to respond
by occupying the country without even the pretext of legality.

The tensions produced by ideological conflict are exacerbated by the
reduction in influence of the states that were considered great powers before
the First World War. The world has become militarily bipolar. Only two
powers -- the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics --
possess the full panoply of military might. Over the next decade, no other
country or

(continue to page 5)

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group of countries will be capable of challenging their physical pre+
eminence. Indeed, the gap in military strength between the two
giant nuclear countries and the rest of the world is likely to
increase rather than diminish over that period. Moreover, the
two superpowers have the ideology, the self-confidence,
technical resources to try to order affairs on a global scale.

Military bipolarity is a source of rigidity in foreign policy. The guardians of the equilibrium of the 19th Century were prepared to respond to change with counter-adjustment; the policymakers of the superpowers in the second half of the 20th Century have much less confidence in the ability of the equilibrium to right itself after disturbance. Whatever "balance" there is between the superpowers is regarded as both precarious and inflexible. A bipolar world loses the perspective for a loss of thePerspective AD

Onig, working, unclear

This doesn't give any idea of the superpowers'意图 but each power wants to end up with.

There is little inclination to make a fundamental adjustment to thePerspective. The fact that some of these objectives may well prove incompatible adds to the strain on the international system.

But the age of the superpowers is now drawing to an end. Military bipolarity has not only failed to prevent, it has actually encouraged political multipolarity. Weaker allies have

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good reason to believe that their defense is in the overwhelming interest of their senior partner. Hence, they see no need to purchase its support by acquiescence in its policies. The new nations feel protected by the rivalry of the superpowers, and their nationalism leads to ever stronger assertions of self-will. Traditional uses of power have become less feasible, while new forms of pressure have emerged as a result of transnational loyalties and weak domestic structures.

This political multipolarity does not necessarily guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability. Nationalism may succeed in curbing the pre-eminence of the superpowers; it remains to be seen whether it can supply an integrating concept of order more successfully in this century than in the last. Few countries have the interest and only the superpowers have the resources to become informed about global issues. The result is a diplomacy often geared to domestic politics and more concerned with striking a pose than contributing to international order. Equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and backgrounds of previous experience.

This, then, is the structural challenge of the contemporary international system: the greatest need of the international community is an agreed concept of order. In its absence, the awesome available power is unrestrained by any consensus as to legitimacy; ideology and nationalism in their different ways deepen international schisms. Many of the elements of stability which

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characterized the international system in the nineteenth century
cannot be recreated in the modern age. The stable technology,
the multiplicity of major powers, the limited domestic claims,
and the frontiers which permitted adjustments are gone forever.
But stability will prove elusive in the absence of some concept
of international structure.

This problem is particularly serious for the United States.
Whatever our intentions or policies, the fact that the United
States disposes of the greatest single aggregate of material
power in the world is inescapable. A new international order
is inconceivable without a significant American contribution.
But the nature of this contribution has altered. For the two
decades after 1945, our international activities were based
on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us
the ability to reshape the international system and to bring
about domestic transformations in "emerging countries." This
direct "operational" concept of international order has proved
too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to
impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to
evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on
political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength
will remain with the two superpowers.

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## II. THE LIMITS OF BITOLABILITY: THE NATURE OF POWER IN THE MODERN PERIOD

STE/

Throughout history, military power was considered the final recourse. Statesmen considered the acquisition of additional power to be an obvious and paramount objective. As late as twenty-five years ago, it would have been inconceivable that a country could possess too much strength for effective political use; every increment of power was $\frac{1}{M}$ at least theoretically $\frac{1}{M}$ politically effective. The minimum aim was to assure the impermeability of the territory. As late as the Second World War, H, a state's strength could be measured by its ability to protect its population from foreign attack.

The nuclear age has destroyed this traditional relationship. Offensive power and defensive power are no longer commensurable. Increasing strength does not necessarily confer the ability to protect the population. No foreseeable force level $\frac{1}{M}$ not even full-scale ballistic missile defenses $\frac{1}{M}$ can prevent levels of damage eclipsing those of the two world wars. Operational definitions of victory in any sense that wouldn't have been meaningful in the past $\frac{1}{M}$ even by World War II standards $\frac{1}{M}$ are almost impossible.

NOTICE: These conditions have made the definition of the nature of power particularly elusive. The problem goes beyond developing some concept of military security; it involves doctrinal considerations of the uses to which power can be put in the modern period. The major problem is to discipline power so that it

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bears a rational relationship to the objectives likely to be
in dispute. The paradox of contemporary military strength
is that a gargantuan increase in power has eroded its
relationship to policy. The major nuclear powers are
capable of devastating each other. But they have great
difficulty translating this CAPABILITY into policy except to
prevent direct challenges to their own survival -- and this
condition is interpreted with increasing strictness. The
capacity to destroy is difficult to translate into a plausible
threat even against countries with no capacity for retaliation.
The margin of superiority of the superpowers over the other
states is widening; yet other nations have an unprecedented scope
for autonomous action. In relations with many domestically weak
countries, a radio transmitter can be a more effective form of
pressure than a squadron of B-52s. In other words, power no
longer translates automatically into influence. This does not
mean that impotence increases influence, only that power does
not automatically confer it.

This state of affairs has profound consequences for traditional notions of balance of power. In the past, stability has always presupposed the existence of an equilibrium of power which prevented one state from imposing its will on the others.

The traditional criteria for the balance of power were
territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only
by conquest; hence, as long as territorial expansion was fore-
closed, or severely limited, the equilibrium was likely to be
preserved. In the contemporary period, this is no longer true.

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Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power are possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state. China gained more in real military power through the acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia. If the Soviet Union had occupied Western Europe but had remained without nuclear weapons, it would be less powerful than it is now with its existing nuclear arsenal within its present borders. In other words, the really fundamental changes in the balance of power have all occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an urgent need to analyze just what is understood by power -- as well as by balance of power -- in the nuclear age.

This would be difficult enough were technology stable. It becomes enormously complicated when a scientific revolution produces an upheaval in weapons technology at five-year intervals. Slogans like "superiority," "parity," "assured destruction," compete unencumbered by clear definitions of their operational military significance, much less a consensus on their political implications. The gap between experts and decision makers is widening. The decision maker rarely has as many hours to study a problem as the expert has years. The result is that the decision maker runs the risk of unprecedented dependence on his technical staff. He is informed by "briefings," a procedure which stresses theatrical qualities and leaves its target with the uneasy feeling that he has been "taken," even — or perhaps especially — when he does not know exactly how. Decisions may

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reflect an attempt to ward off conflicting pressures rather
than a clear conception of long-range purposes.

In short, as power has grown more awesome, it
it has also turned abstract, intangible, elusive. Deterrence
has become the dominant military policy. But deterrence
depends above all on psychological criteria. It seeks to
keep an opponent from a given course by posing unacceptable
risks. For purposes of deterrence, the opponent's calculations
are decisive. A bluff taken seriously is more useful than a
serious threat interpreted as a bluff. For political purposes,
the meaningful measurement of military strength is the assess-
ment of it by the other side. Psychological criteria vie in
importance with strategic doctrine.

The abstract nature of modern power affects domestic
disputes profoundly. Deterrence is tested negatively by things
which do _not_ happen. But it is never possible to demonstrate
_why_ something has not occurred. Is it because we are pursuing
the best possible policy or only a marginally effective one?
Bitter debate even among those who believe in the necessity of
defense policy is inevitable and bound to be inconclusive.

The longer peace is maintained -- or

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the more successful deterrence is -- the more it furnishes arguments for
those who are opposed to the very premises of defense policy. Perhaps
there was no need for preparedness in the first place because the opponent
never meant to attack? In the modern state, national security is likely
to be a highly divisive domestic issue.

The enormity of modern power has destroyed its cumulative impact
to a considerable extent. Throughout history the use of force set a
precedent; it symbolized a demonstrated capacity to use power for national
ends. In the twentieth century any use of force sets up inhibitions against
resorting to it again. Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, it is clear
that it has greatly diminished American willingness to resist this form of
warfare elsewhere. Its utility as a precedent has therefore been importantly
undermined.

The nature of modern power has been partially obscured by the
enormous strategic superiority which the United States possessed until
recently. A limit was placed on challenges by the consciousness that an
American United States preemptive attack was at least sensivable. This degree of
superiority no longer exists and cannot be regained under foreseeable cir-
cumstances. Future crises -- some of which may not be deliberately
caused -L will take place against a background of what will amount to
a effective parity whatever the numerical relationship.
IN A NEW AND PROBABLY DIRECT STRATEGIC

(Continued on page 12A)

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The difficulty of forming a conception of power is paralleled by the problem of how to use it diplomatically. In the past, measures to increase readiness signaled the mounting seriousness with which an issue was viewed. But such measures have become less obvious and more difficult to move when weapons are always at a high state of readiness and solid-fuel missiles require less than ten minutes to be fired, and are hidden either under the ground or under the oceans. With respect to nuclear weapons, signaling increased readiness will either prove unsuccessful or, should it succeed, may trigger a preemptive strike.

Even when only conventional weapons are involved, the problem of what constitutes a politically meaningful threat is increasingly complicated. After the capture of the Pueblo, the United States called up thirteen thousand reservists and moved an aircraft carrier off the shores of Korea. Did the fact that we had to call up reserves when challenged by a fifth-rate military power convey that we meant to act or that we were overextended? Did the move of the aircraft carrier indicate a decision to retaliate or was it intended primarily to strike a pose? What indeed was the appropriate response?

Sometimes these measures got out of control; the mobilization schedules were one of the principal reasons for the outbreak of World War I.

(Continued on page 13)

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The problem is illustrated dramatically by the war in Vietnam. A massive breakdown of communication occurred not only within the policy-making machinery in the United States but also between the United States and Hanoi. Over the past five years, the U.S. government has found it difficult, if not impossible, to define what it understood by victory. President Johnson extended an open-ended offer for unconditional negotiations. Yet our troops were deployed as if this offer had not been made. The deployment was based on purely military considerations; it did not take into account the possibility that our troops might have to support a negotiation -- the timing of which we had, in effect, left to the opponent. Strategy divorced from foreign policy proved sterile.

These perplexities have spurred new interest in arms control negotiations, especially those dealing with strategic missiles. These negotiations can be important for the peace and security of the world. But to be effective, they require an intellectual resolution of the issues which have bedeviled the formulation of military policy. Unless we are able to give an operational meaning to terms such as "superiority" or "stability," negotiations will lack criteria by which to judge progress.

Thus, whatever the course -- a continuation of the arms race or arms control -- a new look at the American national security policy is essential. Over ten years have passed since the last comprehensive, bipartisan, high-level reevaluation of all aspects of national security: the Gaither Committee. A new

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administration should move quickly to bring about such a review.

It should deal with some of the following problems: (a) a definition of the national interest and national security over the next decade; (b) the nature of military power in that period; (c) the relationship of military power to political influence; (d) implications and feasibility (both military and political) of various postures of superiority, parity, etc.;

(e) the implications (both political and military) of new developments such as MIRV (multiple warheads) and ballistic missile defenses; (f) the prospects for arms control including specific measures to moderate the arms race.

# BIPOLARITY AND MULTIPLICARITY: THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM

In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy is philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically. But a philosophical deepening, however necessary, will not come easily to those brought up in the American tradition of foreign policy.

Our political society was one of the few which was **consciously created** at a point in time. At least until the emergence of the race problem, we were blessed by the absence of conflicts between classes and conflicts over ultimate ends. The lessons of two world wars seem to many Americans to be that we saved the world twice in a century.

These factors produce the characteristic aspects of American foreign policy: a certain manipulativeness and pragmatism, a conviction that the normal pattern of international relations was harmonious, a reluctance to think in structural terms, a belief in final answers -- all qualities which reflect a sense of self-sufficiency not far removed from a sense of omnipotence. Yet the contemporary dilemma is that there are no total solutions; we will live in a world shaped by revolutions in technology, values and institutions. We are immersed in an unending process, not in a quest for a final destination. The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physical but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will depend ultimately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power.

a. The New Nations and Political Legitimacy

This challenge is especially crucial with respect to the new nations. Future historians are likely to class the confusion and torment in the emerging countries with the great movements of religious awakening. Continents which had been dormant for centuries have suddenly developed political consciousness. Regions which for scores of years had considered foreign rule as natural, struggle for independence. Yet it is a curious nationalism which defines itself not as in Europe by common language or history, but often primarily by the common experience of foreign rule. Boundaries especially in Africa have tended to follow the administrative convenience of the colonial powers, rather than along NATIONAL or tribal lines. The new nations have faced both problems of identity and of political authority. They often lack social cohesiveness or they are split into competing groups each with a highly developed sense of identity.

It is no accident that between the Berlin crisis and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the principal threats to the peace came from the emerging areas. Domestic weakness encourages foreign intervention. The temptation to deflect domestic dissatisfactions into foreign adventures is ever present. Leaders feel little sense of responsibility to an overall international equilibrium; they are much more conscious of their local grievances. The rivalry of the superpowers offers many opportunities for blackmail.

Yet the traditional foreign policy manifestations are not the most significant aspect of the turmoil of the new countries. It is in the new countries that the issue of the purpose of political life and the meaning of political legitimacy -- key issues also in the modern state -- pose themselves in their most acute form. The new nations weigh little in the physical balance of power. But the forces unleashed in the emergence of so many new states may well affect the moral balance of the world -- the convictions which form the structure for the world of tomorrow, adding a new dimension to the problem of multipolarity.

Almost all of the new countries suffer from the revolutionary malaise: revolutions succeed through the coming together of all resentments. But the degree to which the existing structures are eliminated compounds the difficulty of establishing political consensus. A successful revolution leaves as its legacy a profound dislocation. In the new countries, contrary to all revolutionary expectations, the task of construction has emerged as less glamorous and more complex than the struggle for freedom; the exaltation of the quest for independence cannot be perpetuated. Sooner or later, positive goals must replace resentment of the former colonial power as a motive force. In the absence of autonomous social forces, this unifying role must be performed by the state.

But this produces another cause of instability. When social cohesiveness is slight, the struggle for control of authority becomes correspondingly more bitter. When government is the

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principal, sometimes the sole, expression of national identity, opposition
tends to be considered treason. The profound social or religious schisms
of many of the new nations turn the control of political authority quite
literally into a matter of life and death. Where political obligation follows
racial, religious, or tribal lines, self-restraint breaks down. Domestic
conflicts assume the character of civil war. Such traditional authority as
exists is personal or feudal. The problem is to make it "legitimate" --
to develop a notion of political obligation which depends on legal norms rather
than on coercive power or personal loyalty.

This process took centuries in Europe. It must be accomplished in
decades in the new nations, where preconditions of success are less favorable
than at comparable periods in Europe. The new countries are subject to
foreign pressures; there is a premium on foreign adventures to bring about
domestic cohesiveness. Their domestic structure causes the new nations to
compound the already great international instabilities.

The American role in the new nations' efforts to build legitimate authority
is in need of serious reexamination. The dominant American view about
political structure has been that it will follow more or less automatically upon
economic progress and that it will take the form of constitutional democracy.

Both assumptions are subject to serious questions. In every advanced
country, political stability preceded rather than emerged from the process of
industrialization. Where the rudiments of popular institutions did not exist
at the beginning of the industrial revolution, they did not receive their impetus

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from it. To be sure, representative institutions were broadened and elaborated as the countries prospered, but their significant features antedated economic development and are not attributable to it. In fact, the system of government, whether popular or authoritarian, which brought about industrialization, has tended to be confirmed by this achievement, rather than radically changing the course of history.

Nor is democracy a natural evolution of nationalism. In the last century, it was started by an aristocratic ruling class whose estimate of itself was founded outside the political process. It was buttressed by a middle-class, holding a political philosophy which, as considered by some, was a consideration of the ultimately important social forces rather than the principal focus of national consciousness. Professional revolutionaries were rarely involved; their bias is seldom democratic.

The pluralism of the West had many causes which cannot be duplicated elsewhere. These included, for example, a church organization outside the control of the state and therefore symbolizing the limitation of government power; the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition of justice based on human dignity, which was reinforced later by the Christian ethic; an emerging bourgeoisie; a stalemate in religious wars imposing tolerance as a practical necessity and a multiplicity of states. Industrialization was by no means the most significant of these factors. Had any of the others been missing, the Western political evolution could have been quite different.

Communism has never succeeded in the industrialized Western countries for which its theory was devised; its greatest successes

have been in agricultural societies. This is no accident. Industrialization -- in its early phases -- multiplies dislocations. It smashes the traditional framework. It requires a system of values which makes the sacrifices involved in capital formation tolerable and which furnishes some integrating principles to contain psychological frustrations.

Communism is able to supply legitimacy for the sacrifices inseparable from capital formation in an age when the maxims of laisser-faire are no longer acceptable. And so too Leninism has the attraction of providing a rationale for holding on to power. Many of the leaders of the new countries are revolutionaries who sustained themselves through the struggle for independence by visions of the transformations to be brought about after victory. They are not predisposed even to admit the possibility of giving up power in their hour of triumph. Since they usually began their struggle for independence while in a small minority and sustained it against heavy odds, they are not likely to be repelled by the notion that it is possible to "force men to be free."

(Continue on page 35)

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philosophy, often fails to gain acceptance for the democratic system because of its heavy reliance on economic factors. It has answers to technical dislocations but has not been able to contribute much to building a political and moral consensus. It offers a procedure for change but little content for it.

The problem of political legitimacy is the key to political stability in regions containing two-thirds of the world's population. A stable domestic system in the new countries will not automatically produce international order, but international order is impossible without it. An American agenda must include some conception of what we understand by political legitimacy. In an age of instantaneous communication, we cannot pretend that what happens to over two-thirds of humanity is of no concern or interest to the United States. This does not mean that our goal should be to transfer American institutions to the new nations -- even less that we should impose them. Nor should we define the problem as how to prevent the spread of communism. Our goal should be to build a moral consensus which can make a pluralistic world creative rather than destructive.

Irrelevance to one of the great revolutions of our time will mean that we will ultimately be engulfed by it -- if not physically, then psychologically. Already some of the protest movements have made heroes of leaders in repressive new countries. The absurdity of founding a claim for freedom on protagonists of the totalitarian state -- such as Guevara or Ho or Mao -- underlines the impact of the travail of the new countries on older societies which share none of their technical but some of their spiritual problems -- especially the problem of the nature of authority in the modern world. To a young generation in rebellion

(Continue to page 23)

against bureaucracy and bored with material comfort, these societies offer at least the challenge of unlimited opportunity (and occasionally unlimited manipulativeness) in the quest for justice.

A world which is bipolar militarily and multipolar politically thus confronts an additional problem. Side by side with the physical balance of power, there exists a psychological balance based on intangibles of value and belief. The presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed drastically; those of the psychological balance remain yet to be discovered.

## b. The Problem of Soviet Intentions

Nothing has been more difficult for Americans to assimilate than the fact that in the nuclear age, even enmity is complex. In the Soviet Union, we confront an opponent whose public pronouncements are insistently hostile. Yet the nuclear age imposes a degree of cooperation and an limit to which conflicts can be pushed.

The military relationship with the Soviet Union is difficult enough; the political one confronts us with a profound conceptual problem. A society which regards peace as the normal condition tends to ascribe tension not to structural causes but to wicked or shortsighted individuals. Peace is thought to result either from the automatic operation of economic forces or from the emergence of a more benign leadership abroad.

The debate about Soviet trends between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" illustrates this problem. Both sides tend to agree

that the purpose of American policy is to bring about a more
benign evolution of Soviet society → the original purpose of containment was, after all, supposed to bring about the domestic transformation of the USSR. They are at one that a settlement presupposes a change in the Soviet system. Both groups give the impression that the nature of a possible settlement is perfectly obvious → the apostles of containment never defined what would be the American negotiating program → to be undertaken from the position of strength their policy was designed to achieve. Nor have the advocates of relaxation of tensions been more → they have been more concerned with atmosphere than with the substance of talks.

In fact, the difference between the "hawks" and "doves" has usually concerned an issue of timing: the "hawks" have maintained that a Soviet change of heart, while inevitable, was still in the future, whereas the "doves" have argued that it has already taken place. Many of the "hawks" tend to consider all negotiations as fruitless. Many of the "doves" argue → that the biggest step toward or did before Czechoslovakia → peace has already been accomplished by a Soviet change of heart about the cold war; negotiations need only remove some essentially technical obstacles.

This tendency affects and sometimes poisons → the entire American debate about foreign policy. Left-wing critics of American foreign policy seem incapable of attacking United States' actions without elevating our opponent (whether it happens to be Mao or Castro or Ho to a pedestal). If they

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discern some stupidity or self-interest on our side, they assume
that the other side must be virtuous. They then criticize the
United States for opposing the other side. The "Right" follows
the same logic in reverse: they presuppose _our_ good intentions
and conclude that the other side must be perverse in opposing us.
Both the Left and the Right judge largely in terms of intentions.

They start with a view of America (which they think they understand) and then attribute the opposite moral quality to the other side. In the process, whatever the issue, whether Berlin or Vietnam, more attention is paid to whether to get to the conference room than what to do once we arrive there. The dispute over Communist intentions has diverted attention from elaborating our own purposes. The test of dedication to peace has been whether one interprets Soviet intentions in the most favorable manner.

It should be obvious, however, that the Soviet domestic
situation is complex and its relationship to foreign policy far
from obvious. It is true that the risks of general nuclear war
should be as unacceptable to Moscow as to Washington; but this
truism does not automatically produce détente. It also seems
to lessen the risks involved in local intervention. No
doubt the current generation of Communist leaders lacks the
ideological dynamism of their predecessors who made the revolu-
tion; at the same time, they have at their disposal a military
machine of unprecedented strength, and they must deal with a
bureaucracy of formidable vested interests. (After all, senior
elements in the Soviet hierarchy must have felt subsequently

threatened by freedom of the press in Prague to undergo the
(Red Army for the third time in a decade and a half against an
allied country.) Unquestionably, the Soviet consumers press
their leaders to satisfy their demands; it is equally true that
an expanding modern economy is able to supply both guns and
butter. Some Soviet leaders may have become more pragmatic;
but
or
that direction
results
But in an elaborated Communist state, the conclusions of
pragmatism are complex. Once power is seized and industrialization
is largely accomplished, the Communist party faces a
difficult situation. It is not needed to conduct the government and
it has no real function in running the economy (though it tries
to do both). In order to justify its continued existence and
command, it may develop a vested interest in vigilance against
outside danger and thus in perpetuating a fairly high level of
tension.

Rebuttal to thegov

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into detail
on the issue of internal Communist evolution. But it may be
appropriate to inquire why, in the past, every period of détente
has proved stillborn. There have been at least five periods
of peaceful coexistence since the Bolshevik seizure of power,
one in each decade of the existence of the Soviet state. Each
was hailed in the West as ushering in a new era of reconciliation
and as signifying the long-awaited final change in Soviet
purposes. Each ended abruptly with a new period of intransigence,
which was then generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet "hard=
liners" rather than to the dynamics of the system. There were
undoubtedly
many reasons for this. But the tendency of many in the West

to be content with changes of Soviet tone and to confuse
atmosphere with substance surely did not help matters. This
has enabled the Communist leaders to postpone the choice which
they must make sooner or later: whether to use *détente* as a
device to lull the West or whether to move to a resolution of
the outstanding differences. As long as this choice is postponed,
leaves open the possibility that latent crises may run away
with the principal protagonists as happened in the Middle East
and perhaps even in Czechoslovakia.

The eagerness of many in the West to emphasize the
liberalizing implications of Soviet economic trends and to
make a favorable interpretation of Soviet intentions a test of
good faith may have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening
the Soviet "hard-liners". Soviet troops had hardly arrived
in Prague when some Western leaders began to insist that this would not
affect the quest for détente while others continued a nostalgia for high-level
meetings. Such an attitude hardly serves the cause of peace. The risk is
great that if there is no penalty for intransigence, there is
no incentive for conciliation. The Kremlin may use negotiations
including arms control as a safety valve to dissipate Western
suspicions rather than as a serious endeavor to resolve concrete
disputes or to remove the scourge of nuclear war.

If we focus our policy discussions on Soviet purposes, we
confuse the debate in two ways: (1) Soviet trends are too
ambiguous to offer a reliable guide; it is possible that not
even Soviet leaders fully understand the dynamics of their

system; it deflects us from articulating our purposes which we should pursue, whatever Soviet intentions. Peace will not, in any event, result from one grand settlement but from a long process of adjustment, and this requires some clarity as to our destination. Confusing foreign policy with psychotherapy deprives us of criteria by which to judge real relaxation of tensions.

The obsession with Soviet intentions causes the West to be smug during periods of détente and panicky during crises. A benign Soviet tone is equated with the achievement of peace; Soviet hostility is considered as ushering in a new period of tension and evokes usually purely military countermeasures. The West is thus never ready for a Soviet change of course; it has been equally unprepared for détente as for intransigence.

These lines are being written while the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is still strong. There is a tendency to focus on the military implications or to speak of strengthening unity in the abstract. But if history is a guide, as will be a new Soviet peace offensive sooner or later. Indeed, if Soviet behavior after the invasion of Hungary

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is any guide sooner rather than later. Thus, reflecting about the nature of
NECESSARY détente seems most important while its realization appears most
problematical. If we are not to be doomed to repeat the past, it may be
well to learn some of its lessons: We should not again confuse a change of
tone with a change of heart. We should not pose false inconsistencies
between allied unity and détente; indeed a true relaxation of tensions
presupposes Western unity. We should concentrate negotiations on the
concrete issues that threaten the peace of the world such as intervention
in the Third world. Moderating the arms race must also be high on the
agenda. None of this is possible without a concrete idea of what we
understand by peace and a creative world order.

## II. POLITICAL MULTIPLICITY: THE CHANGED NATURE OF ALLIANCES

No area of policy illustrates more dramatically the tensions between political multipolarity and military bipolarity than the field of alliance policy. For a decade and a half after the Second World War, the United States identified security with alliances. A global network of relationships grew up based on the proposition that deterrence of aggression required the largest possible grouping of powers.

This system of alliances was always in difficulty outside the Atlantic area because it tried to apply principles drawn from the multipolar world of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when several major powers of roughly equal strength existed. Then, indeed, it was impossible for one country to achieve dominance if several others combined to prevent it. But this was not the case in the era of the superpowers of the forties and fifties. Outside Europe, our allies added to our strength only marginally; they were in no position to reinforce each other's capabilities.

Alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions:
(1) a common objective -- usually defense against a common danger;
(2) a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the *casus belli*;
(3) some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon;
(4) a penalty for noncooperation -- that is the possibility of being refused assistance must exist -- otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down.

In the system of alliances developed by the United States after the Second World War, these conditions have never been met outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) (to which we belong in all but

name), there has been no recognition of a threat. Pakistan's
motive for obtaining U.S. arms was not security against a communist
attack, but protection against India. The Arab members of CENTO
armed not against the USSR but against Israel. Lacking a conception
of common interests, the members of these alliances have been
able to develop common policies with respect to issues of war and peace.
Had they been able to do so, these policies might well have been
stillborn anyway, because the technical means of cooperation have
been lacking. Most allies have neither the resources nor the will
to render mutual support. A state which finds it difficult to main-
tain order or the coherence of policy at home, does not increase its
strength by combining with states suffering similar disabilities.
GROWN moribund

In these circumstances, SEATO and CENTO have become moribund
as instruments of collective action. Because the United States has
often seemed more eager to engage in the defense of its allies than
they themselves, America's SEATO and CENTO allies have become
convinced that non-cooperation has no cost. In fact, they
will have
STET to give the impression that it would be worse for us than for them
if they fell to Communism. As a result, SEATO and CENTO have become,
in effect, unilateral American guarantees. At best, they provide a
legal basis for bilateral U.S. aid.

The case is different with NATO. Here we are united with
countries of similar traditions and domestic structures. At the
start, there was a common conception of the threat. The technical
means for cooperation existed. Mechanisms for developing common policies
came into being especially in the military field. Thus in its first decade
and a half, NATO was a dynamic and creative institution.

Nevertheless, NATO is today in disarray as well. United States actions, above all, frequent unilateral changes of policy, are partially responsible. But the most important cause is the transformation of the international environment, specifically the decline in the preëminence of the superpowers and the emerging political multipolarity. Where the alliances outside of Europe have been never vital because they failed to take into account the military bipolarity of the Fifties, NATO is in difficulties because it has yet to adjust to the political multipolarity of the late Sixties.

When NATO was founded in 1949, Europeans had a dual fear: the danger of an imminent Soviet attack, the prospect of eventual U.S. withdrawal. In the late 1960s, however, the fear of Soviet invasion has declined. Even the attack on Czechoslovakia is likely to restore anxiety about Soviet military aggression only temporarily. At the same time, two decades of American military presence in Europe coupled with American predominance in NATO planning, have sharply reduced the fear that America might wash its hands of European concerns. As a result, European support for the�nanization of Europe, which began in the late 1970s, has been waning. Nevertheless, the United States has not yet decided whether to support the European position that the need for American support is so great that it is not possible for the�nanized countries to wait for the support of other Western powers.

When NATO was formed, moreover, the principal threat to world peace seemed to lie in a Soviet attack on Europe. In recent years, the view has grown that equally grave risks are likely to arise in trouble spots outside of Europe. To most Europeans, these

- 33 -

do not appear as immediate threats to their independence or security. The irony here is striking. In the fifties, Europeans were asking for American assistance in Asia and the Middle East with the argument that they were defending the greater interests of freedom. The United States replied that these very interests required American aloofness. Today, the roles are precisely reversed. It is Europe that evades our entreaties to play a global role; that is to say, Europeans do not consider their interests at stake in America's extra-European involvement.

These are symptoms of deeper, structural problems, however. One problem, paradoxically, is the growth of European economic strength and political self-confidence. At the end of the Second World War, Europe was dependent on the United States for economic assistance, political stability, and military protection. As long as Europe needed the shelter of a super-power, American predominance was inevitable. In relations with the United States, European statesmen acted as lobbyists rather than as diplomats. Their influence depended less on the weight of their countries than on the impact of their personalities. A form of consultation evolved whereby Europeans sought to influence American actions by giving us a reputation to uphold or -- to put it more crudely -- by oscillating between flattery and almost plaintive appeals for reassurance. The United States, secure in its predominance, in turn concentrated on soothing occasional European outbreaks of insecurity rather than on analyzing their causes.

Tutelage is a comfortable relationship for the senior partner, but it is demoralizing in the long run. It breeds illusions of omniscience on one side

- 34 -

and attitudes of impotent irresponsibility on the other. In any event, the United States could not expect to perpetuate the accident of Europe's postwar exhaustion into a permanent pattern of international relations. Europe's economic recovery inevitably led to a return to more traditional political pressures.

These changes in Europe were bound to lead to a difficult transitional period. They could have resulted in a new partnership between the United States and an economically resurgent and politically united Europe, as had been envisaged by many of the early advocates of Atlantic unity. However, the European situation has not resolved itself in that way. Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not make even approximately the defense effort of which it is capable. But European unity is stymied, and domestic politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses itself in special testiness toward the United States.

These strains have been complicated by the growth of Soviet nuclear power. The changed nature of power in the modern period was bound to affect NATO profoundly. As the risks of nuclear war have become enormous, the credibility of traditional pledges of support has inevitably been reduced. In the past, a country would carry out a commitment because, it could plausibly be argued, the consequences of not doing so were worse than those of coming to the ally's assistance. This is no longer self-evident. In each of the last three annual statements by the Secretary of Defense on the U.S. defense posture

- 35 -

the estimate of *dead* in a general nuclear war ranged from 40 to 120 million.
This figure will, if anything, increase. It will become more and more
difficult to demonstrate that anything is worse than the elimination of over
half of a society in a matter of days. The more NATO relies on strategic
nuclear war as a counter to all forms of attack, the more this will be true.

The consciousness of nuclear threat by the two superpowers has
undermined allied relationships in yet another way. For understandable
reasons, the superpowers have sought to make the nuclear environment
more predictable, witness the nuclear test ban treaty and the non-proliferation treaty. But the blind spot in our policy has been the failure to understand that in the absence of full consultation, our allies would see in these
talks the possible forerunner of a more comprehensive arrangement about
their vital interests without them. Strategic arms talks thus emphasize
the need of political understanding in acute form. The pattern of
negotiating an agreement first and then giving our allies an opportunity --
even a full one -- to comment is intolerable in the long run. It puts the

(continue to page 36)

- 37 -

This state of affairs has been especially difficult for those Americans who deserve most credit for forging existing Atlantic relations. Two decades of hegemony have produced the illusion that present Atlantic arrangements are "natural," that wise policy consists of making the existing framework more tolerable. "Leadership" and "partnership" are invoked but the content given to these phrases is usually to make the existing pattern more tolerable. European unity is advocated to enable Europeans to share burdens on a world-wide scale.

Such a view fails to take into account the realities of political multipolarity. The aim of returning to the "great days of the Marshall Plan" is impossible. Nothing would sunder Atlantic relationships so surely as the attempt to reassert the notions of leadership appropriate to the early days of NATO. In the bipolar world of the forties and fifties, order could be equated with military security; integrated command arrangements sufficed as the principal bond of unity. In the sixties, security, while still important, has not been enough. Every crisis from Berlin to Czechoslovakia has seen the strengthening of NATO" confined to military dispositions. Within months the malaise has been obvious again because what is needed above all is a common political conception. The challenge of the seventies will be to forge unity from political measures.

It is not "natural" that the major decisions about the defense of an area so potentially powerful as Western Europe should be made three thousand miles away. It is not "normal" that Atlantic policies should be geared to

- 39 -

"Burden-sharing" will not supply that impetus. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair, only because it is necessary. While there are strong arguments for Atlantic partnership and European unity, enabling Europe to play a global role is not one of them. A nation assumes responsibilities not only because it has resources but because it has a certain view of its own destiny. Through the greater part of its history -- until the Second World War -- the United States possessed the resources but not the philosophy for a global role. Today, the poorest Western European country -- Portugal -- has the widest commitments outside Europe because its historic image of itself has become bound up with its overseas possessions. This condition is unlikely to be met by any other European country -- with the possible exception of great Britain -- no matter what their increase in power. Partially as the result of decolonization, Europeans are unlikely to conduct a significant global policy whatever their resources or their degree of unity. Cooperation between the United States and Europe must concentrate on issues within the Atlantic area rather than global partnership.

Even within the Atlantic area, a more equitable distribution of responsibilities has two prerequisites: there must be some consensus in the analysis of the international situation, at least as it affects Europe; there must be a conviction that the United States cannot or will not carry all the burdens alone.

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Neither condition is met today. The traditional notion of American leadership tends to stifle European incentives for autonomy. Improved consultation the remedy usually proposed can only alleviate, not remove the difficulty.

The problem of consultation is complex, of course. No doubt unilateral American action has compounded the uneasiness produced by American predominance and European weakness. The shift in the emphasis of American policy, from the NATO multilateral force to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the frequent unilateral changes in strategic doctrine, have all tended to produce disquiet and to undermine the domestic position of ministers who had staked their futures on supporting the American viewpoint.

It is far from self-evident, however, that more extensive consultation within the existing framework can be more than a palliative. One problem concerns technical competence. In any large bureaucracy and an international consultative process has many similarities to domestic administrative procedures the weight given to advice bears some relation to the competence it reflects. If one partner possesses all technical competence, the process of consultation is likely to remain barren. The minimum requirement for effective consultation is that each ally have enough knowledge to give meaningful advice.

The NATO nuclear committee has made a great contribution in this respect for the military problem: there are even more important technical problems to be solved.

But technical competence alone is not enough. There are limits to the process of consultation. The losing party in a domestic dispute has three choices: (a) it can accept the setback with the expectation of winning another battle later

on this is the usual bureaucratic attitude and it is based on the knowledge that ~~they~~ can be demanded of being able to force another hearing, ~~listen on~~; (b) if advice is consistently ignored, the losing party or group can resign and go into opposition; (c) opposition can have the purpose either of inducing the existing government to change its course or to replace it. If all these avenues are closed, violence or mounting frustration are the consequences.

Only the first option is open to sovereign states bound together by an alliance, ~~since they obviously The partners' cannot resign or go into opposition without wrecking their partners' the alliance. They cannot affect the process by which allied decision-makers are chosen despite the fact that this may be crucial for their fate. Indeed, as long as the need to maintain the alliance overrides all other concerns, ~~sustained disagreement is likely to be stifled. Advice without responsibility and disagreement without an outlet can turn consultation into a frustrating exercise which compounds rather than alleviates discord.~~

Consultation is especially difficult when it lacks an integrating overall framework. The consultation about the Non-Proliferation Treaty concerned specific provisions but not the underlying general philosophy which was of the deepest concern to many of our allies, especially the Federal of Germany Republic, and Italy. During periods of détente, each ally makes its own approach to Eastern Europe or the USSR without attempting to further concept of a coherent Western enterprise. In these circumstances, consultation runs the risk of being irrelevant. The issues it "solves" are peripheral; the central issues are inadequately articulated. It deals haphazardly in answers to undefined questions.

L.C.

ASSURANCE

- 24 -

This state of affairs is not healthy in the long run. Even with
the best will, the present structure encourages American unilateralism
and European irresponsibility. This is a serious problem for the United
States. If the United States remains the trustee of every non-Communist
area, it will exhaust its psychological resources. No country can act
wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time.

A more pluralistic world -- especially in relationships with friends -- is
profoundly in our long-term interest. Political multipolarity, while difficult to go
used to be the precondition for a new period of creativity. Painful as it may be to
admit, we could benefit from a counterweight to discipline our occasional
impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract
and "final" solutions.

that would

by doing

-- OK

-- we see

-- influence

All of this suggests that there is no alternative to European unity
either for the United States or Europe. In its absence, the malaise can only
be alleviated, not ended. Ultimately, this is a problem primarily for
the Europeans. In the recent past, the United States has often defeated its
purposes by committing itself to one particular form of European unity --
complicated
that of federalism. It has also
British membership in the Common
Market by making it a direct objective of American policy.

In the next decade this architectonic approach to Atlantic policy will
be possible. The American contribution must be more philosophical;
it will have to consist more of understanding and quiet, behind-the-scenes
encouragement than in the propagation of formal institutional structures.

RATHER

-45- 44

may be the price for unity on issues that really matter. The memory of
European impotence and American tutelage should not delude us into
believing that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself.
Third force dangers are not avoided by legal formulas, and in any event,
they are overdrawn. It is hard to visualize a "deal" between the Soviet
Union and Europe which would jeopardize our interests without jeopardizing
European interests first. In any event, encouraging a sense of responsi-
bility in Europe is a better counter to this than American tutelage.

In short, our relations with Europeans are better founded on
developing a community of interests than on the elaboration of formal legal
obligations. No precise blueprint for such an arrangement is possible because
different fields of activity have different needs. In the military sphere,
for example, modern technology will impose a greater degree of integration
than is necessary in other areas. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is
almost inconceivable that our allies would prefer to go to war *without* the
support of the United States, given the relatively small nuclear forces in
prospect for them. Close coordination between Europe and the United States
in the military field is dictated by self-interest, and Europe has more to
gain from it than the United States.

For this very reason, it is in our interest that Europeans should assume
much greater responsibility for developing doctrine and force levels in NATO,
perhaps by vitalizing such institutions as the West European Union (WEU),
perhaps by alternative arrangements. The Supreme Allied Commander should
in time be a European.

Military arrangements are not enough, however. Under current conditions, no statesman will risk a cataclysm simply to fulfill a legal obligation. ~~The only motive for running the risk of nuclear war is likely to be a degree of political cooperation~~ has been established which links the fate of each partner with the survival of all the others. This requires an entirely new order of political creativity. ~~Hereafter, Atlantic political cooperation concentrated on developing common political objectives.~~ In the decade ahead, the problem will be to work out a philosophy which makes possible partly coordinated, partly divergent approaches to problems.

Coordination is especially necessary in East-West relations. The traditional view is that NATO can be as useful an instrument for détente as for defense. This is doubtful at least in NATO's present form. A military alliance, one of the chief cohesive links of which is its integrated command arrangement, is not the best instrument for flexible diplomacy. Turning NATO into an instrument of détente might reduce its security contribution without achieving a relaxation of tensions.

Moreover, a diplomatic confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact has all the rigidities of a bipolar world. It will raise fears in Western Europe of an American Soviet condominium, and it will tend to legitimize the Soviet hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. Above all, it will fail to take advantage of the flexibility afforded by greater Western European unity and autonomy. As Europe gains structure its attraction for Eastern Europe is bound to increase. The major initiatives for relations between Western and Eastern Europe should be originated in Europe with the United States in a reserve position.

[y]

Such an approach can work only if there is a real consensus as to objectives. Philosophical agreement can make possible flexibility on method. This will require a form of consultation much more substantial than what now exists and is more effective (and coherent) European contribution.

To be sure, events in Czechoslovakia demonstrate the limits of Eastern European autonomy that the Soviet Union is now prepared to tolerate. But the Soviet Union may not be willing indefinitely to continue to use the Red Army primarily against allies as it has done three times in a decade and a half. In any event, no Western policy can guarantee a more favorable evolution in Central Europe; all it can do is to take advantage of the opportunity if it arises.

Policy outside of Europe is likely to be divergent. Given the changed European perspective, an effort to bring about global burden-sharing might only produce stagnation. The allies would be able to agree primarily on doing nothing. Any crisis occuring anywhere would turn automatically and organically into a world-wide acceptance of American understanding for European autonomy implies also European acceptance of understanding for a degree of American autonomy with respect to areas in which, for understandable reasons, European concern has lessened.

In addition, cooperative efforts in entirely new areas should be explored. For example, our space program need not be national. European participation in it could supply an effective answer to the "technological gap".

Finally, under present circumstances, an especially meaningful community of interests can be developed in the social sphere. All modern states face problems of bureaucratization, pollution, environmental control, urban growth. These problems know no national

- 29 -

considerations. If the nations of the Atlantic work together on these issues -- either through private or governmental channels or both -- a new generation habituated to cooperative efforts could develop similar to that spawned in different circumstances by the Marshall Plan.

It is high time that the nations bordering the Atlantic deal -- formally, systematically, and at the highest level -- with questions such as these: (a) What are the relative roles of Europe and the United States in East-West contacts? (b) Is a division of functions conceivable in which Western Europe plays the principal role in relation to Eastern Europe while the United States concentrates on relationships with the USSR? (c) What forms of political consultation does this require? (d) In what areas of the world is common action possible? Where are divergent courses indicated? How are differences to be handled?

Thus, we face the root questions of a multipolar world. How much unity should we want? How much diversity can we stand? These questions never have a final answer within a pluralistic society. Adjusting the balance between integration and autonomy will be the key challenge of the emerging Atlantic relations.

# AN INQUIRY INTO THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST

Wherever we turn, then, the central issue of American foreign policy is to analyze anew the current international environment and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable order.

This requires that we recognize first the existence of profoundly structural problems to a considerable extent independent of the intentions of the principal protagonists and they cannot be solved merely by good will. The vacuum in Central Europe and the decline of the West are European countries would have disturbed the equilibrium regardless of the domestic structure of the Soviet Union. A strong China (historically has moved toward) to establish suzerainty over many of its neighbors; in fact, one problem of dealing with China (is that) --Communism apart -- has no experience in conducting foreign policy between equals. China has (either been) dominant or subjected.

To understand the structural issue, it is necessary to undertake an inquiry from which we have historically shied away into the essence of our national interest and into the premises of our foreign policy. It is part of the

American folklore that, while other nations have interests, we have responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of peace. We have a tendency to offer our altruism as a guarantee of our reliability: "We have no quarrel with the Communists," Secretary of State Rusk said on one occasion, "all of our quarrels are on behalf of other people."

Such an attitude makes it difficult to develop a
conception of our role in the world. It inhibits other nations
from gearing their policy to ours in a confident way -- a
"disinterested" policy is likely to be considered "unreliable."
A mature conception of our interest in the world should
obviously have to be widespread in general interest in stability
and peaceful change. It would deal with two fundamental questions:
What is it in our interest to prevent? What should we seek to
accomplish?

accomplish?

The answer to the first question is complicated and often confused by an often repeated must. It occurs when we consider the proposition that we will resist aggression anywhere, since peace is indivisible. A corollary is the argument that we do not oppose the fact of particular changes but the method by which they were brought about. We find it hard to articulate a truly vital interest which we would defend however "legal" the challenge. This leads to an undifferentiated globalism and confusion about our purposes. The abstract notion that we must resist a CONCEPTION of aggression in the abstract causes us to multiply our commitments. But the denial that our interests are involved diminishes our staying power when we try to carry out our commitments. If we fail, there are difficulties.

Part of the reason is our reluctance to think in terms
of power and equilibrium. In 1949, for example, a State Department
memorandum justified NATO as follows: "[The treaty] obligates
the parties to defend the purposes and principles of the United
Nations, the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the
parties and their free institutions based upon the principles

of democracy, individual liberty and the role of law. It
obligates them to act in defense of peace and security. It
is directed against no one; it is directed solely against
aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting balance
of power but to strengthen a balance of principle."

But principle, however lofty, must at some point be
related to practice; historically, stability has always coin-
cided with an equilibrium which made physical domination
difficult. Interest is not necessarily amoral; moral conse-
quences can spring from interested acts. Britain did not con-
tribute any the less to international order for having a clear-
cut concept according to which it was in her interest to prevent
the domination of the Continent by a single power (no matter how
it was threatened) and the control of the seas by anybody (even if the
immediate intentions were not hostile). A new administration
confronts the challenge of relating our commitments of America
to its interests and its obligations to its purposes.

The task of defining positive goals is more difficult but
even more important. The first two decades after the end of the
Second World War II posed problems well suited to the American approach
to international relations. Wherever we turned, massive dis-
locations required attention. Our pragmatic, ad hoc tendency
was an advantage in a world clamoring for technical remedies.
Our legal bent contributed to the development of many instruments
of stability.

In the late Sixties, the situation is more complex. The
United States is no longer in a position to operate programs

globally; it has to encourage them. It can no longer impose its preferred solution; it must seek to evoke it. In the forties and fifties, we offered remedies; in the late sixties and seventies our role will have to be to contribute to a structure in which the initiative of others can be fostered. We are a superpower physically, but our designs can be meaningful only if they generate willing cooperation. We can continue to contribute to defense and positive programs, but we must seek to encourage and not stifle a sense of local responsibility. Our contribution should not be the sole or principal effort, but it should make the difference between success and failure.

This task requires a different kind of creativity and another form of patience than we have displayed in the past. Enthusiasm, belief in progress, the invincible conviction that American remedies can work everywhere must give way to an understanding of historical trends, an ordering of our preferences, and above all an understanding of the difference which our preferences can make.

The dilemma is that there can be no stability without equilibrium, but equally, equilibrium is not a purpose that we can respond to the travail of our world. A sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American history; to most Americans, America has always stood for something other than its own grandeur. But a clearer understanding of America's interests and of the requirements of equilibrium can give perspective to our idealism and lead to humane and moderate objectives, especially in relation to political and social change.

This our conception of world order must have deeper purposes than stability
but greater restraints than would be possible if it were approached only
in a fit of enthusiasm.

*On our behavior, result*

Whether such a leap of the imagination is possible in the modern
bureaucratic state remains to be seen. New administrations come to
power convinced of the need for purpose and comprehensive concepts.
Sooner, rather than later, they find themselves subjected to the pressures
of the immediate and the long. Part of the reason is the pragmatic, issue-
oriented bias of our decision-makers. But the fundamental reason may be
the pervasiveness of modern bureaucracy. What started out as an aid to
decisionmaking has developed a momentum of its own. Increasingly, the
policymaker is more conscious of the pressures and the morale of his
staff than of the purpose this staff is supposed to serve. The policymaker
becomes a referee among quasi-autonomous bureaucratic bodies. Success
consists of moving the administrative machinery to the point of decision,
leaving relatively little energy for analyzing its merit. The modern
bureaucratic state widens the range of technical choices while limiting the
capacity to make them.

*The decision's merit.*

An even more serious problem is posed by the change of ethic of
precisely the most idealistic element of American youth. The idealism of
the fifties *during* the Kennedy era expressed itself in self-confident, often
zealous institution building. *Today, however,*
consider the management of power irrelevant, perhaps even immoral.

defines excellence by the ability to manipulate an established framework. But for the major part of humanity, the present becomes endurable only through a vision of the future. To most Americans -- including most American leaders -- the significant reality is what they see around them. But for most of the world -- including many of the leaders of the new nations -- the significant reality is what they wish to bring about. If we remain nothing but the managers of our physical patrimony, we will grow increasingly irrelevant. And since there can be no stability without us, the prospects of world order will decline.

We require a new burst of creativity, however, not so much for the sake of other countries as for our own people, especially the youth. The contemporary unrest is no doubt exploited by some whose purposes are all too clear. But that it is there to exploit is the result of a profound dissatis- faction with the merely managerial and consumer-oriented aspect of the modern state and with a world which seems to generate crises by incompatibility. The modern bureaucratic state, for all its panoply of strength, often finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittle- ness and the world-wide revolution of youth -- especially in advanced countries and among the relatively affluent -- suggests a spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a political environment which, increasing- ly is dedicated to, emphasizes bureaucratic challenges and offers no deeper purpose than mate- rial comfort.

The problem has no easy remedy. Nor is the solution to be found primarily in the realm of foreign policy. Yet a deeper non-technical challenge would surely contribute a sense of direction. The best and most prideful expressions of American action in the world have been those purposes which, when done right, have a One influence has dependence we act in concert with others. This is the situation in which we are engaged.

depended on achieving reputation as a member of such a concert. To act consistently abroad we must be able to generate broad coalitions -- not of military power but of shared purposes. Regional grouping, supported by the United States will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate being areas with the United States concerned more with the overall framework of order than with the management of individual enterprises.

In the best of circumstances, the next administration will be beset by crises. In almost every area of the world, we have been living off capital -- warding off the immediate, rarely dealing with underlying problems. These difficulties are likely to multiply when it becomes apparent that one of the legacies of the war in Vietnam will be a mounting American reluctance to risk overseas involvements.

A new administration has the right to ask for compassion and understanding from the American people. But it must found its claim not on pat technical answers to difficult issues; it must above all ask the right questions. It must recognize that in the field of foreign policy, the key issue is that we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it.