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425 Portland Avenue
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③

KISSINGER, HENRY

/Speeches

Charles W. Bailey

Editor

April 23, 1973

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

I thought you might be interested to see the enclosed clipping
from the editorial page of the Minneapolis Star, reprinting an
excerpt from your talk at the Federal City Club.

I'm delighted that my old club bestowed this treasured honor on you. The title may be redundant -- "very distinguished" seems a bit much, even in this windy era -- but the recipient this year deserves it. I'm sorry I missed the dinner.

Maybe I can catch you for a minute or two when I come to Washington
in early May.

Not incidentally, I thought your theme at the Federal City Club
was precisely right.

Enclosure

CWB:ch

RECEIVED

MAY 4 1973

CENTRAL FILES

WILLIAM M. BATTEN
Chairman

JOHN W. BURKE, JR.
Executive Secretary

Telephone
Area Code 202
298-7650

WILLIAM M. BATTEN
EUGENE N. BEESLEY
BENJAMIN F. BIAGGINI
JAMES H. BINGER
FRED J. BORCH
HARLLEE BRANCH, JR.
WILLIAM S. BREWSTER
LOUIS W. CABOT
HOWARD L. CLARK
JOHN T. CONNOR
C. W. COOK
JOHN E. CORETTE
STEWART S. CORT
JOHN H. DANIELS
FREDERICK B. DENT
E. MANDELL DE WINDT

THE BUSINESS COUNCIL

888 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

ACTIVE MEMBERS

E. HERVEY EVANS, JR.
HENRY W. GADSDEN
A. H. GALLOWAY
PHILIP O. GEIER, JR.
EDWIN H. GOTT
ELISHA GRAY II
PATRICK E. HAGGERTY
JOHN D. HARPER
ELLISON L. HAZARD
WILLIAM A. HEWITT
JACK K. HORTON
AMORY HOUGHTON, JR.
GILBERT W. HUMPHREY
ROBERT S. INGERSOLL
J. K. JAMIESON
SAMUEL C. JOHNSON

EDGAR F. KAISER
GEORGE E. KECK
J. WARD KEENER
DONALD M. KENDALL
RALPH LAZARUS
BARRY T. LEITHEAD
EDMUND W. LITTLEFIELD
MALCOLM MacNAUGHTON
BIRNY MASON, JR.
CHARLES B. McCOY
GORDON M. METCALF
BUCK MICKEL
G. WILLIAM MILLER
IRWIN MILLER
OTTO N. MILLER
FRANK R. MILLIKEN

HOWARD MORGENS
W. B. MURPHY
CHARLES F. MYERS, JR.
ROBERT S. OELMAN
R. S. REYNOLDS, JR.
JAMES M. ROCHE
DAVID ROCKEFELLER
H. I. ROMNES
SHERMER L. SIBLEY
CHARLES H. SOMMER, JR.
FRANK STANTON
LYNN A. TOWNSEND
RAWLEIGH WARNER, JR.
THOMAS J. WATSON, JR.
GEORGE H. WEYERHAEUSER
HENRY S. WINGATE

December 10, 1971

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to The President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I want to express my sincerest thanks for
joining us at the December meeting of The Business
Council.

Certainly, the warmth of the response you
received from our members more than effectively
conveyed our appreciation than any words I might
add in this letter. Your comments on recent and
upcoming events were thought-provoking and challenging.
They will have a distinct influence on our continuing
thoughts and actions.

Again, thank you for taking the time to join
us and for doing it in such an effective and truly
memorable way.

wmb ez

EXECUTIVE

KISSINGER,

FG 85
DONALD C. BURNHAM
Vice Chairman

R. V. HANSBERGER
Vice Chairman

EDMUND W. LITTLEFIELD
Vice Chairman

JAMES M. ROCHE
Vice Chairman

RECEIVED
DEC 21 1971

CENTRAL FCS

WILLIAM M. BATTEN
Chairman

THE BUSINESS COUNCIL

888 SEVENTEENTH STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

ACTIVE MEMBERS

EDGAR F. KAISER
J. WARD KEENER
DONALD M. KENDALL
RALPH LAZARUS
BARRY T. LEITHEAD
EDMUND W. LITTLEFIELD
MALCOLM MacNAUGHTON
BIRNY MASON, JR.
CHARLES B. MCCOY
GORDON M. METCALF
BUCK MICKEL
G. WILLIAM MILLER
IRWIN MILLER
OTTO N. MILLER
FRANK R. MILLIKEN

JAMES M. ROCHE
Vice Chairman

November 19, 1971

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was great news to learn from Peter Flanigan that you can speak to the members of The Business Council at their dinner meeting on Wednesday evening, December 1st.

I know that you have many friends and acquaintances among our members, and you will find their names in the enclosed booklet. To our Washington meetings we only invite the Active and Graduate members, and they are so identified by the initials "A" or "G" beside their names. We expect about 100 of them to be at the dinner, as well as a dozen or so high-ranking Government guests.

We will get together for cocktails at 7 o'clock in the Chinese Room of the Mayflower Hotel and generally plan to be seated for dinner by 8 o'clock. It is an informal evening and dress will be business suit. You are the only speaker of the evening, so it will be somewhere around 9:15 p. m. when you would begin your remarks, and we leave the subject matter, of course, to your own discretion.

I know that you will receive a very warm welcome from all of us and we are looking forward very much to hearing from you.

DEC 2 1971

Enclosure

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /Speeches

December 10, 1969

Dear Mr. Cairns:

Many thanks for your note of December 3.
I was glad to hear that the Union League
Club members enjoyed the occasion as much
as I did.

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing
the President and for sending me a copy of
the letter.

Mr. John A. Cairns, Secretary
The Union League Club
38 East 37th Street
New York 16, New York

HAK:JLP:lds:12/9/69

RECEIVED

DEC 1 1 1969

CENTRAL

THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB

38 EAST 37TH STREET
New York 16, N. Y.

December 3, 1969

President Richard M. Nixon
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I had the pleasure of sitting on the Dais at the Union League Club yesterday noon when Dr. Kissinger gave his illuminating talk on various matters relating to the Administration's over-all program.

I thought Dr. Kissinger's talk was far and away the most effective presentation of the case which I have heard, and I am sure that the vast majority of those present shared my viewpoint. I thought you would like to know.

With every good wish.

JAC:sl

cc: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger ✓

Rockefeller Year End Interview By
Glover DeLaney, President New York
State Broadcasters Association

DELANEY: If Senator Goodell should get the Republican nomination for Senator, do you think his stand on Vietnam policy will hurt or help his chances for election?

GOVERNOR: The Senator -- just, I am sure, as you and I and all of the people wants to see this war ended. It is a tragedy. There is confusion about it. But everybody would like to see the United States terminate that war on a basis that is not going to involve us in another one that is worse; that assures the opportunity for the South Vietnamese to have a self-determination, and brings American boys back and stops the tragic loss of deaths.

Now, the Senator has proposed one method of accomplishing this. Any method is attractive because the people want to see the war ended.

I feel that the President is working on this with the deep determination and dedication and that he is in a position -- the best position to bring this about.

The Senator has proposed that the Senate take this action. Well, it's a difference as to the method, on which we disagree. Maybe some constitutional question is involved. But I think that his determination to try to help accelerate the ending of the war is a big plus, as far as he's concerned.

DELANEY: Governor, another area that you are an authority on is Latin America. If the people of this country don't become more responsive to the needs of the Latin American countries, what do you believe will be the consequences?

GOVERNOR: Chaos in the Western Hemisphere. I really think the situation is serious. They have a population growth rate that is the highest in the world. Two hundred forty million people in the other republics now. By the year 2,000 -- which is just around the corner; you won't believe it -- the estimates are there will be 600 million people. This is getting up like China or India, right here next door, right here in the Hemisphere.

-2-

The growth rate -- their economic growth rate is far too low. The disparity of opportunity is tremendous. Poverty is great. There is tremendous potential down there. They are wonderful people. And we have got to -- and I don't think it's too difficult -- develop the means of working together with them on a partnership which will be mutually beneficial.

The extraordinary thing is, we are selling them 500 million worth more of goods a year than we are buying from them, and they are paying back on debt which we have loaned before, and they are having to borrow more money to pay interest and amortization on what they already ...

We can work things out in a way that will bring them close, where we can show the world that we have the capacity to work with other free sovereign nations on a partnership basis for the mutual interest of all. I think it needs high priority attention, both in the Congress as well as in the government, and it can be done. And I am hopeful that the President is very keen about this and I am hopeful that we will see a change both in the structure of government to deal more effectively so that they feel that they are plugged in with the current.

Right now it's very hard for somebody from one of the other Americas to get a clear answer, to get action, to be able to make their plans that are dovetailed in with ours.

DELANEY: How would you assess the progress -- or the lack of progress -- of the Nixon Administration. What would you do differently?

GOVERNOR: Well, I won't get into what I would have done because I was available and didn't get the nomination in my own party.

I think that the President has gone about his responsibilities in a very orderly fashion. He has tried to study the various areas, and not rush in until after he had the facts; that he is approaching both our international problems and our domestic problems with great care and realism. He is fighting inflation, which is the most serious problem we had. It is a tough one. He is trying to hold down expenditures and to go a route which is not a popular route. Nobody likes high interest rates. But we've got to slow down this economy. And he is doing his best in that area.

-3-

In the Vietnam war, I think that he is working on plans which are realistic and which give great promise of the most rapid termination on a basis that would be acceptable to this country.

In Latin America, for instance -- you mentioned that before -- instead of coming out with his pronounce-ment as to policy, he said, "I want to consult our neigh-bors first; I want to know what their thinking is. I want to know how they think we can handle this to our mutual benefit."

These are sound methods of approach.

He is handicapped -- let's face it -- by the problem of money because the government had been spending as high as $24 billion deficit under the previous adminis-tration, and this was pumping money in, causing this in-flation, so that he has had to cut back. And this is not popular.

But I am hopeful myself that with the soundness of the approach that he is using, and getting our economy back on a stable basis, that there are going to be new initiatives such as he had proposed in welfare and in revenue-sharing that are pioneering efforts.

This problem of his in welfare I think is excellent. I think he's got to go further ultimately. But he is building in the new laws recommended to Congress an incentive to work so that a person who is on welfare and who gets a job can retain more of that money, as an incentive to want to work.

He has got another law -- modification of the existing law -- which would be an incentive for the fathers to stay with the family, where you have the ADC -- Aid to Dependent Children. This is essential to preserve the family unit and the significance of what a family means to a child growing up.

He has recommended a minimum welfare payment of $1,600 nationwide, which has never been done before. Of course, this is way below anything that we have in this state. But it is hard for many people to realize this will result in 22 million people -- pardon me, 11 million more

-4-

people, bringing the total to 22 -- getting welfare benefits, because there are some states that just don't have eligibility levels that even make in my opinion available subsistence support.

So I think there are many very significant pioneering efforts which he has undertaken which haven't become fully visible yet, but which are giving great promise for the future.

ATLANTIC UNION (U.K.)

23 March 1973

On the occasion of the first meeting of the Atlantic Union (U.K.) group, on March 9th, 1973, Sir Frank Roberts, Sir Gilbert Longden, Mr. Harcourt-Munning, Commander Hugh Mullineux, Sir Michael Wright and Sir George Catlin were present.

Apologies were received from Mr. James Huntley, Dr. Cyril James, the Rt. Hon. F. Peart and the Rt. Hon. G. Thomas.

A request was made for a more detailed outline of the proposal.

The original outline which accompanied the invitation was deliberately of a simplicity which approached platitude; and was designed: (a) to use, to avoid disagreement, the same form of words as used in documents over the signature of Achilles and Walden Moore ('Movement for Atlantic Union' - not 'Federation'); (b) while placing EEC within the Atlantic framework to indicate that support for *both* which was generally acceptable in the 'Fifties. The present purpose is to produce maximum agreement on a formula, even if some members have personal preferences which go outside or beyond this. Their presence on the Council, in terms of this agreement, is desirable even if they also wish to advocate Federal Union, World Government or whatever.

(c) The Council must have a specific and publicizable function, needed and not specifically and primarily performed by any other active body. Duplication is to be avoided. This objection is a routine one to almost any new enterprise; experience alone tests. Federal Union and World Government (and United Nations) associations have other and separate tasks. So have the Pilgrims and dinner-discussion groups, without political commitment comparable to what characterised the dynamic of the European Movement. Support for this last (as to principle) must be clear-cut but its activity as part of the wider Atlantic set-up must be equally clear-cut. In popular terms a 'European' maybe should be an Atlanticist (despite M. Pompidou) but is not inevitably such.

This dual support may be regarded as non-controversial in goal. However, it is politically both naive and dangerous to regard this as the entire political reality. No other than the director of London's Europe House can, by his own choice, refer to 'the Atlantic Menace'. Time (10th March, 1973) can headline 'America's Rival, Europe'. (This Europe does not include Moscow, and primarily spells France.) There is a recognised and (as we learned in 1940) dangerous growth of isolationism and of (A.F. of L. supported) protectionism in North America, spelling the reaction against internationalism in view. In Europe and even in the U.K. what can only be called a strong emotional anti-Americanism is only just below the surface and has to be dynamically counteracted before it boils over.

speakers as requested, occur as initial program. A Council of a dozen is
probably enough, beyond which there should be opportunities for Membership.

The American Conference will benefit by your support.

George Catlin.

Whoever - whether Streit, Lippmann or myself first (1940)
put the phrase 'Atlantic Union' (for Henry Kissinger 'Atlantic
Commonwealth') into circulation, whereas 'Federal Union' for Streit
became a doctrine, I proposed 'Organic Union' or 'organic
consultation' (quoted in Lippmann's U.S. War Aims). And this,
at this present, in Anglo-American and American-European Relations,
is quite conspicuously imperfect and in recess. A prime task of
the Council will be publicly (not excluding 'the media' as well as
more privately) to urge the ending of this or indeed of any major
schism in the Atlantic world. It has to be remembered that many
people, especially journalists, are happiest if they can target
a foreign devil to stir matters up; and that, since Vietnam, the
Americans, succeeding the Germans and the Russians, can fill this
public function...

(d) As distinct from uncommitted openings for debate, information and education, the organisation which comes nearest to fulfilling the same function as the Council is B.A.C. Both are national (although affiliated) and autonomous - and hence not involved in feuds elsewhere. However, B.A.C. is inhibited in taking any political line. The Council is not... because B.A.C. is a charity and so restricted. The Council is not. B.A.C. is specifically concerned with NATO (not even Australasia) and with explaining its work for 'security'. The Council is concerned with aspects political, cultural, strategic but is not so delineated, although part of its function would be to promote the implementation, not yet achieved, of clause 2 of the NATO Charter. Hence B.A.C. has a concern with the examination of adequate armament. The Council is emphatically civilian.

Hence there is no duplication although there may be a
collegial duality. It is not the job of the Council to intrude
on B.A.C.'s job. But the general purposes (despite the structural
difference indicated above) are so far the same that I recommend
a close interlocking of personnel and indeed a common chairman.

Atlantic Union is far from likely to duplicate the work of B.A.C.; the dissimilarity is clear. What it is much more like is the European Council in its early days, and with its early political enthusiasm. At minimum it is concerned to prevent North America being ganged up against and a joint enterprise. At maximum as Ambassador Futhill said, we do indeed need 'heroic voices'; but it is not enough piously to talk about this. It is a duty to give them an opportunity to be heard.

(e) The public purpose of the Council is clear. For the present no public appeal for funds is contemplated (the Foundations may supply what is nominally required for secretariat and organisation). The particular activities of the Council, when the process of foundation is mature enough, it is for the Council itself to decide - although press letters as agreed; lunches for visitors (not least but certainly not exclusively H. American) sharing the Atlantic Union vie; if adequate weight & having something to say, & the provision of

888 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

April 17, 1973

Dear Henry:

I read in Sunday's Washington Post the statement that you made at the Federal City Club dinner last Friday evening. While I had heard it, it was good to be able to read and study it. It is a remarkable statement and has made a deep impression.

I am sorry I did not get to speak to you Friday evening, but you were surrounded.

Again, with congratulations and best wishes, I am

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED

APR 24 1973

CENTRAL FILES

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10996

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

MADN-J

4 June 1970

David Young
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Young:

I am inclosing for your information a packet of materials outlining the details of the 1970 USMA Senior Conference here at West Point on 11-13 June.

It includes a draft agenda, a list of participants, a schedule of events, and selected background readings. I have also enclosed reports from the 1965 and 1968 Conferences, to give you an idea of what has been reproduced in the past. As I mentioned to you on the phone, we would like to be able to record and reproduce Doctor Kissinger's speech on Thursday, 11 June. But let me stress that this is less important than providing the Conference participants with the opportunity to hear a candid appraisal from Doctor Kissinger. Therefore, if you are concerned that reproduction will hamper Doctor Kissinger's "elbow room," we will abandon readily any plans to record his remarks.

You will note that included in the background reading is Bill Kaufmann's Defense chapter in the Brookings' budget study. Our thought was that Doctor Kissinger might want to pursue his ideas on national security policy to their budgetary conclusions. That is of course entirely up to him, but I wanted you to be aware of the fact that we are trying to point the participants toward the really difficult questions.

I should also note that Adam Yarmolinsky will address the Conference on Friday, 12 June, on the changing _domestic_ environment and its implications for military planning.

June 11, 1970

Note: Mr. Kissinger unable to do this because of Middle East crisis.

Secure your future with U. S. Savings Bonds

RECEIVED

JUN 11 1970

CENTRAL FILES

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

USMA Senior Conference

11-13 June 1970

Thursday, 11 June

3:00 - 6:00 p.m. Registration, Hotel Thayer

6:00 - 7:00 p.m. Reception, Hotel Thayer

7:00 - 10:00 p.m. Banquet, Hotel Thayer
Keynote Address by the Hon. Henry A. Kissinger,
Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Friday, 12 June

7:00 - 8:45 a.m. Individual breakfasts, Hotel Thayer

9:00 - 12:00 a.m. First Round Table Session, USMA Library
(Coffee and rolls 10:00 - 10:20)

12:15 - 2:15 p.m. Luncheon, West Point Army Mess
Optional Tour of the Military Academy
or briefing on USMA Curriculum

2:30 - 5:30 p.m. Second Round Table Session, USMA Library
(refreshments 3:00 - 3:20 p.m.)

6:30 - 7:30 p.m. Cocktails, Hudson Room

7:30 - 10:30 p.m. Dinner, Hotel Thayer

Saturday, 13 June

7:30 - 8:30 a.m. Individual breakfasts, Hotel Thayer
Check out of hotel rooms.

9:00 - 12:00 a.m. Third Round Table Session, USMA Library
(Coffee and rolls, 10:00 - 10:20)

12:15 - 2:00 p.m. Luncheon, Hotel Thayer
Address by Professor Adam Yarmolinsky,
Harvard University

MADN-J

26 May 1970

SUBJECT: Partial Guest List - 1970 USMA Senior Conference

LTC William L. Hauser, USA
Office of the Coordinator
of Army Studies
QAVCofS, USA
Washington, D. C. 20310

COL Samuel H. Hays, USA Ret.
4600 Newcombe Place
Alexandria, Virginia 22304

Dr. Irving L. Horowitz
c/o Transaction Magazine
Rutgers-The State University
New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

COL Amos A. Jordan, Jr.
Professor & Head
Department of Social Sciences
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York 10996

MG Glenn A. Kent, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff for
Studies and Analysis
Hq, USAF
Washington, D. C. 20330

Dr. Kurt Lang
Department of Sociology
State University of New York
Stony Brook, New York 11700

COL Frederick C. Lough, USA
Professor & Head
Department of Law
United States Military Academy
West Point, New York 10996

Prof. Gene M. Lyons
Department of Government
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755

LTC Fred K. Mahaffey, USA
Director, Leadership Committee
U.S. Army Infantry School
Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

3

MADN-J

26 May 1970

Dr. Maurice Matloff
Chief, Gen. Hist. Branch
OCMH, DA
Washington, D. C. 20315

Hon. Jonathan Moore
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian & Pacific Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

LTC Lee Donne Olvey, USA
Professor & Deputy Head
Department of Social Sciences
West Point, New York 10996

Hon. Robert E. Osgood
Director, Planning Staff
National Security Council
Washington, D. C. 20506

RADM Ray E. Peet, USN
Dir, Office of Program Appraisal
Department of the Navy
Washington, D. C. 20350

Prof. Laurence I. Radway
Chairman, Department of Govt.
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755

Captain William L. Read, USN
6051 Edgewood Terrace
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

LTC Sam C. Sarkesian, USA Ret.
Department of Political Science
DePaul University
Chicago, Illinois 60626

Prof. Warner R. Schilling
Department of Political Science
Columbia University
New York, New York 10027

MADN-J

26 May 1970

LTC John W. Seigle, USA
Coordinator of Army Studies
OAVCofS, U.S. Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

Assoc. Prof. Edward Sherman
Univ. of Indiana Law School
Bloomington, Indiana 47401

COL William Y. Smith, USAF
Military Asst. to the Secretary
of the Air Force
Washington, D. C. 20330

Professor Arthur Smithies
Kirkland House
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

LTG Richard G. Stilwell, USA
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

Dr. Curtis W. Tarr
Director, Selective Service System
Washington, D. C. 20435

CPT Stansfield Turner, USN
Exec. Asst. to the Secy of the Navy
Washington, D. C. 20350

LTC James S. White, USA
Special Affairs & Review Div.
ODCSPER, USA
Washington, D. C. 20310

COL Samuel V. Wilson, USA
USA John F. Kennedy Center
for Military Assistance
Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28307

Prof. Adam Yarmolinsky
Institute of Politics
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

MADN-J

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK 10096

18 May 1970

NOTE TO CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS:

We have inclosed in this folder for your convenience background reading
materials and information about the Conference itself. Please bring the
folder with you to the Conference. Inside it you will find:

A Schedule of Events (leave one copy with your office)

<u>A Telephone Number List</u> (leave this with your office; it is attached to one of the schedules of events. This list informs your Secretary where you may be reached during the Conference.)

<u>Tentative List of Participants</u> (There will be additions to this list; some of those invited have not yet responded.)

<u>A Draft Conference Agenda</u> (We expect to prune and refine this considerably
before the Conference.)

Background Materials:

Graham Allison, Ernest May, and Adam Yarmolinsky, "Limits to Inter-
vention," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, January 1970.

William W. Kaufmann, "Defense," in Charles L. Schultze, *Setting Nation Priorities: The 1971 Budget*, Brookings Institution, 1970.

Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Changing Relationship of the Military and American Society," paper presented at the USMA Leadership Workshop Conference, June 1969.

The President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, *Report. USGPO, February, 1970. Chapters 1, 2, and 12*.

Morris Janowitz, "The Military Profession: Beyond the 1970's," paper presented at the USMA Leadership Workshop Conference, June, 1969.

15 May 1970

1970 USMA SENIOR CONFERENCE AGENDA

I. MISSION AND FORCE LEVEL IMPLICATIONS OF A CHANGING STRATEGIC CONTEXT.

A. What forces are at work in the shaping of United States' strategic posture during the next decade?

(1) How will the "Guam Doctrine" and other emerging changes in United States foreign policy affect military missions and hence the structure, levels, and geographic deployment of the armed forces?

(2) Will there be a demand for American participation in multilateral or international forces?

(3) How does continuing assessment of developments in South-east Asia seem to affect decisions about force structure? Does it raise strategic or political questions about the utility of general purpose forces or counter-in-surgency advisors?

(4) Should we expect the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to produce a curtailment in the evolution of strategic defense/retaliatory weapons systems? To what extent will the outcomes of the Talks influence the size and mix of the armed forces?

(5) To what extent will pressing domestic needs affect active and reserve force level decisions through budget constraints?

B. What will be the role of professional military officers in national security policy processes?

(1) Are there visible trends in the pattern of military involvement in national security decision-making?

(2) Will the transition from war to peace significantly alter patterns of civil-military relations in policy processes?

(3) If there are severe cuts in defense budgets, should we expect an increase in interservice rivalry?

II. DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON MILITARY MISSION PERFORMANCE.

A. Can we identify changes in American society that will significantly influence military missions?

(1) What will be the role of the armed forces in the main-
tenance of civil law and order during the next decade?

(2) Should and will the military establishment play a signi-
ficant role as an avenue of economic mobility or social rehabilitation
for disadvantaged groups?

(3) Is there a danger that such domestic missions will distort
the military's performance of its national security missions?

B. Can we identify societal changes that will significantly alter
the armed forces' relationship with American society?

(1) Does the public reaction to the "Military-Industrial
Complex," successes and failures in Vietnam, and institutional author-
ity *per se* portend a breakdown in communications between American
society and the military establishment?

(2) Will increasingly permissive societal values force fundamental changes in military discipline and judicial doctrines?

(3) To what extent will social cleavages between races,
generations, or political groups be mirrored within the military estab-
lishment? What is the likely effect?

III. INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO CHANGING DEMANDS.

A. What happens as we move toward an all-volunteer armed force?

(1) When and how should the transition begin?

(2) Are the budget estimates for a volunteer force offered by the Gates Commission adequate to fund active and reserve force levels?

(3) Are financial incentives sufficient to attract the numbers and skills necessary for a volunteer force, or are other institutional changes required?

(4) What are the possibilities that an all volunteer force
will differ significantly from American society at large?

(5) What will happen if the effort to convert to an all-volunteer force within acceptable budget levels fails?

B. Does the present system of recruitment and military education produce officers with skills and breadth of view sufficient to meet the complex demands of the next decade?

2

(1) Are generalist career patterns an appropriate response to the increasingly complex responsibilities of the armed services?

(2) Do present doctrines of military leadership and management equip officers to cope effectively with racial and other tensions and dissent within the armed forces?

(3) Can the armed forces train a corps of military advisors skilled enough to accomplish military assistance and nation-building missions without making them overspecialized? Should we train such a group?

C. What should and can be done to improve the military establishment's relationships with American society?

(1) How can widespread misconceptions about the nature of the "military mind" be dealt with?

(2) How can the military's image, especially in terms of public conceptions of its performance in Vietnam, be improved?

(3) How can communication between the armed services and alienated members of academic communities and youth groups be enhanced?

3

CHAMBERS
JUDGE SHERMAN G. FINESILVER
DISTRICT COURT
CITY AND COUNTY BUILDING
DENVER, COLORADO 80202

September 5, 1969

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

During my recent vacation I had an opportunity to reflect
on your remarks given at the meeting chaired by Max Fisher at
the Army-Navy Club on July 17.

In my opinion your remarks were penetrating, articulate,
and well founded. I would like to extend to you my warm
appreciation for your interest in this overall subject matter.
I fully realize the heavy demands on your time, not only
nationally, but internationally. For that reason, I am extremely
pleased that you would make yourself available in an informal
way to inform interested Americans in the manner that you did.

All too often sincere and dedicated service are matters
taken for granted - again, my appreciation to you for your
courtesy.

SGF:mb

KAYSER-ROTH
CORPORATION

640 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019 • PLAZA 7-9600

OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE VICE-PRESIDENT

February 4, 1970

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Presidential Advisor on
National Security
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I listened with great attention to your remarks delivered at the Harvard Club Monday evening. In discussing the educative role of the Presidency, I think you indicated that a primary objective of our policy in Viet Nam concerns the divisive effect on domestic political opinion if we attempted a unilateral pull-out. I can certainly appreciate this position.

However, I wonder why the Administration's policy does not follow this same tack when it considers the closely related issue of the continuing growth of our military establishment, particularly with the recently announced policy of further expansion of the ABM system. If we make military decisions in Viet Nam based primarily upon the effect on domestic policy, rather than based upon strategic considerations, should we not view the decision on the ABM in the same light; namely, that over and beyond the strategic argument, what affect such a decision will have on further dividing an already divided electorate?

Please forgive these remarks from an amateur in the field of politics and military policy, but I feel so strongly about this issue that I took the liberty of sharing these remarks with you.

NMH:icf