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ACT V

FRANCE

DB-VO: Establish current French dichotomy at Pompidou
Museum--radical architecture, avant-garde exhibits and
free admission while medieval performers sing, dance and
swallow flames in the huge courtyard outside. Typical
French mixture of adventurism and tradition.

Then campaign footage, with various parties, emphasizing
the Communists and Socialists, making their pitches before
the electorate (mainly in Paris, the "Red Belt" suburbs,
and Reims), mixed with stock footage of past CP and CGT
activity. All this explained by DB, with statistics.

UNION OF THE LEFT

DB looks at PCF and PSF headquarters, newspapers
(Humanité) and leaders: Allenstein for the PCF, Mitterand
or Rocard for the PSF. Examine main issues separating them
currently and breaking up the Common Program--nationalization,
minimum wage, welfare. Look at factories, workers, unemploy-
ment offices, CGT headquarters. But also point issues of
agreement--far more nationalization in any case, worker
council participation in factory management, etc. And both
parties support the "Force de Frappe" independent of NATO.
French nationalism can be radical on both left and right.

Comment from : Servan-Schreiker, Allenstein, Rocard.

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Municipal victories of the left (Le Havre and Marseille-stock footage).

REIMS:

Example of CP-SP collaboration in provincial city-- a harbinger of the possible coalition. Despite Catholic culture (Reims has one of Europe's greatest Gothic cathedrals) and conservative champagne traditions, Reims elected 18 Communists and 18 Socialists to its 43-member City Council in the last municipal election. They in turn elected a Communist to be their mayor after years of Gaulist (Taitinger) municipal rule. The coalition has already altered the political and social structures of the town; city hall is now open to all to satisfy citizen grievances; pocket parks and block associations are being developed everywhere, and special hearings are being held with city-wide cooperation to solve the local unemployment problems. We will interview (in French) the young, attractive Communist mayor who claims to be a classic "Eurocommunist" and is doing everything possible to appear benign, open minded and cooperative.

But...many locals worry about increasing CP authority (sidewalk cafe arguments) and people like Annie Kriegel (ex-CP writer and sociologist) believe that the French CP's "Eurocommunism" is a tactical sham and that the PCF remains Stalinist in structure and discipline. "Once a Communist, always a Communist", says Kriegel (in English) (intvu). Her opinions seem borne out by the rupture in PC-SP relations and the breakdown of the Common

31

Program which probably will cost both parties a viable plurality in the upcoming French elections, although a post-election coalition is not impossible.

But HAK says (Master Intvu):

"The French Communists were removed from the government in 1947, following the intensification of the cold war. But, just as in the Italian case the following year, the popular revolt against the Communists took place within the framework of a united West with a clear perception of an external and internal threat to its survival. By contrast there are now too many people on both sides of the Atlantic who have permitted themselves to be convinced that European Communism is only Social Democracy with a Leninist face."

(A possible GISCARD or BARRE discussion with Kissinger on France's (and Europe's) future possibilities (with Brinkley moderating) would follow, leading back to campaign footage as election approaches).

Aron-Moss Intvu by DB (Crillon Hotel). They pick up on HAK's point ant explore it further with appropriate footage laid in. The intvu includes speculation about the March election under present confused circumstances.

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This act closes with a wide-ranging discussion of Western European Communist movements and motives with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (Brinkley interviewing) filmed in Bonn. (See page 17 of Kissinger's June 9 speech for possible opening subject matter, wherever it later leads). Some discussion of growing anti-German sentiment in Europe should also be included, as well as SPD support of Soares (for use in Portugal segment). Along the way, HAK makes following points:

"Communist challenges do not exist in isolation from each other. There is no doubt that a Communist breakthrough to power or a share in power in one country will have a major psychological effect on the others, by making Communist parties seem respectable, or suggesting that the tide of history in Europe is moving inexorably in their direction.

"Most of the causes of this phenomenon are indigenous to the individual countries. And by the same token, the response to this challenge must come in the first instance from European leaders and voters who are persuaded that democracy is worth the effort. America cannot make their choices for them or decide the outcome of free elections."

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ACT VI

CONCLUSION IN CHICAGO STUDIO

DB wraps up our findings over film: the specter of either an eventual Socialist-Communist coalition in France or a militant French CP bent on destroying the Socialists via strikes, parliamentary tactics and political sabotage; a working agreement between the PCI and the beleaguered Christian Democrats in Italy, with the Communists sharing more and more political power; a re-born Spanish CP led by one of the most charismatic "Western Eurocommunists" of all; and a tough, old-fashioned Stalinist CP in Portugal heavily financed by Moscow and waiting to cash in on Portugal's economic crisis.

Again, Dr. Kissinger:

"We must avoid giving the impression that we consider Communist success a foregone conclusion by ostentatious association or consultation with Communist leaders or by ambiguous declarations. Communist success

34

is not a foregone conclusion; United States hesitation or
ambiguity can, however, contribute to it. Communist parties
are riddled with weaknesses and internal strains, and marked
by a fundamental flaw: parties that do not speak for the
humane values which have inspired the peoples of the West
for centuries are unlikely to appeal to a majority in a
Western nation except in a moment of unsettling crisis.
In no Western European country has the Communist party
ever fairly won more than about a third of the vote. Their
most powerful weapons are fear, distrust, and discouragement;
their principal asset is the myth of their inevitability.
Therefore, we do our friends in Europe no favor if we
encourage the notion that the advent of Communists and
their allies into power will make little or no difference
to our own attitudes and policies.

"This is not the time for resignation or acquiescence.
It is a time for confidence, determination, and hope. The
power of free men and women and free nations acting in
concert, confident of their strength and of their destiny,
cannot be matched by any totalitarian system or totalitarian
movement. The spirit of freedom can never be crushed. But
freedom can be lost gradually. Such a danger exists today
in Western Europe, and that threat could have consequences
not only in Europe but also throughout the community of
democracies and the world.

35

"If we cherish freedom, we will face the peril, marshal joint efforts to overcome it, and begin a period of new fulfillment for our peoples. Western Europe, our closest partner and the cradle of much of our civilization, is too precious to us for us to do otherwise."

...And then a few more questions from the panel and finally a goodnight from DB.

PROGRAM "Kissinger On The Record"

STATION WRC TV
NBC Network

DATE January 13, 1978 9:30 PM

CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Full Text

ANNOUNCER: NBC presents "Henry Kissinger: On the Record," with David Brinkley, NBC News.

Under discussion this evening, the Middle East, Africa, the cruise missile, American defense, plus a special film report on communism and terrorism in Western Europe.

HENRY KISSINGER: Obviously, Eurocommunism, or communism in Europe, is not a problem that Americans settle for Europeans. On the other hand, the internal development of Europe cannot be a matter of indifference to the United States, at least to understand.

For 30 years, the world balance of power, and the hopes for freedom everywhere, have been sustained by the United States. We have learned, through many crises, that upheavals thousands of miles away can threaten American lives or jeopardize American prosperity.

DAVID BRINKLEY: The red flag flaps in the breeze all over Western Europe. We might ask why.

The wall in Berlin, a familiar sight after 17 years but still an ugly one, a cage to hold people who would like to get out. Russian power runs from here across Europe, across Asia to the Pacific Ocean. They made it this far West by force, with tanks; and their physical power ends here at the wall, where the end of World War II stopped it.

But now, in the '70s, 30 years later, their ideas have crossed the wall and have appeared on this side, in Western Europe, in the form of active and growing Communist Parties in the pros-

2

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perous, civilized countries of Western Europe, Eurocommunism, they
call it.

Already, there are hundreds of communist local officials,
mayors and so on, particularly in France and Italy. And they may
or may not, in the spring or sometime after, take national power
in one or more countries of West Europe. But whatever happens,
the communists are now a substantial political force in Europe;
and they got it not with tanks, but with free, legal elections.
in France, one out of five votes communist; in Italy, one out of
three.

It has been a startling development of the greatest
interest to the United States and to its best friends, its allies
in Western Europe, since we have seen in a few years communist
power, once stopped cold at this wall, crossing the wall and
spreading across Europe; from here, across the continent, through
France and Italy and Spain and clear to Portugal, all the way to
Capa da Roca in Portugal, the westernmost point on the European
Continent.

We will follow this development across the countries of
Europe and try to see what it is and where it is going.

*

*

*

BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, why have the civilized, pros-
perous countries of Western Europe voted for communism to the
extent they have?

KISSINGER: It's a paradox. Here in Western Europe, the
economies are thriving in a way that no one could imagine 30 years
ago. People are prosperous. Two hundred miles away, they live in
bureaucratic, fairly backward societies of Eastern Europe. And
yet, Communist Parties are gaining in influence in at least some
West European countries.

If you compare the performance of communism -- wherever
you go around the world, and if there is a free system and a com-
munist system competing, the free system, invariably, has done
more for its people. And yet, it is precisely in the free coun-
tries of Western Europe that communism is now finding adherents.
And one has to say this is a moral problem, and not a material
problem, for which one has to look for an explanation in factors
that go beyond, far beyond, material conditions.

BRINKLEY: Whatever is said, the fact remains a great
number of European voters seem to believe what the communists say,
and vote for them. One out of three in Italy, one out of five in
France, one out of six in Portugal, and one out of ten in Spain.

Spanish communism, legally, was not allowed to exist in

Franco's day. It was underground, its leaders in exile, waiting. The new government has let it out of the closet. And in the Spanish sun, it flowers. Now it claims 300,000 members.

How conservative, Catholic Spain has changed. At a government-supported school in Madrid they open day playing the Internationale, the Communist Party hymn. During Franco, that song could barely be whistled in the bathroom. Now they play in school.

The teacher is a party member, a former Catholic priest, now head of the Christian Committee of the Communist Party. Half the faculty is in the party. Only one of the priests turning communist has been excommunicated. The others have not.

A fiesta. Actually, a Communist Party rally of working class, middle class, Civil War veterans, young people impatient for change and seeing this as the way to get it. A fund-raiser, 60,000 people.

KISSINGER: The Communist Party in Spain is well disciplined, well organized, it is very shrewdly led. And with 10% of the vote and an influence on at least left wing of the Socialist Party, they, again, in an amorphous situation can play a very important and I hope not decisive role; but, at any rate, they can play an important role.

BRINKLEY: Even with a small...

KISSINGER: Even with a small percent -- a relatively small percentage of the vote. They have a very skillful leader who has positioned himself with great skill in a way that appears very responsible, and yet doesn't change anything in the internal structure of the party and in the manner in which it would be likely to govern if it took over.

BRINKLEY: Santiago Carillo, the leader of Spain's Communist Party, talks with Garrick Utley.

GARRICK UTLEY: European communists, like yourself, say that Eurocommunism is democratic. But everywhere we look in history, when a Communist Party has won power, it's never given it up. Why should we believe you?

SANTIAGO CARILLO [through translator]: Naturally, everybody has the right to doubt. I may doubt Nixon or Kissinger. You may doubt the communists. But there is one guaranty that the Spanish communists can offer about our beliefs. We fought in this country for freedom and democracy, and for freedom and democracy many of our comrades were killed, tortured, and sent to prison.

BRINKLEY: Everything in Spain today, everything, is affected by the Civil War of 40 years ago and the Franco dictatorship ever since. Everyone talks of it now as one might talk on

being let out of jail, of the fact that racism survived here
longer than it survived anywhere else. For 38 years Franco pun-
ished his enemies, held power; and the rest of the world left him
alone.

Party leader Carillo fought in the Civil War. During the
Franco years, he stayed in exile in Paris, waiting. After Franco
died, he returned to Spain wearing a wig and funny glasses, fearing,
they say, that younger party leaders were about to push him aside.

Carillo became, and still is, communism's most poisonous
critic of Moscow, a role that made him famous beyond Spain. The
Moscow style was out of date, he said, cold and mean. He wrote a
book about it, "Eurocommunism and the State," giving opinions the
Russians detested, or said they did.

CARILLO: It is essential that Communist Parties be inde-
pendent of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union seeks conformity.
It doesn't favor free discussion.

Some of Lenin's old ideas are not applicable today. They
are out of date.

The New Times, the magazine of the Soviet Union criticized
the book, calling me an Imperialist agent, a defender of NATO, and
making other such remarks. The attack was outrageous, but it doesn't
bother me. I would worry if my comrades in the Spanish party attacked
me. But those others, it doesn't upset me that they say I'm a heretic
and that heretics must be burned at the stake.

UTLEY: What, specifically, does the Spanish Communist Party
stand for?

CARILLO: We favor a constitution guaranteeing rights for
all democratic political parties, for the rights of various ethnic
groups, guarantees of human rights and of freedom of religion.

UTLEY: So, in the end, we come back to the basic point.
Why should non-communists believe that you will be democratic?

CARILLO: I could bounce that question back to you. The
American Constitution is beautiful. We've all studied it. But it
hasn't kept you from having racist policies or making war in Vietnam.
So, by the same token, I could ask: How do I know that the United
States is democratic?

BRIKLEY: Last fall, Carillo came to the U.S., to Yale
University and other places. At Yale he crossed a picket line
without hesitation. His message, he said, was far more important
than strikers.

KISSINGER: West European communist leaders seek an

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American benediction to demonstrate their respectability at home.
What is less easy to understand is the eagerness of so many to
fall in with this tactic.

Why is it that so many intellectuals in America and, I suppose, in Europe develop theories about the evolution of communism that are totally contradicted by all experience? There is no Communist Party, anywhere, that has ever shared political power. There is no Communist Party, anywhere, that has ever organized itself internally on a democratic basis.

You all know that it would be very easy to have here innum-
erable quotations from East European communists of 1945 and 1946 --
Gomulka, Giera (?), Demetrov (?), Ulbricht -- who said word-for-word
the same thing that West European communists are saying today. And
yet, in not one East European country did the communists share power
once they had ahold of it.

BRINKLEY: In an old neighborhood of Paris, the new
Pompidou Center; a museum built with so many pipes and tubes, it
looks as if it were built by a plumber. And on the sidewalks
around it, the street musicians and entertainers who have been a
familiar part of the Paris scene since antiquity.

It sums up, in a way, the reality of French life today: profound conservatism, a deep commitment to traditional values and customs, combined, somehow, with a political and social radicalism.

Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist leader, on the right. And
Georges Marchais, the communist leader, on the left.

The Paris area known as the Red Belt. The French standard of living now is higher than Great Britain's; and despite the unemployment, the economy is booming. But the communist vote is heavy. And the French Communist Party is big and monolithic. It controls newspapers, magazines, the unions, the arts, a steam locomotive 100 feet long with 10,000 power and one engineer.

KISSINGER: In France, of course, you also have the tradition of radicalism, the tradition of a suspicion among the working class of the state. You have the split in French society dating back to the French Revolution, so that there is always a fertile ground for radical groups and a great difficulty in rallying people on a broad basis.

The Industrial workers in France, until fairly recently, felt substantially left out of the system. And the Communist Party in France does have a large working class support.

And, finally, the Communist Party is extremely well

organized and extremely disciplined in France. And all the other parties, even though they may be numerically stronger, are not nearly so disciplined. And this gives the communists some influence even out of proportion to their number.

GEORGES MARCHAIS [through translator]: What a stroke of luck for the right wing, for the capitalists, if the masses were to adopt an attitude of resignation, if they didn't know how to throw their weight behind a leftist union to achieve genuine change. But the right does not reckon with the communists.

BRINKLEY: The French did reckon with the communits, but only as a part of the wallpower: always there in the background and not bothering anybody. But they did not reckon with their making a deal with the socialists, a so-called popular front. Together, in the '77 elections, they won power in 1100 local governments, including big cities like Calais and Le Havre. The plan was to take over the country after they took over the local government. Communists and socialists politicking together and voting for each other. In the cities and towns, it worked.

Even in Rennes, a proud, ancient, traditional French city, a Catholic city with one of the greatest cathedrals in the world, where Joan of Arc fought, where the kings of France were crowned for a thousand years, sacked by the Vandals in the year 407, shelled by the Germans in World War I, restored with the help of the Rockefeller family.

It is champagne country. It is always bubbling in caves under the city from vineyards dating back to the Romans, where the champagn firms and families, Piper-Hiedsleck and Taittinger, ran the town.

Then came the elections of 1977, when a Taittinger was the mayor. The other candidate was a vigorous young communist candidate. The Communist won. They did it by offering what the previous local government easily could have offered but didn't: a policy of listening to the people and trying to respond to their wants and needs, offering something more from city hall than a bill from the tax collector, something more than the bureaucratic rudeness and insolence that are standard equipment in so many city halls.

It worked; they got the votes. So Rennes has a communist mayor, Claude Lemblan (?). He has opened the city hall and offered a policy that would be radical anywhere: that city hall belongs to the public and not to those hired to work in it.

CLAUDE LEMBLAN [through translator]: City hall is now completely accessible. It's doors are wide open to the populace, to the people who want to come to us with their problems, their worries.

7

I am a communist mayor. We are aiming for a municipal
policy which helps the most disadvantaged, so that in our city the
words "equal rights" will not be mere empty words, but reality.

BRINKLEY: The communists here, as elsewhere, claim more
efficiency than they are able to deliver, and unemployment remains
around seven to eight percent, and the city's unemployed come to
this labor office to look for work.

The party held city-wide hearings on unemployment, more
gesture than substance. Management people, who might hire some,
suspected they would be ridiculed and villified, and never showed
up. The socialists, also in the city government, didn't come either.
So it was all talk and no jobs.

The real argument between communists and socialists was
over how much private property to nationalize. The socialists
wanted to take some of it; the communists wanted it all, down to
even corner stores selling pots and pans. Now, in the weeks before
the March election, they still argue.

KISSINGER: The communist and socialist coalition was
broken up by the communists a few weeks ago. Technically, the
reason was a communist demand to nationalize several hundred enter-
prises. But the real cause went deeper. The communists have used
the alliance with the socialists to gain control of many cities and
towns. But having achieved this, the communists had no intention
of sharing power with a strong socialist party on the national level.
They want total power. And falling that, they prefer to bide their
time in opposition, betting that an economic crisis or a conflict
among the democratic parties will give them their opportunity.

For the moment, they've given up their moderate preten-
sions which they so emphatically and so unanimously proclaimed only
recently, and which so impressed many in Western Europe and the
United States.

It is now abundantly clear that the French communists
remain in alliances only so long as it suits their tactical pur-
poses, and that their fundamental goal of radically transforming
French society and totally dominating the national government
remains unchanged.

BRINKELY: The communist view, here stated by Jean Ellen-
stein, whose title is historian of the Communist Party of France.

JEAN ELLENSTEIN [through translator]: In France today,
it is not possible to form a democracy without attacking the pri-
vileges of the monopolies, of those who control the French economy.
The socialists draw back; they hesitate in the face of today's com-
plex and enormous task of uniting the left wing, a problem that we
know well. It depends on developments within the Socialist Party,

8

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because the Communist Party has not changed; it has not budged one
lota from its former position.

BRINKLEY: The Socialist Party believes Moscow ordered the
communists to disagree, to break up their united front, but they are
not sure why.

The socialist view from a party leader, Michel Rocard (?),
talking with Garrick Utley.

UTLEY: Do you think the communists in France really want to have power, the visible responsibility of being a member of government, given the economic problems?

MICHEL ROCARD: The present stage of negotiations seems to show that the answer is no. And clearly, a wing in the French Communist Party doesn't want to get power in a situation in which they would not be dominating.

KISSINGER: And I think what has happened in France is a very good illustration of the fact that the communists in Western Europe have not essentially changed their character. I believe that the French Communist Party has decided that by staying out of a coalition with the socialists, even if it meant that they couldn't get a share of the power, they would bring about a situation in which they could fragment the socialists. And they have always considered the social democrats one of their biggest threats to themselves, precisely because of the word democrat in their title and in their practices.

So, I interpret what the communists are doing in France as a demonstration of their desire to get into power with an essentially unchanged program. And I think that the menace that they represent has -- over a long time has, if anything, increased as a result of these decisions rather than decreased.

*

*

*

BRINKLEY: In Italy, how do you account for the very substantial growth and power in the Communist Party there?

KISSINGER: In Italy there are very many special factors. One, there is a big split between the industrialized North and the agricultural South. Many people come from the South to work in the factories and the North, and the Communists in the whole post-war period have had a strategy of meeting them, literally, at the train stations and taking care of them. So that most of the unions in Italy now are communist-dominated.

Secondly, there's the myth of the Resistance, in which the communists have created the impression that they were the only ones who resisted the fascists and the Germans, in which they have con-

9

veniently forgotten that, in every European country, they didn't
begin to resist the Germans until the Germans attacked not their
own country but the Soviet Union.

Third, there is the tradition in Italy, and to some
extent in France, where the state gets identified with conser-
vative forces.

All of this has combined to create an atmosphere in which
the saying is, "The enemy is always on the right." And this, in
Italy in particular, has contributed to this large electoral suc-
cess of the Communist Party.

BRINKLEY: Their electoral successes have indeed been
large. Italy now has the biggest Communist Party in the West,
something like two million members. It controls unions and,
through them, controls the industries and offices where the union
members work. If you want labor peace, you can make a cash deal
with the party and it delivers it, for a price.

Enrico Berlinguer, secretary-general of the Italian party,
came from the upper class in Sardinia and still owns land there.

The Christian Democrats thought maybe the Communists, with
their power over the unions, could bring stability to the country,
and so took them into the government, where they are now.

ENRICO BERLINGUER [through translator]: This is a gathering
of hundreds and hundreds of comrades: men, women, young people, in-
dividuals; definitely not the faceless crowd that certain newspapers
make us out to be.

Let us not forget the attacks that we've had to resist.
They always are incredibly shabby and pitiful. The critics throw
up smokescreens. They've come up with nothing but the same tired
arguments: that we are slaves of Moscow, that we want to collecti-
vize everything, that we want to crush the other parties.

The Italian Communist Party is actively taking part in
every aspect of society, staying in touch with all levels and
classes of the population.

KISSINGER: The paradox of the Italian communist leaders
is that none of them come from the working class. They're all
products of the despised middle class. And they're trying to
carry out the programs of their fathers: to cut across the age-
old divisions of Italian history, to overcome the regional loy-
alties -- Southern, Neapolitan, Venetian, Sicilian -- that have
bedeviled Italian unity.

BRINKLEY: In Italy, as in France, the party has system-
atically gone out after power in local government, and got it. It

10

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now has nearly all the big cities: Bologna, Milan, Turin, Florence, Naples, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and even Rome; the government of Rome is communist. In all, the party now has complete or partial control in 2800 regions, cities, towns and villages.

They have done least well in the South, always conservative, but they have won Naples, a city of more than a million, famed in song, legend, sheet music and postcards. But it is poor, with high unemployment, some of the worst slums in Europe, poor public health, bad housing, families jammed into one room, an apartment building bombed in World War II, never restored, but still occupied.

The communist mayor, Maritsio Valenci (?), popular but, so far, ineffective.

A 14th Century castle -- where else but in Italy? -- is where the city council meets and where the Communist Party has a plurality. The Christian Democratic members wait for the communists to try to run what they regard as an ungovernable city, and to fall on their faces.

The communist housing chairman, Antonio Soldana, became locally famous when he found highrise apartments going up on city property -- there was something shady about them -- and he ordered the apartment dynamited, but in a city that desperately needs the housing.

The party won these cities because people thought their local governments corrupt and ineffective, and often they were right. The communists promised local government devoted to something more than lining politicians' pockets, and won.

These local victories brought them 34% of the vote in the national parliamentary elections, very close to first place, barely behind the Christian Democrats, who have governed Italy since World War II. Now they share power. They came very close to full power. And so the tactics they chose were to be nice, cooperative, generally agreeable, to frighten or upset nobody, to look responsible, to say nothing ugly, to wait for the next election, and then hope to take it all.

The Prime Minister is Giulio Andreotti, the Christian Democrat, who does not have a majority anymore and who, without the communists, could not govern. As it is, he makes do, carefully.

You are the only leader of a Western government who has had this experience of working with the Communist Party. How would you describe it?

PRIME MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI [through translator]: On a personal level, I find it easy, since I've worked with many of them in Parliament for 30 years. The Communist Party makes an effort to

11

follow our general objective political line, that is neither com-
munist nor non-communist. Their political behavior is necessary
because of the delicate situation in which we all find ourselves.

BRINKLEY: There's great debate about the Communist
Party's position. They say they're in favor of free elections,
free religion, free speech, and so on. What is your view? Do
you believe it?

PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI: It seems to me that the Italian
communists' anti-Stalinism is a conviction, not just a tactic.
But on the other hand, we can't forget that where communists are
in power elsewhere, those liberties do not exist.

So, while we may have some trust in the evolution of com-
munism, we should also, on the contrary, be very cautious about the
experience of history.

BRINKLEY: Many Italians on the far left see the party's
joining in the government as a sellout to the right, being seen
in the same room with and even shaking hands with the establishment.

So, the party is paying a price. In Bologna there have
been violent and ugly demonstrations against the Communist Party.

Whether related to this or not, nobody knows; but a growth
industry in Italy now is street violence: kidnapings, political
shootings, bombings. Berlinguer hate all of this, fears it will
turn the public against his party, and so he talks feverishly against
it. He doesn't want the public to think that is how communists
behave.

BERLINGUER: We reject all narrow viewpoints, all extremism,
especially those that are blindly violent; the criminals, the ter-
rorists, arousing young people, urging them to commit acts that are
negative, destructive, desecrating everything, everyone, without
raising one slim hope.

But you can be the leaders of a different cause, of renewal,
building a new society. That is the commitment of the Communist
Party and the hope shared by the vast majority of Italian youth.

BRINKLEY: Behaving like the nice folks next door, joining
in the government, all of this has cost Berlinguer some support and
gained him some. But on balance, he has become hugely powerful.

Italy, over the centuries, has brought to the rest of
Europe a great number of trends, ideas, fashions: the arts and
architecture, Christianity to fascism, the radio, knife and fork;
they even taught the French how to cook. Now Italy is the first
country in Western Europe with a Communist Party so big that with-
out its support the government could not govern. And it is entirely

possible that Italy will be the first country in Western Europe to elect a communist government.

KISSINGER: Then will come the ultimate test: whether the Italian communists, having come to power peacefully, would depart it peacefully. It is inconceivable to me that communists, convinced that they represent inevitable historical progress, would consider being voted out of office as democratic. They would have all the less reason to do so, since they're in the process of undermining systematically the institutions around which resistance to them could really.

Even terrorism works in their favor, by provoking a demand for order at almost any price.

If this slide towards communist is not arrested, the consequences will be grave for the entire West. For the Italian Communist Party has not broken with the Soviet Union on a single foreign policy question which involves a conflict with the United States. Thus, the West may find itself with an ally which is at best unreliable, and which may even take the Soviet side in a crisis. And a party which remains so anti-democratic in its internal structure is inherently a threat to the democratic institutions which have been so painfully constructed over the last generation.

BRINKLEY: Portugal in 1974 and '5. Like Spain, years of hardline dictatorship were over; and when the lid came off, there was chaos after government coup after chaos.

Portugal almost became communist.

KISSINGER: Portugal is a classic example. All the parties in Portugal had been suppressed by the previous authoritarian regime. The Communist Party was underground and maintained very strict discipline. The communist leader, Cunhal, lived in Prague, which is in itself an interesting choice, to pick the most Stalinist of the East European countries as a place of exile.

So, when the authoritarian regime of Salazar and this successors disappeared, the Communist Party was the only well-organized party available, and it used this opportunity to seize control of newspapers, got hold of the records of the secret police, which it could use for blackmail, and it infiltrated the junior elements in the army. It was a very close thing.

BRINKLEY: 1975. At times it seemed the communists had done it. Vasco Gonçalves, the Prime Minister, supported the communists and they supported him. The party leader, Alvaro Cunhal, thought it was Portugal's October Revolution and he was its Lenin.

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But maybe it was neither. For reasons still argued about, the party's attempt to take over Portugal failed.

With some outside help, the public turned against the party. Its buildings were attacked and burned down, its members were roughed up, and Goncalves quit.

**KISSINGER:** All of the leaders of the West became convinced that, for example, the present Prime Minister of Portugal, Mr. Soares, was determined to fight the communists. And with a united Western policy, in which each country did what was most suitable in terms of its traditional relationships with Portugal, it was possible to give support to the democratic forces, and encouragement and economic assistance to the country.

**BRINKLEY:** In Lisbon now, the Prime Minister is a socialist, Mario Soares, contemptuous of the Communist Party. He talks with Garrick Utley.

**UTLEY:** Just two years ago, many people thought that the communists might win political power here in Portugal. Why didn't they?

**PRIME MINISTER MARIO SOARES [through translator]:** Fundamentally, because the Portugese people, led by the Socialist Party, opposed the communists. The communists had worked inside the system. They had a majority in the Revolutionary Council. They controlled the unions. They had the media. But what they didn't have was the people.

**BRINKLEY:** In Portugal, as in Spain, a Communist Party suppressed seemed to have more power than it could show when it was free. In the last elections, nobody thought they would come in first, but many thought they would do better than they did: 15% of the vote.

And the party leader, Cunhal, waits. He never made any pretense at being a Eurocommunist. He is a hardline Stalinist and claims nothing else.

**UTLEY:** One of the basic elements that the Eurocommunists are trying to sell is that they are prepared to work through the electoral process. What do you think?

**ALVARO CUNHAL [through translator]:** We are for elections in Portugal. It has always been thus. It's not new. We have always defended the need for elections.

**BRINKLEY:** That's what he says now. But two years ago he talked with the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, and she quoted him as having quite different views.

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WORDS OF CUNHAL: We communists don't accept the rules of the election game. No, no, no. I care nothing for elections. Nothing. I'm telling you that elections have nothing, or very little, to do with the dynamics of the revolution.

UTLEY: Two years ago, after the coup d'état here, did you or did you not say that the Communist party doesn't have to observe the electoral process?

CUNHAL: No, I have not said that.

UTLEY: You didn't say that.

Do you think there's a greater degree of democracy in the West or in the Soviet Union?

CUNHAL: In the Soviet Union.

BRINKLEY: It's all very well to say that anyone who could believe that could believe anything. But Cunhal still has hopes, and some reason for them.

In Portugal, as in one European country after another, the party's power lies primarily in tight discipline, singlemindedness, willingness to wait, financial and other help from Moscow, and control of the unions. Cunhal has all of that, and he has it in Portugal, a country that almost belongs to the Third World.

It's the poorest country in Europe: severe unemployment, 800,000 angry refugees back from the colonies lost in Africa, furious at losing their homes. Portugal has next to no experience with free government. Almost two full geneations knew nothing but the Salazar dictatorship. Free institutions, where they exist at all, are young, poor and shaky.

What Portugal does have is a people unusually energetic and hard-working if given anything to do. And Cunhal, waiting.

Suppose one or more of the European Communist Parties acquired power -- to a limited degree, they have already in Italy -- acquired power. What would that mean to the U.S. and to its relationships with West Europe?

KISSINGER: If they achieve a share of the government, in addition, I think the influence will be, first, that the priorities of that government will change: less emphasis on defense, more emphasis on transforming society, less emphasis on close cooperation with the United States, more emphasis on a semi-neutralist position.

BRINKLEY: After the Russians seized Czechoslovakia in 1948, West Europe and the U.S. set up NATO to prevent any further

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Russian conquest. So, oddly enough, European countries now voting for communism are members of a military organization set up to protect them for it.

NATO now extends from the Atlantic Coast to the edge of the countries locked into the Russian empire, the only real empire left on earth.

Could NATO as we now know it survive any real communist power in Europe?

KISSINGER: Well, there were communists in power in Portugal, and during that period secret documents were not circulated to the Portuguese government, and Portuguese representatives were excluded from certain discussions within NATO.

If this happened in a country like Italy, or France, or any of the larger countries in NATO, it's difficult to see how the present degree of information sharing and military cooperation could be continued, with communists having a significant share of governmental power.

BRINKLEY: The biggest contributor to NATO is the U.S., and so its commander has always been American. Now it is General Alexander Haig, in Belgium.

GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG: I would be seriously concerned about the impact that the evolution of Marxist participation in our member governments would have on our ability to handle and process those highly classified secrets, especially in the nuclear area, which are essential to conduct our day-to-day business. I would be concerned because the influence that that participation would have on the policy of the government concerned, by doctrinal conviction, would be to place our security needs, which are so urgent today, at the lowest level of national priority.

KISSINGER: When I was in office -- and this was not unique to me -- I would be on the telephone to the British Foreign Secretary, the French Foreign Minister, and we'd exchange ideas with all of our allies, Italy, France, in a way that it would be very hard to imagine one did if communists had a significant role in the government.

I don't think the countries in which the communists play a significant role would want to do it. No European Communist Party has unambiguously affirmed the importance of the Atlantic relationship. They sometimes have used some weaseling phrases in which they justify NATO as a contribution to better relations with the Soviet Union, but never have they spoke of the priority of close relationships with the United States. On the contrary, almost any exception they have criticized American foreign policy in every part of the world.

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So that even on the European side the relationship would alter. And again, this may not all happen in the first year. But as a historical phenomenon, it is something that should concern us.

BRINKLEY: The Communist Party is outlawed in Germany, and so there are not many middle-aged radicals lounging about with meerschaum pipes and pilsner beer, discussing the capitalist exploitation of the worker. But there are gangs of young people in their 20s and 30s, products of the riotous 1960s, who now see communism as old fashion, tiresome, boresome, a debating society with no action. They prefer terror: kidnaping, bombing, arson, machine guns, death and destruction.

They have so terrorized the German leadership that every member of it worries about kidnaping and murder. These young gangsters -- many are women -- are from the middle and upper-middle classes, prosperous, educated, and driven by a rage and hatred that nobody can fully explain. And they are clever.

On this street, they kidnaped Hans Martin Schleier. They did it by pusing into the street, in front of his car, a baby carriage that appeared to have a baby in it. They figured, and rightly, that any driver would stop for that; his did. Whereupon they machine-gunned his chauffeur, all of his bodyguards, dragged him away, and, weeks later, killed him.

Mr. Kissinger, what do you make of that?

KISSINGER: I think some of the causes of terrorism are the same as those which lead to the growth of communism -- that is, alienation with the system. The communists want to destroy existing institutions by using the institutions themselves, and then to do away with them. The terrorists want to shortcut this, and some of them even despise the communists for wanting to use the existing institutions. The terrorists want to smash the whole existing framework.

Their exaltation of violence is a rejection of all of the values of Western civilization, including even that part of the communist values that wants to seize power by institutional means. And the nihilism and, in a way, the despair that it represents is a profound threat, even though the numbers are relatively small.

BRINKLEY: Erwin Scheuss (?), professor of sociology at the University of Cologne, has made a specialty of the study of terrorism and young people given to violence and murder.

ERWIN SCHEUSS: We have case studies of the nihilists of the last century and of the anarchists in Western Europe at that time, and their background was similar. It is sort of a protest of

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children of the bourgeoisie against the bourgeoisie itself.

See, the terrorist appears to be very afraid to be just an ordinary person like anybody else, and is terribly provoked by ordinary persons enjoying their life. And it's the very satisfaction with their existence of most citizens that is the supreme insult to someone who is afraid of being just a citizen.

When I speak to people in [unintelligible], they talk about the four people being machine-gunned more so than just Mr. Schleier. They feel offended by the terrorists because the terrorists represent a disgust for what is dear to them, namely, to get enjoyment out of doing one's duty, feel satisfied by doing something nice to someone else, and thinking in terms of the continuity of your life; not just of today, but also of tomorrow and the day afterwards.

WILLY BRANDT: I think the term terrorist, to a certain degree, is misleading, because in certain cases they are murderer and in other cases they are blackmailers and in other cases they are robbers.

BRINKLEY: Willy Brandt, the former Chancellor of West Germany, in the many of all this, has some interesting thoughts about it.

BRANDT: If I look at them, very few people come from normal homes, nor -- almost none from workers' families; most of them from upper-middle class or even upper class. Some of then, I have the feeling, they just got sick of the caviar society.

BRINKLEY: Sick of the caviar society?

BRANDT: Of the caviar society.

BRINKLEY: What would they replace it?

BRANDT: I think they -- some of them, at least, those who influence others -- have the feeling that things as they are must be destroyed. And then out of destruction, out of the ashes, something new should develop.

BRINKLEY: Do you ever feel that these young people are primarily interested in becoming famous, getting public attention?

BRANDT: I think this is too simple, but there may be a little bit in it. And for certain groups of our young people, it may be a question that a normal democracy demands too little from them, that they just are invited to participate in what we call the welfare state, or whatnot; and that we have paid, perhaps, too little attention to the question of what could we expect from them, where could their idealism led for tasks at home, perhaps even

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abroad.

BRINKLEY: A prosperous democratic country asks too little of people.

BRANDT: Yes.

KISSINGER: Some of these people are picked up by the communists and then work within an institutional framework. Some go beyond the institutional framework and become all-out advocates of violence. On the one hand, they despise their Indigenous communists for having some institutional framework. On the other hand, many of these terrorists are beging trained in camps in Libya and in Lebanon by organizations that themselves are financed from the Soviet Union.

BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, we have talked about two developments in Europe in current times. We can't tell the French how to vote or the Italians how to vote. What can we do about it?

KISSINGER: Well, first, we have to recognize the gravity of the problem. In the case of the terrorism, we owe it to the victims that they understand that we do not consider it just a German or an Italian phenomenon, but that we understand that this is a problem that also concerns us.

In the case of the communist dangers in France and in Italy, it is important that those parts of the electorate that care what the United States thinks know what we believe. We shouldn't tell people how to vote, but we can certainly express our conviction of what this will do to the unity of the West.

And, finally, we have an obligation to ourselves to infuse our own democracy with a vitality and a sense of purpose that can demonstrate to all threatened peoples in the world that democracy is the wave of the future.

BRINKLEY: Henry Kissinger will discuss this and other world affairs in a moment.

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BRINKLEY: This part of our program was arranged with the cooperation of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. It is, incidentally, the largest organization of its kind in the United States. Members of the council are here, a representative of them -- there are several thousand. We will invite them now to ask questions of Dr. Kissinger and to listen to his answers.

WOMAN: How do you think NATO should deal with communism in its member governments?

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KISSINGER: First of all, we have to understand the importance of Europe to the United States. Europe, in terms of manpower and in terms of industrial potential, exceeds the resources of the Soviet Union. To put it another way, if the resources were Europe were added to those of the Soviet Union, the United States position in the world would become extremely complicated, not only from a security point of view, but also from the point of view of economics. Since the world has become so interdependent, there must be some societies which have similar values and similar beliefs with which we can cooperate.

If, therefore, the Europeans have communists in significant positions in their government, it would change the structure of relationships. Over a period of time, the advent of communists in significant positions in European governments must undermine the relationship between Western Europe and the United States.

MAN: Dr. Kissinger, we've seen extreme terrorism in a number of Western European countries -- Germany, Italy, the Netherlands -- and some in other countries -- Mexico, the Argentine, and so forth. Is there a common thread running through these? Is there a common force directing and financing them?

KISSINGER: It is clear that these terrorist movements are linked together in some way. You see Japanese terrorists carrying out actions on behalf of Palestinians, even though there's no conceivable Japanese national interest involved. There are demonstrated connections between the German terrorists and, to some extent, the Italian terrorists and, again, Middle East terrorist groups.

Somebody is, clearly, financing the training and the organization; and some of it is, clearly, coming from the Communist World. That doesn't mean that the Communist World is planning all this, but it does mean that without the supply of weapons and training and organization from some of these countries, it would become infinitely more complicated to carry out the terrorist acts.

And then, in any event, whether or not these movements are supported directly by communist countries, in many parts of the world they directly benefit the Communist Parties.

MAN: In at least one case of Western European communism, I'm a little confused as to where the danger lies. Because -- you suggested that Communist Parties are dangerous to us because they're tied to the Soviet Union. Yet in the case of France, it would seem that the last thing the Soviet Union wants is for the French Communist Party to participate in government. So, to the extent that the French Communist Party is tied to the Soviet Union, it will not be in government. If it does go into government, it means it's not tied in with the Soviet Union.

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How do you resolve that problem?

KISSINGER: Well, I don't agree that the last thing that the last thing that the Soviet Union wants is for the French Communist Party to go into government.

What the French Communist Party wants to avoid is to join the government as a junior partner to the Socialist Party. What the communists do want is to bring about in France a situation similar to that in Italy, in which the Communist Party becomes the repository of all of the protest votes on the left, in which they reduce the Socialist Party to relative insignificance, say 10%, which is more or less the case in Italy.

In that situation, when government becomes impossible without the communists, then the communists do make a move towards power. And this is exactly what they're doing in Italy today, and certainly not against the opposition of the Soviet Union.

MAN: What are your views on resolving the West Bank problem? And if resolved, what are the next major issues that Begin and Sadat should address?

KISSINGER: Well, the -- I have the impression that there is no shortage of views being advanced on how to resolve the West Bank problem. And despite my notorious humility, I really don't believe that I should contribute to this.

I believe that the parties should not negotiate with each other for some time to see exactly where the disagreements are, and to talk to each other on a human level, of explaining what their genuine concerns are.

I have repeatedly stated publicly that I do not favor a Palestinian state. I believe that a Palestinian state is likely to become radical in orientation, turn on Jordan, have to depend on the support of countries like Libya, Iraq and the Soviet Union; and after having turned on Jordan, become the seed of an Arab-Israeli conflict.

For Israel, there is a monumental security problem: to have hostile forces eight miles from their principal cities. For the Arabs, there is a problem of national dignity, of having some expression for the aspirations of their people.

MAN: I'd like your opinion, sir, as to the advisability of us as a nation pursuing the development of the neutron bomb and the cruise missile.

KISSINGER: It is imperative that we continue with the development of the cruise missile. The cruise missile gives us an opportunity to offset to some degree the Soviet missiles and

y

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airplanes that are aimed at Europe and other peripheral areas, and they give us some possibility of balancing the tactical situation within NATO.

With respect to the neutron bomb, one has to be clear what the neutron bomb is. The neutron bomb -- the impression is created that, for some reason, people want to preserve buildings and kill people, and that there is something magic about only killing people and not destroying property.

The fundamental reason for the neutron bomb is the ability to fight enemy tanks, because the capacity to penetrate these enemy tanks seems to be stronger in the neutron bomb than it is in the existing bombs, that depend primarily on explosions. Actually, the lethal radius is the same for both, and the same number of people will be killed in either case.

So, I consider this primarily a technical question.

MAN: When you are directing a letter, a brutally frank letter to some subordinate, you seem to manage to keep the microphones closed. How do you manage this?

[Laughter]

KISSINGER: Well, I tell you the truth, I didn't always keep the microphones closed. I once spoke into an open microphone at a dinner in Ottawa, of which certain excerpts were printed. And the only reason why I was afraid to claim distortion was because I had said so many other things that they hadn't that they might have printed if I had said...

[Laughter]

KISSINGER: So, I sympathize with the President.

MAN: Dr. Kissinger, have the changes in public opinion about the U.S. intelligence community and the imposition of constraints on covert operations in any way weakened the ability of the community to support American foreign policy makers?

KISSINGER: I do not approve of every last covert operation that may have been conducted over a 30-year period. But then, I don't approve of every foreign policy that has been conducted over a 30-year period. And no institution should be asked to be infallible.

I believe that we are depriving ourselves of a major tool. I believe that we are unnecessarily weakening one of the important instruments of our national policy. And I also believe that, in common decency, the dedicated men and women who have served in Intelligence for 30 years do not deserve to be pilloried in the manner in which

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which this has been the case in recent years.

Certainly, I would oppose the use of the Intelligence community to circumvent the constitutional protection of American citizens. But, nevertheless, we need an Intelligence community with high morale that collects information, that supplies warning, and that, in certain complicated situations, can defend the American national interest in the gray areas where military operations are not suitable and diplomacy cannot operate.

MAN: I understand that there are about 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola and that they are moving en masse into Ethiopia. I wonder if you could comment on that. I understand they're using Russian arms. What is the significance?

KISSINGER: I believe that it is unacceptable in the long run for a small Caribbean country to make itself a surrogate for Soviet expansionist designs, to have 20,000 Cuban troops, supplied by the Soviet Union, in Angola determining the outcome of a civil war, establishing a domestic structure in an area where, really, relatively small forces can play a decisive role.

Having succeeded in Angola, they are now spreading into other parts of Africa. There are some in Mozambique. But most notably, there has now been exactly the same pattern in Ethiopia that we previously saw in Angola. Ethiopia, over the last six months, has received close to a billion dollars worth of Soviet aid; that is, a billion dollars into one country in a continent where the United States gives less than $100 million of military aid to all the countries put together. In addition, the estimate is that there are about 2000 Cuban troops and 1000 Soviet advisers.

In other words, we are seeing here the deployment of out-
side surrogate forces and a massive introduction of armaments into
an area of great strategic importance. Therefore, if the Ethiopian
government holds together, the outcome is fairly predictable.

This is bound to affect the perception of the United States
in countries like Saudi Arabia, which got themselves involved in
Somalia, partly at our urging, and of our general performance, when
our President had said on television that it is now part of our
national policy to be more friendly to Somalia, which is a policy
that I agree with.

I think in our negotiations with the Soviet Union we have
to make clear that of course a relaxation of tensions is important,
but it cannot be pursued selectively; and that in the long run, the
use of these expeditionary Cuban forces is incompatible with a
normal relationship with the United States on the part of either the
Soviet Union or Cuba.

My view has been that the problems in Africa have several

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components. First, to encourage in Africa moderate forces that stand for principles comparable to our own, taking account of local conditions.

Secondly, to encourage majority rule in those countries where it does not now exist, but to do so in a manner in which the oppression of the majority by the minority is not replaced by the oppression of the minority by the majority. And therefore, in our negotiations we sought to bring about conditions in which the black and the white communities could live side-by-side, taking account of the numerical balance, of course, but with some -- with minority rights protected.

MAN: I would like to ask you your views on the underlying causes for the rise in popular appeal of the Communist Parties in Western Europe during the 1970s.

KISSINGER: I think that all industrial democracies, and maybe all industrial societies, are facing some fundamental problems which they have not been able as yet to solve. There is for example, there's the problem that most investment in advanced industrial societies tend to be capital-incentive and do not necessarily produce the same number of jobs as would have been the case in equivalent periods, say, 30 years ago. The computerization of industry tends to bring about a situation in which you can have substantial investment and, nevertheless, no commensurate rise in employment.

Secondly, in some countries, especially in Western Europe, the indigenous population will no longer perform certain jobs. So, for example, you have in Germany something like a million and a half foreign workers and a million people unemployed. Now, you would think that the easy way to solve the problem is to send the foreign workers home. That will not -- that isn't possible because Germans, on the whole, will not do the menial jobs that are now being carried out by the foreign worker.

Then you have an educational system, in all of the advanced industrial countries, that produces an unprecedentedly large number of advanced agrees and no commensurate employment for that level of education.

And then you have the problem that in a bureaucratized state, where issues become extremely complicated, the relation of the individual to his society and to the decision-making process becomes extremely complex. So that the individual feels he cannot affect decisions. He may not even feel that he understands the decisions.

All of this creates a great sense of emotional insecurity.

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MAN: Dr. Kissinger, what do you think are the appropriate steps that the United States should be taking to counter the rise of communism?

KISSINGER: Europeans must know where we stand. We must not follow the fasionable theories by which our problems are going to be solved by communists who, through some magic, on the eve of coming to power, have become democratic.

Secondly, we ought to make clear that in our judgment the future of NATO would be severely imperilled if Communist Parties came to power or shared in power in European countries. That is not blackmail; that is a statement of fact.

Thirdly, on the positive side, we have to move energetically, both at home and in cooperation with the democratic forces in Europe, in remedying the problem of what I would call congenital unemployment; not the unemployment produced by the swings of the business cycle, but the unemployment produced by the nature of modern technology and the nature of the modern educational system and the changing values that brings new groups of the population, like women and much younger men than in the past, into the labor force. This is a challenge that could unite the industrial democracies in an adventure even more significant than the constructions that formed the great policies of the late '40s and '50s.

This, I believe, is a crucial task for the United States.