STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER
SECRETARY OF STATE

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, I greatly appreciate the very generous comments that have been made, and also the opportunity to meet with you. As I told your staff director, I will make a few substantially extemporaneous and informal remarks, and then look forward to answering your questions.

The United States finds itself at this moment in, for it, an unprecedented situation. We have had an extraordinary success in accomplishing almost everything we set out to do at the end of World War II. If you compare what American leaders were saying in the late 1940s and early 1950s about our objectives and our purposes with what happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s, you will find a degree of correspondence for which I find no previous example in history. It has, however, left us in a position that George Bernard Shaw once described as follows: there are two tragedies in life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desires, and the second is to fulfill your heart's desires.

We have transcended the world we inherited at the end of World War II. I agree with Senator Hutchison. It took us 3 or 4 years at the end of World War II to come up with a concept, a strategy, to have our domestic debate, but after that, it is astonishing with what degree of bipartisan commitment it was carried out until the collapse of the Soviet Union during the Reagan and Bush administrations. We do not have a similar consensus at this moment, and I believe it is important for the United States to develop a strategy appropriate for the period in which we find ourselves.

As a Nation, we have had a unique international position. No other major nation has been populated almost entirely by immigrants. No other major nation has a definite date to which you can ascribe its origin. Above all, no other major nation has lived without powerful neighbors, and therefore the United States has had to believe, for the greatest part of its history, even during the Cold War, that the degree of its involvement was largely up to it. Almost all of the great programs of even the Cold War period, like the Marshall Plan, were presented as relatively short-term programs, as terminal programs, at the end of which the need for that sort of commitment would disappear. Almost all our international commitments were triggered by a specific enemy, ideological or strategic, and in the Cold War they were the same. It was both an ideological and a strategic enemy.

In the period into which we are now heading, there is no clearcut ideological enemy, or maybe there are several ideological adversaries. There is no overwhelming strategic adversary, and yet the American capacity to play a role and to intervene can be the major stabilizing element in many parts of the world. It is not possible to present final solutions to many of the problems that we see in front of us, and we live in a paradoxical world in which the economy, communications, have become global, while at the same time more and more small states are coming into being that feel no responsibility to any global international system or to international stability. These are the dilemmas and challenges within which American foreign policy has to be conducted. Let me very briefly touch a few of the key areas as I see them.

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I have become increasingly convinced, though this has not been a subject that the Armed Services Committee has primarily addressed, of the crucial importance of creating a Western Hemisphere economic and political system. And for that reason, I strongly support the decision of President Clinton yesterday with respect to the aid package to Mexico. I look at this not as a bail-out, but rather as an element of construction.

In the world that is emerging, if GATT works, it is important for the United States to be in the strongest possible position. If GATT does not work, or if it turns out, which is not impossible, that it brings about unacceptable penalties for American working forces, then it is important that the Western Hemisphere has a regional system that can compete with regional systems that may be growing up in Europe and in Asia. And finally, America has always believed that market institutions and democracy can be an element of unifying the international community.

I do not know whether that applies to the whole world. In fact, I have my doubts. But I do believe that it applies to the Western Hemisphere, in which geopolitics have played a smaller role than in any other region. And so for all of these reasons, I think the construction of our foreign policy in the next phase must have, as a principal element, a healthy, vital, Western Hemisphere system, and I look at what has been done with respect to Mexico in that context, and not as an economic bail-out.

Traditionally, any such analysis as I am making here would have begun not with the Western Hemisphere but with the Atlantic Alliance. I still believe that the Atlantic Alliance must be a key element of American foreign policy. And I am uneasy about the tendencies toward its erosion, partly as a result of the end of the Cold War, but also partly as a result of lack of adequate attention.

In Western Europe, and in Western and Central Europe, we are united with countries that have similar values and that, on the whole, not always perfectly, have stood with us in almost all of the crises of the post-Cold War period. It is becoming increasingly apparent that an American participation in Europe is essential, lest the national rivalries, the fears of a too powerful Germany or an encroaching Russia, will lead to the disintegration of the common policies that have developed there. But at the same time, I am uneasy because with the movement of Russian troops east, with the collapse of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe, in Eastern and Central Europe, there has not been a unifying element and there has not been a significant American initiative with respect to the restoration of the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance.

I do not believe that the Partnership for Peace is such an initiative. The Atlantic Alliance is an alliance; that is, it has a clear definition of the area that it protects. The Partnership for Peace is a vague system of collective security like the United Nations, including all the territory from Vladivostok to Vancouver. And in my view, if everybody is allied with everybody, nobody is allied, really, in any meaningful way with anybody. It is a different concept. It is not an alliance concept. It is an alternative to an alliance concept, and was so presented by President Clinton.

In my view, the expansion of NATO is one of the key challenges before American politics, and think it is necessary to make an un-

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ambiguous decision with respect to that. By expansion of NATO, I mean the inclusion of some of the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, preferably Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, possibly Slovakia, in the NATO Alliance. And I believe this is important for the following reasons.

It makes no sense to have the border of NATO at the eastern border of Germany, which is not threatened and which has no plausible security threat, and to leave ambiguous the eastern border of Poland. I believe it is dangerous to have a vacuum between Russian and Germany which both of these nations will then try to fill by their national efforts. I believe that the security of the eastern border of the Atlantic Alliance should be an alliance problem, not a German national challenge. And for these reasons and for others which we might elaborate in the question period, in the discussion period, I believe that NATO expansion is essential.

I do not believe that it can be handled as a study project. It requires a decision, not a study. We know what is needed. And we know what the arguments against it are. And by keeping open the question of whether it is a part of the Partnership for Peace or a part of the Atlantic Alliance, we actually confuse both efforts. I am not clear what our official position is. If it is for expansion, I support it. If it is a mishmash in which Russia is supposed to join the Atlantic Alliance, then I believe it is going to lead to undermining the Atlantic Alliance, and thereby one of the major building blocks of the international system as I understand it.

Let me make a few observations about Asia. In Europe, we are dealing with a group of countries among which a military conflict is almost out of the question. The military conflicts in Europe arise at the fringes among new countries that have not been part of the postwar European order. But Asia sees the emergence of a whole group of nations whose attitude toward each other is very similar to that of European states in the 19th century. The Asian part of Russia, Japan, China, Korea, and Southeast Asia do not look at each other as part of one community. They look at each other as strategic economic and political competitors.

Moreover, all of them are emerging into a new set of national attitudes. During the Cold War, Japan could nestle under the American security guarantee because there was only one plausible strategic threat. In the period ahead of us, almost any foreseeable Japanese leader may well discover that with respect to many of the issues of Northeast Asia, Japan has at least shades of difference with the United States. And I therefore consider it highly likely that Japan will play a more assertive, more autonomous, and more self-reliant role. This is not, in itself, against the American interest. But it means that the single focus of our discussion with Japan has to be broadened from trade to political, strategic, and general issues of world order, which is not an easy assignment given the cultural differences between our two countries and the different way we conceive of the role of dialogue.

Anybody who has visited China must be struck by the extraordinary, almost unbelievable, economic change that has taken place in that country. Any comparison between China a decade ago and today—a country that has grown at an average rate of over 10 percent for over a decade—indicates that China will emerge as per-

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haps the most powerful country in Asia over a 30-year period, and
a country of growing significance economically, politically, and stra-
tegically. Many of the discussions about Chinese internal practices
will be importantly altered by the very pace of industrialization,
because while industrialization may not guarantee democracy, it
does require as an initial step constitutionalism, a legal framework
that can be expected and to which people, foreigners and domesti-
cally, can gear themselves.

For the United States, it is very difficult to imagine that we can
play the decisive role in Asian stability that is achievable without
constructive relations with the People's Republic of China. We are
entitled to have our own view as to appropriate domestic practices,
and the Chinese have dealt, in the 5000 years of their recorded his-
tory, with enough foreigners to know that they have to take ac-
count of strongly held convictions. But what we cannot do is to
make one issue the single test of our relationship. And what we
must do in a positive sense is to find a means for a dialogue with
China on a continuing basis about the relationship between the key
elements in Asia.

We have all been concerned in recent months with the situation
on the Korean Peninsula and we have a number of problems. The
most important, the most immediate, is the nuclear issue. The
longer-term problem is the relationship of South and North Korea
to each other. And the third which rarely gets talked about is the
attitude of the surrounding countries to the future of Korea. Let me
take the last one first.

The United States has every reason to favor the unification of
Korea. The neighboring countries are much less enthusiastic about
this prospect, and I do not think one can understand either Chi-
nese or Japanese policies except against the at least subconscious
preference—and not so subconscious, either—that their leaders
would not die unfulfilled if unification of Korea were put off into
some future generation, or maybe never happen. And this affects
their attitude, even toward the nuclear issue.

Nobody wants North Korea to have nuclear weapons. But other
countries are calculating to what extent they want to exercise pres-
sure that might undermine the North Korean Government. From
the American point of view, I believe that proliferation of nuclear
weapons to North Korea will set a terrible precedent for the rest
of the world. I did not favor the way the Framework Agreement
was negotiated, nor the tacit acceptance of what North Korea has
already done in the nuclear field. On the other hand, I do not see
that abandoning this agreement now is going to meet those par-
ticular concerns. I find it almost unimaginable that this agreement
will go to the end of its foreseen route, and therefore we should
think carefully of how we can be sure to enforce its provisions and
what we will do when the pushing against the edges will take
place. I think that is our most important task with respect to the
Korean nuclear issue.

In foreign policy one occasionally has the choice whether to sup-
port one's friend or to placate one's enemies—or I would say if one
has the choice, one should begin by supporting one's friends. The
strategy of North Korea with respect to South Korea is to
delegitimize it to make itself the chief spokesman for Korean unity

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and to lure us into a set of negotiations that make it appear that South Korea is our tool. We have to be very careful to prevent these tendencies, and as a general principle, we should have no discussions with North Korea about the future of Korea that exclude South Korea, and no discussions with North Korea that South Korea does not feel it has been fully briefed on.

Now, I do not want to go around Asia and analyze every country. I want to make one general proposition. The United States is in a unique position in Asia in this sense: If you ask any Asian leader, Northeast or Southeast Asia, what they consider their principal threat to their security or the principal obstacle to progress, none would mention the United States. All would mention some other Asian country. I have heard it said that Southeast Asia divides itself into two groups of countries. Those that fear Vietnam want good relations with China. Those that are worried about China want good relations with Vietnam. But all want good relations with the United States. So our asset in Asia is if we conduct our policy skillfully that we can be closer to each of them than they are to each other. We can afford friendly relations and we should have friendly relations with all Asian countries, and then at critical moments can throw our weight in the direction most compatible with our values, our purposes, and our perception of the requirements of stability. This, of course, presupposes that we have a clear idea of what these are and that we cultivate these relationships, and therefore we have to be careful not to get trapped into one-issue problems unless they are of truly overriding importance.

Now, I do not present this as an exhaustive view of our challenges, but I want to end as I began. The United States now needs some agreed, hopefully bipartisan, approach to the new world that is emerging. I hear it often said that in this new world there are new issues like environment, population, immigration, economics—and that is absolutely true, and we have to be ready to understand and guide them. But it is also true that in many parts of the world the perception of international affairs has been more fragmented, and that it requires a degree of American leadership that is subtler and more differentiated than was necessary during the Cold War.

I do not claim that I have an answer to every policy problem. I have tried to lay out the conceptual challenges that we face, and having done so, I would be glad to answer your questions. Thank you very much.

Chairman THURMOND. We will now proceed with questions. Since Dr. Kissinger has to leave at 12:30, we will limit the time of questions in the first round to 7 minutes to ensure every member present has an opportunity to ask questions.

Dr. Kissinger, in your recent book, "Diplomacy," you describe at length the difficulty U.S. leaders have had in the past transitioning from one major era to another. As we proceed with another such historical transition, should we be seeking a unifying theme or doctrine to guide us, much as containment did during the Cold War?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is not so easy to come up with one unifying theme. I can state some negative—well, I will say one positive one. I think it is important for us to pay more attention to the Western Hemisphere than was necessary in the previous period.

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Second, I believe we have a national interest to prevent the domination of either Europe or Asia by one potential superpower. Therefore, we have an interest in a close relationship with Western and Central Europe as part of the same system with us, and also to bring about, as far as Europe is concerned, an evolution in Russia that is compatible with these objectives.

In this respect, and I should have covered this in my remarks, there are two schools of thought. One is that we should try to concentrate on shaping Russian domestic institutions and supporting particular leaders. There is another school of thought to which I belong that holds we are likely to be most effective by trying to affect Russian foreign policy. We dealt with in the Cold War both communism and imperialism, and while communism has been defeated, the trend toward imperialism still exists. And so from that point of view, I believe a clear definition of foreign limits, together with a conciliatory approach within those, is the best strategy.

In Asia, I think I have sketched what I believe our policy should be.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, could you briefly outline for the committee how you see U.S. national security interests, and how you would categorize and rank these?

Dr. KISSINGER. How would I rank American security interests? Well, I really believe I would give those three areas that I covered about equal priority. If you ask me to describe the challenges to our national security, I would mention that the growth of Islamic Fundamentalists may present the most serious immediate challenge to us. Attacking, as it does, all the moderate secular regimes in the Middle East, it could produce mass migrations and great upheavals that would undermine both the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis but also the general stability in the Middle East.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, during the Cold War, U.S. national security interests were often viewed as synonymous with containment of the Soviet threat and the spread of communism. As we face an era of greater uncertainty, should we continue to look to threats as the principal source for driving national security strategy?

Dr. KISSINGER. I missed the last part of the question.

Chairman THURMOND. As we face an era of greater uncertainty, should we continue to look to threats as the principal source for driving national security strategy?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is a different situation than it was during the Cold War. In the Cold War we could size our military forces in relation to specific threats. In the next period, we have to develop our military forces in regard to potential situations that might arise, even though we cannot define the individual threat precisely. And so we do not have the advantage of a yardstick in which we simply measure how much the Soviet Union has. We have to think of potential situations of instability, and this means, to my mind, that we need mobile forces, forces with lift capability; that we need a high degree of reconnaissance ability of a different kind than we needed during the Cold War. [Pause.]

Chairman THURMOND. My time is now up. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

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Dr. Kissinger, I listened with great interest to what you have had to say. I would like to ask this dual question of you because I think it is related, with the new challenges that we have with regard to our budget, I would like to ask you if you have any opinions on the future level of defense funding that you think is necessary on an annual basis. I do not know whether you have studied that or not. If so, I would like your statement on that.

We have heavy obligations around the world. Sometimes I almost yearn for the return to the days of yesteryear when we had a more defined policy and to the Cold War that we knew pretty much what to do and how to do it. Do you have any ideas on dollar-wise defense spending? If you have addressed it, I would like to have your recommendation.

And that ties into what I would like to ask you whether you think the ability to fight and win two regional wars nearly simultaneously is a logical, proper definition which should be guiding our defense policies. If not, what other kind of a formula would you suggest we use?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I really do not think, Senator, I have a contribution to make on funding levels. I have read the various studies that have been made by Congressional Budget Office, by the Heritage Foundation, and many of them seem to emphasize shortcomings in readiness, but I have no opinion of my own as to what the appropriate level is. I personally, for example, believe that we have to look at missile defense, which would be an additional funding requirement. But I would not want to put a specific number on it.

Now, the problem with the two war scenario, on the one hand, in the present period it is not so easy to describe even one war that we might be fighting. On the other hand, it is true that if we fought one war we must not be in a position where if, for example, we get drawn into a conflict in Korea, Iran or some other country in the Middle East believes that it now has a free pass to achieve whatever objectives it has to unsettle the situation there. So it seems to me a reasonable proposition not to be in a situation where if we are involved somewhere we are then naked everywhere else. Now, whether you express it as a two-war or how you express it, I think the concept is one that I find acceptable.

Senator EXON. Let us talk about North Korea a little more. You addressed it some in your testimony. From your viewpoint, has the passing of Kim Il-song made chances of reaching more accommodations with North Korea more difficult or less?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not met anybody in Asia or anywhere else, including close neighbors of Korea, who have any idea of what is going on in Pyongyang. Nobody has met Kim Il-song's son, and nobody knows whether he has inherited it or has been shunted aside. So I am not sure that one can define it entirely in terms of openness or its opposite.

There is a school of thought that argues North Korea is going to collapse. As I have indicated, there are some neighbors that may not like North Korea but also are not eager to see it collapse. So this is question we will have continuously to reexamine, because I do believe that whatever we think of the terms of this North Korean nuclear agreement, it will not go to the end of its term, and,

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therefore, we will constantly be up against pushing against the edges of this, unless the North Korean regime collapses, of which I have no opinion. But that will not be determined by the openness of its present leaders, but by the decrepitude of the overall economic situation.

Senator EXON. One last question, and then I will allow things to move along. I was very pleased with your assessment of NATO, how important NATO is, and I think, Dr. Kissinger, people like you who have had experience and helped put NATO together are ones that we should be listening to with regard to its future. When I hear the views of some, such as NATO has outlived its usefulness, it is pretty shocking. I think that we have got to be awfully careful in this area.

Let me have you amplify briefly, if you can, on the concerns that are making the rounds in Congress today with regard to how NATO plays into the obligations of the United Nations and that the United States should not be a police-keeping action force for the United Nations. It seems to me like with all of these concerns that we have, whether or not we should ever have an American soldier under some commander that might not be an American, can you sum up how you feel about these concerns and how serious you think they are?

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to your first question, NATO is the only institutional framework that links America to Western and Central Europe. The unification of Germany has upset many of the presuppositions on which the Cold War system was based and therefore the relationship between the various European nations to each other depends crucially on a continued American participation. And considering the uncertainties, to put it mildly, of what happens to the East of Central Europe, I think that NATO remains vital. However, it must be given a new geographical definition, must be given a new political definition, and within it the role and responsibilities of Europe, could probably be increased.

Now, on the relationship of NATO to peacekeeping, insofar as this refers to Bosnia, I believe it was a grave mistake to marry a NATO participation to a U.N. participation. Those are two totally different institutions.

Second, I believe there is a general proposition if American forces are used they should be for purposes that can, at a minimum, be strongly shared by ordinary Americans and that are not defined in the first instance by international institutions. Therefore, if NATO uses its military force, there should be a clear NATO objective, and there should not be two layers, one of NATO and then another one in which the U.N., which really is, as I said before, a system of collective security operating by different maxims. So mixing the two together was almost bound to lead to a misunderstanding.

Third, with respect to Bosnia, while it is true that the Europeans have not done everything we wanted, there has also been a gap between some of our American stated objectives and what we were willing to do to back them up. So as a general proposition, I believe, when American forces are used they should be for purposes, of course together with allies when appropriate, but that can clearly be related to American national interests, and they should not be defined in the first instance by international organizations.

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I would also make a distinction between peacekeeping that is where an agreement has already been reached and the question is primarily to police it, and peacemaking which is where you are trying to impose a settlement on two conflicting parties. And I think the latter, which requires the use of military force in an affirmative way, should be particularly governed by the need to define an American interest in relation to it.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Before calling on Senator Warner, I want to take this opportunity to welcome Senator Kempthorne back to today's hearing. He has been absent lately from the committee activities while managing the unfunded mandates bill. We are happy to have him back. He did an excellent job on the unfunded mandates bill, and we are pleased to have him as a member of this committee.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your comments. I appreciate it greatly.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Dr. Kissinger, an excellent presentation, and I would like to pick up on that last point and see if we can draw from your wisdom a tight definition to guide the future decision-making as it relates to the deployment of U.S. troops abroad. We saw in the Somalia action a quick switch of public opinion after the tragic loss of a number of our troops in a combat situation, a clamor by Congress to return our troops home by Christmas, and a very narrow vote margin by which Congress decided to let the President make the decision to withdraw our troops in March.

In the Haiti situation, in my judgment, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate, if they had had the opportunity, would have voted in favor of sending the troops into Haiti.

As we look at our defense budget today, the likelihood of added funds, given the balanced budget drive, is not likely. This committee is on record seeking a level funding in real terms comparable to last year's level. It seems to me that the way we will have to invoke savings, if you want to put it that way, is to send our forces abroad in fewer instances, and we must have a clearer definition as to those situations into which we will put our troops, be it peace-making, which has a high risk of combat, or peacekeeping, which has a lesser but still a risk of combat losses.

So how would you define the criteria by which our President should make the decision to send troops abroad?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me first state my reaction to the two instances you mentioned.

I had great doubts, which I expressed at the time, about the initial decision by the Bush administration to send troops to Somalia. Because I did not believe that the distribution of food, however worthy as a humanitarian objective, was something for which American combat forces should be used. And I feared that this would lead to an open-ended commitment.

The current administration escalated our commitment even further by wanting the United States to involve itself in nation-building in Somalia.

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I believe we had a humanitarian interest in distributing food, but no security interest. I believe we had no national interest in using combat troops to build a nation in Somalia. And, therefore, we got ourselves involved in something that was likely to cause casualties that the American public would not support.

I had my doubts about the operation in Haiti on a number of grounds. There is something anomalous about asking the concurrence of the United Nations but not the concurrence of the Congress.

Second, some of the arguments we used in supporting the incursion—or whatever one calls it technically—in Haiti for the first time granted outside nations a right to intervene in the Western Hemisphere which, since the Monroe Doctrine, we have consistently rejected. And it also tended to put on an equal level what we were doing in Haiti with the sort of thing that the Russians later did in Chechnya.

So, there again, while I had great sympathy for the objective, I had my doubts about the use of American military forces. As a general proposition, I think American military forces should be used only in cases of demonstrable threats to American security either immediately or in a situation where it is reasonable to argue that if one does not resist at that point, one will face graver threats growing out of that first threat further down the road. Which is what I think was the case in the Gulf war.

Senator WARNER. So let me clarify the use of the word security. You mean national security interests?

Dr. KISSINGER. American national security interests.

Now, those can have a global significance. I would find it perfectly rational for somebody to say we have to defend Country X; because if we do not do that, the consequences down the road will so threaten American security then that a much bigger effort will be needed. Which is what, more or less, was the case in the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

But I would be very careful not to use combat forces for the achievement of preferences that are not related to demonstrable security concerns.

Senator WARNER. National security?

Dr. KISSINGER. National security.

Senator WARNER. Now, let us turn to the NATO Partnership for Peace. You have taken issue with the Partnership for Peace. And you said here that it will create a vacuum between the borders.

But, as I look at your analysis, you put in a very important condition here. And that is, in the treaty with Russia that you advocate—the NATO and Russia treaty—you would include a provision that no foreign troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members.

Now, to me this would be giving these new member states a political fig leaf of NATO membership, but withholding an essential element to provide Article V protection; namely, the presence of forward-deployed troops. You would be placing the NATO commanders at a handicap, a risk, of their troops to transit the territory to get to the troubled areas if they were not allowed to be in a forward-deployed position.

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Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I would distinguish the technical implemen-
tation of the extension of NATO from the political extension of
NATO. Because the Russians at this moment are at the borders of
Poland, for example, in only a very limited area. Between them and
Poland is Belarus and Ukraine. And since I believe that the inde-
pendence of at least Ukraine, but probably also Belarus, is very im-
portant for European stability.

One could relate those two commitments to each other, so that
if the Russians did violate the independence of those countries, ob-
viously those provisions would no longer apply. But I believe, in
any event, that the Article V guarantees, together with some of the
common exercises and the prepositioning of equipment, could
produce a security situation which would make it very risky to at-
tack these countries.

Senator WARNER. I thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I note with appreciation the primacy that you—the
primary role that you give Western Hemisphere policy. I think it
is very significant. And as you said, traditionally, and probably in
past years, you would have listed the Atlantic Alliance as number
one.

Dr. KISSINGER. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I agree with you with that listing.

And may I say, incidentally, that I also appreciate your support
this morning of President Clinton's action on Tuesday. Because I
do think it was an exercise of leadership in a situation in which
the public opinion polls, at least, say it was not popular, but he did
what was necessary and what was right.

I wanted to ask you in this regard, as a member of this commit-
tee, whether there are any strategic, security, or military implica-
tions or any particular focus that this committee should have in re-
sponse to the primacy of Western Hemisphere interests that the
United States has?

Dr. KISSINGER. What is implied for the kind of forces that we
built?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, would you deploy more in this region?
I mean, it is hard at the moment to see any obvious threat to our
security from this hemisphere.

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not think that the primary challenge in the
Western Hemisphere is security. The primary challenge in the
Western Hemisphere is economic growth and democratic evolution.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER. And I do not believe that it is necessary for the
United States to change the disposition of its forces significantly
based on the new primacy to be given to Western Hemisphere rela-
tions.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, I appreciate that.

I suppose Americans have always struggled with a kind of isola-
tionist instinct and a competing interest in internationalism, and
we are doing it now. As the exchange you had with Senator Warner
suggests, the public response to humanitarian crisis as they see
them on TV then pulls back when there are human consequences
as there were in Somalia, but does not respond—as I think in a

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way they are doing now—in Mexico because they do not see the suffering. It is harder to understand the national interest.

In that regard, you made a statement that I want to ask you to draw out a bit. And that is that the United States has a national interest in preventing one superpower from dominating Europe or Asia. And I wanted to ask you just to explain in a little more detail what that national interest is.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, we fought two World Wars to prevent a potentially hostile country from dominating Europe. And the reasoning seems to have been that such a country marshalling the resources of that region would, in time, threaten American security. I think this would be even more true with respect to Asia, where the resources are larger and the population is much more extensive.

Now, in Europe, this requirement has changed somewhat due to the fact of European unification and due to the fact that Europeans are now playing a primarily economic and political and less a strategic role.

In Asia, that reality still exists. On the other hand, it is not something we have to invent. Because I do not believe that any of the major Asian nations that I mentioned can achieve the domination of Asia without opposition from the others.

We do not have to be the principal opponent of a hegemonial power. We do have to know where our priorities are in conducting our day-to-day policy. And if we conduct it skillfully and consistently, we should be able to prevent the situation from arising where we have to vindicate this objective by military means.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I was going to ask that question which is, in Asia, is the potential threat from a superpower emerging to the United States economic or military?

Dr. KISSINGER. It could become both.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER. But we have to remember, I believe one reason we entered the Korean war was the fear that not to oppose Communist domination of Korea might shake the political orientation of Japan and certainly the political stability of Japan.

Senator LIEBERMAN. A final question: I was interested—as I was in a way by the primacy you gave to the Western Hemisphere interests in your opening remarks, and I know they were not intended to be all-inclusive—that you did not mention the Middle East much at all.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. And I would like to ask you about how you would rank our interests in the Middle East at this point, and, if there is time, how you would evaluate the current peace process there.

Dr. KISSINGER. I was noticing I was running out of time, and I thought this is a question that would come up.

I think our interests in the Middle East are very large. But the way to deal with them is extremely complex, because we have several levels of problems. We have the Arab-Israeli conflict. Then we have the conflict within the Islamic world which may or may not be affected by the Arab-Israeli conflict—the conflict between the

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secular radicals and the fundamentalist radicals in the Middle
East.

And at this meeting today in Cairo, there is actually a common
interest that all the participants have, even if they cannot avow it,
to resist the Islamic fundamentalism that is trying to undermine
the peace process between Israel and the PLO, and thereby also
the position of governments like Jordan and Egypt that have been
supporting it.

So our policy in that area should be to encourage the peace proc-
ess, which we have been doing, and to strengthen the moderate re-
gimes.

I would add that I keep reading about dialogue we are supposed
to have with the fundamentalists. I believe that will prove as
unavailing and as undermining the moderates as was the case in
Iran 20 years ago.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kissinger, I think Senator Hutchison has referred to your
book on diplomacy, which I looked—it contains 912 pages, includ-
ing the footnotes and bibliography, which is probably the shortest
book you have ever written. And a number of us have read parts,
if not all, of it. But I am loathe to try to summarize what you took
912 pages to put forward.

But it seems to me the axiom that ideals without technique fre-
quently is a mess and technique without ideals ends up usually
being a menace. And I think we could apply that, for example, to
Bosnia as being a current-day mess and Germany under Hitler or
Russia under Stalin and his successors as being the menace.

And Senator Lieberman has pointed out, the United States is fre-
quently caught in a sort of schizophrenic conflict, being moved on
the one hand by Wilsonian idealism and spreading American-con-
ceived notions of democracy to other parts of the world, at the same
time being gripped in a state of isolationism from time to time.

And on three occasions during this century, we have proposed
creating a so-called New World Order and have been unsuccessful
in doing that.

And today we are still struggling with your recommendation, as
I suppose it is, to balance our Wilsonian idealism with what you
have called a geopolitical balance of power, which your critics, over
the years, have dismissed as being either too cynical, too manipula-
tive, too Bismarckian, or whatever the label has been.

But it seems to me that that is really the challenge that we face
in foreign policy—how to forge a balance between our ideals and
also balancing our interests, and to do so on a bipartisan basis,
which is not an easy chore to do.

I was curious about a comment in your book, where you said,
"Not every evil can be combated by America, not to mention by
America alone, but some monsters need to be slain, or, if not slain,
at least restrained. And what is needed most is selectivity."

And I would like to talk about what monsters need to be if not
slain, at least restrained, and, specifically, Russia.

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In 1993, we passed a providing aid to Russia, and we conditioned it upon Russia recognizing and respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbors.

Following that, the State Department came back with a report that submitted it endorsed the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it essentially asserted the United States did not know what was going on on the part of the Russian military, and frankly did not intend to try and find out. This was met with some dissatisfaction on Capitol Hill, and we required a report.

They filed a report last year which, while more candid, was labelled "Secret," even though much of the information certainly could have been made public.

And I mention this because just this week I received a briefing from the State Department about the Russian military operations in the Newly Independent States, which I think is remarkable for its incompleteness and, I would suggest, even its fawning character.

It is not written as a public declaration of policy, but it is intended really as a statement to guide about a dozen of us or less who are going over to the Wehrkunde Conference this weekend in Munich. So I think it is not entirely inappropriate for me to quote it to you.

It said, "The United States supports the independence and sovereignty of all NIS states. Full sovereignty includes the right to enter into arrangements such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, or to seek bilateral assistance as initially occurred in Georgia."

I find that a stunning statement, because the Russian military was in fact responsible for helping to foment the civil war in Georgia, nearly bringing Shevardnadze to his knees. And I think we have overlooked the symbolic significance of the embarrassment of Shevardnadze, who was attacked by the Russian nationalists as such—as helping to bring down the U.S.S.R. and the fall of the Berlin Wall, et cetera.

But, nonetheless, having brought him to his knees, then rushing in and offering military aid, provided Georgia agreed to become a part of the CIS, the Commonwealth of Independent States, under the Russian banner. And they have been doing that in area after area with what seems to be the acquiescence on the part of the administration.

Which really is the long way of an introduction to a statement contained in your book on the danger in acquiescing and conduct that is inconsistent with our interests, until a point where it becomes not too late, but much more dangerous to intervene at that time.

And I was wondering about your views on what is taking place in Chechnya, because I think that your comments concerning the failure to express dissatisfaction with international behavior which violates our notions of good behavior, at least, and what are the consequences are for the United States in its dealings with Russia from this point on?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me just make a very brief comment on your first statement, about the relationship between idealism and prac-

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tical politics. And I am sure that brief statement is not going to
end the various comments you have cited.

Any assertion of the American national interest must take into
account the idealistic tradition of America. This country was
uniquely founded on a specific affirmation of liberties and on a
turning away from the practices of the European autocracies of this
period.

And I must say, for somebody who experienced living in a totali-
tarian state as I did in my youth, there is no doubt that the partici-
pation of America as a symbol of freedom and democracy is one of
the great events of history and one of the important factors of our
period.

At the same time, in translating these convictions, it is very easy
to posture and to assume that posturing is self-implementing. And
at the end of the day, political leaders have to be judged by their
capacity to move their society from where it is to where they would
like it to be, and not simply by affirming some general objective
which then becomes an alibi for inaction.

So in this sense, the difference between an academic and a pol-
icymaker is that the policymaker is responsible for the con-
sequences and must take into account also the penalties for failure,
and not only the descriptions of success. That still leaves plenty of
argument in any individual case.

Now, with respect to Russia: Of course, good relations with Rus-
sia are one of the key elements of stability in this world. The ques-
tion is whether one applies this to the goodwill of one group of
leaders or to practices of historic Russian policy.

As I indicated earlier, there are two elements in Russian historic
policy. One was communism; the other was imperialism. Russia
has been expanding in every generation, under czars and
commissars. It has changed its shape constantly. And its domestic
practices were enormously influenced by the need to hold down, in
effect, colonial peoples, whose only difference from the European
colonies was that they were at the borders of Russia, rather than
at some distance.

From that point of view, the Chechnya war is a colonial war.
That is, a territory that was acquired in the second half of the 19th
century is being kept under Russian control by force.

And the practices, even if one grants the Russians, as our State
Department did, that this is an organic part of Russia, the idea of
shelling one's own cities and driving hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple out into the snow, plus however many people get killed, shows
a kind of brutality which is not general in the world, and one
which we should not hesitate to condemn.

Now, in a general sense, our foreign policy objective with Russia
should be to induce Russia to stay within the borders accepted
internationally. And if one considers that St. Petersburg is closer
to New York than to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Se-
attle than to Moscow, they should not feel claustrophobic in staying
in that territory.

In fact, as you pointed out, Senator, there are Russian troops on
the territory of almost every former Republic. The civil wars are fo-
mented or encouraged by these troops that distribute arms in order

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to keep them going in Azerbaijan, in Georgia, and almost everywhere in the former Soviet Union.

This has not been opposed internationally. It is unprecedented that a nation keeps its troops on foreign territory to that extent. We cannot use military force to resist it. But I think it is important for Russia—George Kennan once said that the czarist empire collapsed because of overextension.

I believe, in the long run, one is doing Russia a favor by encouraging it, for the first time in its history, to stay at home and to develop its own resources. On that basis, there is no possible area of conflict between us and Russia.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Dr. KISSINGER. And I think we should politically oppose the undermining of the former Soviet Republics.

Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my welcome to Dr. Kissinger.

First, on the question of Russia, I think you have written that it is in our interest that Russia continue in its fitful way toward democratization and free market liberation. And we have done a few things, at least, to try to support that process.

Dr. KISSINGER. Right.

Senator LEVIN. Would you condition our support for those two processes on Russia changing its behavior in Chechnya, for instance?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would certainly condition it on Russian behavior in ending the placement of Russian troops all over the former Soviet territory. And in the case of Chechnya, I would be unhappy if we accepted the proposal for a summit issued while the Chechnya operation was going on. I do not know whether I would make the economic aid dependent on it.

Senator LEVIN. Now, relative to the NATO Partnership for Peace issue that you have addressed, in some of your writings you have said the following. You said there as you have here that we ought to make it very clear that we going to admit into NATO three or four countries. But you also have written—and I think that Senator Warner has made reference to this—the following: At the same time, NATO would propose a security treaty between the new NATO and Russia, to make clear that the goal is cooperation.

Would you tell us why you believe it is important that at the same time that we admit three or four additional countries into NATO that we propose a new agreement between the new NATO and Russia?

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not know whether I used the words "security treaty." If I did, it was unwise.

What I mean is this: We can have Russian participation in political dialogues that affect both NATO and Russia. And I believe that the European Security Conference is a good forum for this. And I would favor expanding that forum and giving Russia an opportunity to participate; and also to be meticulous about consulting with them about things we are doing in the Middle East, so that they do not feel it is aimed at them.

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But I would not give Russia a veto over expansion of NATO or continue what I take to be the present trend of believing that somehow we can maneuver them into acquiescence, which really means that the Europeans cannot count on us sticking to it. This ambiguity will undermine expansion and will not help us even in the Partnership.

Senator LEVIN. Putting aside the word "security" for a minute, do you still support a new NATO, the proposal of an agreement between new NATO and Russia?

Dr. KISSINGER. You are quoting me correctly, so I am not trying to weasel out of it. I have since talked to Scandinavian leaders, including Finnish and Norwegians, on the occasion of a trip there. And they have indicated doubts about a formal treaty, because they are afraid that it would lead to constant Russian intervention.

I still favor the concept, not so much of a treaty but, of the result of expanding political consultation with Russia, to make clear that this is a safety net and not the essence of our policy.

Senator LEVIN. On the North Korean agreement, would you like to see that agreement fully implemented? I know that you say you are skeptical that it will be. But is it in our interest that it be fully implemented as it is written?

Dr. KISSINGER. The part I do not like is that we seem to have acquiesced in, at least for an interim period, the North Korean retention of whatever nuclear capability they now have illegally. Which then, in turn, will affect the calculations of the Japanese and others as to their nuclear status.

If the agreement were implemented the way interpreted—that is, that the existing nuclear capability has to be destroyed in an early period, and full inspection has to be carried out—if all of that happened, then I would consider that a desirable outcome. But it is a 10-year period, and I find it very difficult to believe that it will go to the end.

Senator LEVIN. I understand that, but I think it is important that, since this is the subject of so much debate here, that we have a clear answer on this if implemented.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, my view is that what has already been given away cannot be retrieved. For the remainder, I would like to see it implemented.

Senator LEVIN. And, if implemented as it is written and said to be written, that that would be a plus for us?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes; except for the impact, what we have given away, will have on Japan and South Korea. But, yes, from that point on.

Senator LEVIN. Okay, from this point on?

Dr. KISSINGER. From this point on.

Senator LEVIN. Now, in terms of United Nations peacekeeping issues—and here using the word "peacekeeping" in the meaning that you have given to it, not peacemaking but peacekeeping—there has been some failures and some successes on the part of the United Nations. Do you believe that United Nations peacekeeping, at least, can provide a useful function?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, in situations like Cyprus, for example, or even Cambodia, where you have a clear-cut delimitation and where all the parties seem to be agreed to observe the delimitation, so

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that you are really trying to deal with violations at the edges, I
think United Nations peacekeeping can be useful.

In situations where the conflict between the parties continues,
like in Bosnia, where there are no clear delimitations, I think Unit-
ed Nations peacekeeping, absent a clear-cut statement of political
objective, is not going to work.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Dr. Kissinger.

Just to clarify your views on Korea again, do you believe that
this agreement should have been made with North Korea?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would have preferred a more confrontational approach. But, then, one should not recommend it unless one believes that it would have been really carried through. I do not think it was a good idea to create the impression that a single American interlocutor showing up that could change what was a systematic violation of a signed agreement, and then relying on another signed agreement to implement it.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, you said in your opening remarks that you believe that this agreement would—I believe you said—not come to term; it would fail at some point between now and the approximately 10-year period for full implementation. Why do you believe that is the case?

Dr. KISSINGER. Because basically what this agreement does is to delay the reprocessing of the material that the North Koreans have illegally removed from the reactor. But it does not prevent it. And it also stops—and that is the plus—the production of new plutonium.

In return, however, the illegal extraction of previous plutonium
is, more or less, accepted.

Now, the theory of the agreement is that at some point along the
way not yet defined, they will agree to let us inspect the waste ma-
terial. And at that point, if we find some violations, they will de-
 destroy whatever diversion has taken place.

We derived that from the implications of the Nonproliferation
Treaty from which they have already withdrawn on previous occa-
sions.

So I think that at every point, given the record of a country that,
in 1991, agreed to the denuclearization of Korea, and then with-
drew from it 2 years later—this is between South and North
Korea—that agreed to inspection of its facilities and withdrew from
it, I just find it very difficult to believe that all the many steps that
have to be taken will be carried on to term in this agreement, and
particularly as they have so meticulously retained the capability for
reprocessing through this whole period.

Senator MCCAIN. I agree. And I also believe that it will fail
sometime in perhaps the not-too-distant future.

Dr. Kissinger, you mentioned the impact on Japan of this United
States acquiescence to a violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty. Do you believe that also might have an affect on other
countries, such as Iran, who is now seeking light water reactors as
we are going to give to or ensure are given to North Korea? And

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what affect does our acquiescence to a blatant violation of the NPT
have on other nations throughout the world?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, that is, to me, the most worrisome part of the evolution. Because there is a blatant violation, at the end of which there is the provision of light water reactors and of oil, and of an agreement that grandfathers, at least for a substantial period of time, what has gone before. And I do not believe that that is an enormous discouragement to countries like Iran, aside from the fact that our bargaining position in urging China and France not to supply light water reactors to them.

Senator MCCAIN. Russia and France I believe.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes, Russia and France not to supply light water
reactors; it is not exactly strong.

Senator MCCAIN. You believe there is some connection? In other
words, it bolsters the argument for the Russians and the French
to—

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it is not easy to draw a distinction between
our supplying light water reactors to a violator and opposing the
supply of light water reactors to some country that has, as yet, not
violated.

Senator MCCAIN. Much to my astonishment, last week the Sec-
retary of Defense said there was absolutely no connection whatsoever.

Dr. Kissinger, let me just also point out that I agree with you
that we should not terminate this agreement or be the cause of its
breakdown; but I am also concerned about this sort of a creeping
kind of acquiescence to certain things that is taking place. We
found out we are now going to provide some $20 million to $30 mil-
lion to North Korea for different reasons.

We have found out there is now a guarantee, a letter from the
President of the United States, which we did not at the time, guar-
anteeing that funding for the reactor—or the President would do
everything in his power to guarantee the $4 billion and the reactor,
the 500,000 tons a year of oil, which now the first supply of that
was provided by the United States.

Now, in today's newspaper, the United States may have to store
North Korea's nuclear rods.

I am concerned that this kind of a creeping involvement in re-
sponsibility for this entire agreement is one that should give at
least the American taxpayers pause, particularly in light, for exam-
ple, of the recent disaster in Japan, which I think might give the
Japanese some rational for not supplying $4 billion worth of nu-
clear reactors.

I would appreciate your comment on that.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, essentially, if all the provisions were carried
out, then, starting on the day the agreement was made, it would
be not an undesirable outcome. I believe we should have stayed on
the course of sanctions, and achieved the concessions as a result of
our insisting on the Nonproliferation Treaty, rather than through
the intermediacy of creating the impression that this was some per-
sonal disagreement.

Second, one never knows what better deal might have emerged
out of such a process. And I believe it is fundamentally not desir-

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able to acquiescence in the violations, even for a, say, 10-year period.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Glenn.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, it is good to have you before the committee again.

You identified the growth of Islamic militant fundamentalism as a major challenge. And I certainly agree with that. And I do not think we know how to cope with it.

I remember a briefing some years ago where it was estimated that the Soviet Union, by the year 2000, would be 25 percent Islamic across that whole southern tier that now, some of them are independent.

Some of the militant fundamentalists see us as the Great Satan; it is their duty to oppose us, even if they sacrifice their lives. That just opens up the gates to Heaven and so on—the murder of innocents. And yet we see these countries that sponsor some of these terrorist programs actually moving very actively toward weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, biological.

We have the trial in New York. We know what can occur from some of this.

This does not respond to normal diplomacy. How would you cope with that? What specific actions would you take to deal with that?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I do not pretend that I have detailed answers to every danger that I can foresee. I think that first it is a question of attitude. I keep reading that some people, either in the government or close to the administration, are of the view that we should improve the dialogue with the fundamentalists in Algeria and elsewhere.

I believe that the practical result of this is to undermine the moderates, and it will do nothing for us with the fundamentalists, who are dedicated to overthrowing Western values and Western institutions, and who have a set of principles that are almost incomprehensible to us, like these suicide bombers.

Now, with respect to countries that assist terrorism, I believe that extremely tough sanctions are in order, and that if it can be shown that there are headquarters of terrorist groups, that then that should be incompatible with normal relations with the United States.

Senator GLENN. Well, I do not think anybody knows really how to deal with that thing.

Dr. KISSINGER. Nobody knows how to deal with it; you are right.

Senator GLENN. Now, a different area. You indicate U.S. forces should only be used where there are American national security interests. Do you consider humanitarian efforts to be in our interest? We come from a Judeo-Christian background—most of our country at least—where we want to help people. We see a million people starving in Somalia, we want to go help. We want to do the same thing in Rwanda. We want to do the same thing other places.

Would you eliminate those, or do you include those in your American national security interests?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, in Somalia, I strongly supported humanitarian relief efforts, and having American organizations help dis-

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tribute food. I have very serious questions about using American combat troops to distribute food unless there is an immediate emergency say, if there is an earthquake disaster or a tidal wave in Bangladesh, or something of that kind.

I can understand making American personnel available for a very limited period of time, but in conditions where, in order to distribute the food, one has to shoot one's way in, I think I would be very, very reluctant to do that.

Senator GLENN. I think to our credit that we saved probably a million lives in Somalia. But where it went awry was when we changed directions under the United Nations and supported that which was a whole different effort.

Dr. KISSINGER. If we had pulled out, say, in March. We went in
in December. If we had pulled out in March, before we escalated
the objective, I would have thought it was at the margin, but a use-
ful exercise.

Senator GLENN. You say that if we include some of the new na-
tions in NATO, that we should not have troops stationed in those
new nations. Does that not sort of make a second-class citizenship
for those people?

We are including them because supposedly there may be some
threat. They see a desire to be included in NATO for their own sta-
bility and their own protection, yet we are saying that even though
something would develop along your borders that looks very threat-
ening, we would have a policy of not putting troops in there.

Is that not sort of a second-class or associate membership that
they are not going to want?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, of course, if there were an actual threat,
that situation would change. But one has to look at the fact that
the NATO forces are now not being deployed along established
lines of the Cold War anyway. The NATO forces are becoming
much more intervention forces—at least the American forces are
becoming a strategic reserve for rapid intervention, and, in any
case, should not be deployed in a line, wherever one draws the de-
marcation line—and the German forces would be fairly close.

So I do not think that this is an insuperable problem, together
with prepositioning equipment and exercises that could be taken.

Senator GLENN. Thank you for your comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Thank you, Senator.

The Senator from Texas.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to say thank you very much for coming. I am sorry I am
going to have to leave after my questions. But I think that you
have put a lot of our dilemma into context, and we appreciate it
and I hope you will continue to do that.

I have two questions. The first, I would like to follow up on Sen-
ator Glenn and Senator Levin's comments with regard to the Unit-
ed Nations. It is very difficult to see what has happened with the
United Nations, particularly in Somalia, where it seems that the
United Nations changed the policy there and turned it from peace-
keeping into nationbuilding. And our troops were there on the line.
And I, for one, believe that we did not take the steps necessary to
override that United Nations policy change.

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How would you advise us in Congress to put the United Nations in context for its very important mission, able to do peacekeeping where there is a peace treaty, but not to let it encroach on our use of force or encroach on NATO, which has a very different mission?

Dr. KISSINGER. I must say, to some extent, in the defense of the United Nations, they did not make us extend our objectives in Somalia; we did it ourselves. You can find many statements by our United Nations Ambassador and others that list the extension of the objective as a desirable goal. The question really is whether the United Nations use of force is more responsible than the American exercise of force.

And many of the people who believe in multilateral solutions are of the view that a United Nations mandate is morally more trustworthy than a national mandate. But, on Somalia, it was not the United Nations that made us extend our mandate; we did it as an American initiative.

As a general proposition, I do not believe that American lives should be risked without, in the first instance, being able to demonstrate why it concerns the families whose sons and daughters would be at risk. Of course, it is always desirable to have other nations support us. And a wise application of American national interest would take into account the general objectives.

But, in the first instance, if one cannot demonstrate to the families concerned why their sons and daughters' lives are at risk, I do not believe American forces should be used. That is the principal objective. One starts with that and builds on it.

Second, as a general proposition, American forces should be under American command. And what the United Nations tends to build into it, which is a series of safeguards and a series of individual decisions, may be compatible with peacekeeping. It is generally not compatible with fast-moving combat situations or with peace-making.

And I would make a sharp distinction there.

Senator HUTCHISON. I agree with you totally on your standard for the use of our military. I think there is a difference between a United States interest and a United States security interest. But what I am asking is how would you define the role of the United Nations and keep us from having the encroachment that we did in Somalia, whether it was the administration's fault or Congress for not realizing it, where do you think the line should be drawn on United Nations missions adopted by us and helped by us, but then putting parameters around those missions so that we do not fall into the use of our troops when we are not in control?

Dr. KISSINGER. As a fundamental proposition, the United Nations can perform many useful and indispensable diplomatic functions, and many humanitarian and technical functions. I do not believe that military operations ought, as a general proposition, to be conducted by the United Nations.

Now, I make a distinction here between something like the Gulf war, which was largely an American and allied operation or the Korean war, for which we got United Nations consensus, from going to the Security Council and agreeing to participate in military operations about which we are at least not absolutely sure.

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And I, as a general proposition, do not favor United Nations peacemaking operations.

Senator HUTCHISON. So you would basically back off from United Nations troops doing peacekeeping missions in a military atmosphere?

Dr. KISSINGER. When there is an agreement—an international agreement that is accepted by all the parties, and one needs some way of policing it so that what the peacekeepers do is make a factual determination, but do not have to enforce it primarily, I think the United Nations can play a useful role.

When the issue is open, or the outcome is open, as in Bosnia, and the United Nations is asked to engage in a series of military operations, then I think it becomes untenable because the United Nations will always want to control every last step, and the military necessities are really quite fluid. And I do not believe we should be involved in peacemaking.

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. Senator Coats.

Senator COATS. Dr. Kissinger, thank you for your always insightful testimony.

I wonder if I could just tag onto an issue we have been discussing relative to the situation in Russia. I appreciate your thoughts on that, and you discussed it before. Do you see the current situation in Russia, and particularly the involvement in Chechnya, as a serious threat to democratic reforms?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we are making a mistake conducting foreign policy with Russia on a semi-psychiatric basis, and assessing how what we do or fail to do affects the future of one leader whom we have defined as democratic.

The evolution of Russia, which has such a different history from ours, is very uncertain. I look at what was done in Chechnya as classic Russian imperialist reaction. This is what a czar would have done and what a Soviet leader would have done.

Even if you say Chechnya is part of Russia, the brutality with which it was suppressed tells us something about the nature of the system. I cannot believe that an American President would permit shelling an open city of Americans.

Now, we have business with Russia. I can respect the need to continue to conduct business with Russia. I just do not want to have it put as if our goal in Moscow was domestic policy.

I believe that the trends in Russia at this moment are not in a pluralistic direction, and that the existing Government of Russia is appealing to the nationalist, and therefore imperialist, elements.

Senator COATS. We have not really discussed Iran. They have been fairly quiet for the last 4 or 5 years. But could you just give us a brief assessment on the situation in Iran, where they are going and what influence they might play in the future in the Middle East?

Dr. KISSINGER. I talked to one of the key people in the Bush administration only recently, and asked him this question, of what he knew. And he said, you know, when he was in office, every month he asked for an assessment of this question and he never could get a straight answer, because apparently we did not know very much. I do not know whether our knowledge has increased.

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From what I can learn, my impression is that Rafsanjani is in the process of being replaced by more radical elements, not that I saw any great signs of conciliation even from Rafsanjani.

Senator COATS. I would assume you would see that as a potentially serious problem?

Dr. KISSINGER. Iran and Islamic fundamentalism stands for the undermining of the Governments of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and all the moderate regimes, and certainly of all the pro-Western regimes in the area. That is the objective thrust of their policy.

Senator COATS. Could you speak to the Israeli-Syria peace attempts, and particularly the equation of stationing U.S. troops on the Golan as a condition of that agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. I will tell you exactly what I have said to my Israeli friends. I told them that if I am asked before an agreement is made, I will say I am not in favor of it. If I am asked after an agreement is made that includes American troops in the Golan as an element, I will swallow it.

I know that may sound like a weaseling answer.

If an agreement is already made, I think it should be carried out. I understand why Rabin, whom I greatly appreciate, who I think is one of the outstanding leaders that I have known, why he wants this as reassurance to his own public. And I have great compassion for that.

And, in the end, I might acquiescence in it. I would feel happier if an agreement were made that did not include this.

Senator COATS. You would swallow it, but it would be a difficult swallow?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator COATS. Do you view that stationing of U.S. troops at the Golan Heights in the American national security interest?

Dr. KISSINGER. If you would stretch it to say that we are trying to prevent another Middle East war. I would prefer it if American forces were not involved in every determination of every incident that may occur there.

And I notice that an agreement that was negotiated in 1974 on the Golan Heights has been meticulously observed by the Syrians without the presence of American forces.

Senator COATS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my times has expired.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Santorum.

Senator SANTORUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. KISSINGER. But I do want to say that I have great sympathy for the way Prime Minister Rabin is conducting a heartbreaking negotiation.

Senator SANTORUM. Dr. Kissinger, I just wanted to follow up on Senator Coats' question. My question is: What mission would you foresee American troops playing on the Golan if in fact they were deployed? What possible mission could they perform?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not seen the actual proposal. My understanding is that their role would be strictly peacekeeping and not peace-enforcing and that they should act as a guarantee that the disarmament provisions are being maintained.

My concern is they are awfully close to a lot of desperate people, much more so than in the Sinai.

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Senator SANTORUM. Do you see this as a mission that is solely an American mission to perform, or could it be performed by other peacekeeping troops?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, the problem is—and I have sympathy for the Israeli position—they do not trust many of the potential candidates to be fair-minded even in keeping a record of whether the peace is being maintained.

Senator SANTORUM. Let me jump to another subject—my final question—and that is your comments on NATO with respect to the entry into NATO of such countries as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, and your support of that.

Could you provide any more detail as to a time line for such entry and any conditions, other than you mentioned, such as not placing troops in any of those countries, that you would have upon entry of those countries into NATO?

Dr. KISSINGER. In my view, the current administration policy confuses the issue. They say it is subject to study, that expansion is open, that anybody can apply. And therefore, you really do not know whether they are talking about the Partnership for Peace including all the successes of the Soviet Union or NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.

I believe that the principle ought to be settled quickly. There is nothing to be learned by a study. We know exactly what the issues are. What it needs is a decision.

I would make the decision fairly quickly—quickly, not just fairly quickly.

The implementation of it, of what forces you move, when, can be extended over a period of time. But every major NATO decision has required American leadership. It was never our practice to say, "Let us see what you all think," which will be vitiated by the fact that so many of these countries are afraid that if they get out in front, we will pull out the rug from under them.

So until there is a clear-cut American position, this is an issue that will not get settled.

Senator SANTORUM. And you believe the American position should be to let them in, and you think we should decide this immediately?

Dr. KISSINGER. I think we should recommend it immediately.

Senator SANTORUM. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

Senator WARNER. Senator Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would ask that my opening statement be made part of the record.

Senator WARNER. Without objection.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Dr. Kissinger, I think it is an honor to have you testifying before this committee.

The first question I would like to ask you really is a bit of a follow-up to what Senator Cohen was asking. Should Congress continue to support the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle and secure Russia's excess nuclear weapons regardless of that country's behavior in places such as Chechnya?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, it depends whether you consider this an aid program or a facilitating program. As a general proposition, I would make aid programs dependent on Russian behavior. And I probably would continue on the Nunn-Lugar road.

/successors

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Senator KEMPTHORNE. And you had mentioned that we should make strong statements perhaps condemning the actions in Chechnya. But what else can we do besides firm statements, and should we?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think we have to, on a number of these issues, we should make it clear to Russia that it is paying a price in political relationships.

Now, Chechnya is a different issue, from a legal point of view, from the presence of Russian troops, say, in Georgia. Because Chechnya is recognized by us as a part of Russia. And while it has all the earmarks of a colonial war, at a minimum, it is from a legal point of view not something on which we have normally taken an international position. But we can and should take a human rights position.

And I found it painful to read the statements that, in effect, supported both the action and the general attitude of Russia in Chechnya.

With respect to Russian troops in the former Republics of the So-
viet Union, I would think our foreign policy, our aid and other
measures, should be related to Russia observing norms of inter-
national conduct.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. Thank you.

How do you see the value of nuclear weapons in the next 10 to
20 years? Have these weapons lost their value, or are they still the
foundation of U.S. security?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, they are certainly the foundations of Amer-
ican security in any global confrontational sense.

With respect to the local issues in which we may be involved, we
have meticulously refrained in the past from using nuclear weap-
ons. And I can foresee no circumstances in which we are likely to
use them or should use them in the future.

On the other hand, it seems to me also likely that nuclear weap-
ons will spread to more and more countries, and that the best we
can do, even though we should try to arrest it, our efforts will prob-
ably be largely to slow it down. Therefore, I believe that we have
to keep open the options of missile defense in our own strategy, ini-
tially on a territorial basis, but, in the long run, even on a con-
tinental basis. Because the arguments that mutual balance of ter-
ror would deter does not apply to the same extent, or at all, once
nuclear weapons spread beyond a certain point.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. When you look into the future, what is the next nation or collection of nations that you see challenging the United States for military supremacy?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, not necessarily military supremacy, but one
could imagine—I think it would probably be in Asia.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. And any more definition than that? Any
specific countries?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I better stop here.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. And, Dr. Kissinger, if you could give us one piece of advice regarding national security policies—if I were to go away from this very beneficial hearing with the one point you would like to drive home, what would that one point be?

Dr. KISSINGER. I would pick up from the point that was made
early in the hearing by the Chairman and by Senator Warner and

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With respect to Russian troops in the former Republics of the Soviet Union, I would think our foreign policy, our aid and other measures, should be related to Russia observing norms of international conduct.

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, they are certainly the foundations of American security in any global confrontational sense.

With respect to the local issues in which we may be involved, we have meticulously refrained in the past from using nuclear weapons. And I can foresee no circumstances in which we are likely to use them or should use them in the future.

On the other hand, it seems to me also likely that nuclear weapons will spread to more and more countries, and that the best we can do, even though we should try to arrest it, our efforts will probably be largely to slow it down. Therefore, I believe that we have to keep open the options of missile defense in our own strategy, initially on a territorial basis, but, in the long run, even on a continental basis. Because the arguments that mutual balance of terror would deter does not apply to the same extent, or at all, once nuclear weapons spread beyond a certain point.

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others. The need for the United States to develop some idea com-
parable to the containment theory in the late-forties that can act
as a guide to us in making security decisions, and hopefully will
serve as the basis for a bipartisan foreign policy. Because it is too
dangerous to have major fluctuations with every change of political
direction.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. All right. Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kempthorne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRK KEMPTHORNE

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for scheduling today's hearing with our distin-
guished visitor, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger is truly
one of the great national security thinkers of this century and I know the committee
will benefit greatly from this hearing.

It is my hope that today's hearing will help the committee gain a better understanding of the strategy and requirements that justify our Armed Forces today. Earlier this week, the committee had a classified briefing on the proliferation threat of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, biological weapons, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. This briefing clearly showed that the world remains a very dangerous place. Countries hostile to U.S. national security interest are acquiring more and more sophisticated weapons. All of these trends demonstrate that American military forces must remain strong and ready to meet the current and future challenges to our interests. I know this hearing will serve as a major contribution to the efforts of this committee and I want to thank Dr. Kissinger for taking the time to come before our committee.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, we are going to make your deadline. But I would like to
ask two brief questions. First, as you know, a central issue here in
the United States and particularly here in the Congress is the di-
versity of opinion on the unilateral lifting by the United States of
the present arms embargo against Bosnia.

Do you have a view on that?

Dr. KISSINGER. I wish I had put 12 o'clock as my deadline.
[Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. If you think that is bad, wait until the next one.

Dr. KISSINGER. About 2 years ago, I wrote an article in which I said if there were not a settlement within I think a month, or, at any rate, a short time, I would favor the unilateral lifting of the embargo. Because at that time, the Serbian forces seemed to have an extraordinary advantage.

In the present circumstances, the Bosnians have received quite a bit of arms, it would raise the issue of, first, would we then send training missions? How would these arms be allocated between Croatians and Muslims, since they would have to go through Croatian territory? And how would we react to a Serbian offensive that would take place in order to forestall this re-equipment?

Unless we are able to answer those questions, I would be very
uneasy about a unilateral lifting of the embargo.

Senator WARNER. And, personally, I share those views and have
consistently voiced the same concerns as you have had in the last
year.

Let us turn to the ABM Treaty. This is when I first had the
privilege of meeting with you in 1972, when I was working on the

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Incidence at Sea agreement and then had the privilege to go to Moscow when you accompanied President Nixon there in May 1972, at which time the ABM Treaty was signed.

In many ways, the treaty codified the central feature of the Cold War; that is, American and Soviet mutual vulnerability. But, in your view, have the strategic and political circumstances that led to this agreement significantly changed? And, as a consequence, should we sit down and determine what modification should be made to that treaty in light of these changed circumstances?

Dr. KISSINGER. That treaty represented two aspects. One, a codification of mutual vulnerability; and, second, a recognition that the Congress was going to cancel our ABM program anyway. So we had to trade it in while there was still something to be achieved for it.

I am being very frank.

If we could have had our own way, we would probably have preferred the original ABM program which we put forward, which was not so much aimed at the Soviet Union—although it would have raised the threshold even for Soviet Union—but would have made it much more difficult for third countries to attack the United States.

As the years went on, I became intellectually more and more dubious about the theory of mutual vulnerability, even under the conditions of the Cold War. It seemed to me unprecedented that a nation would say it would expose its entire population, when there was some means of protecting it, as a guarantee of peace. It has never been done before.

And while it was never easy to demonstrate that a perfect defense was possible, it was possible to demonstrate that the level—the entrance prize for attacking the United States could be raised. And that if, say, at that time, the Soviet Union had to calculate that to attack two American cities it had to launch 2,000 warheads, that was a different calculation than from just launching two warheads.

So I had become quite favorable to the SDI.

Now, in the present world, first of all, I believe that those of our allies who have the technological capability will build a missile defense for their own territories, and I believe that to be generally in our interest.

In a world in which nuclear weapons are likely to spread, however reluctant we are to see this, I believe that a minimum provision for the territorial defense of the United States is necessary so that we can raise the standard of our defense as the threat increases.

It simply seems to me something that will not be explicable to the American public of why it was that when there was a technological ability for some defense it was not taken. Now, what that means in relation to specific technologies and the relation of these technologies to specific treaties and how one would go about modifying these treaties, that is a different set of issues.

But I would believe that when conditions have changed so dramatically, one should reconsider even treaties that are 20 years old.

Senator WARNER. As you know, the administration is currently having discussions with Russia with respect to a demarcation be-

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tween what—and I use your words—the territorial missile systems which we call “theater,” and you said “intercontinental.”

Since that negotiating team for the United States for the ABM Treaty was under your direct supervision at that time in your position as first, National Security Advisor and then, Secretary of State, is there any record or recollection on your behalf that the subject of short-range theater systems, or as you say, territorial systems, would be covered by that treaty?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, of course, this is over 25 years ago or 23 years ago.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have no recollection that theater ballistic missile defense was ever discussed, above all, because I had never heard at that time or any program for theater missile defense.

Senator WARNER. You are quite right.

Dr. KISSINGER. So it would have been weird to discuss it, and we would not have known what technology to ascribe to it.

Senator WARNER. And therefore, it is not likely—

Dr. KISSINGER. I mean, I do not know what might have gone on in the corridors. I am not conscious of ever having seen a paper that came through my office or any meeting at which that subject was discussed.

Senator WARNER. The focus was on the long-range intercontinental systems?

Dr. KISSINGER. Without any question. Those were the only systems that were in existence.

Senator WARNER. In existence.

Dr. KISSINGER. I do not think I had ever heard of a local missile defense.

Senator WARNER. And therefore, I and others have drawn the deduction that the ABM Treaty simply does not apply to the theater systems.

I thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. You have done the Senate and indeed this committee a great service by taking of your valuable time to come here today, to lay a foundation on which we can get together and devise our defense bill for this fiscal year.

Have a safe journey back to your wife and family.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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In the world that is emerging, if GATT works, it is important for the United States to be in the strongest possible competitive position. If GATT does not work, or if it turns out, which is not impossible, that it brings about unacceptable penalties for American working forces, then it is important that the Western Hemisphere has a regional system that can compete with regional systems that may be growing up in Europe and in Asia. And finally, America has always believed that market institutions and democracy can be an element of unifying the international community.

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haps the most powerful country in Asia over a 30-year period, and a country of growing significance economically, politically, and strategically. Many of the discussions about Chinese internal practices will be importantly altered by the very pace of industrialization, because while industrialization may not guarantee democracy, it does require as an initial step constitutionalism, a legal framework that can be expected and to which people, foreigners and domestically, can gear themselves.

For the United States, it is very difficult to imagine that we can play the decisive role in Asian stability that is achievable without constructive relations with the People's Republic of China. We are entitled to have our own view as to appropriate domestic practices, and the Chinese have dealt, in the 5000 years of their recorded history, with enough foreigners to know that they have to take account of strongly held convictions. But what we cannot do is to make one issue the single test of our relationship. And what we must do in a positive sense is to find a means for a dialogue with China on a continuing basis about the relationship between the key elements in Asia.

The United States has every reason to favor the unification of Korea. The neighboring countries are much less enthusiastic about this prospect, and I do not think one can understand either Chinese or Japanese policies except against the at least subconscious preference—and not so subconscious, either—that their leaders would not die unfulfilled if unification of Korea were put off into some future generation, or maybe never happen. And this affects their attitude, even toward the nuclear issue.

Nobody wants North Korea to have nuclear weapons. But other countries are calculating to what extent they want to exercise pressure that might undermine the North Korean Government. From the American point of view, I believe that proliferation of nuclear weapons to North Korea will set a terrible precedent for the rest of the world. I did not favor the way the Framework Agreement was negotiated, nor the tacit acceptance of what North Korea has already done in the nuclear field. On the other hand, I do not see that abandoning this agreement now is going to meet those particular concerns. I find it almost unimaginable that this agreement will go to the end of its foreseen route, and therefore we should think carefully of how we can be sure to enforce its provisions and what we will do when the pushing against the edges will take place. I think that is our most important task with respect to the Korean nuclear issue.

In foreign policy one occasionally has the choice whether to support one's friend or to placate one's enemies—or I would say if one has the choice, one should begin by supporting one's friends. The strategy of North Korea with respect to South Korea is to delegitimize it to make itself the chief spokesman for Korean unity

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As we look at our defense budget today, the likelihood of added funds, given the balanced budget drive, is not likely. This committee is on record seeking a level funding in real terms comparable to last year's level. It seems to me that the way we will have to invoke savings, if you want to put it that way, is to send our forces abroad in fewer instances, and we must have a clearer definition as to those situations into which we will put our troops, be it peacemaking, which has a high risk of combat, or peacekeeping, which has a lesser but still a risk of combat losses.

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Senator WARNER. I thank you.

Dr. KISSINGER. Absolutely.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

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Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

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Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Senator COHEN. Thank you.

Dr. KISSINGER. Right.

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Now, the theory of the agreement is that at some point along the
way not yet defined, they will agree to let us inspect the waste ma-
terial. And at that point, if we find some violations, they will de-
roy whatever diversion has taken place.

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We have found out there is now a guarantee, a letter from the
President of the United States, which we did not at the time, guar-nteeing that funding for the reactor—or the President would do
everything in his power to guarantee the $4 billion and the reactor,
the 500,000 tons a year of oil, which now the first supply of that
was provided by the United States.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Senator from Texas.

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Senator COATS. I would assume you would see that as a poten-
tially serious problem?

Senator COATS. Could you speak to the Israeli-Syria peace at-
tempts, and particularly the equation of stationing U.S. troops on
the Golan as a condition of that agreement?

Dr. KISSINGER. I will tell you exactly what I have said to my Is-
raeli friends. I told them that if I am asked before an agreement
is made, I will say I am not in favor of it. If I am asked after an
agreement is made that includes American troops in the Golan as
an element, I will swallow it.

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my times has expired.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not seen the actual proposal. My under-
standing is that their role would be strictly peacekeeping and not
peace-enforcing and that they should act as a guarantee that the
disarmament provisions are being maintained.

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Dr. KISSINGER. In my view, the current administration policy confuses the issue. They say it is subject to study, that expansion is open, that anybody can apply. And therefore, you really do not know whether they are talking about the Partnership for Peace including all the *successors* of the Soviet Union or NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.

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others. The need for the United States to develop some idea comparable to the containment theory in the late-forties that can act as a guide to us in making security decisions, and hopefully will serve as the basis for a bipartisan foreign policy. Because it is too dangerous to have major fluctuations with every change of political direction.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for scheduling today's hearing with our distinguished visitor, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger is truly one of the great national security thinkers of this century and I know the committee will benefit greatly from this hearing.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Doctor, we are going to make your deadline. But I would like to ask two brief questions. First, as you know, a central issue here in the United States and particularly here in the Congress is the diversity of opinion on the unilateral lifting by the United States of the present arms embargo against Bosnia.

Do you have a view on that?

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31

I am being very frank.

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[c]

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Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator WARNER. In existence.

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THE FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. NATIONAL
STRATEGY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1995

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, McCain, Coats, Kempthorne, Hutchison, Santorum, Exon, Levin, Glenn, and Lieberman.

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Donald A. Deline, minority counsel; Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, deputy chief clerk; and Christine K. Cimko, press secretary.

Professional staff members present: Charles S. Abell, Romie L. Brownlee, Stephen L. Madey, Jr., Thomas G. Moore, Joseph G. Pallone, Steven C. Saulnier, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Andrew S. Effron, minority counsel; Richard E. Combs, Jr., Patrick T. Henry, T. Kirk McConnell, and Frank Norton, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Pamela L. Farrell, Shelley G. Lauffer, Kathleen M. Paralusz, and Deasy Wagner.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Ann E. Sauer, assistant to Senator McCain; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; George K. Johnson, Jr., assistant to Senator Hutchison; Matthew Hay, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Richard W. Fieldhouse and David A. Lewis, assistants to Senator Levin; Steven A. Wolfe, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Patricia J. Buckheit and Suzanne M. McKenna, assistants to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato and Lisa W. Tuite, assistants to Senator Byrd; Suzanne Dabkowski, assistant to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman; and Randall A. Schieber, assistant to Senator Bryan.

(1)

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2

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND,
CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The committee will come to order.

We have the pleasure of having Dr. Kissinger with us today. Dr. Kissinger, I am pleased to welcome you to today's hearing as we take up the serious matter of America's national security planning. We are honored by your presence, and we look forward to your discussion of America's interests, goals, and commitments.

It is ironic that the passing of the Cold War has in many ways complicated our national security planning. We no longer have a single, overwhelming threat to guide our thinking in this area. Instead, we face diverse and more unpredictable threats. In this environment, it is all the more necessary for the United States to have a clear national security strategy to guide our military planning and operations.

Given the uncertain nature of the threats we are likely to face in the future, we must find an appropriate basis for our national security strategy. This foundation must be firmly anchored to our own national interests and objectives. Unfortunately, this job remains incomplete.

I remain concerned that the United States has in recent years allowed budgetary pressures, rather than a coherent strategy, to drive our military planning. Today, we remain without a clear and compelling national security strategy to guide us. Without this, we will surely waste money and put at risk our most precious resource, the fine men and women in the Armed Forces.

We have asked Dr. Kissinger to address the foundations of American national security strategy as the committee prepares to examine U.S. military planning and budgeting. Dr. Kissinger, we are particularly interested to hear your testimony on what you see as America's interests, goals, and commitments. By exploring these underlying pillars of national strategy, we hope to gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of American defense planning. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Senator Thurmond, thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger, welcome to you. I first want to say Senator Nunn, who would usually be speaking at this time for the minority, is necessarily absent this morning. He asked me to express his regrets to you, with our thanks for all that you have done over the years. He also was good enough to afford me some notes that he took from a discussion that you had at some organizational meeting back in November where a whole multitude of things were discussed that will undoubtedly be covered here that he was very much impressed with.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this hearing on the foundation of the U.S. national security strategy. This hearing, coming after last week's Intelligence Committee briefings on the worldwide threat situation, will provide, I suggest, an excellent framework, along with next week's hearings on implementing U.S. strategy and U.S. force planning, for our consideration of the President's defense budget. I want to add my warm welcome to Dr. Kissinger, whose credentials have already been fully described by you and well known to all.

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3

Dr. Kissinger, I look forward to your testimony and to the opportu-
nity to have some questions to get your views on as we proceed
with this hearing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. We will allow 2 minutes for an opening
statement by any other member. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I just join you in welcoming our
distinguished guest, who does bring a perspective and a corporate
memory of this subject which is second to none. We thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. The Senator from Maine.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, could I have my 2 minutes of
opening added to my time for questioning?

Chairman THURMOND. That will be all right. Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. No statement, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Hutchison.

Senator HUTCHISON. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say that I think Secretary Kissinger has given us a blueprint for our role in the world through his latest book, "Diplomacy," which I know Senator McCain has read and I have read part of it. I think it is very important for this committee, as we are trying to determine what our military strategy should be in the world, that we hear from Secretary Kissinger about a bigger picture, what is our role in the world in general, what should our relationship be with our allies, and he has been particularly active in writing about our NATO alliance and a clear understanding of what our potential threats are.

So I very much appreciate this opportunity, and I hope that we
can move toward something that really President Truman did in
1950 with the NSC-68, and that is to have a blueprint for where
we ought to be going to solidify our place in the world, both with
our allies and our enemies.

Thank you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to
thank you for inviting Secretary Kissinger. Welcome to you Sec-
retary Kissinger. We are, in former Secretary of State Dean
Atchison's words, present at the creation of a new world. The birth
is taking some period of time beyond the normal gestation period,
which is probably understandable for the dramatic changes that
have taken place, post-Cold War, but I think, Mr. Chairman, it is
so important that you have invited the Secretary here because I do
not know of anyone in this country who has spoken with more acu-
ity, with more insight, with a broader vision, and with an appro-
priate combination of American ideals and American interests
about the course of our foreign policy.

I consider, if I may not institutionalize you at this moment, Dr.
Kissinger, that you are one of America's great natural resources,
and it is helpful to have the benefit of your counsel this morning
as we consider how to support America's interests with a military
budget.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Dr. Kissinger, you may proceed now with
your statement.

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EDITS BY DR. KISSINGER OF HIS TESTIMONY SENATE ARMED SERVICES

COMMITTEEON February 2, 1995

Only those edits which may be difficult to read are listed below.

<table><thead><tr><th>Page</th><th>Column</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>14</td><td>17</td><td>... tendencies toward <u>its erosion</u></td></tr><tr><td>18</td><td>18</td><td>... without <u>constructive relations</u></td></tr><tr><td>20</td><td>10-12</td><td>... <u>the Korean nuclear issue</u>. In foreign policy one <u>occasionally</u> has ...</td></tr><tr><td>20</td><td>16</td><td>... is to <u>delégitimize</u></td></tr><tr><td>38</td><td>12</td><td>...opponent <u>of a hegemonial power</u>. We <u>do</u> ...</td></tr><tr><td>46</td><td>24</td><td>... by <u>encouraging</u> it ...</td></tr><tr><td>63</td><td>19</td><td>... really quite <u>fluid</u>.</td></tr><tr><td>64</td><td>18</td><td>...permit shelling an open city <u>of Americans</u>.</td></tr><tr><td>68</td><td>23</td><td>... Partnership for Peace <u>including all the successors of the Soviet Union</u>, or NATO expansion <u>into Central and Eastern Europe</u>.</td></tr></tbody></table>

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