FOREIGN SERVICE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION

1906 FLORIDA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

January 11, 1956

Dear Henry:

I received this morning your memorandum to the Subcommittee on the Arms Equation. I found it an excellent document. I think it moves the ball forward quite a bit. The questions that come to my mind as I read it follow.

In the first paragraph you draw a distinction between "resources or technology" and "conceptual superiority either tactical or strategic". I wondered in which category you placed morale, training, and spirit. In the second paragraph you attribute the German 1940 success to superior tactical doctrines. I am sure this was one element but ask whether an equally important element may not have been the superior morale, training and spirit of the German forces which enabled them to contemplate a bold and risky tactical doctrine which would have been out of the question for the French forces opposing them. There would seem to me to be a relationship between superior morale and superior tactical doctrine which is complex and which is not just cause and effect but to some extent goes both ways and may in turn be influenced by superior leadership and by deeper sociological and historical forces.

My basic question on the paragraphs dealing with Strategic Doctrine goes to the distinction between conclusions of fact and conclusions of policy. If it is a fact that any employment of tactical weapons will automatically lead to all-out nuclear war then the thought that this fact has unattractive implications for us should not cause us to deny the fact. If, on the other hand, it need not be a fact and depends in part on what we decide to do, then the unattractive consequences of doing or deciding to do the things which would bring it about should properly be stressed.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.,
58 East 68th Street,
New York 21, New York.

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On page 2 I question whether the use of railroads was *the*, rather than *a*, reason for Prussia's military successes.

In the sentence beginning on page 2, line 16, you infer that the initial thermonuclear blow is a disadvantage to the side initiating it. This may be true politically but not militarily. The thought isn't clear enough to be a good example for the point you are trying to make.

In the next paragraph I find your first postulate muddy. Anybody reading it believes you mean by nuclear war a war in which such weapons are used. Later you say you don't mean this but mean they must be fought as if they might be used. And your arguments on both meanings seem to me to be over-stated. The procurement, training, and planning of our forces is a matter of policy and not of unalterable fact. In a non-nuclear war each side would always consider what happens if it spreads to a nuclear war but may take considerable risks based on his estimate that it won't. We certainly did in Korea.

At the top of page 3 I question whether our strategic doctrine should merely take into account the possibility that cities not be bombarded. The question is whether we shouldn't make it an object of policy to do everything we can to reduce the probability that they will be bombing targets.

In the middle of page 3 it seemed to me the argument needs expansion. As to the first postulate isn't the point rather that if one side is prepared, or is believed to be prepared, to use force and to use it effectively to back up its positions, and the other side is not, the first side is very apt to achieve its objectives. And certainly the Communists are believed to be prepared to use unconventional non-military and conventional military force (and even nuclear military force under certain circumstances) and to use it effectively. Your second postulate seems to me to raise a question as to what you mean by "plausible". It also seems to me to depend on a finding of fact that limited nuclear wars can be kept from spreading and that there is no great advantage in striking the first strategic atomic blow in a general war.

January 17, 1956

Mr. Paul H. Nitze
Foreign Service Educational Foundation
1906 Florida Avenue, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Paul:

Thank you very much for your incisive letter of January 11. Your criticisms of my paper on military superiority are well taken. Most of them, it seems to me, are terminological or are due to inexact phrasing on my part. I have written a much longer memorandum which should be finished sometime next week and which should clear up some of these points. I will send it to you for your comments as soon as it is completed.

I do want to make three substantive points, however:
a) I think your point about the relationship of morale to sociological and historical forces is extremely well taken. b) I do not, for a minute, underestimate the importance of a surprise attack or the advantage of striking the first strategic blow in an atomic war. I cannot, however, believe, that such a course would be adopted by the United States. As a practical matter, therefore, our strategy has to give attention to the problem of deterring rash Soviet moves by retaining a sufficient retaliatory capacity even after the Soviets have been given the privilege of initiating an all-out war. You will find this covered at length in my other memorandum. c) I agree with you that the Russians are entitled to feel that the three criteria for limited wars outlined in my paper are met. What concerns me is not what the Russians feel, but what we _think_ they feel. All discussions on this subject which I have seen, both inside and outside the Government, have emphasized the great danger of any armed conflict because the Soviets would start an all-out war, rather than make any concessions, however limited. This seems to me a prescription for paralysis, nor is it born out by Soviet behavior throughout their history. All I am really saying is that we cannot achieve local transformations in our favor, unless we believe in the possibility of local adjustments and develop a rationale for bringing them about.

Gordon Dean has passed on to me your suggestion that we submit your article in _Foreign Affairs_ to a sub-committee of the Study

[Y]

Mr. Paul H. Nitze

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January 17, 1956

Group. As you know, I think extremely well of your article; it is one of the best things on this topic. But it does seem to me that we would do better by taking up its points at a sucdession of meetings, rather than making the article itself the formal topic of a meeting. It seems to me, for example, that we have discussed the problem of alliances rather adequately at our last sesssion. Our whole next session on January 26 will be devoted to adiscussion of graduated deterrence which we have asked Colonel Leghorn to kick off. This would seem to me to be the place to discuss the range of problems which you introduce under the same heading. I would, therefore, suggest that you comment on Colonel Leghorn's presentation against the background of your article, filling in any gaps in his presentation and raising any qustions which you feel should be explored. Any other points which are not covered then can be taken up at a later meeting. I have talked this over with Gordon Dean and he seemed to think that this was a good approach.

Do let me know what you think of these proposals and whether we can count on you for the 26th.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger

cc. Gordon Dean

cc. Gordon Deen

Henry V. Klaasen

Best regards.

we can count on you for the next.

think that this was a good approach.
meeting. I have talked this over with Gordon Deen and he seemed to
other points which are not covered then can be taken up at a later
and retain any questions which you feel should be explored. And
the background of your article, lifting in any case in his presentation
against that your comment on Colonel Leghorn's presentation against
which you introduce under the same heading. I would, therefore,
This would seem to me to be the place to discuss the range of problems
graduated deterrence which we have asked Colonel Leghorn to kick off.
whole next session on January 20 will be devoted to discussion of
problem of alliances rather adequately at our last session. Our
a meeting. It seems to me, for example, that we have discussed the
meeting, rather than making the article itself the form of topic of
we would do better by taking up its points at a general session of
one of the best things on this topic. But it does seem to me that
Group. As you know, I think extremely well of your article; it is

Mr. Paul H. Utzse

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January 13, 1959