British Liberal Party.

Oxford University Liberals on the Co- Ownership (Industrial) Committee of the
[I'm sorry I can't write so accurately. I am, of course, the representative of

George Watson
Tomás sincerely,

of Mr. Herbert Hoover that have made me so.

is a growing force and home in memory. Before me, it is not the ideas

that he will take thought of British Liberalism while, like his own movement,

political office because of the social class to which he belongs. And I

agree with me that it should be so and that no man should be deemed from

party and mine include politicians within their ranks, and I am sure he will

be a man of firm preference for Mr. Adair Stevenson. But our preference is

disagreements of the Administration. I hardly need to add that British Liberals

Mr. Roosevelt's Administration is composed of politicians, and Mr. Simeon

business. Businessmen, of course, are not beoks. This, it seems, is because

at present, the majority of the people have rejected it, and the party of

beoks," which abhorrently goes on pointing the party of the people even when, as

him there are two political parties in the United States, "the party of the

Mr. Simeon's view of modern liberalism is equally economic. For

2.

March 10, 1954

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Widener 95

Dear Arthur:

I thought it might prove useful if I put down on paper some
of the ideas I discussed with you on the telephone the other day.

I think that there can be no doubt that at the moment we are
living at a critical juncture. We are witnessing, it seems to me,
something that far transcends McCarthy, the emergence of totali-
tarian democracy. It is the essence of a democratic system that
the loser can accept his defeat with relative grace. It is the
essence of a totalitarian system that the victor assumes the right
to proscribe his opponents. It does not matter that this is done
with good intentions, although this is hardly the case with McCarthy.
When the risks of electoral defeat are so fearful, campaigns will
be fought with a bitterness which must erode the democratic process.
When the issue becomes juridical instead of political, political
contests will take on the characteristics of a civil war with
rigid mass organizations confronting each other, even if physical
conflict is temporarily delayed. That most people, and particu-
larly the conservative element, believes this cannot happen here
is a sign of internal strength, but at the same time an asset
to the totalitarian movement. It took some of the best elements
in Germany six years after Hitler came to power to realize that a
criminal was running their country which they had been so proud
of considering a moral state so much so that they were unable
to comprehend what had in fact happened. Similarly, anyone tell-
ing a Roman as late as the time of Sulla that within fifty years
Rome would be an Empire, would have been considered insane. And,
of course, it is forgotten today that the only official office
Augustus held was tribune of the people. But not much need be
about this because I think Stevenson covered it fully in his
speech Saturday night.

The real problem it seems to me right now is twofold: to con-
vince the conservative element that true conservatism at the moment
requires at least opposition to McCarthy and the defeat of the
Eisenhower administration; and to build bridges for the millions
who voted for Eisenhower as a father image and not as a standard
bearer of the Republicans. I am not sure that the ADA is the
proper organization for this because, justly or unjustly, it has

broader organization for this reason, that is, on the basis of the共产主义。I am not sure that the ADU is the party of the Communists. Who voted for Fießhöwen as a father figure and not as a standard Fießhöwen affiliation? and to build prunes for the millions requires at least opposition to McCarthy and the defeat of the since the conservative element that true conservatism at the moment The real problem it seems to me is not how is two-to-one to con-

abeen Saturday night.

about this because I think Stevenson covered it fairly in his Augustus Head was Tribune of the People. But not much need be done. It is a long time since I have been considered insane. And, ing a Roman Catholic as the time of Bulla that within a little time to comprehend what had in fact happened. Similarly, anyone tell- ing a conservative element, believes this cannot happen here conflict is temporarily delayed. That most people, and particularly mass organizations confronting each other, even if public contests will take on the characteristics of a civil war with when the flame becomes kindled instead of hotbed, political be taught with a bitterness which erode the democratic process. When the risks of electoral defeat are so fearfully, compelling will with good intentions, although this is hardly the case with McCarthy, to broach his opponents. It does not matter that this is done essence of a totalitarian system that the victor seems the right the foerer can accept his defeat with relative grace. It is the tariff democracy. It is the essence of a democratic system that something that tar transcends McCarthy, the emergence of totality at a critical juncture. We are witnessing it as seems to me.

I think that there can be no doubt that at the moment we are of the idea I discussed with you on the telephone the other day. I thought it might prove rather harmful if I put down on paper some

Dear Arthur:

Widener 92
Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

March 10, 1964

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

- 2 -

March 10, 1954

become too much of a public symbol and too easy to attack, and its appeal to the Bundy type of Republican will be limited. I do believe, however, that a non-partisan group appealing in the name of conservative values for a defeat of the present administration might prove very effective. It must be sufficiently evident that the vote for Eisenhower was as overwhelming precisely because the people believed he would transcend the petty technical considerations which had been thought to mar the previous administration. There must be a residue of disgust at the moment, at least there is among all the people that I know. I had dinner on Saturday with a wild-eyed South Shore Republican and I am convinced that he would break with the party if an honorable alternative presented itself. The task of appealing to the mass is more complex but I do not consider the task at all hopeless. The reaction to the Stevenson speech is, I think, significant in this respect.

I do believe, however, that the second half of Stevenson's speech on Saturday night was unfortunate. I think it senseless to attack the defense program in detail and on the basis of a strategic estimate which I consider more than doubtful, but which, in any case, is incomprehensible to the average citizen. I think that the two parts of Stevenson's speech were really incommensurable. The complement to the first part would seem to me to have been a series of sharp, precise questions emphasizing that an administration which cheats on security risks is able to cheat on more fundamental problems as well, and that the whole debate about Peress has obscured the real issues of foreign policy and of defense. These problems should have been outlined as problems instead of concentrating everything with the defense program. An abstract discussion regarding national strategy is not very helpful. While I agree with Stevenson that we must not bomb Moscow if Italy goes Communist, I think it equally senseless to announce beforehand that we would not bomb Moscow under any circumstances. Nor do I think it wise to fight any more Koreas. I will send you a memorandum which I wrote three years ago which is quite dated by now but which states my views on this question. It was written for the Army, so you will have to excuse the style.

I also wish that candidates would finally quit talking about a "peace to be won" as if on a certain date "peace will break out" and tensions will magically disappear. I know of no period in which this was true in all history except under the Roman Empire. I can conceive no settlement with Russia which will permit us to say that there will be no longer any tensions, and this would be true even if the Kremlin were ruled by arch-angels. For in a world of two super powers under conditions of sovereignty, tensions are inevitable.

Be that as it may, I do think something must be done and several individuals have already come to me to ask what can be done. None of us will have the right to complain if McCarthyism s

done. None of us will have the right to complain if McCarthyism a
several industrialias have already come to us to ask what can be
Be that as it may, I do think something must be done and
inevitable.

of two other bowers under conditions of severeflesh, tenuous are
time even if the Kremlin were ruled by arch-angels. For in a world
asy that there will be no longer and tenuous, and this would be
I can conceive no settlement with Russia which will permit me to
which this was true in all history except under the Roman Empire.
and tenuous will magically disappear. I know of no period in
a "peace to be won," as it on a certain date "peace will break out"
I also wish that candidates would live fully out talking spont
will have to excuse the style.

my views on this question. It was written for the Army, so you
wrote three years ago which is quite dated by now but which states
to fight and more Korea. I will send you a memorandum which I
not pump Moscow under any circumstances. Nor do I think it wise
I think it equally a件eless to announce beforehand that we would
with Stevenson that we must not pump Moscow if Italy goes Communist,
regarding national strategy is not very helpful. While I agree
trusting everything with the defense program. An abstract discussion
problems should have been outlined as problems instead of concern-
sumed the real issue of foreign policy and of defense. These
problems as well, and that the whole debate about per se has op-
which creates on security risks a desire to cheat on more fundamentals
series of sharp, precise questions emphasizing that an administration
The complement to thetat but would seem to me to have been a
that the two bars of Stevenson's abeep were really incommemorabte.
in and case, is incomprehensible to the average citizen. I think
attractive circumstance which I consider more than doubtful, put which,
to attack the defense program in detail and on the basis of a
sbeep on Saturday night was unfortunate. I think it a件eless
I do believe, however, that the second part of Stevenson's

Stevenson abeep is, I think, significant in this respect.
I do not consider the task at all befeee. The reaction to the
itself. The task of abeeling to the mass is more complex put
would preek with the party, it an honorble alternative prebeated
with a wild-eyed South Shore Republican and I am convinced that he
is among all the people that I know. I had dinner on Saturday
There must be a realign of diament at the moment, at least there
tions which had been thought to mar the previous administration.
people believed he would transcend the beffy technical considera-
tion the note for Frennower was as overwhelming precisely because the
might prove very effective. It must be sufficiently evident that
of conservative values for a defeat of the present administration
fiee, however, that a non-bartlett krohn abeeling in the name
abeel to the Bunga type of Republican will be limited. I do pe-
come too much of a public ampel and too easy to attack, and its

Mr. Arthur Schießinger, Jr.

- S -

March 10, 1984

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

- 3 -

March 10, 1954

should win without our having fought it; and even if we should
lose, it is not the victory which creates symbols but the effort.

I would much appreciate your advice on a suitable course of
action. And I am available for any speaking engagement where you
think I might help.

HAK:ebp

Enclosure

Enclosure

HVK:epb

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

I think I might help.

And I am available for any speaking engagement where you
would much appreciate your advice on a suitable course of
action.

It is not the victory which creates ampola but the effort.

Should win without our having thought it; and even if we should

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

- 3 -

March 10, 1954

HISTORY OF THE WEEK

It was Vice-President Nixon who, with his usual felicity, pro-
nounced the Maine election to be the "first statewide test of the
Eisenhower administration program"; and the Democratic National Com-
mittee can hardly be blamed for accepting the Nixon statement at
face value. It is quite true, of course, that "local issues" were
responsible for Edmund Muskie's election as governor. But Muskie
was an attractive gubernatorial candidate in what is getting to be a
nationwide Democratic pattern: the agreeable, earnest, clean-cut young
man -- Meyner in New Jersey, Williams in Michigan, Leader in Pennsyl-
vania, And local issues had only a most indirect effect on the overall
12 percent increase in the Democratic vote -- an increase which affected
even the popular Margaret Chase Smith.

Six years ago, when Mrs. Smith polled 71 percent of the Maine
vote, she gave a little noticed but significant speech in Boston.
Using the Maine result as the basis of her calculations, she warned
the Republicans against overconfidence. A few weeks later Harry Tru-
man upset Tom Dewey in the election. By the Smith formula, the Re-
publicans should be far worse off today. And insofar as further con-
clusions can be deduced from Tuesday's primary, they are wholly favor-
able to Democratic hopes. Democratic gains in Minnesota and Wisconsin,
for example, testify to the reality of the supposed Democratic ground-
well in the Middle West.

A recent Gallup poll asked voters how they would register if
they were registering today. 61 percent replied that they would re-
gister as Democrats; only 39 percent as Republicans. This computation
does not allow for voters who regard themselves as independents. But

["does not allow for voters who regard themselves as independents. But after asDEMOCRAT: only 30 percent are REPUBCICANS. This computation shows were registering today. Of percent replied that they would re-", "A recent poll shows a strong vote for them would register it", "Well in the Middle West.", "for example, strength to the result of the approved Democratic Groome-\nable to Democratic parties. Democratic gains in Minnesota and Wisconsin,\ncalifornia can be gained from Tuesday's primary, they are wholly favor-\nbful. They should be far worse off today. And in fact as further con-\nman notes Tom Dewey in the election. By the Smith formula, the Re-\npublicans against overconfidence. A few weeks later Henry Tru-\nUsing the Maine result as the basis of her calculations, she warned\nvote, she gave a little noticed put significant speech in Boston.", "Six years ago, when Mrs. Smith left 31 percent of the Maine\neven the larger Margaret Chase Smith.", "IS percent increase in the Democratic vote -- an increase which affected\nvoters. And local issues had only a most indirect effect on the overall\nman -- Mckinley in New York, Williams in Michigan, Leader in Pennsylvania\nand local issues had only a most indirect effect on the overall\nman -- Mckinley in New York, Williams in Michigan, Leader in

2

it does underline the primary results by suggesting that the Democrats are still very much the majority party and that the illusion of Republican popularity is likely to crumble away when the figure of President Eisenhower is not in the picture. David Lawrence has now outdone the paid optimists of the Democratic National Committee by suggesting that the administration "may lose as many as 100 seats in the House."

And victory to some extent will feed on itself. After Maine, Democratic candidates will find it much easier to raise money; the morale of party workers will be strengthened; and local organizations everywhere will move ahead with new confidence. Of sitting Democratic candidates, the two in worst trouble are Douglas in Illinois and Burke in Ohio. Both will receive a shot-in-the-arm from the evidence of the Democratic trend. (Burke should be further helped by the fact that Vice-President Nixon has selected Ohio as the next place to spread his gospel of good cheer.)

More crucial, however, is the effect of Maine on the Republicans. Their setbacks down east will certainly divest them of any traces of overconfidence or complacency. Republican organizations everywhere will redouble their efforts, and pressure will mount on President Eisenhower to take an even more active role in the campaign. But will Maine cause a basic change in Republican tactics? Is it likely, for example, to plunge Attorney General Brownell into one of his chronic states of political depression?

It is to be remembered that Brownell stage-managed the Republicans into the most unexpected political disaster of their entire existence as a political party. He has never been allowed to forget

existence as a political party. He has never been allowed to forget
bundled into the most unexpected political disaster of their entire
It is to be remembered that Brownell stage-managed the Re-
states of political depression

example, to bring Attorney General Brownell into one of his chronic
Maine causes a great change in Republican tactics. If it likely, your
Eisenhower to take an even more active role in the campaign. But will
will record their efforts, and pressure will mount on President
overconfidence or complacency. Republican organizations everywhere
Their sequence does not will certainly divide them at any trace of
More crucial, however, is the effect of Maine on the Republicans.

Gesher of Good Queen.)

Vice-President Nixon has selected Ohio as the next place to spread his
Democratic trend. (Bucke should be further helped by the fact that
in Ohio. Both will receive a shot-in-the-arm from the evidence of the
candidates, the two in worst trouble are Deaka in Illinois and Burke
everywhere will move ahead with new confidence. Of sitting Democratic
morale of party workers will be strengthened; and local organizations
Democratic candidates will find it much easier to raise money; the
And victory to some extent will be on itself. After Maine,

House.)

Meeting that the administration may lose as many as 100 seats in the
done the Democratic National Committee by and—

President Eisenhower is not in the picture. David Lawrence has now out-
bustified barbity is likely to emerge away when the title of
the still very much the majority party and that the inflation of the—

it does underline the primary results by anticipating that the Democrats

5

(M)

3

this, and he has never forgotten it. As he looks back to 1948, it is evident that he feels the crucial mistake was to attempt what politicians call a "high-level" campaign. Neither he nor Dewey have ever repeated this error.

A year ago the Republicans suffered a similar series of set-backs in by-elections. One last by-election loomed ahead, in California; and Brownell, directing Republican political strategy, abruptly switched from the high road to the low road. Defeat had made him desperate. In his desperation he charged that President Truman had knowingly appointed Harry Dexter White, a supposed Russian spy, to positions of new power and responsibility in the American government.

Does Brownell have new Harry Whites up his sleeve today? Persistent rumors out of Washington have forecast possible indictments -- for corruption, this time, not for Communism -- of a former Truman cabinet officer and his undersecretary, as well as of two west coast Democratic congressmen. The new immunity legislation passed by Congress this session may make it possible to warm over old Communist infiltration scandals under Democratic administrations.

Yet one wonders whether Brownell could get away with another Harry White affair today. The Department of Justice has fallen on its face too often Exkazwanek in its political prosecutions of Democrats, as the dismissal last week of the case against former Representative Joseph E. Casey shows again. And there is something a bit too pat and cynical about using the high office of Attorney General of the United States to produce political sensations obviously designed to influence elections. If Brownell succumbs to temptation and tries to reverse the Democratic trend by a new flourish of pre-election indictments, he may provide just the impetus necessary to transform the Democratic trend into a Democratic landslide.

ARTHUR SCHLESSINGER, JR.

ARTHUR SCHERZINSON, JR.

a Democratic candidate.

broadly true that the import necessary to transform the Democratic trend into Democratic trend by a new foreign policy of pre-election indications, he may electors. It, Brownell encombs to nomination and tries to reverse the states to produce political sensations obviously designed to influence and clinical apart using the high office of Attorney General of the United States. E. Osgood shows again. And there is something a bit too bad as the dismissed last week of the case against former Representative Thomas to old friendозem in its political preconditions of Democrats, Harry White after today. The Department of Justice has fallen on its left one wonder whether Brownell could get away with another tion candidate under Democratic administrations.

this session may make it possible so warm even old Committee intransige- ent congressmen. The new immunity justification based by Congress was officer and his undersecretary, as well as of two west coast Demo- cratic corruption, this time, not for Communism -- of a former Trueman ex- cellent numbers out of Washington have forecast possible indications --

Does Brownell have new Harry White in his sleeve today? Her- of new power and responsibility in the American Government. I fully abdicated Harry Dexter White, a subpecked Republican ally, to positions beneath. In his delegation he opened that President Trueman has known switched from the high road to the low road. Defeat had made him des- pair and Brownell, directing Republican political strategy, a prudence packs in pre-elections. One last pre-election focused ahead, in Cvilleon- released this error.

claims all a "high-fever" campaign. Neither he nor Deney have even evident that he feels the crucial mistake was to attempt what benefit- this, and he has never forgotten it. As he looks back to 1948, if it is

HISTORY OF THE WEEK

July 1, 1954

Joseph Harsch, in an acute article for the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, made, it seems to me, an interesting point when he suggested
that it has been one of Sir Winston Churchill's functions in re-
cent years to run political interference for American presidents.

Thus at Fulton in 1946, Sir Winston was able to say things
which Mr. Truman dared not say about the danger of Soviet aggression
and the need for western unity and strength. And at the National
Press Club this week Sir Winston was able to say things which General
Eisenhower dares not yet say about the danger of thermonuclear war
and the need for western patience and steadfastness.

The communiqués from the White House meeting could hardly have
been more wary; and this reticence undoubtedly indicates that wide
divergences still exist between the United States and Britain over
concrete policies, particularly in South Asia. Yet the tone of Sir
Winston's performance on Monday -- and the President's endorsement,
however qualified, of Sir Winston's proclaimed objective at the press
conference on Wednesday -- would appear to suggest that these diver-
gences exist within a general agreement on the objective of "peaceful
coexistence."

It is perhaps useful for the record to point out that Churchill,
in talking about coexistence, means something quite different from
the talk of the muddle-heads who seem to think that everything would
be all right if we only let the Russians alone. Sir Winston's theory
of coexistence is solidly based on the continuing and steady develop-
ment of western power and unity. His policy is "peace through

ment of western power and might. He believed it was becoming
cosmetic, if not coexistent, if sufficiently passed on the continuing and steady
development of the world. He only let the Russian alone. Sir Winston's true
the talk of the unbleached who seem to think that everything would
in talking about coexistence, means something quite different from
It is doubtless useful for the record to point out that Churchill,
cosexistence.

Genes exist within a General Agreement on the objective of "bезопас
conferences on Wednesday -- would appear to suggest that these differ-
ently separated, of Sir Winston's框框框框 objective at the basic
Winston's performance on Monday -- and the President's enforcement,
concrete policies, particularly in South Asia. Let the tone of Sir
the need for western balance and stability.

Hewlett genes not yet about a point the danger of the phenomenon was
braces up the week Sir Winston was able to say things which General
and the need for western unity and strength. And at the National
meeting Mr. Trumman dated not yet a point the danger of Soviet aggression
that it has been one of Sir Winston Churchill's functions in re-
MONITOR, made, it seems to me, an interesting point when he unhesitatingly
told Mr. Winston in 1944, 'Sir Winston was able to say things
about him so much political interference for American presidents.

about him so much political interference for American presidents.
that it has been one of Sir Winston Churchill's functions in re-
MONITOR, made, it seems to me, an interesting point when he unhesitatingly
told Mr. Winston in 1944, 'Sir Winston was able to say things
about him so much political interference for American presidents.

HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN

July 1, 1944

2

"strength" which means that you build your own power and, at the same time, "keep a friendly alternative before the eyes of your possible opponent."

Building strength in the free world means building local strength, through economic and military assistance, rather than letting the frontiers crumble and concentrating on atomic retaliation against the "sources of aggression." Sir Winston, in short, was calling for a return to the Truman-Acheson foreign policy so violently denounced last week by Vice-President Nixon.

If General Eisenhower really agrees with Churchill that "we ought to have a try for peaceful coexistence, a real good try for it," then he has presumably rejected the views of Admiral Radford, Senator Knowland and the other members of his administration who regard "coexistence" as a dirty word. I suppose it is too much to hope that President Eisenhower will ever make a clearcut decision about anything; Radford will no doubt cheerfully survive as a leading member of the Eisenhower team, along with McCarthy. Still, the President seems for the moment prepared, verbally at least, to go along.

The other main event of the week was the AEC decision on Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer. The Russians hardly need to have rubbed in this triumph of American folly by claiming on the same day that they had achieved what we have yet to achieve: an atomic energy plant for peacetime purposes. It was enough to know that we had deliberately denied ourselves one of our most brilliant scientists and cast contamination through our scientific community at the very time when we were fast losing our margin of superiority in the weapons race.

were fast losing our margin of superiority in the weather race.
attenuation through our scientific community at the very time when we
denied ourselves one of our most brilliant scientists and lost con-
decadent time because. It was enough to know that we had deliberately
had achieved what we have yet to achieve: an atomic energy plant for
the future triumph of Americanism. But this, of course, did not do
the triumph of Americanism fully, claiming on the same day that they
in Robert Oppenheimer. The Kratone explosion need to have raged in
the other main event of the week was the A-bomb decision on Dr.
Go, wrong.

the President seems for the moment preoccupied, verdant at least, so
leading member of the President's team, alone with McCarthy. Still,
about anything! Oppenheimer will no doubt certainly survive as a
hope that President Strainheimer will ever make a clear-cut decision
regard "coexistence" in a dirty work. I assume it is too much to
Senator Knowland and the other members of his administration who
it is, since he has probably rejected the views of Admiral Halsey,
ought to have a try for beautiful coexistence, a real good try for
It General Strainheimer really agrees with McCarthy that "we
first week Dr. Vice-Chiefident Nixon.

a return to the Trueman-Whitman foreign policy so violently denominated
the source of opposition." Sir Winston, in short, was calling for
troublesome trouble and concentrating on atomic retaliation against
strong economic and military assistance, rather than letting the
stripping strength in the tree world means stripping local strength,
obvious."

time," he said a truely alternative before the eyes of our bestie
strength," which means that you build your own power and, at the same

3

The AEC opinion was far more brutal and self-righteous even than the report of the Gray commission. A good deal of the material on which it rested its case would, if given similar weight in 1945, have eliminated Oppenheimer from the Manhattan Project. Some of the rest is frankly dubious, such as the heavy emphasis on Oppenheimer's relations in 1953 with Haakon Chevalier. Strauss and his fellow-illiterates would hardly be expected to know this; but, as Dr. Smyth suggested in his able dissent, if Chevalier is currently a chum of André Malraux, a leading Gaullist and a fanatical anti-Communist, then it would seem unlikely that he is a terribly dangerous man for Oppenheimer to lunch with (in Malraux's company) in Paris.

George Kennan, in the Radcliffe address I quoted last week, defined the problem of security as "not to secure a total absence of danger [which is unattainable] but to balance peril against peril and to find the tolerable degree of each." No one can deny that Oppenheimer acted like a political fool in long passages of his career, though no one has yet convincingly specified any direct baleful consequences of his foolishness. The problem is whether this peril, which the nation has borne for a dozen years without demonstrated harm, is greater than the peril of losing Oppenheimer's services, of alienating the American scientific community, and of helping convince the world that we have gone mad.

The AEC majority did not even try to weigh the competing perils. Along with the masterminds who are cutting our Army, reducing the planned build-up of our Air Force and slashing our economic aid, the AEC majority must be conceded a leading role in the Legion of the Death Wish which has currently made Washington an occupied city.

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

["WILLIAM COLUMBIA, MD.", "With whom we currently live in Washington an occupied city.", "WHO majority must be concerned a leading role in the Region of the Death Bringer with whom our Air Force and leading our economic aid, the", "The WHO majority did not even try to weigh the competing benefits. It is clear that we have gone wrong.", "vices, of alienating the American scientific community, and of helping to further harm, is greater than the benefit of losing Oppenheimer's career, which the nation has done for a dozen years without demonstrating consequences of his lootingness. The problem is whether this cancer, though no one was yet convincingly specified any direct benefit, which the nation has done for a dozen years without demonstrating consequences of his lootingness. The problem is

HISTORY OF THE WEEK

The passage by the Senate of the flexible price support pro-
gram represents a major victory for Secretary Benson. Of all the
members of the Eisenhower cabinet, indeed, he is plainly the most
impressive. At an early point, he laid out his objectives with
clearity, and force; and he has moved steadily and vigorously to achieve
them. If Secretary Dulles and Secretary Wilson had shown half his
candor and courage, our foreign and defense policies might be in
much better shape. It is a shame that Secretary Benson's high abili-
ties were not exercised in a better cause.

One is surprised, indeed, to note the way that the big city
press has generally hailed the Benson victory as a triumph for eco-
nomic sanity and intelligence over the greedy and grasping farm bloc.
I am certainly far from being an agricultural economist myself. But
it seems evident on the basis of experience that the Benson program
has been terribly oversold.

One fundamental Benson contention is that flexible prices
will bring about shifts in production and consumption which will
solve the surplus problem. Thus, as surpluses accumulate, prices
will fall, which will cause the consumer to buy more and the farmer
to grow less, thereby exorcising the surplus.

It all sounds fine on paper. But it does not allow for the
inelasticity which has always characterized the agricultural market.
Thus in the price collapse after 1929, farmers, far from growing less,
mostly grew more. If a major price decline did not reduce production,
why should a minor drop to 82.5 percent of parity be expected to have