-1-

# INTRODUCTION

## I. Naval Arrangements:

1. Exchange of Naval Information.--- The British hoped ultimately for some form of moratorium or absolute reduction in British and German naval construction, as suggested in Churchill's "Naval Holiday" proposal of 1912 (see below, Churchill, p.22). But the scheme which they pushed most persistently was an apparently less ambitious one, namely Sir Edward Grey's proposal for an exchange of naval information. Actually, the content of this proposal varied considerably over the period 1907 to 1912, and the British were aiming at different things when they pressed this scheme on the Germans at different times. Initially, Grey was thinking of informal disclosure and negotiation between the governments before they became publicly committed to their respective shipbuilding programs (see Grey, p.3-4). But other features crept into later versions, e.g. exchanges of technical data, disclosure of the actual progress of shipbuilding, and verification by naval attachés (Grey, p.8, p.11, p.19; U.K. Admiralty memo, p.17). And after the "Acceleration Scare" of 1909, the emphasis was on verifying that the powers were keeping within their published programs (U.K. memo, p.20).

The Germans were unwilling to allow a foreign government to have a say in the preparation of their naval programs (German Govt. press statement, p.4-5; Kaiser, p.6). They also shied away from anything involving inspection or "control," fearing disclosure of technical secrets (German Govt. press statement, p.5; Bethmann-Hollweg, p.15). But they were willing to consider a formal exchange between

b.10). But they were willing to consider a formal exchange between technical secrets (German Navy), press statement, b.8: 

But the scheme which they planned most carefully was an apparently
"Naval Holiday" broadcast of f01s (see below, 

INTRODUCTION

-11-

Admiralties of information on actual construction, without inspection, although (or because) this was seen as superfluous (German Govt. press statement, p.4-5; German Govt. p.16; Kaiser, p.17). The Germans did a momentary, but surprising, reversal in 1911, when they proposed a scheme which went further than anything the British had proposed. This was for a simultaneous and binding disclosure of naval construction plans before publication. By this time, the British were highly suspicious, and quickly dismissed the idea (pp.18-20).

2. Reducing the Tempo of Construction.--- The only sign of German willingness to limit their naval construction was Bethmann-Hollweg's offer of a "reduction in the tempo" of construction. He argued that Germany's programs were fixed by law over long periods, and therefore all that the Imperial Government could agree to was a "spreading out" of the actual construction (Schön, p.14-15). This admittedly meant that all the scheduled ships would eventually be built, and that the tempo would have to be increased again towards the end of the period in order to make up for the initial reduction. The best prospect they could offer for an absolute reduction was the chance that Anglo-German relations would so improve that the Reichstag would later repeal part of the program. The British were skeptical. For the Germans refused even to promise not to extend the 1900 Navy Law; Supplemental Navy Laws were passed by the Reichstag in 1905 and 1912. Each time a Supplemental Navy Law was passed, the Germans repeated that their program was now fixed by law, and that they could offer nothing more than a reduction in the tempo of execution of the new Supplemental Law (Kaiser, p.17; Tirpitz, p.21).

["of the new Supplemental Law (Kaiser, b.11; Tittitz, b.51).\n\nCould offer nothing more than a regret in the tempo of execution repeated thus their program was now fixed by law, and that they reals. Each time a Supplemental Navy Law was passed, the German Law: Supplemental Navy Laws were passed by the Reichstag in 1902 and for the Germany remained even to promise not to extend the 1900 Navy would later repeat part of the program. The Britian were a radical chance that Anglo-German relations would so improve that the Reichstag The Reichstag would accept the idea of the actual construction (Schon, b.14-15). This and therefore all that the Industrial Government could agree to was a shared that Germany's programs were fixed by law over four periods, Holweg's offer of a "regret in the tempo of construction". The German willingness to limit their naval construction was Reichstag S. Rechung der Temo of Construction--- The only aim of袖紀", "袖紀 of construction on actual construction, without interruption.\n\nAdmiralties of information on actual construction (GermanNAV. treatise (or because) this was seen as superfluous (GermanNAV. treatise through (or because) this was seen as superfluous (GermanNAV. treatise a momentary, but surprising, reversal in 1914, when they proposed a statement, b.4-5; German NAV. b.10; Kaiser, b.11). The German did not know what would happen to the British had proposed scheme which went further than anything the British had proposed. This was for aADM. transome and plugging disclosure of small construction plane before publication. By this time, the Britian were fully aware of this, and quickly disseminated the idea (p.18-20).", "-11-"]

-iii-

## II. General Themes:

### 1. British Arguments...

**(a) Economic strain and world tension...** The British seemed to be interested in disarmament and naval limitation mainly for economic reasons. "Expenditure" was the key word; the "world evil of this growing armaments expenditure" was the main Liberal target (Commons resolution, p.1-2; Grey, p.2, p.8, p.17-18; Goschen p.14; Churchill p.22). Of course, the Liberal Government also saw the arms race as a source of international tension and conflict, especially since one country's naval expenditure was often dependent on another's (Grey, p.4, p.6, p.8, p.17, p.18; Goschen, p.13; Hardinge, p.12; Churchill, p.22). Thus an agreement on mutual naval limitation would remove the primary source of Anglo-German antagonism (Grey, p.11; Hardinge, p.12), and would benefit both sides equally (Goschen, p.13).

**(b) Britain needed a strong navy and Germany did not...** British naval supremacy was seen as compatible with peace and friendship because British intentions were non-aggressive and benevolent (Campbell-Bannerman, p.3; Crowe, p.10). Since Britain had no army to speak of, she could not threaten others with invasion even with her preeminent navy; but if she lost this naval supremacy, her very survival was at the mercy of ~~all~~ countries with powerful armies (Grey, p.5). The British would never accept an arms limitation agreement that put the national safety in jeopardy (Grey, p.2). Britain was in any case determined to maintain her naval supremacy and the Two-Power Standard (Grey, p.8; Crowe, p.11; Hardinge, p.14; Haldane, p.21). Recognition of this by Germany was not a concession on the latter's part; it was an admission of reality (Hardinge, p.14; Haldane p.21).

c. The British administration of Bessy (Hendige, b.14; Hergeseh, b.15). Recognition of the Free State, Germany was not a concession on the latter's part. The National Council in Jejomina (Grey, b.8; Crowe, a.f.f.; Hendige, b.14; Hergeseh, b.15). In such case determined to maintain their naval supremacy and the Two-States, the British administration in Jejomina (Grey, b.8; Crowe, a.f.f.; Hendige, b.14; Hergeseh, b.15). The British would now accept an arms limitation agreement. Survival was at the mercy of the countries with power (Grey, per. preëminent navy: put it and foot off the naval annihilation, even with (Campbell-Bannerman, b.2; Crowe, b.10). Since Britain had to army, become British intentions were non-aggressive and benevolent. Naval supremacy was seen as compatible with peace and tranquillity.

(d) Britain needed a strong navy and Germany did not. Britain
Hendige, b.15), and would benefit both at least equally (Cooper, b.12). would remove the primary source of Anglo-German arms-consumption (Grey, b.11; Churchill, b.55). Time on agreement on mutual naval limitation (Grey, b.4; b.c, b.8, b.11, b.18; Cooper, b.13; Hendige, b.15; annue one country a naval expenditure was often dependent on another's arms race as a source of international tension and conflict, especially Churchill, b.55). Of course, the British Government also saw the (Commonwealth, b.5; Grey, b.5, b.8, b.14-f.8; Cooper, b.14; of this growing annuitant expenditure, was the main lipper's target. economic resupply. Expenditure was the key word; the world evil to be interested in disarrangement and naval limitation mainly for economic reasons was the key word; the world evil

(a) Economic train and world tension. — The British seemed to be interested in disarrangement and naval limitation mainly for economic reasons. — The British seemed to be interested in disarrangement and naval limitation mainly for economic reasons. — The British seemed to be interested in disarrangement and

the British seemed to be interested in disarrangement and

II. General Themes:

44

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Because her survival was at stake, Britain had to calculate in terms of capabilities, rather than rely on assurances of good intentions (Grey, p.6; Crowe, p.11; U.K. memo, p.19-20).

(c) Germany's political motives could not be trusted. -- The Imperial Government's unwillingness to join in an arms-limitation agreement was suspicious (Grey, p.8). German proposals for a "political understanding" revealed a desire to disrupt England's ententes with France and Russia (Crowe, p.10; Grey, p.13), and to tie England's hands while Germany embarked on the domination of Europe (Goschen, p.10; Crowe, p.10, p.17; Hardinge, p.16). Moreover, Germany had allies like Austria, who could build Dreadnoughts even if Germany signed a naval-limitation agreement (Crowe, p.11, p.19). Alternatively it was argued that England's only possible foe on the continent was Germany, and therefore German pledges to England in case of attack on the latter by a third power were worthless as part of a political bargain (Hardinge, p.15-16). While the British were annoyed that the Germans would not stick to a schedule, they balked at a German proposal for binding exchanges of naval programs on the ground that it would rule out such flexibility as evidenced by the four "contingent Dreadnoughts" of 1909-1910 (Crowe, p.19).

## 2. German Arguments. --

(a) Disarmament was impractical. -- The Germans felt that disarmament and arms limitation, while attractive in their idealism, were impractical (Tirpitz, p.3). Germany could afford the cost (German Admiralty memo, p.1). The Germans were only encouraged by signs that England felt an economic strain (naval attaché, p.18; Kaiser, p.18). No government, moreover, would be willing to reveal secret information to other powers (German Govt., p.5). Arms

secret information to other powers (German Court, b. d.).

Eiweiß, H. J.); No Government, moreover, would be willing to reveal
that England left an economic strain (naval attaché, b. 10;
(German Ministry memo, b. 1)). The German were only encouraged by

were impractical (Tirbitt, b. 2). Germany could afford the cost
disarmament and some limitation, while attractive in their real interest.

(a) <u>Disarmament was impractical</u> — The German left that

S. German documents.

long "continuing droughts" of 1800-1810 (Crowe, b. 13).

Among that it would rule out such flexibility as experienced by the
at a German probeost for probing exchanges of naval programs on the
approved that the Germans would not attack to a reasonable, they asked
of a political bargain (Herbig, b. 12-10). While the Bismarck were
case of attack on the latter by a third power were without any bar,
continent was Germany, and therefore Germany decided to bring in
Aftermath: it was agreed that England's only possible fee in the
It Germany aimed a naval-limitation agreement (Crowe, b. 11, b. 13).
Germany had offices fixe Antrials, who could build Dresdgnungs even
Europe (Coecon, b. 10; Crowe, b. 11; Herbig, b. 10). Moreover,
the England's a range while Germany embarked on the domination of.

enthusiastic with France and Netherlands (Crowe, b. 10; Grey, b. 13), and to
"political understanding," revealed a desire to start up England's
agreement was aspirational (Grey, b. 3). German proposals for a
Imperial Government's unimportunity to join in an arms-limitation

(c) <u>Germany's political wishes could not be trusted</u> — The

intentions (Grey, b. 3; Crowe, b. 11; U.K. memo, b. 10-50).

terms of capitulation, rather than rely on assurances of peace
Because then survival was at stake. Britain used to calibrate in

-11-

-V-

limitation schemes were impractical because of technological
innovation and because of shifting political interests and
alignments (Bülow, p.4, p.7). There were also domestic political
reasons: German naval programs were fixed by law for long periods
(Schön, p.14), and any variations in the pace of actual construction
would be contrary to sound finance and troublesome to the German
war industries (German Govt. aide-mémoire, p.20). The schemes
proposed by the British were useless to Germany; if England wanted
them she would have to pay for them in the political sphere (German
Govt., p.4-5; Schön, p.16).

(b) <u>Germany needed a powerful navy.</u>— Germany needed a strong navy primarily to protect her commercial interests (German Admiralty memo, p.1; Bethmann-Hollweg, p.13). Self-defense was another motive, especially since Germany was threatened by her continental neighbors (Bethmann-Hollweg, p.13; Kaiser, p.17). By 1912, Bethmann-Hollweg admitted that Germany needed a strong navy mainly "for the general purpose of her greatness" (Bethmann-Hollweg, p.22).

(c) <u>German intentions were benign, but Britain could not be trusted.</u>— Germany assured Britain that her own intentions were perfectly peaceful and defensive (Kaiser, p.5, p.6; Bülow, p.7). Germany's word ought to be trusted (Tirpitz, p.8); for this reason no "control" or inspection would be acceptable (Kaiser p.6; Bethmann-Hollweg, p.15). The Germans considered that a naval agreement would be impossible or even harmful unless accompanied by a general political understanding (Bülow, p.4; German Govt. p.5; Stumm, p.7; Draft Treaty, p.9-10; Bethmann-Hollweg, p.11, p.13, p.15; Kaiser, p.22).

The Germans argued that Britain was so strong that she had

["The German signed that Britain was no stronger than that of France.", "Dietrich Treaty, b. 8-10; Bethmann-Hollem, b. 11, b. 12; Kaiser, b. 13, b. 14; German Govt. b. 2; St�, b. 1; British Industries b. 1; British Industries b. 2; British Industries b. 3; British Industries b. 4; British Industries b. 5; British Industries b. 6; British Industries b. 7; British Industries b. 8; British Industries b. 9; British Industries b. 10; British Industries b. 11; British Industries b. 12; British Industries b. 13; British Industries b. 14; British Industries b. 15; British Industries b. 16; British Industries b. 17; British Industries b. 18; British Industries b. 19; British Industries b. 20; British Industries b. 21; British Industries b. 22; British Industries b. 23; British Industries b. 24; British Industries b. 25; British Industries b. 26; British Industries b. 27; British Industries b. 28; British Industries b. 29; British Industries b. 30; British Industries b. 31; British Industries b. 32; 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-vi-

nothing to fear from German naval programs (Kaiser p.6). It was hypocritical for England to press disarmament on the Germans while refusing to relinquish her own naval supremacy (Tirpitz, p.2-3; Marschall, p.4). England had every right to strive to maintain her naval supremacy, but she should not expect other powers to acquiesce in it by treaty (Bethmann-Hollweg, p.18). England would have to get used to German naval competition (Kaiser, p.5). The more that Britain pressed for arms reduction, the more the Germans felt that she was feeling the strain of German competition and the more they were encouraged to keep building (German naval attaché, p.18; Kaiser p.18).

(d) Britain had to pay a political price for a naval agreement.--- Thus the Germans were encouraged to press Britain for political concessions in return for any naval limitation or disclosure agreement. They emphasized that a reduction in the tempo of their construction would involve a sacrifice, for which England owed compensation (Bethmann-Hollweg, p.13; Schön, p.16; German Govt. p.16). Germany's growing naval strength was seen as a "trump card" (Stumm, p.7). England's vague assurances of benign intention were not enough; England had to promise neutrality in the event of a continental war (Bethmann-Hollweg, p.12; Draft Treaty p.9-10; Metternich p.21).

### III. Note on Sources:

The principal sources are: *British Documents on the Origin of the War*, edited by G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley (1927 et seq.) [cited as B.D.D.7]; *Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*, edited by

["The words \"to the unopposed side\" are edited by\nWar, effected by c. 1. (good and temper) (fast at end.)\noffered as\nThe principal annexes are: British Documents on the Origin of the\nTill on document.", "Note on annex.\n\n**Annex 1.**\n\n**Annex 2.**\n\n**Annex 3.**\n\n**Annex 4.**\n\n**Annex 5.**\n\n**Annex 6.**\n\n**Annex 7.**\n\n**Annex 8.**\n\n**Annex 9.**\n\n**Annex 10.**\n\n**Annex 11.**\n\n**Annex 12.**\n\n**Annex 13.**\n\n**Annex 14.**\n\n**Annex 15.**\n\n**Annex 16.**\n\n**Annex 17.**\n\n**Annex 18.**\n\n**Annex 19.**\n\n**Annex 20.**\n\n**Annex 21.**\n\n**Annex 22.**\n\n**Annex 23.**\n\n**Annex 24.**\n\n**Annex 25.**\n\n**Annex 26.**\n\n**Annex 27.**\n\n**Annex 28.**\n\n**Annex 29.**\n\n**Annex 30.**\n\n**Annex 31.**\n\n**Annex 32.**\n\n**Annex 33.**\n\n**Annex 34.**\n\n**Annex 35.**\n\n**Annex 36.**\n\n**Annex 37.**\n\n**Annex 38.**\n\n**Annex 39.**\n\n**Annex 40.**\n\n**Annex 41.**\n\n**Annex 42.**\n\n**Annex 43.**\n\n**Annex 44.**\n\n**Annex 45.**\n\n**Annex 46.**\n\n**Annex 47.**\n\n**Annex 48.**\n\n**Annex 49.**\n\n**Annex 50.**\n\n**Annex 51.**\n\n**Annex 52.**\n\n**Annex 53.**\n\n**Annex 54.**\n\n**Annex 55.**\n\n**Annex 56.**\n\n**Annex 57.**\n\n**Annex 58.**\n\n**Annex 59.**\n\n**Annex 60.**\n\n**Annex 61.**\n\n**Annex 62.**\n\n**Annex 63.**\n\n**Annex 64.**\n\n**Annex 65.**\n\n**Annex 66.**\n\n**Annex 67.**\n\n**Annex 68.**\n\n**Annex 69.**\n\n**Annex 70.**\n\n**Annex 71.**\n\n**Annex 72.**\n\n**Annex 73.**\n\n**Annex 74.**\n\n**Annex 75.**\n\n**Annex 76.**\n\n**Annex 77.**\n\n**Annex 78.**\n\n**Annex 79.**\n\n**Annex 80.**\n\n**Annex 81.**\n\n**Annex 82.**\n\n**Annex 83.**\n\n**Annex 84.**\n\n**Annex 85.**\n\n**Annex 86.**\n\n**Annex 87.**\n\n**Annex 88.**\n\n**Annex 89.**\n\n**Annex 90.**\n\n**Annex 91.**\n\n**Annex 92.**\n\n**Annex 93.**\n\n**Annex 94.**\n\n**Annex 95.**\n\n**Annex 96.**\n\n**Annex 97.**\n\n**Annex 98.**\n\n**Annex 99.**\n\n**Annex 100.**\n\n**Annex 101.**\n\n**Annex 102.**\n\n**Annex 103.**\n\n**Annex 104.**\n\n**Annex 105.**\n\n**Annex 106.**\n\n**Annex 107.**\n\n**Annex 108.**\n\n**Annex 109.**\n\n**Annex 110.**\n\n**Annex 111.**\n\n**Annex 112.**\n\n**Annex 113.**\n\n**Annex 114.**\n\n**Annex 115.**\n\n**Annex 116.**\n\n**Annex 117.**\n\n**Annex 118.**\n\n**Annex 119.**\n\n**Annex 120.**\n\n**Annex 121.**\n\n**Annex 122.**\n\n**Annex 123.**\n\n**Annex 124.**\n\n**Annex 125.**\n\n**Annex 126.**\n\n**Annex 127.**\n\n**Annex 128.**\n\n**Annex 129.**\n\n**Annex 130.**\n\n**Annex 131.**\n\n**Annex 132.**\n\n**Annex 133.**\n\n**Annex 134.**\n\n**Annex 135.**\n\n**Annex 136.**\n\n**Annex 137.**\n\n**Annex 138.**\n\n**Annex 139.**\n\n**Annex 140.**\n\n**Annex 141.**\n\n**Annex 142.**\n\n**Annex 143.**\n\n**Annex 144.**\n\n**Annex 145.**\n\n**Annex 146.**\n\n**Annex 147.**\n\n**Annex 148.**\n\n**Annex 149.**\n\n**Annex 150.**\n\n**Annex 151.**\n\n**Annex 152.**\n\n**Annex 153.**\n\n**Annex 154.**\n\n**Annex 155.**\n\n**Annex 156.**\n\n**Annex 157.**\n\n**Annex 158.**\n\n**Annex 159.**\n\n**Annex 160.**\n\n**Annex 161.**\n\n**Annex 162.**\n\n**Annex 163.**\n\n**Annex 164.**\n\n**Annex 165.**\n\n**Annex 166.**\n\n**Annex 167.**\n\n**Annex 168.**\n\n**Annex 169.**\n\n**Annex 170.**\n\n**Annex 171.**\n\n**Annex 172.**\n\n**Annex 173.**\n\n**Annex 174.**\n\n**Annex 175.**\n\n**Annex 176.**\n\n**Annex 177.**\n\n**Annex 178.**\n\n**Annex 179.**\n\n**Annex 180.**\n\n**Annex 181.**\n\n**Annex 182.**\n\n**Annex 183.**\n\n**Annex 184.**\n\n**Annex 185.**\n\n**Annex 186.**\n\n**Annex 187.**\n\n**Annex 188.**\n\n**Annex 189.**\n\n**Annex 190.**\n\n**Annex 191.**\n\n**Annex 192.**\n\n**Annex 193.**\n\n**Annex 194.**\n\n**Annex 195.**\n\n**Annex 196.**\n\n**Annex 197.**\n\n**Annex 198.**\n\n**Annex 199.**\n\n**Annex 200.**\n\n**Annex 201.**\n\n**Annex 202.**\n\n**Annex 203.**\n\n**Annex 204.**\n\n**Annex 205.**\n\n**Annex 206.**\n\n**Annex 207.**\n\n**Annex 208.**\n\n**Annex 209.**\n\n**Annex 210.**\n\n**Annex 211.**\n\n**Annex 212.**\n\n**Annex 213.**\n\n**Annex 214.**\n\n**Annex 215.**\n\n**Annex 216.**\n\n**Annex 217.**\n\n**Annex 218.**\n\n**Annex 219.**\n\n**Annex 220.**\n\n**Annex 221.**\n\n**Annex 222.**\n\n**Annex 223.**\n\n**Annex 224.**\n\n**Annex 225.**\n\n**Annex 226.**\n\n**Annex 227.**\n\n**Annex 228.**\n\n**Annex 229.**\n\n**Annex 230.**\n\n**Annex 231.**\n\n**Annex 232.**\n\n**Annex 233.**\n\n**Annex 234.**\n\n**Annex 235.**\n\n**Annex 236.**\n\n**Annex 237.**\n\n**Annex 238.**\n\n**Annex 239.**\n\n**Annex 240.**\n\n**Annex 241.**\n\n**Annex 242.**\n\n**Annex 243.**\n\n**Annex 244.**\n\n**Annex 245.**\n\n**Annex 246.**\n\n**Annex 247.**\n\n**Annex 248.**\n\n**Annex 249.**\n\n**Annex 250.**\n\n**Annex 251.**\n\n**Annex 252.**\n\n**Annex 253.**\n\n**Annex 254.**\n\n**Annex 255.**\n\n**Annex 256.**\n\n**Annex 257.**\n\n**Annex 258.**\n\n**Annex 259.**\n\n**Annex 260.**\n\n**Annex 261.**\n\n**Annex 262.**\n\n**Annex 263.**\n\n**Annex 264.**\n\n**Annex 265.**\n\n**Annex 266.**\n\n**Annex 267.**\n\n**Annex 268.**\n\n**Annex 269.**\n\n**Annex 270.**\n\n**Annex 271.**\n\n**Annex 272.**\n\n**Annex 273.**\n\n**Annex 274.**\n\n**Annex 275.**\n\n**Annex 276.**\n\n**Annex 277.**\n\n**Annex 278.**\n\n**Annex 279.**\n\n**Annex 280.**\n\n**Annex 281.**\n\n**Annex 282.**\n\n**Annex 283.**\n\n**Annex 284.**\n\n**Annex 285.**\n\n**Annex 286.**\n\n**Annex 287.**\n\n**Annex 288.**\n\n**Annex 289.**\n\n**Annex 290.**\n\n**Annex 291.**\n\n**Annex 292.**\n\n**Annex 293.**\n\n**Annex 294.**\n\n**Annex 295.**\n\n**Annex 296.**\n\n**Annex 297.**\n\n**Annex 298.**\n\n**Annex 299.**\n\n**Annex 300.**\n\n**Annex 301.**\n\n**Annex 302.**\n\n**Annex 303.**\n\n**Annex 304.**\n\n**Annex 305.**\n\n**Annex 306.**\n\n**Annex 307.**\n\n**Annex 308.**\n\n**Annex 309.**\n\n**Annex 310.**\n\n**Annex 311.**\n\n**Annex 312.**\n\n**Annex 313.**\n\n**Annex 314.**\n\n**Annex 315.**\n\n**Annex 316.**\n\n**Annex 317.**\n\n**Annex 318.**\n\n**Annex 319.**\n\n**Annex 320.**\n\n**Annex 321.**\n\n**Annex 322.**\n\n**Annex 323.**\n\n**Annex 324.**\n\n**Annex 325.**\n\n**Annex 326.**\n\n**Annex 327.**\n\n**Annex 328.**\n\n**Annex 329.**\n\n**Annex 330.**\n\n**Annex 331.**\n\n**Annex 332.**\n\n**Annex 333.**\n\n**Annex 334.**\n\n**Annex 335.**\n\n**Annex 336.**\n\n**Annex 337.**\n\n**Annex 338.**\n\n**Annex 339.**\n\n**Annex 340.**\n\n**Annex 341.**\n\n**Annex 342.**\n\n**Annex 343.**\n\n**Annex 344.**\n\n**Annex 345.**\n\n**Annex 346.**\n\n**Annex 347.**\n\n**Annex 348.**\n\n**Annex 349.**\n\n**Annex 350.**\n\n**Annex 351.**\n\n**Annex 352.**\n\n**Annex 353.**\n\n**Annex 354.**\n\n**Annex 355.**\n\n**Annex 356.**\n\n**Annex 357.**\n\n**Annex 358.**\n\n**Annex 359.**\n\n**Annex 360.**\n\n**Annex 361.**\n\n**Annex 362.**\n\n**Annex 363.**\n\n**Annex 364.**\n\n**Annex 365.**\n\n**Annex 366.**\n\n**Annex 367.**\n\n**Annex 368.**\n\n**Annex 369.**\n\n**Annex 370.**\n\n**Annex 371.**\n\n**Annex 372.**\n\n**Annex 373.**\n\n**Annex 374.**\n\n**Annex 375.**\n\n**Annex 376.**\n\n**Annex 377.**\n\n**Annex 378.**\n\n**Annex 379.**\n\n**Annex 380.**\n\n**Annex 381.**\n\n**Annex 382.**\n\n**Annex 383.**\n\n**Annex 384.**\n\n**Annex 385.**\n\n**Annex 386.**\n\n**Annex 387.**\n\n**Annex 388.**\n\n**Annex 389.**\n\n**Annex 390.**\n\n**Annex 391.**\n\n**Annex 392.**\n\n**Annex 393.**\n\n**Annex 394.**\n\n**Annex 395.**\n\n**Annex 396.**\n\n**Annex 397.**\n\n**Annex 398.**\n\n**Annex 399.**\n\n**Annex 400.**\n\n**Annex 401.**\n\n**Annex 402.**\n\n**Annex 403.**\n\n**Annex 404.**\n\n**Annex 405.**\n\n**Annex 406.**\n\n**Annex 407.**\n\n**Annex 408.**\n\n**Annex 409.**\n\n**Annex 410.**\n\n**Annex 411.**\n\n**Annex 412.**\n\n**Annex 413.**\n\n**Annex 414.**\n\n**Annex 415.**\n\n**Annex 416.**\n\n**Annex 417.**\n\n**Annex 418.**\n\n**Annex 419.**\n\n**Annex 420.**\n\n**Annex 421.**\n\n**Annex 422.**\n\n**Annex 423.**\n\n**Annex 424.**\n\n**Annex 425.**\n\n**Annex 426.**\n\n**Annex 427.**\n\n**Annex 428.**\n\n**Annex 429.**\n\n**Annex 430.**\n\n**Annex 431.**\n\n**Annex 432.**\n\n**Annex 433.**\n\n**Annex 434.**\n\n**Annex 435.**\n\n**Annex 436.**\n\n**Annex 437.**\n\n**Annex 438.**\n\n**Annex 439.**\n\n**Annex 440.**\n\n**Annex 441.**\n\n**Annex 442.**\n\n**Annex 443.**\n\n**Annex 444.**\n\n**Annex 445.**\n\n**Annex 446.**\n\n**Annex 447.**\n\n**Annex 448.**\n\n**Annex 449.**\n\n**Annex 450.**\n\n**Annex 451.**\n\n**Annex 452.**\n\n**Annex 453.**\n\n**Annex 454.**\n\n**Annex 455.**\n\n**Annex 456.**\n\n**Annex 457.**\n\n**Annex 458.**\n\n**Annex 459.**\n\n**Annex 460.**\n\n**Annex 461.**\n\n**Annex 462.**\n\n**Annex 463.**\n\n**Annex 464.**\n\n**Annex 465.**\n\n**Annex 466.**\n\n**Annex 467.**\n\n**Annex 468.**\n\n**Annex 469.**\n\n**Annex 470.**\n\n**Annex 471.**\n\n**Annex 472.**\n\n**Annex 473.**\n\n**Annex 47

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Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Liberal Government, which came into office in December 1905, was interested in disarmament both as a matter of principle and in order to free resources for social reform. The issue became more urgent and at the same time more complicated with the launching of the Dreadnought in February 1906. (The keel had been laid in October 1905, by the previous Government, but as we shall see, the Liberal Government was no less determined to maintain British naval supremacy.) The fire-power and speed of the new "all-big gun" ship made all other battleships vulnerable and obsolete, and threatened to set off another arms spiral.

Germany, meanwhile, had decided that she needed a strong navy to protect her commercial interests. An Admiralty memorandum noted:

> The examination made in 1897 of the maritime interests of the Empire served even then to establish the general conviction that the creation of a strong navy was indispensable, and that the necessary expenditure was, from an economic point of view, no more than a reasonable premium of insurance which the German people could and must pay. Further developments in all directions during the succeeding eight years have only tended to confirm and strengthen this conviction. The duty of feeding and employing a steadily increasing population in such a manner as to raise the standard of living as far as possible throughout the community, and thereby to maintain and promote a healthy social development, can only be fulfilled by affording a properly extended protection to those important branches of economic activity which enable German capital and German labour to find profitable employment abroad, and especially in countries beyond the seas. (German Admiralty, *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Seeinteressen im letzten Jahrzehnt*, November 1905; *passage translated in E.L. Woodward, Great Britain and the German Navy*, 1935, p.119)

A supplementary Naval Law in November 1905 accelerated the construction program of the Navy Law of 1900.

In April 1906, Russia issued an invitation to a Second Hague Conference, to be held in June 1907. The invitation rekindled British interest in arms limitation. The House of Commons passed a resolution:

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That this House is of opinion that the growth of expenditure on armaments is excessive and ought to be reduced, such expenditure lessens national and commercial credit, intensifies the unemployed problem, reduces the resources available for social reform, and presses with exceptional severity on the industrial classes, and it therefore calls upon the Government to take drastic steps to reduce the drain on national income, and to this end to press for the inclusion of the question of the reduction of armaments by international agreement in the agenda of the forthcoming Hague Conference.
(Hansard 4th Ser. clvi 1416.)

During the debate, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey stated that the Royal Navy was strong enough already to allow for a reduction of naval expenditure:

> Our whole policy is that national expenditure has grown enormously in the last few years and that now we have reached the turning point and there is a prospect that the expenditure can be considerably reduced without sacrificing national safety. I admit we may not be able to do all that we wish, and the limitation must be national safety.

> I believe there never has been a time when the relative and comparative supremacy of the British Navy was greater than it is now, and that at the present moment it is at least as sure as it ever has been in our history. If that be so, surely we can, at any rate for an evening, devote our attention to pressing upon the House and upon public opinion generally, the need for economy. And ... though what we can do with regard to the Hague Conference must depend on the response from other Governments -- which in turn will depend partly on the interest which other Parliaments take in the matter -- I do, on behalf of the Government, not only accept but welcome such a Resolution as this as a wholesome and beneficial expression of opinion.
(Hansard 4th Ser. clvi 1413,1415.)

In July 1906 The Government made a gesture of reducing the shipbuilding program from four to three large ships, and announced that one of the three would be delayed until after the Hague Conference, in the hope that some agreement might be reached.

Admiral Tirpitz suggested that it was hypocritical for Britain to express interest in arms limitation while refusing to contemplate the loss of naval supremacy:

> Look at the facts. Here is England, already more than four times as strong as Germany, in alliance with Japan, and probably with France, and you, the colossus, come and ask Germany, the pigmy, to disarm. From the point of view of the public it is

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laughable and Machiavellian, and we shall never agree to anything
of the sort.

... I am prepared to acknowledge that it [disarmament] is a correct religious inspiration, but not practical for people who live in the world. We have decided to possess a fleet, and that fleet I propose to build and keep strictly to my programme. (Tirpitz conversation with Capt. Dumas, U.K. naval attaché in Berlin, 9 Jan. 1907; B.D.D. vi, 2-3.)

The standard British reply to this charge of hypocrisy was that British supremacy was a threat to no-one, since British intentions were benevolent.

The Prime Minister wrote in the new Liberal journal *The Nation* in March 1907:

> We have already given earnest of our sincerity by the considerable reductions that have been effected in our naval and military expenditure, as well as by the undertaking that we are prepared to go further, if we find a similar disposition in other quarters. Our delegates, therefore, will not go into the Conference empty-handed. It has, however, been suggested that our example will count for nothing, because our preponderant naval position will still remain unimpaired. I do not believe it. The sea power of this country implies no challenge to any single State or group of States. I am persuaded that throughout the world that power is recognised as non-aggressive, and innocent of designs against the independence, the commercial freedom, and the legitimate development of other States, and that it is, therefore, a mistake to imagine that the naval Powers will be disposed to regard our position on the sea as a bar to any proposal for the arrest of armaments, or to the calling of a temporary truce. The truth appears to me to lie in the opposite direction. Our known adhesion to those two dominant principles -- the independence of nationalities and the freedom of trade -- entitles us of itself to claim that if our fleets be invulnerable, they carry with them no menace across the waters of the world, but a message of the most cordial goodwill, based on a belief in the community of interests between the nations. (Henry Campbell-Bannerman, "The Hague Conference and the Limitation of Armaments," *The Nation* (London), vol.1, no.1, 2 March 1907, p.4)

The German press responded sympathetically to this expression of peaceful intentions, but some papers remarked that future British Governments might not be so trustworthy. (See survey of German press reaction, *The Nation*, vol.1, no.2, 9 March 1907, p.1.)

In May 1907, Grey came up with a proposal for the exchange of information on naval construction:

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The proposal I had had in mind was that the different Powers should communicate their Naval programmes to each other before disclosing them to their own Parliaments and being publicly and officially committed to them. This would provide an opportunity for negotiations, and would help the Powers to realise how much in some cases the Naval programme of one Power is dependent upon that of another. At present, Naval programmes were announced publicly, and the Governments were committed to them in such a way that they could not modify them; and when one Government had done this, another was obliged to follow suit. (Grey, 1 May 1907, B.D.D. viii,228)

The Kaiser was skeptical:

> The Emperor was opposed to the idea of exchanging information. He thought it nothing more than a piece of Jesuitism suggested by Fisher. England wanted to be forewarned about German intentions. (Woodward p.131, citing D.G.P. xxiii, pt.1, 215-217)

Bülow indicated in a speech to the Reichstag at the end of April 1907 that he too was skeptical about the prospects for agreement:

> The German Government had not found any formula which would meet the great diversity in the geographical, economic, military, and political factors affecting the countries concerned, and at the same time furnish the basis of an agreement. An attempt to interfere with these conflicting interests might defeat its own purposes. The prospect of a discussion at the Conference would not "exercise a tranquillizing influence" upon the international situation. Germany would therefore leave this discussion to other Powers. (Woodward p.131)

The German position had a stifling effect on the Conference, and the issue was not discussed except in the vaguest terms. The German delegate, Marschall, was sarcastic in his report to Bülow:

> Mankind is groaning under the burden of armaments. Freedom, humanity, and civilization demand a limitation of armaments, that is to say the perpetuation of a state of things which is to the present advantage of England. It was a moving spectacle. (Woodward pp.136-7, quoting D.G.P. xxiii, pt.1 282-3)

A press release by the German Government in February 1908 replied to Grey's proposal for an exchange of information. Again the argument was that such disclosure was unnecessary, and possibly harmful:

> According to the press statement, the German Government claim to have already set a good example in this question. The German Naval Law has been discussed entirely in public. The annual naval estimates give an uninterrupted account of the cost of the Navy.

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Naval proposals not included in the Estimates are freely discussed in the Reichstag and in the Press. More than this could not be attained, since the British Admiralty would be as little inclined as the German, or the Admiralties of any other Power, to disclose secret information regarding construction, armament, signals, and tactics. Should information as to proposed naval construction be exchanged between Governments, international competition in shipbuilding would only be rendered more acute, and thus an opposite end would be arrived at to that which His Majesty's Government by the proposal desire to attain; for naturally each power would endeavour to outbid the others in the proposals. For these reasons the German Government see no cause to make any change in the method which has hitherto been followed by them in presenting their naval programme. (Report by U.K. Ambassador in Berlin, Sir F. Lascelles, to Grey, 24 February 1908; B.D.D. vi, 137)

In March 1908, the Kaiser expressed the view that the British were themselves responsible for the anxiety they felt:

> . . . England was making great political mistakes; the "mad" policy of building Dreadnoughts, and not the German fleet, was responsible for British nervousness. The old superiority in numbers was lost because other Powers were building Dreadnoughts. "The English must get used to the German fleet. And from time to time we must assure them that the fleet is not built against them." (Woodward p.170, citing D.G.P. xxiv, 46; 8 March 1908)

In August 1908, King Edward visited the Kaiser at Cronberg. Grey wrote a memorandum on naval policy for the King's guidance, although the King refrained from raising the subject in conversation with the Kaiser. Grey's memo emphasized that Britain required superiority for survival's sake:

> The British Government would not think of questioning the right of Germany to build as large a Navy as she thinks necessary for her own purposes nor would they complain of it. But they have to face the fact that at the present rate of construction the German Naval programme will in a very few years place the German Navy in a position of superiority to the British as regards the most powerful type of battle ship.

> This will necessitate a new British programme of construction to be begun next year. It will be demanded by public opinion; it must avowedly be accounted for solely by reference to the German programme; for the other nations of Europe are either not adding appreciably to their navies or have no navies of importance; and nations outside Europe are too distant or have not armies sufficient to threaten the independence of Great Britain.

> Whereas, if the German navy became superior or even attained such a relative proportion to the British as to enable it at an untoward

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moment to secure command of the sea for a few days, Great Britain would be not only defeated but occupied and conquered; Germany does not run so great a risk as this from any superiority of the British fleet, for the British army is so inferior to the German in size that occupation and conquest are out of the question. Without therefore attributing any sinister motive to the building of the German fleet it is a paramount necessity to increase British naval expenditure to meet the German programme, though we fear that this may be taken as a sign of increasing rivalry and distrust and though we regret anything which is likely to be a barrier to better feeling.

On the other hand a slackening of naval expenditure on both sides would at once be followed by a great rebound in public opinion towards friendly feeling and security. (Grey memo, 6 August 1908; B.D.D. vi, 174)

The Kaiser discussed the subject with Sir Charles Hardinge, Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, who accompanied King Edward. The Kaiser emphasized that England had no reason to fear for her security:

> The Emperor maintained that there was absolutely no cause for apprehension in England as to the German naval programme, and that no sensible person in Germany had ever thought for a moment that the German fleet was intended for an attack upon England. The English fleet had in relation to other fleets already more than a two-Power standard, since in 1909 there would be sixty-two British first-class battle-ships to twenty-four German ships of the same class. . . . He therefore failed to see any reason for nervousness in England, or for any increase in the British fleet on account of the German naval programme. This programme was not a new one; it had been passed by law; and it had become a point of national honour that it should be completed. No discussion with a foreign Government could be tolerated; such a proposal would be contrary to the national dignity, and would give rise to internal troubles if the Government were to accept it. He would rather go to war than submit to such dictation. (Hardinge's report, 16 August 1908; B.D.D. vi, 185-186)

In September 1908, the German Foreign Office hit upon the idea that the British desire for a naval agreement might be used as a "trump card" to force Britain into political concessions. W.A. von Stumm, First Secretary of the German embassy in London, wrote:

> I am inclined to think, although I appear to be stating a paradox, that the British anxiety about the development of our fleet may facilitate the conclusion of an agreement. The ... nervousness with which all England watches the growth of our forces at sea, the heavy financial burdens imposed by the attempt to be twice as strong as ourselves, the difficulties ... in the way of immobilising almost the whole of the British fleet in the North Sea, all these

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considerations seem to me to show that our naval policy gives us a valuable trump card in relation to England. The enthusiastic reception of the American fleet... in Australia must have convinced a good many thoughtful English politicians that the interests of the British Empire would be better served if English battleships could shew by their actual presence the value and extent of the protection afforded by the Mother-Country. ... I am unable to say how we can persuade the English people that there is no need for them to be afraid of a German challenge to their naval supremacy. If we are able to persuade them, in my humble opinion we ought to secure valuable concessions in return. The kind of agreement wanted by politicians here [in England] and affecting nothing more than the naval policy of the two countries is, I think, impracticable because it does not take into sufficient account of the advantageous position in which we are placed with regard to England. We ought rather to have in mind an eventual agreement on the broadest possible basis in order that we may receive compensation in other spheres for the surrender of the favourable position in which we stand in relation to British naval requirements. The Anglo-Russian agreement about central Asia, which has freed England at least superficially and for a time from her fears of a Russian invasion of India, shews what can be gained by using English embarrassments [Zwangsvorstellungen]. (Stumm memo, 8 Sept. 1908, D.G.P. xxiv, 156-8; translated in Woodward, pp.178-9)

In December 1908, Bülow repeated to the new British Ambassador, Sir W.E. Goschen, his view of the technical and political obstacles to arms limitation. Goschen reported to Grey:

> He had explained both to the Reichstag and to the Emperor ... that any international agreement with regard to the limitation of naval armaments was fraught with almost insuperable technical difficulties. How was the scale to be fixed on which the proportions of all the different navies were to be calculated? How would it be possible to lay down a fixed rule, when interests, alliances, and ententes, not to speak of types of ships and new inventions, were all liable to change? To arrange a fixed scale for all the Sea Powers, one would have to have the power of seeing into the future. No! The more he thought of it the more difficulties such an idea seemed to offer. Things would have to go on as they were, and Germany could only hope that the conviction would be eventually gained that she would certainly not pass in shipbuilding the limits of what was required for her defence. (Goschen to Grey, 10 December 1908, B.D.D. vi, 170)

In early 1909, the British were alarmed by reports that the Germans had accelerated their shipbuilding program and were building ships ahead of the published Navy Law schedule. The German Ambassador, Count Paul von Wolff-Metternich, gave assurances to the Foreign Office,

-8-

but Grey felt that British security had to rest on a firmer foundation
than German expressions of benevolent intention:

But such an assurance of intention, volunteered by the German
Government, an intention which might be changed, or which might
be anticipated by the more rapid progress of shipbuilding, coupled
with the statement that the German Government were not prepared to
enter into any arrangement about naval expenditure, and by a
statement that our Naval Attaché was not to be allowed to see the
progress of the building of the ships, such an assurance would not
be accepted by Parliament as something which justified us in not
building the ships we proposed. (Grey to Goschen, 18 March 1909,
B.D.D. vi, 244-5)

In late March 1909, Captain H.L. Heath, British Naval Attaché in Berlin,
heard similar assurances from Admiral Tirpitz, who was indignant that
his word was not sufficient:

I then said that it still seemed possible that if necessity arose
the German programme might be augmented to seventeen ships in 1912,
and that this number was within the limits of the Fleet Law. This
statement rather started the Admiral off again; he said that to
talk of possibilities was nonsense, the possibilities of either
nation were incalculable, and in any case "I have stated our fixed
intention, and my word ought to be trusted." (Heath report to
Goschen, 30 March 1909; B.D.D. vi, 255-6)

Grey told the House of Commons at about the same time that Britain
was determined to maintain her naval supremacy, but was eager for some
kind of arms-limitation agreement:

It is essential to us that we should not fall into a position of
inferiority; it is essential that we should keep a position of
superiority as regards our Navy. ... But public opinion in Germany
and in the world at large increasingly measures the probable
relations of England and Germany by their respective naval expendi-
ture. ...

... Of course, various arrangements are conceivable. An agree-
ment -- a general agreement -- to limit or reduce naval expenditure,
a comparison of naval estimates year by year in advance, to see
whether the modification of one might not lead to the modification
of the other; or even if those responsible, the two Admiralties
might exchange information as to the figures of their naval
expenditure and the progress of their building. All that is
unprecedented possibly, but so is the expenditure. (Debate of
29 March 1909, Hansard 5th Ser. iii, 58-59)

The British Government dropped its plan for eight new Dreadnoughts,
and decided on four at once plus four "contingent Dreadnoughts" -- in

["and stopped on four at one o'clock on the morning of the 1st of March 1908, and then the British Government stopped the plan for eight new battleships.", "So, March 1908, Hanover, 22nd Dec. 1908.\n(Delete of unrepresented hospitality, but to be expensed.)\n\n(Delete of expenditure and the proceeds of their building. All that is left to expenditure information as to the future of their naval forces, the other: or even if those reasonable, the two annuities whether the modification of one must not be felt to be the modification of a comparison of naval assets year by year in advance, to see amount --- a general agreement --- to limit or reduce naval expenditure, and in the world at large increasingly means the prowl for annuities as regards our Navy. ... But little opinion in Germany is entertained of Germany's programme which might be amended to adopt an idea in 1915. I then said that it might be deemed possible that it necessarily arose from an armament agreement between the British and German navies, and that this number we within the limits of the Fleet Law. This the German programme must have been intended to adopt, and the idea in 1915, I then said that it might be deemed possible that it necessarily arose from an armament agreement, volunteered by the German Government, an intention which might be changed, or which might be unflattered by the more rapid progress of building, completed with the statement that the German Government were not prepared to be unflattered by the more rapid progress of building, and by a statement that our Naval Attache was not to be allowed to see the progress of the building of the ship, such an assurance would not be accepted by the British as something which might be lifted up in not being accepted by the British, if we promised to build the ship we promised. (Key to Cochen, 18 March 1908.)", "The word was not sufficient:\n\nperIODIC ASSURANCES FROM ADMIRAL TRITZ, who was indigent that in June March 1908, Captain H.D. Heath, British Naval Attache in Berlin, told the House of Commons at about the same time that Britain", "Cochen, 30 March 1908: R.D.N. at. 522-30)\n\n(Head report to Intention, and my word ought to be transferred. \"(Hed)\")\

-9-

the hope that an Anglo-German agreement would make them unnecessary.

In April 1909, Stumm came up with a Draft Agreement of mutual
assistance, neutrality, and entente. The agreement was to be
accompanied by commercial and naval agreements and understandings
concerning other political issues such as the Baghdad Railway. The
key clauses were as follows:

Entwürfe zu einem politischen Abkommen zwischen Deutschland und England:

A. Defensivbündnis

Dans le cas où l'une des Hautes Parties contractantes, sans provocation de sa part, serait attaquée par une ou plusieurs Grandes Puissances, l'autre Partie contractante sera tenu à prêter à la Partie attaquée secours et assistance avec toutes ses forces. Dans ce cas, les Hautes Parties contractantes se concerteront en temps utile sur les mesures militaires à prendre en vue d'une coopération éventuelle.

Elles s'engagent, dès à présent, dans tous les cas de participation
commune à une guerre, à ne concluire ni armistice, ni paix, ni
traité, que d'un commun accord entre elles.

B. Neutralitätsabkommen

Article I: Les Hautes Parties contractantes se promettent mutuellement paix et amitié et n'entreront dans aucune alliance ou engagement dirigé contre l'un de leurs Etats.

Article II: Si une des Hautes Parties contractantes se trouvait
être engagée dans une guerre avec une ou plusieurs Grandes
Puissances, l'autre maintiendra à son égard une neutralité
bienveillante et vouerait ses soins à la localisation du conflit.

C. Entente

Les Gouvernements ... animés du désir de consolider les liens
d'amitié et de bon voisinage existant entre leurs Etats et de
contribuer par là à la conservation de la paix

reconnaissent que leur politique par rapport à toutes leurs
possessions a pour objet le maintien du statu quo territorial
actuel et déclarent en conséquence qu'ils sont fermement résolus
à conserver intacts et à respecter scrupuleusement les droits
souverains de leurs Majestés ... sur toutes leurs possessions
continentales et insulaires.

The Draft Agreement was apparently never shown to the British Foreign
Office (Woodward, p.258), but Kiderlen-Waechter, acting temporarily

-10-

as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, suggested to Goschen an Anglo-German "political understanding" on roughly the same lines. But Goschen was convinced that the scheme was aimed at furthering Germany's aggressive ambitions in Europe:

> That an understanding of some sort with England is desired is, I think, absolutely clear; but it is my impression that the only kind of understanding really wished for by Germany is one which would clear the way to her becoming the sole arbiter of the destinies of Europe and relieve her from all anxiety with regard to her only vulnerable side -- the sea. The naval supremacy of Great Britain is, in view of Russia's present weakness, the only obstacle to the German domination of Europe, and it is evident that an arrangement which would remove that obstacle would be extremely acceptable to the Imperial Government. The disadvantage to Great Britain of such an understanding is obvious, for though it might obviate temporarily the necessity of abnormal efforts in the direction of naval construction, it would inevitably lead to an upset of the balance of Europe, an endeavour to rectify which might subsequently entail greater and more serious sacrifices upon the country than those which the present naval competition requires. (Goschen to Grey, 16 April 1909; B.D.D. vi, 265-6)

Sir Eyre Crowe, Senior Clerk at the Foreign Office, emphasized in a minute to Goschen's report that, while the agreement would give analogous advantages to Britain, only Germany had such aggressive aims:

Under the terms of such an agreement, Germany would be able --

(a) to increase her fleet to any size desired.

(b) to fall upon France or Russia without fear of English interference.

(c) to impose her hegemony on any of the less powerful States, and in case this provokes resistance, actually to count upon British "benevolent neutrality" in the struggle.

(d) to interfere in any part of the world whilst England would be precluded from offering any serious resistance.

It is true that analogous advantages would simultaneously be secured to this country. But as we have no desire whatever of carrying on a policy of aggression, those paper advantages are in fact null for us. The whole proposal does not merit serious consideration. (Crowe minute, 19 April 1909; B.D.D. vi, 266)

The British were alarmed in April by a comment in the (German?) paper *Kreuzzeitung* that Austria would be free to build Dreadnoughts if Germany signed a naval agreement with England. Austrian Foreign Minister Aerenthal gave assurances on this point, but Crowe saw the

-11-

two-Power standard as a hedge against such possibilities:

In considering the strength of foreign navies, it is not
sufficient to take into account only the present intentions,
real or asserted, of the governments owning such navies. In
this particular case it may be quite true that no hostility to
England is contemplated; but in view of the existence of the
triple alliance, it cannot be overlooked that Austria may, whether
she likes it or not, find herself engaged in a war against us.
The essence of the doctrine of the two-Power standard is, I take
it, that it wisely eschews the almost impossible task of determining
whether a particular Power may or may not be opposed to us in war,
and seeks safety in the abstract and general principle of superiority
over numerically possible combination of two Powers. (Crowe
minute, 3 May 1909, B.D.D. vi, 270)

Grey emphasized that a naval agreement -- in particular, his scheme
for an exchange of information -- was the most important British
objective, and that other (presumably political) arrangements were
"smaller matters:"

The only remedy can be an exchange of naval information through
the respective naval attachés and that the Germans will not adopt.
As regards smaller matters between us we will adopt a conciliatory
attitude if they will reciprocate. (Grey minute, 23 June 1909,
B.D.D. vi, 278)

In August 1909 the new Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, began another
series of negotiations. The Chancellor told Goschen that a naval
agreement would be unacceptable unless accompanied by a political
"understanding:"

His Excellency added, however, that the discussion of a naval
arrangement could lead to no practical result unless it formed
part of a scheme for a good general understanding, and it was
based upon a conviction of the part, not only of the two Govern-
ments, but of public opinion in both countries, that neither
country had any hostile or aggressive designs against the other.
(Goschen report to Grey, 21 August 1909, B.D.D. vi, 283)

At the same time, the Chancellor told his own Foreign Minister, Schön,
that the British would have to give "political compensations" for any
agreement; in any case he would try to make the British reveal their
intentions:

Intentional

agreement; in such case he would try to save the British fleet their
that the British would have to give "definite commentations" for any
At the same time, the Chancellor told his own foreign Minister, "Good,
(Johnson report to them," St. August 1, 1900, P.D. A. 1, 583)

country had any hostile or aggressive designs against the other.
menta, but of public opinion in both countries, that neither
based upon a conviction on the fact, not only of the two govern-
ment or a sense for a good general understanding, and it was
arrangement coming from no direction, which unless it formed
the briefness thereof, however, that the direction of a vast
understanding:

agreement would be unacceptable unless accompanied by a political
series of negotiations. The Chancellor told Johnson that a vast

In August 1908 the new Chancellor, Sir John Hopewell, began another

P.D.D. A. 1, 583)

attitude fit there will, I suppose. (Grey, minute, 23 June 1908.)
In towards smaller matters between us will appear a conflagration
the respective naval attachés and that the Centrale will not short.
The only means can be an exercise of naval information thereon.

"Smaller matters."

objective, and that of (grammaphonic policy). Arrangements were
for an exchange of information — was the most important British

City emphasized that a naval agreement — in particular, the abode
minute, 3 May 1900, P.D.D. A. 1, 580)

over momentarily beautiful coordination of two Powers. (Grave
and seems safety in the spadist and General principle of subordination
Whether a belligerent Power may or may not be opposed to us in War,
it, that it will clearly show the almost indispensable task of determining
The essence of the doctrine of the two-tower at least is, I take
are filed it or not, find herself engaged in a war against me.
Fable alliance, it cannot be overlooked that Anstrum and, whether
unduly far from accomplished; but in view of the existence of the
time partition case it may be quite true that no hostility to
free or independent, of the Government control such Powers. In
afraid to take into account only the present situation.

In considering the seventh of foreign powers, if not two-tower, at least as a rule against such hostilities:

-12-

Undoubtedly the best thing would be a treaty of neutrality, in which England promised to remain neutral if we were attacked by France or Russia singly or together, or if we came to the help of Austria ... and in the event of a Russian attack. ... If England does not accept this proposal, we shall be justified in concluding that she has already made her arrangements with one or both of these Powers for eventualities of this kind, or has decided that in the event of such a war she would join our enemies. We must put a direct question to England. If she assures us that neither the one nor the other course has been taken but that she wishes to keep her hands free, the question then arises; can we content ourselves, merely with the assurance that England will adopt a friendly and peaceful policy towards Germany. I do not think that we can altogether give up the idea of political compensations. (Bethmann-Hollweg to Schön, 13 August 1909, D.G.P. xxviii, 217-218; translated in Woodward, p.268-269)

The German naval offer was a reduction of three ships in their program before 1914 and a proposed 3:4 ratio for new German and British construction. The U.K. was to drop the four "contingent" ships. (D.G.P. xxviii, 217-218; Woodward, p.269.)

But in the political sphere, the British were willing to give only the most general political assurances:

The cause of cool relations between England and Germany is the suspicion aroused by the German Naval Programme with its steady fulfilment and progressive increase during the past nine years. This feeling has been accentuated by certain statements made by German officials and more especially by the German Navy League, which is a recognised and official association. The effect of a technical naval agreement between the two countries would at once remove the feeling of distrust and would re-establish Anglo-German relations on a cordial and satisfactory footing, thus neutralizing the cause of recent suspicions. . . . The conclusion of a naval agreement is in reality the only condition that is needed to ensure more friendly feelings between the Government and people of the two countries.

Although it would be difficult to conclude an understanding with Germany, it should meet all imaginable eventualities, it might be possible to meet the Chancellor's views by making a declaration of general policy which should satisfy Germany without irrevocably binding the hands of England. Thus it might be stated that the two guiding principles of British foreign policy are:--

1. The preservation of peace; and

2. The maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. (Memorandum by Sir Charles Hardinge, 25 August 1909, B.D.D. vi, 285-6)

Grey pointed out that Britain would not jeopardize her existing ententes with France and Russia:

Europe with France and Britain.

Great Britain would not jeopardize her existing

3. The maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. (Memorandum by Air Chief Charles Hailes, 23 August 1903, H.D.B. A1, S26-3.)

f. The preservation of peace; and

two guiding principles of policy are:—

1. Finding the balance of power. Time must be stated that the or of general policy which should actually Germany without سابacuity become to meet the Challenge of a view which making a declaration with Germany should meet all imaginary agencies, it might be thought. It would be difficult to conclude an underwriting and people of the two countries.

needed to unite more friendly ties between the German states of a naval agreement in reality the only condition that is neutralizing the cause of recent amicable... The conclusion German relations on a cordial and satisfactory footing, June remove the feeling of distrust and would re-ënterstand. Under technical naval agreement between the two countries would at once which is a recognised and official association. The effect of a German officials and more especially by the German Navy, alone, the feeling has been accentuated by certain statements made by the Ministry and progressive increases during the past nine years. Anecdote shows by the German Naval Programme with its steady The cause of cool relations between England and Germany is the only the most general and firmest association;

(D.C.B. XXVII, S.I. 584; Woodward, p. 569.)

conclusion. The U.K. was adopted the form "contingent" under

before 1914, and a proposed S.I. ratio to form new German and British

The German naval offer was a renunciation of three allies in their position

D.G.B. XXVII, S.I. 583; transferred in Woodward, p. 568-569) (conclusion). (Reimann-Holzow to Deem, 13 August 1903, think that we can further give our idea of political aspects a friendly and reasonable policy towards Germany. I do not content ourselves, merely with the assurance that England will when to keep her hands free, the question then arises; can we neither the one nor the other come to bear further but that the must but a direct question to England. It is the same as that in the event of any war the world would let our enemies do what of these powers for eventuities of that kind, or may decide concerning that are to be already made per arrangements with our or England does not accept theنبosel, he should be qualified in or Wartris ... and in the event of a main attack ... It France or Russia should or together, or if we come to the help which England promised to remain neutral if we were attacked, would be the best thing would be a treaty or neutrality, in

-15-

-13-

I want a good understanding with Germany, but it must be one
which will not imperil those which we have with France and
Russia. (Grey to Goschen, 1 Sept. 1909, B.D.D. vi, 289)

This ruled out any formula for recognition of the territorial status
quo -- viz. Alsace-Lorraine.

Bethmann-Hollweg repeated that any agreement which forced Germany
to restrain her shipbuilding was a "great sacrifice," in return for which
England owed some concessions:

We believe that, if we respond to the English initiative, we
are making on our side a concession, as we have always declared,
in accordance with the truth, that we only wish to develop our
navy to meet our own requirements and not with regard to any
other navy. We have repeatedly stated and I repeat again that
our navy serves no aggressive purposes but is only destined to
protect our trade and, in case of necessity, to defend our Coasts.
[Marginal comment here by Prime Minister Asquith: "A swarm of
Dreadnoughts is useless for the one purpose, and unnecessary for
the other."] Whether a naval agreement alone ... would be in a
position really and lastingly to improve our relations, may appear
doubtful. ...

England will further understand that we are in reality, and also
bearing in mind public opinion, making a great sacrifice, if in
such an agreement we also recognize legally England's actually
existing naval supremacy. We can only make such a sacrifice, and
in fact we are prepared to make it, on condition that England should
declare and show to us that her confidence in us will thereby
be restored.

Should that not occur, we should be afraid that a naval arrange-
ment, instead of improving general political relations, would arouse
fresh distrust, as ill disposed people would express a doubt as to
whether the agreement which had been concluded would actually be
kept. (Goschen report, 14 October 1909, B.D.D. vi, 296)

Goschen told the Chancellor that, on the contrary, the costs and
benefits of an arms-limitation agreement would be shared equally by
both sides:

I ventured to remark that before we could judge of the sacrifice
we must know what proposals the Imperial Government had to make,
because it appeared to me that as things stood the sacrifice was
no greater for one Power than for the other, both Powers being
equally anxious to curtail the increasing costs of armaments and
to remove from the public mind the impression that aggressive ideas
lay at the bottom of that increasing expenditure. His Excellency
said that that was the idea, but not the whole idea. . . .
(Goschen report, 4 November 1909, B.D.D. vi, 305)

-14-

Hardinge pointed out that, since in any case Britain would never allow the Germans to overtake Britain's supremacy, recognition of that supremacy was hardly a German "concession:"

It is desired that the recognition of the supremacy of the British navy should be regarded as a great concession, meriting counter-concessions on our side, so far undefined. Such a recognition would be of no value unless the British navy were really supreme, and so long as our navy is supreme it does not matter whether it is so recognised in Germany or not. Consequently the concession is dependent entirely on the intentions of H.M.G. to maintain a supreme navy, and as there is a consensus of opinion on this point it thus becomes a paper concession or no concession at all.
(Hardinge minute, 24 Oct. 1909; B.D.D. vi, 299)

In October 1909, the British pressed the Germans to tell them what kind of naval agreement they would accept. The Germans replied that their program of naval construction was fixed by law, but there was a possibility of "reducing the tempo" of actual construction. The British were puzzled by this. Goschen hoped that Germany might fall back from the "rigid execution" of the Navy Law, while Schön suggested that the Germans would promise only that they would not accelerate the Navy Law schedule of shipbuilding. (Goschen to Grey, 15 Oct. 1909; B.D.D. vi, 294)
Goschen reported a later conversation with Schön:

I took the opportunity of asking him to explain to me what the Chancellor had meant exactly by the "relaxation of the tempo of the German programme." He replied that to touch the number of ships provided for by the programme was impossible without a vote in the Reichstag, but that an alteration in the speed with which they were to be built necessitated no such proceeding. That lay in the hands of the Government and they could therefore reduce the number of ships to be constructed in each year. For instance according to the programme four ships were to be laid down each year for a certain number of years. The Government could, without consulting the Reichstag, reduce these to three. It is true that the whole number to be built according to the programme would not be affected by the proceeding, but the expenses would be spread over a greater length of time and at all events the annual expenditure would be reduced. I said that that might be a temporary advantage but that the gross naval expenditure would finally remain the same; a proposal for reducing this gross expenditure would be more to the point. He replied that that was impossible for the moment, and that therefore he was personally in favour of making at present an arrangement which would only cover two or three years. He explained his view by stating that if at the end of a

-15-

certain period within that time the arrangement was found to work satisfactorily and, together with mutual pacific assurances, to have tranquillized public opinion on both sides, it would be highly probable that a strong party in the Reichstag would be in favour of reducing the number of ships provided by the programme and that a vote to that effect could easily be secured. (Goschen to Grey, 15 Oct. 1909; B.D.D. vi, 295)

Hardinge doubted that the Reichstag would ever modify the Navy Law:

... [I]f Germany now lightens the strain upon her finances by building three capital ships instead of four she will be in a better position from a financial point of view to bear this burden than if she keeps to her programme of four ships per annum, and consequently there would be a better prospect of the programme being maintained. (Hardinge minute, 24 Oct. 1909; B.D.D. vi, 299-300)

The British proposal for an exchange of information was discussed again in November 1909. Bethmann-Hollweg emphasized to Goschen that there should be no appearance of "control" in such an arrangement:

... [I]n my opinion we must avoid, in the interests of both countries, giving this part of the Arrangement the faintest appearance of the Naval Attachés having in any way to control the honourable execution of the Agreement. This honesty is to be taken for granted, when England and Germany conclude a treaty. (Goschen report, 4 November 1909; B.D.D. vi, 308)

In the same conversation, the Chancellor proposed a plan of mutual assurance that neither Power entertained any idea of aggression, and neither Power would join in an attack on the other. Goschen replied that England was being asked for something more definite than she had promised France and Russia. The Chancellor answered that England wanted a naval agreement, and that such an agreement could be made only between friends. Hardinge commented in a Foreign Office minute that the German proposals would allow Germany to disturb the political equilibrium of Europe:

Turning to the German proposals for a political agreement between England and Germany there can be no doubt that they go much farther than would be compatible with the foreign policy of His Majesty's Government. The position of Great Britain on the Continent is happily very different to that of Germany. At the present moment England's only possible foe is Germany, while Germany might under certain circumstances have to reckon with England, France or Russia,

certain circumstances have to rock on with Britain, France or Greece, Holland, a only dependent toe on Germany, while Germany might under
roughly very different to that of Germany. At the present moment
Government, the position of Great Britain on the Continent is
than would be compatible with the foreign policy of Mrs. Maleskine's
Holland and Germany there can be no doubt that they go much further
Tending to the German proposals for a political agreement between
Germany and France.

### Conclusion of Europe:

that the German proposals would allow Germany to gain the benefit
only between friends. Hardinge commented in a Foreign Office minute
wanted a naval agreement, and that such an agreement could be made
brought France and Germany. The Chancellor seemed that England
that Holland was being asked for something more definite than she has
wanted power would join in an attack on the other. Coaches replied
assurance that neither power entertained any idea of attenuation, and
In the same conversation, the Chancellor proposed a plan of mutual
report, 4 November 1938; B.D.D. of 20th

for granted, when England and Germany combine a treaty. (Gothen
honorary execution of the Agreement.) This honesty is to be taken
as of the Naval Attaches having in any way to control the
contrary, giving the part of the Arrangement the tiniest abber-
ance should be no abstinence of control in which an arrangement
there should be no abstinence of control in which an arrangement
should in November 1938. Bethmann-Holbach emblazoned to Coachen that
The British proposal for an exchange of information was discussed
continued.

(Hardinge minute, 24 Oct. 1938; B.D.D. of 20th, 20th, 20th, 20th)
concernedly they would be a better proposal of the programme being
than it is the theme to her programme of Tomши de St. Amys, and
better position from a financial point of view to prevent this being
brought into the capital of Tomши itself. It is to be noted that the
programme and that a
proposition that a strong party in the Parliament would be in favour of
have transpired public opinion on both sides, it would be highly
attenuatorily and, together with mutual confidence assumed, to
be certain period within that time the arrangement is found to work

Hardinge commented that the Parliament would even identify the heavy load:

12 Oct. 1938; B.D.D. of 20th
note to that effect could easily be a cause. (Gothen to Grey,
reducing the number of ships provided by the programme and that a
proposition that a strong party in the Parliament would be in favour of
have transpired public opinion on both sides, it would be highly
attenuatorily and, together with mutual confidence assumed, to
be certain period within that time the arrangement is found to work

-16-

or a combination of two or more of these Powers. For Germany therefore to give a pledge to England that if England be attacked by a third European or other Power, she would not join England's adversaries, no real advantage is to be gained, since any such attack is in the highest degree improbable. Were England to give a similar pledge to Germany, the hands of England would be tied so long as the engagement was in force, and Germany, the only aggressive Power in Europe, would be free to act when and where and how she pleased while England remained a discontented and probably angry spectator.

To sum up, no naval agreement can be of any permanent usefulness to restore friendly relations between Germany and England unless it contains some provision for the modification of the present German naval programme. No political agreement between the two Powers would be acceptable on the lines suggested by the German Chancellor which are so far reaching as to be likely to disturb the political equilibrium of Europe. (Hardinge minute, 10 November 1909; B.D.D. vi, 311-312)

Meanwhile Schön wrote in a German Foreign Office memorandum that Britain had to pay for any naval agreement because Germany had no interest in one:

> If the English, as they tell us, want a naval agreement, they must pay a price for it in the political sphere. We have no wish for a naval agreement. For this reason we cannot accept Sir Edward Goschen's and Sir Edward Grey's arguments that England cannot give us more than she has given France and Russia. England wants something from us, and must pay for it. (D.G.P. xxviii, 253-254; quoted in Woodward, p. 277)

The same proposals were discussed throughout 1910 without result. In October 1910, the German Government asked what price Britain would pay for a German promise not to extend the existing Navy Law:

> The Imperial Government have in the first instance examined the proposal for a mutual exchange of information as to the state of progress at any given moment of the vessels of both parties under construction recourse being had to the Naval Attaches in this connection. The Imperial Government have no objections to raise to this proposal. But if the proposal is based on the assumption that the Imperial Government will engage to renounce any extension of the existing German Fleet Law, then the Imperial Government must certainly reply that they cannot take this suggestion into consideration, until it is made clear what equivalent His Britannic Majesty's Government would be willing to offer in return for such a formal undertaking, since such an Agreement, as His Britannic Majesty's Government have themselves pointed out, can only be founded upon the principle of reciprocity. (11 October 1910; B.D.D. vi, 525)

B.D. A., 258)

Committed upon the principle of reciprocity. (If October 1940)

Majesty's Government have themselves decided, can only be a formal undertaking, since such an Agreement, as the British
Majesty's Government would be willing to offer, in return for such
consideration, until it is made clear what equivalent His Majesty
may certainly reply that they cannot make this arrangement into
of the existing German fleet law, then the Imperial Government
that the Imperial Government will engage to renounce any extension
to this proposal. But if the proposal is based on the assumption
connection. The Imperial Government have no objections to raise
construction. The Imperial Government have no objections to raise
proceeds as any given moment of the eventful or joint parties under
protest for a mutual exchange of information as to the state of
The Imperial Government have in the strictest sense examined the
ask for a German promise not to extend the existing Navy law.

In October 1940, the German Government asked what price Britain would
The same proposals were discounted throughout 1940 without result.

quoted in Woodward, p. 111)

D.G.R. xxiiv, S03-S04;

thing from us, and must say for it, that more than are given France and Germany. England wants some
a new agreement. For this reason we cannot accept Sir Edward
pay a price for it in the political arena. We have no idea for
If the England, as they tell us, want a new agreement, they must
pay to pay for any new agreement because Germany had no interest in one:

Meanwhile Schou wrote in a German foreign Office memorandum that Britain

B.D.P. A., 257-75)

equivalent to Europe.

which are so far reaching as to be likely to摘要 the political
would be acceptable on the lines suggested by the German Chancellor
in the new programme. No political agreement between the two powers
contains any provision for the modification of the present German
to reators friendly relations between Germany and England unless it
To am end, no new agreement can be of any permanent value

property, any such abator.

and now she pleased white England remained a discontented and
aggressive power in Europe, would be free to act when and where
so long as the engagement was in force, and Germany, the only
a similar power to Germany, the range of England would be the
attack on the highest degree inadmissible. were England to stay
agreement, no real advantage is to be gained, since any such
by a third European or other power, she would not join England's
therefore to give a pledge to England that it England be attested
or a compensation of two or more of these Powers. For Germany

16

-17-

But the Kaiser, in conversation with Goschen, seemed opposed even to
the idea of promising not to add to the existing program:

His Majesty then proceeded to discuss the naval question. He
said that he had no particular objection to the idea of the two
Admiralties exchanging information; he did not believe that it
would be of the slightest use, as even without an arrangement to
that effect the two Admiralties generally knew pretty well what
was going on in each other's Dockyards. If however His Majesty's
Government thought that it would do good, he had nothing to say
against the proposal. "But to one thing," he added, "I will never
consent, and that is to bind myself not to add to my existing
programme. I do not wish to add to it, but it is asking too much
to request me to make an engagement not to do so. I have two
neighbours, each with a number of corps d'armée close to my frontiers,
who are only waiting for an opportunity to jump at my throat."
(Goschen to Grey, 16 October 1910; B.D.D. vi, 531)

The Germans, as we have seen, consistently argued that a naval
agreement was impractical without a more basic political understanding.
A memorandum by Crowe in October 1910 shows that he, too, understood
that a political problem lay beneath the arms-limitation disputes:

The Chancellor is ... right in suggesting that it is not merely
or even principally the question of naval armaments which is the
cause of the existing estrangement. The building of the German
fleet is but one of the symptoms of the disease. It is the
political ambitions of the German government and nation which are
the source of the mischief. (Crowe memo, 20 Oct. 1910; B.D.D.
vi, 534-535)

Grey, however, continued to seek an agreement on the exchange of
information. Interestingly enough, it was not until December 1910 that
the Foreign Office asked the Admiralty for a list of the kinds of data
which would be relevant. The Admiralty came up with the following list:

(a.) Dimensions of vessels to be laid down.
(b.) Protection, armament, speed and Horse Power.
(c.) When to be laid down and when completed.
(3 December 1910; B.D.D. vi, 560)

In March 1911, an M.P. proposed to the House of Commons a motion
in favor of a reduction of naval expenditure. Grey spoke against the
motion, pointing out that it failed to recognize that "our expenditure
must be dependent on the expenditure of other Powers." But Grey went on

must be dependent on the expropriation of other powers." But Grey wanted
not to be dependent on the expropriation of other powers. They took the
opposition, pointing out that it failed to recognize that "our expropriations
in favor of a reparation of naval expropriation." They took the opposition
in March 1910, an "opposition" proposed to the House of Commons a motion

(December 1910: B.D.P., 31, 280)

(c.) when to be raised down and when completed.

(J.) Protection, annuity, annuity and Home Power.

(a.) Dimensions of vessels to be raised down.

which would be relevant. The Admiralty came to me with the following first:
the foreign office asked the Admiralty for a list of the names of the data
information. Interestingly enough, it was not until December 1910 that
Gray, however, continued to seek an expropriation on the expropriation of

at 244-252)

the source of the machine. (Crowe memo, 20 Oct. 1910: P.M.)

The expropriation of the German Government and station which are
listed is put one of the symptoms of the disease. It is the cause of the expropriation arrangement. The building of the German
on evenffaft the station of naval annuitants which are the
the expropriation is ... right. In accounting for it, I am not ready

that a political problem may be presented the same-mentioned question:

A memorandum by Crowe in October 1910 shows that he, too, under took

agreement was functional, without a mere basic political understanding.

The Germans, and we have been, consistent in stating that a many

(Goaden to Gray, 19.10.1910: B.D.P., 31, 282)
who are only waiting for an opportunity to jump at my throat.

Reinholders, each with a number of come of them close to my frontiers,
to represent me to make an expropriation not to do so. I have two
programme. I do not wish to add to it, but it at least should be too much
content, and that it is to give itself not to me to my existing
opposition, but to one thing, "I will never

Government thought that it would be enough, he said nothing to say
was going on in each column a discussion." I, however, the Matilda,
that effect the two Annexes generally known pretty well must
be of the slightest was, as even without an arrangement to
Vermiforme examining information: He did not believe that it
said that he had so particular an opinion to the idea of the two
His Matilda then decided to discontinue the naval direction. He
the idea of promoting not to add to the existing programme
but the letter, in conversation with his coach, seemed obvious even to

-11-

-18-

to lament the "world evil of this growing expenditure," this "bleeding to death in time of peace," and warned that the arms burden could lead to domestic upheaval and international conflict. He renewed his information-exchange proposal, and looked beyond to an end to arms competition:

> The great nations of the world are in bondage, in increasing
> bondage, at the present moment, to their armies and navies, and
> it does not seem to me impossible that in some future years they
> may discover, as individuals have discovered, that law is a better
> remedy than force, and that all the time they have been in bondage
> to this tremendous expenditure, the prison door has been locked on
> the inside. (Hansard 5th Ser. xxii, 1977-91, 13 March 1911)

The Germans saw this speech as a sure sign that Britain was feeling the strain of competition with Germany. The German naval attaché in London wrote:

> Grey's surrender is due to the Naval Law alone and the unshakable
> resolution of the German nation not to allow any diminution of
> this important instrument. (13 March 1911; D.G.P. xxviii,
> 396-398; quoted in Woodward, p.303)

The Kaiser commented:

> As it is, they [England] respect our firm resolution and surrender
> to the facts. So we must go on building undisturbed. (D.G.P.
> xxviii, 398-400; quoted in Woodward, p.303-304)

Bethmann-Hollweg, in a March 31 speech to the Reichstag, reminded Britain that Germany was not inclined to acquiesce in British naval supremacy:

> England is convinced, and has repeatedly declared that, notwithstanding all her wishes for a limitation of armaments and for the composition of disputes by arbitral procedure, her Fleet must in all circumstances be a match for, or even superior to, any possible combination in the world. To aim at this state of things is England's perfect right ... but it is quite a different matter to make such a claim into the basis of an agreement which by peaceful assent is to be accepted by other Powers. (Reichstag speech of 31 March 1911, quoted in Woodward, p. 304)

In late March 1911, the Germans came up with their own proposal for an exchange of naval information. They suggested a simultaneous

on an exchange of naval information. They acknowledged a situation

In late March 1941, the German came up with their own proposal

of St. March 1941, quoted in Woodward, p. 207):
> "based on the assumption that he is accepted by other powers." (Reprinted
> from the original in the same issue.)

> The German said that he is not satisfied with the terms of the
> agreement. He said that he is satisfied that the terms of the
> agreement are right... but he is quite a different matter
> competition in the world. To aim at this date of time is
> self circumference to a match for, or even aspiration to, any possible
> competition of diameter by arbitrary procedure, her fleet must in
>uring all her waves for a limitation of movement and for the
> support of the British in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

### amity:

Britain that Germany was not interested to acquire in British naval
Bermuda-Holborn, in a March 21 a speech to the Reichstag, remanded

xxvii, 288-400; quoted in Woodward, p. 207-209.

to the facts. So we must go on fighting until we have completed
(D.8.8.8).
As it is, they (Britain) request our firm resolution and amity.

### The kernel commented:

288-289: quoted in Woodward, p. 203)

the important instrument. (F. von Koenigshofer, H. O., xxviii,
resolution of the German nation not to allow any diminution of
they, an annexure is due to the Naval law alone and the unambiguous

### London wrote:

the attainment of competition with Germany. The German naval attaché in

The German saw this speech as a sure basis that Britain was preparing

the trade. (Howard, *Per Car. xxi*, 1947-48, p. 13 March 1941)

to this tremendous expenditure, the British force has been forced on
勢 than force, and that all the time they have been in competition
with Germany, as individuals have discovered, that law is a better
law than discovery, and that we have a better law than the
The great nations of the world are in competition, in increasing

### competition:

information-exchange proposals, and looked forward to an end to this
war to domestic peace and international conflict. He believed his

to death in time of peace, and warned that the arms burden could reach
far beyond the

-19-

exchange (so that neither side could take advantage of the other),
which would be *binding*. (See Goschen memo to Grey, 25 March 1911;
B.D.D. vi, 6--.) This went further than Grey's original proposal,
and the British were both surprised and suspicious. Crowe wrote:

> The German government now propose an arrangement which, under
> the guise of exchange of information, really involves an engage-
> ment to effect a limitation of armaments. It is very desirable
> to keep these things apart.

... /T/he number of ships to be built are, under existing arrange-
ments, given in the naval estimates of each country. What the
special arrangement we desire to conclude is intended to secure,
is that the information given in the estimates shall not be falsi-
fied by the actual proceedings in the dockyards.

It seems curious at first sight that the Chancellor at the very
moment when he declares any limitation to be absolutely impossible,
because of first principles, should put forward a proposal which
does, in however modest a form, take the shape of a limitation to
be agreed upon from year to year. We must assume that this
particular form has advantages for the German government. It is
not difficult to see why this is so. The German government has
in reality no apprehension that H.M.G. may suddenly start a new
building scheme of maximum dimensions. They rely on our being
reasonable. They do not therefore fear that, having made up their
minds how many ships they are going to lay down, their plans will
be seriously upset by the British programme. But are we in the
same position? . . . . There is, further, the other possibility ...
that whilst England would at a given date (as early before the
commencement of the English financial year, as possible) be tied
down to a fixed number of new ships, Austria, Italy, and other
Powers which Great Britain has to take into account, could shortly
afterwards lay down an unexpectedly large number of extra ships?
Moreover, Germany, under her system of a fixed navy law, does at
present tie herself in a certain way for years in advance (notably
as regards providing the money) whereas the British programme is
undetermined until the estimates are, each year, made up. Germany
would gain by knowing something definite and rigid beforehand,
beyond which Great Britain could not go for, say, 15 months. Such
an arrangement as the 4 "contingent Dreadnoughts" of 1909-10 would
be made impossible for us. (Crowe minute, 3 April 1911; B.D.D.
vi, 614-615)

The British eventually replied that they were interested in a more
limited scheme, which focused on the facts of naval construction rather
than on intentions and commitments:

-20-

They [H.M.G.] are content to assume that every ship in each class will represent the last word of the naval science of the constructing Power on the subject. The information which they would wish to obtain, and which they are perfectly willing to furnish, concerns not so much the technical quality and specifications of the various vessels, as the scale of warlike preparation upon which the Admiralties of the two countries have embarked; and it is with the sole object of freeing this vital matter from the atmosphere of doubt and anxiety with which it has been from time to time surrounded that the following observations are put forward.

His Majesty's Government do not seek to know the intentions of the German Government so far as the future is concerned, or to lead that Government into any arrangement which would fetter reciprocally the free discretion of either Power to alter, vary, diminish or extend their naval programme. They are concerned with the exact situation, in fact at given and agreed periods in each year. . . . What is desired, indeed, is an exchange of simple and easily verifiable facts. (U.K. Memo, 28 Jan. 1912; B.D.D. vi,662-3)

Meanwhile the German Government gave some interesting reasons for their reluctance to agree to a reduction in the tempo of shipbuilding (an idea which they themselves had first suggested):

> . . . [T]he Navy Law provides for a minimum number of new ships, to fall short of which would appear impossible for several reasons. In the first place the necessity of making up in later financial years the arrears of delayed construction, so as to comply with the provisions of the Navy Law, would result in irregularities in the demands upon the Imperial finances, which would be incompatible with the principles of sound finance. Moreover, such a course stands self-condemned by reason of the consideration due to the German shipbuilding industry, which would thus be incapacitated from rationally and profitably working its establishments, organized as these are on the basis of having to deal with a definite quantity of government orders. (German aide-mémoire, 9 May 1911; B.D.D. vi, 626)

> The Kaiser spoke at Hamburg on 27 August 1911, recommending another supplemental Navy Law "so that we can be sure that no one will dispute our rightful place in the sun." (D.G.P. xxxi, 3-4n.)

Lord Haldane, Secretary of State for War, visited Berlin in February 1912. The negotiations which followed were somewhat confused, since both Haldane and Bethmann-Hollweg were untrained in diplomacy, and both were eager for some kind of agreement. Haldane gave the Chancellor the impression that England was willing to offer colonial concessions and

-21-

a political agreement. As for the German side of the bargain, the discussion centered around a reduction of the tempo of the new 1912 supplemental Navy Law. Tirpitz preferred that the tempo reduction be in the form of an assurance to the Reichstag, rather than a public agreement. Haldane reported:

> After much talking we got to this, that ... they should put off building the first ship till 1913, and then should not lay down another till three years after (1916), and lay down the third till 1919. Admiral Tirpitz wanted us to give some undertaking about our own ship-building. He thought the two-Power standard a hard one for Germany, and, indeed Germany could not make any admission about it. I said it was not a matter for admission. Germany must be free and we must be free, and we should probably lay down two keels to their one. In this case the initiative was not with us but with them. The idea occurred to all of us on this observation that we should try to avoid defining a standard proportion in the agreement, and, that, indeed, we should say nothing at all about ship-building in the agreement, but that if the political agreement was concluded the Emperor should at once announce to the German public that this entirely new fact modified his desire for the Fleet Law as originally conceived, and that it should be delayed and spread out to the extent we had discussed. For the rest, each of us would remain masters in our own houses as far as naval matters were concerned. (Haldane Diary, 10 Feb. 1912; B.D.D. vi, 680-681)

Bethmann-Hollweg still wanted the British to promise "benevolent neutrality"; he proposed the following formula:

> If either of the high contracting parties becomes entangled in a war with one or more other Powers, the other of the high contracting parties will at least observe towards the Power so entangled a benevolent neutrality, and use its utmost endeavour for the localisation of the conflict. (Haldane Diary; B.D.D. vi, 684)

But in March, Grey made it clear that Britain would offer only a general political assurance, namely:

> England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and pursue no aggressive policy towards her.

> Aggression upon Germany is not the subject and forms no part of any Treaty understanding or combination to which England is now a party nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object. (Grey draft formula handed to Metternich, 14 March 1912; B.D.D. vi, 713-714)

Metternich had to reject it, "as no mention is made of neutrality."

(Metternich to Grey, 14 March 1912; B.D.D. vi, 714.) With the failure

of these political discussions, the Germans lost interest in Grey's
information-exchange proposal, which was never seriously mentioned
again.

The last noteworthy arms-limitation proposal of the period was
the "naval holiday" suggestion put forward in March 1912 by the new
First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill:

Take, as an instance of this proposition which I am putting
forward for general consideration, the year 1913. In that year,
as I apprehend, Germany will build three capital ships, and it
will be necessary for us to build five in consequence. Supposing
we were both to take a holiday for that year, Supposing we both introduced a
blank page into the book of misunderstanding; supposing that
Germany were to build no ships that year, she would save herself
between £6000000 and £7,000,000 sterling. But that is not all.
In ordinary circumstances we should not begin our ships until she
has started hers. The three ships that she did not build
would therefore automatically wipe out no fewer than five British
potential super-"Dreadnoughts," and that is more than I expect them to
hope to do in a brilliant naval action. (18 March 1912;
Hansard 5th Ser. xxxv, 1557-1558)

The Kaiser promptly killed this idea by declaring that such an
agreement was possible only between allies. (Churchill, *The World
Crisis*, i, 109.)

In October 1912, Bethmann-Hollweg told Lord Granville, an official
in the Berlin Embassy, why Germany needed a strong navy:

> Germany required her fleet not merely for the purpose of defending her commerce, but for the general purpose of her greatness.
> (B.D.D. ix, pt.2, 36-39)