[L.C.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

APRIL 29, 1970

NO. 133

CAUTION - FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE AT 12:30 P.M., E.D.T., WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1970.
NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

Address by

The Honorable Elliot L. Richardson
Under Secretary of State

Before the Second National Convocation on the
Challenge of Building Peace

Hilton Hotel, New York City
April 29, 1970

It is a privilege to be asked to participate in
this extraordinary symposium.

Distinguished Soviet and American citizens are
today mingling in this hall and exchanging views in a
public forum, a fact which in itself contributes to a
more positive relationship between our two countries.

Privately organized meetings such as this add a
valuable dimension to official contact. I congratulate
all involved on this initiative and hope that your
discussions will be fruitful and will lead to other such
meetings, with the next round, perhaps, taking place in
the Soviet Union.

My remarks today were composed with an eye both to
the unique nature of this audience and the title of your

Elliot
Richardson

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convocation. I seek to focus your concern on the grave
hazards to world peace which arise when local conflicts
threaten to escalate to the point of confrontation between
the Soviet Union and the United States. Neither of our
two countries--no country, indeed--can afford to under-
estimate these hazards.

There are many questions on which the United States
and the Soviet Union disagree. We are likely to continue
to disagree. There is nothing to be gained by pretending
that this is not the case. Despite these differences, we
also have areas of common interest. I should like to
concentrate today on how we can maximize one of those
areas of common interest: how we can most effectively
insulate ourselves against the escalation of local
conflicts. Whatever strengthens and promotes this common
interest will also serve the cause of peace. To this end
I would like to suggest three simultaneous and complementary
forms of action.

The first involves acknowledging and developing what
I shall refer to as "spheres of restraint"; the second
calls for encouraging regional self-policing and the
development of regional institutions and capabilities; and

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the third requires strengthening United Nations mechanisms
so that they can more effectively cope with local con-
flicts.

As I look at the world situation that now seems to
be emerging I see an uneasy equilibrium at the center in
which the crucial element is the U.S.-USSR bilateral
strategic relationship. In recent years we have both
come to recognize the need to give this strategic
relationship greater stability.

Significant headway has already been made. Agree-
ments on a partial test ban treaty, the banning of nuclear
weapons from Antartica and from outer space, and the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have been followed by
a draft treaty barring weapons of mass destruction from
the seabed. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now
under way in Vienna have even greater potential for
stabilizing our strategic relationship. Extremely
sensitive and complex matters touching upon the vital
security of each side are at stake. But if solutions
continue to be pursued in the same serious manner in
which the talks have begun, we are confident that ways
can be found to limit the dangers and costs of the
strategic arms race.

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Beyond this central strategic equilibrium and destined, I believe, to become increasingly important are complex new configurations of power involving other countries and, in some cases, new regional groupings. In some areas of the world the power of the United States is involved in the local balance; in some areas Soviet power is involved; in other regions we are both involved, directly or indirectly.

Certain regions where both of us are now deeply involved are so important to the central configuration of power that accommodations will require a careful process of negotiation on outstanding issues. Central Europe, for which the NATO ministerial meeting recently proposed mutual and balanced force reductions, is the outstanding example.

In other areas, however, where neither of us is now so heavily committed, progress can be made toward reducing the danger of expanded local conflict by deliberately limiting our involvement. This does not require that we agree on the origin and merits of the conflict in question nor that we forego all interest in the area. What is required is that we do agree--either tacitly or explicitly--to refrain from any action, direct or indirect, which might disturb its internal equilibrium.

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Since the world of the 1970's is not likely to be a placid one, this will not be an easy task. Experience has shown that the process of modernization is inevitably accompanied by convulsion and dislocation. Turmoil and turbulence are thus unfortunately likely to continue to accompany rapid social change in large parts of the world. Peaceful development--economic or political--is a process that has thus far eluded much of mankind.

The temptations, the impatience, and the anger which will be stirred by continuing eruptions and violence in developing areas emphasize the need for major power abstention. The development of "spheres of restraint" will require that both major powers recognize that their long-term interests are not furthered by attempts to gain short-term--and often fleeting--advantage.

Each side has its own views as to what constitute current examples of such attempts. I believe, for instance, that the Soviet Union should realize that any immediate gains it might make by attempting to take advantage of the troubled Middle East situation are far outweighed by the danger of stirring up a wider conflict. When in such an area one of us--in this case the USSR--involves itself militarily, it is inevitable that the other will take notice and react.

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We in the United States, meanwhile, must come to
terms with the fact that violent upheaval--however
repugnant to our preference for orderly and peaceful
change--is going to continue to occur. We must realize
that in most such situations U.S. power is neither a
desirable nor an effective prescription.

In addition to realizing that we have neither a
moral right nor a duty to intervene in every local
quarrel, both the U.S. and the USSR must also recognize
that our power to deal with such disputes is sharply
circumscribed by the new confidence and strength of many
of the smaller nations. In many cases, to be sure, our
participation--together with such leverage as we can
usefully exercise--can help the parties find an acceptable
formula for a settlement. This is what we are seeking to
do in our discussions on the Middle East. But such
efforts should not lead us to believe that an imposed
solution, even where we can agree on its basic elements,
is a lasting solution. Where persuasion fails, coercion is
not an acceptable option.

These perceptions are reflected in the way the Nixon
Administration is attempting to remold U.S. foreign policy.

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They can be seen in the more precise manner in which we are now setting the limits of our obligations. As President Nixon has put it, "We have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around." Accordingly, we are being more exact in the delineation of those U.S. interests which, when threatened, must call forth a response.

We hope that the Soviet Union is also undertaking a new look at its own real interests around the world to see whether they, too might not, to advantage, be defined more narrowly. To the extent it does so, the development of spheres of restraint will become an easier task.

But even if both of us successfully pursue a course faithful to a recognition of spheres of restraint, this may not, in itself, be sufficient to insulate local conflicts and to prevent the risk of escalation. A second form of action, therefore, will also be important--that is, encouraging regional efforts to develop institutions for coping with local problems and disputes.

The Charter of the United Nations--in Articles 33 and 52--clearly envisages regional efforts which can contribute to the preservation of peace. These aspects of the Charter should be given increasing attention, especially by the

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developing countries.

While experience to date does not suggest that major successes will soon be achieved in this way, the record is not without promise. From the dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua two decades ago to the more recent conflict between El Salvador and Honduras, the Organization of American States has demonstrated a useful capacity for peacemaking. The Organization for African Unity has also scored some success in mediating disputes--as in those between Ethiopia and Somalia and between Morocco and Algeria, both in 1964. Nor should one discount the efforts made by the OAU in other instances where, although success was not achieved, some restraint was encouraged and useful experience gained.

In Asia, too, regional organizations are beginning to develop. These, as President Nixon observed in his report to the Congress on foreign policy, "can be bulwarks of peace." We look forward to their undertaking such a role in the future, and even now we hope that the nations of the area can help resolve the conflict in Southeast Asia, for certainly they have a paramount interest in seeing this accomplished.

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It will be especially important, however, to guard against expecting too much too quickly from the emergent regional consciousness in various parts of the world. The necessary concentration of regional power and the formation of institutions for regional action will take time. Early failures or false starts should not lead us to abandon the encouragement of truly regional initiatives.

Since regional action to maintain local stability or control local conflicts will not, in many cases, be adequate, a third form of action is also necessary: U.S.-Soviet cooperation in United Nations efforts to contain and, if possible, settle local conflicts. If this is to be accomplished, the United Nations role in the prevention, isolation, and resolution of local conflicts will have to be revitalized.

The UN, now in its 25th Anniversary Year, has done well in fostering economic development, scientific interchange, and in the area of human rights. It must now be strengthened and enabled to do the job its Charter envisions in the maintenance of peace. The central questions here are when and how peacekeeping can most effectively be brought into play and how the U.S. and the Soviet Union can best join with others to make it work.

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It is time to break through the six-year-old impasse on peacekeeping procedures and peacekeeping machinery. An effective and reliable new set of ground rules must be developed, one which allows for a quick response in emergencies. United Nations action must take account of the interests of all, be impartial in intent and application, and call forth the cooperation of the contending parties as well as of those nations on whom the UN must depend for manpower and funds. Procedures should also be politically responsive, efficient in administration, and adaptable to rapidly evolving events.

Among the key points on which the United States believes progress should be made are: The uses of "voluntary" peacekeeping, more precision and realism toward the balance of responsibilities between the Security Council and the Secretary General, firmer arrangements for ensuring the availability of personnel and facilities, widening the area of recruitment of peacekeepers, and more reliable and equitable sharing of costs.

I am glad to be able to take note today of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have already been discussing some of these matters both in informal meetings and in the negotiations of a United Nations

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[Lc]

working group in an attempt to work out guidelines
for future international action. Although differences
of approach exist between us with respect both to
interpretation of the Charter and to practical mechanics,
these need not stand in the way of uncovering sufficient
common ground to afford a practical basis for certain UN
peacekeeping operations. The responsibility for action,
in any case, lies with the entire international community,
not with the United States and the Soviet Union alone.
The middle powers in particular must continue to play a
key role in energizing and activating peacekeeping efforts.

When referring to "peacekeeping" I do not speak of it
as applying only to actions taken after conflict is
perilously close or has broken out. If the international
community is to be insulated against the potential impact
of local conflicts, efforts must be started at an early
stage; quarrels and disputes cannot be ignored until the
peace has been ruptured.

The UN Charter does not, after all, contemplate that
the UN should be the last resort in efforts to preserve
the peace. Articles 14, 33 and 36 of the Charter lay the
basis for timely action by the General Assembly and the
Security Council to recommend appropriate procedures or

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methods of adjustment of international disputes. It
is a sad commentary on recent trends that these articles
have largely fallen into disuse, and some of the blame
must surely be borne by the United States and the Soviet
Union.

Article 99 is also relevant to this discussion.
Under this provision, the Secretary General may bring to
the attention of the Security Council any matter which in
his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international
peace and security. In assigning the responsibility to
the Secretary General, the Charter thus provides, in
effect, for an early warning system. The responsibility
for action resides elsewhere, but realistic and imaginative
efforts are now called for to bring this potentially
significant role of the Secretary General more fully into
play.

If the full potential of the Secretary General's role
has been neglected, the same can also be said of the
Security Council. In September of last year, Foreign Minister
Gromyko called attention to the power of the Security
Council to consider general as well as specific problems
affecting the maintenance of peace.

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The government of Finland, which has been especially interested in such proposals, has suggested making the Security Council more of a center for world consultations by holding regular meetings at the foreign minister level. The U.S. hopes that some agreed way can be found to pursue this possibility. Also worth exploring is a recent Brazilian proposal to set up small informal subcommittees of the Security Council to examine the fundamental issues in specific disputes and to provide good offices for peaceful settlement of disputes.

Revival of the moribund International Court of Justice would also help to strengthen the mechanisms designed to settle disputes peacefully. Secretary Rogers last Saturday proposed several ways to enhance the role of the Court, which does not now have a single pending case before it.

The Secretary suggested that greater use be made of the chambers of the Court; that the chambers meet outside The Hague; that regional chambers be established, particularly in the developing world; and that regional organizations be given access to the Court. Noting that the major problem is the failure of states to submit disputes to the Court, Secretary Rogers underlined the intention of the United States

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to make more use of the Court in its own international
disputes. He encouraged other states to do the same,
adding:

"Mankind eventually must become wise
enough to settle disputes in peace
and justice under law."

The approaches I have outlined--the creation of
spheres of restraint, the encouragement of regional
institutions, and the strengthening of international
peacekeeping machinery--will not by themselves, it is
true, bring us to this goal. Neither will they guarantee
our safe passage to a securely ordered world free of the
shadow of thermonuclear war. They are, however, steps on
the way--steps we can take now.

If we succeed in these, we shall have the chance to
take other, longer steps. If we do not succeed in these,
we may never have that chance.

* * *

Excerpts on Mid-East from White House Press Secretary,
Ron Ziegler, April 29, 1970 Press Briefing

Q Ron, on another subject, do you have any
response to reports this morning that Soviet pilots are
being used to help defend Egypt?

MR. ZIEGLER: The latest reports regarding Soviet
military involvement in Egypt are, of course, a matter of
serious concern to the United States.

This morning I would reaffirm the statement that
the President made in his message to Congress on February 18 on
this subject, and also the statement which the Secretary of
State made on March 23 when he announced the decision regarding
the Israeli arms request, and that is that a close watch will
be kept on the military balance in the Middle East. For
this reason, the President has ordered an immediate and full eval-
uation of all intelligence reports and the implication of them
on the strategic balance in the Middle East.

As you will probably remember, the President, when
he discussed the Israeli arms decision in a press conference in
his office, emphasized that the Israeli arms decision was an
interim decision and that the military balance in the Middle East
would be watched carefully.

Q Can you say whether the President has received a
personal message from Golda Meir?

MR. ZIEGLER: To the best of my knowledge, I think I
can be quite precise on this, he has not received a personal
message from Golda Meir.

Q Has he received some other sort of message?

MR. ZIEGLER: I assume you mean have we been in touch
with the Israeli Government. I cannot give you information along
that line.

Q If the Soviet pilots are operating in Egypt,
would that possibly change the decision on the Israeli arms?

MR. ZIEGLER: As I said, in response to the question,
this is a matter which the President has ordered immediate and
full evaluation of all intelligence reports on and the implication
of them on the strategic balance in the Middle East. So, I cannot
answer that question since this evaluation will take place.

4/29/70 Press Briefing by State Department spokesman

Robert J. McCloskey:

[excerpts]

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A I have no further comment on it.

Q Can we switch to the Middle East?

[No response.]

Does the United States have independent evidence
that Soviet pilots are flying operational missions in
Egypt?

A I would, if I may, say to that we have no
reason to doubt the accuracy of reports that Soviet pilots
are flying combat aircraft. But I would perhaps better
add that there is no evidence that we have that they have
been involved in combat with Israeli aircraft.

Q And what view does the United States take
of this development?

A Serious; potentially dangerous.

Q Could you say whether, as a result of the
circumstances, there will be a reconsideration of the
Israeli request for more American fighters?

A I can't answer that directly, John.

The White House, I understand, said this morning that it
was reaffirming the statement of the President in his
message to Congress on February 18, and his statement on
March 31; which, in general, said that a close watch will

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be kept on the military balance in the area.

Q Have we taken up with the Soviet Union, or do we intend to, what their motives are in having their pilots fly combat aircraft in this area?

A We have not, but we do intend to.

Q You do intend to?

A Yes.

Q Bob, you say you have no reason to doubt it, that wasn't quite responsive to my question. Do you have independent evidence that this is so -- independent of the Israelis'?

A Yes.

Q Bob, does the Department regard this as an escalation of the Soviet involvement in the Middle East, and, indeed, an escalation of the whole arms race in this region?

A I would prefer to leave it, John, with saying that we do regard this as a serious development, and one that is potentially dangerous.

Q Bob, are you able to say in what fashion this would be taken up with the Soviets?

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A I can't at this time. I don't know.

Q. Bob, if we understood you correctly, you said that the United States has independent confirmation of the reports?

A I answered "yes" to that question.

Q At what stage --

A I am sorry, sir.

Q At what stage will you be in touch with the Soviet Union on this particular matter?

A I honestly don't know that at this point.

Q Is it also possible that you may take this up with the United Nations which has had a long concern for peace in that area?

A I couldn't say "yes" or "no," John. I don't know.

Q Bob, could you give us any estimate as to how many Soviet pilots we believe are in Egypt now?

A No; I am afraid I can't.

Q As I understand it, Ambassador Dobrynin is currently out of the country?

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A According to my information, he is still
in Moscow; yes.

Q Yes. And we had some indication that he
might be there for longer than a few days. On this basis,
would you think the subject would most likely be taken
up by the U. S. Embassy in Moscow?

A Well, I would have to go back saying,
John, I don't know; and I don't want to guess with you.

Q Do we have any reading at this time, Bob,
as to the point on whether Soviet pilots in the future
will be involved in flying operational combat missions
against the Israelis?

A I wouldn't speculate on that, John.

Q Bob, I am looking at Under Secretary
Richardson's speech, which is now released, and he says,
on page five, and he is talking about the Middle East:

[Reading from Press Release No. 133]

"When in such an area one of us--in this case
the USSR--involves itself militarily, it is inevitable
that the other will take notice and react."

Q The Indonesian Government is reported to have given a note to our Ambassador in Djakarta asking the United States to forswear military operations while they're trying to get diplomatic recognition.

A No; I can not confirm that.

Q You have not received it?

A I can not confirm that.

Q Bob, in yesterday's transcript it appears as if you were asked whether the Lon Nol Government had been consulted in advance of the new operation, and I believe you said "Yes"; but is that a correct interpretation?

A I think if you go back and read the question and answer, I'll stand on it.

Q The question starts off with "Can you tell" -- and you had a one-word answer: "Yes." Were you meaning to say, "Yes, they were consulted"?

A Read the transcript, and I will stand on it.

Q Bob, following Golda Meir's statement yesterday, does the United States have any concern that Israeli jets will engage Soviet planes in battle?

6

A I'm sorry, John. Say that again.

Q Well, Golda Meir implied that Israel
might send its planes into the air against either the SAM-3
sites or against the Russian-piloted planes. Is the
United States concerned about this statement, about
this possibility?

A I'm not aware of the statement and I
have no comment.

Q Has the United States yet formally raised
with the Soviet Union the question of their flying-operation
mission in Egypt?

A I don't know whether that has yet been
done. We will be doing this through normal diplomatic
channels both here and in Moscow.

Q Bob, can you say if the Department is in
the process now of looking for a new Ambassador for the
Paris Peace Talks?

A We are not.

Q Is the White House?

A To my knowledge, it is not.

Q Do you have any comment on the Viet Cong
reported charge at the Paris Peace Talks that we're
providing aid to Cambodia to slaughter Chinese and Vietnamese

Excerpt from the President's Press
Conference

May 8, 1970

QUESTION: Mr. President, have you made any judgment yet on the sale of jets to Israel? And how do you view the situation in the Middle East at the moment?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the situation has become ominous due to the fact that reports have been received with regard to Soviet pilots being interjected into the UAR Air Force, not in combat but in some other role. We are watching these reports very closely. If those reports prove to be true, and if that continues to escalate, this will dramatically shift the balance of power and it would make it necessary for the United States to re-evaluate its decision with regard to the sale of jets to Israel.

We have made it very clear -- and this is in the interest of peace in that area -- that the balance of power must not be changed and we will keep that commitment.

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rogers on the Columbia Broad-
casting System's television and radio program
"Face the Nation" (June 7) Interviewing the
Secretary were Charles W. Bailey of the Min-
neapolis Tribune and George Herman and
Marvin Kalb of CBS News.

Press release 175 dated June 8

Mr. Herman: Secretary Rogers, news reports this morning indicate a widening struggle across much of Cambodia, with the Lon Nol government forces in some trouble. The administration, and you yourself, sir, have said that we have no commitment to support the Lon Nol government with troops. But if it does come to a pinch, can we let that government fall to a Communist push?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we certainly hope that the government doesn't fall; but the President has made it perfectly clear—and as you have indicated, I have said the same thing—that we will not support the Lon Nol government with U.S. troops.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, the President's
duty under the Constitution, and under his con-
cept of it, is to protect the safety of American
troops in South Viet-Nam. Can he afford to
have a Communist government take over in
Cambodia on the flank of those troops?

Secretary Rogers: Well, as I indicated, we certainly would hope that the present government does not fall. We would hope that the Communists are not successful in taking over Cambodia. But we are committed to the proposition that we will not use United States troops

to support the government, the present govern-
ment in Cambodia.

Mr. Bailey: But Mr. Secretary, regardless of whether or not U.S. troops should be used or will be used in Cambodia, I think a lot of people are concerned about—with the fear that the new action in Cambodia has permanently widened the war and that South Vietnamese or Thai troops will be fighting in Cambodia from now on and that the United States will inevitably be involved in supporting them. Don't we have a permanent enlargement of the war geographically now?

Secretary Rogers: Well, not at all. I think that it is possible that the war will be fought in a different place and it is possible that it will continue with South Vietnamese forces and Cambodian forces, and even possibly Thai forces, fighting a common enemy. But that doesn't mean that the United States forces will be enmeshed in a combat in Cambodia. The President has made it perfectly clear that our troops will be out of Cambodia by the end of June, and we will follow through on that commitment.

I think it is interesting that for the first time
the countries in the area—Thailand, Cambodia,
Laos, and South Viet-Nam—are all working
together. For the first time they all have diplo-
matic relations with each other. And after all,
the Nixon doctrine is to encourage Asian na-
tions to handle Asian problems and to cooperate
with each other, and that is what they are doing.

Mr. Kalb: Does that encouragement also in-
clude direct American military support of that
Asian effort, sir?

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785

Communists have 20 percent of the popular support in South Viet-Nam, they should have 20 percent of the representation, or 30 percent, whatever it might be. The point is that we're willing to negotiate to attempt to give the other side whatever representation they are entitled to have.

*Mr. Bailey: You're saying, then, that a coalition government, in and of itself, is not ruled out by us, the only thing ruled out is the imposition of a coalition before negotiations?*

*Secretary Rogers:* Or before an election. I don't like the word "coalition," because it has a bad connotation. It suggests that the big powers are going to get together and make South Viet-Nam accept a particular—

*Mr. Bailey:* But a government that is 20 percent Communist and 80 percent non-Communist is in effect a "coalition."

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, do you call it that in Italy, for example; is that a "coalition government"? In other words, there are lots of nations that have representation by the Communists that we don't refer to as a "coalition government." But forget the word for the moment. The United States is prepared, and so is President Thieu, to have the Communists represented in the government if that is the will of the people, and if 20 percent of the people would like to have the vote for Communists then they would have 20 percent of the representation in the government.

*Mr. Bailey:* Do you expect to talk to the President and Vice President of South Viet-Nam in the near future about this kind of thing to see where they are ready to go on negotiations?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I'm going to take a trip to South Viet-Nam at the end of this month, and I'll be there for 2, 3, or 4 days. So I will have a chance to talk to the President of South Viet-Nam and other government officials. I also will have a chance to talk to our chiefs of missions all over that area. We'll have ambassadors from all over the area meet. I'm not sure—it's probably going to be in Japan, but that hasn't been determined. So I'll have a good opportunity

to get a complete picture of the situation in all of those Asian nations, and that will be from June 28 to about July 10.

*Mr. Herman:* Mr. Secretary, on May 13 at your news conference,² you were asked about the diplomatic reaction around the world to our incursions into Cambodia. And at that time you said that, while they were not too good at first, they were now changing the diplomatic climate was rapidly improving. Is it still? And does that mean that we've gotten back to where we were before, or has it been a bonus for us, or has it been bad for us diplomatically?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, as I said, there were some reserved opinions and a few negative opinions by other governments at the time the incursions took place. Since that time there has been considerable improvement. I have just returned from a meeting of the NATO countries, and there were 15 nations represented there. Almost without exception their attitude had changed. They realize now that we are going to leave Cambodia on schedule. They realize that it is not going to enlarge the war. They realize that it is going to make it possible for the Vietnamization process to proceed on schedule. So I think in large part the situation is about the way it was before this happened.

*Mr. Herman:* We made up the ground we lost?

*Secretary Rogers:* I think to a considerable extent. Yes.

## The Arab-Israel Conflict

*Mr. Kalb:* Mr. Secretary, on another subject: You left a group of Senators with the impression the other day that the administration would soon decide to sell jets to Israel. Is that true?

*Secretary Rogers:* That's true.

*Mr. Kalb:* Could you put a time frame on that? Are we now talking about weeks?

*Secretary Rogers:* I wouldn't think it would take that long, Mr. Kalb. We are in the process

² BULLETIN of June 1, 1970, p. 673.

June 29, 1970

789

of making a decision about whether we sell additional jets to Israel and in what form we do that, how we announce it—we would expect it would be fairly soon. I wouldn't want to put a time limit; I think it would be before a few weeks.

**Mr. Kalb:** And how dangerous do you regard—does the American Government regard the operational nature of Soviet military involvement now in Egypt?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, we regard the Soviet presence in Egypt as a serious matter. It's a new element. It's a new element in the sense that they have introduced more pilots in Egypt than they had before. They have these air-to-surface missile sites, SA-3's, which are manned by the Russian personnel, and they are actually flying planes in some patterns that would suggest operational patterns. Now, those are very, very serious matters. And we consider them seriously. And we've advised the Soviet Union that we consider these to be matters of concern to our Government. We would hope that the Soviet Union responds favorably to discussions we've had and that they desist from these operational flights and that they not inject any further Russian personnel into the area. We don't know what their response is going to be. They say that what they have done is defensive in nature, but it is a serious matter, one that we have under study now, and I hope that we will have a decision before long.

**Mr. Herman:** Do you consider the Tass dispatch today to be a partial answer, or a preliminary answer? Tass said, as I understood them, that they were referring not to Government pressure but to American press pressure on the Soviets to withdraw from Egypt, and they said this method has never worked and it's an unpleasant method and we reject it, and so forth and so on. Do you think that this is a harbinger of the likely Soviet Government answer?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I suppose it reflects their views at the moment. Anything in Tass naturally does. It doesn't—

**Mr. Herman:** Did you get any other feeling or any other reaction when you talked to Am-

**bassador Dobrynin** [*Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States*] or any of the other officials?

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I'm not sure. I think it's very difficult to tell whether the Russians are satisfied to leave the situation in its present unsatisfactory state and thereby gain influence in the Arab world or whether they would like to work out a peaceful settlement. Certainly, as far as we're concerned, we're going to do everything we can in the next few weeks to try to get negotiations started, because it's a sad situation. These are nations that would have a very bright future, all of them, if they could settle these problems. And they are not insoluble at all. But there is so much emotion and so much hatred in the area—it's very difficult to get people to talk about these problems sensibly. And of course the only nation that is gaining is the Soviet Union.

## Keeping the Door Open for Negotiations

**Mr. Bailey:** Mr. Secretary, I get the impression from your remarks that the basic decision—that is, to sell the airplanes to the Israelis—has been made and that it's a question of timing in the means and method, and so on, that remains to be settled.

**Secretary Rogers:** Well, I wouldn't want to say that exactly. I would like to say, though, that what we want to do is to make it clear to Israel that our policy has not changed. It's in our best interest to be sure that Israel survives as a nation. That's been our policy, and that will continue to be our policy. So we have to take whatever action we think is necessary to give them the assurance that they need that their independence and sovereignty is going to continue. At the same time, we want to do it in a balanced and measured way so that we don't signal to the Arabs that we are so behind Israel that we'll support them in no matter what they do. The reason for that is that we want to keep the door open for negotiations, and we think that it's just possible—just possible—that you could get negotiations started and it's just possible that this could result in a settlement somewhere along the line. This has been going on

790

Department of State Bulletin

for 20 years, and we just hope that we can do everything as a nation to get the parties to settle this tragic conflict.

*Mr. Kalb: Aren't we in fact further from a negotiated end to this conflict, Mr. Secretary, now than we were when you came out with your own ideas on a solution last December?*⁵

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I wouldn't say that we're any further away. I'd say that we're about the same, but it's possible that both sides might come to the conclusion that *this* is a good time to settle. For one thing, I think Israel is concerned about what has happened. They are losing people. They realize that they are surrounded by hostile nations that have got a much greater population. It may well be that Israel—I mean Egypt—is concerned about the Soviet presence. They know about the doctrine of limited sovereignty, and the other Arab nations know about it; so it may well be that the frame of mind is such that they want to talk about a settlement.

*Mr. Herman:* Do you plan some new initiative to take advantage of this concern on both sides?

*Secretary Rogers:* Yes, as a matter of fact we do. We're going to do everything we can to get negotiations started, and we plan to take some initiatives in the next 2 or 3 weeks.

*Mr. Herman:* You have cast your plans ahead talking about travel to Viet-Nam and so forth. I presume that you still expect to be the Secretary of State at that time. Are you going to have a new assistant?

*Secretary Rogers:* Yes. I never had any doubt about the fact I'd be Secretary of State at that time. I am going to look around for a new assistant. I am delighted that Mr. Richardson has become Secretary of HEW. I think he's an outstanding man, and I am very happy for him. We'll miss him in the State Department, but we'll find somebody, I'm sure, that can replace him.

*Mr. Bailey:* Mr. Secretary, apart from your

own and frequent personal contacts with the President, are you satisfied that the State Department is being given adequate consideration for its policy views in the construction of American foreign policy? I ask because of all the unhappiness and talk about the fact that the State Department was not consulted adequately in the Cambodian case.

*Secretary Rogers:* Yes. Well, I'm absolutely certain that our views are given full consideration. I haven't the slightest hesitation in saying that. Obviously, in any government a President doesn't always agree with his advisers; if he did, it would be a strange phenomenon. Insofar as the State Department's recommendations are concerned, in most cases the President follows them without any question. On something like Cambodia, there were many different points of view expressed on all phases of the operation. So it wasn't a question of sort of a yes-or-no vote, but I had full opportunity to present all the arguments that we advanced, and the President and I have been friends for many years—over 20 years—and I see him frequently. I think a lot of this press speculation is just press speculation.

*Mr. Kalb:* Mr. Secretary, you have a chance now to knock down one of the speculative stories—that you in fact had great reservation about the use of American troops in Cambodia. Is that true?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, as I have said to you, Mr. Kalb, and you know it—that I will never express a view that I might have had in my discussion to the President. I will never say what my view was; but as you know, I support the Cambodian operation. I think it's going to be very successful, and I think it is going to make the Vietnamization program a success.

*Mr. Herman:* We have about 30 seconds. In the time that is remaining, can you assess Cambodia on one hand, Russians in Egypt on the other hand, and tell us how our relations with the Soviet Union are at the moment—are we easing in tensions or are we getting tighter?

*Secretary Rogers:* Well, I don't think that you can generalize. I think in the case of the SALT [strategic arms limitation] talks the

⁵ For Secretary Rogers' address at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 9, 1969, see BULLETIN of Jan. 5, 1970, p. 7.

June 29, 1970

791

relations are quite good, and I look on those
rather optimistically. On the Middle East, I'm
not so optimistic. On the whole, our relations
with the Soviet Union are quite good. We have
sensible discussions, and I would hope that they
would continue.

70th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam
Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador Philip C. Habib, acting head of the U.S. delegation, at the 70th plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on June 11.

Press release 181 dated June 1

Ladies and gentlemen: In your statements last week you again made the following demands as preconditions to serious negotiations: that the United States agree to withdraw unilaterally from South Viet-Nam and that it abandon the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Only if we accept those terms, you said, could detailed negotiations on a peaceful settlement begin.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have long since
been in agreement at this meeting table that
two of the fundamental issues to be resolved are
troop withdrawals and political settlement for
South Viet-Nam. For these issues to be resolved
requires some realistic and reasonable discus-
sion of the actions to be taken by both sides.

Let me be more specific:

You demand that the United States unilaterally withdraw from South Viet-Nam, but you refuse to take into account the related presence of North Vietnamese forces.

We long ago told you we are ready to act on
the principle of a withdrawal of all United
States forces from South Viet-Nam. We are
not demanding the unilateral withdrawal of
North Vietnamese forces from South Viet-
Nam, even though North Viet-Nam has thou-
sands upon thousands of its forces illegally in
South Viet-Nam.

We have repeatedly proposed that all non-
South Vietnamese forces—United States,
Allied, and North Vietnamese—be withdrawn

from South Viet-Nam. We long ago proposed
that these withdrawals be completed within 12
months. We have said we would consider any
other timetable proposed by you. Those nego-
tiating proposals still stand.

What we seek is some sign of your intentions
to remove North Vietnamese forces from South
Viet-Nam. When your intentions with regard
to North Vietnamese forces in South Viet-Nam
become unambiguous, progress can be made on
the fundamental issue of troop withdrawals.
Surely, the interests of the people of South Viet-
Nam, which you claim to respect, would be
served by the removal of all non-South Viet-
namese forces from their territory. With regard
to a political settlement, we have both spoken
of the right of self-determination for the South
Vietnamese people. But this right cannot be
exercised as long as you rigidly adhere to your
demand for imposing upon the South Viet-
namese people a government of your own
choosing.

The Government of the Republic of Viet-
Nam has for more than a year been ready for
discussions with your side without precondi-
tions. Nearly a year ago it put forward reason-
able proposals for free elections under inter-
national supervision with the participation of
all political groups in South Viet-Nam, includ-
ing the NLF [National Liberation Front]. For
our part, President Nixon has set forth—most
recently on April 20—the principles that govern
our view of a just political settlement in Viet-
Nam.¹ They call for the abandonment of no one
on your side. They thus contrast directly with
your own unrealistic demand that we abandon
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Ladies and gentlemen, what is necessary for
progress in these meetings is that you move
away from unreasonable and unrealistic pre-
conditions and from rigid and one-sided de-
mands to a position of genuine negotiation. We
are ready to deal seriously, responsibly, and
with an understanding of your legitimate
concerns, but we cannot reach that stage
of negotiations when confronted with plainly
unacceptable preconditions.

¹ For President Nixon's address to the Nation on Apr. 20, see BULLETIN of May 11, 1970, p. 601.

792

Department of State Bulletin

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

JUNE 9, 1970

NO. 177

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

TUESDAY, JUNE 9, 1970

It is now 16 weeks since President Nixon submitted his Report to the Congress on "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's." In my statement today, I would like to refer briefly to certain key developments in our foreign policy since the Report was issued.

********

In Southeast Asia, our goal remains, as the President put it in February in the Report, a "just peace" in Viet-Nam. Since February the President has made two major decisions -- the decision to withdraw 150,000 more troops from South Viet-Nam by next spring and the decision to attack the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Many Americans have feared that our policy was changing. They have feared that we were abandoning Vietnamization and the pursuit of a political settlement, and that we were expanding the war and looking for a military solution. This is not so. We do not intend to retain American troops in Cambodian territory after June 30. We will fulfill the President's decision on troop withdrawals from Viet-Nam -- a decision which will turn over to the South Vietnamese the responsibility for ground combat by the middle of 1971.

We are determined to do everything possible to end this war while giving South Viet-Nam a maximum opportunity to preserve its right to self-determination. That was our policy when the President submitted his Report to Congress, and it is our policy today.

In his speech

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PR 177

In his speech last Wednesday the President described again the changed situation in Cambodia which led to our action against the sanctuaries. As he said, the Communist attempts to link together their bases would have made the entire 600-mile Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border "one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces."

Moreover, at the Indochinese "summit" in Southern China April 24-25, Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong, and Pathet Lao leaders agreed to "wage a heroic and tenacious fight" on an "Indochinese" basis and to seek "total victory" through "mutual support in the struggle against the common enemy." These statements make clear the purpose of Hanoi's open and long-standing violations of Cambodian and Laotian neutrality.

In the light of these developments, the President decided that an attack on the sanctuaries was necessary so that Vietnamization and the withdrawal of our forces from Viet-Nam could proceed. As far as Cambodia is concerned, we want for it what it wants for itself -- to be free, sovereign, neutral, and unmolested.

Our operations, as the President said last Wednesday, have achieved our major military objectives, and will facilitate and ensure the success of our overall Viet-Nam policy. I might add that the effectiveness with which the South Vietnamese have fought in Cambodia increases our confidence that Vietnamization is the right course to follow.

Our strong preference has been, and continues to be, to settle the problems of Indochina through negotiation. On Viet-Nam, despite Hanoi's intransigence,

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PR 177

[LC]

intransigence, we remain ready to negotiate in Paris. When the situation in Laos worsened earlier this year, the President wrote the signatories of the 1962 Agreements -- including Communist China and North Viet-Nam -- urging cooperation in the consultations called for under Article IV. And since Cambodia has become the focus of attention, we have responded favorably to proposals by France and U Thant, and to a feeler by the Soviet Union made by Ambassador Malik suggesting consultations under the 1954 Agreements. And we have welcomed, as an important Asian initiative, the conference of eleven Asian countries which met in Djakarta May 16-17.

We will continue to press our efforts for a political solution to the problems of Viet-Nam and of Indochina in general.

********

President Nixon said in the February Report that we have no intention of exploiting the dispute between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Rather we consider it in our interest to try to improve our relations with each.

There was some concern that our action in Cambodia would drive the Soviets and the Communist Chinese into renewed cooperation. This has not happened. The Soviets, unlike the Chinese, have not recognized the government Sihanouk proclaimed from Peking, and they still maintain an embassy in Phnom Penh. Moreover, *Pravda* May 18 -- 18 days after President Nixon's April 30 speech on Cambodia -- accused the Chinese of failing to take "concerted actions" with the other Communist countries, apparently with regard to Indochina. The tone of that editorial is a measure of the rift between the two Communist powers; it accused Mao of

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Pr 177

"unscrupulous perfidy" and of "aggressive great-Han chauvinism." Finally, a June 4 article in the Soviet foreign affairs weekly *New Times* explicitly blamed "Chinese interference in Cambodia affairs" for helping to cause the Cambodian coup.

There was also concern that our Cambodian action would damage our discussions with the Chinese in Warsaw and our strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviets in Vienna. It may have been the reason that the Chinese cancelled the May 20 meeting. But we expect that in the near future an opportunity will arise to renew these conversations.

In Vienna, the Soviets have not engaged in polemics even in recent meetings. They apparently believe, as do we, that, as the President said in the Foreign Policy Report, "there is no area in which we ... have a greater common interest than in reaching agreement with regard to arms control."

On April 16 the substantive phase of SALT began. Both sides have presented their respective positions and are now engaged in a more detailed examination of specific issues. We have put forward proposals dealing with all offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, including ABM's and MIRV's.

Our approach has been concrete and comprehensive. The Soviets have also indicated a preference for a comprehensive approach, but have not been as concrete as we in spelling out important specifics.

The atmosphere in Vienna remains serious. Some common ground has emerged, although there are still important differences. We are in the early stages of exploring the issues, but it is already apparent that hard negotiations remain.

It is not

[L.C.]

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PR 177

It is not clear yet what sort of an agreement will result or when.
Nevertheless, we continue to be optimistic.

********

The SALT talks represent, in the strategic arms area, one aspect of
our attempt to preserve the balance of strength at lower levels of cost
and tension. Another aspect, in the area of conventional forces, is our
effort within NATO to engage the Soviets and their allies in talks on
mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. President Nixon, in his
Foreign Policy Report, declared our readiness to negotiate on this issue
in any suitable forum.

Two weeks ago I attended a NATO Ministerial Meeting in Rome. At that
meeting we reaffirmed NATO's 1968 initiative on mutual and balanced force
reductions, with special reference to Central Europe. We set our speci-
fic criteria for consideration. And we requested the Italian Foreign
Minister to transmit our initiatives directly to the members of the
Warsaw Pact and other interested countries. These actions illustrate
our strong desire for progress on force reductions. We await with
interest a response from the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern
Europe.

The United States continues to believe, as I told the meeting in
Rome, that the best way to solve the security problems of Europe is
through a step-by-step approach. Such an approach has already been
launched in the West German talks with the USSR, Poland, and East
Germany, and in the Four-Power discussions over Berlin. Talks on mutual
and balanced force reductions would be a useful further step.

On another

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PR 177

On another major subject discussed at the NATO Meeting -- a
conference on European security -- I emphasized our belief that, before
it can be decided whether a general conference would aid in improving
East-West relations, there should be a good prospect that the conference
would have meaningful results. So far that prospect is at best unclear.
At Rome we agreed to proceed with bilateral contacts but to defer con-
sideration of multilateral exploratory contacts until we had assessed,
at our December NATO Meeting, the progress on the talks now going on.

The Rome Ministerial Meeting was very positive from our point of
view. I am particularly encouraged by the firm commitment the Ministers
made to the search for ways to improve relations among the countries of
Eastern and Western Europe. This commitment applies not only to the
great security issues which have divided the Continent since the War,
but also to such non-security issues as restraints on freer movement of
people, goods, and information.

The objective of improving East-West relations will continue to
stand high on the priority list of this Administration.

********

On December 9 I set out the U.S. policy position in the Middle East.
It was reaffirmed by the President in his February Report.

Since then, the military situation has deteriorated, largely as a
result of increased Soviet involvement in the air defense of the UAR.
For the first time, the Soviet Union has introduced into a non-bloc coun-
try SA-3 missiles and Soviet personnel to man them. And for the first
time outside the bloc, Soviet pilots have flown operational missions
although there has been no actual combat.

When we

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PR 177

When we first learned of the new Soviet pilot activity, we promptly expressed our concern and asked the Soviet Union to clarify its intentions. I underscored this concern in my talks with Ambassador Dobrynin last week.

We made our March decision to hold in abeyance the Israeli request for more planes in the hopes that it would set a pattern of restraint in the Middle East. Since it has not done so, we have initiated a new evaluation of the situation. There will be a decision on this matter before too long.

On the political front, we have pressed our efforts for a settlement bilaterally with the Soviet Union, through the Four Power talks in New York, and directly with the parties.

The only hope for progress is to convince both the Arabs and the Israelis that compromises are necessary. The UAR should abandon its refusal to enter any kind of negotiations and its insistence on prior Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines. Israel should make clear that it accepts the principle of withdrawal as laid down in the November 1967 Security Council Resolution, and that it will no longer insist on the formula of "direct negotiations without pre-conditions."

We are now engaged in a review of the larger political complex in an effort to find ways to break the political impasse. Although the situation is serious, we still believe that flexibility on both sides would develop if a negotiating process could only begin. We will continue our efforts to get such a process started.

******

At the time

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PR 177

At the time the President's Foreign Policy Report was issued, I was on a 15-day trip to ten African countries, the first such trip ever made by an American Secretary of State. Following my return, we announced a new African policy along the guidelines set forth in the Report. We emphasized (1) a support for self-determination rooted in our own American traditions of independence and racial equality and (2) a desire for more active economic relations.

In accord with the first precept, we have taken the following actions in Southern Africa:

- We have closed our Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia, have withheld recognition from the Smith regime, and have continued to give vigorous support to the economic sanctions voted by the UN.

- We have maintained our arms embargoes into the Republic of South Africa and against the shipment of arms to Portugal for use in the Portuguese territories.

- We announced last month President Nixon's decision to discourage actively American investment in Namibia as long as South Africa continues to rule the area in defiance of the UN.

In our practical relationships in Africa, we intend to take a more positive approach than we have in the past. However, as the African policy statement said, "We want no military allies, no spheres of influence, no big power competition in Africa."

In the economic field, our policy is to maintain our assistance programs at a level not less than the present one, to emphasize regional approaches, to facilitate the continued growth of U.S. private investment, and to help stimulate Africa's trade. We estimate that our total commitment

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PR 177

[LC]

commitment in economic assistance to Africa will be $366 million for fiscal 1970, an increase of $40 million over fiscal 1969. In the regional field, we hope that current international talks will soon lead to the creation of a multilateral Special Fund for the African Development Bank. And in the trade area, we have asked Congress for renewal of authority for U.S. participation in the International Coffee Agreement, which affects Africa's second largest export.

******

In his Foreign Policy Report, President Nixon spoke of the need for a new spirit and a new approach toward Latin America. On October 31, the President had outlined his concept for a new partnership. First, he called for a pattern of relations reflecting greater initiative and responsibility by the Latin Americans and increased use of multilateral mechanisms for development. Second, he also proposed concrete steps to improve the substance of our economic relations.

We are following through on these objectives. In February IA-ECOSOC set up a special Ministerial-level Committee to examine US-Latin American economic problems in a Hemispheric framework. The Latin Americans used the first meeting of this Committee last month to press their efforts for expanded access to the U.S. market. We are now studying their requests with a view to identifying ways in which we can be forthcoming. The President is now asking Congress for $1.8 billion to replenish Inter-American Bank funds, and has pledged new financial support for the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress. This will expand the role of these hemisphere-wide organizations in development matters and thus enable Latin American countries to assume more responsibility for programs affecting them.

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PR 177

We have also taken two additional substantive steps to improve our
economic relations with Latin America. We have "untied" our loan dollars
to allow purchases not only in the United States but elsewhere in the
Hemisphere. And we are urging other developed countries to join in a
liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing
countries, including those in Latin America.

At the OECD Meeting in Paris May 20-22, the economic situation of the developing countries in general received central attention. I believe we made great progress, particularly with regard to the "untying" of loans and to generalized tariff preferences. Our initiative for "untying" of bilateral aid was warmly welcomed at the meeting.

Just before the meeting we modified our own position on preferences
to clear the way for a compromise which will serve as the basis for
future work. It emphasizes the desirability of maximum benefits for less
developed countries. It also recognizes the need to phase out "reverse"
preferences which some developed countries receive from developing
nations.

******

The developments I have discussed in this brief statement underscore,
I believe, the importance of the three principles which the President in
his Foreign Policy Report called essential to building a lasting peace.
They are: partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate. They
will continue to guide us in our foreign policy.

* * *

EXCERPTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S PRESS CONFERENCE,

JUNE 25, 1970

SECRETARY ROGERS:

"Turning now to the Middle East, I would like to make a brief statement about the Middle East. Recent disquieting events in the Middle East led President Nixon, on April 29, to order a thorough review of all political and military aspects of this problem. That review has now been concluded.

As a consequence of the review, the United States has undertaken a political initiative, a major political initiative, the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Our objective in launching this initiative has been to encourage the parties to move toward a just and lasting peace which takes fully into account the legitimate aspirations and concerns of all governments and of all peoples in the area.

In light of that objective, we believe that it would not be useful, particularly because of the sensitive nature of the discussions now under way, the diplomatic discussions now under way, to disclose at this time the details of the political initiative or to discuss publicly military assistance for Israel.

We firmly believe that this is the time for such an initiative, which we have launched directly with the parties and with other interested powers. We are now in the process of having further discussions, getting the responses of other governments to this initiative, and we very seriously and profoundly hope that this initiative, taken together in collaboration with others, will result in the beginning of discussions which might lead to a peaceful solution of this problem that has plagued the Middle East for twenty years. Thank you."

Excerpts from Secretary Rogers'
Press Conference, June 25

-2-

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, with respect to the subject of military aid for Israel, which you say you don't care to discuss today, does your statement imply any diminution or any abandonment of the American policy of not permitting the balance of military power to be shifted against Israel in the Middle East?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

It does not. Our policy vis-a-vis Israel remains constant. It has not changed. We believe that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Israel is very important for our national interest.

President Nixon has made clear what his policy is toward Israel, and that policy has not changed. On the other hand, we do think the time is propitious -- in fact, the time demands -- that every effort be made by all concerned to enter into discussions to see if this problem can't be solved.

I think it is useful -- I know it is useful to me -- occasionally to go back and read the Security Council Resolution of 1967, because it does lay down a framework for a solution to that problem, and it clearly contemplates that the parties will discuss the principles that are established or laid down in that Resolution for the purpose of seeing if a settlement can be reached.

I think it is interesting to notice that the Resolution refers to principles which are agreed to. Secondly, it refers to the fact that the Special Representative, Ambassador Jarring, has the assignment of attempting to bring about an agreement based on those principles; and that is what has been lacking for the last three years -- there has been no serious exchange of views among the parties attempting to put those principles into effect by way of a settlement. So, our initiative is designed to see if that can be done.

Excerpts from Secretary Rogers'
Press Conference, June 25, 1970

-3-

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, this review that you have mentioned in your opening statement, also, I believe, was supposed to ascertain whether the military balance of power has changed in the Middle East as a result of SAM-3's and Soviet pilots flying in Egypt. Can you say whether that review has found a change in the military balance?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

That review has been completed. As I have indicated, I would prefer this morning not to get involved in a very detailed discussion of the arms problem in the Middle East. But I will say that, clearly, the review revealed that a new factor has entered into the equation in the Middle East. The fact that the Soviet Union has assisted, in fact deployed SA-3's in Egypt, the fact that Soviet pilots are flying planes in Egypt, the fact that there are a large number of Soviet personnel in the UAR, all, of course, present new factors.

We are not inclined to think that Israel, at the moment, is unable to support itself militarily; but we do think that the presence of the Soviet personnel and military equipment is a new factor and it is a very serious factor.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, to what degree do the Soviets agree or disagree with this American initiative? And did you consult with them at length about it, and are they just simply standing silent during it?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

We did and we have presented our initiative to many governments. We have presented it directly to President Nasser because he directed an appeal to President Nixon in his May -- or at least

-4-

he directly referred to President Nixon in his May 1 speech. He
made a proposal to the President which we thought called for a
response, so we did respond directly to President Nasser.

At the same time, we presented our suggestions, which we re-
ferred to here as "an initiative", to Jordan, to other Arab nations,
to the Soviet Union, to France and the United Kingdom, other mem-
bers who are actively engaged in the Four Power discussions, and
other European nations.

We have not had a response from the Soviet Union. They listened
politely and thoughtfully to the presentation we made. We have not
had a response from them yet.

As I say, at the moment the discussions on this initiative are
in a very sensitive stage; and we would hope that the Soviet Union
and others have the same interest in peace that we have.

<u>QUESTION:</u> Mr. Secretary, various dispatches from the Middle East capitals particularly, say that one of the key features of this new American approach is a call for some kind of ceasefire, temporary or otherwise -- end of the shooting. Can you tell us whether this is accurate?

<u>SECRETARY ROGERS:</u>

Yes, it does include, as I have indicated in my brief statement
here, the idea that the parties should stop shooting.

Now I don't want to go into it any further than that, except to say
that it seems clear to us that if the parties are going to have discus-
sions which might lead to peaceful solution, that it's much easier,
and much more satisfactory to do it at a time when they are not en-
gaged in hostilities.

-5-

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, would it be useful, in your view, for Israel to make a commitment in principle to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territory?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

I don't want to pick out any particular phrases and comment on them, except to say that I was very encouraged when the Prime Minister of Israel referred recently in a statement, a speech, to the fact that Israel accepted the principles set forth in the Security Council Resolution.

And if you read that Resolution, you see that it does set forth principles that I think would be viable, looking toward a peaceful settlement.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in addition to the Prime Minister's speech, what indications do you have that the parties concerned are any more receptive now to new peace initiatives than they have in the past?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

I can refer to two or three public -- three or four, as a matter of fact -- public things which have given us some encouragement:

One, as I have said, is the appeal, the statement by President Nasser directed to President Nixon.

Secondly, President Nasser, in a National Educational Television Program recently, indicated that under certain circumstances, they might be receptive to a ceasefire, and as I recall his statement, he said: somewhere in the neighborhood of six months or less.

Three, the Prime Minister of Israel, as I have said, indicated willingness to accept the Security Council Resolution, which contains principles which I believe will lay the foundation for peaceful settlement.

-6-

Then the Foreign Minister of Israel indicated that if the negotiations once start, the Arabs would be surprised at the concessions that Israel might make.

Now that indicated to me that there was considerable flexibility on the part of Israel and that if negotiations started, there would be a prospect that progress could be made.

And I think that, looking at it realistically, as long as the parties sort of negotiate in public, so that each time a proposal is made the other party is called upon publicly to accept it or reject it -- it makes a very unsatisfactory way to negotiate.

If the parties could get together in a negotiating stance -- and I am speaking now about in the same city, or in adjacent buildings, or on different floors of the same building, or different rooms on the same floor -- and have an active exchange of ideas, quietly and sensibly looking towards a prospect of peace, that progress might be made.

Ambassador Jarring is the negotiator that has been selected by the United Nations for this purpose, and we think that negotiations of that kind have some prospect, hold out some promise.

In the absence of that, what happens is the parties really argue in public. There is no frank exchange of ideas looking toward a settlement. The parties just argue their cases in public, and that obviously doesn't lead to progress.

-7-

**QUESTION:**

Mr. Secretary, on March 23rd, when you said that the Israeli request for jets was going to be held in abeyance, you were asked that in the future if there were a decision in favor of giving, or selling, them more jets whether it would be announced -- and you answered:

"You know, in our existing government, secrecy is not a very productive policy to follow."

Now, when and if the United States decides to sell more Phantom jets to Israel, are you going to make a public announcement on it, or is this going to be kept secret?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

I haven't changed my views on secrecy at all since that statement.

This morning, I just want to emphasize that we think, for the moment, the emphasis should be on the diplomatic initiative that we have taken, and we think any announcements or anything of that kind, of a military nature, would be counterproductive.

We have no hope that anything we do will ever be secret, so that, clearly, any decisions that are carried out will become known. But we do think, at the moment, because of the sensitivity of our diplomatic discussions, and because of their tremendous importance, and the danger that exists in the area -- that it's better at the moment not to discuss them.

**QUESTION:**

Mr. Secretary, on your trip to London, will you be discussing any possible change of British policy east of Suez?

**SECRETARY ROGERS:**

Well, I will be listening.

[Laughter]

-8-

**QUESTION:** How does your government view the rising political leadership of the Palestinian people?

Do you envisage any contacts with them at any stage
in your British visit?

SECRETARY ROGERS:

We have to recognize it as a fact of life. We don't want to get
involved in the discussion of the politics of the situation. But, if
you notice, in my statement, and also in the speech I made Decem-
ber 9th, I refer to the fact that we recognize that a settlement has
to take into account all the people in the area. And the people in the
area include those who are Palestinians. We are dealing with the
governments of the Arab countries. But we do recognize, and I think
anybody has to recognize the fact that we have to consider the welfare
of all the people in the area.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in your December 9 speech you outlined a set of negotiating principles for the Middle East, which I don't believe you've referred to today. Does the United States continue to believe that those guidelines will be the ones under which the Jarring negotiation should be conducted?

SECRETARY ROGERS:

Not necessarily. We think they are very useful guidelines, but
we don't insist that the parties accept them. We think they would
be very useful for purposes of discussion. But we are perfectly
prepared, and obviously we would have to be, to have the discussions
conducted by Ambassador Jarring and he can use any beginning point
he would like to.

One of the most useful starting points of a negotiation would be
the Security Council Resolution itself. As I said, every once in awhile,
I go back and reread it, because it is a very good basis for negotiations.

-9-

And if the parties -- they've all accepted this -- well at least
the UAR, Jordan and Israel have accepted the Security Council
Resolution; and if there was a willingness on the part of the parties
to sit down and discuss how to carry out those principles -- how to
implement those principles, how to translate those principles into
specifics -- I believe that there is a possibility that it can be done.

But you have to start out with a willingness on the part of the
parties to do that. And I don't believe -- we have never believed
that outside governments could do that.

There are a great many specifics, details, that have to be worked
out before an agreement could be reached. And we think the exchange
leading up to that agreement has to be among the parties.

JUNE 25, 1970

NO. 192
(Revised)

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS

In the light of that objective, we believe that it would not be useful, particularly because of the sensitive nature of the diplomatic discussions now under way, to disclose at this time the details of the political initiative or to discuss publicly military assistance for Israel.

We firmly believe that this is the time for such an initiative, which we have launched directly with the parties and with other interested powers. We are now in the process of having further discussions, getting the responses of other governments to this initiative, and we very seriously and profoundly hope that this initiative, taken in collaboration

JUNE 25, 1970

NO. 193

SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 25, 1970

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

SECRETARY ROGERS: Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. I would like to begin by making one or two brief statements. First, I would like to take note of a development in the Department that I am sure you will be hearing more about this summer. You may recall, at my request, Deputy Under Secretary Macomber last January announced a plan to reform the Department of State's Management and Personnel procedures. Shortly thereafter, we assembled thirteen Task Forces composed of some 250 Foreign Service Officers, State Department officials, USIA and AID personnel of all grades to make a thorough review of existing Management and Personnel policies, and to recommend improvements wherever warranted.

I have been meeting with these Task Forces, all thirteen of them, and although the reports are not yet final, I have been very impressed by the enthusiasm and the thoroughness with which these Task Forces have approved these projects. Some of the reports are somewhat critical of past performance, and some of them make very far-ranging proposals for change. I believe that the reports are more thorough and more comprehensive than any previous study that has ever been made in the Department of State, and I think it is a graphic demonstration of the vitality, resourcefulness and intelligence of the professionals in this Department.

In a sense, this is a very unique experiment for a great bureaucracy to involve its own professionals in the creative task of self-appraisal and

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PR 193

and self-renewal. We shall be spending most of the summer refining the
Task Force findings through further discussions with personnel in the
Department. I am sure that some of these drafts will become public.
They still are working drafts. I have no objection to the fact that they
will become public; and if you are interested, I am sure that Deputy
Under Secretary Macomber and his staff will be prepared to give you any
information that they can give you about these proposals.

I particularly wanted to make this comment so there would be no
misunderstanding about the fact that this study is one that we have
initiated. It is not, in any sense of the word, intended to be contrary
to the wishes of those of us in charge of the Department.

Secondly, I would like to mention that I will be leaving Sunday for
about two weeks to attend a SEATO Meeting in Manila and the Troop Con-
tributing Countries Conference in Saigon. Also, I will visit Tokyo for
a meeting of all of our Ambassadors in that area to discuss matters in
the Pacific and get a very comprehensive view of problems that we have
there.

Also, I will visit London on the way back to Washington. In all the
capitals I will have discussions with other government officials, and in
London particularly with the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Home, and
other members of the new Government. I understand that arrangements are
now being made for me to meet with the new Prime Minister.

Before leaving the United States, I will meet with the President in
San Clemente on Monday morning and deliver a speech in San Francisco
before the Conference of Editors and Broadcasters.

While

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PR 193

While in California, I will also be meeting with the Foreign Minister of Romania in San Francisco. On Saturday afternoon here in the Department I will receive the representatives -- the three representatives of the Djakarta Conference -- representatives from Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia. Mr. McCloskey will have a complete schedule of the itinerary available for you at the close of this meeting.

In the light of that objective, we believe that it would not be useful, particularly because of the sensitive nature of the discussions now under way, the diplomatic discussions now under way, to disclose at this time the details of the political initiative or to discuss publicly military assistance for Israel.

We firmly

["-4-", "PR 193", "We firmly believe that this is the time for such an initiative,
which we have launched directly with the parties and with other interested
powers. We are now in the process of having further discussions, getting\nthe responses of other governments to this initiative, and we very\nseriously and profoundly hope that this initiative, taken together in\ncollaboration with others, will result in the beginning of discussions\nwhich might lead to a peaceful solution of this problem that has plagued\nthe Middle East for twenty years. Thank you.", "Mr. Hensley.", "Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the subject of military aid for Israel, which you say you don't care to discuss today, does your statement imply any diminution or any abandonment of the American policy of not permitting the balance of military power to be shifted against Israel in the Middle East?", "A. Mr. Hensley, it does not. Our policy vis-a-vis Israel remains constant. It has not changed. We believe that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Israel is very important for our national interest.", "President Nixon has made clear what his policy is toward Israel, and\nthat policy has not changed. On the other hand, we do think the time is\npropitious -- in fact, the time demands -- that every effort be made by\nall concerned to enter into discussions to see if this problem can't be\nsolved.", "I think it is useful -- I know it is useful to me -- occasionally\nto go back and read the Security Council Resolution of 1967, because it\ndoes lay down a framework for a solution to that problem, and it clearly\ncontemplates"]

PR 193

Q. Mr. Secretary, this review that you have mentioned in your opening statement, also, I believe, was supposed to ascertain whether the military balance of power has changed in the Middle East as a result of SAM-3's and Soviet pilots flying in Egypt.

A. Well, that review has been completed. As I have indicated, I would prefer this morning not to get involved in a very detailed discussion of the arms problem in the Middle East. But I will say that, clearly, the review revealed that a new factor has entered into the equation in the Middle East. The fact that the Soviet Union has assisted, in fact deployed SA-3's in Egypt, the fact that Soviet pilots are flying planes in Egypt, the fact that there are a large number of Soviet personnel in the UAR, all, of course, present new factors.

We are not

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PR 193

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what degree do the Soviets agree or disagree with this American initiative? And did you consult with them at length about it, and are they just simply standing silent during it?

A. Mr. Lisagor, we did and we have presented our initiative to many governments. We presented it directly to President Nasser because he directed an appeal to President Nixon in his May 1 or at least he directly referred to President Nixon in his May 1 speech. He made a proposal to the President which we thought called for a response, so we did respond directly to President Nasser.

At the same time, we presented our suggestions, which we referred to here as "an initiative", to Jordan, to other Arab nations, to the Soviet Union, to France and the United Kingdom, other members who are actively engaged in the Four Power discussions, and other European nations.

As I say, at the moment, the discussions on this initiative are in a very sensitive stage; and we would hope that the Soviet Union and others have the same interest in peace that we have.

Mr. Scali.

Q. Mr. Secretary,

[LC]

PR 193

-7-

Q Mr. Secretary, various dispatches from the Middle East capitals particularly, say that one of the key features of this new American approach is a call for some kind of ceasefire, temporary or otherwise -- end of the shooting. Can you tell us whether this is accurate?

A Well, yes, it does include, as I have indicated in my brief statement here, the idea that the parties should stop shooting.

Now I don't want to go into it any further than that, except to say that it seems clear to us that if the parties are going to have discussions which might lead to peaceful solution, that it's much easier, and much more satisfactory to do it at a time when they are not engaged in hostilities.

Q Mr. Secretary, would it be useful, in your view, for Israel to make a commitment in principle to withdraw its troops from occupied Arab territory?

A Well, I don't want to pick out any particular phrases and comment on them, except to say that I was very encouraged when the Prime Minister of

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PR 193

Q Mr. Secretary, in addition to the Prime Minister's speech, what indications do you have that the parties concerned are any more receptive now to new peace initiatives than they have in the past?

A Well, I can refer to two or three public -- three or four, as a matter of fact --public things which have given us some encouragement:

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PR 193

Now that indicated to me that there was consider-
able flexibility on the part of Israel and that if
negotiations started, there would be a prospect that
progress could be made.

PR 193

-10-

Q Mr. Secretary, the deadline of June 30
has almost arrived. Could you give us your estimate
now of the impact of the American withdrawal in Cambodia
and what we may expect to do to support operations there
after our withdrawal?

A Yes.

We will, of course, carry out the promise that
President Nixon made. Our troops will be out of Cam-
bodia by June 30th, and that includes all of our forces,
including advisers.

We think that the Cambodian incursions have
been very successful from a military standpoint.

We have captured more military supplies and
equipment and food than we captured in all of South

PR 193

-11-

Viet-Nam last year. We think it will be very
difficult for the enemy to resupply, to establish lines
of communication, to organize attacks on our forces in
South Viet-Nam to the extent that they might otherwise
have been able to do.

It is encouraging, I think, this morning
to learn about the statistics of last week. As you know,
our casualties last week were the lowest in three or
four months. The total casualties in South Viet-Nam
were, I think, 60 last week. We would hope that the
casualty rate will continue at a low rate.

One of the reasons the President, as you know,
made the decision that he did, was in the belief that
in the long run, our casualty rates would be down.

And I think it is also encouraging to notice
that the casualty rate -- our casualty rates in Cambodia
-- were considerably less than we had anticipated,
because total casualties to date in Cambodia have been
about 320.

At one point in the discussions leading up to
the decision by the President, there were predictions
that our casualties in Cambodia might run as high as 500
a week for a while.

PR 193

-12-

So I think overall, the Cambodian decision was
a wise one and I think it will result in a lot less loss
of life on the part of the American forces.

Murrey.

Q Mr. Secretary, reports from the scene
say that the United States is engaged in combat air
support for the Cambodian troops. U.S. spokesmen say
the United States is engaged in air interdiction.
Is this a distinction without a difference?

And secondly, how do you describe the state
of U.S. guarantees in Cambodia? Is the United States
engaging in a widening involvement in the Cambodian
war?

A Well, the President's policy on
air interdiction, is that at the present
time and after our troops leave Cambodia,
our Air Force will be used, be permitted to interdict
the supply lines and communication lines in Cambodia.

And, as you know, yesterday, Mr. Henkin,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, pointed out that
General Abrams is following those orders.

It is obvious, of course, that there will be
times when, in the process of interdicting supply lines

PR 193

-13-

or communication lines of the enemy, that that will be
of direct benefit to the present government in Cambodia.
But I think the main thrust of our policy is to use our
Air Force for the purpose of interdicting supply lines
and communication lines to protect Americans in South
Viet-Nam.

Q Mr. Secretary, I believe yesterday a spokesman for the Cambodian Military Command stated that American fighter bombers were flying missions in direct support of Cambodian forces.

Now, was he mistaken, or do I perceive a change
in our policy?

A Well as I have just said to Mr. Marder,
I think that I can see very well why a Cambodian might think
it was helpful to the government when we fly those missions.

But our purpose is to interdict communications
and supply lines of the enemy. As I say, that's our
purpose. That is our policy. Obviously, it may have a
dual benefit -- it may serve our purposes and at the
same time serve the Cambodian Government.

Q Mr. Secretary, at the SEATO Meeting, will
you attempt to spread the burden of the American part

PR 193

-14-

in the Viet-Nam -- in the Indochinese war?

In other words, will you ask the SEATO partners
to take a more active part?

A No, I don't believe so. I think that the
purpose of the meeting is to emphasize the importance that
we attach to the SEATO organization.

It has been very useful, it has provided stability
in the area. We think it will continue to provide
stability in the area.

I will use the opportunity to explain the fact
that we are reducing our troop strength in South Viet-Nam
by 150,000 this year. I will talk about the fact that
we will reduce our troop strength 50,000 by the end of --
well, what is it? October 15th, I think.

And we will discuss the future in the Pacific
area generally.

I also will want to lay considerable emphasis
on what we think has been a very useful development among
the Asians themselves in connection with the Djakarta
Conference. We think that is consistent -- the
fact that it follows the President's Guam Doctrine, and
I think it's one of the most encouraging developments

PR 193

[LC]

-15-

in recent years.

Q Mr. Secretary, on March 23rd, when you said that the Israeli request for jets was going to be held in abeyance, you were asked that in the future if there were a decision in favor of giving, or selling, them more jets whether it would be announced -- and you answered it:

A Well, I haven't changed my views on secrecy at all since that statement.

PR 193

-16-

Marilyn.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that the main purpose
of American air activity in Cambodia would be to
protect American troops in South Viet-Nam.

Is it not essential to the security of American
troops that the Government of Lon Nol, or at least some
government not unfriendly totally to the United States, remain
in Phnom Penh?

A Well, Marilyn, I'm not sure it's essential, but
obviously it's quite helpful if the Government in Cam-
bodia is neutralist and if there's stability in Cambodia.

We intend to proceed with the Vietnamization
program, as planned, regardless of events.

But clearly, it is preferrable to have the
present government or at least a free government,
a neutral government, continue in Cambodia.

The President, of course, clearly
recognizes that and that is part of our policy.

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PR 193

As a matter of fact, I had a long discussion with him yesterday at breakfast about the Cambodian situation, and he told me then that he was, in the very near future, going to nominate an Ambassador for Cambodia.

As you know, we have a Charge there now, and the Cambodians have sent an Ambassador to our country -- so clearly, we would hope that Cambodia remains neutral, and not Communist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the United States originally went into South Viet-Nam to help the people from being subjected to a regime which they didn't want, how is it that so little expression has been made here of concern for the seven million Cambodians who now are faced with invading armies and a sort of a scorched-earth policy, and much of their economy is being plowed up with the destruction of the rubber plantations?

A. I think the basis for the President's decision was to wipe out the sanctuaries in Cambodia and, in doing that, to protect American lives in South Viet-Nam and to further the progress of Vietnamization. Obviously, we have a great interest in the welfare of people all over the world, and we are assisting in some ways in Cambodia. But our purpose was not to affect the course of events in Cambodia as far as politics are concerned. We would hope that Cambodia remains neutral.

Q. Mr. Rogers. Sir, how many nations around the world is the United States today selling arms to, and is there any chance of us having a revision of this role of arms merchant for the world?

A. The first part of the question was, how many nations --?

Q. Are we selling arms to now.

A. That we are selling arms to. I don't know offhand. Certainly, we are not the arms merchant for the world. There are a lot of other nations

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PR 193

[LC]

nations selling arms. In any event, I don't know the answer to your question.

Q. Is there any chance of having this role of selling arms to other nations revised?

A. Well, we would like to. We have indicated in every area that has been publicly discussed a willingness to engage in embargoes of arms shipments. We have tried to do it in the Middle East. We've asked the Soviet Union if they'd be willing to undertake a limitation on arms shipments, and we've done this in other parts of the world. But, unfortunately, the sale of arms has been something that's plagued mankind, I guess, throughout its history.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say you are about to send an Ambassador to Cambodia. When are you going to send one to the Paris Peace Talks?

A. Well, I'm not sure that the President has made any decision on that at the present time. As you know, he stated that he has great confidence in Ambassador Habib, and we think Ambassador Habib is one of the most capable men we have in the Foreign Service. On the other hand, the President is very anxious to make it clear that we have not lost our interest in the negotiating track. He feels, and I feel, that we have made almost every possible effort to get negotiations started. When I say "negotiations," I am now speaking about, again, active exchange of ideas that might lead to a peaceful solution. I know the President, because of my conversations with him yesterday and over the weekend, is actively thinking about what he might do to put more emphasis on the negotiating track. We have never lost interest in our willingness to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the war in Viet-Nam.

Q. Well,

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PR 193

Q. Well, isn't it a fact that negotiations are stuck on the other side's contention that the United States has got to make a unilateral declaration that it's prepared to totally withdraw, and the United States has not done this because this is part of our bargaining position? And how are you ever going to get off of that dime?

A. Well, I suppose that that is one of their arguments. The other is that we should do that -- we should not only say we're going to do it, but we should get out -- and then they will talk to us about a peaceful settlement. And we've always said that doesn't make any sense.

Now, the President, if you read his statements, has said from time to time that he does recognize that the United States forces will have to get out of Viet-Nam; and as a principle he has enunciated that; but he doesn't propose to do it in a way that's precipitant or that might lead to what he's referred to in his speeches as a very serious setback not only for the United States but for South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if it is our policy to desire a neutral or friendly government in Cambodia, are we willing to provide arms and money to keep such a government in power?

A. Well, as you know, we have encouraged Asian nations to do what they could to help other Asian nations. We are encouraged by the fact that Cambodia, for the first time in many years, has friendly relations and diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors. Others in the area are providing some help or are considering other possibilities of help.

As you know, the United States has provided, and is providing now, assistance to Cambodia. In this fiscal year it's amounted to 7.9 million dollars, and we are now considering the program for next year. We do want to do

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PR 193

to do what we can to support the neutrality of Cambodia, but we want to
be sure that it's not done in a manner which suggests that we take over
the responsibility militarily to maintain any government in office. We
would hope, and we are somewhat encouraged by events, that Cambodia will
remain neutral.

Q. Can you state, Mr. Secretary, that American aircraft or American
pilots will not fly close air support for Cambodian units or South
Vietnamese units defending Cambodian positions?

A. No, Gary. I am not going to make any statement that might limit
the use of our air power except what I have already said. And I don't
see any reason why the United States should constantly be put in the
position where we tell the enemy exactly what we are going to do. Our
policy is as I have stated. And we also have said that we would expect
that most of the air flights of that type will be flown by South Vietnamese
forces.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you any knowledge that Communist China has
taken over the Cambodian Government-in-exile?

A. Well, it is pretty clear that they are working very closely with
Sihanouk, and he is in Peking a good deal of the time. I don't believe
he is there now. I believe he is in -- the last I heard he was in North
Korea. But there is no doubt that the Communist Chinese have been very
active in promoting his efforts to form what he refers to as a
"Liberation Front."

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of Mr. Smith's recent visit here, can you
say something about the progress of the SALT talks?

A. Yes, we had a meeting yesterday with Mr. Smith and the President,
and

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PR 193

and with General Allison, and he (Mr. Smith) made a full report to the
President about the talks. The talks have proceeded, I think, in a very
business-like way, and I think there is some reason for optimism.

The question, I think, now is one of timing -- how long the talks
will continue at Vienna; whether they will be recessed, and for how long,
and so forth.

But I think on the whole the talks have progressed very well, and I
think, as I say, there is reason to hope that we can reach an agreement.
Whether the agreement will be, in the first instance, a comprehensive
agreement or a limited agreement, I think we can't predict at the moment.

But, in any event, I think it is important to keep in mind that if
an agreement is reached in the reasonably near future that that would not
mean that that would be the end of the road. Because we would contemplate,
if an agreement can be reached and it is of a limited nature, that there
will be prospects for a more comprehensive agreement and further talks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you say you might reach an agreement in the reasonably near future, do you have in mind by the end of the summer, by the end of this year? Can you give us any idea of how imminent such an agreement might be?

A. No. I don't think it is possible to predict it. I just mean
that I think there is a prospect of an agreement, but I wouldn't want to
give any particular time framework.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the status of negotiations to
send Thai troops into Cambodia to support the government?

A. Well,

PR 193

=22=

A Well, Thailand now has
that under consideration. Whether they will, and to
what extent, and so forth, they haven't made a decision on
it yet. So we haven't made any decisions on our support.

If we support Thai troops in Cambodia, we
would have to do it from Cambodian MAP funds. We
could not use funds that now, under present law,
are used to support Thai troops either in Thailand
South Viet Nam. But we haven't been asked to make
that decision because Thailand itself hasn't made
a decision.

Q Mr. Secretary, on your trip to London,
will you be discussing any possible change of British policy
east of Suez?

A Well, I will be listening.

[Laughter]

Q How does your government view the
rising political leadership of the Palestinian people?
Do you envisage any contacts with them at any stage
in your British visit?

PR 193

-23-

A Well, we have to recognize it as a fact of life. We don't want to get involved in the discussion of the politics of the situation. But, if you notice, in my statement, and also in the speech I made December 9th, I refer to the fact that we recognize that a settlement has to take into account all the people in the area. And the people in the area include those who are Palestinians. We are dealing with the governments of the Arab countries. But we do recognize, and I think anybody has to recognize the fact that we have to consider the welfare of all the people in the area.

Q Mr. Secretary, is there any movement in Pakistan to request more tanks, and is that closer? And are you closer to any decision on that?

A Well, we have had a lot of discussion about it, and we are actively discussing it. No final decision, Mr. Potter, has been made on that yet.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your December 9 speech you outlined a set of negotiating principles for the Middle East, which I don't believe you've referred to today.

PR 193

[c]

-24-

A Well, not necessarily. We think they are very useful guidelines, but we don't insist that the parties accept them. We think they would be very useful for purposes of discussion. But we are perfectly prepared, and obviously we would have to be, to have the discussions conducted by Ambassador Jarring and he can use any beginning point he would like to.

PR 193

-25-

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[L]

Assistant Secretary for Southeast Asian Affairs, one of our
top experts in this field. And he knows Southeast Asia, knows
Laos, knows Cambodia, and knows Vietnam. Both of them will
finish their briefings this morning.

This afternoon they will continue to the extent that
is necessary, and then you will hear from General Vogt.
Lieutenant General Vogt is one of our top men in the Armed
Services. He is not only a fine tactician but he is a fine
strategist, in my view. He works with the National Security
Council, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense.

He is particularly, I think, useful on this occasion
from your standpoint because he just returned from that area.
He has been to Cambodia. He has talked to the government
leaders there. He has also been to Vietnam.

Let your questions and discussion range not only to
Cambodia and Vietnam, but to the rest.

One final thought I would like to leave with you and
then I will go on to the other points. When I spoke yesterday
at the National Convention of the Jaycees in St. Louis, I
remarked about the fact that I had seen there, as I had seen
and as you have seen in every city of the world, the signs
and heard the shouts of those who say, "Peace Now." I don't
resent that when they say, "Peace Now." Everyone in this room
wants peace now.

Of course I, perhaps because I have the responsibility
for the lives of our men, want it more, if anybody could want
it more than anyone else. I could have had it on January 20,
1969 -- 17 months ago. It would have been very easy to bring
the boys home and say we now have peace, and blaming everything
that happened on the five years that went before.

The great question -- and it is the question that
Americans had to answer in World War II, in Korea, and we
answer now, and in lesser incidents that did not erupt into
war -- is not the question of peace now; it is the question
of peace that will last.

In this terribly difficult war which we should like
to have away from us, so we could direct our attentions to
other priorities at home and abroad, it is my view that how
it ends will not only determine whether the United States can
play a role in the world -- some would prefer not to play it;
but let's assume that we take that point of view of "Let's
concentrate on America," what I call the new, shall we say,
"isolationist idea," not critically, but it is a fact: Some
want us to turn away from our responsibilities abroad,
concentrate on the terrible problems of our cities and the
rest. Let's assume we did all that.

We still live in a world in which there are other
nations and other great powers who do not share that view.
Look at the Mideast. There is not any question but that as the
Soviet Union increases its power in the Middle East, as it
develops its military presence, and particularly in the naval
presence in the Mediterranean, not only in the Southern
Mediterranean, but now in the Northern Mediterranean, that the
extent to which it moves, how aggressively it moves, will be
greatly affected by how it evaluates the United States of
America in every other part of the world.

MORE

If the United States shows weakness; if we show
a tendency to retreat from a position which we have taken,
and which we believe is right, when the pressure is put on
us; if we show weakness at home, then we can certainly get
out of that trouble, wherever it is -- be it Vietnam or any
place else -- but the real problem is: It may buy us trouble
some place else because whether the leaders of the Soviet Union
or the leaders of China -- and this is not Cold War rhetoric,
this is simply a statement of fact -- there are other leaders
in the world, other people in the world who want to expand
their systems. They are trying to expand. The only reason
that any other nation in the world today can be neutral, no
nation could afford the luxury of neutrality if it were not,
in the present world, for the power of the United States.

That is a fact. The people of India know it. The
people in Indonesia know it, and any other nation. Because
if we were not there, then those who would expand would expand.

So Vietnam must be considered in that category and in
that context.

I covered as much as I feel is appropriate for me
to cover.

As you know, you are invited for lunch at the luncheon
break. We would like to have you take a brief walk over to
the house that we have here. We are going to have the lunch
around the swimming pool.

Incidentally, Mrs. Nixon and Tricia will be there.
While I speak about my family -- and I am proud of all of
them -- I want to say, as I see several here who are members
of the Inter-American Press Association, Mrs. Nixon, on Sunday,
is going to do something quite unusual. She is going, as the
First Lady, to Peru, where 40,000 people died in the most
terrible destructive accident that has ever occured, an
earthquake.

Actually what happened, it was an earthquake and a
mudslide just suffocated them all. So she is taking down
Air Force One with $2 million or $3 million worth of supplies,
medical supplies that have been contributed by the people
of the United States. She is going around with Mrs. Velasco
and cover those areas.

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But at the same time, while we have believed that we have a course which we believe will bring peace to Vietnam. In any event, the difference between us and others who share this objective, except for those who want to get out today, is so relatively narrow that it is not worth tearing the country apart over. Moving out of Vietnam, which we will do, at our own pace, as an exercise of a planned policy, is essential not just for foreign policy reasons, but even more importantly, for the vitality and future of the American society.

I am sorry I have talked so long, and I will be glad to answer your questions.

MR. KLEIN: Before we take your questions, I would just like to take a moment to introduce the co-host with me for the President, Ron Ziegler, the President's Press Secretary.

Now we will go to questions with Dr. Kissinger and as he said, he will be glad to take them on a broad cross-section of foreign policy, any part you like.

Q Can you bring us up to date on the Middle East?

DR. KISSINGER: On the Middle East, we have just launched a diplomatic initiative and I would prefer not to go into the details of that, but perhaps I can give you our analysis of what the problem is and what we are trying to deal with.

Incidentally, I would have to say that if there is the danger of a general war in this Administration, I do not believe, and we do not believe that it will come from Southeast Asia. It is very hard to see what we could do in Southeast Asia that would produce a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.

But it is possible to conceive situations in the Middle East in which a direct confrontation could arise, unintended, maybe, even by the major contestants.

First, what makes the situation in the Middle East so potentially dangerous is the fact that it has many similarities with the Balkans before World War I. You read the history of what produced World War I. There were a lot of books written about who really caused World War I.

When you really study it, the nightmare of it is that no one caused World War I, that no one wanted it at that particular moment except for Austria and Serbia, all the leaders of major countries actually went on vacation during July, 1914, then came back from vacation and a week later they were in a general war.

Now the problem in the Middle East is that you have two contestants, that is Israel on the one side, and the Arab States on the other side; each of them deeply concerned with their own problems, security and interests. Each of them is allied or connected with one or the other of the major countries. Each of them to some extent not fully under the control of the major country concerned.

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When you have a situation where, in the minds of the contestants, the local issues are paramount and the concern with a general peace is relatively less, it is possible that they will bring about a confrontation among each other that the great powers did not necessarily want, but that once entrained, is very difficult to arrest.

That is what produced World War I. In a way, this is what happened in 1967. Probably the Soviet Union did some mischief in 1967, but it never intended a war. However, at some point, events in the Middle East in 1967 got out of control.

If they now get similarly out of control through a similar series of misunderstandings now, the consequences could be much more serious. This is why the United States has felt that we must try to bring about more settled conditions in the Middle East, even though this is a terribly painful process and even though precisely for the reason that I gave, it is not likely to find the approbation of either of the two contestants.

After these general remarks, let me go on to some of the local conditions that make the issue so intractable. Usually when you talk about settlements, you can say a good settlement is one with which both parties are equally happy. That is beyond reach in the Middle East. The best you can do in the Middle East is to make a settlement with which both parties are relatively equally unhappy.

The reason for it is as follows: It is not that right confronts wrong, but that there are some nearly insoluable dilemmas here. First, the Israeli dilemma, a population of 2-1/2 million, surrounded by 80 million people of varying degrees of hostility.

Israel has managed to survive by their superior quality of trained manpower. This is a very illusive asset. They are inferior in material, probably even inferior in numbers of material, and probably inferior in the quality of their material in some respects, except that they have a larger base of trained manpower.

When we made our analysis at this time last year, we considered it would take a long time for the Arabs to bring up the level of their manpower, but I am frank to say, we did not count --- no one counted --- on the fact that the Soviets would inject their own combat manpower into this area, and therefore, literally from one month to the other, change that side of the equation. There was never any question that the Egyptians had more planes. There was a question, however, whether they could ever get pilots good enough to fly them.

Now that portion of Egypt that is covered by the Soviet air force is taken care of. The Israeli problem now is this: 2-1/2 million or 3 million people cannot possibly hold off 80 million people unless they are militarily superior. The Israeli survival has depended on their capacity to launch a rapid knockout blow. Under normal conditions if these were two opponents with roughly equal strength, you would say you want to bring about a military balance, but a military balance is death for Israel, because a war of attrition means mathematically that Israel will be destroyed. They will run out of men before the Arabs do.

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As it is now, if the Israelis have 100 casualties, it is like 10,000 for us. When you read of 100 Israeli casualties, you have to transpose this into about 75 times as much. So the Israelis have to aim for superiority. It is in the nature of their condition.

On the other hand, the Arabs cannot possibly accept this. If the Israelis have to aim for superiority, the Arabs have to aim for a condition in which their impotence is lessened or reversed.

I am not passing judgment. I am trying to say what makes that situation so inherently explosive.

When the Israelis try to vindicate their superiority, then there is an incentive for the Soviets to come in as balancers.

Secondly, normally you would make a number of propositions. You would say there has to be a military balance. Secondly, you would say, "There ought to be a legal state of peace." Well, that is all right, but most wars have started among countries that have had a legal state of peace.

What the Israelis are asked to do is to give up territory in return for the presumed good will of Arab governments, which may not survive the process of settlement, and which, even without settlement, are not in free control of their territories, as in Jordan.

Well, I could go on, and I simply want to say that this is one of the toughest problems we have. What we are trying to do is to strike a balance between these various concerns, is to give the Israelis enough of a sense of military security so that, in hysteria, they will not strike out and try to settle things before the balance shifts against them.

We are trying to give the Arabs enough of a sense of dignity so that they do not feel that they are at the mercy of the Israelis, and we are trying to create demilitarized zones around Israel in order to remove some of these dangers which I mentioned, so that the Israelis don't feel that by withdrawing from conquered territories, they are merely moving their enemies close to their main centers of population.

The situation in the Middle East is further complicated by the introduction of Soviet combat personnel in the form of SA-3 missiles and Soviet Combat aircraft. One has to distinguish here what may be the original intention of the Soviets and what may be the long-term consequences of their actions.

I consider it quite arguable that the Soviets originally went into Egypt with combat personnel in order to prevent Nasser from being overthrown by the deep penetration raids that the Israelis were launching last December, January and February.

But at the same time, the British acquired an empire by building coaling stations for their commercial ships to go to India. Intentions are irrelevant when you are talking about historical processes. The danger that arises from the persistence of a Soviet combat base in Egypt is that the Eastern Mediterranean may become a Soviet lake as a result.

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It may become very difficult for our fleet to operate
in that area in the face of short-range Soviet bases. What
is more important, because one can argue that there is no law
that says our fleet has to operate there is that the oil supplies
of the Middle East may become totally at the mercy of the Sov-
iets and their radical clients.

It is important for us to keep in mind that there
are different levels of conflict in the Middle East. There is
on one level -- and in many ways the easiest one, even though,
it is complex enough -- the conflict between the Arab's
and Israelis over the conquered territories.

There is also, on the deeper level, the conflict between
the Arabs and the Israelis over Israel's existence. This cannot
be settled by giving back the conquered territories. After
all, the Palestinians, the ones who have caused the upheavals
in Jordan, are contesting Israel's right to exist, not Israel's
right to possess conquered territory.

Thirdly, there is the thrust of the radical Arab
movement against the moderate regimes in that area -- Tunisia,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and so forth. There is the thrust of
the radical regimes against Western interests in this area.
Therefore, many of the moderate regimes are suffering from
schizophrenia. On the one hand they can see how Israel's behavior
helps the radicals. On the other hand, they are terrified lest
Nasser emerge out of these conflicts in such a strong position
that he can topple every moderate regime in the area. Those
are two separate problems.

For example, before the 1967 war, a large part of
the Egyptian army was in Yemen, trying to establish a base from
which, it is safe to say, if that had succeeded, Saudi Arabia
probably could not have survived. After Saudi Arabia had gone,
the pressures on the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, particularly now
that Britain has withdrawn from there, would have been over-
whelming.

Iran certainly considers its own security intimately
linked up with the Persian Gulf and with what happens in Saudi
Arabia. If you add to it that 90 percent of the oil of Japan
comes from precisely that area, and I think 80 percent of the
oil of Europe -- I will check that figure for you, but it is
of that magnitude -- you have some sense of what a radical Arab
movement, backed by the Soviet Union, can do.

If, then, the defense of Egypt becomes a Soviet
responsibility, and the Egyptians are free after an Israeli
settlement for maneuvers throughout the Middle East, then you
may have a whole new complex of problems separate from the Arab-
Israeli thing.

So what we are trying to do is very delicate.
We are trying to separate the issue of Israel's conquest, to
which we cannot give an American position from Israel's
existence, to which we are now committed.

We are trying to get a settlement in such a way that
the moderate regimes are strengthened, and not the radical
regimes. We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence,

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[LC]

not so much the advisors, but the combat pilots and the combat personnel, before they become so firmly established. Here I have to repeat something the President said when he was in here.

It is, of course, nonsense to say that we did what we did in Cambodia in order to impress the Russians in the Middle East. It was not as simple as that. But we certainly have to keep in mind that the Russians will judge us by the general purposefulness of our performance everywhere. What they are doing in the Middle East, whatever their intentions, poses the gravest threats in the long term for Western Europe and Japan and, therefore, for us.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if Russia poses that threat in the Mediterranean, why hasn't she tested us there to pull us away from Southeast Asia faster?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't think that the Russians want to pull us away from Southeast Asia all that fast. You see, the Russians are not yet firmly established to that degree of influence in the Mediterranean. I think you can make the opposite argument that they don't want to test us in the Mediterranean. If they can keep present trends going they may feel that they will gradually increase their influence to a point where we will be in the position where we have to test them and they want to delay that as long as possible.

Secondly, as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, the Russian position is very ambivalent, I sometimes think that one of the curses of the modern state is that the combination of its intelligence and foreign services always makes the assumption that the other side is more rationale than it is. You get all this brain power analyzing the motives and purposes of the other side and then trying to make sense of a lot of dis coordinate moves.

I think as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, they are waffling a bit. I am not certain that they want us out of Southeast Asia if it is to be at the cost of their own influence and an increased Chinese domination. They do have an objective consequence of keeping the war going.

Q What are our commitments to Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: We have no formal U. S. commitment to Cambodia. We do want "a neutral and independent Cambodia." The reason for this is that we don't need it as part of the American system of defense, but at the same time we want to deny it to Hanoi's use as a supply base and route. Even if Phnom Penh should fall, if we can prevent the North Vietnamese from using the areas in Cambodia they hold for supplies, that is, blocking off ports, preventing their build-up of large bases along the border, then we could reduce the bad consequences of the fall of Phnom Penh.

We do not want; we are not seeking any other war involving our ground forces in Southeast Asia. If and as the North Vietnamese develop a supply system in Cambodia, and start rebuilding their bases, with the agreement of the Cambodian Government, we are prepared and will engage in air interdiction in the area.

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in the sense that if their productive capacity went over into hostile hands, and if their resources, intellectual and otherwise, were joined with those of major enemies, that this would give us a significant problem.

Where the difficulties arise is in the gray areas where historical evolution may take care of some of the requirements. But I don't really believe that our existing commitments are so very much out of line with our interests, but you can be certain that we are taking a look at this problem and that over the term of the Administration, we hope to bring them in line with each other.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the brinksmanship the Russians are practicing now with the missile bases and aircraft, does this indicate that they are now prepared to make the big push; that if the fat drops in the fire they have chosen this time and this place to finally come to grips?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets are not really practicing brinksmanship with us at this moment, yet. They have been very careful in making their commitments in the Middle East ostensibly of a defensive nature, and the country they have challenged is Israel, not the United States.

The difficulty that arises is that the capability that is strong enough to challenge Israel can, if it remains in place over a period of time, become a threat to American interests, even if that is not its present function or even if that is not its original intention.

So I would not say that they went into the Middle East in order to challenge us. But I would also say this: At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had 600 missiles and the Soviet Union had less than 60. We had 600 airplanes and the Soviet Union had less than 200.

At that time it was theoretically conceivable that the United States could do to the Soviet Union what Israel did to the Arabs in 1967; that is, they had to be very careful to push the confrontation to a point in which that might trigger an American pre-emptive attack. Therefore, I never believed in 1962 that they would answer our blockade of Cuba with a blockade of Berlin, because the risk to them was much too great.

In the present situation, they have well over 1,000 missiles. Their total megatonnage is superior to ours, and in a local crisis they know that they are not running the risk of having their strategic forces wiped out.

That creates a different psychological balance and makes the local equilibrium of much greater significance than it has ever been before. I would, therefore, not say that they are deliberately challenging us.

On the other hand, I think that they are somewhat more comfortable if a confrontation should develop than they would have been, say, eight years ago. Still, I do not believe that they are in the first instance directing this against us, and this is what gives the ambiguity to their particular thrust. Over a period of ten years, I think we will suffer from it as much as the local balance will if we do not do anything.

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BACKGROUND BRIEFING

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6:00 A.M., EDT, JULY 2, 1970.

EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANS-
MISSION UNTIL 11:00 P.M.,
EDT, JULY 1, 1970.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 10:51 A.M. PDT.

JUNE 30, 1970

TUESDAY

San Clemente, California

MR. ZIEGLER: We will go now to the second portion of the backgrounder. Dr. Kissinger will take questions on matters not relating to the President's statement on Cambodia and South Vietnam. What Dr. Kissinger says you can attribute to White House officials and you should not use direct quotations.

The groundrules on this particular session: It is for 6:00 A.M., EDT, this coming Thursday. Wire transmission is embargoed until after the President's conversation on Wednesday night.

Dr. Kissinger.

Q. I just wanted to ask you, I think you talked about the Middle East or rather refused to talk about the new initiative in this document. Has anything happened since Friday which would give us any additional hope that something may come of this latest initiative?

DR. KISSINGER: Nothing very specific has happened, but the absence of specificity is in itself a very significant development. In the past, the various contenders in the Middle East have been at pains to reject anything that gave them anything less than 100 percent of their demands.

The interesting aspect of this present Middle East initiative is that no one has really yet rejected it. They have nagged away at it and they have reserved their options and they have indicated that their enthusiasm is not total, but as I pointed out in that briefing which you have, the best we can hope for in the Middle East is a settlement that makes everyone equally unhappy.

So the fact that there has not yet been a clear cut rejection, the fact that the Soviet Union has not indicated any hostility; that other countries have worked for it behind the scenes, and that even the radical Arab states, while flexing their muscles have stopped way short of rejecting it, gives us still some hope.

Q. Could I follow it with just the question of whether Nasser's trip there was in any way, in your judgment, related to the political move?

DR. KISSINGER: The trip to Moscow was scheduled before.

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Q On Page 22 of the long transcript you said "We are trying to give the Arabs enough of a sense of dignity" and trying to create demilitarized zones around Israel in order to minimize some of these dangers.

There was a lot of confusion last week as to whether a proposal for a DMZ around the Suez was included in our peace proposal and it finally came out that it was not. Have we formally or informally proposed this?

DR. KISSINGER: You have to distinguish proposals that might be made to separate the contending forces along the dividing lines and schemes which would separate the forces along -- in the phrase of the United Nations resolution -- "secure and recognized boundaries."

We have not made a proposal to separate the contending forces along present dividing lines. We have had it as part of our proposals all along that there should be some demilitarized zones at the finally agreed borders so that hostile forces would not move right up into the vacated territory.

So, I would have to make that distinction. We have always had proposals for demilitarized zones. We did not make a new one as a part of this proposition.

Q Isn't the Suez Canal part of the border? That would be a barrier in this settlement.

DR. KISSINGER: I would doubt this very seriously, unless Nasser suffers from a complete collapse of will. No, the Suez Canal will not be a border in a new settlement because the Egyptians will not accept relinquishing all of Sinai to the Israelis. So, wherever the border is, it will not be on the Suez Canal.

Q Can you realistically expect Nasser to accept a demilitarized zone that will in any way require his moving back even further or relinquishing more?

DR. KISSINGER: No, from the Suez, no. This is not the proposal. The proposal is as Israel moves back to whatever borders are agreed upon, that not all of the territory it relinquishes be available for the deployment of Arab armies, but rather some or much or most of the territory which is relinquished become demilitarized. No one can propose to the Arabs that they move back further to create the zones.

Q Can you amplify what you meant when you used this in the backgrounder to the editors?

DR. KISSINGER: What we meant was that it was part of our general approach that there should be demilitarized zones in the Middle East around the borders that are finally agreed upon, to enhance the feeling of security that Israel might feel in these new borders, or to put it another way, so that the issue does not have to be considered simply in the military terms of giving up territory to an advancing hostile army. But the size of these demilitarized zones, how they are to be policed, and indeed whether they should extend on only one side of the border or not -- that has not been agreed upon.

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Q Can you tell us anything at all about what the United States has in mind about the often mentioned "just settlement" of the refugee problem?

DR. KISSINGER: As I pointed out in that briefing on Friday, really, the Middle East is the area which has conceptually much harder problems than even Vietnam. On the one hand, the Arabs insist on the right to return to what they call Palestine. The Israelis obviously cannot permit the uncontrolled return of large numbers of Arabs, partly because of the danger that this would shift the population balance and partly because of the danger of importing a guerrilla movement into their own country.

So, I will not go into details, but there have been various schemes which attempt to reconcile the principle of free return with the actuality of a quota or some other restraints so that the return would be on one level symbolic and that those who do not return will receive some other compensation towards resettlement, but above all, so that the refugee camps are eliminated and that the Palestinians are absorbed, a small minority in Israel and a large majority in the other Arab countries.

Q Henry, in the briefing you said the President made very generous offers on April 20th in which he considerably modified some emphasis on our peace proposal and you say despite this the enemy moved deeper into Cambodia and started an attack in Laos.

Is the President now modifying some emphasis in our peace proposal and secondly, if you have some of this negative reaction on April 20, why should you not necessarily have it now?

DR. KISSINGER: Two things: One, the reaction to the April 20 statement was subsumed in the larger reaction to the Cambodian operation which followed it shortly afterwards. Therefore, there was no extended test of their reaction.

Secondly, we are always under pressure to come up with some new proposals, but I think what one has to keep in mind is the necessity of balancing the unquenchable American desire for novelty against the necessities of a bargaining situation.

If you are negotiating with an opponent who knows that if he produces a stalemate, sooner or later there will be pressures on you to break it with a new proposal, you are giving him an incentive not for settlement, but for a stalemate.

Therefore, while it is accepted in our folklore that you must always come up with a new proposal, the reality is that if the other side knows that no matter how unreasonable their position, you will always be under pressure to come up with a new proposal, you will be at a great disadvantage in negotiations. If you look at the record of the term of this Administration, every new proposal in Paris has come from us.

Therefore, when we say we are launching new initiatives, this does not mean that we are scrapping all our previous positions. What it means is that we will try to see whether, within the established framework we cannot develop a formula.

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The big issue in Vietnam is whether the other side is willing to accept a political settlement which will give it a chance at a political outcome, but no guarantee of a political outcome. This is the big issue. What they have asked from us up to now is that we destroy the existing government and pull out our forces unconditionally; knowing very well that if we destroy the organized non-Communist forces in South Vietnam there will be no forces left politically to oppose the NLF.

Now, if they are prepared to discuss a reasonable political contest, so are we.

I don't believe the full possibilities have been explored, primarily because the other side has never been willing to engage in a serious negotiation on that issue.

Now, we will attempt to find ways of engaging them in serious discussion and perhaps finding ways of expressing these general principles. But I am not saying that we are going to come up with some spectacular, totally new approach which might well be counterproductive.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have just spent an hour on Cambodia and South Vietnam. The purpose of this backgrounder is for other foreign policy matters. Confine your questions to that, please.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how valid is the proposal made by the Israelis that their casualties are 85 or 75 percent larger than the Arabs?

DR. KISSINGER: I have not seen, actually the Israeli figures on this, but I think it is fair that in proportion to the population one has to multiply Israeli casualties by 85 to get some sense in our terms of the impact of the present war on the Israelis. I have not seen how this projects. I would not be surprised if it turned out to be larger than the Vietnam casualties. But it is much larger than the cold figures would suggest.

Q How would you appraise, Henry, the Soviet role in trying to reach some solution in the Middle East? Do you have anything that gives you cause for hope that they might somehow collaborate or have you been discouraged by the introduction of the Russian missiles and pilots?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets, as everybody else, are in a complex situation in the Middle East. They are trapped by necessities that they did not necessarily create, but which nevertheless may provide opportunities for them which they may not have sought, but which could be of profound significance.

Therefore, one has to distinguish the long term implications of the Soviet presence in the Middle East from the motives that brought them in there to begin with.

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Now, it is not inconceivable to me, indeed I think it is probable, that the Soviets entered the Middle East with combat personnel last winter and spring in order to prevent the collapse of Nasser and that they thought the choices that presented themselves to them were the collapse of a client state or some military engagement.

On the other hand, the introduction of Soviet personnel, of some Soviet combat personnel, into the Middle East objectively created a new reality. The advantage that the Israelis had had before was an advantage in quality manpower. That was erased with one blow by the introduction of Soviet combat personnel. So, it had a profound impact on the Arab-Israeli military balance.

Secondly, it created a situation in which whatever got them in there to begin with, a Soviet combat base that becomes a permanent feature of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean may produce, over a period of time, increasing and perhaps intolerable pressures on the moderate regimes in that area by freeing the radical Arab states to conduct a more aggressive policy under the umbrella of Soviet military power, even if the Soviet military power does not become directly engaged.

Of course, it has military consequences vis-a-vis us. It would be a difficult matter to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean against a large Soviet air presence. So, for all these reasons the Soviet military presence is a serious matter. This has both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect is that the Soviet Union aware of the geopolitical impact of its action, may for a while still be prepared to treat it as a bargaining counter and may try to accelerate an Arab-Israeli settlement in order to prevent us from confronting them over this change.

Over a longer period of time, I think the worrisome problems that I have indicated will exist.

Now, they have shown some increased interest in a Middle East settlement. I think their incentive is in part the danger that their presence may be challenged by the Israelis or us if it continues to escalate.

Q At the same time you say on the bottom of Page 23, "We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence, not the advisers so much, but the combat pilots and the combat personnel, before they become so firmly established."

How is that done? How do you plan to do that? Have you discussed that with them and have you formally protested or asked them to leave?

DR. KISSINGER: "Expel" is a strong word. If my associates had fully let me in on everything that would face me I would have chosen a more waffling phrase drawn from my Harvard vocabulary. It is a fair estimate of what we would like to bring about. It is fair to say that our preference in this respect has been made clear to the Soviets.

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[lc]

Q How does one accomplish this in a long view?
How does one accomplish the removal of Soviet pilots and
combat personnel?

DR. KISSINGER: You know the fellow who said during
the war that the way to deal with the German submarines was to
heat the ocean and boil it and bring them to the surface.
Somebody said, "How do you do that?" He said, "I have given you
the idea. The technical execution is up to you. (Laughter.)

Q Can you elaborate a little on the comments
you made a few moments ago about the increasing Soviet interest
in a Middle East settlement?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviets realize that if
they expand their military presence the point will be reached
where they must be challenged by the Israelis. The Israelis
cannot permit themselves to sit there and strangle gradually.

Given our commitment to the existence of Israel at the
minimum we will be forced to putting Israel in a position where
it cannot be destroyed by the build-up of Soviet and other
forces.

Therefore, the Soviet build-up at this stage is
not without risk. This is leaving aside anything that we
might do in various ways. Therefore, in the discussions on the
Middle East the Soviets have indicated at least a general
interest in bringing about a solution. They have not yet
married that to very many detailed specific formula, but it
is certainly an area in which they seem to be willing to
talk seriously.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how do they indicate a general
interest? What does that mean specifically? Do they say
"We are generally interested" or "We don't want to talk about
it anymore"?

DR. KISSINGER: They have indicated more than that.
They have indicated that they are prepared to discuss it. But
we have not yet got to the point of either side developing the
complete formula to bring this about, partly because it is a
purely theoretical exercise unless we get a modicum of
consensus established among the Arabs and Israeli issues to be discussed.

Q Do you think both sides can work one out?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know whether they can work one
out but I think they may try.

Q What about the reports of Mohammed Riad being
here for discussions?

DR. KISSINGER: What about them?

Q Is he here? Has he had meetings with the
Secretary of State?

DR. KISSINGER: He was in New York, to the best of
my knowledge. I don't want to go into any specific discussions
he may have had.

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Q Was that encouraging?

DR. KISSINGER: At this stage I don't think any of
Arab states have yet made up their mind. He has also gone
oscow.

Q I take it that you don't agree with the
pian theory that the Russians are beguiling Americans,
socially the Russian representation in Washington, into
belief that it is interested in a general settlement
the Middle East when in fact it is acting the way it is,
would seem to be to the contrary.

DR. KISSINGER: Maybe it is. If they are just trying
beguile us, this is not a riskless course for them. I think
they are or not will also depend in part on our actions.
this stage there is no clear evidence of that. There is
theft evidence that they generally do want to talk about a
element. What price they are willing to pay for the
element, that remains to be seen.

Q How hopeful have the developments in the SALT
is been so far and can you look down the road and see the
pects there? How does it look to you at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: If you keep this briefing going
longer you will even ask me how things look this after-
1. (Laughter)

I think we can say already that simply as an
ollectual negotiating exercise the SALT talks have been
constructive than any comparable talks that have been
with the Soviet Union.

If one compares them with the tedious discussions
: used to go on, on the subject of general and complete
ormament one is really in a different era. That doesn't
we have agreed on anything, but it does mean that the
ies they have raised are not frivolous issues. They are
ies that have to be addressed. The issues we have raised
not been negotiating gimmicks, but have been our best
ment of the situation.

I think we have both put on the table how we
id look at a comprehensive settlement; given the difference
geography, history, weapons deployment and types of
ions, obviously major differences do exist.

Now, the problem that both sides face is whether
wants to continue pursuing the comprehensive settlement
whether one can break out isolated parts of it in
there is a larger area of agreement and move those
urds a solution if one does break out isolated parts, how
a chunk you want to break out.

The danger of breaking out too small a piece is
: you may wrap up into the smaller piece all the incentives
: exist for the total package and thereby get a very limited
element that may not lead anywhere else.

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- 8 -

But I think we are at a stage where over a
reasonable period of time, certainly within a year, one
can foresee very clearly whether a limited agreement is
possible and I would lean on the side that it is.

Q Several times in his Cambodian report the
President takes cognizance of recriminations at home. Is
this also a factor in your thinking about the Mideast? If
we get involved there, what is the reading you have on
objections at home and controversy about it?

DR. KISSINGER: The pressures we face in the Middle
East work in the opposite direction from the pressures that
work on us in Vietnam. Many of those who are most insistent
on removing us from Vietnam are most vocal in encouraging a
greater American role in the Middle East.

We have to make these decisions on the basis of
the best judgment that we can made of what is in the long-
term national interest of the United States and in the
interest of peace.

The President has avoided in both areas, I think,
the easy, cheap shot at popularity on the theory that the
public will not forgive its leaders for producing disasters,
even if these are caused by actions that they seem to have
promoted.

So, of course, we have to take cognizance of public
opinion. But if we are convinced that something that public
opinion urges on us would produce a disaster two years down
the road in one direction or another, we have to follow our
best judgment on the long-term consequences.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I read what you have said
essentially, we are in a position where, should, hypothetically,
Russia's presence in the Arab countries become what we consider
to be overwhelming, we would be in the position of having to
establish almost an equal American presence on behalf of
Israel, would that become necessary.

DR. KISSINGER: Who said that?

Q I am asking if I am interpreting you right
because you talk of our necessity to challenge their presence,
our necessity to insure that Israel will not be intimidated
into non-existence, if I understand you right. How do we do
this if the eventsshould become a fact, if their presence
indeed is overbearing and strangling Israel? Precisely what
are we talking about?

DR. KISSINGER: At this moment I don't think we
should lose our sense of perspective. For the foreseeable
future what would be needed in terms of American support to
prevent this from arising does not add up to an overwhelming
American presence in the Middle East.

Secondly, at some point of the Soviet presence in
the Middle East there will be some indigenous Arab forces that
will have their own reasons for not wanting to substitute
one colonialism for another. So, this is a very extreme
situation that you have described, but if the Soviet build-
up continues in the Middle East, there will have to be some
American counteraction, but that will not be an overwhelming
American presence, necessarily.

- 9 -

Do you see any possible threat to our Western interests in the Middle East as a result of Soviet pressures?

DR. KISSINGER: The oil interests have to be seen
Ily on two levels. Ninety percent of the Japanese oil, and
think 75 percent of the Western European oil comes from
it area which again is one reason why we can have an over-
coming interest in preventing this area from being dominated
the Soviet Union.

In addition, there are substantial American invest-
its in this area, and of course we do not want to have those
arded to every political upheaval.

On the other hand, it is dangerous to permit your-
f. to be blackmailed with your economic interests because
it is considered intolerable at one moment, if it works,
then simply lead to another series of demands. Therefore,
long as we are physically located there, we have to be
ry careful in being excessively nervous about this sort of
ockmail. But obviously, if American actions produce pre-
table volatile reactions, this would be one of the
tors that has to be considered.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 11:35 A.M. PDT)

EXCERPTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

FROM A CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
ON LIVE TELEVISION INTERVIEW

WITH
JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC NEWS
ERIC SEVAREID, CBS NEWS
HOWARD K. SMITH, ABC NEWS

JULY 1, 1970, 7:00 P. M., PDT

**QUESTION:** Mr. George Ball wrote an article in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine section in which he suggested that the Russians were bold enough to move into the Middle East because we were bogged down in Indochina.

Do you accept that concatenation of the two events?

**THE PRESIDENT:**

As a matter of fact, Mr. Smith, Mr. Ball should know something about that because he was there when we got bogged down in Indochina, as you recall, as Under Secretary of State. I did not hear his comments at that time indicating that that was the problem.

Now, the second point that I would make is that if the United States, after this long struggle in Vietnam, if we do what Mr. Ball and some others apparently want us to do -- just get out, without regard to the consequences -- I do not see the American people and the American Congress then saying that if we couldn't do what was necessary where the lives of American men were involved in Vietnam, that we will do what is necessary, because we are concerned about Israel or some other state in the Mideast.

You cannot separate what happens to America in Vietnam from the Mideast or from Europe or any place else. That is why European leaders -- some of them don't say it publicly, but privately they all know how much rides on the United States coming out of Vietnam, not with a victory over North Vietnam, but with a just peace because if the United States is humiliated or defeated in Vietnam, the effect on the United States is what I am concerned about, the people of the United States. And I think we'll see a rampant isolationism in this country in which we will not do what we should do in other parts of the world.

[lc]

Excerpts from the President's Live
Television Interview, July 1, 1970

-2-

If I can turn to the Middle East briefly because I think we should speak a moment on it, if you other gentlemen would like. I think, and I say this respectfully, that some of the columnists and commentators -- and I read them and listen to them both with respect -- and some of us in political life have a tendency to look at the Middle East too much in terms of the Israeli-Arab struggle. We look at Israel, a strong free nation in the Middle East and we look at its neighbors, its aggressive neighbors, the UAR and Syria, and we see this struggle and we say, "Are we going to give planes to Israel and are the Russians going to give them to the UAR? And how are we going to have a settlement between Israel and the Arab States?"

If that is all there was to it, it would not be as difficult a problem as I am going to put it. I think the Middle East now is terribly dangerous. It is like the Balkans before World War I where the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a confrontation that neither of them wants because of the differences there.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, I believe the Russians today at the UN are circulating some new ideas about approaching peace negotiations in the Mideast. Is there anything you can tell us about this?

**THE PRESIDENT:**

I haven't had a chance to study them yet, but I will say this, that any propositions that the Russians or anybody else circulate that would offer a chance to cool it in the Middle East would be helpful, because when you look at the Middle East, it is not just a case of, as I say, Israel versus the Arab states, but the Soviet Union is now moving into the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Mideast is important. We all know the 80 percent of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Mideast. We know that the Mideast, this area, this is the gateway to Africa, it's the gateway to the Mediterranean, it's the hinge of NATO, and it is also the gateway through the Suez Canal down in the Indian Ocean.

-3-

Now under these circumstances, when we then look at it in terms of
Israelis versus Arabs, moderate Arabs versus radical Arabs, and who-
ever would think that there would be somebody more radical than the
Syrians, within the radical Arab states, Fedayeen that are more radical,
the super-radicals -- when we think of all these factors, we can see what
a very difficult situation it is. Now what should US policy be? I will
summarize it in a word. One, our interest is peace and the integrity of
every country in the area.

Two, we recognize that Israel is not desirous of driving any of the
other countries into the sea. The other countries do want to drive
Israel into the sea.

Three, then, once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker
than its neighbors, there will be a war. Therefore, it is in US interests
to maintain the balance of power, and we will maintain that balance of
power. That is why as the Soviet Union moves in to support the UAR, it
makes it necessary for the United States to evaluate what the Soviet
Union does, and once that balance of power is upset, we will do what is
necessary to maintain Israel's strength vis-a-vis its neighbors, not
because we want Israel to be in a position to wage war. That is not it,
but because that is what will deter its neighbors from attacking it.

And then we get to the diplomacy. The diplomacy is terribly difficult,
because Israel's neighbors, of course, have to recognize Israel's right
to exist.

Israel must withdraw to borders, borders that are defensible, and
when we consider all those factors and then put into the equation the fact
that the Russians seem to have an interest in moving into the Mediterranean,
it shows you why this subject is so complex and so difficult.

But we are going to continue to work on it, and I can assure you the
fact that we are in Vietnam does not mean that the United States is not
going to give every bit of its diplomatic and other energies to this subject
as well.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

July 3, 1970

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(Los Angeles, California)

Eccentric on the mind EAST

From A CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT
ON LIVE TELEVISION INTERVIEW
WITH

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC NEWS
ERIC SEVAREID, CBS NEWS
HOWARD K. SMITH, ABC NEWS
JULY 1, 1970, 7:00 PM, PDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. Before turning to our panel for their questions, I have a brief announcement. After consultation with the Secretary of State and other senior advisers, I decided to name Ambassador David Bruce as Chief of our Delegation to the Paris Talks.

Ambassador Bruce, as all of those who have studied our foreign policy know, is one of America's most distinguished diplomats. He is a Democrat, but he has served five Presidents, Democrat and Republican, with great devotion and great ability. He is the only Ambassador in our history who has been Ambassador to Germany, Ambassador to England, and Ambassador to France,

He will meet me in San Clemente along with Ambassador Habib, who is Chief of our Delegation, acting at this time, and the Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson on Saturday, July 4th.

There along with Dr. Kissinger we will discuss the situation with regard to the talks as they presently exist. Then on July 11th, he will meet with Secretary of State Rogers, in London, as Secretary Rogers completes his Asian trip and will stop briefly in Britain on his way back to the United States.

Ambassador Bruce will have the opportunity then to meet with the National Security Council in the middle of this month, perhaps about the 15th of July, and is arranging his affairs so that he will be able to go to Paris and take over as Chief of the Delegation on the 1st of August or shortly before that time.

We believe that in appointing Ambassador Bruce we have selected a man who is superbly qualified to conduct these negotiations. He will have great flexibility in the conduct of his talks. We hope that this move on our part will be reciprocated by a similar move on the part of the North Vietnamese in attempting to find a peaceful solution to the war in Vietnam.

Now, with that brief announcement we will go to the questions.

MR. SMITH: Mr. President, in your report on the Cambodian operation yesterday, you said you were going to emphasize the route of negotiated settlement again, and I gather this is the first step.

About other steps, A, have you had any signal from Hanoi that they are more willing to talk than they have been in the past, and, B, do you have any new proposals to put to them to make a negotiated settlement more attractive?

THE PRESIDENT: We have had no signals from Hanoi directly or indirectly that their position of intransigence has changed. They still

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2

insist that their condition for a negotiated settlement is complete with-
drawal of our forces and the throwing out of the government in South
Vietnam as we leave.

On the other hand, we believe that they will be interested in the
fact that we are appointing a new chief of delegation, because on several
occasions not particularly from them, but from third parties who have
talked to them, they have indicated that they felt that we should appoint
a new chief of delegation.

We have now appointed one and we hope that they act. As far as
new proposals are concerned, I think it is important for us to know what
our proposals are because we have made some very forthcoming proposals.

First, we have offered to withdraw all of our forces if they withdraw
theirs, and to have that withdrawal internationally supervised.

Second, we have offered to have cease-fires throughout the country,
and have those cease-fires again internationally supervised.

Third, and most important, we have offered to have free elections
throughout the country, internationally supervised. We have offered to
have the supervisory bodies be ones in which the Communists can
participate as well as those representing the present government in
South Vietnam, and we have offered on our part, and the South Vietnamese
Government has offered on its part, to accept the results of that election,
even though those results might include Communists in some positions,
or Communists in some power.

We believe that these offers are very forthcoming, and I should also
say that in private channels we have elaborated on these offers.

Finally, I should also point out that we have not made our proposals
on a take it or leave it basis. Ambassador Bruce will be in that position.
He will be in a position with his new instructions to tell the opposition
that we have laid these proposals out, we believe they are the formula
that should provide the basis for a negotiated peace, but that we are
willing to see whether we can narrow the gap between their position and
ours.

There is only one matter that is not subject to negotiation, and that
is the right of the South Vietnamese to determine their own future.

That is one of the reasons, for example, that the speculation with
regard to our having changed our position and agreeing possibly to now
offer a coalition government, a negotiated settlement, imposing a
coalition government, that speculation is not correct.

It is not correct, because if we were to negotiate with the North
Vietnamese and decide that we would have a coalition government and
impose it on the South Vietnamese, that is a government without their
choice.

If the South Vietnamese on the other hand in the free political process
should choose Communists as well as non-Communists and out of that
should come a government that is mixed, that is up to them.

But we will not impose a coalition government against the will, and
without the consent of the people of South Vietnam. But except for those
two conditions, Ambassador Bruce will be free to negotiate in a very
flexible manner on our proposals or on theirs.

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3

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. President, we are all pleased to be here with you tonight. As you know, the networks have standing requests for interviews of this kind with you. I would like to know why you have chosen this technique at this particular time.

THE PRESIDENT: We have, as you know, Mr. Chancellor, numbers of requests to do everything from press conferences to individual interviews, and the like. I noted, of course, that in the previous administrations this technique was used first by President Kennedy, and I thought very effectively, you remember, after his first year in office. President Johnson used it twice and I thought also in a very interesting and effective way.

I have not yet used this technique. It seemed to me that this would be useful now and incidentally, it is useful for another reason. I have followed some of what has been referred to as the instant commentary and I do know -- after my press conferences -- and I do know that one of the difficulties with press conferences -- and some of you have been very kind in referring to the style of the conferences, not always to the replies -- but one of the difficulties is that an individual does not get to follow up a question.

Now this allows that. So by taking the subject of foreign policy, by picking the anchormen of the three networks, by having a chance for a little bit longer answer and a chance to follow up, I thought we could give our television audience a chance really to get to the depths of our foreign policy thinking which you can't do when you are up there trying to, in 28 minutes, answer 24 times.

MR. SEVAREID: A lot of things have been happening in the last few days and some in the United States Senate.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know.

MR. SEVAREID: Do you feel that you can give categorical assurances now that we will not send ground troops back into Cambodia no matter what?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Sevareid, as you recall, I indicated when this operation was begun two months ago -- incidentally, it seems much longer, a lot has happened in those two months and a very great deal has been achieved, in my opinion -- but I indicated then that once we had completed our task successfully of cleaning out the sanctuaries that then it would not be necessary and I would not consider it advisable to send American ground forces back into Cambodia.

I can say now that we have no plans to send American ground forces into Cambodia. We have no plans to send any advisers into Cambodia. We have plans only to maintain the rather limited diplomatic establishment that we have in Phnom Penh and I see nothing that will change that at this time.

MR. SEVAREID: You can't forewear in a final way --

THE PRESIDENT: I realize that anybody listening to an answer --

MR. SEVAREID: That is what the Senate seems to want.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that anybody hearing the answer that I have just given would certainly get the impression and would incidentally be justified in having the impression that the President of the United States has no intention to send ground forces back into Cambodia, and I do not believe that there will be any necessity to do so.

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