Interview

KISSINGER
ON WORLD POLITICS

During a three day visit to Nepal at the invitation of His Majesty's Government, Henry A. Kissinger gave an exclusive interview to two members of the Editorial Board of the Strategic Studies Series, Sridhar K. Khatri and Ananda P. Shrestha, in Pokhara on February 16, 1985. A verbatim text of the interview is reproduced below.

S.K.K.: How was [your audience] with His Majesty?

H.A.K.: Oh, it was a very good meeting with His Majesty. It could not have been more cordial. It was very inspiring for me to see his vision of Nepal and his understanding of international affairs.

S.K.K.: May I now proceed with some of the questions we have already prepared?

H.A.K: Please.

S.K.K.: You were quite critical of the Reagan Administration's handling of foreign policy issues during the last four years....

H.A.K.: No, I am not. I have supported the Reagan Administration in the last four years. On some occasions, I was critical of the rhetoric that was used. But, I am strongly supporting the substance of the Reagan Administration foreign policy.

S.K.K.: You were critical I think in the area of conceptual framework that it should follow...and I think the cases you cited were Lebanon and you [had] mentioned Poland also as an example.

H.A.K.: Well, I was critical but that was at the end of the first year. I thought that the Administration was somewhat indecisive in its handling of the Polish question. But, I want to

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repeat [that] I am in strong support of the main
lines of the foreign policy. In arms control, we
need a new conceptual approach. This is not a
criticism of the Reagan Administration. This is
produced by technology and by changing
circumstances.

S.K.K.: What particular areas do you think the
Reagan Administration should focus on during
the next four years?

H.A.K.: Well, I think it is already focussing on
East-West relations. I think it has to keep Central
America in mind and it has two problems in the
Middle East. One, the Arab-Israeli problem and,
the other, the Iran-Iraq [War] and the whole Gulf
problem. These are the areas of priority.

A.P.S.: Why did the relationship with the Soviet
Union based on detente collapse? Do you
envision any other type of a more lasting
structure in America's future relations with the
Soviet Union ?

H.A.K.: I believe that the relationship in the
Nixon Administration was called detente,
[which] collapsed mainly because of domestic
difficulties in the United States. We lost the
capacity either to enforce it, or to offer incentives
to the other side; and we lost, what in America we
call, both the carrot and the stick. That was the
basic tragedy. Of course, the Soviets — as always
—took advantage of the situation and conducted
a number of extremely ruthless policies.

S.K.K.: You've said, and I quote: "The
emptiness of the Western reaction to Poland has
consequences far beyond the tragedy of the
Polish people. It underlies and compounds the
disarray of the Western alliance." My question
is: Do you believe that the US can still influence
the Soviet Union to observe both the Yalta and
Helsinki principles despite the growing signs of
the lack of cohesion of the Western powers? If so
what measures would you recommend?

H.A.K.: Well, the quotation is again from the
article I wrote in the end of the first year of the
Reagan Administration, and it does not reflect my
view of the totality of the Reagan Administration.
I think since then the West has faced down the
Soviet Union on the issue of the deployment of

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missiles in Europe and the Soviet Union has
abandoned its threatening attitude in which it
refused to conduct...further negotiation unless
we stopped the deployment. So, I believe that we
can achieve, and have achieved, unity in the
West.

A.P.S.: For how long and under what conditions
do you feel that the triangular relations between
the US, China and the Soviet Union will continue
to provide a stable balance in their relations? Do
the signs of likely improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations (e.g. Arkhipov's visit to China) pose a
threat to American interests? What implications
do you feel that the condominium among these
powers will have for Asia, and in particular for
South Asian nations?

H.A.K.: I believe that a condominium between
China and the Soviet Union is absolutely out of
the question. I believe that China will always
consider the Soviet Union as a potential strategic
threat. It will certainly never cooperate with the
Soviet Union to the point of undermining the
independence of third countries, because this will
only in the long run lead to its own downfall.

At the same time, I don't believe any of these
three countries will ever be in permanent alliance
with either of the others. That is the essence of
this triangular relationship. From the American
point of view that is not necessary. From the
American point of view, there are sufficient
reasons why China and the Soviet Union cannot
conduct a coordinated policy. As long as that is
the case, whether China is a little closer or little
further down from the Soviet Union, is not a
major American problem. If they want to improve
their trade relations, there is no problem to us.
Conversely, sometimes China will be closer to
us, sometimes it will be a little further from us.
But, China will never in my view — never in the
foreseeable future — not separate from us
enough to become totally dependent on Moscow.
That is a triangular relationship with occasional
shifting balances which is perfectly acceptable to
us. China is not an American card; we are not a
Chinese card; and that is as it should be.

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S.K.K.: Do you think the present state of relations is helpful or harmful to the smaller nations of South Asia?

H.A.K.: Between Russia and China?

S.K.K.: Between Russia and China.

H.A.K.: I think it is on the whole helpful, because for example in South East Asia, I believe it is the presence of China that is keeping Vietnam from being even more aggressive; and I think also in other areas the independence of several countries is certainly made more sure by their friendship with one or the other powers.

S.K.K.: You've been the exponent of a stable world order in a period which can be roughly characterized, by your own definition, a "revolutionary period" — such as in the recent times. At one time quoting Goethe, you said that "If I had to choose between justice and disorder, on the one hand, and injustice and order, on the other, I would always choose the latter." Since the demands of the developing countries, for a new international order basically also calls on the concept of justice, do you believe that the aspirations of the Third World countries are compatible with the stable international system which you seek to promote?

H.A.K.: Many quotations are ascribed to me which are not true. This is one of them. I have never said that...

S.K.K.: I got this from Dr. [John] Stoessinger's book]...

H.A.K.: I know. It still is not true. Certainly, I think any statesman must try to leave the world more orderly then he found it. At the same time if that is not related to some concept of justice then the order can only be imposed by force and then when it's in a sort of an imperialistic phase of foreign policy, one must have both justice and order. Then I believe that is possible.

Now, on the demands of the newly developing countries for a new order, this is sort of a general phrase which means different things to even different Non-aligned countries. It does not always mean the same thing to every Non-aligned country; and, so, there are some Non-aligned countries whose conception of order I

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agree with. There are others on the radical side whose conception of order I don't agree with. So, I would not make a general statement.

A.P.S.: American policy towards South Asia has been pretty much preoccupied with the situation in Afghanistan. Do you see the possibility that the conflict will soon be resolved peacefully with the withdrawal of Soviet troops?

H.A.K.: No. I do not believe the Soviets will withdraw their troops. They never have withdrawn their troops elsewhere, and if they withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, the Government there would collapse. The only condition under which they would withdraw their troops is if we guarantee the continuation of the Government that they installed. Then how can we do that? We would become an occupying power, or call it an imperial power.

If the Soviets are worried about military pressures from Afghanistan, we can meet that demand easily. We have no military purposes in Afghanistan, and we never have had. We have never had any military aid programme in Afghanistan, and we always kept our aid programme in the Southern part of Afghanistan. We never advanced towards the Soviet border — even our economic aid programme which was water irrigation mostly. So, if that's what they want, if they want a neutralized Afghanistan, we are prepared to meet any conditions. But if for them neutralization means a communist government, whose existence we guarantee when they themselves with 130,000 troops can't guarantee it, that's impossible.

S.K.K.: So, in other words, America has no option but to accept the status quo?

H.A.K.: America will not accept the status quo and therefore a civil war is likely to continue.

S.K.K.: During your time in office, both as the National Security Adviser to President Nixon and as Secretary of State, nothing substantive was achieved in US policy towards South Asia, with the exception of US-Pakistani relations. What pre-conditions do you feel are necessary for a better understanding between India and the US? Will the change in leadership in India play a

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significant role in the outcome of relations
between the two nations?

H.A.K.: First of all, you have to remember the
period in which we were in office. We had the
Vietnam War; we had the Middle East Crisis; we
had the Middle East War; we had Watergate; we
had East-West relations; we had the China
opening. There are only so many things you can
do — that's the first point.

The second point is [that] actually our
relations with India improved quite a bit between
1974 and 1977. We established a series of
commissions to discuss to work on technical
cooperation, economic cooperation and similar
matters. And if you read the speeches that were
made on my visit to India in 1974, they were
extremely positive on both sides.

Now, the relations between India and the
United States is an extremely complicated one.
We are both democracies and therefore one
might think it should be easy. On the other hand,
we really have very little to do with each other as a
practical matter. India is a great nation. It is
certainly entitled to a leading role in Asia. I
believe that Mrs. Gandhi, whom I respected as a
statesman, had certain prejudices against the
United States on a personal basis. I don't know
whether her son has the same feelings. There is
no reason why we should not have better
relations. We have no clashing interests. What
we want in South Asia is that the nations in South
Asia should live in freedom and independence to
achieve their economic development. I don't
understand why that should not be also India's
interest. And as to the tension between India and
her neighbours, we would of course prefer to see
a cooperative relationship — but we are not
actively involved in them.

S.K.K.: So you don't think that the United States
can do anything in this regard to help bring about
a more stable relations among nations in the
region?

H.A.K.: I think the United States can help
encourage their cooperation. The United States
can make clear that it favours their
independence, their Non-alignment, their

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economic development, and it can offer its good
offices where that is appropriate.

A.P.S.: South Asia, in recent days, has also been
testing the waters of regional cooperation
despite some political differences among the
participating nations. What prospects do you
foresee for South Asian regional Cooperation?
What can a preponderant power like the U.S. do
to enhance the arrangement?

H.A.K.: I think that South Asian Cooperation is
not something that the United States can bring
about. The ASEAN nations have shown a good
example of how nations can cooperate. In time,
the same thing can happen in South Asia. Of
course there are tensions between India and
Pakistan [in South Asia]...for which there is no
analogy in South East Asia. The U.S. can be
facilitating; it can be encouraging; but, the U.S.
cannot bring about the cooperation by itself.

S.K.K.: In your reading of historical and political
developments, you have often stressed the
statesmanship, or leadership quality, as
essential in moving the age. Today, with the
gradual collapse of the post-World War II
system, we still don't seem able to build a new
structure of relationship which would be more
responsive to our needs. Is this because no such
prominent figures have emerged to take control
of the helm? Or, is it because that no nation,
however powerful, has been in a position to
provide a panecea?

H.A.K.: That's a very good question. I think,
never before has foreign policy had to be
conducted under such complex circumstances.
It has never been global. It has never been
conducted among so many different nations. It
has never had various elements of power so
distorted, so that you can be economically strong
and militarily weak or militarily strong and
economically weak. All of these elements are
new. You cannot have a hegemonial power of one
nation that orders the affairs of the world. You
need the cooperation of at least the major nations
and the goodwill of the others. That is a difficult
process. And, also in many countries, I must say
the quality of leadership is not improving,
because they are constantly running for elections

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in the West and in the communist countries, especially the Soviet Union: they spend all their energies in leadership struggles rather than on far sighted policy.

Yet one also should list some positive achievements. There has been a period of over forty years of peace among the major countries — that is not frequent in history. There has been uneven, [but] nevertheless [a] global economy. As it [has] advanced considerably since the year 1945,...we can take that as the turning point. So, when all is said and done, we have not achieved the maximum that human aspirations would hope for, but we also haven't achieved nothing.

**S.K.K.:** And one last personal question. Despite successes during your term in office at both the White House and the State Department, what issues do you feel you would handle differently now than the way you did before? Do you feel you could contribute more if you were in the government today?

**H.A.K.:** Well, [pause] I of course, if I were in the government today, I would start with a large body of experience; while when I was in the government the last time, I did not have that experience. On the other hand, you also need a certain level of innocence to be effective. So I don't know whether I'll be more or less effective today.

At any rate it's not an acute question because I have made it clear that I don't want to be in the government at this moment and could not accept being [in] the government at this time.

As to what I would do differently, well, that would get us into a lot of questions. Probably, I would try to force a quicker conclusion of the Vietnam War. I think we should have done in '69 what we did in '72, [that is] to see whether we could force a settlement then. And, probably in the summer of '74, we should have made efforts after the Syrian agreement. It was the turn of Jordan and we should have done something for Jordan at that point. That's perhaps my biggest regret.

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PROFILES OF POWER:
REFLECTIONS ON
BRZEZINSKI AND
KISSINGER

Sridhar K. Khatri

The visit to Kathmandu by two prominent architects of recent American foreign policy within two weeks of each other, provided an unprecedented opportunity for the Nepalese intelligentsia to be acquainted with the varying dimensions of America's world view. Armed with penetrating intellectual qualities and versed in limitless aphorisms, both Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry A. Kissinger mesmerized their audiences not only by what they said but by how they said it. Although Brzezinski and Kissinger covered a broad spectrum of topics during their respective addresses to the Nepal Coucil of World Affairs, they managed to convey a general consensus on their perception of recent US foreign policy which has not surfaced in their writings.

There may be a couple of reasons for this anomaly. Firstly, both Brzezinski and Kissinger spoke more like policy makers than as inquisitive academicians. As a result, they ended by not only defending the policy of the Administration under which they worked, but also in shielding the present Reagan Administration as well. And, secondly, the congruence in their world views also became more apparent due to the general nature of the talk they both delivered regarding American foreign policy. As intellectuals influenced by the balance of the power school of thought, their analyses could not but appear to have this uncanny resemblance.

Aside from this cursory analysis, the fundamental differences between Brzezinski and Kissinger, however, go very deep. On two different occasions in their respective visits, they managed to give different impressions. During the working luncheon given by the Executive

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Director of CNAS, Khadga Bikram Shah, to Brzezinski, he was more forthright in projecting his views. Similarly, in an interview conducted by two members of the editorial board of *Strategic Studies Series*, Kissinger was also less reserved in his analysis of events. Although, on a comparative basis, one has to admit there was some confluence of ideas between them on these occasions, the divergence in their views however became more apparent from their approaches to the problems at hand.

Based on these impressions, this paper will attempt to make an assessment of Brzezinski's and Kissinger's recent world views. The first section will examine some of the ideas which have been the driving force of these men who have come to influence the foreign policy of the United States, and to some extent some events in the world at large; and, the second section will analyse the relevance and meaning of their views expounded in Kathmandu as it pertains to the world today.

II

A couple of methods can be used in analysing the roles of both Brzezinski and Kissinger. One way would be to succumb to the romanticist notion of modern media to highlight the crisis and project the dramatic characteristics of these two individuals in conduct of American diplomacy. Although much show would be obtained from this method, the study would badly suffer in the substance analysis that would be required from the policy view point. On the other hand, a more rational means would be to look at them as hostages of not only their own ideas but also of the environment in which they operated. This would give a true feel of reality, but would leave the dramatization process much to the imagination. Since media sensationalism is only a temporary phenomenon relevant to people who are associated with power, this section therefore proposes to look into the substantive aspects of both these individuals in the shaping of American foreign policy.

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Much like the axiom of a chain, the strength of which lies in the weakest link, the intellectual potency of Brzezinski and Kissinger served them both in a similar fashion. As intellectuals par excellence in a society innundated with collegues equally competent and hoping to enter the vortex of power, their strength brought them to that status much coveted by their peers. But, similarly, as people who already had a preconceived notion of the uses of power from their respective intellectual perspectives, their capacities in handling responsibility not commensurable with their conceptual framework also spelled out their limitations. But, however, the essence of both these Ivy League scholars was that as naturalized citizens of the United States, they stood out from the rest of their peers not only in their academic contributions, but also in trying to forge a more "realistic" policy (from their respective view points) for the US from what they had learned.

Besides their academic origins, both Brzezinski and Kissinger had one other thing in common: a similar conception of power. In their studies, they not only learend to appreciate the significance of power, but also successfully grasped the process for acquiring it for their own benefit. As such, for them both, power, in Herb Cohen's terminology, became not an end in itself but a "transport to a destination."¹

For instance, when Brzezinski wrote that "Knowledge becomes a tool of power and the effective mobilization of talent in an important way to aquire power..."², he was in fact describing his own prescription for forging ahead. The special tool he developed was related to his belief that the future of the developed world depended on the collaboration of three centres of power: the US, Western Europe and Japan. The establishment of a group under the rubric of the Trilateral Commission for mobilization of talented people

1. Herb Cohen. *You Can Negotiate Anything* (New York: Bantam Books. 1980). p. 52.

2. Zbigniew Brzezinski. *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (New York: The Viking Press. 1970). p. 12.

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was to serve this purpose. According to Brzezinski's own account in his Memoirs, Jimmy Carter was thus inducted from a list of "forward looking Democratic governor(s)" to spread the Trilateral Commission's concept of "closer and more cooperative relations between the United States on the one hand and Europe and Japan on the other".³ What followed was a quid pro quo relationship between Brzezinski and Carter. Brzezinski, during the Carter presidential campaign, took the responsibility of virtually tutoring him on the Trilateral conception in particular and international relations in general; and Carter in turn made him his National Security Adviser when he became President.

Because of Brzezinski's appreciation of power, during the first couple of weeks in the White House, he also began to consolidate it for future use during his tenure. Believing that "Coordination is predominance...," he quickly guaranteed his unhindered access to the President and also managed to gain control of the governmental bureaucracies and commissions dealing with sensitive issues — such as crisis management — by acquiring the chairmanship of the Special Coordination Committee of the National Security Council.⁴

Whereas Brzezinski's rise to the pinnacle of power was a calculated step, Kissinger's ascendency to the White House eight years earlier was, however, more fortuitous in character. This is not to say that Kissinger did not aspire to the position. But when the "coat-tail effect" which he was expecting through the support of his mentor, Gov. Nelson Rockefeller, for the Presidentship did not materialize, he inadvertently entered the White House at the invitation of Richard M. Nixon — a man whom he hardly admired.

Kissinger's perception of power differed from Brzezinski's only in the sense that he had

3. Zbigniew Brzezinski. *Power and Principles: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 5.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

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studied it in more detail in his writings than his colleague from Columbia University. Describing power as the "ultimate aphrodisiac", Kissinger consolidated his position within the White House by fully utilizing his substantive knowledge of diplomacy. The first object of his diplomacy revolved around the White House and the Government itself. By slowly manoeuvreing among Nixon's old loyalists, such as H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Kissinger managed to penetrate the inner circle of Nixonian confidants in order to get access to the President. Next, in order to gain predominance of the bureaucracies of Government, he also managed to chair numerous sub-committees of the National Security Council which helped him keep tabs on the Government Using this "power of proximity" to the President — as he once termed it — he was able to inundate the bureaucracies with memorandums on numerous subjects, and at the same time conduct secret diplomatic manoeuvres with foreign governments. For example, when he became

> Unlike Brzezinski, Kissinger operated under the shadow of history and thus tried to articulate American foreign policy based on his vision of a world order. Metternich and Bismarck were his inspirations; but the method and the style of his diplomacy were, to a large extent, defined according to his own conception of his encounter with history.

involved in the secret bombing of Cambodia and conducted overtures towards China, not even the Secretary of State, William Rogers, was informed. As a result, the substance of Kissinger's handling of affairs with other governments increased his value within the Nixon Administration and made him one of the most influential National Security Advisers and ultimately a prominent Secretary of State in recent American history.

Intellectually, however, Brzezinski and Kissinger were far apart. Although on an academic level both rated very high in their

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contributions, they differed dramatically on their
intellectual pursuits.

Compared to Kissinger, Brzezinski was
intellectually inconsistent. With time his studies
tended to vacillate from his area of expertise to
topics which became fashionable at a given time.
For instance, a critic once traced Brzezinski's
penchant for adopting or discarding ideas from
his list of writings. According to this writer, the
flow of Brzezinski's thought registered this
pattern:

the North-South impact of technology
(Between Two Ages, 1970) replaced the
East-West contemplation of Soviet power
(The Soviet Bloc, 1960); bridge building (An
Alternative to Partition, 1965) took the place
of convergence (Political Power: USA-USSR,
written with Samuel Huntington, 1964);
Japan (The Fragile Blossom, 1972) replaced
Africa (Africa and the Communist World,
edited in 1963).⁵

Even within his area of expertise, realities
have also yet to catch up with his propensity for
articulating ideas. For example, his prediction
regarding the "degeneration" of the Soviet Union
in terms of its institutions and leadership does not
appear to be a dominant problem despite the fact
that it was advocated fifteen years ago.⁶ Similarly,
his prediction that the nationality problems
would be acute in the future within the Soviet
Union? has not likewise brought about the
degeneration of Soviet power in the world, but on
the contrary the Soviets are seen flexing their
muscles in different corners of the globe.

In addition, Brzezinski's capacity for making
incisive analyses of issues has often lost much of
its weight due to his failures to follow up the
thematic points of interest in his subsequent
studies. It is therefore hardly surprising that the
remarkable depth and vision he so profoundly
displayed in the broad but coherent
interpretation of America's role in the new

5. Simon Serfaty. "Brzezinski: Play It Again, Zbig." Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall, 1978), pp. 6-7.

6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Concluding Reflections," in *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 161.

7. Ibid.

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"Technetronic Era" (his own term, meaning the present period where the impact of technology and electronics have revolutionized the world), was almost entirely forgotten during his White House years. Instead of even considering his own views on the issues from the vantage point of power in his Memoirs, his newly formed conviction for the need to form a balance between American "power" and its moral "principles" seems to have entirely swept Brzezinski to a new dimension of thinking.⁸

In this sense, perhaps one of the greatest gap
in his thinking is the discrepancy between his
knowledge as an intellectual and his capabilities
as a policy maker. Although Brzezinski was
indispensible to Carter in terms of foreign policy
conceptualization and organization, most of the
negotiations, with the Soviet bloc (his area of
expertise) was conducted by Secretary of State
Cyrus Vance. Brzezinski's notable achievement
in the establishment of diplomatic relations with
China resulted therefore, not so much from his
academic prowess, but from his ability to
negotiate confidently with the backing of the
American strength and a more propitious
international environment.

In comparison to Brzezinski, Kissinger's
intellectual background appears to be more
consistent. Although it may be fool-hardy to say
that his academic years may have served as a
period of apprenticeship for his future days in the
corridors of power, one cannot but assume that
the outlook which were formed during those
years were dominant factors in the evolution of
American foreign policy during the late '60s and
'70s.*

There are three major themes which stand

* One writer disagrees with this notion. He believes that Kissinger owes "little to his intellectual training or scholarly equipment, and, still less to his taste for philosophical speculation about world politics. Instead, they derive from his unflagging physical energy, his charm and humour, his instinct for the psychological weaknesses of his interlocutors, his quickness on his feet, his eye for political opportunity. For these are gifts that one associates neither with an academic or a 'loner', but with someone associated in

8. Brzezinski, *Power and Principles*, pp. xiv, 401, 547.

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out in Kissinger's writings from the time of his student days at Harvard. Firstly, there is this preoccupation with the concept of "equilibrium" in international relations. According to him this equilibrium can have a dual nature.

An international order, the basic arrangements of which are accepted by all the major Powers, may be called "legitimate"; a system which contains a Power or group of Powers which refuses to accept either the arrangements of the settlement or the domestic structure of the other states is "revolutionary." A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible; it limits their scope. Wars may arise, but they will be fought in the name of the existing system and the peace will be justified as a better expression of the agreed arrangements. In a revolutionary order, on the other hand, disputes do not concern adjustments within a given framework, but the framework itself.⁹

He argued that the role of diplomacy in both these contexts should not therefore be addressed to the concept of peace, but to the relationship of power itself.¹⁰ The theme of equilibrium, which formed the crux of his Ph. D. dissertation on *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace, 1812* 1822,¹¹ has also remained consistent in his analysis of American foreign policy, both as an academician and also from the vantage point of power.¹²

> the rough and tumble of business or law, the two professions whose dominance in American diplomacy had distorted its conduct, or so Kissinger asserted in every hook he wrote. "See, Alister Buchan, "The Irony of Henry Kissinger," *International Affairs*, vol. 50. p. 368.

9. Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," in Hamilton Fish Amstrong, ed., *Fifty Years of Foreign Affairs* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 262-263.

10. *Ibid.* p. 262.

11. Henry A. Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 19—), p. 319.

12. See: Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy"; Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects for American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), and Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little Brown and Co. 1979), pp. 65-70.

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Secondly, Kissinger is concerned with the nature of leadership, or statesmanship at a given age. Although his hero is Bismarck, he learned to appreciate the conservative leaders of early nineteenth century Europe who had assembled at the Congress of Vienna and whose achievements maintained relative peace for over a hundred years in the Continent. (As such, his reading of history has tended to focus less on events and more on the people who shaped those events.) In his dissertation, the Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich symbolized the essence of leadership for Kissinger. As if amplifying on the virtues of statesmanship, he analyses Metternich's contributions in the following words:

> ...Metternich was the last diplomat of the great traditions of the eighteenth century, a "scientist" of politics, coolly and unemotionally arranging his combinations in an age increasingly conducting policy by "causes". The maxims on which he so prided himself had therefore a psychological, but not a philosophical, significance: because he was convinced, indeed cocksure of his rectitude, he could soberly and cynically evaluate the maxims of others as forces to be exploited. Because he considered policy a science, he permitted no sentimental attachments to interfere with his measures. There was not found in Metternich's diplomacy the rigid dogmatism which characterized his choice of objectives nor the undisciplined sentimentality of Alexander's conduct. And because, despite his vanity, he was always ready to sacrifice the form of a settlement for the substance, his victories became, not wounds, but definitions of a continuing relationship.¹³

After leaving office, Kissinger extrapolated on the same theme on many occasions. The gist of his points read not only as the experience of his own apprenticeship at the White House and the State Department, but as a summary of his dissertation on *The World Restored*. In a conversation with Walter Laquer, he said:

13. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 319.

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Any statesman must strike a balance between capability and intention. He cannot rely entirely on the goodwill of another sovereign state, because that would be an abdication of foreign policy. He cannot base his policies on physical preeminence alone, because unless he is willing to establish a world empire, this will only tend to unite his enemies and force him to attempt a cynical and dangerous policy of divide and rule, or other such measures. The structural problem of foreign policy is therefore also the relative insecurity of all the parties. Along with this, some common sense of value must be found so that the participants will not constantly attempt to overthrow the international order.¹⁴

Similarly, in later years, Kissinger's penetrating assessment of his encounters with his interlocutors is also based in his judgement of these leadership qualities. Stanley Hoffman, in his reviews of two volumes of Kissinger's Memoirs, credits him for not only the depth of the "psychological" profiles that Kissinger was able to make on world leaders, but also on his ability to draw on these insights which might have been responsible for his success in negotiations as well.¹⁵

And lastly, one of the pervasive themes in Kissinger's studies has been his interest in the use of power. In his conceptual framework of international politics, power is often seen as forming a crucial link between the statesman and his search for the "equilibirum." Whereas a statesman is held responsible for forming a conception and having the will to impose his

14. "The Lessons of the Past: A Conversation with Walter Laquer." *The Washington Quarterly*, January 1978. reproduced in Henry A. Kissinger, *For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1981), pp. 115-116.

15. For instance see: Stanley Hoffman, "The World According to Henry Kissinger: I, 1969-1972," pp. 23-24, and "The World According to Henry Kissinger: II, 1973-1984," pp. 50-52 in *Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold-War* (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1983).

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vision,¹⁶ it is usually through the judicious use of power that Kissinger believes the attainment of these objectives to be possible.

In his writings, Kissinger carefully distinguishes the different nuances in the use of power. In Metternich, he admires the manoeuvreing capacity of the Austrian statesman in not only plotting for the destruction of the Napoleonic system, but also in his ability to leave a "legitimate" international system which would maintain the balance in Europe for a long time to come. Similarly, in Bismarck also he admires the Prussian statesman's diplomatic tactics in unifying Germany at the cost of, ironically, dismantling Metternich's European system. In his later studies on the American role in the world, although Kissinger managed to update his visions from the nineteenth century to the nuclear age, he continued to maintain von Clausewitz's approach to international relations. For instance, he chided the American tendency to explain and operate foreign policy on a messianic conception rather than on the basis of power¹⁷ and, in his own prescription for American foreign policy— both in diplomacy and war—, he continued to base them on a cold calculation of power.¹⁸ In retrospect today, both his Memoirs read not only like a justification of his role in office, but also as a test case of his earlier prescriptions in the use of power.

As policy makers, Brzezinski and Kissinger fared differently in their use of governmental authority. While it may be said that the environmental factors played an important role in

16. For instance see Kissinger's study on Bismarck: Henry A. Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," in Dankwart A. Rustow, ed., *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership* (New York: George Braziller, 1970), pp. 317-354.

17. Kissinger, "Reflections on American Diplomacy," pp. 260-261.

18. See, for example, his two books which focuses on the concept of diplomacy and war: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and *The Necessity For Choice*.

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determining the efficacy of these individuals in
office, their perception of their own role also
played a considerable part in their performance
as well.

For instance, Brzezinski seems to have
operated mostly under the shadow of Kissinger.
A year before joining Carter at the White House,
he attacked the Ford-Kissinger team by claiming
that they needed a "major architectural effort
rather than acrobatic[s]"¹⁹ in their foreign policy.
In his Memoirs also Brzezinski demonstrates,
consciously or otherwise, his preoccupation in
distinguishing himself from the Kissinger legacy.
In terms of policy conceptions, he attacks the
periodic swing towards fascination with
Realpolitik in American foreign policy-such as

The rapport between a leader and his lieutenants can
be seen on two levels: personal and from policy
angles. In Brzezinski's case, he had an amicable
relationship with Carter on the first instance; but
encountered severe difficulties in winning the
President over on policy matters on the second.

during the Kissinger era.²⁰ He is also critical of
Kissinger's "Lone Ranger" style of conducting
foreign policy and comes forth to remind his
readers that "Carter didn't want me to be
another Kissinger."²¹

Similarity, in the area of policy
implementation, Brzezinski does not seem able
to detract himself from Kissinger's shadow.
Thus, SALT II negotiation under Carter became
an effort in not only striking a better bargaining
position vis-à-vis the Soviets, but in also getting a
better position for the US than what Kissinger
had been able to achieve in 1972. The Nixon-
Kissinger "detente" also became a process of
redefinition of policy approach to mean a "code

19. Zbigniew Brzezinski. "Recognizing The Crisis."
*Foreign Policy*. No. 17 (Winter, 1974-75). p. 66.

20. Brzezinski, *Power and Principles*. p. 530.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

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word” for “reciprocal” and “comprehensive”
agreement which would not allow the Soviets to
“have a free ride in some parts of the world while
pursuing detente when it suited them;²² in
addition, Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” “fiasco”
became a point of departure for the Carter
Administration’s determination to improve
relations with the European allies.²³ He even goes
to the point of arguing that his National Security
Council was better staffed than Kissinger’s²⁴ and
like the rise of Alexander Haig from a Colonel to a
General in the Kissinger period, he considers it
necessary to point out that his own military aid,
Col. William Odon, also rose to the same rank
while on the NSC staff.²⁵

In Kissinger's case, the relationship he had with
President Nixon was just the opposite. Personally,
they were never able to develop a clear rapport with
one another; but on a policy level there was a strange
congruence of ideas which made its translation on
policy matters possible.

On a practical level however, the ability of
both Kissinger and Brzezinski to help shape a
system based on their conceptions were to a
large extent circumscribed by the environment in
which they operated. On the one hand, the
relationship between these individuals and their
presidents played a decisive role in the kind of
input they were able to make. On the other hand,

22. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 77.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

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their own ability to tackle issues within the given constraints also influenced their ability to function effectively.

The rapport between a leader and his lieutenants can be seen on two levels: personal and from policy angles. In Brzezinski's case, he had an amicable relationship with Carter on the first instance; but encountered severe difficulties in winning the President over on policy matters on the second. Brzezinski himself, attributes the problem to several factors. Firstly, Carter, like some of his predecessors Truman, Johnson and Ford, did not know much about foreign policy.²⁶ "...I noted on several occasions," writes Brzezinski, "that Carter seemed to resist my efforts to make him into a successful Truman rather than a Wilson."²⁷ Secondly, because Carter didn't have a clear conception of how he wanted his foreign policy implemented, he would often let the members of the Cabinet iron out issues in discussions, with himself ultimately acting as an arbitrator. A policy based on consensus not only failed to identify a clear direction for the Carter Administration, but also did not allow Brzezinski to have the maximum input he would have wanted during the Carter period. Brzezinski explains in his Memoirs that he felt as if Carter was playing one adviser (Secretary of State Vance) against the other (himself). In this regard, he says that:

> ...because Vance was not assertive or excessively innovative, Carter needed me; at the same time, as he once noted, he needed Vance to restrain his own activism as well as mine.²⁸

Thirdly, the centralized system of policy making which Carter initiated at the level of the President also circumscribed whatever impact Brzezinski might have been able to add in the Administration. Brzezinski's own account of Carter's involvement contains a paradox: he

26. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

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liked the centralization process in as much as it increased the control of the NSC over the other departments, but appeared to regret the fact that even though Carter involved himself on secondary issues, he was not able to act as a "disciplinarian" in controlling officials within the government.²⁹

Lastly, Carter's image and his outlook also played a decisive role in the performance of his Administration. In what is generally a very praiseworthy account of Carter's role in the White House, Brzezinski's one incisive comment on Carter illustrates not only the difficulties faced by the President himself, but also reflects Brzezinski's own dilemmas as well. Summing up Carter, he writes:

> He was trusted, but — very unfairly — that trust was in him as a person but not in him as a leader. He had ambitious goals for this nation, both at home and abroad, and yet he did not succeed in being seen as a visionary or in captivating the nation's imagination. His personal qualities — honesty, integrity, religious convictions, compassion — were not translated in the public mind into statesmanship with a historical sweep. This was not only very costly; it unduly elevated the importance of some disagreements among his key lieutenants.³⁰

In Kissinger's case, the relationship he had with President Nixon was just the opposite. Personally, they were never able to develop a clear rapport with one another; but on a policy level there was a strange congruence of ideas which made its translation on policy matters possible. Kissinger had not known Nixon personally before working under him in the White House, and prior to his election in 1968 Kissinger had characterized him as "dangerous" and "unfit" to be President.³¹ Even after working with

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 525-526.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 525.

31. Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, *The Final Days* (New Delhi: Coronet Books, 1976), p. 187; also William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (Suffolk: Fontana Paperbacks, 1979), p. 78.

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Nixon for over four years in the White House, "Kissinger's basic attitude towards the President was one of loathing and contempt."³²

On the other hand, Nixon never even made an effort to develop a personal rapport with Kissinger. But as Kissinger became an international phenomenon, Nixon began to be envious of his Adviser. His Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, recalls one such instance. Says he:

> I remember how jealous Nixon was when Henry won the Nobel Peace prize which Nixon believed, with some justification, should have gone to himself. And how he was close to white-lipped in anger when Henry squeezed him aside as Time magazine's Man of the Year. Nixon ended up as part of an unprecedented dual selection, both appropriately carved in stony images.³³

On a policy level, however, there was a strange chemistry in operation which made the relationship between Nixon and Kissinger quite compatible. In his Memoirs, Nixon gives his own explanation for this relationship.

> I had read [Kissinger's] book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* when it first appeared in 1957, and I knew that we were very much alike in our general outlook in that we shared a belief in the importance of isolating and influencing the factors affecting worldwide balances of power. We also agreed that whatever else a foreign policy might be, it must be strong to be credible and it must be credible to be successful.

He goes on later to admit that:

> The combination was unlikely — the grocer's son from Whittier and the refugee from Hitler's Germany, the politician and the academic. But our differences helped make the partnership work.³⁴

There were several unifying factors in both Kissinger's and Nixon's attitude towards the shaping of American foreign policy. Firstly, both

32. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

33. H.R. Haldeman, with Joseph DiMona, *The Ends of Power* (London: W.H. Allen and Co. Ltd., 1978).

34. Richard M. Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978).

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these individuals had recognized the need to redefine a new framework of America's world view in the context of the changing environment. Although Kissinger's article in *Foreign Affairs* on "Reflections on American Diplomacy" in 1956 and Nixon's article on "Asia After Vietnam"³⁵ in the same journal, in 1967, addressed different problems, both however showed a similar pattern in the analyses of issues. Their concern in refocussing American foreign policy by addressing the global problems of America's relations with the important power centres — i.e. Europe, Soviet Union, Japan, (and in Nixon's case China), and important Third World countries — figured prominently in both their analyses. Moreover, there also appeared a strong agreement in their approaches toward the reactivation of American policy in order to influence events rather than be influenced by it in the face of the constantly changing international environment.

Secondly, in the implementation process, both Kissinger and Nixon recognized the need to shift the policy making process away from the State Department. Nixon, as President, was committed to personalizing foreign policy and thus chose William Rogers as the Secretary of State because of the "President's confidence in [his] ignorance of foreign policy".³⁶ With time, Nixon slowly began to move serious negotiations to the White House. In his analysis of Nixon's attitudes towards Rogers and the State Department, Kissinger notes:

> Nor was the President above dissociating himself from State Department foreign policy ventures. Thus in March 1969 Nixon asked me to inform Ambassador Dobrynin privately that the Secretary of State in his first lengthy talk on Vietnam with the Soviet envoy had gone beyond the President's thinking....Nixon [also] kept his private exchange with North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh in July-August 1969 from Rogers until forty-eight hours before

35. Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam." *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46 (October 1967), pp. 111-125.

36. Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 26.

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he revealed it on television in November. In early 1970 Nixon sent word to the Jewish community through aide Leonard Garment and Attorney General John Mitchell that the "Rogers Plan" on the Middle East was aptly named and did not originate in the White House. In May 1971 the Secretary of State did not know of the negotiations in the White House-Kremlin channels that led to the breakthrough in the SALT talks until seventy-two hours before there was a formal announcement. In July 1971 Rogers was told of my secret trip to China only after I was on the way. In April 1972, the President gave Rogers such a convoluted explanation for my trip to Moscow — which had been arranged secretly and which Rogers opposed when he was told at the last minute — that it complicated the negotiations. Such examples could be endlessly multiplied.³⁷

Similarly, for Kissinger, Nixon's attitude towards the State Department not only reinforced his earlier negative readings of the Department itself⁴⁸ but also became convenient for maximizing his own role in the foreign policy making process.

Lastly, there was also a similarity of perception between Nixon and Kissinger in the use of American power to back up their vision of American policy. Although Kissinger has often been the target of criticism for preaching and practicing policies based on *Realpolitik*, Nixon's own conception of foreign policy was not much different. In two books (*The Real War* and *The Real Peace*) which were published after he had left office, Nixon's analyses of the American role appears to fall much within the Machiavellian character.³⁹ Moreover, during his Administration also, Nixon's policy often reflected a boldness which was complimentary to Kissinger's own conceptions. For instance, they thought alike in

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

38. See: Kissinger, *Necessity For Choice*. pp. 340-348; Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus* (Spring 1966), pp. 503-529.

39. See: Richard M. Nixon, *The Real War* (New York: Warner Books, 1980); and *The Real Peace: A Strategy for the West* (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1984).

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agreeing to use the bombing escalation to force the Vietnamese hand at the negotiating table in Paris. They also similarly concurred in the use of highly secret negotiation tactics to improve their relations with both the Soviet Union and China. At one point, Nixon, despite Kissinger's objections, successfully gambled in the mining of Haiphong harbour at the cost of risking the summit meeting in Moscow which was designed to conclude the SALT agreement.⁴⁰

On the whole, it the efficacy of Kissinger and Brzezinski are to be compared on a balance sheet in terms of the challenges they faced, the opportunities that was available to them and the responses they made, both would come out differently not only because of the limitations and capabilities inherent in their own personalities but also because of the leaders they

...reflections...by...[Brzezinski] on power and policies of the Carter Administration enduces one to realize that although Kissinger and Brzezinski did not differ significantly in their desire to use power, Brzezinski subsequently was not provided the opportunities to utilize it fully.

worked under respectively. Brzezinski, to a large extent, was the victim of his environment which he could not masterfully exploit in order to have a greater input in the Carter Administration. For instance, most of the challenges he faced concerned the same issues that had been handled by Kissinger during his term at the White House and later in the State Department. By this time, much of the fan-fare and glory of Soviet-American relations that had been epitomized through detente had already begun to fade; the normalization of relations with China had become less of a feat than the opening process which had glamourised US-China relations less than a decade ago; and, most of the problems that were still left unresolved in relations to Europe and the Third World still continued to

40. John G. Stoessinger, *The Anguish Of Power* (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1976), pp. 62-63.

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plague American foreign policy. Even in two areas where the Carter Administration's records were outstanding, e.g. the Middle East with the Camp David Settlement and the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty, it was Carter — and thus indirectly only Brzezinski — who was identified with the achievements.

In terms of opportunities, Brzezinski's abilities to act effectively were also severely circumsized by his own personal traits as well as by the circumstances he faced. For one thing, Brzezinski had a lower ambition drive compared to Kissinger. Carter records in his Memoirs that after Vance had resigned as the Secretary of State during the Iranian rescue fiasco, Brzezinski had declined to be considered for that post.⁴¹ For another thing, Brzezinski's wish to use American strength to back its policies was neither reciprocated completely by the President nor by the consensus geared decision-making process. Brzezinski's own version on the American agony in the gradual loss of its influence in Iran and his own approach in dealing with the crisis set him apart from other members of the Carter Administration. His desire to see the Americans stage a military coup d'état in Iran to bring about stability and thus prevent Khomeini from coming to power failed; and his proposal to divert Khomeini's plane in flight from France, so as to put him under arrest, distinguished Brzezinski from others who were reluctant in using force to deal with the situation.⁴² Brzezinski's own admission later, that his proposal would have resulted in "less spilling of blood than was subsequently inflicted in Iran" by Khomeini,⁴³ put him not far from a category to which Kissinger also belonged. The following reflections made by him on power and policies of the Carter Administration enduces one to realize that although Kissinger and Brzezinski did not differ significantly in their desire to use power, Brzezinski subsequently was not provided the

41. Jimmy Carter. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of A President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 520.

42. Brzezinski, Power and Principles, pp. 378 and 388.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 394.

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opportunities to utilize it fully. Says he:

> For me, the highest form of attainment is to combine thought with action, and I believed that power should be a means for attaining morally desirable ends. Accordingly, I felt that the United States should use its power to improve the human condition, but I put stronger emphasis perhaps than Carter on the notion that strengthening American power was the necessary point of departure. Indeed, later on, when a choice between the two had to be made, between projecting US power or enhancing human rights (as, for example, in Iran), I felt that power had to come first. Without credible American power, we would simply not be able either to protect our interests or to advance more human goals.⁴⁴

Similarly, in terms of his response to the challenges he faced during his four years with Carter, Brzezinski had less control of events than he would have preferred. As a result, he failed to distinguish himself from the Administration which confused policies with moral principles and thus equally became hostage to events due to their inability in articulating American power to achieve its objectives.

In contrast, Kissinger's record appears to be far more outstanding not only because of his own background, but also because of the fortuitous circumstances which he faced. His ability in mastering events — for his own benefit, as well as in implementing his policies — in essence set him apart from Brzezinski in the sense that he was able to rise above the policy-making quagmire from which the latter was never able to extricate himself.

Challenges for Kissinger, in a way, therefore, became stepping stones to success. Personally, as an outsider in the Nixon Administration, his ability to manoeuvre between Nixon's inner group to gain access to the sanctum of power guaranteed his input into the decision-making process. Later onwards, Kissinger's secret diplomacy on behalf of Nixon gained him a f: me

44. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

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which Nixon eventually coveted. Finally, while
the debacle of Watergate enveloped Nixon, it was
only Kissinger who emerged unscathed to carry
on the policies into the Ford Administration as
well. On a policy level also, Kissinger
encountered almost every issue with distinction.
The Paris Peace Negotiation on Vietnam won him
the Nobel Peace Prize; his secret visits to
Moscow and Peking prepared the way for
unprecedented summit meetings with
America's principal adversaries; and the tragedy
of the Fourth Arab-Israeli War in 1973 gained him
a reputation of a peace-maker in its aftermath. It
is not surprising therefore, that for almost a
decade at least, American foreign policy became
identified with Kissinger himself.

...[Brzezinski] failed to distinguish himself from the Administration which confused policies with moral principles and thus equally became hostage to events due to their inability in articulating American power to achieve its objectives.

Similarly, in terms of opportunities Kissinger
was able to exploit almost every situation to his
benefit; or, if not so, was at least able to
overshadow the dismal times by his performance
from his better days. A combination of factors
worked to his advantage. Firstly, he had the
backing of the President, which was a sine qua
non for any serious policy implementation.
Secondly, he had also the opportunity to deal
with events which promised high rewards for its
successful handling. And, lastly, he also proved
to have the skills which were an equal match to
the opportunities he faced. As a consequence,
Kissinger today is often associated with his
achievements than with the almost
comparatively dismal record he had during his
service in the Ford Administration; or even his
involvement in the surreptious wire-tapping of his
colleagues in the Government.

Finally, in terms of Kissinger's response to
the challenges and opportunities he faced, it must
be said that although he stood above many of the
mediocre policy makers of the post-Second

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World War era, he did not however meet the
same standards that he so much admired in
Metternich's achievements at the Congress of
Vienna. For instance, although Metternich was
able to build a stable international system which
was to last for almost a hundred years,
Kissinger's system proved to be fragile on the
whole. One explanation for this may be due to the
fact that Kissinger's system was not
comprehensive enough to maintain the balance
between the triangular forces (US-China-Soviet
Union) as he had expected; or, a second
explanation — which Kissinger himself has given
for this journal — could be due to the fact that
with foreign policy being conducted under
complex circumstances" and with "various
elements of power so distorted" that a durable
system may not altogether be possible for any
single man to achieve today.⁴⁵

Regardless of the differences in the
performance of both Brzezinski and Kissinger,
these men today continue to be looked upon as
intellectuals and seasoned statesmen of the
highest order. Although they no longer are in the
government, their views are still thought
provoking and carry some weight in influencing
the policies of many governments.

III

The tour d'horizon of recent international
events which Brzezinski and Kissinger covered
on different occasions during their visit to Nepal
carried an aura of both intellectual depth and
policy insights of mature statesmanship.
Although both were quite reserved on passing
judgements on the policies and goals of the
recent American Administration, their views on
international issues reflected on a general level
the outlook -- if not the policy thinking -- of the
American government itself. Since the format
and the type of questions handled were quite
different, this section will examine some of the
salient points covered by both.

45. See interview with Henry A. Kissinger in this issue of *Strategic Studies Series*.

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□ East-West Relations— Because of the preoccupation of Brzezinski and Kissinger with the power centres of the world, both gave a detailed reading of the nature of recent relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The common denominator in both their analyses boiled down to the fact that due to the tense political atmosphere in the relations between these two countries a sudden improvement in their attitude towards one another does not appear very conducive at the present moment.

Brzezinski's handling of the East West relations, contained a combination of the classical American crusade against communism and a cold pragmatic analysis of issues as well. As an expert on the Soviet bloc countries, Brzezinski, during the working luncheon, expressed dissatisfaction not only at the Soviet type of political system but also of the nature of the use of preponderant Soviet power in different parts of the world. Furthermore, because of the instability which the Soviets are trying to foment in the different areas, i.e. the Middle East and South Asia, he argued that the Third World countries should play an important role in arresting the growth of Soviet influence in different parts of the World. On the other hand, at the talk programme sponsored by the Nepal Council of World Affairs where he dealt with the central theme of East West relations, Brzezinski argued that a general improvement in America's relations would depend on Soviet behaviour in different corners of the globe. Because of the complexity of issues which have to be resolved and also the fact that the development in new technologies had complicated the arms-reduction talks between the US and the Soviet Union, he did not consider it likely that any substantive outcome would result from the current negotiations with the Soviet Union.

While discounting the "psychiatry or theology" approach towards foreign policy, Kissinger covered almost the same grounds as Brzezinski did but added a note of warning in his approach regarding the East-West issue. He said that the Soviet method in playing with negotiations and issues by interjecting technical

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points was very dangerous, because he did not believe that any unequal agreement could last. As such, he suggested in his talk at NCWA that the Soviet tendency to "trade specific concessions on the part of the US for relaxation of tension on their part, to give us psychological comfort for specific concessions" must be considered "dangerous." He recommended that since a conservative party was now in power in the US with a mandate to make agreements which would be supported by the Congress, he considered it necessary that Soviet-American relations be based on a "new reality." Not unlike Brzezinski, he added that the "destabilization of different parts of the world cannot go side by side with negotiations."

□ Triangular Relations— Compared to the hard line approach of Brzezinski and Kissinger towards the Soviet Union, their reading of US relations with China, on a bilateral and with the Soviet Union on a trilateral basis, contained a different tone. Their views in this regard strongly underlined their belief which seemed to indicate that at least for the next decade or so, the close relations between China and the United States were here to stay.

Brzezinski's impression on the issues was conveyed during the luncheon when he was asked about the implication of the growing rapprochement between China and the USSR on the global balance of power. In turn, Brzezinski questioned the use of the term "rapprochement" and said that it was not suitable in describing the present state of Sino-Soviet relations. "Rapprochement", "normalisation" and "reconciliation" have different meanings and implications; but, he said, he preferred to call the present Sino-Soviet relations a part of the "normalisation" process. He further explained that the Americans didn't look at it unfavourably as they were also involved in it. Besides, he pointed out that the type of agreement that China and the USSR concluded recently in the economic field — with the visit of Deputy Prime Minister Ivan V. Arkhipov — had already been surpassed ten times in Sino-American relations.

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Kissinger explained during the talk programme that Sino-American relations were based "on a realistic assessment of our mutual interests." He said that the relations between these two countries had gone through three different phases: the "Romantic phase of mutual discovery; the second phase of "discovery which led to disagreement on real issues"; and the "mature, healthy and positive basis" of relationship as it exists today. In the interview given to the *Series* he added that in terms of a triangular relationship, he did not think that any of these countries would "ever be in a permanent alliance with either of the others." He believed that China would not cooperate with the Soviet Union to undermine the independence of a third

In terms of Kissinger's response to the challenges and opportunities he faced, it must be said that although he stood above many of the mediocre policy makers of the post-Second World War era, he did not however meet the same standards that he so much admired in Metternich's achievements at the Congress of Vienna.

country and also that "China will never in my view — never in the foreseeable future — not separate from us enough to become totally dependent on Moscow."

Both, Brzezinski and Kissinger, argued that the current state of relations between these countries were beneficial to the smaller countries of South Asia. Kissinger went even further by citing the Vietnamese case in order to show that the presence of China has kept that country from being more aggressive.

☐ *Relations with Western Europe*—
Brzezinski's and Kissinger's views differed to some extent on their perception of the Western alliance. The former explained that the West European allies of the US sometimes incorrectly blamed the Americans for being insensitive towards the European Security. For the United States, Western Europe is not the only strategic concern because it has equal strategic commitments in other areas also. He reasoned,

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that NATO is only a regional security system and believed that NATO members would go to war against the Soviet Union should it break out in Europe; but he said if the war was to break out elsewhere, i.e. the Persian Gulf, NATO allies of the US would not be involved in those conflicts.

Kissinger when aksed in the interview about the "disarray of the Western alliance" as he had once called it a few years back--⁴⁶ he explained that since the West "had faced down the Soviet Union on the issue of the deployment of missiles in Europe" unity in the West had been achieved.

☐ *Afghanistan*— The most forthright answers given by both Brzezinski and Kissinger concerned the question of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, for instance, said that the present American posture towards the region was to a great extent influenced by the problems in Afghanistan. He explained that the Afghan problem was not a localized one because it has a wide geo-political significance in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. He further elaborated on the fact that the security and stability of the region was in the national interest of the United States and that an understanding of the problem in the region could only be achieved by the widening pattern of strategic accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The growing military threat posed by the Soviet Union, he argued, had necessitated a similar type of response from the US. The Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) — which he claimed he initiated personally — was designed to meet future threats of Soviet intervention in this part of the world. On a peaceful level, he felt that most of the Third World countries have a role to play in discouraging likely Soviet "adventurism" in different parts of the world, particularly in Afghanistan. India, according to him, can play a more constructive role than it has so far played in this case.

Touching on the question of whether he

46. Henry A. Kissinger, "Kissinger Attacks the Reagan Foreign Policy", *International Herald Tribune*. January 21, 1982, p. 4.

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thought that the Soviets would willingly pull out of Afghanistan, Brzezinski said that he didn't think so. He seemed to feel that the options left open to the Soviets at the moment were limited; and therefore the possibility that the whole territory might be absorbed within the Soviet Union also remained very strong.

In the interview, Kissinger also appeared to agree entirely with Brzezinski on the future of Afghanistan. In a reply to a similar question, he said:

> I do not believe the Soviets will withdraw their troops [from Afghanistan]. They never have withdrawn their troops elsewhere, and if they withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, the Government there would collapse. The only condition under which they would withdraw their troops is if we [the US] guarantee the continuation of the Government that they installed. Then how can we do that?...

As to the question of whether the US had no option but to accept the status quo, he replied that America could not accept such a situation and "therefore a civil war is likely to continue."

□ US-India— With the change of leadership in India, the future of the country was examined by both Brzezinski and Kissinger. Whereas, Brzezinski appeared to feel that the possibility of improvement in Indo-American relations seemed very strong on a long term basis, Kissinger remained almost non-committal.

During the luncheon, Brzezinski went about analyzing the issue from the point of the leadership change and argued that India had been given a second chance in the death of Mrs. Gandhi. According to him, Mrs. Gandhi's era had entered a very stagnant phase—a phase in which if any achievements were to be made by the Government it could only be demonstrated on the international front. (Since there was talk of possible confrontation between India and Pakistan before her assassination, it seemed he was alluding this aspect). He explained that it would therefore now be possible for the Indian government — with its landslide victory and with an open slate — to move vigorously on the domestic front. He further stated that Rajiv's

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nation building efforts coupled with concrete economic achievements could serve to mobilize the nation; and that, at the least, Rajiv had two years to make some concrete achievements in that area. He added that a domestically more secure India could also move more confidently on the international arena.

Given the present state of Indo-American relations, Brzezinski felt that a sudden turnabout in relations between India and the United States was not possible. Surprisingly, he didn't mention the Soviet factor in his explanation, but stressed more on the fact that the attitudes of the two governments towards one another would have to change first. This, according to him, could not be brought about suddenly, but would have to await changes in the cooperation in economic and technological fields. He felt that since the type of technology that is needed now in India cannot come from anywhere else but the West, India, under the new leadership, would probably move in that direction faster than expected.

Regarding the point that the kind of military cooperation primarily resulting from weapons supply could keep India bound to the Soviet Union, Brzezinski argued that for India to solve some of its own problems, it would first have to tackle these domestic challenges — which somehow would involve the US in some form or the other.

Kissinger's views regarding the future of Indo-American relations also appeared to be influenced by the leadership factor. In the interview, he inferred that if Rajiv Gandhi does not have "...prejudices against the United States on a personal basis..." as his mother had, then relations between the two countries could also improve considerably. He explained that there was no clash of interests between the two countries, but he emphasized the fact that given the current tension between India and her neighbours the US "would of course prefer to see a cooperative relationship..."

□ SARC— Their views on South Asian Regional Cooperation was only perfunctory at best. Looking at the issue from the angle of economic assistance, Brzezinski said that although most

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Third World countries were looking forward to the American assistance programmes, he said it could not be made readily available to all the countries because of certain preconditions formulated by the American government. These he said include the need of the particular country, the ability to utilize the assistance effectively; and also the political conditions that prevail within. He emphasized that, as of the present moment, the mood of the American public on the aid issue was not a favourable one and as a consequence, suggested that the best means of generating growth for the Third World countries, and for countries in South Asia, depended on their ability to do so through cooperation with one another. He indicated that the American government might look very favourably towards this endeavour.

...both [Brzezinski and Kissinger]...spoke more like diplomats than intellectuals during their visit to Nepal; and thus, it seems, they told their audience what they wanted to hear without compromising on what they wanted to say. As such, their arguments were more forceful in areas of vital interest to the security of the United States, but less so in areas which they considered only peripherally important; or where they might have drastically differed with the audience.

On the other hand, Kissinger did not feel that the United States could help "bring about" South Asian cooperation. He hinted that the US can be "facilitating" and "encouraging", but that the best course for the countries might yet be to emulate the ASEAN model.

□ North-South Dialogue— Both Brzezinski and Kissinger were reluctant in dealing with the North-South issues which have to some extent been the source of tension in international relations today. When asked — during the luncheon — how the issues could be tackled, Brzezinski, in a defensive manner, said that he was not an expert in the field and therefore could not really say anything substantive regarding the matter. He however felt that some of the basic problems which had been raised in the North-South debate could only be

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tackled properly if adequately handled at the regional level first. Since the Americans were not really interested in being the panacea to the problems that associated with the conditions of the developing countries themselves, he said that the countries must realize and resolve the problems through mutual cooperation.

Kissinger, in the interview, side-stepped the question altogether by declining to make a general statement on the matter. He, however, added that since the demands for the new order meant different things to different people, he agreed with some Non-aligned countries on the matter, and remained opposed to the radical conception of others.

IV

Given the background and the views extrapolated by Brzezinski and Kissinger, one cannot but come to the following conclusions. Firstly, both people spoke more like diplomats than intellectuals during their visit to Nepal; and thus, it seems, they told their audience what they wanted to hear without compromising on what they wanted to say. As such, their arguments were more forceful in areas of vital interest to the security of the United States, but less so in areas which they considered only peripherally important; or where they might have drastically differed with the audience. Their common views regarding China and the Soviet Union and their reluctance to delve deeper into the situation in South Asia, or on the North-South issue, appeared to be symptomatic of this approach.

Secondly, considering their past records, one cannot but assume that although their perspectives of power appear to be similar, their prescriptions on its use would differ radically in recent times. However, given the luxury of pontificating on international issues without responsibility, both displayed the depth of their vision on international politics which only surfaces with a combination of intellectual insight and a sharing of burden in the use of authority.

And, lastly -- although it may appear flippant to state this -- one must assume that whether Brzezinski and Kissinger turn out right or wrong in

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