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# CHAPTER V

## THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR CONTROL--THE MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF)

### A. History of the Multilateral Force

Few major departures of American policy have grown out of so much ambivalence as the NATO Multilateral Force (known by its initials as the MLF). Though its fate is still uncertain and it may well be stillborn, so much American prestige has been invested in this project for so long that whether it succeeds or fails, it will affect the shape of the Alliance. Regardless of its ultimate fate it is important to understand how it came about and what it sought to accomplish.

The MLF emerged in February 1963 as America's principal policy to restore the cohesion of NATO. Previously it had been treated at arms length by the Kennedy Administration. After De Gaulle's veto of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it was resurrected and pushed with increasing passion. The United States concentrated its energies on the problem of nuclear control partly because France's claim to political autonomy seemed to be based on an attempt to achieve nuclear independence, partly because it sought to dispose of the twin specters of a German national nuclear program and Franco-German collaboration in the nuclear field.

The original proposal for a NATO multilateral force grew out of a military "requirement" which had been generated in accordance with the NATO doctrine prevalent in the late Fifties. According to this concept, SACEUR was to have the capability necessary to destroy whatever weapons

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might be aimed at Europe. Thus when the Soviet Union began to deploy large numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles in Western Russia, two NATO requirements emerged: a modernization program to replace vulnerable tactical aircraft with missiles; an interdiction mission giving NATO the capability to destroy the Soviet MRBM's.

When the issue of counteracting the Soviet MRBM's came up originally, the first impulse of the Eisenhower Administration was to go along with a proposal of SACEUR (then General Norstad) which envisaged the installation of a mobile land-based version of the Polaris missile in Europe under the double-veto system. Upon further consideration this proposal was rejected. It was argued that a large number of missiles constantly moving on European roads might disquiet the populations and thus encourage neutralist tendencies. The double-veto system was believed to provide inadequate safeguards against the ultimate control of nuclear weapons by Germany. Accordingly, a State Department study group headed by Professor Bowie of Harvard University proposed that NATO's MRBM requirement be met by Polaris missiles installed on ships (in the early version, submarines). These ships were to be jointly owned, operated and financed by the participants and remain under SACEUR's control at all times. To prevent the withdrawal of national contingents each ship was to be manned by crews of mixed nationality. Each participant was to have a veto. The multilateral scheme was submitted to the NATO Council by Secretary of State Herter in December 1960 for study. A final decision was delayed until the new administration could assess the problem.

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There occured a hiatus of several months while the new Administration reconsidered NATO strategy. It concluded that greater reliance be placed on conventional weapons and that nuclear strategy should be centralized.

Any new nuclear force was therefore not very attractive partly because it diverted attention from the conventional build-up, partly because it raised new problems of coordination. Thus on May 17, 1961, in a speech at Ottawa, President Kennedy mentioned the MLF in only a highly elliptical manner. He urged the European allies to meet the conventional goals of NATO before "... we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved." In the course of the next

1
John F. Kennedy, "The Common Aims of Canada and the United States,"
Speech at Ottawa, May 17, 1961, DOSB, XLIV, 1145 (June 5, 1961), p. 841.

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year Administration spokesmen invited United States allies to analyze the
problem and to come up with a satisfactory control plan.

The two conditions put forward by the United States--a prior
non-nuclear build-up and European agreement about a control plan--suggested
that the MLF could not have a very high priority. Most of America's allies
doubted the need for a conventional build-up. None could afford both to
strengthen their ground forces and to contribute to a NATO nuclear force.
Moreover, none of our allies possessed a sea-borne nuclear system. Since
a command and control system for even a national nuclear force is far from
a simple matter, the probability that our allies would come up with a
meaningful control system for a *multilateral* sea-borne force was not great.
Indeed there were many in the Administration who held the view that the
problem would be found insoluble. It was expected that the allies would
then ask the President to act as Executive Agent for the Alliance on
nuclear matters. Central control over nuclear weapons would then be
achieved.

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When this did not happen, the United States in 1962 continued its
gingerly approach to the multilateral force. In September 1962, the President's
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, spoke
hedgingly of a multilateral *European* force.

It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which
we feel with respect to individual, ineffective, and unintegrated
forces would be extended automatically to a European force,
genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated
with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole
nuclear defense of the alliance. Any possible arrangements
for assistance and cooperation in such an enterprise would, of
course, require full consultation and approval by all appropriate
agencies of our government.²

2

McGeorge Bundy, "Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons
from the Past," speech on September 27, 1962, DOSB, October 22, 1962,
LXVII, 1217, pp. 604-5.

The speech said nothing about what the United States understood by "multilateral,"
"unified" or "integrated."

A month later Under Secretary of State Ball returned to the theme of
a NATO nuclear force. He insisted that it was militarily unnecessary and

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he continued to stress the priority placed by the Kennedy Administration on

the build-up of conventional forces. But he added:

...should other NATO nations so desire, we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation of a genuinely multilateral medium-range ballistic missile force fully coordinated with the other deterrent forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³

George W. Ball, "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," speech on November 16, 1962, DOSB, December 3, 1962, XLVII, 1223, p. 835.

In the following weeks an American briefing team toured Europe explaining the American concept of a multilateral force, including the provision for crews of mixed nationality. They did not elicit a significant European response.

In December, Secretary Rusk spoke vaguely of a force "not ...

so heavily dependent upon the United States alone." But he stressed that

it was up to the Europeans to formulate a concrete proposal:

We also have expressed our willingness, if our allies wish
to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would
not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone.

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One of the many confusions in the Nassau Agreement concerned the meaning of this clause: Did multilateral mean the assignment of national contingents to a NATO force, as Great Britain argued? Or did it involve a commitment to create a mixed-manned, sea-borne force as the United States urged? For a few weeks after the Nassau Agreement the term multilateral was in fact used interchangeably for either arrangement.

Whatever the answer, it is obvious that until De Gaulle's press conference on January 15, 1963, what came to be known as the MLF was far from a high priority goal of American foreign policy. In the face of indifference at the highest level, it had in fact been kept alive in the government only by a very small group of enthusiasts who, in the words of one acute observer, engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet

Beecher Stowe . . ."

6
Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary"? *The New Republic*, Vol. 151, (August 8, 1964) pp. 19-21.

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Whatever the hesitations of the Kennedy Administration, they
were resolved after De Gaulle's press conference. On January 21, 1963,
Secretary Rusk said in a television interview that the United States would
proceed with the NATO multilateral force even without France (though
he did not make clear whether he was using multilateral in the American
or the British sense). On February 9th, the Legal Counselor of the State

7 Dean Rusk, "Today," NBC Television, January 21, 1963, DOSB, XLVIII, 1233, (February 11, 1963), pp. 205-6.

Department, Abram Chayes, explicitly advanced the multilateral force as
an alternative route to the "grand design" which De Gaulle had sought to
block with his veto of Britain's entry into the Common Market.

8 Abram Chayes, "European Integration and American Foreign Policy,"
February 9, 1963, DOSB, XLVIII, 1236 (March 4, 1963), p. 321.

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By March 1963 the United States had dropped the conditions of
a non-nuclear build-up and of a prior European ageeement to a
control plan. Indeed, it was now argued that a final decision on
the control problem should await the actual creation of the multilateral
force. Ambassador Livingston Merchant was assigned to carry out the
negotiations to bring the multilateral force into being. On April 27,
Under-Secretary Ball laid down four criteria for the multilateral force:
(a) there must be many participants; (b) the force must not be based
predominantly in one country; (c) the components must be made unavailable
for withdrawal by mixed manning; (d) the decision-making must be collective.

He went on to describe the MLF in glowing terms:

> The kind of multilateral force I have described has much to commend it. Not only is it the best means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity to work toward greater unity in Europe and closer partnership between Europe and the United States.⁹

9 George W. Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance,"
speech April 27, 1963, DOSB, May 13, 1963, XLVIII, 1246, p. 739.

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During 1963, the multilateral force became the main focus of American
NATO policy. The original posture of responding to European wishes was
abandoned. American spokesmen ever more insistently urged the MLF as
a major contribution to restoring Allied cohesion--indeed as the principal
available step. Thus, on October 27, Secretary Rusk speaking in Frankfurt said:

> Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective.
> Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward
> the total needs of Western deterrence.

> It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United
> States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles
> and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could
> not be unilaterally withdrawn.

> And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the
> presently non-nuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership,
> manning, and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis
> as other members of that force.¹⁰

Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in Atlantic Partnership," speech
at Frankfurt on October 27, 1963, DOSB, November 11, 1963, XLIX, 1272, p. 730.

This was supplemented by a flood of emissaries--official, semi-official
and unofficial--pressing the MLF on our European allies with whatever
argument seemed best suited to the particular circumstances. Salesmanship

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on occasion superseded sober analysis. The MLF has been advocated with arguments so extravagant and sometimes so contradictory that American policy may suffer from the unfulfillable expectations of our allies for years to come.

In the face of this onslaught the initial reserve of at least some of our allies melted. After a brief period of hesitation, the government of the Federal Republic agreed to the scheme. While its original motive may well have been to prove that the Franco-German treaty of friendship was not inconsistent with continued loyalty to the American alliance, the Federal Republic soon became nearly as enthusiastic an advocate of the MLF as the United States--so much so that many senior United States officials have come to believe that Germany's stability depends on the future of the MLF. Greece, Turkey and Italy agreed in principle to participate. Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands joined the other countries in a study about the technical feasibility of mixed manning. France refused any degree of participation.

However, the large number of participants is deceptive. United

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States insistence has made it difficult for allied governments to face
the issue of the MLF on its merits. The Defense Ministries of our
allies (except Bonn)--which might be thought to have a vested interest
in the MLF--are opposed or lukewarm while the Foreign Offices, fearful of
the political consequences of a refusal, have been pressing it.

The scepticism or indifference of the military has been overcome by the
concern that to refuse an American overture which is being urged too
insistently might jeopardize the American commitment to the defense of
Europe.

Moreover, American negotiating tactics were deliberately designed
to avoid the political issues raised by the MLF. During 1964, American
diplomacy concentrated on gaining allied approval for the technical feasibility
of mixed manning and drafting a charter for the MLF to be implemented if the
governments concerned later agreed to join. The negotiations thus had
a curious aspect. Some governments participated in order to be informed
about a project about which they were at best lukewarm while the United
States and other advocates of the MLF believed that the technical discussions

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implied a tentative commitment to join. The confusions engendered by
this process were made obvious when Belgium after having taken part in all
the technical discussions announced in November 1964 that it would not
join the MLF after all.

Nevertheless the MLF--ridiculed by many when it first appeared,
doubtfully received even under American pressure, perhaps accepted,
except in Bonn, with the *arrière pensée* that it would never come to
pass--took an increasing substance. By the end of October 1964, the MLF
project had assumed the following form: It was to be composed of
twenty-five surface ships, each carrying eight Polaris missiles of the type
A-3. Each ship was to be manned by crews drawn from at least three
nationalities. No nation was to contribute more than forty per cent of
the total. Command of the ships was to be in proportion to the financial
contribution. (In practice this would mean that the Federal Republic
and the United States would each contribute forty per cent leaving
twenty per cent to be divided among the five or six other participants.)

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The control system had not yet been decided, but it seemed certain
that an executive body comprising the total membership was to make
decisions--at least initially on the basis of unanimity. The time-table
called for signing a treaty on the MLF by the end of 1964, with
ratification taking place sometime during 1965.

But the idea that so radical a departure as the MLF could be
implemented by indirection proved to be mistaken. The attempt to move
from the hypothetical to the actual forced the always latent opposition
of France into the open and impelled a new British government to make
explicit misgivings which had been previously obscured only by the
imminence of elections. The Secretary General of NATO, Brisco, announced
that in his view such a new departure as the MLF required unanimous consent
even of the countries not participating thus giving France an effective veto.
What had started as a means to restore allied cohesion thus triggered a
debate about the future of NATO with profound consequences for the
political stability of many allied governments. The MLF which was intended
to create an alternative to French conceptions of European organization

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became a source of further division of the Alliance. Whatever its ultimate fate, it is already clear that many of the extravagant hopes held for it are unfulfillable. How did this state of affairs come about?

As with many policies it took the partly accidental coincidence of several pressures and points of view (some of them conflicting) to produce the elevation of the MLF into the keystone of American NATO policy. The immediate impetus as we have seen, was supplied by the SACEUR requirement for medium-range missiles to counteract Soviet missiles aimed at Europe.

This proposal acquired political significance through the uneasiness in the Federal Republic about the emergence of at least the early versions of the doctrine of flexible response. The emphasis in U.S. doctrine on conventional forces and the attempt to control nuclear operations even after the onset of hostilities produced German pressures for reassurance about the American nuclear guarantee. Though formal German proposals generally concerned the disposition and use of tactical nuclear weapons on German soil, they were interpreted in Washington as the forerunner of more sweeping demands.

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Another motive behind the MLF was to prevent the arguments made on behalf of the British and French nuclear programs from infecting other allies. To the extent that national weapons programs were justified by the possibility that American assistance was less than certain, they supplied an incentive for other allies to develop a nuclear arsenal of their own. According to this line of reasoning the British nuclear program led to the French and that of France would inevitably produce similar aspirations in Germany.

11

Indeed President Kennedy saw prospects of nuclear proliferation to countries who must have been startled to find themselves listed as possible candidates for the nuclear club. Thus in his television interview of December 18, 1962, President Kennedy said: "The question is whether the United States should join in helping make France a nuclear power, then Italy, then West Germany, then Belgium. How does that produce security when you have 10,20,30 nuclear powers who may fire their weapons off under different conditions?"

Yet another motive behind the MLF was the reluctance of the NATO nuclear powers to share their planning and strategic decisions with

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their non-nuclear allies on a multi-national basis. Though it is not clear whether the MLF was the cause or the result of this state of affairs, the fact remains that the Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council which was created in April 1962 to provide a forum for the nuclear powers to discuss their strategic policy, remained stillborn.

Another pressure for the MLF came from American strategic doctrine.

The emphasis on central command and control over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance produced considerable hostility to the existing national nuclear programs in the Alliance. The prospect of any further proliferation could only compound the Pentagon's dismay. Though the United States Defense Department would have preferred that all nuclear weapons of the Alliance remain under American control, it accepted the MLF as the next best expedient so long as the American veto remained unimpaired. The Pentagon was attracted by the proposition of some of the advocates of the MLF that it might provide a "safety net" into which the nuclear allies might jump in order to dispose of their nuclear arsenal.

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An opposite view was taken by the European integrationists in the State Department and their counterparts overseas. Their objection to the nuclear programs of France and Britain was less that they divided the Alliance than that they divided Europe. Too weak to encourage self-reliance, too nationally oriented to provide a focal point for wider loyalties, these programs prevented both European integration and the "dumbbell concept" of Atlantic partnership. It would be different with a European nuclear force. According to the European integrationists, this had the advantage of promoting European unity and it would be strong enough to become a respectable partner for the United States. The MLF was accepted by Jean Monnet's influential Action Committee for a United Europe for precisely the opposite reason that the Pentagon resigned itself to it. The European integrationists (and their allies in the State Department) saw in the MLF the kernel of a separate European nuclear force. They supported the MLF because they wanted to provide another basis for a united Europe

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than French nuclear claims and at the same time build a bridge for

12

Britain to enter this united Europe.

12

For a splendid historical account of the MLF see Alastair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical Perspective," Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, November Thirteen, October 1964.

Thus many things were hoped for from the MLF. It was supposed
to revitalize NATO and strengthen allied cohesion while reducing the
role of France in Europe. It was to prevent nuclear proliferation and
yet satisfy supposed German desires for a share of nuclear control. It
simultaneously sought to meet the requirements of the Pentagon for
central control over nuclear weapons and the hopes of many Europeans for
an evolution into a European force. These aims were perhaps not
irreconcilable. But by avoiding an explicit consideration of them

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in favor of the technical problem of mixed manning, the final debate

when it occurred in the winter of 1964 was mortgaged by many previous
evasions and ambiguities, some of them deliberate.

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B. MLF Reconsidered

Three questions must be asked about the MLF: 1) How valid was the original analysis? 2) How good is the remedy? 3) Where do we go from here?

Turning first to the military use for the MLF, the argument is usually put in terms of the MRBM "requirement" developed by SACEUR in the late Fifties. However, this "requirement" contains within itself many of the unsolved problems of NATO doctrine. Whether the MLF contributes to the cohesion of NATO or becomes merely another forum for articulating disputes depends in part whether its military mission makes sense or at least commands a consensus. But there is reason to believe that the view of the military role of the MLF current in the Federal Republic and at NATO headquarters differs from the dominant view in the Pentagon and Great Britain.

SACEUR's requirement assumes that all the missiles necessary to conduct a counterforce operation against the Soviet MRBM's in Russia should be under his command. But should this really be a top priority

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mission for SACEUR? Indeed does it make any strategic sense when missiles
on both sides are numbered in the hundreds? Those who cite the SACEUR
"requirement" on behalf of the MLF encourage later pressures for increasing
the MLF to a size where it can conduct effective counterforce operations.
This would require many more missiles than the two hundred projected in
the initial MLF plans.

If, on the other hand, the task of neutralizing the Soviet MRBM's
is to be given to the MLF in conjunction with SAC, it becomes relevant
to inquire why it is necessary to create two nuclear forces in the Alliance
in both of which the United States predominates. Since SAC would be the
key element in such a coordinated strategy, the MLF emerges as a cumbersome
and costly device to accomplish what remains a necessity in any event: to
give our allies greater access to American strategic planning.

But if the MLF is to be given some other mission, new difficulties
arise. For one thing, there does not yet exist an agreed NATO doctrine for
the use of a strategic force for purposes other than those foreseen in

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SACEUR requirements. More importantly, if the doctrine of flexible response is to be maintained any such mission requires delicate control not only with respect to the decision to initiate hostilities but also during military operations. But it is not easy to see how such control is to be exercised on a multilateral basis or by whom. Taking the decision to use the MLF will prove cumbersome enough; controlling the MLF during military operations may prove even more complex. To avoid these questions before irrevocable decisions are taken is to invite endless controversy later on.

However, the military argument on behalf of the MLF has never been decisive. The key arguments have always been political: the need of equal status for Germany, the contribution of the MLF to European integration and the role of the MLF in furthering the cohesion of the Alliance.

There is no doubt that the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance depends importantly on the long-term orientation of the Federal Republic.

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Germany cannot be kept in a second-class status. The Federal Republic must be treated as an equal partner and must be able to participate fully in developing common policies. The issue raised by the MLF is whether access to nuclear weapons should have been made the key test of German equality. It will never be known whether a subconscious desire for the possession of nuclear weapons did exist in Germany or what form it could have taken if it had. Was there a nuclear issue in Germany or did the United States create it by the passionate advocacy of a remedy for it?

The trouble with self-fulfilling prophesies is that in retrospect it is impossible to demonstrate whether the prophecy predicted or caused what happened. The fact is that once the theory of German appetite for nuclear weapons had become established, every German proposal was interpreted to accord with it. Thus in 1960 Chancellor Adenauer stated that the possession by France and Britain of nuclear weapons should not give them a privileged position within NATO. The advocates of the MLF used this to demonstrate a veiled German desire for nuclear weapons. It is more likely that Chancellor Adenauer was concerned lest the Directory proposed by President de Gaulle exclude the Federal Republic. It was a demand for political equality not nuclear weapons.

A similar interpretation was put on the strategic views of former Defense Minister Strauss. He argued for more information about the nuclear stockpiles in Germany, for a guarantee that these would not be withdrawn without the consent of NATO and for a degree of unspecified joint

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control over weapons fired from German soil. But Strauss' concern was

13
See for example, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 21, 1962

primarily with control of tactical nuclear weapons already in the NATO stockpiles and of a range not suitable for a retaliatory strategy.

Whatever the *arrière-penseés* of Chancellor Adenauer and Minister Strauss, the question remains whether it would not have been wiser to take their statements at face value rather than psycho-analyzing them and then gearing our policy to their unstated desires. Moreover, it was a serious mistake to act as if German acquisition of nuclear weapons depended on its own unilateral decision. No country faced greater obstacles in developing a national nuclear program. The treaty establishing the West European Union prohibited the Federal Republic from producing or testing nuclear weapons on its soil. Throughout the next electoral period until 1969, at least, it would have been impossible to mobilize domestic support within Germany for such a program. Above all, any attempt to develop German national nuclear weapons would have awakened latent distrust of Germany all over Europe. It is doubtful that NATO could have survived, if the Soviet Union had used possession by Germany of national nuclear weapons as a pretext to unleash a series of crises. No European country would have run major risks so that Germany might have nuclear weapons under national control. Whatever Germany's real desires, a wise policy would have faced

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the fact that a measure of discrimination against the Federal Republic with
respect to ownership of nuclear weapons is inevitable. American policy
would have been better advised to seek to give Germany fuller access to
political decision-making in the Alliance than to stake everything on a
device which can, at best, be a detour to that goal.

Such a course would have also dealt with the real pressures behind
the spread of nuclear weapons within the Western Alliance. Was the French
nuclear program--begun by De Gaulle's predecessors--really inspired by the
example of Great Britain? It is likely that the experience of Suez with its
dramatic demonstration of how American and European policies and interests
might diverge was a more powerful catalyst than speeches in the House of
Commons. France's incentive to enter the nuclear field came less from
British theories than from American practice. The fact that we gave Britain
a special status in East-West negotiations did more to emphasize the utility
of Britain's nuclear arsenal than the claims of British Defense Ministers.
By the same token, whether the Federal Republic in fact felt a sense of
discrimination would depend above all on its political role. A scrupulous
concern for German interests--especially in the conduct of East-West
negotiations--and an intimate system of political consultation might well
have met the demands likely to be articulated by any foreseeable German
government in the Sixties.

As it is, a vicious circle has been created. The United States
put forward a proposal based on a theoretical model of unconceivable German
desires which the Germans felt obliged to accept because they did not want
to thwart American wishes. What was intended originally as a device to tie

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the Federal Republic to NATO and the United States to Europe has become
an end it itself.

Thus whatever happens to the MLF, the negotiations about it have
established a German claim to participation in the nuclear field. A share
in ownership having been conceded, concern inevitably will shift to the
complex issue of nuclear control.

It is a curious feature of the MLF that so little attention has been
given to the problem of political control. The United States has taken the
attitude that since the multilateral force does not yet exist the issue of
nuclear control need not be faced until later. Official spokesmen have
also implied that the United States would be willing later on to consider a
modification of the initial control arrangements, including perhaps giving
up the veto. Both of these arguments raise serious questions. Physical
operation of the MLF will offer next to no insight into the problem of
political control. Know-how in the operation of a missile-carrying ship is
not relevant to making a judgment about how a coalition of sovereign states
decides to enter a nuclear war. To transform this complex issue into a
technical one is an evasion which may cost us dearly as time goes on.

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The United States may be haunted for years to come by the inconsistencies with which it has advocated the MLF. To the Federal Republic, the MLF has been represented as a device to give non-nuclear countries an increased participation in nuclear matters. To Soviet and European critics, the MLF has been advocated as decreasing, if anything, the role of its members in the decision to go to nuclear war. Thus Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

> Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by multilateral agreement rather than by bilateral agreement as in the case of these earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus increase the number of states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger. 
> 
> /Emphasis added./ There would be no risk of compromise of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial procedures would assure that individual countries had no greater access to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present under the NATO Atomic Stockpile.¹⁴

14 Gerard C. Smith, "The Nuclear Defense of Europe," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, L, 1299 (May 18, 1964), p. 785

The dilemma of how to reconcile the requirement of central control over nuclear weapons with the sovereignty of the allies is real. But for

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the long-term vitality of the Alliance it would have been better to face
this issue honestly than by presenting different versions of the control
problems to different audiences. If there is a German demand for nuclear
weapons--as the advocates of the MLF have alleged--it is unlikely to be
satisfied by multiplying safety catches as Gerard Smith stated. The MLF
cannot at one and the same time satisfy demands for nuclear sharing and
assuage concerns about nuclear spread. The complexity of the issue of
nuclear control is shown by the three kinds of nuclear forces which will
exist in NATO after the MLF comes into being. They are: a) National
nuclear forces--like SAC, the French force de frappe and, depending on its
ultimate disposition, perhaps the British deterrent. These would remain
under exclusive national control. b) Nuclear forces "assigned" to NATO.
Depending on the meaning attached to the word "assignment," these forces
will be available to NATO for planning purposes. But they are also subject
--to a greater or lesser extent--to national decisions. and c) The MLF
whose employment requires unanimity at least in its early phases.

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An MLF in which each contributor has a veto will not change the situation with respect to nuclear control in NATO. No country which is presently unable to go to nuclear war will be able to do so as a result of the MLF. No country able to go to nuclear war can be prevented from doing so because of the existence of the MLF. No country can be made to enter nuclear war through membership in the MLF. In case of disagreement with our European allies, one of two things would happen. If we decided to go to nuclear war against the wishes of our allies, the MLF would be inactive; but we could use SAC and the Polaris submarines assigned to NATO. If the situation were reversed--that is, if our allies wished to use nuclear weapons and we disagreed--neither the NATO force nor SAC could operate. A force which multiplies safety catches and is too small for its mission is certain to produce two sets of pressures: a) to turn it into a militarily more significant instrument by increasing its size at least to the level of the Soviet MRBM's in Western Russia; and b) to dilute the unanimity principle to avoid paralysis in times of crises. These pressures are likely even where there was initial indifference or hostility to the MLF. Defense ministers

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will be forced to justify the continuing expenditures for the NATO nuclear forces. The logic of the MLF will drive them in the direction of making it a significant institution.

There have already been hints of things to come. The German Defense Minister von Hassel has stated that the veto of all the participants while acceptable initially will have to be reconsidered once the MLF has come into being. More recently he has pointed out that while a United States veto is acceptable, the European participants should vote on the basis of a qualified majority. 15 In the United States two sets of ideas have been advanced: An

15

Interview in *Christ und Welt*, October 23, 1963, p. 7

eventual surrender of the United States veto and a less radical solution according to which the United States veto is retained but that of the smaller contributors is eliminated.

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Can the United States consider giving up the veto, as American
spokesmen for the MLF have occasionally stated? It is not easy to see

16
Robert R. Bowie, Speech to the Western European Union Assembly,

December 3, 1963.

how so fateful a decision as the use of nuclear weapons can be abdicated to
a majority vote of even very close allies. The Constitutional provision
that a declaration of war requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate
may well prove insurmountable. The Congressional debate on such a proposition
could not avoid going into the circumstances in which a nuclear war might
break out. The acrimony generated by such a discussion may do more damage
than any benefit that it could possibly bring.

For precisely what commitment would giving up the veto imply? Does
it mean that when requested by a majority of our allies we would agree to
go to war with the small part of the total nuclear arsenal of the Alliance
represented by the MLF while SAC remains inactive? Or does it mean that we
would be prepared to go to war with our entire nuclear arsenal? The former

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interpretation would be utterly contrary to the strategic doctrine elaborated so persistently by Secretary McNamara and his associates. To go to nuclear war with only the MLF which is a small part of the total nuclear force of the Alliance and one not exceptionally well-suited to discriminating targeting would make no military sense. It would prevent a strategy of flexible response. And Soviet retaliation against a blow from a force in which we participate could hardly take into account our negative vote on the control body.

But if the second interpretation is correct--that we would be committed to go to war with our _entire_ strategic force--it is not clear why a special multilateral force must be set up. Then it would be wiser to create a political control body for the Alliance as a whole and agree to go to war on the basis of whatever majority vote seems indicated.

What about the schemes that eliminate not the American veto, but that of the minor participants (for example, those contributing less than ten per cent)? This, in effect, would transform the MLF into a German-American nuclear partnership. Even should Great Britain ultimately join the MLF, its

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share could not be very large. The Polaris program agreed to at Nassau
will absorb most of Britain's resources in the nuclear field. At the same
time, Britain will surely refuse to be considered a "minor" European power
on nuclear matters. Similar considerations may well apply to Italy and
perhaps even to the smaller participants. No country can have a high
incentive to share in the costs of a force when it can neither influence the
decision to use it nor prevent its use.

Difficult as it will be to decide on a control mechanism to enter
nuclear war, the political control over the actual military operations of
the MLF will be even more complex. For who is to make the decisions about
changing planned targets or on the scale of individual attacks? How is
the MLF to fit into wartime negotiations? How does one go about ending
hostilities? On the basis of one vote or unanimity? With whom would the
Soviet Union deal when nuclear operations are to be stopped?

The inevitable debate about the control of the MLF will be complicated
further by the difference in perspective among the participants. The Federal
Republic has joined the Multilateral Force in part in order to increase its

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share of nuclear control. Most other countries--and principally Great Britain--participate in order to prevent an increase of German control.

While this difference can be covered up in the early stages of the MLF, it will become more and more acute as the issue of nuclear control is confronted. The MLF may improve allied cohesion temporarily--though even this is doubtful. In the long run it is more likely to magnify discord.

What then of the other claims often made on behalf of the MLF by American spokesmen specifically that the MLF could promote European integration and in time develop into a European nuclear force. In 1962, McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, stated that American objections to national nuclear forces would not automatically extend to a genuinely multilateral European force. In 1963,

17
McGeorge Bundy, "Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons from the Past," speech on September 27, 1962, DOSB, LXVII, 1217 (October 22, 1962), pp. 604-5.

18
Secretary Rusk praised the MLF because it contributed to European cohesion.

18 Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in the Atlantic Partnership," DOSB, XLIX, 1272 (November 11, 1963), p. 730.

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Deputy Assistant Secretary J. Robert Schaetzel has argued that:

> The multilateral force would also inevitably make easier the eventual development of a European nuclear force, should this be the desire and within the grasp of the Europeans.¹⁹

19 J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-4), p. 567.

The then Vice President Johnson said much the same thing:

> The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this MLF possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable--as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.²⁰

20 Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Brussels on November 8, 1963, *DOSB*, XLIX, 1275 (December 2, 1963), pp. 853-4. See also Robert R. Bowie, *Speech before the Western European Union Assembly*, December 3, 1963, *op. cit.*, p.

Professor Robert R. Bowie who originated the concept of the MLF and who has been one of its most influential defenders has argued:

> Such a force might evolve in either of two ways: it might become an integrated Atlantic force with the United States still a member _but without a veto_. [Emphasis added.] Or

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it might develop into an integrated European force
without the United States as a member.²¹

21

Bowie, Proceedings of the WEU Assembly, op. cit., p.

The influential Action Committee for a United Europe headed by Jean Monnet has endorsed the MLF as the precursor of a European nuclear force.

But if such a prospect is envisaged new disputes are bound to arise. One of the motives of most potential participants is precisely to avoid a European nuclear force--this will be the *sine qua non* of any British participation. The Federal Republic and the Italian government (whose Parliamentary support for the MLF is dubious) have urged the insertion of a European clause in the MLF treaty providing for the possibility of transforming the MLF into a European force once European integration is further advanced. It is doubtful whether there will be majority support within the CDU for the MLF unless there is a European clause. Thus another possible source of discord is imminent in the MLF.

Two problems are raised by the prospect of transforming the MLF into a European force: 1) the relative role of Germany, 2) the relationship of the United States to the emergence of such a force.

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The problem of Germany is acute because in the original concept of the MLF, the Federal Republic was to be by far the largest European contributor, paying close to seventy percent of the European share.

Participants have been promised control of a number of ships and influence in the central body proportionate to their financial contribution. Thus if there is a European point of view within the MLF its spokesman is likely to be the Federal Republic. Indeed before there can be a European point of view, some European country will have to act as a catalyst. Under present circumstances, this role will have to be played by the Federal Republic. This is not because the Federal Republic is governed by "troublemakers." Rather the logic of the MLF will drive any government that takes it seriously in the direction of giving it some military significance and here its interest in more European (or German control) is bound to clash with ours in an undiluted United States veto.

Such a prospect is not in the interest of NATO, of European cohesion, of the Federal Republic, or of international stability. It would push the most exposed ally into the forefront of every dispute. It would again raise

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fears in Europe that a decade and a half of farsighted German policy have
begun to submerge. It might dangerously fuse anti-German, anti-American
and anti-nuclear feelings into a new wave of neutralism.

Some of the advocates of the MLF argue that the prospect of German
domination of the MLF will make Britain and France more eager to join it.
This may be the case. But it is also possible that Britain and France will
move closer to each other and away from a United States that threatens to
turn NATO into a special German-American arrangement. Even if the assumption
proves correct, however such a process of solving NATO's nuclear problem
would be extremely worrisome. It would be better for the long-term
stability and cohesiveness of Europe if the Federal Republic joined an
institution in which France and Britain are the senior partners, than for
Britain and France to be obliged to seek membership in a grouping to which
Germany is the largest European contributor and in which ultimately it may
play the same role as France does in the Common Market. History has been
altered by smaller nuances.

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The fear of German domination apart, the MLF is a poor chrysalis for a European force. A European force could grow out of the MLF in only one of two ways: a) by an American decision to withdraw from the MLF, or b) through a European request that we leave it. Either course will be divisive in the extreme. It is one thing for a European force to grow out of present national programs which have been in existence for many years. It is quite another for a European force to come about through a United States withdrawal, voluntary or forced, from a joint Atlantic enterprise. Such an act might raise serious doubts about the continued validity of America's commitment to the defense of Europe.

In short, the MLF is not a good way-station on the road to European political unity. It represents in fact an alternative approach--that of creating an Atlantic community. If the MLF emerges as the keystone of U.S. Atlantic policy, it is essential that this fact be understood. If we are to be prepared to face its implications, we will disappoint our supporters and give comfort to our opponents. Not to reveal what we intend is a question of tactics; not to know is an abdication of responsibility.

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In short to leave open the two most important and interrelated problems of the MLF--that of control and that of evolution of the force--is to mortgage the future. Failure to face these problems will magnify tensions later. The MLF cannot be both a step towards European unity and a device to vindicate the indivisibility of NATO strategy. Soon after it is established, a choice of priorities will have to be made. Nor can the MLF both satisfy the desires for increased European participation in the nuclear field and merely multiply safety catches. There, too, a choice is imperative.

The elevation of the MLF into the kingpin of American NATO policy thus bids fair to defeat the objectives which led to it. Originated as a means to fulfil a military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem which it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions which gave rise to the SACEUR requirement. Rather than create a structure to heal the rift in the Alliance, it has created yet another grouping which will multiply divisions.

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To be sure, France cannot be granted a veto over every step to advance the cohesion of NATO. But before we proceed on a collision course we should be sure that the new structure will in fact strengthen the cohesion of NATO. And here the reluctance of almost all European allies about joining the MLF is significant. Outside of the Federal Republic no government is wholeheartedly in favor of the scheme. Great Britain will join only under duress and with purposes about the veto and the future evolution of the MLF quite different from those of the Federal Republic.

The Italian government has agreed but it is highly doubtful that the Center-Left coalition could survive putting the project to a Parliamentary test.

All other potential contributors do so under various forms of American pressure. How viable in the long term is a structure developed in this manner? Can it survive the passage of De Gaulle? Is it wise to stake so much on negating the assumed policies of a single individual? Indeed, one of the most worrisome aspects of the MLF is the domestic debate it will trigger in almost every allied country. All over Europe--and especially in the Federal Republic--Gaullist and American factions will struggle over

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the symbol of the MLF. While this conflict has always been latent, it
would not have crystalized so rapidly or at all but for the pressure of
the MLF. Even if one makes the worst assumptions about De Gaulle's motives,
French policy could not have forced this choice had the United States not
insisted on a decision to recast NATO's nuclear structure.

Thus whatever the outcome of the immediate debate about the MLF, it
may turn out that its long term impact will be contrary to United States
intentions. The purpose of containing Germany's nuclear aspirations may
conclude by whetting them. The intention to increase Allied cohesion is
belied by the increasing discord in the alliance. Though Washington tends
to blame all opposition on the manipulations of shortsighted and men of base
motives, the open opposition of France, Belgium and the Secretary General of
NATO, the split within Germany and the lack of enthusiasm of the new British
government cannot be simply shrugged off. If the goal was European
integration, the line-up of potential participants makes clear that this
cannot be the result--indeed the MLF has found whatever support it has among
those who are indifferent or hostile to European integration.

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Moreover, in the MLF the United States has decided to contest DeGaulle on a ground where in the long term his position may be strengthened by American policy. For by proposing the MLF, the United States granted almost all of the Gaullist propositions. It agreed that possession of nuclear weapons was essential for participation in strategic planning and political decisions. It admitted that influence in the Alliance somehow depended on access to a strategic nuclear arsenal. It only differed about the way control and ownership would be exercised. But since these control procedures patently favor United States hegemony, they can be used by the more extreme Gaullists as a proof of American duplicity. If the Federal Republic finds itself at odds with the United States about our views with respect to control, even the minimum objective of isolating France may fail. We may yet see the Federal Republic participate in two MLF's: one sponsored by Washington, the other by Paris.

This is one possible answer to a rhetorical question often asked by the advocates of the MLF. They argue that it is easy to pick holes in any existing nuclear control plan but much harder to offer a constructive

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alternative. It is true that if the assumptions of the MLF advocates are granted, their conclusions are inevitable. But it was a mistaken assessment that the future orientation of the Federal Republic depended on access to nuclear weapons or that the cohesion of the Alliance could best be furthered by a new nuclear force. The basic problem was to further the political cohesion of the Alliance. Put another way, means had to be found to assure each ally that its interests would be taken seriously not only during the almost inconceivable contingency of general nuclear war but during the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and in crisis situations. Insofar as the German conversion to the MLF was not the result of American missionary zeal, it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be excluded from further East-West negotiations.

The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve this result. American policy would have been better advised to have attempted to aim for an Atlantic political structure directly. It would have been wiser to set up a body to address the many unsolved questions of common concern, such as East-West relations; strategic doctrine, trade policy. If France had refused to join

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such a body, its disruptive intent would have been obvious. It would have
stood aside from an effort all other allies wanted to join rather than one
like the MLF they enter only with great misgivings. Such a body could have
attempted to put the existing national nuclear forces into the service of
a common conception. Such a body would moreover have been much easier to
achieve. It would not have raised the issue of German nuclear participation
so directly--indeed it might have been an alternative to it. It would have
involved the allies in a common enterprise in which they were all interested
rather than one they joined to respond to American pressures and to contain
German aspirations.

22. If in the course of elaborating a common strategic

22
For an elaboration of such a policy-making body, see below
chapter .

doctrine something like the MLF had emerged, it would have reflected the
common view of all allies rather than the pressure of one.

The MLF as originally conceived is likely to flounder. Some form of
it may come into being but it will have a more modest scale and a different

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context than had been envisaged originally. It becomes pertinent to inquire
then how American prestige could become so heavily engaged and how instead
of isolating France the United States isolated both itself and, to a lesser
extent, the Federal Republic in this ill-starred project.

One difficulty was a mistaken assessment of the situation. The fact
that De Gaulle's policy represented a fundamental challenge to the American
conception was correctly perceived. But it was a mistake to assume that this
derived from France's nuclear pretensions or that the best means of combating
these was to create another nuclear structure within the Atlantic Alliance.
In many ways, American eagerness about the MLF built up a French alternative
to American nuclear predominance that sober analysts of real German interests
would never have sustained.

Another mistaken assessment was probably the degree of German interest
in access to nuclear weapons. This is not to say that once whetted it did
not become a real factor. But the obstacles to articulating German demands
for a national nuclear program or even for cooperating with the French effort

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were formidable. Whatever Germany's real desire, United States policy was unwise in eroding these obstacles. A related error was to underestimate the divisive effect on the Alliance of making what was advertised as a major departure in allied arrangements turn on access by the Federal Republic to strategic nuclear weapons. It would have been difficult to find an issue more likely to fuse so many diverse emotions in opposition to any other course. In retrospect it would seem to have been much wiser to emphasize the irrelevance of a French national nuclear program to the real concerns of the Alliance and to emphasize instead the need for a common political mechanism to elaborate joint policies and an agreed strategic doctrine.

These problems were compounded by the lack of clarity within the American government about its real purposes. The Pentagon accepted the MLF as the least of available evils but only on the assumption that ultimate American control would be unimpaired. The State Department group which put through the MLF proposal was much more sympathetic to the notions of a separate European force and urged the MLF as a means to this end. When the American government speaks with two (or more) voices, confusion in the Alliance

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is inevitable. While much of our internal debate depends on not sharpening
conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major international innovations
unless we are clear about our ultimate direction.

This is particularly true when one group in the government feels so
passionately about its solution that it becomes a passionate lobbyist rather
than an instrument for weighing policy alternatives. Throughout the existence
of the MLF project, Washington has been bedeviled by the problem that it has
not been able to determine whether what was represented as a European view
did not really reflect European acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of
a small group of one bureaucracy. In the process, the mistake of the
abortive European Defense Community was repealed. What had originally been
a means became an end--so much so that many urgent problems were shelved in
order not to jeopardize success of the MLF. What would have been meaningful
above all if it had reflected a European consensus became through our pressure
a test of American leadership.

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When reality clashes with our expectation of it, frustration is the inevitable consequence. Bitterness is understandable when cherished projects do not succeed. But the MLF experience will have had a good result if it leads to a re-examination of our governmental procedures. There is clearly a need for a focus for planning less geared to meeting dramatic gestures like De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market and more capable of developing concepts responsive to the actual forces in the world. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures which being geared to symptoms may obscure the causes. There is need for more clearly articulated purposes of a wider scope than such heavy reliance on what has been essentially a technical expedient.

In our relations, the MLF has had the virtue of bringing into the open many unstated assumptions and forcing a reconsideration of a whole range of political issues. A great deal depends therefore on how the United States deals with the MLF project from here on. Any reassessment must take into account that whatever its merit, the MLF has become--through our insistence--a test of Atlantic partnership. In many countries, notably the Federal

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Republic, leaders have staked their careers on our proposals. A new
policy cannot ignore this record. Though a different approach to the control
question would have been preferable, future policy must consider that a
collapse of the MLF project at this late stage would have a different
significance than if it had never been invented. Some form of MLF may now
be inevitable. However, it becomes necessary to find a context in which the
MLF becomes less the keystone of NATO policy but one device among many for
achieving the over-all aim of restoring the political vitality of the
Alliance.