a fitergy that was self-evident. This, of course, has not made it unattainable
be made explicit and that the major task was a kind of exegesis of
blication that you were proud to a truth so obvious that it need not
of current attitudes. What bothered me in your letter was the im-
and both eager to find an alternative to the bedantry and mediocrity
of serious people, both equally concerned with avoiding a censure
But I have always looked at these differences in the disagreement
You and I differ on several aecific contemporary problems.

be my allies.

"Results." It is disappointing to see the tone of these who should
fighting the excesses of many of those whom you would consider
to see whatever little influence I possess in the direction of
and need for dealing with concrete issues. I have always attempted
I admire strike a moral attitude and think that speaks them from
it comes from people from whom more is expected--that so many people
equivalent to awesing power. It is even more morbid--because
military strike a strategic base and pretend foreign policy to be
that by themselves they are not enough. It is bad enough that the
ones. This doesn't mean that good intentions are not important, but
has been caused by men with good intentions as by those with wicked
issues. History makes it sufficiently clear that as much asoc
recognition of the complexity of the issues and also of their tragic
resolution of the specific policy problems which confront us is a
department of both issues. I believe that more important than the
situation seems to me to be the increasing self-righteousness of the
One of the most disappointing aspects of the contemporarily

General attitude.

would like to deal not with the specific points you put with the
was not intended for me. However, I respect you so much that I
preparly not much burbose I served by replying to something which
of the letters you have sent to your committee of correspondents.
A friend of mine--not in Cambridge--let me see some

Dear Dave:

Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
Harvard University
Emerson 334
Mr. David Eisman

April 29, 1960

Mr. David Riesman

--2--

April 29, 1960

corollary the conviction that all those who hold different
views must be animated by base motives. It thus becomes
possible to compare the humane attitude of Kennan with the
obsession with power of the so-called realists and to give
throughout the impression of people just this side of being
psychopathic. The students who in all sincerity may be
deeply worried about currents affairs are described as fana-
tical anti-Communists. I am sure I do not need to multiply
examples for you to understand what I am talking about.

I have always admired Mr. Kennan tremendously.
There is no doubt that his attitudes reflect profound values.
But I would suggest that opposite conclusions do not necessar-
ily reflect an absence of values. The chief difference between
my views and yours is that I do not believe it to be a test of
liberalism whether one interprets Soviet motives most favorably.
I am more than willing, indeed eager, for negotiations. I would
like a settlement if it could be achieved. But I also believe
that if the Soviets are sincere they must be mutual accomodation.
I would like to hear just one thing that you think the Soviets
should do to relax tensions. Or are we congenitally doomed to
be wrong? If a real settlement is possible, we ought to be
able to describe its nature to ourselves. Let us then debate
that rather than the desirability of peace, which is not at issue.

Obviously, this is a long debate and I could not do
justice to it in a letter. This letter, moreover, is intended
for your own personal use and not for circulation. I would only
suggest, if this does not seem presumptuous, that your important
enterprise would be even more meaningful if conducted less as
a civil war and more on the basis of granting the good faith
of those who disagree.

With kind regards and all good wishes.

Henry V. Kiebler

Sincerely yours,

of those who disagree.

A civil war and more on the part of granting the good faith
enterprise would be even more meaningful if conducted less as
angest, if this does not seem breakfastable that your important
for your own personal use and not for circulation. I would only
justice to it in a letter. This letter, moreover, is intended
obviontely, this is a long debate and I could not do

that rather than the desirability of peace, which is not at issue,
able to describe its nature to ourselves. Let us then debate
be wrong? It is a real settlement is boatplate, we ought to be
should do to relax tensions. Or are we continually doomed to
I would like to hear just one thing that you think the Soviets
that it the Soviets are sincere (these) must be much accomodation.
like a settlement if it could be achieved. But I also believe
I am more than willing, indeed eager, for negotiations. I would
laboratiam whether one interprets Soviet motives meet favorably.
my views and hours is that I do not believe it to be a test of
only reflect an absence of values. The chief difference between
But I would angest that opposite conclusions do not necessar-
there is no doubt that his attitude reflect prototurn values.
I pass always admired Mr. Kiebler tremendously.

examples for you to understand what I am talking about.
tical anti-Communists. I am sure I do not need to multiply
deadly worried about current affairs are described as tama-
bacrobatic. The students who in all sincerity may be
throughout the impression of people just this side of pettig
oppression with power of the so-called resolute and to give
boatplate to compare the humane attitude of Kiebler with the
views must be animated by base motives. It thus becomes
corollary the conviction that all those who hold different

Mr. David Kiebler

--3--

April 29, 1960

June 3, 1960

Emerson 334
Professor David Kieaman

Dear Dave:

Kind regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

EMERSON HALL 324
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

June 6, 1960

Professor Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue

Dear Henry:

I don't think for a moment that you like arms! I think you like a
strong, purposeful America and be prepared to take risks which, it seems to
me, in the modern world cannot be afforded any more. We differ, I think,
as to the relative risks of dictatorship and the risk of arms.

But whenever I have spoken of your work, I have made the point that
you are a serious person who is willing to confront the possible choices
of our time -- something that cannot be said for many people who lead less
exposed lives political and polemically than either you or me!

Moreover, just as I sometimes appear to the Quakers as a bellicose
man, "realistic" to the point of offensiveness, so you encounter people who
are not aware that you deal with men who have no restraint, believing
neither in limited war nor in limited anything else.

DR:sv

EMERSON HALL
CAMBRIDGE 38. MASSACHUSETTS

July 25, 1961

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Ave.
Harvard University

Dear Henry:

The enclosed comments on Berlin are based on a memo that Erich Fromm and I wrote while we were in Washington. What we shall do with this I don't know as yet, particularly since any suggestion of negotiation might come better from intramural than extramural sources. Still, I thought the paper might be of interest to you, hastily written though it necessarily was.

I'm sorry we haven't had a chance to talk in the several days of overlapping in Cambridge, but I'm sure that the beginning of your International Seminar only crowded an already overburdened life for you.

Did you see the review of *The Necessity for Choice in The Listener* for June 22 -- when I am depressed, I often read *The Listener* for its mixture of typically British garden news, historical sketches, and other items seldom combined in our own weeklies.

As I'm off to Brattleboro I'll ask my secretary to sign and send this on
forme.

DR/mah

EMERSON HALL
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

August 18, 1961

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your cordial note. As I may not have told you, I'm going
to Japan in September and will be gone for two months, but I hope we can
have lunch before I take off. And I'm terribly eager to have your
criticisms of the Berlin memo I sent you, which I've since considerably
revised. I'm still trying to get it published, so far in vain.

With good wishes.

David Riesman

DR:agf

March 8, 1962

Professor Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Ave.
Harvard University

Dear Henry:

I don't know how you feel about the resumption of testing but I would guess
your feelings are probably ambivalent. In any event I thought you'd be
interested in the enclosed comments I wrote after listening to the President's
speech and which I'm considering for our little Newsletter. I'd appreciate
any criticisms you have time for.

I'm delighted by the prospect of your becoming Acting Master of Quincy House
(I know this isn't official but I've been talking about it with John Bullitt
and Paul Sigmund). I think it's wonderful of you to do this.

DR/mhh

March 29, 1962

Professor David Riesman
Emerson Hall
Harvard University

Dear Dave:

Thank you for your note of March 8th. I appreciated your memorandum about the resumption of testing. You are right that my feelings are ambivalent about the whole subject, though probably for slightly different reasons than yours.

I think our performance has been tricky and
too clever by half. I also think that if the various
groups had been more honest with each other a few years
ago, there might have been an atmospheric test ban.
By making impossible claims, each side has contributed
to an endless debate, and objectives were set that could
that be realized.

You may have heard that I have finally decided not to become Acting Master of Quincy House. I would have enjoyed doing it, but my life is simply too complicated. I appreciated your kind words about it.

Every good wish.

Henry V. Klaasinger

Sincerely yours,

Every Good wish.

complicated. I appreciated your kind words about it. would have enjoyed doing it, but my life is simply too ceded not to become Acting Master of Quincy House. I

You may have heard that I have finally de-

that be realized.
to an endless debate, and objectives were set that could
By making unassailable claims, each side has contributed
ago, there might have been an atmosphere to test pan.
Groups had been more honest with each other a few years
too clever by half. I also think that it the various
I think our performance has been tricky and
different reasons than yours.

about the whole subject, though probably for slightly
testing. You are right that my feelings are unimpassive
appreciated your memorandum about the resumption of
Thank you for your note of March 8th. I

Dear Dave:

Harvard University
Emerson Hall
Professor David Rieaman

March 29, 1963

February 11, 1963

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University

Dear Henry:

Thanks for sending me "Strains on the Alliance." There are many things in it which I can't commend highly enough, such as your discussion of the expert at the very end and the general picture you give of De Gaulle and of Adenauer seems right to me, especially your discussion of the relations among these two. (I am puzzled by the last sentence of the second paragraph on 282 simply because I am not sure what you are referring to there -- are the leaders here you speak of European or American?)

Having recently been reading English comments on the Common Market in *Encounter*, I'm struck with the feeling the English have of "who, little me" about their possibility of influence in Europe; the role you assign the British is one many leading British thinkers feel to be beyond them.

Talking at the Washington Sociology meetings last fall with several thoughtful Germans, they argued that it was asking too much to expect German leaders to accept a recognition of the Oder-Neisse line ahead of time, but they felt that if America presented Germany with a fait accompli in this respect, the leaders could feel free to criticize and could not be attacked by refugee elements or the potential demagogues you speak of in the article. They did not expect to exercise a veto on American policy but only the privilege of attacking it.

The worries you have about Germany after Adenauer I translated into some of my own worries about this country during and after Kennedy. As I argued in the paper I gave at the Washington meetings which was really as a discussant of a paper of Charles Osgood's, I worry about containing the USA as well as containing the Soviets, and I have worried very much in recent years about Communist China which could certainly argue vis-a-vis Moscow much the way you propose De Gaulle and others can argue vis-a-vis the USA...

But the main point of this letter is to raise another, though perhaps related issue. In talking with people about the possibilities of a test ban, something I regard as very important though very precarious and chancey, it would appear that the main obstacle at the present time is Governor Rockefeller. If he were to support a test ban, the fear that some of the Administration have *NEMO* that the Senate wouldn't ratify a treaty even if the Russians conceded more inspections would become greatly attenuated. Is it conceivable to you, knowing the Governor, that he could be persuaded that the national interest lay with a treaty rather than against one? Has he become, as I said seemed to be the case at the time of the Godkin Lectures, so completely bent on the Presidency that, provided you agreed on this matter, you could no longer influence him?

February 28, 1963

Dear Henry:

Thanks for your note of February 19 which you had anticipated in our really excellent and for me clarifying talk at Quincy House. I wonder whether what you are writing on the present anti-De Gaulle effort to distribute nuclear weapons de facto to the West Germans could appear in the Newsletter of the Council for Correspondence in addition to *Foreign Affairs* or wherever else you may be sending it? or at least some portions of it? I was greatly struck with the things you said and I think many other people who see our Newsletter which we are now printing and sending to a somewhat wider audience would also be interested.

I'd like to have lunch. The days immediately ahead are crowded but when things are a little less harrassed, let us please do it.

I appreciate ever so much what you did to introduce Kistiakowsky and Frank Long to Rockefeller, even though neither of us is especially sanguine.

With good wishes,

DR/mhh

April 4, 1963

Mr. Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Ave.
Harvard University

Dear Henry:

I've succumbed to the flu and am in bed, but this misery has at least given me the chance to finish and reflect on your searching and interesting article on "NATO's Nuclear Dilemma" in the March 28 Reporter. I'll be very interested to know whether you get any response from official quarters to the rethinking which you recommend at the end. Let me make just a few comments.

1. Years from now if the world goes on, I think that we will look back to the discussions concerning NATO and multilateralism and fingers on the trigger and so on as to a kind of scholasticism (a word you yourself use in another connection) in which we try to reconcile the "supernatural" nature of nuclear war with the natural rivalries of great powers, much as let us say, Thomas Aquinas tried to reconcile complex, subtle, yet crazy Catholic doctrine with a naturalistic approach to the world. As I pointed out in a discussion paper I gave at the Sociology meetings in Washington last September, published in the February Council for Correspondence Newsletter (and in much abbreviated form in The New Republic recently) your thinking and that of many others deals with all the complexities within NATO without ever asking whether the major premise, namely, the fear of Soviet attack is a realistic one. When I read your paper I felt as I often have, that the political possibilities of a test ban and a Berlin settlement and the other things you suggest dealing with at the end are more promising than the effort to reconcile the domestic politics and military aspirations, strategic doctrines and hyper-intellectual inventiveness on the NATO side that your article criticizes.

2. For part of the Second World War I was a contract termination officer at Sperry-Gyroscope Company engaged in negotiations with the Services about altered contracts and the materiel released thereby. I often found it impossible to get the Navy to agree to the orders of the Air Force representative who was nominally in charge of our plan. In one case, a Navy officer stationed at a particular plant (who was in fact a Nazi sympathizer married to a German baronness -- a sympathy he shared with Admiral Brinser of the Third Naval District) refused to allow the Air Force to take possession of released aluminum which was desperately needed but which he simply hoarded. He said frankly that he preferred to fight the Air Force to fighting the Germans. Given these divisions within supposedly national folds, what are people thinking about when they talk about a multi-national crew on a Polaris or a surface ship? If people have worked out the details of this, they have gone further than Herbert Kelman in his paper on internationalizing UN armies and I wonder whether this in some ways quite idealistic notion has been realistically thought about? Consider the studies of national character that would be necessary for the close quarters of a submarine or a small boat which would contain Americans, Englishmen, Germans, Italians, and perhaps a Dutchman or two. The implication of your essay, of course, is that all this is hog wash and nobody has really thought about it.

Mr. Henry Kissinger - page 2

3. Are you really correct where you say in the middle column on page 27 that economic welfare depends in part on national nuclear programs? Japan and Yugoslavia both have had fabulous growth rates without nuclear programs and in the case of Japan, without much armament either. If you are right it is a dangerous omen and you may well be right.

4. Nowhere in your essay do you take account of the effect on a test ban of continued French testing and of course you can't take account of everything. Yet this French testing remains an irritant and it makes it more difficult for possibly more difficult for the Soviet Union to restrain the Red Chinese. Of course I agree with you that this is no reason to facilitate a multi-national force that would in effect be West German, but it is perhaps a reason for the Americans to make clear to the Soviets that we dissociate ourselves from French activities in this field. We have in effect to do this at Geneva.

5. What does it mean in fact to talk about joint targeting? debating whether six instead of seven missiles plus an undetermined number of Minute Men should be targeted to Leningrad instead of to Kiev? or what? Again there is this air of unreality that hangs over the whole nuclear discussion. As I said to you when we talked at Quincy House, the effort by the bright people of the Kennedy Administration to make real the unreal has in effect made them stupider than the stupid people of the Eisenhower Administration -- a strange but perhaps not wholly novel paradox.

6. How do you actually see a multinational diplomacy being pursued given the small domestic room for maneuver that the Kennedy Administration has got? If the West Germans can upset any discussion of Berlin by leaking stories to Flora Lewis or Sidney Grueson, bringing into action the German counterpart to the "China lobby", how are these matters really to proceed? The real problem, it seems to me, is that the Soviet Union and the United States have certain interests in common which are stronger than the interests either of them have with their more irredentist allies, and yet this is politically difficult in obvious ways. To talk of European unity does not solve this problem as you make very clear.

7. Well I must stop although there are any number of thoughtful observations in your paper on which I would like to comment if I felt up to it. Many thanks for it.

DR/mhh

January 14, 1964

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Ave.
Harvard University

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Mr. Riesman is out of town for the week but I know
he will be pleased to see your letter of January 13
when he returns to Cambridge on Friday.

[lc]

5 January 66

Dear Henry:

I thought you might be interested in the
enclosed note written by my friend, Everett
Hughes, professor of sociology at Brandeis -
I am sure it is a theme you have often thought
about.

Yours,

The Army and the Government in undeclared War.

In a conventional old-fashioned, declared war there can or could be some
measure of honor between the opposing forces. There can also be some understanding
between civilian government and the professional army command. Both government
and military are, in declared war, committed to winning by all fair means, and
perhaps some foul. The army might be impatient with government, for failing
to deliver all the means they want for the military action. They might have
a somewhat dim view of civilians. But the relations can remain in good balance.
There is no reason for the military to want more power at home or even in con-
quered territory.

But in our present undeclared war, -- with no clear respected opponent,
with no territorial conquest, with limited objectives, with no clear mandate,
the military is bound to smart and chafe, to consider the civilian government
a fool; more than that, to consider that the civilian government makes the
military look like a fool by not allowing them a free hand to attack when and
where and by what means they would like.

This can only lead, and apparently has led to constant pressure from the
army to be allowed to go all out, to attack new objectives (nearer to the heart
of Hanoi, nearer to the Chinese border, etc.), to use all means. It can lead,
and apparently has led, to a feeling on the part of the military that they are
showing great restraint by obeying orders from the White House and the State
Department (in a real war the diplomats come home) about how to conduct the war
in the field and by putting up with criticism and resistance from the public
at home.

The article on page 3 of the _New York Times_ (December 21, 1966) shows this pressure. One article last week on the general escalation of the war showed the same pressure, together with evidence between the lines that the reporter had talked to army people who had expressed a sort of determination of the army to persuade the government to get tougher.

My feeling is that our Constitution is in great danger from this continued
lack of definition of the situation. The danger is made greater because clarifica-
tion of it by declaration of war would bring untold destruction. The military
is really chafing. There was an article in, I think, the _Boston Globe_ not long
ago, in which some one took the trouble to say that our army would never think
of taking over the government; such an article is an ominous sign.

The article this morning, "U. S. Military Sought Control Over Pacification" in Vietnam, brings out the state of affairs clearly: the State Department through the embassy, the C.I.A., and the Military are all in anamalous positions. The embassy has become an administrative agency, which means the ambassador is a colonial governor. The Central Intelligence Agency is doing whatever it is it does. The army is also engaged in some sort of administration in addition to its military action. There can apparently be no normal division of functions among them, i.e., no structure, no "constitution."

Everett C. Hughes

December 21, 1966

WILLIAM JAMES HALL 280
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

30 July 1968

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your article on Bismarck,
to which I look forward.

I send along a piece from the *American Scholar* which bears obliquely on the work of the International Seminar. Evey and I both thought the group this summer was the most sophisticated and least doctrinaire of any in our experience; this may have represented just good luck in the people we saw or the questions that were asked, but I did have the impression that you had managed to pick an extraordinary group. We are all the sorrier that we will miss the party the Ben Browns are giving, going off now to Vermont.

DR/mg