# Kissinger on Gorbachev: No Risks

On the eve of the Washington summit, Henry A. Kissinger, the former U.S. secretary of state, discussed the meeting's likely outcome and its international implications with the International Herald Tribune's political correspondent, Joseph Fitchett.

Q: What results do you expect from the summit?

A: INF [the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty] is done, although its exact terms have not yet been made public, and I expect that they will make very big progress toward 50 percent reductions in strategic weapons. This will include a framework agreement on the Strategic Defense Initiative, so that President Reagan doesn't have to give it up, but will in effect postpone it for a long time.

Q: Are you implying a risk that SDI could be snared by: Soviet disarmament diplomacy at the summit?

A: It's already snared in my view. They will agree to extend the ABM treaty, and Gorbachev will make a unilateral statement asserting the narrow interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. He will

also try to make the strategic cuts hostage to that doctrine on ABM, increasing the pressure in Congress in that direction. The effect of a 10-year moratorium on real testing is that you won't have anything to deploy after that time. So President Rea-

years. To his amazement, he found that he can get benefits while he is gaining time. I don't blame him for that. From a posture initially designed to gain time, he has now found a mechanism by which he can weaken the Atlantic alliance, or thinks he can, mainly by disarmament diplomacy. That certainly strengthens his position vis-a-vis the military and the secret police, whom he needs to support him against the managers and the Communist Party, which is more committed to central planning.

Q: Is there any step Mr. Gorbachev might take at the summit that proved politically disastrous for him?

A: There's no risk in any of this for him, it will help him at home. The only thing that could cause trouble for him domestically would be if he did something major in political relations, like cutting aid to Nicaragua, and I don't expect him to do that.

Q: Do you think that the treaty to be signed at the summit is a step toward U.S. disengagement from Europe?

A: President Reagan believes he is strengthening the position of free countries by signing this treaty and he would not

See KISSINGER, Page 4

## MONDAY Q&A

Can you abandon SDI or at least postpone it for a long time, without formally giving it up?

Q: You've said elsewhere that previous Soviet leaders rarely seemed to be allowed to negotiate alone with their U.S. counterparts. Now it seems to be the other way around, and Mr. Gorbachev apparently relishes springing initiatives. How does he operate as a negotiator?

A: He's much different from any Russian I've ever known. I haven't negotiated with him but clearly he's clever and he's tough and he's still pursuing the aim of getting a number of years to concentrate on domestic affairs. I do not believe he started out in order to weaken the Western alliance. I believe he started out to try to find out what price he had to pay to get five

## KISSINGER:

### No Risk for Soviets

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knowingly abandon Europe. But the treaty is a matter vital to European security negotiated without Europe's participation, a circumstance due in part to Europe's abandonment from its own defense. In the next phase, two steps are required: a trans-Atlantic agreement on the elements of defense and a trans-Atlantic agreement on the content of the next arms control stages. Europe should organize itself for that dialogue rapidly.

Q: Will the treaty amplify calls in the United States to bring home troops from Europe?

A: After this agreement in the nuclear field any reduction of conventional forces by the United States would be politically disastrous and must be resisted by any American who believes in the Atlantic alliance.

Q: What would be the optimal outcome of the Washington summit for the West?

A: A positive outcome would be if it emerged clearly that there are objective causes for tension with the Soviet Union, that there are political problems that require resolution and that the disarmament process cannot, by itself, go beyond a certain point.

So I would think, paradoxically, a relatively sober and not euphoric outcome of the summit: should evoke more hope than one that tends that a phase of history has ended.

Q: What outcome would worry you most?

A: A renewed commitment to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This, I believe, is impossible to fulfill and undesirable. It plays into the hands of those who want to stigmatize the weapons, on which the defense of the West must be based for the foreseeable future. Another unfortunate outcome would be any agreement that implied a doubt about nuclear capabilities in Western Europe, such as [occurred in the negotiations] at Reykjavik.

Q: Do you think that Mr. Gorbachev will press the spectacular disarmament proposals he made at the Reykjavik summit in 1986?

A: What he tried to get from us wholesale at Reykjavik, he's trying to get retail in Washington. And he's making progress.