II - Report
December 24, 1957

FOREWORD

The Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund is an
attempt to assess the problems and opportunities which are likely to
confront America over the next decade.

As the 20th century nears the end of its sixth decade, America
confronts a world in swift and often turbulent change. Both within our
borders and beyond, enormous transformations -- in human aspirations, in
the structure of society, in economic development, in scientific knowledge --
are reshaping the pattern of existence at a speed without parallel in
history. The recurrent shock of our age is the realization that concepts
and patterns of action of a more secure past no longer have this accustomed
relevance.

We live in a period which demands constant choice. But choice
without purpose leads to paralysis or to fitful and erratic behavior. And
power without a sense of direction may drain life of its meaning if it does
not destroy humanity altogether. Our problems, therefore, require for
their solution not only great effort and skill, but even more importantly
great conviction. And our opportunities will reflect above all in the
boldness and vision with which we face the future.

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December 24, 1957

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This report on national security deals primarily with the tangible aspects of power. It is the effort of only one of seven subpanels. The others deal with United States international objectives, foreign economic policy, domestic economic and social objectives, education and manpower, the democratic process and the moral framework of national purpose.

This alone indicates that security was only one of our concerns. While it is the most urgent, we do not consider it the most important. We are concerned with national security because we **must** be. We are concerned with more positive tasks because we **want** to be. Security defines our necessities. Our other panels will deal with our hopes.

Nevertheless we consider it appropriate to launch this project with a report on the national security. For while power cannot by itself supply an answer to the challenge of the future, it offers the prospect that there **will** be a future. A people preoccupied as ours is with the tasks of peace is always in danger of confusing its aspirations with reality, of refusing to believe that there may be states which prefer victory to peace.

Because we would prefer to dedicate ourselves to tasks of construction, we need constantly to be reminded that we are in great peril and that we cannot substitute our preferences for our duty.

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December 24, 1957

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We must strike a fine balance between vigilance and conciliation, prepared to use force to defend freedom but wary not to let force become an end in itself. Power can only give us security against immediate dangers. In the long run, our security resides in the principles for which we stand and in the confidence which we inspire.

Each of the members of this overall Panel has also served on one of the subpanels. We have been meeting since November 1956. Obviously we are most familiar with the subpanels on which we have served. But we have heard periodic reports from all other groups. In particular, we have considered the draft of this report at various stages of preparation and we have gone over the final draft in full committee. Not every member of our group necessarily endorses every detail in this report. But we have approved its philosophy and we strongly urge implementation of its recommendations.

This report concludes that we can afford what has to be done to assure our security; indeed that we cannot afford less. We feel that we can achieve military power while preserving and expanding other elements of our strength, such as health, education and economic growth. We recognize that this will require great exertion. To say that our institutional structure does not lend itself to such efforts merely reminds us that the

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December 24, 1957

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leadership of a democracy is a more exacting task than the direction of
a police state, but also that the power which is generated by the voluntary
effort of a free people cannot be equalled by the reluctant compliance of
a subject nation.

NAMES

II - Report
December 22, 1957

A WORD BY THE PANEL

This Report is the result of a group effort by Panel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although not every member subscribes to every detail, it reflects our substantial agreement.

Starting in the fall of 1956, we were charged with exploring the military aspect of the United States' security problem, the strategies most likely to achieve our security and the challenges in this field which may face the country during the next ten to fifteen years. We have had the benefit of specially prepared papers. We have heard testimony of numerous experts in relevant security areas. We have sought to make our report as specific as possible, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they become critical. On the other hand, too much of the raw material of our consideration will be shaped by events in science and human affairs which have yet to happen for us to have attempted to blueprint every detail of our military posture.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U. S. security policies and operations. The overall U. S. strategic concept lags behind developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense organization in major ways is unrelated to critically important military missions. Governmental systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management are painfully out of gear with the radically accelerating flow of military developments. The United States system of alliances must be adapted to rapidly changing strategic requirements. United States strength is inadequate with respect to important challenges with which we may be confronted.

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December 22, 1957

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We are convinced that sizeable corrective steps can be taken now.

We believe that the security of the United States supersedes any
budgetary considerations.

Our Panel therefore hopes that the most important result of recent
Soviet advances in the field of earth satellites may be that they will serve
as a catalyst for a genuinely deep review of the basic attitudes and policies
affecting the security of our country.

For the U. S. lag in missiles and space machines, however worrisome,
is a symptom and not a cause. It reflects a general complacency over the
past dozen years. It is now vitally important to the U. S. to calculate its
strategy and security requirements on an integrated and long-range basis,
and to set about correcting all significant deficiencies.

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December 22, 1957

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# I - FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

The world is living through a period of swift and far-reaching upheavals. Standards and institutions which have remained unchanged for centuries are breaking down. Millions who have hitherto accepted their place in life are clamoring for a new and meaningful existence. Western Europe, the fountain-head of our civilization, has lost its position of pre-eminence in world affairs. Across the great land-mass of Eurasia and on the continent of Africa new nations are rising in the place of colonial empires.

The world is yearning to realize its aspirations in peace. But it is faced by two somber threats: the Communist thrust to exploit all dissatisfactions and to exacerbate all tensions, and the new weapons technology capable of obliterating civilization.

The United States has thus been placed into a fateful position. Our whole tradition impels us to desire peace. Relatively invulnerable behind two great oceans, we have until the end of World War II asked little of the world save to be free to work out our destiny undisturbed. But we have been forced to realize that our security is inextricably bound up with the safety of the rest of the non-Communist world and that freedom everywhere depends on our strength and resolution. Force alone will not supply the answer to the hopes of humanity. Yet our power can help bring about a framework of security in which these aspirations may be realized in freedom and without fear.

Looking at the world from the perspective of our past isolation, perhaps the most difficult thing for us is to accept the reality of our peril. Other and

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December 22, 1957

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more exposed nations have had to learn to live over a period of centuries with the consciousness that their existence might be imperiled by foreign attack. It is a new experience for us.

A new technology of unprecedented power and destructiveness has placed _all_ nations of the world into dire peril. The largest "conventional" bomb of World War II -- the famous blockbuster -- had an explosive power of 20 tons of TNT. The first atomic bomb had an explosive equivalent of 20 thousand tons of TNT, a thousand fold increase. Today weapons with an explosive equivalent of 20 million tons (20 megatons) have been tested and there is no theoretical upper limit: it is possible to construct weapons of almost any desired explosive power.

As the weapons have become more powerful, their speed of delivery has grown ever faster. Soon missiles will be able to travel intercontinental distances and wipe out whole cities in one blow. An attack on 50 of our most important metropolitan areas would bring under five 55 per cent of our population and 75 per cent of our industry. Moreover if the fireball of a megaton weapon touches the ground, it sucks up particles of earth and buildings and deposits them downwind as radioactive material. The area of this "fall-out" will depend on meteorological conditions, but it may cover an area of 10 thousand square miles or the size of the State of New Jersey. An attack on 50 of our most important urban centers would, in the absence of effective defensive measures, produce at least 10-15 million dead and 15-20

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December 22, 1957

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million injured from blast and heat and perhaps another 30 million casualties
from "fall-out".

What gives this weapons technology its ominous quality is that it is
in the hands of a Communist movement which has proclaimed for over a
generation now -- the last time in the Moscow declaration of all Communist
states on November 16, 1957 -- the irreconcilability of its system with that
of the free world. Of course "peaceful co-existence" has reappeared periodic-
ally as a Soviet slogan. But, as used in Soviet propaganda, it has never had
more than tactical significance. After World War II, it did not stand in the
way of Soviet domination of the satellite orbit and the breaking of the most
solemn wartime pledges. It did not stop the Berlin airlift, the Greek civil war
and the Korean aggression. After the Geneva "summit" conference "peaceful
coexistence" did not restrain the Soviet Union from selling arms to Egypt,
thereby inviting a crisis in the Middle East that has not ended to this day.
In 1957 it did not keep the Soviet Union from threatening nuclear attacks on
Norway, Denmark and Turkey. Both their doctrine and their internal dynamism
will impel the Soviet Union and Communist China to try to fill every vacuum
and to encourage every dissatisfaction. Should the U.S.S.R. and Communist
China ever attain strategic superiority we can be certain that subsequent
events will be brutal and unforgiving. And the power of these states,
particularly of the U.S.S.R., has been growing threateningly both absolutely
and relative to the United States.

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December 22, 1957

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The prospects of peace, therefore, depend on the strength and firmness
of the United States and other free nations, on their joint ability to relate
power to purpose, on the willingness to act resolutely in the face of continuing
peril and ambiguous challenges.

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December 22, 1957

II - THE NATURE OF OUR STRATEGIC PROBLEM

Ever since our unilateral disarmament at the end of World War II pro-
duced not the peace we desired so earnestly but Soviet intransigence, the
United States has been forced to engage in a military effort unprecedented in
our history in peace-time. But the effort to harmonize our power and our
policy has been handicapped by many factors including the nature of our
historical experience. Tradition impels us to believe that peace is the
"normal" relation among states. As a result we have conceived it to be the
task of our military policy to assemble overwhelming power to "punish" the
disturber of the peace -- the aggressor. Aggression has appeared to us as
an unambiguous and clear act. Because we have been geographically remote
from the major centers of world affairs we have been able to rely on relatively
small forces-in-being and to mobilize our resources only after a war had
started. Because many other powers would be threatened before the danger
to our security became explicit, we have in the past been able to count on
allies to hold a forward line while we rallied both our physical and psycho-
logical resources.

Many of these ideas have been overthrown by technological develop-
ments since World War II and by the emergence of the United States in the
forefront of world affairs. Soviet policy has coupled an attempt to develop
overwhelming power with a strategy of deliberate ambiguity, so calculated
that the risks of resisting any given advance always seem out of proportion

II - Report
December 22, 1957

to the objective or else designed to appeal to what the Free World has come to
consider "legitimate." As a consequence, the recognition of aggression has
often proved as difficult as finding the means to resist it. A symptom of the
difficulty is that a United Nations committee charged with the task of defining
aggression was forced to give up.

At the same time that the forms of aggression have multiplied and
become more ambiguous, we have lost the safety indicators of a more secure
past. We can no longer think of our military effort as designed for a conflict
which we enter only after great deliberation and after other nations had run
the initial risks as was the case in World War I and II. Since many powers
no longer have the ability to resist alone, the international equilibrium will
depend on our ability, psychological and military, to engage our forces promptly
and decisively.

The importance of forces-in-being is magnified by the altered
significance of industrial potential. As long as there prevailed a certain
balance between the destructiveness of weapons and the complexity of their
means of manufacture, victory in war could be achieved only through a
quantity of equipment too large to stockpile before the outbreak of hostilities.
Then, an attack on production facilities was a highly effective strategy. But
with modern technology industrial potential must be used *before* a war breaks
out. Unless a massive and reliable defense is developed each major power
will be able to destroy in a matter of hours the production facilities of its

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December 22, 1957

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opponents with a few weapons relatively simple to manufacture. And long
before attrition can set in, the social structure is likely to have collapsed.

Thus our military problem, with which this particular Subpanel is
exclusively concerned, has three aspects:

(a) We require industrial, technological and scientific potential in
order to be prepared for the long haul. Without an adequate industrial plant
it is impossible to produce the spectrum of weapons to assure security.

Without a pool of scientific talent and a high level of scientific activity, we
shall not be able to maintain the strategic balance in a situation when the
real armaments race is in the laboratories. But scientific development by
itself is ineffective strategically if it cannot be translated into operational
weapons. Great importance therefore attaches to two kinds of lead-time:
the interval between the drawing board and operational weapon; and the
rapidity with which weapons can be manufactured. A lag in either category
is certain to create a strategic weakness. For this reason, great importance
attaches to our industrial base, to our policy with respect to science and
education and to policies to promote long-term growth and stability.

(b) At the same time long-range programs and balance cannot become
ends in themselves. However powerful we may be over the long pull, our
strategic effectiveness in any given crisis depends importantly on our active
forces supplemented by any quickly mobilizable reserve capabilities. Given
the power and destructiveness of modern weapons, we can not count on an
extended period of mobilization prior to the outbreak of any hostilities.

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December 22, 1957

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(c) But however vast our over-all strength, it may still be ineffective
in meeting certain challenges if it can not be applied with discrimination.

Until the development of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver
it, we could concentrate on our capability to deliver a crushing blow on the
Soviet homeland as the deterrent to all types of aggression. But with the
growth of the Soviet capability to retaliate on the United States we may be
reluctant to risk resisting Soviet moves at their periphery. There exists the
great danger that the Soviet Union will be able to use its nuclear striking force
as a shield behind which to expand by more limited means. Thus the test of
our military establishment is two-fold: one, the existence of retaliatory force
sufficiently powerful to discourage an all-out attack; and, two, the ability
to make our response fit all other challenges.

These three factors -- the importance of industrial potential, the
crucial role of forces-in-being, and the necessity of a versatile military
establishment -- impose on policy makers an unparalleled problem of choice.

It is further complicated by the explosive rapidity with which technology is
developing. Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons system
would be good for nearly a generation; the equipment of U. S. ground forces
really changed very little between 1919 and 1940. Today a weapons system
begins to be obsolescent when it has barely gone into production. The B-17
"Flying Fortress" remained in operational use for a decade; the B-36 inter-
continental bomber was obsolescent in less than seven years; and the B-52

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December 22, 1957

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jet bomber is beginning to be outdated even before all wings of our Strategic
Air Command are fully equipped with it.

Moreover, all weapons are becoming increasingly costly. A new
submarine costs ten times as much as its World War II counterpart. A B-52
wing is four times as expensive as the B-36 wings it replaces.

This technological race places an extraordinary premium on the ability
to assess developing trends correctly and to back decisions firmly over a
period of time. It also places the side which is on the defensive at special
disadvantage. The aggressor needs prepare only for the war he proposes to
fight. But the side which is on the defensive must gear its planning and
procurement for as long as the danger of aggression continues and in such
a manner that no important strategic weakness is created at any given point.

The basic problem of American strategy then is the ability to make
effective choices. This will depend on our national resolution, the courage
of our leadership and the effectiveness of the organization of our government.
The test of our military policy will be its relevance to the tasks to which we
may be challenged.

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December 22, 1957

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III - DEVELOPING POWER TRENDS

The outstanding characteristic of the strategic equation is a military
technology in a state of spectacular change. Starting with World War II
scientific research has produced military equipment and new patterns of
military operations at an ever accelerating pace. Four trends appear to be
of particular significance.

1. Weapon technology will become increasingly complex with a corresponding increase in the difficulty of choosing the most effective combination of weapons. The crude U.S. bomb of 1945 has been outmoded by a broad range of highly developed weapons. Energy releases have risen from the original 20,000 tons of TNT equivalent to many million tons. The Hiroshima bomb required a large aircraft and crew. Equally powerful warheads have been reduced in size and simplified to the point where they can be employed effectively in anti-aircraft rockets. And with the increasing capacity for the production of fissionable materials, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have become available in very large quantities.

The outlook is even more portentous than the achievements of the
recent past. Aircraft will be capable of cruising at several times the speed
of sound, of bombing from altitudes of a dozen miles and more, and of
carrying air-launched missiles so that they need not pass directly over
heavily defended target areas. New high energy fuels can give them greatly
increased range and performance.

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December 22, 1957

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Within a very short time, a major role in both offense and defense will be played by missiles. It will be possible to produce missiles of almost any desired range, from very short distances analogous to traditional artillery to intercontinental ranges of five thousand miles or more. Because these weapons require less extensive installations than airplanes, it will be possible to disperse them more easily and they will therefore be more invulnerable to surprise attack.

Earth satellites are a special adaptation of missiles which explore a new frontier. To develop them new technologies are required which will have important military applications.

Submarines, already an extremely powerful weapon will be even more important as nuclear propulsion comes of age. They pose a threat to our harbors and to our allies by interrupting sea communications. As a platform for missiles they can pose a constant threat of a sudden, devastating blow from unpredictable directions.

These are not dreams of the far distant future. Many of these weapons are in existence now; even the most remote among them is attainable within the next 10-15 years. By that time, many of them will be in the hands of several nations.

2. The rate of technological change will continue to accentuate the advantage of lead-time the offense enjoys relative to the defense. Both

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December 22, 1957

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offense and defense will improve -- and improve enormously. However, foreseeable new offensive weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles -- sudden in action, massively destructive, difficult to destroy either before launching or in flight -- will greatly aggravate the problems of strategic defense and enormously increase its costs.

3. The U.S.S.R. and Communist China will continue to gain in overall military strength. Although the rate of economic growth of these countries may slow down, the economic superiority of the West will become increasingly less significant militarily at present levels of effort. By sacrificing the civilian sector of its economy, the U.S.S.R. has already caught up with the United States in many major fields of military technology. In certain areas assigned high priority by the Kremlin the Soviets have surpassed us, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Unless we greatly increase our pace and level of effort, they will achieve superiority in many other fields as well.

4. The concept of "scarcity" in nuclear weapons will disappear from the calculations of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and to a lesser extent Britain.

The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain will continue to increase the number and variety of their atomic weapons. Other countries will in due course have their own atomic arms if on a more limited scale.

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December 22, 1957

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Soviet Capabilities

Ever since World War II, the United States has suffered from a tendency to underestimate the military technology of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet Union produced its first long-range bomber we comforted ourselves with the belief that it was just a copy of our B-29. When it developed jet fighters we dismissed it as the imitation of a British design. When our atomic monopoly was ended we took it as a reflection on our security methods against espionage rather than as an indication that our technological lead was inherently ephemeral.

In the meantime the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its achievements in the immediate post-war period were far from accidental. Today Soviet science is at least equal to our own in many strategically significant categories. In the military field, the technological capability of the U.S.S.R. is increasing at a pace obviously faster than that of the United States. If not reversed this trend alone will place the free world in dire jeopardy.

The result of the Soviet concentration on military technology is an impressive military establishment which already poses a mortal threat to the free world and which is growing larger. Its main features can be summarized as follows:

The Soviet ground forces, far superior numerically to our own, have been reorganized and re-equipped for atomic war. New rockets and missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads add to their atomic capability; new

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December 22, 1957

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tanks, artillery pieces, and light weapons give them a powerful conventional strength. Vehicles and communications equipment have been markedly improved. The Soviet Army not only is far superior numerically to available ground forces in Western or Southern Europe, but is progressively increasing its margin of superiority. In addition to these substantial forces-in-being, the U.S.S.R. possesses a vast and readily mobilizable reserve.

The Soviet Union now has the second largest navy in the world. While producing large numbers of light vessels, the Soviet Union has long concentrated on submarines. A fleet of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the German force which severely menaced Allied surface shipping during the early years of World War II. There is no doubt about the capacity of the U.S.S.R. to develop naval atomic power plants, or to adapt ships and submarines to launch short and medium-range missiles; in fact Soviet leaders have pointedly discussed the vulnerability of the United States to such attacks.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor aircraft, an increasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are a major element of the air defense of important areas, and this system is being progressively extended.

Over the last ten years the U.S.S.R. has not only maintained the largest air force in the world, but has progressively re-equipped it with new

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December 22, 1957

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and modern aircraft. The Soviet Union now produces many aircraft at least as advanced as our own -- and produces them in large numbers. Moreover, the Soviets have impressively demonstrated their ability to manufacture modern electronic equipment and to master the techniques required to guide and direct defensive and offensive aerial operations.

The Soviet weapons program has given high priority to the development of rockets and missiles. A medium range ballistic missile within range of Japan, Taiwan, and most of Western Europe from Communist bloc bases is already operational and missiles of intercontinental range will soon follow.

In all of its programs the Kremlin has apparently given high priority to the development of a long-range air-atomic capability. From what is known of the present Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons it is inferior to that of the United States, but it is already enormous and it is growing rapidly. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. possesses a long-range delivery system which, although second to ours, is considerable. Soviet nuclear attacks of great severity are possible now; within a few years the U.S.S.R. will be capable of delivering massive air and missile attacks against all major targets in the non-communist world. In short Soviet military strength is already enormous and is growing rapidly.