PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 10, 1964

Conversation with Klaus Ritter, Deputy Director of German Intelligence and General Speidel, former Commander of NATO ground forces now Special Advisor to Chancellor Erhard on military questions. May 25, 1964.

Speidel and Ritter see Erhard very often. They say he is well-meaning, but a rather ineffectual man. While Adenauer was always on top of his paper work Erhard seemed to be overwhelmed by it. The administration of the Chancellor's office was not being done efficiently. Moreover, Erhard seemed to have no particular conception of what he was about except for a general desire to be well-liked.

Ritter, who did most of the talking, said that the United States was making a mistake by overloading Erhard with too many decisions. He was a very emotional man. Right now he was flattered by all the attention. However, it could backfire very easily especially if things did not turn out as Erhard had been led to believe.

This was particularly true of the issue of German unification. Ritter thought that this was going to be an increasing problem. Indeed the young generation was more vocal about it than the older one, not so much on nationalist grounds but above all on the basis of considerations of justice. American leaders, especially Rostow, Ball and McGhee were pressing the Germans to be more flexible towards the East indicating that this would lead to reunification. Ritter disagreed. He thought it would lead to a solidification of the East German regime. He was afraid of what would happen if it turned

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out that a policy which had been advertised as leading to reunification
had no such result. Then some sudden upheavals in German domestic politics
were not excluded. This was all the more true because it was next to
impossible for Germany to keep to exactly the right measure of the
"flexibility" which was being urged on it. There were too many pressures
the Communists could put on Germany and too many suspicions of Germany's
past in the West.

I asked him about U.S.-German relations. He replied that they
were very odd. On the surface they were very good. Beneath there was
considerable uneasiness. Most leading Germans did not know what to make
of Johnson. They thought he was too primitive and they did not know how
to deal with him. There was also enormous uneasiness about our detente
policy with the Soviets. The periodic announcements with great fanfare
of new agreements seemed to most leading Germans as only the tip of an
iceberg. It was impossible to exaggerate the extent of German disquiet.
Ritter believed that one of the German motives in joining the MLF was to
gain greater influence on our disarmament policy.

Johnson's interview with Quick had made a very bad impression--even
more on officials than on the public. High officials knew the real cir-
cumstances. The editor of the journal brought the text of the interview
to the White House warning Reedy that its effect in Germany would be

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

extremely unfortunate. Reedy said he would take it up with the President.

A few hours later he called back saying that this text was exactly what the President had wanted to say. When the storm blew up, the White House said that it had been misquoted. This did not fool any knowledgeable German.

Ritter added that he thought there was more to the detente than
met the eye. He had been in Washington for a briefing by his opposite
number in the CIA. They had pressed on him a theory that basic changes
in the Soviet system were opening new opportunities for settlement. He
demurred, arguing that there was no proof of basic changes and also pointing
out that in case of a Communist split it was not self-evident that the West
should support the stronger Communist state. After this, he noticed a
definite coolness towards him. People were correct but the old cordiality
had disappeared. All this led him to believe that apart from actual
agreements which might be contemplated, the real problem was the deep
American psychological need for accommodation with the Soviets.

In fact, what worried him most about U.S.-German relations was the
change in attitude among his contemporaries in Germany. Until recently
they had never made a distinction in their own mind between German and
American interests. This distinction was becoming more and more noticeable.
He did not mean to suggest a Rapallo policy or a Gaullist approach. But
there was disenchantment and a reluctance to speak frankly. He would not
speculate where it might lead.

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Ritter commented unfavorably also on Ambassador McGhee's efforts to push a detente policy by planting articles in German newspapers. This seemed to him to go to the very edge of what an Ambassador could appropriately do. Finally, he said that the constant anti-French phillipics of the Embassy were having a counterproductive effect.

I asked Speidel about the MLF. He said that from a military point of view he was completely uninterested in it. What he wanted was Medium Range missiles based on land. He thought the only use of the MLF for Germany was to enable Germany to raise the issue of land-based missiles later on.

He had serious doubts about Washington's disarmament policy. He thought there were many people in Washington who really wanted to withdraw all tactical nuclear weapons from the Continent. He disagreed with Ritter about Johnson. He thought Johnson was better for Germany than Kennedy whom he described as "dangerous". He had no use for the defense intellectuals. He thought McNamara's intelligence estimates were close to dishonest. Ritter added that the German intelligence estimates of Soviet conventional strength were considerably higher than those of the Pentagon. Speidel said that as former commander of NATO land forces he could assure me that a conventional defense of Germany was out of the question.