-3-

Yet the imposition of the indefensible '67 frontiers is not the solution. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the rest of the world) that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western sense—as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation. In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule. The fundamental schism is between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle, and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for the ultimate showdown later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be replaced by radical successors. A peace agreement will not quell but may stimulate the intransigence of Hamas and other radical groups or states. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are more a matter of adjectives than substance.

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of marginal utility in overcoming this problem. Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against challenges that are likely to be ambiguous. The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against invasion from neighboring states. Aside from raising profound domestic questions in the United States, this would bring with it an American veto of Israeli retaliation against less than all-out attack and be almost impossible to apply against the resumption of guerrilla warfare.

Therefore, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize the impossibility of a final settlement under current conditions. Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable goals will foster a general climate of irre-

sponsibility. Yet a less ambitious mediation may have some prospects, if for no other reason than that the status quo is becoming increasingly intolerable for Palestinians as well. They have fought ferociously on behalf of the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestinian issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able for domes-

tic reasons to support an overall settlement on meaningful terms.

But before the United States launches itself into a major diplomatic effort, it must be clear about what is at stake. Will the mediation be interpreted in the region as being produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to shape an outcome based on familiar American principles? Will the perceived lesson be that September 11 in the end obliged America to adopt positions it had rejected previously? Or will terrorism be viewed as obstructing rather than inspiring a positive American role? If negotiations start, will the military prowess displayed by the Palestinians in the intifada provide an

excuse for Arafat to play the constructive role Anwar Sadat did after the temporary Arab successes of the 1973 war? Or will he view America in retreat and Israel on the verge of an abyss—toward which he will push it step by step with the help of outside mediation? The answers to these questions will determine the prospects for a peaceful evolution of the region, and also to a large extent the prospects for America's war against terrorism.

The Palestinians will not accept a ceasefire because they believe they have momentum; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence.

America can bridge this gap only by making clear to both sides that the only feasible goal is a limited settlement in which each will achieve less than its maximum aim but more than it can accomplish by a continuation of the conflict. It must urge Israel toward a peace program; it must impress upon its Arab interlocutors the limits of achievable concessions.

The strength of the Bush administration has been to cut through slogans to underlying realities. Under present circumstances, this means insisting that a ceasefire must accompany negotiations and that negotiations must aim for less than a final settlement. The goal of such an agreement would be secure borders for Palestinian state with contiguous territory. As part of the necessary withdrawals Israel should be prepared to abandon outlying settlements. Issues other than the border between the two states would be left for later negotiations. There should be an interval of suffi-

cient length for normal life to resume on both sides, encouraged by outside economic assistance. The United States should play a major role in facilitating such an outcome, provided the parties agree to the principles embodied in it. In its absence the United States has no option except to stand aside. If the United States appears to be gradually veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it risks continuation of the conflict.

To contribute to genuine progress, America must back a program that combines respect for Arab dignity with Israel's necessities for survival. There is no middle way.

CORS BETTANY

SEEKING PEACE: The Kissinger-Melnik Golda Meir in 1974

The 1967 'borders' were a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war... I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister who considered [them] defensible.

Please deliver to: Suzanne McFarlane

FROM L.A. TIMES SYNDICATE INTERNATIONAL.
Available by Special Arrangement Only.

For retransmission, please contact Gabe Gutierrez in Los
Angeles.

Phone: 213-237-7903 or e-mail: gabe.gutierrez@latsi.com

HENRY KISSINGER -- BONUS
EMBARGOED IN THE UNITED STATES

3/28/02

CAUTION: The following article is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column outside the United States. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstance be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.

FOR NOW, AMERICA SHOULD AVOID PRESSURE FOR A FINAL SETTLEMENT AND HELP BOTH SIDES AGREE ON ATTAINABLE GOALS

By Henry A. Kissinger

The reappearance of active American diplomacy in the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's foreign policy (and count among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread call for Washington to play a dominant role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity

Please Deliver to: Suzanne McFarlane

in Europe and the Arab world urging American intervention stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diplomacy has been the catalyst for practically all the progress the peace process made. But given the explosive politics of the region, it is all too easy to overestimate what is possible. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to settle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal plan by an Israeli government was put forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. In it, he offered more than 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasser Arafat preferred the intifada to the implications of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is -- the first by an Arab state not having a direct national conflict with Israel -- its specific terms represent a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The pre-1967 'border' in Palestine -- unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with Israel -- was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff who considered the '67 borders defensible, and especially if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along

the Jordan River. This is because the '67 borders leave a
corridor as narrow as eight miles between Haifa and Tel
Aviv and put the border of Israel at the edge of its
international airport. Moreover, Israel would have to give
up settlements containing approximately 200,000 inhabitants
(about 4 percent of its Jewish population).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomatic relations
with its neighbors. But in almost all other negotiations,
mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not
treated as a concession. In fact, nonrecognition implies
the legal nonexistence of the other state, which, in the
context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an option to
destroy it. Once granted, recognition can always be
withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized
diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization involve much
else: Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 23 years ago
has brought little in the way of enhanced economic or
cultural relations other than an exchange of ambassadors
who are rarely brought into play.

While the terms of the crown prince's proposal represent
no breakthrough, Saudi engagement could be important if it
is used to produce a ceasefire and to start negotiations
without preconditions from either side. But if its ultimate
purpose is to induce the United States to impose its
specific provisions, it would undermine the security of
Israel and ultimately the stability of the region.

The precariousness of Israel's position is paradoxical.
Israel has never been more powerful and at the same time
never more vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to
inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But
it has evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as
such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically
draining. The intifada has generated an ambivalent rigidity
in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the
Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab
world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land
would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo
would be revocable. But since the intifada, the vast
majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation;
they want victory and the crushing of their Arab
adversaries.

At the same time, there is growing despair over the
seeming futility of the enterprise. With the proportion of
Israeli casualties to that of the guerrillas going up, and
the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a certain point
will not be tolerated by the United States, a sense of
resignation is spreading. The desire to turn on the

tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger
for peace at any price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of
guerrilla warfare as it has played out for two generations
now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism
but practice an egregious form of it because a violent,
emotional, (and to bystanders) excessive retaliation serves
their purpose: to trigger intervention by the international
community, especially the United States. In the process,
sanctuaries are established -- however dubious their basis
in international law -- that, to all practical purposes,
eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to
the root of the guerrilla challenge. That process gradually
erodes Israel's margin of survival even while the world's
media and diplomats bewail its excesses. Torn between a
recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of
emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into
paralysis.

Yet the imposition of the indefensible '67 frontiers is
not the solution. For after the experiences of Oslo,
Israelis know (as should the rest of the world) that the
real division among Palestinians is not between those who
want peace in the Western sense -- as a point after which
the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of
reconciliation. In reality, the number of Palestinian
leaders holding this view is minuscule. The fundamental
schism is between those who want to bring about the
destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle,
and those who believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for the ultimate showdown
later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a 'final'
agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that
they will not be replaced by radical successors. A peace
agreement will not quell but may stimulate the
intransigence of Hamas and other radical groups or states.
If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a
permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations
because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would
not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus
the differences between a permanent and an interim
settlement are more a matter of adjectives than substance.

Therefore, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize the impossibility of a final settlement under current conditions. Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable goals will foster a general climate of irresponsibility. Yet a less ambitious mediation may have some prospects, if for no other reason than that the status quo is becoming increasingly intolerable for Palestinians as well. They have fought ferociously on behalf of the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able for domestic reasons to support an overall settlement on meaningful terms.

But before the United States launches itself into a major diplomatic effort, it must be clear about what is at stake. Will the mediation be interpreted in the region as being produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to shape an outcome based on familiar American principles? Will the perceived lesson be that Sept. 11 in the end obliged America to adopt positions it had rejected previously? Or will terrorism be viewed as obstructing rather than inspiring a positive American role? If negotiations start, will the military prowess displayed by the Palestinians in the intifada provide an excuse for Arafat to play the constructive role Anwar Sadat did after the temporary Arab successes of the 1973 war? Or will he view America in retreat and Israel on the verge of an abyss -- toward which he will push it step by step with the help of outside mediation? The answers to these questions will determine the prospects for a peaceful evolution of the region, and also to a large extent the prospects for America's war against terrorism.

The strength of the Bush administration has been to cut
through slogans to underlying realities. Under present
circumstances, this means insisting that a ceasefire must
accompany negotiations and that negotiations must aim for
less than a final settlement. The goal of such an agreement
would be secure borders for a Palestinian state with
contiguous territory. As part of the necessary withdrawals
Israel should be prepared to abandon outlying settlements.
Issues other than the border between the two states would
be left for later negotiations. There should be an interval
of sufficient length for normal life to resume on both
sides, encouraged by outside economic assistance. The
United States should play a major role in facilitating such
an outcome, provided the parties agree to the principles
embodied in it. In its absence the United States has no
option except to stand aside. If the United States appears
to be gradually veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it
risks continuation of the conflict.

(c) 2002, Newsweek, Inc. Distributed by Los Angeles
Times Syndicate International, a division of Tribune Media
Services.

For immediate release (Distributed 3/28/02)

END

The Future of Israel

For now, America should avoid pressure for a final settlement and
help both sides agree on attainable goals. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

# What We Can Do

THE REAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVE AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

given fresh impetus by the initiative of
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,
which proposes normalization of relations
between the Arab world and Israel if Israel
returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice
President Dick Cheney's journey to the
Middle East, intended to elicit Arab sup-
port for a possible showdown with Iraq,
was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an oc-
casion for a new initiative to end the Arab-
Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention
from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in
itself a considerable achievement for Saudi
diplomacy. At the same time, the near una-
nimity in Europe and the Arab world urg-
ing American intervention stems from the
hope that, in the end, we will impose on
Israel a settlement essentially identical to
the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diploma-
cy has been the catalyst for practically all
the progress the peace process made. But
given the explosive politics of the region, it
is all too easy to overestimate what is possi-
ble. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to set-
tle all issues in one negotiation of limited
duration at Camp David contributed to the
outbreak of the current warfare.

In present conditions, a comparison of
both sides' positions demonstrates that
another attempt at a negotiated final solu-
tion would not fare better. The only for-
mal plan by an Israeli government was put
forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at

Camp David. In it, he offered more than
90 percent of the disputed territories (the
formula was complex) but retained about
70 percent of the settlements. In ex-
change, the Palestinians were asked to re-
nounce any future claims, including the
right to return into Israel proper (though
they would be free to return to a Palestin-
ian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat
preferred the *intifada* to the implications
of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

Welcome as this engagement in the
peace process is—the first by an Arab
state not having a direct national conflict
with Israel—its specific terms represent a
restatement of a position that has pro-
duced the existing deadlock. The pre-
1967 “border” in Palestine—unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers

with Israel—was never an international
frontier but a ceasefire line established at
the end of the 1948 war. It was never rec-
ognized by any Arab state until after the
1967 war and has been grudgingly accept-
ed recently by states that do not yet recog-
nize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never

DIPLOMATIC PHOTO - GETTY IMAGES

In return, Israel would achieve diplo-

While the terms of the crown prince's proposal represent no breakthrough, Sau-di engagement could be important if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to start ne-

paradoxical. Israel has never been more powerful, and at the same time never more vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically draining. The intifada has generated an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played out for two generations now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional (and to bystanders), excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to trigger intervention by the international community, especially the United States. In the process, sanctuaries are established—however dubious their basis in international law—that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to the root of the guerrilla

A WAR'S TOLL: A
Jewish man cries
out during a mass
prayer for peace

matic relations with its neighbors. But in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, nonrecognition implies the legal nonexistence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tanta-

The Future of Israel

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of marginal utility in overcoming this problem. Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against challenges that are likely to be ambitious. The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against invasion from neighboring states. Aside from raising profound domestic questions in the United States, this would bring with it an American veto of Israeli retaliation against less than all-out attack and be almost impossible to apply against the resumption of guerrilla warfare.

sponsibility. Yet a less ambitious mediation may have some prospects, if for no other reason than that the status quo is becoming increasingly intolerable for Palestinians as well. They have fought ferociously on behalf of the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if they are not able for domes-

CORBETT THYMAN

> The 1967 'borders' were a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war... I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister who considered [them] defensible.

50 NEWSWEEK APRIL 1, 2002

The Future of Israel

For now, the U.S. should avoid pressure for a final settlement and help both sides agree on attainable goals. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

# What America Can Do

Many who generally criticize U.S. foreign policy (and count among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread call for Washington to play a dominant role. These pleas have been given fresh

impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity in Europe and the Arab world urging American intervention stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, U.S. diplomacy has been the catalyst for practically all the progress the peace process made. But given the explosive politics of the region, it is all too easy to overestimate what is possible. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to settle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal plan by an Israeli government was put forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak at Camp David. In it, he offered more than 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 per-

cent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the *intifada* to the implications of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. This would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely

Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is—the first by an Arab state not having a direct national conflict with Israel—its specific terms represent a statement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The pre-1967 “border” in Palestine was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never en-

countered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff who considered the '67 borders defensible, and especially if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan River. This is because the '67 borders leave a corridor as narrow as eight miles between Haifa and Tel Aviv. Moreover, Israel would have to give up settlements containing approximately 200,000 inhabitants (about 4 percent of its Jewish population).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomatic relations with its neighbors. But in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, nonrecognition implies the legal nonexistence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an option to destroy it. Once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn. Nor does formal normalization involve much else: Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 23 years ago has brought little in the way of enhanced economic or cultural relations.

While the terms of the crown prince's proposal represent no breakthrough, Saudi engagement could be important if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to start negotiations without preconditions from either side. But if its ultimate purpose is to induce the United States to impose its spe-

ROGER LERSTRAUM—GETTY IMAGES

DESPAIR: Many have lost hope for reconciliation

NEWSWEEK APRIL 1, 2002

IN THE KNESSET:
Willing to fight
and talk peace

2001-17-4P

**The Palestinian Authority has broken nine or 10 ceasefires. Why would you trust Arafat?**

I don't trust him, but we have to make an effort.

**Can a ceasefire work?**

Real pressure should be put on the Palestinian Authority by the Americans. [The PA] must understand that if it continues terrorism, it will have to pay ... Mr. Arafat is an obstacle to peace ... but we are in a complicated situation. On the one hand, the United States wants to build a coalition. On the other hand, we have to fight terror. Since Jan. 1, 2002, 123 Israelis have been killed and there were 1,633 acts of terror.

**Will you allow Arafat to go to the [Arab summit] meeting in Beirut?**

I don't know if he's going to Beirut. We have not yet decided whether to let him go. In talking to the Americans, I suggested I'll go to Beirut to talk to the Arabs directly about what might be achieved, and I would welcome an American initiative to advance such a move.

**Do you have a plan?**

My plan is comprised of three stages: (1) a complete ceasefire; (2) a long-term interim agreement granting the Palestinians

territorial contiguity without naming final borders; (3) the final borders of the two states would be determined by the future relations between Israel and the Palestinians and in the spirit of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

**You hinted that if Arafat went to Beirut, he might not be allowed to return.**

I don't rule out any options. I don't think he's going to meet with Vice President Cheney.

**Does Arafat have control over the various terror groups?**

Of course. Most of the terror now is conducted by forces that are under his full control. For example, the suicide bomber who struck yesterday was a policeman. He was a member of the Tanzim, which is the military arm of the Fatah.

**Are you acting quietly to prevent terror?**

During the last week we managed to capture or get rid of about 13 suicide bombers. If we had not acted, the number of casualties would have been much greater. They are now choosing targets where celebrations are taking place, weddings and bar mitzvahs. The Palestinian Authority has taken no steps to stop the terror.

**What do you think Arafat really wants?**

Former prime minister [Ehud] Barak promised him almost everything. He turned it down. I think Arafat would like to get concessions from Israel, and his final desire is that Israel be eliminated. One of his immediate goals is the destruction of the national-unity government.

**Are you going to strike back at the Palestinian Authority?**

We can wipe out the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure in a major operation but must consider what else is happening in the Middle East. We don't want to escalate the situation.

**Could this turn into a wider war?**

I'm very concerned by having Hizbullah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards organizing on our northern border. Hizbullah is developing a terrorist infrastructure with Iranian assistance and Syrian

support. Such a new front could lead to regional deterioration. American pressure on Lebanon and Syria is necessary in order that Damascus and Beirut restrain Hizbullah.

**How does [Syrian President] Bashar Assad differ from his father?**

He's much weaker. Hizbullah and the Revolutionary Guards never had it so good.

**What's your reaction to the recent plan proposed by the Saudis?**

Every initiative is welcome. What's interesting is the vision of peace and normalization with all the Arab world. But there appears to be a precondition—Israeli withdrawal to the '67 borders. Israel will not be able to do that if it wants to survive. Of course we are ready to talk to the Saudis.

**How do you compare the difficulties Israel is now suffering with other hard periods?**

We've had much harder periods. I participated in the war of independence and was badly injured.

**Is Israel at war now?**

There's a war going on here. There are funerals every day.

NEWSWEEK APRIL 1, 2002

the process, sanctuaries are established—however dubious their basis in international law—that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to the root of the guerrilla challenge. That process gradually erodes Israel's margin of survival even while the world's media and diplomats bewail its excesses. Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into paralysis.

Yet the imposition of the indefensible '67 frontiers is not the solution. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western sense. The fundamental schism is between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel by continuing the present struggle, and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for the ultimate showdown later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a “final” agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be replaced by radical successors. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are more a matter of adjectives than substance.

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of marginal utility in overcoming this problem. Nobody can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel. The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against invasion from neighboring states.

America can bridge the gap only by making clear to both sides that the only feasible goal is a limited settlement in which each will achieve less than its maximum aim but more than it can accomplish by a continuation of the conflict. It must urge Israel toward a peace program; it must impress upon its Arab interlocutors the limits of achievable concessions.

The goal of such an agreement

CORBIS BETTMAN

DIPLOMAT: Kissinger and Prime Minister Golda Meir, 1974

NEWSWEEK APRIL 1, 2002

Europe

A longtime backwater reinvents itself. BY
TARA PEPPER AND ANNA KUCHMENT

# How Cool Is Lisbon?

OLD LISBON: Medieval
Tour de Belem

WHEN DESIGNER MARCO SOUSA SANTOS came out with a series of glassware, he called it Sweet Revolution. It was a reference, in part, to the rebellious glassmakers who helped overthrow Portugal's fascist regime. But it was also a nod to a more current revolution going on in Lisbon. For the past seven years, Sousa Santos has helped create a new style of design—one that looks to the clean, contemporary lines of

Scandinavian work, but with a modern Portuguese flair.

The testament to his success is that, today, he is at the center

of a cultural rebirth that's transforming Lisbon from a backwater into one of Europe's most vibrant capitals. Aging roads have been overhauled, magnificent squares are being restored and a whole stretch of the riverfront, once home to an abattoir and a petrochemical plant, is morphing into a vibrant, imaginatively designed suburb. Spanish architect Santiago Calatrava's magnificent, glass-and-steel train station has revitalized a decaying industrial neighborhood; the sleek Vasco da Gama Bridge, spanning the Tagus River, firmly links Lisboans with the rest of Europe.

All this has taken money—lots of it. Portugal's socialist government, backed by wads of European Union development aid, has spent heavily over recent years to transform Lisbon into an international cultural and civic showcase. But the question is: are those good times about to end, or at least lose a bit of their sparkle? Three months ago Portugal's socialist Prime Minister Antonio Guterres was ousted for mismanaging the economy and running up massive debts. Last week a new center-right government was elected, promising to rein in spending. Adding insult to injury, the EU a few days later warned Portugal that it was running up against the deficit ceilings al-

lowed by Brussels—effectively mandating further belt-tightening.

It's hard to speculate about what economically stingier times might mean for Lisbon. But if they put a cap on its bubbling cultural scene, that would be a shame. With its face to the Atlantic and its back to the rest of Europe, Lisbon hasn't been the center of anything since its 16th-century kings ruled a global empire and its explorers found new lands to trade with and conquer. Portugal's development during the 20th century was stunted by the 44-year dictatorship of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, whose brutal regime cut off the country from the rest of Europe. Today a new generation of young, innovative Portuguese know they cannot afford to isolate themselves.

Those who will graduate from high school this spring are a new breed—the first to have been born as EU members. And their only slightly older siblings, or perhaps young parents, are just beginning to make their mark as the first Portuguese to have received a complete, compulsory education. (Just four years of schooling were required until the fall of Portugal's dictatorship in 1974.) Never before has the country had such a sizable, sophisticated, utterly

Europeanized group of young people. And they're the ones who are gobbling up Lisbon's cultural offerings—and driving appetites for more.

What a change their half a decade has made. Before 1996 Lisbon's cultural life was hit or miss, with theater lights out, for instance, as often as they were on. Now Portugal's two national theaters and its opera house both run full seasons. Not only are young people fueling a demand for the arts, they're also transforming them. Lisbon's shops, bars and discos are being made over by a trendy group of young graphic and interior designers, like Ricardo Meal-

NEWSWEEK APRIL 1, 2002

To: Henry A. Kissinger

MAR-24-2002 13:49

From: Newsweek

FROM NEWSWEEK COMMUNICATION

TO 918008989733

03/24/02 01:22PM p. 1

P.02/04

The Future of Israel

What We Can Do

Final Art
Type-OK

The REAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVE AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to clicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity in Europe and the Arab world urging American intervention stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

Camp David. In it, he offered more than 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the intifada to the implications of finality.

Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is - the first by an Arab state not having a direct national conflict with Israel - its specific terms represent a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The pre-1967 "border" in Palestine-unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers

with Israel-was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never

MAR 2 5 2002

Foto Mag Pg Vol MO

FRI 9:30PM - ART HED DETACHED

CHANGED PHOTO

To: Henry A. Kissinger

From: Newsweek

03/24/02 01:22PM p. 3

MAR-24-2002 13:51

FROM NEWSWEEK COMMUNICATION

TO 918008989733

P.04/04

The Future of Israel

The strength of the Bush administration has been to cut through slogans to underlying realities. Under present circumstances, this means insisting that a ceasefire must accompany negotiations and that negotiations must aim for less than a final settlement. The goal of such an agreement would be secure borders for Palestinian state with contiguous territory. As part of the necessary withdrawals Israel should be prepared to abandon outlying settlements. Issues other than the border between the two states would be left for later negotiations. There should be an interval of sufficient

COURTESY

SEEKING PEACE: The Kissinger-Melr in 1974

dw59194.tif

The 1967 'borders' were a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war...I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister who considered [them] defensible.

But before the United States launches itself into a major diplomatic effort, it must be clear about what is at stake. Will the mediation be interpreted in the region as being produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to shape an outcome based on familiar American principles? Will the perceived lesson be that September 11 in the end obliged America to adopt positions it had rejected previously? Or will terrorism be viewed as obstructing rather than inspiring a positive American rule? If negotiations start, will the military prowess displayed by the Palestinians in the intifada provide an

50

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final version of Dr. Kissinger's Newsweek essay

Page 1 of 3

Rebecca Jordan

From: Smalley, Suzanne [Suzanne.Smalley@Newsweek.com]

Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2002 7:23 PM

To: 'john.simpson@latsi.com'; 'rjordan@kmaglob.com'

Subject: final version of Dr. Kissinger's Newsweek essay

For now, America should avoid pressure for a final settlement and help both sides agree on attainable goals. By Henry A. Kissinger

<[hnj Loose]> The reappearance of active american diplomacy in <[lb]> the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal <it/hk> is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which <eventually/hk> could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's foreign policy (and count among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread call for Washington to play a dominant <more active/hk> role. These pleas have been

given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity in Europe and the Arab world. <from whence? way to characterize who's unanimous? jm> urging <an/hk>American intervention role/hk/is/cut jm> stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

<[hnj Loose]> In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal plan by an Israeli government was put forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak <hk> at Camp David. In it, he offered more than <hk//over<we prefer "more than"/jda>> 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the <intifada> to the implications of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in <return//hk> exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City <u.c./jda> of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

<[hnj Loose]> Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is the first by an Arab state not having a direct national

3/25/2002

Page 1 of 3

Rebecca Jordan

To: 'john.simpson@latsi.com'; 'rjordan@kmaglobal.com'

# For now, America should avoid a settlement and help both sides achieve goals. By Henry A. Kissinger

<hnj Loose> The reappearance of active american diplomacy in <lb> the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal <it/hk> is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which <eventually/hk> could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity in Europe and the Arab world «from whence? way to characterize who's unanimous? jm» urging <an/hk>American intervention role/hk/ is/cut jm> stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

<hnj Loose> In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal plan by an Israeli government was put forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak <hk> at Camp David. In it, he offered more than <hk//over«we prefer "more than"/jda»> 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the <intifada> to the implications of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in <return//hk> exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City «u.c./jda» of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

<hnj Loose> Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is the first by an Arab state not having a direct national

3/25/2002

Page 1 of 3

Rebecca Jordan

# For now, America should avoid pressure for a final settlement and help both sides agree on attainable goals. By Henry A. Kissinger

given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity in Europe and the Arab world «from whence? way to characterize who's unanimous? jm» urging <an/hk>American intervention role/hk/is/cut jm</an> stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

<[hnj Loose]> In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal plan by an Israeli government was put forward by Prime Minister Ehud Barak <hk>at Camp David. In it, he offered more than <hk//over«we prefer "more than"/jda»> 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the <intifada> to the implications of finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its imprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in <return//hk>exchange for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the Old City «u.c./jda» of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

3/25/2002

Page 2 of 3

conflict with Israel-its specific terms represent a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The pre-1967 <u>"pre-1967"</u>/?jda> "borders" in Palestine <u>"hk"</u>-unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with Israel-was <u>hk</u>//was <u>"were"</u>/?jda> never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff who considered the '67 borders defensible, and especially if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan <u>Rr</u>/jdaiver. This is because the '67 borders leave a corridor as narrow as <u>only</u> eight miles <u>wide</u> between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put the border of Israel at the edge of its international airport. Moreover, Israel would have to give up settlements containing approximately 200,000 inhabitants (about 4 percent of its Jewish population <u>"of 5.9 mill in 2001, CIA estimate/jda"</u>).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomatic relations with its neighbors. But in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, nonrecognition implies the legal non-/jdaexistence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an option to destroy it. Once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization involve much else: Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 23 <u>0</u>//hk years ago has brought little in the way of enhanced economic or cultural relations other than an exchange of ambassadors who are rarely brought into play.

While the terms of the cCrown pP/jdarince's proposal represent no breakthrough, Saudi engagement could be important if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to start negotiations without preconditions from either side. But if its ultimate purpose is to induce the United States to impose its specific provisions, it would <u>only</u>//hk undermine the security of Israel and ultimately the stability of the region.

The precariousness of Israel's position is paradoxical. Israel has never been more powerful, and at the same time never more vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a middle-class advanced society and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologically draining. The intifada has generated an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

<u>[hnj Loose]</u> Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played out <u>[lb]</u> for two generations now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it <u>[lb]</u> because a violent, emotional (and to bystanders), excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to trigger intervention by the international community, especially the United States. In the process, sanctuaries are <u>[lb]</u> established-however dubious their basis in international law-that, to all practical purposes, eliminate the capacity of the defending forces to get to the root of the guerrilla challenge. That process gradually erodes Israel's margin of survival even while the world's media and diplomats bewail its excesses. Torn between a recognition of strategic necessities and the pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into paralysis.

<u>[hnj Loose]</u> Yet the imposition of the indefensible '67 frontiers is not the solution. For after the experiences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the rest of the world) that the real division among Palestinians is not between those who want peace in the Western sense-as a point after which the world lives free of tensions with a consciousness of reconciliation. In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders holding this view is minuscule. The fundamental schism is between those who want to bring about the destruction of Israel <u>[lb]</u> by continuing the present struggle, and those who believe that an agreement now would be a better strategy to rally forces for the ultimate showdown later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no one can guarantee that they will not be replaced by radical successors. A peace agreement will not quell but may stimulate the intransigence of Ham/jdamas and other radical groups or states. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an entrance price into negotiations because his radical opponents would have a veto, why would not the same condition apply after a peace settlement? Thus the differences between a permanent and an interim settlement are more a matter of adjectives than substance.

3/25/2002

NATO, American or other third-party guarantees are of marginal utility in overcom-<lb>ing this problem. Nobody <lb>
>can seriously believe that the European countries would go to war for Israel, especially against challenges that are likely to
be ambiguous. The only possible solution would be an American guarantee against invasion from neighboring states. Aside
from raising profound domestic questions in the United States, this would bring with it an American veto of Israeli retaliation
against less than all-out attack and be almost impossible to apply against the resumption of guerrilla warfare.

Therefore, the beginning of wisdom is <lb> to recognize the impossibility of a final settlement under current conditions.
Some crises can only be managed, not solved. The constant invocation of unattainable goals will foster a general climate of
irresponsibility. Yet a less ambitious mediation may have some prospects, if for no other reason than that the status quo is
becoming increasingly intolerable for Palestinians as well. They have fought ferociously on behalf of the classic paradigm of
asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war
exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their
impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in time to radicalize their domestic politics. They have a stake in a truce even if
they are not able for domestic reasons to support an overall settlement on meaningful terms.

But before the United States launches itself into a major diplomatic effort, it must be clear about what is at stake. Will the
mediation be interpreted in the region as being produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to shape an outcome based on familiar
American principles? Will the perceived lesson be that September 11 in the end obliged America to adopt positions it had
rejected previously? Or will terrorism be viewed as obstructing rather than inspiring a positive American role? If negotiations
start, will the military prowess displayed by the Palestinians in the intifada provide an excuse for Arafat to play the
constructive role Anwar Sadat did after the temporary Arab successes of the 1973 war? Or will he view America in retreat
and Israel on the verge of an abyss-toward which he will push it step by step with the help of outside mediation? The answers
to these questions will determine the prospects for a peaceful evolution of the region, and also to a large extent the prospects
for America's war against terrorism.

<hnj Tight> The Palestinians will not accept a ceasefire because they believe they have momentum; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their existence. America can bridge this gap only by making clear to both sides that the only feasible goal is a limited settlement in which each will achieve less than its maximum aim but more than it can accomplish by a continuation of the conflict. It must urge Israel toward a peace program; it must impress upon its Arab interlocutors the limits of achievable concessions.

<hnj Loose> The strength of the Bush administration has been to cut through slogans to underlying realities. Under present circumstances, this means insisting that a ceasefire must accompany negotiations and that negotiations must aim for less than a final settlement. The goal of such an agreement would be secure borders for Palestinian state with contiguous territory. As part of the necessary withdrawals Israel should be prepared to abandon outlying settlements. Issues other than the border between the two states would be left for later negotiations. There should be an interval of sufficient length for normal life to resume on both sides, encouraged by outside economic assistance. The United States should play a major role in facilitating such an outcome, provided the parties agree to the principles embodied in it. In its absence the United States has no option except to stand aside. If the United States appears to be gradually veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it risks continuation of the conflict.

To contribute to genuine progress, America must back a program that combines respect for Arab dignity with Israel's
necessities for survival. There is no middle way. ^

3/25/2002

MAR-24-2002 13:49

FROM NEWSWEEK COMMUNICATION

TO 918008909733

03/24/02 01:22PM p. 1

P.02/04

The Future of Israel

Final Art
Type-OK

What We Can Do

THE REAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVE AMERICA in the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of trepidation. Hope, because the rage of the Middle East, is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, the goal is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near-unanimity in Europe and the Arab world urging American intervention stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

Camp David. In it, he offered more than 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was complex) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce any future claims, including the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the *intrifada* to the implications of finality.

with Israel - was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never

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MAR-24-2002 13:49

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The Future of Israel

For now, America should avoid press
help both sides agree on attainable goals

What We Can Do

Final Art
Type-OK

given fresh impetus by the initiative of
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,
which proposes normalization of relations
between the Arab world and Israel if Israel
returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice
President Dick Cheney's journey to the
Middle East, intended to elicit Arab sup-
port for a possible showdown with Iraq.
was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an oc-
casion for a new initiative to end the Arab-
Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention
from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in
itself a considerable achievement for Saudi
diplomacy. At the same time, the near una-
nimity in Europe and the Arab world urg-
ing American intervention stems from the
hope that, in the end, we will impose on
Israel a settlement essentially identical to
the Abdullah plan.

Camp David. In it, he offered more than
90 percent of the disputed territories (the
formula was complex) but retained about
70 percent of the settlements. In ex-
change, the Palestinians were asked to re-
nounce any future claims, including the
right to return into Israel proper (though
they would be free to return to a Palestin-
ian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat
preferred the *intrifada* to the implications
of finality.

Welcome as this engagement in the
peace process is -the first by an Arab
state not having a direct national conflict
with Israel-its specific terms represent a
restatement of a position that has pro-
duced the existing deadlock. The pre-
1967 "border" in Palestine-unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers

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# What We Can Do

Welcome as this engagement in the peace process is -the first by an Arab state not having a direct national conflict with Israel-its specific terms represent a restatement of a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The pre-1967 "border" in Palestine-unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers

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SEEKING PEACE: The Kissinger-Morgunbild Golda Meir in 1974

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-------- End of column --------

«approx. 16 characters»

What We Can Do

THE REAPPEARANCE OF ACTIVE AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN<|||lb|>|

the Middle East has been greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation, because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, it is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which eventually could facilitate the destruction of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's foreign policy (and count among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread call for Washington to play a more active role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which proposes normalization of relations

IN0713

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between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near unanimity urging an American role is stems from the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

IN0713 Page 2 of 14

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would not fare better. The only formal plan
by an Israeli government was put forward
by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David. In
it, he offered over 90 percent of the disput-
ed territories (the formula was vague) but

--------- End of column ---------

retained about 70 percent of the settle-
ments. In exchange, the Palestinians were
asked to renounce the right to return into
Israel proper (though they would be free to
return to a Palestinian state) as well as any
other claims. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat
preferred the Intifada to the implications of
finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has
come from Crown Prince Abdullah. Ac-
cording to its imprecise outline, Israel
would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in
return for the normalization of relations
with the Arab states. Literally, this would
imply Israeli abandonment of all settle-
ments and Arab control of the old city of
Jerusalem, including the holy places. The
Abdullah plan does not define what is
meant by normalization, and is silent about
such issues as the right of refugees to return

IN0713

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1 212 445 5146

P.05/15

IN0713 kissinger

DEPT: PG:

Welcome as is this first engagement in
the peace process by an Arab state not hav-
ing a direct national conflict with Israel, its
specific terms represent a restatement of a
position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"-unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers
with Israel-was never an international
frontier but a ceasefire line established at
the end of the 1948 war. It was never recog-
nized by any Arab state until after the 1967
war and has been grudgingly accepted re-
cently by states that do not yet recognize
the legitimacy of Israel. I have never en-
countered an Israeli prime minister or chief
of staff who considered the '67 borders de-
fensible, and especially so if coupled with
-------- End of column --------
an abandonment of a security position
along the Jordan river. This is because the
'67 borders leave a corridor only eight miles
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the edge of its inter-
national airport. Moreover, Israel would
have to give up settlements containing

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DEPT:

PG:

------- End of column -------

In return, Israel would achieve diplomat-
ic relations with its neighbors. But in al-
most all other negotiations, mutual recog-
nition of the parties is taken for granted,
not treated as a concession. In fact, non-
recognition implies the legal non-existence
of the other state, which, in the context of
the Middle East, is tantamount to an option
to destroy it. Once granted, recognition can
always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic

------- Layout Break -------

-------- TEXT BREAK --------

relations is a recognized diplomatic tool.
Nor does formal normalization involve
much else: Israel's peace agreement with
Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in
the way of enhanced economic or cultural
relations other than an exchange of ambas-
sadors who are rarely brought into play.

------- End of column -------

While the terms of the Crown Prince's pro-
posal represent no breakthrough, the fact
of a Saudi engagement could be important
if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to

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DEPT: PG:

start negotiations without preconditions
from either side. But if its ultimate purpose
is to induce the United States
to impose its specific provi-
sions on Jerusalem, it would
only undermine the security
of Israel and ultimately the
stability of the region.

------- Layout Break -------

TEXT BREAK

End of column

middle class advanced society and, as such,
the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologi-
cally draining. The Intifada has generated
an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Pri-
or to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace
movement viewed reconciliation with the
Arab world primarily in terms
of psychological reassurance;
land would be traded for peace

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even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the Intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

DEPT: PG:

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DEPT: PG:

egregious form of it because a
violent, emotional (and to by-
standers) excessive retaliation
serves their purpose: to trigger
intervention by the internation-
al community, especially the
United States. In the process,
sanctuaries are established—
however dubious their basis in
international law—that, to all
practical purposes, eliminate
the capacity of the defending
forces to get to the root of the
guerrilla challenge. That
process gradually erodes Is-
rael's margin of survival even
while the world's media and
diplomats bewail its excesses.
Torn between a recognition of
strategic necessities and the
pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs
the risk of sliding into paralysis.

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DEPT: PG:

------- End of column -------

those who want peace in the Western
sense—as a point after which the world
lives free of tensions with a consciousness
of reconciliation. In reality, the number of
Palestinian leaders holding this view is mi-
nuscule. The fundamental schism is be-
tween those who want to bring about the
destruction of Israel by continuing the pre-
sent struggle, and those who believe that an
agreement now would be a better strategy
to rally forces for the ultimate struggle later
on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "fi-
nal" agreement have no afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be re-
placed by radical successors. A
peace agreement will not quell
but may stimulate the intransi-
gence of Hammas and other
radical groups or states. If, as is
asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent
ceasefire as an entrance price
into negotiations because his
radical opponents would have a
veto, why would not the same

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DEPT: PG:

ment under current conditions. Some
crises can only be managed, not solved.
The constant invocation of unattainable
goals will foster a general climate of irre-
sponsibility. Yet a less ambitious media-
tion may have some prospects, if for no
other reason than that the status quo is be-
coming increasingly intolerable for Pales-
tinians as well. They have fought with dedi-
cation and ferocity on behalf of the classic
-------- End of column --------

paradigm of asymmetrical warfare: the
guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a
point may be approaching where the costs
of the war exhaust, or perhaps even de-
roy, the civil society the guerrillas are
seeking to establish. For the other Arab
states, their impotence on the Palestine is-
sue threatens in time to radicalize their do-
mestic politics. They have a stake in a truce
even if they are not able for domestic rea-
sons to support an overall settlement on
meaningful terms.

But before the United States launches it-
self into a major diplomatic effort, it must
be clear about what is at stake. Will the me-
--------- Layout Break ---------

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DEPT: PG:

-------- TEXT BREAK --------

diation be interpreted in the region as being
produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to
shape an outcome based on familiar Ameri-
can principles? Will the perceived lesson be
that September 11 in the end obliged Amer-
ica to adopt positions it had rejected previ-
ously? Or will terrorism be viewed as ob-
structing rather than inspiring a positive
American role? If negotiations start, will
the military prowess displayed by the Pales-
tinians in the Intifida provide an excuse for
Arafat to play the constructive role Anwar
Sadat did after the temporary Arab success-
es of the 1973 war? Or will he view America
in retreat and Israel on the verge of an
abyss—toward which he will push it step by
-------- End of column --------

The answers to these questions will deter-
mine the prospects for a peaceful evolution
of the region, and also to a large extent the
prospects for America's war against terror-

ism. In short, only experience can supply answers/ cut? mark.

The quest for a final settlement is paradoxically too dangerous in the present situation/cut mark. The Palestinians are not ready to discuss a final settlement because they believe

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PG:

they have momentum; the Israelis will not
yield because they fear for their existence.
America can bridge this gap only by mak-
ing clear to each side that there is an attain-
able short-term settlement in which«add» each
will achieve less than its maximum aim but
more than it can accomplish by a continua-
tion of the conflict. It must urge Israel to-
ward a peace program; it must
impress upon its Arab friends
the limits of achievable conces-
sions.

The strength of the Bush ad-
ministration has been to cut
through slogans to underlying
realities. On the Palestinian issue/cutUnder present cir-
cumstances, this means insist-
ing that a ceasefire must ac-
company negotiations and that
negotiations must aim for less
than a final settlement. The
goal of such an agreement
would be secure borders for Is-
rael and a Palestinian state with
contiguous territory. As part of
the necessary withdrawals Is-
rael should be prepared to

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1 212 445 5146

IN0713 kissinger abandon outlying settlements. Issues other than the border between the two states would be left for later negotiations. There should be an interval of sufficient length for normal life to resume on both sides of the border/cut, encouraged by outside economic assistance. The United States should play a major role in facilitating such an outcome, provided the parties agree to the principles embodied in it. In its absence the United States has no option except to stand aside. If the United States appears to be gradually veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it tempts continuation of the conflict.

**If America is cut** To contribute to genuine progress, America must back a program that combines respect for Arab dignity with Israel's necessities for survival. There is no middle way. ■

DEPT: PG:

IN0713 Page 14 of 14

TOTAL P.15

between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an oc casion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. At the same time, the near una nimity urging an American role is stems from the hope that, in the end, we will im pose on Israel a settlement essentially iden tical to the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diploma cy has been the catalyst for practically all the progress the peace process made. But given the explosive politics of the region, it is all too easy to overestimate what is possi ble. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to set tle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that an other attempt at a negotiated final solution

would not fare better. The only formal plan
by an Israeli government was put forward
by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David. In
it, he offered over 90 percent of the disput
ed territories (the formula was vague) but
retained about 70 percent of the settle
ments. In exchange, the Palestinians were
asked to renounce the right to return into
Israel proper (though they would be free to
return to a Palestinian state) as well as any
other claims. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat
preferred the Intifada to the implications of
finality.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has
come from Crown Prince Abdullah. Ac
cording to its imprecise outline, Israel
would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in
return for the normalization of relations
with the Arab states. Literally, this would
imply Israeli abandonment of all settle
ments and Arab control of the old city of
Jerusalem, including the holy places. The
Abdullah plan does not define what is
meant by normalization, and is silent about
such issues as the right of refugees to return

Welcome as is this first engagement in
the peace process by an Arab state not hav
ing a direct national conflict with Israel, its
specific terms represent a restatement of a
position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"-unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers
with Israel-was never an international
frontier but a ceasefire line established at
the end of the 1948 war. It was never recog
nized by any Arab state until after the 1967
war and has been grudgingly accepted re
cently by states that do not yet recognize
the legitimacy of Israel. I have never en
countered an Israeli prime minister or chief
of staff who considered the '67 borders de
fensible, and especially so if coupled with
an abandonment of a security position
along the Jordan river. This is because the
'67 borders leave a corridor only eight miles
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the edge of its inter
national airport. Moreover, Israel would
have to give up settlements containing

In return, Israel would achieve diplomat ic relations with its neighbors. But in al most all other negotiations, mutual recog nition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, non- recognition implies the legal non-existence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an option to destroy it. Once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic

---------- TEXT BREAK ----------

Nor does formal normalization involve much else: Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in the way of enhanced economic or cultural relations other than an exchange of ambas sadors who are rarely brought into play.

While the terms of the Crown Prince's pro posal represent no breakthrough, the fact of a Saudi engagement could be important if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to

start negotiations without preconditions
from either side. But if its ultimate purpose
is to induce the United States
to impose its specific provi
sions on Jerusalem, it would
only undermine the security
of Israel and ultimately the
stability of the region.

The precariousness of Israel's position is
paradoxical. Israel has never been more
powerful, and at the same time never more
vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly
able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian
terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a
middle class advanced society and, as such,
the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologi
cally draining. The Intifada has generated
an ambivalent rigidity in Israeli society. Pri
or to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace
movement viewed reconciliation with the
Arab world primarily in terms
of psychological reassurance;
land would be traded for peace

even though the Arab quid pro
quo would be revocable. But
since the Intifada, the vast ma
jority of Israelis no longer be
lieve in reconciliation; they
want victory and the crushing
of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is
growing despair over the seem
ing futility of the enterprise.

With the proportion of Israeli
casualties to that of the guerril
las going up, and the fact that
Israel's retaliation beyond a cer
tain point will not be tolerated
by the United States, a sense of
resignation is spreading. The
desire to turn on the tormentors
is beginning to be offset by
signs of a hunger for peace at
any price.

Israel finds itself facing the
classic dynamic of guerrilla
warfare as it has played out for
two generations now. The guer
rillas not only do not recoil
from terrorism but practice an

egregious form of it because a
violent, emotional (and to by
standers) excessive retaliation
serves their purpose: to trigger
intervention by the internation
al community, especially the
United States. In the process,
sanctuaries are established-
however dubious their basis in
international law-that, to all
practical purposes, eliminate
the capacity of the defending
forces to get to the root of the
guerrilla challenge. That
process gradually erodes Is
rael's margin of survival even
while the world's media and
diplomats bewail its excesses.
Torn between a recognition of
strategic necessities and the
pull of emotional imperatives, Israel runs
the risk of sliding into paralysis.
Yet the imposition of the indefensible '67
frontiers is not the solution. For after the
experiences of Oslo, Israelis know (as
should the rest of the world) that the real
division among Palestinians is not between

those who want peace in the Western
sense-as a point after which the world
lives free of tensions with a consciousness
of reconciliation. In reality, the number of
Palestinian leaders holding this view is mi
nuscule. The fundamental schism is be
tween those who want to bring about the
destruction of Israel by continuing the pre
sent struggle, and those who believe that an
agreement now would be a better strategy
to rally forces for the ultimate struggle later
on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a "fi
nal" agreement have no afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be re
placed by radical successors. A
peace agreement will not quell
but may stimulate the intransi
gence of Hammas and other
radical groups or states. If, as is
asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent
ceasefire as an entrance price
into negotiations because his
radical opponents would have a
veto, why would not the same

condition apply after a peace
settlement? Thus the differ
ences between a permanent
and an interim settlement are
more a matter of adjectives
than substance.
NATO, American or other
third-party guarantees are of
marginal utility in overcoming
this problem. Nobody can seri
ously believe that the European
countries would go to war for
Israel, especially against chal
lenges that are likely to be am
biguous. The only possible so
lution would be an American
guarantee against invasion
from neighboring states. Aside
from raising profound domes
tic questions in the United
States, this would bring with it
an American veto of Israeli retaliation
against less than all-out attack and be al
most impossible to apply against the re
sumption of guerrilla warfare.
Therefore, the beginning of wisdom is to
recognize the impossibility of a final settle

ment under current conditions. Some
crises can only be managed, not solved.
The constant invocation of unattainable
goals will foster a general climate of irre
sponsibility. Yet a less ambitious media
tion may have some prospects, if for no
other reason than that the status quo is be
coming increasingly intolerable for Pales
tinians as well. They have fought with dedi
cation and ferocity on behalf of the classic
paradigm of asymmetrical warfare: the
guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a
point may be approaching where the costs
of the war exhaust, or perhaps even de
stroy, the civil society the guerrillas are
seeking to establish. For the other Arab
states, their impotence on the Palestine is
sue threatens in time to radicalize their do
mestic politics. They have a stake in a truce
even if they are not able for domestic rea
sons to support an overall settlement on
meaningful terms.

But before the United States launches it
self into a major diplomatic effort, it must
be clear about what is at stake. Will the me

-------- TEXT BREAK --------

diation be interpreted in the region as being produced by terrorism, or as an attempt to shape an outcome based on familiar American principles? Will the perceived lesson be that September 11 in the end obliged America to adopt positions it had rejected previously? Or will terrorism be viewed as ob structing rather than inspiring a positive American role? If negotiations start, will the military prowess displayed by the Pales tinians in the Intifida provide an excuse for Arafat to play the constructive role Anwar Sadat did after the temporary Arab success es of the 1973 war? Or will he view America in retreat and Israel on the verge of an abyss-toward which he will push it step by step with the help of outside mediation? The answers to these questions will deter mine the prospects for a peaceful evolution of the region, and also to a large extent the prospects for America's war against terror

The quest for a final settlement is paradoxically too dangerous in the present situation/ cut mark. The Palestinians are not ready to dis

they have momentum; the Israelis will not
yield because they fear for their existence.
America can bridge this gap only by making clear to each side that there is an attainable short-term settlement in which «add» each will achieve less than its maximum aim but more than it can accomplish by a continuation of the conflict. It must urge Israel to
ward a peace program; it must
impress upon its Arab friends
the limits of achievable concessions.

The strength of the Bush administration has been to cut through slogans to underlying realities. On the Palestinian issue/cutUnder present circumstances, this means insist
ing that a ceasefire must ac
company negotiations and that
negotiations must aim for less
than a final settlement. The
goal of such an agreement
would be secure borders for Is
rael and a Palestinian state with
contiguous territory. As part of
the necessary withdrawals Is
rael should be prepared to

(sp)

abandon outlying settlements.

Issues other than the border be
tween the two states would be
left for later negotiations. There
should be an interval of suffi
cient length for normal life to
resume on both sides of the border/cut, encour
aged by outside economic assis
tance. The United States should
play a major role in facilitating
such an outcome, provided the
parties agree to the principles
emobdied in it. In its absence
the United States has no option except to
stand aside. If the United States appears to
be gradually veering toward imposing the
'67 borders, it tempts continuation of the
conflict.

If America is cut To contribute to genuine progress,
America must back a program that com
bines respect for Arab dignity with Israel's
necessities for survival. There is no middle
way. ^

fit version

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has
come from Crown Prince Abdullah. Ac
cording to its imprecise outline, Israel
would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in
return for the normalization of relations
with the Arab states. Literally, this would
imply Israeli abandonment of all settle
ments and Arab control of the old city of
Jerusalem, including the holy places. The
Abdullah plan does not define what is
meant by normalization, and is silent about
such issues as the right of refugees to return
(though it would surely be insisted on in an
actual negotiation).

Welcome as is this first engagement in
the peace process by an Arab state not hav
ing a direct national conflict with Israel, its
specific terms represent a restatement of a
position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"-unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers
with Israel-was never an international
frontier but a ceasefire line established at
the end of the 1948 war. It was never recog
nized by any Arab state until after the 1967
war and has been grudgingly accepted re
cently by states that do not yet recognize
the legitimacy of Israel. I have never en
countered an Israeli prime minister or chief

3/22/2002

fit version

of staff who considered the '67 borders de
fensible, and especially so if coupled with
an abandonment of a security position
along the Jordan river. This is because the
'67 borders leave a corridor only eight miles
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the edge of its inter
national airport. Moreover, Israel would
have to give up settlements containing
200,000 inhabitants (about 4 percent of its
Jewish population).

-------- TEXT BREAK --------

relations is a recognized diplomatic tool.
Nor does formal normalization involve
much else: Israel's peace agreement with
Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in
the way of enhanced economic or cultural
relations other than an exchange of ambas
sadors who are rarely brought into play.
While the terms of the Crown Prince's pro
posal represent no breakthrough, the fact
of a Saudi engagement could be important
if it is used to produce a ceasefire and to
start negotiations without preconditions
from either side. But if its ultimate purpose
is to induce the United States
to impose its specific provi
sions on Jerusalem, it would
only undermine the security
of Israel and ultimately the
stability of the region.

-------- TEXT BREAK --------

3/22/2002

fit version

3/22/2002

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepida
tion. Hope, because the rage of both parties
is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation,
because both sides know their objectives to
be essentially incompatible. The secret
dream of Israelis is legitimization of the sta
tus quo. For Palestinians, it is the imposi
tion of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 bor
ders, which eventually could facilitate and facilitating the eventual the destruc
tion of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's
foreign policy (and count among our sins
obliviousness to their advice) are joining the
widespread call for us America to play a more active
role. These pleas have been given fresh
impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers proposes nor
malization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967
frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick
Cheney's journey to the Middle East,
intended to elicit Arab support for a possible
showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his
Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initia
tive to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This
deflection of attention from terrorism to the

pro quo would be revocable. But since the
Intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no
longer believe in reconciliation; they want
victory and the crushing of their Arab adver
saries.

At the same time, there is a growing sense
of despair over the seeming futility of the
enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli
casualties to that of the guerrillas going up,
and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a
certain point will not be tolerated by the
United States, a sense of resignation is
spreading. in Israel. The desire to turn on
their the tormentors is beginning to be offset by
signs of a hunger for peace at any price.

excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to
trigger intervention by the international
community, especially the United States. In
the process, sanctuaries are established-
however dubious their basis in international
law-that, to all practical purposes, elimi
nate the capacity of the defending forces to

That process gradually erodes Israel's mar
gin of survival even while the world's media
and **many** diplomats bewail its excesses.

Torn between a recognition of strategic
necessities and the pull of emotional imper
atives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into **paralysis**
ambivalent rigidity. The other day, I asked a
high-ranking Israeli army officer what
immediate strategy he advocated for the
current struggle. He replied: an all-out
attack on the Palestinian authority. When
asked what ultimate outcome he expected,
he said the imposition of some version of the
'67 borders.

Yet this progressive demoralization will
not be solved by the imposition of the inde
fensible '67 frontiers is not the solution. For after the experi
ences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the
rest of the world) that the real division
among Palestinians is not between those
who want peace in the Western sense-as a
point after which the world lives free of ten
sions with a consciousness of reconciliation.
In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders
holding this view is minuscule. The fundamental real
schism is between those who want to bring
about the destruction of Israel by continu

ing the present struggle, and those who
believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for **the ultimate a-renewed
struggle** later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a
"final" agreement have no **such** afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be
replaced by radical successors. A peace
agreement will not quell but may stimulate
the intransigence of Hammas and **other radical group or states of radical
states**. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an
entrance price into negotiations because his
radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a
peace settlement? Thus the differences
between a permanent and an interim settle-
ment are more a matter of adjectives than
substance.

NATO, American or other third-party
guarantees are of marginal utility in over
coming this problem. Nobody can seriously
believe that the European countries would
go to war for Israel, especially against chal
lenges that are likely to be ambiguous. The
only possible solution would be an
American guarantee against invasion from
neighboring states. Aside from raising pro

should be prepared to abandon outlying settlements. Issues other than the border between the two
states would be left for later negotiations. These should be an interval of sufficient length for normal
life to resume on both sides of the border, encouraged by outside economic assistance. The United
States should play a major role in facilitating such an outcome provided the parties agree to the
principles embodied in it. The administration

should stress that the aim is secure borders;
not the armistice lines of fifty years ago. A
possible interim agreement could envisage
establishing such a border, including the
removal of outlying settlements, the cre
ation of a Palestinian state «side by side with Israel? mark» with contiguous
territory and the elaboration of a code of
coexistence between the two states. Other
issues would be left to a later negotiation.
The United States should play a major role
in generating such an outcome, provided it
can get Arab agreement to the strategy it
implies. In its absence the United States has
no option except to stand aside. If So long as
the United States appears to be gradually
veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it
tempts continuation of the conflict. And
such an outcome would also validate terror
ism as a form of warfare.

If America is to contribute to genuine
progress, it must back a program that
combines respect for respects-Arab dignity with and concerns and

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepida
tion. Hope, because the rage of both parties
is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation,
because both sides know their objectives to
be in many respects essentially incompatible. The
secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of
the status quo. For Palestinians, it is the
imposition of terms reducing Israel to its
1967 borders and facilitating the eventual
destruction of the Jewish state. For
Europeans, it is an outcome very similar to
the '67 borders plan, which would be guar-
anteed internationally and would reconcile
the Islamic world with the West. For
America, it is a "compromise" that would be
acceptable to all parties and finally end ten
sions.

Many who generally criticize America's
foreign policy (and count among our sins
obliviousness to their advice) are joining the
widespread call for us to play a more active
role. These pleas have been given fresh
impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers nor
malization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967

Camp David, where he offered over 90 per
cent of the disputed territories (the formula
was vague) but retained about 70 percent of
the settlements. In exchange, the
Palestinians were asked to renounce the
right to return into Israel proper (though
they would be free to return to a Palestinian
state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has dis
avowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred
the Intifada.

According to its *imprecise* impressive outline, Israel
would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in
return for the normalization of relations
with the Arab states. Literally, this would
imply Israeli abandonment of all settle
ments and Arab control of the old city of
Jerusalem, including the holy places. The
Abdullah plan does not define what is meant
by normalization, and is silent about such
issues as the right of refugees to return
(though it would surely be insisted on in an
actual negotiation).

Welcome as it is, the Abdullah plan,
unless modified, represents a restatement of
a position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"-unlike the

Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with
Israel-was never an international frontier
but a ceasefire line established at the end of
the 1948 war. It was never recognized by
any Arab state until after the 1967 war and
has been grudgingly accepted recently by
states that do not yet recognize the legitima-
cy of Israel. I have never encountered an
Israeli prime minister or chief of staff-and I
have known them all-who considered the
'67 borders defensible, and especially so if
coupled with an abandonment of a security
position along the Jordan river. And main
taining that position makes sense. The '67
borders leave a corridor only eight miles
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the very edge of its only interna-
tional airport. Moreover, Israel would have
to give up settlements containing 200,000
inhabitants (almost 5 about four percent of its Jewish
population of).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomat
ic relations with its neighbors. But in almost
all other negotiations, mutual recognition of
the parties is taken for granted, not treated
as a concession. In fact, non-recognition
implies the legal non-existence of the other
state, which, in the context of the Middle

East, is tantamount to an intent to destroy it.

Once granted, recognition can always be
withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is
a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does for
mal normalization recognize involve much else:

Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 20
years ago has brought little in the way of
economic or cultural normalization other
than an exchange of ambassadors who are
rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons, the Crown Prince's
proposal is no breakthrough. The call for

America to compose it to impose it is not simply an issue
of diplomatic preference; it goes goes to the very heart
of Israel's ability to survive.

The precariousness of Israel's position is
paradoxical. Israel has never been more
powerful, and at the same time never more
vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly
able to inflict heavy disproportionate losses on
Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has
evolved into a middle class advanced society
and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the
Intifada has generated a strange ambiva
lence in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo
agreement the Israeli peace movement

viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the Intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crush of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is a growing sense of despair over the seeming futility of the enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli casualties to that of the guerrillas going up, and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a certain point will not be tolerated by the United States, a sense of resignation is spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on their tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for peace at almost any price.

Israel finds itself facing the classic dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played out for two generations now. The guerrillas not only do not recoil from terrorism but practice an egregious form of it because a violent, emotional (and to bystanders) excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to trigger intervention by the international community and especially the United States. In the process, sanctuaries are established-however dubious their basis in

international law—that, to all practical pur
poses, eliminate the capacity of the defend
ing forces to get to the root of the guerrilla
challenge. That process gradually erodes Israel's margin of survival even while the world's media
and diplomats bewail its excesses. Tunisia played that role during
the Algerian war; Cambodia and Laos dur
ing the Vietnam war. The pattern is now
recurring with respect to Zone A and the
refugee camps in the West Bank.

The chief difference, however, is that
France in Algeria and America in Vietnam
were fighting on distant territories; they had
the ultimate, albeit painful, option to with
draw. For Israel, survival is at stake, not
colonies or geopolitical interests.

Torn between a recognition of strategic
necessities and the pull of emotional imper
atives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into
ambivalent rigidity. The other day, I asked a
high-ranking Israeli army officer what
immediate strategy he advocated for the
current struggle. He replied: an all-out
attack on the Palestinian authority. When
asked what ultimate outcome he expected,
he said the imposition of some version of the
'67 borders.

fensible '67 frontiers. For after the experi
ences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the
rest of the world) that the real division
among Palestinians is not between those
who want peace in the Western sense-as a
point after which the world lives free of ten
sions with a consciousness of reconciliation.
In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders
holding this view is minuscule. The real
schism is between those who want to bring
about the destruction of Israel by continu
ing the present struggle, and those who
believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for a renewed
struggle later on. And Israelis will be rein
forced in this sense of futility by the West's
response to the Intifada, which so often is
directed more against the targets than the
perpetrators of terrorism.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a
"final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be
replaced by radical successors. A peace
agreement will not quell but may stimulate
the intransigence of Hammas and of radical
states. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an
entrance price into negotiations because his

radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a
peace settlement? Thus the differences
between a permanent and an interim settle
ment are more a matter of adjectives than
substance.

NATO, American or other third-party
guarantees are of marginal utility in over
coming this problem. Nobody can seriously
believe that the European countries would
go to war for Israel, especially against chal
lenges that are likely to be ambiguous. The
only possible solution would be an
American security guarantee against invasion from
neighboring states. Aside from raising pro
found domestic questions in the United
States, this would bring with it an American
veto of Israeli retaliation against less than
all-out attack and be almost impossible to
apply against the resumption of guerrilla
warfare.

What, then, are the alternatives? Therefore, the
beginning of wisdom is to recognize the
impossibility of a final settlement under cur
rent conditions. Some crises can only be
managed, not solved. The constant invoca
tion of unattainable goals will foster a gener
al climate of irresponsibility.

Yet a less ambitious mediation may have
some prospects, if for no other reason than
that the status quo is becoming increasingly
intolerable for all the parties. The
Palestinians have fought with dedication
and ferocity and produced the classic para
digm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla
wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be
approaching where the costs of the war
exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil
society the guerrillas are seeking to estab
lish. For the other Arab states, their impo
tence on the Palestine issue threatens in
time to radicalize their domestic politics.

Two broad choices present themselves.

The first is to let the conflict in Palestine
play itself out unless and until one or both of
the parties are willing to adjust their posi
tion. The second is for a more active

American role in pursuit of more limited
objectives. The former course is difficult to
sustain in the face of pressures from allies
and from friends in the Arab sphere. In the
present situation, the Palestinians will not
stop because they believe they are winning;

the Israelis will not yield because they fear
for their existence, especially if the outcome
rewards terrorism. Only the United States
has a chance, however slight, to bridge that
gap. But for the United States to undertake a meaningful mediation it must be clear about the
framework. Will the effort be interpreted as a sign of yielding to terrorism or as a demonstration of
meaningful concern? Is the lesson that September 11 triggered an American role that otherwise
might not have occurred or are acts of violence perceived as delaying a responsible role? Will Arafat
play the moderating role if Sadat believing that the Intifada has redeemed Palestinian military
prowess? Or will he view America in retreat and Israel on the verge of an abyss towards which he
will push it step by step with the help of outside mediation?

These questions cannot be answered in the abstract and for that reason alone the quest for a final
settlement is paradoxically too dangerous. In the present situation the Palestinians will not stop
because they believe they have momentum; the Israelis will not yield because they fear for their
existence.

Only America can bridge this gap but only by showing each side's prospects by which each achieves
less than its maximum aim but more than each can achieve by a continuation of the conflict.

It must urge Israel toward a peace pro
gram; it must impress upon its Arab friends
the limits of achievable concessions.
Israel cannot sustain support for its mili
tary actions internationally-or, in the long
run, even in America-without a peace pro
gram. The Palestinians cannot achieve their
maximum objectives except at the risk of
destroying their own society. The strength of the Bush administration has been to cut through slogans

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412 159 0042ND

BY: mwhita; 03/21/02, 3:48 PM

WRITER: MWHITA

FROM: 03/20/2

FILE: MIDKISS2-MWHITA-PVT

REVISOR: MWHITA; 03/21/2, 15:32

By Henry A. Kissinger

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation. Hope, because the rage of both parties is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation. because both sides know their objectives to be essentially incompatible. The secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of the status quo. For Palestinians, it is the imposition of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 borders, which eventually could facilitate a deal and finalizing the eventual destruction of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's foreign policy (and count among our sins obliviousness to their advice) are joining the widespread call for us to play a more active role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East,

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intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Sandi diplomacy, ~~led to the ~~ and the near unanimity urging an American role as~~ systems from ~~2 markets~~ the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal offer an Israeli government has made ~~is~~ a plan ~~by~~

---

--- End of column ---

regarding a final settlement was presented

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generated a strange ambivalence in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo agreement, the Israeli peace movement viewed reconciliation with the Arab world primarily in terms of psychological reassurance; land would be traded for peace even though the Arab quid pro quo would be revocable. But since the Intifada, the vast majority of Israelis no longer believe in reconciliation; they want victory and the crushing of their Arab adversaries.

----- End of column -----

United States, a sense of resignation is spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on this tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for peace at any price.

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NATO, American or other third-party
guarantees are of marginal utility in over-
coming this problem. Nobody can seriously
believe that the European countries would
go to war for Israel, especially against chal-
lenges that are likely to be ambiguous. The
only possible solution would be an
American guarantee against invasion from
neighboring states. Aside from raising pro-
found domestic questions in the United
States, this would bring with it an American
veto of Israeli retaliation against less than
all-out attack and be almost impossible to
apply against the resumption of guerrilla
warfare.

Therefore, the beginning of wisdom is to
recognize the impossibility of a final settle-
ment under current conditions. Some crises
can only be managed, not solved. The con-
stant invocation of unattainable goals will
foster a general climate of irresponsibility.
Yet a less ambitious mediation may have
some prospects, if for no other reason than
that the status quo is becoming increasingly
intolerable for all the parties, like

Palestinians as well.

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1 212 445 5146

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PRINTED BY: mwhita; 03/21/02, 3:48 PM

WRITER: MWHITA
FROM: ; 03/20/2
FILE: MIDKISS2-MWHITA-PVT

By Henry A. Kissinger

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepida-
tion. Hope, because the rage of both parties
is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation,
because both sides know their objectives to
be essentially incompatible. The secret
dream of Israelis is legitimization of the sta-
tus quo. For Palestinians, it is the imposi-
tion of terms reducing Israel to its 1967 bor-
ders, which eventually could facilitate? mark, and facilitating the eventual destruc-
tion of the Jewish state.

Many who generally criticize America's
foreign policy (and count among our sins
obliviousness to their advice) are joining the
widespread call for us to play a more active
role. These pleas have been given fresh
impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers nor-
malization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967
frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick
Cheney's journey to the Middle East,

MIDKISS2 Page 1 of 13

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1 212 445 5146

P.03/14.

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DEPT:

PG:

intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. This deflection of attention from terrorism to the Palestinian issue is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. Indeed, the? mark, and the near unanimity urging an American role is «stems from? mark» the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In present conditions, a comparison of both sides' positions demonstrates that another attempt at a negotiated final solution would not fare better. The only formal offer an Israeli government has ever made

---------- End of column ----------

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by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, where he offered over 90 percent of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has disavowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the Intifada.

The most forthcoming Arab proposal has come from Crown Prince Abdullah. According to its inprecise outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in return for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return (though it would surely be insisted on in an actual negotiation).

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a position that has produced the existing deadlock. The 1967 "borders"—unlike the Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with Israel—was never an international frontier but a ceasefire line established at the end of the 1948 war. It was never recognized by any Arab state until after the 1967 war and has been grudgingly accepted recently by states that do not yet recognize the legitimacy of Israel. I have never encountered an Israeli prime minister or chief of staff who considered the '67 borders defensible, and especially so if coupled with an abandonment of a security position along the Jordan river. And maintaining that position makes sense. The '67 borders leave a corridor only eight miles wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put the border of Israel at the edge of its international airport. Moreover, Israel would have to give up settlements containing 200,000 inhabitants (about 4 percent of ______ End of column _______ its Jewish population).

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Once granted, recognition can always be
withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is
a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does for-
mal normalization involve much else:

Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 20
years ago has brought little in the way of
economic or cultural relations? normalization other
than an exchange of ambassadors who are
rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons, the Crown Prince's
proposal is no breakthrough. The call for
America to compose/impose? mark? it goes to the heart of
Israel's ability to survive.

The precariousness of Israel's position is
paradoxical. Israel has never been more
powerful, and at the same time never more
vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly
able to inflict heavy losses on Palestinian
terrorist groups. But it has evolved into a
middle class advanced society and, as such,
the strain of guerrilla warfare is psychologi-
cally draining. As a result, the Intifada has

MIDKISS2

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United States, a sense of resignation is spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on their tormentors is beginning to be offset by signs of a hunger for peace at any price.

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excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to
trigger intervention by the international
community, especially the United States. In
the process, sanctuaries are established—
however dubious their basis in international
law—that, to all practical purposes, elimi-
nate the capacity of the defending forces to
get to the root of the guerrilla challenge.

That process gradually erodes Israel's mar-
gin of survival even while the world's media
and diplomats bewail its excesses.

Torn between a recognition of strategic
necessities and the pull of emotional imper-
atives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into
ambivalent rigidity. The other day, I asked a
high-ranking Israeli army officer what
immediate strategy he advocated for the
current struggle. He replied: an all-out
attack on the Palestinian authority. When
asked what ultimate outcome he expected,
he said the imposition of some version of the
'67 borders.

Yet this progressive demoralization will
not be solved by the imposition of the inde-
fensible '67 frontiers. For after the experi-
ences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the

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rest of the world) that the real division
among Palestinians is not between those
who want peace in the Western sense---as a
point after which the world lives free of ten-
sions with a consciousness of reconciliation.
In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders
holding this view is minuscule. The real
schism is between those who want to bring
about the destruction of Israel by continu-
ing the present struggle, and those who
believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for a renewed
struggle later on.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a
"final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be
replaced by radical successors. A peace
agreement will not quell but may stimulate
the intransigence of Hammas and of radical
states. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an
entrance price into negotiations because his
radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a
peace settlement? Thus the differences
between a permanent and an interim settle-

MIDKISS2 Page 8 of 13

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Yet a less ambitious mediation may have some prospects, if for no other reason than that the status quo is becoming increasingly intolerable for all the parties. The

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Palestinians have fought with dedication and ferocity and produced the classic paradigm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be approaching where the costs of the war exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil society the guerrillas are seeking to establish. For the other Arab states, their impotence on the Palestine issue threatens in

But for the United States to undertake a meaningful mediation, it must be clear about the framework. Will the effort be interpreted as a sign of yielding to terrorism, or as a demonstration of meaningful concern? Is the lesson that September 11 triggered an American role that otherwise might not have occurred, or are acts of violence perceived as delaying a responsible

role? «say better, mark» Will Arafat play the moderating role of Sadat as long as he believes that the Intifada has redeemed Palestinian military prowess? Or will he view America in retreat and Israel

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on the verge of an abyss—toward which he
will push it step by step with the help of out-
side mediation?

These questions cannot be answered in
the abstract, and for that reason alone the
quest for a final settlement is paradoxically
too dangerous. In the present situation, the
Palestinians will not stop because they
believe they have momentum; the Israelis
will not yield because they fear for their exis-
tance.

Only America can bridge this gap, but
only by showing each side how it can achive
less than its maxiumum aim but more than
it can achieve by a continuation of the con-
flict. It must urge Israel toward a peace pro-
gram; it must impress upon its Arab friends
the limits of achievable concessions. Israel
cannot sustain support for its military
actions internationally—or, in the long run,
even in America—without a peace program.

The Palestinians cannot achieve their maxi-
mum objectives except at the risk of destroy-
ing their own society.

The strength of the Bush administration
has been to cut through slogans to underly-
ing realities. On the Palestinian issue, <u>under present circumstances</u> this

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means admitting that a ceasefire must
accompany negotiations and that negotia-
tions in the current place must aim for less
than a final settlement. The administration
should stress that the aim is secure borders,
-------- End of column --------

not the armistice lines of fifty years ago. A
possible interim agreement could envisage
establishing such a border, including the
removal of outlying settlements, the cre-
ation of a Palestinian state«side by side with Israel? mark» with contiguous
territory and the elaboration of a code of
coexistence between the two states. Other
issues would be left to a later negotiation.

The United States should play a major role
in generating such an outcome, provided it
can get Arab agreement to the strategy it
implies. In its absence the United States has
no option except to stand aside. So long as
the United States appears to be gradually
veering toward imposing the '67 borders, it
tempts continuation of the conflict. And
such an outcome would also validate terror-
ism as a form of warfare.

If America is to contribute to genuine
progress, it must back a program that
respects Arab dignity and concerns and

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CREATOR: MWHITA; 03/20/2, 15:48

212 759 0042.ED BY: mwhita; 03/20/02, 3:51 PM

WRITER: MWHITA
FROM: ; 03/20/2
FILE: MIDKISS2-MWHITA-PVT
REVISOR: MWHITA; 03/20/2, 15:48

By Henry A. Kissinger

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepidation.
Hope, because the rage of both parties
is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation,
because both sides know their objectives to
be in many respects incompatible. The
secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of
the status quo. For Palestinians, it is the
imposition of terms reducing Israel to its
1967 borders and facilitating the eventual
destruction of the Jewish state. For

Europeans, it is an outcome very similar to
the 1967 borders plan, which would be guar-
anteed internationally and would reconcile
the Islamic world with the West. For
America, it is a "compromise" that would be
acceptable to all parties and finally end war.

Treaties

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4 04/14

role. These pleas have been given fresh impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967 frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick Cheney's journey to the Middle East, intended to elicit Arab support for a possible showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict... This deflection of attention fromRevisionist to the Palestinian cause is in itself a considerable achievement for Saudi diplomacy. underlying

a principal reason for the near unanimity urging an American role is the hope that, in the end, we will impose on Israel a settlement essentially identical to the Abdullah plan.

In the past 30 years, American diplomacy has been the catalyst for practically all the progress that has been made. But given the explosive politics of the region, it is all too easy to overestimate what is possible. In 2000, the impetuous attempt to settle all issues in one negotiation of limited duration at Camp David contributed to the outbreak of the current warfare.

----- End of column -----

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both sides' positions demonstrates the impossibility of a negotiated final solution.

The only formal offer an Israeli government has ever made regarding a final settlement was presented by Prime Minister Barak at Camp David, where he offered over 90 per- cent of the disputed territories (the formula was vague) but retained about 70 percent of the settlements. In exchange, the Palestinians were asked to renounce the right to return into Israel proper (though they would be free to return to a Palestinian state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has dis- savowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred the Intifada.

According to its impressive outline, Israel would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in return for the normalization of relations with the Arab states. Literally, this would imply Israeli abandonment of all settlements and Arab control of the old city of Jerusalem, including the holy places. The Abdullah plan does not define what is meant by normalization, and is silent about such issues as the right of refugees to return

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PG:

Welcome as it is, the Abdullah plan,
unless modified, represents a restatement of
a position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"-unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with
Israel-was never an international frontier
but a cousefire line established at the end of
the 1948 war. It was never recognized by
any Arab state until after the 1967 war and
has been grudgingly accepted recently by
states that do not yet recognize the legitima-
cy of Israel. I have never encountered an
Israeli prime minister or chief of staff-and I
have known them all-who considered the
'67 borders defensible, and especially so if
coupled with an abandonment of a security
position along the Jordan river. And main-
taining that position makes sense. The '67
borders leave a corridor only eight miles
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the edge of its interna-
tional airport. Moreover, Israel would have
to give up settlements containing 200,000

MIDKISS2

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inhabitants (almost ~~percent~~ of its Jewish population of).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomatic relations with its neighbors. But in almost all other negotiations, mutual recognition of the parties is taken for granted, not treated as a concession. In fact, non-recognition implies the legal non-existence of the other state, which, in the context of the Middle East, is tantamount to an intent to destroy it.

Once granted, recognition can always be withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does formal normalization ~~seem to~~ much else: Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 20 years ago has brought little in the way of economic or cultural normalization other than an exchange of ambassadors who are rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons, the Crown Prince's proposal is no breakthrough. The call for America ~~to impose it is not simply an issue~~ to be imposed on Israel goes a way from its ability to survive.

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vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly
able to inflict disproportionate losses on
Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has
evolved into a middle class advanced society
and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the
Intifada has generated a strange ambiva-
lence in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo
agreement the Israeli peace movement
viewed reconciliation with the Arab world
primarily in terms of psychological reassur-
ance; land would be traded for peace even
though the Arab quid pro quo would be
revocable. But since the Intifada, the vast
majority of Israelis no longer believe in rec-
onciliation; they want victory and the crush-
ing of their Arab adversaries.

----- End of column -----

At the same time, there is a growing sense
of despair over the seeming futility of the
enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli
casualties to that of the guerrillas going up,
and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a
certain point will not be tolerated by the
United States, a sense of resignation is
spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on

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Yet this progressive demoralization will
not be solved by the imposition of the inde-
fensible '67 frontiers. For after the experi-
ences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the
---------- End of column ----------

rest of the world) that the real division
among Palestinians is not between those
who want peace in the Western sense—as a
point after which the world lives free of ten-
sions with a consciousness of reconciliation.
In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders
holding this view is minuscule. The real
schism is between those who want to bring
about the destruction of Israel by continu-
ing the present struggle, and those who
believe that an agreement now would be a

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11./14

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better strategy to rally forces for a renewed
struggle later on. And israelis will be reh
forced in this sense of futility by the West's
response to the intifada, which so often is
directed more against the targets than the
preparations of terrorism.

Even if those Palestinians who sign a
"final" agreement have no afterthoughts, no
one can guarantee that they will not be
replaced by radical successors. A peace
agreement will not quell but may stimulate
the intransigence of Hammas and of radical
states. If, as is asserted, Arafat cannot be
asked to accept a permanent ceasefire as an
entrance price into negotiations because his
radical opponents would have a veto, why
would not the same condition apply after a
peace settlement? Thus the differences
between a permanent and an interim settle-
ment are more a matter of adjectives than
substance.

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What, then, are the alternatives? The
beginning of wisdom is to recognize the
---------- End of column ----------

impossibility of a final settlement under cur-
rent conditions. Some crises can only be
managed, not solved. The constant invoca-
tion of unsustainable goals will foster a gener-
al climate of irresponsibility.

Yet a less ambitious mediation may have
some prospects, if for no other reason than
that the status quo is becoming increasingly
intolerable for all the parties. The
Palestinians have fought with dedication
and ferocity and produced the classic par-
digm of asymmetrical warfare: the guerrilla
wins if he does not lose. Still, a point may be
approaching where the costs of the war
exhaust, or perhaps even destroy, the civil

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15. 13/14

(N)

society the guerrillas are seeking to estab-
lish. For the other Arab states, their impo-
tence on the Palestine issue threatens in
time to radicalize their domestic politics.
They have a stake in a truce even if they are
not able for domestic reasons to support an
overall settlement,

The first is to let the conflict in Palestine
play itself out unless and until one or both of
the parties are willing to adjust their posi-
tion. The second is for a more active
American role in pursuit of more limited
objectives. The former course is difficult to
sustain in the face of pressures from allies
and from friends in the Arab sphere. In the
present situation, the Palestinians will not
stop because they believe they are winning;
the Israelis will not yield because they fear
for their existence, especially if the outcome
rewards terrorism. Only the United States
has a chance, however slight, to bridge that
gulf. It must urge Israel toward a peace pro-
gram; it must impress upon its Arab friends
the limits of achievable concessions.
Israel cannot sustain support for its mili-
tary actions internationally—or, in the long

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run, even in America—without a peace pro-
gram. The Palestinians cannot achieve their
maximum objectives except at the risk of
destroying their own society. A possible
interim agreement could envisage estab-
lishing a secure border, including the
removal of outlying settlements, the cre-
ation of a Palestinian state with contiguous
territory and the elaboration of a code of
coexistence between the two states. Issues
such as the holy places and refugees would
be left to a later negotiation. The United
States should play a major role in generat-
ing such an outcome, provided it can get
Arab agreement to the strategy it implies. So
long as the United States appears to be grad-
ually veeing toward imposing the '67 bor-
ders, it tempts continuation of the conflict.
And such an outcome would also validate
terrorism as a form of warfare.
If America is to contribute to gen-
tine progress, it must help depopulate
the areas of current diplomacy. It must back
a program that respects Arab dignity and
concerns and Israel's necessities for sur-
vival. Drifting is no longer an option.

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TOTAL P.14
TOTAL P.14

Rebecca Jordan

From: Whitaker, Mark [Mark.Whitaker@Newsweek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 4:48 PM
To: 'rjordan@kmaglobal.com'

rebecca-here's in my edited version of henry's piece. he can make any changes overnight, and we'll add them tomorrow. we can go back and forth on the final fitting through friday. many thanks, mark

By Henry A. Kissinger

The reappearance of active American
diplomacy in the Middle East has been
greeted with a mixture of hope and trepida
tion. Hope, because the rage of both parties
is in giving way to exhaustion. Trepidation,
because both sides know their objectives to
be in many respects incompatible. The
secret dream of Israelis is legitimization of
the status quo. For Palestinians, it is the
imposition of terms reducing Israel to its
1967 borders and facilitating the eventual
destruction of the Jewish state. For
Europeans, it is an outcome very similar to
the '67 borders plan, which would be guar
anteed internationally and would reconcile
the Islamic world with the West. For
America, it is a "compromise" that would be
acceptable to all parties and finally end ten
sions.

Many who generally criticize America's
foreign policy (and count among our sins
obliviousness to their advice) are joining the
widespread call for us to play a more active
role. These pleas have been given fresh
impetus by the initiative of Crown Prince
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, which offers nor
malization of relations between the Arab
world and Israel if Israel returns to the 1967
frontiers. Thus Vice President Dick
Cheney's journey to the Middle East,
intended to elicit Arab support for a possible
showdown with Iraq, was reshaped by his
Arab hosts into an occasion for a new initia
tive to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed,
a principal reason for the near unanimity
urging an American role is the hope that, in
the end, we will impose on Israel a settle
ment essentially identical to the Abdullah
plan.

3/20/2002

In present conditions, a comparison of
both sides' positions demonstrates the
impossibility of a negotiated final solution.
The only formal offer an Israeli government
has ever made regarding a final settlement
was presented by Prime Minister Barak at
Camp David, where he offered over 90 per
cent of the disputed territories (the formula
was vague) but retained about 70 percent of
the settlements. In exchange, the
Palestinians were asked to renounce the
right to return into Israel proper (though
they would be free to return to a Palestinian
state). Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has dis
avowed this proposal. Yasir Arafat preferred
the Intifada.

According to its impressive outline, Israel
would return to the dividing lines of 1967 in
return for the normalization of relations
with the Arab states. Literally, this would
imply Israeli abandonment of all settle
ments and Arab control of the old city of
Jerusalem, including the holy places. The
Abdullah plan does not define what is meant
by normalization, and is silent about such
issues as the right of refugees to return
(though it would surely be insisted on in an
actual negotiation).

Welcome as it is, the Abdullah plan,
unless modified, represents a restatement of
a position that has produced the existing
deadlock. The 1967 "borders"-unlike the
Egyptian, Syrian or Jordanian frontiers with
Israel-was never an international frontier
but a ceasefire line established at the end of
the 1948 war. It was never recognized by
any Arab state until after the 1967 war and
has been grudgingly accepted recently by
states that do not yet recognize the legitima
cy of Israel. I have never encountered an
Israeli prime minister or chief of staff-and I
have known them all-who considered the
'67 borders defensible, and especially so if
coupled with an abandonment of a security
position along the Jordan river. And main
taining that position makes sense. The '67
borders leave a corridor only eight miles
wide between Haifa and Tel Aviv and put
the border of Israel at the edge of its interna
tional airport. Moreover, Israel would have
to give up settlements containing 200,000
inhabitants (almost 5 percent of its Jewish
population of).

In return, Israel would achieve diplomat
ic relations with its neighbors. But in almost
all other negotiations, mutual recognition of

3/20/2002

the parties is taken for granted, not treated
as a concession. In fact, non-recognition
implies the legal non-existence of the other
state, which, in the context of the Middle
East, is tantamount to an intent to destroy it.
Once granted, recognition can always be
withdrawn; breaking diplomatic relations is
a recognized diplomatic tool. Nor does for
mal normalization recognize much else:
Israel's peace agreement with Egypt of 20
years ago has brought little in the way of
economic or cultural normalization other
than an exchange of ambassadors who are
rarely brought into play.

For all these reasons, the Crown Prince's
proposal is no breakthrough. The call for
America to impose it is not simply an issue
of diplomatic preference; it goes to the heart
of Israel's ability to survive.

The precariousness of Israel's position is
paradoxical. Israel has never been more
powerful, and at the same time never more
vulnerable. Israel is militarily stronger than
any conceivable Arab adversary; it is clearly
able to inflict disproportionate losses on
Palestinian terrorist groups. But it has
evolved into a middle class advanced society
and, as such, the strain of guerrilla warfare is
psychologically draining. As a result, the
Intifada has generated a strange ambiva
lence in Israeli society. Prior to the Oslo
agreement the Israeli peace movement
viewed reconciliation with the Arab world
primarily in terms of psychological reassur
ance; land would be traded for peace even
though the Arab quid pro quo would be
revocable. But since the Intifada, the vast
majority of Israelis no longer believe in rec
onciliation; they want victory and the crush
ing of their Arab adversaries.

At the same time, there is a growing sense
of despair over the seeming futility of the
enterprise. With the proportion of Israeli
casualties to that of the guerrillas going up,
and the fact that Israel's retaliation beyond a
certain point will not be tolerated by the
United States, a sense of resignation is
spreading in Israel. The desire to turn on
their tormentors is beginning to be offset by
signs of a hunger for peace at any price.
Israel finds itself facing the classic
dynamic of guerrilla warfare as it has played
out for two generations now. The guerrillas
not only do not recoil from terrorism but
practice an egregious form of it because a
violent, emotional (and to bystanders)
excessive retaliation serves their purpose: to
trigger intervention by the international
community. In the process, sanctuaries are
established-however dubious their basis in

3/20/2002

international law-that, to all practical pur
poses, eliminate the capacity of the defend
ing forces to get to the root of the guerrilla
challenge. Tunisia played that role during
the Algerian war; Cambodia and Laos dur
ing the Vietnam war. The pattern is now
recurring with respect to Zone A and the
refugee camps in the West Bank.
The chief difference, however, is that
France in Algeria and America in Vietnam
were fighting on distant territories; they had
the ultimate, albeit painful, option to with
draw. For Israel, survival is at stake, not
colonies or geopolitical interests.
Torn between a recognition of strategic
necessities and the pull of emotional imper
atives, Israel runs the risk of sliding into
ambivalent rigidity. The other day, I asked a
high-ranking Israeli army officer what
immediate strategy he advocated for the
current struggle. He replied: an all-out
attack on the Palestinian authority. When
asked what ultimate outcome he expected,
he said the imposition of some version of the
'67 borders.

Yet this progressive demoralization will
not be solved by the imposition of the inde
fensible '67 frontiers. For after the experi
ences of Oslo, Israelis know (as should the
rest of the world) that the real division
among Palestinians is not between those
who want peace in the Western sense-as a
point after which the world lives free of ten
sions with a consciousness of reconciliation.
In reality, the number of Palestinian leaders
holding this view is minuscule. The real
schism is between those who want to bring
about the destruction of Israel by continu
ing the present struggle, and those who
believe that an agreement now would be a
better strategy to rally forces for a renewed
struggle later on. And Israelis will be rein
forced in this sense of futility by the West's
response to the Intifada, which so often is
directed more against the targets than the
perpetrators of terrorism.

3/20/2002