9

the right of every sovereign state to defend its national security alone

as a last resort.

## Iraq

No issue has been more frequently raised in the campaign
[nearing its] end than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing
on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported
that [course], but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task
[at hand]. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism
is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is [the] radical,
fundamentalist militant fringe of Islam, aiming to overthrow both
moderate Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in
the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many
societies that questioned America's intervention nevertheless have a

10

stake in a successful outcome. If a radical government emerges in
Baghdad because the United States is defeated or tires of solitary
exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-type terrorism, the entire
Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or
struggle for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic
minorities, such as India, will witness a mounting challenge. Terrorism
will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

The international community therefore has a major stake in the
outcome. The US acts as the trustee of global stability even while
domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many
countries. Such a one-sided arrangement cannot continue indefinitely
or indeed much longer. Other nations will find it in their interest to
participate at least in the tasks of political and economic
reconstruction.

11

There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the
restoration of security in Iraq, especially in areas that have become
terrorist sanctuaries, and the holding of elections.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security
forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching the security
effort in too mechanical a spirit. In Vietnam, it took far longer to
make units ready for combat than simply fulfilling the requirements of
a training manual. The effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not
only on their military training but above all on the degree to which the
emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without
political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenaries least
reliable when most needed.

The first national elections are only the first and perhaps least
complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democracy in

12

the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church
independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed
pluralism of religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy
of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which
broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on
competition and the market. None of these conditions exists in the
Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics
inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has come
about only in Turkey and there paradoxically by the imposition of
democratic forms by an autocratic leader. This is not to say that
individually Muslims in the Middle East are incapable of operating
democratic institutions, only that the emergence of such institutions
and of the arrangements which hold them together will take time and

13

faces great cultural and traditional obstacles. It cannot be engineered
as an act of will; it requires patience and modesty.

Special understanding is needed of the obstacles to democracy
in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West,
democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no
institutional obstacle to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral
defeat is considered a temporary setback capable of being reversed.
But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority
status turns into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of
political extinction.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of
three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites
representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two
groups about 20 percent each. For 500 years, the Sunnis have

14

dominated by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with
extraordinary brutality. Thus in Iraq, elections, if confined to majority
rule, imply a radical upheaval in the relative power and status of the
three communities. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a
national struggle against America; it is a means to restore political
dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds
means little if it does not assure a large measure of autonomy while
the Shiites support it to some degree to reverse the historic pattern of
Sunni rule or simply replaces it with Shiite dominance. The Shiites
tolerate the American presence - sometimes ambivalently - to achieve
this goal. It remains to be seen to what extent they continue to do so
as the transfer of power progresses.

The January elections in Iraq, therefore, must be regarded as
the beginning of an extended contest among the various groups with

15

the constant risk that it will lapse into civil war or a national struggle
against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both. All factions maintain
militias for that purpose. It will thus be necessary to supplement the
national electoral process with a significant element of federalism and
to establish clear-cut constitutional protections for those who, in
consequence of a democratic vote, might find themselves in the
minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis
and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government on
local affairs would give the various factions a democratic expression
that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; federalist
structures and the assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience,
and due process of law are constitutionally beyond the reach of any
majority might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various
groups and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

16

In this potential witches' cauldron it is neither in America's interest nor that of Iraq that the US be the sole interlocutor for the emerging Iraqi government regarding its political evolution. Some degree of internationalization is the only realistic course toward political stability. The survival of the political process depends in the first instance on security - for which the United States retains a major responsibility - but ultimately to a significant extent on its international acceptance. An international contact group - under UN auspices - to advise on Iraq's political evolution after the January elections is therefore desirable. Logical members would be countries [having] experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq. Countries [such as] India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, together with the United States, Britain, and other nations to be agreed are logical candidates. This is not an abdication to

17

consensus. The United States, by virtue of its military presence and
financial institutions, would retain a significant role. In the context of
protecting an agreed political evolution, the issue of military
contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised again at a
later stage in a more favorable political environment.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Militant Islam is the most immediate challenge to international
order; nuclear proliferation is the most insidious threat to the survival
of civilization. In a world of multiple nuclear powers, the principles of
deterrence will erode for at least three reasons: it will not always be
clear who is seeking to deter whom; the calculus of deterrence may no
longer be uniform so that the possibilities of miscalculation multiply
exponentially as more states join the nuclear club; nuclear materials

18

may spread into the possession of non-state principals, creating
threats that transcend historic targets of deterrence theory.

Dealing with nuclear proliferation requires a diplomacy that is
inherently preemptive diplomacy; it is meaningful only before the
process of proliferation of a given country has become irreversible.
This makes it difficult - or at least controversial - to demonstrate the
extent and the imminence of the danger. A gap opens up between the
diplomacy of nonproliferation which concentrates on technical issues
while the underlying challenge is political. For the state undertaking
the journey toward proliferation, the motive is never technical. Iran
and North Korea, the two most imminent proliferators, seek to
enhance their power relative to other countries of the region and to
reduce the role of large powers, especially the United States. This is
the exact opposite of the general incentives put before them, which

19

are designed to increase their dependence on foreign countries and
obliges them to rely on the promises of countries against which the
process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

It is therefore likely that an incentive-based diplomacy will fail
and will raise the question of what pressures should be applied. This
will raise again the issue underlying the Iraq debate: to what extent
the United States can pursue such a policy unilaterally. Economic
sanctions are doomed in the absence of support from the major
industrial countries. With regard to the threat or use of military force,
the attitude of neighboring or close-by countries – China with respect
to North Korea, Russia and India with respect to Iran – becomes
especially crucial.

To achieve a successful nonproliferation policy, the newly elected
president will need to clarify these issues. The controversies about the

20

appropriate forum detract from the main task, which should be to decide on a precise program to be negotiated. In Europe, the discussion about the method for dealing with Iran too often is presented as a means to restrain American bellicosity instead of as an elaboration of common purposes. And on North Korea, the dispute concerns whether the United States should negotiate bilaterally with Pyongyang.

It goes without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be resolved diplomatically without the direct participation of the interested parties, including the proliferating country. But in the case of Iran, care must be taken lest proliferation assume a symbolic character in an ongoing Atlantic controversy. The United States has signaled often enough that it is prepared for some dialogue with Iran; but our allies do no one a favor by tempting dialogue designed to

21

enhance the prestige of the regime in Teheran rather than an
outcome. With respect to North Korea, the insistence on US-North
Korea bilateralism would leave America as the sole enforcer of any
agreement at the borders of China. And it would invite Pyongyang to
use the new agreement yet again for future bouts of blackmail on the
pattern it followed after the bilateral agreement of 1994.

The most urgent task for the United States is to clarify together
with other interested parties an answer to the following questions:

(a) How much time is left before the process of proliferation in
North Korea and India becomes irreversible?

(b) If negotiations make progress, what precisely do we insist on, and what concessions or assurances are we prepared to offer in return?

22

If we cannot answer these questions before we go to the table,
the nonproliferation effort bids fair to become a means to legitimize
and promote proliferation rather than avert it.

If the drift continues, the issue of how we would react in the face
of a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin either in this country or
on friendly territory will come before us. There is not much time left
to avert this danger if we do not want to face a choice not too far
down the road on how to impose, together with like-minded nations, a
nonproliferation regime on transgressors.

The Long-Term Challenge

The regional crises - Iraq, North Korea - for all their importance
are dwarfed by the fundamental transfer of power within the
international system. Historians agree that the emergence of a unified

23

Germany over a century ago unbalanced the European system by
introducing a state stronger than each of its neighbors individually.

Disraeli called the event of greater significance than the French
Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging structure would
either imply German hegemony or else could be restored only by an
increasingly rigid alliance system depriving diplomacy of maneuvering
room.

In our age, the emergence of China as a potential superpower is
of even greater significance marking as it does a shift in the center of
gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is
obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its
cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development with
a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe and with
an interior containing a population of perhaps 900 million, some of

24

whom subsisting at a level non significantly better than the least
developed nations.

The impact of China and, a little later on, of India on the
international system will be deeper, wider and more rapid than the
diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure, unlike
Germany, China is unlikely to seek to vindicate its role by military
power. For one thing, China's leaders are – or at least have been –
more careful, more deliberate, more tending to accumulate
advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after
Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war
between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political
option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done
so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Every
leader of every major country – and especially the prudent leaders of

25

China - have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest, as will America.

But the long-term relationship with China should not be driven by expectations of a strategic showdown. In pursuit of that strategy, China will not conduct so imprudent a policy as the Soviet Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United States to a contest of survival. But it will seek the diplomatic and political role to which its growth entitles it.

An interesting recent article described the difference in the diplomatic style of China and the United States as the difference in the major intellectual games, between the West's chess and Chinese go. Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The purpose of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the center of

26

the board. The purpose of go is relative advantage; the game is
played all over the board, and the purpose is to increase one's options
and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than
strategic progress.

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades
from now. But both nations' leaders have a responsibility to affect the
judgments emerging generations make of the challenges they face. In
China, they need to forestall the nationalism which is replacing
Communism from taking a confrontational turn and, in America, it is to
transcend the tendency toward the immediate and the temptation of
viewing history through the prism of the most recent experience rather
than of the long-range view.

China and the United States require a strategic dialogue seeking
a common definition of long-range purposes to make them compatible

27

where possible and to reduce the dangers of confrontation where that
effort fails. They need to keep the Taiwan issue from undermining the
relationship while remembering the importance of solving it by
peaceful means. In relations between China and the United States,
the future of Korea will play an increasingly prominent role. It is not
simply a nonproliferation issue but a challenge for a security system
for all of Northeast Asia involving the nuclear future of many countries.

China's economic renaissance, the rapid growth in India and the
globalization in every corner of the world, beneficent as these
conditions may be for individuals, are creating massive issues of
policy, issues which can be postponed only at peril to the world
economy. The equitable management of access to energy and raw
materials is beyond the capacity of the international system as
presently constituted, requiring [as] it does a minimum of foresight

28

lest we trigger a modern version of the rivalries over commodities of
the colonial era and a commodity pricing crisis which could drive the
world into general recession.

Nor can it be safely assumed that America's deficit on current
account with the rest of the world - now tending toward $700 billion
every year - or the accumulation of America's international debt - now
something like two and half trillion dollars - can be sustained
indefinitely. These imbalances, together with the issues of currency
misalignment and trade policy, must be addressed immediately and
with great seriousness by the new administration - and addressed, not
in isolation, but of necessity with our trading and financial partners
who are as directly affected.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic relations. The political
campaign has cast Atlantic disagreements in terms of American short-

29

term tactical errors. This is a misreading of reality. Tact has not
always distinguished every American statement. But the problem goes
deeper than personalities.

Part of the difficulties is caused because the generation that
formed the Atlantic relationship is passing from the scene. In the
United States, the new leadership group [is] preoccupied with the
challenge of radical Islam; our European allies either do not share
America's assessment of that threat or, to the extent that they do,
believe themselves capable of dealing with it outside the Atlantic
framework. In the United States, the political center of gravity has
shifted to parts of the country whose representatives have fewer
personal connections with Europe and less experience with its internal
challenges than their predecessors who created the postwar structure.

30

In Europe, leaders have been concentrating on transferring
national sovereignty to new European institutions. The host of
technicalities and legal issues this involves is a subject both arcane
and elusive for most Americans, including their leaders. More
fundamentally, the United States conducts its policies as the sovereign
states of Europe did in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth
centuries. The European nations having invented the concept of the
nation-state are now in the process of seeking to abandon their
sovereignty to a European Union not yet possessing the traditional
attributes of the state. They find themselves in a halfway house
between their history and a future still in the process of evolving.

All this has generated a witches' brew of mutual
misunderstandings. In Europe the media rarely emphasize common
transatlantic ties; they use the race problem, the death penalty,

31

differences over the environment, mistreatment of prisoners, as if
aberrations reflected the total meaning of America. Shifting their
emphasis to the UN Security Council, European [foreign policy] feels
no special obligation to support the US view, on occasion actively
opposing it.

The real issue then becomes to what extent the Atlantic
relationship is still special – that is, what will the allies do for the
relationship beyond the international consensus reflected at the UN?
Much of European debate implies that the answer is "very little." To
confine common military action to prior approval of the Security
Council spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a
world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The
relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character –
that is, the United States and Europe should be prepared to do things

32

for each other in the sphere beyond the immediate concepts of interest
and short of an attainable universal consensus.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the
Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is
to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility. The
challenge for Europe is whether it views Atlantic relations as a
partnership or as part of an international system of multipolarity very
similar to pre-World War I Europe, in which major power centers
engage in shifting coalitions to maximize their advantage from case to
case. That system broke down in the early twentieth century; its
modern version is not likely to be more successful.

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher

33

Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual Peace", he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It would come about either by human foresight or by a series of escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice.

That is the ultimate challenge the newly elected President will have to face.

Much of German media debate implies that the answer is "very little."

That answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and
of a world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The
relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character -
that is, the United States and Germany should be prepared to do
things for each other beyond the immediate concepts of interest.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the
Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is
to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if
the international order were composed of many centers of power, even
while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need
for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy

11

prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of long-range
purposes.

The challenge for Europe is to resist the temptation of
"distinctiveness" for its own sake. Criticism of US culture and policy
has been a staple of European opponents of NATO for 50 years. What
is unusual now is that governments in key countries are making no
efforts to stem the tide, occasionally even stirring it up. A groundswell
of public opinion is forming, increasingly defining a "European" or
"German" foreign policy as distinctiveness from the United States.

To be sure, a vital relationship must leave room for
disagreements; indeed, it will benefit from it. But if a special
relationship is to survive and prosper, a sense of partnership must be
restored.

7

It is an evasion and an alibi to blame these tensions on personalities. A change in the American presidency will not alter the basic direction of foreign policy, though the tactics might be more accommodating.

Thus the need is to rise above the immediate controversies. Both sides must ask themselves whether they still have a common or at least comparable global destiny. The debate between unilateralism and multilateralism must be overcome with this perspective in mind. Unilateralism for its own sake is self-defeating. But so is abstract multilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in emphasis on a special national mission; the latter waters down purpose in a quest for a

formal
~~general~~ global consensus.

To achieve a compatible sense of direction, a new dialogue is needed on every level, addressed to three major challenges:

Oct. 17 04 01:49p

P. 1

3746 WORDS

10/17/04

ARTICLE

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in
full swing. But in a few days, what has mesmerized America for three
months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the spinners on
talk shows combining eagerness to please with congenital insecurity,
will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

What will remain are the challenges that generated all the frenzy
brouhaha over the privilege of dealing with them.

[And] these are formidable. No president has ever faced [an
agenda] of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to
reconstruct an international system on a global basis; to conduct a war
without front lines and geographic definition; to develop principles to
win wars and at the same time

Oct 17 04 01:49P

P.2

replace those of the Westphalian order, which went up in the smoke of
the World Trade Center.

The [challenge perhaps] most [analogous] to that [facing] the
[next] president is that inherited by President Truman when the end of
the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central Europe and the
Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But
Truman's task was largely centered on the Atlantic [sphere]. The
Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. [Today's]
[Terror] Las no fixed address; it has
principal threats are abstract and mobile; they have generated attacks
from Bali to Singapore, to Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis,
and New York. In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit
difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe
and an economic program to close the gap between public
expectation and
[Economic statures]
reality, which constituted the greatest threat to domestic stability.

Oct 17 04 01:49p

p. 4

4

fundamentals, America is giving itself a chance to implement a
~~common~~ destination.
until it can be tested in another electoral cycle.

It is to this effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

Every international system reflects the ability to deal with two
sets of challenges: security and legitimacy. Both are unprecedented
in the present period.

The contemporary

unprecedented
terror is
caused by

war on

The security challenge arises from two sources: the gravest
from acts until recently considered the task of internal police forces

perfluorocarbon
or it grows out of a scientific evolution
enabling countries to pose threats to survival as a result of

developments entirely within a state's territory.

The No viiile les cannot more intrude

Both threats make to some extent irrelevant the prevailing
denial of preemption
after two often presented

concept of international elections. The legal basis of the existing
international system was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in

the 20th century

as if it were the personal
invention of President Bush
In fact it is inherent in the structure of
the new international order regardless of
what we seek as序

Oct 17 04 01:50p

p.8

8

Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's decision nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome of the Iraqi crisis. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad because the United States is defeated or [tires] of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-free-chops, the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or fight for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will [witness] a mounting violent challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

The international community therefore has a major stake in the outcome. The US acts as the custodian of global stability even while domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many

Oct 17 04 01:50p

P.9

9

countries, though it is not possible for such a one-sided arrangement

[can continue] indefinitely or indeed much longer.

There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the tasks of political and economic planning, military and humanitarian support.

restoration of security, especially in areas that have become terrorist-controlled and are under attack.

sanctuaries, and the holding of elections. These tasks cannot wait for an international consensus. And with respect to them, America has a global responsibility.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching that enterprise with too mechanical a spirit.

In Vietnam, it took longer to make units combat-ready than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training manual.

And many units that were prepared to risk their lives in defense of their home regions were far less effective when used as a strategic reserve to support an overall design - though, in the end, the

Oct 17 04 01:50p

South Vietnamese forces beat back an all-out North Vietnamese
invasion so long as they had American air support.

[Ultimately] the effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only on their military training but above all on the degree to which the emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenaries least reliable when most needed.

But national elections are only the first and perhaps least
complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democracy in
the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church
independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed
pluralism & religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy
of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which
broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on

Oct 17 04 01:50p

p.11

11

only in Turkey and there only on the basis of imposition over 20 years

middle east

will lead them together

are incapable of operating democratic institutions, only that there

will take time and of all institutions to get an amendment

emergence faces great cultural obstacles and overcoming traditional

patient in the execution of political reform.

engaged as an act of will; it requires patience

rnodety.

Oct 17 04 01:50p

P.12

12

But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority status turns into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of political extinction. In such conditions, political contests are over, but constitutional arrangements to protect the minority by means beyond the electoral process or civil war.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated the other groups by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with this (regardless of whether he was an extraordinary brutality. To them, the democratic process implies a radical change in status. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not against any specific group), only a national struggle (it) is a means to restore political dominance.

By the same token, the political process for the Kurds means little if it is uprooted in the relative power and status of the three main communities.

Oct 17 04 01:51p

p.13

13

[degree] to reverse the historic pattern of Iraq rule. The Shiites

tolerate the American presence - ambivalently - to achieve this goal.

The January elections [in Iraq], therefore, are not the end of a

process but the beginning of an extended [contest among] the various

groups with the constant risk that [they] will resort to civil war or a

national struggle against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both - indeed,

[they] maintain militias as a last resort. It thus seems necessary to

supplement the national political process with a significant element of

federalism. This would give the various factions a democratic

expression that coincides with an operational democratic consensus: it

CYJ

Jessee Incao

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com

Sent: Monday, October 18, 2004 3:22 PM

To: jincao@kmaglobal.com

Subject: Message for Dr. Kissinger

t p 1 3

Comments on the article

1. A suggested insert on the economic challenges:

Perhaps something along the following lines, taking the cue from the language at the bottom of page 24 and the top of page 25.

"Finally, China's economic renaissance, the rapid growth in India, and the globalization in every corner of the world, beneficent as these conditions may be for individuals, are creating massive issues of policy, issues which can be postponed only at peril to the world economy. The equitable management of access to energy and raw materials is beyond the capacity of the international system as presently constituted, requiring it does a minimum of foresight lest we trigger a modern version of the rivalries over commodities of the colonial era, and a commodity pricing crisis which could drive the world into general recession.

"Nor can it be safely assumed that America's deficit on current account with the rest of the world -- now tending toward the rather tidy sum of $700 billion every year -- or the accumulation of America's international debt -- now something like two and half trillion dollars -- can be sustained for long. These imbalances, together with the issues of currency misalignment and trade policy, must be addressed immediately, and with great seriousness, by the new Administration -- and addressed, not in isolation, but of necessity with our trading and financial partners who are as directly affected as we. Unilateralism is by definition impossible in international economics."

2. Another on constitutional guarantees.

The discussion on page 13 might be interpreted by some as a suggestion that the one device needed to resolve the tensions between the three religious communities in Iraq is federalism. Consider amending the language from the bottom of page 13 to the top of page 14 as follows:

"It will thus be necessary to supplement the national electoral process with a significant element of federalism, and to establish clear cut constitutional protections for those who, in consequence of a democratic vote, might find themselves in the minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government on local affairs would give the various factions a democratic expression that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; federalist structures, and the assured assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience, and due process of law are constitutionally and forever beyond the reach of any majority, might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various groups, and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible."

This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

William Rogers
Arnold & Porter LLP
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1202

William_Rogers@aporter.com

Telephone: 202-942-5915

Fax: 202-942-5999

1

Oct 17 04 01:51p

p.15

15

to create a contact group to advise on Iraq's political evolution after the January elections. Logical members would be countries [having] military experience with military Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq, such as India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, together with the United States, Britain, and other nations to be agreed. In the context of a common approach to a political evolution, the issue of military protection against an agreed upon political evolution, the issue of contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised at a later stage. [This is not an abolition & censure by United States military presence + financing. The United States would retain a significant role.]

**Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Oct 17 04 01:51p

P. 18

18

about the appropriate forum detract from the main task, which should
be to decide on a precise program to be negotiated. In Europe, the
discussion about the method for dealing with Iran too often is
presented as a means to restrain American bellicosity instead of as an
elaboration of common purposes. And on North Korea, the dispute
concerns whether the United States should negotiate bilaterally with
Pyongyang.

It goes without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be
resolved diplomatically without the direct participation of the
interested parties, including the proliferating country. But in the case
of Iran, care must be taken lest proliferation assume a symbolic
character in an ongoing Atlantic controversy. And with respect to
North Korea, the insistence on US-North Korea bilateralism would
leave America as the sole enforcer of any agreement at the borders of

Oct 19 04 10:40a

Oct 17 04 01:52p

P.2

P.21

21

French Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging balance of-

power would imply German hegemony or also could be restored only

by [an] increasingly rigid alliance system, dequiring diplomatic
of menacwing room.

The emergence of China as a potential superpower is of even
in vone age)
greater significance marking as it does a shift in the center of gravity
of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is obliged to
grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its cohesion as it
undertakes the unprecedented task of development with a living
standard along the coast approaching that of Europe and with an
interior containing a population of perhaps 900 million, some of whom

with a level of some of the least developed nations. // The impact of
not significantly better than

China and, a little later on, of India on the international system will
be deeper, wider + more rapidl than

exceed the diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure,

Oct 19 04 10:40a

Oct 17 04 01:52p

p.3

p.22

22

military power. For one thing, China's leaders are - or at least have been - more careful, more deliberate, more tending to accumulate advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Every leader of every major country - and especially the prudent leaders of China - have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest, as will America. But the fundamental relationship with China should not be dominated by strategic considerations. China will not conduct so imprudent a policy as the Soviet Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United

Oct 19 04 10:40a

Oct 17 04 01:52p

P. 4

P. 23

23

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades
from now. But both nations' leaders have a responsibility to affect the
judgments emerging generations make of the challenges they face. In
China, they need to forestall the nationalism which is replacing
Communism from taking a confrontational turn and, in America, it is to
transcend the tendency toward the immediate and of viewing history
through the prism of the most recent experience rather than of the
long-range view.

An interesting recent article described the difference in national
style as the difference in the major intellectual games, between chess
and go. Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The
purpose of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the

Oct 19 04 10:41a

Oct 17 04 01:52p

p.6

p.24

24

center of the board. The purpose of go is relative advantage; the game is played all over the board, and the purpose is to increase one's options and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than strategic progress.

China and the United States require a strategic dialogue focused on the short term then on a common definition of long-range purposes. They need to keep the Taiwan issue from undermining the relationship while remembering the importance of solving it by peaceful means. In relations between China and the United States, the future of Korea will play an increasingly prominent role. It is not simply a non-proliferation issue but a challenge for a security system for all of Northeast Asia involving the nuclear future of many countries.

Finally, the process of globalization will raise [the] issue of energy supplies and access to raw materials beyond the capacity of

Oct 19 04 10:41a

P.7

In the United States, they are preoccupied with the
challenge of radical Islam; in Europe, our allies either do not share
America's assessment of that threat or, to the extent that they do,
believe themselves capable of dealing with it outside the Atlantic
framework. In the United States, the political center of gravity has
shifted to parts of the country whose representatives have fewer
personal connections with Europe and less experience with its internal
challenges than their predecessors who created the postwar structure.

Leaders have been concentrating on transferring
national sovereignty to new European institutions. The host of
technicalities and legal issues this involves is a subject both arcane
and elusive for most Americans, including their leaders. More
fundamentally, the United States conducts its policies as the sovereign
states of Europe did in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. The

Oct 19 04 10:41a

p. 8

All this has generated a witches' brew of mutual misunderstandings. In Germany, the media rarely emphasize common transatlantic ties; they use the race problem, the death penalty, differences over the environment, mistreatment of prisoners, as if aberrations reflected the total meaning of America. Shifting emphasis to the UN Security Council, German foreign policy feels no special obligation to support the US view, on occasion actively opposing it.

Oct 19 04 10:47a

P.1

Oct 17 04 01:52p

P.26

26

Much of European debate implies that the answer is "very little." That
& military action & pending approval of a
answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a

in the sphere of interest and short
for each other beyond the immediate concepts of interest and
of an attainable unmental consensus.

while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. The challenge for

have to face.

Oct 19 04 10:51a

Oct 17 04 01:52p

of an international system of multipolarity very similar to pre-World
War I Europe in which major power centers engage in shifting
coalitions to maximize their advantage from case to case. That
system broke down in the early twentieth century; its modern version
is not likely to be more successful.

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher
Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual
Peace", he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It
would come about either by human foresight or by a series of
escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice.