6

September 14, 1959

Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric
15 Broad
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Gilpatric:

An important part of the Harvard Defense Studies Program is our graduate seminar in Defense Policy and Administration. We are hoping that you will meet with the members of this seminar on Wednesday, December 9th, to discuss the defense budget -- the budget and the budget process as instruments for policy making and administration.

The Defense Policy Seminar seeks to train the ablest graduate students at Harvard for future public service or for future academic work in the field of national security policy. The student body of the Seminar is a carefully selected group drawn from the Law School, the School of Business Administration, the School of Public Administration and the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. Each member, in addition to participating in the Seminar, is a member of a smaller group for discussion, with discussion focusing around either basic strategic concepts or organization and strategy. To indicate the general orientation of the Seminar a copy of the Syllabus is enclosed.

The Seminar meets from 4-6 P.M. The usual procedure is for the speaker to give a presentation of about 50 minutes as a leadoff for discussion during the second hour.

We are all hopeful that you will be able to be with us December 9th.

With best regards.

Enc.

Henry V. Klausinger

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

having you with us.

we are greatly looking forward to
ments for your visit. In the meantime
in November to make specific arrange-
ments for your visit. In the meantime
I will be in touch with you

September 18.

send you noted in your letter of
Sergels Nos. 62 and 155 and the RVND
I am sending under separate cover.
on December 3rd on defense budgeting.
agrees the Defense Policy Seminar
We are delighted you will

Dear Roy:

New York 2, New York
12 Broad Street
Cranښ, Swain & Moore
Mr. Roswell P. Gilburtic

September 3, 1929

November 20, 1959

Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatric
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
15 Broad Street
New York 5, New York

Dear Mr. Gilpatrick:

All of us are looking forward to your visit to the Defense
Policy Seminar on December 9th. I know that you lead a fairly hectic
life and it is good of you to take time out to come up here. Needless
to say, it will be a great personal pleasure to see you again.

You will find the Seminar somewhat larger than the one with
which you are familiar. With auditors, we have close to 80 people in
the room. Our usual method of conducting the Seminar is for the
speaker to hold forth for up to an hour and then answer questions.
I am enclosing a syllabus which explains the sequence of topics. The
reading we have assigned for your topic can be found under Section #10.

As for the content of your talk, this is a topic on which I
have heard you speak so often and so well that I hardly dare to make
suggestions. It would seem to me, however, that you might perhaps
address yourself to some problems such as these:

(1) A brief description of the mechanics of the budgetry
process. That is, how the military budget is arrived at as a matter
of fact.

(2) The interplay between strategic requirements and fiscal
considerations.

(3) The relationship of the civilian component of the
Defense Department to the military part in determining the budget.

(4) Your own reaction to the process as it now exists,
perhaps with reference to such questions as these:

(a) Some say that an ideal defense budget process would
require military leaders to state clearly what alternative
budgets would buy. This would include alternatives not only
as to numbers of planes, ships, or combat divisions but also
more precise information as to effective units and operational
capabilities. To what extent is this possible; is it now
being done? What are some of the problems involved?

Mr. Roswell L. Gilpatrick

2.

November 20, 1959

(b) To what extent is it possible, under existing budgetary procedures, to learn how much defense money goes for air defense, for anti-submarine warfare or for strategic air power?

(c) Two ways may be said to exist in determining defense requirements:

(1) Pre-determine, as a matter of fiscal policy, a dollar limit for defense expenditures, and shape requirements to fit this limit.

(2) Ascertain defense requirements, given national policy and objectives, Sino-Soviet capabilities and intentions and the international environment, and then see if funds can be made available to meet these requirements.

At what point in the policy process must "ceilings" and budgetary limits be placed? Is approach No. 1, above, inevitable?

(d) What organizational and procedural changes are required in producing a budgetary system that corresponds more closely to a coherent strategic doctrine?

(e) How meaningful is Congressional power of the purse today in defense policy and military strategy?

(5) If at all possible, could you make an analysis of this year's budget, particularly along the lines that I have often heard you make both at the Council and at the Special Studies?

I know this is a tall order, and of course you should not feel either limited by it or obliged to cover every point.

Best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Henry A. Kissinger

HARVARD DEFENSE POLICY SEMINAR, 1959-60

Some Questions for Mr. Roswell Gilpatric --
Defense Policy Seminar Sessions of 9 December

1. Some say that an ideal defense budget process would require military leaders to state clearly what alternative budgets would buy. This would include alternatives not only as to numbers of planes, ships, or combat divisions but also more precise information as to effective units and operational capabilities. To what extent is this possible; is it now being done? What are some of the problems involved?

2. To what extent is it possible, under existing budgetary procedures, to learn how much defense money goes for air defense, for anti-submarine warfare or for strategic air power?

3. Two ways may be said to exist in determining defense requirements:

4. Why cannot a budget-cycle be extended to cover a two-year period (a Congressional term) instead of the existing one-year cycle?

5. How meaningful is Congressional power of the purse today in defense policy and military strategy?

6. What organizational and procedural changes are required in producing a budgetary system that corresponds more closely to a coherent strategic doctrine?

doctrine?

c. What organizational and procedural changes are required in producing a systematically coherent that corresponds more closely to a coherent strategic doctrine?

b. How meaningful is Congressional power of the bume today in defense policy and military strategy?

2. How meaningful is Congressional power of the bume today in defense policy? Is this power 'inadequate'?

a. What Congressional term) instead of the existing one-year cycle?

4. Why cannot a budget-cycle be extended to cover a two-year period?

be placed? Is this approach No. 1, 'appraisal', inadequate?

It what point in the budget process must 'ceiling' and 'pallet' limits can be made available to meet these requirements.

and the international environment, and then see if they can

and objectives, 'sino-soiet capabilities and interactions

(2) Vacant defense requirements, given national budget

to fit this limit.

limit for defense expenditures, and also requirements

(1) Pre-determination, as a matter of fiscal policy, a dollar

3. Two ways may be said to exist in determining defense requirements: to learn how much defense money goes for air defense, for anti-aircraft

mature or for strategic air power?

2. To what extent is it possible, under existing budgetary constraints, to learn how much defense money goes for air defense, for anti-aircraft

operational capabilities. To what extent is this possible? Is it now
divisional put also more precise information as to effective units and
include alternatives not only as to numbers of planes, ships, or combat
leaders to state clearly what alternative budgets would be. This would
I. some say that an ideal defense budget process would require military

Defense Policy Seminar, Sessions of a December,

Some Questions for Mr. Russell Gilchrist —

HYDRAVOR DEFENSE POLICY SEMINAR, 1929-30

FROM: Elizabeth

TO: Kissinger

DEFENSE POLICY SEMINAR, 19 October

Walt Whitman Rostow

Education -- Ph.D Yale, Rhodes Scholar

Past -- Has taught at Columbia University, Oxford and Cambridge Universities, currently at MIT.

1945-46, assistant chief German-Austrian economic division of the State Department

1947-49, assistant to executive secretary, Economic Commission for Europe

Currently -- At MIT Center for International Studies

Publications

The American Diplomatic Revolution (1947)

Essays on the British Economy of the 19th Century (1948)

The Process of Economic Growth (1952)

With collaborators --

The Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy
1790-1850 (1953)

The Dynamics of Soviet Society (1953)

The Prospects for Communist China (1954)

An American Policy in Asia (1955)

The United States in the World Arena (1960) assigned

An American Policy in Asia-

A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (1957)