Henry Kissinger

Global Geopolitical Environment
South Africa Top Management Forum

October 24, 1996

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen

When I listened to the introduction, I learned something about the fluidity of American business because two of the companies on whose boards I have served have been sold from under me so the boards no longer exist; CBS was taken over by Westinghouse and Macys was taken over by Federated Department Stores, which makes all the companies on whose boards I still serve extremely nervous. As the Chairman pointed out, I was National Security Adviser and Secretary of State (in fact for two years I was both National Security Adviser and Secretary of State) and the only reason I mention it is because, never before and never since, have relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those years.

I am here to talk to you about international events, and you of course being South Africans will want to know what I think about South Africa. The fact of the matter is that I have not been here for an extended period in 14 years, though I was here for 48 hours, together with Lord Carrington undertaking a mediation between the Incatha and the ANC a couple of years ago. It was one of the most successful mediations ever because we were able to decide in 48 hours that we had absolutely nothing to do and left the parties to their own devices. A week later they came up with a solution that we could never have imagined, and certainly would never have been able to get accepted on our own. So I thought that what I would talk to you about is how America views foreign policy in general at this moment and that you might thereby get some understanding of where Africa comes in. Then, at the end, I will make some observations about South Africa. A group that has heard so many distinguished South Africans does not need my view on what is going on in South Africa. Though actually one of my incentives, quite frankly, in accepting this invitation was to educate myself on South Africa. I am spending six days here which, on the one hand, is not that much but on the other is three times more than I usually get to spend in a country as I flit around the world, so it is some testimony to the importance I attach to your country.

Let me talk first in general terms about American foreign policy so that when I do get to Africa you
will have some context on which to work.

The first thing I want to say, and which will be shocking to you, is that there is no such thing as a
clear-cut American foreign policy at this moment. I am not saying this because I am a Republican
and will suffer in two weeks when I look at the election results. Nor is it said as a criticism of the
existing foreign policy, only as a comment on the state of mind of America at this particular
moment in history.

Whenever I travel around the world, people keep assigning profound courtesies to America and its
long-ranging foreign policies. But the fact is that America has been historically an isolationist
country. I would hate to take a poll in our Congress to see how many members could find
Johannesburg or Durban or Cape Town on the map. And if you take away the Afro-American
group, how many people would really know exactly where South Africa is located - though you
could say the same thing about Romania, Poland and almost any other country. Americans got it
wrong in world affairs at the end of World War II because, to our amazement, we found that we
were the only non-Communist country strong enough to resist the Soviet Union. At first the
American leaders thought that Britain would take that role. For the secret dream of American
leaders at the end of World War II was to trade in our tanks and aeroplanes and be non-committed
as they mediated between Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. It took about a year to
figure out that this was not to be. President Truman sent an emissary to both Stalin and Churchill,
as if they were the same phenomena, to see what America could do to resolve their differences.
The emissary who went to Moscow wrote the following report, saying "I certainly understood that
all that Churchill is interested in is the British national interest". What exactly did he expect? A
British Prime Minister is of course interested in the national interest of Britain, yet that was the
great discovery of Sir David, who was then Ambassador.

Then came the Cold War. In the Cold War the United States for many years had an atomic
monopoly. We also had 51% of the world's GNP for a while. In those conditions, foreign policy is

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relatively easy, being a question of allocating resources. We had our Marshall Plan, the Point Four program and the Japanese recovery, all of it with American governmental resources, something which is now absolutely out of the question. I asked somebody today, "What do you want from America" and he said "a Marshall Plan". Fantastic! But it cannot happen, being absolutely, totally, out of the question. Conditions have totally changed. But for those forty years we in America were in an ideal position, ideal in this sense that America had always thought of itself as being superior to Europe, having turned its back on Europe, and that it represented a superior moral dispensation. We thought that we had a moral mission to resist evil all over the world. When Communism was the enemy, this was a relatively simple equation. We had an ideological enemy and we had a physical enemy, and we could apply the same methods that we had in World War II and that had overcome the Great Depression. We dealt with economic dislocation by mobilizing governmental programmes and dealt with the Soviet Union by mobilizing containment all around the Soviet perimeter. Even in my day, as Secretary of State, I was triggered into Africa by Cuban forces. We decided that we had to prevent their infiltration by identifying ourselves with the wishes of the majority - a recurrence of a situation in which we were on the wrong side of all the upheavals in Africa.

In 1989 and thereafter the Cold War ended. Now there is no longer a clear-cut anything, and no clear pattern in the ideological sense. So the question is; what is the purpose of American foreign policy? Why do we need a foreign policy at all? In our Congress right now, foreign policy is a very unpopular topic. During their recesses, our Congressman used to take trips around the world at government expense in order to, allegedly, educate themselves on votes on foreign policy. That is not happening anymore because their constituencies say that foreign travel means they are neglecting their duties. In Germany, for example, as Chancellor Kohl pointed out to me, not a single member of our House of Representatives has gone to Germany during the last eighteen months - which is unheard of. That shows a certain lack of interest but it also creates for the United States the problem of deciding what we are trying to do in the world. In America, historically, the national interest has been unpopular, the idea being that it is our duty to spread democracy and stand up for the moral causes all around the world and to let others worry about the balance of power. This is a beautiful idea, so long as somebody always worries about the balance

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of power. But when you are the only country that is in a position militarily to protect what there is
of the balance of power, you cannot conduct such a policy.

For example, suddenly we have 20,000 troops in Bosnia and we keep reading in the newspapers
about the Talleban forces running around Afghanistan, maybe even going to Tadjikistan. There is
no consensus on what this means and everybody is afraid to take a position. One Saturday night on
television there were two teams debating, a Republican team and a Democratic team, four on each
side. I was one of the Republicans and I talked about foreign policy. It was amazing that none of
the Republicans said anything to support me because they did not want to get involved in foreign
policy, while none of the Democrats answered me. I was making a wholesale criticism of the
Administration, but here not one of the four Democrats said, just a minute it's unfair, we are doing
very well. They just brushed it aside and went back to the basic politics. If I had spoken in Swahili
I would have got the same reaction as I did to my eloquent phrases. Not only did they not answer
me but when I had the right to question the other side for ten minutes I asked them all about
foreign policy. If they had been grading the debate, I would have won overwhelmingly, because in
that ten-minute session they did not answer my questions. I would say one thing and they would
come back with some domestic point. What I am trying to convey is the mood of America today.
When there is a crisis, you get some statement but there is no long-term support for anything that I
can see.

Part of it may be due to the fact that we have a whole new breed of politicians. When I started out
in politics, I worked for Nelson Rockefeller. He had the naive idea that you become President by
having the best programme. So he and I worked like crazy to attract the leading intellectuals of the
country. We would spend three evenings a week plus Sundays developing a programme while
Richard Nixon was running around the country getting delegates. Of course we lost the election,
and now no candidate is foolish enough to spend time on such things. What they spend time on is
studying what they might say to get the maximum result on the evening television. Then they start
worrying about next week's television. The result of this is that you get a fragmented kind of
thinking about foreign policy. About fifteen years ago the leading politicians used to ask me what
to think; today they ask me what to say. Therefore you get, even in our leadership groups, a very

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fragmented way of thinking and which is compounded by one other thing that I think everyone will understand. We are perhaps 20 years ahead of you in this, maybe more maybe less, this shift in thinking, in gaining knowledge from concepts to gaining it from pictures. If you look at the history of knowledge, in the medieval period there was no way of storing knowledge because there wasn't paper or printing, and therefore you had to write it all out. Knowledge was not secular, and you learned by memory, which meant that there was only a finite store of knowledge. Then came books, printing and paper and it became possible to store a lot more knowledge, though not all the knowledge you could have. Thus we had to develop concepts, and these enabled us to understand comparable situations and to project them into the future. I was brought up on books as I guess most of you were, but the modern generation of Americans, that is anyone below 30, is being brought up on pictures. They learn from computers and from computerspeak, and that is a totally different kind of knowledge. I am not saying it is worse or better, but it is different. A frie. Und of mine has a 16 year-old son who was going off to Europe. He asked his son, "what is the capital of Spain?", and the boy didn't know. "You mean I'm paying for your trip to Europe and you don't know what the capital of Spain is?" The son answered: "why should I learn what the capital of Spain is when I have a computer. If I want to know what it is I can get it in 30 seconds".

What we now have is a range of knowledge that is unprecedented. I read somewhere that the real problem we have is that when you ask your computer a question, there is so much knowledge stored in there that it will give you only the first 100 ideas. Then the trick is to get the next 9,000. There is a huge amount of knowledge out there but no capacity to integrate it. For policy-makers, the trick is not knowledge - you can always hire people to collect knowledge - but to project the present into the future and to take your society from where it is to where it has never been. And this no computer can tell you how to do. The computer can just tell you where you are, more or less. So at least at this point in our knowledge, what we are expanding is not our knowledge but our imaginations. And our politics is becoming very sentimental and very emotional but not very rationalistic. All this has to be understood, and it is a particular problem of the moment, when the entire world is changing simultaneously.

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The United States faces a world which is totally different from the one before. We have to conduct foreign policy with 140 different nations and from a position we have never been in before - namely that we can neither dominate nor escape our world and now have to do what other nations have had to do for centuries - work out a system of reward and punishment by which to achieve our objectives in stages. The European nation state, which still dominated the world fifty years ago, has become too small for a global role. The nation states of Europe are trying to come together and almost all European energies are being absorbed in the issue of unification. There is no real global European policy. The French want to get involved globally, but they cannot make any particular contribution, cannot affect economic aid or do much in a military sense, so it too is out of scale.

The problem of European unification is one of extraordinary complexity. They may unify and create a common currency but then the Central Bank will demand that they restructure, which it will certainly do. Austerity will result from the decisions of a non-effective Central Bank composed of nationals different from those who have to make the actual sacrifices. Can that work? I don't know, but it is the unanswered question of Europe and, until it is resolved, Europe will be a marginal player. Nor can America really participate in that process.

Take the case of Russia. For 400 years Russia has been expanding. Russian foreign policy has been expansion into empty or semi-empty spaces. Imperialism has been an integral aspect of Russia throughout its history. Communism has collapsed but the empire too has collapsed. For many Russians, the loss of Communism is not as great as the loss of empire - a total change in the world's picture. How should America react to this, and what is it we should draw from Russia? The attitude of most Americans is to try to discover some nice, democratic Russians - a replay of the secret dream of most Americans that all foreigners are really incipient Americans. I have a friend who claims that there is no such thing as an English accent. He thinks the English put it on to intimidate Americans, and that you can capture an Englishman unawares by waking him up at 4 in the morning and he'll talk like a normal human being.

In Russia the problem is that law and order have broken down, that legitimacy has sort of broken down, and that a brutal contest is being waged between various power groups - most of which

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used to run the old Soviet economy. Speeches by Americans that talk about the virtues of pluralistic democracy do not find huge audiences over there. The problem we have with Russia is this: can we get them to stay within their borders? St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok. Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they ought not to feel so claustrophobic. But those of you who do business in Central Asia or Eastern Europe know that all the neighbours of Russia are scared to death of Russia. It is a fact of life and any foreign policy that does not address this is engaging in an academic enterprise.

These are the sorts of things we are now working out in the United States. In addition there is the problem that the energy resources of the world are almost certainly going to run out - at any rate decline - as China, India, Saudi Arabia, Asia and Latin America industrialise. There is a huge pool of untapped energy in Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Now if they all become dominated by Russia, Russia will suddenly emerge as a dominant country in the energy field. On the other hand, how can we in the West have an influence on Central Asia? One way to do it would be via Turkey but (a) Turkey is getting kicked around in the name of human rights and (b) it is part of the fundamentalist wave sweeping the Middle East. Or, take the problem of China, with a population of a billion and which has governed itself for five thousand years. They feel that they have managed quite well without the benefit of advice from the United States for the greater part of that history. They do not necessarily believe that we have the right to tell them how to organise themselves, though it has become one of the driving elements of American foreign policy to tell everybody how to have democratic institutions. As China develops, its very existence is going to become a huge economic reality for its neighbors.

Now, with respect to the Middle East: the Middle East is viewed primarily in terms of the Arab/Israeli problem, though I think the Arab/Israeli part of it is relatively simple, because the most difficult aspect is Palestine, where 2 million Arabs and 5 million Jews are living in a territory that is 50 miles wide. When you look at it on the map, it looks very big but you can in fact drive from the Jordan River to the coast in an hour and a half through both the Palestinian and the Israeli parts.

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When I was Secretary of State I tried to convince the Israelis to give Jericho to Jordan as a symbol of making progress. I was extremely irritated with them, until a few years later when I drove from Jerusalem to Jericho. It took about 35 minutes, being really a suburb of Jerusalem. Then it took on a new significance for me. But I do think that problem will be settled, perhaps not with some great agreement but more along the lines of set constitutional arrangements in which everybody's possibilities are recognized. The big new problem is the growth of fundamentalism in the Islamic world. If Egypt, Turkey or Algeria (or all three of them) become fundamentalist, then the turmoil in this area will become uncontrollable because Saudi Arabia will then fall under enormous pressure which by itself it is not be capable of resisting. At that point another energy crisis will become almost certain. You have to remember that the last energy crisis was not really an energy crisis but a crisis in expectation. For there was no real assurance of energy if everybody's consumption had stayed at the previous levels. What produced the energy crisis was that everybody was expecting an energy crisis and started increasing their oil supplies and that produced a true shortage of energy. It was a relatively minor incident, so imagine what would happen if a major country - say Egypt or Turkey or both - turned fundamentalist. Those are the things to worry about in the Middle East.

I mention all this so that you can get some understanding of Africa - of Africa and America. I am one of the most frequent speakers at high-level conferences in America. I speak to groups on foreign policy and to communications groups. I am never asked a questions about Africa. Though this may upset you, I can assure you that I am never asked about Africa. But now I run an international consulting company. We advise companies which want to invest abroad. Sometimes we advise them and sometimes we actually help them. It is another fact of life that I have never had a client who asked me about South Africa. They ask about China or Indonesia or Malaysia or any country of South East Asia, many countries of Latin America, many countries of the old Soviet Union to some extent, and of course all the European countries. But never about South Africa. What does that mean? It means that there is no huge concern about what is happening in South Africa, that most people still think it is really a case of people murdering each other in Central Africa and that there's nothing we can do about it except to give a little money. South Africa is different however, because South Africa ought to be attractive. The legal system is

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quite well organised and you have major corporations. Even if somebody did ask my opinion, I could give them better advice about where to go in South Africa than I could about Ecuador. But it has never happened. Not many people expect me to know much about Africa. My own views about Africa were in fact late in developing, and I am being perfectly frank when I say that, when I was in office, there were openings to China, openings to Russia, settling of the Middle East crisis, and relations with Europe. Then in about 1974 Cuban troops appeared in Southern Africa. The American Congress did not permit any resistance to them, and I decided then that it was absolutely essential for the United States to become very active in promoting majority rule for what was then Rhodesia. In 1982 I was invited here by the De Beers Institute and I made a speech which was not all that popular at the time. In it I pointed out that even the best-disposed Americans are shaped and bound by their deeply held national ideals and that South Africans must not deceive themselves with comforting thoughts about strategic resources illuminating the nature of moral and political differences. I warned that even the most geopolitical- and anti-communist-oriented Americans cannot fail to take into account the aspirations and convictions of the preponderant majority of this continent and that those who wished South Africa well would not be able to find common ground with a system of institutionalised racial discrimination. I went on like this for about another fifteen minutes, but that was my basic conviction. I also had the great privilege of meeting President Mandela, whom I have met six or seven times since and am going to meet again tomorrow. I am extremely sympathetic towards the future of South Africa. The problem is, what can be done and what is its role? I think it is very important that South Africa succeed as a multi-ethnic market-oriented state. Because, if South Africa succeeds on its present course, it will be a symbol for all the rest of Africa and it will become simpler for Americans to take another look at Africa, especially South Africa, and can then perform many useful functions.

But how to get to this point? First of all, too many South African contacts up to now have been with Americans and through America. They have played an honourable and important role but it is important to get across the idea that South Africa is a country of 41 million with huge resources, a major country of potentially huge economic capacity and independently of racial competition. Secondly, a better job has to be done of explaining to the American business community what the possibilities are in Africa. After all, if businessmen are willing to run risks in Russia and in Indonesia

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(which is going to have a succession problem) and in many other countries I could name, it seems
to me that the risks in South Africa are lower than they are in some of those countries. But up to
now there has not been in the American business community any interest in the possibilities here.
In part this is due to the fact that so much attention has been lavished - correctly - on the
independence struggle so that people forget that you now have a new society which has to make its
own way in the present economic conditions. And in those conditions there is next to no
government capital at the moment or big economic aid programmes. As we cut Medicare and
Social Security to some extent, it becomes impossible to justify huge expenditures abroad at a time
when we are cutting domestic expenditures. Maybe it shouldn't be that way, but it is a fact of life.
Private capital is politically neutral, and goes where its backers think they have the best
opportunities - or where people do the best advertising job, or both. This is the big challenge that
South Africa now faces. In terms of foreign policy, I keep getting asked whether South Africa
should have relations with Libya or Cuba or Taiwan, or whatever? I am personally indifferent for
this is a South African problem. We have our own American policy towards these countries and
unless you do something in conjunction with them that is aggressive or against our interest, I really
do not think it is worthy of a big debate between our two countries. Your leaders have to
determine what is in your own national interest, and in general it is my view that the United States
should not mix too much in what are essentially the domestic issues of other countries but
concentrate on their foreign policies.

So this is the situation as I see it. It is in some respects discouraging for the short term, on the
other hand we are at the beginning of a new period - here in this country but also in America. And
America cannot escape from participating in the world. It took us five years after the end of World
War II to define Europe. The Cold War has only been over three or four years and it may take a
little longer this time but is the exercise in which we are now engaged. And that is why I take the
liberty of talking to you more about America than about South Africa, in addition to the fact that
you obviously know more about South Africans than you do about Americans.

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Henry Kissinger

October 24, 1996

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(which is going to have a succession problem) and in many other countries I could name, it seems to me that the risks in South Africa are lower than they are in some of those countries. But up to now there has not been in the American business community any interest in the possibilities here. In part this is due to the fact that so much attention has been lavished - correctly - on the independence struggle so that people forget that you now have a new society which has to make its own way in the present economic conditions. And in those conditions there is next to no government capital at the moment or big economic aid programmes. As we cut Medicare and Social Security to some extent, it becomes impossible to justify huge expenditures abroad at a time when we are cutting domestic expenditures. Maybe it shouldn't be that way, but it is a fact of life. Private capital is politically neutral, and goes where its backers think they have the best opportunities - or where people do the best advertising job, or both. This is the big challenge that South Africa now faces. In terms of foreign policy, I keep getting asked whether South Africa should have relations with Libya or Cuba or Taiwan, or whatever? I am personally indifferent, for this is a South African problem. We have our own American policy towards these countries and unless you do something in conjunction with them that is aggressive or against our interest, I really do not think it is worthy of a big debate between our two countries. Your leaders have to determine what is in your own national interest, and in general it is my view that the United States should not mix too much in what are essentially the domestic issues of other countries but concentrate on their foreign policies.

So this is the situation as I see it. It is in some respects discouraging for the short term; on the other hand, we are at the beginning of a new period - here in this country but also in America. And America cannot escape from participating in the world. It took us five years after the end of World War II to define Europe. The Cold War has only been over three or four years and it may take a little longer this time, but is the exercise in which we are now engaged. And that is why I take the liberty of talking to you more about America than about South Africa, in addition to the fact that you obviously know more about South Africans than you do about Americans.

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Henry Kissinger

When I listened to the introduction I learned something about the frigidity of American business because two of the companies on whose boards I have served have been sold from under me so the boards no longer exist, CBS was taken over by Westinghouse and Macys was taken over by Federated Department Stores, so all the companies on whose boards I still serve are getting extremely nervous. As the Chairman pointed out I was national security adviser and Secretary of State, in fact for two years I was both national security adviser and Secretary of State and the only reason I mention it is because, never before and never since, has relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those years.

I am here to talk to you about international events and you of course being South Africans want to know what I think about South Africa. The fact of the matter is I have been here for an extended period of 14 years, I was here for 48 hours together with Lord Carrington undertaking a mediation between the Incata and the ANC. It was one of the most successful mediations ever because we decided that in the 48 hours we had absolutely nothing we could do and we left the parties to their own devices. A week later they came up with the solution that we could never had imagined and certainly would never have been able to get accepted from us. So, I thought that what I would talk to you about is how America views foreign policy in general at this moment so that you get some understanding where Africa comes in then, at the end, I make some observations about South Africa but a group that has heard so many distinguished South Africans does not need my view on what is going on in South Africa. Actually, one of my incentives, quite frankly, in accepting this invitation is to educate myself on South Africa. I am spending six days here which, on the one hand is not that much but on the other is three times as much as I usually spend in a country as I flit around the world, so it is some testimony to the importance I attach to the country.

Let me talk in general terms, first about American foreign policy so that when I do get to Africa you have some context on which to work.

First thing I want to say, which will be shocking to you, is that there is no such thing as a clear cut American foreign policy at this moment. I am not saying this because I am a Republican and I am going to suffer in two weeks when I look at the election results. I am not saying it for that reason this is not a criticism of the existing foreign policy but it is a comment on the state of mind of America at this particular moment in history.

Whenever I go around the world people keep assigning profound courtesies to America and the long-ranging foreign policies, but the fact is that America has been historically an isolationist country. I would hate to take a poll in our Congress to see how many people could find Johannesburg or Durban or Cape Town on the map and if you take away the Afro-American group, how many people really would know exactly where South Africa is located but, you could say that about Romania, Poland and almost any other country. America got it wrong in world affairs at the end of World War II because, to our amazement, we found that we were the only non-Communist country strong enough to resist the Soviet Union, at first the American leaders thought that Britain would take that role. The secret dream of the American leaders at the end of World War II was to trade in their own tanks and aeroplanes. We would have liked to have been non-committed and mediate between Britain and the United States and the Soviet Union, it took us about a year to figure out that this was not to be. President Trueman sent an emissary to both Stalin and Churchill, as if they were the same phenomena, to see what we could do to oppose their differences. The emissary who went to Moscow wrote the following report, he said "I certainly understood that all that Churchill is interested in is the British national interest". I don't know what he expected. A British Prime Minister is of course interested in the national interest of Britain. But that was the great discovery of Sir David, who was then Ambassador.

Then there came the cold war. In the cold war the United States for many years had an atomic bomb. We had 51% of the world's GNP for a while, in those conditions foreign policy is relatively easy it is a question of allocation of resources and we could do the Marshall Plan and Point Four and the Japanese recovery and few of them with American governmental resources, something now that is absolutely out of the question. I asked somebody today, "What do you want from America"

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he said a Marshall Plan. Fantastic, cannot happen, absolutely, totally out of the question. Conditions have totally changed. But for those forty years we were in, what is for America, an ideal position, ideal in this sense: America had always thought of itself as being superior to Europe, it had turned its back on Europe and it sort of represented a superior moral dispensation. We thought we had a moral mission to resist evil all over the world. When Communism was the enemy this was a relatively simple equation. We had an ideological enemy and we had a physical enemy, we could apply the methods of World War II and we could apply the methods of dealing with the recession. We dealt with economic dislocation by governmental programmes and we dealt with the Soviet Union by mobilizing containment for this around the Soviet perimeter. Even in my day as Secretary of State, I frankly say, I was triggered into Africa by Cuban forces. We decided that we would have to prevent this by identifying ourselves with the wishes of the majority. A recurrence of a situation where we were on the wrong side of all the upheavals in Africa.

In 1989 and thereafter the cold war ended, now there is no clear cut anything, there is no clear pattern in the ideological sense so the question is, what is the purpose of American foreign policy? Why do we need a foreign policy at all? In our Congress right now foreign policy is a very unpopular topic. Our Congressmen, on recesses, used to take trips around the world at government expense in order to, allegedly, educate themselves for votes on foreign policy. That's not happening anymore because their constituencies say that foreign travel is neglecting their duties.

In Germany for example, as Chancellor Kohl pointed out to me, not a single member of the House of Representatives has been in Germany during the last eighteen months, which is unheard of. That shows a certain lack of interest and it creates for the United States a problem, and for America indeed it is a problem of what they are trying to do in the world. In America, historically, the idea of national interest has been unpopular, the idea has always been that it is our duty to spread democracy and stand for the moral causes in the world and others worry about the balance of power. This is a beautiful idea, as long as somebody worries about the balance of power but when you are the only country that is in a military position to protect what there is of a balance of power you cannot conduct such a policy. Now you see, for example, suddenly we have 20,000 troops in Bosnia. When I used to talk with President Nixon and use "graduate of Harvard University" big

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words, if I used a three syllable word he would say to me "Remember the American public thinks that this is a soft drink".

So now we have 20,000 troops in Bosnia, we keep reading in the newspapers about the Talleban forces running around Afghanistan, maybe going to Tadjikistan and there is no consensus what it means and everybody is afraid to take a position. One Saturday night on television there were two teams debating, there was a Republican team and a Democratic team, four on each side. I was one of the Republicans and I talked about foreign policy, it was amazing none of the Republicans said anything in support of me because they did not want to get involved in foreign policy and none of the Democrats answered me. I made a wholesale criticism of the administration. There was not one of the four Democrats who said, just a minute its unfair we are doing very well, they just brushed it aside. They all went back to the basic politics. If I had spoken in Swahili I would have got the same reaction as I did to my eloquent phrases. Not only did they not answer me, I had the right to ask them, the other side, ten minutes of questions - so I asked them all about foreign policy.

If they had scored the debate, I would have won overwhelmingly because in that ten minute section they did not answer my questions. I would say one thing and then they would come back with some domestic point. What I am trying to tell you is what the mood is in America today, when there is a crisis you get some statement but there is no long term support for anything that I can see. Part of it may be due to the fact that we have produced a new breed of politician. When I started out in politics I worked for Nelson Rockefeller. He had the naive idea that you become President by having the best programme. So he and I worked like crazy we divided the leading intellectuals of the country. We would have three evenings a week and Sunday developing a programme while Richard Nixon was running around the country getting delegates. Of course we lost, and now no candidate is foolish enough to spend time on such things. What they spend time on is to study what they can say on the evening television that gets the maximum result. Then they worry about next weeks television. The result of this is that you get a sort of fragmented kind of thinking about foreign policy. I know what the leading politicians thought about this and they asked my opinion, about fifteen years ago people would ask me what to think today they ask me what to say, in a different order of profit and so you get, even in our leadership groups, a very fragmented way of thinking and this is compounded by another thing, that I think everyone will

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5

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understand, we are maybe 20 years ahead of you in this, maybe more maybe less, a shift in thinking, shift in knowledge from concepts to pictures. If you look at the history of knowledge in the medieval period there was no way of storing knowledge because there wasn't paper there wasn't printing so you had to write it all out. Knowledge was religious, you learnt by memory, which meant that there was only a finite store of knowledge. Then came books, printing, paper and it was possible to store a lot more knowledge. But not all the knowledge you could have, therefore you had to develop concepts, concepts enabled you to understand comparable situations and to project into the future. I was brought up with books and I guess most of you were, but the modern generation of Americans, anyone below 30, is brought up on pictures. They learn from computers and from computerspeak and it is a totally different kind of knowledge. I am not saying its worse or better, its different. A friend of mine had a son who was going off to Europe, a son of 16 years old. He said to his son "what is the capital of Spain", he didn't know what. U the capital of Spain was so he said to him "I'm paying for your trip to Europe and you don't know what the capital of Spain is". He said "why should I learn what the capital of Spain is, I have a computer, if I want to know what the capital of Spain is I can get it in 30 seconds".

What you now have is a range of knowledge that is unprecedented. I read somewhere that the real problem is that when you ask your computer a question there is so much knowledge in there that they give you the first 100 ideas and then the trick is to get the next 9,000. There is this huge knowledge but no capacity to integrate it and for policy makers the trick is not knowledge, you can always hire people to collect knowledge, the trick is to project the present into the future and to take your society from where it is to where it has never been and this a computer cannot tell you, the computer can just tell you where you are, more or less. So it is possible, at least at this state of our knowledge, that we are expanding our knowledge and starting our imagination and you get a politics which is very sentimental and very emotional and not very rationalistic. Now this has to be understood and it is a particular problem at the moment when the whole world is changing simultaneously. The United States faces a world which I have described, totally different to us. We have to make foreign policy with 140 different nations, we have never been in a position where we can neither dominate nor can we escape, we now have to do what other nations have had to do -work out a system, rewards and punishment, by which we achieve our objectives in stages. The

⊕

- 5 -

European nation state, which dominated the world still fifty years ago, is too small for a global role and they are trying to come together and almost all European energies are absorbed on the issue of unification. There is no real global European policy. The French want to get involved but they can make no particular contribution, they cannot effect economic aid, not in a military sense so it is out of scale.

The problem with European unification however is one of extraordinary complexity. They unify and create a common currency and then the Central Bank demands that they restructure, which certainly will happen, austerity will result from the decisions of a non-effective Central Bank of nationals different from those who have to make the sacrifices. Can that work, I don't know, but it is the unanswered question of Europe and until that is resolved Europe will be a marginal player and America cannot really participate in this process very much.

Take Russia, for 400 years Russia has been expanding. Russian foreign policy has been expansion into empty or semi-empty spaces. Imperialism has been an aspect of Russia throughout its history. Now communism has collapsed but the empire has collapsed too. So for many Russians the loss of communism is not a great loss but the loss of empire is a total change of the world picture. Now, how can America react to this and what is it we should draw from Russia. The attitude of most Americans is, let's discover some nice democratic Russians, in this respect the secret dream of most Americans is that all foreigners are incipient Americans. I have a friend who claims that there is no such thing as an English accent, he thinks the English put this on to intimidate Americans, and that you can only capture an Englishman unawares by waking him up at 4 in the morning and he'll talk like a normal human being.

In Russia the problem is that law and order has broken down, legitimacy has sort of broken down, there is a brutal contest between various power groups, most of whom used to run the old Russian economy and speeches by Americans talking about the virtues of pluralistic democracy do not find a very great audience. The problem we have with Russia is, can we get them to stay within their borders? St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok. Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they shouldn't feel so claustrophobic. But those of you who do

⊕

- 6 -

business in Central Asia or Eastern Europe you will know that all the neighbours of Russia are scared to death of Russia, it is a fact of life and any foreign policy that does not deal with this is engaging in an academic enterprise.

So that is what we are now working out in the United States. Then, you have the additional problem that the energy resources of the world are almost certainly going to run out - at any rate become shorter - as China industrialises, India industrialises and Saudi, Asia and Latin America. A huge pool of untapped energy is in Central Asia, Isbekhistan, Kazakhstan, Kakistan. Now if they all become dominated by Russia, Russia will suddenly emerge as a dominant country in energy, on the other hand how will we in the West have an influence on Central Asia. Well, one way to do it would be via Turkey but (a) Turkey is getting kicked around in the name of human rights and (b) it is part of the fundamentalist wave that is sweeping the Middle East. Or take the problem of China, a population of a billion. A country that has governed itself for five thousand years. They feel that they have managed without advice from the United States for the greater part of their history. They do not necessarily believe that we have the right to tell them how to organise themselves, yet this is one of the driving elements of American foreign policy - to tell everybody how to have a democratic institution. Now as China develops its very existence is going to become a huge economic reality for its neighbors. I'm not worried about Chinese armies marching into countries ** and representing huge economic power, they also pay in cash. So one of the problems of Asia for the next twenty years is how does China ** I could go on and on about every country, Japan and others but I think I have made my basic point.

Now, I have one thing to say, namely, the Middle East. The Middle East is seen primarily as an Arab/Israeli problem, I think the Arab/Israeli part of it is relatively the simple part because the most difficult part of the Arab/Israeli problem is Palestine, where 2 million Arabs and 5 million Jews are living in a territory that is 50 miles wide. When you look at it on the map it looks very big but you can drive from the Jordan river to the coast in an hour and a half through both the Palestinian part and the Israeli part.

⊕

- 7 -

When I was Secretary of State I tried to convince the Israelis to give Jericho to Jordan as a symbol of making progress, I was extremely irritated with them, until a few years later I drove from Jerusalem to Jericho, its about 35 minutes, its a suburb of Jerusalem so it had a different significance but I think that problem will be settled not perhaps with some great agreement but more along the lines of some set constitutional arrangements in which everybody's possibilities are recognized. The new problem is the growth of fundamentalism in the Islamic world because if Egypt or Turkey or Algeria, or all three of them, become fundamentalist then the turmoil in this area will be uncontrollable because then Saudi Arabia will fall under enormous pressure and by itself not capable of resisting it and then another energy crisis is almost certain. You have to remember that the last energy crisis was not really an energy crisis it was a crisis in expectation. There was no real assurance of energy if everybody's consumption had stayed at their previous level. What produced the energy crisis was that everybody expecting an energy crisis started increasing their oil stock and that produced a real shortage of energy. That was a relatively minor incident, what would happen if a major country goes fundamentalist, say Egypt or Turkey or both. Those are things to worry about.

I mentioned all of this so that you can get some understanding of Africa, of Africa and America. I am one of the most frequent speakers at high level conferences in America, I speak to groups on foreign policy, to communications groups, I am never asked a question about Africa, now this may upset you but I can assure you, I am never asked about Africa. So I don't even have to stand and answer them for you, but now I run an international consultant company, we advise companies who want to invest abroad. Sometimes we advise them and sometimes we actually help them. I have never had a client who asked me about South Africa that is another fact of life. They ask about China or Indonesia or Malaysia or any country of South East Asia, many countries of Latin America, many countries of Russia, to some extent, and of course all European countries, but never about South Africa. What does that mean? It means, that there is no huge concern about what is happening in South Africa, most people think it is about a case of people murdering each other in Central Africa, there's nothing we can do about it except to give a little money. South Africa is a contrary case because, actually, South Africa ought to be attractive. The legal system is quite well organised you have major corporations, even if somebody did ask my opinion I could give them

⊕

- 8 -

better advice where to go in South Africa than I could in Ecuador but it has never happened. Not many people have expected me to know much about Africa but I can just tell you my experience when I talk to people there are very few questions about South Africa. My own views about Africa were late in development, I am perfectly frank when I say that when I was in office there were openings to China, openings to Russia, settling the Middle East crisis, relations with Europe, then in about 1974 Cuban troops appear, American Congress did not permit any resistance and I then decided it was absolutely essential for the United States not to be on the side of, they did not represent human aspirations in Africa and I therefore then became very active in majority rule for then Rhodesia, Namibia and to getting into South Africa. In 1982 I was invited here by the Institute of De Beers and I made a speech which was not all that popular at the time, in which I pointed out that even the best disposed Americans are shaped and bound by their countries deeply held ideals, South Africans must not deceive themselves U with comforting thoughts about strategic geography resources illuminating the nature of moral and political differences nor can even the most geopolitical and anti-communist oriented American fail to take into account the aspirations and convictions of the preponderant majority of this continent as they express an interest in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Those who wish South Africa well will not be able to find common ground with you as long as a system of institutionalised racial discrimination persists. I went on like this for another fifteen minutes. So this was my basic conviction. I also had the great privilege of meeting President Mandela, I have met him 6 to 7 times since, I am going to meet him again tomorrow. I am extremely sympathetic to the future of South Africa. The problem is what can be done and what is its role? I think it is very important that South Africa succeeds as a multi-ethnic market oriented state. Because if South Africa succeeds on its present course it will be a symbol for all the rest of Africa and it will be simple for Americans to take another look at Africa and especially South Africa. It can then perform many useful functions.

Now, how to get to this point, however. First of all, too many of the contacts of South Africans up to now have been with Americans and through America. They have played an honourable and important role but I think it is important to get across the idea that South Africa is a country of 41 million with huge resources and it is a major country of potential economic capacity, independent of any of the racial competition. Secondly, a better job has to be done to explain to the American

⊕

- 9 -

(4)

(10)

business community what the possibilities are in Africa, after all if businessmen are willing to run
risks in Russia and in Indonesia, which is going to have a succession problem, and in many other
countries I could name, it seems to me that the risks in South Africa are less than they are in some
of those countries, but up to now there has not yet been in the American business community any
interest in the possibilities here. In part this is true to the fact that so much attention has been
lavished, correctly, on the independence struggle that people forget that now you have a new
society which has to make its own way in the present economic conditions. And in the present
economic conditions there is next to no government capital at the moment, there are no longer any
big economic aid programmes. When we are cutting Medicaid, and social security to some extent,
it is impossible to justify huge expenditures abroad when we are cutting domestic expenditures.
Maybe it shouldn't be that way but that is a fact of life. Private capital is politically neutral, they go
where they think they have the best opportunities or where people do the best advertising job or
both. This is the big challenge that South Africa now faces. In foreign policy I keep getting asked,
should South Africa have relations with Libya or Cuba or Taiwan or whatever? To me personally
it is a question of indifference, that's a South African problem, we have our own policy towards
these countries and unless in conjunction with them you do something that is aggressive against our
interest, I really do not think this is worth a big debate between our two countries and I express an
opinion on that subject. Your leaders have to be capable of determining what is in your own
national interest and in general it is my view that the United States should not mix too much in
essentially domestic problems of other countries and concentrate on their foreign policy.

So this is the situation as I see it in the United States. It is in some respects discouraging for the
short term, on the other hand we are at the beginning of a new period here in this country also in
America, and America cannot escape participating in the world. It took us five years after the end
of World War II to define Europe. The Cold War is only over three of four years, it may take a
little longer but this is the exercise at which we are now engaged and that's why I take the liberty to
talk to you more about America than about South Africa, plus the fact that you obviously know
more about South Africans than Americans.

⊕

- 10 -

MAR-19-1997 17:31

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.01

Henry Kissinger

October 24, 1996

TOTAL P.01

MAR-19-1997 17:23

KAI DC

212 753 7248

MAR-19-1997 17:24

KAI DC

212 753 7248

MAR-19-1997 17:24

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.04

-4-

MAR-19-1997 17:25

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.05

-5-

MAR-19-1997 17:25

KAI DC

212 753 7248

MAR-19-1997 17:26

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.07

MAR-19-1997 17:26

KAI DC

212 753 7248

-8-

MAR-19-1997 17:27

KAI DC

212 753 7248

MAR-19-1997 17:27

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.10

TOTAL P.10

10/11 90 MON 14:29 FAA 32 2 0432418

AMAI BRUSSELS

002

Henry Kissinger

When I listened to the introduction I learned something about the frigidity of American business because two of the companies on whose boards I have served have been sold from under me so the boards no longer exist, CBS was taken over by Westinghouse and Maceys was taken over by federated department stores, so all the companies on whose boards I still serve are getting extremely nervous. As the Chairman pointed out I was national security adviser and Secretary of State, in fact for two years I was both national security adviser and Secretary of State and the only reason I mention it is because, never before and never since, has relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those years.

18/11 96 MON 14:30 PAX 32 2 9432419

AMAT BRUSSELS

4000

(2)

- 2 -

10/11 90 MON 14.30 TAX 02 & 0402115

AMRT DROUSSELS

40004

(Y)

Then there came the cold war. In the cold war the United States for many years had an atomic bomb. We had 51% of the world's GNP for a while, in those conditions foreign policy is relatively easy it is a question of allocation of resources and we could do the Marshall Plan and Point Four and the Japanese recovery and few of them with American governmental resources, something now that is absolutely out of the question. I asked somebody today, "What do you want from America" he said a Marshall Plan. Fantastic, cannot happen, absolutely, totally out of the question. Conditions have totally changed. But for those forty years we were in, what is for America, an ideal position, ideal in this sense: America had always thought of itself as being superior to Europe, it had turned its back on Europe and it sort of represented a superior moral dispensation. We thought we had a moral mission to resist evil all over the world. When Communism was the enemy this was a relatively simple equation. We had an ideological enemy and we had a physical enemy, we could apply the methods of World War II and we could apply the methods of dealing with the recession. We dealt with economic dislocation by governmental programmes and we dealt with the Soviet Union by mobilizing containment for this around the Soviet perimeter. Even in my day as Secretary of State, I frankly say, I was triggered into Africa by Cuban forces. We decided that we would have to prevent this by identifying ourselves with the wishes of the majority. A recurrence of a situation where we were on the wrong side of all the upheavals in Africa.

- 3 -

do in the world. In America, historically, the idea of national interest has been unpopular, the idea has always been that it is our duty to spread democracy and stand for the moral causes in the world and others worry about the balance of power. This is a beautiful idea, as long as somebody worries about the balance of power but when you are the only country that is in a military position to protect what there is of a balance of power you cannot conduct such a policy. Now you see, for example, suddenly we have 20,000 troops in Bosnia. When I used to talk with President Nixon and use "graduate of Harvard University" big words, if I used a three syllable word he would to say to me "Remember the American public thinks that this is a soft drink".

- 4 -

18/11 96 MON 14:31 PAX 32 2 0452419

AMRT BRUSSELS

4000

(4)

Sunday developing a programme while Richard Nixon was running around the country getting delegates. Of course we lost, and now no candidate is foolish enough to spend time on such things. What they spend time on is to study what they can say on the evening television that gets the maximum result. Then they worry about next weeks television. The result of this is that you get a sort of fragmented kind of thinking about foreign policy. I know what the leading politicians thought about this and they asked my opinion, about fifteen years ago people would ask me what to think today they ask me what to say, in a different order of profit and so you get, even in our leadership groups, a very fragmented way of thinking and this is compounded by another thing, that I think everyone will understand, we are maybe 20 years ahead of you in this, maybe more maybe less, a shift in thinking, shift in knowledge from concepts to pictures. If you look at the history of knowledge in the medieval period there was no way of storing knowledge because there wasn't paper there wasn't printing so you had to write it all out. Knowledge was religious, you learnt by memory, which meant that there was only a finite store of knowledge. Then came books, printing, paper and it was possible to store a lot more knowledge. But not all the knowledge you could have, therefore you had to develop concepts, concepts enabled you to understand comparable situations and to project into the future. I was brought up with books and I guess most of you were, but the modern generation of Americans, anyone below 30, is brought up on pictures. They learn from computers and from computerspeak and it is a totally different kind of knowledge. I am not saying its worse or better, its different. A friend of mine had a son who was going off to Europe, a son of 16 years old. He said to his son "what is the capital of Spain", he didn't know what the capital of Spain was so he said to him "I'm paying for your trip to Europe and you don't know what the capital of Spain is". He said "why should I learn what the capital of Spain is, I have a computer, if I want to know what the capital of Spain is I can get it in 30 seconds".

- 5 -

18/11 96 MON 14:31 PAX 32 2 5432418

AMAI BRUSSELS

007

(4)

knowledge, you can always hire people to collect knowledge, the trick is to project the present into the future and to take your society from where it is to where it has never been and this a computer cannot tell you, the computer can just tell you where you are, more or less. So it is possible, at least at this state of our knowledge, that we are expanding our knowledge and starting our imagination and you get a politics which is very sentimental and very emotional and not very rationalistic. Now this has to be understood and it is a particular problem at the moment when the whole world is changing simultaneously. The United States faces a world which I have described, totally different to us. We have to make foreign policy with 140 different nations, we have never been in a position where we can neither dominate nor can we escape, we now have to do what other nations have had to do -work out a system, rewards and punishment, by which we achieve our objectives in stages. The European nation state, which dominated the world still fifty years ago, is too small for a global role and they are trying to come together and almost all European energies are absorbed on the issue of unification. There is no real global European policy. The French want to get involved but they can make no particular contribution, they cannot effect economic aid, not in a military sense so it is out of scale.

- 6 -

18/11 90 MON 14:32 FAX 32 2 5432418

AMAI BRUSSELS

40000

(Y)

In Russia the problem is that law and order has broken down, legitimacy has sort of broken down, there is a brutal contest between various power groups, most of whom used to run the old Russian economy and speeches by Americans talking about the virtues of pluralistic democracy do not find a very great audience. The problem we have with Russia is, can we get them to stay within their borders? St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok. Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they shouldn't feel so claustrophobic. But those of you who do business in Central Asia or Eastern Europe you will know that all the neighbours of Russia are scared to death of Russia, it is a fact of life and any foreign policy that does not deal with this is engaging in an academic enterprise.

- 7 -

10/11 90 MON 14:32 PAX 32 2 3432418

AMAT BRUSSELS

40009

When I was Secretary of State I tried to convince the Israelis to give Jericho to Jordan as a symbol of making progress, I was extremely irritated with them, until a few years later I drove from Jerusalem to Jericho, its about 35 minutes, its a suburb of Jerusalem so it had a different significance but I think that problem will be settled not perhaps with some great agreement but more along the lines of some set constitutional arrangements in which everybodys possibilities are recognized. The new problem is the growth of fundamentalism in the Islamic world because if Egypt or Turkey or Algeria, or all three of them, become fundamentalist then the turmoil in this area will be uncontrollable because then Saudi Arabia will fall under enormous pressure and by itself not capable of resisting it and then another energy crisis is almost certain. You have to remember that the last energy crisis was not really an energy crisis it was a crisis in expectation. There was no real assurance of energy if everybodys consumption had stayed at their previous level. What produced the energy crisis was that everybody expecting an energy crisis started increasing their oil stock and that produced a real shortage of energy. That was a relatively minor incident, what would happen if a major country goes fundamentalist, say Egypt or Turkey or both. Those are things to worry about.

- 8 -

18/11 '96 MON 14:33 FAX 32 2 5432419

AMA! BRUSSELS

010

I mentioned all of this so that you can get some understanding of Africa, of Africa and America. I am one of the most frequent speakers at high level conferences in America, I speak to groups on foreign policy, to communications groups, I am never asked a question about Africa, now this may upset you but I can assure you, I am never asked about Africa.
So I don't even have to stand and answer them for you, but now I run an international consultant company, we advise companies who want to invest abroad. Sometimes we advise them and sometimes we actually help them. I have never had a client who asked me about South Africa that is another fact of life. They ask about China or Indonesia or Malaysia or any country of South East Asia, many countries of Latin America, many countries of Russia, to some extent, and of course all European countries, but never about South Africa. What does that mean? It means, that there is no huge concern about what is happening in South Africa, most people think it is about a case of people murdering each other in Central Africa, there's nothing we can do about it except to give a little money. South Africa is a contrary case because, actually, South Africa ought to be attractive. The legal system is quite well organised you have major corporations, even if somebody did ask my opinion I could give them better advice where to go in South Africa than I could in Ecuador but it has never happened. Not many people have expected me to know much about Africa but I can just tell you my experience when I talk to people there are very few questions about South Africa.
My own views about Africa were late in development, I am perfectly frank when I say that when I was in office there were openings to China, openings to Russia, settling the Middle East crisis, relations with Europe, then in about 1974 Cuban troops appear, American Congress did not permit any resistance and I then decided it was absolutely essential for the United States not to be on the side of, they did not represent human aspirations in Africa and I therefore then became very active in majority rule for then Rhodesia, Namibia and to getting into South Africa. In 1982 I was invited here by the Institute of De Beers and I made a speech which was not all that popular at the time, in which I pointed out that even the best disposed Americans are shaped and bound by their countries deeply held ideals, South Africans must not deceive themselves with comforting thoughts about strategic geography resources illuminating the nature of moral and political differences nor can even the most geopolitical and anti-communist oriented American fail to take into account the aspirations and

-9-

18/11 90 MON 14:53 PAA 32 2 5452418

AMAI BRUSSELS

4011

Now, how to get to this point, however. First of all, too many of the contacts of South Africans up to now have been with Americans and through America. They have played an honourable and important role but I think it is important to get across the idea that South Africa is a country of 41 million with huge resources and it is a major country of potential economic capacity, independent of any of the racial competition. Secondly, a better job has to be done to explain to the American business community what the possibilities are in Africa, after all if businessmen are willing to run risks in Russia and in Indonesia, which is going to have a succession problem, and in many other countries I could name, it seems to me that the risks in South Africa are less than they are in some of those countries, but up to now there has not yet been in the American business community any interest in the possibilities here. In part this is due to the fact that so much attention has been lavished, correctly, on the independence struggle that people forget that now you have a new society which has to make its own way in the present economic conditions. And in the present economic conditions there is next to no government capital at the moment, there are no longer any big economic aid programmes. When we are cutting Medicaid, and social security to some extent, it is impossible to justify huge expenditures abroad when we are cutting domestic expenditures. Maybe it shouldn't be that way but that is a fact of life. Private capital is politically neutral, they go where they think they have the best opportunities or where people do the best

- 10 -

18/11 90 MON 14:34 FAX 32 2 9492419

AMRT DROUSSEUS

4012

(4)

- 11 -