P-886

6/26/56

-1-

For those who are interested in the problems of limited warfare, and have been bold enough to propound solutions to them, it is salutary to look back occasionally at that singular event, the Korean war. For the Korean conflict provides a much-needed reminder that the control and limitation of violence is a most difficult task; and, remembering some of the uncertainties of those three years, it suggests that we cannot be entirely confident of our ability to fight such a war again -- assuming that we should want to. It has been said by Bernard Brodie that we might not even believe in the possibility of limited war if the Korean conflict had not occurred. And despite the retrospect of three years it remains somewhat surprising that such a war should ever have been invented or that it could have survived its detractors.

Take, for example, the great protest of General MacArthur which at least brought the dividend of those hearings upon which so much of our knowledge of the war is based.¹ Not only

¹See Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate..., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951.

P-886

6/26/56

-2-

did that protest consume time, cause confusion, and embarrass
the political leadership of the country; it very nearly brought
about a radical change in the character of the war itself.
What, one may ask, is to prevent debate and disagreement from
turning into another such protest in the future? The fact,
it may be answered, that old soldiers do fade away after all,
and that General MacArthur is probably unique in the annals of
American military leadership.

But that, I would argue, is to misunderstand both the
nature and the importance of the MacArthur dissent. For the
General in fact occupied only the most advanced position in
a whole array of dissatisfaction and protest. Some distance
behind him, and considerably more moderate in their views,
were such men as Generals Vandenberg, LeMay, and Stratemeyer,
Generals Ridgway, Van Fleet, and Clark, Admirals Radford and
Joy, and on certain specific issues, although they vigorously
defended the policies of the Administration, possibly even
Generals Marshall and Bradley.² It would be an exaggeration
to say that the entire high command of the armed forces
sympathized with General MacArthur's dicta; for the military,
like other professions, are less than monolithic in their
outlook. Nevertheless, a sufficient number of them became
dissatisfied with the Administration's approach to the Korean
war so that I may perhaps be forgiven if, for the purposes of
this paper, I refer to the attitudes of the military as a whole
rather than to the opinion and beliefs of particular individuals.

²For samples of their views, see *ibid.*, Part 4, pp. 2956-2957; *Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty*

P-886

6/26/56

-3-

Since the principle of civilian supremacy is well established in this country, these attitudes may not seem particularly significant. But, in spite of that vital principle, it is always well to recall that the military leadership plays a vital role and has a great standing in national affairs. As the MacArthur case revealed, it takes a bold and stubborn president to deal with a general of high rank and exalted prestige. What is more, if a considerable portion of the military leadership dissents from national policy, there is a good chance that, because of a lack of alternative ideas, the policy rather than the leadership will be changed. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, there must be a presumption that when the military begin to close their ranks in opposition to high policy, as they did during the Korean war, there may be something wrong in the situation and that more than a simple exertion of civilian authority may be required as a remedy.

On the grounds then of their indispensability, their considerable knowledge, and their integrity, it becomes important to see what it was about the Korean war that so many of the military found so dissatisfying and why it was that these issues aroused such breadth and depth of feeling. For only if we obtain some insight into their dissatisfaction will we have a chance of keeping future debates and disagreements

in the European Area: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate..., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 173, 330-335; Mark W. Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, New York, Harper, 1954; C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate, New York, Macmillan, 1955; and Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier*, New York, Harper, 1956.

P-886

6/26/56

-4-

within reasonable bounds. And only if we are in a position to
do so can we have any confidence in our ability to exercise
control over our military policies in a future war.

I shall not bore you with a detailed account of the
policy discussions and differences that occurred during the
Korean war. Instead, let me take the easier and more specula-
tive course of asserting that, however distinct and separate
they appear to have been, they resulted in three major military
grievances. These grievances, I would suggest, were: first,
the dissatisfaction of the military, particularly the commanders
in the field, with what they regarded as an unwarranted change
in the civilian and military spheres of responsibility for the
conduct of the war; secondly, their distaste for what seemed
to them to be onerous and unnecessary limitations upon their
freedom of action; and thirdly, their frustration at what they
felt was a civilian failure to initiate the plans necessary
to cope with this situation. In effect, a great many of the
military came to believe that the civilians policymakers were
poaching unfairly and unnecessarily upon what had come to be
recognized as the military preserve; that, in doing so, they
had placed irritating and unreasonable constraints upon
military operations; and that, while arrogating the predomina-
ting authority in the conduct of the war, they had shirked the
responsibility of exerting that authority in a way that would
have given positive direction to the military leadership.

These are serious charges and they warrant serious
examinations. It may be well, therefore, not only to explore

P-886

6/26/56

-5-

what caused so many of the military to believe that they had genuine grievances, but also to examine the justice of their case.

## I. The Problem of Role

It is characteristic of most disputes that they center upon specific and concrete issues even though what is motivating the participants may go much deeper than the way in which a particular problem is to be resolved. Certainly the growing dissatisfaction of the military with the Korean war was no exception in this respect. What is more, their dissatisfaction came to the surface clearly on only one of the three issues that I have mentioned. Most of the military made no bones about their opposition to the limitations that were imposed upon them after November, 1950; a record can even be found of their developing dissatisfaction with what they regarded as a failure of the civilians to take the necessary initiatives in policymaking; but there are only slight traces of perturbation over the change in policymaking role that appeared to be occurring. Nevertheless, I have no doubt that in many quarters the disturbance existed.³

³As usual, General MacArthur has been most outspoken in this respect. For him, "The general definition which for many decades has been accepted was that war was the ultimate process of politics; that when all other political means failed, you then go to force; and when you do that, the balance of control, the balance of concept, the main interest involved, the minute you reach the killing stage, is the control of the military. A theater commander, in any campaign, is not merely limited to the handling of his troops; he commands that whole area politically, economically, and militarily. You have got to trust at that stage of the game when politics fails, and the military takes over, you must trust the military, or otherwise you will have the system that the Soviet once employed of the political commissar, who would run the military as well as the politics of the country." *Military Situation in the Far East, Part 1, p. 45.*

P-886

6/26/56

-5a-

The military had long recognized the need to coordinate their policies with those of other branches of the government, and they accepted both the principle of civilian supremacy and the final authority of the President in the direction of a war. Indeed, they had been in the forefront of those who, in the period immediately following World War II, advocated the establishment of a body which would develop unified national policy.⁴ Probably we owe to the military (and the British) more than to any other group the creation of the National Security Council. However, what the military do not appear to have contemplated was that their objectives and needs would be subordinated to those of any of the other great departments of the government. It is fair to assume, rather, that they expected the National Security Council to provide a forum for debate and discussion among equals at the very least, and that in wartime the military would have the predominating voice in the conduct of affairs. This, in effect, had been the situation during World War II and on the whole, despite their grumblings, the military had found it to be satisfactory. What they had not liked then, and what they had hoped to remedy, was their inability to obtain concrete advice and, upon occasion,

⁴See Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, 1951, pp. 352-62.

P-886
6/26/56
-6-

direction from the President and the Department of State.⁵
What they had not bargained for, but what they got during the
Korean war, was, in effect, a diminution of their policymaking
role. Political considerations not only were presented to
them; they were actually forced upon them. Instead of formulat-
ing their objectives and plans, and then bringing other depart-
ments into consultation for purposes of modification, as had
been the procedure during World War II, the military found
themselves being told what they could or could not do, even in
the sphere of tactical operations. Although they did not say
very much about this change in status and role, one can detect
that the new dispensation was not to their liking.⁶ For, from

⁵One suggestion for an improvement in political-military coordination during the war, made by General Wedemeyer to General Marshall in 1943, was that a representative of the State Department be made an associate member of the Joint Staff Planners or be invited to attend JCS meetings "when papers concerned with national and foreign policies are on the agenda." General Wedemeyer's reasons for this suggestion were that "The JCS frequently require information and advice as to how their military decisions will affect our foreign and national policies, or as to whether the decisions are in conformity with international law, or as to what effect, if any, their decisions will have on our national interests. Some solution will be necessary if we are to achieve that unity of national effort which is so will exemplified in the British organization." *Ibid*, pp. 317-18.

⁶General MacArthur, for example, seemed to believe in a kind of separation of powers. As he put it, "there should be no non-professional interference in the handling of troops in a campaign.

"You have professionals to do that job, and they should be permitted to do it; and...there should not be a political commissar system...which would dictate professional subjects which involve the lives of men when war has been engaged in.

"Any idea that a military commander in any position would

P-886

6/26/56

-7-

being the arbiters of wartime policy, with occasional support and assistance from other agencies, they had become subordinate to the Department of State whenever that body chose to exercise its influence.

It is easy to understand and sympathize with the dissatisfaction that so many of the military felt on this score. To have wanted assistance and advice, to have played so great a role in creating the institutions designed to provide that help, and then to have suffered a diminution of policymaking status as a result, was bound to be a blow. It is equally easy to understand why the military were not prepared to make an issue of their changed sphere of responsibility. They themselves acknowledged the principle of civilian supremacy; they also accepted the idea that it was not within their province to define the aims of a conflict. They recognized -- or at least all of them except General MacArthur recognized -- that they would not be on solid ground in fighting the new dispensation, especially since they had been so articulate in their demands for more precise political direction and the institutions to generate it. Consequently, it must have occurred to them that it would be the better part of valor to reserve their protests for decisions which did not respect their views and for occasions when the directives necessary to their operations were not forthcoming.

That they exercised such restraint on this issue must be

6 (continued) possess authority over the civil functions of this Government is a treasonable concept in my mind." Military Situation in the Far East, Part 1, p. 289.

P-886

6/26/56

-8-

counted both creditable and wise. For, if we attribute any serious content to the dictum that war is politics conducted by other means, it becomes clear that agencies other than the defense establishment must have the predominating weight in deciding the objectives and priorities of military action. If, in addition, we recognize that a limited war must compete with other objectives and activities of equal and perhaps greater importance, it becomes even more desirable that the status and authority of the President and the State Department be made dominant in the policymaking process.

Thus, while one may sympathize with the dissatisfaction of so many of the military over their reduced sphere of responsibility in the highest councils during the Korean war, one would hardly wish for a reversion to the state of affairs that existed during World War II. Whatever the defects of the National Security Council in the field of policymaking, it does possess the modest virtue of having begun to institutionalize the development of integrated national objectives and of having forced upon the State Department a great responsibility in this respect during war as well as during peace. In an age of nuclear weapons and guided missiles it is difficult to see how or why we could do otherwise.

## II. The Problem of Limitations

If the military were reticent about their dissatisfaction with the new definition of their role, if they were uncertain about the justice of their claim to overriding responsibility

P-886

6/26/56

-9-

and unwilling to make an issue of it, many of them became out-
spoken in their opposition to the limitations that were imposed
upon their operations during the war. With the possible exception
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is difficult to find a high-
ranking officer who approved of these restrictions or who felt
that they might be of some value. Here, in fact, was the chief
source of the military's dissatisfaction with the Korean war.⁷

The main limitations are so well known that they need only
be listed here. The territory north of the Yalu river was
declared out-of-bounds to United Nations military operations.
Certain targets within North Korea, namely the hydro-electric
power plants and dams, the town of Rashin, and the bridges
across the Yalu, were also excluded from attack at one time or
another but were then released as legitimate military objectives.
A naval blockade of the China coast was forbidden (although an
economic embargo was substituted in the spring of 1951), and
both General MacArthur and his successors were restrained from
using the Nationalist forces on Formosa that Chiang Kai-shek was
willing to make available to the United Nations command. American
military capabilities were also limited in two ways: atomic
weapons were not made available to the theater; and the number
of divisions in the Eighth Army was kept stable after the
buildup of the summer of 1950 had occurred. However, this

⁷Since almost every page of Military Situation in the Far East provides evidence of this dissatisfaction, the reader will be spared examples or detailed citations.

P-886

6/26/56

-10-

last limitation was offset somewhat by the gradual increase in
the size of the ROK army.⁸

According to what logic these restrictions were developed,
and who was responsible for formulating them, is not always
clear. In most cases the restrictions appear to have been
responses to requests from the theater commander for authority
to undertake previously unwarranted or unnecessary courses of
action. Although they were communicated to the commander through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is fair to assume that the State
Department had a hand in their drafting. But if their origins
are somewhat obscure, the rationale for their existence was
made quite evident during the MacArthur hearings. In effect,
this rationale can be summed up as follows: to have removed
the limitations to the extent requested by the theater commander
would not have affected materially the prospect of reaching a
decision in Korea; at the same time, the change in policy
required to meet his demands would have involved unacceptable
risks and costs. The chief risk, of course, was that the
Soviet Union might either enter the war in Korea or start a new
conflict in some other and equally vulnerable corner of the
world. But it was also feared that our own sanctuaries in
South Korea and Japan might become subject to attack and that
our allies might dissociate themselves from American policies

⁸For a partial listing of these restrictions, consult
*Ibid.*, Part 5, pp. 3192-3193.

P-886
6/26/56

-11-

and withdraw into neutrality.

The military who spoke out made equally clear their reasons for opposing these limitations. First, they argued that extending the scope of the war, primarily by means of bombing attacks against Chinese supply dumps and communications, would have enabled the United Nations to inflict a decisive defeat upon the enemy in Korea. Secondly, they claimed that, despite the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance, the Soviet Union would not enter the war as a result of this action. And thirdly, they contended that whether or not our allies defected, the advantage of regaining our freedom of action would clearly outweigh their loss. All along the line, to each argument developed by the advocates of limitation, their opponents propounded a counter-argument.

What can one really say in the light of so sharp a disagreement? Certainly the facts of the case, even when examined in the retrospect of several years, are not very helpful. As of 1956 it is still not clear what might have been the relevant states of mind in China and the Soviet Union at the time of the debate over limitations. Consequently it is impossible to say with any assurance or precision what would have been either the immediate or the longer-run effects of what has come to be known as the MacArthur strategy.

But what does seem certain is that the military opponents of the limitations, while they were aware of the complex conditions that surrounded the Korean war in 1951, were incapable

P-886
6/26/56
-12-

of assessing their significance with any degree of objectivity.
If this judgment sounds unduly harsh, consider the following.
Despite their apparent wish for guidance as to war aims, the
military felt almost to a man that victory, in the sense of
destroying the enemy's military capabilities, was the only
logical objective to seek on the battlefield. What was more,
they clearly felt that victory was an objective so desirable
that it outweighed all other goals and was worth almost any
sacrifice.⁹ Cherishing these beliefs so strongly, they were
almost bound to interpret existing conditions in a manner favorable
to their cause. In their view, the enemy could not be defeated
in an unconditional sense by the methods being followed in the
spring of 1951. Therefore, the scope of the war must be
expanded; and the expansion could be justified by the dogmatic
statement that the Russians would intervene only when and if
they found it to their advantage to do so -- the implication of
course being that our actions would not affect their decision.¹⁰

⁹ General MacArthur, of course, gave the classic formulation of this view when, in his address before a joint meeting of Congress on April 19, 1951, he announced that "in war there is no substitute for victory." Later he amplified this statement by saying that "war never before in the history of the world has been applied in a piecemeal way, that you make half war, and not whole war." *Ibid.*, Part 1, p. 68.

¹⁰ That most articulate of witnesses, General MacArthur, expressed his thoughts on the subject in this way: "As I said before, I believe the Soviet has two fundamental basic choices: either she is going to attack or she is not going to attack; and I do not believe that what happens in Korea will tend to shape the world-wide global policies that they may enter upon." At another point he "doubted that anything that took place in

P-886
6/26/56

-13-

The choice was not between a little more and a little less military action; it was between victory and defeat -- and no doubts, no uncertainties could be permitted to stand in the way of victory.

To put the matter another way, the opponents and supporters of limitations were not really moving in the same realm of discourse. Where the opponents were arguing with the ease and fervor born of a single objective and an almost total disregard of the complexities of the situation, the proponents were thinking of multiple objectives, uncertain conditions, and the relative risks and costs of selecting one policy in preference to another. For one group it was a matter of professional disgrace or a leap into the unknown with the chance of finding victory there; for the other group it was a choice between a known and considerable evil and an evil that was certainly unknown and possibly greater.

Since the military approach to the problem of restrictions was so completely incompatible with the concept of limited war, it is unnecessary for the purposes sought here to question whether the particular limitations which governed the Korean conflict were either desirable or undesirable. The relevant point, fortunately, is that the military were dissatisfied with

the Korean War or in Asia would be of such influence as to alter the basic decision that Russia may make as to whether she is going to attack or whether she is not going to attack." *Ibid*., Part 1, pp. 130, 261.

P-886

6/26/56

-14-

these limitations, not because they were palpably unsuited to
the situation at hand, but because they challenged the military
conception of what constituted a proper war. A limited conflict
of the kind that the civilians, in however fumbling a manner, were
attempting to devise simply was not a part of the military
lexicon.

In other words, if we assume, as I think we must, that a
policy of limited war not only seeks limited military and
political objectives within the theater of war, but also
attempts to harmonize those objectives with the goals being
pursued outside of the conflict, it follows that the military,
in offering their violent dissent, had failed to appreciate
the role in the policymaking process that was required of them.¹¹
In the case of the limitations a majority of the military
acted as blind partisans rather than as useful critics and
advisers.

¹¹My colleague, F. M. Sallagar, has been most helpful
and persuasive in stressing the importance of non-war
considerations in the planning and conduct of a limited war.

P-886

6/26/56

-15-

### III. The Problem of Initiatives

Nevertheless, it must be said of the military that, although they were bitter in their resentment over the restrictions that were imposed upon military action, with the single exception of General MacArthur they did not permit themselves to be swayed from carrying out their instructions. Their feelings did, however, find vent in another direction. Since the principal policymaking role had not been returned to them during the Korean war, and since they had been subjected to such onerous limitations, they felt both as a matter of necessity and as a matter of justice, that another agency of the government should take the initiative not only of raising questions of policy but also in formulating the directives under which the military were to operate. In particular, of course, they had this function in mind for the Department of State and the President.

As the war progressed, however, initiatives and directives were precisely what they felt they were not getting. Here, then, was the third main source of their dissatisfaction: the State Department had failed to occupy the policy premises that the military had been forced to vacate. That considerable delays occurred in the formulation of policy, that the State Department tended to play a negative role -- in the sense of letting the defense establishment take the initiative in raising issues, and then exercising a power of veto or modification over the suggestions of others -- that the military continued to have a very considerable residual responsibility, combined with

P-886
6/26/56

-16-

reduced authority in the realm of high policy, cannot be denied. The pattern began almost from the first day of the war, and it continued right down to the signature of the truce in 1953. It was General MacArthur, for example, who gave impetus to the decision to use troops in Korea. The policy of limitations appears to have arisen out of requests by the military to undertake missions beyond the frontier of North Korea rather than as a result of a conscious decision of high policy. And a firm position on political and military objectives in the spring of 1951 seems to have been formulated only after General MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the senatorial committee investigating General MacArthur's dismissal had attempted to discover what we were trying to accomplish in the war.¹² Even the political importance of the prisoner-of-war issue became evident only after the military had raised the issue. The military would recognize a problem requiring attention; they would press for action; and then, if they were lucky and patient, they might obtain a decision --

¹²For evidence on this point, consult the testimony of Secretary Marshall, General Bradley, and Secretary Acheson in Parts 1, 2, and 3 of *Military Situation in the Far East*. General MacArthur in fact claimed that what he was seeking was, not recall, but policy directives. "I felt that the position I was in, the military position, was untenable without having some directive, some mission which was more realistic than that which existed at the time; and I felt, in all conscience, I could not go on ordering men to their deaths by the thousands, in such a complete vacuum of policy decision." *Ibid.*, Part 1, p. 283.

P-886

6/26/56

-17-

frequently, as a matter of fact, the solution that they
themselves had proposed.

Viewed from the perspective of the military, the behavior
of the State Department does not make a very favorable impression.
But, in all fairness, is not such behavior a necessary charac-
teristic of a situation as fluid as warfare? Are the military
entitled to expect the system to operate otherwise? Despite
what we say about the primacy of political objectives in
wartime, are the civilians not justified in waiting until the
military dust has settled before reaching policy decisions?

The questions are far easier than the answers. We like
to think, of course, that policy can and should govern
military operations; that action on the battlefield will
increase in efficiency as it is guided by high policy decisions.
But it is certainly arguable that one cannot tell what objec-
tives are feasible until one's military capabilities have been
tested against those of the enemy. And this, in effect, is
what the civilian policymakers have often tended to argue.
But is their case persuasive? Let us try to consider it in a
little detail.

Simply as an example, let us limit the forces available
to the military as well as the area in which these forces may
be used. Is this all the direction that the services need?
How much freedom is left to them and to what extent can that
freedom affect the situation? On the whole, it appears that
the military would still have considerable option as to strat-
egies and tactics, and that whatever choice were made among

P-886

6/26/56

-18-

them, it would have some effect upon the realization of
political objectives, especially if one of those aims were
the restriction of the war's effects. In other words, the
establishment of the sort of limitations just described would
not seem to narrow down the military planner's problem
sufficiently so that he knows what constitutes the most
efficient course of action for the occasion. In addition to
limitations, he must have directives which tell him what kind
of political and military objectives he should seek, and at
what kinds of costs. Limitations may provide him with some
idea of the general configuration of the war he must fight;
they will not tell him how hard or by what means to press the
enemy into the acceptance of certain kinds of ends. Nor will
they, for that matter, help the enemy to gauge what sort of
effort it may be worth his while to make.

Such an argument must allow that miscalculations can
occur, that means and strategies may prove inappropriate to
the desired ends, and that objectives must be revised in the
light of the enemy's behavior and the military situation. A
case in point was after the Chinese had entered the Korean war.
Still, it should not take forever to recognize the change of
circumstances and to determine what is feasible and desirable
under the new conditions. That, after all, is one of the main
reasons for having military advisers. Perhaps, in the Korean
war, a testing period was necessary in order to determine
what objectives could be achieved with the forces on hand

P-886
6/26/56

-19-

after the retreat from the Yalu. But the interested observer
must really wonder whether it was necessary or desirable to
take from January until May, 1951, to decide simply on the
need for a cease-fire. For to have done so was to leave the
military with the unpalatable responsibility of developing
their strategy simply within a framework of prohibitions --
limitations which they found repugnant and whose logic they
failed to understand.

The reply may be that the civilian policymakers were not
nearly so remiss as I have portrayed them, that they were
preparing to offer a cease-fire to the enemy when General
MacArthur intervened with his own views on that subject, and
that they had already accepted a modified version of the
Indian truce plan in the United Nations. One may also point
to the difficulties of coalition warfare and on their account
justify the delays in stating a formal position on objectives.
All this can and should be granted; yet the basic point, I
think, remains. During this period the civilian policymakers
may have had a clear-cut set of objectives in mind, but if
they did, they wavered in their allegiance to them and they
failed to communicate what they were thinking to the military
in anything approximating concrete terms.¹³

¹³Thus, on February 13, 1951, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report for the Senate Committees, "it became apparent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of State would prefer not to express political objectives with respect to Korea until military capabilities there were established. On the other hand, the consensus of the opinions

P-886
6/26/56

-20-

Coming so soon after one change in objectives -- the change that had followed the Inchon landings -- this behavior was hardly calculated to inspire confidence and certainty in the military mind. In fact it is probably not too much to say that, faced with this history of change, the military were entitled to believe that they were being asked to assume responsibilities out of all proportion to the authority and freedom with which they had been endowed.

Nor was this area the only one in which the civilian policymakers failed to take effective initiatives. Even during the truce negotiations they leaned heavily upon the military to develop objectives and techniques of negotiation. And on the subject that apparently delayed the conclusion of a truce in Korea for over a year -- the issue of the prisoners of war -- the civilians neither anticipated the problem nor adopted the initiative in finding ways to break the deadlock in the negotiations caused by the United States insistence on

13 (continued) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that a political decision was required before there could be suitable determination of military courses of action." Again, on March 15, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff held an informal conference with representatives of the Department of State and among other things discussed the Korean situation. It appeared to be generally agreed that at some future meeting an agreement should be reached on the objectives in Korea. It was suggested that the Secretary of State talk to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If this question was not settled before the next meeting, the question would be discussed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff-State Department meeting on that date." *Ibid.*, Part 2, pp. 920, 921.

P-886
6/26/56
-21-

the principle of voluntary repatriation.¹⁴ Even here the unfortunate dichotomy between military and diplomatic affairs persisted, possibly because of the fiction that the arrangement of a truce was essentially a military matter. For the civilians, like the military, cherished a number of beliefs which, while tolerable in an earlier period, no longer had much validity in a situation such as the Korean war. Despite the experience and aftermath of the Second World War, not the least of these beliefs was that diplomacy was a peacetime activity and war, after all, the business of the military, and that the two functions could be separated and should be performed in sequence. According to this conception, when the war began, the task of the diplomat ended and the military took over; once the war had ended, and the fighting had stopped, the military would bow out and the diplomats would resume their duties. Initiatives were difficult to take in the midst of a war with an orientation such as that.

#### IV. The Problem of Solutions

The preceding analysis may suggest that the military dissidents were actually more disturbed by what they regarded as defects in the policymaking mechanism than they were by substantive decisions. But to interpret the evidence in this fashion is to overlook the intensity/which the military

¹⁴See Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu*, pp. 33-109, for a discussion of the prisoner-of-war problem and the initiatives undertaken by the military.

P-886
6/26/56

-22-

clung to their basic beliefs. They probably felt less strongly about their role in the policymaking mechanism than they did about getting prompt initiatives and precise directives from the State Department; and they certainly felt less strongly about these matters than they did about being deprived of their victory. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that something far more than sheer perversity of attitude was responsible for the dissatisfaction of the military.

This may be all well and good, but what do such findings imply insofar as improvements for the future are concerned? Perhaps their first implication is that we have not yet devised the roles or perspectives necessary to cope with the complex modes of warfare with which we are likely to be confronted for the indefinite future. If the experience of the Korean war is any guide, it suggests that efficiency in the field of national security will require a somewhat different distribution of functions and powers than existed and became institutionalized during the First and Second World Wars.

Such a discovery will set no one on his ears. General Marshall, during World War II, recognized the need and fought hard for effective direction and coordination of the national effort.¹⁵ After the war, James Forrestal and others fought equally hard to create a new policymaking mechanism of some scope and permanence. And the National Security Act of 1947,

¹⁵See Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post*, Chap. XVI, "Military Planning and Foreign Affairs," pp. 312-332.

P-886

6/26/56

-23-

with its successive amendments and modifications, does represent a notable effort to meet the problem and define the new institutions and roles. But if the problem is obvious, and a solution available, the Korean war still may instruct us on two points. First, it suggests that progress in the direction of blending political and military considerations into an acceptable and effective national policy is not something that automatically results from organizational change. Secondly, it seems to imply that some rather specific changes in functions and powers, in respect of the civilian as well as the military components of the government, are required if the exacting needs of limited war are to be met. In other words, the establishment of the National Security Council may have represented a necessary condition to effective policy in this realm, but the experience of the Korean war suggests that it is by no means sufficient. We simply cannot depend upon it in the future that there will be a very strongminded President who will be guided by the recommendations of his Secretary of State, that the Secretary of Defense will have great military prestige in his own right to pit against critics of national policy,¹⁶ or that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be as representative of the State Department on

¹⁶In fact, we can be certain that future Secretaries of Defense will have no military prestige at all unless the law were changed to permit soldiers to serve at the head of the defense establishment.

P-886

6/26/56

-24-

most issues as the State Department itself. Nor can we rely
upon muzzling the military as a substitute for obtaining
their agreement to the great decisions of state. Their power,
for better or worse, is too great for such a policy to have
permanent effect. What is more, their advice is indispensable
in the arena of high policy and we should be willing, if
necessary, to pay a considerable price in friction and dis-
agreement in order to get it. On the other hand, it seems
equally certain that what we call political considerations
must be given special weight in decisions pertaining to
limited warfare.

Such specifications are easy to formulate; but how are
they to be fulfilled, especially since they verge on the
contradictory? In considering what might be done to improve
the situation it is clear, I think, that on at least two
scores changes in the attitude of the military are required.
They still must alter somewhat their view of what constitutes
their exclusive sphere of responsibility; and they must give
up their dedication to the idea that victory means solely
the destruction of the enemy's capacity to resist.

If such changes seem impractical, it should be noted that
at least under peacetime conditions the military have begun to
accept with increasing grace the new balance of power that the
National Security Council is supposed to reflect and institu-
tionalize. It may even be argued that both before and since
the Korean war they have leaned too far in the direction of

P-886
6/26/56

-25-

permitting important military arguments to be diluted by such considerations as the need to balance the budget or the fear of weakening the economy. General Bradley tried to play the role of economist as well as military expert in the years before the Korean war with the unfortunate result, as he himself admitted, that he recommended a $13 billion budget as just what the military establishment needed for 1951.17 It is one thing to recognize that there are other points of view to be taken into account and even given priority over one's own; it is quite another matter to weaken an argument in deference to these other views. That, I would suppose, is not what advisers are for.18

The idea of controlled and limited warfare has also become somewhat more palatable to the military since the Korean war, even though it is still possible to find approving quotations of the slogan that "in war there is no substitute for victory." But it is doubtful that progress in this direction has gone far enough, however enthusiastic the Army, for example, has become about little bombs and medium objectives.

17 See William T. R. Fox, "Civilians, Soldiers, and American Military Policy," in *World Politics*, vol. VII, no. 3 (April, 1955), p. 414, fn. 19.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 413-414.

P-886

6/26/56

-26-

Perhaps all competitive activities require some conception of
victory, some benchmark of winning, in order to orient the
competitors; but it does not follow that in war the sole
criterion must be the destruction of the enemy's capacity to
resist. Of course, what really needs to be won is some
political objective; thus, victory in the military arena is a
variable, in the final analysis the destruction of that portion
of the enemy's resources required to make him accept the
political objective. If the military will recognize this, if
they will think, not solely in terms of crushing the enemy,
but in terms of tailoring the use of force to specific political
objectives and limitations, they will be in a far more effective
position to furnish the kind of advice the high policymaker
needs, and to oppose political proposals which might have
militarily damaging effects. Freed of the bias introduced by
the single standard of victory, they should be better able to
appreciate the nature of their role and responsibility in
relation to the civilian branches of the government. They
should also find it simpler to accept and allow for the uncer-
tainties of conditions which are bound to dominate every sit-
uation of limited conflict in the future as they did the Korean
war. The achievement of these results would, I think,
constitute a significant contribution to the cause of political-
military collaboration; and there is no reason why, by a careful
scrutiny of their premises and traditions, the military cannot
develop the perspectives necessary to their attainment.

P-886
6/26/56

-27-

If the earlier analysis of the military's dissatisfaction with the Korean war is correct, it is obvious that changes in their role and perspective must be accompanied by comparable and perhaps even greater changes on the part of the civilian components of the policymaking mechanism. For if the military are to surrender the initiative in the making of decisions and are actually to shape their strategies and means to political objectives, a serious gap will exist in the necessary chain of decisions unless the civilians, and more specifically, the State Department, act to fill it.¹⁹

The fact that final authority rests with the civilian branches of the government has not sufficed to fill this gap in the past and is unlikely to do so in the future. Real influence in the American government appears to fall to those who not only have the political power and money, but also command the best prepared case for their point of view.²⁰ Speed, fact, and logic fortunately remain potent weapons in the bureaucratic world. What this means, with the

¹⁹Ibid., p. 412. For a discussion of this problem in an historical context, see Warner R. Schilling, "Civil-Naval Politics in World War I," in *World Politics*, vol. VII, no. 4 (July, 1955), pp. 572-591.

²⁰On the virtues of countervailing power as a means of arriving at rational decisions of state, consult the essay by Charles E. Lindblom, entitled *Bargaining: The Hidden Hand in Government*, The RAND Corporation, RM-1434-RC, 22 February 1955.

P-886

6/26/56

-28-

prospect of limited warfare in all its peculiarity before us,
is that the civilians must engage in contingency and forward
planning. At the very least, they must learn to clarify
objectives, establish priorities, and specify the costs that
they will incur for the attainment of their goals. Nor is that
all. They must also be able to evaluate trends and situations
with reasonable dispatch and to understand the potentialities
and limitations of the military instrumentality. In other
words, where the military need to broaden their perspectives
and increase the range of their values, the civilians must
add specificity, depth, and speed to their thought.

To say what is needed in the civilian realm is by no
means the same as getting it. The change required of the
military can be in large measure self-generating; to make it
is not basically a complicated task. What is involved is a
shift of orientation toward accustomed responsibilities rather
than the assumption of recalcitrant and novel tasks. For the
civilians, on the other hand, the suggested change is quite
considerable. Whatever the textbooks may say, whatever
institutional arrangements may currently exist, the civilians
have no real tradition or experience in the prompt initiatives
and detailed planning required by their function in limited war.
Still, the fact that the military have been so active in the
sphere of planning policy in the past, and will undoubtedly
occupy any vacuum that may develop in the future, suggests one
direction in which the civilians might move. For what appears

P-886
6/26/56

-29-

to have enabled the military to take their initiatives has
been the existence of a staff devoted to the performance of
the planning function. There is no inherent reason why the
civilians cannot create a comparable institution.

Let it be admitted immediately that this is not an
exciting new remedy. General Marshall attempted, with what
had best be called modest success, to introduce the principle
to the State Department in the form of the Policy Planning
Staff. More recently, a task force of the Hoover Commission
has recommended the creation of a staff for the National
Security Council.²¹ Let it also be admitted that to wave a
wand and create a staff is not automatically to solve sub-
stantive problems; nor is equipping the National Security
Council with such a group necessarily going to enhance the
satisfaction of the State Department with its role in the
planning process.²² Still and all, in default of a compre-
hensive code of conduct for limited war, there is something
to be said for establishing a staff with fairly specific planning
functions -- preferably in the State Department -- and

²¹See Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, *Five Staff Papers Prepared for the Task Force on Procurement*, vol. I, released June, 1955. I am indebted to Bernard Brodie, for bringing this document to my attention.

²²For one argument against providing the National Security Council with such a staff, see Robert Cutler, "The Development of the National Security Council," in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 34 no. 3 (April, 1956), pp. 441-459.

P-886
6/26/56
-30-

demanding that its members think out operationally what they
would propose to do in a given set of contingencies. The
procedure has worked for the military; it could conceivably
work for the civilians, albeit under much more complicated
circumstances. How else can we overcome the tardiness and
diffuseness of the political case as it comes up against the
carefully planned positions of the military? The establishment
of a political staff of some size, competence, and freedom from
day-to-day tasks is not certain to provide the answer to the
civilians in their efforts to play effectively their vastly
more complicated role in wartime. But it might be the means
by which solutions could be achieved.

Whether the establishment of effective political control
at the highest levels of policy will prove
sufficient for the planning and conduct of limited war efforts
is very difficult to say. On the one hand, it has been and
still is the American practice to give the theater commander
broad directives together with considerable discretion as to
how they should be implemented, as well as a large measure of
authority to deal with emergencies of local origin. On the
other hand, it is quite conceivable that decisions heretofore
within the discretion of the local commander will have a
significant effect on the stability of the military arena.²³
Thus, against the desirability of decentralizing authority

²³ The kinds of weapons to be used, and the manner of their employment, might well be a case in point.

P-886

6/26/56

-31-

and initiative to the theater, there stands the need to intro-
duce political considerations fairly far down in the chain of
command. The formulation of limitations of the kind that
characterized the Korean war might fulfill this need, but it
is doubtful that they could be made sufficiently detailed and
specific to cover all contingencies. Remote control thus may
not be the answer to the theater commander's problem, however
well integrated and harmonious it may be at the top. There is
one device, however, which has proved useful in the past and
might well be kept in hand for the future. During World War II
and at the end of the Korean conflict we attached a political
adviser to a theater command in the person of Mr. Robert Murphy.
We were fortunate to have in Mr. Murphy someone who could
obtain the confidence of General Eisenhower in North Africa
and General Clark in Japan; but we should not count on such a
lucky accident in the future. If the device of the political
adviser to the theater commander is worth perpetuating, as the
results achieved by Mr. Murphy suggest that it is, then a
conscious effort to train foreign service officers for this
exacting task is surely worthwhile.²⁴

²⁴For testimony on the effectiveness of Mr. Murphy's services, see Mark W. Clark, _From the Danube to the Yalu_, pp. 93-95.

P-886

6/26/56

-32-

None of these measures will ensure against a repetition
of the disagreement between military and civilian agencies
which punctuated the·Korean war. A somewhat diminished role
and changed perspective on the part of the military, the
establishment of a civilian counterpart to the general staff
in the State Department, and the institutionalization of the
role of political adviser to the theater commander may in
fact seem trivial as a means of countering a storm of the
proportions raised by General MacArthur. Nevertheless, changes
even of this order may at least ensure that the considerations
necessary to responsible political-military decisions are
adequately represented at the key policymaking levels; that
the views of the State Department are supported by at least
as adequate staff work as the positions of the military; that
the State Department actually does take the initiative in
the anticipation and formulation of policy; and that both the
civilians and the military are working with roughly the same
perspectives and employing similar methods of discourse.
There is no need in all this for the military to become
political experts, or for the political analysts to become
armchair strategists. It will suffice as a beginning if each
group can be brought to understand and appreciate the other's
responsibilities.