PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON STRATEGIC FORCES

Press Conference, 1130, September 1, 1983

S: Scowcroft

H: Haig

Q: Question

SEP 6 1983

Mr. Hetu: Good morning.

This is the first meeting that Gen Scowcroft has had with a group
like this since we made our report to the President. But since he
received the letter on arms control from Congressman Aspin he has
had so many requests for comments from members of the media that
he asked you all to come here to meet with him this morning.
Also with General Scowcroft are three other members of the
President's Commission on Strategic Forces: Secretary Haig,
Ambassador Helms and Secretary Woolsey.

S: We got so many questions resulting from Congressman Aspin's
letter to us that I thought this was the most efficient way for
us to respond to your questions. We do, of course, have the
letter officially and we will respond to it. In the course of
developing a response to Congressman Aspin's letter we will
consult with him, with other interested members of Congress
including those who have made proposals of their own including
Congressman Gore, Senator Nunn, and Senator Cohen and also with
the Administration in trying to see how we might be helpful in
strengthening both the substance of arms control position and
also the bipartisan nature of U.S. moves on arms control in
pursuit of the charter or the executive order which the President
gave us which continued this commission to provide guidance to
review the integration of the Commission's report into
Administration programs and to consult and consider carefully the
views of Congress on that. As you know, arms control was one of
the major recommendations of our Commission report but other than
specifics on counting by weapons rather than launchers we were
fairly general in our recommendations on arms control and we
would propose to amplify our views on that and arms control and
its relationship to the stability of strategic forces. I might
just say that we have not suddenly come to life as a result of
the Aspin letter. We have been meeting informally with members
of Congress we have consulted with the Administration and met
with the President's senior arms control group which is the new
group chaired by Judge Clark. So we have already been involved
in this process. I think all I would want to say about the Aspin
proposal at the moment is that it does go to the heart of some of
the most vexing problems in arms control and that is that for the
U.S., one of our greatest concerns is the Soviet large missile
and the throwweight which that missile provides to them and I
think it is fair to say, on the Soviet side, that they are very
concerned

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about our bombers and our cruise missiles so that some concept which folds these in a way which accommodates to the asymmetry of the two force postures and still deals with them in a way which is equitable I think would be an important step forward. We will have a Commission meeting next Thursday I think it is, to go deeply into these things. I might just, in conclusion point out that, since the Commission made its report, there has been, in fact, substantial movement by the Administration in modification of its START proposal and, as well, the Soviets have made some positive steps. I wouldn't say there is more than coincidence that these have happened since the Commission's report, but we welcome what has happened and we would like to be helpful in assisting in this process especially in maintaining the kind of bipartisan spirit and the consensus which accompanied the Commission's earlier efforts.

Before we go to your questions are there any of the other Commission members that would like to make a comment.

Ambassador Helms: I would just like to underline what General Scowcroft had to say about the essay which Congressman Aspin appended to his press conference the other day. A careful reading of that, I think, puts in excellent perspective what the problem is before the nation with respect to strategic forces modernization on the one hand and arms control on the other. After all, they say that politics is the art of the possible and so is arms control. If there was ever an issue which gets that kind of billing, so that we have got to, among ourselves somehow, reach some compromises on these various arms control proposals if there is any possibility of getting an agreement or treaty at all. And if anybody disagrees that it has to be a bipartisan approach, one has only to look at the composition of the government these days -- with a Republican President, a Republican Senate, and a Democratic House, and it is in the house where the money bills originate, and therefore it is not going to be conceivable that we will get either force modernization or arms control unless we can maintain this bipartisan approach. That was the whole theme of the Commission's report. It has three elements to it. We would like to see all three elements continued. But there is obviously going to have to be some give and take along the way. And I commend to you, therefore, a careful reading of Congressman Aspin's essay.

S: Now we would be happy to answer any of your questions either directed generally or to specific members of the Commission.

Q: General you did not mention, but will you be talking also to Ambassador Rowny and the arms control negotiators?

S: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

Q: And can you tell us anything about the positive steps the Soviets have taken?

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S: They -- I'd rather leave that to the Administration. But they have been prepared to talk about specific reductions and they have come off some of their previous positions that have been rigid to the point of deferring substantive negotiations. I would not want to oversell that but they have made some gestures which I think --you know -- could be taken as mildly encouraging.

Q: General, you said that you were already geared up and we would propose to amplify our views on arms control. Would you think you would be able to do that before October 6?

S: Yes, I think so.

Q: And would this take the form of a written paper or...

S: I think we are not far enough along to know exactly what form it would take but as I say we have already thought substantially about some of these things as of course has the Administration and have a number of the Congressman and I think it is not beyond the wit of man to put some finishing touches on something before the Fall negotiations start.

Q: What will you be doing now, that you wouldn't have done before the Aspin letter?

S: Well, we will be focusing specifically as one of our efforts on the Aspin letter and on the ideas that it contains so it is another element like, for example, the build-down proposal of Nunn and Cohen and that's all.

Q: Will you be making more specific proposals?

S: Perhaps.

Q: Will you be making a draft treaty?

S: Oh no. That is certainly -- we are not going to attempt, in any way, to substitute for the Administration. What we are trying to do is to be helpful and to assist in bringing a bipartisan dimension into this part of the overall issues that the Commission has dealt with.

Q: General, is this, any way, a response to the somewhat veil threat by Congressman Aspin that if some action was not taken that they might vote against the appropriations for the MX (garble).

S: I would like Congressman Aspin to speak for himself but I think that it is clear that the erosion between the first vote on the MX and the Authorization in June showed that the MX, itself, is in jeopardy unless there are other steps taken and I think I would say that Congressman Aspin was simply stating what he perceives as the trend and I would point out that he called vote,

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the first MX vote, and he was only one off on the House vote and
I think that was what he was saying.

Q: But he said that he would in fact lead a fight in the House
and other Senators such as Nunn and Cohen would lead a fight in
the Senate to defeat appropriation for the MX if there wasn't
some sort of movement made on arms control.

S: Well, as I say, I don't want to speak for Les I don't
remember him saying that he would lead a fight to defeat. But I
think that what he is saying is that the Commission report had
three parts to it: a limited deployment of the MX, the
development and deployment of a small single warhead missile, and
arms control measures and that is an integrated package and that
we have bipartisan support and movement on the first two -- the
small missile and on the MX -- and now we have to do it on arms
control and that is what the Congress expects.

Q: General, your report from last May in outlining an arms
control approach spoke of the virtues of a simple agreement where
you would have aggregate levels, limitations on warheads and
wouldn't try to dictate force structure. Now the
Administration's revised START proposal has two possible avenues
to an agreement. One would involve limits on medium and heavy
missiles although they say they would be flexible on what they
are, and the other would involve limits on throw-weight -- not on
aggregate number of warheads. Do you think the START proposal
needs to be amended in some way to be more in conformity with
your report?

S: I think, if you will recall, our report said that where we
thought that we ought to end up on arms control is equal numbers
of weapons of roughly equivalent yield. And I think we would
stick to that. The path as to how you would get there is
extremely important and...

Q: Do you think the path laid out by the Administration in its
START proposal needs to be changed in any way?

S: It already has been changed from the initial proposal and I
think it is under review at the present time.

Q: General, do you think that the Administration should be
showing greater flexibility at the START talks and what is the
point of making general recommendations -- why don't you make
some specific proposals and thirdly, will you talk to the
Soviets?

S: You know flexibility is a great virtue if you know what you
are being flexible about. And I think one of the things we are
searching for, and I would say the Administration as well, is to
embody principles and concepts which move arms control in the
direction of stability for the force posture on both sides and do
it in a way which, as near as we can judge the Russians, is

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negotiable. No, we do not intend to talk with the Russians. That is the job of the Administration, although most of us in one way or another have informal contact with Soviets in one guise or another and we are not equipped to do treaty kind of work. I think the best we can do is conceptual work of a nature which then can be turned by technicians in ACDA, STATE, and Defense into the kind of treaty language. We just are not equipped to do that kind of job.

Q: General, with regard to the three ideas advanced by Congressman Aspin, you mentioned earlier you felt that they go to the heart of the problem concerning arms control negotiations.

S: Well, there are others..

Q: What is your own view with regard to the three ideas in the Aspin proposal?

S: Well, my view is that throw-weight is a major issue. It is one of our concerns. It is, at least in part, a perspective issue as compared to an immediate one and the real question is how do you deal with it in a way so as to end up with where we think one ought to end up -- and that is with warheads with roughly equivalent yield and do it in a way which recognizes the deep asymmetries of the force structures on each side.

Q: But Aspin says he would deal with it really on a kind of a time basis without something on the side completely he wouldn't require what he calls a pyre of missilry tomorrow -- do you see that as a fruitful path to resolve some of these dilemmas -- to stretch out some of these....

S: I think a stretch out is certainly one way to do it. If you ask the Soviets over a short period of time to reconfigure their forces, they obviously are not going to do it.

Q: And would that also be true in regard to the large missiles?

S: Yes, I think the large missiles and the throw-weight sort of go together. As far as the bombers are concerned, there is no question that the Soviets are concerned about our bombers and our ALCM cruise missiles and there has to be some way to take account of those while at the same time recognizing that they are different from missiles -- that they do have long flying time so that they are not that kind of instantaneous response weapon. They are subject to heavy air defenses and, therefore, there is not a one-for-one equivalence between a warhead carried by a bomber of whatever nature and a missile warhead.

Q: That is also Aspin's point.

S: Yes, yes. We concur with that approach. And translating that to something specific which not only makes sense but appears reasonably negotiable is difficult, but we think not impossible.

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Q: How much support do you have for the Administration in this task you are going to be undertaking in the next few weeks and becoming more specific in your arms control suggestions?

S: I think we have strong support from the President. After all, this is, in fact, what he asked us to do. To review the progress, to consult closely with the Congress and to reflect their views.

Q: Have you talked with him specifically in the last few days?

S: Not in the last few days. I have talked with Judge Clark. I have not talked with the President in the last few days.

Q: And Judge Clark relayed the strong support of the President for what you are about to do?

S: Yes.

Q: Did you say difficult if not impossible?

S: No, I said difficult but not impossible.

Q: OK, alright.

Q: General, did you get a chance to discuss either the essay or the letter with Congressman Aspin before a week ago when he sent it to you?

S: Yes, I have talked with him in the process of his formulating--

Q: Did you see a draft of the letter or the ...

S: He talked about the concepts and he told us he was going to do it, yes.

Q: When did he start working on this -- how did this develop?

S: I think you better ask him.

Q: There are a few efforts going on in the Administration that ought to have some bearing on what you are trying to do. One is the review of the Soviet records so far as compliance with other treaties are concerned and the other has to do with efforts to arrive at some form of build-down. Could you please give us your views on that?

S: The review of possible Soviet violations, of course, will have an impact on the whole arms control approach. It is not something in which we are involved. We will simply be observers, as you will, to that process. What was the other?

Q: Build-down.

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S: I think build-down fits well with what it is that the Commission has recommended. That is, modernization of our forces and reduction of the numbers in order to create an environment compatible with the deployment of a small single warhead missile. So that works well. What we are searching for, is something that is a kind of non-mechanical application of a build-down, which, if you go about it with a kind of a mechanistic approach, could result, at least over a short term, in greater instability rather than stability. So we are looking at ways to incorporate the idea, which is a good idea in a way which facilitates the move toward more stable forces.

Q: How might you do that?

S: Pardon.

Q: How might you do that-- in a non-mechanistic way?

S: I don't know whether I can answer that right now because we, at least the Commission and I can't speak for the Administration is also working very hard on this. I think that with some flexible rules that perhaps with some time or staging -- time scales that it can be done and still fit.

Q: Do you think that the Administration's present posture in which it leaves it up to the Soviets to say how they would comply with the general limits on warheads and on throw-weight is inadequate?

S: I think that the Administration is working very hard on its arms control proposals at the present time and I would take that as recognition that, however happy they are with the proposals that they think some improvement is possible and we will go at it in the same light.

Q: Do you think it is adequate at the present time to get an agreement -- you have no confidence in the Soviets replying?

S: I don't know about that. As I have said there have been significant movement by the Administration since it made its first proposal. I think, and I think the Administration thinks, further improvements can be made now, whether, if they stop now, the Soviets would eventually do something -- I really can't say. But it seems to be that we ought to -- that as a country -- we ought to get the best proposal we can not only to negotiate with the Soviets, but to get to maintain and to strengthen the consensus in this country on something so that we don't have the kind of attacks both on weapon systems and on arms control that have characterized the last decade and that is, importantly, what we are trying to do.

Q: General, in your view what possible effect could today's incident with the South Korean jet airliner have on arms control negotiations in Geneva?

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S: It is a tragic development. I think that is far afield from our focus and I think I would rather not comment in substance. If some of the rest of you would like to

Q: Secretary Haig would you like to?

H: I think it is too early to say. In some respects the incident would tend to sharpen people's concerns about the whole area of arms control and international stability and mutual restraint. But it is too early to say what the full nature of this incident will reveal in the context of command and control, political cognizance of events as they developed and occurred and existing management of the Soviet system itself by its political leadership.

Q: What's an appropriate response on the part of the U.S. for this action?

H: It is too early to say. Certainly an expression of the grave nature of the incident has already been made by Secretary Shultz.

Q: If you had your choice would you like to have a final vote on the MX this morning?

H: As I say, everything is this way and the initial reactions to events of crises-character, in my experience, have always differed fundamentally from the final settling-in assessments of those events and I would say it would be a sharpening of our concern about the Soviet system and the threat it poses is clearly going to be the immediate outcome, but it will also have an outcome which will continue to raise concerns of people everywhere about our military systems and the command and control and the levels of those systems that exists.

Q: General, are you suggesting that the Soviet political authorities do not have adequate control?

H: No, I am not. What I am suggesting is that this is a key question to be investigated and reviewed in the period ahead by everyone.

Q: Is there something going on between the Soviet Union and the U.S. or the Soviet Union and the Koreans that might have somehow created an incident like this?

H: Not to my knowledge, but you would have to ask someone who is plugged in.

Q: Secretary Haig, we heard from Secretary Shultz that the airplane had been tracked for about two and one-half hours -- would that seem to indicate to you that the decision to shoot it down came from very high up?

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H: If that were in the United States command and control system I would say yes, but I think there are questions to be asked and a great deal more information to be derived before a value judgment of the kind you ask for.

Q: Wouldn't that indicate though that they were flying along with the Korean plane just waiting to hear from higher ups as to what to do?

H: I don't know -- might, might not. It might indicate that there was a delegation of authority to local commanders that was rigid and flexible and less than sensitive to the interdependent world that has developed.

Q: General Scowcroft, what does it say about the progress in the START talks or the lack of progress that fell into these discussions we are now having your Commission sit down and redebate the fundamental issues that were raised before we went in with our opening position -- these broad general questions which suggests that there hasn't been very much movement.

S: I don't think there has been a great of movement as I suggest, a lot of what there has been has come in the last few months and I point to that principally for two reasons. First to point out that the Administration has not simply been sitting on its hands and that secondly, I think that if we all - if all elements of the government put their minds to it, it seems to me that it is conceivable that substantial progress can be made now.

Q: So we are not in square one but we are almost at square one.

S: I don't even know how many squares there are. But yes, obviously it is manifest there has not been great progress since we started the talks at Geneva. One of the problems with all of this is to the extent that you make your negotiating position public, you make it very difficult to negotiate because you are negotiating not only with the Soviets but you are negotiating back here with the public and everything. To the extent that you don't make them public then there is suspicion that the Administration is not sincere is not really trying. That's kind of squaring a circle problem that we perennially have in this country which the Soviets don't have to worry about. It is a difficult problem.

Q: General, how likely is it that you could get a START agreement before the INF issues are resolved?

S: One can only speculate. At one level certainly they are interrelated but I think it is not - it would not be impossible that they can be dealt with separately and in the final analysis an INF agreement probably has to be imbedded one way or another in a START agreement. In other words, if you don't have the both of them in the end the possibility of circumvention is fairly

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high but I don't think this Fall that they necessarily have to be
tied together.

Q: Based on what you know right now, would you say it is more
likely we could reach a START agreement before INF or the other
way around?

S: I wouldn't want to speculate on that.

Q: May I follow-up on that? I noticed General in a recent
interview that you said there might be virtue in an approach
where you had an overall limit for both INF and START -- for both
intermediate long-range. Is that an approach you might suggest?

S: I think certainly that is an approach to try to broaden the
scope so that you can deal with some of the more difficult
problems of INF in a broader perspective. I think that would be,
at this particular juncture, that would be very difficult to do
before deployment.

Q: In search of this new bipartisan consensus do you plan to
consult with some of the Democratic presidential candidates?

S: Yes. We have a standing offer with all of them to talk to
us. Some of them have availed themselves of it others have not.

Q: Will you make recommendations bearing directly on the INF?

S: Probably not. That may be premature, but probably not.

Q: You say some of the Democratic candidates have availed
themselves of your offer and some have not -- which ones have?

S: I don't know if I can speak,... The Commission is not
monolithic and we consult broadly, but we have met with -- or
groups of us met with -- former VP Mondale, with Senator Glenn,
and with Senator Hollings.

[LC]

**Phase I** - Period Prior to the Submission of the Report
to the President (Expected 4 April)

I. A. **Objective** - To impress the media and the public with the composition, credibility and hard work of the Commission; the complexity of the problem; and the immediate need for the MX to modernize the land-based leg of the TRIAD.

B. **Philosophy** - Keep the media fully informed from now until R-Day. There will be no surprises, no breakthroughs in the report. As we make progress in preparing the final report we must keep the media apprised of our general direction.

C. **The Message** - If this Commission can't come up with the answer, nobody can. The Commission has examined every reasonable basing option and combinations thereof. They have had 20 meetings (this will change), have seen nearly 200 individuals from inside government and from the private sector representing a wide variety of expertise. It has been necessary to consider each option from several different perspectives:

- National Security

- Availability

- Survivability

- Vulnerability (ARMS CONTROL)

- Salt I & II

- ABM Treaty

- START

- Congress

- Cost

[Lc]

I. D. <u>Actions</u>

1. - <u>Media Analysis</u> - Prepare brief editorial profile of major media outlets, correspondents, columnists and commentators concerning their treatment of strategic forces, particularly the MX. To be used in preparing Commission Members for media break-fasts, backgrounders, interviews and appearances over the next several weeks.

<u>Time</u>: To be completed by Friday March 18

Place: Support and logistics provided by USAF

<u>Responsibilities</u>: Hetu, SAFOI, MX Office

2. - <u>Question and Answer Books</u> - Prepare unclassified briefing books for each member of the Commission and appropriate government spokesmen which will contain general information on the MX and specific position papers and questions and answers about the Commission, it's work and it's report.

<u>Time</u>: First draft to be completed by 23 March

3. - <u>Photo Availability</u> - Provide opportunity for still photographers (wires, magazines, newspapers) and motion picture/video-tape cameramen to obtain file photos to accompany subsequent stories on the Commission.

<u>Time</u>: 1100, Thursday 24 March

Place: Rm 3-E-333, Pentagon

<u>Responsibilities</u>: Hetu, OASD(PA)

4. - <u>Commission Membership Portfolio</u> - Obtain names of media people (reporters, columnists, commentators, editors, etc.) from each member of the Commission who they know well and with whom they would feel most comfortable in interviews.

<u>Time</u>: To be completed by Friday 25 March

Place: Hetu

<u>Responsibilities</u>: Hetu

[Lc]

I. D. <u>Actions</u>

5. <u>Press Breakfast</u> - A press breakfast with a limited number of selected Defense Correspondents, for discussions similar to those held with Congressmen.

<u>Time</u>: 0800 31 March

Place: Pentagon

6. <u>Presidential Statement</u> - Prepare an acceptance statement by the President to be released as a cover sheet for the report with its one page executive summary.

Time: To be completed by 30 March

Place: White House

<u>Responsibilities</u>: Reed, Hetu, White House Press Office

7. <u>President's Speech to Los Angeles World Affairs Council</u> - Include portions on need for TRIAD; why Minuteman must be replaced soon; why MX is only available option now; and mention of composition and work of the Commission.

Time: Thursday, 31 March

Place: Los Angeles

<u>Responsibilities</u>: Hetu, Tom Reed, Bob Sims, Bakshian Al Meyer

8. <u>In-Depth Backgrounders</u> - Commission Members give in-depth backgrounders to select members of the media on the activities and progress of the Commission. These should be undertaken immediately before R-Day when the contents of the report are decided.

Time: During 7-days preceeding R-Day

Place: Various

<u>Responsibilities</u>: Scowcroft, Reed, Hetu

[L]

I. E. Schedule March 1983

Fri 18 - 0830 Commission meets at Pentagon
Media Analysis to be Completed

Sat 19 - (T) Commission meets at Pentagon

Wed 23 - 0800 Congressional Breakfast
Q & A Book ready for Review

Thu 24 - 0930 Commission meets at Pentagon
1100 Photo Availability

Fri 25 0830 Commission meets at Pentagon
Commission Membership Portfolio Completed
Commission Kit (Bios/Photos) Completed

Sat 26 - (T) Commission meets at Pentagon

Wed 30 - Final Draft of Presidential Statement
(for release with report on 4 April)

Thu 31 - 0800 Press Breakfast (Pentagon)
0930 Commission meets at Pentagon
President's Speech, L.A. World Affairs Council

April 1983

Fri 1 - 0800 Commission meets at Pentagon - FINAL MEETING
Prepare statistics sheet to accompany release
of report

Mon 4 - R-DAY - See Phase II

[LC]

**Phase II - Report Day (R-Day)** - The Day the Commission's Report is Submitted to the President and released to the Public.

**Rationale for releasing Report on R-Day**

- President and White House need not answer questions until President acts on the Report - studying public reaction in the meantime.

- Release permits Commission Members to intelligently discuss the report in public.

- It will leak anyway.

II. A. **Objective** - To assure that the first and second day news stories accurately and objectively describe the report.

B. **Philosophy** - The best brains in the Country have worked long and hard on an incredibly complex problem. The results of those labors are embodied in their Report now submitted to the President.

C. **The Message** - This is the final definitive report on Strategic Forces. The President is now considering the Commission's recommendations.

[LC]

## II. E. Schedule - Report Day (R-Day) - April 11

11:00 am - Chairman Scowcroft and Secretary Brown brief the President and the NSC and present the report. (No Press)

11:30 am - All Commission members and Special Counselors who are available assemble in Roosevelt Room for meeting with President. (No Press/WH photographers)

12:15 pm - Room 450/OEOB - General Scowcroft with members of the Commission and Special Counselors. Statement by Scowcroft and answer questions from press corps. Pipe live to Pentagon Press Room.

2:00 pm - Foreign Press Center - General Scowcroft to brief foreign press. RELEVANT HIGHLIGHT

4:00 pm - Roosevelt Room - Analytical/Specialist Group assembled to meet with General Scowcroft, Dr. Brown, Dr. Deutch and Mr. Woolsey.

6:00-7:30 pm - Possible live interviews with evening TV news shows with General Scowcroft.

11:30 pm - "Nightline" - some member of the Commission. Scowcroft not available.

7:00 - MCDERMID LARRERE IS REQUESTING

[L]

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN IN SUPPORT OF
PRESIDENTS REPORT TO CONGRESS ON STRATEGIC FORCES

I. **Background** - On April 19 the President forwarded his report on Strategic Forces to the Congress in response to the Continuing Resolution Act passed on 20 December, 1982. The President's report endorsed the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces which had been submitted to him on 11 April. The Congress now has 45 calendar days plus 50 hours of debate, from the date of the submission of the President's report, to vote on his recommendations.

II. **Objectives** - To enlist support from individuals and organizations throughout the Country who will support the President's position on the MX. To encourage positive action by the Members of Congress by informing and educating their constituents on the complex issues involved in the MX decision.

III. **Philosophy** - The TRIAD must be maintained and strengthened by deploying the MX. If the MX is withdrawn as an option or is voted out of existence by the Congress, the United States will have suffered a catastrophic international strategic nuclear defeat - the first such defeat by any country in the world. The Russians will have won a victory. Other foreign nations will be forced to reevaluate their positions and allegiances.

IV. **The Messages** - Keep the messages simple, believable and logical:

- The recommendations forwarded by the President constitute a strategic package and cannot be separated or isolated one from the other.

- The TRIAD is essential to our National Security and to successful Arms Negotiations.

[L.C.]

#### IV. (Continued)

- Titan has worn out, Minuteman is fast wearing out and must be replaced as soon as possible

- The MX is the only replacement or upgrade missile available **NOW**. Any other alternative is unacceptable.

- The Congress must now decide the future of MX, the TRIAD and indeed the Nation.

- Other issues such as the so-called "Window of Vulnerability"; survivability; hardness and Soviet missile accuracy will also be addressed.

#### V. Responsibilities

A) **Coordination** - National Security Council will coordinate the activities of the members of the Commission, Senior Counsellors and other departments and agencies of the Government in their support of the President's recommendations. Herbert E. Hetu has been designated the National Security Council's representative and overall coordinator for this effort.

B) **Primary Responsibilities** - The following departments and agencies will have a major role:

- Defense Department

- State Department

- Joint Chiefs of Staff

- Department of the Air Force

- Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Each of these is requested to designate a project and contact officer.

#### VI. Actions
A number of actions designed for this period which were contained in the Commission's Public Affairs Plan (promulgated earlier) have already been initiated and some completed. Future actions will be driven primarily by public and media reaction to the President's Report and to the Congressional Hearings now in progress.

[L]

D. <u>Actions</u>

POD

4

Executive Summary

- <u>Mail</u> Presidential Statement with cover letter from the President to former SECDEF's, Service Secretaries, Chairman JCS, Service Chiefs, heads of editorial boards, TV interviewers, and distinguished citizens.

Koane

DOD

DOD

- <u>Mail</u> Presidential Statement with Report to Out-of-Town Press

- <u>Mailout to</u> and briefings for Defense Study Groups

- <u>Mailout to</u> and briefings for Defense oriented Associations

KARNA

- <u>OP-ED Articles</u> by various Commission Members and Special Counselors for major media.

- <u>Arrange one-on-one interviews</u> by Members and Counselors with major newspapers, magazines, and columnists.

- <u>Appearances by Members & Counselors</u> on network radio/TV news shows:

- Good Morning America - ABC

- TODAY - NBC

- CBS Morning News

- Meet the Press - NBC

- Face the Nation - CBS

- This Week With David Brinkley - ABC

- MacNeil Lehrer Report

- CNN

- Larry King (Mutual Radio)

- Early Today - NBC

- CBS Early Morning

- ABC News This Morning

- Nightwatch - CBS

- NBC News Overnight

- Nightline - ABC

Radio call-in

[c]

D. Actions

**Brief Out-of-town Editors** - In depth discussions with groups of out-of-town editors by General Scowcroft and other Members of the Commission and Special Counselors.

- **Brief Foreign Press** - Members of Commission and Special Counselors meet with foreign press at State Department's Foreign Press Center (or invite selected foreign press reps to meet in some other location.)

- **Editorial Boards** - Members and Special Counselors meet with Editorial Boards of major U.S. Newspapers.

**Speakers Bureau** - Create a Bureau to schedule and coordinate speaking engagements by Members and Special Counselors throughout the Country.

- **Press Contacts by Congressional Districts** - Target media in states/districts of Senators or Congressman who are undecided about the MX issue. Arrange interviews with Commission Members or Special Counselors as available.

[L]

D. <u>Actions</u>

- Advertisements supporting Commission Report -
  Ads sponsored by industry or national defense
  organizations in major print media supporting
  Commission report and Presidential action.
  Encouraging positive action by Congress.

- Meetings with various media groups

- Sperling Breakfast

- Orr Kelly's Group

- Foreign Policy Group

- U.S. News & World Report - Scowcroft interview
  by editors for cover story on Commission report.

- One or Two Day Forum Sponsored by AEI - Public sessions with attendant press coverage to discuss full spectrum of issues associated with the MX. Commission Members and Special Counselors would take part on various panels. This should take place after report is delivered to the President but before President submits his proposal to the Congress. Subjects which would be addressed might include:

- The TRIAD

- Survivability and Vulnerability

- Shoot on Warning/ Shoot on Attack

- Mobile Small Missiles

- MX or Nothing

- MX and START

- Congress' responsibility for National Security

[L]

SUGGESTED THEMES FOR MEMBERS
---
AND
---
SPECIAL COUNSELORS

MEMBERS

Scowcroft & Reed - Why the Commissions answer was the best answer.

Smith
- Why all the missiles can't go to sea,
why not only D-5 or a common missile?

Woolsey
- Both sides of the aisle must meet in
the middle on this one - we did!

Lyons
- Survivability is a question of relative
time. Required hardness can be designed
and constructed.

Haig
- International aspects - START/SALT.

Helms
- Running the race with one leg missing.

Perry
- We need answers now and this is the best of what's available.

Clements
- DOD and industry can get the job done
and cut costs at the same time.

Brady
- Congress' responsibility for National
Security.

Deutch
- Within the state of the art these are
the best solutions. More research
needed but we can't wait that long.

[L]

SPECIAL COUNSELORS

**Brown**
- If MX option is withdrawn or voted down it will be international nuclear strategic victory for Soviet Union - First by any country.

**Laird**
- Congress has a responsibility for National Security - can't let this one slip.

**Schlesinger**
- Foreign implications. Forsees disaster in the international arena if this option loses.

**Kissinger**
- Wide ranging effects on foreign policy and international negotiating posture if Congress rebuffs the President.

**Rumsfeld**
- Industry is behind the President on this one.

**Cutler**
- The effect an MX loss in Congress will have on SALT and START.

**Vance**
-

**McCone**
-

PENTAGON NEWS CORRESPONDENTS

Nov. 24, 1982

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<table><thead><tr><th>ORGANIZATION</th><th>DEADLINE</th><th>PENTAGON</th><th>OFFICE</th><th>HOME</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>WIRE SERVICES:</strong></td></tr><tr><td>AP (Fred Hoffman)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-6638</td><td>833-5310</td><td>765-7498</td></tr><tr><td>UPI (Richard Gross)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-3598</td><td>637-3700</td><td>229-0959</td></tr><tr><td>REUTERS (Robert Trautman)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-3267</td><td>628-2316</td><td>654-7854</td></tr><tr><td>KYODO (Yasuhisa Nakada</td><td></td><td>OX 7-6564</td><td>347-5767</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>TELEVISION</strong></td></tr><tr><td>NBC (Richard Valeriani)</td><td>5 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5669</td><td>686-5310</td><td>244-7514</td></tr><tr><td>CBS (William Lynch)</td><td>5 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5688</td><td>457-4433</td><td>966-2162</td></tr><tr><td>ABC (John McWethy)</td><td>5 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5674</td><td>887-7257</td><td>241-1591(703)</td></tr><tr><td>CNN (Charles Bierbauer)</td><td>Open</td><td>OX 4-3118</td><td>298-7400</td><td>424-3075</td></tr><tr><td>ITNA (David Browde)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-4662</td><td>872-8700</td><td>289-7333</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>NEWSPAPERS</strong></td></tr><tr><td>BALTIMORE SUN (Charles Corddry)</td><td>7 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-6894</td><td>347-8250</td><td>WH 2-4048</td></tr><tr><td>CHRISTIAN SCI. MON. (B. Knickerbocker)</td><td>1 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5179</td><td>785-4400</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>L.A. TIMES (David Wood)</td><td>6 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-3757</td><td>293-4650</td><td>649-1148</td></tr><tr><td>N.Y. NEWS (Joseph Volz)</td><td>5 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5670</td><td>467-6670</td><td>249-6158</td></tr><tr><td>N.Y. TIMES (Richard Halloran)</td><td>5 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5985</td><td>862-0300</td><td>362-5742</td></tr><tr><td>WALL ST. JNL (Walt Mossberg)</td><td>5 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-3696</td><td>862-9200</td><td>244-4988</td></tr><tr><td>WASHINGTON POST (George Wilson)</td><td>4 P.M.</td><td>OX 5-6021</td><td>334-7333</td><td>759-3240</td></tr><tr><td>WASHINGTON TIMES (Russell Howe)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-6713</td><td>337-1560</td><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>NEWS MAGAZINES</strong></td></tr><tr><td>NEWSWEEK (David Martin)</td><td>5 P.M. (Sat)</td><td>OX 5-5182</td><td>626-2056</td><td>652-7945</td></tr><tr><td>TIME (Bruce Nelan)</td><td>5 P.M. (Fri)</td><td>OX 5-7476</td><td>293-4300</td><td>385-2862</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. NEWS (Robert Dudley)</td><td>5 P.M. (Fri)</td><td>OX 7-4982</td><td>861-2342</td><td>525-7687</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>WS SERVICES</strong></td></tr><tr><td>COPLEY (Ed Prina)</td><td>6:30 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-5670</td><td>737-6960</td><td>537-0336</td></tr><tr><td>SCRIPPS-HOWARD (Lance Gay)</td><td>4:30 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-7647</td><td>833-9520</td><td>774-6414</td></tr><tr><td>NEWHOUSE (Phil Smith)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-7647</td><td>383-7835</td><td>698-5789</td></tr><tr><td>CROMLEY NEWS (Ray Cromley)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-7477</td><td></td><td>SO 5-4184</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>SERVICE TRADE PUBLICATIONS</strong></td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>ARMY-NAVY-AF-FEDERAL TIMES</strong></td></tr><tr><td>DEFENSE (Paul Smith)</td><td>COB (Thurs)</td><td>OX 7-6938</td><td>554-7153</td><td>521-1726</td></tr><tr><td>ARMY (Don Hirst)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-3764</td><td>554-7160</td><td>422-6623</td></tr><tr><td>NAVY (Ted Bush)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-3764</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AIR FORCE (Bruce Callander)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-6564</td><td>554-7121</td><td>281-9353</td></tr><tr><td>FEDERAL (Sheila Hershow)</td><td>8th/Mo.</td><td></td><td>954-7133</td><td>466-8027</td></tr><tr><td>ARMED FORCES JNL (Ben Schemmer)</td><td>8th/Mo.</td><td>OX 7-4006</td><td>296-0450</td><td>338-2397</td></tr><tr><td>AIR FORCE MAGAZINE (Cliff Berry)</td><td>1st of Mo.</td><td></td><td>637-3362</td><td>860-8497</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>TECHNICAL PRESS</strong></td></tr><tr><td>AEROSPACE DAILY (David Bond)</td><td>4 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-7537</td><td>293-3400</td><td>534-3603</td></tr><tr><td>AVIATION WEEK (Rob Robinson)</td><td></td><td></td><td>624-7587</td><td>573-7845</td></tr><tr><td>BNA (Melanie Dooley)</td><td>6 P.M.</td><td>OX 7-8039</td><td>452-4230</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DEF/SPACE DAILY (Norm Baker)</td><td>4 P.M.</td><td></td><td>638-0500</td><td>592-3531(703)</td></tr><tr><td>McGRAW HILL (James Canan)</td><td>Wed. Noon</td><td></td><td>624-7538</td><td>892-6215</td></tr><tr><td>ELDON PUB. (Hugh Lucas)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-5526</td><td></td><td>548-3418</td></tr><tr><td>INTER-AVIA PUB. (Ramon Lopez)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-5310</td><td></td><td>243-0016</td></tr><tr><td colspan="5"><strong>VERNMENT NEWS AGENCIES</strong></td></tr><tr><td>AFIS RADIO/TV (Cal Lamartinare)</td><td></td><td>OX 5-5991</td><td></td><td>494-3058(703)</td></tr><tr><td>STARS & STRIPES (Rudi Williams)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-6695</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>USIA (Bill Durham)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-8039</td><td>724-9618</td><td>437-4145</td></tr><tr><td>VOA (John Roberts)</td><td></td><td>OX 7-5733</td><td>755-4444</td><td>547-8248</td></tr></tbody></table>

[L.C]

Defense Study Groups:

American Enterprise Institute

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Center for International Affairs, UCLA

The Heritage Foundation

Brookings Institute

Hoover Institution of Stanford University

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Lawrence Livermore Lab

Wilson Center

Research Institute of America

School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Univ

Harvard Center for International Affairs

Center for Science and Technology

School of Foreign Service

School of International Affairs, Princeton University

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University

Cato Institute

Carnegie Endowment

Chicago Council of Foreign Relations

New York Council on Foreign Affairs

New York Conference Board

East - West Center, Honolulu

Center for Defense Information

Scaife Family Trust, Pittsburgh

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia

National Strategy Information Center

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

Rand Institute

[Lc]

- Congressional

-- Congressman Dicks' Letter to Judge Clark

-- Senator Specter's Letter to President Reagan

-- Congressional Record -- Congressman Gore's Proposal for START

- Current News

-- Senate Foreign Relations Committee Action on Nuclear Freeze -- *New York Times*, 3 August '83

-- Mike Getler Article on START -- *Washington Post*, 9 August '83

-- Mary McGrory Article on MX and Chemical Weapons -- *Washington Post*, 9 August '83

- Interviews/Press Conferences

-- Richard Perle -- *New York Times* Interview

-- Ambassador Rowny Press Statement

-- Ambassador Rowny Press Conference

- Miscellaneous

-- Q & A Package for Support of Congress' "Grass Roots"

-- DEEP CUTS : Admiral Gaylor

-- PROMOTING STRATEGIC STABILITY : E. W. Walker

2

[LC]

## Soviet Options to Achieve Reductions to 5,000 Deployed Warheads

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Launchers</th><th colspan="4">Deployed Warheads</th></tr><tr><th>Option A</th><th>Option B</th><th>Option C</th><th>Option D</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>SS-11</td><td>0</td><td>148</td><td>550</td><td>225</td></tr><tr><td>SS-13</td><td>0</td><td>60</td><td>60</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>SS-17</td><td>0</td><td>600</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>SS-18</td><td>3,080</td><td>0</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SS-19</td><td>0</td><td>1,980</td><td>*1,814</td><td>*2,533</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-6</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>352</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-8</td><td>0</td><td>280</td><td>280</td><td>280</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-17</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>12</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-18</td><td>1,792</td><td>1,792</td><td>1,792</td><td>1,792</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-20</td><td>140</td><td>140</td><td>140</td><td>140</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Combined total of SS-18 and SS-19

Under Option "A", the Kremlin would choose to hold onto the entire SS-18 force and all MIRVed SLBMs. The resulting force would still be twelve warheads over the 5,000 limit, and reductions would be required for all the SS-17s and SS-19s. In addition, every remaining single warhead launcher would need to be dismantled. By holding onto its entire force of SS-18s, Soviet leaders would be placing themselves in an extremely vulnerable position, with only 308 ICBM launchers and a mere 17 SSBNs, a fraction of which would be on station. This force posture hardly seems likely, no matter how dearly the Kremlin may wish to hold onto its SS-18s.

Alternatively, under Option "B", the Soviets could choose to sacrifice the SS-18s completely, so as to minimize the number of launchers to be dismantled in order to reach the 5,000 limit for deployed warheads. The remaining reductions -- slightly less than 1,000 deployed warheads -- could be achieved in a variety of ways. Here it is assumed that single warhead forces would be dismantled and the SS-17s and SS-19s are retained. Under Option "B", fifty percent of Soviet MIRVed ICBM warheads would therefore be removed from operational status. In addition, all of the YANKEE-class boats would be retired, as well as almost two-thirds of the SS-11s. The resulting force posture is more likely than Option "A", but it is still difficult to conceive of the Soviets choosing to dismantle all of their SS-18s.

Option "C" reflects Soviet decisions to reach 5,000 deployed warheads by stressing reliance on single warhead forces that could presumable be modernized with a new, land-based missile. If every single warhead missile were retained in the Soviet force structure (even single warhead SLBMs, which would be replaced by PL-5s), 3,746 additional deployed warheads would have to be reduced to reach the 5,000 limit. How would the Soviet go about this? They could retain the entire SS-18 force and an additional 111 SS-19s, but this would

3

[LC]

mean sacrificing the entire fleet of MIRVed SLBMs. If, on the other hand, the Kremlin chooses to hold onto their DELTA-III and TYPHOON boats, an additional allowance of only 1,814 deployed warheads would be permitted to reach the 5,000 limit. In other words, by retaining single warhead and MIRVed SLBM forces, the Soviets would have to accept a reduction by 70% in their deployed ICBM warheads. Option "C" assumes the Soviets would not sacrifice their most modern SSBNs, and therefore cuts are apportioned in MIRVed ICBMs. This option, like those before it, is unlikely to be chosen by the Kremlin leadership, but it does illustrate how difficult it will be for the Soviets to protect their new strategic force investments while meeting the 5,000 warhead limit.

The Soviets are far more likely to reach the 5,000 limit by balanced cuts in ICBM and SLBM forces, as illustrated in Option "D". In this option, single warhead forces, both on land and at sea, are reduced, although some SS-11 & SS-13 ICBMs are retained in the force structure until they are modernized. All DELTA and TYPHOON submarines are also retained, leaving 2,533 deployed warheads to be counted to reach the 5,000 limit. Regardless of how this number is divided up between SS-18s and SS-19s, it still amounts to a sixty percent reduction in Soviet MIRVed ICBM warheads. The Soviets could retain 280 additional MIRVed ICBMs by sacrificing DELTA I and II subs.

[LC]

The President
Page Two

Second, the report implies that proceeding with MX deployment will provide essential leverage for the arms control talks. What is the basis for concluding that without MX, Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously at START will be insufficient and hopes for satisfactory agreement will be "illusory?" (p. 10) As to demonstrating "national will and cohesion," (p. 10) why will the rest of your strategic modernization program not suffice? Why will only I.C.B.M. modernization impress the Soviets?

Third, the Commission stated that deploying 100 MX Missiles would provide necessary capability in our I.C.B.M. forces for "controlled, prompt, limited attack on hard targets..." (pp. 16-17), without providing apparent first strike capability against Soviet silos. It gave little indication, however, of the basis for selecting 100 rather than 50 or 150 or 250. Nor did the report explain why the improvements in hard target kill capability of MX compared to Minuteman III are necessary to deterring "massive conventional ... or limited nuclear attack" on NATO. Why do we believe we must match Soviet "capability promptly to destroy a range of hardened military targets" (p. 17) in order to deter war?

None of the briefings to date have answered these questions to my satisfaction. I would appreciate further explanation.

AS:jb

Vol. 129

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, AUGUST 4, 1983

No. 114

[lc]

Congressional Record
House of Representatives

A NEW PROPOSAL FOR THE
START TALKS

HON. ALBERT GORE, JR.
OF TENNESSEE

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, August 3, 1983

● Mr. GORE. Mr. Speaker, today, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Geneva adjourned for 2 months. Tomorrow, the Congress will adjourn for 6 weeks. What happens during the two recesses now beginning is of critical importance.

The decisions we have reached about the MX missile are fragile. This fall, the debate will begin again and the outcome is anything but predictable. All of us would agree, however, that much depends on whether, when Congress returns, the administration is ready to unveil an approach to arms control that convincingly blends the MX and the single warhead ICBM into a new START negotiating position focused on stability. This new position must speak for itself.

Opponents of the MX believe that it cannot be used effectively in negotiations, and that there is no way in which it might be compatible with an outcome based on a mutually stable nuclear relationship with the Soviet Union. Those who are uncritical supporters of the MX are, on the other hand, intent on acquiring the missile as an end and a good in itself.

At the moment, these two forces are almost precisely in balance, a handful of votes makes the difference. And that handful of votes, at least as of this moment, is in the keeping of a small group of Members whose view of the MX is not absolute, but relative.

In my opinion, a judgment of the MX cannot be made in isolation from the context in which the missile is to be employed. I am prepared to accept as plausible that the viability of this missile, which could not be secured by the most ingenious engineering concepts, might be obtained through arms control. I am prepared to accept that unless we are ready to produce and deploy the MX, the kind of arms control we need will elude us. And I do not find it unthinkable that, in the end, numbers of these missiles will have to be deployed in the course of a shift away from MIRV'd ICBM's, toward smaller, and mutually stable forces.

These are propositions I raised for the consideration of my colleagues on two earlier occasions, on March 22, 1982 and on August 10, 1982, when I rose to present detailed ideas about the need to seek stability as well as re-

[LC]

August 4, 1983

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

E 4047

17, SS-19, and SS-18 ICBMs carry four, six, and 10 MIRVs, respectively.

V. During Phase I—

(1) The United States to retire at least two SLBM warheads for each ICBM warhead it has above the number of ICBM warheads estimated (in accordance to the warhead counting rule stated above) for December 1982. Regardless of any increase in the number of ICBM warheads, no less than 500 SLBM warheads to be retired during each year of Phase I (see (3) below);

(2) The Soviet Union to retire at least two ICBM warheads for each SLBM warhead it has above the number of SLBM warheads estimated (in accordance to the warhead counting rule stated above) for December 1982. The first ICBM warheads retired to be from heavy ICBMs. Regardless of any increase in the number of SLBM warheads, no less than 500 warheads from heavy ICBMs to be retired during each year of Phase I;

(3) Each nation can deploy a new type of MIRVed SLBM, provided that not more than 1,000 MIRVs are deployed on these SLBMs; however, the United States to retire one or more of its older SLBM warheads for every new SLBM warhead it deploys;

(4) Each nation can replace 100 existing MIRVed ICBMs with an equal or smaller number of MIRVed ICBMs, provided that the new MIRVed ICBM: (a) replaces the heaviest type of MIRVed ICBM now deployed, (b) has a throw weight not higher than 3,600 kilograms, and (c) does not carry more than 10 MIRVs.

(5) Each nation can apply any excess of warheads retired above the number required toward follow-on deployments of warheads; and

(6) Each nation can have whatever number of heavy and medium-weight strategic bombers it desires, provided that the aggregate ceiling on ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons is not exceeded.

VI. By the end of Phase I—

Each nation to have not more than:

(1) 8,500 warheads deployed in ballistic missiles and bombers;

(2) 7,500 warheads deployed in ballistic missiles; and,

(3) 4,000 warheads deployed in ICBMs.

VII. During Phase II—

Each nation to retire all but 100 of its MIRVed ICBMs. The ICBMs being retired can be replaced with new single-warhead small intercontinental ballistic missiles (SICBMs), provided that the throw weight of the SICBM is not more than 500 kilograms.

VIII. By the end of Phase II—

(1) 6,500 warheads not deployed in ballistic missiles and bombers;

(2) 5,000 warheads deployed in ballistic missiles;

(3) 100 MIRVed ICBMs; and,

(4) MIRVed ICBMs with more than 3,600 kilograms of throw weight.

IX. After completion of Phase II—

Each nation can:

(1) Retire ICBM warheads and replace them with an equal number of SLBM warheads;

(2) Retire MIRVed ICBMs and replace each warhead with a single-warhead SICBM deployed in a new silo; and,

(3) Replace ICBMs and SLBMs with new models of the same class.

X. General Provisions—

Neither nation can:

(1) Deploy sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) in SSBNs or other types of nuclear-powered submarines; and,

(2) Encrypt the data telemetered during tests of ballistic missiles.

RESULTS OF THE PROPOSAL

Table I and Table II show the estimated number of strategic nuclear delivery sys-

tems (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber aircraft) and warheads the United States and the Soviet Union had at the end of December 1982. Each table shows illustrative inventories of strategic weapons the U.S. and Soviet Union could have under this proposal. The total number of ICBM warheads credited to the Soviets for December 1982 are higher than official U.S. estimates because (following the SALT II rule "once MIRVed, all MIRVed") all the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs are counted as MIRVed warheads.

To the United States

Some of the consequences to the U.S. in adopting this proposal are:

During Phase I

(1) After all the Titan II ICBMs are retired and 100 Minuteman III missiles are replaced with 100 MX ICBMs, the inventory of ICBM warheads would rise by 651 warheads (2,800-2,149=651). Although the U.S. would not reach the proposed 4,000-warhead ceiling on ICBMs, the ratio of Soviet hard-target-capable ICBM warheads to U.S. ICBM silos also would be significantly reduced—from more than 5.0 in December 1982 to about 3.6 at the end of Phase I. Conversely, the ratio of U.S. hard-target-capable ICBM warheads to Soviet ICBM silos would be improved from about 0.64 in December 1982 to approximately 1.98 at the end of Phase I.

(2) The additional 651 ICBM warheads would require a reduction of at least 1,302 SLBM warheads.

(3) The deployment of 2,112 RVs in 11 Ohio-class SSBMs must be offset by retiring an equal or larger number of older SLBM warheads. Therefore, 224 Poseidon SLBMs (2,240 RVs) in 10 Lafayette-class boats, and 144 Trident I SLBMs (1,152 RVs) in nine Lafayette-class boats would have to be retired (1,302+2,112=3,414; 3,392=2,240+1,152).

(4) By the end of Phase I the United States would be under the proposed 7,500-warhead ceiling on ballistic missiles.

(5) To reach the proposed overall warhead limit for Phase I (8,500), the U.S. must reduce its inventory by 1,075 warheads. The U.S. would continue to have substantial numbers of strategic warheads deployed in bomber aircraft, but the current deployment plan for air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) would be cut back to 1,188 deployed externally on only 99 B-52 bombers. B-1B bombers would initially carry only internally-mounted bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs).

During Phase II

(1) The U.S. would replace the remaining 450 Minuteman III ICBMs with a like number of single-warhead SICBMs, deploying them in vacated Minuteman III silos. Also, 164 Minuteman II ICBMs would be retired to retain a larger number of SLBM warheads.

(2) Five more Ohio-class boats (for a total of 17) would be deployed, and all remaining Lafayette-class SSBMs (12) would be retired.

(3) By the end of Phase II the U.S. would be at the proposed overall ceiling of 6,500 warheads for ballistic missiles and bombers. The survivability of the silo-based ICBMs would be improved because the ratio of Soviet hard-target-capable ICBM warheads to U.S. ICBM silos would be approximately 1.8. The ratio of U.S. hard-target-capable ICBM warheads to Soviet ICBM silos would be about 1.5. The B-1B bomber force would be transitioning from a penetration role to a stand-off role armed with ALCMs. The remaining B-52s and FB-111s eventually would be replaced by "Stealth" Advanced Technology Bombers (ATBs).

Post Phase II

(1) The ICBM force would consist of 100 M-X missiles and a mix of new (450 SICBMs) and older single-warhead ICBMs (286 Minuteman IIIs) deployed in silos.

(2) The SSBN fleet would consist of 17 Ohio-class boats equipped with a total of 408 SLBMs (12 boats equipped with Trident Is and five boats equipped with Trident IIIs).

(3) The bomber force would consist of 50 "Stealth" ATBs (replacing FB-111s) and 100 B-1Bs equipped with externally-mounted ALCMs.

To the Soviet Union

Some of the consequences to the Soviet Union is adopting this proposal are:

During Phase I

(1) Following the build-down formula to retire two ICBM warheads for each additional SLBM warhead that is deployed, it is projected that the Soviet Union would have to retire 2,092 ICBM warheads (2,080 from 208 SS-18 ICBMs and 12 from other ICBMs) if it deploys four more Typhoon SSBMs and six additional Delta III SICBMs, and retires 19 Yankee I, one Golf III, one Yankee II, and seven Hotel II/III boats (3,500 SLBM RVs at the end of Phase I minus 2,454 SLBM RVs in December 1982 = 1,046 RVs; and 1,046 x 2 = 2,092).

(2) The remaining 100 SS-18 heavy ICBMs would have to be replaced with a new but lighter MIRVed ICBM, if the Soviets want to retain as many MIRVed ICBMs as possible during Phase I.

(3) In addition to the 2,092 ICBM warheads retired to balance the projected increase in SLBM warheads, the Soviets would have to retire 178 more ICBM warheads to reach the proposed 4,000-warhead ceiling for ICBMs (6,270 RVs in December 1982 - 4,000 RV ceiling - 2,092 RVs = 178 RVs). The Soviets would probably want to retain as many MIRVed ICBMs as possible and choose to retire the 178 additional warheads from older single-warhead ICBMs. If they choose to retire warheads from MIRVed ICBMs instead, they would be able to retain a larger number of ICBMs during Phase I.

(4) By the end of Phase I the Soviet Union would be at the proposed warhead ceiling on ballistic missiles—a reduction of 1,224 RVs. It would also be at the proposed total warhead ceiling after deploying some additional bomber aircraft. It is postulated that additional Backfire bombers would be deployed, and that Bear and Bison aircraft would be replaced with ALCM-equipped Blackjack heavy bombers.

During Phase II

(1) The Soviet Union would retire the remaining 110 SS-17 and 362 SS-19 ICBMs, and deploy a like number of single-warhead SICBMs in the vacated silos.

(2) The remaining Yankee I-class SSBMs would be retired to reach the proposed 5,000-warhead ceiling on ballistic missiles.

(3) By the end of Phase II the Soviet Union would attain the proposed total warhead ceiling. All the Bear and Bison bombers would have been replaced with Backfire and Blackjack bombers.

Post Phase II

(1) The ICBM force would consist of 100 SS-24 MIRVed ICBMs and a mix of new (472 SICBMs) and older single-warhead ICBMs (388 SS-11 missiles) deployed in silos. The ratio of SICBMs to SS-11s could vary, however, depending on whether MIRVed ICBMs or additional SS-11s were retired during Phase I.

(2) The SSBN fleet would probably consist of five Typhoon-class boats equipped with a total of 100 SS-N-20 SLBMs, and 20 Delta

[L]

PART II -- MAIN EDITION -- 9 AUGUST 1983

WASHINGTON POST 9 AUGUST 1983 Pg. 3

Nerve Gas Opponents May Use the MX as a Bargaining Chip

Thanks to a lone Republican's sit-in and an incipient bipartisan rebellion, the fight over nerve gas is not over yet.

Rep. Ed Bethune (R-Ark.), a pro-defense conservative, sat hour after hour for three days last week, waiting to block any unanimous consent request to bring the $200 billion defense authorization bill—of which the new nerve gas buildup is a $130-million item—to the floor.

Friends from his own party relieved him from time to time in his vigil. But he couldn't read or chat or do anything but watch the doors so he could spot anyone who tried to slip through a waiver of the usual three-day waiting period required of conference committee reports.

Bethune's patience paid off. Congress recessed without taking final action on the defense bill.

Pentagon contractors are indignant about the delay. But chemical warfare foes hope to use the interval to rally opposition to the administration's insistence on breaking the 14-year moratorium on the production of lethal nerve gas.

What makes the coming renewal of hostilities even more appealing to doves is the MX-missile component. Authorization for the president's most wanted weapon is also in the conference report. And one pro-MX member is threatening to change his vote when the MX appropriation comes up in September.

Rep. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has warned that if nerve gas remains in the defense bill he will take it out on the MX, to which he has always given the nod. He and Bethune were sponsors of the amendment to turn off the gas chat won in the House by 15 votes in

July.

Vice President Bush, of course, cast the tie-breaking vote for nerve gas in the Senate. The fight against it there was led by Sen. David H. Pryor (D-Ark.), even though the arsenal is in his state; Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) went the other way. So did two presidential candidates, Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) and Sen. Ernest F. Holings (D-S.C.).

Most opponents of chemical warfare rail that it is obscene.

Bethune, 47, an ex-FBI agent, prefers to point out that it is insane.

Mary McGrory

COALITION

His research, which has taken him to Geneva to talk with arms-control negotiators and to the Edgewood Arsenal to meet with Chemical Corps experts, has persuaded him that we are blowing a propaganda opportunity to show the contrast between us and the Soviets in our approach to loathsome, anti-civilian weapons—and a chance to save millions on “nightmare contraptions” that won’t work.

The new “Bigeye” chemical bomb, which is part of the buildup, exploded twice on the pad—a fact carefully concealed from Congress while the administration poured on the coal for another “deterrent.”

The only thing that may deter the administration, which has gone all out for nerve gas, is the damage political fumes from the gas can do to the MX.

Bethune is for the MX, but he will risk it to get nerve gas considered separately.

His most valuable ally is Zablocki, a short and anxious man not given to beating rocking.

After the conference committee report, Zablocki raged around the House. He was furious with Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) for not representing his interests better.

He turned at the high-handed action taken by Rep. Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.) who, after conferring with Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John G. Tower (R-Tex.), entered the meeting, took out a piece of paper and grandly told the group, “Here’s our position on nerve gas.”

Zablocki issued a statement announcing that he would take a step ‘unheard of’ for him by voting against the whole defense bill.

He privately told fellow members that he would so something more: vote against the MX on the next round. “And I’ll take 10 votes with me.”

MX opponents, who have been looking for big-name converts, are overjoyed.

"It's the administration's fault for linking nerve gas with MX," said Bethune. "They insisted on forcing them into the same bill. They don't want to have a separate vote on nerve gas because they know they would lose in the House again, and the program would be killed."

It's a cruel dilemma for the administration. It hates to give up any weapon, and it loves nerve gas because the weapon gives it a chance to talk about the Soviets and yellow rain. But of all its lethal new toys, the MX is by far the favorite because it centerpiece of the administration's curious arms-control package."

But if the coalition—and the wrath of Zablocki—holds in September, the administration may have to choose.

NEWSWEEK 15 AUGUST 1983 (9) Pg. 15

A Summit Looms on the Horizon

There are increasing signs that the White House and the Kremlin are groping their way toward a summit meeting. President Reagan could use such a session to soften his bellicose image, while for Yuri Andropov, it would lend "an aura of acceptance and legitimacy to his new rule," according to William Hyland, a Sovietologist and the new editor of Foreign Affairs. In addition, having concluded that the president will run for a second term and win, the Kremlin would prefer to deal with him during the pre-election period, when he is more likely to be conciliatory.

Beginning with the release of the dissident Pentecostalists last month, Moscow has sent a series of positive signals, including a compromise at the Madrid human rights talks and careful rhetoric.

on U.S.-Central American policy. Another upbeat signal from Moscow: Soviet officials in Washington say that Andropov is considering whether to grant a television interview with a major U.S. network. Also significant, in the Soviet view, is the recent signing of the five-year grain pact with the United States.

The Reagan administration also claims the grain deal and the compromise in Madrid as signs of its willingness to improve super-power relations. Further moves will be weighed cautiously even the moderates on Reagan's staff who favor a summit are wary of anything that smacks of détente. Such actions "could leave us open to a terrible attack from the right," says one aide. Nevertheless, adds another, we get to take some steps in this direction." What is taking place now, says Hyland, "is the thaw before the summit."

3-F

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE AT THE CONCLUSION
OF THE BRIEFING AT APPROXIMATELY 10:15 AM EDT

AUGUST 5, 1983

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR ROWNY

I have just finished reporting to the President, having arrived in Washington yesterday afternoon, on Round IV of START which ended on Tuesday. I also met this week with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels to give them a status report on the round.

I reported to the President that this has been our most significant round to date. Our talks have been intensive, serious, and businesslike. I remain hopeful that we will reach agreement on substantially reducing strategic offensive arms and reducing the risk of nuclear war.

As you know, the President sent me back in June with his personal instructions to show maximum flexibility and explore every possible avenue for agreement. In our formal sessions and in many long and private sessions, Ambassador Karpov and I discussed various ways to narrow our differences.

On July 8, the U.S. Delegation tabled a complete treaty text which embodied the many changes we had previously made and the increased flexibility the President had announced in June. We met the two main complaints the Soviets had previously raised: (1) that we were prescribing how the Soviets must restructure their forces, and (2) that we were not being comprehensive, that is, not including from the outset all our strategic forces.

Reducing the warheads of each side by about a third to 5000 remains the central element of our position. We are also determined to reduce, over time, the 3-to-1 Soviet advantage in nuclear destructive capability and potential. Our goals are two-fold: deep reductions and a more stable strategic relationship.

Without violating the agreement to keep details of our issues confidential, I can report to you that I told the President that the Soviets also showed some flexibility and forward movement. The President appeared pleased that his flexible approach is being carried out in serious and businesslike negotiations. In preparation for the next round, I will be meeting with senior officials and the NSC and will consult with the Congress.

###

[L]

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

August 5, 1983

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
AMBASSADOR ROWNY
ON THE START TALKS

The Briefing Room

10:00 A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Ambassador Rowny has just completed a meeting of about 20 minutes with the President to report on his talks that have been taking place over the past several weeks. He has an opening statement which he will read. And we are now passing out copies for you.

Q Can we have a copy?

MR. SPEAKES: If we can get by the photographers we will.

Q Good morning.

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Good morning. Are you ready?

Q Yes.

Q Have we got an arms package?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: I've just finished reporting to the President, having arrived in Washington yesterday afternoon, on round four of START, which ended on Tuesday. I also met this week with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels to give them a status report on the round.

On July 8th, the United States delegation tabled a complete treaty text which embody the many changes we had previously made and the increased flexibility the President had announced in June. We met the two main complaints the Soviets had previously raised: One, that we were prescribing how the Soviets must restructure their forces; and, two, that we were not being comprehensive, that is, not including from the outset all our strategic forces.

Reducing the warheads of each side by about a third to 5,000 remains the central element of our position. We are also determined to reduce, over time, the three to one Soviet advantage in nuclear destructive capability and potential. Our goals are two-fold -- deep reductions and a more stable strategic relationship.

MORE

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In preparations for the next round, I will be meeting
with senior officials and the National Security Council and will
consult with the Congress. That completes my --

Q Where did they show flexibility?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: They showed some flexibility in some non-central issues, as I declare it. And I, again, to keep the confidentiality of what we have done, and not reveal the details of -- I can report to you that after they heard that we were showing flexibility that they said that they, too, could show some flexibility in several important but not we call the central issues.

Q Where's the forward movement?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: By the fact that they did show that flexibility, the fact that we have laid out our position and have shown that we are meeting their concerns. In other words, we've laid the framework now for moving along.

Q Bob, we can continue on this, can we not? Lights?

MR. SIMS: No, this was -- the opening statement is on the record, camera and a couple of questions and the rest --

Q Why?

Q Why? We haven't had a couple of questions yet.
We want to ask questions.

Q That wasn't the ground rules for this.

MR. SIMS: Will you take a couple more on camera?

Q What's wrong --

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Fine. It's all right with me.

Q Sure.

Q We need a negotiator, Bob.

Q Lights back on?

Q Lights.

Q So the flexibility and the forward movement comes from showing some flexibility --

Q Wait one second. Can we have our lights on?

Q -- in non-central issues?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Yes, the flexibility comes from our showing flexibility in the way to get to our goals. Our goals remain the same to reduce these asymmetries and to have deep reductions and we have laid that out. And the Soviets recognize that and the Soviets showed

MORE

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Q Do you believe you'll have difficulty getting any progress on yours until there's some kind of resolution with Mr. Nitze's negotiations, and will the December deployment of some of -- of the American missiles over there have a direct impact on your negotiations?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Well, you can only speculate on an answer like that. If, what the Soviets are telling me, by bringing up the other negotiation, in my arena, is that they have their priority effort on that one. Then, yes, we can't make any real movement until they see how that one's going to go. On the other hand, there are many things that -- this is a complex agreement -- and there are many things we can work on and do work on, so it's not as though we were standing still or not making any progress; the point is: can you expect a breakthrough? And in my opinion, you cannot, until either Paul and his counterpart have an agreement, or until the missiles begin to be deployed. Other -- because I don't think that they'll focus on these negotiations until --

Q What about the idea of merging the two, which is -- merging the two sets of negotiations, which has come up several times. If the Russians are that fixated on the other set, aren't you sort of wasting your time?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. We don't think we're wasting our time. Paul and I talk about this frequently. We did before we went to the last round, and we still coordinate closely on this, and he and I agree -- and it's a U.S. policy -- that it is not in our interest or in our allied interest to merge these negotiations. It's premature to talk about that. We want an agreement in this INF arena. We want -- if we fail to get an agreement -- and these talks are merged at some further point, we want to see the U.S. missiles deployed on the soil. We don't want to leave problems hanging over to further complicate an already difficult negotiation in our arena.

Q General, are you confident that you'll have an agreement as long as we go ahead with the production and deployment of the MX missile?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Would you repeat the question?

Q Is it possible to get an

MORE

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So you don't solve anything by merging it. You
create a problem, make the other negotiation more difficult. So
the object should be to complete this negotiation -- hopefully,
successfully. Then, think about -- if you're going to think
about any possible merger.

Q Did you get new orders from the President
today?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: No. I didn't. No, not today. This was a preliminary report. We only had a short time. I got from him, again, this feeling that he wants me to show the maximum flexibility that I possibly can, without giving in on our objectives, that he is dedicated. He is serious about the arms control. He wants me to talk to the Judge later this afternoon, which I'll do, and to Secretary Shultz. I've already talked to Adelman. And so I'll be following up on this. And you remember, between the last two rounds, we met five times. So I'm looking forward to meeting with the NSC and others more frequently.

Q Well, when's the next round?

Q -- are saying that they're going to reassess their position in START if we go ahead with the deployment of the medium-range missiles. And if they are, does their new flexibility seem to you in any way kind of a pressure on us to delay deployment?

AMBASSADOR ROWNY: Let me answer. I heard one question: when do we resume. We've agreed to resume on October the 4th. We have this two-month cycle in session, and two months in Capitals.

The question of what the Soviets are up to --
you can only speculate, and I can only speculate on. The fact that

MORE

January 1983

[LC]

# AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD

## DEEP CUTS PROPOSAL

### PROBLEM

Major reductions in nuclear weapons are an avowed policy goal of the US and USSR, but success in negotiations appears remote. Both sides agree that negotiated reductions must be equitable and verifiable, and that agreements must be concrete and precise. But definitions of these criteria are far apart and both sides continue to differ over the focus and extent of reductions.

### Opportunity

The American Committee has a proposal that meets these demanding criteria while avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued earlier negotiations.

Our proposal says:

- US and USSR turn in nuclear warheads containing fissionable material, and convert that material to nuclear fuel for burning in power plants.

- US and USSR cease production of weapons-grade material.

- US and USSR agree to full-scope safeguards on nuclear grade plants.

### Weapons Conversion

Nuclear warheads have a number of components. We propose that both sides turn in warheads but hand over only the core of the warhead—the explosive nuclear fission device—whose fissionable material would then be converted to power-plant fuel. The other components of the warhead would be mechanically destroyed.

The scheme for weapons conversion can be summarized as follows:

- Each country hands over progressively larger numbers of explosive nuclear fission devices to a single conversion facility, built explicitly for this purpose, at a neutral site.

- Under supervision, the devices are dismantled and their fissionable material converted to power-plant fuel for generation of electricity. Swords into plowshares.

- At any given time, each side chooses the devices it hands over. Any device qualifies, without regard to the type of warhead or nuclear weapon from which it is taken. Results are measured by the weight of fissionable material contained in the devices. (We avoid endless debates over classification and equity.)

- Soviet and American Teams, with perhaps a third party as referee, identify and count each device, and weigh the fissionable material turned in. All are positively identifiable, by scientific means. (That's verification, without intrusive inspection in either country.)

The proposal is equitable, practicable and verifiable.

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[lc]

## Production Halt

This Deep Cuts proposal must be accompanied by a negotiated full stop to production of weapons-grade material. (A halt in production is much easier to verify than reduced production.) The production plants in use are well known, and clandestine production of significant amounts would present a number of observables. New production plants would also be difficult to conceal.

Newer methods of producing fissionable material, for example by centrifuges or laser-isotope separation, promise smaller physical plant requirements, but there is reason to believe that useful observables will exist in the event of significant clandestine production.

## Safeguards

This Deep Cuts proposal should also be accompanied by full-scope safeguards against diversion to weapons use of commercial power-plant fuel. It is true that for the US and USSR, already possessing thousands of weapons, safeguards are less critical than they are for the non-nuclear powers who might, through diversion, acquire their first nuclear weapons. Nevertheless it is politically important that both superpowers accept international safeguards against diversion, or agree to joint inspections of commercial power facilities, or both.

## Applicability

This Deep Cuts proposal of the American Committee on East-West Accord has several uniquely attractive features, aside from avoiding many of the problems of equity, verification, and classification that have plagued earlier negotiations:

- It can stand alone, or it can provide a means to carry out reductions achieved through alternative formulas. This approach can fit into the framework of SALT, START or any other approach.

- As a stand-alone proposal, it is the only one that assures real weapons reduction.

- It builds in clear visibility that inventory reductions are taking place.

- It promotes dramatic, immediate, and continuing reductions in nuclear weapons.

- It is simple enough to be understood and sophisticated enough to work.

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6) How can we trust the Soviets to abide by nuclear arms reduction proposals?

We can trust them to serve their own interests. An unregulated strategic arms competition is no more in their interest than it is in ours. It is also in the interest of both countries to maintain and strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty--objectives that are being undercut by a continuing superpower arms race. Any deep cuts arrangement would have to be fully verifiable on both sides, and our plan would employ monitoring techniques that are already in existence.

7) Isn't there reason to suspect Soviet cheating on chemical and biological warfare agreements?

Yes, there is--and we favor pursuing this matter through all available channels until these practices stop or until there is some satisfactory explanation for them. At the same time, as the Reagan, Carter, Ford and Nixon Administrations have said, the Soviets have abided by their obligations under the SALT agreements. They continue to abide by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, and numerous other arms control agreements as well. The record shows that the Soviets will abide by their commitments on nuclear weaponry that are of direct benefit to them, as well as to us, and that are specific and concrete in nature.

8) How does the goal of deep cuts relate to the concept of a stable strategic balance?

A stable strategic balance is plainly important, and nuclear-weapons reductions will support this goal.

9) How specifically would deep cuts enhance strategic stability?

As deep cuts are underway, both sides will have mounting incentives to meet their most basic defense needs first. For example, strong candidates for early retirement would be battlefield nuclear weapons. Removing these weapons from theaters of potential conflict would be one way to lessen the likelihood of nuclear war. The pressure of deep cuts over time would enhance stability, because out of self-interest, both sides would place increased reliance on more survivable weapons systems.

10) How would deep cuts affect accumulated "counterforce" weapons on both sides--systems with high accuracy and destructive power that can traverse intercontinental distances in a matter of minutes?

The best way to make counterforce weapons superfluous, and thereby help bring about their elimination, is to remove their potential targets. This means that either side can unilaterally reinforce stability and devalue counterforce weapons as reductions are underway by eliminating vulnerable systems.

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21) How does the proposal for deep cuts relate to a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons?

The deep-cuts proposal is neutral on the question of no-first-use. To the extent that the proposal helps eliminate or reduce battlefield and tactical nuclear weapons, it should reduce the risk of first-use by either side.

22) How could we verify reductions in nuclear explosive devices from each side's inventories as envisioned by the Deep Cuts Campaign?

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. will designate a neutral facility where nuclear explosive devices will be turned in. The arrival of each device at the facility could be easily confirmed by U.S. and Russian survey teams through a variety of technical means--such as by X-rays-- without the physical handling by one side of the other side's devices. The fissionable nuclear material will be assayed and weighed.

23) How could we verify that weapons grade fissionable material was removed from nuclear explosive device?

Again, there are foolproof ways to proceed. U.S. and Soviet survey teams at the designated turn-in facility can monitor weapons' disassembly by technical means without each side surrendering weapon components to the nationals of the other side. Likewise, the removal of weapons grade fissionable material from the physics package of the weapon can be monitored by technical means, as these materials have unique signatures. These materials can be assayed and weighed with great precision.

24) How can we verify that weapons grade fissionable material, once removed, is converted to non-military purposes?

Weapon-grade fissionable material extracted from weapons can be diluted and then handled under strict custodial arrangements prior to entering the fuel cycle of existing commercial power reactors in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. There, in the course of normal reactor operations, it would become of no practical use for military purposes. This process and the assurance of non-diversion can be monitored by joint teams and by already existing procedures established by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The weapons themselves would be mechanically deformed beyond any potential of reverse engineering.

25) Would the deep cuts proposal make the U.S. dependent on the IAEA safeguards to monitor compliance?

No. We favor U.S.-Soviet inspections of commercial power facilities and production facilities to supplement IAEA safeguards. The U.S.S.R. has stated its willingness to place some commercial power reactors under safeguards. The U.S. has also stated its willingness to proceed along these lines.

[LC]

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26) Would inspections at nuclear power sites and activities at the designated turn-in facility compromise trade, technological or national security secrets?

No. The IAEA already has longstanding experience in power plant inspections, which have not resulted in the disclosure of "trade secrets." Indeed, commercial power plant construction plans are well known. Protection of technological and national-security information involving nuclear warheads is assured because custody of these warheads remains at all times in the hands of the country possessing them. Nonintrusive monitoring measures are taken only with respect to identifying nuclear explosive devices when they arrive at the facility, and assaying and quantifying the special nuclear materials they carry.

27) Isn't this, in effect, a boost to the commercial nuclear industry?

No. Commercial power reactors already exist and will need fuel to operate during their life cycles. We can use this fact of life to help dispose of weapons-grade fissionable material and to achieve deep cuts in nuclear weapons. Transfers of nuclear material to commercial power reactors can probably be accomplished at fair market rates.

28) Your conversion plan flies against growing public opposition to nuclear power plants, which have a questionable safety record. How will you respond to this opposition?

There will be no more power plants than the public wants. We have them now and they use fuel. Our plan would provide an alternative or additional source for that fuel. It will neither create nor aggravate any safety problems, which must be dealt with in any event.

29) How can we be sure reprocessing of fissionable material is not taking place?

Reprocessing is a complex and distinctive process that cannot easily be kept from view, especially if militarily useful amounts of weapons grade material are to be reprocessed.

30) Won't some new production of highly enriched fissionable material be required for naval submarine reactors or advanced, high-temperature reactors?

Yes, and both countries can agree on monitoring procedures to make sure such production is limited to agreed amounts and for agreed purposes. Naval nuclear reactor requirements can be monitored by keeping track of ship-operating days.

[LC]

# THE GAYLER PROPOSAL: CONVERTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO NUCLEAR FUEL

## Summary

This report examines the feasibility of Admiral Noel Gayler's proposal to convert an equal number of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons to nuclear fuel as a step toward nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear arms reduction. The main conclusions are:

* The process of converting weapons-grade plutonium material into fuel for nuclear reactors is technically and economically feasible. The plutonium metal would be converted into plutonium nitrate and then into plutonium oxide for use in conjunction with depleted or natural uranium oxide. Weapons-grade uranium can also be diluted with natural or depleted uranium for the production of conventional uranium oxide fuel.

* Plutonium oxide mixed with uranium oxide has been extensively tested and shown to be acceptable as a reactor fuel.

* Using weapons-grade plutonium as a reactor fuel causes the build-up of other undesirable plutonium isotopes, which render it undesirable as a weapons material.

* Safeguards to protect against the diversion of the material at all stages of the process either currently exist or can be put in place.

* Considering the cost of the nuclear weapons program, if the entire fuel cycle for civilian power, from mining to disposal, is put in place, including recycle of plutonium, the Gayler proposal can be accommodated with negligible cost to the taxpayer. In fact, any cost would probably be made up in the value of the fuel that would be made available.

[LC]

## Introduction

Admiral Noel Gayler, former Commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, has proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union each turn in an equal number of nuclear devices to a joint U.S./U.S.S.R. Commission. The devices would, under safeguards, be converted into commercial nuclear fuel (1). Both the highly enriched uranium-235 and the weapons-grade plutonium metal would be converted into fuel for commercial nuclear power plants. The following analysis will examine the technical feasibility of this process from the standpoint of basic principles, engineering experience, safeguards and economics.

## Basic Principles

Nuclear fission occurs when a neutron is absorbed by the nucleus of an atom, causing it to split into two smaller parts of about equal size. In the fission process, energy is released, and enough neutrons are also produced to initiate other fissions, i.e., a chain reaction. Because they are capable of sustaining the fission process, uranium-233, uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are called fissile materials. The elements that result from the fission process, such as cesium-137 and strontium-90, are called fission products.

Only a fraction of the neutrons generated by the fission process cause other fissions. Most of the neutrons are absorbed by other elements in the fuel and the surrounding structure. When plutonium-239 absorbs a neutron, it becomes plutonium-240. If the plutonium-240, in turn, absorbs a neutron, it becomes plutonium-241. Plutonium-239, -240 and -241 are all isotopes of plutonium. Isotopes of the same elements have the same chemical properties, but they have a different number of neutrons, and, therefore, different masses and different nuclear properties.

Uranium-235 and uranium-238 are both isotopes of uranium found in nature. When uranium-238 absorbs a neutron, it is transmuted into plutonium-239, a fissile material, and when thorium-232, a material found in nature, absorbs a neutron, it becomes uranium-233, another fissile material. Substances like uranium-238 and thorium-232 that can be converted into fissile material are called fertile materials.

The manner in which fissile and fertile materials are applied to the construction of weapons on the one hand, and power reactors on the other, is crucial to the basic practicality of the Gayler proposal. Nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors rely on the fission process to work. However, in a nuclear weapon, the goal is to get as much energy released as possible over a very short period of time,

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employing as little weight of material as possible. To accomplish
this in nuclear weapons, specially designed and fabricated
components, composed of essentially-pure plutonium-239 or
uranium-235, are smashed together in as small a volume as possible
in the shortest possible time to initiate the nuclear chain reaction.

For a nuclear reactor, by contrast, the goal is to control the
generation of energy in the fission process and extract the heat as
it is generated. Accordingly, the concentration and purity of
fissionable material in a bomb is very high (greater than 90
percent), whereas it is quite low in a nuclear reactor
(approximately 3 percent) and highly distributed in a large number
of protective sheaths called fuel elements. Building a nuclear
reactor is easier than achieving the special conditions required for
a nuclear weapon. This is why the first controlled nuclear chain
reaction at Stagg Field in Chicago preceded the first nuclear weapon
by several years (2).

Normal uranium mined from the ground contains 0.7 percent
uranium-235 and 99.3 percent uranium-238. Since isotopes of an
element cannot be separated through chemical processes, the uranium
must be raised (enriched) to 3-4 percent uranium-235 by very
sophisticated physical separation processes, such as gaseous
diffusion, at plants like those in Oak Ridge, Tennessee before it
can be used in light water reactors (LWRs). The highly enriched --
90+ percent uranium-235 -- material in nuclear weapons could simply
be diluted with natural or depleted uranium, which is currently
available in stockpiles, to the 3-4 percent enrichment level of
standard nuclear fuel. Such fuel would be identical to the fuel
already in use.

As the proportion of plutonium-240 and plutonium-241 increases
during the course of the fission process in a power reactor, the
plutonium becomes less desirable as the material for modern nuclear
weapons. This is because the plutonium-240 emits neutrons itself as
a result of spontaneous fission. Plutonium-240 therefore tends to
cause a nuclear device's chain reaction to begin before it becomes a
dense enough mass of fissile material (as a result of the initiating
implosion) to generate a large amount of energy in a predictable
manner (3,4). Moreover, plutonium-240 is self-heating, making
weapon fabrication, storage and transport more complicated and less
practical. In addition, plutonium-241 emits gamma radiation and is
therefore also to be avoided in a weapon since heavy shielding would
be required before the weapon could be transported and handled.

The percentage of plutonium-240 and plutonium-241 increases as the
fuel is involved in the fission process in the reactor. To keep the
levels of plutonium-240 and -241 minimized, the fuel in a reactor
for the production of weapons material is kept in the reactor for a

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short time, probably not more than three or four months. In a
commercial nuclear power plant, by contrast, the goal is to produce
electricity, not material for weapons, and the fuel is kept in the
reactor as long as it is useful. Commercial nuclear fuel must
easily tolerate the corrosive and radiation conditions found in a
power reactor and must be fabricated to exacting tolerances. It is
therefore very expensive compared to military fuel.

After about three years, commercial fuel is removed from the
reactor because the fission products, many of which absorb neutrons,
begin to interfere with the efficiency of operation. In typical
commercial spent fuel, plutonium-240 levels are 25 percent and
plutonium-241 levels are 10 percent (5), whereas the levels of these
undesirable isotopes are significantly lower in weapons-grade
plutonium.

Since there is currently no practical way of separating
plutonium-239 from the other isotopes of plutonium, the
weapons-grade plutonium-239 becomes impractical as the material for
a modern nuclear weapon after being used as fuel in a nuclear
reactor. While the United States Department of Energy has
apparently detonated a nuclear device consisting of reactor-grade
plutonium(6), the details pertaining to the isotopic composition and
the yield remained classified. However, it is expected, on
theoretical grounds, that the device was significantly larger and
the yield was both considerably smaller as well as unpredictable
compared to a weapon fabricated from weapons-grade material (3).
(This can be verified by qualified, cleared personnel at the
Department of Energy.) Weapons of reactor-grade material are simply
not desirable because of the shielding requirements, low yield and
their inherent lack of reliability. Accordingly, those countries
such as India and China which have detonated their own
plutonium-based nuclear weapons have invariably made the plutonium
from irradiating natural uranium in cheaper and more easily
constructed research and development type graphite or heavy
water-modified reactors rather than in power reactors (7).

In sum, there are no intrinsic technical obstacles to the conversion
of nuclear weapons into nuclear fuel by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
In fact, as indicated in the next section, a considerable body of
experience already exists which could be directly applied to
implementing this process.

## Engineering Experience

The plutonium metal in a nuclear device can be removed, dissolved in
nitric acid, and the resulting plutonium-nitrate converted to a
plutonium/uranium oxide mixture of about 4 percent plutonium oxide
and 96 percent natural or depleted uranium oxide. The practicality
of such fuel has been demonstrated in the U.S. and other
countries(8).

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Extensive safety and licensing reviews of uranium/plutonium mixed-oxide (MOX) fuels have been carried out for the Big Rock Point, Quad Cities Unit 1 and Dresden Unit 1 reactors, and large numbers of test mixed-oxide fuel elements have been successfully employed (9). No fundamental technical or safety problems have been uncovered which would preclude the use of uranium/plutonium fuels in current LWRs. Some allowance in plutonium concentration would have to be made, however, for the difference between using reactor-grade plutonium and weapons-grade plutonium, which is almost pure plutonium-239.

Furthermore, fabrication of mixed-oxide fuels is backed by considerable experience (10). Development of the technology for plutonium recycling began with the Plutonium Utilization Program at Hanford, Washington in 1956 and continued with the Saxton MOX fuel development program in demonstration programs using mixed-oxide fuel in commercial reactors. As a result, it was demonstrated that plutonium recycling is technically feasible even though no commercial facilities to fabricate mixed-oxide fuel from weapons material are operating in the U.S. today.

While the reprocessing of spent fuel for the separation of the fission products and the recovery of the generated plutonium and the unused uranium has been part of military operations in the U.S. for over 35 years, there are no commercial reprocessing facilities available in the U.S. However, commercial reprocessing capacity does exist in Europe, and almost 40 metric tons of plutonium will have been separated from spent fuel in Europe by 1985 (11) with about 10 percent of this stock to be recycled in thermal reactors by 1985 (12). The federal government is now encouraging private industry to start up the AGNS reprocessing plant in Barnwell, South Carolina.

In terms of capacity, about one-third of the 90 metric tons of heavy metals (uranium or plutonium) in the core of a typical PWR (13) would be 4 percent enriched plutonium-239. This represents about 1.2 metric tons of plutonium which would stay in the reactor for three years. At that rate, about 400 to 600 kilograms of plutonium-239 would be, on the average, denatured (the process of rendering plutonium impractical for weapons use) per reactor per year. Assuming 10 to 20 kilograms plutonium-239 per weapon, this is equal to 20 to 60 weapons per 1,000 MWe of nuclear capacity per year (the typical capacity of a modern day nuclear power plant). The nuclear capacity currently available (14) would be sufficient to denature the plutonium from 1200 to 3600 nuclear weapons each year.

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## Safeguards and Proliferation

In terms of preventing the material for a nuclear device from being diverted by a terrorist group, the crucial element in the Gayler proposal is the transportation of the actual nuclear weapon to the disassembly facility. Safeguards, procedures and methods are already in place which have allowed the U.S. government to store and transport thousands of nuclear weapons over the last thirty-seven years without a single weapon being stolen and used by a terrorist group. As part of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the Working Group (#4) on Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, and Recycle concluded that a number of techniques may be applied to prevent the diversion of the plutonium by terrorist groups (15). Reactor-grade plutonium must be safeguarded, even though it is a poor material for nuclear weapons.

While a number of technical measures may be applied to preventing the diversion of nuclear weapons material by terrorist groups, it is political and institutional factors which dominate the effort to prevent nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Carter Administration's policy, based primarily on preventing proliferation by studying alternate nuclear technologies and by instituting a policy of denial of nuclear technologies to others, was well-intentioned but largely unsuccessful(16).

Under the Atoms For Peace Program initiated by President Eisenhower (17), those countries needing nuclear power to replace or acquire expensive fossil fuels were led to believe that the U.S. would supply nuclear power reactors and the requisite services. When it became evident during the Carter Administration that the United States could no longer be counted on as a reliable supplier and, furthermore, that the United States was pressuring other supplier nations to adopt the U.S. policy, a number of energy-poor countries felt forced to develop their own nuclear capabilities, including those useful in building weapons, in order to be self-sufficient. Thus, the Carter Administration's policy of technology denial to prevent proliferation backfired and actually encouraged the construction of facilities which promoted the possibility of proliferation.

Despite our good intentions, there are now approximately 850 nuclear facilities, including many research reactors, inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Accordingly, it would appear to be far more prudent to reverse the current policy of denial and make power reactors available to the less developed countries to enable them to get cheaper power -- while at the same time preventing illicit activities on their part by strengthening the role of the IAEA and improving its methods and frequency of inspection.

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The strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are significant. As Prof. Mason Willrich, a long-time nuclear expert, points out (18):

"The IAEA/NPT safeguards system provides by far the most feasible basis on which to develop the global control system required to provide the world community with reasonable assurance that nuclear material is not diverted from civilian industry for use in explosives. Despite certain limitations and weaknesses, it does not seem practicable to scrap the present system and attempt to develop a new and more effective one. Rather the IAEA/NPT system must first gain wide acceptance and then be gradually strengthened. In any event, it must be complemented by strong national safeguards systems."

The nature of power reactors simplifies the verification process recommended as part of Gayler's proposal. For one thing, the fuel assemblies are quite large, almost 12 feet long - not an easy item to hide. To refuel a light water reactor, unlike a reasearch or military production reactor, the reactor must be shut down to change fuel assemblies or even just to rearrange them. When the reactor is shut down, it stops producing electricity, which can be easily monitored. It is impractical to keep refueling the reactor every few months in order to produce weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, it is very unlikely that it would go unnoticed.

In contrast to a policy of denial, the adoption of the Gayler proposal for the institution of real arms reduction by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would be a positive step towards real non-proliferation. Such a move would also answer the charge that it is hypocritical for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to push for nuclear non-proliferation while possessing thousands of nuclear weapons (19).

## Economic Aspects

It is difficult to put a proposal to reduce the potential for nuclear war in the same economic context as the economic analysis of a commercial product. There would, of course, be a cost associated with the Gayler proposal. International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Working Group #4 has reported that for mixed-oxide fabrication, including a conversion facility to convert plutonium-nitrate to the oxide, costs would be in the range of $450 to $800 per kilogram of heavy metal processed, in 1980 dollars, for a 200-metric-tons-per-year capacity facility (20). The estimated capital costs of $275 million dollars (1980 dollars) per year would not be greatly reduced if a dedicated facility one-tenth as large is used solely for the Gayler proposal. However, if a complete commercial nuclear fuel cycle were in place with recycle of plutonium in LWRs, the cost of the Gayler proposal to the taxpayers would be negligible since existing facilities could be utilized instead of spending hundreds

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of millions of taxpayers' dollars on a special facility. In fact, the taxpayer would realize a real return on the cost associated with the weapons material. This is because they have already paid for this material, but to date it has not been made available for useful, peaceful applications.

## Summary and Conclusion

From a technical standpoint, there appear to be no significant problems with Admiral Gayler's proposal to convert nuclear weapons into nuclear fuel. In fact, there is an extensive body of experience on the U.S. and other countries in the fabrication of mixed-oxide (uranium/plutonium) fuels and their use in power reactors. The highly enriched uranium weapons could be simply mixed with natural uranium or with depleted uranium in storage at the enrichment facilities. During the fission and irradiation process, the amount of plutonium-240 and -241 would build up in the fuel, reaching 25 percent and 10 percent respectively, before the fuel is removed from the reactor, greatly reducing the practicality of the plutonium as a weapons material.

In summary, adoption of the Gayler proposal would enable the weapons states, particularly the U.S. and Russia, to:

1. Convert their nuclear swords to plowshares.

2. Assuming the appropriate strengthening of the IAEA, fulfill the original objective of the Atoms For Peace program of supplying LDCs with economical nuclear power without fear that these facilities will be used to produce weapons material.

3. Reduce LDCs' need for OPEC oil and the associated economic and political pressures.

4. Eliminate the need for installing new facilities to handle discarded nuclear warheads.

5. Put to productive use material which the taxpayers have already paid for.

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REFERENCES

1. N. Gayler, "How to Break the Momentum of the Nuclear Arms Race," *New York Times Magazine*, April 25, 1982, p.49.

2. S. Glasstone, *Sourcebook On Atomic Energy*, D. Van Nosfrand Company, Inc., 1967, p. 513.

3. S. Sahin and J. Ligou, "The Effect of the Spontaneous Fission of Plutonium-240 on the Energy Release In A Nuclear Explosive," *Nuclear Technology*, mid-August 1980, p. 513.

4. N. Gylden and L. W. Holm, "Risks of Clandestine Production of Nuclear Weapons," *FOA Report*, C 4568 T3, STS Order No. 16424, March 1974.

5. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycle Plutonium in Mixed Oxide Fuel in Light Water Reactors (GESMO)," NUREG-0002, 1976, Vol. I Appendix A, p.2.

6. A. Wohlstetter, et. al, *Nuclear Policies: Fuel Without The Bomb*, Ballinger Publishing Company, 1978, p. 38.

7. J. J. Duderstadt & C. Kikuchi, "Nuclear Power, Technology on Trial, "University of Michigan Press, 1979 p. 141.

8. A. Chamberlain and C. Melches, "Prospects for the Establishment of Plutonium Recycle in Thermal Reactors in the Foratom Countries: Status and Assessment," IAEA-CN-36/14, Salzburg, May 2-13, 1977, pp. 271-330.

9. U.S. Department of Energy, "Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power," DOE/NE-001/9, Vol. 9, June 1980, p.41.

10. Ibid, p.49.

11. Working Group 4 of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, "Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, Recycle," IAEA, Austria, January 1980, P. 280.

12. Ibid, p. 288.

13. Reference 9, p.5.

14. U. S. Department of Energy, "Nuclear Power Program Information & Data," January - March 1982, p.1.

15. Reference 11, p. 16-17.

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Edward W. Walker

May 5, 1983

PROMOTING STRATEGIC STABILITY

Despite the controversy surrounding our efforts to limit the growth of nuclear weapons, most reasonable people share the three basic goals of arms control. First, everyone wants to limit the resources spent on vehicles of destruction, especially in these days of economic adversity. Second, we all hope that by reducing the number of nuclear warheads we can limit the effects of a nuclear exchange in the event the worst happens and we end up using these weapons of horror. Third, we hope that we take whatever steps are possible to make sure that nuclear war never breaks out.

Unfortunately, these sensible and urgent goals are often in direct conflict with each other. The dilemma is that spending less may well lead to an unstable strategic relationship in which there would be a temptation to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis. Similarly, making nuclear war less destructive could place the use of these weapons within the contemplation of rational decision makers, thus making their use more likely.

Wrestling with these conflicts is the curse of our generation; it is also the moral obligation of all citizens for it involves the future (or perhaps the lack of a future) of our children. Arms control advocates who manifest a dogmatic commitment to all three goals, without admitting to the inherent tension, lose credibility.

This paper argues that of the three goals mentioned above, the most urgent is to make the use of nuclear weapons as unlikely as possible. That

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the consequences of any nuclear war, even one involving nuclear arsenals one-tenth the size of those at the disposal of East and West today, would be devastating makes it imperative to do whatever we can to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. Any effort to reduce spending which makes war more likely is irresponsible: attempts to reduce nuclear arsenals to levels where an all out nuclear exchange would be anything less than catastrophic is, at least for the time being, politically unrealistic.

The question becomes, then, is there anything that the United States can do to create a situation where there would be no rationale for the use of strategic nuclear weapons. There are really only two alternatives: eliminate these weapons altogether or maintain a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union such that the use of their respective nuclear arsenals would be an act of sheer insanity. Because the possibility of eliminating nuclear weapons will remain remote for many years to come, promoting a stable strategic relationship should be the principle objective of any arms control efforts we pursue over the coming decades.

While there is much cause for gloom regarding the arms race, the good news is that promoting a stable strategic relationship is an attainable objective. In fact, as discussed below, it is an objective which can be realized unilaterally by the United States, without cooperation by the Soviet Union or the consumation of arms control arrangements. The bad news is that few people in positions of responsibility seem to share this objective, letting other considerations interfere with what should be the most important goal of our defense planning.

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[LC]

Before turning to the question of how to promote a stable strategic relationship, it would be useful to take a close look at the definition of stability. "Stability" is not synonymous with "equality" in this age of massive nuclear stockpiles. In essence, a stable strategic balance is one in which neither side has any incentive to use the weapons at its disposal except in response to an attack by its adversary. Logically, if both sides share this perspective, nuclear war will never break out.

There are two fundamental reasons why a nation would initiate war in general or use nuclear weapons in particular. The first is to pursue some political or ideological objective; the second is to limit the consequences of an expected attack by an adversary by striking first. The latter, called a "pre-emptive attack," is very important to the strategic relationship and represents the most plausible impetus for a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

The simple fact is that as long as both East and West have a minimal nuclear deterrent, no political objective held by either side could justify the risks of nuclear aggression. Regardless of whether one believes the Soviet Union is an ideological automaton bent upon world domination, the choicest territorial prize, say all of Western Europe, would not be worth the risk of the destruction of Soviet society as a functioning civilization. As Charles de Gaulle argued under his "force de frappe" doctrine, as long as any country has the capability of obliterating its opponent's capital city, the attraction of conquest is limited.

In an unstable balance of power, however, there are incentives for the use of nuclear weapons which have nothing to do with political objectives.

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If, in a period of political crisis, either side felt that by launching its weapons first it could substantially reduce the consequences of an attack by its adversary, it might initiate a pre-emptive strike. By doing so it would suffer less from a retaliatory blow than it would if it absorbed a first strike itself.

The difference between "equality" and "stability" should thus be obvious. If two gunfighters are standing ten feet apart with loaded Colt 45's pointed at each other's head, they are equal. They do not, however, have a stable relationship. Whoever pulls the trigger first will walk away; his counterpart will not. In these circumstances many people might well pull the trigger first, even if they bore no malice towards their adversary.

The significance of instability to the strategic relationship can best be illustrated by a hypothetical. Assume that both sides have nuclear arsenals comprised of 1000 land-based missiles (ICBM's), 500 bombers and 100 submarine-based missiles (SLBM's), and that each ICBM has ten warheads, each of which has a high probability of successfully destroying a land-based missile belonging to the other side. Further, assume that the side which struck first would be able to destroy 99% of its adversary's ICBM's, 70% of its adversary's bombers on the ground and 20% of the SLBM's on submarines attacked while in port. The attacker might also be able to shoot down another 100 of the bombers launched by its adversary in response to any attack and to destroy an additional 20 of the SLBM's through its anti-submarine warfare efforts. Instead of being struck by the full force of thousands of warheads, it could limit the retaliatory capability of its adversary to several hundred warheads. Under these circumstances, imagine that the attacker would suffer, say, 20 million casualties from a retaliatory strike. On the other hand, had it not struck first but rather absorbed a first strike by its adversary, it

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might lose, say, 200 million people. That side would also know that its adversary faced identical choices in any crisis. In these circumstances a leader responsible for the security of his people might well decide to launch a pre-emptive strike which had no objective other than the limitation of damage by the other side. Twenty million deaths is horrific; two hundred million is ten times as horrific.

A stable strategic balance can also be illustrated with a hypothetical. Let's say both sides had one thousand SLBM's and one thousand strategic bombers but no land-based missiles. Assume that an adversary could only destroy 10% of its adversary's SLBM's and 10% of its bombers while expending four hundred of its SLBM's in a first strike. Under these circumstances the attacker would not have improved its military situation in any appreciable way. Its adversary would still have far more nuclear warheads than it would need to obliterate the attacker in a counterattack. The side which struck first might well use up more weapons than it would destroy, thereby putting itself at a military disadvantage. Two hundred million people would still be killed whether a country attacked first or not.

In sum, a stable strategic balance is one in which neither side feels it could substantially mitigate the consequences of retaliation or improve its military position by attacking first.

***

If the objective of maintaining a stable rather than an equal strategic relationship was unequivocally embraced by the American public and its leaders, we would take a fundamentally different approach to decisions on

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whether to deploy particular weapons systems. Basically, two principal rules of thumb would guide our decision-making.

First, and most importantly, any strategic weapon system should be able to survive a first strike. Better not to deploy the system at all if it is vulnerable. A pre-emptive counter-force strike only makes sense if there is a possibility of taking out a significant portion of an adversary's retaliatory power. If there is no target, there is no incentive.

Second, avoid weapon systems which pose a first strike threat to an adversary's forces. In this way, temptation to initiate a first-strike to mitigate the consequences of an attack by the other side is eliminated. More importantly, an adversary lacks an incentive to launch first or risk the destruction of its nuclear capability - a "use 'em or lose 'em" situation.

There are three additional considerations which, while less important to weapons procurement, are nevertheless significant. First, both sides should know and appreciate each other's capabilities so that it can be confident that its forces are not vulnerable to destruction by a first strike. Thus the extent and capabilities of each weapon system should be verifiable through what are known as "national technical means of surveillance." Second, delivery systems which can be recalled are less likely to result in hair trigger reactions or in potentially catastrophic accidents associated with unintentional launches. Third, weapons systems which take a long time to deliver their payloads are more desirable. Long delivery times preclude the possibility of a surprise pre-emptive attack and give adversaries adequate time to consider appropriate responses, again reducing the likelihood of hair trigger reactions.

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Unfortunately, neither U.S. nor the Soviet strategic forces come close to meeting these standards. Sadder still, it has been the United States which has taken the lead in designing and deploying weapons which have promoted instability. Indeed our habit of building destabilizing strategic weapons seems to be getting worse.

The single most destabilizing development in the evolution of the nuclear arms race has been the deployment of MIRV's (multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles). A MIRV'ed missile is one that is capable of delivering more than one warhead to different targets. A single MIRV'ed missile therefore has the potential to destroy more than one opposing ICBM.

The effect of MIRV's on the stability of the strategic balance cannot be exaggerated. Both the United States and the Soviet Union now find themselves in a situation where each can destroy more missiles in a first strike than they would use, the very prescription for instability. The alleged vulnerability of our ICBM forces would be inconceivable if the Soviet Union had no MIRV'ed missiles. Without MIRV's an attacker would always use up more missiles, assuming some malfunctions, than would be destroyed. Suffice it to say that in the absence of the development of MIRV's, it is difficult to think of any motive for a pre-emptive strike by either side.

The United States can claim responsibility for introducing MIRV's into the strategic equation. Indeed, the history of the development of this innovation is instructive as to how a particular weapon with profound implications for stability can be deployed without adequate consideration of its impact on strategic stability.

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The United States developed the MIRV in response to Soviet efforts in the 1960's to build an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system. The belief was that by MIRV'ing our missiles we could overwhelm any Soviet ABM system with enough warheads to saturate their defenses. At a time when there was considerable debate over the wisdom of trying to develop an ABM system of our own, the decision to proceed with MIRV's went almost unnoticed. When the ABM treaty was signed in 1972, effectively prohibiting the development of any substantial ABM systems, the original justification for MIRV's disappeared; nevertheless, we went right on MIRV'ing the bulk of our ICBM and SLBM forces.

The United States has also taken the lead in deploying "counter-force" warheads, i.e., warheads which are capable of destroying missiles in hardened silos. Accuracy is more important than explosive power (yield) for counterforce capability, a consideration which caused the United States to deactivate a substantial portion of its large Saturn and Titan missiles in the early 1960's and to build its ICBM deterrent around smaller, more accurate Minuteman missiles. The Soviets, however, with less technological expertise, built larger but less accurate delivery systems with greater yields. It is only recently that the Soviets have caught up to us in accuracy. They now have large accurate missiles where we have small accurate missiles; both have the capability of knocking out their ICBM counterparts.

***

In light of these considerations, a review of the individual characteristics of the different components of the existing U.S. and Soviet strategic forces to determine their relative contributions to strategic stability would be instructive. The same thing can be done for proposed strategic weapons currently in the pipeline.

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[LC]

Clearly the most destabilizing weapons systems currently deployed by East and West are land based ICBM's. Both Soviet and U.S. ICBM's are capable of destroying hardened targets. Thus both Soviet and U.S. missiles are vulnerable to destruction. Indeed the principle justification for the sense of panic fostered by the Reagan Administration over the current nuclear balance is that Soviet ICBM's are theoretically capable of destroying all of our land-based missiles. Furthermore, ICBM's are not recallable and, like all ballistic missiles, have relatively short delivery times. The only standard of stability met by the ICBM is that to date it is easily verifiable through national technical means of surveillance. As we shall see, however, even this is threatened by the possible deployment of new types of ICBM's.

While the most destabilizing weapons system are land-based ICBM's, the most stabilizing are clearly those based on submarines. Nuclear powered submarines are not currently vulnerable to attack. It is generally agreed that anti-submarine warfare is a long way from presenting a threat to the vulnerability of nuclear submarines. In addition, SLBM's are not currently accurate enough to threaten hardened targets. The deployment of SLBM's is verifiable because the construction of the large submarines needed to base the missiles can be monitored with great certainty. While SLBM's are not recallable and have the short delivery times of ballistic missiles, the fact that their launching platforms are essentially invulnerable nevertheless makes this leg of our nuclear forces the most important stabilizing element in the current balance of power.

The third basing mode is the strategic bomber force, capable of delivering substantial payloads of nuclear bombs and of serving as a launching platform for air launched cruise missiles equipped with nuclear

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warheads. Our bomber force meets all of the criteria of a stabilizing weapons system except that it is partially vulnerable to pre-emption. While we always keep a portion of our strategic bombers in the air and another portion alert, the remaining forces are vulnerable to destruction from short delivery time submarine launched missiles. A final drawback, but one which does not directly undermine stability, is that our bombers are currently of questionable effectiveness due to their vulnerability to defensive measures once they are over Soviet territory. Indeed it is unclear that our current bomber force, based on our vintage B-52's, could successfully deliver their payloads to many of the targets of any retaliatory strike. While this does not invite pre-emption, it does raise questions as to whether our bomber force alone would be an adequate deterrent to the use of nuclear weapons by the USSR for political gains in the midst of a crisis.

Turning to the weapons systems which are planned but not yet deployed, it seems likely that strategic stability will deteriorate long before it improves. First, the MX missile is the very prescription for a destabilizing weapons system. As currently planned, its basing mode will likely prove vulnerable. It is _designed_ to be a counter-force weapon capable of destroying enemy missiles. Certain basing proposals, notably those calling for a mobile missile system or a so called "shell game" solution, threaten the verifiability of our ICBM forces. The MX is a ballistic missile with a relatively short delivery time which is not recallable. In fact, the only strategic capability the MX adds is to pose a greater threat to Soviet ICBM's than we have with the Minuteman. At the same time, it presents a more inviting target, for while each Minuteman has no more than three warheads per missile, the MX will have ten; whereas previously an attacker could destroy but three warheads with one of its own, it could now destroy ten.

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Second, the Trident II SLBM will also have a counter-force capability. Another missile which threatens Soviet ICBM's, even though it is launched from an essentially invulnerable platform, only adds to instability.

Third, the ground launched strategic (as opposed to intermediate range) cruise missile has mixed implications for strategic stability. The cruise should prove invulnerable as a result of its mobile basing mode. Its long delivery time would make it very difficult to use as a first-strike, counter-force weapon. On the other hand, its mobility, low cost and small size will make it very difficult to verify through national technical means. Because the Soviet Union has no apparent plans to deploy long range cruise missiles of its own in the near future, the difficulty of verification may not bother us at the moment. Clearly, however, we have to anticipate the possibility, if not the probability, that the deployment of long range cruise by the United States would prompt similar deployment by Moscow. A strategic relationship in which both sides had large numbers of unverifiable cruise missiles might prove very precarious.

The only planned weapon system which could possibly support strategic stability, rather than undermine it, is the B-1 bomber. Because our existing B-52 bomber force is reaching the end of its useful life, a decision to forego replacement risks increasing our dependence on ICBM's. As will be argued below, the bomber leg to our strategic triad is a useful hedge against the rather remote possibility that our SLBM forces might become unexpectedly vulnerable some time in the future. Strategic bombers meet all the criteria of stability, including being recallable and having long delivery times, the only exception being that the portion not in the air or on alert is vulnerable to

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surprise attack. It should be kept in mind, though, that the longer and clearer the buildup to any attack, the more of our bombers will be either in the air or on alert with crews on stand-by. Assuming that the B-1 is in fact capable of successfully penetrating Soviet air defences or as serving as a launching platform in the future for air launched cruise missiles, it should prove helpful in maintaining a stable strategic relationship.

***

The above discussion illustrates that the most destabilizing weapons systems deployed by either the Soviet Union or the United States are land-based MIRV'ed missiles. ICBM's with large numbers of accurate warheads present particular problems.

Currently it is the Soviet Union which possesses most of the weapons which fit this bill. As noted earlier, the USSR has historically emphasized large missiles with large payloads. Within the last ten years they have developed the capability of MIRV'ing their ICBM's and have increased warhead accuracy, a process which has culminated with the SS-18.

More importantly, the Soviet Union has placed a far greater percentage of its nuclear capability in its ICBM forces rather than bombers or SLBM's. While it is currently upgrading its SLBM capabilities, it is very unlikely that Moscow will decide in the next several decades to back away from its emphasis on large land based missiles and develop a balanced force structure more in line with ours. Clearly, then, the Soviet Union will continue maintaining a force structure which is fundamentally destabilizing.

The question becomes, then, does it take two to do the strategic stability tango. In other words, if the Soviet Union is unwilling to back

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away from weapon systems which do not meet the stability criteria, is it
possible for the United States to maintain stability unilaterally. The answer,
fortunately, is a clear "yes."

A counter-force weapon is only of military significance if there are silos
for it to target. If the United States decided to deactivate its land based
missiles, there would be no significant targets for counter-force weapons to
aim at. The only potential military targets of strategic significance would be
air bases, ports where off-duty submarines were docked, and command and
control centers. If the United States decided to move to a strategic "diad"
based on submarine and bomber forces alone, it could take steps to reduce
off-station time for submarines and to increase alert levels for bombers.
Thus, incentives for pre-emption would be eliminated -- there would be no
targets. Furthermore, no discernible military advantage would accrue to the
Soviet Union. The great majority of our warheads are currently based on our
bomber and submarine forces. Out of a total of some 9,000 warheads, less
than 3,000 are based on our ICBM's. If necessary, we could proceed with
the B-1, equipping it with air launched cruise missiles while deactivating our
ICBM's, thereby allowing us to maintain our strategic arsenal at current
levels.

An examination of the balance of forces under a U.S. "diad" scenario
illustrates the significant improvement in stability with a deactivated ICBM
force. With no targets, it is difficult to see any rationale for the use of
nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union. Any attack on non-strategic targets
could be easily matched in kind by our SLBM forces. An all-out attack would
certainly result in an all-out response by the U.S. of both its submarine and

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bomber forces. If the United States took the additional step of foregoing the deployment of the Trident II, there would be no threat to Soviet ICBM's and thus no use 'em or lose 'em incentive. Finally, the President's "window of vulnerability," which is based on an assumption of a Soviet first strike against our Minuteman missiles, would be promptly closed. Again, with no Minuteman, there is no significant military advantage to a first strike.

The principle military objection (as opposed to political and bureaucratic objections centering around inter-service rivalries) to a diad posture is that a triad provides insurance against the possibility of a technological breakthrough threatening the survivability of the other two legs of our deterrent. It is difficult to imagine, however, that unexpected technological breakthroughs threatening both our submarine and bomber forces would develop simultaneously. Furthermore, there is no indication whatsoever that anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is likely to pose any threat to our SLBM's in the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, it might be wise to continue research and design (R&D) work on a third invulnerable leg to our strategic forces. This third leg could be deployed in the event of unexpected break-throughs which threatening our existing deterrent. R&D work could go forward on missiles placed on a small off-shore submarines or under-water platforms or air launched ballistic missiles from planes over our own territory, or the various other basing modes which have been considered for the MX. But deactivating all U.S. ICBM's would eliminate any need to deploy such weapons until such a threat to our other legs emerged.

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An unequivocal commitment by the United States to pursue the objective of strategic stability would have profound implications not only for our weapons procurement decisions but for the goals of our arms control discussions with the Soviet Union as well. In essence we would focus less on maintaining strategic "equality" and more on measures which would reduce the risk of pre-emptive nuclear war.

Perhaps the most important shift in focus would be a switch from limitations on delivery vehicles (i.e. numbers of bombers and missiles) to limitations on warheads. The importance of such a change can best be explained by considering the implications of a hypothetical agreement reducing missiles but not warheads. Consider an agreement which reduced the number of missiles to 100 on each side but failed to limit warheads. In such a situation both sides would certainly engage in efforts to put more warheads on each missile. Assume that each side eventually deployed missiles equipped with 20 warheads each and that two warheads targeted at an opposing silo would have a 99% chance of destroying an opposing ICBM. By launching 10 of its 100 missiles, an attacker would have 200 warheads targeted at 100 potential silos, two warheads to a silo. The attacker could use but 10 of its own ICBM's to destroy 98 to 100 opposing missiles. And would then have 1800 warheads left after its first strike where its opponent would have at most 40. The incentive for pre-emption in these circumstances would be overwhelming. Under such conditions the strategic balance would be far less stable than it is currently.

Strategic arms reduction agreements which reduce missiles but which fail to reduce warheads, or more particularly the ratio of warheads to missiles,

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can therefore increase instability rather than decrease it. Indeed, this is the effect of President Reagan's recent START proposal. Older missiles with less warheads would be phased out while newer, multiple warhead missiles would remain in place, increasing the ratio of warheads to missiles. Incentives for pre-emption would therefore increase.

Clearly, then, the thrust of our arms control efforts should be toward limiting the number of warheads per missile. Perhaps we will someday return to the more comfortable situation of seeing but one warhead on every delivery vehicle, a situation in which pre-emption would be meaningless as an attacker could never improve its military situation because it would always have use at least an many weapons in an attack as it destroyed.

U.S. efforts to shift to a diad and away from reliance on ICBM's might fit nicely with arrangements to reduce the number of warheads per missile on Soviet ICBM's. Instead of limiting delivery vehicles, the number of Soviet delivery vehicles permitted under a new arms agreement could be increased while it would be precluded from building additional warheads. At the same time the United States could be shifting warheads away from land based missiles to submarine and bombers. Absolute numbers of warheads could remain the same, at least for the time being. Once a stable strategic balance had been reached, efforts could be made to reduce the absolute number of warheads.

It should be emphasized that such a plan clearly focuses on developing a stable relationship, not at reducing the level of destruction involved in an all-out war. Absolute numbers of warheads would remain the same, at least

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initially. Thus destructive capability would not necessarily change. Absolute numbers of delivery vehicles might actually increase, at least in the case of the Soviet Union. It would not be until after strategic stability was firmly established that the other goals of arms control, damage mitigation and cost reduction, would be pursued.

The final point which deserves reemphasis, however, is that arms control agreements are not a prerequisite for the establishment of strategic stability. The opportunity of our age is that the United States can unilaterally take steps which would greatly reduce the risk of a nuclear war by eliminating its vulnerable ICBM forces and by refraining from the deployment of new counter-force weapons.