April 22, 1960

New York, New York
22 West 22nd Street
Mr. Hugh Morrow

Dear Hugh:

or perhaps because of it.
the travail you must have gone through,
eign policy abech came out despite all
I thought the final version of the for-
I wanted you to know how well

Kind regards,

February 20, 1961

MEMO TO: THE GOVERNOR
FROM: HUGH MORROW
SUBJECT: THE GODKIN LECTURES

Henry Kissinger and I have had conversations from
time to time on this subject and are in agreement on procedure:

1. Henry has promised to send me soon an outline of his ideas on approach, subject matter and scope. We will want to discuss this with you when available.

2. Henry feels, and I agree, that a high degree of personalization will be very useful -- that is, using your personal experiences in government and politics to illustrate and emphasize the points to be made.

3. Point two is directed to two ends:

    --Making the lectures themselves interesting enough to hold a good audience through the whole series; Henry says the big problem with some of the past Godkin lectures has been that they were so heavy that the audience had dwindled to a hard core of about 20 by the third lecture.

    --Making the lectures themselves a highly readable book to be published by Harvard University Press (as per attached letter.) I have abandoned my previous thoughts about having Doubleday or some other commercial book publisher do a separate book based on the lectures.

Book passed on the features.

Doubtfully or some other commercial book publisher do a separate
letter.) I have spent some time with a few of them.

Book to be published by Harvard University Press (as heretofore

--Making the features themselves a fairly desirable
of about 50% of the third feature.

They were so heavy that the audience was quizzified to a hard core
the pit proper with some of the best Gorkin features had been that
enough to hold a good audience through the whole series! Henry says
--Making the features themselves interesting

the points to be made.
experience in Government and politics to illustrate and emphasize
benevolence will be very useful -- that is, making them more general

5. Henry Lees¹ and I agree² that a high degree of
to discuss this with you when available.

His ideas on abscissa, abscissa matter and scope. We will want
1. Henry has breakfasted to send me soon an outline of
time to come on this subject and see if agreement on broadeport:

Henry Kreuzberg and I have had conversations with

SUBJECT: THE GORKIN FEATURES

FROM: HUGH MORROW

MENO TO: THE GOVERNOR

September 50, 1967

-2-

4. One point on which Henry and I are emphatically agreed is that the time to start this project is now. Harvard University Press would like to have the manuscript in September or October. A good six months should go into the framing, writing, refining and revising of this manuscript.

I have already been doing a considerable amount of collateral reading. One item I would like to get hold of is the Don Irwin manuscript on your Washington experiences. Once we have Henry's outline, and have your agreement on what we want to say and how we want to go about it, I will need a fair amount of time with you simply to interview you in order to obtain usable information that doesn't appear in the available documentation. We should get started on this as soon after the bill-signing period ends as possible, and earlier if opportunity presents itself. I would hope to get down to actual writing of the first draft no later than May 1.

cc: Henry Kissinger
Emmet Hughes
Mrs. Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL

Here are the notes I took at Tarrytown on April 30, 1961.

Present: Rockefeller, Kissinger, Morrow.

Divisions: US 14, USSR 65, China 100. Viet-Minh has
almost as many divisions as we have.

Nuclear weapons only balance. Talk of nuclear holocaust
hamstrings us. We must be prepared to use nuclear weapons, but
build up conventional forces.

Cuba, Laos, South Viet-Nam, Berlin, Iran - testing points
of national purpose.

Soviet strategy relating to world-wide purpose and lack of
US strategy due to lack of world-wide purpose. UN is world forum, not
an instrument of world-wide strategy fitting in the various countries.

What are our commitments - legal and moral? We cannot
permit further shrinking of the areas of freedom. Here we must stand.
We are coming to the point of no return - like a man half way down the
ski run and near the jump who is going too fast to stop.

Our margin for positive action declines with each defeat.
If we don't stand in Cuba, Laos and Berlin, we have so undermined the
confidence of the free world group that no one will stand with us.

In the 19th century all new nations wanted to copy western

In the 19th century all new nations wanted to cody western
confidence of the free world group that no one will stand with us.

If we don't stand in Cupa, Laos and Berlin, we have so undermined the
Our margin for positive action declines with each defeat.

We are coming to the point of no return - like a man halt way down the
permit further shrinking of the areas of freedom. Here we must stand.

Must are our commitments - legal and moral? We cannot
an instrument of world-wide strategy fitting in the various countries.
US strategy due to lack of world-wide purpose. UN is world form, not
Soviet strategy relating to world-wide purpose and lack of
of national purpose.

Cupa, Laos, South Viet-Nam, Berlin, Iran - testing points
build up conventional forces.

Hamstrings na. We must be prepared to use nuclear weapons, put
nuclear weapons only balance. Talk of nuclear holocaust
almost as many divisions as we have.

Divisions: US 14, US24 92, China 100. Viet-Minh has
Present: Rockefeller, Klaasiger, Morrow.

FROM: HUGH MORROW
MEMO TO: THE GOVERNOR

CONFIDENTIAL

[L]

- 2 -

democracy because it had good values and was successful. Now copying
communism because it sounds as though it has good values and looks
like the wave of the future.

We must organize and train for democratic leadership all
over the world.

It is time we stopped kidding ourselves morally. Elimination
of a cancerous growth is no more violating moral principles than police
moving in on a gang or a doctor operating to remove a malignant growth.

Let's stop kidding the American people. Now is the time
to talk honestly. Our military action is not an issue of war and
peace - but preserving law, order and justice.

Let's take head-on the moral issue in nuclear weapons, the
moral issue in Cuba.

It is time for moral and intellectual honesty - we have
got to get back to this before we do anything.

The American people are not afraid of the truth if they are
told the facts and have an understanding of what is at stake.

**Dignidad** and **humanidad** - we haven't got a sense of dignity
and humanity; we'll double-cross anyone and then put out a moral
statement. This super-righteous morality leads us to be petty,
in-drawn, neurotic society.

- 3 -

If it hadn't been for nuclear weapons, democratic Judeo-
christian forces would not exist today. Nuclear weapons, rather than
the threat, have preserved civilization.

Resume testing of nuclear weapons - make them clean and
for tactical use.

The Russians won't even sign a non-inspectable treaty on
nuclear testing.

1 - Nuclear weapons;

2 - Cuba (defensive freedom, preservation of law, order, and justice);

3 - Concept of world structure - new people must fit into something.

In the absence of a hemisphere police force, we in the US
must exercise police authority until such a force exists. The UN is
just a forum.. It is a substitute for national action, an excuse for
regional inaction. OAS and UN have no executive power to preserve law,
order and justice.

Free world needs a big concept, not just technical solu-
tions.

If we can't organize the Western Hemisphere and the North
Atlantic community there is no free world. We must exert moral and
political leadership.

[c]

- 4 -

Paint the picture of how the world looks at us: we are not moral. We are doing everything the Russians are doing and trying to excuse ourselves morally on the ground that we are not doing it effectively.

Democracy cannot function unless the people are informed, particularly a democracy in which the people are striving to be morally honest and decent. Dilemma of the leader trying to do what is in the interest of the people and at the same time conform to a false morality.

Let's tell the truth. Let's not be ashamed of preserving our values even if we must fight for them.

We can't demand perfection before action. We can't make everyone democratic first - it is a matter of the stage of development of democracy. There's nothing democratic about the FBI, or any police force. Let's face up to the question of who we support; let's defend the bastards and reform them later.

The Communists create conditions making a democratic government impossible within a country they are taking over.

Nine thousand casualties in Viet-Nam last year alone - 13,000 ~~guerillas~~ casualties in from North Viet-Nam.

If we can't wake up the American people by telling them the truth..., the job ahead will require us to stand alone, in

[c]

- 5 -

it will require our leaders to stand alone, but we must do it
because we are doing what we believe is right.

The idea that the Communists can do anything and face
no problems and we can do nothing and face all the problems is
nonsense.

If China gets nuclear weapons, it will be ten times the
problem of France having nuclear weapons. Why are we trying to
take the atomic bomb away from the French? Not worried about France
having the atomic bomb, but very worried about China getting the
atomic bomb.

For a NATO nuclear force.

GODKIN LECTURE - role of democratic leadership; the
political clubhouse, private initiative, no force organizing people
automatically ("I never had a government job I didn't create myself.").

So many men have to make compromises on the way up.
Freedom when you get there is essential, and this may be why we are
turning to the financially secure for leadership.

A lot of well meaning people - and subversives - are
selling us short on how we've survived (nuclear weapons).

We are coming into a period which can be the beginning of
the end - hard as this may be for Americans even to imagine.

Now is the time to pull back the curtain and face the
moral and intellectual considerations - Cuba.

- 6 -

[L]

At Suez, we played for cheap public opinion and threw away security, broke the psychological back of the British. (Nasser government was buying arms from Communists and was anti-American).

Much of the world looks at us as psalm-singing hypocrites, and with considerable reason.

We have achieved neither moral security, nor effectiveness, nor the elementary requirements of security.

We think we can take off the moral opprobrium by failing. We think it is moral to go in with 1000 men and fail - but immoral to go in with 10,000 and win. Had we won, it would have been a big shot in the arm all over Latin America.

We try to look at what we do - or don't do - in a moral argument. We were terribly moral about Suez and Hungary...

The Russians give the impression of moral force because they give an appearance of belief in principles - people with no purpose look to actions (?) (Kissinger to spell out.)

Love and little love is no structure. Bolivar contribution - free people cannot love individually, have got to be part of a political structure.

On leadership = willingness to stand for principles, or get out. The ability to quit is part of leadership - to take a stand on

[L]

principle or just say "I'm sorry", then, "you'll have to get somebody else to do that." Went to the mat with Roosevelt this way three times.

Too many need the job for self-esteem and are unwilling to stand for principles or will compromise them to stay with the job. It is more a matter of inner security than financial security. Requires personal initiative and caring. If something concerns us, the ideas will come.

We often put ourselves in a position where what is required for our security and freedom is considered immoral. The Russians threaten to destroy us, and this demoralizing threat is offered in the name of peace. They lose interest in a nuclear test ban as soon as we quit testing. They had what they wanted - a forum to paint nuclear horror.

List major problems - but will talk on them separately.

Completely artificial concepts of morality. Not testing neutron bomb. Go ahead testing to get tactical, clean weapons. Now have nothing but massive retaliation - all or nothing situations.

Good the democrats have responsibility now for had potential of going to unilateral disarmament like British Labor Party.

In Congo, we are protecting the Communists against destruction by our enemies - more to come from Henry on this. What does strengthening the UN really mean? See nuclear testing chapter of Henry's book.

Ike planning intervention in Cuba but saying we can't
do it, (Nixon), Kennedy for intervention in campaign but then
trying to do it as though we had no part of it.

Cuba is an illustration of the people not being told by
either administration of the issue - no setting of the stage.

We see Castro as popular support. Totalitarians always
do, through terror or real gains for the people. So had Hitler,
so has Khuschchev.

Until we have a clear sense of purpose our actions have
no meaning. "What is the right thing to do?"

The leader must take all responsibility personally - this
is the tragedy and the burden of the leader.

If you wait for events to prove you are right, it is too
late to affect events. "Faith, hope and love and the greatest of
these is love".

We need a deeper moral purpose and a willingness to run
risks.

Values, propositions, concepts supporting policy - and
supporting mechanisms and tools...... Foreign policy is not an end
in itself.

Leadership is seeking what we want. Seeking only the
negotiable means seeking only that which the Russians will go along
with. It means acting like a minor power.

We must make policy - not ~~be~~ negotiators. We should have
stopped Nasser - anti-western and using Soviet weapons.

The Russians have found out the grey area where we can't
act, where our moralism inhibits us; they are circumventing us
through our own mores. We have written off the use of military
force to exert pressure. Any discussion of the UN as a place where
decisions are made on the basis of abstract reason is nonsense -
it is a matter of pressure.

Internal subversive action against government is more
dangerous than overt military threat. Communists create power base
from inside and then ~~only if you come in, we'll come in -~~ meanwhile
feeding in guerillas and supplies. Terrorization of civil govern-
ment. Khruschev told us he was going to do this. Why don't we pay
attention? (Henry to supply text of Khruschev's speech on this
subject?).

We have not incorporated this whole technique (Communist
infiltration and subversion) in our ~~domestic~~ political considerations
or foreign policy. Since overt military action is not involved, it
is not our moral concept to act against it, yet it should be.

Young Russians in the 19th century, looking at the world,
felt ashamed of their own country. Now young Russians take great
pride in it. They are not going to give up their dogma - it is

May 3, 1961

Mr. Hugh Morrow
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Hugh:

I am enclosing extracts of a letter I sent today to the Governor which I thought you might find helpful. I am also enclosing some notes on Communist strategy. I do not have the text of the documents referred to in these notes, but if you asked June Goldthwait she could undoubtedly produce them for your very rapidly.

I am also enclosing a reprint of an article I wrote on the new nations which contains many of the ideas with respect to the United Nations I mentioned to you the other day.

Some random thoughts: The theme of the talk ought to be that democracy can survive only if its leaders ask of the people what is necessary. Therefore, no party should give the impression that it uses our foreign policy choices to improve its electoral position.

Similarly, no leader should fail to do what is necessary because of the political impact of these decisions. (I don't really think Nelson ought to attack Nixon directly, but I do think he might make some reference to the so-called "peace issue" which has been so prevalent in recent campaigns. This has given the impression that we are working towards some terminal point, and has been one of the major factors confusing our people.)

Kind regards as always.

EXTRACT OF LETTER SENT TO
THE GOVERNOR

May 3, 1961

Before my departure for Europe, I would like to put before
you some thoughts about what we discussed for your consideration.
I think some declaration from you about the gravity of our situ-
ation, the nature of our challenge and the need to speak frankly
to the people would be a major national service. If the Administra-
tion understands its problems and has the courage to face them,
it could draw from this declaration the strength to do what is
necessary. If the Administration fails in this task, you can
then rally the American people yourself.

In thinking about what you might say, it has occurred to
me that your original instinct was the correct one. A speech
should not be a criticism of what has been done in terms of specific
policies, but rather an analysis of the overall situation. Its
theme should be that a democratic country cannot survive if its
leaders are not willing to confront the people with the tasks that
have to be performed. The implication should be that this has been
our national weakness for a long time.

You would be calling for not so much a change in this or that
policy, but for a new attitude. The statement would be a serious
admonition to both parties, although perhaps not stated in quite
that form. It then could be illustrated by some of the examples
we discussed, dealing with the question of survival, including
the role of nuclear weapons, the question of morality and foreign
policy, and concluding with an appeal of the general purpose
we should strive to realize.

I think the description should be very specific. I also
believe you should avoid getting into a position where you are
debating specific remedies with the governmental bureaucracy.
We do not lack good ideas but conceptions and criteria for
choosing among them and for establishing priorities. It is to
this level that your speech should be addressed.

As for the timing of this speech, I think it might be kept
flexible until we can see a little more clearly what international
developments will be over the next two weeks. I would not exclude
waiting until the Governors' Conference. I am reasonably sure
that you should not speak about nuclear weapons at the Governors'
Conference. You have done so at two previous meetings and you could
not say anything very much different at this point.

C O P Y

June 14, 1961

MEMO TO: The Governor

FROM: Hugh Morrow

SUBJECT: Statement on Foreign Aid for Charles P. Taft's National
Conference on International Economic and Social Development

Re attached correspondence, I recommend you send the
following telegram:

Hon. Gaylord A. Nelson
National Conference on International
Economic and Social Development
1720 Rhode Island Avenue, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

As one who has been vitally concerned with the subject
over two decades, ever since directing this nation's program of as-
sistance in strengthening the forces of democracy in the western
hemisphere during World War II, I consider extension and improvement
of the U. S. foreign aid program in these days of maximum peril to
be utterly essential to the future of freedom.

I feel that it is especially necessary that our aid program
be placed on a basis permitting long-range planning, as long
recommended by leaders of both political parties. This will not
only enable us to assist more effectively in orderly economic growth
of developing nations to the end that they may remain free, but will

Statement on Foreign Aid...

2.

also assure maximum usefulness of the U. S. contribution to the
developing multi-lateral aid program of the free world.

Emphasis on long-term loans repayable in hard currencies,
insistence on internal reforms to assure stability within recipient
nations, and separation of military and economic aid are all
important.

But most important of all is a realistic appraisal of the
future of our moral responsibility as leader of the free world, of
the long and relentless struggle with communism that we must sustain
if freedom is to live -- rather than fretful dwelling on past errors
or a weary recital of our great contributions in the past.

Now of all times is no time to flag or to fail. Now, if ever,
must free man seize the opportunity to turn belief in freedom into
action for freedom.

August 30, 1961

Dear Hugh:

Thank you very much for the call to Schlabrendorf.

I think it helped a great deal.

As for the attached memorandum, I am in agreement
with its major points. Some of the counter measures seem to
me to go too far, such as the seizing of East German assets.
This I believe ought to be reserved for a later moment. Simi-
larly, I am very leary of applying to the World Court. Ex-
cept for that I think that the major thrust of the paper is
correct.

Warm regards.

Enclosure -

memo. by Herbert M. Holt, sent to us Aug 18.

Dictated by Mr. Kissinger but signed in his absence.

22 West 55th Street
New York 19, N. Y.

Judson 2-7030

August 18, 1961

Dear Henry:

The Lieutenant Governor, as requested, telephoned Herr von Schlabrendorf on Monday and our visitor was much pleased and comforted.

Enclosed is a memorandum from a member of the Governor's staff who was born in Vienna, lived in Berlin through 1956 (Army Intelligence I believe) and who is very much upset about the current situation. Would you mind giving me your opinion of his specifics?

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

A23WX BJT

(1,150) AMS BUDGET

NIGHT LEAD CUBAN SUBVERSION

EDITOR'S NOTE--PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOLD HIS FEB. 7 NEWS CONFERENCE THAT CUBA IS NO LONGER A MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT "THE BIG DANGERS TO LATIN AMERICA" ARE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS WHICH CREATE A FERTILE AREA FOR SUBVERSION. OTHER OFFICIALS, BOTH WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION AND THOSE CRITICAL OF IT, HAVE SAID CUBA-TRAINED AGENTS POSE A THREAT TO THE HEMISPHERE. BUT NOT UNTIL TODAY HAD THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM BEEN DETAILED BY AN OFFICIAL U.S. SOURCE. HERE IS WHAT CIA DIRECTOR JOHN A. MCCONE HAD TO SAY ABOUT IT--AND HOW ADMINISTRATION CRITICS REACTED TO HIS REPORT.

BY GEOFFREY GOULD

WASHINGTON, MARCH 1 (AP)--THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE CHIEF SAYS A DANGEROUS, WIDESPREAD, HIGHLY ORGANIZED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION APPARATUS IS BEING BUILT AROUND LATIN AMERICANS TRAINED IN CUBA.

DESPITE THE GRAVITY OF THE THREAT TO HEMISPHERE GOVERNMENTS AS DESCRIBED BY JOHN A. MCCONE, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, A REPUBLICAN CRITIC CHARGED THE ADMINISTRATION "IS NOT LEVELING WITH US."

REP. H. R. GROSS, R-IOWA, A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE, COMPLAINED THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR "WAS NOT VERY LUCID ON A LOT OF THIS STUFF" WHEN HE APPEARED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE FEB. 19. HIS CENSORED TESTIMONY WAS RELEASED TODAY.

GROSS CLAIMED MCCONE'S APPEARANCE WAS PART OF A PATTERN OF "COVERUP OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED AND THEN BUILD UP A CASE FOR GIVING MORE MONEY TO THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS."

PRESIDENT KENNEDY INSISTS THAT THE THREAT OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA NEVER CAN BE EFFECTIVELY OVERCOME UNTIL THERE ARE EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS TO MEET THE POVERTY AND DISCONTENT ON WHICH THE REDS TRADE. THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S CHIEF WEAPON IN THIS FIGHT.

REP. ARMISTEAD SELDEN, D-ALA., THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, RELEASED THE TESTIMONY WHICH APPEARED TO CONSIST OF MCCONE'S PREPARED STATEMENT AND DID NOT INCLUDE THE QUESTION-AND-ANSWER EXCHANGES BETWEEN HIM AND SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS.

A24WX

MCCONE TESTIFIED THAT AT LEAST 1,000 TO 1,500 "STUDENTS" FROM ALL EXCEPT ONE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY WENT TO FIDEL CASTRO'S COMMUNIST CUBA IN 1962 TO RECEIVE PRACTICAL TRAINING IN GUERRILLA WARFARE, SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM. THE FLOW IS CONTINUING THIS YEAR, HE ADDED, "DESPITE THE LIMITED FACILITIES FOR REACHING CUBA AT PRESENT."

MCCONE SAID THE TRAINEES ARE ORGANIZED INTO NATIONAL UNITS, "IN EFFECT FORMING A PACKAGED CADRE WHICH CAN BE RETURNED TO THE HOMELAND AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO LEAD A 'LIBERATION ARMY.'" HE SAID CUBANS CALL THE TRAINEES "OUR INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE."

KENNEDY HAS MADE REFERENCE TO THESE "STUDENTS" BEING TRAINED IN CUBA AND MCCONE'S TESTIMONY ACTUALLY CONTAINED LITTLE THAT HAS NOT BEEN DISCLOSED PIECEMEAL BEFORE BY ONE SOURCE OR ANOTHER.

ONE DEMOCRATIC SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBER, WHO DECLINED TO BE IDENTIFIED, SAID HE DID NOT EVEN GO TO THE MEETING TO HEAR MCCONE BECAUSE HE REGARDS SUCH A BRIEFING AS "AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY." HE ADDED HE HAS PRACTICED SUCH ABSENTEEISM FOR YEARS SO HE WOULD NOT BE BOUND TO HOLD IN CONFIDENCE INFORMATION HE MIGHT DEVELOP FROM OTHER SOURCES.

MCCONE'S TESTIMONY AND THE REACTION TO IT SERVED TO DRAMATIZE ANEW HOW THE FOCUS OF CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN OVER CUBA HAS SHIFTED TO THE SUBVERSION PERIL AND AWAY FROM TALK OF A DIRECT MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM THE PRESENCE IN CUBA OF SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL--NOW OFFICIALLY ESTIMATED AT AROUND 17,000.

FOR EXAMPLE, SEN. BARRY GOLDWATER, R-ARIZ., WHO OFTEN HAS LAMBASTED THE ADMINISTRATION FOR NOT CLEARING SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL OUT OF CUBA, HAD THIS TO SAY OF MCCONE'S REPORT:

"I AM NOT TOO DISTURBED ABOUT THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN CUBA. THEY COULD LOAD THE ISLAND DOWN WITH ENOUGH STUFF OF ITS KIND TO SINK IT WITHOUT BECOMING A MILITARY THREAT TO US."

"BUT THE TRAINING OF 1,000 TO 1,500 LATIN AMERICANS IN SABOTAGE AND GUERRILLA TACTICS PRESENTS GREAT DANGER. WE MUST BE IN THE POSITION WHERE WE REGARD ANY COMMUNIST ATTACK ON ANY HEMISPHERE COUNTRY AS AN ATTACK ON US."

A25WX

SEN. SPESSARD L. HOLLAND, D-FLA., SAID THE ACTIVITY DESCRIBED BY MCCONE IS "HIGHLY DANGEROUS FOR THE HEMISPHERE. . . THIS ONLY"

SERVES TO ME IT CLEAR AGAIN THAT WE HAVE GOT TO GET RID OF THE COMMUNIST STRONGHOLD IN CUBA."

SEN. JOHN STENNIS, D-MISS., WHOSE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CUBAN SITUATION, SAID "I'M NOT SURPRISED. IT ADDS TO THE OVER-ALL PROBLEM AND CLEARLY ILLUSTRATES WHAT TO EXPECT IN THE FUTURE."

SEN. HERMAN TALMADGE, D-GA., SAID MCCONE'S TESTIMONY SHOULD STIMULATE EFFORTS TO "GET THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO JOIN HANDS IN AS TIGHT AN ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CUBA AS POSIBLE, AND TO DO ALL THEY CAN TO PREVENT THEIR PEOPLE FROM GOING TO CUBA. I WOULD THINK THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS) WOULD BE VERY WILLING."

SEN. FRANK J. LAUSCHE, D-OHIO, SAID A REPORT FROM THE OAS ITSELF HAS MADE CLEAR THAT CLASSES IN SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE ARE UNDER WAY. "WE'VE GOT TO TIGHTEN DOWN AGAINST COMMERCE TO CUBA," LAUSCHE SAID.

MCCONE SAID THE TRAINEES ARE GIVEN SUCH DOWN-TO-EARTH INSTRUCTION AS HOW TO OPERATE COMMON TYPES OF RIFLES AND MACHINEGUNS THEY WOULD LIKELY BE ABLE TO STEAL OR CAPTURE FROM POLICE OR SECURITY UNITS OF THEIR COUNTRIES. ANOTHER PHASE OF THE SCHOOLING WAS HOW TO MANUFACTURE HOMADE "MOLOTOV COCKTAIL" BOMBS.

THE ONLY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY FROM WHICH THE GUERRILLA TRAINEES MAY NOT BE COMING, MCCONE SAID, IS URUGUAY, AND HE DESCRIBED A SPECIAL SITUATION IN THAT STRATEGICALLY LOCATED COUNTRY.

HE SAID ALL COMMUNIST-BLOC NATIONS MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN THE CAPITAL, MONTEVIDEO, AND RED COURIERS AND TRAVELERS CAN FAN OUT FROM THERE TO CUBA AND THE SOVIET BLOC EASILY. THEREFORE, MCCONE SAID, IN ORDER NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THE URUGUAYAN GOVERNMENT, "NO ATTEMPT IS MADE TO FOMENT REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN URUGUAY."

A26WX

HE SAID THE COMMUNISTS GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO CONCEAL THE MOVEMENTS TO CUBA.

ONE METHOD IS FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO TO ISSUE VISAS ON A SEPARATE SHEET OF PAPER, INSTEAD OF STAMPING THE PASSPORT, SO THERE IS NO RECORD OF A TRIP TO CUBA.

ANOTHER METHOD WAS THROUGH MONTEVIDEO WHERE MCCONE SAID "CUBANS HAVE FURNISHED PASSPORTS UNDER OTHER NAMES FOR TRAVEL BY WAY OF CURACAO." HE IMPLIED THAT THIS TRAFFIC HAS BEEN SHUT DOWN SINCE THE UNITED STATES CLAMPED ITS QUARANTINE ON CUBA LAST OCTOBER.

THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR GAVE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF CASES OF COMMUNIST COURIERS WHO WERE CAUGHT WITH LARGE SUMS OF CASH. ONE, A NICARAGUAN EXILE NAMED JULIO MAYORGA PORTOCARRERA, WAS CAUGHT CARRYING $3,600 FROM CUBA FOR NICARAGUAN REBELS IN HONDURAS, MCCONE SAID.

"COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS HAVE STAGED NUMEROUS BANK ROBBERIES IN VENEZUELA, PERU AND ARGENTINA," HE ADDED, TO GET FUNDS TO SUPPORT SUBVERSION. HE CITED ONE THAT NETTED $100,000.

BUT MCCONE SAID "WHILE CUBAN-BACKED SUBVERSIVE PRESSURE IS GREAT IN ALL OF LATIN AMERICA, THE CUBANS HAVE THUS FAR BEEN HAVING ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS. HE GAVE THESE EXAMPLES:

- CUBAN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED LABOR MOVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA "HAVE NOT YET GOTTEN OFF THE GROUND."

- DESPITE GREAT SUBVERSIVE AND SABOTAGE PRESSURE IN VENEZUELA, PRESIDENT ROMULO BETANCOURT SEEMS TO BE PROVING HE CAN CONTROL IT AND IS LIKELY TO BECOME THE FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT IN HISTORY TO COMPLETE HIS TERM.

- IN BRAZIL "SOME MODERATES WERE ELECTED TO CONGRESSIONAL AND GUBERNATORIAL POSTS LAST FALL."

GROSS SAID OF THESE LAST POINTS MADE BY MCCONE, "I DON'T SHARE THIS HOPE HE SEEMS TO HAVE. WE ARE NOT GETTING THE INFORMATION WE NEED WITH RESPECT TO IMMEDIATE POLICY--WHAT IS BEING DONE TO REMOVE THE CANCER THAT IS CUBA."

"I'D FEEL A LOT MORE HOPE," HE ADDED, "IF THOSE FIVE NATIONS WOULD BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA. THEY INCLUDE SOME OF THE BIGGEST AND MOST IMPORTANT NATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA."

THE FIVE SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WHO STILL MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA ARE MEXICO, BRAZIL, BOLIVIA, URUGUAY AND CHILE. JC317PES

A27WX

AMS BUDGET (500)

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISS

T.

c/o Mrs. Alfred Fremont
658 Nash Avenue
Menlo Park, California
phone: 415 - 323 - 1602
16 July 1963

Dr. H. A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was on the point of writing directly to Governor Rockefeller for his
most excellent recent statement re the San Francisco Republicans when,
quite by accident, I read the article in the July *Harpers*. No doubt
any letter of mine would not have reached him, and thus I write to you.
And you may justly begrudge its length. My apologies are tempered by
my hope it may not be devoid of interest.

May I make two comments for future speeches?

1. Never allow the argument to be reduced to free enterprise vs. communism. Soldiers don't fight, and die, in defence of economics - theory and practice. Free enterprise is only a part of a larger entity, freedom. And most peoples seem to prefer a mixed economy, even the American!

2. By all means continue to restrict public statements. No matter how distant the allusion AEsop and the wolf are most pertinent. The public gets awfully tired of daily comments - except by paid commentators. Being tired, they ignore them. But they always respond to the occasional reasoned statement of a statesman.

But it is not just to commend the Governor that prompts this letter.
I suggest he take a trip - to Indonesia.

Why Indonesia? For many major reasons:

1. President Kennedy is contemplating a trip to Asia, and this will undercut him. No other candidate has dreamed of it, probably. It is a novel. It is daring. It is dramatic. I know Indonesia has no electoral votes, BUT -

2. The Governor and his entourage need to be reminded, every day, that Asia is vital, and also desperate. Indonesia is the 5th largest country on earth.

3. If Indonesia falls to the Reds, India is outflanked, and Cuba will be reduced to size. The Governor can at least sound the warning *before* it happens.

4. Indonesia is not lost to the Reds, and need not. The average Indonesian rejects dictation from anyone, as does any human, if given the chance.

5. BUT, Indonesians are desperate. Desperate people do desperate things, as the suicides in Saigon, and car burnings outside Djakarta despite great shortage of transport. And American policy is stymied for lack of decision, skill, wisdom, and courage. By all means re-read General Marshall's "Report to the American People" of 1947 re China. Everything the general wrote about China then is true of Indonesia today, particularly the deliberate hobbling of the local economy - to make a bad situation worse.

- 2 -

6. Because it will do wonders for Indonesian self-respect to be visited by an American of the Governor's stature. They are very sensitive people, quick to sense an affront even if unintended. The last prominent Americans to go there were the Attorney General and General Taylor, both in 1962. The Soviet Union and China are not ignoring Indonesia by any means.

If the Governor, upon arrival at the airport at Djakarta, would say, in effect, "I have come not to learn, but to look, to listen, and to learn" -- all of Asia would respond!

7. Because by visiting Indonesia in person, the Governor would then be in a position to speak intelligently about it. Any comments he might make about Asia before such a trip would - in large measure - be ignored both in Asia and here at home, no matter how excellent the staff of experts at his command.

If the Governor can be persuaded to fit such a trip into a tight schedule, I hereby formally volunteer as an aide/translator. In so far as possible let such a trip be made NOT under the auspices of the State Department or Sukarno. Let him meet the people in his own inimitable way.

As the Governor no doubt well knows, the State Department does not take kindly to opinions or suggestions from beyond its sacred precincts. In all modesty, I have 15 specifics which could and should be done in Indonesia (and elsewhere) today. None call for much expenditure. I shall be only too glad to discuss them, if asked.

I was a classmate of Emmet Hughes. For four years I witnessed the Emergency in Malaya and for parts of five years I have witnessed events in Indonesia - all in private employment. Rightly or wrongly I consider Indonesia particularly crucial but by no means hopeless. Have just returned four months ago and am anxious to return, for at least in my small circle I can attempt to refute the opinion held from Korea right around to Arabia that we are, in fact, a "paper tiger".

Thank you very much for your attention.

We seem to share a mutual interest in Metternich. Have you come across his remark when asked how he managed to do so much? Metternich replied, "I never do what others can do", and this, I think, might be remembered by many who call themselves administrators!

February 18, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HUGH MORROW

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

The following is the text of the alleged
agreement, allegedly signed on June 15, 1962, after
the Washington talks of Chiari and JFK, as printed
in the Boston Globe of February 9th. The last clause
of the third paragraph is the point in dispute.

"President Chiari presented his case
frankly, openly and forcefully to President
Kennedy. He presented the following problems:
lands, flags, mixed courts, sovereignty in
perpetuity, executors, stamps.

"On the basis of his presentation to
President Kennedy of the questions that have
produced sources of dissatisfaction, the two
presidents agreed to appoint immediately a
group of high level representatives that will
discuss the problems.

"While the discussion (sic) are going on
the question of perpetuity becomes less important,
because in the meantime it is possible that the
studies, research and other factors to enable the
United States to come to a definite decision to build a sea-
level canal or continue with the present one, will
come to a point of determination which will make the
question of perpetuity obsolete because a new treaty
will have to be negotiated in either case."

signed: "Karl Kaysen, (Assistant to JFK)
Katherine W. Bracken (then State
Dept. Director of Central American
and Panamanian Affairs)
Augusto Guillermo Arango (then
Panamanian Ambassador to the
U.S. and OAS)
Arturo Morgan Morales (then
Panamanian Minister Councillor
to the U.S.)"

March 16, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO: HUGH MORROW

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Article on Communist Challenge in Look.

It is my understanding from John Deardourff (who discussed it
with Harry Paxton, who discussed it with Shirley Clurman) that the
"Communist Challenge" article is now in the hands of *Look*, but that we
will get an opportunity to make changes once they have set up the proofs.

Changes must be made in the text. The text they are now using
was drafted early in January. There are references to events of December
and November and to people no longer in government service (such as Roger
Hileman).

I am prepared to make the necessary changes when I get the proofs.
But you should know that I will be away from my office from March 25th
to April 6th.

cc. John Deardourff
Harry Paxton
Shirley Clurman