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the back of the minds of the NATO -- has been in the back of
the NATO disputes.

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It is for that reason that, regardless of any of the
disputes about INF and other current issues, a re-examination
of NATO doctrine is necessary. And the Committee, with all
due respect, is doing a very useful service in focusing
attention on this problem.

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My own view is that wherever one draws the dividing line
between conventional and nuclear defense, the argument that
is made by so many, that a nuclear defense must of necessity
be total and aimed at the most cataclysmic strategy, is one
that cannot be sustained indefinitely.

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I think the political leadership of the alliance has an
obligation to limit the consequences of nuclear war should it
break out, and I do not think it is possible to keep relying
on a threat that involves the certainty of suicide. Our
allies have a right to ask of us that we risk what is
necessary for their defense, but they can have no interest in
the consequences of some of the strategies that are being
proposed.

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Now, all of these disputes which have been in here and in
NATO and have been going on for a long time, and not only in
this Administration -- they have been going on for 20 years
at least -- have been accentuated by the INF agreement and
the debate that it has generated.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.

20 F ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 (202) 628-9300

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I want to make clear that, even though I have had the gravest reservations about that agreement, even though I believe that we started at the wrong end of the nuclear spectrum in the negotiations, I do not think that my concerns can be cured by non-ratification. Whatever damage this agreement has done in the political field, it has already done.

And we would pay an exorbitant price if the Senate by a minority larger than a third but less than half, which is what would be the situation, would refuse to ratify the agreement.

Having said this, however, I would like to point out why I think the agreement has raised a whole new set of issues. I believe that the INF deployment, whatever its original justification had been, operationally performed the function of linking the nuclear defense of Europe to the strategic retaliatory capacity of the United States, in the following way.

As the credibility of the American nuclear threat declined on the basis of calculations, the location of weapons that would be in the direct line of a Soviet advance provided a reassurance of a certain automaticity of response.

The Soviets had to calculate that we would not permit these weapons to be overrun without using them, and that

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therefore some 'delegations would probably have taken place,
whether or not this was the case. The Soviets would
therefore have had to attack those weapons if they wanted to
launch an attack on Europe.

But even a 90 percent effective attack would have
elicited a counterblow that, standing by itself, would have
produced exhorbitant damage. The Soviets could not cure that
problem except by simultaneously attacking the American
strategic forces in the United States. In other words, they
were put into the position where they could extricate
themselves from their dilemmas only by the initiation of
general nuclear war, which was a risk out of proportion to
any objective to be achieved.

That organic link has been severed to some considerable
extent by the INF agreement, and it cannot be cured by
arguments of counting warheads on both sides.

It has had the second difficulty that those groups in
Europe, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, who
have in the entire postwar period stood for a close alliance
with the United States have been somewhat demoralized by this
agreement, pushing the political spectrum more in a
neutrallist direction and driving some of them in a more
nationalist direction.

This is revealed in the debate that is now going on with
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of the alliance weapons. And I mention these issues not
because I want to keep carping on a Treaty that I consider to
be an accomplished fact, but because I believe we have to
understand what the problems are that need to be cured in the
alliance.

Now, let me sum up very quickly the arguments, the
directions in which I believe we ought to attempt to go.
One, we need a coherent NATO strategy which deals with the
issue of the relationship between conventional and nuclear
defense and between the various kinds of nuclear defense. In
this respect, I want to warn against two tendencies, one on
this side of the Atlantic, the other on the European side of
the Atlantic.

On the American side of the Atlantic, it is not — I
would warn against the constant reiteration by the
Administration and other spokesmen that the goal of American
arms control policy is the total elimination of nuclear
weapons. That is an unachievable objective. It is not even
a desirable objective.

So many weapons have been produced that no conceivable
verification system could reassure us against weapons that
might be hidden in the Soviet Union. Then there is the
problem of third country nuclear capabilities, so that very
soon any such negotiation would get us right back to where we
are in one way or another anyway, namely to a level of

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nuclear force that we consider compatible with our security.

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On the European side, I would warn against the tendencies
towards the third zero option, because the larger evolution
of that is toward the denuclearization of the Federal
Republic of Germany.

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The Chairman Senator Warner suggests we all go vote,
because we all want to hear what you have to say and we have
a vote on. And we will be back in about five or ten
minutes.

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We will recess briefly.

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[Recess.]

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The Chairman Dr. Kissinger, we apologize for the
necessary break, but we had to go vote. I hope we can get a
few minutes now without a vote, but why do we not start back
where you were.

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Dr. Kissinger: I had reached the point where I wanted to
-- where I warned against the tendencies that are developing
in Europe, especially in the Federal Republic, in the
direction of the so-called third zero option, the removal of
short range nuclear missiles from Europe, which would
gradually move in the direction of the denuclearization at
least of the Federal Republic of Germany.

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I believe this would have the gravest consequences for
the future of the alliance. The denuclearization of the
Federal Republic would almost inevitably produce a proposal