# NATO IN THE SIXTIES: THE UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

## I. The Problem

The meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers at Athens ended with the usual proclamations of Allied unity. A great deal was made of the United States commitment of five-and later more-Polaris submarines to NATO. Yet the significance of the meeting went far beyond this largely symbolic gesture.

The Athens conference marked the point at which a reassessment of NATO strategy could no longer be avoided. It underlined the urgent need to resolve the debate of the past years about the relative role of nuclear and conventional forces, the relationship of deterrence to strategy and the control and use of nuclear weapons.

This debate was first given impetus when, shortly after the advent of the new Administration, the United States proposed that the conventional forces of NATO be strengthened, specifically that they be brought up to the level of 30 divisions agreed upon in 1957. Our allies, in turn, inquired whether the United States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, and whether our nuclear guarantee was being deprived of its credibility. We replied that the build-up of conventional forces did not imply a reduced reliance on what has been

of conventional forces did not imply a reduced reliance on what the US
Guarantee was meant to deliver of its credibility. We replied that the盟-up
States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons, and whether our ances-
ricous weapons alone in 1927. Our efforts, in turn, indicated whether the United
NATO pe stratedly, specifically that they pe brought up to the level of 30
new Administration, the United States proposed that the conventional forces of
This debate was first given impetus when, shortly after the advent of the
nuclear weapons.

The relationship of deterrence to strategy and the control and use of
forces, the role of nuclear and conventional
force no longer p avoided. It underlined the need to resolve the ge-
conomic issues of the meeting went far beyond those largely economic issues.
The Athens conference marked the point at which a reassessment of NATO strategy
significance of the meeting went far beyond those largely economic issues.

The meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers at Athens ended with
the states commitment of five-and later more-polarized subsumption to NATO. Let the
the naval proceedings of Venedig pass. A great deal was made of the United

I. The problem

NATO IN THE SIXTEEN: THE UNSOVERNING PROBLEMS

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called the Deterrent. On the contrary, the strategic striking force was
being expanded and made more invulnerable. The non-nuclear build-up, far
from diminishing the credibility of our nuclear power, would actually en-
hance it. In short, the NATO policy being promulgated was not new, ac-
cording to our official statements; we were simply asking our allies to
live up to their previous commitment. Our goal was flexibility of response.

This curious dialogue in which a change of emphasis in U.S. policy was
defended in terms of traditional doctrines of NATO in many ways only increased
the uneasiness of our allies. There were many reasons why the NATO goals for
conventional forces had never been met. An important one was the fact that
in terms of the prevailing NATO strategy, these forces did not make much sense.

That strategy had been developed during the period of United States
strategic preponderance. For the greater part of the nuclear age we could
win a general war whether we struck first or second. We could destroy the
Soviet means of retaliation at minimum cost. This superiority enabled us not
only to prevent an attack on the United States, but to protect our allies

1. Speech by Secretary of the Army Stahr to the NATO Parliamentatians
Conference, November 13, 1961, cited in *New York Times* November 14, 1961.

2. Secretary of Defense McNamara, February 17, 1962. Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, cited in *New York Times*, February 18, 1962.

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by what amounted to a unilateral American guarantee. The Soviet Union did possess superior conventional strength. But it could not set these forces in motion because such an action might have triggered our Strategic Air Command (SAC). It could not attack the United States at the same time as Europe—even after it became technically feasible—because, while this would have increased our losses, a Soviet defeat would nevertheless have been inevitable. Throughout its history, the security of NATO has depended essentially on the ability of the United States to destroy the Soviet retaliatory power—technically speaking on our capacity to conduct a counterforce strategy.

Any prudent planning for NATO in the Sixties must start from the assumption that the utility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of Europe is

3. The term counterforce strategy can be used in two senses: (a) As a strategy for general war, specifically for dealing with a Soviet attack on our strategic striking forces; (b) As a strategy for dealing with all challenges, including the defense of NATO. The author is of the view that in case of an attack on our retaliatory force a counterforce capability gives us the greatest degree of flexibility and may be an extremely important bargaining device. For almost every other challenge, including the defense of NATO, its ability to deal with counterforce challenges for the reasons outlined in the article, if not the article itself, will be in the second sense: as a strategy is used in this article, it will be in the second sense: as a strategy for responding to challenges other than an attack on our strategic striking forces. The article does not argue against possessing such capability, where possible, but against relying on it too much.

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bound to decline. It is possible to accept the statements of our defense leaders that the United States is superior in strategic striking power and intends to remain so. But the strategic and political significance of this superiority is certain to diminish, and on three levels: that of military effectiveness, political utility, and credibility. For the immediate future—as long as the Soviet missile force remains relatively small, a counterforce strategy may remain technically feasible. This situation should be treated, however, as a temporary respite permitting an adjustment to inevitable realities, not as an excuse for continuing to depend on traditional policies.

For one thing, if a counterforce strategy is to retain any chance of success, the location of the targets must be known in advance. This is particularly true in the case of missiles, which cannot search for their objectives. Given the nature of Soviet society and the vastness of Soviet territory, our knowledge of Soviet launching sites is likely to be at best fragmentary. Moreover, as missile systems become more sophisticated, missiles will be dispersed—at least assuming reasonable prudence on the part of the opponent—thus preventing one attacking missile from destroying more than one defending vehicle. Also, many missiles will be protected in hardened

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underground sites. These two factors will greatly magnify the force required for a successful counterforce strike. Other missiles will be mobile or based at sea, creating the need for coordinating many different forms of attack.

The constantly growing complexity of staging a well-coordinated missile attack is bound to reduce the political utility of a counterforce strategy--perhaps even faster than is warranted by purely military considerations.

It will grow ever more difficult to convince any political leader to rely on a strategy based on intelligence which is fragmentary, using large numbers of weapons for which there is no operational experience in wartime and the in-face of risks which are certain to mount dramatically. Even if the percentage of the opposing strategic force which we are able to destroy remains constant—an unwarrantedly optimistic assumption—the absolute number which is left will rise. Thus the Soviet capability to devastate NATO countries in a counterblow will inevitably increase.

To pretend that these factors will not reduce any President's readiness to initiate general war would be a form of irresponsibility on our part and a convenient delusion for some of our allies. Even our best efforts will not

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prevent the credibility of a counterforce strategy from declining in the
years ahead. It will grow ever more difficult to convince the Soviets
that such a capability exists or that we are prepared to run the risks it
involves. If NATO does not change its strategy as the missile age develops,
ever more direct Soviet challenges will be likely.

There are, of course, those who argue that as long as NATO nuclear
threat is sufficiently grave and will never have to face the consequences
of implementing it because it will never be challenged. But when the stake
is the lives of tens of millions, statesmen cannot gamble on such psychological
assessments. It is simply irresponsible to base the future of freedom on the
gamble that a threat one is not--or should not be--prepared to implement
will never be challenged. And if the threat is implemented except as a
last resort, NATO strategy would have brought on a needless catastrophe.
Wherever possible, NATO should possess the capability to thwart Communist
pressures by means appropriate to the promotion, shifting to the other
side the risks of escalation.

This is not a peculiarly American problem. The reduced utility of a

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counterforce strategy for the defense of Europe is not the result of a desire
by the United States to become a sanctuary while turning the territory of its
allies into a battleground—as is sometimes alleged in Europe. Soviet weapons
deployed against Europe far exceed in number those aimed at the United States.
A United States counterforce strike that destroyed the same percentage of both
categories of weapons would still leave a far greater number directed against
our allies than against us. And the European national strategic forces do not
alter this situation significantly.

A general war is certain to be more destructive to our European allies
than to the United States. Confronted with a strategy of pure devastation,
their inhibitions cannot be less than ours. Our European allies, if they
understand their own interests, should demand, rather than resist, alternatives
other than a United States first strike for the defense of Europe.

## II. NATO and the Problem of Local Defense.

Throughout its history NATO has suffered from the difficulty that its strategic doctrine has followed, rather than guided, the creation of its forces. Decisions have been made to meet specific crises or on the basis of fiscal consideration, or with an eye toward what the traffic would bear politically. Too frequently, more thought has been given to expedients for getting through another NATO conference than to the shape of NATO over a decade.

But whatever the origin of particular force levels, once established they have developed a life of their own. The 30 division goal did not make much sense when first advanced--except as an estimate of what our allies might reasonably be expected to contribute. However, the 1957 goal furnished a convenient target for the Kennedy Administration when it decided that conventional forces should be increased. As a result, goals which originally were not met because, in terms of traditional NATO doctrine, they were too high, may now not be met because they are too low for sustained local defense.

Actually, and fortunately, the size of the military establishment on the Continent--some 22 divisions when the Administration took office--has

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could entirely remove their fear that we might not implement our guarantee.

They therefore sought to remove or at least to restrict our freedom of decision by committing us to maintain substantial ground forces on the Continent. We could not be expected to do this, however, unless our allies were prepared to make an effort on their own.

Thus there grew up a substantial military establishment on the Continent, even though prevailing NATO doctrine could assign no particular function to it. Current disputes within NATO are largely incomprehensible unless we realize that to our allies, the shield forces have always been considered a price that had to be paid for the United States nuclear a guarantee, form of mechanical trigger for the United States strategic forces. Our allies have kept their contribution at a level high enough to induce us to maintain our military establishment on the Continent but not so large as to provide a real alternative to reliance on a nuclear counterforce strategy on our part.

Another consequence of NATO doctrine has been that it has provided a maximum incentive for the creation of national nuclear retaliatory forces.

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Our doctrine had defined these as the ultimately decisive weapons. In order to reduce dependence on the United States, to gain influence over our actions and for reason of prestige, first Great Britain and then France embarked on the immensely costly and difficult course of building up nuclear strategic striking power.

This was the situation when the present Administration took office. Our strategic doctrine had defined *any war* in which United States troops engaged Soviet or Chinese Communist forces as general war. This accounted, not only for the half-hearted build-up of the shield forces on the Continent, but also for the paucity of strategic reserves in the United States. In any direct confrontation with the major Communist powers, the United States had little choice between acquiescing or a counterforce strike.

In seeking to remedy this situation, the Administration complicated its task by identifying an improvement in overall flexibility with a conventional build-up on the Central Front in Europe. Increasing the strategic reserve by three or four division in the United States increased our option in such regions as South East Asia or the Middle East—even the option of local defense. It did not follow, however, that a similar

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increase in the most vital area had the same consequence. In South East Asia, the ability to commit United States divisions by giving us a means of staking our prestige tangibly, also improved the credibility of our nuclear deterrent. In Europe, where we already maintained substantial forces, a few additional divisions took on a different significance.

There, our frequent assertions that increasing the shield forces to 30 divisions made a nuclear response more likely were bound to appear as a subterfuge for our reluctance to face nuclear war. In other words, flexibility of response in Europe cannot be justified as a device to enable us to invoke a counterforce strategy. It is necessary for the opposite reason: to reduce our reliance on such a strategy. As long as this is not openly avowed, the difference between 22 divisions and 30 will seem peripheral.

And if the impending invulnerability of retaliatory forces is squarely faced, the goals of the build-up will have to be redefined.

These considerations are well illustrated by the concepts which we have used to justify the strengthening of the shield forces and by the

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had in effect already been decided against us and when the devastation
caused by a nuclear exchange under conditions of mutual invulnerability
may cause the local situation to appear irrelevant?

If, on the other hand, it is argued that the Soviets will never
dare to defeat our shield forces lest this trigger a nuclear exchange,
what have we gained by increasing the number of our divisions from 22 to
30? In other words, as long as a nuclear strike remains the chief weapon
in our arsenal, the increase in conventional forces in Europe now projected
may turn out to be too little or too much; too little for a real local
defense, and too much for a counterforce strategy to remain credible.

The same difficulty applies to the concept of a "threshold." This has
been defined by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric as follows: "The current doctrine
is that if NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by non-nuclear attacks
from the bloc countries, the NATO would respond, would make use of nuclear
arms." This raises two questions: (1) Who determines whether the NATO
conventional forces are being overwhelmed? (2) Assuming this determination
is made, how are nuclear weapons then to be used?

1.

New York Times, June 7, 1961.

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With respect to the first question, one can foresee situations in which NATO forces are simply pushed back without being overwhelmed. Will this then be the threshold for nuclear war? What if the Soviets mass clearly overwhelming power in Eastern Europe, but have not yet launched an attack? It could happen in an otherwise successful defense individual units, say, of division size, suffer setbacks. Given the dispersal of nuclear weapons in Europe to divisional level and below it may be that the location of our nuclear stockpiles and delivery vehicles will decide the question of using nuclear weapons for us. This situation may well contribute to deterrence. It is not, however, consistent with an attempt to conduct sustained conventional operations.

Assuming, however, that it is possible to make a clear determination that NATO's conventional forces are being overwhelmed, the problem arises how and what nuclear forces are to be used. If we assume that both sides have tactical nuclear weapons in adequate numbers and sizes, it is far from clear that the employment of these weapons would favor the defense at that stage of a battle. With the conventional defense overwhelmed, there would

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presumably be few shield forces left to stem the tide, even if the attacking units were reduced by nuclear power. After a breakthrough has been achieved, battlefield employment of nuclear weapons may well favor the offense, whose units can by then be dispersed while the defense has to move its units into predictable areas. In short, if nuclear weapons are to be used tactically at all, it is likely that the optimum, perhaps the sole, appropriate moment is early in military operations or at least while the shield forces are reasonably intact and Soviet reserve forces have not yet appeared on the battlefield.

The ability to reverse a defeat--or an imminent defeat--of the conventional forces would thus depend on the efficacy of a counterforce first strike and then we are back where we started. If we have a reliable counterforce capability, it will prove as useful when 22 divisions are defeated as when 30 are. If we do not have such a capability, 30 divisions will probably be insufficient.

Similar considerations bear on the troublesome question of "forward strategy" by which is meant the ability to put up a defense along the Iron Curtain and in particular to protect cities close to that dividing line.

It has often been argued that this could be accomplished by a build-up to 30 divisions. If the notion is to prevent a limited coup de main, the argument

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is chosen, the goal of 30 divisions will have to be substantially increased
and a reserve structure would have to be created almost from scratch.

This course is not beyond the capabilities of NATO. Western Europe
alone is superior to the U.S.S.R. in industrial capacity and even in manpower
and the North Atlantic community should find it much easier to maintain a
spectrum of deterrent power than the Soviet bloc. The frequently heard argu-
ment that NATO must retain its present strategy because its people are not
prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for an effective local defense is
surely inconsistent with the desire to maintain the credibility of a
counterforce first strike. Why should an aggressor believe that people and
leaders who are not prepared to make the comparatively small sacrifices
needed to assure a conventional local defense would be willing to face the
enormous devastation implied by general nuclear war?

At the same time, a decision to rely on a largely conventional defense
is not without its risks. Unless we act with great delicacy and subtlety,
it could give rise to the notion that the West considers any kind of
nuclear war unthinkable regardless of provocation. In such conditions, the

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Soviets could make NATO's conventional build-up irrelevant by threatening to use nuclear weapons against it. Moreover, despite the considerations outlined above, no Western government, including that of the United States, may prove willing to make the effort entailed by a heavy emphasis on conventional defense. Failure to meet these force levels is then likely to create a sense of impotence and invite Soviet pressure. Nothing could be more dangerous than to change the doctrine without acquiring the necessary forces to make such a change meaningful.

If NATO is not willing to make the effort required for a conventional defense, its other option would be to rely more heavily on tactical nuclear weapons. While a tactical nuclear war does not require less manpower at the beginning than a conventional war--it may even require more--it may have to be fought substantially by ready forces. It should be possible by using tactical nuclear weapons to interdict massive reinforcement of the battle area.

In this strategy, the conventional forces should be at least sufficiently strong to stop the Soviet forces deployed in Germany and Eastern Europe. This would prevent a sudden coup de main by ready Soviet forces. A decisive

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attack would require Soviet reinforcements in advance. If the conventional forces were powerful enough so that Soviet reinforcements would have to be considerable, many targets for tactical weapons would be presented. In this strategy, the purpose of the conventional forces would be to create optimum conditions for the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Defense would be achieved, not by protecting against every contingency, but by confronting the Soviets with the prospect of a conflict with incalculable consequences.

The difference between this option and current strategy is threfold:
(a) Major reliance would be placed on stopping a Soviet attack without resorting to a counterforce strike. (b) Nuclear weapons would be used not after a pause and when NATO's conventional forces would be on the verge of being overwhelmed. Rather, they would be employed early in the operation, as soon as it was clear that a massive Soviet attack was underway. (c) The primary use of nuclear weapons would be in the battle area.

The most convincing argument on behalf of the 30 division goal is in terms of a tactical nuclear, not a conventional, defense. It is curious that we have thought it necessary to downgrade the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons in the area.

3. See below, next page

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nuclear war in order to obtain the increase of conventional forces, while
the level we have proposed is meaningful only in terms of a concept of
tactical nuclear defense.

At the same time, reliance on tactical nuclear defense is plainly
and risky, even
the more uncertain, if the more attainable, course. It would impose on
the West the requirement to initiate the use of nuclear weapons early in
the operations. If NATO hesitates, the Soviets might wear down the de-
fending forces to a point where even the introduction of tactical nuclear
weapons could no longer restore the situation.

would
This strategy/thus enables the Soviets to pose challenges ambiguously
and force NATO into an unfavorable, perhaps disastrous, war of attrition.
The difficulty is compounded by the failure of the West to devise a clear
doctrine for tactical nuclear war or to develop forces clearly designed
for it. For a variety of reasons--not the least of which is the impact
of disarmament negotiations--the possibility of limiting a nuclear conflict
has been rejected and all nuclear weapons have been stigmatized without
distinction as to category. If these trends continue, it is likely that
a strategy relying on the use of even tactical nuclear weapons may involve
inhibitions similar to those in a counterforce strategy, bringing about
almost equivalent opportunities for Soviet blackmail.

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against the backdrop of tactical nuclear weapons, and that the risk of escalation, even under conditions of mutual invulnerability, is never zero.

Second, in deciding on the strength of forces required, there is the danger of too mechanical an approach. Too often, the impression has been created that a sustained conventional defense is within reach by assuming that the offense requires a superiority of about 3:1. The notion of the superiority of the defense vis-a-vis the offense-strangely reminiscent of certain French theories prior to World War II--cannot, even if valid, be applied so literally. The attacker does not require a three to one superiority all along the front. He can win by massing troops suddenly at the decisive point and overwhelming it. In conventional war, victories have very often been won when forces were roughly equal. (Germany, after all, achieved its victories in World War II with inferior forces.)

A shift of emphasis to local defense will require NATO to address itself more successfully than heretofore to three other problems: the standardization

4. To reduce the danger of a sudden breakthrough, the possibility of building fortifications to protect strategic points at the Central Front should therefore be reexamined.

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U. S. attack is effective, the Soviet response may be a counterblow directed against U. S. cities while the U.S.S.R. still has some strategic weapons remaining. If the opposing retaliatory force is relatively invulnerable, the result may be a tit-for-tat. In that case, the issue may well depend on the outcome of the battle on the Central Front. In almost any foreseeable situation, an all-out counterforce blow may be less risky than a limited one.

If nuclear weapons are used "punitively", the outcome is again likely to depend on the local situation. After Soviet forces have reached the Rhine, for example, the destruction of Kiev followed by a similar destruction in the West may submerge all other considerations in the desire to end the spiral towards ever greater devastation. The ensuing confusion and panic may well enable the Soviets to consolidate their gains.

The most effective method for employing nuclear weapons in a limited manner appears to be the tactical use to stop a battle and prevent a breakthrough. In the best of circumstances, the confusion attendant on any use of nuclear weapons will be considerable. It will be compounded by the lack of experience of every country with them. The use of nuclear weapons to

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A new approach to the nuclear establishment on the Continent should address itself systematically to the role of nuclear weapons in stabilizing a battle front—especially if sufficient conventional forces to resist a massive attack cannot be raised—but, in any case, to develop a counter to the introduction of nuclear weapons by the Soviets against NATO forces. NATO should not simply seek to replace existing weapons with more modern versions designed for similar missions—such as replacing aircraft with missiles. Rather an effort should be made to reassess the missions first and develop weapons appropriate to the new concept afterwards. The term "tactical use" should be much more rigorously defined than heretofore. In terms of current thinking, a tactical nuclear war is distinguishable from a general nuclear war only by its geographic limitation—a fact which can be of no interest to the potential victim. All targets and the weapons appropriate for them will have to be rigorously restudied.

Any tactical employment of nuclear weapons requires discriminating control and careful advance planning. Neither objective is likely to be attained as long as nuclear weapons are such an integral part of every major military unit. Both in order to make the conventional build-up effective and to permit a flexible use of nuclear weapons, the atomic arsenal on the Continent should be grouped into a separate command. If a NATO nuclear force is thought necessary, the control of tactical operations would appear to be the most sensible focus for it.⁴

4. See below, page

4. See below, page

force is thought necessarily, the control of tactical operations would confer
the Continent should be brought into a severe condition. It is NATO unclear
and to permit a flexible use of nuclear weapons, the atoms would on
militarily mit. Both in order to make the conventional pull-up effective
attained as long as nuclear weapons are such an integral part of every major
control and careful advance planning. Neither objective is likely to be
via tactical employment of nuclear weapons redundant decelerating
to be rigorously restricted.

tactical success. VII targets and the weapons appropriate for them will have
by its geographic limitation—a fact which can be of no interest to the bo-
ing,⁵ a tactical nuclear war is diabolically probable from a general unclear war on
be much more rigorously defined than heretofore. In terms of current trik-
appropriate to the new concept afterwards. The term "tactical me" should
an effort should be made to reassess the misuses first and develop weapons
designed for similar misuses—and so reducing errors with respect to missiles. Neither
should not simply seek to replace existing weapons with more modern aerotopes
the introduction of nuclear weapons by the Soviets against NATO forces. NATO
military attack cannot be raised—but, in such case, to develop a counter to
a battle front, especially if sufficient conventional forces to resist a
address itself systematically to the role of nuclear weapons in capitulating
A new approach to the nuclear capitulation on the Continent should

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a course would be extremely unlikely. It is not only that the Soviets
may retaliate against us in any case. More importantly, to "punish" a
recaleitrant ally by leaving him at the mercy of a Soviet counterblow would
be scarcely less serious for us than for the offender.

If we are honest with ourselves, we will have to admit that one of
our objections to the spread of national nuclear forces within NATO is that
we do not wish an ally to be in a position to force us into nuclear war.

For this very reason
But by the same token, independent national nuclear forces, whatever
their military effectiveness, will have the practical consequence of
impelling the coordination of policies which President De Gaulle first
proposed in his scheme for a Directorate and which, in fact, already
exists between the United States and Great Britain.

To be sure, the French initiative is an expensive and wasteful
method of achieving coordination of policy, though President De Gaulle
undoubtedly has other goals in mind as well. The question then becomes
whether it is possible to achieve coordination without an expensive
duplication of effort.

Several schemes have been advanced. In May 1961, President Kennedy

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NATO nuclear force and SAC would be inactive. In other words, a NATO
nuclear force with an American veto would multiply safety catches but not
triggering devices. It can easily be demonstrated to be a shift of nuclear
weapons from one American headquarters to another-- as De Gaulle has
already asserted.

If, on the other hand, we agreed to give up our veto, a major and
perhaps insoluble constitutional issue would be raised in the United &
States. Can a group of foreign powers commit us to nuclear war without our
consent? While the present situation is not very different, a great deal
may depend on the maintenance of this nuance. The attempt to eliminate this
nuance may create a debate casting in doubt the extent of our nuclear
commitment to NATO.

If we gave up our veto, the question would arise whether we would be
merely committing ourselves to the use of the NATO nuclear force or to the
use of our _entire_ strategic force. In the former case, we would have
again raised doubts whether the NATO force represented the limit of the
U. S. commitment to NATO. In the latter case, a separate NATO force would
also be unnecessary, for we would then be obliged to use all our nuclear forces

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at the behest of whatever majority had the power of decision in the control body. If we are prepared to go this far, it would be much simpler to create such a control mechanism in the first place, agree to accept its decisions, give it a voice in our targeting, and not go through the exercise of creating a separate force.

In short, the only kind of NATO force that could meet some of the concerns that gave rise to the quest for multilateral control in the first place is one that involves a modification of the United States veto. Apart from the domestic problems this would raise, a separate NATO force may not represent the most creative use of such a dramatic U.S. commitment. A NATO force without our veto is a European Atomic Force. If we are prepared to give up our veto, it would be better either to create a control body for all strategic forces within NATO or to support an independent European Atomic Force which would allow us to avoid our constitutional dilemma.

In dealing with the problem of the control of nuclear weapons--particularly strategic weapons—we must take care not to confuse palliatives with remedies and symbolism with reality. A guideline is a planning device

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of some usefulness; it does not get to the heart of the problem of control.

To be really meaningful, it should extend to all strategic forces likely to be used in the defense of NATO. Assignment of nuclear submarines to NATO is a token of our commitment; it does not of itself change the existing situation. To be sure, it is highly desirable that our allies have more information about the targeting and planned employment of our nuclear forces. The exchange of information agreed to at the Athens NATO meeting is an important step. It deals, however, with only one horn of the dilemma. The other concerns the issue of the veto.

The discussion about the veto illustrates that the European concern about nuclear control is not as baseless as is often alleged. If disagreements with our European allies were inconceivable, we could agree to use our nuclear arsenal whenever a certain number of our allies requested it, according to plans mutually agreed upon in advance. Since we are unwilling to do this, it must be that we wish to reserve for ourselves the right to differ with the interpretation of our allies about the nature of vital interests or the means to defend them. Jealous as we are of our prerogatives, we should have understanding, even when we do not agree, of the attempts of

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some of our allies to achieve a greater voice in determining their fate.

~~Indeed, the greatest single obstacle to a reassessment of NATO strategy is the Franco-American difference in nuclear matters. Of course, our skittishness about the veto and our refusal even to reply to President De Gaulle's suggestion for a political Directorate at least partly explains, even if it does not justify, France's lone hand in the nuclear field. In any case, irritation at President De Gaulle's tactics should not obscure the fact that, as Bismarck once said, policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative. Our assessment of the military significance of an independent French nuclear striking force is undoubtedly correct.

The question remains whether giving such high priority to thwarting it may not have the ironical consequence of forcing NATO to remain committed to a deterrent strategy. A local defense of Europe is unthinkable without a French contribution or French cooperation~~

We will have to choose between seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons within NATO or a greater emphasis on local defense. The refusal to help France even with projects not directly related to nuclear development (such as guidance systems for airplanes) threatens to turn an erroneous French

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doctrine into an obsession. By absorbing ever more of France's resources, it also commits her to an increasing reliance on a deterrent strategy.

*In these conditions, then even*

*in the unlikely event that the French nuclear effort should eventually atrophy, the result is as long as the doctrine remains intact* is likely to be not a greater contribution by France to the shield forces, but a sense of impotence leading to neutralism.

The chief drawback to our present policy is that it will not work whatever its theoretical merit. It will not prevent the spread of nuclear weapons--not even to France//. It *will* prevent the build-up of local defense forces. Moreover, in seeking to head off the French nuclear program, we may be driven to expedients such as the NATO force whose practical consequences--if they are to have any significance--may well be to bring about an even greater diffusion of nuclear weapons than the French program. If we are to make progress on the primary objective of improving NATO's capacity for local defense, we will have to be prepared--painful as such a reversal would be--to reassess our attitude towards France's nuclear ambitions.

However, if we **do** decide to be more forthcoming with respect to the French atomic program--if only by aiding the development of delivery

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1
nuclear defense as rigorously as we appear to have done.

(5) Greater emphasis on local defense highlights the need, not only for a conventional build-up, but for the ability to conduct discriminating tactical nuclear operations. The nuclear weapons now on the Continent should therefore be given a clear tactical mission--primarily that of controlling the battle situation. A tactical nuclear command should be formed under SACEUR, charged with planning and conducting tactical nuclear operations. Nuclear weapons should be placed under the control of this command rather than of front-line units. If a multilateral NATO force is created, the tactical nuclear arsenal would be a much more useful focus for it than a small multilateral strategic force. The fact that all the weapons relevant to the mission would be in the same command would make NATO guidelines much more meaningful for tactical weapons than for a few Polaris submarines.

In order to take into account the European wish for a greater role in nuclear planning, the commander of this force could be a European, presumably French.

(6) If it makes sense for NATO to rely on local defense, the implications of this for other areas must be squarely faced. It will simply be untenable

1. See the reports of Secretary of Defense McNamara's presentation to the NATO Ministerial Conference in the *New York Times* and *New York Herald* *Tribune*, May 6, 1962.

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to rely on a local defense of the most vital area while being dependent
on a strategy of nuclear retaliation everywhere else. Thus the mobile strate-
gic reserve of conventional and tactical nuclear forces in this country
will have to be augmented.

(7) With respect to strategic nuclear weapons NATO should distinguish
sharply between expedients to ward off immediate pressures and our long-
term purpose. NATO guidelines for strategic forces, to be meaningful,
should extend to all strategic forces of the Alliance and not only to a
small, somewhat artificial NATO force. A multilateral control system, if
it is to represent a change of the status quo will have to involve a U.S.
willingness to give up its veto. The controversy this would raise must be
weighed against any of the advantages of such a force. As for the French
nuclear program, it may well be that the best opportunity for constructive
policy at this stage is to seek to channel the French military effort into
less one-sided directions. However, assistance to France and Great Britain
in the nuclear and related fields should be made dependent on their ful-
filling their commitments to the shield forces.

(8) The ultimate problem in NATO is not military. It is all very well

(8) The ultimate problem in NATO is not military. It is all but well filled their commitments to the field forces.

in the nuclear and related fields should be made dependent on their full-
less one-aided directions. However, assistance to France and Great Britain
began at this stage it is to seek to channel the French military effort into
nuclear program, it will well be that the past experience with constructive
weighted against and of the advantages of such a force. As for the French
willingness to give up its veto. The controversy this would raise must be
it is to represent a change of the status quo will have to involve a U.S.
army, somewhat artificial NATO force. A multilateral control should, it
should extend to all strategic forces of the Alliance and not only to a
term horizon. NATO guidelines for strategic forces, so be meaningful,
separably between expedients to ward off immediate consequences and our long-

(7) With respect to strategic nuclear weapons NATO should distinguish
will have to be augmented.

The reserve of conventional and tactical nuclear forces in this country
on a strategy of nuclear retaliation everywhere else. Thus the mobile attrac-
tive rely on a local delivery of the most initial force while pointing dependent

IV-3

IV-4

to protest the indivisible interests of the North Atlantic Community of nations in the abstract. But on a whole series of disputes, from the Congo to Berlin, the United States and our European allies have seen the matter differently. NATO cannot be welded into a unit militarily until it becomes one politically.

Some of the structural changes recommended by Alastair Buchan may help. But the real problem gets deeper. Nothing less is required than a fundamental reassessment of attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic. When NATO was formed the United States was preponderant politically and strategically. The only security for our European allies was the American guarantee. They were therefore willing to accept most of our proposals without too many quibbles, whatever their real views, for their very act of submission increased our commitment. We have since then fallen into the habit of dealing with our European allies, except Great Britain, almost psycho-therapeutically; we have tended to confuse periodic expressions of reassurance with partnership and the muffling of the expression of concern with meeting the cause of concern.

2. Buchan, loc. cit.

IV-5

Our Continental allies in turn have shown their disquiet more frequently
in the hesitancy with which they carry out agreed measures than in frankly
asserting their disagreement.

In the decade ahead, we must face the fact that the mere enunciation of
a policy by us no longer guarantees acceptance. Henceforth, the Europeans
are bound to examine, not only the fact of our commitment, but also its
nature. At the same time, our allies must accept the responsibility that goes
with their new equality. They cannot adopt a posture of petulance barren of
constructive alternatives without depriving the alliance of dynamism.

In many many ways Europe's new self-assertion should be a source of
pride for the United States. It marks the success of the policies ushered
in by the Marshall plan. Also, some of the misunderstanding between Europe
and the United States reflects the fact that in the United States a new
generation has come into political power while in Europe the leaders of the
post-war period are coming to the end of their term. In short, many of the
difficulties described in this article are the result of vitality and strength.
Resolving them is a worthy task, for it will liberate energies that could trans-
form the nations of the North Atlantic into a true community.

INSERT C Galley 12

Indeed, the only separate multilateral nuclear force within NATO that makes sense would be a European Atomic Force merging the British and French nuclear forces. It would avoid our constitutional dilemma with respect to the veto. It would not involve the same doubt about the extent of our nuclear commitment as would a NATO force. Though a European Atomic Force could not deal with the whole gamut of nuclear threats, this fact would make, not for the dissolution of NATO as is often alleged, but for a true partnership in planning between Europe and the United States. The purpose of a European Atomic Force should be to deal with problems of special concern to Europeans. In particular, such a force could allay the fear that emphasis on local defense would enable the Soviet Union to devastate Europe while it spared the United States. Our support for a European Force would remove the impression that we are striving to keep Europe in a state of dependence with respect to nuclear matters. Such a force could be a powerful spur to European integration and will be in any case its likely result.

However, it is important to recognize that at this time neither the United States nor Great Britain nor France seems ready for

INSERT C Continued

such a course. In that case, theoretical discussions of multilat-
eralism must not become a device to avoid facing the issues which
rend the alliance.

Then continue with "Also, we must take care, etc....

INBERT C. Continued

In that case, theoretical discussions of multifaceted issues come to an end.

The problem must not become a device to avoid facing the issues which

end the alliance.

Then continue with "Also, we must take care, etc...."