DECLASSIFIED

2012958

Authority

NARA Date 9/10

By

Ron Ziegler (cont'd)

2

K: I did not -- But they couldn't have put out a written statement.

Z: Yeah. Following the news conference in Damascus by the Syrian Foreign Minister saying that diplomatic relations will be restored. The Department said in a written statement we have seen --

K: Inexcusable! Absolutely inexcusable! I told them in answer to questions that they could say that in principle there has been agreement on it but there has been no decision whatsoever.

Z: Um-humm. Well, it makes Jerry look like a fool and it makes the White House look like . . because what we have said is we have nothing to add to the comments that the Secretary of State made as he left Syria. And when you left Syria, you said, yes, there is progress in our relationship that could mature into -- you know . .

K: I didn't know they put out a written statement. I'm going to raise hell!

Z: Well, I don't call you for that. I'm calling you really for Jerry because he was just --

K: Well, you tell Jerry it's unbelievable!

Z: Yeah.

K: And I apologize to him.

Z: No, that's not necessary either but I just wanted to raise it with you. So if you could make reference to it there that, you know, they should not put Jerry in that type of position in the future.

K: They shouldn't put out written statements without my concurrence and they shouldn't say things different from the White House.

J: Okay, Henry.

K: Okay.

[End of conversation.]

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

By ARL

NARA Date 9/14

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler / Secy Kissinger

3:40 p.m., June 4, 1974

Z: Hi, Henry. How did you do today?

K: I think I did okay. Don't pay attention to that Star story. I didn't say Syria would get $100 million for economic aid. I said that figure is available for Syria among others in case certain ~~conditions~~ conditions were met we would consider requests against that figure.

Z: Yeah. That's the same point you made in the Leadership Meeting.

K: Exactly.

Z: You said there was available money which if relations developed that would be available for discussion. Right?

K: Exactly.

Z: Okay. Are you going to have your press conference Thursday?

K: Yeah.

Z: Okay. Well, you can clean that up then I guess.

K: Right. I was asked today as I came out of the hearings about the President's trip.

Z: No, I seen it -- it plays well.

K: Good.

Z: The reason I'm calling and I'm sorry to bother you on a minor point like this but poor Jerry Warren is almost in tears. We followed the guidance that ~~we~~ got from NSC and the State Department on restoration of relations with Syria today, which was basically a no comment and we have nothing to add to what Dr. Kissinger said in that regard as he left Syria.

K: Yes.

Z: Well, 45 minutes later the State Department issued a written statement saying that we were going to renew relations with Syria. Now it's a little minor thing that I can straighten out and this is really a pro forma call. . . It makes the White House look like a fool.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012958
By
HL NARA Date 9/7/79

TELECON
Bob Toth/Secretary Kissinger

June 4, 1974

5:38 pm

T: You must be exhausted.

K: Yes.

T: I'm in the process of doing a piece, trying to put a little bit of a human flesh on this mission. I've read both Bernie Gwertzman and Marilyn Berger's pieces about the three times where you were ready to pack up and leave. But I was just wondering how it affected you personally. I'm kind of intrigued by, we got a cable from our guy on the xerox spot who mentioned the ____ calling you Nixon's Jewboy and things like that. Do you really have a kind of personal involvement in this because of this ____ alleges.

K: I'd rather not talk about that. I think you can figure most of it out yourself.

T: Yes. I gather, you know, there were real ups and downs on it but from what I understand of the cables you sent back that it was relatively matter of fact....

K: My cables just described the negotiating situation each day.

T: Without getting into being down or up or anything like that.

K: Exactlv. You know, they occasionally gave an assessment of the prospect.

T: I understand that the worse you ever complained was that there was shortsidedness on the part of both sides after the initial breakthrough when you started the quiveling process. I guess that was about the worse of it. Well, that's about all. I was hoping to be able to, I know you're very busy, to come by and talk to you about your personal impressions of the whole thing, but...

K: Well, you know I'm unbelievably busy with the President's trip.

T: Yes. Can you sum it up for me. I mean, it must have been the hardest negotiations you were every involved in, physically, as well as.....

K: Well, it was the most difficult, it was the most emotional and, you know, it was from every point of view -- this is not for quotation.

T: OK.

K: The most complex and the most difficult negotiation.

Toth - page 2

T: The other thing is, that the after the Mid East trip I hope to be able to get a chance to talk to you. I'm going to the Soviet Union for a couple of years.

K: Well, probably the best time to talk to me is after the Soviet trip, because there won't be all that much intervals between the Soviet trip and the Mideast trip.

T: So, sometime in July, I guess.

K: Yes.

T: I'm going August 1.

K: I'll definitely see you before you go because I have always appreciated your work.

T: Thank you.

K: I'm serious about that. So I'll definitely -- in fact, let's have lunch in July.

T: OK. You want me to call Eagleburger?

K: Yes, or Bremer.

T: Or..."

K: Jerry Bremer.

T: Jerry Bremer.

K: Yes.

T: Alright. Good luck on the Moscow thing.

K: Thank you.

T: It's going to be kind of rough.

K: Well, this is not an easy period in anything, but it's not going to be all that rough, either.

T: Tell Brezhnev not to say anything about Sonnenfeldt's health, will you. I mean, he keeps me out on the tennis courts just to keep up with Brezhnev's word about how young he looks.

K: OK, Bob.

T: OK, bye. END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
ECI/2958

By ML NARA Date 5-7-64

TELECON

Mr. McNamara/Secretary Kissinger

June 5, 1974

9:25 AM

M: Henry, I'll just take a second. I talked to (inaudible) a half hour on the telephone. He was certainly less than enthusiastic and he had several different points, one of them he was concerned about the Donaldson example. I said -- he wanted to talk to Donaldson -- I said, hell I can't stop him from talking to Donaldson but I can tell you more about Donaldson then Donaldson himself can. (A he is a person with considerable potential, (B), he came down here without absolutely no experience in Government, no knowledge of how to deal with governmental problems and people (inaudible) departments. (C) he had no experience in or understanding of international economics and yet by a force of circumstances through nobody's fault, he was thrown immediately into a problem that requires some knowledge of international economics and particularly a knowledge of handle himself within a government and among government.

K: Exactly. His (inaudible) complaint was not that I didn't (delegate) him but (inaudible) responsibility that he couldn't see me (inaudible).

M: In any case that problem I think I perhaps was able to able to clear out of his mind -- he'll still come down to talk to Donaldson, but I think I drew a clear difference Donaldson, on one hand and Cooper on the other. I said, you've got exactly the strength that in Donaldson were his weaknesses, so put that out of your mind. Secondly, he said, well, he didn't think he would operate from a subcabinet level with cabinet offers. I said, you mean to say you don't think you have the competence that exceeds that of Simon, Flanigan, two or three others (inaudible) that are involved in this thing and that you couldn't hold you own in an intellectual debate with them. Well, he said, they would have the power and I wouldn't have any. I said, in the first place, you're speaking with experience and a record that everybody in the government understands (inaudible). Secondly, you're speaking with Henry Kissinger's backing (inaudible) he's the most powerful person in the government. So it's perfectly absurd to say that you wouldn't have any influence. It was this thing running through the whole discussion that obviously was his basic concern, Henry. He feels he'll come down here and accomplish nothing. Either because you won't listen or his position will be weak or that he won't be able ...

K: His position will be very strong, in fact, if I back him he can't lose.

M: This is exactly my point, Henry and he said well, he said the coarse relation now between national and international economic affairs that you can't put them in compartments. I said I understand that and I'm certain that when domestic policy that has implications implications are discussed you would be a participant in those discussions. He was quite right on that point.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 5/7/74

McNamara - page 2

K: You know you must not press it as a theoretical point.

M: I understand that Henry.

K: This is no longer a very formal structure. So anything I want to get into no one is going to keep me out of.

M: This is exactly the point I made to him Henry. Get down here, use your knowledge, your experience, your creative thoughts and get to work and by the force of your argument do exactly in the field and particular Henry's backing and do exactly what he's done in the international political field. As I say we talked on and on and I go on the say I converted him. He sure was cold.

K: Yes. We'll go to see him tonight.

M: Well, I knew you were, that's why I called.

K: Many thank.

M: Right. Bye.

END

By MR NARA Date 9/7/68

DECLASSIFIED
MFD E0 12958
Authority

By ____ NARA Date 6/1/04

Dobrynin - page 2

K: Well, they will -- he will modify his amendments.

D: He mentioned to you ____.

K: Well, he will modify his amendments so that MFM is possible and credits will not be restricted. You know with a review maybe every year.

D: I understand. When we meet next time you are going to show me this letter.

K: I will not send the letter without discussing it with you.

D: OK. In one way or the other it's better to get rid of all these issues.

K: One other thing that I thought about on the SALT discussion we had yesterday. We have no interest in making you sign something that's embarrassing for you. I'm trying to figure out some way of expressing this in a way that the differential in numbers. If we expressed it for example in terms of each side will stop deployment as of a certain date or deploy up to "X" percent of its total force. You see what I mean? Whichever number is higher.

D: To total existence.

K: Supposing we said, each side will stop deployment of MIRV missiles as of and till let's say March 1, 1975, let me just think out loud. That would stop our program at 1100. Or deploy up to "X" percent of its total force in MIRV missiles, which every number is higher.

D: "X" percent on what date?

K: Well, through 1979. You see if we said whatever number you and we agree on, supposing it's 750, we could express that as a percentage of your total force.

D: Of total force, you mean on missiles?

K: Yes. You see in that way there wouldn't be any -- the agreement wouldn't look as if any differential were put in. If each side has the right to do the same thing.

D: I understand. ____.

K: No, you won't have any....

D: Mention to you about what we have now.

K: No, but you have the choice either to stop on March 1975 or to build up to 30 or 40 percent as to whatever the number is we agree on, of your total force.

Dobrynin - page 3

Which one of the following ever number is higher. We would stop in March 1975. Or whenever we have 1100. You would go up to the percentage because in March '75 you won't have anything yet.

D: This is exactly the point.

K: I want to find a formula which sounds equivalent.

D: OK. I think you would like to have this in this case your careful consideration.

K: No, but what you can tell him is this today is this, they will not have to sign an agreement which expresses a differential in number. We can state it in such a way that even if a differential results it will not be expressed in an embarrassing manner.

D: Henry, you understand ______ for me ______ as for my government. You understand what I mean?

K: No, but I'm trying to explain it to you.

D: I understand.

K: But what you tell your government is your problem.

D: My problem is ______ if you just explain what you are proposing. ______ not a change in this substance.

K: OK, I will give you a formulation. I'll get Sonnenfeldt to send it over this afternoon.

D: OK.

K: Yesterday you gave me only one page -- there was no second.

K: There is no number two.

D: So I guess you ______.

K: No, the reserve position -- there is no reserve position.

D: Alright. Sonnenfeldt will send it to us.

K: Yes.

D: On Friday, we will discuss.

K: YES. END

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E0 12958
By -- NARA Date 6/1/04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012958
By A.J. NARA Date 6/7/87

Dobrynin - page 2

D: He mentioned to you ______.

D: To total existence.

D: "X" percent on what date?

D: I understand. ______.

K: No, you won't have any....

K: No, but you have the choice either to stop on March 1975 or to build up to 30 or 40 percent if you or whatever the number is we agree on, of your total force.

Dobrynin - page 3

Which number ever number is higher. We would stop in March 1975. Or
whenever we have 1100. You would go up to the percentage because in March '75
you won't have anything yet.

D: This is exactly the point.

D: OK. I think you would like to have it in this case your careful
consideration.

K: No, but what you can tell him if they insist today is this, they will not
have to sign an agreement which expresses a differential in number. We can
state it in such a way that even if a differential x results it will not be expressed
in an embarrassing manner.

D: Henry, you understand ____ for me ____ as for my government. You
understand what I mean?

D: I understand.

D: My problem is ____ if you just explain what you are proposing. ____ not
a change in my job substance.

D: OK.

K: There is no number two.

D: So I guess you ____.

K: Yes.

K: YES. END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 9/7/74

TELECON
Hal Saunders/Secretary Kissinger

June 5, 1974

11:10 AM

K: A, out that nuclear agreement with Egypt, I've got Ghorbal here.

S: Yes.

K: He says it awaits my approval. That can't be possible.

S: I'm not sure exactly where that is. I'll....

AT

K: Any rate can you process it before he goes back?

S: Yes, I'll get it up to you.

know

K: OK. It's at the AEC I'm told. I agree I agreed to it in principle a few days ago.

S: I just haven't seen the exact status of it. I'll find out....

K: I know I agreed to it in principle a few days ago, but I don't know whether I agreed to all this paper work.

S: OK, let me find out where it is.

K: Will you let me know?

S: Yes.

Saunders - 11:20

K: I talked to Ghorbal about what could come out of that visit and he thinks maybe a statement of principals of our relations between Egypt and the U.S. which we've done with other countries and that isn't a bad idea.

S: That sounds interesting.

K: I told him to get together with you.

S: OK.

K: Will you also work out that negotiating scenario?

S: Which is that?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Date 6-7-74

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By AL NARA Date 9/7/78

E012958

Saunders - page 2

K: Between Egypt and Israel which I asked you about.

S: Oh, yes. I have that in draft.

K: But that I don't need until we get on the trip actually.

S: Well, I have a draft and I'll get it for you in the next 24 hours.

K: OK. Good. Thank you. You'll work with Ghorbal.

S: I will. That's an interesting idea.

K: Will you also think up for me what we can do in other countries.

S: Yes. OK.

K: I mean with Syria we don't need a statement of principles but we could agree on diplomatic relations and so forth.

S: No, I'll take care of that. This will be something for you then. We don't have to get it in the briefing books.

K: No.

S: OK.

K: And send words to Eilts that I'm exploring that here. And he should explore it with Fahmy.

S: OK.

K: And did we send word to Scotes yesterday to explore with [__about the__] restoration?

S: I think Joe sent a telegram.

K: OK, now send one to Scotes saying we're thinking perhaps about announcing it when the President's there. We think that would be a very suitable occasion.

S: OK.

K: And he should discuss it with [__Asadi__].

S: Right.

K: Good, thank you. END

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

Wednesday, June 5, 1974

11:45 a.m.

K: I was talking to McCloskey and Anderson here and they say they never issued a statement about Syrian establishment of diplomatic relations yesterday.

S: Well, where did it come from?

K: Well, they said nothing like this was done from the State Department Press office. Now we're checking around whether one of the bureaus may have, NEA may have done it on its own.

S: Well, I'll be darn. Well, let me find out what...

K: And I didn't see it in any newspaper.

S: Let me find out what happened. It was my recollection that ..

K: Look, the only guidance I gave was the one Ziegler heard

S: Oh, no, no question about it..

K: XXto McCloskey in the morning, and then it turned out there was no briefing yesterday, and they didn't issue anything.

S: Well, the work I got was that there was no briefing yesterday, so they handed out this statement, but let me find out.

K: ...since there was no briefing, you handed out a statement.
Nonsense.

S: Let me find out exactly what..

K: ok.

S: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
By NARA Date 6/5/74

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By A. NARA Date 5/10

TELECON

Foreign Minister Rabasa/Secretary Kissinger

Wednesday, June 5, 1974

1:09 PM

R: Hello Henry, Good Morning.

K: Emilo, I am sorry I am sorry I couldn't call you back.

R: I know you are all tied up.
Henry, I can visit you Saturday?

K: I still haven't had a chance to clear my calendar. Let me call you
before the end of the day. How much time would we need?

R: Half an hour. My idea is this Henry, I would take two people from
Mexico who would speak with the people you are sending here. A man
I think is called Maw that is Legal Advisor and then Trevos(?sp phonetic)

K: I will find half an hour you can count on Saturday. I will let you know
what time.

R: When I can go?

K: Yea. But it probably be more than half an hour.

R: I hope so

K: I am really unbelievably busy right now.

R: I understand Henry. Then I think these two people will make contact
with your people Friday.

K: Good.

R: After they have spoken then you can let me know what hour on Saturday
we can meet.

K: Right.

R: I am leaving tomorrow.

K: Good.

R: Thanks a million. I am very sorry to be insistent at this point.
Monday the whole thing starts and I have to clear things with you
completely.

TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

June 5, 1974

2:12 PM

S: There's another message in from Stoessel that the Soviet's are pressing for a recess.

K: OK.

S: You want to let him do it.

K: Well, if the Soviet's are pressing for it, what can we do?
if

S: Only if you want to call Dobrynin and see if that's really what they want.

K: Hold it until later, I've got to go to a luncheon.

S: OK.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

By A.R.

NARA Date 6/16

TELECON

Hal Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

Wednesday, June 5, 1974

6:18 PM

S..ABM matter and discovered that two days ago the JCS had sent
a memo to Schlesinger opposing the whole thing after that. Moorer
had agreed to it.

K: On what grounds?

S: On grounds that we are ahead and shouldn't give up when we are
ahead, if the Soviets are protecting the ABMs as well as their national ..

K: But, what are we giving up?

S: We're giving up nothing; the whole thing is just crazy. And that
we must not give up our ARVND and that it contradicts our
unilateral ..

K: But who's giving up ARVND?

S: Nobody, but that it contradicts our unilateral statement that we
would get out of the ABM treaty if the Soviets, you know, don't live up--
behave on the offensive side, it doesn't do that either. Anyway, this
is, Schlesinger has that. I don't know whether he will cognizance it,
but it's just another of these gd.

K: Well, look, it I want that thing approved this week.

S: Yeah. Well, it's in the machine now.

K: Good. Ok, Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

By ARL NARA Date 9/10

By

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012958
By NARA Date 9/7/78

TELCONE

Wednesday, June 5, 1974

8:53 PM

S: Yes, Sir.

K: Your basic memo is--these talking points are an outrage and you'd better get these people in and if they have to work through all night, they're going to work all night.

S: Which talking points are these?

K: By country.

S: The country ones?

K: He needs a better explanation of what the issues are. Now, I know you can do it because you've done it in your basic memo. Joint Cooperation Commission--four lines--he doesn't even know what it is. Nuclear Power Plant--three lines--he doesn't even know what it is.
... of Economic Aid--that's bs, with all due respect.

S: OK.

K: It's got to be much more constructive; it's got to give him a list of what has already been done; of what issues are likely to arise; and give him a page on each issue. And the same in Syria. How the hell can he go through four hours of meetings with these guys and not know a good thing about it? And he's going to Florida tomorrow night to study these things.

S: Is the basic memo...

K: Look, the basic memo is fine.

S: OK.

K: These memos are an outrage, and they are not going to be written like this while I'm Secretary of State.

S: OK. It's the talking point memos that need to be beefed up. Right? made

K: They need to be beefed up; they ought to be/more thoughtful. Who did them--some FSO 8?

By A.R. NARA Date 9-7-89

S: The Country desk; I spend my time on the cover memos ..

K: Which cover memos?

S: In each country book -- the issue talking papers, which are appended, I assume that's what you're talking about.

K: They are an outrage.

S: OK. Let me get at them, then.

K: I have no problem but where it says points to make and points to avoid-- it just isn't worthy of him. You know, when I went to China with him with a lousy gd NSC staff, we gave him four whole books. Here I've been negotiating with a gd Middle East leaders for weeks, and we give him what, 40 pages?

S: It's tried to stress the points to avoid in that memo to the President that need to be strengthened.

K: That's right.

S: Plus the attachments, or is it in the memo to the President that you're concerned about? Not the backup.

K: I'm..basically, the whole thing is no good. But, the original memos are bearable. But the talking points are impossible.

S: You mean the attached papers.

K: Well, I don't know what you mean, the attached papers. And look, you have now been in the NSC for ages. You know what papers the President reads, and what he doesn't read.

S: Right.

K: What he gd well doesn't read is something that says memorandum for the President, your talk in Saudi Arabia and then my signature 20 pages later. Because unless he sees my signature on top, he won't know who the hell wrote it. I mean since the days of Adam it's been done this way in the Department.

S: Ok. That's State Department format.

K: I don't give a damn. It is no longer State Department format; it has now been changed. They can go back to it after I leave.

TELECON

Wednesday, June 5, 1974

our leader is getting an even

K: We just found out that /.. higher decoration.

S: Oh really.

K: The highest Egyptian one. Sadat is a statesman isn't he.

say

K: And I don't see how we can/I can't accept it.

S: I think you should. Under those circumstances I think that is fine.

K: I tell you the Russians are going to go out of their cotton picking minds. Can you imagine this.

S: It is sorta mind boggling.

K: Okay.

S: That's great. I'm pleased. I'm pleased for you.

K: I don't care about the decoration.

S: I do. You know.

K: My life's ambition is not Egyptian decoration.

S: No, but it is still nice.

It really is.

K: Okay.

S: Good, thanks.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
NARA Date 6/7/74

By AL

June 6, 1974

11:18 AM

S: Hi, this is Brent, Henry. I just talked to Schlesinger. Was as sweet as sugar. He said he called because Mahon had called him upset because Goldwater had spoken out against any aid to Syria and he said that Mahon said that he if we couldn't get the President's supporters in line how in the hell could he expect Mahon to do something. So I said I'd take care of that.

K: Will you call Goldwater and make clear to him we are not asking for a hundred million we said it comes out of that fund.

S: Sure. I hadn't seen what Goldwater had even said. I told him I'd take care of that and then he said what's the President want. I said the President is concerned about SALT coming up on the summit and we're not getting anywhere and I said that's what he wants to talk to you about. He said who's going in (inaudible) I said I don't know. And he said what was your mood and I said that you were very upset and he said, well, I never look back, he said, I'm ready to talk with him. He said, I'm just tired of all these (inaudible) about the Department, we're doing our best. I think you two need to talk and he said, well, I had breakfast by myself this morning. I said, well, Al Haig told me that you were going to call Henry last night. He said, oh, no, when I hung up, Al said, well, Henry's on the phone, or Henry's calling and he said, well, tell him breakfast is still on. Anyway, he couldn't have been more conciliatory.

K: Yes, but that doesn't change the basic situation.

S: No, but all it indicates maybe if you really run at him hard he really backs down.

K: Yes.

S: So that was the conversation.

K: OK.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012958
By NARA Date 9/7/8

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

11:20 AM

K: __you draft a very conciliatory reply?

S: Yes, I've asked NEA to do that because....

K: Not NEA, NEA means that it's going to leak.

S: Well...

K: jx At most, Atherton.

S: Well, that's what I'm talking about. Because it think it's a hell of a good move and we ought to build down it.

K: That's right. What I would like to do is to say we'd be prepared say to invite him to come to that Security Council fellow to come to Washington after my trip.

S: That's it. I think that's a very good move and you could have a chat with him and then.....

K: Say we hope he comes to Washington, when in June.

S: Yes, well, I'll work something out for your....

K: And secondly, if they have any ~~black~~ ideas of initiative we might take, we'd be glad to consider them.

S: Sure.

K: We're going to drive those out of the Russian orbit too soon before I'm through.

S: There are a few phrases in the that telegram where he began to reiterate that they were nobody's stooges.

K: Exactly.

S: Which sounded a little familiar to you, I'm sure, and ~~mix~~ me.

K: Yes. OK.

S: I think it's very good.

K: OK. Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012958
By A.R. NARA Date 6/7/8

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

11:25 AM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol I have to run to a meeting but I have a cable here saying that your delegation has asked for a week's recess in the text ban talks.

D: I could be, I haven't yet...

K: I don't think it's such a good idea.

D: No? Why?

K: Well, because I think we ought to keep our people working.

D: There.

K: Yes.

D: Well, I think we could do it if you feel it's really a good idea, I'm sure I could do it with....

K: Well, I just think if they come back and then all our people start working on them here.

D: I see.

K: I don't object to it. I just wanted to make sure we didn't encourage it.

D: No, I understand your point, OK.

K: If you really want to have a break, but....

D: But I understand what you said (inaudible)

K: Exactly.

D: I think it's a good point.

K: OK.

D: Yesterday was a very good speech by President. It was very good, I think.

K: Good.

D: Tomorrow you will let me know, definitely?

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June 6, 1974

11:25 AM

D: Hello?

D: No? Why?

D: There.

K: Yes.

D: I see.

K: Exactly.

D: I think it's a good point.

K: OK.

K: Good.

K: Yes. END

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TELECON
Mr. Sonnelfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

12:45 PM

S: Yes, sir.

K: You didn't understand what I wanted. What I wanted to say is, each side will MERV the number of missiles that it has on dated "X", whatever that is when we have completed our program. Or 33 or 35 percent of it's force, whichever number is higher. You see what I mean?

S: I know what you mean. We tried it and...

K: Well, look, we can stop on a certain date having 1100.

S: That would have to be June.

K: Alright, then say June. They can go up to 35 percent, because they won't have 35 percent in June, but it doesn't look like it was if they had settled for an inferiority.

S: That I understand, the -- well, whichever is higher, that 7 percent is to protect the trident business.

K: What 7 percent?

S: The permission to add on 7 percent.

K: Well? Then you better make it 10 percent, but what I want is something that expresses that SALT in a way they don't have to explain to their party members why they've accepted an inferior position. When we said we are accepting a freeze as of a certain date, we accepted lower numbers, but we didn't put it in those terms.

S: Let me try it again, Henry. I tried to express it in a way that would leave out the numbers. Obviously they're going to make their calculations and find out what the numbers are.

K: Of course they know what the numbers are.

S: Let me try another version.

K: OK, good.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/7/74

TELECON

Zon Ziegler/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

12:48 PM

Z: ______ and so forth, but I didn't want to talk to (Vorontsov) without talking to you.

K: OK.

Z: You see no problem with talk that.

K: As long as you say no.

Z: No, I understand that, but I didn't know if that had significance to it. I just wanted to get guidance from you. I'll just proceed as we talked about.

K: Look, they want a (inaudible) man along for political purposes.

Z: No, I understand that.

K: And just turn it down. They'll blame me for it, they won't blame you for it.

Z: That's not the point, I just wanted to make sure I didn't screw you up.

K: You just tell Vorontsov no.

Z: Alright.

K: Thank you.

Z: Bye.

END

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TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

4:40 PM

N: I just thought you'd be pleased to know I got Ron and the boys working on the schedule. Ron told me he thought your news conference played very well. He said the only thing he was mad about was the way they asked you all these questions about wire tapping. Let me say, don't ever be worried about that and frankly if they ever hit me with wire x tapping I'm going to say you're God-damned and some of you are going to be wire taped, you ought to be. You know? It's disgusting.

K: The disgusting thing is I didn't want to both you with it before. The whole world applauds what is being done. These SOB's turn it in as if I'd been engaged in a criminal activity.

N: But wire taping, Henry, all the wire taping we did was totally legal, you would understand that. Every damn one was approved either by Mitchell or Hoover. Everyone. Some of them turned up some very important evidence, as you well know.

K: That is right.

N: And also there was three times as much under Bobby Kennedy as there was from us.

K: Well, I didn't want to go into that.

N: I understand, but nevertheless, we don't need to be apologetic about it. answer

K: Well, I just refused to answer any questions.

N: Right. That's good. Anyway, you did fine, don't worry. OK.

K: Right.

END

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TELECON
Cyrus Vance/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

5:08 PM

EXX

V: Hi, Henry.

K: Cy, how are you?

V: I'm fine. Again, congratulations to you.

K: Aren't you nice.

V: Superb job.

K: Well, you're very nice. Cy I had a number of things, I think should say three things: One, I wanted to get that group together for a rather long session on the Middle East sometime, because we've got to do that on a bipartisan basis.

V: I couldn't agree more.

K: When we get into the sticky part. Second is, I never got any concrete reactions to the various SALTs presentations we made to you.

V: I said, I couldn't carry in my mind all the stuff in that file, Henry, and the general thrust of what was being said, I told, I've forgotten who I talked to, I guess I talked to....

K: Sonnenfeldt?

V: Yes, Hal and I told him the general thrust I thought made sense but some of the options there were probably not for real, but we ought to show what all the alternatives might be. If you want, I can take a more specific look at some of that stuff.

K: I'll tell you what worries me, Cy, as a friend, in the last two years of an administration, even forgetting Watergate, one really has to think about handing over to ones successors, whoever they may be, and I'm afraid I'm afraid some of the trends among the Democrats is going to build the Democratic party into the same whole they were in at the beginning of the Kennedy administration.

V: I share that view. I think that's right alright.

K: I think it would be an absolute disaster, it cannot be in the interest of a possible successor to want to inherit and confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Vance - page 2

V: I agree.

K: And, you know, what's happening now, is that the chiefs and the
conservatives in the Congress are systematically closing off all options.

V: Yes.

K: And I'm really deeply concerned about this. Not for this administration
because we can get through the next two years just on __.

V: If I can help in any way on this I will because I said the other day when
we last met, I think your emphasis on MERV is the thing to get at is
absolutely correct.

K: All this baloney about reduction, you reduce 200 missiles over ten years
while your warheads grow by 8,000, what the hell have you achieved.

V: I'm in agreement. I've got no disagreement with that, but if I can help
with any of these guys, you just let me know who you want me to talk to.

K: Good. Cy, but the last problem, is the following. I don't know whether
Dick Cooper has yet talked to you.

V: No, he has not.

K: I've offered him the position of Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs.

V: Right.

him

K: And he's a little bit worried that it might hurt with the Democrats if they
come in and asked me whether he could talk to you.

V: You can tell him the answer is no, it definitely will not.

K: I really think we have to use this department now to provide a focus for
things which people can believe on a bipartisan basis.

V: I agree and anything I can do to help on that I will and you can count on
me to do that.

K: I know I can and would you talk to Dick.

V: Yes, I'll call Dick. Is he in New Haven?

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Vance - page 3

K: He was in Washington this morning and he told me he was going to call you today or tomorrow.

V: Alright, if I don't hear from him tomorrow, I will call him Henry.

K: I think it would be very nice..

V: Alright, I'd be delighted. Now do you want something more out of me on that SALT thing.

K: No as long as I know the general direction, is alright. When we come down on something specific. I'll check it with you again.

V: That would be great.

K: Good, Cy.

V: Wonderful to talk to you.

K: Nice to talk to you.

V: Right.

K: Bye.

END

By J.R. NARA Date 9/7/68

-2

going to look like a Watergate thing. Or am I wrong there.

J: I think the basis, I just suggested would be a way to limit
the thing only to what is ax legitimately either new or different.
Let me talk to you about that a little later too.

K: Okay.

J: You'll be there tonight.

K: I'll be there, but I have to go out for a dinner for Fahd.

J: What time will ax you have to leave?

K: About a quarter to eight.

J: Well I'll be there x early.

K: Good.

J: Listen Henry, Marion and I thought you and Nancy would like
to come to dinner at Pearl's on Sunday night. Are you going to
be there--New York.

K: Unfortunately, we are not going to be in New York.

J: You're not going to stay that long.

K: No. We are not going to go up at all.

J: Oh, you're not.

K: But we would love to do it on one of our early weekends.

J: One of your trips. I'll talk to you later

K: Thank you, Jack.

K: Goodbye

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TELECON

Senator Javits/Secretary Kissinger

Thursday, June 6, 1974

5:33 PM

J: Hello

K: Jack how are you.

J: OK

K: Two questions: One official and one personal. On the official one first, some people are recommending Graham Martin as deputy here. What do you think that would do in the Committee if we did that.

J: Let me talk to you about it tonight when I see you.

K: OK.

J: Give me a minute tonight and I'll tell you. I'll also think it over a minute which I wanted to do.

K: Good. The second thing, all this wiretap stuff we went through last year is coming again now before the Judiciary Committee and I took quite a beating before a press conference today. I wondered what your advise would be as to your stand.

J: I think that you ought to ask the Chairman to first include in the records, the whole record, which has already been made before Foreign Relations on that matter. And including the sanitizex sanitized record. And then after members have had opportunity to consider that whole body of records, you will be very pleased to answer k any residual questions, but in fairness to youwhat has already occurred w should be the basis so that you don't go over the same ground all over again.

K: You mean with the Judiciary Com.

J: Right

K: I think they got it already.

J: I mean it is one thing to have it, it is another thing to postulate the thixx proposition, but in fairnes to you they oughtto

K: You see the whole thing is starting all over again. Did I recommend it. Did I read these reports. Now they are leaking out that I read all the reports. And it took me 8 hours before your Committee to explain it. And if I get into a press debate about it. I am just

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TELECON

Senator Scott/Secretary Kissinger

Thursday, June 6, 1974

5:48 PM

K: Hello,

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Hugh, how are you.

S: Fine. I won't keep you, I just just inquire whether you feel you
are making any progress with Jackson.

K: Yes, I think I did make a little progress yesterday and we are
going to see what we can do early next week.

S: On some possible language, is that the way you are moving.

K: That's right.

S: Well, I sure hope you can.

K: I am even more worried about the Stevenson thing.

S: Which is, which Stevenson?

K: Well, the restrictions on credit.

S: Oh, on credits, of course, well we will do our best for that.
My junior colleague is against us on that too.

K: Oh, really.

S: Yea. Can't do anything with him because he has been going around
making speeches about it. [crossed out] Putting it in his news stories.
We'll see what we can do, we will watch him.

K: Right, I would appreciate it very much.

S: We'll see what we can do.

K: And I will keep you closely informed.

S: Yes, I think if you can find language for Scoop,
That would help us in the other one too. Let me know Henry.

TELECON
Len Garment/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

6:13 PM

(Missed first part)

K: involving you in this, but they are having a fair for Mrs. Nixon on Sunday, and Rudy called and said would I get after the Israeli Embassy and so forth and have people from the Embassy in New York and my advice to Rudy was not to press the Egyptians or the Israelis on this.

K: Absolutely not, are they crazy.

G: OK, I told them, I said, don't do it. It's too complicated and it's political and there are other nations like Lebanon and Syrian....

K: It's impossible.

G: I just wanted to check it with you and that's all I wanted to talk to you about.

K: Is it true that you're moving out of your house so that ____ will give me one?

G: You don't want my -- that house that we're leaving is not one that's fit for -- Nancy couldn't walk through the doorways. They were build for tiny people of pre-revolutionary era.

K: Well, I don't want that house, I want the one in town here.

G: The one in town. I'll go to work on him but only if you can get me a confession in Syria.

K: Of course.

G: Did you see Rabbi Millers press conference was really quite brilliant.

K: Yes, he was good.

G: Did you get a copy of that?

K: No.

G: On the question of the Jackson amendment, and so on. He found no disparity between your position and Sen. Jackson's position and their position.

Alright, that's all.

K: Good, thank you.

END

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TELECON

June 6, 1974

6:18 PM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry. I just wanted -- it's not very urgent, but maybe you will get an answer tomorrow. This is about the schedule for the President's trip to Moscow. You remember we discussed?

K: Yes.

This is the schedule that that ______ after negotiations in Moscow on the 27th and 28th. It will be Thursday and Friday. The President will spend Saturday and Sunday, it will be 29th and 30th in the Crimea. After that on July 1, it will be Monday, on his way back from Crimea to Moscow, he could stay for a few hours in Volgograd. There is only one small problem, in this case the President's plane, which would accompany him as usual would fly directly from Crimea to Moscow. The airport in Volgograd is not fit for the planes of Boeing 707 type. If for the above mentioned reason, this suggestion would prove for the President's ______ unacceptable because of this Boeing 707, then it would be possible on the way back ______ from Crimea to Moscow to stop for a few hours in Minsk, it is a very good and interesting city. He wasn't there.

K: Yes, that's an interesting idea.

D: Well, so, we propose this way, or we could do it this way: he will fly to Minsk not from Crimea to Moscow but at the end of the day of July 2, after the completion of negotiations in Moscow and with the final departure from Minsk on July 3, there are two possibilities. If he chooses Minsk, then we could do it, either he will go when he will go on July 1 from.....

K: I think he will probably prefer to conclude the trip in Moscow.

D: And to go directly from Moscow to home, yes?

K: Right.

D: In this case it will be these two choices, either he will go to Volgograd but in this case Boeing 707 will stop because he will use our smaller planes there.

K: Alright.

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Dobrynin - page 2

D: Or he might decide if he prefers to go to Minsk than its alright with us with Boeing he could go from Crimea to Minsk then from Minsk to Moscow and then he will depart from Moscow.

K: Let me discuss it with him and I'll let you know tomorrow.

D: This way I'm just giving you the forecast and you can tell me tomorrow what he prefers.

K: Good.

D: I read in a ticker he might fly to ____ or just speculation?

K: Nonsense. Totally out of the question.

D: In this case, we have to look about the flight over the territory there.
OK. ____ Star City, there is no problem for us, one of his days in Moscow
definitely, k if he wishes so, we will organize this one.

K: Right.

D: No problem.

K: jx Good, wonderful.

D: OK.

K: Thank you Anatol.

D: That's all.

K: Bye.

END

TELECON

June 6, 1974

6:18 PM

D: Hello?

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry. I just wanted -- itsk not very urgent, but maybe you will get an answer tomorrow. This is about the schedule for the President's trip to Moscow. You remember we discussed?

K: Yes.

This is the schedule that that ____ after negotiations in Moscow on the 27th and 28th. It will be Thursday and Friday. The President will spend Saturday and Sunday, it will be 29th and 30th in the Crimea. After that on July 1, it will be Monday, on his wax way back from Crimea to Moscow, he could stay for a few hours in Volgograd. There is only one small problem, in this case the President's plane, which would accompany him as usual would fly directly from Crimea to Moscow. The airport in Volgograd is not fit for the planes of Boeing 707 type. If for the above mentioned reason, this suggestion would prove for the President's ____ unacceptable because of this Boeing 707, then it would be possible on the way back ____ from Crimea to Moscow to stop for a few hours in Minsk, it is a very good and interesting city. He wasn't there.

D: WxxSo, we propose this way, or we could do it this way: he will fly to Minsk not from Crimea to Moscow but at the end of the day of July 2, after the completion of negotiations in Moscow and with the final departure from Minsk on July 3, there are two possibilities. If he chooses Minsk, then we could do it, either he will go when he will go on July 1 from......

K: Right.

K: Alright.

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Dobrynin - page 2

D: Or he might if he prefers to go to Minsk than its alright with us with Boeing he could go from Crimea to Minsk then from Minsk to Moscow and then he will depart from Moscow.

K: Good.

OK. ____ Star City, there is no problem for us, one of his days in Moscow definitely, ____ if he wishes so, we will organize this one.

K: Right.

D: No problem.

K: That's Good, wonderful.

D: OK.

K: Thank you Anatol.

D: That's all.

K: Bye.

END

TELECON

Robert McCloskey/Secretary Kissinger

June 6, 1974

6:40 PM

K: Hello?

M: Yes, sir.

K: Bob, I just wondered whether you had any reactions from the press?

M: I've only taken one call so far. I have others lined up. The one I've taken so far is Valerioni (phonetic) who said, the conversation went like this, "Was he pissed?" I said, well, look, he was obviously very disappointed, coming back from another successful peaceful negotiation to have to face that kind of thing is a press briefing where all the policy issues were ____. He said, I guessed that much and that was as far as it went. I haven't returned the other calls yet. But John King is here and he said that the regulars downstairs were, you know, they felt a sense of gloom around the place when that line of questioning developed. The guy who asked the question about a lawyer is apparently some new youngster from, what John described, is from the Underground Press. We're getting his name and all that. Now the networks are leading on the President. Have you seen any of it?

K: No, what did he do?

M: The Grand Jury has named him as, how do that put it?

K: Unindicted co-conspirator?

M: Unindicted co-conspirator.

K: Well as they haven't named him, that was a long time ago. That was just leaked yesterday.

M: Well, it's now confirmed and it's -- and St. Clair was shown a few minutes ago arguing that the Grand Jury only acts on prosecution statements, heresay, bits and pieces. Now you're coming up on NBC.

K: OK.

M: Don't lose spirit.

K: NO, I just wanted to -- OK, thank you.

END

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