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[LC]

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Web: www.ou.edu/oupress

April 7, 1999

APR 12 1999

The Honorable Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Advance copies of *Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century*, edited by David L. Boren and Edward J. Perkins, have now arrived, and I am pleased to send you a copy, under separate cover, by book post.

We are delighted to see this book appear under the Oklahoma imprint and want to thank you for your contribution. I think the volume is handsome; I hope you agree.

As a contributor you are entitled to purchase additional copies of the book directly from the Press at a special discount of 40 percent, with the stipulation that copies bought at the discount are not to be resold. The list price is $24.95; your cost would be $14.97 per copy plus postage of $3.50 for the first copy and $1.00 for each additional copy. Send your orders to our Customer Service Department, University of Oklahoma Press, 4100 28th Avenue N.W., Norman, OK 73069-8218, identifying yourself as a contributor to the book.

JND/yce

JAN-04-98 SUN 19:22

GOLDENHILLER

FHA NO. 301143000

T. UC

Henry A. Kissinger
Keynote Address 9/15/97

Final Draft

12/9/97

universities in the United States in enrollment of National Merit Scholars. He comes to a University that is trying to live up to its obligations to its students by having created more than 70 new endowed chairs and professorships in the last 2-1/2 years. He comes to a University in the state ready to take its place through a responsible part of our national society in helping prepare this country, and provide the resources it needs as we approach the new century. Ladies and gentlemen, he honors us with his presence. It's with profound admiration and respect that I present to you, Dr. Henry Kissinger.

Dr. Henry Kissinger:

David and friends, an introduction like this puts me in the position in which I once found myself at a reception, where a lady came up to me and said, "I understand you're a fascinating man. Fascinate me." It turned into one of the less successful conversations that I have had. If you could permit me, I would like to point out that among the list of my accomplishments, he did not point out that I was simultaneously National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. I mention this only because never before and never since have relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those days! I was here in Oklahoma at the first meeting of the Associates. The then president was enormously proud of the fact that he had assembled 630 people who would back the University and do so with significant contributions. Today, that number has quadrupled. I had the opportunity to visit the campus a little bit this afternoon and I believe that what has been accomplished here is an enormous tribute to the dedication of the President of this University and of the people of Oklahoma in backing

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GOLDHIMNER

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their institution. I have personally, ~~I can tell you, an iron rule.~~ I never speak at Ivy League schools. I always accept invitations from friends like David in places that are strong and patriotic and where the faculty doesn't harass the speakers with reliving their youthful mistakes.

I am supposed to talk about the architecture of the 21st century foreign policy. One of my neighbors at the table pointed out to me that it is necessary to have a little compassion for those who haven't eaten yet and that there is an inevitable limit to the patience (which is difficult for somebody whose native language is German, because it's possible in that language to go on for long stretches without placing a verb). It is an enormous tribute to this University that so many individuals who have contributed to the thinking on foreign policy over the decades and to the conduct of foreign policy over the decades should be assembled here. There was a time, hard to believe, when I knew nothing of the ways of Washington, when I was appointed National Security Advisor. One of the men from whom I learned most was Dick Helms, who was then Director of the CIA, who was always there when the going was tough, on whom one could always count, and who became involved in that period of self-hatred in which we were engaged—, which we have happily transcended. Also, Bill Webster who contributed so much to stabilizing things in both the FBI and the CIA, who has contributed greatly. Then, there are others—I am glad that I am speaking tonight so that you can accuse me of plagiarizing Mike Oksenberg and David Gergen, whom I've known over the years. They all have supplied a cadre of foreign policy thinking—sometimes disagreeing with each other, but always convinced that America's role in the world is crucial for peace, for progress, and for the well being of mankind. That role continues. But

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GULMAMIERIK

FHA NU. 301/430300

r. u4

Final Draft
12/9/97

now under totally new circumstances.

Americans
We have had a very unique history. We are the only major country in the world whose origin can be precisely dated. My son wrote a school play once about the Declaration of Independence which ended with the line—he was only 10, so you have to forgive him—one of the founders of the country said, “We better stop now it’s the July 4th weekend.” We are the only country whose history can be precisely dated. We are the only country, only major country, populated almost entirely by immigrants—by immigrants who turned their back on their mother country and believed that they were creating here a new set of institutions dedicated to liberty, and believing that this had universal applicability to all of mankind. We are the only country, the only major country, that has never had a powerful neighbor. So, for the overwhelming part of our history, we believed that we could engage ourselves or not in foreign policy at our choice.

When it was
We involved ourselves against what we perceived to be overwhelming dangers. We thought we could withdraw into isolation when the danger was dealt with. Unique among the countries in the world, we believed that the key to permanent peace was to transform all other countries in our image. Until 1917, World War I was a traditional European War, more costly than its predecessors, but about familiar crisis. When we appeared on the scene, we announced that the transformation of government was the key to peace, that spreading democracy and the principle of self determination was the way to bring about universal reconciliation, thought that had never been put forward by any other society and which we then refused to undertake after we had established a principle.

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GOLDENHILLER

FHA NO. 3011450300

r. uo

Final Draft

12/9/97

After World War II, we again became involved in world affairs but from a very particular set of circumstances. We first had an atomic monopoly. Then we had huge superiority.

For a long time, we produced nearly 50 percent of the world's gross national product. In those conditions, foreign policy was a challenge to the allocation of resources, not to the strategic design. Any problem we recognized as a problem we could overwhelm with resources. We presented every challenge to all the great initiatives of the post-war period as terminal enterprises, which, once completed, would solve the problem.

I have discussed the history because we now find ourselves in an entirely different environment. We no longer have an atomic monopoly. Russia still has a large arsenal, though not as threatening as it was in the communist period. But nuclear weapons are beginning to spread around the world, creating a substantially new set of challenges that all countries that have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons really must share together. Secondly, we still are the most significant economic power. But we now produce 20 to 22 percent of the world's GNPs.

Our resources are not enough for conceivable challenges. Indeed, theoretically, were all the resources of the rest of the world marshalled by some hostile country, we would be out of phase.

Therefore, for the first time in our history, we face a realistic challenge to the balance of power and we now have a national interest to prevent this marshalling from happening.

We also live in circumstances for which there is no historical precedent. Never before has every part of the world participated simultaneously in international affairs. Either they lived in ignorance of each other—in the sense that in the 16th century China and Europe in effect lived

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GOLDENHILLER

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in different worlds they had no significant capacity to interact with each other. In the 18th and 19th century, world history, indeed, until the middle of the 20th century, was dominated from Europe and then from the north Atlantic. Today, every part of the world participates in international affairs. Major powers are developing in different regions and this presents us with two new challenges. One— how does one define a major power under present conditions? And secondly— how do we manage their interaction? Third— for the first time in history, events can be observed as they occur. Communications straddle the globe in real time. Fourth— the world is linked integrally, not only by communications, but by economics. A few years ago, an obscure bank clerk in Singapore brought down one of the oldest banks in England and nearly sparked an international financial crisis. Indeed, for any student of economic affairs, there are two nightmares. One— that the systems break down because of different conceptions by different parts of the system. But even worse, that everybody comes to the same conclusion simultaneously and rushes to the same side of the boat and capsizes it. It's an even worse danger. How, under those conditions, can one deal with the automaticity of the systems we have developed?

This globalization of parts of international relations is accompanied by the fact that political loyalties are in no way globalized. Political localities are national and, in some regions, ethnic. The loyalties, moreover, are marshalled by political processes which place an enormous emphasis on the immediate.

When I started out as advisor to political figures, they asked me what they should think. Today, experts are asked by political figures what they should say. It's a totally different

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GOLDENHIMMER

RMA NO. 301/450330

R. 01

Final Draft

12/9/97

approach and it is compounded by the revolution in information that is taking place as we shift from learning from books to learning from pictures via computers and television. Book knowledge requires concepts. Picture knowledge is based on impression and an extraordinary accumulation of facts, unheard of, unimaginable in any previous period, but it does not help you, necessarily, to understand the significance of these facts or even less, the trends on which, finally, political judgement depends. The 19th century German statesman, Bismarck, who was considered to be a principal architect of what is called Realpolitik a policy based on the balance of power—nevertheless said, the best a statesman can do is to listen carefully to the footsteps of God through history, get a hold of the hem of his cloak and walk with him a few steps of the way. No modern politician, that I know, can even begin to think in this manner. Therefore, it has become very hard for them to deal with the multiplicity of challenges that our nation faces.

Our experience is an idealistic one. There is no other nation that has ever undertaken so many great projects on an essentially altruistic basis. When I was a young professor, I had an appointment with President Truman. Quite unwaryed, I asked him what he did of which he was most proud. He said, "I am most proud of the fact that we completely defeated our enemies in the war and then brought them back to the community of nations as equals." I would like to think that only Americans would have done that." I think he was right. That was our historic experience and our historic achievement.

Today, we live in a more complex world. We don't have a clearcut enemy. We don't

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JAN-04-98 SUN 19:24

GOLDMANSMITH

FHA NO. 5017450350

r. uo

[v]

Final Draft

12/9/97

confront a military challenge. We don't confront an overwhelming ideological challenge. The question we have to answer is what are we trying to do and why? We do that under extremely difficult circumstances. I served in government during a tragic period in the Vietnam War, in which America engaged itself in a distant enterprise for what I believe were the noblest of motives. We did not understand the limitations of our reach. We applied principles to regions that we had never studied on the basis of our principles, were of universal applicability. Having launched ourselves on the basis of universal principles, those of us who wanted to extricate us on the basis of the practicality of the situation were assaulted by those who wanted to turn it into a great moral issue of the failings of America-- which is what the protest movement was really about and where I parted company. It was the watershed.

But now, we find ourselves in this situation. There are many who believe that all we need to do is to restore the pristine innocence of our period, when we were protected by two great occans. Economics was not yet global and we could choose our involvement. And therefore, our political parties are very split. In my day, difficult as it was, there was a coherent administration which could appeal to the opposition and usually achieve a great deal of support-- whether the administration was Democrat or Republican. Today, every party is split into a radical and an extreme conservative wing. Neither administration, nor opposition, have found a clear foothold. Each of them are looking for some issue which turns foreign policy into an aspect of domestic politics, which is a long term disaster. What we must do is try to reestablish some national consensus. We cannot be embarrassed to ask what our national interest is. Without

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JUN-04-97 SUN 19:25

GOLDMANNERK

RMA NO. 3017450300

r. 09

Henry A. Kiceinger
Keynote Address 9/15/97

Final Draft

12/9/97

it we have no yardsticks. Of course, our national interest includes the preservation not just of our well being, but also of our values. All of life, including foreign policy, involves a balancing of various considerations. The other day I spoke at a denominational school. A young lady brought up by a Baptist preacher father asked me what I thought at home, because he did not want to send her to school. She asked me, "Is there no morality in foreign policy among statesman?"

And my answer.... (End of Tape)

Side Two

and it is important to note that you have some convictions about your society and its role in the world. The President and the Secretary of State get the 50.1 against the 49.9 cases and you can do it only on the basis of assessments that you cannot prove when you make them. Therefore, it depends in an ultimate sense, on your convictions. Also, as a statesman, you must achieve your goal in stages. You cannot reach it in one jump. Every step is imperfect in relation to an absolute value. That is the dilemma. What is that we now face. It becomes more complicated when we consider that in different parts of the world we face different issues.

With respect to Europe and the Western Hemisphere, we deal with countries with comparable histories, similar values, countries which do not look at each other as战略. In those regions we can practice the methods with which we are most familiar, and therefore I strongly feel that we have neglected building on the cohesion of the Western Hemisphere and the North Atlantic area.

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GOLDENHIMMER

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Final Draft

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In relation to Russia, we deal with a more complex case— a country of continental size and of quite different background. One is communist, historically imperialist, whose identity has been tied up with expansion. One of the disputes in policy with respect to Russia is that American believe that our challenge must be to bring about democracy in Russia. I would certainly like to see that happen. I also believe that, historically, the Russian tragedy has been that they have not been able to find security in their own development and that therefore it means leaders that if Singapore, Japan, Austria and almost every country in the world could grow and develop without expansion, so that this is a possibility for a country with eleven time zones that should therefore not feel inherently claustrophobic. But we have to understand how to conduct these policies simultaneously.

Therefore, I would like to spend the remainder of our time on China which is the issue which is immediately before us because of the visit of the Chinese president. Some of you may know that the current administration was my second choice in the last election. Nevertheless, I strongly support the initiative they have taken, with respect to China, to cooperate in making this visit a success.

The Chinese historic experience is quite different from ours. They have five thousand years of recorded history, whose beginning is lost in the mists of time. They believe that they have gotten through 4,800 years of this history without significant advice about their domestic structure from the United States. It is not taken for granted that we are necessarily competent to teach them. Secondly, there is a different historical perspective. If I asked one of

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JAN-04-98 SUN 19:26

GOLDHAN, ECK

RHA NO. 3011450358

11

Final Draft

12/9/97

you when something happened in American history, you would give me a date. If I asked the Ambassador when something happened in Chinese history, he will give me a dynasty. There have been 14 dynasties- ten of which have had a longer history than the entire history of the United States. When my friend the ambassador tells me when something happens, with luck I am within 200 years of what I want to know. When you travel in China, you rarely come to a province that is not larger than the largest European country in terms of population. In other words, you are dealing with a country with a different rhythm and a different experience. China's experience with its neighbors has been that they have been generally threatening. So China does not live in a world which it believes to be inherently harmonious, as we do ours.

I had the privilege of visiting China for the first time in 1971. The transformation from those days is unbelievable. If anyone had described to me as late as 1979 just the physical appearance of cities and the difference in style of life of the population, I would not have believed it possible. So, whatever one may say about China, the quality of life of its population has greatly improved. Without any doubt, things have occurred in China that none of us would have recommended or approved. Without any question, there are differences in perception between China and the United States. The question is whether the most populous country in the world and the most technologically advanced country in the world have a basis for cooperation.

Now, it has become part of our political process, almost to argue that China is our next enemy- that they are growing at the rate of 10 percent a year, and that sooner or later they will take us on and that we should anticipate this. Also, that its domestic institutions must be altered

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GOLDHAMMER

FHA NO. 3011450300

R.12

Final Draft

12/9/97

by American pressure. I think it is important to get this into some perspective. The Chinese GNP is 10 percent of the American GNP. Even when they grow at a rate of 10 percent, this would still not match the 2-1/2 percent at which we grow. Even if you do it at compound interest, somebody has to figure out that it would take 34 years to reach the present American GNP at which point the per capita would still be much lower. Secondly, the Chinese military budget is about 22 percent of the Japanese military budget and about 5 to 10 percent of ours. China is not a military threat for the next decades. Without any question, China will develop and will become politically and economically more influential.

In Asia, however, the situation of China compared to that of the Soviet Union or of Germany is quite different. The last two countries were surrounded by weak states. China is surrounded by strong states—by Japan, by Russia, by India, and by medium size states like Korea and Vietnam. The normal perception of Chinese leaders is directed not at opposition to us, but at fear of their historic opponent. Therefore, I believe that the visit of Jiang Zemin to Washington is of fundamental importance.

President Nixon, and to some extent I, as his associate, have been given credit for creating an opening to China. That is actually not fully deserved because the opening would have happened anyway. We did it perhaps a little more elegantly, a little faster, but it was dictated by reality and the Chinese wanted it very much too. What we did do for which, in my view, we do deserve credit is that we managed to distinguish the essential from the peripheral. When you read accounts of that period, it is said that Nixon and I took these things into the White House away

17

["JAN-04-97 SUN 19.20", "GOLDMINE", "FHA NO. 3017450330", "r.01", "Henry A. Kissinger\nKeynote Address 9/15/97", "Final Draft", "12/9/97", "from the established institutions. That isn't actually true. The established institutions began the dialogue in Warsaw, where the Chinese said to us that they wanted us to come to Beijing. Whereupon the State Department prepared three huge loose leaf notebooks of what we should discuss—arms control, claims and assets, communications and other immunities and visa requirements. And they had another big book on a subject that we should brief about. This is what President Nixon said, \"They're going to kill this baby before it's born.\" That's when it wandered into the White House. What was important was that we talked to the Chinese leaders about the structure of the international order as we understood it. And we understood it. They talked to us in an extraordinary way. Part of the reason was that we were lucky. There was no contact. There was no commerce. There was really nothing to talk about except the really only the really only the really only the really only

JAN-04-98 SUN 19:29

GOLDMANMIERK

PHA NO. 501/450300

R. UC

Final Draft

12/9/97

Japan, India— any nation in Asia seeks the domination of all of Asia, that the United States will absolutely oppose it. With all my love for China, if China were to do this I would urge opposing it. But this is not the situation today. It need not be the situation in any foreseeable future. It must not be the situation without an attempt at carefully analyzing by both sides how the world should evolve. So I hope that as this visit evolves we will distinguish the important from the peripheral and start a dialogue which will be of tremendous importance for the peace of the world.

We have many other problems. We have Bosnia. We have many other regions. But I wanted to give you a conceptual view of the challenge we face as a nation. I have a Chinese friend, former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, who claims there exists a Chinese proverb. I say that the claims are because I sometimes suspect that our Chinese friends invent these proverbs as they go along to intimidate us poor westerners. Allegedly, the proverb goes like this: "When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems aren't dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems and little problems will not disturb us." That is our big challenge. We are still the nation on which, globally, more depends than any other on the challenge we face is whether we can distinguish little problems from big problems and whether we can unite in dealing with them. Thank you very much.

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GOLDMANNERK

FHA NO. 3017450350

r. 03

Final Draft

12/9/97

President Boren:

Thank you very much Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger has agreed to take a few questions and we will hold these down in number to just three or four. We will start over here.

President of the Student Body:

Dr. Kissinger, I just had the opportunity to return from a seminar in Israel where we studied the peace process there and in lieu of the fact that the Secretary of State Albright and Dennis Ross has returned from there, what role should we take? Should we take a greater role in our mission there? I want to know your perspective on that.

Dr. Kissinger:

Before I answer this question, I must point out one other thing. When dealing with China a dialogue is never completed, so I would like to point out to you I told this Lee Kwan Yew story to a Chinese friend in Beijing. He said to me, "Next time, Lee Kwan Yew tells you a Chinese proverb, say to him the following: 'There is an old Chinese proverb that says Lee Kwan Yew invents Chinese proverbs'." Now to answer your question. Should the United States be more active in the peace process? Let me make a few general observations. Whether we are more active in the peace process or not depends on what we are trying to accomplish. It requires for us to understand what the fundamental issues are in the Middle East. My view, which is now very truncated, is this: First of all, the Arab-Israeli issue is not the only issue in the Middle East.

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GOLDHAN, NIKER

FAX NO. 501/450358

P. 04

Final Draft

12/9/97

It is not even the most important issue. The most important issue is the relationship between fundamentalism and secular moderate regimes in the Islamic world.

Secondly, the stability of the Gulf at a time when we are based on one country, Saudi Arabia, opposing the two overwhelming countries in the area, and at a time when our relations with Turkey have not received the attention that they deserve, those are the two issues that I would put before the Arab-Israeli issue.

On the Arab-Israeli issue, I think I was at least one of the inventors of this step-by-step approach, which was based on the fear 20 years ago. Any attempt to make a comprehensive solution was bound to blow up the whole region at a time when we were facing an energy crisis, Soviet opposition, and no real preparation in the Arab world. This step-by-step approach has been very successful for 20 years. Obviously, the more steps you take the fewer steps are left. I believe, now, at this point it is senseless when talking about the West Bank to continue this step-by-step approach. The whole area of the West Bank is 50 miles from Jordan to the sea. How thin can you slice the salami and what progress do you make by debating whether the Israelis should give up 8 percent of the territory, 10 percent of the territory in the next slice, after which the Israelis know there will be another slice. Therefore, I believe there is only one negotiation now that we are doing, which is to determine what are the final borders. Israel has not yet ever been willing to accept the Palestinian state, but the whole rest of the world treats Arafat as if he were the head of a Palestinian unit. I believe that if we want to make a contribution we should stop the out-flow process and move to a final negotiation and exert our influence in that direction.

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GOLDENHIMER

FHA NO. 3017450330

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Final Draft

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Question:

I noticed that in your speech you mentioned Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia republic.

I just wanted to know if you could define what you consider the United States moral and political obligations in this region?

Dr. Kissinger:

I once was at a briefing with a military commander and I asked him a question and he said, "I am so glad you asked that question, may I have the first slide please." Again, let me give you a truncated answer. First of all, what is Bosnia? Bosnia is an administrative sub-division of former Yugoslavia and about 8 years ago in the previous administration the mistake was made to recognize Bosnia as an independent state, this made sense when the issues were with Croatia and Slovenia, which are more or less ethnically homogeneous. But Bosnia is composed of Croats, Serbs and Moslems whose hatreds have broken up Yugoslavia, and I don't understand why anyone ever thought that they would live together peacefully in Bosnia.

We, as Americans, treat the Bosnian conflict as a political issue. In reality, it is a religious issue. These three nations don't only hate each other in the abstract, they have existed in opposition to each other. The Serbs have existed in order to fight Islam and preserve the Orthodox faith. The Croats have existed for the same reason, but also to resist the Serb Orthodox; and both of them consider the Moslems, who are ethnically of the same group, as turncoats. Therefore, the problem that we face in Bosnia is this: we did a useful thing in ending the war for humanitarian reasons. Terrible things were committed in the name of ethnic

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GOLDENHUNTER

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cleansing. Now, the three regions are more or less ethnically homogeneous. I have great difficulty in understanding why we want to meet them together, why we should insist that those three groups must live together. I am very opposed to risking American lives to bring about a shotgun wedding of these three groups. I believe that the principle of self-determination ought to be applied to them, if they choose to live together, of course, but I am afraid.

But I am afraid that we are sliding ourselves into a situation in which our objectives are not backed by resources and in which our public will not support what will be needed to achieve the objective which I consider the classic Viet Nam syndrome. For all of these reasons, I believe we have some humanitarian concern in preserving the existing dividing lines. I would be willing to see that while happening for a time and maybe it should be done by volunteers, rather than by people who are assigned to it. I am extremely uneasy about the incompatibility between our military provisions of the Dayton Agreement which separate the three groups and the political provisions which will try to unify them. We are having an election there now which has absurd aspects.

Incidentally, I was in favor of intervening six years ago when the ethnic cleansing started, so I am not supporting ethnic cleansing. But, now that it has been done, to say refugees must go back means that civil war has to start all over again. There are elections going on now in which you can vote by absentee ballot in regions from which you were expelled. The weird aspect is that, for example in the Krajina, a part of the Croatia took away from the Serbs where no Serbs are living. In several towns have a Serb majority on the voting rolls, although there are no Serbs living there. Who is going to enforce the results of this election? I would strongly urge

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GOLDHAHNERK

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that we get our policies, our objectives, our means and our declaratory policy in line with each other. I give the administration great credit for having brought the war to an end. I supported that. Right now what is happening is neglect rather than a settled policy. I do not believe that Bosnia justifies the use of American military power in the taking of significant American casualties.

President Boren:

I am just going to hold this to two. I apologize. Just two more questions. I would like to give those who haven't had a chance to ask a question.

Question:

Dr. Kissinger, you spoke at length about China and all of us have preconceived notions about communism. At the risk of being philosophical. I am curious to know whether you believe that in the post Cold War era it's possible for human rights and freedoms that we in America hold so dear to exist in a communist state?

Dr. Kissinger:

I believe that in communist states the definition of human rights is quite different from our definition of human rights. I also don't think that China is a communist state of the kind that we have known in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. On the economic level, and on the day to day living level, the condition of the Chinese people has enormously improved in the 20 years

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GOLDHIMNER

RHA NO. 301/450330

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that I have been going there. On the level of political organization, I have different preferences on how to organize the state. At the same time, my point is to what degree we should make that the principle objective of American policy or whether we understand it well enough? It seems to me inevitable, not because we favor it, that as China becomes a modern industrial state a certain degree of constitutionalism will inevitably develop because you need predictable legal forms in order to run a complicated society. We, therefore, should have some understanding for the process as it evolves. My views are not based on an approval of everything that takes place in China. It is based on the importance of China and the United States cooperating to promote stability in Asia and in the world.

Question:

First of all, Dr. Kissinger, I would just like for you to know what an honor it is for us and I think I speak on behalf of all the students, to have you in our presence, a statesman of your kind.

I would like to thank President Boren and the University for giving us such an opportunity. Dr. Kissinger, my question concerns Latin America. What do you think our foreign policy should be concerning this country and especially the certification of countries like Mexico and Colombia?

Dr. Kissinger:

One difference I have with many foreign policies is this: They would like to apply our human rights values in regions where they are being rejected. I would like to apply them in

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GOLDHAN, EK

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regions where they have been accepted and try to create a more coherent structure in the Western Hemisphere and in the North Atlantic area. There we do not have to intervene in the domestic structures fundamentally, and we can build on what exists and try to create through performance a demonstration of what democracies can achieve working together. I, therefore, have strongly favored the administration's proposal of a free trade area for the Western Hemisphere, and I would like to see a North Atlantic free trade area. On the other hand, like many other things, the proposal has never been followed up by any concrete policies and right now it is languishing because the fast-track authority, without which it cannot be implemented, is before the Congress.

It depends whether a fast-track authority can be granted and that in fact it can be used. When you talk about Colombia and Mexico, you undoubtedly are referring to the drug problem. It is a nightmarish problem. Nobody has come up with a brilliant solution to it because what happens in these societies in which drugs become so prominent is that the drug dealers have much greater resources than the state, and they can therefore pay off the police and the military forces. I haven't had many conversations with Colombians, but in Mexico they tend to speak of the disappearing truck. That is, the United States can follow a truck filled with drugs all the way through Mexico and as soon as it crosses the border into Juarez it disappears, and so they imply that there must be a little corruption on our side as well. I think drugs is a problem, not just of production but also of consumption. We've put a lot of effort on production. I have no brilliant ideas about what to do. I am in favor of the toughest measures, and ideally one should create some sort of Western Hemisphere military force that can attack these drug producing areas because the

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countries of concern usually don't have the military strength, but in the immediate future I don't see that as a possibility. Ideally, if one could get the major countries of Latin America to cooperate in this so that it no longer becomes a purely national American effort, that would seem to me to be one way of dealing with the issue.

President Boren:

Thank you very much Dr. Kissinger for sharing with us this evening. I think this evening has reminded us that in our sound byte society, we are indeed hungry for substance and not slogans, and it's been a pleasure to share this time together. Wouldn't it be wonderful if we had more such times of public discourse, of serious conversation of substance and dialogue in our country. We would be on the right path. We thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for providing it for us tonight.

I hope that all of you will take a chance to look at our schedule for tomorrow. I mentioned that we will have David Gergen here for breakfast. We will be following with an outstanding panel on the United States and Asia. We've mentioned that Ambassador Li Daoyu is with us and he will speaking at lunch here in the ballroom. Then, we will later be at a roundtable in Holmberg Hall. Clayton Yeutter, our former U.S. Trade Representative will be joining us and Ambassador John Wolf, Michael Price, who is here with us tonight, Luke Corbett, DeVier Pierson and Max Berry on the economy and trade, and then we have a really special treat. Colleen McCullough, the author of the "Thorn Birds" and the series "The Masters of Rome" and

27

The University of Oklahoma

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS CENTER

June 15, 1998

The Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY, 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

David L. Boren and I request permission to publish an edited version of your presentation, "The Architecture of an American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century," made at the foreign policy conference held at The University of Oklahoma on September 12, 15 and 16, 1997. The edited material will be included in a book by David and me now entitled *Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century*, which will be published by the University of Oklahoma Press in late 1998 or early 1999.

The University of Oklahoma Press, as a condition of publication, requires that you grant David and me exclusive world rights, as part of our edited volume only, in all languages and for all editions. (After publication of the book, you can obtain from the University of Oklahoma Press permission to republish your contribution in any recognized scholarly or professional journal or in a book-length work of your own writings, subject only to full credit appearing in the journal and/or book with an acknowledgment of first publication in the present work.)

If any copyrights are attached to the material you presented at the conference, or if additional permission is needed for world rights from another source, please so indicate.

Attached is a double-spaced copy of the edited version of your presentation at the conference that we intend to publish. Please read and correct this manuscript. If you fail to return the manuscript to us by July 15, 1998, production and publication may proceed without your corrections.

Please know that in order to meet University of Oklahoma Press standards, a professional editor and three "readers" employed by the University of Oklahoma Press are also reviewing the entire manuscript. Should there be any substantive recommendations for changes in your contribution (beyond punctuation, grammar, capitalization, consistency in use of numbers, etc.), we will clear them with you.

Any monetary gain from the publication of this book will be granted to the International Programs Center at The University of Oklahoma for the furtherance of its programs. As a contributor to the book, you will receive one free copy. You also will be able to purchase from the University of Oklahoma Press, as long as the book is in print, additional copies for your own use at a forty (40) percent discount from the then-prevailing list price.

339 West Boyd Street, Room 400, Norman, Oklahoma 73019-5144 PHONE: (405) 325-1396 FAX: (405) 325-7454

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# Chapter 22--The Architecture of an American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century

## Henry A. Kissinger

We Americans have had a very unique history. We are the only major country in the world whose origin can be precisely dated. My son wrote a school play once about the Declaration of Independence which ended with this line--he was only ten, so you have to forgive him--delivered by one of the founders of the country: "We better stop now, it's the July 4th weekend." We are the only country whose history can be precisely dated. We are the only country, the only major country, populated almost entirely by immigrants--by immigrants who turned their backs on their mother countries and believed that they were creating here a new set of institutions dedicated to liberty, and believing that this had universal applicability to all of mankind. We are the only country, the only major country, that has never had a powerful neighbor. So, for the overwhelming part of our history, we believed that we could engage ourselves--or not engage--in foreign policy at our choice.

When we involved ourselves, it was against what we perceived to be overwhelming dangers. And we thought we could withdraw into isolation again when the danger had been

No part of this paper may be reproduced without the explicit written permission of the OU Press, the editors, and the co-authors.

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dealt with. Unique among the countries in the world, we believed that the key to permanent peace was to transform all the other countries in our image. World War I was a traditional European war, more costly than its predecessors but about familiar crises. When we appeared on that scene, we announced that the transformation of government was the key to peace, and that spreading democracy and the principle of self determination was the way to bring about universal reconciliation--a thought that had never been put forward by any other society and which we then refused to undertake after we had established its principle.

After World War II, we again became involved in world affairs but in a very particular set of circumstances. First we had an atomic monopoly. Then we had a huge superiority. For a long time, we produced nearly fifty percent of the world's gross national product. In those conditions, foreign policy was a challenge to the allocation of resources, not to strategic design. Any problem we recognized as a problem we could overwhelm with resources. And we presented every challenge--all the great initiatives of the post-war period--as terminal enterprises which, once completed, would solve the problem.

I have discussed the history because we now find ourselves in an entirely different environment. We no longer have an atomic monopoly. Russia still has a large arsenal, though not as threatening as it was in the communist period. But nuclear weapons are beginning to spread around the world, creating a substantially new set of challenges that all the countries that have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons really must share in together. Secondly, we still are the most significant economic power. But we now produce twenty to twenty-two percent of the world's Gross National Product (GNP). Our resources are not enough for all the conceivable challenges. Indeed, theoretically, were all the resources of the rest of the world marshaled by

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some hostile country, we would be outmatched. Therefore, for the first time in our history, we face a realistic challenge to the balance of power and we now have a national interest to prevent this marshaling from happening.

We also live in circumstances for which there is no historical precedent. Never before has every part of the world participated simultaneously in international affairs. Either they lived in ignorance of each other--in the same sense that, in the 16th century, China and Europe in effect lived in different worlds--or they had no significant capacity to interact with each other. In the 18th and 19th century, world history, indeed, until the middle of the 20th century, was dominated from Europe and then from the north Atlantic. Today, every part of the world participates in international affairs. Major powers are developing in different regions and this presents us with new challenges. One--how does one define a major power under present conditions? And secondly--how do we manage their interaction? Third--for the first time in history, events can be observed as they occur. Communications straddle the globe in real time. Fourth-- the world is linked integrally, not only by communications, but by economics. A few years ago, an obscure bank clerk in Singapore brought down one of the oldest banks in England and nearly sparked an international financial crisis. Indeed, for any student of economic affairs, there are two nightmares. One--that the systems break down because of different conceptions by different parts of the system. But even worse, that everybody comes to the same conclusion simultaneously and rushes to the same side of the boat and capsizes it. It is an even worse danger. How, under those conditions, can one deal with the automaticity of the systems we have developed?

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This globalization of parts of international relations is accompanied by the fact that political loyalties are in no way globalized. Political localities are national and, in some regions, ethnic. The loyalties, moreover, are marshaled by political processes which place an enormous emphasis on the immediate.

When I started out as advisor to political figures, they used to ask me what they should think. Today, experts are asked by political figures what they should say. It is a totally different approach and it is compounded by the revolution in information that is taking place as we shift from learning from books to learning from pictures via computers and television. Book knowledge requires concepts. Picture knowledge is based on impressions. Computer knowledge produces an extraordinary accumulation of facts, unheard of and unimaginable in any previous period, but it does not help you, necessarily, to understand the significance of these facts or even less, the trends on which, finally, political judgement depends. The 19th century German statesman, Bismarck, who was considered to be a principal architect of what is called Realpolitik (words), a policy based on the balance of power--nevertheless said--the best a statesman can do is to listen carefully to the footsteps of God through history, to get a hold of the hem of his cloak and walk with him a few steps of the way. No modern politician that I know can even begin to think in this manner. Therefore, it has become very hard for them to deal with the multiplicity of challenges that our nation faces.

Our experience has been an idealistic one. There is no other nation that has ever undertaken so many great projects on an essentially altruistic basis. When I was a young professor, I had an appointment with President Truman. Quite awed, I asked him what he had done of which he was the most proud. He said, "I am most proud of the fact that we completely

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defeated our enemies in the war and then brought them back to the community of nations as our equals. I would like to think that only Americans would have done that." I think he was right. That was our historic experience and our historic achievement.

Today, we live in a more complex world. We do not have a clear-cut enemy. We do not confront an overwhelming military challenge. We do not confront an overwhelming ideological challenge. The question we have to answer is, what are we trying to do and why? And we do that under extremely difficult circumstances. I served in government during the tragic period in the Vietnam War, in which America had engaged itself in a distant enterprise for what I believe had been the noblest of motives. But we did not understand the limitations of our reach. We applied our principles to regions we had never studied and on the basis of the belief that they had universal applicability. Having thus launched ourselves on the basis of universal principles, those of us who wanted to extricate on the basis of the practicality of the situation were assaulted by those who wanted to turn it into a great moral issue on the failings of America--which is what the protest movement was really about and where I parted company. So Vietnam was the watershed.

But now, we find ourselves in this situation. There are many who believe that all we need to do is to restore the pristine innocence of our early period, when we were protected by two great oceans. Economics was not yet global then, and we could choose our involvements. Therefore, our political parties are now very split. In my day, difficult as it was, there was a coherent administration which could appeal to the opposition and usually achieve a great deal of support--whether the administration was Democrat or Republican. Today, every party is split into a radical and an extreme conservative wing. Neither administration nor opposition has

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found a clear foothold. Each is looking for some issue to turn foreign policy into an aspect of domestic politics, which is a long term disaster. What we must do is try to reestablish some national consensus. We must not be embarrassed to ask what our national interest is. Without it, we have no yardsticks. Of course, our national interest includes the preservation of not just our well being, but also of our values. All of life, including foreign policy, involves a balancing of various considerations and it is important to have some convictions about one's society and its role in the world. The President and the Secretary of State get to deal with the 50.1 against the 49.9 cases, and you do so on the basis of assessments that you cannot prove at the time you make them. Therefore it depends, in an ultimate sense, on your convictions. Also, as a statesman, you must achieve your goal in stages. You cannot reach it in one jump. Every step is imperfect in relation to the absolute value. That is the dilemma. And that is what we now face. It becomes more complicated when we consider that in different parts of the world we face different issues.

With respect to Europe and the Western Hemisphere, we are dealing with countries with comparable histories, similar values, countries which do not look at each other as strategic opponents. In these regions, we can practice the methods with which we are most familiar, and I strongly feel that we have neglected building on the cohesion of the Western Hemisphere and the North Atlantic area.

In relation to Russia, we deal with a more complex case--a country of continental size and of quite different background. One is communist, historically imperialist, whose identity has been tied up with expansion. One of the disputes in American policy with respect to Russia is that some believe our challenge must be to bring about democracy in Russia. I would certainly like to see that happen. I also believe that, historically, the Russian tragedy has been that they

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have not been able to find security in their own development. Therefore it means convincing
Russian leaders that if Singapore, Japan, Austria and almost every country in the world could
grow and develop without expansion that it is absolutely a possibility for a country with eleven
time zones. And we have to understand how to conduct these policies simultaneously.

Therefore, I would now like to spend the remainder of our time on China. Some of you
may know that the current administration was my second choice in the last election.
Nevertheless, I strongly support the initiative they have taken with respect to China. I am urging
all my friends to cooperate in making this visit a success.

The Chinese historic experience is quite different from ours. They have five thousand
years of recorded history, whose beginning is lost in the mists of time. They believe that they
have gotten through 4,800 years of this history without significant advice about their domestic
structure from the United States so it is not taken for granted that we are necessarily competent
to teach them. Secondly, there is a different historical perspective. If I asked one of you when
something happened in American history, you would give me a date. If I asked the Chinese
Ambassador when something happened in Chinese history, he will give me a dynasty. There
have been fourteen dynasties--ten of which have had a longer history than the entire history of
the United States. When my friend the ambassador tells me when something happens, with luck
I am within 200 years of what I want to know. When you travel in China, you rarely come to a
province that is not larger than the largest European country in terms of population. In other
words, you are dealing with a country with a different rhythm and a different experience. China's
experience with its neighbors has been that they have been generally threatening. So China does
not live in a world which it believes to be inherently harmonious, as we do ours.

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I had the privilege of visiting China for the first time in 1971. The transformation from those days is unbelievable. If anyone had described to me as late as 1979 the difference in just the physical appearance of cities and in the style of life of the population, I would not have believed it possible. So, whatever one says about China, the quality of life of its population has greatly improved. Without any doubt, things have occurred in China that none of us would have recommended or approved. Without any question, there are differences in perception between China and the United States. The question is whether the most populous country in the world and the most technologically advanced country in the world have a basis for cooperation.

Now, it has almost become part of our political process to argue that China is our next enemy--that they are growing at the rate of 10 percent a year, that sooner or later they will take us on and that we should anticipate this. Also, that its domestic institutions must be altered by American pressure.

I think it is important to get this into some perspective. The Chinese GNP is ten percent of the American GNP. Even when they grow at a rate of 10 percent, this would still not match the 2-1/2 percent at which we grow. Even if you do it at compound interest, somebody has figured out that it would take thirty-four years to reach the present American GNP, at which point the per capita would still be much lower. Secondly, the Chinese military budget is about 22 percent of the Japanese military budget and about 5 to 10 percent of ours. China is not a military threat for the next decades. Without any question, however, China will develop and become politically and economically more influential.

In Asia, however, the situation of China as compared historically to those of the Soviet Union or of Germany is quite different. The last two countries were surrounded by weak states.

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China is surrounded by strong states--by Japan, by Russia, by India, and by medium size states like Korea and Vietnam. The normal perception of Chinese leaders is directed not at opposition to us, but at fear of their historic opponent. Therefore, I believe that the visit of Jiang Zemin to Washington is of fundamental importance.

President Nixon, and to some extent I, as his associate, have been given credit for creating an opening to China. That is actually not fully deserved because the opening would have happened anyway. We did it perhaps a little more elegantly, a little faster, but it was dictated by reality and the Chinese too wanted it very much. What we did do--for which, in my view, we do deserve credit--is that we managed to distinguish the essential from the peripheral. When you read accounts of that period, it is said that Nixon and I carried these things directly into the White House and away from the established institutions. That is not actually true.

The established institutions began the dialogue in Warsaw, where the Chinese first intimated that they wanted us to come to Beijing. Whereupon the State Department prepared three huge loose leaf notebooks of what we should discuss--arms control, claims and assets, communications, immunities and visa requirements. And it had another big book on whom we should brief about all this. President Nixon said, "They are going to kill this baby before it's born." That is when it wandered into the White House.

What was important was that we talked to the Chinese leaders about the structure of the international order as we understood it. And they talked to us in an extraordinary way. Part of the reason was luck. There had been no contact. So there was no commerce and such to talk about, except important things. This was the foundation of a relationship that worked quite well for nearly twenty years. Even the issue of Taiwan was handled in such a manner that a territory

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which had been historically a province of China was nevertheless not permitted to be an obstacle to an improvement of our political relations.

This is being challenged today. In Asia, we are dealing with a whole set of nations in the process of rapid transformation. Japan is surely moving in a more national direction as the single threat of the Soviet Union disappears. It is bound to look at Korea and at other neighboring regions from a somewhat different perspective than we do. India is moving into great power status. Southeast Asia is growing. All these nations think of each other, to some extent, as possible strategic opponents. In these conditions, why should the United States anoint one of these countries as our permanent enemy? There is absolutely no question that if any nation--China, Japan, India, any nation in Asia sought the domination of all of Asia, the United States would absolutely oppose it. With all my love for China, if China were to do this, I would urge opposing it. But this is not the situation today. It need not be the situation in any foreseeable future. It must not be the situation without careful attempt by both sides to analyze how the world should evolve. I hope that we can distinguish the important from the peripheral and start a dialogue which will be of tremendous importance for the peace of the world.

We have many other problems. We have Bosnia. We have many other regions. But I wanted to give you a conceptual overview of the challenges we face as a nation. I have a Chinese friend, former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, who claims that there exists a Chinese proverb. (I say he claims because I sometimes suspect that our Chinese friends invent these proverbs as they go along to intimidate us poor westerners. When I told this Lee Kwan Yew story to a Chinese friend in Beijing, he said to me, "Next time Lee Kwan Yew tells you a Chinese proverb, say to him the following: 'There is an old Chinese proverb that says Lee

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Kwan Yew invents Chinese proverbs'.') Allegedly, the proverb goes like this: "When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems aren't dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems and little problems will not disturb us." That is our big challenge. For we are still the nation on which, globally, more depends than on any other. And the challenge we face is whether we can distinguish the little problems from the big problems, and whether we can unite in dealing with them.

## Question

Dr. Kissinger, I just had the opportunity to return from a seminar in Israel where we studied the peace process there. What role should we take? Should we take a greater role in our mission there? I want to know your perspective on that.

## Henry A. Kissinger

Should the United States be more active in the peace process? Let me make a few general observations. Whether we are more active in the peace process or not depends on what we are trying to accomplish. It requires for us to understand the fundamental issues in the Middle East. My view, which is now very truncated, is this: First of all, the Arab-Israeli issue is not the only issue in the Middle East. It is not even the most important issue. The most important issue is the relationship between fundamentalism and secular moderate regimes in the Islamic world.

Secondly, is the stability of the Gulf at a time when we are based in one country, Saudi Arabia, opposing the two overwhelming countries in the area, and at a time when our relations

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with Turkey have not received the attention that they deserve. Those are the two issues I would put even before the Arab-Israeli issue.

On the Arab-Israeli issue, I think I was at least one of the inventors of this step-by-step approach, which was based on the fear twenty years ago that any attempt to make a comprehensive solution was bound to blow up the whole region at a time when we were facing an energy crisis, Soviet opposition, and no real preparation in the Arab world. The step-by-step approach has been very successful for twenty years. Obviously, the more steps you take the fewer steps are left. I believe that at this point it is senseless when talking about the West Bank to continue this step-by-step approach. The whole area of the West Bank is fifty miles from Jordan to the sea. How thin can you slice the salami and what progress do you make by debating whether the Israelis should give up eight percent of the territory, ten percent of the territory in the next slice, after which the Israelis know there will be another slice? Therefore, I believe there is only one negotiation now that we should be doing, which is to determine what the final borders are. Israel has not yet ever been willing to accept the Palestinian state, but the whole rest of the world treats Arafat as if he were the head of a Palestinian unit. I believe that if we want to make a contribution, we should stop the out-flow process and move to a final negotiation and exert our influence in that direction.

## Question

Would you define what you consider the United States moral and political obligations in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia republic?

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Henry A. Kissinger

I was once at a briefing with a military commander and I asked him a question and he said, "I am so glad you asked that question, may I have the first slide please." Again, let me give you a truncated answer. First of all, what is Bosnia? Bosnia is an administrative sub-division of the former Yugoslavia. About eight years ago, in the previous administration, the mistake was made to recognize Bosnia as an independent state. This made sense when the issues were Croatia and Slovenia, which are more or less ethnically homogeneous. But Bosnia is composed of Croats, Serbs and Moslems whose hatreds have broken up Yugoslavia, and I do not understand why anyone ever thought that they would live together peacefully in Bosnia.

We, as Americans, treat the Bosnian conflict as a political issue. In reality, it is a religious issue. These three groups not only hate each other in the abstract but they have existed in opposition to each other. The Serbs have existed in order to fight Islam and preserve the Orthodox faith. The Croats have existed for the same reason, but also to resist the Serb Orthodox; and both of them consider the Moslems, who are ethnically of the same group, as turncoats. Therefore, the problem that we face in Bosnia is this: we did a useful thing in ending the war for humanitarian reasons. Terrible things were committed in the name of ethnic cleansing. Now, the three regions are more or less ethnically homogeneous. I have great difficulty in understanding why we want to meld them together or why we should insist that those three groups must live together. I am very opposed to risking American lives to bring about a shotgun wedding of these three groups. I believe that the principle of self-determination ought to be applied to them if they choose to live together, of course.

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But I am afraid that we are sliding into a situation in which our objectives are not backed by resources and in which our public will not support what will be needed to achieve the objective--a classic Vietnam syndrome. For all of these reasons, I believe we have some humanitarian concern in preserving the existing dividing lines. I would be willing to see that happening for a while and maybe it should be done by volunteers rather than by people who are assigned to it. I am extremely uneasy about the incompatibility between the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement, which separate the three groups, and the political provisions, which will try to unify them. We are having an election there now which has absurd aspects.

Incidentally, I was in favor of intervening six years ago when the ethnic cleansing started, so I am not supporting ethnic cleansing. But now that it has been done, to say that refugees must go back, means that civil war has to start all over again. There are elections going on now in which you can vote by absentee ballot in regions from which you were expelled. The weird aspect of that is that, for example in the Krajina, a part which Croatia took away from the Serbs and where no Serbs are living, several towns have a Serb majority on the voting rolls although there are no Serbs actually living there. Who is going to enforce the results of this election? I would strongly urge that we get our policies, our objectives, our means and our declaratory policy in line with each other. I give the administration great credit for having brought the war to an end. I supported that. Right now what is happening is neglect rather than a settled policy. I do not believe that Bosnia justifies the use of American military power at the cost of significant American casualties.

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## Question

At the risk of being philosophical. I am curious to know whether you believe that in the post cold war era it is possible for human rights and freedoms that we in America hold so dear to exist in a communist state?

Henry A. Kissinger

I believe that in communist states the definition of human rights is quite different from our definition of human rights. I also do not think that China is a communist state of the same kind that we have known in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. On the economic level, and on the day to day living level, the condition of the Chinese people has enormously improved in the twenty years that I have been going there. On the level of political organization, I have different preferences on how to organize the state. At the same time, my point is, to what degree should we make that the principal objective of American policy and do we understand it well enough? It seems to me inevitable that, as China becomes a modern industrial state, a certain degree of constitutionalism will inevitably develop because you need predictable legal forms in order to run a complicated society. We, therefore, should have some understanding for the process as it evolves. My views are not based on an approval of everything that takes place in China. It is based on the importance of China and the United States cooperating to promote stability in Asia and in the world.

## Question

Dr. Kissinger, what do you think our foreign policy should be concerning Latin America, and especially the certification of countries like Mexico and Colombia on areas such as human rights and cooperation against narcotics trafficking?

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Henry A. Kissinger

One difference I have with many of our foreign policies is this: they would like to apply our human rights values in regions where they are being rejected. I would like to apply them in regions where they have been accepted and thereby try to create a more coherent structure in the Western Hemisphere and in the North Atlantic area. There we do not have to intervene in the domestic structures fundamentally, and we can build on what exists and try to create, through performance, a demonstration of what democracies can achieve when working together. I, therefore, have strongly favored the administration's proposal of a free trade area for the Western Hemisphere, and I would like to see a North Atlantic free trade area. On the other hand, like many other things, the proposal has never been followed up by any concrete policies, and right now it is languishing because the fast-track authority, without which it cannot be implemented, is before the Congress. It depends whether fast-track authority can be granted and that it can in fact be used.

When you talk about Colombia and Mexico, you undoubtedly are referring to the drug problem. It is a nightmarish problem. Nobody has come up with a brilliant solution to it because what happens in these societies in which drugs become so prominent is that the drug dealers have much greater resources than the state, and they can pay off the police and the military forces. I have not had many conversations with Colombians, but in Mexico they tend to speak of the disappearing truck. That is, the United States can follow a truck filled with drugs all the way through Mexico and as soon as it crosses the border into Juarez it disappears, which implies that there must be a little corruption on our side as well. I think drugs is a problem, not just of are?

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production but also of consumption. We have put a lot of effort on production. I have no
brilliant ideas about what to do. I am in favor of the toughest measures, and ideally one should
create some sort of Western Hemisphere military force that can attack these drug producing areas
because the countries of concern usually do not have the military strength. But, in the immediate
future, I do not see that as a possibility. Ideally, if one could get the major countries of Latin
America to cooperate on this so that it is no longer a primarily national American effort, that
seems to me to be one way of dealing with the issue.

The University of Oklahoma

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

December 11, 1997

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue 26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry,

I wish to thank you again for your superb presentation at the conference "Preparing American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century," September 12, 15 and 16, 1997, at the University of Oklahoma. The exceptional caliber of the conference program participants and the superior quality of their presentations strengthened our resolve that the University of Oklahoma Press will publish the conference proceedings as a book. We believe it can contribute importantly to the on-going dialogue and debate in our country's search for a new foreign policy paradigm.

I am enclosing the verbatim transcript of your September 15, 1997 dinner address. Please go over your presentation and responses to questions. Feel free to correct, delete, expand or modify any part you wish. We want the best content possible for this book.

I am also enclosing for you the *tentative* table of contents of the book and the University of Oklahoma Press guidelines. These are also available on the Press-website <www.ou.edu/oupress>. We would like to have your edited version of your presentation and your answers to questions by the end of January 1998, and would appreciate having them earlier should you finish before that date.

Ed Perkins' and my hope is to have a completed manuscript by March 1998 that – with the help of professional editors and the advice of outside readers provided by the OU Press — we can have in final form to forward to the printer during the summer of 1998. We will send to you your portions of the book for final approval prior to publication.

Once again, I wish to thank you for taking time from your busy schedule to take part in the conference, and to help us prepare what we think could be a useful and influential book.

With best regards,

DLB:cjb
Enclosures

660 Parrington Oval, Room 110, Norman, Oklahoma 73019-0390 (405) 325-3916, FAX (405) 325-7605

DEC 23 1997

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FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

"The Architecture of an American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century"
September 15, 1997
6:45 p.m. - 10:30 p.m.

President Boren:

I want to welcome all of you to this special evening and the keynote address in our Foreign Policy Conference on the subject of Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century. There a number of very special guests with us tonight. Indeed, each and everyone of you is a special guest and it's a really wonderful occasion when the University family--students, faculty and staff--can gather together in this manner. I would like to ask our University of Oklahoma students who are here with us tonight to please stand and let us welcome you especially. Students from the University of Oklahoma who are here in the room. Let me say there are other students down the hallway in the Meacham Auditorium and I hope they heard that applause of welcome as well. Because of the demand of turnout tonight, we have had to have instant video in other rooms and others will be hearing, down the hall, as Dr. Kissinger speaks.

Also, we are being heard live on the radio. The students who were not able to come and faculty will be able to listen in the residence halls. We have with us tonight very special guests, because this conference coincides with the first meeting of the Board of Visitors of the International Programs Center of the University of Oklahoma. As you know the Center is led by a career ambassador, former Ambassador to the United Nations and former Director General of the

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Foreign Service, Ambassador Edward Perkins. I would like to ask Ambassador Perkins and all of the members of the Board of Visitors who are here with us to stand and be recognized at this time. I also am pleased to introduce to you my colleagues at this University who give so much of themselves and are so committed to our progress, committed to the internationalization of our curriculum at this University and our resources and I already think we are already seeing the results of their commitment as we have students from 104 countries—additions to our faculty resources in the area of international and area studies. I would like to introduce the members of the Board of Regents and ask them to all stand and remain standing that we might recognize and thank them. We have the Chair of the Board of Regents, Regent Steve Bentley; Vice Chair, Melvin Hall; Regent Dr. Halverstadt; Regent Noble; Regent G. T. Blankenship and Regent Lewis. Members of the Board of Regents: we appreciate your service to the University. I want to thank the members of the audience who prompted me during the introduction of the Board of Regents and thereby continuing my employment for at least another month at the University. I am hesitant to start introducing our speakers who have been with us, but I know some of them are still with us. Dr. Richard Sandor who was with us this afternoon—the inventor of the concept of financial futures. Dr. Sandor, we are very pleased to have had you with us. I have spotted Director Helms and Director Webster, former Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency. We are very glad that you are here. I just saw a moment ago a former presidential advisor, journalist, David Gergen, who's joined us. We are very honored, as you know, tomorrow to be focusing our interest on Asia and in particular our interest on Chinese-American relations. A critically important relationship to this country as we approach the next century. Speaking at noon

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tomorrow will be the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China to the United States. We are very honored to have him with us tonight here at dinner, His Excellency Li Daoyu. There are many others that will be with us on the program tomorrow, including several distinguished scholars: Jan Berris, the Vice President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations will be with us; Ambassador Francis McNeil, Senior Advisor to the Pacific Taskforce; Professor Michel Oksenberg from Stanford, Senior Fellow of the Asian Pacific Research Center; and Professor Zhou from the Center of American Studies at Fudan University will be with us tomorrow discussing our relationship with Asia. I wonder if the members of the panel might stand and let us thank you in advance for being with us. We are very appreciative that you are here.

Tonight is indeed special for us as we focus our attention on the subject at hand-- preparing our country to enter a new century, preparing ourselves indeed to enter a new millennium. More importantly, preparing our nation to adjust to all the changes in the world around us. I don't know if you are like I am, but as I have studied history I always wondered if those people that lived through remarkable times knew that they were living through them. Were those people living through the Renaissance aware of the fact that they were living through the Renaissance and that historians would judge to have been a Renaissance? Did those that lived through the Industrial Revolution realize that they were going through a pace of change that would, indeed, alter the ways in which society is organized and have profound sociological implications? That husbands and wives comes down to dinner in the morning and turn to each other and say, "Just think dear, we are living through the Industrial Revolution." I doubt it. Perhaps in that way we are different.

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We understand that we've lived through a period of change in the world that has been unprecedented in terms of the encapsulation of so much change in such a brief period. Very few decades have seen as much change as this, perhaps no decade. We have seen the changes of the political and economic systems of well over half the world. We've seen profound changes in the relationship to our own country and to the rest of the world. In many ways, everything indeed has changed. Knowing that we live through this period of enormous change and realizing that this will be one of the watershed periods of history as it will be judged by historians who will follow us. The question that confronts us is will we, honored with this knowledge and conscious of the fact that we're living through this remarkable times, make decisions that are better and wiser than those who have slumbered unconsciously through other great periods of history without realizing it? That is our challenge. Armed with this knowledge and armed with this understanding to make the right decisions that will make this world a safer place for our children and grandchildren.

About ten years ago there was a national experiment in elementary schools across the country. I was talking to Dr. Kissinger when he arrived this afternoon, and before we came over, about my first introduction to his work, reading *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* while I was a student in political science and international relations. That presence, that hair trigger, that delicate balance of power and terror that really typified the nuclear age was something that had an unconscious and profound impact on all of us. We realized what was about us. As this experiment was undertaken in elementary schools, students were asked to draw, in the third grade, anything that came to mind. It was a free drawing period. Ten years ago when children were given the right to draw anything that came to mind, over half of them, according to this

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experiment, drew pictures of mushroom clouds, missiles, elements of war, agents of mass
destruction. That same experiment was repeated last year. Virtually not a single child drew a
mushroom cloud or drew scenes of mass destruction.

We live in one of those incredible moments in the world rarely given to any generation in
which the world is not divided into two super power camps, in which we are given the opportunity
to act together. The great powers are given the opportunity to act together to secure a better
world in a way that an opportunity was not given to our parents or to our grandparents before us.

How long will this window of opportunity remain open? How quickly could it close with the rise
of nationalization fed by economic difficulty, for example, in the areas of the old Soviet Union?

How quickly could it end if fueled by mistrust and misunderstanding of the national pride and
sensitivities on each side— sensitivities to human rights and sensitivities to national sovereignty
between the United States and the People's Republic of China—two great nations whose
relationship are critically important as we enter the next century?

We understood who we were a few years ago. We were the leader of the free world. Our
job was to contain the spread of the Soviet empire and to secure the world from it. Who are we
now? What is our role? What is our place? What is our purpose? Thus far, there has been no
overriding architecture developed. There is not yet any new prism through which we can view
the world with all of its complexity and seek to understand it and bring order to it. That's our
task— this generation armed with the wisdom that we are living through incredible times.

That is the subject tonight we will address through the keynote address of a man who has
provided in many ways intellectual leadership for our country, particularly in the field of foreign

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affairs— dominated, in some ways, intellectual dialogue about our relations with other nations and their relations with each other for approximately three decades in the history of this country.

The intellectual history of this period is written. One of the great characters in it, his place already secured, will be our speaker tonight. He came to this country from Germany in 1938.

He later served his country in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946. Then, joined the Harvard faculty, which is the only blemish on his otherwise sterling record. He has written many major works of importance. The last being *Diplomacy*, which was finished in 1994. He is, at this point in time, working on another book on the general subject that is the focus of this conference. We will all look forward to reading it. He's a trustee of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. He is a trustee of the International Rescue Committee. He served as the National Security Advisor to the President of the United States from 1969 until 1975. He served as the 56th Secretary of State of this country. He has served since on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and the National Commission on Central America. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. He received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1977 and the Medal of Liberty in 1986. About 20 years ago he came to this campus. He came to this university to help us establish what is now known as the Associates Program. As I have indicated to him, this very special partnership— its alumni who've become Associates through their financial support of the University— has grown from some 600, which was the record at that time, to well over 2,300 tonight. He comes to a University that has changed in many ways. It is internationalized with students from all over the globe—104 nations, and with exchange relationships with faculty and students with over 90 universities around the world. He comes to a University that ranks first per capita of all public

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Dr. Henry Kissinger:

David and friends, an introduction like this puts me in the position in which I once found myself at a reception, where a lady came up to me and said, "I understand you're a fascinating man. Fascinate me." It turned into one of the less successful conversations that I have had. If David permits me, I would like to point out that among the list of my accomplishments, he did not point out that I was simultaneously National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. I mention this only because never before and never since have relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those days. I was here in Oklahoma at the first meeting of the Associates. The then president was enormously proud of the fact that he had assembled 630 people who would back the University and do so with significant contributions. Today, that number has quadrupled. I had the opportunity to visit the campus a little bit this afternoon and I believe that what has been accomplished here is an enormous tribute to the dedication of the President of this University and of the people of Oklahoma in backing

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their institution. I have personally, I can tell you, an iron rule. I never speak at Ivy League schools. I always accept invitations from friends like David in places that are strong and patriotic and where the faculty doesn't harass the speakers with reliving their youthful mistakes.

I am supposed to talk about the architecture of the 21st century foreign policy. One of my neighbors at the table pointed out to me that it is necessary to have a little compassion for those who haven't eaten yet and that there is an inevitable limit to the patience, which is difficult for somebody whose native language is German, because it's possible in that language to go on for long stretches without placing a verb. It is an enormous tribute to this University that so many individuals who have contributed to the thinking on foreign policy over the decades and to the conduct of foreign policy over the decades are assembled here. There was a time, hard to believe, when I knew nothing of the ways of Washington, when I was appointed National Security Advisor. One of the men from whom I learned most was Dick Helms, who was then Director of the CIA, who was always there when the going was tough, on whom one could always count, and who became involved in that period of self-hatred in which we were engaged— which he has happily transcended. Also, Bill Webster who contributed so much to stabilizing things in both the FBI and the CIA and has contributed greatly. Then, there are others— I am glad that I am speaking tonight so that you can accuse me of plagiarizing Mike Oksenberg and David Gergen, whom I've known over the years. They all have supplied a cadre of foreign policy thinking— sometimes disagreeing with each other, but always convinced that America's role in the world is crucial for peace, for progress, and for the well being of mankind. That role continues. But

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We have had a very unique history. We are the only major country in the world whose origin can be precisely dated. My son wrote a school play once about the Declaration of Independence which ended with the line--he was only 10, so you have to forgive him--one of the founders of the country said, "We better stop now it's the July 4th weekend." We are the only country whose history can be precisely dated. We are the only country, only major country, populated almost entirely by immigrants-- by immigrants who turned their back on their mother country and believed that they were creating here a new set of institutions dedicated to liberty, and believing that this had universal applicability to all of mankind. We are the only country, the only major country, that has never had a powerful neighbor. So, for the overwhelming part of our history, we believed that we could engage ourselves or not in foreign policy at our choice.

We involved ourselves against what we perceived to be overwhelming dangers. We thought we could withdraw into isolation when the danger was dealt with. Unique among the countries in the world, we believed that the key to permanent peace was to transform all other countries into our image. Until 1917, World War I was a traditional European War, more costly than its predecessors, but about familiar crisis. When we appeared on the scene, we announced that the transformation of government was the key to peace, that spreading democracy and the principle of self determination was the way to bring about universal reconciliation, a thought that had never been put forward by any other society and which we then refused to undertake after we had established a principle.

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For a long time, we produced nearly 50 percent of the world's gross national product. In those conditions, foreign policy was a challenge to the allocation of resources, not to the strategic design. Any problem we recognized as a problem we could overwhelm with resources. We presented every challenge, all the great initiatives of the post-war period, as terminal enterprises, which, once completed, would solve the problem.

I have discussed the history because we now find ourselves in an entirely different environment. We no longer have an atomic monopoly. Russia still has a large arsenal, though not as threatening as it was in the communist period. But nuclear weapons are beginning to spread around the world creating a substantially new set of challenges that all countries that have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons really must share together. Secondly, we still are the most significant economic power. But we now produce 20 to 22 percent of the world's GNPs.

Our resources are not enough for all conceivable challenges. Indeed, theoretically, were all the resources of the rest of the world marshalled by some hostile country, we would be overmatched.

Therefore, for the first time in our history, we face a realistic challenge to the balance of power.

We now have a national interest to prevent this marshalling from happening.

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in different worlds. They had no significant capacity to interact with each other. In the 18th and 19th century world history, indeed, until the middle of the 20th century, was dominated from Europe and then from the north Atlantic. Today, every part of the world participates in international affairs. Major powers are developing in different regions and this presents us with two challenges. One— how does one define a major power under present conditions? And secondly— how do we manage their interaction? Third— for the first time in history, events can be observed as they occur. Communications straddle the globe in real time. Fourth— the world is linked integrally, not only by communications, but by economics. A few years ago, an obscure bank clerk in Singapore, brought down one of the oldest banks in England and nearly sparked an international financial crisis. Indeed, for any student of economic affairs, there are two nightmares. One— that the systems break down because of different conceptions by different parts of the system. But even worse, that everybody comes to the same conclusion simultaneously and rushes to the same side of the boat and capsizes it. It's an even worse danger. How, under those conditions, can one deal with the automoticity of the systems we have developed?

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aspect and it is compounded by the revolution in information that is taking place as we shift from
learning from books to learning from pictures via computers and television. Book knowledge
requires concepts. Picture knowledge is based on impression. Computer knowledge produces
an extraordinary accumulation of facts, unheard of, unimaginable in any previous period, but it
does not help you, necessarily, to understand the significance of these facts or even less, the
trends on which, finally, political judgement depends. The 19th century German statesman,
Bismarck, who was considered to be a principal architect of what is called real politic, a policy
based on the balance of power— nevertheless said— the best a statesman can do is to listen
carefully to the footsteps of God through history. Get ahold of the hem of his cloak and walk with
him a few steps of the way. No modern politician, that I know, can even begin to think in this
manner. Therefore, it becomes very hard for them to deal with the multiplicity of challenges that
our nation faces.

Our experience is an idealistic one. There is no other nation that has ever undertaken so
many great projects on an essentially altruistic basis. When I was a young professor, I had an
appointment with President Truman. Quite overawed, I asked him what he did of which he was
most proud. He said, "I am most proud of the fact that we completely defeated our enemies in
the war and then we brought them back to the community of nations as equals. I would like to
think that only Americans would have done that." I think he was right. That was our historic
experience and our historic achievement.

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confront a military challenge. We don't confront an overwhelming ideological challenge. The question we have to answer is what are we trying to do and why? We do that under extremely difficult circumstances. I served in government during a tragic period in the Vietnam War— in which America engaged itself in a distant enterprise for what I believe were the noblest of motives. We did not understand the limitations of our reach. We applied principles to regions that we had never studied, on the basis that our principles were of universal applicability. Having launched ourselves on the basis of universal principles those of us who wanted to extricate us on the basis of the practicality of the situation were assaulted by those who wanted to turn it into a great moral issue of the failings of America— which is what the protest movement was really about and where I parted company. It was the watershed.

But now, we find ourselves in this situation. There are many who believe that all we need to do is to restore the pristine innocence of our period when we were protected by two great oceans. Economics was not yet global and we could choose our involvement. And therefore, our political parties now are very split. In my day, difficult as it was, there was a coherent administration which could appeal to the opposition and usually achieve a great deal of support— whether the administration was Democrat or Republican. Today, every party is split into a radical and an extreme conservative wing. Neither administration, nor opposition, have found a clear foothold. Each of them are looking for some issue which turns foreign policy into an aspect of domestic politics, which is a long term disaster. What we must do is to try to reestablish some national consensus. We cannot be embarrassed to ask what our national interest is. Without

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it we have no yardsticks. Of course, our national interest includes the preservation not just of our
well being, but also of our values. All of life, including foreign policy, involves a balancing of
various considerations. The other day I spoke at a denominational school. A young lady brought
up by a Baptist preacher father, asked me what I thought at home, because he did not want to send
her to school. She asked me, "Is there no morality in foreign policy among statesman?"

And my answer. . . . (End of Tape)

Side Two

....unless you have some convictions about your society and its role in the world. The
President and the Secretary of State get the 50.1 against the 49.9 cases and you can do it only on
the basis of assessments that you cannot prove when you make them. Therefore, it depends in
an ultimate sense, on your convictions. Also, as a statesman, you must achieve your goal in
stages. You cannot reach it in one jump. Every step is imperfect in relation to an absolute value.
That is the dilemma. This is what we now face. It becomes now complicated when we consider
that in different parts of the world we face different issues.

With respect to Europe and the Western Hemisphere, we deal with countries with
comparable histories, similar values, countries which do not look at each other as strategic. In
those regions we can practice the methods with which we are most familiar, and therefore I
strongly feel that we have neglected building on the cohesion of the Western Hemisphere and the
North Atlantic area.

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In relation to Russia, we deal with a more complex case— a country of continental size, quite different background. One is communist, historically imperialist, whose identity has been tied up with expansion. One of the disputes in policy with respect to Russia is this— some believe that our challenge must be to bring about democracy in Russia. I would certainly like to see that happen. I also believe that, historically, the Russian tragedy has been that they have not been able to find security in their own development and that therefore— convincing Russian leaders that if Singapore, Japan, Austria and almost every country in the world could grow and develop without expansion— that this is a possibility for a country with eleven time zones that should therefore not feel inherently claustrophobic. But we have to understand how to conduct these policies simultaneously.

Therefore, I would like to spend the remainder of our time on China which is the issue which is immediately before us because of the visit of the Chinese president. Some of you may know that the current administration was my second choice in the last election. Nevertheless, I strongly support the initiative they have taken. I am urging all my friends to cooperate in making this visit a success.

The Chinese historic experience is quite different from ours. They have five thousand years of recorded history whose beginning is lost in the midst of time. They believe that they have gotten through 4,800 years of this history without significant advice about their domestic structure from the United States. It is not taken for granted that we are necessarily competent to teach them. Secondly, there is a different historical perspective. If I asked one of

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I had the privilege of visiting China for the first time in 1971. The transformation from those days is unbelievable. If anyone had described to me as late as 1979- just the physical appearance of cities and the difference in style of life of the population- I would not have believed that possible. So, whatever one can say about China, the quality of life of its population has greatly improved. Without any doubt, things have occurred in China that none of us would have recommended or approved. Without any question, there are differences in perception between China and the United States. The question is whether the most populous country in the world and the most technologically advanced country in the world have a basis for cooperation.

Now, it has become part of our political process, almost, to argue that China is our next enemy- that they are growing at the rate of 10 percent a year- and that sooner or later they will take us on and that we should anticipate this. Also, that its domestic institutions must be altered

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President Nixon, and to some extent I, as his associate, have been given credit for creating an opening to China. That is actually not fully deserved because the opening would have happened anyway. We did it perhaps a little more elegantly, a little faster, but it was dictated by reality and the Chinese wanted it very much too. What we did do for which, in my view, we do deserve credit, is that we managed to distinguish the essential from the peripheral. When you read accounts of that period, it is said that Nixon and I took these things into the White House away

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from the established institutions. That isn't actually true. The established institutions began the dialogue in Warsaw. The Chinese said to us that they wanted us to come to Beijing. Whereupon the State Department prepared three huge loose leaf notebooks of what we should discuss—arms control, claims and assets, communications—all the immunities, visa requirements. And they had another big book—whom we should brief about this. President Nixon said, "They're going to kill this baby before it's born." That's when it wandered into the White House. What was important was that we talked to the Chinese leaders about the structure of the international order as we understood it. They talked to us in an extraordinary way. Part of the reason was that we were lucky. There was no contact. There was no commerce. There was really nothing to talk about except important things. This was the foundation of a relationship that worked quite well for nearly 20 years. Even the issue of Taiwan was handled in a manner in which a territory, historically a province of China, was nevertheless not permitted to be an obstacle to an improvement of our political relations.

Now this is challenging this today. In Asia, we are dealing with a whole set of nations in a process of rapid transformation. Japan is surely moving in a more national direction as the single threat of the Soviet Union disappears. It is bound to look at Korea and at other neighboring regions from a somewhat different perspective than we do. India is moving to a great power status. Southeast Asia is growing. All these nations think of each other, to some extent, as possible strategic opponents. In this condition, why should the United States anoint one of these countries as our permanent enemy. There is absolutely no question that if any nation—China,

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Japan, India— any nation in Asia seeks the domination of all of Asia, that the United States will oppose it. With all my love for China, if China were to do this I would urge opposing it. But this is not the situation today. It need not be the situation in any foreseeable future. It must not be the situation without an attempt of carefully analyzing by both sides how the world should evolve.

So, I hope that as this visit evolves we will distinguish the important from the peripheral and start a dialogue which will be of tremendous importance for the peace of the world.

We have many other problems. We have Bosnia. We have many other regions. But I wanted to give you a conceptual view of the challenge we face as a nation. I have a Chinese friend, former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, who claims there exists a Chinese proverb. As he claims (because I sometimes suspect that our Chinese friends invent these proverbs as they go along to intimidate us poor westerners), allegedly, the proverb goes like this:

"When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems aren't dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems and little problems will not disturb us." That is our big challenge. We are still the nation on which, globally, more depends than any other. The challenge we face is whether we can distinguish little problems from big problems and whether we can unite in dealing with them. Thank you very much.

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President Boren:

Dr. Kissinger:

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Secondly, the stability of the gulf at a time when we are based on one country, Saudi Arabia, opposing the two overwhelming countries in the area, and at a time when our relations with Turkey have not received the attention that they deserve, those are the two issues that I would put before the Arab-Israeli issue.

On the Arab-Israeli issue I think I was at least one of the inventors of this step-by-step approach, which was based on the fear 20 years ago. Any attempt to make a comprehensive solution was bound to blow up the whole region at a time when we were facing an energy crisis, a Soviet opposition, and no real preparation in the Arab world. This step-by-step approach has been very successful for 20 years. Obviously, the more steps you take the fewer steps are left.

I believe now at this point it is senseless when talking about the West Bank to continue this step-by-step approach. The whole area of the West Bank is 50 miles from Jordan to the sea. How thin can you slice the salami and what progress do you make by debating whether the Israelis should give up 8 percent of the territory, 10 percent of the territory in the next slice, after which the Israelis know there will be another slice. Therefore, I believe there is only one negotiation now that we are doing— which is to determine what are the final borders. Israeli has not yet ever been willing to accept the Palestinian state, but the whole rest of the world treats Arafat as if he were the head of a Palestinian unit. I believe that if we want to make a contribution we should stop the out-flow process and move to a final negotiation and exert our influence in that direction.

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Question:

Dr. Kissinger:

We, as Americans, treat the Bosnian conflict as a political issue. In reality, it is a religious issue. These three nations don't only hate each other in the abstract, they have existed in opposition to each other. The Serbs have existed in order to fight Islam and preserve the Orthodox faith. The Croats have existed for the same reason, but also to resist the Serb Orthodox; and both of them consider the Moslems, who are ethnically of the same group, as turncoats. Therefore, the problem that we face in Bosnia is this— we did a useful thing in ending the war for humanitarian reasons. Terrible things were committed in the name of ethnic

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cleansing. Now, the three regions are more or less ethnically homogeneous. I have great difficulty in understanding why we want to melt them together, why we should insist that those three groups must live together. I am very opposed to risking American lives to bring about a shotgun wedding of these three groups. I believe that the principle of self-determination ought to be applied to them. If they choose to live together, of course, but I am afraid.

We are sliding ourselves into a situation in which our objectives are not backed by resources and in which our public will not support what will be needed to achieve the objective which I consider the classic Viet Nam syndrome. For all of these reasons, I believe we have some humanitarian concern in preserving the existing dividing lines. I would be willing to see that happening for a bit and maybe it should be done by volunteers, rather than by people who are assigned by it. I am extremely uneasy about the incompatibility between our military provisions of the Dayton Agreement which separate the three groups and the political provisions which will try to unify them. We are having an election there now which has absurd aspects.

Incidentally, I was in favor of intervening six years ago when the ethnic cleansing started, so I am not supporting ethnic cleansing. But, now that it has been done—to say refugees must go back— means that civil war has to start all over again. There are elections going on now in which you can vote by absentee ballot in regions from which you were expelled. The weird aspect is that, for example in the Krajina, a part of the Croatia took away from the Serbs — where no Serbs are living — several towns have a Serb majority on the voting roles although there are no Serbs living there. Who is going to enforce the results of this election? I would strongly urge

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President Boren:

Question:

Dr. Kissinger:

I believe in that in communist states the definition of human rights is quite different from our definition human rights. I also don't think that China is a communist state of the kind that we have known in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. On the economic level, and on the day to day living level, the condition of the Chinese people has enormously improved in the 20 years

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Question:

Dr. Kissinger:

One difference I have with many foreign policies is this. They would like to apply our human rights values in regions where they are being rejected. I would like to apply them in

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regions where they have been accepted and try to create a more coherent structure in the Western Hemisphere and in the North Atlantic area. There we do not have to intervene in the domestic structures fundamentally, and we can build on what exists and try to create through performance a demonstration of what democracies can achieve working together. I, therefore, have strongly favored the administration's proposal of a free trade area for the Western Hemisphere, and I would like to see a North Atlantic free trade area. On the other hand, like many other things, the proposal has never been followed up by any concrete policies and right now it is languishing, because the fast track authority, without which it cannot be implemented, is before the Congress.

It depends whether a fast track authority can be granted and that in fact it can be used. When you talk about Colombia and Mexico, you undoubtedly are referring to the drug problem. It is a nightmarish problem. Nobody has come up with a brilliant solution to it because what happens in these societies in which drugs become so prominent is that the drug dealers have much greater resources than the state, and they can therefore pay off the police and the military forces. I haven't had many conversations with Colombians, but in Mexico they tend to speak of the disappearing truck. That is, the United States can follow a truck filled with drugs all the way through Mexico and as soon as it crosses the border into Juarez it disappears, and so they imply that there must be a little corruption on our side as well. I think drugs is a problem, not just of production but also of consumption. We've put a lot of effort on production. I have no brilliant ideas of what to do. I am in favor of the toughest measures, and ideally one should create some sort of Western Hemisphere military force that can attack these drug producing areas because the

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President Boren:

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among works will be speaking to us lessons of the Roman Empire for the United States is a super
power of the 21st century. We are really honored that Colleen McCullough, distinguished author,
scientist, artist is with us tonight. Will you please stand? We are so pleased that you are with
us tonight. She will also be taking off her political and historian hat and will be speaking as a
writer at a small roundtable meeting with some of our students and faculty at Boyd House
tomorrow evening. Before we commence the dinner together and our time of visiting, and I hope
you will not rush away, but take time to enjoy each other's company and to carry on the
conversation that has begun so eloquently with Dr. Kissinger. Please look at the back of the
program. I would like to thank all of those who are corporate sponsors, foundations and
individual sponsors who have made this exceptional event possible at the University of Oklahoma.

I would like to have all the representatives of our sponsors to stand and let all us as a University
family thank them for providing the resources to make this evening possible and our two-day
conference possible. Thank you very much.

28

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November 4, 1997

# PREPARING AMERICA'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

## Table of Contents

Page

### Foreword

Paul Kennedy

### Chapter 1 - Preface and Introduction: The Context and The Challenge

David L. Boren

(Note: consists of essay on the context and challenge, and closes with description of IPC conference, internationalization of OU, and the purposes of the book.)

## PART I - THE STATE OF THE WORLD AS WE ENTER THE 21ST CENTURY

### Overview by Gaddis Smith

### Chapter 2 - Europe

James L. Hoagland

### Chapter 3 - Western Hemisphere

James R. Jones

### Chapter 4 - Russia and the CIS

Jack F. Matlock

### Chapter 5 - Africa

Edward J. Perkins

### Chapter 6 - Middle East

Prince Bandar (To be written)

Peter W. Rodman

i

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Robert M. Gates

Chapter 14 - A Strategic Look at Intelligence in the Future

George J. Tenet

Chapter 15 - The Role and Organization of Intelligence in the 21st Century

John Milewski
David L. Boren
Robert H. Cox
Richard M. Helms
R. James Woolsey
William H. Webster

Chapter 16 - Comment and Discussion

Stephen Sloan
Audience/speakers - Questions and Answers

PART IV - TRADE POLICY AND PREPARING AMERICA'S ECONOMY FOR THE
21ST CENTURY

Overview by Richard A. Cosier

Chapter 17 - U.S. Trade Policy in the 21st Century

Clayton K. Yeutter

Chapter 18 - Trade Sanctions

Luke R. Corbett - Pluses and Minuses in U.S. Foreign Policy
Archie Dunham

Chapter 19 - Trade Organizations

John S. Wolf

Chapter 20 - Strengthening the U.S. Economy for International Competition

Michael F. Price

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Chapter 21 - Comment and Discussion

W. DeVier Pierson
Max N. Berry

# PART V - THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Overview by Zev M. Trachtenberg

Chapter 22 - United States Role in International Environmental Policy

Richard L. Sandor

Chapter 23 - Comment and Discussion

Rajeev Gowda
Audience/speakers - Questions and Answers

# PART VI - THE MEDIA AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Overview by David Dary

Chapter 24 - The Media and International Relations and Foreign Policy

David R. Green

Chapter 25 - Comment and Discussion

Lee Cullum
David Dary
Lois Romano
Audience/speakers - Questions and Answers

# PART VII - AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Overview by Edwin G. Corr

Chapter 26 - (Title?)

Richard Cheney (Being re-written)

Chapter 27 - Protecting and Defining our National Security in a Changed World

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Sam Nunn

Chapter 28 - The Direct Use of Military Force: Criteria for Intervention

Robert Oakly (To be written)

Chapter 29 - United States' Relations with Nations Emerging as World Leaders

Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

Chapter 30 - U.S. Global Policy: Toward an Agile Strategy

David M. Abshire (Being written)

Chapter 31 - (Title?)

Zbigniew Brzezinski (To be written)

Chapter 32 - (Title?)

Lawrence S. Eagleburger (To be written)

Chapter 33 - The Architecture of an American Foreign Policy for the 21st Century

Henry A. Kissinger

(Note: The order of these co-authors will be altered to fit the "logical" presentation of their material.)

## PART VIII - CONCLUSIONS

David L. Boren

## EPILOGUE - THE LESSONS OF THE ROMAN EXPERIENCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Coleen McCullough with Comments by Alfred S. Bradford and J. Rufas Fears

## PART IX - REFERENCE FOR THE READER

v

University of Oklahoma Press publishing program

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UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS
PUBLISHING PROGRAM

The University of Oklahoma Press is dedicated to the publication of outstanding scholarly works by national and international scholars. The major editorial goal of the Press is to maintain its position as a preeminent publisher of books about the West and the American Indian while expanding its program in other scholarly disciplines, including archaeology, classical studies, energy studies, language and literature, natural sciences, political science, and women's studies.

Series currently published by the Press include:

* American Exploration and Travel Series

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* Animal Natural History Series

* Bruce Alonzo Goff Series in Creative Architecture

* Centers of Civilization Series

* Civilization of the American Indian Series

* Congressional Studies Series

* D'Arcy McNickle Center Bibliographies in American Indian History

* Gilcrease-Oklahoma Series on Western Art and Artists

* Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series

* Legal History of North America

* Oklahoma Museum of Natural History Publications

* Oklahoma Project for Discourse and Theory

* Oklahoma Series in Classical Culture

* Oklahoma Western Biographies

* Variorum Chaucer

* Western Frontier Library

The University of Oklahoma Press publishing program

How to submit a manuscript proposal

How to prepare a manuscript

How to submit illustrations and maps for your manuscript

How to obtain permissions for quotations and illustrations

Home Page | Fall 97 Books | Spring 97 Books | Complete Catalog | Series Lists | Order Info | Author Appearances | Exhibits

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· University of Oklahoma Press - MS Submission

http://www.ou.edu/oupress/howto.htm

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS
HOW TO SUBMIT A MANUSCRIPT PROPOSAL

Our decision to publish a book is based chiefly upon its contribution to knowledge in fields compatible with our list, sound scholarship, clear writing style, and financial feasibility.

Manuscripts and manuscript proposals are often solicited by the Press. For unsolicited inquiries we prefer to receive:

1. a letter of inquiry, directed to the Editor-in-Chief or the appropriate Acquisitions Editor, that briefly describes the manuscript, its approximate length, including number and kinds of illustrations, its purpose, and its relationship to other books in its field;

2. the author's qualifications to write such a book;

3. the contents; and

4. a sample chapter.

When we have evaluated your proposal, we will contact you. If we wish to pursue the project, we will ask to see the complete manuscript. Unless we are told otherwise, we assume that, while we are considering the manuscript for publication, no other publisher has it under consideration.

Manuscripts that pass initial in-house scrutiny are evaluated by experts in the subject area and are then considered by an in-house Editorial Committee. Authors of those manuscripts not recommended for publication are informed immediately. Those manuscripts still under consideration are either presented to the Press's Faculty Advisory Board or returned to the author for revision and later submission. When resubmitted, the manuscript again goes to the Editorial Committee; if approved, it is presented to the Faculty Advisory Board. If the Board approves publication, a contract is drawn up between the author and the Press. An in-house decision to publish a book is usually made in three to six months, depending on the length and complexity of the manuscript and the availability of readers.

Manuscript proposals should be directed to the appropriate editor at the University of Oklahoma Press, 1005 Asp Avenue, Norman, Oklahoma, 73019-6051:

John Drayton, Editor-in-Chief: History of the American West

Kimberly War, Senior Acquisitions Editor: Women's studies, political science, animal natural history, classics, contemporary American Indian fiction and critical studies, Literature of the American West

Randolph Lewis, Acquisitions Editor: American Indian studies, Mesoamerican studies

Ron Chrisman, Paperback Acquisitions Editor: Paperback reprints of previously published works in the

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University of Oklahoma Press - MS prep

http://www.ou.edu/oupress/preparems.html

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS
HOW TO PREPARE A MANUSCRIPT

Following the acceptance and contracting of a manuscript for publication, the Press requests the submission of two typed copies and, if available, IBM-compatible disks with the name of software indicated, along with all illustrative materials in the form in which they will be reproduced and permission to reproduce them.

All materials should be typed double spaced, including elements such as extended quotations, the notes, the bibliography, and illustration legends. The notes, the bibliography, and the legends should each be typed separate from the text. All materials should be prepared in accordance with The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition. (Exceptions to the style recommended by the Chicago Manual may be made in consultation with the Press, if other manuals are used consistently.) Observing the following guidelines will greatly facilitate the movement of your manuscript through editing and production.

A. Preparing your manuscript

B. Preparing an electronic manuscript

C. Matters of punctuation and style

A. In preparing your manuscript, follow these rules:

1. When typing or running out of copy, use any 8 1/2 x 11-inch white paper excluding onionskin. Do not use erasable paper. Computer printouts should be run out from letter-quality printers. Italics should be indicated by the use of underlining. Submit the original and one high-quality copy, and retain one copy for your files.

2. Maintain consistent 1- to 1-1/2 inch margins on all sides. Leave at least 3 inches at the top of the first page of a chapter.

3. Type on only one side of the paper. Do not strike over mistyped letters.

4. Number all manuscript pages consecutively with Arabic numerals in the upper right-hand corner.

5. Double space all materials, including notes, extracts, and bibliography.

6. Set off direct quotations of more than eight to ten typed lines from the text by indenting from each margin, using no opening or closing quotation marks. Shorter quotations should be run into the text, with quotation marks used.

7. Double space tables and source information. Type the source information beneath the table. Double space titles above tables.

8. Double space legends for maps, tables, and other illustrations. Mark placement of these elements by numbers in the left margins of the manuscript (as: Table 1). Type the legends for the different kinds of illustrations separately, including the numbers if the illustrations are numbered. Also prepare lists of plates, figures, maps, and tables to follow the Contents page in the front matter.

9. Do not use pins, tape, or staples. Do not use pens or colored pencils on any part of the manuscript. For minor additions or

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corrections, print legibly with a sharpened number-2 pencil; for major changes, type insert on separate page, label with previous page number and A, indicate insertion on text page (as: see 134A), and place insert after text page.

10. Follow a simple, consistent pattern for indicating headings and subheadings. Type all headings in capital and lower-case letters, never all in capitals. No terminal periods are necessary for heads.

11. Never use all caps for authors' names in bibliographies or notes.

**B. In preparing an electronic manuscript, please also observe the following guidelines from the Association of American University Presses' booklet, "Preparing Your Electronic Manuscript":

1. Prepare your manuscript on the same system--both hardware and software--from start to finish.

2. Name files sequentially: title.01fm, title.02chap1, title03.chap2, etc. A list of file names submitted with your disks is helpful.

3. Front matter, bibliography, and other apparatus should be in separate files.

4. Notes should be grouped together in one or more separate files following the text, not at the bottoms of pages or at the ends of chapters, unless you are instructed otherwise. If your word-processing software has the capability to do on-page footnotes, please do not use it. The notes should be all together, in a separate file or files, grouped and numbered by chapter, double-spaced, with no extra spaces between notes.

5. Keep all formatting to a minimum. Book designers will determine treatment of elements, and most if not all formatting must be removed before typesetting can begin, which can be time-consuming and costly. If you do use any formatting, make certain you are consistent. The best solution might be to print out your hard copy with the formatting you intend, then delete all formatting from your disks before sending them to the publisher.

6. Once you have printed out the final manuscript (hard copy), do not make any further corrections to the computer files. Any further changes should be made on the hard copy in a contrasting color of ink.

7. Do not put "soft" hyphens at the ends of lines; i.e., do not break words. In fact, it's best to turn off the automatic hyphenation feature on your word-processing software. The only hyphens in your manuscript should be in hyphenated compound words.

8. Do not use running heads.

9. Do not put any extra spaces between paragraphs or between notes or bibliographical entries, or before and after an extract. Introduce extra vertical space only where extra space is to appear in the book to indicate a semantic break.

10. Use the tab key, not the space bar, to indent paragraphs, and the indent key, not the tab key or the space bar, to indent extracts and epigraphs. Make sure that the size of the indent is consistent throughout the manuscript. Use the tab key for columns.

11. Use one space after colons, and one space after periods at the

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ends of sentences. If you are so accustomed to using two that you find it impossible to use one consistently, then use two, consistently.

12. Type everything paragraph style. Even if you can hang-indent with your word-processing system, do not do so.

13. Use two hyphens for a dash, with no space before, between, or after the hyphens.

14. Your word processor's codes for superscripts may be used.

15. When several words in a row are to be underlined, issue the underlining command at the beginning of the first word and turn it off at the end of the last word; do not issue separate underlining commands for each word.

16. Hard carriage returns should be used only at the ends of paragraphs and at the ends of items in lists and lines of poetry.

17. Never use letters for numbers, or vice versa; i.e., don't type the lowercase "l" for the number one or the letter "O" for zero.

18. If there are tables in your manuscript, make certain you have an accurate printout of them so the typesetter can easily follow the format. Use tabs, not hard spaces, to define columns, and avoid tables with more than ten columns.

19. If your manuscript has accented letters or special characters that are not available on your computer, provide a list of them and indicate how you have manually marked them.

20. In printing out materials, use a standard font with ten characters per inch. Do not use variable spacing, and do not justify right-hand margins. Print out manuscript using a 300 dpi or better laser printer.

21. Never use paper clips on computer disks.

### C. In matters of punctuation and style, consult *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th edition. Please note especially the following:

1. Place commas and final periods inside quotation marks. Other punctuation marks go outside unless they are a part of the quotation.

2. Use three spaced periods (ellipses) to show an intentional omission within a sentence. To show an omission at the end of a sentence, use three spaced periods in addition to the sentence's terminal punctuation.

3. Use a comma before the final conjunction in a series.

4. Type hyphens and dashes without spacing before and after these punctuation marks. Type two hyphens to indicate a dash.

5. Avoid the use of sexist, racist, or other biased language; when in doubt about the former, consult *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing*, 2d edition, by Casey Miller and Kate Swift.

6. It is University of Oklahoma Press preferred style to use "American Indian" rather than "Native American."

7. Note that an author's preface is concerned with the assembling of the book. It may include reasons for undertaking the work, the method of research, acknowledgments (unless these are sufficiently lengthy to merit a separate section), and, sometimes, a reference to permissions granted. An author's introduction provides a context and background for the subject of the book, and may be placed in the front matter or at the beginning of the text depending on how closely it is

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related to the text.

8. In documentation, use one of the note systems described in The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition, aiming for the minimal information needed to distinguish sources. The University of Oklahoma Press prefers that place and date of publication and name of publisher be omitted in all notes, including first references to works, with complete citations listed in the bibliography. Bibliographical entries should include names of publishers. The bibliography should be arranged so that the readers will find a source easily where only the author and (possibly) short title are cited in a note.

How to prepare a manuscript

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Updated: 01-Dec-97

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University of Oklahoma Press - MS Illustrations

http://www.ou.edu/oupRESS/illus.htm

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS
HOW TO SUBMIT ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
FOR YOUR MANUSCRIPT

1. Choose photographs carefully, bearing in mind that they are almost always reduced somewhat in the finished book, and also that they are almost never improved in the printing. Look for good contrast and clear focus. We recognize, however, that sometimes it may be necessary to use historical photographs of lesser quality.

2. Avoid using illustrations from books. They will not reproduce well. If you have found a significant photograph or painting in a book, look for a credit line that will tell you where the original is and obtain a glossy print from that source.

3. Never write on the backs of photographs if doing so can be avoided. To identify a photograph, tape a written or typed identification on white paper to the photo with Scotch Magic Transparent tape or attach a gummed flap that will show when the illustration is photographed for reproduction. If you must write on the back of a photograph, use a number-2B or softer pencil with a light pressure and write as close as possible to the edge of the image.

4. Indicate "top" at the top of all illustrations, including all base maps and map overlays. Cropping is best done by the designer, though any concerns you may have about cropping can be conveyed in writing to the editor.

5. Never use paper clips on photographs.

6. We do not routinely publish in color, as the cost can be prohibitive. If color is used, however, transparencies are preferable for color illustrations, and the best sizes are four inches by five inches or two inches by two inches. Printed color photographs from a book or magazine are nearly impossible to reproduce satisfactorily and should be avoided. If you are printing your own color photographs or having a professional photographer print them, be sure to include a gray scale or color bar in the edge of each photograph. Converting color prints to black and white is generally unsatisfactory, but you may often be successful in converting color slides to acceptable black-and-white prints.

7. If you are preparing original graphics for your book, it is best to consult with your editor before you begin, demonstrating your ideas with preliminary sketches. Lettering is best done by having type set and pasted onto your finished drawing. Please consult with your editor before having type set so that an appropriate typeface can be chosen. Bear in mind that names should be spelled the same on maps and in charts as they are in the text. Always give your editor the original artwork, not photographs.

8. Unless you are a trained cartographer, the best solution to providing maps is to make very clean, accurate drawings with pencil and hire a professional to draw the finished maps under your supervision. Be sure that everything is correctly located and

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