-6-

deterrence. Relying heavily upon the striking power of SAC, we
attempt to seal off the major avenues of attack open to the com-
munists. At the same time, we reduce the burden of our defense
by focusing our expenditures on what appears to be the most ef-
ficacious arm of the military services, and we release energies
and resources for other and more congenial tasks of foreign and
domestic policy. The United States gains the opportunity to con-
centrate its forces and place the communist world on the defensive.
Certain risks are taken but the initiative is obtained; we reach a
position from which to channel the future course of events in direc-
tions of our own choosing.

These, in truth, may be sound strategic principles, but
whether they are susceptible to practice depends upon the answers
to two questions: first, what requirements must be fulfilled in
order for such a policy of deterrence to be effective; secondly, are
conditions at the present time such that these requirements can be
fulfilled?

IV. The Requirements of Deterrence

In order to evaluate a doctrine like that of massive retaliation it is essential to understand what is involved in a policy of deterrence. Essentially, deterrence means preventing certain types of contingencies from arising. To achieve this objective it becomes necessary to communicate in some way to a prospective antagonist what is likely to happen to him should he create the situation in question. The expectation is that, confronted with this prospect, he will be deterred from taking the action that is regarded as inimical--at least so long as other less intolerable alternatives are open to him.

A deterrence policy thus constitutes a special kind of forecast: a forecast about the costs and risks that will be run under certain conditions, and the advantages that will be gained if those conditions are avoided. The forecast can be made in various ways: by a public statement such as Mr. Dulles delivered; by some pattern of behavior which will lead the antagonist to deduce our intended course of action in various contingencies; or by some combination of diplomatic and other means.

The forecast of intentions can be meant in all seriousness
or it can be in the nature of a bluff. Whichever it is should deter-
mine to a considerable extent the formulation and communication

-7-

of the policy. Presumably the precision of the forecast and the
manner in which it is communicated will vary with the willingness
to live up to the expressed intentions. But whether the forecast
is intended or is a bluff, a very real risk and some serious poten-
tial costs are attached to a policy of deterrence. The risk is that,
despite our best efforts, the antagonist will challenge us to make
good on our threat. If we do so, we will have to accept the con-
sequences of executing our threatened action. If we back down
and let the challenge go unheeded, we will suffer losses of prestige,
we will decrease our capacity for instituting effective deterrence
policies in the future, and we will encourage the opponent to take
further actions of a detrimental character. This kind of cost can
be almost as serious as the cost attached to a fulfillment of the
forecast.

In order to minimize this risk, with its attached costs, and
at the same time preserve the effectiveness of the policy, it be-
comes necessary to surround the proposal with an air of credibility.
In this connection it must be remembered that a large and varied
audience will be observing our behavior and that the reactions of
this audience will be crucial to the success or failure of the policy.
For the purposes of this discussion, the audience may be broken
down very simply into enemy, domestic, and allied categories.

Dealing first with the enemy audience, it is quite obvious
that we must know specifically who the opponent is in order to make
our policy meaningful to him. If, for example, the Viet Minh had
a considerable measure of autonomy from Moscow and Peiping, it
might be quite useless to threaten the destruction of those two
cities for the purpose of deterring an attack on Laos, Cambodia,
or South Vietnam.

But, assuming a knowledge of the antagonist's identity,
there are three main areas in which credibility must be established:
the areas of capability, cost, and intentions. The enemy must be
persuaded that we have the capability to act; that, in acting, we
could inflict costs greater than the advantages to be won from
attaining the objective; and that we really would act as specified in
the stated contingency.

Potential as against actual capability cannot be regarded
as a convincing instrument of deterrence in the present state of
affairs. Nor is it enough simply to have a certain number of
planes supplied with fission and fusion bombs. The enemy must
be persuaded not only that the instrument exists but also that its

[LC]

-8-

power is operational--in the case of SAC, for example, that it
can get through to its targets and inflict a most burdensome cost
upon him.

Even if capability and cost requirements can be fulfilled,
there remains the difficult and delicate problem of making inten-
tions credible. An intelligent opponent--and it would be dangerous
indeed to postulate a stupid one in dealing with the communist
world--may be expected to use three main sources of information
about the intentions of a country such as the United States: its
past record of performance in comparable contingencies; the
statements and behavior of its government; and the attitudes of
public opinion, both domestic and allied. A policy of deterrence
consistent with the country's recent behavior in the international
arena is likely to seem much more plausible than one which con-
stitutes a sharp break with tradition. Similarly, the credibility
of the policy will vary with the degree of consistency in the speech
and action of the government and its executive agencies. Nothing
can be more crippling to a policy of deterrence than to have the
statements of the Secretary of State contradicted or reinterpreted
by other officials of national standing. Nor will official statements
seem convincing if actions are being taken simultaneously to null-
ify the statements, or if nothing concrete is being done to support
them.

Finally, and perhaps most important in the realm of
intentions, a policy of deterrence will seem credible only to the
extent that important segments of public opinion in domestic and
allied countries support it. In democratic nations, especially,
the process of formulating policy is much more than the enuncia-
tion of intentions by governmental leaders. Before those intentions
can be regarded as policy, there must be genuine evidence of
popular support for them from the country at large. This con-
sideration suggests a rather crucial and specific requirement
that a policy of deterrence must fulfill. Its potential costs must
seem worth incurring. In other words, there must be some
relationship between the value of the objective sought and the costs
involved in its attainment. A policy of deterrence which does not
fulfill this requirement is likely to result only in deterring the
deterrer.

V. Existing Conditions of Deterrence

If these are the requirements that a policy of deterrence
must fulfill in order to be credible, and hence effective, it must

-9-

[LC]

now be asked whether or not the conditions have existed--or indeed can be created--in which the doctrine of massive retaliation would accomplish the task assigned to it by Mr. Dulles.

In the realm of capabilities it does appear as though we have, in the instrumentalities of SAC, our carrier-based air forces, and our fission and fusion bombs, the means to inflict damage of an incalculable character upon the Soviet Union and of a much lesser extent upon Red China and the satellite countries. However, several factors are now working to limit their utility. SAC's plans and operations still depend to a large extent on the availability of foreign bases. Consequently, the use of the Sunday punch is subject to some definite constraints. It is quite clear, moreover, that the Soviets are working hard on their active and passive defense measures, and are developing a powerful strategic air force of their own. It may be safe to assume that SAC will get through to its targets now and in the immediate future; but we must also assume that the Soviet strategic air force will be able to retali ate against us with equal devastation. In other words, given these capability conditions, we must face up to the fact that, if we are challenged to fulfill the threat of massive retaliation, we will be likely to suffer costs as great as those we inflict.

An examination of our recent diplomatic record, and indeed of the course of American foreign policy during the past fifteen or twenty years, makes it quite obvious that we do not tend to retali ate massively against anyone except in the face of provocations as extreme as Pearl Harbor. Although World War II garnered a great prestige for the United States, it has been the prestige that invariably accompanies enormous wealth and power rather than the prestige of boldness, sternness, and consistency. And since the war, the record has been a mixed one. Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the North Atlantic Treaty, and intervention in Korea--all have demonstrated a willingness to counter Soviet and Chinese efforts at expansion; but they have also suggested rather strongly that the United States is willing--and, it should be added, able--to meet these moves successfully on the grounds and according to the rules set by the opponent. In fact, Korea and now Indo-China have indicated that we are not prepared in cases of this sort to do more than limit and contain communist thrusts by means of local applications of counterforce. During the Korean war, it is true, we not only tried to prevent the enemy from reaching his objective; we also attempted to punish him for his audacity by removing North Korea

-10-

[LC]

from his sphere of influence. Liberation and medium-weight retaliation actually became components of our policy at that point. But when we computed the costs attached to them, and discovered in addition that our antagonist was quite willing to play the game in this more expensive arena, we settled for our original objectives and the stalemate of Panmunjom. In fact, so poignant was the lesson of Korea that in Indo-China we did not intervene directly at all.

This then is the record--the credit, as it were--that we have at our disposal in making credible any policy of deterrence. It is not unimpressive, nor is it conclusive. Governments, attitudes, and behavior can change with extraordinary rapidity, and the past is a most unreliable guide to the future. But this particular record is a condition that exists, and as such it will have much to do with the effectiveness of our program.

Similarly, in the realm of governmental pronouncements and activities, there exist certain conditions which must necessarily affect the credibility of a policy of deterrence. In connection with massive retaliation, Mr. Dulles has not only given varying interpretations of the doctrine; he has seen it alternately upheld and modified by other members of the government. There appears to be some uncertainty within the present administration as to what the future course of American foreign policy should be, and, in these circumstances, both executive and legislature have on occasion spoken with discordant voices. While the Secretary has threatened massive retaliation, the President has spoken of Asians fighting Asians and has placed very definite limits on his power to act in an emergency.

The impression of confusion and cross-purposes given by these and other statements is not by itself too significant, for the exchange value of verbal symbols is no longer as high as it was in the nineteenth century. But in its activities the government has indicated that it holds to other and quite contradictory goals just as firmly as to massive retaliation. The search for a balanced budget, reduced taxes, and a smaller military establishment provides only some of the reasons why the administration finds it difficult to be consistent in its attitudes toward such a policy.

The state of domestic and allied public opinion is somewhat comparable. Revulsion with the Korean war became evident within a year of intervention by the United Nations, and no enthusiasm could be generated either at home or abroad for similar

-11-

efforts in Indo-China. Fear and hatred of the Soviet Union and
Red China may persist, especially in the United States, but these
emotions are not so intense that they create a desire for the
Western coalition to react to communist expansion massively or
otherwise except where vital interests are obviously at stake.
And even in the United States, the definition of vital interests
remains relatively narrow. The growing desire for peace based
on existing arrangements, the belief in the possibility of some
kind of modus vivendi with the Soviet Union--which has gained
strength particularly in Europe--the unwillingness to make
sacrifices for countries which show no ability to help themselves,
and the increased knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons--
all these attitudes make for reactions of either apathy or outright
criticism of the doctrine of massive retaliation.

## VI. Appropriateness of Massive Retaliation

If this hasty appraisal of relevant conditions is accurate,
we must immediately face the prospect that the leaders of the
Soviet Union and Red China will hardly endow the doctrine with
much credibility. They will see that we have the capability to
implement our threat, but they will also observe that, with their
own nuclear capability on the rise, our decision to use the weapons
of mass destruction will necessarily come only after an agonizing
appraisal of costs and risks, as well as of advantages. Our record
of performance after World War II is unlikely to increase their
apprehension; Korea and Indo-China are important symbols of our
reluctance, not only to intervene in the peripheral areas, but also
to expand those conflicts in which we have become engaged. And
the behavior of the administration itself, including Mr. Dulles'
own reformulations of his policy, will do little to persuade them
of the seriousness of American intentions. Finally, the state of
domestic and allied opinion will provide them with ample reason
to believe that the doctrine is, if not a case of outright bluff, at
the very most a proposal that will still have to undergo searching
and prolonged debate before becoming accepted policy.

In short, the minimum requirements of credibility have
been fulfilled in the case of massive retaliation. What is more,
the possibility exists that the Soviet Union and Red China, instead
of being deterred, will continue to act as they did in Indo-China
and actually push into other peripheral areas not only for gain but
also for the purpose of discovering what constitute the limits of
our tolerance.

-12-

With the doctrine operating under these handicaps, we
run, in a particularly aggravated form, all the risks attached
to a policy of deterrence. If the communists challenge our
sincerity--and they have good reasons for daring to do so--we
shall either have to put up or shut up. If we put up, we plunge
into all the immeasurable horrors of an atomic war. If we shut
up, we suffer a serious loss of prestige and damage our capacity
to establish deterrents against further communist expansion.
Indeed, given existing conditions, there is no escaping that the
doctrine of massive retaliation is likely to confront us continually
with having to choose between one or the other of these two most
distasteful alternatives.

One way out of this dilemma would be to alter the conditions
which make the requirements of credibility so difficult to fulfill.
If we could reduce our own vulnerability to atomic attack, increase
our offensive capability, either talk less openly and specifically
about massive retaliation or act in a manner more consistent with
the implications of the doctrine, and at the same time persuade
domestic and allied opinion of the desirability of such a Draconian
policy--if we could do all this, we might minimize considerably
the risk of having our intentions probed. But existing conditions
do not appear to be so elastic that we can produce rapid or far-
reaching variations in them. What does seem plausible is that
the doctrine of massive retaliation as presently formulated is
neither feasible nor desirable as a policy of deterrence. Despite
the continuing faith of its authors, it cannot be made feasible
because of its lack of credibility. And it hardly seems desirable
so long as there exist alternative deterrents which are not burdened
with comparable risks.

## VII. A Role for Massive Retaliation

It should not be inferred from these conclusions that a
doctrine such as massive retaliation has no place in a policy of
deterrence for the United States. They mean rather that the
policy requires rethinking and that massive retaliation should be
given a special and concrete assignment within it.

Hardly anyone questions the desirability of having a
policy of deterrence; most of us recognize now that it is a mis-
take to wait passively for the arrival of certain contingencies
when the possibility exists of forestalling them. There is an
equally general agreement that the immediate costs of a deterrence

-13-

policy are much smaller than the costs that would result from
having to deal with these contingencies. But even with this
common ground, there remain several difficult problems to be
solved before a satisfactory policy can emerge.

Since there is a large number of contingencies that are
likely to affect American interests adversely, and since the
United States, however wealthy, cannot effectively prepare for
and forestall all of them, it becomes an essential prerequisite
of a policy of deterrence to visualize the most significant and
probable lines of action open to our opponents. A second require-
ment is that efficient deterrents be designed for these possibilities.
Here two rules of prudence are worth remembering. It is probably
hopeless to expect that a single deterrent will cover the entire
range of contingencies and still satisfy the criteria of credibility.
The attempt to devise such a deterrent is likely to result in either
a sparrow hunt with a cannon or an elephant shoot with a popgun.
Similarly, it seems futile to expect of a deterrent that it will
solve a great many other problems and still prove efficient. To
hope, as Mr. Dulles appears to have hoped, that with massive
retaliation he could deter the Soviet Union and Red China, and
at the same time contribute to the goals of a balanced budget
and reduced taxes, is to invite disaster for the deterrent. Ef-
fective deterrents have high production costs under existing
conditions; they cannot easily be constructed without making
sacrifices in other directions.

Is there, in the light of these considerations, a deterrent
role for the doctrine of massive retaliation? The answer, surely,
is yes, but the role is a limited and specialized one. Although
the weapon of strategic air power and nuclear armaments has the
capacity to inflict incalculable damage, the threat of its use in-
volves risks of a comparable magnitude. If these risks could be
minimized by giving an appearance of credibility to our threat
to employ it over a wide range of contingencies, they might be
worth taking. But a society equipped with democratic political
processes has a limited capacity for bluff, so that massive re-
taliation cannot be credible and effective as a deterrent unless
it is matched against contingencies in which the United States and
its allies would actually be prepared to use such a weapon.

Such contingencies are not too difficult to define. They
are: an attack on areas which have come to be regarded as of
vital interest to us; the use by the communists of nuclear weapons;

-14-

and that range of actions by the enemy which demonstrates that
there is a clear and present danger to our society. The first
two are easy to recognize. The third is more elusive and its
identification must depend on whether or not there is evidence
to suggest that the general situation is deteriorating in such a
way that the United States has no real alternatives other than
all-out war or ultimate surrender.

The deterrent of massive retaliation directed toward
these contingencies has a good prospect of being effective be-
cause a majority of people, both here and abroad, are willing
to see nuclear weapons used in such cases. And being agreed,
they immediately give credibility to the threat. However, it
should not be thought that confining massive retaliation to con-
tingencies of the last resort completes the task of setting up
this particular deterrent. The more grimly determined we ap-
pear to be to meet these contingencies with massive retaliation,
the less likely they are to arise. It would seem worthwhile,
therefore, to continue and preferably increase our investment
in both our offensive striking power and in our active and passive
defenses. And, if we are to prevent a rise in the number of
allied nationals who deplore the use of SAC under any circum-
stances, we would do well to increase the stake of our friends
in the maintenance and protection of the Western system. Finally,
since definitions of vital interests will change through time, we
might do worse than to declare a moratorium on public pronounce-
ments dealing with this subject. To the extent that the enemy
requires further briefing about our intentions, there are other
means and channels of communication which we can employ more
effectively--and with less commitment and risk--than the open
declaration.

If, as has been suggested here, we confine massive re-
taliation to contingencies of the last resort, this leaves us with
a large gap in our policy of deterrence. The options available
to the communists which seem most dangerous to the United
States are covered; but it would be to our interest to interdict
a number of alternatives that still lie open to them. Among these
are conventional warfare against the peripheral areas or segments
of the Western bloc, and subversion and civil war instigated in
the same areas. Wherever such operations are attempted they
hold forth the prospect of a long-term erosion of the American
position; at the same time, we suffer serious losses in meeting
them and run the risk of creating contingencies of the last resort.

[LC]

-15-

Clearly they require that we make a considerable investment of resources in order to prevent their occurrence. Yet massive retaliation is not a weapon that can effectively forestall them. Other types of deterrents have to be devised.

## VIII. The Availability of Deterrents

In considering the availability of other types of deterrents, we must appreciate that the reservation of massive retaliation for contingencies of the last resort has disadvantages as well as advantages. The communists may be deterred from creating these contingencies, but they may also be encouraged to engage in other operations to the extent that significant costs are not involved. The threat of massive retaliation narrows the scope and character of their actions; it forces them to compete for areas of lesser strategic and economic value. But these limits and constraints do not abolish their freedom of maneuver, as both Korea and Indo-China have demonstrated.

Our problem, therefore, is to construct deterrents that forecast costs sufficient to discourage the enemy, but not great enough to make him turn, whether out of desperation or design, to contingencies of the last resort. We must, in a word, try to fit the punishment to the crime. This is much more difficult in the international arena than in domestic society, where elaborate and reasonably effective systems of legal deterrents have been developed. But it is by no means impossible. Here only a few suggestions can be made about the weapons that we might consider.

It is probably in the military realm that the richest resources of deterrence still lie. If we show a willingness and ability to intervene with great conventional power in the peripheral areas, after the manner of Korea, we will have a reasonable chance of forestalling enemy military action there. Admittedly this suggests offering to compete with the communist world on terms apparently favorable to it. But are the terms as favorable as they seem at first glance? Our effort in Korea was smaller in size and probably less costly in terms of human and material resources than the communist commitment. And it was the communists who first expressed a wish to terminate the conflict. The charade at Kaesong and Panmunjom has made us forget that, in the face of Operation Killer, Mr. Jacob Malik raised the subject of a truce. Even if the debacle of Indo-China has corroded our reputation, the communists cannot have discarded entirely the

-16-

memory of the Eighth Army under Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet.

In the size and character of German rearmament we also have a weapon of considerable power. The development of the new Wehrmacht will be, in part at least, a function of Soviet behavior, and we might do worse than indicate the correlation. Chiang Kai-shek's troops are a less valuable asset, but they too can play a part in our deterrence policy. Instead of "unleashing" them indiscriminately, we ought to determine the circumstances in which we would be willing to support them, and notify Peiping accordingly. The South Korean army, to the extent that we control it at all, may be drafted to play a similar role. These forces, together with the NATO divisions and our own military power, can provide a very significant deterrent indeed.

In what, for lack of a better term, may be called the social realm, there are several subsidiary deterrents which require consideration. The communist parties in the West, while frequently a nuisance and sometimes a threat, do represent hostages in our hands. The process of destroying their apparatus and dispersing their adherents may be a difficult and costly one. But the threat to do so in prescribed circumstances might well carry weight with the communist leadership. Similarly, the encouragement of defection from, and disaffection within, the satellite countries has excellent deterrent potentialities. The events of June 1953 have already demonstrated that defection and disaffection are possible on a significant scale, and that the Soviets are sensitive to their occurrence. We do not want to be indiscriminate or irresponsible in fostering such activities; but we may wish to advise the enemy as discreetly as possible that there are occasions on which he can expect us to make full use of this subversive potential.

To this arsenal it may be that we can add deterrents of another kind. It was suggested earlier that there are two sides to the coin of deterrence. So far only the threatening face has been considered, but we must examine the side of rewards as well. It is possible, at least in principle, to deter an antagonist from taking inimical action by the offer of a better prospect than the one he presently enjoys. The approach, however, is as familiar to as it is unpopular with Americans. It immediately brings to mind Munich, Yalta, and perhaps even Geneva. The feeling is strong that it is both useless and dangerous to propitiate an

[LC]

-17-

opponent such as the communist because in the end he will simply accept our gratuity and proceed to do what he had originally intended. This is an understandable attitude, and it is justified under three conditions: if the antagonist is being driven into his inimical behavior, not by desperate need, but by conscious, grasping ambition; if the reward is not reciprocated by some tangible concession from him; and if the reward is not revocable by the donor. The tragedy of Munich and Yalta is that all of these conditions were fulfilled, so that it is possible to appreciate why there has been such a loss of faith in this approach.

But it does not follow that we have to imitate the past with exact fidelity. We are almost certainly correct in assuming that we cannot shape the communist world to our image by smothering it in a featherbed of concessions. There is no evidence that we are dealing simply with men of good will driven to desperate extremities by exacting social, political, and economic conditions, or that they will surrender their ambitions in the face of changes in those conditions. But we may be quite mistaken if we assume, on the basis of this diagnosis, that concessions are not worth making at all.

Certainly we will decrease the prospects for an effective policy of deterrence if we insist without end that there are no arrangements under which we can live in peace with the communists; for the most dangerous alternatives will begin to look attractive to them in such circumstances. We ought always to keep open the possibility of a genuine modus vivendi, and we may actually find it advantageous to take specific steps in that direction. There are, for example, certain revocable rewards at our disposal which, at the present time, will benefit both sides and yet can be withdrawn in the event of hostile action by the communists. The resumption of a carefully screened and regulated trade with Red China might be one such measure. Disarmament is another. Territorial concessions without concrete equivalents are dangerous and undesirable; it is impossible to attach strings to these gifts. But probably there are other realms where we can play the Indian-giver.

In doing so, we may not persuade our antagonist to forego his expansionist goals. But, to the extent that he values our concessions and profits from their availability, we will have created additional means of dissuading him from trying to attain these goals. In conjunction with our other weapons, they can give us

-18-

reasonably powerful means of influencing his calculations of cost and risk without all the hazards inherent in massive retaliation.

## IX. Prerequisites of a Policy of Deterrence

Whether or not a program of this general character can be made credible to the communists will depend on our willingness to satisfy the demands that it establishes. In the military realm, if we are to reduce our dangerous dependence on massive retaliation and the instrumentality of SAC, we must strengthen the other arms of the services. The most obvious need is in the ground forces, where we currently lack the necessary divisions for the satisfaction of our overseas commitments and the creation of a powerful and mobile reserve. The tactical air forces probably suffer from undernourishment as well. A general expansion of both organizations seems in order, although their growth should not take place at the expense of SAC. The problem is not to re-slice the present cake; it is to get a larger one with bigger slices available all around.

The question of continental defense in its active and passive aspects has been dealt with elsewhere; it need only be said here that an investment of considerable magnitude in these two activities appears absolutely essential.⁶ Similarly, the support of allied forces, military institutions, and economies can hardly be relaxed. Offshore purchases, a continuing supply of military end items, economic assistance to ease the burden of large military establishments, the liberalization of trade if only to prevent the allied nations from becoming attached to the markets of the Soviet bloc--all this and much more will have to be continued. It would seem desirable, too, for American troops to remain in certain areas of the world even if those areas are not ones that we would attempt to hold in the event of a general war. Economies achieved from a concentration of forces in the United States may be more than offset by losses of territory or by the heavy costs involved in trying to prevent their loss at a later date.

In the realm of our policy record there are certain remedial steps that require taking as well. If our career during the past few years has been a chequered one, there is no reason why it should remain so. With a set of deterrence objectives

6. See Klaus Knorr, "Passive Defense for Atomic War," Memorandum No. 6, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1954.

-19-

clearly in mind, and with a reasonable amount of self-imposed
discipline, the government should be able to speak and act in a
fairly single-minded fashion. That by itself would be a gain.
But we should do more; we should be prepared to seize every
favorable opportunity to demonstrate how serious are our deter-
rent intentions. One of the many tragedies of Indo-China is
that we did not seem to weigh seriously enough the implications
of non-intervention for a policy of deterrence. In that case it
could be argued that the disadvantages of intervention outweighed
the advantages; but should contingencies of a similar character
arise in the future, despite our best efforts to forestall them,
we must remember how much a policy of deterrence depends on
the record for its credibility, and evaluate the desirability of
intervention from this as well as from other standpoints.

In the realm of governmental attitudes there are obviously
several changes that must occur before an effective program of
deterrence can be set in motion. First and foremost, we must
increase our flexibility and adaptability not only in our estimates
of communist behavior and in the ways with which we meet it,
but also in our dealings with the wider universe of international
relations as it has come to be. An ossification of governmental
outlook, a clinging to stereotypes that bear no relation to current
realities, a refusal to experiment with new ideas and methods,
all preclude the institution of an effective program of deterrence,
especially if that program contains not only sanctions but elements
of rewards as well. Of equal importance is the development of the
will, and the institutions, for regular consultation and planning
with the governments of our allies. They have a large stake in
the effectiveness of our policy, but they can also affect materially
the degree of its credibility. For the communists must know,
and regret, that we are very heavily committed to the Western
coalition. If they see disagreement within the alliance, as there
has been over the doctrine of massive retaliation, they will find
it difficult to take our intentions seriously. However delightful
it may be to formulate policy in isolation, the luxury is one that
we can no longer wholly afford. A willingness to act as the leader
of a coalition rather than as the principal of a kindergarten is an
essential prerequisite to effective deterrence in the present state
of the world.

## X. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Policy

Since a key requirement of an effective policy of deterrence
is public support for it both here and abroad, we must deal with

-20-

the question of whether or not domestic and allied opinion will
be prepared to accept the implications of a program much broader
than massive retaliation.

There are several reasons why the prospects of public
support are good. It seems to be recognized quite generally
that there is no easy way of deterring the communists; that if
the goal is achieved it will be by complex and expensive means.
Some if not all of the components of a wide-ranging program of
deterrence have already been accepted. A standing army of
considerable size, large air forces and navies, the peacetime
draft, alliances, foreign aid, and much of the other paraphernalia
of the cold war are now regarded as normal conditions of our
existence. But it is useless to pretend that an expansion in the
magnitude of these weapons will be greeted with equanimity, un-
less it can be shown that the advantages of such a step will clearly
outweigh its disadvantages.

In the case of an effective deterrence program this is a
difficult feat to perform. For its immediate costs would be
large and impossible of concealment. The military budget would
have to expand; there would almost certainly be an increased
appropriation for foreign assistance; and the result would be a
further resort to deficit financing and a rise in taxes of all kinds.
Hardly anything imaginable could be less popular. Moreover,
the risk would remain of the deterrents being ineffective. Guar-
antees are impossible in this realm; refunds are out of the question
if the appliances fail to work. And, if they do work, the returns
will be invisible; our gain will be the negative and unexciting one
that our position has not deteriorated and the communists have
not tried what they might otherwise have been tempted to do.

On the other hand, the demands on our resources and
productive facilities are not now so great that an increase in
expenditures for defense and economic assistance is beyond our
means. Nor will its benefits be any less real because they are
intangible. We expand our capacity for deterrence and free our-
selves from reliance upon the hazardous policy of massive retali-
ation. If the contingencies that we wish to deter do after all
materialize, our preparations will not have been wasted; and
they will probably have cost less than programs hastily instituted
to meet a crisis. If the contingencies do not materialize, we
will not only have saved ourselves additional and very horrible
costs. We will also have increased the chances of constructing

[LC]

-21-

a system of international relations more in keeping with our professed desires.

The development of an effective policy of deterrence means discarding ideas of the stretch-out and the long haul, but this should hardly be a source of regret. The first concept assumes that it is possible to assign target dates to aggression; the second presupposes that military preparations should be related simply to fighting a war and not to preventing one as well. A policy of deterrence has contrary assumptions and is incompatible with these approaches. Its immediate costs, therefore, are greater; but the corresponding advantages are so considerable that support for it should not be impossible to mobilize.

## XI. The Limits of Deterrence

Whatever the advantages of having a broadly based policy of deterrence, certain factors will limit its utility in the present situation. The Soviet Union and Red China have cut themselves off from the outside world to such an extent that they have become immune to many of the pressures and inducements operative among the non-communist nations. The number of sanctions that we can impose upon them, or the rewards that we can tempt them with, are therefore bound to be limited. It may even be that China, with her great spaces and poverty-stricken economy, will not be sensitive to the final threat of massive retaliation.

Moreover, the means of deterrence that we do have at our disposal are, for the most part, extremely blunt in character. Even if we remit the threat of massive retaliation to contingencies of the last resort, we are left with weapons that we shall be reluctant to use except when confronted with quite critical conditions. Although it will be easier for us to be persuasive in our threat to use them rather than the instruments of massive retaliation, there will always be cases to which they will not plausibly apply. There are, in fact, many avenues of attack open to our antagonist from which it would be wasteful to try to deter him. In the realms of propaganda, infiltration, and the divisive diplomatic maneuver he will have to be granted a pretty free hand. A reduction of his effectiveness along these lines will depend, not on the existence of deterrents, but on our capacity to create conditions in the non-communist world which will make his blandishments and blackmail seem meaningless.

Deterrents are costly to construct and maintain; they are

-22-

not suitable to the entire range of foreign policy contingencies;
frequently, it may be cheaper to devise bulwarks against attack
than to attempt to prevent the onslaught. And where the diffi-
culties of the non-communist world result from internal dis-
satisfactions rather than external pressures, deterrents serve
very little purpose at all.

Conclusion

A consideration of these limitations should not be taken
to mean that the United States can achieve a reasonable measure
of security without an elaborate policy of deterrence. The com-
munist world may actually be changing its stripes, but the evidence
of change still is not sufficient to warrant our forgetting the post-
war experience. Whatever comfort we may derive from the Geneva
Conference, the new orientation of Soviet domestic policy, the
soft words from Moscow, and the resumption of disarmament
talks, it is outweighed by the menace implicit in the harsh voices
of Peiping, the divisive tactics of Mr. Molotov, and, perhaps
most important of all, the great change in military technology
that is so rapidly overtaking us. The risks inherent in this devel-
oping situation are very grave, and we know from the recent past
what price must be paid for ignoring them. The outbreak of
World War II, Pearl Harbor, the loss of Eastern Europe, and
the Korean war itself resulted in part because of a failure by the
United States to institute adequate policies of deterrence.

That Mr. Dulles and his predecessors have profited
from this experience offers grounds for encouragement. But
we must not delude ourselves that deterrents can be constructed
on the cheap or that we will be taken at our word when we
threaten massive retaliation indiscriminately. The outcry against
current doctrine stems from more than fear and partisan politics;
it is a reaction against the despair, the futility, and the reckless-
ness that massive retaliation implies. It is, in fact, a demand
for reasonable and tolerable substitutes.

We have the resources, the energies, and the skills
to create these substitutes; and there are ample reasons for
believing that they will perform their appointed tasks. In mar-
shalling our deterrence forces, however, we must remember
that they can occupy only a special sector of the foreign policy
front. Just as massive retaliation is inadequate as a deterrent,
so deterrence is inadequate as a foreign policy. There is a

[LC]

-23-

great range of enemy action that we cannot control by threats
or rewards. And since we seek far more than security--however
vital it may be--there remains a vast field where deterrence has
no utility at all. In areas where the communists cannot be
efficiently deterred we must create the conditions which will
nullify their strategies. In areas where the opportunity exists
to enhance the general welfare we must just as surely act. In-
deed, here must be the heart of our policy, with deterrence as
its discreet, powerful, and versatile guardian.