TRADE & EXCHANGES

1. U.S. Draft, Oct. 22, 1971

Pending the normalization of relations, President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai agreed that a number of concrete steps would be taken to maintain contacts and to improve the understanding between the Chinese and American peoples and between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. These steps will include:

- The facilitation of exchanges between the American and Chinese peoples of a scientific, technical, commercial, cultural, educational, and personal nature.

- The facilitation of the travel of newsmen to each country on a reciprocal basis, including the early establishment of resident press bureaus in each country.

- The two sides agreed to reduce obstacles to mutual commerce, and the President specifically declared the intention of his Government to ease further some U.S. trade restrictions.

2. Exchanges - October Joint Draft (Oct. 26, 1971)

The two sides agreed that pending the normalization of relations between the two countries, the Governments of the two countries would respectively take measures to facilitate the exchange of visits between the two peoples and their contacts in the scientific, technical, journalistic and cultural fields.

3. Exchanges - Suggested Revision

(February 1972)

The two sides agreed that it would be desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in the fields of science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertook to facilitate initiatives by appropriate organizations in their respective countries for developing further contacts and exchanges.

Both sides viewed bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit could be derived, and agreed that normalization of economic relations in the spirit of equality, mutual benefit, and friendly cooperation is in the interests of the peoples of the two countries. They agreed to facilitate contacts between commercial interests in each country for the purpose of bringing about the establishment and development of trade.

4. Shanghai Gommunique (Feb. 28, 1972)

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

TAIWAN SECTION
OF SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

1. First US Draft, October 22, 1971:

"Premier Chou En-lai and President Nixon also clarified their respective positions concerning Taiwan. Premier Chou En-lai stated that Taiwan is an integral part of the People's Republic of China, and that the future of Taiwan is therefore an internal matter. President Nixon stated that the U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States Government takes note of that position and will support efforts to reach an equitable and peaceful resolution of the ultimate relationship of Taiwan to the mainland. Premier Chou En-lai observed that the People's Republic of China has not chosen force of arms as a means of resolving the issue."

2. First Chinese Draft, October 1971:

The U.S.

side state: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China; the United States will encourage the Chinese to settle this internal question by themselves through peaceful negotiations; it will not carry out or support any activities aimed at separating Taiwan from China and will withdraw the U.S. troops and military installations in Taiwan after it has completed the withdrawal of all the U.S. armed forces from Indochina. The two sides held that the settlement of this crucial issue between China and the United States and the normalization of relations between the two countries are not only in the interests of the Chinese and American peoples but also conducive to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world."

-2-

3. October 1971 Joint Draft:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position; it hopes that the settlement of the Taiwan question consistent with this position will be achieved through peaceful negotiations and states that it will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and military installations from Taiwan.*

* The underlined portion is the Chinese formulation that the U.S. side has termed unacceptable.

4. Haig-Trip Alternative (Jan. 1972):

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a province of China. The United States' Government does not challenge that position; it reaffirms its abiding interest that the settlement of the Taiwan question be achieved through peaceful negotiations; and it states that it will work to create the conditions which will permit the progressive reduction of the U.S. troops and military installations on Taiwan.

-3-

5. U.S. Proposal, February 24, 1972:

"The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its view that the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland is not a matter for the U.S. to decide. It believes that a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question by the parties concerned would do much to reduce tensions in the Far East. This would enable the U.S. to progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the U.S. troops and military installations from Taiwan."

6. Chinese Proposal, February 25, 1972 (afternoon):

"The U.S. side declared: The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, the United States anticipates the progressive reduction and final withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan."

7. Final Text, Shanghai Commonigue, February 28, 1972:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: 41st Meeting with the Chinese in Paris, 11 February 1972

Shortly after my return from meeting that morning with the Chinese I received a further message from Washington and called the Chinese for another appointment. (This is done from a special phone and using a code name.) They set 1600 that afternoon and at that time I again returned for the second time that day to the Chinese Embassy in Neuilly.

Met at the gate by TSAO and WEI and ushered into the Red Room, a minute or two later Ambassador HUANG CHEN joined us and after appropriate chit chat he produced a lavish cake and said that it was the beginning of their New Year. We ate the cake and toasted the New Year for our peoples and our leaders with rose flower wine. All of this made me believe that they had something acrimonious to say and I was not wrong. They then produced the message which reaffirmed their position not to interfere in the Vietnamese War and repeating their support for the North Vietnamese. I made a serious effort not to show any feeling as they read it to me in English and then put it in my pocket (without, I hope, any change in expression) and said that I would transmit it to Dr. Kissinger at once. As soon as this was done we discussed Chinese Calligraphy. I drew several characters. They criticized them and showed me how to write them correctly. The Ambassador, trying to be very nice, said that I had obvious aptitude and it would not take me more than three years (!!!) to learn Chinese. All of them were obviously a little embarrassed by the harshness of the tone of the note they had handed me.

I then gave them our message regarding further easing of trade restrictions and our views on the Indian Subcontinent. These they accepted without comment.

TSAO asked, as Press Attaché, if I knew the names of the newspapermen who were going with the President's Party. I said that I did not. He commented that though the numbers might seem small to us they were unprecedented as far as the Chinese were concerned. They had never handled anything like this number before. They asked me whether I was going with the President and I said that I did not believe so or I would have heard by now. The Ambassador said that he hoped

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: 42nd Meeting with the Chinese in Paris, February 15, 1972

Following receipt of a coded message and having made the necessary
appointment (with some difficulty because of the Chinese New Years
Day holiday), I went to the Chinese Embassy in Neuilly at 1700 on
February 15, 1972.

Let in the gate by WEI, met at the door by TSAO, the Ambassador
joined us in the "Red Room". I wished him a Happy New Year in
Chinese, which pleased him considerably and he replied, "Happy
New Year to you" in English.

He then said that I was by now like a member of the family to them
and they were very happy to have me share New Year festivities
with them. At this, large amounts of goodies, tea and warm rose
flower wine were brought in and began to flow.

The Ambassador expressed regret at the death of Edgar Snow whom
he had known personally and had himself taken him to Yenan in the
"Heroic Years". He said that Snow was a true friend who knew far
more about Chairman MAO than did André Malraux who had seen
Chairman Mao only a few times but who talked a great deal about
those few times. Nevertheless, Malraux had been a friend of China's
and had written with sympathy and understanding of their problems.

Ambassador HUANG CHEN then said that he had recently entertained
the Italian Ambassador (Malfatti) and his wife and the Ambassador had
told him that the Chinese ravioli was better than Italian ravioli. I said
that he had better not say this publicly or he would not long remain an
Italian Ambassador. He laughed and agreed. Ambassador HUANG
CHEN then said he understood that I had been one of the first Americans
into Rome at its liberation in 1944. I agreed as modestly as I could
that this was true. He then commented that Mussolini was a bad man,
but nowhere near as bad as Hitler who had killed millions, whereas
Mussolini had only killed tens of thousands.

I then read to him our two messages, the first regarding Dr. Kissinger's
desire to meet with the Prime Minister prior to the first plenary meeting
in Peking. I also read to them the message regarding the fact that we would
ensure the security of the Presidential aircraft until it was within 12 miles
of the PRC and that we presumed that at that point the PRC would undertake
the responsibility. He said that that would be normal.

Rather uncharacteristically for his usual caution, he said he did not think either of these matters would cause any problem. He felt sure that Dr. Kissinger's meeting with the Prime Minister and return to the guest house prior to the departure of the main convoy would be easy to arrange and he appeared perfectly satisfied with our arrangements for the security of the Presidential aircraft.

Ambassador HUANG CHEN said that he felt that all the arrangements for the Presidential visit were moving smoothly.

Again, he said how glad he was that I could spend part of New Year with them and with pats on the back and many handshakes I was shown out.

VERNON A. WALTERS
Major General, USA
Defense Attache

SECRETarial

7

| Date | Internal Studies and Decisions | Public Steps | Public Policy Statements |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1972 Cont'd | | | |
| | 9 March: NSSM 148 orders study of promotion of US-PRC exchanges, to implement communique. (Tab 60) | | 21-28 Feb: President's Trip to China - (Statements, Toasts, Briefings, Communique, & Arrival Statement, at Tab 59) |
| | 10 March: NSSM 149 orders study of promotion of US-PRC trade, to implement communique. (Tab 61) | 10 March: White House announces Paris embassies channel for US-PRC contacts. | |
| | | .18 Apr: President receives PRC table tennis team | |
| | | 18 Apr - 3 May: Scott & Mansfield visit PRC | |
| | | | 14 June: White House announces HAK trip to Peking (Ziegler announcement and briefing, Tab 62) |