DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Flanigan/Kissinger
morning 11/20/70

K: My instinct is not to give a formula through my channel.

F: That was my instinct.

K: There's no reason to give this formula suppose they will be more honorable
on this.

F: They are today and that's before my call asking for a meeting.

K: Why don't you see what they have to say.

F: That's my view. We shouldn't put words into their mouth. They will probably
come with a formula and make it our formula.

K: In channels. If we test Sato too much and he rams it too much we may
over throw him.

F: If we test him too much we are not testing him less by having him come to us.

K: If we have it in channels then this is his bureaucracy will share the
responsibility. Then it's not his formula. He went through this in May.
We had two plans -- Kendall screwed up one. I don't think he knows how to
deliver. It just gives them advance warning and another trading position.

F: That's my feeling. Meet them at 6:00 today and then check with Stans and
the industry even if it's just telling them what to do. Al doesn't feel that way.

K: He is my Deputy and I can handle him. Al was following instructions. He
will go along with it.

F: I want the same amity in your office that is in mine. Yours has the sullen?

K: Al acts submissive but if he acts disagree he doesn't do it.

F: I will say that before we do anything we have to meet with Henry Kissinger.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Sisco/Kissinger

10:30 am

11/20/70

S: I want to express my decision to you to remain another two years in this Administration.

K: I haven't done that.

S: The President said this a couple of days ago.

K: Someone leaked something but I haven't made that decision yet.

S: I need a telegram very badly. On Hussein. Not the Palestinian one. Another one.

K: The x is trouble with that is that it's in the President's office.

S: And we can't go ahead unless we know how he feels.

K: If we don't hear by the end of the day, we will go ahead.

S: If he decides to come --

K: I don't see how he can see Meir and not Hussein.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Hilaly/Kissinger

11:55 a.m.

11/20/70

H: Who's speaking?

K: Mr. Kissinger. I don't know why my office didn't share this secret with you.

H: I didn't know who was calling, only that there was a call.

K: I wanted the Ambassador to know the President's great distress on what has happened in Eastern Pakistan.

H: We are aware of his great interest and all that he has done. I am sorry I just heard that Sen. Kennedy has attacked the Govt.

K: I hadn't heard about that. What I am calling about is if you are interested we would be glad to send some high level people and to get interest behind volunteer contributions but we don't want to do it without your saying you want it. Send some people out and there to survey the need and then come back and give a report and get public attention.

H: I will put this to my next government immediately. If they come back and report the extent of the need required you feel the contributions will be much larger. Please accept my thanks for what the U.S. Govt. has done. The State Dept. is working hard on that. There seems to be tardiness there in working things out but it all happened so fast that it takes time to collect their thoughts. Now there's a problem of getting next supplies there. Now I understand that so many helicopters have been offered that it's not necessary to send them from here in crates. Also I have told my government that if they are needed you will be willing to send them right away. After the President visited here I want to Chile as my government's representative to the inauguration. You said you wanted to see me.

K: I wanted to see you before you go back to Pakistan.

H: I haven't gotten the summons.

K: Call me if you do.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
11/20/70 ca. 12:00 noon

R: I was talking with Ted about what we are saying about the vote on China. I don't object to taking out the last sentence, but I thought that was what the President wanted to say.

K: ... I have heard him say that we have not changed our policy on the UN question. We are just making tactical maneuvers. The last sentence seems to me to promise a reappraisal of our policy.

R: I read it the other way. [R read itX] ... "We are not prepared to drop our firm opposition . . ."

K: One can read that to say we don't object to Communist China coming in on a two-China situation solution. I am not going to fall on my sword over this. You think this a tactical way of maintaining our position?

K: Yes, it's what we have said the last two or three times. We would leave the first part out and just say we are not prepared to drop our position. I thought the President would want us to reaffirm our support on the question of China's membership.

K: But aren't we saying this earlier? We do not believe the majority favors . . . willing to go along with you and support it if the President says anything. I see that this can really be read either way. Why don't we go ahead with it as is.

R: Okay, if he raises any question about it, it's okay with me to change it.

K: If he raises a question, I'll say I won'tx went along with you on it. It's not a bad statement.

R: What you are saying is that the first part of the sentence might be construed that we are talking about the two nations?

K: Why don't we just say "For our part, we are not prepared to drop our firm opposition. . . !"

R: Okay, that sounds fine.

K: That would take care of it,

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Ann Chisholm/Kissinger

12:26 pm

11/20/70

C: I am back for a couple of days and ____ David is here too. Any chance of seeing you?

K: Let's try tomorrow around noon.

C: How about lunch here? We have invited Kathy McNamara or we could meet you for a drink.

K: What time is lunch?

C: 1:00.

K: Let's see, say one or the other and I will call you around 9:30 tomorrow morning.

C: I hope we can meet.

K: We will.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Zeigler/Kissinger

12:28pm

11/20/70

Z: The Boston Globe is moving a story on Moynihan that he will replace
Yost. How shall I handle it.

K: It's true and it gripes me. I am still at a lower level.

ZL We don't want to confirm it.

K: Say many speculations at this time. Say you noticed that the leak yesterday
didn't describe me as a fixture.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Yoshida/Kissinger

12:53 pm

11/20/70

K: I have to run to a meeting but I must tell you that we cannot make a suggestion today because our representative is meeting yours late today. We want to see what your representative has to say.

Y: I see.

K: We really don't feel it's our turn to make a suggestion. What we want to do is to hear what your representative has to say and then we will decide.

Y: I see. OK I told ______ about why the instructions were sent to our representative.

K: I understand your problem but our problem is that our people have lost confidence in the arrangement. They feel it's your turn to make a proposal and we see what you come up with. We may have something tomorrow. Our people will not make a proposal until your people make a suggestion today. I am terribly sorry but I must go to an important meeting now. I will call you later today if you want. What time?

Y: What time do they meet?

K: At 6:00.

Y: Your time. In the afternoon.

K: That's correct.

Y: What time -- I have an appointment to see my friend in about 5 hours time.

K: I will not be able to call you then. I will not be able to tell you more later this afternoon.

Y: Then what time do you think is best?

K: About 8:00.

Y: Your time. All right. Would you please call me back around 8:00 your time.

K: I will. Good-bye.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Haldeman/Kissinger

early afternoon 11/20/70

K: I called for two reasons. That thing is underway.

H: Go going to make it?

K: Can't tell yet.

H: No reading for awhile.

K: Wont get on the ground until 2:18 or so.

H: When will you here from them?

K: About 3:15.

H: You will know what is there and what we have.

K: Probably. I have two problems about the Pakistanis. I called the Pakistan Ambassador. He is satisfied. I asked about sending a delegation. They are probably not eager to have a delegation.

H: We don't care. It's to avoid the negative. We have to look humanitarian.

K: We can't hurt relations with them. You can't send a delegation into a country that doesn't want it.

H: I just blasted people working on this because they only have a re-type of the Peru plan. Maybe we should drop food but we have to think of something.

K: Second, we will have the WH involved with a loser. Hundreds of thousands will starve there.

H: But we should do something.

K: We have a man who can step into the Zeigler briefing this afternoon.

H: I won't do it because we have done nothing.

K: 19,000 kex blankets, ________ tents, ________ lbs. of wheat. Just waiting to know where to send it.

H: What about concentrated food stuffs.

K: I haven't the detailed program.

H: What good can they do with wheat. We are treating it as a bureaucratic thing.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Haldeman/Kissinger

early afternoon 11/20/70

-2-

K: That's not true. We have sent three cables a day.

H: Does any one in Iowa care about 3 cables a day to the Raxxk Pakistanis? They watch thousands of people dying and we should be doing something.

K: And we are doing what can be done at this moment. If there's a new idea of course we will implement it.

H: We need something that has dramatic fact. Did you read the story in the Post today? U.S. listed between Norway and Jerusalem in the middle. 1

K: That's no our fault.

H: That doesn't matter.

K: We are doing all everyone else combined is doing.

H: We are making a mistake public-relations wise to let it drop. What we can do to stop it I don't know. But if we keep needling long enough we may come up with other basis.

K: I have to go to the Pentagon.

H: Fascinating how that comes out.

K: We will get hotshots together because we should really ride that. It will make headlines for days.

H: As soon as we know we have done it.

K: 5:30.

H: At 5:30 we should build the mystery. Maybe even now.

K: The *thing* may fail. Say nothing until 5:30.

H: The problem is that at 6:30 we have missed the TV.

K: Better than to miss on ________.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TWLCON

U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

2:43 pm 11/20/70

K: Could you come over about 3:00 on something urgent?

J: All right. I can cancel my appointment.

K: You had better make it at 3:00. I tried to get the Secy. but he is at lunch.

J: He is back in his office now.

K: He knows what's its about.

J: He said something mysterious to me at lunch.

K: I will call him and let him know.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE

Rogers/Kissinger

3:07 pm

11/20/70

R: So far so good.

K: I tried to reach you and couldn't and I took the liberty of asking Alex to come over to see what should be done on your end. I called you first.

R: I knew that. I was going to Greenbriar tonight but changed my mind. I think everyone should be here. Should we know by 5:00?

K: 5:30. They will be due back at 5:20. We know they are out of the target area.

R: You mean the planes. But not what's happened after that. If it's successful we should have the President make a statement.

K: That's his thought at the moment. As soon as I know something I will call you.

R: Fine. I think anything he wants any of us to do we should do. But if it's a real success, it should be --

K: I worry about your cannelling anything.

R: It was tomorrow night and I said the weather was bad. The airport I had to use I couldn't get into.

K: Just don't want a crisis.

R: It will be tremendous if it goes.

K: I will be in close touch.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11/20/70 3:20 p.m.

K: I am returning your call, but I have something for you too.

L: Thay are out of . . .

K: Yes. Do we know how it worked?

L: No, but they are out of the country and that's good news.

K: Right, you let us know. One thing the President wants to do --
he would like to do the first announcement and he would like you and
Tom to come over for it.

= L: When will that be?

K: Let's say around 7:00.

L: Okay, but let's wait and see what we have got. I'll keep you in
touch and let you know as soon as we've got anything.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Zeiger/Kissinger

mid-afternoon 11/20/70

Z: The Boston Globe is a firm on the Moyhnihan thing. They don't speculate and say he has accepted the job. Yost and the UN delegation will get word. I know what to say but I want you to know the story is firm.

K: I will talk to the Secy. or Alex Johnson about it.

Z: We are talking about the Ambassador to the UN. I will get hit with it. It's hard and not speculative. Says Moynihan will go to the UN."

K: I told Laird I wouldn't tell you until 4:30. What Al Haig told you about.

Z: I don't know what your talking about.

K: I know damn well you know what I'm talking about.

Z: I don't know a thing until you tell me at 4:30.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

3:45 pm

11/20/7-

K: We just got a flash from McCain indicating it may be nothing. But my sup-
position is that he didn't have the information he wouldn't have sent it if he didn't know. Either
it was in there or they moved them. I think under these conditions we should
say nothing.

R: Does it seem that we are safe?

K: They are back out over Laos.

R: What a disappointment. All those people and that work.

K: They went in and out so fast that it wasn't planned or as
a dry hole.

R: It doesn't seem it was advance information because they would have laid
a trap.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

5:15 pm

11/20/70

K: I was just with the President. He wanted you to know that no matter what your final report is he is proud of the way you did it. He would like a message sent to the commander thanking him in the name of the President and bring the commander in to see him when he is back and a few of the men. It looks like a dry hole, doesn't it?

L: We will get our first reports from the ground in 6-7 minutes. We are now awaiting the weather out there for the other. I will keep you advised.

K: Is Moorer with you?

L: Yes and he is standing by and we will let you know as soon as we can.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Moorer/Kissinger
5:20 pm 11/20/70

K: The President wanted me to tell you that no matter how it turns out he is proud of the way you sent about it. He wants *his* decorations for the officers and men who participated and he wants to see the commander and a few of the men when they come back.

M: I appreciate it. It took courage on his part. If the President had been here in the '60's we wouldn't have been here today. They will be done shortly.

K: Is the other going?

M: I just talked to Gen. Clay. We have about 10 hours of good weather and he will call me back and I will let you know.

K: If you want to wait but we want it to go in a few days.

M: If we go now it would be unlikely we can do re-strikes. But if we wait it will be a few days before we can go. I think we should go.

K: I do too. Sat. is a good day for it to happen.

M: I will let him make the final decision. Appreciate your calling.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ron Ziegler
11/20/70 5:30 p.m.

Z: I hope someone has talked to Yost. This story has been ballooning.

K: I told Rogers it's his problem now.

Z: It's too bad. We've blown this announcement. It will be all over the papers tomorrow.

K: Well, you can't win them all.

Z: You've proven that today.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

5:32 p.m., November 20, 1970

R: Is there any further word?

K: No word since the garbled transmission. They should be on the ground, and we should be hearing shortly. I'm positive it was a dry hole. They wouldn't have transmitted that message unless they were pretty sure. Laird and Moore seem to think so, too. I checked with both. We will say nothing -- but respond to questions and shove it over to Defense.

R: We will do the same thing. That story Moynihan leaked. Did you talk to Butterfield? What is your honest appraisal for that job?

K: Apparently he has been asked and accepted -- he seems to think so. My honest appraisal is it would not have occurred to me. He is erratic, but he is bright. Frankly, he might turn out like Korry.

R: That's what worries me. I don't know him well enough.

K: He is imaginative, intelligent and a decent guy.

R: He's a pretty good team-player, I think. We will see how it works. We certainly can't do anything while the Assembly is on. It may result in a good deal of flak. We will see what happens -- see how the music plays.

I sent to the President today a recommendation as Korry's replacement. He is presently our Ambassador in Guatemala and has had experience in Eastern Europe.

K: Oh, Davis?

R: Yes, do you know him?

K: I don't know him, but I know his name.

R: He speaks Spanish fluently and has a lot of guts. One interesting thing -- he left a memo with his staff that if he were kidnapped, he didn't want us to make any concessions on his behalf. This was long before... He just did it.

Telecon
Secretary Laird/Admiral Moorer
11/20/70 ca. 5:55 p.m.

By NARA, Date 5/26

L: Tom has got something to report to you--he's right here.

M: I talked to the boss man, and everybody is back and all the aircraft are on the ground. There are no injuries, but no joy on the air objective.

K: Was it ever a camp?

M: I couldn't talk about it on the phone. But I'll have a last message coming in soon and have it right to you. But here everybody is back.

K: Terrific. You all have reason to be proud of yourselves and you have as much admiration from us as if you had brought back 100 prisoners. It took real guts and imagination to plan this and we are proud of you. How about the other operations?

M: The commander has recommended to Abrams to go. We're waiting for Abrams in a minute or two and I'll call you back.

K: Okay. Let me talk to Mel about the press handling.

L: Yes Henry?

K: Mel, as I told Tom, both the President and I feel you did a superb job. It took a lot of guts for you to authorize it and without your imagination we never would have gotten to first base.

L: Thank you. About the press, our feeling here is that we say nothing and later on say yes, there are __________ operations.

LK: I think this thing will go. I think you should get something over to Amb. Bruce.

K: As soon as we know that it has gone we'll get something to Bruce.

L: And I think you've got to let Bruce know a little something about it -- you know what I mean?

K: Yes.

L: Okay.

K: Many thanks.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Zeigler/Kissinger
5:55 pm 11/20/70

Z: They will be worshiping the gods that fell from the skies for at least a century. (Probably the only form of locomotion they have ever seen before in those villages was the water buffalo).

K: I said right away it's either a spectacular success or a dry hole.

Z: It's the latter and it's too bad.

K: It must be. It's a pity.

Z: Did Yost at the beginning say he would only stay on for several years?

K: no.

Z: Where's he going?

K: I don't know.

Z: Will we say Yost resigned?

K: He will deny it. They will give him a promotion and make him a deputy to Henry Kissinger. It won't be a quiet weekend because of the other things.

Z: I have a statement but I will not say anything. I shouldn't say anything but give it to Defense?

K: That's right.

Z: But I have the statement so I know what the line is.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

6:03 pm

11/20/70

K: It was a dry hole. Confirmed now.

J: That's that then.

K: The other problem is and the press line is nothing. Everything will go to Defense. If the other operation goes you should let Bruce know what it is. Not this first part. No need for me to do it.

J: You never told him about the other one. You will have confirmation on it.

K: In 15 mins.

J: Plan still for DOD statement tomorrow?

K: That's right or as soon as Hanoi screams.

J: No, the other operation.

K: Either tomorrow morning or if Hanoi screams in the middle of the night.

J: We will have confirmation?

K: Within the hour. Draft something and hold it until we get word. We don't want too many aborts.

J: I have been doing some research and what happened the last time. That was smothered by Cambodia. They postponed the meeting a week following that. They made some statements and we did in Paris. We didn't do anything else.

K: I don't think we should make much of it.

J: No. I just wanted to review what we have done previously. That's the record. I will get something ready on a contingency basis for Bruce.

K: Abrams will brief Bunker.

J: What a disappointment. On Cienfuegos, DOD handled it today saying nothing new. Chalmers Roberts called and said a new line and what's up. I said nothing and said I had heard something new. He asked for the significance and I said nothing and it's noted. They are back in a new port.

K: I would say if I wanted to relax tension I wouldn't do it this way.

J: I am baffled. Nothing new from them.

By NARA, Date 5/26

U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

6:03 pm 11/20/70

-2-

K: No. I will see you Monday.

J: 5:15. I have to go to the Hill for Passman in the early afternoon.

K: We have to massage him on this.

J: I expect no problem. He insists on me. It's only a matter of making the record.

K: I will see you at 5:15.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:25 p.m., November 20, 1970

K: Mr. President, we have confirmation now and the original report was right. Everyone got away -- no one was hurt and there were no casualties.

P: What is the appraisal?

K: This was a telephone report. We are getting a flash message -- a full report in. I asked the same question -- whether there was every anything there or what it was. There wasn't a trap or they wouldn't have gotten away uninjured.

P: It was a complete surprise -- but a little late.

K: It was bad luck.

P: It was not bad luck at all. We haven't paid any price at all. It was just a little exercise, but it proved we could do it. It proves they could do another one.

K: That's right. They could hit something else with that sort of thing. The other thing is going.

P: Good. One or two?

K: It depends on the weather. One, certainly.

P: Get a message to that Colonel congratulating him.

K: I have already done that, Mr. President.

P: Say I am proud of him and his men -- the daring, the execution.

K: I have done that. It ran like planned.

P: Within our inner circle, we are proud of them.

K: They are really behind you now. They were behind you before but your attitude on this has been tremendous. It gave them a tremendous boost.

P: Poor Johnson and even Kennedy. They stomped around and didn't do anything.