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CONFERENCE CALL

Secretary Kissinger/Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll/Wells Stabler/William Buffum

7/19/74 9:30 a.m.

K: Hello, who is this?

M: This is McCloskey

K: Are the others on the line?

M: The others are on--our signal is not quite as clear because Buffum and Ingersoll are in their own offices.

K: Why is that.

M: That is the way the call came in I guess.

S: We can go to the other office, if you like

M: Yes, do that we had a better connection this morning.

K: But I would like to get some action and -- do you think you could all assemble in the next two minutes.

All: Sure. Be right up.

K: Hello? Well, this isn't any better, let's just keep going. Is everybody together now?

M: Mr. Secretary: I'd like to take up the subject of the press briefing, if I may, first

K: Why

M: Because we're right against the deadline. Only two minutes.

K: Right.

M: We will annnunce the Makarious call on you and there will be a question as to whether he is being received as the President and Anderson would say, as we previously indicated, no question of recognition with respect to Cyprus has yet arisen.

K: Well, in his case you've seen ... of recognition

M: No, change of recognition. It is an important distinction from what we hav

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have been saying all week.

K: Until we change our recognition, the existing arrangement obviously continue.

M: But I'm afraid we have changed it by what we said throughout the week implying that we are undecided as to which is the legal government and which one would we recognize, and I think and I'd like to recommend that we use the same formulation we have all week.

K: But I always thought we said this in relation to the Sampson government.

M: No, the questions were not always that specific.

K: I can't held responsible, you know for example, it wasn't I who instructed Anderson to say there was no outside influence.

M: That was a different matter, Mr. Secretary, in the context of the question on that point, was since Monday.

K: If you say it this way, it means we no longer recognize Makarios.

M: No, it doesn't. It just leaves ambivalent.

K: Why can't we say, we don't have to make a formal decision on recognizing Makarios.

M: I'm afraid if we say that, we have made an important new diplomatic statement. I frankly think it is safer to leave it the way it has been--the fact that you are going to see Makarios.....

K: Now just a second, Bob. It makes a hell of a lot of difference whether when you are asked about Sampson who is in de facto control, whether you say the question of recognition hasn't arisen, or whether you say about it Makarios who happens to be the legal head of the government.

S: But because no question has yet arisen, it means obviously that we continue because nothing is before it--

K: That is fine with Sampson but if somebody says are you receiving him as President--can we just say the question the request was made by his Ambassador and he is being seen on that basis?

S: We do say ... agreed to receive him at the ...... request--do we want to say conveyed to his embassy in Washington--that might do it.

K: Yes, just say the request was made through the Cyprian Embassy.

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plus waffle it.

M: That is what we thought--

K: Bob if you say the question of recognition hasn't arisen, that is a clear step away from Makarios, because that in effect says you may not recognize it.

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry, I think I must disagree. I think that the answer implies more that we continue to recognize Makarios by saying that--by announcing that you received him--than it does the other way.

K: What is the question--is he being received as President?

M: Yeh. --that would be the natural question.

K: And we say what?

M: As we previously said, no question of recognition with respect Cyprus has yet arisen. Now that was our formula for maintaining flexibility

K: Bob, I understand--I'm not as intelligent as the country directors, but after this week I learned something. My point is when you say in answer to, will you recognize the Sampson regime, if you say the question of recognition has not yet arisen, then you are distancing yourself from the Sampson regime. Are you receiving him as president and you answer, "The question of recognition hasn't arisen", you are saying something entirely different. Then you are distancing yourself from Makarios.

M: But the questions throughout the brief have not been specifically, do you recognize the Sampson government, the question is who do you recognize, that is why we have the answer, the "question of recognition has not arisen." It did not tie us specifically to one way or the other. Now when you put together the answer today, that the announcement that you are going to receive Makarios, it means the situation in favor of Makarios. Without jeopardizing what you may want to do later on, if Makarios is completely and forever out of the picture.

K: I would prefer to say the question of recognition has not arisen when I am asked about Makarios. I would prefer to say almost anything else.

M: All right, then supposing we do this. Announce that you have seen Makarios and any question of recognition, say we have nothing to add to what we said earlier this week.

K: We can say we've nothing to add to what we said earlier this week. That we can say. They say, then do you recognize Makarios, say his appointment was made through the Cypriot Embassy. Say anything other than

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say yes.

M: All right. Second subject. There has been much made of the announcement by Greeek Ambassador in NATO yesterday that the Greek government is going to rotate the 650 offices in the National Guard

K: Yeh

M: The only thing we can think to say sensibly in response to a question for reaction would be the following: We have noticed this announcement and we hope that it may contribute to an easement of tensions in the area

K: Say we have been urging all parties to exercise restraint and we hope that this may contribute to an easement of tension. But I don't frankly think it will.

M: Neither do I.

K: I don't think it has any significance.

M: Okay. Third subject, how now if Anderson is asked to describe the objective of the Sisco mission in which you want to have down.

K: The objectives of the Sisco mission are--first to state the three objectives we have been stating since Monday--territorial integrity, independence and constitutional arrangements. To prevent a Greek/Turkish war, and to find a solution acceptable to all of the parties concerned.

M: Good. Rather than our finding a solution...

K: And to encourage the parties to come up with a solution acceptable to all of them.

M: Right.

K: Now, may I get around to getting instructions to Sisco or would this be against State Department rules.

M: Mr. Secretary, just one more moment please--

K: Now just a second, one more moment for me please. Sisco is not to talk to anybody until he gets instructions. Is that clear?

M: We have sent a flash--

K: Is it clear that he has--is not to talk until he gets instructions?

M: We sent a flash message out right after I talked to you--the instructions were coming.

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K: That doesn't mean he will not come back to us and say in the absence of instructions, I had no choice. You fellows better understand one thing-I am going to do this thing--as long as I am in charge the way I want it. And Bob Ingersoll, you will see to it that this department is going to do what is needed in this crisis and I do not give a good God-damn about the independence of emissaries and I want to make God-damn sure that Sisco knows he is not to talk until he gets instructions and if Ecevit climbs down a grease pole, that is going to happen.

M: Sisco has been told definitely and has acknowledged that he will see nobody in Ankara until he receives instructions.

K: Okay, I just don't to get a cable being ... that since it is now 9:00 in Ankara and he has no instructions, he went ahead.

M: And he won't Mr. Secretary, we can say that confidently. And we have a telegram we would like to run over with you--

K: Now before you run anything over with me, I'm going to tell you/want . But now fix let's go thru the press briefing.

M: There is a lot of reporting this morning that Turkish naval units are moving out of South astern Turkey for Cyprus

K: Yeh, I have the impression they are ... going intomorrow morning.

M: I think the only thing we should say so we don't raise any alarm--is we have seen the report, we have not seen any announcement...

K: No we are going to say --but we want to make clear we are opposed to any military intervention at this point--we are opposed to any military intervention and we hope very much all parties will exercise restraint --can do nothing to confirm this, but the US wants to make absolutely clear that diplomatic processes have not yet been exhausted. And we better say that at the briefing. Now where is Scowcroft. What has he has he got to do that is more important than this.

M: One other thing--Clements has told--called Bob Ingersoll and Bob do you want to describe it.

I: He explained that the amphibious force that we talked about yesterday is about 100 miles or 10 hours no 20 hours steaming (?) time from Cyprus.

K: Yeh, I think they are going into tomorrow morning.

I: He recommends we move that force half-way or 10 hours away or 50 miles away.

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K: That is correct, I agree with it.

M: Do you want to run over the telegram now?

K: The first thing that--no, no I want to tell you what I want. Then you may run over a telegram with me. And not one second before that. I want a telegram to Sisco that as soon as he arrives he is to tell Eeevit that we are extremely concerned about unconfirmed reports we have about Turkish military moves. He is instructed to point out to the Turkish government that the US would take the gravest view of turkish military move before all diplomatic processes are exhausted. That is point one. That he must do immediately, because I think we have been waffling and weeping around the place and we have not made clear that we are opposed to military intervention. Secondly, he is to say we are doing this in the Turkish interests, that Turkish intervention will not be the last move, it will be the first of a whole sequence of moves, that in our judgment something he never said, the government that will emerge out of this cannot be that a Greek Cypriot government will become a Turkish stooge. I mean you can put this in more elegant language. That therefore, if you look for support from --to the Soviet Union and to its own communist strength on the island--left wing strength on the island and therefore he can make this a message from me that part of it, as a freind as somebody who admires Eeevit, I want to warn him that what he is starting is a process in which he in which all can easily lose control. Now can we get that telegram out immediately. Then we will send him a longer one on the solution.

M: Okay.

K: Now what is it you fellows--could somebody go off and draft this now?

M: Yep.
Right away.

K: Now what is your telegram, what do you want to say.

M: What you have just given us would overtake what we have pursuant to your instructions this morning. Do you want to go over it--

K: No, why don't you send this telegram and then in 15 minutes call me again.

M: Thank you.

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TELCON

Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger

11:25 a.m. 7/19/74

F: Henry, how are you?

K: I've got a little crisis on here, so

F: Just take me a couple of minutes. First of all, we have been working on this Jackson thing--and you made great progress on this--Javits call me yesterday and I think if you are ready, but I don't think it ought to be until you are ready.... it might be advisable for us to meet with the just the two people--remember--the head of the conference and --that is Stanley Lowell and Is Miller and myself

K: Yeh but on general grounds would like to meet with the whole group too.

F: You would, fine.

K: The reason for my meeting isn't just the soviet situation, I just haven't met with the Jewish leaders for a while, I don't mind in addition meeting them

F: I am thinking about this because on the Russian situation, we put all the backers of Jackson on top of his neck, some of his particularly most influential financial backers and I think he has come around a long ways 0-if you think it is ready, there are two things that can be done. We arrange a meeting with the group, but as a matter of strategy it would be very important at the same time to go thru the procedure of a 30-minute meeting with Miller and Lowell and then have them come into the other meeting. I think I recommend this Henry/

K: Then let's aim for that.
But I hope they understand that I also have time problems.

F: I realize that--I know you have plenty of other problems. Secondly, I think that something that could be very, very significant in this whole thing would be this. When I was in Israel, I met with all wives and children--the prisoners of conscience--the 17 prisoners who are in prison in Russia and the wives and children are in Israel. They are the ones who were involved in the highjacking 7 or 8 years ago.... I met with them and it was a very teary scene because I had to give them an audience. But I think if something could be done to ease that problem, it could be a tremendous psychological boost for the Russians.

K: Yeh, but the problem is this.... Max, and even I am getting impatient with it. Every three months I am told there is one other thing the Russians have to do. They do it after which we say, fine, now do the next thing.

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F: (laughs) I can't argue with you--just think about this prisoner of conscience. I'm telling you what happen while you were over there and I met with them--now I just mentioned it to you, but I tell you this psycholically now if you feel you have made enough progress with Jackson, I think it would be important to have this meeting and you could cut the meeting short to meet with the three and go into this meeting and

K: You work with Jerry Bremer

F: Is he your man on that.
Jerry Bremer. And what we will do is allocate a half hour for one and hal
hour for the other.

K: Good.

F: We'll find a time and date convenient to you.

K: Excellent.

F: I met with --do you think we made some progress with this

K: I think we have.

F: I met with his two big financial backers--in New York--Jackson
you know is running for president and I just told him the facts on this
thing--do you want me to apply any more pressure on that or do we have
enough.

K: No, I'd keep up the pressure

F: All right. And we will try to do this in the next week.

K: Exactly.

F: I'll be in touch.

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TELCON
Conference Call
Secretary Kissinger
Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll
Mr. Stabler

11:35 a.m. 7/19/74

7/19/74

K: What are we doing--why are you all at the White House?

ALL: Because! You asked for a WSAG meeting

K: Yeh, yeh, okay. What are we doing about that UN speech. I haven't seen a copy of it.

M: Buffum is going to get it back out to you. Stabler and I read it, it looks okay. I thought it ought to convey a little more of the concerns that is reflected in the telegram you wanted sent Anakara.

K: That is right. That--but it is now 2:30

M: Last I talked to him Mr. Secretary 20 minutes ago it was still possible Scali would not have to speak this afternoon--that the council may agree to hear only Makarios and then carry over until tomorrow. ..... is to let me know just as soon as he has any change in that.

K: Right. Let me say a general thing. The management of a crisis like this depends on everybody being informed of our thinking that we want to take action. Now I have a cable here from Sauvagnargues....which shows for example in para 4., is Stabler on?

S: Yes, sir.

K: It says Sauvagnargues proposes that Sisco go on to Ankara, now what does Irvine say to that profound remark, why doesn't he say that is exactly what he is doing? Does he need instructions to be told this

S: He certainly shouldn't--he

K: Why didn't he say it/

S: It doesn't suggest he didn't, but he didn't--certainly doesn't pxe purport that he said so, no.

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K: There are only two possibilities--if he is reporting of it==he must either want to inform us of their thinking and think this will influence the decision--at any rate, I want Irwin to go back to Sauvagnargnes and tell him two things--I greatly appreciate his analysis, I agree with it and there were a number of things which weren't made clear in our original cable--one that we have made clear to Turkey that we would strongly oppose anosis, direct or creeping and that the Turks to us have expressed great appreciation for this.

Secondly, that we are going in the UN debate to indicate our objection to outside intervention and third as he knows Sisco has been sent to Ankara. Just want to do this to keep them happy.

Now is somebody keeping the British informed of what we are doing.

I just talked to the minister--Ramsbothom was not available--but I got Sykes.

They have a long message from Callahan to you in which they are delivering to me and we were just getting it over the phone when your call came in--

K: Is he rambunctious?

I: No, pretty much the same position they had before saying they were going to support Makarios at least at this time not knowing whether he could eventually be the head of the government, but until they found another solution, this was their position.

I:

K:

I: They said the only way this will happen is by putting pressure on the Greeks.

K:

I: Okay.

K:

And you might call the Turkish ambassador and make this clear to him.

And have we heard from the Germans?

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I: Nothing I have seen so far--

S: No, absolutely nothing at all

K: But could you gentlemen form a little group that keeps on top of this and not just reacts.

I: That is right. We talked to Fulbrigh and Morgan

K: How are they reacting?

M: I spoke to Mansfield and Morgan. Mansfield was in full support-- Morgan who I had to reach--

K: Of your position or my position?

M: Of your position and efforts

K: (laughs)

M: that we are making.

K: Good. I

N: I: I talked to Fulbright and he was concerned with the way things were going and he commented very adversely on the colonels (?) in Greece.

K: You tell him we have no love for them.

I: I know. I told him we'd keep him informed.

K: The major theme is we can't have a war there right now and can only do one thing at a time.

I: We don't have anything from Joe from Athens, so we don't know what happened there.

K: Has he left?

I: Yes, He must be to Ankara now.

K: He must be taking over the government. Can we call Ankara and make sure the guy reports. And does he understand he is not to surface the Clerities thing until he gets instructions.

M: We told him we'll send instructions on that from his two telegrams this morning--

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K: You better pray that these were clear enough. I tell you there will be blood if he surfaced--the last thing I want is an American draft proposal--the last thing we need is an American proposal. We first have to get into the Turkish heads there must be an alternative solution. Once he has done that--then tell them we will support a alternative solution such as for example Clerities or something else they might think of. But until he has convinced them that there has to be an alternative, our introducing Clerities just makes us a.....

S: I have prepared as a result of an earlier conversation this morning the subsequent instructions

K: Listen Stabler, just because you have won me over with that cable last night, don't press your luck. Okay, what are your instructions. I've even been saying nice things about you to Eagleburger. Which is the highest--almost like a declaration.

S: I'll have to return it. But may I--

K: What did you say--you are going to say nice things about me to Eagleburger

All: Laughter

K: That is the foreign service mentality.

S: Could we get on with your EX instructions? What I said, "the Secretary has considered the report of your conversations with Ecevit in London as well as your proposal to suggest a strategy contained in the message which you.... The Secretary does not want you to float the Clerities proposal until you have been absolutely sure that Ecevit understands that in our view the direction taken is presently pointed... would lead to ultimate disaster for Turkey. ......

K: Excuse me, I've got a call from Sauvagnargnes. Hold still and I'll call back. I placed the call to him to make sure he is happy.

S: Will you tell him these things?

K: I'll tell him those things, but send them anyway. And will you all stay where you can be reached

M: Should we start the WSAG

K: Yeh, and I'll call you out again.

M: Last thing, Mr. Secretary, there is a message coming in from Sisco

K: Good and the State Department at the WSAG will act firmly, right? Not handwringingly?

I: Yes, that is right.

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FonMin Sauvagnarges
Secretary Kisȧn̈ger

7/19/74 11:45 a.m.

K: Hello: I thought I'd call you and tell you I have read the report of your conversation with our Ambassador

S: Yes.

K: And I just wanted you to know that I basically agree with you

S: I thank you, yes.

K We have sent Sisco to Ankara, as you know and I basically--can you hear r

S: Yes, I hear you

K: AND we basically agree with the strategy which you outlined, one reason--we have told the Greeks all week long that we would oppose enosis either direct or hidden. So I want you to know I am sendni g you a message what we have told the Greeks but I just wanted you to know tonight that the basic strategy you have described is one in which we are not in disagreement.

S: Thank you very much. I appreciate very much your message--you know, we have just seen Mr. Wilson and Callahan and I have seen reports of the Turkish ships ...... Cyprus.

K: I noticed that--I think the major thing now is to prevent precipitant action

S: As a matter of fact Callahan did not seem too worried because he says they same thing as happened in '64 and '67 that the Turks ships that closed (?) before the island, but without taking action--

K: I wouldn't stake my position on that

S: Did you have the same information? The Turks have already set their .... in motion?

K: We have that information and we are telling the Turks we think it would be unfortunate.....

S: Yes, do you think they are contemplating landing? in the next few days?

K: I hope not. I think it would be useful if you stated your views to the Turks tonight on that matter.

S: Yeh, good, we'll do it.

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Secretary Kissinger
Robert McCloskey
Robert Ingersoll
Mr. Stabler
7/19/74 11:50 am.

K:

25x(6)

S:

25x(1)

I: The total of their mobilization so far appears to be two divisions.

K: Then the point is the we have got to get instructions to Sisco on the Clerities matter. Now I want two things--Now I want two things for Sisco--one is I want him to explain to the Turks that a pro-Makarios intervention is not in their interests. But secondly, you have the Turks understand t: at we are not in favor of enosis hidden or direct so that we are not unsympathetic to their point of view. Thirdly, that we are willing to work with them energetically to bring about a constitutional solution that protects the Turkish minority and their strategic interests on the island. Because I don't want them to think we are going in there as pro-Greek. Four, we are willing to listen to any ideas they have. Five, one idea which has occurred to us is possibly having Clerities succeed and that is as far as we should go on Clerities. If they are interested in that we can see whether we can flush it out. You see what I mean? Then it is not the US, pushing its own idea.

of this

M Now you know there is a good deal that is already in the message that Sisco should receive very shortly if he hasn't. Already. How a

K: How about humoring me and summing it up again, the way I gave it.

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K: Now I don't know what is in the message that you are talking about.

S: The message that was sent out this morning which I have here
--should I read it again?

K: No, no that is the one you did this morning.

S: But in that one at your instructions we said you should reaffirm to Ecevit that we are totally opposed to enosis whether direct or creeping. That was in that one and that was the one about intervention--

K: But we didn't give the Clerities solution.

S: No we did not because that was in this other one

K: How about humoring me and and summing up our position again. That keeps Sisco from getting off on something else. And winding up with Clerities. I want some compassion shown to the Turks. I --we are going to wind up bulldozing both parties into a solution they don't want. The trick is to get at least one of them to want it.

I: We will do a new telegram on this instruction--we've already made the point on enosis in the previous one but all the rest of it them is

S: But I think sums up in this message--

K: Could you express to Sisco that the strategy to follow is to show compassion to the concerns of both sides so that --at least of the Turks so that we are not in a position where at the end of it the Turks will say we raped them--they said it in '67.

And that is why I want him to present our views of this in the most compassionate light and convince them that military intervention has the wrong impact now because it strengthens the wrong forces. My personal view is that in '67 I wouldn't have been as opposed to their intervention as I am today. But that is a different matter.

I: Okay sir, we'll do it.

K: Will you read it to me and get it off, because it is already 7:00 in Ankara --no it is 10:00

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M: You understand he already has the one message.

K: Bob, I understand he has the message--I want him nevertheless in every message to understand the strategy. I want then from the base of that strategy--my nightmare is that his proclivity is to peddle a solution in the face of an unagreed view in which we will then become one of the parties to the dispute and we will have a Clerities faction, a Makarios faction and a Sampson faction and Clerities at that point has no support at all.

M: Understood. Get the point.

K: If we could convince the Turks that they should work with us for a new solution.

XXI: You mean some other solution?

K: Here we go.

M: No, I understand.

K: Here we go. July 19. Turkish news broadcasts reports by news agents that US Sisco has brought to Greece and Turkey and American plan for solving Cyprus crisis. According to their plan in which it is replacing current head of Cyprus regime with more moderate and influential person who could be Clerities. ......reads rest. Well gentlemen we have a disciplined outfit of which we can be proud.

I: Mr. Secretary, I was afraid you would see that.

K: The worse thing we can have is an American plan at this moment. It isn't after all that I have failed for five years. It is that I have occasionally been right. Now can't this department carry out my instructions? That is where I want to come to. All it takes now is for Clerities to say he doesn't want it.

I: We have a good cable from Roger Davies where talking with Clerities where he comes up with the same answer we do.

K: Who Clerities or Davies?

I: Clerities.

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Friday, July 19, 1974

Secretary Kissinger - Ambassador Ingersoll

12:05 p.m.

San Clemente

K: Bob?

I: Yes, Henry.

K: Now, Bob, let's get something straight. You're now acting Secretary. You're going to shape up this rabble while I'm out of town.

I: All right.

K: And first of all, any press comments on this Claridies thing, we do not comment on on-going negotiations. Now you get Stabler and McCloskey under tight control, Bob, or I'm going to clean the whole bunch of them out.

I: OK.

K: This is a god-damn rabble house. Why do I not want to surface Claridies? We are going to be in the UN with an American------Makarios when nobody supports it.

I: Well this bunch here did not do that. We don't know what has been done in Athens. But I can assure you that we have been following your instructions explicitly.

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But now what I want to understand is, I want these guys, my nightmare is that we are going to wind up totally isolated. And we will be committed. I wanted us to be in a position where others were committed and we could go either way depending

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on the balance of forces. You know, it isn't that I've failed so often in these things.

I: Right.

K: I mean, that's where I want to come out. If I had surfaced an American plan on the second day on the Syrian-Israeli negotiation, I would have been home on the fifth day.

I: Right, I understand what you're saying.

K: Yeah, but are you going to take over now?
And will you be willing to give orders now? I don't care about their morale.

I: I'll give orders. Don't worry.

K: OK. Now, press comment. There is no American plan. We are discussing various ideas with these people designed to prevent a Greek-Turkish war, the ______ and restoration of constitutional rule.

I: OK.

K: These are our objectives.

I: All right, sir.

K: And I'm counting on you to keep this thing under control.
I may have to have a meeting on Sunday morning with you all if that is possible.

I: You're coming back tomorrow.

K: OK. Bye.

I: Bye.

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NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

Friday, July 19, 1974

San Clemente
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. McCloskey
12:45 p.m.

K: Hello?

M: We've got Welles Stables on and he will read to you the telegram--one to Sisco and the other to the French Foreign Minister

S: For Undersecretary Sisco: The has sent us a report ------
as well as your proposal ---strategy..... The Secretary wants you in
your approach to Ecevit to demonstrate compassion and understanding for
Turkish concerns. But at the same time make it clear that we----
not in Turkish interests because it would set in train ---precisely those
events which in the end would be damaging to Turkey's long-term interest.
Ecevit was also concerned that by the same token we are totally opposed
to ------ and have so informed the Greeks.

K: And that we will cooperate with the Turks to this end.

S: We are willing to work energetically with Turkey for a solution which will preserve constitutional arrangements while protecting the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community. You should go through carefully with Ecevit our analysis of this, hopefully to lead him to understand we are not attempting to ------ the situation for to put forth a US plan but rather in our judgment . the Turkish, while it might seem to have advantages to Turkey in the short term, clearly has the most dangerous potentialities in the long term.

K: Good.

S: The Secretary recognizes it may be difficult to present such a case but our analysis is correct------ he considers it imperative that Ecevit be carefully led through this analysis . Basically the text of our package here is our hope that if Ecevit can be convinced that our analysis is correct, it is therefore a Makarios solution would be no better for Turkey than-Sampson he will be -------- what an alternative solution might be. You should tell Ecevit that we are open to any ideas . he may have and then indicate that as an idea of yours there might be a --------.

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Do not suggest in any way that this is a American chief proposal but rather
an idea on which he might want to reflect. Summarize briefly.

K: And say if he finds it useful he will report immediately to Washington and see whether we can... and what our reaction is. Well, maybe we can put it a little stronger. Say that I asked him to feel him out on the... just say it is something that I have not discussed with anybody but that I would like personally to get his reactions to and as soon as we have it we should report it. That makes it a little less free-wheeling.

S: OK, to summarize briefly, we must not get ourselves in a situation where we are backing one solution and the UK and Turkey backing another and the Greeks another solution and the Soviets having the role of opting for Turkey if they so desire for Turkey. We must remain as flexible as possible and not get ahead of the previous proposal. Carides proposal until we can bring the parties themselves to recognize that a compromise solution must be sought and that it is in their best interest. The Secretary does not wish you to commit yourself in any way to returning to Wash. at this time.

K: No, in fact, I think he should go to London for the Monday meeting.

S: Well, you should be prepared to go to _________ London if desirable.

K: No, that's a damn good cable. Can you add one other thought to it, please. That one of our principle objectives is not to have the Turks feel we let them down in this and therefore he should really make Ecevit understand that we are really talking to him as friends as allies.

S: Yes, we said we wanted him to approach it with compassion...

K: Yeah, I know, but say it again at the end.

S: Right.

K: And you better tell Joe that he should not surface his document.

S: S Yes, right.

K: I mean, that is totally premature. Now, gentlemen, before I get another spade of stories, does anyone disagree with this? If anyone does, please let me know. There is no crime in disagreeing. There is a crime in taking it to the press.

Mx I: We don't know where those stories came from--but certainly none of the people have been in on this.

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K: I don't mind the disagreement if there is one.

I: No, I don't think there is one.

S: Mr. Secretary, I don't know how to convince you but---I wouldn't have any hesitations.

K: And, Bob, you agree?

M: Oh yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: OK, fine. I'm not asking this for PR reasons, I'm asking it to make sure that we are all aboard. You might as well go ahead even if you disagree but I'd like at least to know.

I: Do you want to hear about the Souvaraguales cable?

K: Yes. I have talked to Souvaraguales incidently.

S: ... and therefore a compromise is the only way out. We are willing to press for such a compromise once it is clear what sort of compromise is desirable. We should also make the following two points---
Therefore a compromise is the only way out ---

K: And also you should tell them that we have told the Turks we will work with them on any solution on Cyprus that gives them guarantees in that respect. You know just a sentence about our cable.

S: Yes. And then finally during the Security Council consideration you should make clear that we are opposed to all outside intervention from whatever quarter.

K: Including ---.

S: Yeah.

K: Now we better tell Erwin that we had a telephone call with Sauvargues, otherwise he'll look like a fool. Tell him the Secretary has made these points in capsule form to Sauvagnargues on the telephone but this is an extension of his remarks--or something like that.

I: Henry, we've set up a WSAG meeting for tomorrow morning at 10:00 a.m. To set up a working group to prepare a possible contingency plan and we thought we should not do anything on alert or anything like that. No evacuation plan.

4

K: I agree, but we should look them over.

I: We are, that is what we are preparing for tomorrow morning.

K: Good.

I: The other thing, I think I told you we got a message in from Callaghan which we are going to send to you as soon as it is delivered from the British.

K: You might talk Ramsbotham through what we are telling the Turks.

M: Anyone else that you want us to do this with?

K: No, Ramsbotham, and has somebody talked to the Secretary General--

SANITIZED

M: No, not other than what you instructed Buffum this morning.

K: That's good enough. Has that been done?!

M: I'll have to check. Anything else?

K: No.

M: Thank you.

K: Thank you, Bob.

By J.R. NARA Date 5-10-68

Friday, July 19, 1974

K: Bob? I just want to talk to you alone but if you've got the others on there it is OK with me.

M: Which Bob do you want?

K: McCloskey.

M: He's on here. I'll get off.

K: No, you can stay on (Ingersoll). Just the two of you?

M: We can have it just the two of us. You want the two of us?

K: Well, what I wanted to mention briefly is that Dana Schmidt article now in the Christian Science Monitor about the disagreement in the State Dept. with our policy.

M: God damn it. Does he have a piece like that?

K: Yup.

M: I should have seen him the other day. He came and waited for me and I got too busy and never got to see him.

K: Well, it is a little odd that we've got a Department that can get things about itself that are against it--regardless of whether I am right or not. And the press doesn't seem to get any briefing about what we're doing. And I'm wondering if Hartman or somebody who can bring himself to do/can explain that the senior officials in the State Dept. are in agreement with each other---not that it makes a god-damn bit of difference.

I: I told to call John Oaks of the New York Times at noon to explain that to him after their editorial but I wasn't able to reach him.

K: But the fact is that no press man has yet heard one word of support out of the State Dept. for US government policy. That is a little odd. Could somebody call Schmidt. I mean for example---it says, "US officials were critical of the

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decision to seek a postponement of the Security Council meeting for Monday until Friday, ostensibly to wait until all the facts were in. Well, the delay according to officials gave the insurgents time they needed to consolidate their position. Now then, on Monday we didn't even know Makarios was alive. Secondly, supposing there had been a meeting. How would we have unconsolidated their position? Thirdly, from Wednesday until today the delay was not at our request but at Makario's request.

We just a delay only until Tuesday when Makarios could get there.

Now I'm just wondering, can we do a little briefing of at least my point of view.

M: All right, sir. I'll do it.

K: I don't care so much for a defense for myself but I can't believe it is in the interest of the Department to appear as a rabble.

M: I quite agree with you.

K: And, furthermore, not one of these policies was ever raised with me.
Do you recall that this was ever raised?

M: No.

K: Was there one person who ever said to me, "let's have a meeting this afternoon?" And what would have been out position at that meeting?

Can we do something to keep this thing from developing into a rolling campaign?

Can we get some background, or should I do it from out here?

M: We'll do it here, sir.

K: Will you let me know what has been done on the Turkish intervention.
per your instructions

M: We have a telegram that we are typing up now and that we will have back to you very shortly to read it to you.

K: I don't want instructions. I want a contingency plan.

I'm worried that if we don't get that------soon Joe won't have anything to talk about.

M: Have you seen his telegram from Athens? Can I read it to you? He saw your----------

K: Oh, here it is. It was just brought in. Well, of course, Joe's conception of his role is not my conception of his role. He is going empty handed---you

3
know, well, fine. But it is at least progress.

M: I think it is encouraging.

K: Oh yeah.

M: And then, I think armed with what has already has been bent and what will be sent--he ought to be on pretty sound ground for his conversations with the Turks.

K: Yeah, if we get it there in time.

I: We'll call you in a few minutes.

K: Yeah, but---Hartman is a sensible fellow. Can somebody talk to the key reporters like Murray Marder, or should we get a backgrounder group together, what do you think?

M: Well, we could, given the time now, I think what I would do is to get after the Times and the Post and I'll get a hold of Schmidt and go over our thinking with them. Now I had to pull Marder back last night from a story in which he was saying that we were introducing . . . . . . . . . . . now he claims to have gottn the basis for this from the British and the Cypriots.

K: Well, just keep it confused. I thought for some reason that the Marder article wasn't bad.

M: Well, I pulled it back from it. He had already written it and he changed it after I talked to him. I'm sorry about Schmidt. He came and tried to see me yesterday morning but I got busy and couldn't see him and he couldn't wait any longer.

K: Yeah, but the fact of the matter is that it isn't your fault. The fact is in the Department no one seems interested in defending our policy and everybody that has a gripe that he doesn't have the guts to tell me personally is going to the press with it. Theimpression that makes of the Department is a disaster.

M: Right. I regret to say that that's true and that is the kind of thing thatled to that terribly misleading editorial in the New York Times this morning. That's why I tried to call Oaks to correct the impression.

K: The fact is that it never seems to work. No one has yet---there is not one newsman who has heard one senior official in the Dept. who is supporting policy. I don't even want personal support.

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Well, that's not entirely--

K: Well, who's heard it--from whom?

M: Well, Marder has heard it from me. Valeriani has heard it from me.
I talked also to Pete Lisagor yesterday.

K: I had no sense that any of these meetings show any fundamental disagreement.

I: I think you are right. I gathered all the regional assistants together this morning to tell them that and to pass the word down in their departments.

M: I fell particularly bad about this because I'm the one who---

K: Well you have many other things to do.

M: But I'm talking about the people in the Department now who are airing their own opinions.

K: Well, if they had only told me their opinions.

M: It is a gutless thing for someone to have done.

K: But what we face now---this is going to turn into the god-damnest brawl ever. It will be like the India-Pakistan thing. And it won't stop unless someone get a hold of it. So if just a few of these key people could get it---

M: I'll take care of that.

K: Or, I'll hold a backgrounder out here. Though it is a little humiliating for a Cabinet member to say my subordinates agee with me and never disagreed with me when I was there.

I: We'll take care of it.

K: OK and get me that cable within the next 15 minutes or else Joe won't have anything to talk about.

I & M: OK, Bye.

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TELCONE

Senator Mansfield

(continued Page 2)

M: But if it comes to that and you've no leg to stand on, then you are in great trouble--worse than Vietnam, I would think

K: If we try to get in.

M: Yes.

K: We will not get in. But knowing that we can't get in, we are trying to maneuver in such a way that a constitutional solution emerges.

M: That won't meet with Makarios' approval yet.

K: We don't know yet.

M: You are seeing him Monday, McCloskey said?

K: On Monday, if he figures he can't get back any other way--it might meet with his approval.

M: That would be fine, but it is a delicate situation as you know more than me.

K: What is your view.

M:

K:

M:

K:

M

K: That is why I am seeing him.

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K: What I said to you isn't our public position.

M: No, no, I haven't heard a thing.

K: Our public position is that I am seeing Makarios and if I can work out something with his approval, that would be the best solution.

M: But he is a pretty mercurial character

K: Yeh, he is tricky.

They all seem to wind up in my baliwick sooner or later

M: But you can't avoid it either.
Do your best Henry, we will watch.

K: Right, and I just wanted you to know (1) we won't intervene militarily
second we will not support the Greek government --in fact we will
oppose the greek government--but in such a way that they can pull back
from their position without going towar

M: Good, it sounds good.

K: And third we won't make any other decisions until I've seen Makarios

M: And fourth you will walk the tight rope.

K: Do the very best of our abilities.

M: Good luck, Henry. Take care.

K: Thank you.

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TELCORN
Amb. Ramsbotham
Secretary Kissinger

2:05 p.m. 7/19/74

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Peter, how are you?

R: Sound as though you are in Washington.

K: No, I'm in San Clemente. I'll be back tomorrow night.

R: Yes.

K I just wanted to check, our press reports are based on what my loyal
subordinates are leaking out that there are disagreements between the
UK and the US.

R: I had to take that up today with the State Department because it is troubling me a bit.

K: Well, it troubles me. And I just want you to know that as far as I
am concerned there are some differences in emphasis, but I am
not aware of any major differences.

R: Right. Well, that is very good to say that, I'm not either.
And I've been saying Henry that there is a difference in position
which arises inevitably from the fact that we are a guarantor and
you are not.

K: That is right.

R: That is not a necessary difference in policy--a position which we can't
avoid.

K: I don't mind you having your position and our having a slightly more
nuance position because we can eventually go to yours if that is the
way things develop or you can go to ours.

R: That is right. Henry, I don't know if you have had a longest message
from Callahan.

K: It is allegedly on the way to me, but

R: Because it has come to me now and I think it is very much bears out
what you are saying--this is how we see it too.

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K: Would you let Jim know that that is how I see it?

R: I will indeed.

K: And if you have an occasion to say this to the Press, we would welcome it.

R: Let's get a phrase while we are together on this--

K: Think I could mention that we are a guarantor guarantor.

K: You can say first of all that I have been in telephonic and other contact with the foreign secretary every day.

R: Yes.

K: That there is a consistency in our approach appraisal of the situation and that Britain as a guarantor power has a different approach differently situated from us, but that there is no difference of policy.

R: Yes, I think it would be very helpful, Henry

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TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Amb. McCloskey
2:15 p.m. 7/19/74

M: Yes sir

K: Bob I have just talked to the British ambassador--just in general to tell him there were no disagreements of any major substance between us and he concurred and he says the British press has been fed stories from my darlings that I was furious with Callahan and I blew my top at him

M: I had heard this this morning that he was attributing to someone of the Financial Times

K: That is right, but *wx* did we do anything *xkxexxx* Bob?

M: No, Mr. Secretary, since I talked to you I went in and spent 10 minute with the Task Force explaining to them that if any of those people in there had any differences they owe it to you to tell one of your advisors to tell you directly --but we can't have editorials of the major--

K:N No, did we tell-did somebody straighten the financial times?
When we get a story in the morning and if I hadn't heard it from
Ramsbotham, why didn't we call them and say it is totally
total balderdash

M: First I was trying to find out the name of the guy at the *conveniendi*
Financial Times who I had never heard of before.

K His name is Lewis.

M: I now know it and I haven't talked to him yet. I will. I have been talking to David Binder of the NY Times. Bob Ingersoll who is here now has talked to Johnny O.akes of the editorial page .... that had not been considered and when they had been--

K: First of all if the department wants to be the Polish Parliament they can do it. I don't even remember we received any recommendations.

M: That's what I told them.
and

K: But even if we didn't reject them, that is what we are there for
for God sake.

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M: I said we wouldn't necessarily agree with the, but we haven't even received them. And he is willing to print any kind of message we want to send him.

K: In a letter box.

M: I don't think it is worth doing.

K: That is not worth doing.

M: I was talking to Binder who gave me the sense that he was embarrassed to see that editorial this morning because he said he became convinced yesterday and wished he had talked to me the day before--convinced that this is not the case.

K: But Bob we have two problems, one is a report filtered into the department that I was supposed to have blown my top to Callahan. If the Financial Times prints this it will become gospel truth and I'll never catch up with it. Now if by the sheerest accident I haven't talked to Ramsbotham I wouldn't even know about it. The opposite is true. We had the most amicable relationship. There isn't the slightest cross word, their position--the position Ramsbotham will take as signatories, they are in a different position from us but they are close and intimate coordinates

M: I understand.

K: You get a story of allied disagreements floating around and we will be in deep trouble. I talked to Mansfield and he said don't use force, we will not support it, don't support the Greeks and don't use any pressure. Now you tell me what policy that is.

M: A nonpolicy. I will talk to Lewis of theFTimes--

K: I don't know if it is worth it at this late stage, because by now, whatever he has done he has filed.

M: I will find out.

K: Now whose resolution is this--(to someone in HAK's office)

M: Mr. Secretary--can I come back to the press--after--we have just received your for Sisco for the Secretary--that you sent to San Clemente--

K: Yeh, that really isn't necessary--after what you did
Has that already gone?

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M: No, it just got here.

K: I would hold it because your other cable takes care of it.

M: Okay.

K: What do you think?

M: I agree. I think the other one takes care of it.

K: The only thing is, if you redo it and say, you know, this is on top of the other one--and I just wanted to make sure that he heard also personally from me.

M: Well, we will send it but I honestly think--

K: No, I don't frankly think it is necessary. Where is the Callahan message?

M: It is pretty long--do you want me to read it to you?

K: No, but has it been sent to me.

M: Yes, to the WH

K: Well has it been sent to me?

M: To you from the WH. It was delivered over there because we were waiting for it at the WSAG meeting and Kennedy was to send it to you from there.

K: Now, I just wonder whether there is any sense talking to Lewis. It is now past his filing deadline.

M: I'll get off the phone and get on it right now.

K: No, no, isn't it past his filing deadline--it is now--10:00 in London.

M: It would be yes. It is possible that someone else here has already talked to him also. In the Eur Bureau.

K: Could somebody take control of this. When we get a story going in the department like this, by the time it gets established, if we want an artificial crisis, that once more we are troubled with our allies, if we had a functioning thing, someone would be putting out that we are in the closest contact with all our allies everyday. Which happens to be the truth. In NATO with the nine, with France, with Britain. That is what we should be putting out. We have been in touch, but we

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have not been putting it out.

M: I think we will do it right now.

K: I don't think Bob can do it all but some of the leakers could put their
energies on that.

M: Right.

K: Above all, if a paper as prestigious as the Financial Times puts out that I yelled at Callahan in which there isn't the slightest bit of truth, then other British papers will pick it up--then you are going to get the left wing of the labor party screaming.

M: In this case, at least this is not the kind of thing that would come
out of the State Department--it had to come from the British
source.

K: Impossible, because he checked with the British.

M: Ramsbotham.

K: Lewis checked with Ramsbotham.

M: Saying he got it from the State Department.

K: He got it from an American source. Why would the British put it out-
it isn't true. There isn't the slightest bit of truth in it.

M: Mr. Secretary, the question I am sorry to be just catching up--
apparently came up in the press briefing today and was denied.
I have this man Lewis calling in now if you --

M: Why don't you talk to him and tell him it isn't not only not true
it is the opposite of the true.

M: Right. Bob Ingersoll is still on.

K: Now what about the UN resolution--

M: Bill Buffum is here--here is Buffum.
Has Larry given you this resolution yet, Mr. Secretary, I dictated to
him a few minutes ago?

K: It isn't as bad as I thought.

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MX It really is the best we have seen so far. It also will coincide

B: with our policy except for that reference to withdraw of excess troops, but I think there will be unanimous support for in the Council Mr. Secretary

K: Can it no longer be changed?

MX B: I don't believe so at this late stage. I would urge however that

K: If you say at this late stage--how did it get to this late stage without my getting a crack at it.

MX B: Because they are nonaligned--they have been negotiating this text among themselves during the day--this is just emerged this afternoon from their own efforts--they gave us their earlier version night before last--the one I showed you yesterday.

K: And we never knew about anything they were doing. And we didn't know what they were doing?

MX B: They have been huddling on this throughout the day and this is the text they have finally produced--now we will urge that they not vote on this text this afternoon but if they should force a vote on this this evening, I wanted very much to have your [REDACTED] judgment on it.

K: [REDACTED]

Except for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel we could live with it.

MX B: Indeed. That is the one sticking point and the question is I think, what --whether that is a serious enough consideration for you in view of the very good appeal to all states to exercise restraint. But we should stand aside on the text if everyone is supporting it.

K: No, but we should try to change it.

B: All right. We could make an effort, but I think this is probably the minimum requirement on withdrawal if that most of the other members have settled for. Particularly since the British had been sponsoring this kind of language from the beginning.

K: But see if we can get it watered down--talk to the British first.

B: Will do. And has the revised text of the speech reached you yet, Mr. Secretary?

K: No. I also would prefer not to mention Makarios--but we don't seem to be able to avoid that.

TELCOM -- CONFERENCE CALL
Secretary Kissinger [San Clemente]
Dep. Sec. Ingersoll, Amb. McCloskey,
Wells Stabler & Colonel Kennedy [Washington]

2:30 p.m., July 19, 1974

HAK: Hello, what are we doing -- why are you all at the White House
may I ask?

McC: . . for a WSAG meeting.

HAK: Yeah.

McC: Just about to begin.

HAK: About that UN speech, I haven't seen a copy of it.

McC: Buffum is to get it back out to you. Stabler and I read it, it looks
okay. I thought it ought to convey a little bit more of the concern
that is reflected in the telegram that you wanted sent and we sent
to Ankara.

HAK: That is right. But it is now 2:30.

McC: Well, the last I talked to him, Mr. Secretary, -- 15 or 20 minutes
ago -- it was still possible Scali would not have to speak this
afternoon. But the Council may agree to hear only Makarios and then
carry over until tomorrow. Buffum is to let me know just as soon
as he has any change in that.

HAK: Right. Now, let me say one general thing, the management of a crisis
depends on everybody being informed of our thinking that we want to
take action. Now I have a cable here from Sauvagnargues which shows
for example in paragraph 4 -- Is Stabler on?

S: Yes, sir.

HK: I mean, it says -- Sauvagnargues proposes that Sisco go on to Ankara.
Now what does Irwin say to that profound remark? Why doesn't he
say that's exactly what he's doing? Does he need instructions to be
told this?

S: No, he certainly shouldn't. Because he's certainly aware that he would
It was announced in the public domain in any event.

HAK: Well, then why didn't he say it?

S: Well, I'll have to just check that and see. I mean, it doesn't suggest
that he didn't. But it certainly doesn't report that he said so, no.

DECLASSIFIED

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By H.L.

Conference Call - Continued

2

HAK: Well, there are only two possibilities. If he's reporting it, he must either want to inform us of their thinking.

S: Yeah.

that
HAK: And think this will influence a decision. Well, at any rate, I want him -- I want Irwin to go back to Sauvagnargues and tell Sauvagnargues two things: One, I greatly appreciate his analysis; I agree with it and there were a number of things which weren't made clear in our original cable. One is that we have made clear to Turkey that we would strongly oppose enosis direct or trekking (?) and that the Turk to us have expressed great appreciation for this.

S: Um-humm.

K: Secondly, that we are going in the UN debate to indicate our objection to outside intervention. And third, that, as he knows, Sisco has been sent to Ankara. Now I just want to do this to keep them happy.

I: Okay.

HAK: Now, is somebody keeping the British informed of what we're doing?

I: Bob has just talked to --

McC: I have just talked to the Minister -- Peter Ramsbotham was not available but I got Sykes. And they have a long message from Callaghan to you which they are delivering to me and we were just getting that over the phone when your call came in. We didn't quite complete it.

HAK: Is he rambunctious?

I: No, pretty much the same position they were in before, saying that they were going to support Makarios, at least at this time, not knowing whether he could eventually be the head of the government. But until they find another solution, this is their position.

HAK: Well, that's all right.

I: Sampson out of course. And they have to do something to make sure that the Turks didn't move in and that would be the removal of Sampson. They said the only way this is going to happen is to put pressure on the Greeks.

By A.R. NARA Date 9-7-68

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Conference Call - Continued

3

HAK: Well, then we are willing to bring pressure on the Greeks as soon as we know what the alternative is that emerges.

I: Right.

HAK: And you can tell Ramsbotham on my behalf to Callaghan that we are not in disagreement with them on this.

I: Okay.

HAK: I don't want the British to start leaking that they are fighting us on Greece. Tell them it is a tactical difference. That we don't want to move against Sampson until we know the alternatives and use him as a bargaining chip but we can assure them we don't want to have Sampson emerge out of it.

I: Right.

HAK: And you might call the Turkish Ambassador and make this clear to him.

I: Right.

HAK: Hopefully on a line that the Russians monitor . . . make microwaves.

I: [Laughter]

HAK: And have we heard from the Germans?

McC: Nothing I've seen so far. Wells?

S: No, there's been absolutely nothing at all from the Germans.

HAK: But you gentlemen form a little group that keeps on top of this and not just react?

S: That's right. We talked to Fulbright and to Morgan and to --

McC: I spoke to Mansfield and Morgan. Mansfield was fully in support. Morgan who I had to reach at home in Pennsy --

HAK: . . . my position.

DECLASSIFIED

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Conference Call - Continued

4

McC: Of your position and the efforts that we're making.

HAK: Good.

I: I talked to Fulbright and he was just concerned over the way thin s
were going. He commented very adversely against the Colonels in
Greece.

HK: Well, you tell him we have no love for them.

I: [Laughter] I told him we would keep him informed.

HAK: The major thing theme is that we cannot have a war there right now.

I: Right.

HAK: And we can only do one thing at a time.

I: Right. We haven't heard anything from Joe from Athens so we don't know what happened there.

HAK: Has he left?

I: He's supposed to have to have left.

S: He must be in Ankara by now.

HAK: He's probably taking over the government.

[Laughter]

HAK: Well, can we call Ankara and make sure the guy reports?

I: Yep.

McC: Sure.

HAK: And does he understand he's not to surface the Clevides thing until
we get there give instructions?

McC: We told him that we will send him instructions on that from his two
telegrams this morning --

HAK: You better pray that people are clear enough.

[Laughter]

Conference Call - Continued

5

HAK: I tell you there will be blood. If he surfaces this. The last thing I want is an American draft proposal. The last thing we need is an American draft proposal. The first thing he's got to do is to get into the Turkish heads that there must be an alternative solution.

I: Right.

HAK: Once he's done that, tell them we will support an alternative solution such as, for example, Clevides or something else they might think of. But until he's convinced them that there's got to be an alternative, our introducing Clevides just makes us a party.

S: Well, I have reported as a result of any conversations this morning the subsequent instructions. There were done of course --
Well, just

HAK: Because you won me over with that cable last night, don't press your luck.

S: I'm not pressing my luck. But I think you've got to --

HAK: What are your instructions?

S: Well, they are your instructions.

HAK: ... nice things about you to Eagleburger.

S: Huh?

HAK: I've even said nice things about you to Eagleburger.

S: That's ________.

HAK: Which is the highest -- it's almost like a declaration.

S: [Laughs] I'll have to return it. Well, --

HAK: What did you say -- you're going to say nice things about me to Eagleburger?

[Laughter]

That's the ... mentality. Go ahead.

S: Can we get on with your instructions?

HAK: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

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By HAK

1-800-247-8948

Conference Call - Continued

6

S: So what I said is: The Secretary has considered the reports of your conversations with Ecevit in London as well as your proposals to sugg as ____ contained in the message which you saw. And the Secretar does not want you to float the Clevides proposal until you have made absolutely sure that Ecevit understands that in our view the direction in which Turkey is presently pointed would lead to ultimate disaster fo Turkey. You should, therefore, in speaking with him in Ankara go through it in carefully analysis set forth in the message of yesterday. He must be made to understand --

HAK: I got a call from Sauvagnargues. Hold still and I'll call you back. I placed the call to Sauvagnargues just to make sure he's happy.

HAK: I'll tell him those things but send them anyway.

S: All right.

HAK: Will you all stay where you can be reached?

S: If you want us to. Shall we start the WSAG?

HAK: Yeah. Start the WSAG and I'll call you out again.

I: Okay.

McC: Last thing, Mr. Secretary, there is a message coming in now from Sisco.

K: Good.

McC: Okay.

HAK: And the State Department at the WSAG will act firmly right? Not hand wringingly?

I: That's right.

HAK: Thank you.

I: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

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TELCOM
Dep Sec Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger

3:40 p.m. 7/19/74

K: I just got the speech of Scali's but I suppose it is too late since I also had a call from Ramsbotham congratulating me on the masterful way in which Scali sometimes referred to Makarios as President and sometimes as Archbishop

I don't consider that masterful, I consider it another example of
total indiscipline.

I: I just heard it and I talked to Ramsbotham afterwards who called it to my attention.

K: Do you suppose our calling President Makarios is without significance?

I: No, I don't--it is rather significant--the first part of the--

K: Did we all agree on that--I Mean is everyone happy with this, I am not.

I: He started out with Archbishop--that is what we had in the text
I don't know where he got the President Makarios.

K: Well, we'll somebody call it to his attention? That he is to stick to archbishop Makarios

I: Right.

K: If we can interrupt his great flights of policymaking.
Did he give essentially this speech?

I: Yes. I didn't have the text in front of me, but one of the fellows there was looking at it and said it was essentially that.

K: With what changes?

I: Well, he adlibbed at one point and talked about a reference that the Soviet representative made that--I didn't hear the Soviet man, so I don't really know what he was saying, and it implied that there had been American appealing to the Soviets that we should have a policy similar to theirs. And he said we always permit our citizens to take opposite policies or anything they want.
Henry you heard the story in the Fin. Times was not filed because the reporter found out it wasn't true.

K: No, I have not heard that because it would have been interesting information

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I We called Lewis and I--

K: That's all right. The next thing, Bob is the Callahan letter. I think it is basically a friendly letter and that basically we don't disagree with it, we are just differing about pace and how we get to this objective. Could Stabler do one of his masterpieces

I: To Callahan

K: A personal letter and reply, giving him our analysis of the situation again in a capsule and saying we agree--I've already called Ramsbotham just so that you know--is Stabler on?

I: I think I'm the only one on--I didn't know you wanted him

K: No, no that's all right. Tell him an A I don't disagree except I would do it with lower key, B I agree, C I believe that that is going on, D--that is premature--E we are willing to do once, we know what is acceptable to the parties or at least to the Turks and F is becoming moot because of the eloquence of our great ambassador. Don't put it this way--F is now being debated. Does Scali understand that we would like to delay everything as long as possible.

I: I haven't been in touch, but I will find out and we could make sure he does--I'm sure he does.

K: Have you ever dealt with Scali? Will you tell Buffum that I'm holding him personally responsible for slowing Scali down

I: All right

K: Okay.

I: Essentially this is all right that Stabler can say except for this--'

K: I want him to give our view and then say what this means to us is with respect to your letter the following--do it a little bit fuller than what I have just given you.

I: Right. We will draft it let you know in a bit.

K: Good. Today.

I: Right.

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TELCONE
Amb. McCloskey

Sec. Kissinger

7/19/74 3:40 p.m.

M: I've talked to Lewis of the Financial Times. He explained to me that he first heard this from an American--I explained the realities of the situation and said nothing like that ever occurred. He then told me that by the time he talked to a second source, he realized it was exactly the right version. It happened that I had in front of me Callahan's letter to you today and I said you can't read a letter that the Secretary just received from Calahan and believe anything like this happened at any time let alone in the present situation--it turns out he did not write a story that Kissinger blew up at Callahan by the British insistence on supporting Makarios. K: We don't disagree with the British so much.

M: I don't think we do.

K: There is a slight tactical nuance to the Callahan letter I'm not in much disagreement.

M: I've also talked to Marder, Binder, Dana Adam Schmidt --Baltimore Sun this p.m., I think I got the message thru of our serious disappointment at this line getting around that you working against the advice of your people and I went into this at some length with all of them--I think I got them persuaded. In the case of Binder, you'd be interested, that he said he began to understand this as far back as yesterday. I said it was too bad then that that didn't get conveyed to the editorial page. He told me that on his original story where on Wednesday he had the quotes from unnamed sources that that opinion was easy to come by, but now looking back on it realized that that is not an opinion that doesn't really counts and it doesn't involved the people who are mostly working closely with you.

It happens that Les Gelb is doing today's Cyprus story and I had Anderson speak to him; after Anderson listened to me talk to Marder. And my impression is that Gelb is on course and understands. The same thing with Marder and I just spent 15 minutes with Dana Adma Schmidt.

K: I wonder whether we should have Schlesinger get some of his people to call.

M: We have--My confidence in them is not as strong as my confidence in some of our own people.

K: It can't be that desperate. Okay. Then we won't do it.

M: I wanted to tell you also I went in on my own and spoke to the members of the Task Force and told them if any of this represented any views

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the people in the Task Force, I'd like to have them say it to me. That I thought it was putting the Sec State in an intolerable position when he is accused of ignoring the advice of his people and he hasn't gotten any advice contrary to what he is doing. I went on at some greater length --and someone with me said he thought the message was put across. I also talked to Hartman to keep his eye on that Task Force and see that it has some good strong leadership.

K: I think we will all learn from this crisis how to run a tighter ship.

M: For one who found myself arguing with you at times on behalf of the Foreign Service, I'm deeply disappointed with...

K: No, I understand this Bob and my concern is to make the FS a great institution. I'm not fighting the FS. Because in the two years I've got left, I'd like to see that when I leave it will be proud of itself.

M: We had an inquiry in the press office this afternoon from John Finney who picked up some word the Soviet forces in So. Russia are on alert He went to the Pentagon and was given no comment and certainly got the same thing out of John King and our press office. I've asked Dick Kennedy to circulate from NSC that any inquiries should be marked met with no comment unless authorized guidance from the WH

K: Exactly right.

M: I guess that's all.

K: On the press that needs to be done is --two points that I--I just got the editorial from the Times--one did I do it against the advice of the State Dept. Two, we are not having any trouble with the British--we are in close touch with allies and more or less they agree with us--which ally is really unhappy with us.

M: None that I know of-- except the Greeks

K: The Greeks are unhappy.

M: Although after all

K: On the whole we are doing fine--what we are trying to do is working. If we can keep the Turks from invading another 48 hours.

M: I hope you might find occasion in the next day or so to send a one line note to Joe how much you--how well you think he has done--

K: Okay--I'll send it now. But have we heard from him again?

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HK: Do we know what he is doing.

M: He had--the last someone talked to him on the phone--he was awaiting the instructions--he must have them now. He did tell someone on the phone that he had heard in Ankara that Ecevit was going on the air sometime within the next couple of hours.

He didn't seem to --and we don't know--what to take from that--

K: But did we deliver the original message--

M: Yes.

K: Did Joe do it or Macomber.

M: Macomber delivered the original message because Sisco had not yet arrived in Ankara--that was the instruction. I'm sorry.

K: Okay, so that have that--so he must be having the next instructions.

M: Oh sure, I would think they are there by now.

K: We sent them two hours ago didn't we?

M: We sent them not quite that far back.

K: Okay. Thank you--are you going away.

M: No, I'll leave a number where I can be reached--

K: Good, we may all have to get together Sunday morning--it depends what the situation is--

M: When are you coming in tomorrow?

K: About 9 or 9.

M: Do you want any of us to meet you?

K: I don't see any need for it.

M: I'll talk to Eagleburger tomorrow.

K: There is no need for it really--Bob. I'm a pain in the neck, but I'm not petty.

Do what you planned to do in the evening.

M: Okay.

TELCOM
Secretary Ingersoll
Secretary Kissinger

4:00 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Bob, you'll regret the day you were sworn in.

I: Ahhh ha.

K: At any rate, it is proof for you--the people I don't trust, I don't work with.

I: Right.¹

being

K: Your predecessor had not complaints about/called too often.

I: I don't mind a bit.

K: Look do you have that Clerities cable in front of you --

I: No, I don't--I'll get a copy though.

K: Let me tell you I would like it to be given on a confidential basis to Ramsbotham for Callahan
And to say this is pretty much an analysis of ours.

I: Do you want to incorporate in this reply that Stabler is making?

K: Yeh, why don't you say for your own personal use, I am sending you a cable.
Secondly, I would like an instruction sent to Davies that he should see Clerities if at all possible and tell him we are quite sympathetic to the considerations he advanced--or more tactfully at any rate under no circumstances should he resigns his position.

I: All right.

K: Now the only thing that Stabler has to learn to become a really good friend is to draft faster.

I: He drafts fast, it is a matter of getting it through the typewriter I think is our biggest trouble.

K: Can we get those two things off in the next hour--or fairly soon

I: You want them out there first, don't you?

K: Or read to me on the phone. Fine. Thank you.

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TELCONE
Irving Lazar/HAK

7/19/74 - 4:40 p.m.

L: Hello. Hi Henry.

K: Ok. How are you.

L: Very well thank you. When are you going back?

K: Tomorrow afternoon.

L: Would it do any good at all if I came out tomorrow around 11:00 or 12:00 and just sit and talk to you for a few minutes?

K: I'd better to you about that in the morning. Can I call you around 8:30?

L: Well, I'm usually not up. I'd rather call you.

K: OK.

L: I'll call you at 8:30 in the morning.
up

K: You'd have to get/around 8:30 if you wanted to come down by 11.

L: That's no big problem. I'd have a car and chauffeur drive me down.
2 hours.

K: Less than that. Well, we might talk for half an hour. That might be
useful.

L: Yes. I'd be glad to do it - happy to do it and if you said to me now yes
and even if you couldn't give me more than 15 or 20 minutes I'd under-
stand obviously. Perfectly.

K: On that basis I could probable do it.

L: Let's make a date for me to be there at 11:00 and I'll make arrangements.

K: Let's make it at 11:30.

L: Perfect. I'll have my car fetch me and take me right down to the --
San Clemente. And should you leave word at the gate that I'm coming.

K: And you know how to get here?

L: Yes. I'll get back your Secretary and she'll give me the exact turn off.

By NARA Date 5/14

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UNCLASSIFIED

TELCONE - McCloseky, Ingersoll/HAK - 4:45 p.m. - 7/19/74

K: I thought you were going off Bob McCloskey.

I: But he is in my office.

M: Knowing you're still working I can't leave.

K: Yes, but I'm three hours behind you.

M: Anytime we're three hours ahead of you I'll figure we've gone pretty far.

K: In that message to Callaghan - one point that ought to be made is that it is of you two that to bring pressure to restore Makarois from the outside may well be a way of solidifying rather than weakening the Greek regime. Which I believe to be true. And that [SAINTIFIED] report I've just seen from athens. It rationalizes that it will look to them as an outside pressure of somebody that is unacceptable to all of them of that Greek junta. Excuse me. Fulbright is calling me. I'll call you right back.

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TELCOM
Fulbri ght/HAK

4:47 p.m. - 7/19/74

F: Mr. Secretary. How are you?

we

K: OK. I just wanted to bring you up date at where/stand. It isn't much different from what you were told this morning. But the Greeks have now agreed to send somebody to London on Monday.

F: To send somebody where?

K: To London. Which is what we had proposed and the British had supported. To talk about new constitutional arrangements which is a big step forward. And we're trying to keep the Turks from invading.

F: Well, I hope you do.

K: So that's where we are right now. You know I'm seeing Makarois on Monday?

F: What time?

K: Before your Committee. About 2:30

F: You're supposed to come to my Committee about 4:00.

K: I think that gives me an hour and 15 minutes with him.

F: What do you think he is going to say?

K: To me? I don't have a clear idea. We're not opposed to Makarois. We're opposed to getting ourselves into a position where we have to restore him by force.

F: I'm opposed to using force too but I don't want to support the Greeks.

K:

25x(6)

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F: That's good too.

K: That's again for your very private information.

F: That's what my Committee has been telling you for two or three years.

K: So we're bringing pressure on the Greeks but we're doing it so it isn't
too publicly visible.

F: OK.

K:

25x(6)

F: Well, I agree with that.

K: But as soon as we have -- well have a substantial -- don't believe the
newspaper stories. There isn't any real difference between us and
London. Sometimes a shade of tactics but in terms Callaghan has
written me a long letter today of their views and I've just replied to
him and told him that. You know, here and there there may be a shade
in tactics but we're on substantially the same wicket.

F: That goods.

K: We'll keep a little more daylight between ourselves and Makaros than
they do but we're in total agreement that the present group in Cyprus has
to go.

F: Good. Well, that's just amazing. It's the main thing.

K:

25x(6)

F: Sampson? Yes.

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San Clemente

Friday, July 19, 1974

5:05 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger - Senator Pell

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Claiborne.

P: Greetings.

K: I just received your letter. I'm out on the west coast for a few days and I just wanted you to know that there is no intention of recognizing the Sampson regime and that it will not stay there. But we have to maneuver in such a way that we don't trigger a Soviet intervention and that we don't get a Turkish-Greek war started. But, just for your information there is no intention or any prospect of recognizing the Sampson regime.

P: I'm delighted to hear that and I appreciate more than I can say your letting me know that. I think that will make the Committee feel more relaxed. As you probably know, Bill Fulbright is inviting Makarios.

K: That's all right. I knew that and had no objection. See what we are trying to avoid, just for your information again, we are trying to avoid the situation where we are nailing our flag to something which we then have to impose by military force. We would like to get the situation in which the Greek government accepts the removal of Sampson. We think if that happens that will also have a major effort of weakening the Greek government and doesn't put us in the position of an ineffectual grandstand play.

P: Right, but if you find that the --that you have to take a public position on this--

K: We will take a public position on this. And against---we are moving steadily. And, again just for your information and not to be repeated, we are already beginning to cut off military supplies.

P: Right. Well I'm delighted and I thank you very much.

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K: But don't get that into the newspapers. You can tell the other signers of your letter that if you want to that I have talked to you, you know, McGovern, Humphrey and McGee and you can give them a little feel. At any rate, put their mind at ease that we are heading for the recognition of the Sampson regime.

P: That I will but I will wait to contact them until Monday when they will be back in town.

K: That's fine with me.

P: I appreciate very much your calling.

K: Don't let some of these articles in the NY Times affect you. The top echelon of the State Dept. is all the people and they are totally behind what is being done.

P: Then basically your position is parallel to that of the British.

K: That's right. There are minute tactical differences but--produced by the fact that they are a guarantor, but I talked to Callaghan at least once a day-- I've just had an 8 page letter from him. I'm writing him one that is going off tonight and we are working in the greatest harmony.

P: That is good news indeed. What will you do though if you find that you just can't get rid -- that he stays and stays--.

K: Then we will have to do other things.

P: All right. I thank you very, very much.

K: But what we don't want to do is have the Soviets go in there in the name of the Security Council to enforce a Security Council decision.

P: Yeah.

K: But, we will not accept Sampson.

P: Then I hope in the course of -------- that will give us an opportunity to let the Greek people be aware of the fact that the -------- government, while we have no wish to interfere---that it is not our first choice in government.

K: Well I think that if it comes out the way I think there is a good chance of it coming out, the junta will be substantially discredited anyway.

P: Would you think it would go toward --------.

K: Well, you know, we are not at that point yet. I personally, I would lean toward

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Caramonles?.

P: He seems to have a broader base. And some respectibility at home still.

K: That would be my view but you know one cannot be sure what willemerge
there.

P: I had a long talk with the King on my way through London. He has matured a great deal. A few years ago he was a little cocky. Now he is a much more solid person. And I would say probably in the end that we would be used as a symbol---to keep his fingers clean in all these very different machinations that have been going on. He is in Eng. finishing up his degree, he moved into a smaller house and I think he would be-- we would be pleased with him if he went back.

K: Yeah, low we would have no objection to that if that is how it developed.

P: Good, well I thank you very much.

K: You're welcome, Claiborne.

P: Very nice of you to call and good luck to you---

K: You can reassure your colleagues on Monday. I've already explained it to Fulbright and he is fully with us.

P: All right and I will do that myself.

K: Find, bye.

P: Bye.

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By MR NARA Date 9/16

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 9/7/8

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

15-A

UNCLASSIFIED

TELCOM

Ingersoll/McCloskey/Stabler - HAK

July 19, 1974 - 7:30 p.m.

I: Another message that Sisco and McComber were called back to
The Prime Ministers.

K: But that is just to tell them we refused.

I: There was a separate message Mr. Secretary which said that the
ships had turned.

K: Oh really.

I: Yes.

S: They'd been in a 7 1/2 mile limit. Both forces had turned off and they've gone outside ____.

K: Really.

S: That occurred just before the message to Sisco.

K: Could it be that we do something right sometimes.

M: We'll have to wait and see.

Let me get that other message.

I've just shaken that over self-confidence of this Department. If Sisco
gets a 48 hour dealy he'll be insufferable.

I'll say. We'll be willing to insufferable.

Maybe we should try Stabler as an alternative.

He's been doing alright on the messages today.

K: He's terrific on messages. Where are those two messages that he sent out.

S: Did you get the one to Callaghan.

K: A message to Callaghan. Has that actually been sent.

S: It was sent out to LDX several hours ago at the White House.

K: It went two hours ago to the W.H. Now will you find you out where these idiots have it. Did you tell them to clear the lines.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
E012958

By
H.R.

NARA

Date
5/10/74

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 5/10/74
by NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

Stat
call)

15-B

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

I: An hour and a half ago.

K: Did you tell them it has high priority.

I: Yes. They were told to clear the lines.

K: Ok. Well, let's have a word.

M: This message I referred to reads both groups of Turkish ships have changed course according to reports London British sources Cyprus. Task force north of Cyprus has just entered 12 mile limit when it turned. Forces now steaming north and is approximately 22 miles off course.

K: They may be heading for Salonika.

I: That's a long way away.

K: Or Rhodes. Listen gentlemen. I'm not that crazy yet.

I: You haven't looked at your map.

K: I know they are not heading for Salonika Bob. Now. Let's discuss what we do if they turn around again. Supposing they land. What do we do.

I: I think we should get our people heading for the Turkish base.

K: Get what people heading for what Turkish base.

M: We're talking about the Americans on Cyprus and moving them to one of the British sovereign bases on the Island.

K: Yes, but that is a minor problem. I mean that is important but that's easy. But what do we do in policy. Wells what do we do.

S: The only option that we have left open at that point is the most undesirable one we probably have to sort of join maybe in some sort of a ______ to call for the cessation of hostilities and stand aby I think because it doesn't give a position but that is the only position one can take. You really can't accept a Turkish invasion because that's what.....

K: You're talking to fast. What would happen.

S: One thing we wanted to prevent was a Turkish invasion.

25x(6)

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Authority 2012958

By NARAD Date 6/7/67

15-C

- 3-

K:

S:

K:

25x(6)

S:

K:

S:

K: Well, what has happened to the Callaghan message. You know these messages have taken hours to get here. The Situation Room says they haven't received it yet.

S: I'm just having a check made this very moment now to find out if it was delivered up here an hour and a half ago.

K: Where did you send it to.

S: The White House to be sent to you. The people over there were told it was coming.

K: He said they LDX'd it to the White House to send to us. Well, its partly overtaken by events anyway.

S: Yes, I know. Almost entirely. Unless he gets 48 hours delay.

K: But if we get the 48 hour delay we have then move with much greater speed.

M: Right. I think we have to get joined up by the British here Mr. Secretary

K: We have what?

M: To get joined up with the British.

K: That's clear. That's why I'm looking for the Callaghan message.

M: And I think now the pace of events overtake that message to Callaghan if it gets to you.

UNCLASSIFIED

By J. H. NARA Date 9/7/68

15-D

- 4 -

UNCLASSIFIED

K: But I'd let it go anyway and then follow it with something else.

M: Unfortunately it doesn't go anywhere until it gets to you.

K: So far it doesn't seem to have even reached the White House yet. It's probably some desk officer who hasn't put his initials on it. Whom did you give it to State Operation.

S: It was given to the SS director here directly with instructions to LDX immediately over to the White House for transmission to San Clemente on a high priority basis.

K: OK. Well, let's not worry about that now. When will we know... We haven't heard from Sisco yet.

M: You have his one message.

K: No we haven't heard about his being called -- his result of the....

S: He was called in just a little while ago.

M: The time was 10:00.

S: The message from Ankara was dated 10:06 our time. 7:06 your time.

K: What time is that in Ankara

I: Plus 7. 5:00 a.m.

K: Assuming they gave him -- there are two possibilities either they are telling him they are going in anyway or they gave him 48 hours. Now if they're going in anyway we've got to get the fighting stopped -- we've got to tell the Greeks to stop fighting. Not to go to war. Then the question is how to do we accomplish that.

M: I think you have to start with Presidential messages for one thing.

K: Ok. Will you draft those. And we've got to do something about this G.D. communications here. Brent will you do something about this communication and tell them to get the Watergate traffic off the bloody lines.

K: I guess they're sending those six books out here by ... Well, we need a message to Turkey and to Greece. We need immediately -- a contingency message to the British. I guess we have a little time on that. When do you think we'll know from Joe?

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E012958

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By NARA Date 9/14

15-E

- 5 -

S: I suspect we would know by another 45 minutes.

K:

25x(6)

M: Do you have the Callaghan message now.

K: I have no idea where it is but what I'm now trying to decide is have we found out where the Callaghan message is. It is here. But that is not the key issue here. The key issue is when we have 48 hours we ought to try to get the Greeks and the Turks. There are two possibilities. Either the Greeks and Turks meet in London or Joe goes on a quick shuttle.

S: Either the Greeks and do Turks do what?

K: Go to London. Or Joe goes back there now. If the -- if he has 48 hours we have to see what it is that the Turks want. If the Turks insist on bringing Makarios back I don't think that can be done in 48 hours.

S: I was thinking if he does get 48 hours we then ought to stay where he is and continue to find out exactly the perimeter.

K:

I:

K:

I: 25x(6)

K:

I:

K:

I:

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E012958

By A.R. NARA Date 9/7/69

UNCLASSIFIED

15-F

- 6 -

S: I don't ever see how you could get the Greeks to stand on that.

K: On Makarois. We agree on that. I'm just trying to go a step at a time. So the next thing is the Greeks accept in principle a constitutional solution other than Makarois. That's what would have to be done -- that is how this would have to be phrased within the next 48 hours.

M:

K:

25x(6)

I:

K:

I:

K: Well, if that is true then if we got 48 hours we're not in bad shape. Let's see what it is. Get me a copy too. We've got a great organization here. Cables are distributed in this order - Eagleburger, Scowcroft and then me. Well, this is just what you've been telling us. This is about that change of direction. Well look, what we need is first of all to get my other cable off ΧΡΕΙΔΙΑ ΜΗΣ to the British as if nothing had happened.

E: Are you ready to go on that.

K: They haven't found it yet because its probably being read by Zeigler at a briefing. In reply to Doar. And we may have sent him a St. Clair statement.

M: They're still trying to find phase three. We passed to the British those other two papers you wanted.

K: You have.

M: Yes.

K: Just for Callaghan

S: Yes.

K: I thought we were going to attach them to the letter but this is actually very helpful.

UNCLASSIFIED

TELCOM

McCloskey/Stabler/Ingersoll-HAK

7/19/74 - 7:30 p.m.

K: If they've gone to war on the other hand, we should have a presidential message to both Greece and Turkey asking them to stop in the name of greater interests. We'll do a message out here again to the Soviets. Maybe we can get Sonnenfeldt. We'll handle it. And then we appeal to the British to get the 2 parties to London as quickly as possible.

M: The flash in is that they have made the decision to attack.

K: So they're coming back in.

M: McClosely reads calbe.

K: Isn't that the old one. What's the time.

M: 10:38 EDT.

K: Somebody has to teach me to read. What time is this G. D. message. We have 114 Zebra is where they turned around. What do you have.

M: A message from Sisco. Ecevit just informed me final Got decision to land on Cyprus taken. Precise timing of landing of landing up to military leaders but we have impression is within the hour if it has not already taking place. Ecevit said so long as Greeks don't fire we won't. If Greeks are cooperative we can stabilize our forces and a certain number of places in Cyprus and then Turkey is ready to negotiate as to who will be present at the Cyprus under such circumstances Ecevit said Got does not need care. He assured us in response to my request that every effort would be made to avoid injury to American citizens and all civilians on the island. Ecevit asked that the y phone the Greeks to inform them of the above and to stress that there will be no Turk firing if Greeks refrain from same. Ecevit said he is not going to Army Headquarters to urge his commanders to "take chances" to avoid any gunfire if at all possible.

K: We don't need the 48 hour contingency plan.

M: The other wire says the Turkish force north of Ireland has turned south again and ships are spread out in lines ten miles long and are now approximately 10 miles from coast.

K: Where could Scowcroft have gone at this particular moment in history. You think I could keep both of you sitting here while I discuss this.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
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By A.L. NARA Date 5/19/74

*

DECLASSIFIED

2012958

Authority

By NARA Date 9/7/69

- 2 -

K: We didn't get the Callaghan message but it is now totally overtaken by events. Well, we better get -- where is Sisco now?

M: He is apparently still there but I would suppose he is leaving soon.

K: I think Sisco ought to go to Athens. That's where he can do most good.

M: What instructions should he have?

K: His instructions are to urge them not to fire and to start an -- we will support immediate negotiations looking for a constitutional solution and let him surface the KEMHAHA solution.

Clerides

K: I think we should give Taska the outline of the Clerides solution. First of all get a flash to Taska what Wheaton has to transmit to them. Secondly tell them we recommend that they not go war. That the consequences for everybody including themselves would be disastrous. And three, we continue to save the return to the constitutional arrangements including the level of military forces on the island as it was prior to the coup. I mean now the Turks have something to bargain with. Four, we think under these conditions, a compromise solution is necessary and we recommend -- and our idea is that perhaps Clerides can take over and if they agree we will put this to the Turks. And Sisco is coming to discuss it with them.

S: You think it would be useful for me to telephone Callaghan.

K: Yes.

S: And just tell him what we're doing and get him to weigh in right away.

K: Its night....never mind.

S: It's five hours.

K: It's alright. I'll call him if I can get my people to put in a call to Callaghan immediately and tell them to wake him up. And tell them to wake him up.

M: Mr. Secretary. How about our convening an immediate meeting of the Security Council and asking for.....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
2012958
By A.R. NARA Date 9/7/68

K: No, no. God no.

M: Telling them all to excercise restraint.

K: No. I don't want to get the Russians in yet. Let's first get somebody to Greece. We can call a meeting of the Security Council in another couple of hours if necessary.

M: It's scheduled at 11 tomorrow morning as it now stands.

K: Look to me the Security Council is far down on the agenda. It will make no contribution, it will get the Russians involved and the best hope is Sisco now. But also tell Ervin what we are doing. Let him see Souvana. OK can you draft that message to Callaghan immediately.

M: Mr. Secretary. May I suggest that you call Callaghan directly.

K: I'm calling Callaghan but I want a message drafted anyway.

M: Alright. I think we should get craking on what is necessary in Athens right away.

K: That's right. The first message that has to be done is the one to Taska.

S: The question is whether we telephone Taska and...

K: Then the whole world will know.

S: The whole world is going to know shortly - the first landing you know.

K: But we don't want our solution known by the whole world.

S: That's true but I mean in terms ...

K: That's true. You can do and you can say we are sending a -- it finally got here the letter to Callaghan. We got a great system here. Fischer got through with it. So I think the operative part - the message from the Turks you should call Taska about right away.

S: Do you want Presidential messages too.

K: That's too. But the first thing now is to get instructions to Taska about how we think this thing can go. I think the Greeks have to understand it is now too late. Either stonewall it. They should not go to war and that we think this is the way it could go and if they're willing to do it Sisco is on the way and -- so call Taska -- somebody other than Stabler

SANITIZED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E012958

By ARL

NARA Date 6/16/85

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCOM
HAK/PRESIDENT
7/19/74 - 8:00 p.m.

K: Hello Mr. President

N: Hi Henry.

K: I was just checking the line had gone dead. Mr. President it looks as if the Turks are going to land in Cyprus within the hour if they haven't already landed there. At any rate they've told us they're going to land there. And that they have given instructions to their troops to avoid fire if the Greeks avoid firing. And so my recommendation, if you agree Mr. President, is the following. That we send -- we first of all are going to get in touch with Taska immediately and give him that message from the Turks about the firing. Secondly we're going to urge the Greeks to see whether they will accept the solution of the head of the national assembly Clerides. They'll never accept Makarios without going to war.

N: Yes.

K: And the Turks have already told us they will accept anybody and if they accept Clerides then actually we'll have come out very well. If they don't accept Clerides we're going to have a war between the Greeks and the Turks. We're also drafting letters from you to the Greek and Turkish leaders urging restraint on them but the first thing we've got to do is get the message to the Greeks. We'll get the message off -- your message off immediately. Immediately after that. And then maybe in a few hours we can consider the question of a Security Council meeting.

N: Good. Fine.

K: I'll keep you informed as soon as we know more. I've got a call into Callaghan to see that we can stay lined up with the British.

N: He ought to. We'll see. He'll support us. Why are the Turks going to such lengths.

K: They have a very tough domestic situation at this point. That is just the message that the Minister of Turkey has just told Sisco that they have a tough domestic situation and Ecevit is trying to appeal to them -- the nationalists. And....

N: Well, if it gets down to the Greeks and the Turks having at each other I mean if it does get to that we then have to go to the Security Council

UNCLASSIFIED

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 9/10/03
by NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01/2958
By NARA Date 9/10/98

15-M

- 2 -

K: To the Security Council and NATO and we'll have to stop military supplies to both while they are fighting. There is no sense having an open pipeline to two NATO allies who are fighting each other.

N: That's alright. That's the way to play it.

K: Let's see first whether we can get... if actually we get the Clerides solution this will be the best way to do it.

N:

K:

N:

25x(6)

K:

N: Yes.

K: Call Ingersoll. OK Mr. President. I'm sorry to.....

N: No, that's what I'm here for.

K: I'll call you as soon as I have some more news.

N: I guess there is no way we could have kept the Turks from doing this.

K: Mr. President, we had Sisco out there. We had Sisco talk to them in London. He talked to them again. The only way I suppose we could have done it was by being more threatening which we weren't. We were maybe too pleading but frankly we didn't think they'd move this fast.

N: Well, threatening them now I suppose...

K: Now it's too late. We did send them a very strong note about 8 hours ago telling them it would have very grave consequences.

N: Right. Well don't be concerned about the reaction. The libs and all that sort of thing.

UNCLASSIFIED

By ML

NARA Date 9/7/8

TELCON
Schlesinger/HAK
7/19/74 - 8:15 p.m.

K: Hello, Jim.

S: Yes Henry.

K: I just wanted to bring you up to date. You know the situation and I want you to know what my thinking is and see whether we're in step on it. My view is that -- you know the methods that the Turks have asked us to pass to the Greeks about not firing.

S: Right. They're landing.

K: They're landing and they have orders not to fire at the Greeks if the Greeks don't fire. So we're going to pass that message and we're also going to tell the Greeks that we think the best solution now is to have a negotiation as rapidly as possible looking for the return to constitutional government. And that we recommend the Clerides solution under these conditions. That's -- that means they have gotten rid of Makarios and they'll have to give up Sampson. And we'll send Sisco back from Ankara. Now we don't think this will really fly but at least it's a slender threat.

S: My feeling is that the Turks at this stage are not going to settle for anything less than a piece of the island.

K: No, the Turks have said that they are willing to stabilize their forces and that they are willing to keep the existing structure and they will accept any president other than Sampson.

S: That's very generous of them. That's good. OK......

K: If the Turks want a piece of the island then in my view we have to work for double enesis and give the Greeks the other part of the island so my view is there are now two possible outcomes. Either double enesis or Clerides.

S: Completely. Henry. I had a call from Ingersoll a bit ago who wanted to move the Americans down to the British base.

K: I tell you. My bloody outfit. When they got a crisis the first thing they can think up is something trivial. What do you think. I'm not against it. I just wish they'd do first things first.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By N.A. NARA Date 5/19/74

TELCORN

Friday, July 19, 1974

8:15 p. m.

Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

-----

K: That is my feeling.

S: And it shows a certain nervousness on the part of the US government.

K: Agree completely.

S: If there is a discreet withdrawal by car but the hint -- the statement that I got -- was we ought to move in helicopters and start removing Americans.

K: Well, to tell you the splendid reporting system I have they told me that you had offered helicopters. And I was under the impression that you were the energizing party.

S: Oh hell, I heard about this about 15 minutes ago.

K: OK, I'll take care of this. Of -- if they convince me that we need it,

I assume we can appeal to you.

S: You bet, you bet.

K: But I agree with you that we should play that part cool.

S: We can move by car.

K: That is my strong feeling too. If we go in with helicopters no one will ever know what they are in there for.

S: That's right. And miserable as the circumstances are, we still want to keep a low profile.

K: So we will work either for double enoisis or for Clerities, whichever works out.

S: OK, bye.

K: Bye.

By NARA Date 574
DECLASSIFIED
 Authority
 E012958

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

NARA Date 5/16

TELCORN

Friday, July 19, 1974

8:20 p.m.

Amb. McCloskey - Secretary Kissinger

K: Hello,

M: Hi, Mr. Secretary. I still have Joe on the phone and he is insisting
that it is not wise to go to Athens.

K: On what grounds?

K: Well, we were only half way through our conversation when I found
out you were trying to reach me.

K: I'm returning your call. Didn't you call me 10 minutes ago?

M: I was on the phone with you 10 minutes ago--along with the others.

K: But then I got a message that you had tried to reach me while I
was talking to Secy. Schlesinger.

M: Well, I don't know. There must have been a garble somewhere.
In any case, Sisco is on the line. I've talked to him. He is resisting
or questioning that he should go to Athens. He says that the Clerities
proposal has already been rejected by the Turks--

K: I thought he said he would accept any President.

M: This is the word I was getting from him when I got off the phone to take
your call. He says it makes no sense for him to go to Athens now.

K: Well, look, I've got Callaghan calling. Tell him that I read his cable about
their saying they don't care who the president is under these conditions.

M: He asks then why we think the Turks, or the Greeks would accept this.

K: I don't know. That's what he's going there for!

M: All right.

K: But tell him to wait until I can get back to him. It would be a pleasure
to talk to somebody who takes orders.

Let me talk to Callaghan.

M: OK.

TELCON
SAN CLEMENTE

7/19/74 - 8:22 p.m.

Callaghan/HAK

K: Hello.

C: Hello Henry.

K: Jim, how are you?

C: Not so good with the news.

K: That's it and I just wanted to check with you about where you think we should go now.

C: Yes. Can you speak a little louder Henry. I can't hear very well.

K: Good. I can hear you very well.

C: Good. So can I now. Well, what do we do now? Joe Sisco arrives here -- it is now half past four in the morning with us -- he'll arrive here in about an hour I think.

K: No, he hasn't left Ankara yet.

C: Oh, he's still there is he?
to send him

K: I was wondering whether/from Ankara to Athens? To see whether we could get our compromise solution floated there now.

C: If you would send him to Athens.

K: Yes.

C: Well, that's a prospect.

K: What do you think?

C: I think that's an idea -- what would he put to Athens Henry?

K: Our pet idea. I don't want to say it on an open line. You know what I mean. Because I don't think your idea.

C: I don't think I'm in the picture on that.

DECLASSIFIED

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By

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K: You know the one I've mentioned the compromise I mentioned to Clerides -- or I mean to.........

C: Yes. Well I think there is a lot to be said for that. But it wouldn't be sufficient now would it. Would it be sufficient now to stop anything?

K: The Turks have told us they would accept anybody.

C: Have they. I see. And pull out.

K: No. But that would have to be the next phase.

C: I see.

K: Joe is eager to go to London but I don't see what he can do in London.

C: No. There is nothing he could do here. Very much at the moment. I was wondering whether we ought to invite them both there.

K: I think that you should do.

C: The alternative -- I wondered about this Henry -- is whether I would go to the sovereign base area and invite them both there.

K: That's another possibility.

C: I'd be closer to him there too. I'll think about that one.

K: Let me call Sisco and I think there is nothing he can do in London. Unless he has a friend there.

C: That's right. The Greeks have told us they will come here you know. You knew that did you?

K: I knew that and I thought that was good progress.

C: So did I. But I think probably.....

K: I think the Turks have decided to go it before they went to London. Don't you?

C: Well I think they were divided myself and they assured me that they hadn't you know. They assured me hand on heart that if I were to give them helpful answers to their questions that they would use them for peaceful purposes and not as an excuse for going in.

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K: Yes, but ____ strike me as having been helpful.

C: Well, that's what I thought but I still think they were divided and that when they got back. However this is all history.

K: What more could you have done.

C: What's that.

K: You couldn't have offered them anymore than you did.

C: Well. There you are. I'm just trying to turn the thing over in my mind now. I was just thinking about where Sisco ought to be. Certainly not here. There is no point in that and there is nothing more he can do. I don't know anything about his mission to Turkey-- whether they told him anything or.

K: I will get all the cables we have to Ramsbotham within the next half hour and I will now in any case make sure you get Sisco's reporting cables.

C: I will get those then if you will authorize them and I can see what the story is. Then perhaps we could have another word.

K: Let's do that. I will get you all his reporting cables from Turkey and also from Greece. Then I will send him back to ......

C: My first reaction is subject to seeing that he should go to Greece. He's got to put a lot of pressure on there and to do one of two things and you'll need that to make strong representations in Ankara before he leaves

K: To what effect?

C: I think we have to do that--we've got to put that on the record, anyway.

K: That's right.

C: And we'll do the same and I think I'd like about an hour to consider whether we should call them to London or not, or whether I ought to go to Cyprus itself--perhaps you could think about that, could you?

K: I shall, and will you call me.

C: Yeh, I'll call you in about an hour then when I've had a chance to read it his cables. Do you think it would be better for me to invite them both to London or whether I should go out there and I'll think about it too and then as then stands at the moment Henry, I think I sooner he was in Athens than anywhere else.

K: That's my view,--it is everybody's view execpt Sisco's.

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C: Ah of course, well poor Sisco!

K: But he is going to come to Athens, believe me.

C: I think so, now what about the UN--have to think about that

K: Let's put that off for a couple of hours.

C: Soviet Union, what do we do there.

K: Was going to get in touch with them as soon as you and I had agreed--in other words, after the next hour and tell them what is going to happen and where we --

C: I think we ought to notify the SU too, but I'd like first to make up my mind roughly what I'm going to do.

K: We won't get in touch with them until I've talked to you again.

C: In about an hour's time then?

K: Yes.

C: That's very good
All right Henry--as the Chinese say, may you live in interesting times.

K: We've achieved that anyway.

C: What is the time with you?

K: Oh I'm in good shape, it is 8:30 in evening on the West Coast.

C: Well, it is 4:30 in the morning here. I feel in good shape now, but I shall feel light-headed like hell in a few hours time. Okay.

K: Nice to talk to you.

C: Good bye old man.

K: Bye.

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E012958

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By NARA Date 9/7/74

TELCOM

Friday, July 19, 1974

8:45 p.m.

M: Hello.

K: Hello, OK. Sisco is to go to Athens. Callaghan agrees.

M: OK.

K: Before he goes to Athens he is supposed back into the Turks and he is to tell them first of all that we object strongly to their actions, that it has strong consequences for everybody, we now believe that the Clerivites solution is the only one and that he has been instructed to Athens to propose it, and that we expect the Turks to go along with us. And we are interpreting that phase "go along with it".

Now is there anything else on his tortured mind?

Has he told you our whole plan on the telephone?

M: No.

K: What is his objection? Callaghan does not want him in London.

M. OK, that is doesn't know and no one could tell him that before now.

K: Well, what was he going to do in London? Will you tell me?

M: Mr. Secretary, I'm sorry. I don't know what he was going to do in London. I had to be interrupted twice while I was speaking with him.

K: What is his reason for not wanting to go to Athens?

M: He says there is no way the Greeks will accept the Clarities proposal that has already been rejected by the Turks furthermore.

M:

K: Then he has been writing out the cables. / But that is what he is saying to me over our rough connection.

K: As to who will be president under those circumstances, Ecevit said government is Turkey does not care. Now, what in the hell does that mean?

M: OK. I think I still have an open line to him. I'll go back to him and tell him he must go, he will have detailed instructions for him there and...

2

K: Yeah, but before he goes we want him to go back into the Turks.
By now what else have the Russians not picked up? What is there left to
say? OK, we've said so much on the open line we might as well go ahead.
But Sisco is going to Athens and he is going to stay there. Now has anyone
talked to Tasca?

M: We have been trying to get a call into him also. Bob Ingersoll is trying to get that call through.

K: Yeah, but not before we have had an evacuation. OK, let's get to Tasca, but let's not do everything on an open line.

M: OK,

K: Fine, bye.

By [signature] NARA Date 6/7/69

TELCOM
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Sec. Kissinger

8:50 p.m.

7/19/74

K: Hello? Where are you?

K: Get yourself brought up to date and see what message we can send to the Soviets--I've told Ingersoll to bring you up to date and at least you are one professional--my ...... is fighting right now whether Sisico should go to--

S: I know, I know it.

K: I don't mean what they are complaini g about Makarios--that's down the drain.

S: Any way do you want to do something with them after this thing happens or before?

K: It has happened so we might as well send them a mesaage-- Give them some idea what we are working towards--tell them we are going to work for what I discussed with Dobrynin--namely a Clerities type solution.

S: Okay why don't I get something on the wire to you or read something to you.

K: Yeh, read something to me.

Thank you.

By J.R. NARA Date 7/19/74

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER __3__ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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NARA Date 9/10

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCON
Secretary Kissinger
Mr. Stabler/Sec. Ingersoll

7/19/74 8:50 p.m.

S: Larry

K: Yeh

S: This telegram to Tasca is ready --I've written it--its ready to go,

K: Joe Sisco is going to Athens or I'm going to clean out the whole stinking department.

S: We know he is going to Athens, Mr. Secretary, that has been done, but you asked me to send a telegram to Tasca as well which I have now written.

K: Okay, the first thing I want to make sure that Sisco goes back in to the Turks and tells them what he is going to do. When he tells McCloskey that the Turks have already rejected the Clerities solution, I can only assume either that he misreported in this last cable or that his mind is still enthralled with the first conversation. In the first conversation they rejected the Clerities solution as a means of keeping them quiet. Now that they are in, they apparently have said they'll accept any government.

S: That's right.

K: That being the case, why does he say they have already rejected it?

S: I'm afraid I haven't talked to Bob since he has talked to Sisco, so I'm afraid I'm being on that.

K: Now could we also try to do this thing professionally and not discuss everything on an open phone to Turkey

I: Bob has been talking to Joe just to get him to go to Athens.

K: But in the process he has been told that the Clerities ideas has already been rejected by the Turks and therefore it is senseless for him to go to athens--therefore, everybody from Yugoslavia over knows what our plan is. I just haven't seen anything like this. I mean the Russians now know what our scheme is--everybody knows what we are going to try to do.

I: Bob is over in the Operations Center, I don't know what he said--

K: What he said was the Joe opposes going to Athens because the Turks have already rejected Clerities. From this I would have to assume that he discussed our plan with him--how else could he have gotten that intelligence.

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Page 2

I: I didn't know he got it.

K: That is what Bob told me. Now can you please get some discipline in this bunch.

I: Mxx Sure. Get on em right away.

K: He eh--it's already done.
I'm just trying to tell you if you tip everything to the Russians, we might just as well call Gromyko on an open line and tell him.

I: Right.

S: Should we still tell Tasca to go ahead--

K: Well, has somebody called Tasca?

I: We've been trying to get him--he hasn't been available.

K: What does that mean?

S: We've not been able to get through on the wire--meanwhile I've got the telegram --

K: Okay, you will send the telegram--

S: May I read it to you?

K: Yeh
has

S: Sisco exx just reported that GOT has taken final decision to land forces on Cyprus--now information is exx that landing may be underway within the hour. He should immediately get in touch with PM Ioaniddes, and pass their message from Turkish government Turkish troops should not open fire ...... you should urge Greek government to recognize direct confrontation between Greek and Turkish forces would hand to the Soviets the advantage they have been seeking in the ME, which would be disastrous for western interests, not for just ........., but over the years ahead. USG is prepared to support immediate negotiations with the parties concerned for the restoration of the constitutional situation in Cyprus, and we have in mind the possible succession of Clerities--we would support the return to the level of forces existing prior to the coup. Sisco will shortly arrive in Athens and if GOG agrees to proceed along the above lines, Sisco would return at once to Ankara to put these ideas to the Turks. You should tell GOG that we have tried our utmost to avoid Turkish intervention in the wake of the coup. Now that it has occured GOG must join

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with us in seeking a negotiated settlement which will preserve the legitimate rights of all concerned. We call upon the Greeks to exercise that degree of restraint in statesmanship without which the ......

K:

25x(6)

M

I: Henry, may I interrupt a minute--Bob has Sisco on the phone, do you want him to go back into Ankara and talk to the Turks or do you want to give a message to the Turks?

K: I want Sisco to go back into Ankara, talk to the Turks, he is then to go back to the airport and go immediately to Athens and he will get instructions there.

I: And have you told Bob what you want Joe to tell the Turks?

K: I've have told Bob what I want him to tell the Turks, but I repeat it again: I want Bob --I want Sisco to tell the Turks that we take an extremely grave view that I believe they are jeopardizing ............end conversation

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TELCOM - 8:57 pm 7/19/74
Conference Call
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Ingersoll
Amb. McCloskey
Mr. Stabler

K: Bob--

I: Yes.

K: Are you on alone?

M: Noooo, I'm on. Do you want me off.

K: No, no. I just wanted to know who else--was on whether Stabler was on--

M: No, no

K: Because I ah--wanted to get another cable done of more detailed instructions to Sisco--

M: Do you want Stabler on--

S: Yes, sir. I'm on.

K: Okay. You will do some detailed--now does Sisco understand what he is supposed to do?

M: Mr. Secretary, I have to say that Sisco is in the air--they had to leave the airport and I am afraid I could not understand completely the reasons he was attempting to give me over a very bad connection--

K: And where is he going?

M: Athens.

I: We will get the message you suggested for him to give the Turks to Macomber.

K: Okay, now Bob--you are going to take over this goddamn department till I come back.

I: Right.

K: And nobody is going to move without your authority. And anybody who doesn't like it should hand in his resignation. I've just had it.

I: Probably some military problems--

By A.R. NARA Date 6/24

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K: I don't give a damn all right. Send a message to Macomber. Of the same substance that Sisco was supposed to deliver. That message is that we etake a grave view of the situation, it could have themost serious consequences. That we are asking the Turks to keep in mind that it is easy to start these things--it is more difficult to end them. Our belief is that these must be restored as quickly as possible--our believe is that the only way now to restore constitutional government with any chance of success is the Clerities solution which Sisco outlined. Sisoo is on his way to Athens to present that and we are assuming that the Turkish government will agree to that, secondly, we are going to ask Britian to call for immediate negotiations of the Xanthos powers, probably in London, but conceivably on a British base in Cyprus. But we think London is better and we hope that the Turkish government will accept that.

And you get Macomber in to see Ecevit with this message fastest.
Read it to me before you send it out. Second we send detailed instructions
to Sisco who may be a little tired after his exertions and explain to him
what we have done in Turkey, why I believe the Clerities solution has
not been rejected by Turkey if his reporting was correct, that they
rejected it at first Because they thought it was a way of keeping them
from invading--now that they have invaded------ah (long pause)

Now the only other thing we have to keep in mind is to leave open the
door to double enosis--but I think we better not start pushing that yet.

Okay can you get those two cables out--Point out that I interpret his
reporting to mean that the Turks rejected the Clerities idea when they did
thought it was a way of keeping them out.

That I interpret what they said that they will accept any President as a
means of settling it. Now what is the judgment of the people about
whether we should float the double enosis idea now?

I: Some people think that is probably the practical thing with the Turks in place.

K: I think we should go to that after trying the Clerities. It is too dangerous to come up with it now Because it will run into massive Soviet opposition.
OKAY_let's get them drafted.

I: One to Macomber, one to Sisco--

K: The one to Macomber first.

S: The one to Tasca would be on its way--the one I read to you.

K: Then to Macomber, and then longer instruction to Sisco in Athens--quickly

TELCONE

Secretary Schlesinger/
Secretary Kissinger

9:10 p.m. 7/19/74

K: Jim, how are you

S: Okay. We have at the present time, reports of bombs falling in Kyrnia and Nicosia

K: Bombs falling ?

S: Yeh. There is no confirmation of Turkish landing as yet, but if they have not occurred as yet, they are expected momentarily. Now the Forrestal--

K: You consider that confirmed?

S: Yeh. We are getting that from the British I believe, but I can check on that.

Now the Forrestal Task Force is west of Crete at the present time and it might be desirable for us to start moving it down towards Cyprus.

K: I agree.

S: The amphibious forces moving towards Cyprus is steamed for about four hours and it is still about six hours away -- the British have an evacuation plan for themselves with a Caravan going toward the base and we would hook into it if the need arises, but nobody has indicated as yet the need is arising.

K: When bombs start falling, they may change their mind. Who do you think is doing it?

S: Turks--Turks took several F 100's off about 3 hours ago from one of their bases and in Turkey--they were loaded up.

K: You think they are getting the airfield?

S: My own guess is that they have a notion that before you land on a beach you are supposed to drop bombs and they are doing that.

K: Nicosia is not on a beach is it?

S: There is nothing in the manual of war that says you have to drop the bomb on the beaches.

K: The only reason I keep asking is because I have a message here from

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Ecevit--have you seen that?

S: Yws.

K: It says to pass to Schlesinger--Ecevit said so long as Greeks don't fire we won't.

S: I'm not sure he has control over everything--my own guess is that Sancherra and the military have their own ideas about what to do when the balloon goes up. We shall try to check thru the reports that the bombs have impacted.

K: Good.

S: But the purpose of the call at the moment is that we probably ought to start moving that Task Force out from west of Crete.

K: I agree with you completely

S: Okay. You've got my number here at the NMCC--
Believe me! am at the NMCC

K: Good, make sure the WH board knows where you are at all times.

Thank you Jim.

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