A769

R A631ZSACYNIYC

AMBASSADOR

UNITED NATIONS; NOV 26; REUTER - U.S. AMBASSADOR DANIEL
PATRICK MOYNIHAN CATEGORICALLY DENIED TODAY A REPORT THAT HE
WOULD RESIGN HIS U.N. POST WITHIN A MONTH TO RUN FOR THE
SENATE AS A DEMOCRAT.

"NOT JUST MOST, BUT EVERY SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENT IS UNTRUE"
IN THE PUBLISHED REPORT, HIS PRESS SPOKESMAN TOLD REPORTERS.

THE LONG ISLAND NEWSPAPER NEWSDAY SAID IN A STORY FROM
THE U.N. TODAY THAT MR. MOYNIHAN TOLD PRESIDENT FORD IN
WASHINGTON ON MONDAY THAT HE WOULD QUIT TO RUN FOR THE SENATE
SEAT HELD BY CONSERVATIVE-REPUBLICAN JAMES BUCKLEY.

THE ACCOUNT CONTINUED THAT MR. FORD AND SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY KISSINGER URGED THE AMBASSADOR TO REMAIN AT THE U.N.
UNTIL THE END OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SESSION; DECEMBER 16; AND
THAT HE AGREED ON CONDITION HE RECEIVED A STRONG STATEMENT OF
SUPPORT FROM THEM.

THE NEWSDAY REPORT ALSO SAID MR. MOYNIHAN DIFFERED FROM DR.
KISSINGER ON TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH THE ANTI-ZIONISM
RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WITH THE AMBASSADOR URGING
THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO APPLY PRESSURE ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES
"WHILE HE WOULD CREATE THE MORAL PLATFORM FOR THE DEFERT OF THE
RESOLUTION."

REUTER 1312

THE WASHINGTON POST, THURSDAY, AUGUST 14, 1975

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Kissinger, Schlesinger and SALT

Although the Pentagon now has
been brought into the heart of policy-
making on Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks (SALT), there is widespread sus-
picion that Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger will abandon the mili-
tary's position if necessary to avoid
stalemate with the Soviets.

The fact that Kissinger finessed the
Defense Department out of a seat at
recent SALT conversations in Hel-
sinki, while not inherently important,
demonstrates he is not fully sharing
the stage. There is, moreover, in-
formed opinion high in the govern-
ment that Kissinger will not endanger
a SALT agreement by sticking to the
Pentagon position on critical ques-
tions affecting long-range security of
the United States and short-range po-
litical success for Gerald R. Ford.

If Kissinger seeks new compromises,
the final decision will be President
Ford's. He maintains total confidence
in Kissinger, and some high-ranking
officials cannot imagine him breaking
with his Secretary of State if that
would prevent 1975 agreement with
the Soviets. Other officials, however,
believe the President's interests are
not identical to Dr. Kissinger's and
that he must be prepared to support
the harder-line Pentagon position.

Actually, preparations for U.S.-Soviet
SALT sessions at Helsinki were far
less of a one-man show than in the
past. Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, Kissinger's arch-rival in-
side the administration, attended two
top-level planning sessions. Schles-
inger and Gen. George Brown, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with
the President at a third meeting,
which did not include Kissinger.

The result: a unified U.S. position at

Helsinki, including Kissinger's accept-
ance of the Pentagon's tough standard
for counting Soviet MIRVs (multiple
independent re-entry vehicles). That
turned into a vindication of Schles-
inger's arguments for hard bargaining
when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
agreed in Helsinki to MIRV verifi-
cation.

But picayune maneuverings over
whether the Pentagon would have its
own man in Helsinki undercut this
unity. As we reported earlier, Schles-
inger requested that a high level
Pentagon representative attend the
Helsinki bilateral negotiations about
SALT. Acting on Kissinger's recom-
mendation, Mr. Ford replied the So-
viet wanted only four persons per
side—definitely excluding the military
of both nations.

Schlesinger, therefore, sent nobody.
But at Helsinki, the cozy four-man
game suddenly doubled, with eight
Americans and eight Russians sitting
in—including, unexpectedly, Gen. Mik-
hail Kozlov, deputy chief of the Soviet
general staff.

Pentagon officials concluded Henry
had tricked them again. Elsewhere in
the bureaucracy, the interpretation
was that Kissinger was determined
not to let his Kremlin counterparts
think he was being outflanked by
Schlesinger. Nothing occurred at Hel-
sinki to alarm the Pentagon. But Kiss-
singer's maneuverings raised doubt
about how long he—and the President
—will stick to these hard bargaining
points:

The Soviet Backfire bomber: The Kremlin contends it is only a local weapon and is not to be counted among strategic weapons according to the SALT agreement reached in Vladivostok last November. But the Back-

fire can easily reach the continental
United States on a one-way flight and,
by refueling in Cuba, could make a
round trip. Therefore, the U.S. insists
the Backfire must be counted among
strategic weapons.

Cruise missiles: The Soviets claim
the Vladivostok agreement counts as
strategic weapons subsonic cruise mis-
siles, fired from bombers, with a range
over 600 kilometers. But the U.S. mili-
tary contends that this conveniently
discriminates against U.S. cruise mis-
siles which could reach the Russian
heartland.

Missile size: The Pentagon, backed
by U.S. disarmament director Fred
Ikle, considers it vital to negotiate
reductions in the huge Soviet ad-
vantage of larger missiles and believes
Brezhnev is now ready to negotiate.

The question of U.S. survival may
depend more on missile size than on
any other issue. But in the short run,
the Backfire bomber is most politi-
cally combustible. Should the U.S. per-
mit this menace to the U.S. heartland
to be omitted from strategic weapons,
Mr. Ford would be open for intense
political assault.

When Kissinger first returned from
Helsinki, colleagues found him pessi-
mistic about prospects for a SALT
agreement this year and wedded to a
tough bargaining position. But more
recently, the officials describe him as
reverting to his old theme of this
being the last chance for agreement
that would avoid additional multi-bil-
lion-dollar defense requirements. If he
follows that through by recommend-
ing key concessions, Mr. Ford will face
the most difficult and most fateful
choice of his presidency.

© 1975, Field Enterprises, Inc.

Editorials

NOV. 26, 1975

NEWSDAY

Behind the Pike-Kissinger Confrontation

Americans mustn't be misled by the rhetoric surrounding the contempt citation voted against Henry Kissinger Friday by Representative Otis Pike's House Intelligence Committee.

The confrontation is not simply another outbreak of political infighting between the Democratic Congress and the Republican President.

Nor is it just a personal feud between an ambitious committee chairman and the secretary of state over documents that Pike would like to see in the headlines and Kissinger wants to protect. Anyone personally acquainted with Pike, as many Long Islanders are, knows better than that.

It isn't even an argument about the public's right to know. The Pike committee hasn't sought to release the subpoenaed documents, which deal with Soviet adherence to the SALT agreements, State Department recommendations for covert operations and White House decisions thereon. It merely demands the right to read them under its mandate to

investigate the conduct of U.S. intelligence. No, what's really at stake is far more significant. The Pike-Kissinger confrontation is the inevitable test of everything the country should have learned from the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam and Watergate about Congress' responsibility to oversee the policies carried out by the executive branch in the name of the American people. Either Congress has the absolute right to examine the operations of the executive branch, or the executive is effectively free to exempt itself from oversight whenever it sees fit. There is no middle way.

Even the CIA seems to have learned that lesson. Director William Colby has cooperated fully with the Pike committee and its Senate counterpart. There have been no pleas of executive privilege from CIA headquarters, because the intelligence community now recognizes the need for the public support that can only come with oversight on behalf of the public.

It's hard to believe that Gerald Ford hasn't learned. Can he really have forgotten in 15

months that it was confrontation over a cover-up that drove Nixon from office? More likely, in our opinion, Ford has come to another grossly unwise decision by the same route that has led him astray so often in the past (on aid to New York, for instance): his almost paranoid desire to appease the right and somehow, head off Ronald Reagan's challenge, his vulnerability to self-serving advice from one or two favored advisors and a vacuum in that corner of the White House where every President should be able to turn for disinterested counsel.

Kissinger's motives are less clouded. Regardless of his protestations that the subpoenaed documents concern previous administrations, the fact remains that he stands to be personally embarrassed by his own role in some of the grievous policy mistakes now coming under congressional scrutiny. If that's a false assumption, Kissinger need only hand over the subpoenaed documents to prove it. He certainly won't accomplish that by reviving the Nixonian rhetoric of a year or two ago.

Senate calls for review of U.S. support

UN officials fret over U.S.

[L.C.]

reaction to 'Zionist' vote

By David Anable

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, New York

United Nations officials are extremely concerned about the
possible American reaction to this week's anti-Zionist vote in
the General Assembly.

But some of these officials, together with numerous
Western as well as "third world" diplomats, are almost
equally disturbed by what they are convinced was U.S.
Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan's mishandling of the whole
issue which they say made things worse than they need have
been.

In particular, these diplomats are worried by what they
describe as Mr. Moynihan's tendency to emotionalize the
Zionist debate. At stake was an Arab-inspired resolution that
defined Zionism as "a form of racism and racial dis-
crimination." The Assembly adopted the resolution by 72
votes to 35 with 32 abstentions.

By helping to turn the debate into a dramatic confrontation,
these diplomats say, Mr. Moynihan drove some of the
waverers back into the shelter of their customary alliance
with the "third world." A more extreme view held by a
number of Western diplomats is that the crucial vote to
postpone the issue to next year, lost by only 12 votes Monday
afternoon, could have been won had the U.S. Ambassador
combined his firmness with more tact.

In his speech following the General Assembly vote, Mr. Moynihan stated flatly that the U.S. "does not acknowledge, it will not abide by, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act."

UN officials fear that the American reaction could involve
severe financial cutbacks or even the downgrading of the U.S.
mission to the point where it becomes a "sleeping mission."

These privately expressed concerns are reflected publicly
in the strongly worded statement put out by usually extra-
cautious UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

"I am profoundly conscious of the gravity of the situation which has arisen in the General Assembly," he said. "It reflects a deep and bitter division among the membership at a time when the need for understanding on a wide range of critically important questions is more than ever necessary."

Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D) of Minnesota, who attended a press conference with Mr. Moynihan following the vote, was asked whether the appropriations bill, containing U.S. voluntary contributions to the UN, now would get through the House. "It's going to be very difficult," he replied, adding that Sen. Richard B. Stone (D) of Florida "thought all the voluntary contributions ought to be taken out of the bill."

[President Ford and the Senate Tuesday condemned the UN General Assembly's adoption of the anti-Zionism resolution. The Senate called for a review of U.S. participation in the Assembly.

[The President was quoted as denouncing the UN move as a "wholly unjustified action." There was a torrent of criticism elsewhere in Congress.

[By voice vote without dissent, the Senate passed a nonbinding resolution of condemnation after several members rose to denounce the General Assembly action.

[The bipartisan resolution, introduced by Republican
leader Hugh Scott with more than 30 cosponsors, said the

Assembly action "encourages anti-Semitism by wrongly associating and equating Zionism with racism and racial discrimination."

[It calls on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee to begin immediate hearings "to reassess the United States' further participation in the United Nations General Assembly."]

Francis Ofner reports from Jerusalem:

An Israeli official said the "hypocrisy" of the resolution recalled the sacrificing of Ethiopia by the League of Nations in the '30s.

Israelis were particularly saddened that their people, who suffered such atrocities as a result of the theory of race in World War II, now should be accused of the same crime.

"The resolution profanes the memory of our 6 million Nazi victims as well as of the freedom fighters of all nations who fell in the fight against the Nazis so that a new world of human freedom should be built," the Foreign Ministry said.

John K. Cooley reports from Beirut, Lebanon:

Arab capitals generally welcomed the General Assembly resolutions condemning Zionism and supporting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) participation in Mideast peace talks.

They interpreted the resolutions as an invitation to the PLO to take part in the Geneva Mideast conference if it reconvenes.

Although Arab statesmen are well aware of the prospect of a Western backlash, including threats by some U.S. congressmen of American "punitive action" against the UN, there was no hint of apprehension in official Arab reactions.

CSM

4/12

# The U.N.
And
Zionism

By Anthony Lewis

BOSTON, Nov. 12—The United Nations General Assembly deserves every bit of the outrage aroused by its resolution terming Zionism “a form of racism.” Fear and anger are appropriate reactions.

Plain old anti-Semitism in the world is one reason for passage of the resolution, and it is necessary to face up to that grizzly fact. Averting one's eyes from the incitement of hatred against Jews—pretending that it is a passing phenomenon in some other place—was tried in the 1930's.

Nor is it possible to take much comfort from the fact that the General Assembly has long since lost its right to be treated seriously as a maker of moral statements to the world. Whatever its foolishness, the resolution will almost certainly be used as the basis for new discriminations against Jews (who will be called "Zionists") in the Soviet Union and elsewhere.

But it is not enough for Americans to be angry at the United Nations. It is certainly not enough to nod in agreement at preachments by such well-known exemplars of moral sensitivity as Gerald Ford and Jacob Javits. For the unhappy truth is that this country has a share of responsibility for the disaster.

A generation ago the United States was in a position to talk of moral standards in world affairs. There was, for example, a strong idealistic ele-

## ABROAD AT HOME

The United States must avoid the temptation to be self-righteous.

ment in America's support for the creation of Israel and in our effective leadership of the U.N. to that end. In those days there was an extraordinary respect around the world, for American idealism.

That hold on the world's imagination—that unique form of leadership—has been lost by our own actions. Successive Governments of the United States put aside ethical considerations as amateur stuff and went in for the cynical use of power. If we make short-term interest our guide, with power as the only limit, how can we object to the Arabs or anyone else doing the same thing?

A superpower that drops 500,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia is in rather a doubtful position to lecture others on morality. So is a Secretary of State who asserts the right to upset the constitutional government of a friendly country by covert means.

The funny thing about all the hard-nosed "realism" practiced by Henry Kissinger and others is that it evidently does not gain votes for our side when we want to make a stand on principle. The torturers whom Mr. Kissinger and the C.I.A. helped to power in Chile, and are helping to keep in power now, did not vote with us in the General Assembly. Chile abstained.

A particularly grotesque example of the results of "realism" in this regard is provided by Burundi. When the Burundi Government engaged in mass tribal slaughter of a truly genocidal character, the United States Government declined to take any disapproving action—apparently because of American economic interests there. But even in tiny Burundi such a policy earned no return favors in the U.N. Burundi voted for the resolution.

A word has to be said, too, about Israel's responsibility. While it is true that declared opposition to "Zionism" often cloaks anti-Semitism, it is also true that Israel's policy made it easier for the Arabs to push through an extremist resolution.

Israel has persistently refused to make a real commitment to return the Arab territories won in the 1967 war. Her policy instead has been to rely on American support and huge amounts of American arms, playing for time on the ultimate territorial issues—time that I think is making life progressively harder for Israel, not easier.

There is every reason for Israel to have survival as its first national thought—and second, and third. But it does not follow that the correct policy is to take a diplomatic line so hard that moderate Arabs are given no encouragement and extremism this as

As for the United States, the temptation it must avoid now is to luxuriate in self-righteousness. To respond in kind to the opportunists and tyrants who pushed this resolution through to boycott the U.N. or punish it financially—would be unhelpful. That is the Soviet way. When the game goes wrong, pick up your marbles. The United States should show that it is bigger than that, and more patient in the cause of freedom.

If we believe in freedom, then we should be prepared to go on arguing the case for it, with other free countries, in what remains for all its distortions the most complete international forum. Some day, too, an American Government will understand again that cynical manipulation does not work for this country in foreign policy—that our strength lies in our ideals.

NYT

11/13

Kurds Say CIA
Betrayed Them

By Joseph Fitchett

London Observer

HEIRUT—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger scuttled the revolt of the Kurdish nationalists in Iraq earlier this year, according to one of the aides of the defeated Kurdish leader, Gen. Mulla Mustapha Barzani.

The Kurds believe that Kissinger cut off aid to them—supplied through Iran and the Central Intelligence Agency—to save his larger Middle East game.

Kissinger apparently hoped that Iraq, free of the Kurdish problem he had helped to foment, would renew its rivalry with Syria, weakening opposition in Damascus to the Egyptian-Israeli withdrawal pact he was working out last spring. The plan seems to have worked—at great cost to the Kurdish movement.

The harm to Iraq, the nominal target, was nothing compared to the destruction wrought on the Kurds, nominally the CIA's ally. An American CIA operative, who was involved in Kurdish affairs, summed up, "The Kurds were dizzled; we dizzled them."

Taking openly for the first time about the CIA involvement—ordered by Kissinger—in the Kurdish insurgency, a Barzani aide who was privy to the operation told me here that covert American support was central to Kurdish strategy in the Kurds' decision to defy the Baghdad government.

Through CIA channels, Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party received tens of millions of dollars' worth of weapons. The best American-supplied materiel consisted primarily of Soviet-made artillery and portable anti-aircraft plus a powerful American-made radio transmitter that broadcast the Voice of Kur-

distan throughout the Middle East.

Despite his disillusionment, Barzani is said by the Kurds to have forbidden his inner circle to disclose the American connection or to complain publicly until after the CIA involvement had been leaked in Washington.

The Kurds' view of Kissinger's role was reinforced by the disclosures in Washington last week that he ordered the CIA operation in his capacity as National Security Council chairman, answerable only to President Nixon. In Washington, a congressional committee confirmed that the CIA had arranged shipments of "untraceable" Soviet- and Chinese-made weapons to the Kurds via Iran.

Former Treasury Secretary John Connally, who represents several companies in the Middle East, was named in Washington as the contact man with the Shah, who was enthusiastic about the operation. The CIA also funnelled financial support to the Kurds.

The military impact of the American commitment was far outweighed in the Kurds' eyes by its political significance, according to the Kurdish official. American influence was viewed as a guarantee against a doublecross by the Shah. "We would never have launched the revolt trusting the Persians alone," Barzani's aide said. "Barzani believed the U.S. would prevent any further maneuver by the Shah, who ultimately has to worry about his own, incipient Kurdish problem."

American support for the Kurds was pledged via the CIA in secret contacts dating back to 1972. The Kurd indicated. The agency said the Kurds were seen as a means of ousting the Iraqi Baath (Arab

Socialist) regime, whose shaky new leadership appeared to be turning Iraq into a base of Soviet influence after signing an Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty.

The CIA contacts occurred primarily in Europe, although the assistance was funnelled through Iran, which has a common border with Kurdistan. The agency pleaded the need for secrecy to spare Barzani embarrassment as an "American client." To reinforce this cover story, the CIA reportedly discouraged Kurdish contacts with high-level Americans and arranged elaborate gambits like successive semi-public brushoffs for Kurds attempting to see American officials in Washington or U.S. Ambassador Richard Helms, a former CIA chief, in Tehran.

The Kurds managed to project their case to American opinion through a few journalists, but their collapse around little public concern in the United States. Survivors now face difficulties even in getting visas for the United States.

The CIA also reportedly laid the political groundwork for a Kurdish-sponsored change of regime in Iraq by secret contacts in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. But CIA "back-channel" maneuvers were never allowed to compromise the United States publicly, leaving the way clear for the abrupt disavowal that finally materialized, the Kurds say.

In the end, Barzani analysts believe, Washington pushed the Shah, perhaps even against his own judgment, to mend fences with Iraq. Iraq's move away from the Soviet connection in late 1974—when the Soviets were refused the sovereign base facilities in south Iraq they had asked for as the price for increased military support—reduced the American motive for supporting a change in regime.

The final decision was apparently made nearly 1974 when Kissinger was attempting to put together the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement pact in the teeth of fierce Syrian suspicion. By letting Egyptian President Anwar Sadat arrange a solution for the Kurdish problem, Kissinger obtained Iraqi support for the Egyptian leader's diplomacy.

WP
11/13

## Crosby S. Noyes

# Real doubts on the theory behind foreign aid

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is on notice that the administration's $4.7 billion package of foreign military and economic aid is in trouble in Congress. Apart from the size of the package, there are very real doubts about the political theory behind it.

The great bulk of the request is for the nations of the Middle East. Almost half of the total is earmarked for Israel — $1.5 billion in military aid and $740 million in economic support. Of the rest, $750 million is for economic aid for Egypt. Jordan is to get arms and aid to the tune of $253 million; Syria, $90 million in grants.

But this latest administration program of arms and economic aid is only a part of the whole story. In addition, Kissinger has told Congress that American arms sales to foreign countries will total some $9.2 billion this year, much of that going to such well-heeled Middle Eastern countries as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

In Kissinger's view, this combination of aid, loans, grants and sales adds up to sophisticated diplomacy. It is, he says, "a prudent investment in peace" so far as the Middle East is concerned.

That, of course, is to state the obvious. No one disputes the proposition that the United States has a

large stake in world peace and in avoiding a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union. It is also quite clear to most people that the use of oil from the Middle East as an instrument of economic warfare by the Arab states has added a new dimension to the Arab-Israeli conflict in terms of the interests of the industrialized Western states.

It is also arguable — though less obvious — that Western interests are served by making some Arab states less dependent on the support of the Soviet Union. The Russian record has been terrible. Those who have thrown in their lot with the Soviets have not only suffered through a disagreeable experience, but have also lost wars.

And for its part, the Soviet Union has lost immense material and moral treasure in its pursuit of ambition in the Middle East.

What is not obvious at all — and indeed is open to the most serious question — is the notion that the United States increases its control of events by supplying arms and economic aid to both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For this, in fact, is the direction in which the Ford administration is clearly headed.

As Kissinger put it, it is necessary "to find the means to demonstrate and

nurture our growing friendship with Israel's neighbor Egypt" and strengthen the domestic political position of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat who, in Kissinger's view, has "courageously embarked on the road to peace."

Maybe so. It must be said, however, that Anwar Sadat, in the course of his recent visit to these shores, did very little to reassure Americans of his dedication to peace in the Middle East. And he did quite a lot — including his ruminations on the evils of Zionism — to convince many Americans that his new friendship with the United States has a good deal to do with his ultimate designs on the state of Israel.

In the most sophisticated of foreign policies, there may come a time to recognize the essentialtractability of the issues involved. There may also come a time when "even-handedness" between mortal enemies becomes an impediment to the solution of a conflict.

In the Middle East, it must be recognized that every weapon owned by every Arab state is available for the destruction of Israel, regardless of our relations with the states involved. That problem will not be resolved by any amount of American aid and wishful thinking.

WS

11/13

# The New U.S. Style in the U.N.

## By Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband

Last March, Daniel P. Moynihan, finding himself temporarily between government jobs, wrote a piece for Commentary magazine outlining a new role for the United States at the United Nations. "We are the liberty party," he proclaimed, "and it might surprise us what energies might be released were we to unfurl those banners."

Henry A. Kissinger, reading the piece, must have said something like "Why not? What's to lose?" And so the United States Permanent Mission became the Secular Church Militant marching as to war behind the flags of freedom and individual enterprise.

The new style became operational after Uganda's Idi Amin called on a rapt General Assembly to exterminate Israel and the United States Zionists. Four days later, Mr. Moynihan put it in perspective for the A.F.L.-C.I.O. All but two dozen regimes in the United Nations, he explained, are totalitarian

despotisms that find democracy anywhere an embarrassment and therefore seek its destruction. He said that "it is no accident," that General Amin, this "racist murderer," heads the Organization of African Unity.

Mr. Moynihan's approach represents more than just a change of style. The United States has signaled its intention to cut the General Assembly back to size. This involves two tactical decisions to say exactly what we feel and to pay less attention to what the majority does.

That Assembly debates and resolutions are currently taken so seriously is mainly due to the misguided United States initiatives and self-delusions of

the 1950's. Through such devices as the Uniting for Peace Resolution we strove to upgrade the United States-led General Assembly while demoting the veto-bound Security Council.

Fortunately, the Russians, who were then in the minority position now occupied by the United States, prevented our representatives from doing irrepensible injury to the Charter's checks and balances.

While we convinced ourselves that the Assembly ought to become a major instrument of global policymaking, they steadfastly continued to treat it

as an Oxford Debating Union: fine for ventilating powerful ideas but powerless to impose them.

Whenever the Assembly overreached itself, as during the Congo operation of the early 1960's, the Russians spoke up clearly, withheld payments, withdrew recognition from the Secretary General, trotted out the troika—their proposal for a tripartite Secretariat—or just walked out of debates.

A recent United Nations experts' study urges states to "enhance the authority of the Assembly's decisions." No way! The United States will hereafter re-emphasize the primarily lyrical functions of the Assembly. In speaking out more vigorously, however, we must expect some costs. Professionals on the United States delegation have complained that Mr. Moynihan's verbal hand-to-hand combat precludes negotiated compromise and loses us votes on resolutions. While this view overrates the prospects of serious negotiations in a goldfish bowl, it is, nevertheless, important to hold down costs.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. speech affords an object lesson. By lumping all African members of the O.A.U. with General Amin, Mr. Moynihan has undermined the seventeen who abhor the Ugandan and do not side with the Arabs over Israel. Such verbal carpet-bombing welds an anti-American unit that is against our interests, yet is an inevitable result of Mr. Moynihan's

thesis of a free "we" and a totalitarian
"they."

It may be good senior common-
room target practice to reify the élites
of all the new nations as reincarna-
tions of that choleric Fabian, Harold
Laski. But it is neither prudent nor
a palpable hit. The truth is more
shaded and good verbal strategy re-
quires finer calibration.

To rally the forces behind the tat-
tered flag of human dignity and in-
dividual worth is a splendid endeavor.
Yet Mr. Moynihan must also insure
that he is seen to carry the banner
with clean hands. If he cannot per-
suade Washington and American busi-
ness to stop subsidizing fascism in
Spain and Chile or racist regimes in
Southern Africa, his crusade will mere-
ly appear naive or hypocritical.

The United States must fine-tune
its rhetoric to avoid hitting innocent
bystanders, get its own morality in
order, and stop worrying about what

follies of men are interred in Assem-
bly resolutions.

If we can do that, then a more
militant use of the Assembly to expose
despotism, inhumanity and deception,
without fear or favor, will clearly be
a superior strategy to either acqui-
escence or exit.

Indeed, if he can restore the As-
sembly's lyrical function, America
should propose taking the show on
the road—other United Nations organs
travel—to Moscow, New Delhi, Santi-
ago, even Kampala: wherever the mu-
sic has stopped. On the other hand, if
the lyrical function should become
stifled, then it will surely be time for
free peoples to regroup elsewhere.
Meanwhile, if we can't be popular, we
might as well be outspoken.

Thomas M. Franck is professor of
international law at New York Uni-
versity and a program director at the
Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Edward Weisband is director
of international studies at the State
University of New York, Bingham-
ton, and associate professor of politi-
cal science. They are the authors of
"Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among
the Superpowers."

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

# Campaign '76: A Sad Year for Foreign Policy

The campaign year of 1976 is shaping up as a sad year for foreign policy and for foreign-policy debate alike—a year of hypercautions, negatives, inhibitions and prejudices, all of them presented to the public, naturally, as serving the American interest and reflecting the American spirit to a T.

Say what you will about 1972, its campaign offered a fair if over-simplified choice. Nixon said stay involved internationally and McGovern said "come home." The people chose Nixon but thereafter the rosy promise of his policy got badly tarnished by disappointments with the Russians, another Mideast war and the oil-price increases, among other dismal items, not least Nixon's discrediting of the office.

The upshot is that the terms of debate on international policy and national security have shifted markedly or, more accurately, have been tightly squeezed.

Nixon-type large-stage internationalism, dealing with Russia and China, has been rendered somewhat suspect, substantively and politically. At the same time McGovern-style neoisolationism—by which I mean his premise that the United States would be both safer and richer (and more unified) if

it looked more inward — has also been undercut.

We find ourselves in broad agreement that 1) detente is tougher sledding than had been figured and does not itself portend an early easing of our cares, and 2) that retreat from foreign policy is impractical and leads us away from engagement with the international concerns vital to our political health and economic welfare.

But we are not agreed at all on how or even whether a careful and effective international policy can be formulated and given the necessary domestic underpinning. Such a policy would have to include the lessening of tensions with both our political adversaries the Russians, and with (like it or not) our economic partners, most all of the other nations of the world.

I think Secretary of State Kissinger understands these requirements better than anyone else around but he is operating under such heavy disabilities, not all of his own making, that he has difficulty conveying his judgment even to his own chief, let alone to the Congress or the country at large. He has his head noticeably down these days.

Liberal internationalists who might be expected to be more or less on his

wavelength are not much to be seen now, their lights dimmed either by events or by the pulls of electoral politics or by the fallout of all those damaging battles on side issues (Chile, Turkey, wiretapping, etc.) for which Kissinger has such a fatal attraction.

Ford's recent national security personnel changes, replacing a heavyweight with a lightweight at the Pentagon while clipping the wings of his own chief diplomatic and intelligence lieutenants, demonstrate his own flight from messy reality on this score.

In his rhetoric the President increasingly is just giving out code-word grunts to the right to assure the folks out there that he believes in "strength" and does not intend to give away the family jewels. Can he or will he, as his friends suggest, change tune after disposing of Ronald Reagan in primaries next year, and revert in deed as well as word to a real foreign policy?

Reagan, meanwhile, is no help. He regularly throws red meat to the right, cultivating the old illusions that the budget can be balanced, the nation made stronger and the Russians rendered more pliant at his single stroke. The particular security issue he seems to have focused on is the

Panama Canal, a natural, alas, for a conservative looking for something with a lot of popular vibrations. David Binder of the Times reports that Reagan has put himself, on the Panama issue, in the hands of an authentic rightwing nut, a fellow by the name of Phillip Harman.

George Wallace, too, like Reagan a home-centered politician little called on previously to fashion international views, is working to narrow the spectrum of responsible foreign-policy discussion. That his attitude of contempt for foreigners and foreign policy can only hurt the longterm economic interests of his blue-collar constituency seems not to strike him—or to bother him—at all.

Perhaps we are in an unavoidable phase in which the country must work its way through these partisans of un-policy, these men who tell us that slogans will serve, before politicians emerge who can express the deeper concerns of a broader public. For there are such politicians on the roster of presidential and vice presidential hopefuls—Carter, Church, Humphrey, Mathias, Rockefeller and Udall are among them.

It will be interesting, not to say fateful, to see whether they survive this winter of our discontent and come up with the crocuses next spring.

A National Interest in Principle

Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan has found just the right rhetoric to deal with the UN's hypocrisy, notably the recent vote equating Zionism with racism. He retaliates by calling on all its members to live up to the principles they apply so one-sidedly. His latest proposal, excerpts of which are reprinted nearby, is a world-wide amnesty for political prisoners.

The Zionism vote and amnesty proposal are definitely related, in that both are strong American stands on principle. Their consistency gives them a force that simple propaganda could never achieve. And we would be quite satisfied with the American side of things if we could be sure that everyone in Washington really understood what their semi-autonomous UN Ambassador is up to.

Unfortunately, we suspect that the professional diplomats at Foggy Bottom don't really comprehend the strength of Ambassador Moynihan's strategy. Of course, he was appointed by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, and presumably they approve of his work. And in the Zionism fight, it probably was wise to delegate leadership to European governments. Still, we hear disturbing reports that in this campaign the State Department's backing was tepid, that it was slow in carrying the fight outside of the UN halls, and if left to itself the department probably would have ignored the whole issue.

We are worried by these reports

since they seem so typical of that bureaucracy. The bias at State is to define American interest in terms of narrow tangibles on one hand and soupy generalities on the other. So in our foreign dealings we compromise our devotion to the principles of the Constitution and Declaration of Independence in return for trade agreements, and try to compensate by windy talk of world peace and human brotherhood. Often, as the Ambassador sees, this talk is turned not against the worst offenders, but against those where some chance of redemption still exists. It is hard to realize that while we do have national interests, it is also true that a bonafide moral principle is a precisely definable entity, demanding specific action, and that when it is compromised we pay a discernible price.

And it is precisely because Ambassador Moynihan does understand this truth that his brief career at the UN has been so spectacular. He is making a remarkably consistent defense of our political values, which would have been gravely compromised by silence on the Zionism issue. His amnesty proposal is simply his latest effort to show that the United States does stand for something.

Since we believe that principles, and the lack of them, shape events, we believe that this country can draw great benefits from Mr. Moynihan's course of action, just as the United Nations may yet pay a heavy price for its own. But we hope the folks at State agree.

Committee Votes
Contempt Action
For Kissinger

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House intelligence committee yesterday voted to hold Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in contempt of Congress for refusing to produce documents concerning covert CIA operations and alleged Soviet arms-control violations.

Chairman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) said he would seek House approval as soon as possible of the three contempt citations the committee issued in a series of lopsided votes.

Each accused Kissinger of "contumacious conduct" for refusing to comply with three committee subpoenas, one sent to him as Secretary of State and two as White House assistant for national security affairs.

Kissinger was cited just before the committee brushed aside a last-minute letter from the State Department explaining that Kissinger declined to comply with the subpoena on the instructions of President Ford.

Pike said the committee's staff had been deceived by the National Security Council staff at the White House about the existence of some of the documents and given the runaway in its efforts to obtain others.

He told reporters later that he felt there were some fundamental issues at stake in the showdown, primarily "the ability of the Congress to exercise its constitutional role of legislating and its constitutional role of oversight."

It was the second time this week that a Cabinet member has been cited for contempt.

A House Commerce subcommittee voted Tuesday to hold Secretary of Commerce Rogers C.B. Morton in contempt for refusing to turn over the names of companies asked to participate in an Arab boycott against Israel. Congressional Quarterly and the Library of Congress say the contempt citations are unprecedented.

If approved by the House, the Kissinger and Morton citations would be forwarded to the U.S. attorney here for prosecution. Contempt of Congress carries a maximum penalty of a year in prison and a $1,000 fine.

A circuitous, last-minute attempt to invoke executive privilege in the face of one of the Kissinger subpoenas fell flat.

Rep. Robert McClory (R-Ill.), the committee's ranking GOP member, said at the outset of the hearing that he had been informed by White House counsel Philip Buchen over the telephone yesterday morning "that the doctrine of executive privilege would be raised" to maintain the secrecy of some 10 subpoenaed State Department recommendations for covert operations that had been proposed in past administrations.

Pike replied that it had not yet been invoked and that he felt it would be stretching the privilege unreasonably for President Ford to claim it for communications to past Presidents and past White House groups in charge of secret operations.

The committee then voted 10 to 2 to cite Kissinger for contempt, with McClory and

See PIKE, A6, Col. 3

PIKE, From A1

Rep. David C. Treen (R-Ia.) dissenting. Shortly afterwards, White House aide Charles Leppert hurried in to deliver a letter on State Department stationery from Department acting legal adviser George H. Aldrich.

Pike refused to look at it, so McClory read it into the record. It said that Kissinger "had been instructed by the President" not to comply with the subpoena and that Kissinger was thus declining to honor it "on the basis of the President's assertion of executive privilege."

Pike told reporters later that he did not consider it a valid assertion. Committee counsel Aaron Donner added that past Presidents have traditionally promised to invoke the privilege only over their own signatures.

No privilege was claimed for the documents demanded of the National Security Council staff by the other two subpoenas. The committee approved contempt citations against Kissinger for failing to produce these records by separate votes of 10 to 2 and 10 to 1.

Committee staff director A. Searle Field said Kissinger was the proper party to cite because he was still legally assistant to the President for national security affairs.

President Ford announced last week that Kissinger's longtime deputy, Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, would relieve the secretary of his second hat as NSC staff director, but the committee was told that Scowcroft had yet to be sworn in.

The solidest vote against Kissinger came on a subpoena for all documents in the hands of the National Security Council staff concerning both Soviet and American "adherence to the provisions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972" and a follow-up agreement reached at Vladivostok in 1974.

"They did not tell the truth and they have, in effect, admitted they did not tell the truth," Pike said of the NSC staff.

Only McClory, who authored all of the subpoenas at issue, voted against the contempt citation stemming from the SALT controversy. Treen voted present.

The third citation, approved by a 10-to-2 vote, involved a subpoena for the records of

covert CIA operations approved since Jan. 20, 1965, by the National Security Council's so-called "Forty Committee" and predecessor groups ostensibly in charge of clandestine spy projects. As White House national security adviser, Kissinger has been chairman of the Forty Committee since the start of the Nixon administration.

On Capitol Hill later in the day to testify before a House Appropriations subcommittee, Kissinger paused before a bank of microphones long enough to protest the one contempt citation directed against him as Secretary of State, then turned on his heels and walked away, ignoring questions about the other two citations.

Kissinger said the subpoena issued to him at the State Department concerned proposed covert operations that originated there between 1962 and 1972 and involved primarily "previous administrations, previous Secretaries of State and previous Presidents."

"The President decided that this involved communications of a sensitivity and of a

character that have never been submitted previously to congressional committees and therefore invoked executive privilege," Kissinger said. "I profoundly regret that the committee saw fit to cite in contempt a Secretary of State, raising serious questions all over the world of what this country is doing to itself and what the necessity is to torment ourselves like this month after month."

Defending President Ford's plans to invoke executive privilege to block the one State Department subpoena, McClory said at yesterday morning's hearing that he felt the privilege "applies to the office (of the President) and not to the individual who holds the office." As a result, McClory said he felt it "appropriate for this President to invoke executive privilege in behalf of ...,

"President Washington," Pike interjected. He protested that such reasoning would prohibit the committee from investigating any covert CIA operations since, as Kissinger has testified, all such undertakings were personally approved by the President.

Kissinger
Role Held
Impaired

By John M. Goshko

Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department yesterday characterized a congressional committee's citing of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for contempt as an act that could seriously hinder his ability to deal with foreign governments.

William G. Hyland, the department's director of intelligence and research, told reporters: "We consider it unbelievable that a committee of Congress would move toward a citation of contempt on the eve of an important summit meeting, two weeks before a presidential visit to China and less than a month before a major NATO meeting."

On Friday, the House intelligence committee, its members angered by their inability to obtain certain classified documents for their investigations, overwhelmingly approved three separate contempt citations against Kissinger. They accused him of "contumacious conduct" for his failure to comply with three subpoenas issued by the committee.

Kissinger left Friday night for Paris, where he and President Ford are attending a weekend summit meeting on economic problems. In his absence, Hyland appeared before reporters to give the department's reply to the committee's action.

"A completely erroneous impression has been created that a Secretary of State has refused to comply with three congressional subpoenas," he said. "That is not correct."

Two of the subpoenas, Hyland noted, were for material in the hands of the National Security Council and were addressed to "the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or his subordinates." But, he pointed out, these two subpoenas were issued after President Ford's decision on Nov. 3 to replace Kissinger as his national security adviser.

"Henry Kissinger has not acted in this capacity since Nov. 3," Hyland said. "The Secretary of State was not the addressee for the subpoenas relating to the National Security Council. They were not received or handled by Henry Kissinger."

Hyland is scheduled to become the deputy to Mr. Ford's new national security adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft. However, when reporters asked who was the proper addressee at the National Security Council, Hyland insisted that he did not know whether Scowcroft or anyone else had been occupying the post officially since Nov. 3.

In regard to the third subpoena, Hyland conceded that it involved 10 documents in the possession of the State Department and had been addressed to Kissinger as Secretary of State. This, he said, "is a separate question and involves an entirely different matter of principle."

The disputed documents concern covert intelligence operations initiated by the State Department before Kissinger was Secretary of State and Mr. Ford was President.

Before the contempt citations were voted on Friday, the House committee was given a letter from the State Department legal adviser asserting that Mr. Ford was invoking executive privilege to block release of those documents.

However, that move was brushed aside by the committee chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.), and other committee members. They contended that Mr. Ford could not rely on an assertion of executive privilege to keep secret matters involving presidents other than himself.

Hyland said the executive privilege claim had been made after the documents were turned over to the White House and examined by the Justice Department. He added: "From that point on, the decision was with the White House, and the Secretary of State had no further discretion."

In addition, he argued that since the documents do not involve activities that occurred while Kissinger and Mr. Ford were in office, it was erroneous to charge that they are withholding from Congress information about the present administration.

In reply to questions about why the White House felt that an assertion of executive

privilege was justified, Hyland referred to a letter sent to Kissinger on Nov. 11 by Philip W. Buchen, counsel to the President. It said in part:

"The President's reason for making this determination is that it would be contrary to the public interest and incompatible with the sound functioning of the executive branch to produce the documents requested . . . In addition to disclosing highly sensitive military and foreign affairs assessments and evaluations, they do reveal to an unacceptable degree the consultation process involving advice and recommendations to previous Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon."

The intelligence committee's contempt citations must be approved by a majority of the House before action can be taken against Kissinger. Should the House endorse the citations, the matter could then be referred to the Justice Department for investigation of possible criminal liability on Kissinger's part.