Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

11:30 am

4/17/70

K: About that thing we were discussing yesterday. Where does it stand?

L: I have a proposal here. I'm going to send it with an alternative. There are no sites in the area capable of reaching Laos. There were some active sites on the 11th of April but there's nothing there now except some parts are things. There are some pads and equipment that could be reactivated. We could hit that site. I would recommend another alternative that we go in here on Rt. 1032 -- a new one at the end of the

K: The President is calling. I will call you right back.

Further conversation: 11:40

L: I will send this over to you.

K: Can it be here by noon? He is getting extremely resitive. He is yelling about not getting his orders carried out.

L: Maybe I should call him. If I can't find a site, I can't help that. We have a 19 mile range and this is 25 miles over.

K: That's -- I don't know those facts.

They

L: I can move that site over so it has a capability against our aircraft. We can take out their components so it can't be reactivated.

K: He doesn't care if it hits Laos. He wants to hit NVN.

L: How about 1032 and slopping over. Near the DMZ.

K: What do your Chiefs think?

L: I am getting a recommendation now. I have to use protective reaction on this. We can knock out the components.

K: Can't you knock out -- can't you measure it?

L: They know they have only a 19 mile range and they know we know.

K: They know we are not hitting for that reason.

L: The Chiefs are against it. They recommend that site where there were missiles on the 11th of April. We don't need to say anything. There are components.

By KLW

NARA, Dato

Laird/Kissinger

11:30 am

4/17/70

-2-

K: Will you send the Chief's recommendation over with your recommendations in the next hour?

L: I will call him. I can get him a better site on the NVN side of the DMZ. But we can stop over. We have had that area but never in the north.

K: Get that report over here, please.

L: The Chiefs go along and we say the best is the deactivated site. But I don't want to tell the President this is active. These things are generally known. This bothers me -- you want to give a message but you also want to do a little good.

K: He is strong on this and is really bugging me.

L: He reads the newspapers --

K: His strategy is that by squeezing them they will give in faster.

L: I have been reading that file -- you get just as much hell by being in the

K: But you hit supply dumps and there's no justification.

L: They are hitting us from this site. It's AA fire -- it's in Laos.

K: He is ordering this thing today one way or the other. There's no doubt about it.

L: If I disagree, I will go to him.

K: You have every right. I have orders and I am not fighting with you. We have to do it.

L: We can go up and hit this. The Chiefs don't think we should hit one that isn't a threat. The only one we have is on the Vinh airbase but it doesn't have anything on Laos. There are a couple of others but they are way in.

K: Can you have your alternative recommendations in an hour?

L: We will have both recommendations. We had a good strike last night. There were NVN in good concentration. I have a couple of other things -- I'm concerned about the Jordanian thing. That ambassador is on one day and off the next.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

11:30 am

4/17/70

-3-

K: I was amazed when they cancelled that trip.

L: That should not have been cancelled. One day that ambassador says ship arms and then he says hold them. The King said ? ? ? Things are worse now then they were.

K: I raised holy hell with my staff man that such a decision was made with White House consideration.

L: On this Canadian thing, you were there -- we have a cable and it's tough but the one that goes out is milk toast.

K: How did that happen?

L: I don't know but it's not tough. If we are going to have meetings to discuss these things and Dave spent much time and then they send an entirely different one. In Jordan we are in worse shape now then we have ever been. I was mad today.

K: I understand that.

L: We gave the worst kind of signals we can. Did you get a copy of the second draft?

K: I will get back on that by 2:30.

L: I made those 5 changes. Bill thinks we shouldn't take a strong statement on ABM. I can't do that.

K: The Secy. of Defense should be able to talk about defense or we are in real trouble.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
General Wheeler
Mr. Kissinger

April 17, 1970, 12 Noon

W: Hello Henry.

K: I have been having some conversations with Mel. I want to be sure I understand. Is it true that the Chiefs recommend that we do not hit the SAM sites?

W: No, there is one that we don't think we should do because it is 20 miles inside the border and is not a bother. The other does not pose any problem. I have recommended in a CM that it be attacked. It is to the south of the other one. You should know that they can put those components together in three hours and they could have themselves an operational site.

K: What's this road. He wants to hit Route 1023 near the DMZ. What is that?

W: There is a road down near the DMZ that leads into the southern panhandle. I don't understand why he mentioned this. It is a supply route if you want to look at it that way. I am perfectly willing to take out supplies.

K: Which would you rather do?

W: I would rather do both. Take out the SAM components and also hit 1023.

K: OK. Alright Bus. I suffer from the naive idea that Presidential orders tend to get carried out. He is now talking about supply operations. He does not want to do SAM site. OK Bus.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:12 pm

4/17/70

L: I'm sorry but when you called back I had the officials of the Ford Motor Co. and I wanted to get them out.

K: I understand.

L: I'm going to send this memo over. It isn't the detail that another hour would give. I think I should tell the President that we can hit it but we don't have any active missiles involved, SAM's, but they could set up the missiles.

K: You have every right to call him anytime you want to.

L: I think he should know so when it breaks he won't ask why I didn't tell him.

K: You will probably get orders to do both.

L: I would rather hit down there. That AA is firing at us. It's in Laos but ~~we don't have to know that.~~ You are talking about slopping over 4-5 miles.

K: His signal is that we are thinking of going again with the bombing.

L: They will get that because there's a supply route. We will send it over there. Henry, I hope you don't think I was too upset about that Jordanian thing.

K: I felt the same way about it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KH U NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

P. Farley/Kissinger

12:20 pm

4/17/70

F: I have been engaged in a three way conversation with Gardner, Rogers and Tucker on operating procedures of the delegation and I want to be sure what's done is right. Have you talked to Gardner or Laird?

K: k Laird called me yesterday.

F: You know how Gerry felt about being uninhibited.

K: I know how the President feels. One thing that will create feelings is that option D has the same status as C and is not a fall back position. I don't think we have to give the order three times. They have equal status and we want to discuss them both.

F: I didn't realize there was an issue on this. I thought that was very clear. There was a reference to (order) in both the instructions and I understand that the people in Vienna felt that as long as we were going to take the second step on the discussion in NATO nad it's better not to put that on the table with the Soviets. That might inhibit it.

K: Why should it. I got word to Gerry he was to discuss it at NATO.

F: He did and no if, ands or buts but we were going to handle NATO thing before tabling it. Larry has the thing to look at the U.S. side of it.

K: That problem exists in either case with any option.

F: Actually the reduction one --

K: If we make the hard one ? ? ? ? ? ?

F: The only question that has been raised with the degree with which the statements made by the delegation are reviewed back here. I had proposed after talking to Rogers to get word to Gerry that if anything of significance he would make, he should get it back here but we should discourage the idea that every FSO-3 or Lt. Col has a better idea.

K: That's right. Laird said that opening statements are not being cleared any more. But you are not saying that.

F: He is right. One that was made today was not cleared and the one for Monday has not been cleared. I will cable Gerry and say we have to have that.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Chapin/Kissinger

morning (12:48 ish)

4/17/70

C: Laird called. I didn't talk to him. Nell talked to his secretary. He has asked that the President call him on the secure phone. The President has never used the secure phone!

K: I had better see the President and tell him what it's about.

C: I will tell Bob that you would like to talk to the President before he call Laird.

K: It's essential.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

1:15 pm

4/17/70

K: The President just asked me to check.

L: Do you have the memo?

K: Yes. To reaffirm his understanding with you -- to go after that one site plus the route into VN.

L: As soon as I get that checked out.

K: Both of them.

L: We are checking that other one but we will go on that one. Depending on the weather.

K: You will let me have a map of the other one.

L: We don't have that fully worked out but you wanted the memo.

K: His understanding is that you are doing both.

L: We will have it done by Monday noon. They are down in the ____. I will be back in touch later on this afternoon about a couple of other matters.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Zeigler/Kissinger

3:00 pm

4/17/70

K: They haven't announced the trip yet.

Z: You're not aware of that? I thought I knew something you didn't know.
You are going to be in L. A. to brief?

K: San Clemente.

Z: Same thing. We will have the girls there for you. You should get into
a thorough briefing.

K: You set that up. What I want to know -- I can't make any preparations
until it's <u>ARRIVAL</u> announced. When will it be announced?

Z: About 4:00.

K: What about the WH dinner?

Z: They will probably go on with it.

K: But won't 4/5 of the correspondents be on the trip?

Z: Yes.

K: All right.

Z: Can;t I hold anything over you?

K: The President <u>ask</u> told me yesterday.

Z: I knew before that. (ha, ha).

By K.L. NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Phil Geylin/Kissinger

3:03 pm

4/17/70

G: I want a little general guidance because you don't want to get into a long
conversation on Cambodia.

K: What are your cautioning us against?

G: Getting a little bit pregnant. I have been spending time in the Pentagon and they don't know how to shoot and we are sending men to show them how We have been there before. I'm asking if you can give me guidance on where that issue is going and at what rate. I don't see any stories of our getting involved.

K: The question of finding up the war in VN is what we want. We don't want another war. On the other hand, we don't want to tell the NVN to march on Penom Pehn and we will not stop you. You can be sure we are not rushing an AID program into Cambodia.

G: How do we tell them?

K: By keeping ambiguity on what we are doing. We won't wind up the war by excalating it.

G: The argument you get from the Commandant of the Marine Corps is to get the NVN troops out of Cambodia.

K: We are obviously not moving in that direction (?). Our major concern is to have the Cambodian in a position to keep the NVN from moving on Penom Pehn from being anything then just a day's march. Our policy is not to put Cambodia in a position to squeeze the sanctuaries.

G: Can you keep it from being a two day march?

K: After a ____ you cannot calibrate this without it slopping over.

G: The others cut off in my mind is advisors.

K: I haven't heard that idea proposed.

G: It has been.

K: There's no chance -- at least not now. Practically out of the question.

G: That's what I'm trying to ascertain. The problem gets a little complicated along what's being given along the river over there.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON

Peter Flanigan
Mr. Kissinger

3:30 pm, 4-17-70

(did not hear first part of conversation)

F: I understand that Larry Lynn is leaving and that you think that Tom Whitehead would be a good man for your staff. They worked together on this same effort for a long time.

K: I think if Whitehead and I can work together that it is just about the most important job on my staff - probably one of the most important jobs in the government. He does all the analytical work on the staff.

F: Needless to say, I would be delighted to see him work for you.

K: Pete, that is very big of you. I really owe you.

F: I think it is great. I have tried to push things at him this past month to get him to do the creative work he did last year.

K: Maybe the subjects don't interest him. Was he the guy that was with us the other day?

F: Yes. He would be very helpful in that area also.

K: Yes.

F: I would like to let him know you are interested first.

K: That is alright.

mlh

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON

B. Haldeman/Kissinger

4:36 pm

4/17/70

K: Has the trip been announced? So I can cancel things on Tues. in reference to that.

H: I don't know if they have announced Monday night.

K: We will be back when?

H: 6:00 on Tues. He has the Chaing dinner so we can't be back much later than that.

K: I will be there no later than 6:00 on Sun. What about the Correspondent dinner?

H: You will be the ranking member. They will probably play "Hail to the Chief".

K: That's the least. It's long overdue.

H: We are leaving at 8:45 in the morning.

K: Will he be working on the statement?

K: I doubt it. He feels he needs to do it; it's well done. Except for some technical things.

K: That's right. He will probably work on it next Sunday night and Monday.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telcon
Secy Laird

4/17/70; 5:20 p.m.

K: Mel, I didn't mean to get you out of a meeting. I have seen to it that they check their statements back here in Vienna from now on. What we discussed yesterday.

L: I think that is good. You haven't looked into that Jordanian thing at all, have you?

K: No, but I will.

L: They will come in screaming like mad for military support now and I think we ought to look into at least not letting Sisco leave that area without at least stopping there. You don't want to let the King down too badly.

K: I agree. You don't want to let him down at all.

L: Just for protection, he can't leave the area without going to see him. It is none of my business, but you don't mind my passing that on to you, do you?

K: Mel, we always want to hear from you.

L: Very good.

ms

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KM V NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Boris Sedov/Kissinger

5:50 pm

4/17/70

S: I am leaving this Sunday and I wanted to say good bye and if you want me to say anything in Moscow we have a chance tomorrow.

K: We are in good shape. I wish you a good trip back and we will miss you.

S: Come to Moscow and we will be glad to show you around.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

6:00 pm

4/17/70

H: We have to have a briefing book for the President in a process you make to follow.

K: What are you talking about?

H: Buchanan is supposed to have the book to the President Tues. noon, after you edit it. Your people promised it to him Thursday night, then Friday, now Sun., because you haven't looked at it.

K: He will have it Sat. night. I don't think much of that idea. It happened once that the President had to have it before I could check it through and there was a lot of stuff --

H: The point is he knows how to get it done like the President wants. You can look at what Buchanan has done.

K: I will let him edit it and then I will look at it again. Then if I object, I can pull it out.

H: The President wants us to back him on the great exposés on SALT. Y. office says we should do nothing.

K: What does he want?

H: He thinks it's a great accomplishment that we have gotten them going.

K: Why don't I brief some of your people.

H: Tomorrow?

K: Yes. I will be in all day tomorrow.

By KCL- NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Wm. Sullivan/ Kissinger

6:25 pm

4/17/70

K: I have just gotten to the President. He wants to add one sentence at the end of paragraph 2. Something like the number in any month will be flexible depending on the situation at the time.

S: But leaving the other sentence the same?

K: Yes. He just want to be sure we don't engage in encourage speculation on the length of the period. You know the time I gave you and you know the length of the periods. You know the time frame. Do you think it's clear to the recipients?

S: Yes. I don't think they expect an enourmous frame.

K: I'm concerned about what you said at lunch.

S: Laird explained to ______ who will be there on Monday that it will not go into the fall.

K: Possibility or probability?

S: Probability. I sent a memo on the stuff we talked about for the Preside

K: You will send this out?

S: I have already.

K: Saigon tonight?

S: Saigon, ______, and Wellington tonight.

K: He wants to be sure it's not in Defense channels.

S: Ted Eliot holds the only copy. It's going Cherokee.

K: We will know whom to blame if it leaks.

S: I have sent the package you asked for -- it contains the two memos p
the thing on top.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCOM

Amb. Lucet/Kissinger

6:40 pm

4/17/70

K: With the astronauts we have had a bad week.

L: That was wonderful and we are full of admiration. It was ______ the way you did it.

K: On your question, there are only two things I can say. If you make a fo
request to the State Dept. we will keep a close eye here. Or if you can wai
weeks until you come back, I will put it to the President.

L: What's your advise -- put it to the State. Dept. ? That's best.

K: Yes, I would to do that.

L: And keep it confidential. I come back in 10 days.

K: You put it in and we will follow it for you.

L: Thank you, Henry. I sent a message this afternoon to your President f
mine on Laos. I sent it to Sonnenfeldt. It's in answer to the note of
April 9 re Article 4.

K: Good. Have a good vacation.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
4/17/70; 6:50 p.m.

L: This has been a bad day all the way along. They did go ahead on that statement in Vienna and went along with Option C.

K: They could not have.

L: I have the text right here.

K: How could they have presented the whole option already? We are going to make them give Option D on Monday. I have sent up a directive again today. I want you to hold firm on this. Are you sure they presented the whole option?

L: Yes, all of Option C and none of Option D.

K: We are going to make them present Option D on Monday.

L: They make no indication that anything more is going to come.

K: I have issued another directive today and I have said the President will not make a decision until both options have been presented. I am going to call Farley immediately and make sure that Option D is presented.

L: Okay, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KMLV

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger
Phil Farley

4/17/70; 7:05 p.m.

K: I think we are suffering here from working at cross purposes. I read the cable on the opening session today and Laird called me and said we got them to go along with Option C by saying Option D is a co-equal but he says there is no mention that there is a D. Could we stop playing with this and use both options. That idea of the NATO thing hadn't even occurred to us or that it would be used to prevent the presentation of something. The President had a vague feeling at the Congressional briefing yesterday that there was some footdragging on Option D. He said he wanted us to make D co-equal with C. We are going to confuse people if....

F: We really are at cross purposes.

K: We have tried to be responsive and helpful to you. The thought of NATO never crossed our mind. If I were the Russians, I would think that nothing more was coming. If we have two weeks of talks and then present something new, they will say we are being tricky. I know that Gerry isn't enamored with D, but the Chiefs are no enamored with C.

F: There are two parts to that. There is some advantage to presenting one before the other.

K: What happens next?

F: The next thing is that there will be a fuller presentation of C on Monday. Why don't I see that we get a statement in there before it goes any further.

K: Why don't we say this is one comprehensive approach. As soon as we finish this presentation we will present another approach -- then you will fulfill what the President has in mind.

F: I don't know whether you talked to Gerry about these supplemental instructions or not -- but I didn't know about them until I talked to Gerry. I will talk to Gerry tomorrow in the sense you have just summed up.

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Sen. Fulbright/Kissinger
9:20 pm 4/17/70

F: We went to see that movies VED (?).

K: I would like to see that. Unfortunately, on Tues --I have to go to the West Coast with the President. We won't be back in time.

F: Thurs and Fri. are both open.

K: I have something on Thurs I can switch easily. How about 5:00 on Thu I'm terribly sorry.

F: Is the President going to make his speech Monday?

K: He is and from the West Coast.

F: That's perfectly all right. 5:15 on Thurs.-- let's make it 5:15.

K: That's excellent.

By KLC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Dewey

4/17/70 p.m.

K: I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you yesterday.

D: That's okay, nothing urgent. We feel about 10 years younger
don't we?

K: It was a great thing.

D: It was a horror.

K: It was a nightmare for a few days.

D: It was probably rough on the boss.

K: He didn't show it, but toward the end he wanted some of his troops
around.

D: Out of all tragedies some times something comes that's good.
I think that happened this time.

K: It lifted us up a bit.

D: Yes, and it was a wonderful break in the controversies which I'm
sick of and I'm sure everybody else is. Jack McCloy says he's made a
report.

K: There isn't a lot in it.

D: Can you mail it to me at 140 Broadway?

K: It's classified.

D: Too bad.

K: It's a product of people spending half a day listening instead of
reading.

D: It's too bad the superficial stuff makes the headlines. Is there anything in it I should know that you can tell me?

K: No, you know more than what's in it. We were way ahead of them.

D: Yes, and everybody gets credit for it except the President. He got a
good press this morning.

K: I think he's getting a good press now.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Gov. Dewey

4/17/70 p.m. page 2

D: Are there any dates you have in mind that I might have to pre-empt?

K: Two things: I would like to have a DOD person talk to you about the POW thing. That would be Mr. Nutter and one of his people. I'll have them check with your office

D: I can make Tuesday afternoon after 2:30.

K: They'll be in touch. Some time in the next two or three weeks I'd like to talk to you about some of the negotiating problems we have coming up.

D: Are you going to be in town soon? For the evening, for a date?

K: Not likely. My reputation as a swinger is very greatly exaggerated. The intention is there, but not the time.

D: I understand. I lived it and it's a hell of a life. I do think you'd live longer if you could enjoy it more.

K: Could you try to make an appointment in the next two weeks? We may ask you to do something/ It's important for you to understand the bureaucratic reasons why we want to do it.

D: I am at your service.

K: I have so much confidence in you.

D: I wish I could justify it.

K: It's tough to find people whom you know are on your side.

D: George Gallup has written me a letter saying he's got 80 pages in draft on research in depth on public opinion on Vietnam. He wants me to read it and advise him. Should I say I'll be glad to read it and get a more official opinion on it so he won't be misled? I could send it down to you and you could have somebody with brains on your staff take a look at it. Might be able to pick up a few things to prevent error or make it better informed. I have the highest regard for him as a scholar. If it would be useful I'll get an extra copy and sent it to you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
Gov. Dewey

4/17/70 p.m. page 3

K: I think that would be very useful. And I was sorry not to be able to come to your birthday. It was the week Laos was about to go down the shoot and I'll tell you why it didn't when you come down.

D: I know one reason why it almost did and it's the Senator from Arkansas

K: Yes, the things that man must have on his conscience if he's got one.

D: The President has to live with a lot of things.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4/17/70 p.m.

K: I talked to Mel about this paper and he's taking out the SALT references. At least he tells me he is. And he sent something else over I've just skimmed. It's less violent than the preceding draft.

R: I don't see why he shouldn't put the facts in; let the facts speak for themselves. But it doesn't help to say what we are suspicious of, that we think they are developing a first strike capability. It just gets their hackles up. It's not productive. Have you talked to the P about ____________

K: He's been so wrapped up with the astronaut thing. I didn't have a chance to tell him. You are giving a talk tomorrow on SALT?

R: It's at a Cronell meeting. There will be something on SALT and something on Southeast Asia. The only question I have is whether we should do something on the Malik statement. I got a call from Mansfield and Aiken. They thought we should have some positive response. The President might point out that we are willing to enter negotiations on any subject. I could say something about we've asked Yost to pursue with Malik what he has in mind.

K: That's almost what the President means to say minus the Amb. Yost part. Say we are ready to explore, but you want to say who's doing the exploring. The President is thinking of saying something like that.

R: This won't pre-empt him. It probably won't be noticed. This is along the President's guidelines in not saying a lot about SALT. I will comments about what Breshnev said and they say we are serious.

K: That's a good thing to say.

R: I've been trying to get language from the Pentagon to support them on ABMs.

K: Laird has been calling every half hour.

R: He may not have so much trouble. Aiken Aiken and Mansfield xxx were in a great frame of mind this morning. In Cambodia I'm going to say we have no present plans to use Americans there.

K: That is correct. We can't rush out to maxx embrace the Malik thing, but they couldn't have said it without Hanoi's knowledge. I think it's quite a positive thing.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
4/17/70 p.m. page 2

R: I'm not very hopeful on the SALT talks.

K: No, but we've set it very well. And we've all worked together on it. No one can run around Washington and get different opinions. The President will know where to get you this weekend, won't he? Of your office will know.

R: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Laird/Kissinger

9:00 a.m.; 4/18/70

(missed first part of conversation)

L I think Defense and State at least should have a chance to read statements before they are given.

K Would you please write me a little note.

L I'll have it over right away. Are you going to Hawaii?

K No, I'm going to the West Coast though.

L I was concerned about the Monday night thing. There is a lot of speculation. I don't want to be in a position where we get into too complicated of formula as far as giving too many dates in that statement. We can keep the troops in Vietnam through the 15th of June without 1/2 came out. I think to see another timetable would be a mistake, and I'll put out an order. Two timetables will be watched by the Press.

K That's a good point. He told me he was going to go off and think the whole thing over on the plane. I won't know exactly -- it will be in the range of what we were talking about, give or take a few weeks.

L It's okay to go to the end of the month. I think we can make this okay, but I also want to keep people more or less happy and I have told chiefs. They are aboard as long as they aren't out until the 15th.

K Right. I have no reason to suppose that if he is going to do it in as much detail. I will get him a note before he leaves.

L If he takes a figure on troop ceilings, 390 or 395 - --- We must get down to 260 by August for budgetary reasons. Any problems?

K I can foresee nothing that I have heard him say that is inconsistent with what you said. I think he is trying to figure out how to general thought.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

L This is the first time he has talked to me about going between 40 and 50 to be a candidate for office. I would rather go between 40 and 50 and look a little better.

K Did he say 40/50?

L Yes. Personally I think 40.

K I hadn't realized he put it that way.

L Personally I think from 35 - 45 is better.

K You think a figure should be below 400?

LDamn right.

K Essentially like last time.

L I think that is right. I think late August or early September. It's no time for decisions before elections. It puts heat on President.

K Let me get all of this to him. I talked to him about this last week.

L I talked to him about this last week, but then I see these stories, and ---

K When he saw figure of 50 - 60, he started getting sore.

L I would rather go down to 35 - 45. The figures in the Los Angeles Times should not be over-reacted to. Pat Buchanan puts these things in the morning brief. That morning brief causes me more problems than anything in the whole White House.

K I causes me more than it causes you. On that thing we discussed yesterday, it is in order now.

L I will see the picture today or tomorrow morning. It was important to get them.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KMLV NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Laird/Kissinger

12:05 pm

4/18/70

L: I got this note on the President's request that we not limit sorties requirements in S. E. Asia through July 30, 1970.

K: That's right.

L: I'm having to put some pressure on these people to keep within the budget. We can't get a supplemental.

K: He said we are willing to draw down or something.

W: We can draw down with a reduction in force someplace. We can put peo- off but I need at least 60 days. Why would he choose July 30?

K: Three months.

L: I'm going to have trouble with this. I need $3 billion for Laos and I have been having trouble hiding that. We increased Laos by more than double.

K: His concern is that it cannot work if withdrawals we cut all actions.

L: Let me give you a report on our raids. You have to use quality use of sorties and not just because we have them.

K: He wanted to put out the memo for a year but I said we had to review it every three months.

L: Does he realize the costs?

K: Yest but he ? ? ? ? ? ?

L: We will have to cut down in Europe.

K: You will send me something on SALT.

L: I am upset about that. I have very good indications that have turned this into ACDA's position and interpreted that ? ? ? ? ?

K: That's right.

L: You cannot get back to that now. They don't plan to do that Mon.

K: I told Farley it had to be Monday.

L: I haven't even seen a statement on that

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL

NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

12:05 pm

4/18/70

K: I will not tolerate that. I know what the President has in mind. You heard him at the Congressional briefing.

L: On the bombing thing I will send you a memo expressing my concern.

K: Will you? I will only send it to the President.

L: My problem -- If I have to keep within ordiancesupplementals, I will have to make terrific changes. It goes into '71. This goes into our budget.

K: Hedidn't focus on it. He looked at the fixx figures in respect to his statement.

L: When the rainy weather came I thought I could save $100 million.

K: Why don't we get together on this when I come back from Calit.

L: I have to talk to Mayo and I don't think we can get a supplemental because I will have to tell him why and we are flying very little in SVN.

K: He is concerned with air support to VN forces.

L: I could increase that. We are fixx flying little of that. Very few strike are in support of the VN. Less than 10 percent. I just as soon cut back in the rainy season and give them support. We have not refused any of the

K: What bothers you then.

L: I have to maintain the same rate on the Ho Chi Minh trail and in Laos when during the rainy season it won't be necessary. I can't put stuff in VN when we don't have anything.

K: I will talk to the President on the way back from the West Coast.

L: I will keep the greatest amount of pressure on but on the same number of sorties during the rainy season so I can save $100 million

K: ON the Ho Chi Minh trail I will talk to the President. This order has to stand until we have another word about it so you have to think of carrying it out. Wx Send a memo on what you propose to do. If I fixx could have that with me. Rough order of magnitude.

L: Porblem of 71 budget -- ______ thousand sorties. That's a cut down. Cut down the sorties from the 70 budget. Tactical sorties from 14,000 to 10,000. The fixx big thing is ordinance. Effective the sorties costs $40,000 for

By KHL NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

12:05 pm

4/18/70

K: If you would give me a memo on how you would break this down.

L: We would not cut back support for SVN. We could increase that. Let n work this out for you and get you something.

K: By noon tomorrow.

L: We will see.

K: I am leaving at noon.

L: I will talk to you when you get back. In the meantime I will keep us the trains.

K: Give me a memo on that other think.

L: I feel strongly about it and I will talk to the President (SALT delegation)

K: I may do that on Wed.

L: The Soviets will table to accept the MIRV ban and it will put us in a bad position by not having it on the table.

K: I have insisted on that for Monday.

L: I have checked with Vienna and nothing is coming out.

K: I will change the rules in writing on that.

L: I think it's important.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Farley/Kissinger
12:30 pm 4/18/70

F: I have talked a couple more times with Vienna and they will say Monday we will have another alternative and say a few words of it's nature. Gerry me to pass on to you as I had guessed he had had no objection in mention this yesterday and had been persuaded by the misreading as I had.

K: I have had 3 calls from Laird this morning alone.

F: I wanted to assure you there was no effort on his part to avoid this.

K: If you will make clear that the other has equal standing.

F: We will meet with the defense people this afternoon.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Kay Graham/Mr. Kissinger

1:17 p.m., April 18, 1970

KG: I was made to call you by Mrs. Kraft to (a) put pressure on you, and (b) to see if we could out together to the Kraft's after the White House Correspondents dinner.

K: The President having gone off to Hawaii and taken most of his assistants, I think I am the only White House Assistant going to the dinner. I have to show my face at several receptions for about 5 minutes each. Could you do that with me?

KG: Certainly.

K: Then I would love to go with you to the Krafts'.

KG: I will look for you at the dinner -- I'm sure we'll be sitting at different tables.

K: Fine. I have one of our supporters here who would like to talk with you. [He then put John Kenneth Galbraith on with Mrs. Graham

lds

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerard Smith/Dr. Kissinger

1:20 p.m., April 18, 1970

K: I have been talking to Phil (Farley), and as far as I can see, it is all straightened out. I have been getting restive calls from various people including my friend. The way you and Phil have worked it out is fine.

S: As long as it is clear to you that we are trying to do what you want us to do.

K: There is no problem. Make it clear we have these alternatives. The order in which you present the details, we won't get into to.

S: We are not trying to fight the problem.

K: We don't want "D" to appear as the fall-back.

S: We will do it that way on Monday.

K: In our Congressional briefing on Thursday, having the thing suggested for Monday helped a lot.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

TELECON
Rogers/Watts

2:52 p.m.; 4/18/70

R I was just listening to the radio and heard Tom Braden quote Henry -- and it must be a mistake. Braden quotes Henry as saying he thought "it was the beginning of the end of the war in Vietnam". I can't imagine Henry saying that. Anyway, I thought you should know.

W What broadcast was this on?

R Braden's radio program. It was the kind of thing that could get a lot of publicity.

W Did he give any background?

R He said Dr. Kissinger had advised that in addition to the safe return of the Apollo 13 Astronauts, the President had additional good news that it might be the beginning of the end of the war in Vietnam, and he made comments about developments in Cambodia.

W He didn't indicate the basis of where it was obtained?

R No. It might be someone who would like to get to Braden.

W I'll be in touch with Henry. Shall I get back to you?

R Well -- if you have anything significant to report.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Watts/Kissinger

2:57 p.m.; 4/18/70

W I just had a call from Secretary Rogers, who said that Tom Braden had reported on his radio broadcast that you had advised the President that he has additional good news in addition to the return of the Apollo 13 Astronauts because you thought we were at the beginning of the end of the war in Vietnam.

K That's absolute baloney. I haven't even seen Braden in 6 months.

W Do you want me to do anything about this.

K There is absolutely nothing to it. It's pure invention.

W Should I do anything vis-a-vis Braden?

K I haven't even seen Braden except for 10 minutes at a party a while back. There was absolutely nothing said. Tell = Rogers there was absolutely nothing to it.

W I'll call him right back.

K I have said no such thing. I haven't seen Braden.

W I will call Rogers right away. I'll confirm with you as soon as I talk to him.

K It's pure invention, tell him. There will, of course, be no such thing said.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Rogers/Watts

3:05 p.m.; 4/18/70

W I just spoke to Henry. He was very upset. He said this was pure invention on Braden's part. He hasn't seen Braden in over six months. He said it's absolutely untrue.

R I knew it would be. There's no use raising a flap about it. It wasn't on the 3 o'clock news. Why don't we wait a little while and see if anything is repeated. If it's a one shot proposition, let's drop it. If it's raised again, then let's call Kissinger.

W Then I could call Braden and let him know it's not true -- Kissinger had made no such comment to the President.

R Why don't you have someone listen to WTOP. If they don't say it again, let's drop it.

W OK. I'll call Kissinger and let him know what we've discussed.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Watts/Kissinger

3:08 p.m.; 4/18/70

W Henry, I just spoke to Rogers. I told him the report was an absolute untruth. He heard Braden's remarks over WTOP news. We're listening to see if anything is repeated. If not, he suggested that we ignore it.

K If it's repeated, let me know and I'll call Braden. I haven't talked in substance with him in over a year. I want to speak to Braden. You told Rogers I haven't talked to Braden?

W I did. I explained what you told me earlier -- that the report was absolute baloney -- pure invention.

K Good. I'm going to call Braden in the morning. Let me know if anything further develops.

W I'll do that.

K You don't have to stay in the office.

W OK, I don't plan to.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger
7:10 pm PST 4/26/70

P: The way we would handle that with Bill is that the VP called
you and you are calling for information.

K: I don't think we have to make a big affair of this until
after the speech.

P: I want to be sure it's handled in the right way. He is
absolutely right. Do it right afterwards. Maybe I should have
the VP talk to him.

K: I will tell Bill that I didn't want to bother you now but
I knew your reaction.

P: I am going to make a statement on deserters soon.

K: I will tell him that he should take some action before I
tell you.

P: None of them are very bright. None of these people.-

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

7:15 pm PST 4/19/70

K: Two things -- one is that Braden-Mankowitz thing -- I haven't seen either of them I will call Braden tomorrow and tell him to knock it off.

R: It was in the news twice. On the first he said you told the President that the war will (be knocked off ?) On the second they said the Russians act like they want to end the war and it will be ended in a week.

K: I certainly didn't say it and I wouldn't tell them what I tell the President.

R: It's not a very big news item.

K: I was invited to BRADEN Braden's and didn't go.

R: I don't think it will require anything. I just knew that if it became anything, you would want to know.

K: The VP is in a rage because Holland, in Sweden, apparently said that he respected the Swedish right of treatment of our deserters and if they give aid to NVN it's their business, and apploauded the Carswell decision. I can't keep him from the President but I thought you might want to do something first.

R: I will get in touch with him. It wasn't clear how the thing happened.

K: I just thought if he sees it in his news summary -- if only to find out what the facts were.

R: It will probably help him with the Swedes but not with the President. What he said wasn't what it came out he said but I don't think it was too good. It was an off-the-record dinner remark to the press and he said the youth were working on their convictions and he was asked about aid and he said that was Sweden's business. When does the President get in?

K: He's here now but I will see he isn't disturbed.

R: As soon as I know something I will call you.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger
7:20 pm PST 4/19/70

K: I just wanted to tell you I talked to Bill and he will look into it.

P: I hope he realizes it's serious.

K: I said you didn't know about it yet and I thought when you read it in the news summary, I could say the State Dept. had already taken action.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

*

TEEECON

Wheeler/Kissinger

11:30 am PST 4/20/70

K: You remember that menu thing. I forget-- they were some U.S. and some mixed. Any local?

WH We don't have any details.

K: Could we get that? By tomorrow?

Wh: We will have to go to him. It's awful fast but we will try.

K: A planning figure started. If things get out of hand, that's what we will do.
We will be back tomorrow and I will talk to you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger

11:40 am PST 4/20/70

K: What he wants to avoid is to be ______ put under pressure of regular intervals and he is thinking of giving the rate along the lines of your consultation. You are the only person we are talking to. I wanted to get your reaction.

R: A rate with the ______ of the previous without a cut off time.

K: No, a time but

R: I have no strong feeling so long as it isn't construed as ______ walking out on the program. Will he announce a ______ numerical rate.

K: Yes.

R: It's difficult to judge.

K: That's not concrete. I wanted to find out where you can be reached.

R: I'm not sure it's such a bad idea to have these periodic announcements. He feels it puts him on the spot?

K: Everytime, yes.

R: On the other hand we ______ get a lot of respite from it. When he builds up to one of these it takes the pressure off for 2 - 3 months. In the absence, we will not get that.

K: He only saw the disadvantage.

R: This will take the steam out of it.

K: So they said the Joint Chiefs are against it -- that will be an asset.

R: He could fudge up the time frame and leave a month or two latitude. Otherwise, he will not have the opportunity to let off steam. I will be here all day until 7:00 our time.

K: You are going to meet Chiang Ching-kuo -- you will leave at 6:00?

R: Yes.

K: I will call about three our time if I have anything.

R: We got a good telegram from Holland.

K: It was very thoughtful.

By [redacted] NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

12:40 pm PST 4/20/70

(summarized)

HAK told Laird what he had told Rogers, mainly that the President was thinking of announcing a monthly pace without fixing deadlines. Laird argued strongly for target dates, i. e., Sept. 1, saying otherwise the whole Vietnamization program might be ruined. HAK promised Laird that if the President was planning not to announce a ceiling, HAK would call Laird and give him a chance to speak with the President directly.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
3:55 pm PST 4/20/70

K: I just left in the Preside nt and here is what he will do. He is going to
announce a figure but he will pull together the next two announcements and
do it for a year. 150 for a year.

L: Reduce troops by 150,000 from now until June 1.

K: We can get to your ceiling.

L: He will throw away the criteria and go for this. He won't give a monthly
rate?

K: He wants to have no withdrawal until about July 1-15. And then 10 a month
for the rest of the year.

L: He shouldn't say that.

K: No, that's up to you.

L: He doesn't understand the budget but I will explain it to him.

K: The major portion next year.

L: 50,000 out on Aug. 15.

K: He wants less out by the 15th of Aug.

L: Our budget is based on 50 and we could go to 40 and still make it.

K: This gives him more breathing space on the numbers.

LL: I don't think he understand the budget. This is OK -- ifx as long as he
doesn't put in guidelines on how we do it.

K: None to July 1 and then 10 a month for the rest of the year and then the rest
next year. He won't say that publicly.

L: 234-284. He will announce that tonight?

K: He won't announce it but it can be deducted.

L: But don't get into those rates because it puts pressure on our force force.
That thing on logistics I don't understand.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: He is concerned that we don't do that 40 by Aug. 15.

L: What changed his mind on this thing?

K: I made my case on the figure. Then he decided that a formal figure gets him into trouble but at the same time it gives him flexibility. You are the only one who knows. Don't tell your staff.

L: He'll have to keep it out of the rate. We can't get into that so far in advance. You have to be in a position to do it either way. That's why I liked the three criteria.

K: He feels strongly that there cannot be 40 out by Aut. 15. That's too fast.

L: It isn't. I know where he got that but if he read our stuff --

K: He has. Anything with your signature goes to him.

L: I hope we don't get into a regular rate -- we will have trouble making 280. I have to make it because it's all the money I have. You are contacting the troop contributors?

K: With the greatest number next year.

L: Are you going to say that?

K: No. To the troop contributors we give only the facts.

L: The problem with the regular announcement is his popularity always went up after an announcement.

K: He says no.

L: Clark Clifford and I argued this and that's his idea. I argued the opposite.

K: You saw it develop and you know the consensus on it. We can do more now.

L: I think there's some problems with this. We can work out live with it.

K: We will have to.

L: You wonder about it. All of the arguements for regular announcements go out the window.

K: He wasn't taking any calls and he called me on something else. He had a poll taken and when you give a formal figure it doesn't hurt as much.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

3:55 pm PST 4/20/70

-3-

L: I don't want them to think it's going to be there another year.

K: Next year is his idea.

L: If you let off until July 1 it makes the rate higher.

K: At 10,000 rate you can do 60 this year and do 90 next year.

K: L: But we have to go down to 260.

K: We can make an announcement in April.

L: I'm afraid that people don't understand my budget presentation. I learned a lot on that. If they want maneuverability they have to have it at the start and not the finish.

K: I'm more to blame than you.

L: No, but? ? ? ?

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
c.a. 4:20 pm PST 4/20/70

K: Just one thing. Make absolutely sure -- I gave the President your quick reaction. He wants to be sure that there's no backgrounding at Defense that 40 thousand will be done by Aut. 15.

L: We have only done what he said.

K: But it's feasible that someone will ask by Sept. 1. Make sure no one --

L: We have to set targers. Our budget calls for 50,000 by Aug. 15. you understand. We can slip that some. They will watch these because they have seen what we have done and figure we have slipped the program. They didn't bother us/because we had a short target date. Now they will be on us every week. Just so he understands that. I will make sure there are no back grounders given. He has come to the 24 month schedule. We wanted the one between the 18 and 24 month schedule.

K: He hopes to get the whole thing wound up.

L: I heard Johnson tell us that every year. Just 6 months more. This had gone on too long for that.

K: But now he has to play this the way.

L: If you don't show progress by Nov. -- They will watch the Nov-Oct. fix figure because it's the half-way point. It's election time too.

K: You can show significant progress by Nov. You yourself said wait until July.

L: There's a tendency to keep the troops there.

K: His idea is to get out on the best policy.

L: We have to keep pressure on the XX SVN.

K: We will do that.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
4:40 pm PST 4/20/70

K: We have been going over and over this statement and I wanted to give you some advance warning. He just finished it. He is going to announce -- instead of being caught in a time bind he is going to announce a year's time and he will do it over a year and stick to it. He will do the best greatest part next year.

VP: How does the best ? ? ?

K: He will withdraw this year but fewer than next year.

VP: Is that over and above what's been done?

K: Yes.

VP: How much thus far?

K: 15. Laird wanted more this year. Our choice was do nothing or this.

VP: We couldn't avoid that. If it collapses on us, we are finished.

K: We are not there to fulfill our program but to get out honorably.

VP: I wish we hadn't gotten into the numbers thing.

K: They are the affirmation of our principles (?). It's a strong speech.

VP: We will probably get cut up. The President is saying that in a year -- and if nothing happens they will raise hell.

K: Would we have been better to do 40 now and 40 next year?

VP: Our idea was to withdraw ____ thousand over the next 5 years. But don't get into this僵 number thing. We have to be prepared to be cut heavily.

K: You think we will?

VP: That doesn't make any difference. There's no alternative or you give the game away to satisfy the press. You can't keep Goodell under control. Maybe I'm unduly pessimistic.

K: More than if we had announced 40?

VP: No, about the same. To do what they want we would weaken ____ to the point we cannot do. I don't envy you on these decisions. At least you are making an effort.

By __NARA, Date 5/26__

TELCON
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger
5:45 pm PST 4/20/70

K: I just got those two cables and they will help a lot on the plane.

J: I told you I would get that out but the other the Secy. will have a reaction to.

K: The Secy. deserves a right to be heard. One doesn't railroad this by him.

J: How was the backgrounder?

K: You know what he is doing? He is announcing the whole year's program so far as not to go through the agony every 3 or 4 months. Aslo, it will show where we are going and what the floor is. He is saying 150 over a year..

J: That's a very good idea.

K: I don't know what steps have been taken to tell our Allies. You might want to contact Marshall.

Did
J: I haven't seen it. Did you see the telegram that we sent out?

K: I cleared it but it doesn't give the rate and total.

J: A one year program.

K: And if there's anything that needs to be done, why don't you initiate it.

KWKHKKXXXXX

J: I will have Marshall listen to it and see if we have to do anything.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President/Kissinger
4-20-70 10:20 p.m.

P: Do you want to have it sent to your home?

K: No. I will stay here. I have a lot to do.

I thought, Mr. President, that it was in good shape ______.

P: They are ______ about Americans. We will continue without them.
There will not be any privileged sanctuaries. That's pretty tough.
We are saying, in effect, that if you continue this business, we will hit
them more.

K: Once on this course, we will (have to give that impression).

P: Good night, Henry.