THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY - October 27, 1991

1

MR. BRINKLEY: The attempt to arrange a peace conference between the Israelis and their various enemies in the Middle East has a long and difficult history and not any great success. The back-and-forth Middle Eastern shuttle in search of peace originated with Henry Kissinger when he was secretary of state. He is here with us today.

Mr. Kissinger, seeing as we do all the changes that have taken place in the world, what would you hope or what would you expect to see out of next week's meeting?

MR. KISSINGER: First of all, I think it's a great achievement to assemble the conference, and Secretary Baker deserves enormous credit for his dedication in bringing it about.

I expect the first phase of the conference to present basically incompatible positions. And I think it is very likely that a deadlock will develop, at least in some of the subgroups that are being formed. But that is when, in my view, the real negotiations will begin, and then the United States, playing the role of mediator, can try to bring the various parties together. I think we have to be open-minded to settle for something less than a complete agreement and to bring it along step by step.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, if the Israeli position remains no land for peace, there isn't much room for progress, is there?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, the Israeli position is no land for peace, and the Arab position is peace with nothing else, just the phrase of peace. And if those remain the positions, then there is no hope for progress.

But on the other hand, in the Middle East, the opening of negotiations is usually a terrific occasion for rhetoric, and after that one has to see whether anything more practical can be done. Israel has to give up some land; the Arabs have to give some content to peace. How much land, what the content for peace is, and who is willing to settle for less than everything in the first phase, that will be the subject of the subsequent negotiations after the formal positions are put down.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, one of the Palestinian spokesmen said they would be happy to settle for--or be willing to settle for some land adjoining Israel, but not in place of Israel. Does that offer some hope to you, do you think?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't know what they mean by adjoining.

MR. BRINKLEY: Beside.

MR. KISSINGER: It depends what they mean by adjoining Israel. I have always believed that Israel cannot stay in possession of all the occupied territories. I also don't believe they can go back to the '67 borders. I believe it is a big step if the Arabs offer peace, but they have to give a content to the word peace. I think there is hope. They wouldn't all be coming if they weren't at least willing, after a lot of rhetoric, to let us mediate between them. They will not be able to do it by themselves, and I don't think that direct talks, except for their symbolic quality, are going to get very far without American mediation.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kissinger, the original Middle East shuttler, thank you very much for coming in today and giving us a bit of history on this. Thanks for coming.

NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, INC. - (202) 682-9050

2

Coming next, Dr. Haider Abdel-Shafi, leader of the Palestinian delegation to the peace conference. And shortly, Moshe Arens, defense minister of Israel. And our Secretary of State James A. Baker. In a moment.

*(Announcements)*

MR. BRINKLEY: Dr. Abdel-Shafi, thank you very much. Thank you for being with us today.

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: We are happy to have you.

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, here in the studio with us are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News. We're all glad to have you.

Now, Dr. Abdel-Shafi, the Israelis want recognition and they want a peace treaty with their Arab, Palestinian neighbors. What do you think the prospects are?

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Well, as probably you know, the Palestinians have adopted a peace initiative in the meeting of the Palestine National Council in its 19th session, November 1988, where they have adopted the peace initiative based on the principle of the two-state solution as a basis for negotiations towards reaching a settlement. And I think the Palestinians are still committed to this peace initiative, which in essence recognizes the right of Israel to exist. Only it remains for Israel to respond in the same or express its acceptance of the principle of the two-state solution as a basis for negotiations.

MR. WILL: Doctor, today there are two states in the territory of the old Palestinian mandate. There's Jordan and there's Israel. And it has been traditionally United States policy that there should not be a third state in the area of the old Palestine mandate. Are you saying that this traditional American policy is not compatible with the Palestinian position as they enter this peace negotiation?

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: No. Palestine was always designated as the area west of the Jordan River. And we have been struggling all through, since during the mandate and up till now, for recognition of our right of self-determination. So if the Americans deny us this, I think this is not fair. And Jordan is another state by itself. So our request, in my opinion, remains valid.

MR. WILL: Doctor, Resolution 242, which is part of the basis of this peace conference, does not require that Israel withdraw from all territories, or the territories taken in the '67 war, but just territories. Israel says that it has withdrawn now, unquestionably has withdrawn now, from 90 percent of the territories it occupied in the '67 war.

How much more withdrawal do you think is necessary, and do you think Israel ever again will go back to borders in which it was only 10 miles wide?

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Well, I don't have to respond to whether it was 10 miles wide or not, but

3

I think Israel has occupied these territories in 1967 in a manner of aggression, and aside from the stipulation of the 242, talking about withdrawal from occupied land, still the first phrase which is "inadmissible to acquire territory by force."

Now, I presume that this withdrawal should be almost total from all the occupied territories. And the argument that the withdrawal from Sinai would be enough or it is substantial--well, Sinai is one thing and Palestine is something else.

However, if Israel, I mean, sticks to this point, well, let us put it on the negotiating table.

MR. DONALDSON: Dr. Shafi, you are quoted this weekend as saying that in the next few days, if the time comes when you think it appropriate to declare publicly your support for the principles of the PLO organization, Yasser Arafat's organization, you will do so. What did you mean by that, and what is your association with the PLO?

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Well, I can tell you that I am like any other Palestinians, our allegiance is to our legitimate leadership, which is the PLO. We are not officials of the PLO, but certainly, as everybody knows, there is an overwhelming support for the PLO as the legitimate leadership by all the Palestinian people. Is there anything wrong with this?

MR. DONALDSON: I was going to ask you about a specific member of your delegation, Said Araqat. Israel has said Israel will not come to the table if he is still a member of the delegation, because he has said publicly that the delegation was selected by and represents the PLO. Do you think Araqat should remain a member of your delegation? Do you expect him to be in Madrid?

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Well, really here I must discuss this a little bit. Now, Israel objects to dealing or to having anybody in the delegation from the PLO. What does this mean? Does it mean that Israel--I mean, Israel knows that there is an overwhelming support among the Palestinians for the PLO. Then the request of Israel must be explained in this context: Are they refusing to talk to officials of the PLO or are they, on the other hand, refusing to talk to all Palestinian people in their state of allegiance to the PLO?

I know that Mr. Araqat is not an official of the PLO. He is an ordinary Palestinian. And so I don't think that the Israeli argument holds on here. I mean, I can concede that probably he was a little provocative in what he said, but still, all the same, I think Israel must explain its position. Either she wants to talk to Palestinians or she does not want to talk to Palestinians.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, I suppose I'm asking whether you see this as an ultimate obstacle to sitting down next Wednesday in Madrid. Do you believe that Araqat will be a member of your delegation, and do you also believe that Israel will be present?

MR. ABDEL-SHAFI: Well, really I don't think, as long as Araqat is nominated to be a member of the delegation with the approval of the gentlemen, Mr. Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi, who were talking so long with Mr. Baker, I don't think it is fair to exclude him just because he was a little provocative in what he said.

But the way I explain it, I think really leaves no reason why should Araqat be out.

However, anybody who can be nominated will represent the views of the Palestinians.

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY - *October 27, 1991*

4

MR. BRINKLEY: George, we have a few seconds--we don't, sorry, the satellites gone, we're finished. Dr. Abdel-Shafi, if you can hear me, thank you very much, pleased to have you with us giving us your views on this subject.

Coming next, Moshe Arens, defense minister of Israel from Tel Aviv, and, shortly, our own secretary of state, James A. Baker--in a moment.

*(Announcements)*

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Arens, thank you very much for coming in today.

MINISTER ARENS: It's nice to be with you, especially under these auspicious circumstances.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, we certainly hope they turn out to be auspicious, and, again, we thank you. Now, Israel's, your country's, position in relation to the Palestinians has been well known for quite a long time--and I don't ask you to give away your bargaining position in advance--but, as you go into these meetings, do you have anything new to offer, anything new that you can tell us about?

MINISTER ARENS: Well, actually, David, I think that amongst the various rounds of negotiations that will be taking place, the negotiations with the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation probably have the greatest promise of bringing some agreement in the immediate future. And this is because it has been agreed that these negotiations will be based on two phases, the first phase begin connected with the Camp David agreements, namely, the establishment of a self-governing authority.

That having already been agreed, I think there's a good chance that we will be able to flesh out that authority and not leave any specific problems that will disturb the relationship between Israel and Jordan.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, you sound very hopeful and optimistic. Is that right?

MINISTER ARENS: Well, I think on that score, yes, on that score I think that's going to be relatively easy--not easy, relatively easy. According to the Camp David agreements, the negotiations on the permanent settlement will be held after three years of self-governing authority. That's going to be a great deal more difficult, but hopefully in three years maybe many things will happen that will remove anxieties and differences of opinion.

MR. BRINKLEY: Very good.

MR. WILL: Mr. Arens, the preceding guest representing the Palestinian position spoke of the two-state solution. Is it your understanding that the two-state solution is incompatible with or compatible with traditional U.S. policy regarding the final solution here of the dispute in the old Palestine mandate?

MINISTER ARENS: I think that to the best of my knowledge that it is incompatible with the traditional U.S. position. But as I said, in the first round, when discussions will be held on the self-governing authority, I think the question won't come up or really shouldn't come up.

5

MR. WILL: It is said repeatedly that Resolution 242 is the primary basis of this peace conference. It speaks of withdrawal from territories, not all territories, not the territories.

As I asked in the previous segment, what does Israel think remains to be done for Israel to be done to comply with Resolution 242, given the extent of withdrawals already from territories occupied in '67?

MINISTER ARENS: You know that Resolution 242 talks about withdrawal from territories and not the territories. That was a subject that was discussed at the time, and the absence of the word "the" is quite deliberate and not accidental. And it also talks about secure and recognized boundaries for the state of Israel. I think that is something that needs to be understood by all the parties to the negotiation.

Israel is surrounded by hostile states, has had to fight five wars in its defense in the past 43 years. There are neighbors or neighbors on the periphery like Iraq, Iran, Libya, who refuse to join the peace process, who threaten Israel. The foreign minister of Iran just the other day said that Israel must be destroyed. So I think, under the best of circumstances, it must be recognized that Israel will continue to have security problems and must have the kind of borders that can be defended.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Arens, let me ask you the Israeli view of Said Araqat, this member of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. Is it your view that he must be excluded, otherwise you will not be in Madrid?

MINISTER ARENS: I think there is a deliberate attempt here to scuttle the negotiations. Why make things difficult when, with a little effort, you can make them impossible?

It was agreed that the Palestinian section of the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would not represent the PLO, would not be appointed by the PLO. And this particular gentleman, if we can call him that, of course, is trying to throw a monkey wrench into the works, and we'll see how we'll handle that.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, our previous guest who is the leader of the delegation said that he thought Araqat may have spoken a little out of school, or he may have been a little too outspoken. If Araqat simply withdraws his comments, will he then be acceptable to be a member of the delegation?

MINISTER ARENS: I don't know that it will be appropriate for me to make that kind of deal on television. It is a problem. I was glad to hear Dr. Abdel Shafi say that it was a provocative statement, namely, he spoke out of turn, And so maybe the situation can be solved to everybody's satisfaction.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Minister, you have said recently that you do not believe the United States has been absolutely even-handed in its approach to this problem.

Did you mean that? What did you mean by that?

MINISTER ARENS: Well, first of all, I have to tell you that I find it difficult to accept that the United States would take an even-handed position when negotiations are held between Israel, the only democracy in the area, the United States being the leader of the democratic community of nations, and countries run by totalitarian rulers that have time and again attacked Israel.

6

I think it obviously should be a situation where the United States has more sympathy for this
little democracy than for some of these other dictators.

MR. DONALDSON: So your point is, I take it, that you don't expect--you did not want the United States to be even-handed. I take it you think then the United States has not been.

MINISTER ARENS: I would be disappointed if it was just even-handed.

But I have to add immediately that the continuous pronouncements in Washington that the negotiations have to be based on territories for peace, that there must be an end to the occupation, that settlements are an obstacle to peace, they are interpreted in the Arab world as a U.S. position that all of the territories that the Arabs lost in the aggression against Israel will be retrieved, and that the United States will help them retrieve them. And that I think is raising expectations that are not helpful for the negotiations that are coming up in Madrid.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Arens, thank you. Thank you very much for coming in to talk with us. And needless to say, we hope the meeting goes well.

Coming next, the U.S. Secretary of State, James A. Baker, in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, thanks for coming.

SECRETARY BAKER: Thank you, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Glad to have you with us.

SECRETARY BAKER: Glad to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, you went to the Middle East round-trip seven times, and so far, as we know, not a great deal happened. On the eighth time, you got this peace conference organized. What happened?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think things were happening during the course of the first seven--

MR. BRINKLEY: But you didn't tell us about it.

SECRETARY BAKER: --trips. Well, but there was, for instance, an announcement after one of those trips, or a couple of those trips, to the effect generally that some Arab countries said they would attend under certain circumstances, an announcement that I think represented a rather significant change in what had been their attitude toward a willingness to sit down with Israel and talk peace. So I think that's one of the first things that happened.

Then we were able during the course of those visits to work out agreements with the government of Israel and others respecting the standards for representation of Palestinians, which had been something that had prevented the parties from getting together in the past. And so I don't think

7

it was only the last trip that made headway.

**MR. WILL:** As I understand the ancient history of the argument about the settlements, the Carter administration said settlements are illegal. The Reagan administration said they're not illegal, but they're an obstacle to peace.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Yeah, that's right.

**MR. WILL:** Answer me this: do Jews have less of a right to live on the West Bank than they do in Haifa, and if so, why?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** I won't answer that question because that gets into the legalistics and philosophy of what our policy position is or should be towards settlements. I will say to you that it has been the consistent policy of this administration that settlements are an obstacle to peace, and we have declined to adopt the formulation, go back to the formulation that was expressed during the Carter administration that they're illegal.

It would not be helpful for me to hypothesize with you here this morning on this program 24 hours in advance of our leaving for the peace conference with respect to questions like that, so I hope you'll understand why I decline to answer it.

**MR. WILL:** We don't want you to be helpful; we want you to be newsworthy.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** I know you do.

**MR. WILL:** I know that it is the administration position that military technologies have changed and the situation in the Middle East changed because of Desert Storm and all the rest, and therefore territory and peace may not be linked as they traditionally have been thought to be linked. That said, can you imagine a settlement in which Israel is once again 11 miles wide or 10 miles wide at its narrowest point?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Another thing I'm not going to do, George, is take a position with respect to borders or take a position with respect to exactly what 242 requires. Throughout this process, we have made it clear that the terms of reference for this conference and really for the bilateral negotiations that are going to follow, hopefully, are a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of 242. There are differing interpretations of 242. The parties will come to the table with those differing interpretations. They revolve around the questions that have been broached here in questions to prior guests on the program--all the territory, the territory.

The position of the United States is simply 242, territory for peace, and we're going to leave it right there. One of the agreements that we've made with all of the countries is we will not change U.S. policy in order to get people to the table. And throughout very long negotiations with the parties on letters of assurance, we have declined specific requests from almost every one of these parties to change U.S. policy position.

**MR. WILL:** Okay. It has been U.S. policy in the past that there are now two states in the basic Palestine mandate territory and that a third state is not required and not advisable. Is that still--

8

**SECRETARY BAKER:** It continues to be U.S. policy that we do not support an independent Palestinian state.

**MR. DONALDSON:** It is reported by the Washington Post this morning that the Bush administration has declined to follow the law and impose sanctions on Israel because Israel in the last year shipped missile parts to South Africa. Is that correct?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** We obviously have not declined to follow the law. We have been very careful to follow the law, and we have been working with Israel and other states on matters involving the export of missile technology. We're going to continue to work with them. I'm not going to get into hearsay. I'm sorry to disappoint you, but I can't get into specific discussion of matters which are classified, and these are classified issues.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Well, Mr. Secretary, I'm not talking about matters of the conference; I'm talking about U.S. law. If it is your position that that is not the law, the Defense Act does not say that, then I'll stand corrected and we'll take a look at it. But I want to know whether the Bush administration is going to make any effort to sanction Israel because of this past sale of missile technology to South Africa.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** I'm not going to comment on the story this morning in the Post, because to do so would get me into making comments with respect to classified information that I'm simply not willing to do. Let me assure you that we are following the law very, very specifically in this matter.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Mr. Secretary, let me then ask you to comment on this business about Said Araqat, a member of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, and as to whether you think he ought to remain a member of that delegation or whether you think he ought to withdraw because of Israel's objection.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** We were disturbed by the comment. I was glad to see the head of the Palestinian side of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation say on this program a few minutes ago that he thought it was provocative, because we certainly thought it was provocative. And we think that it goes outside the bounds of the standards that we have negotiated and agreed upon with the parties, so we're disappointed and I will leave it right there.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Well--may I just press one more?

**MR. BRINKLEY:** Go ahead, Sam.

**MR. DONALDSON:** You say it's provocative. Provocative enough, in your judgment--

**SECRETARY BAKER:** I didn't say it was provocative. I said that the head of the Palestinian said it was provocative, which is a statement that we agree with.

9

MR. DONALDSON: All right, you didn't say it was provocative, but you agree with the statement it was provocative. Therefore, was it provocative enough for him to have to withdraw from this delegation, or the withdrawal of the statement perhaps will be enough?

SECRETARY BAKER: I just said I think we ought to leave it right there.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, you were instrumental, to say the least, in organizing, getting this conference together.

What is your role? What is our country's role going to be once it starts?

SECRETARY BAKER: Our role, David, should be that of a catalyst for peace. We ought to do whatever we can to try and move these discussions forward, to promote progress. We ought to--we should serve as an honest broker, something, frankly, that the prime minister of Israel asked us to do and something that is incorporated in the documents that have been--

MR. BRINKLEY: Are you join in the discussions in the meetings?

SECRETARY BAKER: We will only participate in the bilateral discussions if we are asked by both parties. But we will be available, if we are asked, and we would, together with the other co-sponsors, serve as the driving force to keep--to try and move forward toward progress.

Having said all that, I think we ought to--I notice some of the commentators at the beginning of the program recognize the fact, and I think we should recognize the fact that there are going to be interruptions; there are going to be glitches; there are going to be a lot of hitches here. And we should not go into this conference thinking that this is going to--that this two and a half to three days is going to produce peace in the Middle East.

I was glad to see Moshe Arens say what he said about prospects for progress with respect to the talks between Israel and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on interim self-government arrangements. But I think we ought to make sure we understand this is the Middle East. It's been hard enough to be them to agree to talk. Now we have to recognize we have a difficult path in front of us in order to see progress.

But one final comment, George, and then I'll be glad to take another question from you. But I think that talks don't guarantee peace. But without talks, it's pretty certain that we're not going to make progress toward peace. So I hope here we're taking a necessary first step in order to at least make some progress toward peace.

MR. WILL: Two questions about the larger frame of this. First of all, what has Gorbachev got to do with this? He doesn't even have a country anymore. Why is it important for him to be involved?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it's important I think because the invitation was initially issued by President Gorbachev and President Bush. I don't think it would have been productive for us, frankly, to take the position that, having had that happen, we should somehow take the position the Soviets should be ejected from the process.

And let me say further, the Soviets have been very helpful. The change in the East-West confrontation has been one of the things I think that's enabled to see the parties come together or be willing to come together. The Soviets have been helpful with some of the Arab states that used to be

10

their client states. They've been helpful with Palestinians. So they've contributed.

**MR. WILL:** The enormous investment of your time and the president's time in this settlement of basically the West Bank and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute suggests in a way that's peculiar to some people that this is a vital American interest.

There were two huge wars in the Middle East in the 1980s. Neither had anything to do with Israel and the Palestinians. Few of the conflicts in the Middle East in the last 50 years have. Why is this so important that we have to put all this pressure on Israel to try and solve this? What great national interest is implicated here?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** I think with the end of the East-West confrontation, with the emergence of the United States as the preeminent power, if you will, it is incumbent upon us to at least continue what we've been trying to do for a long, long time, and that is to promote peace in the Middle East.

**MR. WILL:** Is this altruism or is there--

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Well, it is important for and to our strong ally, Israel. It is important in terms of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is the binderbox now of the world, if you will, in terms of the weapons that have been accumulated by the powers, by the states of the Middle East.

**MR. WILL:** Syria has lots of those weapons--

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Yes, they do.

**MR. WILL:** --chemical weapons, long-range missiles now from North Korea and elsewhere.

**MR. WILL:** Shouldn't Israel be petrified of our new friend, Syria?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Mr. Will, I don't know that they should be any more petrified than they have been. But there's no change in our position with respect to Syria. We have not changed anything. But we have been willing to talk to Syria about getting a peace process going. And when people suggest to me that we should not even have had those discussions which have involved the peace process, I think that that's very short-sighted.

You're not going to get peace unless the parties are willing to talk, and you're not going to get talks unless you get all the parties there.

**MR. BRINKLEY:** You have a few seconds, Sam.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Mr. Secretary, we heard Defense Minister Arens complain that the United States should be even-handed--rather should not be even-handed, should tilt toward Israel--and complain about a whole series of things, including the U.S. position on the settlements that he said were not helpful.

11

What's your response to that?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Well, my response is that it was the Israeli government that asked us to assume the role of honest broker; it was their term, their suggestion, and--

**MR. DONALDSON:** Do you think we should be an honest broker? That is, do you think we should be even-handed?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** I think that we should be an honest broker in this process and do everything we can to promote peace and to help bring the parties together and to help bridge gaps where we can.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Should we be even-handed, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY BAKER:** We should not put our own proposal on the table, and we haven't. But we ought to try and promote peace in the Middle East.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Why can't you answer the basic question as to whether we should be even-handed?

**MR. BRINKLEY:** We've run out of time, Sam. We've run out of time.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Yes, we should; we should.

**MR. DONALDSON:** Thank you for the answer.

**MR. BRINKLEY:** Mr. Secretary, thank you. Thanks very much for coming.

**SECRETARY BAKER:** Thank you, David.

**MR. BRINKLEY:** Pleasure to have you. Good luck next week.