Professor Henry A. Kissinger:

Suggestive points - foreword Ørviks paper.

1. The discussion of European defense has tended to concentrate on Berlin and West Germany. Why there now? The flanks, particularly the northern one, deserves more attention.

2. Why? With the new stress on Polaris missiles based on ships, Europe's northern cap is becoming of increasing strategic importance. The Soviets are cramped on their narrow ice-free strip in the north. They need more space. To the Americans the arctic seas are of vital importance for Polaris-carrying ships.

3. This area is the weakest on the NATO frontline. The Norwegians refuse establishment of bases and bans nuclear weapon even in their territorial waters. The nearest US bases are far away. The Northern Cap is very vulnerable.

4. The immediate danger is not an overt, full-scale military attack. It is the "low-level move", aiming at compromising NATO and weaken the credibility of the American guarantee. The main Soviet aim on the <u>Minsk</u> northern flank is gradual neutralisation, not direct occupation.

5. It is high time we start thinking of contingencies that are less than <u>open</u>, <u>agreed</u> military aggression and more than threats and accusations

6. Hardly anything written about <u>this area</u>. It is therefore . . . . . . .

FORWARD

By Henry Kissinger

One of the most difficult dilemmas of the
policymaker involves the role of conjecture. It
is always possible to avoid coming to grips with
a problem by making a projection of probable events
which involves the least necessity for decisive
action. Assumptions about the course of history
can serve as a substitute for effort.

But the serious policymaker knows that he is
responsible not only for the best thing that could
happen but also for the worst. He cannot entrust
the survival of his society entirely to guesses
about the ~~certained~~ good-will of a likely aggressor.

[Y]

For if his estimate turns out to be inaccurate it
is too late to do anything about it. History is
the witness to too many irremediable errors.

Any country then must strive to make an
estimate of the requirements of its security and
relate these to the necessities of international
order. To conceive security too narrowly--or in
purely military terms--involves the danger of force
as the sole arbiter of international disputes. To
rely entirely on the continued good-will of a
potential aggressor is to abdicate an independent
policy and to create temptations for pressures.
Striking this balance is an art, not a science.

This problem, difficult enough for an individual
country, becomes especially *difficult* in an alliance.

-2-

[Y]

Even if the over-all interests of an alliance are relatively harmonious, its components often see special problems in a different light. Looked at from the point-of-view of the North Atlantic alliance as a whole a retreat of 100 miles somewhere along its front might be considered an incident in a battle.

The country affected is bound to consider it as a threat to its very existence.

The difference in perspective is signified by the existence of weapons which combine unparalleled destructiveness with great novelty. The new technology is essentially intended with respect to large-scale operational use. As a result the Alliance has oscillated between staking everything on the immediate use of the most destructive weapons and attempts to

-3-

construct strategies to obviate reliance on them. It
has not been easy to strike a balance between threats
which might be desirable from the point of view
of deterrence and strategies a country would be
prepared to implement.

Finally, many theories which are applicable
to regions where the vital interests of major
countries are directly involved become imprecise
when applied to remote areas where the definition
of interests is more difficult and the relation
of risks and gains harder to define. Most of NATO
thinking has concentrated on the contingency of
a massive Soviet attack on the Central Front. It
is likely that this danger is less real than Soviet
pressures in peripheral areas where Soviet power

-4-

[Y]

can be demonstrated at much smaller risk.

Neils Ørvik has taken one of these areas and analyzed both the threats to it as well as the means to deal with these dangers. The Northern Gap is remote both geographically and psychologically from the serious concerns of Atlantic strategy. Mr. Ørvik has resisted the tendency of many of his compatriots as well as others in the Alliance of simply denying the existence of a danger. He has not taken the easy course of seeking security by making a favorable assessment of Soviet intention.

He does not make the opposite mistake of asserting that aggression is certain. He does insist that there is some relationship between the preparations of the defender and the intentions of the aggressor.

-5-

[Y]

He shows the many indirect ways pressures could
develop. He has demonstrated the strategic importance
of the Northern Gap. He has called attention to
the need of examining the security of areas at the
periphery of NATO strategy. He would probably be
the first to insist that he has offered no final
answers--though he has suggested some very useful
approaches. The important thing is that he has
called attention to the need for analysing an
important problem of Western defense and that he
himself has made a first-rate contribution to the
continuing discussion of Western strategy.

-6-

Dr. Nils Örvik
c/o Norwegian Consulate General
26 Broadway
New York 4, N.Y.

June 28, 1963.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Henry:

As you had taken off for Europe by the time I left, I did neither get a chance to say goodbye, nor to thank you for the valuable and stimulating discussions you opened up at the defense policy seminar as well as at our many sessions at the Center. I found that one of the greatest advantages of the Center was the diversity of views as presented by the faculty members. There was no majority rule, no complacent, easy solutions. The fellows had to make up their own minds.

As far as I am concerned I found myself most of the time in close agreement with your opinions on the present strategic problems, particularly as related to Europe. The Endicott seminar seemed to indicate that those views were also shared by most of the Europeans.

For this reason I hope you will get time to write a little foreword to my booklet on the Northern Cap. I share your ungrateful role of presenting unpopular views, criticizing the policy of the present administration. As McNamara supports the Norwegian Government's attitude to defense, it is hard for a little university professor to attack it. The Government people will be likely to answer: "The Americans accept it, what more do you want?" - If, however, you write a foreword the readers will know that there are Americans who do not agree to the present doctrine as regards the defense of Europe. In the northern area you are beyond comparison the best known and most widely read strategic writer. A foreword by you may make some people stop and think for themselves instead of blindly following what now appears to be the majority rule in Western strategy. It may help our common request for a revaluation of some important aspects.

I am now trying to collect material for my lectures

2.

FOREWORD

By Henry Kissinger

A policy-maker can always avoid coming to grips with a problem by
making a projection of probable events which requires little action.
Assumptions about the course of history can serve as a substitute for
effort. But the wise policy-maker knows that he is responsible not only
for the best thing that could happen but also for the worst. He cannot
entrust the survival of his society entirely to guesses about the assumed
good will of a likely aggressor. For if his estimate turns out to be
inaccurate it will be too late to do anything about it.

So any country, in estimating the requirements of its security,
must strive to relate these to the necessities of international order.
To rely entirely on the continued good will of a potential aggressor is
to invite pressures and eventually to abdicate an independent policy. On
the other hand, to conceive security too narrowly--in purely military
terms--brings the danger that force will be the sole arbiter of international
disputes. Striking the balance is an art, not a science.

This problem, difficult enough for an individual country, becomes
especially acute in an alliance. Even if the over-all interests of the
alliance are relatively harmonious, its component nations often see
specific problems differently. For example, from the point of view of
the North Atlantic alliance as a whole, a retreat of 100 miles somewhere
along its front might be considered an incident in a battle. But the
country affected would consider it as a threat to its existence. This
difference in perspective is magnified by the existence of weapons which

difference in perspective is magnified by the existence of weapons which
country affected would consider it as a threat to its existence. This
along its front might be considered an incident in a battle. But the
the North Atlantic alliance as a whole, a retreat of 100 miles somewhere
specific problems differently. For example, from the point of view of
alliance are relatively harmonious, its component nations often see
especially acute in an alliance. Even if the overall interests of the
This problem, if difficult enough for an individual country, becomes
disputes. Striking the balance is an art, not a science.

terms--brings the danger that force will be the sole arbitrator of international
the other hand, to conceive security too narrowly--in purely military
to invite hostilities and eventually to adicate an independent policy. On
To rely entirely on the continued good will of a potential aggressor is
must strive to relate these to the necessities of international order.
So any country, in estimating the requirements of its security,
inaccurate it will be too late to do anything about it.

Good will of a likely aggressor. For if his estimate turns out to be
entrap the survival of his society entirely to guess as to the assumed
tor the past thing that could happen but also for the worst. He cannot
effort. But the wise policy-maker knows that he is reasonable not only
Vasculous apart the course of history can serve as a substitute for
making a projection of possible events which requires little action.

A policy-maker can always avoid coming to strike with a problem by

By Henry Kissinger

FOREWORD

-2-

combine unparalleled destructiveness with great novelty. The new technology is essentially untested with respect to large-scale operational use. As a result the North Atlantic alliance has oscillated between staking everything on the most destructive weapons and trying to construct strategies to obviate reliance on them. It has not been easy to find the elusive boundary between threats which might be desirable for deterrence and strategies which the alliance would be prepared to implement should deterrence fail.

The fact is, moreover, that defense theories are not equally applicable to all parts of the alliance's territory. Theories applicable to regions where the vital interests of major powers are directly involved become less precise when applied to remote areas where the definition of interests is more difficult and the relation between risks and gains is harder to define.

Most of NATO thinking has concentrated on the contingency of a massive Soviet attack on the central front. Very likely this danger is less real than that of Soviet pressures in peripheral areas where Soviet power can be demonstrated at much smaller risk.

Nils Orvik has taken one of these peripheral areas and analyzed both the danger and the means of dealing with the danger. The Northern Cap is remote both geographically and psychologically from the overriding concerns of Atlantic strategy. Mr. Orvik has called attention to the need of examining the security of such areas. He has not taken the easy course of identifying security with a favorable assessment of Soviet intention. He does not make the opposite mistake of asserting that aggression is certain. He does insist that there is some relation between the preparations of a defender and the actions of an aggressor. He shows the many indirect ways in which pressures could develop. He would probably be the first to insist that he has offered no final answers--though he has suggested some very

that he has offered no final answers--though he has argued some very
in which breviate could develop. He would probably be the first to insist
deterror and the actions of an aggressor. He shows the many indirect ways
He does insist that there is some relation between the preparations of a
does not make the opposite mistake of asserting that aggression is certain,
identifying security with a favorable assessment of Soviet intention. He
examining the security of such areas. He has not taken the easy course of
of Atlantic strategy. Mr. Oravik has called attention to the need of
remote both geographically and psychologically from the overriding concern
the danger and the means of dealing with the danger. The Northern Cap is
Nile Oravik has taken one of these peripheral areas and analyzed both
power can be demonstrated at much smaller risk.

less real than that of Soviet breviate in peripheral areas where Soviet
mysterious Soviet attack on the central front. Very likely this danger is
more difficult and the relation between risks and gains is harder to define.

The fact is, moreover, that defense theories are not usually applicable
the alliance would be prepared to implement should deterrence fail.

between threats which might be desirable for deterrence and strategies which
oppose reliance on them. It has not been easy to find the elusive boundary
on the most destructive weapons and trying to construct strategies to
result the World Atlantic alliance has facilitated between striking everything
is essentially unattacked with respect to large-scale operational use. As a
compine unparalleled destructiveness with great novelty. The new technology

-3-

useful approaches. The important thing is that he has called attention to
the need for analyzing an important problem of Western defense and that he
himself has made a first-rate contribution to the continuing discussion of
Western strategy.

July 12, 1963

Mr. Nils Orvik
c/o Jarving
4518 30th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Nils:

Today I sent your manuscript to the printer, except for Henry Kissinger's foreword which he has assured me will be in my hands soon. We will have galley proof in a few days. I will send you two copies, one to correct and return to me, the other to keep for reference. When I say "to correct," of course, I use the phrase advisedly, for I believe that we are all agreed that the proofreading will be to catch errors and not to make further revisions (unless something of extreme urgency comes up).

I assume you will not need to see page proof.

As you know by now, Karen and I spent nearly all day together yesterday going over your Chapter 3 alterations, which really were quite extensive at this late stage of the game. She was a tremendous help, and I am very grateful for her fine contribution.

In one of your recent letters you asked for the carbon copy that Henry has, and also for a copy of Chapter 2, "Soviet Strategy." My secretary will send you Henry's copy when Henry returns it to us after he is through with it. As for Chapter 2, we had no up-to-date copy including the editing; so Mrs. Christmas typed it over, and I enclose a carbon copy. Please don't get the urge to improve it!

I am pleased to have the paper finally finished and in the hands of the printer. It is an important paper and I hope will attract some attention. I expect the printed books to arrive early in August. All correspondence concerning the distribution and promotion of the paper, and concerning the number of free copies you want and where they are to be sent, etc., should be addressed to Miss Sue Schmidt here at the Center. My responsibility ends with the publication of the paper. Anyhow, I expect to leave July 29 for Mexico and to be away from the office until mid-September. I hope you will send Sue a list of periodicals that ought to receive review copies. Any other ideas you might have for promotion would be appreciated.

Enclosure
Copies to Mr. Kissinger
Sue Schmidt

["Cables to Mr. Kieisinger\nEnclosure", "Max Hill", "Sincerely yours,", "What other ideas you might have for promotion would be appreciated.", "I hope you will send me a list of periodicals that ought to receive review copies. I expect to leave July 20 for Mexico and to be away from the office until mid-September, the Center. My responsibility ends with the publication of the paper. Anyhow, I and where they are to be sent, etc., should be addressed to Mrs. Sue Schmidt here at publication and promotion of the paper, and concerning the number of tree copies you want printed books to arrive early in August. VII correspondence concerning the district it is an important paper and I hope will attract some attention. I expect the I am blessed to have the paper tinsily finished and in the hands of the printer.", "", "I enclose a carbon copy. Please don't get the urge to improve it! Use no nb-to-date copy including the editing; so Mrs. Christmas tabbed it over, and copy when Henry returns it to me after he is through with it. As for Chapter 3, we also for a copy of Chapter 3, \"Soviet Strategy.\" My secretary will send you Henry's, in one of your recent letters you asked for the carbon copy that Henry has, and contribution.", "State of the Game. She was a tremendous help, and I am very grateful for per line over your Chapter 3 iterations, which really were quite extensive at this late date. You know by now, Karen, and I about nearly all day together yesterday going", "I assume you will not need to see page proof.", "urgency comes nb). Be to catch errors and not to make further revisions (unless something of extreme phrase advice). For I believe that we are all street that the proofreading will the other to keep for reference. When I say \"to correct\" of course, I mean the proof in a few days. I will send you two copies, one to correct and return to me, and the other to keep for reference. When I say \"to correct\" of course, I mean the proof in a few

N. Örvik
4518. 30th. street, N.W.
Washington D.C.

Washington D.C. 20519-63

Professor Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
6.Divinity Ave.
Cambridge,
Mass.

Dear Henry,

Thank you so much for the foreword which I received today. I really felt bad about taking your time to such an off-the-road thing as my northern paper. But reading it now I am very glad I did ask you. You put your finger precisely on the most central issue in the problem I wanted to bring out and stresses the importance of it very effectively. It is indeed a great help.

I have never concealed that among the faculty members at the Center I was mostly impressed by your analyses of Western strategy not the least as regards Europe. I have not been able to accept the doctrines and policies of the present US administration, and have fully shared your criticism. The points you brought out during our seminars and discussion was an inspiration as well as a challenge and have been very valuable to me.

Hoping that we can keep up our contact, I send my thanks and warm greetings