Foreword

This volume contains documents of the period 1955 to 1959 covering the principal developments leading to the May 1960 Paris Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. A narrative summary, which precedes the documents, refers to the Heads-of-Government meetings held during World War II and reviews briefly the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers in the early postwar years. It deals more fully with those relations for the period beginning with the Geneva Summit Conference of July 1955.

The documents, all of which have been released previously, include diplomatic communications exchanged by the several Governments; a number of official declarations and communiqués; various proposals and statements made at the Heads-of-Government Conference of July 1955 and at the Foreign Ministers Conferences of October-November 1955 and May-August 1959; messages exchanged by President Eisenhower and Soviet Chairmen Nikolai Bulganin and Nikita S. Khrushchev; and press statements and addresses of importance made by President Eisenhower, Chairman Khrushchev, Secretaries of State Dulles and Herter, and others.

Publications issued by the Department of State in 1955 and 1959 provide a detailed public record of the four-power conferences held in those years.¹ Another important documentary collection with relevant materials was printed in 1959 by the 86th Congress, 1st Session, under the title, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959* (printed for use of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations). This publication includes, among other materials, the text of Department of State publication 6757, issued earlier with the title *The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis*.

Further pertinent documentation is included in a comprehensive Department of State publication on disarmament and related issues to be released in the near future.

¹ *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (publication 6046); *The Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, October 27-November 16, 1955* (publication 6156); and *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (publication 6882).

III

Contents

<table><tr><td></td><td>Page</td></tr><tr><td>FOREWORD</td><td>III</td></tr><tr><td>NARRATIVE SUMMARY</td><td>XIII</td></tr></table>

Documents

<table><tr><td>Tripartite Note to the Soviet Union Proposing a Heads-of-Government Conference, May 10, 1955</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Soviet Note Accepting Invitation to Heads-of-Government Conference, May 26, 1955</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by Prime Minister Eden, July 23, 1955</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by Chairman Bulganin, July 23, 1955</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by President Eisenhower, July 23, 1955</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by Premier Faure, July 23, 1955</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Radio-Television Address by President Eisenhower on the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, Washington, July 25, 1955</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, September 19, 1955</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, October 11, 1955</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Secretary of State Dulles, November 16, 1955</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Foreign Minister Pinay, November 16, 1955</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Foreign Secretary Macmillan, November 16, 1955</td><td>34</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Foreign Minister Molotov, November 16, 1955</td><td>39</td></tr></table>

v

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Communiqué, November 16, 1955</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Tripartite Declaration on Germany and European Security, November 16, 1955</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Radio-Television Report by Secretary of State Dulles on the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Washington, November 18, 1955</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, January 23, 1956</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, January 28, 1956</td><td>62</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, March 1, 1956</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, June 6, 1956</td><td>68</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, August 4, 1956</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Memorandum From the Federal Republic of Germany to the Soviet Union, September 2[?], 1956</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States, September 2, 1956</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, October 9, 1956</td><td>87</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Soviet Union, October 10, 1956</td><td>88</td></tr><tr><td>Swiss Invitation To Hold a Heads-of-Government Conference in Switzerland, November 6, 1956</td><td>89</td></tr><tr><td>Reply by President Eisenhower to Swiss Suggestion for a Heads-of-Government Conference, November 10, 1956</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>Letter from Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, November 17, 1956</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, December 31, 1956</td><td>95</td></tr><tr><td>Joint Declaration by President Eisenhower and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Adenauer), Washington, May 28, 1957</td><td>97</td></tr><tr><td>Four-Power Berlin Declaration on the Reunification of Germany, July 29, 1957</td><td>99</td></tr><tr><td>Report to the Supreme Soviet by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev), November 6, 1957 [Extract]</td><td>102</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, December 10, 1957 [Extracts]</td><td>106</td></tr></tbody></table>

vi

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>NATO Heads of Government Meeting: Communiqué, December 19, 1957 [Extracts]</td><td>113</td></tr><tr><td>Soviet Proposals Sent to NATO Members, United Nations Members, and Switzerland, January 8, 1958</td><td>117</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, January 12, 1958</td><td>129</td></tr><tr><td>Address by Secretary of State Dulles Before the National Press Club, January 16, 1958 [Extract]</td><td>138</td></tr><tr><td>Remarks by Secretary of State Dulles: Replies to Questions Asked at the National Press Club, January 16, 1958</td><td>139</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, January 20, 1958</td><td>142</td></tr><tr><td>Address by the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev), Minsk, January 22, 1958 [Extracts]</td><td>142</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by the Department of State, January 28, 1958</td><td>152</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, February 1, 1958</td><td>153</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin, February 15, 1958</td><td>162</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the United States, February 28, 1958</td><td>168</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower, March 3, 1958</td><td>172</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the United States to the Soviet Union, March 6, 1958</td><td>181</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by the Department of State, March 20, 1958</td><td>185</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the United States, March 24, 1958</td><td>186</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Dulles, March 25, 1958 [Extracts]</td><td>192</td></tr><tr><td>Tripartite Declaration Presented to the Soviet Union, March 31, 1958</td><td>194</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, April 11, 1958</td><td>195</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Dulles, April 15, 1958 [Extracts]</td><td>197</td></tr><tr><td>Tripartite Statement Presented to the Soviet Union, April 16, 1958</td><td>203</td></tr><tr><td>Tripartite Statement Presented to the Soviet Union, April 24, 1958</td><td>205</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the United States, April 26, 1958</td><td>206</td></tr></tbody></table>

VII

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Tripartite Statement Presented to the Soviet Union, May 3, 1958</td><td>209</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the Soviet Union to the United States, May 5, 1958</td><td>209</td></tr><tr><td>Memorandum From the Soviet Union to the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, May 5, 1958</td><td>211</td></tr><tr><td>Communique of the North Atlantic Council, May 7, 1958 [Extract]</td><td>222</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 16, 1958 [Extracts]</td><td>224</td></tr><tr><td>Tripartite Aide Memoire Presented to the Soviet Union, May 28, 1958</td><td>227</td></tr><tr><td>Tripartite Memorandum on Proposals for Summit Agenda, May 28, 1958</td><td>228</td></tr><tr><td>Tripartite List of General Headings for Reviewing Specific Agenda Proposals, May 31, 1958</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>Czechoslovak Memorandum, May 31, 1958</td><td>235</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, June 11, 1958</td><td>238</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Dulles, June 17, 1958 [Extracts]</td><td>249</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, July 1, 1958</td><td>251</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the Soviet Union to the United States, July 15, 1958</td><td>253</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, July 19, 1958</td><td>263</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, July 22, 1958</td><td>267</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, July 23, 1958</td><td>270</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, July 25, 1958</td><td>273</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, July 28, 1958</td><td>275</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, August 1, 1958</td><td>281</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, August 5, 1958 [Extracts]</td><td>282</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by President Eisenhower, August 5, 1958</td><td>284</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Soviet Union, August 22, 1958</td><td>285</td></tr></tbody></table>

VIII

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the Federal Republic of Germany to the United States, September 9, 1958</td><td>285</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to Czechoslovakia, September 12, 1958</td><td>286</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on a Peace Treaty With Germany, September 18, 1958</td><td>288</td></tr><tr><td>Aide Memoire Presented by the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, September 30, 1958</td><td>291</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Soviet Union, September 30, 1958</td><td>292</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on Germany and the Berlin Situation, November 27, 1958</td><td>295</td></tr><tr><td>Communique by the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, December 14, 1958</td><td>313</td></tr><tr><td>North Atlantic Council Declaration on Berlin, December 16, 1958</td><td>314</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Soviet Union on Germany and the Berlin Situation, December 31, 1958</td><td>315</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on the Problem of Germany, January 10, 1959</td><td>319</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Soviet Union Proposing a Foreign Ministers Meeting on the German Problem, February 16, 1959</td><td>329</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on the German Problem, March 2, 1959 [Extract]</td><td>330</td></tr><tr><td>Joint Communiqué by Prime Minister Macmillan and Chairman Khrushchev, Moscow, March 3, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>333</td></tr><tr><td>Note From the United States to the Soviet Union on Proposed Meeting of Foreign Ministers, March 26, 1959</td><td>335</td></tr><tr><td>Joint Statement by Western Foreign Ministers, March 31, 1959 [Extract]</td><td>337</td></tr><tr><td>Communique by the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, April 30, 1959</td><td>337</td></tr><tr><td>Radio-Television Address by Secretary of State Herter, May 7, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>338</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by Secretary of State Herter, May 14, 1959</td><td>344</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Peace Plan Presented by the Western Foreign Ministers, May 14, 1959</td><td>350</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Summary of the Western Peace Plan, May 14, 1959</td><td>356</td></tr></tbody></table>

IX

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko, May 15, 1959</td><td>360</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Soviet Draft Peace Treaty With Germany, May 15, 1959</td><td>371</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower, June 3, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>385</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Western Proposal on Berlin, June 16, 1959</td><td>387</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower, June 17, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>388</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Presenting a Soviet Proposal on Berlin, June 19, 1959</td><td>391</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by the Three Western Foreign Ministers, June 19, 1959</td><td>394</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko, June 19, 1959</td><td>395</td></tr><tr><td>Radio-Television Report by Secretary of State Herter on the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, June 23, 1959</td><td>396</td></tr><tr><td>Statement in the British House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Lloyd on the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, June 24, 1959 [Extract]</td><td>401</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko at Moscow on the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, June 28, 1959</td><td>403</td></tr><tr><td>Statement in the British House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Lloyd on the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, July 8, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>415</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower, July 8, 1959 [Extract]</td><td>423</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Herter, July 9, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>425</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by President Eisenhower on Exchange of Visits With Chairman Khrushchev, August 3, 1959</td><td>430</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Secretary of State Herter, August 5, 1959</td><td>431</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, August 5, 1959</td><td>438</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko, August 5, 1959</td><td>441</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Closing Statement by Foreign Secretary Lloyd, August 5, 1959</td><td>451</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Communiqué Issued by the Four Foreign Ministers, August 5, 1959</td><td>456</td></tr></tbody></table>

x

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko Upon Conclusion of Foreign Ministers Meeting, Geneva, August 6, 1959 [Extract]</td><td>457</td></tr><tr><td>Summary Statement on Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva by Secretary of State Herter, Washington, August 6, 1959 [Extract]</td><td>458</td></tr><tr><td>Radio-Television Address by President Eisenhower, September 10, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>459</td></tr><tr><td>Joint Communiqué by the United States and the Soviet Union, September 27, 1959</td><td>461</td></tr><tr><td>Remarks by Chairman Khrushchev at the National Press Club, Washington, September 27, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>462</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower, September 28, 1959 [Extracts]</td><td>465</td></tr><tr><td>Statement by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President, September 28, 1959</td><td>468</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statement by Chairman Khrushchev, Moscow, September 29, 1959</td><td>469</td></tr><tr><td>News Conference Statements by Secretary of State Herter, October 6, 1959</td><td>469</td></tr><tr><td>Announcement of Invitation to Chairman Khrushchev To Visit France, October 23, 1959</td><td>473</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, December 21, 1959</td><td>474</td></tr><tr><td>Communiqué by Western Heads of State and Government, December 21, 1959</td><td>474</td></tr><tr><td>Communiqué Issued by the North Atlantic Council, December 22, 1959</td><td>475</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, December 25, 1959</td><td>476</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Khrushchev, December 29, 1959</td><td>477</td></tr><tr><td>Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, December 30, 1959</td><td>478</td></tr></tbody></table>

XI

# Narrative Summary

## I

### ORIGINS PRIOR TO 1955

The May 1960 conference at Paris of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union has antecedents in the meetings between Heads of Government to deal with problems of global concern which began during World War II when President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill held a series of meetings to plan the conduct of the war. Later, Premier Stalin joined these "summit" conferences, and tripartite meetings took place at Tehran in November-December 1943, at Yalta in February 1945, and at Potsdam in July-August 1945. The meetings at Yalta and especially those at Potsdam dealt to a considerable extent with postwar planning. At Potsdam President Truman represented the United States, and during the latter part of the conference Prime Minister Attlee took over for the United Kingdom.

The wartime Heads of Government meetings were supplemented by other high-level negotiations such as the conference at San Francisco, April-June 1945, to establish the United Nations, and were followed in the immediate postwar period by a number of conferences of the four Foreign Ministers aimed at finding the way to definitive peace settlements.

The task of reconstruction of a peaceful world, however, has involved political, economic, and social problems of extraordinary complexity. These would have been difficult enough to solve even if the major victorious powers had approached them in a spirit of common resolution and under mutually compatible political assumptions. It became apparent early in the postwar period, however, that the policy of the Soviet Union, unlike that of the Western allies, was directed primarily, not toward reaching solutions of the problems left by the war, but toward extending the Communist system beyond the Soviet borders by any and all available means. In many instances, the Soviet Government was concerned not to reach agreements nor to facilitate the healing of the wounds of war, but to preserve or aggravate situations which promised sooner or later to offer opportunities for the eventual installation of governments subservient to Moscow.

XIII

Thus, despite the many efforts made by the Western allies to pre-
serve a joint approach to postwar reconstruction, Soviet striving for
immediate or potential political advantage increasingly separated the
U.S.S.R. from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

The last quadripartite meetings of the Allied Control Council for
Germany were held in March 1948 and the last meeting of the Council
of Foreign Ministers in June 1949. In the succeeding years, a renewal
of attempts to deal with the German problem was made impossible
by a whole range of aggressive Soviet actions—the Berlin blockade
and the Communist attack on South Korea were prominent examples—
through which the U.S.S.R. made plain its intention of forcibly im-
posing settlements which would further the attainment of Communist
goals. In May 1953, however, after the death of Stalin and when
an armistice was in sight in Korea, Prime Minister Churchill raised
the question whether it might not be desirable to attempt to bridge
the gap between the powers by reviving the wartime practice of face-
to-face meetings of the Heads of Government.

It was determined first to test the intentions of the new Soviet
regime by reviving the meetings of the Foreign Ministers.

The Soviet Union was slow to respond to the invitations of the
Western Powers, but a meeting of the Foreign Ministers was finally
held in Berlin in January-February, 1954. The Western allies
presented to the conference a detailed plan, known as the Eden Plan,
for the reunification of Germany in several successive steps. Under
this plan free elections would be held throughout Germany to estab-
lish an all-German national assembly the first task of which would
be the preparation of a constitution for an all-German government.
This government would be responsible for the negotiation and con-
clusion of a peace treaty, to which all states which were at war with
Germany would be signatories. The peace treaty would enter into
force when ratified by the four powers and by Germany.

The Soviet Foreign Minister in reply maintained that the Western
proposals represented an attempt to impose a four-power plan upon
Germany and that an eventual all-German government could only
be worked out through the parliaments of the two existing German
states, the "German Democratic Republic" and the Federal Republic
of Germany, negotiating as equals. Dismissing the Eden plan as
unsuitable even as a basis for discussion, the Soviet Foreign Minister
proposed the conclusion of a general European treaty on collective
security in Europe, with which the United States and the Chinese
Communists would be associated in the capacity of observers. This
in turn was unacceptable to the Western Powers, since it was evidently
designed largely as a means of eliminating the North Atlantic Treaty

XIV

Organization and preventing Germany from participating in Western defense arrangements.

Discussions concerning the conclusion of a treaty with Austria also came to nothing because of Soviet amendments which would have provided for an indefinite perpetuation of foreign armed forces on Austrian territory.

The Berlin Conference adjourned without agreement on February 18. At the Geneva Conference of April-July 1954, on Korea and Indochina, cease-fire arrangements were concluded for Indochina but the Communist side refused to agree to the unification of Korea by free elections.

The rest of 1954 was characterized by Soviet efforts to prevent by propaganda and intimidation the association of Western Germany in the defense of Europe. Included in this campaign were threats, which were later carried out, to denounce the Soviet Union's mutual assistance agreements with France and the United Kingdom, and a barrage of notes calling on the Western Powers to meet with the Soviet Union to discuss Soviet plans for a security agreement which should replace NATO. In spite of these tactics, the Western Powers concluded and ratified a complex of agreements, known as the Paris Accords, through which the Federal Republic of Germany became a sovereign partner in the defense arrangements of the Western European Union (the Brussels Pact) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The failure of the Foreign Ministers Conference and the harassing attitude of the Soviet Union in the succeeding months did not destroy the feeling that a meeting at the level of the Heads of Government might nevertheless prove useful. Sentiment for such a meeting had been expressed in France during the parliamentary debate on the Paris Accords and was also manifest in the United Kingdom during the general election campaign of May 1955. In the United States, Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, publicly declared on March 20, 1955, that he favored such a meeting. Soviet sources had also been urging for some time the convocation of a conference of Heads of Government.

This sentiment was greatly strengthened when, in the spring of 1955, the Soviet Union indicated its willingness to proceed to the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria. The subsequent negotiations were short and a treaty was signed in Vienna in May 1955.

Signature of the Austrian State Treaty by the Soviet Union, which had blocked its conclusion for 8 years, raised the possibility that the Soviet Government might be ready to revise its attitude of intransigent opposition to agreements on other subjects. Accordingly, in an effort to test this possibility, the United States, the United Kingdom, and

xv

France on May 10, 1955, invited the Soviet Union to join them "in an effort to remove sources of conflict between us" through a conference of the Heads of Government.

## II

### HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CONFERENCE, JULY 1955

In their note proposing a Heads of Government conference, the Western Powers recognized that the removal of the sources of conflict between them and the Soviet Union could not be achieved in a single meeting or in a hasty manner. They therefore proposed that the meeting be devoted to formulating the issues and that it be followed by a second stage in which these issues would be examined in detail according to such directives as might be jointly given by the Heads of Government. The Soviet Government having accepted the invitation of the Western Powers and their suggestions as to procedure, President Eisenhower and the three Prime Ministers, Edgar Faure of France, Sir Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom, and Marshal Nikolai Bulganin of the Soviet Union, met in Geneva from July 18 to 25, 1955.

The question first discussed was that of German unity. As the discussion progressed it became evident that the Soviet Union viewed the German question primarily from the standpoint of its own security and that it desired, as at Berlin in 1954, to create, first of all, a sweeping all-European collective security system which would lead to elimination of NATO and the Western European Union. In the Soviet view, the reunification of Germany could then be dealt with as a secondary problem which could perhaps be resolved as a by-product of the first.

The Western Powers recognized that the reunification of Germany involved considerations of European security but took the view that NATO and the Brussels Pact were entirely defensive arrangements within the framework of the United Nations Charter and that the possibility that a united Germany might elect to participate in these organizations did not constitute a threat to European security. By way of reassurance to the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Eden stated that the Western Powers would be ready to examine the possibility of a demilitarized area between East and West.

In the discussions on disarmament the Western Powers continued to maintain that no sound and reliable agreement could be made unless it were covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to insure enforcement of the agreement. In this connection President Eisenhower made his dramatic proposal to the Soviet Union that an immediate practical step be taken—that the United States and the

XVI

(LC)

U.S.S.R. should agree to give each other complete blueprints of their military establishments and that each should provide facilities to the other for aerial photography.

With regard to contacts between the Soviet Union and the West, detailed proposals were not put forward, but the Heads of Government agreed that an increase in such contacts was important to the relaxation of international tensions and should be the subject of later detailed study.

Following these discussions to determine the issues, the Heads of Government concluded their meeting by instructing their Foreign Ministers to meet in October to continue the consideration of the questions of European security, Germany, disarmament, and the development of contacts between East and West.

With regard to Germany, the Heads of Government agreed "that the settlement of the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." They also agreed to work together to develop an acceptable system of disarmament through the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. On the expansion of contacts, the Foreign Ministers were directed to study measures, including those which might be taken through organs and agencies of the United Nations, which could bring about a progressive elimination of barriers to communication and peaceful trade and such freer contacts and exchanges as would be of mutual advantage to the countries and peoples concerned.

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 27-NOVEMBER 16, 1955

While the meeting of the Heads of Government had indicated wide differences of view between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, it was hoped that in the more detailed examination of the issues by the Foreign Ministers some progress might be made toward narrowing these differences. In the discussions in October, however, sharp divergences of view and of interpretation soon became evident.

With reference to the directive on Germany, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov declared that in the view of his government, German reunification and free all-German elections could not be considered apart from the existence of two independent German states. The solution of the problem of reunification could be worked out, he declared, only through agreement between these two states. He emphasized that settlement of the German problem could not be permitted to jeopardize the "social achievements of the workers of the German Democratic Republic."

544645-60-2

XVII

The Western Powers added to the Eden Plan for the reunification of Germany a new proposal for the conclusion, concurrently with reunification, of a "Treaty of Assurance on the Reunification of Germany." Through this treaty the Western Powers aimed to remove any basis for the fears which the Soviet Union professed in regard to possible aggressive tendencies of a reunified Germany. By its terms, each party would be obligated to react against aggression and arrangements would be established, in which the Soviet Union could directly participate, for control of the levels of armed forces and armaments in a zone to be established on both sides of the line of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries.

The Soviet delegation did not respond favorably to this new approach. As before, the Soviet Union pressed for the conclusion of a general European security agreement in which both Germanies should participate. This proposal was again declined by the Western Powers since it would not put an end to the division of Germany and seemed designed primarily to bring about the elimination of NATO and the Western European Union.

The Soviet Foreign Minister rejected President Eisenhower's proposals for aerial photography and exchange of military information. These, he declared, had nothing to do with disarmament and would only serve to intensify mutual distrust "in view of the fact that each party would be under a constant threat that the other party, which has the proper information at its disposal, may utilize it for a surprise attack and for aggression."

The third and final item of discussion was the development of contacts between the Soviet Union and the West. The Western Powers put forward 17 concrete proposals for the freer exchange of persons, ideas, and information. While accepting a few of these proposals in principle, the Soviet Union was unwilling to agree to specific arrangements for carrying out such exchanges in a manner satisfactory to the Western Governments.

The Foreign Ministers Conference thus came to an end on November 16, 1955, without reaching any greater degree of agreement than had previously been achieved by the Heads of Government. The Soviet Union's intransigence on the German question provided yet another clear demonstration of its refusal to permit the reunification of Germany on any terms other than those dictated by the purpose of maintaining its domination over East Germany.

Upon his return from Geneva, Secretary of State Dulles reported to the American people on November 18 that the Conference was barren of accomplishment because the Soviet Union, although desiring

XVIII

certain results in terms of European security, disarmament, and freer exchanges, was not yet willing to pay the price in terms of doing what was inherently necessary to achieve such results.

### III

#### EISENHOWER-BULGANIN CORRESPONDENCE

During the year which followed the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, the channels were kept open for a renewal of negotiations. The West still hoped, as President Eisenhower wrote on June 16, 1956, to President Theodor Heuss of the German Federal Republic, that the Soviet Government would "come to recognize that it is in its own interest to negotiate a settlement which respects the right to freedom of the German people and the interests of both East and West." This hope was nourished by a potentially significant series of letters between Marshal Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and President Eisenhower, begun by the former in September 1955 as an extension of the discussions held at the Geneva Summit Conference. These exchanges through 1956 were primarily concerned with the basic questions of maintaining the peace and the lessening of international tensions. Through these letters, the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States were set forth publicly on a wide range of issues, with the greatest attention being given to the disarmament problem. Among the questions dealt with in this sphere were limitation of forces, aerial inspection, mutual reduction of foreign military establishments, particularly in Germany, suspension of nuclear weapons tests, and the control of outer space for peaceful purposes.

#### WEST GERMAN PROPOSAL FOR DIPLOMATIC TALKS ON GERMAN PROBLEM

On September 2, 1956, the Federal Republic of Germany sent notes to the three Western Powers expressing its concern at the lack of progress toward a settlement of the German problem. These notes presented the view that since efforts to reach agreement through large conferences had failed, another conference should be convened "only when a well-founded prospect has been created through normal diplomatic channels that such a conference would lead to success." The notes appealed urgently to the Western Powers "to resume energetically [their] efforts to advance the matter along these lines."

The United States, in a note of October 9, 1956, welcomed this initiative of the Federal Republic, and on the following day it joined France and the United Kingdom in sending to the Soviet Government identical notes expressing hope that the latter would respond by stat-

XIX

ing its views "as to how effect can be given to the agreement made by
the Heads of Government at Geneva to restore German unity by means
of free elections."

THE SUEZ CRISIS AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

Any prospect of an early renewal of negotiations was removed by
the international crises in October-November 1956, over Hungary and
Suez, which revived in full force the conflict between the Soviet
Union and the West. The Suez crisis temporarily disrupted the co-
operative relationship among the Western Powers, while the ruthless
suppression of the Hungarian revolution by the Soviet Union led to
the condemnation of that country by the General Assembly of the
United Nations by an overwhelming vote. The Soviet Union's de-
fiance of world opinion in the Hungarian case, together with its threat
to intervene in the Suez crisis, which it coupled with ominous talk of
a possible third world war, created an atmosphere that for some time
precluded the resumption of negotiations on Germany and other ma-
jor issues.

The Soviet Union, however, regarded the Suez crisis as calling for
a conference at the summit. In a letter of November 17 to President
Eisenhower, Chairman Bulganin declared that the Anglo-French-
Israeli military operations against Egypt had moved the Soviet Union
to appeal to the governments of all countries, and especially those of
the great powers, to unite in efforts to prevent war. He enclosed a
declaration of the Soviet Union on the measures it considered neces-
sary to bring about disarmament and the reduction of international
tensions. The declaration proposed that a conference of the Heads
of Government of France, India, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and the U.S.S.R. be held for this purpose and referred to a
similar proposal which had been made by the Swiss Government on
November 6. It condemned the "unprovoked aggression" against
Egypt and asserted that the charges brought against the Soviet Union
in the case of Hungary were nothing but a "slanderous campaign"
being carried on as part of an "imperialist plot" against the peace
and security of the peoples of the Middle East and Europe.

In his reply to Chairman Bulganin of December 31, President
Eisenhower rejected the thesis of the Soviet Government as to where
the responsibility lay for the creation of international tensions, point-
ing out that the parties in dispute in the Middle East had accepted
the recommendations of the United Nations and had ceased military
actions, whereas the Soviet Government had rejected the U.N. recom-
mendations with respect to Hungary. As for the Soviet suggestion
for a meeting of Heads of Government, the President expressed the
view that negotiations within the framework of the United Nations

XX

seemed most likely to result in progress toward disarmament and that he could agree to such a meeting only when circumstances should make it seem likely to accomplish a significant result.

## WESTERN POWERS RESTATE THEIR POLICIES AND INVITE NEGOTIATIONS

In May 1957, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany made an official visit to Washington at the close of which he and President Eisenhower, on May 28, issued a joint declaration affirming that the reunification of Germany was a major foreign policy objective of their two countries and that in conjunction with reunification they stood ready to conclude European security arrangements which would provide far-reaching assurances to the Soviet Union. The two leaders emphasized the necessity of strengthening the Western defense system in the face of the continuing Soviet threat and the absence of any agreement for arms limitation. At the same time they stated their conviction that efforts must be pressed in the United Nations for a disarmament agreement covering both nuclear and conventional weapons under an effective system of international control.

The Adenauer-Eisenhower statement was followed on July 29, 1957, by the Berlin Declaration in which the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany set forth their views on German reunification, the conclusion of a peace treaty, European security arrangements and disarmament. In this Declaration, which stressed the importance of German reunification as the essential basis for agreement on the larger issues of European security and disarmament, the Western Powers affirmed "their sincere desire to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to reach a European settlement and to give evidence that the paramount objective of their policy is the attainment of a just and lasting peace."

## COURSE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN 1957

Meanwhile, during the first half of 1957, a struggle for power ensued within the Soviet leadership, from which Party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev emerged victorious, and, at the end of June, Soviet policy toward the West assumed a more aggressive tone. Because of the stand taken by the Soviet Union on Western disarmament proposals, the London disarmament talks carried on under U.N. auspices were adjourned in September without agreement. Intensified efforts to expand Soviet influence in the Middle East were instrumental in the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in Syria in August. The tense situation which resulted in the Middle East was transformed into a major international crisis in October when Moscow accused Turkey of planning an attack on Syria and warned it that the Soviet Union would not remain passive in such an eventuality. However,

XXI

when Syria, with Soviet backing, submitted its case on the Turkish "threat" to the U.N. General Assembly, the Soviet Union abandoned its bellicose posture and allowed the crisis to subside.

## IV

### SOVIETS PROPOSE NEW SUMMIT MEETING

Following the Soviet Union's launching of two artificial earth satellites (Sputniks I and II)—an achievement which attracted worldwide attention and contributed greatly to the raising of Soviet prestige from the depths to which it had fallen after the tragic events in Hungary—Party Secretary Khrushchev, in a speech on November 6, 1957, the 40th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, declared that the U.S.S.R. desired a high-level meeting of representatives of "socialist" and "capitalist" countries for the purpose of reaching agreement on measures to lessen international tension.

This initiative was followed up on December 10 by letters addressed by Chairman Bulganin to the Heads of Government of most of the countries of the world. The letter sent to President Eisenhower pointed to the growing dangers of the international situation and appealed urgently for "joint efforts to put an end to the 'cold war,' to terminate the armaments race, and to enter resolutely upon the path of peaceful coexistence." Mr. Bulganin suggested that a meeting of Heads of Government be held to discuss a number of proposals made by him toward this end, as well as any additional ones that might be suggested by other powers.

### NATO COUNCIL MEETING OF DECEMBER, 1957

This new approach of the Soviet Union came on the eve of a NATO Council meeting at Paris (December 16-19), attended by the Heads of Government of the NATO countries. At the close of this meeting, representatives of the 15 nations of the North Atlantic alliance issued a declaration reviewing the international situation, the working of the alliance, and the problems of NATO defense.

The statement declared that the Soviet Union, while continuing to seek the disruption of the free world, had made no real contribution to the solution of the major problems causing international tension such as the continued partition of Germany and the absence of control over armaments. In particular, it cited the rejection by the Soviet Union of the series of disarmament proposals which had been made by the Western countries in the 1957 London disarmament talks and had been approved by 56 members of the United Nations. It noted further that the Soviet Union had brought about a deadlock in the disarmament negotiations by declaring its intention of boy-

XXII

cutting the U.N. Disarmament Commission and its 5-nation Subcommittee on the grounds that their members reflected a predominantly Western viewpoint, and had persisted in this attitude despite a decision of the U.N. General Assembly to expand the Commission to 25 members. It declared, however, that if the Soviet Government refused to participate in the work of the new Commission, the members of NATO would welcome a meeting with the Soviet Union at the Foreign Ministers level to try to resolve the deadlock.

## WESTERN CONDITIONS FOR A SUMMIT MEETING

President Eisenhower's letter of January 12, 1958, in reply to Chairman Bulganin, represented a common Western viewpoint arrived at through consultation with the NATO countries. It constituted a conditional acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a new summit conference. The President stated that he was ready to meet with the Soviet leaders to discuss outstanding issues provided "that prior to such a meeting these complex matters should be worked on in advance through diplomatic channels and by our Foreign Ministers, so that the issues can be presented in form suitable for our decisions and so that it can be ascertained that such a top-level meeting would, in fact, hold good hope of advancing the cause of peace and justice in the world."

As for the matters to be discussed, President Eisenhower pointed out some of the inadequacies and biases of the items on Chairman Bulganin's list of December 10, answered some of the accompanying criticisms of U.S. policy, and then offered his own list of subjects for discussion. The most important of these were (1) strengthening of the United Nations, primarily by restricting the use of the veto in the Security Council, (2) reunification of Germany by free elections, (3) implementation of past Soviet pledges regarding the right of the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their own form of government, and (4) a number of specific proposals in the disarmament field, including agreements to use outer space for peaceful purposes only, to control the production of nuclear weapons, to end nuclear tests, and to guard against the possibility of surprise attack.

The Heads of Government of the United Kingdom and France replied to Chairman Bulganin in similar terms thus establishing a common position with the United States toward the holding of a summit conference.

The response from the Soviet rulers was far from encouraging. A hostile speech by Party Secretary Khrushchev at Minsk on January 22 called into question the motivations behind President Eisenhower's proposals. This was followed by a letter from Chairman Bulganin on February 1, attacking a number of the President's proposals.

XXIII

In his reply to Chairman Bulganin of February 15, President
Eisenhower expressed his doubts as to whether the establishment of
better relations between the two countries could be advanced by the
"mere prolongation of repetitive public debate." He pointed out
that Mr. Bulganin insisted that all the Soviet proposals be discussed
but took the position with respect to the President's proposals that
there must be "unanimous agreement of all participants as to the
necessity for considering such proposals," and was thus attempting
to exercise a unilateral Soviet veto over the problems to be discussed.
The President suggested that the impasse to which they had come
might be broken through less formal and less publicized contacts
such as exchanges of views through diplomatic channels, and he stated
that the United States was consulting other nations as to the desirability of exploring through such channels the prospects of a summit
meeting.

CONFLICT OVER PURPOSE OF CONFERENCE

On February 28, 1958, the Soviet Union proposed to the United
States that a conference of Foreign Ministers be held in April, with
the discussion strictly limited to questions relating to the organiza-
tional side of preparations necessary for a meeting at the summit.
This proposal did not take account of the U.S. view that the prepara-
tions for such a meeting required advance exploration of the ques-
tions at issue with a view to bringing out the positions of both sides
and the possibilities of reaching agreements. This omission
prompted the United States, in its communication of March 6, to
inquire whether the Soviet Union really wanted to hold a summit
meeting that would "take meaningful decisions" or whether its
objective was "merely to stage a spectacle."

Chairman Bulganin's letter of March 3 to President Eisenhower
and a Soviet memorandum of March 24 revealed the conflict which
persisted between the Soviet and the U.S. positions regarding the
agenda and purposes of the proposed conference. These communi-
cations continued to press for inclusion in the agenda of many pro-
posals based on Soviet points of view not accepted by the United
States.

Among these proposals were the immediate termination of nuclear
weapons tests; the reduction of foreign troops in Germany; the
liquidation of military bases on foreign territory; and the ending
of "war propaganda." At the same time, two subjects proposed for
discussion by President Eisenhower—the reunification of Germany
and the situation in Eastern Europe—were declared to be inadmiss-
ible as agenda topics, the first because the U.S.S.R. held it was a

XXIV

matter to be decided by the two German states themselves, and the
second because it was "insulting" to the countries concerned.

Both Chairman Bulganin's letter and the Soviet memorandum reiterated the view that the proposed Foreign Ministers conference should confine itself to the organizational side of preparations for a summit meeting, covering such matters as the agenda, composition, time, and place of such a meeting. All discussion of the substance of the questions to be advanced should, in the Soviet view, be left to the Heads of Government.

At his news conference of March 25, Secretary Dulles commented that the Soviets appeared to be asking a "terribly high political price" as a condition of having a summit meeting. He listed the following Soviet "price tags" to illustrate his point: (1) acceptance of the legitimacy of the East German regime and acquiescence in the continued division of Germany; (2) ending the agreed joint responsibility of the four former occupying powers of Germany for the reunification of Germany; and (3) the acceptance of a conference agenda so formulated that virtually every item implied acceptance of a basic Soviet thesis that the Western Powers rejected.

On March 31 the United States joined with France and the United Kingdom in presenting to the Soviet Union a comprehensive program of negotiations which could lead directly to the summit if Moscow concurred. The first phase would be diplomatic conversations "to examine the position of the various governments on the major questions at issue between them and to establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by heads of government." These preparatory talks would not be for the purpose of reaching decisions but to bring out, by general discussion, the possibilities of agreement. The Foreign Ministers, assuming that the results of these talks were satisfactory to them, would then reach agreement on the date and place of the summit meeting and decide on its composition. It was suggested that diplomatic exchanges between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the three Western Ambassadors at Moscow be commenced in the second half of April.

## SOVIET "PEACE OFFENSIVE" OVERSHADOWS SUMMIT MEETING

While the Western proposal was being prepared, Marshal Bulganin was replaced on March 27, 1958, by Khrushchev as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. The latter's first foreign policy moves as Chairman indicated that he had relegated the Soviet proposal for a summit meeting to a secondary position in favor of a new "peace offensive". On March 31 the Soviet Union announced a unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons tests, and in April it brought

XXV

a complaint before the U.N. Security Council against the operations of the U.S. Strategic Air Command on the Arctic approaches to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, when the United States offered a resolution proposing that the Security Council recommend the establishment of an Arctic "open skies" inspection zone, without waiting for agreement on other areas, the Soviet Union vetoed it.

The United States responded to these moves with proposals which led to a series of protracted negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers looking toward the conclusion of agreements to suspend nuclear tests and to guard against surprise attack.

On April 11 the Soviet Union agreed to hold talks with the Western Ambassadors at Moscow, but only for the purpose of settling the organizational details of a subsequent meeting of Foreign Ministers. This did not, of course, meet the Western view of what these diplomatic exchanges should accomplish, but the three powers nevertheless agreed to the commencement of the talks on April 17 in the hope that the differences of opinion could be resolved.

Instead of meeting with the three ambassadors in joint session, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko insisted on seeing them individually. When the Western Powers remonstrated against this procedure as causing unnecessary delay, Gromyko replied that to receive the three ambassadors together would be equivalent to holding a conference, which would require parity of representation between the Soviet bloc and the West. If joint meetings were to be held, he proposed that the Ambassadors of Poland and Czechoslovakia should take part in the sessions. While regretting the "unnecessary obstacle" raised by the Soviet Union, the Western Powers stated on May 3 that to get on with the work itself, they would agree to the Soviet Government's preference for separate interviews.

The NATO Council of Foreign Ministers which met at Copenhagen May 7 to 9, 1958, voiced regret that the Soviet Union had made the preparations for a summit meeting more difficult by posing "unreasonable conditions." While declaring that its members refused to be discouraged by the Soviet attitude, the Council expressed the view that conferences at the summit were not the only way, or necessarily the best way, of conducting negotiations but that in any event, such a conference had to be adequately prepared for and held under conditions that would give promise of its achieving something.

## PREPARATORY TALKS SUSPENDED BY SOVIET ACTIONS

The next Soviet move seemed calculated to break off altogether the preparatory negotiations for a summit conference. On June 16, 1958, the Soviet Government made public a letter of June 11 which Chairman Khrushchev had written to President Eisenhower complaining

XXVI

that the Western Powers were creating obstacles and impeding
progress toward a summit meeting. At the same time, without con-
sultation with the Western Powers, the Soviet Government published
a collection of hitherto confidential documents relating to the Western
agenda proposals for summit talks.

Simultaneously with this unilateral action came the disclosure that former Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy and other leaders of the 1956 revolution in Hungary had been executed after a secret trial. These executions, carried out in defiance of world opinion, were difficult to reconcile with the professed desire of the Soviet Union for a relaxation of tensions.

The effect of these developments was to cast serious doubts on
whether a summit meeting would take place at all, although President
Eisenhower wrote Chairman Khrushchev on July 2 that, despite the
apparent unwillingness of the Soviet Government to negotiate seri-
ously on the concrete points at issue, the Western Powers did not
propose "to abandon hope or to relax their efforts to seek solutions
of the major outstanding problems."

SUPPLEMENTARY NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN

The disruption by the Soviet Union of the preparatory negotiations
for a summit meeting did not terminate an important supplementary
negotiation with the Soviets initiated by President Eisenhower on
April 8 in his reply to a letter from Chairman Khrushchev inviting
the United States to follow the example of the Soviet Union in sus-
pending nuclear weapons tests. The President proposed that techni-
cal studies be undertaken by experts from East and West not only
on the feasibility of detecting nuclear explosions but also on methods
of inspection to guard against surprise attack.

In replying to the President's proposals on May 9, Chairman Khrushchev said that in view of the importance attached by the United States to such technical studies, the Soviet Union was prepared to swallow its "serious doubts" and "to try even this course." As a result, a meeting of technical experts from the Soviet bloc and Western countries began work at Geneva on July 1, 1958, on the problem of detecting nuclear tests, the solution of which was regarded by the United States and the United Kingdom as a necessary preliminary to any agreement for a nuclear test ban.

V

SOVIETS REVIVE SUMMIT MEETING PROPOSAL IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

The outbreak of a nationalist revolution in Iraq on July 14, 1958, intensified unrest in the area to such a degree that Lebanon and Jordan

XXVII

appealed urgently to the United States and British Governments, respectively, which dispatched troops to help these two countries to guard against attempts at subversive coups. In the context of the Middle East crisis Chairman Khrushchev revived the summit conference proposal by demanding, in a letter of July 19 to President Eisenhower, that an immediate meeting be held by the Heads of Government of the four powers plus India. He declared that the question "whether the conflict in the Middle East will be settled through war or peace" depended on the U.S. Government.

While refuting Soviet criticisms of American policy and actions in the Middle East, President Eisenhower suggested in his reply of July 22 that the Heads of Government might meet to discuss the situation as delegates to the U.N. Security Council, which was already dealing with certain phases of the problem. This suggestion was initially accepted by Chairman Khrushchev. However, after hasty consultation with the Communist Chinese leader, Mao Tse-tung, at Peiping, Chairman Khrushchev rejected it and proposed instead in a letter of August 5, that a special session of the U.N. General Assembly be convoked to discuss "the question of the withdrawal of USA troops from Lebanon and troops of Great Britain from Jordan." Chairman Khrushchev declared that such action would be a step toward the relaxation of tension and would "prepare the ground for the speeding of a meeting at the summit."

Khrushchev's proposal for a meeting of the General Assembly was quite acceptable to the United States, which had proposed the same procedure to the Security Council as early as July 18. Accordingly, the General Assembly met from August 8 to 21. The result of its deliberations was unanimous approval of a resolution proposed by the Arab States, which moderated the tension in the Middle East and was followed by the withdrawal of American and British troops in October and November 1958.

## PREPARATORY TALKS REMAIN AT STANDSTILL

No sooner had the Middle East crisis subsided than a new crisis arose in the Far East as the result of the initiation, in August-October 1958, of an incessant bombardment by Communist Chinese forces of Quemoy and other islands held by the Republic of China. On September 12, in reply to a letter of Chairman Khrushchev denouncing U.S. actions in the Taiwan Straits area as a danger to peace, President Eisenhower suggested that Mr. Khrushchev urge the Chinese Communists to discontinue their military operations and turn to a policy of peaceful settlement of the Taiwan dispute. Chairman Khrushchev then sent another letter which the President rejected as "unacceptable," since it was abusive in tone and full of false accusa-

XXVIII

tions and inadmissible threats. The Taiwan crisis began to subside gradually at the end of October when the Chinese Communists commenced the practice of shelling the islands on an intermittent basis.

Meanwhile, the negotiations for a summit conference remained in abeyance. On July 1, 1958, and again on August 22, 1958, the United States, together with France and the United Kingdom, expressed regret that the preparatory discussions in Moscow remained at a standstill and called upon the Soviet Government to consider the practical procedure for discussing a summit conference agenda which they had suggested on May 31.

The meeting of technical experts at Geneva to study the feasibility of detecting nuclear explosions, in its report of August 30, concluded that technical means were available for enforcing a test ban, and the Soviet Union accepted the invitation of the United States to participate in negotiations toward this end to commence at Geneva on October 31. On August 22 President Eisenhower announced that the United States intended to suspend nuclear tests for a period of 1 year following the opening of negotiations, unless testing should be resumed by the Soviet Union. On September 15 the Soviet Union also agreed to a meeting of experts at Geneva on November 10 to study the technical problems of guarding against surprise attack. This meeting was recessed without agreement on December 18 after it became clear that the Soviet approach to the subject was in sharp conflict with that of the Western Powers.

In September the United States exchanged views with the Soviet Union on the German problem as the result of a proposal advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany on September 9 for the establishment of a four-power group to work on this problem, and a parallel proposal made by the "German Democratic Republic" on September 5 and supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was informed on September 30 that the United States was prepared to discuss the German problem in a separate four-power group, as proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany, whose purpose would be to carry out preparatory work necessary for final negotiations to be held subsequently, either at a conference of Heads of Government, if one could be arranged, or otherwise. No reply to this proposal was received from the Soviet Government.

## VI

### SOVIETS PRECIPITATE CRISIS OVER BERLIN

On November 10, 1958, Chairman Khrushchev declared, in a speech at Moscow, that the time had come to terminate the four-power occupation regime in Berlin and to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.

XXIX

His declaration was followed on November 27 by Soviet notes to France, the United Kingdom, and the United States denouncing the occupation regime in West Berlin as "abnormal" and "dangerous" and a threat to the security of the "German Democratic Republic," the Soviet Union and other countries of the Communist bloc. The Western Powers were notified that the Soviet Union considered as "null and void" its wartime agreements with them relating to their presence in Berlin and freedom of access to that city, and that it planned in due course to enter into negotiations with the "German Democratic Republic" with a view to transferring to that regime the functions performed by the Soviet authorities under those agreements. The Soviet Union proposed that West Berlin be transformed into a demilitarized "free city" and declared that, unless the Western Powers accepted this proposal within 6 months, it would consider itself free of its obligations to them in relation to Berlin.

The response of the Western Powers to the Soviet challenge was prompt and determined. On November 26 Secretary Dulles characterized the threat to Berlin as another in the series of probing operations undertaken periodically by the Soviets "to find out whether they are up against firmness and strength and unity." In a communiqué issued at the December meeting of the NATO Council at Paris, the four major Western Powers expressed their determination that Western rights in Berlin must be maintained and declared that a unilateral repudiation of Soviet obligations with respect to these rights was unacceptable. This stand was endorsed by the 15 member governments of NATO in a final communiqué of December 18, which declared that they would continue their efforts to seek equitable solutions of the problems of European security and the future of Germany, including Berlin. Similar views were expressed in the official Western replies of December 31 to the Soviet notes. The reply of the United States declared that "public repudiation of solemn engagements . . . coupled with an ultimatum threatening unilateral action" would afford no reasonable basis for negotiation, but added that if the Soviet Government was prepared to discuss the matter "in an atmosphere devoid of coercion or threats," the United States would be prepared to hold talks on "the question of Berlin in the wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the German problem as well as that of European security."

## SOVIET DRAFT TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY

On January 10, 1959, a new note was received from the Soviet Union proposing the convening of a conference of all states which fought against Germany, to be held within 2 months at Warsaw or Prague to consider a Soviet draft treaty of peace with Germany. In

XXX

essence, the note maintained that the reunification of Germany was an internal German problem which could be achieved only in a series of steps which must be preceded by a rapprochement between the two German states. In the judgment of the Soviet Union, a treaty of peace was precisely the measure best calculated to initiate this rapprochement. The Soviet Government stated that, in addition to proposing a peace conference, it wished to indicate its readiness to discuss with interested states the question of Berlin.

UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

Following consultation with London, Paris, and Bonn, the United States replied on February 16 that it maintained the views set forth in its notes of September 30 and December 31, 1958, and did not consider it useful to discuss in a new note the numerous points on which it did not agree with the Soviet Union. The United States was prepared, however, to participate in a conference with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom and would consider any suggestions as to a place and date. The conference should deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications as raised in the recent exchange of notes. The American note further suggested that German advisers should be invited to the conference and should be consulted.

In a note of March 2, the Soviet Government, after restating at considerable length its previous views on the necessity of concluding peace with both German states and establishing West Berlin as a demilitarized free city, declared that in its opinion a meeting at the highest level had the greatest chance of achieving positive results, but that if the governments of the Western Powers were not ready to take part in a summit conference, the Soviet Government considered that a meeting might be convoked of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. At this meeting both German states should also be represented.

To this the United States responded on March 26 by proposing a meeting at the Foreign Ministers level to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. The purpose of this meeting should be to reach "positive agreements over as wide a field as possible and in any case to narrow the difference between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer." The United States noted that Poland and Czechoslovakia, like a number of other countries, had a legitimate and direct interest in some of the matters to be discussed, but believed that at least at the outset the proposed meeting should

XXXI

involve only the four powers responsible for Germany. The four powers agreed to meet at Geneva on May 11, 1959, on these terms.

During the period in which this exchange of notes was taking place, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom, accompanied by the British Foreign Minister, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, made an official visit to the Soviet Union from February 21 to March 3, 1959, at the invitation of the Soviet Government. During this visit, they held discussions with Chairman Khrushchev and other high Soviet officials on major international issues, including disarmament, the problem of Germany, and the question of Berlin. An Anglo-Soviet communiqué of March 3, issued at Moscow at the close of the visit, expressed confidence that the personal contact which had been established between the Heads of Government of the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom would be continued in the interest of peace.

1959 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING—FIRST PHASE, MAY 11-JUNE 20

In an address to the nation on the eve of his departure for Geneva, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter declared that the heart of the policy of the Western Powers could be simply and clearly stated to be "a Germany reunited in freedom, a security system linked with arrangements for arms control, and in the interim a free and secure Berlin." The Secretary admitted that he did not go to Geneva with great expectations in view of the past record of negotiations with the Soviets. Some, he said, might think the Western position unrealistic since the Soviet Union might well reject it. To his mind, however, this was no reason for failing to set forth a proposal which the United States believed to be both sound and just. The United States would, therefore, make every effort to convince the Soviet representatives that it would be in their interest.

*Western Peace Plan.* At the opening of the conference the Western Powers presented a peace plan containing proposals for German reunification, European security, and a peace settlement. Under this plan, the reunification of Germany would not begin at once with free elections, but these would be preceded by a preparatory period. During this period a mixed committee for the whole of Germany would be set up. This committee, whose members would be nominated both by the Federal Republic of Germany and the East German regime, would be authorized to make proposals with the object of facilitating contacts and freedom of movement between the two parts of Germany. It would likewise be charged with preparing and proposing an electoral law which would allow for the constitution of a national assembly for the whole of Germany by free elections.

XXXII

During this preparatory period, measures could be taken in the field of European security, such as the extension to the rest of Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe of the prohibitions, already accepted by Western Germany on the manufacture of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons of mass destruction; exchange of information on armed forces; overall limitation of armed forces and armaments to agreed levels; measures against surprise attack in agreed areas throughout the world; and the working out of a system of inspection.

At the end of this preparatory period, free elections would take place, a national assembly would be constituted, and a government for the whole of Germany would be formed.

The Western Powers took the further view that in regard to Berlin any agreement should be applicable to the whole of the city of Berlin and not merely to West Berlin. They therefore proposed that the reunification of Berlin should be a first step toward German reunification, a forerunner and microcosm of the reunification of Germany as a whole.

*Soviet Attitude Toward Western Proposals.* The attitude of Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, was that the Western proposals were far-fetched and that far from removing the contradictions between the Western and Soviet positions one by one, they merely bound these contradictions into "one intricate knot." "Under present conditions," he declared, "a united Germany can come into existence only as a result of agreement between the two German States which have followed the course of independent development for almost ten years. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to stress that there is and can be no other way."

As for the Directive of the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government in 1955, Mr. Gromyko declared that it was well known that the Heads of Government had failed to reach any agreement on German reunification and the question was only that of giving directions to the then contemplated meeting of Foreign Ministers to examine that problem.

The Western peace plan, he continued, was merely a plan for evading the discussion of a peace treaty and could in no way serve as a basis for the discussion of the questions included in the agenda of the present conference. In addition, the Western proposals on Berlin could not be regarded as anything but an attempt at gross violation of the "sovereign rights" of the "German Democratic Republic." The Western proposals on European security and disarmament were held to be unsatisfactory on the grounds that they were tied up in a package with German reunification.

544645—60—3

XXXIII

Outside the conference, Chairman Khrushchev, in a speech in Albania on May 31, supported his Foreign Minister by declaring that in the Western Powers proposals of May 26 relating to Berlin "there is not a single point for negotiation. These proposals are not based on any desire to find a correct solution which could bring about the lessening of international tension."

*Soviet Proposals.* In the place of the proposals thus categorically rejected, the Soviet Union proposed that an All-German Committee should be established, on the basis of equal representation of the "German Democratic Republic" and the Federal Republic of Germany, which would work out an agreed decision in regard to the question of a peace treaty and the reunification of Germany. In the meantime, the Soviet Government would agree to the provisional maintenance of certain occupation rights of the Western Powers in West Berlin but on condition that such a situation would exist only for a strictly limited period, namely, one year. The All-German Committee should also conclude its work within one year. If the Western Powers or the government of West Germany obstructed the achievement, within the period indicated, of agreed solutions to the questions relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty, the Soviet Union would be compelled to sign a peace treaty with the "German Democratic Republic."

Mr. Gromyko further stipulated three requirements in West Berlin: (1) the reduction of Western forces and armaments to token levels; (2) the termination of alleged hostile propaganda, subversive activity and espionage directed against the "German Democratic Republic", the Soviet Union, and other "socialist" countries; and (3) a ban on atomic or rocket installations.

The Western Powers pointed out that the Soviet proposals on Berlin were unacceptable, apart from their unreasonable content, because of their threatening nature. On June 19 Mr. Gromyko proposed the extension of the time limit from 1 year to 18 months but reserved to the Soviet Union freedom of unilateral action at the expiration of that period.

Commenting on the Soviet proposals in a speech on June 19 at Moscow, Chairman Khrushchev remarked: "Yes, we intend to conclude the German peace treaty. One must be punished by nature and deprived of normal mental faculties to condemn these [i.e., Soviet] intentions and these wishes." In the same speech he made it clear that the signature of such a treaty would "mean the end of all the remains of occupation which still exist on its territory" [i.e., the territory of the "German Democratic Republic"] and that "if any other states undertake any effort to restore the occupation regime by force, the Soviet Union will support the German Democratic Republic with

XXXIV

every means at its disposal, and as a faithful ally according to the
Warsaw Treaty it will defend the territorial integrity of the German
Democratic Republic."

SECOND PHASE, JULY 13-AUGUST 5

On June 20 the conference recessed until July 13. During the second phase, Secretary Herter, on behalf of the three Western Powers, presented proposals on Berlin which provided for (1) no increase of forces in West Berlin and a prohibition on nuclear weapons and missile installations in West Berlin, (2) guaranteed free access to Berlin, (3) measures to avoid disturbing activities in either part of Berlin, under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and (4) agreement that these arrangements should last until German reunification. The Soviet Foreign Minister objected to any agreement lasting until the reunification of Germany. The Western Powers then offered to provide that the arrangements might be reviewed, in the absence of reunification, at any time after five years on the request of any of the four governments. Mr. Gromyko insisted, however, that any agreements reached must expire after a specified period.

Further discussion of the Berlin proposals was prevented by Soviet insistence on discussion of its plan for an all-German committee of representatives of the two German states appointed on a basis of parity. Pointing out that the outcome of any such confrontation of representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the "German Democratic Republic" would inevitably be a total and early deadlock, the Western Powers proposed that the Foreign Ministers Conference itself continue in being for the purpose of considering the German problem as a whole and questions relating to the extension and development of contacts between the two parts of Germany. For this purpose, the conference would meet from time to time at such level and at such place as might be agreed.

On August 5, after full exposition of the views of both sides had taken place, the conference once more recessed, the date and place of a future resumption of its work being left to be settled through diplomatic channels.

VII

EISENHOWER-KHRUSHCHEV EXCHANGE OF VISITS ANNOUNCED

On August 3, 1959, 2 days before the close of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, identical statements were issued at Washington and Moscow that Chairman Khrushchev had accepted the invitation of President Eisenhower to visit the United States in September and that the President had accepted the Soviet leader's invitation to pay a

XXXV

return visit to the Soviet Union later in the fall. This announcement
aroused intense interest throughout the world and much speculation
as to what bearing the exchange of visits might have on the prospects
for settling the basic conflicts between the Soviet Union and the
Western Powers which the Geneva Conference had made no progress
in resolving.

The President's invitation to Chairman Khrushchev was in one
sense the culmination of a process of growing Soviet-American con-
tacts, the framework for which had been provided by the Soviet-U.S.
Agreement on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical and Educational
Fields, of January 27, 1958. In his letter to Mr. Bulganin of Febru-
ary 15, 1958, the President had suggested that, in addition to exchanges
of technicians and specialists, it might be well if "leaders of thought
and influential citizens within the Soviet Union should come to the
United States, not to acquire technical knowledge but rather to learn
at first hand the feeling of our people toward peace and the working
of our popular institutions as they affect our conduct of foreign rela-
tions." The letter went on, "Most of the Soviet citizens who exert an
influence are strangers to this country with, I fear, totally false con-
ceptions. These misconceptions I should like to see corrected in the
interests of better relations."

In January 1959, Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., had made an unofficial visit to
the United States. In June, First Deputy Chairman Frol R. Kozlov
had come to open the Soviet Exhibition in New York and to visit other
parts of the United States. And in July-August, Vice President
Richard M. Nixon had opened the American Exhibition at Moscow
and visited Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk.

Prior to Chairman Khrushchev's arrival in the United States, Presi-
dent Eisenhower traveled to Europe for a series of conferences with
Western European leaders. Upon his return, he reported to the
American people on September 10 that he had assured the allies of the
United States that his invitation to Mr. Khrushchev was not made for
the purpose of definitive negotiations but in the hope that it might re-
veal "new opportunities for practical progress toward removal of some
of the causes of world tensions." The President stated:

"I outlined to them the reasons for my invitation to him [Khru-
shchev], which are simply: first, to give him the opportunity to see
what America and Americans are really like—to let him see a great and
thriving nation living in real freedom; second, to give him, face to
face, the basic convictions of our people on the major issues of the day,
including West Berlin, and to hear from him directly his own views
on those issues."

XXXVI

The President reported that these reasons were well understood by Western leaders, who, moreover, were convinced that the effort had to be made, although their hopes for practical results revealed varying degrees of optimism.

Insofar as the prospects of agreement to hold a summit meeting were concerned, the President said it was America's conviction that such agreement must be based on "the certainty that our rights and status in Berlin will be respected." In addition, he voiced the belief that some clear Soviet indication must be given that further negotiations would offer real promise of reducing the causes of world tension.

### CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

Chairman Khrushchev visited the United States from September 15 to 27, 1959. In the course of his visit, which included stopovers at New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines, and Pittsburgh, as well as initial and final stays in Washington, the Soviet leader unquestionably got a clearer conception of the United States and its people than he had had before. He recognized that the U.S. Government and the American people were virtually one when it came to foreign policy, and acknowledged that Americans generally wanted peace. At the same time, he made it clear that there were basic differences between the American and Soviet systems and that the Soviet Union would exert every effort to demonstrate that its own system was the superior one. The massive coverage given the visit by the press and by the radio and television networks also enabled Americans to judge the character and personality of Mr. Khrushchev and to form their own opinion of the views he expressed on major world issues and the problems of Soviet-American relations.

*Camp David Talks.* At the end of his visit Chairman Khrushchev conferred with President Eisenhower at Camp David. The most important outcome of their talks were agreements (1) that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation, and (2) that the negotiations on Berlin would be reopened and that, while they were not to be prolonged indefinitely, no time limit would be placed upon them.

While the Camp David talks centered on the question of Berlin, several other subjects affecting relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were also discussed. Among these were (a) disarmament, which the President and Chairman Khrushchev agreed was the most important problem facing the world; (b) the German problem, including the question of a peace treaty with Germany; (c) Soviet-American trade relations; and (d) the expansion of ex-

XXXVII

changes of persons and ideas between the two countries already begun under the exchange agreement of January 1958. It was also agreed that the exact date for the return visit of President Eisenhower to the Soviet Union would be arranged through diplomatic channels. The dates for this visit were subsequently fixed at June 10-19, 1960.

An important intangible gain from the Camp David talks was the establishment of closer personal contact between President Eisenhower and Chairman Khrushchev. Much more than at their previous meeting at the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955, the two men had an opportunity for a frank exchange of views on major world issues and a chance to evaluate each other's way of thinking. The President stated in his press conference of September 28 that as far as he personally was concerned, the talks had removed many of the objections he had previously held to the holding of a summit conference with the U.S.S.R. The President emphasized, however, that a decision regarding such a conference would be made only after prior consultation among the allies.

## WESTERN POWERS APPROVE SUMMIT CONFERENCE

At a meeting of the Heads of Government of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held at Paris and Rambouillet, December 19-21, 1959, agreement was reached on the desirability of a new summit conference with the Soviet Union. The final communiqué of the meeting issued on December 21 stated that President Eisenhower, President de Gaulle, and Prime Minister Macmillan had sent letters to Chairman Khrushchev proposing such a meeting at Paris, to commence on April 27. The President's letter extending the invitation stated that the three Western leaders had agreed that it would be desirable for the four Heads of Government "to meet together from time to time in each other's countries to discuss the main problems affecting the attainment of peace and stability in the world." Thus the possibility was envisaged of not merely one, but a series of summit conferences.

Chairman Khrushchev replied on December 25 expressing satisfaction at the Western proposal and stating that the Soviet Government was prepared to participate in the summit meeting at Paris but that the date suggested was not convenient. Subsequently, it was agreed to convene the conference at Paris on May 16, 1960.

In October 1959 Chairman Khrushchev had accepted an invitation from President de Gaulle to make an official visit to France early in 1960. Thus before the convening of the summit conference at Paris

XXXVIII

in May, the Soviet leader would have had face-to-face talks with all three of the Heads of Government of the participating Western Powers.

VIII

Since the revival of four-power meetings in 1954, the United States and its British and French allies have consistently striven to resolve the grave problems left by World War II and in so doing to lay the foundation for a just and lasting peace. This aim has been pursued in the Heads of Government Conference of 1955, in the Foreign Ministers conferences of 1954, 1955, and 1959; through separate negotiations on disarmament both in and outside the United Nations, as well as by correspondence between the Heads of Government and exchanges through regular diplomatic channels.

Among the major unresolved issues are the reunification of Germany, including Berlin and the question of a peace treaty; disarmament; and relations in general between the Soviet Union and the West. In the case of disarmament, negotiations with the Soviet Union were renewed on March 15, 1960, in a new 10-nation disarmament committee established under a four-power agreement announced in September 1959. Meanwhile, the Anglo-American-Soviet talks looking toward an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests under international control, which began at Geneva in October 1958, have continued.

The road to peace is a long and hard one and no one can now say when the goal will be reached. However, the long series of negotiations and high-level discussions recorded herein have clarified the basic differences and have, at the same time, made it clear that there is no quick and easy solution.

It would be unrealistic to expect that these grave issues can be resolved at one Heads-of-Government conference. In expressing his hope that some good would result from the talks at Paris, Secretary Herter has pointed out that the Paris meeting of the Heads of Government would be the first since 1955 and that it would be overoptimistic to expect that the complicated problems at issue with the Soviet Union could be settled at a single meeting.

The United States is nevertheless persevering in its efforts to make a beginning toward finding areas of agreement that would open the way to solutions of major problems. In seeking such solutions, this country will continue to honor President Eisenhower's pledge:

"I say once more, to all peoples, that we will always go the extra mile with anyone on earth if it will bring us nearer a genuine peace."

XXXIX

Tripartite Note to the Soviet Union Proposing a
Heads-of-Government Conference, May 10, 1955¹

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United
States believe that the time has now come for a new effort to resolve
the great problems which confront us. We, therefore, invite the Soviet
Government to join with us in an effort to remove sources of conflict
between us.

We recognize that the solution of these problems will take time and
patience. They will not be solved at a single meeting nor in a hasty
manner. Indeed, any effort to do so could set back real progress
toward their settlement. Accordingly, we think it would be helpful
to try a new procedure for dealing with these problems.

In view of their complexity and importance, our suggestion is that
these problems be approached in two stages. We think it would be
fruitful to begin with a meeting of the Heads of Government, accom-
panied by their Foreign Ministers, for an exchange of views. In the
limited time for which the Heads of Government could meet, they
would not undertake to agree upon substantive answers to the major
difficulties facing the world. Such a meeting could, however, provide
a new impetus by establishing the basis for the detailed work which
will be required.

For this purpose the Heads of Government could devote themselves
to formulating the issues to be worked on and to agreeing on methods
to be followed in exploring solutions. We further propose that the
Foreign Ministers, to assist the Heads of Government in their task,
should come together shortly in advance of the meeting of the Heads
of Government and at the same place.

This first stage would lay the foundation for the second stage in
which the problems would be examined in detail by such methods,
organs, and participants as it appears will be most fruitful according
to the nature of the issues. This work should be started as soon as
practicable after the meeting of the Heads of Government.

This procedure would facilitate the essential preparation and orderly negotiation most likely to bring about agreements by progressive

¹Text from Department of State press release 257, May 10, 1955.

stages. The important thing is to begin the process promptly and to pursue it with patience and determination.

We hope that this proposal will commend itself to the Soviet Union as a useful basis for progress toward better relations between us. If the Soviet Union agrees that an early meeting of Heads of Government to explore such a program would be useful, we suggest that our Foreign Ministers settle through diplomatic channels or otherwise upon a time and place for such a meeting. The forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Vienna for the signing of the Austrian State Treaty might provide an opportunity for preliminary discussion of this proposal.

## Soviet Note Accepting Invitation to Heads-of-Government Conference, May 26, 1955¹

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. presents its compliments to the Embassy of the U.S.A. and in connection with the Embassy's note of May 10 on the convening of a conference of the Heads of Government of the U.S.A., France, England and the Soviet Union has the honor to state the following:

The Soviet Government, as is known, regards positively the convening of a conference of the Heads of Government of the aforementioned powers, having in view that such a conference must facilitate the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of mutual confidence in relations between the states. The Soviet Government considers that a meeting of leading state figures can contribute to the establishment of conditions necessary for settling unresolved international problems, given a genuine desire for this of all the interested parties.

In this connection it is pertinent to recall that the display of readiness by interested states to contribute to the settlement of such problems permitted the bringing to an end of bloodshed in Korea and also to the stopping of military action in Indochina with the recognition

¹ Transcription of translation communicated to the Department of State by the American Embassy at Moscow.

The conference was held at Geneva from July 18 to 23, 1955. The United States was represented by President Dwight D. Eisenhower; the United Kingdom, by Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden; France, by the President of the Council of Ministers, Edgar Faure; and the Soviet Union, by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Marshal N. A. Bulganin. For the published record, see *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046, October 1955).

2

of the lawful rights of the peoples of Indochina for independent
national development. By this, two dangerous hotbeds of war in the
area of the Far East and Southeast Asia were successfully liquidated.
Recently one of the most aggravated questions in Europe was also
successfully resolved—the question of the Austrian State Treaty with
recognition of the permanent neutrality of Austria, which was an
important contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and lessen-
ing international tension.

Following its constant policy directed to securing peace, and striving for the strengthening of mutual confidence in relations between the states and the cessation of the "cold war", the Soviet Government on May 10 specifically set forth its position on the questions of disarmament, the banning of atomic weapons, and the elimination of the threat of a new war.¹ The achievement of an appropriate agreement on these questions first of all among the great powers would permit putting an end to the existing arms race, including the field of atomic and hydrogen weapons, freeing peoples from the ever growing burden of military expenditures and creating conditions for a peaceful and untroubled life for the people. In accordance with this, the Soviet Government expresses its agreement to the proposal of the Government of the U.S.A. and also to the Governments of France and Great Britain relative to carrying out in the very near future meetings of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. However, the Soviet Government in this connection cannot but draw attention to certain statements of leaders of the U.S.A. made after receipt by the Soviet Government of the aforementioned note of the Government of the U.S.A. In these statements it is pointed out that the Government of the U.S.A., while declaring for the convening of a conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers, approaches this conference "from a position of strength" which indicates a desire to exert inadmissible pressure on the conference. This is done in spite of the fact that the fruitlessness of similar attempts in negotiations with the Soviet Union has been repeatedly demonstrated.

The aforementioned leaders in the U.S. have even gone so far as
to state the necessity of interference in the internal affairs of other
states, making various thrusts and attacks in regard to the countries

¹ For text, see United Nations document DC/SC.1/26/Rev. 2, May 10, 1955 (also document DC/71, Annex 15), in Disarmament Commission, *Official Records: Supplement for April to December 1955*, pp. 17-25. Also printed in 84th Cong., 2d sess., *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55* (printed for use of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1956), pp. 385-391.

of the people's democracies, who are defending the freedom and independence of their peoples. At the same time it is completely evident that such attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of other states, which are incompatible with the principles of the U.N., must be rejected as expressions of the aggressive intentions of certain circles, which have as their aim further intensification of the arms race, prolongation of the "cold war" and still further exacerbation of international tension. Such statements cannot be evaluated as other than the tendency to discredit the very idea of convening a conference of the Four Powers.

In this manner, the U.S. Government on the one hand proposes to organize a meeting of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers for consideration of unresolved international problems and on the other hand is already proposing plans which deliberately doom the conference to failure. This can be explained only by the fact that the Government of the U.S.A., in spite of its statements, evidently does not in fact seek the settlement of aggravated international problems.

In such a situation a conference of the Four Powers not only cannot give positive results on which the peoples are naturally counting, but on the contrary, frustration of the conference, which is already being prepared, would lead to a further deepening of disagreements between the powers and a worsening of the international situation.

The Soviet Government, as it has stated repeatedly in the past, considers the task of a conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to be the reduction of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states. Such an aim can be attained only in the event all of the interested states strive for it. Only in this case can a conference of the Heads of Government give positive results. Regarding questions which should be the subject of consideration at the conference, taking the foregoing into consideration, the Heads of Government could themselves determine the range of questions and also determine ways of settling them and give appropriate instructions to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet Government considers the most suitable place for the convening of a conference of the Heads of Government to be Vienna, which corresponds also to an invitation extended by the Federal Chancellor of Austria, J. Raab.

The Soviet Government assumes that the question of the time of convening a conference of the Heads of Government will be subject to further agreement.

Analogous notes of the Soviet Government are also being sent to the Governments of Great Britain and France.

4

# Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Directive of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers to the Foreign Ministers, July 23, 1955¹

The Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., guided by the desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and to the consolidation of confidence between states, instruct their Foreign Ministers to continue the consideration of the following questions with regard to which an exchange of views has taken place at the Geneva Conference, and to propose effective means for their solution, taking account of the close link between the reunification of Germany and the problems of European security, and the fact that the successful settlement of each of these problems would serve the interests of consolidating peace.

## 1. *European Security and Germany*

For the purpose of establishing European security with due regard to the legitimate interests of all nations and their inherent right to individual and collective self-defense, the Ministers are instructed to consider various proposals to this end, including the following: A security pact for Europe or for a part of Europe, including provisions for the assumption by member nations of an obligation not to resort to force and to deny assistance to an aggressor; limitation, control, and inspection in regard to armed forces and armaments; establishment between East and West of a zone in which the disposition of armed forces will be subject to mutual agreement; and also to consider other possible proposals pertaining to the solution of this problem.

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. The Foreign Ministers will make whatever arrangements they may consider desirable for the participation of, or for consultation with, other interested parties.

¹ Text from conference document CF/DOC/25, July 23, 1955.

For the texts of proposals and of published statements made at the conference, see *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046, October 1955); see also *Department of State Bulletin*.

5

## 2. Disarmament

The Four Heads of Government,

Desirous of removing the threat of war and lessening the burden of armaments,

Convinced of the necessity, for secure peace and for the welfare of mankind, of achieving a system for the control and reduction of all armaments and armed forces under effective safeguards,

Recognizing that achievements in this field would release vast material resources to be devoted to the peaceful economic development of nations, for raising their well-being, as well as for assistance to underdeveloped countries,

Agree:

(1) for these purposes to work together to develop an acceptable system for disarmament through the Sub-Committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission;

(2) to instruct their representatives in the Sub-Committee in the discharge of their mandate from the United Nations to take account in their work of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference;

(3) to propose that the next meeting of the Sub-Committee be held on August 29, 1955, at New York;

(4) to instruct the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings in the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the views and proposals advanced by the Heads of Government at this Conference and to consider whether the four Governments can take any further useful initiative in the field of disarmament.

## 3. Development of Contacts between East and West

The Foreign Ministers should by means of experts study measures, including those possible in organs and agencies of the United Nations, which could (a) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between people and (b) bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned.

4. The Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers will meet at Geneva during October to initiate their consideration of these questions and to determine the organisation of their work.

6

## Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by Prime Minister Eden, July 23, 1955¹

We have now concluded the Conference of the Heads of Governments which has been so much discussed and so earnestly advocated, notably by Sir Winston Churchill more than two years ago. This Conference set itself a limited task. This it has more than accomplished.

Ten years ago the war in Europe was brought to an end. Now at last we have made a start with the work which we might have hoped to begin in 1945. What we have now agreed makes it possible to get to grips with the twin problems of the unity of Germany and the security of Europe. No one expects that it will be easy to settle every detail of these complicated issues. But there is now a better chance than we have known at any time since the war to get to work on practical proposals to solve the differences which have divided Europe all these years. At this Conference we did not set out to make a detailed plan in these few days. For all that it will be found that in our Directive to the Foreign Secretaries we have included the essentials of a comprehensive settlement.

The world will have observed the tone and temper in which our work has been conducted. Those of us who have been engaged in the actual negotiations have been aware that a new spirit of conciliation has been present at our meetings. But in addition to this formal work, we have had many opportunities for personal contacts, which I know we have all found invaluable. I am quite certain that the exchanges which have taken place outside the Conference Room have given us all a far better understanding of each other's points of view and of the problems each has to face. If we can continue our work together in the spirit of this meeting, what is hopeful promise today should become solid performance as events unfold.

## Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by Chairman Bulganin, July 23, 1955²

There is no doubt that the meeting of the Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which took place in Geneva, has its positive significance

¹Text from conference document CF/DOC/26, July 23, 1955.

²Text from Conference document CF/DOC/27, July 25, 1955.

7

for the relaxation of tension in the relations between states, for the re-establishment of the necessary confidence between them. First of all, personal contacts established between the leading statesmen of the Four Powers in Geneva will facilitate this. We have come to know each other better and have exchanged views on a number of the most important international problems. Notwithstanding the fact that our views on certain questions did not coincide, the Conference as a whole was held in an atmosphere of sincerity and was marked by the desire of the participants to establish mutual understanding.

The Geneva Conference attracted the attention of the nations throughout the whole world and strengthened even more their will to ease international tension and to put an end to the "cold war". We hope that all this will yet play its positive role and will facilitate the achievement of the noble objective—to ensure a stable and lasting peace.

The Delegation of the Soviet Union came to the Geneva Conference with good intentions to facilitate the organization of practical work directed toward the solution, first of all, of such basic international problems as the organization of collective security in Europe and disarmament. In the present situation these questions are of decisive importance for strengthening universal peace.

The most important question considered at the Geneva Conference was that of European security. The Soviet Government believes that the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe based on the participation of all European states and of the United States of America would contribute to the strengthening of peace. The new proposals concerning this question submitted by us at the Geneva Conference are based on reckoning with the fact that under the present conditions where there are set up in Europe the groupings of states which oppose each other, it is necessary first of all to launch the relations between the states-members of these groupings in the direction of peaceful cooperation, and peaceful settlement of disputes between them. The Soviet proposals do not provide for the liquidation of the North-Atlantic bloc, the Western European Union or of the Warsaw Treaty organisation during the first stage of creating a system of all-European security. In the course of time, during the second stage, when success in easing tension in Europe and in establishing confidence between states has been achieved, the said groupings could be liquidated and replaced by a system of collective security in Europe.

Along with this, the Soviet Delegation submitted the proposal to agree, pending the creation of a system of collective security in Europe, on the conclusion of a treaty between the states-members of

8

the groupings which exist in Europe to mutually refrain from the use of force and to settle disputes by peaceful means.

The exchange of views on European security has proved that all participants in the Conference manifested a desire to reach a concerted decision on this important problem. We hope that further consideration of this problem will achieve still greater success.

Even before the Geneva Conference, on May 10, in regard to the question of disarmament the Soviet Government submitted concrete proposals on the reduction of armaments, prohibition of atomic weapons and elimination of the threat of a new war.¹ At the Geneva Conference we proposed that the agreement already reached on the questions in regard to which our positions either fully concurred or came considerably closer together be definitely fixed. This concerns, first of all, the establishment of the levels of armaments of states, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the need to set up a system of effective international control. The discussion on disarmament proved that all participants at the Conference declared themselves in favour of seeking also an agreed solution of this important problem which is of decisive importance for the security of nations.

In this connection one must point out that in the course of discussions on disarmament the participants in the Conference made proposals which undoubtedly would be taken into account in the further consideration of this problem and which would serve to reach the necessary agreement among us.

The Soviet Government states that in the course of the further consideration of the disarmament problem it will exert all its efforts to find such a solution of this problem as would meet the aspirations of nations.

We held an exchange of views on the German question in the course of which the difference in approach to it became evident. The Delegations of the USA, the United Kingdom and France maintained, when speaking on the re-unification of Germany, that West Germany re-militarized under the Paris agreements—and, later, a unified Germany—should be a member of the North Atlantic group and of the Western European military Union.

The Soviet Government which has consistently stood for the re-establishment of the national unity of Germany, had pointed out even before the ratification of the Paris agreements that their coming into force would create difficulties for the negotiations on the German question and would make the discussion on German unification pointless.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary to reckon with facts when solving the German question.

¹ See ante, p. 3n.

544645—60—4

9

The war in Europe terminated 10 years ago. In the course of the last decade there came into being two Germanies—the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic—each with an economic and social system of its own. Besides, under the Paris agreements the German Federal Republic started remilitarization and is included in the military groupings of the Western Powers. As to the German Democratic Republic, in view of the conclusion of the Paris agreements it decided to become a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

It is clear that under such conditions one cannot raise a question of a mechanical merger of the two parts of Germany—the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic—since that would make the question unrealistic.

The Soviet Union has been and remains an ardent champion for the unification of Germany as a peaceful democratic state. We firmly believe that it is not possible to discuss the German question without representatives of the German Democratic Republic and of the German Federal Republic.

The joint efforts of the Four Powers as well as those of the German nation aimed at the relaxation of tension in Europe, at establishing confidence between states, provide the only real means of unifying Germany in the situation existing in Europe. The establishment of a system of collective security in Europe with both parts of Germany participating in it on an equal basis pending the unification of Germany would best serve this purpose. Since that would lead to strengthening peace in Europe and would make the restoration of German militarism more difficult, the obstacles to the unification of Germany, which now emerge, would be eliminated in the course of time.

On the other hand, the rapprochement between the two parts of Germany—the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic—is of utmost importance for the unification of that country from the standpoint of its internal conditions.

The Soviet Delegation feels that it was unfortunate that our Conference did not pay due attention to the problems of Asia and of the Far East, although such questions as the restoration of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the UN, the settlement of the situation in the Taiwan area on the basis of the recognition of the indisputable rights of the Chinese people, the implementation of the Geneva agreements on Indo-China and other questions do not admit of delay. We cannot escape these problems; we shall have to solve them in the interest of peace and security in Asia and in the Far East and for the sake of international peace.

10

The Geneva Conference opened the way for further joint consideration of urgent international problems and for their solution. We also took such an important decision as the decision about the necessity to develop contacts between East and West, about developing and strengthening economic and cultural ties between our states. Thereby we formed a basis for the expansion of cooperation between our countries.

The Soviet Government, for its part, is prepared to facilitate such cooperation by every means. It expects that other States participating in the Conference will also follow this course which is in the interest of the peoples of our countries and of universal peace.

We all recognise the great importance of the decisions taken here. They mark the beginning of a new phase in the relations between our countries. They will contribute toward strengthening confidence between us, between our nations. These decisions will be of positive significance for other countries as well, for the cause of strengthening universal peace.

The most ardent desire of all peoples is the desire for peace. The Soviet Government will exert the necessary efforts to implement our decisions which are aimed at the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of universal peace. This requires a patient and loyal consideration of the questions which we have yet to consider and settle. But if we all display the same spirit of cooperation that was displayed here, at Geneva, it will be a true guarantee that the noble aim to maintain peace will be achieved and nations will no longer feel anxiety concerning their future.

## Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by President Eisenhower, July 23, 1955¹

I welcome and warmly reciprocate the spirit of friendliness and good intent that have characterized the statements of the two preceding speakers. But I do hope that my silence respecting certain of the statements made by the immediately preceding speaker will not by any means be interpreted as acquiescence on my part—Far from it.

But it has seemed to me that in the closing minutes of this conference there is no necessity for me to announce to this conference and to the world the United States position on the important questions

¹ Text from news release issued by White House Office (Geneva), July 23, 1955.

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we have discussed. These I hope and believe have already been made clear. Therefore, it has not seemed particularly fitting once more to recite them in detail. Rather I content myself with some reflections on our work of the past week and an expression of some hopes for the future.

This has been an historic meeting. It has been on the whole a good week. But only history will tell the true worth and real values of our session together. The follow-through from this beginning by our respective Governments will be decisive in the measure of this Conference.

We have talked over plainly a number of the most difficult and preplexing questions affecting our several peoples and indeed the peoples of the entire world.

We did not come here to reach final solutions. We came to see if we might together find the path that would lead to solutions and would brighten the prospects of world peace.

In this final hour of our assembly, it is my judgment that the prospects of a lasting peace with justice, well-being, and broader freedom, are brighter. The dangers of the overwhelming tragedy of modern war are less.

The work of our Foreign Ministers as they strive to implement our directives will be of great importance, perhaps of even more than what we have done here. Theirs is the task, reflecting the substantive policies of their Governments, to reach agreement on courses of action which we here could discuss only in broad terms. I know we all wish them well.

I trust we will all support the necessary adjustments which they may find our Governments must make if we are to resolve our differences in these matters.

If our peoples, in the months and years ahead, broaden their knowledge and their understanding of each other, as we, during this week, have broadened our knowledge of each other, further agreement between our Governments may be facilitated. May this occur in a spirit of justice. May it result in improved well-being, greater freedom, and less of fear or suffering or distress for mankind. May it be marked by more of good will among men. These days will then indeed be ever remembered.

I came to Geneva because I believe mankind longs for freedom from war and rumors of war. I came here because of my lasting faith in the decent instincts and good sense of the people who populate this world of ours. I shall return home tonight with these convictions unshaken, and with the prayer that the hope of mankind will one day be realized.

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## Heads-of-Government Conference at Geneva: Closing Statement by Premier Faure, July 23, 1955¹

Our meeting is about to conclude, but that does not mean we must separate. By this I mean that, even if all four of us do not again meet in person in the same room, we must nevertheless remain united in spirit by the same desire.

You will, I am sure, permit me to say that over and above the agreements we have reached on certain matters, or documents, or directives, the very fact of our meeting, the spirit which has prevailed at our discussions, and the mutual understanding which has resulted, will have a profound effect on international relations and a felicitous influence on their future development.

At this conference we have shown that we have a common purpose. We must now find the means of carrying it into effect. The first step on the road has been taken, but there are still obstacles in the way. We have made no attempt to conceal them, for truth alone makes progress possible.

If it is true that life consists of tension and is always based on strength, may this tension and this strength be those of understanding and friendship, and no longer of hostility and distrust! We must be able to suggest to the peoples who are watching us, and not only to those for whom we are responsible, that, beyond the still necessary provisions for security, there are the constructive and beneficent labours for peace.

## Radio-Television Address by President Eisenhower on the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, Washington, July 25, 1955²

Secretary Dulles and I, with our associates, went to the Big Four Conference at Geneva resolved to represent as accurately as we could the aspirations of the American people for peace and the principles upon which this country believes that peace should be based.

In this task we had the bipartisan, indeed almost the unanimous, support of the Congress. This fact greatly strengthened our hand throughout the negotiations. Our grateful thanks go out to all your

¹ Text from conference document CF/DOC/24 Rev. 1, July 23, 1955.

² Text from White House news release, July 25, 1955.

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Senators and your Congressmen in the United States Congress. Aside from this, we had, during the past week, thousands of telegrams of encouragement and support from you as individuals. Along with these came similar telegrams from great organizations, church organizations, business and great labor organizations.

All of these combined served to make us feel that possibly we were faithfully representing the views that you would have us represent. Now peace—the pursuit of peace—involves many perplexing questions. For example:

* Justice to all nations, great and small;

* Freedom and security for all these nations;

* The prosperity of their several economies and a rising standard of living in the world;

* Finally, opportunity for all of us to live in peace and in security.

Now, naturally, in the study of such questions as these, we don't proceed recklessly. We must go prudently and cautiously—both in reaching conclusions and in subsequent action. We cannot afford to be negligent or complacent. But, we must be hopeful. We must have faith in ourselves and in the justice of our cause. If we don't do this, we will allow our own pessimism and our own lack of faith to defeat the noblest purposes that we can pursue.

Now, because of the vital significance of all these subjects, they will be exhaustively surveyed by our government over a period of many weeks. Tonight the most that I can give to you are a few personal impressions and opinions that may have some interest for you and certainly have some bearing on the outcome and on the progress of those negotiations.

Of course, an interesting subject that could be taken up, had I the time, would be the personalities of the several delegations, the relationship or apparent relationships of one to the other—the principal considerations that seem to motivate them. These would all have a bearing on this problem. But I forego them and take up instead just two general opinions in which I am sure every American shares:

The first of these, that we must never be deluded into believing that one week of friendly, even fruitful, negotiation can wholly eliminate a problem arising out of the wide gulf that separates, so far, East and West. A gulf as wide and deep as the difference between individual liberty and regimentation, as wide and deep as the gulf that lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the State. Now, if we think of those things we are apt to be possibly discouraged.

But I was also profoundly impressed with the need for all of us to avoid discouragement merely because our own proposals, our own

14

approaches, and our own beliefs are not always immediately accepted
by the other side.

On the night I left for Geneva, I appeared before the television to explain to you what we were seeking.¹ I told you that we were going primarily to attempt to change the spirit in which these great negotiations and conferences were held. A transcript was made of that talk, and I should like now to read you one paragraph from it.

This is what I said with respect to our purpose: "We realize that one ingredient has been missing from all past conferences. This is an honest intent to conciliate, to understand, to be tolerant, to try to see the other fellow's viewpoint as well as we see our own. I say to you if we can change the spirit in which these conferences are conducted, we will have taken the greatest step toward peace, toward future prosperity and tranquility that has ever been taken in all the history of mankind."

During last week in formal conferences, and in personal visits, these purposes have been pursued. So now there exists a better understanding, a closer unity among the nations of NATO.

There seems to be a growing realization by all that nuclear war-
fare, pursued to the ultimate, could be practically race suicide.

There is a realization that negotiations can be conducted without
propaganda and threats and invective.

Finally, there is a sharp realization by the world that the United
States will go to any length consistent with out concepts of decency
and justice and right to attain peace. For this purpose, we will work
cooperatively with the Soviets and any other people as long as there
is sincerity of purpose and a genuine desire to go ahead.

In the course of carrying on these discussions there were a number
of specific proposals, some of which were items on the official agenda.
That agenda contained German reunification and European security,
disarmament and increased contacts of all kinds between the East and
the West.

Most of these conference meetings were given wide publicity and
even some of the specific suggestions made in those conferences like-
wise were publicized. In any event, I can assure you of one thing:

There were no secret agreements made, either understood agree-
ments or written ones. Everything is put before you on the record.

Outside of these conference meetings there were numerous unofficial
meetings—conversations with important members of the other dele-
gations and, of course, very specifically with the Soviet delegation.

¹ For text of President Eisenhower's address of July 15, 1955, see *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046, October 1955), pp. 13-16.

15

In these conversations a number of subjects were discussed and among them the Secretary of State and I specifically brought up, more than once, American convictions and American beliefs and American concern about such questions as the satellites of Eastern Europe and the activities of international Communism. We made crystal clear what were American beliefs about such matters as these.

Now to take up for a moment the items on the official agenda.

Probably no question caused us as much trouble as that of German reunification and European security. At first we thought that these could be dealt with separately, but the American delegation concluded that they had to be dealt with as one subject. We held that Germany should be reunited under a government freely chosen by themselves, and under conditions that would provide security both for nations of the East and for nations of the West—in fact in a framework that provided European security.

In the matter of disarmament, the American government believes that an effective disarmament system can be reached only if at its base there is an effective reciprocal inspection and overall supervision system, one in which we can have confidence and each side can know that the other side is carrying out his commitments. Now because of this belief, we joined with the French and the British in making several proposals. Some were global, some were local, some were sort of budgetary in character. But all were in furtherance of this one single objective, that is, to make inspection the basis of disarmament proposals.

One proposal suggested aerial photography, as between the Soviets and ourselves by unarmed peaceful planes, and to make this inspection just as thorough as this kind of reconnaissance can do. The principal purpose, of course, is to convince every one of Western sincerity in seeking peace. But another idea was this: if we could go ahead and establish this kind of an inspection as initiation of an inspection system we could possibly develop it into a broader one, and eventually build on it an effective and durable disarmament system.

In the matter of increasing contacts, many items were discussed. We talked about a freer flow of news across the curtains of all kinds. We talked about the circulation of books and particularly we talked about peaceful trade. But the subject that took most of our attention in this regard was the possibility of increased visits by the citizens of one country into the territory of another, doing this in such a way as to give each the fullest possible opportunity to learn about the people of the other nation. In this particular subject there was the greatest possible degree of agreement. As a matter of fact,

16

it was agreement often repeated and enthusiastically supported by
the words of the members of each side.

As a matter of fact, each side assured the other earnestly and
often that it intended to pursue a new spirit of conciliation and co-
operation in its contacts with the other. Now, of course, we are
profoundly hopeful that these assurances will be faithfully carried
out.

One evidence as to these assurances will, of course, be available soon
in the language and the terminology in which we will find speeches
and diplomatic exchanges couched. But the acid test should begin
next October because then the next meeting occurs. It will be a
meeting of the Foreign Ministers. Its principal purpose will be to
take the conclusions of this conference as to the subjects to be dis-
cussed there and the general proceedings to be observed in translating
those generalities that we talked about into actual, specific agree-
ments. Then is when real conciliation and some giving on each side
will be definitely necessary.

Now, for myself, I do not belittle the obstacles lying ahead on the
road to a secure and just peace. By no means do I underestimate the
long and exhausting work that will be necessary before real results
are achieved. I do not blink the fact that all of us must continue
to sacrifice for what we believe to be best for the safety of ourselves
and for the preservation of the things in which we believe.

But I do know that the people of the world want peace. Moreover,
every other individual who was at Geneva likewise felt this longing
of mankind. So, there is great pressure to advance constructively,
not merely to reenact the dreary performances, the negative perform-
ances of the past.

We, all of us, individually and as a people now have possibly the
most difficult assignment of our nation's history. Likewise, we have
the most shining opportunity ever possessed by Americans. May
these truths inspire, never dismay us.

I believe that only with prayerful patience, intelligence, courage
and tolerance, never forgetting vigilance and prudence, can we keep
alive the spark ignited at Geneva. But if we are successful in this,
then we will make constantly brighter the lamp that will one day
guide us to our goal—a just and lasting peace.

17

Letter From Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower,
September 19, 1955¹

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I feel I must sincerely and frankly exchange opinions with you on a subject which at the present time has acquired particular importance. I have in mind the question which is being discussed now by our representatives in the subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission.

In the course of our memorable meetings in Geneva we agreed to work jointly for elaboration of an acceptable system of disarmament. When we approved directives to our Ministers of Foreign Affairs on this score, I thought a great deal had been accomplished. Now the representatives of our countries, guided by these directives and taking into account in their work the opinions and proposals put forth by the heads of the four governments in Geneva, can and must achieve definite progress.

I and my colleagues thought that even at the very beginning of their work our representatives would be able to reach general agreement on those basic questions on which our viewpoints either coincided or had already appreciably approached each other. I have in mind first of all the question of the levels of armed forces of the five great powers, the question of dates for introducing into force the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the question of international control. In this manner there would be created a solid foundation for further work during which it would be possible to make more precise all the details of the necessary agreements concerning the working out of an acceptable system of disarmament.

However, the first weeks of the work of the subcommittee so far have not yet produced those results for which you and I were fully entitled to hope, and I must frankly say that the delay is occasioned to a considerable degree by the fact that the members of the subcommittee so far do not know the position of the representative of the United States with regard to those provisions which we had all the grounds to consider as agreed. As is known, the representative of the United States completely put aside the questions of reduction of the armed forces, of armaments, and prohibition of atomic weapons, having expressed the desire to discuss first of all and mainly your proposal concerning the exchange of military information between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as well as of the mutual exchange of aerial

¹Text from Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 24, 1955, pp. 644-647.

18

photography of the territories of both countries.¹ In this manner the impression is left that the entire problem of disarmament is being confined by him to these proposals.

I think to put the question in this manner would not satisfy the aspiration of peoples, even though I fully recognize the importance of the proposals introduced by you in Geneva.

However, since I and my colleagues have received the above-mentioned impression, I consider it my duty once more to share with you, esteemed Mr. President, certain primary considerations.

We feel that the main problem for us is to use further efforts to look for ways which would permit us to move the problem of disarmament away from dead center, which problem has vital importance for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. as well as peoples of the entire world.

In connection with this allow me to touch upon the proposals put forward by you at Geneva. We regard these proposals as testimony of your sincere desire to find a way to settle the important problem of the international control and inspection and to contribute personally to general efforts for the normalization of international relations.

Upon our return from Geneva we with all carefulness have studied your proposal of July 21st which was introduced on August 30 by Mr. Stassen into the disarmament subcommittee. In the course of this study several questions have arisen about which I would like to express to you my thoughts.

First of all, about the mutual exchange by the United States of America and the Soviet Union of information concerning their armed forces and armaments.

In principle, we have no objections to this proposal. I think that at a definite stage the exchange of such information between states is necessary. It would be better, however, if such information concerning armaments were submitted by all states, and not only by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., to the international organ of control and inspection, concerning the creation of which we should reach an agreement. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is self-evident that information on all kinds of armaments, conventional as well as nuclear, must be submitted in order to avoid misunderstanding. If these considerations are valid, we should carefully discuss exactly

¹ For text of the opening statement made by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the subcommittee on Aug. 29, 1955, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 12, 1955, pp. 438-440.

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 1, 1955, p. 173; see also *The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 18-23, 1955* (Department of State publication 6046, October 1955), pp. 55-59.

19

when this full information on armaments of states should be presented
and first of all information concerning the armaments of great powers.

It is self-evident that the submission of the above-mentioned infor-
mation to an international control organ would become significant
only if agreement is achieved on the reduction of armaments and on
taking measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

It seems to me that the problem of the creation of an international
control organ which would satisfy the requirements of the problems
of disarmament should be considered in indissoluble unity with deci-
sions for putting into effect a plan for gradual disarmament. At the
same time it is necessary to keep sight of the fact that achievement of
a really valuable exchange of military information will become really
effective to the degree that mutual trust among states is strengthened.

Now I would also like to express my opinion about the problem of
aerial photography.

I do not doubt that when you introduced your proposal for photo-
graphing from the air the territories of our two countries, you were
guided by a legitimate desire to create confidence that neither of our
two countries would be subjected to attack by the other.

However, let us be frank to the end. Under present international
conditions both our countries are not acting singly. The United States
of America, as is known, heads all military groupings which exist in
the West and in the East, and what is more their armed forces are
stationed not only on American territory; they are also stationed in
England, West Germany, Italy, France, Spain, North Africa, Greece,
Turkey, in several countries of the Near and Middle East, in Japan,
on Taiwan, in the Philippines, etc.

To this should be added the fact that the armed forces of several
states are organically connected with the military forces of the United
States through inclusion under a single command.

Under these conditions, the Soviet Union on its side has united
militarily with several allied states.

It is impossible not to see that the proposal introduced by you com-
pletely omits from consideration armed forces and military installa-
tions which are outside the area of the United States and the Soviet
Union.

And yet it is perfectly self-evident that aerial photographing
should also be extended to all armed forces and military installations
located on the territories of those other states.

This presents an entirely new problem: Would the governments
of such states permit their sovereign territory to be photographed
from the air by foreign aircraft?

20

the system and regime in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is understandable that this would not only not facilitate the attainment of the national unity of Germany but, on the contrary, would also increase the already profound gulf between both German states.

On the other hand, under present conditions the conclusion of a peace treaty is precisely that measure which most rapidly of all can bring the German people to a solution of their principal all-national task, the reunification of the country. The definition in a peace treaty of the military status of Germany and also of the external conditions, the observance of which would safeguard its internal development from any and all foreign interference, would open up clear perspectives before the German people for the future Germany, (and) would make much easier for Germans living in the two states with different social-economic structures the search for ways to broaden contacts and to establish trust between them. A peace treaty would create a good basis for the rapprochement of both German states, (and) for the surmounting of those profound differences which now still stand in their way toward unification into one entity.

For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany bears a significant share of the responsibility for the situation which has been created in Germany, including also for the fact that Germany remains without a peace treaty up to the present time, inasmuch as it has adopted the course of remilitarization and has closely tied its policy to the plans of the NATO military bloc, which (plans) fundamentally contradict the national interests of Germany. If new evidence is needed of the fact that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is conducting just such a course, then the note of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany of January 5, 1959,¹ which is an answer to the note of the Soviet Government of November 27, 1958, on the Berlin question, is this evidence. This note shows that, instead of assisting in the solution of the Berlin question in the interests of peace in Europe and in the interests of the German nation itself, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is striving in every way to inflame passions and to make the situation around the Berlin question red hot with the aim of achieving the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin.

One cannot justify such a situation wherein states which participated in the war with Hitler Germany are forced to wait and remain passive observers in such a serious matter which brooks no delay as the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. These states, which were able to arrange a close collaboration with

¹ Not printed here.

321

each other during the war, have an opportunity even now to find a common language, regardless of existing differences, to bring to a conclusion the matter of a peaceful settlement with Germany, (and) finally to secure to the European peoples, including also the German people, a quiet and peaceful life. The necessity for a solution of this task is all the more urgent because in both German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany— a movement is spreading for the most rapid preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty.

Proceeding from the observations set forth above and wishing to place the matter of a peaceful settlement with Germany on a practical basis, the Soviet Government has prepared the draft of a peace treaty¹ and refers it herewith for the consideration of the Government of the United States of America.

Aspirations for the division of the world into conquerors and conquered are foreign to the Soviet state just as feelings of revenge in regard to its former military opponents are also foreign to it. The idea of the peaceful democratic development of Germany is set as the basis of the Soviet draft of the peace treaty. The restoration of the full sovereignty of the German people over Germany, its territory, and its airspace is provided for by the draft. No limitations in the development of its peaceful economy, trade, (and) navigation, (and) in its access to world markets are imposed on Germany. The right is recognized for Germany to have its national armed forces necessary for the defense of the country. All these provisions of the draft open broad opportunities before the German people for peaceful creative labor and guarantee to them an equal position among the other peoples of the world.

Of course, the draft of the treaty provides for certain military limitations which in the conviction of the Soviet Government correspond both to the national interests of the German people, who have twice gone through the abyss of world wars, as well as to the general interests of peace. In the military obligations imposed on Germany there is above all the prohibition of the production of nuclear and missile weapons and the supplying of the German armed forces with them, which would help in the strengthening of security in Europe and would aid in eliminating one of the main barriers dividing both German states at the present time.

The provision of the peace treaty which excludes the possibility of the enlistment of Germany in any kind of military groupings di-

¹ Printed, in unofficial translation, *ibid.*, pp. 337-343. The same treaty draft, as presented on May 15, 1959 (in another English translation) at the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, is printed *post*, pp. 371-385.

322

rected against any state which was in a state of war against Hitler Germany and among the participants of which are not all the four main Allied powers in the Atlantic coalition—the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, England, and France—also has an important significance for assuring peace in Europe. The inclusion of this provision in the treaty would to a significant degree deliver humanity from the threat of a new war inasmuch as nobody will deny that this threat is much stronger just because of the presence of a military alliance of one or several great powers with Germany divarcted against the other great power.

Taking account of what has been said, the Soviet Government proposes in a 2-month period to convoke in Warsaw or Prague a peace conference for consideration of the draft of the peace treaty with Germany which is being presented, (and) for the working out and signing of an agreed text of the treaty. In the conference there would take part, on the one hand, the Governments of the states which participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany and, on the other hand, the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, which would sign the peace treaty in the name of Germany. If a German confederation has been created by the time of the signing of the peace treaty, then in that case the peace treaty could be signed by representatives of the German confederation and also of both German states.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Government recognizes the right of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany to come to an understanding about any suitable representation for Germany in the preparation and signature of the peace treaty.

In presenting the draft of the peace treaty with Germany, the Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that the positions of the interested parties in the German question have already been fully defined and that it is now essential, dispensing with unnecessary polemics, to proceed to the working out of decisions of a practical nature dictated by the situation which has arisen in Germany and by the interests of strengthening peace in Europe.

The Soviet Government is convinced that only he who does not wish the German people well, who wants to see Germany torn apart also in the future, who does not want to convert Europe into a continent where firm peace and security would reign and who wants it (Europe) to be left as before as a breeding ground for dangerous tension, (and) for a "cold war" fraught with a serious threat to the cause of peace can fail to show a positive attitude toward the proposal concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty.

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The Soviet Government considers that, besides the conclusion of a peace treaty, practical measures can also be taken even now in regard to Berlin, as the Soviet Government has already suggested, in particular in its note to the Government of the United States of November 27, 1958. As far as the U.S. Government in its note of December 31, 1958, set forth its consideration in connection with the indicated suggestions, the Soviet Government in answer to this note must declare the following.

The period has long since passed when the Allied governments demanded from Germany fulfillment of the terms of unconditional surrender, when the supreme power in Germany was carried out by the Supreme Commanders of the occupation troops of the four powers, (and) when there functioned the Control Council and the "Interallied Kommandatura" directed by it for the joint administration of "Greater Berlin". However, one might think that the U.S. note was written in conformity with the situation during the first years of the occupation without taking into consideration at all those major changes which have taken place in Germany in the postwar years. The whole note is imbued with the spirit of that time (and) with the aim of justifying and affirming its "right of occupation" although the U.S. Government also recognizes as abnormal the fact that 13 years after the end of the war, there still exists in Berlin a system of occupation established in 1945.

The argument that the presence of American troops in Berlin is somehow justified by the fact that they entered there as a result of the Second World War cannot call forth belief on anyone's part. If one casts aside the obsolete accretions of the occupation period and soberly evaluates the existing situation, then it will become clear that the aim of the United States of America, England and France to retain their positions in West Berlin, does not have anything in common with the consequences of the last war and with those postwar agreements by which the development of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state was determined. It is based on the new situation which has arisen as a result of the gross violation by the Western powers of the said agreements, of the withdrawal from good Allied relations and of their turn of their policy into the direction of sharpening relations with the U.S.S.R. and creating military groupings.

Only he who wishes to utilize West Berlin as an instrument of hostile activity against the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and the states friendly to them for a still greater deepening of the existing contradictions and for an intensification of interna-

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tional tension, can speak out for the preservation of the present situation in Berlin.

To preserve the existing situation in Berlin means to preserve the danger of development of the "cold war" into a third world war with grave consequences for the peoples. Under such conditions, nobody can expect that the Soviet Union will support the occupation regime in West Berlin with its own hands.

The occupation which was understandable and necessary immediately after the rout of Hitlerite Germany, insofar as it led to the transformation of German political life on a peace-loving and democratic basis, now has its significance above all as a cover for the transformation of West Berlin into a strong-point of NATO, situated in the center of the German Democratic Republic.

In the note of the U.S. Government, there are recalled the Allied agreements of 1944 and 1945 concerning Berlin along with which these agreements were interpreted in such a way as to make out that they do not depend on the Potsdam agreement and up to now give a right to the Western powers to maintain their troops in West Berlin. Such an interpretation can in no way be agreed with since it is in contradiction with well-known facts and with those obligations which were taken by the powers in regard to Germany.

The four-party status of Berlin arose and existed not isolated from all the other agreements of the Allies on Germany but was fully subordinated to the fulfilling of the basic tasks of the occupation of Germany in the early postwar period, which were specified in the Potsdam agreement. Setting forth on the path of the rearmament of West Germany and of drawing it into its military grouping, the United States of America, Great Britain, and France have crudely violated the Potsdam agreement and have thereby eliminated the legal ground for maintaining the present status of Berlin as well as in general for the occupation of Germany.

The Soviet Union always observed and is now observing its obligations under international agreements, including those on Germany. Moreover, nobody can reproach the Soviet Union for not having raised its warning voice when the Western powers tore up one Allied agreement after the other, pushing Western Germany on the path of militarism and revengefulness. If the three Western powers respected the Potsdam agreement as does the Soviet Union and fulfilled the obligations taken on themselves according to this agreement, then one could with certainty say that now there would not only be no Berlin question, but no German problem in general since they would have been decided for the good of the German people (and) in the interests of peace in Europe.

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The four-part agreements on Berlin as well as on Germany as a
whole bear a temporary character only for the period of the occupa-
tion of Germany. But the occupation has ended. The Soviet Union,
the United States of America, Great Britain, France, and other states
have made announcements concerning the ending of the state of war
with Germany. In view of this, the groundlessness of the arguments
concerning some sort of rights for the continuation of the occupation
contained in the note of the Government of the United States of
America is thoroughly obvious.

In the light of the facts set forth it is not difficult to understand that, on the part of the Soviet Union, the question is not that of a one-sided denunciation of the Berlin agreement, as the Governments of the three Western powers are attempting to represent it, but only of the logical conclusion from the situation which has arisen, that is, a situation which is characterized by the ending of the occupation of Germany and by the flagrant violation by the Western powers of the obligations which they undertook at the end of the war.

The Government of the United States of America states in its note
that the Western powers received rights to Berlin also because they
"allowed" the Soviet Union to occupy various areas of Germany taken
by American and English troops in the course of the war. That
affirmation is nothing else than a flagrant distortion of the facts. Cer-
tainly, everyone knows well that the understanding on the areas of
occupation of Germany was already reached during the course of the
war, when it was not possible to foresee whose troops would be the
first to reach these areas. Along with this, it is essential to recall
that at the moment of the ending of the war in Germany, Soviet troops
found themselves not only in Germany, but also on the territory of
many countries, specifically in Austria. However, the Soviet Union
never raised the question of any kind of compensation for the with-
drawal of its troops from these territories, just as it did not demand
any concessions for the entry of the troops of its allies into areas
held by Soviet troops, for example, in Vienna, because to state such
claims means to conduct unworthy haggling in regard to foreign ter-
ritories. One must only be astonished that the Government of the
United States of America allows such an approach in regard to such
a country as Germany. The Government of the United States of
America states that it might be ready to discuss the Berlin question
in the broader framework of negotiations for the settlement of the
German problem, including the unification of Germany as well as of
the problem of European security.

The Soviet Government has already more than once indicated that
there can be no kind of meeting of representatives of the four powers

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for consideration of the question of the unification of Germany, for this question does not lie within the competence of the U.S.S.R., the United States of America, England, and France. Negotiations of the four powers regarding the unity of Germany were entirely legal in the occupation period, when these powers carried out the functions of administration and control in Germany. At the present time, when the occupation is a passed stage, and (when) two independent German states have arisen on the territory of Germany, the question of the reunification of Germany has become an internal German problem, which can be decided only by means of a rapprochement and agreement between these states.

As far as the problem of European security is concerned the Soviet Government attaches tremendous importance to its solution. It has on more than one occasion come forward with proposals aimed at the creation of a system of measures for the guaranty of security in Europe. It is sufficient to recall such proposals as that for the conclusion of a nonaggression agreement between states in the North Atlantic bloc and in the organization of the Warsaw Treaty, as that for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Europe, and also as that for the support by the Soviet Union of the proposal of Poland to create a zone in Central Europe free from atomic weapons. The Soviet Government is convinced that the problem of European security requires special discussion and cannot be mixed in with other questions, including with that of Berlin. It is pertinent to say that the Government of the United States of America in its note has not mentioned ways for assuring European security acceptable to the interested states. Under such circumstances it is impossible to avoid the impression that, by making the solution of such questions dependent on one another, as, for example, that of Berlin and that of European security, the Government of the United States is clearly trying to complicate the adoption of agreed decisions on both matters.

The Soviet Government is striving to settle the Berlin question by means of negotiations between the interested states. It is convinced that its proposal about the declaration of West Berlin as a demilitarized free city creates a healthy basis for an agreement, for it is responsive to the general interests of the strengthening of peace in Europe. At the same time, the implementation of the Soviet proposal does not affect the prestige and does not do damage to the security interests of any state, just as it does not give one-sided profits and advantages to anyone.

The Soviet Government, of course, is far from considering its proposal about a free city for West Berlin as excluding any additions and amendments. It would willingly consider appropriate proposals on

327

this question on the part of the other powers, having in mind that
such proposals will be directed toward the liquidation of the occupa-
tion regime in West Berlin and the strengthening of peace in Europe.

The refusal of the Western powers to conduct negotiations with
the Soviet Union in the interests of the normalization of the position
in Berlin will not, of course, stop the Soviet Union halfway from
its goal, which has been advanced by life itself and insures the stability
of the situation and calm in the center of Europe. No one can prevent
the Soviet Union from divesting itself of the functions being carried
out in relation to Berlin and its communications with West Germany,
and from settling the questions arising in connection with this by
means of agreements with the German Democratic Republic.

Summing up what has been said the Soviet Government, besides
the proposal about the calling of a peace conference, proposes also to
discuss with interested states the question of Berlin. If, however,
the Western powers consider it expedient before the calling of a
peace conference preliminarily to exchange opinions with the Soviet
Union about the content of a peace treaty, then the Soviet Government
will be agreeable to that. In this case it will be essential to insure the
appropriate participation of the German Democratic Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany as the states directly interested in
the conclusion of a German peace treaty.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government
of the United States of America will study with the necessary attention
the proposals brought forward and also the attached draft of a peace
treaty with Germany and on its part will make efforts in order that
the peace conference will be able to cope successfully with its re-
sponsible task.

Together with this it would like to believe that the Government
of the United States of America, recognizing the abnormality of
the preservation of the occupation regime in West Berlin, will draw
the necessary conclusions from the situation which has arisen and will
help in the settling of the Berlin question as the interests of the
consolidation of peace in Europe and the whole world demand.

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Note From the United States to the Soviet Union
Proposing a Foreign Ministers Meeting on the German
Problem, February 16, 1959¹

The Government of the United States refers to the note of the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dated January
10, 1959.

The United States Government has repeatedly expressed its conviction that the continued division of Germany constitutes a danger to European security and to world peace. This danger is heightened by the persistent and flagrant denial to the East Germans of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United States Government has sought to deal with this problem as urgently as possible through negotiations among the Four Powers responsible for Germany. In pursuing this objective, it has been willing to negotiate seriously on all aspects of the problem. This attitude long held was most recently put forward by the United States in its notes of September 30 and December 31, 1958.

The Soviet Government has announced its intention unilaterally to abdicate certain of its internationally agreed responsibilities and obligations in regard to Berlin.² That would encourage, and could result in, an attempt to assert control over the rights of the Western Powers to be in Berlin and to have unhampered access thereto. The danger to world peace inherent in this Soviet initiative is evident.

The position of the Western Powers in this matter has been made clear in their note of December 31. They have no choice but to declare again that they reserve the right to uphold by all appropriate means their communications with their sectors of Berlin.

Apart from the question of Berlin, the Soviet note of January 10 contains a number of statements and proposals with which the United States Government does not agree. The United States Government does not, however, propose to discuss these things in the present communication. This is partly because its views on the points at issue

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 9, 1959, p. 333.

² See *ante*, pp. 306-307.

544645—60—24

329

have been made plain in the note of December 31, 1958, and on previous occasions; and partly because in its view neither polemics nor insistence on the prior acceptance of any limitations on the means of reaching mutually satisfactory solutions can be helpful.

The United States Government is prepared to participate in a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and is ready to consider any suggestions as to a date and place, which would be fixed by mutual agreement. The place and date should be settled through diplomatic channels.

The conference should deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects and implications as raised in the recent exchange of notes between the Governments of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand.

It is suggested that German advisers should be invited to the conference and should be consulted.

## Note From the Soviet Union to the United States on the German Problem, March 2, 1959¹

[Extract]

Unofficial translation

No. 15/OSA

The negotiations of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which are now proposed by the Government of the United States of America are a long road.

If the Heads of Governments have not yet adopted a firm decision in order to build relations among states on the basis of cooperation and in order not to permit anything that would complicate these relations, then can other representatives of the states adopt such decisions which would secure a basic improvement of relations among states? It cannot be doubted that the efforts of such representatives would be directed not so much to aiding rapprochement among states as to pursuit of reasons and motives which guide one or another state in introducing its proposals.

Even the very fact of a meeting of the Heads of Government in the present strained situation undoubtedly would further the normaliza-

¹ This note was in reply to the U.S. note of Feb. 16, 1959 (supra). For full text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 13, 1959, pp. 508-511. The U.S. reply is dated Mar. 26, 1959.

330

tion of the whole international atmosphere. Can one ignore the truly great historical significance which would have a decision of the Heads of Government participating in the conference that henceforth they will make efforts toward a settlement of all international problems in the interests of peace on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence and will not permit anything that would interfere with the achievement of such noble ends? This alone would already create propitious conditions for the successful settlement of concrete questions engendering tension in international affairs.

Of course, the Heads of Government could consider a wider circle of questions than is proposed by the Government of the United States of America for a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This especially refers to those questions the lack of solution of which conceals within themselves a threat to the security of peoples and international peace. The Soviet Government proceeds on the basis that the Heads of Government will discuss the proposals introduced by it about the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and also about the adoption of joint measures toward the elimination of the abnormal position which has resulted in connection with the foreign occupation of West Berlin. Of course, decisions agreed at this conference about a peace treaty would have to be submitted to a peace conference, as was proposed by the Soviet Union.

In addition, at the conference of Heads of Government could be discussed questions connected with the safeguarding of European security and disarmament, such as the mutual withdrawal of forces and the creation of an atom-free zone and a zone of disengagement between the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO organizations, the reduction of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, Great Britain and France on the territories of other states, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen armament and the cessation of its testing, and others. The Soviet Government has at the appropriate time named these questions and they are well known to the Government of the United States of America.

The Soviet Government considers that for successful work in the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany and the decision of questions connected with the safeguarding of European security, it is necessary that there be active participation in this work by the representatives of countries which were subjected to aggression from the side of Hitlerite Germany. Proposals directed to the limiting of the discussion of a peace treaty in the framework of four powers can only call forth difficulties in the achievement of agreed decisions. In view of this, the Soviet Government considers it necessary that at the conference should take part, besides the four powers, also interested coun-

331

tries, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, as states bordering on Germany which became the first victims of Hitlerite aggression. With regard to the participation in the conference of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Government considers that at the summit conference in the examination of questions about a peace treaty with Germany and about West Berlin both the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany must be represented. In the West, voices are often heard against a summit conference since, they say, there are no guarantees that this conference will not suffer failure. Of course, if from the very beginning one or another participant has no desire to further coming to an agreement at such a meeting, then it really can suffer failure. But in such a case any conference, on whatever level it is conducted, will inevitably be doomed to failure.

To secure the success of a summit conference it is necessary that all its participants be guided by a sincere desire to come to agreement and realize that for the sake of securing a lasting peace among peoples it is necessary to renounce attempts to achieve any one-sided advantages in the negotiations.

The Soviet Government adheres to the opinion that a meeting at the highest level has at the present time the greatest chances of achieving positive results. Such authoritative statesmen as the Heads of Government, who possess very great plenary powers and experience, must have their say in order to give a new direction to the development of relations among states. After achieving agreement among themselves on vital international questions, the Heads of Government would be able then to instruct the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to work out future measures for the realization of the joint decisions adopted.

If the governments of the Western powers are not yet ready to take part in a summit conference, then the Soviet Government considers that for an examination of questions concerning the peace treaty with Germany and concerning West Berlin, there could be convoked a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Besides, the Soviet Government declares its agreement with the proposal of the Governments of the United States of America, Great Britain, and France that at this meeting both German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—would be represented. Since both these concrete questions had long since matured, the Soviet Government considers it appropriate to set for the work of a meeting of Foreign Ministers a term of not more than two or three months.

As for the question about the time and place of a meeting of Heads

332

of Government, the Soviet Government would consider it possible to convene such a conference in April of this year in Vienna or Geneva, if this is convenient for the Government of the United States of America, and also the governments of the state participants of such a conference, and if, of course, the Government of Austria or Switzerland would be ready to extend hospitality to the participants of such a conference.

If the Government of the United States of America is not ready for a meeting of Heads of Government, then the Soviet Government proposes at the above-noted time and place to convene a conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs with the above-proposed composition.

The Soviet Government would like to express the hope that its proposal will meet support on the part of the Government of the United States of America, which, together with the Soviet Union and other state participants of the anti-Hitler coalition in the period of the Second World War, made its contribution to the cause of smashing Hitlerite Germany and now with the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany would further the removal of a military danger on the part of German militarism.

Joint Communiqué by Prime Minister Macmillan and
Chairman Khrushchev, Moscow, March 3, 1959¹

[Extracts]

ANGLO-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of the Government of the U.S.S.R., Mr. Harold Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, accompanied by Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and official advisers paid a return official visit to the Soviet Union from February 21 to March 3, 1959.

In the course of their visit Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd have had the opportunity to hold a series of discussions with Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and other members of the Soviet Government, including Mr. A. I. Mikoyan, the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mr. A. A. Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

These discussions have ranged over some of the more important questions which are currently of general international concern. Both

¹ Text from British Command Paper 689.

333

sides, however, took account of the fact that these questions concern
many countries other than the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom.
Although they did not hold negotiations, the Prime Ministers have
been able, in the course of their discussions during the past ten days,
to hold a valuable exchange of views on these questions. They have
taken advantage of this to explain their attitude, and the reasons
underlying it, on all the questions discussed. The free interchange
of views and ideas which has taken place has created a better under-
standing of the respective attitudes of the two Governments, and has
thereby made a useful contribution towards the forthcoming inter-
national discussions in a wider circle.

The Prime Ministers agreed that an advance towards a solution of
the problem of disarmament would be a major contribution to the
maintenance of peace. It would help to increase international confi-
dence and to reduce the burden of military expenditure. They agreed
to continue their efforts to make progress in this field.

Their common objective remains the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy solely to peaceful purposes.

They recognized, however, the great importance of achieving agree-
ment to stop nuclear weapons tests under an effective system of inter-
national inspection and control. They reviewed the course of the
work of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear
Weapons Tests and resolved to continue their efforts to reach a satis-
factory agreement. They considered that such an agreement would
reduce tension, would eliminate the possible danger to health and life
resulting from nuclear weapons tests, and would help to avert the
further development of nuclear weapons.

The Prime Ministers exchanged full explanations of the views held
by their respective Governments on questions relating to Germany
including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin.
They were unable to agree about the juridical and political aspects
of the problems involved. At the same time they recognised that it
was of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of
peace and security in Europe and throughout the world that these
problems should be urgently settled. They therefore acknowledged
the need for early negotiations between the interested Governments,
to establish a basis for the settlement of these differences. They con-
sidered that such negotiations could lay the foundations for a stable
system of European security. In this connexion they agreed that
further study could usefully be made of the possibilities of increasing
security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both
conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with
an appropriate system of inspection.

334

In relation to all these matters the Prime Ministers endorsed the principle that differences between nations should be resolved by negotiation and not by force. They recognised that, if such negotiations were to succeed, it was important that each side should make a sincere endeavour to understand the point of view of the other. They agreed that the present visit of British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Union had made a valuable contribution towards such an understanding.

The Prime Ministers expressed their confidence that the personal contacts which had been established between the heads of Governments of the Soviet Union and of the United Kingdom would be continued in the interests of the development of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of the two countries, as well as in the interests of preservation and consolidation of universal peace.

## Note From the United States to the Soviet Union on Proposed Meeting of Foreign Ministers, March 26, 1959¹

The Government of the United States refers to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of March 2, 1959, in response to the U.S. note of February 16 proposing a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The U.S. Government has consistently favored meetings of interested powers that could provide opportunities for conducting serious discussions of major problems and could be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects. It was for this reason that the U.S. Government in its note of February 16 proposed a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States. The U.S. Government notes with satisfaction the Soviet Government's agreement to such a meeting.

Specifically, the U.S. Government proposes that a meeting of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States at the Foreign Minister level be convened in Geneva on May 11, 1959, to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. Naturally, any of the

¹Text from Department of State press release 223, Mar. 26, 1959. The Soviet reply of Mar. 30, 1959, is not printed.

335

four participating governments should have the opportunity to present its views on any question which it may consider relevant to the problems under consideration. The purpose of the Foreign Ministers meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible, and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer. On this understanding and as soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers meeting justify holding a summit conference, the U.S. Government would be ready to participate in such a conference. The date, place, and agenda for such a conference would be proposed by the meeting of Foreign Ministers. The conference of Heads of Government could consider and if possible resolve some wider problems such as those referred to in the Soviet Government's note of March 2 and in previous communications from the U.S. Government and where necessary establish machinery for further negotiation on these problems.¹

The U.S. Government fully recognizes that Poland and Czechoslovakia, like a number of other countries, have a legitimate and direct interest in certain matters which will be discussed in the conference. The possibility of the participation of other countries at a certain stage in negotiations could therefore be contemplated. However, the U.S. Government believes that the proposed meeting should at least at the outset involve only the four powers responsible for Germany. The U.S. Government also notes that the Soviet Government agrees with the proposal made in its note of February 16 that German advisers should be invited to the meeting on May 11 and be consulted.

The Government of the United States in proposing a Foreign Ministers meeting on May 11 understands that the Soviet Government would find Geneva a suitable location. The Government of the United States will, therefore, inquire of the Government of Switzerland to determine if this place and time would be convenient and also of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ascertain if the facilities of the United Nations in Geneva can be made available.

¹ For developments during this period regarding disarmament, European security, peaceful uses of outer space, suspension of nuclear testing, measures to prevent surprise attack, and other major problems, see *Department of State Bulletin*.

336

Joint Statement by Western Foreign Ministers,
March 31, 1959¹

[Extract]

The Foreign Ministers of France and the United Kingdom and the Acting Secretary of State of the United States met this afternoon from 2:50 to 4:35 for a discussion of the problem of Germany including Berlin. Among other topics the Ministers discussed the March 30th reply of the Soviet Union.² The three Ministers noted with satisfaction the Soviet acceptance of their proposals to hold a foreign ministers meeting in Geneva beginning May 11 provided this is acceptable to the Swiss Government. They recalled that in their notes they had made clear their position with respect to the relationship of a foreign ministers conference to a summit conference and also regarding the question of German advisers.

Communiqué by the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, April 30, 1959³

The Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States have concluded their meetings in Paris to concert their position on the basis of which to negotiate with the Soviet Union at the forthcoming Geneva conference.

Their discussions were based on the report of the Working Group which has been meeting in London to examine various aspects of these problems.

The Foreign Ministers reiterated the determination enunciated in their meeting in December 1958⁴ and reaffirmed at their recent Wash-

¹Maurice Couve de Murville, French Foreign Minister; Selwyn Lloyd, British Foreign Secretary; and Christian Herter, Acting Secretary of State of the United States. For full text, see *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 20, 1959, pp. 554-555.

²Not printed.

³Von Brentano, Couve de Murville, Lloyd, and Herter. Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, May 18, 1959, p. 699. The four Foreign Ministers met at Paris Apr. 29 and 30.

⁴For text of communiqué issued Dec. 14, 1958, see *ante*.

337

ington meetings¹—to maintain the freedom of the people of West Berlin and the rights and obligations there of the Allied Powers. At the same time they reaffirmed their willingness to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a just and durable peace in Europe.

To this end the Western Ministers reached complete agreement on the position to be presented at Geneva.

The results of the meeting just concluded will be discussed with the North Atlantic Council and arrangements will be made to maintain contact with the Council during the Geneva conference.

## Radio-Television Address by Secretary of State Herter

May 7, 1959 ²

[Extracts]

### THE WESTERN POSITION

Last week I met in Paris with the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the Federal Republic of Germany. We reached complete agreement on the Western position to be presented to the Soviets at Geneva. This position contains fair solutions for the problems of divided Germany, including a peace treaty, Berlin, and European security. The North Atlantic Council has given its approval.

We therefore go to Geneva with a united position. The 15 nations of the North Atlantic Alliance are as one in saying to the Soviet Union: If you are willing to engage in honest negotiation, here is a basis for securing a lasting peace in Europe.

On the eve of the Geneva Conference this high degree of unity is heartening.

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States go to Geneva sincerely determined to negotiate patiently and constructively. We will not deviate from our basic principles. But we are willing to negotiate about their application, provided that concessions from us are matched by equivalent counterconcessions from the Soviet Union.

We hope the Geneva talks will prove to be businesslike negotiations and not a propaganda exercise. It was for this reason we agreed at

¹ For text of communiqué issued Apr. 1, 1959, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1959, p. 555.

² For full text, see *ibid*., May 25, 1959, pp. 735-739.

338

Paris that we would not make public the comprehensive Western
position until it was presented to the Soviets at the Conference. I
know you will appreciate that it would be unwise to precipitate a long-
range discussion of this position before serious negotiations begin.

BERLIN CRISIS CREATED BY SOVIETS

How did the latest tensions—revolving around Berlin—get started?
Let's take a look at the record.

The Soviet Union deliberately created the crisis from which the
Geneva Conference results. The Soviet diplomatic note on Berlin
of November 27, 1958, contained both a demand and a threat.

The demand was that the three Western Powers withdraw their
forces from West Berlin. The Western Powers—with unanimous
NATO support—rejected that demand. Our forces are in the city
under rights arising out of the war and subsequent international
agreements. If they withdrew, West Berlin's 2¼ million people
would be at the mercy of the Communist imperialist power which sur-
rounds them. You will recall that Berlin is separated from West
Germany by more than 100 miles of Communist territory.

The threat in the Soviet note was that the Soviet Union would
abandon its existing obligations to assure free access to Western
forces in Berlin. It would do this by turning over to its puppet,
the East German regime, its control of the access routes. It would
then be up to the East Germans to decide what, if any, access the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France could have to West
Berlin.

The Soviet rulers obviously felt that free and prosperous West
Berlin was dangerous to them because it displayed to East Germany
and Eastern Europe the benefits of a free society. The Soviets have
talked much about peaceful coexistence. They have boasted that
under peaceful coexistence the ultimate victory of the Communist way
of life is inevitable. Here, however, pending reunification, peaceful
coexistence has existed for 10 years, with communism in one part of
the city, with freedom in the other. This is coexistence, and it is
peaceful. But from the Communist point of view it is obviously a
failure. Otherwise, how explain their anxiety to terminate it, how
explain the constant flow of refugees who give up homes, jobs, some-
times families in East Germany to seek freedom and human dignity?

In maintaining both our right of access and our forces in West
Berlin we are honoring our repeated pledges to the people of that
city. If these pledges are not fulfilled, our other pledges around the
world will soon be called in question. As the distinguished British

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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, said recently: "If Berlin goes, what goes next?"

In the view of the people of West Berlin, as recorded in the plebiscite of last December, American, British, and French troops are there as protectors. They are there to safeguard the freedom of more than 2 million men, women, and children.

We shall stand firm at Geneva in upholding our rights and responsibilities in Berlin. But firmness does not imply an unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.

## PROBLEM OF A DIVIDED GERMANY

The Soviet Union, after having created the crisis over Berlin, has agreed that a Foreign Ministers Conference be held in Geneva to discuss all the factors involved in the continued division of Germany, including Berlin and European security. The challenge from the Soviet Union has thus created an opportunity. This is a chance to settle not just the problem of Berlin but, much more important, the problem of the reunification of Germany. There can be no lasting solution for Berlin by itself. The problem ceases to exist only when that city again becomes an integral part of united Germany.

The United States will use its best efforts in seeking a solution to the problem of divided Germany. We are convinced that as long as Germany remains divided the peace in Europe will continue to be threatened. And twice in this century we have seen that when major war comes to Europe it comes to all the world. In the meantime a precarious peace will live hand-to-mouth from month to month.

The division of Germany creates an unnatural situation. Millions of Germans are separated from relatives, friends, business and working associates, and fellow countrymen by this artificial division. One-fourth of all Germans are subjected to a rule not of their choice, imposed by foreigners. Three million Germans have fled from that alien tyranny to the West. History gives us this lesson: Mankind will never give up its struggle against inhumanity and injustice.

Fears have been entertained that a reunited Germany would be a threat to peace. Provided German reunification is integrated with European security measures, as we shall propose at Geneva, the contrary is true. A Germany united in connection with European security measures can and will play a constructive and peaceful role in the development of Europe as a whole.

The Western allies are hopeful that the Soviet Union will see the wisdom of this approach. Surely it must become apparent to the Soviets that in the long run they face a greater danger from continuing the disunity of Germany.

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Some may think the Western position is not realistic because the Soviet Union may well reject it. This to my mind is certainly no reason for failing to set forth a proposal we believe to be both sound and just. We shall make every effort to convince the Soviet representatives that its acceptance would be in their interest as well as in our own.

If the Soviets do not seriously want to negotiate at Geneva, the world will see that it is the Soviet Union alone which is blocking the free choice of the German people and the chance for true peace.

## BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WESTERN POLICY

The basic principles that will guide us in the coming talks are clear.

First, we believe in unity for the German people in one nation, under a government of their own choice. We cannot accept a permanently divided Germany.

We recognize, however, that the consequences of the division of Germany during the last 14 years cannot be removed overnight. Reunification will therefore have to be a gradual process assuring time for all the peoples concerned to adjust to the change.

Second, we believe that there should be ample security safeguards and arms-control arrangements for the nations so that they can have assurance of being able to develop in peace and prosperity.

Third, we believe in guaranteed freedom for Berlin, with no reduction of existing rights and obligations, until Berlin can again assume its appropriate place in a united Germany.

Thus the heart of our policy can be clearly and simply said to be this: a Germany reunited in freedom, a security system linked with arrangements for arms control, and in the interim a free and secure Berlin.

## PATIENT NEGOTIATION

My fellow Americans, let me be frank with you. I do not go to Geneva with great expectations. The past record of negotiating with the Soviets does not warrant much optimism. Although the Western Powers have constantly sought agreement, we must not lose sight of the deep gulf that unfortunately divides the free world from the Communist bloc.

Negotiations with the Soviets can be very long-drawn-out. We should not expect quick or easy agreement. Some 400 meetings with Soviet representatives were required to reach agreement on the state treaty which restored freedom to Austria in 1955. Since it is our national characteristic to get things done quickly, we Americans are perhaps inclined to be impatient of delays in solving international problems. We must learn new patience in dealing with questions in which

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war or peace may be at stake. The best we can look for is slow progress toward the ultimate goal of international stability which only a just peace will bring.

We shall go into the Geneva talks with these general purposes:

*Honestly and in good faith to seek some advance, even if small, toward a just peace.*

*To stand firm against pressure.* We aim to make perfectly clear to the Soviets once again that we have the power and the will to maintain free-world positions. We do not intend to give the Soviets any reason to think that pressure tactics will profit them or divide and weaken the West.

*To strive to probe Soviet intentions so as to obtain a better idea of their thinking.* There is some chance that, even if no broad agreements are reached at these talks, better mutual understanding might still result.

*To seek agreements that mean something.* We shall try to reach agreements which rely either on self-enforcing provisions or on the obvious self-interest of the nations concerned.

*To seek to relax tension.* We want to lessen the strains on free world-Communist bloc relations so as to reduce the dangers of war and promote the chance of further progress. But we seek solid accomplishments and not merely deceptive promises.

## PROSPECT FOR SUMMIT CONFERENCE

The President and I hope that the Geneva Conference will so develop as to lead to a summit conference. President Eisenhower has stated publicly his readiness to attend a summit meeting if developments at the Foreign Ministers Conference justified it. This means that the Foreign Ministers meeting must give some promise that a summit meeting would have a reasonable prospect of advancing the cause of peace. The eyes of the world are bound to be focused on a meeting of the Heads of Government. It would be unfair to all peoples to risk shattering their hopes and expectations by engaging in summit talks under conditions likely to produce failure.

## A FIRM STAND

One fact must be faced squarely. Fear and appeasement will not in the long run reduce the danger of war. Only courage and a firm stand on our rights and principles can do this. Once the Communist rulers soberly realize the depth of our solemn Berlin commitment, we believe they will refrain from putting to trial by force the present right and obligation of the Western Powers to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin.

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If dangerous tensions over Berlin are eventually relieved, let us hope the Soviets will realize more clearly that they and the free world now have a primary interest in common—to avoid war. If so, perhaps the Soviets will see the wisdom of not again kindling a crisis, such as Berlin, from which war could conceivably quickly break out.

## PERSPECTIVE ON GENEVA TALKS

The Geneva talks must be viewed in the perspective of worldwide problems and policies.

In a world of change and growth, many ferments are at work: nationalism, anticolonialism, the yearnings of the destitute for a fuller life. We must try to understand these forces and to influence inevitable change along peaceful evolutionary courses.

Amazing new material forces are shrinking our world. International problems are becoming community problems in which all peoples have a stake.

The Communists have won successes in exploiting the currents of change for their own revolutionary purposes. But lately there has developed among many peoples a fresh understanding of the real purposes of Communist imperialism. The Red tide that threatens Iraq is bringing home to the Arab peoples the Kremlin's designs on the Middle East. The ruthless Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt showed what the Soviets mean when they profess no interference in the internal affairs of other countries. And now the tragic events in Tibet have dramatized in blood the clear and present Chinese Communist threat to all free Asians.

In our struggle for the future of mankind, America seeks peace by outlawing the aggressive use of force and by gradually establishing international customs and institutions which will make for peace. It tries to promote human dignity and freedom. And America encourages economic development, because peace can only be maintained if there is continuing prospect for increasing human welfare.

The most pressing problem, of course, is that of peace. In a world which is rapidly exploiting nuclear energy and thrusting into outer space, the maintenance of peace among the nations is more urgent than ever before in history.

Peace is not a static condition. As President Eisenhower has said,¹

"The peace we seek is a creative and dynamic state of flourishing institutions, of prosperous economies, of deeper spiritual insight for

¹Address by President Eisenhower at meeting of Heads of Government of NATO countries, Dec. 16, 1957; Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 6, 1958, pp. 3-6.

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all nations and all men. . . . We are in a fast-running current of the great stream of history. Heroic efforts will long be needed to steer the world toward true peace.”

Beyond the present crisis looms a long period of competition between the free world and the Communist bloc. If the Communists have the faith they profess in their system, they should not oppose open and fair competition with the free lands. We welcome such competition. We have confidence in freedom's future.

I even dare to hope that, as the interdependence of all peoples on earth becomes more evident, competition will increasingly be tempered by cooperation. It is not impossible that the present aggressive phase of international communism will be succeeded by a period of more responsible Soviet policies.

If war is to be contained in this nuclear era, the great powers will have to exercise restraint in dealing with the crises spontaneously generated by the tides of change and growth now surging through the world. Control of these crises must be governed by reasonable agreements among the nations as well as through the operations of the United Nations. Successful negotiations with the Soviet Union this year could make a good beginning for this indispensable development.

This then fits into the strategy which President Eisenhower described in saying,¹

"There lies before the free nations a clear possibility of peaceful triumph. There is a noble strategy of victory—not victory over any peoples but victory for all peoples."

*Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by Secretary of State Herter, May 14, 1959* ²

Since the end of the war it has been the business of the four major powers to restore to Europe the unity and peace which Hitler destroyed.

¹ *Ibid.*

² Department of State press release 333, May 15, 1959; also issued as conference doc. RM/DOC/7, May 14, 1959.

For published documents of the Geneva Meeting of Foreign Ministers, held May 11-June 20 and July 13-Aug. 5, 1959, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959). In addition to the Delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, adviser groups were present from the Federal Republic of Germany and the East German regime.

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Each of us have recognized this obligation. I do not have to remind you of the terms of the Directive given by the Heads of Government here in Geneva on July 23, 1955. That Directive said: "The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question and the re-unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security."

This Directive of the Heads of Government constitutes for the Four Powers both a recognition of the principles which ought to govern the settlement of the German problem and a concrete undertaking. Yet the anomaly has remained that, even though that was agreed in 1955, today, 1959, fourteen years after the defeat of Germany, no peace settlement has been made. The principles contained in the Directive of the Heads of Government represent the views not of one side or the other but the views of both. The Soviet Union has expressed as fervent a desire as any of the other powers to conclude a final settlement—to draw a line under the past and provide a secure basis for the future.

Where circumstances have permitted it, where the wishes of peoples have been given free play, much has been accomplished. In Western Europe the wounds of the war have healed. The Federal Republic of Germany has settled its differences with its Western neighbors. It has become a member of the European family and this membership has operated to provide an important guarantee to all European countries. As the ties of association increase and the bonds of interdependence multiply the possibility of unilateral action becomes increasingly remote.

But the division of Germany itself continues. It remains the first task of the four Foreign Ministers to bring this division to an end.

Germany is not the only piece of unfinished business which faces the troubled peoples of the world. Since the conference of 1955 no agreement has been reached in the solution of the other principal questions outstanding between the peoples of the East and West, although there is hope for progress in certain fields. The negotiations on general disarmament have made no real progress and the question of inspection and control, which is indispensable, remains a most serious difficulty. Disturbing and divisive situations persist in the heart of the European continent. Peoples in Eastern Europe, as the events of Hungary have shown, remain powerless to determine their fate. In other areas grave crises continue to threaten the tranquility of the world.

544645—60—25

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After the efforts made by them during the years 1956, 1957 and 1958 to resolve the crises which have shaken the world, and in order to advance the cause of disarmament and to ensure the renewal of negotiations of the principal outstanding problems, France, the United Kingdom and the United States have resolved to make a new endeavor to find a way forward. Although they consider their previous proposals reasonable, they are ready to develop them further in the hope of meeting the legitimate preoccupations of the Soviet Union and of the other countries of Eastern Europe.

The Soviet Government has said that the problem of German reunification is not ripe for solution at the present time. It wishes to limit the discussion at the present conference to Berlin and a peace treaty with the two parts of Germany.

Is it realistic to exclude consideration of German reunification in dealing with the present Berlin crisis? Surely the way to deal with the Berlin problem is to deal with its cause. One must consider Berlin as part of the central problem in Germany, the division of the country, and must find a solution to this central problem. When this is solved, the question of Berlin will disappear and the city will take its rightful place as the capital of Germany.

Just as the question of Berlin is part of the larger German question, so the problem of Germany as a whole is itself in turn part of an even larger problem. The reconstruction of a unified German state of 70 million people in the heart of Europe will unquestionably be a new factor of great importance and far-reaching consequences. This is why all the powers represented here have always recognized the interrelationship of German reunification and European security. Furthermore, it has long been the view of the Three Powers that no European security settlement would be of value unless it was accompanied by a solution of the German problem. This is because, so long as the German problem remains unsolved, a basic source of insecurity, dissatisfaction and risk will continue to prevail.

On the basis of a review of these interrelated problems the Western Powers have developed proposals which take into account the interests of Germany's neighbors and of Germany herself and which provide a basis for the establishment of a permanent settlement in Europe. They are ready to discuss these plans in as thorough and painstaking a fashion as possible. But they must press for a serious discussion which goes to the root of the problem.

Any lasting settlement must take into account the needs and interests of the parties concerned and must not require any of them to make intolerable concessions. It is not the view of the Three Powers that advantages secured by one side should be offset by disadvantages ac-

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cepted by the other side. They believe in the possibility of a general
settlement which could be mutually advantageous to everybody.

A lasting solution must be based upon the consent of the partici-
pants. It cannot be imposed; it must be accepted. It must provide for
free determination, free expression of opinion, in short a vote. The
West is aware that the Soviet Union is not prepared for the immediate
holding of free elections in East Germany. We are ready therefore
to agree that prior to elections contacts between East and West Ger-
mans should be arranged in order to discuss, among other subjects,
the modalities of elections. But there can be no question of the basic
need at some definable point of elections as the means for achieving
reunification. Otherwise there would be no means of ascertaining
the popular will as to the kind of state and government under which
Germany's future should develop. In fact, it is essential that there
should be an all-German government so constituted as to be able to
speak with undoubted authority for the whole of the German people.

The Soviet Government has complained that such a method would
result in what they refer to as a mechanical merger which would au-
tomatically liquidate what the East German regime describes as its
"social achievements". It is certainly not the intent of the Western
Powers to impose on one part of Germany the regime which prevails
in the other one. But it must be the German people themselves, acting
through a freely chosen government, who will determine their own
social structure. Exactly what that social structure will be cannot be
determined now. The Three Powers freely recognize however that the
different social development of the two parts of Germany itself con-
stitutes a major problem.

Any settlement must also assure the participants that their own
security will not be imperilled. The scales must not be tipped against
either side.

Since there is an obvious connection between the solution of major
political problems and disarmament the Western Powers suggest that
the negotiation on German reunification be considered in relation to
general disarmament. They stand ready to make renewed efforts in
the latter field as a means of facilitating progress in the former.

The building of confidence is an important element in creating the
basis for political agreement. The demonstrated fulfillment of en-
gagements can contribute greatly to an increase in confidence. This
is one of the reasons why effective methods of verification must form
an essential element in proposals in the disarmament and security field.

Using the principles which I have discussed briefly as guide lines
the Western Powers have prepared for the consideration of the Soviet
Government a peace plan containing proposals on German reunifica-

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tion, European security and a peace settlement. Its parts are all linked together and it must be viewed as a whole.

The three powers believe it possible to envisage a new plan under which the reunification of Germany could take place not only in the framework of a system of European security but also by stages. In particular, the plan would provide that the reunification of Germany would not begin at once with free elections, but that these would be preceded by a preparatory period. During this period a mixed committee for the whole of Germany would be set up. This committee would be authorized to make proposals with the object of facilitating contacts and freedom of movement between the two parts of Germany. It would likewise be charged with preparing and proposing an electoral law which would allow for the constitution of a national assembly for the whole of Germany by free elections. The Soviet Government is well known to hold the view that it is the two parts of Germany as at present constituted which ought to prepare German reunification. In contrast, the Three Powers feel that only freely elected representatives are competent to speak for the German people as a whole. They believe that it is a duty incumbent on the Four Powers to see that such representatives, who alone would have the necessary authority for their task, are formed into an all-German government. The Four Powers cannot divest themselves of this responsibility. Nevertheless, the Three Powers regard their present proposal, whereby election procedures can be agreed between members of the committee nominated both by the Federal Government and the East German regime as a reasonable compromise designed to take account of the Soviet viewpoint. They trust that the Soviet Government will themselves regard it in the same light.

This preparatory period would likewise be utilized to establish the first bases of a system of European security. At the end of the initial phase, which could be at the end of the present conference, the Four Powers would enter into formal understandings not to have recourse to force and to refuse help to any aggressor. At the same time, they would agree upon arrangements for consultation and conciliation among the interested parties. Finally, they would jointly suggest a resumption of negotiations on general disarmament in conditions to be agreed upon.

Then, during the preparatory period, positive measures would be taken in the field of European security. These could be envisaged as follows: arrangements to secure in the remainder of Germany and in other European countries to the East the prohibition of the manufacture of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction now accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany; exchange

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At the end of this preparatory period free elections would take place, a national assembly would be constituted and a government for the whole of Germany would be formed. At the same time, new security measures would enter into force. These would relate particularly to the fixing of ceilings on armed forces, foreign as well as national, stationed in certain parts of Europe. There would be provisions for an effective inspection and verification system.

Finally, there is the question of Berlin. The Soviet Government has itself taken the initiative in raising this question. The three powers believe that any further agreement relating to Berlin should, both in logic and in equity, apply to the whole of Berlin and not merely to West Berlin as the Soviet Government have proposed. They believe that the reunification of Berlin, which is what they suggest, should be a first step towards German reunification. In short, what they propose is that the reunification of Berlin should be the forerunner and microcosm of the reunification of Germany as a whole.

It is on these bases, which provide in advance the principal clauses of a settlement of the problem arising from the last war, that the remaining provisions for the final peace settlement could be negotiated.

Such are the broad lines of the plan which the Western Powers present to the Soviet Union for examination.

An examination of the plan which I have just submitted on behalf of the Governments of France, the U.K. and the U.S. clearly shows that our governments have gone very far to meet Soviet preoccupations. My colleagues and I will have an opportunity during the discussions to point out the important modifications which have been made to our 1955 proposals in order to take account of Soviet views. We earnestly hope that the Soviet Government will for its part make a comparable effort and thus make it possible to find at last a basis for mutual understanding.

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Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Peace Plan Presented by the Western Foreign Ministers, May 14, 1959¹

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are convinced of the urgent need for a settlement of the German problem. They desire to seek, in such a settlement, progressive solutions which would bring about German reunification and security in Europe. Moreover they believe that progress on each of the problems of general disarmament, European security and a political settlement in Europe affects the degree of progress possible in the solution of each of the other problems.

They accordingly propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an agreement between the Four Governments which would include the measures outlined below relating to a general settlement of the problems at issue. The measures envisaged are closely interrelated and the present proposals are therefore to be regarded as an inseparable whole. They would come into effect progressively at the stages indicated.

## STAGE I

### Reunification

1. The Four Powers would establish suitable arrangements for consultation among the parties to supervise the implementation of the agreement and to settle any disputes which might arise before the conclusion of a peace settlement with a reunified Germany.

2. With regard to Berlin, the Four Powers would agree that:

(a) Berlin is one city and belongs to all of Germany. East and West Berlin should, therefore, be united through free elections held under quadripartite or UN supervision. A freely elected Council would be formed for the whole of Berlin until German reunification was achieved and as a first step towards it. Thus Berlin would be retained as the future capital of a reunified Germany.

¹ Department of State press release 331, May 14, 1959; also issued as conference document RM/DOC/8, May 14, 1959.

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(b) Subject to the supreme authority of the Four Powers, (with voting procedures as adopted by the Allied authorities in Vienna) the freely elected Berlin Council would be free to administer the city.

(c) The freedom and integrity of the united city of Berlin and access thereto would be guaranteed by the Four Powers who would continue to be entitled as at present to station troops in Berlin.

(d) The Four Powers would take the necessary steps to carry out during Stages I and II of the "Phased Plan" the measures described in (a) to (c) above.

## Security

3. In a common declaration, with which other interested European states would be invited to associate themselves, they would undertake to:

(a) settle, by peaceful means, any international dispute in which they may be involved with any other party;

(b) refrain from the use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) withhold assistance, military or economic, to an aggressor.

4. In order to facilitate further the solution of political problems and the improvement of international relations, the Four Powers would, in an appropriate forum, initiate discussion of possible staged and controlled comprehensive disarmament measures.

5. The Four Powers would arrange discussions to develop procedures for exchanging information in Stage II on military forces in agreed areas of Europe.

## STAGE II

### Reunification

6. Bearing in mind the complex issues involved in reunification, a transitional period would be agreed. The Four Powers would set up a Mixed German Committee.

7. The Mixed Committee would consist of 25 members from the Federal Republic of Germany and 10 members from the so-called "German Democratic Republic". These members would be appointed by the Federal Government and the authorities of the so-called German Democratic Republic respectively.

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8. The Mixed Committee would take its decisions by a three quarter majority.

9. The Mixed Committee would be entrusted with the task of formulating proposals:

(a) to coordinate and expand technical contact between the two parts of Germany;

(b) to ensure the free movement of persons, ideas and publications between the two parts of Germany;

(c) to ensure and guarantee human rights in both parts of Germany;

(d) for a draft law providing for general, free and secret elections under independent supervision.

10. The Mixed Committee would transmit any proposals made by it under subparagraphs (a) to (c) inclusive of paragraph 9 above to the appropriate authorities in both parts of Germany. Such proposals, if no objections are raised with respect of [to] them, should be implemented as appropriate in both parts of Germany.

11. (a) Any agreed proposal for an electoral law in accordance with subparagraph (d) of paragraph 9 above would be submitted to a plebiscite in both parts of Germany.

(b) If within one year no such draft law had been formulated by the Committee, the group of members from the Federal Republic on the one hand and the group of members from the so-called German Democratic Republic on the other would each formulate a draft law approved by a majority of its members. These two draft laws would then be submitted to a plebiscite as alternatives. The electoral area for each draft law would consist of both parts of Germany.

(c) If any proposal for an electoral law obtained a majority of valid votes in each of the two parts of Germany, it would acquire the force of law and be directly applicable for the entire electoral area.

(d) The Four Powers would, at the time of signature of the agreement, expressly authorize the competent German authorities to promulgate any electoral law so approved.

(e) The Four Powers would adopt a statute providing for the supervision of the plebiscite.

12. If all-German elections had not been held on or before the termination of a thirty months' period beginning on the date of the sign-

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ing of the agreement, the Four Powers would determine the disposition to be made of the Committee.

## Security

13. An exchange of information on military forces in the areas referred to in paragraph 5 above would be undertaken.

14. The Four Powers would restrict or reduce their armed forces to agreed maximum limits, for example, United States 2,500,000; Soviet Union 2,500,000. During this same period, these states would place in storage depots, within their own territories and under the supervision of an international control organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments to be agreed upon and set forth in lists annexed to the agreement.

15. The Four Powers would be prepared to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments to become effective in Stage III subject to:

(a) verification of compliance with the provisions of paragraph 14 above;

(b) agreement by other essential states to accept limits on their armed forces and armaments, fixed in relation to the limits of the armed forces and armaments of the Four Powers;

(c) installation of an inspection and control system to verify compliance with all agreed security measures.

16. Measures of inspection and observation against surprise attack, helped by such technical devices as overlapping radar systems, could be undertaken in such geographical areas throughout the world as may be agreed by the Four Powers and other states concerned.

17. Since in 1954 the Federal Republic of Germany renounced the production of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the Four Powers will take such arrangements as might be appropriate to secure similar measures of renunciation in the remainder of Germany and in other European countries to the East.

18. Inspection systems would be worked out for ensuring compliance with the appropriate security measures envisaged in Stage III.

## STAGE III

### Reunification

19. Not later than two and a half years after the signature of the agreement elections for an all-German Assembly would be held in both parts of Germany under the terms of the electoral law drafted

¹See London and Paris Agreements, September-October 1954 (Department of State publication 5659), pp. 47-48.

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by the mixed Committee, approved by the Four Powers and adopted
by the German people in a plebiscite (in accordance with the provi-
sions in Stage II above).

20. The elections would be supervised by a supervisory commission and supervisory teams throughout all of Germany. The commission and teams would be composed of either (a) United Nations Personnel and representatives of both parts of Germany, or (b) representatives of the Four Powers and representatives of both parts of Germany.

21. The all-German Assembly would have the task of drafting an all-German constitution. It would exercise such powers as are necessary to establish and secure a liberal, democratic and federative system.

22. As soon as an all-German Government has been formed on the basis of the above mentioned constitution it would replace the governments of the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic and would have:

(a) full freedom of decision in regard to internal and external affairs, subject to the rights retained by the Four Powers as stipulated in paragraph 23 below;

(b) responsibility for negotiating, as soon as possible after its establishment, an all-German Peace Treaty.

23. Pending the signature of a Peace Treaty with an all-German Government formed on the basis of the all-German constitution, the Four Powers would retain only those of their rights and responsibilities which relate to Berlin and Germany as a whole, including reunification and a peace settlement and, as now exercised, to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security.

## Security

24. Implementation of the following security provisions would be dependent upon the establishment of effective control and inspection systems to assure verification and upon the agreement, where appropriate, of the all-German Government to the security measures called for in Stage III.

25. Upon the establishment of an all-German Government, the Four Powers and such other countries as are directly concerned would agree that in a zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on either side of a line to be mutually determined, agreed ceilings for the indigenous and non-indigenous forces would be put into effect.

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26. After conclusion of the peace treaty, no party would station forces in any country in this area without the consent of the country involved. Upon the request of the country involved, any party so stationing forces would withdraw them within a stated period and would undertake the obligation not to send forces to that country again without the consent of the Government of that country.

27. Should the all-German Government decide to adhere to any security pact:

(a) there might be special measures relating to the disposition of military forces and installations in the area which lies closest to the frontiers between a reunited Germany and countries which are members of another security pact;

(b) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements in additional mutual obligations, covering especially the obligation to react against aggressions;

(c) the Four Powers would be prepared to join with other parties to European security arrangements herein described in giving an assurance that they would not advance their forces beyond the former line of demarcation between the two parts of Germany.

28. Providing that the limitations and conditions set forth on armed forces and armaments in Stage II are met, the Four Powers would further limit their armed forces together with corresponding reduction on armaments to agreed maximum levels, for example U.S. 2,100,000; and U.S.S.R. 2,100,000. Reductions in the armed forces and armaments of other essential states to agreed levels would take place at the same time in accordance with paragraph 15 of Stage II.

29. After verified compliance with the above limitations, and subject to the same conditions, negotiations would be undertaken on further limitations (for example U.S. 1,700,000; and the U.S.S.R. 1,700,000) together with corresponding reductions on armaments. The levels of armed forces and armaments of other essential states would be specified at the same time through negotiations with them.

30. The measures provided for above would be harmonized with general disarmament plans so as to be included in a general framework.

31. All of the security measures of the "Phased Plan" would continue in force as long as the control system is operative and effective and the security provisions are being fulfilled and observed.

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## STAGE IV

Since a final Peace Settlement can only be concluded with a Government representing all Germany, it should be concluded at this stage. The Settlement should be open to signature by all states members of the U.N. which were at war with Germany. The Settlement should enter into force when ratified by the Four Powers and by Germany.

# Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Summary of the Western Peace Plan, May 14, 1959¹

## A. INTRODUCTION

The 1959 Western Peace Plan contains proposals for a phased program to settle the problems of German reunification and security in Europe. It also contains some proposals which were in the past dealt with in the framework of general disarmament.

The phased Plan envisages parallel progress, step by step, in the fields of German reunification and European security. There are four phases.

There are also proposals for an interim settlement for the whole of Berlin pending German reunification. Berlin would again become a "United City" guaranteed by the Four Powers.

The last act of the whole process would be the conclusion of a final peace settlement with Germany.

The problems of German reunification and European security remain closely linked, as they were, with Russian agreement, in the Directive of the Four Heads of Government to their Foreign Ministers signed at the Geneva Summit of 1955 on July 23. It is not possible to separate the two problems. They belong together logically and through the force of facts, for without German reunification there can be no lasting security in Europe.

Just as the problems of German reunification and European security are closely inter-related, so are the progressive phases of the Plan. The Plan is thus an inseparable whole.

The Plan contains a number of new features which take account of views expressed by the Soviet Government. The holding of free all-German elections would now not take place until after a transitional period of two and a half years. There are also more far-reaching security proposals than have been made hitherto which cover all possible future alignments of a reunited Germany.

¹ Department of State press release 330, May 14, 1959.

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There are however certain fundamental principles which for reasons of justice and security cannot be sacrificed. The most important of these are:

(a) In the field of *German reunification*, the right of the German nation to decide its own way of life in domestic and external affairs. This means that the German people must have the right to choose the Government it wants, and the only practical way of exercising this right is through free elections. As regards external affairs, a reunited Germany must have the sovereign right to decide its own foreign policy, whether it wants to be a member of N.A.T.O., or of the Warsaw Pact, or whether it chooses any other status. The alternative course is to impose a dictated treaty as was done at Versailles in 1919.

(b) In the field of *European security*, the West cannot agree that the military balance should be changed to its disadvantage.

## B. SUMMARY

### German Reunification

### European Security

#### Phase I

Establishment of suitable arrangements for carrying out the Agreement.

"United City" of Berlin. Free elections to be held throughout all Berlin under supervision. The Four Powers to guarantee the freedom of the united City and access thereto pending German reunification.

Common Declaration on peaceful settlement of disputes, renunciation of the use of force inconsistent with the purpose of United Nations Charter, pledge to withhold assistance from an aggressor.

#### Phase II

Setting up of a *Mixed German Committee*, consisting of 25 members from the Federal Republic (population over 52 million) and 10 members from East Germany (population under 17 million) to work out proposals for increased technical contacts between the two parts of Germany and for freedom of movement.

*Exchange of information* on military forces in areas of Europe to be mutually agreed.

*Limitation of over-all strength of forces* of the Four Powers to agreed maximum levels, e.g. 21½ million each for the United States and the Soviet Union. Quantities of designated types of armaments to be placed in stor-

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## German Reunification

ment and respect for human rights throughout Germany; and to draft a law for free and secret elections in the whole of Germany under independent supervision. The Mixed Committee would take its decisions by three-quarter majority, i.e. the East Germans could not be outvoted. The draft of the electoral law would be submitted to an all-German plebiscite. If no agreement were reached in the Committee two draft electoral laws would be submitted in the plebiscite.

## European Security

age depots under international supervision.

*Measures of inspection against surprise attack, possibly including overlapping radar systems, could be undertaken in various areas of the world to be mutually agreed.*

The renunciation of the production of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons made by the Federal Republic in 1954 to be extended to the remainder of Germany (and other European countries in the East).

### Phase III

*Elections for an all-German Assembly on the basis of the electoral law worked out by the Mixed Committee and adopted by the German people in a plebiscite to take place within 2½ years.*

The elections to be supervised by Germans from both parts of Germany plus either United Nations personnel or representatives of the Four Powers.

The All-German Assembly to draft an *all-German Constitution*.

Formation of *all-German Government* on the basis of the Constitution with freedom of decision in internal and external affairs.

The *All-German Government* to be responsible for negotiating an *all-German Peace Treaty*.

Upon the establishment of the all-German Government a "zone comprising areas of comparable size and depth and importance on either side of a line to be mutually determined" should be created with "agreed ceilings for the indigenous and nonindigenous forces".

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## German Reunification

Until the conclusion of the Peace Treaty the Four Powers would only retain powers and responsibilities relating to Berlin, Germany as a whole, including reunification, and the right of stationing armed forces in Germany.

## European Security

Upon the conclusion of the Peace Treaty all foreign troops to withdraw from countries in the area at the request of the Government of the country in which they are stationed.

Global force limits could be further reduced, e.g. to 2.1 million each and later 1.7 million for the United States and the Soviet Union.

If the all-German Government decided to adhere either to N.A.T.O. or the Warsaw Pact, the following additional security arrangements to be made:

(a) special measures regulating disposition of forces and installations in the area closest to the frontier between a united Germany and countries which are members of another security Pact.

(b) agreements between the Four Powers and other European countries about joint reaction against aggression.

(c) If a reunited Germany joined NATO the three Western Powers would join with other parties to European security arrangements in undertaking not to advance their forces further to the East, i.e. into the present area of East Germany. If a reunited Germany joined the Warsaw Pact the Soviet Government would undertake not to advance their forces towards the West.

## Phase IV

Conclusion of a Final Peace Settlement with the all-German Government.

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Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by
Foreign Minister Gromyko, May 15, 1959¹

In the course of the exchange of notes prior to the convocation of
this conference it was agreed that the conference would consider
the question of a peace treaty with Germany.

It was only two days before the opening of this conference that
the anniversary of the victory over Hitler Germany and of the cessa-
tion of the war in Europe was observed for the fourteenth time.
Since the memorable spring of 1945 life has made a big stride for-
ward. In place of the smouldering ruins and debris left by the
war, hundreds and thousands of towns and villages have been re-
stored or rebuilt. Humanity has been enriched by discoveries made
by the genius of man which not only enable us to make life on earth
better but also pave the way for the conquest of cosmic space. During
these years new independent States have emerged in many parts of
the world. A new generation was born which at present is preparing
to cross the threshold of adult life.

The changes that have taken place have left almost unaffected only
the sphere of the relations between States in regard to eliminating
the aftermath of the war in Europe, for in that sphere the main
thing has not yet been done—there has not been achieved a peace
settlement between Germany and the former anti-Hitler coalition
formed by the majority of the countries of Europe and many coun-
tries of the other continents. Outstanding problems left in the wake
of the past war weigh like a heavy burden on the relations between
States, and are a permanent source of frictions, disputes and sus-
picion between them.

Germany has always occupied one of the leading positions among
the European States both for her economic and for her political weight
and importance, and her geographical position in the centre of Europe
for centuries linked the German people with West and East. It is
only natural that as long as the relations between Germany and the
States which were the victims of Hitlerite aggression are not cleared
of the deposits left by the war, Europe will feel that burden on her
shoulders.

Meanwhile, if we approach with sober mind the assessment of the
situation that has developed here over the recent years, we cannot fail
to see that we are again faced with the fact of a dangerous piling up of
inflammable materials in this part of the world where in the course

¹ Conference doc. RM/DOC/10, May 15, 1959, and Correction 1, May 22, 1959.

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of a quarter of a century the conflagration of war has twice flared up enveloping almost the entire world.

The division of Europe into two opposing military camps, the beginning of which was laid by bringing about a certain military grouping of the Western States, has now reached a dangerous level. Never before have the States of West Europe seen on their territories such accumulations of foreign troops and war equipment, never before has so vast an area of fertile soil been taken away from the peaceful population in order to build on it all kinds of military bases, depots, launching sites, airfields, testing grounds. Never before have the armies come to possess such deadly weapons as hydrogen bombs and missiles.

It would be a profound delusion to think that if all these military preparations are directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, they do not affect other States. The fact is that if world war II involved a far greater number of States than the previous one, world war III may have no bounds at all.

Had a German peace treaty been concluded in time, we would undoubtedly have been faced with a different Germany, and with a different situation in Europe. For it is inconceivable that if a peace treaty had existed there could have taken place such facts as the incorporation of the FRG in NATO, the equipment of the Bundeswehr with atomic and rocket weapons, revanchist pronouncements in West Germany, i.e., everything that has dug a deep trench between the two German States and has brought about the atmosphere of tension which is so typical of the present situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole.

If we are faced today with the necessity of taking measures to render harmless such a hotbed of international conflicts as West Berlin has become owing to the unduly prolonged occupation, this is also one of the consequences of the absence of a peace treaty.

It is clear from the above how serious and even dangerous for the cause of peace have been the consequences of delaying a peaceful settlement with Germany. To raise objections to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, to drawing the final line under the past war is tantamount to denying people the right to enjoy a peaceful and tranquil life today. And no matter how many speeches the advocates of such a policy may make about their attachment to the cause of peace, they fail to prove such attachment by their actions.

The Soviet delegation does not deem it necessary to go into an analysis of the causes which at one time prevented the conclusion of a German peace treaty, for this would scarcely help to promote a solution of the question under discussion. As far as the position of the Soviet Union is concerned, no impartial observer could find grounds for re-

544645—60—26

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proach, or could fail to recognize that the Soviet Government has done
its utmost to bring about a peace settlement with Germany.

At the same time the Soviet Government has constantly shown its
anxiety lest any move be taken in Germany which might complicate
the situation as regards reaching a peace settlement. The Soviet
Union, which bore the responsibility for the development of East Ger-
many during the period of Allied control, has helped the forces of
antifascism and democracy among the German people to implement
the decisions of the Potsdam Conference in that territory. The Soviet
Union has done this with the same loyalty and consistency as she
showed in carrying out her obligations to her Allies during the war
against Hitler Germany.

But who will be so bold as to maintain—without flying in the face of
facts—that the soil which nourished German militarism in the past
has now been destroyed in Western Germany too, as the Potsdam
Agreement required, or that those who faithfully served the nazi re-
gime are not there enjoying authority and influence, or that a policy
of militarizing the country is not undermining the foundations of
European security?

Much of the present policy of the Government of the Federal Re-
public of Germany is designed to aggravate international tension, and
this inevitably compels us to be on our guard. How can European
States, and especially Germany's neighbours, be free from anxiety
when the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is openly
proclaiming its territorial pretensions? It is in Bonn that the voice
of blackmail is raised at the first sign of rapprochement between the
States concerned, or of the prospect of settling outstanding inter-
national questions. We all know what obstacles were raised by cer-
tain people in the Federal Republic of Germany against calling this
conference.

The understandable concern, in these circumstances, of the peoples
of Germany's neighbour States makes it all the more pressing that
a German peace treaty be concluded which would constitute a definite
guarantee for the peaceful development of all Germany.

We all value highly the important and useful contribution to the
peaceful post-war settlement of Europe which has been made as a
result of the preparation and conclusion of peace treaties with the
States which fought on the side of Hitler Germany. The four Powers
were also able to arrive at an agreement with regard to the conclusion
of the State Treaty with Austria,¹ which placed the development of

¹ See *The Austrian State Treaty: An Account of the Postwar Negotiations Together with the Text of the Treaty and Related Documents* (Department of State publication 6437, Apr. 1957). The treaty was signed at Vienna, May 15, 1955.

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that country on an independent national basis. This act, as everyone will recall, produced a considerable improvement in the political climate in Europe and served as an example to show how great were the possibilities and untapped resources which could be put at the service of international co-operation, given a reasonable and business-like approach by the interested parties.

The vital interests of nations make it imperative to continue the work of completing the peaceful settlement of Europe, so that the victory of the forces of peace and justice may be finally consolidated, and nations may be given an opportunity to devote themselves entirely to peaceful pursuits, and governments to direct their efforts to the solution of other important international questions.

The experience of the recent past, when a mighty anti-Hitler coalition was built in the struggle against fascism, is convincing proof that differences in the social and economic systems of States do not constitute an obstacle to their making common cause to secure a life of peace for the peoples. But the co-operation which was essential to achieve victory in a just war is no less necessary for the purpose of preserving and consolidating the peace. If ways to continue such co-operation are to be sought, then it is only natural to turn first to the solution of questions which remain over from the war and which affect all the Allies. Chief of these is undoubtedly the question of a peace treaty with Germany, the conclusion of which will in its turn give us the key to the solution of many other problems which are dividing our countries.

We realize, of course, that the Soviet Union and the Western Powers have a different approach to the German question, different notions as to the future development of Germany. But our countries have one thing in common which once enabled us to make common cause. During the war we were united by the desire to destroy German militarism and to secure peace for the nations. Now we can and must be united by the desire to do everything to prevent a revival of German militarism and the possibility of its ever again, either alone or in alliance with anyone, launching a new war, which would again drown Europe and the whole world in blood and turn flourishing cities into ruins.

The main argument advanced by those who oppose the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany comes to this: that at present there is no government that could sign a peace treaty on behalf of the whole of Germany and ensure that the obligations involved would be fulfilled. But this argument cannot be accepted as either correct or convincing. It proceeds from extremely formal legalistic considerations, than which none could be less appropriate under the existing conditions. It is rooted in a deliberate refusal to recognize

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the de facto situation in Germany, a territory in which two independent sovereign States have long been in existence. Is not the very fact that the official representatives of the Governments of these two States are present in this room convincing proof that it is no longer possible to be blind to the actual state of affairs?

Moreover, if we are to speak of the legal side of the matter, there are examples in the practice of international relations, to show that the existence of the two German States cannot be an obstacle to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

To wait for an all-German government to be set up in Germany, in the full knowledge that this will be a complicated and lengthy process, means both postponing the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany indefinitely and ignoring an opportunity to bring the national reunification of Germany a step nearer. How can one think of a united Germany as our partner in a peace treaty when, because of the stand taken by the Government of West Germany, the GDR and the FRG have not even been able to start working out a common platform for their rapprochement—which is exactly what a peace treaty should facilitate to a considerable extent? A further point which should be taken into account is that the FRG Government does nothing but keep creating fresh obstacles in the way of rapprochement between the two German States.

We are forced to note with regret that yesterday's statement by Mr. Grewe, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, contained nothing to indicate any change for the better in the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany on this question.¹

Yesterday Dr. Bolz, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GDR, expressed the readiness of the GDR Government to discuss with the FRG the questions of a peace treaty and other relevant issues which concern both German States.²

The FRG Government, however, has not yet reacted to this.

Taking into account the de facto situation, the Soviet Government sees no other possibility but to conclude a peace treaty with the two German States; and, in the event that a German confederation has been formed by the time the peace treaty is signed, to sign the treaty with the German confederation as well as with the GDR and the FRG. To refuse to conclude a peace treaty today means to face still bigger differences between the GDR and the FRG tomorrow, to pander to those extremist circles in West Germany which do not conceive of the unification of Germany in any other way than by their absorbing

¹ For texts of statements by the West German Adviser, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), annex I.

² For texts of statements by the East German Adviser, see *ibid.*, annex II.

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the GDR, even though this could mean confronting the world with
the catastrophe of a new war. If, of course, these circles were able
to assess the situation soberly, even they might see the completely
illusory and absurd nature of such plans.

Similarly, it is difficult to take seriously the arguments of those
who are trying to justify their negative attitude to proposals for a
peaceful settlement with Germany by references to the fact that they
recognize one German State alone. We know that the social system
of the GDR is not to the liking of certain people in the West. In
politics, however, it is least of all appropriate to give way to feelings,
at the expense of a sober approach to facts, and the facts are that
the Government of the GDR has fully acknowledged and accepted all
the aims that were proclaimed in the Allied agreements on Germany.

Yesterday we heard this confirmed once more, in the statement by
Dr. Bolz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Re-
public, who, we are convinced, expressed the sentiments of the majority
of the German people.

The voice of the GDR which we heard here yesterday was the voice
of a true champion of peace and of the cause of reducing interna-
tional tension.

Why then do not the Western powers give the German Democratic
Republic its due for the work it has done in fulfilling the Potsdam
agreements, for its peace-loving policy, and why do they prefer to hold
aloof from this, with their references to being unable to declare rec-
ognition of the German Democratic Republic?

It is not out of place in this connexion to recall that history provides
a good many instances of attempts on the part of some States to vent
their dislike of the policy of some other State by withholding recogni-
tion for many years. But time passed, and the "unrecognized" States
continued to exist and develop. Those who refused to recognize them
were forced to reconsider their position and their erstwhile policy of
ignoring facts evoked nothing but perplexity and irony.

The Soviet Government has acted differently. Taking into account
the situation created in Germany, it has recognized the FRG. We
certainly did not do this because we sympathized with the political
course of the Adenauer government or with the regime established
in that country, which could hardly be reconciled with the ideas that
inspired the Allies in the recent war. In making this move, the Soviet
Government proceeded from the interests of relaxing tension, and
allowed for the fact that just as without the GDR there could be no
progress in the solution of the German question, so too there could
be none without the FRG. One would think these considerations
would not be alien to the Western Powers, if they are really willing
to advance the solution of the German question and to strengthen
peace in Europe.

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One should not lose sight of the fact that while the question of unifying Germany mainly concerns the Germans, the question of a peace treaty involves the interests of many nations in Europe and not only in Europe, and its solution would be a most important step toward consolidating European security. Of course, the question of the unification of Germany is of great importance, and the Soviet Union consistently advocates solving this question on a peaceful and democratic basis. But if the FRG is not yet prepared to negotiate with the GDR on the means of solving this question, then obviously there is nothing to do but wait until the FRG Government adopts a more realistic attitude.

The peace treaty is a different proposition. The delay in solving this question is causing harm not only to the German people, but also to other nations and to the common cause of peace. Therefore the Soviet Government holds to the view that the Foreign Ministers' conference should concentrate mainly on the question of a peace treaty with Germany.

The participants in this conference have obviously had an opportunity of studying the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany and the relevant proposals of the Soviet Government on the procedure for concluding this treaty, which were brought to their notice in the Soviet Government's Notes of 10 January and 2 March of this year. Since we have started discussion on this question, the Soviet delegation considers it necessary to refer back to the contents of the Soviet Draft Treaty, and to outline the considerations which guided the Soviet Government in preparing it.

The proposed Draft Peace Treaty with Germany is based on the Allied agreements on Germany made during and after the war, and above all on the Potsdam Agreement. It proceeds from the necessity of reaching the objectives proclaimed by the Allied States, that is, the prevention of further aggression by Germany, the revival of Germany as a peace-loving and democratic State and the establishment of a stable peace in Europe.

Certain circles in the West are expressing themselves in favour of granting Germany a so-called freedom of choice between the Eastern and the Western military alliances; in fact, what they have in mind here is the future integration of the whole of Germany into NATO; that is, the possibility of using her territory and her resources in material and manpower in the interests of this military alliance. It is known also that such plans meet with support from certain quarters in the FRG, although the latter, of course, are not thinking in terms of the advantages of the Western Powers which today hold the leading position in NATO, but of designs of their

366

own which are prompted by their unwillingness to resign them-
selves to the defeat of Hitler Germany.

The consequences of the FRG's four years membership of NATO
are openly to be seen: more and more young men in uniform are being
packed into barracks and military schools; many areas of the country
are dotted with rocket-launching installations and nuclear weapons
depots; every day there are fewer footbridges connecting the two
parts of Germany. It is not difficult to foresee the threat that would
hang over Europe if the attempts to push the whole of Germany along
the same road were not resolutely resisted. We are all well aware
that what the overwhelming majority of the German people demand
is the right to live in peace and tranquillity and to participate on an
equal footing with other States in ensuring the security of Europe.
This is precisely the intention behind the provisions of the Soviet
Draft Peace Treaty which is now under discussion.

The Soviet Union recognizes Germany's right to have such national
armed forces of her own as are necessary for the defence of the coun-
try. The Draft certainly contains a number of military restrictions,
but these restrictions are only natural and necessary when we bear
in mind that German militarism has already launched two world
wars. Among the obligations to be imposed on Germany, the first
and foremost is a ban against her producing nuclear weapons, to-
gether with a ban on any means of delivery of atomic weapons. In-
cidentally, the relevant provisions of the Soviet Draft Treaty do not
go further than the restrictions provided for in the Paris agreements
between the FRG and the Western Powers. Our proposal further
provides for preventing the German armed forces from being equipped
with nuclear weapons. I believe that the necessity for this is realized
both in Europe and America and everywhere else where the lessons of
the two world wars are still remembered.

The Soviet Government, standing as it does for the withdrawal
of foreign troops from Germany, does not see any obstacle in the way
of completing such withdrawal not later than a year from the date
when the peace treaty comes into force. If the three Western Powers
and the FRG are not as yet prepared for this, then the withdrawal
of foreign troops from Germany could be carried out gradually within
time limits which would be agreed upon between the parties con-
cerned; and in that case we would propose that the numerical strength
of the foreign troops stationed on the territory of Germany be re-
duced by one third within six months from the date on which the
peace treaty comes into force.

It is often alleged in the West that after the withdrawal of foreign
troops from Germany the Soviet Union would gain some sort of mil-
itary advantages, to the detriment of the security of the FRG and

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other Western States. But surely nobody is demanding anything more from the Western Powers than from the Soviet Union. We are proposing that *all* foreign troops should be withdrawn from Germany, both those of the Soviet Union and those of the NATO States: in other words we are talking about a settlement which would require both sides to enter into equal commitments and to make equal concessions.

We are also told that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the GDR would not be equivalent to the withdrawal of the foreign troops from West Germany, since the Soviet armed forces would, they say, still be able to remain somewhere close to Germany. Such arguments are patently artificial and far-fetched. We have only to remember that the armed forces of France, Great Britain, Belgium and other NATO countries would also, in this case, be no farther from Germany than the Soviet troops. Moreover, the critics of the Soviet proposal on the withdrawal of troops from Germany cannot be unaware of the fact that the Soviet Government has long been urging an even more fundamental settlement of the problem of foreign troops in Europe. The Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw its troops not only from Germany but also from Poland and Hungary, where they are at present under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty, provided of course, that the other NATO countries withdraw their forces back within their own frontiers and dismantle their military bases on foreign territories.

It is self-evident that the text of a peace treaty should include the appropriate provisions of the Allied agreements on the German frontiers. The question of Germany's Eastern frontiers was decided by the Allies even while the war was still being fought, and when a peace treaty is concluded that decision naturally will be explicitly written into it.

The Soviet Draft includes provisions for ensuring the basic human rights and freedoms throughout Germany and freedom of activity for democratic parties and organizations. A truly democratic development of Germany is impossible unless the fascist, militarist and revanchist parties and organizations of every variety which have always exerted a pernicious influence on the minds of the German people and spiritually prepared them for predatory wars are completely eliminated from the social and political life of the country. For this reason, the proposed Draft Peace Treaty envisages an unconditional ban on the activities of such organizations.

The Soviet Draft Peace Treaty offers wide possibilities for the development of economy, science and culture in Germany, affords the German people every opportunity to show such qualities as their in-

368

dustriousness, their talent for organisation and their technical prowess to the full in the work of peaceful construction. Any discrimination against Germany in respect of trade with other countries, navigation and the access to world markets is excluded.

The Soviet Government proposes to regard as completely settled the question of reparations from Germany in compensation for the damage caused by her to the Allied and Associated Powers during the war, and to write into the peace treaty a waiver by the said Powers of any claims against Germany with regard to further payment of reparations. We submit this proposal in spite of the fact that Germany has paid compensation for only a small part of the damage caused by the fascist aggression. The settlement which we are proposing for this problem is motivated by feelings of good will towards the German people, and takes into account the fact that during the post-war period the German people have shown in many ways that they condemn the crimes committed against the peoples of Europe in the course of the aggression launched by the Hitlerites.

The conclusion of a peace treaty would greatly facilitate the unification of Germany in accordance with the national aspirations of the German people. The acceptance and bona fide fulfillment of the provisions of the peace treaty by both German States will remove the barriers on the road to a rapprochement between the GDR and the FRG, and will lead to the development of fruitful co-operation between them.

The Soviet Draft Peace Treaty provides for the Contracting Parties to render every assistance to both German States in order that this aim may be achieved, and to refrain from such actions as might hinder the unification of Germany.

The Soviet Government's proposal on the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany includes a simultaneous solution of the Berlin question; this solution would thereby become an integral part of the general peace settlement with Germany. The quadripartite agreements which determined the procedure for the administration and occupation of Germany, including Berlin, would naturally lapse with the signing of the peace treaty. The occupation regime which is still maintained in West Berlin, would thereby be ended, and the soil which nurtures the very causes of friction between States would be removed. In this connexion there arises the question of the future status of West Berlin, pending the restoration of German unity, and of Berlin's becoming once again the capital of a united German State. The Soviet Government believes that the most appropriate solution would be to give West Berlin the status of a demilitarized Free City. This is the solution of the Berlin question which is envisaged in Article 25 of the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty; it enjoys the full sup-

369

port of the Government of the GDR on whose territory West Berlin is situated.

We are prepared to work out, together with other States concerned, appropriate guarantees to ensure that the proposed status of West Berlin is respected so that there would be no interference in the life of the Free City from any quarter and so that its independence, as well as its commercial, cultural and other ties with the countries of both West and East would be assured. If the proposal for a Free City were put into effect a healthier situation would be created not only in Berlin but also throughout Germany; at the same time, the arrangement would not introduce any changes in the social and economic order which already exists in West Berlin.

Such are the more important provisions of the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany. If we are asked what the major merits of this Draft are, our answer is as follows: the Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany offers a solid guarantee of security both to the past victims of Hitlerite aggression and to the German people themselves, who in the past have more than had to pay in millions of human lives for the sanguinary adventures of German militarists.

The growing awareness both in Europe and outside Europe of the necessity for concluding a peace treaty with Germany without further delay is proved by the wide response and support with which the recent Soviet proposals on this question have been met.

The Soviet delegation is prepared to do its best to find a mutually acceptable basis for a prompt solution of the question of a peace treaty with Germany through an appropriate agreement between all parties concerned. We propose that we take the Soviet Draft as a basis for examining the question of a peace treaty at our conference and we submit it at this Meeting as an official document from the Soviet Government. Naturally, we are also prepared to consider any proposals designed to bring about the speedy conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany which may be made by other members of the conference.

Yesterday Mr. Herter, the U.S. Secretary of State, submitted on behalf of the Governments of the three Western Powers, for consideration by our conference, an extensive document containing the proposals of those Governments on various international questions.

This document deals with: disarmament problems; the Berlin question; European security problems; the unification of Germany; and, finally, a peace settlement with Germany. And, we are told, this document is to be regarded as an inseparable whole.

We listened attentively to the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State and to the Foreign Ministers of France and Great Britain who spoke after him. The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity of expressing its attitude to such a method, whereby compli-

370

cated questions which are different in character, are lumped together,
with the result that it becomes still more complicated—indeed im-
possible—to solve them. Should such a path be followed only one
result could be achieved: complete deadlock from the very outset.

Naturally, the Soviet delegation will at a later stage state its views
on the substance of the proposals contained in the three-Power
document.

All the essentials for a prompt solution of the question of a peace
treaty with Germany already exist: the desire of the peoples to re-
move the last traces of the recent war and to establish, at last, the
conditions for a stable peace in Europe and a proper representation
of Germany in the form of the two German States whose Govern-
ments are vested with the necessary sovereign authority to sign a
peace treaty in the name of the whole of Germany and to assure
compliance with its terms. Now everything will depend on the good
will of the Governments of the four great Powers, on whether they
will be willing once again to travel the road of fruitful peaceful
co-operation.

As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, it will, as we have al-
ready stated, spare no effort to help the work of our conference to
proceed in a constructive atmosphere, in the spirit of friendly co-
operation, and to ensure that a peace treaty with Germany is drawn
up. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that its efforts towards
this noble aim will meet with the understanding and support of the
other participants of the conference.

We should now like to hear the views of other delegations on the
question under consideration.

Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Soviet Draft
Peace Treaty With Germany, May 15, 1959¹

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America,
the French Republic, Australia, the People's Republic of Albania,
Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the People's Re-
public of Bulgaria, Brazil, the Hungarian People's Republic, Greece,
Denmark, India, Italy, Canada, the Chinese People's Republic, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Polish
People's Republic, the Romanian People's Republic, the Ukrainian
Soviet Socialist Republic, Finland, the Czechoslovak Republic, the

¹ Conference doc. RM/DOC/11, May 15, 1959.

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Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Union of South Africa, as States which participated with their armed forces in the war against Germany, designated hereafter as "the Allied and Associated Powers", on the one part,

And Germany, represented at the present time by the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany (or, in the event of a German Confederation being formed prior to the signing of the peace treaty, the German Confederation, and also the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany), on the other part,

Noting that the further maintenance of the profoundly abnormal situation under which foreign troops continue to remain on German territory in the 14th year after the cessation of hostilities cannot be justified, and the German nation continues to be deprived of the possibility of fully exercising its state sovereignty, of maintaining equal relations with other States and is outside the United Nations;

Being guided by the desire to carry out under existing conditions the basic provisions contained in the documents of the anti-Hitler coalition and in particular the Potsdam agreement;

Considering that the absence of a peace settlement precludes the possibility of ensuring a just regard for the legitimate national interests of the German people and to a considerable extent helps to increase the tension and instability in Europe;

Being united in their intention finally to draw a line under the war which was unleashed by Hitler's Germany and which brought in calculable calamities and suffering to many peoples, including the German people;

Recognizing that during the years which have passed since the cessation of hostilities, the German people have demonstrated in many ways that they condemn the crimes which were committed against the people of Europe as a result of the aggression unleashed by German militarism;

Firmly resolved not to permit Germany to threaten its neighbours or other States and unleash a new war at any time again;

Desirous of securing for Germany the possibility of peaceful and democratic development and its fruitful co-operation with other States as an equal member of the family of nations;

Convinced that the conclusion of a peace treaty will be of exceptionally serious importance for guaranteeing security in Europe and strengthening peace throughout the world;

Considering that the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is a necessary and important step towards restoring the national unity of Germany;

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Have decided to conclude the present peace treaty and for this purpose have designated the undersigned as their plenipotentiary representatives, who, after the presentation of their full powers, found in due and proper form, have agreed to the following provisions:

# PART 1

## POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL PROVISIONS

### I. Peace and Peaceful Relations

#### Article 1

The Allied and Associated Powers, on the one part, and Germany, on the other, note and confirm the cessation of a state of war and the establishment of peaceful relations between themselves, and that accordingly all the political and judicial consequences deriving therefrom will become effective from the moment of the entry into force of the relevant declaration or decree of each of the Allied and Associated Powers.

#### Article 2

Pending the unification of Germany in one form or another the term "Germany" in this treaty shall be understood to include the two existing German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—and all the rights and obligations of Germany, provided for in the treaty, shall relate both to the German Democratic Republic and to the Federal Republic of Germany.

#### Article 3

The Allied and Associated Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the German people over Germany, including its territorial waters and airspace.

#### Article 4

1. The Allied and Associated Powers declare that they will establish their relations with Germany on the basis of observance of the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Germany, non-intervention in its internal affairs, non-aggression, equality, and mutual advantage, and also on the basis of the provisions of this treaty.

Germany shall be guided by the same principles in its relations with all countries.

2. Germany undertakes to settle its international disputes solely by peaceful means in such a way as not to endanger international peace and security. Germany also undertakes to refrain in its international

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relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
violability or political independence of any State and not to give any
aid or support to any State or group of States violating international
peace and security.

Article 5

1. Germany undertakes not to join any military alliances directed against any State which is a participant in this treaty, and also not to take part in military alliances which do not include all of the four principal Allied Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

2. The Allied and Associated Powers shall respect Germany's undertaking not to participate in the military alliances referred to in paragraph 1, and shall refrain from any actions in regard to Germany which might involve direct or indirect violation by it of this undertaking.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers shall take all the necessary steps to enable Germany to participate on an equal footing in measures designed to strengthen general European security and to establish a security system in Europe, founded on the joint efforts of the European States.

4. With the coming into force of this treaty, Germany—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—shall be considered relieved of the obligations arising out of membership in the Warsaw Pact Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance and the West European Union respectively.

Article 6

Germany recognizes the full validity of the peace treaties with
Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland.

Article 7

Following the coming into force of this treaty the Allied and Associated Powers shall support Germany's application for membership in the United Nations.

II. *Frontiers*

Article 8

The frontiers of Germany shall be those which existed on 1 January 1959. The frontiers of Germany are shown on the map attached to this treaty (annex no. 1).¹

¹ Annex 1 not printed here.

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Pending the unification of Germany in a single State, the territories of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany shall be delimited by the line existing on 1 January, 1959, as shown on the map attached to the treaty (annex no. 1).

### Article 9

In conformity with the Potsdam agreement of 1945:

A) Germany renounces all rights, legal titles and claims to the former German territories east of the line passing from the Baltic Sea slightly west of Swinemuende and from there along the Oder River to its confluence with the Western Neisse and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including the territory of the former East Prussia and the territory of the former city of Danzig which have come under the sovereignty of the Polish People's Republic, which sovereignty Germany recognizes.

B) Germany renounces all rights, legal titles and claims to the former city of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area which have come under the sovereignty of the U.S.S.R., which sovereignty Germany recognizes.

### Article 10

Germany acknowledges as null and void the Munich agreement with all its ensuing consequences and declares that it will always recognize the territory of the former so-called Sudeten Region as an inviolable constituent part of the national territory of the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

### Article 11

Germany recognizes that the territory of Alsace-Lorraine is a constituent part of the Republic of France.

The Saar District is part of the territory of Germany.

### Article 12

Germany confirms and recognizes the changes and delimitation of its frontiers carried out in accordance with the agreements concluded with neighbouring States between May 1945 and 1 January, 1959.

## III. *Germany and Austria*

### Article 13

1. Germany recognizes the full validity of the State Treaty for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria of 15 May, 1955 and the prohibition of Anschluss contained therein.

2. Accordingly, Germany shall respect the sovereignty and independence of Austria and shall renounce all territorial and political claims in regard to Austria and Austrian territory.

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3. Germany recognizes and undertakes to respect the permanent neutrality of Austria as defined by the Federal Constitutional Law of Austria enacted by the Austrian Parliament on October 26, 1955.

4. To prevent the danger of Anschluss, a political or economic union between Germany and Austria is prohibited. Germany fully acknowledges its responsibility in this matter and shall not enter into a political or economic union with Austria in any form whatsoever.

Germany shall not conclude any agreement with Austria, undertake any actions or carry out any measures likely, directly or indirectly, to promote its political or economic union with Austria, or impair the territorial integrity, political or economic independence of Austria. Germany further undertakes not to permit on its territory any actions likely, directly or indirectly, to promote such a union and it shall prevent the existence, resurgence and activity of any organizations having as their aim political or economic union with Austria and propaganda in favour of such union.

#### IV. *The Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual*

##### Article 14

1. Germany undertakes to carry out all the necessary measures to ensure that all persons under German jurisdiction without distinction as to race, sex, language, religion, nationality, origin or political beliefs shall enjoy human rights and the fundamental freedoms, including personal freedom, freedom of speech, press and publication, religious worship, political opinion, association and public assembly.

2. Germany further undertakes that the laws in force on its territory shall not, both as regards their content and their application, discriminate or entail any discrimination between persons of German citizenship on the grounds of their race, sex, language, religion, nationality, origin, political beliefs, or party affiliation, whether in reference to their persons, property, occupation, professional or financial interests, status, political or civil rights or any other matter.

3. Past membership in the National Socialist Party or in organizations affiliated to or controlled by it, of any German citizen may not serve as grounds for restricting the rights and freedoms provided for in paragraph 1, if the rights of the person concerned have not been restricted by a court of law.

4. Persons of German nationality, resettled in Germany from other countries in accordance with the decisions of the Potsdam conference of 1945, shall enjoy on the territory of Germany all the rights referred to in paragraph 1 without any discrimination, as equal German citizens.

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### Article 15

No German authority or German citizen shall persecute or otherwise oppress any person for having, during the second world war, acted in favour of the Allied and Associated Powers, or for expressing sympathy with their cause, or for having acted in the period prior to the coming into force of this treaty in a way calculated to facilitate implementation of the joint decisions on Germany of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., the United Kingdom and France, or of any proclamation, ordinance, order or instruction issued in pursuance of these decisions.

## V. Political Parties and Other Organizations

### Article 16

Germany shall guarantee freedom of activity for political parties and other organizations, with the exception of the parties and organizations referred to in Articles 13, 17 and 18, allowing them the right freely to decide their internal affairs, hold conferences and meetings and enjoy freedom of press and publication.

### Article 17

Germany undertakes not to permit, on pain of punishment under criminal law, the resurgence, existence and activity on German territory of the National-Socialist Party and organizations affiliated to or controlled by it, including political, military and paramilitary organizations, or the emergence and activities of similar parties and organizations, in particular revanchist parties and organizations demanding revision of Germany's frontiers or making territorial claims on other States.

### Article 18

Germany undertakes to dissolve and, on pain of punishment under criminal law, not to permit on its territory the existence and activity of any organizations whatsoever, including émigré organizations, engaged in hostile activities against any Allied or Associated Power. Germany shall not grant political asylum to persons belonging to the aforesaid organizations.

## VI. Other Clauses

### Article 19

Germany recognizes the verdict of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and the verdicts of other courts on criminal offences envisaged in the Tribunal's Charter, committed within Germany and beyond her frontiers.

544645—60—27

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### Article 20

Germany undertakes not to permit propaganda in any form calculated or likely to create a danger to peace or intensify it, violation of peace, or an act of aggression, including war propaganda and any kind of revenge statements putting forward demands for the revision of Germany's frontiers or territorial claims on other countries.

### Article 21

1. Germany shall render every assistance to the repatriation of citizens of the Allied and Associated Powers who found themselves on German territory as a result of the war.

2. For their part, the Allied and Associated Powers shall, in so far as this has not already been done, render similar assistance in the repatriation of German citizens who found themselves on the territories of the Allied and Associated Powers as a result of the war.

3. The Allied Powers undertake, in so far as this has not already been done by them, to return to Germany within six months after the coming into force of this treaty, all German specialists who left the country under coercion during or after the war. The provisions of this article shall not apply to persons who left Germany of their own accord.

## PART 2

### PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED GERMANY

#### Article 22

The Allied and Associated Powers acknowledge the right of the German people to re-establish the unity of Germany, and express their readiness to render to both German states every assistance in the achievement of this aim on the basis of a rapprochement and understanding between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The two German states, as well as the Allied and Associated Powers regard the present Treaty as an important contribution to the unification of Germany in accordance with the national aspirations of the German people and also with the interests of European and world security.

#### Article 23

Whereas any attempt to solve the question of the unification of Germany by force would be fraught with the danger of a war entailing incalculable disasters for the peoples of Europe, and above all for the German people themselves, the German Democratic Republic

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and the Federal Republic of Germany solemnly pledge themselves never to resort to force or the threat of force for the purpose of unifying Germany, and shall resolve any disputes which may arise in their mutual relationships by peaceful methods.

### Article 24

The present Treaty shall remain in force after the re-establishment of German unity, and its provisions shall extend to the united German state.

### Article 25

Pending the re-establishment of German unity and the creation of a united German State, West Berlin shall have the status of a demilitarized Free City with a special Statute of its own.

## PART 3

### MILITARY PROVISIONS

#### Article 26

Germany shall have its own national armed forces (land, air, and naval), as necessary for ensuring the country's defence.

#### Article 27

The following persons shall not be permitted to serve in the armed forces:

(a) Persons convicted by the courts of countries which were in a state of war with Germany, or by German courts, for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, or war crimes;

(b) Persons not having German citizenship;

(c) Persons of non-German nationality who found themselves on the territory of Germany during and after the war, irrespective of whether or not they subsequently acquired German citizenship.

#### Article 28

Germany shall not possess, produce, acquire, or experiment with

(a) any form of nuclear armament or other means of mass destruction, including biological and chemical weapons;

(b) any form of rockets or guided missiles or any apparatus or installations connected with the launching or control of such weapons;

(c) aircraft designed basically as bombers and adapted for carrying bombs or shells;

(d) submarines.

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### Article 29

Germany shall not possess, produce, or acquire either through state or private channels, or in any other way, war materials and equipment, or maintain productive potential for their manufacture in excess of her requirements for the maintenance of the armed forces permitted under article 26 of the present Treaty; nor shall Germany export any military materials and equipment from German territory to other countries.

### Article 30

All foreign troops which are in Germany shall be withdrawn from Germany not later than within one year from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force.

(Or: After the present Treaty comes into force, all foreign troops which are in Germany shall be withdrawn from Germany within time limits to be agreed on by the interested Parties, with the proviso that within 6 months from the moment when the Treaty comes into force, the numerical strength of foreign forces stationed on the territory of Germany will be reduced by one-third).

Simultaneously with the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany all foreign military bases on the territory of Germany shall be abolished.

In future, Germany shall not permit the presence of any foreign armed forces or foreign military bases on her territory.

### Article 31

Germany undertakes to respect, preserve, and maintain the graves on German territory of Servicemen, prisoners of war, and nationals of Powers which were in a state of war with Germany, who were forcibly brought to Germany; the tombstones and emblems on these graves; and the memorials to the military glory of the armies which fought against Hitler Germany.

The Allied and Associated Powers shall, on their part, ensure the proper maintenance of designated graves of German Servicemen which are on their territories.

## PART 4

### ECONOMIC PROVISIONS

#### Article 32

No restrictions shall be imposed on Germany in the development of her peaceful economy, which should serve to enhance the welfare of the German people.

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Similarly, no restrictions shall be imposed in respect of Germany's trade with other countries, or in respect of navigation, or in respect of her access to world markets.

### Article 33

After the withdrawal of foreign troops from German territory all German property which has been used by the armed forces of the foreign States on German territory and for which compensation has not been paid shall either be returned to its owners, or suitable compensation shall be paid for it.

### Article 34

1. Insofar as she has not already done so, Germany shall restore the legitimate rights and interests of the Allied or Associated Powers and their nationals in Germany as of 1 September, 1939, or as of 30 September, 1938, in the case of the Czechoslovak Republic and its nationals, and shall return the property of the Allied and Associated Powers and their nationals or make compensation. The procedure and terms on which the provisions of the present Article shall be implemented will be defined by special agreements between Germany and the States concerned.

The term "property" means movable or immovable property, material or nonmaterial, including industrial, literary, and art property, and also rights and interests of any kind in property.

2. The existence of a state of war shall not in itself be regarded as a factor affecting the obligation to repay monetary debts arising out of obligations and contracts which existed before the state of war came into existence.

3. Germany undertakes not to permit any discrimination with regard to the satisfaction of claims to compensation for damage caused to citizens of the Allied or Associated Powers, irrespective of the nature of the compensation due, or of the organization or institution meeting the claim.

### Article 35

Germany recognizes the rights of any Allied or Associated Power to German assets abroad which have been transferred to that power by virtue of agreements between the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France.

Germany recognizes the provisions contained in the State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria regarding German assets in Austria.

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## Article 36

1. Germany waives, on her own behalf and on behalf of German organizations and nationals, all claims of any description against the Allied and Associated Powers, their organizations or nationals, arising directly out of the war or out of actions taken because of the war in Europe after 1 September, 1939, irrespective of whether or not the Allied or Associated Power concerned was at war with Germany at the time.

This renunciation of claims includes, in particular, the following:

(a) claims for losses or damages sustained in consequence of actions by the armed forces or authorities of the Allied or Associated Powers;

(b) claims arising out of the presence, operations or actions of the armed forces and authorities of Allied or Associated Powers on German territory;

(c) claims with respect to the decrees or orders of the Prize Courts of Allied or Associated Powers, Germany agreeing to accept as valid and binding all decrees and orders of such Prize Courts issued after 1 September, 1939, in relation to German maritime and river vessels, or German cargoes, or payment of costs;

(d) claims arising out of the exercise of belligerent rights, or out of measures taken in the exercise of such rights.

2. Germany's renunciation of claims under paragraph 1 of this Article covers any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied or Associated Powers with respect to German sea and river vessels after 1 September, 1939, as well as any claims and debts arising out of international Conventions on prisoners of war now in force.

3. The provisions of this Article shall bar, completely and finally, all claims of the nature referred to herein, which shall henceforward be extinguished, whoever may be the parties in interest. The German Government agrees to make equitable compensation in marks to persons who furnished supplies or services on requisition to the armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers on German territory and in satisfaction of non-combat damage claims which have arisen on German territory against the armed forces of the Allied or Associated Powers.

## Article 37

Germany waives all Government claims, all claims of public German juridical persons, German private juridical persons and German nationals connected with territories that have been returned to other States and have been transferred to their sovereignty.

382

### Article 38

The States to which sovereignty over part of the former territory of Germany has been transferred are not responsible for obligations arising out of the debts of the German State, German municipalities or German public institutions, or for any other legal questions of a public or private character that arose prior to 8 May, 1945 and are connected with the territory concerned.

### Article 39

1. Germany agrees to enter into negotiations with any Allied or Associated Power and conclude treaties and agreements on trade and navigation, after granting each Allied or Associated Power most-favoured-nation treatment on a reciprocal basis.

2. Germany shall not permit discrimination or artificial restrictions in any matter concerning her trade with Allied or Associated Powers. For their part, the Allied and Associated Powers shall adhere to the same principle in trade with Germany.

3. Germany shall not grant any exclusive rights to, or discriminate against, any country whatsoever with regard to the operation, within her boundaries, of commercial aircraft in international traffic; shall afford all the Allied and Associated Powers, on a reciprocal basis, equal opportunities in obtaining, on German territory, international commercial aviation rights, including the right to land for refuelling and repair. These provisions should not affect the interests of Germany's national defence.

### Article 40

Germany undertakes to allow Austria the right of unhampered transit and communication without customs duties or charges between Salzburg and Lofer (Salzburg) via Reichenhall-Steinpass and between Scharnith (Tyrol) and Ehrwald (Tyrol) via Garmisch-Partenkirchen.

## PART 5

### REPARATIONS AND RESTITUTION

#### Article 41

The question of German reparations in compensation for damages caused by Germany to the Allied and Associated Powers during the war shall be considered fully settled, and the Allied and Associated Powers renounce all claims against Germany with regard to further reparation payments.

383

### Article 42

Insofar as she has not already done so, Germany undertakes to return in proper condition identifiable objects of artistic, historical or archeological value that constitute part of the cultural property of Allied or Associated Powers and were transported to Germany from their respective territories by force or coercion.

Claims for the restitution of the aforesaid objects may be presented within twelve months from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force.

Germany shall also transfer to those States to which part of former German territory has been returned or placed under their sovereignty, all historical, juridical, administrative and technical archives, together with maps and plans, relating to these territories.

## PART 6

### FINAL PROVISIONS

#### Article 43

Upon the coming into force of the present Peace Treaty, Germany shall be released from all obligations under international treaties and agreements concluded by the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Government of the German Federal Republic prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty which are in contradiction to the provisions of the Treaty.

#### Article 44

Any dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of this Treaty which is not settled through direct diplomatic negotiation or by some other procedure by agreement between the contending Parties, shall be referred to a Commission composed of representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic. Should the Commission fail to agree on a solution after two months, and if the contending Parties have not arrived at an agreement on an alternative procedure for its settlement, the dispute shall be referred to a Commission composed of one representative from each Party and a third member chosen, by agreement, from the nationals of a third country.

#### Article 45

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and shall come into force immediately upon deposit of instruments of ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain

384

and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, France and Germany. With respect to each Power which shall subsequently ratify the Treaty or accede to it, it shall come into force upon the deposit of its instruments of ratification or accession.

2. If the Treaty does not come into force within ten months after the deposit of Germany's instruments of ratification, any State which has ratified it can bring the Treaty into force between itself and Germany by notifying Germany and the depository State to this effect within three years of the deposit of Germany's instruments of ratification.

### Article 46

Any State which was at war with Germany and is not signatory to this Treaty may accede to it.

### Article 47

The present Treaty grants no rights, title or advantages to non-signatory Powers, and no German rights, title or interests shall be regarded as impaired in favour of these Powers by any provision of the present Treaty.

### Article 48

The present Treaty and all the instruments of ratification and accession shall be deposited with the Government of _______________, which shall furnish certified copies to each of the signatory and acceding Powers, and shall also inform them of further ratifications and accessions.

In faith whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in _______________ in the Russian, English, French and German languages, all texts being equally authentic.

## News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower, June 3, 1959¹

[Extracts]

Q. Mr. President, when the Big-Four Foreign Ministers were here last week, you expressed the hope for what you called a measure of progress at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' meeting as being necessary for a later summit conference.² And against that background, I would like to ask you a two-part question:

¹ For complete text of news conference, see White House news release, June 3, 1959.

² See statement by White House press secretary James C. Hagerty, May 28, 1959 (Department of State Bulletin, June 15, 1959, pp. 865-866).

385

One, sir, whether you have detected from Geneva any evidence of
this progress which you feel is necessary as a prologue to a summit
meeting; and second, whether from Geneva or the statements re-
cently by Premier Khrushchev, whether you sense any cooling off by
the Russians toward the idea of a summit meeting?

The President: Well, the first answer is no, there has not been any
detectable progress that to my mind would justify the holding of a
summit meeting.

Now, I think I have expressed before my readiness to interpret
satisfactory progress or define satisfactory progress rather liberally,
because it would be unrealistic to believe that the Foreign Ministers
could make a number of agreements that would be significant to the
world and that would of themselves promote a much more peaceful
situation in the world. This is because these Foreign Ministers are,
after all, acting for someone else, and for delegates of their govern-
ments, and these matters have to be brought back and studied
carefully.

Nevertheless, I think that as the very least, we should expect that,
as Mr. Herter said in his opening statement, that we could see where
we are apart on issues, whether we could define the areas where it
was going to be worth while for us to confer; that is, at the summit.¹

Q. Mr. President, a moment ago, when you were discussing the
Berlin situation, I believe you said that you felt there should be a
clear commitment of the Western—on the Soviet part, as to Western
rights in West Berlin. Do you mean, sir, that this commitment
should be made as part of the agreement to have a summit meeting,
or do you mean that this commitment should be made without any
time limit and not merely to get to the summit, so to speak?

The President: I say that until the Germans participate them-
selves, as a whole, in settling these problems we ought not to have
any more questions or difficulty about the Berlin question.—that's
what I mean.

Q. Well, may I ask, then, do you mean that this commitment
should be given before—as a condition, in your mind, for having a
summit meeting?

The President: Well, I don't like to call it condition. I would
just say this: I don't see how the head of any self-respecting gov-

¹ For Secretary Herter's statement of May 13, 1959, see *Foreign Ministers' Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 34-37.

386

ernment can go to an international conference in response to any
kind of thing that can be interpreted as a threat.

Q. Mr. President, if there is satisfactory progress at a Foreign
Ministers' level at Geneva, what would you think of the concept of
a series of summit meetings at which the world leaders could get
together and try to ease world tensions?

The President: Well, I have no opinion about this because it would
be entirely on the basis of results and the promise of further results.
I have put myself on the record, as often as I was asked the question,
that I am ready to go anywhere, any time, where I am quite certain
that tensions will be lessened and where the confidence of people will
raise rather than be decreased.

Now, I see, after you go to one meeting, it could very well be the
kind of results—say, “Well, this is profitable. All right, we will
go another time.” I have no objection as long as there is improvement
and progress.

Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Western Proposal
on Berlin, June 16, 1959¹

[Draft Agreement]

1. The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have examined the question of Berlin in the desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been raised and which derive essentially from the division of Berlin and of Germany. They agreed that the best solution for these problems would be the reunification of Germany. They recognized, however, that pending reunification, the existing situation and the Agreements at present in force can be modified in certain respects and have consequently agreed upon the following:

(a) The Soviet Foreign Minister has made known the decision of the Soviet Government no longer to maintain forces in Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that it is the intention of their Governments to limit the combined total of their forces in Berlin to the present

¹Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 3, 1959, p. 153. The proposal was handed to Foreign Minister Gromyko.

387

figure (approximately 11,000) and to continue to arm these forces
only with conventional weapons as at present. The three Ministers
further declare that their Governments will from time to time con-
sider the possibility of reducing such forces if developments in the
situation permit.

(b) The Ministers agreed that there shall continue to be free and unrestricted access to West Berlin by land, by water and by air for all persons, goods and communications, including those of the French, United Kingdom and United States forces stationed in West Berlin. The procedures applicable shall be those in effect in April 1959. However, without prejudice to existing basic responsibilities, these procedures may where it is not already the case be carried out by German personnel.

The Ministers likewise reaffirmed that freedom of movement will
continue to be maintained between East and West Berlin.

All disputes which might arise with respect to access will be
raised and settled between the four Governments. The latter will
establish a quadripartite Commission which will meet in Berlin to
examine any difficulties arising out of the application of the present
sub-paragraph and to facilitate their settlement. The Commission
may make arrangements if necessary to consult German experts.

2. The Ministers consider that measures should be taken consistent with fundamental rights and liberties to avoid in both parts of Berlin activities which might either disturb public order or seriously affect the rights and interests, or amount to interference in the internal affairs, of others.

3. The Ministers agreed that unless subsequently modified by Four
Power agreement these arrangements will continue in force until the
reunification of Germany.

News Conference Statements by President Eisenhower,
June 17, 1959 ¹

[Extracts]

Q. Mr. President, in view of the recent developments in Geneva,
sir, do you feel that the prospects for a summit conference have
grown dimmer since we last discussed this with you two weeks ago?

¹ For complete text of news conference, see White House news release, June 17, 1959.

388

The President: Well, certainly they have grown no brighter, unfortunately. There seems to be, if not an impasse, an unreadiness to discuss things that could be classed as giving us possibilities for fruitful negotiations at the summit, and therefore I'd say the prospects are no brighter at this moment.

Q. Mr. President, assuming that the Foreign Ministers meeting does recess or break down without the kind of agreement you refer to, do you consider that Vice President Nixon's trip to Moscow next month might offer a new channel of negotiation with the Russians on these problems?

The President: Well, I hadn't thought of it as that, as a mechanism for reopening negotiations.

I would say this: We would never lose any opportunity that would arise through the contact of any responsible official of any government with his opposite number or with the other government to bring about some advance. I understand, for example, Mr. Koslov ¹ is asking to see me, and I certainly shall make an engagement some way so he can come to see me.

Q. Mr. President, with respect to a meeting at the summit, you made it quite clear in our last meeting, I think, that no head of a self-respecting government could go into a negotiation with other heads of government under any kind of ultimatum, such as the Soviets have imposed on Berlin.

I wondered, does the Soviet failure to withdraw that ultimatum mean to you that you could not go into a summit negotiation on other questions, such as disarmament, nuclear test suspension, or any others?

The President: I don't recall that I put my conclusion and my statement of a couple of weeks ago on the basis just of Berlin. I said that if a Foreign Ministers' meeting made such progress as to give to any reasonable person the belief that that progress would make a summit meeting fruitful, then I would be glad to go; because certainly I am not going to indulge just prejudice or preconceived notions or anything else to such an extent that it will stand in the way of some kind of tiny step toward easing tensions in the world.

So, if I did tie that directly to the Berlin bit, I did it only as an example. If there is any kind of reasonable progress that justifies a summit meeting, why, of course I would never decline the opportunity.

Q. Mr. President, there appears to be some sentiment in Britain for a summit conference, even if the Geneva Foreign Ministers meet-

¹ Frol. R. Kozlov, First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Union, who visited the United States beginning June 28, 1959.

389

ing winds up without any substantial progress of easing the Berlin and other problems. What do you think of this idea?

The President: I sometimes hesitate to speak at too great length here because I have always a feeling I've spoken to you before so often on these things that I'm just putting on an old record.

What I want to point out is that there is developing in the world sort of an idea that heads of government can take themselves away from their normal posts and go and do a lot of things that cannot be otherwise accomplished.

Now, the Foreign Ministers of free countries are people who go to conferences clothed with a very great deal of authority. The governments involved normally try to establish limits within which their Foreign Minister can negotiate. He communicates with his own government every single night. There are exchanges of telegrams and cables to keep him informed and to keep the Government informed so that from the standpoint of traditional diplomacy the Foreign Minister provides the mechanism, either he or his Ambassadors or the Government's Ambassadors, provide the mechanism through which these agreements are supposed to be obtained.

Now, everybody knows that when you are dealing in a dictatorship, there is only one man, finally, that can make the decision, a firm decision, final decision. Therefore, there has grown the, what I believe to be a false doctrine that we should revamp our entire diplomatic procedures in order to go to a summit meeting every thirty days or so.

Now, from my viewpoint, the dictator can give his Foreign Minister just as much flexibility in dealing with these troublesome and tough questions as can a democracy. Therefore, I think to assume that Foreign Ministers have now become useless, they are no good and throw them away and make every single head of government or head of state to spend his time in work that has been the function of specialists in this line,—I think is a step backward in diplomacy. This is like Alexander and Napoleon meeting on a raft in a river and settling the fate of the then world.

You can't do that. And to my mind, if these Foreign Minister meetings cannot prepare the ground and at least—and sow some of the seed for accord, then I see no use whatsoever for trying to have a harvest when there is no planting and no tilling.

Q. Mr. President, yesterday Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson said that he thought this attack on the Navy patrol plane was deliberately timed at the time of the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference to create tensions.

390

Do you agree with that, sir, and have you yet determined who did it?

The President: Well, of course, I always try to get away from motives.

Now, we don't know who did it, don't know who did it; and while you might say it is more than coincidence that such a thing has happened—to give a, to supply a motive where you are not sure is just some kind of wisdom that I don't have. So I would say that it does seem a strange coincidence, and let it go at that.

## Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Presenting a Soviet Proposal on Berlin, June 19, 1959¹

*Unofficial translation*

In the course of the work of the Foreign Ministers' Conference a useful exchange of opinions took place on the question of West Berlin and on the establishment of an all-German committee. Notwithstanding the fact that certain differences of opinion and difficulties [were] revealed, the work which has already been done by the Conference is of certain positive significance. The exchange of opinions permitted to know better the positions of sides, to discern more clearly the degree of differences and to try to bring the views on these questions to some extent closer.

Taking into account the position of the Western Powers and the actual situation the Soviet delegation submitted on June 9-10 for the consideration by the Conference new proposals on the Berlin question and on an all-German committee [,] which proposals in our opinion offer a good basis to solve these questions.²

We regret that the Western Powers took a negative attitude as regards our proposals but we believe the main objection against our proposals, that is on the period the interim agreement on West Berlin is to remain in force and on an all-German committee, to be based on a misunderstanding or on incorrect conception of the essence of our proposals.

¹Text from U.S. doc. US/DEL/WP/49, June 20, 1959.

The statement was made at a private Four-Power meeting at 2 p.m. At the conclusion of the meeting Gromyko handed to his colleagues a paper containing the portion of his remarks which the editors have set off by brackets in the middle of this statement.

²For Gromyko's statement on June 10, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 260-266.

391

The essence of the proposals is that since the Western Powers are not at present prepared to agree to an immediate and complete elimination of the occupation regime in West Berlin, the Soviet Government gave its consent not to object against the preservation for a definite time-limit of certain occupation rights of the Three Powers in West Berlin. What we proposed was to work out an agreement on a temporary settlement of the West Berlin question which would remain in force for a definite period. An all-German committee should meanwhile [be established?] to work out specific measures for the preparation and conclusion of a German peace treaty and for the unification of Germany.

Thus, the essence of the Soviet Government's proposals is to eliminate gradually an abnormal situation in West Berlin and to prepare a peace treaty and measures for Germany's unification.

[On the basis of the exchange of views held at our Conference and taking into account the considerations put forward by the Western Powers, the Soviet Government believes that it is quite possible to find an acceptable basis for agreement on the Berlin question and on the question of an all-German committee.

An agreement on an interim status of West Berlin should, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, include agreement on the following:

- Reduction of the occupation forces of the Western Powers in West Berlin to symbolic contingents;

- Termination of subversive activities from West Berlin against the GDR and other socialist states;

- Non-location in West Berlin of atomic and rocket weapons.

These are the measures relating to West Berlin that we should agree upon in the first place.

The question of a time-limit of that agreement is a matter neither of major importance, nor of principle to us. The Soviet Government is proceeding from the premise that it is impossible to delay a peace settlement with Germany and to preserve the occupation regime in West Berlin ad infinitum. If the one year time-limit indicated by the Soviet Government does not suit the Western Powers, then we can agree upon another time-limit acceptable to all sides concerned. In the course of the Conference the Western Powers have indicated a definite time-limit for the functioning of an all-German committee, namely, two and a half years. We have indicated a one year time-limit. Now we should try to find something of a medium nature and to reach an agreed decision. We believe that it would be possible to agree upon a one and [a] half year time-limit. We are convinced that if agreement is achieved between us on main questions of principle no difficulties will arise in agreeing on necessary time-limits.

392

During the period agreed upon between the parties to the agreement the two German states will carry out measures relating to the establishment and activities of an all-German committee composed of the representatives of the GDR and FRG on a parity basis. The Committee should promote extension and development of contacts between the GDR and the FRG, discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

If during the agreed period no solution of the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and the unification of Germany can be reached within the framework of an all-German committee or otherwise, then the participants of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers of 1959 could resume the consideration of the West Berlin question.

Should we have to renew the discussion of the West Berlin question after the expiration of the said time-limit, such discussion should undoubtedly be conducted with due regard of a situation obtained by that time.

For the duration of the agreement the communications of West Berlin with the outside world will be preserved in their present form.

As it has already been pointed out in the proposals of the Soviet Government of June 9-10, a supervisory committee composed of the representatives of the United States, the USSR, Great Britain and France is proposed to be established to supervise the fulfillment of the obligations of the parties arising from the above-mentioned agreement on an interim status of West Berlin.

The above proposals of the Soviet Government meet the views expressed by the Western Powers and constitute a good basis for mutually acceptable agreement on the Berlin question and on an all-German committee.]

The Soviet delegation takes also cognizance of the fact that in the course of discussions at the Conference the position of the Western Powers and that of the Soviet Union were brought closer together on many questions touched upon in these proposals. This applies among other things, to the reduction of armed forces and non-location of atomic and rocket weapons in West Berlin, the termination of subversive activities, as well as to the necessity of setting up an all-German committee to facilitate a rapprochement of the two German states and to make easier their reunification and to the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany.

The Soviet Government hopes that the Governments of the USA, Britain and France will approach with due attention the said Soviet proposals and a mutually acceptable agreement will be reached.

544645—60—28

393

Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by the
Three Western Foreign Ministers, June 19, 1959¹

The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have examined the statement made to them this afternoon by Mr. Gromyko.² This statement was clearly timed to coincide with Mr. Khrushchev's speech today ³ in which the Western proposals of June 16 were characterized as "groundless and unacceptable". Mr. Gromyko's statement does not differ in any important aspects from the Soviet proposal of June 9 on which the Western Ministers clearly expressed their views in the meetings of June 10 and 12.⁴

Although the latest Soviet statement extends the time limit of the proposed agreement from one year to a year and half, it reserves to the Soviet Union freedom of unilateral action at the expiration of that period. Moreover it is clear that it is the Soviet intention that the Western Powers upon signing such an agreement would acquiesce in the liquidation of their rights in Berlin and the abandonment of their responsibility for maintaining the freedom of the people of West Berlin.

It is true that there is provision for a resumption of the consideration of the Berlin question by the Four Powers during or at the end of the year and a half period. But if no agreement has been reached in the meantime the Western Powers would enter into any negotiation at the end of that period without any rights at all so far as Berlin or the access to it were concerned.

In the light of these fundamental objections the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have concluded that the latest Soviet statement constitutes no change in the previous Soviet position. They consider that in the circumstances the wise course is to recess the conference for a period. They accordingly suggest that the next meeting be postponed until July 13. This interval would give the Soviet Government the opportunity of considering the Western proposals further. It would give the Western Governments the opportunity to consider the position in relation in particular to Mr. Khrushchev's statement of today and its connection with the future course of negotiations.

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, July 6, 1959, p. 3. The statement was submitted at the private Four-Power meeting at 5 p.m.

²*Supra*.

³For excerpts from the speech, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 316-328.

⁴See *ibid*., pp. 260-294.

394

Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva: Statement by
Foreign Minister Gromyko, June 19, 1959¹

Unofficial translation

In connection with the statement by the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain and France read by Mr. Herter,² I deem it necessary to make certain remarks. In that statement, in the part dealing with a one and a half year time-limit during which period the agreement on an interim status of West Berlin will remain in force, it is stated that the Soviet proposals do not allegedly change the substance of the matter. Whereas when we suggested the year and a half time-limit of the duration of the agreement we stated that we did not envisage any difficulties in reaching agreement in the question of a time-limit. The Western Powers have suggested a time-limit of 2.5 years, we have suggested another time-limit—1 year. We believe that it is possible to come to agreement on some intermediate time-limit and therefore we are now suggesting the year and a half. At the same time we emphasized that we did not consider the question of a time-limit to be a matter either of major importance or of principle. It is our profound belief that if agreement on major questions is achieved there will be no difficulties as to the duration of an agreement.

The statement by the three Ministers further speaks of some uni-
lateral action on the part of the Soviet Union. The Ministers of the
three Powers, judging by their words, interpret the statement made
by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. S.
Khrushchev, on June 19³ and the statements of the Soviet delegation
made here at the Conference as meaning that on the expiration of the
time-limit of the agreement indicated in the Soviet proposals the
Soviet Union allegedly reserves freedom of unilateral action. But
my colleagues know very well from our proposals and this is a fact
I mentioned at our first meeting today, that if no agreement is reached
within the all-German committee during the specified time-limit on
the questions it has to discuss, we propose that the states-participants
in the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers of 1959 resume the
consideration of the West Berlin question. In other words, what we
propose is to consider the whole of this question again at the Con-
ference composed of the same participants, i.e. to make this question
a subject of negotiations similar to those which we hold here now.

¹ U.S. doc. US/DEL/WP/50, June 20, 1959. The statement was issued in the evening.

² *Supra*.

³ For excerpts from the speech, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 316-328.

395

Such is our position.

It is difficult to understand the reason why in this case a question
of some unilateral action of the Soviet Union is being raised at all.

The Ministers of the Three Powers declare further that on the
expiration of the time-limit of one and a half year they are invited
allegedly to enter into negotiations in such a period when they would
have no rights in West Berlin. Naturally they are free to draw these
or those conclusions from our proposals but we are not bound by their
one-sided interpretation of our proposals. We do not touch upon
the rights of Western Powers in West Berlin in these proposals.
Therefore, the conclusion made in their statement is of an arbitrary
nature.

We should like to point out that as we submitted today our pro-
posals which were agreed with the Government of the German Demo-
cratic Republic, we expected a favorable reaction to them on the part
of the Ministers of the three Western Powers. We believe that the
statement they have just read is a result of only a preliminary exam-
ination of our proposals. We hope that the Governments of the
United States, Britain and France will thoroughly examine and think
over the proposals of the Soviet Government submitted by us today.
We would like to emphasize that these proposals have been submitted
not to make the situation more complicated but to facilitate achieving
agreement. We express the hope that this step by the Soviet Govern-
ment will be correctly understood by the Governments of the three
Western Powers.

As to the question of an interval in the work of our Conference
raised by the Ministers of the three Powers, we would like to state
that we are in favour of continuing negotiations and achieving posi-
tive results without an interval. If, however, Mr. Herter, Mr. Lloyd
and M. Couve de Murville insist on an interval in the work of the
Conference, we have to reckon with such position of theirs. But
we proceed from the assumption that the interval will be of the least
duration.

Radio-Television Report by Secretary of State Herter on
the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, June 23,
1959¹

Fellow Americans: President Eisenhower has asked me to report
to you tonight on where we stand after 6 weeks of the Geneva talks

¹Text from *Department of State Bulletin*, July 13, 1959, pp. 43-45.

396

with the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and the
Soviet Union.

I regret to say that no significant progress was made toward settle-
ment of the problem of the continued division of Germany and of
Berlin.

My Western colleagues and I did not go to Geneva with any high
hopes. We knew how difficult it is to negotiate with the Soviet
Union, but we negotiated earnestly and in good faith. The Soviets
gave no indication of being interested in genuine negotiation. They
engaged in a good deal of propaganda and some threats. Once again
they demonstrated that they are not willing to rely on normal
methods of transacting international business.

## UNNATURAL DIVISION OF GERMANY

The long-range Soviet aim is to keep Germany divided until the
possibility exists of a single German state under Communist influ-
ence. The Soviet Union has year after year refused to allow the
issue of German reunification to be put to the free electoral choice
of the German people.

As long as Germany remains unnaturally divided there will be a
continued threat to the peace of the world.

The problem of Berlin arises from this continued division of Ger-
many. The Berlin issue can only be solved finally when Germany
is reunified.

## WESTERN PEACE PLAN REJECTED BY SOVIETS

We put forward at Geneva a Western peace plan¹ designed to
bring about the reunification of Germany. This plan was carefully
phased into progressive arrangements for European security. It was
especially designed to meet Soviet objections to previous Western
plans for German unification. It provided for reunification of the
country in a manner which would safeguard the best interests of
the German people and of the other nations concerned.

The Soviets flatly rejected the Western peace plan. They would
not even consider it as a basis for discussion. Instead they proposed
that a peace treaty be signed with two German governments—the
Federal Republic of Germany and the Communist regime, the so-
called German Democratic Republic. By some curious logic which
was never explained, Foreign Minister Gromyko argued that by thus
making two peace settlements the cause of one Germany would be
advanced. On the contrary it seemed to us that the Soviet plan
would assure the permanent partition of Germany.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 350, 359.

397

SOVIET'S "FREE CITY" PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE TO WEST

You will recall that last November the Soviet Union presented the Western Powers with a threatening proposal for what they called a "free city" status for West Berlin. If we did not accept it, the U.S.S.R. said it would abandon its obligations to us in regard to Berlin.¹

In our judgment this proposal could only have led to the absorption of West Berlin into the Communist empire. Foreign Minister Gromyko frankly admitted at Geneva that this was the Berlin solution which the U.S.S.R. would like to see.

It would sever West Berlin economic and political ties with West Germany. It would make West Berlin more and more dependent on the Communist system which surrounds it. It would deprive West Berlin of the protection afforded by the Western forces—either by eliminating them or reducing them drastically and by introducing Soviet forces into West Berlin. It would have required a major Western withdrawal from which the world would have drawn the lesson that Soviet brute strength was the ruling force in that part of Europe.

The Soviets called their proposal for West Berlin a proposal for a "free city." By this they meant a city free of the protection of Allied forces and exposed to the pressures and inroads of the Communist area surrounding it. This was a typical example of Communist upside-down talk. The Soviets would take what is now in fact a free city and make it like East Berlin, which is now in fact a slave city.

We must remember what this would mean in human terms. West Berlin's population of more than 2 million is greater than the population of almost 20 percent of the member nations of the United Nations. Over half the States in the United States have fewer people than there are in West Berlin. The value of goods and services produced in West Berlin last year exceeded that of more than half of the member nations of the United Nations.

How did the West Berliners themselves react to the Soviet proposal? Within a few weeks West Berlin elections showed that 98 percent of the voters supported parties whose programs called for the continued presence of the Western forces in Berlin. The courage these people exhibited is but a repetition of the courage they displayed at the time of the Soviet blockade 10 years ago. You may be sure that we will stand by people who stand by themselves.

The Western Powers rejected this Soviet proposal and its associated threat.²

¹ On November 27, 1958; ante.

² See the U.S. note of Dec. 31, 1958, ante.

398

Because Berlin is divided into a free part and a Communist part, its situation is certainly not ideal. The Western Powers made serious proposals to the Soviet Union for an interim settlement on Berlin which would insure the stability of the city until Germany is reunified. These proposals would have offered a basis for agreement if the real Soviet concern had been to reduce tension over Berlin.

Agreement was not reached, however, because of one crucial obstacle: Foreign Minister Gromyko refused time and time again to discuss Western proposals until the Soviet-proposed new status for the city had been agreed to. That new status was the so-called "free city," which was as unacceptable to us as when it was first put forward last November.

In the later stages of our talks about Berlin the Soviets once again introduced threatening proposals. They called on the Western Powers to agree to a time limit, after which our rights to protect West Berlin would expire. They proposed a 1-year extension, which later, with a show of mock generosity, they increased to 18 months. We made it clear that the Western Powers were no more interested in negotiating under threat in the spring than in the fall.

While the Foreign Ministers were negotiating, the baneful influence of statements outside the conference by Mr. Khrushchev was clearly felt. On one occasion he stated that the Western seven-point program for Berlin did not contain a single element for negotiation. Then just before Mr. Gromyko presented his final paper Mr. Khrushchev made a speech in Moscow ¹ in which he repeated previous Soviet threats to abandon their responsibilities to the Western Powers concerning Berlin. These statements, reflected in the Soviet attitude at Geneva, made our attempts to negotiate practically fruitless.

## HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

President Eisenhower has made quite clear his willingness to attend a meeting of the Heads of Government if such a meeting holds out some prospect of success. We believe that some degree of progress in the Geneva negotiations is necessary if there is to exist such a prospect of success. Regretfully, no such progress has as yet been registered at Geneva.

## SOME POSSIBLE AREAS OF AGREEMENT

Did any good come out of the first session of the conference? I believe so. The Western peace plan for the reunification of Germany

¹ For excerpts from Khrushchev's speech on June 19, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 316-328.

399

has met with widespread approval around the world. History will, I believe, judge it to be a significant political offer looking to the solution of the key German problem. A study of this proposal shows that the Western allies are willing to go the "extra mile," of which President Eisenhower spoke in his state of the Union message last year,¹ in order to make peace more secure. I still hope that the Soviet Union will give serious second thought to this proposal.

In addition the Geneva talks demonstrated a high degree of unity among the Western allies. Allied unity was maintained from start to finish and was, if anything, even more solid at the end than at the beginning.

Finally, the conference revealed possible areas of agreement concerning specific arrangements for Berlin. I believe that it may be possible to build on these areas of agreement if the Soviet Union is prepared to accept the continued existence of a free West Berlin under Western protection.

This is the critical question. If the Soviet Union persists in its determination to add more than 2 million free West Berliners to the captive peoples of Eastern Europe, then no agreement is possible. However, if the Soviets do not hold to this annexationist design, we should be able to reach agreements on Berlin consistent with the honor and interest of all our countries.

We again take up the Geneva talks on July 13. We will continue our efforts to find an area of agreement, but the United States will never compromise the freedom of the brave people of West Berlin, who have placed their faith in our protection. Our fate and the fate of the people of West Berlin and that of free people everywhere are linked together. When their freedom is diminished, our freedom is inevitably diminished.

The path to a just peace will be long and difficult. But I know that I speak for all of you when I say that we will continue with the patience and understanding and firmness needed to travel that path so long as it remains open.

¹ Delivered on Jan. 9, 1958; H. Doc. 251, 85th Congress, 2nd Session. Also printed in *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 27, 1958, pp. 115-122.

400

Statement in the British House of Commons by Foreign Secretary Lloyd on the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, June 24, 1959¹

[Extract]

The first phase of the conference was devoted to the discussion of problems affecting Germany and European security in general. The western Foreign Ministers tabled the western peace plan, which was a phased plan for German reunification and European security. The Soviet Foreign Minister tabled the Soviet draft peace treaty with Germany which had already been published. They were both what are called "package deals", including in them attempts to solve a wide variety of questions.

Mr. Gromyko went so far as to say that there were some acceptable ideas in our proposals. I would also say that in his draft peace treaty there are certain elements with which we would not quarrel.

At the end of this phase of the discussion it was still quite obvious that there was a wide gulf between the two sides. It was also obvious that more time must elapse before there is a chance of comprehensive agreement.

At that point in our discussion, Mr. Dulles's much regretted death took place and there was a brief intermission while the Ministers went to Washington. After our return our attention was really centered on the problems of Berlin.

## FREE ACCESS TO BERLIN ESSENTIAL

It is not the view of the British Government that we should seek to stay in Berlin for military, propaganda, or intelligence reasons. We are there to maintain the right of 2,250,000 west Berliners to choose their own way of life and to protect them from being forced or gradually squeezed into submission to a régime which they reject. An essential element in this is the right of free access for all forms of traffic between west Berlin and what Mr. Gromyko himself described as the outside world.

The Soviet Government have also declared their willingness for the west Berliners to remain free to choose their way of life. To that extent both sides have had a declared common purpose in these discussions.

The proposals which we put forward on June 16 suggested modifications of the existing situation in certain respects. We offered to

¹ NATO *Letter*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Paris*, July 1959.

401

set a ceiling on the level of our forces in west Berlin and to continue
only to arm them with conventional weapons.

We were prepared on a reciprocal basis to try to ensure that activity
should not take place in either part of Berlin which might disturb
public order, affect the right and interests of others, or amount to
interference in the internal affairs of others.

We wished to reach a new agreement that free and unrestricted
access to west Berlin of all sorts should continue, that the existing
procedures should remain applicable, but that they could, where it
is not already the case, be carried out by German personnel, provided
it was without prejudice to the existing basic responsibilities.

## INTERIM STATUS

Mr. Gromyko said he could not accept this western plan for Ber-
lin. For his part, he suggested an interim status for west Berlin,
including the reduction of the western occupation forces to symbolic
contingents, the termination of what he described as subversive activi-
ties in west Berlin against G.D.R. and other Socialist States, and the
"non-location" in west Berlin of atomic and rocket weapons.

He suggested a time limit of 18 months should be set to that
interim status, during which an all-German committee, composed
of representatives of the Federal Republic and the G.D.R. on a
basis of parity, should operate: that this committee should promote
contacts between the two Germanys and discuss measures for reuni-
fication and the preparation of a peace treaty.

At the same time as Mr. Gromyko put forward these proposals,
Mr. Khrushchev was making a speech in Moscow stating that if
agreement was not reached at the end of the 18 months' period,¹ all
western rights in Berlin would be extinguished. In other words,
he was indicating what seemed to be a reversion to the method of
ultimatum. This was disappointing.

## WHAT THE OTHER SIDE MEANS

We judged that the time had come for a recess. I think in every
negotiation there comes a moment when emotions are being aroused,
misunderstandings are temporarily increasing, and everyone is the
better for a brief interval to take stock, and decide what the other
side has been saying, or perhaps, what is more important, has been
meaning. I am sure that those in the House with experience of
industrial or other negotiations will agree that can be so. I felt
strongly that this was the position on Friday afternoon last week.

402

I do not regard the conference in any sense as having broken
down. We go back a fortnight next Monday to resume our efforts
to negotiate some agreement. Failure to reach agreement so far is,
of course, disappointing, but I intend to go on trying to the best
of my ability. If we are able to get an agreement on Berlin it should
open the way for agreements on wider issues.

But we must not delude ourselves that these agreements can be
easily or quickly negotiated. For agreement, much patience and
allied unity are both extremely important.

With regard to a summit conference, I repeat what the Prime
Minister said yesterday: it is also my hope that our resumed con-
ference will lead to a meeting of heads of Governments.

Although the various proposals and statements have been pub-
lished, it would be for the convenience of the House if I were to
lay a White Paper putting them together in a single document.
That I propose to do. It will be printed as rapidly as practicable.¹

Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko at Moscow on
the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva, June 28,
1959 ²

In view of the lively interest displayed in our country in the work
of the Geneva conference of foreign ministers and of inquiries re-
ceived in this matter by representatives of the press, the necessity has
arisen to make a statement on both the position following the end
of the first stage of the conference and on its prospects. This is es-
pecially necessary since in the statements made by some other partici-
pants of the negotiations after their return from Geneva, particularly
in the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State,³ a tendentious inter-
pretation of the course of the negotiations and of the attitude of the
Soviet Union was manifest.

What were the real developments in the negotiations in Geneva?
The inclusion in the Geneva foreign ministers conference of repre-
sentatives of the two German states shows that, despite the oppo-
sition by extremist circles in the NATO countries, the awareness of
the necessity to reduce international tension by mutually acceptable
solutions prevails over the bankrupt position of strength policy.

The Soviet Government belongs, as is known, to those who believe
that the time has come to ventilate the stuffy atmosphere of mistrust

¹ British Command Paper 797.

² Broadcast by Soviet Home Service, June 28, 1959.

³ See ante, pp. 396-400.

403

and hostility which now exists in international relations as a consequence of many years of cold war and to converge the efforts of all states in one single direction—the consolidation of peace.

Not a few problems have accumulated in the postwar period. They concern all those who seek to relax international tension instead of conceiving the future of mankind as a race toward a new war. The results of the Second World War in Europe, not yet removed because of the absence of a peace treaty with Germany, are corroding relations between many states. The unsettled position in West Berlin, that reserve of the occupation regime in the center of a sovereign state—the German Democratic Republic—is constantly causing tension in the international position. It is therefore quite natural that the questions of a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin question became important items for discussion at the Geneva conference.

The first weeks of the conference were mainly devoted to examining the question of a peace treaty with Germany. To the extent to which the ministers of the Western powers touched upon the draft peace treaty put forward by the Soviet Government and the concrete proposals concerning the contents of the future treaty with Germany, the discussion was useful. However, the Western powers made no [or?] little effort to wind-up the examination of the question of a peace treaty as quickly as possible.

Striving to fence themselves off from a settlement of this long overdue task, the governments of the United States, Britain, and France have many times hidden behind the statement—as if it were some shield—that their unwillingness to tackle the settlement of the question of a peace treaty with the two existing German states is dictated by nothing less than concern for the unification of Germany!

It would seem impossible to deny that in circumstances where two sovereign German states exist with differing social systems, there is no better way to help eliminate the alienation between them and to direct their development into a common stream of peaceful policy than to conclude a German peace treaty.

All talk about a reunification of Germany remains an empty sound if it is not accompanied by a readiness to really help the Germans of both German states to bring out what they have in common, and around which, in the process of a gradual rapprochement, a single peace-loving German state could crystalize.

This task can be accomplished by the conclusion of a German peace treaty. If there are people in the United States who pretend—to judge by the recent statement of Secretary of State Herter—that they do not understand the significance of a peace treaty for the unification of Germany, the reason is clear.

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They do not want to see the positive effect which the conclusion of a German peace treaty would have for the cause of German reunification, just as they do not want reunification itself. The attempts of the U.S. secretary of state to prove the opposite only show how little truth is told to the people in the West concerning the true policy toward Germany and how much space is devoted there to cheap propaganda in which few people believe.

The endless postponement of the peace treaty has already caused sufficient harm to the cause of the restoration of German national unity. There can be no doubt that with further delays of a peaceful settlement with Germany, the paths to development of the GDR and the Federal German Republic will diverge more and more and the unification of Germany will become increasingly remote.

It is therefore not difficult to guess what it is that causes certain U.S. statesmen to manipulate trivial arguments denying the significance of the peace treaty for the solution of the problem of German reunification. An admission on their part of the usefulness of the peace treaty for German reunification would be equivalent to their acknowledgement of the fiasco of a policy on the German question which, both in the past and today, is in fact aimed at consolidating the division of Germany.

Of course, the negative attitude of the Western powers toward the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany does not signify that this subject may be regarded as exhausted. We consider, said the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Khrushchev, on June 19, 1959,¹ that the best solution to this problem would be the conclusion of a peace treaty with an all-German government, or with another plenipotentiary organ representing all of Germany. If, however, it is not possible to conclude a peace treaty on such a basis, then it will have to be signed with the two sovereign German states which exist today. If the aggressive and reactionary circles also prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty with the two German states, there will be nothing left but to sign a peace treaty with the GDR.

When the Soviet Government openly declares that it cannot delay the question of a peace treaty with Germany indefinitely, statesmen of the Western powers try to represent this as almost a threat. Such assertions can hardly be taken seriously. Their authors cannot be slaves to their own prejudices to such an extent that they fail to realize that the question here concerns the only way left to the Soviet Union, which it will be forced to take if the Western powers continue

¹ For excerpts from the speech, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 316-328.

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to obstruct joint work on the elimination of the dangerous vestiges of
war and occupation in Germany.

Last week the conference concentrated its attention on the second
question on the agenda: the Berlin question. A thorough and con-
crete discussion developed on this question and the work of the con-
ference was broken off at the very height of the discussion. The
Soviet side tried in every way to convince the Western powers of the
need to alter the present dangerous situation which has developed in
West Berlin. We continually emphasized that the occupation regime
has long been obsolete and that 14 years after the end of the war the
question of West Berlin should have found a new solution. West
Berlin and its occupation regime, barracks where foreign soldiers are
 quartered, organs of the occupation administration which have the
last word in the solution of all the most important questions in the
life of the town and its inhabitants—this is a sorrowful monument to
the period of the war and the occupation.

It is true that sometimes the representatives of the Western powers
say to us that the occupation regime in West Germany must not be
preserved forever, but only until the reunification of Germany. But
this is an argument for naive people. To say that the occupation
regime in West Germany must be preserved until the reunification
of Germany means in fact to stand for its perpetuation, in view of
the present policy of the Western powers and the Adenauer govern-
ment on the question of German unity.

There is another side to the question. It is sufficient to look at the
map to understand that West Berlin, as a base for the NATO powers
which has been formed in the center of a socialist state, is a field for
subversive activity and provocations and constitutes a source of dan-
gerous friction between the states and a constant potential threat to
the cause of peace in Europe.

They have tried to convince us that the situation in West Berlin does
not constitute a danger, and in this respect they have referred to the
fact that so far nothing terrible has happened there. But why wait
until something terrible occurs, we asked? If a conflict flares up—and
in the present situation in West Berlin this can always be expected—
it will possibly be too late to talk. Would it not be better to avert
such a possibility?

The Soviet Government calls for this. An improvement of the
situation in West Berlin, the strengthening of peace in Europe, and
the improvement of relations between the powers have been the aims
of all proposals of the Soviet Government on the Berlin question and
first among these has been the proposal to grant West Berlin the status
of a demilitarized free city.

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As a result of the stand of the ministers of the Western powers, it was not possible to reach agreement on a radical solution of the problem of West Berlin by granting it the status of a free city. The representatives of these powers preferred to discuss only individual—though having a certain significance—problems relating to West Berlin. The strength of the armed forces of the three powers stationed in West Berlin and the measures which might be taken with regard to the subversive activities and hostile propaganda against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries conducted from the territory of West Berlin were points under discussion, as well as the safeguarding of access of West Berlin.

We were, of course, concerned about the clarification of the attitudes taken toward each of these problems, having in view that they should be solved in combination with the main point; namely, in connection with the future fate of West Berlin itself.

Whether West Berlin should remain a city whose population is doomed to live indefinitely under the guns of foreign troops or to become a city free from occupation, independently building its life, is the chief problem whose solution cannot be evaded.

When the question of the possibility of concluding an agreement came up, we stated clearly that this document should not contain stipulations that would perpetuate the occupation status in West Berlin, because this would contradict the interests of peace, the interests of relaxation of tension in Europe in general, and in Germany in particular.

Since the three Western powers stubbornly refused to agree that the outdated occupation status in West Berlin should be abolished forthwith, the Soviet Government decided, in the interests of reaching agreement, not long before the interval in the work of the Geneva Conference, to put forward new proposals on the Berlin issue.

The Soviet Government proposed to liquidate the abnormal position in West Berlin gradually, at the same time preparing a peace treaty and working out measures aimed at the unification of Germany.

The new Soviet proposals provide that the four powers—the USSR, the United States, Britain, and France—conclude an interim agreement, of definite duration, on West Berlin. This agreement on the interim status of West Berlin would include agreement on the following issues:

- Reducing the occupation forces of the Western powers in West Berlin to token contingents;

- Stopping the subversive activities from West Berlin against the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries;

- Not siting atomic and rocket weapons in West Berlin.

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These measures constitute the minimum of what must be done at once with a view to bringing about conditions of safety in West Berlin for the period during which the interim status of West Berlin is effective.

The committee which would be set up—consisting of representatives of the United States, the USSR, Britain, and France—could be in control of the implementation of the obligations arising from the agreement. During this period the three Western powers would retain certain occupation rights in West Berlin, and its communications with the outer world would be maintained in the same form as now.

In the meantime, conditions would be prepared for a more cardinal settlement of the Berlin problem on the basis of a peace treaty with Germany.

With a view to not permitting a suspension of work on the preparation of a peace treaty and at the same time to actually help the rapprochement of both German states, the Soviet Government spoke out in its new proposals in favor of an all-German committee to be created by the two German states on a parity basis, consisting of representatives of the GDR and the German Federal Republic. The duties of the committee would include expansion and development of contacts with the two German states, working out concrete measures for the unification of Germany, and examination of questions linked to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

Obviously, should the GDR and the German Federal Republic prefer not to negotiate with each other on the above-mentioned questions within the framework of such a committee but in some other way, it is their affair. They can elect any form of cooperation acceptable to them.

The Soviet proposals envisage that by agreement between the four powers a definite time limit will be established for the temporary status of West Berlin and for the work of the all-German committee. The establishment of such a time limit is necessary because it is impossible to draw out indefinitely a peaceful settlement with Germany and maintain an occupation regime in West Berlin. If no definite time limit is established for the all-German committee to carry out its tasks, there will be no guarantees that one of the sides will not make use of this, and prefer marking time to serious talks. I say straightforwardly that the present attitude of the Government of the German Federal Republic, both on question of unifying Germany and on the peace treaty, fully confirms the grounds for these fears.

It emerges from statements by leading figures of the German Federal Republic that Bonn actually would like not a settlement of

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outstanding international problems but a continuation of the former policy of obstructing their settlement, which is so dear to the heart of Chancellor Adenauer. Is it possible not to take this circumstance into account? Obviously not!

For its part, the Soviet Government had proposed that the agreement on the temporary status of West Berlin be designed for a year and a half. The all-German committee would have to complete its work by the end of that period.

If, within the time limit agreed upon by the sides, both German states, as a result of negotiations within the framework of the all-German committee or in any other form, do not come to agreement on the peaceful settlement and unification of Germany, the states represented at the 1959 Geneva conference of foreign ministers could return anew to an examination of the question concerning West Berlin.

Such is the essential content of the last proposals of the Soviet Government.

It may be asked: What has moved the Soviet Government to come out with new proposals for a temporary solution of the Berlin question? The answer is simple. We want a solution of the Berlin question on a concordant basis. We also want measures to be taken at last to bring nearer the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. That is why the Soviet Government has, as is known, introduced certain changes in its proposals, in order to take more fully into account the point of view of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France, as expressed at the Geneva conference, and to promote a rapprochement of the positions of the two sides.

Let us, for example, take the question of the term of validity of the temporary agreement on West Berlin proposed by the Soviet Union. At first, the Soviet Government proposed to fix this at one year. However, since this did not suit the Western powers, another term was suggested, that is, one and a half years. We are prepared to negotiate on this topic. Let me recall that the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France have themselves proposed at the Geneva conference that a period of two and a half years should be fixed for the completion of the work of the all-German committee. If the two sides come to an agreed view on the main issue, it appears that it would not be too difficult to agree on the required period of time.

I should like to call special attention to one misinterpretation of the last Soviet proposals which one often meets in the West and which, unfortunately, may be heard from statesmen of the Western powers. It is asserted that fixing a period of time as envisaged in

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our proposals means that when this period expires all the rights
of the United States, Great Britain, and France in West Berlin
will automatically lapse, while the Soviet Union will immediately
embark upon unilateral acts in relation to West Berlin. Why is
such a conclusion drawn? Does not the fact that the Soviet Union
is proposing to hold new negotiations on West Berlin after the
expiration of the terms provided for in the agreement—if by that
time the all-German committee does not succeed in its work—speak
for itself?

If only a unilateral solution of the question of the rights of West-
ern powers in Berlin—either now or after the expiration of the term
of validity of the above-mentioned temporary agreement on West
Berlin—were envisaged, we would not have proposed jointly de-
ciding on the temporary status of West Berlin, solving the question
of the guarantees of such status, and creating a four-power super-
visory agency. We would not have proposed that the joint discussion
of the Berlin question should be renewed if the GDR and the German
Federal Republic fail to come to an understanding in the all-German
committee. Thus, the Soviet Government prefers to find an agreed
solution regarding our new proposals, also, I repeat, an agreed solu-
tion concerning West Berlin, which must, of course correspond to
the present situation in Berlin and in Germany and must not, and
cannot, emanate from a desire to perpetuate the occupation regime
in West Berlin.

Critics of the Soviet proposals go so far as to try and ascribe to
the Soviet Union the intention to swallow West Berlin and deprive its
inhabitants of freedom. Strange assertions of this kind were con-
tained, in particular, in the speech made by Mr. Herter on the radio
on his return to the United States from Geneva. Is it necessary to
say that such arguments do not contain even one grain of truth?
In no way can they testify to a desire to throw an objective light on
the Soviet Union's position.

Leaving aside the question of the kind of freedom for West Ber-
liners that is supported by foreign tanks and machineguns, it is
necessary to point out that the Soviet Government, both in its pro-
posal to turn West Berlin into a free city and in the proposal to
work out a temporary status for West Berlin, showed consideration
for the way of life of the West Berlin population and strived to
exclude the possibility of any outside interference in the internal
affairs of this city. Everybody knows, too, that the GDR Govern-
ment adheres to an analogous point of view on this issue, and has
solemnly declared its readiness, together with the other states, to
guarantee the observance of the agreed status of West Berlin.

It is not superfluous to recall that when, in the course of the talks,
the delegations of the Soviet Union and of the GDR declared the

410

readiness of their governments to guard West Berlin from all outside
interference, the ministers of the Western Powers somehow suddenly
lost interest in this problem. They did not want to speak of the
participation of United Nations in the guarantees, although from the
rostrum they frequently speak of the organization's role. But, as we
see, speaking about it is one thing, and respecting it in practice is
another thing.

It has become clear from all this that in reality they are concerned
not with the maintenance of the existing way of life of the West
Berlin population—with which, as is well known, nobody interferes—
but with the continuation of foreign occupation in this part of the
city. This, and nothing else.

Why, then, did the U.S. Secretary of State deem it appropriate
again to give currency to the version that the Soviet Union allegedly
strives for some kind of annexation of West Berlin? There is
nothing but to suppose that this version, too, which has been bor-
rowed from the cold war arsenal, can hardly be intended for any-
thing but to mislead public opinion in Western countries. But it is
difficult to combine such methods with a business-like approach to
the solution of the questions on the conference agenda.

During the debate on Berlin, the United States, Britain, and France
showed great interest in securing the further stay of their troops in
West Berlin. Taking this into account, we expressed readiness to
agree to the temporary stay of a token quantity of U.S., British, and
French troops in West Berlin. The Western powers attached great
importance to insuring freedom of access for American, British, and
French military personnel to West Berlin. On this issue, too, we
went some way toward meeting the wishes of the Western powers,
having declared that we agreed to the temporary maintenance of the
links between West Berlin and the outside world in their present
state and to return to the discussion of this question if the work
of the all-German committee does not yield positive results.

Thus, the Soviet Union has gone some way to meet the positions
of the Western powers, although they by-pass it in silence. Appar-
ently, the governments of the Western powers have nothing to say
to this, for in fact they are interested not in a reasonable solution of
the aforementioned questions, but in the preservation of West Ber-
lin as a permanent source of international tension.

In assessing the situation that has arisen at the Geneva conference,
one must note that the discussion on the question of a peace treaty
and West Berlin reflected, like in a mirror, the two lines in the pol-
icy of the former members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition toward
Germany.

411

Should a line be drawn under World War II in Europe? Should development of Germany as an independent, peace-loving, and democratic state be insured? The Soviet Union gives a positive reply to this question. It is for this reason that it proposes to prepare without delay and to conclude a peace treaty with Germany.

In present conditions this would mean concluding such a treaty with two German states, thus solving the question of West Berlin in the interest of peace and easing tension.

A different reply is given by the Western powers. The existing situation in Germany apparently suits them better, since it creates favorable conditions for the transformation of West Germany into a NATO rocket and atomic base and transforms West Berlin into a permanent cancerous growth on the body of Germany and Europe.

It is apposite to recall that on the eve of the foreign ministers conference in Geneva, and even during the conference, the U.S. Government took further steps to provide nuclear and rocket armaments for a number of NATO countries, notably for the Federal German Republic. Can this fact be assessed in any way but as evidence of the governments concerned being guided not so much by the interests of achieving agreement and easing tension, but by the plans of NATO military staffs?

In connection with West Berlin, this is the main question: Shall an end be put to the occupation regime which is still being preserved in that part of the city and shall a fundamental improvement in the situation in Berlin—and consequently in Germany and Europe—be effected?

The Soviet Union gives a clear answer to that question, too. It strives for the quickest liquidation of the out-dated occupation rule in West Berlin.

A different answer is given by the Western powers. The proposals they presented for consideration by the Geneva conference had but one aim in view: To preserve at all cost the occupation regime in West Berlin, as well as the occupation privileges. Apparently 14 years of occupation of that part of the city is not enough. How much longer do they want to prolong it—for 50, or for 100 years? Then let them say so, and also reply to this question: How is it possible to state earnest intentions to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Berlin question while at the same time clinging to the occupation regime in West Berlin. The two are incompatible.

Let us now consider the question of the creation of an all-German committee. Its essence is briefly this: Are Germans from East and West to sit at one table in order to jointly discuss concrete steps for bringing together the two German states and then completely reestablishing the unity of Germany? Are they to work out a common posi-

412

tion in relation to a peace treaty, or are the German people to be deprived of this right? The Soviet Union supports the first course, the Western powers stand for the second.

Speaking of the course of the Geneva conference, it is impossible to remain silent about the role adopted by the Government of the Federal German Republic. There is a fully adequate basis for the conviction that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany sent its delegation to Geneva with instructions to create as many difficulties as possible in the work of the foreign ministers' conference and to hinder their adoption of any kind of positive decisions. With all good will, it is impossible to name a single speech by this delegation which even contained a hint of a striving to contribute to the settlement of the questions on the agenda of the conference. Yet these were questions which directly touch upon the vital interests of Germans and therefore it would seem that the representatives of the German states, above all, should be concerned about them.

The role of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany looks especially unseemly in light of the fact that the GDR delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Bolz, exerted a lot of effort to contribute to the success of the conference and to bring together the positions of the two German states. This, however, did not meet with due response from the Adenauer government, to which—and this came out once again during the Geneva conference—the interests of peace in Europe are alien.

Speaking of the two opposing lines which were pursued during the Geneva conference by the two German states—the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany—it is essential to emphasize that the very fact of the active participation of the representatives of these states in the Geneva conference has a great significance as a matter of principle. It is an admission that without the participation of both German states it is impossible to consider problems dealing with Germany. Although the Western powers have not yet recognized the GDR diplomatically, they have nonetheless been forced to recognize its de facto existence, and even this is an important success of the Geneva conference for the German people.

Let us add that during the discussion of the question of a peace treaty, the U.S. Government, through the words of its Secretary of State, was forced to state that the Federal Republic of Germany does not represent and cannot represent all Germany.¹ This statement,

¹ At the session of May 18, 1959, Mr. Herter spoke as follows: "The German Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic do not, either separately or in combination, constitute an all-German Government, authorized to act for and bind the international entity known as Germany. That can be done only by an all-German Government, freely chosen by the German people." Ibid., p. 96.

413

which without a doubt represents a step forward in the assessment
of the real position which has developed in Germany, was in itself a
bucket of cold water on the heads of those politicians in Bonn who
have more than once tried to assume the right to represent all the
German people.

During the last few days Bonn have [has?] given a new illustration
of its obstructionist policy by adopting a decision to hold the presi-
dential election for the Federal Republic of Germany in West Berlin
on July 1, although it is known that the Federal Republic of Germany
has no relation to West Berlin. Why was such a demonstration nec-
essary? Moreover, was it timed to take place at a moment when the
question of West Berlin is on the agenda of the Geneva talks? Of
course, not to make the talks easier, but in order to introduce acerbity
in the work of the Geneva conference.

The leaders of the Federal German Republic, and notably Chancellor
Adenauer, openly let it be understood that the most joyous news from
Geneva for them would be an announcement of the collapse of the
negotiations. One can only regret that the influence of the rabid par-
tisans of the cold war is clearly affecting the positions of our other
partners in the negotiations, primarily the governments of France
and the United States. One is justified in asking: How rational is
a policy which is built upon the support, even the courting, of those
forces which are preventing the removal of the sources of friction
among states, which live only by the idea of how to make profits from
the contradictions among the great powers and how to cause a really
good quarrel between the USSR and the United States?

The Geneva conference of ministers has been adjourned until July
13 at the request of the foreign ministers of the United States, Great
Britain, and France. If one were to talk of the causes which have led
the Western powers to propose a three-week break in the work of the
conference, these must obviously not be sought in the course of the
talks themselves. Judging by everything, this break was planned by
the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France
beforehand, and they were merely looking for a pretext to declare it.

What conclusion can be drawn from the fact that so far it has not
been possible to reach agreement on the important questions for whose
consideration the conference of the foreign ministers was convened?
The USSR Government considers that there can be only one conclu-
sion: Further efforts are needed by all those represented at the Geneva
conference of states in order to settle the unsolved international
problems.

Though the first half of the conference did not have the results
which the world expected, yet the exchange of opinions which took
place has been definitely useful: The positions of the participants

414

have become better defined, the existing disagreements have been
[made?] more precise, and attempts have been made to bring the
positions of the two sides nearer on certain questions.

Statement in the British House of Commons by Foreign
Secretary Lloyd on the Foreign Ministers Meeting at
Geneva, July 8, 1959¹

[Extracts]

I now turn to the Conference of the Foreign Ministers. On 24th June, I promised to lay a White Paper. That was done last Friday.² I regret that it does not contain a fuller account of the proceedings during the formal sessions, but I was told that if the White Paper was to be produced before the weekend—which was for the convenience of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite and, indeed, for both sides of the House—then it could not be very lengthy. A fuller account is being prepared and it will be published quite soon.³

We are seeking to achieve three things at this Conference: First, some progress towards the reunification of Germany; secondly, the reaffirmation of the right of the people of West Berlin to choose their own system of society, and also acceptance of the need for satisfactory arrangements for the free access to West Berlin upon which that freedom of choice depends; thirdly, a reduction in tension and an improvement of stability in Europe.

I cannot claim much in the way of progress towards the first of those objectives, the wider German problem. It is true that we had a prolonged discussion of the German problems in an atmosphere of frankness and cordiality. They were certainly the best humoured discussions in which I have taken part with representatives of the Soviet Union for the last seven and a half years. Both sides put forward their package proposals or peace plans covering reunification and European security, including the relations which a reunified Germany would have with the other States of Europe.

We for our part made a genuine effort to go some way to meet some of the Soviet criticisms of our previous proposals. For example, in the context of German reunification we offered to defer free elections

¹ Text from Hansard, July 8, 1959.

² British Command Paper 797.

³ British Command Papers 827 and 829.

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for two and a half years after the signature of a four-Power agreement. We proposed a mixed German committee in which the East German element could not be out-voted. In other words, for any decision to be taken, there would have to be agreement by both parts of Germany. From our proposals the Soviet Government could see exactly how we considered that European security measures and progress towards German reunification would be interrelated.

Although Mr. Gromyko said that there were some acceptable features in our proposals, the result of our discussions was that neither side was able to accept the proposals put forward by the other. We went over the ground carefully and thoroughly, but we failed to make real progress. It is quite true that both sides stated that they believed in the need for the unity of Germany, that both sides said that they believed that at some point there should be free elections, and that both sides said that at some stage there should be a peace treaty. But we were not able to agree about the timing or method.

However, I feel very strongly that the fact of this disagreement does not mean that we can put all these problems on one side and forget about them. I think that there must be a continuing review of them and that time may bring about the possibility of agreement on some of them. After all, there were more than 300 meetings before the Austrian Treaty was signed. Let us take comfort from the fact that, if we are sufficiently patient and persevering, agreement can, in the long run, be attained.

The second objective was in regard to Berlin. On this matter we had a number of private meetings. The discussions to which I have just been referring, on German reunification, were very largely in formal session, at the end of each of which the speech or proposal of either side was handed out verbatim to the Press. As I said in our last debate, I have never believed that that kind of discussion is likely to lead to very satisfactory results.

But when we came to talk about Berlin, the discussions were private, and I think that they were kept secret. The four Foreign Ministers met in turn in the private house of one or other of them. We had two advisers aside, together with interpreters. There were genuine discussions and not just the reading of prepared speeches at one another. Those discussions went on for about a fortnight, really on the basis of whether we could devise what both sides would regard as improved arrangements in relation to Berlin.

On 9th June, there was a perceptible hardening on the part of the Soviet Union, and that was reflected in the speech which Mr. Gromyko made in formal session on 10th June and which appears at

416

page 22 of the White Paper.¹ In that speech he put forward the idea of the maintenance of the existing situation, subject to certain modifications, for a limited period, namely, one year. These modifications related to the level of Western forces in West Berlin, propaganda, espionage, and atomic weapons. But Mr. Gromyko was quite explicit that if agreed solutions to the questions relating to the conclusion of a peace treaty were not reached in the period of one year, then the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the G.D.R. The Soviet case, as the House knows, is that such a peace treaty would extinguish all Western rights relating to West Berlin.

In his speech Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union considered it essential to stipulate in advance that the all-German committee, or some other body established by agreement between the two German States, must reach an agreed decision on the question of the peace treaty and the reunification of Germany within one year. The Western reaction to that speech was adverse. We regarded it as a reversion to the language of 27th November last year and to the idea that negotiation must take place under duress, and with the knowledge that if, in a limited time, agreement was not reached, then the Soviet Union would take unilateral action.

Speeches made on 10th June by Mr. Herter, Mr. Couve de Murville and myself are set out in the White Paper,² and on 12th June, by agreement with my Western colleagues, I made a statement which is set out at pages 34 to 38 of the White Paper and which was a statement made on behalf of the three Western Powers.³ I tried to set out our view about the threat of unilateral action. I indicated our ideas as to the possibility of improved arrangements for Berlin designed to avoid friction in future. I will not repeat to the House at length what is set out in the White Paper, but I did state that I thought that it was not beyond our capacity to devise a formula for dealing in any new agreement with the question of Western rights in West Berlin, a formula which would be mutually acceptable.

I also dealt with the way in which the level of our troops and the way in which objectionable activities in both parts of Berlin might be dealt with. I indicated the fact that we had had useful private discussions about the arrangements in connection with the procedures for free access to West Berlin. I asked Mr. Gromyko to forget his statement of 10th June and to revert to the kind of discussions which we had been having with him up to 9th June.

¹Text is found also in *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 260-266.

²*Ibid.*, pp. 267-275.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 279-284.

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These ideas were further developed in the Western paper on Berlin handed to Mr. Gromyko on 16th June. That paper is also set out in the White Paper. I think that it was generally accepted as a major effort to meet the Russian point of view. Mr. Gromyko asked for time to examine it, which we readily agreed to, and he did not make his reply until 19th June. The paper which he gave us on that date is also set out in the White Paper. It was timed to coincide with the speech which Mr. Khrushchev was making to a Soviet G.D.R. friendship meeting in Moscow.¹ We had to consider Mr. Gromyko's paper simultaneously with the advance notices of what Mr. Khrushchev had said.

There was some ambiguity about Mr. Gromyko's paper. There was the suggestion of an interim status for West Berlin put in rather different terms from those of 10th June. There was a suggestion this time of a time limit of eighteen months during which an all-German committee formed on the basis of parity should promote the extension of contacts between the two parts of Germany. They should discuss and work out concrete measures for the unification of Germany and consider questions pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. There was a suggestion that if, at the end of that time, there had been no agreed solution, then the Foreign Ministers should resume consideration of the West Berlin question.

It was not clear from Mr. Gromyko's paper whether free communication between West Berlin and the outside world would stop at the end of the eighteen months or not. But this paper was given to us, as I say, simultaneously with the reports of Mr. Khrushchev's speech. That speech appeared to leave no ground for doubt upon the matter, because he said that if the all-German committee proved unable to agree the Soviet Union would be compelled to sign a peace treaty with a German State willing to do so—in other words, the G.D.R. He said that when such a peace treaty was signed all vestiges of Western occupation rights in West Berlin would be ended. If any attempt was made to maintain the occupation régime by force the Soviet Union would defend the territorial integrity of the G.D.R. In other words, it looked again as if the Soviet Union had reverted to the language of 27th November—a time limit for agreement between the two parts of Germany, after which the Soviet Union would take unilateral action whatever we thought.

At that point, I felt strongly that the wisest thing for us to do was to recess to consider these various statements. The Western prelimi-

¹ For excerpts from Khrushchev's speech of June 19, see *Foreign Ministers Meeting, May-August 1959, Geneva* (Department of State publication 6882, Sept. 1959), pp. 316-328.

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nary attitude upon both Mr. Gromyko's paper and Mr. Khrushchev's speech, was put forward to Mr. Gromyko on 19th June, and after some discussion agreement was reached about a recess until next Monday. Mr. Gromyko, however, did publish that night a further statement¹ which is set out in the White Paper, at page 42. I also had a conversation with him on the following morning, in which he definitely said to me that the Soviet position was that if at the end of the time limit agreement had not been reached then the Foreign Ministers' Conference should reconvene to make a further attempt at a negotiated statement.

It is clear to my mind, therefore, that we must go back next Monday determined to make another attempt to reach agreement on Berlin. I think that in the present state of relations between East and West it is of supreme importance that we should achieve some agreement, however limited. We cannot make an agreement just for the sake of making it if that means abandoning our basic position, that the people of West Berlin must be free to choose their way of life. They must feel confident of that freedom and must have the necessary free access to the outside world which makes that freedom of choice a reality and not a paper formula. If, however, subject to that proviso, we can reach a time limit, as I have said frequently during our meetings, that could be a turning point and could open the way to the wider agreements which would mean so much for peace and stability in Europe.

> *Mr. Arthur Henderson (Rowley Regis and Tipton): Do I understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that this rather important statement made by Mr. Gromyko on 19th June was not handed to the three Western representatives until after the conference had recessed?*

> *Mr. Lloyd: The paper of 19th June was handed to us in the afternoon before the recess. The further statement was issued before the Conference formally recessed, but after it had agreed to recess. There was a meeting of the Ministers on Friday afternoon at which agreement was made. We had to meet at eleven o'clock the following morning, the Saturday morning, formally to recess. The statement to which I think the right hon. and learned Gentleman is referring was issued in the middle of the night, I believe.*

On the matter of a summit meeting, I think that we must proceed step by step. The next step, I think, is to make a success of the coming phase of the Foreign Ministers' conference at Geneva. It may be only a limited success, but the way will then be open for a meeting of heads of Governments. To start speculating about what might

¹ Issued June 19 in the evening; ante.

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happen if our talks break down seems to me to be the best way to ensure that they do break down. In spite of occasional relapses, portrayed by some speech or statement, I think that since February the atmosphere has steadily improved. I think that we have to seek to maintain that improvement and to work quietly and steadily together for agreement.

I will deal with one final point relating to what the right hon. and learned Gentleman the Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. A. Henderson) said just now. There may be some criticism of the fact that the West took the initiative to suggest a recess of the conference on 19th June. I am absolutely convinced that it was the right thing to do. We had been hard at it for six weeks, and a pause for reflection was urgently required. The House will remember, perhaps, a little bit of the atmosphere that was coming from Geneva during the week or so before 19th June. After Mr. Gromyko's speech of 10th June there was talk of the imminent breakdown of the Conference. I was determined that that should not happen. During the week beginning 14th June there had been more talk of the Conference slowly expiring.

I remember that in the pages of one newspaper which has been rather critical of the fact that we recessed, the headline on 18th June was, "Death agonies of the Geneva talks". That was not very helpful to those who were trying to keep the talks in being. In the atmosphere produced by the reports of Mr. Khrushchev's speech, against the background of the kind of reports which had been coming from Geneva, there was again the danger of the breakdown of the conference. I do not think danger would have been averted by continuing our talks for another twelve or twenty-four hours. It was much better to have a recess during which we could all think things over and get the statements in proper perspective.

I still believe that it is possible to reach agreement on Berlin even although it is not finalised at the Foreign Minister's Conference. Such an agreement will open the way for further progress, and with that belief I shall go to the meeting on Monday.

*The Prime Minister... [The Meeting of Foreign Ministers] was to some extent the result of the British initiative. It was because we felt that a sort of deadlock had arisen last winter that the Foreign Secretary and I determined to break it. We knew, of course, that our action would incur a certain degree of suspicion and anxiety even from our Allies, but these things have to be borne.*

The right hon. Gentleman may say that we have achieved nothing. At any rate, we have achieved this. We are not now grappling with

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