After a war of such magnitude, it was inconceivable for Israel to make such a retreat in return for such a promise. Therefore I believed - and the Israeli leaders of that time came to believe - that a series of smaller steps, each of which would invite some reciprocity, might create the conditions in which a breakthrough towards peace could be achieved by one or the other of the Arab countries.

At the time, I was heavily criticized for this. But I thought it important not to humiliate Egypt to the point where Sadat would not be able to participate in peace negotiations since, in my view, the soldiers of the Third Army could be replaced easily. But an Egyptian government willing to talk to Israel was harder to find. And so the step-by-step approach developed, gained huge momentum, and was culminated by Yitzhak and Shimon in the Oslo Agreements.

Like many of you, when the Oslo Agreements were first published I was quite uneasy. I am frank to admit it. I wrote some articles in which I raised a number of questions about what might happen, and about the things which might go wrong. Some of the questions I raised, such as the possible behavior of the Palestinian police, proved to be valid. Yet I came to believe, and I hold the view now, that if one had tried to tie up every last of the things that could go wrong, there would never have been an agreement.

The fundamental breakthrough was to teach the Arabs and Israelis the grammar of coexistence, and to enable them, by working through basically insoluble problems towards some practical solution to solve the fundamental challenge on the West Bank, which is this.

-10-

[cc]

The Sinai was relatively easy to make an agreement on because there are 200 miles of sand between the Egyptian population and the Israeli population. But on the West Bank, it is not possible to create any physical separation of that kind. And there, the problem is one of coexistence.

On the Arab side, there are undoubtedly those who are using the negotiations in the way France negotiated with Germany before World War I - as a way of getting back Alsace-Lorraine at the right moment. And indeed, in one of the early meetings with Asad, he said to me: the French waited 50 years, I can wait 50 years. There are people who go even further and want to destroy the process.

Yet I also believe that there is no alternative for either side, as I was quoted in an Israeli newspaper. That, by the way, came about in a typically Israeli way: a journalist came to me at the airport and said: give me a break, I came all the way out here, at least give me one sentence. So, given the unlimited Israeli ability to make me feel guilty, I told her what I actually ought to believe.

I believe that the objective conditions to making progress are in place for the following reasons: neither side can or want to go to war; neither side can continue imposing its will because the international community will not stand for it; and there are critical limits even to terrorism.

I believe, in fact, that the tragic events since the death of Yitzhak have taught many Israelis who opposed him that what they thought was achievable is not achievable. I have the impression that Arafat and the Arab side are learning that they cannot mobilize enough outside pressure to make Israel do something which goes against the basic instincts of the Israeli people.

-11-

So now the problem is, how does one put this together. As I understood the Oslo Peace Process, it was the lead step, would improve the atmosphere and gradually create a situation in which the final decisions would operate on the momentum of what had already been achieved. I think that was a realistic and visionary concept.

Now I think that so much has happened on both sides that this expectation is harder to fulfill. Therefore I, the originator of the step-by-step approach, have become more and more attracted to the idea of either taking some bigger steps or even trying for a final, overall, settlement. The reason for this is that, in an atmosphere of distrust, if one does not know the destination, each concession becomes much harder.

I recognize that the atmosphere of distrust also makes a permanent settlement negotiation very difficult, because people may think it is an excuse for doing nothing. And so the question is whether it is possible to link a number of big issues together.

I have argued ever since Prime Minister Begin agreed to the concept of autonomy, that a Palestinian state was inevitable. Once the concept of autonomy had been granted, nothing would prevent the outside world from elevating the status of that autonomous unit. Therefore, I told Begin on the day after Camp David - and I have said it ever since - that the key question is: what borders will that unit have?

Those two issues must be linked. What are the borders, and that, in return for them, a Palestinian state will emerge and will be recognized by the outside world, whatever Israel does. That framework has to be faced. I do not think Israel can possibly return to the '67 borders on the West Bank. I have always believed that something like the Allon Plan,

-12-

[L.C.]

without tying myself to any particular line, will have to be the outcome.
And it has to be faced by the Arab side. What has to be faced by the
Israeli side is the political outcome I have described.

There is a whole host of other issues - from refugees to the precise
limitations of armaments for the Palestinian unit, because that cannot
possibly be a constant source of upheaval. But if we are clear about the
destination and, above all, if Israel and the United States can agree that
that is the destination, then the tactics can maybe be argued.

This seems to me the big decision which has to be made. One cannot
possibly hope that there is a way around it. This is a relatively quiet
period in international affairs but it would be unrealistic to expect that
it will continue indefinitely, or even much longer; and then it will be
much more difficult to mobilize public support, at least in America.

As I said, I was a great admirer of Yitzhak and I would like to close with
one episode and one quote. Many of you will remember the episode of
the young soldier whose father was killed in the last days of the 1973
war; who volunteered, after he had already served his time, in the unit
charged with antiterrorist actions of the Israeli Army; and who was killed
in that last action.

A friend of mine called me up and said: you know this is awfully tough
on Yitzhak. He had to order this. Why don't you give him a call. I gave
him a call, and of course those of you who know Yitzhak will recognize
that he didn't want to talk about having done his duty. And any one
who knew him knew he was suffering. So I said: Yitzhak, I sometimes
think that all your life has been a preparation for this period and that it
was really some divine providence that made you go through this.

-13-

Well, even this did not elicit any more from Yitzhak except to say: we
shall see. And of course we have.

Now I would like to read a paragraph from a speech which many of you
will undoubtedly know, one he made at a joint session of the American
Congress in 1994. I think it epitomizes what he stood for and the attitude
that needs to animate our actions:

> It is said in the Bible, our Book of the Books, peace is mentioned in its
> various idioms 237 times, in the Bible from which we draw our values
> and our strength. In the book of Jeremiah we find the lamentation of
> Rachel, the Matriarch. It reads: 'Refrain your voice from weeping and
> your eyes from tears for thy work shall be rewarded, said the Lord.' I
> will not refrain from weeping for those who are gone. But on this summer
> day in Washington, far from home, we sense that our work will be
> rewarded, as the prophet foretold.

I think there is no more to be said about the peace process than that.
Thank you very much.

-14-

The Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies

November 9, 1997

Dr. Henry Kissinger

United States and Middle Eastern Policy in a Changing Global Arena

Prof. Henry Kissinger: Prof. Shapira, Lea, Dalia, Prof. Cohen, Shimon Peres and all my friends here, it is a very moving occasion for me to be able to inaugurate this series of lectures, and the Center named after a dear friend of mine.

I met Yitzchak Rabin in 1967, right after the Seven Day War, as I remember the Six Day War because, on the seventh day, he rested so I counted it. Relatively soon after, he invited me to give some lectures to the military leaders and shortly after that we worked together when he was ambassador of Israel and I was National Security Advisor.

Very early in my period in office, Aba Even came to see me and said, remember, we Israelies consider objectivity to be a hundred percent agreement with our point of view. I thought he was kidding. But it was a complicated period. It was the period of the War of Attrition, of the Soviet missiles along the Suez Canal, then of the

Yom Kippur War. And through that period Yitzchak and I worked not only together as colleagues but became close friends.

I admired his extraordinary analytical skill and, while he was a shy man, he was also a very passionate man dedicated to the security of Israel and to the peace within which that security must be embedded.

When he was taken from us, it was a terrible personal blow. I had seen him two weeks before the assassination at a long lunch at the Regency Hotel in New York. He said that Israel really had no choice and that with respect to the Arabs on the West Bank, there were only three possibilities: integration into the Israeli state, which would change the character of the Israeli state; turning the Arab regions into a kind of Bantustan, which would destroy the moral basis of the Israeli state; or to work on coexistence.

Once I met the Australian Foreign Minister after he had just had a meeting with Yitzchak, and he told me that in trying to persuade Yitzchak to some point of view, had said: " but I am

2

preaching to the converted." And Yitzchak said, "no, not to the
converted, to the committed." That was the essence of what he stood
for and why he was as close to being an indispensable leader as
Israel is likely to have.

He was fortunate to have had as collaborator Shimon Peres, my
long-time friend. The combination of those two men made for
extraordinary progress towards peace. At present the question is:
Where are we now and where should we go?

I have always been in a rather complicated situation
personally. I am of course Jewish and I lost 13 members of my
family in concentration camps. That links my destiny with that of
the Jewish people. But I have also been honored by being the first
Jewish Secretary of State to have contributed to guiding the
destiny of America in a - for America - very tragic period, the
ending of the Vietnam War and trying to maintain American
credibility at a time of enormous domestic crisis. In the middle
of all this came the Yom Kippur War, and then the peace process,
all of it in very complicated circumstances.

3

EVJ

Many of my colleagues from this period who are in this room will remember what pressures existed at that time. The energy crisis, the oil embargo, the pressures from most of America's allies to force Israel back to the '67 borders immediately - not a peace process at all but abandonment under outside pressure. And Arab leaders would not even talk to Israel in those days so that I had to carry messages back and forth. Of course since the two parties never even came face to face, both of them probably thought they could have done a lot better. And probably they could have, if they would only have talked to each other directly.

Through this period, the people I have mentioned, and others like Simcha Dinitz who was then ambassador, and those of us on the American side, may have had occasional disagreements but we always had a common objective. And there was through all those years fundamental agreement as to where we were trying to go.

The point I want to make to you tonight is that that is the absolutely essential requirement for progress towards peace. There are three aspects, it seems to me, for Israel's position in a peace

4

process. The first is the relationship to America. The second is
the relationship to the international community, and the third is
to preserve the security of Israel through all of this.

It is almost impossible to have every one of these three
elements in perfect harmony or to expect that everything is
possible within each category. But enough of it must be achieved
to allow for underlying harmony.

The great contribution of Yitzchak Rabin was that he was
totally trusted in America and that by the end of his life he had
established a truly extraordinary position in the international
community. I was in Asia once and happened to be watching some
Asian television when, quite by accident, I saw his arrival in
China, where he was treated as an honored state guest. I tracked
him down and called him up and said, I have become somewhat of an
expert in Chinese receptions and you have received the most
respectful, courteous and high-level reception that I have seen.

That was a great achievement for Israel and not just in China
but everywhere. And through all of this, as a former Chief of Staff

5

he maintained of course his dedication to the security of Israel.

Now, where are we?

I do not want to talk in categories that are part of the
Israeli domestic debate. I simply want to describe what I believe
to be the challenges which must be met in the contemporary period.
First, relations with America.

The Israel of today is dealing with quite a different America
from the one that started the peace process. It is a generation
which, on the whole, has no memory of World War II. My generation
went through World War II, the restoration of Europe, the Marshall
Plan, and the rebuilding of free societies. For us it was
absolutely axiomatic that we would protect the Middle East against
Communist dangers.

Today there is no longer that sort of Communist danger. The
formative experience of the current generation of Americans was the
Vietnam War and its disappointments. In America today there is
isolationism on the left and unilateralism on the right, and the
government has to navigate with great care between them.

6

As some of you may know, President Clinton was my second choice in the last election. Nevertheless, I say that only to indicate that I support him on his recent initiatives to China, his NATO expansion policy and, if he should feel that it is necessary to take a strong stand against Iraq, which I certainly believe, I will certainly do my utmost to bring about bipartisan support for him in that respect.

But bipartisanship in America now is more difficult. Over 30% of those in Congress have never been outside the United States, and many of the issues we read about in the newspapers are almost incomprehensible to them.

When I am asked about the Middle East or about the Palestinian-Israeli issue, I always ask an American audience: What is the distance from the Jordan River to the sea? Will you please raise your hand. Never have I found one person who knew. They think 300 miles, 500 miles. When I say 50 miles, it is a stunning piece of news to them.

So when the issue is, how many kilometers one can safely

7

withdraw, that is a very difficult concept to get into the minds
of the average American. There is also inherent disparity with the
views of a continental country which has never been in mortal
danger or suffered a major defeat in war. Not even Vietnam really
touched American soil.

In a country like Israel, which has never been out of danger,
never been recognized and has lived a ghetto existence for most of
its history, the dialogue between America and Israel is important
and absolutely essential to acquiring some understanding of where
we are going.

The second is the relationship to the international community.
The international situation is totally different from what it was
25 years ago. At that time it was a two-power world and it was
relatively easy to integrate the thinking about the relative power
positions of the various countries.

Now we have a Russia which is back to the borders of Peter the
Great. We have a China growing at the rate of 10% a year for 20
years, an unheard-of evolution. India is developing rapidly. South

8

East Asia is also growing. And then there are changes in the area
much closer to you in to Israel, in Iran, and possible changes in
other regions as well.

In terms of just America, the question is how to handle this,
and what the American national interest is in such a situation. We
live in a world of global economics but politics remain national.
I do not know how much of our current debate is presented in the
Israeli press, or what the countries of South East Asia and
elsewhere are saying. But we have to find a way of insulating
ourselves from economic crises which start far away and are
orchestrated by pension funds and other institutions we don't even
understand. This will absorb an enormous amount of American
attention, and Israel must be placed in all this somehow if it is
not to become in time the focal point of a lot of pressures.

So now let me talk about Israel. What a unique country. What
other people would conceive to return to where they haven't been
for 2000 years. What a testimony to faith to build on this
territory a significant nation.

9

I came here for the first time in 1961. I met the first Israeli leader, Yigal Alon, when he studied at Harvard for three months in 1965. He told me about the Independence War in 1948, a fantastic adventure, but Israel then had only a few hundred thousand people.

I came to this city for the first time in 1962 when Shlomo Argov, who is now lying in the Haddassa Hospital because he was shot in the head by an Iraqi assassin, took me around and we stood at the separation of the City of Jerusalem and looked into the Old City. So, without a doubt, Israel has had a very complicated past, has grown into a modern industrial state, and is in the best economic position it has ever been in. But how can it look to the future?

As a result of its history, Israel has developed, or some Israelis have developed, notions of peace and security that are almost eschatological. The notion of security is one of perfect security and of avoiding a repetition of the endless cycle of wars through which Israel has lived. Or, if that is not achievable,

10

perfect security against all the outside world.

The notion of peace is that some magic point will be reached when an agreement is signed, after which the Middle East will live with a consciousness of harmony. I think neither of these objectives is going to be achievable quickly. But definite and significant progress can be made towards each of them, and has been made towards each of them.

With respect to the problem of security, it is of course essential that Israel never be in a position where aggressors believe they can achieve a decisive victory; or where Israel is totally dependent, or even largely dependent, on foreign support for its security. On the other hand, Israel must also find itself in an international environment in which it is not perceived as the principal cause of tension in the region.

In 1973, when the peace process started, I was perhaps the principal advocate of what was then called the step-by-step approach. My reasoning was as follows: all the surrounding countries were demanding that Israel return immediately and

11

unconditionally to the 1967 borders, after which they would be
willing perhaps to open peace negotiations.

After a war of such magnitude, it was inconceivable for Israel
to make such a retreat in return for such a promise. Therefore I
believed - and the Israeli leaders of that time came to believe -
that a series of smaller steps, each of which would invite some
reciprocity, might create the conditions in which a breakthrough
could be achieved towards peace by one or the other of the Arab
countries.

At the time, I was heavily criticized for that. But I thought
it important not to humiliate Egypt to the point where Sadat would
not be able to participate in peace negotiations since, in my view,
the soldiers of the Third Army could be replaced easily. But an
Egyptian government willing to talk to Israel was harder to find.
And so the step-by-step approach developed, gained huge momentum,
and was culminated by Yitzchak and Shimon in the Oslo Agreements.

Like many of you in this room, when the Oslo Agreements were
first published I was quite uneasy. I am frank to admit it. I wrote

12

[Y]

some articles in which I raised a number of questions about what
might happen and about the things which might go wrong. Some of
the questions I raised, such as the possible behavior of the
Palestinian police, proved to be valid. Yet I came to believe, and
I hold the view now, that if one had tried to tie up every last of
the things that could go wrong, there would never have been an
agreement.

The fundamental breakthrough was to teach the Arabs and
Israelis the grammar of coexistence, and to enable them, by working
through basically insoluble problems towards some practical
solution, to solve the fundamental challenge on the West Bank,
which is this.

13

Yet I also believe that there is no alternative for either
side, as I was quoted in an Israeli newspaper. That, by the way,
came about in a typically Israeli way: a journalist came to me at
the airport and said: give me a break, I came all the way out here,
you can at least give me one sentence. So, given the unlimited
Israeli ability to make me feel guilty, I said to her what I
actually ought to believe.

I believe that the objective conditions to making progress are
in place for the following reasons: neither side can want to go to
war; neither side can continue imposing its will because the
international community will not stand for it, and there are
critical limits even to terrorism.

14

LYJ

Yitzchak have taught many Israelis who opposed him that what they thought was achievable is not achievable. I have the impression that Arafat and the Arab side are learning that they cannot mobilize enough outside pressure to make Israel do something which goes against the basic instincts of the Israeli people.

15

Those two issues must be linked. What are the borders, and that, in return for them, a Palestinian state will emerge and will be recognized by the outside world, whatever Israel does. That framework has to be faced. I do not think Israel can possibly return to the '67 borders on the West Bank. I have always believed that something like the Alon Plan, without tying myself to any particular line, will have to be the outcome. And it has to be

16

As I said, I was a great admirer of Yitzchak and I would like
to close with one episode and one quote. Many of you will remember
the episode of the young soldier whose father was killed in the
last days of the 1973 war; who volunteered, after he had already

17

[Y]

A friend of mine called me up and said, you know this is
awfully tough on Yitzchak. He had to order this. Why don't you give
him a call. I gave him a call and of course those of you who know
Yitzchak will recognize that he didn't want to talk about having
done his duty. And any one who knew him knew he was suffering. So
I said, Yitzchak, I sometimes think that all your life has been a
preparation for this period and that it was really some divine
providence that made you go through this. Well, even this did not
elicit any more from Yitzchak except to say: we shall see. And of
course we have.

Now I would like to read a paragraph from a speech which many
of you will undoubtedly know, one he made to the American Congress
at a joint session of Congress in 1994. I think it epitomizes what
he stood for and the attitude that needs to animate our actions.

"It is said in the Bible, our Book of the Books, peace is
mentioned in its various idioms 237 times, in the Bible from which

18

we draw our values and our strength. In the book of Jeremiah we
find the lamentation of Rachel, the Matriarch. It reads: 'Refrain
your voice from weeping and your eyes from tears for thy work shall
be rewarded,' said the Lord. I will not refrain from weeping for
those who are gone. But on this summer day in Washington, far from
home, we sense that our work will be rewarded, as the prophet
foretold."

Prof. Anita Shapira: Before we came in I spoke with Dr. Kissinger and he was hesitant regarding how you would receive him. But, I said, there won't be any more amenable crowd than this crowd and both of you, Prof. Kissinger and this crowd, lived up to our expectations. Thank you Dr. Kissinger for a most memorable lecture of a wise, experienced, down to earth statesman and let us hope that history will bear you out. Thank you.

19

10/12/1998 10:46

97236436546

YITZHAK RABIN CENTER

I came to this city for the first time in 1962 when Shlomo Argov, who is now lying in the Haddassa Hospital because he was shot in the head by an Iraqi assassin, took me around and we stood at the separation of the City of Jerusalem and looked into the Old City. So, without a doubt, Israel has had a very complicated past, but how can it look to the future? It has grown into a modern industrial state, and is in the best economic position it has ever been in.

9

[4J]

November 9, 1997

Dr. Henry Kissinger

1

Attrition, of the mines¹ along the Suez Canal, then of the Yom Kippur War. And through that period Yitzchak and I worked not only together as colleagues but became close friends.

When he was taken from us, it was a terrible personal blow. I had seen him two weeks before the assassination at a long lunch at the Regency Hotel in New York. He said that Israel really had no choice and that with respect to the Arabs on the West Bank, there were only three possibilities: integration into the Israeli state, which would change the character of the Israeli state; turning the Arab regions into a kind of Bantustan, which will destroy the moral basis of the Israeli state; or to work on coexistence.

¹HAK needs to fill in

²HAK to fill in

2

LYJ

had a meeting with Yitzchak, and he told me that in trying to
persuade Yitzchak to some point of view, he said: " but I am
preaching to the converted." And Yitzchak said, "no, not to the
converted, to the committed." That was the essence of what he stood
for and why he was as close to being an indispensable leader as
Israel is likely to have.

3

4

EYJ

absolutely essential requirement for progress towards peace. There
are three aspects, it seems to me, for Israel's position in a peace
process. The first is the relationship to America. The second is
the relationship to the international community, and the third is
to preserve the security of Israel through all of this.

The great contribution of Yitzchak Rabin was that he was
totally trusted in America and that by the end of his life he had
established a truly extraordinary position in the international
community. I was in Asia once and happened to be watching some
Asian television when, quite by accident, I saw his arrival in
Tinamen Square in China, where he was treated as an honored state
guest. I tracked him down and called him up and said, I have become
somewhat of an expert in Chinese receptions and you have received
the most respectful, courteous and even level reception that I have

5

CVD

seen.

That was a great achievement for Israel and not just in China but everywhere. And through all of this, as a former Chief of Staff he maintained of course his dedication to the security of Israel. Now, where are we?

6

[47]

7

CJ

Great. We have a China growing at the rate of 10% a year for 20
years, an unheard of evolution. India is developing rapidly. South
East Asia is also growing. And then there are changes in the area
much closer to you in to Israel, in Iran, and possible changes in
other regions as well.

9

10

security and of avoiding a repetition of the endless cycle of wars
through which Israel has lived. Or, if that is not achievable,
perfect security against all the outside world.

In 1973, when the peace process started, I was perhaps the
principal advocate of what was then called the step by step

11

approach. My reasoning was as follows: all the surrounding
countries were demanding that Israel return immediately and
unconditionally to the 1967 borders, after which they would be
willing perhaps to open peace negotiations.

At the time, I was heavily criticized for that. But I thought
it important not to humiliate Egypt to the point where Sadat would
not be able to participate in peace negotiations since, in my view,
the soldiers of the Third Army could be replaced easily. But an
Egyptian government willing to talk to Israel was harder to find.
And so the step by step approach developed, gained huge momentum,
and was culminated by Yitzchak and Shimon in the Oslo Agreements.

12

Like many of you in this room, when the Oslo Agreements were first published I was quite uneasy. I am frank to admit it. I wrote some articles in which I raised a number of questions about what might happen and about the things which might go wrong. Some of the questions I raised, such as the possible behavior of the Palestinian police, proved to be valid. Yet I came to believe, and I hold the view now, that if one had tried to tie up every last of the things that could go wrong, there would never have been an agreement.

13

[Y]

is one of coexistence.

14

I believe, in fact, that the tragic events since the death of
Yitzchak have taught many Israelis who opposed him that what they
thought was achievable is not achievable. I have the impression
that Arafat and the Arab side are learning that they cannot
mobilize enough outside pressure to make Israel do something which
goes against the basic instincts of the Israeli people.

Now I think that so much has happened on both sides that this
expectation is harder to fulfill. Therefore I, the originator of
the step by step approach, have become more and more attracted to
the idea of either taking some bigger steps or even trying for a
final, overall, settlement. The reason for this is that, in an

15

[v]

16

EJ

that something like the Alon Plan, without tying myself to any
particular line, will have to be the outcome. And it has to be
faced by the Arab side. What has to be faced by the Israeli side
is the political outcome I have described.

17

18

It is said in the Bible, our Book of the Books, peace is mentioned in its various idioms 237 times, in the Bible from which we draw our values and our strength. In the book of Jeremiah we find the lamentation of Rachel, the Matriarch. It reads: Refrain your voice from weeping and your eyes from tears for thy work shall be rewarded, said the Lord. I will not refrain from weeping for those who are gone. But on this summer day in Washington, far from home, we sense that our work will be rewarded, as the prophet foretold.

19

YITZHAK RABIN CENTER
מרכז יצחק רבי לחקור ישראל

August 12, 1998

Ms. Suzanne S. McFarlane
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022
Fax: 001-212-759-0042

Dear Ms. McFarlane,

I am writing to you regarding the publication of Dr. Kissinger's lecture "United States and Middle Eastern Policy in a Changing Global Arena".
As you know, we wish to publish the lecture, under a special publication, towards the third anniversary of Yitzhak Rabin's assassination. (Transcript and disk were sent to you in May).

I would greatly appreciate it if you could let me know, at your earliest convenience, when do you think you will send us the final version of the lecture. As you can imagine, we are working within a very tight schedule.

I am grateful for your kind assistance and cooperation.

מררכז יצחק רבי לחקור ישראל
61176 רחום הים 26 ב往来, ת.ד. 17538, תל אביב
03-6436548 :070

The Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies
26 Chaim Levanon st. P.O. Box 17538, Tel Aviv, Israel
Tel: 03-6436545. Fax: 03-6436546

[YJ]

November 9, 1997

Dr. Henry Kissinger

1

Attrition, of the miEs¹ along the Suez Canal, then of the Yom
Kippur War. And through that period Yitzchak and I worked not only
together as colleagues but became close friends.

When he was taken from us, it was a terrible personal blow.
I had seen him two weeks before the assassination at a long lunch
at the Regency Hotel in New York. He said that Israel really had
no choice and that with respect to the Arabs on the West Bank,
there were only three possibilities: integration into the Israeli
state, which would change the character of the Israeli state;
turning the Arab regions into a kind of __2__, which will destroy
the moral basis of the Israeli state; or to work on coexistence.

¹HAK needs to fill in

²HAK to fill in

2

[47]

3

4

The great contribution of Yitzchak Rabin was that he was
totally trusted in America and that by the end of his life he had
established a truly extraordinary position in the international
community. I was in Asia once and happened to be watching some
Asian television when, quite by accident, I saw his arrival in
Tinamen Square in China, where he was treated as an honored state
guest. I tracked him down and called him up and said, I have become
somewhat of an expert in Chinese receptions and you have received
the most respectful, courteous and eye level reception that I have

5

[4]

seen.

6

7

So when the issue is, how many kilometers one can safely
withdraw, that is a very difficult concept to get into the minds
of the average American. There is also inherent disparity with the
views of a continental country which has never been in mortal
danger or suffered a major defeat in war. Not even Vietnam really
touched American soil.

In a country like Israel, which has never been out of danger,
never been recognized and is living a ghetto existence, the
dialogue between America and Israel is important and absolutely
essential to acquiring some understanding of where we are going.

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EJ

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C4J

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[v]

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LYJ

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[v]

is one of coexistence.

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S]

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EYJ

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EJ

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[43]

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HAK:

The Rabin Center wants to publish your remarks and offer to do the editing if you prefer not to do it yourself. (That will be the day!) You never gave permission for publication, so don't feel you must.

Have them send transcript here for editing ✓ Prefer not to publish

ssm

YITZHAK RABIN CENTER
מרכז יצחק רבני

Dr. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
26th floor
New York NY 10022
FAX: 212-753 7248

April 22, 1998

MAY 1 1 1998

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

The deep impression your visit has left on all of us is still persevering. Hence, the Yitzhak Rabin Center for Israel Studies wishes to publish, under a special publication, your memorable lecture "United States and Middle Eastern Policy in a Changing Global Arena". We would be delighted to provide you with a transcript, so you can prepare it for publication according to your wishes. However, we can do the editing of the transcript here, in which case we shall pass you the edited version for comments and approval. Please let us know which alternative is more to your liking.

I truly hope that you will continue to be involved in the activities of the Rabin Center, in the generous and most meaningful way that you did in the past.

Head

מרכז יצחק רבני לחקר ישראל
61175 רח"מ לבנון 26. ת.ד. 17538, ת.ד. 61175
03-6436546 :070

Prof. Henry Kissinger: Prof. Shapira, Lea, Dalia, Prof. Cohen, Shimon Peres and all my friends here, it is a very moving occasion for me to be able to anaugurate this series of lectures, and the Center named after a dear friend of mine.

I met Yitzchak Rabin in 1967, right after the Seven Day War and I remember
the- was it longer? Six Day War. Well, on the seventh day he rested so I counted it.
And relatively shortly afterwards he then invited me to give some lectures to the
military leaders and shortly afterwards we worked together when he was ambassador
of Israel and I was National Security Advisor.

Very early in my period in office Aba Even came to see me and said,
remember, we Israelies consider objectivity to be a hundred percent agreement with
our point of view. I thought he was kidding. But it was a complicated period. It was
the period of the War of Attrition, of the mi..les along the Suez Cannal, then of the
Yom Kippur War. And through that period Yitzchak and I worked not only together
as colleagues but we became close friends.

I admired his extraordinary analytical skill and while he was a shy man he was
also a very passionate man, dedicated to the security of Israel and to the peace within
which that security must be embeded.

And so, when he was taken from us it was a terrible personal blow. I had seen
him two weeks before the assassination for a long lunch at the Ridgency Hotel in New
York. He said that Israel really had no choice, that with respect to the Arabs on the
West bank there were only three possibilities, integration in the Israeli State, which

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would change the character of the Israeli State; turning the Arab regions into a kind of ..., which will destroy the moral basis of the Israeli State or to work on coexistence.

In those days I met the Australian Foreign Minister, who had just had a meeting with Yitzchak and he told me he had tried to persuade Yitzchak to some point of view and he said, but I am preaching to the converted. And Yitzchak said, no, not to the converted, to the committed. That was the essence of what he stood for and why he was as close to indispensable as a leader, as Israel is likely to have.

He was fortunate to have as collaborator Shimon Peres, my long-time friend and the combination of those two men made extraordinary progress towards peace. Now the question is: Where are we now and where should we go?

I have always been in a complicated personal situation. I am of course Jewish and I lost 13 members of my family in concentration camp and that links my destiny with that of the Jewish People. But I have also been honored by being the first Jewish Secretary of State and to have to contribute to guiding the destinies of America, in a, for America, a very tragic period, ending the Vietnam War, maintaining American credibility through a vast domestic crisis - in the middle of which fell the Yom Kippur War. And then to begin the peace process in very complicated circumstances.

Many of my colleagues of this period, who are in this room, remember what pressures existed at that time. The energy crisis, the oil embargo, the pressure from most of America's allies to force Israel back to the 67 borders immediately. Not a peace process but an abandonment under outside pressure, and Arab leaders who would not even talk to Israel. In those days I had to carry messages back and force

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and of course since the two parties were never face to face both of them probably
thought they could have done a lot better. And probably they could have if they would
had talked to each other directly.

Through this period the people I have mentioned, and others like Simcha
Dinitz, who was then ambassador and those of us on the American side, we may have
had occasional disagreement but we always had a common objective. And there was
through all these years a fundamental agreement as to where we were trying to go.

The point I want to make to you tonight is, that that is the absolutely essential
requirement for progress towards peace. There are three aspects, it seems to me for
Israel's position in a peace process. The first is, the relationship to America. The
second is the relationship to the international community and the third is, to preserve
the security of Israel through all of this.

It is almost impossible, I would say, it is impossible to have every one of these
three elements in perfect harmony or to expect that everything is possible within each
category. But, enough of it must be achieved so that there is an underlying harmony.

The great contribution of Yitzchak Rabin was that he was totally trusted in
America, that by the end of his life he had established a truely extraordinary position in
the international community. I was in Asia once and was watching on some Asian
television by accident, his arrival in Tinamen Square in China, where he was treated as
an honored state guest. I tracked him down and called him up and said, I have become
somewhat of an expert in Chinese receptions, and you have received the most
respectful and courteous and eye level reception that I have seen.

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And through all of this as a former Chief of Staff he maintained of course his dedication to the security of Israel. Now, where are we?

I do not want to talk in categories that are part of the Israeli domestic debate. I simply want to describe what I believe the challenges are that must be met in the contemporary period. First, relations to America.

The Israel of today deals with a quite different America from the one that started the peace process. It is a generation that on the whole has no memory of World War II. My generation went through World War II, the restoration of Europe, the Marshal Plan, the rebuilding of the free societies and for us it was absolutely axiomatic that we would protect the Middle East against Communist dangers.

Today there is no longer that sort of Communist danger. The formative experience of this generation of Americans was the Vietnam War and its disappointments. In America today there is isolationism on the left and unilateralism on the right and the Government has to navigate with great care between them. As some of you may know, President Clinton was my second choice in the last election.

But nevertheless, I say that only to indicate that I support him on his recent initiatives to China, his NATO expansion policy and if he should feel that it is necessary to take a strong stand against Iraq, which I certainly believe, I will certainly do my utmost to bring about bipartisan support for him in that respect.

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But bipartisanship in America now is more difficult when over 30% of the
Congress have never been outside the United States, and when many of the issues we
read about in the newspapers are almost incomprehensible to them.

When I am asked about the Middle East or about the Palestinian-Israeli issue, I always, to an American audience, say: What is the distance from the Jordan River to the sea? Will you please raise your hand. Never have I found one person who knew. They think 300 miles, 500 miles. When I say 50 miles - that is a stunning piece of news to them.

So then when the issue is, how many kilometers one can safely withdraw, that
is a very difficult concept to get into the minds of any of the average American. So
there is an inherent disparity between the view of a continental country, never in
danger, never suffered a major defeat in war. Not even Vietnam really touched
American soil.

In a country like Israel, which has never been out of danger, never been
recognized living a ghetto existence, so this dialogue is important between America
and Israel and it is absolutely essential at this moment to get some understanding of
where we are going.

The second is the relationship to the international community. The
international situation is totally different from it was 25 years ago. At that time it was
a two-power world and it was easy to integrate the thinking, or relatively easy about
the relative power position of the various countries.

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Now we have Russia, which is in borders of Peter the Great. We have China growing at the rate of 10% a year for 20 years. An unheard of evolution. India which is developing rapidly. South East Asia which is also growing. And then changes in the area much closer to you, to Israel, in Iran. Possible changes in other regions.

Just for America alone, without Israel, how to handle this, what is the American national interest in such a situation? We live in a world of global economics but the politics are national. I don't know how much of a current debate is presented in the Israeli press, where the countries of South East Asia and elsewhere are saying, we have to find a way of insulating ourselves from economic crises that start far away and that are run by pension funds and other institutions that we don't even understand. This will absorb an enormous amount of American attention. And into all of this Israel has to be placed if it is not to become in time the focal point of a lot of pressures.

So now let me talk about Israel. What a unique country. What other People would conceive to return to where they haven't been for 2000 years. What a testimony to faith to build in this territory a significant nation.

I came here for the first time in 1961. I met the first Israeli leader, Yigal Alon, when he studied in Harvard for three months in 1965. And he was telling me about the Independence War in 1948. It was a fantastic adventure, but Israel then had only a few hundred thousand people.

I came here for the first time in 1962 and Shlomo Argov, who is now lying in the Haddassa Hospital because he was shot in the head by an Iraqi assassin, took me

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around and we stood at the separation of the City of Jerusalem, and looked into the Old City. So of course Israel has had a very complicated-

(Cassette #2, Side A)

... grown to become a modern industrial state and is economically in the best position it has ever been. But how can it look now at the future?

As a result of this history Israel has developed, or some Israelies have developed a notion of peace and a notion of security that is almost escadelogical. The notion of security is perfect security, to avoid forever a repetition of the endless cycle of wars through which Israel has lived. Or, if that's not achievable, perfect security against all the outside world.

I think both of these objectives are not going to be achievable quickly. But definite and significant progress can be made towards each of them, and has been made towards each of them.

With respect to the problem of security, it is of course essential that Israel never be in a position where aggressors can believe that they can achieve a decisive victory, and where Israel is never in a position where it is totally dependent or even largely dependent on foreign support for its security.

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On the other hand, Israel also must be in an international environment where it
is not perceived as the principal cause of tension in the region.

In 1973, when the peace process started, I was perhaps the principal advocate
of what was then called, the step by step approach. My reasoning was as follows: All
the surrounding countries were demanding that Israel return immediately and
unconditionally to the 1967 borders, after which they would be willing perhaps to
open peace negotiations.

After a war of such magnitude it was inconceivable for Israel to make such a
retreat in return for such a promise and therefore I believed and the Israeli leaders of
that time came to believe, that a series of smaller steps, each of which would invite
some reciprocity might create conditions in which a breakthrough could be achieved
towards peace by one or the other Arab countries.

At the time I was heavily criticized for that. I thought it was important not to
humiliate Egypt to a point in which Saadat would not be able to participate in peace
negotiations because in my view, the soldiers of the Third Army could be easily
replaced. But an Egyptian Government willing to talk to Israel was harder to find. And
so the step by step approach developed, gained huge momentum and was culminated
by Yitzchak and by Shimon in the Oslo Agreements.

Like many of you in this room, when Oslo Agreements were first published I
was quite uneasy. I am frank to admit it. I wrote some articles in which I raised a
number of questions of what might happen and of things that might go wrong. Some
of those questions I raised such as the possible behavior of the Palestinian police

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proved to be valid. Yet, I came to believe and I hold the view now that if one had tried to tie up every last one of the things that could go wrong there would never have been an agreement.

The fundamental breakthrough was to teach Arabs and Israelies the grammar of coexistence, and to enable them by working through basically insoluble problems towards some practical solution to solve the fundamental challenge on the West Bank, which is this.

The Sinai was relatively easy to make an agreement because there are 200 miles of sand between the Egyption population and the Israeli population. But on the West Bank it is not possible to create any physical separation of that kind. And there the problem is one of coexistence.

On the Arab side there are undoubtedly those who are using the negotiations, the way France negotiated with Germany before World War I as a way of getting back Outs.. Lorain at the right moment. And indeed in one of the early meeting one of the early meetings with Asad he said to me, the French waited 50 years, I can wait 50 years. There are people that go further and that want to destroy the process now.

Yet, I also believe that there is no alternative for either side. I was quoted in an Israeli newspaper which came about in a typically Israeli way, a journalist came to me at the airport and said, give me a break, I came all the way out here, you can at least give me one sentence. So given the unlimited Israeli ability to make me feel guilty I said to her what I actually ought to believe.

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I believe the objective condition to make progress are quite ready for the following reason: Neither side can want to go to war. Neither side can continue imposing its will because either the international community will not stand for it or there are critical limits even to terrorism.

I believe in fact that the tragic events since the death of Yitzchak have taught many Israelies who opposed him that what tehy thought was achievable is not achievable. I have the impression that Arfat and the Arab side is learning that they cannot mobilize enough outside pressure to make Israel do something that goes against the basic instincts of the Israeli People.

So now the problem is, how does one put this together. As I understood the Oslo Peace Process, it was the lead step, it would improve the atmosphere and gradually create a situation in which the final decisions would operate on the momentum of what had already been achieved. I think that was a realistic and visionary concept.

Now I think that so much has happened on both sides that this expectation is now harder to fulfill. Therefore, I, the originator of the step by step approach have become more and more attracted to the idea, either to take some bigger steps or even try for a final solution, a final settlement, an overall settlement. The reason I think this is because in an atmosphere of distrust if one does not know the destination, each concession becomes much harder.

Now I recognize that the atmosphere of distrust makes also a permanent settlement negotiation very difficult, because people may think that it is an excuse for

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I have argued ever since Prime Minister Begin agreed to the concept of autonomy, that a Palestinian state was inevitable. Once the concept of autonomy had been granted nothing would prevent the outside world from elevating the status of that autonomous unit. Therefore, I told Begin on the day after Camp David and I have said it ever since, that the key question is, what borders will that unit have.

So I think those two issues must be linked. What are the borders and in return for that, I believe, that a Palestinian state will emerge and will be recognized by the outside world, whatever Israel does.

That framework in my view has to be faced. I do not think Israel can possibly return to the 67 borders on the West Bank. I have always believed that something like the Alon Plan, without tying myself to any particular line, will have to be the outcome. I believe that has to be faced by the Arab side. What has to be faced by the Israeli side is the political outcome that I have described.

I know the whole host of other issues from refugees, on precise limitations of armaments for the Palestinian unit because it cannot possibly be a constant source of upheaval. But if we are clear about the destination and above all, if we can agree between Israel and the United States that that is the destination, then the tactics can be maybe argued about and can be achieved.

This seems to me the big decision that has to be made. One cannot possibly hope that there is a way around it. Because this is a relatively quiet period in

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international affairs but it would be unrealistic to expect that this period will continue indefinitely or even much longer, and then it will be much more difficult to mobilize public support, at least in America.

As I said, I was a great admirer of Yitzchak and I would like to close with just two episodes, well one episode and one quote. Many of you will remember the episode of the young soldier whose father was killed on the last days of the 1973 war, who volunteered, after he had already served his time in the unit that was charged with antiterrorist actions of the Israeli Army and who was killed in that last action.

A friend of mine called me up and said, you know this is awfully tough on Yitzchak. He had to order this. Why don't you give him a call. I gave him a call and of course those of you who know Yitzchak will recognize that he didn't want to talk about having done his duty and any one who knew him knew he was suffering. So I said, Yitzchak, I sometimes think that all your life has been a preparation for this period and that it was really some divine providence that made you go through this. Well, even this did not elicit more from Yitzchak, except to say, we shall see. And of course we have.

Now I had like to read a paragraph from a speech which many of you will undoubtedly know, which he made to the American Congress at a joint session of the Congress in 1994. I think it epitomizes what he stood for and the attitude that needs to animate our action.

It said in the Bible, our Book of the Books peace is mentioned in its various idioms 237 times, in the Bible from which we draw our values and our strength. In the

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book of Jeremiah we find the lamentation of Rachel, the Matriarch. It reads: Refrain your voice from weeping and your eyes from tears for thy work shall be rewarded, said the Lord. I will not refrain from weeping for those who are gone. But on this summer day in Washington, far from home we sense that our work will be rewarded, as the prophet foretold.

**Prof. Anita Shapira:** Before we came in I spoke with Dr. Kissinger and he was hesitant regarding how you would receive him. But, I said, there won't be any more amenable crowd than this crowd and both of you, Prof. Kissinger and this crowd lived up to our expectations. Thank you Dr. Kissinger for a most memorable lecture of a wise, experienced, down to earth statesman and let us hope that history will bear you out. Thank you.

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