Additional Copies Made 7/11/62

Copy No. 8 of 12

(To be handled only
under the personal
direction of Mr. Katz)

Paraphrase of Message sent by Ambassador Katz to Mr. Bissell

November 26, 1950

I am disturbed over the use of the term, "equitable distribu-
tion of the defense burden", although I realize it is essentially
fruitless to prolong our discussion of concepts and I assume that
the use of the term will probably do no real harm.

The British used this phrase in the NATO exercise and in so
doing indulged in an unconscious psychological sleight of hand
which involved a slip from words to things. Everyone is quite
naturally in favor of equity in the same sense everyone is for
motherhood. Another point to be borne in mind is that there has
been a tendency to use the term as if analagous to the equitable
distribution of tax burden in progressive income taxation in the
U.S.A. or the U.K. The result is that when we discuss the phrase,
"equitable distribution of the defense burden", there is a tendency
to talk in terms derived from discussions of the relationship of
United States citizens one to another, as if these relationships
were identical to those of the NATO governments one to another.
The day might conceivably come in the far off future when this may
be the ideal for a relationship between citizens of Europe and
citizens of the United States. But there is no relevance here to

citizens of the United States. But there is no relevance here to
be the ideal for a relationship between citizens of Europe and
The day might conceivably come in the far off future when this may
were identical to those of the NATO governments one to another.
United States citizens one to another, as if these relationships
to talk in terms derived from discussions of the relationship of
"equitable distribution of the defense burden", there is a tendency
U.S.A. or the U.K. The result is that when we discuss the phrase,
distribution of tax burden in progressive income taxation in the
been a tendency to see the term as if analogous to the equitable
motherhood. Another point to be borne in mind is that there has
naturally in favor of equity in the same sense everyone is for
which involved a slip from words to things. Everyone is quite
doing intrigued in an unconscious psychological sleight of hand
The British need this phrase in the NATO exercises and in so
the use of the term will properly do no real harm.

November 30, 1950

Paraphrase of Message sent by Ambassador Kets to Mr. Pratapji

direction of Mr. Kets)
under the personal
(To be handled only
Cody No. 3 of 15

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relationships among governments today.

When we talk about the equitable distribution of the defense burden, we must ask ourselves in relation to what should the distribution be equitable. A good many variables have to be taken into consideration in this connection, among them comparative benefit, comparative responsibility and comparative capacity. Quite obviously the U. S. has greater capacity than the other countries have. Obviously also the U. S. has a great deal less responsibility for the defense of France than the French have, for the defense of Britain than the British have and for the defense of Europe than the Europeans have. Looking at the reverse side of the coin, the defense of France is of far more immediate and far greater benefit to the French than it is to us; defense of Britain is of far more immediate and far greater benefit to the British than it is to us; and defense of Europe is of far more immediate and far greater benefit to the Europeans than it is to us. It would be pretense and nothing else to ignore these facts and the obvious conclusion that they counterbalance the greater relative capacity of the U. S. in determining what allocation of the burden may be equitable.

I would boil this down to the following: the recovery of Europe is a matter of vital interest to the U. S. It is of even more vital interest to European countries. The term "common purpose" is in fact a definition of this interest on the part of the U. S. and the European countries. We have agreed to associate

U. 2. and the European countries. We have agreed to associate
hence, ie in fact a definition of this interest on the part of the
more vital interest to European countries. The term "common bur-
 Euclidean is a matter of vital interest to the U. 2. It is of even
I would poll this down to the following: the recovery of
in determining what allocation of the burden may be equitable.
that they correspond to the greater relative capacity of the U. 2.
and nothing else to ignore these facts and the obvious conclusion
benefit to the Europeans than it is to us. It would be better
and defense of Europe if far more immediate and far greater
immediate and far greater benefit to the British than it is to us;
to the French than it is to us; defense of Britain if far more
defense of France if far more immediate and far greater benefit
the Europeans have. Looking at the reverse side of the coin, the
of Britain than the British have and for the defense of Europe than
ity for the defense of France than the French have, for the defense
have. Obviously also the U. 2. has a great deal less reasonable-
opinionally the U. 2. has greater capacity than the other countries
it, comparative reasonableness and comparative capacity. Quite
into consideration in this connection, among them comparative pen-
tration be equitable. A good many variables have to be taken
p burden, we must ask ourselves in relation to what should the dis-
relationship among governments today.
When we talk about the equitable distribution of the defense

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together in respect of certain activities for certain purposes.
This agreement is made in recognition of our respective security
interests. The interest of the U. S. is sufficiently great to
warrant the extension of aid. The relationship between the U. S.
and the European countries is one which we want to be that of
mutually respecting, self-respecting countries. It should not be
that of principal to satellite. It should have the moral quality
of a partnership. Having this moral quality, we agree that the
amount and kind of aid we give should be determined in the light
of discussion among the European countries and ourselves. Aid so
determined is nonetheless aid. This aid represents resources
which the American taxpayer and the American Congress have made
available to others. Executive agencies administer it and it
cannot be denied that in doing so they have a trustee's responsi-
bility. As trustees, they must account for their stewardship. Un-
less they exercise that stewardship strictly no assurance can be
given to Congress and the people of the U. S. that the expenditure
of funds will accord to the "common purpose".

Continued dependence on American aid creates moral and psycho-
logical problems for the British. I am fully aware of these prob-
lems and believe that I have some understanding of them. Certainly
I sympathize deeply with the British desire to be independent of
this aid. On the other hand, I believe that for the British to

On the other hand, I believe that for the British to
I emphasize deeply with the British desire to be independent of
law and believe that I have some understanding of them. Certainly
Continued dependence on American aid creates moral and bayonc-
ot funds will accord to the "common burghers".

Given to Congress and the people of the U. S. that the expenditure
less they exercise that stewardship strictly no assurance can be
purity. As trustees, they must account for their stewardship. Un-
cannot be denied that in doing so they have a trustee's reason-
available to others. Executive agencies administer it and it
which the American taxpayer and the American Congress have made
determined is nonetheless aid. This aid represents resources
of direction among the European countries and ourselves. Aid so
amount and kind of aid we give should be determined in the light
of a partnership. Having this moral quality, we agree that the
that of principal to affiliate. It should have the moral quality
mutually respecting, self-respecting countries. It should not be
and the European countries is one which we want to be that of
warrant the extension of aid. The relationship between the U. S.
interests. The interest of the U. S. is sufficiently great to
This agreement is made in recognition of our respective security
together in respect of certain activities for certain burghers.

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delude themselves into thinking they had achieved independence by calling aid by another name would create for them even graver moral and psychological problems. Every effort must be made to lay this issue to rest. We must deal with the problem in terms of realities.

Issue to react. We must deal with the problem in terms of realities, and baychological problems. Every effort must be made to lay this calling aid by another name would create for them even graver moral delusion themselves into thinking they had achieved independence by

Copy No. 8 of 12

Paraphrase of Message Drafted by Ambassador Katz and Sent Jointly
to ECA and State by Ambassadors Katz and Snofford.

April 1951

One of the difficulties of administering aid programs is drawing the line between (1) the point where the amount of aid provided by the United States may be so inadequate as to discourage constructive European action and (2) the point where softness on the part of the United States may encourage the European governments to postpone difficult and essential decisions which they must inevitably face. We still find a lag between the sense of urgency, the determination to get on with the job, which is found in the United States, and corresponding European attitudes.

The Europeans realize this. They realize our concern over the psychological and political difficulties and the economic stress which beset them. They are in consequence quite tempted to feel that if they hesitate for a sufficiently long period of time the U.S. may be moved by impatience and sympathy to "take over" and at the same time to pay the bill. Should the U.S. "take over" -- and to the extent that it does so -- the result would be to make inadequate use of European resources and to impose an excessive drain on U.S. resources. This in turn could

bore an excessive drain on U.S. resources. This in turn config
would be to make insubordinate use of European resources and to im-
"take over" -- and to the extent that it does so -- the result
over" and at the same time to pay the bill. Should the U.S.
time the U.S. may be moved by impatience and sympathy to "take
to feel that if they hesitate for a sufficiently long period of
attract which peut them. They are in consequence quite exempted
the psychological and political difficulties and the economic
The Europeans realize this. They realize our concern over
found in the United States, and corresponding European attitudes.
of Mr.ency, the determination to get on with the job, which is
they must inevitably face. We still find a lag between the same
erments to boathome difficult and essential decisions which
on the part of the United States may encourage the European gov-
age constructive European action and (3) the point where softness
provided by the United States may be so insubordinate as to prevent
drawing the line between (1) the point where the amounts of aid
One of the difficulties of administering aid programmes is

Vorrt. 1937

to ECA and State by Ambassadors Kets and Scottok.
Exaggeration of Message Drafted by Ambassador Kets and sent Jointly

direction of Mr. Kets)
under the personal
(To be handled only
Cody No. 8 of 15

Additional Copies Made 7/11/85

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lead to political repercussions of a serious nature in the U.S.
It could also have serious psychological and moral consequences
in Europe. To understand these consequences, we must bear in
mind the nature of the political processes in Europe leading to
decisions.

The initial burden of deciding what action to take normally
falls, within European countries, on a particular finance, de-
fense or foreign minister. In a situation such as is here painted
the Minister has the alternative of either (1) asking the U.S.
for more aid or (2) convincing his colleagues in the government
about the need, the government in turn having the job of convinc-
ing its parliament. If the second of these alternatives is
adopted, there must be public discussion, explanation and persua-
sion involving consequences of a far-reaching nature over and
above the increase in appropriations. The parliament and the
public face the facts and go through the unpleasant process of
reaching a tough decision. The exercise of resolution tends to
promote resolution within the government and the parliament. With-
in the parliament and among the people, the exercise means educa-
tion and psychological preparation for difficulties and dangers
which may be in the offing. If ministers can turn to the U.S.
for more aid they are spared all these troubles, but the whole
process of education and psychological preparation is curtailed
or omitted.

or omitted.

process of education and psychological preparation for extraterritorial
for more aid they are shared all these troubles, put the whole
which may be in the offing. It ministers can turn to the U.S.
region and psychological preparation for difficulties and dangers
in the parliament and among the people, the exercise means execu-
bacute resolution within the Government and the parliament. With-
resisting a tough decision. The exercise of resolution tends to
bump out the facts and go through the unpleasant process of
apologizing the increase in abstractions. The parliament and the
union involving consequences of a far-reaching nature over and
adopted, there must be public discussion, explanation and benac-
ing its parliament. If the second of these alternatives is
upon the need, the Government in turn having the job of convine-
for more aid or (S) convincing life colleagues in the Government
the Minister has the alternative of either (I) asking the U.S.
tense or foreign minister. In a situation such as he has banked
talks, within European countries, on a particular finance, ge-
The initial burden of deciding what action to take normally
decisions.

and the nature of the political processes in Europe leading to
in Europe. To understand these consequences, we must bear in
It could also have serious psychological and moral consequences
lead to political repercussions of a serious nature in the U.S.

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There is some reason to hope that the situation outlined in the foregoing paragraphs may represent a transitional phase. This phase may in time be superseded by one in which the countries will proceed jointly on the basis of a common appraisal of what the facts are and what are the needs, fully recognizing that organization for self-defense is in each case the responsibility of the individual country. If this could be brought about, it would mean the actual realization of responsible initiative and voluntary performance by each country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of such a nature as to constitute firm ground for mutual undertaking in a spirit of genuine partnership, including where needed appropriate provision for aid. We should concentrate on an effort to speed up this transition and to avoid any action which might slow it up.

In the meantime the unsatisfactory situation outlined above continues. It concerns military aid as well as economic aid. It also concerns on a broader basis all aspects of our financial relations with Western Europe. It emerges sharply in current discussions concerning the utilization of unused European capacity for military production and intra-European military transfers.

In approaching the problem there is a delicate matter of balance involved. One must weigh risks of initial delays against benefits of an effort based on a real appreciation by European

benefits of an effort based on a real appreciation by European
painee involved. One must weigh risks of initial delays against
in approaching the problem there is a delicate matter of
for military production and intra-European military transfers.
discussions concerning the utilization of unused European capacity
relations with Western Europe. It emerges sharply in current
It also concerns on a broader plane all aspects of our financial
continues. It concerns military aid as well as economic aid.

In the meantime the un迷atory situation outlined above
and to avoid any action which might slow it up.

We should concentrate on an effort to speed up this transition
nerably, including where needed appropriate provision for aid.
firm ground for mutual undertaking in a spirit of genuine part-
Atlantic Treaty Organization of such a nature as to constitute
initiative and voluntary performance by each country in the North
about it, it would mean the actual realization of reasonable
apportionment of the individual country. If this could be brought
that organization for self-defence is in each case the reason-
of what the facts are and what are the needs, fully recognizing
that will proceed jointly on the part of a common abpraisal
This phase may in time be accomplished by one in which the conn-
the foregoing paragraphs may represent a transitional phase.

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countries of their own self-interest and a real assumption of
responsibilities by them. Such an effort may well be sufficiently
greater and sounder in the longer run to be worth the risk of an
apparent initial delay. In the administration of U.S. aid during
the present phase in Europe, we therefore believe that the common
interest and the U.S. interest would both be better served on the
whole if we were to expect a larger performance by the European
countries and if we were to make U.S. aid available more sparingly.
On the part of the U.S. such an approach could involve the risk of
deterioration into self-righteousness and preaching. But it need
not, if we are to the utmost degree tactful and understanding and
are constantly aware that sensitive questions of degree are in-
volved. Things being as they are in Europe today this is the
approach we feel we should adopt.

approach we feel we should adapt.

Things being as they are in Europe today this is the
are constantly aware that sensitive questions of degree are in-
not, if we are to the utmost degree tactful and understanding and
deterioration into self-righteousness and brescuing. But it need
On the part of the U.S. such an approach could involve the risk of
 countries and it we were to make U.S. aid available more sparingly.
whole if we were to expect a larger performance by the European
interest and the U.S. interest would both be better served on the
the present phase in Europe, we therefore believe that the common
abherent initial delay. In the administration of U.S. aid during
greater and sounder in the longer run to be worth the risk of an
reasonableness by them. Such an effort may well be sufficiently
countries of their own self-interest and a real assumption of