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Withdrawal and Peace

The United States does not propose that Israel withdraw from
occupied Arab territory except in the context of a mutually
accepted peace and measures to ensure the security of both
sides. What virtually the entire world is saying to both
sides is that peace and withdrawal are inseparable. There
will be no peace without withdrawal; there should be no with-
d withdrawal without peace. This has been the constant position of
the United States since the 1967 war and is the essence of the
November 1967 Security Council Resolution.

As Secretary Rogers said in his December 9 speech: "...our
policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace
based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to with-
draw when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged
by the Security Council resolution."

Foreign Minister Eban of Israel gave recognition to this US
position in the course of an interview on Israeli television
December 22, 1969 when he stated: "No demand is being made on
Israel to budge or withdraw until an agreement is signed which
would satisfy Israel's needs from a peace and security point
of view."

What the US proposals specify as constituting a genuine peace
is totally different from the fragile armistice arrangements
that have existed in the past. The US proposals provide that
a final peace settlement should include firm and specific com-
mitments by the parties, undertaken in relation to each other,
to refrain from hostile acts; to restrain guerrillas on their
respective territory; to guarantee free navigation for all
through the area's international waterways; to acknowledge each
other's sovereign existence; and to refrain from interference
in each other's domestic affairs.

Negotiations and Agreement

Similarly, the United States continues to hold firmly to the
view that there is a need for a mutually binding, contractual
peace based on negotiated agreements. The US proposals provide
that Israel and its Arab neighbors in a final peace agreement
should explicitly acknowledge each other's sovereignty, political
independence and territorial integrity and undertake to desist
from hostile acts of any kind; that the agreed and stated aim
of a settlement must be the establishment of a lasting peace
between the parties; and that the final documents must set forth
secure and agreed boundaries between them.

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The US believes that the best way to begin a negotiating process is to support the mission of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring established by the 1967 Security Council resolution. We are fully aware and appreciate that Israel would prefer to reach a settlement through direct negotiations from the outset with no preconditions, and opposes as a matter of principle the efforts of the major powers to work out guidelines to help the parties enter into the negotiating process. The history of settlement efforts over the past two and a half years makes clear that negotiations between the parties are unlikely to get started at all without some kind of outside catalyst and without flexibility on both sides with respect to the precise negotiating procedures used.

The aim of the US proposals is to bring the parties to the negotiating table. We are strongly opposed to any attempt to impose a settlement. Our proposals leave large and vital areas of negotiation to the parties, in particular the practical security arrangements which are intended to safeguard a peace. As to negotiations, the only preconditions contained in our proposals are those laid down in the 1967 Security Council Resolution which include commitments to peace and withdrawal.

## Other Issues: Boundaries, Refugees, Jerusalem

Some commentators have expressed concern that the US has changed its policy on the question of boundaries and territory and have taken the view that by stating its position on borders and making suggestions on refugees and Jerusalem, the US has undermined Israel's bargaining position. Israel's bargaining position has not been weakened; it is not called upon to remove one soldier from territory occupied during the June 1967 war unless it receives from the Arabs commitments incorporated in a peace agreement in which the practical safeguards of Israeli security are spelled out and are contractually binding on the parties.

On the boundary question, our position rests firmly on the 1967 Security Council resolution which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. As President Nixon told the UN General Assembly on September 18, 1969, we believe that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East. We make a distinction between the question of the location of Israel's boundaries, on which the thrust of the Security Council resolution is clear, and the act of Israeli withdrawal to those boundaries, which should only take place under terms and conditions of peace and security worked out and agreed to by the

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parties themselves under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

On refugees and Jerusalem, the recommendations we have made as a framework for negotiations and agreement between the parties reflect long-established policies of the United States Government which have been stated publicly in the United Nations and elsewhere on numerous occasions.

## US Role and Interests

As Secretary Rogers has emphasized, peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help; they can provide a catalyst; they can stimulate the parties to talk; they can help define a realistic framework for agreement; but agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.

The US and others who have interests at stake in the Middle East cannot remain aloof while dangerous instability grows in that area. Furthermore, the major powers have responsibilities inherent in their Security Council role and in their relations with the countries in the area, including the supply of arms and economic support, which they cannot abdicate. We are convinced that we should continue to work with others--in the area and throughout the world--so long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace without which no state in the area will find true security.

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Public Information Series

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Secretary of State on December 9, 1969 made a statement outlining the views of the United States on a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict. The Secretary's remarks summarized proposals which the United States has made in the major power talks on the Middle East and has discussed with the parties. Substantially accurate versions of United States views on both the UAR and Jordan aspects of an Arab-Israel settlement have appeared in the press.

The United States proposals are fully consistent with long-standing United States policy with which the parties to the conflict have been familiar since the months immediately following the Arab-Israel war of 1967. It gives strong support to the Security Council Resolution adopted unanimously on November 22, 1967 which, in the view of the United States, provides the best framework for a peaceful and enduring settlement.

Although Secretary Rogers' speech gives a clear outline of United States policy, there have been misunderstandings of the United States position in the press and elsewhere in recent weeks. Fears have been expressed that the United States has changed its position on essential aspects of an Arab-Israel peace.

A careful reading of Secretary Rogers' speech together with a review of the text of the Security Council Resolution of November 1967 shows that these fears are without foundation. The United States position on major points at issue is clear and is based firmly on the Resolution of the Security Council.

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

The following can be attributed to White House officials and is not to be directly quoted. Information contained in this BACKGROUND BRIEFING is for release 6:30 A.M., EST.
December 20, 1969

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 2:50 P.M. EST.

DECEMBER 18, 1969

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The ground rules for the backgrounder today are the same as they were for the backgrounder on domestic matters. You can attribute what Dr. Kissinger discusses with you today to White House officials, and you should not use direct quotations.

As was the case in the domestic backgrounder, the purpose of this is not to produce immediate spot news. It is to give you our impressions as to the year that has gone by in response to your questions primarily to Dr. Kissinger.

The material from this particular session is embargoed for use until 6:30 A.M. on Saturday.

Again, the objective of this, however, is hopefully to provide you with in depth information that you can use for year-end wrapups, if you have that project to do, and not to just generate a Saturday story.

Q This is a Saturday story?

MR. ZIEGLER: You can use it any time you want, whenever you are doing it. But to put some sort of embargo on it so you are all starting off at the same position, it will be 6:30 A.M. Saturday morning, or for Saturday P.M.'s.

Q This would apply to radio, too?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, sir, 6:30 A.M.

Dr. Kissinger, as you may know, prefers to conduct these sessions in response to questions. So we will go right to questions.

Q As a matter of curiosity, Ron, for guidance, do you have something coming down the track for Sunday? I am thinking 6:30 A.M. Saturday is kind of unusual.

MR. ZIEGLER: We did that because we wanted to focus dramatically on the fact that we are not doing this for spot news. We felt one of the ways to do that was to embargo it for use until 6:30 Saturday.

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DR. KISSINGER: I am ready for your questions.

Q I thought you might have a frame, if I asked this question: Would you list briefly the accomplishments of the Administration this year and its major disappointments?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me first list the disappointments: Of course we haven't made more progress in ending the war, although we are on course. But we have always said there are two ways of ending the war. One is through essentially unilateral moves, on which we are now embarked, and the other one is through negotiations, which would be the rapid way of ending the war.

We are disappointed that there hasn't been more progress in the negotiations and we were perhaps more hopeful that there would be greater progress in the negotiations than there has in fact been, earlier this year.

In the accomplishments, let me take a few minutes on that. First, we have devised a new way of making decisions in the field of foreign policy, which I have explained to you on many occasions, and which takes a period of time to become effective; that is, we now have a reasonable opportunity to be sure that when a decision is made, we have looked at every respectable option, not only those generated within the bureaucracy, but those that exist outside, through the NSC system, and we have engaged in a systematic review of American foreign policy with this in mind.

We have done so, moreover, because we are convinced that, while *Vietnam* is, of course, the most anguishing problem we face, and the one that in the short term is going to determine the success or failure of this Administration, in the long term we are in a period in which American foreign policy has to be put on a new foundation.

For about 20 years after the end of the war, American foreign policy was conducted with the maxims and the inspiration that guided the Marshall Plan, that is, the notion of a predominant United States, as the only stable country, the richest country, the country without whose leadership and physical contribution nothing was possible, and which had to make all the difference for defense and progress every where in the world.

Now which ever Administration had come into office would have had to face the fact, I believe, that we have run out of that particular vision. Conditions have changed enormously. We are now in a world in which other parties are playing a greater role. They have regained some of their self-confidence. New nations have come into being. Communism is no longer monolithic and we, therefore, face the problem of helping to build international relations on a basis which may be less unilaterally American.

With this in mind, we have engaged in a rather systematic review of a whole range of things. What we have done in various fields, really, ought to be seen as part of this general pattern.

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You take the *Nixon doctrine for Asia, the basic* philosophy of which has really guided our actions elsewhere. This is based on the proposition, not that the United States withdraws from Asia, but that the defense and progress in Asia, as elsewhere, cannot be a primarily American policy, that the United States can participate where it can make a difference, but it cannot, over an historic period, be the American role to make all the plans, to design all the programs, to execute or implement all the decisions and undertake all the defense and be in the posture where both progress and defense of other areas seem more important to the United States than it is for the countries concerned.

Therefore, what President Nixon announced in Guam is the basic policy we have followed elsewhere. We have generally approached these problems in the NSC in two bites: That is, we would make a general -- the word isn't a bit philosophical -- decision first, of where is it we want to go, and then we would make a number of practical decisions on how to implement it.

For example, on Latin American policy, we made the general decision of where we wanted to go in July, and then in October, after Governor Rockefeller came back from his trip, and the Department of State and other agencies had made specific recommendations, we developed the implementing decisions.

What we have done in Latin America reflects essentially the same philosophy that has guided the policy towards Asia. That is to say, we have tried to develop a pattern that to the greatest degree possible elicits Latin American initiatives and the Latin American contribution, so that the programs that emerge there are joint programs, or programs in which the Latin American countries have played an important and perhaps even predominant role in formulating.

We have seen our role in eliciting their initiative and their contribution, and within the framework of what is a fact of life -- that huge sums are not available -- we have tried to go as far as it is possible to go, through executive and legislative action, to elicit this set of initiatives.

The policy towards Okinawa or towards Japan was set in effect in March. We decided in March that we were going to return Okinawa to Japan and we did so because we had to weigh the benefit in terms of physical security in maintaining our base in Okinawa against the intangible benefit of being able to establish a partnership with Japan on major areas of concern in the Pacific.

We decided that the temporary continuation of a certain amount of physical security was not our primary problem, that our primary problem was to enlist Japan's cooperation in the development of Asia and in the security of its immediate concern; and therefore, it seemed to us important for the sake of this long-term relationship to make the decisions which we did in March.

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We have always made it clear that we have no
permanent enemies and that we will judge other countries,
including Communist countries, and specifically countries
like Communist China, on the basis of their actions and not
on the basis of their domestic ideology.

And we hope we have started a process towards
Communist China, that over a period of years, will permit
a more calibrated relationship to develop, and one in which
such a large part of humanity will not be excluded from
the international community.

Now, let me go back to SALT because I think this is
a good example of both our approach and our philosophy.
There has been a lot of discussion, some discussion in the
press, that the White House in contrast to previous periods
is not as interested in negotiations as before, that we have
not given the push to arms control that previous White Houses
have given. I think it might perhaps be of some use, if I
explained our general approach, because I think it is
symptomatic of the Administration.

First, in the SALT talks, we are concerned not with
one weapons system, but a complex inter-relationship of weapons
systems, in which on both sides, the most basic elements
of security are involved, and which on our side, the most
fundamental issues of alliances and the conception by our
allies of their security is involved.

Secondly, there are many people who like to see this
as a morality play in which the good guys defeat the bad
guys and in which you drive desperately or, if not desperately,
in which you drive brutally, if necessary, towards one
position which you impose on the bad guys with White House
leverage, if necessary.

But if you look at the negotiations in this field
that have taken place over the years, you will find that
negotiations as relatively simple as the test ban, and as
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, took five and three years
respectively; that, if you look at what the classical
pattern has been, that we would enter with a position.:

It never happened that the other side would come in
with a similar position and therefore, we were confronted
with having to spend half of our time negotiating with
ourselves, another quarter of our time negotiating with
our allies and the rest of our time in an entirely tactical
exercise with the Soviets. Therefore, what we attempted to
do is to be prepared for the contingency that the other side
might really be serious, and that if it was serious, it would
have to address a number of fundamental questions, which
would concern us as much as them, and, therefore, we did
something, which has not been done, I think -- I know -- in
the history of these arms control negotiations; that is, we
made a systematic survey of every weapons system that could
conceivably be the subject of negotiations, of our intelligence
capabilities with respect to that weapons system, of the
possibility of evasion with respect to that system, what counter
measures we would have to take, if there were evasion, what
risks we were running and how we could avoid these risks.

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And the purpose was to avoid the sterile, theological debate where one group of the bureaucracy would say, "You are jeopardizing American security without ever being able to define how", and the other group of the bureaucracy would be saying, "You must be able to run the risk for peace", without ever being able to tell you what the risk was.

As a result, first of all, many of the disagreements, most of the disagreements disappeared because when you define just what the evasion was that was possible, and what the risk was, it was possible to express it in a way in which most people agreed.

Secondly, we are in a position to put together almost any position, and we have in fact put together a whole variety of positions, depending on the scope of the agreement, that the other side might be prepared to undertake.

Thirdly, we were able to engage with the Soviets in the preliminary talks in Helsinki, in what I consider the most constructive talks on arms control of which I am familiar, either in or outside the government, and I had participated in almost all of the scientific exchanges outside the government that have taken place.

We were told before we went to Helsinki by many people that if we didn't go there with a position, the Soviets would lose confidence in us, or we were told if we didn't go there with a detailed position the Soviets would pre-empt the field with a spectacular of their own.

In fact, the curious thing seems to have happened that the Soviet preparations have taken about the same form as ours; that is, they have made a detailed analysis of the problems and I consider that one of the more hopeful signs, regardless of what may come out in the next phase of the talks.

We are now in a position to enter the next phase of the talks with some understanding of how the Soviets conceive the problem. And we are not flying blind and we are not just negotiating with ourselves when we put forward a position. Again, I repeat, I think we have done in terms of preparation, a more thorough, detailed, and thoughtful work than I remember having been done in the last ten years.

Another example of how this works is in the field of biological and chemical warfare, where rather than turn it into an obtuse exercise of whether one was for or against biologica warfare, we went through an analysis of what could be accomplished in either of these forms.

And in short, what we have attempted to do is to be thoughtful and to look ahead and to look at matters in a comprehensive manner.

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The Defense budget now is no longer looked at
from a purely security point of view. We have this Defense
Policy Review Committee, which has been written about, which
takes into consideration political and arms controls
considerations and in the consideration of our basic defense
posture, we, for the first time consider the relationship
between the Defense spending and domestic needs.

And when it was presented to the President, he was
in a position to compare what domestic priorities had to
be given up, or where possible, at various levels of
Defense spending.

I don't want to be misleading. No procedure and
no attempt to be thoughtful guarantees that one is in fact
right, or indeed that one is in fact thoughtful. And three
years from now, we won't be judged by the process by which
we have made the decisions, or even where we attempted to
be thoughtful, but whether were we in fact thoughtful.

And I give that answer only in so much detail
because Peter raised it and this is the summing up of the
first year.

There are some other things that might be mentioned,
like the restoration of confidence in Western Europe, but
I think this is an area in which we will have to make further
progress, but why don't I stop now and make some more
questions.

Q Can you add the Middle East to that?

DR. KISSINGER: I will get to you, though.

Q A year ago when this Administration came in,
it was with the feeling that the Middle East was a powder
keg and that conceivably through approaching the Soviets,
one could find ways of defusing this. At the end of this
12-month period, where do we stand?

DR. KISSINGER: Did everyone hear the question? It
was where do we stand at the end of a year with respect to
the Middle East, which we had hoped was one of the areas
in which we can make progress.

In answer to the first question, I should have listed
the Middle East as one of the areas of disappointment. It is
true that we had hoped that we might be able to make greater
progress in the Middle East than has, in fact, been the
case.

And there are a number of reasons for it: One is
I must repeat that all our negotiations with the Soviet
Union, even about the Middle East, have been business-like and
precise. There has not been on the Soviet side, even with
respect to the Middle East, where they have been quite
unyielding, any of this tendentious propaganda which
characterized our previous exchanges.

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So that the tone of our conversations has been one which, at least does not foreclose future movement. But it is true that there hasn't been progress. There are a number of reasons for it.

One is that the local passions run so deep that they may not be amenable to outside pressures or outside advice, and that neither of the parties there may be willing to accept outside advice.

Secondly, in the abstract, one would say that a settlement in the Middle East comes about when each side will recommend to its friends what they consider a fair solution.

So far, the Soviet Union has not shown any great willingness to recommend to its friends in the Middle East a solution that deviates very much from what the friends have already unilaterally stated they consider as a fair solution. In other words, the Soviet Union has not been willing to pay any potential price for the sake of peace in the Middle East.

Therefore, we have not achieved through these political conversations as much as some of us had hoped might be possible.

On the other hand, we have been in contact and we have exchanged ideas. But I would have to list the Middle East among the areas of disappointment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I understood your remarks concerning our attitude toward having no permanent enemies, and you said we would judge each nation on the basis of its action, including Communist China, and it would have a more calibrated reaction to the Mainland Chinese. Does that not in fact constitute a change when compared with President Nixon's remarks at either his first or second news conference in which it seems to me -- I am going on recollection here -- that he said in effect there would be no change in our attitude toward Communist China.

Could you expand a little bit for us on that?

DR. KISSINGER: Frankly, I don't have the text of the press conference, and I seem to remember that he was speaking about the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, which we don't believe is the overwhelming problem since it involves a lot of other issues, including the international position of Formosa.

But I would say it is clearly a change in American policy of the post-war period, that we are prepared to have serious, concrete and we hope, constructive talks with Communist China. We make no attempt to overload the circuit at this moment, the problem is one of restoring a degree of confidence and the basis for a possible dialogue, rather than any very precise shopping list of ideas. There has, after all, been for over 20 years an absence of communication.

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But we have attempted, and I think to some extent succeeded, in beginning to establish some communication and at least to convey a different basic stance than has been characteristic in the past.

Q Doctor, how about Communist Cuba in that connection? Any openings foreseeable there?

DR. KISSINGER: There has not been any change during the past year with respect to Communist Cuba.

What we have attempted to do is to restore, is to establish the basis of a western hemisphere consensus first, and then to address the problem of Communist Cuba.

Q At the National Security Council, do you ever -- I am going back to Communist China -- talk philosophically about long-range Communist China? Do you ever relate -- let me press you on one point on Communist China. You have said that in the past, Dr. Kissinger, there is no problem of communication with Communist China. There is Warsaw and you yourself have said there is no problem.

Can you take us further back, or can you really elaborate on Communist China? Just what is the stumbling block?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether in the National Security Council we ever discuss philosophically the question of Communist China, the evolution of Communist China, and secondly, I have said in the past that there is no problem of communication with Communist China because of the Warsaw talks.

I don't quite remember what --

Q You said there are channels.

DR. KISSINGER: -- of the many remarks I have made over the years, which of the many remarks you may be referring to. And I think we have to distinguish two things: One is, of course, there are channels in the sense that there were the Warsaw talks, which haven't actually taken place this year, except for the one that took place last week, and then I suppose there are other channels that could be found. But the problem isn't only the existence of channels, but what moves in these channels.

In this respect, we have tried to convey to Communist China at this stage what our basic philosophy of international relations is, and how they fit into that basic philosophy of international relations.

This is much more important than to engage in a complicated negotiation because the outstanding issues, concrete negotiating issues between us and them, are relatively few, and, therefore, at this stage of the game, after 20 years of isolation, it seemed to us more important to convey our general attitude.

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If one looks ahead, if you say what is one's
basic notion of basic evolution: First of all, the Chinese
people are obviously a great people. They have the longest
unbroken record of government in one area of any of the
existing civilizations; and secondly, 800 million people
representing 25 percent of the human race, is a factor that
cannot be ignored. They will influence international affairs
whatever we intend to do and declaratory policy we adopt. They
are a reality. And their policy, for good or ill, will
determine the possibilities for peace and progress. And that
is irrespective of what we do.

Thirdly, a country of this size and weight is going
to affect all surrounding countries, again, irrespective of
what we do. Therefore, if it is true that the big problem
of the immediate post-World War II period was to avoid chaos,
and if it is true that the big problem of the next 20 years
is to build a more permanent peace, then it seems to us
impossible to build a peace, which we would define as something
other than just the avoidance of crisis, by simply ignoring
these 800 million people, whether they are aggressive or
relatively peaceful or something in-between is bound to
affect the whole structure of Asia and of many other parts.

Nor, do we over-estimate what we can do by
unilateral actions towards them.

They will make their decisions on the basis of their
conceptions of their needs, and of their ideology. But to
the degree that their actions can be influenced by ours,
we are prepared to engage in a dialogue with them.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you discuss Africa in this
context of disappointment or accomplishment?

Q Could you repeat the question?

DR. KISSINGER: The question was where I would list
Africa in this catalogue of accomplishments or disappointments.
I would have to put it into neither category really, at
this stage. Obviously, we cannot do everything simultaneously.
We would have hoped that, for example, the Nigerian civil
war could be ended. And we have in this consideration of
major areas of the world, in fact, we had a consideration
of Africa this week in the National Security Council, which
would lead to the same set of actions -- I mean not to the
same set, but which will lead in due course to a concrete
set of actions.

So, I would have to say that by the time we meet
next year, we attach considerable importance to it, but it
did not seem as much in need of an immediate new departure
as some other areas.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you have cited for us some things that you are satisfied with and some things that you are disappointed with. Some of the disappointments have been major ones, such as the Mid-East and Vietnam. Would you say on the whole that the disappointments outweigh the accomplishments or the other way around or how would you weight, in the other words, what has happened in the first year?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is how would I weight the accomplishments against the disappointments.

MR. ZIEGLER: You had better say the right thing, Henry.

DR. KISSINGER: If I say I weight the accomplishments more, you will accuse me of being a White House puff. If I say I weight the disappointments more, you will have a big headline. So, you have given me a hell of a question.

Let me say this: With respect to the two major disappointments that I mentioned, Vietnam and the Middle East, it is our judgment that we have not made further progress largely due to circumstances outside of our control, and that when I said that we have not made further progress on Vietnam, I think we have made considerable progress in Vietnam. We have not made considerable progress in the negotiations, as yet.

I would add to this the following point, however: When we talk about negotiations and the success and failure of negotiations, we tend to look at it from an Anglo-Saxon legalistic point of view; that is, we think negotiations are successful when there is a protracted period of give and take leading towards a settlement. This for better or worse is not the way the Vietnamese negotiate. The Vietnamese negotiate, or Hanoi negotiates, by adopting a posture of implacable ferocity and wanting to be paid -- they consider it a concession to enter that process of give and take.

Not that they don't look at that process for the place at which you make the concession. If you look at the negotiations that have taken place with the Vietnamese, over the years, you will see that every negotiation that succeeded has been preceded by a protracted stalemate that looked almost hopeless.

If you look at the site of the conference, the issue of the site of the conference, that was hopelessly deadlocked for six weeks and was settled in a week. The bombing halt seemed hopelessly deadlocked for six months and was settled in a week or two. The shape of the table seemed hopelessly deadlocked for three months and was settled in a matter of two or three days at the end of the Johnson Administration.

Now, I won't insult your intelligence by saying the fact there is a deadlock proves that they are going to settle. I am saying that the fact that there is a deadlock does not prove that they are not going to settle. And I would have to say that looking at the surrounding objective conditions, it seems to me, and it seems to us, that they have probably more reason to settle now than they had six months ago.

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So, from this point of view, while we have not made more progress in the negotiation itself, we hope to have laid the basis for making more progress in the next month. But I would also have to say that we don't make progress in the negotiations, we now have a plan which will take longer, but which will enable us to end the war even without negotiations.

On the Middle East, I think I have explained what the reasons are that produced a deadlock. On the whole, I think that the accomplishments far outweigh the disappointments, and above all, I would like to believe, and we believe, that when the history of this Administration is written, the war in Vietnam will appear an incident that seemed overwhelmingly anguishing while it took place, but which does not in itself decide the other -- that is, the disaster could make impossible the constructive accomplishments that we are aiming for in the direction of constructing a peace, but I would say that the things that I have listed, and the basic objective of trying to bring about a peaceful world, should be the matters which over a period of years will become increasingly the overwhelming concern and the accomplishment by which this Administration will be judged.

Q Dr. Kissinger, two things: One, I wonder if you would illustrate with specific things that have occurred this year your more general remarks about the thrust of U.S. policy towards the Communist world, and second, I wonder if you could give us your observations on the structural things in foreign policy-making, what you have had to change and perhaps what, if anything, you came upon as things you hadn't thought about before as you actually got into the operations of government?

DR. KISSINGER: Maybe I will take the second part of the question first, the structural changes.

Q I asked you because so much has been written and talked over the years about the effects of the policy-making process.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me repeat again. No process can ever substitute for thought. And I don't want you to get the impression that we are claiming that the process alone is decisive.

Secondly, having seen three White Houses in operation, one would also have to say that there isn't a good or bad system in the abstract, although there are better or worse systems, but the system has to be geared to the personality of the President.

In our system, it is the President who decides and he, therefore, has to feel comfortable with the way his choices are presented to him or indeed whether he wants any choices.

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For example, I did not see the Eisenhower White House in operation, but I am told that President Eisenhower did not want choices presented to him. He wanted a consensus of the bureaucracy. Professors of public administration can explain that this is wrong, but the results were not cataclysmic. The structural changes that we had to make were, first, that there really wasn't an orderly procedure for making decisions.

The system was geared to getting the President's attention on a series of tactical choices, which came into the White House generated by the need to make some decision. It was therefore heavily oriented towards crisis matters, extremely dependent on whether somebody identified a problem and managed to push it into the White House and there was no regular method for forcing a consideration of issues that were not yet acute.

Secondly, the system was not at all geared to producing choices. And I must say that one of the big problems we had in our system was to convince the departments that when the President said he wanted choices, he meant it.

The tendency was to present the preferred choice and two phony choices, and to say that this was the range of options.

Thirdly, there has been an attempt -- and it is very understandable. Most senior officials are operators, and they are overwhelmed with their day-to-day problems. There is a natural reluctance for them to take on a problem that they don't have to take on since they already have more problems than they can usually manage in the course of a 24-hour day.

What our system has enabled us to do is to take the long-range and urgent problem by scheduling almost weekly NSC meetings, by forcing them into a framework of options and by separating the operational decisions from the basic -- I don't want to use the word "philosophical" because this gives it a pretentious meaning -- but from the general posture and attitude we want to take and forcing the senior people to address themselves to this. I think we have been able to introduce a sense of perspective to the policy-making that would then enable us to guide issues.

Usually, the President is confronted with, or historically the President has been confronted by the pressures of events, and by the necessities of making decisions in a limited time. By getting the basic policy determinations first in a rather specific way, the negotiations on a number of issues could then be quided in terms of them.

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Let me illustrate it with the SALT talks. We have not separated strategic doctrine from arms control; that is, the arms control people have sat on every body that produced strategic doctrine and the Joint Chiefs have sat on every body that produced SALT papers.

We went through the NSC process presenting, I forget, four or five basic approaches to the issues of strategic sufficiency on which we made a prior determination and those then guided both our weapons policy and our SALT preparations.

We did the same thing with respect to the general purpose forces, later in the year, and they, in turn, effected -- no specific negotiations, but they will effect our basic posture, for example, towards such issues as the European Security Conference.

In our relations with the Soviet Union, it seems to me that we have in the post-war period oscillated between periods of exaltation and periods of depression; that is, there have been periods in which the Soviets were thought to be irreconcilably hostile and it is absolutely senseless to talk to them. There were other periods in which good relations between our leaders and Soviet leaders tended to be equated with substantive progress. Both of these approaches were really dangerous because in the first period when we spoke of irreconcilable hostility, we tended to break off all contact and we tended to be obsessed with the tactics of managing the symptoms of a crisis rather than the crisis itself.

In the period of personal diplomacy, we actually made it harder for the Soviets to settle because the Soviets cannot settle, if they want to settle something, on the basis of good personal relations. They can settle it on the basis that their assessment of the situation makes it in their interest to come to an understanding. And we have never believed that we are doing the Soviets a service by saying that some Soviet leader is a particularly attractive fellow and some American President is particularly charming and he is going to charm that Soviet leader into making a settlement.

So, our approach to the Soviets, from the beginning, has been to convey to them the President has made clear -- when he has met, on the rare occasions he has met with the Soviet Ambassador, that, yes, we wanted to have a period of negotiations. We considered the issues seriously. We would prepare ourselves meticulously for any negotiations in which we engage. We would not engage in propaganda. We wouldn't use slogans which pretended we could break up Soviet relationships with their friends without the Soviets knowing it.

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On the other hand, we wanted the same attitude on their part; that when we entered SALT, we wanted to go in there knowing what we were doing and not simply engage in a great exercise of comparing overriding plans. This has been our attitude on the Berlin exploratory talks we have had, on SALT, on the Middle East. One has then to separate the accomplishments in this respect on two levels:

On the Middle East, for example, we have not settled the issue. But I think the exchanges we have had can contribute to what must be at least our minimum objective, which is to prevent tensions in this area from involving the two great powers.

At least we don't want the Middle East to produce a general war. And I think in this sense we have understood each other better.

On SALT it is too early to make claims for progress. This can still fail. Even if it fails, I think we have had a better understanding of what we are aiming at. And I don't think it is an entire accident that the Nixon Administration has been in office nearly one year without being exposed to any of the vilification in the Soviet press and to any of the personal attacks by the Soviet leaders that used to be standard in any previous Administration. I think the tone we have adopted, and the general framework, has contributed to that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could I ask two related questions on Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: Please.

Q You said that there is more reason for them to settle now than there was six months ago, and I wonder if you could be specific in terms of what you believe some of those reasons may be. A related question: You refer, as has been the case on other occasions, to ending the war without negotiations, using the phrase, "Ending the war", when, if I understand the Vietnamization program, that it is not really ending the war, but turning it over to South Vietnam.

I wonder if you could help us a little bit in those two areas.

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DR. KISSINGER: The first question is what are the factors that I believe may contribute to increased willingness to, or possible willingness on the part of Hanoi, to negotiate; and the second question is whether Vietnamization will end the war, or why not just turn it over to the South Vietnamese?

Well, it is part of the general posture of the Administration that we like to do more than we say. And I would prefer not to make any sweeping claims on the negotiations.

What the President said at his press conference is obviously totally correct. There has been no progress in Paris. There is no progress to date. I have no secret information that indicates that there will be progress.

And, therefore, I want to make it absolutely clear that I am not predicting progress. And I would say that there are several factors that Hanoi is counting on: One is a division in the United States.

Until October, let us say, Hanoi, looking at the United States, could conclude that the pattern here very much followed the French pattern, that is more and more public discontent, more and more concessions, the greater the concessions the greater the public protest, creating a vicious cycle which could lead only to the collapse of the effort.

This has been reversed. While, of course, there are people who are dissatisfied with the war, and indeed we are dissatisfied with the war, the change in the American public mood and the degree of support that the President has managed to rally, is something that Hanoi must weigh. To what degree it will weigh it, it is hard to know and only they will know it.

The second factor that Hanoi cannot ignore is the continuation of the Sino-Soviet tension. Again, to what degree they consider it, I wouldn't care to predict. But it is something that cannot leave them unaffected.

Thirdly, while we have not made excessive claims for progress in South Vietnam, and while anyone who has seen the war over the years must be very cautious about claiming any permanent progress, there have simply been too many disinterested and even hostile observers visiting South Vietnam in the last few months, coming back with almost unanimous conclusions of significant progress in the country-side, one cannot ignore it.

I will be able to speak on that with greater confidence in another month or so when our own internal studies of this problem will be complete.

But if the reports are even partially correct -- and I can say that, already with some confidence -- then Hanoi may face for the first time the prospect that its political base in South Vietnam may erode the longer the war continues.

If that is true, and you notice I am making it

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conditional, then time is not necessarily on its side.

On the question of ending the war, of course, it
is impossible to make peace with an opponent who is assumed
to have an unquenchable thirst for conflict and there is
nothing we can do if one assumes that Hanoi is beyond any rational
calculation and is determined to fight for all eternity until
it either destroys itself or destroys its opponent.

So I would have to say that on its crudest level,
obviously,, the objective of Vietnamization is to reduce
the American participation increasingly and eventually
eliminate it.

On the next level, though, if Vietnamization
succeeds, and again one here is always talking about probabilities,
not certainties, then a point must be reached where this
fact will be obvious also to Hanoi and where then either the
war will fade away or some settlement will be made or what
is more likely, that sometime before then a settlement will be
made.

But I recognize that it is the curse of any
Vietnam discussion that the negative can always prove all
of the weaknesses of any course that one adopts.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in retrospect and in the broad
context of our relations with Communist countries and what we
would like them to be, how significant do you consider the
President's visit to Rumania was?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the visit to Rumania
was significant. I think it was a symbolic demonstration
of our general philosophy that we are prepared to have
normal relations with countries on the basis of the foreign
policy they conduct towards us, not towards others necessarily.

We did not insist or suggest or even hint that
Rumania should loosen whatever relationship it may have
with the Soviet Union. We attempted to indicate that we
were prepared to have normal relationships with even Communist
countries, on the basis of their deeds.

Secondly, in dealing with the Communist world,
it is important to find methods of communication that are
believable and that can be put in a framework that others
understand.

So from this point of view, I believe it was
useful.

Thirdly, I think it was hard to go to Bucharest,
as many of you here did, without coming away with a feeling
that was not particularly aimed for when we came, because
it was not foreseeable, namely, that at least in Eastern
Europe, the ideal of what the United States stood for is
still something vital and important.

We have always interpreted the reception that was
received, not in terms of a personal tribute to an individual,

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but of an affirmation of certain fundamental human concerns.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there has been a great deal of concern, as you know, public concern, about the influence of the Pentagon and military thinking on the civilian decisions that are made in the White House, and the feeling on the part of some people that the military exerts an undue influence on those decisions.

Can you comment on that relationship during the past year?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

First, the military, as every other significant branch of the government, are given a full hearing. This is part of what the process is attempting to do.

Secondly, my experience with the military has been that once they have been given a full hearing, they are more likely to accept decisions they do not like than many other groups.

Certainly, they are not less likely to accept it.

Thirdly, I would think that the influence of the Pentagon on decisions in this Administration on political decisions, has been less than it has been in previous Administrations for a number of reasons:

One, when the Pentagon is making a deliberate attempt to assert a foreign policy role, even on the leadership that recognizes the limitations of this foreign policy role, it is the size of its budget, of the competence of its staff, which gives it a great influence, whatever the intentions of the Secretary.

Under the leadership of Secretary Laird, the Pentagon has not attempted to assert a prerogative in wide areas of foreign policy. It has confined itself more to strictly military considerations than has been the case at least in the two previous Administrations. I say that without any reflection on the two previous Secretaries of Defense who happen to be personal friends of mine, but simply as a description of a structural problem.

Then the NSC system, as it has developed, makes it almost impossible for any one department to assert as a department a predominant influence, because end running is almost impossible. I would say it is almost impossible. It has not happened.

The decisions come to the President not in an impartial way, but with all the agency views fully presented. No decision is made without every interested party being in the room, and if you look, for example, at the decision made on biological and chemical warfare, and the kind of preparation that has been made, on SALT, the seabeads, and Okinawa, all of them have been done with the cooperation of

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the Defense Department, and certainly they don't reflect
a predominant military consideration.

Then, for the first time in the post-war period,
we have put the approach to the Defense budget into a wider
forum, and we have in the consideration of basic strategic
postures related them to the domestic needs.

All of this, I think, indicates that not
that the military don't play an important role, but that they do
not play a predominant role and that we are attempting
to put the military into the service of overall national
objectives, instead of having the national objectives
determined essentially on security grounds.

Q The almost one year of the Nixon Administration's
life has coincided with the period of the sharpest conflict
between the Soviet Union and Communist China. I was wondering
to what extent you felt that these softer tones and character
of Soviet conduct is related to their needs to accommodate
this fact, as opposed to a response perhaps to your own
conduct towards them.

DR. KISSINGER: It is never easy to disentangle
what is produced by conditions that you did not create and
what is produced by your own policy.

All I can say is that I remember that during the
Berlin crisis in 1961 and 1962, it used to be argued that
Soviet intransigence was caused by their conflict with
Communist China, that they wanted to clear their rear up
so that they would be ready for the eventual conflict with
Communist China.

I am not saying that was correct. All I am
saying is that whatever policy the Soviet Union has adopted
to the west can be made to fit some interpretation of Sino-
Soviet relationships.

I would have to guess that it is probably a combination
of both factors -- the fact that the Sino-Soviet conflict
is, of course, very much on the minds of Soviet leaders.
At the same time, if they believed we were either
irreconcilably hostile or so impervious to the needs of
the situation that it was impossible to talk to us, then
they would have to take that into account all the more so
as their conflict with China is not one that they cannot
defer for any number of years or defer forever.

So my judgment would be that our policy has
contributed substantially. I don't think it is the only
factor that produces the Soviet policy.

Q Have the massacres ---

DR. KISSINGER: I think I have had a question from
you already.

Q Doctor, has agreement been reached on a date
and place for the strategic arms talks?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is has agreement been reached on the date and place of the strategic arms talks?

I do not believe that an agreement has yet been reached. The issue of the place is not an issue of principle with us, but an issue of convenience and will not raise an insurmountable problem. On the issue of the day our general attitude may be somewhat earlier than that of the other side.

But again, I wouldn't draw any profound conclusions from it. I find it hard to believe that the preliminary talks that have started on this level should not be followed by serious substantive talks.

Q What is our thinking about the time for the start of the talks?

DR. KISSINGER: We are ready to proceed after a relatively short interruption. I don't want to characterize the on-going discussions. We are not the obstacle to an earlier resumption, but I don't want to accuse the Soviet Union of anything in this respect, because serious people may want to evaluate the implications of what was discussed and may be confronted with the decision-making process that has its own necessities. And I don't ascribe any profound significance to that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when the Administration first came into office there was a good deal of speculation, correct or otherwise, about the possibility of an early Presidential trip to the Soviet Union. What is the thinking behind that scheme, if it every really was correct, and what would be the reasons for going to the Soviet Union, given your line about the de-emphasis on personal diplomacy?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make two comments about personal diplomacy. Personality plays a role in foreign policy, but personal diplomacy has to be seen in its proper context. I believe, for example, that the fact that the President is personally acquainted with most of the world leaders that we have met, and the fact that they have known him for a long period of time, has made it much easier, and in many cases has made it possible, to bring about the transition from that period of American tutelage to a period of something much closer to equality.

Those of you who have been familiar with various kinds of alliance discussion in the '50's and '60's will recognize that many aspects of the Nixon doctrine were not very easy for many of the leaders of other countries that were used to other forms of relationship, and the fact that the President has known them for a long time, and his personal acquaintance has certainly helped. So I don't want to underrate the importance of personal relationships.

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But in the relationship with the Soviet Union, we face this problem: First of all, empirically, if you look at the summit meetings that have occurred, none have really permanently improved the situation, and almost all of them have been followed by a deterioration rather than by an improvement in the relations.

The reason may be that if you go to a summit meeting that is not carefully prepared, if you make the exercise in the personal conduct the only purpose of the meeting, then you are driven towards issues that are not really worthy of Presidential concern, and while the deeper issues continue, and when Heads of State confront each other, an impasse has a much deeper meaning than otherwise.

Therefore, our approach to summit meetings is this: We are prepared to have a summit meeting, and we hope that sometime during the Administration it will be possible to have a summit meeting. But we would like to have the summit meeting register considerable progress, and that it would move the last step of the way rather than use the summit meeting for its own sake.

Therefore, any time when enormous progress has been made, or when considerable progress has been made, or when we can see progress in sight, or when some issue that is soluble within the framework of a summit meeting presents itself, we will be prepared to have it. Because when we have a summit meeting, we would like to build something permanent. That, therefore, I think, reflects what can be fairly described as our general approach.

We don't want spectators for their own sake. We don't want to engage in public relation efforts, and we don't want to raise hopes that then cannot be fulfilled.

So I hope that when there is a summit meeting in our Administration, we can all feel that we have made considerable progress before it and will make even more progress.

Q Do you list as one of your disappointments the fact that our *disengagement from the war plan* has not come across with the peace group more, and along that same line, would it not have been wise for the President to have at least seen the peaceful peace leaders here when they were here as they requested?

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, you can't ask Presidential Assistants to second-guess what the President may or may not have done.

We have taken the peace groups very seriously. A number of us have been in close contact with the leaders of the peace movement, and not always with a great deal of publicity, precisely because some of us have felt that serious people should be able to talk to us without having to worry about being used for whatever benefit the meeting could be for us.

So I can say that with the strong encouragement of the President, a number of senior White House Assistants have been in frequent contact with a number of peace groups.

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I, for one, have never commented on any meeting with peace groups. Peace groups have come to see me and have commented after they had seen me about my inadequacies, but I have never made any comment one way or the other about my impressions.

Secondly, in a way, of course, it is a disappointment. It is not one of our fundamental ones. Of course we understand their frustrations, and their concerns. They won't be satisfied until the war is ended.

I would like to think that a year or so from now, whenever the war is ended -- don't hold me to this time-frame -- they will feel that we have done well by them. The final judgment of what we may have done for the peace groups will have to be made when our policy has succeeded.

Many of the peace groups want to end the war. They don't really know how. They are trying to instruct us in something in which we don't need instruction. We want to end the war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you spoke earlier of the Administration's expectations that negotiations would succeed. In the Spring of this year, wasn't it your expectation that the negotiations would have wrapped it up by the end of 1969?

DR. KISSINGER: No. In the Spring of this year, it was my hope that some progress could be made during the summer. In this complicated demonology in which one analyzes new answers or statements, there was some marginal reason to believe that some progress might be possible during this year.

Then for a variety of reasons, one of which probably was the illness and death of Ho Chi Minh, some of these hopes were frustrated.

For example, after the President made his May 14 speech, Le Duc Tho, the Hanoi politburo representative in Paris, made a public statement in which he said that the President's eight-point plan and their ten-point plan had many things in common. This is something they had never said before and have never said since.

Then about a week later, this line was dropped and they reversed themselves. We hadn't done anything in the interval to affect this.

Many people speculated that perhaps this coincided with the terminal illness of Ho. I don't know whether this is the explanation or whether there is some other explanation.

So there were periods in which one was more optimistic on negotiations. There were periods when it seemed less possible, and at this moment, I would have to say candidly that there was no significant progress in the negotiations.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, the President has said he doesn't think the enemy in Vietnam is capable of a major and sustained offensive. Could you tell us what you think they are capable of at this point, and do you see them building now toward a winter offensive, a couple of months away?

DR. KISSINGER: At this point they are certainly capable of the sort of thing that occurred a few times during the summer, a high point, in which, through shelling and more or less coordinated attacks, they can bring up American casualties -- not to the levels of the Tet offensive, but for a week or two, to levels considerably above what they are now.

They are probably not, with their present forces, capable of achieving any permanent gain. That is, they are unlikely to take a provincial capital and hold it and declare it as their capital, or to do the sort of thing that was done during the Tet offensive or even that was done during last year, the sustained series of attacks against our positions over a seven-week period. This, I consider, improbable, with their present forces.

But even with their present forces, some reverses are inevitable. It isn't possible to have such a conflict without a front line in which there are no reverses.

The next question is, are they building towards an offensive? This is what we will know in the next six to eight weeks. They started infiltration again at the end of October -- incidentally, about ten days before the President's speech -- on a scale considerably above -- well, to say considerably above what had been taking place doesn't mean much, because for awhile there was next to no infiltration for a few weeks, but at a rate which is comparable to what had gone on in previous years.

This went down a little bit again, and then started up again. What we are trying to determine is this: If it does not go much further than it has gone, between the end of October and now, it would be consistent with a decision to replace losses, and that, in turn, would be consistent with a decision to negotiate, since, if they don't replace their losses, their situation will disintegrate.

If it continues at the average rate of the last seven weeks for the next seven weeks, then they are clearly augmenting their forces. If they augment their forces considerably, then this probably means that they will launch some attacks. What sort of attacks, whether this is the beginning of a sustained offensive, or a one-shot, dramatic operation, this is hard to say. They have never followed the same pattern in two successive years.

I must say at this point, it is too early to say that they are building up for an offensive. Our evidence is consistent, really, with both interpretations. Therefore, we are watching it carefully.

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Q You make a convincing argument for the options and the alternatives being laid out. In that case, could you give us your option or alternative in case they do launch major offensives sometime in the next six months? What happens to our Vietnamization program then?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, the one thing I will not do in this job is to provide a check list of what I recommend or even of the choices that I outline. On this level, I will have to be reasonably anonymous.

Vietnamization really has two meanings. One is the degree of the control of the Vietnamese government in the provinces. On this there is almost general agreement that this has been extended considerably and quite effectively.

The second one is the improvement in the effectiveness of the Vietnamese forces. There we have many reports that we have no reason to doubt that this is taking place, but we don't really know, because it hasn't been fully tested yet.

One of the things that may be tested by this offensive is whether Vietnamization has really put these Vietnamese forces in a position where they can resist substantial attacks.

What we will do in various circumstances, I think, I wouldn't want to speculate, except to refer you to the President's speeches.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you address yourself to the question of public patience and acceptance of the policies now, in terms of how permanent or how fragile it might be, how lasting you consider it is now, in terms of how much concern there might be that it might suddenly, quickly evaporate, should events lead that way?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let me make it clear that I am no expert on the public mood. I hope I can contribute to a consideration of what I believe to be the right policy. But I can't guarantee that that will inevitably find public acceptance.

The big intangible is not only whether there will be public acceptance of the war, but also whether there is public acceptance of the peace. Anybody can end the war. Our problem is to keep the society together. We are not trying to create more schisms. We are trying to heal the schisms through the process of how we are trying to end the war.

We believe that as long as we are candid with the American people and tell them all the news, that we will have enough support to do what we believe must be done. If not, then we will see.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 4:15 P.M. EST.)

Public Information Series

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Department of State

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Withdrawal and Peace

Negotiations and Agreement

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## US Role and Interests

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

DECEMBER 9, 1969

NO. 371

CAUTION - FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE AT 6:30 P.M., E.S.T., TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1969. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE 1969 GALAXY CONFERENCE ON ADULT EDUCATION
SHERATON PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1969, 8:00 P.M., E.S.T.

Dr. and Mrs. Charters, Members of the Central Planning Committee, and
ladies and gentlemen of the 1969 Galaxy Conference on Adult Education.

I am very happy to be with you this evening and be a part of this impressive Conference.

The Galaxy Conference represents one of the largest and most significant efforts in the nation's history to further the goals of all phases of adult and continuing education.

The State Department, as you know, has an active interest in this subject. It is our belief that foreign policy issues should be more broadly understood and considered. As you know we are making a good many efforts toward providing continuing education in the foreign affairs field. I am happy tonight to join so many staunch allies in those endeavors!

In the hope that I may further that cause I want to talk to you tonight about a foreign policy matter which is of great concern to our nation.

I.

I am going to speak tonight about the situation in the Middle East. I want to refer to the policy of the United States as it relates to that

situation

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PR 371

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situation in the hope that there may be a better understanding of that policy and the reasons for it.

Following the third Arab-Israeli war in twenty years, there was an upsurge of hope that a lasting peace could be achieved. That hope has unfortunately not been realized. There is no area of the world today that is more important because it could easily again be the source of another serious conflagration.

When this Administration took office, one of our first actions in foreign affairs was to examine carefully the entire situation in the Middle East. It was obvious that a continuation of the unresolved conflict there would be extremely dangerous; that the parties to the conflict alone would not be able to overcome their legacy of suspicion to achieve a political settlement; and that international efforts to help needed support.

The United States decided it had a responsibility to play a direct role in seeking a solution.

Thus, we accepted a suggestion put forward both by the French Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations. We agreed that the major powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France -- should cooperate to assist the Secretary General's representative, Ambassador Jarring, in working out a settlement in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of November, 1967. We also decided to consult directly with the Soviet Union, hoping to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible between us.

These decisions were made in full recognition of the following important factors.

First, we knew that nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the peoples and governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help; they can provide a catalyst; they can stimulate the parties to talk; they can encourage

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encourage; they can help define a realistic framework for agreement; but an agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.

Second, we knew that a durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Third, we were clear that the only framework for a negotiated settlement was one in accordance with the entire text of the UN Security Council resolution. That resolution was agreed upon after long and arduous negotiations; it is carefully balanced; it provides the basis for a just and lasting peace -- a final settlement -- not merely an interlude between wars.

Fourth, we believed that a protracted period of no war, no peace, recurrent violence, and spreading chaos would serve the interests of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.

### III.

For eight months we have pursued these consultations, in Four Power talks at the United Nations, and in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.

In our talks with the Soviets, we have proceeded in the belief that the stakes are so high that we have a responsibility to determine whether we can achieve parallel views which would encourage the parties to work out a stable and equitable solution. We are under no illusions; we are fully conscious of past difficulties and present realities. Our talks with the Soviets have brought a measure of understanding but very substantial differences remain. We regret that the Soviets have delayed in responding to new formulations submitted to them on October 28. However, we will continue to discuss these problems with the Soviet Union as long as there is any realistic hope that such discussions might further the cause of peace.

The substance of the talks that we have had with the Soviet Union have been conveyed to the interested parties through diplomatic channels. This

process

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process has served to highlight the main roadblocks to the initiation of
useful negotiations among the parties.

On the one hand, the Arab leaders fear that Israel is not in fact
prepared to withdraw from Arab territory occupied in the 1967 war.

On the other hand, Israeli leaders fear that the Arab states are not
in fact prepared to live in peace with Israel.

Each side can cite from its viewpoint considerable evidence to support
its fears. Each side has permitted its attention to be focused solidly
and to some extent solely on these fears.

What can the United States do to help to overcome these roadblocks?

Our policy is and will continue to be a balanced one.

We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call for
Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the UN resolution without achieving
agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To call on the
Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward
Israel. Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a
permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to
withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured
as envisaged by the Security Council resolution.

## IV.

In an effort to broaden the scope of discussion we have recently
resumed Four Power negotiations at the United Nations.

Let me outline our policy on various elements of the Security Council
Resolution. The basic and related issues might be described as peace,
security, withdrawal and territory.

### Peace between the Parties

- The Resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal
is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the
state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years.

We believe

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We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and in the Straits of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

But peace, of course, involves much more than this. It is also a matter of the attitudes and intentions of the parties. Are they ready to coexist with one another? Can a live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust and hate? A peace agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.

## Security

- A lasting peace must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged in the Security Council resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring's help, are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of such security arrangements. It is, after all, their interests which are at stake and their territory which is involved. They must live with the results.

## Withdrawal and Territory

- The Security Council Resolution endorses the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the Resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.

The boundaries from which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 Armistice Agreements and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20 years. Those boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights, claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the Armistice Agreement.
The

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The Security Council Resolution neither endorses nor precludes these armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the Resolution provides. We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires security for both.

V.

By emphasizing the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal and territory, I do not want to leave the impression that other issues are not equally important. Two in particular deserve special mention - the questions of refugees and of Jerusalem.

There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the United States for over twenty years. During this period the United States has contributed about $500 million for the support and education of the Palestine refugees. We are prepared to contribute generously along with others to solve this problem. We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area.

The problem

NO. 371

[L.C.]

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The problem posed by the refugees will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration towards hope and justice.

The question of the future status of Jerusalem, because it touches deep emotional, historical and religious well-springs, is particularly complicated. We have made clear repeatedly in the past two and one-half years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its status can be determined only through the agreement of the parties concerned, which in practical terms means primarily the Governments of Israel and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community. We do, however, support certain principles which we believe would provide an equitable framework for a Jerusalem settlement.

Specifically, we believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the city.

It is our hope that agreement on the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal and territory will create a climate in which these questions of refugees and of Jerusalem, as well as other aspects of the conflict, can be resolved as part of the overall settlement.

During

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VI

During the first weeks of the current United Nations General Assembly, the efforts to move matters toward a settlement entered a particularly intensive phase. Those efforts continue today.

I have already referred to our talks with the Soviet Union. In connection with those talks there have been allegations that we have been seeking to divide the Arab states by urging the UAR to make a separate peace. These allegations are false. It is a fact that we and the Soviets have been concentrating on the questions of a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic. We have been doing this in the full understanding on both our parts that, before there can be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there must be agreement between the parties on other aspects of the settlement - not only those related to the United Arab Republic but also those related to Jordan and other states which accept the Security Council Resolution of November 1967.

We started

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We started with the Israeli-United Arab Republic aspect because of its inherent importance for future stability in the area and because one must start somewhere.

We are also ready to pursue the Jordanian aspects of a settlement -- in fact the Four Powers in New York have begun such discussions. Let me make it perfectly clear that the U.S. position is that implementation of the overall settlement would begin only after complete agreement had been reached on related aspects of the problem.

In our recent meetings with the Soviets, we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common positions. They consist of three principal elements:

**First**, there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the United Arab Republic to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.

**Second**, the detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the procedures followed in negotiating the Armistice Agreements under Ralph Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. This formula has been previously used with success in negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal objective of the Four Power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.

So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate primarily to the area of Sharm al-Shaykh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones as foreseen

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as foreseen in the Security Council Resolution, and final arrangements in
the Gaza Strip.

Third, in the context of peace and agreement on specific security
safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be
required.

Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns
of both Israel and the UAR. It would require the UAR to agree to a bind-
ing and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of
Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international border
between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half
century. It would also require the parties themselves to negotiate the
practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace.

We believe that this approach is balanced and fair.

We remain interested in good relations with all States in the area.
Whenever and wherever Arab States which have broken off diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States are prepared to restore them, we shall
respond in the same spirit.

Meanwhile, we will not be deterred from continuing to pursue the
paths of patient diplomacy in our search for peace in the Middle East.
We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though
they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides. We remain pre-
pared to work with others -- in the area and throughout the world -- so
long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace.

* * *

Public Statements -- 1969 [L]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 21, 1969

Dear Dr. Davis,

Your letter regarding the plight of refugees in the Middle East and the activities of U.S. voluntary groups to help alleviate some of their burdens highlights the spirit that must characterize a true peace in that area. The condition of all of the refugees of the Middle East has been of great concern to me. It is, in part, clearly a political problem to be resolved in a negotiated settlement and without a fair solution to the problem there cannot be an honorable settlement.

The circumstances of the refugees are also of urgent humanitarian concern to Americans -- a concern which grows not from agreements between governments but from the common instinct which urges one human being to help another. Just solutions to the whole problem in all its aspects require imagination and boldness from everyone involved. The refugee aid work private American groups have undertaken is gratifying and very encouraging. It demonstrates once again the determination of Americans to help and more than that, it keeps alive the hope that if governments can find the courage to agree, human ingenuity and perseverance are at hand to find answers to the practical difficulties that will remain.

I commend the dedication of all those who are making a significant contribution to the cause of a peace which speaks not only about the integrity of nations, but

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 26, 1969

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND
PRIME MINISTER GOLDA MEIR OF ISRAEL
DEPARTURE CEREMONIES
THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

AT 5:12 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Madam Prime Minister, it seems that you have just arrived and, of course, your visit has been a short one. But in the brief hours you have been in Washington we have had very extended talks, private talks, on the relations between our two countries and, beyond that, I want the members of the press to know, on problems in the world generally.

This is the first opportunity I have had to talk to the Prime Minister, although I have known of her work in the field of diplomacy and in other areas over many, many years. She is, naturally, an expert and an advocate of the great principles that concern her own country, but she has a very deep understanding of those issues that divide the world.

It has been very valuable for me to have the benefit of her counsel on those problems all over the world, including even the problems of youth, which we discussed at some length last night, although we found, I must admit, no solutions.

I would like to say, too, that in these talks we have discussed all of those matters that have been speculated about in the press. We will not announce any decisions at this time. There is no formal communique.

This was a meeting where we thought it was very important for us to have a direct discussion of, first, our past relations, where we are now, and what course of action should be followed in the future.

I think we have a very good understanding as to the positions that we both take, and I think growing from this meeting could come some progress toward a solution of the terribly difficult problems we confront in the Mideast. I say "could" because I want to be very realistic. I find that one thing the Prime Minister and I have in common is that we are "no nonsense" kind of people. We talk very directly and we cover a lot of subjects in a very brief time.

The problems in the Mideast go back over centuries. They are not susceptible to easy solution. We do not expect them to be susceptible to instant diplomacy. On the other hand, we must try -- and I was glad to find a willingness on the part of the Prime Minister and her colleagues -- try to find a way to peace.

We have no new initiatives to announce, but we do think that we have a better understanding of how we should move from here on out in attempting to meet this very difficult problem.

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I can only wish you well on the balance of your trip. I know you will receive a wonderful welcome everyplace you go, particularly in Milwaukee. Milwaukee lost the Braves, but they got you back.

THE PRIME MINISTER: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, the Braves could use you as a pinch hitter right now in order to win.

THE PRIME MINISTER: They lost that opportunity.

THE PRESIDENT: They are in Atlanta. You know that.

THE PRIME MINISTER: I only want to express my extreme appreciation for the opportunity that I have had to spend so much time with the President. It was an exceptional opportunity for me personally.

The President says he knew about me.

You would not be surprised, I suppose, if I said I knew about you, Mr. President.

Also, representing my country, speaking to the President of the United States, I am happy that I can go home and, without any announcement of news, that I found in the President of the United States a friend of Israel, and found full understanding for our problems and difficulties; and that there is something that we share in common: that is, that everything should be done that is possible to bring real peace in the area, knowing that the interest of peace is for the welfare of all in the area -- not only Israel but the tens of millions of Arabs and others in the various Arab countries.

It is good to know that in the search for peace, both of us, both of our countries, the populations in both of our countries, are deeply interested and dedicated to this quest, not something that is makeshift, but something that is real peace in the area of the Middle East and all over the world.

Mr. President, I don't know how to thank you for the time that you have taken, for the privilege that I have had to discuss many problems with you in an atmosphere of friendship and frankness, for the opportunity that you gave me to place upon your shoulders, that are carrying such a heavy burden for the entire world, also the burdens of a little country somewhere put away in the Middle East, but that you have made me feel means something to you and to your people.

Thank you very much.

END

(AT 5:20 P.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 25, 1969

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT
AND GOLDA MEIR, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL,
UPON THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER
THE SOUTH LAWN

AT 10:37 A.M. EDT.

THE PRESIDENT: Madam Prime Minister and our guests
here at the White House today:

It is a very great privilege for me, speaking in
behalf of the American people, to welcome you, Madam Prime
Minister, in a very personal sense, because you were raised
in this country. You have been to this country many times,
but we are particularly proud that for the first time we
welcome you as Prime Minister of Israel.

Speaking to you in that capacity, as the head of
government of a very courageous people, a people who are
determined to maintain their independence, who also are
determined to maintain a lasting peace in the area in which
they live, I look forward to the talks we shall have
individually, and also with other members of your party.

It would be less than candid for me not to say that
the problems of the Mid-East are terribly complex and not
susceptible to solution in one meeting, or two or three,
or even more, at the level at which we will be talking.

But it is also proper to say that the Mid-East
and peace in the Mid-East is of interest not only to your
nation and your neighbors, but to the whole world, because
of what could happen in the event that war were to break out
there, the repercussions that that could have all over the world.

We know that you and your people want peace. We
know that your neighbors want peace. Certainly the majority
of the people in the whole area want peace. The question is
how to achieve it. On this we shall have discussions that I
hope will be helpful: The real peace, the peace that is not
simply one of words, but one in which both parties will have
a vested interest in maintaining.

I would say finally, Madam Prime Minister, that a
very famous British Prime Minister once said: "One should
always talk as much as possible to women, because this is
the best school."

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(OVER)

PRIME MINISTER MEIR: Mr. President, needless to say, I am deeply moved by the reception and by the words that you have spoken. Every official guest from abroad to the White House must surely sense the significance of the occasion. May I say that this is particularly so for a representative of a people, small in numbers and in resources.

May I say that in receiving me here in friendship and equality you are affirming that the attitude of the United States to other peoples is not determined by physical factors.

The history of Israel reborn in the years preceding statehood and the more than two decades since its achievement cannot be told without reference to the unwaivering support and friendship shown by successive American governments and by the American people.

Within hours after the proclamation of our statehood, the United States government recognized Israel and Jewish remnants from the Nazi death camps, who had been largely liberated by the American forces in Europe, came to our shores.

Mr. President, the ties between our two countries are rooted in the Biblical heritage and in the common dedication to human dignity, freedom and to democracy.

We have done everything in our power to translate these ideals into the fabric of our national life. It is this sense of affinity that has encouraged us to ask for America's understanding and support in difficult times.

The story of modern Israel is essentially the story of the return to the ancestral homeland of exiles from persecution, insecurity and fear in quest of freedom, human dignity, independence and peace.

Today, no Jew need remain homeless because of oppression and insecurity. I am gratified to be able to say this here in this great land which has been a haven for the oppressed, including many of my own people.

I shall be able to tell you, Mr. President, of Israel's progress in many fields. Tragically, peace is still denied us. But that same faith that has sustained us down the ages instills within us the confidence that the hour of peace will come.

I look forward to the day when an Israeli Prime Minister will be able to come here bearing to the President and the people of the United States the tidings that the Middle East has entered a new epoch of amity and regional cooperation.

Mr. President, the prayers and hopes of my people are with you in the heavy responsibility you carry, not only for your great country, but for freedom loving mankind at large. We follow with deep sympathy your efforts for regional and world peace, the phenomenal scientific advance of America under your leadership, the results of which are open to all Nations, and your interest in economic and social advancement for all peoples.

I am privileged, Mr. President, to convey to you the best wishes from the President, the government and the people of Israel, together with their deep appreciation for your invitation to me and for your interest in our welfare and progress.

From Jerusalem, the city of prophecy and universal inspiration, I bring you the traditional Hebrew greeting, Shalom.

END

(AT 10:45 A.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 25, 1969

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT
AND GOLDA MEIR, PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL
STATE DINING ROOM

AT 9:53 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Madam Prime Minister and our very distinguished guests this evening:

As I look around this room, I see several Members of the Senate and the House who have been here before during this Administration's dinners in this State Dining Room, and who have seen the Heads of State and Heads of Government who have been here.

All of them were very distinguished leaders of their countries, but as you know, this is the first time in this Administration we have had the honor to receive the Head of Government of another State who also is a woman.

Now that, naturally, should give a great deal of opportunity for a President of the United States, in welcoming the Prime Minister, to remark about her unusual capabilities, not only in her official capacity, but as a woman. I can only say this, that I am reminded of the fact that David Ben-Gurion, in referring to our very distinguished guest this evening, referred to her as the best man in his Cabinet.

I also recall the old Jewish proverb to the effect that man was made out of the soft earth and woman was made out of a hard rib.

I do not mean by these references to indicate that the Prime Minister whom we honor tonight, is one who does not have those very remarkable and unique qualities that we admire in the women of her country and the women of our own country, and the women of the world. But what I would like to say very simply is this: That throughout the history of her people, a history that we know very well in this country, a history that we heard even the Marine Band and our Strolling Strings attempt to represent by music very briefly a few moments ago, we know that very capable women and strong women have played a remarkable and important part in that history.

In Biblical terms, we remember Deborah, 3,000 years ago. The Bible tells us very little about Deborah, except that she loved her people and served them well. Then, if I may paraphrase, it concludes with this one thought: That there was peace in the land for 40 years.

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(OVER)

Page 2

Madam Prime Minister, as we welcome you here at this dinner, and as we meet with you today and tomorrow on the occasion of this visit, what is really deepest in our hearts is the hope that history will record that after your service as Prime Minister there was peace in the land for 40 years and longer.

When we think back on your people, a war every ten years; when we think back on your people going back through the century, how they have suffered, we know how much the word peace means.

We can say to you that while it is fashionable in the great councils of the world to talk rather casually about peace, and while it is, of course, expected that at events like this we use that term almost in an offhand way, that we feel it very deeply here. We feel it because the people of Israel deserve peace. They have earned peace, not the fragile peace that comes with the kind of a document that neither party has an interest in keeping, but the kind of peace that will last, one that will last for 40 years or even longer.

I say that for another reason, too. I have had the privilege and I know that many of our friends around this room have had the privilege of seeing what the people of this very small country have done in Israel, and it is a remarkable story.

With this immense military burden, with this tremendous budget that they have to bear in that respect, how they have made that land bloom, how they have made it productive. But also I have seen what the people of this country have done in other lands, in Africa, in Asia, in Latin America. People have gone from the State of Israel to these other lands in their own programs of assistance and advice and this kind of genius, this kind of ability, is very rare in the world. It is desperately needed in the world. It is desperately needed for the works of peace.

And for these and so many other reasons, we simply want to say that we are very honored to have the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and others in this distinguished party here in this room tonight. We are honored to pay tribute to a very brave and courageous people. We hope that as a result of our meeting that we will have taken a significant step forward toward that peace which can mean so much to the people of Israel, to the people of all the Mid-East and also to the people of the world.

Now, I would like to ask you to, in affirming that sentiment, rise and raise your glasses with me to the Prime Minister.

PRIME MINISTER MEIR: Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, Mr. Vice President, friends:

There is no use in my trying to hide the fact that this has been an exceptional day in my life. One reads sometimes that representatives of big powers get together, try to solve problems, make certain decisions, and we know it is important.

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Page 3

Then one sentence reads that representatives of little countries, not very powerful, not very much, not very able to give each other, one has a feeling, well, they got together, they at least shared their troubles and problems, they at least feel sorry for each other. That helps sometimes.

But I think that this world would be entirely different if there was a possibility of meeting between the big and powerful and the small, in an atmosphere and a feeling not of one asking for something, and one giving something, but in an atmosphere that in this world there must be a real partnership between large powers and small, rich and poor.

This world has become too small and too full of problems and troubles for any one of us to feel that he, by himself, can either separate himself from the world and be happy in his home, isolated because he is powerful, or that it doesn't matter.

There can be some that are secular and strong and resourceful and there are others that are small and poor and troubled, as though it did not affect all of us, what happens in any corner of the earth.

We have become too advanced in science. If any trouble is discovered in the moon, Mr. President, I am afraid it will affect us on earth. We are all a part of everything that is good and everything that is dangerous.

To me this has been a great day. Not because I have come representing the people that has no worry in the world, that has no problems, that need nothing, but this is a great day for me because I represent a small country, a small people. I represent a people that throughout its history for 2,000 years has known persecution, has known discrimination, has been driven from place to place. And for 2,000 years this people has refused to give up a dream, an ideal that some day it will come back to its home and rebuild it.

It is tragic that this happened when six million of our people were gone. Those six million in eastern and central Europe--those were the centers of culture, of religion, of Zionism, of faith--withstood everything, all hardships, and did not give up their faith. They are gone.

Everyone of us feels that he has to make up and he owes it to them, not only to those who are alive, that those remenants that have remained, but owes it to them who are gone.

Those who went to the gas chambers went singing, "I believe the Messiah will come." They knew that they were going to their death and we feel that they left us a legacy that we must implement and put into life, that which they believed in and that for which they died. It is not simple in this world, in the neighborhood in which we live.

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(OVER)

[Lc]

Page 5

I felt I was speaking to a friend who not only listens -- in Hebrew we have two words, a word that means only listening, and a word that means that it really is absorbed -- and I felt that you were not merely kind to listen to me, but you shared what I was saying, what our worries are.

We discussed the problems of Israel as though they were our common problems. This means a lot. Israel has known in its short number of years too many hours when we felt we were all alone. And we made it.

In 1948, when we were attacked by six Arab armies and had nothing to fight with, but thank God we did not lose our sense of humor, we said, yes, but we have a secret weapon and our secret weapon is, there is no alternative, we must win because we have nowhere to run to except the sea. Therefore, we chose to fight and to fight it out and win. We had no alternative. We had many hours that were dark, the hours before the 5th of June in 1967, none of us will ever forget them.

But we believe. We have not lost our confidence. We have faith, not only in the life and existence and development of Israel, but we believe honestly and sincerely that the day will come when there will be peace in the area. The day will come when across the borders there will not be tanks and one will not listen only to the shelling, to the shells that will be sent from across the borders into villages killing men and women and children. But I am convinced that the day will come when farmers from Israel, young men and women who have left their homes and left their towns and went to the desert and went to the hills at Galilee and brought life to the desert when nothing has bloomed for hundreds and hundreds of years, and have brought forests to the hills and have absorbed human beings, shattered in body and spirit after the Second World War, and made them alive again and they straightened their backs and the children who came to us with eyes full of fear are happy now and they sing.

These men and women and these scared children who have now become young men and women have made it possible for us to develop the desert, to do what we have done, and there is song on their lips and they teach and they study and they farm and they build.

No greater day can we envisage than when these people merely step across the border and with a farmer of Jordan and with a farmer in the Nile Valley and with a farmer in Syria, not when we are on the Golan Heights and we see what was not done in the villages of the Golan Heights -- and we will just step across the border and bring with us not only the fruits of our experience, but the joy in being alive together, we and they, and making it possible for their children, too, to live as human beings and to hope for a life where one will bring joy to everyone around and where we can erase from the minds of young people, where we can erase the horror of mothers that they bring children into this world and who knows, maybe when they are just beginning their life they will be sent into the battleground.

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(OVER)

We believe in that, Mr. President, honestly and faithfully. We are a people who for 2,000 years believed in the impossible. And here we are, a sovereign state, accepted in the family of nations, with many problems, many troubles, but here we are.

And here we are speaking in the United States. Here I am as a guest of the President of the United States, having full understanding of what this day means and yet I will come home and I will tell my Cabinet and I will tell my people and I will tell our children and our young people, don't become cynical, don't give up hope, don't believe that everything is just judged only by expediency.

There is idealism in this world. There is human brotherhood in this world. There is a great and powerful country, the United States, that feels that the existence of Israel is important to it because it is important that we all live and all exist, no matter how small and how troubled we are.

Mr. President, thank you, not only for your wonderful hospitality, not only for this great day and every moment that I had this day, but thank you for enabling me to go home and tell my people that we have a friend, a great friend and a dear friend. It will help. It will help us overcome many difficulties.

When the great day comes when this dream comes true, you will have had a great share in it.

Thank you very much.

To the President of the United States.

END

(AT 10:14 P.M. EDT)

[L.C.]

EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION UNTIL 9:30 a.m. EDT SEPT. 18, 1969

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY AT 11:15 a.m. EDT

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(New York, New York)

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF THE ADDRESS BY THE
PRESIDENT TO THE 24th SESSION
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS

Madame President, Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Foreign Ministers and Delegates -- and my fellow citizens of the world community:

There is no nobler destiny, nor any greater gift one age could make to the ages that follow, than to forge the key to a lasting peace.

In this great Assembly, the desirability of peace needs no affirmation. The methods of achieving it are what so greatly challenge our courage, our intelligence and our discernment.

Surely if one lesson above all rings resoundingly among the many shattered hopes in this world, it is that good words are no substitute for hard deeds, and noble rhetoric is no guarantee of noble results.

We might describe peace as a process embodied in a structure.

For centuries, peace was the absence of war and stability was the absence of change.

But in today's world, there can be no stability without change -- so that peace becomes a continuing process of creative evolution. It is no longer enough to restrain war. Peace must also embrace progress -- both in satisfying man's material needs and in fulfilling his spiritual needs.

The test of the structure of peace is that it ensure for each nation the integrity of its borders, its right to develop in peace and safety, and its right to determine its own destiny without outside intervention.

As long as we live with the threat of aggression, we need physical restraints to contain it.

But the truest peace is based on self restraint -- on the voluntary acceptance of those basic rules of behavior that are rooted in mutual respect and demonstrated in mutual forebearance.

The more closely the world community adheres to a single standard in judging international behavior, the less likely that standard is to be violated.

## ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

I am well aware that many nations have questions about the world role of the United States in the years ahead -- about the nature and extent of our future contribution to the structure of peace.

Let me address those doubts quite candidly.

In recent years, there has been some criticism here in the United States of the scope and the results of our international commitments.

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This trend, however, has not been confined to the United States alone. In
many countries we find a tendency to withdraw from responsibilities; to leave
the world's often frustrating problems to the other fellow and hope for the best.

As for the United States, I can state here today without qualification: We have
not turned away from the world.

We know that with power goes responsibility.

We are neither boastful of our power, nor apologetic about it. We recognize
that it exists; and that as well as conferring certain advantages, it also imposes
upon us certain obligations.

As the world changes, the pattern of those responsibilities changes.

At the end of World War I, the United States for the first time in history
assumed the major responsibility for world peace.

We were left in 1945 as the one nation with sufficient strength to contain the
new threats of aggression, and with sufficient wealth and industrial capacity
to help the injured nations back to their feet.

For much of the world, those first difficult postwar years were a time of
dependency.

The next step was toward independence, as new nations were born and old
nations revived.

Now we are maturing together into a new pattern of inter-dependence.

It is against this background that we have been urging other nations to assume a
greater share of responsibility for their own security, both individually and
together with their neighbors. The great challenge now is to enlist the coopera-
tion of many nations in preserving peace and enriching life. This cannot be done
by American edict, or by the edict of any other nation. It must reflect the
concepts and the wishes of those nations themselves.

The history of the postwar period teaches that nationalism can be dangerously
disruptive -- or powerfully creative.

Our aim is to encourage the creative forms of nationalism; to join as partners
where our partnership is appropriate, and where it is wanted, but not to let a
U.S. presence substitute for independent national effort or infringe on national
dignity and pride.

It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting
down our allies. On the contrary, our aim is to place America's international
commitments on a sustainable, long-term basis, to encourage local and
regional initiatives, to foster national independence and self-sufficiency, and
by so doing to strengthen the total fabric of peace.

We do not pretend that the United States has no national interests of its own, or
no special concern for its own interests.

However, our most fundamental national interest is in maintaining that structure
of international stability on which peace depends, and which makes orderly
progress possible.

TOWARD PEACE IN VIETNAM

Since I took office as President, no single question has occupied so much of my
time and energy as the search for an end to the war in Vietnam -- an end fair
to the people of South Vietnam, fair to the people of North Vietnam, and fair to
those others who would be affected by the outcome.

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We in the United States want an end to the war, and we are ready to take every reasonable step to achieve it. But let there be no question on this one fundamental point: in good conscience we cannot, in the long-term interests of peace we will not, accept a settlement that would arbitrarily dictate the political future of South Vietnam and deny to the people of South Vietnam the basic right to determine their own future free of outside interference.

As I put it in my address to the American people last May, "What the United States wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What North Vietnam wants for South Vietnam is not the important thing. What is important is what the people of South Vietnam want for South Vietnam."

To secure this right -- and to secure this principle -- is our one limited but fundamental objective.

Both in public and at the Paris talks, we have offered a number of proposals which would bring peace and provide self-determination. We are ready to consider any other proposals that have the same objective. The missing ingredient so far has been the willingness of the other side to talk on any terms other than those that would pre-determine the result and deny the right of self-determination to the people of South Vietnam. Once that willingness exists, and once there is a genuine willingness by the other side to reach agreement, the practical solutions can readily be found.

This makes it urgent that the UN members who have long taken an active interest in peace in Vietnam now take an active hand in achieving it.

Many urged that if only we halted our bombing of the North, peace would follow. Nearly a year has passed since the bombing of the North was stopped.

Three months have passed since we began the process of troop replacement, signaling both our own genuine desire for a settlement and the increased readiness of the South Vietnamese to manage their own defense.

As I announced on Tuesday, by December 15 our troop strength in Vietnam will have been reduced by a minimum of 60,000 men.

On September 2, 1969, North Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris said that if the United States committed itself to the principle of totally withdrawing its forces from South Vietnam, and if it withdrew a significant number of troops, Hanoi would take this into account.

I repeat here today that we are prepared to withdraw all our forces.

The replacement of 60,000 troops is a significant step.

The time has come for the other side to respond to these initiatives.

The time has come for peace.

In the name of peace, I urge all of you here -- representing 126 nations -- to use your best diplomatic efforts to persuade Hanoi to move seriously into the negotiations which could end this war. The steps we have taken have been responsive to views expressed in this room. We hope that views from this organization may now also be influential in Hanoi. If these efforts are successful, the war can end.

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The people of Vietnam, North and South alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last a century. They have endured an unspeakable weight of suffering. They deserve a better future. When the war ends, the United States will stand ready to help the people of Vietnam -- all of them -- in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction. When peace does come at last to Vietnam, it can truly come with healing in its wings.

## AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION

In relations between the United States and the various Communist powers, I have said we should move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

I believe our relations with the Soviet Union can be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect, recognizing our differences and also our right to differ; recognizing our divergent interests, and also our common interests; recognizing the interests of our respective allies as well as our own.

It would be idle to pretend that there are not major problems between us, and conflicting interests. The tensions of the past 30 years have not been caused by personal misunderstanding. This is why we have indicated the need for extended negotiations on a broad front of issues.

Already, as you know, we have had extensive consultations with the Soviet Union as well as with others about the Middle East, where events of the past few days point up anew the urgency of a stable peace.

The United States continues to believe that the UN cease-fire resolutions define the minimal conditions that must prevail on the ground if settlement is to be achieved. We believe the Security Council resolution of November, 1967, charts the way to that settlement.

A peace, to be lasting, must leave no seeds of a future war. It must rest on a settlement which both sides have a vested interest in maintaining.

We seek a settlement based on respect for the sovereign right of each nation to exist within secure and recognized boundaries. We are convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East. We are equally convinced that peace cannot be achieved on the basis of anything less than a binding, irrevocable commitment by the parties to live together in peace.

Failing a settlement, an agreement on the limitation of the shipment of arms to the Middle East might help to stabilize the situation. We have indicated to the Soviet Union, without result, our willingness to enter such discussions.

In addition to our talks on the Middle East, we hope soon to begin talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. There is no more important task before us.

The date we proposed for the opening of talks has passed for lack of response. We remain ready to enter negotiations.

Since the United States first proposed strategic arms talks three years ago, the task of devising an effective agreement has become more difficult. The Soviet Union has been vigorously expanding its strategic forces; weapons systems themselves have become more sophisticated and more destructive. But as the difficulty of the talks increases, so too does their importance.

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Though the issues are complex, we are prepared to deal with them seriously, concretely and purposefully -- and to make a determined effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic arms, but to reverse it.

Meanwhile, I want to affirm our support for arms control proposals which we hope the Geneva conference will place before this Assembly with regard to the seabed and to chemical and bacteriological weapons. We hope also that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will soon enter into force.

We should be under no illusion, however, that arms control will in itself bring peace. Wars are fought by soldiers, but declared by politicians. Peace also requires progress on those stubbornly persistent political questions that still divide the world -- and it requires other exchanges not only of words but of deeds, that can gradually weave a fabric of mutual trust.

We intend to conduct our negotiations with the Soviet Union soberly and seriously, neither encumbered by prejudice nor blinded by sentimentality, seeking to reach agreements rather than to make propaganda.

Whenever the leaders of Communist China choose to abandon their self-imposed isolation, we are ready to talk with them in the same frank and serious spirit.

## PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING

For nearly a quarter of a century, the UN has struggled with the often thankless tasks of peace-keeping.

As we look to the future, however, keeping the peace is only part of our task. We also must concentrate on building the peace.

Let us be candid. There are many differences among the great powers, as well as among others, which as realists we know cannot be resolved quickly. But we also know there are five areas in particular of great concern to us all with regard to which there should be no national differences, in which our interests are common and on which there should be unanimity. These are:

- Securing the safety of international air travel.

- Encouraging of voluntary service.

- Fostering economic development and population control.

- Protecting our threatened environment.

- Exploring the frontiers of space.

I. By any standards, aircraft hijackings are morally, politically, and legally indefensible. The Tokyo Convention has now been brought into force, providing for prompt release of passengers, crew and aircraft. Along with other nations, we also are working on a new convention for the punishment of hijackers. But neither of these conventions can be fully effective without cooperation; sky piracy cannot be ended as long as the pirates receive asylum.

I urge the United Nations to give high priority to this matter. The issue transcends politics; there is no need for it to become the subject of polemics or a focus of political differences. It involves the interests of every nation, the safety of every air traveler, and the integrity of that structure of order on which a world community depends.

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II. The creative, dynamic kind of peace I have spoken of, of course, requires more than such basic protections.

To build this kind of peace, we must join together in building our societies -- in raising a great cathedral of the spirit, which celebrates the infinite possibilities of man himself.

Such a peace requires a fuller enlistment not only of government resources, and of private enterprise resources, but also of the dedication and skill of those thousands of people all over the world who are ready to volunteer in the cause of human advancement. Our own Peace Corps has helped in many countries. I especially welcome the consideration the UN itself is now giving to establishment of an International Volunteer Corps. We stand ready to give this exciting new venture our full and enthusiastic cooperation.

III. As the UN looks toward the beginning of its Second Development Decade, it faces a time of enormous challenge and enormous opportunity.

We can only guess at the new scientific discoveries the 70's may bring, but we can see with chilling clarity the gap that already exists between the world's developed and its developing economies -- and the urgent need for international cooperation in spurring economic development.

If, in the course of the Second Development Decade, we can make both significant gains in food production and significant reductions in the rate of population growth, we shall have opened the way to a new era of splendid prosperity. If we do only one without the other, we shall be standing still. If we fail in both, great areas of the world will face human disaster.

IV. Increasingly, the task of protecting man's environment is a matter of international concern. Pollution of air and water, upsetting the balance of nature -- these are not only local problems, and not only national problems, but matters that affect the basic relationship of man to his planet.

The United Nations already is planning a conference on the environment in 1972. I pledge the strong support of the United States for that effort. I hope that even before then we can launch new international initiatives toward restoring the balance of nature, and maintaining our world as a healthy and hospitable place for man.

V. Of all man's great enterprises, none lends itself more logically or more compellingly to international cooperation than the venture into space. Here, truly, mankind is as one: as fellow creatures from the planet Earth, exploring the heavens that all of us share.

The journey of Apollo 11 to the moon and back was not an end, but a beginning.

There will be new journeys of discovery. Beyond this, we are just beginning to comprehend the benefits space technology can yield here on earth. But the potential is enormous.

For example, we now are developing earth resource survey satellites, with the first experimental satellite to be launched sometime early in the decade of the 1970's.

Present indications are that these should be capable of yielding data which could assist in as widely varied tasks as the location of schools of fish, the location of mineral deposits and the health of agricultural crops.

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[LC]

I feel it is only right that we should share both the adventures and the benefits of space. As an example of our plans, we have determined to take these five actions with regard to earthresource satellites, as this program proceeds and fulfills its promise:

- The earth resource satellite program will be dedicated to producing information not only for the United States, but also for the world community.

- We shall support the convening of a series of international symposia for reports on the work in progress in this field and on projections of future possibilities.

- We shall cooperate in the establishment of international information centers to broaden dissemination of satellite data.

- We are prepared to work with other nations and specialized agencies in developing educational and training opportunities to meet future needs for specialists, especially in the use of earth resource satellite data.

- We shall consider specific international arrangements for handling the data needs of other nations and specialized agencies.

We will be putting proposals to this effect before the United Nations.

These are among the positive, concrete steps we intend to take toward internationalizing man's epic ventures into space -- an adventure that belongs not to one nation, but to all mankind, and one that should be marked not by rivalry, but by the same spirit of fraternal cooperation that so long has been the hallmark of the international community of science.

A survey of history might discourage those who seek to establish peace.

But we have entered a new age, different not only in degree but in kind from any that has gone before.

For the first time ever, we have become a single world community.

For the first time ever, we have seen the staggering fury of the power of the universe unleashed, and we know that we hold that power in precarious harness.

For the first time ever, technological advance has brought within reach what once was only a poignant dream for hundreds of millions -- freedom from hunger and freedom from want.

For the first time ever, we have seen changes in a single lifetime that dwarf the achievements of centuries -- and that continue to accelerate.

For the first time ever, man has stepped beyond his planet -- and revealed us to ourselves as "riders on the Earth together," bound inseparably on this one bright, beautiful speck in the heavens, so tiny in the universe and so incomparably welcoming as a home for man.

In this new age of historic "firsts," even the goal of a just and lasting peace is a "first" we can dare to strive for. We must achieve it. And I believe we can achieve it.

In that spirit, then, let us press toward an open world -- a world of open doors, open hearts, open minds -- a world open to the exchange of ideas and of people, and open to the reach of the human spirit -- a world open in its search for truth, and unconcerned with the fate of old dogmas and old isms -- a world open at last to the light of justice, and reason, and to the achievement of that true peace which the people of every land carry in their hearts and celebrate in their hopes.

# # #

Q Could you tell us who you favor for Mayor of New York at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the people of New York have had some difficulty in that respect.

I will follow the practice as President of the United States and as leader of the Republican Party of endorsing all Republican nominees. Therefore, I will endorse Senator Marchi and the other Republican nominees on the City ticket in New York.

However, I will also follow the practice that has been my practice during my entire political career of campaigning and participating in only National and State elections. I will not participate in, and I will not comment upon, city or local elections, including the election in New York.

Q Mr. President, on the Midway trip, we were told by an official of your Administration that he felt the time had come for substantive negotiations to begin at Paris. Do you agree with this assessment, and, if so, what evidence is there to point it up?

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with the conclusion that the time has come for some substantive negotiations in Paris. As far as evidence that such negotiations have begun, there is no substantial evidence, publicly, to report.

However, I am not pessimistic about the outcome. As you may recall when these questions were first raised, when the talks in Paris were beginning, I pointed out that it would be a long, hard road after we got over the procedural points.

When this Administration came in, all that had been decided was the shape of the table. Now we are down to substance. The two sides are far apart. But we believe that the time has come for a discussion of substance and we hope within the next two to three months to see some progress in substantive discussions.

Q Mr. President, former Defense Secretary Clark Clifford has suggested that 100,000 American troops ought to be out by the end of this year and we ought to say that all ground troops will be out by the end of 1970. I wonder if you think that is a realistic timetable?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I noted Mr. Clifford's comments in the magazine Foreign Affairs, and, naturally, I respect his judgment as a former Secretary of Defense.

I would point out, however, that for five years the Administration in which he was Secretary of Defense in the last part we had a continued escalation of the war, we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam; we had 35,000 killed; we had over 200,000 injured.

And, in addition to that, we found that in the year, the full year, in which he was Secretary of Defense, our casualties were the highest of the whole five-year period and, as far as negotiations were concerned, all that had been accomplished, as I indicated earlier, was that we had agreed on the shape of the table.

This is not to say that Mr. Clifford's present judgment is not to be considered because of the past record. It does indicate, however, that he did have a chance in this particular respect, and did not move on it then.

Page 3

I believe that we have changed that policy. We have started to withdraw forces. We will withdraw more. Another decision will be made in August. I will not indicate the number, because the number will depend upon the extent of the training of the South Vietnamese, as well as developments in Paris, and the other factors that I have mentioned previously.

As far as how many will be withdrawn by the end of this year, or the end of next year, I would hope that we could beat Mr. Clifford's timetable, just as I think we have done a little better than he did when he was in charge of our national defense.

QUESTION: Mr. President, Mr. Clifford goes on to urge that you order our military commanders to cease the policy of applying maximum military pressure against the enemy and switch, instead, to a policy of reducing the level of combat operations. Do you intend to issue any such instructions?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Scali, I have checked the situation with regard to our operations as compared with the enemy's since this Administration took over. I find that our casualties are in direct ratio to the level of enemy attacks.

We have not escalated our attacks. We have only responded to what the enemy has done.

As far as Mr. Clifford's suggestion is concerned, it implies that the United States is at the present time responsible for the level of fighting. It takes two in order to reduce the level of fighting, and I would only suggest that if the enemy now will withdraw forces, one-tenth of its forces, as we have withdrawn one-tenth of our combat forces, that would tend to reduce the level of fighting.

As far as the orders to General Abrams are concerned, they are very simply this: He is to conduct this war with a minimum of American casualties. I believe he is carrying out that order with great effectiveness in the field.

QUESTION: Mr. President, have you had any response from the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong either in Paris or on the battlefield to the withdrawal of the first 25,000 American troops?

THE PRESIDENT: No, we have not.

QUESTION: When and where do you expect to begin arms talks with the Soviet Union, and do you favor suspension of the testing of multiple warheads in the meantime?

THE PRESIDENT: We are just completing our own strategic review, and as a matter of fact, the National Security Council meeting dealing with our position on the SALT talks, as they are described -- the first was held this last Friday, and the second will be held on Wednesday. Consultation with our allies will then proceed through the balance of June and through July.

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We have set July 31st as a target date for the beginning of talks, and Secretary Rogers has so informed the Soviet Ambassador. We have not had a reply from them.

Assuming that our consultations are completed, and that the Soviets find this date is acceptable to them, I would say that sometime between July 31st and the 15th of August there would be a meeting. As far as the place of the meeting is concerned, it could be Vienna, it could be Geneva. We are open on that question.

QUESTION: Mr. President, the Viet Cong and/or Hanoi recently announced the creation of a new provisional government for South Vietnam. There have been many interpretive reports of what that may mean for the political stability or instability of South Vietnam and its portent on the international scene for progress toward peace. Could you give us an assessment of the new government?

THE PRESIDENT: The new government is simply a new name for the same activity that was there previously, the NLF or National Liberation Front, as it was called. There is no new blood in it. It has no capital. As a matter of fact, I do not know where Ambassadors would present their diplomatic credentials because it has no major city or town which it controls in South Vietnam.

As far as the changed situation is concerned, however, I would make this suggestion: President Thieu has offered to have internationally supervised elections to let the people of South Vietnam determine whether they want his government or some other government.

It would seem that if the provisional government which also claims to represent the people of South Vietnam really means that, that they would accede to this request and agree to internationally supervised elections.

As far as the United States is concerned, we will accept any decision that is made by the people of South Vietnam, but we think that the provisional government should join with the Government of South Vietnam, and any other political parties in South Vietnam, in participating in supervised elections.

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Q Mr. President, referring to an earlier question by Mr. Valeriani, do you regard further testing of MIRVs as an obstacle to reaching an arms control agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: I am sorry, Mr. Semple, I forgot the last part of his question. I am glad you brought it back.

As far as the further testing is concerned, this suggestion was made to me by Senator Brooke and by others in the Senate. I know that it is certainly a very constructive proposal insofar as they, themselves, are thinking about it. We are considering the possibility of a moratorium on tests as part of any arms control agreement.

However, as far as any unilateral stopping of tests on our part, I do not think that would be in our interest. Only in the event that the Soviet Union and we could agree that a moratorium on tests could be mutually beneficial to us, would we be able to agree to do so.

Q Mr. President, several prominent Americans have urged you to propose a cease fire in Vietnam as a means of reducing American casulaties. Why does that idea not commend itself to you?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the idea of a cease fire, Mr. Lisagor, does commend itself to me. But I do not want us to cease and have the other side continue to fire, because, basically, as I have pointed out in a previous press conference, where we have a conventional war, cease fire is very relevant; then we know that the guns have stopped firing.

In the case of a guerrilla war, unless you have an international force or some outside force to guarantee it, a cease fire is a grave disadvantage to those forces that are in place.

I should point out, however, that in my May 18th speech, I advocated supervised cease fires. That is the position of this Administration. It is the position of Mr. Thieu.

We want cease fires, but we want them supervised. We don't want us to cease fire and the other side to continue to kill our men.

Q Mr. President, against the background of a controversy involving Mr. Hoover, J. Edgar Hoover, a controversy which revolves around electronic surveillance and in which one newspaper, at least, has called for his resignation, may I ask you two questions: One, does Mr. Hoover continue to enjoy your complete confidence; and, two, has there been any decisions concerning his tenure?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hoover does enjoy my complete confidence, and there has been no discussion with regard to his tenure as far as the future is concerned.

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I should add, further, that with regard to
the controversy on electronic surveillance, that I checked
personally into the matter as to whether or not that sur-
veillance which had been discussed had been conducted by
him and the FBI, by themselves, or whether it had been, as
is supposed to be the case, always approved by the Attorney
General.

I found that it had always been approved by the
Attorney General, as Mr. Hoover testified in 1964 and 1965.
As far as this Administration is concerned, our attitude
toward electronic surveillance is that it should be
used very sparingly, very carefully; having in mind the rights
of those who might be involved, but very effectively to protect
the internal and external security of the United States.

Q Mr. President, sir, the small business people
of this country are suffering and much more so now because
of the high interest rates. I wonder if you have given
any thought to organizing a Reconstruction Finance
Corporation again?

THE PRESIDENT: I know that the high interest
rates have caused great concern, particularly to the
small business people.

I do not believe, however, that a new RFC would
necessarily be the approach that would be effective to deal
with it. I think the way to get at high interest rates
is to get at the cause, as I answered the earlier question
put by Mr. Smith.

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[L.C.]

**QUESTION:** What is your answer, sir, to the report presented to you yesterday by the group of Republican Senators on campus unrest?

**THE PRESIDENT:** It was a very thoughtful report by men who do not have the problem of the generation gap. They are young and vitally interested in these problems, and they gave me a lot of information that is essential for this Administration to have in mind as it develops a program to deal with campus unrest.

With regard to what our position is, I would like to point out, however, that I cannot support the legislative proposals in the House of Representatives which would simply cut off funds from any college or university in which there was a demonstration. This would be cutting off our nose to spite our face, and it would be just what the demonstrators wanted, because we do not want the Federal Government interfering in and responsible for discipline in every college and university in this country.

The responsibility for discipline in colleges and universities should be on the college administrators. That is why I have asked the Attorney General to develop, if he can, new legal remedies that might be available to college administrators to use where violence or lawlessness does occur on the campus. The responsibility should be theirs. The government's role should be to help them meet that responsibility.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, Secretary Finch very much wants Dr. John Knowles to be Assistant Secretary of Health. Evidently Senator Dirksen very much doesn't want him to be. Are you going to support your Secretary against your Senate Leader?

**THE PRESIDENT:** I have heard of this controversy from some people. As you well know, the President of the United States, under the Constitution, makes nominations with the advice and consent of the Senate. I have found in my short term of office that it is very easy to get advice and very hard to get consent.

But with regard to this particular matter, Secretary Finch has the responsibility for selecting those who will be his Assistant Secretaries. When he makes a recommendation, after he has made every effort to clear it with the Senators involved, I will support that recommendation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, you expressed the hope earlier for substantive talks on Vietnam, perhaps in the next three months. I wonder, sir, in this process, and before elections are held in Vietnam, are we wedded, to whatever degree, to the government of President Thieu?

**THE PRESIDENT:** When you use the term "wedded to the government of President Thieu," I would not say that the United States, insofar as any government in the world is concerned, is wedded to it in the sense that we cannot take any course of action that that government does not approve.

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Q Mr. President, although not all of his recommendations were accepted, Mr. Clifford did reverse himself while in office, a rather rare thing for a public official to do. My question to you is perhaps somewhat philosophical: How do you keep from being locked in on a decision involving something as pressurized as Vietnam? How do you determine once a policy is adopted that it continues to be right?

THE PRESIDENT: This is one of my major concerns, and it is one of the reasons why I perhaps allow more controversy and, frankly, even open dissent, as I note from reading all the newspapers, within our Administration than any in recent years.

I believe that a President must constantly re-examine the policies, and I am re-examining our policy on Vietnam every day. I am examining the military policy. I am examining the political policy, our diplomatic options, and I will not be frozen in.

With regard to my comment on Mr. Clifford, I do not mean to suggest that because he, in a very difficult position, was unable to do anything about it, that his words should not now be given some weight. They should be given some weight, and a man should be given credit for changing his mind if the facts have changed.

But I am only suggesting that, as I make up my own mind at this time, I have to look at the facts as they are presented to me today, and as they are presented to me today I think we are on the right road in Vietnam.

We have started toward the withdrawal that Mr. Clifford has advocated and, I hope, as I said earlier, that we will be able to beat his timetable and that we will not be in Vietnam as long as he suggests we will have to be there.

Q Mr. President, your predecessor in office used to quite often solicit the advice of one of his predecessors, General Eisenhower, particularly with respect to foreign policy. Have you solicited Mr. Johnson's advice, and have you got any that is comparable to Clifford's, and does he back your policy?

THE PRESIDENT: I have talked to Mr. Johnson on the telephone, Mr. Potter, on two occasions, and he has been regularly briefed by members of the National Security Council, by Dr. Kissinger, and also by our Economic Advisers, and those briefings, of course, have provided an occasion for him to give his ideas to us. He has been very helpful in terms of advice and I think he will be more helpful in the future.

Mr. Kaplow?

Q Mr. President, what do you make of the recent election results in the Mayors' races in Los Angeles, New York, and Minneapolis? What do you think the voters are saying?

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think the snap reaction to the election in Los Angeles, which was understandable, may have been wrong. The snap reaction to that election, because it was a white man, was that it was simply a white-black vote.

And yet when you see Minneapolis, where there is only a four percent black constituency, coming up with a 62 percent vote for a candidate against the Republican candidate for Mayor, and then in New York City where you see conservative candidates, that is the lable that has apparently been given to both of them, in both the Democratic and Republican primaries, winning over the liberal candidates, it seems to me we have to take a different view.

What I feel is this: I do not believe the great majority of the American people in our cities are anti-Negro. I do not believe they are anti-poor, or anti-welfare, or reactionary, or members of hate groups.

I do believe, however, this, and this is the message that comes through rather loud and clear from these elections: The American people in our cities, in our small towns, and in this country are fed up to here with violence and lawlessness and they want candidates who will take a strong stand against it. I think that is the message for the candidates in the future.

Q Mr. President, the Surgeon General said today that your Administration faces what he called a cripling lack of leadership in its top health offices. You earlier indicated that you are staying out of the Dirksen-Ford controversy for now. Will there come a time when you feel that you must intervene as the nominating officer for those jobs?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that I can go even further than that. I will not have to interven because Mr. Finch will make a decision on that next week.

Q Mr. President, what do you think of the Fulbright proposal that would limit the Presidential power to act militarily in an emergency?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I understand the sentiment behind the proposal. When I was a Member of the Senate and a Member of the House, I will have to admit that I felt that there should be more consultation with the Senate, and that Presidents should not have unlimited power to commit this Nation, militarily as well as politically.

On the other hand, as I know assume the responsibilities of power, I, of course, see it from a different vantage point. And for the President of the United States to have his hands tied in a crisis in the fast-moving world in which we live, would not be in the best interests of the United States.

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As President, I intend to consult with the Senate, with Senator Fulbright and with his colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee before taking any action whenever I can.

But look, for example, at President Eisenhower in 1958. He had to move very fast in order to save the situation in Lebanon. There was no time to consult, and also it would have tipped off the enemy.

Look at President Johnson when he sent in airplanes to save the missionaries in the Congo in 1964. He had to move fast. He had no time to consult.

I don't think a President of the United States should be tied down by a commitment which will not allow him to take the action that needs to be taken to defend American interests and to defend American lives where there is no time to consult.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, five months ago at your first news conference you described the Middle East as a dangerously explosive situation in need of defusing. In the five months since that time, do you think there has been any defusing that you can measure, or do you think the situation has become acutely worse?

**THE PRESIDENT:** I would have to admit that I see very little defusing. The situation is better only from the standpoint that we do have some four-power talks going, and we would trust that from those talks we might get some basis of communication between the two sides, and particularly that we might get all parties involved, including the Soviet Union, to use their influence to defuse a crisis. The talks will serve that interest if they serve no other interest.

Also in that connection, I would like to say that I, as you know, have met already with the King of Jordan, and I am hoping to meet sometime within the next month with the Prime Minister of Israel.

We intend to have bilateral talks, multilateral talks -- anything that we can do -- to attempt to defuse the situation.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, you said earlier that you feel that the income surtax will be extended by the Congress. However, it expires in just 11 days. If the Congress does not act or does not act in time, what economic situation will you be faced with, and what realistic policy options will you be considering?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Despite the fact that the surtax will expire, and that has happened before, the Congress will pass a resolution which will allow the forms to go out and the collections to proceed. What is important is not that the Congress pass the tax before it expires, but that the general public and the world knows that the tax will eventually be passed. That has the psychological effect.

In my belief, due to the bipartisan support -- and it has been really statesmanlike support that we received from the Democratic Leadership as well as the Republican Leadership -- due to that support, it will pass the House and I then think will pass the Senate.

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**QUESTION:** Mr. President, due to Governor Rockefeller's difficulties on his Latin American jaunt, do you see any usefulness coming out of the trips, and could you tell us what it might be?

**THE PRESIDENT:** A great deal of usefulness. For example, in my conversations with President Lleras, the talking paper that President -- Governor Rockefeller; a Freudian slip -- the talking paper that Governor Rockefeller gave me was extremely helpful, extremely helpful because it gave me the background of his conversation with President Lleras.

I would say further that the very fact that there are these rather explosive demonstrations indicates that such a trip was necessary. The United States can't be penned up within our borders simply because of the fear of demonstrations.

I remember very well when I planned my trip to Europe there were several editorials to the effect that I shouldn't take the trip because of the possibility of demonstrations. As those of you who were with me will remember, there were demonstrations in every major city which I visited. Yet the trip was worthwhile.

As far as I am concerned, I am very happy that Governor Rockefeller has made this trip. He is getting valuable information which we needed to get.

I would add one further thought: We must not interpret these demonstrations as reflecting the will of the people of Latin America. The few demonstrators, violent as they are, in Latin America, no more represent the 200 million people of Latin America than the Black Panthers represent the 11 million law abiding Negro citizens of this country. That is what we have to get across.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, when you proposed the Safeguard antiballistic system, you said it was vital to the interests of the United States. Nevertheless, reports persist that it is in trouble, the program is in trouble, in the Senate, and there is now talk of a possible compromise in our program. What is your position on Safeguard and what do you intend to do to win passage for the program?

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THE PRESIDENT: On March 8th before I announced my decision on Safeguard, a story appeared in the Washington Post indicating that the count at that time was 20 Senators for it, 46 against it, with the rest undecided.

The latest count I have seen indicates that there are 50 or 51 for it, 46 against it and the rest undecided. We will win the fight on Safeguard. It will not be necessary to compromise.

I don't mean by that that every section of the bill as presented to the Armed Services Committee has to be kept as it is. That is up to the Committee and to the Chairman to work out.

But in recommending Safeguard, I did so based on intelligence information at that time. Since that time new intelligence information with regard to the Soviet success in testing multiple re-entry vehicles, that kind of information has convinced me that Safeguard is even more important. However we may argue about that intelligence, as to whether it has an independent guidance system as ours will have, there isn't any question but that it is a multiple weapon and its footprints indicate that it just happens to fall in somewhat the precise area in which our Minutemen silos are located.

This would mean that by the year 1973, in the event the Soviet Union goes forward with that program, that 80 percent of our Minutemen would be in danger. ABM is needed particularly in order to meet that eventuality.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

END

AT 7:30 P.M. EDT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

APRIL 11, 1969

NO. 78

CAUTION - FUTURE RELEASE

FOR RELEASE AT 5:00 P.M., E.S.T., FRIDAY, APRIL 11, 1969. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY THE
HONORABLE JOSEPH J. SISCO,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
AT THE 73rd ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE,
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN HOTEL, PHILADELPHIA,
FRIDAY EVENING, APRIL 11, 1969

The United States and the Arab-Israeli Dispute

I.

I am pleased to be with the American Academy of Political and Social Science this evening to discuss the Arab-Israeli dispute.

For twenty years peace, which is so sorely needed by all peoples in the area, has been elusive. One side sees in the creation of the State of Israel an act of aggression introducing outsiders into the Arab homeland. The other side sees the creation of the State of Israel as an act of destiny, an historic right and a response to the world's conscience.

Each side argues its case with firmness and passion. Israel has insisted upon direct negotiations and a peace treaty; the other side has adhered to the Khartoum formula of "no peace, no negotiations, and no recognition." Somehow ways must -- and I believe can be found -- to get around this impasse. If the climate of distrust can be replaced by an attitude of co-existence and live-and-let-live, enduring peace could in time become a reality. Such a fundamental change is the goal of our efforts. As Secretary of State Rogers said the other day, "the one factor which would guarantee a successful result would be the willingness of all nations to say we want to live in peace ..."

II.

U.S. Interests in the Middle East

It is a fair question to ask why instability in the Middle East need concern the United States.

The most direct answer is that in a shrunken, interdependent world areas of instability are too dangerous and could become the source of major power conflict. In this connection, we are keenly aware that the expansion of Soviet influence in the area in the past dozen years and more particularly since the June war has added a new dimension and complexity. Our own interests require an effective presence in the area. We have strategic interests arising from the simple fact that the Middle East is there, a cross-roads of the world which the United States as a nation with global interests must take fully into account.

We have

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We have long been involved in the area. We have roots in the Arab world which go back to early educational and missionary activities in the days before World War I when the area was all part of the Ottoman Empire. Those roots were widened as American private enterprise acquired interests in developing the area's petroleum resources in the 1920s and 1930s.

Our roots are also intertwined with the establishment and development of Israel. The United States Government endorsed the Balfour Declaration of 1917, was first to recognize the new State of Israel in 1948 and has supported the security and well-being of Israel for two decades with a constancy rarely surpassed in the history of relations between nations.

The question therefore is not whether we should concern ourselves with the Middle East, but how.

We have pursued our interests in four principal ways.

First, we have constantly sought to prevent outright hostilities. To this end, we have looked primarily to the United Nations, and we have given full diplomatic and material support to its peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East. Three outbreaks of war in the area in the last twenty years regrettably reveal that we have had only limited success; nevertheless, in each instance it was possible to help localize the conflict before it broadened into more dangerous proportions.

Second, we have sought to maintain free and mutually advantageous relations, to the extent possible, with all nations and peoples of the area and we have sought to encourage those nations to conduct their mutual relations in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. This attitude is consistent with our deep and abiding interest in Israel and our enduring interest in friendly relations with the Arab States and their hundred million people.

Third, we have sought to slow the arms race, and we have hoped thereby to avoid becoming a major supplier of armaments. But we could not ignore large-scale deliveries of Soviet arms to some states in the area. Accordingly, from time to time, we have provided limited quantities of arms on a selected basis to such states as Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, and Israel. At the same time, the United States has continued to explore possibilities for agreement on limitation of arms in the Middle East. Unfortunately, the Soviets have shown no serious interest since the June war in discussing this matter with us.

Finally, we have sought a stable peace -- one which would help free the vast resources of the area -- both material and human -- for the good of the entire region.

### III.

#### Steps by the Nixon Administration

Our immediate concern is that rather than making progress towards a peaceful settlement, the parties are gradually being drawn again toward a vortex of violence and recrimination. The present opportunity for settlement could slip away unless present trends in the area are reversed.

In recent

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In recent days:

We have seen border incursions and raids by Arab commandos, terrorist bombings in super-markets and at a university, prolonged artillery duels across the Suez and retaliatory strikes from the ground and the air. Attacks on Israeli civil aircraft have posed grave risks to innocent people at international airports at Athens and Zurich.

Both sides today seem to be seeking to justify their positions in more strident and menacing words; both stick tenaciously to strongly held positions. From the UAR have come statements which indicate it does not feel bound by the UN cease-fire resolutions; from Israel has come verbal and actual evidence of a policy of "active defense" against suspected fedayeen bases.

This is a somber picture I know. It helps to explain why high priority has been given by President Nixon to the Arab-Israeli dispute. These are some of the principal steps taken by President Nixon since January 20.

There has been an intensive overall review of U.S. policy in the area and a number of National Security Council meetings devoted to it.

President Nixon made the Middle East conflict a prime topic of discussions during his recent European trip.

There have been serious exchanges of view with the high-level representatives of the principal parties, including King Hussein of Jordan and Foreign Minister Eban of Israel. Nor has the lack of diplomatic relations impeded a free exchange with the UAR, including talks with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, President Nasser's Adviser for Foreign Affairs, who has been in Washington during the last ten days.

Intensive exploratory conversations are being pursued in Washington between representatives of the United States and the USSR to see whether common or parallel views and actions can be agreed upon to promote a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 1967. While it is too early to make a judgment regarding their prospective outcome, these talks and other bilateral diplomatic efforts are being carried forward in a serious vein, free of invective and propagandistic overtones, and have helped set the stage for Four Power talks which are in train at the United Nations.

And finally, President Nixon decided to pursue the new Four Power approach in the belief that the present situation in the area has deteriorated, that the parties left to themselves have not been able to narrow their differences, and that the major powers have an interest and a responsibility in trying to do everything possible to help bring calm to the area, to avoid another general renewal of hostilities with all of the risks that would be involved, and to encourage steps toward peace.

IV. For the

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IV.

For the United States the framework for peace is contained in the UN Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. If there is a short answer to what is U.S. policy, it is that resolution in all its provisions. I say all of its provisions because each side likes to emphasize the parts it likes while de-emphasizing or disregarding the provisions it dislikes.

First, What is the Objective?

The resolution is very clear: the objective is a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, not a fragile armistice arrangement. If a peace is to last, if it is to be just, it must be juridically defined and contractually binding.

Second, What should be the Content of Peace?

I need only to repeat here precisely what Secretary Rogers said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 27. He said:

"A just and lasting peace will require, as the Security Council's resolution states, withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and the acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Clearly, withdrawal should take place to established boundaries which define the areas where Israel and its neighbors may live in peace and sovereign independence. Equally, there can be no secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. In our view rectifications from the pre-existing lines should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not reflect the weight of conquest."

The Council's resolution also affirms the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area. It was the denial of such freedom to Israel through the Straits of Tiran which was the proximate cause of the six-day war. For twenty years, Israel has been denied transit through the Suez Canal. A permanent peace must include the right for all states to traverse these waterways without discrimination.

We deeply believe too that an overall settlement must provide for a just solution of the refugee problem. Consistent with past UN resolutions, the refugees should be given a choice between repatriation and resettlement with compensation. Our hope is that a just settlement of the refugee problem can be achieved which takes into account the tragic human element and the concerns and requirements of both sides. There is need for a fundamental not an ephemeral solution.

The Security