# THE NATO NUCLEAR DILEMMA

by
Henry A. Kissinger

The Atlantic Alliance is going through another of those reexaminations which seem to have become its standard method of operation over the past few years. Once again the relative emphasis of nuclear as against conventional arms, of the nature of nuclear war and the relationship of various national nuclear forces to each other are being widely debated. Certain ideas such as the multilateral NATO force have been resurrected and are even being urged as the test of Atlantic solidarity.

These issues have been brought to a head by President De Gaulle's abrupt re-
fusal of the Nassau agreement. However, the problems have beset NATO for a long
time. What makes the impasse so intractable is that the domestic situation in
many countries prohibits a clear articulation of the true convictions of many
leaders. With a succession to the Chancellorship imminent in Germany, elections
in the offing in Britain and a political realignment being attempted in Italy,
the voice of Europe reaches us in an extremely distorted manner. This makes it
all the more essential for us to understand what is at stake. What are the assump-
tions on which our NATO policy is based and what is at issue in the controversies
that have rent the Atlantic Alliance for two years?

2

U.S. Strategy

United States defense policy since the advent of the Kennedy Administration has been developed by the ablest group of civilians ever assembled at the Pentagon. Trained through many years of systems analysis--particularly at the RAND Corporation--they have applied superior analytical skills to the given business of strategy in the nuclear age. The result has been sophisticated, complex--and one-dimensional. Enormous technical competence has been purchased at the expense of political insight. Technical options have been developed at the price of political ones. Temporary respites in the nuclear controversy have been brought about by devices--such as the NATO multilateral force--which guarantee and compound future difficulties. What then are the main elements of current United States strategy; what are its strengths and its weaknesses?

Four major elements can be discovered with various degrees of explicitness in the U.S. strategy for NATO:

a) **Counterforce Strategy.** The first component has been identified with the phrase "counterforce strategy." There have been many variations of this theme. It has been argued by Secretary McNamara that even after absorbing a Soviet surprise attack our strategic retaliatory forces would be able to destroy the "entire Soviet

3

[y]

target system." Though this statement never made clear just what this target sys-
tem consisted of, the presumption was strong that it would include the entire
Soviet retaliatory force. In other words, we would be able to "win" a general
war--even after conceding the first blow--in the sense that after the nuclear ex-
change we would still possess reserves of nuclear fire-power while the Soviets
had expended theirs. In his more recent pronouncements Secretary McNamara has
been more modest. Now the argument is that our reserve of protected fire-power
will enable us to conduct a "centrally-controlled" nuclear war which provides
the opponent a maximum incentive to spare the civilian population by giving us
the option to do likewise.

b) **National Nuclear Force.** If the primary purpose of strategic nuclear forces is to fight a centrally controlled general war against a "single (though unspecified)" target system, national nuclear forces are, according to the pre-valent doctrine, dangerous and useless. They are dangerous because their vulner-ability may tempt attack. They are useless because, if employed independently against cities, they may destroy the Soviet incentive to exercise restraint which it is the purpose of our defense policy to induce. And if used against military targets, these national forces are too small to make a substantial difference. Thus our official policy has been hostile to the existence of national nuclear

4

[Y]

forces within the Alliance (other than our own). President Kennedy has described the French *force de frappe* as inimical to NATO and Secretary McNamara's epithets have been less restrained. In short, the requirement of central control is interpreted to mean that the strategic nuclear weapons of the Alliance should be under U.S. control. To be sure, we have offered to create a "truly" multilateral NATO force. But we have added the proviso that it had to be "integrated" and "responsive to a single chain of command," in other words that it had to be an adjunct to the US Strategic Air Command.

c) **Tactical Nuclear Weapons.** Similar hostility has been shown to tactical nuclear weapons. It might seem that if a general nuclear war can be fought with restraint, it should certainly be possible to limit the employment of tactical nuclear weapons in a geographically confined area. However, Secretary McNamara and his associates have held the contrary view. Secretary McNamara has repeatedly pointed out that tactical nuclear weapons involve a definite threshold and should not be considered a substitute for conventional defense. At the same time, the tactical nuclear weapons deployed overseas are said not to be really necessary for the kind of general war envisaged by the McNamara theory. They are not well-enough protected and not easy to control centrally. In Secretary McNamara's statements they are therefore described as a "bonus" on the use of which our strategic planning

6

probes. But it was never considered that a full scale conventional defense of Europe should be attempted.

In the light of this, it is not easy to understand the repeated expressions of outrage by Administration spokesmen about European doubts with respect to the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee. For the rationale of the new strategy is precisely that traditional NATO doctrine--and its nuclear guarantee--has lost some of its validity. Why else did the Nassau communique reverse the original significance of sword and shield, calling the nuclear weapons the "shield" and the conventional weapons the "sword"?

NATO's nuclear dilemma has thus been the result of two trends in American strategic thought: the reliance on a conventional defense of Europe and the insistence that national nuclear forces were wasteful,

Europe and the inexistence that national nuclear forces were useful,
American strategic thought: the reliance on a conventional defense of
WTO's a nuclear dilemma has time passed the result of two trends in
bone the "sword"?

enfield, calling the nuclear weapons the "enfield" and the conventional was-
the Soviet communique reverse the original significance of sword and
and its nuclear guarantee -has lost some of its validity. Why else did
rationale of the new strategy is precisely that traditional NATO doctrine--
with respect to the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee. For the
brev冒one of outrage by Administration acrobatics about European coups
in the light of this, it is not easy to understand the repeated ex-
tent of Europe should be attempted.

bopes. But it was never considered that a full scale conventional de-

9

9

The first victim of these convictions was the theory of "finite de-
terrence" according to which the United States required strategic forces
only large enough to devastate the Soviet homeland. Instead, the new
Administration adopted a program to give us a capability to fight a "con-
trolled general war," a nuclear exchange confined to military targets.
By October 1961, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric asserted that we
possessed nuclear superiority. In January 1962 Secretary McNamara spelled
this out to the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We conclude there is
no question but that today our strategic retaliatory forces--bombers,
missiles, and Polaris--are fully capable of destroying the Soviet target
system even after absorbing an initial nuclear surprise attack...and
without any help from the deployed tactical air units or carrier task
forces which, of course, have the capability for attacking those targets
with nuclear weapons."

This statement had two implications: (1) it was possible to win a
general war even by striking second (for obviously the Soviets would not
have been able to destroy our target system); (2) nuclear weapons deployed
overseas were not essential to our strategy. The scepticism towards

10

nuclear weapons deployed overseas extended to tactical nuclear weapons
as well. "I for one have never believed in the so-called limited nuclear
war," said Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric. "I just don't know
how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nuclear
hang,"

With any nuclear war likely to be all-out, what was the U.S. strategy
for such a conflict? "...Our forces can be used in several different
ways," said Secretary McNamara early in 1962. We may have to retaliat
with a single massive attack. Or we may be able to use our retaliatory
force to limit damage to ourselves before he has launched his second
salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our
force as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack..." Here
was the first public distinction between two kinds of target system: the
total Soviet target system including cities, control centers and indus-
trial installations; and a second one, confined to the bases of the
Soviet strategic force.

These pronouncements culminated in Secretary McNamara's famous
speech at Ann Arbor in June 1962, where he declared that "the United

11

States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been conducted in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives... should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population."

It followed that to pursue this strategy all nuclear weapons of the Alliance had to be under tight central control, indeed under a single command, which in effect meant U.S. command: "We have consistently stressed the importance of a single, integrated strategic nuclear force responsive to a single chain of command, to be employed in a fully integrative manner against what is truly an indivisible target system," reported Secretary McNamara to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963.

The McNamara doctrine, for all its subtlety and quest for flexibility, contained many ambiguities. For example, Secretary McNamara never clarified what he considered more important: the attempt to spare cities or the effort to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. He could mean that in case of general nuclear war we would attempt to spare cities but would

12

destroy known strategic bases located near them. Or else he could mean
that we would try to avoid ambiguous targets such as civilian airports
located near cities. Still another interpretation would be that we would
avoid cities under all circumstances, in other words, that we would avoid
hitting even military targets if striking them involved a probability of
heavy civilian casualties.

If the first interpretation is accepted, it could transpire that the
practical difference between the McNamara strategy and the traditional
notions of massive retaliation may be relatively slight. It is likely
that a sufficient number of Soviet strategic bases are located close to
cities so as to produce enormous civilian casualties.

Moreover, even if the Soviets followed the same strategy as we--as
Secretary McNamara assumes--the casualties in the United States might be
indistinguishable from those of an attack aimed at the civilian population.
As long as our strategic forces are composed in large part of airplanes,
a disarming attack would have to seek to destroy all airports capable of

a disarming attack would have to seek to destroy all airports capable of
being long as our strategic forces are composed in large part of airplanes,
indirectly vulnerable from those of an attack aimed at the civilian population.
Secretary McNamara assumes--the casualties in the United States might be
moreover, even if the Soviets followed the same strategy as we--as
cities so as to produce enormous civilian casualties.

that a sufficient number of Soviet strategic planes are located close to
notions of massive retaliation may be relatively slight. It is likely
practical difference between the McNamara strategy and the traditional
If the first interpretation is accepted, it could transpire that the
heavy civilian casualties.

pitting even military targets if striking them involved a probability of
avoiding cities under all circumstances, in other words, that we would avoid
located near cities. Still another interpretation would be that we would
that we would try to avoid ambiguous targets such as civilian airports
destroy known strategic planes located near them. Or else he could mean

13

13

capable of handling strategic bombers. This will be particularly true
if in crisis situations we continue to stage bombers to civilian airports
as was done during the Cuban blockade. Given the location of most United
States airbases, vast civilian casualties are inevitable. This in turn
is bound to affect our choice of targets. In short, Secretary McNamara's
strategy may give the Soviets a high incentive to avoid an attack on the
United States; it is much less clear that it gives the Soviet Union an
incentive or indeed a possibility to spare our civilian population in
the unlikely event of a Soviet surprise attack.

If the McNamara doctrine implies that we would spare Soviet cities
in all circumstances provided the Soviets do likewise, a nuclear stalemate is the likely consequence. If the Soviets spare our cities, they
will not be able to destroy our retaliatory force. If we spare their
cities, a great part of their force may survive--unless of course the
Soviets leave so much of our force untouched in their first strike as
to enable us to disarm them in a second strike by attacking all their
bases, even those close to cities. It is not impossible that the Soviets
will act with reckless foolishness; but equally it is not wise to base

14

the entire U.S. strategy on what will be a very special case.

The most likely interpretation then is that the need to disarm the opponent will transcend the incentive to spare cities. However, during the Sixties, the reliability of even such a notion of counterforce strategy is certain to decline. As the retaliatory forces multiply and become more dispersed, it may become increasingly difficult to pinpoint the targets precisely or to give the President enough confidence that their exact location is known, which amounts to the same thing.

Then there is the problem of command and control. The strategy envisaged by Secretary McNamara and his associates presupposes that "our forces can be used...in a controlled and deliberate way subject at all times to the direction of the highest civilian authority." (Defense Department Council John McNaughton) This laudable objective is extremely difficult to realize technically in the face of the kind of attack on the U.S. postulated by Secretary McNamara. It may be even more difficult to carry out psychologically when casualties in the best of circumstances will amount to millions.

Moreover, as missile systems become more diversified and sophisti-

15

cated, some will be hardened, some will be mobile on land, others will be at sea. This will enormously complicate the problem of coordinating an attack--indeed in his statement to the House Armed Services Committee on January 30, 1963, Secretary McNamara pointed out that we did not possess any present capability to target missile carrying submarines.

Finally, as the numbers of missiles multiply the scale of the attack may have to mount to a point as to defeat the objective of sparing the civilian population. Thus, even if the percentage of the Soviet retaliatory force which we were able to destroy were to remain constant--an unwarrentedly optimistic assumption--the absolute number remaining is bound to increase. Whatever its technical feasibility, the obstacles in the way of a strategy based on intelligence which is fragmentary and using large numbers of weapons for which there is no operational experience in wartime are certain to mount.

This is not to say that there is no possibility for Secretary McNamara's strategy to be applied. Even if the probability is not too high that it would reduce casualties significantly, a rich country should avail itself of every option that may save lives. It is another

16

[y]

question, however, whether it is wise to push such a theory to such rigorous and indeed brutal conclusions. It is one thing to develop an option for controlled general nuclear war; it is quite another to gear all of our Alliance policy to an effort to maintain a monopoly position with respect to nuclear strategy.

The extreme formulations of the McNamara doctrine had the curious consequence of casting into doubt our nuclear commitment to NATO--and not simply because of the shortsightedness or selfishness of the Europeans. The European concern arose not because of the technical doubts expressed in this article. Their fears were bound to be magnified particularly when they accepted Secretary McNamara's assessment of the strategic balance. For if we were able to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force even after we had suffered a surprise attack, it followed that we must possess an overwhelming superiority if we struck first. If this was true, our insistence on building up the conventional forces in Europe--and the ever more explicit implication that we were envisaging a purely conventional defense--inevitably appeared as a symptom of our reluctance to launch a nuclear war for the defense of Europe. If our nuclear superiority was as crushing as

crushing as

nuclear war for the defense of Europe. If our nuclear superiority was as
defense--inevitably appeared as a symptom of our reluctance to launch a
more explicit implication that we were envigorating a purely conventional
instance on building up the conventional forces in Europe--and the ever
an overwhelming superiority if we struck life. If this was true, our
after we had entered arieze attack, it followed that we must possess
ance. For it we were able to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force even
when they accepted Secretary McNaar's assessment of the strategic pa-
in this article. Their fears were bound to be magnified particularly

The European concern arose not because of the technical doubts expressed
simply because of the shortfalls or beiliness of the Europeana.
consequence of casting into doubt our nuclear commitment to NATO--and not
The extreme formulations of the McNamara doctrine had the curios

affect to unclear strategy.

our Alliance policy to an effort to maintain a monopoly position with re-
tor controlled general nuclear war; it is quite another to bear all of
one and indeed primal conciliations. It is one thing to develop an option
d question, however, whether it is wise to push such a theory to such rigor-

16

17

[y]

Secretaries McNamara and Gilpatric maintained, then it simply made no
sense to envisage a substantial conventional build-up(as distinct from
improving the existing capability). P AR In that case, the traditional
doctrine of the nuclear "sword" and the conventional "shield" would con-
tinue to be effective. The Soviet Union would be deterred from a massive
attack on Europe, for this would trigger a decisive blow by the United
States strategic forces. It could not escape this dilemma by means of
a simultaneous attack on the United States for--by Secretary McNamara's
hypothesis--this would still lead to the destruction of the entire Soviet
nevertheless definition target system. If we/reversed the significance of the "sword" and the
"shield" this could only be interpreted in terms of our reluctance to
use our nuclear superiority in the face of a massive Soviet attack on
Europe. The precipitate withdrawal of the Jupiters and Thors from Britain,
Italy and Turkey added to these concerns. For whatever the technical
IRBM's in Europe superiority of the Polaris, these weapons were useful for a nuclear
strike in response to a massive Soviet attack. Their withdrawal was
bound to be interpreted as a proof of our reluctance to use nuclear wea-
sons against a conventional attack confined to Europe. Our seeming

bore against a conventional attack confined to Europe. Our seeming
pound to be interpreted as a brood of our reluctance to use nuclear me-
strike in response to a massive Soviet attack. Their withdrawal was
inferiority of the Solaris, these weapons were useful for a nuclear
IRBM's in Europe.
Italy and Turkey added to these concerns. For whatever the technical
Europe. The breachbitrate withdrawal of the Russians and those from Britain,
use our nuclear inferiority in the face of a massive Soviet attack on
"enfield" this could only be interpreted in terms of our reluctance to
target system. It was reversed the significance of the "Aword" and the
"Nevada" definition of the "Aword" and the
pilots'--this would still lead to the destruction of the entire Soviet
a simultaneous attack on the United States for--by Secretary McNamara's
states strategic forces. It could not escape this dilemma by means of
attack on Europe, for this would trigger a decisive blow by the United
time to be effective. The Soviet Union would be deferred from a massive
deadline of the nuclear "Aword," and the conventional "enfield" would con-
improving the existing capability). Yes [in that case, the traditional
sense to envisage a substantial conventional build-up] as distinct from
Secretary McNamara and Gilbaric maintained, then it simply made no

17

18

[y]

unwillingness to rely on our declared nuclear superiority did more than
President De Gaulle's declarations to create confusion about our real
purposes.

This difficulty has led to a reformulation of the counterforce the-
ory. In his statement to the House Armed Services Committee on January
30, 1963, Secretary McNamara emphasized that a general nuclear war even
under conditions of controlled response would still produce casualties
numbering in the tens of millions. This was because "even if we were to
double or triple our forces we would not be able to destroy quickly all
or almost all of the hardened ICBM sites. And even if we could do that,
we know no way to destroy the enemy's missile-launching submarines at
the same time." Secretary MacNamara went on to say that our strategic
forces were designed to destroy virtually all of the "soft" and "semi-
hard" military targets in the Soviet Union and a proportion of the hard-
ened sites. No significant capability for destroying missile-carrying
submarines would be developed.

With respect to European nuclear aspirations, Secretary McNamara
emphasized that they would have to be governed by the requirements of
this strategy. "We have consistently stressed the importance of a single
integrated strategic nuclear force responsive to a single chain of command,

19

With respect to European nuclear aspirations, Secretary McNamara em-
phasized that they would have to be integrated into a single command and
capable of instant response. The President has reiterated these require-
ments in his press conference of and added that the
decision to retaliate might have to be made in five minutes.

Galley 37

What of the argument that the proposed NATO force could
in time be transformed into a European force if our allies
requested it? We have repeatedly hinted at our willingness
to consider this prospect. However, there are two major
obstacles. The first is our strategic doctrine. Our in-
sistence on a unified command, a single target system and the
need for instant response is as inconsistent with a separate
European force as with national forces.

However, even if we are prepared to change our strategic
doctrine, serious problems would remain. The only way a NATO
force as now conceived could be transformed into a European
one would be for our allies to ask us to withdraw from it.
This would defeat the prime purpose of many of the smaller
countries in joining the force: to demonstrate Atlantic soli-
darity. Such a step--even were it politically feasible--is
much more likely to accentuate Allied divisions than beginning
with an explicitly European program. Moreover, as long as France
is not part of a NATO force and Britain's contribution is
token only, any attempt to turn it into a European force
will raise the spectre of German domination and thus create
powerful antagonisms in other European countries.

It can be argued, of course, that the fear of German
domination will make Britain and France more eager to join
the multilateral force. This is doubtful. But even were it
correct, such a process of arriving at a European force
would be extremely worrisome. It would be better for

Galley 37 continued

the long term stability and cohesiveness of Europe if the
Federal Republic joined a Franco-British program than for
Britain and France to be obliged to seek membership in a
grouping of which Germany is the senior European partner.
History has been altered by smaller nuances.

This suggests the need to reexamine another of the
assumptions behind our advocacy of the NATO force. The
NATO force is often said to be a device/to avoid the issue . . .

68

of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role.
It serves nobody's purpose to force the Federal Republic to
choose between France and the United States. A divided coun-
try which, in the space of fifty years, has lost two wars, ex-
perienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme
inflation, and is still affected by the trauma of the Nazi
era, should not—in its own interest—be placed in a position
where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet
pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy.

We are encouraging tendencies which we may later regret.

There must be better ways for the Federal Republic to demon-
strate its devotion to the Atlantic Alliance than to become
the largest European contributor to a NATO multilateral nuclear
force.

of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. It
serves nobody's purpose to force the Federal Republic to choose
between France and the United States. The very act of choice may
encourage tendencies which we will later regret. There must
be better ways for the Federal Republic to demonstrate its devotion
to the Atlantic alliance than to become the largest European
contributor to a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

3 [y]

b) **National Nuclear Force.** If the primary purpose of strategic nuclear forces is to fight a centrally controlled general war against a "single (though unspecified)" target system, national nuclear forces are, according to the pre-valent doctrine, dangerous and useless. They are dangerous because their vulner-ability may tempt attack. They are useless because, if employed independently against cities, they may destroy the Soviet incentive to exercise restraint, which it is the purpose of our defense policy to induce. And if used against military targets, these national forces are too small to make a substantial difference.

4 Εγ]

forces within the Alliance (other than our own). President Kennedy has described
the French **force de frappe** as inimical to NATO and Secretary McNamara's epithets
"And our opposition to the British military presence has been less restrained. In short, the requirement of central control is inter-
preted to mean that the strategic nuclear weapons of the Alliance **MUST** be under
U.S. control. To be sure, we have offered to create a "truly" multilateral NATO
force. But we have added the proviso that it had to be "integrated" and "respon-
sive to a single chain of command," in other words that it had to be an adjunct
**U.S.**
to the Strategic Air Command."

5

Σ

can
not really count.

d) **Conventional Defense.** If strategic weapons are to be controlled by the United States, and if European national nuclear forces are as irrelevant as the tactical nuclear weapons are overvalued, it follows that the European contribution should be in the field of conventional defense. This argument has been pressed insistently. It has been said that thirty fully equipped and modernized divisions would be able to stop the entire Soviet field army deployed in Eastern Europe. "The decision to use tactical nuclear weapons," Secretary McNamara said in his report to the Armed Services Committee in January of this year, "should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other way to cope with a particular situation." It follows that the most desirable objective would be to resist a Soviet conventional attack with purely conventional means, a task which it is often said is well within the capabilities of the West.

Secretary McNamara in his recent testimony indicated that present NA conventional capabilities were adequate to deal with any major invasion. "Nevertheless, if they are not sufficient to meet this threat, we shall have to seek

To understand the European reaction to these propositions it is important to compare them with what has been traditional NATO doctrine. Until the advent of the Kennedy Administration the ground forces in Central Europe had been considered the "shield" and the nuclear forces the "sword." It was part of NATO doctrine that a massive Soviet attack on Central Europe would be met with nuclear retaliation practically from the outset. The conventional forces were to deal with minor

To give us "capabilities for dealing with any threat or invasion, whether Soviet or German," - in other words, to increase our military strength.

7

EYJ

weapons in the defense of Europe and the insistence that national nuclear forces
were wasteful, dangerous and useless. The tendency to seek to defend Europe con-
ventionally was bound to raise doubts about our nuclear commitment. The more
convincing our argument on behalf of conventional defense, the more the European
fear grew that we were purchasing a tolerable strategy by sacrificing nuclear
deterrence. These fears might have subsided had we been more tolerant towards
the tendency of Great Britain and France to obtain reassurance by developing some
nuclear arms of their own. United States monopoly of nuclear arms has proved to
be incompatible with an increased emphasis on conventional defense. Another
look at the strategic theory that has produced this insistence on "single chains
of command" and "indivisible control" may therefore be in order.

"Flexible Responses"
Counterforce Theory Reconsidered

One of the features of strategic thought in the nuclear age has been the
~~high rate of obsolescence of military theories.~~ By the time a new theory has
overcome established orthodoxies it runs the danger of having become itself out-
dated. This has been the case with the theories of general war which dominate
in Washington today. In the middle 1950's, After the Soviets had exploded a hy-
drogen bomb, many analysts--including this author--came to the conclusion that a
nuclear stalemate was imminent. They were effectively contradicted by a series

8

of brilliant studies conducted at the RAND Corporation under the direction of Wallstetter & Collie, effectively agreed. Albert Wohlstetter. These demonstrated that there was nothing automatic about the nuclear stalemate. On the contrary, the balance of terror was "delicate," depending on such factors as vulnerability of the bases of the retaliatory force, the relative state of active and passive defense, the ability to reach the enemy targets and similar factors. This led to the elaboration of a theory placing great stress on the importance of a first strike and to the elaboration of such concepts as surprise attack or preemptive attack. Without going into the fine points of the theory, Wohlstetter's major thesis was that a general war could be won or lost by the destruction of the retaliatory force. Nuclear superiority was not an empty concept even in the age of nuclear plenty. A general nuclear war could have as its main objective the elimination of the opposing retaliatory force--a goal which would be significant even if we suffered a surprise attack. In that case, by destroying the weapons earmarked for a second attack we could reduce damage and greatly improve our bargaining position.

This subtle theory has been accepted almost completely by Secretary McNamara-- and not by accident. For many of his key advisers are "alumni" of the RAND Corporation and had previously helped work out the Wohlstetter theories.

9

The first victim of these convictions was the theory of "finite deterrence" according to which the United States required strategic forces only large enough to devastate the Soviet homeland. Instead, the new Administration adopted a program to give us a capability to fight a "controlled general war," a nuclear exchange confined to military targets.

10

hang.

With any nuclear war likely to be all-out, what was the U.S. strategy
for such a conflict? "...Our forces can be used in several different
ways," said Secretary McNamara early in 1962. We may have to retaliate
with a single massive attack. Or we may be able to use our retaliatory
force to limit damage to ourselves before he has launched his second
salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our
force as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack..." Here
was the first public distinction between two kinds of target system: the
total Soviet target system including cities, control centers and indus-
trial installations; and a second one, confined to the bases of the
Soviet strategic force.

11

The McNamara doctrine, for all its subtlety and quest for flexibility, contained many ambiguities. For example, Secretary McNamara never clari-fied what he considered more important: the attempt to spare cities or the effort to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. He could mean that in case of general nuclear war we would attempt to spare cities but would

12

destroy known strategic bases located near them. Or else he could mean
that we would try to avoid ambiguous targets such as civilian airports
located near cities. Still another interpretation would be that we would
avoid cities under all circumstances, in other words, that we would avoid
hitting even military targets if *striking* them involved a probability of
heavy civilian casualties.

If the first interpretation is accepted, it could transpire that the
practical difference between the McNamara strategy and the traditional
notions of massive retaliation may be relatively slight. It is likely
that a sufficient number of Soviet strategic bases are located close to
cities so as to produce *enormous* civilian casualties.

Moreover, even if the Soviets followed the same strategy as we--as *one of* more questionable exemptions--
Secretary McNamara assumes the casualties in the United States might be
indistinguishable from those of an attack aimed at the civilian population.

14

Then there is the problem of command and control. The strategy envisaged by Secretary McNamara and his associates presupposes that "our forces can be used...in a controlled and deliberate way subject at all times to the direction of the highest civilian authority." (Defense Department Counsel John McNaughton) This laudable objective is extremely difficult to realize technically in the face of the kind of attack on the U.S. postulated by Secretary McNamara. It may be even more difficult to carry out psychologically when casualties in the best of circumstances will amount to millions.

15

[y]

Finally, as the numbers of missiles multiply the scale of the attack may have to mount to a point as to defeat the objective of sparing the civilian population. Thus, even if the percentage of the Soviet retaliatory force which we were able to destroy were to remain constant--an unwarrantedly optimistic assumption--the absolute number remaining is bound to increase. Whatever its technical feasibility, the obstacles in the way of a strategy based on intelligence which is fragmentary and using large numbers of weapons for which there is no operational experience in wartime are certain to mount.

16

above, in this article. Their fears were bound to be magnified particularly when they accepted Secretary McNamara's assessment of the strategic balance.

18

With respect to European nuclear aspirations, Secretary McNamara
emphasized that they would have to be governed by the requirements of
a capableINSTANTLY
this strategy. "We have consistently stressed the importance of a single
integrated strategic nuclear force responsive to a single chain of command,

19

L'Y

With respect to European nuclear aspirations, Secretary McNamara em-
phasized that they would have to be integrated into a single command and
capable of instant response. The President has reiterated these require-
ments in his press conference of _________ and added that the
decision to retali ate might have to be made in five minutes.

t p 2.5

t p 2.5

28 28

[y]

to this effort.

The insistence on a single command for all nuclear weapons coupled with the implication that the most desirable situation would be a capability for a conventional defense of Europe in fact provided incentives for the development of...

For Europe by 1988

European nuclear strength. Few Europeans have agreed with our judgment about the feasibility of a purely conventional defense. Most of them believe that a great gap in conventional power exists and that we have adjusted our intelligence estimates to fit our strategic preference. Their judgment may be mistaken but we must remember that we possess no historic advantage over the Europeans in our analysis of conventional war.

In any event, Europeans have had too much experience of the defeat of forces that were thought to be adequate, not to ask what happens should our assessment prove mistaken. Even those who favor as a more modest goal a "pause" before nuclear weapons are used--and they are not in a majority--must be concerned about the options available at the end of that "pause."

30

[y]

But even the acceptance of our conventional goal and the theory behind it still raises the nuclear issue in acute form. Europeans are bound to want to have a share in determining their fate if the Soviets do not follow the strategy preferred by the United States. What if the Soviets use nuclear weapons on Europe only? Even more, what if they use them on Europe in the controlled, flexible way recommended by Secretary McNamara? It is a great deal to ask of the Europeans to concentrate all their military efforts on weapons which can be overcome by the introduction of nuclear arms while the United States reserves control over the weapons at any level of conflict which is not purely conventional. Such a situation would be made to order for Soviet "nuclear blackmail." This is why the new strategy has led to what is probably the most serious crisis in NATO's history.

### III. European Concerns: National Nuclear Forces.

The nature of the crisis is underlined by the inability of the two sides to understand what really is in dispute. We have called national nuclear forces--particularly the French

-27-

offer a better possibility of a non-catastrophic outcome.

But this strategy is not the same as an integrated attack on
the entire strategic force of an opponent. And if our force
is well-designed, we should have much more time available than
five minutes to respond to Soviet moves. Indeed, a flexible
strategic system composed partly of hardened, partly of
mobile missiles, ought to be able to ride out an attack.

Our present strategy in fact contains many relics from
the age of extremely vulnerable retaliatory forces. It has
taken the principle of controlled response and applied it to a
single, remote contingency--that of a surprise nuclear attack
on the United States. As a result, we have developed force
levels and a strategic doctrine unrelated to our more likely
perils. Controlled response does not have to mean a single
massive blow against the opposing retaliatory blow. Quick
time of delivery should not be confused with a hairtrigger
response.

-28-

A strategy suitable for a rich nuclear power does not imply that a poorer country is without strategic options in the nuclear field--particularly if it is closely allied to a more powerful country. The one-dimensional nature of our approach to these questions and the XXXXXXXX tendency to push good arguments to extreme conclusions have produced the most serious crisis in NATO's history.

-29-

### III. National Nuclear Forces.

The nature of the issue is misunderstood by the inability of the two sides to understand what really is in dispute. We are national nuclear forces. They have been called--particularly the French effort--divisive, inimical to the West, based on distrust of the United States, prone to obsolescence, and even less flattering epithets. It has been said that the French nuclear program is based on a rejection of the interdependence of the Atlantic Community. "Premier Khrushchev," President Kennedy has argued, "believes our nuclear guarantee and I believe he is right."

The French have not helped matters by pressing their own arguments with a kind of Cartesian rationalism which is sometimes on the verge of parodying valid arguments. It is one thing to argue the undesirable fact that in the age of nuclear plenty the old nations of nuclear protection have to be abandoned. It is quite another to insist that this ends all

-30-

all possibility of one country coming to the assistance of
another. Arguing for a redistribution of responsibility on
nuclear matters is one thing; insisting that fifty French
airplanes can do by themselves what several thousand United
States delivery vehicles are thought incapable of achieving
comes close to absurdity. It may be that the significance
of numbers has been reduced in the nuclear age; it surely
has not been completely eliminated.

Withal we have had a tendency to react to the most
extreme formulation of French (and British) doctrine. To
men: the French the bagay if any complete unchability;
respond officially to articles in the (Gallois December article)
me the pretense of a French quest for complete self-sufficiency
makes as much sense as for foreign governments to treat pro-

of
nouncements in the Air Force Association as official declarations
of the United States government. In demonstrating that France--
or Great Britain--cannot win a nuclear war by itself, we have
neglected to examine the more sensible arguments on behalf of

-41-

[y]

it is wise to deprive Europe of the physical possibility of
independent action.

If the interdependence of the Atlantic area is as self-evident as we claim, why then are we so nervous? One of two things is likely to happen with respect to European nuclear power: either our allies realize that our strategy theory is right, in which case they will coordinate their forces with ours; or they will assume the major burden of their own defense, what which is why we have always said we wanted and what in fact is in the common interest. The former is by far the more likely outcome. It has been our experience with Great Britain. It is likely to be our experience with France if we ever get away from the scholastic debate over "integration" versus "integration" and face the practical issue of how to relate a French nuclear force to the common defense.

This is not to say that we should urge other European nations to build their own strategic forces. The question NATO now