asked to make sacrifices for a peace which would benefit both sides. What sacrifices are the Egyptians and the Arab side being asked to make?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I do not believe that it is helpful for the United States, which is trying to act as an intermediary at the request of the parties, to list the concessions that either side is willing to make. None of the stories of what either side has been willing to do or has been asked to do has come from the United States.

I am confident that if an agreement is reached, that when any fair-minded person compares the publicly stated starting position of the two sides with the final agreement, it will be self-evident that both sides have made concessions.

With respect to the question earlier that I have not fully answered, I believe that there are possibilities for achieving agreement. I stated last weekend that progress had been made. I still maintain this. I believe there is a possibility for making an agreement if everybody keeps in mind that the consequences of a breakdown of negotiations will transcend in significance any of the difficulties that will be produced by the negotiation itself. And under those conditions, I think the progress that has already been made can be consolidated and extended.

**Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you see the role of the United States being vis-a-vis struggles for majority rule in southern Africa during the 1970's, especially in light of the heavy U.S. business interests in that area?**

**Secretary Kissinger:** The United States has made clear its position that it favors respect for human rights and respect for the rights of all the populations in southern Africa. The United States has expressed also the strong hope, in the interests of all of the peoples concerned, that this process take place by peaceful means and through negotiation. And there have been some encouraging developments in this direction. So the United States will support an evolution in the direction of an extension of humane values, and it will support this evolution by peaceful means.

**Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think the consequences would be of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Desert?**

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, the consequences of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Sinai Desert would be to complicate enormously the negotiating possibilities and to raise serious doubts about the possibilities of such negotiating efforts. It would undoubtedly contribute to an increased state of tension. It would not necessarily mean an end of all the agreements that have been reached, but it would certainly compound an already difficult situation.

**Q. Mr. Secretary, former Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia has criticized your policy position as being neglectful of the smaller developing countries. Do you plan at any time soon to make a visit to Africa to assure these countries that they are not being neglected?**

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, first, I understand the problems that Governor Carter has, and I do not want to be uncooperative. But if you read the public statements of the U.S. Government and the many speeches that I have given on the subject in recent months, the whole thrust of our approach is to insist that some arrangements must be negotiated.

Keep in mind the concerns of these developing countries. Our dispute with the developing countries is not about their aspirations, but about their methods. What I attempted to say here the other evening, what I said at the OECD [Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development] meeting in Paris, what I have said in Kansas City, is that the United States is prepared to have a dialogue on development with the new countries and to discuss with them their concerns with respect to raw materials, with respect to development, with respect to transnational corporations and other issues. And I have stated that we will put before this special session of the General Assembly our program of how to deal with it.

With all due respect to Governor Carter, I do not agree with him about the lack of concern. It is one of the big themes in our foreign policy.

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Department of State Bulletin

The second set of issues concerns the new problems that have arisen growing out of the interdependence of the world economy and the impossibility of founding cooperation entirely on military measures.

Two years ago, when this was put forward in the proposal for the year of Europe, it led to rather intense debate. Today, the interrelationship between economic, political, and security elements is a fact. In fact, two years ago, there were some who argued that the Western alliance had no role except in the military field. Today, most of our allies insist on the proposition that the economic policies of the industrialized countries must be brought into some relationship with each other if there is to be any effective future. It is no accident that the summit is occurring at the end of a week that begins with the meeting of the IEA, goes through a meeting of the OECD, and culminates in the summit.

The IEA—the International Energy Agency, which we consider one of the success stories of the recent period—links together most of the consuming nations into an organization designed to enable the consumers to take some control over their economic destiny by cooperative programs of conservation, alternative sources, and financial solidarity. This will be the first ministerial meeting since the Washington Energy Conference, and it will take stock of the past and look into the future.

The OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], comprising most of the industrial nations of the world, will address the problem of industrial growth and the relationship of the industrial nations to the less developed nations, so that the summit of the Western alliance is coming at the end of a period in which the Defense Planning Committee has looked at the security side, the other meetings have addressed the economic and energy aspects—so that the leaders of the Western alliance can look at the whole architecture of their relationship and develop a concept of security transcending the purely military aspect.

The third element that will be discussed at Brussels is the relationship between the

Communist and the non-Communist world, or between the Western alliance and the Communists.

As the Administration has repeatedly pointed out and as the President again emphasized yesterday, we consider the easing of tensions, where it can be honorably done, an essential goal of Western policy and we will make every effort to pursue the same.

We do not believe that the easing of tensions is an alternative to alliance policy. We think that both of these elements of policy are integrally related to each other. Without the strength of the alliance there would be no basis for détente that is based on equivalence.

But without demonstrating to our people that serious efforts are being made to improve international conditions, that confrontation is not an end in itself, we will also not be able to maintain the strength that is needed for realistic détente.

There are before the West three major areas in which negotiations are at this moment going on. The negotiations on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], which concern the alliance indirectly but which are being conducted primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union; the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reductions, in which NATO is negotiating with the Warsaw Pact; and the negotiations on European security, in which all European nations—NATO, Warsaw Pact, as well as the so-called neutrals—participate.

No doubt the President will review with his colleagues, in plenary sessions and in the bilateral meetings, the status of these negotiations and will discuss how they can best be promoted.

While in Brussels, the President will have a series of bilateral meetings; indeed, after the completion of the Brussels meetings, he will have had bilateral meetings within the month with every leader of the Western alliance. You will have the schedule of those meetings, and therefore I will not go through them.

It is obvious that particular attention will be paid to his meetings with the Greek and Turkish leaders. He will see Prime Minister

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Department of State Bulletin

ship to the circumstances involving Greece.

As you know, following the Cyprus dif-
ficulties of last summer, Greece made a deci-
sion to terminate its previous relationship
with the allies. It is now in a different re-
lationship than any one of the others in the
alliance.

It is a relationship, however, that—we
hope, once the Greek-Turkish dispute is re-
solved over Cyprus, that Greece will return
to its previous status within the alliance.
And, of course, the meetings that have been
held between Greece and Turkey over the last
several months, and the meeting that the
Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey are
having tomorrow, will hopefully lead to some
progress in this dispute.

If that progress materializes and the dis-
pute is settled, we are most hopeful that
Greece will return to its permanent previous
relationship within the alliance.

Q. Mr. President, the NATO communique
refers to the need for deeds in terms of the
accomplishments projected for the European
Security Conference, and you also have re-
ferred to that, sir. Also, we have the problem
of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks] negotiation to be concluded. Do you
see, sir, any risk that the timetable may be
upset, which could affect the convening of a
summit conference in Washington with Sec-
retary General Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezh-
nev, General Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union]?

President Ford: The CSCE negotiations are reaching a point where there is some reason for optimism. There are some points that must be resolved, but progress is being made.

I am not in a position to forecast when the
final agreement will be achieved, if it is, but
there is a possibility that the time schedule
of several months ago might materialize, and
if it does, then I think the follow-on SALT
Two meeting in Washington can also be on
schedule.

But, in both cases, there is no final agree-
ment, so I hesitate to be precise as to a date
in either case.

Q. Mr. President, in your head-to-head
talks with some of the leaders from the other
nations, did you carry the ball in the dis-
cussions or did you rely on Secretary Kis-
singer to do most of your talking? [Laugh-
ter.]

President Ford: Those bilateral discussions
between myself and the heads of state were
carried out in the traditional fashion. In each
case, the Foreign Minister representing the
other government and Secretary Kissinger
were present.

They were constructive. They were, I
think, a free discussion where the parties
there fully participated.

Q. Mr. President, in your meetings with
the full Council and with the individual heads
of state and government, did there come up
in the conversation the difficulties you have
had in trying to get a Middle East peace set-
tlement, and did you come away with a feel-
ing that you will have support of the member
nations in your efforts in Vienna [Salzburg]
with President Sadat and later, in Washing-
ton, with Rabin?

President Ford: In almost every bilateral
meeting, the question of the Middle East did
come up. In each instance, we gave our re-
assessment procedure. We indicated that I
was meeting with President Sadat in Salz-
burg and then subsequently meeting with
Prime Minister Rabin in Washington.

We pointed out the three alternatives that
have been well written about. We indicated
that any views or recommendations that
might be made by the heads of state or
the foreign ministers would be most wel-
come.

We did reemphasize that our objective in
the Middle East was peace, that we could not
tolerate stagnation or a stalemate. We felt
that movement was essential in the recom-
mendations that I do make, sometime the lat-
ter part of June, early July, will be a position
of movement aimed at the objective of a se-
cure peace in the Middle East, and I think,
the feeling of the allies here was one of—
supportive of the general objectives without

June 30, 1975

893

problem. While I do not want to make any comments about these conversations, I am more hopeful than I was before I arrived that progress is possible and may become visible as events unfold.

In addition to this, the U.S. Government is profoundly concerned with the fate of the refugees and will in the interlude between now and a political settlement do its utmost to ease their plight. Moreover, the U.S. Government is prepared to use its influence with the parties to bring about a settlement which is just and equitable.

As far as the NATO meeting itself is concerned, it was thought best not to turn it into a confrontation, and I must say the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey both spoke with restraint and wisdom and in a manner which I think contributed to the hopes for a peaceful solution which we all share, and which may have been brought somewhat closer.

Q. Do you think that your talks with the two Ministers contributed to moderation between the two countries and that after your talks with them that the intercommunal talks in Cyprus will start soon?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that with respect to the intercommunal talks that any announcement with respect to that would have to come from Nicosia. And this is a matter for the two communities to decide and not for the American Secretary of State to determine or to announce. It is my impression that the talks—I don't know whether the talks contributed to an atmosphere of moderation or could build on an existing atmosphere of moderation. As I said, I am more hopeful than I was when I came here that progress can be made.

Q. I am a little puzzled by your expression of hope. A senior American official said earlier that very little could come out of these discussions in view of the American Congress' action to cut off aid to Turkey. Doesn't that still pertain?

Secretary Kissinger: That still pertains to the substance of the talks. The question concerns procedures. I believe that conditions

exist for progress and negotiations. I also believe that the actions of the American Congress, if they are maintained, will impede this progress. I have said so repeatedly.

Q. What are your views on the anxiety of Mr. Brezhnev for the European summit—for the summit of the European Security Conference—and the recent talks in France where France in some way endorsed the European Security Conference summit next year in Helsinki?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has maintained the position, which it adopted together with its other allies, that the decision on whether there should be a summit should await the determination of the results of the second stage of the conference. This has been the American position and it remains the American position, and it is that if the results justify it we are prepared to go to a summit, and there has been no change in our position. I can't interpret the Franco-Soviet communique because it has been explained to me that there are subtleties in the French language that are untranslatable into English [laughter]. If that is so, it may be that they follow the same principles that I have just announced.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your conversation with the Greek and Turkish Ministers, you are a little bit encouraged. Do you have the impression that a solution can be achieved if you could, for example, make a trip to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia?

Secretary Kissinger: None of you will ever know whether I understand French or not [laughter], but it is not necessary for my answer [laughter]. I would like to repeat what I said in reply to Mr. Freed [Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press]. Whether substantive progress can be made depends in part on certain domestic legislative issues that are yet to be resolved in the United States. I would also like to emphasize again what I have said repeatedly—that the United States supports aid for Turkey not in order to take sides in the Greek-Turkish dispute and not as a favor to Turkey, but because it believes it is essential for the security of the

January 6, 1975

West. Now, if I understood the question correctly—whether it involves travels to Athens, Athens, and Nicosia—we believe that the major problem is to get the talks started. And once the talks are started with the right attitude, the United States will be prepared to do what the parties request to accelerate them and to help them along. But I think we cannot determine this until the talks have been started. But I hope that progress can be made, and fairly soon.

**Q.** Mr. Kissinger, you speak French without subtlety. Very simply, it seems that some time ago you were very concerned about the internal Italian political situation. Are you still so concerned?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I do not believe that I have stated any public views on the interior situation of Italy. It is always complicated and always seems to get solved, and I think that I have so much difficulty conducting foreign policy that I don't want to get involved in the domestic politics of the country that produced Machiavelli [laughter].

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, you said that you were not familiar with the subtleties of the French language, but I heard yesterday that you asked Mr. Sauvagnargues for his interpretation of the paragraph of the Rambouillet communique on the European Security Conference. Mr. Sauvagnargues gave it to you. He said that it had the same meaning as the Vladivostok communique, and you said that you did not agree. Is this true?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I think as a matter of principle we should not begin the practice of restricted sessions by then discussing what went on in restricted session. If, as I pointed out before, the communique from Rambouillet has the same meaning as the communique in Vladivostok, then, of course, we agree with it [laughter]. If it has a different meaning, then we would obviously have that degree of disagreement with it, since only two weeks before we found another formulation better. But I am willing to accept the French statement that it has exactly the same meaning.

**Q.** You are the representative of the most powerful and the richest nation in the world. You therefore have an enormous influence to which is added your own well-known personal dynamism. However, a number of countries and people are concerned because your power gives you the appearance of an elephant. When an elephant turns around, he sometimes does damage—even when making a gesture of friendship. What are you doing personally, Mr. Kissinger, to see to it that the elephant retains his goodness but is not too heavy when he leans in a certain direction [laughter]?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I think that this is a serious question actually, and it is a problem that the United States, because of its scale, can produce consequences with the best of intentions that are out of scale for some of its allies and partners. Now, knowing the problem doesn't necessarily mean that you know how to solve it, and as I pointed out yesterday to some of my colleagues, in the economic field, for example, we are prepared to discuss with our friends our long-term intentions and to hear their views before we make any irrevocable decisions. And the best solution we have is, one, that we should be aware of the problem, and secondly, that we should have intensive consultations with our allies in more fields than has been customary to give them an opportunity to learn our views and to give us an opportunity to learn their concerns. I know the word "consultation" is one of these that produces linguistic difficulties, and we are happy to call it by some other name if it helps matters.

**Q.** [Can you say what you feel will be the impact of] the economic recession and high oil prices on the NATO military alliance? Either now or in the future?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Some of these accounts have an even greater sense of the dramatic than the officials'. The basic issue is that in the twenties and thirties the problem of the industrialized countries was depression. Gradually a theory was developed, the

4

Department of State Bulletin

found solemn expression in the Ottawa Dec-
laration.

2. Ministers reviewed developments in East-West relations. They noted the progress, albeit uneven, towards détente over the past six months. They stated their readiness to continue their efforts to make progress in their negotiations and exchanges with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries aimed at steady improvement in East-West relations. Noting, however, the increase in the military strength of the Warsaw Pact countries, and bearing in mind that security is the prerequisite for the policy of détente, they expressed their determination to maintain their own defensive military strength.

3. Ministers had a broad discussion on the implications of the current economic situation for the maintenance of Alliance defense and noted the efforts made at both the national and international levels to overcome the difficulties confronting the economies of the allied countries. They reaffirmed their determination to seek appropriate solutions in the spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence which characterizes their relations. Ministers decided to continue to consult on the repercussions of economic developments on areas within the direct sphere of competence of the Alliance.

4. Ministers noted that at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe there had been enough progress to show that substantial results were possible. Nonetheless, important questions remain to be resolved. Ministers expressed the undiminished determination of their Governments to work patiently and constructively towards balanced and substantial results under all the agenda headings of the Conference, so as to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to the Conference as a whole as soon as may be possible.

5. Ministers of the participating countries reviewed the state of the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. These negotiations have as their general objective to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, and their success would advance détente. These Ministers were resolved to pursue these negotiations with a

view to ensuring undiminished security for all parties, at a lower level of forces in Central Europe. They reaffirmed their commitment to the establishment of approximate parity in the form of an agreed common ceiling for the ground force manpower of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area of reductions. They considered that a first phase reduction agreement covering United States and Soviet ground forces would be an important and practical first step in this direction. They noted that the negotiations have, so far, not produced results and expressed the hope that a constructive response to the Allied proposals would soon be forthcoming. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to the principle to which they adhere in these negotiations that NATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Agreement with the East.

6. Ministers heard a report from the United States Secretary of State on the continuing United States efforts towards the further limitation of strategic offensive arms in the light of President Ford's recent talks with Mr. Brezhnev. They noted with satisfaction the significant progress towards limitation of strategic nuclear weapons achieved in Vladivostok. They expressed the hope that this progress will lead to the early conclusion of a satisfactory SALT II Agreement. They also expressed appreciation for continuing consultations within the Alliance with respect to the SALT negotiations.

7. The Ministers reviewed the developments concerning Berlin and Germany which have taken place since their last meeting in June 1974, especially as regards the application of those provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin. They considered, in particular, traffic and ties between the Western Sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany and the representation abroad of the interests of those sectors by the Federal Republic of Germany. They emphasized the importance to the viability and security of the city of all provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement. The Ministers also emphasized that there is an essential connection between dé-

6

Department of State Bulletin

son-Vanik about basic values and basic ob-
jectives. The administration consistently
maintained that the method of a legislative
prescription in this case was not the appro-
priate method and might backfire.

Now, whether that was because it was in
the second category that I pointed out or in
the first category, I don't really want to
insist upon. Nor do I want to challenge the
right of the Congress to pass such an action.

And finally, I really don't think much pur-
pose is served by prolonging the debate
over the past—of how we got to this point
—because we did try to work together with
the Congress on a good-faith basis, once it
had embarked on a course which we con-
sidered unwise, to try to resolve the ensuing
difficulty.

If we go back on the trade legislation, we
will try to achieve the objectives which we
share with the Congress by methods that
may be more appropriate to the objective.
We will not give up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us how you
estimate the prospects of a summit meeting
with regard to the CSCE Conference [Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe] and what significance a summit
could have for détente, East-West détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that the European Security Conference is making good progress. The issues—as you know, they are discussing them in various categories called “baskets,” and the issues in most of these categories are beginning to be resolved. There are some unresolved issues with respect to general principles and some unresolved issues with respect to human contacts. But progress has been made in all of these categories.

I believe, therefore, that if the confer-
ence is concluded along the lines that are
now foreseeable, a summit conclusion is
highly probable. I believe that a successful
outcome of the European Security Confer-
ence would contribute to détente.

Cyprus Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, next week, February 5,
is the deadline by which time the admin-

istration has to report progress on Cyprus.
What kind of report do you think you will
be able to give to Congress by that date?
Otherwise aid to Turkey is cut off.

Secretary Kissinger: I can only stress
what I have said previously.

The United States gives aid to Turkey
not as a favor to Turkey, but in the interests
of Western security. And I think anybody
looking at a map and analyzing foreseeable
trouble spots must recognize this. Therefore
the administration is opposed to the cutoff
of aid to Turkey, regardless of what prog-
ress may be made in the negotiations.

Secondly, the administration favors rapid
progress in the negotiations over Cyprus
and has supported this progress. And I be-
lieve that all of the parties, including the
Greek side—and especially the Greek side—
would have to agree that the United States
has made major efforts.

I believe that some progress is possible
and will be made—can be made before Feb-
ruary 5. And we will be in touch with the
Congress either late this week or early next
week. And I have stayed in very close con-
tact with those Members of the Congress
and the Senate that have had a particular
interest in this question to keep them in-
formed of the state of the negotiations.

So by the end of this week—as you know,
the parties now meet twice a week in Nicosia
—and by the end of this week, after their
second meeting this week, I will be in touch
with the parties, and we will discuss that
with the Congress.

Assistance to Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Robert Byrd
said this morning the leaders of both parties
in Congress have told President Ford that
it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get
more aid to South Viet-Nam. Where does
that leave the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let us make
clear what it is we have asked for. And let
me express the hope that what we are asking
for doesn't rekindle the entire debate on
Viet-Nam, because that is emphatically not
involved.

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Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger

I would like to express my own great pleasure at returning to Riyadh and to see our old friends in Saudi Arabia. I will report fully to His Majesty about the trip I have now taken through the area and the determination of the United States to contribute to rapid progress toward peace in the Middle East. We will also talk about other problems, including the problems of cooperation between consumers and producers and the American attitude of conciliation, cooperation, and traditional friendship.

DEPARTURE, RIYADH, FEBRUARY 15

Press release 73 dated February 18

Secretary Kissinger

Really, I can record only that I reviewed with His Majesty and his advisers the state of negotiations toward peace in the Middle East, and I listened with great interest to the advice of His Majesty, that we take, always, extremely seriously. We also reviewed bilateral relations and other matters of common interest. The talks were warm, friendly, and constructive; and my colleagues and I are grateful for the reception we have had.

Petroleum Minister Yamani

Well, every time we receive our friend Dr. Kissinger, he leaves with us more confidence in his ability, his sincerity, and we wish him good luck. We believe that it is in the interest of the United States to create peace in this area, and we believe that he is doing his best to create that interest and to maintain it.

ARRIVAL, BONN, FEBRUARY 15

Press release 75 dated February 18

I wanted to say how delighted I am to have this opportunity to meet my friend and colleague the Foreign Minister. I will re-

port to him and to the Chancellor about my trip to the Near East and about the prospect for further steps toward peace as I see them.

Naturally, we will also review German-American relations and world problems in general. I am not aware of any problems that exist in the relationship between the Federal Republic and the United States. So it will be a meeting among friends who will talk about how to make close relationships even closer.

Q. Did you get the support of King Faisal for your efforts?

Secretary Kissinger: I think Minister Yamani said at the airport that the Government of Saudi Arabia supported the approach that I am following.

REMARKS AT BONN, FEBRUARY 16³

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

The visit of the Secretary gave us an opportunity for an exchange of views on Middle East developments. In these discussions it became clear that our evaluations are in agreement. The same applies to the situation in the Mediterranean. It is natural that we talked about the Cyprus situation. Other topics this morning included the status of discussions on CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] as well as the status of MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] negotiations. We were able, which for us is not surprising, to agree fully on all these questions.

Secretary Kissinger

Both for the benefit of the American press here and for the sake of German-American relations, I will not inflict my German on you, which the Foreign Minister maintains is not German at all, but Franconian [laughter].

I would like to underline the remarks of the Foreign Minister. We reviewed my trip

³ Made to the press following a meeting at Schloss Gymnich (text from press release 76 dated Feb. 18).

288

Department of State Bulletin

to the Middle East, the European Security
Conference, mutual force reductions, and the
situation in the Mediterranean with partic-
ular emphasis on Cyprus. And on all these
matters there was a complete unanimity of
view, and the discussions were conducted
in the warm and friendly spirit which has
characterized our relationship.

Thank you very much.

Q. Did you discuss the position of the PLO
[Palestine Liberation Organization]?

Secretary Kissinger: The American position on the PLO is well known, and I am obliged to repeat it at every press conference. We have nothing to discuss with the PLO until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel and of the relevant resolutions. At that point we can think about the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss the ques-
tion of German arms shipments to Turkey
in view of the American embargo?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is a matter for the Federal Republic to decide. We discussed, rather, the political situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and of course the Administration's position on that matter has been made abundantly clear.

INTERVIEW WITH GERMAN TELEVISION (ZDF),
FEBRUARY 16

Press release 77 dated February 18

Q. Have you made progress in pursuit
of your policies in the Near East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that my trip to the Middle East outlined the main positions with a much greater precision than I had understood them before. It indicated the difficulties, but it also indicated the possibilities, and therefore I shall return to the Middle East within a few weeks with hope that some progress can be made.

Q. Has your trip placed you in a good
position for your talk with Foreign Minister
Gromyko in regard to improving relations
with the Soviet Union in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States recognizes that a final settlement in the Middle East cannot be achieved without the participation, cooperation, and possible guarantee of the Soviet Union, and I will talk to Foreign Minister Gromyko this evening in that spirit. We have both taken trips to the area, and we will exchange ideas, and we will do so from the attitude, certainly on the American side, that good relations with the Soviet Union are an essential aspect of our policy.

Q. What role can Europe play in your
view in that part of the world?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, I have always been a very convinced believer in the proposition that the United States and Europe must cooperate closely and coordinate their policies closely. One reason I stopped in Bonn, and will stop in London and Paris, is to inform our European colleagues of the results of my trip. Coordinated policies do not mean it has to be identical, and I think that Europe can with its own influence and with its own relations exercise a rule of moderation and conciliation and at crucial moments can use its influence to help bring about a peaceful solution.

Thank you very much.

ARRIVAL, GENEVA, FEBRUARY 16

Press release 79 dated February 18

I would like to express my pleasure at
being in Geneva to review with Foreign Min-
ister Gromyko the state of U.S.-Soviet re-
lations and also the situation in the Middle
East. I agree with Foreign Minister Gromyko
that the state of U.S.-Soviet relations is of
great importance to the peace of the world,
and therefore the United States attaches
considerable importance to the relaxation of
tensions between the Soviet Union and the
United States and will continue to pursue
this policy with energy and conviction.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and I will
review the whole range of Soviet-American
relationships and will of course pay attention

March 10, 1975

289

Q. Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Brezhnev recently complained that certain persons were offering the Arabs a soporific in the form of a partial settlement in the Middle East. Do you have any idea who those certain persons are and why he was complaining?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: He did not mention any particular persons. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I asked the Foreign Minister the same question. [Laughter.] I offered to share in the condemnation of such efforts. [Laughter.]

Foreign Minister Gromyko: So there is no basis for criticizing.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk about the resuming of the Near East conference here in Geneva and about dates?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will issue a communique later today in which these and related questions are addressed.

Q. This is tonight for the German television?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you can read it on German television this evening. Thank you.

## TEXT OF U.S.-U.S.S.R. JOINT STATEMENT
ISSUED AT GENEVA FEBRUARY 17

Press release 80 dated February 18

As previously agreed, a meeting between Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, took place on February 16 and 17 in Geneva.

They exchanged views on a number of questions of bilateral American-Soviet relations, including the various negotiations currently in progress between them, and on certain international issues of mutual interest. Both sides emphasized their determination to adhere to the course of continu-

ing to improve Soviet-American relations in accordance with existing understandings and agreements of principle, which they firmly believe are in the interest of the peoples of the United States of America and the USSR and of international peace.

Both sides stressed the great significance of the agreement regarding the further limitation of strategic offensive arms reached in the course of the meeting between the President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L. I. Brezhnev in November, 1974, in Vladivostok. On the basis of this agreement, both sides intend to continue energetic efforts to work out an appropriate long-term agreement this year.

It was noted that a great deal of progress has been achieved at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The two sides stated that they will continue to make active efforts jointly with the other participants to have the Conference successfully concluded at an early date.

They assume that the results achieved permit its conclusion at the highest level.

They also agreed that active efforts should be made to achieve positive results in the mutual reduction of forces and armaments in Central Europe on the basis of the principles referred to in the American-Soviet communique of November 24, 1974.

In the course of the conversations, particular attention was given to the Middle East. The two sides remain concerned over the dangers persisting in the situation there. They reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in the area on the basis of UN Resolution 338, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people, and respect for the right to independent existence of all states in the area.

The two sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work at an early date.

March 10, 1975

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ments that it would involve. But there does not yet exist an Administration position either on the nature of the guarantee or on the commitment, nor have we had any discussions with the Israeli Government. All I indicated is that this is a subject we are studying within our government, as we are dutybound to do in the process of moving toward a final peace.

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, when you speak of a quid pro quo, would that be expressed at this step or at some future stage? And secondly, would it be something directly given to Israel by Egypt or indirectly? And indeed, if it's indirect, is that a quid pro quo?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I think that Israel has to be the judge of what it considers an adequate arrangement. And that is not for me to say at this moment. It stands to reason that a settlement is not possible until both sides are satisfied with it. It is also clear that, Israel being a democracy, any agreement that is made must have visible parts that can be presented to the Israeli domestic opinion and to the Israeli Parliament.

What combination of direct and indirect assurances will be given must be left to the process of negotiation. But it goes without saying that any settlement, to have any meaning, must be acceptable to both parties.

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back for a moment to the Viet-Nam problem and the grave doubts that you referred to. You seem to be saying that it is more important for the United States to enjoy credibility abroad than to have credibility at home.

**Secretary Kissinger:** No. I'm saying that the security of the United States and the security of the many countries in the world that depend on the United States is a matter of the gravest importance to the American people as well. And I therefore believe that, however painful the discussions, however anguished the experiences, that the American people over a period of time will recog-

nize that this distinction cannot be made.

I am as subject to the correspondence as many of the members of the Congress. It is my belief that those who are responsible for national policy are accountable not only for the moment but for how it will look several years from now. And three to five years from now, when the consequences are apparent, I believe that there will be no distinction between credibility at home and credibility abroad.

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, in a series of uncomplimentary remarks about you by former associates of President Nixon, how do you account for these comments? Do you think it's a concerted effort? And what's your reaction to what Mr. [William] Safire and Mr. [Charles W.] Colson have been saying about you?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I think the two individuals you mentioned represent different phenomena. I don't believe it is a concerted effort. And in the case of one of them I don't believe that what is being said today is any different from what was being said when we were colleagues. [Laughter.]

## European Security Conference

**Q.** Mr. Secretary, when in Geneva you talked with Foreign Minister Gromyko. You talked about the European Conference, too. From here it looks as if the European Security Conference might be wound up this summer, not so much because of the results it will achieve but because many of the participants are impatient now to wind it up. I would like to ask you what your view is of the timetable. Is there any chance of any firm link with progress in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, it is my impression that the overwhelming majority of our European allies is opposed to having any linkage between the European Security Conference and the force reduction talks and therefore this is not an issue that is likely to arise.

March 17, 1975

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As far as the timetable is concerned, the United States favors—as do all the other participants—an expeditious conclusion of the conference. The issues have become so abstruse and esoteric, reaching sometimes such issues as the placement of a comma, that it is hard to explain all of the issues that are now before the conference. And I wouldn't want to speculate in what month there will be a conclusion. The United States will support a rapid conclusion of the conference.

## Defense Agreements With Spain and Portugal

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to date on the U.S. base agreements with Spain and Portugal? Are we being asked to vacate Torrejon? And how do we stand with the U.S. base in the Azores?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, these negotiations are conducted, as you know, by the new Assistant Secretary for congressional liaison [Ambassador at Large Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations]. We have not been asked to vacate any of the Spanish bases. And therefore this report seems to us at least premature. In fact, it seems to us inaccurate. The discussion has concerned mostly what sort of security assurances the United States might give Spain in return for the continuation of its bases in Spain.*

With respect to the Azores, we have not been asked to vacate the base in the Azores. The agreement has not yet been renewed, but under the agreement we can maintain our base there until a new agreement has been made or it is clear that no agreement can be made.

## Confidence in U.S. Commitments

*Q. Could I just follow that up? The security arrangements that Spain is asking for, is that the sort of thing that you mean other countries will begin to doubt if an*

*American decision lets Viet-Nam and Cambodia go "down the tube"?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I was talking about the general ability of other countries to rely on the word of the United States or on the ability of the United States to bring about the security of those countries that rely on it. This has serious consequences. I know it is fashionable to sneer at the word "domino theory." I think this is a very grave matter on which serious people have had a divided opinion. And we've been torn apart by the Viet-Nam war long enough. But I do not believe we can escape this problem by assuming the responsibility of condemning those who have dealt with us to a certain destruction.*

The answer to your question is, yes, this is one of the things. But I was talking of a more general problem.

*Q. More specifically, the country that's most often discussed in the context of American security is Israel. Do you think Israel perhaps is exempt from this problem because of support in Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it is appropriate for me to go around the world asking which countries would be particularly threatened by this attitude. I would say that the questions that are now being asked can be applied to almost any country as far as terminal date is concerned, as far as the end process is concerned. I do not want to apply it to any particular country. And it is, of course, clear that there has been a special relationship between Israel and the United States that can withstand strains that other relationships might not be able to withstand. But it is not a trivial matter.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, within the spirit of meaningful détente, why haven't you put more pressure on the Russians and the Chinese not to supply Hanoi so abundantly?*

*Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I am constantly being asked, "Why don't we bring*

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Department of State Bulletin