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in the future. One lesson we must surely learn from Vietnam is that
new commitments of our nation's honor and prestige must be carefully
weighed and shared in by the Congress and the public. But this
moment imposes a special obligation to make certain that the
commitments we make are rigorously kept -- and that this is understood
by all concerned. Let no ally doubt our steadfastness. Let no adversary
again
ever believe/that it can flout with impunity a solemn agreement signed
with the United States.

On this basis, we must continue our policy of seeking to ease
tensions. The American people expect their government to seek stability
and peace, not to invite confrontations.

Detente, if it is to be a serious policy, must start from the
premise of American strength and resolve. We are not neutral in the age-old
struggle between freedom and tyranny. But precisely because the

them
Competition
opponents
we cannot deal with/simply

-11-

by speeches or legislation. As the President said in his State of the
World address on April 10, "There should be no illusions about the
nature of the Soviet system, but there should be no illusions about
how to deal with it."

The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the necessity
of the task; the competing philosophies and interests of the Soviet Union
and the United States point up its difficulty. These differences do not
spring from misunderstandings or personalities or transitory factors.
But however competitive we are, both nuclear superpowers must base
their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its
will on the other without running an intolerable risk. The challenge
of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative
of coexistence. There can be no peaceful international order without
a constructive relationship between the United States and the major
Communist powers.

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Thus detente, in our conception, means the search for more constructive relations, reflecting these realities. It is an effort, which requires continuing vigilance and perseverance; it is not a final condition of utopian safety. In essence, it is the objective pursued by every American President in three decades, though its specific policies have reflected evolving conditions.

In our view, in the present period it requires two principal elements: first, firm resistance to Soviet encroachments or attempts to exploit or exacerbate tensions; and second, efforts to break down the wall of Soviet isolation from the rest of the world, by engaging the Soviet system, at many levels, in more positive relationships -- economic, diplomatic, professional, cultural -- with the outside world. Both elements of our policy are meant to give the Soviet Union a stake in responsible behavior and positive relations with the rest of the world. It is in our interest, in their interest, and in everyone's interest.

-13-

The historic negotiations on limiting strategic nuclear arsenals
are a benefit to both sides, and to mankind. President Ford is determine
to pursue a fair and reliable agreement, based on the elements agreed
upon with General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November.

For the first time in history, a ceiling will have been placed on the
strategic forces of both sides for a ten-year period. The momentum
of deployments will have been slowed; planning will no longer be driven by
fear of the unknown; a baseline will have been drawn from which to
seek reductions soon thereafter.

The degree and intensity of consultation between the United
States and Soviet Union now on this and other issues, and the degree
to which our bilateral cooperation is now institutionalized in many fields,
are unprecedented -- and of lasting significance.

The new relationship between the United States and the People's
Republic of China is another priority of American policy. Stability
in Asia and the world requires our constructive relations with one-quarter

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of the human race. Our mutual long-term interests endure, as do
the goals of the Shanghai Communique. The President will visit China
this year; he will reaffirm these interests and goals and work for the
continuing improvement of our relations.

A crucial issue on the international agenda, of course, is
the Middle East. We must not forget that America's influence in this
area and the hopeful first steps we have achieved in the process of
peace come not merely from our god will, but from the parties'
estimate of our steadfastness and global strength. We intend to
continue our effort to promote a just peace. We cannot afford to permit
stagnation and the danger of war and crisis that would inevitably ensue.
The President will pursue next steps in the diplomacy when he meets
with Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin early
next month.

-15-

The four-fold oil price increases decided upon in 1973 by OPEC dramatized another dimension of American foreign policy -- our relations with the developing world. For years it has been apparent that a new range of issues was coming upon us in international affairs -- not the issues between East and West, but between North and South, between the industrial nations and the developing nations. Already, international forums like the United Nations, or the recent preparatory conference in Paris between oil consumers and producers, are the scene of global disputes over economic issues -- raw materials, energy, development assistance -- and over ideological issues.

The American people have supported the aspirations of developing countries since the postwar years of decolonization. Their economic development has been an objective of American policy for decades; their genuine non-alignment and independence are an American interest. Therefore, the stridency of anti-American and anti-Western sentiment in the Third World in recent years is deeply disillusioning.

-16-

The silence of the poorer developing countries in the face of
the oil price increases which devastated them most of all is an amazing
testimony to the power of the ideology now sweeping the developing
world.

We should have no illusions about it. We should consider how to
make our case in international forums where we are confronted by
slogans instead of solutions.

The United States has nothing to apologize for. We will defend
our interests in international negotiations; we will defend our beliefs
in individual liberty and the unmatched power of free men to achieve
progress and dignity. The new nations, shaped by their own histories
and seeking their own future, will have our sympathy and our help.

But they must remember that mutual respect is one of the commandments
of international relations. We expect it for ourselves, as they expect
it for themselves.

-17-

The flaw in these rhetorical confrontations is not in their stridency but in their unreality. Whatever 19th-century doctrines preach, the reality of the modern world is that the economic future of mankind is interdependent. The developed and developing nations are each both consumers and producers; we need each other for our markets and for our mutual prosperity. The oil producers by their unilateral action accelerated global inflation and stimulated a world-wide recession -- which rebounded upon themselves and did jeopardy to their own as well as everyone else's interest.

The United States sees its own economic advantages, its own precious assets such as food, not as weapons of economic warfare but as resources of humanity. Last November in Rome, the United States launched a long-term international program to combat the age-old scourge of hunger -- to maximize our own food production, to facilitate distribution and most of all to expand food production in the developing countries themselves.

-18-

We hope to make international cooperation on food a model of cooperation on the other global issues of an interdependent world. No nation can do the job alone; there can be no solution other than a cooperative solution:

we will continue to work with the other consumers

-- On energy, we are still ready for a constructive dialogue with the producers on the future of supply and price. A tough domestic energy program, to conserve energy and develop new sources, is a major priority of this Administration, if we are to deal with the producers and restore balance to the international market.

-- We are prepared to work about other raw materials in a cooperative spirit.

-- The United Nations will hold a special session of the

General Assembly in September to address broad economic

We hope this session can be infused with issues, such as raw materials, energy, and trade. These medium and mutual respect and companion issues deserve world consideration in this and other forums.

are now launched

-- Multilateral negotiations will soon resume among the world's major trading nations. The Trade Act of 1974 gives

-19-

us flexible negotiating authority to take a leading role in what
could be a new era of trade expansion and reform.

-- A session has just concluded at Geneva of the multilateral negotiations to chart a new law of the sea. Progress has been made in shaping a new international consensus on the extent of sovereignty over territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, access through vital straits, international use of the deep seabed, and other issues in dispute. Vital concerns of international security, economic rights to vast wealth, and political disputes will be affected by this unprecedented negotiation. Much work remains to be done.

As law of the sea illustrates, the interdependence of the modern world is a political fact and not merely an economic fact. As technology expands the economic reach of mankind, and global communications, it also poses new dangers. At the United Nations last September I

-20-

announced a concerted new effort to deal with the worldwide menace
of the spread of nuclear explosive technology. Our effort to strengthen
safeguards among other suppliers of nuclear energy and among suppliers
and recipients is one of the central objectives of our diplomacy. An
international conference opened in Geneva on May 5 to review the
effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States is
taking an active part in this conference, to strengthen international
safeguards and to make clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons
is a danger to all nations' security.

## The Domestic Dimension

These are the challenges of the new era. In every area, our
objectives depend critically on our own effort. Our alliance relations,
our hopes for detente, and our relations with the Third World, depend
on our own vigilance and our own self-assurance. We will defend our own
interests. No one will do us any favors.

-21-

In the wake of Vietnam, the credibility of America's word --
in the eyes of friend or foe -- will not be automatic. We will have to
earn it. And we shall.

A perception of America's withdrawal would itself be one
of the most destabilizing factors in international affairs.

One lesson we have surely learned from Vietnam is that the
crucial front is the home front.

It is clear to all that if we are not strong and healthy at home,
we cannot be strong abroad. If there is uncertainty or mistrust at home,
our actions will be erratic abroad.

The peculiar feature of many of our problems in foreign policy
is that they are of our own making; they result from divisions at home.

America's physical strength is unmistakable; the challenge most
apparent to American policymakers is not the challenge of foreigners

-22-

but the problem of regaining our own unity and balance. Paradoxically, herein lies the most fundamental reason for my optimism about the future. For the remedies, too, then lie within ourselves.

Just this past week was the thirtiety anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe. Over the generation since then, taught by that war, the American people understood that we best secured our domestic tranquility and prosperity by enlightened participation and indeed leadership in world affairs. The people understood that assistance to allies and friends was not a price to be paid but a service to be rendered to international stability and therefore to our own self-interest.

The postwar period was a great creative period of achievement in American foreign policy.

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina and other frustrations of global engagement, opinion in many leadership groups in this country has turned against many of the internationalist premises of our postwar policy. We now hear, and have been told for several years,

-23-

that suffering in the world is only caused or prolonged by American steadfastness to allies, that injustice everywhere is perpetuated by American inaction, that American defense spending is a waste or a menace to mankind, that American intelligence activities are immoral, that the necessary confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the American public, that humanitarian aid and participation in the economic order are a substitute for political engagement -- and that tranquility is somehow to be obtained by an abstract purity for which history offers no example.

These attitudes are familiar. They were all characteristic of the American isolationism of the 1920's and 1930's. But there is one difference: In that period we held back from involvement believing we were too good for the world, believing we would be defiled by engaging in Old World politics. Today we are constantly told we are not good enough for the world -- that we are guilty of historical sin by what

-24-

we have attempted to do in the last 30 years.

The American people know better.

A nation that opens its heart to 120,000 refugees fleeing from tyranny, remembering its own heritage as a nation built by immigrants, is not an immoral country.

An effective foreign policy, as the people expect of their government, means shaping the future, not just managing the present. This requires strength and assurance, a sense of direction, a coherence of design, a flexibility of action. When these qualities were present, as for example in the formative years of postwar foreign policy -- the Marshall Plan and formation of the Atlantic Alliance -- the results were evident. But such a policy requires, above all, public confidence in government and legislative-executive cooperation.

Many factors have eroded this base of confidence in the modern period.

-25-

All modern governments are besieged by social change, economic problems and political challenges that cut across national boundaries and lie at the margin of governments' ability to control.

The challenges are more subtle than the overt crisis of war or depression that summoned leadership in the past, and that/support for leadership.

The energies of officials are too often consumed in the management of bureaucracy, which turns issues of public purpose into issues of administration. Yet instant communications today force the pace of events -- and of expectations.

Persuasion -- the lifeblood of democracy -- becomes extraordinarily difficult in an era that is without simplicity and without certainty. A premium is placed on simplification - an invitation to demagogues. Too often, the result is a disaffection that simultaneously debunks government and drains government of the very public confidence that it needs in a democracy if it is to address our problems effectively.

-26-

A new generation of young people takes no inspiration from
the great postwar achievements of our foreign policy, which they either
do not remember or take for granted. Their idealism is one of the most
encouraging features of contemporary America. But the gulf between
their experience and ours is enormous. They are traumatized by Vietnam
as our generation was by Munich. Their nightmare is foreign commitment
as ours was abdication from international responsibility. Each generation
may have learned its lessons too well. And an impersonal, bureaucratic,
technological and materialistic society mocks their idealism and hopes.
For their frustration, we offer them only iconoclasm and cynicism.

The problems of executive-legislative relations are magnified
in modern conditions and go deeper than disputes over Vietnam. In
every country the modern state seems frustratingly impersonal or
remote from those whose lives it increasingly affects; in nearly every
democracy, executive authority is challenged by legislatures which

-27-

themselves find it difficult to affect policy except negatively or piecemeal.

The very essence of problem-solving on domestic issues -- namely accommodation of special or regional interests -- robs foreign policy of consistency and focus, which are the essence of national action abroad.

Statesmen must act, even when premises cannot be proved; they must decide, even when intangibles will determine the outcome. Yet predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided are never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus increasingly infect the legislative-executive debate. Policy arguments are overwhelmed by a series of confrontations on often peripheral issues.

But these are the battles of Washington.

Outside of Washington, in the center of America, I am struck by the buoyancy and confidence and good sense of the American people.

I find it remarkable that two-thirds of the Americans interviewed in a poll in December, at a time of severe recession, still believed an

-28-

role in world affairs served our national interest better than withdrawal.

Even as other nations watch how we act in Washington, I suspect they marvel at the resilience of our people and our institutions.

Will the American public support the conduct of an active, responsible foreign policy in the 1970's? I believe they will, if their leaders -- and by this I mean the broad spectrum of society's leaders both in and out side of government -- give them a sense that they have something to be proud of and something important to accomplish.

The American people want something better now than cynicism.

They want an end to accusations and scapegoating. They yearn for an end to the divisiveness of the past decade.

You -- the citizens of this country, who are its inherent strength -- are in a position to determine the standard of conduct you expect of your leaders.

-29-

This is a time for unity. The bitterness that characterized
the Vietnam debate no longer has reason or place. It is time to debate
policies, not motives. It is time to attack our problems, not each other.

The President has made it a major objective of his Administration
to restore the relations between the Executive and the Congress.

Let there be no mistake about it: The decadelong struggle in
this country over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The
assertion of Congressional authority is the dominant fact of political
life today. The question now is whether the Congress will use its
new-found power to frustrate -- or to facilitate -- effective national
action abroad. The clash of special interests does not help us conduct
a strong and purposeful national policy abroad, which is perhaps more
vital now than at any moment in the past 30 years.

The effectiveness of our foreign policy, in our Constitutional
system, depends on cooperation between Congress and the Executive.

-30-

There is no other basis for national action.

The public and the Congress have a right to know and consider
when national commitments are involved, and to pass judgment on
aspects within the sphere of legislative action. The Executive Branch
has a responsibility to explain its objectives and to disclose the commitments
that result from its negotiations. The American tradition is indeed
"open diplomacy." But as Charles Evans Hughes explained 50 years
ago, "open diplomacy is openness of results." Confidentiality
in diplomacy is the necessity of intergovernmental business; it has been so
throughout our history and world history. It makes compromise possible,
and negotiated solutions. The openness of our system -- the degree
of legislative involvement for 200 years -- has been without equal
anywhere in the world.

The Congress as a participant has an obligation -- as does the
Executive Branch -- to fulfill its responsibilities with restraint and

-31-

constructive purpose. Partisan warfare is unforgivable. Especially
at this critical moment in our history, the people will not forgive
disarray or disunity in the conduct of our foreign affairs.

For in a system, like ours, which works on the basis of consent
and consensus, division can lead only to paralysis. Neither the Congress
nor the Executive can work its will without the cooperation of the other.

The struggle over Vietnam is a striking example: Those who believed
the disengagement of American forces had to be conducted with dignity,
and with an effort to enable our South Vietnamese ally to survive on
its own, were blocked by the increasing opposition of those who wanted
what then received as a response, even
the United States to leave Vietnam rapidly and unconditionally. Yet
the latter could not work their will against the determination of five
Administrations to carry out what they saw as our broader responsibility.

In the end, neither side won; neither side's policy carried the day. This,
as much as anything, accounts for the outcome in Indochina.

-33-

## Conclusion

The world looks to us for leadership in a turbulent period, when a new international order is taking shape around us. Will the world be consumed in anarchy -- in economic warfare, proliferating nuclear weapons, and regional conflagrations? Or will a new pattern of stable international relations be established, to bequeath a prospect of peace to succeeding generations?

The outcome is hardly foreordained. In large measure it is for us to determine. We are realists -- but the wisest of realists are those who know their own power to shape reality.

We must look ahead, not back.

An uncertain world still looks to America for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us most of all a tradition of hope. Just as our technological genius has symbolized for generations man's conquest over nature, so also has America's banner of human progress and freedom symbolized man's mastery over his own

-34-

fate.

There is a vast reservoir of confidence around the world in
this country's strength and values and capacity to do good. And
there is a deep reservoir within this country of confidence in what we
have before us to accomplish.

Therefore, I am optimistic.

We are not innocent. Neither are we guilty.

We have come of age.

We shall do our duty.