Doing Injury to History

Henry Kissinger

Secretary of State, 1973-1977

The war in Kosovo is the product of a conflict going back over centuries. It takes place at the dividing line between the Ottoman and Austrian empires, between Islam and Christianity, and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The ethnic groups have lived together peacefully only when that coexistence was imposed—as under foreign empires or the Tito dictatorship. President Clinton has asserted that, after a brief period of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) occupation, the ethnic groups will reconcile. There is no realistic basis for that assumption. Ethnic groups in Bosnia have not reconciled after three years of NATO peacekeeping.

When American forces are engaged in combat, victory is the only exit strategy. And that requires a definition of issues that can survive scrutiny. The Administration, in pursuit of symbols that resonate with the public, has put forward three categories of argument. The most convincing is that suffering in Kosovo is so offensive to our moral sensibilities that we will use force to end it even absent traditional considerations of national interest. But since this leaves open the question of why we do not intervene in East Africa, Sri Lanka, Kurdistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan—to name just a few of the places where infinitely more casualties have been incurred than in Kosovo—the President has invoked historical analogies or current threats that are extremely dubious. Where he does injury to history:

* Slobodan Milosevic is not Hitler but a Balkan thug, and the crisis in Kosovo has no analogy to the events preceding World War I. Neither Milosevic nor any other Balkan leader is in a position to threaten the global equilibrium, as the President constantly asserts. Milosevic bears a major responsibility for the brutalities in Bosnia, and I strongly supported the American deployment there. But unlike Bosnia, Kosovo is a war for territory considered by the Serbs as a national shrine. This is why there have been few, if any, signs of opposition in Belgrade to Milosevic's Kosovo policy.

* World War I started in the Balkans not as a result of ethnic conflicts but for precisely the opposite reason: because outside powers intervened in a local conflict. The assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria—an imperial power—by a Serbian nationalist led to a world war because Russia backed Serbia and France backed Russia while Germany supported Austria.

* The Second World War did not start in the Balkans, much less as a result of its ethnic conflicts.

11

As for the KLA, its goal is independence, not autonomy; it acceded to Rambouillet as a tactical device to unleash NATO air power against the hated Serbs. The KLA is even less likely to agree to autonomy under Serbian rule now that Serbia has been so weakened by the NATO air campaign. The KLA will not turn in its weapons to NATO forces. And NATO forces will have no domestic support if they fight the KLA to impose disarmament. Nor will the KLA acquiesce to Serbian forces policing its frontiers. The role of Serbian police and military forces in the proposed agreement is both unclear and incapable of being implemented.

The ironic outcome of the Rambouillet agreement, in the name of which the NATO air campaign is being conducted, is that the NATO peacekeepers will replace the Serbs as obstacles to the national aspirations of the Albanians—especially if Serbia is too weak to provide a counterweight.

Moreover, as Kosovo moves toward independence, the pressures on Macedonia, a third of whose population is Albanian, will increase. Why should they not be granted the same self-determination as their brethren inside Serbia? And that will risk expansion of the conflict as Bulgaria claims its own ethnic nationals in Macedonia, comprising at least a third of the population, and Greece perceives an opportunity to curtail—or to eliminate—a state whose very name it has rejected.

As the war continues, the Administration must redefine its objectives. NATO cannot survive if it now abandons the campaign without achieving its objective of ending the massacres. The Rambouillet agreement should therefore be stripped of its more esoteric components. The terms for ending the air war should be: an immediate cease-fire; the withdrawal of Serbian forces introduced after the beginning of the negotiations at Rambouillet, and the immediate opening of negotiations over autonomy for Kosovo. These negotiations are likely to be prolonged and bitter. But, at their end, Kosovar independence in some form is inevitable unless NATO insists by force on the kind of Serbian suzerainty which the President has promised—a course neither the alliance nor the American public will support.

If a cease-fire on such terms is rejected by Milosevic, there will be no alternative to continuing and intensifying the war, if necessary introducing NATO combat ground forces—a solution which I have heretofore passionately rejected but which will have to be considered to maintain NATO credibility. Whatever the outcome, stationing of some NATO ground forces in either Macedonia or Kosovo will be necessary, to serve not so much as peacekeepers as to prevent the Balkan conflict from widening. I have consistently warned against such an outcome. But, as a result of hesitations and confusions, NATO now has little choice if it wants to avoid a larger war.

For someone who has supported every military action of the Clinton Administration—or who has criticized it for acting too inconclusively, as in Iraq—the war on Yugoslavia inspires profound ambivalence. Serbia fought at our side in two world wars, and stood up to Stalin at the height of his powers. We cannot ignore Milosevic's brutality,

13

03/30/99 14:15 FAX 213 237 3602

LA TIMES

KISSINGER 3/31/99

As the war continues, the Administration must redefine its objectives. NATO cannot survive if it now abandons the campaign without achieving its objective of ending the massacres. The Rambouillet agreement should therefore be stripped of its more esoteric components. The terms for ending the air war should be: an immediate cease-fire; the withdrawal of Serbian forces introduced after the beginning of the negotiations at Rambouillet; and the immediate opening of negotiations over autonomy for Kosovo. These negotiations are likely to be prolonged and bitter. But, at their end, Kosovar independence in some form is inevitable unless NATO insists by force on the kind of Serbian suzerainty which the president has promised -- a course neither the alliance nor the American public will support.

If a cease-fire on such terms is rejected by Milosevic, there will be no alternative to continuing and intensifying the war, if necessary introducing NATO combat ground forces -- a solution which I have heretofore passionately rejected but which will have to be considered to maintain NATO credibility. Whatever the outcome, stationing of some NATO ground forces in either Macedonia or Kosovo will be necessary, to serve not so much as peacekeepers as to prevent the Balkan conflict from widening. I have consistently warned against such an outcome. But, as a result of hesitations and confusions, NATO now has little choice if it wants to avoid a larger war.

For someone who has supported every military action of the Clinton administration -- or who has criticized it for acting too conclusively, as in Iraq -- the war on Yugoslavia inspires profound ambivalence. Serbia fought at our side in two world wars and stood up to Stalin at the height of this powers. We cannot ignore Milosevic's brutality, yet the disappearance of Serbia from the Balkans equilibrium may tempt eruptions in other neighboring countries containing ethnic minorities. Even more importantly, the problem of Macedonia's integrity will be upon us, threatening a wider Balkan war. Let us hope that it will be handled with greater foresight than the prelude to the current crisis.

From Newsweek. Distributed by the Los Angeles Times Syndicate

For immediate release

END

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

# Doing Injury to History

Finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis must begin by rejecting false analogies to the traumas of the past
BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE WAR IN KOSOVO IS THE PRODUCT OF A CONFLICT going back over centuries. It takes place at the dividing line between the Ottoman and Austrian empires, between Islam and Christianity, and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The ethnic groups have lived together peacefully only when that coexistence was imposed—as under foreign empires or the Tito dictatorship. President Clinton has asserted that, after a brief period of NATO occupation, the ethnic groups will reconcile. There is no realistic basis for that assumption. Ethnic groups in Bosnia have not reconciled after three years of NATO peacekeeping.

* Slobodan Milosevic is not Hitler but a Balkan thug, and the crisis in Kosovo has no analogy to the events preceding World War I. Neither Milosevic nor any other Balkan leader is in a position to threaten the global equilibrium, as the president constantly asserts. Milosevic bears a major responsibility for the brutalities in Bosnia, and I strongly supported the American deployment there. But unlike Bosnia, Kosovo is a war for territory considered by the Serbs as a national shrine. This is why there have been few, if any, signs of opposition in Belgrade to Milosevic's Kosovo policy.

* It is absurd to allege that the economic well-being of the European Union, with a GNP exceeding America's, depends on the outcome in impoverished Kosovo. This is even more true of Atlantic prosperity.

* The cohesion of NATO is threatened primarily because it was staked on the unsustainable Rambouillet agreement. It remains to be seen how long it can be maintained when public reaction to the scale and duration of the bombardment sets in, and when it becomes apparent that the long-term consequences of the present campaign have to be policed by NATO ground forces.

I respect the humanitarian motive for intervention. But this does not absolve the democracies from the necessity of coming up with a sustainable solution. The Rambouillet agreement does not meet that test. Conducting a negotiation based on an agreement drafted entirely in foreign chancelleries and seeking to impose it by the threat of air bombardment has only exacerbated the crisis in Kosovo. The Rambouillet text was sold to the Kosovo Liberation Army—which initially rejected it—as a device to

THE ADMINISTRATION SHOULD REDEFINE ITS PRIORITIES: Joint Chiefs

Ch

THE WHITE HOUSE—AP

38 NEWSWEEK APRIL 5, 1999

Chairman Shelton briefs the president in the Oval Office

bring the full force of NATO to bear on Serbia, and it may have tempted Milosevic into accelerating the repression of the KLA before the bombs fell. Now it risks involving NATO and U.S. ground forces in policing an agreement neither side really wants. It was a grave error to abandon any effort to strengthen the observers already in Kosovo in favor of NATO peacekeepers who will find no peace to keep.

President Clinton, in a speech to the Serbian people, has declared: "The NATO allies support the Serbian people to maintain Kosovo as part of your country." He added that the agreement would "guarantee the rights of all people in Kosovo—ethnic Serbs and Albanians alike within Serbia." This is why the Rambouillet agreement provides for the KLA to surrender its arms to a NATO force. Some ten thousand Serbian policemen are to maintain security; some fifteen hundred Serbian soldiers are to safeguard the frontiers.

None of this is achievable by agreement, only by imposition. The Serbs have rejected the Rambouillet agreement because they see in it a prelude to independence for Kosovo. They also see the

presence of NATO troops as the sort of foreign occupation Serbia has historically resisted against the Ottoman and Austrian empires, Hitler and Stalin. Even if they are bombed into capitulation, they can hardly be expected to be willing supporters of the outcome.

As the war continues, the Administration must redefine its objectives. NATO cannot survive if it now abandons the campaign without achieving its objective of ending the massacres. The Rambouillet agreement should therefore be stripped of its more esoteric components. The terms for ending the air war should be: an immediate ceasefire; the withdrawal of Serbian forces introduced after the beginning of the negotiations at Rambouillet, and the immediate opening of negotiations over autonomy for Kosovo. These negotiations are likely to be prolonged and bitter. But, at their end, Kosovar independence in some form is inevitable unless NATO insists by force on the kind of Serbian suzerainty which the President has promised—a course neither the alliance nor the American public will support.

If a ceasefire on such terms is rejected by Milosevic, there will be no alternative to continuing and intensifying the war, if necessary introducing NATO combat ground forces—a solution which I have heretofore passionately rejected but which will have to be considered to maintain NATO credibility. Whatever the outcome, stationing of some NATO ground forces in either Macedonia or Kosovo will be necessary, to serve not so much as peacekeepers as to prevent the Balkan conflict from widening. I have consistently warned against such an outcome. But, as a result of hesitations and confusions, NATO now has little choice if it wants to avoid a larger war.

For someone who has supported every military action of the Clinton Administration—or who has criticized it for acting too inconclusively, as in Iraq—the war on Yugoslavia inspires profound ambivalence. Serbia fought at our side in two world wars, and stood up to Stalin at the height of his powers. We cannot ignore Milosevic's brutality, yet the disappearance of Serbia from the Balkans equilibrium may tempt eruptions in other neighboring countries containing ethnic minorities. Even more importantly, the problem of Macedonia's integrity will be upon us, threatening a wider Balkan war. Let us hope that it will be handled with greater foresight than the prelude to the current crisis. ■

In the NEWSWEEK Poll, 57% approve of the job Clinton is doing—a decline of six points from early March, before the U.S.-led attacks in the Balkans

APRIL 5, 1999 NEWSWEEK 39

1625 WORDS

KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE 3/27/99 III

For someone who has supported every military action of the Clinton Administration - or who has criticized it for pursuing them too inconclusively, as in Iraq - the war on Yugoslavia inspires profound ambivalence.

Hope for a successful outcome mixes with regret that matters were permitted to drift to this point; agreement with the goal of ending genocidal strife coexists with embarrassment at the way the issues are explained to the public; sadness that the full force of NATO's advanced technology has been unleashed against a small backward country of ten million that fought at our side in two world wars and stood up to Stalin at the height of his power is overlaid with

2

the sense that what the Administration has defined as success
has first exacerbated the underlying crisis and threatens its
continuation with no end in sight.

The most convincing is that suffering in Kosovo is so
offensive to our moral sensibilities that we will use force to
end it even in the absence of traditional considerations of
national interest. But since this leaves open the question of
why we do not intervene in East Africa, Sri Lanka, Kurdistan,
Kashmir and Afghanistan, to name just a few of the places
where infinitely more casualties are occurring than in Kosovo,
the President has broadened the argument to historical

3

analogies or current threats that are extremely dubious. For
example:

- Slobodan Milosevic is a Balkan thug, not Hitler, and the crisis in Kosovo has no analogy to the events preceding World War I. Neither Milosevic nor any other Balkan leader is in a position to threaten the global equilibrium, as the President constantly asserts. Milosevic bears a major responsibility for the brutalities in Bosnia, which was a war of conquest. This is why I strongly supported the American deployment there and urged the Senate to endorse it. Kosovo is a war for territory considered by the Serbs as their national shrine and the origin of their nation. This is why there have been few, if any, signs of opposition in Belgrade to Milosevic's Kosovo policy.

- World War I started in the Balkans not as a result of ethnic conflicts but for precisely the opposite reason:

4

because outside powers intervened in a local conflict. The assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria - the imperial power - by a Serbian nationalist led to a world war because Russia backed Serbia and France backed Russia while Germany supported Austria.

- The Second World War did not start in the Balkans, much less in its ethnic conflicts.

- It is absurd to allege that the economic well-being of the European Union, with a GNP exceeding ours, depends on the outcome in impoverished Kosovo. This is even more true of Atlantic prosperity.

- The cohesion of NATO is involved primarily because it was staked on the unsustainable Rambouillet agreement. It remains to be seen how long it can be maintained when the public reaction to the savagery of the bombardment and its duration set in, and when it becomes apparent that the long-

5

- I respect the humanitarian motive for intervention. But this does not absolve the democracies from the necessity of coming up with a sustainable solution.

The Rambouillet agreement, which Serbia is to be forced to accept by NATO military power, does not meet that test. Conducting a negotiation based on an agreement drafted entirely in foreign chancelleries and seeking to impose it by the threat of air bombardment exacerbated the crisis in Kosovo. The Rambouillet [text]? was sold to the KLA - after it initially rejected it - as a device to bring the full force of NATO to bear on Serbia and it may have tempted Milosevic into accelerating the repression of the KLA before the bombs fell. Now it bids fair to involve NATO and US groundforces in policing an agreement neither side really wants. It was a

6

grave error to abandon any effort to strengthen the observers
already in Kosovo in favor of the occupation of Kosovo by NATO
peacekeepers who will find no peace to keep.

The Kosovo conflict is the product of a conflict going
back over centuries. It takes place at the dividing line
between the Ottoman and the Austrian empires, between Islam
and Christianity and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism.
The ethnic groups have coexisted peacefully only when that
coexistence was imposed - as under the Tito dictatorship or
the Ottoman and Austrian empires. The President has asserted
that, after a brief period of NATO occupation, the ethnic
groups will reconcile. There is no realistic basis for that
assumption. Ethnic groups in Bosnia have not reconciled after
three years of NATO peacekeeping.

This is why the Rambouillet agreement has been rejected
by both sides who understood local conditions better than

7

drafters in distant chancelleries. What the Albanians accepted
was not a peace agreement, as the Administration asserts, but
a nudge and a wink that NATO would indeed bomb Serbia if
Belgrade rejected it.

The Rambouillet agreement provides for Kosovar autonomy
under Serbian sovereignty supervised by a NATO peacekeeping
force. The KLA is supposed to surrender its arms to that
force. Some ten thousand Serbian policemen are to maintain
security; some fifteen hundred Serbian military are to
safeguard the frontiers.

President Clinton, in a speech to the Serbian people, has
declared: "The NATO allies support the Serbian people to
maintain Kosovo as part of your country." He added that the
agreement would "guarantee the rights of all people in
Kosovo - ethnic Serbs and Albanians alike within Serbia." None
of this is achievable by agreement, only by imposition. The

8

Serbs have rejected the Rambouillet agreement because they see
in it a prelude to independence for Kosovo and the presence of
NATO troops as the sort of foreign occupation Serbia has
historically resisted against the Ottoman and Austrian
empires, against Hitler and against Stalin. Even if they are
bombed into capitulation, they can hardly be expected to be
willing supporters of the outcome. As for the KLA, its goal is
independence, not autonomy; it acceded to Rambouillet as a
tactical device to unleash NATO airpower against the hated
Serbs. The KLA is even less likely to agree to autonomy under
Serbian rule now that Serbia has been so weakened by the NATO
air campaign. The KLA will not turn in its weapons to NATO
forces. And NATO forces will have no domestic support if they
fight the KLA to impose disarmament. Nor will the KLA
acquiesce to Serbian forces policing its frontiers. The role
of Serbian police and military forces in the proposed

9

The ironical outcome of the Rambouillet agreement, in the name of which the NATO air campaign is being conducted, is that the NATO peacekeepers will find no peace to keep and will replace the Serbs as obstacles to the national aspirations of the Albanians - especially as Serbia will be too weak to provide a counterweight. Moreover, as Kosovo moves toward independence, the pressures on Macedonia, a third of whose population is Albanian, will increase. Why should they not be granted the same self-determination as their brethren inside Serbia? And that will risk a genuine expansion of the conflict as Bulgaria claims its own ethnic nationals in Macedonia, comprising at least a third of the population, and Greece perceives an opportunity to curtail - or to eliminate - a state whose very name it has rejected.

10

As the war continues, the Administration must redefine
its objectives. NATO cannot now abandon the campaign without
achieving its objective of ending the massacres of civilians.
The Rambouillet agreement should therefore be stripped of its
more esoteric components. The terms for ending the air war
should require: an immediate ceasefire; the withdrawal of
Serbian forces introduced after the beginning of the
negotiations at Rambouillet; and the immediate opening of
negotiations over autonomy for Kosovo. These negotiations are
likely to be prolonged and bitter but, at their end, Kosovar
independence in some form is inevitable unless NATO insists on
the Serbian suzerainty which the President has promised. In
this, neither the alliance nor the American public will
follow. At that point the remaining Serbian population will be
obliged to leave Kosovo unless it is protected by outside
forces.

11

If that outcome is rejected by Milosevic, there will be no alternative to continuing and intensifying the war, if necessary with the introduction of NATO combat ground forces - a solution which I have heretofore passionately rejected but which is now necessary if NATO credibility is to be maintained. Whatever the outcome, Kosovar independence will make necessary the stationing of NATO ground forces in either Macedonia or Kosovo, not so much as peacekeepers in Kosovo as to prevent a wider Balkan war. Their purpose will be less to keep the Serbs out than the Kosovars in. I have consistently warned against such an outcome. But, as a result of [provisions]?, hesitations and confusions, NATO has no choice if it wants to avoid a larger war.

Whatever happens, we will face the problem of how to fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of Serbia from the Balkan equilibrium that may cause bonfires to erupt in other

12

countries containing ethnic minorities. Even more importantly,
the problem of the integrity of Macedonia will be upon us and
the danger of a wider Balkan war. Let us hope that it will be
handled with greater foresight than the prelude to the current
crisis.

MAR-27-1999 12:25 FROM

27-MAK. 99(SAT) 15:04 GULUHAMMEK

TO

GINA LONDON

P.01

TEL:0171-493-0834

P. 001

1514 WORDS

TOTAL P.01

MAR-27-1999 12:29 FROM

27-MAR.'99(SAT) 15:55 GOLDHAMMER

TO
TEL:0171-493-0834

GINA LONDON

P.08

M. UU.

7

Belgrade rejected it. The KLA accepted NATO as its artillery,

and NATO's political program. And Serbia rejected it because it called for NATO forces to stay in South Albania until the property of a new Albanian slum was stockpiled there.

What the Rambouillet agreement provides is Kosovar

jac

autonomy supervised by a NATO peacekeeping force. The KLA is under Serbian sovereignty, supposed to surrender its arms to that force. Some ten thousand Serbian policemen are to maintain security; some fifteen hundred Serbian military are to safeguard the frontiers.

President Clinton, in a speech to the Serbian people, has declared: "The NATO allies support the Serbian people to maintain Kosovo as part of your country." He added that the agreement would "guarantee the rights of all people in Kosovo - ethnic Serbs and Albanians alike within Serbia." Also, this is unsustainable. The Serbs have rejected the Rambouillet agreement because they see in it a prelude to independence for

1514 WORDS

2

When American forces are engaged in combat, victory is
the only exit strategy. And that requires a definition of
issues leading to a conclusion. But the Administration, in
pursuit of symbols that resonate with the public, has put
forward arguments that will not survive prolonged scrutiny.
For example:

- Slobodan Milosevic is a Balkan thug, not Hitler, and the crisis in Kosovo has no analogy to the events preceding World War I. Neither Milosevic nor any other Balkan leader is in a position to threaten the global equilibrium, as the President constantly implies. Milosevic bears a major responsibility for the brutalities in Bosnia, which was a war of conquest. This is why I strongly supported the American

3

deployment there and urged the Senate to endorse it. Kosovo is
a war for territory considered to be Serbia's national shrine
and the origin of the Serbian nation. Any other Serbian leader
would pursue similar policies in Kosovo, perhaps with
marginally less brutality.

- [A] world war started in the Balkans not as a result of ethnic conflicts but for precisely the opposite reason:

[because] outside powers intervene[d] in local quarrels. World War I grew out of the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria - the imperial power - by a Serbian nationalist and because Russia backed Serbia and France backed Russia while Germany supported Austria. There is no analogy whatever to current ethnic conflicts.

4

- The economic well-being of Europe [and] Atlantic prosperity do not depend on the outcome in Kosovo, as the President alleges.

- The cohesion of NATO is involved primarily because it was staked on an unsustainable agreement. It remains to be seen how long it can be maintained when the public reaction to the savagery of the bombardment and its duration set in, and if the long-term consequences of the present campaign have to be policed by NATO ground forces.

- There is only one meaningful reason for intervention and it is not the traditional approach of citing national interest but the modern definition of humanitarianism. It is to the credit of the democracies that they are determined to prevent suffering as offensive to their sensibilities even when few of the historic reasons justifying intervention

5

pertain. But this does not absolve them from the necessity of
coming up with a sustainable solution.

The Rambouillet agreement, in the name of which the air
campaign is being waged, does not meet that test. Introducing
an agreement drafted entirely in foreign chancelleries and
seeking to impose it by the threat of air bombardment
exacerbated the crisis. It was sold to the KLA as a device to
bring the full force of NATO to bear on Serbia and it may have
tempted Milosevic into accelerating the repression of the KLA
before the bombs fell. Now it bids fair to involve NATO and US
groundforces in policing an agreement neither side really
wants. It was a big mistake to abandon any effort to
strengthen the observers already in Kosovo in favor of the
occupation of Kosovo by NATO peacekeepers who will find no
peace to keep.

6

The Kosovo conflict is the product of a conflict going back over centuries. It takes place at the dividing line between the Ottoman and the Austrian empires, between Islam and Christianity and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism. The ethnic groups have coexisted peacefully only when that coexistence was imposed from the outside¹ - [as under] the Tito dictatorship or the Ottoman and Austrian empires. The President has asserted that, after a brief period of NATO occupation, the ethnic groups will reconcile. There is no realistic basis for that assumption. The only possible outcomes are victory for one side or a NATO protectorate of permanent duration.

This is why the Rambouillet agreement has been rejected by both sides. What the Albanians accepted was not the Rambouillet agreement, as the Administration asserts, [but] a

¹could drop last three words as they do not pertain to Tito

7

nudge and a wink that NATO would indeed bomb Serbia if
Belgrade rejected it. The KLA accepted NATO as its artillery,
not NATO's political program.

What the Rambouillet agreement provides is Kosovar
autonomy supervised by a NATO peacekeeping force. The KLA is
supposed to surrender its arms to that force. Some ten
thousand Serbian policemen are to maintain security; some
fifteen hundred Serbian military are to safeguard the
frontiers.

President Clinton, in a speech to the Serbian people, has
declared: "The NATO allies support the Serbian people to
maintain Kosovo as part of your country." He added that the
agreement would "guarantee the rights of all people in
Kosovo - ethnic Serbs and Albanians alike within Serbia." All
this is unsustainable. The Serbs have rejected the Rambouillet
agreement because they see in it a prelude to independence for

8

Kosovo while the presence of NATO troops as the sort of
foreign occupation Serbia has historically resisted against
the Ottoman and Austrian empires, against Hitler and against
Stalin. Even after they are bombed into acquiescence, they can
hardly be expected to be willing supporters of the outcome. As
for the KLA, its goal is independence, not autonomy; it
acceded to Rambouillet as a tactical device to unleash NATO
forces against the hated Serbs. And the KLA is even less
likely to agree to autonomy under Serbian rule now that Serbia
has been so weakened by the NATO air campaign. The KLA is
unlikely to turn in its weapons to NATO forces. And NATO
forces are unlikely to fight to impose disarmament. Nor will
the KLA acquiesce to Serbian forces policing its frontiers.
The role of Serbian police and military forces is highly
unclear.

9

The ironical outcome of the Rambouillet agreement, in the name of which the NATO air campaign is being conducted, is that the NATO peacekeepers will find no peace to keep and will replace the Serbs as obstacles to the national aspirations of the Albanians - especially as Serbia will be too weak to insist on its implementation. Moreover, as Kosovo moves toward independence, the pressures on Macedonia, a third of whose population is Albanian, will increase. And that will risk a genuine expansion of the conflict as Bulgaria claims its own ethnic nationals in Macedonia, comprising at least a third of the population, and Greece perceives an opportunity to curtail - or to eliminate - a state whose very name it has rejected.

As the war continues, the Administration must redefine its objectives. It must recognize that the introduction of NATO forces on the ground will risk NATO unity. On the other hand, NATO cannot abandon the campaign without achieving its

10

objective of ending the massacres of civilians. The
Rambouillet agreement should therefore be stripped of its more
esoteric components. The terms for ending the air war should
require: an immediate ceasefire; the withdrawal of Serbian
forces introduced after the beginning of the negotiations at
Rambouillet; and the immediate opening of negotiations over
autonomy for Kosovo. These negotiations are likely to be
prolonged and bitter. At their end, Kosovar independence in
some form will almost certainly emerge unless NATO insists on
the Serbian suzerainty which the President has promised and
for which the alliance will have no long-term will. At that
point the remaining Serbian population will be obliged to
leave Kosovo unless it is protected by outside forces.

If that is rejected by Milosevic, there will be no
alternative to the introduction of NATO combat ground forces -
a solution which I have heretofore passionately rejected but

11

which is now imposed if NATO credibility is to be maintained.

Whatever the outcome, Kosovar independence will make necessary
the stationing of NATO ground forces in either Macedonia or
Kosovo, to prevent the expansion of the conflict described
above - against which I have consistently warned but which is
now inevitable.

Whatever happens, we will face the problem of how to fill
the vacuum left by the disappearance of Serbia from the Balkan
equilibrium - a problem similar to the consequences of the
policy of unconditional surrender in World War II. Even more
importantly, the problem of the integrity of Macedonia will be
upon us and the danger of a wider Balkan war. Let us hope that
it will be handled with greater foresight than the prelude to
the current crisis.

MAR-27-1999 09:38 FROM
6/27/99 7:51PM 06:1/ GOLDBAHMER

TO GINA LONDON P.01
TEL:01/1-493-0834 P.001

1325 WORDS

For someone who...like me, has supported every military
action of the Clinton Administration - or who has criticized
for pursuing them too inconclusively, as in Iraq - the war on
Yugoslavia inspires profound ambivalence. Hope for a
successful outcome mixes with regret that matters were
permitted to drift to this point; agreement with the goal of
ending a genocidal strife exists side by side with
embarrassment at the way the issues are explained to the
public.

American people; sadness that the full force of NATO's
advanced technology has been unleashed against a small
backward country of ten million that basically fought at our
side in two world wars and stood up to Stalin at the height of

MAR-27-1999 09:44 FROM
27-MAR-'99(SAT) 08:19 GOLDHAMMER

TO
TEL:01/1-493-0834

GINA LONDON P.02
R. UIU

10

policy of unconditional (surrender), in World War II. Even more importantly, the problem of the integrity of Macedonia will be upon us and the danger of a wider Balkan war. Let us hope that it will be handled with greater foresight than the prelude to the current crisis.

TOTAL P.02

1325 WORDS

For someone who, like me, has supported every military
action of the Clinton Administration - or who has criticized
for pursuing them too inconclusively, as in Iraq - the war on
Yugoslavia inspires profound ambivalence. Hope for a
successful outcome mixes? with regret that matters were
permitted to drift to this point; agreement with the goal of
ending a genocidal strife exists side by side with
embarrassment at the way the issues are explained to the
American people; sadness that the full force of NATO's
advanced technology has been unleashed against a small
backward country of ten million that basically fought at our
side in two world wars and stood up to Stalin at the height of

2

his power is overlaid with the sense that what the
Administration has defined as success exacerbated the crisis
and will guarantee its endless continuation.

When American forces are engaged in combat, there is only
one exit strategy and that is victory. That requires a
definition of the issues permitting a resolution. But the
Administration, in pursuit of symbols resonating with the
public, has confused the issue rather than explained it. For
example:

- Slobodan Milosevic is not Hitler, and resistance in Kosovo has no analogy in the events preceding World War I. Milosevic is a Balkan thug pursuing local advantages in a brutal manner. Neither he nor any other Balkan leader is in a position to threaten the global equilibrium, as the President constantly implies. Milosevic bears a major responsibility for the brutalities in Bosnia, which was a war of conquest. This

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is why I strongly supported the American deployment there and urged the Senate to endorse it. Kosovo is a war for the preservation of basic Serbian territory considered the national shrine and the origin of the Serbian nation. Any other Serbian leader would pursue similar policies in Kosovo, perhaps with marginally less brutality.

- World wars start in the Balkans only when outside powers intervene in local quarrels, not as an automatic expansion of local conflicts. World War I grew out of the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria - the imperial power - by a Serbian nationalist and because Russia backed Serbia and France backed Russia while Germany supported Austria. There is no analogy whatever to current ethnic conflicts.

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- The Second World War did not start in the Balkans, much less in its ethnic conflicts. The analogy to Churchill is absurd.

- The economic well-being of European society? depends on the outcome in Kosovo much less. Atlantic prosperity, as the President alleges...[thought unfinished].

- The unity of NATO is often invoked. But it remains to be seen how long it can be maintained when the public reaction to the savagery of the bombardment and its duration set in and the political consequences of the present campaign come to be understood.

- There is only one meaningful reason for intervention and it is not the traditional approach of national interest but the modern definition of humanitarianism. It is to the credit of the democracies that they are determined to prevent a scale of suffering offensive to their consciences even when

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few of the historic reasons justifying intervention pertain?.

But this does not absolve them from the need of coming up with
a sustainable solution. The Rambouillet agreement, in the name
of which the air campaign is being waged, does not meet that
test. It was a big mistake to abandon any effort to strengthen
the observers in Kosovo in favor of the occupation of Kosovo
by NATO peacekeepers who will find no peace to keep.

The Kosovo conflict is the product of a conflict going
back over the centuries. It takes place at the dividing line
between the Ottoman and the Austrian empires, between Islam
and Christianity and between Serbian and Albanian nationalism.
The ethnic groups have coexisted peacefully only when there
was a dominant physical imposition - the Tito dictatorship or
the Ottoman and Austrian empires. The President has asserted
that, after a brief period of NATO occupation, the ethnic

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groups will reconcile?. There is no realistic basis for that
assumption.

This is why the Rambouillet agreement has been rejected
by both sides. The Administration keeps asserting that the
Albanians have accepted it. But this agreement did not come
until after a nudge and a wink that NATO would bomb Serbia if
Belgrade rejected it. The KLA accepted to turn NATO into its
artillery not because it shared NATO's goals.

The Rambouillet agreement provides for Kosovar autonomy
supervised by a NATO peacekeeping force. The KLA is supposed
to surrender its arms to that force. Some ten thousand Serbian
policemen are to seek to maintain security; some fifteen
hundred Serbian military are to safeguard the frontiers.

All this guarantees that there will be no peace to keep
because the proposed mix is unsustainable. The Serbs have
rejected the Rambouillet agreement because they see in it a

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prelude to independence for Kosovo and the presence of NATO troops as the sort of foreign occupation Serbia has historically resisted. Even if they are bombed into acquiescence, they can hardly be expected to be willing supporters?. The KLA will not observe the agreement because its goal is independence, not autonomy; it acceded as a tactical device to unleash NATO forces against the hated Serbs. And it is even less likely to carry out its terms now that Serbia has been so weakened by the NATO air campaign. The KLA is unlikely to turn in its weapons to NATO forces. And NATO forces are unlikely to fight to impose disarmament. Nor will the KLA acquiesce in Serbian forces policing its frontiers. The role of Serbian police and military forces is highly unclear. The President, in a speech to the Serbian people, has declared: "The NATO allies support the Serbian people to maintain Kosovo as part of your country." He added

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This will have the crucial result that, as the agreement
goes into force, the NATO peacekeepers will find no peace to
keep and, ironically, that they will replace the Serbs as
obstacles to the national aspirations of the Albanian ethnic
group - especially as Serbia will be too weak to insist on its
implementation. Moreover, as Kosovo moves toward independence,
the pressures on Macedonia, a third of whose population is
Albanian, will increase. And that will risk a genuine
expansion of the conflict as Bulgaria claims its own ethnic
nationals in Macedonia, comprising at least a third of whose
population, and Greece perceives an opportunity to curtail -
or to eliminate? - a state whose very name it has rejected.

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NATO forces on the ground will involve NATO in a conflict which will shred its unity. On the other hand, NATO cannot abandon the air campaign without achieving its objective of ending the massacres of civilians. The Rambouillet agreement should therefore be stripped of its more esoteric components.

These negotiations are likely to be prolonged and inconclusive. At their end, some independence for Kosovo will almost certainly emerge unless it is held down by NATO, for which the alliance will have no long-term will.

At that point we will face the problem of how to fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of Serbia from the Balkan equilibrium - a problem similar to the consequences of the

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policy of unconditional [surrender] in World War II. Even more
importantly, the problem of the integrity of Macedonia will be
upon us and the danger of a wider Balkan war. Let us hope that
it will be handled with greater foresight than the prelude to
the current crisis.