DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

Irwin/Johnson/Kissinger
9:10 am 12/3/70

-2-

J: No question. I will make that clear. All that session ~~and~~ there after
the midnight call is dealing with subsequent events. There was no --
I am not trying to -- we have made it clear.

K: My people feel it's not clear.

J: I will revise that.

K: Now, the case of whether to testify.

J: Yes. Lots of heat over there. Volpe and I agreed to act together.

K: We are ~~not~~ going to put out in a statement but Zeigler will put out the conclusion of your report. You have issued the procedures that Coast Guard put on ~~statement)''~~. This incident revealed the procedural weaknesses -- "(read

J: All right. What about -- I am tender on the Post story this morning.

K: I haven't read it. Who are they blaming?

J: Both equally and I don't accept that.

K: I agree with you. If we had to do it -- My own judgment which I have not repeated to the President -- if we had to do it all over again it would have been better to add a positive phrase to the cautionary phrase. ? ? ? ? asylum ~~and~~ rather than wait until he comes aboard. But your official expected him to report back.

K: We have had relations with the ~~Gulf Coast~~ Coast Guard in Floridathat have worked very satisfactorily. Anybody in the Department ~~receives~~ receiving a call like this would ~~act like~~ we have had long standing relationships.

K: Never said if the guy is genuine we will give him asylum?

I: That's not the question.

K: State does not compare to the Coast Guards'. I think the Coast Guard was very stupid. I read the conversations.

I: Did you read that scientific people said "contact State" and the Captain said he had his orders from Boston and nothing he can do?

By

NARA. Date 5/26

Irwin/Johnson/Kissinger

9:10 am

12/3/70

K: The Coast Guard wanted to do what they did.

J: It's incredible that they don't have better communication between Boston and here. I would like the full text except the secret annes released subject to clarifying the part your people thought was not clear.

K: I have a call to the President. May I raise it with him?

J: If you don't, they know we handed in a report --

K: I think they should release both reports then.

J: Then the WH has pre-empted the whole thing. When we go to the Hill there's nothing that can be said about what the WH has released.

K: Apart from personal sensitivity the President will want all implication of the WH taken away.

J: We will take it out.

K: If you could relate it to the facts.

J: We will await you.

K: An hour? This will be my recommendation --

x: I: Read annex 3.

K: You wouldn't release annexes.

I: Everything but the last one which is secret. They are all just clarification.

K: I have no trouble in my mind on where the responsibility lies.

J: On the guidance to Zeigler, it seems to apportion it equally.

K: It speaks of discipline only for the Coast Guard. State Dept. issuing instructions.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Irwin/Kissinger

10:40 am

12/3/70

I: I had called to catch you before you went because I have another point of information on the vector because John King on press had talked several times and said Zeigler and Klein knew about it on Tues. That has nothing to do with Mon. Wanted you to know.

K: We are aware of that. We are having reports <u>lead</u>ook at by PIO and the legal people to be sure nothing will prejudice a court-martial.

I: Macomber in talking about Congress he felt that if they are not released they will be pulled out of the person testifying and they will look like they are ______ the Executive Dept.

K: We are checking them at today and probably will release them tomorrow.

I: If we can prevent people from going to the Hill today --

K: If you could be sure there's no leak. President is furious about the Murray and Shultz (?) stories. He has given orders not to let documents even go to State. Of course that's (ridiculous ?) but --

I: As far as Marshall and Sullivan go, we have not seen the report. Sheeheen covers the Pentagon as much as he does the rest of government.

K: The other story is the L. A. Times story which he just caught up with. That would have to come from State. Who else? I am just telling you. The President worked on the press guidance and I am going to have Haig read it to Eliot. I have taken out most of the <u>aggressive</u> items but it's still rough. I will have it read. These things happen every few months.

I: Too bad that they come all at once.

Further conversation: 10:55 am

I: I told Macomber not to go this afternoon but he has to call back up there and imply he is instructed not to go up until the report is released and the implication will be that he is under instructions on that until it's released.

K: Why couldn't he say until the investigation has been reviewed at the WH since we haven't decided yet on releasing it. It's a good chance but we don't want to be forced into it.

I: I will tell him to do that.

K: I just had an irate call from the President that every department understands

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Irwin/Kissinger

10:40 am 12/3/70

-2-

K: (cont) his outrage on the Shultz story. You know simply to say -- anyone says it didn't happen but we know it did happen and so he is saying the same thing to Defense and CIA and not just to State. I am getting statements from our own people.

I: We have to see someone here who has seen it. They talked only to Alec and Marshall.

K: Reports afterwards?

I: I am trying to find out. One person went to the Pentagon for a briefing.

K: Who talked to Shultz in the last few weeks?

I: We are trying to find out.

K: I am under great pressure. It's a distasteful episode.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Helms/Kissinger

11:10 am

12/3/70

K: Have you seen the Kraslow story in the L. A. Times? When the President sees it he will be --

H: It has nothing to do with me.

K: I wonder what we can do about it.

H: I have not discussed this problem with you.

K: Laird said he fully briefed you.

H: Someone queried me about TIME magazine and asked who attended the meeting and I said I wasn't there. That's true!

K: That's right.

H: ____ asked me what our contribution was. I outlined it and I don't know what we can do about it.

K: I want to tell President I talked with you.

H: You have and I had nothing to do with this and it may be come from the Hill.

K: Am I right in assuming that you were told about it by Laird?

H: A couple of months ago. The only thing that I had to say was that I knew about it and contributed technically. I didn't know the kick off date. This kind of article is just trying to make trouble.

K: We are just trying to get the facts.

H: I don't blame you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Under Secretary Irwin

12/3/70 11:15 a.m.

K: These are days we will both long remember. On the front page of the Los Angeles Times you will see two stories. The biggest headline reads "Nixon Orders POW raid Without Consulting CIA." It alledges that CIA didn't know, which is a lie. It goes on and on and then on page 21 it says "I can't understand" said one qualified State official ". . . not to ask the council of the agency whose business it is to find out . . . is certainly not sound decision-making procedure.¹

I: Quoting a State official?

K: "One qualified State Department official." So you have that to add. Second is Stans' handling of the Japan textile dispute is blamed for trade crisis. This seems to come from Japanese sources.

I: I read that in another paper.

K: Alex Johnson is pictures as backing the Japanese position while "Stans sputtered in indignation." I don't know where that came from, but I know it didn't come from Alex.

I: Yes, that's right.

K: Our own friendship will remain unimpaired.

I: Okay Henry, thanks for that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Gerard Smith/Kissinger

12:21 pm

12/3/70

S: Did you get the message I sent you?

K: On ABM? Yes.

S: I wanted to make sure we are on the same ______. I propose to say we will study it and then talk about the accident problem.

K: If I may suggest, don't give them any hope we will accept it. If you could add a sentence saying offensive and defensive things go together but we can study it -- I have raised it with the President but strintly for your information he is more prepared to split accident part then ABM.

S: Split accident from ABM?

K: No. Make a separate agreement on accidental war (?) problem. I don't see him making an agreement on ABM alone.

S: I just had a session with Semenov on a separate deal.

K: What did he want? Did he give you something interesting?

S: Nothing. I Hard line on forward base systems and if we are not willing to withdraw forward base <u>all</u> systems then we should reduce ? ? ?I said I would not check with our authorities on that because it was unacceptable. They are trying to make it ______. ______ thing unpalatable but offense and defense go together but we will study the proposal.

K: I have checked on the leak problem. No one at WH had talked to people. It's against policy.

S: Gla d to hear it. Chalmers Roberts has been getting close to the truth.

K: He hasn't been seen by anyone here for months.

S: Do you remember the July 4 exchange we had. I would like to disclose that to the other delegates in view of the proposal.

K: Who?

S: ______, ______, AND Parsons.

K: I would -- let me check with the President.

S: I sent you a message on that 3 days ago.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

G. Smith/Kissinger

12:21 pm 12/3/70

-2-

K: I haven't seen it.

S: Eyes only to you.

K: something slipped. I will check with the President. Why must you tell them?

S: I want them to ____ on the problem I took in July.

K: Let me look at that exchange and I will call you at the end of the day.

S: If you will send a wire and let me know. Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/20

TELCOM

Sen. Baker/Kissinger

12:30 pm

12/3/70

B: I wanted to call you to ask you if you could see briefly John Harper,
Chairman of the Board of ALCOA. Has a Guinea problem. They are
substantial in Tennessee. He would like to fly fix from Pittsburgh today.

K: Must it be today? I will let your office know in the early afternoon. I
will see him but it may have to be Sat. morning.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Irwin/Kissinger

12:31 pm

12/3/70

I: On the defector and testimony on the Hill, Bill Macomber called and said he would not be there. Hayes flew into a rage and they would hold the meeting and that they would denounce the Administration and say, here's the empty chair where ? ? ?. A Republican will go over and say that there's no one there because the investigation going on and when they could they would be the re. Of course, it may not occur that say and depends on how long his temper will last.

K: Don't know what to do. Things here today are as nasty as everyday at Harvard.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Dave Kraslow

12/3/70 5:30 p.m.

HK: Dave, I've got about 10 huys stacked up, but you know, your story -- whoever gave you that information was totally wrong.

DK: You know me, and you know I don't proceed carelessly.

HK: I know you don't. But I tell you it is not true. Ask Helms.

DK: But if this were a fact, why conceal it?

HK: Who concealed it? The only one around the White House who would know was Haig and me. You could ask Ziegler till he were blue in the face and he wouldn't be about to tell you. Helms was asked to give any information he had.

DK: At what point?

HK: When it was being planned.

DK: Back in August.

HK: I don't know the exact dates.

DK: But then the thing was dropped?

HK: What do you mean?

DK: You were getting continuous input from Defense; what about CIA?

HK: Certainly.

DK: How did you get if it was not asked for?

HK: Do you think you have to ask every day what is your continuous input?

DK: Henry, I researched this very carefully, as carefully as I could. I was barred from access to you. I asked Dianne if I could see you . . .

HK: I know. My scheduling has gotten utterly out of hand and is going to be addressed in the next few days.

DK: I understand. I believe you are the most harrassed man around. But I remember your lecturing at Harvard on functioning and non-functioning of [communication?]. If what you say is totally accurate . . .

By NARA, Dato

5/26

Telecon

Dave Kraslow

12/3/70 5:30 p.m. page 2

HK: It is totally accurate!

DK: then why was the Agency not included in the final meeting?

HK: Because basically that was to discuss the policy issue of
whether to do it and not the evidence on which it was based.

DK: But the Joint Chiefs were there.

HK: The Joint Chiefs had to conduct the operation. Our assumption
was the intelligence input would continue.

DK: There you go -- "Our assumption was . . ." I have never in
my life been more sure of something than this. I researched it
very carefully.

HK: What incentive would we have to keep CIA out of it?

DK: That's a good question. That's a hell of a good question. I
wish I knew the answer.

HK: There is no answer because there is no issue.

DK: But here's the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs making this critical assumption.

HK: My understanding from the Director of CIA is he gave all the
information he had to Laird.

DK: I would be very happy if this could be put on the record, to
record what you have to say.

HK: No, I can't do that. But I realize you are a serious person about this.

DK: And when I speak to Ron, he spoke to the point immediately without
question. He said I cannot get into this question. I think he is serious enough
about his job that he might check it out if he thought he could. If you feel that
you, or anyone else, can say something for the record, I assure you we will
publish it.

HK: I appreciate that. That's all I can ask.

DK: This is something a scholar would respect. To state on the record
that the Secretary of Defense or the Director of DIA, or Henry Kissinger
were in contact over the past three or four months, I would respect that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Dave Kraslow

12/3/70 5:30 p.m. page 3

HK: DIA?

DK: Okay, just you and the Secretary of Defense. If the White House states that you were in contact and continuous consultation on this matter, between Defense and the White House on the one hand and CIA on the other, this would be respected.

HK: I don't like to get into CIA procedures, and I never speak on the record, but let me call you tomorrow.

DK: Okay, and I hope when things ease off, I can have a talk with you.

HK: I will promise you that.

DECLASSIFIED
E.Q. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Under Secretary Irwin
5:45 p.m., December 3, 1970

K: This is the sort of day that tries one's soul. I had a call from our leader about 20 minutes ago which I hope you understand because I didn't. One of the items he forgot to mention to you is the Latin America story which is another one on which he wants a report. He is sure it came out of there, and the Sir Robert Thompson one.

I: He called about the Thompson story in the LA Times. Haldeman called about this one this morning, and I was trying to run it down. I can see how he feels.

K: It's an accumulation of things.

I: Nothing is more irritating or, in fact, damaging.

K: Something is going on, if only a total lack of discipline.

I: I will get a report over on all three of these. It's so hard to pin down -- that's the terribly difficult part.

K: Thank you.

lds

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Don Kendall

12/3/70 5:50 p. m.

DK: Your reputation is improving all the time.

HK: Really? That makes me irresistible.

DK: Just make sure you don't get hooked.

HK: No danger of that.

DK: That fellow heading the National Party in Chile, Sergio Jarpa (SP?). He's the President of the National Party with about 45 members in the congress.

HK: I know who he is.

DK: He is arriving this weekend and would like to see you on the 7th or 8th.

HK: Sure. Whom do I call to fix the date?

DK: I will fix it. I guess I'm the conduit.

HK: Can I call you tomorrow with the time?

DK: Yes, you can just give me the time and I'll give it to him. His contact here is Augustine Edwards.

HK: Consider it done. Maybe I should talk to that guy alone and have you and Edwards in another time. You coming in with the other fellow?

DK: No, I don't have anything to contribute. I don't think I will. He will have an interpreter. He speaks English, but not very well.

HK: Does he speak French?

DK: I don't know.

HK: The interpreter is okay. I will call your office tomorrow with a time.

DK: You are great. Just get the Japanese thing straightened out.

HK: They don't even understand the meaning of the word "honor." I couldn't have misunderstood what we had agreed because I only know what I am told.

DK: They are totally impossible. I hope you have the opportunity some day to give it to them. HK: If I do, believe me, they'll get it.

By NARA, Dale

5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Joe Sisco
12/3/70; 6:20 p.m.

S: That was quite a group -- very hawkish.

K: Which group?

S: The one we just spoke to -- but we both rung a bell. This is one of the best reactions the two of us have gotten in a group. It proves both of us are Hawks. Let's take over some really big enterprise -- you do the thinking and I will make the money. Are you adverse to money?

K: No, but I don't know how to make it.

S: Henry, I sound like a broken record.

K: How about if I will try to get it to you the first thing in the morning.

S: I want it tonight. Wally has got to go in -- want to get a decision on Sunday before Dyan shows up. Try tonight, Henry.

K: Okay.

feg

By [signature] NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Roger Davies
6:43 p.m., December 3, 1970

D: This is Roger Davies.

K: Will you tell your boss he has won another one and it is getting
embarrassing. The letter is on its way back to you now.

D: We are eternally grateful and we will get it out as soon as we receive
it.

K: Will you also tell him he is making my job superfluous and all that
is left is to nitpick.

D: I'll call him at home and tell him.

K: Okay.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

John Ehrlichman/Mr. Kissinger

6:45 p.m., December 3, 1970

E: You know this Coast Guard fracas you have -- we have reviewed these reports because Ziegler wanted to release them. I think they are terrible.

K: I do, too.

E: What do you think about John Dean sending specific questions to State and Transportation for them to answer?

K: I like that. I would like to tell State and Transportation prior to release of the reports that I have turned them over to our legal people. I would love to do that. Give me a sample question.

E: 'When the call was made to Admiral Ellis at his home, what facts were given him?' It's very unfair to hang Admiral Ellis on such a thing -- it appears to be done artfully to screw Ellis. He was home sick. It looks like somebody is trying to ruin his career. It leaves terrible inferences.

K: The guy at State left more inferences than they admitted. I am sure the local Coast Guard people are embarrassed to tears. I would love it if you did this. I will call both departments right now.

E: I have positioned Ziegler if he gets questions about the report that 'we are not taking the first thing given us -- we are not going to be snowed by the bureaucracy.'

K: I like that. Thanks.

lds

NARA. Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Mrs. Freeman

7:09 p.m., December 3, 1970

F: I was calling you -- sorry to interrupt your days.

K: Cut it out, what are you up to? When you call being so demure ...

F: Nothing, I am not up to anything. John leaves on Saturday (?) evening and we have a promised date and I was specifically wondering if you would be free for lunch on Sunday. Roy Jenkins will be here and if you have a young lady here for the weekend, please bring her along.

K: I may not be here, may I let you know?

F: Yes and if you are here and you have nothing better to do ...

K: Let me get it in order, if I am here I will have nothing better to do.
Are you going to the Braden thing on Sunday night?

F: No. ... Remind you of next week.

K: I'll call you, right now there are about 25,000 White House and related activities and I have to decide which of them I will cancel.

F: Talked about the symphony ball and the fact that the Annenbergs will be staying with the Freemans.

K: That will keep John from Camp David.

F: Why doesn't someone tell him?

K: When is John coming back?

F: About the 15th I think, can't be much later than that because of the PM.

wgh

By NARA, Dato

5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
12/3/70; 7:30 p.m.

K: This is one of those goddamned days which make me think academic life is much more peaceful.

J: Why don't we all go home and sleep.

K: On this list of people who signed the goddamn letter -- let me tell you what happened -- personally. I was asked two weeks ago to produce a list and I just sat on it because I thought it would produce nothing but grief and was hoping it would go away. Then it came up again early this week and I again ignored it. He said he needed it in an hour and then apparently changed his mind and said 24 hours. If there is anything useful that you think I could do, I will do my best but . . .

J: Was this triggered by the *Times* article today?

K: No. He has had it on his mind for weeks.

J: That's right, you said . . .

K: It was not anything that was specifically done or not done. . . I never had anything to do with it. I think he has a deal with you and the Secretary.

J: He does and I am all prepared to report on it. I know what he is thinking about. I have not neglected it. I will be prepared to report.

K: I would prefer that you do this through Haldeman.

J: Yes. I have not neglected it and I have no problem in telling him what I have done. I don't think I have to get into individuals' names. I can tell him in general what happened -- on transfers and promotions, how people in Vietnam made out, etc. I am going to do so . . .

K: The numbers have to come out right -- the following number of people had grade one and now they are in grade two -- that sort of thing. I don't know if you have to bother to give names.

J: I have always avoided names.

K: It's up to you to do it how you feel.

J: I can give him something.

K: In this I have not heard anyone doubt your word. I have not heard aspersions on you. Okay, I am not bugging you -- I know that you people have been hit with 25 things during the course of the day.

By NARA. Date 5/26

-2-

J. Yes. I will have something for him tomorrow on that -- I will send it to Bob.

K: Right. I don't want to know about it. I have stayed out of personnel matters -- except Vaky. I plan to bug you on that.

J: I understand -- I will do this through Bob.

K: Unless there is an individual case in which you think I will be helpful.

J: New subject: I called Ron and told him that my only concern was that (I was distracted here and missed part of the sentence) come out in bits and stages by the people on the Hill.

K: There is no worry about your attitude on this. The only problem is what we gave the thing to the Counsel's office. John Dean wants to ask you some questions. I don't know of any question that is directed to you -- one thing they want to know is what was Ellis told. He gets a phone call and all we have in this report is that he got a call. Ehrlichman thinks it is important that we know what he was told -- you see, that's the sort of question Ehrlichman wants to ask.

J: That's perfectly . . .

K: I told him to give me an example and that's the sort of thing he mentioned. There must be two or three addressed to you but he didn't say.

J: The only slight discrepancy is what our Duty Officer was told at 7:30 that night. As a matter of fact . . .

K: Excuse me, it's the President.

feg

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

7:40 p.m., December 3, 1970

By NARA, Date 5/20

K: Mr. President,

P: Do you have someone in your office?

K: No, I am alone.

P: Well, I was just thinking a bit about what we talked about. I have talked to Safire and I have done a little thinking about the Ehrlichman conversation. The major problem is to shape up our own people, not Safire, he is basically Ray but Shultz and Ehrlichman. They see an awful lot of people and if they reflect a little softness by saying maybe Rogers is right and that sort of thing, you see what I mean?

K: Absolutely.

P: You see what I mean, I've reached the point of no return.

K: I think Ehrlichman and Shultz are absolutely loyal to you but sometimes influenced by television and ...

P: And the people they see and talk to. The backgrounders, the Sperling ...

K: The intellectuals here are more impressive to people that don't know them as we do.

P: I look to them not with anger but with sorrow.

K: I think one of your greatest strengths is that you have gone your course while everyone else is yelling and it comes through to the people.

P: I have talked to Safire about that and he believes that is our greatest strength. You and he work together on a plan to do it. Basically the man not the process. Bill has strong feelings on this, you are the only guy that can do it -- the only guy that can do it. You see me more than anyone else, you are the guy who can be the expert on what the President is really like.

K: I'll get together with Bill tomorrow.

P: Take a little ________. Done all you can in foreign policy, the Jordan thing, the Cuban thing. You know baseball, do you remember Joe DiMaggio? He was known as a better hitter but played as a better fielder. The problem is to get out that, Goddamm it, these two -- Defense and State -- opposed us, not Defense but certainly State.

on Cambodia,

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/The President
7:40 p.m., December 3, 1970

K: Make it clearer then. You took this tough decision when everyone else was against it and you have been vindicated.

P: In spite of my own staff, I have never gotten mad.

K: You never lost your composure and during the Jordan crisis ...

P: The only thing, Moynihan said was when I called them bums but I was referring to a bad type of people. A little girl had asked me about people burning.

K: I remember the day that we were going to the Pentagon and you were talking about the Stanford Professor who had lost 30 years and that was on your mind. The sequence of events in Cambodia ?? ? tremendous build-up in May and June.

P: Tell Haig -- he is the only one on your staff you can tell, he knows this -- that this particular point and then I'll tell Rogers when he gets back and tell Mel too, make all the little plays but in the final analysis, we can't let the United States be a second-rate power.

K: I think also it is what the American people will believe. Based on that poll last week, I think you are not in bad shape with the public.

P: [Reasonably well].

K: Eisenhower was not any higher during any comparable period.

P: He came up in '58 (?) because he had a good economy but ???? until '72. Dow Jones went up another 8 points today so your stock is still good.

K: John Ehrlichman made me sell them all.

P: You can do on the staff -- stay out of this business about fighting Rogers and say let's just be thankful that we have got a President who has the guts to stand up.

K: That is your greatest strength and your greatest contribution to the present situation -- I can do that with very great convictions.

(President interrupted in his office)

P: Sorry Henry, Alex was here and I asked him to bring his little girl in -- the one who was in the accident and has her face all smashed up and everything.

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: Incidentally, last night at midnight I was placing a call and the telephone operator said one of the more thrilling things was when he was asked to come to your office along with the other telephone operators. No one ever hears about these things.

P: These are one of the things, Henry. The point is on this business, you have got to help get across the fact that the man is more important than the process. Some guy has got to stand up and make a tough decision and make it go through.

K: I'll get together with Safire tomorrow and work on it.

wgh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Irwin/Kissinger

10:20 am 12/4/70

K: If your patience holds out -- I was just called to the President. His pleasure has not abated. 10:00 am and he has not seen a report of what he asked for.

I: Last night he said 24 hours.

K: That was the other thing. He is counting on action and not just a report that nothing can be done. He demands the names of the 69 people in a sealed envelope at noon.

I: How many?

K: The signers because he hasn't received them. Do me a favor and don't send them through my office. I don't want to be involved in personnel matters. Or a double envelope and I will get it to him. Mention it to Alex. It's his field.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
van der Beugel/Kissinger

10:25 am

12/4/70

V: I am available to be your body guard but I am damned expensive! I am a grandfather !

K: Congratulations!

V: Since Tuesday.

K: This plot is put out by rivals for girls favors and my staff is now hoping for another chance. They have always hoped I would have a physical collapse. I am delighted about your own news.

V: I will be in the Regency until Thurs. and if you call in the morning I will be in the hotel until 10:00 in the morning.

K: I may be there this weekend. How about dinner?

V: Dinner is difficult but I could see you. If we can't see each other -- I cannot come to Washington -- then a quiet chat on the phone. At the Regency on Sat. and Sun. until 10:00 am and other days between 8:00 and 9:00. I will WAIT for your call.

K: Excellent.

V: You are fine?

K: In good shape.

V: Perhaps we can have a chat. I want to discuss a few things. I'm in Room 1034.

K: If I am in NY, perhaps we can get together for half an hour. I will be calling you.

By NARA, Dated 5/26

TELCOM
Kraslow/Kissinger
10:55 am 12/4/70

HAK: When we talked yesterday I told you that for the sake of conscience I would look into it. I don't want a story because it's not good for the country to have intelligence matters in the papers.

K: You know I deal frankly with you. There's going to another story. I have information from the Hill.

HAK: Just for your own thinking and in no basis for Zeigler saying there was full coordination -- Zeigler couldn't say further without checking with me -- the mock up model on which this was rehearsed was made by the CIA.

K: In August?

HAK: No, October. This you cannot use. It's a fact.

K: I see.

HAK: That's the basis for Zeigler's statement.

K: Is that what you consider full coordination?

HAK: No, I am just giving you this. In lieu of giving all the details I wanted to give you this fact.

K: The CIA was asked for information on layout of camp. This was matter of advice Agency was asked for.

HAK: I don't want to go into -- I understand.

K: Other than that there was no other consultation with the Agency on this matter.

HAK: That's not true. I don't want to go into it and we will not say anything more. They were asked about the impact on the Chinese and Hanoi, about the ??

K: Henry, I love you but --

HAK: That's what Helms tells me.

K: I know what I know and what others know. This will not compromise the security of the country. You would do a serious public service by documenting this. I don't think it can be documented. I am convinced this didn't happen.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Kraslow/Kissinger

10:55 am

12/4/70

-2-

HAK: Then someone is lying to me.

K: I am just saying you know me and I don't fabricate. I would go into this before doing a story. I am satisfied that one contact on providing information on the layout of the camp, Agency was in the dark and put in later stages. You are the scholar in understanding what happens in a national security bureaucracy. Maybe you were relying on what the Secretary of Defense and DIA said to make contacts to get the best possible intelligence and perhaps the fault was there.

HAK: That's essentially the way it was handled.

K: If you were at Harvard trying to re-construct this you would wonder if it were wise not to check all intelligence on this mission. That the WH relied on the Secretary of Defense and DIA is best information on assumption they did go to CIA for whatever they had.

HAK: I am satisfied that they asked questions beyond that and they were answered.

K: You couldn't document it. Dates, telephone conversations, people contacted.

HAK: I appreciate you are a careful reporter and I understand what you are saying.

K: Is it not possible that people in the Pentagon were so determined to pull it off there was hasty judgment? Not interested in getting CIA information? There's a history of this ever back 4-5 years ago.

HAK: I have to run off. I just wanted to give you this information.

K: You are sure of October.

HAK: I know it was after Sept. 24.

K: Mock up?

HAK: Yes.

K: And constructed by CIA. But I cannot use this.

HAK: Right.

K: I will use what I got from the Hill.

By [她的] NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE
U. A. Johnson/Kissinger
4:22 pm 12/4/70

K: On that envelope you gave me today. I made an appeal to the President to return it to you and he has agreed.

J: I appreciate that.

K: If you want to come by at 6:30 or if you want me to send it by messenger, I will.

J: I would like to come by. Is 6:30 okay?

K: Yes. He has it now but said I could have it when he leaves. We both have the same ______ here. memos are not the subject.

J: John Ehrlichman said he is sending over a memo --

K: Hasn't mentioned it to me.

J: I am very anxious to get it.

K: He can send them over and if you have a question about one question, call me.

J: I wanted both you and Ehrlichman to see them and said I would get them to me about 2:00.

K: I can't get to them this afternoon. I will have him send it and you can call about anything that raises questions. I can't contribute. I have given you everything.

J: Have your office send them over.

K: I will have Dean send them over.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Bonnie Angelo (Time)

12/4/70 5:17 p. m.

A: Isn't this a story? !

K: I love it. I am so flattered. I can only say at my level of income I cannot afford ivory elephants.

A: How about marble?

K: That's not a bad idea. How did they find out? Actually I did try to get her one, but I couldn't get it up the hill.

A: Why not? Hannibal did it.

K: But that was in the Alps. This is in Southern California.

A: Are you telling me that you are not getting an elephant in Southeast Asia?

K: Well, now that you have found out, the real reason for the raid on Sontay . . . is that we discovered there was a huge granite elephant right in the center of the village square. The village elder was confused as hell: these Americans drop in, blow some of the place up and run off with their elephant. Listen, don't be ridiculous. Off the record, my strategy for women is to do nothing for them. That drives them crazy.

A: Just let them come whimpering after you. She looked good on TV last week. Did you see her?

K: No, but someone else told me it was good.

[Talk about the TV program.]

A: You mean Jill St. John is not going to get an elephant from Henry Kissinger now or in the immediate future?

K: She is not going to get an elephant from Henry Kissinger now or ever.

A: She will be crushed. I will tell New York, sorry to shoot down their story, but it's not true.

K: But you thought it was a good story?

A: Yes, it had a nifty sound about it.

K: Well, I am relaxed about the state of the world if they are going around starting stories like this.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Geo. Shultz/Kissinger

5:40 pm

12/4/70

K: Having failed to return your call for 24 hours we know who matters here.

S: We know that. I have some additional stuff and I would like to drop down. I would like to discuss Jim Schlessinger. Can you do it now?

K: I have someone with me. How about first thing in the morning?

S: I have a budget meeting at 10:00.

K: Do you want to have breakfast?

S: No, about 9:00? I eat before that.

K: Score one for Mr. Shultz. Do you want me to come there?

S: No, I will come to your quarters. They are so elegant.

By NARA, Dated 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Yost
12/4/70; 6:50 p.m.

K: I have been meaning to call you for a long time and I take it
Alex has kept you informed on my feeling.

Y: No. I have not heard from him.

K: Well, I have been in close touch with him to tell him of my
admiration of how you have conducted yourself. I understand you are
having a staff party today. The President will not be able to come
there even though he is in town and he wishes to express his appreciation
to you and your staff for what you have done during the Assembly --
will you share that with them.

Y: I will be glad to do that.

K: When you come to Washington, do look in on me.

Y: I hope to be down on Tuesday.

K: Please come in.

Y: Okay

K: Do share our thoughts on this with your colleagues. My best to
you.

feg

By Φ NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Amb. Freeman

12/5/70 12:55 p.m.

K: Two problems before you go off. One, in the exuberance of our social office, which is not exactly clued in on diplomatic problems, I want you to be aware of the fact that Alphand, who happens to be in town when the Prime Minister is here, was invited to the dinner. It would not have been the choice of more rational people.

F: Yes, it might have been more happily arranged, but we understand what happened.

K: It's bad enough to invite a Frenchman but one who doesn't like Englishmen...

F: And a generally unpleasant personality too.

K: I just hope to seat him out of harm's way.

F: That was not one of my more diplomatic remarks -- I withdraw it.

K: If you could explain to your people that this was not intended.

F: I will make certain it is understood.

K: It's just a product of an effort to make certain that every so often Rose Woods has something to do. Secondly, we have this Algerian situation on Portugal... on G______. As far as I understand, the resolution is taking on ______ forms. We have two broad strategies -- we can try to get a better resolution or try to keep it as bad as possible and veto it. If we have to bargain and then veto anyway, that would be a good cause for not trying to improve it. I have not discussed this with the President; I am just giving you my own thinking. The State Department will probably have slightly different ideas about it. I would like to know what you intend to do.

F: I understand and will try to find out for you.

K: I am not recommending that you veto, but if France, we and you took a joint Stand, that would be one thing.

F: I see your point. This is a very difficult one because it is not a good idea to veto unless from a position of considerable strength -- theoretically and numerically.

K: But we can't acquiesce... and perhaps if they directed against commercial and military moves...

F: I will make some inquiries but probably Millard will have to get back to you on this.

By NARA. Date 5/26

Telecon
Amb. Freeman

12/5/70 12:55 p.m. page 2

K: Okay, have him get back in touch with my Assistant, Marshall
Wright on this. And let's keep this between your office and mine/

F: Yes, this is just shaping your thinking. I understand this.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Catherine Freeman

12/5/70 1:00 p.m.

K: How would Wednesday evening be, to get right to the point.

F: Just fine. When? Do you want to come pick me up? Shall I
come to your office? How forward can a girl get? Do you really want to?

K: Well really it's a terrible imposition, but I feel in a benign mood.

F: You bastard!

K: Of course I want to do it.

F: Okay, Wednesday I will keep free and you come when you can get
away.

K: About 8:00 or 8:30?

F: Fine.

K: Do you have any preferences as to where?

F: No, you lead and I will follow.

K: You are not a submissive type.

F: But I will put on a good act.

K: You are not totally convincing.

F: Really, anywhere at all is fine and very nice. Seriously, if it's
possible to be serious with you.

K: That's a very diplomatic thing for the wife of an Ambassador to
say to the Assistant to the President...

F: I'm finished with diplomacy. Seriously, if something does keep
you I will be completely understanding.

K: See you Wednesday.

F: Good.