Nuclear Problem—Where Do We Go from Here?

183

lines: (1) its mission must be redefined, (2) its vulnerability must be reduced and (3) its deployment must be changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use of battlefield weapons according to purely military criteria would surely obliterate the combat zone, and this cannot be in the interest of any threatened country. Thus the mission of the tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered in isolation from the other, primarily strategic, operations which will be taking place. This makes it necessary to redefine some traditional military missions. For example, given the range of modern weapons, air superiority can be obtained —if at all—only by deep penetration of hostile territory on a scale indistinguishable from general nuclear war. Such operations should not be conducted by a theater commander fully occupied with the land battle. This is why all weapons above a certain range (say 300 miles) should be put under the NATO Strategic Command described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons that remain under sacre-dos command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine the requirement of relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons remaining on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, presents different problems when thousands of weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communications system could withstand such a strain.

During the Presidential campaign of 1964, it was pro-

186 The Strategic Issues

vene rapidly either in a land battle in Europe or in distant theaters.

## CONCLUSION—THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

The military organization of the Alliance would then appear as follows:

1. There would be an Allied Nuclear Force. It would be constituted from existing NATO weapons above a range of, say, 300 miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States, together with long-range delivery vehicles now on the Continent, and an eventual French contribution. If the MLF survives the re-examination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.¹

2. SACEUR would retain tactical nuclear weapons up to a range of, say, 300 miles. However, their deployment would be altered in order to create real conventional and nuclear options. Their number would be related to the existing missions.

3. The deployment of conventional forces would clearly reflect their primary mission of acting as a screening force and furnishing a strategic reserve.

However, no arrangement of military forces will, of itself, solve the problems of the Alliance. The ultimate challenge lies in the political field. It is whether NATO can develop common purposes and whether it can devise a political structure that combines community with flexibility.

¹ See Chapter 8.

232 Political Prospects

share in it, much as the commitment of Britain and France to the European balance of power permitted the United States to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941.

Thus, European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than reduce differences. As Europe gains structure, it will be in a better position to insist on differences whose ultimate cause is structural rather than personal. Phrases like "indivisible interest" are correct when applied to the defense of Europe or East-West relations; they come close to being platitudes in other parts of the world. A wise Alliance policy will not gear everything to the expectation that common positions can be developed on a global basis; it will also take account of the fact that the interests of Europe and America are not identical everywhere.

This fact is relevant to any assessment of the degree of tenses. The behavior of our Allies toward American requests integration of Atlantic policy which it is in our interest to promote. Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European Allies will almost certainly consider that their vital interests are not at stake in these areas. If Atlantic policy is completely centralized, it may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only on doing nothing. Or else, it will engage in a series of pre-for assistance in Vietnam is a good example. The Soviets may use our involvements in other continents as a pretext to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point.

Looking beyond the immediate future, it is not difficult to visualize an increasingly powerful China fomenting the already strong tendencies toward turmoil in other parts of the world. If we insist on remaining the sole trustee of policy everywhere, including Europe, the strain on our resources

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership? 233

and ingenuity may well be too great. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny.

If we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence. Each partner will regain a measure of flexibility. The temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Europe could assume greater responsibility for its defense and its future. Put positively, the Atlantic Alliance will have to decide whether to emphasize immediate convenience or long-term political vitality. At any given point of time, centralization of decisions guarantees the greatest degree of coordination. Critics of such schemes can always be put on the defensive by being accused of fomenting distrust. In the long term, however, excessive concentration of decision-making in the hands of the senior partner may deprive our Allies of the incentive to be responsible and it may create profound fissures when a conflict of interest becomes apparent.

This suggests that the vitality of the Alliance would be served by an Allied structure which makes possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues. For responsible attitudes to emerge, participants in a consultative process must do more than simply advise. Influencing another country's actions—however benevolent the dominant partner may be—will be demoralizing in the long run. If coalition diplomacy becomes largely an exercise in affecting essentially American decisions, most of our Allies will lose the incentive to make responsible judgments. The type of leader comfortable with such a relationship may be only too ready to shift

CHAPTER SIX

(August 10, 1965)

# THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM--WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

## Strategic Weapons

The nuclear problem in the Alliance has four components: (1) The United States would like to establish central control over the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. The ideal solution from the point of view of the Pentagon is to deprive all Allies of the physical capacity to act autonomously in the nuclear field. (2) Two of our Allies, Great Britain and France, have national nuclear weapons programs. (3) It is desirable to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and elsewhere. (4) The MLF negotiations have established or confirmed (depending on the point of view) the claims of non-nuclear Allies to participate in nuclear control and, perhaps, to some form of ownership of nuclear weapons.

No program could perfectly reconcile all these objectives, partly because each Ally has two somewhat contradictory aims with respect to nuclear policy, partly because there is an inherent inconsistency between the attempt to establish central control over nuclear weapons and the jealously with which each major Ally, including the United States, has heretofore guarded its sovereignty.

- 2 -

The two contradictory aims of the Allies sometimes tend to cancel each other out: Each Ally wants to avoid being forced into nuclear war against its will, and it wants to be certain of nuclear support when its existence is at stake.

What our Allies understand by nuclear support is less clear. They want the *appearance* of nuclear support so that the Soviets never challenge their vital interests. Whether they are actually prepared to face the consequences of nuclear war is ambiguous. Their tendency to base NATO's military policy entirely on deterrence suggests that many of them may be above all concerned with their veto if nuclear war seemed imminent. They may be more interested in not being forced into nuclear war against their will than in being able to force us into a nuclear war against our will.

The ambivalence of our Allies underlines the incompatibility between central control over nuclear weapons and undiluted sovereignty. If no conflict of interest among the Allies were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering ability would not exist. But as a sovereign state is the final judge of its interests, absolute reassurance is unobtainable. No one can

- 3 -

predict with certainty how hard-pressed leaders will react under the
unprecedented stresses of imminent nuclear war--not only with respect to
the decision to use nuclear weapons but also with respect to the many
nuances of bargaining during crises. The single-mindedness with which the
United States has always guarded its freedom of decision is as significant
a symptom of this dilemma as France's exessively theoretical claims to
independence.

American proposals--including the MLF--have largely avoided this
problem. The United States, starting from the technically unexceptionable
premise that the conduct of nuclear war should be centrally controlled, has
tried hard to create a structure in NATO which deprives our Allies of the
physical capacity to act independently. We have been less ready to face the
inevitable corollary: Those nations which are being asked to entrust their
nuclear defense to the United States will urge, in return, a commensurate
surrender of American sovereignty in the political field. To insist on
centralized strategy while diplomacy remains national guarantees mounting
disputes.

- 4 -

France, on the other hand, has expressed the implications of
sovereignty clearly and correctly, but it has neglected the technical
requirements of nuclear strategy. In the face of the risks of a nuclear
holocaust, no country can have complete freedom of decision--least of all
a nation with a nuclear force strong enough to start a nuclear war but far
too weak to finish it. While the United States has overemphasized the
technical aspects of central command and control, France and those Europeans
agreeing with her have pushed the legal implications of sovereignty to a point
where they clash with the technical realities of the nuclear age.

We react bitterly when Europeans suggest that no one can foresee
how even the most solemn commitments will be interpreted in the stark
circumstances of a nuclear showdown. But when we argue *against* the nuclear
forces of Britain and France, we seem to understand the problems produced
by sovereignty very well. Then we tend to reverse the field and use the
arguments which our nuclear European Allies invoke against us and thereby
generate suspicions where none had been articulated before. Thus J. Robert
Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, explained why even a joint

- 5 -

Franco-British nuclear force which shared command and control responsibilities
with other European countries would still not meet the need as he saw it:

> An agreed European control mechanism would still not answer the basic question of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement --the powers which owned and operated the nuclear forces--in fact consult and collaborate on an equal basis with their associate members?¹

Carrying Schaetzel's argument one step further, it may be relevant to ask why, if our European Allies cannot rely upon formal commitments among themselves, they should have absolute trust in the United States, which is 3,000 miles away and has a recent history of isolation.

The debate about nuclear control has reversed the real priorities.

It has created the impression that differences about political purposes can be resolved by a technical expedient in the military field. Allies that cannot agree on a common diplomacy on much less vital questions are asked to accept unitary direction in the stark and catastrophic contingency of nuclear war.

Instead of attempting to unify foreign policy and long-range planning, the dominant schemes of nuclear control leave these to existing processes of

¹J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-64), pp. 565-566.

consultation while putting all the energies behind the creation of
technically integrated nuclear forces.

The opposite course would be much wiser. Focussing attention on the
conduct of nuclear operations causes the Allied debate to be beset by
confusions and evasions. Discussions about nuclear war are inherently
unreliable because no government can be certain about its actions when the
lives of its entire population are quite literally at stake. To pretend
that a voting formula or any other essentially legal construction will
oblige a government to go to nuclear war when its convictions dictate
otherwise is to ignore the most fundamental reality of the nuclear age:
In the past a nation's reputation for reliability often seemed more
important to it than its fear of the consequences of war. No serious
person can pretend that the possibility of wiping out entire populations
has not changed this relationship.

Thus in the nuclear age alliances will hold together only if their
members grow so intimate politically that they consider their vital interests
virtually indistinguishable. If this condition is met, the physical

arrangement of nuclear forces is relatively unimportant. If a political
consensus does not exist, arguments about the conduct of nuclear war
only accentuate the underlying difficulty when they do not confuse it.

Indeed, to the extent that debates about nuclear control magnify
existing political disputes, they achieve the opposite of what they
attempt to promote. They may erect a facade of Allied unity which will
prove brittle under stress. The discussions about the MLF and even
about the British substitute--the Allied Nuclear Force--illustrate this.
Some countries--especially Great Britain and almost certainly the United
States--favor these new constructions only if they guarantee a perpetuation
of the American veto. Others--notably the Federal Republic and probably
Italy--will agree to them only if they contain a "European" clause, that is
if the new nuclear force can in time become European and free of the American
veto. This difference in approach can be overcome only through formula
which evade the real issue and permit the partners to maintain often conflicting
constructions. In short, any new nuclear force, when it becomes serious,
will repeat within its framework all the debates which it is designed to

- 8 -

resolve. The amity its creation would seem to produce would be more
apparent than real.

Thus the major focus of Allied debate should shift away from the
creation of new nuclear forces to building the political consensus which
alone can give military forces their meaning. This seems to be the direction
indicated by Secretary McNamara's proposal at the NATO Defense Ministers'
meeting in June, 1965 for a select Committee within the Alliance to deal
with nuclear matters.

Up to that time, the United States had been reluctant to shift its
emphasis for three reasons: (1) the desire to suppress the national nuclear
forces of Britain and France, (2) the corollary that autonomy in the nuclear
field for some of our allies--or for a European force--would jeopardize our
security and (3) concern that the Federal Republic might harbor a sense of
discrimination if France and Britain remained the sole allies in possession
of nuclear weapons.

- 9 -

The desire to suppress the national programs of France and Britain has had the paradoxical result that we have been prepared to bring the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear business--as long as they accepted an American veto--in the hope that this might thwart the efforts of our nuclear Allies. We have been less concerned about the proliferation of nuclear know-how which the MLP is bound to bring than about eliminating the already existing centers of nuclear decision within the Alliance. We have preferred establishing yet another nuclear force--provided it was subject to an American veto--rather than concede in theory the autonomy which France and Britain already possess in practice.

The debate engendered by this policy has been more conductive to self-righteousness than to sober thought. By placing so much stress on the actual conduct of nuclear operations, we have forced our Allies into inherently misleading justifications of their nuclear programs. They have projected the remote nightmare of the failure of the Alliance into the present; we in turn have confused their fears with their preferences.

[Y]

- 10 -

But the real concern behind pressure for European autonomy goes deeper. Europeans have had too much experience with nuances of interpretation which can all but nullify formal commitments; indeed, at some point, all of them have felt obliged to leave some ally to his fate. The concern for a European role in nuclear affairs expresses a desire to obtain a measure of insurance against the unforeseeable events of which European history is so full. The problem posed by American strategic doctrine is that it seeks to gear the structure of the Alliance to a contingency--the outbreak of general nuclear war--which our Allies consider tantamount to their end as functioning societies. Their primary concern is therefore to prevent this contingency by complicating the predictability of nuclear operations. The thrust of their efforts is to increase their influence before hostilities start, during day-to-day diplomacy and in crisis management.

As for the argument that the British and French nuclear programs jeopardize our own security because they may force us into a nuclear war against our will, this is carrying logical extrapolations to extremes. France and Great Britain

- 11 -

must know at least as well as we--though we can hardly expect them to advertise this fact--that using their nuclear forces independently against the Soviet Union would be a desperate last resort. The French and British nuclear programs are not a strategic preference but an attempt to provide insurance against a disastrous contingency within Europe and against nuclear developments in other parts of the world. Taking out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary, it may prevent a remote possibility from turning into an obsession and thus free energies for more constructive tasks.

Even from the United States point of view there are important reasons for modifying our heretofore doctrinaire opposition to other centers of nuclear decision within the Western Alliance. It is, of course, highly desirable that the spread of nuclear weapons be arrested. It is less clear that this objective is furthered by concentrating our pressures against our closest allies. There is no evidence that the nuclear program of Communist China was in the slightest influenced by the example of Great Britain or that its willingness to end its nuclear efforts depends in any sense on the actions of our European allies.

The same is true of the possible nuclear programs of India, Israel or Egypt.

- 12 -

[Y]

When the real danger of nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of anti-Western countries, it is not clear that the first remedial step should be the elimination of the nuclear programs of our closest allies. Would it not be wiser to concentrate our anti-proliferation policy on countries which may join the nuclear club in the future? Is it really in our interest to be the only Western country possessing nuclear weapons? Is it not likely that in that case all pressures around the world will eventually concentrate against us while our European allies sink into the irresponsibility of the impotent?

To be sure, two national nuclear forces are not the ideal way to share nuclear responsibility within the Alliance. A united European force coordinated with that of the United States would be preferable. But policy must work with the material at hand. It can not chose the theoretical at the expense of the attainable. For the immediate future, the issue is whether a European force should develop--if at all--out of the existing European nuclear programs or whether it should grow out of a new structure, such as the MLF. To be sure, the MLF may well wreck any prospect of a European nuclear identity because of the divisions within Europe

- 13 -

which it will inevitably produce and also because countries having once left
the nuclear field are not likely to re-enter via the supranational route. But
if it _should_ lead to a European nuclear force--as some of its proponents urge--the
MLF will have shifted the nuclear balance within Europe toward presently
non-nuclear countries, which are much more vulnerable to pressures than Britain
and France. Thus the MLF is either a poor starting point for a European force
or it will bring into being the kind of European nuclear force which would create
the greatest long-term difficulties.

On both sides of the Atlantic serious individuals oppose a European
nuclear force because they fear that it would lead to a reakless European policy
and to an eventual withdrawal of the United States from Europe. But what exactly
is the danger posed by European autonomy in the nuclear field? Is the problem the
essentially technical one of coordinating legally autonomous forces in a common
strategy? Or is the concern deeper? Are we really worried lest, for whatever
reason, Europe may feel so desperate or behave so irresponsibly that it would
be prepared to go to nuclear war against our wishes and in the full knowledge that

this would mean the end of its existence as a functioning society? If divisions
in the Atlantic area ever reach this point, the Alliance will have come to an
end whether or not a European nuclear force exists. If our Allies should feel
forsaken, they would sooner or later re-enter the nuclear field or else withdraw
into sullen neutralism. A wise United States policy will not invest American
prestige in forcing our Allies into a structure which makes autonomous action
physically impossible. Rather it will create a relationship which grants autonomy
while reducing the desire for it.

With such an attitude, the coordination of technically autonomous nuclear
forces should not prove an insuperable problem. Indeed it is likely that nuclear
autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity. In the economic field,
competition between Europe and the United States involves, at best, indirect
risks. In the political area, the temptations for independent action are great and
the penalties small. In military matters--and particularly in the nuclear field--the
closest association between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of
both sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is inconceivable that our Allies

- 15 -

would _prefer_ to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and _without_ the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal. Close coordination between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by self-interest; and Europe has more to gain from it than the United States.

This is not to say that the United States should actively promote a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should show more restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for an alternative--the MLF--which will in time cause much greater difficulties and which involves a much greater degree of nuclear proliferation. No final solution is possible so long as the Alliance remains composed of sovereign states. Any interim arrangement should therefore be consistent with the most constructive evolution of European and Atlantic relationships.

- 16 -

[y]

This suggests that any new Allied construction in the nuclear field
should be based on the existing nuclear forces; it should emphasize political
unity rather than military structures; and it should leave open the evolution
of European autonomy in the nuclear field.

Would such a course discriminate against the Federal Republic and
thus alienate her? It is to render a poor service to responsible Germans
to encourage pressures which in the name of German equality confuse the issues.
Germany's role in the Alliance is not furthered by devices which are either
misleading or irrelevant. For example, it is not clear what is achieved
by pressing for the mixed-manning either of British submarines or of British
airplanes. If Britain retains control over its nuclear forces, disguising
this fact will multiply distrust later on. If Britain is to leave the nuclear
field, it is not easy to see in what way Germany's security is enhanced. It is
possible to argue that an autonomous British nuclear force does not add to
deterrence; it is not plausible that it could impair it. Subjecting the
British nuclear force to multiple vetoes eliminates its chief significance:

- 17 -

that of adding an element of uncertainty to an aggressor's calculations.

Is it really in the Federal Republic's interest to encourage it to strain
its relations with France for this objective--all the more so as the
practical consequence could well be to enhance the long-term role of the
French nuclear force?

Some argue that as long as the nuclear forces of the Alliance remain
national, no assurance exists that these forces will not be withdrawn in
times of crisis. But every existing scheme--ANF, MLF or a mixture of the
two--would leave the major part of the United States strategic forces under
national control and this is surely the key element of any strategy. In
order to avoid this problem, there have been experiments with such formula
as "irrevocable assignment". But it is not healthy for the Alliance to
waste energies on legalistic clauses which obscure reality. Assignment--as
we have seen--is always hypothetical. Assigned forces can be used only if
there is a decision to go to war by the national government to which they
belong according to its constitutional processes. And no sovereign government

- 18 -

is going to be forced to go to war against its will--no matter what the
arrangement of nuclear forces and regardless of the label under which
they are grouped. A nuclear structure depending initially on the coordination
of national nuclear forces is no protection against situations in which the
Alliance has already collapsed. But neither is the MLF, which could be
paralyzed by a single veto. There is no technical or legal expedient which
can serve as a substitute for political unity or which could protect the
Alliance against failure to achieve it.

The real test of any new structure as far as the Federal Republic is concerned is its ability to provide full political equality. Participation in vital negotiations should not depend on the possession of a national nuclear arsenal. The Federal Republic must have a real opportunity to contribute to the formulation of positions in such fields as disarmament while they are still fluid. In other words, political unity must precede nuclear integration.

To reverse the process is to sow the seeds of unending disputes.

- 19 -

[Y]

Thus until either Atlantic or European political cohesion progresses further, the nuclear policy of the Alliance should be three-pronged: (1) There is need for a political mechanism to plan long-term policy, to manage crises and to control the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. This may require the establishment of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy and a rotating representative of the smaller countries. (2) The military advice to this Committee should come from a group of senior officers from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It might be useful to charge the NATO Standing Group with this task. In that case it would have to be expanded to include the Federal Republic, and its seat would have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) The existing strategic nuclear forces in the Alliance, including that part of the United States force earmarked for the defense of Europe, should be coordinated--either through an Allied Nuclear Force of some other arrangement--in a way which

The functions of this Committee are described in Chapter 8.

- 20 -

leaves open the evolution of a European force. The Federal Republic should be given an equal voice with its nuclear allies in the targeting and deployment of these nuclear forces. In bringing such a force into being, the Alliance should strive to reduce existing rifts rather than magnify them. The participation of France is more important than theological debates about the relative merits of integration and coordination. The joint planning of technically autonomous nuclear forces is more significant than the facade of "earmarking," "assignment" and other devices which confuses all issues.

The United States has obvious interests with respect to the European components of such a structure. The following criteria seem most important:

(1) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite pre-emptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability. (2) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction.

(3) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response. (4) They should be coordinated as part of a common NATO strategy.

- 21 -

As for the Command Structure, the sensible arrangement from a military
point of view would be to place all weapons above a certain range (say three
hundred miles) under a separate NATO Strategic Command. From a strictly
military point of view, SACEUR (The Supreme Commander Europe) will have his
hands full conducting the land battle. He should not, at the same time, be
responsible for what amounts to a segment of general nuclear war.

At the same time, some of our allies, especially the Federal Republic,
see in the control by SACEUR of nuclear weapons a guarantee against nuclear
disengagement. These allies seem to feel that since SACEUR is located in
Europe he will be more sensitive to European needs than Washington. In these
circumstances a reconstruction of the Command should await the elaboration
of political mechanisms to restore confidence. However, the attempt to
freeze the existing command structure in order to avoid undesirable political
changes demonstrates the need for a recasting of the processes of political
consultation. If a political consensus continues to be lacking, difficult
problems--such as arms control--will always arise at a moment of maximum

- 22 -

embarassment. Distrust will grow. A military commander cannot possibly
be used to paper over this problem indefinitely. Its solution must be
sought by developing a political program for the Alliance as a whole.

Within the outlined here framework, the Alliance could finally address itself to
the tasks which must be undertaken rather than spend energy on legalistic
debates about who has a right to do what in circumstances that no one can
describe. With some insurance available for the improbable contingency
that the United States might interpret its interests differently from those
of Europe, our Allies are likely to come to conclusions very similar to
ours about the desirability of a strategy which provides multiple options.

a framework for giving the existing strategic forces a clearly defined
mission. It would create a structure that France could ultimately join,
if not under its present government, certainly under its successor. As
compared to the MLF the United States would sacrifice some measure of physical
control out the Alliance as a whole would gain in political cohesion. This

[Y]

- 23 -

arrangement would differ from previous arrangements of nuclear forces
because it would include a political mechanism for managing crises for
the Alliance as a whole and because it would create an explicit Allied
strategic war.

Such an arrangement provides the greatest flexibility with respect
to the future. If European political integration progresses, the European
contingents in the Allied nuclear structure can merge into a European
nuclear force. If desired by the European members, the Western European
Union could be given official status in the various political and military
bodies from the beginning. If integration proceeds more slowly, the major
Allies can contribute individually to the planning of Allied nuclear policy.
In either case, the United States will remain closely linked to Europe
through a structure which leaves the Europeans free to develop their own
initiatives. An Allied nuclear structure in which an American contingent
is an integral part and which controlled all the weapons relevant to its
mission would be a better symbol of the indivisibility of Atlantic interests

- 24 -

than an MLF whose strategic role would be, at best, marginal. By ending the debate about integration as against coordination, the greatest possibility exists to obtain eventual French collaboration.

For this to be achieved a change in attitude on both sides of the Atlantic is needed. The United States would have to abandon its futile insistence on maintaining physical control of all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Some of our Allies would have to stop extolling the theoretical virtues of autonomy and begin dealing with the problem of how autonomous nuclear forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical virtues of "integration." But our Allies--especially the French--bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs because they have never spelled out concretely what they mean by their alternative of coordination. If abstract and doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current disputes from hopeless. Arguments about the right of independent action in the nuclear field are

MCGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

A DIVISION OF MCGRAW-HILL, INC.

330 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

DEC 1 1966

November 22, 1966

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Studies
Room 105
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Your book, THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP, has been under consideration
by Minerva Forlag of Oslo in view of a Norwegian translation.
Minerva now informs us that they would like to publish your book
in Norway, provided they will receive permission to make some cuts.

Enclosed, I am sending to you a copy of this book which was marked
up by Minerva and in which you will find on the following pages the
proposed changes: 4,9,13,15-16,23-28,39,42-43,43,44,54,76,79,82,91,
127,130,132,133,137,140,154,156,157-159,170,173,192-93,194,215,223-
24,228,230,231,235,236-37,238-39,240,241-42,243,248-51.

Would you please let me know at your earliest convenience if you
agree to the Norwegian publisher's proposals. I am sure that this
would clear the way for a Norwegian translation.

Looking forward to hearing from you, I remain,

AvdM/mc
Enclosure

cc Miss Sylvia Baruch

Henry V. Klauder

It's
I look forward to receiving a copy of
for the Norwegian edition of my book.
you were able to work everything out
February 14. I am very pleased that
Thank you for your letter of

Dear Mr. van der Marck:

New York, N. Y. 10036
330 West 42nd Street
McGraw-Hill Book Company
Foreign Rights Department
Mr. Alfred van der Marck, Manager
February 24, 1964

February 24, 1964