["KISS4", "DEPT.", "PAGE-3", "The new Soviet policy may have created a Frankenstein. To weaken the Atlantic Alliance Moscow must appear to invite greater ties between East and West. But as the Federal Republic and to a lesser extent the other countries of West Europe increase their activities and investments in Eastern Europe, the centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet empire will accelerate. Bonn's slogan that it seeks to ease the lives of ordinary East Europeans is no doubt sincere. But to the extent that policy succeeds, it may lead to a reemergence of the competition between TUTON and Slav that produced two world wars. Confronted with a growing erosion of its position in Eastern Europe, Moscow may decide to intervene militarily. A new crisis over Berlin may seem farfetched today, but is conceivable if the Soviets feel pressed to demonstrate the limits of Western power behind the Iron Curtain. If that should happen-even as an act of desperation-the present euphoric mood in the West will switch to hysteria.", "Soviet policy, whether by design or inadvertence, has returned the diplomatic focal point to Europe-a situation that requires", "[24]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS4", "DEPT.", "PAGE-4", "more far-reaching decisions by Moscow\nthan by Washington. The time has come for\nthe first grand discussion about the politi-\ncal future of all of Europe since the out-\nbreak of World War I. The Soviet formula\nof a European House is too clever by half.\nAfter all, it was the projection of Soviet\npower into the center of Europe that led to\nthe creation of the Atlantic Alliance and\nthe Marshall Plan. For America to leave a\nEuropean House that includes Russia\nwould bring about the very kind of hegemo-\nny that we fought two wars to prevent.\nNeither Washington nor its European al-\nlies can possibly be interested in that\noutcome.→", "[19]", "But there is another approach that could\ndramatically alter the frozen landscape. It\nwould be based on the realization that\nthere are only two solutions for Europe:\neither both the US and the USSR are pre-\nsent in force, or they both substantially\nreduce their military and political pres-\nence. In that concept, the European House\nwould extend from the Polish-Soviet fron-\ntier to the Atlantic. Its core would be a\nunited Western Europe.→", "[11]", {"bbox": [763, 1432, 896, 1455], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["KISS4", "DEPT.", "PAGE-5", "□ A thoughtful exploration of this subject would seek to bring home to Soviet leaders that by identifying their security with unpopular regimes, they have mortgaged their policy to the repression of periodic upheavals—in other words a counterrevolutionary policy. In the long run, aren’t arrangements in Finland more useful to Soviet security than those of Eastern Europe? Is it possible to devise security arrangements that would meet Soviet military concerns (widely defined) while permitting the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their own political future? Under such a system, it would be possible to conceive a drastic reduction of all outside forces in Europe—including those of the U.S.—that might revolutionize present concepts of security.+", "□ This is not a negotiation that would lend itself to formal diplomacy conducted by conveys of diplomats and technicians. Its initial phase must be highly confidential. It can only succeed if Europe is an active participant in partner. Thus it requires rapid progress toward West European integration.+", "[19]", "[7]", {"bbox": [762, 1386, 894, 1408], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

KISS5
VER # 00

DEPT.

BU:
PG:

MWHITA

HJ: Y 00163 LINES(INCL.HEAD)
ISSUE: ; 88B
KISS5 -BZ-NWK
MWHITA ;09/09,12:16

/

Asian Perspectives+

11111111111111111111

□Gorbachev has made essentially the same appeal in Asia as in Europe: that the United States has become dispensable to Asian security. But the impact has been different.+

[1]

□The Asian nations have learned the lessons of European colonialism and of their own national experience. They are preoccupied in a manner no longer conceivable in Europe by their relations with each other. They do not look for a transcendent end to international tensions. They will try to assess the trade-off between a decline in Soviet ideological dynamism and a potential increase in Soviet power should perestroika succeed. They will seek to evaluate whether American actions reflect a long-range strategy, a decline in American strength or domestic incoherence. Compared with the Western democracies, the

[5]

(((MORE))))

["KISS5", "DEPT.", "Asian nations have never felt so dependent\nfor security on the United States, nor as\nafraid of the Soviet Union. They are there-\nfore not as emotionally absorbed with Gor-\nbachev's personality. +", "[20]", "At least since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, China has feared that it could become a victim of the Brezhnev doctrine—Moscow's claim to maintain doctrinal orthodoxy in the Communist world. Now that Moscow is itself preaching reform, the Soviet incentive to impose ideological conformity on China has surely diminished. To be sure, China will always be wary of the Soviets and the possibility that they might try to set back Chinese modernization. But that prospect is limited by Moscow's need to maintain its standing elsewhere—at least while it is absorbed in domestic struggles. Too much overt pressure on China would weaken the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States. The careful calculators in Beijing understand that the Soviets are unlikely to make a direct grab for hegemony, so the price they will be willing to pay for Washington's support will decline. At the same", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS5", "DEPT.", "PAGE-3", "time, Beijing will take care not to be isolat-\ned by a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. It will\nnot want to be the last to main the barri-\ncades of the Cold War. +", "[26]", "The prospect is for a steady improvement\nin Sino-Soviet relations-especially as the\nSoviets meet Chinese conditions, such as\nencouraging Vietnam to withdraw from\nCambodia. But Chinese planners are not\nsentimental. They will keep in mind that\nrapprochement with Moscow cannot short-\nen the 3,000 mile Sino-Soviet frontier. They\nknow that professions of good will are not\nbinding. They will try to improve relations\nwith Moscow without weakening the confi-\ndence of the United States, which China\nwill continue to see as necessary to block-\ning Soviet hegemonial aspirations in Asia\nor any other attempt to pressure China.\nChina will also continue to be interested in\na vital and independent Europe, capable of\nkeeping Soviet attention and resources fo-\ncused on the West.+", "[19]", "The next test for Sino-U.S. relations will\nbe whether the United States can under-\nstand and accept Beijing's complex and", (((MORE)))))"]

KISS5

DEPT.

PAGE-4

power-oriented diplomacy. Conservative ideologues frustrated by the waning of the Cold War may be tempted to turn on China. Liberals may resist the idea that helping to preserve China's territorial integrity and assisting in its modernization is essential to maintaining a balance of power. Beijing may compound the problem by misunderstanding American psychology or domestic politics. But wise leaders in China and the United States must see that the parallel vital interests of both countries will be threatened by hegemonial aspirations from any quarter.→

[17]

□Japan, already an economic superpower, is on the way to becoming a major political and perhaps even military force. Though less than two percent of its Gross National Product, Japan's military budget is already the third largest in the world. Japan is not likely to be much influenced by the domestic changes in the Soviet Union. Its policy towards Moscow has always been shaped less by the ideological threat of communism than by the Soviet Union's national aspirations, especially its occupation of Japan's four northern islands and its con-

(((MORE))))

KISS5

DEPT.

cern over Soviet military power in the Far
East. As its own military capacity grows,
and Americas emphasizes burden-
sharing, the price Japan is prepared to pay
for American military protection is bound
to decline. The economic rivalry between
the two allies is likely to increase. Japan is
certain to conduct an increasingly asser-
tive foreign policy, especially in Asia. The
U.S.-Japanese relationship will need care-
ful tending to allow for greater mutual
respect and reciprocity.→

At the same time, India will grow in
strength and play an increasing interna-
tional role. Its goals are the same as those of
Britain east of Suez in the 19th Century—a
policy essentially shaped by the Viceroy's
office in New Delhi. It will seek to be the
strongest country in the subcontinent, and
will attempt to prevent the emergence of a
major power in the Indian Ocean or South-
east Asia. Whatever the day-to-day irrita-
tions between New Delhi and Washington,
India's geopolitical interests will impel it
over the next decade to assume some of the
security functions now exercised by the
United States. The politicians in New Del-

[25]

# (((MORE)))))

["KISS5", "DEPT.", "PAGE-6", "hi will not like this, but they are con-\ndemned to rivalry with Moscow in the Indi-\nan Ocean, and with China and Japan in\nSoutheast Asia, much more than with the\nopponent of their rhetoric, the United\nStates.+", "[21]", "In fact, the balance of power in Asia in-\nvolves the United States less directly than\nin Europe. For the foreseeable future, the\nUnited States must be part of the European\nbalance. In Asia, Korea excepted, no Amer-\nican troops are in the front line. In the '90s\ntwo balances of power will exist in Asia:\nbetween China, Japan and the Soviet\nUnion in Northeast Asia; and between Ja-\npan, India and (to some extent) the Soviet\nUnion in Southeast Asia. The American\nrole with respect to these two balances\nshould be similar to Britain's historical\nstance vis-a-vis the European continent: we\nare the guarantors of the equilibrium.", "Whatever our legal obligations, Maericans\nhave as much interest in preventing hostile\ndenomination of Asia as we do in keeping\nEurope free. To maintain these balances,\nthe U.S. must support the weak against the\nstrong and potential victims against poten-", (((MORE)))))"]

KISS5

DEPT.

PAGE-7

tial aggressors. Such a policy has to be
carried out despite the fact that we may not
be able to count on our Philippine bases
over the next decade, and that we will need
to restructure both our forces and com-
mand arrangements in Korea. This re-
quires a sense of ~~national~~ strategy yet to be
shown by American foreign policymakers.+

(((END)))

[29]

KISS6
VER # 00

DEPT.

BU:
PG:

MWHITA

HJ: Y 00184 LINES(INCL.HEAD)
ISSUE: ; 88B
KISS6 -BZ-NWK
MWHITA ;09/09,12:40

/

## Regional Issues+

Recently major progress has been made in settling regional conflicts. The Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has indicated that it would leave Cambodia by 1989; Angola has agreed in principle to send home Cuban troops.

[1]

At a minimum, all this indicates that the Soviet Union has found itself overextended in areas that (with the exception of Afghanistan) were not traditionally identified with Soviet national security. It is important, however, to put these successes in perspective. There is a tendency to compare the various agreements to the American experience in Indochina. But in Vietnam the United States not only withdrew, it abdicated. The Soviets will not do that in Afghanistan; nor will the Vietnam wash its hands of Cambodia. Neither nation will

[7]

(((MORE))))

["KISS6", "DEPT.", "PAGE-2", "abandon historic designs on neighboring\ncountries; they will pursue their objectives\nby more indirect means.→", "[16]", "□ To sustain the progress on regional issues will be tricky. Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, Congressional and public enthusiasm for supporting the resistance will surely decline. The Soviets will INCREASE pressure on Pakistan to adhere to its agreement not to supply arms, and after the death of President Zia Pakistan will be preoccupied with domestic affairs for many months. It will therefore be difficult to prevent the Soviet Union from implementing Lenin's dictum of ``one step backwards, two steps forward'' by playing the various forces in Afghanistan against each other and exploiting America's short attention span.→", "□ Pakistan is difficult politically; Cambodia is complex morally. The challenge there is not only to thwart Hanoi's ambitions but to prevent the unspeakable Khmer Rouge from taking over the country. So far, the trauma of Indochina has prevented us and other democracies from", "[16]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS6", "DEPT.", "PAGE-3", "translating moral outrage over genocidal\npractices into adequate support for non-\nCommunist forces such as those of Prince\nSihanouk. In the absence of such support,\nthe Khmer Rouge are bound to prevail. Or\nelse the anti-Vietnamese coalitions will\nhave to rely on the puppet Vietnamese\nmilitary force as a counterweight to the\nKhmer Rouge-an absurd situation.+", "[16]", "□A detailed analysis of the regional issues\nis beyond the scope of this article. They\nshow, however, that the basic challenge to\nUS foreign policy is conceptual. The evolu-\ntion in Moscow, the change in weapons\ntechnology and the emergence of new cen-\nters of power have combined to hasten the\nend of the postwar international order.+", "[8]", "□The emergence of a multipolar world\ndoes not diminish America's importance.\nBut it requires us to change the nature of\nour involvement, at least in some areas. It\nis clear that we can no longer do everything\nsimultaneously. We remain the world's\nhope for freedom and progress, but we must\nlearn to establish priorities and allow other\nnations to take over some of the security", (((MORE))))"]

KISS6

DEPT.

PAGE-4

functions heretofore assumed by the United States.→

[11]

Americans of all persuasions have historically believed that the concept of balance of power is immoral and contributes to international tensions. This is strange, because our domestic political system is based on a balance between the three branches of government. And it is unrealistic, if ``burden-sharing'' is to become not just a slogan but a policy. Until very recently, America could base its foreign policy on geographic isolation, economic self-sufficiency and military superiority. But modern technology has made distance irrelevant, and nuclear weapons make superiority an elusive goal. As for economic power, in 1950 the United States produced 52 percent of all the world's goods and services. Today that ratio is around 22 percent. That still makes us the world's strongest nation. But since we can no longer maintain the balance of power all by ourselves, we must rely on coalitions and equilibrium.→

[23]

The recent progress on so-called regional

(((MORE))))

["KISS6", "DEPT.", "PAGE-5", "conflicts in Afghanistan, Africa, Cambodia and the Persian Gulf all resulted from a favorable local balance of power and the ability to articulate clear objectives. But in none of these areas has the conflict ended. It must now be pursued in different realms with subtler means and more complicated goals. We need realistic goals and the power to attain them, or all that has been achieved can again be lost.", "Many Americans are restless with foreign policy because it no longer seems to permit the direct application of our moral principles. But to meet today's more ambiguous, drawn-out challenges requires an even greater moral commitment than any effort in our past. This is why America must work systematically on the elaboration of a strategic and geopolitical concept. Today, defense policy too often focuses on procuring weapons for their own sake, not because they meet a strategic need. Arms control has become a liturgical exercise for experts. Alliance strategy is frozen in patterns developed during the period of overwhelming Western nuclear superiority. But now all-out nuclear war risks hun-", "[11]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS6", "DEPT.", "dreds of millions of casualties. Attempts to develop more discriminating, less potentially cataclysmic options—such as strategic defense or more precise targeting—are resisted on the one hand by pacifist groups and on the other by allies eager to move the theater of devastation from their own territory to ours. That resistance must be overcome if we are to avoid a choice between Armageddon and surrender.→", "In arms control, all experts agree that if existing arsenals are cut by 50 percent, the vulnerability of the remaining forces will become more vulnerable especially on the U.S. side. There is wide consensus, too, that this vulnerability could be eased by such measures as developing mobile missiles, reducing the number of warheads on existing missiles, deploying fewer missiles on each submarine or some sort of strategic defense. Sometimes in the name of arms control, sometimes in the name of economy, the Democratic candidate for President opposes every known program that would reduce the looming vulnerability of our strategic forces. That a responsible arms control program will cost more, not less, is a", "[27]", (((MORE)))"]

["KISS6", "DEPT.", "PAGE-7", "fact not yet explained to the American\npeople.+", "[19]", "Attention is turning to conventional defense, but without a conceptual framework. That makes the democracies extremely vulnerable to Gorbachev's favorite tactic of accepting a vague Western idea based more on domestic politics than long-range strategy. There is a real danger that by undertaking a symbolic reduction of their forces in Eastern Europe, the Soviets could paralyze the elaboration of either a serious Western buildup or a realistic arms control scheme. What will be NATO's defense strategy after nuclear weapons have lost their credibility and conventional weapons have been frozen in a reduced in a strategically irrelevant manner?+", "[17]", "Any catalogue of contemporary problems is bound to look formidable, especially in a period of dramatic change. But it is important to maintain perspective. The challenges outlined here can almost without exception be met by changes in policy. Those of the Communist world are struc-", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS1\nVER # 01", "DEPT.", "BU:", "PG:", "EHARTM", "HJ: Y 00766 LINES(INCL.HEAD)", "ISSUE: ; 88B", "KISS1 -BZ-NWK", "MWHITA ;09/09,13:03", "/", "The post-war era in international relations is coming to an end. In the past such periods of transition have presented opportunities, but also involved turmoil and struggle. But that is not how many Western leaders view today's realities. They paint an idyllic picture in which change will occur thanks to a new breed of Communist leader. Gorbachev is described as a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are seen as the key to ending international tensions—even though most people do not even know exactly what the words mean. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society; its leaders are expected to lose their ideological fervor and become preoccupied with domestic affairs.", "To be sure, this refrain is punctuated by frequent protestations that we must remain wary of Soviet intentions. But this is", "[19]", {"bbox": [749, 1396, 883, 1419], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

PAGE-2

ritual; the dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the West and the Soviet Union, and even of personal friendship between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev.

[8]

Progress has clearly been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But a new era cannot be based on ephemeral personalities. To be lasting, it must reflect a number of new, underlying realities:

[5]

dbtGorbachev has started a process within the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell. The current turmoil in Poland and the ferment in several Soviet republics show that change, once started, generates its own momentum.

[7]

dbtIn the West a comparable momentum will bring about major changes in the political and security relations of the Atlantic Alliance during the next decade. The political structure of Europe-East and West will thus emerge as the central political issue of the '90s.

[7]

dbtThe declining appeal of Communist ide

(((MORE))))

["CD", "KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-3", "ology does not eliminate-and could well\nincrease-the threat of historic Russian\nexpansionism.→", "□dbtJapan, China and India will grow in\n‘‘‘‘\nstrength and importance, and will have to\nbe integrated into a new international\norder.→", "[4]", "□dbtThe recent progress on regional con-\nflicts-Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern\nAfrica-has resulted in part from the\nchanged priorities of the superpowers. But\nit would be naive to believe that the Soviet\nUnion has abdicated its interest in these\nregions, and it would be wrong for the Unit-\ned States to pull back from them.→", "[4]", "□Rarely are so many factors in flux simul-\ntaneously. There is an extraordinary op-\nportunity to shape a better future with\nimaginative statesmanship. For the first\ntime since World War I, it is possible to\nenvisage a plan to reunite Europe that\nwould have the consent of all its peoples.\nThis would permit the creation of a new\nsecurity arrangement that would sharply\nreduce the armed camps that now confront\neach other in the center of Europe. In Asia,", "[8]", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-4", "too, a new equilibrium is emerging. Regional disputes could become more of a matter of diplomatic and economic competition than military conflict. +", "[15]", "But a more desirable international order will not appear automatically. Gorbachev will not solve our problems for us; nor is arms control the sole, or even the principal, key to meeting these challenges. No agreement so far negotiated—including those in which I participated—has made a strategic difference. Indeed, they are justified domestically on precisely the grounds that they leave the military situation unchanged. They are a response to domestic pressures; they are valued for their political symbolism. But the symbolism in fact accelerates the potential for crisis by encouraging centrifugal tendencies in both East and West. +", "[16]", "If the democracies persist in relying on only the most optimistic assumptions about the future, the present tranquility will be just the calm before the storm. The overwhelming need is to create a political framework for dealing with the conse-", (((MORE)))))"]

["(N)", "KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-5", "quences of foreseeable change.+", "The Riddle of Mikhail Gorbachev+", "11111111111111111111111111111111", "[7]", "[1]", "Gorbachev's success in overcoming the\nSoviet Union's isolation has been astonish-\ning. Many Western leaders, President Rea-\ngan included, now emphasize their person-\nal relationship with Gorbachev. They\nimply that Gorbachev alone is responsible\nfor the domestic changes apparently tak-\ning place in the Soviet Union, and that\nthese changes in turn will bring about a\nnew era of peace.+", "True, major, perhaps historic, changes\nare under way in the Soviet Union. But it\ndefies all reason to believe that a man who\nhas never held any post outside the Soviet\nCommunist Party (with its doctrine that\nhistory is governed by ``objective factors```')\nwould approach his colleagues on the Polit-\nburo with the proposition that his personal\nties to democratic leaders justified changes\nin Soviet policy.+", "[10]", "For all his panache and intelligence, Gor-\nbachev is to some degree responding to cir-\ncumstance. The struggle in Moscow is not", "[10]", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "over democracy but how to achieve a more\ncompetitive Soviet Union. This goal re-\nquires the weakening of the almost feudal\nbaronies that have become entrenched\nwithin the centrally-planned Leninist\neconomy. In all likelihood, another Soviet\nleader would pursue similar policies, if\nwith less verve and psychological skill. Af-\nter all, the present phase of Soviet policy\nwas inaugurated during the era of the de-\ncrepit Chernenko when Gromyko called on\nPresident Reagan at the White House in\n1984.+", "[16]", "Even were Gorbachev committed to\npeace in the Western sense, there is little in\nthe history of either tsars or commissars to\nsupply comfort to the Soviet Union's neigh-\nbors. The issue of whether Soviet foreign\npolicy is shaped by Communist ideology or\nhistoric Russian expansionism has been\ndebated ever since the Bolshevik revolu-\ntion. It is impossible to answer. The de-\nmands that Molotov made to Hitler in 1940\nas a price for Soviet support, that Stalin\npursued after the war and that Brezhnev\ncarried out in Afghanistan date back to\nimperial Russia: Soviet domination of the", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-7", "Balkans and the Dardanelles; a major voice\nin Poland; and Soviet hegemony over Iran.→", "[16]", "□The role of Communist ideology has been threefold: it has given Soviet leaders an assurance that the tsars lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters; and it tempted them into distant conflicts in such places as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina that traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. Because it seems less committed to exporting ideology, the Gorbachev regime may be willing to trim distant commitments. But that does not mean the historical Russian agenda in Eurasia has been abandoned. And it is a historic fact that ever since the 17th Century, the frontiers of what was once the Duchy of Muscovy have moved inexorably outward, until the present national frontiers now encompass 11 time zones.→", "[19]", "□Twice before the West deluded itself by basing its policies on favorable assessments of Soviet leaders: with Stalin in 1944 and with Khrushchev in 1956. I am not making any predictions with respect to", (((MORE)))))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

Gorbachev. But I consider it dangerous to base East-West relations on the personality of one Soviet leader for several reasons: First, it makes the dialogue inherently unstable, since every new Soviet leader has disavowed the policies of his predecessor. Second, it strengthens neutralist elements that have claimed all along that the Cold War is frivolous and unnecessary. Third, it creates the risk that if Gorbachev leaves office, most likely for internal reasons, the democracies will blame and flagellate themselves.+

[18]

> Most importantly, the psychiatric approach could lead to adventurism. In the present circumstances Soviet restraint is not a concession but a prudent course. But it is much easier for a Soviet leader to exploit Western escapism to achieve unilateral gains than to pay the domestic price that genuine reciprocity would exact.+

[8]

> The increasingly fashionable notion that we should help Gorbachev is devoid of meaning unless ``help'' is properly defined. Does it imply that we should make agreements that we would not make on their

(((MORE))))

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-9", "merits? Does it mean that we must accept\nthe Soviet definition of the issues? Should\nwe side with Gorbachev in his internal dis-\nputes? Do we understand them well\nenough to do so? Or do we help him-or\nother moderate elements-simply by put-\nting forward a careful assessment of the\nlegitimate interests of both sides, and un-\ndertake a serious effort to determine\nwhether and how they can be reconciled?", "[15]", "□In my view, it renders no service to Gor-\nbachev to ascribe Western liberal values to\nhim. The democracies must face the reality\nthat a lasting peace must not depend on one\nSoviet leader. Any other course invites a\nsubtle form of blackmail.", "[6]", "The Challenge for NATO", "11111111111111111111111111111111", "[1]", "□Unlike Brezhnev, who was above all concerned with safeguarding the status quo in Europe, Gorbachev seems intent on weakening the Western Alliance. Soviet theoretical journals justify peace not so much for its own sake as to deprive the United States of the Soviet menace as a rallying cry. Taking their cue from the General Secretary's book, Perestroika, Soviet emis-", "4444444444444444", (((MORE))))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

saries are promoting the vision of a ``European House'' that will extend from the Urals to the Atlantic, providing for European security and safeguarding European civilization against American materialism. The thrust of the Soviet policy is to diminish American influence, if not to ex-pel us from Europe altogether.

□ Gorbachev has already made significant progress in undermining the existing NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence. How often can the phrase ``a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought'' be repeated in U.S.-Soviet communiqués before the deterrent loses its credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes unfeasible? Step-by-patient-step, the Soviets are gaining a de facto veto over NATO nuclear defense policy. For example, they have already sowed doubts in Europe about the modernization of short-range weapons, which ten years ago the allies accepted without controversy or even comment.

□ Traditionally pro-American groups, es-

(((MORE))))

[17]

[17]

["CND", "KISS1", "DEPT.", "pecially in the Federal Republic of Germa-\nny, are beginning to respond to the siren\ncalls from the East. More and more Europe-\nan political candidates journey to Moscow,\nsometimes even in preference to Washing-\nton. Neutralist elements feel vindicated. In\na prescient 1982 lecture, the distinguished\nAmerican historian Gordon Craig warned\nthat historically Germany has felt tied to\nCentral Europe or the East. The German\nattitude toward the West is ambivalent, he\nargued, and vulnerable to ``gusts of nostal-\ngia'' for a return to Mitteleuropacheck spelling. I believe\nthat is now happening.+", "I do not expect anything so dramatic as a\nGerman swing to overt neutralism. But\nefforts to augment and modernize NATO\nforces and to strengthen the cohesion of the\nAlliance are already meeting increasing\nresistance. Even increased European mili-\ntary cooperation may face opposition. We\nmay soon witness a repetition of the '50s\ndebate about whether German unity\nshould take precedence over Western ties.+", "According to the current conventional\nwisdom, none of this makes any difference", "[15]", "[10]", {"bbox": [753, 1374, 888, 1400], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

PAGE-12

because the Soviets will become so economically dependent on Western Europe as to preclude a return to Cold War tensions. But such dependence is double-edged. It is equally possible-and more likely-that some Western leaders will grow so politically and psychologically dependent on good relations with Moscow that they will do anything to avoid the Kremlin's displeasure.+

[12]

The Future of Eastern Europe+

□ These trends are being exploited by the Soviets with a daring inconceivable in the Brezhnev period. But it remains to be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as farsighted as it is daring.+

[1]

□ For one thing, the Soviet Union is operating from a position of domestic weakness. Over two decades ago, de Gaulle said, ``During my lifetime Communist ideology has been personified by many people. Each of these leaders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event he fights firmly against the personality cult of the others.'' At this point, it is impossible to predict

[5]

(((MORE))))

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-13", "whether Gorbachev will prove an exception. What is certain is that he has started a process with an uncertain outcome. The established bureaucracies will not give up their power and their privileges easily. In an empire of many peoples, decentralization is bound to raise the nationality question. The Soviets have no entrepreneurial tradition to act as a counterweight to central planning, or to play the role the middle class did vis-a-vis the aristocracy during the struggle to build a modern state in Europe. The secret police and the military-two of the most potent bureaucracies-may not have spoken their last word.", "Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove particularly unsettling in Eastern Europe. Its ruling parties were imposed by a country that now advertises the corruption and inefficiency of its system. The Gorbachev reforms are thus bound to increase challenges to the legitimacy of ruling groups in Eastern Europe. No wonder that some of the East European Communist parties-in East Germany particularly, and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia-are openly disassociating themselves from the Soviet pat-", "[25]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "tern. The Polish Communist Party, of\ncourse, was in trouble even without\nchanges in the Kremlin. But glasnost has\nclearly helped revive the Solidarity trade\nunion movement.+", "[17]", "The new Soviet policy may have created\na Frankenstein. To weaken the Atlantic\nAlliance Moscow must appear to invite\ngreater ties between East and West. But as\nthe Federal Republic and to a lesser extent\nthe other countries of West Europe in-\ncrease their activities and investments in\nEastern Europe, the centrifugal tenden-\ncies in the Soviet empire will accelerate.\nBonn's slogan that it seeks to ease the lives\nof ordinary East Europeans is no doubt\nsincere. But to the extent that policy suc-\nceeds, it may lead to a reemergence of the\ncompetition between Teuton and Slav that\nproduced two world wars. Confronted with\na growing erosion of its position in Eastern\nEurope, Moscow may decide to intervene\nmilitarily. A new crisis over Berlin may\nseem farfetched today, but is conceivable if\nthe Soviets feel pressed to demonstrate the\nlimits of Western power behind the Iron\nCurtain. If that should happen-even as an", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-15", "act of desperation—the present euphoric\nmood in the West will switch to hysteria. +", "[24]", "□ Soviet policy, whether by design or inad-\nvertence, has returned the diplomatic focal\npoint to Europe—a situation that requires\nmore far-reaching decisions by Moscow\nthan by Washington. The time has come for\nthe first grand discussion about the politi-\ncal future of all of Europe since the out-\nbreak of World War I. The Soviet formula\nof a European House is too clever by half.\nAfter all, it was the projection of Soviet\npower into the center of Europe that led to\nthe creation of the Atlantic Alliance and\nthe Marshall Plan. For America to leave a\nEuropean House that includes Russia\nwould bring about the very kind of hegemo-\nny that we fought two wars to prevent.\nNeither Washington nor its European al-\nlies can possibly be interested in that\noutcome. +", "[19]", "□ But there is another approach that could\ndramatically alter the frozen landscape. It\nwould be based on the realization that\nthere are only two solutions for Europe:\neither both the US and the USSR are pre-", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-16", "sent in force, or they both substantially\nreduce their military and political pres-\nence. In that concept, the European House\nwould extend from the Polish-Soviet fron-\ntier to the Atlantic. Its core would be a\nunited Western Europe.+", "[11]", "□ A thoughtful exploration of this subject\nwould seek to bring home to Soviet leaders\nthat by identifying their security with un-\npopular regimes, they have mortgaged\ntheir policy to the repression of periodic\nupheavals-in other words a counterrevo-\nlutionary policy. In the long run, aren't\narrangements in Finland more useful to\nSoviet security than those in Eastern Eu-\nrope? Is it possible to devise security ar-\nrangements that would meet Soviet mili-\ntary concerns (widely defined) while\npermitting the peoples of Eastern Europe\nto choose their own political future? Under\nsuch a system, it would be possible to con-\nceive a drastic reduction of all outside\nforces in Europe-including those of the\nU.S.-that might revolutionize present\nconcepts of security.+", "[19]", "□ This is not a negotiation that would lend", (((MORE))))"]

["(N)", "KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-17", "itself to formal diplomacy conducted by\ncoveys of diplomats and technicians. Its\ninitial phase must be highly confidential. It\ncan only succeed if Europe is an active\nparticipant. Thus it requires rapid pro-\ngress toward West European integration.+", "[7]", "Asian Perspectives+", "1111111111111111111111111111

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "pared with the Western democracies, the\nAsian nations have never felt so dependent\nfor security on the United States, nor as\nafraid of the Soviet Union. They are there-\nfore not as emotionally absorbed with Gor-\nbachev's personality.+", "At least since the Soviet invasion of\nCzechoslovakia in 1968, China has feared\nthat it could become a victim of the Brezh-\nnev doctrine—Moscow's claim to maintain\ndoctrinal orthodoxy in the Communist\nworld. Now that Moscow is itself preaching\nreform, the Soviet incentive to impose ideo-\nlogical conformity on China has surely di-\nminished. To be sure, China will always be\nwary of the Soviets and the possibility that\nthey might try to set back Chinese modern-\nization. But that prospect is limited by Mos-\ncow's need to maintain its standing else-\nwhere—at least while it is absorbed in\ndomestic struggles. Too much overt pres-\nsure on China would weaken the Soviet\nappeal in Western Europe and the United\nStates. The careful calculators in Beijing\nunderstand that the Soviets are unlikely to\nmake a direct grab for hegemony, so the\nprice they will be willing to pay for Wash-", "[20]", (((MORE)))))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

PAGE-19

ington's support will decline. Chinese poli-
cy will grow bolder, though not more reck-
less. At the same time, Beijing will take
care not to be isolated by a U.S.-Soviet rap-
prochement. It will not want to be the last
to man the barricades of the Cold War.+

[27]

□The prospect is for a steady improvement
in Sino-Soviet relations-especially as the
Soviets meet Chinese conditions, such as
encouraging Vietnam to withdraw from
Cambodia. But Chinese planners are not
sentimental. They will keep in mind that
rapprochement with Moscow cannot short-
en the 3,000 mile Sino-Soviet frontier. They
know that professions of good will are not
binding. They will try to improve relations
with Moscow without weakening the confi-
dence of the United States, which China
will continue to see as necessary to block-
ing Soviet hegemonial aspirations in Asia
or any other attempt to pressure China.
China will also continue to be interested in
a vital and independent Europe, capable of
keeping Soviet attention and resources fo-
cused on the West.+

[19]

(((MORE)))

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "be whether the United States can under-\nstand and accept Beijing's complex and\npower-oriented diplomacy. Conservative\nideologues frustrated by the waning of the\nCold War may be tempted to turn on China.\nLiberals may resist the idea that helping to\npreserve China's territorial integrity and\nassisting in its modernization is essential\nto maintaining a balance of power. Beijing\nmay compound the problem by misunder-\nstanding American psychology or domestic\npolitics. But wise leaders in China and the\nUnited States must see that the parallel\nvital interests of both countries will be\nthreatened by hegemonial aspirations\nfrom any quarter.→", "□Japan, already an economic superpower,\nis on the way to becoming a major political\nand perhaps even military force. Though\nless than two percent of its Gross National\nProduct, Japan's military budget is al-\nready the third largest in the world. Japan\nis not likely to be much influenced by the\ndomestic changes in the Soviet Union. Its\npolicy towards Moscow has always been\nshaped less by the ideological threat of com-\nmunism than by the Soviet Union's nation-", "[17]", (((MORE)))))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

PAGE-21

al aspirations, especially its occupation of
Japan's four northern islands and its con-
cern over Soviet military power in the Far
East. As its own military capacity grows,
and as America emphasizes burden-shar-
ing, the price Japan is prepared to pay for
American military protection is bound to
decline. The economic rivalry between the
two allies is likely to increase. Japan is
certain to conduct an increasingly asser-
tive foreign policy, especially in Asia. The
U.S.-Japanese relationship will need care-
ful tending to allow for greater mutual
respect and reciprocity.+

[25]

At the same time, India will grow in
strength and play an increasing interna-
tional role. Its goals are the same as those of
Britain east of Suez in the 19th Century-a
policy essentially shaped by the Viceroy's
office in New Delhi. It will seek to be the
strongest country in the subcontinent, and
will attempt to prevent the emergence of a
major power in the Indian Ocean or South-
east Asia. Whatever the day-to-day irrita-
tions between New Delhi and Washington,
India's geopolitical interests will impel it
over the next decade to assume some of the

(((MORE))))

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "security functions now exercised by the\nUnited States. The politicians in New Del-\nhi will not like this, but they are con-\ndemned to rivalry with Moscow in the Indi-\nan Ocean, and with China and Japan in\nSoutheast Asia, much more than with the\ntarget!\nopponent of their rhetoric, the United\nStates. +", "□In fact, the balance of power in Asia in-\nvolves the United States less directly than\nin Europe. For the foreseeable future, the\nUnited States must be part of the European\nbalance. In Asia, Korea excepted, no Amer-\nican troops are in the front line. In the '90s\ntwo balances of power will exist in Asia:\nbetween China, Japan and the Soviet\nUnion in Northeast Asia; and between Ja-\npan, India and (to some extent) the Soviet\nUnion in Southeast Asia. The American\nrole with respect to these two balances\nshould be similar to Britain's historical\nstance vis-a-vis the European continent: we\nare the guarantors of the equilibrium.\nWhatever our legal obligations, Americans\nhave as much interest in preventing hostile\ndomination of Asia as we do in keeping\nEurope free. To maintain these balances,", "[21]", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-23", "the U.S. must support the weak against the\nstrong and potential victims against poten-\ntial aggressors. Such a policy has to be\ncarried out despite the fact that we may not\nbe able to count on our Philippine bases\nover the next decade, and that we will need\nto restructure both our forces and co-\nmand arrangements in Korea. This re-\nquires a sense of strategy yet to be shown by\nAmerican foreign policymakers.→", "[29]", "Regional Issues→", "1111111111111111", "[1]", "□ Recently major progress has been made\nin settling regional conflicts. The Soviet\nUnion has agreed to withdraw its armed\nforces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has in-\ndicated that it would leave Cambodia by\n1989; Angola has agreed in principle to\nsend home Cuban troops.→", "[7]", "□ At a minimum, all this indicates that the\nSoviet Union has found itself overextended\nin areas that (with the exception of Afghan-\nistan) were not traditionally identified\nwith Soviet national security. It is impor-\ntant, however, to put these successes in\nperspective. There is a tendency to com-\npare the various agreements to the Ameri-", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "can experience in Indochina. But in Viet-\nnam the United States not only withdrew,\nit abdicated. The Soviets will not do that in\nAfghanistan; nor will Vietnam wash its\nhands of Cambodia. Neither nation will\nabandon historic designs on neighboring\ncountries; they will pursue their objectives\nby more indirect means. +", "[16]", "To sustain the progress on regional issues will be tricky. Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, Congressional and public enthusiasm for supporting the resistance will surely decline. The Soviets will increase pressure on Pakistan to adhere to its agreement not to supply arms, and after the death of President Zia Pakistan will be preoccupied with domestic affairs for many months. It will therefore be difficult to prevent the Soviet Union from implementing Lenin's dictum of ``one step backwards, two steps forward'' by playing the various forces in Afghanistan against each other and exploiting America's short attention span. +", "[16]", "Pakistan is difficult politically; Cambodia is complex morally. The challenge", (((MORE))))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

there is not only to thwart Hanoi's ambitions but to prevent the unspeakable Khmer Rouge from taking over the country. So far, the trauma of Indochina has prevented us and other democracies from translating moral outrage over genocidal practices into adequate support for non-Communist forces such as those of Prince Sihanouk. In the absence of such support, the Khmer Rouge are bound to prevail. Or else the anti-Vietnamese coalitions will have to rely on the puppet Vietnamese military force as a counterweight to the Khmer Rouge-an absurd situation.

□ A detailed analysis of the regional issues is beyond the scope of this article. They show, however, that the basic challenge to US foreign policy is conceptual. The evolution in Moscow, the change in weapons technology and the emergence of new centers of power have combined to hasten the end of the postwar international order.

□ The emergence of a multipolar world does not diminish America's importance. But it requires us to change the nature of our involvement, at least in some areas.

[16]

[8]

(((MORE))))

KISS1

DEPT.

is clear that we can no longer do everything simultaneously. We remain the world's hope for freedom and progress, but we must learn to establish priorities and allow other nations to take over some of the security functions heretofore assumed by the United States.

[11]

(((MORE))))

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-27", "maintain the balance of power all by our-\nselves, we must rely on coalitions and\nequilibrium. +", "[23]", "The recent progress on so-called regional\nconflicts in Afghanistan, Africa, Cambodia\nand the Persian Gulf all resulted from a\nfavorable local balance of power and the\nability to articulate clear objectives. But in\nnone of these areas has the conflict ended.\nIt must now be pursued in different realms\nwith subtler means and more complicated\ngoals. We need realistic objectives and the\npower to attain them, or all that has been\nachieved can again be lost. +", "[11]", "Many Americans are restless with for-\neign policy because it no longer seems to\npermit the direct application of our moral\nprinciples. But to meet today's more ambig-\nuous, drawn-out challenges requires an\neven greater moral commitment than any\neffort in our past. This is why America\nmust work systematically on the elabora-\ntion of a strategic and geopolitical concept.\nToday, defense policy too often focuses on\nprocuring weapons for their own sake, not\nbecause they meet a strategic need. Arms", (((MORE))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-28", "control has become a liturgical exercise for\nexperts. Alliance strategy is frozen in pat-\nterns developed during the period of over-\nwhelming Western nuclear superiority.\nBut now all-out nuclear war risks hundreds\nof millions of casualties. Attempts to devel-\nop more discriminating, less potentially\ncataclysmic options-such as strategic de-\nfense or more precise targeting-are resist-\ned on the one hand by pacifist groups and\non the other by allies eager to move the\ntheater of devastation from their own terri-\ntory to ours. That resistance must be over-\ncome if we are to avoid a choice between\nArmageddon and surrender.+", "[27]", "In arms control, all experts agree that if\nexisting arsenals are cut by 50 percent, the\nremaining forces will become more vulner-\nable-especially on the U.S. side. There is\nwide consensus, too, that this vulnerability\ncould be eased by such measures as devel-\noping mobile missiles, reducing the num-\nber of warheads on existing missiles, de-\nploying fewer missiles on each submarine\nor some sort of strategic defense. Some-\ntimes in the name of arms control, some-\ntimes in the name of economy, the Demo-", (((MORE)))))"]

["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-29", "cratic candidate for President opposes\nevery program that would reduce the loom-\ning vulnerability of our strategic forces.\nThat a responsible arms control program\nwill cost more, not less, is a fact not yet\nexplained to the American people.→", "□Attention is turning to conventional defense, but without a conceptual framework. That makes the democracies extremely vulnerable to Gorbachev's favorite tactic of accepting a vague Western idea based more on domestic politics than long-range strategy. There is a real danger that by undertaking a symbolic reduction of their forces in Eastern Europe, the Soviets could paralyze the elaboration of either a serious Western buildup or a realistic arms control scheme. What will be NATO's defense strategy after nuclear weapons have lost their credibility and conventional weapons have been frozen or reduced in a strategically irrelevant manner?→", "[18]", "□Any catalogue of contemporary problems is bound to look formidable, especially in a period of dramatic change. But it is", "[17]", {"bbox": [751, 1374, 883, 1397], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE)))"]

KISS1

DEPT.

PAGE-30

important to maintain perspective. The
challenges outlined here can almost with-
out exception be met by changes in policy.

Those of the Communist world are struc-
tural-a much more difficult situation.

The United States and its friends are still in
a position to shape their own future. Gorba-
chev will not save us; the democracies must
do that job themselves. +

(((END)))

[12]

AUG. 30 '88 11:32 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.01

August 30, 1988

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

A gap between expectations and actions is the hallmark of a revolutionary period. We are living through the end of one of the most dramatic stages of international relations--a process which is always involved turmoil and struggle. But too many leaders of the democracies paint an idyllic picture of the world ahead of us. In it Gorbachev emerges as a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are treated as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society and its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs. Therefore the democracies are said to have an obligation to "help" Gorbachev achieve these goals.

To be sure this idyll is punctuated by frequent protestations of wariness as to Soviet intentions. But this is ritual. The

P.01

August 30, 1988

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

A gap between expectations is the hallmark of a revolutionary period. We are living through the end of a structure of international relations--a process which in the past has always involved turmoil and struggle. But too many leaders of the democracies paint an idyllic picture of the world ahead of us. In it Gorbachev emerges as a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are treated as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society and its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs. Therefore the democracies are said to have an obligation to "help" Gorbachev achieve these goals.

P.01

August 30, 1988

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

A gap between expectation and reality is the hallmark of a revolutionary period. Ours is no exception. We are living through the end of the post-war structure of international relations--a process which in the past has always involved turmoil and struggle. But too many leaders of the democracies paint an idyllic picture of the world ahead of us. In it Gorbachev emerges as a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are treated as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society and its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs. Therefore the democracies are said to have an obligation to "help" Gorbachev achieve these goals.

AUG. 30 '88 11:33 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.02

2

dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the democracies and the Soviet Union and even of personal friendship between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev.

No doubt progress has been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But a new era to be lasting cannot be based on personalities--by definition. To be lasting it must reflect an underlying reality. The way the principal countries assess and shape that reality will determine whether there will be tranquility or turmoil:

- Whatever Gorbachev's intentions, he has started a process within the Soviet Union and even more in Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell.

- Whatever the intentions of the leaders of democracies, they have contributed to a process which within the next decade will bring about major changes in Atlantic relations.

- These twin events make the future of Europe--East and West--a central political issue and not simply an arms control problem.

AUG. 30 '88 11:34 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.03

3

As the US-Soviet ideological rivalry diminishes, traditional geopolitical factors will become more prominent. The decline of Communist ideology--real or imagined--will require increasing attention to historic Russian expansionism.

--This will occur while Japan, China and India will grow in strength and become increasingly important in international affairs.

--The regional conflicts which are being settled--Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern Africa--result in part from the changed priorities of the US and the USSR. And each of the so-called settlements creates a dynamism of its own and therefore the need for a new approach to the issues and interests at stake.

--To deal with such a world the United States must reassess its historic approach to international affairs and its reluctance to be involved with maintaining a balance of power.

AUG. 30 '88 11:35 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.04

4

# The Impact of Mikhail Gorbachev

Gorbachev's success in overcoming the Soviet Union's isolation of 1985 when he took office is an astonishing tour de force. Many Western leaders, President Reagan included, seem to believe that their personal relationship with Gorbachev eases diplomatic negotiations, that Gorbachev virtually alone is responsible for the domestic changes apparently taking place in the Soviet Union, and that these changes in turn will bring about a new era of peace.

Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True, major, perhaps historic, changes are under way in the Soviet Union. But it defies all reason to believe that a man who has never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party and who was in the Politburo during the Brezhnev era--without any record of opposition--would abandon the Marxist belief in the predominance of objective factors in favor of a "subjective" affection for a

AUG. 30 '88 11:36 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.05

5

democratic leader. No member of the Politburo, much less
its General Secretary, would dare approach his colleagues with
the proposition that his personal ties to a democratic leader
could justify changes in Soviet policy.

For all his panache and intelligence, Gorbachev like most
statesmen is to some degree a product of circumstance. He
seeks--with courage and imagination--to overcome the stagnation
of the late Brezhnev era. Another Soviet leader would in all
likelihood feel compelled to pursue similar policies, if with
less verve and psychological skill. After all, the present phase
of Soviet policy was inaugurated when Gromyko--attacked at the
party conference as a relic of the Brezhnev era--called on
President Reagan in 1984 during the leadership of the decrepit
Chernenko, who has become a non-person in the Soviet Union. No
one can know--including Gorbachev himself--what he will do if he
should succeed in his goal of infusing the Soviet economy with
dynamism and Soviet society with higher morale.

P.06

6

The struggle in Moscow is not over democracy or peace
in the abstract but how to achieve a more competitive Soviet
Union. This goal cannot be achieved without destroying the
feudal baronies which are the practical result of a centrally
planned Leninist economy. The process is akin to the struggles
by which the modern state emerged from feudalism in Europe in
the 17th century. That did not lead to democracy nor to a
restrained foreign policy. In England it ushered in two centuries
of colonial expansion. In France it led to a century and a half
of seeking to dominate Europe.

Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense
as a static condition of good will--which it must be remembered
the West developed only after World War I--the criteria on the
basis of which he is to determine it are far from clear. There
is little in the history of either tsars or commissars to supply
him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

AUG. 30 '88 11:37 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.07

7

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by
Communist ideology or Russian historical expansionism has been
debated ever since the existence of the Communist state. During
World War II the democracies convinced themselves that Stalin,
having defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution, would
pursue Russian national objectives rather than Communist ideology
after Germany was defeated. And they proved to be right though
not in the sense they had imagined. After the war Stalin returned
to the program Molotov had submitted to Hitler in November 1940
as the price for Soviet support. It could have been crafted by
Peter the Great: Soviet domination of the Balkans and of the
Straits; a major voice in Poland; and Soviet hegemony over Iran.
Soviet policy did not reach all these objectives but it was not
through lack of trying.

The role of ideology has been threefold: it gave Soviet
leaders an inner assurance that their tsarist predecessors lacked;
it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters and in the

AUG. 30 '88 11:38 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.08

8

'70s it tempted them into distant enterprises such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an abandonment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the historical Russian agenda.

Even should Communist ideology decline, historic Russia would still remain as a great power. And for four hundred years it has been a major challenge for world peace how to establish a relationship between that giant state of eleven time zones and its smaller neighbors. Often breached by invaders, Russian frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably outward in all directions.

The reliance on one Soviet leader created four dangers: Since every new Soviet leader has disavowed his predecessor,

Since every new Soviet leader has diarified his predecessor, The reliance on one Soviet leader created four dangers:

directions.

frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably outward in all
and its amorphous neighbors. Often preached by invaders, Russian
a relationship between that giant state of eleven time zones
it has been a major challenge for world peace how to establish
would still remain as a great power. And for four hundred years
Even should Communist ideology decline, historic Russia's
historical Russian agenda,

apportionment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the
willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an
ideological flaw if thus most likely to be reflected in a
ruler might have given a lower priority. The decline of
Copa, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional Russian
'70s it tempted them into distant enterprises such as Angola,

8

AUG. 30 '88 11:39 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.09

9

such a course is inherently precarious. Second, by creating
the impression that tensions were caused by idiosyncracies
it strengthens the neutralist elements who have claimed all
along that the risks of the Cold War were frivolous and
unnecessary. Third, should Gorbachev leave office for
essentially internal reasons a wave of despondency and self-
flagellation will sweep over the democracies that will no doubt
accuse themselves of not having made enough concessions.

Most importantly, the psychiatric approach to foreign
policy tempts not only escapism on the part of the democracies
but adventurism on the part of the Soviet Union. In the contemporary
world even a nationalistic Russian leader should have incentives
for moderation. Almost all emerging power centers are at or near
the borders of the Soviet Union. An expansionist policy would
run the risk of creating a coalition among them. Thus moderation
is a prudent course. But such an insight is far from automatic.
Adjusting to the new realities is inevitably painful. It is much

AUG. 30 '88 11:40 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.10

10

easier to exploit the confusion of the adversary for unilateral
benefits than to explore a new relationship based on true
reciprocity.

The often repeated phrase that we should help Gorbachev
is therefore devoid of meaning unless "help" is properly defined.
Does it imply that we should make agreements that we would not
make on their merits? Does it mean that we must accept the
Soviet definition of the issues? Should we side with Gorbachev
in his internal disputes? Do we understand them well enough to
do so? Or do we help him--or other moderate elements--most by
putting forward a reasonable concept of a more peaceful world
that takes account of changing realities and that he can submit
to his colleagues?

I believe the latter is the only responsible course. It
is to render no service to Gorbachev--whatever his motives--to
ascribe to him Western liberal values. Nothing could undermine

P.11

11

him more rapidly with his colleagues. The opportunity presented by the Soviet need for a respite and the emergence of new power centers must not be lost by making the most favorable assumptions about the future, avoiding all difficult issues and conducting foreign policy largely as an aspect of domestic politics.

Nuclear weapons demand coexistence; but if the democracies are to avoid blackmailing themselves they must learn that coexistence requires a careful assessment of the legitimate interests of both sides and a serious effort to determine whether and how they can be reconciled.

Three sets of issues will shape the new era whatever one thinks of Gorbachev's motivations:

- The political impact of the successful arms control negotiations especially in Europe.

- The relationship of countries like Japan, China and India (and later Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico) to the international equilibrium.

AUG. 30 '88 11:41 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.12

12

—The nature of Third World conflicts now that the
nuclear superpowers seem to be disengaging in certain key areas.

## The New Phase of East-West Relations

As Third World problems move from military confrontation
to the diplomatic arena, Europe and Asia have returned to center
stage in East-West relationships. And especially in Europe
appearances are deceptive. A seeming calm could be the prelude
to a major crisis—unless the current preoccupation with arms
control is accompanied by a serious effort to shape the foreseeable
political evolution.

Unlike his predecessor who was above all concerned with
safeguarding the status quo in Europe Gorbachev seems to have
chosen to undermine the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Soviet
theoretical journals justify peace not so much for its own sake
as to deprive US policy of the fear with which it rallied its
allies to the common defense. Soviet emissaries taking the cue

AUG. 30 '88 11:42 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.13

13

from their General Secretary are promoting a so-called "European House" from the Urals to the Atlantic which is supposed to achieve European security and prevent European civilization from being overwhelmed by American materialism. Its practical consequence is to diminish American influence in Europe if not to expel us from it. And that slogan is gaining in appeal especially in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Gorbachev's strategy has already made significant progress. Soviet policymakers understand very well that the various nuclear arms control agreements either concluded or in the process of negotiation tend to undermine the existing NATO strategy which is based on nuclear weapons. How often can the phrase "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" be repeated in US-Soviet communiqués before the nuclear deterrent loses its credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes unfeasible? In

AUG. 30 '88 11:43 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.14

14

the existing climate of relaxation of tensions it is escapist
to believe that conventional rearmament can serve as a substitute;
NATO will be fortunate if it can maintain its present level of
conventional forces. Step-by-patient-step the Soviets are
elaborating a claim to a veto over NATO nuclear defense policy.
For example the modernization of short-range weapons introduced
into Europe ten years ago without controversy or even comment
is on the verge of turning into another bitter struggle.

As a result traditional pro-American groups, especially in
the Federal Republic of Germany, are giving increasing emphasis
to relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow rather than Washington
has become the mecca for political leaders contesting local
elections. Neutralist elements who in the entire postwar period
have argued either that tensions were artificial or that there
existed some neglected deus ex machina to overcome them feel
vindicated. In 1982 the distinguished American historian Gordon
Craig in a prescient lecture warned that historically Germany's

AUG. 30 '88 11:44 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.15

15

ties had been in Central Europe or the East, that the German relationship to the West was ambivalent and that excessive pressures by the Western allies might produce "gusts of nostalgia" for a more traditional course. I believe that is now happening.

I do not expect anything remotely so dramatic as leaving NATO or overt neutralism. But efforts to augment or to modernize NATO forces or to strengthen NATO cohesion are already meeting increasing resistance. Even European integration in the military field will become controversial. We may then well witness a repetition of the debate of the Fifties whether prospects for German unity are being sacrificed on the altar of Western ties.

Conventional wisdom argues that the Soviets will become so dependent on Western Europe economically as to preclude a return to Cold War tensions. But dependence is double-edged. It is equally possible--and perhaps more likely--that some Western leaders will become so dependent psychologically and domestically on good relations with Moscow that they will not run any risk of

AUG. 30 '88 11:45 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.16

16

the Kremlin's displeasure thereby giving the Soviets a veto
over a wide range of their policies.

These trends are being exploited by the Soviets with a
daring inconceivable in the Brezhnev period. But it remains to
be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as farsighted as it is
daring. For one thing the Soviet Union is operating from a
position of domestic weakness.

Revolutionaries rarely foresee all the consequences of their
actions. They attack the existing structure by forming a
coalition of all resentments. But having undermined the status
quo they wind up having to reestablish discipline among their
followers. This is why revolutions usually consume their own
children.

Gorbachev's situation illustrates this observation. Until
he also becomes President as he has proposed his sole official
position is that of General Secretary of the Communist Party.

he also becomes President as he has proposed his sole official
correspondence illustrates this observation. Until
children.

This is why revolutions usually consume their own
followers. They are why revolutions usually consume their own
duo they wind up having to reestablish discipline among their
coalition of all segments. But having undermined the status
actional, they attack the existing apparatus by forming a

Revolutionaries rarely foresee all the consequences of their
position of domestic weakness.

daring. For one thing the Soviet Union is operating from a
be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as far sighted as it is
during inconceivable in the Brestlov period. But it remains to
these trends are being exploited by the Soviets with a
over a wide range of their policies.

the Kremlin's dispassionate therapy giving the Soviets a veto

t6

P.17

17

He has repeatedly and passionately avowed his commitment to one-party rule. At the same time he seems to recognize that his reforms can only be achieved by overturning the encrusted party bureaucracy which supplies his power base. Because the Soviet system by the account of its own leaders is run like a feudal state on the basis of personal relationships every new General Secretary has begun his reign with a purge.

What is novel in Gorbachev's approach is not the purge but his obvious conviction that his goals cannot be achieved by the traditional method of taking over the Communist Party. His solution is a complicated structure in which the governmental and the party bureaucracies balance each other out. They are joined only at the apex in the new office of the President with unprecedented powers. When fully elaborated this structure will lend itself to authoritarian control, indeed to one-man rule. At this point glasnost is a means to bring pressure on the party bureaucracy not

AUG. 30 '88 11:46 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.18

18

a permanent form of government. Like many reformers Gorbachev
may believe that all reasonable people will come to similar
conclusions; like many revolutionaries he will be disappointed
in that expectation. Will he then attempt to destroy his future
critics, now his supporters?

As de Gaulle said over two decades ago: "During my lifetime
Communist ideology has been personified by many people. Each
of these leaders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes
and at times kills the others. In any event he fights firmly
against the personality cult of the others."

It is impossible to predict at this point whether Gorbachev
will prove an exception. What is certain is that the process
started by Gorbachev will produce a substantial period of turmoil
and uncertainty. The established bureaucracies will not give up
their power and their privileges easily. In an empire of many
peoples, decentralization is bound to run into the nationality

AUG. 30 '88 11:47 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.19

19

question. There is no entrepreneurial tradition. The secret police and the military--two of the most potent bureaucracies--have not yet been heard from.

It is possible that this turmoil will lead to a more restrained foreign policy--though as I explained above surely not automatically. It is equally possible that in the end the regime will appeal to the nationalism that has historically unified at least the Russian part of the population. It would be foolhardy for the West to stake everything on the possibility requiring least effort.

Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove even more unsettling in the countries of Eastern Europe. Even after hearing that every leader since Lenin was responsible either for a cult of personality, adventurism or stagnation a Soviet citizen can still take patriotic pride in the victory in World War II, the industrialization of the Soviet Union and its achievement of high

AUG. 30 '88 11:48 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.20

20

status in international affairs. No such comfort is available
to the East Europeans. Their ruling parties were imposed by
a country which now advertises publicly the corruption and
inefficiency of its system. The Gorbachev reforms are thus
bound to increase the challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling
groups in Eastern Europe. These will not be able to operate
the subtle balancing act between government and party envisaged
by Gorbachev for the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that some of
the East European Communist parties--in East Germany explicitly
and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia--are dissociating
openly from the Soviet pattern. When the East German Communist
organ announces that the German Democratic Republic never having
followed the Soviet pattern in the first place need not adapt
it to the party conference it is proclaiming a doctrine of national
Communism. And in most countries of Eastern Europe nationalism
is not friendly to Russia. The Polish Communist Party, of course,
is in trouble even without changes of policy by the Kremlin.

AUG. 30 '88 11:49 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.21

21

Gorbachev may therefore well be ushering in a period of upheaval in Eastern Europe. Faced by spreading discontent Soviet leaders may feel compelled to intervene. In this connection it is significant that Gorbachev in his interview with the _Washington Post_ claimed that the West fomented the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czech spring of 1968; in other words challenges to Communist preeminence are ascribed to foreign intervention by definition. And if the Soviets should intervene--even as an act of desperation--the present euphoric mood in the West will switch to hysteria repeating--with even wider swings--the postwar cycle between excesses of conciliation and excesses of belligerence.

It may thus happen that the new Soviet policy has created a Frankenstein. As the Federal Republic and to a lesser extent the other countries of West Europe increase their activities and investments in Eastern Europe the centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet empire will be accelerated--especially if there is not

22

some political understanding of how this process might
evolve.

In short, Soviet policy can embarrass the Atlantic Alliance
but the long-range dilemma is on the Soviet side. To weaken
NATO Moscow must pursue a policy of moderation both internationally
and domestically. But such a poicy encourages autonomy in
Eastern Europe and tempts Western Europe and especially the
Federal Republic into seeking to dissociate Eastern Europe from
the Soviet Union by economic and even political penetration. Then
we might see a reemergence of the competition between Teuton and
Slav that produced one world war or a partition of Eastern Europe
into spheres of influence which led to another. Either contingency
is certain to lead to a traumatic crisis. If that occurs in a
vacuum the danger of brutal Soviet intervention is real, perhaps
designed to demonstrate Western impotence in shaping the future
of Eastern Europe. A new crisis over Berlin may seem farfetched
today but is conceivable in that context.

AUG. 30 '88 11:50 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.23

23

Soviet policy whether by design or inadvertence is
returning the focal point of diplomacy to Europe. This may
well require more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than by
Washington. In these circumstances arms control negotiations
cannot continue to bear the principal burden of East-West
relations. They are too esoteric; they turn political leaders
into ratifiers of agreements among technicians. It is time to
face the fact that no agreement so far negotiated—including
those in which I participated—has made a strategic difference.
Indeed they are justified domestically on precisely the grounds
that they leave the military situation unchanged. They are a
response to domestic pressures; they are valued for their political
symbolism as a step towards an undefined peace. But the symbolism
in fact accelerates the potential crisis described here by
encouraging centrifugal tendencies in both East and West without
creating a political framework for dealing with them.

creating a political framework for dealing with them, encouraging centrifugal tendencies in both East and West without in fact accelerating the potential crisis described here by the symbolism as a step towards an undefined peace. But the symbolism reasons to domestic pressures; they are valued for their political that they leave the military situation unchanged. They are a indeed they are justified domestically on precisely the grounds those in which I participated--has made a strategic difference. take the fact that no agreement so far negotiated--including into ratifiers of agreements among technicians. It is time relations. They are too aseptic; they turn political leaders cannot continue to bear the principal burden of East-West Washington. In these circumstances same control negotiations will require more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than by returning the focal point of diplomacy to Europe. This may Soviet policy whether by design or inadvertence is

23

P.53

AUG.30 '88 11:20 H321MTER A2200183: WAH.DC

AUG. 30 '88 11:51 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.24

24

The time may have come to begin sensitive discreet
discussions about the political future of Europe. Historically
and logically the European House of which Soviet emissaries
speak cannot include parts of the Soviet Union because
territorially the larger part of the Soviet Union is in Asia.
A true European House would extend from the Soviet-Polish frontier
to the Atlantic.

A thoughtful exploration of this concept would point out to
Soviet leaders that by identifying their security with the
forcible maintenance of regimes considered alien by their publics
they have made their entire policy dependent on the capacity to
repress periodic upheavals. This puts Soviet policy at the
mercy of unforeseeable events. Are not in the long run arrangements
in Finland more conducive to Soviet security than those of
Eastern Europe? Is it possible to devise security arrangements
for Eastern Europe that meet Soviet security concerns even very

AUG. 30 '88 11:52 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.25

widely defined while permitting a political evolution compatible with popular aspirations? In the context of such a House of Europe it would be possible to conceive a security system involving drastic reductions of all outside forces-- including those of the US--that might in fact revolutionize present concepts of security.

This is not a negotiation that lends itself to the formal diplomacy conducted by coveys of diplomats and technicians characteristic of arms control negotiations. Ideally it should be conducted by some emissaries fully trusted by the leaders of the Soviet Union, the US and a representative of Europe. It requires a strategy worked out with some care and closely coordinated with our allies. It would be most effective in the context of rapid progress towards West European integration in which case Europe should play a major exploratory role in the sensitive, confidential talks without which the concept is doomed.

AUG. 30 '88 11:53 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

26

## Asian Perspectives

Gorbachev has made essentially the same appeal in Asia as in Europe: a suggestion that the United States has become dispensable and a proposal for some vague Asian security system to parallel the House of Europe. But the impact has been different.

The Asian nations have gone to school in the European power politics of the age of colonialism and have grafted onto it their own unsentimental national experiences. They do not look for a transcendent end of international tensions. They will try to assess the trade-off between a decline in Soviet ideological dynamism and its increase in real power if perestroika succeeds. They will seek to evaluate whether American actions reflect a long-range strategy, a decline in American strength or domestic incoherence. They will be preoccupied in a manner no longer conceivable in Europe by their relations with each other. Hence

P.27

27

the ups and downs of US-Soviet relations concern them more
from a geopolitical than from a tactical perspective. Not
having felt so dependent on the United States nor as afraid of
the Soviet Union there is not in Asia the emotional absorption
with Gorbachev's personality as in the Western democracies.

At least since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in
1968 China has feared the application to it of the Brezhnev
doctrine by which Moscow asserted its right to maintain doctrinal
orthodoxy in the Communist world. That fear has undoubtedly been
eased by recent developments. With Moscow imitating many of
China's economic reforms the Soviet incentive to impose ideological
conformity on China has surely diminished. On the other hand the
growth of Chinese power could--at least in Chinese eyes--create
a Soviet temptation to set back Chinese modernization. But
that temptation finds a limit in the Soviet need to maintain its
standing elsewhere. Too overt pressure on China would weaken

AUG. 30 '88 11:54 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.28

28

the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States.
Thus the careful calculators in Beijing will lower their
estimate of the dangers of a direct quest for hegemony by the
Soviet Union. Moreover they will take care not to be isolated
by a US-Soviet rapprochement. They will not want to be the last
to man the forts of the Cold War.

The likely outcome is a steady improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations--especially as the Soviets meet Chinese conditions,
above all by encouraging Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. At
the same time Chinese planners are not sentimental. They will
keep in mind that rapprochement with Moscow cannot shorten the
3,000 miles of the Sino-Soviet frontier. They know that
professions of good will can always be reversed. They will try
to improve relations with the Soviet Union without weakening their
ties to the United States which China will continue to require as
counterweight to any hegemonial aspirations in Asia. And in that

AUG. 30 '88 11:55 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.29

29

respect China's long-term fear concerns Japan nearly as much
as the USSR. China will continue to be interested in a vital
and independent Europe lest the Soviet Union shift the center
of gravity of its pressures towards the East.

The next test of Sino-US relations is likely to be over
whether the United States will be able to grasp Beijing's complex
and power-oriented diplomacy. Ideologists frustrated by the
waning of the Cold War under the aegis of a conservative president
may be tempted to turn on China. Liberals may resist the reliance
on balance of power which is implicit in making close ties to
Beijing and the preservation of China's territorial integrity a
major American interest. Beijing may compound the problem by
misunderstanding American psychology or domestic politics. But
wise leaders in both China and the United States will understand
that a close understanding between the two countries is more
necessary than ever in a multipolar world.

AUG. 30 '88 11:56 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.30

30

Japan, already an economic superpower, is on the way to becoming a major political and even military force. Though less than 2% of the Gross National Product Japan's military budget is already the third largest in the world. Japan is not likely to be basically influenced by the domestic changes in the Soviet Union. Its policy towards Moscow has always been shaped less by an ideological threat to which Japan feels itself largely immune than by national aspirations especially its claim to the four northern islands and by its concern over Soviet military power in the Far East. As its own military power grows and America emphasizes non-nuclear defense the price Japan is prepared to pay for American military protection is bound to decline. And the economic rivalry between the two allies is likely to increase. Thus the US-Japanese relationship will need careful tending.

At the same time India will grow in strength and play an increasing international role. Its policies can be deduced from

AUG. 30 '88 11:57 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.31

31

Britain's east of Suez in the 19th century which were essentially
shaped by the Viceroy's office in New Delhi. India's modern
leaders are likely to have the same conception of security as
their colonial predecessors. This is why they have insisted on
all the boundaries established during British rule. They will
seek to be the strongest power in the subcontinent and will
attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian
Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Thus whatever the day-to-day
irritations between New Delhi and Washington, its own geopolitical
interests will impel India over the next decade to assume some
of the security functions now exercised by Washington in those
areas.

Thus the balance of power in Asia involves the United States
less directly than in Europe. In Europe for the foreseeable
future, the United States must be part of the balance. In Asia,
Korea excepted, no American troops are in the front line. In the

Korea excepted, no American troops are in the front line. In the
future, the United States must be part of the balance. In Asia,
fear directly then in Europe. In Europe for the foreseeable

Thus the balance of power in Asia involves the United States
areas.

of the security functions now exercised by Washington in those
interests will impel India over the next decade to saunter some
irritations between New Delhi and Washington, its own geopolitical
Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Thus whatever the day-to-day
attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian
seek to be the strongest power in the independent and will
all the boundaries established during British rule. They will
their colonial predecessors. Thus is why they have insisted on
leaders are likely to have the same conception of security as
shaped by the Viceroy's office in New Delhi. India's a modern
Britain's a cast of 800 in the 19th century which were essentially

AUG. 30 '88 11:27 KLAUSNER ASSOCIATES, INC. DC

F.31

P.32

32

'90s there will exist in fact two balances of power in Asia: between China, Japan and the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia and between Japan, India and to some extent the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. The American role with respect to these two balances should be similar to that of Britain with respect to the European continent: we are the balancer of the equilibrium. Whatever our legal obligations an Asia under hostile domination is as much against US interests as an enslaved Europe. This after all was the proximate cause of US involvement in the second World War. As a balancer the US must support the weaker against the stronger and the potential victim against the potential aggressor. Such a policy has to be carried out in the face of the almost certain degradation of our Philippine bases over the next decade and the need to restructure both forces and command arrangements in Korea in the same period. This requires a sense of national strategy yet to be acquired by American foreign policy.

AUG. 30 '88 11:58 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.33

33

## Regional Issues

Major progress has been made on so-called regional issues during the course of this year. The Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has indicated that it would leave Cambodia by 1989; there is an agreement in principle for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

All this indicates at a minimum that the Soviet Union has found itself overextended in theaters that with the exception of Afghanistan are far from areas traditionally identified with Soviet national security.

These successes have had common characteristics: the United States had a clearly defined objective; it managed to establish a regional balance of power that provided an incentive for negotiation; and there was enough domestic support to enable the Administration to persevere. In the one regional conflict where

Administration to persevere. In the one regional conflict where
negotiation and there was enough domestic support to enable the
a regional balance of power that provided an incentive for
states had a clearly defined objective: it managed to establish
Soviet national security.

These successes have had common characteristics: the United
States had a clearly defined objective; it managed to establish
Soviet national security.

Angola.

agreement in principle for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from
indicated that it would leave Cambodia by 1989; there is an
to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has
during the course of this year. The Soviet Union has agreed

## Regional Issues

33

AUG 30 '98 11:38 KISSIMMER ASSOCIATES, INC. DC

P.33

AUG. 30 '88 11:59 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.34

34

the United States has not been successful--ironically closest to its borders in Nicaragua--none of these conditions have been met.

It is important to see the successes in perspective. Foreign policy knows no plateaus; each advance is an admissions ticket to a new set of challenges. There is too much of a tendency to look at the various agreements as final destinations and by analogy to the American experience in Indochina. But in Vietnam the United States not only withdrew but abdicated. But this cannot happen with respect to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; nor between Vietnam and Cambodia. Neither of these nations will abandon its historic ambitions with respect to a country at their border. They will pursue these objectives by more indirect means.

To maintain a new balance to sustain what has been achieved will be a tricky enterprise. Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan maintaining Congressional and public support for what are now called freedom fighters will surely

AUG. 30 '88 12:00 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.35

35

decline. Soviet pressure on Pakistan to adhere to the agreement not to supply arms will increase and after the death of President Zia Pakistan will be preoccupied with its domestic affairs for many months. It will therefore be difficult to prevent the Soviet Union from implementing Lenin's dictum of one step backwards, two steps forward.

Cambodia is more complex still. For the problem there is not only to thwart Hanoi's hegemonic ambitions but to prevent the unspeakable Khmer Rouge from taking over the country. But so far the trauma of Indochina has prevented us and other democracies from translating moral outrage over the genocidal practices of the Khmer Rouge into adequate support for the non-Communist forces such as those of Prince Sihanouk.

A detailed analysis of the various regional conflicts is beyond the scope of this article. It is clear that success requires a long-term policy, a willingness to persevere and an understanding of what forces are needed to give an incentive for negotiations.

AUG. 30 '88 12:01 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.36

36

## Conclusion

The basic US foreign policy problem is conceptual. The evolution in Moscow, the change in weapons technology and the emergence of new power centers have combined to hasten the end of the world as it existed in the forty years since the end of the second World War. This is often identified with a decline of American power. In fact absolute American power has grown in the past forty years and is increasing still. But the strength of other nations has increased even more rapidly partly because as a result of the devastation of the second World War they started from a smaller base.

The emergence of a multipolar world does not diminish America's importance but requires us to change our involvement from a principal actor to a supporting role at least in some areas. If our relative power is shrinking, if ideology is declining and if new power centers are emerging it is clear that we can no longer do everything simultaneously. It follows that

we can no longer do everything simultaneously. It follows that
declining and if new power centers are emerging it is clear that
areas. If our relative power is shrinking, it ideologically is
from a principal sector to a supporting role at least in some
America's importance but requires us to change our involvement
The emergence of a multiholar world does not diminish
they started from a smaller base.

because as a result of the devastation of the second World War
atlength of other nations has increased even more rapidly partly
in the past forty years and is increasing at still. But the

of American power. In fact, apportion American power has grown
the second World War. This is often identified with a decline
of the world as it existed in the forty years since the end of
emergence of new power centers have combined to weaken the end
evolution in Moscow, the change in weapons technology and the
The basic US foreign policy problem is conceptual. The
Conclusions

38

P.38

JUN. 30 '88 15:01 K1221NER R330C1E3A M3H. DC

AUG. 30 '88 12:02 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.37

37

peace presupposes a balance of power--a concept which Americans of all persuasions have historically resisted.

It is part of America's historic legacy that we have considered our situation as unique and the foreign policy experiences of other nations irrelevant. But the basic change in international relations is that our situation is no longer unique. Modern technology allows no significant distinction between American survival and that of other nations. We can no longer afford to wait for an actual assault on the equilibrium as we did in the two World Wars because by then it will be too late. A policy which pays attention to the balance of power must focus on capabilities as much as on intentions. It has to deal with nuances rather than absolutes; it assesses power relationships as much as moral preferences. It knows few final solutions for every apparent solution creates a new equilibrium that must be managed. It requires consistency of policy based on a national consensus regarding historical and geopolitical trends.

The second requirement is to build arms control negotiations into a concept of national strategy. Driven in all democracies by domestic politics, conducted by experts who have studied the issues for as many years as the political leaders have hours to deal with them they threaten to slip out of control of any long-range policy. For example all experts agree that a reduction of present strategic forces by 50% increases the vulnerability of America's strategic deterrent. There is wide consensus, too, that this increase in vulnerability could be avoided by measures such as mobile missiles or fewer missiles on each submarine or strategic defense. But these measures have not been taken or even publicly outlined and they are being opposed by one of the candidates for the presidency.

Modernization of the strategic forces is therefore a prerequisite to arms control negotiations and it must be related as well to a sustainable concept of conventional defense. It is

AUG. 30 '88 12:03 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.39

39

highly probable that the next President will face early on
a renewal of the Gorbachev tactic of accepting some Western
proposals made for domestic considerations and insufficiently
worked out in strategic or political terms. This could involve
some reduction of Soviet forces in Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
or even from Eastern Germany. What should the West's response
be then? How will it affect nuclear modernization in the Federal
Republic in the light of the statement by the Federal government
that modernization would not take place if there were progress
towards conventional arms control? What will be the defense
strategy of NATO after nuclear weapons have been stigmatized
and conventional weapons frozen or reduced in a strategically
irrelevant manner? Historically conventional deterrence has never
worked. What then is the Western concept of conventional arms
control?

Arms control negotiations are an integral part of Western
diplomacy. They will turn into a trap, however, if they are not

AUG. 30 '88 12:04 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

embodied in a concept of defense on one side and a vision of
a political future on the other.

This requires a new look at the organization by which
national security policy is developed in the United States.
It stresses adversary procedures between increasingly autonomous
departments that specialize in solving day-to-day operational
problems. There is in practice no focal point for long-range
strategy especially since the decline in the role of the National
Security Council staff and its diversion into the very short-term
operational considerations that it should seek to overcome. It
has been fashionable to deprecate the role of the national
security advisor. But without some focal point in the White
House to make sure that the options are sorted out, a new
President will be swamped by pet projects without the means of
evaluating them. And the great departments must take a look at
their own structure to make sure that strategy is not overwhelmed
by tactics.

AUG. 30 '88 12:05 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

Any catalogue of contemporary problems is bound to look formidable especially at the onset of a period of dramatic change. But it is important to maintain perspective. The problems outlined here are almost without exception susceptible to policy adaptations; those of the Communist world are structural--a much more difficult challenge. The United States and its friends are thus in the unusual position of being able to shape their own future.

23

Soviet policy whether by design or inadvertence is to return to the focal point of diplomacy to Europe. This may require more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than by Washington. In these circumstances arms control negotiations cannot continue to bear the principal burden of East-West relations. They are too esoteric; they turn political leaders into ratifiers of agreements among technicians. It is time to face the fact that no agreement so far negotiated—including those in which I participated—has made a strategic difference. Indeed they are justified domestically on precisely the grounds that they leave the military situation unchanged. They are a response to domestic pressures; they are valued for their political symbolism as a step towards an undefined peace. But the symbolism in fact accelerates the potential crisis described here by encouraging centrifugal tendencies in both East and West without creating a political framework for dealing with them.