[L.C.]

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, President Pusey, ladies and gentlemen: Before you get too impressed with this list of publications, I think I should tell you what a British reviewer wrote when he read one of my books. He said, "I don't know whether Mr. Kissinger is a great writer, but anyone finishing this book is a great reader."

Secondly, when reference was made to the off-the-record nature of this talk, the general mirth that it evoked seemed to indicate that you thought that it was one of the jokes that go with every introduction. Let me, therefore, underline this fact: I really have held the view that it is inconsistent with the position of a President for an Assistant to give public speeches on the subject of his duties. When I appear, for example, on television shows, which I do very rarely, it is to describe the operation of my office, never to talk about the substance of the job.

The relationship between the President and his Assistant has to be in terms of the fact that the Assistant is an extension of the President,

2

[LCJ]

and not an independent operator.

I accepted this because of my affection
for Harvard and my admiration for President Pusey,
who, I understand, is attending this function here
for the last time, and I therefore would greatly
appreciate it if the members of the Press would
take seriously the injunction that this is off
the record.

In addition to that, my Germanic nature
will probably cause me to put the verb into the
last paragraph.

When I was at Harvard, nothing infuriated
me more than a senior official who arrived in
Cambridge to say wearily that all alternatives
had been considered; that the best possible policy
was being pursued; and that if the audience only
knew as much as he did, they would not waste his
time by asking him questions. Well, ladies and
gentlemen, I am here to tell you that the best
policy is being pursued, that all alternatives
have been considered and that if you only knew
as much as I do, you could throw away all these
questions.

3

Your Chairman suggested that I make a few comments, first, about how we make decisions and then perhaps a few observations about the state of our foreign relations. I will do this and I will confine specific remarks to the answers to the questions.

Let me perhaps disagree with your Chairman on one point. A Presidential Assistant should not be a principal advocate of any particular policy. And, therefore, when I read all these exciting theories in the newspapers that describe momentous battles that are going on in Washington in which sometimes I win and sometimes I lose, you can assume that to the extent that they are true at all, they indicate a breakdown of what we are trying to do and not its normal operation.

My responsibility to the President is to put before him the range of reasonable choices. When the President asked me to assume my present responsibilities, he did not want to be known as a man who managed crises. He wanted to conduct a foreign policy in which we asked ourselves where

4

we wanted to go and then develop our policy in
relationship to these goals.

He demands that we put before him the
alternatives, the consequences, and then he
makes the decision. The issues are too serious
to put them in terms of a morality play in which
various bureaucracies are conducting a bitter
struggle for preeminence.

And I recognize that Cambodia was a
searing decision. I respect the people who
were profoundly upset about it. When the
decision was undertaken, it was done with
enormous travail and because it seemed to the
President and to his senior advisers that
given the existing choices, it was the best
course.

But whether you agree with what is
being done in Washington today or whether you
disagree with it, you should at least have the
assurance that the serious alternatives are
being seriously considered and not that there
is a foreordained process to its predetermined
conclusion in which contrary points of view are

5

[L.C]

simply dismissed.

Now, let me say briefly, because I do want to answer your questions, what it is that we are trying to do and how we see the contemporary international situation. This administration came into office at one of the most complex periods of American history. The country was divided by a tragic and inconclusive war.

We had come, apart from the issue of the war, to the end of the expectations and theories on which the postwar American foreign policy had been based. We had to reestablish a sense of direction in American foreign policy while at the same time bringing to an end a war that had produced enormous divisions in the American body politic.

We had come to the end of the expectations and theories of the previous period not because they have been wrong, but because the conditions which produced them had been changed partly as a result of the success of previous policy.

When the United States first got

6

[L]

involved in foreign policy in the postwar period, we were the only noncommunist country capable of taking a global view. We were the only country with a domestic structure strong enough to sustain a long-range policy. And we were the only country powerful enough to assure progress and defense in other parts of the world. And, therefore, it was natural for us to oscillate from the period of isolation to a period in which commitment almost became an end in itself.

Twenty-five years after the end of World War II, even without the war in Vietnam, these conditions had changed dramatically. In Europe and in Japan, economic recovery had produced political stability. In other parts of the world, new nations had come into being, many of which at least had achieved increasing cohesion.

The communist world, which had appeared as totally monolithic in the immediate postwar period, was divided by one of the profoundest national rivalries of the contemporary period, the split between Communist China and the

7

Soviet Union. The strategic situation had changed
with the growth of Soviet strategic power and the
emergence of Chinese and French nuclear power.

So, whoever came into office in 1968,
and apart from the war in Vietnam, a rethinking
of American foreign policy was essential. We
concluded that it was imperative to bring our
commitments into line with our physical as well
as our psychological possibilities. The idea
that the United States could be responsible at
every moment of time in every part of the world
for both defense and progress was partly beyond
our physical resources, but it was even more
importantly beyond our psychological resources.

When I am asked what I have learned in
my present position, I do not know, but I think
that this isn't the best time to answer it because
there isn't enough time for reflection, but there
is one respect in which it has been very striking
and it is this: As a professor, the identification
of a problem was always the most important task
because then we could work on it for as long as
it was necessary and one could do the best with it

8

of which one as an individual was capable.

In government, the identification of
a problem is only the beginning of another
dilemma because there are many problems of
which senior officials may be conscious and
they even might know what they would do with
it if they only had the time to address it.
The more decisions around the world are cen-
tralized in Washington, the longer the agenda
of problems to which we cannot turn. The
more we can decentralize decisions around
the world, the greater there is the possibility
that the imagination and energy of others can
be brought to bear on the agenda of world
progress.

And, therefore, even more for
psychological than for physical resources,
our policy has been to try to bring about a
devolution of responsibilities. It is impor-
tant for that reason and it is important also
to give other countries a stake in international
order and international peace. That is what we
are attempting to do with the Nixon -- with the

9

[11]

so-called Nixon Doctrine, which in effect says
that development and defense of other areas
depends in the first instance on the area con-
cerned, on the country concerned and on the
region concerned, and that the United States
should be involved only where it can make a
difference but not where it is the only weight
in this case.

Now, this style of policy has created
great problems in relations with other countries
that are extremely ambivalent. They want to be
more assertive but still have the total assurance
of continuous American involvement. And when
people say they don't fully understand what the
Nixon Doctrine means, that may be due to the
acuteness of its formulation but it may also be
due to the fact that they are asking of us a
question to which they must give part of the
answer.

We cannot and we do not want to hand
them a blueprint of the international system.
We believe that the kind of international order
that should emerge is meaningful primarily if

10

[LJ]

it generates the participation of others and if
they believe that it is partly theirs and not
something that was handed to them from Washington.
And, therefore, we are in a profound transitional
period in our relationship toward our allies and
also in a transitional period in our relationship
to the communist countries.

These countries, too, are facing major
problems. They are torn between an ideology that
commands worldwide hostility to noncommunist states
and a reality that makes such hostility too dan-
gerous and the fact that their own internal
rivalries have proved to be more intractable than
any rivalry they may have with any outside country.
And, therefore, our attitude towards the communist
countries has been to deal with them precisely and
substantively on issues of mutual concern.

We have believed that the psychothera-
peutic approach to foreign policy that believes
that good relations on a personal plane can be
equated with good relations on an international
plane is not adequate to the dangers that we face
and to the hopes that people have for a resolution

11

of some of the outstanding conflicts.

We have worked hard on such issues as the Strategic Arms Limitations Negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to bring about a state of affairs where both sides have a substantive interest in maintaining some agreement that could act as a break on the conflict they have in other areas.

Now, let me say a few words about Vietnam. Vietnam is, of course, an almost liturgical issue at this moment and there are standard objections and standard answers, and those of you who are unhappy about what happens in Vietnam cannot be reassured by anything I can say in the few minutes that I have left here and that is not my purpose. My purpose is to tell you what we are trying to accomplish and how we see the problem as a general problem and then, again, I will be glad if there are any questions to see what specific answers I can give.

Nobody questions the concern and the anguish of those who have been opposed to the war in Vietnam. Nobody is in favor of war. We have

12

attempted to end the war in the most rapid way
possible consistent with our conception of the
requirements of international peace and the
requirements of domestic peace.

We have held the view, when we came
into office there were 530,000 Americans in
Vietnam and the number was still increasing on
the basis of programs we inherited. There did
not exist an American negotiating proposal on
the basis of which the war could be ended. Nor
did there exist a domestic program on the basis
of which we could end the war unilaterally if
negotiations didn't succeed.

It was decided that we should attempt
to end the war in a way in which those around
the world whose security had come to depend on
American promises were not disheartened or
shaken and to end the war also in such a way
that took account not only of the concern of
the opponents but of the concern of those whose
families had suffered as a result of the war,
because we believed we owed it to the American
public to end the war in a way that showed that

13

[LJ]

there was a sense of purpose in ending it and not simply a panicky reaction to domestic pressure.

This explains why we have moved perhaps more deliberately than some people in this room may have welcomed, but they should also keep in mind that while we may have moved more deliberately, we have moved inexorably. And while there may be temporary ups and downs, you should be assured that no one is looking for an excuse to expand the war or for an excuse to prolong the war; that we are on course; and that when the process is finished, which we believe will be in a time, in a finite time, that people looking back on it may feel that their purposes were met even if their time scale was not.

And this gets me to the last point I want to make before I answer questions and it is this: For a then still professor and a barely former professor, it has, of course, been particularly difficult to see the unhappiness of some of the younger generation and the outrage of some of the academic community and, again, I do not wish to debate the merits of the various

14

positions.

I want to say one thing other. We have believed that we were serving, at least in part, some of our most vocal critics by not permitting this focal point of decision to be the size of the demonstration that could be generated. We've believed that it was essential that there be some degree of sense of direction in the major course of our foreign policy because among the many reasons that produce the anguish of the younger generation there is certainly hardly the problem of a lack of direction, of a sense of impotence in relation to bureaucracies too great to be seemingly influenced, and above all, a sense sometimes of uneasiness towards people who are not able to maintain their purposes in the face of any pressures whatsoever.

The problem of adolescence is the problem of identity. And I do not know whether one serves that best whether it is possible to get a sense of identity vis-a-vis people who attempt to join a revolution at the first push.

So, we have believed that the victims of

15

[L]

demonstrations would not be upper middle class
children, but much more elemental forces whose
first victims would be the upper middle class
college kid. I say all of this only to point
out that we have tried to hear, we have tried
to understand, and so that you can see that even
if you do not agree with the answers, we have
tried to ask some of the questions that concern
concerned people.

But it is too early after two years
to make any judgments.

And, finally, we will not be judged by
Vietnam alone and probably not even primarily.
The basic problem of our period is that with
weapons of mass destruction growing on all sides,
a continuation of the state of affairs of the last
twenty-five years in which traditional elements
of power were used to settle international problems
will become too dangerous in the years ahead.

What we are trying to do, I do not
claim success, what we are trying to do is to
begin the process of building an international
structure in which we will transcend those methods

16

in which most nations, all nations hopefully, will
feel they have a stake in preserving the inter-
national system that exists and in which we have
brought about not just a condition of peace but
where people looking back can say that this was
the period in which we began to live with a con-
sciousness of peace.

And now, I will be glad to answer
questions.

(Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Dr. Kissinger has said one
of the principal problems in the academic
community is identifying those problems. Well,
I can assure you that this Harvard audience has
been living up to this reputation because on
this list of questions, you have identified
enough problems to keep Dr. Kissinger here for
another hour or two.

But, I will take just a couple. The
most recent ones, concerning the most recent
problems.

How would you respond to the idea that
U.S. air support for South Vietnam and Cambodian

17

[L]

ground troops at Pich Nil Pass violates the letter
and spirit of the Cooper-Church Resolution?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me answer that in two parts. First the legal part and, secondly, let me explain what we are trying to do because it isn't enough to be able to prove that we are within our legal rights about which there can be very minimal questions.

The various amendments to the Military Appropriations Act that was passed at the end of December provide that American forces can be used in Cambodia and Laos when it helps the overall program of -- in which we are engaged and -- or, when it helps to prevent the reestablishment of sanctuary areas from which operations can be launched into South Vietnam, apart from control of the picture.

Now, therefore, there is no question, I believe, about the legality of the action. The one thing for which we -- that we cannot do, although that even might be doubtful -- the one thing we could not do is insert American ground forces into Cambodia. Now, we have no

18

[L]

intention, obviously, of doing that. But let me,
rather than talking about the fact that it is
legal, explain what it is that we are attempting
to do.

First of all, the number of forces
involved, I cannot give you the figure here,
the number of forces involved on both sides in
that particular operation is extremely small
compared to many other operations that have
been taking place on any scale.

Secondly, this operation which will
be of limited duration has as its sole purpose
the opening of Route 4 between Sihanoukville,
or what used to be called Sihanoukville and
Phnom Penh.

Thirdly, what we are attempting to
do in Cambodia this year is to prevent the
establishment of base areas from which
attacks can be launched into Vietnam or to
prevent the features of the aforementioned
areas from which supplies can be introduced
into Cambodia that can then be brought to the
sanctuaries.

19

[14]

9

In order not to interfere with the Vietnamization program and with the withdrawal program which we are determined to continue, these operations are limited in scope. They will not get us involved in Cambodia. We are not fighting for Cambodia as such. There is no intention of getting involved in Cambodia for this year.

And the notion that has developed over the last six years that one sort of stumbles into an involvement step by step without knowing what one is doing, I do not believe it's true of how we got into Vietnam. It is certainly not true of what we are doing.

It simply makes no sense to assume that we are withdrawing troops from Vietnam in order to get involved in Cambodia.

We are determined to end the war in Vietnam and the measures we are pursuing are designed to help us extricate our forces from Vietnam in the fastest possible way, and they are confined to that purpose and to no other and under no circumstances are American ground

20

[L]

troops going to be involved in Cambodia.

(Applause.)

THE CHAIRMAN: In the light of the present
Jarring peace discussion and antagonisms in the
Middle East, do you see any possibility for a
settlement between Israel and the Arabs in the
foreseeable future?

DR. KISSINGER: In many respects, Vietnam
is really our most anxious problem, but the
Middle East is certainly the most dangerous
area.

It is in the Middle East that you
have countries with overwhelming concern for
their own security, for their own aspirations,
connected with the major nuclear powers but
not under the control of the major nuclear
powers and, therefore, a conflict which may
start either an internal upheaval or as a
local conflict can expand without the inten-
tions of the United States and the Soviet
Union into a general, into the risk of a
general war.

Therefore, it has been our attempt

21

to reduce the local conflicts as much as possible
and to attempt to bring about a negotiated
solution.

Now, at the moment, Israel and Egypt
are talking to each other through Jarring. He
will have to make a report to the United Nations
before February 5 on the basis of which there
will be a decision whether the ceasefire can be
continued and therefore, while I do not like to
duck questions, I would rather not comment on
those negotiations while they are in such a
delicate phase.

Our attempt is to try to bring about
a solution which reconciles the Arabs' concern
about the conquered territories with the Israeli
concern about their security and I can tell you
that this is not one of the easiest jobs.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would you comment on Mr.
Brandt's Eastern policy?

DR. KISSINGER: When I leave this job,
I will be one of the world's great sports.
But I know just enough about every topic to
make a nuisance of myself.

22

The problem of Germany and Central Europe is -- I nearly said it was complex, but it isn't. The Federal Republic on the one hand is part of the Western Alliance. On the other hand, it is the one country in Europe with unfulfilled national aspirations and I don't think it is giving away an enormous secret that no other country feels a need for German unity with the same intensity as Germany.

Therefore, it is natural for the Federal Republic to conduct a policy which it believes will help ease the conditions for Germany, and, obviously, one of the components of that has to be to try to ease, insofar as it is possible, the fear in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union that has been generated by two world wars and especially the last one.

Therefore, the policy of a relaxation of tensions in Central Europe coincides with our own attempt to bring about a more normal relationship between the United States and the communist countries. And the Schlesinger Report said that there is no question about the objective, or for

23

B

that matter, about the measures that have been taken.

One problem that all of us in the West face is to bring about -- that when we conduct bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, to conduct them in such a way that that should not become an instrument of dividing the West and permitting the Soviet Union to use these negotiations to split up the alliance that has produced the conditions which made the negotiations possible. We have this problem in our negotiations on the limitations of strategic arms and we have seen, therefore -- we have attempted to be very careful to inform our allies at every stage about what we are going to do.

The Germans and we have talked about the evolution of our policy and we have not, up to now, had any differences of opinion. It is in everybody's interest to make sure that national considerations do not override the considerations of European unity and of Western unity.

24

But that point has not been reached and
any problems that may arise I think we can handle
through the process of consultation.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would the present Greek
dictatorship collapse if we withdrew our support
of it?

DR. KISSINGER: This, Mr. President, I
remind you, is what caused me to lose my job.

(Laughter.)

The present -- when one conducts the
foreign policy of the United States, one has to
conduct it in the first instance with the
government which exists. To say that we support
any particular government with which we deal is
not a correct statement of the situation. We
have maintained a relationship with the Greek
Government as we maintain relationships with
many governments whose domestic structure we
might not have chosen.

But the Greek Government can maintain
itself without the sort of relationship that we
have maintained and it has been our belief that
we can have a greater influence through the sort

25

of relationship that we have maintained than
through any of the alternatives. But it is
under no circumstances correct that we are
propping up the existing Greek Government
through any measures that we are taking.

THE CHAIRMAN: The last question:

Quite a few questions here dealt
with the problem or the hidden problem of
whether China would become expansionist in
the next decade ahead. Would you please
comment on that in general?

DR. KISSINGER: One of the problems of
China -- there are many problems, particularly
in China, and some of them on the Western side,
but some included in Chinese, in communist
ideology and in Chinese history.

If you look at Chinese history, you
will see that at no time in Chinese history
has China had to deal with other nations on
the basis of sovereign equality. China has
been either politically or culturally dominant
or, for what in Chinese history, for a very
brief period in the early Twentieth Century,

26

China was the object of foreign interests, but it
has never had to deal with foreign countries on
the basis that has been familiar to Western
nations and, as a matter of fact, Chinese
relations with no country have been spectacularly
good.

The only country which has had an
unbroken record of good relations with Communist
China in the postwar period is Albania which
does not impinge on China.

Now, our policy towards Communist
China is this: We recognize that 800 million
people are a major factor in international
policy. We recognize that they have the longest
unbroken tradition of self-government of any
nation in history and we recognize that a
permanent peace is going to be very difficult
without bringing Communist China into some
civilized system with the rest of humanity.

We, therefore, in the first year of
this administration, took measures to ease
trade restrictions and to eliminate most travel
restrictions to China. We have taken the position

27

7

that we will not let any communist country,
including the Soviet Union, prescribe to us
what our relationship will be to any other
communist country.

We have made clear to Communist
China through a variety of ways that we are
prepared to discuss with them in a serious
manner on the basis of reciprocity measures
of easing the existing tensions between us.

I cannot predict whether Communist
China will expand as China generally has been
unified partly politically and partly culturally,
or whether China will come to recognize, as I
believe all nations must come to recognize,
that the traditional balance of power policy in
which you accumulate small advantages in the
hope that a quantitative advantage in time can
become a qualitative advantage. It's simply
too dangerous in this period and that you cannot
conduct foreign policy on such a basis; or,
whether China will recognize it, but recognize
it too late.

All I can say is that we are prepared

28

to conduct our relationship with Communist China
on the basis of their actions and not on the
basis of their ideological statements and that
we stand ready to engage in serious discussions
with them and that we have tried to indicate to
them, and we will continue to try to indicate
to them, how such a dialog might be conducted.

That seems to us much more important
than the legalistic question of the legal form
in which such discussions should take place
or the precise forum in which they might exist.

(Applause.)

29