Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW
NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCONE

Roland Evans/Kissinger

1:17 p.m. - 5/17/72

K: Hello.

E: Henry.

K: Rowland, I see that Haig's secretary now calls you by the first name.
Is that the code name for classified documents?

E: We have something going. What's up?

K: I just wanted to know that Dobrynin says if you want to go early
you can get a visa but you probably have it already.

E: The visas Henry are not going to be good until arrival on Saturday.

K: He's telling me you can go whenever you want to. Just call him.

E: That's fantastic because ... I will call as soon as I get back because
I have been talking to all day and he said that no visa will be
made good until arrival Saturday.

K: Talk to him and say I just talked to him and he said anytime you want to
leave he will give you a visa.

E: I'll call him in half-an-hour. I really appreciate that Henry. How are you
doing?

K: I'm doing fine. Our problem now is not to get this settled too early because
you don't want to peak before November, do you? Have you thought of that?

E: I'll keep my fingers crossed. When's your birthday?

K: My birthday? Mine is May 27th.

E: 27th. 48 or 49?

K: 49.

E: That's what I thought. I'm having lunch with Stu Alsop. We had a little
fight about it - May 27th. Henry, I will let you know what happens on this.

K: Listen, you two shouldn't collude.

E: But I appreciate that help for me very much and I'll let you know what happens.

Re: question about the open line call

the phone or the switchboard

Please call!

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

5/17/72 1:55 p.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Henry.

K: Yes.

Z: Henry, I don't mean to bother you. Are you alone now?

K: No, I'm not.

Z: We're going to put out the schedule and then we're going to refer to the fact that we're going to the Bo . . . you know the ballet and then Mrs. Nixon . . .

K: You better let me look that over.

Z: Well that's what I'm doing. I just don't want to do this until ______ with you.

K: Can't you wait till tomorrow with it?

Z: We really can't.

K: Don't want to. I mean, why can't you?

Z: I mean we could wait until Friday to do it but it's foolish to do that. We've gotta get some momentum going here if we're going to have a story that things are bogging down.

K: Oh, there's no danger of that.

Z: I'm telling you, there is from the standpoint of the press.

K: Well then we'll just turn it around all the quicker. But I don't know what you define as the schedule.

Z: Well, let me go over with you. When will you be free?

K: In about half an hour.

Z: Good. I'll see you at 2:30.

K: Right.

Z: I'll come in there.

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

Re: [insert telephone number]

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: KHL, NASA Date: 5/13/74

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

2:20 5/17/72

BR: Say, Henry two things--one on the matter of the statement on the German matter--you and I saw eye to eye. I called Boggs just before you did and told him I didn't think it was a very good idea.

HAK: Yes, because their constitutional process hasn't completed yet--

BR: That what I said. There is no point putting it up to the President.

HAK: Okay, I will hold it Bill.

BR: I heard on the radio and called him and said hell it isn't finished so there is no point --we have taken the position until it is final or almost final we shouldn't say anything.

HAK: I completely agree

BR: Secondly, on the matter of who ABM you know the Russian proposal that we might want by agreement to defer the start of construction --

HAK: No, I don't think that is the Russian proposal--I think--go ahead

BR: I understood that position was no and Gerry told Semonyov--

HAK: That's right, that is our position.

BR: I wonder if that is a wise position--I don't think we could get it through the Congress this year--we could next year I think, but I doubt very much

HAK: Yes, but deferral is for three to five years--you see the problem is that they could then develop that technology--

BR: What I was going to suggest was that maybe we could when the President is there, just defer it this year--from our standpoint, I don't think we can get it through this year anyway.

Re: [Subject to the open file]

Title, Name of individual

Public records staff

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

Page 2
TELCONE

NARA. Ote 5/13/04

HAK: One problem with that delegation, Bill, is you never can be sure
what Semonyov proposes and what Goddov slips him to propose to us.
We are not dug in on that particularly.

BR: There is no reason for us to change our position in the negotiations
but I am thinking in terms of --

HAK: If they don't settle it by Monday--this is the sort of thing I think
the President and Breshnev can worry about--

BR: And some of the signings up on the hill--they indicated that
it would be damn tough to get ABM legislation this year--

HAK: I think that is correct. I am sure that we would'nt fall on our
sword on that one

BR: One other subject--on the Indochina Geneva Conference, I am sending
a memo to the President along the lines of our discussion the other day
saying that when we get back, this is something he may want to think about.
I think in the meantime we will tell the British we would just as soon they
not approach the North Vietnamese about it

HAK: I thought Alex's idea yesterday which he told me was yours, was
the right one because not to --to tell the British not to approach them until
we come back and see if this is worse.

BR: I will have a chance to talk to Alec Humum in London--

HAK: You are going from Warsaw to Sento--right?

BR: Right, but I will see him at the NATO meeting. But I think that it
is something that might appeal to the Russians in that it would be a littler
easier for them to have a face saving device.

HAK: But it is one we could feel out in Moscow.

BR: That is right. And they have already approached so we would
have no trouble approaching it, the British have asked

Национальная дипломная
электронная
baseball
Database System

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.V. NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

TELCONE
Page 3

HAK: Yes, but I think it would be a little premature to do it before that we have been in Moscow.

BR: Oh, I don't think anyone wants to. I don't think anyone is interested in that. Okay, thanks Henry.

HAK: Right.

The President's Office of the Vice President

Publicity Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.W. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

5/17/72 2:28

JA: Hello Henry. I just wanted to know if you thought that letter was alright.

HAK: The letter was alright, Joe, but I thought on second thought, why don't you address it to me because you are not supposed to know with whom I am dealing.

JA: Alright. I will have it rewritten and....

HAK: And then, I can send it to them.

JA: And then I will address it to you. I agree with you about that. The other thing which I cannot resist asking you about but did not call you on, can you give me any guidance on this business of your friend whom I will see tonight--the Secretary of Treasury?

HAK: I think it is purely political.

JA: You don't think it was precipitated because of Wallace being shot--

HAK: Oh no, I know it was decided before then...

JA: And they just went ahead with the schedule no matter what. There is a certain lack of sensibility I must say.

HAK: I think he will be more valuable in that role of getting the south now than he would have been before. And I think he is in a position now better for doing it from a public outside

JA: Of course, I have seen that already. The thing that bothered me was the timing of it, because there is no doubt that getting the south of someone who has been but isn't there any longer, leaving his party, as someone who has been but isn't there any longer is altogether different from taking a position when you are in fact in the office. Am I wrong?

HAK: Exactly. That is right. My view is really it was not a decision of which I was involved. I would like to tell you that there were so many speculative stories over the weekend that he was displacing me I had to move decisively and get rid of him.

["Department of Defense\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Navy\nU.S. Marine Corps\nU.S. Army\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Navy\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Army\nU.S. Marine Corps\nU.S. Navy\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Navy\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Army\nU.S. Marine Corps\nU.S. Navy\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Army\nU.S. Navy\nU.S. Air Force\nU.S. Army\n

Husqville 312, the open house
in the house of a confidential
Preliminary Report

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sec. 3-6

TELECON

Dwight Chapin

5/17/72 2:35pm

K: Hello.

C: Henry, Dwight. You called sir? You wanted me to call?

K: Yes, but I have somebody with me. There are a number of . . . I have raised that issue about the TV, . . . hello?

C: Yes sir.

K: He said it's a very unusual suggestion and you are not to raise it in Moscow.

C: Okay, thank you for telling me.

K: And, but he will get it the highest level attention.

C: Okay, perfect. We won't know until we get there then.

K: No, no. I think you will know by Friday evening.

C: Okay.

K: And he has a number of other . . . he has a number of things that I wanted to take up with you.

C: Okay. Vorontsov's calling me. Do you want me to go ahead and call him back just in case you were going to cover some of them with me?

K: Oh yeah.

C: Okay, I'll do that too then before . . .

K: A lot of the things I know he won't raise with you because they have to do with the car which is giving them gas pains.

C: Oh I know it. Okay, we can cover it later then.

K: Yeah.

C: Okay. Thank you.

The President's Office of the Vice President
The Department of the Navy
Reproducible Copy

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sect. 3.6

By: KMLV

NASA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Walter Kissinger/Henry Kissinger
Page 2

WK: I have an invitation from Sec. Rogers for a Foreign Policy
Conference for Senior Business Executives--

HAK: Yeh, I think you should go. You can be damn sure they won't ask me
to participate if it is at the State Department.

WK:

SANITIZED

HAK:

WK: We'll come down on Thursday, I believe and will be down next on
Wednesday night and stay until Friday morning. Maybe we can get
together one evening-- How are you feeling

HAK: Fine

WR: Do you think our posture in Vietnam is beginning to pay off.

HAK: Oh yes, we are really--they may be tough, but without supplies
even they cannot fight. In another month or two, it will begin
to tell. We have knocked out every bridge on the railroad to China.

WR: Well, I will restrain myself from asking any questions, but I think
it took a lot of guts and courage.

HAK: I will see you on the 7th or 8th. Call me as soon as we are back
from Russia. And then we will get together.

WR: Fine and have a good and successful trip.

MLN F

The President's Office of the Vice President
for the Office of the Vice Chairman
Publicity Staff

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

4:51 p.m., May 17, 1972

By: KMLW, NASA Date: 5/13/74

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you?

Z: I was so ______ today, I don't even understand what we're going to do on the trip myself.

K: Well, you did tell him the capitol of the country we're going to?

Z: No, I didn't even give him that much. Are you going to see Schecter?

K: No.

Z: Oh, okay. They're going to cover on the story. I thought it might be worthwhile for you to do it.

K: Cover on what story?

Z: On this big trip to the Soviet Union.

K: I think he has asked to see me. I'll see him.

Z: It might be worthwhile to see him and you know, move a little stuff along to him. He came in here and wanted me to give him a feel of what the schedule was and so forth and I kind of played -- I couldn't do it; I wanted him to talk to you first.

K: Okay.

Z: Then I'll fill in the mechanics around it at your authorization.

K: I'll talk to him tomorrow.

Z: Good. And then I'll see him after you but I won't talk to him until you talk to him and then do what you say to do.

K: I'll talk to him tomorrow.

Z: Okay.

K: Bye.

A letter from the open sea
from the sea, son of a seaplane
Pilot of the Pacific Ocean

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.5

By: K.M.L. NAVAQ. Date: 5/13/74

TELCOM

Frank Sinatra/Mr. Kissinger

4:55 p.m., May 17, 1972

K: Frank, how are you?

S: Fine. Did you call me earlier?

K: Yes. Are you coming down tomorrow?

S: Yes.

K: Good, what time are you coming in?

S: I'll get in about 4 o'clock at the hotel. I'll call you when I get in.

K: Good. You bringing Tina along?

S: Tina's coming from LA. She's going to come into Dulles and we're having a car pick her up. She'll be in in plenty of time.

K: Okay. Now let me ask you this. Marion Javits is having a party for her husband's birthday. Would you like to drop by there?

S: We could. We could do that for a drink, is that what you mean?

K: Yeah. Before we have dinner.

S: Sure.

K: Okay.

S: Fine, Henry, anything you like.

K: Good. Then I'll see you tomorrow.

S: Very good. Fine, Henry, I'll call you as soon as I get in. I'll call your girl and let you know I'm there.

K: Good. Terrific. Where will you be, the Madison?

S: The Madison, yeah.

K: Good. Can we do anything?

S: No, everything's fine, all taken care of. All right, Henry, talk to you tomorrow.

K: I look forward to seeing you. S: Right, bye. K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E102358
By Lb NARA Date 5/10/72

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

5:19 p.m., May 17, 1972

K: I haven't talked to you in two hours.

D: Yes ... unstavle I should say. That's why I was intending to call you and to tell you that I have now -- we rather have the beginnings of a communique.

K: Good.

D: So I will bring it to you that night. That will give you chance to study it during the night. I will go to bed, all right?

K: Okay.

D: You will study it -- if you are upset over the possiblity.

K: I just wanted to tell you we are going back to the original text on the scientific agreement.

D: Oh, I think this is really very nice. It was yours and we accepted, there was nothing really --

K: No, no, no; we're going back to it and so we can forget about that.

D: It will be very helpful really.

K: Good.

D: Well, what about this car? You have a chance to --

K: Well, I can tell you informally that we will work it out substantially along your lines. I haven't had the final word yet.

D: Yeah, Understand.

K: But we will go very far towards your position.

D: I understand this.

K: I think if we could settle it on the basis that when the President travels alone, he can use his car.

D: When he goes where?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012382

By: LENA RA Date: 6/16/72

TELCORN

5:19 p.m. May 17, 1972

Page 2

K: When he travels alone.

D: Alone, what do you mean alone?

K: You know, when he is unaccompanied by a Soviet official.

D: Oh, I see.

K: Which will not happen too often.

D: No, I mean but then that way he would like -- you remember the
arrangement that is no problem from us. But if he is going to
some places -- in this case which is just really --

K: Now, look, you tell them to have faith in me.

D: Yeah.

K: Give me 24 hours.

D: No problem, no problem.

K: But we understand your concern.

D: But only on this matter really.

K: Well, it will be substantially met.

D: I understand. Of course all the other things which you mention
is perfectly all right with us.

K: The TV thing too?

D: On TV, I have no chance to check with them.

K: Right.

D: So I really don't know whether I will get that tomorrow but when
you will be there on airfield, I promise you to give answer there
or Moscow.

K: Okay. Well, I think we can settle the other one.

D: Yeah.

Receptionist's Office
Ms. Ann K. McVay
Assistant Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: K.H.Y. NASA Date: 5/13/74

TELECON

5:19 p.m., May 17, 1972

D: You ... uninvited I should say. That's why I was intending to call you and to tell you that I have now -- we rather have the beginnings of a communication.

K: Good.

K: Okay.

D: You will study it -- if you are up at all the possibility.

K: Good.

D: Yeah, Understand.

D: I understand this.

D: When he goes where?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By: CNARA Date: 6/1/72

TELCONE

5:50 p.m., May 17, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol. We are doing instructions for Helsinki and I wanted to mention a few issues to you just so that we don't waste time going back and forth.

D: Yes.

K: One, on the ABM, I've already explained it to you but we are against this deferral idea.

D: About what?

K: The idea that the construction of the second side be deferred for three years or whatever the proposal is.

D: Yes. Deferment for --

K: Deferral. We call it deferral or deferment is fine.

D: For three years.

K: We are against it.

D: Oh, yes, um-humm.

K: Because this is one of the ideas we taught you and now Semenov is mentioning it to Smith and --

D: But what do you want to have?

K: We want the original position, both sides -- what you gave us in Moscow is fine.

D: ...

K: No, no; what you gave me. That sort of paper.

D: What was [in it]?

K: That each side can do two sides, one of the capital and one of the field.

D: Yes, but what was given to you by Brezhnev.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01-2357
By LJB NARA Date 5-1-72

TELCOM

5:50 p.m., May 17, 1972

K: Yeah. I mean, that basic idea.

D: Yes.

K: Is acceptable to us.

D: Yes.

K: And not the refinement that there should be a delay of the second side, that is for you the ICBM field and for us the capitol for three years. We don't like this.

D: Yes. What --

K: I'm just trying to -- we're going to instruct Smith accordingly.

D: Yeah.

K: He's already told Semenov. The second is that 62 boat limit which I've already told you at noon.

D: Yes.

K: Where we want to go back to Brezhnev's proposal.

D: I understand.

K: And let me see what other issue there is. Oh, there's something about large faced radars.

D: Yes.

K: Where your side has proposed a limit that we consider too high.

D: Our limit is you think too high?

K: What you have proposed that the limit be on the radar which we consider too strong.

D: Um-humm.

K: So our proposal is either we go to a lower power radar or we will make a unilateral interruptive statement.

D: Um-humm.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Fob 1287
By: CNARA Date 6/1/71

TELCONE

5:50 p.m., May 17, 1972

K: And I think the other issues we will leave to the Delegation to settle so that Semenov and Smith have something.

D: All right. And I will tell Moscow about it in the meantime.

K: Okay but just to save time so that you know what the President's view is.

D: Yes, I understand. But one ABM just as good as two.

K: Just stick with the formula which we discussed in Moscow,

D: Moscow, yeah. Okay.

K: Okay.

D: And I will mention to Moscow.

K: Good.

D: Thank you.

K: In other words, we insist on accepting your proposals; that's a tough position for you to be in.

D: (laughter)

K: We have more trouble with our own Delegation than with you right now.

D: Sounds kind of stubborn. There are several ways out. I will tell you what the other way out is when you get in trouble with your own Delegation.

K: Okay.

D: Okay.

K: Good, thank you.

D: Thank you. Bye, bye.

A. J. F. T. of the open line
lieutenants and lieutenants
President and Vice President

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

TELCOM

Robert Toth/Mr. Kissinger

6:00 p.m., May 17, 1972

By: KJLW NAVA Date: 5/17/72

T: Hi, Dr. Kissinger. I'm doing an advance on the trip and there are a couple of things I wanted to ask you if I can. One, do you think that Vietnam is going to really dominate, at least initially, the talks or can we hope that it will be finessed somewhat by both sides.

K: It will certainly not dominate -- this is not on-the-record.

T: No, no, no.

K: It's for your guidance.

T: Right.

K: And it shouldn't be White House sources either.

T: Right, I understand. As I understand it, it's at most Administration sources.

K: No, I don't want any of that.

T: Okay.

K: No, it will not dominate the talks but it will be discussed. I mean, you know, we've been working on this agenda for a long time.

V

T: Um-humm.

K: And it's essentially [an alternate].

T: Is it essentially [an alternate]. Well, that's good. Would Vietnam be the first order of business?

K: I doubt it.

T: Um-humm. What do you think the potential for confrontation with them of Vietnam is?

K: Zero.

T: Zero?

K: Well, low. Very low.

September 17, 1972

U.S. Dept. of State

Reproducible Copy

By: K.M.L. NARA ID: 5/12/72

TELCOM

Robert Toth/Mr. Kissing er
6:00 p.m., May 17, 1972

T: I'm kind of curious as to why Rogers didn't return to his appointed rounds of briefing the allies on what --

K: Well, you'll have to ask him.

T: Huh?

K: Because at that time, you know, he was needed here for the crisis; for what might develop during the week.

T: Well, I thought it might have been a change in the agenda.

K: No.

T: Would you expect the Paris peace talks might resume while he's in Moscow?

K: I doubt it.

T: Uh-huh.

K: You know, there's no point resuming the talks unless there is some prospect for progress.

T: Well, I was re-reading the section of the President's Report -- The Foreign Policy Report -- where you do credit the Soviets with exercising some restraint in South Asia/India business. And, of course, I recall that in 1970 in the Mid-East the same thing happened. Is there any evidence that they are doing the same now? I mean, a lull around Hue and Komtum. You think that might have something to do with it?

K: No, I think they have nothing to do with it.

T: Nothing to do with that. You anticipate hard attacks there while you're in Moscow?

K: I think they are about ready in Komtum. I wouldn't speculate on Hue.

T: Uh-huh, uh-huh. One of the overriding things in my line is whether or not with Vietnam here now overshadowing relations.

K: You're saying that; I'm not saying that.

The text in this image does not contain any tables.

By: KMLV, NASA Date: 5/12/94

TELCOM

Robert Toth/Mr. Kissinger

6:00 p.m., May 17, 1972

T: Right. I'm posing hypothesis whether or not one can expect -- if anyone can codify the agreements that are almost reached and sign them and so forth. But in talking about breaking new ground and beyond European Security Conference or MBFR, in talking about setting up rules, as you have often talked to say the Mid-East, I mean what potential would there be for really serious discussion on this with Vietnam still at least in the background?

K: I think every potential.

T: Really? In other words, even more potential than before this?

K: At least as much because Vietnam should be a lesson to both, if not one side.

T: Are we in any --

K: You know, you people have the characteristic of setting up impossible goals and then when they're not reached, you say it must have been by Vietnam.

T: Well, I think that's a fair criticism.

K: Well, I can assure you and I think I know more about the summit preparations than most people in this town, that they are going ahead at least as well as they have.

T: At least as well as they have.

K: Yes. This is for your guidance, not for quotation.

T: Right, right. But there has to be some fallout from the President's decision to block Soviet ships as well as other ships from access to North Vietnam. I mean, if nothing else, they have to immediately state their position and at least repeat that rather mild statement.

K: Well, so what. I mean, maybe it will also lead to some more serious discussions.

T: Well, do you think you'd engage them now in Vietnam. That is, that you have --

K: Well, I just don't want to speculate on that.

Hqustion 3.10.4, the open line
in the first line of a confidential
Purdue System Data File

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCONE

Joe Kraft/Mr. Kissinger

7:02 p.m., May 17, 1972

K: Hi, Henry, how are you?

HAK: Joe, how are you? I'm sorry I couldn't get back to you.

K: No problem. How does tonight look? I'm not putting in a call, the only reason I had my name on the list is because we said something about maybe being able to --

HAK: Oh, oh. Yes. No, no, I couldn't -- I can't do it. I thought I had said I'll call you if it turns out that I'm free this evening -- later this afternoon. But I'll -- when are you leaving Friday?

K: I will be leaving Friday afternoon and I just got a sort of cable from the North Vietnamese. I'm supposed to call them tonight at 3 o'clock in the morning but they said please do come on Saturday.

HAK: Okay.

K: I will but I would like to know what questions to ask.

HAK: Well --

K: I can figure out so many questions.

HAK: But I am going up to Camp David tomorrow and I ought to be back by about 2 o'clock.

K: I will be here.

HAK: You will be?

K: I will be here. I have a dinner that I really have to go to tomorrow but I will be here all day apart from that. And all of Friday as well.

HAK: How about 5:30?

K: 5:30 sounds fine.

HAK: But let's aim for 5:30.

K: 5:30 tomorrow. Okay, swell.

Husqville 31001 Paris 75005 C.P. 310 25 rue de l'arc d'Ile de France 75005 Paris

TELCORN

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

5:55 p.m., May 17, 1972

By: KMLW NAVAQ Data: 5/13/84

K: Henry, It was good of you to call. Henry, I wanted to contact someone I know with CBS and I just didn't know whether you had --

HAK: No, I had not because I was going to be at a lunch with Stanton where I was going to mention it and I never got there.

K: Okay.

HAK: But I will call him before the afternoon end of this week.

K: Before the end of the week?

HAK: Yes.

K: Oh, that's fine because I will be back in New York Friday evening and I plan to contact this man on Monday so that will be good.

HAK: All right. You can be sure that I will have talked to him by Friday evening.

K: And then I can go ahead and contact this other fellow?

HAK: Absolutely.

K: Henry, have a good trip and I look forward to seeing you when you get back.

HAK: Thank you, Dave.

K: You've been a good friend.

HAK: Well, not at all. You've been a good friend to me.

K: I owe you one.

HK: No, you don't owe anything.

K: You owe me a hundred but I owe you one. (laughter)

HAK: No.

K: No, seriously.

HAK: You don't owe me a thing.