Status implies a break in time.

28

[Y]

use the weapon around which our whole military planning had been built. The [status] between military and national policy was complete.

Our power was not commensurate with the objectives of our national policy and our military doctrine could not find any intermediary application for the new weapons. The growth of the Soviet atomic stockpile has merely brought the physical equation into line with the psychological one; it has increased our reluctance to engage in a general war even more. But it has not changed the fundamental question of how the political and military doctrines can be harmonized, how our power can give impetus to our policy rather than paralyzing it. *Section II is, by and large, very good*

### III

But perhaps this difficulty is most inherent in the new weapons and not in the strategic doctrine? Perhaps in the face of the war of nuclear force has ceased to be an instrument of policy save for the most naked issue of national survival? Here it may be useful to discuss some fundamental characteristics of the new technology.

Nuclear weapons, only a short decade ago a difficult engineering feat, have become plentiful. They can be produced in all sizes from weapons of that fraction of the explosive power of the bombs that exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki to thermo-nuclear devices which represent the same increase of explosive power over the Hiroshima bomb as the original atomic bomb did over the largest "blockbusters of World War II; an increase that is a thousandfold over one thousand.

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs had an explosive equivalent to 20 thousand tons of TNT (20 kilotons); "tactical" nuclear weapons are as small as 100 tons of TNT equivalent and below. Have been developed. At the same time, thermo-nuclear devices exist which have an explosive equivalent of twenty million tons of TNT (20 megatons), and there is no theoretically upper limit; thermo-nuclear and nuclear weapons can be made of any desired explosive power. Moreover, there is no "secret" about the manufacture of nuclear weapons or even of thermo-nuclear devices. Given a certain level of technology, any industrialized state will be able to produce them. With the spread of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, it can be expected that within fifteen years at the outside many secondary powers will

that within fifteen years at the outside many secondary powders will
abraid of the peaceful use of atomic energy, it can be expected
industrialized state will be able to produce them. With the
nuclear devices, given a certain level of technology, any
"secret" about the manufacture of nuclear weapons or even of thermo-
can be made of any desired explosive power. Moreover, there is no
no theoretical number limit; thermo-nuclear and nuclear weapons
edivalent of twenty million tons of TNT (50 megatons!) and there is
20
At the same time, thermo-nuclear devices exist which have an explosive
as small as 100 tons of TNT edivalent and below one percent develop-
50 thousand tons of TNT (50 kilotons); "tactical" nuclear weapons are
The Hirohims and Nagasaki bombs had an explosive edivalent of
"blockbusters" of World War II: a thousandfold increase.
Hirohims bomb as the original atomic bomb did over the largest
which represent the same increase of explosive power over the
exploded over Hirohims and Nagasaki to thermo-nuclear devices
mesons of six fraction of the explosive power of the bomb that
was
Test, have become pleasurable. They can be produced in small sizes from
Unclear weapons only a short decade ago a difficult engineering

30

have entered the nuclear race either by making their own weapons or
by purchasing them from the constantly growing list of countries
which possess a nuclear armaments industry. For better or worse,
strategy henceforth must be framed against the ominous background
that any war, at least between major powers, is likely to be a nuclear
war.

And the new technology is awesome. The lethal radius of the
weapons dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki - the area within which
destruction was total and the ratio of fatalities was in excess of
75 percent - was 1½ miles. Their blast and heat effects destroyed
or set fire to buildings within a radius of another 8 ______ miles.
The explosions of the first atomic bombs killed ______ in
Hiroshima; and ______ in Nagasaki; the direct injuries were
______ in Hiroshima and ______ in Nagasaki. The collateral
effects of radiation may not become apparent for several decades.

Nevertheless for all their horror the nuclear devices dropped
on Japan were elementary compared to present weapons. The damage
they caused was restricted to a relatively small area; even the
effects of radiation were generally confined to the area covered

effects of radiation were generally confined to the area covered
they caused was restricted to a relatively small area; even the

Nevertheless for all their horror the nuclear devices dropped
atom bomb2
effects of radiation may not become apparent for several decades.

Hiroshima; and in Nagasaki; the direct injuries were
______ in Hiroshima and ______ in Nagasaki. The collateral
______ in Hiroshima and ______ in Nagasaki.
The explosions of the first atomic bomb killed
______ in
or set fire to buildings within a radius of another 8
______ miles.

70 percent - was 120 miles. Their plume and heat effects destroyed
destruction was total and the ratio of fatalities was in excess of
weapons dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki - the area within which

was.

And the new technology is sweeter. The lethal radius of the
war.

that any war, at least between major powers, is likely to be a nuclear
strategy henceforth must be framed against the ominous background
which boases a number of armsments industry. For better or worse,
by purchasing them from the constantly growing list of countries
have entered the nuclear race either by making their own weapons or