-2-

more lively than what I am used to.

I have been asked: "was the Rabin visit to America a success?" I am asked this repeatedly by the many members of the Israel Protective Society who suffer from the illusion that the Prime Minister needs help.

What can I say? The Prime Minister is accompanied by the Israeli press. As is appropriate for a country with three million people and six million opinions, the Israeli press corps is a wild group of individualists united by a common dedication to paranoia. If I say that the Prime Minister

-3-

and we agreed, they will write that the _Prime Minister_ has just betrayed Israel. If I say that we disagreed, they will write that _President Ford_ or -- more likely -- I have betrayed Israel.

So let me be diplomatic, which is to say evasive.

One day on the last shuttle, the Prime Minister sent me to Egypt with fifteen issues to be settled. We managed to solve 12 of them. I returned to Israel inordinately proud of myself -- a not unusual occurrence -- until the Prime Minister cast a cold eye on me and said: "You betrayed us again."

- 4 -

So knowing his standards -- we did a little better this time.

In fact, the Prime Minister did so well with Congress that I am thinking of becoming his agent and collecting a fee. This way I might have a fund that is safe from Senator Tunney.

Speaking of Congress, you may have read that recently a Congressional Committee cited me for demonstrating contempt of Congress.

Some of my friends claim this was unfair. They hold the view that I have spent seven years in Washington concealing my contempt for Congress.

- 5 -

In a more serious vein, the Prime Minister
and I are old and close personal friends. We worked
together in great intimacy for many years
when he was Ambassador to Washington, during
events of great moment in the history of Israel
and the United States. We have seen each
other so often that we not only thoroughly
know each other's arguments, but what is
worse, each other's strategies as well. This
makes it tough for both of us unless we are
completely honest with each other.

- 6 -

Our discussions this past week have reflected
the mutual and sometimes silent understanding
of old friends--though I would not say that silence
is the distinctive quality for which Israelis will
be known by history. And they were conducted,
as always, in a spirit of trust. I believe they
will be seen in retrospect as another positive
step in the cooperation and friendship
of our two countries.

-7-

All of us are here because we admire Israel,
that country of inestimable courage, vision
and humanism. It is those qualities, which
have so often meant for Israel the margin
of victory in war, that give us confidence
that Israel will also win peace. No people have
earned it more than the people of Israel, who
have never known a day's peace in their national
history, and who have indeed lived in the
shadow of oppression or injustice for thousands
of years.

-8-

No one who has worked in the Middle East
has any illusion about the difficulty of the task
we face. It is often easier to be dominated
by events than to be responsible for them.
Change requires courage; progress requires
vision.

Together the United States and Israel have
accepted the challenge of resolving the most
complex dispute of our time. We have joined
with Israel in seeing that the negotiating
process does not wither, that the impetus to peace

-9-

is not extinguished, that we leave no
possiblity unexplored.

Throughout the millenia of the diaspora,
Jews repeated a chant that only faith could
validate: "Next year in Jerusalem."

Israel is a living example of the historical
truth that all great achievements start as
dreams. Against all probability, the Jewish
people returned to Jerusalem and out of the swamps
of Palestine grew the State of Israel. The wisest
of realists are those who remember that only
men of faith have the power to shape reality.

-10-

We now have need for one more dream: it
is part of the tradition of Judaism that the
world rests on three pillars: on justice, on
truth, on peace -- and that these three
are one and the same: for if there is justice,
there is truth, and if there is truth, there is
peace.

So let us all hope that in some year soon the
cradle of our civilization will again be an
example of what men of faith and good will
can achieve, so that a people that have suffered
much and struggled heroically may find at

-11-

long last peace and truth and justice.

And that this visit of Prime Minister Rabin
will be remembered as an important step
taken toward that goal.

* * * * * * *

Draft X

2/2/76

# THE PERMANENT CHALLENGE OF PEACE:
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

America enters its third century and its 48th Presidential election with unmatched physical strength, a sound foreign policy design, yet scarred by self-doubt. In the past decade and a half we have seen one President assassinated, another driven from office and a third resign. We have lived through the agony of Vietnam and Watergate. We are still struggling to overcome the bitterness and division that have followed in their wake. We face no more urgent task than to restore our national unity and our national resolve.

For we, the strongest free nation, cannot afford the luxury of withdrawing into ourselves to heal our wounds. Too much depends upon us -- peace or war, prosperity or depression, freedom or

- 2 -

tyranny. Too much is at stake for America to paralyze itself tearing
up the past, seeking sensational headlines in the present, or offering
panaceas for the future. For our own well being -- American lives
and American jobs -- will be affected if we permit our domestic
disunity and turmoil to cause us to falter in our meeting our inter-
national responsibilities.

And so, it is imperative that the national debate in this election
year -- the greatest demonstration of how free people govern
themselves -- strengthen, not undermine, our confidence and our
capacity to carry out an effective national policy. It is essential
that we quickly rebuild our national unity, the sense that we are all
part of a shared enterprise.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to discuss America's
relations with the world's other superpower -- the Soviet Union.
In recent months that relationship has become -- as it should be --
an important part of our national debate. I want to explain the

-3-

Administration's view of the conditions that gave rise to the policy known as "detente," the goals we seek, and the relationship of our Soviet policy to the over-all design of American diplomacy.

The United States is today confronted by one challenge unprecedented in its own history, and another challenge without precedent in the history of the world. America finds itself for the first time, permanently and irrevocably involved in international affairs. At the same time, the catastrophic nature of nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity that transcends traditional concepts of diplomacy and balance of power -- to shape a world order that finds stability in self-restraint and, ultimately, cooperation.

For the first century and a half of our history, our peace and security were provided for us by two oceans, the shield

- 4 -

of the British Navy, and equilibrium among the European powers. The success of our democracy at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it was up to America to choose whether and when we would participate in the world.

> Since Tocqueville it has been a cliche that Americans, as a people, are slow to arouse, but that once aroused we are a tremendous and implacable force. Thus, even when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, we identified our exertion as a temporary disruption of our tranquility. Our history, except for the Civil War, was without the tragedies and the sense of practical external limits that so colored the experience of almost every other people.

Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could

-5-

be solved -- once and for all -- be determined effort. We
considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign
involvement appropriate only so long as needed to remove some
temporary threat or disorder. We entered World War I as
"the war to end wars," and to "make the world safe for democracy."
We fought World War II until "unconditional surrender."

Even in the first twentyfive years after World War II --
an era of great creativity and unprecedented American
engagement in foreign affairs -- we acted as if the world's
security and economic development could be conclusively
ensured by the commitment of American
resources, know-how and effort. We were encouraged --
even impelled -- to act as we did by our unprecedented

-6-

predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse
of the great colonial empires.[] We considered our
deployment of troops in Europe and elsewhere to be temporary.

[We thought that the policy of containment would transform the
Soviet Union, and that a changed Soviet society would then
evolve inexorably into a compatible member of a harmonious
international community.]

[At the same time, the central character of moral values
in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the
purity of means -- and when we disposed of overwhelming power,
we had a great luxury of choice.] Our moral certainty made
compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem
unnecessary.

Today, while we still have massive strength, we no longer
enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. We remain the world's

- 7 -

most productive and innovative economy, but we must
now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and
Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing
nations, and we must make new choices regarding our
economic relations with the Communist countries. Our
democratic principles are still far more valued by the
world's millions than we realize, but we must also compete
with new ideologies which assert progressive goals but pursue
them by oppressive methods.

Today, for the first time in our history, we face
the stark reality that the challenge is unending; that
there is no easy and surely no final answer; that there
are no automatic solutions. We must learn to conduct
foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it

- 8 -

for so many centuries -- without escape and without respite,
knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful
of the necessities of self-preservation, conscious that the
reach of our national purpose has its limits. This is a new
experience for Americans. It prompts nostalgia for a simpler
past. As before in our history, it generates the search for
scapegoats, holding specific policies responsible for objective
conditions.

It is precisely because we no longer predominate but
must pursue a long-term course that there is a premium today
on our constancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford to swing
recklessly between confrontation and abdication. We must not
equate tough rhetoric with strong action; nor can we

-9-

wish away tough realities with nostalgic hopes. We can no
longer act as if we engage ourselves in foreign affairs only
when we choose, or only to overcome specific problems, so
that we can then shift our priorities back to our natural
concern with ourselves. The reality is that there can be
no security without our vigilance and no progress without our
dedication.

It is in this context that U. S. -Soviet relations must
be seen.

- 10 -

The Contemporary Challenge of US-Soviet Relations

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has
been a central feature of American policy for three decades.
What is new today is the culmination of thirty years of
postwar growth of Soviet industrial, technological and military
power. No American policy caused this; no American policy
could have prevented it. But American policy can keep
this power from being used to expand Soviet influence to
our detriment; we have the capacity to enable allies and
friends to live with a sense of security; we possess the assets
to advance the process of building an international order
of cooperation and progress.

We must do so, however, in unprecedented conditions.

In previous periods, rivalry between major powers has

- 11 -

almost invariably led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable. We must manage a fundamental clash of ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nuclear superpowers, first into coexistence, and then mold coexistence into a more positive and cooperative future. For as President Kennedy once said, "in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

In the period after World War II, our nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after consolidating its occupation of Eastern Europe, might seek to spread its control to other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia. Our policies therefore sought to build alliances and positions of military strength from which we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet Union might be forced to settle for peace; transformations might occur

- 12 -

within Soviet society that would curb expansionist
tendencies and make the USSR over time into a more
cooperative participant in the international system.

These policies served us and our allies well.

Soviet expansion was checked. Behind our shield of security
and with our assistance, our friends and allies in Western
Europe restored their economies and rebuilt their
democratic institutions.

Yet the hope that these policies would produce permanent
stability, positive evolution of the Soviet system, and
greater normality, was only partially realized. In the
immediate postwar period, the aggressiveness of Soviet
ideology in the Stalinist era obscured some of the real
weaknesses of the Soviet state. Indeed, as late as 1962

-13-

during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States enjoyed
a five-to-one superiority in strategic missiles, a three-to-one
superiority in strategic bombers, total naval superiority
everywhere, and rough equality on the ground in Europe.

Gradually, with the acquisition of nuclear technology and
the transformation of the international system through decolonization,
the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first-class military
power.

In strategic military terms the USSR has achieved a broad
equality with the United States, as was inevitable for a large nation
whose rulers were prepared to impose great sacrifices on
their people and to give military strength the absolute top
priority in resources. With only half of our Gross National
Product, Soviet military expenditures exceed those of the
United States.

- 14 -

For the first time in history the Soviet Union can
threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian land-mass --
including the United States. With no part of the world
outside the range of its military forces, the USSR has
begun to define its interests and objectives in global terms.
Soviet diplomacy has thrust into the Middle East, Africa and
Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real power, rather
than a rhetorical manifestation of a universalist doctrine
which in face of has very little validity or appeal.

Coping with the implications of this emerging superpower
has been our central security problem for the last several
years. This condition will not go away, and it will perhaps

- 15 -

never be conclusively "solved." It will have to be faced by
every Administration for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the consequences. The
emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing
international structure is a recurrent phenomenon.

Historically, the adjustment of an existing order to the
arrival of one or more new actors almost invariably
was accompanied by war [-- to impede the upstart, to
remove or diminish some of the previously established
actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised system.]

But in the nuclear era, when casualties in a general nuclear
war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter of days,

- 16 -

the use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It is our
responsibility to contain Soviet power without global war,
to avoid both abdication as well as unnecessary confrontation.

This can be done, but it requires a delicate and complex
policy. We must strive for an equilibrium of power, but we must
move beyond it to promote the habits of mutual restraint,
coexistence and ultimately, cooperation. We must stabilize
a new international order in a vastly dangerous environment,
but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideological conflict
into constructive participation in building a better world.

This is what is meant by the process called "detente"
-- not the hunger for relaxation of tension, not the striving
for agreements at any price, not the mindless search for
friendly atmosphere which some critics use as naive and

- 17 -

dangerous caricatures.

The policies pursued by this Administration have been designed to prevent Soviet expansion, but also to build a pattern of relations in which the Soviet Union will always confront penalties for aggression, and also acquire growing incentives for restraint. These goals are well within our capacities. Soviet power is evolving with considerable unevenness. Soviet society is no longer totally cut off from contact with or the influences of the world around it, nor is it without its own needs for outside relationships.

It is the great industrial democracies, not the Soviet Union, that are the engine of the world economy and the most

- 18 -

promising partners for the poorer nations.

The industrial democracies, if they face their challenges with
confidence -- if they do not mesmerize themselves with the
illusion of simple solutions -- possess vast strengths to
contain Soviet power and to channel that power in constructive
directions.

Our essential task is to recognize the need for a dual
policy that simultaneously and with equal vigor resists
expansionist drives and seeks to shape a more constructive
relationship. We must prevent the Soviet Union from
translating its growing strength into global or regional
preponderance. But we must do so without escalating
every crisis into a massive confrontation. In recent years,
the United States has firmly resisted attempts
by the Soviet Union to establish

-19-

a naval base in Cuba, to impede the access routes to Berlin,
to exploit the explosive situation in the Middle East.

Recently we have sought to halt blatant intervention in Angola --
until prevented from doing so by Congressional action.

At the same time, we have an historic obligation to
mankind to engage the Soviet Union in settlements of concrete
problems and to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe.

At the very least, we owe it to our people to demonstrate that its
government has missed no opportunity to achieve constructive
solutions and that crises which occur were unavoidable. For
whatever the rhetoric, Americans will not support confrontations
they consider contrived.

This is why the United States has set forth principles of responsible
relations in the nuclear age: respect for the interests of all,

- 20 -

restraint in the uses of power, and abstention from efforts
to exploit instability or local conflicts for unilateral
advantage. The United States has sought to give life to
these principles in major negotiations on arms control,
the prevention of accidental war, and in the settlement of
political issues such as Berlin. And we have begun to
construct a network of cooperative agreements in a variety
of functional areas -- economic, scientific, medical,
environmental, and others -- which promise concrete
benefits if political conditions permit their full implementation
and further development. It has been our belief that, with
patience, a pattern of restraints and a network of vested
interests can develop which will give coexistence a more
hopeful dimension and which would make both sides

-22-

This policy reflects the deepest aspirations of the
American people.

In the early 1970's when current U. S. -Soviet relations
were shaped, our nation had already passed through traumatic
events and was engaged in an anguishing war. There were
riots in the streets and on the campuses demanding rapid
progress towards peace. Every new defense program was
challenged -- including the ABM which was approved by only one
vote, the development of multiple warheads, the Trident submarine, and
the B-1 bomber. Successive Congresses passed resolutions
urging the Administration to reorder our national priorities
away from defense. We were continually attacked for not
making concessions in the SALT talks. The Congress and many

-23-

interest groups pressed continually for the opening up of
East-West trade and agitated against the Administration's
approach of linking progress in economic relations with
prior progress in political relations. Throughout the
course of 1970 and 1971, we were involved in a series of
crises with the Soviet Union and were often accused of
provocation or bellicosity in the process.

Thus, only a few short years ago, the pressures in this
country and from our allies were overwhelmingly to move
rapidly toward better relations with Moscow. We resisted
these pressures then, just as we now refuse to let ourselves
be stampeded in the opposite direction. In the Administration's
view the country needs a balanced policy, combining firmness

-24-

and conciliation, strong defense and arms control, political
principles and economic incentives. And it must be a policy
for the long term, that the American people can sustain,
offering promise of a constructive future.

It is therefore ironic that our national debate seems
now in many respects to have come full circle. The conditions
in which detente originated are largely forgotten. Those who
pressed for concessions and unilateral restraint towards Moscow
now accuse the government of being too conciliatory. Those
who complain about our failure to respond with sufficient vigor
to Soviet moves are often the very ones who incessantly seek
to remove this country's leverage for influence or action --
through restrictions on trade and credit, through weakening
our intelligence capabilities, through preventing aid to

- 25 -

friends who seek to resist Soviet aggression.

> The restrictions on trade and credit are a case in point.

The human rights issue is a matter of deep and legitimate concern to all Americans. But the Congressional attempt to link it openly with economic relations, without subtlety or understanding of Soviet politics, both deprived us of economic levers and sharply reduced Soviet emigration. Other industrial countries have stepped in to provide credits and technology, with less concern for the objective of inducing political restraint which we had envisaged.

So let us understand the scope and limits of a realistic policy:

- We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power,

- but we can prevent its use for unilateral

-26-

advantage and political expansion.

-- We cannot prevent a build-up of Soviet forces but we have the capacity, together with our allies, to maintain an equilibrium. We cannot neglect this task and then blame the Soviet Union if the military balance shifts against us.

-- We have the diplomatic, economic and military capacity to resist expansionism, but we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confrontation while depriving ourselves of the means to confront.

-- We must accept that sovereign states, especially of roughly equal power, cannot

-27-

impose unacceptable conditions on each other
and must proceed by compromise.

-- We must live with the reality of the nuclear
threat but we have it in our power to build a
new relationship that transcends the nuclear
peril.

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that
Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful and overwhelming
while American policy is bumbling, uncertain and weak.

Let us stop pretending that somehow tough rhetoric and contrived
confrontations show confidence in America. The opposite is true.

Those who are prepared to base their policy on reality, those
who assert that the American people will support a complex

-28-

policy of firmness and conciliation and that this policy will
succeed show a real faith in our capacities and our future.

We have a design and the material assets to deal with the
Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a
united people.

Against this background, let me discuss two current
issues that illustrate the two strands of policy that we
are concurrently pursuing:

-- The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in
which we are seeking to shape a more positive future.

-- The Angolan situation, where we are attempting to
curb Soviet expansionism.

- 29 -

Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods -- the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared from the effects of a general nuclear exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable

- 30 -

even though it has become difficult to define precisely what
purely military purpose is served.

We thus face a paradox: at current and foreseeable
levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous
to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic
weapons of the two sides determined the outcome. Today
these arsenals increasingly find their purpose primarily in
matching and deterring the forces of the opponent. For under
virtually no foreseeable circumstance could the United States --
or the Soviet Union -- avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange.
Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty of finding a way to
get off the treadmill.*

*To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side could use its strategic forces and how in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide. They are invariably based on assumptions such as that one side would permit its missile silos to be destroyed without launching its missiles before they are actually hit -- on which no aggressor would rely where forces such as those possessed by either the U. S. or the USSR now and in the years ahead are involved.*

-31-

This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility
on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the
nuclear competition requires endless invocations of theoretical
scenarios of imminent or eventual nuclear attack. The attempt
to hedge against all conceivable contingencies, no matter how
fanciful, fuels political tensions and could well lead to a
self-fulfilling prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic
arms imbalances that is inherent in an unrestrained arms race
diverts resources into strategically unproductive areas --
particularly away from forces for local defense, where shortfalls
and imbalances could indeed be turned rapidly to our disadvantage.
If no restraint is developed, the competition in strategic arms
can have profound consequences for the future of international
relations, and indeed of civilization.

- 32 -

The United States, therefore, has sought and achieved, since 1963, a series of arms control agreements which build some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok accord leads to a new agreement, an even more important advance will have been made.

Yet, at this critical juncture, the American people are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender of American interests. There are assertions that the United States is falling behind in the strategic competition and that SALT has contributed to it. There are unsupportable charges that the Soviets have systematically violated the SALT agreements.

None of this is accurate.

What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960's

- 3 3 -

set the level of our strategic forces for the 1970's. We then
had the choice between continuing the deployment of large,
heavy-throwweight missiles like the Titan or Atlas, or under-
taking development and deployment of large numbers of smaller,
more flexible ICBM's, or combinations of both types. The
Administration then in office chose to rely on an arsenal of
1000 small, sophisticated and highly accurate ICBMs and 656
submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats, along with heavy
bombers; we deployed them rapidly, and then stopped our build-
up of launchers unilaterally in the 1960's when the programs were
complete. Only 54 of the heavy Titans were retained and still
remain in the force. The Soviets made the opposite decision;
they chose larger, heavier missiles; they continued to build up
their forces through the 1960's and 1970's; they passed our numerical
levels by 1969-1970, and continued to add an average of 200 missiles
a year until stopped by the first SALT agreement.

- 34 -

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity and sophistication, and we possess larger numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was still building at the rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a year, while we were building none, as a result of our own repeatedly reaffirmed unilateral decisions of a decade previously. Since new American programs to redress the balance had only recently been ordered, there was no way to reduce the numerical gap before the late seventies, when more modern sea-based missiles and bombers were scheduled to become operational.

The Interim SALT Agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers of launchers on both sides for five years -- thereby limiting

- 35 -

the momentum of Soviet programs without affecting any of ours.

It stopped the Soviet build-up of heavy missile launchers. It forces the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on missile-carrying submarines.

The agreed-upon silo limitations permitted us to increase the throwweight of our own missiles, if we decided on this avenue of improving our strategic forces. We have so far chosen not to do so, although, through research and development, we retain the option.

By any measure, the SALT agreements prevented the then-evolving gap in numbers from widening, while enabling us to retain our advantage in other categories and easing the problem of redressing the balance when new programs became operational.

What no negotiation could do is reverse by diplomacy the results of our own long-standing decisions with respect to weapons design and deployment.

- 36 -

Moreover, the SALT agreements ended for an indefinite
period the prospect of a dangerous and uncertain competition
in anti-ballistic missile defense -- a competition that
promised no strategic advantage but potentially serious
instabilities and the expenditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were therefore without
question in the American national interest.

In the five-year respite gained by the 1972 Interim
Agreement, it was our intention to negotiate a long-term
pact on offensive weapons that would firmly fix both
sides at an equal level once our new programs
became operational. This is precisely what

- 37 -

President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2400 strategic weapons covering strategic systems and heavy bombers -- but not counting any of our forward-based aircraft and missiles in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2400 is lower than the level the Soviet Union already has reached; it would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons while the planned levels and composition of our forces would not need to be reduced or changed. An equal ceiling of 1320 was placed on numbers of strategic weapons with multiple warheads. Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain frozen. These limits would cap the strategic competition in numbers for a 10-year period, yet preserve all the

-38-

programs we need to assure deterrence and strategic
sufficiency.

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem.

This is not a question of loopholes but of evolving technology, with respect to which we intend to remain vigilant. We will negotiate carefully to make certain that the national interest and national security are protected. But if we succeed in turning the Vladivostok accord into a 10-year agreement, we will have crossed the threshold between total, unrestrained competition and the difficult but promising beginning of long-term strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces.

The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase of the negotiations starting in 1977.

- 39 -

One would have thought that these accomplishments
would speak for themselves. Instead they have triggered
a flood of charges which mislead the American people and our
friends, give a wrong impression of irresoluteness to our
adversaries and complicate the prospects for a new agree-
ment that is in the overriding national interest.

No charge is more irresponsible and potentially more
dangerous than the allegation that the United States has
knowingly tolerated violations of the first SALT agreements.

What are the facts? A Standing Consultative Com-
mission was created by the agreements of 1972 precisely
to consider disputes or ambiguities in implementation.
Such incidents were almost certain to arise in a first, quite
limited, agreement between long-standing adversaries

- 40 -

possessing weapons systems of great complexity whose
growth is verified not by some neutral policing mechanism but by
each side's own intelligence systems. Every questionable
activity that has arisen has been systematically analyzed by
this Government and considered by the President and his
advisors. Whenever any question remained, it was then
promptly raised with the Soviets. All instructions to the
American representative on the Consultative Commission
reflected the unanimous views of all U. S. agencies
concerned and the data and assessment produced jointly

by them. [ No one had a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets --
an inherently malicious charge. No one prevented all question-
able or suspicious activities from being raised with the Soviets.
And not all the questioned activities were on the Soviet side.]

- 41 -

All of these issues have been and will continue to be seriously
handled and dealt with through a process that has proved effective.

Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump together incidents
that have been explained or are still being considered with wild
allegations that have no foundation. They sometimes put forward
inaccurate figures and data which often can be refuted only by
divulging sensitive intelligence information. Yet with all the
recent flurry of allegations, no recommendations are made of what
countermeasures we should take, or how to assess the significance
of any given alleged violation. In what way do the alleged violations
affect the strategic equation? In what manner, if any, have we been
foreclosed from protecting ourselves? Would those who inaccurately
allege violations simply throw over all the agreements regardless
of the benefits they provide to the United States? Would they
halt the negotiation of further agreements? What purpose

- 42 -

is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to
believe -- totally incorrectly -- that the United States is
blind to violations, or that its government deliberately
deceives its people? Can anyone seriously believe that this
Administration which has strenuously resisted Communist
advances in every part of the world -- and is often strongly
criticized for it -- would ignore Soviet violations of a formal
agreement?

I can assure you that this Administration will not
tolerate violations. It will continue to monitor Soviet
compliance meticulously. It will pursue energetically all
ambiguities or signs of non-compliance. But it will not be
driven by demagoguery to make false or hasty judgments.

- 43 -

No department or agency charged with responsibility for
this problem holds the view that any violations have occurred.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one question:
what is the alternative to the agreement we have and seek?
If the SALT process falters, we must consider what new or
additional strategic programs we would undertake, their
likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose. An
accelerated strategic buildup over the next five years could
cost as much as an additional 20 billion dollars. Failing a
satisfactory agreement, this will surely be the path we must
travel. It would be a tragically missed opportunity. For,

-44-

in the process of such a build-up, and the atmosphere it
would engender, it would be difficult to return to serious
negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to increase;
a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future
negotiations would eventually have to begin. And in the
end, neither side will have gained a strategic advantage.
At the least they will have wasted resources. At worst,
they will have increased the risks of nuclear war.

Of course the Soviet Union must ponder these
alternatives as well. Their sense of responsibility must equal
ours if there is to be an equitable and durable agreement
based on strict reciprocity. We consider a SALT agreement important,
but we will take no chances with our national security.

Let me sum up:

-45-

-- We will never stand for the violation of a
solemn treaty or agreement and we will
remain alert.

-- We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic
balance against us; by violations of agreements,
by unsatisfactory agreements or by neglect of
our own programs; we will spend what is
necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.

-- The President is determined to pursue the effort
to negotiate a saner strategic balance on equitable terms --
because it is in our interest, and because we have an
obligation to our own people and to world peace.

## The Soviet Union and Angola

As the United States strives to shape a more hopeful
world, it can never forget that global stability and security

- 46 -

rest upon an equilibrium between the great powers. [If the Soviet Union is permitted to exploit opportunities arising out of local conflicts by military means, the hopes we have for progress toward a more peaceful international order will ultimately be undermined.]

This is why the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa with nearly 200 million dollars of military equipment, its advisors, and its transport of the large expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the U. S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit.

- 47 -

And it is the first time that Congress has halted national
action in the middle of a crisis.

When one great power tips the balance of forces
decisively in a local conflict through its military intervention --
and meets no resistance -- an ominous precedent is set, of
grave consequence even if the intervention occurs in a
seemingly remote area. Such a precedent cannot be tolerated
if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if the
pattern is not broken now, we will face harder choices and
higher costs in the future.

The United States seeks no unilateral goals in Angola.
We have proposed a ceasefire; withdrawal of all outside
forces -- Soviet, Cuban and South African; cessation of foreign

- 48 -

military involvement, including the supply of equipment;
and negotiations among all three Angolan factions. This approach has
the support of half the nations of Africa.

Last summer and fall, to halt a dangerously escalating
situation, the United States provided financial support through
African friends to those in Angola -- the large majority -- who
sought to resist Soviet and Cuban domination. Using this as
leverage, we undertook an active diplomacy to promote an
African solution to an African problem. We acted quietly, to
avoid provoking a major crisis and raising issues of prestige.

At first, it was feared that the Soviet-backed faction
because of massive Soviet aid and Cuban mercenaries would
dominate totally by Independence Day, November 11. Our

- 49 -

assistance prevented that. African determination to oppose
Soviet and Cuban intervention became more and more evident.

On December 9, the President warned Moscow of the consequences
of continued meddling and offered to cooperate in encouraging a
peaceful outcome that removed foreign influence. The Soviet Union
appeared to have second thoughts. It halted its airlift from
December 9 until December 24.

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate over-
whelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. It was demanded that
we explain publicly why our effort was important -- and then
our effort was cut off. After the Senate vote to block further
aid to Angola, Cuba more than doubled its forces and Soviet
military aid was resumed on a large scale. The cooperativeness
of Soviet diplomacy declined. Since then the situation has continued
to deteriorate.

- 50 -

As our public discussion continues, certain facts must be understood.

The analogy with Vietnam is totally false; this nation must have the maturity to make elementary distinctions. The President has pledged that no American troops or advisors would be sent to Angola, and we were prepared to accept legislative restrictions to that effect, in addition to the War Powers Act which already exists.

What was involved was modest assistance to stabilize the local balance of forces and make possible a rapid political settlement in cooperation with African countries.

It is charged that the Administration acted covertly without public acknowledgment. That is correct, for our purpose was to avoid an escalated confrontation that would make it more difficult for the Soviets to back down, as well as to

- 51 -

(N)

give the greatest possible scope for an African solution. Angola was a case where diplomacy without leverage was likely to be impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve needless risks. [This is precisely one of those grey areas where unpublicized methods would enable us to influence events short of direct conflict.]

And we complied totally with Congress' new standard of Executive-Legislative consultation on secret activities. Beginning in July, and through December, we discussed the Angolan situation and what we were doing about it with more than two dozen Senators, 150 Congressmen, and over 100 staff members of both Houses. Eight Congressional Committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions. We sought in these briefings to determine the wishes of Congress, and there was little sign of active opposition to our carefully limited operations.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be eased out by the Africans themselves over a period of time. This may

-52-

or may not prove true. But such an argument, when carried
to its logical conclusion, implies that we can abandon the
world to interventionist forces, and hope for the best. And
reliance on history is of little solace to those under attack,
whose future is being decided now. The degree of Soviet
and Cuban intervention is unprecedented; they will have
effectively determined the outcome. There is no evidence to
support the claim that they will be quickly removed or that
other nations may not draw damaging conclusions dangerous
to our long-term interests.

It is maintained that we should meet the Soviet threat in
Angola through escalated methods of pressure such as altering
our position on SALT, or grain sales. But these arrangements
benefit us as well as the Soviet Union, and are part of the long term
strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. History

- 53 -

has proved time and again that expansion can be checked
only when there is a local balance of forces; indirect means
can succeed only if rapid local victories are foreclosed.

As the President has pointed out, the Soviet Union has survived
for nearly sixty years without American grain; it could do so
now. Cutting off grain would still lose Angola. We would
duplicate the experience of the Trade Act, which interrupted the
trade relationship with the USSR to ensure emigration --
and ended up with neither.

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile slogans about not
becoming the world's policeman. We have no desire to play
such a role. But it can never be in our interest to let the
Soviet Union act as the world's policeman. There are
many crises in the world where the United States cannot and

- 54 -

should not intervene. But here we face a blatant Soviet and
Cuban challenge, which could have been overcome if we
had been allowed to act prudently with limited means at the
early stage. By forcing this out onto center stage, our
divisions simultaneously escalated the significance of the
crisis and guaranteed our impotence.

To claim that Angola is not an important country, or
that the United States has no important interests there, begs
the principal question. If the United States is seen to waver
in the face of massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, what
will be the perception of leaders around the world as they
make decisions concerning their future security? And what
conclusions will an unopposed superpower draw when the
next opportunity for intervention beckons?

- 55 -

Where are we now? The Government has a duty to make clear
in the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent,
that this type of action will not be tolerated again. [It must reassure
adjacent countries that they will not be left exposed to attack or
pressure from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold.] Congress and the
Executive must come together on this proposition -- in the national
interest and in the interest of world peace.

The Administration will continue to make its case however
unpopular it may be temporarily. Let no nation believe that
Americans will long remain indifferent to the dispatch of
expeditionary forces and vast supplies of arms to impose minority
governments -- especially when that expeditionary force comes
from a nation in the Western Hemisphere.

National Strength and the Debate at Home

We live in a world without simple answers. We hold

- 56 -

our values too dear to relinquish defending them; we hold

human life too dear to cease the quest for a secure peace.

The first requirement of stability is to maintain our defenses
and the balance of power. But the highest aim of policy in the
nuclear age must be to create out of the sterile equilibrium
of force a more positive relationship of peace.

America has the material assets to do the job. Our
military might is unmatched. Our economic and technological
strength dwarfs any other. Our democratic heritage is envied
by hundreds of millions around the world.

Our problems therefore are of our own making -- self-
doubt, division, irresolution. We must once again become a
confident, united and determined people.

Foreign countries must be able to deal with America as

- 57 -

an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. If our
divisions paralyze our international efforts, it is America
as a whole that will suffer. We have no more urgent task than
restoring the partnership between the American people, the
Congress, and the Executive. A new partnership can enable
the President of the United States, in his constitutionally-determined
role, to address the world with the central authority of the
spokesman of a united and purposeful America.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But restraint is
the cement of national cohesion. It is time to end the
self-torment and obsession with our guilt which has threatened
to paralyze us for too many years. It is time to stop dismantling
our national institutions and undermining our national confidence.

Let us learn -- even in an election year -- the self-discipline

- 58 -

to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive
process.

One of the forgotten truths of our history is that our
Founding Fathers were men of great sophistication in foreign
affairs. They understood the balance of power; they made use
of the divisions of Europe for the advantage of our own
Revolution. They understood the need for a strong executive
to conduct the nation's diplomacy. They grasped that America
required economic, political, and moral links with other nations.
They saw that our ideals were universal and they understood
and welcomed the impact of the American experiment on the
destinies of all mankind.

In our age whose challenges are without precedent, we
need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our

- 59 -

ideals must give us strength -- rather than serve as an
excuse for abdication. The American people want an effective
foreign policy. They want America to continue to help shape
the international order of the coming generation according to
our ideals. We have done great things as a united people.

We have it in our power to make our third century a time
of vibrancy and hope and greatness.

******************

The Secretary
of State

Speech

February 3, 1976

San Francisco

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

THE PERMANENT CHALLENGE OF PEACE:
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Common-
wealth Club and the World Affairs Council of
Northern California.

America enters its third century and its 48th
Presidential election with unmatched physical
strength, a sound foreign policy design, yet scarred
by self-doubt. In the past decade and a half we
have seen one President assassinated, another
driven from office, and a third resign. We have
lived through the agony of Viet-Nam and Water-
gate. We are still struggling to overcome the bitter-
ness and division that have followed in their wake.
We face no more urgent task than to restore our
national unity and our national resolve.

For we, the strongest free nation, cannot af-
ford the luxury of withdrawing into ourselves to
heal our wounds. Too much depends upon us—
peace or war, prosperity or depression, freedom or
tyranny. Too much is at stake for America to para-
lyze itself tearing up the past, seeking sensational
headlines in the present, or offering panaceas for
the future. For our own well-being—American lives
and American jobs—will be affected if we permit
our domestic disunity and turmoil to cause us to
falter in meeting our international responsibilities.

And so it is imperative that the national de-
bate in this election year—the greatest demonstra-
tion of how free people govern themselves—
strengthen, not undermine, our confidence and our
capacity to carry out an effective national policy.
It is essential that we quickly rebuild our national

unity—the sense that we are all part of a shared
enterprise.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to dis-
cuss America's relations with the world's other
superpower—the Soviet Union. In recent months
that relationship has become—as it should be—an
important part of our national debate. I want to
explain the Administration's view of the conditions
that gave rise to the policy known as "detente,"
the goals we seek, and the relationship of our So-
viet policy to the overall design of American diplo-
macy.

The United States is today confronted by one
challenge unprecedented in its own history and
another challenge without precedent in the history
of the world. America finds itself, for the first
time, permanently and irrevocably involved in
international affairs. At the same time the catastro-
phic nature of nuclear war imposes upon us a
necessity that transcends traditional concepts of
diplomacy and balance of power—to shape a world
order that finds stability in self-restraint and, ulti-
mately, cooperation.

For the first century and a half of our history
our peace and security were provided for us by two
oceans, the shield of the British navy, and equilib-
rium among the European powers. The success of
our democracy at home, and the absence of direct
threat from abroad, nourished our sense of
uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it was up
to America to choose whether and when we would
participate in the world.

PR 44

2

Since De Tocqueville it has been a cliche that Americans, as a people, are slow to arouse, but that once aroused we are a tremendous and implacable force. Thus, even when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, we identified our exertion as a temporary disruption of our tranquility.

Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved—once and for all—by determined effort. We considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign involvement appropriate only so long as needed to remove some temporary threat or disorder. We entered World War I as “the war to end wars,” and to make the world “safe for democracy.” We fought World War II until “unconditional surrender.”

Even in the first 25 years after World War II—an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs—we acted as if the world’s security and economic development could be conclusively insured by the commitment of American resources, know-how, and effort. We were encouraged—even impelled—to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires. We considered our deployment of troops in Europe and elsewhere to be temporary. We thought that the policy of containment would transform the Soviet Union and that a changed Soviet society would then evolve inexorably into a compatible member of a harmonious international community.

At the same time the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means—and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.

Today, while we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. We remain the world's most productive and innovative economy, but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations; and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our democratic principles are still far more valued

Today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending; that there is no easy and surely no final answer; that there are no automatic solutions. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for so many centuries—without escape and without respite, knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, conscious that the reach of our national purpose has its limits. This is a new experience for Americans. It prompts nostalgia for a simpler past. As before in our history it generates the search for scapegoats, holding specific policies responsible for objective conditions.

It is precisely because we no longer predominate but must pursue a long-term course that there is a premium today on our constancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford to swing recklessly between confrontation and abdication. We must not equate tough rhetoric with strong action, nor can we wish away tough realities with nostalgic hopes. We can no longer act as if we engage ourselves in foreign affairs only when we choose—or only to overcome specific problems—so that we can then shift our priorities back to our natural concern with ourselves. The reality is that there can be no security without our vigilance and no progress without our dedication.

It is in this context that U.S.-Soviet relations must be seen.

## Contemporary Challenge of U.S.-Soviet Relations

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a central feature of American policy for three decades. What is new today is the culmination of thirty years of postwar growth of Soviet industrial, technological, and military power. No American policy caused this; no American policy could have prevented it. But American policy can keep this power from being used to expand Soviet influence to our detriment; we have the capacity to enable allies and friends to live with a sense of security; we possess the assets to advance the process of building an international order of cooperation and progress.

3

We must do so, however, in unprecedented conditions. In previous periods rivalry between major powers has almost invariably led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable. We must manage a fundamental clash of ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nuclear superpowers, first into coexistence and then mold coexistence into a more positive and cooperative future. For as President Kennedy once said: "...in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

In the period after World War II our nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after consolidating its occupation of Eastern Europe, might seek to spread its control to other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia. Our policies, therefore, sought to build alliances and positions of military strength from which we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet Union might be forced to settle for peace; transformations might occur within Soviet society that would curb expansionist tendencies and make the U.S.S.R., over time, into a more cooperative participant in the international system.

Yet the hope that these policies would produce permanent stability, positive evolution of the Soviet system, and greater normality was only partially realized. In the immediate postwar period the aggressiveness of Soviet ideology in the Stalinist era obscured some of the real weaknesses of the Soviet state. Indeed as late as 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in strategic missiles, a three-to-one superiority in strategic bombers, total naval superiority everywhere, and rough equality on the ground in Europe.

Gradually with the acquisition of nuclear technology and the transformation of the international system through decolonization, the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first-class military power.

In strategic military terms the U.S.S.R. has

achieved a broad equality with the United States, as was inevitable for a large nation whose rulers were prepared to impose great sacrifices on their people and to give military strength the absolute top priority in resources. With only half of our gross national product, Soviet military expenditures exceed those of the United States.

For the first time in history the Soviet Union can threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian land-mass—including the United States. With no part of the world outside the range of its military forces, the U.S.S.R. has begun to define its interests and objectives in global terms. Soviet diplomacy has thrust into the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real power, rather than a rhetorical manifestation of a universalist doctrine, which in fact has very little validity or appeal.

Coping with the implications of this emerging superpower has been our central security problem for the last several years. This condition will not go away. And it will perhaps never be conclusively "solved." It will have to be faced by every Administration for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the consequences. The emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing international structure is a recurrent phenomenon. Historically, the adjustment of an existing order to the arrival of one or more new actors almost invariably was accompanied by war—to impede the upstart, to remove or diminish some of the previously established actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised system. But in the nuclear era, when casualties in a general nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter of days, the use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It is our responsibility to contain Soviet power without global war, to avoid both abdication as well as unnecessary confrontation.

This can be done, but it requires a delicate and complex policy. We must strive for an equilibrium of power, but we must move beyond it to promote the habits of mutual restraint, coexistence, and, ultimately, cooperation. We must stabilize a new international order in a vastly dangerous environment, but our ultimate goal must be to transform ideological conflict into constructive participation in building a better world.

This is what is meant by the process called "detente"—not the hunger for relaxation of tension, not the striving for agreements at any price,

4

not the mindless search for friendly atmosphere
which some critics use as naive and dangerous
caricatures.

The policies pursued by this Administration
have been designed to prevent Soviet expansion
but also to build a pattern of relations in which the
Soviet Union will always confront penalties for
aggression and also acquire growing incentives for
restraint. These goals are well within our capacities.
Soviet power is evolving with considerable uneven-
ness. Soviet society is no longer totally cut off
from contact with or the influences of the world
around it nor is it without its own needs for out-
side relationships. It is the great industrial de-
mocracies, not the Soviet Union, that are the
engine of the world economy and the most pro-
mising partners for the poorer nations.

The industrial democracies, if they face their
challenges with confidence—if they do not mesmer-
ize themselves with the illusion of simple solu-
tions—possess vast strengths to contain Soviet
power and to channel that power in constructive
directions.

Our essential task is to recognize the need for
a dual policy that simultaneously and with equal
vigor resists expansionist drives and seeks to shape
a more constructive relationship. We must prevent
the Soviet Union from translating its growing
strength into global or regional preponderance. But
we must do so without escalating every crisis into a
massive confrontation. In recent years the United
States has firmly resisted attempts by the Soviet
Union to establish a naval base in Cuba, to impede
the access routes to Berlin, to exploit the explosive
situation in the Middle East. Recently we have
sought to halt blatant intervention in Angola-until
prevented from doing so by congressional action.

At the same time we have an historic obliga-
tion to mankind to engage the Soviet Union in
settlements of concrete problems and to push back
the shadow of nuclear catastrophe. At the very
least we owe it to our people to demonstrate that
its Government has missed no opportunity to
achieve constructive solutions and that crises which
occur were unavoidable. For whatever the rhetoric,
Americans will not support confrontations they
consider contrived. This is why the United States
has set forth principles of responsible relations in
the nuclear age: respect for the interests of all,
restraint in the uses of power, and abstention from

efforts to exploit instability or local conflicts for
unilateral advantage. The United States has sought
to give life to these principles in major negotiations
on arms control, the prevention of accidental war,
and in the settlement of political issues such as
Berlin. And we have begun to construct a network
of cooperative agreements in a variety of function-
al areas-economic, scientific, medical, environ-
mental, and others-which promise concrete bene-
fits if political conditions permit their full imple-
mentation and further development. It has been
our belief that, with patience, a pattern of re-
straints and a network of vested interests can de-
velop which will give coexistence a more hopeful
dimension and make both sides conscious of what
they would stand to lose by reverting to the poli-
tics of pressure, confrontation, and crisis.

In the early 1970's, when current U.S.-Soviet
relations were shaped, our Nation had already
passed through traumatic events and was engaged
in an anguishing war. There were riots in the streets
and on the campuses demanding rapid progress to-
ward peace. Every new defense program was chal-
lenged—including the ABM [antiballistic missile
treaty] which as approved by only one vote, the
development of multiple warheads, the Trident
submarine, and the B-1 bomber. Successive Con-
gresses passed resolutions urging the Administration
to reorder our national priorities away from de-
fense. We were continually attacked for not making
concessions in the strategic arms limitation talks
[SALT]. The Congress and many interest groups
pressed continually for the opening up of East-
West trade and agitated against the Administra-
tion's approach of linking progress in economic re-
lations with prior progress in political relations.
Throughout the course of 1970 and 1971 we were
involved in a series of crises with the Soviet Union
and were often accused of provocation or bellicos-
ty in the process.

Thus, only a few short years ago, the pres-
sures in this country and from our allies were over-
whelmingly to move rapidly toward better rela-
tions with Moscow. We resisted these pressures
then, just as we now refuse to let ourselves be
stampeded in the opposite direction. In the Ad-
ministration's view the country needs a balanced
policy, combining firmness and conciliation, strong

5

It is, therefore, ironic that our national debate seems now in many respects to have come full circle. The conditions in which detente originated are largely forgotten. Those who pressed for concessions and unilateral restraint toward Moscow now accuse the Government of being too conciliatory. Those who complain about our failure to respond with sufficient vigor to Soviet moves are often the very ones who incessantly seek to remove this country's leverage for influence or action—through restrictions on trade and credit, through weakening our intelligence capabilities, through preventing aid to friends who seek to resist Soviet aggression.

The restrictions on trade and credit are a case in point. The human rights issue is a matter of deep and legitimate concern to all Americans. But the congressional attempt to link it openly with economic relations, without subtlety or understanding of Soviet politics, both deprived us of economic levers and sharply reduced Soviet emigration. Other industrial countries have stepped in to provide credits and technology, with less concern for the objective of inducing political restraint which we had envisaged.

* We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

* We cannot prevent a build-up of Soviet forces, but we have the capacity—together with our allies—to maintain an equilibrium. We cannot neglect this task and then blame the Soviet Union if the military balance shifts against us.

* We have the diplomatic, economic, and military capacity to resist expansionism, but we cannot engage in a rhetoric of confrontation while depriving ourselves of the means to confront.

* We must accept that sovereign states, especially of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other and must proceed by compromise.

* We must live with the reality of the nuclear threat, but we have it in our power to build a new relationship that transcends the nuclear peril.

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful, and overwhelming while American policy is bumbling, uncertain, and weak. Let us stop pretending that somehow tough rhetoric and contrived confrontations show confidence in America. The opposite is true. Those who are prepared to base their policy on reality, those who assert that the American people will support a complex policy of firmness and conciliation and that this policy will succeed show a real faith in our capacities and our future. We have a design and the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a united people.

Against this background let me discuss two current issues that illustrate the two strands of policy that we are concurrently pursuing:

* The strategic arms limitation talks in which we are seeking to shape a more positive future and

* The Angolan situation, where we are attempting to curb Soviet expansionism.

## Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods—the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared the effects of a general nuclear exchange.

For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet in the nature of things, if once side expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable even though it has become difficult to define precisely what purely military purpose is served.

We thus face a paradox: At current and foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides determined the outcome. Today these arsenals increasingly find their purpose primarily in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent. For

6

under virtually no foreseeable circumstance could the United States—or the Soviet Union—avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange. Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty of finding a way to get off the treadmill.

To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side could use its strategic forces and how in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide. They are invariably based on assumptions such as that one side would permit its missile silos to be destroyed without launching its missiles before they are actually hit—on which no aggressor would rely where forces such as those possessed by either the United States or the U.S.S.R. now and in the years ahead are involved.

This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the nuclear competition requires endless invocations of theoretical scenarios of imminent or eventual nuclear attack. The attempt to hedge against all conceivable contingencies—no matter how fanciful—fuels political tensions and could well lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic arms imbalances that is inherent in an unrestrained arms race diverts resources in strategically unproductive areas—particularly away from forces for local defense, where shortfalls and imbalances could indeed be turned rapidly to our disadvantage. If no restraint is developed the competition in strategic arms can have profound consequences for the future of international relations, and indeed of civilization.

Yet at this critical juncture, the American people are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender of American interests. There are assertions that the United States is falling behind in the strategic competition and that SALT has contributed to it. There are unsupportable

None of this is accurate.

What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960's set the level of our strategic forces for the 1970's. We then had the choice between continuing the deployment of large, heavy throwweight missiles like the Titan or Atlas, or undertaking development and deployment of large numbers of smaller, more flexible ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missile], or combinations of both types. The Administration then in office chose to rely on an arsenal of 1,000 small, sophisticated, and highly accurate ICBM's and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats, along with heavy bombers; we deployed them rapidly and then stopped our buildup of launchers unilaterally in the 1960's when the programs were complete. Only 54 of the heavy Titans were retained and still remain in the force.

The Soviets made the opposite decision; they chose larger, heavier missiles; they continued to build up their forces through the 1960's and 1970's; they passed our numerical levels by 1969-70 and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year until stopped by the first SALT agreement.

Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication, and we possess larger numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was still building at the rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a year, while we were building none, as a result of our own repeatedly reaffirmed unilateral decisions of a decade previously. Since new American programs to redress the balance had only recently been ordered, there was no way to reduce the numerical gap before the late 1970's, when more modern sea-based missiles and bombers were scheduled to become operational.

The interim SALT agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers of launchers on both sides for five years—thereby limiting the momentum of Soviet programs without affecting any of ours. It stopped the Soviet build-up of heavy missile launchers. It

7

forced the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older
land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on
missile-carrying submarines. The agreed upon silo
limitations permitted us to increase the throw-
weight of our own missiles, if we decided on this
avenue of improving our strategic forces. We have
so far chosen not to do so, although, through re-
search and development, we retain the option. By
any measure the SALT agreements prevented the
then evolving gap in numbers from widening, while
enabling us to retain our advantage in other cate-
gories and easing the problem of redressing the
balance when new programs became operational.
What no negotiation could do is reverse by diplo-
macy the results of our own longstanding decisions
with respect to weapons design and deployment.

Moreover the SALT agreements ended for an
indefinite period the prospect of a dangerous and
uncertain competition in antiballistic missile de-
fense—a competition that promised no strategic ad-
vantage but potentially serious instabilities and the
expenditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were, therefore,
without question in the American national interest.
In the five-year respite gained by the 1972 interim
agreement, it was our intention to negotiate a
long-term pact on offensive weapons that would
firmly fix both sides at an equal level once our new
programs became operational. This is precisely what
President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in Novem-
ber 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed
on a ceiling of 2,400 strategic weapons covering
strategic systems and heavy bombers—but not
counting any of our forward-based aircraft in
Europe or our allies' strategic weapons, many of
which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2,400 is
lower than the level the Soviet Union already has
reached; it would require the dismantling of many
Soviet weapons while the planned levels and com-
position of our forces would not need to be re-
duced or changed. An equal ceiling of 1,320 was
placed on numbers of strategic weapons with
multiple warheads. Soviet heavy missile launchers
will remain frozen. These limits would cap the
strategic competition in numbers for a ten-year
period, yet preserve all the programs we need to
assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency.

problem. This is not a question of loopholes but of
evolving technology, with respect to which we in-
tend to remain vigilant. We will negotiate carefully
to make certain that the national interest and na-
tional security are protected. But if we succeed in
turning the Vladivostok accord into a ten-year
agreement, we will have crossed the threshold be-
tween total, unrestrained competition and the
difficult but promising beginning of long-term
strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces. The
United States and the Soviet Union have already
agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in
the next phase of the negotiations starting in 1977.

One would have thought that these accom-
plishments would speak for themselves. Instead
they have triggered a flood of charges which mis-
lead the American people and our friends, give a
wrong impression of irresoluteness to our adver-
saries, and complicate the prospects for a new
agreement that is in the overriding national
interest.

No charge is more irresponsible and poten-
tially more dangerous than the allegation that the
United States has knowingly tolerated violations of
the first SALT agreements.

What are the facts?

A standing Consultative Commission was
created by the agreements of 1972 precisely to
consider disputes or ambiguities in
implementation. Such incidents were almost cer-
tain to arise in a first, quite limited agreement be-
tween longstanding adversaries possessing weapons
systems of great complexity whose growth is veri-
fied not by some neutral policing mechanism but
by each side's own intelligence systems. Every
questionable activity that has arisen has been
systematically analyzed by this Government and
considered by the President and his advisers. When-
ever any question remained, it was then promptly
raised with the Soviets. All instructions to the
American representative on the Consultative Com-
mission reflected the unanimous views of all U.S.
agencies concerned and the data and assessment
produced jointly by them. No one had a bias in
favor of absolving the Soviets—an inherently mali-
cious charge. No one prevented all questionable or
suspicious activities from being raised with the
Soviets. And not all the questioned activities were
on the Soviet side.

8

All of these issues have been, and will continue to be, seriously handled and dealt with through a process that has proved effective. Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump together incidents that have been explained or are still being considered with wild allegations that have no foundation. They sometimes put forward inaccurate figures and data which often can be refuted only by divulging sensitive intelligence information. Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations, no recommendations are made of what countermeasures we should take or how to assess the significance of any given alleged violation.

In what way do the alleged violations affect the strategic equation? In what manner, if any, have we been foreclosed from protecting ourselves? Would those who inaccurately allege violations simply throw over all the agreements regardless of the benefits they provide the United States? Would they halt the negotiation of further agreements? What purpose is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to believe—totally incorrectly—that the United States is blind to violations or that its Government deliberately deceives its people? Can anyone seriously believe that this Administration which has strenuously resisted Communist advances in every part of the world—and is often strongly criticized for it—would ignore Soviet violations of a formal agreement?

I can assure you that this Administration will not tolerate violations. It will continue to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously. It will pursue energetically all ambiguities or signs of noncompliance. But it will not be driven by demagoguery to make false or hasty judgments. No department or agency charged with responsibility for this problem holds the view that any violations have occurred.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one question: What is the alternative to the agreement we have and seek? If the SALT process falters, we must consider what new or additional strategic programs we would undertake, their likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose. An accelerated strategic build-up over the next five years could cost as much as an additional $20 billion. Failing a satisfactory agreement, this will surely be the path we must travel. It would be a tragically missed opportunity. For, in the process of such a build-up, and the atmosphere it would engender, it

would be difficult to return to serious negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to increase; a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future negotiations would eventually have to begin. And in the end neither side will have gained a strategic advantage. At the least they will have wasted resources. At worst they will have increased the risks of nuclear war.

Let me sum up:

* We will never stand for the violation of a solemn treaty or agreement, and we will remain alert.

* We will never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against us—by violations of agreements, by unsatisfactory agreements, or by neglect of our own programs; we will spend what is necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.

* The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate a saner strategic balance on equitable terms—because it is in our interest, and because we have an obligation to our own people and to world peace.

As the United States strives to shape a more hopeful world, it can never forget that global stability and security rest upon an equilibrium between the great powers. If the Soviet Union is permitted to exploit opportunities arising out of local conflicts by military means, the hopes we have for progress toward a more peaceful international order will ultimately be undermined.

This is why the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa with nearly $200 million of military equipment, its advisers, and its transport of the large expeditionary force of 11,000 Cuban combat troops must be a matter of urgent concern.

Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distance to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the United States has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet

9

orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has
halted national action in the middle of a crisis.

When one great power tips the balance of
forces decisively in a local conflict through its mili-
tary intervention—and meets no resistance—an
ominous precedent is set, of grave consequence
even if the intervention occurs in a seemingly re-
mote area. Such a precedent cannot be tolerated if
a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. And if
the pattern is not broken now, we will face harder
choices and higher costs in the future.

The United States seeks no unilateral goals in
Angola: We have proposed a cease-fire; withdrawal
of all outside forces—Soviet, Cuban, and South
African; cessation of foreign military involvement,
including the supply of equipment; and negotia-
tions among all three Angolan factions. This ap-
proach has the support of half the nations of
Africa.

Last summer and fall, to halt a dangerously
escalating situation, the United States provided
financial support through African friends to those
in Angola—the large majority—who sought to resist
Soviet and Cuban domination. Using this as lever-
age we undertook an active diplomacy to promote
an African solution to an African problem. We
acted quietly to avoid provoking a major crisis and
raising issues of prestige.

At first it was feared that the Soveit-backed
faction, because of massive Soviet aid and Cuban
mercenaries, would dominate totally by Independ-
ence Day, November 11. Our assistance prevented
that. African determination to oppose Soviet and
Cuban intervention became more and more evi-
dent. On December 9 the President warned Mos-
cow of the consequences of continued meddling
and ofered to cooperate in encouraging a peaceful
outcome that removed foreign influence. The
Soviet Union appeared to have second thoughts. It
halted its airlift from December 9 until December
24.

At that point the impact of our domestic de-
bate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. It
was demanded that we explain publicly why our
effort was important—and then our effort was cut
off. After the Senate vote to block further aid to
Angola, Cuba more than doubled its forces and
Soviet military aid was resumed on a large scale.
The cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined.

Since then the situation has continued to deterio-
rate.

As our public discussion continues certain
facts must be understood. The analogy with Viet-
Nam is totally false; this Nation must have the
maturity to make elementary distinctions. The
President has pledged that no American troops or
advisers would be sent to Angola, and we were
prepared to accept legislative restrictions to that
effect, in addition to the War Powers Act which
already exists. What was involved was modest as-
sistance to stabilize the local balance of forces and
make possible a rapid political settlement in co-
operation with African countries.

It is charged that the Administration acted
covertly, without public acknowledgement. That is
correct for our purpose was to avoid an escalated
confrontation that would make it more difficult
for the Soviets to back down, as well as to give the
greatest possible scope for an African solution.
Angola was a case where diplomacy without lever-
age was likely to be impotent, yet direct military
confrontation would involve needless risks. This is
precisely one of those grey areas where unpubli-
cized methods would enable us to influence events
short of direct conflict.

And we complied totally with Congress' new
standard of executive-legislative consultation on
secret activities. Beginning in July, and through
December, we discussed the Angolan situation and
what we were doing about it with more than two
dozen Senators, 150 Congressmen, and over 100
staff members of both Houses. Eight congressional
committees were briefed on 24 separate occasions.
We sought in these briefings to determine the
wishes of Congress, and there was little sign of ac-
tive opposition to our carefully limited operations.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be
eased out by the Africans themselves over a period
of time. They may or may not prove true. But such
an argument, when carried to its logical conclusion,
implies that we can abandon the world to interven-
tionist forces and hope for the best. And reliance
on history is of little solace to those under attack,
whose future is being decided now. The degree of
Soviet and Cuban intervention is unprecedented;
they will have effectively determined the outcome.
There is no evidence to support the claim that they
will be quickly removed or that other nations may

10

It is maintained that we should meet the
Soviet threat in Angola through escalated methods
of pressure such as altering our position on SALT
or grain sales. But these arrangements benefit us as
well as the Soviet Union and are part of the long-
term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union.
History has proved time and again that expansion
can be checked only when there is a local balance
of forces; indirect means can succeed only if rapid
local victories are foreclosed. As the President has
pointed out, the Soviet Union has survived for
nearly sixty years without American grain; it could
do so now. Cutting off grain would still lose
Angola. We would duplicate the experience of the
Trade Act, which interrupted the trade relationship
with the U.S.S.R. to insure emigration—and ended
up with neither.

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile slo-
gans about not becoming the world's policeman.
We have no desire to play such a role. But it can
never be in our interest to let the Soviet Union act
as the world's policeman. There are many crises in
the world where the United States cannot and
should not intervene. But here we face a blatant
Soviet and Cuban challenge, which could have been
overcome if we had been allowed to act prudently
with limited means at the early stage. By forcing
this out onto center stage, our divisions simulta-
neously escalated the significance of the crisis and
guaranteed our impotence.

To claim that Angola is not an important
country, or that the United States has no im-
portant interests there, begs the principal question.
If the United States is seen to waiver in the face of
massive Soviet and Cuban intervention, what will
be the perception of leaders around the world as
they make decisions concerning their future securi-
ty? And what conclusions will an unopposed super-
power draw when the next opportunity for inter-
vention beckons?

Where are we now?

The Government has a duty to make clear in
the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no
precedent, that this type of action will not be
tolerated again. It must reassure adjacent countries
they will not be left exposed to attack or pressure
from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold. Congress and
the executive must come together on this proposi-

tion—in the national interest and in the interest of
world peace.

The Administration will continue to make its
case however unpopular it may be temporarily. Let
no nation believe that Americans will long remain
indifferent to the dispatch of expeditionary forces
and vast supplies of arms to impose minority gov-
ernments—especially when that expeditionary
force comes from a nation in the Western
Hemisphere.

We live in a world without simple answers. We
hold our values too dear to relinquish defending
them; we hold human life too dear to cease the
quest for a secure peace. The first requirement of
stability is to maintain our defenses and the
balance of power. But the highest aim of policy in
the nuclear age must be to create out of the sterile
equilibrium of force a more positive relationship of
peace.

Our problems, therefore, are of our own
making—self-doubt, division, irresolution. We must
once again become a confident, united, and deter-
mined people.

Foreign countries must be able to deal with
America as an entity, not as a complex of divided
institutions. If our divisions paralyze our interna-
tional efforts, it is America as a whole that will
suffer. We have no more urgent task than restoring
the partnership between the American people, the
Congress, and the executive. A new partnership can
enable the President of the United States, in his
constitutionally-determined role, to address the
world with the central authority of the spokesman
of a united and purposeful America.

Let us learn—even in an election year—the
self-discipline to shape our domestic debates into a

11

positive, not a destructive, process.

One of the forgotten truths of our history is
that our Founding Fathers were men of great
sophistication in foreign affairs. They understood
the balance of power; they made use of the divi-
sions of Europe for the advantage of our own
Revolution. They understood the need for a strong
executive to conduct the Nation's diplomacy. They
grasped that America required economic, political,
and moral links with other nations. They saw that
our ideals were universal and they understood and
welcomed the impact of the American experiment

In our age whose challenges are without
precedent, we need once again the wisdom of our
Founding Fathers. Our ideals must give us
strength—rather than serve as an excuse for abdica-
tion. The American people want an effective for-
eign policy. They want America to continue to
help shape the international order of the coming
generation according to our ideals. We have done
great things as a united people. We have it in our
power to make our third century a time of
vibrancy and hope and greatness.

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America enters its third century and its 48th Presidential election with unmatched physical strength, a sound foreign policy design, yet scarred by self-doubt. In the past decade and a half we have seen one President assassinated, another driven from office and a third resign. We have lived through the agony of Viet-Nam and Watergate. We are still struggling to overcome the bitterness and division that have followed in their wake. We face no more urgent task than to restore our national unity and our national resolve.

For we, the strongest free nation, cannot afford the luxury of withdrawing into ourselves to heal our wounds. Too much depends upon us -- peace or war, prosperity or depression, freedom or tyranny. Too much is at stake for America to paralyze itself tearing up the past, seeking sensational headlines in the present, or offering panaceas for the future. For our own well being -- American lives and American jobs -- will be affected if we permit our domestic disunity and turmoil to cause us to falter in meeting our international responsibilities.

It is in this spirit that I intend today to discuss America's relations with the world's other superpower -- the Soviet Union. In recent months that relationship has become -- as it should be -- an important part of our national debate. I want to explain the Administration's view of the conditions that gave rise to the policy known as "detente," the goals we seek, and the relationship of our Soviet policy to the over-all design of American diplomacy.

The United States is today confronted by one challenge unprecedented in its own history, and another challenge without precedent in the history of the world. America finds itself for the first time permanently and irrevocably involved in international affairs. At the same time, the catastrophic nature of nuclear war imposes upon us a necessity that transcends traditional concepts of diplomacy and balance of power -- to shape a world order that finds stability in self-restraint and, ultimately, cooperation.

For the first century and a half of our history our peace and security were provided for us by two oceans, the shield of the British navy, and equilibrium among the European powers. The success of our democracy at home, and the absence of direct threat from abroad, nourished our sense of uniqueness and fostered the illusion that it was up to America to choose whether and when we would participate in the world.

Since deTocqueville it has been a cliche that Americans, as a people, are slow to arouse, but that once aroused we are a tremendous and implacable force. Thus, even when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, we identified our exertion as a temporary disruption of our tranquility.

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Our successes seemed to teach us that any problem could be solved -- once and for all -- by determined effort. We considered peace natural, stability normal, and foreign involvement appropriate only so long as needed to remove some temporary threat or disorder. We entered World War I as "the war to end wars," and to "make the world safe for democracy." We fought World War II until "unconditional surrender."

Even in the first 25 years after World War II -- an era of great creativity and unprecedented American engagement in foreign affairs -- we acted as if the world's security and economic development could be conclusively ensured by the commitment of American resources, know-how and effort. We were encouraged -- even impelled -- to act as we did by our unprecedented predominance in a world shattered by war and the collapse of the great colonial empires. We considered our deployment of troops in Europe and elsewhere to be temporary. We thought that the policy of containment would transform the Soviet Union, and that a changed Soviet society would then evolve inexorably into a compatible member of a harmonious international community.

At the same time, the central character of moral values in American life always made us acutely sensitive to the purity of means -- and when we disposed of overwhelming power we had a great luxury of choice. Our moral certainty made compromise difficult; our preponderance often made it seem unnecessary.

Today, while we still have massive strength, we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear supremacy. We remain the world's most productive and innovative economy, but we must now share leadership with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal with the newly wealthy and developing nations; and we must make new choices regarding our economic relations with the Communist countries. Our democratic principles are still far more valued by the world's millions than we realize, but we must also compete with new ideologies which assert progressive goals but pursue them by oppressive methods.

Today, for the first time in our history, we face the stark reality that the challenge is unending; that there is no easy and surely no final answer; that there are no automatic solutions. We must learn to conduct foreign policy as other nations have had to conduct it for so many centuries -- without escape and without respite, knowing that what is attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful of the necessities of self-preservation, conscious that the reach of our national purpose has its limits. This is a new experience for Americans. It prompts nostalgia for a simpler past. As before in our history, it generates the search for scapegoats, holding specific policies responsible for objective conditions.

PR #44

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Since deTocqueville it has been a cliche that Americans, as a people, are slow to arouse, but that once aroused we are a tremendous and im-placable force. Thus, even when we ventured forth in foreign affairs, we identified our exertion as a temporary disruption of our tranquility.

PR #44

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PR #44

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It is precisely because we no longer predominate but must pursue a long-term course that there is a premium today on our constancy and purposefulness. We cannot afford to swing recklessly between confrontation and abdication. We must not equate tough rhetoric with strong action; nor can we wish away tough realities with nostalgic hopes. We can no longer act as if we engage ourselves in foreign affairs only when we choose, or only to overcome specific problems, so that we can then shift our priorities back to our natural concern with ourselves. The reality is that there can be no security without our vigilance and no progress without our dedication.

It is in this context that US-Soviet relations must be seen.

## The Contemporary Challenge of US-Soviet Relations

The issue of how to deal with the Soviet Union has been a central feature of American policy for three decades. What is new today is the culmination of thirty years of post-war growth of Soviet industrial, technological and military power. No American policy caused this; no American policy could have prevented it. But American policy can keep this power from being used to expand Soviet influence to our detriment; we have the capacity to enable allies and friends to live with a sense of security; we possess the assets to advance the process of building an international order of cooperation and progress.

We must do so, however, in unprecedented conditions. In previous periods, rivalry between major powers has almost invariably led to war. In our time, when thermonuclear weapons threaten casualties in the hundreds of millions, such an outcome is unthinkable. We must manage a fundamental clash of ideologies and harness the rivalry of the nuclear superpowers, first into coexistence, and then mold coexistence into a more positive and cooperative future. For as President Kennedy once said, "In the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

In the period after World War II, our nightmare was that the Soviet Union, after consolidating its occupation of Eastern Europe, might seek to spread its control to other contiguous areas in Europe and Asia. Our policies therefore sought to build alliances and positions of military strength from which we could contain and isolate the Soviet Union. In this manner the Soviet Union might be forced to settle for peace; transformations might occur within Soviet society that would curb expansionist tendencies and make the USSR over time into a more cooperative participant in the international system.

PR #44

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Yet the hope that these policies would produce permanent stability, positive evolution of the Soviet system, and greater normality, was only partially realized. In the immediate post-war period, the aggressiveness of Soviet ideology in the Stalinist era obscured some of the real weaknesses of the Soviet state. Indeed, as late as 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, the United States enjoyed a five-to-one superiority in strategic missiles, a three-to-one superiority in strategic bombers, total naval superiority everywhere, and rough equality on the ground in Europe.

Grandually with the acquisition of nuclear technology and the transformation of the international system through decolonization, the Soviet Union began to emerge as a first-class military power.

In strategic military terms the USSR has achieved a broad equality with the United States, as was inevitable for a large nation whose rulers were prepared to impose great sacrifices on their people and to give military strength the absolute top priority in resources. With only half of our gross national product, Soviet military expenditures exceed those of the United States.

For the first time in history the Soviet Union can threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian land-mass -- including the United States. With no part of the world outside the range of its military forces, the USSR has begun to define its interests and objectives in global terms. Soviet diplomacy has thrust into the Middle East, Africa and Asia. This evolution is now rooted in real power, rather than a rhetorical manifestation of a universalist doctrine which in fact has very little validity or appeal.

Coping with the implications of this emerging superpower has been our central security problem for the last several years. This condition will not go away. And it will perhaps never be conclusively "solved." It will have to be faced by every administration for the foreseeable future.

Our policy must deal with the consequences. The emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing international structure is a recurrent phenomenon. Historically, the adjustment of an existing order to the arrival of one or more new actors almost invariably was accompanied by war -- to impede the upstart, to remove or diminish some of the previously established actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised system. But in the nuclear era, when casualties in a general nuclear war will involve hundreds of millions in a matter of days, the use of force threatens utter catastrophe. It is our responsibility to contain Soviet power without global war, to avoid both abdication as well as unnecessary confrontation.

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This is what is meant by the process called "detente" -- not the hunger for relaxation of tension, not the striving for agreements at any price, not the mindless search for friendly atmosphere which some critics use as naive and dangerous caricatures.

The policies pursued by this Administration have been designed to prevent Soviet expansion, but also to build a pattern of relations in which the Soviet Union will always confront penalties for aggression, and also acquire growing incentives for restraint. These goals are well within our capacities. Soviet power is evolving with considerable unevenness. Soviet society is no longer totally cut off from contact with or the influences of the world around it nor is it without its own needs for outside relationships. It is the great industrial democracies, not the Soviet Union, that are the engine of the world economy and the most promising partners for the poorer nations.

Our essential task is to recognize the need for a dual policy that simultaneously and with equal vigor resists expansionist drives and seeks to shape a more constructive relationship. We must prevent the Soviet Union from translating its growing strength into global or regional preponderance. But we must do so without escalating every crisis into a massive confrontation. In recent years, the United States has firmly resisted attempts by the Soviet Union to establish a naval base in Cuba, to impede the access routes to Berlin, to exploit the explosive situation in the Middle East. Recently we have sought to halt blatant intervention in Angola -- until prevented from doing so by Congressional action.

At the same time, we have an historic obligation to mankind to engage the Soviet Union in settlements of concrete problems and to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe. At the very least we owe it to our people to demonstrate that its Government has missed no opportunity to achieve constructive solutions and that crises which occur were unavoidable. For whatever the rhetoric, Americans will not support confrontations they consider contrived. This is why the United States has set forth principles of responsible relations in the nuclear age: respect for the interests of all, restraint in the uses of power, and abstention from efforts to exploit instability or local conflicts for unilateral advantage. The United States has sought to give life to these principles in major negotiations on arms control, the prevention of accidental war, and in the settlement of political issues such as Berlin. And we have begun to construct a network of cooperative agreements in a variety of functional areas -- economic, scientific, medical, environmental, and others -- which promise concrete benefits if political conditions permit their full implementation and further development. It has been

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PR 44

(c)

our belief that, with patience, a pattern of restraints and a network
of vested interests can develop which will give coexistence a more
hopeful dimension and make both sides conscious of what
they would stand to lose by reverting to the politics of pressure,
confrontation and crisis.

In the early 1970's when current U. S.-Soviet relations were shaped,
our nation had already passed through traumatic events and was engaged
in an anguishing war. There were riots in the streets and on the
campuses demanding rapid progress towards peace. Every new defense
program was challenged -- including the ABM which was approved by only
one vote, the development of multiple warheads, the Trident submarine,
and the B-1 bomber. Successive Congresses passed resolutions urging
the Administration to reorder our national priorities away from defense.
We were continually attacked for not making concessions in the SALT
talks. The Congress and many interest groups pressed continually for
the opening up of East-West trade and agitated against the Administration's
approach of linking progress in economic relations with prior progress
in political relations. Throughout the course of 1970 and
1971, we were involved in a series of crises with the Soviet Union
and were often accused of provocation or bellicosity in the process.

Thus, only a few short years ago, the pressures in this country and from
our allies were overwhelmingly to move rapidly toward better relations
with Moscow. We resisted these pressures then, just as we now refuse
to let ourselves be stampeded in the opposite direction. In the
Administration's view the country needs a balanced policy, combining
firmness and conciliation, strong defense and arms control, political
principles and economic incentives. And it must be a policy for the
long term, that the American people can sustain, offering promise of
a constructive future.

It is, therefore, ironic that our national debate seems now in many
respectsto have come full circle. The conditions in which detente
originated are largely forgotten. Those who pressed for concessions and
unilateral restraint towards Moscow now accuse the Government of being
too conciliatory. Those who complain about our failure to respond with
sufficient vigor to Soviet moves are often the very ones who incessantly
seek to remove this country's leverage for influence or action -- through
restrictions on trade and credit, through weakening our intelligence
capabilities, through preventing aid to friends who seek to resist Soviet
aggression.

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PR 44

- We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet power, but we can prevent its use for unilateral advantage and political expansion.

- We must accept that sovereign states, especially of roughly equal power, cannot impose unacceptable conditions on each other and must proceed by compromise.

So let us end the defeatist rhetoric that implies that Soviet policy is masterful, purposeful and overwhelming while American policy is bumbling, uncertain and weak. Let us stop pretending that somehow tough rhetoric and contrived confrontations show confidence in America. The opposite is true. Those who are prepared to base their policy on reality, those who assert that the American people will support a complex policy of firmness and conciliation and that this policy will succeed, show a real faith in our capacities and our future. We have a design and the material assets to deal with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move forward as a united people.

- The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in which we are seeking to shape a more positive future.

## Strategic Arms Limitation

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods -- the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared the effects of a general nuclear exchange.

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For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable even though it has become difficult to define precisely what purely military purpose is served.

This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the nuclear competition requires endless invocations of theoretical scenarios of imminent or eventual nuclear attack. The attempt to hedge against all conceivable contingencies, no matter how fanciful, fuels political tensions and could well lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic arms imbalances that is inherent in an unrestrained arms race diverts resources in strategically unproductive areas -- particularly away from forces for local defense, where shortfalls and imbalances could indeed be turned rapidly to our disadvantage. If no restraint is developed, the competition in strategic arms can have profound consequences for the future of international relations, and indeed of civilization.

The United States, therefore, has sought and achieved, since 1963, a series of arms control agreements which build some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972. If the 1974 Vladivostok Accord leads to a new agreement, an even more important advance will have been made.

* To be sure, there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side could use its strategic forces and how in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide. They are invariably based on assumptions such as that one side would permit its missile silos to be destroyed without launching its missiles before they are actually hit -- on which no aggressor would rely where forces such as those possessed by either the U. S. or the USSR now and in the years ahead are involved.

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None of this is accurate.

What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960's set the level of
our strategic forces for the 1970's. We then had the choice between
continuing the deployment of large, heavy-throwweight missiles like the
Titan or Atlas, or undertaking development and deployment of large
numbers of smaller, more flexible ICBM's, or combinations of both types.
The administration then in office chose to rely on an arsenal of
1000 small, sophisticated and highly accurate ICBM's and 656 submarine-
launched missiles on 41 boats, along with heavy bombers; we deployed
them rapidly, and then stopped our buildup of launchers unilaterally
in the 1960's when the programs were complete. Only 54 of the heavy
Titans were retained and still remain in the force. The Soviets made
the opposite decision; they chose larger, heavier missiles; they
continued to build up their forces through the 1960's and 1970's;
they passed our numerical levels by 1969-1970, and continued to add
an average of 200 missiles a year until stopped by the first SALT
agreement.

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Thus, as a consequence of decisions made a decade ago by both sides, Soviet missiles are superior in throwweight while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity and sophistication, and we possess larger numbers of warheads. In 1972 when the SALT agreement was signed, the Soviet Union was still building at the rate of 90 land-based and 120 sea-based launchers a year, while we were building none, as a result of our own repeatedly reaffirmed unilateral decisions of a decade previously. Since new American programs to redress the balance had only recently been ordered, there was no way to reduce the numerical gap before the late Seventies, when more modern sea-based missiles and bombers were scheduled to become operational.

The interim SALT agreement of 1972 froze overall numbers of launchers on both sides for five years -- thereby limiting the momentum of Soviet programs without affecting any of ours. It stopped the Soviet build-up of heavy missile launchers. It forced the Soviets to agree to dismantle 210 older land-based missiles to reach permitted ceilings on missile-carrying submarines. The agreed-upon silo limitations permitted us to increase the throwweight of our own missiles, if we decided on this avenue of improving our strategic forces. We have so far chosen not to do so, although, through research and development, we retain the option. By any measure, the SALT agreements prevented the then evolving gap in numbers from widening, while enabling us to retain our advantage in other categories and easing the problem of redressing the balance when new programs became operational. What no negotiation could do is reverse by diplomacy the results of our own long-standing decisions with respect to weapons design and deployment.

Moreover, the SALT agreements ended for an indefinite period the prospect of a dangerous and uncertain competition in anti-ballistic missile defense -- a competition that promised no strategic advantage, but potentially serious instabilities and the expenditure of vast sums of money.

The first SALT agreements were therefore without question in the American national interest. In the five-year respite gained by the 1972 interim agreement, it was our intention to negotiate a long-term pact on offensive weapons that would firmly fix both sides at an equal level once our new programs became operational. This is precisely what President Ford achieved at Vladivostok in November 1974.

In this accord in principle, both sides agreed on a ceiling of 2400 strategic weapons covering strategic systems and heavy bombers -- but not counting any of our forward-based aircraft in Europe, or our allies' strategic weapons, many of which can reach Soviet soil. The ceiling of 2400 is lower than the level the Soviet Union already has reached; it would require the dismantling of many Soviet weapons while the planned levels and composition of our forces would not need to be reduced or changed. An equal ceiling of 1320 was placed on numbers of strategic weapons with multiple warheads. Soviet heavy missile launchers will remain frozen. These limits would cap the strategic competition in numbers for a 10-year period, yet preserve all the programs we need to assure deterrence and strategic sufficiency.

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PR #44

Obviously no single agreement can solve every problem. This is not a question of loopholes but of evolving technology, with respect to which we intend to remain vigilant. We will negotiate carefully to make certain that the national interest and national security are protected. But if we succeed in turning the Vladivostok Accord into a 10-year agreement, we will have crossed the threshold between total, unrestrained competition and the difficult but promising beginning of long-term strategic equilibrium at lower levels of forces. The United States and the Soviet Union have already agreed to turn to reductions in strategic forces in the next phase of the negotiations starting in 1977.

One would have thought that these accomplishments would speak for themselves. Instead they have triggered a flood of charges which mislead the American people and our friends, give a wrong impression of irresoluteness to our adversaries and complicate the prospects for a new agreement that is in the overriding national interest.

What are the facts? A standing consultative commission was created by the agreements of 1972 precisely to consider disputes or ambiguities in implementation. Such incidents were almost certain to arise in a first, quite limited agreement between long-standing adversaries possessing weapons systems of great complexity whose growth is verified not by some neutral policing mechanism but by each side's own intelligence systems. Every questionable activity that has arisen has been systematically analyzed by this government and considered by the President and his advisors. Whenever any question remained, it was then promptly raised with the Soviets. All instructions to the American representative on the Consultative Commission reflected the unanimous views of all U.S. agencies concerned and the data and assessment produced jointly by them. No one had a bias in favor of absolving the Soviets -- an inherently malicious charge. No one prevented all questionable or suspicious activities from being raised with the Soviets. And not all the questioned activities were on the Soviet side.

All of these issues have been and will continue to be seriously handled and dealt with through a process that has proved effective. Yet irresponsible charges continue to lump together incidents that have been explained or are still being considered with wild allegations that have no foundation. They sometimes put forward inaccurate figures and data which often can be refuted only by divulging sensitive intelligence information. Yet with all the recent flurry of allegations, no recommendations are made of what countermeasures we should take, or how to assess the significance of any given alleged violation. In what way do the alleged violations affect the strategic equation? In what manner, if any, have we been foreclosed from protecting ourselves? Would those who inaccurately allege violations simply throw over all the agreements regardless of the benefits they provide the United States? Would they halt the negotiation of further agreements? What

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purpose is served by leading our public and the Soviet Union to
believe -- totally incorrectly -- that the United States is blind to
violations or that its government deliberately deceives its people?
Can anyone seriously believe that this administration which has
strenuously resisted communist advances in every part of the world --
and is often strongly criticized for it -- would ignore Soviet
violations of a formal agreement?

I can assure you that this administration will not tolerate violations.
It will continue to monitor Soviet compliance meticulously. It will
pursue energetically all ambiguities or signs of non-compliance. But
it will not be driven by demagoguery to make false or hasty judgments.
No department or agency charged with responsibility for this problem
holds the view that any violations have occurred.

As we assess SALT we must face squarely one question: What is the alter-
native to the agreement we have and seek? If the SALT process falters,
we must consider what new or additional strategic programs we would
undertake, their likely cost, and above all, their strategic purpose.
An accelerated strategic build-up over the next five years could cost
as much as an additional 20 billion dollars. Failing a satisfactory
agreement, this will surely be the path we must travel. It would be a
tragically missed opportunity. For, in the process of such a build-up,
and the atmosphere it would engender, it would be difficult to return
to serious negotiations for some time. Tensions are likely to
increase; a new, higher baseline will emerge from which future
negotiations would eventually have to begin. And in the end, neither
side will have gained a strategic advantage. At the least they will
have wasted resources. At worst, they will have increased the risks
of nuclear war.

Let me sum up:

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PR #44

The Soviet Union and Angola

Angola represents the first time that the Soviets have moved militarily at long distance to impose a regime of their choice. It is the first time that the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside the immediate Soviet orbit. And it is the first time that Congress has halted national action in the middle of a crisis.

The United States seeks no unilateral goals in Angola: we have proposed a ceasefire; withdrawal of all outside forces -- Soviet, Cuban and South African; cessation of foreign military involvement, including the supply of equipment; and negotiations among all three Angolan factions. This approach has the support of half the nations of Africa.

At first, it was feared that the Soviet-backed faction because of massive Soviet aid and Cuban mercenaries would dominate totally by Independence Day, November 11. Our assistance prevented that. African determination to oppose Soviet and Cuban intervention became more and more evident. On December 9, the President warned Moscow of the consequences of continued meddling and offered to cooperate in encouraging a peaceful outcome that removed foreign influence. The Soviet Union appeared to have second thoughts. It halted its airlift from December 9 until December 24.

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PR 44

At that point, the impact of our domestic debate overwhelmed the possibilities of diplomacy. It was demanded that we explain publicly why our effort was important -- and then our effort was cut off. After the Senate vote to block further aid to Angola, Cuba more than doubled its forces and Soviet military aid was resumed on a large scale. The cooperativeness of Soviet diplomacy declined. Since then the situation has continued to deteriorate.

It is charged that the Administration acted covertly, without public acknowledgment. That is correct, for our purpose was to avoid an escalated confrontation that would make it more difficult for the Soviets to back down, as well as to give the greatest possible scope for an African solution. Angola was a case where diplomacy without leverage was likely to be impotent, yet direct military confrontation would involve needless risks. This is precisely one of those grey areas where unpublicized methods would enable us to influence events short of direct conflict.

It is said that the Russians will inevitably be eased out by the Africans themselves over a period of time. This may or may not prove true. But such an argument, when carried to its logical conclusion, implies that we can abandon the world to interventionist forces, and hope for the best. And reliance on history is of little solace to those under attack, whose future is being decided now. The degree of Soviet and Cuban intervention is unprecedented; they will have effectively determined the outcome. There is no evidence to support the claim that they will be quickly removed or that other nations may not draw damaging conclusions dangerous to our long-term interests.

It is maintained that we should meet the Soviet threat in Angola through escalated methods of pressure such as altering our position on SALT or grain sales. But these arrangements benefit us as well as the Soviet Union, and are part of the long-term strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. History has proved time and again that expansion can be checked only when there is a local balance of forces; indirect means can succeed

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PR 44

Let us not bemuse ourselves with facile slogans about not becoming the world's policeman. We have no desire to play such a role, But it can never be in our interest to let the Soviet Union act as the world's policeman. There are many crises in the world where the United States cannot and should not intervene. But here we face a blatant Soviet and Cuban challenge, which could have been overcome if we had been allowed to act prudently with limited means at the early stage. By forcing this out onto center stage, our divisions simultaneously escalated the significance of the crisis and guaranteed our impotence.

Where are we now? The Government has a duty to make clear in the Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of action will not be tolerated again. It must reassure adjacent countries they will not be left exposed to attack or pressure from the new Soviet-Cuban foothold. Congress and the Executive must come together on this proposition -- in the national interest and in the interest of world peace.

## National Strength and the Debate at Home

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PR 44

Our problems therefore are of our own making -- self-doubt, division, irresolution. We must once again become a confident, united and determined people.

Foreign countries must be able to deal with America as an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. If our divisions paralyze our international efforts, it is America as a whole that will suffer. We have no more urgent task than restoring the partnership between the American people, the Congress, and the Executive. A new partnership can enable the President of the United States, in his constitutionally-determined role, to address the world with the central authority of the spokesman of a united and purposeful America.

Let us learn -- even in an election year -- the self-discipline to shape our domestic debates into a positive, not a destructive process.

One of the forgotten truths of our history is that our Founding Fathers were men of great sophistication in foreign affairs. They understood the balance of power; they made use of the divisions of Europe for the advantage of our own Revolution. They understood the need for a strong Executive to conduct the nation's diplomacy. They grasped that America required economic, political, and moral links with other nations. They saw that our ideals were universal and they understood and welcomed the impact of the American experiment on the destinies of all mankind.

In our age whose challenges are without precedent, we need once again the wisdom of our Founding Fathers. Our ideals must give us strength -- rather than serve as an excuse for abdication. The American people want an effective foreign policy. They want America to continue to help shape the international order of the coming generation according to our ideals. We have done great things as a united people. We have it in our power to make our third century a time of vibrancy and hope and greatness.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

February 3, 1976

No. 44-A

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CALIFORNIA
AND
THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
FEBRUARY 3, 1976
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MR. BATES: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your excellent talk.

I've been asked to announce that there will be a press conference this afternoon for the benefit of the press at 3:00 p.m. in the Gold Room.

And now, Mr. Secretary, I guess first, for our radio audience, I should say that I'm John B. Bates, the President of the Commonwealth Club. And as is our custom at the Commonwealth Club, we ask that our speaker please return to the podium for questions from our audience.
Mr. Secretary?

I would like to first say that this too is a shared responsibility between the Commonwealth Club and the World Affairs Council. We have tried to screen out the many questions we have received and not duplicate them and get down to what we believe is representative of all of the questions that have been submitted to us.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, quite a few questions on what has happened to Ambassador Moynihan. (Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, let me say first of all that Ambassador Moynihan is a close friend of mine over many years.

For further information contact:

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Like many Harvard professors, he has his temperamental side and is unusually sensitive to criticism.

(Laughter.)

But let me say that I recommended Ambassador Moynihan for his present position after reading an article in *Commentary* magazine that he had written in which he outlined the policy that he thought we should pursue at the United Nations. We, therefore, knew exactly what he would do; and he was sent to New York to carry out the policies which he, in fact, carried out. Indeed, last July, before he assumed office, I made a speech in Milwaukee in somewhat more pedantic language than he uses. (Laughter.) I outlined essentially the same considerations.

So Ambassador Moynihan carried out with very great distinction the instructions of the President and the Secretary of State and gave them his own inspired cast (laughter).

I think he made a major contribution to American foreign policy. He has told us that he wishes to return to Harvard because if he did not at this time he would lose his tenure position irrevocably. And with the most enormous reluctance, the President and I had to go along with a repeatedly and insistently made request that we accept his resignation. There were no policy disagreements,

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and his successor will be instructed to carry out the
same policies -- though, of course, there's only one
Pat Moynihan in the United States. (Laughter and
applause.)

MR. BATES: There was a recent article in *Pravda*
somewhat critical of you, Mr. Secretary, and I
have this question: Did the recent *Pravda* article
lose anything in its translation? Why
do you think the article was printed at this time?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, of course, I
don't think that the editors of *Pravda* understand the
policies of my father in clipping newspaper articles or
they wouldn't have written it -- because my father
has the rule that any author is given two chances.
The second time they write an unfavorable article he
delineates it from the scrapbooks he keeps. (Laughter.)
So I want to make clear to *Pravda* that if they want
to stay in my father's clipping file, they bother stop
here. (Laughter.)

I don't know whether the article lost anything
in the translation, but I think I got the message. (Laughter)

There is no complete unanimity of views between
us and the Soviet Union on Angola, but I can only repeat:
The United States is dedicated to improving its relationship
with the Soviet Union. The United States believes that