The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961,
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Doubleday & Company, Inc.
(Garden City, New York: 1965), pp. 329-360.

CHAPTER XIV

Berlin

When Berlin falls, western Germany must be next. If we mean
... to hold Europe against Communism, we must not budge.

—General Lucius Clay

ON Monday, November 10, 1958, Soviet Premier Khru-
shchev declared his intention of signing at an early date a
"peace treaty" with East Germany, thus—he contended—terminating Al-
lied rights in West Berlin. With this pronouncement he transformed the
city of Berlin, which had remained relatively quiet for more than nine
years, into a tnderbox.

At the end of World War II, Germany's capital was divided into four sectors; the larger and more populous area comprised the sectors occupied by British, French, and American forces, the smaller area by Soviet troops. Since Berlin lay within the Soviet Zone in East Germany, the Western sector of that city was dependent for access on narrow corridors some 110 miles long through East German territory, completely controlled by the Soviets.¹

This access was maintained by political agreements, the most specific of which were the Potsdam protocol signed in 1945 between the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, and the agreement reached by the four powers at Paris in 1949. The Western nations were committed to the eventual reunification of the entire German nation and did not recognize the "German Democratic Republic," a puppet government set up by the Soviets; the Soviet Sector in East Berlin was made the "capital" of this regime.

¹ Map, "The Berlin Corridors," appears following page 360.

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WAGING PEACE

Under these awkward conditions it was always easy for the Soviets to create varying annoyances involving Berlin and Allied right therein. In this latest instance Mr. Khrushchev bluntly declared that the four-power occupation of Berlin was out of date and must be ended. He asserted that East Germany should have its capital free of the "state within the state" (his term for West Berlin), and that the situation in that region should be "normalized."

Khrushchev did not at first threaten drastic action, such as the blockade of 1948. Instead he called on the Western nations to begin negotiations with the East German government toward a complete withdrawal of Allied forces from the city. The Soviet Union said it intended to transfer all its administrative functions in the city to the East Germans; but politically we would not, under any circumstances, do business with the East German mock government.²

I of course at once recognized the dangerous potential of the Russian declaration, though it was no surprise that the Communists should continue to make trouble wherever they saw a promising possibility. But there was little room in the Berlin situation for negotiation or compromise. Militarily, our forces in the city were token garrisons only. Berlin's actual defense lay only in the West's publicly expressed intention that to defend it we would, if necessary, resort to war.

The physical and psychological condition of West Berlin had changed dramatically in the decade since the blockade, when the Allied airlift saved the city from starvation. No longer were West Berliners barely scraping along on subsistence amounts of food and fuel; they now had a fully-geared industrial economy. Its new prosperity required supplies and raw materials multiplied many times over those needed a decade before.

This thriving industrial metropolis was showing to the world, and to the East Germans in particular, the contrast between the Communist and free ways of life. West Berlin had long provided a haven for thousands upon thousands of unhappy, escaping East Germans of whom, to make matters even worse from Khrushchev's viewpoint, a considerable proportion were professionals and intellectuals. Small wonder he was to call the city a bone in his throat. An Allied retreat would remove it.

Moreover, any concession that Khrushchev could wring from a crisis-weary West could be pictured in Communist propaganda as a magnificent victory. Tacit recognition of the Grotewohl regime in East Germany could

² Later on Khrushchev apparently changed his mind. His puppet Prime Minister, Otto Grotewohl, said that Soviet withdrawal would be contingent on simultaneous Western withdrawal.

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be politically disastrous to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, the man who, more than any other, had been responsible for the rapid rehabilitation of West Germany and for her solid, courageous alignment with Western philosophy. Khrushchev now hoped to exploit differences among the four Western governments—differences, for example, over the kind of Communist provocation that could compel the West to go to war.

When the news of Khrushchev's statement first broke, there was no reason for an immediate public reply by the United States government; too much eagerness to counter Khrushchev's statement would give the impression that our government was edgy. Our rights, which had been observed for years, were evident. The people of Berlin were unshaken by the news; indeed no overt action had been taken, and thus there was really nothing to react to as long as Western rights had not been infringed. So, for the moment, we said nothing. But I kept in close touch with developments. The next one was not long in coming.

On Friday, November 14, four days after the initial announcement, the Soviets detained three United States Army trucks for 8½ hours at a checkpoint on the Autobahn just outside Berlin. General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, sent a message that, in the absence of other instructions, he was planning to dispatch a test Berlin-Helmstedt convoy. If the Soviets were to detain it and if protest did not effect "early release"—within two or three hours—he planned to extricate the convoy "by minimum force necessary."

Clearly, however, if such action were to be taken, it should first be made known to our allies. Therefore, even though the administration was generally sympathetic to Norstad's approach (the Chiefs of Staff thought we should move at once), his plan could not be put into effect immediately. To give time for consultation an order was sent temporarily suspending all convoys to Berlin.

Soon thereafter Foster Dulles informed me that the initial combativeness of the military had eased and the Chiefs of Staff and General Norstad now recognized the necessity for bringing our allies in line prior to taking drastic action. At a meeting a few days later—on the twentieth—Secretary Dulles observed that if Khrushchev should carry out his intention of transferring Soviet responsibilities to the East German government, he would create the most complicated situation in Berlin since the end of the 1949 blockade. Foster believed that Khrushchev would probably move soon to carry out his threat.

By November 21 I felt the time had come to make some sort of low-key announcement that the United States would stand on its commitments. I directed Jim Hagerty to make the announcement for me to the

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assembled press representatives in his routine briefing. The transcript gives an idea of the atmosphere of one of these informal, speak-but-say-little Hagerty press conferences, at which he was a master when he chose to be:

Mr. Hagerty: "There isn't much I can tell you, but I can say this: that the President and our government are keeping in close touch with the situation in Berlin and are also keeping, as a government, in close touch with the government of the United Kingdom and the government of the Republic of France.

"This [Berlin], as you realize, is not a unilateral problem. . . . It is a problem that concerns our two allies as well. And I can say, speaking for the U.S. government, . . . that our firm intentions in West Berlin remain unchanged."

Q. "Speaking there for the U.S. government or for the three allies?"

Mr. Hagerty: "Well, I can't speak for the governments of the UK and France, but as I say, we are keeping in close touch with the Allies and I would think that would also be true, but I can't speak for them."

Q. "Jim could spell out those intentions?"

Mr. Hagerty: "No, and I do not intend to."

Q. "Well, [it] certainly involves permanent intention to stay in West Berlin, doesn't it, Jim?"

Mr. Hagerty: "If you ask me what our 'firm intentions' mean, I can say that those firm intentions remain to maintain the integrity of West Berlin. That is all I have to say this morning—(laughter)—unless you have some questions."

I soon learned from Prime Minister Macmillan that he had sent a message to Khrushchev, warning of the worry which Khrushchev's recent statements on Berlin had caused. Harold, possibly with tongue in cheek, had said that he found Khrushchev's statements difficult to reconcile with the many previous expressions he had made expressing a desire to reduce tension in the world. He reminded Khrushchev that the position of the allies was well known. For us the crux of his message was "the British government have every intention of upholding their rights in Berlin, which are soundly based."

Meanwhile the allies began, through their embassies in Bonn, an effort to compose a four power note (including West Germany) to the Soviets. At the same time we lifted our ban on truck convoys from West Germany to Berlin, and soon one was reported to have passed unhindered.

There matters stood until the 27th of November, when my son John arrived in Augusta with an extensive summary of current State Department, CIA, and military reports. Together, the reports stated that none of the Western governments or any member thereof advocated pulling out of Berlin. However, there had been Allied discussion on various subjects

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including (1) the degree with which the Western powers could deal with the East German government without loss of prestige or undue damage to Adenauer, (2) the procedures to be followed (including the degree of force to be used) in the event of serious harassment by East German police, and (3) the timing of Western moves, such as the proposed note to the Soviets or any proposed message to Adenauer. The report concluded that, of the nations involved, West Germany had taken the firmest and most unequivocal position; that France was uncommitted (apparently President de Gaulle preferred to wait a little longer before moving), and at the "working level" (the men below the Prime Minister) the British appeared to be the most conciliatory.

The only startling aspect of the report was found in the British paper. It had been received informally from the British government, apparently representing only the views of the lower echelons of the Foreign Office, and not pretending to commit the government. The paper suggested a Western readiness not only to deal with the East German puppet government but, eventually, to recognize it, rather than expose Berlin to the danger of a blockade. These views reportedly had been communicated to our ambassador, John Hay Whitney, by the British foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, who implied that there was no reason why dealing with East Germany should lead to our ejection from Berlin. He claimed, furthermore, that the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, agreed with him that "low-level" recognition of that regime was better than a risk of war.

On reading the report I telephoned the Secretary of State, saying "Until this morning I didn't know of the existence of this British paper and I'm astounded by its arguments." I said that I was amazed also at the alleged sentiments of Couve de Murville, whom I had always considered a stout-hearted individual.

Foster's reply was that the working level British paper had been repudiated by Harold Macmillan himself!

Foster had more to report. The State Department had just received a note from Moscow that seemed to defer any move on Khrushchev's part for six months, during which time negotiations over Berlin should take place. Khrushchev had also proposed that West Berlin become a "free city" under the United Nations, and that all occupying powers' military forces withdraw from Berlin.

If an agreement to this effect could not be reached at the end of six months, Khrushchev concluded, the Soviets would go ahead with their program.

We discussed the free city concept for a few moments. I would be willing to study the possibility of creating a free city, I said, if it in-

WAGING PEACE

ciuded all of Berlin, East and West; if the avenues to the city from the West were placed also under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, and if the West German government approved. If the proposal applied to West Berlin only, I would have nothing to do with it. At the end of the conversation I asked Foster to urge a four-power conference of Western foreign ministers with a view of concerting the stand which the West would take.

At the conclusion of this conversation, I turned to John and we speculated for a few moments. The immediate crisis was averted. But Khrushchev's latest pronouncement had, nevertheless, the tone of an ultimatum. At the end of six months, on May 27, 1959, to be exact, we presumably would be faced with a far more serious crisis-unless Khrushchev backed down or a solution satisfactory to all interested parties, not yet in sight, could be found. During the interim we could be sure that the Russians would use every weapon in their arsenal to divide the West and to play on the already taut nerves of some of its leaders. There seemed to be no avoiding a showdown because Khrushchev had apparently laid his pres- tige on the line.

During the next few days I had ample occasion to reflect at length on Berlin. I had lived with this problem intermittently for the past thirteen years. Inevitably, despite intimate acquaintance with it, the question kept coming back to me: "How, or rather why did the Free World get into this mess? How did we ever accept a situation in which our only feasible response to an attack on a thirteen-thousand-man garrison³ surrounded by numerous Communist divisions would likely mean the initiation of World War III?"

From a conventional military viewpoint alone, the situation was so lopsided as to be ridiculous. But far more was at stake than the fate of military men surrounded by a sea of potential enemies.

The Western position in Berlin was the result of political agreements made by United States, British, and Soviet governmental leaders during World War II, agreements which the Soviets never carried out.

The arrangements they established for occupation of Germany were intended to be temporary only. Allied governments never visualized that the

⁸ The United States and Great Britain had four thousand to five thousand each and France about three thousand. There was probably a like number of civilians from all three nations. Informed estimates set the number of Soviet divisions at 180, of which twenty-two were deployed in East Germany.

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occupation zones for Germany would one day become enduring political boundaries, dividing the population and condemning millions of unfortunate peoples to live under dictatorship for decades, possibly generations.

Moreover, the decisions made regarding the division of Germany and the status of Berlin were not reached impulsively or without long study. When the allies were preparing for Operation OVERLORD,⁴ they set up in London the European Advisory Commission, composed of political representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and charged them with responsibility for recommending plans to govern a defeated Germany. They were to suggest boundaries for occupation zones.

During the 1944-45 campaign in Europe, my headquarters came to the conclusion that the boundaries recommended by the Advisory Commission would give more territory to the Soviets than they could take by force of arms. We reported this. But because the Western governments undoubtedly looked upon the division of Germany as a temporary arrangement, the exact lines may have seemed, at that time, as of little importance.

My headquarters also proposed as an alternative to the use of Berlin as the temporary capital of Germany the building of a cantonment capital to be located at the junction of the American, British, and Soviet Zones.⁵ But the Commission's recommendations for Germany's division were adopted, with the retention of Berlin, over one hundred miles within the Soviet Zone, as the site from which all Germany should be governed.

For months following V-E Day I, as the United States representative on the Four-Power Allied Control Council, visited Berlin periodically. The Council attempted to run the country from this traditional seat of au-

⁴ Code name for the Normandy invasion.

⁵ Although the scheme brought no positive response, President Roosevelt might have had something similar in mind when in February of '44 he reportedly sketched out a plan for Germany's division. In his rough diagram the national occupation zones were triangular in shape with the points joining at Berlin.

My pie-shaped plan was similar except that the center of the pie was located elsewhere—at the junction of the U.S., British, and Soviet Zones. The President seemed little concerned about Berlin in contrast to Winston Churchill, who thought it would be greatly to our advantage to capture it even though by the prior decision to which he was a party, the area in which it was situated would be surrendered to the Soviets.

Mr. Roosevelt's only interest, as I recall, was in our control of the northwest sector; there was nothing in the southwest, he remarked, "except tourists and scenery." I did not believe we should have sectors, and said as much to the President when I was ordered back to consult with the Joint Chiefs at Staff in 1944.

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City in accordance with the joint directions of our respective superiors. As it turned out, Soviet cooperation was so lacking that Germany was soon, in effect, governed by two authorities, the Soviets in the East and the Western allies in the West. Both parts of the nation were later accorded recognition by their respective occupiers. The West, however, retained their rights in and access to Berlin.

Trouble was always afoot. Possessed, geographically, of the power to control access to the city, the Soviets never lost an opportunity to harass the West as much as they dared. The Free World was kept acutely aware of this during the following years, a period that witnessed the initiation of the Reds' Berlin blockade in 1948 and its later defeat. When in 1951 I was recalled to duty as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, Berlin became once more a matter of my immediate direct responsibility but little difficulty was encountered.

Soon after my inauguration as President, the East German revolt of 1953 broke out. It was quickly quelled. The Western part of Berlin was subjected to periodic harassment, and the city always held my attention. At innumerable meetings, we examined, against the possibility of future emergency, methods of support, including financial support, of the city, increased air transport, stockpiles of materials for emergencies, and limited retaliatory measures to discourage Soviet proddings. As the city grew from a heap of rubble to a brilliant showplace, we were determined to leave no doubt in the mind of Stalin and his successors that challenging our rights in the city could have painful consequences.

Now at the end of 1958, with the threat suspended for the moment, we began to plan the United States' response.⁶

Foster Dulles and I put less credibility in Khrushchev's threat to move

⁶ Many people seemed to assume that, because Mr. Khrushchev had made an announcement, I should abandon my determination to enforce strict economy on defense expenditures. This showed a total lack of understanding of our military problem. If resort to arms should become necessary, our troops in Berlin would be quickly overrun, and the conflict would almost inevitably be global war. For this type of war our nuclear forces were more than adequate. Why so much of our populace has always seemed to feel that our defense would be immediately improved by an increase of a billion dollars or so, or by the quick call-up of a hundred thousand ground troops, has always been beyond my ken. I determined that this crisis should not affect our long-range plans for assuring the defense of America without waste. Indeed, it was always my conviction that one purpose of Khrushchev's manufactured crisis was to frighten free populations and governments into unnecessary and debilitating spending sprees.

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in the following May than he possibly expected. But every tick of the clock brought us nearer to the moment when we had to be ready to meet him head on, if necessary. Though six months can sometimes seem like an age, there was little enough time to perfect contingency planning with our allies.

The problem was delicate: We could leave no doubt in the Soviets' minds of our intentions, yet we could not be provocative. First of all, the work we had done over the previous six years, and the concepts behind it, had to be coldly examined in the light of existing circumstances.

On December 11, immediately following the regularly scheduled meeting of the National Security Council, I asked the Vice President and a dozen others to come into my office. Before the meeting I had been informed by Foster Dulles that certain assumptions or attitudes about Berlin on which our previous planning had been based had turned out to be obsolete or invalid. For example, the State Department had thought it possible that when Khrushchev announced his intention of turning over controls of access routes to the East Germans the West should simply announce its intention to treat the East Germans as the "agents" of the Soviets. There were precedents for dealing with unrecognized Communist governments on specific problems. In Korea we had negotiated with the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists; in Indochina we had sat at the table with the North Vietnamese; indeed, in Germany, East Germans had administered transportation, utility, and other systems with our tacit approval on the assumption that they were responsible to the Soviets. Now, however, Khrushchev's belligerent message of November 27 left no doubt in anyone's mind that the East Germans would act in their own right, officially at least, once control of facilities should be turned over to them.

This position surprised me. Until that meeting, I said, I had not been aware that our petty dealings with the East Germans had become, by any distorted interpretation, a basis for virtual recognition of East Germany. I had no difficulty in rejecting the State Department's proposed "agent" expedient. An individual could be treated as an agent; a nation could not. However, I was troubled that up to this time we had always justified our position in Berlin solely on our rights as "conquerors." After all, we had recognized the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) as a sovereign nation four years before, and she had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The soundest basis for our remaining in Berlin, I felt, was our solemn obligation expressed to the two million Germans of West Berlin and to the entire world to stand by a city that had freely chosen to stay with the West and the cause of freedom. If our word to