TELCONE

Under Secretary Johnson/Kissinger

9:13 a.m. - 11/16/72

K: Hello, Alex.

J: Yes, Henry.

K: I wanted to have a brief meeting this morning to review the various protocols just so I know what we're doing at that meeting and also to go over that economic paper.

J: OK. Fine. Very good. When do you

K: How about 11 o'clock?

J: 11 o'clock. OK, I'll bring Bill along.

K: Right. Now if Marshall wants to come to discuss the economic paper - how much does he know of this thing?

J: He knows the details - well, the protocols he knows all about. We've never shown him the agreement as such, as a whole nor the play-by-play on this. Not that - I'm personally willing - you know I'd like to bring him on it as a matter of fact much more than we have with - particularly Bill and you going away. But I just haven't done so up to now.

K: Yes.

J: But if you simply want to discuss protocol and the economic paper and that type of thing of course Marshall should be there.

K: OK, well why don't you have him in. Now also, Alex, that goddam Bray statement yesterday has infuriated Ziegler and Haldeman in an extraordinary way here.

J: Well, I talk to

K: In fact we sat on them and let them say nothing.

J: I see. I see. I see. Well, you know what happened?

K: I don't know what happened.

DECEMBER 19, 1972

2

J: He was simply asked a question and Adam Malek from Djakarta made a statement that everybody had agreed and they asked Bray whether or not he was going to deny this and Bray said, 'No, he was not going to deny it. I haven't got the exact transcript but rather that there had been agreement in principal with most of these countries but there were a lot of details yet to be worked out. That's all he said which is a fact.

K: I know it's a fact but we haven't said anything about the agreement.

J: I see.

K: Look, if we can just keep any substantive comments out it would be helpful.

J: I didn't know he was going to make it, frankly, but

K: But if you'd like to have Marshall with you that's fine with me.

J: OK. Will it be in your office?

K: Yeh, let's do it in my office.

J: OK. 11 o'clock I'll be over.

K: Good. Fine.

J: OK, fine.

DREASSIFIED

Autograph: FEB 2 95
BAS
SINCE: 11/01/91

TELCONE

Dave Kraslow/Kissinger

11:05 a.m. - 11/16/72

K: Hello.

DK: Henry.

K: Yes, Dave.

DK: Thank you for calling. One question on this project proposal I made with you the other day - would you consider the advisability - if you think it's a good idea and want to go ahead with it -

K: Well I haven't agreed to do it yet.

DK: I said if you agree on the feasibility and you want to go ahead with it, would you consider the advisability of taping this in advance on the absolute understanding that none of this would be used until after the settlement.

K: No. I'll do it after the settlement and besides I wouldn't have the time to do it before.

DK: Would not have the time to do it before.

K: No, I really wouldn't.

DK: OK, well you'll still consider it then? The possibility after the settlement? You see the thing we were able to do with the President was to get this thing in type and just sit on it for the proper moment, but you say you can't do it under those conditions, obviously we would like to do it later then.

K: I think we should wait until it's all done.

DK: Until it's all done.

K: And you know there'll be periods of intervals before the whole thing gets into operation so it won't be out of the news unfortunately.

DK: Oh, no it won't be out of the news at all but you'll be running around from Saigon to Paris and Washington and we won't be able to sit down and focus on this thing, it's a valid one to make.

K: Yes, I just don't think there is enough time to do a good job, to get it all straight and

DRAFTED

Author: F. D. 26-588
Date: 10/01/01
By: B. M. D.

2

DK: Right. But you're still favorably inclined to the idea?

K: Yes, but of course I'll have to discuss it with the President.

DK: I understand. I understand. OK, now I'm still hoping we can have
lunch when you get back from Paris one of these days.

K: Well, you know in this period I'm just snowed completely. I'm fighting for my job.

DK: (Laugs) I'll tell you privately if you won't break a confidence that one of the two off-the-record comments the President made in an interview concerning you - I don't know whether you were aware of that or not - it was a rather flattering one. Can I ask you a question of substance?

K: Yeh.

DK: The TIMES reported yesterday that when Haig went to Saigon he made it clear to Thieu that we would not be deterred from going ahead with an agreement with Hanoi if we felt Thieu's objections were unreasonable. Was that a fair summation of

K: Oh, we, you know, I've stated the view publicly. I've said we won't give a veto. We've said that. We've said it publicly.

DK: All right. Well, it's in effect saying that if you don't find any merit to Thieu's objections we would go ahead with an agreement.

K: Yeh, but I wouldn't make a big affair of it because I'm certain we can work it out.

DK: OK, Henry. Thank you very much.

K: Good.

DK: Bye. Bye.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:17 pm, November 16, 1972

K: Mr. President

P: Hi, Henry.

K: Just wanted to tell you we've had a very long exchange with Bunker and things seem to be moving. We've got about 75 percent of the issues either resolved or in shape where they can be resolved. And even on the troop issue they're beginning to back peddle. So that I think we can assume there will not be a crisis. It depends, though--

P: Now, I guess, Henry, it's on what you can do on the North Vietnamese.

K: That's right. I think we can now--if we can get 80 percent of our changes, we--

P: Well, did Bunker get any reaction to my letter?

K: Well he thinks your letter was the decisive thing.

P: Did he think it helped?

K: I think it was decisive, because until Thieu got your letter, as he points out, there wasn't much-- there wasn't any movement. And when they met this time it was done in a really constructive-- the first really constructive meeting we've had with them.

P: Go after it!

K: Good, great.

P: On this other, on the North Vietnamese, I suppose you told Dobrynin that they damned well better be reasonable at this thing. You'll put the proper pressure on?

K: Oh, yes, I talked to the Chinese and to Dobrynin.

P: They've just got to be--this is not a one way street, you know.

K: Right. Well, I think, Mr. President, that if they don't settle next week we'll just have to go back to Bonn, then, for a few weeks.

2

P: Well, I--

K: It's going to be painful, but I think

P: It's been saluatory, in my opinion, that we have hit them with, I notice, it was apparently a pretty good rage yesterday.

K: Oh yes, now that we are getting out, we've finally got the bastards in the Pentagon doing what they should have done all summer.

P: Right, right, right. Well, at least we don't have any reasons to think they are going to be unreasonable in Paris.

K: Well, the headlines say North Vietnam rejects any changes in the agreement. That isn't true. What they said was they oppose any changes, they didn't say they'd reject them. Of course, they'll oppose them.

P: Well, we'll see what they do.

K: We'll have a rough day or two days.

P: Right, right. Okay, well, we'll see you tomorrow.

K: Right, I'll be up at 10:30.

DREASHERS

*

TELCOM

Henry Hubbard/Mr. Kissinger

7:02 p.m., November 16, 1972

H: ... if possible.

K: In both.

H: I have you --

K: But that's easier done in the 4th reduction than in the Security Council.

H: Right. Right; well, this is the point. But I have you also -- you saying "MBFR could be a lot of eyewash."

K

K: No, no.

H: If anything was going to be eyewash --

K: No, no, no; I didn't mean -- I said what we could do with MBFR is just have a lot of high sounding principles.

H: Oh, I see.

K: But we don't do that.

H: I see, I see. But otherwise about the agenda and all that, refers to both.

K: Yes.

H: Okay. Very good.

K: Good.

H: Thanks a lot.

K: bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

August 26 1972

SUNDAE 9:00AM

TELCORN

Flanigan/Kissinger

9:40 a.m. - 11/17/72

K: Hello.

F: Before you go running off to Paris, the discussions on the European study, military problems first - come to the conclusions there and then fit the economic decisions into that preordained conclusion and I think that misreads the importance of these economic discussions.

K: I think they should be handled simultaneously.

F: I quite agree.

K: But above all I want to stop - you know, the one trouble I have with Sonnenfeldt is that sonofabitch turns everything into a Federal case. Now for the last two months I wanted to study on Europe and he's still negotiating it. We'll still be negotiating it on Inauguration Day.

F: I think that's right and he's also trying to make it so damn big he's trying to wash the whole elephant. Well, it's big enough by itself without

K: OK, Pete, I've got to run because I got to be up at 10:30. Look, one quick question first. How strong a guy is Rush?

F: Rush was not considered a strong man when he was in the business world. I talked to his directors and some of the people in the company and got a very complete report. I reported that to the President the time he went to Germany and said as an Ambassador he's probably good, but as a leader, as an organizer he is not considered to be by these members of the business community, his directors, people for whom he was a director and some of his key employees, was not considered to be a tough guy and therefore they're glad to see him go.

K: He's not just lying low now.

F: No.

K: As deputy? And hiding his strength?

F: No, the company did not do very well and they were glad to see him go. And I made that abundantly clear when they brought him back for this job. I thought I told you that too, at the time.

DREASPIRED

An-1197-12-21
BY BOB MANGAMAN 11/17/72

TELCOM

Larry Higby/Kissinger

3:15 p.m. - 11/17/72

K: Hello.

H: Hello, sir.

K: Larry.

H: Yes, sir.

K: If you could get Bob to call me before the end of the day I do want to pursue that one subject we discussed this morning about which I've had a chance to think a bit.

new

H: OK. For what the/guy or what?

K: Well, uh

H: Never mind I'll just

K: No, no, he knows - about the organization of the principle department with which I have to deal.

H: Yeh. OK. Fine.

K: And because I think it's more complex than he thinks it is.

H: OK.

K: Secondly, will you tell him that I've talked to Laird and I think I've prepared the ground so that he will not make his resignation conditional on the retention of his people. All he wants is to make recommendations but they will not be made in a conditional way.

H: OK.

K: I thought you might tell him before Laird gets there.

H: I sure will.

K: But get him to call me, I really do want to raise one more issue.

H: OK. Fine.

K: Good. Thank you.

TELCOM

Tom Jarriel

11/17/72 4:10 p.m.

TJ: Henry, Tom Jarriel with ABC, how are you?

HK: (laughing) I know who you are with.

TJ: All right, I am also standing out in the cold while watching you drive by in a warm limousine.

HK: Yeh, I know.

TJ: Do you have just a moment that you might give me some of the background information update from earlier--I had you briefing of the 26th and have been reading over it trying to get prepared in terms of a personal feel for where you are and where you might be going without getting into too much detail which I know you can't get into into.

HK: Yeh.

TJ: You still fell that another session of some length might wrap the agreement up or is that a little bit--

HK: It depends entirely on the attitude with which the NVN come there. I think what I said in my press conference is valid--if they come there with anything like this attitude, I think we can break the back of it--well then it still will require several weeks of consultations. I don't what to tie myself to it--

TJ: Right, but in terms of going back to the SVN and ironing out the final wrinkles--

HK: Yeh, but if you know they come back bloody minded--we may be in a longer process.

TJ: Have you had a feel at all for from them to indicate what their attitude would be if they have had any basic change since the last time you met?

HK: No, but I think I have no reason so far to suppose that they have changed their basic desire to get this over with.

TJ: Right, can we expect any changes in any of the major points of the negotiation?

HK: You see the major points have never been published--

TJ: The ones you outlined.

CLASSIFIED

Author: E. P. S. - 8/26 - 8/28/72

Date: 8/28/72

Page 2

HK: Yeh--the changes will be in the refinement and since the basic text has never been published I think there will be some changes-- but the process is about following the course that we had outlined. That is--I knew when I met with the press that they had agreed in principle to resume negotiations. And the reason we haven't announced the date before is because they didn't want the date announced until two days before the meeting.

TJ: This was an understanding?

HK: Yes.

TJ: But the day of Monday has been set for sometime--

HK: For several weeks.

TJ: Okay. There is an awful lot of speculation--It centers on--

HK: None of this can be ascribed to me

TJ: No sir--not at all--just trying to bring my background up to date so I have an idea of what is happening here. There is a lot of speculation on the SVN insistence of withdrawal of forces now--I remember vaguely a comment that you made to the pool on AF One to the effect that this may not be such a big issue that the situation of force have already been pretty much decided. Is this something that we are giving undue emphasis to in reporting the problem of NVN troops in the South?

HK: No--we will--it is one of the things that has to be cleared up more.

TJ: Is it minor to include the SVN in the signing of an agreement--is this something that you expect would be worked out or is it something--

HK: I think that it will certainly be worked out.

TJ: Right. And the phraseology on the coalition--not the coalition but the National--

HK: Well Xuan Thuy has pretty well with my statement.

TJ: Right--in the statement he made from Hanoi the other day?

HK: Right.

TJ: Which indicates--

HK: No, he made it in Paris.

Page 3

TJ: I'll look it up--I did see one out of Hanoi.

HK: No I think he made it in Paris.

TJ: Okay. Fine. Would the pattern--again the idea on our side that you would go back and meet for 3 or 4 days in Paris and then to SVN

HK: Depends on what happens in Paris.

TJ: Will there be any contact there with anyone from SVN.

HK: Oh yes, we'll be in close touch with them.

TJ: Okay. I know how much you dislike the idea of reporters taking the temperature of meetings as they are going on. And this --

HK: I won't talk to the press while I am over there.

TJ: Okay, I've been assigned with another fellow here to go over and to what we can on the talks--

HK: I must warn you you won't get any help from me.

TJ: I have already warned our people that I didn't expect any.

HK: Okay.

TJ: We'll be there. Thanks very much sir.

HK: Okay, bye.

DAILY NEWSPAPER

Published Every 2nd of October

Box 61484

TELCOM

Howard K. Smith/Mr. Kissinger

11/17/72 4:17

HS: Henry, how are you?

HK: Howard how are you?

HS: Good luck to you.

HK: Thank you. I appreciate it. Howard I was talking to the President this morning and he thought that because you've really been so fair and responsible I might give you just a tiny bit more detail on this meeting.

HS: I would love it.

HK: Only in the sense that he--we knew all during the last 10 days of the campaign first that they NVN had agreed to have another meeting. And then of course the end of the last week the specific date that they proposed.

HS: Uh huh.

HK: But we had agreed with them that we wouldn't announce it until two days before I left here. So we didn't announce it even though we took quite a bettering about fraud and hoax and things like that.

HS: Right.
Most of that criticism died down by now?

HK: We haven't heard anything about it sense. We haven't had any criticism that we--of that kind.

HS: Henry, do you think this will be the last meeting?

HK: First they are approaching it with the attitude of --that they did in October that is, if they approach it with the determination to settle, then the issues dividing us are as I said in my press conference, relatively minor compare to those that have already been settled.

HS: Yeh.

HK: If they want to go another round, then the issues are big enough for them to stonewall, so it really depends on their basic choice. My instinct is that we have a better than even chance to settle. Then after that there would have to be some more consultations on technical matters--

HS: Yeh, does Thieu present a problem.

HK: I think we are moving him along.

UNCLASSIFIED

Approved 12/26/72
Date 11/01/72

RECLASSIFIED

Autobiography FEB 12 1958-

BSENT

MAR 13 1958

10:03

Page 2

HS: You don't think that anything that he has said will cause the NVN to change their attitude.

HK: I would have written a different script. If he had asked my opinion.--

HS: (laughs)

HK: I think we can still manage it.
I am quite confident.

HS: Have you any forecast of how many days it will take.

HK: It could take the better part of the week because --I mean of the negotiations in Paris.

HS: Yeh.

HK: And after that we need a couple of weeks to clean up things at least.

HS: Would there be any initialing at the end of that week?

HK: No.

HS: You have to wait for the cleaning up of that.

HK: But we'll have a pretty good feel at the end of next week--because after we do the agreement we'll have to work you know on how we'll get the International force in and get the protocols worked out.
But that's not going to destroy the agreement by such dingy work that has to be done.

HS: Yeh. Now the actual date was agreed but you weren't to announce it until two days before you left.

HK: Yes. Incidentally, don't ascribe that to me.

HS: No, of course not.

HK: And we are not saying it to anyone else.

HS: I am delighted to hear about it.

HK: What is important is that people can have the confidence that when we announce something that we don't just do it to talk -- that we knew where we were going.

HS: There is something behind it substantial. I wish you luck. I am going away for a few days in the Caribbean.

Page 3

HK: Well Tom Jarriel called me and he said he is going although I'll be goddamn if I know what he is going to do there.

HS: (laughing) Well that's interesting to hear. If there is a signing I will go.

HK: There won't be any signing. Nothing dramatic.

HS: Thanks for the fillin--will you have another briefing or will I have a chance to see you when you come back?

HK: Sure give me a call.

HS: I'll give you a call. Good luck.

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 2012

Bastinagard: 01/10/12

TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/President

11/18/72 12:18 p. m.

RN: Henry, you ought to inform Bunker that I have directed that we go ahead so that Bunker knows we are taking a hardline on this thing.

HK: Absolutely.

RN: And inform him so that Thieu knows that there is no fooling around here and that this bargaining is--the time is over--the fellow has got to be out of his mind after the letter that I wrote --if after that we don't get anything why it may be one of those breaking of relations.

HK: He wants to send an emissary to see you personally too.

RN: Is that what they said?

HK: Yeh.

RN: No.

HK: They cant' do that while we are negotiating in Paris--

N: No, no, no. Not going to be any emissary--Anything they have to say --Is to be transmitted through Bunker --that's the way it is to be done.

HK: Right.

RN: And that we've had enough emissaries and that sort of thing--so we'll just ready to--we have any--I just think that Bunker has to get to him a message from me to the effect that we are going ahead and and as pointed out in my letter we're going to negotiate as hard as we can for the best position we can and that we're on this course and that he must realize that we will not be subjected to harrassment on this thing.

RN:

HK: Right. I think that essential to the negotiations/--there are to be no ultimatums to be come from them under any circumstances.

HK: Now I have the substance it just came in and again the trouble with them is every draft we give back to them already incorporates 70% of their changes. This has now been going on for three weeks. Now they sent us another batch of changes. I would say again we could accept 50% of them but the trouble is if you accept all of these on top of all the others we have an entirely new document, and Le Duc Tho

BRASSFIELD
Author: F. 12. 95-
B: 8F SM D: 11/19/93

is going to walk out.

RN: No, no no--just say that the document that we already have is the basic framework. And that's that. And we're going to do the best we can, and he's to know that that's the situation.

HK: After Haig went out there--we already incorporated all the changes they made to me when I was there. Since then we have made two more revisions.--Based on comments they gave to him and comments they sent us afterwards. Now they have given us yet another 10 pages of comments. And the end result of that is to kill the agreement.

RN: How does it kill it?

HK: Because they are changing everything--for example, wherever they talk about the U.S., they say the US will draw its forces, they want to say the North Vietnamese will withdraw--

RN: No, no, withdrawal has to be handled on the basis that we already suggested.

HK: And so they keep putting in needles--there is a phrase which says U.S. forces and those allied to the U.S. --

RN: We rigged the deal so Bunker can handle this--we don't need to send an emissary--I don't mean Haig--but

HK: I think we should wait until we see what we get--if Hanoi kicks us in the teeth then we don't have a problem, but if Hanoi accepts the changes we are bringing then an already good agreement becomes excellent and then we might consider sending somebody.

RN: Yeh, all right, but be sure Bunker tells them we are going forward and the document is --that we already have will be the basis for it! we'll do the best we can, but the negotiation involves give and take on both sides.

HK: Incidentally, I talked to Peterson this morning and I think he will almost certainly accept it.

RN: Ah--you do huh? It's the best thing--it's a better job for him.

HK: It is a better job for him--his talent is really in foreign policy--

RN: Right and it'll get him a chance to move--in commerce, he'll simply be a second man to Shultz and all the others.

DISTRIBUTED

Dated: 02/12/95

Dated: 01/10/95

TelCon
Secy. Gen'l Waldheim/Mr. Kissinger

1:30 pm, Nov. 18, 1972

K: Hello Mr. Secretary-General, I'm sorry they put you on first.

W: It was very kind of you to return my call. I can very well imagine how busy you are. I just wanted to wish you good luck before you are leaving and I wish you success. We are all very interested in your success.

K: Oh, aren't you nice.

W: Is there anything new, you think, I should know from our point of view. Are there any changes, or is there any thing you could tell me.

K: No, it's essentially the same thing as when we last talked. But I have your suggestions in mind and I will see what the reception is on the other side.

W: Yes, yes, of course. I'm fully aware of this, and it's quite interesting, I don't know whether you got that I informed ______ about it, I had a long talk with the Chinese and in this talk, it was this Chou..., the Vice Foreign Minister, about Thieu and Le Duc Tho and I asked him what is the reason why Hanoi was negative towards the United Nations, and he said, well it has changed but we are still not too positive because they consider the United Nations a ______ institution, and when I said, well, the reason that I asked of DeVore it was more a ______ institution but now it has changed considerably. He said, well, how is it done with the Korea debate, and why does South Korea Vietnam have an observer status and North Vietnam no status, etc. So he tried to explain to me that if they expect to the Korean war and to previous situation when the U.N. was more a ______ institution and whenever the Communist wanted something like during the Korean war and afterwards, the ong debates in the United Nations, all this was directed against the North Koreans, against North Vietnam, etc. The Chinese tried to explain the reasons why Hanoi is rather negative towards the United Nations, but still recognizing that things have changed and he did not deny that we try to do our best to be objective.

K: Well, I appreciate this information, and I also appreciate the interest you are taking in this problem.

W: Thank you very much, it's very kind of you to tell me. I also mention in this connection the possibilities of the United Nations

not pressing at all, and he confirmed this intention to ~~include me~~ in connection to a peace conference, etc., so from this point of view the Chinese ~~the~~ reaction was rather positive, but still mentioning that Hanoi hesitates because they consider the United Nations being too much a ~~organization.~~

K: Right.

W: Did they tell you similar things when they discussed the role of the U. N. with you.

K: More or less, ~~yes.~~

W: Well, with regard to a reconstruction and rehabilitation, I think we have the possibility to be helpful and if you think that in one way or the other we can be usefully ~~we, of course, are quite~~ ready to do it.

K: Good, well, we'll keep all of this very much in mind and we'll be in touch with each other.

W: Thank you very much, perhaps we can get in touch when you are back again.

K: Yes, Mr. Secretary-General.

W: I wish you a good trip and again, good luck to you.

K: Tkhank you.

W: Goodbye.

K: Goodbye.

TELCOM

Lew Gulick/Mr. Kissinger

1:35 pm, Nov. 18, 1972

K: Hello.

G: Henry, Lew Gulick.

K: How are you?

G: I want to wish you all God speed.

K: Aren't you nice.

G: I just will take a few seconds of your time to ask for information with info on the usual take off to Paris, a piece that everybody is doing these days. One, is it safe to predict project an agreement sometime around Mid-December.

K: It's just very hard to tell until I actually get there. . . what the mood will be. If the two sides work with the attitude that they did in October, then that is a reasonable projection. If that doesn't happen, you know, there could be slippages.

G: Therefore, in the absence of knowing yet, what Tho's will be, it's premature to lay out a---

K: But it's not an unreasonable possibility.

G: Secondly, there's been a lot of talk about what the remaining differences are---I assume some of them have diminished-- some other have increased, perhaps, between October 26 and now, all those which have been mentioned publicly, are there any that should be stressed in a story?

K: Oh, I think I'd better not make any comments. I think the issues are still roughly what they were when I met the press. I think they are clearly understood by both sides.

G: Okay. and the last item is do you know yet whether you'll be going to Saigon.

K: I don't, but it's a reasonable projection that sometime after those meetings, I'll go again to Saigon.

W: Well, thank you very much for calling.

K: And I appreciate what you said at the beginning.

RECLASSIFIED

Date: 10/15/72
From: JAS
To: D.G. SMITH
Subject: TELCON

TELCOM
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger
3:05 p.m., November 18, 1972

L: Hello, Henry.

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Good. How are you?

K: Mel, can I ask your opinion on one thing?

L: You can always ask my opinion on anything and I can always give it to you and you never have to accept it.

K: I want to ask your opinion about the Richardson situation.

L: Well, as I told the President yesterday, he's a stand-up guy and you know, I have great respect. I've talked to Elliot about coming over here.

K: Right. You think he can handle the -- is he tough enough?

L: He's all right. I'll tell you, of the people that we talked about, he's fine. I really like Elliot. Elliot wants to be Secretary of State.

K: Yeah.

L: I had a long visit with Elliot. I went over and had lunch with him just two weeks ago and we talked about this whole matter. And Elliot does not want to come over here. He wants to go to the State Department. You know that, Henry.

K: Yeah, I know it.

L: Elliot's got to be tough enough -- you know, with the other group in the White House. That's where he's going to have his problem.

K: Well, my concern -- let me tell you whether that concern is justified. My worry is that he's going to bring in all these goddamn systems analysts.

L: Well, that is right and that'll be a problem over here. You know, that'll be a real tough problem over here. We'll have lots of problems with the tyrants (?) and with the people over here. But I thought I'd talk with him a little bit about that but the President didn't want me to talk to him again until he had talked to him.

K: Yeah. But he hasn't talked to him yet.

CLASSIFIED

August 12, 1972

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

*

- 2 -

L: No, he hasn't. He told me he'd let me know when he had and then I could talk to him. I raised this point with the President -- that it's going to be, you know, the Eastern group that would be kinda moving in here.

K: But in what way will he be different from McNamara?

L: I think he's a little more of a human being. He's a little warmer towards people than McNamara.

K: But I mean in basic orientation.

L: Well, it will be about the same.

K: Well, that's my view. Or it will make you look good.

L: Pardon?

K: Make you look good.

L: Well, but I'm not --

K: I'm kidding.

L: .. really interested in that.

K: No. But my worry is that he will run the same sort of shop as McNamara did.

L: Well, and maybe after the war is over, that will be all right for a few years again, I don't know. I'm not sure about that. You know, I like McNamara.

K: I like him teriffically as a human being but you know what he did to Defense was a disaster.

L: Yeah, that's true.

K: I think he's been a fine human being who has shown great dignity.

L: Yeah, he sure has. Well, he always has. You know, everybody thought that we were always fighting with one another. I never fought with McNamara. The only trouble I ever had with him was when I told him he ought to go away for about 4-5 weeks rest. He fired up at me --

(cont'd)

CLASSIFIED

Autobiography 6/2/98

BSP FAX DATE 6/10/91

TELCON
Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., November 18, 1972

L: (cont'd) I don't know whether you remember that or not -- but now
he admits that I was right.

K: Well, that's the trouble with you.

L: Well, but he was a good guy.

K: No, he's a decent guy but I think he was a poor Secretary of Defense.

L: But if Elliot will come over here on the understanding that he can
go to State -- I mean, he really will want that kind of understanding
I think.

K: You know that he won't get that understanding.

L: I know, but you watch because Elliot told me very -- you know, everyone
thinks this will be a surprise. This won't be a surprise. I mean, 4 week
ago *U.S. News and World Report* said Elliot was coming to Defense.

K: Yeah. When did you talk to him first?

L: I talked to him about 4 or 5 weeks ago. We went over and had lunch
with Bob Fist (Fitz?) and I told him that I thought that Bill would stay.
And I told him while we missed him in State, what a difference it made
when he left State as far as the Defense Department was concerned.

K: Yeah.

L: You know, it was much different when Elliot was over there.

K: Yeah. Okay, Mel, I just wanted to get your judgment too.

L: Well, I like Elliot.

K: I like him very much. I liked him very much at State.

L: Yeah, he was great when he was over there.

K: But at Defense I don't know how many more intellectual Generals and
Admirals we can stand.

L: Well, we're getting quite a few over here (laughter). I just read the
President's letter. Have you read the letter he sent me?

K: No.

TELCONE

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissinger

3:05 p.m., November 18, 1972

- 4 -

L: Well, you ought to read it. It's kind of an interesting letter accepting my resignation, you know.

K: Is it friendly?

L: Oh, yeah, sure; it's very friendly. Very, very friendly. It goes back to some of the old associations that only he knows about.

K: No, I'll get a copy of it.

L: And it's a very nice letter.

K: We'll miss you. There aren't many patriotic stand-up guys around.

L: I will always appreciate it. I had a good meeting with him yesterday.

K: He was very pleased. The reason I called you is because he told me about the conversation he had with you with respect to Richardson and I wanted to hear it from you firsthand.

L: And I told him he was a stand-up guy all the way.

K: Right.

L: And I have no problem with Elliot. The only problem I have with Elliot is that he doesn't want to orient this Department in the mold of Larry Lynn. Now Larry is a nice guy.

K: Well, that's what worries me.

L: And he's just got to be a little careful about that. But I'll talk to Elliot about that.

K: Okay. Thank you.

L: Okay.

wgh

DREASHER

AUG 12 95 88-

TELCONE

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

3:15 p.m., November 18, 1972

DK: Henry, sorry to trouble you. I'm down in Virginia and the Managing Editor just called me. I just wanted you to know that we are going to use the Lisagor piece in Sunday's paper with a paragraph or two of insert which I worked out with Scali about the possible distortion and possible error in translation and so forth.

K: Good.

DK: And the fact that --

HK: But I thought it was going to be check with me.

DK: Well, I don't know whether you want to use the other -- would you want that in there?

HK: Well, what do you think?

DK: Well, I think maybe we can get that in there. But we also are going to put in the fact that you regret giving the interview and that you did this under the pressure from the Italian Ambassador.

HK: David, I really appreciate this.

DK: I'm just so sorry. But apparently there's a full transcript over at the State Department and I have a hunch that's where Peter got it.

K: Yeah.

DK: Somebody cabled it back here from Rome.

HK: Yeah.

DK: This thing goes on for page after page.

HK: Well, you know, that doesn't make it authentic but --

DK: I understand.

HK: But what I don't want to fight about is how authentic it is because you know many of the things I clearly couldn't have said that way.

DK: Yeah.

HK: But it was done on a harassing day and --

DREAMFIELD

TELCON
Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger
3:15 p.m., November 18, 1972

- 2 -

DK: Sure. And I understand it was tape recorded.

HK: Yeah. But even that, you know, what does that mean?

DK: No, it's so easy to edit the tape.

HK: Yeah.

DK: But if you would like us to put it in that you thought she was going to check this thing back with you and she never did, I think we can arrange that. I'll call him back.

HK: Yes, that could be put in. But that's fair enough.

DK: I did everything I could, Henry.

HK: No, David, you've been extremely decent and I won't forget.

DK: We're going to lead with the Vietnam stuff so that'll take a little bit of the sting out of it. So we won't have you walking off as a lonely cowboy until down in the story somewhere (laughter).

HK: Well, that was just -- that I know I didn't say. In that way.

DK: Yeah. Right. Well, we did the best we could.

HK: Is it a big piece?

DK: I don't know. I think it's about 700 words, I don't know. But they're going to put it on page one; they can't avoid it. You know, we just tried every which way.

HK: Well, if a man makes a horse's ass of himself, he should have been made a horse's ass of.

DK: Well, at least we kept it out of the Saturday paper and I thought for a while we were going to keep it out altogether but the way this thing came back so strongly, we thought we had to do something and we're putting it in the best we can.

HK: Okay, thank you.

DK: Okay. Have a good trip and a very successful one, Henry.

HK: Thank you.

wgh

TELCORN

Amb. Bill Sullivan (State)/Mr. Kissinger

3:50 p.m., November 18, 1972

S: Henry, the more I thought about this request for either Lam or
Duc to see the President --

K: We reject it.

S: ... that he should.

K: We're sending a letter to him rejecting it.

S: Really?

K: Yep.

S: Well, you know, this will mean Ellsworth will never get to see Thieu.

K: Well, then what do you think we should do?

S: I think there are two or three reasons why he should see him.
I think that (1) there is this lingering suspicion that somehow or
other --

K: Yeah, but he shouldn't see them until I am back.

S: Well, the other way to do it would be to have him come -- to insist
that if he comes here, he sees the President and goes onward to
Paris where he meets with --

K: No, we cannot do that. It is out of the question that it happens with
Haig and me gone.

S: You know, there's a lingering suspicion that you and Haig and
everybody else doesn't talk for the President.

K: Well, that may be but we will not do it while Haig and I are gone.
That's out of the question. There's no telling how it will go then.

S: Well, then we won't get anything from these bastards in Paris while
they --

K: Well, that's too bad. But they can send Lam over right after we
get back.

S: Well, we're on a stall with them then from now until then.

DREASSFIELD

Amb. Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

3:50 p.m., November 18, 1972

- 2 -

K: Well, that's what we'll be.

S: They're a hard man, McGee.

K: We're just not going to yield now on that. It cannot work with the
President sitting here and all of us over there.

S: But all they have to hear from the President is that he has given full
powers to you on this one and that you speak for him and so forth and
so on and get him over to Paris where he can meet with you.

K: No, I don't think it's a good idea.

S: Well, it's probably -- in many ways it's not a good idea but it takes
dealing with a bunch of people who are reaching a stage of being
slightly maniac and --

K: Well, actually the changes they gave us aren't all that bad.

S: The changes aren't all that bad. This is, you know, what Phuong (?)
was telling me yesterday. I think this is his memorandum because
he was rather proud that he had drafted it and it wasn't all that
bad. But I think there are two aspects of prestige in this thing. One
is that they will cut off access from Ellsworth to Thieu --

K: Well, then we'll just have to scuttle them. I mean, we've just about
reached the end of what we're going to take from them.

S: Oh, but we can't scuttle them, Henry. It would be a kick in the
eyeteeth of the President, that's the main thing.

K: We're not going to have an emissary here while we're gone. Now
that's final. We are just not going to have it because it is going to
open up all sorts of things. But what we can do is to change the -- to
say, "the most useful time for him to come would be right after the
completion of that next round."

S: Well, let's have them come to Paris and be with us there. Because
otherwise, we are just going to get stonewalled from them. I know
what you're saying but I really see some value in having them come
here -- one man come here, get the word straight from the President
that you are dealing as the President's man on this and therefore
they should get their tail over to Paris and sit down and talk seriously
with you. And if there's ever been any doubt in their minds, the
President can resolve it in 3 minutes.

LINDA ASSISTED

Author: E.D.2.95-85

Date: 11/10/72
By: B.P.

TELCOM

Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

4:25, November 18, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, I talked to the President. What he's going to say in his message--he's not going to refuse to see him all together. He's going to say that we have all the information we can possibly use for this meeting. That they should get Lam to Paris or if Duc is the immissary, they'll work with Duc and they can come back with us, and then he'll meet them.

S: Okay. That's better, I think, than a turn down because if it leaves it open that he'll be meeting them, then I think Ellsworth still has entree, otherwise I think they just cut him off cold.

K: I'm not so sure that what they don't need is an absolute shot of brutality at this point.

S: Well, I think they've got that already in their minds, I think they understand that's coming or about to come. What I'm thing more of is anything that appears publicly or openly to the North Vietnamese that they've got some opening that they can exploit between us, then they've really, as you said this morning, they've really yo yo to us.

K: Well, this is what the President has decided to do.

S: Well, I guess that's the answer then.

K: And, I think this is also, technically, the best way for us to operate. There's absolutely nothing we can do now in changing our position.

S: No. I trust in his answer he will make clear you have his full powers and full authority. That's the thing that I think still lingers somewhere in the back of their minds. If they could only get to him, they'd get him out from under that Svengali Kissinger.

K: Yes.

S: Okay.

CLASSIFIED

AUDIT FEB 12 1972 5:01 PM

BOSCHSDIAGNOSTIK

TELECON (Secure Phone)

Ambassador Dobrynin (Mr. Kissinger's Washington Office)

Mr. Kissinger (Paris)

5:40 p.m., November 20, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: I tried to catch you but you were too quick for me -- I couldn't catch up. I spoke with Mr. Brezhnev and he would like me to speak with you. First, about the Summit. Mr. Brezhnev asked me to tell you and through you to the President that he is thinking along the same lines as the President and you, including the approximate time -- the end of May or the beginning of June.

K: I understand.

D: And all details can be discussed later -- perhaps next month.

K: We can discuss the details later, Anatol?

D: Yes. I raised the idea of having you in Moscow.

K: Before?

D: Yes. I raised this idea. He will write next month to the President along those lines.

K: I appreciate that.

D: Second, about Tricia. He would like to assure that everything will be done for her to have a nice trip to my country -- the two of them.

K: Isn't that nice.

D: He asked me to tell you and the President he will make it a nice trip to Moscow. The last one -- about Vietnam. Brezhnev sent an oral message which I am going to give to Colonel Kennedy. I will leave it here.

K: And ask him to get it to me.

D: In there is that we discussed it with the leadership of North Vietnam, including Le Duc Tho, the whole business. We got the impression that they intend to take a constructive position at the meeting with you

DECLASSIFIED
HOTLINES
5/20/72
By
3-20-72

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

5:40 p.m., November 20, 1972

and they hope you will display a constructive approach as well. I am
leaving the message with Colonel Kennedy.

K: Give to XEX Colonel Kennedy the oral message. Tell Mr. Brezhnev we are taking a very constructive position.

D: Was the first meeting a good one?

K: We are taking a constructive position. Tell your leadership. I appreciate this and I will convey all the messages to the President.

D: I didn't mention them to anyone here. Only the message on Vietnam which I am leaving. When will you be back.

K: I will convey it to the President through my channel.

D: When will you be back? In a week?

K: At the end of the week and I will call you immediately.

D: All right, Henry.

K: Right Anatol.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECOM (Secure Phone)

Mr. Kissinger (Paris)

5:40 p.m., November 20, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: I tried to catch you but you were too quick for me -- I couldn't catch up. I spoke with Mr. Breshnev and he would like me to speak with you. First, about the Summit. Mr. Breshnev asked me to tell you and through you to the President that he is thinking along the same lines as the President and you, including the approximate time -- the end of May or the beginning of June.

K: I understand.

K: Before?

K: I appreciate that.

K: Isn't that nice.

D: He asked me to tell you and the President he will make it a nice trip to Moscow. The last one -- about Vietnam. Breshnev sent an oral message which I am going to give to Colonel Kennedy. I will leave it here.

DELEGATED

5:01PM

BRIEFING