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. . . We will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it." ¹²/
"A mature conception of our interest in the world," according to Dr. Kissinger, "would obviously have to take into account the widespread interest in stability and peaceful change. It would deal with two fundamental questions: what is it in our interest to prevent? what should we seek to accomplish?" ¹³/
There seems to have been an incapacity in this area to realistically define what those areas of strategic concern to this country should be. One of the key problems Ambassador Kennan notes in regard to the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment was the failure to clearly distinguish between those areas vital to our security and those not. Both domestically and overseas, many interpreted these doctrines to signal the United States' immediate and total obligation "to support free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." ¹⁴/
In Kennan's view, though, "there were only five regions of the world -- the United States, the United Kingdom, the Rhine Valley with adjacent industrial areas, the Soviet Union and Japan -- where the sinews of modern military strength could be produced in quantity" and these were the only areas the Administration should be concerned about. But that was not the message he felt that the world received.

Another problem has been misinterpretation of the alliances, collective security agreements and bilateral treaties that currently bind the United States to guarantee the protection of some 50 odd countries. In planning and practice, we seem to have regarded our existing treaty commitments as self-fulfilling. Yet, former Assistant Defense Secretary Paul C. Warnke reminds us: "No treaty negates our right to determine the character of our reaction on the basis of our perception of the national interest. Our one absolute commitment is to the preservation of our own independence. And we might fairly ask whether that independence does, in fact, turn on the viability of every international basket case with anti-Communist credentials." ¹⁵/

12/ *Ibid.*, p. 614.

13/ *Ibid.*, p. 611.

14/ Cf. Kennan, op. cit., pps. 336-340 and pps. 376-385.

15/ "National Security: Are We Asking the Right Questions?" *The Washington Monthly*, October 1969, p. 29. (Note: This article is reproduced as Attachment 3.)

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This brings us to two final considerations: who should decide what our national security interests really are and, based "on the real risks and on the means realistically available to meet them" what level of defense expenditures is required to support them?

Who decides national security policy? In this Administration, at the same time as the President has reasserted his primacy in this area, both the Legislative Branch and the citizens have demanded that greater attention be paid to their views. As the Chief Executive outlined in his State of the World Message last year, "the President bears the Constitutional responsibility of making the judgments and decisions that form our policy." To guarantee himself the right, as well as the responsibility, he "reestablished as the principal forum for Presidential consideration of foreign policy issues" a revitalized National Security Council. The Council is supposed to ensure creativity, systematic planning, determination of the facts, a full range of options, crisis planning and policy implementation in regard to foreign policy. The reassertion of Executive Branch authority and the location of a vastly expanded National Security Council within the White House signal the President's determination to chart what he considers the proper course in this vital area.

"We must know the alternatives; we must know what our real options are and not simply what compromise has found bureaucratic acceptance. Every view and every alternative must have a fair hearing. Presidential leadership is not the same as ratifying bureaucratic consensus." The recent establishment of a Council on International Economic Policy and the transfer of responsibility for Japanese textile negotiations from the Secretary of Commerce to White House Aide Peter Flanigan underline the President's intention to oversee any other related matters of national concern. In fact, virtually the only recent exception was the designation of Under Secretary of State Irwin to communicate American concern over the recent negotiations with the oil producing countries. Mr. Irwin, however, is both relatively new to the bureaucracy and is, more importantly, like the Secretary, an old and trusted associate of the President's. In other words, control still firmly lay in the hands of President Nixon.

Congressional concern about its role in foreign policy is not new. The Senate, because of its broad powers "to advise and consent" on foreign policy matters, has been particularly assertive in recent decades. Recently, however, their protests have gone beyond debate and have been successfully translated into specific attempts to limit the authority of the President in

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foreign involvements. On June 25, 1969, Senate Resolution 85 was overwhelmingly approved by a 70-16 role call vote. Although the measure did not have the force of law, it declared that a "national commitment" ("use of the armed forces on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government or people by the use of the armed forces or financial resources of the United States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events") "results only from affirmative action taken by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty statute or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment." The measure carried despite President Nixon's vigorous opposition.

Controversy also surrounded The Export Administration Act of 1969 which was finally passed emphasizing the promotion of trade with all nations and calling for a thorough review of export controls, with the intention of promoting trade on over 1,200 non-strategic goods to Communist nations. The Administration had opposed any liberalization. Considerable debate also surrounded the Military Assistance Program and the ABM. After compromises, though, the Administration succeeded in getting both passed. The Cooper-Church Amendment restricting the use of American ground forces in Cambodia and Laos was, however, a signal defeat to the Administration. Moreover, although the McGovern-Hatfield proposal to fix a definite date for withdrawal from Vietnam never succeeded, the tenor of the debate and the reaction of both the media and the people seemed to communicate the wide depth of discontent there was over the conduct of the war. Finally, the passage of legislation at the State level relieving a particular State's citizens of the obligation to fight in an un-declared war was another embarrassment to the Administration, despite its eventual rejection by the Supreme Court.

The reaction of many young, liberals and intellectuals went even further than the above. Demonstrations, marches, moratoriums, -- including the destruction of property and premeditated violence became widespread in 1969 and 1970. The mood of the country shifted and the polls shifted. Then there was a reaction. Those supporting the President began to use the same techniques. The "hard hats" and police began to fight back. The country was split and the tragedy at Kent State looked like the beginning of a rough period. Luckily, things simmered down and, although many continued to disagree with the President's policies, the country returned to normal life. But all were reminded once again that, in a democracy, the President must always reflect in some way the mood of the country.

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The critical question remains: How large a part should public opinion play in shaping national security policy? Either extreme can be ruled out immediately. To have our policy reflect the polls would invite anarchy at home and disaster abroad. The President has been chosen to lead, not to decide a popularity contest. Furthermore, the rest of the world must not only be confident that they fully understand what our policy is, but feel it is reliable in order to act correctly. Theodore Sorensen reminds us "that public opinion and public interest do not always agree." "Public opinion is often erratic, inconsistent, arbitrary and unreasonable -- with a 'compulsion to make mistakes,' as Walter Lipman put it. . . . Rarely (considering) the needs of the next generation or the history of the last. . . frequently hampered by myths and misinformation, by stereotypes and shibboleths, and by an inate resistance to innovation. . . Usually slow to form. . . and always difficult to distinguish. . . it rarely speaks in one loud, clear, united voice. "16/ At the other end of the spectrum, though, any policy that is too unpopular constitutes a risk in itself. No matter how right a President may consider a certain policy, he is constrained by the capacity of the citizens of this country to accept it. Beyond such a point, the greatest threat to our national security might well come from within rather than from without.

Once we have decided what constitutes national security, including domestic as well as foreign concerns, and once the President has defined the goals we seek to achieve, we must decide how to achieve them best and for the least cost. Right away, we assume that we seek to purchase a limited security. As President John F. Kennedy emphasized, " . . . The United States is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. . . . We cannot always impose our will. . . . we cannot right every wrong or reverse every adversity. . . . there cannot be an American solution for every world problem. . . ." Furthermore, as Von Clausewitz outlined in *On War*, all relationships between States are dynamic ones and wars are only manifestations of policy differences. "The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible. Both of these paradigms must be kept firmly in mind.

Defense expenditures have risen from $10.3 billion in mid-1947 to a high of $78.7 billion in fiscal year 1969. (FY 1970, 1971, 1972)

16/ *Decision-making in the White House*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1963.

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estimates are respectively $76.4, $72.3, $76.1 billions.) Between fiscal year 1964 and 1968, we spent $133.5 billion ($94.7 billion in economic aid and $38.8 billion in military aid.) to strengthen allied and friendly countries against potential enemies. But, as President Eisenhower has warned, "Every addition to defense expenditure does not automatically increase military security. Because security is based upon moral and economic, as well as purely military strength, a point can be reached at which additional funds for arms, far from bolstering security, weaken it."

Many claim the time is long overdue for this country to reassess and reorder its priorities. Put more pragmatically, the level of strategic forces which we see as providing nuclear sufficiency and the number of major and minor wars which we should equip our general purposes forces to fight are both extremely critical elements in determining the size of that limited portion of the Budget which is directly under Executive and Legislative control, 28%.-- 42% according to various estimates. For years billions of dollars of discretionary expenditures have depended upon the decisions or hunches of a small number of master strategists and politicians. Yet, during this time the American people have lacked both the information and opportunity to discuss the very fundamental on which much of our defense posture and a large part of its budget, excluding Vietnam, was based. 17/

"The size and composition of our offensive force has been shaped by the concept of U.S. strategic superiority." 18/ Both the need and desirability of having "superiority" may not only be outdated, but counter-productive, especially in regard to strategic forces. The aim of these is to prevent the adversary from using his own forces. Our goal should be nuclear sufficiency, rather than nuclear superiority. We seek only a fully credible second-strike capacity, not a first-strike capacity. This constitutes effective deterrence. Any margin over deterrence can only be justified for reasons of "damage limitation," a sort of contingency plan

17/ For further information, Cf. Carl Kaysen, Military Strategy, "Military Forces in Arms Control," *Agenda for the Nation*, op. cit., pps. 549-584, and Charles L. Schultze, *Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget*, Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, Chapter 2. (Note: Portions of this chapter are reproduced as Attachment 4.)

18/ Carl Kaysen, *op. cit.*, p. 550.

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should deterrence ever fail. Protection, then, no longer depends *per se*
either on the number or types of these forces, only on the enemy's percep-
tion of our capabilities and intentions. Thus, we are actively engaged in
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) today and the President is well
aware that "the biggest responsibility of this generation (is) to avoid
becoming the victim of its own technology."19/

The great danger with the AMB and the MIRV is that they change the
balance that has been achieved. A truly effective ABM system, for example,
could conceivably raise others' conception of our stated aim, second-strike
capacity, to a yearning for a first-strike capacity. Our opponent, the U.S.S.R.,
would then have to achieve an equally effective system or even feel forced into
a pre-emptive strike to protect itself. The ability of MIRV's to raise the
number of warheads per missile is equally disorienting because, while we
can count the number of missiles, it would be virtually impossible to
determine the number and capacity of their warheads and, therefore, the
potential danger. Beyond these all-important psychological concerns and
deterrence, after all, is primarily psychological -- any new round of
massive defense spending, such as these efforts would require, would be
harmful in that it would distract both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. from
pressing domestic problems.

The size, capacity, range and flexibility of general purpose forces
also merits a complete reexamination. According to the Nixon doctrine,
"The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies
and friends, but (America) cannot -- and will not -- conceive all the plans,
design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the
defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a
real difference and is considered in our interest." The Administration's
new objective is based on a policy of coping with only 1-1/2 wars, a one
war decrease from the old intention of fighting 2-1/2 wars simultaneously.
"... We cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum
of threats facing allies or potential allies around the world."

Much of what happens to our general purposes forces, however,
depends more directly upon what we do with our troops in Europe. Senator

19/ The President's Message, op. cit.

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Percy and others have sought to reduce the large annual expenditure we make on these troops. But how do we measure budgetary concerns against psychological perceptions or diplomatic pressures? West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, for example, remarked on a visit here last April 10, "The efficiency of the Atlantic Alliance continues to depend essentially on maintaining the military presence of the United States on the European continent. . . there is still no security for Europe without the United States." How much of this is true must be carefully determined and then acted upon.

We must guard against letting pure Budget considerations shape our policy. Earl C. Ravenal claims that the Nixon doctrine "changes the model for determining defense requirements. Instead of the classic progression from the definition of foreign policy interest to the formulation of objectives, to the perscription of strategies, to the calculation of forces and their cost, we now see a constrained calculus that proceeds in reverse from limited budgets to trimmed forces to arbitrary strategies."<u>20</u> If what Mr. Ravenal asserts is true, the President has shifted priorities. Last year, for example, he stated, "Defense spending is, of course, in a special category. It must never fall short of the minimum needed for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot."<u>21</u>

Whatever we define our national security to be and however we seek to achieve it, we must always remember that we are part of the world. The biggest threats to our national security may not lie with any enemy or even coalition of enemies. They may be more subtle, but in the long run they may also be more dangerous. Furthermore, they are global threats. No part of the earth is now spared; no sanctuary can ever be established. Man cannot hide from them because he has made them. He is their cause. How and whether we can successfully control population, arms and machines remains to be seen.<u>22</u> Already there are more than 3-1/2 billion people

<u>20</u> "The Nixon Foreign Affairs, January, 1971, p. 210.
(Note: This article is reproduced as Attachment 5.)

<u>21</u> The President's Message, op. cit.

<u>22</u> The author is indebted to James Reston's article, "Primary and Secondary Questions," <u>The New York Times</u>, February 14, 1971, for many of the thoughts in this paragraph.

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on the face of this earth. This number will soon double. The majority still live in abject poverty, suffering in the misery of knowing there is virtually no chance for hope of change for them or even most of their children. While others spend over $200 billion a year on arms, only a minute fraction of this sum is spent to relieve others' sufferings. Little relative effort is also made to control population and pollution. The achievement of a decent environment must become nothing less than a global concern. Unfortunately, that will depend upon how we perceive the threat. Right now we see our national security related to more direct and pressing concerns. Is this enough though?

James B. Robinson
Director
Industry-Government Seminars

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1. Questions on "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade."

2. "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace,"
Message to Congress, February 18, 1970.

3. *Agenda for the Nation*, Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, 1968, page 612.

4. "National Security: Are We Asking the Right Questions?" *The Washington Monthly*, October 1969, page 29.

5. *Setting National Priorities: The 1971 Budget*, Washington, D. C., The Brookings Institution, Chapter 2.

6. "The Nixon Doctrine," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1971, page 210.

7. "Public Opinion and National Security Policy" by Gabriel A. Almond, reprinted from *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer, 1956.

8. "Security and Sovereignty" by Vernon Van Dyke, extracted from *International Politics*, by Vernon Van Dyke, 1957.

9. "Military-Industrial Complexities," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, February, 1971.

10. "The Death of Doctrine" by William P. Bundy, *NEWSWEEK*, February 15, 1971.

11. "Defense As An Economic Problem," *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*, Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, Atheneum, 1965.

Questions

1. What is national security?

2. What are the present goals, both domestic and foreign, of our national security policy?

3. Should they be changed in any way?

4. What role, if any, should the Departments, the National Security Council, the Congress and the people play in shaping our national security policy?

5. Are we seeking to achieve this policy in the most efficient and effective manner?

6. What areas, if any, are of vital strategic concern to us?

7. Are there any areas where we can and should reduce our military presence overseas?

8. Should America's commitments established during the cold war years through a number of multi-lateral and bi-lateral security agreements be reevaluated? Would doing so be apt to erode U.S. credibility in the world?

9. Should national priorities be reordered?

10. What parts of the defense budget, if any, can and should be reduced?

11. How can the Executive and Legislative Branches of government be made more responsive to the people?

12. Is our greatest immediate threat to national security external or internal?

13. Is the Legislative Branch overstepping its Constitutional or traditional bounds in attempting to influence national security policy?

14. Can a clear and universally acceptable distinction be made between nuclear sufficiency and nuclear superiority?

15. What role, if any, should the United Nations play in the determination of U.S. national security policy?

16. In the context of global economics, are we following policies designed to enhance our national security?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1971

Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger

From: Winston Lord
Subject: Material for Your TV Show on the Annual Review

Attached at Tab A is an answer to the question, What's new in the Foreign Policy Report? This consists of both a general conceptual response and a specific listing of new material in the report itself.

At Tab B is the summary of the report that you approved this morning.

At Tab C is a memo comparing this year's report with last year's report.

Attachments

ANNUAL REPORT

Question: What's new in the Foreign Policy Report?

Answer:

The very nature of your question points up what is new. This document, like the first one, tries to do what no other President has ever done -- lay out, in one report, for the American people, the Congress, the bureaucracy, and the world the Administration's overall approach to foreign policy. It is not meant to make new policy initiatives (why should we bury major ones in a lengthy document?) It is meant to pull together and flesh out the major foreign policy and defense concepts -- and relate them to each other in one coherent whole.

The report first reviews the great historical changes calling for a new American role (Introduction). Then it describes the core of the new approach (Nixon Doctrine). Then the application around the world (Relating National Interests). Then a separate philosophical chapter on the one other global superpower (The Soviet Union). Then the two related ways of maintaining national security -- defense and arms control (Securing National Interests). Then a new dimension in foreign affairs, covering global challenges which need a global partnership of adversaries

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and friends alike (World Interest). The report concludes
with a brief description of the way we organize ourselves
for foreign policy (NSC System) and an appeal for
dialogue and understanding among the American people
to define and carry out a new American role in the world.

What is new, in short, is a coherent framework for
all our policies. We don't ask everyone to agree. We do
hope they will recognize that we have thought about the
problems. We hope for a debate on purposes and long
range trends, not tactics. We hope to raise the level of
discussion on foreign policy and stimulate reasoned debate
in American homes, the Congress, the media, the
academic community and foreign capitals.

During this transitional period, after some anguishing
years, and when we are searching for a new definition of
the American world role, we need tolerant and compas-
sionate discussions. This document seeks to stimulate that.
That is its novelty. We think that is a more profound
newness than any particular policy initiative making for
a headline.

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New from Last Year's Report or Any Other Report

This report gives the first full elaboration of the _Nixon Doctrine_.
This includes its theme of invigorated partnership; eliciting the
concepts as well as the resources of others; getting all countries
to participate fully in foreign policy so that they are committed to
their future and the international system; how this approach takes
account of changed conditions in the world; how it must be carried
out in balanced fashion abroad; how it seeks to evoke the support
of the American people, who are weary of 25 years of responsibilities,
to a new type of American leadership in the world; how it has been
applied and animates all our policies.

A comprehensive approach to the issues we face in _Europe_ where
in 1970 perhaps more happened of long-range significance than anywhere
else in the world. For example, how we seek to balance autonomy
with unity in our Alliance; our attitude toward the Common Market
and Ostpolitik; a detailed discussion of the US's Alliance strategy and
defense review which explains why we are keeping our current troop
levels while Europe contributes more.

The President gives the most detailed account ever of the
rationale and record of _Indochina_ policy. Both the concrete progress
and the remaining problems are cited. The chapter includes why
precisely we object to Hanoi's negotiating position. Also discussion

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of political and economic issues which get few headlines but are
of increasing importance as the war winds down. The strategic
picture in Laos and Cambodia and the rationale for South Vietnamese
defensive actions are given.

In the _Asian_ chapter for the first time the President tries to
look beyond the present situation and the application of the Nixon
Doctrine to what the future will look like -- the interplay between
regional associations and the 4 major powers - US, Japan, China,
USSR. The fullest accounting yet of our approach to the China
problem is given.

The _Middle East_ chapter lays out in detail the three forces at
work in this most dangerous area: Arab-Israeli conflict; intra-Arab
dispute; and Great Power rivalry. There is the most extensive
treatment yet of an approach to these problems, our ceasefire
initiative and the Jordanian crisis.

The _International Economic_ chapter speaks forcefully for liberal
trade policies but lists candidly the protectionist arguments and
calls on other countries to cooperate if these arguments are not to
prevail.

Our specific dealings with the _Soviet Union_ are sprinkled
throughout the entire report. In the section on the Soviet Union, the

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President sets out, more extensively than ever before, our conceptual approach to our relationship -- the forces that make for cooperation, the differences that separate us.

The rationale and forces for sufficiency are fleshed out in the *Strategic Forces* section. *Arms Control* includes the most detailed account yet of the SALT negotiations -- our preparations, the course of the talks, the major problems. The main issues of a brand new area for negotiations -- mutual force reduction in Europe -- are also treated.

A whole new dimension of foreign affairs, *global challenges*, is discussed by the President in the World Interest section. The concept of a global partnership is introduced.

The President, in the *Conclusion* and elsewhere, underlines the need for a tolerant and compassionate dialogue among the government, people and Congress. The need for domestic support for a new foreign policy role is explicitly recognized.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S

Building for Peace

A REPORT BY

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

TO THE CONGRESS

FEBRUARY 25, 1971

## Highlights

President Nixon today sent to the Congress his second annual message on United States foreign policy. He told the Congress: "In a democracy, policy is the public's business. I believe the President has an obligation to lay before the American people and its Congress the basic premises of his policy and to report fully on the issues, developments and prospects confronting the Nation."

This year, the President's message will be supplemented by two additional major documents: the Secretary of State's review -- the first of its kind -- and the annual Defense Report by the Secretary of Defense.

## Introduction

"In the first year of this Administration we outlined a new American role. In 1970, we implemented policies which embody our new purpose.

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4

"This year, as any year, saw crises. We dealt with them without new war and while winding down the war we inherited. But our fundamental goal is deeper. It is to get at the roots of crises and to build a durable structure of international relationships.

"This second annual report to the Congress and the Nation, therefore, like the first, is more than a recital of events. It reviews the premises and philosophy of our foreign policy and discusses events in the context of purposes. It explains why we have done as we have, and sets forth our hopes and concerns for the years to come."

The task of his Administration, as the President sees it, is to
"lead the nation through a fundamental transition in foreign policy."
In the postwar period, the United States shouldered the primary respon-
sibility for security and progress in the non-Communist world; we possessed
an overwhelming superiority in strategic military power; and the Communist
world was monolithic and uniformly hostile. In the new era:

-- "our friends are revitalized and increasingly self-reliant
while the American domestic consensus has been strained
by 25 years of global responsibilities."

-- "growing Soviet power has altered the military equation."

-- "we see a multipolar Communism marked by a variety of attitudes toward the rest of the world."

-- "unprecedented challenges," social, environmental, and technological, "beckon nations to set aside doctrine and focus on a common agenda."

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Y

The United States has responded to these historical changes and has set out to build a new structure of international relationships with other nations, to shape a peace that will endure because all nations help to make it. "We in this generation have before us an historic opportunity to turn the transformations of the last 25 years into new avenues for peace, and to realize the creative possibilities of a pluralistic world."

The core of the new foreign policy is a partnership reflecting the theme of the international structure we seek to build. Its necessary adjuncts are strength to secure our interests, and negotiation to reconcile our interests with those of others. A global partnership for new problems must include adversaries as well as friends.

# Part I. The Nixon Doctrine

America will continue to play a role of leadership in the world, the President emphasizes, but its style and content are redefined to meet the changed conditions. "Other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours."

The tangible expression of a new partnership will be in greater material contribution by other countries, in some cases leading to reduced American presence and involvement abroad. But the fundamental thrust of the Doctrine is to look to other countries "for a greater share in the definition of policy as well as in bearing the costs of programs." This psychological reorientation encourages other nations to define the

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[Y]

nature of their own security and progress and thus to be committed to maintaining them. For the United States, the "new sharing requires a new, more subtle form of leadership." Whereas before we often acted as if our role was primarily drawing prescriptions for others; "now we must evoke the ideas of others and together consider programs that meet common needs."

"There cannot be a structure of peace unless other nations help to fashion it. . . . it cannot be built except by the willing hands -- and minds -- of all."

The President elaborates on the Doctrine's principles first outlined at Guam in the summer of 1969. He notes the need for striking a balance abroad "between doing too much [to help allies] and thus preventing self-reliance, and doing too little and thus undermining self-confidence." He notes as well the need to make clear to the American people that the new policy "calls for a new form of leadership, not abdication of leadership." Specific examples of implementation of the Doctrine during the past year are given. The Doctrine applies most directly to our relations with allies and friends, but its partnership theme animates all areas of our foreign policy -- in economics, defense, negotiations and global cooperation.

The President closes with need for a continuing dialogue abroad and at home in order to define and gain support for the new policy which

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"is a means to fulfill our world responsibilities on a sustained basis by evoking both the contributions of our friends and the support of our own people." This dialogue will enable America to "play its vital part in fashioning a global structure of peace. A peace that will come when all have a share in its shaping. A peace that will last when all have a stake in its lasting."

## Part II. Relating National Interests

This section of the report illustrates how the new approach to foreign policy is being applied around the world.

"Clearly, if we are to found a structure of peace on the collaboration of many nations, our ties with Western Europe must be its cornerstone. ... Western Europe is central because its nations are rich in tradition and experience, strong economically, and vigorous in diplomacy and culture; they are in a position to take a major part in building a world of peace."

The President made the second European trip of his Administration in September and October, to reemphasize America's commitment to close ties with our allies. We have adjusted the style and substance of our leadership in the Alliance in response to our allies' new strength and self-assurance. We seek their ideas and their contribution; we welcome their independent spirit.

We attach the greatest importance, therefore, to close and full consultation on the common agenda we face -- on economic relations

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[Y]

between the U.S. and the European Common Market; on the social,
environmental, and technological challenges facing modern industrial
societies; on European defense; on SALT, which affects their interests;
on the possibility of balanced force reductions by NATO and the Warsaw
Pact; on Berlin; and on a possible East-West conference on European
security.

Our intensive studies produced a new Allied consensus on the
strategy and forces for NATO defense, a commitment by the United States
to maintain its troops in Europe, and a collective decision by our allies
to take on an expanded share of the common defense burden. The Presi-
dent cites our improved relations with Romania, a Warsaw Pact country,
and with non-aligned Yugoslavia, as examples of America's interest in
a broader reconciliation in Europe -- which is the only lasting basis of
European security.

It is in our interest to help our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere
to realize their aspirations for economic and social progress. But
"modernization brings extensive and frequently unsettling change, accom-
panied by growing nationalism." And our hemispheric neighbors seek to
reconcile their interest in close ties with us with their determination to
mold their own destinies.

The United States has responded with a new approach -- to
solicit the views of our partners on how we can be of help, and to direct
our effort toward helping them to set their priorities and define their own

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national and social objectives. The basic principles of the United States
are a shared responsibility, a positive commitment to assist development,
an accommodation to diversity, and a better life for the people of the
hemisphere. The President traces U.S. policies in each of these areas
during 1970. "In a turbulent age, the mandate for our hemispheric policy
is to act compassionately, to work cooperatively and to strengthen the
bonds of a maturing partnership."

The President offers a candid and comprehensive accounting of
his _Indochina_ policy. He discusses the concrete progress in Vietnam in
the last two years, along with the problems which remain.

He first recalls the situation in January 1969 and the basic choices
it presented the incoming Administration. Our one irreducible objective
has consistently been "the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people
to determine their own political future without outside interference."

He reiterates that negotiation remain the constant primary goal.
"We would take no satisfaction in the fact that after U.S. involvement
and casualties were ended, Vietnamese continued to fight Vietnamese."
The President reviews the long series of negotiating proposals put for-
ward by the U.S. and Republic of Vietnam, up to and including the
October 7, 1970, peace initiative calling for a ceasefire in place through-
out Indochina.

The report reviews the great progress made by the South Vietnamese

- 8 -

in taking on greater responsibility; the withdrawal program; the successful impact of the allied operations against North Vietnamese sanctuaries along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border; and the pacification advances in the countryside. The report discusses political and economic issues, of growing importance as the war winds down. The President reaffirms our determination to secure better treatment for and release of all American prisoners of war. The report then cites the sobering problems for the future.

The President closes with a strong appeal for a negotiated end to the war. "If winding down the war is my greatest satisfaction in foreign policy, the failure to end it is my deepest disappointment. ... I once again ask the other side to work for a settlement that will stop the fighting, meet the concerns of all parties, and last because all want it to last."

A separate chapter in the report discusses Laos and Cambodia.
"Enduring peace will come for Vietnam only when there is peace for its neighbors." The President traces North Vietnamese aggression against these countries and use of them to attack South Vietnam. American support of these countries, he emphasizes, -- not including U.S. ground combat troops -- furthers Vietnamization and American disengagement. It is consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, since they are shouldering the primary responsibility for their own defense and are receiving regional assistance. A negotiated settlement for all Indochina remains the highest priority, "but if the other side leaves us no choice, we will follow the alternate route to peace -- phasing out our involvement while giving the

- 9 -

region's friendly countries the time and the means to defend themselves."

East Asia today "is vastly different from the Asia which required, over the past several decades, so activist an American role. ... Thus it was that the Nixon Doctrine was first announced in the Pacific region, and has most actively been manifested in Asia." "The new strength in Asia is a fact, and it requires a different and more restrained American approach, designed to encourage and sustain Asian regionalism, Asian self-reliance, and Asian initiatives," We are adjusting our role in Asia, not unilaterally or precipitately, but in consultation with our allies.

But even as we carry out the Nixon Doctrine in Asia we can now look beyond it, toward building a stable structure of relationships accommodating on the one hand the collective interests of Asian nations acting in regional groupings, and on the other hand the interests of the major powers involved in the Pacific -- the U.S., USSR, Japan, and Communist China. The President traces the growth of regional organizations. He stresses the vital importance of our close and friendly relations with Japan, "the third greatest economic power on earth." The problems in our relationship are frankly addressed, as well as the successes achieved in building a strong Pacific partnership.

The President also emphasizes that "we are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking;" he cites the unilateral steps the U.S. has taken to make this clear. He strongly affirms, however, that this will not be

- 10 -

at the expense of our commitment to the security of the Republic of China.

"South Asia's fundamental problems are two: to meet the challenges of economic and political development and to turn the relationship between India and Pakistan from hostility to cooperation." This is not something the United States can accomplish by itself. But "South Asia's progress is important to us,". "We will do what we can to help the countries of the area meet their economic and social needs," and "keep our activities in the area in balance with those of the other major powers concerned."

"The Nixon Doctrine's encouragement of self-reliance," the President's report continues, "has an immediate and broad applicability in Africa." Our new emphasis on encouraging other nations to determine their own priorities and define their own national goals suits Africa well. The United States will make its contribution in a framework which Africans themselves have built; this is the approach both we and they prefer. The President reaffirms that America is responding to the three primary needs of the continent to which we can contribute: peace and freedom from great power rivalry; economic development; and the search for social and political justice in southern Africa. "We hope by our policies to facilitate economic progress in one part of Africa, human and social justice in the other, and peace in both."

The President's report traces the background of the Middle East crisis, which he terms our "most dangerous" problem in foreign policy. He discusses in turn each of the three dimensions of the problem: the

- 11 -

[4]

Arab-Israeli conflict, differences within the Arab world, and the conflict between the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. These three sources of conflict are "enmeshed, and each tends to exacerbate and make more intractable the others."

The President explains the purpose and approach that lay behind the U.S. peace initiative of last summer; this initiative halted the bloody fighting along the Suez Canal and obtained agreement among Israel, the UAR, and Jordan on a set of principles as the basic starting point for Arab-Israeli talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. He also describes the danger that threatened in the Jordanian crisis of September -- "the gravest threat to world peace since this Administration came into office." The report also treats the great power contest and nationalism in the region, as well as issues for the future.

A new Council on *International Economic Policy*, chaired by the President, will provide a focus for consideration of international economic issues at the highest level. It will insure consistency between domestic and foreign economic policy, and consistency with our basic foreign policy objectives.

Last year was an exceptionally successful year for the international monetary system. For the aid field, the President unveiled his proposal for a wholly new structure and purpose for U.S. foreign assistance. In the report, he also notes with satisfaction that U.S. foreign aid levels rose

- 12 -

in 1970, for the second straight year. But 1970 also saw the most serious challenge to worldwide free trade in the postwar period. The President strongly backs liberal trade policies but notes that countries must cooperate if these are to be possible.

# Part III: The Soviet Union

The President devotes a chapter to his general approach to relations with the Soviet Union, while many specific issues are dealt with in various regional chapters. The President points to factors which could be the basis of the "new and constructive relationship" which the United States hopes to achieve -- avoiding nuclear war; reducing the burden of arms; the mutual benefit if our relations permitted expanded trade; and collaborative efforts to promote constructive economic and social progress.

He analyzes as well the range of our differences -- our differing views of the world and international affairs; our rivalry as global powers; our approaches to negotiation; and our strategic and military competition.

"An assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations at this point in my Administration," the President frankly concludes, "has to be mixed."

There were encouraging developments -- the serious dialogue in SALT; banning nuclear weapons from the seabeds; ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; negotiations over Berlin; and a first step in space cooperation. On the other hand, certain Soviet actions in the Middle East, Berlin, and Cuba were not encouraging.

- 12 -

Y

The President calls for a new road for U.S. -Soviet relations and
for further progress on such issues as SALT, the Middle East, and Berlin.

## Part IV: Securing National Interests

"The first responsibility of the President is the security of the Republic." We have reordered our national priorities; overall defense expenditures in the FY 1972 budget are a smaller share of our Gross National Product and the Federal Budget than in any year since 1950. But we must keep our security forces at the level of sufficiency, to protect our vital interests.

"Strategic Forces, both offensive and defensive, are the backbone of our security." The growing Soviet strategic strength raises questions about Soviet intentions. Our strategic forces are needed to deter strategic attacks, to confront potential aggressors with the danger of escalation, and to help maintain a stable political environment. The report describes our doctrine of strategic sufficiency, and the U.S. Government's analysis during the past year of the survivability, the flexibility, and the mix of our existing forces. It discusses the forces we maintain in accordance with this doctrine, including the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system.

"In light of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations, we are acting with great restraint in introducing changes in our strategic posture,"

The President explains, and we are actively negotiating with the Soviet Union to limit defensive as well as offensive weapons.

- 14 -

CJ

Because of the shift in the strategic equation, "_general purpose forces_, therefore, now play a larger role in deterring attacks than at any time since the nuclear era began." The report explains the rationale of our decision "to maintain general purpose forces adequate to deter or, if necessary defend against, a major threat to the interests of the U.S. and its Allies in Europe or Asia; and simultaneously to cope with a minor contingency elsewhere." It discusses the guidelines for these forces and how they are designed for Europe, Asia, and other areas. The agenda for the future includes "our ultimate goal ... to meet our military manpower requirements without resort to the draft."

"The Nixon Doctrine requires a strong program of _security assistance_," to foster self-reliance. Without it we cannot reduce our military presence abroad or the likelihood of our direct military involvement abroad.

The great importance of _arms control_ in the nuclear and technological age is stressed. Agreement on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, banning nuclear weapons from space and the seabeds, and the Administration's comprehensive initiatives on reducing the threat of chemical and biological warfare, are cited as successes. The report gives the fullest accounting yet of the issues and developments in SALT. It covers the meticulous preparation for the talks, the differing perspectives of the two sides, the course of the negotiations, and the issues for the future. "We have been able to move from preliminary exploration of substantive issues

- 15 -

4J

to concrete negotiations in a fairly short period. The dialogue has been serious and businesslike.... At this stage what is needed are political decisions to move towards an agreement on the basis of an equitable strategic relationship. We have taken this decision." A possible future area of negotiations is on mutual force reductions in Europe -- some of the issues are highlighted.

Defense and arms control are two closely related ways to secure national interests: "We have defined our security requirements in terms that facilitate arms control agreements," the President stresses. "Our goal is security -- and if others share that goal, it can be assured through mutual design rather than mutual exertion. It will, in any event, be maintained."

## Part V. The World Interest

Because the modern world faces urgent problems which can only be solved by collaboration between governments, "the United Nations' role in facilitating international cooperation has taken on a new importance." The report treats UN peacekeeping efforts, the need for responsible restraint by member states in UN discussions, the major role of the world body in economic and social development, and the "transcendent interest" of the United States "in a more effective United Nations." The organization's central role in meeting new global problems, and its recent resolution calling for humane treatment of prisoners of war, are cited.

- 16 -

M

There is a full discussion of the new dimension in foreign affairs, *global challenges* which call for a partnership for the world's interest that includes adversaries as well as friends. For these questions transcend ideological and geographic borders. They include protection of the environment, exploration of the oceans, population control, narcotics, hijacking, and space cooperation. These issues deeply concern nations but "are simply not subject to satisfactory resolution by national means. They are matters on which the nations of the world must subsume their narrower interests in a broad and generous concept of the world interest."

## Part VI: The National Security Council System

The President's report continues and updates the description in last year's report of the way in which the revitalized National Security Council and its supporting committees provide "crucial support" for American foreign policy. Our new procedures further our new purposes. Illustrations of the policy-making process and changes in the machinery during 1970 are cited.

## Conclusion

The President concludes that "our new course of partnership in the world can only be steered with the sustained understanding of the American people." He calls for mutual respect and open discussion of American foreign policy goals among the Executive, the public, and the Congress. Tolerance and compassion in the national debate "will enable us to bring Americans together and, in so doing, help to bring the world together."

# Index of Papers

## Industry-Government Seminar on National Security

1. A digest of the 1970 Report on Foreign Policy from the Congressional Quarterly.

2. HAK's "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy" from Agenda for the Nation.

3. Paul Warnke's "National Security: Are We Asking the Right Questions? from The Washington Monthly, October 1969.

4. Charles L. Schultze's chapter on Defense in Setting National Priorities, The 1971 Budget (Brookings)

5. "The Nixon Doctrine and our Asian Commitments" by Earl Ravenal, Foreign Affairs, January 1971.

6. Gabriel Almond's "Public Opinion and National Security Policy" from Summer 1956 Public Opinion Quarterly.

7. Vernon Van Dyke's "Security and Sovereignty" extracted from his International Politics, 1957.

8. Charles Wolf's "Military-Industrial Complexities," Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, February 1971.

9. William P. Bundy's "The Death of a Doctrine," Newsweek - February 15, 1971.

10. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean's "Defense as an Economic Problem" from their The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (1965).

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUITE 300, 1225 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON D. C. 20036

FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND
President

AREA CODE (202)
296-0903

March 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM

TO: Participants, Second Wednesday Industry-Government Seminar

FROM: Frederic N. Cleaveland, President

RE: March 10, 1971 Meeting

The March Industry-Government Seminar will focus on: "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade." Brief background materials on this subject are enclosed.

With the firm understanding that future events might prevent his attendance, we are especially privileged to announce that Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will open the discussion with a brief statement. We request that this information be kept confidential. It should also be emphasized that all proceedings will be off-the-record, and that only regular Seminar participants attend.

At the request of many regular participants, we are slightly changing the format of the evening's activities. The session will now begin with cocktails at 5:30 p. m. in the Mt. Vernon Room of the Madison Hotel. Dinner will be served promptly at 6:30 p. m. and we shall try to start the proceedings at 7:15 p. m. As usual, the meeting will break by 9:30 p. m. in order to permit those who have to catch planes adequate time to do so.

I would appreciate it if you would advise Miss Tartaglione of our staff by means of the attached postcard whether or not you are planning to attend. If we can help with hotel or transportation arrangements, please let her know.

A summary of the February session is being sent you under separate cover.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES:
John D. Millett, Chairman
James E. Webb, Treasurer
Frederic N. Cleaveland, Secretary and President
William T. Golden
Roger W. Jones
Ronald B. Lee
Matthias E. Lukens
Kent Mathewson
William W. Parsons
Nathan W. Pearson
John A. Perkins
Elmer B. Staats
Charles B. Stauffacher
York Wilbern
Robert C. Wood

AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Foreign
Policy

# NIXON PROCLAIMS END OF ERA; SAYS COLD WAR IS OVER

President Nixon Feb. 18 sent Congress a special message reviewing his Administration's foreign policy accomplishments and outlining its objectives for the 1970s.

The 40,000-word document, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace," was widely described as a "State of the World" message although the White House did not use that term. The President had stated Jan. 22 during his State of the Union address that he would submit a "separate report on foreign policy...to the Congress at a later date." (Text p. 516; for State of Union text p. 245)

The "first annual report" on foreign policy described the Administration's policy during its first year in office, the principles which guide U.S. policy, and set forth objectives the Administration would pursue in the 1970s. A basic theme throughout the report was the changed relationship of the United States with its Free World allies.

White House aides said they could not recall when a President had submitted such a sweeping review of foreign policy issues to Congress.

Stressing that the post-World War II cold war era had ended, the report maintained that U.S. relations with allies would change from one of "predominance" to one of "partnership." The United States would aid in the defense of other allied and friendly nations, would maintain its treaty commitments but would not assume a primary responsibility as a world policeman.

The document--drafted by a group of Presidential advisers under the direction of Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's Special Assistant for national security affairs--emphasized the role that analysis and planning by the National Security Council played in the Administration's conduct of national security and foreign policy. A separate section on the National Security Council, as "revitalized" by Mr. Nixon, contrasted the systematic approach of his Administration with that he attributed to his Democratic predecessors.

The President spoke about the report Feb. 16 at a White House press briefing held in advance of the Feb. 18 release date. Other high Administration officials conducted the briefing.

Mr. Nixon described the report as a "monumental task," the "most comprehensive statement on United States foreign policy ever made in this century." It marked, he said, a "watershed" in U.S. foreign policy out of the cold war era. It set forth "a policy not just for a year but for a decade," he said.

## Introduction

The President described the message as the "first annual report on U.S. foreign policy." He emphasized that it was "more than a record of one year...(it was) a new approach to foreign policy to match a new era of international relations."

These factors characterized the new era:

* Former recipients of U.S. aid were now able to share their resources with the developing world and were able to play a larger role in their own defense.

* A monolithic Communist world no longer existed. Sino-Soviet rivalry and the Soviet armed interventions in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) demonstrated that Marxist international unity has "disintegrated."

* The U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons has been replaced by a situation where both sides can "inflict unacceptable damage no matter which strikes first."

U.S. policy in the new era would be guided by three principles: partnership with allies, strength with regard to potential enemies and a willingness to negotiate with the Communist powers.

Partnership, said the President, "is the message of the doctrine I announced (July 25, 1969) at Guam—the 'Nixon Doctrine.' Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."

U.S. interests, he said, were the basis of U.S. commitments in the world. "We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

Strength, Mr. Nixon said, meant the primacy of defense over domestic priorities: "There is an irreducible minimum of essential military security; for if we are less strong than necessary, and if the worst happens, there will be no domestic society to look after." He emphasized, however, that "we should spend no more than is necessary."

A willingness to negotiate, said the President, had been "convincingly demonstrated" by the Administration in its "fair and businesslike" dealings with "the Communist countries." The United States, he stressed, was "confident that tensions can be eased and the danger of war reduced by patient and precise efforts to reconcile conflicting interests on concrete issues."

## The National Security Council

The President stressed the role a "revitalized" National Security Council (NSC) played in the formulation of defense and foreign policy. The NSC he said, "composed by statute of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning—and its new system of supporting groups are designed to respond to the requirements of leadership in the 1970s."

Mr. Nixon had promised in the 1968 campaign to reform the NSC. In a nationwide telecast Oct. 24, 1968,

COPYRIGHT 1970 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC
Reproduction prohibited in whole or in part except by editorial clients

Feb. 20, 1970—PAGE 511

Foreign Policy - 2

he praised the role played by the NSC during the
Eisenhower Administration: "Throughout the Eisenhower
period this Council met week in and week out....I at-
tended these weekly meetings...and during the President's
absences due to illness, it tell to me to preside. The
process was, of course, not flawless, but it was the con-
trolling element in our success in keeping the peace
throughout our eight White House years."

In the same speech Mr. Nixon charged that Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson had failed to make proper
use of the NSC; "Since 1960," he said, "this Council has
virtually disappeared as an operating function. In its
place there have been catch-as-can talk-fests between the
President, his staff assistants and various others. I at-
tribute most of our serious reverses abroad since 1960 to
the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower's
successors to make effective use of this important Coun-
cil." He promised that as President he would reform the
NSC system. Shortly after the election, Mr. Nixon ap-
pointed Harvard professor Henry A. Kissinger as his top
national security adviser.

The White House announced Feb. 7, 1968, that the President had taken steps to "revitalize" and "reinvigorate" the NSC. In a statement released by the President's press secretary, the NSC was designated as "the principal forum for the consideration of policy issues" about which the President is required to make decisions. (1969 Weekly Report p. 280)

In his message, President Nixon stressed that the
reformed NSC system had enabled the Administration
to make foreign policy judgments on the basis of better
analysis and knowledge than available to previous Ad-
ministrations. "Too often in the past, "he said, "the pro-
cess of policy-making has been impaired or distorted by
incomplete information and by disputes in the govern-
ment which resulted from the lack of a common apprecia-
tion of the facts." The new NSC system, he claimed, had
as an "essential function...to bring together all...pertinent
knowledge available."

Summing up the purposes of the NSC system, he said
it was meant "to help us address the fundamental issues,
clarify our basic purposes, examine all alternatives, and
plan intelligent actions."

Partnership and the Nixon Doctrine

Europe. The fact that Western Europe was men-
tioned first in the section on regional policies reflected
the President's strong conviction that continuation of a
solid Atlantic alliance ranked among America's foremost
foreign policy objectives. The President's first foreign
trip (in late February 1969) took him to the countries
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). (1969
*Weekly Report p. 311*)

The message highlighted three major issues facing
U.S. relations with Western Europe:

* Creation of a genuine partnership, less dominated by the United States. (Fact sheet on NATO problems, 1969 Weekly Report p. 1611)

* Maintenance of the "strength required to defend our common interests against external dangers..." While the message stated that U.S. troop levels in Europe would remain at present strength "at least through mid-1971," the President said the interim period must be used "to conduct a thorough study of our strategy...." The statement came against a background of growing Congres-

sional support for a resolution (S Res 292), introduced Dec. 1, 1969, by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D Mont.), calling for a "substantial reduction" of the 320,000 U.S. forces in Europe.

* Readiness to negotiate and to "pursue genuine relaxation of tensions between East and West..." The President stated that the United States was consulting its NATO allies "at every stage" of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union. He also welcomed attempts of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to normalize the Federal Republic's relations with Eastern Europe.

The President mentioned the Dec. 16, 1969, proposal of France, Britain and the United States to the Soviet Union on alleviating tension in Berlin. (The Soviet Union Feb. 10 agreed to hold talks on Berlin, but did not respond to specific Allied proposals for reducing tension.) "Even if progress on broader issues cannot soon be made, the elimination of recurrent crises around Berlin would be desirable," Mr. Nixon said.

The message touched only briefly on the subject of an East-West security conference, stating: "We are prepared to negotiate on these issues in any suitable forum." This reflected the caution previously urged by the United States in NATO's response to Communist bloc (Warsaw Pact) overtures for an all-European security conference. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2549)

The President pointed to the NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, created in 1969 at U.S. initiative, as a "new dimension" of the alliance. He said he looked forward to expanding the number of nations involved in discussing environmental problems. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2056, 562)

Western Hemisphere. The message outlined the President's Latin American policy, which has become known as "Action for Progress." Its emphasis, according to Mr. Nixon, is on "actions that can realistically be implemented. I refused to propose grandiose spending programs that had no prospect of Congressional approval, or to make promises that could not be fulfilled."

Congress appropriated $337 million for the Alliance for Progress in fiscal 1970 (Administration request: $554 million). The fiscal 1971 Budget has recommended $428.3 million for the Alliance.

Referring to his major foreign policy address on Latin America (Oct. 31, 1969), the President enumerated specific steps he had taken or would propose: (1969 Weekly Report p. 2230)

* An authorization of $23 million for the activities of the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and the Inter-American Development Bank, which would help strengthen joint planning and "enable the other Western Hemisphere nations to assume a primary role in setting priorities within the hemisphere." (The Administration planned to request $205.8 million in supplemental appropriations for the Inter-American Development Bank.)

* A pledge that the United States will press other industrialized nations to initiate a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries, as well as a commitment to lead an effort to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade.

* Establishment of a special standing committee within the inter-American system to consult regularly on mutual economic problems.

PAGE 512—Feb. 20, 1970

COPYRIGHT 1970 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.
Reproduction prohibited in whole or in part except by editorial clients

* Steps to ease restrictions on U.S. economic assistance to Latin America, including termination of the "additionality" rule and a partial "untying" of U.S. aid. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2219, 1226)

* Legislation (submitted Dec. 20, 1969) which would create the position of Under Secretary of State for western hemisphere affairs.

Discussing the problem of rising nationalism in Latin America—which he noted, “was taking on anti-U.S. overtones”—the President said: “There is no more delicate task than finding new modes which permit the flow of needed (private) investment capital without a challenge to national pride and prerogative.”

(The Nixon Administration has created an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to spur U.S. investment in developing countries. During 1969, however, widespread Latin American opposition to foreign capital was reflected in the expropriation of several U.S.-owned companies.) (On OPIC, 1969 Weekly Report p. 2684; on issues of private investment, p. 667.)

In the section on international economic policy, the message declared: "Our bilateral aid must carry fewer restrictions." An Administration spokesman said the Hickenlooper amendment, an issue during the 1969 dispute with Peru over expropriation of a U.S. oil company, was one restriction which the Administration may request eliminating. (1969 Weekly Report p. 587)

The President's remarks on U.S. policies in the Western Hemisphere included no reference to U.S. relations with Canada.

Asia and the Pacific. The major theme of the Presidential message concerning Asia was that future U.S. policy would be shaped in accordance with the Guam Doctrine, first described by the President on July 25, 1969, and later restated in his Nov. 3 Vietnam address. The policy has won praise in Congress. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2233, 1404)

Although the United States would maintain its Asian interests and commitments, the President said that changes occurring in the region meant that the United States could change the character of its involvement. Continuing Asian economic development had strengthened those countries' ability to defend themselves, he added.

But the President indicated that in order to reduce direct U.S. military involvement, continued—and perhaps greater—U.S. economic and military assistance would have to be given.

The President indicated that the nature of the future U.S. commitment to Asia would depend on the actions of "hostile nations." (He has used a similar argument with respect to Vietnam when he said the rate of U.S. troop withdrawals would depend to a large extent on the level of enemy actions.)

"We do not assume that these nations will always remain hostile and (we) will work toward improved relationships wherever possible. But we will not underestimate any threat to us or our allies....The success of our Asian policy depends not only on the strength of our partnership with our Asian friends, but also on our relations with Mainland China and the Soviet Union."

Mr. Nixon indicated that the Guam Doctrine should be a general guideline. "In practice," he said, "the specific circumstances of each case require careful study."

The President did not refer specifically to U.S. involvement in Laos, which has recently provoked consider-

able Congressional concern. (Laos fact sheet, 1969 Weekly Report p. 2069)

The message singled out continued partnership between the United States and Japan as a pivotal point of U.S. Asian policy. (Fact sheet on Okinawa, 1969 Weekly Report p. 1696; for agreement, p. 2386)

Vietnam. The President quoted his past statements on the war in Vietnam. The United States could not abandon its effort and withdraw unilaterally. He declared. He enumerated steps taken by the Administration to end the war and U.S. combat involvement—"generous and reasonable proposals" at Paris and an intensified Vietnamization program. (1969 Weekly Report p. 731, 1045)

At present the Vietnamization and pacification programs were gaining, he said, but their future success was not assured. In this context, he referred to impact of enemy actions on the viability of the U.S. Vietnamization policy. In view of these uncertainties, the Administration is investigating the following questions:

* "What is the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations? Could they succeed in undoing our gains?"

* "What is the actual extent of improvement in allied capabilities?"

* "What alternative strategies are open to the enemy in the face of continued allied success?"

* "Most important, what are the attitudes of the Vietnamese people, whose free choice we are fighting to preserve?"

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Feb. 3 began public hearings on the Administration's Vietnam policy. In an opening statement, Chairman J.W. Fulbright (D Ark.) raised many of these questions. He asked whether, if the Vietnamization program failed, or the enemy launched a new attack, the Administration would send U.S. troops back in a re-escalation of the war. (Fulbright statement and Committee staff report assessing Vietnamization program, Weekly Report p. 336, 333)

The President and Administration officials have frequently referred to the Vietnamization program as the first concrete application of the Guam Doctrine. Although U.S. military spending would be reduced, "some increases in our spending for economic purposes will be required," Mr. Nixon stated. (The Budget estimates fiscal 1971 spending for economic aid to Vietnam will total $474 million, as compared to actual expenditures of $314 million in fiscal 1969.)

The Middle East. The Middle East, Mr. Nixon said, "presents one of the sternest tests of our quest for peace.... It combines intense local conflict with great power involvement. This combination is all the more dangerous because the outside powers' interests are greater than their control."

The President restated the Administration's belief "that the United Nations cease-fire resolutions define the minimal conditions that must prevail on the ground if a settlement is to be achieved."

He noted that the United States was continuing to participate in bilateral talks with the Soviet Union and four-power talks among the permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, U.S.S.R., Britain and France), but he said little had been achieved in that forum. (Israel opposed the four-power discussions.)

Referring to the U.S. proposals outlined by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on Dec. 9, 1969—and

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Foreign Policy - 4

rejected by the Soviet Union— the President declared, "We have gone as far as we believe useful in making new proposals until there is a response from other parties. But we shall continue to participate in the dialogue..." (1969 Weekly Report p. 2649)

The President restated the U.S. position that a lasting peace could only be negotiated by the parties directly involved.

Mentioning U.S. attempts to obtain agreement on controlling arms shipments to the region, Mr. Nixon declared, "I now reaffirm our stated intention to maintain careful watch on the balance of military forces and to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises." (Weekly Report p. 290)

Noting that Soviet activity in the Middle East and the Mediterranean had increased in recent years, the President said, "The United States would view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern."

### Africa.
The central thrust of U.S. African policy in the next decade will be to keep the continent "free of great power rivalry or conflict in any form," Mr. Nixon said. The United States, for its part, "will not intervene in the internal affairs of African nations," but will provide economic assistance and will support regional cooperation.

The message extended noninterference to U.S. policy toward the white supremacist governments in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. "Though we abhor the racial policies of the white regimes, we cannot agree that progressive change in Southern Africa is furthered by force," the President said.

In a reference to possible Communist actions, he said: "The United States is firmly committed to non-interference...But Africa's future depends also on the restraint of other great powers. No one should seek advantage from Africa's need for assistance, or from future instability."

"The Africa of the 1970s will need schools rather than sympathy, roads rather than rhetoric," he said. (The U.S. aid program for Africa is estimated to be $158 million in fiscal 1971.)

### International Economic Policy.
The message termed the creation in 1969 of almost $10 billion worth of Special Drawing Rights ("paper gold") for the members of the International Monetary Fund "a step of profound importance." The President said further steps to coordinate national economies should be taken in the 1970s, noting that continued U.S. inflation would have a harmful effect on the international as well as the domestic economy. (1969 Weekly Report p. 1909)

Turning to U.S. trade policy, the President reviewed the Administration's trade legislation now before Congress: Executive authority to negotiate modest tariff reductions; elimination of the American Selling Price system of fixing duties for certain chemicals; improvement of the means to help U.S. industries and workers adjust to import competition; and new Presidential authority to retaliate against unfair trading practices of other countries. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2329)

The President noted that the United States had called on other nations to begin "serious discussions on the remaining nontariff barriers to trade." During 1969, Administration officials had been active in attempting to persuade West European nations and Japan to begin

negotiations on this subject. Indirectly referring to this problem, the President said, "the principle of true reciprocity must lie at the heart of trade policy." (For fact sheet on protectionist sentiment in Congress, 1969 Weekly Report p. 1292.)

Concerning the prospects for East-West trade, the President said, "We look forward to the time when our relations with the Communist countries will have improved to the point where trade relations can increase between us"—thereby indicating that no new Administration trade initiatives toward Eastern Europe were foreseen in the immediate future. (Weekly Report p. 51; 1969 Weekly Report p. 1037)

The President noted briefly that the United States had taken "specific steps toward easing economic relations between the United States and Communist China." by relaxing slightly the total U.S. embargo on trade with Peking. But he did not indicate whether new initiatives were being considered. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2675)

On the subject of international economic assistance, the President said the task force he had named in late 1969 to review U.S. aid policies would soon be making a report, which "will provide the foundation for a new American policy." (1969 Weekly Report p. 1226)

### United Nations.
Mr. Nixon pledged continuing U.S. support for the United Nations. He referred to his Sept. 18 address to the General Assembly in which he suggested specific tasks for the near future concerning the environment, population control and economic growth, common space exploration efforts, establishment of international rules governing use of the sea, among others. (1969 Weekly Report p. 1808)

## America's Strength

Shunning specifics, Mr. Nixon sketched the decision-making process and the rationale behind his new doctrine of "sufficiency" in nuclear weaponry and the policy of preparing for 1½ wars rather than the 2½ conflicts planned for by the Johnson Administration.

In the military portion of the message, he again stressed his Administration's review of recent global policies which he said "produced a reform of both national security policies and decision-making processes which was the most far-reaching in almost two decades."

He made no mention of important and controversial issues such as multiple warhead (MIRV) missiles, the C-5A transport, the draft, cost overruns and specific weapons systems.

He said the Johnson Administration's nuclear policy of "assured destruction," which limited the U.S. nuclear arsenal to that necessary to destroy most of an attacker's civilian population, had been rejected as the prime guide for U.S. nuclear planning. Such a policy, Mr. Nixon said, was too limited, leaving the President "in the event of a nuclear attack...with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the uncertainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans." In its place, the Administration immediately sought a nuclear policy based on "sufficiency."

In defining "sufficiency," Mr. Nixon said its overriding purpose was "to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority." He added that the sufficiency doctrine should "represent a significant intellectual advance," provide adequacy and flexi-

PAGE 514—Feb. 20, 1970

Foreign Policy - 5

bility and be constantly reviewed in the light of changing technology.

Without using the critical tone he had employed during the 1968 campaign, Mr. Nixon said that the Johnson Administration's policy of nuclear restraint in recent years had enabled the Soviet Union to match and in some cases surpass U.S. capabilities.

In specifically discussing the deployment of the Safeguard antimissile network, he said his recent decision to expand the system was consistent with defense and arms control goals. He recalled his previous statements on the subject in which he had said the program should afford protection against Chinese attacks. And he said he and his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had concluded there was today an even greater Soviet threat to the U.S. retaliatory capability than there was in 1969. He also said the National Security Council had analyzed the missile defense options on four different occasions. (ABM stories, Weekly Report p. 317, 206)

Concerning the use of U.S. conventional forces and manpower, Mr. Nixon revealed five different strategies had been considered. He said the previous Administration's policy was based on the ability of fighting 2½ wars simultaneously, but that in effect that level of preparedness had never been reached. Instead, he said his Administration had formulated a policy of coping with only 1½ wars.

"Under it," he continued, "we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere." An Administration official said conflicts such as the Vietnamese or Korean wars would be considered non-major ones.

Among the factors dictating such a change in policy, Mr. Nixon said, was the fact that "we cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world."

Commenting on his Administration's review and policy-making process, Mr. Nixon repeatedly stressed that many options and points of view were considered and that for the first time defense and foreign planning had been made in the light of other Budget needs and priorities. He added that in making these decisions, the various views of the Joint Chiefs, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State and Defense Departments, the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers had been weighed.

Mr. Nixon also said that for the first time defense needs had been projected for five years and that the fiscal 1971 defense request was a transition Budget from the old strategies to the new.

In commenting on the need to weigh domestic and defense needs and priorities, Mr. Nixon stated:

"Defense spending is of course in a special category. It must never fall short of the minimum needed for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot. But neither must we let defense spending grow beyond that justified by the defense of our vital interests while domestic needs go unmet."

## An Era of Negotiation

**The Soviet Union.** Describing U.S.-Soviet relations in 1969, the President said "we made a good beginning."

He cited ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiating arms control on the seabed, taking steps "to further the prospects of agreement" regarding chemical and biological warfare and beginning of negotiations on strategic arms limitation.

He maintained, however, that "our overall relationship with the USSR remains far from satisfactory," citing the failure of the Soviet Union to "exert a helpful influence" on the North Vietnamese at the Paris negotiations, Soviet arms supplies to North Vietnam and the Soviets' failure to play a restraining role in the Middle East.

Eastern Europe. Mr. Nixon described the history of the East Europe nations as one "with many tragic aspects." He emphasized, however, that the United States would do nothing in Eastern Europe to "undermine the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union."

The United States, he said, was prepared to "enter into negotiations with the nations of Eastern Europe... (and would) adjust ourselves to whatever pace and extent of normalization these countries are willing to sustain." The President recalled his trip to Romania in August as a contribution to "a general improvement of the communication between West and East." (1969 Weekly Report p. 1236)

**Communist China.** The President said the Chinese "should not remain isolated from the international community." He stressed, however, that the United States would "maintain our treaty commitment to the defense of the Republic of (Nationalist) China." He cited unilateral steps the Administration had taken to increase contact with Communist China in the past year and the resumption of ambassadorial talks with Communist china in Warsaw. (Weekly Report p. 202)

**Arms Control.** The President said there was no area in which the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations had a greater common interest in reaching agreements.

Mr. Nixon indicated that the Administration's careful review of the issues had contributed to the constructive nature of the preliminary U.S.-Soviet arms talks in Helsinki. (1969 Weekly Report p. 2212)

He also reviewed the Administration decision to curb germ warfare as a result of the first U.S. examination of chemical-biological warfare (CBW) in 15 years. And he expressed hope of reaching further agreement in this area and on the denuclearization of the seabed at arms control talks in Geneva. (CBW story, 1969 Weekly Report p. 2385; Seabed story, 1969 Weekly Report p. 2216)

Summarizing the U.S. arms control policy, Mr. Nixon said "we should seek to maintain our security whenever possible through cooperative efforts with other nations at the lowest possible level of uncertainty, cost and potential violence....It is the biggest responsibility of this generation to avoid becoming the victim of its own technology."

**Issues for the Future.** The President cited these additional issues for future negotiation with Communist countries: (1) limiting the flow of weapons to regions in conflict; (2) solution of great East-West political issues, such as the division of Germany, referred to as "the cruel division of Europe," and (3) cooperation to "head off conflict." He said the "choice was to find a way to share more information with our adversaries to head off conflict without affecting either our own security interests or those of our friends."

Feb. 20, 1970—PAGE 515

HENRY A. KISSINGER

CENTRAL ISSUES OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

The twentieth century has known little repose. Since the turn of the century, international crises have been increasing in both frequency and severity. The contemporary unrest, although less apocalyptic than the two world wars which spawned it, is even more profoundly revolutionary in nature.

The essence of a revolution is that it appears to contemporaries as a series of more or less unrelated upheavals. The temptation is great to treat each issue as an immediate and isolated problem which once surmounted will permit the fundamental stability of the international order to reassert itself. But the crises which form the headlines of the day are symptoms of deep-seated structural problems. The international system which produced stability for a century collapsed under the impact of two world wars. The age of the superpowers, which temporarily replaced it, is nearing its end. The current international environment is in turmoil because its essential elements are all in flux simultaneously. This paper will concentrate on structural and conceptual problems; earlier papers in this volume have dealt with specific policy issues.

The Structural Problem

For the first time, foreign policy has become global. In the past, the various continents conducted their foreign policy essentially in isolation. Throughout much of history, the foreign policy of Europe was scarcely affected by events in Asia. When, in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the European powers were extending their influence throughout the world, the effective decisions continued to be made in only a few great European capitals. Today, statesmen face the unprecedented problem of formulat-

585

586 Agenda for the Nation

ing policy for well over a hundred countries. Every nation, no matter how insignificant, participates in international affairs. Ideas are transmitted almost instantaneously. What used to be considered domestic events can now have world-wide consequences.

The revolutionary character of our age can be summed up in three general statements: (a) the number of participants in the international order has increased and their nature has altered; (b) their technical ability to affect each other has vastly grown; (c) the scope of their purposes has expanded.

Whenever the participants of the international system change, a period of profound dislocation is inevitable. They can change because new states enter the political system, or because there is a change in values as to what constitutes legitimate rule, or finally, because of the reduction in influence of some traditional units. In our period, all of these factors have combined. Since the end of the Second World War, several score of new states have come into being. In the nineteenth century the emergence of even a few new nations produced decades of adjustment, and after the First World War, the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were never assimilated. Our age has yet to find a structure which matches the responsibilities of the new nations to their aspirations.

As the number of participants has increased, technology has multiplied the resources available for the conduct of foreign policy. A scientific revolution has, for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy. It has magnified insecurities because it has made survival seem to depend on the accidents of a technological breakthrough.

This trend has been compounded by the nature of contemporary domestic structures. As long as the states' ability to mobilize resources was limited, the severity of their conflicts had definite bounds. In the eighteenth century, custom restricted the demands rulers by "divine right" could make upon their subjects; a philosophy of minimum government performed the same role through much of the nineteenth century. Our period has seen the culmination of a process started by the French Revolution: the basing of governmental legitimacy on popular support. Even totalitarian regimes are aberrations of a democratic legitimacy; they depend on popular consensus even when they manufacture it through propaganda and pressure. In such a situation, the consensus is decisive; limitations of tradition are essentially irrelevant. It is an ironic result of the democratization

[v]

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 587

tion of politics that it has enabled states to marshal ever more resources for their competition.

Ideological conflict compounds these instabilities. In the great periods of cabinet diplomacy, diplomats spoke the same language, not only in the sense that French was the lingua franca, but more importantly because they tended to understand intangibles in the same manner. A similar outlook about aims and methods eases the tasks of diplomacy—it may even be a precondition for it. In the absence of such a consensus, diplomats can still meet, but they lose the ability to persuade. More time is spent on defining contending positions than in resolving them. What seems most reasonable to one side will appear most problematical to the other.

When there is ideological conflict, political loyalties no longer coincide with political boundaries. Conflicts among states merge with divisions within nations; the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy begins to disappear. At least some states feel threatened not only by the foreign policy of other countries but also, and perhaps especially, by domestic transformations. A liberalized communist regime in Prague—which had in no way challenged Soviet preeminence in foreign policy—caused the Kremlin to believe that its vital interests were threatened and to respond by occupying the country without even the pretext of legality.

The tensions produced by ideological conflict are exacerbated by the reduction in influence of the states that were considered great powers before the First World War. The world has become militarily bipolar. Only two powers—the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—possess the full panoply of military might. Over the next decade, no other country or group of countries will be capable of challenging their physical preeminence. Indeed, the gap in military strength between the two giant nuclear countries and the rest of the world is likely to increase rather than diminish over that period.

Military bipolarity is a source of rigidity in foreign policy. The guardians of the equilibrium of the nineteenth century were prepared to respond to change with counteradjustment; the policy makers of the superpowers in the second half of the twentieth century have much less confidence in the ability of the equilibrium to right itself after disturbance. Whatever “balance” there is between the superpowers is regarded as both precarious and inflexible. A bipolar world loses the perspective for nuance; a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to involve a question of survival. The smaller countries are torn between a desire for protection and a wish to escape big power dominance. Each of

588 Agenda for the Nation

the superpowers is beset by the desire to maintain its preeminence among its allies, to increase its influence among the uncommitted, and to enhance its security vis-à-vis its opponent. The fact that some of these objectives may well prove incompatible adds to the strain on the international system.

But the age of the superpowers is now drawing to an end. Military bipolarity has not only failed to prevent, it has actually encouraged, political multipolarity. Weaker allies have good reason to believe that their defense is in the overwhelming interest of their senior partner. Hence, they see no need to purchase its support by acquiescence in its policies. The new nations feel protected by the rivalry of the superpowers, and their nationalism leads to ever bolder assertions of self-will. Traditional uses of power have become less feasible, and new forms of pressure have emerged as a result of transnational loyalties and weak domestic structures.

This political multipolarity does not necessarily guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability. Nationalism may succeed in curbing the preeminence of the superpowers; it remains to be seen whether it can supply an integrating concept more successfully in this century than in the last. Few countries have the interest and only the superpowers have the resources to become informed about global issues. As a result, diplomacy is often geared to domestic politics and more concerned with striking a pose than contributing to international order. Equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations, and previous experience.

The greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order. In its absence, the awesome available power is unrestrained by any consensus as to legitimacy; ideology and nationalism, in their different ways, deepen international schisms. Many of the elements of stability which characterized the international system in the nineteenth century cannot be re-created in the modern age. The stable technology, the multiplicity of major powers, the limited domestic claims, and the frontiers which permitted adjustments are gone forever. A new concept of international order is essential; without it stability will prove elusive.

This problem is particularly serious for the United States. Whatever our intentions or policies, the fact that the United States disposes of the greatest single aggregate of material power in the world is inescapable. A new international order is inconceivable without a significant American contribution. But the nature of this contribution has altered. For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assump-

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Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 589

tion that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape
the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in
"emerging countries." This direct "operational" concept of international
order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible
to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the
creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity
even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two
superpowers.

*The Limits of Bipolarity: The Nature of Power in the Modern Period*

Throughout history, military power was considered the final recourse. Statesmen treated the acquisition of additional power as an obvious and paramount objective. As recently as twenty-five years ago, it would have been inconceivable that a country could possess too much strength for effective political use; every increment of power was—at least theoretically —politically effective. The minimum aim was to assure the impermeability of the territory. Until the Second World War, a state's strength could be measured by its ability to protect its population from attack.

The nuclear age has destroyed this traditional measure. Increasing
strength no longer necessarily confers the ability to protect the population.
No foreseeable force level—not even full-scale ballistic missile defenses—
can prevent levels of damage eclipsing those of the two world wars. In
these conditions, the major problem is to discipline power so that it bears
a rational relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute. The paradox
of contemporary military strength is that a gargantuan increase in power
has eroded its relationship to policy. The major nuclear powers are capable
of devastating each other. But they have great difficulty translating this
capability into policy except to prevent direct challenges to their own sur-
vival—and this condition is interpreted with increasing strictness. The
capacity to destroy is difficult to translate into a plausible threat even
against countries with no capacity for retaliation. The margin of superior-
ity of the superpowers over the other states is widening; yet other nations
have an unprecedented scope for autonomous action. In relations with
many domestically weak countries, a radio transmitter can be a more
effective form of pressure than a squadron of B-52s. In other words, power
no longer translates automatically into influence. This does not mean

590 Agenda for the Nation

that impotence increases influence, only that power does not automatically confer it.

This state of affairs has profound consequences for traditional notions of balance of power. In the past, stability has always presupposed the existence of an equilibrium of power which prevented one state from imposing its will on the others.

The traditional criteria for the balance of power were territorial. A state could gain overwhelming superiority only by conquest; hence, as long as territorial expansion was foreclosed, or severely limited, the equilibrium was likely to be preserved. In the contemporary period, this is no longer true. Some conquests add little to effective military strength; major increases in power are possible entirely through developments within the territory of a sovereign state. China gained more in real military power through the acquisition of nuclear weapons than if it had conquered all of Southeast Asia. If the Soviet Union had occupied Western Europe but had remained without nuclear weapons, it would be less powerful than it is now with its existing nuclear arsenal within its present borders. In other words, the really fundamental changes in the balance of power have all occurred within the territorial limits of sovereign states. Clearly, there is an urgent need to analyze just what is understood by power—as well as by balance of power—in the nuclear age.

This would be difficult enough were technology stable. It becomes enormously complicated when a scientific revolution produces an upheaval in weapons technology at five-year intervals. Slogans like "superiority," "parity," "assured destruction," compete unencumbered by clear definitions of their operational military significance, much less a consensus on their political implications. The gap between experts and decision makers is widening. The decision maker rarely has as many hours to study a problem as the expert has years. The result is that the decision maker runs the risk of unprecedented dependence on his technical staff. He is informed by "briefings," a procedure which stresses theatrical qualities and leaves its target with the uneasy feeling that he has been "taken," even—or perhaps especially—when he does not know exactly how. Decisions may reflect an attempt to ward off conflicting pressures rather than a clear conception of long-range purposes.

In short, as power has grown more awesome, it has also turned abstract, intangible, elusive. Deterrence has become the dominant military policy. But deterrence depends above all on psychological criteria. It seeks to keep

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 591

an opponent from a given course by posing unacceptable risks. For purposes of deterrence, the opponent's calculations are decisive. A bluff taken seriously is more useful than a serious threat interpreted as a bluff. For political purposes, the meaningful measurement of military strength is the assessment of it by the other side. Psychological criteria vie in importance with strategic doctrine.

The abstract nature of modern power affects domestic disputes profoundly. Deterrence is tested negatively by things which do not happen. But it is never possible to demonstrate why something has not occurred. Is it because we are pursuing the best possible policy or only a marginally effective one? Bitter debate even among those who believe in the necessity of defense policy is inevitable and bound to be inconclusive. Moreover, the longer peace is maintained—or the more successful deterrence is—the more it furnishes arguments for those who are opposed to the very premises of defense policy. Perhaps there was no need for preparedness in the first place because the opponent never meant to attack. In the modern state, national security is likely to be a highly divisive domestic issue.

The enormity of modern power has destroyed its cumulative impact to a considerable extent. Throughout history the use of force set a precedent; it demonstrated a capacity to use power for national ends. In the twentieth century any use of force sets up inhibitions against resorting to it again. Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, it is clear that it has greatly diminished American willingness to become involved in this form of warfare elsewhere. Its utility as a precedent has therefore been importantly undermined.

The difficulty of forming a conception of power is paralleled by the problem of how to use it diplomatically. In the past, measures to increase readiness signaled the mounting seriousness with which an issue was viewed.¹ But such measures have become less obvious and more dangerous when weapons are always at a high state of readiness—solid-fuel missiles require less than ten minutes to be fired—and are hidden either under the ground or under the oceans. With respect to nuclear weapons, signaling increased readiness has to take place in a narrow range between the danger of failure and the risk of a preemptive strike.

Even when only conventional weapons are involved, the question of what constitutes a politically meaningful threat is increasingly com-

1. Sometimes these measures got out of control; the mobilization schedules were one of the principal reasons for the outbreak of the First World War.

592 Agenda for the Nation

plicated. After the capture of the *Pueblo*, the United States called up
thirteen thousand reservists and moved an aircraft carrier into the waters
off the shores of Korea. Did the fact that we had to call up reserves when
challenged by a fifth-rate military power convey that we meant to act or
that we were overextended? Did the move of the aircraft carrier indicate a
decision to retaliate or was it intended primarily to strike a pose?

The problem is illustrated dramatically by the war in Vietnam. A
massive breakdown of communication occurred not only within the policy-
making machinery in the United States but also between the United States
and Hanoi. Over the past five years, the U.S. government has found it
difficult, if not impossible, to define what it understood by victory. Presi-
dent Johnson extended an open-ended offer for unconditional negotiations.
Yet our troops were deployed as if this offer had not been made. The
deployment was based on purely military considerations; it did not take
into account the possibility that our troops might have to support a nego-
tiation—the timing of which we had, in effect, left to the opponent. Strat-
egy divorced from foreign policy proved sterile.

These perplexities have spurred new interest in arms-control negotia-
tions, especially those dealing with strategic missiles. These negotiations
can be important for the peace and security of the world. But to be effec-
tive, they require an intellectual resolution of the issues which have
bedeviled the formulation of military policy. Unless we are able to give an
operational meaning to terms such as "superiority" or "stability," nego-
tiations will lack criteria by which to judge progress.

Thus, whatever the course—a continuation of the arms race or arms
control—a new look at American national security policy is essential. Over
ten years have passed since the last comprehensive, bipartisan, high-level
reevaluation of all aspects of national security: the Gaither Committee. A
new administration should move quickly to bring about such a review. It
should deal with some of the following problems: (a) a definition of the
national interest and national security over the next decade; (b) the nature
of military power in that period; (c) the relationship of military power to
political influence; (d) implications and feasibility (both military and
political) of various postures—superiority, parity, and so on; (e) the impli-
cations (both political and military) of new developments such as MIRV
(multiple individually targeted reentry vehicles) and ballistic missile
defenses; (f) the prospects for arms control including specific measures to
moderate the arms race.

## Political Multipolarity: The Changed Nature of Alliances

No area of policy illustrates more dramatically the tensions between political multipolarity and military bipolarity than the field of alliance policy. For a decade and a half after the Second World War, the United States identified security with alliances. A global network of relationships grew up based on the proposition that deterrence of aggression required the largest possible grouping of powers.

This system of alliances was always in difficulty outside the Atlantic area because it tried to apply principles drawn from the multipolar world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when several major powers of roughly equal strength existed. Then, indeed, it was impossible for one country to achieve dominance if several others combined to prevent it. But this was not the case in the era of the superpowers of the forties and fifties. Outside Europe, our allies added to our strength only marginally; they were in no position to reinforce each other's capabilities.

Alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions: (1) a common objective—usually defense against a common danger; (2) a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the casus belli; (3) some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon; (4) a penalty for noncooperation—that is, the possibility of being refused assistance must exist—otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down.

In the system of alliances developed by the United States after the Second World War, these conditions have never been met outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), to which we belong in all but name, there has been no consensus as to the danger. Pakistan's motive for obtaining U.S. arms was not security against a communist attack but protection against India. The Arab members of CENTO armed not against the USSR but against Israel. Lacking a conception of common interests, the members of these alliances have never been able to develop common policies with respect to issues of war and peace. Had they been able to do so, such policies might well have been stillborn anyway, because the technical means of cooperation have been lacking. Most allies have neither the resources nor the will to render mutual support. A state which finds it difficult to maintain

594 Agenda for the Nation

order or coherence of policy at home does not increase its strength by combining with states suffering similar disabilities.

In these circumstances, SEATO and CENTO have grown moribund as instruments of collective action. Because the United States has often seemed more eager to engage in the defense of its SEATO and CENTO allies than they themselves, they have become convinced that noncooperation will have no cost. In fact, they have been able to give the impression that it would be worse for us than for them if they fell to communism. SEATO and CENTO have become, in effect, unilateral American guarantees. At best, they provide a legal basis for bilateral U.S. aid.

The case is different with NATO. Here we are united with countries of similar traditions and domestic structures. At the start, there was a common conception of the threat. The technical means for cooperation existed. Mechanisms for developing common policies came into being—especially in the military field. Thus in its first decade and a half, NATO was a dynamic and creative institution.

Today, however, NATO is in disarray as well. Actions by the United States—above all, frequent unilateral changes of policy—are partially responsible. But the most important cause is the transformation of the international environment, specifically the decline in the preeminence of the superpowers and the emergence of political multipolarity. Where the alliances outside of Europe have never been vital because they failed to take into account the military bipolarity of the fifties, NATO is in difficulties because it has yet to adjust to the political multipolarity of the late sixties.

When NATO was founded in 1949, Europeans had a dual fear: the danger of an imminent Soviet attack and the prospect of eventual U.S. withdrawal. In the late 1960s, however, the fear of Soviet invasion has declined. Even the attack on Czechoslovakia is likely to restore anxiety about Soviet military aggression only temporarily. At the same time, two decades of American military presence in Europe coupled with American predominance in NATO planning have sharply reduced the fear that America might wash its hands of European concerns.

When NATO was formed, moreover, the principal threat to world peace seemed to lie in a Soviet attack on Europe. In recent years, the view has grown that equally grave risks are likely to arise in trouble spots outside Europe. To most Europeans, these do not appear as immediate threats to their independence or security. The irony here is striking. In the fifties, Europeans were asking for American assistance in Asia and the Middle

U

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 595

East with the argument that they were defending the greater interests of freedom. The United States replied that these very interests required American aloofness. Today, the roles are precisely reversed. It is Europe that evades our entreaties to play a global role; that is to say, Europeans do not consider their interests at stake in America's extra-European involvement.

These are symptoms of deeper, structural problems, however. One problem, paradoxically, is the growth of European economic strength and political self-confidence. At the end of the Second World War, Europe was dependent on the United States for economic assistance, political stability, and military protection. As long as Europe needed the shelter of a superpower, American predominance was inevitable. In relations with the United States, European statesmen acted as lobbyists rather than as diplomats. Their influence depended less on the weight of their countries than on the impact of their personalities. A form of consultation evolved whereby Europeans sought to influence American actions by giving us a reputation to uphold or—to put it more crudely—by oscillating between flattery and almost plaintive appeals for reassurance. The United States, secure in its predominance, in turn concentrated on soothing occasional European outbreaks of insecurity rather than on analyzing their causes.

Tutelage is a comfortable relationship for the senior partner, but it is demoralizing in the long run. It breeds illusions of omniscience on one side and attitudes of impotent irresponsibility on the other. In any event, the United States could not expect to perpetuate the accident of Europe's postwar exhaustion into a permanent pattern of international relations. Europe's economic recovery inevitably led to a return to more traditional political pressures.

These changes in Europe were bound to lead to a difficult transitional period. They could have resulted in a new partnership between the United States and an economically resurgent and politically united Europe, as had been envisaged by many of the early advocates of Atlantic unity. However, the European situation has not resolved itself in that way. Thoughtful Europeans know that Europe must unite in some form if it is to play a major role in the long run. They are aware, too, that Europe does not make even approximately the defense effort of which it is capable. But European unity is stymied, and domestic politics has almost everywhere dominated security policy. The result is a massive frustration which expresses itself in special testiness toward the United States.

These strains have been complicated by the growth of Soviet nuclear

596 Agenda for the Nation

power. The changed nature of power in the modern period has affected NATO profoundly. As the risks of nuclear war have become enormous, the credibility of traditional pledges of support has inevitably been reduced. In the past, a country would carry out a commitment because, it could plausibly be argued, the consequences of not doing so were worse than those of coming to the ally's assistance. This is no longer self-evident. In each of the last three annual statements by the Secretary of Defense on the U.S. defense posture, the estimate of dead in a general nuclear war ranged from 40 to 120 million. This figure will, if anything, increase. It will become more and more difficult to demonstrate that anything is worse than the elimination of over half of a society in a matter of days. The more NATO relies on strategic nuclear war as a counter to all forms of attack, the less credible its pledges will be.

The consciousness of nuclear threat by the two superpowers has undermined allied relationships in yet another way. For understandable reasons, the superpowers have sought to make the nuclear environment more predictable, witness the nuclear test ban treaty and the nonproliferation treaty. But the blind spot in our policy has been the failure to understand that, in the absence of full consultation, our allies see in these talks the possible forerunner of a more comprehensive arrangement affecting their vital interests negotiated without them. Strategic arms talks thus emphasize the need of political understanding in acute form. The pattern of negotiating an agreement first and then giving our allies an opportunity—even a full one—to comment is intolerable in the long run. It puts the onus of failure on them, and it prevents them from doing more than quibble about a framework with which they may disagree. Strains have been reinforced by the uncertain American response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—especially the reluctance to give up the prospect of a summit meeting. Atlantic relations, for all their seeming normalcy, thus face a profound crisis.

This state of affairs has been especially difficult for those Americans who deserve most credit for forging existing Atlantic relations. Two decades of hegemony have produced the illusion that present Atlantic arrangements are “natural,” that wise policy consists of making the existing framework more tolerable. “Leadership” and “partnership” are invoked, but the content given to these words is usually that which will support the existing pattern. European unity is advocated to enable Europeans to share burdens on a world-wide scale.

Such a view fails to take into account the realities of political multi-

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 597

polarity. The aim of returning to the "great days of the Marshall Plan" is impossible. Nothing would sunder Atlantic relationships so surely as the attempt to reassert the notions of leadership appropriate to the early days of NATO. In the bipolar world of the forties and fifties, order could be equated with military security; integrated command arrangements sufficed as the principal bond of unity. In the sixties, security, while still important, has not been enough. Every crisis from Berlin to Czechoslovakia has seen the call for "strengthening NATO" confined to military dispositions. Within months a malaise has become obvious again because the overriding need for a common political conception has not been recognized. The challenge of the seventies will be to forge unity with political measures.

It is not "natural" that the major decisions about the defense of an area so potentially powerful as Western Europe should be made three thousand miles away. It is not "normal" that Atlantic policies should be geared to American conceptions. In the forties and fifties, practicing unity—through formal resolutions and periodic reassurances—was profoundly important as a symbol of the end of our isolationism. In the decade ahead, we cannot aim at unity as an end in itself; it must emerge from common conceptions and new structures.

"Burden-sharing" will not supply that impetus. Countries do not assume burdens because it is fair, only because it is necessary. While there are strong arguments for Atlantic partnership and European unity, enabling Europe to play a global role is not one of them. A nation assumes responsibilities not only because it has resources but because it has a certain view of its own destiny. Through the greater part of its history—until the Second World War—the United States possessed the resources but not the philosophy for a global role. Today, the poorest Western European country—Portugal—has the widest commitments outside Europe because its historic image of itself has become bound up with its overseas possessions. This condition is unlikely to be met by any other European country—with the possible exception of Great Britain—no matter what its increase in power. Partially as the result of decolonization, Europeans are unlikely to conduct a significant global policy whatever their resources or their degree of unity. Cooperation between the United States and Europe must concentrate on issues within the Atlantic area rather than global partnership.

Even within the Atlantic area, a more equitable distribution of responsibilities has two prerequisites: there must be some consensus in the analysis of the international situation, at least as it affects Europe; there must be a

598 Agenda for the Nation

conviction that the United States cannot or will not carry all the burdens
alone. Neither condition is met today. The traditional notion of American
leadership tends to stifle European incentives for autonomy. Improved
consultation—the remedy usually proposed—can only alleviate, not re-
move, the difficulty.

The problem of consultation is complex, of course. No doubt unilateral
American action has compounded the uneasiness produced by American
predominance and European weakness. The shift in emphasis of American
policy, from the NATO multilateral force to the nonproliferation treaty,
the frequent unilateral changes in strategic doctrine, have all tended to
produce disquiet and to undermine the domestic position of ministers
who had staked their futures on supporting the American viewpoint.

It is far from self-evident, however, that more extensive consultation
within the existing framework can be more than a palliative. One problem
concerns technical competence. In any large bureaucracy—and an inter-
national consultative process has many similarities to domestic administra-
tive procedures—the weight given to advice bears some relation to the
competence it reflects. If one partner possesses all the technical compe-
tence, the process of consultation is likely to remain barren. The minimum
requirement for effective consultation is that each ally have enough knowl-
edge to give meaningful advice.

But there are even more important limits to the process of consultation.
The losing party in a domestic dispute has three choices: (a) it can ac-
cept the setback with the expectation of winning another battle later on—
this is the usual bureaucratic attitude and it is based on the assurance of
another hearing; (b) if advice is consistently ignored, it can resign and
go into opposition; (c) as the opposition party, it can have the pur-
pose either of inducing the existing government to change its course or of
replacing it. If all these avenues are closed, violence or mounting frustra-
tion are the consequences.

Only the first option is open to sovereign states bound together by an
alliance, since they obviously cannot resign or go into opposition without
wrecking the alliance. They cannot affect the process by which their
partners' decision makers are chosen despite the fact that this may be
crucial for their fate. Indeed, as long as the need to maintain the alliance
overrides all other concerns, disagreement is likely to be stifled. Advice
without responsibility and disagreement without an outlet can turn con-
sultation into a frustrating exercise which compounds rather than alleviates
discord.

599

Consultation is especially difficult when it lacks an integrating overall framework. The consultation about the nonproliferation treaty concerned specific provisions but not the underlying general philosophy which was of the deepest concern to many of our allies, especially the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. During periods of détente, each ally makes its own approach to Eastern Europe or the USSR without attempting to further a coherent Western enterprise. During periods of crisis, there is pressure for American reassurance but not for a clearly defined common philosophy. In these circumstances, consultation runs the risk of being irrelevant. The issues it “solves” are peripheral; the central issues are inadequately articulated. It deals haphazardly in answers to undefined questions.

Such a relationship is not healthy in the long run. Even with the best will, the present structure encourages American unilateralism and European irresponsibility. This is a serious problem for the United States. If the United States remains the trustee of every noncommunist area, it will exhaust its psychological resources. No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time. A more pluralistic world—especially in relationships with friends—is profoundly in our long-term interest. Political multipolarity, while difficult to get used to, is the precondition for a new period of creativity. Painful as it may be to admit, we could benefit from a counterweight that would discipline our occasional impetuosity and, by supplying historical perspective, modify our penchant for abstract and “final” solutions.

All of this suggests that there is no alternative to European unity either for the United States or for Europe. In its absence, the malaise can only be alleviated, not ended. Ultimately, this is a problem primarily for the Europeans. In the recent past, the United States has often defeated its purposes by committing itself to one particular form of European unity—that of federalism. It has also complicated British membership in the Common Market by making it a direct objective of American policy.

In the next decade the architectonic approach to Atlantic policy will no longer be possible. The American contribution must be more philosophical; it will have to consist more of understanding and quiet, behind-the-scenes encouragement than of the propagation of formal institutional structures. Involved here is the American conception of how nations cooperate. A tradition of legalism and habits of predominance have produced a tendency to multiply formal arrangements.

But growing European autonomy forces us to learn that nations cooperate less because they have a legal obligation to do so than because they

600 Agenda for the Nation

have common purposes. Command arrangements cannot substitute for
common interests. Coordinated strategy will be empty unless it reflects
shared political concepts. The chance of disagreements on peripheral is-
sues may be the price for unity on issues that really matter. The memory of
European impotence and American tutelage should not delude us into
believing that we understand Europe's problems better than it does itself.
Third force dangers are not avoided by legal formulas, and more important,
they have been overdrawn. It is hard to visualize a "deal" between the
Soviet Union and Europe which would jeopardize our interests without
jeopardizing European interests first. In any event, a sense of responsibility
in Europe will be a much better counter to Soviet efforts to undermine
unity than American tutelage.

In short, our relations with Europeans are better founded on develop-
ing a community of interests than on the elaboration of formal legal
obligations. No precise blueprint for such an arrangement is possible
because different fields of activity have different needs. In the military
sphere, for example, modern technology will impose a greater degree of
integration than is necessary in other areas. Whatever their formal auton-
omy, it is almost inconceivable that our allies would prefer to go to war
without the support of the United States, given the relatively small nuclear
forces in prospect for them. Close coordination between Europe and the
United States in the military sphere is dictated by self-interest, and Eu-
rope has more to gain from it than the United States.

For this very reason, it is in our interest that Europeans should assume
much greater responsibility for developing doctrine and force levels in
NATO, perhaps by vitalizing such institutions as the West European
Union (WEU), perhaps by alternative arrangements. The Supreme
Allied Commander should in time be a European.

Military arrangements are not enough, however. Under current condi-
tions, no statesman will risk a cataclysm simply to fulfill a legal obligation.
He will do so only if a degree of political cooperation has been established
which links the fate of each partner with the survival of all the others. This
requires an entirely new order of political creativity.

Coordination is especially necessary in East-West relations. The con-
ventional view is that NATO can be as useful an instrument for détente as
for defense. This is doubtful—at least in NATO's present form. A military
alliance, one of the chief cohesive links of which is its integrated command
arrangement, is not the best instrument for flexible diplomacy. Turning
NATO into an instrument of détente might reduce its security contribu-

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Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 601

tion without achieving a relaxation of tensions. A diplomatic confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would have all the rigidities of the bipolar military world. It would raise fears in Western Europe of an American-Soviet condominium, and it would tend to legitimize the Soviet hegemonical position in Eastern Europe. Above all, it would fail to take advantage of the flexibility afforded by greater Western European unity and autonomy. As Europe gains structure, its attraction for Eastern Europe is bound to increase. The major initiatives to improve relations between Western and Eastern Europe should originate in Europe with the United States in a reserve position.

Such an approach can work only if there is a real consensus as to objectives. Philosophical agreement can make possible flexibility of method. This will require a form of consultation much more substantial than that which now exists and a far more effective and coherent European contribution.

To be sure, events in Czechoslovakia demonstrate the limits of Eastern European autonomy that the Soviet Union is now prepared to tolerate. But the Soviet Union may not be willing indefinitely to use the Red Army primarily against allies as it has done three times in a decade and a half. In any event, no Western policy can guarantee a more favorable evolution in Central Europe; all it can do is to take advantage of an opportunity if it arises.

Policy outside Europe is likely to be divergent. Given the changed European perspective, an effort to bring about global burden-sharing might only produce stagnation. The allies would be able to agree primarily on doing nothing. Any crisis occurring anywhere would turn automatically and organically world-wide. American acceptance of European autonomy implies also European acceptance of a degree of American autonomy with respect to areas in which, for understandable reasons, European concern has lessened.

There may be opportunities for cooperation in hitherto purely national efforts, for example, our space program. European participation in it could help to remedy, the "technological gap."

Finally, under present circumstances, an especially meaningful community of interests can be developed in the social sphere. All modern states face problems of bureaucratization, pollution, environmental control, urban growth. These problems know no national considerations. If the nations of the Atlantic work together on these issues—either through private or governmental channels or both—a new generation habituated

602 Agenda for the Nation

to cooperative efforts could develop similar to that spawned in different
circumstances by the Marshall Plan.

It is high time that the nations bordering the Atlantic deal—formally,
systematically, and at the highest level—with questions such as these:
(a) What are the relative roles of Europe and the United States in East-
West contacts? (b) Is a division of functions conceivable in which West-
ern Europe plays the principal role in relation to Eastern Europe while
the United States concentrates on relationships with the USSR? (c) What
forms of political consultation does this require? (d) In what areas of the
world is common action possible? Where are divergent courses indicated?
How are differences to be handled?

Thus, we face the root questions of a multipolar world. How much unity
should we want? How much diversity can we stand? These questions
never have a final answer within a pluralistic society. Adjusting the balance
between integration and autonomy will be the key challenge of emerging
Atlantic relations.

Bipolarity and Multipolarity: The Conceptual Problem

In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will
be philosophical: to develop some concept of order in a world which is
bipolar militarily but multipolar politically. But a philosophical deepening
will not come easily to those brought up in the American tradition of for-
eign policy.

Our political society was one of the few which was consciously created
at a point in time. At least until the emergence of the race problem, we
were blessed by the absence of conflicts between classes and over ultimate
ends. These factors produced the characteristic aspects of American
foreign policy: a certain manipulativeness and pragmatism, a convic-
tion that the normal pattern of international relations was harmonious, a
reluctance to think in structural terms, a belief in final answers—all quali-
ties which reflect a sense of self-sufficiency not far removed from a sense
of omnipotence. Yet the contemporary dilemma is that there are no total
solutions; we live in a world gripped by revolutions in technology, values,
and institutions. We are immersed in an unending process, not in a quest
for a final destination. The deepest problems of equilibrium are not physi-
cal but psychological or moral. The shape of the future will depend ulti-
mately on convictions which far transcend the physical balance of power.

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 603

THE NEW NATIONS AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

This challenge is especially crucial with respect to the new nations. Future historians are likely to class the confusion and torment in the emerging countries with the great movements of religious awakening. Continents which had been dormant for centuries suddenly develop political consciousness. Regions which for scores of years had considered foreign rule as natural struggle for independence. Yet it is a curious nationalism which defines itself not as in Europe by common language or culture but often primarily by the common experience of foreign rule. Boundaries—especially in Africa—have tended to follow the administrative convenience of the colonial powers rather than linguistic or tribal lines. The new nations have faced problems both of identity and of political authority. They often lack social cohesiveness entirely, or they are split into competing groups each with a highly developed sense of identity.

It is no accident that between the Berlin crisis and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the principal threats to peace came from the emerging areas. Domestic weakness encourages foreign intervention. The temptation to deflect domestic dissatisfactions into foreign adventures is ever present. Leaders feel little sense of responsibility to an overall international equilibrium; they are much more conscious of their local grievances. The rivalry of the superpowers offers many opportunities for blackmail.

Yet their relations with other countries are not the most significant aspect of the turmoil of the new countries. It is in the new countries that questions of the purpose of political life and the meaning of political legitimacy—key issues also in the modern state—pose themselves in their most acute form. The new nations weigh little in the physical balance of power. But the forces unleashed in the emergence of so many new states may well affect the moral balance of the world—the convictions which form the structure for the world of tomorrow. This adds a new dimension to the problem of multipolarity.

Almost all of the new countries suffer from a revolutionary malaise: revolutions succeed through the coming together of all resentments. But the elimination of existing structures compounds the difficulty of establishing political consensus. A successful revolution leaves as its legacy a profound dislocation. In the new countries, contrary to all revolutionary expectations, the task of construction emerges as less glamorous and more complex than the struggle for freedom; the exaltation of the quest for

604 Agenda for the Nation

independence cannot be perpetuated. Sooner or later, positive goals must
replace resentment of the former colonial power as a motive force. In the
absence of autonomous social forces, this unifying role tends to be per-
formed by the state.

But the assumption of this role by the state does not produce stability. When social cohesiveness is slight, the struggle for control of authority is correspondingly more bitter. When government is the principal, sometimes the sole, expression of national identity, opposition comes to be considered treason. The profound social or religious schisms of many of the new nations turn the control of political authority quite literally into a matter of life and death. Where political obligation follows racial, religious, or tribal lines, self-restraint breaks down. Domestic conflicts assume the character of civil war. Such traditional authority as exists is personal or feudal. The problem is to make it "legitimate"—to develop a notion of political obligation which depends on legal norms rather than on coercive power or personal loyalty.

This process took centuries in Europe. It must be accomplished in decades in the new nations, where preconditions of success are less favorable than at comparable periods in Europe. The new countries are subject to outside pressures; there is a premium on foreign adventures to bring about domestic cohesiveness. Their lack of domestic structure compounds the already great international instabilities.

The American role in the new nations' efforts to build legitimate authority is in need of serious reexamination. The dominant American view about political structure has been that it will follow more or less automatically upon economic progress and that it will take the form of constitutional democracy.

Both assumptions are subject to serious questions. In every advanced
country, political stability preceded rather than emerged from the process
of industrialization. Where the rudiments of popular institutions did not
exist at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, they did not receive
their impetus from it. To be sure, representative institutions were broad-
ened and elaborated as the countries prospered, but their significant fea-
tures antedated economic development and are not attributable to it. In
fact, the system of government which brought about industrialization—
whether popular or authoritarian—has tended to be confirmed rather
than radically changed by this achievement.

Nor is democracy a natural evolution of nationalism. In the last cen-

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 605

tury, democracy was accepted by a ruling class whose estimate of itself was founded outside the political process. It was buttressed by a middle class, holding a political philosophy in which the state was considered to be a referee of the ultimately important social forces rather than the principal focus of national consciousness. Professional revolutionaries were rarely involved; their bias is seldom democratic.

The pluralism of the West had many causes which cannot be duplicated elsewhere. These included a church organization outside the control of the state and therefore symbolizing the limitation of government power; the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition of justice based on human dignity, reinforced later by the Christian ethic; an emerging bourgeoisie; a stalemate in religious wars imposing tolerance as a practical necessity and a multiplicity of states. Industrialization was by no means the most significant of these factors. Had any of the others been missing, the Western political evolution could have been quite different.

This is why communism has never succeeded in the industrialized Western countries for which its theory was devised; its greatest successes have been in developing societies. This is no accident. Industrialization—in its early phases—multiplies dislocations. It smashes the traditional framework. It requires a system of values which makes the sacrifices involved in capital formation tolerable and which furnishes some integrating principles to contain psychological frustrations.

Communism is able to supply legitimacy for the sacrifices inseparably connected with capital formation in an age when the maxims of laissez faire are no longer acceptable. And Leninism has the attraction of providing a rationale for holding on to power. Many of the leaders of the new countries are revolutionaries who sustained themselves through the struggle for independence by visions of the transformations to be brought about after victory. They are not predisposed even to admit the possibility of giving up power in their hour of triumph. Since they usually began their struggle for independence while in a small minority and sustained it against heavy odds, they are not likely to be repelled by the notion that it is possible to "force men to be free."

The ironic feature of the current situation is that Marxism, professing a materialistic philosophy, is accepted only where it does not exist: in some new countries and among protest movements of the advanced democratic countries. Its appeal is its idealistic component and not its economic theory. It offers a doctrine of substantive change and an explana-

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606 Agenda for the Nation

tion of final purposes. Its philosophy has totally failed to inspire the
younger generation in communist countries where its bureaucratic reality
is obvious.

On the other hand, the United States, professing an idealistic philos-
ophy, often fails to gain acceptance for democratic values because of
its heavy reliance on economic factors. It has answers to technical dislo-
cations but has not been able to contribute much to building a political
and moral consensus. It offers a procedure for change but little content
for it.

The problem of political legitimacy is the key to political stability in
regions containing two-thirds of the world's population. A stable domes-
tic system in the new countries will not automatically produce interna-
tional order, but international order is impossible without it. An American
agenda must include some conception of what we understand by political
legitimacy. In an age of instantaneous communication, we cannot pretend
that what happens to over two-thirds of humanity is of no concern or
interest to the United States. This does not mean that our goal should be
to transfer American institutions to the new nations—even less that we
should impose them. Nor should we define the problem as how to prevent
the spread of communism. Our goal should be to build a moral consensus
which can make a pluralistic world creative rather than destructive.

Irrelevance to one of the great revolutions of our time will mean that we
will ultimately be engulfed by it—if not physically, then psychologically.
Already some of the protest movements have made heroes of leaders in
repressive new countries. The absurdity of founding a claim for freedom
on protagonists of the totalitarian state—such as Guevara or Ho or Mao—
underlines the impact of the travail of the new countries on older societies
which share none of their technical but some of their spiritual problems,
especially the problem of the nature of authority in the modern world.
To a young generation in rebellion against bureaucracy and bored with
material comfort, these societies offer at least the challenge of unlimited
opportunity (and occasionally unlimited manipulativeness) in the quest
for justice.

A world which is bipolar militarily and multipolar politically thus
confronts an additional problem. Side by side with the physical balance of
power, there exists a psychological balance based on intangibles of value
and belief. The presuppositions of the physical equilibrium have changed
drastically; those of the psychological balance remain to be discovered.

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 607

THE PROBLEM OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

Nothing has been more difficult for Americans to assimilate in the nuclear age than the fact that even enmity is complex. In the Soviet Union, we confront an opponent whose public pronouncements are consistently hostile. Yet the nuclear age imposes a degree of cooperation and an absolute limit to conflicts.

The military relationship with the Soviet Union is difficult enough; the political one confronts us with a profound conceptual problem. A society which regards peace as the normal condition tends to ascribe tension not to structural causes but to wicked or shortsighted individuals. Peace is thought to result either from the automatic operation of economic forces or from the emergence of a more benign leadership abroad.

The debate about Soviet trends between "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" illustrates this problem. Both sides tend to agree that the purpose of American policy is to encourage a more benign evolution of Soviet society—the original purpose of containment was, after all, to bring about the domestic transformation of the USSR. They are at one that a settlement presupposes a change in the Soviet system. Both groups imply that the nature of a possible settlement is perfectly obvious. But the apostles of containment have never specified the American negotiating program to be undertaken from the position of strength their policy was designed to achieve. The advocates of relaxation of tensions have been no more precise; they have been more concerned with atmosphere than with the substance of talks.

In fact, the difference between the "hawks" and "doves" has usually concerned timing: the hawks have maintained that a Soviet change of heart, while inevitable, was still in the future, whereas the doves have argued that it has already taken place. Many of the hawks tend to consider all negotiations as fruitless. Many of the doves argue—or did before Czechoslovakia—that the biggest step toward peace has already been accomplished by a Soviet change of heart about the cold war; negotiations need only remove some essentially technical obstacles.

This difference affects—and sometimes poisons—the entire American debate about foreign policy. Left-wing critics of American foreign policy seem incapable of attacking U.S. actions without elevating our opponent (whether it happens to be Mao or Castro or Ho) to a pedestal. If they discern some stupidity or self-interest on our side, they assume that the other side must be virtuous. They then criticize the United States for

608 Agenda for the Nation

opposing the other side. The right follows the same logic in reverse: they
presuppose our good intentions and conclude that the other side must be
perverse in opposing us. Both the left and the right judge largely in terms
of intentions. In the process, whatever the issue—whether Berlin or Viet-
nam—more attention is paid to whether to get to the conference room
than what to do once we arrive there. The dispute over communist inten-
tions has diverted attention from elaborating our own purposes. In some
quarters, the test of dedication to peace has been whether one interprets
Soviet intentions in the most favorable manner.

It should be obvious, however, that the Soviet domestic situation is
complex and its relationship to foreign policy far from obvious. It is true
that the risks of general nuclear war should be as unacceptable to Moscow
as to Washington; but this truism does not automatically produce détente.
It also seems to lessen the risks involved in local intervention. No doubt
the current generation of communist leaders lacks the ideological dyna-
mism of their predecessors who made the revolution; at the same time,
they have at their disposal a military machine of unprecedented strength,
and they must deal with a bureaucracy of formidable vested interests. Un-
questionably, Soviet consumers press their leaders to satisfy their demands;
but it is equally true that an expanding modern economy is able to supply
both guns and butter. Some Soviet leaders may have become more prag-
matic; but in an elaborated communist state, the results of pragmatism are
complex. Once power is seized and industrialization is largely accom-
plished, the Communist party faces a difficult situation. It is not needed to
conduct the government, and it has no real function in running the econ-
omy (though it tries to do both). In order to justify its continued existence
and command, it may develop a vested interest in vigilance against outside
danger and thus in perpetuating a fairly high level of tension.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into detail on the issue of
internal communist evolution. But it may be appropriate to inquire why,
in the past, every period of détente has proved stillborn. There have been
at least five periods of peaceful coexistence since the Bolshevik seizure of
power, one in each decade of the Soviet state. Each was hailed in the West
as ushering in a new era of reconciliation and as signifying the long-awaited
final change in Soviet purposes. Each ended abruptly with a new period of
intransigence, which was generally ascribed to a victory of Soviet hard-
liners rather than to the dynamics of the system. There were undoubtedly
many reasons for this. But the tendency of many in the West to be con-
tent with changes of Soviet tone and to confuse atmosphere with substance

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Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 609

surely did not help matters. It has enabled the Communist leaders to postpone the choice which they must make sooner or later: Whether to use détente as a device to lull the West or whether to move toward a resolution of the outstanding differences. As long as this choice is postponed, the possibility exists that latent crises may run away with the principal protagonists as happened in the Middle East and perhaps even in Czechoslovakia.

The eagerness of many in the West to emphasize the liberalizing implications of Soviet economic trends and to make favorable interpretation of Soviet intentions a test of good faith may have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the Soviet hard-liners. Soviet troops had hardly arrived in Prague when some Western leaders began to insist that the invasion would not affect the quest for détente while others continued to indicate a nostalgia for high-level meetings. Such an attitude hardly serves the cause of peace. The risk is great that if there is no penalty for intransigence there is no incentive for conciliation. The Kremlin may use negotiations—including arms control—as a safety valve to dissipate Western suspicions rather than as a serious endeavor to resolve concrete disputes or to remove the scourge of nuclear war.

If we focus our policy discussions on Soviet purposes, we confuse the debate in two ways: Soviet trends are too ambiguous to offer a reliable guide—it is possible that not even Soviet leaders fully understand the dynamics of their system; it deflects us from articulating the purposes we should pursue, whatever Soviet intentions. Peace will not, in any event, result from one grand settlement but from a long diplomatic process, and this process requires some clarity as to our destination. Confusing foreign policy with psychotherapy deprives us of criteria by which to judge the political foundations of international order.

The obsession with Soviet intentions causes the West to be smug during periods of détente and panicky during crises. A benign Soviet tone is equated with the achievement of peace; Soviet hostility is considered to be the signal for a new period of tension and usually evokes purely military countermeasures. The West is thus never ready for a Soviet change of course; it has been equally unprepared for détente and intransigence.

These lines are being written while outrage at the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is still strong. There is a tendency to focus on military implications or to speak of strengthening unity in the abstract. But if history is a guide, there will be a new Soviet peace offensive sooner or later. Thus, reflecting about the nature of détente seems most important

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## 610 Agenda for the Nation

while its achievement appears most problematical. If we are not to be doomed to repeat the past, it may be well to learn some of its lessons: We should not again confuse a change of tone with a change of heart. We should not pose false inconsistencies between allied unity and détente; indeed, a true relaxation of tensions presupposes Western unity. We should concentrate negotiations on the concrete issues that threaten peace such as intervention in the third world. Moderating the arms race must also be high on the agenda. None of this is possible without a concrete idea of what we understand by peace and a creative world order.

### An Inquiry into the American National Interest

Wherever we turn, then, the central task of American foreign policy is to analyze anew the current international environment and to develop some concepts which will enable us to contribute to the emergence of a stable order.

First, we must recognize the existence of profound structural problems that are to a considerable extent independent of the intentions of the principal protagonists and that cannot be solved merely by good will. The vacuum in Central Europe and the decline of the Western European countries would have disturbed the world equilibrium regardless of the domestic structure of the Soviet Union. A strong China has historically tended to establish suzerainty over its neighbors; in fact, one special problem of dealing with China—communism apart—is that it has had no experience in conducting foreign policy with equals. China has been either dominant or subjected.

To understand the structural issue, it is necessary to undertake an inquiry, from which we have historically shied away, into the essence of our national interest and into the premises of our foreign policy. It is part of American folklore that, while other nations have interests, we have responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of peace. We have a tendency to offer our altruism as a guarantee of our reliability: "We have no quarrel with the Communists," Secretary of State Rusk said on one occasion, "all of our quarrels are on behalf of other people."

Such an attitude makes it difficult to develop a conception of our role in the world. It inhibits other nations from gearing their policy to ours in a confident way—a "disinterested" policy is likely to be considered "unre-

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Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 611

liable." A mature conception of our interest in the world would obviously have to take into account the widespread interest in stability and peaceful change. It would deal with two fundamental questions: What is it in our interest to prevent? What should we seek to accomplish?

The answer to the first question is complicated by an often repeated proposition that we must resist aggression anywhere it occurs since peace is indivisible. A corollary is the argument that we do not oppose the fact of particular changes but the method by which they are brought about. We find it hard to articulate a truly vital interest which we would defend however "legal" the challenge. This leads to an undifferentiated globalism and confusion about our purposes. The abstract concept of aggression causes us to multiply our commitments. But the denial that our interests are involved diminishes our staying power when we try to carry out these commitments.

Part of the reason for our difficulties is our reluctance to think in terms of power and equilibrium. In 1949, for example, a State Department memorandum justified NATO as follows: "[The treaty] obligates the parties to defend the purposes and principles of the United Nations, the freedom, common heritage and civilization of the parties and their free institutions based upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the role of law. It obligates them to act in defense of peace and security. It is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression. It seeks not to influence any shifting balance of power but to strengthen a balance of principle."

But principle, however lofty, must at some point be related to practice; historically, stability has always coincided with an equilibrium that made physical domination difficult. Interest is not necessarily amoral; moral consequences can spring from interested acts. Britain did not contribute any less to international order for having a clear-cut concept of its interest which required it to prevent the domination of the Continent by a single power (no matter in what way it was threatened) and the control of the seas by anybody (even if the immediate intentions were not hostile). A new American administration confronts the challenge of relating our commitments to our interests and our obligations to our purposes.

The task of defining positive goals is more difficult but even more important. The first two decades after the end of the Second World War posed problems well suited to the American approach to international relations. Wherever we turned, massive dislocations required attention. Our pragmatic, ad hoc tendency was an advantage in a world clamoring

i

612 Agenda for the Nation

for technical remedies. Our legal bent contributed to the development of
many instruments of stability.

In the late sixties, the situation is more complex. The United States is no longer in a position to operate programs globally; it has to encourage them. It can no longer impose its preferred solution; it must seek to evoke it. In the forties and fifties, we offered remedies; in the late sixties and in the seventies our role will have to be to contribute to a structure that will foster the initiative of others. We are a superpower physically, but our designs can be meaningful only if they generate willing cooperation. We can continue to contribute to defense and positive programs, but we must seek to encourage and not stifle a sense of local responsibility. Our contribution should not be the sole or principal effort, but it should make the difference between success and failure.

This task requires a different kind of creativity and another form of
patience than we have displayed in the past. Enthusiasm, belief in progress,
and the invincible conviction that American remedies can work every-
where must give way to an understanding of historical trends, an ordering
of our preferences, and above all an understanding of the difference our
preferences can in fact make.

The dilemma is that there can be no stability without equilibrium, but
equally, equilibrium is not a purpose with which we can respond to the
travail of our world. A sense of mission is clearly a legacy of American
history; to most Americans, America has always stood for something other
than its own grandeur. But a clearer understanding of America's interests
and of the requirements of equilibrium can give perspective to our ideal-
ism and lead to humane and moderate objectives, especially in relation to
political and social change. Thus our conception of world order must have
deeper purposes than stability but greater restraints on our behavior than
would result if it were approached only in a fit of enthusiasm.

Whether such a leap of the imagination is possible in the modern
bureaucratic state remains to be seen. New administrations come to power
convinced of the need for goals and for comprehensive concepts. Sooner,
rather than later, they find themselves subjected to the pressures of the
immediate and the particular. Part of the reason is the pragmatic, issue-
oriented bias of our decision makers. But the fundamental reason may be
the pervasiveness of modern bureaucracy. What started out as an aid to
decision making has developed a momentum of its own. Increasingly, the
policy maker is more conscious of the pressures and the morale of his
staff than of the purpose this staff is supposed to serve. The policy maker

Central Issues of American Foreign Policy 613

becomes a referee among quasi-autonomous bureaucratic bodies. Success consists of moving the administrative machinery to the point of decision, leaving relatively little energy for analyzing the decision's merit. The modern bureaucratic state widens the range of technical choices while limiting the capacity to make them.

An even more serious problem is posed by the change of ethic of precisely the most idealistic element of American youth. The idealism of the fifties during the Kennedy era expressed itself in self-confident, often zealous institution building. Today, however, many in the younger generation consider the management of power irrelevant, perhaps even immoral. While the idea of service retains a potent influence, it does so largely with respect to problems which are clearly not connected with the strategic aspects of American foreign policy; the Peace Corps is a good example. The new ethic of freedom is not "civic"; it is indifferent or even hostile to systems and notions of order. Management is equated with manipulation. Structural designs are perceived as systems of "domination" —not of order. The generation which has come of age after the fifties has had Vietnam as its introduction to world politics. It has no memory of occasions when American-supported structural innovations were successful or of the motivations which prompted these enterprises.

Partly as a result of the generation gap, the American mood oscillates dangerously between being ashamed of power and expecting too much of it. The former attitude deprecates the use or possession of force; the latter is overly receptive to the possibilities of absolute action and overly indifferent to the likely consequences. The danger of a rejection of power is that it may result in a nihilistic perfectionism which disclaims the gradual and seeks to destroy what does not conform to its notion of utopia. The danger of an overconcern with force is that policy makers may respond to clamor by a series of spasmodic gestures and stylistic maneuvers and then recoil before their implications.

These essentially psychological problems cannot be overemphasized. It is the essence of a satisfied, advanced society that it puts a premium on operating within familiar procedures and concepts. It draws its motivation from the present, and it defines excellence by the ability to manipulate an established framework. But for the major part of humanity, the present becomes endurable only through a vision of the future. To most Americans—including most American leaders—the significant reality is what they see around them. But for most of the world—including many of the leaders of the new nations—the significant reality is what they wish to

614 Agenda for the Nation

bring about. If we remain nothing but the managers of our physical patrimony, we will grow increasingly irrelevant. And since there can be no stability without us, the prospects of world order will decline.

We require a new burst of creativity, however, not so much for the sake of other countries as for our own people, especially the youth. The contemporary unrest is no doubt exploited by some whose purposes are all too clear. But that it is there to exploit is proof of a profound dissatisfaction with the merely managerial and consumer-oriented qualities of the modern state and with a world which seems to generate crises by inertia. The modern bureaucratic state, for all its panoply of strength, often finds itself shaken to its foundations by seemingly trivial causes. Its brittleness and the world-wide revolution of youth—especially in advanced countries and among the relatively affluent—suggest a spiritual void, an almost metaphysical boredom with a political environment that increasingly emphasizes bureaucratic challenges and is dedicated to no deeper purpose than material comfort.

Our unrest has no easy remedy. Nor is the solution to be found primarily in the realm of foreign policy. Yet a deeper nontechnical challenge would surely help us regain a sense of direction. The best and most prideful expressions of American purposes in the world have been those in which we acted in concert with others. Our influence in these situations has depended on achieving a reputation as a member of such a concert. To act consistently abroad we must be able to generate coalitions of shared purposes. Regional groupings supported by the United States will have to take over major responsibility for their immediate areas, with the United States being concerned more with the overall framework of order than with the management of every regional enterprise.

In the best of circumstances, the next administration will be beset by crises. In almost every area of the world, we have been living off capital—warding off the immediate, rarely dealing with underlying problems. These difficulties are likely to multiply when it becomes apparent that one of the legacies of the war in Vietnam will be a strong American reluctance to risk overseas involvements.

A new administration has the right to ask for compassion and understanding from the American people. But it must found its claim not on pat technical answers to difficult issues; it must above all ask the right questions. It must recognize that, in the field of foreign policy, we will never be able to contribute to building a stable and creative world order unless we first form some conception of it.

we could point to our nuclear striking force. But this answer became less and less plausible as our monopoly in intercontinental missiles dissipated. Neither we nor our potential adversaries could continue to believe that the United States would react to any and every Communist provocation by initiating a nuclear exchange in which our own society would be devastated.

Nor could we accept an "all-or-nothing" doctrine of defense that would leave us bereft of any ability to respond with conventional force to conventional attacks on friendly nations. So "massive retaliation" gave way to the more common-sense notion of a "flexible response" adequate to counter, and hopefully to deter, instances of aggression for which we would be unwilling to risk a nuclear holocaust.

But the cost of the capability to respond flexibly can be immense if an American military response must be contemplated whenever an international development disfavors our national interests. And this expense can be infinite if the adequacy of that capability must be measured in terms of a clear superiority in every aspect of armed might.

In a world in which we are not the single "great power," any such total military versatility and invincibility is clearly unprocurable—at any price. Until we begin to refine our questions and direct them toward realistic and realizable security goals, we will continue to ask the impossible and get answers that are unacceptable.

In the broadest sense, we now ask our government: make us safe from any attack by any foe. The answer is a defense budget in the neighborhood of $80 billion a year. It is an answer that is increasingly unsatisfactory. It certainly does not satisfy the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who recognize that this amount is inadequate to buy the American people anything like full protection. The Armed Services Committees of Con-

gress can prove that a lower budget means less over-all military strength and less capacity to do things by military force, for a defense budget of $80 billion obviously provides the capability to meet contingencies that a budget of $50 billion must ignore. But before concluding that the $50 billion budget will leave us weaker and in greater danger, we need political judgments as to what unmet contingencies are apt to occur and—if they do occur and if they are unmet—what vital national interests may be adversely affected. We need the further political judgment of whether the $30 billion thus freed can be spent on problems of greater risk to our national security and in areas of greater benefit to the over-all quality of American life. We need the answers that will put in perspective any incremental gain in physical security.

In the age of intercontinental ballistic missiles, we cannot now, with any amount of money, buy physical safety from a Soviet attack of indescribable devastation. But the real pressures for a ballistic-missile defense—and perhaps even its lulling designation as the "Safeguard" system—derive from our unwillingness to accept emotionally what we have every factual reason to comprehend.

Nor can we curb the infinite expansion of the military-industrial complex by continuing to demand margins of superiority over our potential adversaries all across the spectrum of military armament. We should ask, instead, which leads are meaningful in terms of security or political advantage, and which are not. "Superiority" in nuclear missiles, for example, is too expensive if all it gives us is a status symbol. And "inferiority" is no cause for alarm or even embarrassment if what we have is enough to deter any Soviet effort at a pre-emptive strike.

We should keep in mind that what the Soviets themselves are doing may

27

not always provide a useful measure
of the appropriateness of our own de-
fense expenditures. We sometimes seem
to proceed on the assumption that we
are not doing enough unless we more
than match what the Soviets spend in
every area of armed might. We rarely
inquire whether the Soviets are spending
too much. Instead, when there is crit-
icism of our ABM deployment, we accept
as valid the answer that, after all, the
Soviets have already deployed an ABM
of their own. Maybe we should ask
whether theirs is a poor investment.
While vaunting our superior sophist-
cation in other things, both economic
and social, we at times come perilously
close to adopting Soviet answers when
it comes to the allocation of our defense
dollars on strategic weapons systems.

In the area of conventional forces, we waste the time and the talents of our military leaders when we leave them to prepare their budget requests on the basis of assumptions devoid of political validity. Our military planners, in fact, are major victims of our defective interrogatory technique. The problem is not that their advice is too often ignored. It is that their answers frequently don't matter because we've asked them the wrong questions. It's neither fair nor fruitful to ask them to develop a military machine that will help achieve a set of foreign-policy objectives which haven't been articulated—and which, when developed, can prove impervious to military solution.

In order to obtain the proper wea-
pons systems—in the proper quanti-
ties and supporting the proper number
of military personnel—we need a much
clearer idea of the circumstances under
which we will be willing to use them.
The Systems-Analysis group within the
Office of the Secretary of Defense
serves an essential function in develop-
ing the most effective means of per-
forming the various military missions.
These civilian experts constantly dis-

cuss issues of relative cost effective-
ness with the different Armed Services.
But neither the civilian nor the mili-
tary personnel of the Pentagon should
be asked to speculate on the nature and
number of instances in which they'll be
asked to provide military force in fur-
therance of national objectives. Our
current force posture—designed to
fight two wars while handling another
contingency somewhere else in the
world—is the product of such specula-
tion.

This "two-and-a-half war" concept
did not arise from an informed predic-
tion of international developments. It
derived, during the last decade, from
what Pentagon planners saw as the need
to buttress conventional military forces
neglected during our years of reliance
on a nuclear strategy of "massive retali-
ation." But we lacked then, as we lack
now, an accepted perception of our na-
tional-security interests; we had no mea-
sure for the adequacy of our conven-
tional military capability. As a conse-
quence, our forces are not shaped to
fit a policy—and the risk always exists
that the policy itself may be influenced
by the military forces on hand. We
need not conclude that our analyses
of force requirements in the early '60's
were wrong. But we do need to ask if,
in today's world, our national scale of
priorities justifies the expense of pre-
paring to fight the Soviets in Europe.
while we simultaneously fend off Chi-
nese aggression in Asia and deal else-
where with some lesser adversary.

It may be that I unduly discount the
risk that Russia and China may resolve
their differences to the point where
they could even consider concurrently
engaging us in large-scale conventional
warfare. But it is difficult to imagine
that either nation would deem the nu-
clear threshold sufficiently high to
block an early resort to strategic forces.
Before we commit ourselves to further
funding against such an eventuality.

28

we should ask the National Security Council to consider the likelihood of this kind of dispersed Armageddon, and to shun a policy that might make it thinkable.

A bumper sticker of the recent past read: "Support Mental Health or I'll Kill You." Sanity in foreign policy compels the recognition that we can't use military means to make the world behave the way we'd like it to behave. We can't use it to compel a country to be free and democratic. And we're aware, at least tacitly, that however we may deplore aggression and strife anywhere in the world, most of it cannot affect our national security and most of it does not call for an American military response. But I don't think we've told those who originate our defense planning enough to permit their reasoned response to our basic questions about how national security can best be assured.

When we ask them to define the necessary dimensions of our military forces, referring them to our existing treaty commitments is not enough. No treaty negates our right to determine the character of our reaction on the basis of our perception of the national interest. Our one absolute commitment is to the preservation of our own independence. And we might fairly ask whether that independence does, in fact, turn on the viability of every international basket case with anti-Communist credentials.

To accept the facts of modern life, we need not adopt the extreme position that no defense effort is availing and that no measure of security can be obtained through expenditures for weapons systems. What is required is that debate about the level of defense expenditures—and about the kinds or quantities of armaments that we can prudently purchase—focus on the real risks and on the means realistically available to meet them. In national defense,

as in our personal finances, we can afford to carry just so much insurance—particularly against the rarer tropical diseases. Our present preoccupation with physical security may be anachronistic when only two nations in the world can pose a physical threat and when neither could carry it out except at the cost of its own existence as a modern society.

In posing new questions about our national security, we need not repudiate the expert witnesses on whom we have relied in the past. Granted, the results achieved have not been uniformly satisfactory. But we should resist the temptation to blame our Vietnam troubles, for example, on the advice of our military men. In my view, we've consistently been asking them the wrong questions about Vietnam. Such issues as measuring the pace and permanence of pacification involve political judgments that only an objective Vietnamese politician could make, if one could be found. Our commanders are probably right in thinking that a virtual U.S. military occupation is the best way to control an insurgency, but it does little to advance our announced political goal of self-determination for the South Vietnamese.

It has been suggested—by Candidate Goldwater in 1964 and by Senators on both sides of the aisle in years since—that victory in Vietnam requires only that we tell our military leaders that we have decided to win and then leave the war to them. This ignores, I think, our lack of an agreed definition of victory and our unwillingness to go all-out to achieve military conquest. Indeed, no satisfactory answer can be given to the question why we are in Vietnam, because we never asked the question in time. In late 1967, Secretary Rusk explained our presence as necessary to contain a projected one billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. But if the original purpose

29

of American participation in Vietnam was to contain China, we never asked whether adoption of an attrition route to victory was consistent with that purpose. Certainly there are more promising avenues to the close-in control of China than by killing off the nationalistic North Vietnamese.

Much of the failure to examine the underlying political rationale stems from a fear of poaching on military preserves. But, in the absence of all-out war, our military means surely must be kept consistent with our political objectives. They can't be and they won't be unless we insist that our policymakers articulate these objectives.

Perhaps the first step toward useful answers in the realm of national security would be to abandon the partisan prose. "Missile gap" allegations from the 1960 campaign, like the outlandish charge of a "security gap" in 1968, have only made it more difficult for incoming administrations to pose the relevant questions. What should worry us is a "question gap" that leaves us without meaningful answers, both on national-security policy and on how it should be translated into military capability. In making decisions on defense planning we're constantly in danger of putting the hardware before the horse sense.

There are growing signs of a healthy willingness to question some of the items in the defense budget. But the absence of an over-all policy from which these individual items derive makes the debate revolve largely around tangential issues.

For example, in examining the request for additional attack carriers, it is sensible to ask whether one nuclear-powered carrier is preferable to the two that could be built with conventional power for the same price. It's important to note the age of some carriers in our fleet and the alternative possibility of land-based aircraft. But the real questions remain unanswered. They concern

the relationship between our tactical air power and our security interests. Fifteen nuclear attack carriers will indeed permit the flexible application of that power anywhere in the world. But where in the world, and against whom, will we want to apply it, and what should we pay for this capacity?

Without an updated justification for our carrier fleet, we can make no value judgments on the need for new fleet defense aircraft. The mission intended for the F-111B (the Navy version of the TFX) was to stand well off from the fleet for hours with a highly sophisticated missile capable of shooting down hordes of enemy bombers at great range. But debate about the F-111B focused on its weight, its expense, and whether Boeing might have done it better. The Navy succeeded in substituting the F-14A, which on paper provides a superior dog-fighter but continues with the basic mission of fleet defense. The case for continuing this multi-billion-dollar program should not rest on the merits of the airplane. The question we should ask is: what are the chances that our fleet will be sent to sea when there is a real risk of the kind of mass air attack that only the Soviets could mount? Perhaps we should be persuaded that this is plausible, but I think those responsible for our foreign policy should be asked to convince us.

The Senate, by almost a two-to-one margin, recently approved going ahead with the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA). Supporters of a new nuclear bomber, while granting its redundancy, refer to the risk that our intercontinental ballistic missiles may work imperfectly. But no new bomber can provide the ability to destroy the Soviet missile forces and thus prevent nuclear retaliation. Nor, we are told, do we aim at any such "first-strike" capability. Our strategic forces are intended to deter and thus, in an age of sophisticated air defense, strategic

30

missiles must remain our primary de-
terrent. How, we might ask, is that
deterrent affected by a decision to pro-
ceed with a new manned aircraft on the
premise that it is needed because the
nuclear missiles may not work? More-
over, our continued expenditures for
anti-bomber defense are rationalized
as serving to discourage the Soviet
Union from developing a new super-
sonic bomber. Do we expect our bomber
to be that much better, the Soviet air
defense that much poorer, or the Soviets
that much smarter in deciding that
manned bombers are obsolete?

Sound defense decisions outside
the procurement area are equally im-
possible until we acquire a better sense
of policy direction. In the military as-
sistance field, continuation of our mili-
tary advisors in Latin America obvious-
ly preserves a degree of United States
influence. But shouldn't we ask, on a
country-by-country basis, whom we are
influencing, toward what ends, and how
this serves our national interest?

As a military matter, reversion of
Okinawa to Japanese administrative
control primarily involves the ques-
tion of our unrestricted freedom to use
it as a military base. But politically we
should ask whether there may ever be
circumstances in which we will want to
use Okinawa for military operations
which the Japanese are unwilling to
support. In situations where the Japan-
ese conclude that such use is not in
their security interests, can it be es-
sential to ours?

British withdrawal from East of
Suez will leave a "great-power" vacuum
in the Indian Ocean. Do we need bases
and boats to fill it or can we count on
nature's abhorrence, and the people of
the area, to do that job? The considera-
tions that led to British colonialism in
the Nineteenth Century, when empire
was profitable, can't justify an Ameri-
can military presence in this century if
it means little more than a bigger de-

fense bill. The White House and State
Department assert that we will not re-
place the British. But unless we tell
our military planners to forget it, we
may find ourselves continuing to pay
for that possibility.

The asserted unavailability of a
"peace and growth dividend" will be a
self-fulfilling prophecy if we use the
peace to catch up on every item of our
defense arsenal stinted by Vietnam pri-
ority needs. Before we can fit our de-
fense program to our national interest,
we must decide when and where we
may seek to advance those interests by
the application of military force. If our
national security in fact demands a kind
of Western Hemisphere "Brezhnev
doctrine," we need the means to enforce
a non-Communist orthodoxy. If we plan
to support regimes in Southeast Asia
against overthrow by their internal
political rivals, we have to face up to
the budgetary consequences. And if
we must conclude that our security
requires us to resist and repel external
aggression wherever it appears in the
world, then our present defense budget
is indeed too little and too late.

But I doubt that these are the prem-\ises on which our foreign policy will
proceed in practice. And I think that
the theory underlying our defense bud-
get should be consistent with what we
plan in practice to do. This violates,
I recognize, the principle of ambiguity
in the conduct of foreign policy. There
are admitted disadvantages in tipping
off a hostile power as to the circum-
stances under which we may go to war.
A degree of uncertainty is undeniably
a valuable factor in deterring aggres-
sion. But the gray area should not be
so large as to delude those who, if under
attack, would have our best wishes but
might expect our armed support. A co-
herent defense program can never be
constructed if we continue to leave the
architects confused about the purposes
we want it to serve. ■

31

The Policy Universe

The President's problem, in an area where units and equipment take years to develop and deploy, is to choose during a time of waning war a defense posture for a time of hoped-for peace. This requires criteria for determining the state of military readiness, nuclear and non-nuclear, that the nation should maintain in peacetime and during at least the initial stages of conflicts for which it is prudent to prepare. The resulting forces will not and should not be static; they will undergo modernization of weapons and other equipment, and they must possess sufficient flexibility to vary in size and composition with the capabilities of potential enemies. However, the criteria themselves must be sufficiently explicit in outlining the size, expected performance, composition, and derivation of the normal peacetime force so that it is possible to measure and evaluate change, whether stimulated by a buildup for a particular conflict or a shift in national priorities. Just as there is no perfect security, so there are no absolute defense requirements. Consequently the choice of a defense posture depends on weighing the military and diplomatic consequences of various

Defense

19

Table 2-1. Trends in Funds Authorized for Strategic and General Purpose Forces, Various Fiscal Years, 1962-71

Billions of current dollars

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Authorization category</th><th colspan="2">1962</th><th rowspan="2">1964</th><th rowspan="2">1968</th><th rowspan="2">1970</th><th rowspan="2">1971</th></tr><tr><th>Jan. 1961 estimate</th><th>1962 actual</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Strategic nuclear forces</td><td>15.7</td><td>17.0</td><td>17.1</td><td>16.6</td><td>17.7</td><td>18.0</td></tr><tr><td>General purpose forces (other than additions for Vietnam)</td><td>29.2</td><td>33.2</td><td>34.5</td><td>37.5</td><td>41.7</td><td>43.3</td></tr><tr><td>Vietnam additions</td><td>...</td><td>...</td><td>...</td><td>23.0</td><td>17.0</td><td>11.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>44.9</td><td>50.2</td><td>51.6</td><td>77.1</td><td>76.4</td><td>72.3</td></tr></tbody></table>

Sources: Totals are from the following U.S. Department of Defense releases: Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense Program and 1965 Defense Budget (Jan. 27, 1964); Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1970-74 Defense Program and 1970 Defense Budget (Jan. 22, 1968); Statement of Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford: The Fiscal Year 1970-74 Defense Program and 1970 Defense Budget (Jan. 15, 1969); Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Landl before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget (Feb. 20, 1971); The costs of the strategic nuclear forces are an aggregate of the strategic forces program, half of the intelligence and communications program, 40 percent of the research and development program, and a varying percentage of the support programs (programs 7, 8, and 9). The costs of the general purpose forces program, the aircraft and sealift program, the National Guard and Reserve forces program, 60 percent of the research and development program, the support of other nations program, and a varying percentage of the support programs. Vietnam additions are based on Tables 2-13, 2-15, and 2-4.

alternatives against costs, which in turn represent the other public and private goods we must give up.

The most convenient means to illustrate the choices involved is to determine the force configuration and budget level that obtained before the Vietnam war began significantly to affect the major budget elements, and then to examine possible changes in that baseline force. Table 2-8 on page 38 spells out the components of this baseline force, which in general terms included about 2.7 million military personnel, about 30,000 aircraft, and almost 900 commissioned ships. It encompassed nineteen and one-third active and nine high priority reserve Army and Marine Corps divisions, twenty-one tactical air wings, and fifteen attack carrier task forces. With respect to the strategic nuclear forces, the baseline budget was designed to provide an assured capability to inflict unacceptable damage in a second, retaliatory strike against the Soviet Union. In 1964 prices, this force cost about $51 billion a year. The $51 billion purchased not only the maintenance of the force, but also a continuing modernization of its equipment. The Defense Department has recently estimated that approximately the same force and pace of modernization (which in 1964, after adjust-

20

ment for inflation, involved significantly higher expenditures on strategic nuclear forces than in any year since) would require about $64 billion at 1970 prices. Judging the adequacy of this concept of a baseline force, and developing alternatives, requires an examination of each of the major cost elements separately.

## Alternative Policies: Strategic Nuclear Forces

Determination of the size and composition of the strategic nuclear forces depends quite critically on the relative weights assigned in the planning process to two objectives: (1) an assured destruction capability sufficient to deter a potential enemy—that is, the capacity, even after absorbing a well-designed first strike, to inflict unacceptable levels of human and economic damage on that enemy; and (2) a damage-limiting capability, or the means to limit the destructiveness of enemy attacks by some combination of offensive and defensive action. As spelled out in the following pages, the U.S. position in the past decade of significant nuclear competition may be characterized as an initial quest (in the early 1960s) for an assured destruction reserve and a second-strike damage-limiting capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The subsequent deemphasis of damage-limiting capability occurred as the cost of providing it rose very sharply with the increase in Soviet missile strength. More recently there has been a resurgence of interest in damage limitation as mainland China moves closer to a long-range nuclear missile capability, and in the use of the antiballistic missile (ABM) to protect our missile sites as the Soviet Union develops greater offensive capacity to destroy those sites.

Throughout this period of increasingly obvious nuclear stalemate, the American concept of unacceptable damage to the Soviet Union by prompt blast and radiation effects has remained in the range of 20-25 percent of the population killed (around 50-60 million people) and 50-75 percent destruction of industrial capacity. However, the mix of delivery systems maintained to achieve assured destruction goals has changed markedly on both sides. The United States, which depended in 1960 almost exclusively on bombers and bomber defenses, relies in 1970 largely on hardened land-based missiles and mobile missiles at sea, although long-range bombers remain an important element of the force. The Soviet Union has achieved an even more remarkable transformation from medium-range bombers and missiles aimed at Europe to an ICBM force of launch vehicles that

Defense

21

is already larger than our own, a submarine-based missile system, growing rapidly but still smaller than ours, and an antiballistic missile system around Moscow. These simultaneous metamorphoses have brought the two superpowers to—some would argue beyond—the threshold of a new phase in the strategic arms competition, symbolized in the United States by five possible new strategic weapons systems:
* the antiballistic missile (ABM);

* the multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), which permits installation within a single missile of a number of warheads, each capable of being directed to a separate target;

* an advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA or the B-1), successor to the B-52;

* a new airborne warning and control system, probably with a modified F-106 interceptor (AWACS-F-106X), to intercept low-flying aircraft and those carrying long-range air-to-ground missiles; and

* a new underwater long-range missile system (ULMS) to carry much heavier and longer-range missiles than today's Polaris and Poseidon.

Research and development on all of these systems has been under way for some time. Deployment has been ordered for the MIRV and, on a limited basis, for the ABM. The evidence suggests that the USSR has long been working on an ABM and is interested in multiple warhead delivery systems. More significant to many observers is the fact that the Soviet Union has achieved a massive increase in the number of ICBMs, particularly the very large SS-9 variety which, if sufficient accuracy can be achieved, has a high probability of knocking out hardened missiles sites.

It is in this maelstrom of highly complex technological concerns and even more difficult questions of individual and social psychology that the strategic policy maker must operate. Moreover, in both countries his frame of reference must extend beyond domestic shores to the many countries that rely upon the United States or the Soviet Union for a nuclear umbrella and that have testified to their confidence by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He must juggle costs and risks in a field where there is no longer any certainty that higher costs buy lower risks. Obviously, the range of choice is very wide and allows for substantial variations in the strategic posture. Nevertheless it is possible to discern at least three broad potential courses for strategic nuclear weapons policy. Table 2-2 shows the possible budgetary consequences of each. The cost of each option, measured in constant 1971 dollars, is assumed not to change over the next four

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Table 2-2. Estimated Expenditures for Alternative Strategic Nuclear Forces, Fiscal Years 1971, 1973, and 1975ª

Billions of current dollars

<table><thead><tr><th>Alternative force</th><th>1971</th><th>1973</th><th>1975</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Low budget</td><td>14.0</td><td>15.5</td><td>16.5</td></tr><tr><td>Pre-Vietnam</td><td>18.0</td><td>20.0</td><td>21.5</td></tr><tr><td>High damage-limitation</td><td>24.0</td><td>26.5</td><td>28.5</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: The cost of the pre-Vietnam strategic forces is derived from the program budget in *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1971*, p. 84. Explanations for the low-budget and high damage-limitation variants are in the text.

a. The 1971 column shows the cost of each alternative in fiscal 1971 prices. In succeeding years the budgetary costs of each alternative rise, reflecting not a change in real outlays but an expected increase in wages, prices, and military retirement costs.

years. The increases shown in the table reflect solely changes in wages, prices, and military retirement costs.

First, one might settle on a configuration that accepts assured destruction capability as the proper safeguard against potential enemies but redefines its level of effectiveness to require fewer assured fatalities as the basis for deterrence. It would reject moderate damage limitation as self-defeating because of probable Soviet counteractions, and comprehensive damage limitation as impossible. Such a choice would reflect the belief that a restrained posture is most likely to lead to progress on arms limitation. This low-budget alternative would start from the proposition that, short of very improbable changes in the strategic balance that would enable one side to score a first-strike knockout blow, damage-limiting capabilities are not useful as military or diplomatic instruments and not worth the cost of major new systems in present circumstances. Such a posture would permit deferral of the deployment of ABMs (while continuing research), a stretchout of MIRV production and deployment, maintenance of AMSA and ULMS as low-priority research and development projects, and gradual elimination of much of the present air defense system while also holding AWACS to a research and development phase. U.S. strategic deterrent capabilities would then rest on a force of 1,054 perhaps vulnerable land-based ICBMs, 656 presently invulnerable submarine-based missiles, some of which might be carrying MIRVs, a fleet of over 300 heavy bombers, and a sophisticated command, control, and warning system. As Table 2-2 shows, resulting expenditures on strategic nuclear forces (and their share of intelligence, communications, research and development, and support)

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would be on the order of $14 billion a year in 1971 dollars. Adoption of this alternative would not preclude later review and policy changes, depending particularly on the future action of potential adversaries.

Second, one might choose an approximation to the pre-Vietnam baseline concept that emphasizes a rather generous capability for assured destruction, in a retaliatory strike, of 20-25 percent of the Soviet population, but admits of a need to develop damage-limiting capability against third parties and the requirement both to continue MIRV deployment and to start an ABM defense of land-based ICBM sites along with a thin area defense. This course would involve strategic costs on the order of $18 billion a year, of which around $4 billion would be available for a gradually phased procurement of at least some of the five systems discussed above.

Third, the United States could decide that assured destruction capability on the present scale is not enough—that high damage-limiting capability against both great and small nuclear powers is necessary to a credible deterrent, particularly from the standpoint of our foreign allies who, in the absence of such a deterrent, might be moved to build nuclear forces of their own. To reach such a decision, it would be necessary to conclude that the possibility of achieving the capability to limit damage to the United States to nominal levels is worth the risk of stimulating very large reciprocal expenditures by both superpowers, which could turn out in the end to increase the relative security of neither. If that judgment were made, the resulting defense program would provide for major expansion of three elements above the pre-Vietnam baseline force: more offensive forces, particularly sea-based missiles; a much heavier ABM and bomber defense network; and a large system for civil defense. The budgetary consequences of this high damage-limitation strategy are difficult to estimate, in part because so much would depend on the Soviet reaction. However, it is easy to imagine total expenditures for strategic nuclear forces on the order of $24 billion a year.

## Alternative Policies: General Purpose Forces

Difficult and important as these choices of strategic capabilities are, their budgetary implications are smaller than those of the general purpose forces which exist very largely to protect our interests and commitments abroad. The two-thirds of the defense budget that re-

24

flects these forces supports most of the Army, all of the Marine Corps, all of the Navy except the Polaris fleet, and the tactical wings of the Air Force, as well as 60 percent of expenditures on research and development and a substantial share of intelligence, communications, and support costs. These are the military instruments available to support the alliances by which the United States is formally joined to forty-five countries—twenty-one in the Western Hemisphere, thirteen in Western Europe, two in Central Asia, six in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and three in the Far East—and to protect American interests in other countries to which we are not formally allied.

Planning general purpose forces to deal with all the contingencies that may arise in such a broad geographic and political spectrum frequently encounters severe practical problems. Current analysis cannot precisely tailor forces to likely demand, nor is force planning designed to lock the resulting capabilities irreversibly into some fixed geographic allocation. Finally, the active and high priority reserve forces specified in such plans are not designed to fight a major war from start to finish, but to cope with the immediately available capabilities of the potential enemy while other reserves are activated and new units mobilized.

With these limitations in mind, it was determined in the 1960s that, taking into account allied forces, U.S. planning should provide the active and high priority reserve forces needed to wage the initial stages of major and simultaneous conflicts in Europe and Asia (as in the Second World War), and a sufficient capability to deal with a much smaller conflict involving U.S. forces in the Western Hemisphere at the same time. In Europe this meant that NATO should be capable of a non-nuclear forward defense against a major conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact on the basis of approximate equality in deployed combat manpower and tactical aircraft, in the rates of deployment of strategic reserves, and in the ability to sustain them. In Asia, the planning goal was the force required to withstand conventional attacks by North Korea or North Vietnam supported by mainland China. However, limitations imposed on Chinese forces by their deployments against Taiwan and the USSR and logistical difficulties suggested that it was not necessary to maintain equality in manpower as long as prevailing U.S. advantages in firepower, mobility, and logistical support prevailed. The requirements associated with the "brushfire" Western Hemisphere contingency involved only a slight enlargement of active

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forces (about one division, with associated airlift and sealift capacity). A combination of these broad propositions produced the pre-Vietnam baseline force sketched in Table 2-8 on page 38. The spectrum of possible force levels and patterns is as wide in the general purpose as it is in the strategic area, but again it is possible to describe three fundamentally different postures that would be reflected in significantly different budget levels. Table 2-3 provides aggregate estimates for these options.

Table 2-3. Estimated Expenditures for Alternative General Purpose Forces, Fiscal Years 1971, 1973, and 1975ª

Billions of current dollars

<table><thead><tr><th>Alternative force</th><th>1971</th><th>1973</th><th>1975</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Low budget</td><td>34.0</td><td>37.5</td><td>40.5</td></tr><tr><td>Pre-Vietnam</td><td>44.0</td><td>48.5</td><td>52.0</td></tr><tr><td>Heavy modernization budget</td><td>53.0</td><td>58.5</td><td>62.5</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: The cost of the pre-Vietnam general purpose baseline forces is derived from the program budget in *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1971*, p. 84. Explanation for the low budget and heavy modernization budget variants are in the text.

a. See note (a) to Table 2-2.

First is the possibility of shifting the broad planning assumption to allow for only one major conflict and one minor one at any one time—or shifting to a low-budget general purpose force. This suggestion is frequently based on the explicit or implicit proposition that, despite uncertainty in Vietnam and Laos and commitments in Thailand and the Republic of Korea, the United States need not prepare for another major land war in Asia. Alternatively, it is sometimes suggested that even though we could use a large part of the remaining single major-war capability to respond to an Asian contingency, the problem involved in so doing would exert a useful restraining influence on the President. If adopted, this posture might lead to elimination of as many as six Army divisions, three wings of tactical aircraft, and six attack carriers, along with a significant reduction in amphibious assault and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces in the Pacific. The resulting decline in expenditures would be at least $10 billion a year (at 1971 prices) below the pre-Vietnam baseline of $44 billion, to a level of about $34 billion a year; but it would leave the United States with two Marine divisions with air wings, at least one attack carrier on station, and four fighter/bomber wings available for service in the Pacific.

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Second, the nation might elect to continue with the pre-Vietnam baseline force, which was intended to have the capability simultaneously to make an initial response in two major wars and one minor conflict. It also emphasized the mobility of U.S.-based men and equipment to permit both flexible geographic allocation and protection against the necessity to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict. This posture would express a willingness on the part of the United States to maintain its military readiness with respect to both Europe and Asia, or to engage in a very large-scale effort in one theater at a time. It would cost on the order of $44 billion a year at 1971 prices.

Third, it might be decided that the U.S. posture should be based on two major and one minor conflicts but that the forces in being should be substantially improved in firepower, mobility, tactical air support, and the like. The result might be called a heavy modernization budget. It would permit much greater tactical mobility and firepower for the land forces, large-scale acquisition of the F-14 and F-15 fighters, an increase in attack carrier task forces, more "high speed" attack submarines and ASW escorts, at least two more C-5A airlift squadrons for strategic mobility, and the increased outlays for operation and maintenance that would go with these advanced weapon systems. The cost of such a posture would be around $53 billion in 1971 prices.

## Vietnam Costs

The discussion of policy alternatives to this point has concerned itself entirely with alternative peacetime defense postures. Obviously, the final element necessary to link these options and their budgetary consequences to the real world of the next few years is to estimate the future costs of the Vietnam conflict. There are no official projections of Vietnam force levels or budgetary costs beyond what one can infer from the President's announced intention to continue the troop withdrawals, which are scheduled to reach 115,500 by April 15, 1970. Table 2-4 shows a possible schedule of withdrawals and associated expenditure levels for illustrative purposes; it seems as reasonable as any and is incorporated below in the overall alternative estimates. This treatment also reflects the view that there is no substantial "deferred deficit" of equipment, supplies, or facilities that must be made up after the war ends, a conclusion for which the reasoning appears in the latter part of this chapter.

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Table 2-4. Expenditure Levels for Illustrative Vietnam Disengagement Program, Fiscal Years 1969-75

<table><thead><tr><th>Item</th><th>1969</th><th>1970</th><th>1971</th><th>1972</th><th>1973</th><th>1974</th><th>1975</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Military personnel (thousands of men)</td><td>538</td><td>380</td><td>200</td><td>50</td><td>0</td><td>0</td><td>0</td></tr><tr><td>Incremental outlays (billions of dollars)</td><td>23</td><td>17</td><td>11</td><td>3</td><td>1.5</td><td>1</td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

Note: These are purely illustrative estimates. However, through fiscal 1971 they are roughly consistent with the budget document projections of total armed forces personnel strength shown in Table 2-7. See also Tables 2-11, 2-13, and 2-15 for the cost calculations. All figures are as of the end of the fiscal year to which they relate.

The President must build his defense budget recommendations out of three major components: strategic nuclear forces, general purpose forces, and incremental forces for Vietnam. It used to be argued that the first two were inversely related, but recent thinking largely holds that deterrence of nuclear attack and readiness for conventional conflict are two quite different problems in which the capability for one is not much related to the capability for the other.

Thus the President has what amounts to a matrix of possibilities that provides at least nine different levels of defense spending. Table 2-5 shows these possibilities projected over five years, incorporating expected wage and price changes during the period. Each alternative also includes Vietnam estimates according to the above schedule. In 1971 prices the alternatives range from $59 billion to $88 billion; by 1975, taking account of reduced Vietnam costs on the one hand and higher prices and wages on the other, the range is from $58 billion to $92 billion. Again, it should be remembered that variation from these broad projections is not only possible but extremely likely. These figures are neither more nor less than orders of magnitude corresponding to the major options identified.

## Thrust of the 1971 Budget

Table 2-6 breaks down the 1971 defense budget proposals by program. It highlights the fact that, despite the administration's policy to proceed with the Safeguard ABM and the testing and deployment of MIRVs, only a very moderate increase is proposed in funds authorized for strategic nuclear forces. In general, the $5 billion in expenditure cuts results from disengagement in Vietnam. The President's February message on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970s clearly indicates that a reexamination of U.S. military doctrine with respect to possible future engagement in a major land war in Asia has taken

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place, but the specific contingencies and force level determinations connected with this policy have not yet been forthcoming, at least in public sources.

## Strategic Nuclear Forces

Assured destruction apparently remains the object toward which the strategic forces are principally directed. As the budget puts it, "Our strategic forces are designed to provide a highly reliable and credible ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon those who might attempt a nuclear attack upon the United States or its allies."¹ The President asked, however, in his February message whether, in a retaliatory strike, he should "be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans. Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?"²

The proposal to continue deployment of Safeguard makes clear the desire for at least some damage-limiting capability, presumably against mainland China. The AWACS-F-106X air defense system is also under development as a replacement for the present obsolescent SAGE-BUIC system, supposedly at only slightly higher procurement and operating cost over the next decade. Though the Safeguard sites programmed for Malmstrom, Montana; GrandForks, North Dakota; Warren, Wyoming; and Whiteman, Missouri (all Air Force bases) will afford a measure of protection to land-based ICBMs and some bombers, what principally seems to be involved is an effort to force the Soviet Union, which is likely to be uncertain of the effectiveness of Safeguard, to choose between a major expansion of its SS-9 program and abandoning any hope of acquiring the ability to destroy our land-based ICBMs. With respect to the ABM's role as a protector of the civilian population, Safeguard will be able at best—and at very considerable cost—to deal with very light attacks.

Turning to strategic offensive forces, the President proposes to continue perfecting MIRV technology and to deploy MIRVs on the new missiles soon to be introduced into the forces, Minuteman III and Poseidon. He plans a modest acceleration of the ULMS research and development program to provide a sea-based platform for large, long-range missiles should the SS-9 buildup continue and pose a

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serious threat to land-based missiles that Safeguard cannot handle. The budget also proposes to proceed with short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) that would give the bomber force the capability to attack targets from outside sophisticated short-range defenses. The AMSA is continued at only a relatively low level of effort as a replacement for the B-52. In short, survivability and penetration receive the bulk of attention in the offensive programs.

Each of these investments in strategic nuclear systems, offensive and defensive, raises five separate but related issues. First is the issue of the goals toward which the entire strategic establishment is directed, the criteria by which it is judged, and the specific contribution of each system. Second, there is the technical question, particularly relevant in the case of Safeguard, whether the system will work at all and, if so, at what level of effectiveness and cost. Third, it must be asked whether each system represents the best buy when compared with other possibilities. Fourth, the government must decide which systems represent blue chips at SALT and which tactic—acceleration or restraint—is most likely to produce the desired Soviet response. Finally, and closely related to SALT strategy, this country must try to foresee the effect of each decision on the attitudes of present and potential holders of nuclear weapons, particularly but not exclusively the Soviet Union and mainland China.

Of course the chemistry of the U.S.-Soviet relation is the most sensitive and important of these issues, and because of it, we need constant reminding that U.S. options will change with time. The decision to proceed with MIRVs, for example, even though—or perhaps because —SALT resumes in April, raises a serious question. Will the United States be able to join with the USSR in a verifiable ban on MIRVs, should it so desire, given the difficulty of unilaterally verifying the absence of these weapons when it is known they have been tested and can be deployed? A failure to ban MIRVs, even at this late date, may be a genuine tragedy if agreement might otherwise have been possible. Yet to propose that we forego further MIRV testing requires two judgments: that in the short run a cessation of testing would not lead to an unacceptable risk for the U.S. strategic position, and that in the longer run there is a reasonable chance that such an action on our part would induce a similar Soviet response.

These judgments are important to the basic reconsideration of strategic policy that the times clearly demand. If the United States adopts a minimal view of what it takes to deter the Soviet Union and

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possibly other nuclear nations from attacks on this country and its allies, it follows that with the very large forces already at our disposal we can afford to defer further major programs—such as MIRVs, the ABM, and AMSA—in order to test the will to arms limitations and at the same time to save money for other pressing needs. If, on the other hand, we decide that assured destruction alone is not a credible deterrent, then we must demonstrate the capacity, in the event of an enemy attack, to carry out something other than a suicidal attack on his cities—for example, a strike against his missile sites or military bases—particularly if we want our allies to refrain from nuclear investments. And this, in turn, may require some margin of striking power above a substantial retaliatory capability. These issues and the five preceding ones related above are in sore need of systematic consideration. There is no evidence in the 1971 budget that they have yet been decided. The strategic programs in this budget represent a modest restatement and continuation of previous policies.

## General Purpose Forces

Much the same can be said of the budget for general purpose forces. To the extent that it reveals a rationale, the logic remains essentially the same as it was in 1969 and 1970—the need for versatility and the ability to follow a wide range of strategies other than general nuclear war. If this is the case, it would mean baseline forces comprising on the order of sixteen and one-third Army divisions and three Marine divisions, essentially the same National Guard and reserve forces as before, twenty-three wings of Air Force fighter-bombers, fifteen attack carriers with their air wings, 239 ASW and AAW escorts, more than sixty nuclear attack submarines (SSNs), including at least six of the new high-speed variety, four ASW carriers to be outfitted with the new S-3A aircraft, along with at least 300 land-based patrol aircraft, and a large force of amphibious assault ships, minesweepers, and fire support ships. The strategic airlift will presumably stop at fourteen squadrons of C-141s and four squadrons of C-5As; the sealift will probably remain out of balance with the airlift unless the Congress approves Secretary Laird's recent proposal to construct the equivalent of fast deployment logistics ships (FDLs) under charter arrangements.

Although the baseline general purpose forces have undergone a modest reduction as a result of base closures, the mothballing of older ships, and the retirement of aging aircraft, they bear a striking resemblance

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blance to the pre-Vietnam baseline force. Yet Secretary Laird has hinted in his 1970 posture statement, and newspaper reports have asserted, that a major change in the baseline force is in the offing. Secretary Laird states flatly that we never have had the capability to cope simultaneously with two major contingencies and one minor contingency, and that "under our new strategy we will maintain in peacetime General Purpose Forces that are adequate for simultaneously meeting a major communist attack in either Europe or in Asia, assisting allies to cope with non-Chinese threats in Asia, and in addition, meeting a contingency elsewhere."a

Less formal descriptions of the new strategy suggest that we plan to dispense with many of the baseline forces now supposedly associated with the Asian contingency and perhaps even revert to a greater dependence—at least for "jawboning" purposes—on the tactical use of nuclear weapons. Such a change could mean a substantial reduction in the cost of the baseline general purpose forces. It would also mean a somewhat greater risk—particularly if land forces and strategic mobility were the first to be cut—since there is great uncertainty as to just how many forces are needed for any major contingency. Consequently an issue for the future, if not for 1971, is the extent to which changes in general purpose forces should be rigidly related to changes in the number of contingencies for which we prepare, and how many of these forces we really want to dispense with as a result of the Guam doctrine.

In his message on United States foreign policy for the 1970s, the President indicated that the new strategy is an "effort to harmonize doctrine and capability." To the extent that this foreshadows a reduction in baseline general purpose forces, it could have one of several results. First, the United States might exercise much greater restraint in committing and deploying its military power. Second, it might simply avoid becoming committed simultaneously on two fronts, the prospects of which, in the President's view, "are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation." Third, we might place greater reliance on our theater nuclear forces. Indeed, there is at least the hint of such an intention in the President's statement that "the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies," and in his suggestion that, in the unlikely event of combined Sino-Soviet aggres-

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sion, "we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces."⁴

In these circumstances, we need to ask how serious we really are about substituting tactical nuclear weapons for conventional forces and warfare. During the past fifteen years the case for such a substitution has failed to withstand systematic examination. If there are serious new arguments for believing that the theater nuclear forces provide the United States with some advantage heretofore unrealized, it is important to examine them.

Whatever may be decided with respect to the future size of the general purpose forces, there remain a great many issues concerning their specific composition. One of the most urgent has to do with tactical air capability. If the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps wings are all counted as part of that capability, it costs about $14 billion a year and provides more than forty-one fighter-attack wings. At least 30 percent of this capability is intended for deep interdiction of enemy lines of communication, despite the fact that experience in Korea and Vietnam has raised an increasing challenge to the utility of interdiction sorties. There is also a question whether more than twelve attack carriers are needed, requiring that we keep buying new attack carrier task forces at an investment cost of more than $1.8 billion apiece, despite the availability of land bases in the main theaters where the United States is heavily committed. There is the related question whether the proposed F-14 and F-15 Navy and Air Force fighters are the best possible successors to the F-4, and the rate at which the F-4s should be replaced.

A great many other issues concerning the general purpose forces are already subjects of intense debate among defense analysts. They have to do with the future utility of large amphibious forces, the need for ASW carriers and diesel-powered submarines, the advantages of large and very expensive destroyers rather than destroyer escorts, the extent to which the new main battle tank makes sense as a replacement for the M-60, and such detailed matters as the wisdom of continuing to add electronic equipment with low reliability to aircraft and to substitute missiles for guns on armored vehicles.

As equipment and its maintenance grow increasingly expensive, still other questions arise. At any given budget level, are we willing to accept supposedly advanced technology as a substitute for numbers? For example, do we really believe that one F-14 is the equivalent of two or

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three F-4s? Alternatively, with rapidly rising costs and presumed increases in effectiveness, is it necessary to replace existing aircraft, ships, helicopters, and tanks on a one-for-one basis? And in what may be an era of declining defense budgets, are we willing to sacrifice combat readiness in the short run so as to continue paying for new equipment with high technology and long lead-times? Should we forego the costs of sonobuoys and torpedoes, ordnance and rockets, spare parts and maintenance manpower, at a risk to sustained combat effectiveness, until such time as defense budgets become more generous? Does it make sense to keep large land forces in the United States if we are not also willing to maintain enough airlift and sealift to move them to areas of commitment in a timely fashion?

When the bills for such imbalances come due, they tend to be very high indeed. Cutting the defense budget therefore involves not only a question of how much, but also where. Whether or not a further decline in defense spending is desirable, if we still care about the military effectiveness of the U.S. defense establishment we must learn to be as concerned about the distribution of defense dollars as we are about the absolute size of the expenditures. The 1971 budget provides little new guidance on either.

## Vietnam Disengagement

Table 2-7 shows the reductions in defense personnel in 1970 and 1971, most of which are attributable to disengagement from Vietnam.

It seems plausible to infer from the budget that about $6 billion in Vietnam war costs will be saved in 1971 compared with the previous year. The main budgetary issue with respect to Vietnam is, of course, the rate of troop withdrawals. If the armed force reductions called for

Table 2-7. Personnel Strength, Department of Defense, Fiscal Years 1969-71ª

<table><thead><tr><th>Fiscal year</th><th>Military personnel</th><th>Reduction</th><th>Civilian personnel</th><th>Reduction</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1969 (actual)</td><td>3,459,423</td><td>...</td><td>1,225,877</td><td>...</td></tr><tr><td>1970 (estimate)</td><td>3,160,700</td><td>298,723</td><td>1,165,900</td><td>59,977</td></tr><tr><td>1971 (estimate)</td><td>2,908,100</td><td>252,600</td><td>1,110,000</td><td>55,800</td></tr><tr><td>Total reduction (estimate)</td><td>...</td><td>551,323</td><td>...</td><td>115,777</td></tr></tbody></table>

Source: Special Analyses, Budget of the United States, Fiscal Year 1971, pp. 100, 102.

a. All figures are as of the end of the fiscal year to which they relate.

[t]

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in the budget primarily reflect withdrawals from Vietnam, this would seem to imply the removal of about 180,000 men from the theater and a further reduction of perhaps 60,000 or more along the line of communication and within the United States. This would leave about 200,000 men in Vietnam by the end of 1971. Judging from other administration statements, however, the budget numbers should not be taken to reflect an inviolable schedule of withdrawal.

## Long-Term Implications

To say that major issues of long-term strategic and general purpose force policy have not been decided is not to suggest that the defense budget for fiscal 1971 ignores them. As the disengagement from Vietnam continues, major units are being disbanded and the defense establishment is shrinking. As indicated in the following section, many programs that had previously come under fire have been cancelled or severely curtailed. Nevertheless, it remains true that the defense budget as yet commits the administration to no clear course for the longer term.

Critics will argue that the budget contains the seed money for a rapid growth in expenditures on future weapon systems, and they may be right. About 130 new systems, estimated to involve a total procurement cost of at least $140 billion, are under development or in procurement, and new systems, once started, have proved notoriously difficult to cancel. As the cost of hardware increases by a factor of two or more, the United States could end up with higher budgets, less manpower, and lower fighting effectiveness.

This is not, however, a necessary result. Although programs such as the F-14, the F-15, AMSA, AWACS, and Safeguard would increase future budgets if they were added on top of everything else and rapidly procured, this outcome is by no means preordained. As new systems are brought into the active inventory, older systems with high operating costs can be retired, although there is usually a lag between new procurement and the phasing out of the older systems. Moreover, the rate of deployment of the new systems will determine whether there are sharp increases in the appropriations for military personnel, operations and maintenance, and procurement. Programs can be bunched up or stretched out, depending on the actions of potential adversaries, the fiscal situation, and the other uses to which

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There is no escaping the fact that the making of a defense budget demands difficult and fundamental choices. Simplistic theories about defense outlays are inadequate to the depth of security interests and the complexity of the means employed to protect them. They miss the central point that there is a hierarchy of decisions along the way to the defense budget and that each step confronts the President with a variety of complicated issues as he struggles with even broader questions of allocating federal funds. Only by addressing these steps in a serious and knowledgeable way can those not burdened with his responsibilities be helpful.

[w]

# THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND OUR ASIAN COMMITMENTS

By Earl C. Ravenal

EIGHTEEN months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.

The President's foreign policy declaration of February 1970 promised that "our interests, our foreign policy objectives, our strategies and our defense budgets are being brought into balance—with each other and with our overall national priorities."¹ After a decade of burgeoning military spending and entanglement in foreign conflict, the nation has welcomed the vision of lower defense budgets balanced by a reduction in American involvement overseas, particularly in Asia. Actually, however, the Administration's new policies and decision processes do not bring about the proposed balance; in fact, they create a more serious imbalance. Essentially we are to support the same level of potential involvement with smaller conventional forces. The specter of intervention will remain, but the risk of defeat or stalemate will be greater; or the nuclear threshold will be lower. The fundamental issues of interests, commitments and alliances are not resolved.

## II

The objectives of close-in military containment and the for-

¹ Richard Nixon, "U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, February 18, 1970).

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ward defense of our Asian allies present us with a series of bleak choices:

With regard to deterrence: (1) perpetuation of a high level of active conventional forces, conspicuously deployed or deployable; (2) fundamental and obvious reliance on nuclear weapons; or (3) acknowledgment of the higher probability of an enemy initiative.

With regard to initial defense: (1) maintenance or rapid deployment of large armies in Asia; (2) early recourse to tactical nuclear weapons; or (3) acceptance of the greater risk of losing allied territory.

With regard to terminating a war: (1) large commitments of troops and heavy casualties; (2) use of nuclear weapons, either tactical or strategic; or (3) resignation to an indefinite and wasting stalemate, tantamount to defeat.

The only solution that transcends the triangle of unsatisfactory choices is to reevaluate our interests in Asia; restate those objectives that implicate us in the possibility of war on the Asian mainland and diminish our control over our actions; resist the grand and vapid formulas of our role in Asia—such as the existential platitude that “we are a Pacific power”—that perpetuate the illusion of paramountcy; retreat from the policy of military containment of China; and revise the alliances that have come to represent our commitment to containment.

But this course the President has consistently rejected: “...we will maintain our interests in Asia and the commitments that flow from them. ... The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.” Thus the root problem of the Nixon Doctrine is its abiding commitment to the containment of China. In the furtherance of this policy our government hopes to maintain all our present Asian alliances and de facto commitments, profiting from their deterrent value but avoiding their implications. Yet it also intends to scale down our conventional military capability. The result is that the Nixon Doctrine neither reduces our potential involvement in Asian conflicts nor resolves the resulting dilemma by providing convincingly for a defense that will obviate reliance on nuclear weapons.

Let us examine the prospect of the Nixon Doctrine as a relief from involvement in Asian contingencies. The trauma that has resulted from our inability to win decisively in Vietnam has caused our policy-makers to suggest a limitation of future in-

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volvement on the basis of a distinction between external or overt
aggression on the one hand, and insurgency, political subversion
and civil war on the other. The President attempts in this way
to avoid the strategy dilemma by altering the criteria for inter-
vention and thus understating the probability of involvement:

... we cannot expect U. S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world. This is particularly true of subversion and guerrilla warfare, or "wars of national liberation." Experience has shown that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.

But this is nothing more than a postulation that the unwished contingency will not arise. The hard question remains: What if these "best means" are not successful? Under those conditions what kind of solutions does the Nixon Doctrine envisage? Might the United States be impelled to intervene with combat forces? The President states:

... a direct combat role for U. S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our interests and our commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response.

But this formula for discrimination and discretion seems both
unclear and unrealistic. At what point does an insurgency be-
come "external aggression"? A definition sometimes proposed
is the introduction of enemy main-force units, rather than mere
individual fillers. But, even apart from the difficult question of
verification, this event might be well beyond the point where our
intervention became critical to the situation. The paradox is that
in critical cases we might not wish to define the situation to pre-
clude intervention; in less than critical cases we would not need
to invoke nice distinctions to justify it. In any case, relying on
formulas and distinctions misses the point: it is simply not
credible that we would sacrifice our still-held objectives to the
vagaries of circumstance.

Indeed, as long as our policy remains the containment of
China and the repression of Asian communism, we are inclined
to view even largely indigenous revolutions as objective instances
of the purposes of Peking or Hanoi or Pyongyang. Consequently,
if an insurgency in an allied or even a neutral country began to

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succeed, we would probably first increase logistical aid, then extend the role of advisers and provide air support. Since such moves might bring a countervailing response from the Asian communist sponsors of the insurgency, we might have to choose between sending ground forces and allowing an ally to lose by our default. In certain extremities we might be forced to the final choice among unlimited conventional escalation, defeat of our own forces, or "technological escalation" to the use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, with our formal or implied commitments and the President's open-ended prescription, the United States might yet be drawn into a land war on the Asian mainland or have to confront equally dire alternatives. In this respect the Nixon Doctrine does not improve on the policy that led to Vietnam. And, of course, our exposure to involvement in the case of more overt aggression, such as a Chinese-supported invasion in Korea or Southeast Asia, remains undiminished.

The only proposition that has become clear about the Nixon Doctrine is that its most advertised hope of resolving the strategy problem—both reducing the forces we maintain for Asian defense and avoiding involvement in conflict—is Asianization, i.e. the substitution of indigenous forces, equipped through enlarged U.S. military assistance, for American troops. The case for expanded military assistance has been stated with unprecedented urgency by Secretary Laird in preparation for vastly increased Military Assistance Program (MAP) budget requests for 1972 and succeeding fiscal years. Secretary Laird has characterized MAP as "the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units."²

But the Secretary recognizes the declining level of popular and Congressional support for military assistance. His solution, considered perennially within the Defense and State Departments but proposed for the first time in a Secretarial posture statement to the Congress, is that "military assistance should be integrated into the Defense Budget so that we can plan more rationally and present to the Congress more fully an integrated program." Military aid for certain "forward defense countries," including South Vietnam, Thailand and Laos, and consisting of

² Melvin R. Laird, "Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget" (Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, March 2, 1970).

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about 80 percent of the total category "Support for Other Nations," is already meshed into the Defense Budget. This legislative ploy has not yet been applied to Korea or Taiwan, though the reduction of our troops in Korea and the insurance of Taiwan against communist pressure depend, in the judgment of this Administration, on the freedom to substitute U.S. matériel for manpower.

To merge military assistance entirely into the regular functional appropriation categories of the Defense Budget would be to institutionalize the dual rationale for military assistance that has become traditional in debate within the Department of Defense. The first element in this rationale is the argument from "trade-off"—a calculus that compares the costs of equal units of effectiveness of U. S. and foreign troops. This is essentially an assertion of "absolute advantage" and is the basic and obvious sense of Secretary Laird's statement: "A MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces."

The second element is the argument from "comparative advantage," borrowed from the economic theory of international trade: "Each nation must do its share and contribute what it can appropriately provide—manpower from many of our allies; technology, material, and specialized skills from the United States." The proponents of military comparative advantage assert, by analogy, that the coöperating and specializing defense community can "consume" security at a higher level. It may be, however, that they can only consume more of the tangible intermediate trappings of security, i.e. the forces and arms. The essence of security, especially for the United States as the senior partner, might depend more on certain qualitative factors. In fact, there are several difficulties in the Administration's ostensibly neutral and technical arguments for military assistance.

First, both trade-off and comparative advantage assume and confirm the inevitability and relevance of the shared mission—that is, the forward defense of the ally's territory. But only if we cannot avoid this mission is it proper to confine the debate to the optimal distribution of roles and costs.

Second, the argument from comparative advantage, like the economic theory at its origin, stresses specialization. But the concomitant of specialization is interdependence. Thus a policy of selective reliance on allies, in order to be effective, implies auto-

⁸ $2.443 billion out of $3.127 billion in the President's budget for fiscal year 1971.

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matic involvement from the earliest moments of a conflict.⁴

Third, early experience indicates that U.S. ground forces can-
not simply be traded off with precisely calculated increments of
military assistance. They must be politically ransomed by dis-
proportionate grants, more conspicuous deployments and more
fervent and explicit confirmations of our commitment.⁵

Fourth, from the diplomatic standpoint the substitution of
massive infusions of modern arms for U.S. troops is anything but
neutral. To the North Koreans and their sponsors, for example,
the one and one-half billion dollars of support and new equip-
ment we now intend to give South Korea might look very pro-
vocative and destabilizing. A new phase of the peninsular arms
race could be the result, with a net loss to regional and U.S.
security.

Finally, the legislative tactic of integrating the Military Assistance Program into the Defense Budget would remove military assistance as an object of the broader concerns of foreign policy and assign it to the jurisdiction of more narrowly defense-oriented Congressional committees. The debate would be less political and more technical. The focus would shift from the question of involvement to the question of relative costs. Thus Asianization, which is the keystone of the Nixon Doctrine, would substitute some Asian forces and resources, but along the same perimeter of interest. It affords a pretext for reducing expense, but it does not enhance our security or relieve us from involvement.

III

The basic question is whether the Nixon Doctrine is an honest
policy that will fully fund the worldwide and Asian commit-
ments it proposes to maintain, or whether it conceals a drift
toward nuclear defense or an acceptance of greater risk of local

⁴ After the decision to reduce the ceiling on U.S. troops in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000, our government moved to base permanently there a wing of F-4 fighter-bombers. An American official explained: "Our aim is to reassure the Koreans during this difficult period. Despite budgetary cuts, it shows we intend to maintain our relative air strength here. They know that the minute an air attack starts, we're involved." (The New York Times, August 17, 1970.)

⁵ The Administration proposes special budget requests of $1 billion over a five-year period for Korean force modernization, in addition to about $700 million likely to be provided in the regular military assistance budget. Even then, the Republic of Korea is demanding $2-3 billion, plus public assurances of no further troop withdrawals until after five years and the actual completion of the promised modernization program.

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defeat. The most obvious change in our military posture is that the new formula provides conventional forces to counter a major communist thrust in Asia or Europe, but not simultaneously. As the President has explained:

> The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 1960's was the so-called "2½ war" principle. According to it, U.S. forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency—all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached.

In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "1½ war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.

What will be the ultimate force levels associated with the new 1½-war strategy, and how can we assess their implications for Asian defense? Peacetime forces are obviously entailed by the extent of our commitments, but in no precisely determined way. A most important intermediate term—which could account for wide differences in strategy and forces—is the probable simultaneity of contingencies.⁶ The Nixon strategy of 1½ wars is explicitly founded on the improbability of two simultaneous major contingencies. Thus demands on the planned general purpose forces are to be considered alternative rather than additive.

Can we then expect a force reduction equivalent to the requirement for defending against the lesser of the major contingencies? To support the previous strategy of 2½ wars, the Baseline (or peacetime) Force Structure was thought to provide seven active divisions for Southeast Asia, two for Korea, eight for NATO, and two and one-third for a minor contingency and a strategic reserve—a total of 19-1/3. Since the present 1½-war doctrine includes only one major contingency, in NATO or Asia, one might derive an active ground force as low as 10-1/3 divisions.

Such a literal expectation, however, is confused by the President's desire to insure "against greater than expected threats by maintaining more than the forces required to meet conventional threats in one theater—such as NATO Europe;" the fact that certain types of divisions are inherently specialized for certain geographical contingencies, so that all eight of our armored and

⁶ Other sources of uncertainty and wide variation are: the readiness of our reserve divisions, the amount of available airlift and sealift, and the effectiveness of allied forces.

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mechanized divisions will probably remain oriented to NATO and inapplicable to Asian defense; and finally, the judgments of both the President and Secretary Laird that the force levels necessary to implement the previous 2½-war policy "were never reached."

But it seems clear that the ultimate Baseline Force Structure under the Nixon Doctrine will contain even fewer divisions for the Asian requirement than the minimal proposals for a conventional defense.⁷ The reduced conventional force is most significant as a reflection of the altered concept of Asian defense embodied in the Nixon Doctrine. The constituent propositions of this concept are: (1) the most likely threats to our Asian allies do not involve Chinese invasion, and (2) with greatly expanded military assistance our allies can largely provide the ground forces to counter such threats.

There is a third proposition, strongly implied by the logic of the problem and markedly signaled in the President's foreign policy statement: in a future Asian conflict, particularly if it does involve China, United States intervention is likely to carry with it the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

- the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies;

- the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces.

Though the "coördinated" attack described by the President is improbable, it should be noted that "theater nuclear forces" are prescribed as deterrents against the *single* contingency of a "Chinese attack on our Asian allies." Also, there are more plausible scenarios that would, in terms of their potential to immobilize U.S. forces, be the functional equivalent of a major attack: a Soviet military build-up and political pressure in central or southern Europe; or China's rendering massive logistical support to one of her Asian allies to the point where that ally could release overwhelming forces against a neighboring country; or

⁷ About five to seven divisions have been considered the minimum to blunt and delay an attack along the main access routes in Southeast Asia, then fall back to a defensible perimeter. Against a communist invasion of Korea it was thought that the South Korean army alone could hold initially north of Seoul until reinforced by Korean reserves or U.S. units to be mobilized or diverted from other requirements.