DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By

NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCONE
Cargo/Kissinger

9:05 am 1/29/70

C: I understand the European discussion went well. I am glad. I want to check to see if we were on the same wave length on the French paper.

K: I don't think we were at the meeting. I thought I would handle it when it came over. We cannot take it out of the NSC.

C: I understood that there was no NSC meeting.

K: I don't care

C: The missing paper is the issues paper on the military relating to the Pompidou visit. These issues are all grouped under section 3 of the revised paper. We can pull them out for the Pompidou visit.

K: That would be helpful because that was what I was going to do.

C: I wanted to talk to you.

K: I told Elliott that the relationship could not be better.

C: I want to keep it that way. But I had a sense

thought

K: I thought someone wanted to make it a single paper.

C: That was my fault. I thought you wanted to pull the issues out. I thought that for the Pompidou visit a memo from the Secretary to the President would suffice.

K: I think the President now is focusing on European issues. I think that with what Wilson said, the President doesn't agree. For instance, Europe should be independent except militarily. So if you can get it over we might have an NSC meeting.

C: The Secretary will have to decide whether to send a memo. It would depend on whether there will be an NSC.

K: We could have one.

C: I will have an issues and options paper to you shortly.

By ace NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

10:45 am

1/29/70

K: On that air pollution thing.

L: I sent you a little memo. Did I make the point?

K: Yes

L: I tried to be as light (?) as I could.

K: We got the message. I wanted to get it started now. What they would like to do is accept what you have in that last paragraph. The $40 million instead of the $65 million.

L: They want to go for the last paragraph? Do you want us to send a re-draft of the memo over along that line?

K: Could you do that

L: I will do that. I must talk to the President about this.

K: I told the President now that this cannot be done next year.

L: I cannot keep

K: Bryce Harlow agrees with you. If we break the confidence of the military in their civilian leaders, it isn't worth it.

L: I keep reading about what we are trying to do with a 1964 -- I have to have some awareness on this. Everyone is saying we can meet our commitments without any resources.

K: The President is most anxious on the SAM sites.

K: We think we got the two. We will know within a little while if we get a reaction.

K: Make sure you hit more than one site.

L: We went for two and got two but there may be one down the pass. If we get a response we will go for it.

K: You will go for it even without a response?

L: Yes, but we don't tell people that.

By NARA, Date 5/21

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

10:45 am 1/29/70

-2-

K: You have 2 and possibly 3. Secondly, the President would appreciate it if you could make some recommendation on Wheeler.

L: I did

K: Ane you are in favor of Moorer? He won't announce anything. This is just for his own thinking. When do you think the time is right on bringing Moorer in on the discussions.

L: About the first of March.

K: He is aboard?

L: I sent comments on that. It will be tough. I don't want any approaches on that until I have it worked out.

K: We won't do anything. He thinks we should make an announcement though before it's gone too far.

L: March will be time enough.

K: You are not thinking of any other changes?

L: Yes, but not at that time. A replacement.

K: For Moorer?

L: Right.

K: But not at that time. I wanted to be sure of the team

K:

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Kendall/Kissinger
10:55 am 1/29/70

Kendall: We are having dinner on the trade bill. We have Hey members such as Boggs, Mills and the rest of the list. There would be a reception from 6:00 - 8:00 and then dinner. We'll have all the Senators there who are in on the trade bill:

K: Could someone send me a note on this? I have difficulties making appointments on the phone. Anything you want me to do I will do if it's possible.

Kendall: I have written to the President about my trip to the Far East. I am leaving March 12 and going to Osaka. Then I am going to Korea and Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Bangkok. The President suggested stopping by Saigon. I have no intention of doing that unless there is something he wants done.

K: He probably wanted your impression.

Kendall: I will be back on March 25 (?). I would like to see you. We have discussed this so much and I will be up to my ~~ ears out there. ~~

K: I am usually there on those things.

(Somewhere in the conversation -- missed by the notetaker -- Mr. Kendall eluded to a meeting with the President after his return. Thus HAK's final comment)

By NARA, Date 3/97

TELCOM
Javits/Kissinger

11:05 am

1/29/70

J: I struck a blow for freedom. Your people are in 7th heaven all over the world. As far as Mrs. Meyer is concerned, I told her to keep her mouth shut temper. I told her it would work out. I think it was terrific and I was delighted with it. I am reporting to the Senate on Monday. I have a proposition to put to the Senate. I have thought of the possibility of something to do with the 4 power meetings. Tell the Israelis they can join if they consent to also allowing the Arabs to come. This way we might get them all together.

K: It's an interesting idea. Have you talked with Sisco?

J: Trial ______. It gives us something else to do. Something for the 4 power business

K: Would the Israelis do it?

J: I think that given the opportunity to modify their tone, they now would and, I would like to give them a chance. I will call Joe as long as it doesn't hit too badly.

K: No, it wounds like a good idea.

J: I will give it Monday as a new ______.

K: Sounds interesting.

J: I had a very interesting and long talk with President Thieu. I assume Bunker will have cabled on that. In this respect he may have the properties of another Sihanouk. The problem is whether that should be promoted. It is the traditional Asian way. Maybe no other way is right now.

K: Very interesting.

J: He is a man of considerable authority and strictly in business for himself and so is everyone else in VN. But maybe it's a situation we face.

K: Are you going to say that publicly?

J: I may. It's the most original idea I have on that.

K: Do you go along with this fellow and do something to enable us to get out.

J: At least it's a BRIDGE(?) out. Let me think about it. Only new thing that hit me.

By CCO NARA, Date 3/27

Javits/Kissinger

11:05 am 1/29/70

-2-

K: But it's important.

J: I was absolutely confirmed in my feeling. The other thing is that the Japanese are worried about our getting out of VN and they are willing to do something now

K: Very interesting

J: Meyer was delighted and he telegramed that.

K: I saw that. You did a superb job as always

J: I only did what will help. Let me call Joe. I will visit with you shortly.

K: Let's do that.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale S/27

TELCON
Ehrlichman/Kissinger

12:00 noon 1/29/70

E: Are you getting rid of the Secretary of the Army?

K: I thought he was being replaced. Have you a man?

K: The general counsel at HEW

K: Is that how you get it?

E: Just call and ask for it. I just wanted to find out where we the whole thing was. I will call Harry Dent.

K: When we are serious on that, let me know and I will help.

E: I will.

By _cc_ NAHA, Date 5/27

Telcon
Attorney General Mitchell
29 Jan 70; 12:30 p.m.

(Missed first part of conversation)

M: There is an Undersecretaries committee working on Continental Shelf, etc.

K: Yes, it creates strong feelings. I haven't focused on it yet.

M: My question to you is that Packard is making a very strong and impassioned plea for us to stay with the Defense establishment as putting an absolute requisite with the concept that somewhere, perhaps in the UN, they could back off to some extent, but that it shouldn't be given away now.

K: Yes.

M: This arises out of Dick Kleindienst's concept with some of our people who worked at DCX-7 out a compromise formula that Defense can probably live with. Defense is afraid that if the compromise is put forward at this meeting today it will be adopted and the government's posture will be eroded where somewhere they will lose some of the items they want.

K: I know, yes. Laird and Packard feel very strongly about this. My instinct is that if we could maintain a compromise position so it is purely a tactical question of how we get that. Are you going to the Undersecretaries?

M: No, Dick Kleindienst is. I think it gets down to the point where divergent positions of State and Defense maintain themselves at the present time.

K: Why don't we let them maintain their positions and let the compromise position be maintained here. Then you could reserve your position. That is what I think will be the best way to handle it because otherwise we will try to drive them off the other position.

M: He also mentioned that the damn thing will get leaked.

K: I think we should leave the confrontation where it stands.

M: Then if we want a compromise position it could come out of the White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale 5/27

- 2 -

K: John, there is one thing the President wanted me to talk over with you, but not over the phone. It will just take five or ten minutes.

M: I can always arrange it.

K: I will be here by 8:00 tomorrow. I have a breakfast at 8:00.
What time do you get in?

M: I get in at 8:00.

K: I could do it almost anytime before Noon tomorrow morning.
How about 10:00 o'clock?

M: I will come on over there then.

ms

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
1/29/70 5:40 p.m.

R: Two things to bother you with.

K: Never.

R: I had a meeting with a group of presidents of national Jewish organizations this afternoon. They were very pleased about the P's letter. But they're concerned about the Pompidou visit, and you can see why they could be. I said I thought that since the P had obviously invited him we had to go through with it and it may be for the best. Find out what he's thinking and doing.

K: That's right.

R: Wanted to mention that I had no idea what the problems were and I said I thought they were fortunate you are there. I said that you are very sophisticated on the matter and will take full advantage of the visit. I said the P is going to invite me to the dinner, and he will understand my not coming.

K: Good.

R: Now the other thing I wanted to mention is the meeting in Caracas. Doug Dillon used to go. I understand no cabinet-level person is going?

K: That's right.

R: I've had two thoughts: Mayers is a great guy, but not too much weight. Either Elliot Richardson could go, or--and this idea really excites me--George Woods. He could go to the conference, and give the opening speech, as the P's personal representative.

K: Interesting thought.

R: He'd have no problem working up a speech which you could approve. And they are all crazy about him. He knows all of the ministers of finance.

K: Interesting idea. My problem is that until the press conference is over I can't get any decisions made of this kind.

R: I know. When's the press conference?

K: At 6:30 tomorrow. But it's certainly an interesting idea.

R: I might call George and say I've taken the liberty of throwing out

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
1/29/70 5:40 p. m.

By NARA, Date 5/27

page 2

this idea. And be preparing yourself in case it materializes.

K: As long as you don't raise the expectation that he will.

R: No, he doesn't want it. He would go only because the P sent him.

K: I don't know many people like that.

R: He's already been nominated by the P on the discussion of the debt. George worked out the impasse on the debt. He prepared to discuss this in a way no one else could.

K: Very interesting idea. It hadn't occurred to me.

R: Well, it hadn't occurred to me. I just got to thinking about it today.

K: Let me raise it and see what I can get. Did you have a chance to talk with Buckley?

R: Yes. Had a meeting with him today for an hour. I said I felt I knew him from watching his TV show and because you are Henry's friend. He couldn't have been nicer and we had a marvelous time.

K: He's a nice fellow.

R: I discussed the whole political situation strategy as far as I'm concerned. He told me to get together with Mahoney, which I had planned to do. We are going to meet and talk in an informal . . . like what you are doing with the Chinese. He was terribly helpful, and I'm very grateful.

K: Not at all--I think it's in the national interest.

R: I made my case as to why I was taking Goodell. We've got to think of all these things and reconcile them within the party.

K: Well, good. I'll raise the subject of George with the P.

R: Good. In the meantime I'll mention it to George.

K: And I'll talk to Elliot Richardson just in case.

R: It's a cheap way of preserving what they in Latin America would consider a downgrading: no plan . . .

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Dato

5/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird
1/29/70 6:10 p.m.

K: ... summing up and then the three.

L: On the rules of engagement, we've got no change. I didn't ask for a change at this time. Just keep the way I've got it for these two sites.

K: I'll show that to the . . .

L: . . . .

K: I would like to brief you--discuss next with the here's something the Soviet Union and the U.S. are in agreement on.

K: Let's do it next week. And I want to talk to you before you go to Vietnam.

L: They send the thing on pollution before . . .

K: Is it what you wanted? I told Ehrlichman to wait for your draft.

L: He just went ahead and signed the damn thing. I'll send it to you anyway. We've got to think this through. The ship will hit the span quite often. We can't put everything on a dollar basis.

K: No, it's important. That's why I wanted to talk before you went away.

L: We can't go to Congress for a supplemental for Defense. I don't think we'd get it.

K: We've got to talk.

L: The I think the P has got to understand that too.

K: We've got to set up the system next year so it doesn't happen.

By NARA, Dato

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Elliot Richardson
1/29/70; 6:50 p.m.

R: We are recommending, and you will get a paper on it, to go ahead with cash sales to Argentina. It doesn't involve Conte-long -- we must prepare to make sales to Brazil, Chile and Colombia. Can you assure the President will go along with the waiver?

K: You know Chile always presents a special problem.

R: I wanted to bring it to your attention.

K: I wouldn't act on it until we approve it. When do you need an answer?

R: I think Monday.

K: He hates to be rushed into a decision.

R: You might say we need a decision as soon as we can get it.

K: I can tell you now that the decision is almost certain to be favorable. This is the kind that if he were on a trip I would sign it on my own. I will do my best to get you an answer.

R: Sorry you could not get to the meeting on the Mathias Resolution.

K: I was raising hell with my staff. The President takes a rather dim view of the Resolution.

R: The conclusion we reached was that we in State would prepare a draft of our report to the Budget Bureau from the Resolution together with a draft of an opening testimony for a State witness. Meanwhile I understand that you or your staff have submitted a memorandum to the President with a number of alternatives. We ought to see the memo.

K: I have not submitted a memo to the President and my staff does not submit anything unless it goes through me.

R: I understood you had.

K: That sort of meeting should not take place if I cannot be there -- but I am not blaming you.

By NARA, Date 5/27

R: You should blame me because I thought I should go ahead even when I knew you could not be there.

K: Harlow's interest isn't necessarily the President's. He wants to get along with Congress.

R: I was very sorry when we got the discussion underway that you weren't there.

K: The first thing we have to get straight is what we really think of this thing. What is the impact on foreign countries? What is impact if you try to restate...?

R: It is quite clear that if you had your druthers you'd wish it had never been put in.

K: The thing that bothers me about preparing a testimony -- I don't mind your preparing a testimony as long as you give me the option of saying I don't like the way it is going.

R: The only thing that I am calling about now is if that is not the way you want it to be done.

K: What I want to know is Khruschev's comment correct that both of us are paying the same spys? (Laughter)

R: We don't need a resolution to do what the President needs to do in the national interest. We are trying to avoid creating an ambiguous impression.

K: As far as the facts are concerned, I have had a long staff paper prepared to help me make up my own mind. To the best of my knowledge this has not been forwarded to the President.

R: I have no complaints about the way you run your business. All I want to be told is whether I am wasting my time in the development of a draft...

K: I would personally prefer -- I hate to be in a position where we will have to overrule an existing State Department draft.

R: We ought to have a report on the Resolution in on the onset of the hearings.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

K: I have been trying to think the problem through. I am prepared to discuss it whenever you want to. Just understand that the President may decide to take a different view.

R: I think we might as well go ahead as we left it and maybe you and I should try to find some time on Saturday.

K: As long as you don't send it over as a memorandum from the Secretary that will have to be overruled.

R: How about Saturday morning for breakfast?

K: 8:00 a.m.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telcon

Ziegler

29 Jan; 10:55

Z: ...helicopter that was shot down.

K: I don't think so.

Z: I am telling you that I know so. The reason for this call is I am getting ready to go on and we have not officially confirmed this. If I say no comment - if they say, what about this helicopter being shot down, I will say I don't have the details, you will have to get that from MACV. An F-105 was shot down together with a rescue helicopter. I have no details on it. What do you think?

K: I would check with Defense.

Z: I am checking with Defense. All the wires are going with the story. I will low key it but refer it to MACV.

K: Well, but if you say yes it happened and refer them to MACV won't that still do it? What do we gain by putting it out?

Z: I am not pushing to put it out. The question is do we "no comment" here and have them go out with a "no comment" on it.

K: For your information the helicopter was shot down over Laos.

Z: Well, I don't want to get into this.

K: Then the question is, what was the helicopter doing over North Vietnam.

Z: I will talk to Defense and handle it very low key. If you will let me have that option.

K: I would make it clear that the helicopter was shot down over Laos.

Z: I have been getting some very good guidance from Houdek. I am going to delay to let them get it out.

ms