Telcon
Secretary Rogers
9/20/70; 6:58 p.m.

R: I have been out of touch for the last 2 hours. What is the latest? Are you having the meeting?

K: Yes. There is nothing of great consequence that has happened. The Israelis said if we want anything we have got to be loud and clear, but we don't want anything.

R: Yes, be soft and obscure.

K: The President has come to the view if any action it should not be by us. What was the latest information you had?

R: Pretty much how you and I last talked. What is the meeting going to consider?

K: Just update everybody on what has happened and pros and cons of American vs Israeli action. If the Syrians come back.

(General Haig walked into HAK's office and Mr. Kissinger asked him what had happened in the last 3 hours.)

K: (Continuing) Our Embassy is still isolated. We have got Israeli intelligence report about armored battle between Syrian and Jordan armies. Essentially there isn't anything of consequence. No actions have been taken by anybody as far as I know. Your statement was played very well on TV this evening, with your picture.

R: Oh, well, but that isn't...

K: I just wanted you to know. I will call you as soon as the meeting is over.

R: All right.

ms

Telcon
The President
9/20/70; 7:25 p.m.

P: What time will the meeting [WSAG] be finished?

K: In 15 minutes probably, or maybe a half hour. We have already been meeting for about 30 minutes.

P: I will come over in a few minutes. I want to get a feel for what's going on.

K: Fine, Mr. President.

P: I will just sit in for the last part of it.

K: Terrific, Mr. President.

ms

TELECON

Kissinger/Moose (Private Secretary for PM)

September 20, 1970 11:15 p.m.

K: Hello, can you hear me?

M: Can you hear me?

K: Not very well. I have just talked to your Ambassador and I would
like to use this occasion to pass on this message received from our
Ambassador in Amman.

M: Yes

K: It read as "The King phoned me at 3:00 a.m. He said he wanted
me to pass the following most urgent message directly to the President.
Message follows: Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian
massive invasion. Northern forces disjointed. Irbid occupied. This
having disastrous effect on tired troops in the capital and surroundings.
After continuous action and shortage of supplies.." Why don't we do this
then. We will tell our Embassy to deliver it to you immediately. That's
the way to do it. I have read it to Mr. Freeman. ? ? ? from any
quarter including from you because we are asked to pass this message
to you.

M: I see. That's similar to the message we passed to you.

K: Stronger than the message you passed.

M: The same meaning.

K: As I have told your Ambassador, we have informed the Israelis
of this message, and your Ambassador as on other information.

M: Thank you very much.

K: You will tell Dennis Greenhill this?

M: Will tell them what you have told me. Have you any other comment?

K: We are discussing our own course of action which we have confined
to ______ but we have not made any decision

M: Are you considering at this time?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.1958

NARA Date 6/9/70
By AB

TELECON
Kissinger/Moose

September 20, 1970 11:15 p.m. - 2 -

K: We are considering but will not do this precipitously.

M: I have great difficulty hearing you.

K: We are considering the message but we will not precipitate action.
You will hear from us. Give my best regards to Dennis. Good bye.

M: Good night, Dr. Kissinger

mlc

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
General Haig

K: Al, I talked to Sisco. He sent a note to Brown which is good, telling him not to rule out American intervention or other countries' intervention. He hadn't heard about the WSAG meeting and I didn't raise it.

H: No, he hasn't gotten it yet but he just called here.

K: And it's all set?

H: Yes. He will be there. The only one we haven't gotten yet is Helms and he is on the other line calling in.

K: Alright fine. Well, two things. The little plane from the fleet to Israel - I am not going to bother the President.

H: You know when I say little plane I mean a single transport. It is not a combat plane. It is a personnel carrier.

K: Well, what is it? It is not a B-52.

H: No, no, they call it a Perk. It is a small transport.

K: Well, that's their problem. You know they are not going to - we get as much heat one way or another.

H: Right.

K: He raised the issue that medical personnel were in civvies or in uniform.

H: Yes. Let me give you some indication of the problems there that he does not understand and State frequently jumps into these things. If you are talking about two hospitals you are talking about a massive number of men - probably 400 or 500. They don't have civilian clothes as a general rule. Their re-supply, their maintenance while they are there, there are there - they are going to look like a bunch of bums within 24 hours.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/4/04

-2-

K: Well look, I have no interest one way or the other.

H: I think he is wrong.

K: He understood from Laird - no I think he is not wrong in the
sense that American uniforms are not the most desirable thing
now but I wouldn't hold up anything for that. But I don't
know whether we should be sending in anything until that
situation in the north clears up.

H: I couldn't agree more and I don't think things in town are as
good as they have been reported to be either.

K: They are not?

H: No, the Embassy is isolated and the reason he can't get to see
the King is because he just physically can't do it. He is held
up. They have had another guard wounded and there has been
heavy fighting all around the Embassy. I'm just not sure things
are going as rosy as everyone seems to think.

K: Jesus Christ. Of course to start that peace offensive in June
was the worst mistake we made. To reply to Soviet SA 3s by
starting a peace offensive, directed at Israel, that was our
disaster. I mean it. That put the cat among the pigeons.

H: That's right.

K: Things would have slowly deteriorated without it but not anything
like they did. If we had given 50 Phantoms to Israel, would we
have been as badly off as we are now?

H: No, not a bit.

K: Except you could never have proved it. But that isn't the issue.
On that memo to the President, that is another thing that concerns
me. Make sure there isn't any of this pansy Saunders language in
it. It has got to be firm, strong and definite.

H: I'll have Ha do it.

K: How? You just say the following were the actions taken - one,
two, three, four - as per your instructions and just tell him -
no argument, no pros and cons, just tell him what was done,
don't you think?

MMA F.O. 12258
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/06

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/4/04

H: Yes, he reacts better to that.

alright

K: I mean he reacts to pros and cons but he has no choices to make right now.

H: No, we just don't want a lot of flimflam. We just want to tell him this is what we have done.

K: And this is where we stand. What does it mean? I would have a concluding paragraph. The possibility cannot be ruled out that as in Cuba, as previously with the missiles when they offer us a cease-fire that we have got a pattern here of reassurance and at the same time a reassurance to cover an aggressive move, don't you think?

H: Well, I'm not so sure you want to do that tonight before he gets to the bullet on this one. You may not sleep for the rest of the night. On this one, you could make a good case that they have nothing to do with it.

K: I don't believe it.

H: Well, I don't either but we have no evidence of it. We know the other stuff they have got.

K: Look, they offered a cease-fire and put in SA-3s. They offered Cuban reassurance and put in a Naval base. I just don't trust these sons of bitches. But they certainly ripped it with me. I mean I didn't trust them much to begin with but they are thugs. You bet

H: They are.

K: But actually if we can get - actually, domestically it is better for us if the Israelis get involved.

H: Oh, I think so too. I just think the other is out of the question.

K: We need the others in reserve for a Soviet move.

H: That's right. That's my point. You've got more flexibility this way. And on top of that you bring down the house of cards over the issue before it surfaces.

K: Right. Is Kennedy ready to come in for the WSAG?

H: Yes, I've called him in.

K: I need a damn good paper overnight of the Israeli vs. U. S. option.

- 4 -

H: Well we've got one of those fairly well drafted.

K: Well have it for me at 7:00 and I'll just run through it with the group.
I need the address of Kay Graham where I am supposed to be at
dinner at 8:00 -- I have misplaced it.

H: Okay.

K: Make sure that this wrapup is going to the President within the hour.

H: Right.

K: I'd rather have it shorter and over there.

H: Oh, yes.

K: Okay, I think that touches all the bases of what needs to be done.
Can you think of anything?

H: No, I think

K: Can you go home for a few hours and get some sleep because you
are going to be routed out when hell breaks loose tonight.

H: Yes. I'll just have to get some sleep -- I just haven't had enough.

K: Go home then, will you. Get that memo done and then go home
and come in at 7:00

H: Right. Okay, sir.

K: Bye

K: Hello, Al. What do you make of this?

H: That's frankly exactly what I expected.

K: That's the only thing serious people can do. What do you think they
will do - what do you think our heroes will do if they get 24 hours?

H: I think that will hold up alright. I think they will be tougher to get
from #1 an okay -- that will be the only problem because we will
end up with a new situation. They don't trust us, why should they.
They are going to improve their position after that and indeed it
will do that. You know you can't get away with what we've been doing

DECLASSIFIED

MMD E0 12958
Author

By NARA Date 6/9/04

- 5 -

H: That's just common sense. In addition to that, in the military sense of it, I sat there laughing all during that meeting. When I walked out I said, Christ Pete (?) they aren't going to accept air action. That's not why they have been successful.

K: Yes. Well, they are serious.

H: That's right. And I think that is the way to do it but I think it raises the risk somewhat in terms of the whole exercise. The alternative you have here now is you could get the President, tell him the situation and set up a conference call.

K: What time is it?

H: It's now 5:00. If we do it that way, under the guise that he wants an answer -- actually he told me and he didn't tell you first time around -- I thought you were on the first time he told me that had a conference call set up -- and he got half way through and I said Henry, I was going to ask you something and I found out that you weren't on. They thought that two or three hours would be enough time to get the decision from us.

K: Well, two or three hours won't help the sleeping problem much.

H: No. I am not so concerned about holding it together in the bureaucracy

K: You are not?

H: No, I am more concerned about just the basic issue.

K: Which is what?

H: Of getting everyone on board to b____ type action. Not the fact that that action won't be taken for a period of time.

K: But that's the only issue about holding it together in the bureaucracy. I don't understand the distinction you are making.

H: No, I thought what your concern was we couldn't keep everybody on board for another 24 hours.

K: Abroad?

H: No, on board.

K: Our Government?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authorit.
By ____ NARA Date 6/4/04

- 6 -

H: Yes.

K: Well, I am only concerned about the top people.

H: I think if you can keep them on board - in other words, if you telescope the requirements that they have to know -- see they need that much lead time so that the issue is telescoped down to either you can insist that we need an answer now for go or no go or you can wait another two or three hours and have a formal meeting and do it and discuss it around the table. Now if you telescope it I think it is worth ____ in the direction of a favorable response.

K: If I get them up now.

H: Yes. Have everyone on the phone with the condition that it is going to take this much lead time to have it effective in any event and minimize the risk and then just give them an affirmative. Then the people who are told to do it

K: Then it's too late.

H: Then it's too late. We have to live with it.

K: Well, you know Laird's reaction.

H: I am sure it will be no.

K: Right.

H: Rogers, I think, is more inclined to be affirmative because of his stakes in this thing. The President, I have some doubts about.

K: That's right.

H: One of the things that the Chairman shocked me on at the table. sat there After it got finished I said to Dick that I was shocked that he said that air would be enough because I've known all along it would not be at least it wouldn't be if I were in charge. Not only for political considerations which have a major influence but purely military. Assuming that their motives are totally wholesome and I don't think they are completely -- they wouldn't be with me. They want to get that ridge, they want to solve the problem once and for all. I think in either event it enhances the chances of a solution ultimately.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By ____ NARA Date 6/9/04

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/4/10

K: And of course, they don't mind if it deteriorates another 24 hours.

H: Absolutely not, it gives them a better chance to get ready and to know that they are hitting in the right place. And then you've got the problem of what you tell the little fellow to keep him bolstered over the period without a security risk.

K: Yes. I'd take my chances.

H: I think I would, too. Because that would just give the other guys a better chance to figure up a reaction.

K: Yes.

H: I am not so sure that they aren't exactly right. In other words, you telescope the decision in time so that you insist we have to have one within an hour or two. Get our principals together, principals alone but be sure perhaps that we have Packard among the group and Sisco.

K: Yes. So call a meeting for 7:30 for ________.

H: That's right and tell Rabin that it won't be quite as quickly as we thought but we would have it within two or three hours.

K: Alright. But should I call the President to get that done.

H: I think what I would do is set the meeting up.

K: How can I set it up without him.

H: Well, that's right, if you are bringing Rogers and Laird in I think maybe you better warn him. Your other alternative would be to have them all in the Conference call but I think it is risky for security reasons and I think you might end up getting the decision on the telephone which you couldn't reverse because of the quickness of the situation. My instinct would be to call the President tell him that you have gotten the answer that it is necessary to give them a confirmation and that you have everyone in his office that have been involved as well as the principals and then bring in Rogers and Sisco -- keep Alex Johnson out -- bring in Packard and Laird and the Chairman and keep CIA out.

K: Right. If we do this, could you talk to Robbie?

- 8 -

H: Right, I can take care of Robbie and we can get some posture in this way and then I think Helms is leaving town as I understand.

K: Well, he is no loss, is he?

H: No, but the question is whether you would include Chapman -- include his Deputy because he would be a ______ to ______.

K: Would he?

H: I'd be inclined to think so. You see, if you talked to the President first then get the feeling that he is resigned to this solution. If he really listened and made the decision he did last night, he will be.

K: Yes, but I am not at all sure he has.

H: If you think he is not.

K: In any event, I have to get to the President. I can't make this decision on my own.

H: Absolutely not.

K: My own judgment is that with 24 hours of reflection these guys (with) see anti-semitic tendencies are going to come out

H: Oh, I wouldn't let them have that.

K: Yes, but they will still have 24 hours to figure up things that can go wrong. I think actually if the Israelis were clever they would have done it ~~by air~~ first and then jumped in with the other if that hadn't worked.

H: Well, I think they are afraid of what kind of pressure will come on them. You know, they have been through this before.

K: Yes, but they would have done it at our request and there would have been a moral obligation. See, one of two things will happen. Some further reflection will make people - they will get plenty of arguments that it isn't worth it and secondly they'll get plenty of other reasons.

H: Well, I think one thing that should be made clear at the outset is that without that okay the chances of any action are almost nil hence we get the consequences we fear the most.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F.O. 12958

By NARA Date 6/10/04

K: Right.

H: And that the decision has to be made now so that preparations can be done.

K: Okay.

H: There is no drawing back.

K: Okay, I will call the President and I will be back to you.

H: Alright, sir.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
By NARA Date 6/4/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

Sun, Sept 20 (?)

H: Sir, I have the text of the note to be handed to the Chargé.

K: I've talked to old Willy.

H: Oh, did you?

K: Oh, he's sweating bullets.

H: I'll bet he is.

K: He wants to make that press announcement himself.

H: Good. I think that's great.

K: That's what he wanted to check with the President about. I said, 'You don't have to check with the President; I've approved it.'

H: Let me read this text. We have only one minor nitpick change.

"The Government of the U.S. notes that the Soviet Government expressed concern over the sharp aggravation of the situation in Jordan in the message delivered by Mr. Vorontsov. It is evident that responsibility for this aggravation rests with those opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. At this moment, the situation is being further and dangerously aggravated by the intervention into Jordanian territory of armored forces from Syria and the concentration of further offensive forces in Syria along the Jordanian border. The U.S. Government has condemned this intervention in Jordan and has called for the immediate withdrawal of the invading forces. This intolerable and irresponsible action from Syria, if not immediately halted and reversed, could lead to a broadening of the present conflict. The U.S. Government calls upon the Soviet Government to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present course of action and the need both to withdraw these forces without delay from Jordanian territory and to desist from any further intervention in Jordan. The USSR has a great responsibility to take effective action in

DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By:
NARA Date:
6/4/04

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

- 2 -

"this matter so as to avoid the serious consequences which would ensue from a broadening of the conflict."

K: I would take out the last sentence. That's the only thing that Rogers was bleeding about.

H: Well, he changed what Joe drafted originally which was even stronger and we thought you could make it a little more precise and a little less obligatory on their control of Syria if we changed the language from "great responsibility" to "a clear obligation." In other words, "the USSR has a clear obligation to take effective action in this matter so as to avoid the serious consequences which would ensue..."

K: Okay. I just didn't want to hold them responsible because they really may not be able to deliver those maniacs.

H: That's right, and that's what this makes it...

K: And we may have to go back to them.

H: That's right.

K: ...on the Cuban thing. I, frankly, would just...

H: Take that sentence out?

K: Yeah; I don't see what it adds, do you?

H: Well, it's very starchy.

K: Well, read me the preceding one.

H: "The U.S. Government calls upon the Soviet Government to impress upon the Government of Syria the grave dangers of its present course of action and the need both to withdraw these forces without delay from Jordanian territory and to desist from any further intervention in Jordan."

K: And we just say any other... that this is the only way to avoid the serious consequences? I mean we've already called on them; I mean, to say they have an obligation doesn't really add much to it.

H: Yeah, but you know, it says that 'you will bear...' Well...

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

K: I mean, this is a very tough note as it is.

H: Well, how about this? "The U.S. Government calls upon the Soviet Government to exercise its clear responsibility..."

K: No; why say this? It calls upon the Soviet Government... I don't see what the phrase adds to it.

H: Okay. I have no problems. I think the note is good and strong with or without the last sentence. Hold on a minute. [End of tape]

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic

By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

H: Hi.

K: I just wanted to let you know what had happened. He went along, of course, with a very tough line on the Syrians. I don't know whether he even told you about that. Well, the Syrians moved a brigade into Jordan today.

H: Oh, another move, huh?

K: And then they pulled it back.

H: This was after the tank thing yesterday?

K: Yeah, and he approves sending... You know State had two ideas -- one to go to the UN; the other to go to the UN but to go to France, Britain, Cairo and everyone else individually. My idea was to send one very tough note to the Russians in reply to what they sent to us Friday. And he went along with that, so... He never makes the wrong move on the actual substance. It's the bureaucracy where... On the thing I talked to you about earlier -- the Dobrynin/Rogers meeting -- I didn't mention Rogers at all. I said we just shouldn't have any high-level contacts except for this one until after the meeting, and I think we should put out a directive to that effect.

H: Uh-huh.

K: Because I have no reason to know that one was planned.

H: Right.

K: And, indeed, I don't even officially know that Dobrynin is going to be in New York.

H: Right. Just put out a general directive...

K: So I'll just put out a directive that there should be no high-level contact. And he said he absolutely agrees. And I didn't see any sense in going through the Cuban drill with him until we had the meeting. I want him to absorb it for a bit and think about it himself. Don't you think?

H: Yep.

K: That's not something we can settle on the telephone.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

- 2 -

H: Yeah. He's leaving at noon.

K: Oh, he is.

H: Yeah. I don't know whether he's going directly down or whether he's going by Camp Hoover on the way.

K: What's Camp Hoover?

H: It's another camp -- rustic, fishing camp kind of thing that he's been wanting to see.

K: Belonging to the President?

H: Yeah.

K: Oh, really. I didn't know that. How far is that?

H: It's 40 minutes from Washington and 40 minutes from here. It's over in the Shenandoah Mountains of Virginia.

K: Oh, that's a lovely area.

H: Yeah. It was given by Herbert Hoover to the Government for the use of the President and the White House staff.

K: I never knew that there was anything there.

H: It's apparently very rustic.

K: I see. It doesn't have any ...

H: It has cabins and all, but it doesn't have... It has electricity and water, but it isn't as fancy as Camp David.

K: Well, he won't like that.

H: I don't think so.

K: I mean he doesn't want it fancy, but he wants it comfortable. Well, that isn't the problem.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD 12958
Author:
By: NARA Date 6/9/04

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By. NARA Date 6/9/04

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

= 3 =

H: But anyway, he leaves at noon. He'd be down there by 1:00 or, if he goes to Camp Hoover, it would be 2:30 or 3:00.

K: And you'll stay up?

H: Yeah. On that Cuba thing, Bob, I can handle the substance; but we'll have to think how to handle making sure... This one, he can't let go and then retrieve because here he is up against a mortal enemy. But when I spot a problem, I'll come to you.

if

H: Fortunately, we get past this week, we'll have Rogers with us all for the next 10 days on that trip.

K: Yeah, but Rogers is no help.

H: Yeah, but he can't get away.

K: Oh, he can't do any damage by himself.

H: He can't move unilaterally because you've got him under your thumb.

K: That's actually a blessing, isn't it?

H: Yeah.

K: That's right; I hadn't thought of that.

H: It keeps everything right there on the tour.

K: Did you see the _New York Times_ editorial about the trip today?

H: Yeah.

K: Did you tell him about it?

H: I haven't seen him. I talked to him. He'll probably see it. He reads the _Times_ usually.

K: Actually, that trip will turn out to be a superb foreign policy move.

H: It's getting set right, anyway.

K: It happens at exactly the right moment. It's focused on exactly the right problem.

MJA F01 1228
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By NARA Date 6/1/67

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

- 4 -

H: Yeah. That's right. The Sixth Fleet thing couldn't work better.

K: No. Okay, Bob, I just wanted to keep you informed. If anything blows during the day, I'll tell you.

H: Okay, but you feel reasonably...

K: Well, I feel that if they're tricking us, that it ought to be all right.

H: Okay. And you're not concerned about the President's attitude now.

K: Well, I'm very concerned about the President's attitude on Cuba.

H: Are you?

K: Yeah.

H: Why, 'cause you don't think he recognizes the seriousness...

K: Well, you know I think it's something that only you, I and a few others understand. When he doesn't really engage a problem, he sort of withdraws and sort of, you know, he'll say 'yes, I agree,' but you know his mind isn't working on it. I don't think he's driving on it, and he's trying to duck it.

it

H: Uh-huh; he probably doesn't accept as being really what it is.

K: Well, he doesn't, you know -- he's looking for... Frankly, I think he is very conscious of what you told me.

H: The election?

K: Yeah. And he'd like to see whether he could slip it till November.

H: Yeah. I think you're right, especially because of the '62 parallel.

K: Well, I don't mind his slipping, but he has also to consider how or what he will say in November and December, if people say 'when did you learn about this?'

H: But he could say we were dealing with it in secret ways before that, or something.

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Haldeman

- 5 -

K: But, all it means to me is it will put an entirely new face on a summit possibility even if it is possible. It would now have to be pretty close to a confrontation on Cuba.

H: But he told me the other day what -- just completely out of the context of foreign policy at all -- but as we were going over schedule stuff, because we've got a tough problem through the month of October on scheduling...We were going over days and the way the whole thing laid out, and I said something about holding a couple of days' period there the first of that week of the 20th or whatever it is against the possibility of a Kosygin meeting, and he said, "Well, I don't think there's going to be one."

K: But you know, I... Of course, you know that the Russians have...

[The Camp David operator interrupted to say the President was calling Mr. Kissinger]

K: Okay, I'll take it.

H: Okay, Henry.

The President/Mr. Kissinger

P: Hello.

K: Hello, Mr. President. I just have two minor items: (1) A rather interesting one -- the *New York Times* has a very, very favorable editorial today about your trip.

P: I see.

K: ...saying it's a very good move, exactly at the right time, couldn't be better. They said a meeting with Bruce is, of course, very important but not in comparison to what you are doing in the Middle East.

P: The Sixth Fleet, in other words.

K: The Sixth Fleet part of it.

P: Sure.

DECLASSIFIED

MDD F0 12958

By NARA Date 6/10/10

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: And I thought it's just amusing that... what it takes to get their support.

P: Yeah, sure. Well, we don't mind.

K: On the other business which we discussed, everybody is aboard now and they are moving on it. There is only one thing on that field hospital. The military believe -- and there's no disagreement within anywhere -- that this brigade we've got in Germany which has been in semi-readiness ought to be moved out of its maneuver area into greater proximity to the plane so that we can get it in there to protect the hospital if need be. And I think, in the light of all our other moves, this is rather good.

P: Good.

K: Particularly in view of what the Syrians did.

P: Yep. Do we have any indication as to what, if we came down to... c
knocking out these tanks, to how the Jordanians do it.

K: The Jordanians did it with other tanks. They were reluctant to use the air and they haven't got much air. And also they are very inferior in the air to the Syrians.

P: I'm just thinking of a contingency as to what we could do with air. We could go in there with...

K: Oh, we could wreck them.

P: That's what I mean. If the Israelis could, we could, couldn't we?

K: Oh, yes. Well, if it's anybody... Our major drawback, which we are rectifying every day, is intelligence. We don't have... But we are getting lots of intelligence from the Israelis that we are feeding into our carriers.

P: Yeah; I see. Well, I think we should be prepared though for [End of tape]

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger (Cont'd)

P: ...name necessarily, but you have to do something. We have to be prepared for some punishment in the event there is anything there because we have said we'd hold them responsible. And we've got to keep our pledge in that respect.

K: Absolutely.

P: If we don't, why we're in a helluva shape.

K: Right, it will help in general to play a very fairly hard line also in respect to our other, ~~too~~ because it will help our credibility with the other problem. Not that we need to do anything but it just makes it... But all these measures... I will get a contingency plan worked out today. We have a plan on the tank and so forth. We don't have a clear plan on what you just said on ~~punishment~~.

P: Yeah; we should have one though.

K: Absolutely.

P: We may be faced with that, and I want to have something we can do -- not just make a big statement. We just go in with a merciless air strike on somebody -- even the Syrians.

K: That's right. I will get a plan worked out by tomorrow morning.

P: All right. What time will they bring it? Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: All right, Henry. Thank you.

K: Good-bye.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/10/1964

2/7

P: That kind of a . . . because of the current . . . brief run down on that situation. Nothing new on it I would just play it very cool.

K: Would you want me to concentrate on Cambodia or on all of Southeast Asia?

P: Just Cambodia.

K: Just Cambodia.

P: I to not think I would get into it. I would just simply say - on the general situation - things are going according to schedule, troop withdrawal, casualties down. Word or 2 words about got to remember that Cambodia . . . great deal of speculation and misconception and hearings . . . exactly what we are doing - first doing what we said we were going to do. We did what we said we would. Have no ground forces there and do not expect to. Went into Cambodia and got out. Totally related to our efforts to defent our position in Vietnam and is not for the purpose of becoming involved in Cambodia. Purpose of preventing the enemy to resupply, etc.

K: You think it would help? -I got some figures today that show that during the high first - first of all during that Route 4 operation that xgo got everybody so steamed up is now ended and the maximum number of planes we used was 21 a day. That is all we were talking about. And in the whole xxxxx rest of Cambodia. 21 for one strike - 21 sorties a day. And in the whole rest of Cambodia on that sort of operation are 30 a day. It seems to me that that is so minimal that . . .

P: Exactly. Say here's what we are doing. Totally related to helping the Cambodians and . . . South Vietnamese.

K: Re-establishment of . . .

P: One purpose is to avoid a situation where they are reestablishing at a time when great bulk of our forces gone . . . I just think . . . any more than.

K: I will keep it to between 5 and 10 minutes.

P: Just get up there and lay it out and sit down. Then I am going to put Shultz on with the budget. Ehrlichman on . . . positive pitch. Is Rogers going to testify? Are both he and Laird going to testify?

K: Rogers is testifying on Thursday. I had a talk with him today and he seems to be well postured.

P: Rogers is going to testify, the Secretary of Defense is going to testify and say you are not going to go over that. Absolutely clear that we are doing exactly what we said we were going to do.

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F.O. 12958
Author's
By NARA Date 6/10/64

that I have said on 8

I would lay out / . . . different times.

K: I mentioned that to him today and gave him the quotes and he thought
that was very useful and he is going to use that.

P: 8 times we have warned them and . . . July first. Say that on July
1st the President warned . . . that he would take action. Not action on the
ground but action in the air to stop . . .

K: I scheduled a meeting tomorrow with you for Moorer.

P: I saw that.

K: Just so that he can give you a more detailed briefing on what that operation
is about. And then I thought if you were agreeable, Mr. President, after
NSC meeting which we can hold to an hour. . . you might want to meet.

P: Tomorrow?

K: No Wednesday. You might want to meet with Rogers, Laird, Helms,
Moorer on

P: We will be ready then.

K: just letting them all state their concerns if they have any and then towards
the end of the week you can do your own decision. I would not let up the
pressure at that point.

P: Not one bit. Give it right to them.

K: Because that will also make them more willing to do other things.

P: Incidentally, have you done any more checking with Kingx Zumwalt or

K: Yes. First of all I have found a way in which we can get 100 prop planes
out of the Air Force.

KX P: They found some ?

K: They are not B-25's but they are prop planes that were of service and I am
getting the report from the Navy tomorrow evening.

P: I will tell you who could really do it. The Marines. They . . . really
close support. . . . just as they aren't doing it because it just is not the
thing these days.

K: The Marines are practically the only ones who are still doing it.

P: They still have some . . .

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/10/64

["- 4 -", "K: Quick impression of the Navy was that they might have quite a few but they wanted to wait until tomorrow to give me a final answer.", "P: Just might be a damned intriguing thing to do. We could really get some prop planes over there. They just might hold that damned trail down. I really feel that that is one of our major weaknesses.", "K: Right.", "P: ... jets, helicopters and things ... this is xixx ridiculous. Don't you believe so?", "K: Right. Well, certainly with the xxx jets. With the helos are pretty effective.", "P: They are also wadable x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

K: No, we had to do it and it is just as well that we didn't did it.

P: Everything. Everything else . . . in that part of the world.

K: We sent a message to the Egyptian President last week on your behalf which State drafted which was a very forthcoming one. He made a rather cool reply today and Sisco is analyzing that. He may be too weak to be conciliatory at this moment. That may be his problem. But otherwise things are pretty quiet.

P: Ex tomorrow . . .

K: Yes, You are going to get a report from Urbin (phonetic)

P: . . .

K: He is playing a very hard game.

P: . . .

K: And I am proceeding with Rush. I had Mitchell - I am sending a letter to him by messanger so that it cannot leak.

P: Good.

K: And sex also a letter to the other sex fellow.

P: Good

K: And told them both to come over here onsome other pretext.

P: Good

K: And then we get that game plan working.

P: . . .

K: I think that with that is -- Dobrynin called me this morning. I told him he had to keep me informed about everything that they were doing so that we do not make any missteps. He told me what they had told the Germans and it was just that they might try to see what they could work out with us together with them. Which is all right. They told it to Bahr.

P: . . . interesting report from Coleson on Jay Lovestone. Here they said they would . . . conceding that we have been too rigid so they would be very pleased to have him discuss it. (laughter) Damned if they would.

- 6 -

K: But I am not so sure Mr. President that . . .

P: On the other hand they may figure that he may be not as tough as tough enough . . .

K: Well, they need somebody who can deliver. Doesn't do any good to get a sap in there.

P: Cannot tell how they feel though. They like sap . . . the other thing. The way this is going now. Somebody told me today that Jackson had met . . . Saturday and he had crossed the line and would be coming over as a candidate pretty soon.

K: I think that Jackson would be our most formidable opponent.

P: Yes. If he could get nominated. Problem is that that would tear hell out of the Jackson democratic party.

K: If he trys that yes.

P: It would tear hell out of them for the reason that how in the world a dove - any dove - Muskie is in the middle of this fellow. Of course, I thought that the . . . damn thing . . . screwed up in California. . . That's the kind of thing - you cannot have many of those.

K: He has not really done anything of distinction to become a candidate.

P: But on the other hand he is trying . . . sort of in the center.

K: But you are crowding him awfully hard. I had an ex-attorney extatic phone call from Rockefeller today who said that your State of the Union message was spectacular. That he is going to form a citizens committee to help support your program.

P: That's great.

K: And he said that he was asked at some dinner yesterday who would be the most formidable democratic candidate against you and he said if you keep going on the line you are now it doesn't make any difference who they nominate - there is no such thing as a formidable candidate.

P: It's good to have him say that.

K: Its good to have him say that.

By NARA Date 6/16/64
DECLASSIFIED
MJO F012958
Authorized

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

K: I just wanted to touch base with you about all the backs and forths of this morning. I just got that statement which Sisco LDX'ed over which I think is excellent. We just have really a minor nitpick where it says "have engaged that force are resisting this invasion." You know.

R: Say it again.

K: Where you say that Jordanian tank forces are engaging this force, just to make it a little stronger -- to say "are resisting this invasion." Or rather, resisting this force -- rather than "engage" to indicate.. But otherwise, I think it's first-class.

R: Well, I want to talk to the President to be sure he wants... whether he wants to have it from just the State Department or in my name. I don't think it makes too much difference. I sort of preferred my name in the sense I think it's a little stronger.

K: He would like it as strong as possible, and if you are willing to have it in your name, I know he would want it in your name. He may be in transit now. This is not to suggest that you shouldn't talk to him, but my impression from talking to him is...

R: I see. Where is he? At Camp David?

K: Well, he was leaving Camp David and he was planning to go to Camp Hoover which I didn't even know existed. Did you?

R: You're better off not knowing.

K: Oh, really?

R: Yes; it's a terrible place.

K: Well, he had never seen it and he wanted to take a look.

R: He's flying over?

K: He was flying over there, leaving at noon. Well, so he's in transit now.

R: Are you in the White House?

K: No, I'm at home now.

R: Well, there's no point in bothering him if it's all right.

K: I know he would... My own personal judgment, Bill, is that he would appreciate it probably if you did it in your name, but he wouldn't ever ask for it. He would have left that up to you, but

DECLASSIFIED

MJD E012958
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

7

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/04

- 2 -

I think he would think that makes it even stronger.

R: Well, I think it makes it a little stronger to personalize it because otherwise, it's just sort of a State Department announcement.

K: And for whatever it's worth, I... my own recommendation is that in your name it would be stronger.

R: All right. Well, we'll go ahead and do that then. And on the one to Russians, I think that's a good strong statement.

K: I haven't seen it -- that's on the way over.

R: It's pretty tough in tone. I'm not sure it's the ideal time... place to do it because I think they are just as anxious to have the Syrians stay the hell out of there as we are, but I think in terms of the other problems we have, maybe this is fine.

K: Well, that's what he thought.

R: The only reservation I have on that at all is that somehow it's saying to them, 'God-damn it, do something'... a little bit like the Israelis keep telling us to do something about getting missiles out of there. In the case of the Soviet Union, they've issued some God-damned tough statements about Syria. They had one today in TASS which was very tough.

K: Oh, really?

R: But somehow going to them and saying, 'Now, God-damn, do something about Syria' when they really seem to be serious as hell about it -- in fact, they delivered a note day before yesterday saying that they...

K: But can't we do it in response to this note and just say...

R: That's what we are doing.

K: ..."we are doing everything we can with Israel..."

R: That's what we're doing. The only thing is the last part of it, we sort of say, "Now, God-damn it, do something or we'll hold you responsible."

K: Now, that I think perhaps we ought to tone down, Bill.

R: It's a little tough. Joe said he felt he had to do it because the President wanted it.

K: No, the President wanted a strong tone. I think if your view... I'm not so sure that we should say to the Russians we'll hold them responsible for Syria.

R: No, I think, to me, it's the wrong place to do it. I mean, I think in the case of the other problem we are going to talk about Monday...

K: Wednesday.

R: ...or Wednesday on the missile sites or something. But that's different. But this one...

K: No, I agree with you, Bill. I haven't seen it yet, but if there is something in there to the effect 'we'll hold you responsible'...

R: I'll look at it again and we may tone it down a bit. All right, we'll go ahead with this statement then. I won't bother the President if he is traveling.

K: That's my impression. I know he is traveling; but I think it's a first-class statement.

R: Okay, fine, Henry.

K: Right, Bill.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authored
By ____ NARA Date 6/9/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird

K: Hello Mel.

L: Hey Henry, I've still tried to get that intelligence but it is awful spotty. You know that. I am trying to put that together - how much has been committed by the Jordanians. They say it will take them another 30 minutes.

K: Well, it may not make any difference because the situation can unravel even without their having committed anything.

L: Sure. I understand that but I think it is good for us to at least - you know in the future - to say that we have looked at or tried to get the intelligence.

K: Look, in the meantime, I have talked to the President. And it seems to me we can't go to war on the telephone so we have scheduled a meeting at 8:30, in the White House.

L: Oh, okay, fine. I will have all that material by then.

K: I told the President that my impression was that you would have to speak for yourself, that if the facts were what we thought they were you were inclined to go along with this.

L: That is right. Absolutely. That is the only thing that I wanted to make sure of - that Jordanian order of battle. From my standpoint, I think if we are ever asked in the future and we didn't look at it that it will look like hell.

K: Now we are going to invite you, Bill, the Chairman, Sisco and Packard and that is all. Do you have any problems with that?

L: No, I have no problems with that.

K: You are sure?

L: I never know just what side Sisco will come down on any issue but I think that is fine.

K: Well, we can put him to work selling rugs. I will talk to you as a friend. Last night he was in the office with the President for a few minutes and took a line that was so hard that you and

MJD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
10:30 c.a. 9/21/70

P: How long do we have to make our plans because of the number of people who are depending on this trip. It comes apparent that nothing will happen that will change the situation now.

K: We can decide by the end of the day.

P: You said Wed.

K: No, we should cancel before someone cancels us. After the meeting this afternoon, we can probably make that decision.

P: hmmh-hummh. We might hear from Tito on this. Nothing will happen on that. I don't see anything that will change it by the end of the day.

K: Unless the king stabilizes the situation.

P: Then it would be important to go. We could wait until this afternoon or tomorrow.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/70

Telecon
Joe Kraft

9/21/70 11:55 a.m.

JK: I'm calling because Mrs. Meir at lunch said something about a personal statement by the President to take up Soviet missiles.

K: She must have had in mind that we promised her we would not drop the issue.

JK: I see. It was interpreted by some of us as an indication of movement toward communication at the highest level.

K: No, there was no such. She must mean that we said we would raise it and continue to raise it and not acquiesce in it.

JK: I see. Is there any sign that the Russians are stopping the Syrians.

K: There's no sign that the Russians are doing anything. We get a different report every hour on what the situation really is in Jordan. The Soviet behavior is not easy to understand...

JK: It's quite easy in light of what General DeGaulle once said to you, about trying to restore credibility in the most visible way.

K: But it's not easy in light of what they are saying about trying to help with a settlement.

JK: Okay. I would like to see you.

K: It's a bad week, but I would love to see you.

JK: Okay.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9/21/70 3:50 p.m.

R: I'm calling about a totally different subject.

K: Thank God.

R: Yes, your backgrounder. Gerry Smith is concerned about something on page 13, regarding the SALT talks. You said "Proposals . . ."

K: I was afraid you were going to praise me for a minute.

R: Said, "Proposals have been carefully prepared on our side, and the Soviet proposals have provided a basis for negotiation." Gerry Smith doesn't think they do.

K: That's an unhappy formulation.

R: What he asked about was whether this had been released.

K: Yes it has. The intention was to say "were not unreasonable." It was badly put.

R: He is afraid it might be seen as a signal to the Russians that we want to negotiate on their proposals.

K: It hasn't been picked up in the press like that.

R: What we should do, he thinks, is to have somebody say just the opposite, not to refer specifically to it, but have somebody ask us and say no.

K: That's okay as long as it doesn't look like a frontal attack on me. That's not a good formulation, I agree.

R: Okay.

Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Thank God.

R: 'Okay.

By: KLC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCORN

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

4:02 p.m.

9/21/70

K: I still hope to get together with you this week if the M.E. calms down. But next time when you have a complaint about a backgrounder come to me and not the Secy. of State.

S: I just thought it was a change in policy.

K: Oh, God. When you go through 20 pages -- you know I don't accept the Soviet proposal. I don't think anyone has picked it up.

S: I bet the Soviets have. And why should they pay any attention to our proposal if we accept theirs?

K: It said many good things about our proposal and since I have been involved in forming our proposal it doesn't seem likely that I would (advocate something totally different).

S: I just wanted to get it straight.

K: Then call me. The Secy. of State calling me 3 times when I have other things to occupy me, you may have your objective but not make a friend of me.

S: I have a responsibility to him too.

K: Sure and now we can trace through our pages and see (what we come up with and who did what when.)

S: I don't want to knife anyone.

K: ???? answer newsmen and do it. And if you call me directly, that's what I would have said.

St: OK

TELCORN

N. Rockefeller/Kissinger

5:20 p.m.

9/21/70

R: I wanted to thank you for what you did in relations to the visit.

K: I hope it was all right.

R: Did you see the NYTimes? Fantastic!

K: I gave the ambassador a talk on where their interests are.

R: Arther left the dias and joined his wife in the audience, he was so furious.

K: I told them a co-religionist wouldn't do them any good.

R: She's a great woman. We need her in our country.

K: That's what the President said.

R: I told her to take the job here.

K: We are trying to move in the first team but before we are through they will know they have bitten something off. Things have turned a lot.

R: It's exactly what you said two months ago.

K: He was convinced that I made myself extremely unpopular here by saying this would lead to war rather than peace. It's like lions, you blink once with the Arabs and they are all over you.

R: Does he understand what Rogers has been doing?

K: I think. We work are really pouring power in there now. More going on this week.

R: She said, and rightly, that Hussein wouldn't have done ______ without encouragement. You needn't comment. The other thing is on the shipment of equipment which I hope is taking place.

K: It's ordered about 3 times a month but then it's like punching pilbow s.

R: She said one week technicians were sent and things were rolling and then it was turned off. But you know.

K: Too well.

R: Thank you.

N. Rockefeller/Kissinger

5:20 p.m.

9/21/70

-2-

K: Your support has always meant an enourmous amount to me. You have walked the line well. We are slowly digging ourselves out of the morass but if this blows you are not coming through Washington during the campaign?

R: I may.

K: If you should, there are some things of interest to you which you can't use in the campaign but show a rough time.

R: Does it look like a trip?

K: I guess no.

R: If there were, you would go?

K: Yes.

R: I had a feeling that with the problems and crises that another trip --

K: It was a good move to go to the 6th Fleet to show se meant it but now so much has ax happened and now it will be hard.

R: I hope Hussein doesn't go under.

K: That's essential. We are more in control with things here than two weeks ago.

R: You know, she never criticized in public or private. Really great.

K: A great woman.

R: Well, people up here are happy.

K: How is your campaign going?

R: Too well. Too long between now and elections. Job of keeping the momentum I am going up-state this week.

K: I need hardly tell you I am for you.

R: You have been very helpful and John Mitchell has been helpful.

K: He likes you. Did you see where he popped off, after a few drinks, in Women's Wear Daily? He said Winthrop can buy the votes so why worry.

R: I think he will lose. He was fabulous when I brough those blacks down.

K: He is great. (last seemed to refer to Mitchell).

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

5:55 p. m.

9/21/701

P: Did you have anything before this meeting at 6:00?

K: I could drop by.

P: Did we have Helms?

K: You decided last night not to have him.

P: I meant this morning.

K: OK, I will see that he is invited from now on. Anyway, he is in Alabama.

P: Good, then we don't need him.

K: May I raise a trip question with you? I spoke to the Ambassador about Mrs. Nixon. The Queen is going to ask to be invited to lunch with you and Mrs. Nixon at Chequers and afterwards Lady Home would take care of her at her country house. It's so unprecedented that it would be awkward to turn down.

P: That's right.

K: You would have a meeting with Heath before lunch. She would join after and then you'd meet with Heath after lunch. We could make Shannon later.

P: That's right. Check with Haldeman because Mrs. Annenberg was working on something. I told them that the Queen took precedence.

K: Freeman said it's unprecedented.

P: I hope we can make the trip. Maybe we can.

K: We don't have to be precipitous on this.

P: Let's get this going on time. These people have been working hard and they need a good night's rest. Bring us up to date on developments during the day. You and Sisco.

K: Vorontsov is in to see Sisco now. He had a message.

P: Probably warning us.

K: That's all we have to do now. (?)

P: Has anyone talked to Rabin about going through Sryia?

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

5:55 p.m.

9/21/701

K: I could drop by.

P: Did we have Helms?

P: I meant this morning.

P: That's right.

P: Probably warning us.

7:43 p.m., September 21, 1970

(President spoke very softly --
very difficult to hear)

K: You say you are leaning to keeping the trip on.

P: In every possible way, we are not going to be in position to be in
the middle of it.

K: I think we should go full speed ahead, Mr. President.

P: Just because the Israelis are having a little battle with the Syrians,
we are not going to be moving around.

K: Would expect that the Soviets would make some sharp move under
these conditions.

P: We have got to go on as if the world is still turning.

K: The fleet will have to leave its station around the 26th, 5 days from
now, so we have plenty of time.

P: We don't have to have exercises, just knock that off -- don't have to
have the whole fleet over there.

K: Have most of the fleet there.

P: We don't have to go to the carrier you understand. -7-2-2-2-2-2-2-2-?
Think you should continue the plan as if the trip was going to go on
and we could cancel but not before Wednesday evening. Everybody
will understand if we knock it off.

K: Have you had a chance to talk to Bob about the Queen?

P: ????-?

K: We ought to invite the Annenbergs.

P: That's fine, that's fine, it would be very nice for Mrs. Nixon to see
Chequers.

wgh

By KHLW

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:43 p.m., September 21, 1970

P: We don't have to go to the carrier you understand. -7-2222-222-2-
Think you should continue the plan as if the trip was going to go on
and we could cancel but not before Wednesday evening. Everybody
will understand if we knock it off.

P: :??????

wgh

TELECON
General Haig/Prof. Yoshida
8:00 p.m., October 23, 1970

Y: How are you?

H: Just fine.

Y: I know that Dr. Jones is not in your office, he's in New York I believe.

H: That's correct.

Y: I will be talking to him tomorrow morning 10:30 of your time. In the meanwhile, time is very short and I wonder if you yourself could on Dr. Jones' behalf, if it is possible to talk with the gentleman on your side to have conversation this morning.

H: Yes.

Y: With our gentleman at the office.

H: Yes.

Y: To sound out how it went. It is rather important for me to know so that I could do something for my own friend.

H: Yes.

Y: My problem unlike you or Dr. Jones, I do not have direct access but nevertheless tonight it is very important from our point of view where some important decisions might be made.

H: Yes. I know that it was a, appeared to be an acceptance of categories on your side. That was the interpretation of our people but no progress beyond that and very strong resistance to categories that were shown to them.

Y: Did the gentleman on your side, Flanigan, did he put forth to our representative the concrete proposals?

H: Yes.

Y: He did.

H: Yes.

Y: I see. And what was the impression that he received from my representative?

MVD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author:
By NARA Date 6/1/04

DECLASSIFIED

MJD F0 12958
Authorit

By NARA Date 6/10/10

TELECON

General Haig/Prof. Yoshida

8:00 p.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 3

H: Yes, all categories on the specific categories.

Y: Yes on the specific categories.

H: Yes.

Y: Unless you have something definite you would not be prepared to talk, Dr. Jones' friend would not be prepared to talk about the subject?

H: No, I don't think it would be possible.

Y: Our man knows that very well.

H: Yes I think he knows that very well.

Y: Would you kindly check with the man in your office, know that Dr. Jones is preoccupied in New York. Would you please check with that gentleman and return the call because tonight the major decision will be made on our side tonight.

H: I will do that or get the information and have Dr. Jones call you.

Y: It is crucial. It will probably be too late to wait until tomorrow morning and talk to Dr. Jones.

H: Yes

Y: You have to get recommendations by tomorrow noon from our side, our response to you tomorrow noon at the latest so that this entire subject can be taken while the Doctor is away?

H: Yes

Y: You will do that?

H: Yes.

Y: I am at my office and I will be standing by.

H: Yes, I will call you.

wgh

TELECON

General Haig/Prof. Yoshida

8:00 p.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 2

Hi: I would say generally noncommittal.

Y: Noncommittal.

Hi: Noncommittal with the exception of categories, but accepted the proposal of categories.

Y: He did.

Hi: Yes.

Y: This was the basic issue that had to be solved at this moment. How long does the meeting last?

Hi: I think it lasted quite long, not an exact time on it.

Y: More than an hour?

Hi: I think so, would have to check. The thing that was not inc in not accepting the proposal of categories. When he looked at our list, he was very dis about that but not intransigent totally.

Y: Yes

Hi: I think that there might be more to discuss if your man were to be somewhat more forthcoming on specifics.

Y: You see on our side we are in the middle of proposal discussions about your proposal.

Hi: Yes.

Y: Submitted to our man this morning.

Hi: Yes.

Y: Will you please tell me very frankly as much as you can. It has been necessary as I understand from Dr. Jones, from your side, by tomorrow morning you see the final top meeting will be 4 p.m. tomorrow. Am I right for in the morning, it has to be morning understanding.

Hi: Absolutely.

Y: Absolutely. I see, have you made some concrete specifics more complete and more specific from our side?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/10/70

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 21, 1970

S: What I will do if you agree, Roger will clear simultaneously with the Secretary.

K: You will give the answers to Rabin tonight?

S: If you clear and the Secretary clears the way I formulated it. It will be over in 5 minutes. I have arranged with Haig to call Roger Davies who is on duty and give him any changes that you may have. Will communicate these to Robbey. Think I have reflected the meeting pretty well.

K: You always do.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12558
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/9/70

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

8:20 p.m., September 21, 1970

K: You always do.

wgh

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

8:30 p.m., September 21, 1970

K: Two things, one about England -- the Queen who is going to be in Balmoral is going to make a special trip down to have lunch at Chequers.

H: Great

K: The British Embassy tells me this is unprecedented and has never been done before.

H: ??

K: She is invited too. She would have lunch at the Embassy. This is in effect the Queen inviting her to lunch. Mentioned it to the President, he said yes but also that I should take it up with you.

H: Should get word to Mrs. Annenberg.

K: Will you take care of it?

H: Yes.

K: May I give you my personal judgment on the trip. I don't think we will be going. He said you told him that he should do business as usual.

H: Did the President say I said that. I said in cancelling the trip the process of doing that would be a major factor in itself. I have no view on that whatsoever. The question of if you do it, you have to do it. That in itself is a major event.

K: It would be a disaster if we were all scattered all over Europe. The Saratoga would have to pull out of line if the crisis is still in full pitch.

H: Cancelling is a very major event and will be regarded as such and may be a very good event. The fact that we are doing that may do us as much good as doing the trip.

K: [How do you think we are doing? ]

H: So far I think we are doing great in spite of ourselves.

TELECON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
9:10 p.m., September 21, 1970

P: Henry, I am going to bed early -- I am meeting with Congress in the morning.

K: Think it is going to be quiet tonight. I won't disturb you unless --

P: If you hear anything, let me know.

K: Haven't given them the answers. When I talked to Rabin there were so many conflicting signals -- I think by tomorrow morning we will have answers.

P: We will have additional intelligence on where it all stands.

K: Think noon tomorrow is a good time for this group to meet. I think the Jordanian psychological end is stronger, more than their physical strength.

P: More than they are showing on their nerve.

K: They might still pull it out.

P: I hope so but whatever, if the thing quiets down, this trip would be a reinforcement.

K: If the Israelis don't move by Thursday, the thing will settle down.

P: Okay Henry.

wgh

By KCL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

9:10 p.m., September 21, 1970

P: Okay Henry.

wgh

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger

Roger Davies 9/21/70; 9:30 p.m.

K: Would you read the last paragraph again.

D: In the recent crisis the U. S. has augmented the Sixth Fleet. It has also taken other readiness measures clearly implying a decision not to permit Soviet intervention against Israel in the conditions under discussion. As for the specific measures the U. S. may take to prevent Soviet intervention we have contingency plans for these eventualities.

K: No, what I was going to say -- these would depend on circumstances that exist at the time.

D: That these depend upon the circumstances of the situation that exist at the present time -- we have contingency plans for these eventualities.

K: Do you agree it sharpens it?

D: Yes, sir.

K: You will be pleased to know that I am clearing the other cable as it is. I appreciate the cooperation of everyone in your organization.

D: Thank you very much. I will pass that on to the boys.

K: Seeley impressed me in particular today. He did a superb job in drafting considering the pressure he was under.

D: He turns out a great deal of good work.

K: He impressed the hell out of me.

D: I will be pleased to pass that on to him

feg

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By AB NARA Date 6/2/70