Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Senator Prouty/Mr. Kissinger

2:43 p.m., June 22, 1971

K: How are you, Senator.

P: I have raised a question with regard to a procedural matter on the Cook Amendment. If you would agree to knock the language out -- all of it -- so the President wasn't able to achieve any negotiations in 60 days... Is it better to have it out or leave the language in now?

K: In other words it is better to have that section in?

P: They would stop right there.

K: We are violently opposed to the whole thing.

P: I know you are, but one of these will be approved.

K: It is on the conscience of the people voting for it. It is wrecking our only last chance at negotiations. If the people want to do that, we can't change it.

P: Knowing you are opposed to everything, would you like to have the procedural language out or leave it as is?

K: What is the procedural language?

P: [Read the language]

K: I want the procedural language out. We want it to lapse after 60 days if there is no solution.

P: You would be willing to have them knock that language out?

K: As long as it lapses after 60 days.

P: I think they will agree to that.

K: I believe that this is wrecking our negotiating position in whatever form it appears. There is no way satisfactory way of expressing it. It is undermining our position.

P: I am supporting your position. There is no question as far as I am concerned. It's a question of whether it is better from your standpoint to have this terminate if the President reports to Congress that he has been unable to negotiate.

By KHC U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Senator Prouty/Mr. Kis

2:43 p.m., June 22, 1971

K: We would rather have that. That, of course, would have to be decided... That parliamentary problem I cannot decide. If you are asking on something we don't really want -- if we are going to get a date, we would rather have it without the procedural part.

P: That is my question. I am supporting the Administration's position.

K: If the difference is between my saying that I would rather have an unsatisfactory one beaten than a slightly more satisfactory one passed

P: That is the question I am raising. I think it will be a close vote. I am going along with the Administration. I wanted to check with you first. If by striking the language it enhanced the chances of passing, you want the language left in?

K: Yes.

P: If you could come up with some alternative that could be acceptable, it would be awfully helpful. I can appreciate your position, but I'm afraid one is going to get through.

K: Well, we'll take a look at it.

lds

By KHC V

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
Sen. Baker/Kissinger
3:10 p.m. 6/22/71

K: I am calling you about these votes that arecoming up on vari forms of deadline. I don't call you too often and naturally if the administration is opposed you expect us to call you.

B: No, I try to figure out the position.

K: No, I don't do it for attention. We are taking this matter extremely seriously.

B:

B: Have you talked about my situation on this withx Timmons? I am afraid I am not in a position to alter and change. Timmons and I had difficulty with the Childs amendment on Hatfield/ McGovern. That's why I am in difficulty on this one. Otherwise I have no intention of voting for any deadline.

K: The last negotiations we can conduct.

B: I am not a bad (?) one on this. The only one that has appe is the "Sense of the Senate" of Mansfield. But others I don't.

K: It's the worst possible time.

B: The other day Timmons called and asked if I could help on Cooke/Stephens. I sai- I can get Cooke against Childs but then I would have to vote for Cooke. He elected that alternative.

K: Then you have to.

B: I have no choice. I wish you luck.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird
6/22/71 3:20 p.m.

E: I sent you a copy of those comments which stirred up Ehrlichman. These were made after I saw Mitchell yesterday.

K: They stirred up the President even more.

L: Well read them.

K: Their understanding is that you agreed to say nothing.

L: About delivery of the documents to the Congress. That was announced in court yesterday. They asked me not to mention the fact that we had delivered them to Congress.

K: No one knew you were having that meeting with ____________.

L: Rogers set it up. I am over there testifying and I get a note that Bill Rogers has set this up.

K: Our understanding was that you were going to have that meeting and deliver the documents.

L: No, no, no, no, no, no. That's what they told me not to get into, and I haven't.

K: You told Ehrlichman that Rogers set it up?

L: No, but . . . We are not delivering the documents. That's all they asked us not to do.

K: I will explain that to Ehrlichman and to the President.

L: For Christ's sake this bothers me. It only had to do with delivering the classified version to Congress. I can't go before these committees and tell them we are not going to look at these papers.

K: Ziegler was going to . . .

L: I think he ought to look at what I said. I haven't agreed to deliver any god-damned papers. This kind of bothers me. The only thing we discuss this other I discussed with Mitchell and he said go ahead and do it.

K: Okay, if we can just cool it now.

L: Rogers said he called the White House before he set that appointment. McGregor encouraged him to do it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Laird

6/22/71 3:20 p.m. p. 2

K: Ehrlichman is supposed to be the central focus for this.

L: I didn't know about that. I just got off the stand, came back over here and I'm shocked by this. I called Bill and said we've got to cancel the appointment. He said no; I called Clark Macgregor and he said it's a good idea. He told the Speaker we'd do it and I'm going to help him.

K: Well, Mel, it's nice to talk to you.

L: It's nice to talk to you too Henry, but read over what I said because this is the only thing that was said.

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

John Osborne/Kissinger

3:36 p.m.

6/21/71

K: You are writing an article on the dove being the most vicious bird?

O: Nope. I have been ill the last couple of weeks and trying to catch up. I wonder if on the phone or in person if you could add to my understanding of the papers of the view of the matter and the seriousness of the NWTimes pape

K: I will try to fit in 15 mins. tomorrow before I go off to England.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

Ambassador Cromer/Mr. K
3:45 - 6/22/71

AC: I am sorry to get you out of your meeting.

HAK: That is alright.

AC: You should tell the Administration at whatever level you feel appropriate about the following statement on the New York Times articles: [The Ambassador read the statement to Mr. Kissinger - but sorry was unable to get it -- too fast.]

HAK: At what level?

AC: This is what I would like your advice on. I would think under the circumstances of the case . . . and try to discuss it with Bill Rogers.

HAK: I think that is a good idea.

AC: I didn't want to do it without your knowledge.

HAK: I think that is a good idea and will tell the President.

AC: I will not say that it rose out of a conversation I had with you. Would it be embarrassing to you if I mentioned that I was having a conversation at the White House yesterday?

HAK: Not at all. You can say you came to the White House to see me about my forthcoming trip.

AC: Good I will mention it to Bill.

HAK: That is excellent. Do it right away.

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/94

TELCONE
The President

7:04 p.m., June 22, 1971

P: Henry, I wonder if you think maybe Ron ought to say in the statement tonight that this amendment could seriously jeopardize our negotiations.

K: I think he should. I will do it immediately.

P: Get him immediately and say that this amendment could seriously jeopardize our negotiations if it is misunderstood by the enemy.

K: I will immediately.

P: You see my point -- the reaction of the Congress is not --

K: Absolutely.

P: The second point I was going to make, you get the ______ out. I think we should tell them. You see what I am getting at -- highlight the fact that this caused it.

K: Let's see what happens this weekend.

P: Suppose it comes out firmed. You ought to get hold of B ______ before he goes on tomorrow. You see what I am getting at, you think we are doing the right thing saying this?

K: It is the right thing to do. If the other side turns us down, we play it hard.

P: Okay.

By KMLN

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

The President

7:10 p.m., June 22, 1971

P: Were you able to get Ziegler?

K: Yes, I saw what he has already said to a few wire reporters and it is practically on that line now. He is adding the sentence that this could seriously jeopardize our negotiations to it.

P: Well -- might as well drop it.

K: No, no; he is meeting with the rest of them in 5 minutes.

P: On that line, what may happen?

K: If the enemy misunderstands this as a binding policy, it will seriously jeopardize negotiations.

P: But you can see what my point is?

K: Yes, the point you actually gave him in your office.

P: Which one?

K: (reading ??) The point this is first of all a sense of the Senate Resolution and not mandatory; that you note with pleasure that mandatory resolutions have not been passed and third, we have continued to .................... without setting the deadline because it would jeopardize negotiations. We are trying to pursue ............ offered on October 7 and ______ has been a standard part of our policy.

P: That's all right.

K: Then we are adding that sentence.

P: In terms of future, intend to play hard line. We shouldn't be thinkin about the election in October. My own view is keeping the negotiatin open is to their advantage not ours, therefore, we've got a perfect excuse not to d________ negotiations and particularly if these -- what it appears like all proceed to go along. .......... negotiations and set up team of International Red Cross.

K: Will know more about that on Sunday and will know considerably more after China.

D. Be prepared to go all the way if we need to. It is a miracle. If

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCON
Clark MacGregor

7:25 p.m., June 22, 1971

K: This is a day of great triumphs. Understand the Cooke-Stevens passed.

M: No, no; Mansfield's was a substitute for Cooke-Stevens. One was the substitute vote for Cooke-Stevens; because they couldn't leave the Cooke-Stevens' one dangling, then for clearing up the record the voted; couldn't leave the Mansfield dangling. The Cooke-Stevens amended by Mansfield. The first was a guts vote -- 61 to 42. The proforma vote was 61 to 32. The final vote is just really a vote on the Mansfield substitute.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
Senator Javits

7:48 p.m., June 22, 1971

K: I just wanted to tell you that the NRLP (?) fellow you were concerned about isn't going to happen.

J: Good.

K: And the other thing, I will look into.

J: The Ambassador in Japan --

K: You mean Meyer? Don't think that needs to worry you too much longer.

J: That probably is a delicate and sensitive job as there is and he is a nice guy but --

K: Just for your own information, I wouldn't worry about it for much longer.

J: Henry, this morning was really great; I really loved it. You will let me know about Hess (?).

K: I have already taken some preliminary steps but I just want to give you a reliable judgment.

J: Thank you so much.

K: Okay.

By: KLCW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerard Smith

6/23/71 8:45 a.m.

K: I saw Dobrynin yesterday and he had some nit-picking changes in the letter. They claim they translated it slightly differently from us; I said we didn't translate it. They just put "spirit" before ABM agreement always. One thing: he says they have had a massive bureaucratic problem on SALT on their side between the foreign office and the defense ministry. If we go in on the first day and insist on concurrent discussions there will be a stonewall. On the other hand, if we discuss ABM for two weeks first so they can say there was a previous discussion he guarantees there will be no problem.

S: Is that possible?

K: Not even table it?

S: Didn't discuss that detail. Said one of the things we were playing with was what you mentioned. I thought he thought it didn't present any problem.

K: I think if we just table something and say our understanding is we are going to take up ABM first it will be all right.

S: I said there was no chance of talking about the [offensive/defensive] part without also discussing the [defensive/offensive] part.

K: You are right about that. If you could find a work modality I think they would consider it a sign of our good faith. Say first defensive, then offensive and then concurrently.

S: Let me work out a paper on this and send it over to you.

K: I think he is trying to be helpful. If he'd said first ABM, then I'd have thought it was a real screwing.

S: No, if it's first ______ and they see we are serious about ABM then no problem.

K: In their bureaucracy it's a big deal which goes first.

S: We may be misreading -- when Semenov talked to me in May, ______ talking about reciprocal ______ but ______ wonder if we shouldn't as a first try say a temporary cessation of ongoing IC and SLBM programs.

K: I think they are thinking of mutual.

S: I was just checking our May 4 conversation. He was talking about temporary cessation in Soviet programs. It might be a good idea at first

By KHC

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
General Maxwell Taylor

6/23/71 10:15 a.m.

K: I wanted you to know that we have been reading what you are saying and writing and it is good to know that there are still a few men of character in this country.

T: Thank you very much. I have been embarrassed by so much exposure I'm just sorry none of my other colleagues will come forward.

K: I just talked to the President and he asked me also to tell you how much he appreciates it.

T: That's very kind of him. Thank him very much.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
President Johnson
6/23/71, 10:25 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

J: Yes Henry.

K: I am going off for a few days to London to do a few things for the President. But before I left, the President wanted me to tell you that we are going to continue this fight, that we are not going to get rattled by this thing. And we will keep you fully briefed. We wanted you to know we will not give up on classification or on the policies we are pursuing.

J: I want to be very careful that we don't get ourselves embarrassed by a book. I have been careful about several memoranda that I believe do involve security. I believe I have eliminated the security aspects but I do want someone to look at it. My view is the issue is who has the right to declassify classified material and my view is that only the government has the right. Lyndon Johnson does not have the right. I want to see if there is anything in here (the book) that would harm the President. You know we had a broadcast where I left off the final conclusion on the assassination. We also had some other information that our brothers were in Cuba and that Oswald had been sent in. We also had some information on Trujillo from the same individual -- all of which we did not use. If you will recall my speech in February 1964 in California, I notified North Vietnam that they were playing a very dangerous game. When I left that gate open in my comments, it later developed that it might create a problem with maybe Cuba, with an unsupported intimation that they had participated here or with the Soviet Union or that my successor had. No one can stop me from talking but I try to be responsible. CBS did not want me to eliminate that sentence and I don't want anyone enjoining my book.

K: I read it (the book) from the point of view of foreign policy but I am not able to pass on the security point of view.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Kissinger/President Job

J: That is right. I told Rostow to find someone who could.

K: We will follow up on that Mr. President.

J: You know some magazine or publication such as Playboy
might say what is the difference here. Johnson did this
and the New York Times did that. I think the difference
is that Johnson has not endangered the national security
and if it does I want someone to point it out so that I can
do something about it.

K: Well, let me get on that Mr. President.

J: Thank you Henry.

K: And, again, let me say our thoughts are with you.

J: Henry, you should take some lessons from Dean Rusk.

K: I get the point Mr. President.

J: Dean Rusk said: "I never withhold any information from my
Presidents but I have the right to choose when I relay it."
Thank you my friend.

K: Goodbye, Mr. President.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

10:37 a.m., June 23, 1971

R: Hi, Henry. When are you going to leave?

K: In two minutes. You caught me on my way out.

R: This may be too late, but I think the President should be apprised of the necessity of coming to some conclusion on the China representation issue. If we are going to change the policy, we won't have the votes.

K: I will leave a memo for him before I go.

R: He needs to decide it so we can start making a headcount.

K: I haven't heard him talk about it, but he does have to come to some conclusion.

R: How long are you going to be gone?

K: I will be back on Saturday. I don't know how I ever got involved in this. I thought I would pick a quiet two days. I was going in May and now it's June. It's no hardship to be in London but it's not a necessity either. You are going over in July?

R: For a day. I may stop in Iceland.

K: That would be important.

R: And maybe Norway and the Netherlands.

K: Stay out of Sweden. The Netherlands really deserves somebody. If we can gig the Swedes...

R: It wouldn't be any strain to go to Iceland, Norway and the Netherlands.

K: There's a lot to be said for it.

R: Now I don't know why I agreed to go to the Bar Association meeting in England. I gather the President got mad at Laird about what he said yesterday.

K: He was almost beside himself. He was on the way to say it and he reads it on the ticker. He wanted to say it.

By: KCL NARA, Dato:

5/12/04

10:37 a.m., June 23, 1971

K: It didn't involve you at all.

R: That Mansfield thing got a bigger play than it deserved. I don't think it deserved it.

K: It was such an unpatriotic thing for them to do. What are they trying to accomplish? We have gotten the message. Hanoi can only misunderstand it. Did you read that the Paris spokesman said that Clark Clifford's proposal was pure invention. That makes it unanimous.

R: Those judges up in Boston did the smart thing. They impounded the papers. It should have been done in the first instance. I thought Griswold is beginning to make the right pitch. Well, have fun.

K: I will call you when I get back.

lds

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELCOM
A. Harriman/Kissinger

11:00 a.m. 6/28/71

H: Le Duc Thos coming back. I would like to talk with you about it. It seems significant unless you have dealt with it.

K: We are certainly watching it.

H: No, talking with him and seeing what's in his mind.

K: No.

H: If you have any time I would like to talk with you.

K: I will call you. I was in England a few days.

H: I know you were.

K: I will call you this afternoon and we will get together. I will see you tomorrow at Bradens. But no chance to talk then. Maybe we can have breakfast or day this week.

TELCON
McGregor/Kissinger
12:30 p.m. 6/29/71

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

M: Gerry Ford just called me and said in the next half hour he will say ~~that~~ on his initiative that Le Duc Tho returned to Paris has some significance. ~~initiative~~

K: It cannot be done under any circumstances.

M: I can't tell him.

K: Then I will call him.

M: We have to tell him why.

K: We are in a position where we are killing ourselves.

M: We have to mould, persuade --

K: I would rather lose the vote.

M: Well it's in print and says Le Duc Tho said we can just set a date and ~~when~~ release prisoners. Gerry feels he must respond because we can't let that star

K: I see. OK. I will call him.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Cong. Gerald Ford/Kissinger

12:33 p.m.

6/28/71

K: I just talked with Clark McGregor about the speech you are planning to give I understand you are going to say Le Duc Tho's return is untimely.

F: No. Le Duc Tho left the negotiations a year ago and said he would not ret until there's something meaningful. He made the statement to the press. He returned last week and his statements were more moderate than in past and if his return is meaningful, it would be unwise to do something at this stage to undercut the negotiations.

K: May I make a suggestion? Any speculation on Le Duc Tho should be kept to a minimum.

F: Then I won't say it.

K: Some doves will say it but say I am in no position to say if it's meaningful but we will undercut the President if the Congress does anything to harm (?) negotiations. That's the maximum. But keep away from Le Duc Tho because we don't want to g trigger him into some wild statement.

F: I won't say anything unless the doves bring it up. I will say I don't know if the return is meaningful but if it's it would be unwise for Congress to do something to interrupt negotiations.

K: And others to. We have to wait to see what we can do to ? ? ? ?.

F: This will be very close. We will have to see how it comes out.

K: You're a good soldier.

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Clark MacGregor/Mr. Kissinger

3:00 p.m., July 28, 1971

M: I returned from my 3-hour lunch.

K: I just wanted to tell you Fulbright invited me to his house at 6:30 Monday evening to meet with members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

M: I think that is all right.

K: I told him I would bring you with me. He said he can't stand you, but all right.

M: I have to be at a meeting with Time-Life in New York on Monday evening at the invitation of Hedley Donovan. Would you tell the Senator I can't accept his invitation.

K: But you agree I should do it.

M: I certainly do. I would like Timmons to go with you.

K: Okay, I will bring Timmons with me.

lds

By KM. NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

3:35 p.m.

6/28/71

R: When do you leave?

K: Thurs. night ~~is~~ my present plan. I understand from Bob you have eye problems.

R: I was afraid it was a detached retina. It was examined today and it's not as serious. Allot called and said he thought it was a serious mistake to have the SVN give oil concessions. All the complaints have to vie and timing can not be worse.

K: How do we turn it off? Take it up when I am there? Or does too late?

R: You might. Allot said when stroy was around 6 months ago there was a lot of criticism and we said we weren't in VN for that. He is afraid that it will look like that's what the war is about. He thinks it's a bad time.

K: I agree with you. It will just put more fuel into the fire.

R: I thought I would mention it to you.

K: I agree. We can cable Bunker or I can take it up with Bunker.

R: I will do it both ways. Cable here and you take it up.

K: I ~~xexx~~ told Haig that I will not want press backgrounders. It's on every program but no need.

R: Particularly for Pakistan and India.

K: And VN too. There's nothing I can say that won't make a headline and is a fact finding ~~xexx~~ mission and policy decisions will be taken when I get back.

R: I talked to Al about India part of it. You could be stepping into a bee's

K: I don't know if you say State ? ? ? ? . They are happy with it.

R: They will try to put you on the spot to change our policy about arms embargoes. And while you are there ships will come in with arms for Pakistan.

K: I may get assassinated.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Rogers/Kissinger

3:35 p. m.

6/28/71

-2-

R: No, but you could focus their attention. I guess the President will not change his position.

K: No, I won't get into it.

R: We have $30 million worth of arms in the pipeline. Al Haig said the President is <u>unhappy</u> happy about the story in the TIMES. We didn't learn from here. I didn't know Eisenhower did leave until today. I didn't know about anyhting.

K: Just so that announcements not made,

R: Habib known and Green thing pretty well known. Ungar decision not made and Bruce not made. And you and China --

K: Wishful thinking -- they want me to <u>go</u> in Outer Mongolia.

R: It was news to me.

K: And me.

R: Not a bad trip if you want to get away from it all.

K: I love the food.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Jerry Schecter

6/28/71 3:42 p. m.

K: I read that article about Ellsberg in your magazine. It quotes me as having answered the question of do we consider Vietnamese casualties as having said that's a racist question. You people come to me every time you have a problem. I am just not going to see you any more. You could at least check alledged quotes with me. What happened was that he got up at that conference and said 'you are trying to save American lives and get Asians to kill each other off. What you are doing is getting Asians to kill Asians.' I said whatever we do, let's not turn the war into a racist question. At least you could have checked this with me. I am not going to see you any more. I have been trying to be helpful.

S: I know you have.

K: I think it's just a cheap shot.

S: I am sorry about this and upset about this. I don't have to tell you this but I think you appreciate how much I respect your confidence and the fact that I can see you.

K: But what's the sense . . . you must have gotten that from Ellsberg. Ellsberg has many good qualities, but he is a fanatic. The minimum I could expect is that you check with me. This makes me look as if Ellsberg is a great sensitive boy and I'm a lout and he was driven to all of this. Oh well I don't see what you can do now.

S: Maybe write a letter.

K: We've gone through that before. By me?

S: Or by someone in the bureau.

K: He's the one who made the racist comment.

S: When was this meeting?

K: It was a meeting at MIT last February with students. It was not low key, it was very intense, but bruitful. I said it's a question always in everyone's mind, but don't have it formulated as a racial question. All I am asking is that you check with me and hear my side. I wish someone would tell Hedley Donohoe or whoever is in charge of these things that I am outraged.

S: I will do so personally. Let me work something out on this. Maybe we get the record set straight. I will get back to you.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Henry Hubbard

6/28/71 3:50 p.m.

H: What have we done now?

K: I tried to protest last week against the account of the Ellsberg story when you knew damn well that it wasn't the truth.

H: We debated it long and hard and I thought it was explained to you.

K: Then you told me you'd put in tontect this week...

H: Who told you that?

K: Elfin. He left word with my secretary that it was going to be straighted out this week. I couldn't get through to you for one reason or another. But I despair of you people.

H: The conclusion we came to at first was that Ellsberg was at the time at least of the interview a first-class citizen and deserved his say.

K: You could have put in a footnote...

H: We wouldn't do that to you.

K: You didn't even call me.

H: This was in the context of Ellsberg's version of history. He came across as a nut anyway. The use of you in the ad took advantage of you anyway. But you didn't suffer from this.

K: I've had him on a panel, have consulted with him two or three times. What more of a hearing can he expect? Now in [name of magazine] I'm the guy who won't look at the McNamara papers and in this week I'm the racist. I am wondering if some of your critics aren't right that you have got a story to sell and none can talk you out of it

H: I was not aware of our saying we would put the records straight.

K: Elfin left that word here about it.

H: What Ellsberg said compared to what was printed was as different as night and day. We/ threw out a lot of trash. But we thought it was essential to save the context of the relationship between you and Ellsberg. ... You might have said that thinking that he was talking about something else. But you didn't know it existed.

TELECON

Henry Hubbard

6/28/71 3:50 p. m. p. 2

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: No, not in finished form.

H: So Ellsberg could have been saying something to Kissinger which he thought meant something else.

K: Well, reading these volumes was not a central part of my life in 1970.

H: Of course not. Everyone knows this White House and this National Security advisor are not involved in this. He comes across as an irrational man. To put a footnote in with the President's advisor arguing with the third new lefty from the left... I had my own problems last week, but I thought I did a fair job. He claimed that he did that study.

K: We have eight witnesses who know that that is not true.

H: That's right, so Blocker threw that out. There were other points like that that we knew were patently ridiculous.

K: Beside, what is he complaining about if we took his options story?

H: That's right. I guess it's a symptom of what this war has done/

K: Well, after Elfin called I dropped it.

H: That bothers me and I'll check into that. I will talk to Elfin and we'll try to do better.

K: No, you've been very decent.

By KNV NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCOM

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

4:00 p.m.

6/28/81

K: What's your problem?

S: Before the meeting tomorrow I would like to show you a letter I will send to President.

K: It's been delayed to Wed. at 8:00 a.m. I want to see you on a number of problems. Either 6:00 tonight or sometime tomorrow morning. Someone will call your office. What's the letter?

S: What he should say after Helsinki. I like it a record of what I recommend.

K: Some others send their letters after the decision is made.

S: I like to take risks. I just came back from meeting with Jackson, Toy and Byrd. They are against us and very vociferous. In their understanding the treaty would end on ABM.

K: We will handle the hawks. We will handle them when you get an agreement. I will be hated by left and right.

S: I feel we are doing right after talking with Muskie and Jackson. No, not Muskie, I mean Symington. I see you will be Ambassador to Peking.

K: State says that because they cannot get me to Outer Mongolia.

S: You should be flattered as it's such a high position.

K: I am.

By KCL-WS

NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELECON

Bill Watts/Mr. Kissinger

4:19 p.m., June 28, 1971

K: Bill, how are you? I never had a chance to tell you how much I appreciated what you said on TV.

W: I got your letter -- that was an amusing response. That was the first time I said anything on television -- it's the first time I could usefully say anything.

K: I appreciated it.

W: Did you get a copy of the first book we have put out?

K: I haven't seen it.

W: I dropped a couple of copies off with Jeanne Davis -- it is entitled "Hopes and Fears of American People." It was written up in the weekend papers -- in the New York Times. We did a national opinion sampling on domestic and foreign policy issues. I left copies with Jeanne; she said she would get a copy over to you.

K: I haven't seen it yet. I look forward to it.

W: Fine. This is the first effort in our new venture at Potomac Associates. Perhaps we can get together after you have had a chance to read it. I would like to catch up with you.

K: I would like to see you.

lds

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN
Ehrlichman/Kissinger

5:37 p.m.

6/28/71

E: Your Secretary of the Navy is the fellow who personally approved Pete McCloskey's promotion to Colonle.

K: Jump all over him.

E: Shall I or you?

K: It would be a pleasure to let you. Or I will call Laird and say everyone he is beside himself.

E: No, I will call Chaffee. I like to sneak up on his blind side. I will let you know what he says.

K: Will you?

By KHC

NARA, Dato

TELCON
McGregor/Kissinger
afternoon 6/28/71

M: Margin of 43-- we would like it over 50. We will take it as we can get it. Do you have a minute?

K: I have someone waiting. I will come see you after -- in about 45 mins