Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

Telecon
The President
9:15 a.m., April 18, 1969

By KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

The President said his concern was that we were going to have a great amount of attention today on this particular thing. He didn't think there was much point in going forward with Option 2. Its too much of a piddily thing to announce it on Monday. To me, its not all that significant. What he had in mind to say was just the facts -- that we have run these flights many times, they have been completely unarmed, they have been well outside the territorial limits, he has ordered a continuation of the flights and will take whatever steps are necessary to see that they are protected.

HAK thought it would most certainly be read as an end to it. The President said suppose it is. HAK said maybe some of the President's supporters would also think this. The reason they are quiet on the Hill is that they don't want to get ahead of the President. The President said if we crack it on Monday he will still get the supporters to come along. HAK agreed.

The P said he would use the phrase "he would use whatever action is determined to be necessary and wondered if HAK had any problems with that. HAK said no but in that case he posed two additional questions: If the question is asked whether this same flight has been flown since the incident the answer would be no since they will not fly another pattern of this kind for another two weeks. On the other hand, we do have another plane standing by. The P said whether we do option 2 or not, we would do that. He would keep these flights on the same pattern. The President said he is not trying to provoke such so no special missions would be set up. If the question is asked whether that means a flight will be in the area, the answer is that it will be in that area whenever it comes up on its regular schedule or we are resuming scheduled reconnaissance. HAK was worried that the headline would be "President orders armed fighter escorts."

The President said don't let the Times editorials bother you. When they push him in one direction, it makes him go all the more in the other. You just don't appease them.

The President said the Czech thing was important. HAK suggested he play that one low key until we see what we are doing to do on the other thing. He added that this is going to make the Soviets look particularly repressive and we would look good because of our restraint.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

- 2 -

The President said HAK's plan for today should be to get the plan ready and recheck with Mel and Helms. HAK said he would have a session with Rogers too.

The President said how about spend 15 minutes with the Statutory members of the NSC (specifically Lincoln) just to get their ideas on this thing. He said he favors option 1 because if they took option 2 they would have to take a very tough line in Vietnam and we don't have to with option 1. That would mean the risk of Cambodia

(South?)

HAK said we have had a cable from the North Korean President urging strong action. Our ambassador said we can't.

*

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/96

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9:50 a.m., April 18, 1969

R just wanted to check when whether HAK had checked the message to the UN. HAK said he personally hadn't see it. Rogers said it was o.k., one of HAK's staff had cleared it.

HAK said the letter was simply a transmitte to the members to make them aware of our protest.

HAK said the President wanted to have this meeting tomorrow afternon so would R keep his fax afternoon free. R said he would.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12:10 p. m. April 18, 1969

HAK said the President wanted the two of them (K & R) to get
together before the meeting tomorrow to discuss this thing.

Rogers agreed and HAK planned on going over to State at 12:45.

*

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/18/69 1:25 p. m.

Rogers and HAK agreed to meet after the reception this evening.

Rogers thought the Pres did pretty well (on the press conference). HAK said it wasn't the sharpness he had before. Rogers said on the unilateral thing he went too far. Before he said we were considering it but hadn't made a decision. He said it another way. HAK said in the end he said we won't do it any earlier than these other conditions are met. Rogers said two conditions--when the South Vietnamese would be able to replace our troops. Rogers had planned to take that line in his speech. He doesn't want to be inconsistent with the P. It seems to him that we should portray to the American public (1) we are doing everything we possibly can to resolve this by negotiations. Our posture has been totally reasonable and flexible about how to do it. We want the people in the South to determine their own future. We are flexible and reasonable AND WE WANT IT. I think the American people tend to think nothing is happening. It seems to me that our main activity is going to be on peace negotiations, but at the same time we are going to plan and have programs set up when the proper time arrives for the South Vietnamese to replace our troops. And I think that's a sensible thing.

HAK: We always had that. I think that would be well within the spirit of what we are saying.

Rogers: I'll try to have something prepared and have you look at it when I come over.

HAK: I will be in my office after the reception.

Rogers: I think the President is getting tired--his voice.

HAK: He has this cold. He is going to Camp David for the weekend. Of course he has been under great strain. It's a pity that he had to have a p. c. before he was ready. He let the p. c. force him into a preliminary statement.

Rogers: It wasn't bad.

HAK: I thought what he said was OK and kept his basic choices open.

Rogers: It was a slower paced one--only 16 questions asked. Rogers than referred to statement by NBC commentators--something about troop withdrawals HAK expressed dismay and said so help him, if he finds out who, that man is Out

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/64

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

9:25 a.m., April 19, 1969

HAK said he had talked to the President and the P has decided not to proceed with the strike but to keep the carriers going to the launch point and then turn around. He is not happy about it though.

Rogers said he thought it was a good idea not to. If the occasion does arise later we could make a gesture then and it would look better to the public. He thought the overall results of the press conference was good.

He asked if HAK had a chance to look at his comments yet.
HAK said he hadn't received them. R said they would be right
over.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

10:10 a.m., April 19, 1969

HAK said the President wanted to keep the task force moving, not to do anything and then after they have reached the launch point come back. Whatever public statements should keep that impression alive. We want to see what XXX may elicit from the Russians.

Rogers mentioned his speech again. HAK said he still didn't have it.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon
Ron Pederson

10:15 a.m., April 19, 1969

P mentioned the Secretary's speech. The reason it wasn't
over here was that Rogers was going to bring it himself but
the meeting was cancelled. They have LDX'd it over. It
will include Bunkers comments. If they could have HAK's
ideas soon it would be appreciated.

HAK said he was leaving at 2:30 with the President so they
would have to send it right over.

*

*

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10:20 a.m., April 19, 1969

Laird wanted to know if the President had been briefed on
the SS9 firing the other day. The Soviets fired an SS9 and
we think it reached its maximum range.

HAK said he didn't think the President had been briefed and wanted to know if it had been accurate. Laird said it was and it had three warheads. The significant thing here was the maximum range did not cover any of our big cities.

HAK thought that was very interesting. If you haven't sent
it over, I think it would be very useful. Laird added
that they had also fired an ABM with a loiter capability.

HAK said that Wheeler had told him they had one of this
capability but didn't know they had actually tested it. He
wanted to know if that was a new thing.

Laird said he was giving a speech to the Southern Newspaper
Editors and wanted to know if it was o.k. to say the following:
If the projections continue and the buildup of Russian strategic
forces, they will be ahead of us in conventional, strategic
offensive and strategic defensive. He wanted to know if that
was too scary. HAK didn't think so and thought the President
would want that to get out. He suggested Laird send the speech
over and he would go over it. Laird said he told Rogers about
this and HAK agreed that he should know. HAK said he would
pass this information on to the President.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Edwin Land
Mr. Kissinger
4/19/69 2:20 p.m.

Land called regarding the Long appointment. He said it would be an opportunity for the President to make a small but important major announcement on the role of science in the US -- a sort of Nixon doctrine on the separation of science and state.

HAK said all he asked Long to do was wait until Congressional hearings were over.

Land said this is bringing politics into that other institution.

HAK said when he has more time he would like to talk to Long about the relationship of scientists to the Administration. Some of them have been extremely reckless in their statements.

HAK said he was going to David this weekend and would raise Land's positive proposal with the P. He also said the next time Long is in town, to call and see if they couldn't get together -- he would like to talk to Long about the relationship of scientists to the Administration.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Gerard Smith

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 9:45 AM

S said he was calling about Harold Brown and making him scientific assistant for SALT Delegation. S asked whether there is any possible objection. K said he heard Flannigan mention something that sounded unfriendly. K asked if S was talking to anyone about starting talks. S said no, he is just talking about who should be on delegation - something will have to be started on pack place, people and time. K asked if he was talking to the Russians. S said no, he will not do that until it is clear that everyone wants him to. K asked S to send him over a paper on Brown which he will give to the President with his own endorsement.

N/R

S asked whether K had seen the paper about Merz (?). K asked whether S had any ideas on how to stop it - how would S make sure the other side is not going ahead. S said by mutual looking at tests. K asked whether S was confident that it required testing. S said yes - he thinks we should look at this problem. K said he would see if he could pull some of it into the NSC for a formal look throughout government. S said he has passed the paper he sent to K to Wheeler and Packard. S agreed that it should go into the NSC.

jm

*

TELCON
Bryce Harlow
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 9:55 AM

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

H said the President is having Senators Mansfield, Aiken and Fulbright in tonight for an informal session. Since most of discussion is apt to be foreign affairs H thinks K should be present. H will propose to the President and let K know. It is to be at 6:00 in the Library.

jm

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Gov Rockefeller

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 10:00 AM

R asked if everything was progressing - K said we are not going to do it.

R said the Secret Service feels the mission situation is manageable. R said when he was down here he talked with Dick Helms briefly - as far as security is concerned they will be the ones to protect him. K said he does not think the Secret Service knows what they are talking about in foreign countries except for physical protection. R said he wondered if there should not be a brief meeting in K's office with Helms, Jim Cannon and also Bob Lilly - just to compare record in forton of Dick. K said he had had a special report made by the Agency and in their judgment there was a possibility that an attempt would be made. They think riots are less like than assassination attack. K said he had mentioned this to the President becuase he did not want to put R into position of passing on his own security.

K said he would set up meeting for Jim if R wanted him to. K said he has two worries - one is physical attempt and the second is if there is an incident. If so, others will probably feel they have to prove their manhood. K said he would check with Helms again today to see what he thinks. R said check out idea of going by chopper - that minimizes situation.

jm

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon

10:25, April 21, 1969

Joe Sisco

Sisco said he had talked to Hal on the Middle East paper they sent to HAK. HAK said he hadn't seen it yet.

Sisco wanted to know if they had to take this paper to the Review Group. He said they could move faster on it and it wouldn't be necessary to introduce people who are extraneous to it. Sisco said he would like also to skip the NSC if this was possible and go straight to the President.

HAK the Review Group and NSC does two things. (1) makes decisions, (2) educates the people. Sisco agreed that this would definitely educate the people. Sisco said, justified on the ground of education, he would agree with that.

HAK said he would read it, take it directly to the President and then probably go to the NSC anyway for education sake without telling them of a previous decision. Sisco said this was a major decision.

HAK said he thought Sisco's talks were going well with Dobrynin. Sisco said he was applying Harriman's principles. You keep telling the Russians what you want them to do on what point but you don't tell them how. Dobrynin said that he(Sisco) had made his point *ad nausium*. HAK said he was very shrewd.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dalo: 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Laird

10:55, April 21, 1969

AM.

Laird wanted to know if Helms had called HAK about the U-2. HAK said no but Packard did. Laird's view was that we should stand it down and HAK agreed at least until the President has a chance to hear about it.

Haid said he had already done this and added that we couldn't protect the U-2 flights. HAK said we can't afford to lose another unprotected plane.

Laird said he wanted to lean over backward so we wouldn't have another knocked down. He added that a fighter escort doesn't mean a thing against reconnaissance unless you have ground control radar. We have ships and plans with radar equipment but some of these are coming from Vietnam. He thought they would have to fly fewer recons in Vietnam but he said he would send over a paper explaining this whole thing to HAK. Laird said he has asked for the minimum amount of reconnaissance needed. He said you have to do this in order to give this kind of protection. HAK wanted to know what it would do to Vietnam.

Laird said every flight in Vietnam is protected by ground and air control. The safest way to do it in Korea is to do it like they are doing it in Vietnam. Laird said he would arrange it so there would be no noticeable degradation of any recons in Vietnam until the President or HAK orders it. They are trying to make it with none at all.

Laird will get the paper over to HAK for his review.

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Joseph Alsop

11:00 a.m., April 21, 1969

Alsop thought the Korean thing was handled very well in the President's press conference. HAK said, you don't think we should have done more. Alsop said no, but he thought the President would have to go outside the press conference on the ABM thing.

Alsop was going to do a story on the troop withdrawals and thought that since all the phoney stories were confusing in the papers lately, he wanted to see if he could shed any light on it. He wanted to know if the story in Newsweek that Abrams was ordered to stop the heat was true. HAK said it was totally untrue. He wanted clarification -- if we find we have some superfluous power in August we would pull them out. HAK said he didn't want to set any dates and furthermore, no decision has been made to pull out any troops. He added that until there is some functions that can be taken over by the SVN we cannot do it. 200,000 is absurd.

Alsop said he thought the whole thing had reached the absurd stage. It is vitally important to keep the pressure on. HAK said he thought the President was quite clear about his intentions at the press conference. Alsop said what worried him was combat troops. No matter how much the SVN improve, you know power of pressure is always increasing by the Americans. He judged that in talking with Mel that that was also Mel's view. He wanted to know if HAK agreed with this. HAK reiterated his previous statement on the present views.

Alsop said this Cambodian thing is also important. HAK said they wouldn't resume negotiations with us if they thought negotiations with NV were preordained (question posed by Alsop). Alsop wanted to know how much chance was there of it leading to resumed relations. HAK said we would just have to wait. Alsop wanted to know what we were doing. HAK said we were just not doing much. He said he didn't want to mislead him. The last thing we want to do is explain to the Senate Sub-Committee that we don't plan to do something that we say we might plan to do. Also said he got the impression that HAK didn't would rather not have the subject mentioned, but added that he thought it was too important a subject not to be mentioned. He wanted to know where we stand and what we would gain by bomping those stations. HAK said he could only tell him that we are going to do nothing and that it wasn't in any immediateSANARIO. Alsop wanted to know how long it would take to complete the Sihanouk negotiations - HAK said about a month

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

*

- 2 -

Alsop
April 21.

Alsop said that Sihanouk has changed his basic posture.

Alsop and HAK discussed the possibility of getting together
Monday, April 28 for an early dinner. HAK accepted tentatively.
They would get back with each other before then. No mention as
to who would call who.

*

By: K.L. V NARA, Date: 5/13/64

TELCON

Marshall Schulman - Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 12:15 PM

S said he was calling about two things. The first: he had dinner with Millionschkiy last night and his visit with K had a good effect. On basis of M's talk with K, he advised S that their academy group should not try to move now. S said M seemed to have confidence that Administration was serious about it.

S said he was leaving Wednesday for England for an ISS Council meeting and Ditchley for European Study Group. K said he would like to see S on his return. S asked if there was anything K wanted to sharpen him up on. K mentioned the SALT talks on which we are proceeding - K said this is not single concern of the Administration but it is one and we are serious about it. K mentioned NATO - it is time now for them to tell us.

Also discussed ABM and Harvard.

S asked whether Frank Long could be taken care of and whether there was any chance of reversing this. K said he had talked to Ed Land about this last week.

S said he would be back next Tuesday and will call K - K said he wants to see him.

jm

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

James Killian

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 2:45 PM

K HAK said he did not realize K had called on Friday. K said he was hopeful of making some kind of input on celebrated case of Frank Long.

KQ HAK asked what could be done now. K said some kind of xx reassurance should be given that the National Science Foundation will be continued as objective agency, insulated as much as possible from political considerations. K said he would hope very much that the President will find some occasion to fix give some reassurance of this kind. K was sorry Lee DuBridge had been overridden. K said the Administration got off to such a wonderful start and it was too bad this had to happen. HAK said he has been wracking his brain to figure out what we could be done. HAK said it is one of those things where you had to be in Washington to see how things occur. Concern was the problem of putting up before the Senate at a time when there was so much pressure anyway - turned into supporting a particular program. K said that is not understood. K said he knows it is not and he is not one hundred percent sure he understands it correctly.
K said there is some concern among the scientists that this could destroy DuBridge. Kx HAK said he has not been in on this one, but he had a good talk with DuBridge last week and that would be most unjust. HAK said this is out of his domain but he does see the President a lot and has occasions to say something.

jm

*

By: KHU NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger

4/21/69 2:55 p. m.

The Pres. asked if HAK had those two names on a piece of paper
so he could dictate to Rogers. HAK said he had one, and would check
out the other one and have it first thing in the morning. Pres. asked
did HAK think one is enough? HAK said on one he was not clear.
So Pres asked him on which one he was unambiguously clear.
HAK said the man's name is Richard Holbrook, a Foreign Service man,
very able. 25 or 26, and he has a great missionary spirit. Pres said
that's all we need. One's enough.

President said "you didn't have to come up with anything today apparently?"
HAK said he was told that the Pres would call him when he was ready to
see him. Pres noted they got a little tied up because of the tax bill.
He said "let's see what develops here -- it won't be until after 5:00."

Pres asked "anything on your mind? nothing new?"
HAK replied we are holding fleet there for 72 hours, as you ordered.
And State is drafting a message back. Pres said, just say it's no
threat to them. HAK said he would suggest, the reason the fleet is
there is because of the two things the Pres said in p. c., protecting our
planes, etc. We can say it is no threat to the Soviet Union.

Pres: I think this is no threat. I'd then couple that with "this is no
threat to you, but in view of your communication with North Korea, you
should restrain them on something like this."

HAK said Bryce Harlow called him about tonight. Pres said he thinks
it would be a good idea -- 6:00 o'clock. Just sit and talk with Mansfield
and Fulbright.

*

By: KML NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Senator Javits
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 3:05 PM

J asked whether K was acutely and dynamically aware that he is Chairman of Political Committee of North Atlantic Assembly - it is parliamentarian organization of NATO. J said they meet twice a year and J says it is a great platform for Europe. J said he would like to consult with someone as to what the basic problems are and what might be done about them. Asked for K's advice as to people he should talk with. K suggested Hillenbrand at State and Hal Sonnenfeldt on his staff. J said he had heard of a fellow at State by name of Abraham Katz. K said he did not know him. J said there is also a Middle East angle because Turkey and Greece are members. J said he has special relationship with Demirel.

J asked if K remembered his mentioning Whitney and that committee. K said it is pretty full. J said he is still interested and J would like to have it considered. K said there is no vacancy. J said well if there are 10 members they could make it 11. K asked why he did not write the President a letter. J said no, he would commit it to K momentarily.

K asked whether J would let him know at some point what he wanted him to do on the 19th - J said he would.

jm

*

By: KH NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON

Secy Hickel

Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 3:10 PM

H said he talked to President last Thursday about Micronesia. K said
Pres told him about it. H said about 4 or 5 people in his Department
would like to discuss this with K and wondered if K could do it tomorrow
or Wednesday. K said Wednesday would be better and he would
have his office call this afternoon and make a few suggestions re time.
K said he would like to bring one of his staff people. H asked where
meeting should be and K said if H was planning to attend he would come
over there. H said he was and would set it up in the conference room.

jm

(Meeting set for 11:00 AM, Wednesday, April 23 - Sneider advised
to accompany)

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Robert Mayo
Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 3:15 PM

M said K had mentioned to him the other day that there was a good
possibility of turning upside down what the President decided on those
two projects. K said his reading (his alone) was that President will
probably decide to go ahead with HEXAGON and turn the other way
on MOL - at least for strong xkmax stretch-out. K said he was getting
paper in next day or so from Defense which he would show to M.
K said he is more apt to cancel MOL than Hexagon, which he assumes
M will not object to. M said no, particularly if MOL is cancelled -
if stretched out, it does not save a great deal. M said he understands
that Mel would be unhappy if either of them are cancelled and K agreed.

jm

*

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

Mr. Moynihan
Mr. Kissinger
4-21-69 4:00 PM

M asked whether K remembered exchange he had with Calaghan at British
home office. K said yes - he saw the note to the President. M said he
had picked for topic the most neutral one - evaluation of social programs.
A year ago, M arranged for conference to be held at American Academy
of Arts and Sciences two weeks from now. Discussion will be race
and poverty and a series of papers will be given. The Academy is
willing to put up money to bring one or two Englishmen over here for
conference and M asked how to proceed. K said he could go thru State
but they will make a huge operation Kx out of it, or he could do it thru
back channel with British Embassy, keeping State informed. K said
that is the way he would do it. M said he would call the Cultural Attache
and tell State as a matter of courtesy.

jm

*

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

ElliotRichardson - Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 approx 6:30 PM

K said he understood R was going to see his friend with whom he did so well on Czech matter. R said posture we will take is firm one but not too reassuring. R said he will read talking paper to him and tell him he can have a copy if he wants. R said he was instructed to see him. K asked R to give him a call after the meeting.

K said he was having some East Asia experts here for lunch on Thursday and asked R if he would like to join them. R said he would like to very much. K said lunch would probably be in the Situation Room and K said he would call about the time.

jm

(R's office advised lunch is at 1:00)

*

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger

4-21-69 8:00 PM

R said Dobrynin read his statement which was identical, except for variance in translation, that had been presented to Beam. R said he then read our statement. R said he prefaced reading of it by picking up phrase from their statement, saying we hoped we could continue to find ways of improving relations between US and USSR. R said concluding note was to effect that with 20 US ships in the Sea of Japan approaching closely to the Soviet border, naturally the Soviets had some concern with this. R said he took it to be semi-apologetic. R said he then thanked him for explanatory statement

R asked if K had gotten anything more for him on Billington. K said no he would call Mosely in the morning.

jm

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Fritz Kraemer

8:50 a.m., April 22, 1969

It seems that David Nevin from Life called Kraemer and wanted an interview to discuss HAK. Kraemer didn't want to grant the interview without first getting HAK's permission.

HAK thought that Nevin had done the most perceptive article on Rockefeller and thought that Kraemer should see him.

Kraemer wanted to discuss Rogers' statement but HAK said he just couldn't discuss it now. He would send Haig over. Kraemer said he had put Nevin off until Thursday and hopes to be able to see Haig before then.

Kraemer said he would stand by HAK and wanted to know, as everyone did, if HAK knew what was going on. HAK said he certainly did but he couldn't afford to be defended. Kraemer understood.

Kraemer wanted still to see HAK. HAK said he might go into Walter Reed next Saturday and if he did, Kraemer could come there to visit him. In any event, HAK said he would try to see Kraemer next week some time.

*

By K.L.V.

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCOM

McGeorge Bundy

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 9:30 AM

K said he had a problem on which he wanted B's advice - concerns the Long matter which has been dumped into K's lap. K said he did not know anything about it until it blew up. K said now, quite frankly, how can the damage be minimized. President feels badly about it - he had not focused on what NSF is, etc. B asked if there is any chance of just turning it around - saying staff was wrong, etc. B asked what Lee thinks. K said Lee is just frantic and between the two of them his nervousness contributed to this - he did not take it to high enough level and did not handle Long in such a way that it could be turned around. K said he had talked to Killian and his view is that it is too late to turn *mm* it around. B said he knows Frank very well and could find out about that. K said he is not sure there is readiness for that. It may be that someone will be appointed and along with that the strongest possible *mmx* statement would be made re independent role of the Foundation and independent role of science. K said he does not completely exclude the turn-around. B asked how high up short of the President is the staff judgment that would have *km* to be overruled. K said there are two difficulties - one is newspapers and second is the level in the White House is at the same level as K. K said on Congressional side and old adviser side, this presents some personal problems. B said then the next best thing would be to get word out quietly that you want someone just as good as Long. B said he does not think science community is vindictive. K said he was sure we could get some recognition for Frank - he is sure Pres would make *xXXX* clear that this is no reflection on him. B said that was not the perfect solution, however. B said it boils down to fact that Pres has now focused on what NSF is and with what he knows now, if DuBridge/ had been more sensitive, this never would have happened. At some point someone will have to have the authority to leak this. B said if K allows him to, he would like to talk to his friend Stratton. K said fine and B said he would call back later today. K said Killian thought if we did not reverse the thing we should go for Peori(?). B said there is no doubt that he has standing. K said if it should be that B's best judgment that the only way to rectify this is to go back to Frank, he will not hesitate to put that up. B said it is certainly not the only way but it is magnanimous. K said one thing that was said was that scientific community will not give Frank credit - he was just beaten down. B said he would take a reading on that and be back in touch.

jm

*

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
James Killian
Mr. Kissinger
4-22-69 9:45 AM

HAK said he was calling because he could not get to the President until later in the day. HAK said he has checked around and has every reason to believe that what he told K yesterday will have considerable support. HAK said it is only to avoid another confusion that he wants to get President's final approval. HAK said what he told K about President's attitude and desire to rectify matter will not be changed by a conversation - HAK just wants to run name by him. K asked whether HAK had seen story in the Times today on this - it is critical statement pointing out bad effects on Foundation's prestige. K said before any action is taken Philip Handler, Chairman of that Board, should be consulted. Handler is also President-elect of National Academy of Sciences. K said any kind of selection of individual should have Handler's knowledge and support. HK agreed. HAK said speaking strictly for himself (not for President) what would be the impact on the scientific community if President reversed himself. Kwx said wonderful. HAK asked whether they would say we had beaten him down and now we will beat him down on everything else. K said he did not think so. K said he thought it would have profoundly beneficial effect. HK asked better than Benito Peori one - K said yes. HAK said he would put these choices before the President and thanked K for his willingness to help and for talking with him.

jm

*

By KML NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON

Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 10:00 AM 9:55 AM

K said he had called H last night and operator could not reach him.

K said he talked to Killian and asked what could be done to rectify
Long situation. K said Killian did not say we have to appoint Long
and mentioned Peori. H said we can't get him. K said Killian
claims that is because way DuBridge put it to him - Killian thought
he could sell it to him. K said he then called Paul Doty and he was
affirmative - suggested President might meet with Counsel of
National Academy of Sciences for half hour in his office this would
help. H said he is planning to go there to the meeting. K asked whether
it was already agreed to an on program. H said yes. K said he might
get booed - H agreed.

K said he then talked to McGeorge Bundy who said he would like to
talk with his friend Stratton and he will call K back. H asked K what
his conclusion is at this point - K said he wanted to wait until Bundy
calls back. K said he leans toward reappointing Long - at least
he does not reject it as totally as he did yesterday. H said their
mistake was in appointing DuBridge. K asked if this could wait
until this afternoon and H said he guessed so but DuB is rushing
around lobbying. H said he suggested K call DuBridge DuB and have him
tell him not to do anything for 24 hours - K said he would.

jm

*

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/13/64

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Paul Costello
4-22-69 10:00 AM

C said the VP is speaking tonight in New York before large group - Klein feels there is a noticeable void in his speech because there is no mention of Korea. C said he was not sure Korea should be mentioned and asked if speech was on foreign policy. C asked that text be sent to him - his own instinct is that the subject of Korea should not be mentioned unless he mentions other foreign policy matters. C said he was not sure he could get text of speech as he thinks it is in New York. Klein asked C to get a page from K that could be inserted covering the President's position on Korea.

K said he would think about it and call C back.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Dr. DuBridge

Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69

10:10 AM

DuB asked if Flannigan had been in touch with K about getting together. K said he has had a number of calls from scientific community and President asked him to get consensus based on calls today. President wants to do nothing today - he will put it all together and act on tomorrow morning. K said he thought they should all do nothing until tomorrow morning. DuB said he thought they should all meet. K said President does not want a lot of calls made around the country which would indicate enormous confusion and RMX nervousness. DuB said he certainly agrees with that - this must be kept between them until decision is made. DuB said he thought they should meet and compare notes on this and what it will mean to the Administration. DuB said if we can get together today and give him something tomorrow that would be helpful.

jm

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON

Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69

10:12 AM

K told H about his conversation with DuBridge. K said he wants to meet today with H, K and Flannigan, but K suggests it be set for tomorrow morning - by then, K will have the temperature. H said o.k.

*

By KML V NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Gerard Smith
Mr. Kissinger
4-22-69 11:55 AM

K said he went to Pres on S's behalf and Pres says he has already approved the thing - K just wanted S to know that he has his interest at heart.

S said he was talking to Flemming about another matter this morning and he said on General Advisory Committee there was some question because President saw a number of good friends on the list. S said he told him he had talked to K and Rogers a month ago and K said the President had said to go ahead with a clean sweep. K said that is what he said. K said he thinks he meant there were some good friends on the new list. S said Flemming led him to believe there was a question about accepting some of the resignations. S said he has already notified each one. S went over list of names (McCloy, Blough, John Cowles, Al Gruenther, Kistiakowsky, Meaney, McGee, Neuberger, Frank Phleger, Troy Post, Roby, Wright and York) K said he would take care of this and take the blame on it. S said he is retaining York, Phleger, Gruenther and Kistiakowsky as consultants and he has written them to this effect. S said this is just as consultant and not Presidential appointment - can't break off with all people who disagree with ABM. K said as far as York is concerned, President feels he went too far. K said the people S mentioned are the ones whose resignations he would have accepted with pleasure. K said he was only telling him what the thinking is here. K said since these are not Presidential appointments, there is no need for S to clear them here. K said if it surfaces he will point out that S informed him - no reason for S to take any action until it surfaces.

jm

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger
4/22/69 12:40 p. m.

Haldeman said the President wondered if HAK had anything to report on the Long status. HAK said he had talked to Killian since talking to Haldeman. Killian was taking another reading. HAK said he put it straight up to Killian who, after all, was Eisenhower's advisor.

Haldeman said the President had an interesting thought: What about Killian? HAK said he didn't know if Killian would take it. HAK had said there is probably no chance of a reversal, but if there were one, would this be taken to mean yielding to pressure or a sign of magnanimity?

Killian said he wanted to think about it, but he was waiting to hear from Piori. HAK is waiting to hear from Killian, Stratton and Bundy.

HAK said we know we can get out of it by the Piori route. Killian wouldn't take this lightly.

*

By: KLW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCON

Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger

4-22-69 11:50 AM 3:05 PM

H asked whether President had talked further to K about Long thing and if so, where was it left. K said he told him he would have info by noon tomorrow. H asked whether there is a meeting tomorrow with DuBridge and K said he would like to wait to see what reading he gets.*

H asked whether President had approved K's plan about Laos. K said he was mumbling about it but he does not know.

jm

(*prior to this telephone conversation, Flannigan's office called to say a meeting on this subject was set for 4x 10:00 AM tomorrow - don't know whether it is on or off now as result of this conversation)

*

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Kissinger
4-22-69 4:20 PM

B said he had relatively little to report. He talked to Stratton who tried to reach Long but he is unavailable until later. Stratton was going to talk to him on a purely personal basis.

B said both he and Stratton have high opinion of Peori but Stratton has impression he has turned it down. K said Killian thinks if he is approached right, he would reconsider. B said if this happens Stratton felt it would be quite important for someone (should be President perhaps) to speak to Tom Watson. B said he thinks Peori would be regarded as brave recovery - he has respect of first-class people in scientific community. B said he, of course, does not know who other possible candidates might be.

K said B was going to give him sense of what reaction would be if President reversed it. B said it would be very easy to get responsible men of science to applaud that - to say two big men had met over errors of lesser men. B said what puzzled both him and Stratton was if DuBridge's role was so imperceptive and unhelpful, could Frank work in a role in which he would have to have a normal close relationship with President's Science Adviser. B said he was hoping to learn more on that from Long but could not reach him. B said Jay is more uncertain than that and more edgy than he is as to whether science would come around - it was only his obligations here that prevented Stratton from writing a strong letter to DuBridge.

B said President would come out smelling like a rose but question is whether he wants to overrule his staff. K said he thinks he owes him that option and would like to put it before him as one of the choices. B said he could assure President that both he and Jay would get on phone and try to make their prediction come true in terms of scientific reaction.

jm

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Glen Seaborg

4:40 p.m., April 22, 1969

Seaborg wanted to know whether Commissioner Tape and John Foster of DOD could come over to discuss the policy question of high-yield tests. It is rather ξ intricate and thought HAK should have the problem relayed to him before making a definite request to the President.

HAK agreed.

Seaborg said he would have his secretary call Joan McC to work out this four-sided meeting.

(HAK said he would prefer it to wait at least until Thursday which didn't present any problem to Seaborg)

*

By: KH NARA, Date: 5/12/69

Telecon
Herb Klein

7:25 p.m., April 22, 1969

Klein was in New York with the Vice President and wanted clearance on statement regarding Korean situation that the VP was going to make.

HAK thought that the less we mentioned Korea, the better. Klein thought it would be good if the VP mentioned at least something. Klein was going to jot down a sentence or two and call HAK back.

Klein wanted to mention that this was an act by an immature nation but HAK objected to immature -- word was struck. Finally ended up with statement that mentioned that flights were being continued with protection.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/69

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to Gen Wheeler

9:00 p. m., 4/22/69

K -- Wanted to check on the press guidance for the upcoming
exercise.

W -- The same guidance as before on how to handle this was put
in the message; i. e., "we don't know anything about this."

K -- asked if W was back-channelling the message.

W -- It's already gone. When I left, I released the message which
I had already prepared (in fact, I had prepared 2 messages -- one
saying 'yes,' and one saying 'no.')

K -- You will let us know when the thing is on?

W -- Yes, it will be Wednesday afternoon.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to Bryce Harlow

9:05 p. m., 4/22/69

K -- At President's request, was checking on sending to the Senate
the Long appointment.

H -- Had talked with Dirksen -- told him the problem the President
has. He said he understood the President's problem with the academic
and scientific communities, but this man should not be appointed.
The President should go ahead and send it up to the RXXX Senate;
Dirksen will put a "hold" order on it, and he will take the fire.

K -- Is that wise?

H -- It's all right, if we have to do it to placate the community.

K -- The reason the President feels this way now is because of the
soundings K has taken. The President doesn't want to sit down with
a bunch of scientists again.

H -- This is subjective.

K -- Would the Pres. lose prestige in the Senate if he sends it up?

H -- Ev fully understood it. The press would make a good deal over
a turn-around. Feel it's a one-day wonder. Don't think it amounts to
much one way or another.

K -- Suppose Dirksen doesn't put a hold order on it -- would it go
through?

H -- It would probably would go through. Think now, in light of what
has happened, that it would make Dr. Long a useful political instrument
to the President's opponents on the ABM.

K -- How would they use it?

H -- He would be called to testify and would appear on TV programs.
In any case, Lee DuBridge is almost at the breaking point with this
thing. I don't think it is worth it not to go ahead with it.

K -- I think so too. I have promises from 5-6 senior people they would
give statements. You will go along if I do it?

H -- Yes, I am with it.

lds

*

By:KNV NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Prof. George Kistiakowsky

10:00 a.m., April 23, 1969

After discussing the Harvard situation, the conversation turned to the Long appointment. Kist. had talked to Doty and thought Doty had given HAK some wrong advice.

Kist. wanted HAK to be aware that there will be a motion of the business meeting of the Academy. He had several calls asking him to be the leader and he refused saying that as Vice President he couldn't get involved in this. Kist. said he understood from Doty that the President was concerned about this. He said the sad thing is DuBridge and his statement about the ABM. He is now considered as an evil doer. Kist. said he heard that the President might want to invite the Council of the Academy for a meeting.

HAK said he wanted to look at the whole situation further.

Kist. said if the President has something to say, then this would be a good avenue but would have to be done before Wednesday (this was the point that Doty and Kist. disagree upon). HAK wanted to know just what the Council would expect from the President. Kist. said they would want the assurance by the President that the next director of the NSF will be selected without any concern to his views on the ABM or military issues, but he didn't know whether the President would be willing to do that. HAK thought he would. Kist. said there is a tremendous gulf between the retiring president and the rest of the group. The Council seems to be united between Handler(?) and Kost.

HAK said he wanted to talk further on this on a personal basis re the relationship between the science community and the administration.
HAK said he would call Kist. back.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

Dr. Frank Murphy - Times Mirror - Los Angeles
12:40 p.m., April 23, 1969

Dr. Murphy read a letter he received from Senator Fulbright
following the Senator's meeting with the President and HAK. It
contained his views on Vietnam and felt that the meeting went
very well, although he thought more could be done in Vietnam to
end the war.

HAK said the tone of the letter was good and that was all they were
looking for -- not to change his attitude. HAK mentioned that they
had another meeting with Fulbright on the Korean situation on
Monday to bring him up to date.

Murphy said that since it looked as if the mandate for the Foreign
Intelligence Advisory group had increased, he would like to discuss
it with HAK and would be in Washington next week. Invited HAK
to dinner on evening of 29th. Hak said he would like to shoot for
it but would call him back either later today or tomorrow morning.

(If Dr. Murphy isn't in talk to Mrs. Wilke)

*

By: KLC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-23-69 2:30 PM

R said he had just been talking to Walsh and R plans to come over with him when he sees the President this afternoon. R said he will not raise the problem he has with the President. Walsh has been cut out of flow of work which is very unfortunate - Cabot gave it wrong interpretation but R said we can straighten that out. R said that Walsh mentioned K said we are going to table the paper on withdrawals. R does not think this is any point in talking about how we work out mutuality now - as soon as they are ready to talk about it, we will. R talked about initiating some additional private talks on Deputy level - deputies could do with less formaility, free exchange of ideas, etc. R said what happens is there is no exchange of ideas - a paper is just read. R thought it might be worth trying and Walsh might raise it. K said Walsh had mentioned this to him and K told him to raise it when he saw President.

jm

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Secy Packard
Mr. Kissinger

4-23-69 3:55 PM

P said the Pike Subcommittee on Armed Services started out with Pueblo but now including 121 operation. Wheeler testified Friday in open session and now they have received a request to give them a copy of the reconnaissance schedule book. P said this would open up a lot of problems and said he wanted to check with K. P feels this is one case where we might want to consider using Executive privilege. K said yes, definitely. P suggested that K might want to mention to the President. K asked what committee and P said the Pike Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. P said they have asked for copy of book or to be able to see it, also JCS directives describing how programs reviewed, procedures, etc. P said if K wants more background he can send someone over so he can see what he is talking about. K said that was not necessary - he will give the President a note. K is sure his answer will be to invoke Executive privilege.

P said this would cause no end of troubles - they are anxious to cooperate but there are times when it makes no sense. K said he would get back to P but it may not be until tomorrow.

jm

*

*

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Bob Haldeman
Mr. Kissinger
4-23-69 4:00 pm

H asked what Long & situation is. K said he has not been able to get him -
will put in another call now.

H said he understood that K wanted to talk to him about Billy Graham
and Bilderberg meeting. K said it is private meeting to which Pres
cannot send delegates. H said this kx was brought up by Prince Bernhard -
K said Prince has invited him to go and he told the Pres he hoped he would
let K attend. K said he personally thinks it is grave mistake to send
Billy Graham. H said should I tell the President that and K said yes.
K said these are tough minded politicians. K said if he really wants to
send Graham, he'll look into it. H said he was sure he would back off.

H said he understood President was going to have K check into Brooke
letter - K said he never got it. H said he would check Pres on that.

jm

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
4:05 p.m., April 23, 1969

The President said he had just or was just talking with John on this Micronesia thing. The President said he was against any further independence for Micronesia, anybody, anywhere in the world -- referring probably to those territories with similar history to Micronesia.

HAK said he had talked to Sec. Hickel and thought that an unincorporated territory.

The President said that State wanted to give them an army, navy and anything else to retain the military status but he would not do that. He said that State wanted to normalize relations with Castro. He wanted HAK to turn that off -- he was going to move in the other direction.

HAK said he was coming over with Walsh at 5:00. Walsh wanted to put the negotiations in Paris on the Deputy level. HAK thought Lodge would resign if this should happen and felt that Walsh was not the one to carry on these negotiations and would probably give us away. The Deputies refused to serve the paper that the NSC had approved thinking it was too tough.

The President wanted to know if Walsh was coming in just to convince him he needs should agree with Walsh. HAK said it was originally set up for a courtesy call but that the President shouldn't close him out since Rogers would be in the meeting too. The President agreed.

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

*

Telecon

6:00 p.m., April 23, 1969

Secretary Rogers

Rogers was talking to Ed Walsh about his trip and disagreed with him going to Korea since Rogers himself would be going there soon. He didn't object to Japan, Hongkong or Saigon though.

HAK said if Rogers still felt this way tomorrow morning, he should scrub it. The President wanted Rogers' approval on this trip anyway.

Rogers said he would talk to Habib about the problem with Lodge.

HAK said he mentioned ixix it in passing to the President but didn't make if formal. Rogers felt that the President shouldn't get involved txix in this kind of decision and HAK agreed.

By: KLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
General Wheeler
Mr. Kissinger

4-23-69 approx 6:15 PM

W said he knew Packard had called K about the book and paper. K said right - he has just signed a memo to the President recommending we do not do it. W said the same is true of the paper. K asked what paper and W said JCS instructions - in other words, the policy. K said that is in there too. W said this would be a terrible precedent. K agreed and said he will fight it.

K asked how we are doing on other thing and W said we will not know until some time during the night.

jm

*

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCOM

Dr. James Killian (was in Washington)
Mr. Kissinger
4/23/69 6:50 p. m.

HAK: I'm beginning to make a nuisance of myself, but it shows how much we value your counsel. Let me tell you what has happened since I last spoke to you. The Pres. and I reviewed the situation and it seemed to us that the best way to undo what had been done would be to go back to Frank Long and see if the thing could be rectified. Which we did, on the basis that this had been handled as a regular political appointment, and that as soon as the Pres. recognized the true facts of the National Science Foundation, he regretted it -- this is the exact truth. Frank Long feels, after long consideration, that he just cannot begin as a controversial appointment with a heavy Congressional load and very regretfully, HAK thinks, without any malice or ill-will, said he could not reconsider. But he indicated he would certainly be prepared to speak to a designee indicating he would be happy for him to take the position, and give him support.

Killian: I salute the President and yourself for having done this. I think this is an act of real understanding and courage.

HAK: We aren't going to give this any publicity, but I think some of the people who have been very helpful and whose judgment we value should have this. Now the President is going to invite the Council of the Academy to meet with him and repeat that the Science Foundation should be independent. We have two choices. We can ask them to get together with the National Science Board to make three recommendations to us of which we will choose one -- this is one way of handling it. The other would be to go after Piore now, who has already been approved by the NSB at one stage -- in fact, he was the first choice -- so that we wouldn't be going out of channels. Which of these procedures would be the better one?

Killian: I think the first one you mentioned would be better. I think you might wind up with Piore under those circumstances, but with much greater assurance that he would not react as Long did.

HAK: I think the Pres. probably leans a little toward the other one just to get the thinking over with.

Killian: I think either course is all right. I think you will need the participation of some people whom Piore knows and feels easy with. I'm sure he would appear to go in under a cloud (??)

Kissinger: Even if Long were to urge him to do it? Or if he were told he could call Long?

Killian: It may work and you could certainly--if you wanted to follow that

*

By: KHL NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

route and after he had talked to Long. I know Piore very well. He
came to me originally on this.

Kissinger: I don't know the fathers of science very well, and I've
had a phone call from George Kistiakowsky, who is generally over-
wrought right now because of Harvard, which led me to believe
that he was very conscious of the hurt that was being done to the
scientists xxx, but perhaps less conscious of the problems the
President has. If we do arrange this meeting for the council of the
National Academy and there should be some magnanimity on the other
side.

Killian: I agree completely.

HAK: And the three people they recommend, we aren't going to ask
what their political connections are, but they shouldn't be Jerry Wiesner.
They should be people who command a wide consensus in the scientific
community. I don't even know three on the board.

Killian: Fred Seitz is the president of the committee.

HAK: Everyone tells me people don't have confidence in him, and
we should work with Hendler.

Killian: He is an unimpressive figure, I must say. Hendler is coming
in to that post on the first of July. Could I have a chance to look up
the membership of this group to see who is on it, and I will try to give
you another reading.

HAK: The President's advisers have the legitimate feeling that, considering
from where they have started, they've come a long way. (Killian: they
certainly have.) HAK: And that scientists have not always shown full
compassion for them. They don't object to the position on ABM, but
to the constant charges of bad faith.

Killian: No, that's not tolerable.

HAK: Could you give some thought and can I call me back?

Killian said he would.

##

*

TELCON

Julius Stratton
Mr. Kissinger

4-23-69 6:55 PM

K said he had called Mac about the NSF problem which resulted
from bad staff work more than anything. S said he understood
so well what had happened. K said on private basis he would like
to tell S the following. K said we have reviewed various things
that could be done, such as meeting with the Board of National
Academy, making firm statement, etc. K said then as they were
talking, President decided easiest way to undo is to go back to
Long. K said he went to Long on a personal basis and had a long
talk with him. K said he did rather than DuBridge because
we did not want to make it official. He was responsive but after
thinking about it for 24 hours, Long decided he could not begin
with possible Senatorial fight, etc. Long indicated that if we
wanted his help in connection with any possible appointee, he
would be more than willing to talk to him. K said while
this won't undo all the damage, we are going to appoint him to
PSAC and he will get a Presidential appointment - which is about
as much as we can do. S said he had tried to reach Long but
was unable to and planned to call Mac tomorrow about what
happens next.

K said there are two choices which have occurred to us. K said this
has not been discussed with Lee yet so it would be embarrassing if
it got back to him before K talks to him. S said he understood.
K said, one, we could go back to Piore (who was first choice) and
ask him to reconsider; if two, we can ask Council of National Academy
to meet with Pres and ask them to come up with three k nominations.
K said Piore does not need this as he has already been recommenced
by the Board. S said it was his understanding that Piore weighed
pain of undertaking and IBM and later withdrew. S said he thought
Piore needed some encouragement - he has all the background from
back in days of ONR, etc. K said he had a call from Kistiakowsky
who was so overwrought by Harvard and felt put upon. S said,
frankly that is why he hesitated about Council because of George.
S said K may not know, but feelings between Sipes and Kistiakowsky
are strained. K said that is another thing - they are asking up
to keep Sipes out of such a meeting and K does not know how we
do that. S said on balance he would have a try at Piore - some of
his friends could encourage it. If Piore won't do it, nothing is lost
as there is still the Council. K asked if we go Council route

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-2-

can some influence be brought to bear on us to get three competent nominations. S said that is hard one but he thinks so. Kx S asked if Phil Handler (?) knows anything about this and K said no. K said what he wants to do is get it basically set up and turn it over to Lee. S said he thought they would respond to Lee but there is some concern about his statements. K said his problem is that he (Lee) has not worked in this environment before and K does not think charges he has heard are fair. S agreed. S said he would like to review it and take another look - he will call K back tomorrow. K said the earlier the better.

jm

By KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon

8:45 a.m., April 24, 1969

Paul Doty

HAK said we all agree that this was handled poorly. The staff handled this as if it were a cabinet appointment and DuBridge behaved stupidly. He said he had made the suggestion that the President meet with the Council of the National Academy. The President agreed to this and would be willing to make a strong statement regarding the independence of the science community but would prefer to do this after an appointment had been made.

Doty finally agreed that this was probably the best way. HAK said the President would like Piori but would need some help. They decided that HAK would call Killian, Long and Harry Brooks and they Doty would follow up. HAK said DuBridge would have to be brought in at this point. He(Hak) is afraid if this drags on any further DuBridge is going to mess it up again. Long would be put on PISAC and Doty agreed that this was a good move. The next opening on the National Science Board should go to Long also.

HAK is going to call Doty back after his meeting with the President this morning to clarify the course of action today.

TELCON
Dr. James Killian
Mr. Kissinger

4/24/69 9:45 a.m.

(at end of conversation, HAK said: I WILL MAKE SURE YOU DON'T HAVE TROUBLE REACHING ME.)

HAK told Killian that he had talked to President and what he feels would be most comfortable for him would be if he could go ahead with Piore and then meet with the Council of the Academy and tell them what he has done -- make a very firm statement on the independence of the Foundation. Pres. also told HAK that he would put Long on PSAC so that that would be the strongest sort of endorsement he can make of Long. HAK feels that, in these conditions, if a few senior people could call Piore and put it on the grounds this is no longer just an offer of a job, but a way of healing something, so that it really is in the national interest that he does it--beyond the importance of the job. HAK asked if Killian would be willing to help out with it.

Killian: I will.

HAK: There is a slight delicacy on this -- I have not yet told DuBridge -- all the advice I get is that the approach should be made otherwise. If I knew you were calling Piore I would call DuBridge and tell him this is happening.

Killian: Let me get my lines out this morning, and I will call you back.

HAK: I have also talked to Doty, who is willing to help. Long told me yesterday that when we get a prospect, he would be willing to talk to him. I think this would be the easiest way to heal it now.

Killian: After thinking about it overnight, I would have hesitancy recommending that there be a meeting of the Council with the Academy until the matter was resolved. I can see a meeting with the Board of the Foundation, but I am not sure that the Council of the @x Academy ought to be involved other than to be informed.

Killian went on to say there were the Council of the Academy of Science, and the other is the Council (Engineering?), and then he thinks the NSF deals with both, and he would have hesitancy in singling out Council of the Academy. So he thinks there is this complication, too. He thinks if the matter can be resolved to go ahead with a meeting of the kind described by HAK, he would bring in both Councils.

HAK: He would do that only on the basis of recommendations of people he respects, like you. He has indicated he is willing to do it, but he would like to do it from a platform after he has appointed someone who is clearly acceptable.

Killian: Let me see who I can line up. I will not get in touch with Piore until after I have been in touch with you.

HAK: As far as we are concerned, you are welcome to get in touch with Piore.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

Killian: I will.

Killian went on to say there were the Council of the Academy of Science, and the other is the Council (Engineering?), and they think the NSF deals with both, and he would have hesitancy in singling out Council of the Academy. So he thinks there is this complication, too. He thinks if the matter can be resolved to go ahead with a meeting of the kind described by HAK, he would bring in both Councils.

By KL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

TELCON
McGeorge Bundy

4-24-69 10:00 AM

B said it was very clear to Frank Long that it would not work - has nothing to do with his feelings for the President. K said he had a talk with Long yesterday in a guard way and that is the impression he got too.
B said for K's information, this comes from Kaysen. K said we had come to view that that was the neatest way of rectifying situation but he understands Frank's view.

B said as far as Max Piore, everything comes up roses except for the question as to whether he will do it. B suggested that it should be tested with Tom Watson first, partly because it might be an economic problem for Piore.
B said there is one other fellow, the President of Univ of Utah - Fletcher.
K said right - he is a good man and on every list for other positions.
K said he has never been put before the Science Board. B said their informal guesswork is that he would get a strong endorsement from the Board.

K said he thinks we will probably have a go at Piore and couple that with a strong statement re independence of foundation, etc. B said he did not think it would do any harm for the President to call Frank. K said he has agreed to put Frank on PSAC. B asked whether Frank would do that.
K said we do not know. B said he might not because of Lee. K said he thought Lee is being a little unfairly attacked - B agreed.

K said he would see B at lunch tomorrow.

jm

By: K.L. NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Paul Doty
Mr. Kissinger
4-24-69 10:00 AM

K said he has talked with President and he feels he would like to go ahead with Piore. After looking over Council of Academy, he should meet only to xx inform them and not to ask for their advice and make a strong statement regarding independence of foundation, etc. K said to have them involved in selection would be too risky. D said he has talked to Mac and he is waiting to hear from K - he will put on pressures as soon as he hears from K. D said there is intensive agitation in Academy for strong statement. K said he can get it done on Saturday. D said they will not be there then. D said it is much better to have meeting on Monday with President so that when Academy meets they can be informed of President's statement.

By KLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Prof Kistiakowsky
4-24-69 10:10 AM

Discussed Harvard situation and then turned to Long situation.
HAK said everyone here recognizes that mistake was made - HAK said he did
not get involved in this until about four days ago. HAK said problem was
that it was treated like a Cabinet appointment and President never focused
on it - did not realize it was Foundation. HAK said if you read President's
press conference statement you will see this is so. HAK said the problem
now is how to rectify it. President intends to reaffirm in strongest possible
terms the independence of the NSF - now problem is how to do it. HAK
said he has to talk to Long on behalf of the President and President
plans to appoint him to PSAC. K said Frank does not know this yet and
everything K is telling Kist. Lee does not know yet. Kist said he had talked
to Frank and he is upset by alternatives presented by Lee. K said Lee is
not a bad fellow - he just does not know how to operate in Washington.

K said our view now is this: if we could get someone who commands wide
respect; then Pres would like to reaffirm role of science, etc., and meet
with Academy. K said Piore is man who would fill this best and he has already
been approved by NSF. K said he has turned down twice but if a number of
senior people appeal to him, he might change his mind. K said he has
talked with Killian and Doty who are willing to help in this and asked
if Kist would help. Kist said yes - he will call Piore and talk with him.
K asked that he coordinate with Killian. Kist said he would let Killian know
that he is calling him. K asked that he call him today or tomorrow morning.

Kist said he would be here next week and K said he would like to see him.
Kist will be at Roger Smith Hotel and K said he will call and make suggestion
as to when they might get together.

K asked whether they could talk later in the day and Kist said he would be
at ITEC Corp (276-3001) in Frank Lindsay's office.

jm

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Dr. DuBridge
Mr. Kissinger
4/24/69 10:30 a.m.

HAK: I've gotten involved in your business.

DuB: I think you're the only one over there who understands it.

HAK: I want to report to you where things stand. After our conversation yesterday, the Pres. called me (after this meeting--in which I don't think all the people talked about the same thing) and asked me for my judgment, which I had been reluctant to give in that forum. I told him he had essentially two choices, of which I favored returning to Long. As it happened, I had had a call from Long about an unrelated matter. So the Pres asked me whether I would use the occasion of returning that call to sound out Long as to whether he would reverse himself. I had a long talk with Frank about it and told him your role in this and that you had been carrying out orders. Secondly, I told him the President's feeling that he had handled it like a regular Cabinet position and now realized that this was an independent thing -- he couldn't feel more badly about it, and was willing to make any remedy.

Frank thought about it for a few hours and said he really couldn't reconsider it -- not because he has ill-feeling towards you or the President, but this job has such a heavy Congressional side to it that if there were concern, he wouldn't want to start under a cloud. But he felt that he would talk to any possible successor and urge him to take the job.

Then in the evening Jim Killian, who has been calling me regularly about this, called (he was in town presiding over some dinner). I gave him a rough fill-in on these things and of the other choice of the National Council and then he came to the conclusion -- with the Kisty/Seitz situation, it would be better to give them an accomplished fact rather than ask for their assistance. He thought that the President would command a very wide consensus. So I reported that to the President. And the President said what he would like to do now is to move on Piore again. Killian said he has a lot of pull with Piore. The President said if he could get Piore on the ground that it's not just a job any more, but a means of healing the breach, he would like that best, and then get with the Council and make a strong statement to them on his conception of the independence of the Foundation.

Dubridge said there was confusion as to whether he meets with Board or Council of Academy.

HAK: He is willing to do both. Killian said he would talk to a number of other senior people, like Doty and Kistiakowsky, and they are willing to appeal to Piore. Killian is going to call me back before he does anything. I thought I better talk to you before this thing goes any further.

By: KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

-2-

DuBridge: Piore was second man we approached, and second one to turn it down. I asked Piore to reconsider. At that time the Long situation was out and he didn't want to... With this development there is a chance he might reconsider. Does the President want it to be let known to the Board and Academy that he had offered to nominate Long and Long had declined to on account of the Congressional situation?

HAK: I didn't ask any of this and I think we ought to wait.

DuBridge: If he is going to talk to Council or Board I better say something as to what the Long situation turned out to be, and that he had asked you to talk to Long.

HAK: He said he would be happy, if you agree, to put Long on PSAC.

DuBridge: He is already on one of PSAC panels. I was simply stalled in knowing how to approach this. I felt completely hopeless after conversation yesterday...

HAK: I didn't think you should get involved in a plot (?) -- you have made your case as strongly as you possibly could.

DuBridge: It's ideal that you were into it, and I appreciate it enormously. What should I do next? I think I should talk to Frank Long and tell him I heard of your conversation. I understand his position, but I hope he will help us in search for another person. Is it appropriate to call Piore and get him to reconsider?

HAK: Wouldn't it be better to unleash our scientific friends on him first? But I leave that up to you. Killian told me he would organize a little group. After Killian calls me to tell me where he stands, I'll call you, and after that it's your baby. Killian said he would call me before noon.

DuBridge: I had planned to go to Philadelphia this afternoon, and I wonder if I should go.

HAK: He doesn't want to meet them today.

DuBridge: The Council of the Academy is meeting Saturday and Sunday. He should meet with some members of the Science Board before he meets with the Council. I plan to come back Saturday afternoon.

HAK: Why don't you go up, and come back if it is necessary?

DuBridge: OK. That's another possibility. Do you think I better alert Handler to see if it is possible to assemble a few members of the Science Board Saturday or Sunday to see the President?

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

-3-

HAK: Sunday is out of the question. Saturday afternoon or Monday. Why don't we wait on that to see what our friends can produce?

DuBridge: All right; you talk to Killian. You let me know whether I should call Manny or what steps to take. I do think I ought to inform Handler, Chairman of the Board, as to what is going on, on a very confidential basis. It seems to me there was confusion here yesterday also. The Council of the Academy is in regular session on Saturday. The Council, plus other people known as the Governing Board, is in session on Sunday. The National Academy begins scientific sessions on Monday, all day. Tuesday there is election of members and officers, and so on.

HAK: The Pres. shouldn't meet with anyone this week; I think he will be fresher on Monday morning.

DuBridge: In that case he should be prepared to say something to the entire Academy membership meeting on Tuesday.

HAK: I think all he wants is to meet with the Governing Board at the White House, preferably Monday. Why don't we see how things go today with Manny?

DuBridge: Thanks very much. This is beginning to look up. I had a long talk with Burns about it last night. He completely agrees that this thing is right, and political advisers to the President have been wrong on political matters.

##

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon

10:40 a.m., April 24, 1969

Secretary Laird

Laird wanted to know that the flights had gone o.k. They are tracking our cover. We will keep the fleet in the area until 1:00 tomorrow afternoon. We are having the New Jersey steam 200 miles off Japan then back to Long Beach.

He said everything went well last night. I agreed since he had seen the reports. Laird said everything was on schedule. Laird wanted to talk to HAK more this afternoon about what we should do in Korea. Because of the difficulties with foreign aid, they are considering sending up a little supplemental now on Korea and then the cutback in foreign aid won't be as bad. He had talked to Otto Passman who agrees and will go along with putting something in the supplemental. Passman was a severe critic. This would give us a bargaining position. HAK agreed.

HAK asked about the other paper. Laird said he would like to keep it until at least 5:00 tonight since he won't be back until 3:00 this afternoon. HAK said o.k.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/13/04

TELCON
Peter Flannigan
Mr. Kissinger
4-24-69 10:45 AM

K said he has scientific community calling Piore. DuBridge is happy -
best news he has heard in a long time. F said brilliant. K said
Killian, Kistiakowsky and Stratton and Doty are calling Piore today
saying it is his national duty to do it. F said if he does then President
can make a drop by at National Academy. K said he is going to
get Long to call Piore too. K said one thing Flannigan might be able to
do is to call Tom Watson - one of Piore's problems is financial and if
he got a generous separation it might help. F said he would call Watson
and K said not to do until K has other things lined up. K will call F
back.

F said Smith has submitted a new list of advisers for ACDA - he would
like K to take a look at it.

jm

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-24-69 10:50 AM

K said he just wanted to let R know the report of this thing is 150 secondary explosions and 44 secondary fires. K said this may mean we have a more optimistic crew - at any rate, they claim this is most successful thing of this kind they have ever done. R asked if it is over now. K said no there is one more - at 2:00 he thinks. R asked whether the ones last night got back safely and K said yes.

jm

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Bob Haldeman

Mr. Kissinger

4-24-69

12:50 PM

K said he has talked to DuBridge and he is ecstatic - we saved his life, etc. H asked whether we can get Piore. K said he has scientific establishment calling him today. H asked whether DuBridge was not upset - K said he is delighted - thrilled. K asked whether H thought the President would call Tom Watson - K understands that what is needed is some appeal to Watson to let Piore go or make generous settlement. H asked about Dick Watson, who is in same business. Dick supported us and Tom did not. H is pretty sure Dick is high in Company and it would be lot easier for President to talk to him than to Tom. K said it is premature now in any case.

H told K about his talk with Dan Rather today - background interview for general information. Rather said one of areas he felt he was wrong was in his analysis of relationship between K and Rogers. He knows that K has enormous influence and power - how does it all work. H said he want into a lot of detail. H said he made a damn good case re the whole point of a good staff man and made point that K functions in precisely the way H feels a staff man to the President should function - responsibility of providing the President with best possible analysis of alternatives available to him. H said he told Rather that K obviously has strong convictions on particular matters but from watching K in action it is obvious to H, to give a simplified example, when solutions A and B are opposed and K firmly believes that solution A is right solution, you make it known that solution A is right one but make sure that both solutions A and B are presented as effectively as possible - giving all arguments for and against both. H said he told Rather that as President moves along decision-making process and it appears that he is moving toward solution A, K then moves to espousing solution B. K said that was really helpful and thanked H.

jm

*

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Julius Stratton
Mr. Kissinger

4-24-69 4:45 PM

S said he talked to Mac and exchanged views. S said this is hard one - he has looked over the NAS Council and if he stuck by all his high principles, real reason for the NAS is that we should have independent forum that speaks for science, etc. S said as he looks over people he is very concerned about some of the in-fighting that is going on at this particular moment and finds it difficult to advise K in terms of this. S said he at least has to make a few warnings. K knows George better than S - he is angry at Fred and this is and S does not find this situation the best. S said he thinks he would want to explore once more the Piore matter. S said Tom Watson has been Democratic leanings but he is good man and S's inclination would be to have a hard try at that. K said S has come to same conclusion that we have. If we do this, K said we will meet with Board and just inform them. S said between turning to Council of Academy and National Science Board, at the moment he would turn to the NSB. S said he has both lists before him and list of NSB is pretty good bunch of fellows. S said if you send K to National Academy and bypass NSB, it cuts ground out from under them. S said if Piore pitch fails, Mac suggested Fletcher as good man. K said he likes that too. S said he thinks K would be on strong ground to go back to NSB - from what he knows. S is worried about personalities in Academy.

K said we are presently exploring Piore matter and asked whether S would feel inclined to call him. S said yes. K said Killian has called in to him and asked where S could be reached about 6:00. S said at home and he is then going to Foreign Relations Council about 6:20. S said his home number is 212/249-4427. K said he would be in touch, but if he missed S for any reason, could S call him. S said he would

jm

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon

4:55 p.m., April 24, 1969

James Killian

Killian said he had talked to Pixx Piori and Piori didn't want to come to a conclusion now but wants to think about it. He (Piori) will be in Washington tomorrow and would try to come to a decision. He said he did his best to persuade him. He pointed out the desires and attitudes of the WH and will keep after this. He wondered what the timing should be on this and should someone contact Tom Watson.

HAK agreed and said that Flannigan had offered to call. Killian said he thought it would be better for the call to come from the WH instead of him. HAK said he would get Flannigan on this right away. Killian said there have been other situations where Piori has been sought and Watson wasn't called. He thought Watson would understand this situation.

Killian said he had tried to get long but was unsuccessful.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Peter Flannigan
Mr. Kissinger
4-24-69 5:00 PM

K asked whether F could call Tom Watson right away and what we want from him is to make things as easy as possible for Piore financially.

F said it is six year term. K said everyone he talks to advises this.

Killian is bringing pressure on Piore and so is Stratton - answer promised
tomorrow. F said he would call him right away (Watson)

F said he was sending to K the list of people who were on ACDA and the
list of people who were nominated. F said he has is holding off letters
until he gets some o.k.s

jm

By: KHC NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

Telecon

5:00 p.m., April 24, 1969

Julius Stratton

HAK said he had talked to Killian and Killian had talked to Piori.
Piori hadn't made a decision yet and thought that it would help
if Stratton would try to talk to Piori also.

Stratton said he would get on it right away and report asap.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/64

Telecon

5:20 p.m., April 24, 1969

Secretary Rogers

Rogers said he was talking to Elliott and Alex and they are concerned
about the reconnaissance flights and whether our planning is adequate.
Did the President realize the risks. He wanted to know if the task
force shouldn't continue their planning. We wondered if we weren't
running serious risks of having another shootdown which we couldn't
afford right now.

HAK said he thought the group should continue. Mel is sending over a
package of what he proposes to do and what is involved. So far only
one flight has been made. Mels notion that there should be armed
escorts along the Chinese <u>xxxx</u> coast is wrong. since that would be an
entirely new pattern. HAK said he would like to put the package before
the group when it comes in.

Rogers said the possibility should be considered of leaving one carrier
in there. To have the ships run up and then run back down doesn't
prove anything. HAK said there wasn't going to be any movement
until the President has had a chance to review it. Rogers said that
HAK should keep Alex informed. HAK said Alex called a meeting at
State today on his own. HAK said the movement in Korea should be
done without any degradation of our effort in Vietnam and there are
many ways xxxx of accomplishing that. Defense is going to put up several
proposals -- one being the rotation of carriers. No decision will be
made without Rogers having a chance to be in on it. HAK said as soon
as he has the package from Mel, he woudl convene the group.

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Senator Jackson
Mr. Kissinger
4-24-69 5:30 PM

J said our people did a good job - Wohlstetter was terrific, also McNullin and Nitze. J said the New York Times will probably have it on page 50.
J said he had to take his hat off to Abe Chayes - he was very honest

J said he had been talking to Robert Anderson about Medport thing in Malta.
As J understands it, Italian Govt wants some kind of comment from our
Govt that it would be useful. J said he would think the thing in in our interest.
K said his personal opinion is that it sounds good but he has put it into
State Department for recommendation. J said he understood procedural
problem. K said his own personal impression is that reasonably favorable
but he does not want to get involved in something that is not an immediate
Presidential concern - he would be glad to if someone can get State to
send it over here. J said time is running out and wondered who at
State would be handling. K said man to call would be Asst Secy Hillenbrand.
J said he would do so.

K asked J what he would have recommended re Korea: J said just what
President did. K asked no more and J said he would have to have some of the
facts and would want to know what Chinese would do. J said he would not
give them any excuse to open up another front.

J and K agreed to get together soon.

jm

By KL V NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Secy Laird
Mr. Kissinger
4-24-69 7:20 p. m.

L said I sent that paper over to you tonight. HAK said I have not gotten it yet. Laird said you will be receiving it shortly.

L said I would like to discuss another subject with you. Do you remember I discuss with you this speech that I will be making in Florida as far as where the Soviets will be in 1975. L said it is kind of a hard speech and I think someone should look at it.

HAK said I don't think it will cause us any pain. L said I also sent it over to State. It is just a review of where we are as far as where missiles are concerned, tactical aircraft, weapons. All of it is published information on where the Soviets will be if they continue on the way they are.

HAK said as I say, it will not bother me. In fact, not only me, but I think the President will like that.

L said I think we should make a few references to this now. It was not as rosy a picture when we took over as when the Democrats took over in 1960.

HAK said good, Mel, many thanks. When I get the package I will give you a call. L said I am going to that White House reception tonight.

HAK said alright, I will give you a call on it tomorrow then.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Donald Kendall
Mr. Kissinger

4-24-69 8:00 p. m.

K said I am glad there are a few people that still work late. I want to talk to you about an idea generated by some people regarding South America. If you have not had a great deal of background in this area, I think it would be a good thing to do, because the President will rely heavily on you. K said I thought the best way to bring into focus in one day, if you would be willing to do this, would be to get some of the top leaders up from South America to meet with you and spend a day with you and cover the whole gamut in South America. Similar to the type thing that the President had in NASA.

HAK said in principle I would be delighted but I don't want to under-
mine their confidence. I don't know a helluva lot about South
America. Frank Shakespeare dropped me a note about this.

K said we would be keeping it in a private area. We could do it any-
where, in Washington or here. Perhaps if we could spend a day
with you, then the President could come in for a few minutes.
HAK said then this would have to be in Washington.

K said he had talked to Dwight Chapin and he said this kind of thing
could be done on a Saturday. HAK said in principle I would be de-
lighted to do that.

K said, the next thing is (and I have to take the cue from you. Would
you want Meyers brought into it or keep it totally within the White
House group. HAK said I have found when you bring State Department
into it, it becomes a bureaucratic exercise and they start sending
cables back and forth to different people.

K said you could absolutely rely on these people. You would pay
nothing. These people would come up on their own. HAK said I
would be very happy to do this in principle.

K said do you want me to proceed? Do you want to think it over and
call me? HAK said if you can proceed in principle, I will give you

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-Z-

a date of next week. I could not do it before that. K said if you could do it within three weeks or a month, that would be fine. I am ready to go whenever you give me the word. Augustine Edwards is going to Japan and when he gets back he was going to fly around South America on his own and talk to these people.

HAK said if it turns out that the President does not want to participate, do you think it is essential. K said I think it is essential. He would probably know some of them from the previous conference. K said as a courtesy I think it would be very good. Whether he can do it or not, it still should be done.

HAK said let me check this out tomorrow. If he gets out, we should check out names of people. K said it would almost be on the basis of where he talked to private citizens on trip to Europe. K said this would be on the same basis. They would have an agenda to go through with you so that there would not be a lot of wasted motion.

HAK said let me get in touch with you in a few weeks. You are very thoughtful.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger
returning Joe Sisco's call
8:15 p.m., 4/24/69

K -- We want half of Sinai for the Israelis. Seriously...

S -- How is the meeting tomorrow morning structured.

K -- Would like to let you present it, which is basically against instructions, to which S replied that he would prefer not to.

S -- said he had done a talking paper for the Secretary along the lines of "Here's where are **(very briefly)** in the two-power and four-power talks. Here are the 3 alternatives cited in the paper. The proposal we have put forward for consideration is based on Option 3. It can be summarized as follows: ...." I will be ready to make this presentation if it works out that way; however, I would prefer that you and Secretary present it.

K -- Let's do it this way. The Secretary will give the remarks you just outlined. I will make a few remarks of what issues this raises. It will be a fairly brief meeting. The only issue open is whether we hold this consultation up until the Jordan package is done.

S -- I see it this way: (1) we have already put together a preliminary draft; (2) it is my considered judgment that if there is any chance of selling the UAR proposal to the Israelis, we want to give a little more time to see what can be done with the Jordanians. Then in 3 weeks from that, we would go to the Israelis VERY PRIVATELY because we don't want the Russians in the Jordanian part of the settlement which has to be figured out by 3 countries -- Jordan, Israel and the US.

K -- Why should Israel accept this scheme.

S -- They will not accept the American proposal without a certain amount of complaining. We should get the go-ahead to try this out on the Israelis, and we should report back that reaction. I have written into the Secretary's brief, "we ought to give serious consideration to changes which the Israeli's might suggest." In my judgment, if you got the withdrawal paragraph in the proposal, it is a non-starter on the other side. That is the dilemma. We might as well fold the two-power and four-power talks. If we get it in, the Israeli's will react strongly. The position that will present itself is whether we remain absolutely firm on that paragraph. If all pieces of the package remain, there will be (1) permanent peace, (2) binding agreement, and

-2-

*

(3) direct negotiations at some stage. With regard to what should be finally demilitarized, we will say "let's agree to disagree and let the parties decide it.

K -- What if the Russians say 'half of Sinai,' (from the mountain ridge where the Arab Task Force gets trapped in every war).

S -- We disagree on that proposal. Robbie (?) told me the Egyptians won't buy a total demilitarization.

lds