institutionalised context.

communism and by Locke, Romaneau and Lingelbach in an in-
solutions of the democratic problem by Kant in an ethical
criterion. The next chapter will deal with attempted
tions, which makes conformity and not conviction the
of another system of Apaclude encoded in detailed regula-
present it has particular relevancy through the emergence
This is the nature of the democratic dilemma. At
and its role in the democratic state?

Freedom of one is the autonomy of the other? What is law
What indeed is the limit of freedom, for without limit the
one allow in good conscience the floating of that standard?
to right action as in Kant's categorical imperative, can
is an ethical standard, even if expressed only as a guide
to democratic theory. What are its limits? How, if there
doctrine of Apaclude. But tolerance presents problems even
protestantism, so is recognized tolerance to the medieval

5.

## II. Attempted Solutions.

### a. Kant

The ethical formulation of a new ethical Absolute which took into account the operation of the individual conscience was achieved by Kant and derived merely from Man's rational nature. Goodness is no longer a mere compliance with the Law of God as the Law of Nature. Indeed one can obey both and still be immoral. The righteousness of an action is to be judged entirely by the disposition or will underlying it and that disposition is attained by a rule which is not a law, but a guide to action. It is from the formulation of this rule, the categorical imperative, that Kant derives a will which is universally legislating which is at the same time subject and lawgiver in a kingdom of ends. This concept of man as an end and never as a means (the 2nd formulation of the categorical imperative) is the quintessence of democratic thought, which in Kant's formulation allows at the same time a morality of Absolute guides to action. Thus Kant has pointed a way to the resolution of one facet of the democratic dilemma and has achieved a synthesis of liberty expressed in the righteousness of the will and equality exemplified by its universal applicability.

In these assumptions a different conception of law is implied. It is no longer positive morality but merely

is implied. It is no longer positive morality put merely
in these assumptions a different conception of law
will and equality exemplified by its universal applicability.
synthesis of liberty expressed in the righteousness of the
of one facet of the democratic dilemma and has achieved a
to action. Thus Kant has pointed a way to the resolution
tion allows at the same time a morality of Absolute Guide
unintuitiveness of democratic thought, which in Kant's formu-
lae (the Second formulation of the categorical imperative) is the
end. This concept of man as an end and never as a means
is at the same time subject and lawgiver in a Kingdom of
Kant derives a will which is universally legislating which
formulation of this rule, the categorical imperative, that
which is not a law, put a guide to action. It is from the
underlying it and that disabortion is attained by a rule
action is to be judged entirely by the disabortion or will
oply both and still be immoral. The righteousness of an
with the law of God as the law of Nature. Indeed one can
rational nature. Goodness is no longer a mere compliance
science was achieved by Kant and derived merely from Man's
which took into account the operation of the individual con-

a. *Kant*

II. *Attempted Solutions.*

a. *Kant*

p.

[N]

[Y]

6.

serves to define the frame-work within which individual
morality is made possible. Law then becomes a guarantee
of rights and not a definition of moral obligations. Thus
Rousseau's statement that only by obedience to law is man
really free - in the moral sense - becomes meaningful.

The principle of political obligation based on this
concept can develop two strands. It can either conceive of
government in the sense described above, as a formulator
of minimum restraining rules, with no further obligation
except one of expediency. Or it can develop a formulation
of law which carries with it the same moral sanction as
attaches to individual conduct, as exemplified by Rousseau's
General Will. This results in an organic view of society,
with man finding his true fulfillment only as part of a
larger whole.

Both concepts derive their primary obligation from
a Social Contract, the ethical implications of which are
not, however, germane to this inquiry.

b. Locke

For the first of these formulations we shall examine
Locke, who though starting from somewhat different premises,
described an institutionalized democracy which fits very
closely the principle of a state serving merely as a minimum
restraining agency, the laws of which guarantee certain

retraining agency, the laws of which guarantee certain
closely the principle of a state governing merely as a minimum
described an institutionalized democracy which fits very
Locke, who though starting from somewhat different premises,
for the first of these formulations we shall examine

p. *Locke*

not, however, German to this industry.

farger more.

with man finding his true fulfillment only as part of a
General Will. This results in an organic view of society,
attaches to individual conduct, as exemplified by Ronaean's
of law which carries with it the same moral sanction as
except one of excommunication. Or it can develop a formulation
of minimum retraining rules, with no further obligation
Government in the sense described above, as a terminator
concept can develop two strands. It can either conceive of
the principle of political obligation based on this
resilient tree - in the moral sense - becomes meaningful.

Ronaean's a statement that only by obedience to law is man
of rights and not a definition of moral obligations. Thus
morality is made possible. Law then becomes a guarantee
serves to define the frame-work within which individual

e.

[N]

7.

self-evident rights.

Locke believes that Man in the State of Nature is insecure. But this insecurity is less the result of inadequate character or lack of ethical concepts, but due to a sincere misunderstanding of a universal Law of Nature. Men are notoriously bad judges in their own cases. What is more the strength of an individual is frequently insufficient to enforce his rights. Thus a state of insecurity exists, particularly as to property which is the basis of society. But since men are reasonable and since their greatest treasure is their right to Life, Liberty and Property, there is no sense creating an all-powerful state. Its disadvantages would merely compound the original insecurity and negate the very reason for the State's existence. Therefore Locke's men form a Social Contract very similar to that of a joint Stock Company which creates the State for a specific purpose, namely the preservation of life, liberty and property. But since uncertainty as to the nature of law caused men originally to form a state, there must be standing laws, interpreted by an impartial judiciary, enforced by a controlled Executive. To prevent the State from getting too strong it is well to separate Executive and Legislative functions. To insure representation of the popular will, an assembly should press the laws. Moreover, if the State at any time exceeds the specific

laws. Moreover, if the State at any time exceeds the a specific
tation of the popular will, an assembly should press the
Executive and legislative functions. To name representative
the State from getting too strong it is well to separate
judicial, enforced by a controlled Executive. To prevent
there must be standing laws, interpreted by an impartial
to the nature of law caused men originally to form a state,
of title, flexibility and property. But since uncertainty as
the State for a specific purpose, namely, the preservation
similar to that of a joint Stock Company which creates
ence. Therefore Locke's men form a Social Contract very
security and negotiate the very reason for the State's exist-
its disadvantages would merely complicate the original in-
property, there is no sense creating an all-powerful state.
Greatest treasure is their right to life, liberty and
society. But since men are reasonable and since their
ity exists, particularly as to property which is the basis of
am sufficient to enforce his rights. Thus a state of inaeom-
fa more the strength of an individual is trependently in-
Men are notoriously bad judges in their own cases. What
a sincere misunderstanding of a universal law of Nature,
adequate character or lack of ethical concepts, but due to
inequality. But this inequality is less the result of in-
Locke believes that Man in the State of Nature is
self-evident rights.

7.

8.

and limited powers extended to it, revolution is not only
permissible, but desirable.

This sketch suffices to demonstrate this strand
of democratic theory. Though the reason for the State is
not found in the ethical problems discussed above, its
actual operation lends itself well to concepts of freedom
and equality in the moral sense. With the State issuing
laws, which are essentially rights, the moral personality
of the individual will be free to develop. Withal it is
well to emphasize that the nature of the obligation is
mutual expediency, that the State per se has no moral found-
ation, that it is a device with all its imperfections due
to Man's failure. As Lord Lindsay points out, this view
implies a separation between society and the state and lends
itself well to a demand for a minimum of government. It
does not follow from that, however, that the theory of Locke
is basically anarchical. Government will set the frame-work
within which the development of the individual's moral person-
ality occurs and is as such a testimony to a certain inad-
equacy or lack of harmony in man. Yet, this is, after all
the sole function of Lindsay's government, to make the com-
munity more of a community (neglecting for the moment his
concept of the General Will). Locke's concepts, the basis
of American democracy, are then easily adaptable to a moral
interpretation of democracy as outlined in Part I. This

interpretation of democracy as outlined in part I. This
of American democracy, are then easily adaptable to a moral
concept of the General Will). Locke's concepts, the state
munity more of a community (neglecting for the moment his
the sole function of Lindsay's Government, to make the com-
edasy or lack of harmony in man. Yet, this is, after all
safety oocme and is as such a testimony to a certain insid-
within which the development of the individual's moral perma-
is pastlessly anachronical. Government will set the frame-work
does not follow from that, however, that the theory of Locke
itself well to a demand for a minimum of Government. It
implies a separation between society and the state and tends
to Man's tailime. As long Lindsay points out, this view
action, that it is a device with all its imperfections one
mutual expropriacy, that the state has no moral lomb-
well to emmulate that the nature of the obligation is
of the individual will be free to develop. With this it is
fame, which are essentially rights, the moral personality
and equality in the moral sense. With the state issuing
actual operation tends itself well to concepts of freedom
not lombd in the ethical problems discussed above, its
of democratic theory. Though the reason for the state is
This sketch alludes to demonstrate this atand
permisstble, put desirable.
and limited powers extended to it, revolution is not only

8.

9.

further relevency will be discussed later on.

### c. Rousseau

The second strand of democratic theory - exemplified by Rousseau - took more direct cognizance of the contradiction posed by the requirement of obedience to law against the concept of man's inherent freedom. Rousseau attempted to solve the difficulty of the umoral foundation of the rule of the majority and the obligation to obey imposed on the minority despite their failure to consent. Rousseau achieves this with his doctrine of the General Will, which is in a sense an institutionalization of Kant's categorical imperative. The General Will is nothing less than the individual's will when addressed to the problem of the General Good and as such different from, and on occasion, in conflict with, his particular will which tends to the exclusive advantage of the individual. The General Will, moreover, is not the Will of All, which would theoretically still arise from an agreement among particular, selfish wills, but is elicited by the answer to the question: "How will the act help the community?" Since it will be impossible to determine in practice whether each individual has in fact asked himself the proper question, the General Will is institutionally equated to the will of the majority.

The operation of the General, which can not be

The operation of the General, which can not be
will is institutionally equated to the will of the majority.
has in fact asked himself the broader question, the General
possible to determine in practice whether each individual
"How will the set help the community?" Since it will be im-
sufficient will, put in effect by the answer to the question:
firstly, still arise from an agreement among baronial,
will, moreover, is not the Will of VII, which would theoret-
to the exclusive advantage of the individual. The General
occasion, in conflict with, his baronial will which tends
of the General Good and as such different from, and on
than the individual's will when addressed to the problem
categorical imperative. The General Will is nothing less
will, which is in a sense an institutionalization of Kant's
Romaean achieves this with his doctrine of the General
imposed on the minority despite their failure to consent.
of the rule of the majority and the obligation to obey
attempted to solve the difficulty of the unmorally founded
against the concept of man's inherent freedom. Romaean
tradiction based by the requirement of obedience to law
filed by Romaean - took more direct compliance of the con-
test of the second string of democratic theory - exemplif-
c. Romaean

further reference will be discussed later on.

9.

[2]

10.

wrong, is the moral basis for Rousseau's laws. Since the General Will represents each individual's real will in so far as he recognizes the rights of others, obedience to its dictates is true freedom. Prof. Lindsay's criticism of this view of freedom, that even though I may be prepared to allow everybody else to make noise as the prize for my being allowed that privilege, noise-making can not be made a general rule, seems not well-taken. Both in Rousseau's view or in Kant's this argument ad absurdum is easily refuted. To begin with Rousseau would maintain that even if noise-making (and indeed crasser cases than this might just as easily have been used) were by chance universally assented to, it would still be only the will of all and as such essentially selfish, for in no sense can noise-making be considered a help to the state. But furthermore, Rousseau's concept of freedom implies not only my granting the rights to others that I claim for myself but also in their reciprocal recognition of these rights. This is also Kant's idea of the universally legislating will. This will which flows from man's nature as a rational being can therefore not issue universal rules inconsistent with what is implied by rationality. For otherwise the murderer, the thief and the lunatic would also, by their action, set ethical standards.

Other criticisms, by Lord Lindsay, are more valid.

Other criteria, by Lord Lindsay, are more valid.

ethical standards.

Chief and the innatic would also, by their action, set
implied by rationality. For otherwise the manner, the
tore not same universal rules inconsistent with what is
which flows from man's nature as a rational being can there-
Kant's idea of the universally legislating will. This will
their reciprocal recognition of these rights. This is also
the rights to others that I claim for myself but also in
Rousseau's concept of freedom implies not only my granting
be considered a right to the state. But furthermore,

such essentially aelfish, for in no sense can noise-making
assented to, it would still be only the will of all and as
that as easily have been need) were by chance universally
it noise-making (and indeed crasser cases than this might
beuted. To begin with Rousseau would maintain that even
view on in Kant's this argument ad homum is easily re-
sponds allowed that privilege, noise-making can not be made
to allow everybody else to make noise as the prize for my
of this view of freedom, that even though I may be prepared
its dictates is true freedom. But Lindsay's criticism
tan as he recognizes the rights of others, obedience to
General Will represents each individual's real will in so
wrong, is the moral base for Rousseau's laws. Since the

10.

11.

The definition of the General Will as the real will of each with the implication that the minority is not merely wrong but selfish and wicked, leads, if consistently developed, to an absolutist type of democracy and is in this sense the forerunner of Marx and modern totalitarianism. The conflict of whether a proposition derives its validity solely from its identification with the General Will or whether it is right and therefore becomes part of the General Will is never made explicit by Rousseau.

Three variations of the General Will are implicit in Rousseau. The concept that the General Will is merely all particular Wills involves what Lindsay calls the "silly" democratic argument, that conflicts in government occur only when the interests of the few who rule clash with the interests of all the citizen. This is resolved by putting the government in the hands of all the citizen and logically implies that government is justified only if it is unanimous.

The second view of the General Will that is represents the will for something general seems more properly based on Rousseau. This implies a particularly positive view of human nature, that if everybody takes the moral attitude and considers the view of others, the particular views, being selfish, will cancel out and the General Will result.

result.

views, being 'selfish', will cancel out and the General Will attitude and considers the view of others, the particular view of human nature, that it everybody takes the most based on Ronaean. This implies a partially positive end the will for something General seems more properly

The second view of the General Will that it represents is

implies that Government is quantified only if it is unnecessary the Government in the hands of all the citizen and logically interests of all the citizen. This is resolved by butting only when the interests of the few who rule clash with the democratic segment, that conflicts in Government occur all particular Willa involves what Lindsay calls the "afily" in Ronaean. The concept that the General Will is merely

Three variations of the General Will are implicit the General Will is never made explicit by Ronaean.

Will or whether it is right and therefore becomes part of validity solely from its identification with the General faith. The conflict of whether a proposition derives its sense the foreunner of Marx and modern totalitarian developed, to an indefinite type of democracy and is in wrong put 'selfish and wicked', leads, it consistently each with the implication that the minority is not merely

11.

[A]

12.

The third concept of the General Will as being the
will of something general, forms, with important modifications,
the basis for Lindsay's concept of the modern democratic
state. It states nothing less than that the state is an
organic whole, the totality of its wills being at the same
their sum.
time greater and more pervasive than each particular will, or/

Though Rousseau never makes explicit which one of
these General Wills he is concerned with and despite certain
undemocratic implications of his doctrine, an important
residue, with particular applicability to a moral inter-
pretation of democracy, remains. /the difficulty of combin-
ing liberty with equality, the institutionalization of the
categorical imperative as a moral basis for action has been
attempted and has with all its imperfections pointed a way
for future philosophers to build on.

Lindsay.

Lord Lindsay accepts the democratic dogma that it
is the purpose of the state to further to the fullest the
development of each individual's moral personality. This
is derived from the history of Protestantism which by
multiplying sects made tolerance a practical necessity
besides an ethical norm, and from the experience of the
Puritan congregations. In those societies it was assumed
that discussion was necessary to illicit something, implicit

that discussion was necessary to illicit something, implicit
buitain congregations. In those societies it was saamed
peages an ethical norm, and show the experience of the
multiplying acts made tolerance a practical necessity
is derived from the history of protestantism which dy
development of each individual's moral peracuality. This
is the purpose of the state to further to the fulfilment the
long lindbasy accepts the democratic dogma that it
lindbasy.

for true nature burloobers to priff on.

attempted and has with all its imperfections pointed a way
categorical imperative as a moral point for action has been
ing tipperly with equality, the institutionalization of the
bretation of democracy remains. \_the difficulty of compu-
resident, with particular abscissity to a moral inter-
ungdemocratic implications of his doctrine, an important
these General Willa he is concerned with and despite certain
through Ronaasen never makes explicit which one of
time greater and more berausive than each particular will, ok
their amm.

organic whole, the totality of its wills being at the same
state. It states nothing less than that the state is an
the past for lindbasy's concept of the modern democratic
will of something General's forms, with important modifications,
the third concept of the General Will as being the

fs.

13.

in the group, that each individual's contribution was im-
portant in discovering it, that the very diversity of the
members of the group helped in finding and formulating the
will of that society. This implied a concept of tolerance,
a recognition of the individual's inherent worth, but at the
same time made explicit the claim of the community.

It is important to understand the nature of law in
such a context and the claim of the state. That, however,
presupposes a discussion of Lindsay's concept of human
nature. Personality develops in fellowship and community.
Each group is governed by its own purposes, its members
bound by certain rules. Each society thus develops a will
of its own. What then is the difference between this will
and the general will of Rousseau? What superior sanctity
attaches to the rules of the state, the law?

The answer to the first question involves a re-
 appraisal of Rousseau. Rousseau's general will is a re-
 formulation of the doctrine of sovereignty. The secular,
national states which had emerged in the 16th and 17th
century, needed a doctrine to support their claim to law-
making apart from the sanction of the Church and the custom-
ary law of the medieval period. This was found in the
concept of sovereignty which places law-making in a person
or body of persons who, while they can exact obedience, are
subject to no one. In the Austinian sense then law was a

subject to no one. In the Austrian sense then law was a
or body of persons who, while they can exact obedience, are
concept of sovereignty which places law-making in a person
and law of the medieval period. This was found in the
making apart from the sanction of the Church and the canon-
century, needed a doctrine to support their claim to law-
national states which had emerged in the 16th and 17th
to whom the doctrine of sovereignty. The secular,
abstract of Ronaean. Ronaean's General will is a re-

The answer to the first question involves a re-
attaches to the rules of the state, the law?
and the General will of Ronaean? What anterior sanctity
of its own. What then is the difference between this will
pound by certain rules. Each society thus develops a will
Each Group is governed by its own purposes, its members
nature. Peronality develops in fellowship and community.
broadness a distinction of Lindsay's concept of human
and a context and the claim of the state. That, however,
It is important to understand the nature of law in
same time made explicit the claim of the community.
a recognition of the individual's inherent worth, put at the
will of that society. This implied a concept of tolerance,
members of the Group helped in finding and formulating the
portant in discovering it, that the very diversity of the
in the Group, that each individual's contribution was im-

13.

[N]

14.

command, the recognition of the authority of some person or persons. But since Rousseau could find no person or body of persons to represent that authority, he created an artificial entity, a corporate personality, society as a whole. But if, as was stated above, this doctrine presents difficulties both in determining what constitutes the general and what the particular will, just where is Rousseau's fundamental contribution? It resides primarily in the recognition that each society or group tends to develop a will of its own, apart from the particular wills of its constituent members. In Bosanquet's restatement of the General Will this is defined as the whole working system of ideas which determines the places and functions of its members. It is expressed in the workings of that system and particularly in the direction of its readjustment. Though every decision of the community by vote on any simple issue is a consequence of that general will it does not embody it and needs interpretation to determine the dominant trend.

This version of the general will is accepted by Lindsay. It becomes the will of something general but not expressed in the state but in the whole complex of group and institutions which represent society. A difference between the state and society is postulated. Indeed society through the general will becomes the operative criticism of

through the General will becomes the operative criticism of
between the state and society is postulated. Indeed society
and institutions which represent society. A difference
expressed in the state put in the whole complex of Group
Lindsay. It becomes the will of something General put not
This a version of the General will is accepted by
the dominant trend.

it does not embody it and needs interpretation to determine
and simple issue is a consequence of that General will
ment. Through every decision of the community by vote on
statem and particularly in the direction of its resolut-
tion of its members. It is expressed in the workings of that
system of ideas which determines the places and functions
of the General Will this is defined as the whole working
of its constituent members. In Boasandnet's reatement
develop a will of its own, apart from the particular wills
in the recognition that each society or Group tends to
Ronaaen's fundamental contribution. It reposes primarily
the General and what the particular will, just where is
presents difficulties both in determining what constitutes
a whole. But it, as was stated above, this doctrine
an artificial entity, a corporate personality, society as
body of persons to represent that authority, he created
or persons. But since Ronaaen could find no person or
command, the recognition of the authority of some person

14.

[Y]

15.

the state.

What is the state then and what is its function?
It is clear that the democratic state's claim to obedience
can not be based on force. Indeed in Bosanquet's views of
the General Will even authoritarian governments can not be
based on force alone, for law can not maintain itself which
most people are not prepared to usually obey anyway.

Since it has been postulated that it is the prim-
ary function of the state to further the development of
each individual's personality and since that is possible
only in fellowship, it is the state's primary purpose to
make the community more of a community. To this end the
state lays down certain rules. The chief determining
factor of which of society's rules shall be backed by
organized force and thus be embodied in law and which
shall be left to the lateral sanctions of the General Will,
resides in the desirability between having all people al-
ways complying instead of most people usually. The use
of force is justified by the doctrine, also found in Locke
and Rousseau, that rules are of no use to maintain the
rights of others unless they are kept and that this uni-
versal compliance is best insured by the sanction of force.

This view of the state's function is the best
refutation of the Marxist doctrine of the state as an
instrument of class oppression. For the state with a

in instrument of class oppression. For the state with a
religion of the Marxist doctrine of the state as an

This view of the state's function is the best
verbal compliance is best informed by the sanction of force.
rights of others unless they are kept and that this mi-
and Honaean, that rules are of no use to maintain the
of force is justified by the doctrine, also found in Locke
ways complying instead of most people manually. The use
reaches in the fearability between having all people af-
shall be felt to the literal sanctions of the General Will,
organized force and thus be embodied in law and which
factor of which of society's rules shall be packed by
state lays down certain rules. The chief determining
make the community more of a community. To this end the
only in fellowship, it is the state's primary purpose to
end individual's personality and since that is possible
any function of the state to further the development of
Since it has been postulated that it is the brim-
most people are not prepared to manually obey anyway.

Since it has been postulated that it is the brim-
most people are not prepared to manually obey anyway.
pased on force alone, force can not maintain itself which
the General Will even authoritarian Governments can not be
can not be passed on force. Indeed in Bausamnet's views of
It is clear that the democratic state's claim to obedience
What is the state then and what is its function?

the state.

12.

16.

function of making the community more of a community can
not in the democratic sense become such an instrument. In-
deed if the divisions within a society become so intense
that all energies are consumed in class-conflict, the state
can no longer perform its proper function. The Marxist
assumption that if the conflict of classes were to disappear,
the need for enforcement of common rules would disappear too,
rests therefore on a complete misunderstanding as to the
reason for the use of force.

The state's function of making the community more
of a community implies certain consequences. It makes educa-
tion a question of national policy, though Lindsay is not
explicit in defining the extent of state supervision. It
also involves a consideration of abstract equality, the con-
cept of the potential equality of men and of literal equal-
ity which asserts that since Christians are potentially
equal they are so actually and completely. Neither posi-
tion is entirely tenable according to Lindsay. But if an
individual is to play his full role as a member of the com-
munity he must be guaranteed certain minimum economic rights.

Thus Lindsay has taken the reformulated concept of
the General Will of Bosanquet and has made it the basis of
his democratic society. The moral personality is now ex-
pressed through a series of general wills depending on the
community or group of a man's allegiance and fusing into

community or group of a man's afflèance and living into
brought through a series of general wills depending on the
his democratic society. The moral rationality is now ex-
the General Will of Boardnet and has made it the basis of
Tina Lindsay has taken the reformulated concept of
munity he must be guaranteed certain minimum economic rights.
individuals is to play his full role as a member of the com-
tion is entirely tenable according to Lindsay. But it an
equal they are so actually and completely. Neither boat-
fly which asserts that since Christians are potentially
cept of the potential equality of men and of literal edna-
also involves a consideration of abstract equality, the com-
 explicit in defining the extent of state supervision. It
tion a question of national policy, though Lindsay is not
of a community implies certain consequences. It makes equa-
the state's function of making the community more
reason for the use of force.
reacts therefore on a complete misunderstanding as to the
the need for enforcement of common rules would disfigure too,
assumption that it the conflict of classes were to disfigure,
can no longer perform its proper function. The Marxist
that all energies are conserved in class-conflict, the state
does it the divisions within a society become so intense
not in the democratic sense become and an instrument. In-
function of making the community more of a community can
be.

[1]

17.

the larger general will of society which is regulated by
the state and at the same time acts as its operative crit-
icism. The next part will be devoted to a critical evalua-
tion of these concepts.

17.

tion of these concepts.

The next part will be devoted to a critical evaluation
of the state and at the same time acts as its operative crit-
ical general will of society which is regulated by

[N]

18.

### III. Evaluation.

Kant's concept of the ultimacy of moral personality has moved from its positive expression in one interpretation of the General Will of Rousseau to a passive limiting factor on government in Lindsay. It is curious in how far Lindsay approximates the medieval ≡ concepts of law. Law is not something to be promulgated, but to be discovered. It inheres - to use medieval terms - in the folk and its custom. Lindsay's position that man's personality finds its ultimate development as a member of the community - and actually of a limited sub-community - may well be questioned. This concept places a very definite limiting factor on the relevancy of Kant's universal moral personality. Each individual now takes a point-of-view not based on Man as a rational being, but on himself as the member of a definite sub-group of society. It is conceivable that as a part of two or more such sub-groups a man might help bring about several general wills, though of course as a member of the all pervasive community obvious limiting conditions arise.

It might well be asked whether making the community more of a community is either an ethical or practical end of state activity. To advocate harmony, without describing its nature is little better than espousing good without

its nature is little better than elaborating good without
of a state activity. To advocate harmony, w ithout describing
more of a community is either an ethical or practical end
It might well be asked whether making the community
advons limiting conditions arise.

of course as a member of the whole benarative community op-
a man might help bring about several General wills, though
conceivable that as a part of two or more such and-broads
as the member of a definite and-group of society. It is
view not based on Man as a national being, but on himself
moral personality. Each individual now takes a point-ol-
the limiting factor on the relevance of Kant's universal
may well be questioned. This concept places a very delin-
the community - and actually of a limited and-community -
society finds its ultimate development as a member of
took and its atom. Lindsay's proposition that man's ben-
discovered. It implies - to use medieval terms - in the
of law. Law is not something to be promulgated, put to be
in how far Lindsay approximates the medieval concepts
limiting factor on government in Lindsay. It is obvious
pretension of the General Will of Romans to a naiveive
ity has moved from its positive expression in one inter-
 Kant's concept of the ultimate of moral benarous-

III. <u>Hasmatton</u>.

18.

[A]

19.

noting its content. It is doubtful whether harmony can
be considered the sole end of state-action, though it may
well be part of it or whether man will only find fulfill-
ment in a community though that too must play its role.
It seems to be the essence of democratic doctrine that man,
as a rational being in the Kantian sense, is possessed of
a moral personality expressed through the operation of his
conscience and that in this sense he must be allowed free-
dom of action within certain bounds, (the rights of others)
without reference to state-action on concepts, with such
uncertain criteria as making the community more of a com-
munity. One may well ask who will set the standards of
that harmony or how progress is possible with such static
concepts?

Locke's position still offers better possibilities.
To be sure it implies a very positive view of human nature
and of the ethical possibilities of democracy. Yet such
a view is no more than the essence of tolerance and the
key to democratic thought.

Plato, the great teacher of them all, made the very
profound observation that each form of state presupposes
a definite type of personality for its operation. That there
is need for a democratic personality is doubtless. What
then is the nature of that personality? We shall again
come back to Kant's concept of the universally legislating

come back to Kant's concept of the universally legislating
then is the nature of that personality? We shall again
is need for a democratic personality is complete. What
a definite type of personality for its operation. That there
broadly observation that each form of state brevages
plato, the great teacher of them all, made the very
key to democratic thought.

a view is no more than the essence of tolerance and the
and of the ethical bosaivities of democracy. Yet such
To be sure it implies a very positive view of human nature
Locke's position at all offers better bosaivities.
concepts?

that harmony or how progress is possible with such static
munity. One may well ask who will set the standards of
mysterious criteria as making the community more of a com-
without reference to state-action on concepts, with and
dom of action within certain pomps, (the rights of others)
conscience and that in this sense he must be allowed free-
a most personality expressed through the operation of his
as a national being in the Kantian sense, is possessed of
It seems to be the essence of democratic doctrine that man,
ment in a community though that too much play its role.
well be part of it or whether man will only find triffl-
be considered the sole end of state-action, though it may
noting its content. It is doubtful whether harmony can

19.

20.

will, which in its highest sense implies a feeling of res-
ponsibility in treating others as ends and never as means.

What is the relevancy of this doctrine to the
issues of the day? It seems no part of tolerance to allow
an ideology to utilize an ethical doctrine in order to
destroy it. The feeling of responsibility described above,
the concept of Man's ultimate moral personality implies
positive action, not passive acceptance of any view-
point, regardless of moral content.

This then is the nature of the democratic problem
and its attempted resolution. It requires not merely in-
stitutionalization but an outlook of positive morality.
Yet I do not hold with the critics who cite certain short-
comings as evidence of ultimate inapplicability. The
ethical basis of the democratic doctrine is the concept
of infinite moral progress, achieved by man on the basis
of his rational nature. This implies that perfection at
any one stage is unattainable but it gives the widest pos-
sible scope to philosophers such as discussed in this paper,
to trace the nature of our ideals, beacons to follow, aims
to attain.

to attain.

To trace the nature of our ideas, persons to follow, aim
able scope to Friedrichs and so discussed in this paper,
any one stage is attainable but it gives the widest pos-
of his rational nature. This implies that perfection at
of infinite moral progress, achieved by man on the basis
of ethical laws of the democratic doctrine is the concept
coming as evidence of ultimate inapplicability. The
Yet I do not hold with the critics who cite certain short-
attitudesfixation put an outlook of positive morality.
and its attempted resolution. It requires not merely in-
This then is the nature of the democratic problem
point, regardless of moral content.
Positive action, not passive acceptance of any view-
the concept of Man's ultimate moral personality implies
destroy it. The feeling of rationality described above,
am ideology to utilize an ethical doctrine in order to
issues of the day? It seems no part of tolerance to allow
What is the relevance of this doctrine to the
bonapastity in treating others as ends and never as means.
will, which in its highest sense implies a feeling of res-

50.