Flanigan - page 3

Because then either we will have had a success in which case I'll proceed
might help alot. Well, if we've had a failure then it would effect everything
anyway. I think we can gamble on success.

F: When do you hope to see Gomyko?

K: Monday.

F: Good. Is this something he can deal with?

K: Well, if -- look if he would give me anything at all, it would help. OK.

F: Then we will just think about of alternative courses, put it in our back
pocket until you come back and whenever it is, that's beginning the week after
next, and make a real reappraisal right then.

K: Exactly.

F: Good luck, Henry.

END

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TELECON
William Casey/Secretary Kissinger

2:40 PM

Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello

C: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill.

C: How are you?

K: OK

C: Good. I had a talk with last week with Stevenson and Jackson.

K: Yea.

C: I had to go up and testify Tuesday on the EX-IM authorization and I just thought I would touch base with you to see if you had any guidance for me. They've been talking together about getting the EX-IM Bill out quite clean. With respect to Soviets and European transactions except for requirement that to be a Presidential finding with respect to any loan over some amount yet to be determined. Maybea $100 million maybe a quarter of a million dollars. And also a requirement that specifies loans perhaps energy related and those of a large magnitude to gain a 100 million or whatever. The ... on the table up there is 30 to 60 days with an opportunity on the part of Congress to veto. Now that it is my view that we could live with the Presidential finding requirement although I don't think that should be placed on the President but the requirement that you lay the whole tax transaction out so that the sponsor could be jilted at the altar and his competitors would know all about it and do zero in on him. I think would just put us out of business.

K: Yep.

C: Now I'm going to say that, lay it out in my testimony.

K: Well I wouldn't have an objection to the veto by Congress if the sum were high enough, if we could lick that problem, that technical problem of the <u>unfair</u> competition.

C: Well it is not only the problem of competition it also puts the
Congress in a position of perhaps administering a specific review
slap in face to one of our trading parties and one of the countries
we are trying to do business with and they really shouldn't put themselves
in that position. It is a stupid thing for them to do.

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TELECON
David Rockefeller/Secretary Kissinger

3:02

Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: David, how are you?

R: How nice of you to call back and I apoligize...
I just wanted to point out to you a couple of things.

K: Yes.

R: As you heard from Nelson about Bilderberg. yes

K: Yes I have.

R: You probably also heard from Hal.

K: Right.

R: So I don't think I need to fill you in on that.

K: I think I have a pretty good feel.

R: He and Nelson made a great impression.

K: Wonderful.

R: It was very useful having him along and he defended the President
very well against George Ball.

K: You know, we have a report today from Dabenyour(sp?) saying a
lot of Americans at Bilderberg and also Americans from Bilderberg
traveling through Europe were saying that this Administration is
determine to destroy our Atlantic relations. You know, I don't
understand what good it does to an American to do this.

R: Well, I can't imagine why they would.

K: It is not true but even if it were true.

R: I'd say that Hal did present a hard line.

K: Yea, but that's our line.

R: Well, OK. But I mean this is part of the problem for us we have

K: But that couldn't have caused anything, because the damage by that time had been done.

R: Right, it is an example of the sorta thing they think to pick on.

K: Yea. But that is a symptom that is not a cause.

R: No, no, it isn't a cause. I don't know. I think they are having trouble among themselves and therefore they are looking for outside excuses.

K: I mean that talk to the ladies was a disaster, because I didn't know the press was there and it wasn't a well considered statement.

R: That's right. Well, you know, I can understand, but I think

K: At any rate that couldn't have been the cause because that was the end of a year of trying to get them to agree to something rational.

R: Yea, well, they are very difficult. I have no question about that. But I think it is clear that they need a lot of sorta tender loving care just to give them when they behave the way they do.

K: Yea.

R: And I fully agree on that. I did want to say a word on the Soviets. I think the Darmouth meeting went much the best than any we have had. And I have been sick in the sense that it was much less recrimination and much less polemic than there has been at the others. And much more willingness to discuss in a rational fashion the nature of our problems and a willingness to discuss how we can deal with them. And in a way, strangely enough almost more than in Bilderberg.

K: Oh, really.

R: It was surprising. Of course I would write it up in three groups. One on political side which I think is a little more fireworks and I wasn't involved in that. Then there was one on science and environment and that went very well. And ours was on trade and economic relations And we brought up a whole series of rather concrete suggestions that would make possible a more effective cooperation. Excepting the fact that the wouldn't accept ownership in the Soviet Union by anyone, that was the most difficult. We said well how about leasing and we described what this country could do with equipment and also with plants and this be a possibility. And then we discussed the possibility of joint ventures in third countries and instead of just saying this is the end, they said, well, we would like to study it and it was agreed in the end that new US/USSR Council would be asked to set up a task force to see what might be done in this area.

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R: And I think that is encouraging because if we could do something along those lines, it would be very positive and their whole approach is this, they sense a good delegation. Richard Lee who is Administrator of Food sat in with us for one whole day & the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and the Vice Chairman of the state Bank so that it was really a good discussion. And then that was followed up by ... I did go to see Kosygin in Moscow and had an hour and a half with him. I think he would have gone on a lot longer, but we were half an hour late for lunch as it was. And he brought up an interesting idea and that is and he really wanted me to take this up with you and he said how about US and Soviets being participating in the construction of nuclear power plants in third countries. In other words this is a variation of the idea we had advanced only doing it in a different way and then we saw Deviseonne(sp?) and he is pretty clearly I think and put the idea in his head but he would really like to do this and I think it is an interesting idea.

K: It is certainly one we would be prepared to look at.

R: You see the idea would be that they would provide certain elements of the plant and we in others.

K: Yea.

R: But I would think this has interesting possibilities. So far as the joint ventures are concerned it seemed right to me that the ideal place to do it would be in India. Where they are already strong, where the Indians need enormous amounts of capital and I'm not sure it might not be an interesting idea. Not now speaking of necessary power plants but something else. And they were at least willing to discuss it.

K: Now are they going to approach us on this? Or how is it going?

R: Well, I mean, what he is going to do is to send me through Dobrynin a memorandum but I thought maybe it was useful to you if have it in the back of your mind when you are over there seeing them. It seemed tome a positive approach and the whole meeting with Kosygin was much more positive friendly, much less barring and much less jives than I have ever had it before.

K: Well I think they are still eager to continue the detente, but what's going in this country with Congress isn't very encouraging.

R: No, although Hugh Scott was there you know. He gave them a moderately optimistic view on MFN.

K: Good. I hope he knows what he is talking about.

TELECON
Senator Cranston/Secretary Kissinger

3:20

Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: Hello.

C: Greetings.

K: How are you? Sorry I couldn't get back to you earlier.

C: Quite all right. I was curious if you could tell me anything about the Jackson/Ribicoff situation.

K: Well the Jackson/Ribicoff situation seems to me what Jackson really wants, is to kill the Trade Bill for this year. I think he is softening up a little bit though--Jackson. He is now shifting from numbers to harrassment. On the other thing though is that we have got to get something done on the credits.

C: Yes.

K: And my own view would be of the two options you gave if you could help with the credits, that is the most urgent.

C: So we should just

K: I'm afraid if you put in a revision of Jackson and the credits you are going to start one hell of a brawl.

C: Yea.

K: Don't you think.

C: It is quite possible. Unless we could come at Jackson from two sides. I think the only way we can do it without a terrible brawl is to have a number of Jewish leaders approach him and urgent compromise and at the same the Senate leaders approach him and say we are prepared to seek to do it and we think we can swing it. In that way it might be possible, but it is probably wiser to just do nothing until we get the trade the Export-Import Bill through.

K: That is what I would think. Can all of this wait until I get back or would you like to trigger it earlier?

C: When do you get back?

K: About the 10th of May.

C: No it can wait. Because we don't go to markup until around May 23 on

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sorta indicated that if they don't accept what he wants then Jackson
will offer the Jackson amendment on the Export-Import thing.
We'll try to compromise.

K: So he, I think what he wants is the minimum is the Congressional
veto on every loan. That has, Casey tells me a number of commercial
problems in that while that loan is on the table the competitors would
all know what the bidding is.

C: Yea. Well, we will try to avoid that except at some figure
Unfortunately they are talking fairly low figures like 25 million

K: Yea. I mean if the figure is high enough we can live with it.

C: What is your idea of an acceptable figure?

K: Oh, God, a few hundred million.

C: Yea. I doubt that we can get one at that level, but

K: But what they have to consider, well I don't have to convince you.
We just cannot get a moderate Soviet policy in the Middle East
and systematic cutoff of all the fruits of detente. That isn't possible.

C: Yea. I fully understand that and I think there is a good number
who do. Well we'll work

K: I can say my impression in talking with the Jewish community
was that all except the head of the Soviet group would positively
favor a compromise and even he in private talks was more
flexible than I have ever seen that group to be.

trying to arrange

C: Really. That is very encouraging. Well what I will be doing is
to hit Jackson from the two sides if necessary from the Jewish
community on the one hand and the Senators on the other hand.
To try to orchestrate that so that it sorta happens about the same
moment, if we need to do that at this point. But I will focus on
the credits and let the other stuff sorta slide.

K: I greatly appreciate this.

C: If we can help on the SALT thing why there is a number of us
who want to. We don't

K: Well, I have talked to Muskie about this yesterday and we may
get together a group just one evening at the Department and let
our hair down and explain the figures, because I tell you of all
the demoniac things that I have heard this one is the worse.

TELECON
Ambassador Dinitz/Secretary Kissinger

3:35

Saturday, April 27, 1974

K: We will just do Assad as we did last week telling him essentially what you have told us as our own view. That the method is not consistent. Secondly, I wanted to tell you I have a message from Keating about the behavior of your press vis-a-vis the Aid program and I want you to know that everyone here is, if I sent this to the President then you're going to see some things which will be extremely unpleasant. I am not going to send it to the President, but there has got to be a limit to the insolence of your press and they must be given some positive guidance. You know damn well you got everything you wanted.

D: You mean in regard to our aid in regard to.

K: With the regard they have, apparently they are writing profound articles that the aid to Egypt is inadequate quote aid to Israel. And the Lebanon vote all mean that the U.S. is shifting to the Arabs. Now no one can be so stupid as to believe that our aid to Egypt is serving any other interest except Israel.

D: Mr. Secretary, I can assure you that these were not motivated by this Embassy.

K: Your press in Israel is for Christ's sake. I am not talking about the American press.

D: They got

K: And when I say for Christ's sake to you you know I mean it.

D: I know.

K: That I'm appealing to a co-religionist.

D: Mr. Secretary, I want to distinguish between ... the vote in the UN this week... American press

K: I realize it would be condemned and that was the price we had to pay.

D: Fine, but that is one element. On this I have not quarrel on this. They follow the New York Times with the cartoon of babies being thrown out of the UN windows and with a sign underneath .... This is one complication. With regard to our aid, I am not aware of any .... with regard to Egyptian aid and I am not trying to justify I don't know what your Embassy reported.

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The military aid there is to my knowledge no great criticism
to economic aid. In fact on the National television set that ...
US and Arab countries strengthening relations of our countries.

K: Well military aid want happen before next Wednesday to Egypt so can we cool it until I get there.

D: I have said that there are no plans at the present time to have any military aid to Egypt.

K: Because it takes us a certain amount of time to build the SS-11 silos that is that Soviet one, I mean the minute men silos we are going to give them.

D: Yes, Mr. Secretary.

K: So you got a 6-months lead time before we do that.

D: I know very well how long it takes to get American military aid

K: But you know what the Israelis should get into their heads as I told you the other day, even if we replaced every damn piece of Russian equipment with American equipment, which is not going to happen before next Thursday.

D: Wednesday, sir.

K: Or Wednesday, Now you are assuming it is going to happen by Thursday. You'd still be better off because it is unlikely that we would mount an airlift to Egypt during the war. I will tell you this if we mount an airlift to Egypt during the war we will get more European bases than we will if we mount one to Israel.

D: Well, I am not sure about this, but maybe you are right. But the point.

K: No, No, but my point is this isn't going to happen on the question of military supplies, if it arises it would be in the context of a substantial egraded association from the Soviet Union and substantial greater progress toward peace with Israel. So this is not an issue we should now spend our time on.

D: Right, I agree with you. I think.

K: If that is an issue, we can perhaps discuss in Israel even though it's even premature for discussion in Israel.

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D: I think with the Prime Minister you should discuss this.

K: I will be glad to discuss it with the Prime Minister, but there
is nothing active going on at this moment, nor in the defense of
the Egyptians do I have to say have they even made a request.
When they make a request and we deal with them at Israel speed
you know we have months of debate before we crystalize it.

D: Mr. Secretary, I am aware of this and I

K: But I foresee the earliest time that this problem can arise
completely *too* towards the late fall of this year in my own ex-
estimate but I just don't see this thing any substantial amount
of military aid. We may at some point give some token saying
if the Russian pressure gets too great but even that when I say
we may be discussing an abstract theory.

D: Yes, I understand this and I report exactly this way to my
Government after I talked to you the other night. So there is
no misunderstanding on this. But I want to tell you that the
price is not the scientific institution.

K: No, no, but the press is not unresponsive to your Government.

D: Well, yes it is. And you must understand, Mr. Secretary,
I am telling you the truth. It is a combination of things together
that make the press suspicious when you have in one week.

K: Listen.

D: No, I'm not justifying, I am trying, if I may be so bold to help
you understand the mood. This is my job, it is my function to do this.
And the mood *is* that the combine military *aid* to Saudi
and prospects of military aid to Egypt --prospects I say, plus aid
economic aid to the Arab countries for the first time in Egypt in a
long time plus the vote in the UN *ANEXIX* and they come with
and plus the fact that our voting assistance was not what we wanted.
Everyone of these things can be explained. We did not government
promote it. The totality of the picture with the say in shooting.

K: I understand this. But what you have to understand is something else
Because you have to explain both sides. Whatever our inadequacies
whatever maneuvering we have to do, I believe firmly that we have
contributed greatly to the security and survival of Israel in an almost
impossible situation.

D: I don't think the people argue this.

-4-

K: No, that is not your fault that you are in such a difficult situation. Secondly, the forthcoming negotiation is apt to be the most difficult and in many ways the most decisive we have had, because after that one whether you negotiate Jordan or with Egypt you are not dealing with countries that can themselves start a hollow course in the Middle East or likely to do it. So in this sense it is extremely decisive. Thirdly, if we get the proper kind of settlement, our chances of doing to the Soviets and Syrians about 70% of what we have done to them in Egypt is not bad. All of this is directly relevant to the security of Israel. Conversely if we fail, the U.S. by this is not a threat of what I am going to do, but the U.S. by the logic of events it is going to be out of that negotiating game and it goes one way or the other into international forums where what happens in the Lebanese case will be compounded. This is the dilemma that I'm putting to you as an Israeli and as a friend.

D: I understand it.

K: And therefore, it is no sense threatening me with not making concessions. You are not making them to me. And when Rabin said, you are not responsible for Rabin, but when Rabin said you are willing to make a few concessions to your friends, but finally you have to protect your own security. You don't have to make any concessions to your friends.

D: Yes, I understand it, Mr. Secretary.

K: I know how much you admire Rabin.

D: Yes, but the Jews came out before .... That I am not blaming you for. I want to say something else. We are quite aware of general situation. It is in fact, the prime Minister in a message was very careful not to plague the negotiations, in fact, I added to Eagleburger orally that that means we want to negotiate and that we want you to come. And normally if we didn't realize the totality of the strategic interest in what you are trying to accomplish the normality would have been Mr. Secretary thank you very much for your good offer, but under these circumstances, with these wild men, the Syrians, we cannot negotiate. If they pacify the area we will discuss it. That would have been normal reaction if we did not have the Government that was fully afraid of what the strategic involvement of the situation and your good intentions about it. So I mean I want.

K: But it is not really any more at this point my good intentions that matters so much, because it is the objective strategic situation.

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D: No, it matters to us tremendously what these motivating factors behind you and your operations.

K: Yea, but even if my intentions were less good.

D: If your intentions were less good, we would look for another man to do the job.

K: You're welcome, to that. That is what I would really want.

D: I know, but we are not going to let you off the hook so easily, but at the same time we as I think the basic thing we have to do is make you aware of

K: I understand you. You passed your message to me. Now I am giving you some to give to her so that she can yell at you too, there is no sense you being yelled at only from one side.

D: That she has done even before your message.

K: And I just don't want to talk to Jerusalem to talk itself into a masada complex in a period of enormous complexity and danger.

S: Yes, yes, I know, but the Syrians must

K: The Syrians, I'm sending a message.

S: Mr. Secretary I did not ask you to beg the Syrians to be good children, you have done it before and I know.

K: And it actually worked for a week.

S: No, no, it didn't. There were a couple of days. I don't think there was any basic change init. It was more dictated by the situation. But be as it may what I am trying to say, is that you should start conditioning the Syrians in their minds that they are not going anywhere near what they expected.

K: That I listen, I have told them already a 100 times. That is not the issue. I have told them, I have told Boudienme, I have told Sadat that what they want is unattainable, and will not be supported by us in any sense.

S: I understand this. I am not dictating the crazy plan about half of the Golan Heights. I am saying that additional gesture should be good of them to accept our arrangements, because I am fearful would not be able to go beyond this.

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K: Well, I tell you that is out of the question. That cannot be done. That you have to, there is no possibility of either Sadat or Boumedienme supporting that and that I think ...

D: I mean after all, Mr. Secretary ...

K: Well look, frankly I can't argue that. I tell you it would lead to ... a louse up of the negotiations. And in that case

D: As you know Syrians and Russians... I don't think disagreement...

K: Yea, but the fact of the matter is in this whole process it is basically in my judgment more in the interest of Israel because well I think a failure of this process will bring it all back into international forum.

D: That I agree with you.

K: You cannot get it on Dayan. There is no possibility of getting it on any thing close to what Dayan brought here. I have said so from the beginning. I have said so for months. It is my best judgment. Even what I have suggested, my judgment has a better than 50/50 chance of failing. Because I have never had even the slightest thing from the Syrians that they would accept less than the map I gave you.

D: I understand.... But what I am saying is this--if I may be as bold to suggest to you, I think if I were you, I would say to the Syrians that you behave ...

K: That I am willing to say to them.

D: This is not a tactical move, I know, Mr. Secretary....

K: I'm willing to say it to them, but I am telling you you can't act on that basis.

D: Yes....

I think will be misleading you if I don't tell you what the mood is.

K: The mood may be what it is but you have to report to them my judgment and if I reach the conclusion that it is hopeless I have no choice except to go back home and then let nature take its course and see what else happens.

D: I understand this.

K: And that is what I am going to do.

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D: I can assure you but..

K: I have tx made no secret of my firm conviction and I consider
what I have asked of Israel is the absolute minimum of what is
dueable and has been designed to be the absolute minimum.
And It is not what anyone else has suggested, but I will see you
in Israel and we will all have a merry time.

D: Yea.

K: Because you will surprise me with your flexibility.

D: That has always been your problem that you were taken by
surprise. Maybe the Syrians will surprise you.

K: I will tell you this, in my view if your settlements weren't there
and if you were capable in your Government of making tx more than
I had proposed and more than I will propose, we would have an 85%
chance of driving the Russians out of Syria and I think this would
do you more good than all this horsing around.

D: I understand Mr. Secretary.

K: But I don't have to worry because we would even discuss this
I am just giving you my personal opinion.

D: Well I don't know. There has been all sorts of denial in your
press conferences and I understand ... Soviets .. I'll help you
and so what. Not everyone is so sophisticated to understand this
when you say that the Soviets are not going to help actually..
you know what I mean....

K: I have got to keep the Soviets quiet while I am doing this.

D: I understand this.

K: The problem of the Jewish in Israel right now is whether when
they are in mortal danger they have enough understanding and self-
discipline to survive.

D: I think Mr. Secretary.

that

K: Now they have not proved they can do that to me yet.

D: Well, Mr. Secretary, I beg to differ with you. I think the
Jews. I think both the military situation.

K: That isn't the issue. The issue is that if you want to pick a word up
out of my press conference.

-8-

D: No, no I'm not doing this. I am telling you this is the sorta thing that people read and they are not pleased and we cannot make them agree with all the negotiations and this is not Israel you have people in America who believe this way too. This is part of the problem we have with the ...

K: Yes, but we went through this and I am sorta sick and tired of it because this is done by people who sell out in every part of the world except a narrow strip on the Mediterranean and you can't sell that in America. And at any rate I have given you our views now and I'll see you on Wednesday in Israel. Now seriously.

D: Yes. I am leaving on Monday. I'll be there on Tuesday and I will be waiting for you on Thursday.

K: Good

D: Have a good trip and a safe trip.

K: I understand you don't have a lunch.

D: I don't have a lunch when?

K: On Monday.

D: Yea he called me and told me that he got a message from Gromyko.

K: Yes, I am having lunch with him on Monday.

D: I'm thinking to join you in Geneva. but if you prefer to join him than me that is a matter of taste.

K: Well let Larry know what he said when you see him.
Well you won't see him.
Well you don't ~~I~~ need it.
OK. Bye.

D: Best regards to Mrs. Kissinger. Bye

K: Thank you.

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TELECON

Max Fisher/Secretary Kissinger
3:55

Saturday, April 27, 1974

F: A. the meeting was very very worthwhile.

K: Good.

F: Good expression and helpful ...

Two, I talked to ... I passed along to him my feeling that this is a
very acute time in history. I felt he ought to realize this.

I also passed along comments of ...

K: Right.

F: And I think it would advantageous if it could be done.

Sometimes to spend a few moments

K: With whom? Rabin?

F: Surpetra.

K: OK.

F: Here is the man behind the throne and he could have been
Prime Minister. He has the same sorta feelings that now is the time
to hit;... But if by chance it could be arranged for you to spend
a few moments, I suggest that you ought to do that. I think it would
be very worthwhile.

K: Good.

F: And on the last thing, the Russian thing, the meeting yesterday
a few people like Arthur Hurtchberg, and Congress and a few other
organizations are ready to make a move, but I think the report of the
gesture, Jackson visit. I understand he had a very good one.

K: Yea.

F: And I think we are making a little progress

K: Terrific.

F: Beyond that, good luck to you. You have a tough thing, but I wanted
to get to them. I wanted to talk to them directly overseas on this thing.

And let me say this, time to time, see I talk to all those people
directly over there, I have no problems at all getting points of view.

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-2-

K: Look if I hear of anything that needs to done, I'll take the liberty of letting you know.

F: Don't worry about this, just any time at all.

K: Right.

F: Good luck to you. You looked a little uptight yesterday and I know you have a difficult time.

K: I looked uptight when? When I met with your leader?

F: You looked a little harrassed. Look you got a tough thing, my friend you got all the cares in the world.

K: OK, Thank you

F: My sympathies, my feelings. You just feel that any thing I can do, I'm in that corner.

K: Thank you very much Max.

F: OK. Good luck.

K: Bye.

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