TELCOM

Sec. Shultz/Kissinger

8:58 a.m. - 4/27/73

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: What do you make of this affair this morning?

S: Oh, the course laid out is a disaster. And I think we should at least stop that.

K: But I don't think there's a clue to what's going on.

S: I don't either.

K: I saw the President. We went over a list of things and at the end he said he's going to replace Haldeman and then Bill Sullivan and business will go on as usual. That will not work.

S: Where are you?

K: In my office.

S: I thought you were off to Mississippi.

K: No.

S: You're not going?

K: No, but all the others are apparently.

S: Are you free for lunch?

K: No, but I may - if you think we should talk, I'll make myself free.

S: When is your luncheon appointment?

K: One o'clock.

S: Suppose I come to your office about 12:15 for a little while.

K: OK, let me look at my calendar for a minute. Can you hold on? Hello, let's do that.

S: OK. Did you get a chance to cover that McNamara letter with him?

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Dave Kraslow

4/27/73 9:52 a.m.

DK: Hi, Henry, It's been a long time.

HK: Too long.

DK: Things all right with you?

HK: Yeh.

DK: Henry, normally I wouldn't waste your time with this thing, but things are so wild that I cannot discount any serious possibilities, so let me put the question to you. We got a tip yesterday from a normally reliable source-- we couldn't believe it--as we say, we have to try anything

HK: Don't apologize--I know you are a decent man

DK: All right, the story is early this month, Bill Rogers, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz and Eliott Richardson--

HK: I heard this story, it is not true.

DK: Let me finish--secretly agreed to deputize Rogers as a spokesman and to let the President know that either the entire Watergate mess was cleaned or they would submit their resignations in March--

HK: This is totally untrue Dave, whatever--never would I stay in this job and gang up on the President. Whatever I say to him, I say to him directly.

DK: All right, you wouldn't say it through an agent.

HK: I think it would be totally wrong in my position.

DK: All right, you give me your assurance it didn't happen, it didn't happen.

HK: I give you my word and I am sure if you check with George Shultz, he'd say the same--the reason I said it didn't happen--before you finished it-- is because someone else has tried that story on my.

DK: How long ago did they try it?

HK: Two days ago.

DK: Fine, all right Henry.

Page 2

HK: As long as you are on the phone--you're not asking me about it, but about the North Vietnamese are sort of talking today about the meeting between me and Tho not being set.

DK: Right.

HK: I just wanted you to know that the date has been set and agreed upon this in written communication; that the only thing in dispute was when to announce it and how. And that is what the maneuvering was about. We have written communications, not just agreeing to the date in principle, but to a fixed time and place.

DK: Well what's gone wrong?

HK: Nothing, I think their contingent squeezes

DK: Ah huh. Do you think it will go off as scheduled?

HK: I would expect it to.

DK: Can you tell me the date?

HK: I don't think I should--middle of May--very close.

DK: And how can we use this information--to attributed.

HK: You can say Administration sources. --Usually reliable administration sources.

DK: Right and the only motivation you are going to ascribed to this statement by Hanoi is just simply to be obstreperous.

HK: Well it may be that they feel that we went too far in unilaterally saying that.

DK: About the meeting?

HK: Yeh, not that this information was wrong, but that perhaps--I am trying--

DK: Perhaps being too premature in talking about it.

HK: Exactly.

DK: And you are trying to straighten out that misunderstanding through your normal channels and--

HK: And through Sullivan

TELCOM

Amb. Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

10:14 a.m. 4/27/73

HK: Pete, I won't be able to do it al 11:00

AP: Okay.

HK: I've got to meet with George, we've got a psycopathic situation here.

AP: Really.

HK: Yeh.

AP: Okay, any other suggestions?

HK: Let me see what I can do--I'll call you back. Okay?

AP: All right fine.

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger Goerge Shultz

4/27/73 10:15 a.m.

HK: George?

GS: Yeh, hello.

HK: How about having lunch--I'll just get too jammed up. Or is that bad for you?

GS: Ah, I was going to have lunch with Bill Simon and Ken Dam
just to discuss the situation. They are both very thoughtful people.
But I think you and I ought to talk by ourselves.

HK: Can you see them at 12:00

GS: Yes, I can.

HK: I'll come over to you, because my food is worse.

GS: Well we have a set up here on Fridays when unless I change it, the staff can use that dining room. So why don't we have something brought in to your office or my office--why not your office.
Barbara will order something.

HK: Okay.

GS: What time?

HK: About 1:00 - 1:15

GS: Can we make it a littler earlier than that? 12:45

HK: Good, fine.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Howard Stein

4/27/73 10:16 a.m.

HS: How are you?

HK: Okay,

HS: You're smiling--you're laughing--good to see you're keeping up the spirits.

HK: Well, you called me the other day and then I never got around to returning

HS: I just wanted to mention--I don't know what will happen in the future as far as personnel is concerned. I just wanted to mention to you that Gene McCarthy mentioned that he--that if there were anything that he might be able to do at this point--

HK: Isn't that nice. Isn't that big of him.

HS: So, I just mention that--

HK: That is really big of him.

HS: So if there is anything that would be of any help in anyway.

HK: Well I have no idea what will be decided yet. But something--it can't be small. Well I'll talk to Gene myself, but you tell him, that I'm not surprised that he's a big man, but it is very, very generous and big of him. I want to wait here until the smoke clears a bit, before I know what people can do.

HS: You know, there is little I can say. If there is anything that people can do to be helpful. Things have to go on.

HK: That's what some of the liberals don't seem to realize--when they scream for blood. Blood aplenty is bound to flow.

HS: Yeh. But I think you know--that's the one aspect of it, but the other it takes some--

HK: But that is not the big problem. The problem is how to go on and what the economic program should be--I think that--I am concerned about the direction of it, but nevertheless it has to go on and in a way that people have confidence--most of this is psychological anyway. It's just how you instill the psychological feeling that it is all right.

Page 2

HK: It is affecting the economy now, is it?

HS: Yeh. When I spoke to you years ago, I said that using the monetary system is not the way.

HK: I remember very well.

HS: And now you are going back to what I think is not the way. That's a philosophical -- I just don't think it is going to work and you are getting many people upset again, because they know it is not going to work. That economic situation begins to affect people and then Watergate become important around the country to them.

HKF: Well Howard, my judgment is that this situation will -- must have a denouement within the next two weeks--I mean the negative part of it. After that we must address brutally the positive part of it--

HS: I think that if you can move forward in that--that would be a great help.

HK: Yeh.

HS: Because you do represent a certain spirit in the country.

HK: I appreciate it. Come by sometime when you are in Washington, soon.

HS: I'll be down in the next couple of weeks anyway.

HK: Good, let me know.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized
By OKRA Date 6/16/84

TELCON

Senator Percy/Mr. Kissinger

4/27/73 10:22 a.m.

HK: Hello, Chuck where are you?
How are you Chuck.

CP: Oh, I'm just fine, thank you. I'm in Paris with your good friend Bill Sullivan and staying with Jack Erwin. I sent you a cable from London on your speech which I found universally applauded and accepted all over London--despite the fact that everyone was thinking about Easter and the Watergate. I would say the reactions were exceptionally good.

HK: Aren't you good.

CP: Not nearly that clear in Paris. I talked with a number of French people here. There are several concerns which I talked to Jack Erwin about and I am having in just a few moments with a couple of French diplomatic writers in the French newspapers--Lemont and a few others-- a little interpretation first from the standpoing of trade legislation which I can speak for with a little more authority from the Congress in assuring them that I really feel the President is going to be able to delive a package that will be the most important trade legislation he's enacted. And I certainly believe he will. But I know that I'll get questions on a cou of points in your speech. One aspect of it that was brought up today--they feel that it is an implication that we're going to go back to zones or sphere of influence--and we are thinking in terms of structuring a power block again which we have worked away from and they have worked away from and my interpretation is that it is not that at all--

HK: That is total nonsense, because we are continuing very active detente polici too.

CP: Very good, I have no problem with that--the other point that they have rais is that in the section where you deal with the US has global issues and inter and responsibilities--European allies have regional interests--the French are nitpicking a little bit -- looking at national interests stronger--have taken that to mean that we really don't interpret European powers as having global interests any longer. And I have just chosen to interpret this to mean that our allies--our European allies have regional interests as well as global, but sometimes the regional presents points of conflict a little bit That's just sort of a freer interpretation I've placed on what you said there.

HK: The fact is that the Europeans have been very reluctant to play a role outside of Europe. Nothing would please us more if they wanted to play a global role--nothing. And that is really their choice, not ours.

Page 2

CP: Right.

HK: We would prefer to say a global responsibilities.

CP: How would you propose I handle the questions I think I'll get--we are considering that they do not have worldwide interests--

HK: No, we say that many of them have been very reluctant to assume global responsibility to the extent that they are, we are more willing to have them as partners or associates or cooperators or anything else --so it's their choice.

CP: Very good. Finally, what I am simply going to interpret this as a invitation for participation. That we have no blueprint--we are simply saying that just as two or three decades ago we developed NATO, the Marshall Plan, all of the things appropriate for that period, that era is now over--now we go into a new relationship of interdependence and we're simply saying we invite all to participate now in a development of a new blueprint.

HK: Exactly. Right.

CP: Okay, that's all we need.

HK: Let me know when you are back.

CP: I get back Saturday night--and hopeful of doing, Henry--I'm on Face the Nation with Lowell Wicker on Sunday--I am hopeful of getting someone on that panel to ask me about--the reactions to your speech--more longer ranged points of view and not just get totally immersed in this Watergate situation

HK: You can perhaps bring it in even if you are not asked.

CP: I'll try to--obviously Watergate is growing here--it was very big in London Surprisingly,big and beginning with radio and television yesterday and this morning in Paris--it seems to be growing quite substantially here. We may have some real problems of keeping our eyes focused on some important things and I think your speech is very helpful--it got wonderful press in..... (end of tape)

TELCOM

Ambassador Sullivan/Dr. Kissinger

10:29 a.m. - April 27, 1973

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Bill, how are you?

S: OK.

K: Look, what we are saying here is on this--they are now saying it isn't set, we said--what we are saying here we stand by what we said and we have written communications to back it up.

S: OK, as a matter of fact in the meeting this morning it was not even an issue. I will send you a message. I think we just went right by it.

K: Will you tell them to shut up about it?

S: I did, but did you see what he did in the middle of the meeting, he went out and made a statement.

K: Yeah, but did you call him on that?

S: I didn't know about that until I got back to the Embassy. In the meantime, we had agreed that we would say nothing about these meetings. Not it was--I'll send you a message on the whole business. We are taking a recess tomorrow; they obviously want to communicate. And a meeting on Sunday.

K: Well, that's all right but we must get this debate stopped now.

S: Must get what?

K: We want that argument stopped or we'll just put out their messages.

S: Yes, they have agreed to say nothing more.

K: OK.

S: And You'll see from the way it went in the meeting that it does not seem to be an issue, but I can't guarantee, of course, that it won't come back.

K: OK, good.

[ interruption--Is your call finished? ]

S: No, hello Henry?

K: Hello.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: WW1APADG
Date: 04/27/73

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Dr. Kissinger

10:47 a.m.

April 27, 1973

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatole

D: How are you?

K: I have another proposal to make to Smirnov.

D: All right. [Laughter] You do keep him in suspense really.

K: Because if he would like to--if he doesn't know exactly how to dispose of
the SS-9.

D: Yeah what's your proposal.

K: He could load some of them on the grain ships that are coming back empty.
And we'll be glad to dispose of them for him.

D: But do you have a large enough ______?

K: Well

D: I'm not so sure about it.

K: I gave you so many good ideas. I told you to put them on submarines and
you never accepted that.

D: Well, I think he is still thinking. He never refused by the way. He has
not refused he has just begun to think and he continues to think it over. So
he never flatly refused as you know. So who knows, maybe it will be a big
surprise for you when he makes his contra-proposal.

K: Do you want to come around 11:45, 12:00 o'clock?

D: 12:00 o'clock, OK.

K: I'll have about 40 minutes.

D: OK or 15 minutes before 12.

K: Good.

D: Usual place.

TELCONE

10:47 a.m.

April 27, 1973

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatole

D: How are you?

K: Because if he would like to—if he doesn't know exactly how to dispose of the SS-9.

D: Yeah what's your proposal.

D: But do you have a large enough _________?

K: Well

D: I'm not so sure about it.

D: 12:00 o'clock, OK.

K: Good.

D: Usual place.

TELCORN

Roland Evans/Dr. Kissinger

10:50 a.m.

April 27, 1973

K: Hello.

E: Are you staying it.

K: I have to Rollie, we have a slightly critical situation in here I--

E: I won't keep you. Henry, when can you see me? You're not going to be here tomorrow.

K: No

E: Well, I won't be able to work, you know, over the weekend.

K: I'm going to be in New York.

E: How about-- do you see a possibility late today. Are you going up this afternoon?

K: I'm going up late this afternoon.

E: Oh shit.

K: What was that word?

E: W I'm sorry, Dr. Kissinger, I shouldn't use that word in your presence, after all I'm speaking on a line that ties into the White House, sanctum sanctimonious.

K: We don't use such language here.

E: It's getting worse and worse and worse.

K: Excuse me, I have only two choices, I can either cry or laugh.

E: That's right, that's right.

K: What do you think?

E: I think it's, I'll tell you what I think.

K: Tell me, honestly as a friend.

E: I am so filled now with inner suspicions about the real depths of this thing, Henry, that I think one reason there is not going to be a special prosecutor

- 2 -

is that they can't afford it. They can't afford to let someone new into
the White House at this stage. I think also there's a possibility that--
a possibility I say it's very low but it's there--and that the strategy is
going to be a strategy of counterattack. Well everything is building to-
ward that.

K: Well, what, by whom. Who is going to counterattack.

E: The President.

K: Whom?

E: I think he's going to go after the McGovernites, the long-haired kids--

K: How?

E: The kids who tried to see out American interests in Vietnam, Ramsay
Clark and that this is what the whole operation at the Watergate was
really about and some of these people were a little bit too concerned
about the security of their country and that Nixon has been fighting this
thing for four years and he knows what it's like and if he ever does it's easy to--

K: It's impossible.

E: All right, I think it's impossible, too, but what this long delay on any kind
of restructuring of the White House? For God's sake, Magruder wasn't
allowed to quit until yesterday. These are slimy people.

K: I'll tell you the real problem is that Shultz are fighting over who gets
Haldeman's office.

E: All right I'm being serious. And I told you something that I shouldn't have
told you.

K: No, no.

E: I don't really think that's possible. Nevertheless, Henry,

K: No, we're speaking as friends now.

E: This is where the suspicions are running. And you know that this man has
never failed to counterattack when he's been backed in a corner. Never.
It would be so out of character for him to say you're right we made a
terrible mistake, I'm going to clean out all my top people. This would be

- 3 -

totally out of character. Now every day that goes by in my feeling increases
the possibility of some kind of a serious strategy of defense. And by serious
I mean not just cleaning house, apologizing, saying I knew nothing about it
it won't happen again and going on for the next three and one half years. I
mean a strategy designed and calculated somehow to elevate the President
over and beyond this thing totally. You know, you get on television with
films of the May 1970-71 Cambodia trying to take over Washington, you
get on with mob scenes, stonings of Republicans of what he went through
in the 70 campaign, you just show a few clips like that and you damn well
you've got 75% of the American people with you. I'm not saying he's going
to have it. I'm saying you can write the scenario.

K: How will that affect the facts that have come out?

E: I don't know.

K: Supposing all of this were done, how would that affect what we know?

E: Well, my answer to that is no answer. It's the same answer you'd have to give me: Why is John Dean and Bob Haldeman, etc. still working in the White House? what's the answer.

K: I have not a clue.

E: OK. I can't answer you question either. The answer is exactly--the question
is exactly as valid in my question as yours. I don't know how this would be
worked out but once you get a counter thing going and I find that a hell of a
lot of people around this country--votes not politicians--are so confused by
all this. That piece from Muncie, Indiana in the New York Times this morning
is very revealing.

K: I didn't see it, what is it?

E: The Democratic Mayor said, I don't see what everybody is so steamed up about, nobody was killed, no money was stolen, no bank was robbed, what are you all so worried about. No body understands what's at issue here except a few of us here in Washington. I think the President can turn this. I mean he might, I mean he might think he might. And build on the case for a subversive left-wing takeover implicit in the McGovern campaign and he quotes McGovern, and, my God, you can do it for two hours the juiciest kind of quotes, pin them right on the candidate of the Democratic Party. Say most Democrats are good Democrats but my people were concerned about this for their country and that's why the exhibited excessive zeal in buggings which they never should have done.

K: Do you think he could keep George Shultz with such a line?

-4-

E: I don't know, it's pretty hard to quit the President. I don't know I'm sure he couldn't keep you, he couldn't keep George, who knows. I don't know what he could do. These things have lives of their own and I just don't think it's a cut and dried proposition. He's going down there today. Let's see what kind of reception he gets in Mississippi. Supposing they have a big one. They've been working on it for three weeks, they have 10,000 people screaming for Nixon. That's what I'd be doing if I were him. Maybe it's not going to be that way. I don't know what kind of show it's going to be down there. But if he gets a big reception; headlines, Nixon praised, the plane cheered, I think we are in a period of ______ still of indecision I don't think anything has been decided. The column I wrote this morning I got two days ago at 4:00 in the afternoon that he had made his first big decision. Not to fire Haldeman. That he had rejected the advice that was coming in from Rogers and all his old pals, Bob Finch, a couple of New York lawyers, that he have a total cleanup of the White House staff. Now information is cheap in this town, good information is very expensive. I think it was accurate, I'm sure it was accurate as far as I know. Let's assume it was accurate. What does that tell you about his inner about how his inner resources are working.

K: Yeah.

E: I mean in this crisis. It tells me that he's going to fight.

K: Well.

E: You disagree totally.

K: I have no way of knowing.

E: What, what, oh God.

K: I'm serious.

E: Why don't you let me come over and have a sandwich with you at the office?
for 20 minutes? I won't be long. You are in the office aren't you?

K: Well, I'm going, I'm--frankly I have to see George Shultz for lunch.

E: How about breakfast Tuesday?

K: There is a leadership meeting. Why don't we, well if you want to drop in at 12:30 for fifteen minutes.

TELCONE

Sec. Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

4:30 p.m. 4/27/73

HK: George.

GS: I find that within the last 15 minutes, the meeting we had scheduled with the quadrad tomorrow morning has been cancelled, so I assume that something is brewing, second I would just as soon do this talking together just so that the presence emphasizes the point.

HK: And your judgment is that it should be today?

GS: Well, I don't know quite what to wait around for.

HK: Let me think about it for 15 minutes and call you back.

GS: All right. I'm in the midst of a meeting that will take me 20 minutes to unwind it here.

HK: Call me when you're through with your meeting.

GS: Good.

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/George Shultz

5:20 p.m. April 27, 1973

HK: George, I understand they are all too busy now appointing a new acting Director of the FBI and that they are drafting statements and that the President can't be seen. I think it is probably just as well.

GS: They think they are playing tiddly-winks around here.

HK: I think we have to let nature take its course.

GS: Well this consult again Monday morning.

HK: Yeh, or maybe over the weekend--will you leave your phone number where I can reach you.

GS: Oh yeh, the WH board will know where to reach me.

HL: Good.

TELCONE

Mel Laird/Mr. Kissinger

9:10 a.m., April 30, 1973

L: ... nothing very important. I was just going to ask you to have lunch one of these days.

K: Right. We must do that -- Let's do that.

L: All right.

K: Let's see, what day? Can we do it this week some time?

L: Sure. You want to do it tomorrow?

K: Goddammit, I have a lunch tomorrow with Ambassador Bruce Goddammit, I have a lunch every day this week. How about breakfast?

L: Yeah, that would be fine.

K: How about breakfast on Wednesday?

L: Wednesday morning, that would be great.

K: Where should we do it? I'm delighted to do it in the office here if you --

L: Well, why don't we do it in the office.

K: Good. Come in about 8:30.

L: Don't you think that's a good place to do it?

K: Right.

L: I'll meet you in your office about 8:30 on Wednesday.

K: That would be terrific.

L: Okay, fine, Henry.

K: What do you think of where we are right now?

L: Well, you mean the Administration?

K: Yeah.

L: Well, it's in pretty bad shape.

Mel Laird - 4/30/73

2

K: Really?

L: Yeah. I mean, I'm not trying to be pessimistic.

K: No, no; but you're an old pro.

L: I really think it's in worse shape out in the country than it is here in Washington.

K: In worse shape?

L: In Washington I think people kind of shrug it off a little bit but out there -- you get out of Washington and I think that they think it's something rather criminal. They've got it confused -- you know, these dirty trick things.

K: Yeah, yeah. Goddamn bunch of amateurs.

L: Yeah, yeah. I don't understand that. Well, we can talk about that, Henry. I was really kind of disappointed to be out around -- I was glad to get the hell out of there to tell you the truth because I couldn't go any place without having kind of bad problems with a lot of my old friends in Wisconsin. It's really kind of bad.

K: Really?

L: I felt so. It's better to be around Washington right now than it is out in the boon docks, I'll tell you that. You'll find these Congressmen when they get back, who have been out home are going to be coming back steaming.

K: Really??

L: Yeah.

K: Because here they always tell us it's a bigger story here than out in the country.

L: Well, you know my national committee man, who's a real nice guy -- he's a decent sort of a guy, Woody Fish, -- you may have met him at one time or another but he has been the State Chairman for a long time. He's a very honorable politician. He called George Bush the other day and he told George George, you've got to quit saying that that's only a story in New York and in Washington and that it's only the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. He says: You know, you keep saying that and it's just encouraged all of these papers all over the country and all the TV stations and everything else to give it a bigger play and bigger play and you ought to quit saying that.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01207
Date: 04 May 1973
By: WW. Kissinger

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:48 a.m., April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry. Welcome back!

K: Thank you, Anatol.

D: Well, I receive a telegram from Gromyko. He asked me rather urgently to come back so tomorrow I am leaving.

K: Oh, you are?

D: Yes. Today I received four drafts of agreement (laughter). One is on peaceful use of atomic energy. The other one is draft in general terms on contacts, exchanges and cooperation. The third one about world ocean exploration and the fourth one is on transportation. And I was told that is coming on agriculture. Really, my first impression there is nothing really very difficult in them but would you like me to send you right now before we leave or when I will be at 3 o'clock to bring them? There is nothing really special excitement there. But it's in connection with Brezhnev . . .

K: Why don't you bring them along at --

D: Okay.

K: Let's say 3:30, incidentally, for the meeting.

D: Okay, 3:30.

K: Yes.

D: I will be there. This is the new developments -- You remember there was earlier . .

K: Oh, yes, I remember very well.

D: Matters from Brezhnev. And he was counting on them -- rather naming them.

D: So this is what it's about. So today I would like you first to look once again about, if you don't mind, you know, the general ____ just to check what we have -- that there will be no misunderstanding where we stand now. Okay?

Ambassador Dobrynin
9:48 a.m., April 30, 1973

2

K: Right.

D: Just to look through what we have. And then SALT --

K: Did they give you an answer?

D: On SALT?

K: Yeah. Oh, no, I'll give you the material on SALT, yes.

D: Yes, you owe me other material. So we have a second discussion about the SALT. And then I give you this paper. And we will look through some protocol thing. I would like to collect my mind through talking with you what possibilities just to tell Brezhnev on certain kinds of things.

K: Okay, good.

D: Okay?

K: Good.

D: If President could write some letter ............ it would be very nice but maybe tomorrow. I am leaving tomorrow around 5 o'clock.

K: I'll have it for you before you leave.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Today is not the ideal day.

D: (laughter) Oh, all right, I understand. So 3:30 today, the usual place.

K: Right.

D: Thank you very much, Henry. Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

HOLY INNODBUSTED
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: J. M. W.
Date: 4/2/73

TELCONE

9:48 a.m., April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

K: Thank you, Anatol.

K: Oh, you are?

D: Okay.

D: Okay, 3:30.

K: Yes.

CLASSIFIED

50 193-1

AMERICAN BRIEF

By: O.H. MARRI Date: 6/1/71

Ambassador Dobrynin

9:48 a.m., April 30, 1973

2

K: Right.

D: On SALT?

K: Okay, good.

D: Okay?

K: Good.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Right.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCOM

George Sherman/Kissinger

10:17 a.m. - 4/30/73

K: Hello.

S: Henry, is it fair of me to assume that basically what we talked about in San Clemente about the Summit still holds; mainly about the possibility of some sort of declaration setting up guidelines for the second phase of SALT?

K: That's a possibility.

S: How do you see meeting you are having in Moscow? Are you going to (delineate) the subjects you are going to discuss at top level?

K: And a whole range of bilateral relations.

S: Indochina?

K: That's going to be one of them.

S: Are you going to show that Russia has cut back their shipments in Hanoi?

K: That is one of the things. I just haven't got any precise information yet.

S: No precise information but that will be one of the things you will be discussing with them.

K: That is one of the areas of our concern. This is not for attribution.

S: On MBFR you said in your speech last Monday that the U.S. was going.

K: No, I said we would submit it next week in the National Council.

S: Right. How does this fit in terms of the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit?

K: That is part of the on-going negotiations.

S: You will be discussing this with Brezhnev in Moscow?

K: Well, MBFR we discuss in the NATO framework. We don't discuss that bilaterally.

1

TELCOM

Richardson/Kissinger
11:23 a.m. - 4/30/73

R: You should have blocked it.

K: No, I had a chance to block it but there was no possibility. There was no alternative.

R: I understand. I was really being facetious. I must say, though, I was convinced of that when I saw the President yesterday afternoon. If I can help, I will do it. I kind of hate to...

K: It is a horrible tragedy.

R: It is and...

K: Despite the broad ______ here in Washington.

R: I hope I turn out to be the right guy for this. The principle thing that concerns me was I am already titled as a team player.

K: Everyone knows you are a man of integrity.

R: One good thing is...

K: I happen to believe that this is not a time for
but a time for justice and I don't think no one has as much of a feel
for the real thing as you.

R: One good thing from my point of view is the President said he would like me to continue to attend NSC meetings so I will have that opportunity and I would like to continue to get together with you. I hope we can have our breakfast on Wednesday anyway. If not...

K: Yes, certainly. I may have to shift it to Thursday but...

R: It doesn't have to be any particular day but I would like to keep doing it in my new job.

K: It was just impossible to even think of anyone who had enough of a
sense for the complexity, humanly and every other way.

R: Well, I came to see that certainly when I saw the President.

K: He is in very bad shape now.

2

R: I don't blame him. It is a very tough thing.

K: And you know the nightmare about this is: God knows what they thought they were doing when they were doing it but it was a series of inconsequentials.

R: It is a tragic characteristic included - the human tragic flaw which I think is inherent in the ______ process of administration to begin with.

K: Sometimes I think the gods watch over America, with a vengeance. First you have the Kennedys who think they can plan everything, destroyed by two nuts. Then you have our colleagues who think they can administer anything described by their administrative puritanism and it was a tragic flaw but this is what always happens in tragedy.

R: Hopefully there are hopeful possibilities.

K: Well, I think if we now get it behind us and begin governing and begin asserting the national interest and avoid this terrible self-righteous ______ That is start thinking we can come up strong as a country.

R: I think the President could himself. It was that side of it I saw in that meeting yesterday.

K: I think he can and I think those who now take charge with confidence and ______ will certainly show you are in a very decisive position, Eliot.

R: Well, I hope so. If you have any insights that you would like to get to me that they don't have to be on the national security side.

K: Why don't you and I have breakfast alone on Thursday or Wednesday - whenever we do it we can talk about it.

R: I think that's a good idea.

K: OK.

TelCon
Vice President/Mr. Kissinger
12:40 pm, April 30, 1973

K: Hello. Mr. Vice President.

VP: Henry. I've got a little problem I need to seek your counsel about. I've got to speak to the Maryland press club, it's been a longstanding engagement, on Wednesday. As should be obvious my topics are rather circumscribed at the moment. I'd like to do something of a general nature on foreign policy. If think it would be the safest thing I could do.

K: I think that's right.

VP: I'd like to do something about my trip, and I'm just wondering whether there are any areas that you think would be very poor for me to get involved in at the moment. In such other words I don't want to get into any discussions that may affect the current status of the peace effort and so forth.

K: Well it would be bad to get involved in too many details about the Soviet relationship because I'm going there Thursday night, but you can express general views.

VP: There's no reason to be pessimistic about our Soviet relationships.

K: Oh, no, Oh, God, no.

VP: I'm just asking for information.

K: No, absolutely none, on the contrary.

VP: And I think that I can confine myself to the overall views of the Asian leaders, perhaps the continuing along the courses seeking a com-- accommodation and--

K: After all, if you insisted publicly on the enforcement of the agreement.

VP: I might do that if I could off the--how about the Cambodian situation, can we be a little more optimistic based on the council and that sort of thing. Or is that too dangerous.

K: I wouldn't put myself if I were you into a position that can be used against you. Why not just say what we want is a ceasefire and a political solution that permits all people who have their future there.

VP: What can I take this to make it a little more--

2

K: If you wanted to say something about that we want to make a major effort in our European relationship this year, that also would help/

VP: Then other words, take it to some extent around your speech.

K: That's right, you wouldn't have to mention my speech, but you could just speak of the importance we attach to the European relationship.

VP: Is there anything knew outside of Indochina itself that I could use to peg it around - Indonesia, or anything of that sort.

K: I don't think so.

VP: How's our Philippine situation coming.

K: That's essentially unchanged.

VP: What I was really trying to--I n;t only want to avoid this other area of course at the present time, but it precludes my choice - talking at all on anything that has to do with media, precludes my talking about law and order and anything of that sort, so it cuts me way down now. In orde not to be too bland and to create a criticism that would look like an obvious attempt to simply recite 3 months old news, what I was looking for was something current that I could take this--

K: You could take it to--you can't yet speak about the Summit meeting because it hasn't yet been announced.

VP: How do we stand on -- I'm not thinking of this in regard to the speech -- but h;w do we stand on this problem with the Jewish immigration, since our meeting over there.

K: That's about where it was. Although we are making progress in the sense that Mills has agreed to support it now.

VP: What about the Brezhnev visit, is that look feasible.

K: Oh, yes, that looks very probably now. You could do it in the general context that there'll be a Summit meeting this summer and that you want to restate your view of American foreign policy.

VP: All right. Well when I finally get something, not too long, maybe ten minutes, I'll shoot it over and maybe someone in your shop can look at it

K: I'll appreciate that.

VP: All right, Henry.

K: Good, Mr. Vice President.

TelCon

Koe Sisco, Mr. Kissinger

12:48 pm, April 30, 1973

S: ...... and then if there is anything you want me to prepare why, let me know, I've got some ideas.

K: Good, did you have a chance to talk to Greene?

S: Yeah, I talked to Greene and here's the understanding I have with him. That if he gets any reports of that kind, that he is to report them to me by letter and then I will see to it that they are distributed in the right place. The second thing I told him, so that you will know, is that he should not assume that he does know or will everything that is going on and that various people will know various things and so he understands, I didn't mention White House, State Dept, or anything--

K: Good.

it

S: Whether that will do /or not Henry I don't know.

K: Well, we are going to move into a new phase now anyway. I mean we've got to get these channels straightened out now as we go.

S: Well, in any event, I think that what we really need is--I still think we need kind of a two-track operation; one that becomes known and one that isn't. There are two practical complications, or at least one--you've got now this whole UN think cranked up you see, which of course is a complication, then there is the question of what we do and say when and if the Russians want to talk about all this, and I've got a thought on that too.

K: Right.

S: But whenever you call me, Henry, and then I'm ready to do whatever needs to be done.

K: Right.

S: Okay.

K: Thank you. Bye.

TelCon
Under Secretary Clements/Mr. Kissinger

3:00 pm, April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you.

C: I'm just fine, how are you?

K: Okay.

C: I wasn't sure you'd still be in your office.

K: Wishful thinking.

C: Well, it's quite a surprise to everybody. Henry, what I'm calling about--I'm trying to think through some of the transition things here to kind of hold the fort and in a quick transition of this thing, even under the best circumstances, it looks to me like that we ought to be thinking in terms of somebody to go to that NATO meeting.

K: Yeah, you.

C: No, Henry. You see, I'm going to be the only one left.

K: Yeah, well, whom would you want to send.

C: Larry.

K: When.

C: You see, I can't leave Henry.

K: Well why not Hill?

C: Well, the hell of it is, and this has somewhat to do with you and the people over there in the White House. You know, it's always well to keep these people unidentified and that way no one can ever get in touch with him, but we've got to get those names released and get them before the Committee. If we get Hill released, that'd be great. If we can get the names released out of the White House up to the Committee.

K: Oh, you can consider Hill released.

2

C: Well by gosh let's just get him on up there and get him processed and the Committee will work with us and they'll do this in a weeks time.

K: Well why don't you do that.

C: That's a great solution.

K: I would just as soon have Larry to come over here as soon as possible because I've got to get this thing going now. I'll tell you, if you want to get send Jonathan Moore I won't stop you; particularly if you won't let him come back.

C: Now look, now look, Jonathan is going back on the other side of the river.

K: Oh, he's going with--

C: Yeah.

K: Good.

C: So, this whole thing, Henry, and I would really appreciate some advice and counsel here because there are going to be some changes made and the restriction of the situation.

K: Yeah, but I don't know yet whom he has picked as Secretary.

C: I don't know either.

K: I know one or two people he was thinking of, but I don't know how it came out.

C: Well, in the case of Dave, I know the answer is no.

K: Oh, it is. Well then I don't know what his second best idea is.

C: I don't either. And as you move forward through this list, or this exercise, and I know he has undoubtedly a lot more important things on his mind right now, but as he addresses himself to this--there's a time lapse here, and in the transition period we are going to have to hold skin and bones together.

K: No question.

C: Anyhow, will you see about releasing the nomination of Hill?

TelCon

B. Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

3:03 pm, April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Hi, someone is still covering foreign affairs. (laughter) I wasn't at the White House when they announced your trip to Moscow, I just wanted to check---

K! Well, we just forgot to clear it with you, we wouldn't make such an--

G: (laughter) All right. I was up covering Rogers about the integrity of the foreign policy scenery.

K: All right if you're gonna do that.

G: I gather this is laying the groundwork for his trip.

K: Yeah, more or less.

G: And you're still aiming at late June I take it.

K: Now just tell me when your wife is expecting a baby because we want to get even with the New York Times.

G: All right, I'll tell you, she's expecting June 24. I would like some cooperation.

K: You want it either well before or well after.

G: That's right, that's right.

K: Okay.

G: Will you help me out on that?

K: I think if I put it that way to the President, he'll--

G: He go exactly June 24 (laughter)

K: Oh, he might just make sure he brackets it.

G: I called up M______ and I said to her, it doesn't look good does it, as far as I can determine, it will be around that time, we'll just have to name it ______.

K: Well, really, it could be just around that time.

2

G: I know, I was trying to lay the groundwork myself. The other thing is like who are you taking with you?

K: I'm taking along Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, Peter Rodman and Phil Odeen.

G: He's your SALT man, huh.

K: Yeah.

G: Okay, I gather you'll be talking the normal SALT, MBFR--trade--

K: That's right.

G: And Vietnam I expect.

G:

K: That's right. /Is that thing still on with the Vietnamese?

K: Well I have never had any reason to doubt that it was on--nor had anything been said in Paris in the meetings to question that it was on.

G: It was a little press thing.

K: It was a haggle about how it would be announced.

G: Yes.

K: And I think they probably feel that we played a little rough with them. On the announcement. And you know, they are Vietnamese and therefore /&@#$%*&(. That's not a quote. So they tried to squeeze us a little. Believe me, there's no ambiguity in the messages, the time is set, the place is set, and the hour is set. You know, they could change it.

agreement

G: I see, but you have to get another /g/ with them at some point when to announce it.

K: That's right.

G: But that would be not until you are back from Moscow I presume.

K: Well, you know, I don't much care.

G: Yeah. You have a busy month ahead of you.

K: Yes. You know, they might just announce it while I'm gone, and then we have stories that Scowcroft is taking over here.

3

G: (Laughter) Let me just say, the kind of stories the editors are bothering with, they are very up tight why there is no ambassador to Moscow yet. I gave them my theories, but is there a guy picked yet.

K: No. What is your theory.

G: I had three theories, I said one is the obvious one that the President has other things on his mind, but the other two were: one, he is looking outside the foreign service and he just couldn't get anyone to accept it yet, and the third was that maybe he wanted to promote Swank.

K: No, it's between the first and second.

G: I see. It's hard to get a good man I would think.

K: Yes.

G: And the other was, the stories that are coming in, but so far we haven't printed it about how the Watergate is not slowing down the management of foreign affairs. You can't demonstrate that yet.

K: Well, that is--from my office we are still doing business as usual.

G: Oh, yeah, most things go through your office or the State Dept.

K: Yeah. I think whatever impact Watergate is going to have in foreign policy won't show up for a few weeks.

G: Yeah, how well the Government's reacted to. Okay much thanks.

K: Bye.

TELCOM

Senator Pastore/Kissinger

3:10 p.m. - 4/30/73

K: Hello.

P: Hello, Doctor.

K: Senator, how are you? How nice of you to call.

P: Fine, how are you?

K: OK.

P: Look, I may be barking up the wrong tree but we're desparate. I don't know if you're familiar with the story that appeared in this morning's paper about the close down of our bases in Rhode Island.

K: I haven't seen the story.

P: Anyway, in the announcement that was made in April we get an 80% cut. Now I've been talking to Eliot Richardson and now, of course, because of this thing he's been transferred over to the Justice Department and he's going to have a young man by the name of Dick Strangelow who works with him to come up and see me on Wednesday, but the one thing that we're a little worried about is the fact that the shutdown is coming along too fast and I was wondering - you see we addressed ourselves to the President asking for a meeting, that is the Massachusetts and the Rhode Island delegation - and with all the things he's got on his mind at this moment I suppose we'll just have to sit back and wait to see if we even can see him.

K: Well, Senator, I don't know the details of it but let me personally look into this.

P: I'll tell you why. You see here's the point - we got an unemployment of 6.4 and much of what we have is going to Norfolk and Charleston and also Mayport. Now the thing that frightens me from a strategic point of view is the fact that we are concentrating within a small area some of all of our power and I think that this thing ought to be reviewed and I think the President ought to take a look at it and you're the one man I think I can appeal to.

K: Senator, I will personally take a look at it and I'll call you back. I won't realistically have a chance to talk to the President about it before Wednesday I'll call you back Thursday.

P: All right. Thank you.

TELECON

Prof. James Q. Wilson/Kissinger

3:13 p.m. - 4/30/73

K: Hello.

W: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Jim.

W: You haven't been fired, have you?

K: No.

W: Good. Look, we just heard the news, Arthur Moss is in my office, and we didn't know who else to call and you seemed to be the absolute perfect person and I don't know whether you're in touch with the President, but we would like to suggest that in his restaffing the White House on the domestic side, he look very hard at John Dunlop who's already down there in the Cost of Living Council.

K: Excellent idea.

W: His talents are much better than the Cost of Living Council.

K: I agree. I hadn't thought of that.

W: He's non-partisan.

K: No, no, I know him well and anyone who can handle all you guys...

W: That's exactly the recommendation I was going to endorse. He got us drooling like sheep - the Congress and the Federal Executive Branch should be like duck's soup with a man of that talent.

K: I'll take it up. You can be sure.

W: OK, how have you been otherwise?

K: I've been fine.

W: OK. I take it Stanley Hoffman has been in touch with you about our search project.

K: Well, he's given me general information.

W: The Department is looking close at Ernest Haase (sp. ?)

TelCon

Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 pm, April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

A: Hello Henry, you must be breathing a sigh of relief.

K: Why.

A: Well I thought by now the lance had got to the heart of the ulcer.

K: Oh, yeah. Now, all we've got to do is get the State Dept cleaned out.

A: Yes, but first it was reported that Rogers is going to the Justice, but now it's--Eliot they say.

K: It's Elliot Richardson.

A: That's what I thought.

K: This is a better choice.

A: Much better from the President's standpoint, and it also solves another problem--

K: That's right, I mean it's--

A: Who will get the job, Clements?

K: It isn't decided yet.

A: I hope so, he's very good man, I think.

K: That's what I say.

A: And who will you have to deal with in your delightful shop, now that Bob Haldeman's resigned.

K: I have no idea.

A: I'm sure you'll regret Bob before--

K: It's one reason why I cannot continue the old management. I knew Bob Haldeman as a man of integrity, I don't give a damn what the vultures are now saying. In the performance of his duties as they affected me, he was a man of total integrity, and unselfishness.

2

A: Well. Suppose he goes on making a few more clean cuts, he may have a very successful second term.

K: Yeah.

A: Henry, this change in the politburo--I created a new situation which I'd like to tackle you about. You wouldn't like to come and eat some of your own caviar and talk to my brother and sister in law and nobody else this evening.

K: No, I can't this evening, I have to go and see the Chinese.

A: Oh, at the Bruce's.

K: Yeah.

A: Ah, ha, ha, big Chinese men, I know all about it. I feel like going and getting a table on the other side of the screen.

K: Well I have go after the speech, so I'll probably miss the best part of it.

A: Well, the speech reminds me of the other thing. I thought about writing that letter that we talked about, I'm now writing it. I thought it would be impertinent and an intrusion until he had made up his mind.

K: Well, if you do it now, Joe, it's very needed, and if you can--

A: I thought I'd call Rose Woods and tell her I have it on the way down.

K: Yes.

A: Thank you so much.

K: Thank you Joe.

A: Bye bye.

TelCon

3:35 pm, April 30, 1973

Marvin Kalb, Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello.

MK: Henry?

K: Marsvin, how are you.

MK: Fine thank you. I just wanted to check one thing with you, it's kind of important. In the Rogers testimony this morning--I'll just read you a sentence here--"Ambassador Sullivan is now meeting with his North Vietnamese counterpart in Paris to prepare to review the implementation of the agreement preparatory if the meetings goes well. There will be a meeting at a later date with Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho." And I had been assured last week that that kind of "if"

K: That is correct, you were right.

MK: I was right last week.

K: Yes.

MK: Well, what's he talking about.

K: Oh, I don't know what he's talking about.

MK: You know, it just jumped out at me when I heard it. "If" the meetings go well. There isn't anything that's happened over the weekend that would--

K: No, I suppose he wanted to cover the possibility that the North Vietnamese would pull off that understanding.

MK: Uh huh. But so far as you know--

K: So far as I know, and based on all the communications, the meeting is still on.

MK: Right. Is that to be in Paris.

K: Yes.

MK: So that your Moscow thing is not related to that.

K: Well, I wouldn't go quite that far. I would say the Moscow thing is independent of it, but what will happen in Paris will undoubtedly be discussed.

2

MK: Oh, I understand that. But it isn't that you would be going from--

K: No, no, I'm coming back and then going over again the following week.

MK: There wouldn't be any other stops on this thing.

K: On this trip from Moscow?

MK: Moscow.

K: Conceivably, I might stop in London, I haven't decided yet.

MK: Oh, I see. Who's idea was the Moscow thing.

K: It was really a joint idea, but maybe a little bit more their's.

tick

MK: Oh, really. I see. And presumably if one would take off the major things like SALT II, trade, European security--

K: That's right. The outstand bilateral issues. Plus a review of the world situation.

MK: Right. And in effect to set up the Summit trip here.

K: Exactly. It's not a crisis meeting.

MK: Right.

K: It wasn't suddenly set up.

MK: Oh, it's been kicking around for a time.

K: Well, the actual date was arrived at within the last ten days, but the fact that there would be a trip within a reasonable time frame before his arrival was always-- foreseen.

MK: I see. Well that's very helpful. Thank you, sir.

K: Right, Marvin. Bye.

MK: Bye.

TELCONE

Theodore White/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 pm, April 30, 1973

W: Henry, Teddy here.

K: How are you, Teddy?

W: Lousy. You must be too. I'm not going to go into anything else but my contract with you. I promised you that you would see and approve of what you told me.

K: Yes.

W: Right. I'm in the process you must imagine right now of tearing up and revising chapter of chapter. ____ chapter of chapter of Democratic stuff that stands but some stuff has to be changed. I'll always be able to get copy to you -- on a personal basis. I'm showing it to you personally, as I promised you, until Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

K: That's fine.

W: But now the problem is --

K: Oh, wait a minute, I'll be in Moscow.

W: Oh, shit!

K: But I'll be back on Thursday night.

W: All right. Because then the problem is with these crazy deadlines, Henry and I've pushed off every deadline, as you can imagine. Could you give a response in a week because I'm under the most --

K: Oh, yes, of course. Easily.

when

W: So you come back from Moscow --

K: If you give me over the weekend, I will do it.

W: Oh, great, Henry. I'm not going to ask you anything else. I feel sick at heart and I know --

K: I feel sick at heart and I don't throw in this self-rightous breast-beating.

W: Well, neither do I. I have a very delicate row to walk, you know. You know what my opinion is of it and also the campaign.

Theodore White - 6:15 p.m., 4/30

2

K: Absolutely.

W: It was a fairly won campaign. And the scoundrels who #@$@*! it up should be castrated.

K: Yeah.

W: But if you won clean and that's my feeling, the book has to say so.

K: That is my feeling also.

W: But you can imagine ______ position with the stuff coming up. So I'd love to show you the whole book as a friend but what I promised to show you, I'm now packing entirely in the first chapter and I'll show you the first chapter and then if you can get back to me in a week, it would be terribly nice of you.

K: Good.

W: Okay?

K: Good.

W: And we'll talk when we see each other.

K: I'd like that.

W: Okay, Henry.

K: Okay, Teddy.

W: Henry, you remember what D ______ said in the French Revolution?

K: No.

W: [Speaks French]

K: Thank you, I appreciate that.

W: (laughter) Okay, carry on.

K: Bye.

W: Thank you. Bye.

wgh

TelCon
Sen. Javits, Mr. Kissinger

6:25 pm, April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

J: Henry.

K: Yes, Jack.

J: Do you think you'll have a chance to come by.

K: I'm afraid not - with all the commotion here.

J: I know, it's terrible. Anything I can do to be of comfort to you.

K: No, you've been a great help and moral support.

J: Well I know it's very upsetting times.

K: You'll be there until when?

J: We'll be there until 9:00. We'll be home anyhow, all evening.

K: Well, maybe I'll come by between 8:00 and 8:30 for a bit, and come back here for the speech.

J: Great.

K: Good, Jack.

J: Thank you, bye.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

5-26-73

Date 6/26/73

Attn:

By: CHA.

TelCon

Sen. Goldwater/Mr. Kissinger

8:45 pm, April 30, 1973

K: Hello.

G: Henry.

K: Barry, how are you.

G: Fine how are you. On the 21st of this month, I've been invited to address the Air Force Chiefs of Staff of NATO who are coming to this country. I wondered if you could turn it over to someone to give some idea of what I might talk about.

K: Sure.

G: I thought you might have something you'd want said.

K: Aren't you nice. Let me send you an outline of some ideas of what might be usefully said.

G: All right. And keep it all tied up with NATO structure.

K: Oh, yes.

G: And our responsibilities towards that.

K: No question. That's what we would think would be most useful to say.

G: All right, well I appreciate--

K: There may be a little scolding that they should make a bigger effort.

G: Well, I agree with that. I think in the Air Forces they probably are making--

K: The Air Forces are pretty good.

G: But doing a little bit is so much better than what they've been doing. All right. Fine. How are you feeling ?

K: I feel fine.

G: I hope we get this damned mess all straightened out.

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

9:28 p.m., April 30, 1973

Z: Hello.

K: Ron, I think it went all right and I'm pleased about the reference he made to you. Aren't you?

Z: What do you think of the overall speech?

K: Weak.

Z: Weak?

K: I mean, too defensive but I think it served its purpose. The major thing now is to get on with it.

Z: Right.

K: Because it doesn't make any difference what he said and how he said it.

Z: That's right.

K: He's said it now and --

Z: And now we go.

K: And now the thing is to face the future.

Z: Right.

K: And the main thing for you now is not to fret about what you said or didn't say.

Z: Okay.

K: Because you were very strong.

Z: Thanks, Henry.

K: And you come in any time you want to talk.

Z: Okay, sir.

K: Good.

Z: Thank you.

wgh