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December 22, 1957

# VIII - THE SPECIAL CASE OF NATO

## Introduction

It is no derogation of the value of our alliances in other parts of the world to give special treatment in this report to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is militarily the most highly developed of our multiple alliances. It covers an area of great cultural and economic significance to both East and West. It embraces many nations with whom we share a common spiritual and cultural heritage.

In order to appreciate the importance of NATO we need only to contemplate our situation if Western Europe were in Soviet hands. The Communist bloc would then have an industrial potential at least equal to our own. It would lie astride the world's main communications lines. It could flank and engulf the Middle East. It would be able to manipulate the man power, factories and cultural prestige of Europe to dominate Africa and infiltrate South America.

## The Weaknesses of NATO

The factors which make the NATO area essential to U.S. security also create difficulties and complications. For Western Europe is deeply affected by the revolutionary transformation going on in the world. European political and economic power has been weakened by the wholesale and continuing loss of colonial possessions in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As the danger of modern weapons technology has evolved Soviet aggression has come to seem less imminent, the sense of urgency on has been added to the

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which NATO was founded has declined and a number of rivalries and irritations
between NATO members have been revived. The dispute over Cyprus was
permitted to fester to the detriment of NATO; France, against the wishes of
some of her allies remains heavily embroiled in Algeria. Germany is offered
the choice of unification on Soviet terms or continued membership in NATO and
~~no unification.~~ The Anglo-French adventure in Suez has not strengthened NATO
ties while the recent British White Paper on Defense, whose issuance was
surely hastened by the debacle at Suez, foreshadows sharp reductions of
~~on the continent,~~ British military power in Germany.

Sentiment toward neutralism, or at least toward a more passive
adherence to the alliance, has been growing in some NATO countries. Many
factors contribute to this psychological retreat from nuclear reality, including
the relative weakness of our NATO partners as compared to the two super states
and the frictions and antagonisms inherent in any alliance system. But perhaps
the most pervasive reason is the fear of the consequences of nuclear warfare.
This fear involves paradox and ambivalence: Europeans recoil from the damage
and destruction they believe would result from the use of any sort of atomic
weapons on their densely populated territories, but they are also beginning to
~~be afraid that the growing Soviet nuclear stockpile will make the U.S. reluctant~~
question whether
~~to risk devastation of the American mainland in order to protect Europe.~~

~~This does not mean that NATO is falling apart or has lost its importance.~~

Whatever the disagreements within NATO, the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated the
significance it attaches to NATO by its incessant efforts to disrupt it. But it

NAR [y]
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does mean that NATO will have to be adapted to the new conditions created
by an evolving technology. It will have to find new means of political and
economic collaboration; it will have to find a new expression for its military
strategy.

NATO Strategy

However, before either of these objectives can be attained, attention
will have to be paid to certain fundamental weaknesses in NATO strategy and
military policy. Since 1954, all NATO planning has been based on the
assumption that in any major war NATO forces would use nuclear weapons
from the outset. Accordingly, NATO strategy calls for the maintenance of
two components: a shield of local tactical forces and a sword of nuclear
retaliatory force. The shield component of NATO has a double purpose: it
provides sufficient tactical forces in Western Europe to discourage or contain
local aggression, and its presence notifies the communists that a major
aggression, with which these forces might not be able to cope, would trigger
the second component of NATO strategy, the sword of strategic striking forces
carrying nuclear weapons.

However, three factors have served to cast serious doubts upon this
strategy. The first is the Soviet development of a large-scale air-atomic
capability, which has led to fears that the "sword" of NATO -- the strategic
air forces of the United States and the United Kingdom -- may not be unsheathed
in the event of Soviet aggression. In Europe for fear of the devastation
of an all-out Soviet attack on the U.S. & the U.K.

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The second factor is that recent trends in U.S. military policy, and perhaps even more in British military policy, have done much to discredit the NATO doctrine of resistance to local aggressor for both countries have emphasized the massive deterrent rather than the shield force. Thus the Europeans are placed in a position where they can no longer trust the strategic striking force to deter war, and yet see that force strengthened at the apparent expense of forces needed for their local defense. Coupled with this is the fact that the strategic striking forces are not under NATO command, that of the tactical forces only the British and the Americans possess nuclear weapons, and that the opposing Soviet forces are daily increasing their capabilities to wage both strategic and tactical nuclear warfare. Under these circumstances many Europeans may well regard war as solely a choice between occupation and destruction, even though, in fact, the choice is between the deterrence of aggression and one of several types of destruction.

A third factor making for instability is the reverse of the above: a tendency on the part of some NATO allies to seek to escape their dilemmas by a policy of disengagement. There is an understandable temptation to depend for deterrence on the military effort of a stronger power and, should aggression take place nevertheless, to rely for protection on a war fought elsewhere. Thus while the strategic striking forces in the exclusive possession of the United States and the United Kingdom tend to produce a sense of impotence, they also provide a feeling of security inhibiting a major effort.

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NATO Objectives

The problem of NATO is therefore one of will as well as of power.
All partners must realize that security can be enhanced only by a sharing of risks. And they should all be placed in a position where they are able to contribute, at least to some extent, to their own security.

The ultimate answers to the problems of NATO will be found not in the realm of strategy but of policy. NATO to survive must generate a common sense of political purpose. Many of the difficulties of NATO are aspects of East-West relations in general; others are produced by situations outside of NATO area proper. Subpanel I is dealing with the political problem at greater length. Still, it would be idle to pretend that an alliance designed to provide security against aggression can survive if it is not able to develop a common military strategy in which all partners can play a role. If it cannot adapt itself to new conditions, it must of necessity become sterile.

Fortunately there are two factors which seem to offer possibilities for a viable common strategy. The first of these is the disaffection in the Soviet bloc, so vividly illustrated in the cases of Hungary and Poland. This reduces the combat value of satellite forces and makes even more precarious the already tenuous line of communications between the Soviet forces in Central Europe and their home base. The second, and more important, is the availability in quantity of tactical nuclear weapons. The great advantage accruing to tactical defensive forces, through preparation of positions, prior determination of target areas and

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stockpiling of both nuclear and conventional munitions, offers hope that even relatively small NATO forces could hurl back a local attack and blunt major aggression. It is perhaps too early to say that this is possible; it is crucial that we re-examine our present concept of the capabilities required to defend Western Europe in addition to the threat of strategic retaliation on the U.S.S.R. as was evident at the December meeting.

Thus a prime element in the new strategy should be the strengthening of the NATO shield forces and backing them up with locally based missiles. The ability to resist local incursions will remove one temptation to aggression. The knowledge that an attack will meet with substantial local resistance provides an additional deterrent to Soviet aggression. The United States should approach with conviction this task of strengthening the shield forces, for it is equally in our interest to see that a conflict arising in Europe, either by design or by miscalculation, does not immediately result in all-out war.

A corollary of this central problem of establishing an adequate NATO shield is to provide within Europe -- controlled by Europeans -- an atomic capability that will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U.S. strategic air power. This is necessary both to restore the declining power position of NATO vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and to bolster the European sense of hope and of participation, which are basic ingredients of the will to resist. The development of European forces armed with nuclear weapons, and possessing their own delivery systems could create a kind of atomic stand-off between Europe and the U.S.S.R., similar to the broader strategic stand-off now existing between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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December 22, 1957

A strong NATO shield is all the more important because one of the purposes of the growing Soviet naval threat is undoubtedly to bring about a situation where the Soviet Union may be able to interrupt sea communications between us and our NATO allies by submarines and by mining European harbors.

In such a situation, the willingness to resist a simultaneous Soviet invasion will depend importantly on the forces available in Europe and under NATO control.

## The Role of the United States

To accomplish these objectives will require the following:
As the strongest power in NATO, and the most influential in shaping its policies, the United States has a major role to play in carrying out the policies recommended. First of all, this will require that we share with our allies scientific and technical information and that we assist in mobilizing the research and development capability of NATO both in the civilian and the military field. Second, we must strive for a true military interdependence which closely ties together the United States and the other NATO powers.
Thirdly, we must acknowledge the necessity for maintaining in Europe for an indefinite period a strong contribution to the shield forces. And finally, we must provide those of our allies which desire them with nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as well as with some of the other complex equipment of modern war.

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December 22, 1957

It will be unrealistic to say that such policies would be either cheap or without risk. There are always questions of cost to be considered and issues of security against espionage to be weighed. These are more than unbalanced however by the need to strengthen Europe militarily, in order for us to be effective politically. A strong, self-reliant Europe is a major American concern. Such a Europe, continuing along its present path toward greater unity, is a major force for peace and can - could become a great partner in the future evolution of free society.

ever greater force.

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December 24, 1957

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# IX - THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND ARMAMENTS

## Arms and the Prospects of Peace

The destructiveness of modern weapons have focussed the hopes of mankind as never before on the attainment of a stable peace. It is only natural that considerable attention has been paid to the effort of reducing tensions through the reduction and control of armaments.

This panel, as all Americans do, considers the achievement of a peaceful world the primary challenge before mankind. The American people have demonstrated their dedication to this goal by their unilateral and drastic disarmament immediately after World War II, by their refusal to take advantage of the atomic monopoly, by their patience and moderation in the face of constant Soviet provocation. Even after the Greek civil war, the Berlin blockade, and the Korean War caused us to undertake a substantial rearmament program, we have responded to every seeming relaxation of tension by unilaterally reducing our military establishment sometimes even below the point of safety. In fact, many of the difficulties described in this report are due to this tendency.

The desirability of easing international tensions therefore does not require argument. It would be highly irresponsible, however, were a report to raise hopes which cannot be fulfilled or hold out prospects which on closer examination prove to increase our peril. However dangerous the

The Reduction of Tensions and Armaments

Page 63 - 2nd paragraph - Add: "Moreover we can not yet afford to sacrifice entirely the advantages in the production of weapons resulting from our industrial might. (Let us remember that if we give up the advantage which does result from our production of weapons we would not be equal to our adversary."

Page 63 - 7th line - "reduction of armaments"

Page 63 - 3rd pgh, after second sentence - Add: "True disarmament must follow long behind an improved successful reduction in arms."

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December 24, 1957

multiplying armaments, the illusion of security brought about by a spurious
agreement to disarm would be a poor substitute for vigilance based on strength.

Genuine, enforceable, inspected disarmament will always be a U.S.
objective. Yet we must realize that of all the outstanding issues, disarmament
is the most difficult problem to settle directly. There are many other problems
the settlement of which would greatly ease tensions and almost automatically
bring about a reduction of arms, the unification of Germany for example or
Soviet attempts to stir up the Middle East. We will make greater progress
in disarmament negotiations if we face frankly their inherent difficulty and
if we are not seduced by Soviet slogans which in the past have used these
negotiations as a means to disarm their intended victims.

The nature of disarmament must be understood if peace and not
slavery is to result from efforts to attain it. It has several meanings, all
of which hide great complexities: the reduction of forces, the control of
arms, the prevention of surprise attack and the end of bomb testing. Each
will be considered in turn.

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The Reduction and Control of Arms

Reduction of forces is always a difficult matter to negotiate because it seeks to compare incommensurable quantities. What for example is the relation between the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the ability of Soviet ground forces to overrun adjacent countries? How does one compare an aircraft carrier to a Soviet armored division? If the United States disbanded its Strategic Air Command, it would take a decade at least to reconstitute. The Soviet Union can demobilize parts of its vast army and still retain the ability to reconstitute it from reserve components at a moment's notice.

Moreover, the Soviet Union is not likely to accept a reduction of forces which curtailed its ability to control the satellites or to play a major role in areas like the Middle East. But forces sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all the powers around the Soviet periphery. A reduction of forces which leaves unimpaired the Soviet ability to overrun its neighbors will not diminish the basic security problem of the non-Soviet world.

Reduction of armaments is not meaningful unless there exist safeguards against violations of the agreement. But reduction of forces, always a difficult matter to control, have become more complicated by the increasingly rapid rate of technological change. Scientific research and development can decide the armament race. Hence no reduction in standing forces, however scrupulously

Dean

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carried out can protect a nation against a technological breakthrough --
a scientific discovery which drastically changes the strategic balance.
The fact that so much of the armaments race occurs in laboratories makes
control and inspection highly complicated. It is difficult to find something
when one does not know what it is one is looking for.

At the same time, technology has tended to change faster than the
pace of negotiations. Many schemes which would be meaningful if accepted
at the _beginning_ of a certain technological development turn ineffective when
the technology is fully developed. Thus acceptance by the Soviet Union of
the U.S. Baruch-Lilienthal plan of 1946 which proposed the elimination of
nuclear stockpiles might have practically eliminated the possibility of nuclear
war. In the meantime so much fissionable material has been produced and it
is so easily hidden that no control scheme could be completely
against a violation.
And the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will complicate the
problem even more because fissionable material is relatively easily diverted
from peaceful to military uses and because the dividing line between the two
is so narrow.

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The Problem of Surprise Attack

Because a controlled and verifiable reduction in forces has proved
so complicated, a
the major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to
the prevention of surprise attack. It is often argued that an inspection system
which reduced the danger of surprise attack would also remove some of the
urgent strains from international relationships.

There is no doubt that the danger of surprise attack contributes to the
tensions of the nuclear age. But with evolving technology it is doubtful whether
aerial inspection will significantly reduce the element of surprise. The high
state of readiness required of strategic striking forces means that they need no
noticeable mobilization to launch their blow. Thus it will be difficult to tell
whether a given flight of planes is on a training mission or is launching a
surprise attack until the early warning line is crossed.

As the speed of planes increases, warning times will be progressively
reduced. In the age of the Inter-continental Ballistic Missile, which is close
upon us, the maximum warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection
system will be half an hour, the period of time the missile will be in transit.
Under such circumstances, even a foolproof inspection system will tell largely
what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a
devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning.

But if aerial inspection can no longer protect against surprise attack,
it can reveal an almost equally grave threat from hidden installations. Until
recently, there has been great hesitation in the free world to consider aerial

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surveillance without the permission of the country being observed. With the
development of earth satellites however, there exists a possible means of
observation: in a relatively short time earth satellites can be equipped with
long-range cameras and radar. Accordingly, the U. S. should place at the
disposal of the U. N. as soon as practicable a reconnaissance satellite which
could apprise the world of relative military strengths. Even a partial inspection
system, operated by the U. N. might protect the world to a degree from hidden
military capabilities. But more than this is unlikely from aerial inspection.
Much as we would like to be more optimistic, we cannot see how present
vigilance could be reduced or insecurity be removed, by any inspection system
now in prospect.

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December 24, 1957

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The Problem of War Limitation

Since all-out war could start not only by surprise attack, but also by
spreading of a small war, this study has considered various suggestions for
preventing the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation or
through the spreading of small wars. It seems doubtful that ground rules
for the conduct of limited war could be established by mutual agreement, since
in order to undermine the will to resist, the Soviet Union has every interest
in painting the consequences of resistance in direct terms. Nevertheless,
it would seem wise for the U. S. to include on the agenda of disarmament
negotiations concrete proposals to limit such wars as may be forced on us
to the smallest necessary dimensions. Even should the Soviet Union reject
them, such proposals might serve to clarify our intentions and makes less
likely a war caused by miscalculation.

Accordingly, the United States should announce that if we are involved
again in fighting communist aggression we will use the forces and weapons
that seem best adapted to quick termination of open military operations but
that we will use them in a manner to reduce non-combattant casualties to a
minimum. Even a unilateral declaration which gave an indication of some of
the steps we propose to follow to insure this would give an opponent a strong
incentive to follow suit. At the very least, the United States could thus make
clear to the world that we will make every effort to limit the use of nuclear
weapons and to avoid the devastation of civilian populations.

Hickey: Should define Geneva convention of 1929 relationship
with to International Red Cross - has more than unilateral
unilateral background. She also suggests that December 24, 1957
we site the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on poisoned gas. US did not sign it but
insisted on observing. - 69 -

The value of unilateral declarations is proved by the experience of
World War II. Neither the Soviet Union nor Japan had signed the Geneva
convention of 1929 with respect to the treatment of war prisoners. Yet on
______ the U. S. S. R. informed Germany of its decision to adhere to the
convention and on ______ Japan so notified its opponents. Clear United
States declarations, firmly adhered to, might provide a similar framework for
the mitigation of the worst consequences of modern war.

The Issue of Testing

Despite the vital importance of nuclear weapons to our survival, it
would be irresponsible to deny the hazards inherent in their use. An all-out
exchange of nuclear stockpiles by the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. would bring
about an extremely serious level of radiation on the entire planet.

The growth of nuclear stockpiles on both sides has been aptly described
by Winston Churchill as the "balance of terror." It is a situation which some
have incorrectly interpreted as a static, unchanging, nuclear "stalemate" or
"standoff." Nothing could be further from the truth.

Nuclear deterrence is immensely complicated, since each new
scientific advance, if applied by one side and not the other, is capable of
overturning the strategic equation. In a dynamic situation, we must continually
strive to improve our technological position lest an accumulation of advances
by the other side faces us with overwhelming strength. It is this situation
which makes a continuance of nuclear weapons testing so important.

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It has been proposed to start disarmament by agreeing to stop tests of nuclear weapons. It has been claimed that such a ban would be self-policing. Nuclear tests are said to be a hazard to the health of all people and of generations yet unborn; and they are believed to lead to ever more horrible weapons.

Unfortunately a nuclear test is easily monitored only if no serious attempt is made to keep it secret. If a nation wants to hide its tests, observation will become very complicated and uncertain. To be sure, secret tests require considerable effort. But the Soviet Union has never spared resources in order to secure a military advantage. On the other hand, our tradition and the structure of our society makes it certain that we shall not violate any international obligations to which we have agreed.

As to the medical danger, past tests have had a much smaller effect on public health than other biological effects to which mankind is constantly exposed. At higher altitudes the cosmic rays which bombard the earth have a greater intensity than the effects of weapons testing. The accumulated radiation from weapons test is only an insignificant fraction of the dosage to which most Americans are exposed from x-rays. A person moving from the seashore to Colorado exposes himself to considerably more radiation than the accumulated effect of all past weapon tests. To be sure, *any* additional radiation should be avoided. But weapons testing must be weighed against the consequences of ending tests not against the hazards inherent in it. If

ADOLF BERLE: third paragraph, re medical danger, there is a vast, solid difference of opinion about this. A UN committee, others working on. It should be toned down along the lines that there is evidence that in general past tests have as much affect on public health as (?) than other biological tests although the full picture is not yet available. Also fall-out concentrates in certain areas and does not touch others.

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-70A

an end of weapons testing weakened the deterrent and made a war more likely, we would have brought on what we most wished to avoid.

Thus the most important question is how will continued testing affect a possible future war? Since the more powerful weapons have already been tested, further tests will enable us to use nuclear arms in a more discriminating manner. By reducing radioactive fall-out we will become increasingly able to confine our military effort to our opponent's war machine. At the same time continued testing will enable us to develop nuclear anti-aircraft or anti-missile weapons to protect our population against enemy attack.

Thus, we are persuaded that a ban on weapon testing could not be enforced, would make a future war more brutal, and would be beneficial only to the side which would violate the ban by secret testing. Our strong desire for peace and security should not induce us to buy the semblance of one at the expense of the other.

## The Prospect of Peace

This pessimistic assessment of the prospects of disarmament does not mean that we welcome the current armaments race. Nothing would reflect the deepest desires of American society more than a world from which the threat of war has been removed. But peace cannot be attained by wishing for it. It requires patience, understanding and determination. We must always stand ready to negotiate on the issues that divide the world. But until the Soviet

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Union has shown a greater willingness to settle these disputes on terms other than her own, it would be dangerous for us not to be wary of a power that has brutally suppressed Hungarian freedom, fanned Middle Eastern flames by its sale of arms and constantly threatens the world with rocket and nuclear attacks. As soon as Soviet intransigence abides, our desire for peace and our willingness to devote our resources to constructive tasks will insure an eager American cooperation in any disarmament effort.

Goodpaster

Page 71 - third pgh, last sentence re "Courage in Crisis............
............must rest on at least a modicum of hope.

Could better say ...at least confidence and hope. We are
here getting to an important point of the whole thing - to do these things
and not just stand paralyzed.

## Civil Defense

It must be recognized that if the U.S. has made or makes
a decision to go into a long range civil defense program at home and is asking
our allies to accept intercontinental ballistic missiles, we must
be prepared to help them on at least an equal priority basis.

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X - CIVIL DEFENSE

There are few problems of the atomic age with which the United States
has had greater difficulty in coming to grips than civil defense. Our tradi-
tional invulnerability to direct military attack and our predilection for the of-
fensive over the defensive have combined to cause us to treat civil defense as
a mindor adjunct of our overall strategic posture both in terms of planning and
in the resources allocated to it.

The full civil defense problem is well beyond the scope of this report.
The technical possibilities of defending our cities and homes, the costs, the
impact on our national psychology and ways of working and living -- these
present a complex of considerations deserving detailed and separate examina-
tion. Nevertheless, the connection between civil defense and the other elements
of our national security requires a general evaluation of the possibilities.

If relations with the Soviet bloc ever reach the showdown stage, the
edge of difference which may be very fine, will depend on the strength of the
competing wills. This in turn may well reflect the relative vulnerabilities. It is
an oppressive thought that such circumstances might in fact occur, but it would
be feckless to suggest that they are impossible. Courage in crisis, if it is to
be effective and continuing, must rest on at least a modicum of hope.

Deterrence in short, depends on a combination of power and will. The
factor of power requires a retaliatory capability sufficient to overcome any
enemy defense, and as invulnerable as possible to surprise attack. The factor

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of will may hinge importantly on a reasonable combination of passive and active defense measures. An enemy who felt confident that he could disrupt and disorganize our society while preserving the substance of his own would be tempted to launch an all-out blow. Conversely the ability to protect our population at least to a degree may enable us to act with firmness and resolution in times of crisis. In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important deterrent.

Civil defense will not be easy, and it can never be complete. Protecting against massively destructive weapons is an enormous problem.

A 20-megaton thermonuclear weapon, for example, with a radius of surface destruction by blast and heat of between five to eight miles will inevitably have devastating consequences.

Difficulty does not mean impotence, however. While it may be impossible to protect the population against the blast and heat of an atomic explosion, protection against radioactive fall-out and other contamination appears to be a great deal easier. Above all, it is essential that our people understand the dangers of modern weapons and the possibilities of mitigating their effects, so that we may respond with discipline and so that no enemy can assume that a sudden attack would disorganize our society.

While the whole field of civil defense requires, above all, the most careful study, it is possible to state a few general principles in relation to it:

1. Civil defense must be considered as part of the overall U.S. strategic posture. It must be faced forthrightly. It should be

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part of our defense planning and included in our overall strategic
plans. The expense involved should be treated as an addition to
existing military outlays.

2. The American people need to be told more clearly the dimensions of the problem of civil defense and what can be done to reduce them. Any effective civil defense program must have as a pre-requisite a program of public information supported by the Federal Government and carried through at all levels.

3. A civil defense program should be integrated with the construction program needed for the normal development of our expanding population and economy.

4. A cadre charged with supervising civil defense activities must be developed and trained immediately.

An effective civil defense program can be separated into three stages:

1. To provide warning, where possible and information about radiological levels. This requires an attack-proof radio-net to broadcast instructions during and after an attack. The cost of such a program would be reasonable.

2. Protection against fall-out. It has been estimated that half of the casualties of a large-scale atomic attack or between 25 - 30 million might result from radioactive fall-out. To prevent such a calamity, a fall-out shelter program is vital and it is essential that individuals in an area contaminated by radioactivity, chemicals,

PAGE 74

ELLIS JOHNSON: Comment on Statement 3. *Protection against atomic blast and heat.* "There is only one defense. An active defense, you cannot protect against a direct hit within U.S. economics."

Statement 3. Underlines third, fourth and fifth sentence and comments: "This is nonsence. It will subject the Panel to ridicule if left in."

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or biological agents behave with discipline and effectiveness.

A proportion of this program could be locally financed.

3. Protection against atomic blast and heat. This is a major problem particularly in our big urban concentrations. This panel has heard testimony that it is possible to construct shelters capable of resisting even a direct hit, located so that they can be reached within 15 to 30 minutes by the population they serve, and useful meanwhile for peacetime purposes, such as underground passages.

The subject is of such complexity, however, and the costs are so very large that this report cannot plausibly go further than to commend such a deep shelter program for careful study. If indeed it proves feasible it will add greatly to our security as a nation.

The major difficulty with civil defense has been our failure to treat it as an integral part of our defense planning. As a result, civil defense has been badly neglected and such steps as have been taken have been fitful and only inadequately related to our over-all strategic posture. The immediate task is to make a start in the direction of civil defense, both by including it directly in our defense planning and by mobilizing incentives for local support.

The purpose should be to protect as great a proportion of our population as possible and to permit a disciplined and efficient effort in case of an attack.

The immediate task is to construct an attack-proof radio-net to begin a program of fall-out shelters. The shelter program should be carried out

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with a maximum degree of cooperation with local and state authorities. Thus
in addition to federal and state and local spending tax incentives might be
created for all new construction which includes fall-out shelters, low interest
federal loans to all private construction including fall-out shelters. A program
of fall-out shelters might (in case of attack) reduce casualties by 25 - 30 million.

In addition to the protection of the population against fall-out, pro-
vision should be made for the post-attack period. It will be highly important
to stockpile food supplies and industrial reserves in safe places to prevent
famine and to enable the early resumption of economic activity. At the same
time a continuation of organized activity will be aided by the greatest possible
degree of dispersal of industry. It would be too costly to disperse existing
industrial installations but tax incentives could be provided for the location of
new facilities away from main concentrations.

The main feature to note with respect to civil defense is that time
is running out. It does not make sense to engage in a major military effort
without at the same time protecting our most important resource: our civilian
population. The cost of launching even a gradual civil defense program, may
well be high -- but the price of being without it may be national disintegration.