CHEVROLET
MAKES SENSE FOR AMERICA

EXAMPLE:
IMPALA'S COMFORT
MAKES A LOT
OF SENSE FOR A
LOT OF PEOPLE.

Big people. Tall people. Older people. Young people with little ones. People who travel far. People who travel together.

THINK SENSIBLY.

These are times requiring each of us to think hard about our car needs. To think out carefully just what car, in what size, is right for our individual requirements. For a lot of people, a small economy car such as Vega is the right answer. But everybody can't get by with a small car.

CAR POOLS, GROCERIES
AND THE TRAVELING
SALESMAN.

Because it's a bigger, roomier, more comfortable car, Impala makes a lot of sense for a lot of

driving requirements. Impala's leg room and six-inch-deep foam seats can make car-pooling a very comfortable proposition. Its big, functional, usable trunk can be loaded with grocery bags without squashing the bread. And if you travel for a living, you can get where you're going comfortably surrounded by a lot of car. When you think about it, Impala's room and comfort make a lot of sense for a lot of people today.

IMPALA'S VALUE IS IN
TUNE WITH THE TIMES.

We offer Impala at a reasonable price. With an impressive list of standard equipment including power steering, power brakes and automatic transmission. Impala's special frame coating helps resist corrosion in salty winter road areas. Its disc brake wear sensors let you know when the linings need replacing to help save you money in the long run. Available GM specification radial tires offer less rolling resistance for improved fuel economy. Speed and cruise control you can order can help you maintain an efficient 55 mph. When you think about it, Impala's value makes a lot of sense for a lot of people today.

IMPALA'S
RESALE VALUE:
A COMFORTING
THOUGHT FROM THE PAST.

For the last 14 years in a row, Impala has been America's favorite car. Number one... hands down. One big reason Impala's so popular new is because it's so popular old. Impala traditionally has had a higher resale value than its nearest competitor. That's why we call Impala "The Great American Value."

Think about your car needs today. If they include ride, room and comfort at a reasonable price, turn those thoughts to Impala. Because when you think about it, Impala makes a lot of sense for a lot of people today.

ENERGY

## Route of a Giant Pipeline

TIME Map by W. Hortens

cians in the U.S. and Canada have begun jostling for position on the question of how best to transport the gas to market —or whether to bother at all.

The first round began last week when Canadian Arctic Gas Pipeline, Ltd., a consortium of 27 American and Canadian energy firms, filed a 7,000-page application in Ottawa and Washington. The group is seeking permission to build a 2,600-mile pipeline from Alaska's Prudhoe Bay and Canada's Mackenzie River Delta, across the barren Mackenzie Valley and into the U.S. (see map). The pipeline could eventually provide some 2.25 billion cu. ft. of gas a day for customers in Midwestern and Pacific Coast states—about 3.6% of present U.S. consumption—and an equal volume for Canadians. Bearing a projected price tag of $5.7 billion, the pipeline would likely be the largest privately financed construction project ever undertaken. Consortium officials say that the gas line could be completed in 1979 if all goes well.

That is hardly likely. The project faces stiff competition from a shorter, all-U.S. pipeline that will be officially proposed this summer by El Paso Natural Gas Corp. Beyond that, the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, as last week's proposal is sometimes called, involves complex and perhaps insoluble problems. Unlike the controversy over the Alaska oil pipeline, the battle for Arctic natural gas will be fought mostly over economic and political considerations, not environmental dangers.

Spokesmen for the consortium argue that Canada has only about seven years of proven natural gas reserves left before it may have to rely on the untapped Mackenzie Delta deposits. A

pipeline to the delta would be too massive a financial undertaking for Canada alone. But by hooking up with U.S. gas fields in Alaska, the Canadians can share the costs. The consortium has thoughtfully proposed that the 48-inch-wide pipe be buried, the surface above it revegetated, and the gas refrigerated to prevent melting the permafrost that it would traverse.

**Joint Venture.** But many Canadians do not like the idea of sharing control of the pipeline—and hence, of a precious natural resource—with Americans. Moreover, some U.S. Government officials privately question the political wisdom of a massive joint venture now that Canadian nationalism is on the rise. Some Canadian economists note that the proven Mackenzie Delta gas reserves are not now large enough to justify Canada's proposed 50% share of the program's cost. And settling claims with the Eskimos and Indians whose ancestral lands the pipeline would cross could cost billions of dollars. "This is essentially a project to transport Alaskan gas to American consumers," says McGill University Economist Eric Kierans. "Building a pipeline that will last 50 to 70 years when the total known resource will be exhausted in 25 years is an expensive proposition."

Consortium officials will answer those objections in another application to be filed by next fall. Hearings will probably be held in both countries next year, and neither government is expected to make a decision much before 1976. Just about the only indisputable observation on the future of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline is that the debate now beginning will be as dramatic and complicated as the project itself.

POWER

### Electric Catch-22

For owners of all-electric homes—houses that use electricity for heating, lighting and all major appliances—the energy crisis has been an unmitigated financial disaster. Electricity has become more expensive, partly because power companies have been passing along the increased costs of coal and fuel oil. The efforts of homeowners to conserve electric power during the energy crisis have had a devastating catch-22 effect: because electricity use declined, the utility companies' revenues fell off. To recoup the loss, the companies have jacked up their rates still further, in some cases to the highest levels since World War II.

Soaring electricity bills are angering homeowners all over the U.S., but the situation appears to be most highly charged in the New York area, where Con Edison's rates are among the highest in the nation. Several hundred residents of affluent Westchester County, which has possibly the largest concentration of all-electric homes in the U.S., have banded together to protest rate increases that have hiked their monthly bills from an average of $136.87 last March to $252.52 this month, an increase of 85%. Says Housewife Tena Jackson: "My electric bill was $267 in February—$98 more over last year for 1,500 kilowatts less." The consumers contend that Con Ed has a moral obligation to adjust its rates downward, and they are refusing to pay their bills until it does so. But Con Ed maintains that the rate hikes are necessary and justified—and in fact is asking the state public service commission to grant it an additional 17.5% increase.

CONSUMER REVOLT IN WESTCHESTER COUNTY

THE NEW YORK TIMES

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

23

KISSINGER WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ANATOLY DOBRYNIN, ENTERING & WORKING IN HIS STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICE...

THE WORLD

DIPLOMACY/COVER STORY

Superstar Statecraft: How Henry Does It

By now the scene has been played so often—four trips to eleven nations in the past ten weeks alone—that it has taken on an atmosphere of, “If this is March, then it must be Moscow.” The big, blue and white Boeing 707, with the seal of the President of the United States emblazoned on its door, wheels and whines to an airport ramp. As local officials rush forward, the door swings open, and out pops a wavy-haired, rathier pudgy man (185 lbs. on a 5-ft. 8-in. frame), with the unmistakable aura of a true celebrity. Adjusting his glasses and his smile, the visitor speaks in a solemn baritone, the scholarly English sentences laced, to the puzzlement of some, with the Germanic accents of his native Fürth. But the audiences listen carefully. The hopes, fears and future of his own country and the world may well depend on whatever is about to transpire.

It is March, and it is Moscow. Early Sunday evening, *Air Force Two* was scheduled to roll up to a ramp at Vnukovo airport as U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 50, arrived on his sixth and potentially most important visit to the Soviet Union since he became the foreign-policy plenipotentiary of Richard Nixon's Administration. In the Russian capital, the policymakers of the two ranking superpowers were to review a number of issues that affected not only East-West détente but the entire world. Items on the agenda:

1) **SALT II**, or a continuation of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Since the signing in May 1972 of the SALT I agreement, which limits offensive weapons and anti-ballistic missiles, the Soviets

have tested four new intercontinental ballistic missiles and have developed their first submarine-launched multiple warhead missile. The Pentagon, meanwhile, as part of a record $85.8 billion budget request, included items to improve missile accuracy, guidance and control that are also meant to prod the Soviets into a formula for “essential equivalence” in missiles and payloads. At a predeparture press conference in Washington last week, Kissinger indicated that the two nations had passed the stage of technical exchanges and were “at the point where we should be making, or should be attempting, a conceptual breakthrough on arms limitation agreements.”

2) **TRADE.** Both the Soviets and U.S. industry are anxious to increase U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade, but the credits and most-favored-nation status that Moscow seeks are both bottled up in Congress. Amendments to pending trade legislation, notably including one sponsored by Democratic Senator Henry (“Scoop”) Jackson of Washington, tie M.F.N. status to a nagging political question and one which is directly tied to Jewish emigration to Israel—the right of Soviet citizens to leave the U.S.S.R. without harassment or penalties. Kissinger firmly insists that emigration is a domestic Soviet issue, and he has fought all efforts to tie it to the trade legislation that he considers essential to détente.

3) **THE MIDDLE EAST.** The two superpowers are at odds over how to achieve a peaceful resolution of Arab-Israeli hostilities. In a dazzling display of his personalized brand of “shuttle diplomacy,”

Kissinger successfully negotiated disengagement between Egypt and Israel. After his return from Moscow, he will attempt to work out a similar agreement involving Israel and Syria, a considerably more difficult task. The settlement talks began last December in Geneva under joint Soviet-American auspices. But the Russians, who for years have been the chief arms suppliers to the Arab world, feel humiliated and embarrassed that they have seemingly contributed nothing to the shaping of a possible peace and that Kissinger has quickly made friends with Egypt, once a virtual Soviet client. Soviet resentment is visceral and obvious: last week pointed articles appeared in *Pravda* and other Soviet publications charging that Kissinger had negotiated disengagement, not for the Middle East's benefit, but to protect U.S. oil sources. It was a rare criticism of the American agent whom the Russians know and like best of all.

As Kissinger admitted with some understatement at his Washington press conference, U.S.-Soviet relations have entered “a more difficult period.” Beyond the agenda, there were other items to be discussed in Moscow that would make his trip particularly critical. In the course of his visit, as politely as possible, Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders were bound to ask critical questions that nag statesmen everywhere: can President Nixon survive Watergate, or should the Soviets prepare to deal with someone else? Kissinger’s probable answer: Nixon will survive, but even if he does not, the institutional structure of the U.S. is strong enough to stand an impeachment.”

24

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

AND RIDING TO THE WHITE HOUSE

AND RIDING TO THE WHITE HOUSE

ment trial, and the U.S. will fulfill its
commitments to détente no matter what
happens. Thus the Russians should look
to their long-term interests in détente
and not take a quick, dangerous advan-
tage of a seeming American weakness.

For the President, who takes a spe-
cial pride in his mastery of foreign pol-
icy, there may well be particularly poi-
gnant irony in the fact that Kissinger is
now widely viewed as an autonomous
operator who might well survive the col-
lapse of the Nixon Administration.
(Vice President Gerald Ford has made
it clear that, should he become Presi-
dent, he would ask Kissinger to stay on.)
Whatever private doubts Kissinger may
have about Nixon's role in Watergate,
he keeps them well hidden in public. De-
spite his immense prestige, the Secre-
tary carefully preserves the ritual re-
quired of a subordinate who takes orders
from a Commander in Chief. When in
Washington, he consults daily with the
President; on the road, he cables back re-
ports and requests for foreign policy
guidance when necessary.

**Total Trust.** Despite five years of close association, Kissinger and the President have a relationship that, in the view of White House observers, is best described as formal and correct rather than personal. Nixon's trust in Kissinger, on diplomatic issues, is total. The Secretary recognizes that the quickest way to lose his negotiating flexibility would be to exceed the President's instruction. Sums up Presidential Aide Al-exander Haig: "I think the President considers Henry a unique national institution."

For Kissinger personally, the suc-
cess of his Moscow trip is particularly
crucial for the continuation of his grand
vision of American policy, for the main-
tenance of the accomplishments he has
both achieved and has still in the mak-
ing. So swiftly and dramatically has the
Secretary of State worked radical chang-
es in U.S. diplomacy—détente with
Moscow, friendship with Peking, prog-
ress toward a settlement in the Middle

East—that he has acquired something
of the mystique of a magician, pulling
doves of peace out of a hat for a fas-
cinated circle of world watchers.

Of late, however, the Kissinger mag-
ic has come under attack as a kind of in-
ternational legerdemain that is at least
partly mere illusion. Critics, including
Scoop Jackson and liberal academi-
cians, charge that détente has been un-
productive, that Kissinger's personal
style of diplomacy pays more attention
to principals than principles, that he has
neglected relations with such proven al-
lies as Europe and Japan for deals with
America's ideological enemies in Mos-
cow and Peking. They are hard prob-
lems, partly because final judgments re-
main to be uncovered by events.
Kissinger is a fast-moving target; aim-
ing at him requires a long lead, and in
a measure, he controls his trajectory.

The criticisms, voiced most loudly
in recent weeks by Europeans (see box
page 26), represent a startling reversal
for Kissinger. In an Administration
marked by scandal, he has not only sur-
vived but prospered—a scholar, states-
man and superstar who has done the
seemingly miraculous for so long that it
has become almost routine. Despite the
new chorus of complaints and question-
ing, Kissinger today probably has more
impact than any other person in the
world. Quite possibly, he has now be-
come the world's indispensable man.

According to a recent Gallup poll,
Kissinger is the man Americans admire
most in the world today. Abroad he has
achieved the kind of celebrity status sel-
dom enjoyed by anyone but top movie
stars; in fact, he has become in some
places almost a cult hero. His round, ex-
pressive face draws more instant recog-
nition in many nations than even that

of the local ruler. Govern-
ment leaders, like so many
shy fans, inveigle ways to be
photographed with him.
Arab sheiks, fascinated as
much by the *machismo* im-
age of his well-publicized
dates with Actresses Jill St.
John and Marlo Thomas as
by his statesmanship, insist
on being briefed by no one
else. In Cairo he is referred
to as "the American magi-
cian." Taxi drivers rever-
ently point out to tourists
the streets along which he
has traveled, and when the
car hits a pothole the cry
is, "Where's Kissinger?"

Meeting other Western
Hemisphere foreign minis-
ters in Mexico City recent-
ly, the Secretary of State
was so sought-after by his
Latin American counter-
parts that they even pur-
sued him to the men's room
to carry out impromptu dis-
cussions. "*Kissinger y Ra-
basa conferencian en el
W.C.*," headlined Mexico

City's *Ovaciones*, after one such session
involving Kissinger and Foreign Min-
ister Emilio Rabasa.

One reason for Kissinger's exalted
reputation as a wonder-worker, obvious-
ly, is the record of his diplomatic suc-
cesses. Another is the fact that, with
Richard Nixon hampered and crippled
by Watergate, Kissinger increasingly
looms as the architect as well as the voice
of U.S. policy. That, of course, is not
quite the case. Kissinger himself always
makes it clear that the necessary thrust
of the White House is behind his suc-
cess, but the misperception is under-
standable. Still another reason is that
Kissinger happens to be the right man
in the right place at the right time. As
London *Times* Foreign Editor Louis
Heren recently put it: "Much of the
world, East as well as West, hankers for
Superman. The role was thrust upon
him, although presumably he did not
have to be persuaded." In fact, as Kis-
singer readily agrees, he did not.

**Chain Reaction.** Some tradition-
oriented European diplomats insist that
Kissinger's success is built mainly on na-
ked power politics, as is Soviet foreign
policy. "He is a troublemaker out of the
19th century," snaps a ranking French
Gaullist. In fact, Kissinger has created
a novel personal approach to diplomacy
fashioned primarily out of self-confi-
dence, charm, boundless energy, humor
when applicable, and an ability to grasp
what Kissinger, the once—and perhaps
future—scholar, calls "the historical
process."

Israel's Deputy Premier Yigal Al-
lon, a friend and former student (see box
page 28), describes the triumph another
way. "He does his homework," says Al-
lon, who also admires Kissinger's "mas-
tery of detail, quick mind and acute

THE SUPERSECRETARY VISITING THE SPHINX

S
O
B
—
S
Y
G
M
A

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

25

THE WORLD

sense of timing." The success of the Secretary's "chain reaction" diplomacy is that Kissinger "manages to make you feel that he is listening to you with great understanding, and yet he is never soft. He does not antagonize you by coming with a specific plan, although I am sure he has his own ideas. He gives you the feeling that he really cares about you, your country, and the Middle East."

A man with a large measure of self-esteem—some critics call it egomania—Kissinger considers himself a statesman rather than a diplomat. Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's former Chief of Staff, as well as Ambassador to Washington and now Minister of Labor, recalls vividly Kissinger's own definition of the distinction: "The diplomat believes that an international conflict derives from misunderstanding. Therefore he seeks a verbal formula to overcome it. The statesman believes that conflict derives from a difference of interest and confrontation positions. Therefore he tries to change the realities on the ground."

The Secretary believes in taking what he calls a "conceptual approach" to negotiations: he tries to consider not problems or areas but the overall perspective. He carefully judges how far each side in his negotiations is prepared to go. He also tries to avoid getting bogged down in either minute detail or rhetorical polemics. A classic example: the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement negotiations, which climaxed with Kissinger, in his now famous shuttle diplomacy,

making almost daily flights between Jerusalem and President Anwar Sadat's vacation retreat in Aswan.

The October war had ended with both armies hunkered down along the Suez Canal in a hazardous politico-military tangle. Kissinger began the negotiations on disengagement by going to each side and asking, in effect, "What would you like to get out of this situation? What are the minimum requirements with which you would be satisfied?" From then on, it was a matter of trying to reconcile the two positions, trying to make one side see and understand

the other's conditions, suggesting subtle adjustments here and there—all the while keeping a basic concept in sight.

Kissinger himself appears to work best when, rather like a playground basketball superstar, he can go one-on-one with a leader who shares his own sense of geopolitical realities. "He always looks for the guy who can deliver," says an aide who has sat in on many of Kissinger's negotiating sessions.

Kissinger's diplomatic success in the Middle East so far is due, in part, to the fact that the October war ended in a stalemate, and both sides were psycho-

KISSINGER EXCHANGING JOKES WITH EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT AT SADAT'S HOME

Looking to the far target and paving the way.

Henry's Seven Deadly Sins

When he joined the Nixon Administration in November 1968, Henry Kissinger was regarded in foreign policy circles as a neophyte on the subjects of China and the Middle East but an expert on Europe and NATO problems. And yet nowhere has Kissinger's diplomatic touch proved to be less sure than in the countries of his native continent.

What went wrong? Did the Europeans expect too much from Kissinger simply because he was born in Germany? Did he feel that he had to be "more American than the Americans," as one Dutch official put it, to prove that he was not "soft on Europe"?

In his remarks to the congressional wives in Washington this month, Kissinger declared that America's biggest problem was not its enemies but its "self-assertive" allies. But many European leaders feel that the U.S., and Kissinger in particular, deserve most of the blame for any deterioration in the Atlantic Alliance. The complaints can perhaps be summed up in a listing of what they regard, rightly or wrongly, as Kissinger's seven deadly sins:

I. He hath denied us any world role.

Many officials see the current imbro-

glio as a Kissinger tactic to stop Europe from playing any role at all in international affairs, outside of being simply an extension of U.S. foreign policy. Said one French diplomat: "Kissinger is attempting to bring the Nine into an Atlantic system whereby they will be able to take only decisions that are approved in Washington." Kissinger irritated European leaders in his Atlantic Charter speech last April when he stated that the nations of the Continent had only "regional" interests while the U.S. had "global" ones. He now seems to be denying them even a regional policy. If Europe cannot have a separate policy in the Middle East, where it has historical, geographical and economic ties, where can it ever have a separate policy?

II. He alone determineth the "common" interest.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. and European leaders alike have advocated a united Western Europe in the conviction that there would never be any transatlantic rupture on major policy issues. The theory was fine so long as the dominant issue was the Soviet threat to peace. But first détente and then the oil crisis have exposed the fallacy of that assumption. The Middle East is the strong-

est case in point. Europe is dependent on the Arabs for 80% of its oil; before the embargo, the U.S. imported only 11% from the Middle East. As a Bonn official puts it: "For the U.S., the Middle East is one conflict among others, all of which are equally far away from Washington. But for Europe, the Middle East conflict is on its doorstep and a direct threat to its security."

III. He hath interfered in our decision-making.

To the Europeans, Kissinger's complaints that there has been "insufficient" consultation look like an attempt to interfere in an already difficult decision-making process. The political situation in NATO and the Common Market is rather similar to what the U.S. would have to endure if it had a Cabinet that included, say, Edward Kennedy, Barry Goldwater, George McGovern and George Wallace, each with his own constituency, sitting down and trying to reach a consensus. If they allow the U.S. to take part in major decisions, Europeans contend, the Americans would divide them. Says West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel: "We cannot have Americans at the table. No European sits in the State Department."

IV. He doth form a condominium with the Soviet Union.

This is a familiar argument on the

26

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

THE WORLD

ROBEKO—CAMERAS

PARTYING WITH FAVORITE DATE NANCY MAGINNES

Chess with Buchwald, dinner at the Bradens'.

ways. When he meets Israeli leaders, for instance, Kissinger calls Golda Meir "Madame Prime Minister," while Dayan and Allon are always "Moshe" and "Yigal." Foreign Minister Abba Eban, by contrast, is simply "Eban." Explains one participant in their talks: "For Mrs. Meir he has high respect, with Dayan good rapport, with Allon comradeship. With Eban there is not much more than a colleague-to-colleague relationship, since Eban is the silent man on the team

who does not have much to say." Although Sadat addresses his "dear friend" as "Henry," Kissinger calls the Egyptian leader "Mr. President."

Once he begins negotiations, the particular Kissinger mystique begins to operate, and that in itself is almost a harbinger of success. Wit and humor are key weapons. After many years of conferences and confrontations, he has even relaxed poker-faced Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the point that they can kid each other about the recording devices hidden in rooms they are using.

During one sensitive stage of last fall's disengagement negotiations, Kissinger felt that the Israelis were trying to propose more than the Egyptians were prepared to consider. He advised the Israelis to hold back a bit. When an edgy Cabinet minister declared that it would be wrong to offer less than Israel was genuinely willing to concede, Kissinger smiled and answered: "Don't push it. Be despicable—like me." He feels that tension-easing banter can of-

ten help negotiations proceed smoothly, which may explain in part his lack of success with relatively humorless Japanese diplomats.

Once talks begin in earnest, however, Kissinger can become deadly serious and wholly pragmatic. Says one Middle Eastern diplomat: "He does not make value judgments. The question for him is not who is right and who is wrong. The question is what in reality can be achieved under the prevailing circumstances." Kissinger frequently stagemanages negotiations to produce the right kind of "atmospherics." Said Costa Rica's Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio, after the Mexico City conference: "When he has a tough response, he lays it on gently but clearly. But when he has good news, he warms up like a Venenese good fairy, all sugar plums and Schlag [whipped cream]."

**Five-Minute Deal.** The Schlag is more than topping. In Geneva last December, Egypt almost scotched the first meeting of the U.N.-sponsored talks with Israel on disengagement by objecting to the seating arrangements. The Egyptians demanded an empty table between themselves and the Israelis for distance, with the Israelis sitting next to the Americans like satellites. The Israelis bluntly refused. At that point, recalls

## Kissinger's Old-Boy Network

While on a visit to Washington, D.C., a few years ago, Israeli Knesset Member Gad Yaacobi picked up his hotel telephone early one morning and dialed the White House. Asking for Henry Kissinger's office, Yaacobi identified himself and explained that he would like to drop by to talk to the President's foreign policy adviser. Normally, such a request from a relatively unimportant visitor would be brushed aside as an intrusion on Kissinger's carefully rationed time. Yaacobi's appointment, however, was promptly arranged for 4 p.m. that same day. Recalling the incident last week with a grin, Yaacobi explained: "I guess that's what you call having an in."

Like Yaacobi, several dozen other non-Americans have a similar in with the U.S. Secretary of State. They are alumni of Harvard University's six-week summer International Seminar, run by Kissinger for 18 consecutive summers, until he joined the White House staff. Each year he selected about 40 men and women from abroad who had already started their careers and who, he figured, might eventually become leaders in their own countries.

Kissinger chose well: among the graduates of his seminars are Belgium's prospective Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, West German Minister for Economic Cooperation Erhard Eppler, Israeli Deputy Premier Yigal Allon, South

Korean former Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon, Japanese Minister of Trade and Industry Yasuhiro Nakasone, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Frydendlund, and such prominent nongovernment figures as West German Editor Theo Sommer and British Historian Michael Foot.

In conversations with TIME correspondents last week, many of Kissinger's "old boys" remembered him as a reserved, hard-working scholar without flamboyance. Belgium's former Finance Minister André Vlerick (seminar of '53) recalled: "Henry Kissinger was very shy and timid. He was self-conscious about being considered a foreigner by the Americans."

While some alumni recall that Kissinger at times was overbearing and a stickler for rules, none deny his unmistakable intellectual brilliance. A European student of Kissinger's in 1962 who is now a senior official in his own country remembers that "one had to be alert in Kissinger's class or else one would be pushed quickly against the wall. The seminars were fencing matches, one hit after the other. His strong weapon in arguing was irony. We all loved it. He was never boring, always relating to what was actually happening."

Some former students occasionally dig out their old seminar notebooks for insight into Kissinger's current policies.

Yaacobi says that his 1967 notes contain "a very precise plan of what subsequently happened in America's relations with China, Viet Nam, Russia and the Middle East." Tindemans feels that Washington's present difficulties with Europe were anticipated by Kissinger in 1962: "He realized that Europe would want to take an independent stand, but warned that Europe must accept the consequences of its policy."

Many former students claim that their exposure to Kissinger in the seminars has helped them to understand certain key elements in his approach to foreign policy: an undisguised disdain for bureaucracy, an impatience with utopian ideas, and an ability to view power relationships unencumbered by ideology. Several former students remarked that Kissinger had no apparent heroes, and that his supposed administration for Metternich has been considerably exaggerated. Some Asian and Middle Eastern students criticize him on the grounds that he viewed the world in European terms and understood little about the Third World.

Like most teachers, Kissinger is pleased to see his former students succeed. At diplomatic receptions, he enjoys greeting foreign officials as "my old student." He must have been especially delighted at the opening of last year's Middle East peace conference in Geneva, where Tahseen Basheer was the Egyptian spokesman and his Israeli counterpart was Meron Medzini. Both are Kissinger alumni.

28

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

WITH DEFENSE MINISTER DAYAN
"Moshe," and "Yigal" but "Eban."

1976

logically ready for some kind of settle-
ment. The situation was tailor-made for
Kissinger: the Israelis, from sad past ex-
perience, greatly distrust the United Na-
tions, and the Russians, besides being
wholly committed to the Arab cause,
had no diplomatic relations with Israel.
But to make progress Kissinger also had
to deal with an Arab leader who pos-
sessed both courage and imagination.
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat turned
out to be that kind of man.

Last October, for instance, Sadat
took a major political risk by tolerating
the encirclement of Egypt's Third Army

by Israeli forces in the Sinai.
Moreover, he did not overre-
act when Israeli troops vio-
lated the Oct. 22 cease-fire
and surrounded the city of
Port Suez. Sadat's restraint
allowed Kissinger to make a
convincing case to the Israe-
lis that Egypt really wanted
an agreement.

Kissinger considers Sadat
the outstanding Arab leader,
"a man of vision and cour-
age, not concerned about
standing up against enor-
mous difficulties." Egypt's
President enthusiastically re-
turns the praise. As Sadat
told TIME in a recent inter-
view, "He is a very good man.
For the first time, you have
a real politician as Secretary
of State. He is a man of vi-

sion and also a strategist. Above all, he
is a man of his word."

Another Middle Easterner who seems to have a conceptual knack for successful bargaining is Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. He handled many of the negotiations with Sadat —through Kissinger, of course—and has been designated Israel's representative in the disengagement talks with Syria that will begin in Washington this week. Another Kissinger favorite, surprisingly enough, is French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who has been the Secretary's most acerbic critic in European assem-

blies. Kissinger's superlatives, though,
are saved for Chinese Premier Chou En-
lai, whom he describes as "the greatest
statesman of our era."

In forging Washington's new links
with Peking and establishing a person-
al rapport with Chou, Kissinger shrewd-
ly capitalized on China's fears of Soviet
expansionism. Timing, Kissinger read-
ily concedes, has always played a large
part in his success as a statesman. But
says one Washington friend and admir-
er: "Sure, a lot of doors open for him,
but he walks through them with class."

**Flexible Tactician.** Kissinger approaches negotiations, not as a lawyer trying to dispose of a case, but as an intellectual and historian. His thorough steeping in the facts about a country and its problems seldom fails to impress government leaders. Although a flexible tactician, he will, if necessary, present a proposal over and over in hopes of getting it accepted. In Paris during 1972, negotiating an end to U.S. participation in the Vietnamese war, Kissinger often worked double sessions, seeing the North and South Vietnamese separately and at length in search of ways to bring the two antagonists closer. He established a respectful relationship with Ha noi's chief representative Le Duc Tho, despite his exasperation with the doggedly hortatory North Vietnamese approach to negotiations.

Kissinger has a finely tuned sense
of hierarchy and addresses those
he deals with in subtly differing

part of the French: East is East's and West's is West's; the Soviet Union and the U.S. are seeking, as did Napoleon and Russian Emperor Alexander III, to divide up Europe into spheres of influence. The French fear is widely shared. Many diplomats worry that Kissinger is using the European nations as pawns in what French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert calls the U.S. "adversary-partnership" relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed, some Europeans are now convinced that the latest diplomatic crisis was deliberately staged by Kissinger to forestall the creation of a potential rival to the U.S.-U.S.S.R. condominium—namely a united Europe.

V. He doth distort the military situation.

Europeans are tired of listening to first the pleas and now the threats of Washington to pull out its troops, while the U.S. ignores the fact that 300,000 Americans are in Europe primarily to act as an advance guard for U.S. defense. American forces are not in Europe out of charity: the Pentagon would clearly prefer that Berlin be the battleground in a potential encounter with the Soviet Union rather than Boston. Says Jobert: "In all frankness, if it is in the interest of the U.S. to remain in Europe, it will remain here. If it is not in its interest, it will leave."

VI. He hath fabricated this political crisis.

Kissinger's outburst against the European decision to go ahead with a conference with the Arabs on the plane flying back from the NATO meeting in Brussels, and his follow-up statements, are seen as deliberate provocations. What makes the Europeans so sure that it is staged is that the theatrics are out of all proportion to the problem. As a French official put it: "Why is it so vital for the U.S. if Europe takes a [separate] position in the Middle East?" Europeans argue that any conference with the Arab nations on the oil crisis is most unlikely to upset Kissinger's peace negotiations. Besides, the conference is tentative at best and far in the future. So how, then, could it threaten to unravel Kissinger's foreign policy?

VII. He hath demonstrated to us
our weakness.

The sin that the Europeans will never forgive, and rarely admit, is that by demanding so much of Europe Kissinger has shown how weak it really is. After all the flowery rhetoric about European unity by 1980, the nine nations of the Common Market have failed the test of their first serious external challenge and fallen back to squabbling among themselves. Former French Premier Maurice Couve de Murville be-

lieves that the end result of the Nixon-
Kissinger salvo will be more disarray
for Europe in the years to come. "But
it's most probably what Kissinger
wants," he said. "We never seriously be-
lieved that the U.S. was interested in a
united Europe anyway."

HERBROEK—WASHINGTON POST

"It's from Europe. They're thinking about
having a 'Year of the United States.' "

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

27

THE WORLD

man, 48, a Kissinger favorite, was re-
cruited from the U.S. Mission to the Eu-
ropean Community to oversee European
affairs as Assistant Secretary. Sisco's old
job of Assistant Secretary for Near East-
ern and South Asian Affairs was last
week given to his capable longtime as-
sistant, Alfred ("Roy") Atherton, 52.
Jack Kubisch, 52, who was in the Paris
embassy during Kissinger's secret ses-
sions with Le Duc Tho, now runs Inter-
American Affairs. Robert Ingersoll, 60,
who tried conscientiously to patch up
U.S.-Japanese relations as best he could
as Ambassador to Japan, was called
home from Tokyo five months ago to be-
come Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs.

A few years ago, Kissinger depre-
catingly noted that the most impressive
function of the State Department was
answering cables. Receptivity is not

Last December, Walter Stoessel, 54,
formerly Ambassador to Warsaw, was
named Ambassador to Moscow. Secre-
tary Kissinger is not permitted to do to
Stoessel what Presidential Adviser Kis-
singer did to Stoessel's predecessor,
Jacob Beam: in 1972, while he was ne-
gotiating détente with the Kremlin, Kis-
singer sneaked into Moscow without
even telling Beam that he was coming,
or why.

**Open Target.** Kissinger's passion-
ate concern for secrecy, indeed, is one
of the things for which he is most often
faulted by his critics. Kissinger's treat-
ment of Beam in Moscow may have been
humiliating, but at least it had no ad-
verse effect on U.S.-Soviet relations. On
the other hand, relations between Wash-
ington and Tokyo have gone awry ever
since Kissinger went to Peking in 1971
without telling former Japanese Premier

Eisaku Sato what was afoot with Sato's Chinese neighbors. Even if rumors of Nixon's proposed visit had leaked, some critics say, it would have been less damaging in the long run than Japan's subsequent loss of face. One specific complaint of U.S. intelligence experts who resent Kissinger's excessive sense of secrecy: the fact that information about his talks in Peking with Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-tung have never been allowed to circulate beyond the White House.

TASS

Kissinger's eminence and vis-
ibility as a ranking world states-
man make him a fairly open and
obvious target for criticism, some
of it valid, some not. One com-
plaint is that he gets along better
with dictators than democrats.
Kissinger replies, "Our initial ne-
gotiations were directed to author-
itarian governments because that
was where we faced the danger
of war. Negotiations with allies
are more complex in this phase
of the development of Western de-
mocracies but in the long run more
important."

The most trenchant criticism, how-
ever, comes from old academic col-
leagues who question his intensive use
of personal diplomacy. The University
of Chicago's Hans Morgenthau worries
that Kissinger will be constricted in
whatever else he does by an obsession
with preserving détente. Harvard Pro-
fessor of Government Nadav Safran,
who otherwise gives Kissinger's perfor-
mance high marks, suggests that "per-
haps a less interesting Secretary of State
might delegate authority so that vari-
ous people would be running various
problem areas simultaneously."

More than one critic recalls that it
was Kissinger himself, in the spring 1966
issue of the quarterly magazine *Daed-
alus*, who wrote: "The statesman is sus-
picious of those who personalize foreign
policy, for history teaches him the frag-
gility of structures dependent upon
individuals."

With that dogma in mind, the Kis-
singer critics contend that his penchant
for building a policy on personal rap-
port can sometimes be a barrier to shap-
ing objective policies. Some feel that
Washington's tilt toward Pakistan dur-
ing the 1971 Bangladesh war was mo-
tivated as much by Kissinger's (and Nix-
on's) dislike of Indian Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi as by the fact that the
eager Pakistanis were assisting Wash-
ington in its overtures to Peking.

In the Middle East, claim the crit-
ics, there is a built-in peril in Kissin-
ger's approach to negotiations. Peace,
complains one U.S. observer, "is being
built on confidence in Kissinger as a go-
between. There isn't any systematic
method." Sadat has put absolute trust
in Kissinger's ability to achieve Egypt's
goals. For the sake of the Egyptian Pres-
ident, who cannot stay out ahead of the
rest of the Arab world in dealing with Is-
rael for too long, the Secretary must try
to win results fairly soon. But the Mid-
dle Eastern tangle is not easily unrav-
eled, and Kissinger, in the end, may not
be able to deliver. If this happens, or if
Middle East negotiations are not con-
cluded before he leaves office, the result
might be a backlash of resentment
against the U.S. for betraying a trust.

**Flight Bag Diplomacy.** Asked to comment on his opponents, Kissinger answers with a smile, "Anyone who criticizes me cannot be in good faith." His serious answer is that it was not choice but necessity that has forced him to conduct so much foreign policy out of his own flight bag. How, he asks, would a more conventional approach have worked better? His activities thus far, both as Presidential Adviser and Secretary of State, involved what Kissinger refers to as "crisis management," and he stoutly defends the results: "The Middle East is very complex, and it still is potentially explosive. Our relations with China are solid. Viet Nam has held up better than I thought. In Europe, we will come out of the latest blowup much stronger because we will bring issues that have been disentangled back into some political focus."

The magician's subjects, however,
are by no means docile: he still faces po-
tential setbacks in détente, the Middle
East, Europe—and Washington, where
impeachment could undo much of what
he hoped to accomplish. But if the cri-
ses ever fade, Kissinger hopes to shift,
so to speak, from defense to offense. He
wants to do nothing less than rebuild
the national foreign policy consensus
that was fragmented first by Viet Nam
and then by Watergate. His aim, in a
world where Kissinger sees conflict as
the norm, is to define U.S. foreign pol-
icy goals so clearly that future Admin-
istrations will have no difficulty under-
standing what they are. If that happens,
what is good for America will inevita-
bly be good for Henry Kissinger. He will
have become more than a second Met-
ternich; he will be the first statesman of
nuclear diplomacy.

WITH SOVIET PARTY BOSS BREZHNEV

Rare criticism from Moscow.

enough, and no longer is the department
allowed to wait for things to happen and
then figure the best way out. All of
State's bureau heads have been given the
same mandate from Kissinger: to define
precisely the foreign policy options in
their areas. One sign of Kissinger's prog-
ress in trying to vitalize the department:
ambassadors who formerly went to the
White House for information on foreign
policymaking are calling again at State.

The foreign service has so far not
shown as much Kissinger imprint, part-
ly because Kissinger does not always
have the final say in the selection of am-
bassadors. Two important posts, how-
ever, have been filled during Kissinger's
tenure as Secretary with promising re-
sults. In Egypt, where President Sadat
has resumed diplomatic relations that
were broken off by the 1967 war, Ca-
reerman and Arabist Hermann Eilts,
52, like Kissinger an emigrant from
Germany in his youth, has assumed
the re-established ambassador's post.

32

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

THE WORLD

one participant, Kissinger “entered the room smiling and cracking jokes. He exclaimed what a pleasure it was to see Abba Eban. (They had breakfasted together.) Grabbing Eban by an elbow, Kissinger took him aside. The Egyptians were in a bind, Kissinger explained. They were embarrassed because the Syrians had refused to join the talks and needed to avoid the appearance of being too easy with the Israelis. Would the Israelis consent to make some adjustments in the seating? ‘You don’t like the empty table? No? What about another plan, an arrangement that would place the Israelis between the Russians and the U.N. delegation?’ If the Israelis agreed, he would try the idea on the Egyptians. In five minutes, a deal was reached, and the talks moved ahead with the Israelis next to the Soviets and the Egyptians alongside the Americans in a symbolically important game of political musical chairs. The ice had been broken largely by Kissinger’s warm personality and, even in this relatively minor dispute, his accurate sensing of what each side could or could not yield on.”

**Background Music.** As part of his “atmospherics,” Kissinger at times unabashedly uses the American press corps that travels with him aboard Air Force Two. During the shuttle flights between Jerusalem and Aswan in January, which eventually led to disengagement along the Suez Canal, the press was an integral part of Kissinger’s diplomatic gap closing. Whenever he was asked how far along the negotiations had come, Kissinger would answer, “Oh, 60% completed.” The next time it was 75% and the next 90%. As the two sides kept reading these daily stories, they could not help being nudged into believing that a settlement was nearly at hand. “He played the press like a cello,” recalls one reporter. “We created all the background music he needed.”

In return for such orchestration, however, Kissinger is more available to journalists than any other major figure in the Nixon Administration and more open than any other Secretary of State in recent years. On long flights aboard Air Force Two he will wander into the press section to trade news or simply chat. At such moments he is unprofessionally informal and often brutally candid in his assessment of the leaders he has just talked to. Shirt open, stomach bulging, he will complain: “When I negotiate I get nervous, and when I get nervous I eat. When I get rid of this Israeli thing, I am going to weigh 350 lbs.” Newsmen enjoy the proximity to Kissinger and the thoroughness of his briefings, but they also complain that he can occasionally be devious. Despite promises to the contrary, he has yet to reveal the reasons that he says required a worldwide U.S. alert during the latest Middle East war.

These days, Kissinger does much of his socializing aloft. Since becoming Secretary of State, he has cut down on his after-hours activities in Washington. He

studiously avoids cocktail parties; if forced to attend a reception, the abstemious Kissinger (who does not smoke) will sip unconvincingly at a glass of wine or champagne. When he does relax, it is within a small circle of friends. They include the writing Alsop brothers (Stewart and Joseph), Humorist Art Buchwald (a regular chess partner) and Columnist Tom Braden and his wife Joan. A pleasant evening for the capital’s most sought-after guest may include nothing more than dinner at the Bradens’ with “favorite date” Nancy MAGGINNES, a Nelson Rockefeller aide, followed by the home screening of a movie.

The Secretary’s two children, Elizabeth, 15, and David, 12—he was divorced in 1964—live with their mother in Belmont, Mass. This week while they are on spring vacation, they will get a treat that any school child would envy. Kissinger is taking them to Moscow.

WRIGHT—MIAMI NEWS

Lately, most of the Secretary’s meals have been either on the road or in his private State Department dining room, where he has played host to such official guests as Israel’s Eban or Jordan’s King Hussein. At least once a week he will have breakfast with Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. Both men insist that they have a healthy working relationship based on mutual respect. “Schlesinger and I are closer together on strategic policy than any other Secretaries of State and Defense since Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett,” Kissinger insists. “We have no basic differences on strategic policy, although we may have some tactical differences.”

Kissinger’s grueling workday begins shortly before 8 o’clock, when he leaves his town house overlooking Rock Creek Park for the White House. Normally, he spends the morning there and the rest of the day, which often does not end until midnight, at his State Department office. When he is not traveling, Saturdays and many Sundays are work-

days, not only for Kissinger, but for much of his staff as well. “It takes a hyperthyroid condition, an iron will and, somewhere down the list, intelligence,” says one assistant. “Fortunately, Henry has all three.” His aides are not quite so well endowed with stamina. They can hardly wait until early April, when the boss plans a ten-day vacation in Acapulco.

One reason for Kissinger’s exhausting routine is that he still serves as presidential adviser for national security affairs and National Security Council chairman as well as Secretary of State. Another reason is that since moving to Foggy Bottom, Kissinger, between overseas trips, has been attempting to overhaul the creaky machinery of the U.S. State Department. Some staffers complain that Kissinger is too aloof and fails to delegate enough authority. On the other hand, notes Ambassador-at-Large

Robert McCloskey, 51, “there is a sense of excitement among the professionals. Kissinger’s coming has made them feel not only on center stage but also part of the decision-making process.”

**Answering Cables.** Kissinger has gathered an energetic, able team of aides and advisers, including Winston Lord, 36, head of his planning and coordination staff, Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 47, Executive Assistant Lawrence Eagleburger, 43, and Press Aide George Vest, 55. He has begun to pluck more talent out of the State Department to augment this group. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, 54, the longtime Middle East expert, was persuaded to back out of a college presidency (Hamilton College in upstate New York) and was promoted to the No. 3 spot, Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The No. 2 job of Deputy Secretary is held by an able former Ambassador to Bonn, Kenneth Rush, 64, who oversees administration.

At the regional level, Arthur Hart-

TIME, APRIL 1, 1974

31

Mid
East
Policy
Papers

A study prepared for the
Joint Mid-East Policy Committee
of the
Combined Jewish Philanthropies
and
The Jewish Community Council
of Greater Boston
72 Franklin Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02110
Tel. (617) 542-7876

Research and Writing:

H. M. Altschuler

E. M. Gilbert

J. Shattan

A. M. Soloway

E. Weiss

Dr. Kissinger, Detente, and
U.S. Interests in the Middle East

How is Detente Affecting U.S. Middle East Policy?

What is Dr. Kissinger's Understanding with Arab Leaders?

Where will Dr. Kissinger's Diplomatic Style Lead?

How Does Detente Affect Soviet Actions in the
Middle East?

What if Israel Disappears?

Are the Arab States Reconciled to Negotiations
and Peace with Israel?

What Really are U.S. Interests in the Middle East?

Does Geneva Hold any Promise for Peace?

Vol. 1 No. 1

April 1974

Mid
East
Digest

A Condensation of the Mid-East Policy Paper on
"Dr. Kissinger, Detente, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East"

Secretary of State Kissinger so far has emerged from the Mid-East negotiations with his reputation for diplomatic wizardry more firmly established than ever. But close examination of his diplomatic offensive raises some serious questions.

The Investment in Detente

The Administration's enormous political investment in detente requires quick resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict to avoid further Soviet-American confrontations. All other policy considerations—including Israel's security and pursuit of a true peace in the Middle East—have been devalued to protect the investment in detente.

The "Understanding" with Sadat

Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic breakthrough in the Arab world is based on his "understanding" with Sadat to secure Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory without direct, substantive negotiations. This Arab perception of the "understanding" explains Sadat's statement that "The United States has adopted a new policy ..."

The Current Arab Stance

Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy, combined with the effectiveness of the oil weapon and the Arabs' own temporary and limited success during the War, far from reconciling the Arabs to Israel's existence, has strengthened their belief in Israel's ultimate destruction, through their "two-stage strategy."

They now refrain from calling openly for Israel's destruction and employ instead a euphemism: the need for "restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people."

Can the U.S. Outbid Russia?

To prove to the Arab states that only America can deliver what they want, we appear prepared, by pressures, threats and promises, to induce Israel to make major concessions that would limit her ability to defend herself from aggression—and to entrust her very survival once again to unenforceable contrivances that have invariably proven worthless when put to the test.

But any American initiative that rests on coercing Israel into concessions favoring the Arab states only pushes the Soviets into an even more uncompromisingly pro-Arab stance. Arab regimes are encouraged, or forced, to adopt ever more militant and unyielding postures, the U.S. remains as far as ever from pleasing them—and the Middle East is moved further away from peace than before.

The Soviet Union, which sees Israel as a barrier to its attainment of hegemony over the Middle East, can always outbid us in wooing Arab favor at Israel's expense.

If Israel Disappeared ...

It has been suggested that the U.S. might jettison its relationship with Israel and go all out for Arab favor and friendship.

But were Israel eliminated as a political and military force, the U.S. would still confront Soviet imperial ambitions in the Middle East. The ultimate reality: the Soviets would be in the Middle East if there was no Arab-Israel conflict—even if Israel did not exist.

An Indo-China Scenario in the Middle East?

Were Israel gone, the Arab states themselves would be sharply divided into hostile camps. Egypt might pursue a "neutralist" role, but Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Jordan and Lebanon would seek American protection against Soviet-supported aggressive, militant states—Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and others—and against Soviet-supported "revolutionary" and terrorist movements.

Vol. 1 No. 1

April 1974

The Arab states on "our side" would require direct, large-scale military support, **including American troops**, in order to survive aggression and subversion promoted by the U.S.S.R. In effect, the U.S. would see a replication of the tragic Indo-China scenario.

Short of direct U.S. involvement, the Middle East would come under Soviet domination—even without the use of Soviet troops. The Russians would have a stranglehold on the jugular of Persian Gulf oil. Iran and Turkey would be "Finlandized", as would the heartland of Eurpoe. The U.S. would be effectively isolated.

## Will Detente Change the Rules of the Game?

Secretary Kissinger believes that through detente he is changing the rules of the game, that a new international system can be based upon Soviet-American cooperation.

But Soviet behavior in the Mid-East crisis betrayed the detente declaration, and marked the relaxation in Soviet policy as no more than temporary, a tactical rather than a strategic change. As long as the Soviet Union remains a closed society, committed to a hostile ideology, **genuine** detente is impossible.

Nevertheless, sensible and realistic policies can limit confrontations and promote accommodation. But sensible, realistic policies clearly preclude **unilateral** concessions for **illusory** detente. They require also the development of a truly informed **public will**.

## Diplomacy of Ambiguities and Secret Understandings

The Secretary of State's diplomatic style is one of ambiguities, secret understandings and closed summits—capable in his hands of achieving some spectacular short-term results. But it is not a diplomacy which builds genuine public understanding of the issues—without which a democracy like America cannot exercise the power at its command, nor conduct an effective long-term foreign policy.

## Looking Toward Geneva

The present outlook allows little optimism for the Geneva negotiations, if they do in fact take place.

While Israel wants a secure and permanent settlement with her neighbors, the Arab states regard the Geneva proceedings primarily as the political continuation of the October War. Russia is completely committed to backing all Arab demands—while the U.S. is primarily concerned with detente, or at least its illusion.

For the Geneva negotiations to serve the cause of peace, they will have to be transformed so that Arab-Israel reconciliation is made their real objective:

* Once and for all, the Soviets must abandon their deliberate policy of maintaining and promoting Mid-East tensions.

* Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union should intrude, either as advocates or adversaries, into the peacemaking process.

* The U.S. and the Soviet Union should jointly **reaffirm**, in an open, public declaration, their agreement that neither will commit any combat forces or nuclear weapons into the Middle East.

Only if the U.S. and Russia demonstrate true mutual restraint, can Israel and the Arab states possibly engage in free and untrammeled negotiations toward a genuine resolution of their differences. Geneva then could mark a turning point in the tragic history of the Middle East. It could also mark a new beginning for the battered spirit of detente.

Secretary of State Kissinger so far has emerged from
the Middle East negotiations with his reputation for
diplomatic wizardry more firmly established than ever.
The cease-fire and disengagement agreements he
worked out have been received in this country with
much enthusiasm and surprisingly little criticism. The
national media have been effusive in their appreciation
of the Secretary of State's diplomatic skills, and his for-
midable talents are credited with setting in motion a
process that may lead to a final Arab-Israel peace.

Henry Tanner, Cairo correspondent of the *New York Times* (Nov. 29, 1973), reports that Egypt's decision to participate in the Geneva Peace Conference "implies" recognition of Israel. According to *Newsweek* (Dec. 10, 1973), "the Arab states for the first time tacitly recognized the right of Israel to exist as a state" when they accepted Kissinger's proposals for a peace conference.

The Question of "Detente"

The only aspect of the Secretary of State's diplomatic offensive which has been called into question as a result of the October War is his policy of detente with Russia. Under cover of detente, the Soviet Union supplied the Arab states with immense quantities of the most advanced weaponry and encouraged them to launch their surprise attack against Israel. Russia planned for and then delivered a massive resupply of arms to Egypt and Syria at the height of the War—thereby forcing a reluctant United States to improvise a hasty airlift of arms to Israel.

Before, during and after the War, the Soviet Union urged the Arabs, in numerous radio broadcasts as well as in private forums, to use their oil resources as a weap-on against the West in general and the United States in particular. When Egypt and Syria were making military gains, the Russians rejected a cease-fire. Only after Israel had gained the offensive and Egypt was on the brink of military disaster did a panic-stricken Kremlin leadership summon Dr. Kissinger to Moscow. The Soviet Union then threatened direct military interven-tion in the Middle East conflict if the United States did not restrain Israel from destroying the Soviet-Arab mili-tary juggernaut.

The Soviet actions have seriously shaken public con-
fidence in Secretary Kissinger's judgment that the
Soviet leaders are prepared to organize and cooperate in
a new international system based on "stability and per-
manence". But authorities claim that Soviet behavior
during the War was, in fact, a vindication of the admin-
istration's detente policy.

That the Soviet Union had engaged in clearly ag-
gressive behavior merely reflected, they explain, the
temporary predominance of "hawkish" influence in the

SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

(Pravda, Oct. 8, 1973 p. I)

Due to the absence of a political settlement,
armed conflict resulting in loss of human life, dis-
aster and destruction has again broken out in the
Near East.

The peoples of the world, who greeted the re-
cent process of international detente with relief,
are again faced with a dangerous development of
events.

It is no secret to any one that the cause of the
situation that has arisen in the Near East lies in
the expansionist policy of Israeli ruling circles.

For several years now Israel, enjoying the sup-
port and protection of imperialist circles, has been
constantly aggravating the situation in the Near
East with its rash, aggressive actions...

Israel recently concentrated considerable num-
bers of armed forces along the ceasefire line with
Syria and Egypt, called up its reservists and, hav-
ing exacerbated the situation to the breaking
point, **launched military operations.** (*Emphasis
supplied*)

What is taking place now in the Near East forci-
bly confirms the indisputable truth that it is im-
possible to eliminate this hotbed of constant ten-
sion and to establish a reliable and guaranteed
peace for all the states and peoples of this region
without the complete liberation of all Arab territo-
ries occupied by Israel and without ensuring the
legitimate rights of the Arab people of
Palestine. (Emphasis supplied)

The Soviet Union, true to its principled policy of
support for peoples striving for freedom and inde-
pendence, consistently emerges as a reliable
friend of the Arab states.

Politburo. Because Secretary Kissinger eventually was
summoned to Moscow, and a Soviet-American cease-
fire was imposed, they credit U.S. detente policy with
having enabled the Politburo "doves" to establish their
line. This is presumably the logic behind President Nix-
on's statement during his news conference on Oct. 26,
1973, that, "Without detente we might have had a major
conflict in the Middle East. With detente, we avoided
it."

The Administration's enormous political investment
in detente now requires that the Secretary of State press
for a quick resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict to
avoid further Soviet-American confrontations. All
other policy considerations—including the matter of
Israel's security and the pursuit of a true and lasting
peace in the Middle East—have been devalued to pro-
tect the investment in detente.

## The "Two-Stage" Arab Strategy and Dr. Kissinger's Understandings

One assumes that Secretary of State Kissinger is familiar with the basic "two-stage" strategy underlying Arab policy toward Israel since 1967. This policy was succinctly formulated by Mohammed Heykal, then editor of the semi-official *Al Ahram*, on Feb. 25, 1971:

> Arab policy at this stage has but two objectives. The first, the elimination of the traces of the 1967 aggression through an Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied that year. The second objective is the elimination of the traces of the 1948 aggression, by means of the elimination of the State of Israel itself.

While no doubt disagreeing with Heykal's "second objective", Dr. Kissinger realizes that it was the insistence of the Arab states on an Israeli commitment to complete withdrawal as a *pre-condition* for any negotiations which led to the failure of previous diplomatic initiatives. His current diplomatic success derives from his pragmatic acceptance of this basic Arab condition; from his "understanding" with Sadat to secure an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory without direct, substantive negotiations between the beligerents.

This specific Arab perception of the "understanding" is the basis of Dr. Kissinger's breakthrough in the Arab world. It is also the basis of Sadat's statement, made in Algiers on Jan. 22, 1974, that "the United States has adopted a new policy, that there is a significant—though not total—change." (Total change, in this context, would mean an acceptance by the United States of stage two of Heykal's scenario.)

A revealing article by Ihsan 'Abd al-Quddus, editor-in-chief of Cairo's *Akhbar Al-Yawm* (Feb. 9, 1974), and one of President Anwar Sadat's intimate collaborators, responded to Libyan and Syrian charges that Egypt had abandoned her Arab allies in its quest for a military disengagement. He wrote:

> "Kissinger deals with Syria in the same way he deals with Egypt ... Kissinger has formulated his idea of the line that will separate the Syrian and Israeli forces ... this line is identical with the line suggested by Syria. As he did with Egypt, Kissinger intends to summon Moshe Dayan to agree with him on this line ... if no agreement is reached, then firing will be resumed."

Al-Quddus asserts that the indirect Arab-Israel disengagement negotiations were of little real significance. First with Egypt, and then with Syria, agreement on an Israeli withdrawal was worked out between the Arab heads of state and Secretary of State Kissinger. Only then does it fall to Secretary Kissinger to induce the Israelis to accept this prearranged and prenegotiated settlement.

## The Arabs On Negotiations, Recognition And Peace

The Arabs have been remarkably frank about their objectives. They have repeatedly stated that they regard the Geneva Peace Conference as nothing more or less than the instrumentality by which Israel is to be compelled to comply with their demands (e.g., *New York Times*, Dec. 11, 1973). The mere fact that Arab and Israeli negotiators happen to be "gathered" in the same hall, they declare, does not imply Arab recognition of Israel.

The Arabs are at Geneva not because their feelings of inferiority have been assuaged by success in October, and not because they have had a fundamental change of heart concerning Israel's right to exist, but because they believe that their "understanding" with Secretary Kissinger commits him to secure an Israeli withdrawal from virtually all occupied Arab territory without their having to negotiate directly with the Israelis. In fact, when President Qaddafi of Libya recently recanted on his earlier criticism of President Sadat and publicly embraced him, it was in belated recognition of these facts.

Not only have the Arabs failed to reconcile themselves to Israel's existence, but also the combination of Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy, the unexpected effectiveness of the oil weapon, and their own temporary and limited military successes during the Yom Kippur War have strengthened their belief that Israel's ultimate destruction is assured.

More sophisticated in their approach to influencing international public opinion than in the past, they now refrain from calling openly for Israel's destruction and employ instead a euphemism: the need for "restoring the national rights of the Palestinian people". These rights, as defined by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which at the 1973 Algiers Conference was recognized by the Arab states as the sole legitimate spokesman of the Palestinian people, include the establishment of an Arab Palestine and the expulsion of all Jews who arrived in Palestine after 1917.

## Reversal on Policy: Can The U.S. Outbid Russia?

Against this background, the recent sharp turn in America's Middle East policy has put her on a course that can lead to tragic consequences for all the parties concerned, except perhaps for the Soviet Union.

The Administration is involved in an obvious attempt to prove to the Arab states that only America can deliver what they want. America appears prepared to attempt to coerce Israel into major concessions—concessions that could increase her vulnerability to any future round of Middle East war. In response to pressures, threats and promises from the United States, Israel may be induced to limit substantially her ability and alienable right to defend herself from aggression; to

entrust her very survival once again to unilateral, bilateral or international "guarantees" or to other unenforceable contrivances that have invariably proven worthless when put to the test.

## KISSINGER MEETS HAIKAL

(Excerpts from Al-Anwar, Nov. 16, 1973)

During the visit to Cairo early in November of Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State met Muhammad Hassanian Haikal, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Ahram, and the two men had on November 7 what Haikal described as a "frank discussion", quoted in his weekly column in Al-Ahram over a week later. This quote of Dr. Kissinger is excerpted from Al-Anwar (Beirut) which reproduced the column on November 16.

**Dr. Kissinger:** "This time you (the Arabs) have behaved differently from 1967. In 1967 you set the world against us... In this way you destroyed any desire on the part of the United States to perform a role it felt itself capable of performing.

"In 1973 President Sadat behaved more quietly and, whether or not we were wrong, you made it possible for us to perform a role we desired to perform and felt ourselves capable of performing. The USSR can give you arms, but the United States can give you a just solution which will give you back your territories, especially as you have been able to really change the situation in the Middle East." (Emphasis supplied)

But even should Israel agree to withdraw from much of the territory occupied by the Arab states prior to June 5, 1967, and to make other concessions demanded by the United States, the Middle East conflict would not be resolved.

Events of recent months simply underscore the lesson of repeated failures during the past 25 years, and demonstrate once again that the United States cannot outbid the Soviet Union in wooing Arab favor at Israel's expense.

For example, when the President remarked at the White House in Nov. 1973, that, to achieve peace, Israel will have to withdraw from some of the territory under her control since 1967, Mr. Brezhnev immediately countered with the declaration that in any forthcoming negotiations Israel, and only Israel, will have to make the concessions. Moreover, the Soviet leader threatened that unless Israel quickly surrenders to all Arab demands, the Middle East and the world will face an even more "explosive" crisis—that is, the prospect of direct Soviet military intervention and nuclear confrontation with America. The ante has been raised. The Soviets again have outbid the U.S.

In addition, soon after the Secretary of State's efforts produced acquiescence from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Israel for negotiations in Geneva, the Kremlin leaders announced a new and far-reaching stance: that Yasir Arafat and the P.L.O. terrorist movement must be considered the sole voice of the Palestinian people.

This Soviet response undermined America's Geneva peace initiative, strengthened immeasurably the most intractable elements in the Arab world, and insured future tension in the area.

If Mr. Arafat and the P.L.O. are to be the only voice of the Palestinian people, how can Israel and Jordan proceed to meaningful negotiation of their differences? Moreover, any peace settlement achieved between Jordan and Israel would still leave Mr. Arafat and his P.L.O. terrorists to keep the Middle East pot boiling—with the support and encouragement of the Soviets.

Finally, this new Soviet declaration denies the right of self-determination and dictates the future for the majority of authentic Palestinians living in Jordan and on the West Bank. Their fate would now be in the hands of Mr. Arafat's terrorist movement and its Soviet patrons.

The United States should have learned from the abject failure of the "Rogers Plan" of Dec. 1969, and other similar ventures, that any American initiative that rests on coercing Israel into concessions favoring the Arab states only pushes the Soviets into an even more uncompromisingly pro-Arab stance. The Arab regimes are encouraged, or even forced, to adopt ever more militant and unyielding postures, the U.S. ultimately remains as far as ever from pleasing them, and the Middle East is moved further away from peace than before.

The Soviet Union, which sees Israel as a real barrier to its attainment of hegemony over the entire Middle East, can always outbid America in wooing Arab favor at Israel's expense.

## USSR REPORTEDLY PRESSING ARAFAT TO NEGOTIATE

Beirut, Jan. 12 (AFP) The Soviet Union has asked the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Yasir Arafat, to follow Egypt's example and negotiate with Israel ... the Beirut daily newspaper Ad-Diyar reported yesterday.

The paper said the Soviet leaders said they would press as hard as possible for the PLO to be the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people at the peace conference. The message continued:

> There is a Palestinian land which Israel will evacuate. The United States is working to make King Husayn of Jordan the representative of your people. **This we cannot accept, and we promise you that we will always be at your side.**

*(Emphasis supplied)*

## AUCTION

In any geo-political auction, the party seeking peace and stability, i.e., the United States, cannot outbid the party seeking tension and instability, i.e., the Soviet Union. Tension and instability are easily promoted—requiring only that one side be encouraged to reject compromise and concessions. But to achieve peace and stability requires that both sides agree to make concessions and compromises.

## If Israel Disappeared

It has been suggested that the United States might reconsider its basic Middle East policy, jettison its relationship with Israel and go all out for Arab favor and friendship. But the abhorrent immorality of such a policy shift, with its potential for encouraging Arab genocide against the Jews of Israel, is not the only reason for its rejection.

The fact is that the Arab governments, so called "revolutionary" as well as conservative, are authoritarian military dictatorships, feudal or semi-feudal monarchies, dominated by ruling oligarchies that have proven unable to solve the problem of orderly and peaceful succession to power. Assassination, coup and counter-coup constitute the routine method of transferring power from one ruling group to another. Nor does the historical record provide any basis to expect that a new ruling group will accept or honor the commitments of its deposed predecessors.

This instability casts great doubt on the viability of an American Middle East policy based exclusively on a pro-Arab orientation.

More importantly, even if the United States should adopt a completely pro-Arab position, she would still be in confrontation with Soviet aspirations in the Middle East. The Soviets will not sit idly by, nor are they unprepared for such a self-defeating U.S. effort—as Mr. Gromyko's recent tour of major Arab capitals demonstrates.

The ultimate reality, of course, is that the Soviets would be in the Middle East if there was no Arab-Israel conflict—even if Israel did not exist.

In fact, the Kremlin's operational headquarters for subversion in Aden (South Yemen) already controls the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), and is using Russian arms and training to promote unrest throughout the Persian Gulf area.

Were Israel eliminated as a political and military force in the region, the Arab states themselves would be sharply divided into hostile camps. Egypt would likely attempt to benefit from a "neutralist" role, but Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf sheikdoms, Jordan and Lebanon would seek American protection against Soviet-supported aggressive, militant states such as Syria, Iraq, South Yemen and others—and against Soviet-supported so-called "revolutionary" and terrorist movements.

The Arab states on "our side" would require direct, large-scale military support, including American troops, in order to survive aggression and subversion promoted by the U.S.S.R.

In effect, the United States would see a replication of the tragic Indo-China scenario.

Short of direct and active U.S. involvement, the Middle East would come under total Soviet domination—even without the use of Soviet troops. The Russians would have a stranglehold on the jugular of Persian Gulf oil. Iran and Turkey, despite their wishes, would be "Finlandized", as would in fact the heartland of Europe. The U.S. would be effectively isolated.

It is this basic Middle East confrontation between Soviet imperial ambitions and western security which marks as futile and short-sighted the U.S. maneuvers which undermine the basic security of a strong and dependable ally, Israel, just as they undermine the vital interests and credibility of the U.S.

## The "Nixon Doctrine" Breached

In repeated "State of the World" messages to the Congress, the President has emphasized that United States policy is to strengthen her friends and allies to the point where they will be capable of defending themselves, assisted only by American arms shipments and deterrence against attack by a nuclear power. In these messages and in other public statements, the President has made it very clear that the "Nixon Doctrine" seeks to avoid the catastrophic pitfalls of the Indo-China involvement by restricting America's commitments to those of our allies who have the social and economic infrastructure, the will, determination and capability to defend themselves.

## RELATIONS ARE DEVELOPING

*(Pravda, Sept. 19, 1973, p. 4)*

A delegation of the Central Executive Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Persian Gulf was in the U.S.S.R. Sept. 9-18 at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity committee...

**Questions concerning the further development of bilateral cooperation were discussed during the talks in the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. (Emphasis supplied)**

Members of the delegation expressed gratitude to the Soviet people for their constant support of the Arab peoples in their just struggle for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression and for the aid rendered to the anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf zone...

The Soviet side reaffirmed the Soviet peoples' unswerving solidarity with the struggle waged by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Persian Gulf for freedom, national independence and social progress. *(Tass)*

Among all the states of the Middle East today, Israel is America's only friend and ally who meets all these tests. It has long been understood that Israel plays a vital role in preserving the security of the free world. It was for this reason and not, as Arab spokesmen have claimed, because of a powerful Israel lobby, that successive American administrations have supported Israel. It is ironic, therefore, that faced with its first real challenge, the credibility of the "Nixon Doctrine" has been breached by its original sponsors.

If America persists in wooing Arab favor at the expense of Israel's ability to defend herself, if she imperils Israel's security by forcing her back to the indefensible pre-June 1967 Armistice lines or some approximation thereof, America will only be inviting further aggression. The "Nixon Doctrine" and the thrust of recent initiatives are clearly contradictory. And this contradiction can only confuse America's friends and dangerously mislead her adversaries.

## ON PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(From an Address by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Congressional Record, Wednesday, Dec. 19, 1973)

One hears a great deal these days, from people whose vision is shorter even than their memories, about the wisdom of international guarantees as a means of assuring Israel's security. I can't imagine a more misdirected policy than to ask Israel, which has been the model of the self-reliant ally, to transform itself into an American dependency. There are few situations in the world that are more volatile than the Middle East, few places so endowed with an abundance of mischievous elements and unbridled passions. For the United States to pour itself into that cauldron of instability, along with the Russians and assorted other forces, is to invite a multitude of mischief makers to try their hand at stirring the pot.

Much of the history of international guarantees is the history of countries who have lost their territory, their freedom and even their sons and daughters. It is the history of nations drawn into conflicts that would have been better contained. It is a history that the Israelis, for their reasons, and we, for ours, ought to do everything possible to avoid.

Give the Israelis the tools they need to provide for their own defense and I am confident that, with defensible borders, they will provide for their own security. Give them guarantees instead, and we will inevitably end up joining them in a quagmire of instability.

## Will Detente Change The Rules Of The Game?

But Secretary Kissinger believes that through detente he is changing the rules of the game, that a new international system based upon Soviet-American cooperation

marks a turning point in modern history, and that American support for Israel is no longer as vital as it once was. When President Nixon refers, as he so often does, to the "new stable structure of peace being built in our time", he too is referring to detente.

Yet, the basic agreement arrived at between the President of the United States and the Soviet leaders at their 1972 Moscow Summit, and expressed in their "Declaration of Intent", stipulated that both powers: would actively discourage their allies and clients from resorting to force; inform each other immediately of any signs that these allies or clients were contemplating war; and cooperate immediately, bi-laterally and in the United Nations to prevent or quickly terminate any armed incursions or acts of war that occurred despite their efforts. And, of course, they themselves would refrain completely from direct combat intervention in areas like the Middle East.

These understandings and commitments are the basic building blocks of the "detente" which Americans had presumed was in effect. But despite their solemn undertakings in the "Declaration of Intent", the Soviets failed completely to meet their clear obligations on three of the four key points: they did nothing to discourage their Arab clients from resorting to force; they did not inform the U.S. of the advance preparation and planning for war (in which they played an active and essential role); and they refused to support America's efforts for a U.N. cease-fire when the war started. Finally, they even threatened direct intervention.

Despite the alleged detente, Soviet behavior in 1973 was clearly more aggressive than in 1967. This time the Soviets not only carried out a massive arms re-supply to Egypt and Syria in the midst of the War itself, but for the first time also openly urged Iraq, Algeria and other Arab countries to join the war against Israel — pointedly reminding them that sophisticated Soviet weaponry had been provided to them for this specific purpose.

Notwithstanding the Secretary of State's commitment to detente, these facts are impossible to reconcile with his news conference statement on Oct. 12, 1973, in which he said of the Soviet role:

> "If you compare their conduct in this crisis to their conduct in 1967, one has to say that Soviet behavior has been less provocative, less incendiary, and less geared to military threats, than in the previous crisis."

## Temporary, Tactical Accommodation

Soviet involvement and behavior in the Mid-East crisis grievously disappointed a hopeful world. But leading Sovietologists had never considered the recent relaxation in Soviet policy as more than temporary, a tactical rather than a strategic change, prompted by a number of factors: the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship, the continuing Soviet agricultural crisis, and

the inability of Soviet industry to produce the tech-
nologically sophisticated equipment obtainable only in
the West. It was these considerations, and not any
alleged conflict between Kremlin "hawks" and "doves"
which brought about a temporary Soviet-American rap-
prochement.

Moreover, in the absence of significant internal
transformation of the Soviet system itself, it is clear that
Soviet-American relations will continue within their
traditional adversary context—with the Soviet Union
exploiting temporary "detentes" to improve its position
vis-a-vis the West. At a time when the Soviet Navy is
establishing itself more firmly in the Indian Ocean, and
when the general strategic balance is shifting from
Soviet-American parity to Soviet superiority, American
support for Israel is more vital than ever for America's
own national interest. The Soviet Union cannot be
allowed, under the cover of detente, to build up her
military and economic position to the point where vital
American interests in the Middle East and elsewhere
are seriously undermined.

“FRANKLY SPEAKING”

(Excerpts from column of Mohammad Heykal, Al-Ahram, Jan. 4, 1974)

U.S. policy... is trying to convince the Arabs to accept a major role for the United States in the attempts to settle the Middle East crisis. To prove this, I might relate a part of what occurred at the famous meeting between U.S. President Richard Nixon and four Arab foreign ministers. This meeting took place in the White House on 17 October while war was raging in the Middle East...

As previously agreed among the foreign minis-
ters, Saudi Foreign Minister 'Umar as-Saqqaf was
the spokesman. The Saudi minister presented the
Arab viewpoint quickly and calmly. President Nix-
on replied. Among the things he said was that the
United States was ready to exert its influence to
solve the crisis after the cease-fire was estab-
lished.

Nixon said: "I have authorized Dr. Kissinger to play a leading role in the name of the United States to solve this serious crisis which has reached the level of war—a war in which you have fought honorably and expressed your position. Therefore, you face the solution without the inferiority complexes which resulted from your failure in the 1967 defeat by Israel."

President Nixon then turned toward Henry Kissinger and pointed at the Secretary of State as if introducing him to the four Arab ministers and said:

"Here is Henry Kissinger ... He has already succeeded in solving our problems with the Soviet Union and China and has succeeded in solving the Vietnam problem. He has succeeded in all this. He is determined to keep his record of success. He has won half of the Nobel peace prize. He does not want to lose his right to this prize. I want you to deal with him."

Diplomacy Of Ambiguities And
Secret Understandings

It is essential to recognize that Secretary of State Kissinger is not a practitioner of the Wilsonian doctrine of "open covenants openly arrived at". On the contrary, despite his flair for publicity and his constant presence in the international limelight, his is a diplomacy "from chancellery to chancellery", of ambiguities, of secret understandings and closed summits—in which public statements or semi-public assurances are sometimes made as much to mislead as to inform.

This type of diplomacy, unencumbered by the con-
straints of public opinion, may be capable of achieving
spectacular short-term results, especially when pursued
by a practitioner as capable as Secretary Kissinger—but
it does not build genuine public understanding of the
issues. And a democracy, like America, cannot exercise
the power at its command, nor can it conduct an effec-
tive foreign policy if that policy is not broadly under-
stood and supported by the commitment of its people.

A dictatorship, like the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, is uninhibited by such democratic constraints, and is capable of sudden, violent policy shifts—and therefore is hardly a reliable long-term partner.

As long as the Soviet Union remains a closed society, committed to a hostile ideology, genuine Soviet-American detente is impossible. Even Dr. Kissinger's vaunted personal diplomacy, relying heavily upon secret understandings and dramatic summit meetings is hardly likely to produce durable accommodations in such a setting. True detente, which a troubled world sorely needs, can only come about when ideas and people, as well as commodities, are allowed to circulate freely between East and West.

While genuine detente and a fundamental restructur-
ing of the international order ultimately cannot be sepa-
rated from the basic domestic structures prevailing in
different societies, sensible and realistic policies can
limit confrontation and promote mutual accommoda-
tion in areas of international tension. But sensible,
realistic policies require the development of an in-
formed public will—and they definitely preclude
**unilateral** concessions for **illusory** detente, or other
futile acts of appeasement.

Much as the world wants and needs peace, accom-
modation and not confrontation, this fundamental
reality directly affects the future of freedom in the
world. If the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy strategy
depreciates this reality, far from providing for a genera-
tion of peace, it may succeed merely in lulling the West
into a false sense of security and in providing the Soviet
Union with a cover for her aggression. For the United
States, as for Europe and Israel, the current version of
detente policy could easily end in catastrophe.

Looking Toward Geneva

Against this complex background of regional and
global problems, there is little ground for optimism that
the negotiations planned for Geneva, if they do in fact

take place, will produce the true and lasting peace that
the people of the Middle East so urgently need.

While Israel needs and wants a secure and permanent
settlement with her neighbors, the Arab states appear to
regard the Geneva proceedings primarily as the political
continuation of the October War. The Russians are
committed to backing all Arab demands to the hilt,
while the United States is primarily concerned with the
preservation of detente, or at least its illusion.

Yet the negotiations in Geneva can be made to have
real meaning for the people of the Middle East and the
world if true Arab-Israeli reconciliation is made their
overriding objective.

As a preliminary step, both the United States and the
Soviet Union must finally recognize the inevitable
futility of excessive Big Power intervention in a process
of peacemaking that concerns the vital long-term in-
terests of the nations of the area. By their actions and by
their pronouncements, the Soviet Union and the United
States must encourage and allow the leaders of Egypt,
Syria, Jordan and Israel to engage in real negotiations,
not a charade in which the two super-powers dominate
and control the proceedings either covertly or openly.

"The time has passed in which great nations can dic-
tate to small nations their future where their vital in-
terests are involved." (March 4, 1969).

This direct quotation of President Nixon remains
true today. Consequently, Americans should look for-
ward to hearing again, in credible and convincing terms,
that the U.S. is steadfast in her resolve to insure that if
and when, at long last, leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan
and Israel finally meet at the conference table, they will

meet as representatives of sovereign states and not as
subjects for manipulation by the Soviet Union and the
United States.

Furthermore, the United States and the Soviet Union
should jointly reaffirm in an open, public declaration,
their agreement that neither superpower will commit
any of its combat forces or nuclear weapons into the
Middle East. Such a joint declaration would defuse the
threat of an infinitely dangerous confrontation. It is an
essential step in restoring a world atmosphere in which
meaningful peace negotiations can take place among the
states of the Middle East.

Such a declaration would not, by itself, be sufficient
to insure successful Arab-Israel peace negotiations; but
failure to make that declaration could insure the failure
of this long-sought process. Indeed, from the conduct
and outcome of the Geneva talks, Americans will know
better the kind of world we face and how best to con-
duct the nation's affairs.

Once and for all, the Soviet Union must abandon her
deliberate policy of maintaining and promoting Mid-
East tensions. The United States and the Soviet Union
must not intrude, either as advocates or adversaries,
into the peacemaking process. Both superpowers must
finally subordinate their competing interests to the
urgent needs of Middle East peace.

Only if the U.S. and Russia demonstrate such true
mutual restraint, can Israel and the Arab states possibly
engage in free and untrammeled negotiations toward a
genuine resolution of their differences. Geneva, then,
could mark a turning point in the tragic history of the
Mid-East. It could also mark a new beginning for the
battered spirit of detente.

H.M.A.
E.M.G.
J.S.
A.M.S.
E.W.
3/15/74

EPHRAIM KISHON
ISRAELS PROVISORISCHE BILANZ

Im allgemeinen schaukelt
der Israeli entweder auf
einer Woge überschäu-
menden Selbstvertrauens – oder er kriecht
auf allen vieren im Schlamm der Selbst-
erniedrigung umher. Dazwischen gibt es
nichts. Der Durchschnitts-Israeli hat die
Kunst des Verlierens nicht gelernt. Deshalb
bastelt er seit dem Jom-Kippur-Krieg an den
finstersten Untergangsvisionen, hört nur
noch auf Kassandrarufe und sucht ständig
nach Schuldtragenden, die ihm das peinliche
Gefühl abnehmen könnten, dass auch er
selbst an der Entwicklung der Dinge mit-
schuldig ist.

Nun, alle sind mitschuldig. Aber müssen
wir deshalb gleich böse auf uns werden?

Bitte sehr. Vielleicht ist das ein ganz ge-
sundes Bedürfnis. Sehen wir also zu, wie es
um unsere Schlechtpunkte bestellt ist.

Zunächst müssen wir eingestehen, dass
die Araber, obwohl sie auf dem Schlacht-
feld auch diesmal den kürzeren zogen, den-
noch einen wesentlichen Erfolg zu verzeich-
nen hatten. Sie haben es fertiggebracht,
unsere Position nicht nur im Nahen Osten,
sondern in der ganzen Welt zu erschüttern.
Sie haben bewiesen, dass man auch be-
festigte Abwehrstellungen erobern und sogar
israelische Soldaten gefangennehmen kann.
Ihr eigenliches Kriegsziel, nämlich Israel zu
vernichten, haben sie allerdings nicht er-

reicht. Ebensowenig ist es ihnen gelungen,
die «legitimen Rechte des palästinensischen
Volkes» durchzusetzen, oder mit anderen
Worten: uns auszurotten. (Was sie durch
den Einsatz ihrer offenen Geheimwaffe Oel
erreicht haben oder noch erreichen werden,
steht auf einem anderen Blatt; hier ist von
der direkten Auseinandersetzung zwischen
3 Millionen Israeli und 100 Millionen Ara-
bern die Rede.)

Ein weiterer Gutpunkt für die Araber be-
steht darin, dass uns jeder einzelne unserer
Soldaten, dass uns jedes junge Leben am
Herzen liegt. Das ist sowohl in militärischer
wie in politischer Hinsicht eine bedenkliche
Schwäche. In Syrien zum Beispiel scheint es
keine Mütter zu geben.

Und nun zum grössten militärischen und
politischen Erfolg unserer arabischen Vet-
tern: ihr Grosser Bruder ist stärker als der
unsere. Sie stützen sich auf eine Supermacht
& Co., wir stützen uns auf eine Supermacht
mit beschränkter Haftung. Nicht als ob die
amerikanischen Machtmittel geringer wären
als die des Friedenslagers, das nicht. Aber
Russland hat es leichter, zornig zu werden,
schon weil niemand den Genossen Bresch-
njew zur Ablieferung von Tonbändern zwin-
gen kann. Russland ist jederzeit in der Lage,
Druck auszuüben, während Amerika sich
damit begnügt, dem Druck zu widerstehen.
Man nennt dieses Gesellschaftsspiel «Gleich-

gewicht der Kräfte». Die wichtigste Spiel-
regel besteht darin, dass der eine Partner
macht, was er will, und der andere im ge-
gebenen Augenblick die Achseln zuckt und
sagt: «Da kann man leider nichts machen.»
Erinnern wir uns nur an die Zeit, als die
Aegypter ihre Raketenbasen unter Verlet-
zung aller feierlichen Vereinbarungen im-
mer weiter nach vorn rückten und als wir
«Gewalt!» schrienen. Auch damals konnte
man leider nichts machen.

Professor Kissinger, auch Düsen-Henry genannt,
ist eine der intelligente-
sten Intercontinental-Raketen, die sich je-
mals in Betrieb gesetzt haben. Wir hoffen,
dass er trotz seiner jüdischen Abstammung
unser Freund ist und dass er es uns nicht
allzu übel genommen hat, als wir uns wei-
gerten, die von uns eingekesselte dritte
ägyptische Armee ausser mit Nahrungsmit-
teln und Medikamenten auch noch mit Mu-
nition zu versorgen. Trotzdem können wir
uns nicht ganz der Befürchtung erwehren,
dass er an einer Art «Brücke über den
Kwai»-Komplex leidet. Im Mittelpunkt die-
eses Films steht bekanntlich ein stolzer briti-
scher Oberst, dem alle körperlichen und see-
lichen Qualen der japanischen Gefangen-
schaft nichts anhaben können. Allmählich
freundet er sich mit den Japanern an, und
nachdem er gemeinsam mit ihnen eine
Brücke über den River Kwai gebaut hat, ist
er um die Aufrechterhaltung dieser kon-
struktiven Zusammenarbeit so sehr besorgt,
dass er sich anschickt, auf die amerikani-
schen Soldaten zu schiessen, die seine Brücke
sprengen wollen. Erst im allerletzten Augen-
blick wird ihm klar, was mit ihm vorgegan-
gen ist, aber da erscheint auf der Leinwand
bereits das Wort «Ende».

Mit Professor Kissinger scheint es sich
ähnlich zu verhalten. Er sieht nicht, oder
will nicht sehen, dass der russische Bär, der
ihn unter der Chiffre «Entspannung» herz-
haft umarmt, ihm zugleich den Boden unter
den Füssen abgräbt. Schon steht der eine
Teil Europas unerschütterlich unter sowjeti-
scher Herrschaft und der andere Teil unter
der drohenden Peitsche der arabischen Oel-
scheichs, schon bereiten sich in den von
Amerika dem Frieden überlassenen Län-
dern wie Südvietnam und Kambodscha die
nächsten kommunistischen Siege vor, die
weitere Einbussen für die freie Welt mit
sich bringen werden. Das alles geht zu La-
sten Israels. Und die Vereinigten Staaten lä-
cheln dazu. Sie haben Angst um die Brücke.
Wahrscheinlich kann der Westen nur von
China gerettet werden.

Noch rasch ein paar Worte über jene selt-
samen Staatsmänner, für die sich die Exi-
stenz eines kleinen Volkes auf die Frage der
Zentralheizung reduziert. Seien wir uns doch
endlich klar darüber, dass der Kniefall West-
europas vor dem arabischen Oel und die
schändliche Preisgabe Hollands eine zyni-
sche Wiederholung des Münchner Verrats
von 1938 ist... Na ja. Warum soll man
auch wegen der lächerlichen Tschechoslo-
wakei das klaglose Funktionieren der öffent-
lichen Verkehrsmittel aufs Spiel setzen.

Aber Israel ist keine Tschechoslowakei.
Und von dieser Voraussetzung ausgehend,
wollen wir nunmehr mit der Aufzählung
unserer Gutpunkte beginnen.

Selbst die tiefste nationale Verzweiflung, in die wir uns jetzt den Arabern gegenüber hineinmanövrieren könnten, würde nichts daran ändern, dass wir ziemlich knapp an ihre Hauptstädte herangekommen sind, 35 Kilometer an Damaskus und 70 Kilometer an Kairo; dass wir den Griff an ihrer Kehle hatten, nicht sie an der untern; dass wir in der Lage waren, ihre hoffnungslos umzingelten Streitkräfte mit Nahrungsmiteln und Medizin zu versorgen, nicht umgekehrt; kurzum: dass wir militärisch die Oberhand gewonnen hatten. Wir, die überfallen, im Gebet überraschten, unvorbereiteten, nachlässigen, arroganten Bewohner eines winzigen Landes sind zum vierten Mal von einer überlegenen Vielzahl feindlicher Mächte herausgefordert worden und haben die Herausforderung bestanden. Und ohne die panische Intervention des Computers aus Washington hätten wir unsere Angst- und Existenzgrenze noch weiter verschoben und gefestigt.

Zugegeben: es gab da eine Legende, dass
die israelische Armee unbesiegbar sei. Das
müssen wir richtigstellen. Es ist keine Le-
gende, sondern eine Tatsache. Man kann
uns Verluste zufügen und die tun weh, man
kann uns grüne und blaue Flecken schlagen,
aber man kann uns nicht von der Land-
karte streichen. Wir sind keine Tschecho-
slowakei.

Es trifft auch nicht zu, dass wir die Sym-
pathien der ganzen Welt verloren hätten.
Die Welt ist noch immer zum weitaus gröss-
ten Teil für uns. Gegen uns sind nur die
Regierungen. Das Publikum spendet uns
Beifall, die Kritiker verreissen uns. Aber
man soll das Publikum nicht unterschätzen.

Und sogar vom Standpunkt der Araber
aus betrachtet: ist ihre Lage wirklich so her-
vorragend? Waren sie nicht auch ein wenig
überrascht von der Art, wie wir diese neue
Krise gemeistert und in welcher kurzen Zeit
wir uns von den anfänglichen militärischen
Rückschlägen erholt hatten? Waren sie auf
die energische Unterstützung, die uns Ameri-
ka im kritischen Augenblick angedeihen
liess, gefasst? Sie waren es ebensowenig wie
die Russen. Und wie wir selbst.

Wenn ich ein Araber wäre, würde ich
mich mit gemischten Gefühlen fragen, ob
diese trotzigen Juden nicht vielleicht darauf
aus sind, sich in einer nächsten Runde für
die Erniedrigung zu rächen, die wir ihnen
an ihrem heiligsten Feiertag zugefügt haben.
Denn möglicherweise haben auch Juden ein
Ehrgefühl, auf dem man nicht ungestraft
herumtrampeln darf.

An dieser Stelle unterbricht
mich der ungeduldige Le-
ser: «Wovon reden Sie
eigentlich, Herr? Wer plant eine nächste
Runde? Wer legt Wert auf Siege,?»

Lieber Leser, dies alles habe ich eben des-
halb geschrieben, damit es keine nächsten
Runden und keine Siege mehr gibt. Aber
auch den Frieden muss man erst gewinnen.
Es ist eine alte historische Erfahrung, dass
bei Verhandlungen über einen gerechten
Frieden alle erdenklichen Faktoren ins Kal-
kül gezogen werden, nur einer nicht: die
Gerechtigkeit. Ein starkes, selbstbewusstes,
vielleicht gar übertrieben selbstbewusstes
Israel wird eines Tags zu fairen Abmachun-
gen mit seinen Nachbarn gelangen. Ein jam-
merndes, entmutigtes Israel wird von seinen
Feinden wie von seinen Freunden ins un-
terste Regal der Weltgeschichte gestossen
werden. Dabei kommt es im globalen Poker-
spiel weniger auf den Beweis von Stärke an
als vielmehr auf den Beweis, dass man zu
wirklicher Wut fähig ist, dass man bereit ist,
um der Selbsterhaltung willen sogar Wahn-
sinnstaten zu begehen. Wer zu diesem Po-
kerspiel mit zerrütteten Nerven und man-
gelndem Selbstvertrauen antritt, hat schon
verloren. Eben diese Nervenzerrüttung, eben
dieser Mangel an Selbstvertrauen wird nun
von Ihnen, lieber Leser, verbreitet und ge-
fördert. Wünschen Sie, dass Goldas Hand
vor Aufregung zittert, wenn sie die Karten
hält? Wünschen Sie eine vor Angst bebende
Grossmutter an der Spitze Israels?

Unsere Zukunft wird sich in jenem Au-
genblick entscheiden, da Golda sich an eine
befreundete Macht wendet und mit lauter,
klarer Stimme ein einziges Wort ausspricht:

«Nein!»

«Mrs. Meir», wird ihr amerikanischer
Partner einwenden, «wenn Sie sich unserem

Diktat nicht beugen, ziehen wir unsere Un-
terstützung zurück und werfen Sie den Rus-
sen zum Frass vor.»

Und darauf wird Mrs. Meir die folgende
Antwort haben:

«Werfen Sie!»

Und wird ihrem amerikanischen Partner
starr in die Augen blicken, ohne sich zu
regen, ohne mit der Wimper zu zucken.
Denn das ist die einzige Möglichkeit, uns
die Unterstützung Amerikas für einen halt-
baren Frieden zu sichern.

Aber dazu muss ganz Israel hinter Mrs.
Meir stehen. Dazu braucht sie den Rückhalt
den nur die drei Millionen Israeli ihr geben
können, drei Millionen verrückte Anrainer
des Mittelmeers, die ihre Existenz um jeden
Preis zu verteidigen bereit sind.

Das sollten Sie, lieber Leser, und alle
Ihresgleichen sich vor Augen halten. Hören
Sie um Himmels willen mit Ihren Unken-
rufen und Ihrem Verzweiflungsgetuschel
auf. Der Krieg mit den Amerikanern hat
erst begonnen. Wir brauchen alle Kraft, um
ihm gewachsen zu sein. Jeder Vorwurf, den
man uns machen kann, den wir selbst uns
machen sollten – und davon gibt’s zweifel-
los eine ganze Menge –, ist eine Trumpf-
karte in der Hand der Araber. Jedes
Schwächezeichen, jede interne Streitigkeit,
jedes Gejammer vermindert unsere ohnehin
geringen Chancen für die friedliche Lösung,
deren wir so sehr bedürfen und die wir so
innig herbeisehnen.

Einem Volk, das um Mitleid greift, wird
nicht einmal Mitleid zugestanden. Und Ge-
rechtigkeit schon gar nicht.

(Deutsch von Friedrich Torberg)