## Nation

Committee Chairman Frank Church questioned Kissinger's reasoning: the Idaho Democrat pointed out that even when the U.S. enjoyed nuclear superiority, the Soviets were not inhibited from building the Berlin Wall or putting missiles in Cuba. Kissinger riposted softly, "They might feel less inhibited if we didn't have superiority." While concern about Soviet superiority had been raised by other witnesses, such as the Joint Chiefs, it carried extra weight coming from Kissinger. Just five years ago, he declared: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it?" But last week he recanted, explaining that the

statement had been made "after an exhausting negotiation" and that it "reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis." When New York's Jacob Javits later referred to this change of heart, Kissinger jokingly alluded to his famous ego, saying that this confession of error was "a historic occasion."

By carefully proposing changes only in the "strategic environment," while keeping intact the painstakingly negotiated SALT II text, Kissinger was able to stress that his proposals would not require new bargaining with the Kremlin. Explicit Soviet approval would not be needed for the strictly unilateral actions sought

by Kissinger. He thus distanced himself from those Senators who have demanded fundamental revisions in the accord, such as Henry (Scoop) Jackson of Washington and Jake Garn of Utah. Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee has also been seeking major changes of the pact's provisions, but he hinted that his position might shift as a result of what he had heard from Kissinger. Kissinger indicated that he had no major worries about verifying Soviet compliance with SALT II, something that has bothered Senator John Glenn of Ohio.

From the Administration there was almost an audible sigh of relief after Kissinger.

# An Interview with Kissinger

> "They should not dispatch proxy forces, not encourage coups..."

In his Senate testimony, Henry Kissinger exhorted the Congress and Administration to join in meeting what he believes is a very real Soviet threat. In an exclusive interview with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Kissinger expanded on the strategic themes of his testimony. Excerpts:

**Q.** If, as you suggest, the Soviets have been primarily exploiting targets of opportunity rather than pursuing some detailed master plan, why do you put so much of the onus on them to resist those tempations? Why is it up to them to avoid taking advantage of opportunities that come their way, such as the turmoil in Iran?

**A.** Clearly we cannot ask the Soviet Union in effect to police the world for us by preventing situations adverse to our interests. You cannot ask the Soviet Union not to take advantage of what is in effect being handed to them. I have never accused the Soviet Union of directly causing the events in Iran. However, I believe that some of the

things the Soviet Union did contributed to a climate of insecurity that helped to demoralize the leadership of Iran and encouraged its opponents. The network of semiterrorist and guerrilla-trained organizations that the Soviet Union finances and supports has an impact on such situations. After all, Khomeini admitted—indeed avowed—that the PLO had been a major encouragement [in his revolution].

But Iran is not the principal example. The best examples of unrestrained Soviet conduct, in which they create the opportunity rather than simply reaping the harvest of our failure, are the dispatch of Cuban proxy forces to Angola and Ethiopia, the two invasions of Zaïre from Angola, the Communist coups in South Yemen and Afghanistan, and the Soviet friendship treaty with Viet Nam just prior to Viet Nam's occupation of Cambodia. Also, there's the establishment of Soviet bases in Viet Nam and military depots

in Ethiopia and Libya, the dispatch of air forces to Cuba to fly air defense missions so that the Cuban air force could operate in Africa. All of these cases are an assault on the geopolitical equilibrium.

So I'm not saying that everything that happens in the world that is adverse to our interests and which benefits the Soviet Union is up to the Soviet Union to avoid. But the Soviet Union can avoid exacerbating conflicts that may arise even if it did not cause them. That means they should not dispatch proxy forces, not encourage coups and create a general climate of insecurity, not sign friendship treaties under conditions that will lead to military operations. That burden we must assume, too, in any rational pattern of coexistence.

**Q.** Does not the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty have to be seen in the dual context of the Sino-Soviet hostility and Viet Nam's

The former Secretary of State in his Washington office

TIME. AUGUST 13, 1979

singer's appearance. Because he had given
no clue to what he intended to say, some
Carter aides had feared that the former
Secretary might propose "killer amend-
ments." After the Tuesday testimony, the
State Department said that while it did
not agree with all of Kissinger's points, it
welcomed his "general approach."

How much a strong defense will cost
is uncertain. Kissinger put no
price tag on the extra efforts that
he urged, but he cited the Joint
Chiefs' recommendation for a 5% boost
(after inflation) in the Pentagon budget.
The Administration already is committed
to an annual 3% real increase. The hike
asked for by the Joint Chiefs probably

would mean increasing the proposed 1980
defense outlays of $122.7 billion by more
than $6 billion.

This would confront the Administra-
tion with a painful choice: either cutting
civilian programs to spend more on the
military or increasing the budget deficit
and probably fueling inflation. Advocates
of higher military spending note that dur-
ing almost every year since 1968, U.S. de-
fense outlays (adjusted for inflation) ac-
tually were shrinking while the Soviet
arsenal kept expanding. But Kissinger
sees no alternative to higher spending.
Said he: "The Soviets will never agree to
unilateral reductions. If we want equal-
ity, we must build to equality."

He proposed no new weapons sys-

tems. Instead he said that the extra money
should be used to accelerate existing stra-
tegic arms programs, such as the Trident
missile and submarine, the MX mobile
ICBM and the air-launched cruise missile.
In addition, he called for improved tac-
tical nuclear weapons, expanded conven-
tional forces and a larger navy.

Although Kissinger wants the size and
shape of the extra defense effort deter-
mined before the SALT II vote, the Sen-
ate and Administration are unlikely to
move that quickly. The chances seem
good, however, that the White House will
be willing to accelerate programs for mod-
ernizing the U.S. arsenal. Said a top Ad-
ministration aide: "We'll work out the dol-
lars if that will get the treaty."

feeling of being directly threatened by China? Why was that treaty
necessarily provocative against the U.S.?

A. Of course it has to be seen in that context. But under the practical conditions at the time, the signing of that treaty had the perfectly foreseeable consequence of throwing a lighted match into a powder keg. That treaty came about when the Vietnamese army was substantially concentrated on the Cambodian frontier, so the treaty gave the Vietnamese reassurance against a Chinese reaction to their aggression in Cambodia. Now I happen to believe that the Cambodian government [of Pol Pot] was a group of genocidal murders. But that was not why the Vietnamese went into Cambodia; they went in because the Cambodian Communists wanted to be independent of Viet Nam.

The attack by Viet Nam had an enormously unsettling im-
pact on all of the other countries of Southeast Asia. Therefore it
affected our own longer-term interests. Such behavior is incom-
patible with a U.S.-Soviet relationship of genuine coexistence.

Q. What is the Soviet responsibility for the coup in Afghanistan?

A. Somebody who starts a rock slide does not have to be ac-
countable for every last rock that hits a victim. The coup was
heavily Communist in its organization, and since then the So-
viet Union has taken operational control over many aspects
of Afghan political life. That fact had an extremely unsettling
effect on the Iranian government, which interpreted our ac-
quiescence in it as potential collusion between us and the So-
viet Union in creating spheres of influence. It also had an
unsettling effect on Pakistan. I do not want to imply, though,
that there was much we could have done about it locally. But
the fact that the coup in Afghanistan seemed to have no in-
fluence on our relationship with the Soviet Union was up-
setting to others in the region.

Q. In some ways, your approach seems to suggest a version of the spheres-of-influence doctrine: the U.S. has its friends, and the Soviets have theirs, and the Soviets are not allowed to make encroachments in our areas when our friends are in trouble.

A. Look at it from another point of view. It is simply im-
possible to have rules of conduct whereby we cannot encroach
on the Soviet sphere while the Soviets exercise an unlimited
right to create turmoil in our sphere. If that's the situation, then
over a period of time the defeat of free societies is foreordained.

Q. Why can't we encroach in theirs?

A. Because we would immediately be accused of provocative
conduct involving a high risk of war. If we started engaging in
the sort of activities in Eastern Europe that the Soviets have en-

gaged in Africa, first it would lead to bloody repression,
and second we would be accused of fomenting the risk of war.

Q. Are the dangers you see permanent?

A. Not necessarily. We are in a curious position. Let's look at the future in a ten-year perspective. If we can solve our immediate problems of military security, energy and chronic unemployment caused by the rise of labor-saving technology—and I believe those problems can be solved—then I think the greater dynamism of the free societies is bound to tell. We have a major problem facing us now in setting an agenda first for the industrial democracies and second for the relationship of the industrial democracies to developing countries. I do not believe that the Communist states have an answer either to the questions about the internal structure and evolution of industrial society or to the problem of development. So I would expect that if we do our job on the immediate issues, by the late '80s we could be in a period of tremendous dynamism, while the Soviet Union could be in a period either of serious domestic crisis or at least ambivalence.

The military danger I see in the early '80s is this: I can imagine a new generation of Soviet leaders deciding that the structure of Soviet society must be changed. Look at the dramatic transformation being attempted by the post-Mao Chinese leaders in very different circumstances. Future Soviet leaders, however, may consider that they have a choice: Do they want to undertake to change the internal structure of their society with all the attendant turmoil and uncertainties while the international environment is unsettled? Or do they want to create what they might see as an absolutely safe international environment and thereby postpone the more painful domestic choices? That might mean taking advantage of their military potential, possibly toward China, in the Middle East, or perhaps even in Europe. This is why the military problem is so acute. In my judgment the Soviet Union will face that choice at the precise moment that the military balance [between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.] could be rather difficult for us and rather advantageous to them. In what I am proposing [as a strategic and military program to accompany SALT], I would like to compress the time period that is available to the Soviet Union for making that decision. That is the essence of what I have been trying to say in the Senate this week.

Q. You seem to feel if we can get over the bad period immediately
ahead, the prospect for the longer term is quite promising. That is
not the Spenglerian pessimism that is so often associated with you.

A. (Laughing) In my most Spenglerian moments, I have not
said the sorts of things about America even comparable to
what President Carter said on July 15 [in his nationally tele-
vised speech on energy].

TIME, AUGUST 13, 1979

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