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When you say, can I be pinned down to say that under no circumstances would the United States ever do anything, I would not say that, but I will say that our plans do not countenance it, we do not plan on it, and under the circumstances, I believe that the success of the operation which we have undertaken, as well as what the South Vietnamese will be able to do, will make it unnecessary.

MR. SMITH: Mr. President, one of the things that happened in the Senate last week was the rescinding of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution by the Senate. Mr. Katzenbach, in the previous administration, told the Foreign Relations Committee that resolution was tantamount to a congressional declaration of war. If it is rescinded, what legal justification do you have for continuing to fight a war that is undeclared in Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT: First, Mr. Smith, as you know, this war, while it was undeclared, was here when I became President of the United States. I do not say that critically. I am simply stating the fact that there were 549,000 Americans in Vietnam under attack when I became President.

The President of the United States has the constitutional right, not only the right, but the responsibility to use his powers to protect American forces when they are engaged in military actions, and under these circumstances, starting at the time I became President, I have that power and I am exercising that power.

MR. SMITH: Sir, I am not recommending this, but if you don't have a legal authority to wage a war, then presumably you could move troops out. It would be possible to agree with the North Vietnamese. They would be delighted to have us surrender so you could -- What justification do you have for keeping troops there other than protecting the troops that are there fighting?

THE PRESIDENT: A very significant justification. It isn't just a case of seeing that the Americans are moved out in an orderly way. If that were the case, we could move them out more quickly, but it is a case of moving American forces out in a way that we can at the same time win a just peace.

Now, by winning a just peace, what I mean is not victory over North Vietnam -- we are not asking for that -- but it is simply the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future without having us impose our will upon them, or the North Vietnamese, or anybody else outside impose their will upon them.

When we look at that limited objective, I am sure some would say, "Well, is that really worth it? Is that worth the efforts of all these Americans fighting in Vietnam, the lives that have been lost?"

I suppose it could be said that simply saving 17 million people in South Vietnam from a Communist takeover isn't worth the efforts of the United States. But let's go further. If the United States, after all of this effort, if we were to withdraw immediately, as many Americans would want us to do, and it would be very easy for me to do it and simply blame it on the previous administration, but if we were to do that, I would probably survive through my term, but it would have, in my view, a catastrophic effect on this country and the cause of peace in the years ahead.

Now I know there are those who say the domino theory is obsolete. They haven't talked to the dominoes. They should talk to the Thais, to the Malaysians, to the Singaporeans, to the Indonesians, to the Filipinos, the Japanese, and the rest. And if the United States leaves Vietnam in a way that we are humiliated or defeated, not simply speaking in what is

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called jingoistic terms, but in very practical terms, this will be immensely discouraging to the 300 million people from Japan clear around to Thailand in free Asia, and even more important, it will be ominously encouraging to the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union who are supporting the North Vietnamese. It will encourage them in their expansionist policies in other areas. The world will be much safer in which to live.

MR. SMITH: I happen to be one of those who agrees with what you are saying, but do you have a legal justification to follow that policy once the Tonkin Gulf Resolution is dead?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, sir, Mr. Smith, the legal justification is the one I have given, and that is the right of the President of the United States under the Constitution to protect the lives of American men. That is the legal justification. You may recall, of course, that we went through this same debate at the time of Korea. Korea was also an undeclared war, and then, of course, we justified it on the basis of a UN action. I believe we have a legal justification and I intend to use it.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, you have said that self-determination in South Vietnam is really our aim, and all we can ask for. The Vice President says a non-Communist future for Indochina, or Southeast Asia. His statement seems to enlarge the ultimate American aim considerably. Have we misunderstood you or has he or what is the aim?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Sevareid, when the Vice President refers to a non-Communist Southeast Asia that would mean of course, a non-Communist South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. That is the area we usually think of as Southeast Asia,

This is certainly something that I think most Americans and most of those in free Asia and most of those in the free world would think would be a desirable goal.

Let me put it another way: I do not think it would be in the interest of the United States and those who want peace in the Pacific if that part of the world should become Communist, because then the peace of the world, the peace in the Pacific, would be in my opinion very greatly jeopardized if the Communists were to go through that area.

However, referring now specifically to what we are doing in Vietnam, our aim there is a very limited one, and it is to provide for the South Vietnamese the right of self determination. I believe that when they exercise that right, they will choose a non-Communist government. But we are indicating -- and incidentally, despite what everybody says about the present government in South Vietnam, its inadequacies and the rest, we have to give them credit for the fact that they also have indicated that they will accept the result of an election, what the people choose.

Let us note the fact that the North Vietnamese are in power not as a result of an election, and have refused to indicate that they will accept the result of an election in South Vietnam, which seems to me to be a pretty good bargaining point on our side.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. President, I am a little confused at this point because you seem in vivid terms to be describing South Vietnam as the first of the string of dominoes that could topple in that part of the world and turn it into a Communist part of the world, in simple terms.

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Are you saying that we cannot survive, we cannot allow a regime or a government in South Vietnam to be constructed that would, say, lean toward the Communist bloc? What about a sort of Yugoslavia? Is there any possibility of that kind of settlement?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chancellor, it depends upon the people of South Vietnam. If the people of South Vietnam after they see what the Viet Cong -- the Communist Viet Cong have done to the villages they have occupied, the 40,000 people that they have murdered, village chiefs and others, the atrocities of Hue -- if the people of South Vietnam of which 850,000 of them are Catholic refugees from North Vietnam after a blood bath there when the North Vietnamese took over in North Vietnam-- if the people of South Vietnam under those circumstances should choose to move in the direction of a Communist government, that, of course, is their right. I do not think it will happen. But I do emphasize that the American position and the position also of the present government of South Vietnam, it seems to me, is especially strong because we are confident enough that we say to the enemy, "All right, we'll put our case to the people and we'll accept the result." If it happens to be what you describe, a Yugoslav type of government or a mixed government, we will accept it.

MR. CHANCELLOR: What I am getting at, sir, is, if you say on the one hand that Vietnam -- South Vietnam is the first of the row of dominoes which we cannot allow to topple, then can you say equally, at the same time, that we will accept the judgment of the people of South Vietnam if they choose a Communist government?

THE PRESIDENT: The point that you make, Mr. Chancellor, is one that we in the free world face every place in the world and it is really what distinguishes us from the Communist world.

Again, I know that what is called Cold War rhetoric isn't fashionable these days and I am not engaging in it because I am quite practical, and we must be quite practical, about the world in which we live with all the dangers that we have in the Mideast and other areas that I am sure we will be discussing later on in this program.

But let us understand that we in the free world have to live or die by the proposition that the people have a right to choose.

Let it also be noted that in no country in the world today in which the Communists are in power have they come to power as a result of the people choosing them -- not in North Vietnam, not in North Korea, not in China, not in Russia, and not in any one of the countries of Eastern Europe, and not in Cuba. In every case, communism has come to power by other than a free election, so I think we are in a pretty safe position on this particular point.

I think you are therefore putting, and I don't say this critically, what is really a hypothetical question. It could happen but if it does happen that way we must assume the consequences and if the people of South Vietnam should choose a communist government, then we will have to accept the consequences of what would happen as far as the domino theory in the other areas.

MR. CHANCELLOR: In other words, live with it?

THE PRESIDENT: We would have to live with it, and I would also suggest this: When we talk about the dominoes, I am not saying that automatically if South Vietnam should go the others topple one by one. I am only saying that in talking to every one of the Asian leaders -- and I have talked to all of them; I have talked to Lee Kuan Yew (all of you know him from Singapore of course), and to the Tunku from Malaysia, the little countries and to Soeharto from Indonesia, and of course to

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Thanom and Thanat Khoman, the two major leaders in Thailand -- I have talked to all of these leaders and every one of them to a man recognizes, and Sato of Japan recognizes, and of course the Koreans recognize that if the Communists succeed, not as a result of a free election -- they are not thinking of that -- but if they succeed as a result of exporting aggression and supporting it in toppling the government, then the message to them is, "Watch out, we might be next."

That's what it really is. So, if they come in as a result of a free election, and I don't think that is going to happen, the domino effect would not be as great.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, what caused the change in plans about the South Vietnamese troops remaining in Cambodia? On April 30th you said they would come out about when ours came out, and they are apparently building big bases and intend to stay. What happened in the meantime to change this?

THE PRESIDENT: When I spoke on April 30, Mr. Sevareid, I pointed out that we would be out, as you recall, and we have kept that promise, despite -- there is some speculation to the effect that we would have advisers in, or this, that, and the other. All Americans are out and, answering your earlier questions, we have no plans and have no expectation that any Americans would go back in.

With regard to the South Vietnamese, I pointed out on April 30th that our air support would stop and there would be no advisers with the South Vietnamese, that any activities of the South Vietnamese after we left would have to be on their own.

Now what they are doing in South Vietnam, and I checked this just before the program tonight as to the numbers, there are approximately 40,000 North Vietnamese in Cambodia at the present time. There are approximately 8,000 South Vietnamese. What they are doing is cleaning out some of the sanctuary areas that were not completed when we left.

They are not building substantial bases. What they are really doing is simply providing the basis on which they can stop the North Vietnamese from coming back into the sanctuary areas, and I think that is their responsibility and their right.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, to what extent are we really committed to preserving this new government in Cambodia, which is a rather shaky one. What would we do, for example, if the capital city of Cambodia is in imminent danger of getting into Communist hands?

THE PRESIDENT: It is well for us to understand exactly what our relationship to Cambodia is. Let me compare it with Thailand.

With Thailand, we have a treaty, and if Thailand comes under attack, that treaty comes into force. The same is true, of course, of Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines. Cambodia is in the same category as Indonesia. It is a neutral country. It is a nonaligned country. We have no treaty with it.

As far as Cambodia is concerned, our only commitment to Cambodia is the commitment that the United States for 190 years has had, that it's a principle of international law that a country that chooses to be neutral should have its neutrality respected.

Now that means that we are furnishing as you know small arms to them for their own defense. It means that, in addition to that, we are trying to

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give them the moral support that we can. We are supporting the initiative of the 11 Asian nations who are attempting to stand with that government in its neutrality, but as far as military support, the United States moving forces into Cambodia for the purpose of helping them defend against enemy attack -- that we are not required to do under treaty and that we do not intend to do.

MR. SMITH: Mr. President, also about Cambodia, in your last press conference, I believe you were asked what distinguished this operation from escalations that occurred in past administrations, and you said this is decisive in nature.

Now, when one thinks of a decisive military operation, one thinks of things like the battle of Stalingrad, or D-Day. Do you think that this is really decisive for the Vietnam war, or does it just gain time -- or what?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith, I remember your broadcast, as a matter of fact, from England, as I recall at the time of Stalingrad and D-Day and the rest, and I think you will agree that as we look at it in the perspective of history, we think Stalingrad was decisive, and also that D-Day was decisive.

However, at the time that they occurred, immediately thereafter, we couldn't be sure. Now, looking at this particular operation, it is in my view the most decisive action in terms of damaging the enemy's ability to wage effective warfare that has occurred in this war to date.

Whether it will be as decisive as Stalingrad was or as D-Day was, I am not prepared to say. Only history will tell.

I do know that any action which captures and destroys over 12 months of the enemy's small arms ammunition supply, over 14 months of their mortars, over 4 months supply of rice, in addition to the very considerable number of enemy personnel that were killed and captured, approximately 15,000, that that is a very effective blow.

How decisive it will be remains to be seen.

I will say it is decisive in a couple of other ways. It does make it possible for us to go ahead with the assurance on our withdrawal program of 150,000 more, which will be completed during the spring of next year, and it does give us more assurance that the South Vietnamese now, for the first time tested in battle by themselves against the North Vietnamese, can handle themselves, that Vietnamization can work and will work, and that we can get out, and they can stay in and hold their own.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. President, can I ask you about the plans for withdrawal far down the road? There are 419,000 American troops now in Vietnam -- I believe that is the figure -- and 260,000 will be there in the spring of 1971 according to your withdrawal formula.

But what happens after that? Will we find ourselves in the position where we will have to keep a couple of hundred thousand men there logistically for some period of time or, sir, do you believe that we should pose that threat to the North Vietnamese that they might have to wait another 10 years while we had 200,000 men in South Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT: I suppose that question becomes particularly apropos when you think of Korea, because in Korea we still have 50,000 men and it has been 17 years since the Korean war was over.

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In terms of South Vietnam, I think we could put it, however, in
another way. We are prepared by negotiation to bring out all of our
forces and have no forces at all in South Vietnam if the enemy will
negotiate, if they will withdraw theirs.

We are confident that the South Vietnamese can defend themselves
if there is a mutual withdrawal of outside forces.

Now, if they do not agree to it, then we still have a plan which, as
for its long-term goal, is to withdraw all of our forces. However, it
will be in stages.

As you know, what we are withdrawing now are primarily our ground
combat forces, and the majority of our ground combat forces will be out
during the spring of next year. The 265,000 will -- that number, of
course, will be a majority of our ground combat forces.

Now, when it comes to naval forces and air forces which require
more sophisticated training and the rest, it will take a longer time to
get them out, but I again come back to this proposition. Our long-term
goal is to get them all out, and short-term, if the enemy is willing to
negotiate with our new Ambassador, we will get them all out within a
year, if they are willing to negotiate.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, you have always refused to set a
definite terminal date for our final withdrawal from Vietnam on the
grounds the enemy would just sit and wait and never negotiate at all, as
I understand it.

But, your advisers always say to us that it would be better for the
North Vietnamese to negotiate while we are still there rather than face
Saigon alone later on.

If that is the case, then why not set a definite terminal date to
encourage them to negotiate, knowing we will leave?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the argument that if we just set a terminal
date as to when we are going to get out that this might, in reverse,
encourage them to negotiate, I don't think it will stand up. I think it is a
good debating point to make and perhaps we could say that the debating
point we have made on the other side is just that, but I don't believe it is.

Let me put it this way: Put yourself in the position of the enemy. Also,
put yourself in the position of an historian -- and all of you are historians;
you study these matters and you write about them, you think about them,
and you commentate upon them. You will generally find that negotiations
occur, negotiations which end war, only when the balance of power changes
significantly, only when one party or the other concludes that as a result
of the shift in the military balance they no longer have an opportunity to
accomplish their goal militarily and therefore, they had best negotiate.

Now, I think one of the positive benefits of the Cambodian operation
is that it has changed the military balance. How much it has changed in
the minds of the enemy remains to be seen.

I do not say it has changed it enough so that they will negotiate. I think
it might help. Only time will tell. But putting myself -- again, looking at
the enemy, I am convinced that if we were to tell the enemy now, the North
Vietnamese, that within, as for example, the McGovern-Hatfield resolu-
tion, that by the end of this year all Americans will be gone, well, I can
assure you that the enemy isn't going to negotiate in Paris at all.

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They are not going to talk. They are going to wait until we get out because they know that at the end of this year the South Vietnamese won't be ready to defend the country by themselves.

But if, on the other hand, the enemy feels that we are going to stay there long enough for the South Vietnamese to be strong enough to handle their own defense, then I think they have a real incentive to negotiate, because if they have to negotiate with a strong, vigorous South Vietnamese government, the deal they can make with them isn't going to be as good as the deal they might make now.

MR. SMITH: Sir, talking about troop withdrawals, American troop withdrawals, on June 3rd you said that if the other side took advantage of our troop withdrawals and intensified their attacks, you would be prepared to take strong effective measures to meet that situation.

Now, in view of the explosions of wrath on the campus that the Cambodian affair, do you think you could reescalate even temporarily the fighting as you seem to say you might if you had to?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Smith, when we talk about re-escalating the fighting, I think we have to be precise about what we mean. First, I have already indicated in answer to Mr. Sevareid's first question that we have no plans to go back into Cambodia.

And incidentally, I am not as bearish as some commentators have been about the future of Cambodia. If I could digress a moment, I think this is a question that our listeners would be interested in -- Cambodia's chances of surviving as a neutral country are infinitely better now than they were on April 30th. And they are better, first, because the North Vietnamese have a 600-mile supply line rather than a 40-mile supply line back to the sanctuaries which we have destroyed.

They are better, also, because the Cambodian Government has far more support among the people, and the reporters from Phnom Penh generally have reported that. They are better, too, because the Cambodian Government also has support from the 11 Asian nations, representing 300 million people, and I think also they are better for the reason that the South Vietnamese have been very effective when they have taken on the North Vietnamese in the Cambodian area.

They have posed a rather considerable threat to them. I do not suggest that it is still not a fragile situation. It is difficult. But it is possible for them to survive.

Now coming back to your question, first, when you talk about re-escalation, we do not plan to go back into Cambodia. We do plan, however, and I will use this power -- I am going to use, as I should, the air power of the United States to interdict all flows of men and supplies which I consider are directed toward South Vietnam.

That is in my role of defending American men.

Now let's look at the other possibilities of the escalation. For example, we have a bombing pause in the north, as you note. As you also note, one of what was called the understandings when that bombing pause was entered into was that American reconnaissance flights could take place over North Vietnam so that we could determine whether or not they were planning a new attack, and those reconnaissance flights were supposed to be immune from attack.

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Now consistently the North Vietnamese have been shooting at those planes. In fact at the time we embarked on the April 30th operation, I ordered some attacks on some sites in North Vietnam which had been shooting our planes.

If those attacks should now develop again, I will, of course, use our American air power against North Vietnam sites that attack our planes.

That is my responsibility, to defend American boys -- American men, our boys when they do come under attack.

Now when you talk about re-escalation in other terms, I do not see that presently as a possibility, presently in terms of what the North Vietnamese may be able to do and what we would do in action to it.

But I want to leave no doubt on one score: I am concerned, as all of you gentlemen have been concerned, about the dissent on the campuses, and among a great many thoughtful Americans that are for peace, as I am sure all of you are, and as I am. Sometimes people say, "Well, was it really worth it?" Right after I made this report, one of the members of the press said, "Do you think it was all worth it?"

And my answer, quite candidly is this: There are no easy choices in the position I hold, as you well know, particularly when it is one like this. I knew there was a risk, risk of dissent, and I knew that a barrage of criticism would come not only from the campus but from many others as well.

So I had to weigh that risk. I had to weigh the risk of dissent from those who would object if I did act, against the risks to 435,000 American lives who would be in jeopardy if I did not act, and as Commander in Chief, I had no choice but to act to defend those men. And as Commander in Chief, if I am faced with that decision again, I will exercise that power to defend those men.

It will be done, and I believe that the majority of the American people will support me then, as a majority of the American people, even in this difficult period, have seemed to support me.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. President, in your report on the Cambodian incursions you described again in vivid terms the dangers of a Communist-controlled Cambodia with its long frontier along South Vietnam and the ability that the enemy would have if the Communists controlled it to wreck our program of Vietnamization and many other things in South Vietnam. But some of us I think are more apprehensive than you seem to be this evening about the chances for survival of the Lon Nol government. I surely don't question your information, sir, but people do worry that that government may topple, that Sihanouk may come back, that there are an awful lot of Communist troops in that country.

What will we do then if we have this hundreds of miles of open frontier? Would you then think that we could mount an international rescue operation or would we have to be drawn in again?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chancellor, the hypothetical question that you have posed shows, it seems to me, very clearly why as Commander in Chief I have no choice but to move in the sanctuary areas. Just think what the situation would be that we would confront if the Communists were to take Cambodia and if they had -- they, rather than we, had the 14 million rounds of small ammunition and the 190,000 rounds of mortars and recoilless rifles, and all the rest. It would mean that the position that we would be in, and our troops would be in would be extremely difficult and more difficult than was previously the case because they not only would have the sanctuaries but they would have the back country to back

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it up and they would also have the Port of Sihanoukville open and over 50 percent of the material in the sanctuaries came in through that port. Now you come to the second point. Now that we have cleaned out the sanctuaries, let us suppose -- and what you are putting is a hypothetical question and a hypothesis I do not accept, although it is a possibility, because nobody can be sure, it is a fragile situation -- if the Communists despite the support that the present government in Cambodia gets for its neutrality, if they should nevertheless topple it, what do we do? The answer is that we continue in our course in South Vietnam to defeat the enemy there, and the South Vietnamese, who are now a very formidable fighting force, will certainly see to it that the sanctuary areas are not again occupied. That is a very real threat to whatever Communist activities might be engaged in Phnom Penh.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, in view of the Cooper-Church Amendment passed yesterday in the Senate, do you feel now obliged to suspend the negotiations with Thailand about our paying and equipping their troops that they were going to send into Cambodia? I think this is forbidden as far as the Senators are concerned.

THE PRESIDENT: Fortunately, our Founding Fathers had great wisdom when they set up two Houses of Congress.

MR. SEVAREID: So, you're going to wait and see what --

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. Let me say with all due respect to both the House and the Senate -- and as you know, I started in the House and also served in the Senate, and I have great respect for the Senate, I served there 2 years as a Senator and presided over the body for 8 years as Vice President -- but I think the performance of the Senate over the past seven weeks, going up and down the hill on Cooper-Church, has not particularly distinguished that august body, and the Cooper-Church that came out was not a particularly precise document, and was somewhat ambiguous.

Now, fortunately, it now goes to the House and the House will work its will on that amendment, and then it goes to conference and, of course, the conference, which most of our viewers don't think of as being a very important body, that is probably the most important legislative entity that we have in our Government, because there they take the differences between a House and a Senate bill, things that were done, for example, that went too far in one direction or too far in another, and they work them out. And I believe that the conference of the Senate and the House, when they consider all of these factors, will first be sure that the power of the President of the United States to protect American forces whenever they come into attack is in no way jeopardized. Even Cooper-Church recognizes that to an extent. And second, that they will recognize that the Nixon Doctrine, which provides that the United States rather than sending men will send arms when we consider it is in our interest to do so, arms to help other countries defend themselves. I believe that the conference will modify Cooper-Church.

MR. SEVAREID: How do you take it yourself, this action of yesterday? The Senate majority. Do you take it as a rebuke, a warning, an expression of mistrust in your word as to what you are going to do in Cambodia? How did it hit you?

THE PRESIDENT: The action of the Senate is one that I respect. I respect, I know the men in the Senate. Take the two authors, Cooper and Church. They are good men. They are very dedicated to peace. So am I.

There is one difference between us. I have responsibility for 440,000 men. They don't.

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And I intend to do what is necessary to protect those men, and I believe
that as far as the Senate is concerned that, while I will listen to them, I
will pay attention to what they have said, I am going to wait until the House
acts, until the conference acts, and I believe that the action, the joint
action of the House and Senate, will be more responsible, I will say
respectfully, than the action of the Senate was.

I don't consider it a rebuke, and I am not angry at the Senate. It
won't pay. They have the last word some times -- or many words.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Sir, you said in your report that you had un-
ambiguous knowledge of enemy intentions in Cambodia just after April 20,
April 21, 22, 23. It has been asked, and I think it is valid to raise it
here, could you, in these early days in that week, before you decided to
move on the 30th of April, have consulted with certain key members of
Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as a matter of fact, when we talk about con-
sultation, you can do it formally or you can do it informally, and I can
assure you, Mr. Chancellor, I consulted with a great number of people
between April 20th and April 30th, including Members of the Senate and
Members of the House.

Now, let's come to perhaps really the thrust of your question, and I
think this is perhaps something that many of our viewers and listeners
would ask: Well, in ordering American men to join with the South
Vietnamese, and incidentally, this was 60 percent South Vietnamese and
40 percent Americans, but we carried a very important part of the load --
in ordering that kind of an action, why didn't I go to the Senate, for example,
and the House and ask for their approval?

Well, now let us suppose we had done that. It took them 7 weeks for
Cooper-Church. Let's suppose it had taken 7 weeks? What would have
happened? Well, first, all of this year's supply of ammunition that we
have acquired would have been gone out of the sanctuaries, or even
worse, what might have happened is that the rather fearsome defensive
barricades that they had in these sanctuaries would have been ready for
us, and we would have lost not just 330 men -- that is too many to lose
in two months, and that is all we lost in Cambodia -- we would have lost
3,000 or 4,000.

As far as I am concerned, I had to think of what was right, what
was necessary, what would save American men, and the element of
surprise was important.

Now let me also add this. If this had been what some thought it was,
an attempt to expand the war into Cambodia, to launch a war into Cambodia,
then of course, I would have gone to the Senate. You can be sure that in
my Administration we are not going to get involved in any more Vietnams
where we do not get the approval of the Congress. I will not do this
because I think we need Congressional support for our actions, and I
trust we do not have to go to the Congress for that kind of support.

But when we have this limited, very precise action which was limited
in terms of the time, limited in terms of 21 miles as far as we were going
to go, and which had for its purpose the protecting of American lives, I
had to take the action when I did, and I did not think it was wise to give
the enemy the advance notice, the strategic warning, which would have
taken away the surprise and would have cost us lives.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Sir, aren't we at the crux of the argument now
that is going now in the country that the Executive Branch, according to

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the Legislative Branch, or at least one body of it, ought to be limited, they say on the Hill, in what it can do in ordering American troops to be used in many different ways around the world? I think we would all benefit, sir, if we could explore your views in a general way on that.

Do you feel that in the modern world there are situations when the President must respond against the very tight deadline or for reasons of security in using American troops crossing a border with them when he cannot, under reasons you yourself have described, consult with the Legislative Branch?

The Constitution says they declare war and you, sir run it.

THE PRESIDENT: Another good example of course is the Cuban missile crisis. President Kennedy had a very difficult decision there and two hours and a quarter before he ordered -- and I thought with great justification and great courage -- before he ordered the blockade, the use of American men to blockade Cuba, he told the Senate and the Congressional leaders. Now, why didn't he give them more time? For a very good reason he did not give them more time.

It was imperative to move soon with some surprise and some impact or the possibility of a nuclear confrontation might have been greater. That is one example. I trust we don't have another Cuban missile crisis. I trust we don't have another situation like Cambodia, but I do know that in the modern world, there are times when the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, will have to act quickly. I can assure the American people that this President is going to bend over backwards to consult the Senate and consult the House whenever he feels it can be done without jeopardizing the lives of American men.

But when it is a question of the lives of American men or the attitudes of the people in the Senate, I am coming down hard on the side of defending the lives of American men.

MR. SMITH: I can see a clock on the wall which indicates we haven't got a lot of minutes left. I want to ask you about the Middle East.

Mr. George Ball wrote an article in last Sunday's New York Times Magazine section in which he suggested that the Russians were bold enough to move into the Middle East because we were bogged down in Indochina.

Do you accept that concatenation of the two events?

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, Mr. Smith, Mr. Ball should know something about that because he was there when we got bogged down in Indochina, as you recall, as Under Secretary of State. I did not hear his comments at that time indicating that that was the problem.

Now, the second point that I would make is that if the United States, after this long struggle in Vietnam, if we do what Mr. Ball and some others apparently want us to do -- just get out, without regard to the consequences -- I do not see the American people and the American Congress then saying that if we couldn't do what was necessary where the lives of American men were involved in Vietnam, that we will do what is necessary, because we are concerned about Israel or some other state in the Mideast.

You cannot separate what happens to America in Vietnam from the Mideast or from Europe or any place else. That is why European leaders -- some of them don't say it publicly, but privately they all know

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how much rides on the United States coming out of Vietnam, not with a
victory over North Vietnam, but with a just peace because if the United
States is humiliated or defeated in Vietnam, the effect on the United
States is what I am concerned about, the people of the United States.
And I think we'll see a rampant isolationism in this country in which we
will not do what we should do in other parts of the world.

If I can turn to the Middle East briefly because I think we should
speak a moment on it, if you other gentlemen would like. I think, and
I say this respectfully, that some of the columnists and commentators --
and I read them and listen to them both with respect -- and some of us
in political life have a tendency to look at the Middle East too much in
terms of the Israeli-Arab struggle. We look at Israel, a strong free
nation in the Middle East and we look at its neighbors, its aggressive
neighbors, the UAR and Syria, and we see this struggle and we say,
"Are we going to give planes to Israel and are the Russians going to
give them to the UAR? And how are we going to have a settlement
between Israel and the Arab states?"

If that is all there was to it, it would not be as difficult a problem
as I am going to put it. I think the Middle East now is terribly dangerous.
It is like the Balkans before World War I where the two super powers,
the United States and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a confronta-
tion that neither of them wants because of the differences there.

MR. SEVAREID: Mr. President, I believe the Russians today at the UN are circulating some new ideas about approaching peace negotiations in the Mideast. Is there anything you can tell us about this?

THE PRESIDENT: I haven't had a chance to study them yet, but I will say this, that any propositions that the Russians or anybody else circulate that would offer a chance to cool it in the Middle East would be helpful, because when you look at the Middle East, it is not just a case of, as I say, Israel versus the Arab states, but the Soviet Union is now moving into the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Mideast is important. We all know that 80 percent of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's oil comes from the Mideast. We know that the Mideast, this area, this is the gateway to Africa, it's the gateway to the Mediterranean, it's the hinge of NATO, and it is also the gateway through the Suez Canal down in the Indian Ocean.

Now under these circumstances, when we then look at it in terms of
Israelis versus Arabs, moderate Arabs versus radical Arabs, and who-
ever would think that there would be somebody more radical than the
Syrians, within the radical Arab states, Fedayeen that are more radical,
the super-radicals -- when we think of all these factors, we can see what
a very difficult situation it is. Now what should US policy be? I will
summarize it in a word. One, our interest is peace and the integrity of
every country in the area.

Two, we recognize that Israel is not desirous of driving any of the
other countries into the sea. The other countries do want to drive Israel
into the sea.

Three, then, once the balance of power shifts where Israel is weaker
than its neighbors, there will be a war. Therefore, it is in US interests
to maintain the balance of power, and we will maintain that balance of
power. That is why as the Soviet Union moves in to support the UAR, it
makes it necessary for the United States to evaluate what the Soviet
Union does, and once that balance of power is upset, we will do what is
necessary to maintain Israel's strength vis-a-vis its neighbors, not

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16

because we want Israel to be in a position to wage war. That is not it, but because that is what will deter its neighbors from attacking it.

And then we get to the diplomacy. The diplomacy is terribly difficult, because Israel's neighbors, of course, have to recognize Israel's right to exist.

Israel must withdraw to borders, borders that are defensible, and when we consider all those factors and then put into the equation the fact that the Russians seem to have an interest in moving into the Mediterranean, it shows you why this subject is so complex and so difficult.

But we are going to continue to work on it, and I can assure you the fact that we are in Vietnam does not mean that the United States is not going to give every bit of its diplomatic and other energies to this subject as well.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Very briefly, Mr. President, would you say that the situation in the Middle East is as dangerous to the United States as the situation in Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The situation in Vietnam, fortunately, has reached the point where we are embarked on a plan which will get the United States out, and which will bring a just peace.

It will succeed. That I know.

Second, the situation in the Mideast is more dangerous, more dangerous because it involves, and this is not the case in Vietnam, a collision of the super powers.

Neither Communist China, in my view, nor the Soviet Union will have a confrontation with the United States about Vietnam, although many have feared that. But it has not happened, and it will not happen, in my opinion.

But in the Mideast, because of the things that I have mentioned earlier, this tremendous power complex, it is not only the cradle of civilization, but it also, as we have already indicated, this is the area that controls so much of the world's people and the world's resources.

The Mideast, being what it is, is a potentially dangerous spot, and that is why it is in the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union to work together to bring this particular danger spot under control.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Mr. President, I want to thank you very much for being with us tonight.

Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you. I wish we had more time.

(End at 8 PM, PDT)

# # #

DRAFT STATEMENT FOR NOON BRIEFING '70 JUL 7 AM 11:05

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

On July 1 the President expressed the policy of the United States on the Middle East with particular reference to Soviet activities in the area. A report which appeared in this morning's press alleging that the State Department was dismayed and puzzled by White House policy statements is absolutely without foundation.

No responsible or knowledgable State Department official made such a statement to the White House or to anyone else, nor does such a statement correspond with the views of the Department of State.

July 7, 1970

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SUBJECT MIDDLE EAST PORTION SECRETARY'S LONDON PRESS CONFERENCE
JULY 11 1970.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DO YOU SHARE THE OPTIMISM EXPRESSED BY U
THANT ABOUT A COUPLE OF DAYS AGO ABOUT THE SOVIET PLAN FOR
THE MIDDLE EAST?

A: WELL, I DON'T RECALL THAT I SAW HIS PRECISE WORDS. I CERTAINLY
HOPE THAT HIS OPTIMISM IS JUSTIFIED. YOU KNOW THAT THE US IS
VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE ME. WE HAVE MADE
A PROPOSAL TO ALL PARTIES CONCERNED WHICH WE THINK IS A VERY
CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE PARTIES WILL
GIVE IT VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION, HOPEFULLY ACCEPT IT,
OR ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE IT. WE ARE NOT PARTICULARLY WEDDED

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TO OUR PROPOSAL BUT WE THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PARTIES
BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND IF POSSIBLE WE HAVE A CEASE FIRE
BECAUSE THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE MUCH BETTER CHANCE TO
SUCCEED IF THERE WAS A CEASEFIRE. AS FAR AS THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL
IS CONCERNED THE COURSE THAT WAS PRESENTED TO US SOMETIME BACK.
WE THINK IT IS A STEP FORWARD BUT IT DEPENDS A GOOD DEAL ON THE
ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES ABOUT WHETHER PROGRESS
WILL BE MADE OR NOT.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT IS GOING ON BETWEEN NASSER AND THE RUSSIAN LEADERS?

A: NO.

Q: IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT BY TALKING ABOUT EXPELLING SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM EGYPT THE USG HAS JEOPARDIZED ITS OWN PEACE PLAN FOR THE ME.

A: WELL, I CERTAINLY NEVER USED THE WORD EXPELL. AS FAR AS I KNOW THE GOVT OF THE US HAS NEVER THOUGHT IN THOSE TERMS. OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE PEACE OF THE AREA NOT TO HAVE THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN PERSONNEL IN THE UAR. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THE US HAS EVER THOUGHT ABOUT EXPELLING THEM IN THE USUAL SENSE OF THAT TERM. SO THAT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT IT I THINK WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IT IN THE TERMS THAT WE WOULD HOPE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT COULD BE REACHED AMONG THE PARTIES AND THAT THEREFORE THE RUSSIANS WOULD FEEL THAT IT WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST TO LEAVE THE UAR.

Q: DO YOU SEE THE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET SAM MISSILES INTO THE SUEZ CANAL ZONE AS A MAJOR SETBACK TO YOUR PEACE TALKS?
A: WELL, I THINK IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER IT IS A MAJOR SETBACK OR NOT. IT CERTAINLY IS NOT HELPFUL. THE SAM IIS HAVE BEEN THERE FOR SOMETIME AS YOU KNOW AND THE INTRODUCTION OF SAM IIIS IS A MORE RECENT DEVELOPMENT. ACTUALLY WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE CREEPING NATURE OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SAM IIIS GETTING CLOSE TO THE SUEZ CANAL. BUT WHETHER IT IS A SETBACK OR NOT I AM NOT SURE. YOU COULD ARGUE IT THE OTHER WAY. YOU COULD SAY THAT BECAUSE IT BECOMES A MATTER THAT IS MORE SERIOUS, AND THE WORLD I THINK RECOGNIZES THE SERIOUSNESS OF IT, THAT IT MIGHT HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. IT MIGHT SUGGEST TO THE PARTIES THAT THIS IS THE MOST APPROPRIATE POSSIBLE TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND THEREFORE IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. IT SOUNDS A LITTLE BIT MAYBE MORE HOPEFUL THAN I SHOULD BE BUT I JUST DON'T

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KNOW. WE ARE I THINK INTERESTED IN THE FACT THAT WHEREAS
THE MEETING BETWEEN MR KOSYGIN AND PRESIDENT NASSER WAS SUPPOSED
TO CONCLUDE SOMETIME BACK AND THERE WAS GOING TO BE A RESPONSE
AT THAT TIME. THEY HAVE DELAYED THAT AND IT WOULD INDICATE TO
US THAT THEY ARE GIVING SOME SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE RESPONSE
THEY ARE GOING TO GIVE TO OUR PROPOSAL.

Q: BOB JUST SAID IN A LATE DESPATCH THAT THE US HAS SHED DOUBT ON ITS PEACE PLAN BY THE SUPPLY OF HOWITZER TYPE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAT ISRAEL WOULD BE ABLE TO FORE NUCLEAR TIPPED MISSILES. IS THIS A NEW SUPPLY OF ANY SORT TO ISRAEL AND WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THIS COMPLAINT ABOUT IT?

A: I HAVEN'T SEEN THAT COMPLAINT BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS ANYTHING TO IT.

Q: THEN THE US HASN'T SUPPLIED ANY SUCH WEAPONS?

A: NOT THE WEAPON THAT YOU HAVE DESCRIBED. NO, SIR.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, DO I UNDERSTAND THAT THE ANSWER TO YOUR EARLIER QUESTION AS BEING THAT WE NOW HAVE INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION THAT THERE ARE SOVIET MANNED SAM IIIS IN THE SUEZ ZONE?

A: NO I DIDN'T SAY THAT. I SAID THAT THERE WERE SAM IIIS IN THAT AREA AND WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROSPECTS THAT THEY MAY BE DEPLOYING THEM CLOSER TO THE SUEZ THAN PREVIOUSLY.

AS I HAVE SAID TO YOU BEFORE ON THE PLANE I WANT TO WAIT UNTIL I GET BACK TO ANALYZE THE EVIDENCE PRETTY CAREFULLY BEFORE I COME TO ANY JUDGMENT ON THAT BUT CLEARLY THE SITUATION IS A SERIOUS SITUATION AS PRESIDENT NIXON SAID IN HIS TELEVISION APPEARANCE THE OTHER NIGHT.

MORE.

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Q3 (MOSTLY UNINTELLIGIBLE) THERE WAS A REPORT IN THE PRESS
YESTERDAY SAYING THAT... OR 4 HOWITZERS HAVE BEEN...

DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT AND ALSO DOES THE REPORT SAY
THAT THE SHELLS ARE EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR...

A3 I AM NOT FAMILIAR WITH THAT REPORT. I THINK IT IS THE SAME
REPORT THAT YOU ASKED ME ABOUT. I AM NOT FAMILIAR WITH THAT.

I CERTAINLY HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THE LAST PART OF THE QUESTION.

WE AREN'T PROVIDING ANY WEAPONS TO ANYBODY THAT FIRE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.

Q3 I ALSO HEARD A REPORT THAT THE US HAS ALREADY DECIDED TO
REPLACE THE MILITARY JET AIRCRAFT LOST BY ISRAEL.

A3 WELL I HAVE IN SEVERAL PRESS CONFERENCES POINTED OUT THAT

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WE ARE NOT GOING TO DISCUSS ANY MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE MIDDLE
EAST UNTIL WE GET SOME RESPONSE TO OUR INITIATIVE. IN OTHER
WORDS WE ARE PUTTING ALL THE EMPHASIS ON OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT
TO SEE IF WE CAN BRING THE PARTIES TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.
WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE THEM START TALKING AND STOP SHOOTING AND
UNTIL WE GET SOME RESPONSE, WE WANT TO DELAY ANY DISCUSSION
ABOUT ANY MILITARY ACTION OF ANY KIND OR ANY PROVISION OF ANY
MILITARY EQUIPMENT. IN OTHER WORDS WE THINK IT IS SUCH A
SENSITIVE TIME IN THE AREA. IT IS SO IMPORTANT FOR THE PARTIES
TO ACT SENSIBLY AND TO ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM BY DISCUSSIONS
AND WE ARE GOING TO RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS
ABOUT MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

Q: MR. SECRETARY, PRESIDENT NIXON AND YOU HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE MAJOR AMERICAN CONCERN IN THE ME IS THE DANGER OF GREAT POWER CONFRONTATION THERE. REPORTS FROM VIENNA SAY THAT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME LIMITED AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION. IS THERE ANY POSSIBILITY OF SEEING A LINK IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE IN VIENNA AND THE POSSIBLE SOVIET ATTITUDE ON THE ME?

A: WELL THAT QUESTION ARISES OFTEN IN PRESS CONFERENCES. WE DO NOT APPROACH THESE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE THOUGHT IN MIND OF LINKAGE AND WE HAVE NEVER SUGGESTED THAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. SO THAT WE WOULD EXPECT THAT WE COULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON THE SALT TALKS WITHOUT NECESSARILY SOLVING OTHER ISSUES IN THE WORLD ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HOPE THAT IF WE COULD SOLVE ONE THAT THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD BE IMPROVED AND IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN THE OTHER AREA, BUT NOT IN THE SENSE OF LINKAGE.

Q: I WAS THINKING OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE. DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE FORWARD IN VIENNA (REST OF QUESTION MAINLY INAUDIBLE BUT QUESTIONER APPEARED TO ASK IF THERE A LINK BETWEEN MIDEAST TALKS AND SALT TALKS IN THE SOVIET MIND)

A: YES, I DON'T THINK THE TWO ARE LINKED IN THE SOVIET MIND EITHER. I THINK THAT THEIR PRINCIPLE MOTIVATION IN THE SALT TALKS IS ECONOMIC, AND WITH A PERIPHERAL BENEFIT OF REDUCING TENSIONS. OURS IS PRETTY MUCH THE SAME THING. WE WOULD LIKE TO REDUCE THE COST OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT IF WE WOULD HAVE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMS IT WOULD HAVE A PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT.

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IT WOULD BE A BENEFIT ALL AROUND BECAUSE IT WOULD INDICATE
TO THE WORLD THAT WE COULD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON A MAJOR
ISSUE. BUT WE NEVER NOR HAVE THEY TALKED ABOUT IT IN TERMS OF
LINKAGES IN FACT THEY VERY MUCH OPPOSE ANY DISCUSSION OF LINKAGE
AT ALL IN ANY DISCUSSION.

Q: WHAT KIND OF TIMING DO YOU HAVE IN MIND FOR THE RESPONSES
TO THE MIDDLE EAST, FORTNIGHT OR THREE WEEKS?

A: OH NO, I WOULD SAY THAT IT WOULD BE SOONER THAN THAT.
I WOULD HOPE IT WOULD BE.

Q: DAYS?

A: WELL, I WOULD EXPECT THAT WHEN PRESIDENT NASSER LEAVES
MOSCOW THAT THEY MIGHT RESPOND. IN FACT THEY HAVE SAID THAT IS
ONE OF THE THINGS THEY PROBABLY WOULD DO WHEN HE LEAVES.

ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

Assistant Secretary Sisco Interviewed on "Meet the Press"

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on the
National Broadcasting Company's television
and radio program "Meet the Press" on July 12.
Interviewing Mr. Sisco were Warren Rogers of
the Los Angeles Times, Hedrick Smith of the
New York Times, Richard Valeriani of NBC
News, Lawrence E. Spivak, permanent member
of the "Meet the Press" panel, and Edwin New-
man of NBC News, moderator.

Mr. Newman: Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco. Secretary Sisco is the United States negotiator in the current Middle East talks with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the President
said that the situation in the Middle East is ter-
ribly dangerous and the United States and the
Soviet Union could be drawn into a confronta-
tion.¹ Now, many Americans fear that we may
be on the verge of a shooting war with the
Soviet Union. Is there danger of the U.S.-
Soviet military confrontation over the Middle
East?

Mr. Sisco: There is a danger, Mr. Spivak, that events can develop in such a way that they can lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the moment we are pursuing a very important political initiative in hopes that we can get the parties to stop shooting and start talking. We think this is the best way at the moment to try to alleviate the difficult situation that confronts us.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, there are some Americans who look upon the Middle East problem just as a dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis, and they can see no reason why the United States should get more deeply involved. Why should we get more deeply involved?

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Spivak, we have very important interests in the Middle East. The Mediterranean is important in terms of strategic interests to the United States. The Middle East is a gateway not only to the Persian Gulf but to the Indian Ocean. It is important in terms of our policy in Africa. We have got important political interests there; we have got a number of friends, including Israel, as well as a number of friends among the Arab world; and we have got a number of very crucial economic interests in the area.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, the United States has indicated on a number of occasions that it will provide Israel with additional aircraft if it is convinced that she needs them for her defense. In view of what you have just said about our vital interests in the situation in the Middle East, can you tell us whether the United States is convinced today that Israel needs the additional aircraft for defense?

Mr. Sisco: We feel that the heavier Soviet involvement has injected a new qualitative factor into the situation. Both the President and the Secretary of State have made it very clear that we are going to do whatever is necessary to assure that the balance does not tip against Israel. Mr. Spivak, I cannot get into the specifics of the military aspects of this thing during the period in which we are pursuing this political initiative. I would only reaffirm quite categorically that the United States is resolved

¹ For President Nixon's television interview on July 1, see BULLETIN of July 27, 1970, p. 101.

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Department of State Bulletin

to do everything that is necessary to maintain
the balance in the area.

*Mr. Spivak: Can you tell us whether we now think the balance has tipped or whether we think it soon will tip?*

*Mr. Sisco:* The balance has been affected by the more direct involvement of the Soviet Union, both in the hinterland of Egypt as well as with the positioning of SAM-2's and SAM-3's in areas in close proximity to the Suez Canal. It has been affected, and this is what I meant when I said a qualitative factor has been injected into this situation simply because the Soviets now for the first time are operating in Egypt in an operational capacity.

*Mr. Smith:* Mr. Sisco, you have mentioned that the United States would do everything necessary to maintain the balance between Israel and the Arabs. You spoke of the danger of a confrontation between the two great powers. Does this mean United States forces would become involved on the side of Israel if the Russians became involved in a full-scale war on the side of the Arabs?

*Mr. Sisco:* There are no plans, Mr. Smith, for involvement of American forces. My response to Mr. Spivak was within the context of the question as to what military assistance the United States is or intends to provide Israel in the future.

At the moment, Mr. Smith, we are pursuing an important political initiative to try to get the shooting stopped and to get the parties to begin talking under Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices. We think this is very important. We think if we can get the parties talking that there is some hope of developing some flexibility between the two sides which would offer an opportunity for progress.

*Mr. Smith:* Let me be a little bit more specific. The White House has spoken recently of expelling the Soviet advisers and the combat pilots who have become involved in the defense of Egypt. Does it mean by this that U.S. forces would be necessary, or what can we realistically do to get the Soviets out of Egypt?

*Mr. Sisco:* As you know, Mr. Smith, the word "expel" was further elaborated on and explained subsequently. I would merely say to you that we are interested in reducing Soviet influence in the area. The best possible way to reduce the Soviet influence is to achieve a political settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides; and that means a settlement that will protect the security of Israel but also meets the principal concerns of the Arab states, and I would include here the Palestinians as well.

*Mr. Smith:* Do you sense in the growing Soviet role in Egypt's defense a basic change in Soviet strategy in the Middle East that is going from what has been essentially a defensive role in Egypt on to an offensive role?

*Mr. Sisco:* The question that is raised with respect to the Soviet role gets focused principally on the developments of the last month or 6 weeks. For example, we are particularly concerned over the creeping process we have seen in the last few weeks. It raises the question: Is this defensive or is it intended to afford the opportunity to Egypt to press its announced war of attrition against Israel and to challenge and to win the control of the air over the Suez Canal?

You must bear in mind, Mr. Smith, that it is only as recently as a speech at Benghazi that President Nasser made very, very clear that if Egypt should wrest air control over the Suez this would afford the opportunity to press the war of attrition further against Israel.

*Mr. Rogers:* Mr. Secretary, you have made clear that there is a Russian incursion into Egypt which poses a great threat. Now, could you be more specific and say precisely, for example, how many, what number of Russian technicians there are, how many shiploads, how many planeloads of supplies, how many generals?

*Mr. Sisco:* I would say—and this is a rough guess—that there are anywhere from 8 to 10 thousand Soviets in Egypt today. Our intelligence has noted in recent weeks and months a substantial increase not only in the number of loadings but also the number of ships that have

August 3, 1970

151

arrived in Egypt, as well as a number of air transports.

I would go further, Mr. Rogers. We have noticed quite recently, for example, that there has been a shipment of amphibious equipment.

*Mr. Rogers: Landing craft to carry troops to make landings?*

*Mr. Sisco: That is correct.*

*Mr. Rogers: You say the balance of power has been affected, the military balance is affected. By this I take it you mean adversely in respect to the Israeli point of view?*

*Mr. Sisco: I would use merely General Bar-Lev's [Lt. Gen. Haim Bar-Lev, Israeli Chief of Staff] statement to explain that. What he said was this: that Israel continues to retain control of the air but the control has been limited by virtue of what has been done in recent weeks.*

You must bear in mind, Mr. Rogers, that from the point of view of Israel the defense of the cease-fire lines depends primarily on its capacity to maintain control of the air over that particular area.

*Mr. Rogers: In view of that, can I ask you pointblank: Has a decision been made to supply planes to Israel?*

*Mr. Sisco: I cannot comment specifically on that, Mr. Rogers, during the course and during the period in which we are pursuing this political initiative, but I will repeat what I said to Mr. Spivak: The President has made it very clear that we intend to support the security of Israel, and I think that you can just take that at face value.*

*Mr. Valeriani: To follow up, Mr. Sisco, Newsweek magazine will say in its new issue that President Nixon has ordered the Pentagon to rush a shipment of F-4 Phantom jets to Israel along with top-secret electronic equipment that jams radar. Can you confirm or deny that report?*

*Mr. Sisco: I can neither confirm nor deny that report, Mr. Valeriani. I am not going to get into the details of what we may have been

doing or are doing with respect to military assistance for Israel.

*Mr. Valeriani: At the time Secretary of State Rogers announced the new American peace initiative, he said the situation was so sensitive that he did not want to talk about either military aid to Israel or the details of the proposal, and then 10 days ago President Nixon talked about the Middle East in rather harsh words, calling Egypt and Syria aggressive and saying that some other countries wanted to drive Israel into the sea. Now, isn't there an inconsistency in the approach here?*

*Mr. Sisco: There certainly isn't, Mr. Valeriani.*

The Secretary of State, in announcing that initiative, declared a moratorium on one specific thing; namely, he wasn't going to get into the details of the military assistance aspect for Israel, any more than I have gotten into the details here today. There was no moratorium with respect to what the Soviets are doing in the area. A check of that press conference² will indicate that the Secretary of State underscored with great seriousness the feelings that we have with respect to this encroaching role of the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State himself has brought this to the attention of the Soviets on several occasions, and what the President had to say on July 1 was the result of a systematic, careful study of all of the information, which the President ordered in late April.

We have had a number of National Security Council meetings on this. I personally have discussed this matter with the President on several occasions in the last 4 or 6 weeks, and as recently as the last 48 hours; so that the judgments that have been expressed by the President on July 1 were the result of careful consideration and evaluation by this administration. And the Soviet factor, I might say, Mr. Valeriani, has been taken into account in our strategy throughout because we are up against both a political, as well as a military, strategy from the Soviet Union.

² BULLETIN of July 13, 1970, p. 25.

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Department of State Bulletin

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, if you were trying to get the Arabs into a very delicate negotiating process, how is it going to help by calling them aggressive and saying they want to drive Israel into the sea?

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Valeriani, what was being referred to there was simply this: Let's look at the record for just a moment. You have Syria that has never accepted the Security Council resolution, has been unwilling to meet with Jarring, and has never talked in terms of a political solution.

You have the Palestinians—a variety of groups with a variety of opinions, but none have come out explicitly for a political solution based on coexistence with Israel.

You have also, as the background, a recent speech by President Nasser which talked in terms of wresting control over the Suez Canal, which would afford an opportunity for pursuing the war of attrition further against Israel.

You have the Egyptian spokesmen in the last 2 weeks basically repeating this same line.

It is important, Mr. Valeriani, for all concerned to know that we are very anxious to achieve a political solution, that we are quite flexible politically, we have put forward some new propositions; but it is also equally important for all to know that we are keenly aware of the context in which we are pursuing this political initiative, and that the political initiative offers a new opportunity in a very difficult situation.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you have been negotiating with the Soviet Union for a great many months, I understand. Can you give us any idea what some of the major stumbling blocks are?

Mr. Sisco: I certainly can, Mr. Spivak. First of all, the three key issues have been the question of negotiation, the question of peace between the parties, the question of withdrawal, and I would add a fourth: the question of the refugees. We feel that this time what we need is a peace agreement, not a de facto armistice arrangement, which existed for 20 years and gave rise to several wars during the period. We

agreed with the Soviets as late as last September that negotiations ought to be pursued on the basis of the so-called Rhodes model. In other words, this was a proposition that afforded both sides the opportunity to engage in both indirect and direct discussions. Unfortunately the Soviet Union backed off, so there is no meeting of the minds as yet as to how the negotiations, as a matter of form, should proceed.

Second, we have been absolutely insistent that the future agreement must be a peace between the parties in which each of the parties undertakes reciprocal commitments in relationship to each other. The Soviets' proposals have fallen short in this regard.

Third, obviously withdrawal is a key element. Withdrawal from territories occupied during the June war is a key element of the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 1967.³

Mr. Spivak: Withdrawal from all occupied territories?

Mr. Sisco: No, and this is what the argument is all about. The Security Council resolution calls for withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied during 1967. I was engaged in the negotiations for months of that resolution. That resolution did not say "total withdrawal." That resolution did not say "withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines." That resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other words, the question of the final borders, Mr. Spivak, is a matter of negotiations between the parties.

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, you have been talking to the Soviets for some time. Have you come to agreement on anything significant?

Mr. Sisco: There are a number of points we have agreed on. For example, I think at least formally speaking, there is a clear understanding that any agreement has to be based on the recognition of the right of all states in the area to exist. There is a large measure of agreement with respect to the right of all states to use the

³ For text of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), see BULLETIN of Dec. 18, 1967, p. 843.

August 3, 1970

153

international waterways in the area. We are coming close to the point where, hopefully, there is more understanding that an agreement really has to be based on commitments to make peace with one another. But the fundamental differences, Mr. Spivak, are two: the question of withdrawal, as I have described it a moment ago, and secondly, how do you solve the question of refugees in a way in which it meets the concerns of both sides.

*Mr. Smith: Let me follow up, Mr. Sisco, and put it just bluntly: Do you think the Soviets want a political settlement in the Middle East?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Mr. Smith, we have been operating on the assumption that it is not in the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States to allow things to evolve in such a way in the area that it increases the risk of confrontation. We have also been operating on the assumption that it is not in the interest of the Soviet Union to allow things to come to a point where there is a general renewal of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israelis. Other things being equal, I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Union has been deriving unilateral advantage from the present turmoil in the area; but the Soviet Union in assessing whether it wants a political solution or not must weigh whatever unilateral advantage it has been deriving in recent months—it must weigh that against the risk of this thing getting out of control, as it did just before the June war, and confronting both the Soviet Union and the United States with some very difficult choices indeed.

*Mr. Smith:* Earlier on you mentioned the Palestinian groups, the commando groups. They have gained a lot of strength in the last 2 years. Is it realistic to try to form any kind of a settlement in the Middle East without including the Palestinians in the negotiating process?

*Mr. Sisco:* I have just returned from a trip some 6 weeks ago, Mr. Smith, and I became even more convinced then than I had been before that it isn't going to be possible to achieve a peace in the Middle East unless the legitimate concerns not only of the established governments—and here I mean primarily President

Nasser and King Hussein—but the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians must also be met, because, as you say, today they have become a formidable political force in the area.

*And I would add this:* For its part, the United States is ready to talk to anyone—anyone that is interested in pursuing a political solution based on the Security Council resolution, which is another way of saying a political solution and a peace based on a live-and-let-live philosophy.

*Mr. Rogers:* Mr. Secretary, as you pointed out, the Russians have gained a lot of advantages over the years by exercising a policy of controlled turmoil in the Middle East and now we see them making an entirely different approach to this whole situation. Is it your view that they have abandoned this old policy upon which so much of your assumptions are based, that they are now directly moving in without respect to Israel being a factor to play with, that they are supporting the Arabs, and that they don't mind this possibility of a confrontation?

*Mr. Sisco:* The Soviets have very, very consistently supported the Arab position, and the new increment is the one that I indicated; namely, a much more direct Soviet involvement in Egypt.

The Soviets are pursuing a political strategy bulwarked by increasing military strength, Mr. Rogers, and for this reason it is important for American policy to approach this from both points of view—do everything that we can, exhaust every possible way to achieve a political solution but at the same time make our resolve clear, make it clear that we intend to remain engaged in this area.

Now, I am not talking about the United States being truculent. Truculence breeds provocation. But weakness, Mr. Rogers, will only help to promote and to encourage brinksmanship in the area. We must remain engaged in this area in every respect.

*Mr. Rogers:* My point was, have they now abandoned this policy? If we would be firm if not truculent, would they again back down?

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, of course, this is an “iffy” question, Mr. Rogers. I would only repeat this:

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Department of State Bulletin

The Soviets are using both political means and military means, and in recent weeks it has been a step-up of military means in support of a political strategy.

**Mr. Valeriani:** Mr. Sisco, you mentioned that the Soviets have now sent amphibious equipment to Egypt. That doesn't sound like defensive equipment. What is your reading of that? Does that indicate they are getting ready to cross the canal?

**Mr. Sisco:** No, I don't say that, Mr. Valeriani, but I certainly will agree with the judgment that you just expressed; namely, it doesn't look like defensive equipment to me.

**Mr. Valeriani:** How serious would you regard the threat of another all-out war in the Middle East now?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, I think the situation is serious. I think, however, that neither side is ready to break out into something which is more general. However, I will say this, Mr. Valeriani: If the political initiative of the United States is rejected, I am afraid that this will be another lost opportunity, and there have been a good many lost opportunities over the months. If we lose this opportunity, I feel that the options that are open to the parties in the area, as well as to the major powers in the future, are slowly becoming more constrained and what we can look to, unfortunately, is a continuation of the violence and the counterviolence, and I am afraid at an escalated level.

**Mr. Valeriani:** Do you have a deadline for replies to the initiative?

**Mr. Sisco:** No, we don't. Our hope is, as Secretary Rogers stated last night in London, our hope is that when President Nasser returns that we will receive a reply shortly.

**Mr. Spivak:** Mr. Secretary, you have made it clear, as the President has, that we are going to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East. Is it possible to maintain that balance of power merely by sending planes to Israel?

**Mr. Sisco:** Well, I think, Mr. Spivak, we have made major efforts to try to get arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union going in the last 17

months. We have been turned down every time.

The way to maintain the balance of power is to pursue, I think, the kind of policy that we are pursuing. We want the friendship of all of the countries in the area. We are trying to achieve a political solution that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides.

**Mr. Spivak:** That is not responsive to my question.

**Mr. Newman:** I must interrupt at that point. I am sorry, our time is up. Thank you, Secretary Sisco, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."

## 75th Plenary Session on Viet-Nam Held at Paris

Following are remarks made by Ambassador Philip C. Habib, acting head of the U.S. delegation, at the 75th plenary session of the meetings on Viet-Nam at Paris on July 16.

Press release 220 dated July 16

### OPENING REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: It has been our constant purpose here at these meetings to try to focus attention on the fundamental issues involved in a settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict and to urge your side to discuss them seriously with us. As we have stated many times before, these issues are:

- withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from South Viet-Nam;

- a political settlement which gives the South Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their own future; and

- the proper treatment and early release of prisoners of war held by both sides.

We and the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam have made clear our positions on these issues. We have offered to discuss them with you on a flexible basis and without preconditions.

The question which must be asked—and, in-

August 3, 1970

155

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

POTOMAC CABLE

OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANS

No. 349

July 14,

1970

U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco, in an appearance on NBC's television program, "Meet the Press," July 12, discussed the present situation in the Middle East and U.S. efforts to find a political settlement to the Arab-Israel conflict and made the following points.

There is a danger that events in the Middle East can develop in such a way that they could lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the moment the U.S. is pursuing a very important political initiative to try to get the Arabs and Israelis to stop shooting and start talking. This is the best way at the moment to try to alleviate the difficult situation.

The Soviets are pursuing a political strategy in the Middle East bulwarked by increasing military involvement which has injected a new qualitative factor into the strategic situation. The balance has been affected by the more direct Soviet involvement. In this context, both the President and Secretary of State have made it very clear that the U.S. will do whatever is necessary to assure that the balance does not tip against Israel. For this reason it is important for the U.S. to approach the question from two points of view: to do everything, exhaust every possible way to achieve a political solution, while at the same time making clear the U.S. resolve to remain engaged in this area where it has very important strategic, political and economic interests.

The Soviet Union has been deriving unilateral advantage from the present turmoil in the area. But the Soviet Union, in assessing whether it wants a political solution, must weigh whatever unilateral advantage it has been deriving in recent months against the risk of letting things get out of control -- as they did just before the June war -- and confronting both the Soviet Union and the United States with some very difficult choices indeed.

The U.S. is interested in reducing the Soviet presence in the area. The best possible way to accomplish this is to achieve a political settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides. That means a settlement that protects the security of Israel while meeting the principal concerns of the Arab states, including the Palestinians as well.

The major differences between the U.S. and the Soviet positions revolve around the question of negotiation, the question of peace between the parties, the question of withdrawal, and the question of the refugees.

First, the U.S.

EXCERPTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

FROM REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT AT A
PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE PRESIDENT'S
OFFICE

JULY 20, 1970, 4:13 P. M. EDT

QUESTION:

Mr. President, could we move to the Mid-East for a moment? Can you at all, sir, clarify for us how your various approaches to the problem, both to the area itself and Soviet movement in the area, are proceeding?

THE PRESIDENT:

I would be glad to discuss it. I don't, however, count this as a clarification. I think my position is quite clear.

First, I have always said, as I said on July 1, that our interest is peace in the area and the recognition of the sovereignty and independence of every state in the area.

Second, I pointed out that to maintain peace in the area we felt that it was important to maintain a military balance of power so that no state in the area would be encouraged to launch an offensive against another state or be driven to launching a preemptive strike because of the fear of an offensive or buildup.

Third, I have indicated that the Soviet movement not just of weapons but of men to [the UAR] to man the weapons causes us concern because if that continues that could upset the balance of power. It has not yet been upset, as the Secretary of State has said, but we are watching it closely because if the balance of power is upset then that could have the effect of leading nations on both sides possibly to take action which would lead to another war.

I further pointed out that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned and the United States is concerned that we both wanted to avoid confrontation, we want to avoid a confrontation every place in the world. We want to avoid it in Europe, we want to avoid it in Southeast Asia, and we want to avoid it in the Mid-East. And that an arms escalation, and particularly

- 2 -

the insertion of troops, men, into the Mid-East increases the risks of a confrontation, a confrontation that neither side wants. That is why we are putting such emphasis on our peace initiative. That is why we have not announced any sale of planes or delivery of planes to Israel at this time because we want to give that peace initiative every chance to succeed.

Now, one other point that I think is worth, shall we say--I will accept the word clarifying in this respect--I know that there was some concern expressed about the use of the word "expelled" in one of the backgrounders that was given. I read the backgrounder and I support exactly what was said because what we meant to say there was simply this: that in any peace settlement once a peace settlement is made then there will be no need for the forces of other nations to be in these countries.

The use of the word "expelled" was not with the idea of using armed force for that purpose but to negotiate any peaceful settlement, the removal of these forces which if they remain there we believe might increase the chance of a confrontation.

I suppose that needs to be clarified again..

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 20, 1970

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 4:13 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: While they are taking their pictures, I will say this will be on the record for direct quotation. A transcript will be furnished immediately after the conference so you will have it for your stories, if you desire it.

Because we will not have pictures during the course of the conference, and no recording will be made, no requests of equal time will be honored.

In respect to the California schedule, we plan on this trip to have a major meeting on national defense policy in terms of our national defense budget in which Dr. Kissinger, Secretary Laird and Secretary Packard will participate on Monday. In the balance of the week, we are having meetings of the Domestic Policy Council with particular relationship to the problems we will confront in the 1972 budget.

These will be the first meetings on the '72 budget and will be mainly planning meetings in which we will take a long view with regard to what the budget may be.

We look forward to your questions.

QUESTION: Do you expect to balance the budget, Mr. President? Do you expect to have a balanced budget or do you think you will be working with a ---

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our budget for the year 1970 will not be in balance; and our budget for the year 1971 will not be in balance. We announced that in February. That would have been the case even without the additional problem we confront of the Congress not enacting the tax legislation that we have requested and the Congress adding to appropriations requests above the amounts that we recommended.

As far as 1972 is concerned, whether that budget can be balanced will depend upon two factors: One, the restraint that the Congress shows now in this session with regard to spending, because what happens now will have a great delayed impact on the 1972 spending programs; and, second, the economic situation. We expect the economy to be moving upward for the last half of this year and to continue to move upward during fiscal 1972. But those are the two major items that will determine whether the budget in 1972 will be balanced.

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(OVER)

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Our goal in a period when the economy will be working at full employment, which is to say, can achieve during fiscal year 1972, is, of course, to operate with a balanced budget.

QUESTION: Mr. President, won't Secretary of State Rogers take part in the Monday meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: No. The Secretary of State is going to be at the Bohemian Grove over the weekend and will not be there for that meeting. That meeting is solely with regard to the Defense budget and its implications. It does not have to do with Defense policy insofar as it would affect foreign policy.

The Secretary of State, however, will participate in other meetings later in the week over the weekend. I think he is coming to California on Thursday or Friday, later in the week.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you anticipate being able to cut the Defense budget some more in fiscal '72?

THE PRESIDENT: It would be very difficult. I know that it is fashionable to suggest that as we face these increased spending programs in the domestic field, that Congress seems intent upon enacting, that we can just take it out of Defense. Well, there is very little left to take out of Defense.

I do not mean that some efficiencies may not be brought about. But I do suggest that when we look at the Defense budget we find that our national priorities have already changed.

I was looking at the percentages just this morning and found that in 1962, during the Kennedy Administration, 48 percent of the budget went for Defense and 29 percent for non-Defense programs. By 1968, it was still 44 percent for Defense and 34 percent for non-Defense programs. Now it is 41 percent for non-Defense programs in our '71 budget and 37 percent for Defense purposes.

As these priorities have been reordered, it has meant that the Defense budget has been cut. It was one and one-tenths billion dollars less in 1970 than in the previous year. And our budget for 1971 is, as you know, $5-1/2 billion less than for last year.

We will still try to cut in Defense as well as in other areas. But to suggest that the money for big, new domestic spending programs can come out of substantial cuts in Defense, I think is not realistic.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, in your television conversation a couple of weeks back, you said that Ambassador Bruce would be receiving new instructions for the negotiations in Paris.

Does that mean that our negotiating position in Paris is going to change, and if so, would you tell us what the new instructions would be?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I, of course, would not tell you what the new instructions were because Ambassador Bruce, as the negotiator, must reflect those instructions at a time and in a way that he thinks would be helpful to negotiations.

I will only say at this time that we are giving Ambassador Bruce great latitude to discuss all of the proposals that we have made both in public and in private sessions to the North Vietnamese and the V.C. in addition to the discussion of the proposals they have made and also to recommend to us any new approaches that he believes might be helpful in pursuing the negotiations.

With regard to the specific matters that Ambassador Bruce will discuss, these are subjects we are planning to take up in our meeting with him perhaps tomorrow, but in advance of the negotiation, of course, it would not be helpful to his negotiating position to indicate what he was going to do.

QUESTION: Mr. President, Mr. Weinberger said last week that he would like to see some part of any savings, any surplus go into a tax deduction. Is that realistic in the foreseeable future?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Weinberger was speaking of the long run, I think, rather than the short run. I had a long talk with him and, of course, with Mr. Shultz who have their new responsibilities in the budget area, and when we speak of the possibilities of tax reduction, I think it would not be fair to the American people to suggest that we can have a tax reduction in 1971 and 1972.

Looking beyond that time, the international situation might change, our economic growth might exceed the present estimates and under those circumstances we, of course, might consider tax reduction. But it is not realistic to suggest that it would be in '71 or '72.

QUESTION: Mr. President, is there a significant difference between this Government's view of the political future of the Saigon regime and President Thieu's view of it as expressed in his interview yesterday?

THE PRESIDENT: No, there is not. I understand, I think, why President Thieu indicated concern about the use of the word coalition. Coalition is a code word in international settlements and wherever there have been coalition governments that include Communists, it usually means that the Communists' view has, of course, prevailed and eventually expelled, if I may use that term too, expelled the non-communists from the government.

Now, I stated the position with regard to coalition

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government at considerable length in San Clemente on July 1.
In the negotiations there will not be an imposed coalition
government on South Vietnam. The government of South Vietnam
must be one that is chosen by the people of South Vietnam. It
will be one and should be one that reflects the political forces
in South Vietnam. How those forces would be represented in the
parliament, for example, in other respects is something to be work-
ed out by the people of South Vietnam and by the elected repre-
sentatives and elected leaders of South Vietnam. But under no
circumstances does this Government stand for the proposition that
we would attempt to negotiate an imposed coalition government
in South Vietnam.

QUESTION: Could I follow that up for a moment? When
you used the expression "free decision," did you mean to imply
it should be reached through something other than elections, be-
cause President Thieu seems to suggest that the only way the
political outcome in South Vietnam will be determined is through
elections?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I was referring to the fact that
free decision did reflect elections.

QUESTION: It was equivalent?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. There should be free elections.
But as President Thieu has indicated, the Communists can parti-
cipate in those elections, they can participate in the election
supervisory bodies and he has also indicated that he would accept
the result of the election, whatever that result might be.

Once the election has been held, then what government
comes out of that election is something to be worked out by the
elected officials. But it should not be determined in advance
of the people indicating what kind of government they want.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, if I could get clear on this, do you mean by that that a political settlement which would be negotiated by the various Vietnamese parties, including the present government, would not be acceptable?

THE PRESIDENT: No. That is another matter. When you were suggesting that the present Vietnamese parties, as they are represented in the legislative body of South Vietnam, which has been elected by the people, if those parties should negotiate a settlement with other political parties, that is certainly something that is a decision by the people of South Vietnam.

QUESTION: I was referring, sir, to the Government of South Vietnam as it is represented in Paris and the other parties that are represented in Paris--settlement in that forum.

THE PRESIDENT: A settlement in that forum would seem to be highly improbable. And I think perhaps it serves no interest to speculate as to whether that would happen.

President Thieu has indicated that he in that forum would not agree to a coalition government.

QUESTION: Mr. President, how do you view the trade bill that seems to be developing in the House Ways and Means Committee, and if it contains the provisions that apparently will be voted on, would you veto it, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I would certainly veto it, if it contains the provisions which I did not recommend. Speaking in general terms, first, quota legislation, mandatory quota legislation, is not in the interest of the United States. We an exporting Nation rather than an importing Nation. It would mean in the end, while it would save some jobs, it would cost us more jobs in the exports that would be denied us, the export markets that would be denied us; and, second, even more important, it is highly inflationary, as anybody who has studied tariffs and quotas through the years is well aware.

Consequently, I have always opposed quota legislation as a general proposition.

In the case of textiles, for 16 months we have been attempting to negotiate a voluntary quota agreement with Japan without success and also with other nations. In view of that lack of success, and in view of the enormous importance of the textile industry to this country, the fact that one out of eight workers in manufacturing is in textiles, we feel that for the Congress to pass a limited bill dealing with textiles only and providing that mandatory quotas will come into effect and will remain in effect only if voluntary quotas are not negotiated, we believe that that approach is acceptable.

But if the bill goes beyond that, if it, for example, includes other items, I would not be able to sign the bill because that would set off a trade war which would have all the repercussions that I have tried to describe earlier.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, are we in the situation, getting back to the Vietnam situation, where the South Vietnamese Government has in effect vetoed certain advances that we would like to make, new initiatives?

THE PRESIDENT: No, not at all. The South Vietnamese Government has been very cooperative. They have agreed to free elections. They have agreed to accept free elections, something the Government of North Vietnam, of course, has never agreed to in North Vietnam. They have agreed to discuss and negotiate cease fire on a national basis. As far as this talk about coalition government is concerned, I want to be quite categorical. I have always said that in South Vietnam, we will negotiate without conditions except with regard to one condition: and that is the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their future.

Imposing a coalition government upon them, one which they had not chosen themselves, would be in violation of that principle. That we will not accept. But this is not a case of South Vietnam vetoing our initiatives.

QUESTION: Mr. President, following that up, does Mr. Thieu's statement that Communist candidates would not be allowed in the election, does that fit in with your belief that there should be a free election in South Vietnam to determine its future?

THE PRESIDENT: I have read his statements in context of the general proposals that he and his government have made, along with the proposals we have made in the Paris talks. And those proposals have indicated that all political parties in South Vietnam could participate in the political process. And I do not understand that President Thieu has departed from that proposition.

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THE PRESIDENT: Sure. I don't want to go.

QUESTION: Can you at all, sir, clarify for us how your various approaches to the problem, both to the area itself and Soviet movement in the area, are proceeding?

Third, I have indicated that the Soviet movement not just of weapons but of men to Vietnam(sic) to man, the weapons causes us concern because if that continues that could upset the balance of power. It has not yet been upset, as the Secretary of State has said, but we are watching it closely because if the balance of power is upset then that could have the effect of leading nations on both sides possibly to take action which would lead to another war.

I further pointed out that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned and the United States is concerned that we both wanted to avoid confrontation, we want to avoid a confrontation every place in the world. We want to avoid it in Europe, we want to avoid it in Southeast Asia, and we want to avoid it in the Mid-East. And that an arms escalation, and particularly the insertion of troops, men, into the Mid-East increases the risks of a confrontation, a confrontation that neither side wants. That is why we are putting such emphasis on our peace initiative. That is why we have not announced any sale of planes or delivery of planes to Israel at this time because we want to give that peace initiative every chance to succeed.

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Page 8

Now, one other point that I think is worth, shall we say -- I will accept the word clarifying in this respect. -- I know that there was some concern expressed about the use of the word "expelled" in one of the backgrounders that was given. I read the backgrounder and I support exactly what was said because what we meant to say there was simply this: that in any peace settlement, once a peace settlement is made then there will be no need for the forces of other nations to be in these countries.

QUESTION: Mr. President, are you concerned about southern reaction to the Administration's school desegregation policy, particularly since Senator Thurmond's speech the other day?

THE PRESIDENT: I am not surprised at the reaction, but I believe that as thoughtful people in the South consider not only what we have done in the past but what we do in the future they will recognize that we finally have in this country what the South has wanted and what the South deserves, a one-nation policy -- not a southern strategy and not a northern strategy, but a one-nation strategy.

As far as the South is concerned, the statement that Senator Thurmond made partially objected to an action we have not taken and have no intention of taking, and that is of sending vigilante squads, in effect, from the Justice Department, lawyers, in to coerce the southern school districts to integrate. We have not done that; we are not going to do that.

Our approach is one of recognizing this terribly difficult problem of cooperating with the educational leaders and other leaders in the South in bringing them into compliance with the law of the land as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. Our policy, in other words, is cooperation rather than coercion.

Now I would say finally that I know that some people in the South would prefer a policy that was perhaps not as even handed as this, but I believe this is the right policy insofar as carrying out the Constitutional mandates are concerned. I think it also is the fair policy. I think in the long run, too, it is in the interest of the South, because when we look at this difficult school problem there cannot be instant integration, but segregation must be ended. That is the law of the land and it is necessary for us to go forward and to end it with a transition period which will be as least difficult as possible.

That is what we are trying to work out. That is one of the reasons we are trying to, as you know, obtain $1-1/2 billion out of the budget for this year and next year to cushion that transition period from segregated to non-segregated education.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, is there any movement
in our relations with Mainland China?

THE PRESIDENT: No. As you know, there was slight
movement before in the meetings we had in Warsaw. We are
still hopeful that those meetings will be resumed.

But I have nothing to report on any movement toward
resuming them at this point, although we think there is a
chance they may be moving.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you said that the Cambodian
operation has smoothed the way or helped the course of the
Vietnamization. Do you think you will be able to increase the
increment of the 50,000 troop withdrawal that you have
announced between now and October 15?

THE PRESIDENT: I have nothing to say on that at
this time. We are going to examine this situation as time
goes on -- I know you get tired of hearing this -- based on
the three criteria of progress in Paris, if any, and the
level of enemy activity and the progress in the training of the
South Vietnamese.

At the present time, however, our plans are to go
forward with our 150,000 withdrawal to be completed during
the spring of next year. In the event that there is progress
on any of these three fronts which will justify our moving
faster, you can be sure that we will move faster.

Incidentally, one factor that is encouraging in this
general area was the fact that I was looking at this morning:
In the three weeks since the Cambodian action was completed
on July 1, American casualties were the lowest of any three-
week period in the last four years.

That still is too many. One is too many. But the
fact that we have come that far is some accomplishment.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you have any concern
that your staff might have ..you isolated, as has been charged
in some news columns?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I isolate them. No: as a
matter of fact, I not only see my staff, but I see a great
number of people who come in representing all points of view.

As a matter of fact, we have been checking on that
since the suggestion was made that I was isolated.
And some members of my staff believe that perhaps I have
been having too heavy a schedule in that respect. However,
I intend to continue as heavy a schedule as I can, talking
to all people representing various points of view.

I am generally, incidentally, a very good listener,
except in a press conference.

QUESTION: Mr. President, last Friday, I believe,
you had a report from Dr. Heard on the problems of campus

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unrest and your Commission, headed by Governor Scranton, has been studying this problem. There have been some indications that they think that the Administration itself ought to do something to still the problems on the campuses.

What is your feeling about what you may be able to do before the schools open in the fall to help alleviate this problem?

THE PRESIDENT: I would rather wait until Dr. Heard has an opportunity to make his conclusions public, which I asked him to do after we met--and I understand he will make those conclusions public sometime this week--and until after the Scranton Commission makes some recommendations.

I noted that the Scranton Commission hearings had been interpreted by some as indicating that the evidence was mounting to a conclusion that one way to bring peace on the campus was to end the war in Vietnam.

Well, that of course would not be news. I am not sure that it would bring peace on the campus. But I would have to respond to that in this way: I want peace on the campus, but my major obligation is to adopt policies that I consider will bring peace to the world.

And for that reason I have to reject the easy and sometimes tempting road of a quick and easy solution ending the war in Vietnam, because I want to end it in a way that we can have a better chance for a lasting peace and not in a way that will encourage the forces of aggression in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been speculation recently that American forces or South Vietnamese forces are planning a Cambodian type operation into Laos. I know that you can't talk about future operations in this sort of thing.

But can you tell us if our policy precludes American troops launching a Cambodian style operation into Laos?

THE PRESIDENT: I think I answered that question when I issued my rather long Laotian statement you will recall earlier this spring.

Our actions in Laos will be directed toward interdicting the flow of enemy supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. That is the occupied part of southern Laos. We will use air power for that purpose.

We have no intention of using ground forces for the purpose of interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

QUESTION: Mr. President, how do you now assess the prospects of your Family Assistance Plan getting through the Senate?

THE PRESIDENT: I would probably know more about that after I see what happens in a meeting with some of the Senators today. I put the chances as fair. I expect to meet with our legislative leaders in the morning and may have more to report on that later.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, do you have any travel plans for this year? A year ago at this time you were greeting the Apollo Astronauts in the mid-Pacific. I wondered if you had any plans to do any traveling between now and January 1.

THE PRESIDENT: No, I haven't figured out anything that would top that.

QUESTION: How high do you think unemployment may rise in the interim and in general how strong do you think the recovery of the economy may be this year?

THE PRESIDENT: I wouldn't and should not speculate on that point. We are at really the watershed of economic policy now. That is why I issued the rather strong statement to Congress with regard to appropriations and spending.

I am a political man. I know how popular it is to be for big spending programs in an election year. But I also know that big spenders are only popular as long as they are picking up the check -- when somebody else picks up the check they become very unpopular -- and when the American people learn that the big spenders in Congress are primarily responsible for higher prices, and eventually even higher taxes. I think that the American people will turn on the big spenders politically.

Let me put that into context with the question of employment. We are at a situation now where we finally see as we look at the wholesale price index and at the inflator figures that came out, which of course were the broader price index figures a few days ago, that the inflation has cooled.

I believe, and all of the economic experts tell me that I can predict this, that that leveling of the rise in wholesale prices will be reflected as the year goes on in a downturn of the rate of increase in the consumer price index. However, at the same time, as we do that, we find that the economy as it has cooled has inevitably had some upturn in unemployment and also this upturn has been greater than would usually be the case in moving from an inflation to an economy with price stability or realtime price stability.

This situation has been aggravated by the fact that we have been moving from a wartime to a peacetime economy. As I have pointed out, 700,000 men out of the Armed Services and defense plants had added to the unemployment roles.

We think this is a cost worth paying, however. We want, however, to cushion that transition as much as we can.

Looking on through the summer, I think I could probably better, with more precision, speak of the last half of the year. The economic experts, with whom I have been meeting quite regularly here, indicate that the last half of the year will definitely see the economy turning up. And as all of you have noted, there have been some indications, both in the indicators, not all of the indicators, but a majority of those that people watch, and also among the economic analysts that the downturn has bottomed out and that the last half of the year will see an increase in productivity and an upturn in the economy.

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PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 11

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

8:00 P.M. PDT

July 30, 1970

Thursday

Century Plaza Hotel
Los Angeles, California

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, we are having trouble with the audio. I hope all of you, when you ask your questions, you will ask them quite loudly.

This press conference is one that is being held for the first time, while I have been President, outside of Washington. We want to welcome all of the members of the California press. We will follow the usual format of White House press conferences, with the first two questions going to the Wire Services, and then we will try to cover as many others as we can.

Mr. Cormier?

QUESTION: Could you give us an update on the very fast moving developments in the Middle East; particularly, have we heard from Israel in response to your peace proposal?

THE PRESIDENT: We have not heard from Israel on our submission. As you know, we have heard from the Jordanians and the UAR, and the Israelis have been considering the matter in the Cabinet sessions. We are hopeful that Israel will join the UAR and Jordan on the peace initiative.

Some concern has been expressed by Israeli Government officials that if they agree to a cease fire, they run the risk of having a military build-up occur during the cease fire. We and others have attempted to assure them that that would not be the case. If there is a cease fire, a natural proposition connected with that and in consideration with that will be that there will be a military standstill during that period.

As far as Israeli's position is concerned, I indicated on July 1 in the broadcast with Network commentators from Los Angeles the position of this Government insofar as Israel security is concerned, and our commitment to maintain the balance of power in the Mideast. Seventy-one Senators have endorsed that proposition in a letter to me which I received yesterday.

In view of that position, which was stated then and which I will not go into now, I believe that Israel can agree to the cease fire and can agree to negotiations without fear that by those negotiations her position may be compromised or deteriorated in that respect.

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Page 4

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have said that you are in accord with President Thieu on peace initiatives. Does that mean that we agree with him that there could be no candidate who would support a coalition government, and there would be no Communists who would run in an election that would result to try to settle the war?

THE PRESIDENT: Miss Thomas, the position of President Thieu there with regard to a Communist not being on the ballot is purely a matter of semantics. Under the South Vietnamese Constitution, a Communist cannot run for office.

On the other hand, President Thieu has specifically agreed that those who are members of the NLF, who of course represent the Communists in South Vietnam, could run as members of the NLF on the ballot.

Now, as far as President Thieu's attitude on a coalition government is concerned, it is the same as ours. A coalition government should not be imposed upon the people of South Vietnam without their consent. If the people of South Vietnam, by election, elect people who then choose to form a coalition government, that is a matter, of course, that we will except.

QUESTION: To pursue the question of our military preparedness a bit further, twice within the past week statements have been made by high ranking naval officers, Admiral Rickover and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, to the effect that our military preparedness is suspect. They went further. Each gentleman said that in his opinion it is doubtful that we could win a war with the Soviet Union. Given the eminence of these gentlemen, as Commander-in-Chief, how do you regard the validity of those statements?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I would first react by saying that if there is a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, there will be no winners; there will be only losers. The Soviet Union knows that and we know that.

That is the reason why it is vitally important that in areas like the Mideast we attempt to avoid to the greatest extent possible being dragged into a confrontation by smaller powers, even though our interests in the area are very, very great. That is why it is very much in our interests in the SALT talks to work out an arrangement if we can, one which will provide for the interests of both and yet not be in derogation of the necessity of our having sufficiency and their having sufficiency.

There is one other point I would make very briefly and that is this: What the Soviet Union needs in terms of military preparedness is different from what we need. They are a land power primarily, with a great potential enemy on the East. We are primarily, of course, a sea power and our needs, therefore, are different. But what is important now is to find a way to stop this escalation of arms on both sides, and that is why we have hopes in the SALT talks which, I emphasize again, do not involve disarmament for the U. S. or the Soviet Union, but do involve a limitation and then eventually a mutual reduction.

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MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1970

for this appropriation or that one, appropriations and spending that would benefit some of the people but that would cost all of the people in higher taxes and higher prices.

I have to represent all of the people and that is why I am going to make some hard decisions, vetoing some popular measures if I believe that those measures would result in increasing prices or require an increase in taxes.

On that last front, we can avoid an increase in taxes and we can avoid an inflationary budget in 1972 but only if we get the cooperation of the Congress in these next 2 or 3 months. This is the critical time. If the Congress does not cooperate in holding down spending, it will be necessary then to look hard about where we are going to find the money and that means more taxes. But if the Congress cooperates we can avoid it.

## VIETNAM POLICY

Q. How do you reconcile the position of the United States that we are not bent on a military victory in Indonesia with the statement that was made yesterday by President Nguyen Van Thieu that he is looking for a military victory within the next 3 years, and also he says that he is against a coalition government in Vietnam whether that is imposed or negotiated. In other words, to what extent are we the independent authors of American foreign policy and to what extent are we subservient to President Thieu?

THE PRESIDENT. We are opposed to a coalition government negotiated or imposed. We are for a government which is consented to by the people of South Vietnam. If that government happens to be one that has Communists in it, and it is their choice, we do not have objection and neither does President Thieu, as I understand it.

Now, as far as President Thieu is concerned, when he speaks of victory for his government and the people of South Vietnam, he is referring, of course, to what will happen in Vietnam over the long haul, assuming there is not a negotiated settlement.

As far as we are concerned, we have a program of Vietnamization. We are withdrawing our forces. Just as soon as the South Vietnamese are able to defend the country without our assistance, we will be gone.

But then if at that time the South Vietnamese still have not worked out a negotiated settlement with their enemy, then it is certainly up to the South Vietnamese to determine whether they are going to negotiate with the enemy or seek a victory, that would be President Thieu's decision.

## BRINGING THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PEOPLE

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Horner?

Q. Mr. President, this press conference in Los Angeles is sort of a climax to a series of activities that you have described as bringing the Government to the people, such as your recent meetings in Louisville, Fargo, Salt Lake City, and your work at the Western White House at San Clemente.

What benefits do you see to you and to the country from such activities?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I hope there is benefit to the country. I believe there is benefit in bringing the White House to San Clemente or to Fargo or to Louisville.

I note, for example, some comments to the effect that I leave the White House too often. I think that all of my predecessors would agree with this statement: A President never leaves the White House. The White House always goes with him wherever he is. It must go with him, and it is with him wherever he is.

I think it is very important for the people of California, for example, to know the White House, to participate, for example, like this in a Presidential press conference.

I think that also the other side of the coin is vitally important to those of us in Government. Everyone of the members of the Cabinet who have participated in one of these regional meetings come away making this very significant statement, and it is that when they meet with people in the country, those individuals, whether they are Governors or mayors or representatives of citizens' groups, talk much more freely than they do when they are in the Cabinet Room or in the President's office in Washington, D.C., or even in their offices in the various departments.

I think this whole program of bringing Government to the people can be served by having the White House go to the country from time to time and, of course, we can handle Federal business from here with rapid communications just as effectively as we do in Washington.

Reporter. Thank you.

NOTE: President Nixon's eleventh news conference was held at 8 p.m., P.d.t., on Thursday, July 30, 1970, in the Santa Monica Room of the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles, Calif. The news conference was broadcast on television and radio.

# The Situation in the Middle East

The President's Remarks on Acceptance by the Governments Concerned of the United States Proposal for a Cease-Fire and Negotiations.

July 31, 1970

Ladies and gentlemen:

As you know, the Secretary of State and I have been meeting for the past two hours and a half on various foreign policy matters, but particularly concentrating on the problems of the Mideast. The Secretary has made a report to me on the latest developments, and I have a prepared statement which will be issued to all of you immediately after this statement.

With regard to the developments in the Mideast, as you know, on June 25th the Secretary announced that

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the United States was undertaking a major political initiative, and our objective was to encourage the parties to the conflict to stop shooting and to start talking under the auspices of the United Nations Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the pertinent resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.

The Israeli Government is now in the process of drafting its detailed reply to the United States. However, I am pleased to say that we have been informed by the Government of Israel of the cabinet vote to accept the United States proposal, and I am gratified that now all three governments to whom we addressed our initiative have responded positively and accepted the U.S. proposal.

We do not underestimate the difficulties which still lie ahead. The acceptance of the U.S. proposal by the governments principally concerned, important as it is, is only a first step. It will require moderation, flexibility, and a willingness by both sides to accept something less than their maximum positions if progress toward a just and lasting peace between the parties is to be made. But the cease-fire and the negotiations that now seem within reach are an essential beginning.

In this connection I want to reiterate one point, a point that I made last night in my press conference. It is an integral part of our cease-fire proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire period to improve its military position in the area of the cease-fire lines. All would have to refrain from emplacing new missiles or other installations and from undertaking a military buildup of any kind in such an area.

For our part, we have been engaged since early 1969 in cooperative efforts with the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France to help move the Middle East conflict toward a peaceful settlement. We expect these efforts to continue. We firmly believe, however, that the focus of future efforts must be on the parties directly concerned under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring's mission. We wish him and the parties well in their efforts, and we stand ready to help whenever and wherever we can.

In that connection, in the same area, we have made two appointments to ambassadorial positions today, two of our most distinguished and able Ambassadors. To Jordan, Mr. Dean Brown, and to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Nicholas Thacher.

I will say finally, that I believe that all of those who have worked on this initiative within our own Government and particularly those in the State Department, deserve a great deal of credit for the progress that has been made.

As we have indicated, we still have a long way to go before we achieve the results that we hope can be achieved. But in a situation where a year and a half ago there seemed to be no hope, there now appears some hope—some hope that a peaceful settlement can be arrived at.

NOTE: The President spoke at 12:13 p.m., P.d.t., at the San Clemente Inn in San Clemente, Calif. As printed above, this item

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

July 31, 1970

As you know on June 25 the Secretary announced that the United States
was undertaking a major political initiative, and our objective was to
encourage the parties to the conflict to stop shooting and start talking
under the auspices of United Nations Ambassador Jarring in accordance
with the pertinent resolutions of the UN Security Council.

The Israeli Government is now in the process of drafting its detailed
reply to the U. S. However, I am pleased to say that we have been
informed by the Government of Israel of the Cabinet vote to accept
the U. S. proposal and I am gratified that now all three governments
to whom we have addressed our initiative have responded positively
and have accepted the U. S. proposal.

We do not underestimate the difficulties which still lie ahead. The
acceptance of the U. S. proposal by the governments principally
concerned--important as it is--is only a first step. It will require
moderation, flexibility, and a willingness by both sides to accept
something less than their maximum positions if progress toward a
just and lasting peace between the parties is to be made. But the
cease-fire and negotiations that now seem within reach are an
essential beginning.

In this connection, I want to reiterate one point, a point I made last
night at my press conference. It is an integral part of our cease-fire
proposal that neither side is to use the cease-fire period to improve
its military position in the area of the cease-fire lines. All would
have to refrain from emplacing new missiles or other installations
and from undertaking a military build-up of any kind in such an area.

For our part, we have been engaged since early 1969 in cooperative
efforts with the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and
France to help move the Middle East conflict toward a peaceful
settlement. We expect these efforts to continue. We firmly believe,
however, that the focus of future efforts must be on the parties
directly concerned under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring's
mission. We wish Ambassador Jarring and the parties well in their
efforts and stand ready to help wherever and whenever we can.

-2-

As we have indicated, we still have a long way to go before we achieve the results that we hope can be achieved. But in a situation where a year and a half ago there seemed to be no hope there now appears some hope, that a peaceful settlement can be arrived at.

Statement made by Department spokesman at 1:45 p.m.,
August 7, in the name of the Secretary

We have just been informed by the Governments
of the United Arab Republic and Israel of their
acceptance of the United States proposal for a
standstill ceasefire to come into effect at
2200 Greenwich mean time today, Friday, August 7.

We welcome this statesmanlike action taken
by the leaders of the Governments concerned. We
hope this important decision will advance the
prospects for a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East.