AMBASSADE DE FRANCE

SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y. REgent 7-9700

SPEECHES & PRESS CONFERENCES
No. 217

February 21, 1965

TEXT OF THE INTERVIEW OF M. MAURICE COUVE DE MURVILLE

FRENCH MINSTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ON THE CBS TV NETWORK PROGRAM FACE THE NATION

ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 21, FROM 12:30 TO 1:00 PM

During the Face the Nation interview, the French Foreign Minister was questioned by CBS News Diplomatic Correspondent Marvin Kalb; Max Frankel, Diplomatic Correspondent of the Washington Bureau of the New York Times; and CBS News Correspondent George Herman.

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**George Herman:** "Mr. Couve de Murville, when the average American looks at France he's puzzled, he thinks to himself, 'What has our country done wrong? Why don't the French like us anymore? Why are they trying to get our gold? Why are they blocking us in the United Nations? Why is President de Gaulle trying to kick us out of Europe? Why are they coming up with unorthodox solutions for Vietnam? What have we done wrong?'"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I would say that this is hardly an unexpected question, and maybe I'm here precisely to explain why I believe, personally, that this is a hasty generalization and probably not a very fair judgment."

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**Herman:** "Mr. Couve de Murville, France and America are very important allies in the free world as we face the troubles that beset the free world now. How is the state of our alliance?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I don't think the state of our alliance, between France and the United States, causes any real motive for alarm. We are, as you said, old friends and allies. We have in common a great number of interests and a great number of questions.

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"Sometimes, the interests are not exactly the same, of course. Often the judgments on the questions are different, and the fact is that when that happens we don't hesitate on the French side to say it and to try and explain why our positions are different, the reasons for which our judgments are not the judgments that you have."

**Frankel:** "Mr. Minister, one of the differences of judgments that tends to look like actual friction in the headlines relates to Vietnam.

"May I ask you -- I gather that the French believe that we cannot win militarily the kind of war that the United States is now involved in in South Vietnam. Your country has long experience out there. Is it that you are convinced we must lose? If so, why?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, as you say, we -- it's true that we have had a long and painful experience in Vietnam a number of years ago. Now we are out, and now the responsibilities are no longer ours. To a large extent, they are American responsibilities."

"So, I think it's good and fair on our side, when we discuss with you, to try to explain what is our judgment on this situation -- on the situation -- and the reasons why we think that one course of action would be better than another one."

"I don't -- I wouldn't say at all that you are bound to fail. That's not the question. What happens in Vietnam -- in South Vietnam -- is something very special which is called the guerrilla war."

"Our experience is that this is a war that is very difficult to win by military means, and we think that the origin of a guerrilla war being political problems inside the country, mainly, it is normal that we should try and find a solution by political means rather than by military means."

"That's what we think, generally speaking."

**Kalb:** Mr. Minister, there appears to be still another coup going on in Saigon at this very moment. Do you feel, sir, that the kind of political instability that we find in South Vietnam at the moment makes it at all feasible or even possible for the United States to engage in any kind of negotiations at this time?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, you see, the political instability that you see developing in Vietnam -- the coup of today is not especially important; it is just the prolongation of a situation that you and we know very well about since some time now."

"This political instability is just a manifestation of the fact that what is happening in Vietnam is not just a war in the classical sense of the word, but a guerrilla war, which is something quite different, as I said."

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"And political instability is connected, is linked to the continuation of this guerrilla war to which you must find a political solution, which means you must find a way to bring about all the Vietnamese, because after all it is the Vietnamese people that are in South Vietnam, essentially."

"You must bring them together and try and put them in a position freely to decide what they want their future to be and what they want their future government to be."

**Kalb:** "At the same time, sir, I'm kind of curious about how you would suggest this happen, in view of the fact that the instability is so great. How do you reconcile the American position vis-à-vis that instability and at the same time your own government's position that we would have to engage in negotiations and, I assume, as quickly as possible, in your view?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, we think that the negotiations should be engaged as soon as possible. A long time, in our opinion, has already been lost, and the more we wait the more, of course, the situation deteriorates and the more it is difficult to arrive at a satisfactory settlement."

**Frankel:** "As a nation -- I'm sorry. Did you finish?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Yes, I wanted to add this, that what we believe, also, is that if a negotiation is engaged -- which means a conference of one kind or another -- it will create a new element in the situation, we hope, giving the possibility for a cease-fire and then for political development tending to a normalization in South Vietnam."

**Frankel:** "As a nation which has, certainly, as great a stake as the United States in the total outcome of the Asian confrontation, if not the direct responsibility in Vietnam, does France believe that Western interests would be seriously damaged if a Communist or pro-Communist regime came to power in South Vietnam?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, that is, of course, one of the problems that arise. And, as far as I understand it, one of the main problems -- this possibility is one of the main reasons why, on the American side, one is reluctant about the idea of a negotiation or a conference. It is, of course, something to be envisaged."

"I don't know what's going to be -- nobody can say what's going to be the future, the political future, in South Vietnam. What seems to me essential is that South Vietnam is given independence, freedom, and is in a situation to decide it-self its own future."

**Herman:** "Dividing the question for a moment, leaving aside our part of it, do you think there is any reason why the North Vietnamese, at this season, would want to negotiate, instead of continuing to make the progress they have been making?"

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**Couve de Murville:** "Well, that's another question, to which I, personally, have no answer. You should ask the North Vietnamese, of course, if you want to negotiate with them."

**Herman:** "You..."

**Couve de Murville:** "It seems to me that their interest is to arrive at a peaceful solution, because, in any case, peace will have to come one day, and the sooner, the better."

**Herman:** "How broad do you envision these negotiations? Who would be the parties on each side?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Oh, well, we've always believed that there should be a sort of conference of the type we had previously in Geneva in '61-'62 -- in '54, before, with all the interested countries participating, which, of course, means on the Communist side both the Soviet Union, China -- Peking, China -- and North Vietnam."

**Kalb:** "Mr. Minister, in your view, should there be any preconditions set in advance of the convening of such a conference?"

**Couve de Murville:** "No, I think we should begin discussing and trying in good faith to find a solution."

**Kalb:** "And the other part of that question, sir, do you feel -- have you any indication, on the basis of French experience in Hanoi and Peking, that the other side -- it takes two to negotiate -- is prepared to negotiate?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I can't answer that question. What I can say is that it seems to me to be in their interest, and I don't see why anybody would refuse to negotiate with the view of coming back to what was the situation created by the 1954 Geneva agreement. That seems to me the basis of the negotiation."

**Herman:** "Mr. Minister, it not only takes two to negotiate; it takes two to have diplomatic relations. You've made reference to Peking, as well as to the Soviet Union."

"The United States has frequently watched our brethren in the free world develop relations with Peking and then, sometimes, have very disappointing relations. I was in Hong Kong when the British first developed their relations with Peking and watched their disappointment grow very strong."

"How are France's relations with Peking? Are they fruitful? Are you getting information? Do you have a feeling of the Red Chinese government?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I would say that our relations with Peking develop in a normal way. We have, as you say, diplomatic relations. We have an embassy there. They have an embassy with us. And we have contacts with them in a quite normal way, discussing questions of common interest, as is always the case

(LC)

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when you have diplomatic relations."

**Herman:** "Is there a real dialogue?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Yes, of course,"

**Frankel:** "Mr. Minister, let me ask you, in terms of American-French relations, why is it that France in this case -- that is, China, Vietnam, several European questions -- has been almost dramatic in demonstrating its differences of opinion with Washington. What is your purpose in this?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I don't think that is a very fair judgment. As I said right at the beginning, answering your question, we are saying... and we are saying openly, publicly -- what we think the course of action should be as regards the South Vietnamese problem.

"That has nothing to do with the idea of being unpleasant or disagreeable to the United States or of trying to make things more difficult. On the contrary, we believe that by taking publicly that position on the Western side, it helps further developments in this situation.

"And we think that we are usefully using our relations with you when we tell you quite frankly, quite openly, and even publicly, what we believe. I think it's not what friends should do between themselves to hesitate to say the truth..."

**Kalb:** "Mr. Minister, in terms of..."

**Couve de Murville:** "...or what they believe to be the truth."

**Kalb:** "In terms of a broader Western interest, do you feel, sir, that it could serve that interest for France, at this time, in some capacity, to serve as a go-between between Washington and Peking?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, that's another question which I think I would not be in a position to answer. What I can say, I think, is that we have no direct or special interest now in Vietnam since 1954. Our interest is of a more general kind, and that is called the peace of the world."

**Herman:** "Mr. Minister, to go back to what you were saying about making your suggestions openly, freely, and frankly, it's hard to disagree with that and yet is it not frequently the courtesy among nations to let the other country know quietly, through diplomatic channels, before what Washington now considers the semi-annual bombshell from Paris explodes here?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, on this Southeast Asian question, it's a very very long time -- it's many years -- that your government has been fully informed of what our position is. And if I may remind you what happened some years ago -- that was in 1961 -- we had a discussion of that kind, and it was a public discussion. It was à propos Laos at that time, and then we discussed -- we discussed with our

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other friends, also -- and finally we came to a kind of agreement which permitted us to convene the Geneva conference."

**Frankel:** "Would you tell us sir, from the other side of the Atlantic, what is the feeling in France and in Europe, as you gather it? Is there counterpart feeling that the United States itself has not always been as free with its consultations of its allies, that it has too often undercut them, that its interests are getting obviously different in the world from those of Europe?"

**Couve de Murville:** "I wouldn't say that. What I would say would rather be this: That you are a very big and powerful country, and the countries in Europe are not so big and not so powerful."

"Therefore, it's easier for you to tell us what you think than for us to tell you what we think, and maybe that's partly an answer to the question that was put previously."

**Kalb:** "Mr. Minister, one of the problems concerning this Vietnam dilemma at the moment is just what the Communist response might be. There is, at the moment, a new leadership -- relatively new leadership in the Kremlin."

"I wonder, sir, if you could give us what your assessment is of this leadership's intentions -- one, in Southeast Asia, and, secondly, towards the broader sense of East-West negotiations."

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, there is a new leadership in the Kremlin. That's true. I don't believe that that new leadership has a very different policy from the previous one, which means from the one of Mr. Khrushchev, even if sometimes the methods are not quite the same or not quite so spectacular."

"As regards Southeast Asia, the Russian position has been known since a very long time, and, if I may say, it's not very different from our own position, that is, that the idea of a political settlement is the right one and that it should be brought about by negotiation."

"Now, on the other side, you were speaking of East-West relations. As I said before, I don't think that the new Soviet government is in a different position from the other -- the previous one. I think they still continue to believe in what they call peaceful co-existence, which means the progressive normalization of the relations between them and us."

**Herman:** "Does that normalization mean less pressure on Berlin and on West Germany?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, it seems to me that there should be a strong contradiction between peaceful co-existence and a new Berlin crisis, as the one we have had from 1958 and which led to the building of the wall across Berlin."

[LC]

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**Herman:** "I recall that you said in 1963, I think it was, that you needed -- we needed -- an end to threats on West Berlin and an end to pressure on the highway for a reasonable period in order to achieve some kind of a détente over Berlin.

"Do you think we're approaching that reasonable period?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Yes. You see, we thought that, at that time, as pressure was put on us and as even threats were expressed, the time had not come to negotiate."

**Frankel:** "Do you think..."

**Couve de Murville:** "...that we should negotiate only when there is no pressure or no threat."

**Frankel:** "Yes."

**Couve de Murville:** "So, if there is no pressure or no threat, we're always ready to speak."

**Frankel:** "Do you think that time is now approaching?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, it seems to me that the situation is such now, and, as a matter of fact, for two years now -- really, since the end of the Cuban crisis -- the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have developed enormously and you now have frequent contacts with Soviet leaders."

**Frankel:** "But, do you think it is time to really open up serious negotiations on such subjects as the division of Germany? Are the Soviets ready?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Yes, that's another question. You see, I think you must make a distinction which is only realistic between improving relations -- I said, 'normalizing' relations -- on one side, and settling problems on the other side.

"And, as a matter of fact, the only great problem between us and the Soviets is the German problem, which is the essence of the European problem, the question of what's going to be the future reunified Germany.

"That, of course, is a matter for a long process and long discussions."

* * * * *

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**Herman:** "Mr. Foreign Minister, in the light of your remarks about the lessening tension, the lessening frictions, between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the Eastern world, do you think there is still a need for a large American military presence on the continent?"

**Couve de Murville:** "That, of course, is a very important question.

"Let me say, first of all, that I think, generally speaking, for the peace of the world -- which means, really, for maintaining the balance of power in the world -- the alliance between Western Europe and North America -- which is really what the Atlantic Alliance is -- continues to be necessary, and probably will be necessary for a very long time to come."

"Now, there is that consequence of the Alliance which is the presence of American troops -- important contingents of American troops -- in Western Europe. I think that for the time being it is still very important to maintain this American military presence in our region of Europe."

**Herman:** "Do you think it should be retained as an independent American force, or should it be unified with the European forces around it into a NATO force that is well-homogenized?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Ah, that's the old question of so-called integration. I think that in any case, you know, the American troops will be always American troops."

**Frankel:** Under what circumstances can you imagine the Americans beginning, at least, to withdraw some of those troops?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, that's a question to which, for the time being, I think I couldn't give an answer."

**Frankel:** "Would the development of France's nuclear power or a European nuclear power be relevant to that?"

**Couve de Murville:** "No, I don't think so, because whatever nuclear force there is in France, it's for the future. At present, it doesn't change anything in the balance of power in Europe."

**Kalb:** "Mr. Minister, do you feel that some of the problems that France has with the United States could profitably be taken care of at a meeting between President de Gaulle and President Johnson?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Oh, yes. Of course, I think such a meeting would be very useful."

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**Kalb:** "And, in the course of your conversations this past week with President Johnson, could you tell us whether such a meeting was arranged for this summer?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I already had the opportunity of saying that this question was not 'really discussed' between President Johnson and myself, and it seems to me now, speaking on my own behalf, that for the time being it probably will be very difficult for President Johnson to have a fixed schedule for the months to come."

**Herman:** "Mr. Foreign Minister, the problems of France are not just the United States. You also have neighbors closer at home. President Kennedy is quoted as having said that part of the needs of your policy is tension with America for your other doings. Is that true?"

**Couve de Murville** (laughing): "No. I think it's a little bit of a caricature of what our policy is. Our policy is certainly to act as a free and independent state. That has nothing to do with the fact of having or not having good relations or difficulties with the United States as long as, I believe, the United States consider us also as a free and independent country."

**Herman:** "Is it necessary or is it an easy way to prove freedom and independence to make explosive statements, or is this purely an internal matter?"

**Couve de Murville:** "Well, I would say it is neither internal nor explosive. Why should it be explosive to say what one thinks?"

**Herman:** "The only thing I can say is that it sometimes astounds the hearers, and I'm terribly sorry to say that our time is up, and I want to thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister, for being here to answer our questions, being here to face the Nation."