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Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee:

## The Shifting Military Balance

I have a long-standing personal commitment to the process of limiting strategic nuclear arms. As an historian I am conscious of the lessons of World War II when a global war resulted because the democracies disdained to maintain the balance of power. But equally we must not forget the tragedy of World War I: when disaster resulted even with an equilibrium of power, when technology and rivalry outran the control of statesmen.

Thus I regret to have to say that the present Treaty comes up for ratification at a time of grave danger to our national security and to the global equilibrium. The military balance is beginning to tilt ominously against the United States in too many significant categories of weaponry, and this is bound to have grave political consequences. The unprecedented Soviet use of proxy forces in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, and the turmoil caused by radical forces and terrorist organizations sponsored by Moscow's friends, mark ours as a time of profound upheaval. We have learned painfully that we alone cannot be the world's policeman. But neither our moral values nor our safety can tolerate the Soviet Union's increasing tendency toward global intervention. As the United States nurses its wounds after Vietnam, radical forces are threatening regional stability and attempting the violent overthrow of moderate governments friendly to the West. If present trends continue, we face the chilling prospect of a world sliding gradually out of control, with our relative military power declining, with our economic lifeline vulnerable to blackmail, with hostile forces growing more rapidly than our ability to deal with them, and with fewer and fewer nations friendly to us surviving.

For about the first twenty-five years of the postwar period, the problem of maintaining the military equilibrium was relatively straightforward. The Soviet Union was always superior in ground forces on the Eurasian continent; we were vastly ahead in strategic striking power as well as in theater nuclear forces. The reach of the Soviet Union was limited to regions accessible to motorized ground transport, generally adjacent territories in Europe and to some extent China. Africa, most of the Middle East, even Southeast Asia were beyond the capacity of major Soviet military intervention. And the areas which were hostage to Soviet ground armies were protected by three factors:

- First, by the American preponderance in strategic nuclear striking power capable of disarming the Soviet Union or at least

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reducing its counterblow to tolerable levels while still retaining large residual forces for attacks on industrial targets;

-- Second, by a vast American superiority in so-called theater nuclear forces everywhere around the Soviet periphery.

-- And thirdly, in Europe by substantial American and allied ground forces that posed at least a major probability that Soviet ground attack would trigger the nuclear retaliation of the United States.

Not surprisingly, the major crises in the first twenty years of the postwar period--whether in Berlin, Korea, or Cuba--were ultimately contained, because the risks of pushing them beyond a certain point always appeared exorbitant to Moscow.

This state of affairs will soon have ceased to exist. It is imperative that we recognize without illusion that a continuation of these dangerous trends will leave us helpless in future crises and unable to shape events. It is crucial that we begin now to rectify the trends that are emerging.

There is now general agreement that their improvements in missile accuracy and warhead technology will put the Soviets in a position to destroy our land-based forces of Minuteman ICBMs by 1982. Whether this capability is ever exercised or not--and I consider it improbable--it reverses and hence revolutionizes the strategic equation on which our security and that of our friends have depended through most of the postwar period. My principal worry is not only this growing vulnerability of our land-based forces--though this must be remedied--but the growing invulnerability of Soviet land-based forces. The deterrent effect of our strategic forces in defense of allies will continually decline; our strategic forces will surely lose their ability to offset the Soviet capacity for regional intervention. And this capacity will be reinforced by the growing edge in Soviet theater nuclear forces, a naval and airlift capability which immeasurably extends the reach and preponderance of Soviet conventional power.

As I said, it is not necessary for present purposes to debate whether the Soviet Union would in fact run a risk of war on the global level; it will be grave enough if the Soviet willingness to run risks in regional conflicts is magnified. And that seems to me the minimum consequence of what is ahead. The side that can defend its interests only by threatening to initiate the mutual mass extermination of civilians will gradually slide towards strategic, and therefore eventually geopolitical, paralysis. The consequence, to put it bluntly, is that in the 1980's regional conflicts--whether deliberately promoted or not--threaten increasingly to grow

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out of control unless we drastically reverse the trend. We cannot possibly continue to gamble with inferior forces for regional defense, a shifting balance in theater nuclear forces, vulnerable land-based strategic forces, and invulnerable Soviet ICBMs without courting the gravest dangers to our interests and to our allies.

## Recommendations

I must conclude that I have serious reservations about the Protocol, which limits only American systems, and systems relevant to the theater nuclear balance, with no reciprocity. As for the Treaty, I conclude that its terms do not improve our strategic situation--but neither do they prevent our remedying it during the remaining six years of its life. Undoubtedly it imposes some inhibitions on us--the prohibition against "heavy" missiles for the United States, for example, as well as the Protocol's ban on mobile missiles through 1981. But I believe that the Senate can deal with these during the ratification process.

I have concluded that I can support ratification only with the following conditions:

- First, if it is coupled with a defense program representing an obligatory understanding between the Congress and the President which overcomes on an urgent basis the grave peril posed by the current military balance.

- Second, if it is accompanied by amendments--not requiring renegotiation--clearing up ambiguities in the Treaty, defining the status of the Protocol, the meaning of non-circumvention, and setting guidelines for follow-on negotiations.

- And third, if it is accompanied by a vigorous expression of the Senate's view of the linkage between SALT and Soviet geo-political conduct.

This approach would avoid the negative consequences of a collapse of SALT. But ratification must not become an end in itself. In my view it can only be justified if the Administration is prepared to unite our country by demonstrating its determination to restore our military strength and the geopolitical equilibrium. This seems to me the sense of what Senator Nunn among others has proposed, and it points the way to a bipartisan resolution of the issue. I would like to stress that if these conditions are not met, I cannot support ratification.

Let me outline my specific recommendations:

1. With respect to the military programs, I respectfully recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Vienna Treaty only after the Administration has

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submitted, and the Congress has authorized and begun appropriat-
ing, a supplemental defense budget and a revised five-year defense
program that will begin rectifying some of the shortcomings I
have identified. The Congressional recess provides an opportunity
to prepare such a program, on which work should already be far
advanced as part of the normal budgetary process. If the
Administration is unable to put forward such a program to this
session of Congress, I recommend that the Senate delay its advice
and consent until a new military program has been submitted to
and authorized by the next session of Congress. I would be open-
minded about other methods to achieve this end, provided they are
unambiguous, and represent an obligatory commitment by both
branches of our government.

The program should include accelerated development of a
counterforce capability through the MX and Trident II, air defense
against Backfire, immediate steps to restore the theater nuclear
balance, and urgent measures to beef up our capacity for regional
defense including accelerated modernization and expansion of our
Navy. Our current five-year program is deficient in all these
categories. My support for ratification is entirely conditional
on the development of a new program and doctrine given some bind-
ing form by the Congress.

The Joint Chiefs have testified that the rapid improvements
required cannot be achieved at expenditures representing less
than a five percent real increase over current programs, for at
least the next five years. The burden of proof to the contrary
should rest with the Administration.

2. In addition to these military programs, I recommend that the Senate add the following amendments to its advice-and-consent resolution. <u>None</u> of them requires renegotiation with the Soviet Union:

-- First, as far as cruise missiles are concerned, that the
Protocol may not be extended after 1981. The Senate should
stipulate that its particular limitations can be submitted to
the Congress again only as part of an equitable arrangement for
theater nuclear forces. Specifically, no limitations may be
negotiated for American theater weapons--such as cruise missiles--
which are not matched by similar limitations on Soviet weapons
performing comparable missions. This will bring cruise missiles
into some equilibrium with the Backfire and the SS-20.

-- Second, the Senate should specify that as part of SALT
III, the United States be entitled to <u>any</u> weapons system permitted
to the Soviets in the new agreement unless the Soviets agree to
some compensation by giving up a weapons system of equivalent
characteristics allowed to us. This should take care of the heavy

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missile inequity within the only framework--that of SALT III--
which will give us a real option to produce it.

-- Third, that the non-circumvention clause be interpreted
by the Senate as not interrupting cooperative relationships with
allies with respect to technology needed to modernize their
forces. No technology available to us should be barred for
transfer.

I also suggest that the Senate reexamine the SALT Agreement
every two years, specifically to determine its verifiability.

3. Finally, I respectfully urge the Senate to use the ratification process to put the Soviet Union on notice that this country is prepared, nay eager, for peaceful coexistence that reflects true stability and equality in arms, and also political restraint. But such a course is bound to fail if Moscow chooses to exploit it as a convenient opening to Soviet predominance. The Senate should attach to its instrument of advice and consent an expression of the following principles:

-- that the absence of political restraint will seriously jeopardize continuation of the SALT process.

-- that the Senate understands this to include Soviet supply or encouragement of intervention by proxy military forces; the use of Soviet forces on the territory of its allies such as Cuba to free Cuban forces to fight in Africa; the support, financing, or encouragement by any member of the Warsaw Pact of groups and activities seeking to undermine governments friendly to the United States; or the exacerbation of regional conflicts.

-- that the Administration be required to submit an annual report to the Senate on the degree to which the Soviet Union is living up to these criteria.

-- that the Senate vote every two years its judgment whether the Soviet Union has lived up to these criteria. If the judgment is negative, the Senate should then vote whether whatever SALT negotiations are taking place should be continued.

Some, whose analysis I respect, have urged amendments to
the Treaty to accomplish these goals. One suggested type of
amendment would represent a claim of equal "entitlement"--such
as an American right to possess 308 heavy missiles--which cannot
be exercised during the life of the Treaty and would therefore
represent an assertion of principle rather than a contribution to
the strategic balance. The only amendments that would make any
immediate difference are a second kind, which go to the heart of

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the problem: they would remove the Soviet counterforce capability against our ICBMs (by mandating a drastic reduction of throwweight or heavy missiles, for example). Such amendments are almost certain to be rejected by the Soviets; they would be accepted, if at all, only after an actual build-up of our forces, which in turn might well be delayed by the very fact that renegotiations were underway. If we maintained the current limits while negotiating, the result would be a continuation of the existing deterioration of the strategic balance. We would thus wind up with neither SALT nor a strengthened defense.

I recommend the approach outlined here because it gives this country an opportunity to address its dangers without abandoning an important negotiation that has already extended over seven years. And it gives us an opportunity to proceed as a united people. If the Administration rejects this approach, the Senate will have no alternative except to go the route of farther-reaching amendments, either holding the Treaty in abeyance or forcing a renegotiation. The result will almost certainly be a diplomatic stalemate until the Soviets are convinced that we are determined to restore the strategic balance; it would be an indirect--and in my view less productive--route which, even if successful, would lead to the same result of a major new effort to meet our imperative defense needs.

To be sure, the course I propose will make SALT II far from the turn in the arms race many of us hoped for when the negotiations were inaugurated. But too much time has been lost, too many weapons systems have been unilaterally abandoned, too many military adventures have been encouraged by the Soviet Union, the geopolitical balance has been too severely strained by Soviet pressures, for SALT to be much more than a base from which, one can hope, a new and serious effort at equitable arms reduction can be made. Concrete steps to rectify the global balance are urgently required. In this context a ratified SALT II Treaty can play a useful role as a signpost to continuing negotiations, as a beacon illuminating the path to genuine coexistence and detente, and as a means to contain current tensions. But SALT must contribute to the world's security, not insecurity.