Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

MacGeorge Bundy

5/13/71 11:50a.m.

B: You have a lot of friends on your fight, but they have got to get a signal. That goes for the press and the people on the whole. You can't fight something with nothing. They need to know what the something it.

K: You think they want a solution, a compromise?

B: They want something the White House is backing. No one thinks it is safe to go after Mansfield without an alternative. They also say Mike doesn't mean to press this to the heart. He has said that to a guy I trust.

K: The President is not inclined to accept any compromises that commit him to withdrawing troops as a national policy. We are making and have made extensive reviews of the NATO policy. We haven't committed ourselves to any specific levels, but we don't want to commit ourselves to withdrawing either.

B: The brothers up there -- Republicans and Democrats alike -- who hold to a European policy in essence think there must be some way of stating the sense of the Senate in a way that is also the sense of the White House.

K: No question about that.

B: What you said yesterday, perhaps numbers aren't the point. The point is in light of what Europe can do and in light of others in Western Europe. I can't write the language. But there is a sense that the quarterback hasn't called the signals.

K: If that is the case -- and since you tell me it is I assume it is -- we must rectify that.

B: The guy I got it from is Mathias, but I've also gotten it from newspaper people.

K: Let me call Mathias immediately and see where we can go from there.

B: And he's got Bowie helping him. So you see he is not reaching out for crazy people. He is not sure he's got people behind him as staunch as he is.

K: I'll call him and find out what signal he would find helpful. The impression here is that we'll start with Mathias. . . we don't want to commit ourselves to . . .

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELECON

MacGeorge Bundy

5/13/71 11:50 a.m.

page 2

B: Might say . . . in addition, the Administration remains concerned about the balance of effort in Europe. Not put it on a basis of not committing ourselves to withdrawing because we got another battalion out of the Germans . . . Something like that.

K: If they say not setting American force levels we should take into account the efforts of our allies. If we could have them put it that way.

B: If Bowie is there working with Bob you have got a real ally.

K: Well, he's got some complexes about me.

B: That's right; I remember that, but this is bigger than that.

K: Of course it is.

B: I guess the best way is from you to Mathias and from him to Bowie. I haven't gotten a lead on Muskie and Humphrey.

K: Cy Vance told me he'd speak to both today.

B: That's good, and George is going to speak to Humphrey today. They have a language problem; but you'll find that out from Cy if he calls you back. George Ball and Cy are the best. Mathias has a strategic parliamentary position -- he has one chance to rewrite it and he would like to as soon as he knows what the signal is.

K: I'll be in touch with him as soon as I can.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
5/13/71 1:15 p.m.

K: I'm sorry I didn't get back to you earlier; I called but you had left.

R: Oh that's okay. I talked to Al. We ought to get someone from
Treasury helping us.

K: I've already arranged it. If there's any trouble I'll take care of it.

R: Good. Have there been any developments?

K: No, I talked to Governor Rockefeller yesterday. He promised
to make a statement today or tomorrow. And to call Senators.

R: Good. I saw Mansfield and Stennis, had a good conversation with
Stennis, and he brought in Benson. I talked to Bible and Griffin and I'm
meeting with a group in Scott's office at 3:00 today. I think Mansfield is
a little embarrassed. K said to him 'I don't understand it; you are usually
so careful and deliberate.' I said I'm getting telegrams and calls from
capitals all over the world. He said "I don't know if it will pass and if it
does pass in the Senate it won't in the House." He did it half-way to give
visibility to the problem.

K: I called Vance last night. He will be at the meeting. He will
have talked to Muskie and Humphrey today. And Katzenbach and Ball
won't leave till the vote.

R: I don't know how much weight he carries.

K: He carries some with the older Democrats. Another thing is to get
the Presidential statement in support of NATO, a very brief one which then
all former Secretaries of State, Under Secretaries of State and cabinet members
will say they agree with. It will be an imposing list.

R: The President is going to do the talking?

K: Yes, but I am sure he will call on you.

R: I don't think we will have to go into much detail with them.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN
Dobrynin/Kissinger
1:28 p.m. 5/13/71

D: When do you have lunch. You are working without lunch.

K: What's true because you are being so difficult. I am sending you what I think is the text we agreed on. You look as if it over and call back. The President is still somewhat restless about that one thing.

D: You mean on the public communication?

K: No, the public is agreed to. We would like to add the word "this year".

D: That's all right.

K: Also I might as well send you the text on the public announcement. I am still trying to figure out some way -- are you committed to the sequences of the sentences?

D: It's the identical text.

K: Could we move a sentence to the end? I will send you the text and then I will discuss with you a suggestion. Of the letter. Let me send you the text and I will call you.

D: I will call you after 3:00.

K: After you have studied it. Call me before 4:30 because I have a meeting. What I am sending you is --

D: Put it in pencil.

K: I will do it on the telephone. I will send you the text and you and I talked about.

D: You will send it to the Embassy?

K: You are there?

D: Yes.

K: How will be there in 5 mins.

D: Put it in a double envelope and they will bring it to me.

TELCO..

Dobrynin/Kissinger

1:28 p.m.

5/13/71

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: That's true because you are being so difficult. I am sending you what I think is the text we agreed on. You look at it over and call back. The President is still somewhat restless about that one thing.

K: No, the public is agreed to. We would like to add the word 'this year'.

D: That's all right.

D: It's the identical text.

D: Put it in pencil.

K: I will do it on the telephone. I will send you the text and ask you and I talked about.

K: You are there?

D: Yes.

TELECON
Vice President
5/13/71 2:13pm

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I put on my schedule a suggestion for seeing you tomorrow; I support they haven't gotten to your office yet.

V: No, they haven't.

K: I was going to suggest 5:00 tomorrow.

V: That's a bad time for me I think. I'll try to do it at the earliest possible moment.

K: I find I might make it earlier tomorrow.

V: If you could I would like to.

K: How about 2:30?

V: I've got to go to Fort Knox tomorrow. I can't do it.

K: The whole day?

V: I'm going in the afternoon. You don't have any time now do you?

K: No, I'm tied up with this NATO thing. How about in the morning?

V: Okay.

K: What time do you start?

V: I think I have got some time in the morning. I will be here tomorrow morning.

K: How about 9:00?

V: 9:00 will be fine.

K: Okay, I'll be over at 9:00.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Under Secretary Irwin

5/13/71 ca. 2:30pm

I: I am leaving for the Philippines tomorrow for the Chiefs of Missions conference with Marshall Green and then going with him to Southeast Asia.

K: That should be interesting; how long will you be gone?

I: I should be back in two weeks.

K: That should be fascinating.

I: I'm calling about one matter: The weather modification study before the Under Secretaries Committee. I meant to talk to you about it if I came over today.

K: I am sorry. I had to cancel lunch every day this week practically because of this schedule.

I: Our problem is that the question of military implications, and some information has come available to two of our people who were working on it accidentally. One of them is a friend of Packard, and when he mentioned to Dave that he was working on this _______________ comment with regard to it. The question arises that if there is no guidance with regard to military uses possibilities they, in the normal course might come out with recommendations for control add use of weather that might be contrary to . . .

K: We didn't want anything set.

I: I know. What I am saying is that if no one knows anything about it they they may come out with recommendations that are contrary.

K: Why don't we wait to see whether that's going to happen.

I: We could do that, but then you have got the problem of backtracking and explaining our letting implications float to everyone who was working on it. I wanted to talk to you about and get some guidance.

K: Unless you can show me what we'd tell them, my instinct is to wait till the danger materializes.

I: Well, that's one way to do it. I'm just. . . I gather there has been some discussion in the press now. I haven't read it myself, but there have been speeches or comments by people like Teller about how weather can be effective as a weapon and that our _______________ are that it be used for peaceful purposes.

K: Can I see what it is that we would say?

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin
5/13/71 ca. 2:30pm p. 2

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

I: You mean what the committee might come out with in the study?

K: It seems to me what you want is the authority to say something in the committee.

I: I don't know whether it's so much in the committee as just to talk to the people who seem to know what's going on to try to head off any language that might be a problem. That's Herman Pollack and Granger.

K: I am reluctant to do it without Laird and he is opposed to it.

I: I know that. Granger is a friend of Packard and just happened to be talking to him about this. What I guess I better do is tell them to move slowly and to be careful while they work in this area and be prepared to this time to say how to ______ and without going to committee to ask guidance.

K: That is my view.

I: One other thing: The Panama Canal. I think the paper will come over.

K: Do you want it to wait till you get back?

I: It might come over before I get back. That's perfectly all right. My only thought is that it might be helpful for the President to see Bob Anderson before he starts again on the talks.

K: That will take some selling.

I: But if he is going to be the negotiator...

K: He thinks Anderson can put almost anything to commercial advantage. But I'll do my best.

I: In this case that might be helpful.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

John Roche/Mr. Kissinger

2:41 p.m., May 13, 1971

R: Henry, you are alive and holding up pretty well?

K: With all the committees I'm running, I have a mad schedule.
I would like to see you.

R: I am going to be down next week on my way to Texas. I will be in town Thursday and most of Friday next week. I have a problem and you can help. It is a question LBJ and I want to raise privately. Does anyone have any notion of why the U.S. has a strategic reason for wanting to open the Suez Canal.

K: If they hate foreign policy, let them look at one they can't identify with me.

R: Much against my better judgment, I am going on BBC -- it's an extravaganza -- an international thing with lots of people. I don't know the layout at MX State anymore, but I want hard briefings on civilian casualties, etc.

K: We will do that.

R: I want hard briefings as we have.

K: Come down and we will arrange it.

R: Shall I give you a ring when I get to Washington?

K: Give me a ring. I will try to see you on Thursday. I want to see you.

R: I want someone on the order of Bill Sullivan -- if he's still there -- to brief me.

K: He's still there, and I will get some of my people to do it.

R: I will call you Wednesday evening. Keep up the good work. We will make it.

K: I think we are doing pretty well. See you soon.

lds

*

TELECON

Robert Murphy

5/13/71 2:55pm

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

M: I understand you broke all records and took two days vacation.

K: Right.

M: That's a terrible precedent.

K: Another week and I would never have come back.

M: In connection with that matter . . .

K: The President wants to see you.

M: Mr. Wong at the Chinese Embassy told me that Mr. Chen who is newly arrived will be presenting his credentials on Tuesday. He said he'd like to see me. He wants to talk with the President on Tuesday.

K: The President hasn't decided yet. He has read your report which, incidentally, I thought was excellent.

M: All I want to be able to say to Chen is that the President has my report . . .

K: I think Chen's meeting with the President on Tuesday is not a good occation for an extended conversation. I would discourage him and tell him we'll do it soon. As I understand it Chiang might go along with the scheme provided we protect his Security Council seat. Is that a fair summary of the situation?

M: That's a fair summary, but I would use different language. He understands and believes that we are going to go along with this. He doesn't want the record to show that we encouraged or connived in it. At the back of his mind is a serious doubt about the Security Council seat.

K: But were he to lose it, what would his reaction be?

M: Indecisive. At the moment he indicates they might have to withdraw from the UN. This might be just a bogey.

K: It looks like he is almost certain to lose it.

M: Yes. _________ saw him last week. I said what if Peking took the seat as an ordinary member. He said they'd consider that an insult. They might turn it down, which would leave the matter in status quo.

do

K: Where/you personally come out?

By K.L. NARA, Dale 5/12/04

TELECON

Robert Murphy
5/13/71 2:55 p.m.

page 2

M: The sticking with status quo would set us up fine with Taipei --
that is what they like. The rest of the world . . .

K: There is the Machiavellian advantage that it sets us up with
Taipei and finishes the matter because we would lose.

M: And whether they would carry with it insupportably himiliation
is the crux of the matter.

K: You want to give that a little thought and we'll talk about it next
week?

M: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By CHARA Date 05/13/71

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

5/13/71 3:55pm

[ General Haig: The first page, the third paragraph, line 4, the part where it says "limiting ABM systems, active negotiations ~~leading~~ existing" We left out "leading to an agreement." ]

[HK picks up phone]

K: The only point is that in English negotiations don't limit anything.

D: Active negotiations aimed at limiting . . .

K: How about "aimed at an agreement to limit." There's no change. The negotiations don't limit it; it's the conclusion of the negotiations that limit it. I don't care about the ______; this is not a major point, it's stylistic.

D: On the draft, the shorter one -- I look in the text. I will put it this way: "... on a priority basis this year." To put it this way with "this year", that I will have to confirm. Will put it this way "have agreed to concentrate on a priority basis this year . . ."

K: What do you think this adds?

D: It's the exact wording of our draft.

K: May I make another suggestion. I just want to make it in English: "concentrate on working out this year" and leave out "on a priority basis."

D: That's all right with me.

K: The "this year" should come after working out in English.

D: I will look again at the Russian text. It says "concentrate at present" the efforts of working out. I just included your "this year." Right at this moment it says "at the moment."

K: But it's really from the letter.

D: It says "... to concentrate at this moment on working out . . ."

K: But in English you give me "this year."

D: You are looking at the text.

K: I am looking at the letter.

D: You are right. It said "... to concentrate in this year on working out questions . . ."

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10252
By CHNARA Date Stot

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

5/13/71 3:55pm p. 2

But shorter is quite all right. Put it this way: "... to concentrate this year on working out ..."

K: The best thing in English is "to concentrate on working out this year an agreement ..."

D: But it will have stress on working out this year. You really emphasized that it should be working out this year. Though it really will be practically the same. In your case, you would rather put it ...

K: If you say this year then I rather say "... On a priority basis..."

D: Say "current year."

K: No, that's not the point. The point is what in the hell have we agreed to? Have we agreed to concentrate or have we agreed to work something out? If you say to concentrate on working out this year it doesn't mean we are committed to work it out, only that we are committed to work on it. "... concentrate on working out this year an agreement for the limitation of Anti-ballistic missile systems. ..."

D: I don't know what to tell you.

K: Why don't you check it?

D: According to me text, it was many times before. You for the first time raised it. I didn't pay much attention when it was in the text. This is the first time you raised it.

K: We thought of ________ on two separate letters.

D: It's the same really; it doesn't change it

K: Let's leave it aside for the moment. Any other problems?

D: On the statement no. But on the text of the letter ...

K: In that case, if you want to have "concentrate" let's leave it and we'll come back to it.

D: On the letter, do you have it?

K: Yes.

D: Paragraph three, "is prepared to concentrate this year." Instead of saying ...

["DECLASSIFIED", "Authority E10125E\nBy Lb NARAH Date 05/13/71", "*", "TELECON", "Ambassador Dobrynin", "5/13/71 3:55pm p. 3", "K: All right, \"... to concentrate this year...\"", "D: However you have it. That is not either ...", "K: Except between negotiations aimed at...", "D: That's all right.", "K: Here it says separate agreement...", "D: That makes it perfectly clear.", "K: On the second page, just . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10258
By CIVILIAN DATE 05/13/71

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

5/13/71 3:55pm p.4

an agreement should be equitable'and so on. The text I gave to you says
the terms of a limitation should be . . .

K: What do you want?

D: I would like to put it in terms of limitation of this agreement should
be equal.

K: We aimed at drawing up the text of an agreement limiting ABMs;
that such an agreement should be 'equitable' and 'substantially'.

D: It's not a question of both sides on an equal basis.

K: What do you mean by "equal."

D: When I mentioned this to you . . .

K: What you propose is your problem.

D: I understand. Terms of limitation should be equal . . .

K: Except "equal" doesn't have any precise meaning in these terms.

D: What you pur, " . . . terms of limitation will be the same." I
think "equal" but maybe "the same" or some other word. I am only trying
to be close to what we said, whether terms should be "the same" or "close"
or maybe something else.

K: The trouble with "equal" is that since our weapons and radars
are so different I am not in a position to say this has to be the same numbers.
There has to be some flexibility. "equitable" seems to me to be a good word.

D: " . . . terms of limitation in such an agreement . . ."

K: " . . . should be equitable."

D: The question is really that you can now check it with your boss and
come back. I am stuck here.

K: My boss is getting mad at me -- he thinks you are taking advantage
of me. " . . . the terms of limitation in such an agreement should be . . .

D: . . .

K: Let me have a word, "equitable." "Equitable" means "substantially

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10258
By CHNARA Date 5/13/71

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

5/13/71 3:55pm p. 5

equal" Your radar is different from our radar.

D: My discussing with you the English translation is a must unusual
procedure.

K: It is not for me to say whether you accept "equitable" or not.
When we negotiate this in detail we will need some flexibility on both
sides to take account of conditions. Frankly, we consider
this sentence unnecessary. We consider it to be meaningless.

D: I hope some day you will be an ambassador and be sitting in a
capital not so close to your source of power.

K: I understand.

D: If it was my proposal . . . But they gave me the text. To
prepare a letter is one thing, but in drafting this letter there were six
meetings of the whole government.

K: You haven't changed the text. I think "equitable" means much
more than "just." Will you accept "should be based on the principle of
equality? "

D: On equality? All right.

K: On the principle of equality.

D: Can't you say it without "principle? "

K: It just doesn't make any sense.

D: "Principle of equality" . . . . . "principle of equality". All right.
You are taking advantage of me. It's your native language.

K: You see, I want to tell you as a friend, what we want to propose
is an arrangement so that we can keep 20 radars and you can keep one -- we
have to keep some flexibility for that. Now, I have had another long session
with the President . . . are we through; have you any other complaints?

D: No.

K: You were easier to deal with when we bought Alaska.

D: We didn't have Kissinger then.

H: We didn't have Dobrynin. The President asked me to say to you

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012368
By CHARA Date Elstol

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin

5/13/71 3:55pm p. 6

on the letter thing, what he will let me do is read to you exactly from the
memorandum I will put in our files for the record, not a memo to your govern-
ment: "I told Ambassador Dobrynin that we wanted one sentence making clear
that an agreement to limit Anti-ballistic missiles and phasing of offensive
weapons would be concluded simultaneously. Ambassador Dobrynin was
instructed by his government that this was unnecessary because it was
implicit.

D: In the previous paragraph as a whole?

K: In the previous paragraph with letter. This is just for your informa-
tion, what we have in our files.

D: That's exactly what I told you yesterday.

K: That's right.

D: This question is fully covered by present text. . . . because it
was fully covered by present text on above-mentioned . . .

K: I'll just put it that way. He also wanted me to put it to you on this
basis. He thinks because we want this exchange and the whole sequence here
and on Berlin and on other things to start a new approach on our relationship
it would be best to avoid as many legalistic exchanges as possible. He
therefore wanted to ask your government, not as a condition, but as a suggestion
as a sign of good will, whether it would not be possible to change the word
"discuss" to "elaborate" or "work out."

D: Where?

K: In the paragraph where we say . . .

D: First page?

K: No, second page . . . <u>knowing</u> We are not making it a condition,
we are just asking it as an act of good will.

D: I could only tell them it is not really a question of good will. It is
a question of whether the Foreign Minister can go to the whole government. I m
put it this way. I may consult privately with my Foreign Minister. I don't
want . . .

K: He would consider it . . . Why don't you tell your Foreign Minister
the President things it would help get matters straightened on the best
possible basis if this could be done; if it can't he understands.

TELECON
Ambassador Dobrynin
5/13/71 3:55p.m. p. 7

D: If it could be done in [insert time here] of my Foreign Minister I can just say to you it may happen. It may take two or three weeks, because they will put it in the agenda . . .

K: In general, rather than go through another two to three weeks . . . If it can be done consistent with the timing we discussed last night it would be appreciated; it not we understand.

D: If he feels it will take more time . . .

K: Then just forget it.

D: Okay.

K: Okay.

D: If it can't be done by the end of this week, it's not lack of good will. But if it is possible to do it in a few days it will be highly appreciated?

K: Exactly. But if it will take more time we will understand and will give you the memo.

D: We have discussed everything?

K: I think we are now clear. Why don't I get it retyped and send it over to you.

D: What about on timing?

K: Thursday, 11:00 or 12:00?

D: There is seven hours difference.

K: Will you prefer 11:00 or 12:00. Let's say 12:00 unless I . . .

D: Dobrynin 12:00 is better -- it will be on radio because it will be 7:00 in the evening there, and the next day will be in the newspapers.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2582
By CNARA Date STOCH

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:30 p.m.

5/13/71

K: The one thing we didn't settle was the public statement. We agreed to concentrate --

D: I will look. Just a minute. What's the question?

K: Where to put the word this year -- after concentrateor -

D: I prefer this year as we have it. If you could do it it would be nice.

K: To concentrate this year.

D: Then on working out.

K: It would be more effective if we said to concentrate working out this year.

D: I prefer the first one.

K: OK. Will you point out to your colleagues that I have tried to cooperate?

D: They know. It's no need because it's the only negotiations that all members of my govt. have been working each day. I have worked for 9 years and its the first time they that the whole govt. has worked on each sentence.

K: If you get a big promotion it will be because of my showing you attention to your govt.

D: It's sometimes better not to have attention. I do not complain. It's a little dangerous.

K: I have been called to the President. I will send you both statements as we will use them.

D: I will look at them.

K: don't make any more changes.

D: It's only my --

K: My principle will get mad. I will hand you the memo I read you. But not now. When we exchange the letters.

TELCO

Amb. Dobrynin/Kassinger

4:30 p.m.

5/13/71

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

K: Where to put the word this year -- after concentrate or -

K: To concentrate this year.

D: Then on working out.

D: I prefer the first one.

D: They know. It's no use because it's the only negotiations that all members of my govt. have been working each day. I have worked for 9 years and its the first time I know that the whole govt. has worked on each sentence.

D: I will look at them.

D: It's only my --

By: KLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger

6:32 p.m. 5/13/71

P: I may go to Fla. tomorrow for a couple of days.

K: I think that's good.

P: Do you want to come over for a little sun?

K: I could come down on --

P: No need, I don't plan on working.

K: I have a Verification Panel meeting Sat. morning which is a way of keeping Smith under control but I could come down and ride back with you.

P: Don't work too hard.

K: I feel fine. I have a slight cold coming on.

P: Next week we will keep this undercontrol and we can work it well. On SALT.

K: We can do it well.

P: Have you stopped to think that SALT announcement is enormously important.

K: This was going to make a tremendous splash. The columnists will be ready. We will have a free run for 3 weeks in the negotiations. I think they want an agreement.

P: So let's go Thurs. noon.

K: It's all set.

P: The way we will do it is to have the leaders down at 11:00 and at noon I will walk in and announce it.

K: That's exactly the way.

P: I would call the leaders the day before.

K: It would be possible and better to call them in the morning.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

P: Good. The main purpose is to show the establishment agreeing with the President.

K: You are making a statement and they are saying we are supporting t e President.

P: Do you think the Times and Post will write editorials?

K: Absolutely.

P: I don't know why but on this issue I guess they will.

K: It's a sacred cow. I am certain.

P: Time-Life?

K: They will also support us. I am sure about NEWSWEEK.

P: You are? Because of Kay Graham?

K: No, Osborne Elliott.

P: He is for it? He is a decent guy.

K: Yes.

P: It's never dull.

By: KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Senator Mathias
5/13/71; 6:50 p.m.

K: I called you earlier because I thought you and I ought to be in touch about this NATO situation.

M: As you know I have one shot to amend and I talked to Clark MacGregor earlier today. I would like to amend the language which is agreeable to the President but also has a chance of acceptance on the floor.

K: First of all let me say your language as such I find no bothersome at all and in fact has many constructive aspects.

M: (I was distracted and missed a sentence.)

K: Why would you lose too many Republicans?

M: They would consider it "another Gulf of Tonkin Resolution."

K: At this point our strategy has to be against -- to have Mansfield voted up or down. It is one thing on Vietnam but it is another thing to fool with cornerstone of our foreign policy.

M: Let me say you and I both have a lot of friends in Europe. I talked to a lot of people about this. This doesn't come as a surprise to Helmet Schmidt or Joseph Luns or anyone else. I have developed some new language -- Hugh Scott's office has a copy of it. I honestly believe that between Mansfield and nothing you are likely to get Mansfield and that would be a disaster. I would urge very strongly upon you that you look at the new language that Hugh as or I can send you a copy down directly.

K: Can you do that?

M: I could get somebody to do that.

K: I have to go to a dinner at Brookings Institution -- doing it for Kermit Gordon.

M: Why don't I do that.

K: Let me tell you there is a good possibility no matter what there is in the language the President may decide not to go with it.

M: I understand. You know, maybe I will get to a point and just withdraw it and let you have go with Mansfield. I have been working hard with Adalai Stevenson and others who are concerned about the problem and also have problems in their personal relationship with Mike.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Let me take a look at it.

M: Keeping in mind that my mind isn't fixed. I think it would be best to get modified amendment printed sometime well before the vote. But I think we have until Monday to make up our minds.

K: I will give you a reaction by the end of the morning tomorrow. I will do it in two parts -- one the Administration view and the other a NATO scholar view -- what this will do to NATO.

M. Also, Hugh, as you know, was not in. I actually used his office and scribbled on this paper and Hillenbrand (sp. ?), his legislative assistant said what are you doing. He said let me just make this observation -- they want to be for something not just against Mansfield. This is what is building here -- they want to be for something!

K: Let me look at it with a positive attitude and I will call you tomorrow. I like to be on the same wave lengths with you.

M: You and I don't have any problems.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
5/13/71; 7:10 p.m.

L: We have a flyer that escaped over that area we were operating in Laos. We are sending in a mission to see if we can pick him up. It is beyond anything I told the President about.

K: How large?

L: About 35-40 but then we will give them a lot of air support. I didn't want you to get it by surprise.

K: What area is it?

L: I am not sure about this -- Tchepone. We have intercepts.

K: Okay, you can go ahead.

L: He escaped about eight hours ago. We have to give it a try. I just didn't want you to be taken by surprise.

K: You are very thoughtful. Are you in the hospital?

L: I go back at night. I talked to everybody. I talked to the Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee and Eddie ________ -- they all think we will do right on the Mansfield thing because it is so far out.

K: Mathias and everybody is trying to get me to compromise.

L: We have to have the Draft. A lot of these guys are saying we will support Administration on NATO but not on Draft thing.

K: They came in here and wept all over me for the Volunteer Army.

L: That's what gripes me.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Bob Bowie/Kissinger
afternoon 5/13/71

K: I heard from Mac that you are hear working with Mathias on the NATO THING

B: No, I am hear for a meeting of the ODC. I stopped in to see him.'

K: I assume we are working the same side of the street.

B: I am trying to keep the troops there.

K: We will make no compromise on the Mansfield resolution. People are looking for a formulation that we will accept -- fewer troops withdrawn and ? ? ? -- but we will accept none. Making no changes except in conclusion with Europeans or mutual force reductions with the Russians but we don't think we should negotiate with the European who want us to remove troops.

B: What he showed me didn't seem harmful.

K: Onee we agree to any formulation we have to go with a resolution so we have said no compromise accept a general endorsement of a resolution.

B: I thought that was his resolution. There's an enourmous impatience with the WH. The mood is very bad. I would suggest looking at the Mansfield --

K: Mathias'?

B: He was quoting others. I would acquaint myself with Mathias' and see if I could live with it. It didn't look harmful at all in practical terms. Perhaps if I were making policy I would see if differently.

K: Except we are getting impatient with people doing things that are not harmful and want to ______ them when they say they are not harmful.

B: I only got into it because way bakc Mathias consulted me. I don't want to get into the middle.

K: I won't mention you. I have a call into him. You won't get involved. I want your judgment.

B: If I could get Mathias thing and head off Mansfield I would consider I was in good shape. Mathias endorses the decision to keep forces there. The only possible thing on itx which there's any conceivable objection was the last line on full consultation with Congress. If that's not read as a resolution there's no problem.

By: KM V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-a-

K: I had it here. Here we are. While you are on the phone I would like to re-new my suggestion in the letter if you wouldn't want to stop by sometime.

B: I will keep it in mind.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
G. Smith/Kissinger
afternoon 5/13/71

S: I was planning at this morning's meeting to talk with you on the sub-agreement on article 5. Could we clear it because there will be a meeting tomorrow on that.

K: I will check tomorrow. I talked with the President about a separate accidental agreement. Since the prospects of moving ahead he wants it attached to the ~~other~~ one and not broken loose. I think that's consistent with your views.

S: That's right.

K: Can we get together half an hour before the meeting on Sat.?

S: Sat. morning? I will be there.

*

TELECON

Gerard Smith

5/14/71 9:06am

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

S: I notice in all of this there has been no reference to the relationship of SALT to it. It seems to me that some Senators would be quite sensitive if we told them the withdrawal of these forces __________ since this is one of the ostensible purposes in SALT.

K: That's a good point. I'll take care of this immediately. We haven't set it up officially yet.

S: The NAC (?) people have been confident __________. If on top of that we have a unilateral troop withdrawal, we'd have a hard time bringing NAC along with us.

K: Excellent point and I'll see it gets into the statements.

S: Is it safe for me to catch a plane back Tuesday?

K: Yes, and the President has agreed to an adjournment on May 28.

S: Semanov has been called to (Moscow?) from Dresden where he's been vacationing. Apparently they just wanted to touch base with him, but that is something you might factor in. Is there any way around Article 5?

K: All I want to do is to avoid having it broadened.

S: "... in other situations involving risk of accidental or unintended nuclear war . . ."

K: Type it up and let me look at it. My disposition is to be helpful -- I'm looking for a way to go along with it.

S: All right. I'll see you in the morning.

K: Can you come half an hour early?

S: Yes.

K: Good.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

10:15 a.m., May 14, 1971

K: We have had a tough time getting together.

C: Do you know the certain information we discussed about my
neighbor to the south? The message I passed to the Prime Minister?

K: Yes.

C: In receiving thanks back, the observation has been made that we
hope it will not be necessary to tell our neighbors we are aware of what
you are doing. Do you get my point?

K: I think I got that point.

C: If your Embassy in that capital doesn't realize that this is
sensitive to us, could they be advised that it is?

K: Okay, I will try to get that done. I see no reason why they
should even mention it.

C: It's much better they don't know -- that it be bilateral between
you and them.

K: As long as I have you on the phone -- on the computer business
I will have an answer for you within two weeks. There is one thing
based both on your note but above all on your comment the other day
under the misapprehension there were two different concepts of going
to Europe the first time. The third element is to have a few days off.
The second time was of the greatest important to the President. It
had nothing to do with a personal desire of mine. I don't want you to
think I would use my position to ease my own personal arrangements.

C: It never entered my head. I was only teasing you because you
have been so kind.

K: Good; fine.

C: We still hope for obvious reasons it will be possible for you to
pay that visit when you wish.

K: I will have to see how it works out and it may be that I may
importune you where it would be a big help to me. If that doesn't happen,
I may try to come anyway.

Ids

*

TELECON

Dean Acheson

5/14/71 11:35am

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

A: I was just talking to Lord and giving him a pretty nearly final roundup of this. It comes down to . . . we had trouble with the Secretaries of Defense. Clifford won't do it. He can't be talked into doing it.

K: Oh what grounds?

A: The ground he will not go along on is that he spent a lot of time arguing with Defense Ministers of other countries to keep up their forces and they wouldn't. He thinks they should have the hell scared out of them. He said it won't pass anyway and maybe it will be defeated in the Senate, if not, in the House and if not the President can veto it.

K: That's a very patriotic attitude.

A: It's a very silly attitude. It's like a poker game; it's not statesmanship.

K: What if I tried Gates? I don't mind having Clifford but if he's the only one.

A: Didn't you get a report on McNamara?

K: Yes.

A: He said he didn't want to be the only one out.

K: I'll be glad to call Gates and put a little pressure on him.

A: But even then we won't get McNamara.

K: I am not so sure. I might be able to get him.

A: All right, maybe you can. Douglas, Gilpatrick and Cy Vance
and what do they add. You could rationalize this
by having only people who have dealt full-time with NATO.

K: But then what about the Secretary of the Treasury?

A: I would leave him out. And Humphrey is dead; I don't know why
they keep putting him on these lists.

K: He wouldn't have signed it anyway.

A: He might have signed it, but he's in the next world. Anyway
that leaves only __________ and __________ and I don't
think they add much.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Dean Acheson

5/14/71 11:35 am

page 2

K: Let me take a crack at Gates and McNamara. If we can't get both of them then it's not worth doing. I'll report to you in an hour.

A: You don't report to me sonny; I report to you. I am your servant.

K: No matter what our positions you are always my master.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Telcon
George Ball

May 14, 1971; 11:45 a.m.

B: I just want to pass one thing along to you. I've been up on the Hill all morning. I don't feel discouraged. Ran into one problem with Ribicoff counting very heavily on John Connolly coming up Monday morning before the Joint Economic Committee. K will get out of John all the details on balance of payments costs. John should be given specific indication from the President as to the line he takes because it should have consistent stories.

K: I am calling him immediately.

B: Particularly about the figures.

K: All right. Are we having lunch on Monday?

Ball: Yes. I am checking on details now. Will give you a full report.

K: Good.

ms

By KML NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Larry Eagleburger/Mr. Kissinger

2:15 p.m., May 14, 1971

E: Ambassador Ellsworth is sending a copy of a letter via backchannel from Brosio to the President on Mansfield which he thinks you can use. You can use it publicly or privately or any other way.

K: I will take care of it. It may be quite helpful. Thank you, Larry.

lds

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Telcon

George Ball and Senator Humphrey

April 14, 1971; 2:57 p. m.

B: What would be very helpful would be if the President in response to a query or otherwise could comment on the Brezhnev statement about an interest in mutual force withdrawals.

K: In what sense?

B: I think simply on the Hill there is a feeling that the Russians are talking about this but really no major effort on the part of the Administration.

K: Should I talk to Senator Humphrey for a minute?

B: All right. He is right here. This I don't get from Hubert. This was just a general impression I got on the Hill.

K: That is totally wrong. We have spent a year on the MBFR. If Brezhnev had never opened his mouth we would have moved in that direction this year. It is a very complex subject, as you know, and we have had to study it, but we are ready to move on that and that is why if Humphrey wants to come by here some time -- I like him -- I will tell him exactly what we have done. The President went to Key Biscayne and I don't see how I can get a statement out of him. But you can say this has high priority in our Administration.

B: Let me put Hubert on.

H: Hello, Henry. By the way, welcome to the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson Center.

K: I always like to be associated with you.

H: We have had a good meeting here today.

K: I am sorry I missed it. I intend not to miss any more.

H: On our problem on the Senate. You know I want to help on this one. Solidly. I don't know what you have in mind. I think you have got to be awfully careful on your count. There are a lot of things bothering the Senators over there. Overall, on the military, this is one easy way to get a vote - to prove you want to cut back on military expenditures and military manpower.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/13/04

*

HAK with Ball & Humphrey

other

K: When we are pulling out from so many/places in the world, to compound that and give the impression there is no discrimination in what we *cut* and what we maintain.

H: Exactly.

K: I have no sense of Congressional relations, but quite apart from what Brezhnev said today we have been studying this on high priority for a year. We have been ready and are in the process now of putting our ideas before the NATO Council and we are in good intellectual shape to end the negotiations almost any time. So if you want to meet with me next week sometime I could show you the work we have done.

H: I don't doubt you are working on it. It is a question of how we can use this opportunity now to put some sense back into our overall discussion.

K: The only concern we have is in relation with the Russians not to have such a fire put under us that we have no negotiating room. But you would certainly be correct in pointing out to anybody that this Administration is committed to serious negotiations on MBFR -- to enter them very soon -- and we will press them energetically.

H: I think you might give thought to a letter to some appropriate member of the Congress would be helpful on this. You may have somebody on the Republican side you are working with to ask to report implicitly. We can get into a colloquy with him where the letter can be read and we can explore with this individual why it is important that we not throw away our bargainships.

K: You think a letter by the President?

H: I do. I imagine Hugh Scott is going to stay with you as your leader on the other side.

K: Yes. Let's do it on that basis - probably not before Monday. Is that time enough?

H: I would have that in the hands of the Minority Leader - a letter for Hugh to read/in the opening of the debate, because the people will not be listening Monday or Tuesday. They will be listening on Wednesday - in the first hour on Wednesday when the reporters are in the gallery and the members are on the floor it would be important.

HAK with Ball and Humphre

By KHL NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

K: I am lunching with George on Monday and I will give him the final word then, but unless you hear from me to the contrary you can assume there will be such a Presidential letter.

H: We need a team captain. We must not have several commanders in the Senate. If it is Scott or somebody else you can work with to call the shots from the Administration point of view because we want to be careful not to have too many distractions. You have got to run a tight ship.

K: You will be willing to work with him?

I shall

H: Yes. I would support the Mathias amendment as it is. /Xerox vote against the Mansfield proposal. No question or hesitation. I do think something has to be done to assure routine consultation with the Congress directed toward troop levels and troop reductions which is part of the Mathias amendment. There is a feeling in Congress that there are too many forces in Europe. I think the emphasis should be on maintaining combat strength in Europe as to our troop levels with our allies. Reduce force levels without significantly reducing our combat capability. The Committees must be assured of systematic support from the Administration. There might very well be an amendment offered to have an overall reduction of troop levels but subject to the discretion of the President as to where those troop levels are reduced. Let us give the President authority to trim 150,000 out of all forces of the US between now and such-and-such a period of time. This is exclusive of Vietnam. I mean keeping Vietnam separate and distinct. I personally think that one would be the better. Not too difficult in light of the wind-down of Vietnam to take out 150,000 forces out of all continental US as well as our overseas forces.

K: Speaking off the top of my head that one is easier than the first one. I am reluctant about an amendment which forces the President every year to show what he has done to reduce forces in Europe because it makes it almost impossible to have any stability in our NATO policy. One of the problems we have there now is to get some sense of continuity and not to compound their already strong feeling of the fact that this country is on such an isolationist kick that they must go alone.

H: I am going to try to issue this weekend a bill of issues on why I think this is an unwise proposal.

K: The second one is an easier one to consider.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

HAK with Ball and Humphrey

H: I would think the second one would be an amendment that would give about 20 members in the Senate that would be tempted to vote for Mansfield simply because it is a reduction in military expenditures and forces. Saying the Europeans don't give a damn about us anyway. If you would give the President the discretion, you would save all those votes to defeat Mansfield.

K: I have no authority to make the decision, but that is one I find more appealing than the first one.

H: I don't want you to think that if I introduce such an amendment it is directed against NATO because it isn't. I am against the Mansfield amendment. He said, this is where I cross swords with Hubert and I said, that is right. Mansfield has said: 1) he is for NATO; 2) 150,000 is extreme but it is one way to force the Administration to do something; 3) he doesn't expect it to pass the House with that figure but he hopes he can come out with some reduction. It would have compelled the Administration to pull out 75,000 out of there. I personally think this unilateral business of legislating what the troop levels will be in NATO is very unfortunate and may be dangerous.

K: Let me get that letter to some Senator and let's you and me stay in touch. Any time you want to, I am at your disposal.

H: I think this is an important issue psychologically.

K: I think it is important for our position in the world if we show we are discriminating about where we reduce our commitments.

H: Nice to talk to you, Henry. Goodbye.

B: I will see you Monday.

ms

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

5/14/71 3:15pm

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I understand that you got quite a workout.

R: It wasn't bad. It always seems worse in the papers.

K: I told someone this morning that, as a veteran of encounters
fwith you, one shouldn't be fooled by your calm appearance.

R: They are bbsessed with Vietnam. They refer to it immediately.
Are you going to Florida?

K: No, I think I'm going to stay here. He asked me to go, but I
had too much to do.

R: Does he know, and do you know, that Ambassador Bruce is
going to quit definitely on July 1?

K: No. Bob Kleiman of the New York Times told me this was so;
I couldn't believe it.

R: I've been meaning to tell the President.

K: Why, is he bored?

R: Yes, bored and old and tired as hell of it. We have to consider
what to do. It would be possible to take another old-time public figure
or a foreign service officer, someone like Unger. And Unger would be a
possibility: He knows the area; makes a good impression.

K: But for the sort of thing that's been going on anyone can do it.

R: That's right. But there's an advantage in having someone who
knows something about it. But as we continue to get out we will have less
and less responsibility there; once it's really up to the Vietnamese.

K: It's the President's general tendence to think of downgrading
the negotiations anyway.

R: Is the President gone now?

K: Yes.

R: Let's not bother him with it down there.

K: Right. On the Mansfield thing . . . you really pitched in on this.

*

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

5/14/71 3:15pm p. 2

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

R: Well, as I told Al, we've got to keep Acheson out...

K: He shouldn't have used the word "assanine."

R: Ball and Vance would have been fine, but I got questioned a great deal about "assanine." He's such a crotchety old fellow and so sure he's right. A bou coupl of the people on the committee that were with us didn't know about Acheson. Have you heard from Ball about his talk with Muskie?

K: No, but he called from Humphry's office. It was a typical Humphrey performance. He was whole-heartedly with us but he had two suggestions. The first was _______________ and the second was not to cut the 150,000 nut out of NATO but over all from our military establishment. We have cut it already. But Muskie, as I understood it, was going to vote against.

R: They will try to gixx figure out some compromise, like Javits who is looking for a compromise he can attach his name to.

K: Well I just want to say again I think the way State and we have worked together on this has been very good.

R: I do too. I took a strong stand against war powers thing today.

K: And you took some heat from Fulbright.

R: From the way the press reported it, it wasn't that bad.

TELECON

MacGeorge Bundy

5/14/71 4:17 pm

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

B: An entirely different subject: My Russian friend Kocharian (sp?) wants to come in and give me an important message, and I am letting him come.

K: of course.

B: Is there any record you want played this week? I thought I'd call his attention to the President's press conference about relations with the Soviet Union, say that it was as constructive as anything Brezhnev said which everyone has been quoting. Is the European ______ initiative interesting to you?

K: Yes. We'll have to spend some time educating our allies on it.

B: But a lot of that can't be done until people see the need to have a position.

K: I would say we are in the same position as we were with SALT three months before negotiations began.

B: But this will have to be more of a common position.

K: Exactly, as far as the United States Government is concerned we are in good shape; we could go to negotiations fairly rapidly. You can be encouraging on MBFR. The line you have the last time about the importance of SALT and the willingness of this Administration wanting to make a breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union was very appropriate. If there ever were in the field a significant turning point then we would certainly make some real gestures of good will. We are thinking in terms of trade and related fields

B: Do they regard that as important?

K: Yes.

B: That's the kind of thing Arbatov is making.

K: When are you seeing him?

B: Tuesday.

K: If anything special comes out of this I'll give you a call; otherwise I will just send you a memo.

K: Give me a call in any case.

B: Okay. I gather the other affairs are going better?

TELECON
MacGeorge Bundy

5/14/71 4:17 p.m.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

How does Mathias feel?

K: Okay. The problem with the Mathias Resolution is the danger that opponents will see it as a sort of Tonkin Resolution

B: He said the same thing to me today.

K: It might be easier to defeat the Mansfield thing than . . .

B: I talked to ______ this morning. He is hopeful about at least some of the Democratic Presidential hopefuls.

K: I think we have Muskie. I thought I had Humphrey until he volubly told me he was on our side and then volubly told me he had two other alternatives.

B: That's one of the things that can't be solved from this part of the world. Good luck to you.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELECON

Professor Jerome Cohen

4:30 p.m., May 14, 1971

C: I very much appreciate your returning your call. Herb Levin left and Holdridge is away. I want to try out something on you. A friend of mine is working for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting which wants to do a 6-7 hour thing on China. It would cover several fields and would entail going to China. We got Fairbank and Alec Eckstein on board. He finds John Macy is for it but nervous that maybe this might not be consistent with government policy. He is not comfortable until he has some informal word this is okay.

K: That is okay.

C: I thought so. If it is done -- we don't know whether they would cooperate -- it would be done next October or November. It would be favorable. I thought I would check with you.

K: No problem. We would welcome it.

C: The other thing -- if at some point you want to talk about the UN as things change, I would be delighted to get my further word in.

K: Is it better to be defeated with our present position or move to a new position which eventually is going to wind you up the same way.

C: Some people say go down with the ship.

K: Supposing we go down with the ship -- what would we lose. If we do any of the variations of the two Chinese, what do we gain.

C: If you are worried about criticism from the establishment liberals they would say you haven't changed your problem. You are ossified. The right wing might favor ______ the President in. If you don't get too excited, the simplest thing is not to work too hard but formally to continue the new policy. I was in Ottawa and had five hours of good conversation with the embassy staff. They are aware that is one alternative. They are certainly aware that is the option. Two Chinas infuriates them. They would understand that if the President played it skillfully and explained it to the American people what had happened... We had a program the other day with Charles Yost on it. He said do what we can -- we can't do more than that and he said not to get too excited. Thank you for your help. Six hours of very serious coverage could make an important dent on the American public.

lds

By KHL NARA, Dalo.

Telcon
Senator Javits

April 14, 1971; 4:45 p.m.

J: I have to decide whether to cancel out of a very important thing to me in Japan - something that I have fathered. And a Japanese joint board of directors meeting. I will find it very difficult to cancel out unless I am acting on behalf of the President in connection with this Mansfield business. So if you think it is all that critical.

K: We think it is critical and I would talk to the President about it.

J: It puts me on an extremely tough spot. All the big industrialists in the world will be there. I should have something authoritative and a note if I am going to wash out.

K: I will get you a note.

J: What is your judgment?

K: You have played a national leadership role and therefore it would be unnatural for you not to be there. When I talked to Nelson the first question he asked was, what does Javits say?

J: All right. Let me talk to you over the weekend and I will decide. You can get me something I can say the President says is of such importance to the country that I just can't leave.

K: I He would certainly write you a letter thanking you for having done it.

J: Something for me to put my cancellation on a very high level. It is really bothering the hell out of me.

K: We would appreciate it. I know how much this means to you. I will get you a letter.

Let me see and

J: I will get back with you. If you feel that affirmative.

K: Definitely.

J: OK.

ms

*

TELECON

Secretary Volpe

5/14/71 5:02pm

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

V: I have a wire in front of me from Graham Martin about visiting which the President told me to do out of the clear blue sky. We were discussing ______ with John Ehrlichman and he said "Joh, I just thought, you are going to stop in Italy of course." I said I hadn't planned on it, I had been there six months ago and didn't feel it was necessary. He said no, a Volpe can't go too many times and if I could work it in I should do so. So I just had a wire back from Martin -- I wrote him a little note about it -- and he said something the President didn't know. They have elections on June 16 and he feels in as much as Packard is there now, Kennedy was going to be there; Secretary Rogers has been there, the Christian Democrats might not make as much as they should in the election.

K: He has a good point

V: He said although he'd like to have me there he thought it would be better to do it later.

K: I think he has got a good point.

V: So would you be kind enough to take this up with the President? I don't want to disobey him and if he just tells me to go I will, but I think Ambassador Martin made some excellent points. He thinks it might jeopardize my future usefulness, that it would be better for me to go later. If I want to at all it would be better in the fall.

K: Good, I'll take care of it.

V: Will you call me back?

K: If you don't hear from me by the first thing Monday morning it's okay.

V: It's okay meaning I won't go.

K: Yes, meaning you won't go.

V: If you hear any sooner...

K: I'll let you know tomorrow. I'll be talking with the President tomorrow anyway. I'll call you back and let you know.

V: Good. You can get me through the White House switchboard any time tomorrow.

By KLC NARA, Dato. 5/13/04

TELECON
President Johnson

5/14/71 5:20pm

K: I am calling you on behalf of the President about this Mansfield Resolution to cut our NATO forces in half. Dean Acheson has made the suggestion, and which we support, that the President should have a brief statement which says "At this point it would be . . ." The President has lined up all former Secretaries of State, Secretaries of Defense (except Clifford), SACEURS, [etc.] to support that statement. He would also like to have the two living ex-Presidents go along with it. The only reason the President isn't calling you himself is because he basically we are not calling any of these signatories -- Acheson is doing it, but he thought it inappropriate for him to call you.

J: I haven't made any statements since I left there. I felt under the circumstances of my leaving I didn't want to be telling my successors what to do. I had my chance and I am not now active. I wanted to avoid every appearance of getting involved. I have very strong feelings about the NATO forces, as I expressed all during my Administration, but to go to writing letters and making statements, if I do that I'll have everyone in my party calling me, as they do all the time, asking me to make statements some in favor; most against on the President. If I thought I could make the difference, which I don't think I can . . . but I would probably just add to the difficulties.

K: This is a very understandable position and preserves the policy you have so honorably kept. If it comes to the point where we think it will make a difference, we will call you.

J: Okay, and you wire a copy of it down to me. I'd like to look at it.

K: Yes. I look forward to seeing you at the opening of the Library next weekend.

J: Fine, I want you to look at the chapter on Vietnam; I would like to feel I could trust you privately to look at the things in it. It might add to your burden but it might help with the things you're doing now.

K: It wouldn't add to my burden. Ixitgoinxto be sure I know xxxxxx
Has it been sent to me?

J: No, but thought if you come down you could take a few minutes to look at it. I just want you to deal with Vietnam and the things that affect your area.

K: I am coming with the Presidential party.

*

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Henry Hubbard

6:55 p.m., May 14, 1971

By KHLW

NARA, Date 5/12/04

H: Dean Acheson is supposed to be working up little statements but he isn't giving them out. He says he left it up to the White House's discretion.

K: He is denying it?

H: Oh, no, he said he was leaving it up to the White House to release them.

K: You will get it tomorrow.

H: Oh, it will be out tomorrow. Signed by how many people?

K: All former assistants to the President.

H: If they can be found. What is your estimate now of what Mansfield is going to do, people up on the Hill keep referring to a compromise.

K: There is no compromise. What compromise is conceivable? We don't object to the size of the force, we object to being told -- this is off-the-record.

H: Off-the-record, you mean like deep background?

K: Yes. We don't want to be in a position of having to make a semi-annual report.

H: You want the President to still control foreign policy. You object to being ordered to reduce the forces.

K: Reduction of forces is our primary objective in Europe.

H: Not the problem of doing it unilaterally.

K: That's it, and in a time ........

H: On this Brezhnev thing, did you have any idea Brezhnev was going to do what he did today.

K: We had no idea he was going to do it today or with this formality but we have known that it was likely to happen. You might like to know that we have completed a massive study on mutual balance of forces reduction which we have been conducting for a year so this is a particularly opportune moment.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

*

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Henry Hubbard

6:55 p.m., May 14, 1971

H: You mean because of the ______.

K: No, no, at the NATO Council in Brussels.

H: Did you have some idea that you could sit down with the Russians?

K: We frankly haven't worked out in detail how to do it.

H: Maybe the Secretary of State can do this.

K: This can not be done by a Minister, it is more complicated than SALT.

H: They need a whole new negotiating team.

K: Yes. We would need the Allies involved.

H: Theirs and ours. Why did he want to reduce forces?

K: He, who?

H: Brezhnev. Money, that can't be it.

for him

K: He may think it is easier to come back than us.

H: Are his Allies complaining?

K: I don't know.

H: All right.

K: Okay. I have again poured out my heart to you and it will be on page 40 in one sentence.

H: If you are lucky, one incorrect sentence. Thank you, Henry.

K: Right.

By KHLW

NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Chalmers Roberts

7:04 p.m., May 14, 1971

K: Haven't settled on it.

R: Has Gerard Smith seen the President yet?

K: He is seeing him Tuesday.

R: Is there any possibility of changing on the ABM position only do you think?

K: We are reviewing the whole SALT situation and the President doing next week and I don't want to prejudge what he will do.

R: This Brezhnev thing -- is there an additional reason not to go for ABMs only at this point?

K: Very likely to go for ABMs only in any circumstance.

R: Is there an NSC meeting on it next week?

K: No, next week we will just have a small group meeting and then there will be an NSC.

R: Is the actual negotiating going on on the part of SALT making progress.

K: Actually the negotiations are doing quite well.

R: When you say you are not surprised, that you expected the Brezhnev thing after the Party Congress, were you reading the Party Congress as pretty positive?

K: Well, I said on Air Force One and some of the newspapers picked it up --

R: I know.

K: That I thought it would result as positive and constructive thing and I expected it to lead to some progress.

R: He hasn't made a speech just on MBFR, he has introduced something else here.

K: Right.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN

7:04 p.m., May 14, 1971

R: I have got a double problem -- I have got to do something for Sunday on this Mansfield thing and on the flap it has created. Brezhnev has killed Mansfield at this point and you are all safe there.

K: On deep background, we don't have that hot line for nothing.

R: It seems to me that you didn't get it on the hot line, I would have to see the traffic on that one. On this Brezhnev thing, he has introduced not just mutual balance force reduction but nucs, right?

K: Right.

R: Nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the problem of forward based systems based on SALT, you are prepared to take that issue in some form?

K: Right.

R: Is this an opening where they might lead us out of that deadlock?

K: I will have to say that what I am saying now is no better speculation than yours, at least that's right.

R: This is something to explore. Have you got any general reflections on Mansfield with things as complicated by Brezhnev now, how does it look to you?

K: How does what look to me?

R: The whole smear between us and the Russians?

K: I was not surprised, what Brezhnev is doing is what you would have expected him to do after a Party Congress.

R: Arbatov is going around telling people we have not been paying enough attention to what he said at the Party Congress.

K: Sometimes I wonder about Arbatov.

R: At any rate, it will give this L______ Ministers meeting something of a goose. How did we negotiate with the ________ subcommittee of NATO and subcommittee of Warsaw?

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCORN

7:04 p.m., May 14, 1971

R: Do you think before Brezhnev that Mansfield had done you a lot of harm in Europe but now it might serve some useful purpose.

K: Had it passed in the Senate, he would have done us some harm but if it is stopped at this point, it will have been useful and we can go to the Europeans now and say we can't continue to fight this each year. Chalmers, I really must run off.

R: All right, Henry.

K: Right, Chalmers.

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Cor

May 15, 1971 10:00a jlj

By NARA, Dato 5/13/04

K: Someday I am going to have a Secretary who will put me on the line first.

C: If that is the greatest problem you have you are very well off.

K: It is a question of propriety.

C: How are you coming on the Mansfield thing?

K: By our count we are even now and have a good chance. What do you think?

C: I think it looks good.

K: This will scare the Europeans though. Even if it is defeated we can say get busy to these guys. I do not mind scaring them just mind having it rammed down our throats. But I think we are in good shape. John, I hate to bug you on this Pakistani thing but I was wondering where it stood.

C: Henry, I did a memo on it and there are two missions going over there. I will get the memo and send it to you. We have been talking to the Pakistanis and thought they would have done something but they have been slow. They said they would work out the last part of it. I think this will work out very well today or Monday.

C: John, that is great. One thing. Can you get your people on these missions to take a benevolent attitude. We really need these guys for the next three months and it would help.

C: Yes. I told them I could not tell them what was behind it but that it should go through. They are talking in terms of a loan of $100 million and with another $60 million order.

K: That is great. One more thing - the legislation on replenishment of Ida (phonetic). Do you think we will be able to get it?

C: We just caught hell on some of these multi institutions and have been working out our strategy. We think we will probably have to wait until the new fiscal year starts.

K: But we don't have to wait to submit it until then do you? We?

C: Oh no. It is going up right away. We won't get any money for it right away.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: No, but McNamara thinks if it is submitted he can get an advance from the British and the Germans. He can use it.

C: In fact Henry, I think I signed off on that yesterday or the day before.

K: John, it is a pleasure to do business with you.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. McNamar

May 15, 1971 10:04 a.m. j-s

K: Bob, I know you are going off. I just wanted to let you to know that the Ida legislation will be going up.

M: I think that is great. I talked to the Germans and told them they better get ready to supply something. Talked with Pierre Paul Schweitzer (phonetic) regarding Pakistan dx and I called U Thant who said we should not lose the momentum.

K: We will do our damndest to get this. Can you get an IMF Mission out there?

M: IMF and World Bank out there and we will get the World Bank to go in with other things. We have free access to East Pakistan the first of June and we will have a World Bank Mission in there right away.

K: We really need these guys for three months and then we will relent. It's good a bank mission is going in there.

M: Henry, I wanted to tell you that was a virtuoso performance last week.

K: You are kind to say that.

*

The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 15, 1971 11 a.m.

jlj

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

P: Well, you got everybody under control there?

K: Yes. You know it is tough going. I have a Verification Panel meeting now and Smith is dancing all over the place. He is so delighted with what he has that he wants to announce it. If we don't go on Thursday something may leak.

P: We are going on Thursday.

K: I talked to Gerry -

P: Has he talked to Rogers?

K: Yes, Rogers knows.

P: Will Rogers know the difference between the two?

K: Yes. We will explain to him. We have 2 problems. The <u>prak</u> proposal made to Smith was the one that we had talked about in February or March. All that they did was take what we said to them at that time and gave it back to Smith now. We have got more than Smith did but in a whole different concept.

P: Smith is not to go out and State not to go out and say that all because of Smith's brilliant negotiation we got this. <u>Not with just</u> I think that we should have some of the media people in - not all of them - just some of the main ones. Chancellor, Vereid, Howard K. Smith. Even the columns I would talk to. Roberts, is OK. I do not know who you have in the <u>Times</u>.

K: Frankle will understand it.

P: He (Smith) certainly must be surprised he got this offer.

K: Of course, because - This is what they were going to recommend to you.

P: And he is suggesting we take it.

K: I am telling him that the President is in Key Biscayne, he has all the papers with him and he is thinking about the whole thing. I told him you would see him on Tuesday.

P: I have to see Rogers before him and I think I should see him alone.
What should I tell him?

K: Simply that we have this proposal. You should not be too modest about the agreement. The Soviets have accepted this and it is much beyond the

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

agreement they offered Smith.

P: Say in March they came back and this and that. I have no problem with Smith. I don't give a goddamn about what he thinks. But when Rogers comes in how to say we handled that.

K: Well, you could just say that we got a reply in early April when he was away.

P: But we got it earlier than that. I will just tell him that we proposed this in January and they came back in April while he was away. This is simultaneity right?

K: They have accepted the ideas of linkage and simultaneity. Even linkage we got through your efforts.

P: I think I will start with Rogers simply by saying that we started in January and while you were away they came in with a response. We are going to turn down what they submitted to Smith and then they came through with this. Have you told Smith to keep his mouth shut.

K: Yes. They all think that you are thinking over the proposal and they wouldn't say anything to jeopardize that. They have been pretty quiet.

P: They must not put anything out on it.

K: Chalmers Roberts called me yesterday and he knew nothing about it so they haven't gotten wind of it.

P: When we put it out it will have to go further than Chalmers Roberts. I don't like this business about putting ourselves under a gun. Any agreement to agree on ABM and . . .

K: break the deadlock.

P: Forget the deadlock. What is this going to mean to the common person and will they understand it. Danger that it will not be understood. Point is we are saying that two governments commit themselves to an agreement?

K: Not exactly that far. But the common person does not know about these things. They will take their lead from the person who does know something.

P: Yes. Another thing we will have to keep the Senate and Congress in line because I do not want them to defer funds for ABM.

K: We should just tell them that everything has come through just like you said. You said that if they voted for ABM it would help with the negotiations. It has. I think this would help with the Congress.

By: KHL, NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

P: But to what extent does this point us under the gun and put the Soviets under the gun to come up with an agreement and to negotiation freeze. There is not a goddamn thing in it ---

K: That is what the Soviets will try to do but we aren't going to let them and that is not what we have now.

P: The way the paper is written now does not provide for action this year?

K: No.

P: Just serious discussions? If we don't get some sort of agreement - that should be our goal internally. If they do not have action this year they will be yapping.

K: Come back from ... ABM only with just an agreement.

P: How does it differ. I know but you tell me. Read it to me.

K: I don't have it in front of my at the moment but it says we will agree also on certain measures to limit offensive weapons and not use the word freeze. Does not use the word freeze.

P: SKKMGEX Smith will see the difference. Have to get the papers to see the difference.

K: Chalmers Roberts will write it is great.

P: We want it far beyond Chalmers Roberts. It is important for you to sit down with Scali and Rogers and decide who should be briefed.

K: I see, but I think I must do that.

P: We must sell two or three of the leaders.

K: I must do it because I understand it better than Scali.

P: Oh yes. But I don't want you to waste your time. You should see only about 1/2 dozen people. That's right. Only you can brief. We need the three networks, Post and Times and Stuart Hensley (phonetic).

K: I will set down with Scali on Monday.

P: You are going to tell him on Monday.

K: No, I will do it on Tuesday after you have talked with Rogers and Smith.

P: I want you to scare people to death if word leaks before 12 noon Thursday, this puts us in a very awkward position because we have agreed with the Soviets.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: We have to let the letter be discussed to work out. Nothing at all.

P: But as far as he kxxx is concerned we have agreement that we go on Thursday noon.

K: Yes.

P: On this Mansfield thing - I just talked with McGregor who is going to be on Face the Nation or Meet the Press . . . those who would vote unilaterally to bring forces home are looking at only one side - reducing American costs - reducing the danger of war is another thing they should look at and reducing tensions. If there is an imbalance created then this would have the effect of increasing the chances for disagreement. Southeast Asia, Middle East.

K: I think that is an excellent way of putting it Mr. President.

P: In the 19th Century any sort of power was weak stability was built on the balance. This was the way the British foreign policy worked. All on a balance of power.

K: I think that is an excellent way of putting it.

P: This Breshnev thing has been of help to us.

K: It has had a good effect as for us. I think we are well covered.

P: I do not think that it was bad. He asked for it. We didn't know that Acheson was going to use that word, but everyone knows his tongue. It was an asinine proposal. You feel pretty good about that one?

K: I think we could come out excellent.

P: You know I tried to imply with Brook. That any person who votes against the President on Monday will look bad on Thursday. They are not going to look very good when this thing comes out on Thursday if they voted against the President.

K: These things altogether are getting them really upset. Said at the time of Laos that the Chinese would come in and the Chinese moved toward us. The Mansfield thing then SALT comes up. They have got to think that you have a hell of a lot more up your sleeve and you have.

P: We have Muskie in a trap.

K: If you would want to shoot a bullet in June we could break out the hotline part of it.

P: Save it for a Summit. We have to have a few things to talk about.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: We can break that out at 11.

P: We have to get this out though. I think you should talk to Wilson, Bill White. Reducing our costs as a laudable objective but should think of the balance of power and reduction of tensions also.

K: I think that is an excellent way to put it.

P: KXK Europeans will become nervous and there will be an increasing in tensions. Haldeman was telling me about how Rogers caught Symington.

K: Yes.

P: ... 7,000 tactical weapons. Bring them back here. and Rogers said that we don't want them back here. I think these guys are making in an awfully bad wicket. They are playing on the Nation's terrible, terrible fatigue over the war. The Nation thrashes out - like on Calley. We just want to be sure that they don't thrash out and do not bring down the whole house with them.

K: I think we have scared them.

P: You are going to Paris on the 30th? You are going to England first and then -

K: I don't know if I can work that out now.

P: Well you can go to Paris if you want to. Take a weekend. You don't have to go to England as an excuse - you can go to Paris if you want to.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Jerry Warren /Mr. Kissinger

May 15, 1971 11:30 a.m.

jlj

K: Have you released the President's statement on Mansfield yet? Because we have a statement from President Johnson now. Can we release that separately?

W: Yes. The only thing is that we have had a question on why the former President's were not included and were they approached. WXX Our guidance said that we did not approach them.

K: Your guidance is that ~~the~~ President Johnson has made a statement in support of President Nixon and here it is.

W: Did we solicit it?

K: Said we had not solicited it. Johnson was informed of the President's statement and after thinking about it he decided to issue this one.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Walt Rostow

Dr. Kissinger

12:10 pm, May 15, 1971

R: Henry, I have something that President Johnson dictated and then I have a comment on it from him. He dictated the following statement: "I have seen the President's proposed statement opposing at this time a unilateral reduction of military forces maintained in Europe for the common defense. I am totally in accord with that statement. (para) American steadiness in support of NATO for more than twenty years has not only helped to bring security and progress to the North Atlantic Community, it has also encouraged movement toward reconciliation with those toward the East. Unilateral reduction of our military forces in Europe would endanger what we have achieved in the past and shatter our hopes for the future."
President Johnson ask me to tell President Nixon that he is free to use this statement in any way he judges useful.

K: Is he going to release that statement or should we release it?

R: I can only say that he said that President Nixon is free to use the statement in any way he judges useful. He added that he made available to you yesterday his own re-
servations, that he wanted President Nixon to know he
believes in this statement, that he would do anything to
support the President and the country.

K: What do you think - should we release it or should you?

R: I can only tell you again what President Johnson told me.

K: Alright Walt, thank you very much. You have been very helpful.

mlh

Secretary Laird/Mr. Kissing

May 15, 1971 1:10 p.m.

jlj

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

L: I am at Walter Reed. I am checking out tomorrow and will be back on full duty Monday. I wanted to talk to you about a couple of things. I think we should talk about SALT. I think we should hardline on ABM because Russians will never buy that and then get back into Safeguard like we want. . . . large missiles . . . something below. If the Soviets position leaked out more and more and we should try to position ourselves in the public that we have taken a hardline and not go in with exchange on ______ and MCA right away.

K: There have been no decisions.

L: I think they are never good going for - you know. It gives us position there - then bad news reduction of large missiles. I think we should think about this.

K: I want to talk to you about whole SALT situation next week.

L: I think we should Henry. There are a couple of things I think we should talk about.

K: How about breakfast on Tuesday? 8 or 8:30.

L: Breakfast is fine - 8 is fine with me. There are a couple of propositions I want to talk to you about. Maybe I should warn you about them. Perhaps I should talk to the President on this Secretary of the Army thing before I leave for NATO. I think I ought to talk to the President. Get it squared away and go public with it on Friday.

K: I think you should talk with him. OK Who do you have in mind?

L: I think we should go on the Foky (phonetic) and then find another man to take intelligence and administration.

K: Whom are you thinking about?

L: I have a couple in mind but should not make this plan until we have moved on the other. Another thing - I announced Resor's appointment and should he sign his letter to me or - right now it is drafted to me. I want to do this before I leave for the NATO Ministerial conference. The Nuclear Planning group meets in Germany and Helmut Schmidt is our host. The Defense Planning Committee is going to be talking about mutual and balanced force reductions in Lisbon and I will go on to that. We should get the maximum advantage we can. Helmut does not feel that his foreign minister is too strong and . . .

K: What's the recommendation?

By: KML NARA, Dato

L: He wants to separate that out from the overall European Conference. Wants to have it separate and not get tied up with that. I think we should think about this and talk about it.

K: Let's discuss it at breakfast. I will get you an appointment with the President before you go.

L: I want to talk to him about it a bit.

K: Good. I think we probably ought to approve them.

L: Let him hang on them. We just should not intervene. You know what I am talking about.

K: I know what you are talking about.

L: Thanks much Henry.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/94

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissing

May 15, 1971 1:25 p.m.

jlj

R: Did you see the telegram to Brosio which would give ...

K: Yes. President Johnson had Walt Rostow phone in a statement that supports the President. You can't get much more than that between Johnson and Acheson.

R: I talked to Mike. The President asked me to. He is OK about us but he is madder than hell at Acheson. He said that getting Acheson was like digging up Lazarath and we shouldn't get him involved in it. I said we had no idea that he was going to use that word.

K: Of course we didn't.

R: He said that he knew that. I am getting Joe Fowler to write a piece for *Washington Post* which could counter the piece done by *Washington Post* in today's paper. I have been trying to reach Kiley so that his testimony on Monday is consistent with what we want.

K: I called him.

R: What is he going to say about the balance of payments. If we could just agree on a figure.

K: Are you going to New York on Monday.

R: Yes, I have to. I tried to get out of it. But both Jarring and U Thant said that they thought it should be followed up.

K: The Administrative Assistants are running low on paper. I talked to the office lower figures. 25-50,000 (This could have been 150,000). I talked to Ball this morning. He said he was having lunch with you. This is the problem. The Senators he has talked to like Mike and do not want to take Mike on because they like him. We need something to take up. But at the same time they want to have something to take back to their people. Some of the younger guys are thinking about the lower figures but he is disassociated from it. 25-50,000 reduced force levels. Also anywhere in the world.

K: Humphrey tried that on me last night yesterday.

R: I am not saying this because I know the Administration's view is hard and we don't want to compromise at all, but if we have a 250,000 cut contemplated anyway - this is according to my figures - couldn't we get along with a compromise that allowed the troops anywhere in the world. MKX Mike wants an up or down vote on his amendment. I do not think that it has a chance of becoming law. Mathias, Javits, Case all looking for a compromise position because they do not want to go against Mike. Mike said he thinks we have the votes but he says he thinks

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

something will pass. He said the President's position was all right with him but that he wanted to keep the emphasis on this question.

K: You and your associates have done a tremendous job on it.

R: We would do more if we could get by with it and have it go down.

K: It is basically a frivolous exercise. If it passes the President will just lose credit for that because as the proposed amendments - we are going to do that.

R: They are trying to use this as a face saving device. President planned to do it long ago. Byrd is thinking isn't there something to do to soften the blow.
XXX The Administration Assistant's are causing most of the trouble up there.
I understand it is raining in Florida.

K: Unfortunately, he is on the goddamn phone all day.

R: When is he coming back? Tomorrow.

K: I think he will because it is raining. He was thinking about Monday.

R: Thanks Henry.

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger 1:37 p.m.

R: I forgot to tell you that Ball said on these discussions he is having that he is having trouble to get somebody to vote for it. They are perfectly satisfied to have it die in Committee. This would be a face saving device for them.

K: Why don't we try to see if we can hold out first.

R: Oh yes. I am behind the Administration's position and the President has made it plain that he would not compromise. But Ball was not for it but wanted us to know. I do not think that anything that passes will become law.

K: I agree that we ought to put out the Brosio letter. I will get it down to Ziegler.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Ken Clawson/Mr. Kissinger

May 15, 1971 1:50 p.m.

jlj

C: I just wanted to ask you if Truman was approached and if he refused to discuss it or what.

K: To be very frank with you he is not very well and off the record we thought his physical condition as such we would not ask anything. XXXXX
XXXXXX

C: You did talk with President Johnson?

K: I talked about the general situation with President Johnson. We thought on Truman that it would do him no good. To have Johnson is good. To have Truman would have been doubly so.

By: KHL
NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 15, 1971 2:03 p.m.

jlj

P: I thought you should know I got a report that George Ball says that some of the young guys on the Hill were trying to work out some sort of compromise with a figure of 25-50,000 and making it anywhere in the world. I just thought that Ball might be trying to get something out of this. Said something about a force level reduction of 150,000.

K: Humphrey tried me on that yesterday.

P: I cannot be in the position that they are dictating troop levels to me. They must have really petrified those democrats. You know what the real game is here.

K: 150,000 anywhere in the world. We would have to take from Europe. Don't have them anywhere else.

P: Unless you take Vietnam.

K: That they want to exclude. 150,000 from total forces that we might be able to do but this is just a cheap stunt.

P: You should call Ball and tell him that we will not compromise on anyx anything. In the questioning of Rogers yexx yesterday. Senate wants to have a heart (?).

K: Same with ABM. When they do not have the votes they look for some sort of compromise.

P: I do not want to have them force us to do something. I really think on this one we should hard xixxx nose it.

K: I think we should hard line it.

P: No token cut and no matter for negotiation.

K: I will call George Ball.

P: We cannot let this Administration be told what to do or be put in a compromise situation. It is sickening.

K: Amazing the way they play with the national security.

[Got off when Mr. Kissinger buzzed for a secretary in the office.]

P: K Later in the week, people that cut our throat earlier will make them selves look really bad.

K: Mitchell is on the Verification Panel and he was in today. I gave him a

By KHC NARA, Dato. 5/13/04

preview of what the situation was and he thought it was absolutely great.
Not only politically.

P: Yes?

K: And here is a man who does not know about the subject. He thought
it was terrific.

P: The way to do this with the leaders. I am not going to show them the
correspondence but just read the announcement to them and say that Moscow
time they are going to announce the same thing.

K: They must not babble about claiming that we have too much too fast.

P: I will knock that down hard. Just say it is a break in the negotiations.
It will take several months.

K: I thought you might be interested in what Mitchell thought.

P: Yes, I am.

K: He said it was a substantive step forward and (b) a 10 pin strike. Just
hopes we can keep it quiet until Thursday. Rogers may want to tell some
of his staff but you should tell him State's head is riding on this.

P: I will just tell him that we have an unbreakable commitment to the
Soviets until 12 noon on Thursday. Rogers will be all right. I am
concerned about Smith.

K: He will not leak it. He is going back to Europe and can's leak it.

P: You must scare him. I don't now want to have it leak. And you should
see Dick Wilson and Bill White, the Alsops and get it out to them and what
a big step it is.

K: Coming our way. That is why they are talking a compromise. There are
8 uncertain but leaning our way.

P: The current count is 43 now. That only gives us 51 that is pretty damn
close. Has the Times hit it yet?

K: Not but tomorrow.

P: Reston hit it.

K: yesterday.

!P: Reston will understand it.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: He will. I will get my scientific people to slobber about it a bit.

P: I want to do something thanking the Senators who voted for ABM.

K: OK Except that we do not have the agreement yet.

P: I know. But tell them that we could not have gone this far if they had not voted with us. The total SALT agreement that people who say x they are for - are politically for it. But they are concerned that they are not doing it and it is just as cold as that. OK Henry.

By: K.L. U NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/George Ball

May 15, 1971 2:12 p.m.

jlj

K: The President is very concerned that you understand and with anyone that you talk about between now and next week that he is not going to compromise. Bill Rogers told him about 150,000 around the world and he just doesn't want to have the Congress able to put that kind of pressure on the Presidency.

B: I understand. Purely practical notion and they are going to put something in, before they will vote against Mansfield.

K: It is a basic point with him. He thinks it is bad public policy to seemingly be forced into something that he is doing anyway. Or forced into doing something he would not do. It would totally confuse the issue.

B: I see. I am clearer on it now. On my own estimate I do not think we have the votes without XX at least giving these guys some sort of a compromise. Mathias has been thinking about some sort of compromise.

K: Another think thing that he said he would absolutely not have. Report to Congress every six months or year on troop withdrawals or levels around the world. This is like having a gun to your head with negotiations to the Russians and (2) negotiations with the Europeans and needing some feeling ofj stability.

B: We are both seeking the same objective. I have a fresher sense of what the problem is. I have seen 22 democratic Senators since this thing started.

K: We appreciate what you are doing.

B: They have left themselves wiggle room on a compromise but have told the people they would come back home with something. If I do not come up with something they can use I am confident they will come up with something themselves. If I stay independent and they work something out - the Administration's position may be worse.

K: President feels that we are torn enough with Vietnam. But there are some things that he wants to show we are not split on and NATO is one of them.

B: Choice of two things - simply say - look you are making a mistake and hold firm and get out of it.

K: Why not take this position today and we can discuss it when we have lunch. Hardline until Tuesday and after we have lunch we could see where we stand then. If you agree with the arguments I made and hardline it and stick it out until Tuesday.

B: That's fair enough. What I had hoped to do was work out something you could accept.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: Those guys would be happy to have an old hand like you take a look at it even as late as Tuesday.

B: I will follow that line. You can tell the President. I will follow that line. I cannot sew up the Mansfield amendment doing it though. I had hoped I could.