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February 18, 1985

Dr Henry Kissinger,
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MAR 01 1985

Dear Dr Kissinger,

Enclosed is a copy of our latest interview with the interview we did last month. We had to delay it one issue when, unexpectedly, we were able to interview Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi the same week that you were in India, and it wouldn't have done to have carried two significant interviews in the same issue.

As you will see, your answers are complete, as you gave them. But we did have to drop some questions to fit the text in the space available.

I trust you have been getting copies of our magazine. In case the subscription hasn't started, do let me know and I will make sure there is no delay.

It was a privilege to meet with you, and I hope you will find time to visit India again.

With kind regards,

Registered Office : 9 K-Block, Connaught Circus, New Delhi-110 001, INDIA

INTERVIEW OF THE FORTNIGHT

HENRY KISSINGER

# "We expected too much of India"

NOBEL Prize winner, once the most powerful person in the US establishment next to the President and now an advisor-about-the-world, Dr Henry Alfred Kissinger was in Delhi last month on his first visit in more than 10 years. "I am a student of international affairs, I write articles, I advise and I have to keep myself informed about various affairs, and there have been tremendous changes in this country," the 61-year-old one-man think-tank said, explaining what he was doing here as a guest of the Indian Government.

It's not an area that he is reputed to know well. Kissinger is best remembered here for the notorious tilt to Pakistan engineered by him on Nixon's behalf during the build-up to the Bangladesh war in December 1971. Visiting India as secretary of state in 1974 on a fence-mending visit, he boosted his image somewhat, but his interests then lay elsewhere: Indo-China and ending the disastrous war there, the opening with China, detente with the Soviet Union.

As a private citizen, Kissinger has become a professional advisor to governments and corporations, a celebrated member of the lecture circuit and an author. His book of the Nixon years, from which INDIA TODAY excerpted the chapter on the Bangladesh war over four issues in late 1979, was a controversial work, not just in its handling of India, but in its narration of those eventful years.

A master diplomat and negotiator—his shared Nobel Peace Prize was recognition of his role in negotiating the end of the Vietnam war—Kissinger had strong views about one adversary he could not beat: Mrs Indira Gandhi. His writings betray a certain administration for a person who proved to be his equal in diplomacy. "Once one cut through the strident, self-righteous rhetoric, Mrs Gandhi had few peers in the cold-blooded calculation of the elements of power," he wrote in his book. At another point he said: "Mrs Gandhi was a strong personality, relentlessly pursuing India's national interest with single-mindedness and finesse. I respected her

strength even when her policies were hurtful to our national interest." Not surprisingly, one of Kissinger's first acts on reaching India was to lay a wreath at her samadhi. "I felt I owed it to her," he said. During his brief visit, Kissinger gave Managing Editor SUMAN DUBEY an exclusive interview. Excerpts:

Kissinger: "I'm interested in good relations with India"

**Q.** Lots of Americans seem to feel that with the change of government in this country, there is now a new opportunity for better Indo-US relations. Do you share this view?

A. Yes. I share that view, but one has to keep in mind that the foreign policies of great nations like ours and yours are determined by certain realities which confine possible changes to certain limits. I say that in order not to put an undue burden on your prime minister. The pre-

vious prime minister was a strong leader who defended India's national interest. So will the current one.

I believe that there is considerable room for improvement of relations. Much of it would have happened also under the previous prime minister. The new prime

minister can give this additional impetus, and in addition, he represents a new generation and therefore has perhaps fewer of the preconceptions of the previous generation that grew up in the colonial period.

**Q.** Are you satisfied that the Reagan Administration is doing all it can to help Indo-US relations?

A. No, I don't think they are doing all they can to help things along. The Reagan Administration came into office with certain preconceptions, and they have changed very importantly in their relations with the Soviet Union. I suspect they will now change in their relations with the developing world. But since we cannot deal with the whole of the developing world as a unit effectively, we must deal with some of the key countries, and that again makes India one of the principal countries.

**Q.** What do you think the Indian Government should do?

A. I think that there should be a continuing dialogue on perceptions of international problems. We don't have to agree, but we should explain to each other periodically what we think the key issues are as we see them and see how we can avoid needlessly irritating each other even while we maintain our national positions. Secondly, there must be something on which Indians and Americans can work together —economic and scientific projects. That would create a body of people on both sides that at least know each other. Thirdly, it is strange how little systematic contact there is. I'm part of a group in which leading Europeans and Americans from

BHAWAN SINGH

52 INDIA TODAY • FEBRUARY 28, 1985

the private sector meet once a year. The
same exists with Japan. It does not exist
with India. The advantage of these
private groups is not that they can make
policy but it means when there is a pro-
blem you can call up and say, look I don't
understand this, explain it to me.

Q. Some of us are bothered by the fact that even though India and the US are both democracies, this particular aspect does not figure in American calculations of what is good for this part of the world or what is bad for it.

A. I think India has had an enormous reservoir of goodwill in America and one of the problems is that we expected too much of India. We thought that because India is a democracy, it could act as a judge of all international relationships. In 1961, I was an advisor to President Kennedy and my friend John Kenneth Galbraith was ambassador to India. At that time, there was the Berlin crisis and many in the Kennedy administration thought, if we conducted a certain kind of policy, India would support us. There was the nonaligned meeting in Belgrade in which India took a position between the two sides. There was terrible disappointment in the Kennedy administration—except me, because I said to myself, if Nehru took a position on Berlin critical of the Soviets, he would be jeopardising Indian interests for a subject of no conceivable concern to India. India has no view on Berlin for which it needs to risk a great deal. That is our problem. So paradoxically, if India had been a military dictatorship, we wouldn't have expected it to play that sort of role.

Q. *But that role has been resented as well?*

A. That's right. India, precisely because it speaks English, is a democracy, and all of us know Indians, we like and have easy relations with them, there is an exceptional demand put on India which isn't fair to India. But I think India has had really more influence in America than it gives itself credit for, and I can tell you at one time I opposed India (during the Bangladesh war in 1971) our media and much of our bureaucracy gave me a terrible time.

Q. *In retrospect, that tilt, was it the right thing to do?*

A. Yes. I'm not saying that every tactical move was the right thing. When I was security advisor I saw very few ambassadors, L.K. Jha will tell you, he was one of four that I saw regularly before 1971. I did that because I was convinced that we wanted to establish new relationships with many countries, with China,

with the Soviet Union, with Europe and with India. For me, for all of us, the events of 1971 were a tragedy. We didn't want them, but we felt that we had no choice. But as soon as the crisis was over, we worked energetically to restore good relations and I came here in 1974. I wouldn't be here today if I weren't interested in good relations with India. I have no other motive for being here.

Q. There's a feeling here that successful US administrations, including the one you were part of, have never treated India as the central point of their south Asian policies. Why is this so?

A. I can't speak for all administrations. I attempted to treat India as a leading country and a central point of south Asian policies. We had in 1971 an inevitable clash that would take too long to ex-

Q. Well then, to what extent do you think Indian sensibilities should be taken into account in the formulation of American policies towards this part of the world?

A. I think Indian sensibilities should be taken very much into account.

Q. More than at present?

A. Well, what is lacking at present and has been lacking is a systematic review of policy when there is no problem. For example, Britain had a major influence

on American foreign policies for a long time and it still has a big influence—not because they raise an issue every two weeks, but because there is so much dialogue between Britain and America at all levels of government that they have an influence even on policies already formed. As a general proposition, we don't deal with India or India with us until there is already a problem and until both sides have gone a long distance down whatever road they are going. I think we can pay more attention and I think India should pay more attention to us, and that I say without any prejudice to any existing Indian relationship.

Q. One of the reasons this doesn't happen is that the US views problems from a global point of view and India from a very regional point of view, and these perceptions do not meet.

A. Yes and no. Because it seems to me... what does the US want in this sub-continent? Peace, stability and progress. Not even many Americans present this as self-interest. Supposing this area became like the Middle East, divided—which it could be—between seven or eight conflicting states, all in constant rivalry with each other. It would of course not be desirable for the people of the region, but it would lead to endless international conflicts in which everybody could fish in troubled waters. I think that peace, stability and progress in the region is a joint interest.

There are, of course, conflicts between India and Pakistan and between India and Sri Lanka or Bangladesh in which the US does not have the same intensity of interest that India can have, and there we may part company, but we have conflicts in Europe and Latin America of which India has a different perception. We have to learn to live with them.

Q. Couldn't the Americans do more to bring India and Pakistan closer and help the India-Sri Lanka problem instead of, as it is now perceived here, doing things that drag them apart, such as the arms aid?

A. Let's take the India and Sri Lanka problem. I think that your high officials will agree that the US has attempted to play a helpful role and has had many discussions on a serious level with the Indian Government trying to bring about reforms that would make it possible for all the nations here to join in a constructive solution. And we have also expressed a view very similar to that of your government and the President's speech to Parliament, that a purely military solution of the problem is not possible. I think in Sri

> "India has had really more influence in America than it gives itself credit for, and I can tell you at one time I opposed India (during the Bangladesh war in 1971) and our media and much of our bureaucracy gave me a terrible time."

plain but which, given our new relationship with China and the role Pakistan played in that at the time, had its own necessities. Then the question is, what does one mean by central role and how does one articulate it, and does that mean one can do nothing without the permission of India? I would say, we should do nothing without discussing with India, but I don't think we should give any country the veto power over our foreign policy in any part of the world.

FEBRUARY 28, 1985 • INDIA TODAY 53

## INTERVIEW OF THE FORTNIGHT

Lanka I would be surprised if your government had a substantial disagreement with us or our role, but you'd have to ask your government.

Now, on the Pakistan issue, there are two separate problems. There's the arms relationship and there is the general relationship between India and Pakistan. I think the US would like nothing better than improved political relations between India and Pakistan. I know for certain, having talked to our leading officials at the very highest level before I came that they would be willing to play any facilitating role that they could in improving this relationship. I have the impression that both parties, specially India, preferred to conduct the negotiations between India and Pakistan as a bilateral matter which is very understandable. I think we could play a facilitating role designed to meet the various concerns of both sides.

On the arms supply, if the Soviet army could be removed from Afghanistan, I think the American perceptions of the problem would alter and remove one of the causes of the arms relationship as it now exists. Secondly, if one looks at the overall strength of the Indian and Pakistan military forces, it is difficult to visualise any rational motive that would cause a Pakistan leader to attack India. But, still, this is a problem. I understand the Indian view but I think considering that I have not yet been to Pakistan, I should not pronounce on this.

**Q. Do you think a squadron or two of F16s or whatever is being given to Pakistan really adds to its security against a threat from the Soviets in Afghanistan?**

**A.** There will never be enough arms with Pakistan to protect itself from a full scale attack from the Soviet Union. What American arms can do is to raise the threshold of and the price for harassment of the border regions and for the sort of psychological warfare at which the Soviets are particularly adept.

**Q. What would the American reaction be if Soviet forces were to make retaliatory strikes into Pakistan?**

**A.** Well, it is very hard to predict but we have a treaty relationship with Pakistan in relation to such a contingency which would force us to extend some assistance—whether in the form of weapons or in any other form would depend on the situation and on the extent of the attack.

**Q.** *You don't think that the induction of arms to guerrillas in Afghanistan through Pakistan creates a situation for precisely this sort of problem? The Indian perception of Afghanistan is to work for a political settlement whereas the Americans seem to be opting for a military settlement.*

**A.** With all due respect, it is wrong. When there are 130,000 Soviets in Afghanistan, you cannot say that the US is opting for a military settlement. We did not put the troops in Afghanistan. We have nothing in Afghanistan. We were content with what we considered a pro-Soviet government headed by Daoud who certainly gave our allies plenty of trouble and was never considered a

> "If the Soviet army could be removed from Afghanistan, American perceptions of the problem would alter and remove one of the causes of the arms relationship (with Pakistan) as it now exists."

source of great comfort to us. I believe that if Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, American aid to the freedom fighters or whatever you call them should stop. Refugees should be permitted to return and then normal political processes should continue. Countries of the region should guarantee the neutrality, independence, non-alignment and demilitarisation of Afghanistan with the US having no role in this whatsoever, or the Soviet Union.

**Q. How do you think this can be brought about?**

**A.** India or even Iran or any other country of the region that is acceptable should do this. We want nothing in Afghanistan except the withdrawal of Soviet forces. I think there should be negotiations, initially including the US and the Soviet Union. I think India could play a very major role in this and maybe make a specific proposal.

**Q.** *Do you believe that the Soviet Union does indeed threaten Pakistan in search of a warm water port as is commonly hypothesised?*

**A.** Well, I happen to think that the fundamental thrust of Soviet policy will be aimed towards Iran, but each of these moves has its own corollary. And so I

believe that Pakistan, through Baluchistan, will not be able to escape those pressures. I think the major thrust is against Iran, and when I say that I don't mean next week, or month or even next year. I am saying as a strategic direction, because I think that the Iranian economy complements the Soviet economy, and because it gives them an easy and direct outlet into the oil regions of the Middle East.

**Q.** *What you're saying is that the Soviets would like to secure Iran as an area of their influence?*

**A.** At a minimum. But you see, the way the Soviet Union acts depends on many factors. I am not saying that the Soviets have a fixed timetable in which they are going to do this, and they may possibly never do it. This is, I think, a strategic objective.

**Q.** *One of the nightmares here is of Pakistan getting a nuclear bomb. There is speculation and some evidence in scientific circles that it is very close to it or already has it. What would you do in such circumstances, knowing that it is going on and in spite of the best efforts to prevent it?*

**A.** There is an amendment, the so-called Symington amendment, that prohibits any security assistance to any country that is actually working on a bomb. And if we should have any irrefutable evidence to that effect, we would be bound by our law to carry that out. Secondly, India is the only country that has set off a nuclear explosion and that has also announced that it would not build nuclear weapons, which is a great tribute to India. I think, therefore, perhaps it might be possible for both India and Pakistan to sign a joint statement or two separate statements that they will neither build weapons of this kind nor ever use them against each other, or any other set of measures of that kind. I would greatly welcome this.

**Q.** *Do you think we are entering a less tense and violent phase in the rest of this century? What do you think the 21st will be like?*

**A.** I think the next four years are really very important. We have a president with a huge mandate. You have a prime minister with a huge majority. The Soviets have certain necessities. If we all act in a far-sighted spirit, we can by the end of this decade bring about a change which will see us to the end of this century. Then what happens in the 21st century is hard to foretell, but I hope we can bring about a qualitative change in relationships.

54 INDIA TODAY • FEBRUARY 28, 1985