10/03/2003 18:07 FAX

002

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2401-A Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Phone: 202-226-7820

Fax: 202-226-2722

Chairman, Douglas Bereuter (NE)

October 3, 2003

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Dr. Lawrence Summers
Chairmen
Task Force on Transatlantic Relations
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York, NY 10021

Dear Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Summers:

First, I would like to express my thanks and praise to both of you for your excellent work in chairing the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Transatlantic Relations. To the extent that I could participate directly or by telephone, I certainly was very impressed by the high level of discussion in the task force, which in part reflects your leadership and credibility.

I would also express my regrets for being unable to join the September 30th meeting due to the press of Congressional business. However, I do have some comments on the draft report that I would like to submit for your consideration. I would first like to draw attention to two major areas of concern that I believe must be addressed in the final report, and then offer some minor suggestions to the rest of the text where I believe it could be clarified or otherwise improved.

Thank you for your consideration of my comments, which begin on the next page.

c: Dr. Charles Kupchan

10/03/2003 18:07 FAX

003

"New oversight body"

I am particularly concerned with the proposal to create "a new oversight body for the Atlantic community," consisting of "a small standing council of high-level U.S. and European officials." From the text of the report, it appears to suggest that this new body would regulate all aspects of U.S.-EU relations and would operate along the lines of the European Commission. The draft also appears to suggest that NATO be subordinated to this new institution.

I question the wisdom of this idea. In fact, I would strongly suggest that it be stricken from the final report. My reasons are several:

* The draft text is not specific on the point of who would comprise this new institution, but the text appears to imply that it would be a joint U.S.-EU body. The transatlantic relationship goes beyond the European Union, yet this proposed institution appears to exclude any European country outside the EU.

* NATO is not obsolete or becoming obsolete, despite Dr. Kupchan's view, expressed in various op-ed articles, that it is. In the past year, NATO countries have transformed the Alliance by creating the NATO Response Force, undertaking the Prague Capabilities Commitment, beginning an overhaul of the command structure, and taking command of ISAF. Yes, NATO needed to continue reforms, but that process is already underway.

* Defense remains a national responsibility, so it would be both presumptuous and ineffective to treat the EU as the main American interlocutor on defense matters. In addition, this "new oversight body" would not include key NATO allies like Turkey and Canada in the transatlantic defense relationship. Because defense remains a national responsibility, a transatlantic defense and security institution should be comprised of those nations that desire a mutual defense commitment, such as NATO members.

* In the area of trade, it would make more sense to include our NAFTA partners, Canada and Mexico, in any kind of organization that seeks to regulate the transatlantic economic relationship. One could make a coherent case for creation of an "Atlantic Marketplace" between the EU and NAFTA, rather than a broad, new institution that would go far beyond the economic sphere and infringe on an area in which NATO already has established a long track record.

* Basing any institution on the European Commission is ill-advised. The Commission suffers from a severe lack of democratic legitimacy and accountability. To surrender national sovereignty to an elite panel of unelected bureaucrats not directly accountable to elected officials or the electorate is profoundly undemocratic.

* At least as far as the United States is concerned, incorporating legislators in an executive body is contrary to the principle of separation of powers. Lawmakers should enact legislation and exercise oversight, not execute the laws. There may be a need for closer cooperation between the Congress and the European Parliament, particularly with regard to legislation that leads to the promulgation of regulations. But that could be

10/03/2003 18:07 FAX

004

accomplished in other ways: for example, by establishing a congressional liaison office in the EP and an EP liaison office in the Congress, which would allow for staff-level consultations as regulatory legislation is developed.

* There is substantial legislative exchange through bodies like the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which brings together national legislators to discuss not only defense, but also political, economic, civil affairs, and scientific issues. The Transatlantic Legislators' Dialogue performs a similar role for Members of Congress and MEPs.

## NATO

Replacing the institution, procedures, and cooperation that NATO has developed over 54 years with something new and unproven is ill-advised. There is no need for a new institution to oversee the transatlantic defense relationship.

First and foremost, NATO is a military alliance through which its member states provide for their common defense. During the Cold War, the main threat to its security came from within Europe in the form of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. Today, the main threats come from outside of Europe: global terrorism, WMD proliferation, rogue states, and the nexus of these three. But NATO's core mission—the collective defense of its members—has not changed. What has changed is the nature of the threats and where they are found.

It is true that the EU, through ESDP, will take on more responsibility for intra-European security: that is, in managing instability in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, which do not pose a direct threat to the territory of its member states. It is true that NATO-EU links must be deepened and regularized, something that has been resisted by the EU. But NATO will retain the responsibility of defending its members—both European and North American—against threats to their security, most of which are likely to arise from outside of Europe and North America.

It is important to note that peacekeeping in southeastern Europe is not a "traditional NATO mission." NATO has been in the peacekeeping business for only eight of its 54 years, and only because the EU proved itself incapable of restoring peace in the Balkans—not because peacekeeping is an integral part of NATO. It will probably continue to undertake peace operations, but these may be outside of Europe, such as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. In this regard, we should not confuse the traditional and new roles for NATO. Its traditional mission is the collective defense of its members, and its new missions are the peace operations, be they in Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan.

**Other points to improve the text: Some minor, some significant**

Page 1: First sentence: Saying the relationship is "at risk" overstates the degree to which differences on some issues with some European countries threatens the broader transatlantic relationship. Second sentence: Text should be clearer in noting that the clash over Iraq was

2

10/03/2003 18:07 FAX

005

between the U.S. and some European countries, on the one hand, and several other European countries, on the other. The clash was not between "America and Europe."

Second paragraph: I disagree with the premise. The relationship, clearly, is *not* being left unattended. It is receiving a great deal of high-level attention. In addition, the sense of estrangement does not apply to the U.S. relationship with all of Europe, but only with a few European countries.

Page 2: In second sentence, the "achievements" came in the second half of the 20th century. The first half was a different story. Third sentence: No one but France is advocating a return to a balance-of-power rivalry, so this concern seems overstated.

In "Diagnosis" section, third sentence: It is true that Europe no longer depends on the U.S. for its security *internally*, but we continue to face external threats together.

Page 3: First sentence: The use of "pacifier and protector" could be seen as patronizing. Also, the United States remains committed to the defense of Europe, but the threats today arise from outside of Europe.

First full paragraph, last sentence: America and Europe have *similar perceptions* of the terrorist threat, as shown by the Solana strategy and last month's German Marshall Fund poll. The differences come in deciding how best to address this threat.

Page 4: Second full paragraph, last sentence: change "will not embrace" to "may not embrace" - it seems a little presumptuous as written.

Page 5: First full paragraph is overdrawn, and it seems to accept that there exists a "European" identity that doesn't yet exist across Europe. The third sentence is particularly overdramatic, not to mention probably wrong.

Page 6: The entire balance of power discussion on this page fails to recognize the divisions within Europe and instead treats Europe as a unified actor. Given that most European countries do not harbor French aspirations for the EU to become a counterweight to the United States, it seems fears of a return to balance of power politics are perhaps exaggerated.

Page 9-10: Last sentence beginning on page 9: We don't see Europe as a strategic competitor - we see some Europeans countries trying to turn Europe into a strategic competitor, without success. Yes, Europe is an economic competitor, but we can accept that competition and even find it to be actually salutary.

Page 11: First full paragraph, third sentence: *Some* U.S. policy-makers, not all of them, have begun to question whether a stronger Europe is in America's interests.

After the heading: I would not endorse a "looser" transatlantic relationship. I agree with the last sentence that the relationship will be broader.

Page 12: First line: It would be more accurate to say that responsibility for crisis management in Europe will switch to the EU. The responsibility for defending Europe (and North America) against outside threats will remain a transatlantic responsibility and will be

3

10/03/2003 18:07 FAX

006

handled through NATO. Also, the end of the paragraph unfairly ignores British and French military power.

Page 14: First full paragraph, first sentence: This is definitely over-reaching. It is a generalization that simply is not accurate.

Page 15: Top of page, second sentence: This statement ignores the fact that the U.S. would have benefited from European unity even more than it did from internal divisions if Europe had been unified in support of the U.S. position. European unity is desirable if Europe seeks to be a partner of the United States.

Second full paragraph, second sentence: This really is not different than during the Cold War. It is doubtful that the U.S. would have supported European integration during the Cold War if the EU had used its power against the United States.

Page 16: Second paragraph: This discussion should note that much of the "anti-American" sentiment is opposition to certain U.S. policies or simply anti-Bush sentiment. I simply disagree with the third sentence. This question needs more thought from the task force.

Page 19: First full paragraph: One might question whether such a discussion of preventive war would heal or, instead, would reopen the wounds of last winter. One might argue that the European concern about pre-emption is not about carrying it out in practice, but rather that the Bush Administration would make it a declaratory policy. It may be that the less said publicly about pre-emption, the better. Amity across the Atlantic might be best preserved if we let the Europeans look the other way, rather than throwing a pre-emption doctrine in their faces.

Page 21: First paragraph: Reference to the Concert of Europe is unfortunate. Even mentioning the idea of a Great Power concert to regulate international affairs is bound to make our smaller allies uncomfortable. Perhaps reference to NATO's CJTF concept would be more appropriate to a discussion of opting out of military operations.

Page 26: Second paragraph, second sentence: There have been some thoughtful proposals put forth regarding decision-making at NATO, particularly the idea of allowing a "committee of contributors" to oversee a military operation on a day-to-day basis, rather than the NAC. In particular, refer to the paper that Leo Michel at the National Defense University recently published on this subject for some more refined ideas. As written here, the text seems to imply that smaller countries in the NAC should be bypassed by the big countries.

Page 28: Second set of bullet points, second bullet: Need to rewrite - this text seems to imply that there are European claims that Europe is too pro-Palestinian.

Page 30: The conclusion should be rewritten to delete references to a possible return to a balance of power relationship and to more clearly indicate that the updating of Atlantic institutions is already underway, such as the work that was done at NATO's Prague Summit.

4

OCT 03 2003

Jessee Incao

From: JFly@cfr.org
Sent: Thursday, October 02, 2003 4:58 PM
Subject: CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations -- Member Comments on Draft Report

Below, please find comments on the draft report from several Task Force members who were unable to attend Tuesday's meeting.

----- Forwarded by Jamie Fly/DC/CFR on 09/29/2003 04:27 PM -----

John Gaddis
<john.gaddis@yale.edu>

09/28/2003 05:43
PM

To: ckupchan@cfr.org
cc: JFly@cfr.org, gji@georgetown.edu
Subject: Comments on draft

Dear Charlie --

Herewith a few comments on the draft report.

Section I in general I think could use some tightening. It makes its basic points forcefully, but their reiteration somewhat diminishes the effect. This section ought to be both stark and succinct.

p. 6: If after five decades, transatlantic comity is taken for granted, then what's the crisis all about? Seems to me what the report is trying to say is just the opposite.

p. 9: First sentence of second paragraph essentially repeats final sentence of the preceding one.

p. 13: If American international dominance is unchallenged, why does the US need to win anybody's consent? Our military power may be unchallenged, but our dominance of the international system surely isn't.

p. 14: Is it accurate to say that a "broad" coalition of current and prospective EU members supported the US on Iraq? I think the word "several" would come closer to what happened.

p. 16: You say here that the US can be relatively relaxed about the challenge posed by a rising Europe, but then at the end of the paragraph you say that Europe's shortcomings in building its own security assets have caused the trans-Atlantic strategic separation to take place. This doesn't quite mesh.

pp. 21, 23: You say on p. 21 that NATO is no longer suited to serve as the chief institutional bond between the US and Europe, but on p. 23 you have it as "the primary institutional linkage across the Atlantic and the most appropriate forum for U.S.-European consultation."

Finally, some more substantive points:

1

There are, as I see it, only two recommendations in this draft that are likely to stand out: the first is that the US should condition its future support for European integration upon the EU's willingness to cooperate with the US (p. 15); the second is the call (p. 22) for a new oversight body for the Atlantic community. The second recommendation will probably not ruffle many feathers, but the first will certainly do so. I think, therefore, it deserves more analysis than the brief couple of lines it receives here.

For what you're really raising here is the issue the report otherwise evades: is the optimal international system to be unipolar or a multipolar? The American preference for unipolarity has been clear since the early days of the Clinton administration, and so by the logic of your recommendation US support for further European integration will be conditioned on the extent to which the EU accepts unipolarity. What you don't discuss is whether the Europeans can -- or should -- do this. The French, for all their faults, have posed that issue clearly. I think it will seem quite a large waffle if the Task Force fails now to address it.

That, in turn, gets at the issue that you and I have discussed: should the report move beyond process to lay out its own view of the structure its recommendations are intended to produce? Or, to put it another way, what the trans-Atlantic relationship should look like, say ten or twenty years out? You give us a "worst case" vision of the future when you invoke the specter of a revived balance of power system, improbable though that might be (unless you read Kupchan, of course). Should there not be an equally clear "best case" vision?

Finally, one other suggestion. We all became familiar, if not always comfortable, with the distinction between actual and declaratory policy during the Cold War -- NATO could hardly have held together without it. It strikes me that both the Americans and the Europeans, these days, have lost that skill: declaratory policy has become actual policy. Would there be any point in trying to revive the distinction as a way of getting beyond some of the current difficulties? Not sure this is something to say in the report (which has to be declaratory), but it might be worth thinking

about how we could get back to a situation where such a practice could be mutually understood and respected. My source for this idea? One of our Grand Strategy sophomores.

Good luck with this -- sorry I can't be there on Tuesday.

-- John

-----Forwarded by Charles Kupchan/DC/CFR on 09/29/2003 02:44PM -----

To: <ckupchan@cfr.org>

From: "European Studies" <european.studies@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk>

Date: 09/29/2003 12:32PM

Subject: Re: CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations -- Draft Report

Dear Charlie

Many congratulations on the draft report. I think it is generally eloquent and forceful.

I have the following comments and suggestions for changes. They are numbered by page numbers as it came out, printed doublespace:

5. I would say that Europeans have begun to see Americans more as 'other' than as 'self'. I don't think Americans have begun to see Europeans as so much 'other' - just irritating and irrelevant.

11. I don't like 'looser' - more diverse? more flexible? I think it would be important to mention the impact of EU enlargement here.

15. I very much like the formulation about American support for European unity here.

21. Concert of Europe suggests a mention of contact groups already here.

2

22. If any recommendation makes the headlines, it will probably be this one. What does 'oversight body' mean? What powers, rights, responsibilities, brief would it have? I would definitely NOT suggest that it should resemble the EU commission. I would take this sentence out. The next paragraph says, more wisely, that the 'council's composition and procedures would emerge through transatlantic negotiations'. I would like a further sentence in that paragraph saying how contact groups have not only helped to solve a particular problem, but also to ensure the purpose stated earlier, namely 'the containment of disagreements'.

27. Could we add a further bullet point addressing the regulatory issues raised by Gordon Brown and Co? An apparently small issue, but, as they point out, with large implications.

28. Could we suggest a contact group already on Iran?

Otherwise, I like it very much, and shall be happy to subscribe my signature.

Best

Tim

Timothy Garton Ash
Director
European Studies Centre
St Antony's College
Oxford
England

Tel + 44 1865 274470
Fax + 44 1865 274478
european.studies@sant.ox.ac.uk

Caroline Atkinson
Comments on draft CFR Task Force report on Transatlantic Relations.

1. The overall conclusion?that the Transatlantic partnership has changed, for structural reasons; it is worth preserving, though for different tasks from in the past; and needs action to become/stay effective?is clearly stated. But the recommendations, in particular that the US-EU should work together?presumably excluding others?on devising new international institutions, are not well set up by the middle section (which needs some re-ordering to reduce repetition and bring out key arguments more clearly) and are not very convincing. As earlier meetings have discussed diagnosis, the final meeting will presumably discuss the specific recommendations. Some of these are now buried in the text (eg, p16 discussion of need for political leadership in EU and Washington to push actively for better relations and "political mainstream"). Others (especially the call for new institutions) seem impractical. A clearer link between the tasks that the US and Europe need each other for (importantly, those outside Europe?described well here) and the ways that they need to cooperate to address those tasks would help.

2. I would emphasize "common interests" more than "common destiny" or common identity". At present, the draft shifts between the view that process and institutions will follow if there is basic agreement on policy substance (as p20 first para) and a call for new institutions (also on p 20, at the bottom, with a hint at "institutions that better meet the challenges of the day")

3. Throughout, the report tends to use "Europe" and "EU" as synonyms. This risks confusing the issue. On foreign policy and security matters (and some key economic ones) the US-Europe dialogue cannot be a US-EU dialogue. The US needs to rebuild/maintain its bilateral relations with the major European powers, as well as readying itself to deal with the expanded EU. For this reason, the recommendation for an expanded dialogue between the US and EU is not very practical: if this is the US and Brussels, it will remain the ceremonial event that it is today.

4. The economic issues do not integrate very well with the security and foreign policy ones?in particular the recommendations on fiscal policy and structural reform (p27) seem beyond the scope of the Task Force. On trade, the treatment of the Cancun breakdown seems

3

LLO)

to underplay the enormous difficulty that poses for the world trading system going forward (this could be cited as a topic for the US-EU agenda, rather than something to be discussed in substance here).

5. Mostly, the draft neatly avoids blaming either side for present difficulties in the relationship. But Iraq, and the growing opposition in the US as well as in Europe, feels a bit like the elephant in the room. In particular, developments in Iraq will surely affect the domestic and international view of the doctrine on pre-emptive action: the report at present seems to take for granted that this doctrine is now part of the landscape and needs to be incorporated in EU-US understandings.

6. The suggestions of a US-European "fix" for the international system run counter to the growing importance of other nations and regions both in securing the peace and promoting a strong global economy and trading system, and the recognition of that importance by both the US and Europe in their diplomacy. How would these recommendations read to Japan? China? Brazil?

7. Instead, the report could emphasize more the strong shared interests that Europe and the US have in a successful, peaceful, growing world as part of a broader call for multilateralism and a multilateral approach to problems (surely something that the Task Force could agree on), even while accepting that nations will some times agree to disagree

-----Forwarded by Charles Kupchan/DC/CFR on 09/23/2003 05:33PM -----

To: "ckupchan" <ckupchan@cfr.org>

From: "giuliano\..amato\@iol\..it" <giuliano.amato@iol.it>

Date: 09/23/2003 11:44AM

Subject: draft report

Dear Charlie,

I told you already that I cannot attend our final meeting. Let me make my remarks on the draft by e-mail. First of all, I want to tell you that you have done an excellent job. Most of the relevant observations and comments of our previous discussions have been utilized and now enrich the clear and tense thread that runs through the draft. This is really remarkable. Some specific comments:

- pag. 5. Here you write that "Some Europeans have become openly hostile toward the US...." I would put it somehow differently by saying that "In Europe a radical hostility toward the US, that had been minoritarian in portraying it as the main threat to international stability, has been gaining ground and affects also political actors at the center of the European stage" (or something similar);

- pag. 9, where you conclude on the reasons that both parties have for making the rejuvenation of their partnership. Here I would add that it is not without importance that third countries still look at them as a sort of joint counterpart in relation to their responsibilities toward the world. They are the richest ones, they also are, in different ways, the "exemplary" democracies, and consequently they share common responsibilities;

- pag. 12, where you speak of strategic separation and division of labor. Here I would dare to introduce the notion of 'regional power' for Europe, which reflects the actual role of Europe itself, without excluding its role vis a vis the wider world;

- pag. 15: A deeper and more united Europe is in the interests of the US also because a united Europe would necessarily reflect the 'average' feelings of all of the Member States. And such average is closer to the US than some of the individual States. Can we say this explicitly? One of the consequences could be the US support to a European seat in the UN.

- pag. 19: I would delete the sentence where you say that "they may at times feel compelled to take military action despite the absence of UN authorization". This is very controversial. Let us work on an agreement on the need to also cover 'threats' and therefore preventive actions; let us promote (as you suggest in pag. 20 and 21) institutions that better meet the challenges of the day. The consequences will follow:

pag. 22: the proposal of a small standing council is a good one. Shouldn't we be more precise on the "European officials"? Are they officials of the EU or of the Member States or of both?

4

-pag.27 and following pages: are you sure that it is advisable for us to enter into the global governance agenda, the economic agenda and so forth? We run the risk to forget this or that important item. Isn't better to more broadly refer to these areas and say that the US and Europe should set their 'joint' roles, without further details?

Thank you, Charlie, for what you have done. And than you for the attention to these comments. Giuliano

Memorandum

To: CFR Transatlantic Task Force
>From: Anne-Marie Slaughter
Re: Comments on Draft Report
Date: September 29, 2003

I compliment Charlie on pulling together many different threads from a complex set of discussions over several meetings. The report is a good start and contains some excellent ideas (such as the Atlantic Council). I have three comments.

1) The emphasis on structural factors as the principal explanation for the current state of U.S.-European relations is too strong for me to be able to sign the report in its present form. In my view this account does not accurately reflect the views of many group members. Moreover, the emphasis on structural factors suggests an air of inevitability about the U.S. and Europe drifting apart, suggesting that the best we can do is recommend palliative measures. My own preference would simply be to list structural factors alongside other factors, without claiming that they are the "principal causes" of the current problems. Related objections concern the statement that the Atlantic "zone of peace" could unravel and give way to a renewed balance of power system in Europe, which reflects a particular conception of international relations that is not shared by many group members, and the claim that "absent the Soviet threat, American and European security are no longer indivisible." I would delete these claims, as none are necessary to the substance of the report.

2) The prescriptions should be bolder. In addition to creating an Atlantic Council, I would also propose a New Atlantic Charter, affirming America's and Europe's common history and values and setting forth shared goals for a new era. The Charter should spell out the "new transatlantic bargain" and should offer some specifics: 1) a shared commitment to multilateral decision-making but also to major reforms of existing international institutions like the UN (a goal that could be advanced through a caucus of the democracies); 2) an acknowledgment of the common threats we face and the need for a holistic approach to countering them, combining military capacity to root out terrorists and deter states from supporting them with the economic and political assistance necessary to rebuild failed or shattered states and to prevent other states from disintegrating through poverty and disease; and 3) agreement on a more pro-active approach to the combined threat of terrorism and WMD proliferation -- what Kofi Annan referred to last week as "criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats." Finally, the Charter should spell out a vision of a united Europe that the U.S. can support. The language in the draft report conditioning U.S. support for European integration on Europe's agreement not to "cast itself as a counterweight" could be counter-productive with the nineteen-year olds.

3) The Atlantic Council should definitely include parliamentarians. Engaging parliamentarians can help to increase awareness of U.S.-European economic interdependence in ways that matter, by making clear how much constituents on both sides rely on transatlantic investment. Creating transatlantic legislative networks can also create personal relationships that over time may help hold individual legislators to account for mindless Europe or U.S.-bashing. Judicial networks have had similar effects in making U.S. judges more receptive to European approaches to common legal issues.

Jamie M. Fly
Research Associate, Europe and National Security
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 518-3404

5

09/22/2003 13:57 FAX 202 518 3431

09/19/2003 09:04 FAX 212 434 9880

Council on For. Rel.
EXECUTIVE CFR

☑ 003

☑ 002/008

September 19, 2003

TO: Henry Kissinger
Larry Summers
Charlie Kupchan

FROM: Richard Haass

RE: Latest Transatlantic Task Force Draft

Sirs: I have read what I believe to be the most recent draft, and while improved, I would suggest it still has a way to go before it is likely to have the impact we all seek. I will get some line in/line out comments directly to Charlie, but here are some broader reactions:

--I believe the draft exaggerates the risk of U.S.-European rivalry and a return of traditional great power politics in the previous centuries. The real danger for the next few decades at least is less that and more a lack of cooperation/partnership. If this comes about, the two sides will be much less able to deal with the regional and transnational issues that define this era. Said differently, I am worried less about growing rivalry across the Atlantic than I am about diminishing relevance and effectiveness of the transatlantic relationship.

--Some of the language is too "wonky" for my taste. Here I would single out the talk of "other" and "self" on page 4. A bigger problem throughout is the lack of clarity. For example, the call for the United States to "remain engaged in Europe" on page 10. Or what you mean by NATO expanding its peacekeeping role in Afghanistan on page 25. Or the call for the United States and EU to make the G-8 a more effective forum for managing the global economy on page 26. Such statements are not useful absent specifics for what you have in mind.

--I agree with not getting into which side is to blame more for the current problems. But to suggest the current situation is 100% structural, i.e., inevitable, wont persuade many. You at least need to posit that statements and actions by leaders on both sides have exacerbated the situation even if you do not get into the specifics.

--More needs to be said re the cause and impact of trade differences post-Cancun.

--The draft could be more direct in making clear to Europeans that they have as much to lose as does the United States if we fail to cooperate.

09/19/2003 09:05 FAX 212 434 9880

004
003/006

2

--The discussion of the United States and European integration needs to be more explicit. (I have attached a copy of an article by Gerry Baker of the FT. Agree or not, the report should take on what he writes about, especially his recommendations on the last page.)

--Why isn't genocide (a la Kosovo) a trigger for the potential use of force (page 17)?

--I disagree strongly with the assertion on page 20 that the current institutional infrastructure of the transatlantic relationship is obsolete. (Ironically, the draft seems to as well in it is discussion of NATO's role on page 22.) I am also unpersuaded of the need for a new "oversight body" as suggested on page 21, which seems to put forward a mechanical fix to a political problem, but this is obviously your call. But if you do go this way, you should make a stronger case for it, explain why the task can't be accomplished just as well or better by existing institutions and better consultations, and explain how this new body would affect existing institutions, such as NATO. Also, you might want to opine on whether the quad should be maintained/revised.

--Why such a division of labor where the United States does warfighting and the Europeans emphasize peace operations and nation building? Why not have both do both?

--I would think the discussion of the new Iraq UNSC resolution (page 25) will be overtaken by events.

--Why fudge the discussion on page 25 of voting within NATO? If you think the veto is obsolete or undesirable given NATO's increase in size and the reality that it will mostly be dealing with challenges that will not fall under Article V, then there is a case for revising its decision-making.

--I would not conflate your suggestions for the United States and Europe to promote economic growth and political reform in the developing world with a call for the two to actively promote political, economic, educational, etc reform in the Arab and Islamic worlds. The latter requires a different set of programs. I also question the need for a section on East Asia and, if you include it, the absence of a section on Africa.

--You may want to sharpen the back end of the report by breaking out recommendations to the United States, those for Europe, and those for both.

I hope some of the above is useful. Over to you.

Cc: Jim Lindsay
Lee Feinstein

09/19/2003 09:07 FAX 212 434 9880

005
004/006

Against
United Europe

*It probably isn't in Europe's interest.*
*It certainly isn't in America's.*

BY GERARD BAKER

America wasn't the only country attempting a bit of nation-building this turbulent summer. While U.S. troops and U.N. diplomats battled insurgents in the streets and deserts of Iraq, European politicians and bureaucrats, in the less demanding surroundings of Brussels bistros and Provençal villas, were putting the finishing touches on a project that might prove every bit as consequential as the liberation of Baghdad.

Next month the Europeans will attempt to mop up the last remnants of opposition to a proposed new constitution for the European Union, the first ever codification of a supreme legal authority for the current 15 and soon-to-be 25 members. For two years, in a conscious effort to emulate the work of America's Founding Fathers, committed Europeans, under the leadership of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, have been at work in a constitutional convention to draw up a document that would establish a new relationship between their nations. In June these soi-disant successors to James Madison and Alexander Hamilton produced a draft constitution that seeks to construct in effect the basic institutions of a single European superstate. In October, member governments will begin a lengthy conference before deciding whether to approve the document.

Of course, to skeptical electorates in the member countries, the federalists strenuously deny that they are building a European *über*-nation. It is merely a tidying-up exercise, they say; European law already supersedes the laws of individual European nations in a number of fields. The new constitution simply recognizes this in one document.

This is pure casuistry. The draft E.U. constitution—1,000 pages long (imagine that debate in Philadelphia)—

enshrines in law a single flag, anthem, motto, and currency for the union. Less symbolically but more significantly, it also creates a single president to replace the current arrangement whereby the presidency rotates through the member states every six months, as well as a single foreign minister to run a single foreign policy. It establishes vast areas of European law where nation-states cede ultimate legal sovereignty to E.U. courts. And it creates a "charter of fundamental rights," which includes a long list of such basic human freedoms as the right to be represented on workers' councils—think Bill of Rights in socialist garb. Indeed the true intent of these founding fathers was revealed by their original proposal right at the outset of their proposed constitution—to rename the E.U. the United States of Europe (USE).

Not all governments are happy with these ideas—the USE moniker did not survive, and the drafters will probably be forced to drop some of their more ambitious proposals. But these will be mere tactical retreats. This week, even Tony Blair's British government made clear it would accept the basic principles. The constitution is expected to be approved at a summit in Rome in December and then ratified by the member states. By the end of 2005, the E.U. constitution will join the euro—Europe's single currency, launched four years ago—as a central pillar of an emerging European state.

Americans can be forgiven for yawning at these developments on the old continent. The internal deliberations of Brussels committees can send the most engaged Europeans to sleep, let alone Americans. But even those Americans who are paid to keep track of what Europe is up to—at the State Department, in Washington's think tanks, and in the White House—do not seem unduly animated. The new European Union that is being born is nothing for the United States to get agitated about, they say. Indeed, from President Bush on down, U.S. officials repeat the old line that European integration will bring untold benefits to the United States. Future Henry

Gerard Baker is associate editor of the Financial Times.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

THE WEEKLY STANDARD / 23

09/19/2003 08:10 FAX 212 434 9880

Council on For. Rel.

EXECUTIVE CFR

0006

0005/006

Kissingers will never again have to complain about whom to call when they want to talk to Europe.

If this complacency becomes official U.S. policy, it will be folly of the highest order. The events of the last year should have demonstrated the risks for the United States inherent in a united Europe.

The new Europe in the making is not the New Europe Donald Rumsfeld hailed in the run-up to the Iraq war—an alliance of Atlanticist nations like Britain, Spain, and the ex-Communist states of Eastern Europe. It is likely to bear a much closer resemblance to the Old Europe of Gaullist stripe, defining itself as a self-appointed counterweight to U.S. power; Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder are likely to be the main drivers of its political direction.

Calm down, say Europe's supporters in America. There are many reasons why the United States should not get agitated at events across the Atlantic. For sparters, there is the "It will never happen, so why worry?" argument. Whatever the ambitions of the Gaullist superstars at the heart of Europe, haven't the events of this year revealed that the continent is simply too divided to have a meaningful European foreign policy identity?

It is certainly true that the One Europe vision has suffered a setback. To their serious divisions over Iraq, Europeans have spent much of the summer adding some enteringly trivial ones. Last month an insanely puerile food fight erupted between Italy and Germany over a speech by Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi to the European parliament. "Mafioso" and "Nazi" insults were traded, and the russle ended with the German chancellor canceling his plans to take a holiday in Italy. Such enmities run deep, so who can fear a united Europe?

But European political elites have demonstrated time and again that, despite enduring national differences, the European project goes on. Indeed, it is usually at moments when Europe seems to be breaking apart that the largest strides towards unity are taken, often in the face of public opposition. European strategists are animated by the bicycle theory—if you don't keep moving forward, you fall off—and they have no intention of falling off.

In 1993, when the European exchange rate mechanism, the system that kept the E.U.'s currencies locked together, collapsed under the weight of economic realities, the idea of a single currency, for which the mechanism was a precursor, looked dead. John Major, the British prime minister, gleefully observed that the euro idea had all the relevance of a "raindance." In just three years came the deluge, and the design for the new euro was unveiled.

There is a powerful dynamic at the heart of the E.U.

that tilts the whole process strongly towards closer integration—and towards a particular sort of integration. It is a bargain between Germany, the most federalist country, and France, which supports European union on French terms, together with smaller countries such as Belgium that see an opportunity to punch way above their weight in international affairs if Europe is united.

These countries are now eagerly pressing ahead with an embryonic E.U. security policy, formed around a Franco-Belgian-German core. In neither France nor Germany is there any talk of reorienting policy post-Iraq towards Atlantic cooperation. Indeed, they take seriously Jacques Chirac's notion of a new world in which Europe balances the United States.

Very well, say the doubters, but surely Iraq showed a new arithmetic at work—one basically favorable to the United States. Whatever the Franco-German dreams, European integration will be good for Americans because, thanks to Tony Blair's Britain, Jose Maria Aznar's Spain, and the entry next year of Eastern European countries, the E.U. is moving in our direction.

This is one of the most enduring and dangerous myths about Europe, one sadly fostered by successive British prime ministers, including Blair. If only Britain would put itself at the "heart of Europe," it goes, Britain would lead it. This has never happened. Which is hardly surprising. It is no accident that the countries that have resisted most European moves towards integration have been the least influential. In Europe, as in life, if you pay, you play. The Franco-German axis, together with the deracinated, committed Europeanists who make up the bureaucracy in Brussels, will always win this game.

As for the role of the new Eastern European members, optimism about their influence is misplaced. Once inside the E.U., which has powerful economic leverage over small, relatively poor countries, the magnetic pull of Brussels overwhelms all. When in April the United States offered Poland a sector to control in Iraq, the reaction in official Europe was vicious, "One cannot entrust his purse to Europe and his security to America," warned Romano Prodi, the president of the European Commission.

All right, say the non-worriers, but so what? Even if a new E.U. takes the Franco-German tilt, does it really matter? Everyone knows, thanks to Robert Kagan's analysis, that Europeans are ideologically committed to weak-kneed multilateralism, that they are not really interested in exercising power. What possible effect could a United Europe have on America's ability to execute its intentions? As one conservative puts it, "Why get upset about 10,000 Vanessa Redgraves marching through Paris?"

This "Europeans as soft multilateralists" argument is only half right. The E.U.'s increasingly urgent efforts to

24/THE WEEKLY STANDARD

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

09/22/2003 10:00 FAX 202 510 3431
-09/19/2003 09:13 FAX 212 434 9880

COUNCIL ON FOR. REI.
EXECUTIVE CFR

0007
0006/0005

L.C.J.

turn itself into a single state expose a fundamental deception in the European project. The Europeans are not multilateralists at home. On the contrary, they want to turn Europe from an intergovernmental institution into a single nation—with real power. It's true that even the French have no grand design to take on the United States in some new superpower struggle. But this misses the point. The kind of multilateralism they do believe in is the one that uses institutions to hold American power in check.

Think of the E.U. not as a Superpower but as a kind of Sniperpower, constantly picking off parts of U.S. foreign policy objectives around the world. It made life difficult enough over the Iraq war; it could make life in post-Saddam Iraq much harder for the United States. It could cause plenty of mischief in all corners of the globe. Imagine a united Europe aggressively pursuing a single line against the United States in the councils of NATO. Or throwing its sizable economic weight around in Latin America or Africa.

And one other longstanding goal of U.S. policy could also make European awkwardness more of a constraint for America. It has long been an axiom of U.S. policy that Europe should develop military capabilities of its own—genuine ones that would enable Europe to fight hot wars in difficult places and take some of the burden off the Americans. This too has always been dubious policy. If a united Europe really does develop enhanced capabilities, it is inconceivable that it will not demand a bigger say in the decision-making in new international crises.

Finally, there are those who accept all these premises, but still say, What can the United States do about it? U.S. intervention in a private debate won't help—and will probably make matters worse. The one thing that would make Europeans more determined to press ahead with their project is the idea that the United States was trying to stop it.

But this does not mean Washington is powerless. It can do a number of useful things. Above all, it can stop spouting the outdated Cold War idea that an integrated Europe is in the best interests of the United States. Can anyone now seriously believe that a single E.U. foreign policy will be more helpful to the United States than a British, a Polish, and a Spanish one?

Second, it should strengthen its political and military ties with Eastern Europeans. Moving troops out of Germany to Bulgaria, Romania, and perhaps other countries is a smart move, as was offering the Poles a leading role in postwar Iraq.

Third, it should temper its enthusiasm for the development of stronger European military capabilities. Fran-

co-German-Belgian-Luxembourg plans for a core E.U. military alliance can easily be laughed off. But in these testing times, the United States should be extra careful about a separate European identity within NATO.

Fourth, it should oppose any plans to change the membership of multilateral institutions to reflect a single "European" identity. There should be no talk of a U.N. Security Council seat for Europe, or the creation of a United States-Japan-Europe Group of Three in international economics to replace the G7.

Fifth, it should refrain from doing anything that might help push Britain into the euro. Nothing would represent a more fateful step for European integration than Britain's joining this ill-starred project. U.S. officials sometimes argue that the U.K.'s membership in the single currency would help American businesses. There is scant evidence for this, and the impetus such a British decision would give to European superstatehood cannot. be overstated.

In the end, U.S. policymakers should know that the biggest threat posed for the United States by European ambitions comes from inside Europe. Most ordinary Europeans are aghast at the sovereignty that has already been handed over to Brussels. The dynamic of European integration is not a popular one, but one driven by political elites, and there is already evidence of mounting unease among the general public. The euro, the biggest leap yet towards European statehood—and the monetary and fiscal policies required to make it work—are causing real stresses for Europeans.

There are signs of broader political unrest—of a growing mood of popular disenfranchisement, with increasing support for extreme-right parties in France, Italy, Germany, and even Britain, as voters react with irritation to the growing gap between the governing institutions and the governed. In the last three years, voters in Ireland and Denmark have rejected grandiose E.U. integration plans in referendums. Polls going into Sweden's September 14 referendum on joining the euro suggest the Swedes could deliver another rebuke to the Euro-federalists.

But still the European creators press on, continuing to shift power away from communities, regions, and nations in favor of the emerging supernation in Brussels.

This is the ultimate irony. The Europeanists see themselves as latter-day Thomas Jeffersons and George Washingtons, creating a new state and a new continental global power. But they are closer in spirit to George III and General Cornwallis—imposing a remote, burdensome, and ultimately undemocratic authority on a reluctant people. The risks for stability in Europe are obvious. It is not too late for the United States to help stop the European superstate from becoming a reality.

SEPTEMBER 22, 2003

THE WEEKLY STANDARD / 25

Page 1 of 2

Jessee Incao

From: JFly@cfr.org

Sent: Thursday, September 18, 2003 4:02 PM

To: beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com

Subject: CFR Task Force -- Saturday Conference Call at 3 pm

A conference call between Dr. Kupchan, President Summers, and Dr. Kissinger is scheduled for Saturday at 3 pm. We anticipate that this call will last roughly one hour. You can dial 1-800-311-9403 and use the security code, "Europe Task Force," to join the call. Dr. Kupchan would like to discuss the most recent draft of the Task Force report, which he circulated on Wednesday (see below).

Our office is closed today and may be closed tomorrow due to the hurricane. If you have any questions, please leave me a voicemail at 202-518-3404 and I will return your call.

Jamie M. Fly
Research Associate, Europe and National Security
Council on Foreign Relations
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 518-3404
Fax: (202) 986-2984
http://www.cfr.org

-----Forwarded by Jamie Fly/DC/CFR on 09/18/2003 03:49PM -----

To: beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu, julia_topalian@harvard.edu, lawrence_summers@harvard.edu, jincao@kmaglobal.com, tcimino@kmaglobal.com, jfly@cfr.org
From: Charles Kupchan/DC/CFR
Date: 09/17/2003 04:56PM
Subject:

Dear Henry and Larry,

Attached please find a new draft of the CFR Task Force Report. As I noted in an email sent at the end of last week, I would like to suggest a repackaging of the main sections of the report to make it more straightforward and accessible. I have gone ahead and made these changes in the attached draft. I believe these changes significantly moderate the "academic tone" of the report – which both of you recommended when we last spoke – and will enhance its impact.

The new section headings are as follows: The Terms of a New Atlantic Bargain, New Rules of the Road, Common Tasks and the New Agenda for Cooperation.

9/18/2003

Page 2 of 2

The main changes in this draft are at the beginning of each section: pp. 8-9, 16, and 21. I have also folded the discussion of European integration into the New Bargain section (pp. 14-15) and slightly revised this section. I also revised the conclusion (pp. 28-29).

I would like to send out a draft of the report to the Task Force this Monday, September 22, to ensure that the members have time to go over it carefully before our meeting on September 30. I am going to try to arrange a conference call for either Friday or Saturday to discuss this draft. Any desired changes not made by Monday can of course be made later as we revise the document in response to feedback from the Task Force members.

Best,

Charlie

9/18/2003

SEP 12 2003

Amanda Henry

From: Jessee Incao [jincao@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Friday, September 12, 2003 2:41 PM
To: 'Amanda Henry'
Subject: FW: task force report

For the mail

------Original Message------

From: kupchanc@georgetown.edu [mailto:kupchanc@georgetown.edu]
Sent: Friday, September 12, 2003 2:21 PM
To: beverly_sullivan@harvard.edu; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; lawrence_summers@harvard.edu; jincao@kmaglobal.com; tcimino@kmaglobal.com; jfly@cfr.org
Subject: task force report

Dear Henry and Larry:

Richard Haass and Jim Lindsay, the new director of studies at the CFR, yesterday provided some very helpful feedback on the Task Force Report. In particular, they suggested a change in the packaging of the three sections in the second half of the report to make the document more straightforward and thereby more accessible to journalists and policy makers. I think their suggestions are good ones and wanted to pass them along to you so that we can discuss them in our next conference call. I also think implementing these changes will also address some of the concerns you both raised last week.

Under the new packaging, the second half of the report, "Bridging the Transatlantic Divide," would have three subsections:

The Terms of a New Bargain. This subsection would contain our discussion of the looser but wider partnership, the need for the U.S. to listen more and Europe to do more, and the U.S. approach to European unity.

Forging New Rules of the Road. This heading would replace "Preserving Comity," which is perhaps a bit elusive for some. The subjects in that section would remain as in the current draft.

Redefining Common Tasks. This heading would replace "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership," and the subjects would remain as in the current draft.

Richard and Jim also passed along other more specific suggestions, which I can share with you when we next speak.

Best,

Charlie

1

*KUPCHAN, CHARLIE
2 PARTIES

Call Enhancements:

Special Instructions:

Please press "STAR (*) ZERO (0)" on your touchtone phone if you need any assistance during
your conference.

If you need to make any changes to your reservation or have any questions, please call our
Customer Service Department at 1-800-925-8000.

Thank you for choosing Conference America, Inc.

1-800-925-8000

1-800-388-6742 Fax

www.yourcall.com

Confidential Information - If you have received this transmission in error, please notify sender via telephone. Any dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.

JUL 28 2003

Jessee Incao

From: ckupchan@cfr.org
Sent: Friday, July 25, 2003 6:29 PM
To: azoba@cfr.org; giuliano.amato@iol.it; reginald_bartholomew@ml.com; AlessandraC@exchange.it.ml.com; hbrown@csis.org; awilson@warburgpincus.com; tdm@ifri.org; vigne@ifri.org; thomas_donilon@fanniemae.com; msfeldst@nber.org; john.gaddis@yale.edu; ikenberr@hotmail.com; joffe@zeit.de; Gentsch@zeit.de; lauras@gatesfoundation.org; a.olechowski@olechowski.pl; Felix.Rohatyn@Rohatyn.com; gturner@scowcroft.com; slaughtr@princeton.edu; tarullod@law.georgetown.edu; stephen_walt@harvard.edu; catkinson@stonebridge-international.com; sue.hager@mail.house.gov; rburt@diligencellc.com; seizenstat@cov.com; timothy.gartonash@sant.ox.ac.uk; kagan@ceip.org; lfeinstein@cfr.org; bsteil@worldnet.att.net; mschubert@london.edu; LWorkman@cfr.org; jincao@kmaglobal.com; julia_topalian@harvard.edu; marne_levine@harvard.edu; european.studies@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk; lpisar@hotmail.com; abranczik@cfr.org; moravcs@fas.harvard.edu; jfly@cfr.org; tcimino@kmaglobal.com; ckeene@cov.com; mrochford@london.edu
Subject: Re: CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations -- September 30, 1:00-6:00 pm

Response Form.doc

(21 KB)

Thank you for your continued participation in the task force. I am writing to inform you that our next meeting will take place on Tuesday, September 30 at the Council in New York. The meeting will run from 1:00-6:00 pm. At this meeting, we will discuss a draft of the task force report.

Over the next month, I will work with Henry and Larry to draft a report that draws on the group's deliberations. We will circulate this draft to all task force members before the September 30 meeting. We ask that you read the draft beforehand and come to the meeting prepared to discuss the report. Those of you who cannot attend should submit comments via email.

As Larry mentioned on Tuesday, if you have particular points/proposals you would like incorporated in the report, please send them to me as soon as possible.

Please RSVP for September 30 by faxing the attached response form to Jamie Fly at 202-986-2984, calling 202-518-3404, or emailing jfly@cfr.org. In addition, please feel free to contact me directly at 202-518-3402 if you would like to discuss the activities of our task force. I look forward to seeing you on September 30.

1

Page 1 of 1

JUN 3 0 2003

Jessee Incao

From: CKupchan@cfr.org
Sent: Thursday, June 26, 2003 3:58 PM
Subject: CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations Meeting -- July 22, 12:00-5:00 pm

Thank you for your continued participation in the Council's Task Force on Transatlantic Relations. We have had two very successful meetings and I look forward to continuing the discussion in July.

Our third meeting will be held on Tuesday, July 22 in New York at the Council's offices (58 East 68th Street). Henry Kissinger and Larry Summers felt that it would be useful to have a number of policy makers contribute to our deliberations at that session. Accordingly, we have extended invitations to Gordon Brown, Hubert Vedrine, Joschka Fischer, and Paul Wolfowitz to brief the Task Force at our July 22 meeting. I will keep you posted as the agenda for that day firms up. We will again be meeting from noon to 5:00pm.

In addition, we are now planning a fourth session for early September to discuss a draft of the Task Force report. I will let you know as soon as a date has been fixed.

Please RSVP for July 22 as soon as possible. You can fax the attached response form to Jamie Fly at 202-986-2984, call him at 202-518-3404, or email him at jfly@cfr.org. In addition, please feel free to contact me directly at 202-518-3402 if you would like to discuss the activities of our task force. I look forward to seeing you on July 22.

6/26/2003

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET • NEW YORK • NEW YORK 10021
Tel 212 434 9400 Fax 212 434 9880 www.cfr.org

Henry A.
Kissinger
Lawrence H.
Summers
Co-Chairs
Task Force on
Transatlantic
Relations

June 24, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE:

Mr. Hubert Vedrine
HV Conseil
6 rue de Luynes
75007 Paris
France

Dear Minister Vedrine:

As you may know, the Council has recently established an Independent Task Force on Transatlantic Relations. A diverse group of roughly twenty Americans and five Europeans has been assembled to discuss how the United States should respond to the burgeoning rift across the Atlantic. For your information, a list of task force members is enclosed.

In the coming months, we will be drafting a report outlining our recommendations. The report will examine the following questions: (1) How serious is the current transatlantic rift and how did it come about? (2) How important are good working relationships with Europe, including institutional ties, to America's interests? (3) If the transatlantic community is to be put on a sounder foundation, what are America's strategic options? Do we need to substantially reorient relations? (4) What precise policy paths and actions should the U.S. be prepared to take to carry out the preferred strategy?

At our next meeting on July 22 in New York City, the Task Force would like to solicit input from officials on both sides of the Atlantic. We would like to invite you to join us to provide a French perspective. We would suggest that you make a fifteen to twenty minute presentation on the issues outlined above, leaving roughly forty minutes for discussion with task force members. This meeting would be conducted under the Council's strict non-attribution rules.

The Task Force will meet from 12:00-5:00 pm on July 22. We are also extending invitations to Joschka Fischer, Gordon Brown, and Paul Wolfowitz to present their views to the Task Force that afternoon. Should you be able to meet with the Task Force on July 22, we will make every effort to accommodate your schedule.

Please let us know as soon as possible if you will be able to join us on July 22 by faxing Jamie Fly at 202-986-2984 or phoning 202-518-3404.

⊗

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

June 24, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE:

H.E. Joschka Fischer
Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Federal Republic of Germany
Werderscher Markt # 1
10117 Berlin
Germany

Dear Minister Fischer:

At our next meeting on July 22 in New York City, the Task Force would like to solicit input from officials on both sides of the Atlantic. We would like to invite you to join us to provide a German perspective. We would suggest that you make a fifteen to twenty minute presentation on the issues outlined above, leaving roughly forty minutes for discussion with task force members. This meeting would be conducted under the Council's strict non-attribution rules.

The Task Force will meet from 12:00-5:00 pm on July 22. We are also extending invitations to Gordon Brown, Hubert Vedrine, and Paul Wolfowitz to present their views to the Task Force that afternoon. Should you be able to meet with the Task Force on July 22, we will make every effort to accommodate your schedule.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

[c]

June 24, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE:

The Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown MP
Chancellor of the Exchequer
HM Treasury
1 Horse Guards Road
London SW1A 2HQ
United Kingdom

Dear Chancellor Brown:

At our next meeting on July 22 in New York City, the Task Force would like to solicit input from officials on both sides of the Atlantic. We would like to invite you to join us to provide a British perspective. We would suggest that you make a fifteen to twenty minute presentation on the issues outlined above, leaving roughly forty minutes for discussion with task force members. This meeting would be conducted under the Council's strict non-attribution rules.

The Task Force will meet from 12:00-5:00 pm on July 22. We are also extending invitations to Joschka Fischer, Hubert Vedrine, and Paul Wolfowitz to present their views to the Task Force that afternoon. Should you be able to meet with the Task Force on July 22, we will make every effort to accommodate your schedule.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

June 24, 2003

VIA FACSIMILE:

The Honorable Paul D. Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Defense
U.S. Department of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Secretary Wolfowitz:

At our next meeting on July 22 in New York City, the Task Force would like to solicit input from officials on both sides of the Atlantic. We would like to invite you to join us as a representative of the Bush administration. We would suggest that you make a fifteen to twenty minute presentation on the issues outlined above, leaving roughly forty minutes for discussion with task force members. This meeting would be conducted under the Council's strict non-attribution rules.

The Task Force will meet from 12:00-5:00 pm on July 22. We are also extending invitations to Gordon Brown, Joschka Fischer, and Hubert Vedrine to present their views to the Task Force that afternoon. Should you be able to meet with the Task Force on July 22, we will make every effort to accommodate your schedule.

LLO

June 13, 2003

To: CFR Task Force on Transatlantic Relations

From: Stephen Walt
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Re: Recommendations for Report

Due to a prior professional commitment, I am unable to join you for the discussion on June 16. Given that the discussion will focus on recommendations, I am especially sorry to miss it. Here are some thoughts on what we should include in the report.

1. Make the case for why close transatlantic cooperation is still in Europe and America's interest. As several of our readings note, there are many areas where U.S. and European interests are largely identical (e.g., control of WMD, counter-terrorism, international crime, promotion of democracy and human rights, etc.) Moreover, several of these areas—and especially those lying at the intersection of global terrorism and WMD—are more important today than they were in the past. Because progress in these areas will require close cooperation among all the major powers, it follows that the United States and Europe have a vital interest in preserving a solid relationship. Because it is not obvious that key elites (including some top U.S. officials) genuinely recognize this, we would do a great service by making this case as clearly and powerfully as we can.

2. Recognize that the existing structure of power creates new tensions in the alliance. As I outlined in our first session, there are powerful structural forces pulling the United States and Europe apart, and the unifying forces that once existed have grown weaker. Current transatlantic tensions are not simply the result of inept diplomacy, careless rhetoric, or ideological extremism; they also reflect underlying America's current position of dominance and European concerns for the ways that US power may be used. These facts do not mean that NATO has no future or that Europe and the United States are destined to divorce, but our report should acknowledge that preserving close cooperation is going to be more difficult in the future than it was in the past. Paradoxically, Europeans and Americans will have to put more effort into alliance management in the future.

3. Emphasize areas of agreement. As noted above, there are many areas where European and U.S. interests are nearly identical. Transatlantic diplomacy (and cooperation) should focus on these areas of agreement, while "agreeing to

disagree" in areas where our interests obviously conflict. We should commit greater effort (and resources) to these areas, and encourage Europe to do the same.

4. Make the "road map" a reality. The continued conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is tragedy for both sides, a liability in the war against global terror and has increasingly corrosive effects on U.S. relations with Europe. Ending this conflict is thus a vital national security interest for the United States. Europe and the United States agree that there should be a two-state solution, but Europeans oppose Israeli settlements and favor a return to the pre-1967 borders (possibly with minor modifications). It is not clear if the United States favors this or not, especially at present, and it is not clear if the Bush administration is willing to fully commit to making the "road map" work. Yet close cooperation between the United States and Europe could play in invaluable role. Specifically, European aid and pressure could be used to encourage greater efforts to control Palestinian violence against Israel and to obtain key Palestinian concessions (such as indemnification for the "right of return). Similarly, U.S. pressure will be necessary to obtain the "painful concessions" that the Sharon government has promised. The necessary ingredients for a solution may in fact be present; what has been lacking (for years) is the political will to use them.

5. Lower the rhetorical temperature. Recent disagreements over policy have been exacerbated by a level of scorn, rancor and contempt on both sides of the Atlantic. It is not clear if these statements reflect a genuine desire to downgrade the alliance, or merely a mistaken belief that tough talk and demeaning rhetoric is the best way to keep one's allies in line. This sort of "big-stick" diplomacy is unlikely to work against democratic countries, however, because inflaming public opinion makes it harder for foreign leaders to cooperate with the United States and gives them a greater incentive to distance themselves publically. I hope our report will condemn this behavior and call for greater rhetorical restraint and mutual respect in subsequent transatlantic discussions.

Needless to say, this list of possibilities barely scratches the surface. Nonetheless, I hope that these ideas contribute to the discussion and I am sorry I am not there to learn from the other members of the task force. I look forward to reading the draft report, and will make a point of being present at our final session.

The following European Reply to the CSIS Joint Declaration of May 2003 appeared in Corriere Della Sera and Le Monde, published on 14 June 2003. The 17 former European officials who signed this declaration are listed below.

RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP
A EUROPEAN REPLY TO THE JOINT AMERICAN DECLARATION

We have read with appreciation a joint declaration endorsed by a bipartisan
group of prominent American figures which underscored the importance of the
transatlantic link. We share the view that, even after the end of the Cold War, the
renewed Transatlantic Alliance remains the main pillar of the Euro-American
partnership, as well as the belief that the basic premise of a strong transatlantic
partnership is a stable Europe, a cohesive and dynamic European Union.

In particular, we agree with the conclusion of the joint declaration that neither the United States nor Europe is omnipotent, both will need help in ensuring their own physical and economic security, let alone threats beyond their respective borders. That help is most logically sought from the nations with which we have most in common. Accordingly, whatever the merits of our respective positions, it is incumbent upon us all to make of the renewal of the transatlantic partnership an urgent priority.

The existence of a united Europe would not have been possible without the
decisive role played by the United States in helping us to defeat totalitarianism:
Europeans will never forget this and they appreciate American support to the
Union, especially in this defining moment of their history. Thus, Americans will
always be welcome in Europe.

In the late 1940's the Founding Fathers of Europe envisaged the creation of
a long term union among Europeans; this project drew its inspiration from the
lessons of history and from the determination that war between European countries
should never again be possible.

Now that Europeans have joined their forces in the European Union and
have established a single market and a single currency, there is a widespread
consensus that this process of integration should progress further. Although each
European country is proudly unique, EU members share interests, values and a
way of life.

The European Convention is the expression of our determination to move
even further along this path: it has the task of defining Europe's role in the XXI
century and of creating a genuine political community. It is a major effort and we
are confident that it will succeed – in particular in defining the international role
of Europe, aiming at a just and fair world order. We are equally confident that the
US will support this project, as it is in the best interests of the West as a whole.

The process of European integration is based on democracy, freedom,
market economy and social solidarity, on the universal application of human
rights, on a deep awareness of the many problems that can destabilize the
international community: the North-South divide, the environment, the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, the scourge of terrorism as a threat to all of us,
international crime and drug trafficking. Europeans believe that such problems can
only be dealt with in a multilateral framework as provided by the United Nations.
To this end, US-European cooperation and sustained engagement are necessary
conditions.

The European Union is now a reality. It was not founded in opposition to
America, and it will work closely with the United States.

2

Our main partner across the Atlantic has been faced with a twofold reality for several years: it deals with a plurality of friendly States on the one hand, and with the European institutions on the other. With the latter it negotiates a range of issues, from international trade to competition.

This reality is still incomplete, but a full-fledged European player will soon be the main reference in transatlantic relations. The role of the individual European states in foreign policy will remain strong, but the European Union, as depository of common interests and a shared vision, will increase its profile and weight.

We are convinced that the development of an effective European defense does not endanger NATO; on the contrary, it may make NATO stronger if so the two sides of the Atlantic firmly want.

Our values and basic political aims are shared by the United States. No major problem in the world can be solved without a joint US-European commitment; no problem is unsolvable when we tackle it together. Such awareness can strengthen the policy of transatlantic cooperation. The next EU-US summit should be the occasion to concentrate on an ambitious common agenda of tasks to be carried out on the basis of strong complementarity.

We believe that, especially with the advent of a new generation of political leaders in Europe and in the United States, we should draw strength and inspiration from the past but look to the future: we should thus focus on the challenges and threats of the 21st Century, which require a full joint commitment. North America and Europe are depositories of democracy and freedom. Together we will be able to share these values with the rest of the world. By joining forces we will further stabilize the international community and give dignity to all human beings.

It would be a grave mistake for the very countries who forged close bonds fifty years ago, when interdependence was hardly existent, to relinquish these precious bonds in the age of globalization.

Although it is not the first time that the transatlantic partnership has raised questions on both sides of the Atlantic, short term divisions have never prevailed over the core of common values and interests which still define the Western world.

In connection with the war in Iraq and because of disagreements which have come to the fore in the aftermath of September 11th, the unity of the Western world is now being openly questioned.

The debate has become harsh. Some observers and sectors of public opinion have over-simplified it into the assumption that Americans are from Mars and Europeans from Venus.

We have been involved in transatlantic cooperation for many years and we refuse to believe that the Atlantic is getting wider. Americans and Europeans have disagreed in the past and may disagree in the future. The question is whether the disagreements will touch upon essential concerns or be limited to specific and manageable issues.

Our firm answer is that the American and European democracies are united by their values. They cannot succeed in isolation from each other, let alone in opposition. Working in partnership on the basis of their common roots and shared objectives, and of mutual respect, they will never antagonize each other on vital issues.

United, we are seen by the rest of the world as interpreters of a great vision and of great wisdom; divided, we shall be losers. It is up to us to make the best of this great asset.

3

This declaration was signed by the following:

* Susanna AGNELLI former Italian foreign minister

* Giuliano AMATO vice president of the EU Convention on the Future of Europe and ex-Italian premier

* Raymond BARRE former French prime minister

* Carl BILDT ex-Swedish prime minister

* Emilio COLOMBO ex-Italian premier

* Jean-Luc DEHAENE former Belgian prime minister and deputy EU Convention chairman

* Bronislaw GEMEREK former Polish foreign minister

* Hans Dietrich GENSCHER former German foreign minister

* Valery GISCARD D'ESTAING former French president and current chairman on the EU constitutional convention

* Felipe GONZALES ex-Spanish prime minister

* Douglas HURD former British foreign secretary

* Helmut KOHL former German chancellor

* Giorgio NAPOLITANO ex-Italian parliament speaker and president of the European Parliament commission on Constitutional Affairs

* Helmut SCHMIDT former German chancellor

* Carlo SCOGNAMIGLIO former Italian defense minister

* Eduardo SERRA former Spanish defense minister

* Hans VAN MIERLO former Dutch foreign minister

EU/US Enhanced Economic Cooperation

HM Treasury, 1 Horse Guards Road, London SW1A 2HQ

The UK believes strongly in a European Union that is open and outward looking, and takes
the lead in establishing a stable and sustainable global environment through its bilateral
and multilateral relationships, particularly with the United States. To deliver effective
global economic leadership - helping to underpin the wider foreign policy relationship -
the US/EU relationship should be one of cooperation, not confrontation.

In addition, the scale of the transatlantic economic relationship means there are huge potential benefits to both the EU and US from closer economic cooperation. Bilaterally, the EU and US are each other's largest trading partners. Over 20 per cent of EU exports are to the US, while over 25% of US exports are destined for the EU. And these figures are dwarfed by the investment relationship. A recent study¹ estimates that in 2000, foreign assets held by US companies in Europe totalled some $5.2 trillion - roughly 58% of their total overseas holdings. As US Under-Secretary of Commerce Grant Aldonas recently remarked, "When there are political differences, those of us on the economic side of the house need to tack against the wind ... you have to do something that provides a bit of a counterweight."²

At present, the US and EU already work closely together in international fora. High profile trade disputes tend to cloud what remains an essentially healthy relationship, affecting only around 1-2 per cent of transatlantic trade and investment. But this masks the challenge presented by regulatory disputes, rather than tariffs, that will become the main barriers to trade - regulatory issues often adopted for legitimate domestic concerns, but which inadvertently erect new trade barriers.³ We believe, therefore, that the EU and US should build upon the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership, developing an enhanced agenda for economic cooperation - recognising:

* the need to ensure a successful WTO Round, and to allow developing countries to play their full part in the global economy;

* the benefits of further bilateral trade liberalisation, particularly in those areas where the multilateral process is not well-suited to progress, such as capital market liberalisation;

* that in an increasing integrated global economy, economic cooperation must extend beyond trade to investment, macroeconomic policy, competition policy, and international development; and,

* the case for improving dialogue and methods of governance in the face of changing trade disputes, and increasingly integrated economies - implying that trade discussions must better address those sectors that have not traditionally been the focus of trade discussions, such as services.

¹ "Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy" Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2003. Available at: http://sais-jhu.edu/transatlantic/Quinlan%20Text.pdf

² Grant Aldonas, comments in Brussels 28 April 2003, reported in the Financial Times

³ In financial services, for example, there is increased recognition that many financial sector issues require international solutions, and cannot be resolved by the EU or US on their own.

## Detail

HM Treasury, in partnership with the Netherlands Ministry of Finance, commissioned two studies: from the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) on the potential benefits of greater EU/US trade liberalisation; and from the European University Institute (EUI) on the political economy of the transatlantic relationship. These studies were published on 29 May 2003, and are available from: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2003/press_64_03.cfm.

A key finding of the CEPR study is that the full liberalisation of transatlantic trade would lead to an annual income gain to the EU of up to 2 per cent of GDP (or €140 billion) and for the US of up to 1 per cent of GDP. The additional benefit to the EU would arise because of the positive impact US competition would have on economic reform in Europe.

These studies make a powerful case for further work. The following presents a summary of our preliminary proposals for greater EU/US economic cooperation – in many cases, we have also posed questions about which, we believe, the Council for Foreign Relations task force could make a significant contribution. More generally, we hope this may provide a framework for discussion, and

The UK believes that the EU and US should:

* Cooperate to ensure the success of the Doha Development Round, through a firm commitment to the WTO.

How do you recommend that this best be achieved? Are there reforms/improvements to the WTO process that would facilitate a more positive cooperative relationship? Would you recommend that the EU and US look to a bilateral agreement to supplement the WTO process?

* Complementary to the multilateral trade agenda, examine the case for further bilateral trade liberalisation and regulatory cooperation, significantly broadening the scope of the Positive Economic Agenda⁴;

Is existing research sufficient to identify the benefits of greater liberalisation, and the specific sectors in which it should be pursued as a priority? If not, how could you involve governments and business in taking such work forward?

* As a priority, enhance and strengthen the current financial services regulatory dialogue, to adopt a more forward-looking approach to financial services regulation;

The existing ad-hoc regulatory dialogue between the EU and US administration tends to deal (too late) with issues where the impact of legislation on each other's jurisdiction has not been thought through. The UK believes there is a need to formalise this dialogue,

⁴ The Positive Economic Agenda is a programme of bilateral cooperation in 7 specific sectors, announced at the May 2002 EU-US summit – including financial markets, organic produce and e-procurement.

[LC]

providing a forum to catch such regulatory issues early - and provide a framework through which both sides can gain a better understanding of each other's regulatory and legislative approaches.

* Commit to the completion of a study into the benefits of capital market liberalisation between the EU and US (as recommended by the TABD), taking into account the Steil Report into the benefits of transatlantic securities exchange access;

* Renew and reinvigorate the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD);

Businesses are often best placed to identify key regulatory barriers and it is they who suffer the most from trade disputes and retaliations - their role in early warning and identifying trade barriers should be maintained. How, if at all, would you develop the business dialogue? How should this feed into any improved, broader economic dialogue between the EU and US?

* Develop joint approaches to development goals, including cooperation on the proposed International Finance Facility;

Designed specifically to help meet the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals, the UK has proposed the creation of the International Finance Facility⁵ - to provide long-term, but conditional, funding guaranteed to the poorest countries by the richest. Are there other areas in which you believe the EU and US could cooperate on joint approaches to achieving development objectives?

We would, of course, be willing to discuss these points in more detail with you.

We would also strongly encourage the CFR task force to consider other means of improving the economic relationship - in this regard, the EUI report on the Political Economy of the Transatlantic Relationship may provide some useful input. Our firm view is that the economic sphere is an area where deeper cooperation has clear economic benefits to the US as well as the EU - in addition to the vital role it can play in supporting the wider political relationship.

**Ed Balls**
Chief Economic Adviser
[Ed.Balls@hm-treasury.gov.uk](mailto:Ed.Balls@hm-treasury.gov.uk)

For further detail, please also contact:

**Richard Salt**
Economic Adviser - EU US Economic Cooperation
[Richard.Salt@hm-treasury.gov.uk](mailto:Richard.Salt@hm-treasury.gov.uk)

⁵ See: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/int_gnd_intfinance.cfm