DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON
Secretary Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
8:50 a.m., 5-12-70

K: Hello Elliot.

R: Good morning Henry.

K: How are you. I only have a few minutes. I have to run off to a Congressional briefing.

R: I won't keep you very long but you have gotten into this Stans thing.

K: Yes, and I have recommended to Flanigan that they take out the veto sentence and he has agreed to it.

R: OK.

K: I frankly do not want to bother the President for the next few days unless absolutely necessary.

R: I think with that sentence out it will be alright.

K: Alright Elliot, I will see you.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

HAK
SenatorDole
May 12, 1970
11:10 a.m. (?)

**Senator Dole:** Have you had a chance to look at the Frelinghuysen
resolution. Is it better than Finley's. Ford thinks it is a better drafting
job.

HAK: Frankly, I haven't studied it yet. Can I call you back

Senator Dole: Sure. I will wait to hear from you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Sen. Dole/Kissinger

11:40 am 5/12/70

K: I haven't been able to find the person who handles this but I have just
found him. May I call you in 5 minutes?

D: Certainly. I'll be waiting.

Further conversation: 11:47 am

K: I'm sorry to have had such difficulty. Between the two the Findley is better
than the Frelinghuysen. 1

D: That's what I thought. It's more positive.

K: Our Congressional people have a version which I don't have when they
really want.

D: Different from the other two?

K: Yes. Do you want that to get to you?

D: Or to Scott or Griffin.

K: They have that.

D: I will get to them.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON

Leland Hayward/Kissinger

1:00 pm

5/12/70

H: I was supposed to call you yesterday but I got in so late I didn't. I have an idea in the back of my mind but let me work it out.

K: You are very generous.

H: Let me see if I can figure it out. I didn't want you to think I forgot. You impressed me very much. In the meantime, don't forget Walter Thayer.

K: I would like see you when I'm next in NY. Maybe next week sometime.

H: Call me before you come. And if I work something out, I will give you a call.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ethel Kennedy
5/12/70 2:20 p.m.

E: Listen kid, I read in Life where when you are talking on the phone you read the newspaper too.

K: Not when you call.

E: That a way Henry. Listen, I had a brainstorm--I don't know how it will go over. Wouldn't it be nice if John Glenn were made an ambassador somewhere? It would be a terrific feather in the President's cap I think.

K: I will put it to him.

E: He's got so much world acclaim. I didn't tell him I was calling; he doesn't have any idea.

K: You know I have nothing to do with appointments, but I'll mention it to the people who do.

E: He's so nice. And so decent.

K: Yes, a first-class person.

E: And he's mad for Africa. He did a lot for Tanzania so they like him there. I don't know if anybody in the Administration would like the idea.

K: They don't usually rush out looking for Democrats to appoint.

E: But he's one of these people who puts his heart into his work. He'd go out and see the people. He doesn't know I'm mentioning it, and I don't even know if he'd take it.

K: It will take me a couple of weeks.

E: Okay Henry, I just wanted to mention it. And thanks for calling back.

K: Oh, when I don't talk to you then I am in trouble.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:40 p.m., May 12, 1970

P: How did you get along with Sidey?

K: We are not completely finished; however, he is not in the room at the moment. Henry Grunwald just came back from the Mid-West and found that people support you. Wherever he went, XW people said, "The President has to know what he is doing; we trust him." Now they want to do an article.

P: Did you get across the point of the other thing?

K: I told him about the 3 NSC meetings; the separate meetings with Laird and Rogers; the 5 WSAG meetings with the Under Secretaries present; and the National Intelligence Estimate.

P: Show him that physically.

K: I found this interesting. I called him in and now it turns out he is chastened. He was basically a peacenik.

P: He found that in the Mid-West?

K: Yes; they are leaving their old liberal, conservative audience and competing with the arch-liberal Newsweek people.

P: What did you do with regard to... There was some article in the Star charging that we were fully blockading Cambodia. Of course, it is not true. Are they attempting to not do it?

K: That is Market Time -- 30 miles into Cambodia with the approval of the Cambodian government, so they can't shift supplies into Cambodia and vice versa.

NARA, Date 5/26
BY

Telecon
The President
5/12/70 6:45 p.m.

P: What we are doing is marking time. . . //extending 30 miles into Cambodia with the approval of the Cambodian government so we can ship supplies into Cambodia and vice versa.

K: The Star has a good editor all supporting us.

P: On what ground?

K: What we are getting out of it - they call it "Progress Report."

P: Well, we're going to get some more. With Sidey the thing to hit was the serenity in the procedure and that somebody had to stand up and do something and the country is always with whoever is strong. One thing Heard said was he was horrified that the students on his campus were wearing arm bands with American flags on them taking off after the demonstrators. What's wrong with that? I really worked him over.

K: He looked pretty shaken. I saw him in the hall.

P: Oh, he'll yap around and so forth, but he'll never get any place. He said in North Carolina his life was threatened because he wasn't supporting the President.

K:f Oh really?

P: Sure, there are a lot of people who don't like these college professors. He said they want to participate in decision-making. I said fine, why not do it on your campuses. What really shook him was I said I don't think we should impose blood money on university professors who don't believe in national defense. You should have heard him squeal. These people were just cowering when they heard that. Your friend Pusey isn't going to get any more blood money.

K: I think they did their worst. They're going to have a hard time explaining when we're out with such success by the time we said we would be.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
V.P. /KIssinger

9:45 am 5/13/70

VP: I read of your tribulation with the academic community. They are really
not too beating on you.

K: You should see my mail. But the classic is "the situation is so ridiculous
we didn't let Mr. Kissinger explain it."

VP: I had an idea on the war in general and Reagan thought it was good.
When the President went on TV we were aware of the stimulation of the map.
You have seen the military training films. Some on map reading made it very
easy to read a map.

K: I found some very profitable.

VP: I should think that with our help in the movie community we should put
together a film, not only on Cambodia but on the developing history of
Indo-China since the Japanese left, up to the present time and including
the Cambodian thing. If such a film were made well and points made we could
distribute it to civic groups.

K: It's an interesting idea. Let me talk to Haldeman. Or do you want to?

VP: I want you to handle it if you think it has merit. Pointing at a map makes
no difference but if you use a training film and then show pictures of what
you are talking about, it makes it much easier to get the idea across.

K: I think it's an interesting idea and I will take it up.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

10:00 am 5/13/70

L: Have things quieted down a little?

K: I'm getting my paranoia under control.

L: When can you come for a briefing over here? 30 - 40 minutes.

K: Can I call Pursely tomorrow morning or this afternoon?

L: Whenever you can. I think you should see the message traffic and what Abrams has come in with and Gen. Bennett and his staff can have laid on a special effort.

K: That's extremely thoughtful.

L: It's by each operation -- a separate map.

K: I would like to do that. It would be extremely helpful.

L: I do it once or twice a day. It's very worthwhile. The understanding of the whole thing comes to you much better.

K: May I call you within the hour? Does it make much difference when?

L: Whenever you want to do it. It will be most helpful to you.

K: 40 minutes?

L: Whatever amount of time you can.

K: I will set aside an hour.

L: I have this ________ committee. Yesterday I went up on ABM and Cambodia. I will have to go through this thing for the House. Stennis went right into it.

K: You did a great job yesterday.

L: We keep plugging. The situation is such that I want you to be alert. On Monday they will make a big production.

K: We want you to. Keep taking the line you have. You are our most effective (?) spokesman.

L: Yesterday with the Armed Services Committee they were trying to tie me down on the budget. I said the President used 240 as an approximation.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

10:00 am

5/13/70

K: 260 is the planning figure.

L: I will have to give that planning figure sooner or later. Now it doesn't make such a difference.

K: Say 284 is the only one the President is ~~ex~~ now working over.

L: They will say that happens in a year and you have two months to go. The 240 figure means a further reduction.

K: That's absolutely wrong.

L: I have to be in a position -- Meahan has to go with a planning figure. The President has already one below 285.

K: That was a mistake. He started out with 520. It was the tension.

L: Sooner or later the committee will have to have the figure. I have to at least maintain the ? ? ?

K: I just think you give Hanoi these figures -- we want to show strength. We don't want to show what we are taking out. I would save that for later.

L: OK. We are going to have to at least tell in a classified way, Meahan. The staff is using a lower figure and we will come up with a reduction.

K: You can trust him, can't you?

L: We are using 71 allocations on ammunition. So I have to get every dollar I can.

K: You won't get any problem here with a higher figure. That's what we want.

L: Just so you understand.

K: You should give a higher figure. I have talked to the President about that and it was just a slip of the tongue. Try to stay away from that as long as we can.

L: I did yesterday. Brooke and Schweikert have gone way over. Byrd feels "I heard the President say the SVN would be out at the same time." He told this to the leaders of both committees. I was referring to these operations. I said before that the SVN were going into Cambodia in skirmishes and I would hope we can do this in the future.

K: He doesn't care so long as there are no advisors along.

By NARA, Date 5/26

LAIRD/KISSINGER

10:00 am 5/13/70

-3-

L: But the President did say that. So I had to fluff it.

K: His present view is the opposite.

L: Then we need to get that word to them.

K: We may need to put them in Fish Hook to get that stuff out.

L: If the rains come on June 5 we will have to blow a lot of stuff. But we will get pictures first. Otherwise we couldn't get a truck in for several months. Get as much out as we can and blow the rest. We are getting pictures now.

K: Can't we get correspondents in there?

L: We have more in there since the war. We will have more than 3 - 4 hundred. More correspondents than troops.

K: Maybe they can carry out the rice.

L: Or let them handle rifles. We have to certify them. I would like to curtail the number.

K: That's all right if the number is large. If you want to propose that, we will consider it.

L: Even after Tet of '68 we ddn't have this many. Some are evening going into Cambodia in automobiles. That's a violation of their certification of the present credentials.

K: Can you kick them out?

L: Yeah, but before they are captured.

K: OK. I will be over today or tomorrow.

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

2:30 pm

5/13/70

K: I was with the VP. I am back in my office.

P: Do you have anything you want to take up with me? I'm in my office working now.

K: I have a review group meeting now.

P: OK, I will work on domestic things. What about Laird?

K: We can do it tomorrow morning.

P: I want him to think he is doing a good job. (He's been working hard.)

K: About 9:30.

P: Have him come over and give me a briefing.

K: Moorer too?

P: Yes. We have the whole business bombing of the North. Our options have opened up. I think this guy is gung ho.

K: He is good and has a lot more vigor than Wheeler. The BXX VP thinks that the public is strongly with you. He thought the winning of Byrd in W. Va. was good. He got 88% of the vote.

P: Did he have any opposition?

K: From the doves.

P: I have Ehrlichman here now.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sen. Cooke/Kissinger
4:35 pm 5/13/70

C: May I give you two suggestions on what occurred yesterday?

K: Yes.

C: Your was great. The State Dept. I will pass no comment on. It was long winded and I will not say whether it was good or bad. The general made two mistakes. You talked about the great change that occurred after the ____ of April.

K: I noticed that.

C: He tells about the security that was needed.

K: These idiots like to give the impression that they are working like (hell?).

C: When we are pushing that Vietnamization is going to work then someone will say why did we send advisors into Parrot's Beak, it was because they had never done anything like this and we didn't want them to screw it up.

K: That one didn't bother me because it was true. But I was worried about the other. We didn't do any planning for it before the 22nd. It's their job to plan but the full scale didn't go before the 22nd.

C: I caught it -- I'm trying to put it down. I seem like a tattle tale and I will probably call you tomorrow. I was at lunch today and it's getting out of hand. The resolutions bouncing around. I dictated a memo today.

K: By the Senators?

C: You have some friends you don't know about. Percy gave me a memo that he thought was great but it's nothing but Tonkin Bay resolution all over again. They are bounding around with resolutions. They are talking of whether to go with the President.

K: A show down?

C: Yes, it's off base. A real confrontation.

K: The thing is going well and if we could get a modicum of domestic support, we could make progress.

C: Someone would be willing to buy what you could issue and we could swallow or buy.

K: Could you be more specific?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Sen. Cooke/Kissinger

4:35 pm

5/13/70

-2-

C: Let me send this from Percy. And Javits is writing one. He is more friendly than you think. ? ? ? ? ? ? and he said you are flirting with disaster and I cannot agree with the McGowern/Goodell and I can agree with the Cooper/Church with some ramifications. He went on to tell them, "I think we should REJECT be able to come up with something we can buy. The Democrats are coming up with ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . We have to take off the heat for the President."

K: If it's done in a constructive spirit we would cooperate. But it would be damaging if the Senators passed something that looked like an attack on the President.

C: I agree but this is the voice you would not expect. He is looking for a view the President can agree with. I will send the Percy and Javits things to you and you can take a look at them.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Senator Javits

May 13, 1970

6:15 p.m.

Javitz: I have talked to my colleagues about our conversation last night and everyone is interested in trying to find some effort should be made to see if any accommodation with the President on practical grounds is possible.

HAK: I talked to the President about this in diplomatic terms and he has not rejected the principle.

Javits: I am supposed to see Attorney General Mitchell at 8:15 in the morning. I knew him closely in the campaign. I wanted to talk to him to see whether he could be of any help with the President on the Israeli situation.

?????

HAK: What I would like to do is to discuss with you whether we can agree on a general outline of a direction. If we all know where we are headed then perhaps we can avoid this contest. I am going to Key Biscayne with the President this weekend. How about getting together early next week. We stay in Key Biscayne through Monday. How about breakfast on Tuesday.

Javitz: Fine.

HAK: I want you to know how much I appreciated the spirit in which you talked yesterday. What we want to avoid is to play the Cooper/Church thing into a condemnation of what the President did. We need to see how we can manage the future and not to have a vote of no confidence in the President.

Javits: I think this is well worth exploring and I am more than ready. What time on Tuesday?

HAK: 8:00?

Javits: Fine.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger
6:25 pm 5/13/70

P: I noticed an interesting thing. We are getting huge hauls of ammunition but Ryland asks if it's going to be printed. I said yes, it's in the Times. So it shows it's not getting through. Keep riding it and it will.

K: The man who said he agreed with you and although he didn't agree with Cambodia he knew you were doing what's best for the country -- it was McNamara. Javits is going to see what he can do with the Foreign Affairs Committee. He thinks he can get support from everyone but Church, Cooper, Mansfield, and (2 or 3 others). To get them off your back.

P: I hope you told him not to go for the Cooper/Church resolution tomorrow.

K: I said not to make it look like the President is being con骗ned. The mood is changing.

P: And tell Haldeman to keep getting a better story out.

K: I will keep hitting it.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

W. Rostow/Kissinger

11:04 am

5/14/70

K: I find now that I am more villainous than you and how much worse can it get?

R: Just do your best.

K: My Harvard colleagues were here to see me.

R: Was that Time story true?

K: Worse. They said the decision was so bad they wouldn't discuss it.

R: Mac Bundy is coming to Austin and he's going to make a policy statement. I'm sure he's against it. How can these people do this? Get hold of John Roach's columns. They are a comfort. I don't understand how people can talk to you that way. Did I tell you about Reischauer? He was coming down to Washington after he got back from Japan to give a testimony and he and I had worked like brothers on Japan and VN. I offered to give him a briefing. He said no because he had to live in Cambridge. That was the most shocking I had heard.

K: If we can hold public opinion which I think we can -- when this started the Washington Post said it never would succeed because Cedar Falls only set them back 4 months. We have already captured ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? times as much. Another newsman said Junction City was the big one. We have ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? as much. Heavy weapons are 1800. Rifles, 8,000. Ammunition, 9 million rounds.

R: Rice?

K: 2,500 tons.

R: Will the boys stand on their feet in Penom Penh?

K: I think so.

R: It's quiet in Laos.

K: We cracked that. We lost most of the Plain des Jars.

R: ______ Tao is still on his feet.

K: And his people are in the area.

R: The most worrying thing in reading the intelligence is Thieu's incapacity to lead his government. Of course, you are in a war with all sorts of dangers.

By NARA, Dato'

5/26

W. Rostow/Kissinger

11:04 am

5/14/70

-2-

K: When is Bundy giving his talk?

R: Tomorrow. He is supposed to talk about pollution but he will get that in. You'll be reading about it in the newspapers.

K: Bundy has never failed to do the fashionable thing yet.

R: The main thing is the pay off. What's the set of the play on the possibility of a Geneva Conference.

K: We haven't heard anything further. But by the end of the summer we will have be heading towards one. We have cut off their main force units from their ________ units. We have captured enough ammunition for 6 months.

R: Does the ARVN know it's the great opportunity to get population control?

K: Already operations in Third Corps have dropped 30%. Soon they will run out of ammunition.

R: And with pacification they will run out of recruits. And you have warned them about the bombing on the DMZ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: We may appeal to you if we have problems. 14,000 mortar rounds is a lot.

R: You had a great TV on yesterday. Two soldiers just glowing about this stuff.

K: We have 10,000 recoilles rifle grenades.

R: What about documents?

K: We have some but not analyzed.

R: One of our weaknesses was that we couldn't override our intelligence. We could never get it out. If you could get out how the war is run from Hanoi to the people. Now, President Johnson has been reading intelligence on the M.E. and newspapers. He is concerned and doesn't want to press you. He has some questions, If in the Friday intelligence if you could give him a picture of your considered view of the M.E. and your frame of mind. The primary things are scale of Soviet pilots, Soviet intentions. Nasser's intentions and what does he assess where he is. Are we discouraging Moscow and Cairo? What is your thinking on aircraft and other supplies? I think it would be good if you could brief him on your picture.

K: We are going to Key Biscayne tonight so it might slip a few days.

By NARA, Date 5/26

-3-

R: If you could give him a fuller briefing than he gets in his weekly reports.

K: Will do.

R: God Bless. You have a guy cheering you down here.

K: I know now what you went through for many years.

R: You won't change a day of it.

K: We did the right thing. You know that.

R: They are going through a very complicated calculus now and they are waiting to see how the President weathers the campuses. I wish that you didn't give yourself such rigid deadlines on pulling troops out.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

May 14, 1970

11:20

Phil Farley

**Farley:** I was surprised that you didn't have anyone over to hear me explain U.S. arms control policy to the McCloy Committee.

**HAK:** I have complete faith in you.

**Farley:** I am calling on two small problems. In our SALT business two topics come up in which AEC is involved. One is the Kurin (?) discussion on accidents. The other is the business of MIRV detection devices.

**HAK:** I have just signed an instruction on the latter to expedite.

**Farley:** That takes care of that. On the other I wanted to be sure there was no objection to involving AEC...

**HAK:** None, No objection.

**Farley:** Good. That is all.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Maxine Chesire/Kissinger

2:30 p m

5/15/70

C: I hear something too interesting to ignore.

K: Am I getting married again?

C: No, that Arthur Schlesigger has been giving you advice in letters and is coming next week.

K: He is an old friend and often comes down.

C: When again?

K: He was supposed to come last week but he couldn't. He may come down this coming week.

C: Where?

K: Oh, usually the San Souci or the Metropolitan Club.

C: Has he been writing you ?

K: We have been writing for 15 years.

C: Has he been giving you a list on the war of does and don'ts.

K: We just ______ gentle philosophy. And I don't give an accounting of my correspondence.

C: Do you exchange notes with Martha Mithcell?

K: Not that I remember.

C: She's never written you a funny note re something that's (in print ?) ?

K: It's possible but I don't remember. Do you have the notes?

C: Yes, they will be sold at Hamilton's next week. (ha, ha!)

K: Arthur's an old friend and we have corresponded for a long time.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Bunker/Kissinger
2:33 pm 5/15/70

B: I got finished up this morning with the committee. It went well. No rough stuff. Much better than I expected.

K: The President wants to see you before you go. He may not be back until Tues. Can you wait that long?

B: I can do whatever the President wishes.

K: The President tried to call you on your birthday on Monday but he got no answer.

B: At the Madison?

K: I guess. They may have tried Vermot or Saigon!

B: I appreciate it very much. I understand he is going away today.

K: I'm going to try again for today.

B: That's all right.

K: He does want to see you.

B: Well, I also would like to see him. I will keep the plane. I can go Tuesday.

K: Let's try Tues. afternoon.

B: The plane I have should leave by 4:30 on Tuesday.

K: I will do what I can.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Under Secretary Richardson
11:22 p.m., 1May 18, 1970

K: I just had a chance to talk to the President on the plane and if you still want to send Bennet, he would be delighted.

R: Yes, I do. Thank you, Henry.

K: We didn't know of what country he was Country Director.

R: Cambodia.

K: This is, of course, contingent on the fact that he wasn't one of the signers.

R: Nobody in EA signed it.

K: He understands that the President wishes him to see Lon Nol and M_________?

R: Yes. Thank you a lot. I hope you got some rest.

K: Yes, I feel a lot better.

R: How about the President?

K: Yes. I have seen 4 Presidents in action, and no one was ever so torn at. The collapse of our establishment is frightening -- both within the government to some extent, but above all outside. What's the difference between Clifford's timetable and ours? Nine months at the most -- and for that they tear the country to pieces.

R: I live in hopes...

K: Did you see the Newsweek poll? 65% think the President is doing a good job.

R: That's the best thing I have heard in a long time.

K: 58% think the students are to blame; 10% think the National Guard is to blame for Kent; 51% were for the President's right to enter Cambodia; 38% were against it. If the right to clean out the sanctuaries were polled, it might have been different.

R: That's heartening.

K: You will arrange things with Bennett. They leave at 4:00 tomorrow afternoon.

lds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

2:33 pm

5/19/70

L: I'm sorry to bother you. On this base area operation we have gone into every area except in the north that we are not going into, the 740. It's mostly SVN with 40 American advisors. I wouldn't ? ? ? ? ? ? I'm going to execute.

K: I think you should. ? ? ? ? ? may operations outstanding. We were saiting to hear from you.

L: I'm going on this. It will be over in two days weeks. We should keep the pressure on. We are going to have a rain on target problem. No one will be in there on the 30th. If you had been at the Cabinet meeting you would understand.

K: It's not exactly the most lionhearted Cabinet I have ever seen.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

6:25 pm

5/19/70

R: I just wanted to talk a bit about the trip of Haig's. Are we making representation to Lon Nol? Is he sending a letter to him?

K: Only one that introduces Haig. He only wanted some estimate of the situation-military effectiveness and what the problems are. A fact-finding mission. We carefully took our any reference.

R: I think the other thing I talked to the President about and he said he would have Haig look into it with Abrams -- cutting down casualties in August.

K: He will do that. As long as I have you on the phone, we talked briefly about getting together occasionally. I would like to do it for 15 mins.

R: Let's keep Thurs. in mind. I'm going away next week.

K: Any time to fit your schedule. I could do it at noon.

R: That's good for me too.

K: I will keep it on the calendar, and if anything happens --

By

NARA, Dato

5/26

Telcon
The President
5/19/70; 6:30 p.m.

P: Henry. What is new on your front? How did you get along with Stewart?

K: Very well. I think I ought to read to him from that yellow memo, if you agree.

P: Sure.

K: I went through the decision making process at great length. I said it was the most thoughtful process any man could go through. He said it is a complete collapse of the WASP establishment in this country. He said he knows what you must be going through. People call him a Fascist for supporting you. But I think he is going to do a thoughtful piece.

P: Yes, you can show him the yellow paper. You have it, don't you?

K: I think Rose has it.

P: You got Haig off all right, with the right instructions?

K: Yes, he has the basic instructions.

P: We can wire him out there if we have anything else. He knows what to do. Wasn't that just awful that thing of Bunkers about those guys going out there? I am going to have Haldeman have a talk ..

K: I think I should stay out of it.

P: You have other fish to fry. You stay out of it. You can't be in every fight. I notice in the STAR the big headlines, "North Vietnam Attacks." It's not significant, is it?

K: No, they keep attacking individual towns and then when the Cambodians stand at all they withdraw.

P: It's a big high point, isn't it.

K: They just don't have the steam, Mr. President.

P: The press tries to build everything except our side.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: There were practically no attacks in III and IV Corps for a week. They haven't managed to take over any provinces.

P: I see Mansfield in the paper on Laos. There isn't a damn thing in Laos.

K: He is talking about SVN Ranger units and they occasionally have American advisers with them.

P: Here we are going in to defend Americans. One of these days I am going to take him on. I have decided I have got to go earlier in my talk.

K: First week in June.

P: Yes. We had to make a basic strategy decision. Bryce wanted to make a compromise. Were you there?

K: No, I saw Javits.

P: That didn't do any good, did it?

K: I scared the pants off him. I warned him, if you want Israel to be destroyed you just get us out of Vietnam. You can't expect any President to make a confrontation with Russia after we withdraw from Vietnam.

P: Did he get the point?

K: Yes.

P: I am going to speak to the country first, then the Senators can pass anything they please.

K: I didn't feel confident enough about the Senate to have a strong judgment, but my instinct now is for you to stand firm.

P: The tide is changing. The congressmen received a lot of mail, but it was all a lot of form mail from the kids.

K: Chamberlain came in with some businessmen from central Michigan and I gave them a strong speech and they were literally cheering. I gave some of the figures and said, just remember, every one of these bullets could have killed an American. Remember, we didn't invade Cambodia, we went after North Vietnamese supplies in Cambodia.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

P: It's like saying the Americans in World War II invaded Europe. Hell, we were driving the Germans out of Europe. Did Eisenhower invade Europe? No.

K: They applauded every other sentence. And you know, I am not a rabble-rousing speaker.

P: What other points in addition to the ammunition did you make?

K: I began with the point of invasion. I said, here we have this problem of American soldiers driving them from these sanctuaries. The President needs no prodding about the desirability of ending the war. He went in there to end the war, not to expand the war. I said you look over the record of this President. Every promise he has made he has kept. He promised to end the war and he will keep that promise. I spoke with great confidence and I don't know who they were and there was a sort of electric feeling in the room. I spoke for two minutes and answered questions. They gave me a big ovation after the two minutes and applauded 8 or 9 times in between. If these are leaders in their communities I think that is what is getting back to the Congress.

P: They are. I will talk to you tomorrow. Incidentally, Rogers mentioned this morning when talking to the Leaders. He made the point very effectively that the Russians and Chinese are having their "do" again. There is no detente there, is there?

K: The only way they can get together is for one of them to yield the primacy to the other. The Chinese turning off the meeting the way they did was the best thing they could do.

P: I want you to open that channel to Paris again right away.

K: I will.

P: Next week. Right away.

K: Right, Mr. President.

ms

in side.

By ____ NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Cong. Arends/Kissinger

6:45 pm

5/19/70

A/ Some time ago Johnny Shaheen wanted to be appointed to a board.

K: Everybody thinks ____ are in my hands when they want a fall guy.

A: This was started by Dirksen and I have been working with Flanigan.

K: Your opinion is worth much.

A: I hope it is. I talked to the President about this. He said M Shaheen is a friend of ours and have him put on.

K: If the President wants him, he will go on. I will talk to the President.

A: I would appreciate it. I just got a good report that you met with a group of Minhigan boys.

K: That was an enthusiastic group. They were cheering and applauding.

A: There were ? ? ? ? A group of kids from Bloomington got mad about fires and such so on the spur of the moment they had a "respect the flag" day and had so many the couldn't get in the door.

K: They can't stampede this country this way.

A: The Michigan boys said they would try the same thing. We will get groups together and ? ? ? ? ? ?

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
5/20/70 9:10 a.m.

L: I think we ought to get together and perhaps get Bryce in and one or
two others and discuss the whole problem which we have in regard to main-
taining the President's posture as far as the Congress is concerned on cer-
tain things they feel he has pledged to them which there may be some question
about.

K: All right.

L: They believe they have a commitment from the President to end
all U.S. operations on June 30 in Cambodia. I see how they got it . . .

K: Who is they?

L: House Armed Services Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, and House Foreign Relations Committee. They were very critical of
me because they say I am at variance with the President's pledge to them, in
indicating in my testimony that there might be use of air power in Cambodia.
The President did say that at that leadership meeting.

K: I don't remember his saying anything about air power.

L: Well he did. He may have meant something else. But we shouldn't
get in that kind of confrontation without consulting. If we could even turn
them to the understanding that it's ridiculous for us not to keep the sanctu-
aries under some air interdiction. I'm sure it's a serious problem. I think
we can handle it if we will just work out how we will get to them. Have you
got a transcript of what the President said to Mansfield and Fulbright before
he went on TV?

K: No.

L: Well, there must be one over there. Look that over. They keep
throwing those quotes back. People like Zablockie and Fort are going all
out on support, but it's based on the idea that the U.S. operations will end on
June 30. I think if we start looking at it now we'll be in a better position later.

K: I think you are right.

L: Another thing. Abrams came in this morning with a cable saying he
has no targets beyond the limitations which he requested (Patio? was extended
to the perimeters he set). But he came in with a cable today indicating he has
no need for further authority at this time. The Joint Chiefs have gotten the
idea that they ought to have Abrams come in with a different kind of request.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
5/20/70 9:10 a.m. page 2

I hate to do that. He feels he can carry on interdiction in the Steel Tiger area and that doesn't have the problems that ______ does.

K: What the President wants is to use the interdiction to interrupt North Vietnamese movement against Cambodia.

L: Well, we've got targets developed by intercept, but you know how they are. You saw in that briefing, a target developed by three lines coming together, some targets cover an area of maybe 10 square miles. We've got 11 targets like that. But you can't fly air missions against them. You don't have anything to hit. Well you read over Abe's cable?

K: Yes, but I'll still send over the authority so you know the President's wishes.

L: I will use it as soon as something develops. But not before, and I don't think we should go back to Abe to tell him he's wrong. We've sent too many messages that way.

K: No.

L: Will you read over this cable?

K: Certainly.

L: I think Tom has the feeling the President has made up his mind and wants to run strikes in whether there are targets or not.

K: Well, there are movements . . .

L: But these are very small movements. Next thing, I got a note from Mayo that he wants assurances that I'm not exceeding the 70 budget. In order to keep up the strikes at this level we have to use some 71 money.

K: We understand that.

L: Sooner or later I will have to surface that. Should I tell Mayo now? In my testimony, when I wouldn't take a stand on the ship ______ XX. I talked with the President about that. He had an understanding with Mendel Rivers that I don't want to tell Mayo about that, but he feels I'm violating Presidential orders.

K: Oh the hell with him. We will just tell Mayo to lay off for a few weeks.

L: I think probably this question of the air ammunitions . . . that runs about a billion, 5 hundred million dollars. It's not cheap. We may have to draw down

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

5/20/70 9:10 a.m. page 3

on some of our reserves, which we hadn't intended to do. But we'll come
out at the end of FY 71 with this kind of shortage. We are going to have to
borrow on 71 stocks for a while. I don't want this to come as a shock to
the President.

K: You have told him?

L: But did he understand?

K: I don't think he understands the significance of it, but you've explained it to him.

L: Okay. If any target does develop I'll just go ahead, but right now I would like to go along and support Abe rather than anyone else right now. I don't want to go against his judgment unless there is some overriding policy reason for it. If there is, tell me, he would understand that.

K: Let me talk to the President.

L: Okay. We are putting maximum pressure on the river and Laos, and on certain check points on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. One other thing--Jerry Ford and a few other Congressmen want me to price out the rice and rounds of ammunition. I think we should stay away from pricing them out. The rice would be about a million dollars worth, but when you're talking about Cambodia . . . I think it's better to stay in tons and feeding years.

K: I agree.

L: And I'm going to tell Herb that I think we should stay away from that. We do a better job when we are talking about rounds instead of dollars.

K: I agree.

L: Anything else?

K: No, that's all I have.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

10:45 ;am 5/20/70

R: I was talking to Alex about the possibility of bombing additional bombing in Cambodia. Mel is concerned too. I hope that if the President is thinking of making decisions of that kind we can get together and talk about it.

K: OK, certainly.

R: I see arguements for and against it. If it gets out that the President wants to bomb then the military will work it out. But I just got back from a meeting with House leaders and is we vary from what we are doing, we will split the ranks. It was mostly the young leaders. It looks like bombing is support the Lon Nol Government.

K: He wants to relate it with operations there and interdiction and not to Lon NOL.

R: If it's doing whatwe have done that's one thing but if it changes what we are doing it should be discussed in advance. We should also talk about SVN forces in Cambodia. That's troubling people on the Hill. After June 30. We have fuzzed that up.

K: I think we should have a review -- Why don't we ask the President to have an NSC meeting?

R: Or a limited group. That would be better. I would like to do it before I leave for NATO.

K: When do you leave?

R: Sunday morning.

K: We could do it Sat. Morning.

R: That's all right or late in the day one day. We only need an hour or so.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Haldeman/Kissinger

11:55 am

5/20/70

-2-

H: But they will spread out with only a couple at each.

K: But they will say it's never been done before and riots work so we will have 500,000 next time in Washington.

H: ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: After we have ridden out the storm and they see we don't have to do it. That's my judgment. We should communicate and I see some here. They will structure riots on Cambodia, the bad kids, and the good ones won't be able to stand it off. We should have a well thought out program, talk to students leaders all summer long, and have a good plan; next year. With campuses breaking up and on strike I think wouldn't get into a new confrontation.

H: Very good, thanks.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Prof. Graubard/Kissinger

12:10 pm

5/20/70

G: I hope you are well/

K: I'm fine.

G: You remember we talked about the Soviet Union thing. Did you have any thoughts about that? What's a reasonable way for me to do it.

K: I g forget -- what was it?

G: We want to see how research is carried on in various industrial societies.

K: You should be in touch with the Soviet ______. I can arrange that.

G: How quickly can I do that? I want to visit the Soviet Union. I think the University as a center of research is coming to an end.

K: Can I call you back between 3:00 and 5:00 on this?

G: Can you call me at home after 5:00?

K: I will try.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Secy. Stans/Kissinger
2:40 pm 5/20/70

S: When can I have 30 mins. of your time?

K: Friday is probably best. Can I have my office call you?

S: Friday is best and I'm reasonably free. We have an opportunity to get together with Miazawa if we move. He is in Paris and he asked Shimoda to ask State if I will be here if he comes to Washington. We may want to see if he can negotiate or whether to meet him some place else.

K: Why don't we give him the choice.

H: I could meet him in Paris.

K: Leave it up to him.

S: I talked to Rogers yesterday. He said "keep my people out of it and sell it." I said I don't think his people wanted that.

K: If Bill feels that way, go ahead.

S: I will see if I can meet with Miazawa, probably in a neutral place.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Flanigan/Kissinger

2:55 pm

5/20/70

F: I sent you a memo on the Vatican. They were very concerned. It seems minor to us.

K: Why were they concerned?

F: That Lodge's mission at the Embassy, there would be a confusion between issues. They brought that up. That was what we planed but they brought it up and ?? ISSUE ?? THEY will take it up with the Holy Father. Another thing, Vance took a position against us on Cambodia. I told him of times we stood up for him when others were against him. I said he should get briefed. How can we brief him?

K: I am sick of him but I will see him for a few minutes. I have tried to brief him before and never get through. When I thought the VN policy was a disaster and tried to help them -- for him to go public is a disgrace.

F: I agree. If we can divert him --

K: You can't.

F: Then don't waste your time.

K: I have not seen him in 4 months. I had dinner with him and showed him highly classified things. He is just out for his own skin.

F: I hate to give up on him but I think his position is inexcuseable.

K: You can't change them. They have to be beaten down. I worked with them for years and never attacked them publicly.

F: I thought better of Cy.

K: I did too. I'm not surprised by Harriman. I even had McNamara work on him. It does no good.

F: He claims he has no political ambitions.

K: That may be.

F: They talk about representing the whole country.

K: Except 65% of the people.

F: If you don't want to do it, I'm sorry I brought it up.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

May 20, 1970

Dr. Kissinger/Elliot Richardson

4:10 p.m.

**HAK:** The President has approved your position on the seabeds. Did you know that?

**Richardson:** No, I'm very glad to hear it. We'll start the Hill and other contacts.

**HAK:** OK. Incidentally, just now I saw a column by Stu Lory. Did you see it?

**Richardson:** No.

**HAK:** It describes State dissatisfaction with the way the Cambodian K.K.XX decision was made. It describes a Laos/Cambodia Committee which is a way of expressing frustration with the way the system is working.

**Richardson:** I don't know where he got that from. We have set up a group working for the Secretary on longer range things like if we have an Indochina conference what would we want to get out of it or how should we influence it. There is an element of feeling that this is the sort of thing we should do, a way of getting some people working on aspects of the problem as a whole which gives State Department people a function which, without involving them in the kinds of problems before the WSAG, can still be useful.

**HAK:** It is just that that sort of story. . . Dean Rusk called me. He thought it was unbelievable the way the departments were undercutting each other.

**Richardson:** Well it is bad. IX I think that statement was bad.

**HAK:** Well, that was not the reason I called you. I'll see you tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Bill Gill

5/20/70 4:25 p. m.

G: I have been ordered to do what amounts to a rewrite of the Mary McGrory and Time magazine story. It was suggested to me that I should call you because the story was erroneous. The story I am referring to is last week's Time story that Yarmolinsky and Reischauer insisted that there be a change in policy or that you resign, or you would not be welcomed back to Harvard.

K: It is not true as far as those two are concerned.

G: It is not true?

K: Not as far as those two are concerned. Some other suggestions were made to me, but I would just as soon not talk about that.

G: I will tell that it was your decision to remain where you are.

K: I have no intention to leave now.

G: Thank you for taking the call.

K: Right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Richardson Kissinger

6:25 pm

5/20/70

R: I got word yesterday from one of the people here that Marilyn Berger of NEWSDAY had a story which appeared fairly fully to set forth the U.S. negotiating position in Vienna.

K: I haven't seen her since I came here.

R: I haven't talked to her about SALT. I asked the fellow to call and tell her it was very unhelpful. A series of calls to here and the bureau cheif which led to a call to the publisher, Albright, by me last night. I thought I got the pitch across. I thought I would try to plug further leaks and prevent further stories by asking Alx Farley to issue a new reminder on this score which would be pegged on a cable we got yesterday which Semanof beefed about a story in the London Times. I decided at that point I would call Frankel and Bradley and say stories of this sort are unhelpful to an atmosphere of effort to secure propaganda. This afternoon Chalmers Roberts says he has a story written that will appear tomorrow. We are deliberating here whether I should go higher in the Post when Albright decided to print their story. Therefore, there's no reason to go back to the Post. They probably wouldn't have done it anyway. I wanted to warn you. I will have Farley warn Smith so he can handle it on the ground.

K: OK

R: Actually, I'm surprised it has taken this long.

K: I don't know what we can do. I will see you tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Rowland Evans
5/20/70 6:45 p. m.

K: Now that I've kept you waiting for 48 hours and put you in your
proper place what can I do for you?

E: There's only one way for a journalist to look at a public official,
and that's down.

K: No, I know, but my megalomania won't permit me to believe it.

E: I see Barbara Howar had something to say.

K: If I ever took that woman out for a third time there would be no
stopping her.

E: I wondered whether you could come for dinner. It's basically for
Charlie Whitehouse who has just returned from Vietnam. But I promise
we won't talk about Vietnam all evening.

K: I have already accepted. Maybe word hasn't gotten to you yet.
At your house we can talk about anything you like.

E: What is there to the stories that Laird is very worked up about the
Joint Chiefs.

K: Well, that's between him and the Joint Chiefs. What is not true
is that we ever gave direct orders to the Joint Chiefs that didn't go through
Laird's office.

E: That's what I thought.

K: Never. It's conceivable that a nit-picking detail staff members
might discuss, but never orders. That's an absolute truth to which there
is no exception.

E: Have you felt any reservations over there about what's going on in
the White House?

K: No. You've been in this town long enough to know there are a lot
of people who are scurrying for lifeboats. And there are people trying to
position themselves. But in my dealings I haven't felt this.

E: I would have been shocked if the Secretary's office had ever been
bypassed.

K: It's hard to prove a negative but every order of consequence is given

By NARA, Dato

5/26

Telecon
Rowland Evans

5/20/70 6:45 p. m. page 2

in writing to the Secretary of Defense and we don't address the Joint Chiefs directly. They are not principal addressees on information things.

E: What are your own feelings on the Senate amendment?

K: The Cooper-Church one?

E: Yes.

K: Well, practically, it will have no great consequence. But symbolically the consequence is profound. We don't want it to appear that the Senate forced us out or gave us a vote of no confidence.

E: What do you think they're going to do on it?

K: I don't know. That's out of my field to guess.

E: I think they should modify that language. This whole thing could turn by September. It could be a big plus.

K: Yes. I'll see you on the 28th. At 8:00

E: Yes, no dress. What happened to Phoebe? Will she still be here?

K: No, I don't think Phoebe will still be here.

E: We would invite her if she were going to be. If anything changes let me know.

K: Okay. Good.

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCOM

Rogers/Kissinger

7:40 pm

5/20/70

R: I'm going to Eban's dinner tonight. Did the President say anything I should know about?

K: He hasn't seen him. I will let you know from now on if anything transpires.

R: This is what he said on request for planes. He said he had to give his Government some feeling -- if it was ______ or friendly. I said no decision has been made but our statement on the policy still prevailed and don't I didn't want him to leave with a negative attitude.

K: The President will go at least that far. Not much further.

R: I have a feeling on how we will negotiate but that will give us some running room.

K: He hasn't seen him. We will set the other meeting for Friday.

R: You aren't going to this dinner tonight?

K: No. ? ? ? ? ? ? (I'm going to Nancy Dickerson's).

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
President/Kisinger
7:55 pm 5/20/70

P: Whatever elements of the 7th fleet we have available that will not jeopardize VN move them into the *fx* Formosa Straits.

K: Right.

P: Stuff that will look belligerent. I want them to know we are not playing this chicken game.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: I don't want any long paper prepared. No NSSM. I want you to call Moorer that it's an order from the Commander-in-Chief. You can tell Laird. There's no recourse. I want them there within 24 hours.

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON
V. P. /Kissinger

10:20 am

5/21/70

VP: I was wondering again about my conversation with you the other day and whether you had had a chance to discuss it with the President. I saw a bulletin yesterday about the problem of raising this issue in an inflammatory manner at NATO.

K: I raised it but he didn't react. Probably because he wants no more problems domestically at this point. Let me raise it formally again today and call you back. Maybe you want to talk directly to the President.

VP? Have you discussed the Danish idea concerning the NATO meeting?

K: This we deplore.

VP: We tried to discourage it in tenuous ways. I feel it will go off the track and Tasca feels the same way.

K: We won't react until we get them into a pro-left stand and then we will take an interest.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

S. Alsop/Kissinger

10:30 am

5/21/70

A: That was fine speech you gave last night. It gave me an idea for a piece called "3 strikes and out." Three Presidents in a row.

K: I see what you mean. I thought you had drawn the conclusion that I had just struck out.

A: No, the U.S. How about that piece of paper? Can I look at it?

K: Yeah. Let me see when.

A: I hope I can use it and don't just curiosity.

K: That I will have to think about. Come at 4:30 for 15 mins. Or 6:00.

K: That's a little tight for me because my wife is giving a party.

K: OK. Come in at 4:30 then.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Flanigan/Kissinger

11:47 am

5/21/70

K: I have a strong personal reason to want to be in NY on Wed.

F: This is something I have nothing to do with. He looked at me and kept repeating he wanted it Monday.

K: I worked it out with Haldeman for Wed.

F: I know you did. Will you tell the President?

K: Yes, I don't see the hurry on this.

F: The President said he wanted this. I told him you wanted to do it on Wed. He said whatever it is I said to do it on Monday. But will you tell him?

K: I'm beginning to be run like a puppet. Can you imagine that it makes any difference on Monday or Wed.?

F: Nope.

K: If you can give me a substantive reason I will do it on Mon. Otherwise I will do it on Wed.

F: Lakker will say he would rather have it on Wed.

K: Is that what he will say? Is he there now?

F: Yes.

K: Good. Thanks. I appreciate that very much.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Laird/Kissinger

3:40 pm

5/21/70

L: What's the situation on this meeting?

K: Bill wanted a meeting.

L: What time?

K: 3:00.

L: I was talking to John Mitchell and I didn't know anything about it. I will have to change that meeting in Chicago. It's a two day assembly of the Presbyterian ______.

K: Bill wants a general talk about ARVN and air operations. Not so much relevant to the decisions which I think he goes along with but before he goes away, some general guidance.

L: The overall problem here -- I don't -- I thought there was a hang up I had cleared up last night. In my statements I had not given proper support.

K: There's no problem on our part on your giving support. I don't know exactly what you are talking about. When I have a complaint I make it to you. There was some concern about the tactical air thing.

L: I want to know where the best place to use it is.

K: That's ______ away.

L: We have to get an understanding on this that the budgetary restraints are off. I can't do that. I'm not going to get a supplemental. I'm going to get a reduction in my budget. You know that.

K: That's no problem with me.

L: I have notified every boyd and I'm levying an assessment against every service. They think there's a supplemental. They don't realize that's a problem now. I don't have that problem with Wheeler.

K: They haven't come over here with that.

L: They think if they can get an increase in troop levels and sorties we will have a supplemental. I have to be an SOB and tell them there's no money.

K: I don't know what Mitchell raised with you but I had to talk to the President. The disagreement on his idea and yours on the ARVN cable -- then it has to go to the President.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

3:40 pm

5/21/70

-2-

L: Sure but that is used over here that we are going to be able -- I have $300 million not to make troop reduction? ? ? ? ? ? . They will have to eat it. That's what it costs.

K: They haven't come to us.

L: It's not going to.

K: I keep reading and the President has read that you and your office are mad at us because we are endrunning to the Joint Chiefs.

L: They think they have a direct order on ? ? ? ? ? . But that's not true except on tacair. I have a morale problem here. Some of the services are printing that idea.

K: You don't think so do you?

L: No. They have the impression that they have approval on these things and budgetary restraints should not be our concern. They talk too much on it. If you are Secy. of Defense and have an increasing budget then you have no problem (?). When I tell Adm. Moorer he says "I think the President supports these things" and then he gives it to the services. I keep telling them they have to eat this. There are budgetary restraints.

K: Let me call Mitchell.

L: Don't worry about that.

K: When I have a complaint --

L: You will have more complaints on the <u>hard</u>-nosed attitude I have to take. We are going to cut back on the NATO force on reserve.

K: That's all right.

L: I will not pull people out of Europe because the President made a commitment. The only thing they will show up is that the readiness posture is for troops here in the U.S. will go down 20%. Some people over here have the idea that it won't happen. It has to happen. But I will have trouble enforcing it. I don't want to get it over in your shop. They still have the idea, except Wheeler, that somehow or other they will get the supplemental through, based on present activity to maintain the present status. You probably get the complaints.

K: We haven't had them.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

3:40 pm

5/21/70

-3-

L: Abrams doesn't like it nor the people in the planning area.

K: You can be sure that I don't consider it my job to carry that kind of
complaint around. I tell you and not the President.

L: When I ? ? ? ?? keeping in mind the approved budget of 1971 keeping in mind the budget of 1970. They bitch like hell when I ask them to show the offset. They are doing too much talking about that.

K: We don't have a problem.

L: As far as our budget is concerned, those decisions were made at that time and we have to live with them. They had a chance to make an appeal. I tell them they lost their chance.

K: The President didn't understand the sorties thing. Get over a piece of paper on the budgetary matter so the President can decide to go. He will decide no probably and then you can go to the Chiefs.

L: He is going to cut our budget.

K: We will talk to him. He won't do that.

L: We will have some cut.

K: I hope not.

L: This is the only problem that I know about that I don't feel we have communicated properly. You understand it. There's going to be a lot of bitching.

K: The best way is to send us a couple of pieces of paper and I will discuss it with the President. Then you will be protected. The President will rule that there will not be a supplemental.

L: The other thing is the Blue Ribbon Commission -- there's some conflict. That report will be made to the President on the first of July. The next meeting is the 15th of June. I think the Commission should see you and the President before the meeting or before the report is made public. It shouldn't come out. The President said to make revolutionary changes. They are so charged up.

K: What recommendations will they make?

L: Some of the recommendations you made in the Rockefeller report.

K: of 10 years ago?

By NARA, Dato

5/26

Laird/Kissinger

3:40 pm

5/21/70

-4-

L: They have talked to people all over the country. These guys have met every day for 10 months.

K: Have you seen the report?

L: No. I think the thrust of the report you should have some understanding of. I'm being briefed tomorrow and you should be and the President should talk to the Chairman. Should I write you a memo?

K: Drop me a note. About the President's meeting, drop me a note.

L: I should not be there. They will raise hell -- the procurement people and a hell of a lot of other things. This reorganization plan to make the Dept. more effective and I think you should be aware of it. I will write you a little note so you don't forget about it.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

Volpe/Kissinger

4:07 pm

5/21/70

V: I was in a conference which I wound up quickly.

K: I'm returning your call of yesterday. Sorry I didn't call sooner.

V: If your days are anything like mine with Cambodia piles on top, I know it's very heavy. Some time back you said the President had approved for me to visit the Soviet Union.

K: He didn't approve a time.

V: That's what I'm calling about now. I only want to suggest that if 1) should I make such a trip that it would seem to me you wouldn't go without taking in other East. European countries and 2)? ? ? ? ? ? ?. The Ambassador in Romania has asked me several times to come -- they are very interested in road construction.

K: On the Soviet Union give us 10 days after Dobrynin is back to see what they say. Romania is fine.

V: Besides Romania and Yugoslavia we have no arrangement with Poland but the Ambassador from Poland to the U.S.

K: We have no problem with East European countries.

V: Czechoslovakia or Bulgaria wouldn't be wise. Let me work on a time frame. There are times when I have to be here. My present plans XXX indicate that I could make this trip about the first 10 days in Aug. That's my timetable but it may agree or may not.

K: With Eastern Europe you can do that on your own. The Soviet Union I will let you know in two weeks.

V: That would give us two months to make arrangements if we decided to include the Soviet Union.

K: The issues are entirely foreign policy and has nothing to do with your dept.

V: You will give us your determination and we will go with or without the S. U.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Bryce Harlow

May 21, 1970

4:35 p.m.

HAK: Well, I'm glad the Reverent Harlow is available.

Harlow: I've been trying to reach you for about four hours. First they say you are with the President, then the Pope, and then you are too busy to talk to me.

HAK: I ran into Hugh Scott at a party last night and he left me the only one defending the President. He made an appeal that we give a little on the Cooper Amendment and it sounded good. Even Cooper said he would go an extra mile to help work things out. On the first sentence, I mentioned to him what bothered me in that first sentence. Scott said he would take out the word and "and then it doesn't look like two separate ideas."

Harlow: We have to kill the whole thing. I would take out the excess language. The problem is I have flat orders which I am sick over. I have a memo from Haldeman saying "it is imperative that there be no White House talk of compromise."

HAK: I'm beginning to think that is a mistake. Church is willing to be reasonable.

Harlow: I know he is. Cooper is waiting to hear from me.

HAK: I just got word the President wants to see me. I have to go...

Harlow: Could you raise this with him.

HAK: Then you agree with me?

Harlow: I agree with you.

HAK: I think Haldeman just doesn't understand this problem. I'll raise it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

Knauer/Kissinger

5:45 pm

5/21/70

K: I have been getting a lot of calls from podiatrists from the colleges of podiatry. They say somewhere in the NSC is a recommendation that would exempt podiatrists as doctors are exempt.

HAK: I don't know what a podiatrist is.

K: A foot doctor -- what we used to call a chiropodist. There are 5 colleges in the country -- including in my home town of Phila.

HAK: I will have to look into it. I'm not stalling it.

K: I know. I told them they are working out the whole problem of volunteer army and the whole bit. I have had several calls in the last couple of days.

HAK: Let me see if we are the hold up and why.

K: It's in a subcommittee that podiatrists be treated as doctors.

HAK: It's the sort of subject that I don't second guess if some reliable person has a reasonable ______. I will call you tomorrow after looking into this.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Dan Rather

5/21/70 5:50 p. m.

R: Can you tell me on any basis whether the new amendment offered on the Senate floor meets the White House objectives?

K: I don't know what it is to tell you the truth.

R: Well, let me read it from the top. [Rather read it.] It narrowed it down to Cambodia rather than the other wording having to do with the wider war.

K: I would rather not comment on something I haven't had a chance to study.

R: What I'm getting at is was it worked out in a White House compromise.

K: The reliable information you can get on this from Bryce Harlow. I can only comment on these things from a foreign policy point of view.

R: Well, he was out today.

K: He is back.

R: Then I'll call him. I appreciate your taking the call. We had a deadline . . .

K: No, I know what you're up against.

By NARA, Dato

5/26

TELCON
Zeigler/Kissinger

6:00 pm

5/21/70

Z: Why did the Pentagon say today that COSVN was discovered outside the limits which the President said we could go in?

K: It's true but I don't know what they thought they were doing. Call Hencken and let me know.

Z: It means the President cannot obtain his objective because of the limits he has presented.

K: We have gone over this --

Z: I just wanted to be sure it's not a Kissingerism.

K: I would warn you beforehand if it were.

Z: I will let you know.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Flanigan/Kissinger

6:06 pm

5/21/70

F: Returning your call.

K: About that speech in NY. The President has it in his head that it might make a difference to do it on Monday.

F: I have talked to him at some length and he is going for Wed. We did it on the terms that Lasker preferred it. Don't change it now!

K: Is that true?

F: It's true enough. I can't see it makes any difference. After Wed. it would be frantic.

K: Are you going to be there?

F: No, just the big cheese.

K: I hope it's worthwhile.

F: It will be.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Alex Johnson

5/21/70 6:20 p.m.

K: I guess my wall poster is slipping when I can't get you to return my phone calls.

J: What do you mean? I've been trying madly to return them. They said you were busy.

K: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't know that. You got that redraft the President did?

J: Yes, and it's gone.

K: And I discussed it with the Secretary. As far as matter of fact he said his reaction was the same as mine. ButK I know X you were following instructions. I know you have no latitude. The Kabuki play--

J: Oh God yes.

K: Did you and Stans come to an agreement?

J: Yes.

K: And has it been communicated?

J: Yes. Shimoda left for Paris this morning and I'm waiting for word from him.

K: That was not to be surfaced within the X bureaucracy. They were supposed to come up with it.

J: I think Maury's entirely clear on that.

K: It left for Paris with Maury?

J: No.

K: With Shimoda?

J: Let me start over again. Shimoda was instructed to go to Paris to see Miazawa. I told Shimoda that Maury was prepared to meet Miazawa. Maury and I got together. . . Maury's not to you was based on a misunderstanding and misinterpretation by his staff. Maury is content about the proposition.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Alex Johnson

5/21/70 6:20 p.m. page 2

K: Than I will call and put a little heat under them.

J: Shimoda wasn't sure why he was going to Paris to talk to Miazawa. But my word to him is that Maury is prepared to meet Miazawa any place any time. He would hope that Miazawa would be prepared to negotiate.

K: The problem is that either of us writes his memoirs nobody will believe them.

J: Maury is about 95 percent satisfied with that proposition. I told him if he would just get that Stan Neimur out of this. His only answer is what does the industry want. I'm sure that the industry will be happy with anything close to this.

K: I'll try to bug them a little.

J: It would be useful to have that information. Is that all for the day?

K: I think so.

J: Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.

K: I don't know what we're going to do after July 1.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger
May 21, 1970
7:35 p.m.

Pres: How did your meetings go?

HAK: This fellow that was just here, I gave him the details of whom you consulted, the WSAG, how you got the information, how I reported to you after each meeting, how you consulted with Helms and Moorer and Johnson.

Pres: If anything, we did too much. I checked with too many people. Who could have spend more time on this thing. I didn't do anything else.

HAK: I spent more time with Stuart Alsop. He is doing a favorable story next week on whether the country can really afford to destroy the establishment. Next week he will do an article on the decision. Stuart is really going into meticulous detail.

Pres: Well, don't tell them too much, they are basically unfavorable.

HAK: Well, Chapin has already given him your whole schedule. He knows everybody you saw. I'm just filling in the cracks. He is doing a straight reportorial job, with no comment at all.

Pres: What is your feeling about the casualties last week. 214 wasn't it. I guess that's normal.

HAK: There were two big fire attacks in I Corp.

Pres: Of course, this was about 1/2 of last year's.

HAK: If you took out the Cambodian ones, it was that they have been edging them up towards 150.

Pres: Can you think of any places we can hit them?

HAK: I don't think we should hit them now.

Pres: We can't be timid. We must be strong from the standpoint of the Soviets.

HAK: I agree with that. But I think hitting them now would provide too easy a pretext to start the whole domestic uproar again.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

- 2 -

**Pres:** I think the domestic scene is very confused right now.

**HAK:** After your June 5 report we will have the failure of the Cambodian operation or the fact that it wasn't worth it will be dead then. They will see that it was worth it. Then they will be hacking away at trivia. Then XXXXX we will be in a better position to hit them than now.

**Pres:** I agree, but keep it open.

**HAK:** OK