FROM THE DESK OF

JOHN H. TAYLOR

August 25, 1987

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

The four Presidents are doing articles for Life magazine about the 21st century, and the other day I was talking to the fellow (it's better if he remains unnamed!) in the White House who was writing Reagan's. I asked him if Reagan was going to provide answers to three additional questions Life had submitted to each President about Gorbachev. He replied, "Well, it seemed to us it was worth doing since our man has some first-hand experience of U.S.-Soviet relations."

When I told RN about this, he suggested I share it with you as additional evidence that 1981 was indeed the beginning of time!

All best,

Dr. Henry Kissinger

[LC]

[L.C]

JUL - 2 1987i

RICHARD NIXON

June 30, 1987

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

How typically thoughtful of you to send me
the absorbing mystery stories. As you know, it is
at times difficult to sleep after an operation and
I found "The Third Betrayal" to be better than a
pain killer.

My prognosis is excellent. I am recuperating
at home in Saddle River and hope to be able to go
back to the office on a limited schedule in two or
three weeks.

Pat joins me in sending our very best wishes.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

[LC]

JUN - 5 1987

RICHARD NIXON

June 2, 1987

I liked the strong statement the President made on Saturday with regard to the importance of our protecting our interest in the Persian Gulf. However, I think you will agree when I say that whoever prepared his remarks was very good at rhetoric but a little short on history.

After pointing out that in 1973 there were gas lines, shortages, higher prices, and economic dislocation in the United States and other parts of the world, he said, "This could happen again if Iran and the Soviet Union were able to impose their will on the friendly Arab states of the Persian Gulf and Iran was allowed to block the free passage of neutral shipping. But this will not happen again, not while this President serves." The implication to the average reader is that the reason for the oil crises of 1973 is that the U.S. failed to stand up to Iran and the Soviet Union.

On the contrary, Iran did not participate in the oil embargo which of course was a fall out from the Yom Kippur War and we kept the Soviet Union out of the Mideast through our airlift and our alert.

I am not trying to nit-pick, but it seems clear that the speechwriter was following the same line as has been the case with previous statements which were based on the assumption that not just during the Carter Administration but during the Republican Administrations which preceded it, our defenses were allowed to deteriorate and we failed to stand up to the Russians -- totally ignoring our bloody battles for Trident, etc. and our actions on Cienfuegos, bombing the North three weeks before a summit in 1972, and preventing Soviet-supported India from gobbling up of West Pakistan.

FEB 12 1987

THE TIMES WEDNESDAY JANUARY 28 1987

(London)

Ex-president Richard Nixon recalls a wise and warm friend

My debt to Macmillan

Now that Harold Macmillan's compatriots have paid tribute to his distinguished career in British politics, may an overseas colleague offer an assessment of his contribution internationally.

As prime minister from 1957 to 1963 he was the right man in the right place at the right time. The tragedy of Suez brought him to power. If I may resort to a British understatement, the role of the United States in handling that crisis was not admirable. The serious mistakes the US has made in dealing with Iran pale into insignificance compared with those made during the Suez crisis.

As Eisenhower's vice-president I followed events at first-hand. Suez could not have come at a worse time, since Eisenhower was running for re-election on a platform of peace and prosperity. In our public statements, we virtually put the British and French in the same category as the Soviets in unjustifiably resorting to force to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Only a few days before, the United States had joined other countries in condemning Khru-shchev for his ruthless sup-pression of the Hungarian free-dom fighters. We forced the Brit-ish and French to abandon their efforts to punish Nasser for his expropriation of the Suez Canal.

Years later, after he had left office, I talked with Eisenhower about Suez; he told me it was his major foreign policy mistake. He gritted his teeth as he remarked, "Why couldn't the British and the French have done it more quickly?" He went on to observe that the US action in saving Nasser at Suez didn't help as far as the Middle East was concerned. Nasser became even more anti-West and anti-US. We agreed that the worst fallout from Suez was that it weakened the will of our best allies, Britain and France, to play a major role in the Middle East or in other areas outside Europe.

Macmillan's task as he assumed office was awesome. Britain had lost its colonies. It was no longer a military or economic superpower. The special relationship with the

November 1958: Macmillan and Nixon, then vice-president, at No 10. Fourteen years later, a message of sympathy after Watergate

United States had been severely damaged. Only a master politician could meet the challenge of carving out a new role for Britain on the world stage: a task for which Macmillan was uniquely qualified. He was justifiably proud of his British heritage. While he was too discreet to say so publicly, I think he would have agreed that while Britain was no longer a military superpower, it was still an intellectual superpower with the responsibility and opportunity to play a significant role in the world.

I can personally attest to that fact. In the 40 years that I have been in politics I have profited enormously from the wise counsel of many prominent Britons whom I have been privileged to know and work with, but no one influenced me more in that time than Harold Macmillan. He gave me invaluable advice when I met him in London in 1958, prior to my first trip to Moscow the following year. Based on the meetings he had had with Soviet

leaders, he said: "They want to be admitted as members of the club." Macmillan was a consummate realist and gave no credence at all to the sentimental view that atmospherics would change Soviet behaviour, but he believed that treating the Russians with respect was a small price to pay for establishing the basis for rational discussion of our differences rather than to have meetings end up in a shouting match.

Macmillan also expressed some views when we met in 1958 which are relevant to Gorbachov's highly publicized openness initiative — glasnost. As a cold-eyed realist, he would be the last one to be taken in by tokenism. But he always put what would seem at the moment to be very small changes into historical perspective. He observed: "A hundred years elapsed between the time that Queen Elizabeth sent her advisers who fell out of favour to the scaffold, and Queen Anne, who sent hers

into exile. Only five years elapsed between Stalin, who executed his rivals, and Khrushchev, who sent Bulganin out to run a power plant in Siberia."

He was convinced, as I am, that while the pace of change in the Soviet Union seems excruciatingly slow, we must always bear in mind that what matters in the long run is the fact and the direction of change.

His famous "Wind of Change" speech has been widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. He was a far-sighted observer who saw that change was inevitable in Africa and other Third World countries, but he never advocated that we should bend with the winds. What we should do is to try to change their direction.

I profoundly disagree with those who believe that because Britain is no longer a military and economic superpower, what British leaders think no longer matters very much. As long as it produces leaders like Harold Macmillan, Britain will always play a major role on the world scene.

My affection and respect for Harold Macmillan is due in part to our personal relationship. When my problems in the Watergate crisis were being widely publicized, he wrote to me: "Although I now live remote from current affairs, thinking more of the past than of the present, I feel impelled, in view of our long friendship, to send you a message of sympathy and good will. I trust that these clouds may soon roll away and that you may be able to take up with enthusiasm the task of promoting the peace and prosperity of the world to which you have already made such a notable contribution."

He did not intend to take sides in what he considered to be a strictly American political issue, but in effect what he was saying, as one practising politician to another, was that he wished me well. I shall always be grateful for his kindness at that time. What you learn when you fail is that you hear from your friends.

© Times Newspapers, 1987.

FEB 27 1986

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON

February 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN H. TAYLOR

As we begin 1986 -- the 40th anniversary of
President Nixon's entry into politics and his
election to the House of Representatives -- I
thought you might be interested in a brief summary
of his activities in 1985 and a preview of some of
what lies ahead for him this year.

The three high points of 1985:

**No More Vietnams.** Last spring, the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon to the communists, President Nixon published his sixth book. It was a look back at the Vietnam war -- how it was fought, how it was covered, and how it was eventually lost -- and also a look forward. Its final chapter, "Third World War," contained a blueprint whereby the United States and the West might avoid "more Vietnams" by learning to anticipate crises in the developing world and then marshalling their vast resources to provide a realistic alternative to the empty rhetoric of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries. **No More Vietnams** was a New York Times bestseller. The paperback edition will be published in mid-1986 by Avon.

President Nixon also published two major
articles: one on summitry (the lead article in the
fall issue of Foreign Affairs), and another on
nuclear diplomacy for National Review.

**Giving up the Secret Service.** According to an official of the U.S. Secret Service who visited President Nixon early last year, the annual cost of protecting former Presidents and former First Ladies had reached $25 million. As the budget and deficit crises mounted he decided the $3 million his own detail cost was not an expense that should

-- 2 --

be borne by a government that was being forced to
consider cutting defense and domestic programs to
the bone. (Mrs. Nixon had voluntarily given up her
own detail a year before.) In a handwritten letter
to Treasury Secretary Jim Baker informing him of
his decision to terminate his Secret Service
protection effective July 31st, the former
President wrote, "It doesn't seem like much, but to
paraphrase Everett Dirksen, a million here and a
million there adds up to a lot of money." His and
his First Lady's security is now paid for from
their own funds. It is under the able supervision
of Mike Endicott, who retired last summer to join
President Nixon's staff after 20 years with the
Secret Service.

Around the World in 30 Days. Many of
President Nixon's friends were understandably
apprehensive about his relinquishing his Secret
Service detail. In September his decision was put
to the test when he undertook his most extensive
single foreign excursion since leaving office: An
around-the-world factfinding trip that took him to
11 countries in a month. When he travelled abroad
with the Secret Service he was accompanied by as
many as 25 agents. This time his staff support
consisted solely of Mike Endicott and me. The
President's hosts were more than willing to provide
all the security he needed, and many of them were
delighted that they were being given full
responsibility for protecting a prominent American
visitor -- and also that they would not have to
provide accommodations for a large detail of
agents.

The trip itself, during which he visited many
of the countries he and Mrs. Nixon first visited on
a 70-day trip around the world they made in 1953 as
emissaries of President Eisenhower, was a triumph.
A few highlights:

In China (one nation he wasn't able to visit
in 1953) he had substantive meetings with Chairman
Deng, General Secretary Hu, Premier Zhao, and a
number of the younger men Deng is grooming for
leadership. In Singapore he renewed his 20-year
friendship with Lee Kwan Yew. In Japan he met with
Prime Minister Nakasone and was hosted at dinner by

-- 3 --

two former Prime Ministers, his old friends Nobusuke Kishi and Takeo Fukuda. In Burma, seldom visited by Americans, he spent many hours in conversation with its brilliant, idiosyncratic ruler, General Ne Win, and travelled by helicopter to the famous pagoda at Pegu, where he rang the same ceremonial bell he had rung on his first visit in 1953. In Pakistan his plane was escorted into the airport at Islamabad by four Pakistani Air Force fighter jets, and he was greeted on the tarmac by President Zia, his Cabinet, members of the Senate, and one hundred little girls waving American and Pakistani flags. President Nixon was with Zia for almost two days, discussing issues ranging from the Soviet war in Afghanistan to Zia's warming relationship with India and its new Prime Minister. President Nixon called on Afghan elders-in-exile in Peshawar, and then helicoptered up the Khyber Pass for a luncheon hosted by the legendary guardians of the Pakistan Frontier, the Khyber Rifles, and a press conference conducted within sight of the Afghanistan border. And in England, his last stop, he briefed a group of eminent British politicians and journalists, gathered at the home of Jonathan Aitken M.P., on the conclusions he had drawn during the trip, which also included stops and meetings with leaders in South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey.

Attached is a photograph that appeared in newspapers around the world when President Nixon was in China. On a break between meetings he visited the Evergreen Township near Beijing. During a stop at the township's kindergarten the children sang "Old MacDonald Had a Farm" for him. Afterwards he walked to the piano and asked whether any of the children were celebrating birthdays. The teacher translated, three hands shot up, and President Nixon played "Happy Birthday."

* * *

President Nixon was slowed during the first three months of 1985 by a much-publicized case of the shingles, and again briefly in August by skin cancer surgery. He recovered fully from both and

-- 4 --

found time for a wide range of activities. As you
may know, he often prefers addressing off-the-
record groups of influential people to appearing
before big crowds and TV cameras. In 1985, he gave
such briefings to the editorial boards of the Wall
Street Journal, NBC News, and the Washington Times,
in addition to his two dinners for young Washington
reporters at his residence in Saddle River. He met
with the boards of directors of the Hearst
Corporation and Chase Manhattan Bank, and in June
he spoke for two hours before America's top
television and motion picture executives at a
conference sponsored by the Aspen Institute.
Finally, he invited two groups of young
Washingtonians to his New York City office: one
from the White House writing shop and a delegation
of press aides to Republican Senators.

On each of these occasions he spoke and
answered questions about a wide range of foreign
policy and domestic issues, but usually the focus
was on the great international issue of 1985: U.S.-
Soviet relations and the prospects for President
Reagan's first summit meeting with Gorbachev.

In October President Nixon spoke at two large
public events: black tie dinners given by the
Mid-America Committee in Chicago and the National
Black Republican Council, which honored him and his
Secretary of Commerce, Maury Stans, in New York for
their Administration's contributions to minority
business enterprise. Finally, he addressed the
Pumpkin Papers Irregulars, a shadowy group of
aficionados of the Alger Hiss case who meet each
year on Halloween. You should already have
received the full text of the remarks President
Nixon prepared for that occasion; attached is an
article excerpted from them that appeared a few
weeks ago in the New York Times.

His other appearances in the American media:
Strobe Talbott, Time magazine's new Washington
bureau chief, interviewed him about summits and
Gorbachev; Walter Cronkite of CBS and Roger
Rosenblatt of Time interviewed him about nuclear
diplomacy for a program and an article that marked
the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima; and ABC made
extensive use of a conversation between President

-- 5 --

Nixon and Peter Jennings for its three-hour
retrospective on the postwar era, "45/85." From
among the dozens of requests he received for
interviews last spring during the tenth anniversary
of the fall of Saigon, he chose two: an interview
by Barbara Walters for ABC's "20/20," and a three-
way conversation between President Nixon in New
York, Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore, and Ted Koppel in
Bangkok on "Nightline."

These activities represented a small fraction
of the invitations President Nixon received in
1985. All told there were 120 invitations from the
media (in addition to over 50 about the November
summit), 45 from GOP organizations and candidates,
49 from colleges and universities, and 150 from
various other organizations.

While many offered him substantial
honorariums, President Nixon continues to observe
his longstanding policy of accepting no payment
whatsoever for speeches, briefings, or interviews.

* * *

We are curtailing President Nixon's February
schedule to permit him to recuperate following his
hospitalization in Miami for a severe viral
infection and dehydration. Once he is fully
recovered, however, he will have an active spring.

In March in California he will address the Los
Angeles World Affairs Council and meet with
supporters of the Nixon Presidential Library, which
is nearing its fundraising goal of $25 million.
Later that month he will receive the Public Service
Award of the National Fitness Foundation, which
will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the
President's Council on Physical Fitness (whose
first chairman was Vice President Nixon) at a gala
dinner in New York. Two weeks later, on April 5th,
the Association of Community Cancer Care Centers
will honor him at a luncheon in Washington marking
the 15th anniversary of the War on Cancer, which
President Nixon announced in his State of the Union
address in January 1971. And in late April he will
address the American Newspaper Publishers
Association.

[Y]

HK:

Nixon asks for your advice on how to respond to Levin's letter re the new interpretation of the ABM treaty.

Do you want to dictate something or wait until you see him next Thursday?

I will dictate

Will discuss next Thursday

It called back
10th

RICHARD NIXON

February 14, 1986

With all of your other more important
responsibilities, I hesitate to bother you with
another request but I would greatly appreciate it if
you could indicate to me how I might reply to the
enclosed letter I received from Carl Levin.

As you know, I have only the dimmest recol-
lection of the negotiations with regard to the
controversial paragraph in question but I want to be
sure that whatever answer I give is consistent with
what you might provide. Of course the obvious way to
proceed would be to tell him that there is an honest
difference of opinion and that I support the
Administration's current position of indicating that
while the broader interpretation is possible, the
Administration will continue to adhere to in practice
a narrower interpretation pending further
negotiations.

I will not respond to Levin's letter until I
hear from you. In the meantime, I am looking forward
to our getting together for a good chat about 1988.
You have a big gun to fire and you should not use it
until you see the white's of their eyes!

With warm regards,

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger

CARL-LEVIN
MICHIGAN

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

January 3, 1986

President Richard M. Nixon
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10007

Dear Mr. President:

The present Administration's efforts to create a favorable context for further reductions in nuclear forces have resulted in new initiatives in United States nuclear deterrence policies. Most significantly, the Administration has commenced a major research effort to determine the feasibility of a space based defense against strategic missiles. This research, if it leads to unilateral deployment of defensive systems, would seem to require modification or abrogation of one of the more significant arms control treaties that has yet been negotiated, the ABM treaty.

In early October of last year, the Administration announced that as a consequence of a new review of the negotiating record of the Geneva negotiations leading to the ABM treaty of 1972, that the "true" interpretation of the treaty permits what for nearly 15 years had been thought to have been prohibited.

The new interpretation holds that the ABM treaty limits testing and development of ABM systems _only_ if they are based on the conventional ABM technology as understood at the time the treaty was ratified in 1972. It further holds that ABM systems based on "new" technologies such as lasers and X-rays are not limited in testing and development. These systems are only limited in deployment, according to the new interpretation.

The members of your negotiating team at Geneva - Gerard K. Smith, John Rhinelander, Ray Garthoff and others - have unequivocally testified that the new interpretation is without justification. For instance, John Rhinelander in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on November 21, 1985, stated the following: "the President approved a White House staff compromise ... on 'exotic systems' which would prohibit: (1) the deployment of fixed land-based systems and components and (2) the development, testing and deployment of systems and components for all other basing modes."

I would be most appreciative of your recollection relative to this matter. Is it your recollection that the intent of the treaty was to distinguish between the limitations on testing and development of ABM systems based on technologies existing at the time and ABM systems based on new("exotic") technologies that might

be discovered at a later date? Or was it your understanding that
the limitations on testing and development of ABM systems and
components were intended to be independent of the technological
principles involved?

The Reagan Administration as a matter of policy has stated
that, for the time being, it will adhere to the "old"
interpretation of the treaty. But the prospect
of our country moving to the new interpretation whenever our SDI
programs "bump up against" the old interpretation is a real
prospect - and a chilling one for those of us who feel strongly
that the interests of the United States are best served by strict
adherence by both sides to treaty obligations.

Mr. President, I fear the re-interpretation of the ABM treaty
could jeopardize one of the most important accomplishments of your
Presidency.

Your own recollections of this matter would be most valuable
and I will hope to share them with my colleagues on the Senate
Armed Services Committee and other members of the Senate.

Thank you for considering this request.

CL/jbk

RICHARD NIXON

January 16, 1986

JAN 23 1986

Dear Leo:

I have just received a letter from Freedom House asking me to comment upon an article by George Weigel entitled, "Beyond Containment or Detente: Pluralizing the Soviet Union." I do not want to make a statement for publication at this time, but I would like to pass on to you my off-the-record observations since the article raises some very interesting questions.

In his recommendations for a new strategy toward the Soviet Union, the author attacks what he calls the school of containment and the school of detente and insists that the only effective way to deal with the threat is to support programs which would pluralize the Soviet system. Specifically, he recommends a substantial increase in the international broadcasting capabilities of the United States which would provide accurate information on conditions within Soviet society. In addition, he advocates new exchange programs which would open windows in the closed society of the Soviet Union through insistence that those coming to the United States not be the Leninist robots who participate in such programs at the present time. I agree with the objectives of these proposals but recognize, as does the author, that it is a strategy for the long haul. While we should urge the Soviet leaders to go along with such proposals, we should have no illusions that any government, particularly a totalitarian one, will acquiesce in programs which would result in its own destruction.

Pending the time when the Soviet Union will change from within -- a goal we all seek -- we have no choice but to deal with the situation as it is today and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Here, I must dissent from the author's interpretation of detente as it was practiced during

Mr. Leo Cherne

January 16, 1986

the Nixon Administration. In effect, the author suggests that detente was institutionalized brotherhood in which the U.S. sought to engage the Soviet Union in a web of economic, political, and cultural relationships with the hope that this alone would temper Soviet international activism. This, of course, is fatuous nonsense. Kissinger and I may have been wrong but we were not stupid. The author points out that among the dubious propositions Americans have been taught in the detente era is that the Soviet Union is essentially a defensive power, that the roots of U.S./Soviet conflict have to do with problems of misunderstanding and communication rather than with fundamental differences of interests and values, and that an accommodating approach to the Soviet leadership is most likely to result in arms reduction agreements.

Anyone who has read my articles and speeches on hard-headed detente and my discussion of detente in *The Real War* and *Real Peace* find that as we practiced the concept, we always combined detente with deterrence. The critics fail to recognize that whatever the flaws in our policy were, it worked. No country was lost to the communists during my Presidency. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Yemen, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan all were lost after I left office. I do not make this point to fault my successors, but simply to illustrate the difference between hard-headed detente as we practiced it and the well-intentioned but rather naive approach during the Carter years.

Let me give some examples from the record. The era of detente officially started when I announced in my first Inaugural that the United States would seek an era of negotiations rather than confrontation with the Soviet Union. Early in 1969, I followed up on this concept by arranging for the series of secret map room meetings between Henry Kissinger and Dobrynin. For three years, prior to the Moscow summit in 1972, we practiced hard-headed detente.

Item: In 1970, the Soviet Union surreptitiously tried to put a nuclear submarine base into Cuba. At my direction, Kissinger flatly informed Dobrynin that

Page 3
Mr. Leo Cherne
January 16, 1986

we would break off all negotiations on arms control, trade, etc. with the Soviet Union unless the base was removed. This was done privately, without having a nuclear confrontation. It worked. The base was dismantled.

Item: In December 1971, the Soviet Union was supporting Mrs. Gandhi in her blatant efforts to gobble up West Pakistan after the Pakistan government's defeat in East Pakistan. The Soviet's primary goal in this case was to embarrass the Chinese who were supporting Pakistan. Publicly, we tilted toward Pakistan. Privately, we warned the Soviets that unless they joined us in negotiating a cease-fire, the plans for a Moscow summit, which had already been announced, would be put on hold. We also moved a carrier unit into the Indian Ocean. After some huffing and puffing, the Soviets again backed down and joined us in peaceful cease-fire negotiations which saved Pakistan from Indian domination.

Item: Three weeks before the Moscow summit in 1972 when Soviet armed North Vietnamese troops were marching on Saigon, I ordered the mining and bombing of the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Most Soviet experts inside and outside the government thought that this would torpedo the summit. It had exactly the opposite effect.

Item: In the Yom Kippur War, which was used as one of the examples of the failure of detente in the Freedom House article, we answered the Soviets airlift to the Egyptians with a much bigger airlift to Israel. When Brezhnev threatened to intervene unilaterally with Soviet forces in the area, we called his bluff by putting our nuclear forces on alert. Brezhnev had a sufficient stake in preserving what was left of detente that he joined with us in our successful efforts to bring about a cease-fire and an eventual disengagement of forces in the area.

This letter is already much too long, but because both you and I have long seen the world through somewhat similar lenses, I thought it was important to set the record straight as far as our management of detente was concerned.

[LC]

RICHARD NIXON

November 5, 1985

In my conversation with Deng, we covered a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues. I shall try to cover in this letter those subjects he might raise with you and on which you might want to make points with him.

You can assume that he will be very tough on Taiwan. I made the point that the President had shown great courage and statesmanship in changing his views on Taiwan but that there was no way that he could at this time go further than he had gone and accede to the P.R.C.'s request via Margaret Thatcher that he mediate the issue. I emphasized that there was still a strong pro-Taiwan sentiment in the Congress, as evidenced by the Winston Lord confirmation hearings, and that the President had too much on his plate politically to tackle this issue at this time. I assured him that the Administration would not provide military assistance to Taiwan which would increase their offensive capability and that it would not discourage any efforts to reach a rapprochement. I deliberately tried to cut the conversation on this matter short so that we could get on to other issues. He was obviously not satisfied but he at least was left with no illusions that the President might be persuaded to play a mediator's role.

We had a long discussion of the strategic balance in the world. I noted that since my first visit in 1972, the Soviet threat as far as the P.R.C. was concerned was far greater today. The Soviets had moved from a position of nuclear parity in 1972 to nuclear superiority in the most powerful and accurate nuclear weapons -- land-based strategic and intermediate missiles. I also pointed out that the encirclement which the P.R.C. was concerned about in 1972 was far more dangerous today with the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and

2

Cambodia. I also made the point that the Soviets were now moving into a dominant position in North Korea. He tried to down play the significance of the Soviet planes in North Korea but was obviously sensitive on this score. I would urge that you indicate that your intelligence indicates a Soviet determination to replace the P.R.C. as the major supporting power for North Korea and that this, thereby, increases the encirclement danger.

I also made the point that while we understood why the P.R.C. would want to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, public statements to the effect that the Chinese considered the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be equal obstacles to peace gave ammunition to the hawks who opposed President Reagan's decision to provide technology for the P.R.C. and would jeopardize any further transfers in this regard which the Chinese very much want. I told him that I had personally supported the technology transfer and would continue to do so but that while I trusted the Chinese leadership, there were strong and powerful forces in the Congress and the media who did not and who would seize upon the evidences of Sino-Soviet rapprochement to block such transfers in the future.

This got his attention. He insisted that the P.R.C.'s new independent line served the cause of peace. He made the point that getting the Soviet Union to move on the "three obstacles" -- Cambodia, Afghanistan, and their forces on the northern border -- would serve not only the interests of China but the cause of peace. But like Hu Yaobang, to whom I made the same points, he reacted almost violently to the suggestion that if the P.R.C. received technology there is a possibility they might make it available to the Soviet Union in the future. It was the only time during the two hours that he became very agitated and raised his voice saying, "Never, never, never." Of course this is what he had to say and it could have been an act, but you could well build on the point that I made because I think it does pose a real problem for technology transfers in the future. Their cozying up to the Soviets and particularly their equating of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as potentially aggressive powers could cause serious problems in the event that technology transfers are considered.

3

It was obvious that I had hit a raw nerve, because he went to considerable length then to point out that in spite of the public statements, he wanted to make it very clear that the P.R.C. had far more differences with the Soviet Union that it had with the United States. On the other hand he made the point that because China was a very weak country militarily and would continue to be for a long time, "We don't want to tie ourselves to one chariot." I responded by saying that I recognized his concern and that what we should do was to develop a close strategic relationship privately between our military and intelligence agencies but to keep a low profile on that relationship publicly. He responded enthusiastically to that suggestion, observing that it was "a very good idea" and that he would welcome such cooperative contacts. I believe that this gives you a very good opening to follow up on my suggestion that you should make it clear that you are not sharing the views that he and you expressed with anybody else except the President and that consequently you are going to be very candid with him and you would hope that he would follow the same course with you.

He was more guarded than Hu Yaobang and Zhao in his evaluation of Gorbachev. But he did state categorically, "We have seen no change in his policies yet in relation to us." He said that they will continue to explore economic, cultural and other ties but until there was movement on the three obstacles, there could not be a real rapprochement. However, I sensed that if Gorbachev was smart enough to move on even one of the obstacles, we might expect a significant change on this front. In any event, you may want to explore the matter with him further.

On SDI, I noted that he had come out flatly against it and then gave him my own rationale which, incidentally, may not be exactly the same as yours. I pointed out first that the Soviet Union was spending twice as much on missile defense as we were. As far as a foolproof population defense was concerned, I pointed out that most of the experts do not believe it would be possible until the next century but that a system that would defend enough missile sites to deny the Soviets a first strike capability could become operational in the next

4

ten years. I emphasized strongly that the major threat to peace in the world was the Soviet SS-18 first strike capability which provided a dangerous probability of their being able to use nuclear blackmail against the United States and our friends. I made the point that 40 MX missiles were not enough of an incentive to get the Soviets to reduce that threat and that in dealing with the Russians I had found that you can't get something from them unless you have something to give to them. He emphatically said, "I agree." I made the additional point that any program that makes the United States more secure, makes our friends more secure and, particularly where Japan was concerned, makes the credibility of our deterrent absolutely indispensable. I didn't have to paint any pictures for him to realize that if the U.S. nuclear deterrent lost credibility, the Japanese would have no option but to develop their own nuclear defense capability. He responded, in my view somewhat lamely, by saying that he didn't believe absolute parity was possible and that superiority is now irrelevant. He came down hard on the point that a nuclear arms race risks war and would hurt everyone. I got his attention somewhat when I observed that the P.R.C.'s opposition to SDI helps the Soviet Union by encouraging them to stonewall the President at Geneva. I won't go into further detail of our rather long conversation on this subject except to point out a rather curious conversation I had with Henry. He said that Han Xu had suggested that he talk to me about my conversation with Deng on SDI prior to the time that he sees Deng later this month. I also made my usual point, and yours as well, that it wasn't the existence of nuclear weapons but the failure to resolve political differences which lead to their use which brings war. His interview in *Time Magazine* last week would seem to reflect that point of view.

It was interesting to note how he had changed since the two times I talked to him in 1979 and the other occasion in 1982. He bluntly said that the P.R.C. had changed its policy of forming a line against the Soviet Union running from Japan, through China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe. While Mao had said that war was inevitable, the situation has now changed and that he no longer believed that was the case. The Soviet Union has encountered great "problems" and the United States has recovered from

4/5/85

HAK:

Last month Richard Nixon sent you a copy of _No More Vietnams_ and you sent a short note of reply. That exchange is at back.

The former President has now sent
you another note - this time en-
closing a letter of praise from
Lee Kwan Yew.

How about something like the
attached as a further reply?

Approve ______

as edited ____

Rosemary

(CV: Date when signed)

RICHARD NIXON

February 22, 1985

Dear Henry:

Since April 30th will mark the tenth anniversary of the fall of Saigon, we shall probably be inundated in the weeks ahead with scores of books, columns, and television documentaries criticizing and lamenting the American role in Vietnam.

The enclosed book presents a different point of view. There can be an honest difference of opinion over whether we should have become involved in Vietnam and how the war was conducted. But after witnessing the reign of terror that has been imposed upon the people of Vietnam and Cambodia by the Communist regimes we opposed, fair-minded observers can reach only one conclusion: Whatever our mistakes, the United States tried and failed in a just cause in Vietnam.

As I put it in the last paragraph of this book, "'No more Vietnams' can mean that we should not *try* again. It *should* mean we must not *fail* again."

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

MAR 19 1985

[LC]

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

September 19, 1978

I thought you might be interested in some observations with regard to your possibly running for the Senate in 1980.

My first reaction was that you should not do so, and that on the other hand you should develop contacts so that you could serve whoever obtains the Republican nomination for President. On further thought, I believe you should seriously consider the Senate race.

For any Republican to win in 1980, in view of the overwhelming registration advantage any Democrat will have, is at best a relatively long shot, unless the administration falls totally on its face in handling what will probably be the major issue in 1980 - inflation and the high cost of living. And you may find that you could not comfortably serve with whoever happens to become the Republican candidate.

In the Senate you would have a powerful forum for years to come and could be a major force in developing a bipartisan foreign policy in the Vandenberg tradition which the country desperately needs.

Should you decide to seek the Senate seat I believe the following game plan should be implemented:

You should decide in your own mind immediately after the November elections to become a candidate.