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Side A Henry Kissinger tape for syndicate.

A. About half an hour.

Q. We're gonna try to well so might, I should charge the fans (?) 40 my loses, I think the first question you initiated the first that of Israeli talk about '73, now 19 years later do you feel that a final solution to this important international conflict has become possible?

A. I think that there it would be highly debatable if they find a solution could be found. I have always believed that it should be approached on a step by step basis and I still believe that it will be very difficult to settle all issues at one negotiation. And that one should conclude that other (?) are possible and then go on from there to others.

Q. Well don't you think you actually missed a historical for 34 peace when you handled this engagement talk after the war of '73. Those are your very lives that might suffer a military defeat without American support while the Arabs had already accepted the principles negotiating for this engagement, why were your priorities limited to the restoration of dramatic relations with Egypt and supporting Israel military only.

A. (?) a misstatement about priorities. We first of all Israel was not on the verge of being defeated they had the Egyptian third army trapped and they were gaining militarily when defeat finally was was established. Secondly we did not confine it to restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt. We made two disengagement agreements with Egypt that regained a considerable part of the Sinai Peninsula and we made a disengagement agreement with Syria that has lasted to this day and out of this conclude the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel that our successors negotiated.

Q. Yeah, would a supplement to the Palestinian question put an end to major problem in the Middle East do you think.

A. I believe that progress of the Palestinian question would be a huge step over towards peace in the Middle East.

Q. And how would you visualize the new political matter in the Gulf region. Given the uncertainty and the ambiguity of the alternative to Saddam's regime in Baghdad.

A. Well historically they established the power in the Gulf and Iraq is an important component as a balance against Iranian defense and domination and conversely therefore the weakening of Iraq obviously enhances the power of Iran. It is a reality and you know, the United States of course, has in the past and will in the future support the friendly government in the Gulf in the Gulf region. There's no doubt that the Gulf war has affected the equilibrium in the region.

Q. And so you see that maybe ~~Iran~~ will have now more control of the Gulf region than at any time before.

A. I think at this particular moment Iran has has gained in strength vis-a-vis Iraq. But two years earlier Iraq gained in strength vis-a-vis Iran so it's a fluctuating circumstance. The longest Saddam Hussein stayed in Iraq, the more the relative position of Iraq will decline.

Q. What about the Kurdish question which you handled as well in the '70s now with the changes in politics and in Iran and in Iraq as well do you think the Kurds could obtain a state of their own under the circumstances we have (?).

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A. Well first of all when you say I handled the Kurdish question.

Q. Yeah.

A. In the '70s, that's not exactly accurate. In the 19 in 1975, we were asked to support an Iranian effort to help secure us in the same year that the Congress had not act world refused to vote money for Vietnam. And we were told that a Iranian effort to help the Kurds would cost $300 million dollars. And we didn't think the country would support (?). Secondly, an independent Kurdistan or whatever we want to call Kurd would involve not only Iraq but Turkey, Syria and Iraq and it would therefore require a major international effect.? But I do believe the human rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq ought to be protected.

Q. Talk about them at least peace right now the negotiations cover the beginning. Do you think the PLO leadership will be able to survive the crisis right now being outside the negotiation.

A. I, I'm no great expert on the internal arrangements of the PLO. But Arafat seems to have survived an extraordinary number of vissitudes. And I would suspect he can survive this one too.

Q. So you think he will.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you see that area as hurting foreign or military contact in war with the U.S. against Libya.

A. It depends what do you mean by military conflict. And I believe that with their acts of terrorism supported by Libya that there if it is conceivable that the United States would undertake retaliation. I do not believe the United States would initiate a war against Libya without a provocation.

Q. What if the right now they trying of course to have the blockade against Libya if this one doesn't work, in the Lockerby affair.

A. Well it's a very difficult question when you know that a country's responsible for the deaths of 290 of your citizens, and when you know that two people who are mostly responsible for it and they're not being punished simply to accept this will be very difficult. But what precise measures can we take for that I cannot (?).

Q. Well they (?) terrorist attack by organizations or states both in Latin America and at the Middle East. Why has the Lockerby affair become so pressing and critical as opposed to other terrorist operations.

A. Well it could well I don't remember that the United States as being casualties of this magnitude, or that the United States knew exactly who did the terrorist act and and (?). I believe also that since the murder of 250 or whatever number American Marines in their barracks in 19 (?) it was '84 I guess '83, in Beirut there is a determination to retaliate if there is a major attack and this would be at the basis of of (?).

Q. OK, what about now the other one which is the new order, putting Panama's ex-strongman Noriega in prison punishing Hussein in Iraq for his occupation of Kuwait, and certainly Kadafi with military confrontational blockade. Are these all links in a chain of new world order to be polarized in a single power and if you

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allow me, who would protect the smaller nations tomorrow from the
possible misuse of such power by the always the power left in the
world today.

A. Well I think one has to separate leadership.

Q. Yes.

A. I think Saddam Hussein engaged in a major act of aggression when he took over a country and the American reaction to him is not good. The American reaction was a demand who in a period of 10 years there was a whole series of wars. And threatened the international equilibrium and indeed the United States made every effort to get along with him. The President Bush has been criticized for having been too friendly with Saddam. Not that they were not the opposite. Libya again has a long history of terrorism against the United States. And I do not believe that state-supported terrorism can be tolerated. And definitely it is not an attempt however to dominate small countries. On the Noriega issue I want to wait until the trial is over. I have some questions about that.

Q. What about now talkin' about this one, do you think the Pentagon document, presented a list of declarations the U.S. knew it all after the Soviet collapse.

A. No I don't. I believe that the Pentagon document states a number of effective that are highly (?). For example, the spread of nuclear I do not believe however that the United States can go around the world attacking every country without provocation simply because we suspect that they have a military program. I am in favor of using diplomacy even diplomatic pressure to reduce the spread of nuclear weapons. I'm not in favor of using military force.

Q. The Pentagon documents has allowed many Europeans despite Secretary Baker's reassurances to them in Brussels could you could yesterday's allies become tomorrow's opponents with the new changing situation.

A. The question can America's European allies.

Q. Yes.

A. Become tomorrow's opponents.

Q. Correct.

A. Now they could become tomorrow's citizens (?) They in my view cannot become tomorrow's opponents because our policy depends not on agreement on every detail but it depends on fundamental agreement on long-term objectives. And on those there will be enough (?) to maintain the Atlantic relationship. On specific issues they could lead to this.

Q. Well former President Nixon has warned if the risk allowing Yeltsin to fall because of his country's economic conditions. Are we to see a repetition of the fall in China before being Communism.

A. No. America didn't do it to China. There's nothing we could have done to prevent the Communists from (?) the world other than engaging in a huge military operation and maybe even then it would not have succeeded. We cannot protect? Yeltsin. We can help him within limits. But we cannot excitedly? against whether he succeeds or fails the decided? politic has to be done by him. He (?) and I support him.

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Q. Well to go back to the nuclear issue since India made its first atomic test almost three decades ago it has become now it's more increasingly easier for Third World nations to build their own atomic weapons, do you think that the present international agreements are no longer sufficient to throw out to the nuclear ambitions of such nations and do you see any way of this danger out of this dangerous atomic situation we are having.

A. I believe that the nonproliferation treaty is (?) goal within the next two or three years. I think an attempt should be made to achieve an international agreement that (?) the deployments of the treaty and makes it more difficult to divert nuclear energy or nuclear materials for weapons purposes. But with modern technology I feel that it's so? proliferation of nuclear weapons could happen anywhere.

Q. And another question Turkey and Iran are racing to inherit some of the Islamic territories which used to be part of the (?) and Soviet wealth would international conditions allow two major regional powers such as Turkey and Iran to expand geographically or increase their political influence in that area?

A. I believe that in Central Asia there will be a three-cornered-rivalry between Russia for historically Iran has represented and Turkey representing the ethnic relationship. Other players will be Pakistan and to some extent even China for leaving Kazakhstan. The United States though will be somewhat more remote because it is quite far away from the United States. And I believe the influence of especially Iran and Turkey will increase. And the international environment will have to permit it. If they try to annex predatos? and actually establish physical control either Turkey or Iran I suspect that Russia would resist and this would create great difficulty. But if we're talking about political influence economic influence from these countries, I believe it will be inevitable.

Q. I see you mentioned the Islamic case, with the rise of Islamic political movements do you think that the West would be willing to deal with such movements if they come to power in some countries in that area.

A. Like fundamentalism.

Q. Yes.

A. Or any Islamic movement.

Q. Well fundamentalism like almost happened in Aegea.

A. The West would certainly be prepared to deal with non-fundamentalist regime. If a fundamentalist regime came dependent? or in a significant country the West would face the problem of whether to accept reality. And I think it might.

Q. So you kind of go back to American politics. Do you see that maybe the right could lose here in the United States while the left lost in some other countries like in in Russia.

A. Well, the American right and left.

Q. Then.

A. Cannot be compared with the Russian right or left. The American Republican Party has now held the Presidency for 20 of the last 24 years. So in those circumstances some change in any one election is more likely than not. I believe that President Bush will get reelected especially if the economy continues to improve.

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So I don't think the issue will arise this time. But certainly one of the next few elections will be won by the Democrats. But in assessing this you have to remember that the Democrats of 1992 are far to the right of the Democrats of 1972. So you have to look at the structure of the parties and it will be difficult to call the Democratic Party a truly leftist party.

Q. What about now if we have because we've Buchanan's you know call for reducing foreign aid outside don't you think that will (?) Americans' position abroad which relies partly in its help to other countries.

A. There is hum there's a growth of isolationists in the United States from both the right and the left not just on the right. The American position will depend only marginally on economic aid. Because the economic aid programs have been changing. And the conditions have become more and more polarized. But certainly the growth of isolationism (inaudible.)

Q. What about the now the big problem between Israel and the United States. Do you think this is a just a new style of politics will take place between.

A. Which?

Q. Between Israel and the Bush Administration.

A. No I think.

Q. Over the $10 billion dollars.

Q. Loan guarantees.

A. No I think that the United States is trying to position itself more equidistant between the (?) and Israel.

Q. And and do you think the Israelis will change their politics for (?). Will they go (?) of the (?).

A. Well.

Q. Because of the American pressure as a.

A. In Israel the government is always a coalition. So there's never a huge change. Mike I would think that the result at the next connection? most likely result at the next connection? most likely result will be a coalition between Labor and Likud. On depending who will be the larger party will determine the prime minister (?). But I think that that there will be gradually a greater flexibility in Israeli (?).

Q. And will that do you think will lead to some sort of an agreement in the region?

A. I expect an agreement within the next two years at least on the Palestinian issue.

Q. So what about the Syrian and the maybe the Jordanian.

A. Well I have.

Q. (?).

A. I have often publicly stated my friendship for King Hussein and my high regard for President Assad. And therefore I hope very much that an agreement will be made. And people forget an agreement was made with President Assad on the Golan Heights in 1974, it is still in effect and everybody agrees that it has been meticulously observed.

Q. We have more fire (?).

A. No let's call it a day. You're from where?

Q. I'm from Saudi, Arabia myself OK.

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(Note to syndicate from transcription: Please check content closely for accuracy as Kissinger's voice dropped at times and some words hard to understand.)

End of Side A Henry Kissinger tape for syndicate.

ML

APR.28 '92 09:33 212 753 7248

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Q. Just to start, a hypothetical question: do you have an idea about how future historians might evaluate the role of Germany and the Germans played in the downfall of the Bolshevik empire during the 1989-91 period?

A. First, one really has to go back to 1950; the Truman role will be very highly evaluated as will, I believe, the courage of Adenauer in opting for a Western alignment at a time when there was a temptation for at least attempting a national solution. That was the first major decision. And especially if one looks at the various proposals the Soviet Union made in 1952. UNIFICATION would could not have happened as it did if Germany had chosen a national ROUTE in the 1950s because then Germany would have been back in its traditional role of trying to balance itself against East and West.

Secondly, I believe that the period '89 to '91, which was an historic opportunity that could not come back, the German government showed courage in grasping that opportunity and pushing for unification.

Q. Which was basically the chancellor. And. . .

A. Which was substantially the chancellor. Against the preference of most of the Western allies. But convincing them and dragging them along was also historically important because if there were two German states today, which was the alternative, then second, the German state was not Communist it would be a replay of European history after the Thirty Year's

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people don't pay attention to

With respect to Germany, it was the last country to be unified, the last major country to emerge. It spent most of its most of its intellectual energy becoming unified rather than reflecting on what to do once it was unified. And especially since it was unified in a way that nobody expected, which was, as an expression of power rather than as an expression of national will, a liberalization like the one

Secondly, its foreign policy was conducted for 19 years by a very great person who was a genius, but was not capable of institutionalizing policy. Though that policy was brilliant, it meant throwing a lot of balls into the air and being in a better position to pull them down than anybody else. None of his successors even understood it, nor were they able to do so.

Then between 1890 and 1914, I believe that Germany conducted what is arguably the first foreign policy that has been conducted in Europe in the modern period.

Q. Right.

A. In which Germany produced all the dangers it feared most. And managed to bring together Britain, France and Russia, which had been in the verge of war.

Q. Sure.

A. Which nobody would have thought possible 10 years earlier. Building a navy, putting a military mission into Constantinople

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deliberately aggressive German foreign policy. The problem, ~~it~~ was the Hitler problem, was the more one reads about him--is that of a Bohemian psychopath, I don't mean Bohemia but a sort of a "Bohemian" artistic psychopath.

Q. Right. Yes.

A. Got hold of a government. In a country that ~~didn't~~ couldn't comprehend it.

Q. Yes.

A. The problem of the Germans between 1890 and 1914, which was the other difficult period but never could translate it into anything very definite. So I think the point that the Germans would be at peoples' throats is not the danger. The danger is that the Germans without a clear idea of what they want will play every situation purely tactically, and thereby create great disquiet without intending anything particularly unpleasant.

Q. But, as you probably know, what they call the French "political class" is a little bit disturbed.

A. Because, ~~partly~~, of a real inequality of strength. Germany has a population nearly twice that of France. And it has a more dynamic industry. And, therefore, it has a large influence.

Q. Yes.

A. Now, France, you can reasonably argue, has not come to grips for 100 years with the loss of the preeminent position that the two Napoleons threw away. The French position as the preeminent power in Europe depended on a divided Central

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domestic debate. It would be hard in France to generate so much excitement about tanks to Turkey, or over Kurdistan or over the Kurds. These things are not even--in a strictly rational point of view--in the German interest.

Q. No.

A. So that tendency is inherent in German politics. And that makes people uneasy.

Q. Yes, I see now.

A. But it is less over Kohl than with any other chancellor except Adenauer.

Q. Could you say something about emerging tendencies, worldwide, toward nationalism and internationalism. In the world integration there's this (?)... Do you see economic community? The European Community decided last week to enhance the cohesion of the community, establish even a common currency. And this seems to indicate a decrease of nationalism in Western Europe at the same time as nationalism increases in the former Eastern Bloc. Which tendencies do you think will prevail at the beginning of the next (?)...

A. Both at the same time.

Q. And wouldn't one tendency affect the other. Could it happen that the integrating of the West would be as (?)... touched by America on (?)...

A. You see (?)... even in the West if you look at Scotland.

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Q. Yes, Ireland.

A. Ireland, Belfast, Lombardy. It may be that national states may weaken but not necessarily in favor of internationalism.

But of regionalism. I do not think it is at all self-evident that Europe will form itself into one nation. In fact, based on my own personal experience, the people I know in the European countries seem to me to be less European today than they were five years ago, when they are European they do it rationally. I do not think my great emotion, well, maybe my German friends are not all that enthusiastic about the common currency. So I suspend judgment even about Europe going far beyond some economic integration.

In Eastern Europe, the big problem that, in my view, nobody addresses is that the area between the Polish frontier and Vladivostok is for the first time in 400 years capable of being organized as a nation. We all talk about democracy in Russia, market economics. There's no real democracy, and there's real market economics. And it's not even self-evident to me that democracies never make wars against each other. World War I occurred in countries that were more-or-less democratic to the wild enthusiasm of the population. If you held a plebiscite in Serbia today, I'd bet you 80% of the people would approve what is being done in Bosnia and Croatia, and the same in Croatia, with respect to Serbia.

A. So it's not done by dictatorship alone. But it's put that way. The major point, it seems to me, is we have this war is

war is

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area--I mean we don't have it. This area exists for the first time in 400 years, and it is trying to break up into various states. One could make the case for the proposition that this is even better for Russia because it will still be a huge country of 150 million with a bigger territory than any other state but ~~willing~~

(......?)

It will not have the incubus of all these foreign nationalities. I do not see any outside country discussing the relationship of Ukraine to Russia, ~~and to Russia.~~ All the actions of the outside countries seem to me designed so as to exalt the role of Russia. Russia maintaining troops in their territory plus our diplomatic relations, well item. If these trends continue

That it becomes inevitable that they will recentralize the whole area again and thereby recreate the old Russian problem.

The old Russian problem is that once you have half your population foreign there's no stopping for. These Russian-nationalist writers in the 19th Century said we are now at the (......?) but if we don't reach the point we have to go back to the (......?).

Q. Yeah, Yeah. That one is involved in a reorientation which will expedite imperialism. So we are talking about a social welfare program in Russia. And that seems to me when you say regionalism what is easily possible is that the West now begins to move towards integration. And if we are to have a strong, stable, and will reintegrates under the tutelage of one imperial power.

The political dimension must be included.

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create a no-man's land between the German border and the Russian border in which the historic contest between Germans and Russians ~~gets reinvigorated and in which the countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary a minimum are encouraged~~ rapidly to become associated with the West. And I find it troublesome that so much passion is given to economic aid programs for Russia and so little to Eastern Europe. I ~~do not~~ the object to aid program for Russia. But we need to get a sense of priority. And we need to get a sense of balance. I think it is in our interest that the transition to market economics and Western values succeed in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. That will in the long run even help inside the former Soviet Union.

Q. But when these states get affiliated to the EC, it would be difficult to envisage that the cohesion of this community would be enhanced.

A. No but I think Greece and Northern Europe are a bigger obstacle to that. Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary inwardly consider themselves belonging to the West.

Q. Now coming to NATO. Do the defense ministers of the states of the former U.S.S.R. take part in NATO meetings.

A. Ridiculous. NO

G. Why?

It guarantees the end of NATO. NATO was a defensive alliance. If it isn't a defensive alliance what is it? It will lead to the moral disintegration of NATO. What common purpose do we have with those defense ministers? And what is the

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danger that we're trying to deal with in NATO. You cannot have
a defensive alliance that does not have some probable danger
and common political objective.
And the central area
republics are no more European than Palesinian
Q. So where would you locate the danger?

A. I could say first of all I don't have to know where to locate the (？...... ?). One of the problems that always happens is you ask an individual what he would do. I I would assume that if these great men who lead world affairs today get together and put all their bureaucracies to work, they might be able to do better than I. Therefore you shouldn't judge the problem. I would say the problem of how the IF? will organize itself over the next five or 10 years. It's a problem that concerns us.

Q. Yes.

A. This may be now more a political than a military problem. And therefore the military forces ~~should~~ can be ~~reduced.~~ Considerably reduced. Secondly, there are certain special trouble spots that are certain to arise again-- the Persian Gulf, North Africa--even such concentrate cases as Yugoslavia. We need American forces in Europe for the balance between the West European countries and for the balance between Europe and a reawakening of Russia. Because Russia will become again a major country. And, because she is. And therefore we must need a plan for military operations, but then we have to organize it so that in some areas the United States can take the predominant role and in other areas Europe can take a predominant role. And therefore I have always favored a

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European component in NATO. But I think that this attempt to turn NATO into an instrument of East-West detente will doom NATO.

Q. Will doom NATO? But I learned just the other day in that the U.S. community sector was very much in favor of

(???) even though it is and
A: Because it's politically the easy thing to do. Also, it's emotionally satisfying.

Q. Yes.

A. But what's the sense of it.

Q. And a recent survey of the Rand Corp. shows that 57% of Germans are in favor of a complete withdrawal of U.S. troops, and 70% in favor of a complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons. Doesn't an erosion of public support in Germany for U.S. military presence constrain U.S. strategic flexibility?

A. To some extent, but it constrains European flexibility more. The argument for American nuclear forces in Europe has always been there. We don't need the forces in Europe.

Q. Somewhere somewhere become a member of the Security Council of the United Nations what do you think.

A. In the course of (the Nuremberg Trial), it is inevitable. Unless there's a European Community and there's only one

Q. But you don't see it.

A. Unlikely.

Q. And, finally, do you think that Germany should be prepared to take part in military actions out of NATO area, under the umbrella of the U.N. combat action?

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A. Preferably not for the '90s.

Q. No you don't see it.

A. No. I don't see why it is desirable to bring about a reawakening of historic fears. If it were a question of life and death for Europe, yes, but only if it is a question of life and death for Europe, I think the wiser course is not to encourage Germany to do that.

Q. OK. Thank you.