CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC DEBATE

I. Background: The Change in United States Strategic Doctrine.

Structural problems inevitably emerge as policy issues. Debates, which really concern political evolution, can easily appear as a strategic challenge to strategic doctrine.

So it has been with the debate about strategy within the Atlantic Alliance. To be sure, disagreements about strategy have been real enough. But their urgency is due to the fact that something deeper than the analysis of weapons systems is involved. Disputes have grown particularly intractable because the United States and its European critics have rarely talked about the same thing.

The United States has stressed the technical adequacy of its strategic views and the analytic accuracy of its strategic assessments. Our European critics have emphasized the political and psychological framework within which these decisions had to be implemented. The United States has reiterated its legal and moral commitment to the defense of Europe. Our European allies have less confidence in even the most solemn undertakings; too many of them have betrayed allies of their own not to be concerned that the stress of events might

II - 2

override obligations incurred years previously under completely different circumstances.

The sense of insecurity of most of our European allies reflected the one-sided relationship which had grown up with the Atlantic Alliance. In no other area was the dependence of Europe on the United States so great or so prolonged as in the military field. The pattern of United States-European relationships differed importantly between the economic and the military field.

With respect to European economic recovery, the United States, in effect, asked its allies to develop a common program and a method for dividing up the total available aid. Though United States representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. This encouraged the emergence of a responsible group of European leaders, dedicated to Atlantic partnership and experienced in working without complexes with the United States.

In the military field the situation has always been different. Through-out the existence of NATO, strategy has been based on more or less unilateral American conceptions. The consultative role of our European allies has been

II - 3

confined in effect to the technical implementation of American views. In
contrast to the economic field, no specifically European concept of defense--
and no real sense of responsibility--developed. The West European Union,
which originally had been expected to play a role similar to that of the OEEC,
remained inactive.

There were many reasons for this state of affairs. Initially, our
European allies actively encouraged a predominant United States role.

America's hegemonial position seemed the best guarantee of our commitment to
the defense of Europe. We, in turn, were psychologically more heavily engaged
in the military than in the economic field. Heavy as the material sacrifices
required by Europe's economic chaos were, they could not compare to the con-
sequences of an eventual military occupation of Europe, which was rightly
considered a challenge to our survival. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the United States possessed a monopoly of the weapons on which by consensus of
the Alliance the common safety depended.

However valid the reasons, they brought about a relationship, which for
the long term could not be healthy. It was unprecedented that the defense of

II - 4

an area so rich and potentially so powerful as Europe should be the primary
responsibility of a country three thousand miles away and with a recent
history of isolation. On the part of our European allies this produced a
tendency to cling to the familiar as a guarantee of American constancy. It
undermined the European sense of responsibility. Our allies saw their role
as that of lobbyists trying to sway a decision not their own. The rigidity of
our European allies was inevitably a source of tensions because in the face of
a rapidly changing technology it was impossible for any strategic doctrine to
remain static. Had our allies considered the problem of strategy as a technical
issue, they would have been concerned not when we changed our views but if we
had rigidly clung to them in new circumstances. It has been a measure of
Europe's sense of dependence that the opposite has been the case.

The United States, in turn, fell into the habit of dealing with its
European allies, except Great Britain, almost psychotherapeutically. It
tended to confuse periodic briefings and reassurance with consultation and
to muffle expressions of concern, rather than deal with the underlying causes.
This is the psychological background for the strategic debate which has been
raging since 1961.

II - 5

The impact of the change of United States strategic doctrine in 1961 makes it necessary to sketch the views being replaced. When the Korean War first raised the specter of a Soviet attack on Europe, NATO developed the Lisbon goals which envisaged a largely conventional defense of Europe. These envisaged some 35 - 40 regular and some 55 - 60 reserve divisions for a total of ninety-six. It soon became apparent, however, that no European ally was prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to raise these forces.

At the same time, the advent of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 led to a new defense policy--called the New Look--which placed much greater emphasis on nuclear forces. In 1957 the United States submitted to NATO--initially to the dismay of the Europeans--what came to be known as the Radford Plan. According to it, NATO was permanently inferior in conventional strength to the hordes of easily mobilizable Soviet manpower. To try to resist a Soviet attack with conventional weapons was to adopt a strategy that emphasized Communist superiority. The defense of NATO depended on nuclear weapons. Any attack on Europe would involve general nuclear war. The purpose of local defense was primarily to delay a Soviet advance long enough for the

II - 6

effects of strategic nuclear war to make itself felt. Tactical nuclear weapons would be an integral part of whatever local defense might be attempted.

As a result, large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe under the so-called double-veto system which required the consent of both the United States and the host country for a nuclear weapon to be used. Moreover, the definition of "tactical" was such that SACEUR (The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) was to be able to destroy all Soviet weapons capable of attacking Europe. The nuclear arsenal in Europe thus included weapons of a range and destructiveness indistinguishable from some of those in the arsenal of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). They could be called "tactical" only in the sense that they were stationed in Europe and not in the United States and that they were commanded by SACEUR and not by the commanding general of SAC.

According to this strategic concept, conventional weapons played a minor role. Their function was to deal with minor incursions or to determine that a full-scale Soviet attack was taking place. Though there was some talk of a "pause" before nuclear weapons might be used, the logistic system of NATO made clearer than any public declarations where the real emphasis of

II - 7

NATO strategy was. None of the conventional forces had supplies for more
than two weeks, and several national contingents had supplies for considerably
less than a week. In case of large-scale Soviet attack, nuclear weapons
would have to be used practically from the outset. "The pause," General
Norstad was reported to have observed, "will probably take place before the
outbreak of hostilities." In NATO doctrine, conventional weapons were the
"shield", nuclear weapons the "sword" of the Alliance.

Almost concurrently with the revelation of the Radford Plan in 1957,
the United States came to believe that it was inferior in long-range missiles.
In order to close this "missile gap," the United States pressed its NATO
allies to permit the installation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles on
their territory. It was argued that these were essential to the over-all
strategic posture of the West. The vulnerability of the sites was not con-
sidered decisive because the Soviets would not be able to launch a blow against
our European bases without an unacceptable risk of an all-out United States
counterblow and because a coordinated Soviet attack against U.S. overseas and
domestic bases might prove difficult to stage.

II - 8

These policies were drastically and suddenly changed with the advent
of a new United States Administration in 1961. Starting early in 1961 and
continuing with increasing insistence, the Kennedy Administration developed
a four-pronged strategic theory which has remained essentially unchanged under
President Johnson.

a. **Flexible Response:** When it took office, the Kennedy Administration found itself confronted by a strategy for general war which emphasized a single all-out response. The goal of general nuclear war, if it was forced on us, was to destroy the opposing society essentially in one blow.

The Kennedy Administration sought to replace this conception with a
more differentiated approach. It attempted to develop the maximum number of
options even for the contingency of general nuclear war--a strategy summed up
in the phrase "flexible response." This strategy was summed up as follows by
Secretary McNamara in 1962:

...our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retali ate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack. In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give

II - 9

an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World. ¹

Administration statements about the purpose of this capability for flexible response have fluctuated and have not always been consistent. When criticizing the nuclear forces of Britain and France, Secretary McNamara has argued that the United States proposed to rely on a counterforce strategy confining its attacks to military targets:

> The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.²

Throughout 1962 Secretary McNamara insisted that the United States would be able to destroy the entire Soviet military target system even after

¹ Robert S. McNamara, Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962. Quoted in

² Robert S. McNamara, Address at the Commencement Exercises, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 16, 1962.
See also statement on RS-70, *The New York Times*, March 16, 1962.

[N]

II - 10

absorbing a first blow. Coupled with his stated preference for a counter-force strategy, this had to mean that the United States, even if it was the victim of a surprise attack, would still be able to destroy the entire Soviet strategic striking force. The corollary was, of course, that the U.S. would be able to overwhelm Soviet strategic forces, if it struck first for instance in a response to an attack on Europe. But if this assessment was correct, the purpose of a conventional build-up was far from obvious. If Soviet strategic forces were so vulnerable in relation to ours, a Soviet conventional attack on Europe was bound to be too risky. United States strategic striking power would continue to be the chief reliance of NATO strategy.

However, on other occasions, particularly when stressing the need for a build-up of conventional forces, Secretary McNamara has been less sanguine about the prospects for a counterforce strategy. He has argued that the growing size of strategic forces on both sides forced us to define more modest objectives than the original counterforce doctrine seemed to imply.

Thus in January 1964 Secretary McNamara testified as follows:

II - 11

A damage-limiting strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow. While there are still some differences of judgment on just how large such a force should be, there is general agreement that it should be large enough to ensure the destruction, singly or in combination of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites as national societies, under the worst possible circumstances of war outbreak that can reasonably be postulated, and, in addition, to destroy their warmaking capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our allies.

b. Hostility to National Nuclear Forces: Whatever interpretation of flexible response was dominant, the minimum requirement for it was a highly centralized system of command and control. This, in effect, was inconsistent with the existence within the Alliance of strategic nuclear forces not under United States control. Thus a great deal of the opposition to the British and French nuclear forces--especially within the Pentagon--was based on considerations of strategic doctrine rather than the political concerns of nuclear proliferation. Said Secretary McNamara:

> We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled. We know that the same forces which

1

House Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, 88th Congress, 2nd Sess., Part 4, pp. 25-28.

II - 12

are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies. Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U.S. is as much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion that also can reach the United States. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.¹

President Kennedy described the French nuclear program as "inimical" to NATO. Secretary McNamara called European nuclear forces "dangerous," "expensive," "prone to obsolescence" and "lacking in credibility." Under Secretary Ball has criticized these nuclear forces because "the road towards nuclear proliferation has no logical ending."

At first, these attacks were directed against the French nuclear program alone. However, they logically apply also to the British strategic forces which have been in existence for over a decade. Robert Bowie, one of the most eloquent defenders of official nuclear policy, has made this

¹ Robert S. McNamara, University of Michigan, June 16, 1962, op.cit.

² George Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1964, p. 211.

II - 13

1. explicit. The provision of the Nassau Agreement, which permits Britain to use its nuclear forces at its discretion if "supreme national interests are at stake," has been strongly criticized. In short, the requirement of central control is interpreted to mean that strategic nuclear forces should be "integrated" in a way that forecloses the technical possibility of independent use: if the nuclear forces of our allies are to exist at all--and the clear United States preference is that they be abolished--they must be an adjunct to United States strategic forces and under what amounts to American control.

c. **Tactical Nuclear Weapons:** United States strategic doctrine has shown considerable ambivalence about tactical nuclear weapons--previously considered the key element of the military establishment on the Continent. On the one hand, the tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent have been increased--according to official Pentagon estimates by some sixty per cent.

1. Robert Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance: Atlantic Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1963, pp. 66.

, "Strategy & Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, Special issue on the Atlantic Community, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1963), pp. 722-726.

II - 14

On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons do not really fit into the Administration's strategic concept. In the spring of 1961, Secretary McNamara said that limited war in effect excluded the use of nuclear weapons. "I think by 'limited war' we simply mean war that is carried on, for the most part, with non-nuclear weapons. . . " The same theme was repeated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric: "I, for one, have never believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nuclear bang."

If any nuclear war was likely to be general, it followed that the strictures applied to national nuclear forces also applied to the tactical nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of front-line units are extremely difficult to subject to the central command and control envisaged by Pentagon doctrine. Moreover, they are too vulnerable to serve as reliable second-strike weapons.

1. Robert S. McNamara, U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense, Appropriations for 1962, Hearings 87th Congress, 1st Session 1961. (Part 3), p. 136.

2. *New York Times*, June 7, 1961, p. 9.

II - 15

Thus Administration statements insisted that the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe were not required to fight a general nuclear war. And they have warned against relying on tactical nuclear weapons for local defense.

Dr. Alain C. Enthoven, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) said on February 10, 1963:

> There has been in recent years the development of small nuclear weapons having yields equivalent to a few thousand tons of TNT or less. The day will come, if it has not already when there will be nuclear weapons of smaller yield than the largest high explosive weapons. When that day comes, will there no longer be a distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons? Some have argued to that effect. But they are mistaken. There is and will remain an important distinction, a "firebreak" if you like, between nuclear and non-nuclear war, a recognizable qualitative distinction that both combatants can recognize and agree upon, if they want to agree upon one. And in the nuclear age they will have a very powerful incentive to agree upon this distinction and limitation, because if they do not there does not appear to be another easily recognizable limitation on weapons--no other obvious "firebreak"--all the way up the destructive spectrum to large-scale thermonuclear war.

Secretary McNamara pursued a similar theme when he spoke without much confidence of the prospect for tactical nuclear war:

> Even if tactical nuclear warfare can be limited, below some ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange, the key fact is that if the West initiates such warfare in the

1

Speech reprinted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorization: Fiscal Year 1964; Hearings on H.R. 2440, 88th Congress, 1st Session 1963, pp. 166-174.

[Y]

II - 16

future, it must be expected to be bilateral in any theater which engaged the Soviet Union. 1

d. **Conventional Defense:** If European national forces were irrelevant or worse and tactical nuclear weapons overvalued, the major contribution of Europe has to be in the field of conventional defense. This argument has been pressed insistently. "The decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons," testified Secretary McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1963, "should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other way to cope with a particular situation."

The corollary was that the most desirable objective would be to resist a Soviet conventional attack with purely conventional means. Secretary McNamara added that existing NATO conventional capabilities were adequate to deal with any "major incursion." Nevertheless, he urged that they be strengthened to give us "capabilities for dealing with even larger Soviet attacks"-- in other words a massive, sustained Soviet offensive. This view was made explicit by Alain C. Enthoven a little later that year:

1. Department of State Bulletin, 9 December 1963, XLIX, 1276, p. 917.

2. Robert S. McNamara, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963

II - 17

... We will have no sensible alternative to building up our conventional forces to the point at which they can safely resist all forms of non-nuclear aggression. Our forces will be adequate if we can never be forced because of weakness to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons.¹

The shift in emphasis of United States strategic doctrine was symbolized most strongly by the Nassau Communique which reversed the traditional concepts of "shield" and "sword" in NATO doctrine. In this unilateral change, the nuclear weapons became the "shield" and the conventional weapons the "sword" of the Alliance--implying that the United States envisaged an essentially conventional defense for Europe.

1

Alain C. Enthoven, Address to the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Los Angeles, February 10, 1963.

II - 18

## II. The Nature of the Strategic Debate.

The debate produced by this new doctrine was at first given a slightly unreal quality by the desire of all parties to maintain an appearance of unity. Thus when the Kennedy Administration early in 1961 sought to induce NATO to strengthen its conventional forces up to the thirty divisions agreed upon in 1957, our allies inquired whether the United States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons. We replied that the proposed build-up did not involve any reduced reliance on what had come to be called The Deterrent. On the contrary, the strategic striking force was being expanded and made more invulnerable. The non-nuclear build-up, far from diminishing the credibility of our nuclear power, would actually enhance it. According to official American statements, the NATO policy being promulgated was not news. We were simply asking our allies to live up to their previous commitment. The goal was flexibility of response.

1 Speech by Secretary of the Army Stahr to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, November 13, 1961. Cited in *New York Times*, November 14, 1961.

2 Secretary of Defense McNamara, February 17, 1962, Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago. Cited in *New York Times*, February 18, 1962 and Department of State Bulletin

II - 19

This curious dialogue, in which a change of emphasis in United States policy was defended in terms of traditional doctrines of NATO, in many ways increased the uneasiness of our allies. The question was inescapable why conventional forces had to be strengthened if the reliance on nuclear deterrence remained unimpaired. If NATO doctrine continued to envision the use of nuclear weapons almost from the outset, did not the American effort to build up conventional strength involve a dual risk: Even thirty divisions would probably not be enough to stop a full scale Soviet attack. And such a build-up might raise doubts about the American nuclear commitment and thus might make aggression more likely. The result was a paradoxical argument about whether an increase in NATO's strength would weaken its over-all defensive posture.

Some thoughtful observers have argued that this was due to the over-emphasis on nuclear weapons in United States strategic doctrine prior to 1961. To the degree that the United States reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons our European allies would soon take a more balanced view of the strategic problem.

II - 20

The opposite is likely to be more nearly correct. As long as NATO strategy was nuclear and the United States had no obvious alternative to nuclear retaliation, the Europeans were ready to acquiesce in the hegemonial position of the United States. They reasoned that this was the price to be paid for the automaticity of the American response. However, one of the essential characteristics of the doctrine of flexible response was that American nuclear reaction would occur--if at all--deliberately and in stages.

The very qualities that made the new doctrine desirable for Americans were bound for Europeans to raise issues of sovereignty and questions of how the American commitment would be interpreted under the stress of nuclear war.

This, in turn, brought to a head a difference in perspective between the American and the European conception of NATO which had existed since its beginning. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was that the advent of a new, highly analytical American Administration coincided with the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe and the deliberate policy of President de Gaulle to assert a more independent role.

The basic psychological problem was that throughout the existence of NATO the military establishment on the Continent was seen in symbolic terms

II - 21

by the Europeans and in military terms by the United States. When the Korean
War seemed to indicate that Soviet aggression might be imminent, both sides
of the Atlantic made a serious effort to turn NATO into a more effective
military instrument. However, given the enormous disparity in military and
economic strength between the United States and Europe, the primary concern
of the European countries was to commit the United States to their defense.
They saw in NATO above all a means to obtain American protection, by which was
meant American nuclear protection.

However, the Europeans had too much experience with the tenuousness
of formal commitments not to strive for more tangible guarantees. This led to
pressures for the stationing of American troops in Europe. European reasoning
was similar to that ascribed to a French marshal in 1912 when he was asked how
many British troops he wanted for the outbreak of a European war. He is re-
ported to have replied: "We need only one, who we will make sure is killed
on the first day of the war." In the nuclear age, the price of a guarantee
has risen to something like five divisions.

II - 22

With so many American troops permanently stationed in Europe, it was
only sensible to try to give them some meaningful military mission. Even
during the period of the doctrine of massive retaliation, NATO forces were
larger than the prevailing strategic concept seemed to demand. Indeed, the
number was somewhat inconsistent with it. Dispite the United States commit-
ment to a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation, we constantly pressed for
a European contribution of ground forces. The Europeans, though they agreed
to a succession of NATO force goals, never really believed in the doctrines
used to rationalize them. Rather they considered their military contribution
a form of fee paid for United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed
to our requests. But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions
would be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military establish-
ment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative to nuclear
retaliation. They were opposed to giving the conventional forces a central
military mission; but they also resisted any hint of American withdrawal.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in United
States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to strengthen

II - 23

conventional forces had the paradoxical consequence of bringing to the fore
the issue of nuclear control which for many Europeans had always been the
crux of the matter. For the first time, U.S. strategic views were publicly
challenged, at first hesitantly, then ever more explicitly. Europe had now
gained sufficient strength and confidence so that the mere enunciation of an
American policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The pre-emptory way in
which the United States proceeded added ruffled feelings to substantive con-
cerns. And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings
their most extreme formulation.

But, if French policy has deliberately sharpened conflicts, the United
States tendency to turn an essentially psychological issue into a technical
one has unintentionally exacerbated disagreements beyond their intrinsic
significance. United States spokesmen often leave the impression that dis-
agreement is due to the ignorance of our allies and that it is destined to
yield ultimately before extensive briefings and insistent reiteration.

But the real issue is not that the Europeans fail to understand the
notion of flexible response. They simply reject it for themselves. When