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have joined it and we expect that others will follow. We do not seek to impose our system on anyone. At the same time we hold it very dear ourselves. We believe that it makes a real contribution in the world.

You may well ask—if British policy is so pacific and so reasonable, why then are the relations between our two countries not better. Well, the reasons are complicated, and go back to all sorts of misunderstandings and perhaps mistakes. But I suppose the real reason is this—that we each see the world differently. We take a different view of life and politics. All the same, we are all men and women, and I am sure we have much more in common than many people would admit. So we must somehow establish confidence between our countries and Governments. How are we to do this? I would suggest three ways.

First we should each avoid acts which disturb the existing position anywhere in the world to the other's disadvantage; for such acts must, to use your Prime Minister's words, produce dangerous situations. Secondly, let us recognise that each side needs concrete reassurances. Words are not enough. Deeds count. Thirdly, let us see if we can make a start and go forward step by step. Agreement on one thing leads to agreement on another. It's the first step that counts. That's why I'm here.

There is one other practical step that I would also advocate. Visits by delegations such as mine are all very well in their way. But what we really need is thousands of visits to each other's countries by ordinary people. Nothing would do more to help understanding. Tourism between us is increasing: let it grow much more. We have never refused a visa to a Soviet tourist, so come to see us. Our people will certainly come to visit you. In the present state of the world military conflict between Great Powers can bring victory to no one but must mean disaster for all. Similarly, in the political field; an attempt to gain total victory may well produce disaster. So let us work together with patience and understanding.

It was difficult to know how many Russians had listened or what effect it may have had. But it was reproduced in the Russian Press, and in most of the British and many foreign newspapers.

The next morning Selwyn Lloyd and Gromyko met to settle the communiqué, which was, at any rate, more substantial and even

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frank than such documents often are. After referring to the free interchange of views and ideas and the many discussions which we had held together, Khrushchev and I declared that our common objective remained the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the application of nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes. Meanwhile we stressed the importance of an agreement to stop nuclear tests 'under an effective system of international inspection and control'. We considered that such an agreement 'would reduce tension, would eliminate the possible danger to health and life'. On Berlin we did not conceal the difficulty:

> The Prime Ministers exchanged full explanations of the views held by their respective Governments on questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. They were unable to agree about the juridical and political aspects of the problems involved. At the same time they recognised that it was of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world that these problems should be urgently settled.

The communiqué also referred to the purely Anglo-Soviet questions which we had discussed. While noting with satisfaction the improvement of trade which had already taken place, we recognised the need for further expansion. We agreed upon a mission, led by a United Kingdom Minister, to investigate the possibilities of further trade development. We also announced our agreement about increasing the scale of exchanges in the cultural field, books, newspapers, films and the like. The British Council would come to Moscow to discuss a programme for the cultural, educational, technical and scientific exchanges between the two countries.

Naturally the main interests and indeed the chief practical result was the postponement, if not the solution, of the Berlin crisis and the agreement upon arrangements to be made through the Foreign Ministers for an ultimate meeting of the Heads of Government.

At last the visit came to a close. After Selwyn Lloyd and I had given a Press conference in the House of Journalists we left for the airport. Here again Khrushchev laid himself out to show every

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outward mark of attention. There were bands, guards of honour, speeches and all the rest. In the beginning of his speech he made a veiled reference to the earlier difficulties:

> I should like to draw the attention of our esteemed guests and of all those present here, especially Press correspondents and photographers who can record the fact, that a bright sun is again shining today. It has accompanied us throughout our talks and is now trying, as it were, to help us thaw the ice that has formed in recent years in the relations between our countries.

After some reference to our talks and the published account of their results he ended with these words:

> A great responsibility devolves on us, as persons placed at the head of Governments. We must do everything within our power to prevent war, to provide normal and peaceful conditions and justify thereby the trust and the hopes of the peoples.

After expressing my thanks for the generous hospitality which the Foreign Secretary and I had received and my appreciation of the many striking ceremonies and entertainments with which we had been provided, I thanked him for the frankness of our talks: 'We shall return to Great Britain the better able to tackle those issues on which the future of mankind depends.'

It had indeed been a gruelling eleven days. I had now to set about the task of explanation, particularly to our allies, and to seek their help. Meanwhile I spent my first evening at home, while these events were fresh in my mind, in recording my impressions:

> In the first place, the ten days of our visit were absolutely filled from morning to night. Three large dinners—at the Kremlin in Moscow, in Kiev, in Leningrad. Two large receptions—at the British Embassy in Moscow and at the Kremlin. Three ballets—Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad—all admirable in their different ways. Hours and hours of unofficial and fairly relaxed talks with Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Gromyko. Hours of 'official' conferences, with more officials present on each side. Luncheons; tourist visits to special places in the three cities; visits to universities, collective farms, shipyards, factories and so on.

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The second impression—dominating everything else—was the strange experience of being surrounded by friends and advisers—(Foreign Secretary, Sir Norman Brook; Sir Patrick Dean; Sir Anthony Rumbold; Bishop; de Zulueta; Sir Patrick Reilly (Ambassador) and all his staff) and yet being unable [except with great precaution] to communicate with them. This is because you cannot speak in the residences, town or country, put at our disposal. Every room is 'wired'. You cannot speak in a car, or train, or even outside the house, if it be a small compound or garden. There is [always the] danger of the apparatus picking up what you say. In the British Embassy, in spite of constant searches, the modern methods are so good and the modern mechanisms so unobtrusive, that (with so many foreign servants, etc.) [security is almost impossible]. This makes everyone rather jumpy and is a very unpleasant feeling. Those who stay long here either disregard it or get very irritable and nervy. (I do not myself think that an Ambassador should stay more than two to three years.)

The third impression is more banal. The consumption of food and drink is tremendous. The food (except for caviar, smoked salmon and similar pre-dinner delicacies) is not good. The drink (other than vodka—which is very good) is bad—with the exception of some quite nice white wine from the Caucasus. Soviet brandy is just poison.

The fourth impression was how nice and how friendly all the people are. I spoke to many-crowds in the street, in the factories, outside the places where we dined and outside the 'residences' put at our disposal. These gatherings-which grew in size as the visit proceeded and my speaking to them in this way got known—were uniformly good-mannered and attractive.

Some of the crowds were clearly anxious about Peace and War. The propaganda was terrifying. Everyone in Russia seems genuinely persuaded that the Americans, and probably the British, have decided on a 'surprise attack'—a 'bolt from the blue'. Everyone asks anxiously whether we are going to keep the Peace. They are kept absolutely ignorant of all the provocations of Soviet policy all over the world.

The fifth—and clearest—impression of all is that Mr. Khrushchev is absolute ruler of Russia and completely controls the situation. The uneasy period after the death of Stalin is now over. The attempt

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at a 'directory' has not lasted. The First Consul is in authority.

Mr. Khrushchev is a curious study. Impulsive; sensitive of his
own dignity and insensitive to anyone else's feelings; quick in
argument, never missing or overlooking a point; with an extra-
ordinary memory and encyclopaedic information at his command;
vulgar, and yet capable of a certain dignity when he is simple and
forgets to 'show off'; ruthless, but sentimental—Khrushchev is a
kind of mixture between Peter the Great and Lord Beaverbrook.
Anyway, he is the boss, and no meeting will ever do business
except a Summit meeting. Neither Mikoyan (a clever Armenian,
who cringes to Khrushchev) nor Gromyko (Foreign Secretary),
who is afraid of him, will ever do any real negotiation on any
essential points....

We had expected to find difficulties about telegrams from
England and conducting affairs while away (as one can do in
most capitals, at any rate). But we had not reckoned on the
difficulties of de-cyphering and cyphering telegrams, or of
consultation, etc., owing to the tremendous espionage system.

We were very well treated-apart from this—and all the
different residences and *dachas* put at our disposal were made as
comfortable as possible. Food and drink were lavish.¹

Perhaps the only change I would wish now to make in this apprecia-
tion regards the undisputed supremacy of Khrushchev. He had not
the strength of Stalin, for he had eschewed, or could not rely on,
Stalin's chief weapon—the Terror.

At the meeting of the Cabinet on 4 March the

Foreign Secretary and I gave an account of what we had
learned in Russia and of what we proposed to do. We are to visit
Paris, Bonn, Ottawa and Washington. We want a negotiated
settlement, because we do *not* believe that (in spite of all the
brave talk) the allies will face war over not the right to supply
Berlin but the insistence that U.S.S.R. and not D.D.R. police
or customs officials shall issue the necessary permits. However,
we (Britain) must not get into the position we got into at Munich
(1938). I will be no Mr. Chamberlain. . . . What would be the
worst thing of all for the West would be a humiliating climb-
down *after* talking big.

14 March 1959.

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635

I fear this may be the result, unless Western leaders consult
together *en toute franchise* and not with the idea of shuffling off
their responsibilities.¹

After the Cabinet I went to luncheon with the Queen to tell her
the story of our strange experience. In the afternoon I made a short
statement in the House of Commons, in the course of which I
welcomed the latest Soviet note to the Western Governments. It
was vital that these grave questions should be settled by negotiation
and not under duress. Gaitskell, who followed, showed great
generosity and even cordiality. He would not wish 'to put anything
in the way of an initiative towards peace on the part of the British
Government'. All this was encouraging and showed the Opposition
in a sympathetic mood. I had already had a splendid reception from
my own supporters: 'All the Conservative Party rose and cheered
when I came in, led by Winston Churchill.'¹

Since the most important result of our visit to Russia was the
proposal of the Soviet Government, contained in their note of
1 March (delivered 2 March) replying to the allied proposals of
16 February, it was vital not to let this opportunity slip. The
Russians had again proposed a meeting of Heads of Governments.
But they had declared themselves willing, if the West were not
ready for a Summit Conference, to start with a meeting of Foreign
Ministers. It was, naturally, easy and tempting to grasp at the
second proposal while ignoring the first. Caccia had already warned
me that opinion was hardening in America. Knowing that I could
not be in Washington for some weeks, the Ambassador thought it
would be wise to send a message at some length to the President
since 'the drift in American thinking seemed to be towards tougher
attitudes'. The French and German Ambassadors in Washington
were talking in a similar vein. I had already sent a telegram thanking
Khrushchev for my hospitable entertainment, full reports to all the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers, and a suitable reply to a friendly
personal message which I had received from President Eisenhower.
I now had to send a longer explanation to Washington to try to hold
the position.

14 March 1959.

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The next days were spent in Belfast—a long-standing engagement
—where Dorothy and I had a tremendous programme on 6 March,
followed by a great meeting on the next day. At the Harland and
Wolff shipbuilding yard 'I had the most enthusiastic reception from
the workmen, such as I have never experienced in England or
Scotland.'¹

It was not until we got to Chequers on Sunday 8 March that I
could get to grips with our task. A message arrived from Washing-
ton with the draft of a reply from the American Government to the
Russian note. This proposed a Four-Power Conference of Foreign
Ministers to open at Geneva on 11 May. The date was all very well,
but the tone of the note did not suit me at all. The Summit meeting
was simply ignored.

A large party had assembled at Chequers, including the Foreign
Secretary and his chief advisers.

We had a tremendous discussion, ending by drafting telegrams
to Washington, Paris and Bonn. I am trying to get the Allies to
send a really forthcoming reply to the last Soviet note, instead of
the usual quibbling answer. I am quite convinced that we can
have no effective negotiation with anyone but Khrushchev. We
ought therefore to propose, right away, a Summit meeting. I
would like this as early as possible, but would accept end of July
or early August. This would probably have the effect of getting
Mr. Khrushchev to take no dangerous or provocative action till
then. It would force the Allies to concentrate their minds on the
real problem—an acceptable compromise on Germany and
Berlin.²

Accordingly we made it clear in our reply to the Washington draft
that we believed the issues involved in the German situation were so
grave that only the Heads of Governments would be able to take the
vital and final decisions. A Summit meeting was therefore essential.
Meanwhile we would be willing to agree to a meeting of Foreign
Ministers provided that it was clearly regarded as a preliminary and
not a substitute.

The next day the Foreign Secretary and I left for Paris, and here,
after a noble luncheon given by the Prime Minister, Debré, at the

¹ 6 March 1959.

² 8 March 1959.

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637

Matignon, we had a full talk lasting until six in the evening. This
was followed by dinner at the British Embassy.

The French really agree with us entirely over the German
problem. But they are trying to pretend that we are weak and
defeatist, and that they are for 'being tough'. The purpose of this
is to impress Chancellor Adenauer, and keep his support in their
protectionist attitude towards European economic problems. I
concentrated therefore a good deal of my talk, especially after
dinner, on the practical measures which ought now to be taken
... calling up reservists, organisation of Civil Defence, more
troops to Germany, evacuation of children from Berlin, etc. This
surprised and alarmed them very much.¹

On the next day, 10 March, we called at the Elysée at 11.30 a.m. After I had had a short talk alone with the General, he invited Debré and Couve de Murville, who were chatting with Selwyn Lloyd, to join us. As usual, the conference proved something of a monologue.

De Gaulle rather put out of countenance his team, by admitting
right away that one could not have a nuclear war in Europe on the
question of who signed the pass to go along the autobahn or the
railway to West Berlin—a U.S.S.R. sergeant or a D.D.R.
sergeant. In his view the only question which would justify war
would be an actual physical blockade. I asked, 'Did he say this to
Adenauer?' He admitted that he had not. It would depress him.
He also thought the Russians should be kept guessing.

On the two Germanies, de Gaulle also said that reunion was
impossible without war, and that France and Britain could not
fight such a war. But the 'idea' of reunification should be kept
alive in order to give some comfort to the German people. This
is 'the light at the end of the tunnel' idea, about which much has
already been said. *La chose allemande*, that must be kept alive.
Meanwhile there should be practical co-operation on economic,
supply and cultural matters between the two Germanies. What
Dulles had called 'confederation' should be pressed. Again, I
asked, had he said this to Adenauer? He said, 'No.' It was clear
that the French ... expect Britain or America to put this
forward.²

¹ 9 March 1959.

² 10 March 1959.

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I next asked about NATO. General Lauris Norstad had been to see me to express his distress at the open flouting by the French of their NATO obligations, including the withdrawal of their fleet from NATO command. He had begged me to take up this matter with the General. But I got little satisfaction. My halting questions were swept aside with a splendid gesture. We turned then to the danger of war. 'War,' he said. 'Do not speak of it.' 'Je ne peux pas faire la guerre-on ne me donne pas les bombes atomiques!'¹

When we passed to the more immediate question of our reply to the Russians and the possibility of a Summit meeting,

Debré and Couve de Murville more or less agreed with us. De Gaulle was rather uncertain as to fixing a precise date.¹

After returning from Paris, and before leaving for Bonn, I held a full Cabinet. As I was going into the Cabinet Room I was handed a characteristic message from Bob Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia:

> Harold. I think you did a great piece of work. I am old-fashioned enough to think that you gave back to Great Britain her proper intellectual and spiritual leadership in the Western world. R. G. Menzies.

Too generous, but very encouraging.

I was equally pleased with a letter which reached me a little later from my old friend. It was dated 1 April; but I still think it was genuine, and not a hoax:

My dear Harold,

I have had a letter from Mr. Ewen Waterman, who represents the Commonwealth Government on the Australian Wool Bureau, about the gift of British cloths to your Russian hosts on your recent expedition to that country.

This gesture has filled with pleasure Mr. Waterman and his colleagues on the Wool Bureau, who have described your gift as 'one of the best pieces of promotional work to date this year'.

I am sure that the many wool producers of this country have

¹ 10 March 1959.

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also been gratified that, of the many gifts which you might have taken produced in Great Britain, a wool product was chosen.

Kind regards,

I had little difficulty in persuading my colleagues to accept my views as to the somewhat grudging nature of the American draft reply. They were equally glad to know that although the French might wish to put some of the odium on to us, they shared our view of the realities of the Berlin situation. 'Firmness without bluff' should be the motto for the Western Allies. Before leaving, I sent a long message to President Eisenhower giving my impressions of the visit to Paris.

On 12 March the Foreign Secretary and I left early in the morning for Bonn. We were met at the airport by the Chancellor and his Foreign Minister, von Brentano. The conference began at 3.30 p.m. and lasted for three hours:

> The first half of our conversation was a full account, given in detail by [the] Foreign Secretary, of what happened in Russia. ... We then had an account of the Chancellor's six days in Russia, a year or two ago. Also, a very long speech giving his views on Russia generally, and the future of Western Europe. This was all rather pessimistic. The Germans then launched quite an attack upon us about 'disengagement', which they seemed to think we had agreed in principle with the Russians. We argued that 'limitation and inspection in an agreed area' was the only way to avoid 'disengagement', which we too thought very dangerous. It took an hour or more of quite heated discussion to get these suspicions out of their heads. The Chancellor was slow to understand and seemed to cherish some resentment. I was pretty sharp with him, and this had some effect. Von Brentano and his colleagues told Selwyn Lloyd afterwards that they were themselves perfectly satisfied. The Chancellor had got hold of the wrong end of the stick, but this talk would do a lot of good.¹

The next morning I had a private talk with Adenauer from 10.15 to 12.30.

¹ 12 March 1959.