TelCon
Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

9:08 am, Oct. 28, 1972

K: Hello Dave.

DK: How are you, Sir.

DK: Are you calling from Hanoi or Paris. I never know with you.
According to the broadcast from the Palace, you speak with <u>faux</u> forked
tongue.

K: From where?

DK: From the Palace. We got a story in our paper today, which will be
coming out shortly, which says that you made them very angry and
that your version doesn't agree with their version of what you talked
about.

K: In Saigon?

DK: Yep

K: Well what the hell did I say?

DK: I don't know, I haven't got the details. I don't have the story in front
of me, but

K: What did I say about them?

DK: Well they said that your representations to the press in the press conference
here, about some of the remaining differences, do not accord with what
you said in the meetings with Thieu and that, therefore, you are in effect
a liar.
(laughter)

K: Why don't they rest until they have committed suicide?
Did they say that officially?

DK: It was in the Palace box, yeah. You know, you can't have a broadcast from
Saigon which isn't authorized by the Palace on a matter of this magnitude.

K: So, the headlines are going to say "Kissinger angers Saigon".

K: Well, you might be in Vietnam yet in spite of me.

DK: If we can get Hanoi and Saigon jumping all over you, it's the only thing
that unites them. . Henry Kissinger. (laughter)

CLASSIFIED
Allotted E017258
By DAVID RICHMOND

2

DK: Put us on some guidance. We've got a paper to put out today and tomorrow, any guidance we can properly go with on our own--I've heard all kinds of radio reports and what-not. Tuesday is the critical time, you've indicated confidence in your press conference and un-named governmental spokesmen have indicated in confidence last night that there will be another meeting imminently--

K: Well, first of all about these government spokesmen, I think everybody should just ignore them--nobody knows anything. We'll have the meeting as soon as it can be set up.

DK: What is your reasonable expectation. Can you give us any guidance on that?

K: I feel the ball is in their court, they have to suggest a day.

DK: Well, should we take what they said publicly yesterday literally?

K: What?

DK: You know, that they would happy to have champagne on Oct. 20th with you, they would be happy to have you come there on the 30th, 31st to sign; they would be happy to meet with you on Nov. 1st or Nov. 2nd after you sign--

K: They know damned well I'm not going to go there to sign. You know they have such strange --

DK: Then we should not take them literally?

K: No, I'm not going there to sign, that's obvious.

DK: Are you going there to drink champagne.

K: Of course not.

DK: Can we suggest, Henry, that there might be a business meeting before the 31st.

K: I think it's extremely unlikely. I wouldn't suggest it and I sometimes really wondering why worry over little things like that, it's totally irrelevant. There won't be a signing of the agreement after the next meeting either. That'll just lead to make new discussions.

DK: You mean the next meeting will lead to new discussions?

K: Well, I'm not going to come back with a signed document even if there is a meeting. We may be able to settle some of the issues, but there has

DK: What they have to be is another meeting sometime after the 31st, it can't be before. You say it's extremely unlikely. Even after that next meeting, you would have to return for further consultations.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal ED1725f
By: HAROLD GLOSSER

3

*

K: Of course.

DK: Not only with the President, but with the Saigon government.

K: Of course.

DK: So that we are talking about the elapse of a week or two before there could possibly be a signing.

K: What I said in the press conference was "several weeks".

DK: There still remains confidence that they will give ground on the Oct. 31st signing date.

K: It takes two to sign. I mean, how can they give ground or not give ground--they have two choices, they can break up the negotiations and they can renege on the agreement, that is inconceivable. We have strong evidence to the contrary. I mean, that's not even in the ball park. I guess they will break

DK: And if they do not break off the negotiations,

K: That's right. But you know, many strange things have happened in this world. They cannot make us sign on the date of their choice, even if we accepted it as a planning date at one point.

DK: That's the only way you accepted was at a possible target date.

K: Well it stands to reason unless you have a completed agreement their can't be a signature.

DK: Henry, you sort of have been suggesting that the strong evidence to the contrary, that is their intent to carry on with the negotiations beyond Oct. 31st--

K: Oh, I said there is strong evidence that they're not kicking over the agreement.

DK: Right. They would be willing to continue the discussions, right?

K: We are talking off the record.

DK: Of course, Henry, we write our own material on a purely speculative basis, we are not going to embarrass you. It has been suggested that strong evidence, strong assurances have been coming at us primarily through the Russians. Is that something we can play around with?

K: No. I just don't want to get into that. But that is not a fair thing to say, You've seen the public statement of Kosygin yesterday.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E017258
By: N.A. DeGloster

4

DK: Public statement of Kosygin?

K: Yes. In which they supported the renewal of negotiations.

DK: Kosygin did? Right. But, if we are not depending on the Russians then we have some direct contact with Hanoi.

K: Well, don't you think that's a reasonable deduction.

DK: Yeah. While Hanoi may be saying one thing publicly in Paris, privately---

K: Well, whatever they're saying, they are not saying--they have a very close voice--

DK: Yeah, but I say we've taken them literally, and there have been times in the past, five or six years you will admit, that public statements turned out in that respect should have been taken literally. What you are telling me is that we should not accept what they said yesterday literally.

K: Well, you can take it literally that they'd like us to come there and sign it on the 31st. We didn't sign it on the 31st.

DK: But a reasonable deduction on our part that you have private direct communication with the other side that suggests that a strong probability of continuing discussions beyond Oct. 31st and no abrogation of the agreement by either side.

K: Yes, there's been no abrogation but you know, we maintain what has been stated. We will add what we want with certain modifications.

DK: Which you outlined to the press?

K: Yes, you know I didn't outline every last word of it, but in that general area.

DK: Right. Do you anticipate a meeting sometime next week, Henry.

K: I really haven't the answer to that.

DK: What's your guess.

K: I think it's possible.

DK: Do you have any indication that Le Duc Tho leaving Hanoi yet?

K: I haven't seen any.

DECLASSIFIED

Antony E07258 f
By: HARRY DICKINSON

DECLASSIFIED

Act: 012518
By: B.A. R.A. Dugle/lot

DK: That would be the key thing to watch for, would it not?

K: Wasn't there in that statement yesterday something to the effect that Le Duc Tho will be there next week?

DK: That they would happy to have you meet with Le Duc Tho at Quang-Tri to drink champagne or to sign the document.

K: Well in essence, he may be there, but I haven't any evidence of it yet.

DK: Well, is your guess would be that Henry will be in Paris some time next week.

K: I have literally, believe me--

DK: I believe you, I believe you--

K: I have no ideas, your guess is as good as mine.

DK: I'm asking what the probabilities are and if no, your guess is better than mine I think.

K: I haven't got any guess.

DK: But you certainly will hope for a meeting next week.

K: Well, we have an awfully lot at stake, I'm relaxed about it. Next week, the week after--

DK: Well, I'm going to have somebody write confidently that there have been private indications--

K: You have no, absolutely no basis for saying that we are meeting next week.

DK: I'm not saying that. I'm saying that we will write confidently that there are private indications that indicate to our government that North Vietnames are still serious about continuing these discussions and not standing away from the U.S. on the Viet bargains. There's a probability of another meeting some time after Oct. 31st.

K: That I would stay away from. Well, you can say there's a strong possibility.

DK: That's right.

K: Okay, I've got to run off.

DK: Henry, thank you very much.

K: Bye

TelCon
Sen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger

9:32 am - Oct. 28, 1972

K: Hello

J: Henry

K: Right, how are you?

J: Good morning, how are you? Look you were absolutely brilliant. I hear nothing but rave reviews.

K: Aren't you nice.

J: I mean It. It's just terrific. I would hope that you would not mind if I don't come down to the---

K: Oh, for God's sake's don't. Between you and me, I'm going to try to cancel that briefing. Because I don't want to politicize that. What do you think?

J: Let me give you my explanation on the House thing, which is the one thing I wanted to convey to you, and then I think that may help you come to a judgment. You see, I am asked constantly in all kinds of ways, how is it that you, Senator, who have advocated withdrawal for years are now with the President on this matter, and don't you believe that he should have done what he is doing now four years ago. And I say no I do not because it must be clear that the American people did not buy my thesis, they bought the President's thesis through the Congress who votes and knows of the opinions and polls in the country. Having bought the President's thesis, to wit, Vietnamization, release POWs, South Vietnam to have the opportunity to determine its own future form of Government, we find that the President's thesis has come to maturity now, not four years ago. It couldn't be done four years ago.

K: That's exactly right.

J: It has now come to maturity, this is it; the timing, I can't tell you say I, the timing is off by six weeks or a month, but this is generally the time. Now it's ready, according to the President. It is so ready, I say, that in my opinion if you won't go along and do what ought to be done, he may be overruled. But then the President will not overrule him as I would have, by just pulling out. He's overrulling them because the President finds that he is really, even if he doesn't think so.

K: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
Autumnal E01725B
By DAVID M. CHISLEY

CLASSIFIED

Antonly HAROLD

E017258
ByDA

J: That seems to be handled very well from my point.

K: That's an excellent interpretation.

J: So, I personally wish they hadn't consigned it to the surrogates. You follow me. That's a good six politicans it. If they had given you, let us say, 50 Congressmen and ten Senators or something like that, or other, it would be the same you see.

K: I don't even know who the surrogates are, but I'm going to do something about it.

J: But you see my point?

K: Absolutely.

J: In other words, if they blew up the meaning to include an official rather than a political classification, then you'd be home free.

K:

K: Right, I will do something about it.

J: Well, that's the--

OK

K: Okay, well there's no need for you to come down. You and I have talked too often almost about this.

J: Well, you know I got pushed out on the campaign trail at 7:10 on Wednesday night having completed Senate business at 7:09. How should I talk to you but being exhausted. You're an expert on that.

K: How does the campaign look to you.

J: Very good. The only fly in the ointment, in my judgment is Watergate. The reason it's a fly in the ointment is this--it will result in reclaiming considerable number of Democratic stalwarts who were about to leave, and it will somewhat abate that defection. So, from that point of view it has a disadvantage, but there's nothing else much to do with the Watergate incident. I, myself, must concede as I have publicly that at this stage of the campaign, if the President went at it in a big way, the assumption would be that he had something to do with it. So, he's got to understand that he can do it after, but not before. He simply has to take whatever--it's not very great. And, also, I'll tell you this, interestingly enough, again bearing on your question, is it politicized--

I don't think that what you are doing now and what is being done is going to make a great difference in the vote and for this reason: The people who are with him, and that's an overwhelming majority, have been with

TelCon
Lew Gulick (AP)/Mr. Kissinger

12:08 - Oct. 28, 1972

Hello.

G: I certainly appreciate very much your returning the call. And, what we have is a big vacuum on our wire today, and the need for some kind of perspective as to how to relate these various pieces coming in from around the world that sound like there's tremendous tugging and hauling going on. Yesterday, we were able to write a story saying that there's still confidence about it being reached within the framework as you outlined it on Thursday.

K: We never said within, you know, not within the deadline by the other side.

G: Is that still the case?

K: Oh, yes. What has happened today, I'm not aware of anything.

G: Well, we have, you saw what did in a rather ridiculing fashion, I think, saying well okay all these things that Dr. Kissinger talked about has completely failed. In this whole text in may ways---

K: That's total nonsense.

G: And then, they've been giving some hints that well, okay, all you need to do spend a nickel.

K: But you're going to go--I would really suggest to reporters to foldow. E everybody is not going to posture themselves. Obviously, there isn't going to be an agreement until we sign it. We're in a position--this is off the record what I'm saying

G: Okay

K: We're in a position where somebody is buying a house and sell it at the last minute and say, look let's sign it, the owner is leaving and if you have any trouble with the furnace, just call me in six months, I'm a decent guy. Then the furnace blows up in six months and he says, what do you mean, it doesn't say a word about it in the agreement. That's our problem. We are willing to consumate details but we are responsible for what it's going to look like six months from now.

G: Right.

K: And, the issue is are they going to blow up this agreement when it's 90 percent done by giving us arbitrary deadlines geared to our elections.

DECLASSIFIED

Alexandria E.D. 12-25 By DAVID HARRIS-Glisson

2

waive

K: And I can't believe it. You know, let them weigh the documents, let them publish the whole damned document. We'll still insist on the changes and on the additions.

G: You think there is the impression---

K: I don't have the impression--I have the impression they are moving towards ~~talking~~.

G: How do you get that?

K: That's my impression because I have other sources of information.

G: Yeah. Well they certainly haven't encouraged military noises in my opinion. Now when they talk about initialing instead of signing I think, myself, that's a risky thing to do.

K: We have no intention of doing it.

G: On the other hand, you hear from Saigon Thieu made a conciliatory speech yesterday. I think, I figure he's making conciliatory with the one exception, if he's raising the question of withdrawals of the Vietnamese troops again, if it's a new condition then that's a bad start. Otherwise, possibly he's being conciliatory.

K: Well--

G: You see the troop withdrawal at Suez--one --

K: I don't want to negotiate this whole thing in the newspapers.

G: Okay.

K: But I understand the problem and I think we all have to stay cool now. We've brought it this far and we going to get it the rest of the way.

G: Suvana Suma (Sp?) said last night he said he was going back to Paris soon, but he didn't name a time. Do you have any advice as to how we should play that?

K: I think it's reasonable that we will resume talks. Le will certainly envy us. I think that's going to happen.

G: However, it doesn't look like it's going to happen by midnight of Tuesday.

K: I would guess not.

DECLASSIFIED

Autonomy E017258
Byron HARPER

3

G: Uh huh. Well I certainly appreciate your valuable seconds.

K: You know, you understand my problem.

G: Well, yes, I appreciate your understanding mine.

K: Right

G: And, by the way, I was asked by my New York office for a log on how things went on Wednesday, thursday. And I said, well, that was a brilliant performance, and they said we 'll get you for the editorial work describing Dr. Kissinger. I said, well okay, think of something better.

K: You're very nice. I appreciate this.

G: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

G: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258

By DAVID PAGLESLEY

Telcon
Bernard Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

12:37 pm - Oct. 28, 1972

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Sorry to bother you again on this but pressure on me in New York is almost as bad as it is on you from other people. Is the situation roughly the same as it was yesterday.

K: Yes, and you can't take the temperature because --

G: Right. There have been stories about the meeting already set up for a day or so, but I see they caught and left Hanoi.

K: Has he left Hanoi?

G: Oh, he hasn't, no, I mean to say that you are about to leave any minute.

K: I know, but these reports --I think it's a good thing to watch for, yes.

G: Yeah, but haven't got an official word, yet?

K: I wouldn't say so anyway. The thing to watch to be of concern with is the trend and whether we are on one day or another or one week of another is all that essential. There can't be an agreement without our signature. There won't be a signature without these changes that we want and these are just--

G: Uh huh. Right. The--again Saigon is making a lot of noises, but then again is this you think posturing.

K: We are going to have a rough time. No one ever said this was going to be easy.

G: When you said at the press conference that you needed one last session with North Vietnam, did that mean--did you re-open an offer that after that you would go back to Saigon or you wouldn't have--

K: Oh yes. After that there will be consultations here and in Saigon, and other communications with Hanoi, no doubt.

G: I see, but you don't think you need another face to face situation with Hanoi.

K: Probably not.

G: I see. That's when you were talking about-- that's what you were thinking of--there wouldn't necessarily be three or four days in Paris and then a signature. You'd have to go to Saigon and--

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01728F
By: D.R. DeGloistey

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

12:40 p.m. - 12/28/72

K: Hello.

R: Henry, I had a meeting with Dobrynin this morning and after we finished the meeting, I expressed my appreciation for the cooperation we received on the negotiations. The Kosygin meeting reported by TASS was unusual. The highest thing in the story was that he supported your position on this and I wanted you to know this - that it is quite unusual. I thought you might tell the President that. They seem anxious to work it out. The war is going on too long and our government is giving full support.

K: I saw a story saying that Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy would meet with me next Tuesday.

R: It's screwed up. One says they won't unless you are ready to sign the agreement and another

K: Yes, but we got that other message.

R: I thought if you were going to do it to be sure you didn't conclude before the 7th because if a settlement . . . . . . cause inclusive your meeting with Thieu.

K: They have to give us time to sell it to the other place. I can string it along and start it late.

R: If you have to start it after the 7th.

K: I would prefer to start it after the 7th but I can't suggest that. It would be too obvious.

R: If they propose Tuesday, you suggest Thursday and Friday. I had a meeting with Souvanna Phouma but there is nothing particular to tell you about that. I told him he might tell the President he supported the U.S. and hope the talks will be resumed.

K: Good. I asked Bill Sullivan if he has any ideas of how we can get the Indonesians into place because that is the best way we can

R: I think the Indonesian Ambassador should be called in.

K: We'll get on that.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By: DANA HARRADGEE

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

12:50 p.m. - 10/28/72

J.D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: You shouldn't keep the girls on the weekend. You're already keeping me.

K: How am I keeping you?

D: I have not yet received the letter for Brezhnev.

K: It will be over in 10 minutes. Actually it's nothing urgent. It requires no action on your part at all. Hold on a second. (HAK checks with Dick to find out if the letter has gone.) I thought the letter wnet over this morning.

D: If you want to leave - if you put it in a sealed envelope then in the evening I will pick it up and send it to Moscow.

K: Good. OK. Have a good time wherever you are going.

D: We will because my wife - if you don't have anything else.

K: No, I have nothing else.

D: So please send me and I will handle it in the evening. You don't have anything else on the schedule?

K: No, but I will get that over to you right away.

HOTMAIL
DECLASSIFIED
01/01/99
By: N.A. Kissinger

TELCOM

Dobrymin/Kissinger

12:50 p. m. - 10/28/72

JD: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol, how are you?

K: How am I keeping you?

D: I have not yet received the letter for Breshnov.

K: It will be over in 10 minutes. Actually it's nothing urgent. It requires no action on your part at all. Hold on a second. (HAK checks with Dick to find out if the letter has gone.) I thought the letter went over this morning.

K: No, I have nothing else.

DECLASSIFIED

01/22/72

HAROLD GILSON

TELCONE

Secretary General Waldheim

1:04 p.m. - 10/28/72

K: Hello.

W: Yeh, this is Waldheim speaking.

K: Hello, Mr. Secretary General.

W: Dr. Kissinger, first of all my congratulations. I'm very pleased
with the development and I hope very much that at last things can
be settled.

K: Oh, I'm sure they can be.

W: Yeh, well, I'm really very happy about it and I wish to congratulate
you.

K: You're very courteous to call. You're very nice

W: I also wish to tell you that I wish very much the idea that the
Secretary General - the participation of the Secretary General of
this organization.

K: Oh yes.

W: In this one.

K: We are very pleased that this was possible and it may be an opening.

W: I'm very

K: For other things.

W: With regards to the other points possible, UN involvement in the
whole concerning the ceasefire control and the elections, I
the State Department about the situation. I wonder whether it wouldn't
be possible to look out for the role of the UN in this respect.

K: We have no objection to that at all. In fact, we proposed it but this
was not accepted.

W: By Hanoi?

DECLASSIFIED

Act. by E017258
By: Hanoi, DeGloster

2

K: Yes.

W: They're not to favorable to the UN, I know that.

K: (Laugs) No, you get it from both sides.

W: (Laugs) Well, but I remember when I first suggested a UN role, Hanoi was the first one to refuse it and therefore I'm not too much surprised. But in one way, with the experience we have in this field of concord and ceasefire, etcetera, and preparing elections here too, we had this New Guinea experience and so many other experiences, I wonder whether it shouldn't be __________ to see what kind of role we could play in this regard. I know it's difficult but I thought I should mention it.

K: I'll raise it again.

W: It's very kind of you. I thought if you had suggested the UN compose the supervision of the elections, but the question is will Hanoi accept it.

K: I doubt it but we will raise it again.

W: That is very kind. I'm very appreciative of your willingness to do it. And with regards to the Control Commission, there you see no possibility of adding one representative of the UN?

K: It was our proposal but it was again rejected.

W: Well, I see the difficulties and where they are.

K: Right.

W: But I'm grateful if you could perhaps raise the question of this Control question and Supervision question.

K: I shall do that.

W: And I think the argument is simply that we have the experience and the machinery so it would just - at any rate it couldn't do harm.

K: Well, I will raise it.

W: Again many thanks and my sincere congratulations and I wish you good luck for the last efforts you have to make.

K: Thank you very much. W: Bye, Dr. Kissinger. K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Antony EDWARDS
By DAVID HARRIS-GILSON

TelCon

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

1:20 pm - Oct. 28, 1972

K: Hello.

DK: Henry, bear with me, I'm sorry, just one question. Could we say pretty much the same thing on our own, that the Administration fees confident that whatever misunderstanding or differences that now exist between the Saigon government and our Government, that it will be reconciled.

K: Of course, it will be.

DK: In the course of negotiations?

K: Well, you can say that the Administration will make it's utmost efforts to reconcile these differences.

DK: Do you feel, individually, confident that these will occur.

K: I think so, yes.

DK: Okay, just as long as I can accurately reflect your state of mind.

K: But I'm not saying it will necessarily occur, but I have every confidence--

DK: I can reflect a state of mind that there's confidence that these misunderstandings that these differences will be reconciled in the course of these negotiations will may stretch over a period of two or three weeks--you know, I think we will be on safe ground.

K: Right.

DK: Thank you.

CLASSIFIED

Autumnal 07:25:58
By: H. Kissinger

TELCONE

Amb. Bush/Kissinger

1:35 p.m. - 10/28/72

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: George, how are you?

B: Sorry to interrupt you, how are you?

K: OK. How are you?

B: In your adulation, I'm in your fan club. I need leadership on one
point. Because of what came out of Saigon, they keep asking about
UN role. What is the answer? Just in negotiation or what should
we say? Because my job - I'm in Texas. They have these different
press conferences and what do we say on that?

K: We can't say much because it hasn't been published yet but there
will be some role for the UN.

B: But we don't say that - we just say it's just as Dr. Kissinger said
at his briefing this is a matter for negotiation and they

K: Well no, you can say that there's some role for it in the International
Conference.

B: You can say that?

K: Right.

B: On the reconstruction end or on the other or not get into that?

K: I wouldn't get into that.

B: OK. It's just confident that in the final solution there will be some
role for the UN.

K: That's right.

B: OK. Good luck.

K: Where are you, George.

B: I'm in Houston, Texas and I might - well I'll talk to Al Monday. I had
one other request.

CLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By DAVID Kissinger

K: Did you tell Al that the Chinese cancelled the social engagement?

B: I sent the message to him through one of your people. I forget the guy's name. Yeh, I had invited them at their leisure to come out to Greenwich last weekend. Thursday they told me they would accept. The Deputy Foreign Minister and Huang would like to come and have a quiet dinner, lunch and walk in the woods which I invited them to do. I planned to come back from here to do that and then they invited themselves on Thursday and Friday they cancelled it. But I filtered that into you all. I didn't know whether it had any significance but it came directly from the Minister with tons of apologies and all of that but I didn't know whether it meant anything you see.

K: Yeh, I can't judge.

B: OK. Good to talk to you.

K: Right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By A HARRIS-GILSLEY

TELCOM

Senator Mansfield/Kissinger

2:00 p.m. - 10/28/72

K: Hello.

M: Hello, Henry.

K: Senator, how are you?

M: Fine, how are you?

K: OK.

M: Listen, I watched you in Phoenix on Thursday morning. I thought you did a magnificent job.

K: Arent' you nice!

M: How's it coming out? I'm out in Missoula, Montana.

K: Oh, I think it will work out. You know there are a number of aspects of disagreement that just have to be clarified. You know but I think that during the month of November and maybe earlier we can get it all done. I'm confident of that.

M: Good. Is the President in Saigon the roadblock?

K: No, you know some of his objections are well taken and we had come to independently. They're not really objections to the agreement, but for example, we have tons of instructions to the VC that we've picked up that they should seize a maximum amount of territory between the time the agreement is announced and the ceasefire goes into effect.

M: Which they seem to be endeavoring to do at the present time?

K: That's right. What we would like to do is to get the ceasefire - international body into place simultaneous with the promulgation of the ceasefire. Now some other concerns he has we don't completely agree with but we're sure that this can be worked out in the next couple or three weeks.

M: Well, I'm delighted and the sooner the better. It'll be well received by all concerned. The reaction is tremendous and now you've got to produce.

K: Well, we will.

M: OK and Henry, take care of yourself.

K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Autoly E017258
By DAVID B. GIBSON

TelCon

Murray Marder/Mr. Kissinger

2:40 pm - Oct. 28, 1972

K: Hello.

M: Hello, Murray Marder, Henry. How are you?

K: Okay.

M: Henry, could you give any guidance on the possibility of initially and then proceeding or signing and proceeding--

K: No. I mean we won't do it.

M:

M: I was going to be cautious about that, but I couldn't get back to anyone yesterday and mention it, but with that uncertainty--that would apply to either one, anything our signing?

K: That's right. But, I don't know what it means that you initial something and then proceed to renegotiate it.

M: Well, they tell me that this, of course, has happened before on many things. I happen to know of anything as momentous as an ending the war agreement, though.

K: Well, I have a firm understanding of the essential provisions in the press conference and they know we don't want to change the basic structure.

M: Uh huh. Do you really think this is any barrier here at the present time?

K: No.

M: Anything said by Nuyen while in Paris that means anything fundamental from your position.

K: No. Because we base ourselves on direct communication we get from them and I don't know what their spokesman said in Paris.

M: Uh huh. Is there any guidance on the news of the resumption?

K: No. But, you know, Murray, you got through four years of this like keeping your eye on the big picture. I really wouldn't play this game of taking the temperature every ten minutes to see if it was up a degree or down two degrees. You really know enough to know that having come 90 percent of the way, it would be highly improbable to get it kicked over--over an arbitrary signing date.

NOT CLASSIFIED

August 07 78 By NARA-GLISHERY

2

M: I would think so. What I don't know, frankly at this point, is there -- their degree of suspicion and their degree of determination to get something, initialed, signed or what have you. Something formalized.

K: But what is their threat that it will not be signed?

M: I beg your pardon/

K: But what sanction do they have?

M: I realize that.

K: I mean, if we don't sign it, then what, then they let us get into Nov. 7th without an agreement. Is that their worry?

M: We, as you know, there's lots of speculation reports whirling about Rogers going to sign, you are going to sign, and so on.

K: Neither is going to sign.

M: I didn't think so really--

K: You mean ultimately? Or on Tuesday?

M: No, the next week.

K: Neither of us.

M: Does the time factor look any different to you than it did the other day.

K: No, it's about the same.

M: Would we presumably see Le Duc Tho moving in the normal---

K: That's been the normal pattern. That's what usually happens. When I--we haven't picked anything like that up yet, so it usually takes him three days to get there.

M: Right. I-- one thing I did not have a feel for yesterday from my better informed colleagues who were I gather being advised to trim back some allusion that you made and I didn't know if--

K: Well, it's trimmed back in the sense that you shouldn't expect if there is a meeting, I'd gone back with a signed document. That after that there would have to be additional conversations.

M: Well this is what, frankly, I was trying to see whether we didn't have you pinned too close to a--to what you clearly put out as an illustrative time.

DECLASSIFIED

Act. 1. E017258
By DAVID HARRIS

DECLASSIFIED

K: What I meant was that will then lead to another round of consultations.

M: I wonder if you could tell me for my own guidance--the people here in my office are saying, don't you think he should get to Paris, and I said--

K: At this time, I don't see what you would find in paris.

M: Because it would seem to me that the--another round of negotiations--you had said that you thought this would be the final round, but you envision--I realize this is very hard--would you envision a public anything at the end of that, Henry.

K: No. I would expect to return here and probably go to Saigon again.

M: Uh huh. And at this point there is no Hanoi visit by you that would fit into any pattern?

K: Not now.

M: Has a discussion with Suvana Suma (sp?) or others materially widened the required modifications, can you tell yet?

K: Not significantly.

M: The ah--

K: You know, we want to bring the various cease-fires as close to each other as we can.

M: Right. Is it simultaneously possible at all--

K: Well, they're probably not complete, but at least we want it accomplished.

M: Do you have much homework to do yet.

K: A little bit No, we are in pretty good shape.

M: From a timing standpoint even in the most opportune possibilities, three or four days or more, should we stretch that, Henry.

K: Well, three or four days of negotiations assumes the same sense of urgency that there was last time. It doesn't necessarily mean that it will all be taken in one gulp.

M: What I think we do not have a feel for from you r recent pattern is, is their ability of rapid communication with Hanoi. Was that pretty good or--

4

K: It seemed to be pretty good.

M: Getting down to this kind of wire, on specifics on modifications, would it not be probable in their going back and forth to Hanoi, that you could have a gap in the process, at least two days or something like that.

K: It's quite possible.

M: Well then, and then to Saigon which could be--could that be a long process?

K: I think that's too hard to predict.

M: What we are essentially trying to get a feel for, and I do have a pretty good feel from you now, is they have from their propaganda position it's going to be grinding hourly, thinking of that Tuesday date here, is it possible that in this process there is some face saving vehicle for Nam to slide pass it or doesn't it really matter from a Washington standpoint.

K: It's their deadline, we can't be bound to their deadline.

M: Right. Well I didn't know whether they are struggling over that deadline requires any or warrants any accommodation for our side.

K: I think it's all a subsidiary issues.

quite strong and helpful

M: The Russians take the; is quite strong, was it not/from your standpoint.

K: That seemingly was very helpful. Murray, you are getting Marilyn's habits. My talking to her didn't do much good in her column today.

M: Well, I haven't read it. I got a wet paper this morning. I think she was puzzled, I don't think she knew what you meant. I will have to explain it to her, Henry.

K: Okay.

M: Thank you, you've been most kind.

K: Right, bye.

M: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Autograph E012258
BY ARA DOLGILY

TELCOM

Amb. Bill Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

K: Bill, do you think these fellows could declare a unilateral ceasefire on Tuesday?

S: I know John Negroponte has been worrying about this. I don't think they would. This statement that Madame Binh made the other day sounds to me as though they are definitely negative on that idea.

K: Right. What do you think they're going to do?

S: I think they're probably going to sit tight until after the -- maybe until after the election but I don't think they will do anything vis-a-vis us until October 31 comes and goes.

K: That is, they won't accept the talk?

S: That's right. Whether they will accept it -- whether they will give us a note on November 1 or whether they will give us a note on November 8, I don't know.

K: Do you think they'll break off the talks?

S: No, I doubt it.

K: I consider them probable to.

S: Pardon? You consider it probable?

K: No, I do not consider it probable because I think the factors that brought them to this point --

S: Are still prevailing.

K: Unless they think they can keep us from bombing again.

S: Well, I think the factors are still prevailing and I think that the longer-range factors, particularly the problem of feeding (?) themselves next spring is still staring them in the face.

K: Right. Now let me ask you one other thing, I had never -- Unfortunately, I didn't make much of it at my press conference, the negotiating record stands like this: I had asked for a provision in the agreement with respect to their troops.

DECLASSIFIED
Autumn 2021

TELCORN

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

S: Right.

K: That fell out. Then I told them I want a unilateral action on their part, you know, just withdrawing some troops along the alledged model of '68 with Harriman.

S: Right.

K: That one we never withdrew.

S: That's correct.

K: I didn't want to redirect it at the press conference because I was afraid of making a demand which then would really put the fat in the fire.

S: Right.

K: If we didn't get it. What do you think of redirecting that?

S: I think -- my own checklist reads like this: You should resurrect that and it should have performance on it. I would nominate 3 divisions the 325th, the 224B and the 305, all of which are in the western reaches of the northern part of Military Region I --

K: But the point is, should I do some public preparation of that?

S: No, I don't think you should do public preparation. My feeling is that you do it privately; if you get them to agree, then it can be announced by our intelligence --

K: And I could say that we have not made a public issue of it to save their position.

S: Yes, but I think Thieu is going to have to make a public issue of it to save his face.

K: That's right. But how the point I'm going to --

S: The planning on that I think would be only after we've finished in Paris the next time.

K: Right. But the public position I will take is, if this thing blows up, is to say that this has always been our position, I just didn't want to make it public in order not to create a face issue.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

- 3-

S: I think that's safe but I don't think -- You know, that's proceeding from an assumption that it would blow up, which I don't think is going to happen.

K: No, actually the biggest favor they could do me is not to meet until after the election.

S: I think they're going to have a tight squeeze. My guess is that they'll give some sort of note about November 1 and start the meeting about 4 or 5. That's too near the --

K: Yeah, but then I'll move it to the 8th.

S: Well, maybe somebody to start the talks before. We don't have to do any initialing until after.

K: I won't do any initialing until I've been back in Saigon.

S: That's what I mean.

K: No, but I've already told them that I'm not available between the 4th and 9th.

S: Oh, you did.

K: Yeah.

S: I see. Well, then I guess the 9th would be the time. Well, I think that's one point you ought to raise with them. I think the other point is the starting from the accusation that Pham Van Dong's interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave was deliberately misleading, that we now need some clarification on the Council and we could either have it by . . . . . or by dropping out the three people segments or else by having another sentence that explains how those segments are formed so that it becomes quite clear it's a bilateral affair.

K: Yeah. Well, that we will do and I'll also put in that sentence from their own broadcast -- "That until the completion of the political process, the existing authorities will exercise all their internal and external functions."

S: Yeah. Well, that's got a double edge on it of course as far as Saigon is concerned.

K: Yeah, but Saigon can claim it is the only existing authority.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal EV 12258
By DAVID DeSantis

TELCON

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

- 4 -

S: Well -- The other two things I think we need to get pinned down is something which has a little more simultaneity in the ceasefires in the three countries.

K: Absolutely.

S: And then the final thing I think we need to put the squeeze on -- I don't know if John has shown you, we did a little draft of protocol how the commission would function.

K: No. Well, I want two things. One is how the Commission functions but I think we can now nail them to having actual observers in-place when the ceasefire occurred.

S: That's exactly what I had in mind.

K: Because with that we can make the presence of their forces more palatable.

S: Right. But the problem on that is going to be with Thieu again because we've got to have this agreed in a 4-party forum. The only 4-party forum is Claybear (?) but if we can table it next time we meet with the -- in the private session and then get them to agree that we will not be able to initial anything until --

K: The Claybear (sp?) thing has worked that out.

S: That's right, yeah.

K: But have you got numbers of people in that commission?

S: Yes.

K: How many?

S: Well, we've given it to the Canadians in terms that would make it a total of about a thousand altogether -- that is, to say 200 or 250 from each of the four.

K: Right. Okay.

S: Let me talk about the Canadians a bit. They're being cooperative but still reserving their position. If and when Trudeau gets re-elected, I should assume that President Nixon's going to telephone him to congratulate him.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority: ED 1258
By: J. HAROLD GLISBey

TELCON

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

K: Right.

S: I hope in the flush of congratulations he can get him pinned down to agree to this.

K: Right.

S: Because they're going along I think at the bureaucratic level but they say they have no guidance from palace on it.

K: Okay, good.

S: One other thing that I think we might want to pin down when we get over there -- the French are busily touting the story that the International Conference is going to be in Paris.

K: Absolutely not.

S: I don't know if you know yesterday Rogers telephoned Waldheim to tell him what their role was -- how his role was.

K: Yeah, that was a mistake.

S: Well, since he had already done it, I then called one of our people --

K: Why the hell did he do that?

S: I don't know. I think because he'd seen the story coming out from Paris. I didn't find out about it until afterwards and I haven't talked with him since. Alex told me about it. What I did then was to telephone up there - George Bush was down at Houston but I got Shaflee (sp?), his senior assistant, to go over to tell Waldheim that Paris was absolutely out and that what we were counting on was the ______ in Geneva so that Thieu would --

K: Oh, that explains why Waldheim called me.

S: What did he call you about?

K: Well, the same thing. He said he was so happy to hear about his role and I couldn't figure out where he --

S: Rogers had called him. I haven't yet heard what Rogers said to him.

DECLASSIFIED

Alexandria EOL255f
Byron HAROLD Blythe

TELCOM

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

- 6 -

K: Well, you want to know -- Now you see why we are so reluctant to let things over there.

S: (laughter) Well, that was an uncoordinated -- I thought maybe he had coordinate it with you.

K: No, it's a sort of --

S: Well, Alex called me to tell me this is what had happened so then --

K: Well, it's the sort of hip shooting that, you know, I don't give a damn but --

S: Now the only other -- I've got two or three things going. One, I've told our people in Phom Penh to tell Lon Nol to go ahead as soon as possible on getting the ICC established -- re-established there.

K: Right.

S: I've got in mind a cable to go out to Ellsworth to tell him to get Freddy Weyant in to start discussions on how we would set up the 4-party giant military commission; that he should be thinking about that.

K: Right.

S: Now the Australians as I told you and the New Zealanders have been trying to get me too -- on how they sort of accede to the provisions that govern them. I've got a little draft protocol -- my idea would be that the five TCCC ambassadors in Paris could come around and sign that the morning before Rogers and Trend -- you know, a couple of hours before Rogers and Trend go over --

K: But don't let's get one of our big palavers started until we get the agreement.

S: Oh, no, no. This is just -- they're being frankly a little snotty on it I think but this is the simple way out of it.

K: Right. Good.

S: I haven't told them this at all but this is what I --

K: Good, I think we should have plans but I don't think we should discuss it with them.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258

By: D.M. Dugle/lot

TELCON

12:10 p.m., October 29, 1972

- 7 -

S: I told them that our plans are still ________ on this but I've had -- I've done a draft on this which I told them I was doing. And that's about all I guess. But I think all of those things if we can pull them together would manage to get this scenery in place.

K: Well, we're having a WSAG meeting where I want to go over these things.

S: So I understand. That's at 11 o'clock.

K: Right. Good, Bill.

S: Okay. . . . my coming over before?

K: But your judgment is that they won't reply at all until Wednesday?

S: I would find it strange that they would because they seem to be set upon running this bluff. But I think the Kosygin statement of the other day was a tip off on that.

K: Yeah. Well, and also their message to me.

S: Yeah. I haven't seen it but you told me about it.

K: Yeah.

S: I think they have to go through --

K: Well, in their message they said -- I read it to Alex yesterday and of course my people have hidden it from me again.

S (laughter) Well --

K: At any rate, it says that they believe negotiations -- that while they have lost a lot of confidence, they believe negotiations should continue.

S: Right. And I think that with them -- that was apparent in the first, even when they made their propaganda blast on the 9 points. They accused us of responsibility for the delay; they never said for the failure.

K: Yeah. Okay.

S: Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you.

wgh

RECLASSIFIED

Date: 10/23/72
From: B.A. MANKIN
To: E.O. BOLIVAR

TELCONE

General Maxwell Taylor/Kissinger

Sunday evening - 10/29/72

K: Hello.

T: Hello, Henry.

K: Max, I hope I'm not interrupting your dinner.

T: Not in the slightest. I've dined and am just sitting back and
reflecting.

K: I was just watching you on television a little while ago and I thought
you were very good.

T: Well, thank you very much. I've been asked questions, of course
and I have the great advantage of being the bystander and just doing
what I read in the newspapers.

K: And I thought I'd take this occasion to tell you that all along you've
really played an extraordinarily useful role and I've admired the
dignity with which you've done it. And also the strength. One
thing I did want to tell you - I wouldn't worry about this Council of
Reconciliation. That's all that's left of the coalition government
and it has no powers whatsoever.

T: Well, I can see that but

K: The less it has to do - you know, to say that it's paralyzed, that's
fine. That's what we wanted.

T: That'd be my impression; that you may perhaps succeed in signing
it assuming you get cooperation in Saigon to do it, but it just can't
work by the way it's organized.

K: It isn't supposed to - it has only two functions; to help promote the
ceasefire and to organize and supervise elections which the two
parties first have to agree upon. In other words, first Saigon and
the NLF have to agree on some elections - that's not a very probable
thing.

T: Very unlikely, no Communist has ever trusted himself to a really,
truly free election.

K: So then if there were such an election then that Council would supervise
it and seal the electoral commission.

DECLASSIFIED

Aero. E01258
By: H.A. Gilsley

2

T: Yes.

K: Except for that it has no powers whatsoever. It has no executive, administrative or any other sort of function.

T: Yes, I can see that and I'm not afraid of it as it stands there. It would become another forum I would suspect and I'm afraid that our friends in Saigon would appear in the American eyes as being causes of delay and receive an increased criticism than what they're getting now.

K: The delay was because there isn't anything that the Council is supposed to do.

T: Yeh. I appreciate your calling.

K: I think you're right. This is one of the problems. I mean this is one of the dangers. My own judgment is that if our friends in Saigon act aggressively and positively, they can use this to their advantage.

T: I doubt it.

K: They aren't smart enough. That's the big worry. My big worry is if they use this agreement intelligently which will keep them in control of 90% of the population, an army of a million which can get unlimited replacement aid, unlimited economic aid and no changes in their governmental structure that they ought to be able to win a political contest hands down.

T: I would certainly think so. They've always had an inferiority complex - they had in the past. I don't know whether they got rid of that or not. They're afraid of the ~~whole~~ homogeneity of the other side.

K: One problem we have with them now actually, Max, is to some extent they have to posture themselves as independent of us, but if they place themselves too much in American public opinion as the obstacle to peace they're going to prevent what we are determined to do which is to stake ourselves on their survival immediately as soon as the agreement is signed. We want to have a meeting between Thieu and the President for example and we're not going to let them go down the drain unless they commit suicide.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority E017958
By: HARVEY GIBSON

RECLASSIFIED

Autley E017258

By DAVID HARRIS

T: Well, neither side - neither we nor they - can have anything other than a loss by an open split on this issue.

K: That's right.

T: So we better get - I know you're leaving no stone unturned to do just that.

K: No, no.

T: May I ask you just one question. Of course I'm an old career man. I even got the old armistice text out and reread parts of it. The Hanoi statement worried me with regard to replacement because it doesn't mention ammunition. It doesn't use a word that suggests that it could be burned up in combat.

K: No, no, ammunition absolutely

T: I'm sure it'll be part of that.

K: That's in the agreement.

T: That's not the way the Hanoi text

K: Well, the Hanoi text is a very misleading text.

T: Couldn't you put it before the American people?

K: I tell you, I don't want to put the text out because I want to negotiate parts of it.

T: Yeh. But . . . . . are just as . . . . . as I am. I'm making comments about the Hanoi text and comments which are not relevant I would assume.

K: No, the text says war materials which certainly includes ammunition.

T: No, but it talks about that which is worn out and damaged. Now that's not consumed. And going back to the language of the Korean armistice we were very careful to mention ammunition that has been used up.

K: Ammunition to my certain knowledge is included in the text and there's absolutely no possibility that we will not replace ammunition.

T: Yeh, I can believe it, but nonetheless these lads grab onto these words, as you know and when you finally sign something you'll be held to every

DECLASSIFIED

April 10 1975

By: HARRY GIBSON

damn little comma and

K: Well, I'll have to look at the text again but this would be another
revision we'd insist on.

T: Well I appreciate your calling Henry. You're my friend, I'm all
for you. I admire you enormously.

K: But I so much admired - you wrote an article a few months ago
and you stuck with us in the most difficult periods. I think that
with this agreement we have a chance to keep them alive and from
a different posture - our nightmare was that if this thing dragged
on another two years we'd lose so much public support at home
that we couldn't keep them alive in peace time.

T: I'm sure you're right. I would say this though, Henry, I think
you've got everything without an agreement just by the Vietnamization
course except for the prisoners.

K: Look, if it weren't for the bloody prisoners we would have no reason
to make

T: Let's not sacrifice the war for 400 prisoners - or

K: Max, it is in a way an absurdity to make the future depend - in which
you've lost 50,000 men on 400 prisoners.

T: That's right.

K: But that's the way the politics of this thing has developed.

T: We'll live to regret it if indeed we do give away virtually all the
things we've struggled for so hard already just for a handful of
prisoners.

K: But do you think we have?

T: I certainly hope not. But there are plenty of people in this country
that couldn't care less about what happens to South Vietnam.

K: Oh, you mean in the post-war period - we'll certainly not give
anything away.

5

T: No, once you got your prisoners out and so forth, then we'll be able to readjust our heights, I would suppose, but we'll still be tied to whatever language we've agreed to.

K: You have no worry on the replacement. We will absolutely not agree not to replace ammunition. And I'll take a look at it. I believe that ammunition is specifically mentioned.

T: I'm referring only to the published Hanoi text in the press. And it is not.

K: If it is not and I'll have to check it because I'm practically certain that we lifted the language from the 1954 Geneva Accords in which it is mentioned.

T: Well, if the staff hadn't got out the old Korean ceasefire - it would be well to read it over. They are just suggestions - not directly to your problem.

K: Well, we'll make sure that ammunition is included because obviously we have no intention to make an agreement.

T: Yes, now also one other thing, Henry, the North Vietnamese forces are no place referred to in the Hanoi text.

K: Yeh, but there is a total prohibition against infiltration.

T: But the language again with Hanoi is that the two parties of the South will not accept these troops and so on. If North Vietnam has divisions of their own in the South, the South Vietnamese, neither the Communists or the GVNs have nothing to say about it and I would assume that they could go ahead an resupply their own divisions in dependent as they are not mentioned and not covered by this agreement.

K: No, no there is this statement which is absurd - that they do not have their own divisions in there; that everything that is there is part of the PRG.

T: Everything in it is part of the

K: Of the NLF.

T: In other words, they're saying that all their troops are really VC.

RECLASSIFIED

Autumnal ED17258
Byron HARRIS GIBSON

K: That's right.

T: Are you going to let them live with that?

K: No, but that takes care of the reenforcement problem. I mean they can't use that loop hold.

T: No, if that is clear in the language - at least in the Hanoi text.

K: The Hanoi text is very fragmentary.

T: Well, as I say I read it over several times trying to find out - couldn't they claim that the North Vietnamese forces don't exist. They never existed before and they can't resupply forces that don't exist.

K: Yeh, it's a good point. For all these reasons we want to have this other round. Any other suggestions you have, I'd appreciate.

T: Well, I might sit down and send you a note but I'm sure you've thought of all these things.

K: No, I have not.

T: Evidently having worked on them except in the last three or four days.

K: No, I'm sure I have not thought of all of them and I'd appreciate any suggestions you have.

T: Good. I'll do that Henry. My pleaseure to talk to you.

K: Bye.

T: Good night.

TELCONE

Lady Hartwell/Kissinger

9:33 a.m. - 10/30/72

K: Hello.

H: Henry, you are a noble man to take that awful noise and battering last night.

K: I didn't think - this was fairly mild compared to what I've been exposed to here.

H: I didn't think any . . . . . . or negotiator would ever stand it or
. . . . . . You were so wonderful to go out and submit your thoughts
to these Democratic ________, if that's what we call it.

K: Well, you're very nice to say that.

H: I never admired anybody more. I mean the way you take it and your
presence and your calmness over it. I thought it was fantastic.
Henry, I'm going to call my husband directly after lunch time Britain
when I get to New York.

K: Because I really was extremely disturbed by this. Not because of
any impact it has on our elections.

H: Of course not.

K: But because if we can't keep the faith of the people who were with
us when things were tough, then something is deeply wrong.

H: Well, all I wanted to ask you is - supposing that they thought it was
a good idea to send somebody to see you.

K: I would, of course see them.

H: Would it be off-the-record or on-the record?

K: Well. . .

H: Your conversation, I mean supposing for the sake of argument.

K: I'd rather do it off-the-record or a background. Because I haven't
been giving personal interviews to any American.

H: I know you haven't. I realize that.

CLASSIFIED

By: HAROLD GLOSSER

*

2

K: Newsman and I think they would take it very illy.

H: Of course they would.

K: And frankly I'm really more concerned with what your editorial people think than what they write.

H: Yes. Yes.

K: But I really feel very strongly that your papers have been morally so much on our side when things were so very difficult and if we hadn't kept faith with you or if you don't understand that we have then this is a cause of very great concern to me. The applause of Clayton Fritchie, even if I could get it, doesn't really mean a damn thing.

H: It doesn't mean a damn thing.

K: And the applause of so many of my liberal friends who were at the dinner yesterday - that doesn't mean a damn thing either. It's socially acceptable.

H: Well I don't think that we shall be nearly as bad or irritate you or treat you as the columnist. . . .

K: Well, I'm - you know I really don't care what you write. I do care what you think.

H: I know, but I mean I would just ask you to let me have a conversation about this which I haven't yet done with my husband.

K: Yes.

H: And you've given me your telephone number and if I may, presume

K: Would you really call me.

H: Before I go because I always felt such nervousness doing it only once before I thought such nervousness would even

K: No, you'll see it's very painless. If I'm in I'll take the call right away. If I'm in a meeting, I'll call you back as soon as I leave the meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Acct. 607258
By: D. HARRIS

DECLASSIFIED

H: May I say that you would be willing to talk to somebody but just not for attribution?

K: That is right. I don't totally exclude for attribution.

H: You don't?

K: But I am not so much interested in ginning up a publicity thing.

H: No.

K: As I am

H: In setting the record right.

K: Yeh.

H: I've got it I think, Henry and I'll do everything I can and maybe I've exaggerated to just . . . . . . . the telephone conversation.

K: You may not have. But in any event, no matter what they write, I care what they think.

H: Well, you've been so kind to me I couldn't sit next to you for a whole dinner and not just mention it. I thought it would be dishonest.

K: I very much appreciate it and I haven't been kind to you at all.

H: You have indeed.

K: No, it wasn't kindness. I was selfish.

H: Well, thank you Henry, and I shall call you if I may... during the week.

K: Kindness is not my outstanding virtue as many people will tell you.

H: I have been told contrary by people actually.

K: Will you call me? When are you leaving?

H: I'm not leaving until after the election.

K: I see.

4

H: As you know a hungry rubbernecker like me, a political ________.
I wouldn't leave until after the election.

K: Listen, we are so close to it.

H: Well, I'm going to stay until the 8th. But I shall call you before then.
If I may.

K: Yes, please. Call me if you have

H: Anything I think worth wasting

K: No, I frankly would like to know in any event what it is that bothers them. Why don't you call me in any event.

H: All right, Henry. I will.

K: And I hope to see you very soon again.

H: Thank you for ringing. Good bye, Henry.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Autograph ED12453
By: NARANGLISOF

TELCONE

9:39 a.m. - 10/30/72

K: Hello.

T: Hello, Henry.

K: Max, I've looked at the agreement and it mentions munitions specifically.

T: Henry, I didn't quite hear you.

K: I said I looked at the agreement and it mentions munitions specifically.

T: Yes, and what is in it?

K: It mentions munitions. You were concerned yesterday

T: It mentions - and munitions.

K: And munitions, specifically.

T: And also consumption, not wear out.

K: That's right. Destroyed, used up or worn out.

T: That's fine. The words you used cover it then.

K: That's right.

T: That's fine.

K: I just wanted you to know that

T: I appreciate that. Henry, when I hung up last night I did what you suggested. I wrote you a note on some of these points. Most of them we talked about and I'll send them over to the White House this morning.

K: I'd appreciate it.

T: Yes, indeed. Thanks for the call, Henry.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Ad. by E07558
By: HARMAN/ALSON

TELCONE

Secretary Rogers/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 10/30/72

R: Hi, Henry.

K: Bill.

R: I'm calling about this press conference to see whether it's wise or not for today. I sort of have mixed emotions about it. I think maybe there'd be some advantage politically. I'm not too sure about whether it will - I think from the standpoint of negotiations themselves, you left them in a pretty good position.

K: I think it's bad to have to go through the whole goddam rigamorole again.

R: Yeh, and I think that's what would happen. I can't really just go down and make a statement and then get out. I'd have to have a press conference and then it would look as if we were going to announce something. First, if we say I'm going to have one, then it's going to look as if we're going to announce something about tomorrow.

K: Yeh. We're getting a message today incidentally about 2 o'clock ourtime.

R: Are we?

K: Yeh. And I'll call you right away.

R: Well, you know I'm prepared to do it if the President wants to. I'm inclined to think that it might be a mistake. I'd like to do it

K: Well, I can see scoring the point against McGovern that they want you to score. I think it would be very bad to go through the whole bloody details of the negotiation again because either you repeat what I said or they'll find some crack between us, even if it's only apparent.

R: Well, I could probably avoid going through the whole thing again but I can't avoid talking about it. In other words, they would say what about the coalition government; are the South Vietnamese worried about a coalition government; how do you see it? I just can't keep saying "Well, Dr. Kissinger said"

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E01725f
Evan HARRIS

2

K: No, no you can't.

R: I can't possibly do that.

K: Absolutely not. No, no I recognize that if you step up there you have to say something, but then the result will either be that in substance you agree or you will say something they will play into a nuance.

R: That's right.

K: And after that both you and I will be spending the next couple of days explaining why we don't differ.

R: That's right.

K: No, you cannot just go up there and refer them to me.

R: Now on something like MEET THE PRESS I have no problem because I can stay away from the question there, but in these press conferences you can't do that, as you well know. You got people who know a lot about it and you can't turn them around.

K: I don't think you should say anything until we have the message.

R: All right. Why don't we - you tell Chuck because he was saying I needed to - you wanted me to do it.

K: No, no, Chuck asked me what I thought of answering that one point of McGovern's and I said I thought it was a sort of useful thing to do. I don't myself think that we have to reply to every goddam thing he says.

R: No, I don't either.

Why don't we get Agnew and tell him what we want him to say - have him say it, he's out there. He gets a lot of television coverage, but we'll just prepare a statement for him to make.

K: I think that would be better. I agree with you. I think it would be better. I think it'd be unwise for you to go up and have a press conference before we know what the answer is.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258 f
By DAVID HARVEY

R: Now I can't go down and read a statement and then go out of the room.

K: If they see that they'll break off the talks, you know, there's nothing
conceiveable to me that they'll go for all the ________. In that
case both you and I will have to do some work - some more press
briefings. I'll tell Chuck.

R: OK.

K: Why don't we wait until this afternoon. When we get the message,
then you and I should talk and decide how we do it best.

R: Right. I don't mind taking them on but I don't think it's wise at the moment. I think it'll sort of screw it up because

K: Let Agnew do it.

R: I think if we just prepare a statement for Agnew. He's out on the road and we can give it to him right away and he can take McGovern on and say whatever he wants to and then get off the stage.

K: I agree completely.

R: OK, Henry.

K: Right, Bill

RECLASSIFIED

Action: E017258
By: HARRY DUGLEY

TELCORN
Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger
10:47 a.m., October 30, 1972

C: Hi, Henry.

K: Chuck, Rogers called in some anguish that he didn't want to have a press conference today and there have been some developments that make it unwise because we may be hearing something from the North Vietnamese today.

C: Favorable or unfavorable?

K: Well, we don't know. But I don't think Rogers should be out on a limb without knowing what they're going to do.

C: Well, I told him that he should go on his press conference just as we discussed at the :15 meeting and do nothing but kick McGovern for what he said yesterday.

K: That's right. But he feels he can't do that and he has to answer other questions if he goes out there.

C: Well, I think on these other questions he simply says, you know, he repeats the line that we just --

K: I think we ought to save him till we see what the North Vietnamese are doing. But can't we get Agnew to kick McGovern?

C: No, no, no. Agnew doesn't know anything about this area though.

K: No, we can give him a statement just saying how shocked he is that he'll do that.

C: No. Agnew, number one, can't do it in front of cameras because he does not -- I mean, if the Vice President should call a press conference like this would be --

K: No, but can't he do it out on the stump?

C: He's not on the stump. My feeling is that if tomorrow -- Henry, I feel very, very strongly about this -- if tomorrow the North Vietnamese publicly profess having laid the foundation for that by Bill Rogers today doing an attack on McGovern --

K: I think that it is unwise to have Rogers go over the same ground as I did again.

DECLASSIFIED
August 30 1972
By DA

HARVEY J. MCGOVERN
10/1/72

TELCON
Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger
10:47 a.m., October 30, 1972

- 2 -

C: He's not going to go over the same ground you did.

K: He says he can't avoid it; that there will be just no way that there can't be a crack that's opened up. I mean, he'll say something. He doesn't know the subject well enough that's going to confuse the issue and he's softer than I am.

C: Well, except that I don't -- well, there's two problems here. One is that after the 8:15 meeting, I called Haldeman and checked with him and he thought it was a damn good idea; the President did last night, you did at 8:15 so I really laid it on the rafters that this is one he had to do and what he's doing now of course is his normal technique of divide and conquerre.

K: Yeah.

C: Goes back and ______ to you.

K: You know, the President just talked to me and I told him also that I thought -- you know, I'd like that one statement against McGovern but I don't want more.

C: Well, why don't we just tell Bill Rogers to go down to the press room and make that statement and leave.

K: Well, he claims he can't do that.

C: Oh, that's plain bullshit! If he's told to do it, he can do it. Of course he can do it. Hells bells, our guys are always hung upon on this idea that they have to suck around with the press corps and answer their questions.

K: Well, if you can handle it on that basis, that's fine with me.

C: Well, it's going to be more than fine with you; it's going to be something you'd like him to do.

K: If he does no more than that, but if he holds a regular press conference, I'd rather not.

C: Why don't we get a conference call between you and I and Bill Rogers right now and see if we can't talk him into doing that. I see no reason that he can't go down there and read that.

CLASSIFIED

Antonly E01758
By: D. H. Ellis

TELCONE

Chuck Colson/Mr. Kissinger

10:47 a.m., October 30, 1972

K: Well, I just don't want to be in the public relations arguments.

C: No, but he's going to play one against the other, Henry; that's what he's
doing.

K: No, my view is if he can do just that one thing, it would have a certain
utility. If he does more than that, it doesn't. Secondly, I think the
President can hit McGovern tomorrow in Chicago.

C: I know, but Jesus Christ I wouldn't do it on the day that the North
Vietnamese said --

K: They're not going to -- I exaggerated -- they're not necessarily going
to blow it off tomorrow. I said that's one of three things they might do.

C: Um-humm.

K: Besides we'll know today what they're going to do.

C: We will, of course, have missed the opportunity to crack McGovern
for what yesterday is an utterly preposterous statement.

K: Well, if you can get Rogers to read a simple statement and do no more,
I'd be delighted.

C: All right. I still would love to have a conference call so that he doesn't
end up playing one of us against the other.

K: No, then just say I think it's a bad idea to have a press conference. It's
a good idea to make that one statement. I'll back you up on that.

C: Back me up on it though, this is what he says.

K: One thousand percent!

C: (laughter) I'll feel much better. Have you talked to Harris?

K: No, but I will this morning.

C: You know why you should?

K: Why?

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
Byron Harris

- 4 -

C: Not just to thank him but to listen to his analysis. I just was talking to him and he said boy, this thing saved the day. He said, all of my poll data from last week shows that there was an enormous decay. However, he says, you fellows had better not build up the expectations and let them now collapse. He said you will have a monumental problem on your hands You ought to listen to him and he will give you data that may influence how you this week -- You would also if you listen to what I just listened to for a half hour, you'd be telling Bill Rogers go down there at any cost and crack McGovern.

K: I'll call him this morning.

C: I'm not now thinking of stroking him which I was asking you to do but --

K: No, no; I'll talk to him about --

C: You should listen to his analysis, it is goddamned wholly impressive and (b) scary.

K: Okay.

C: Good. And back me up a thousand percent with Bill.

K: I will.

C: Okay.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Act.olly E017228
By: A. MARGulisley

TELCOM

Jack Anderson/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m. - 10/30/72

K: Hello.

A: Henry.

K: Jack, how are you?

A: Congratulations!! I really do mean that.

K: Aren't you nice.

A: What an astonishing performance!

K: Aren't you nice.

A: If there's anything that I can - if there's anything that would be useful my saying so, let me know and I'll be happy to.

K: I appreciate that very much.

A: One of my charges called to my attention the transfer of two diesel submarines he said that you had ordered it or approved it - at least - the transfer of two diesel submarines to the Republic of China. That I assume is of course, Taiwan.

K: Yeh.

A: And I just don't know what it means. He thought it was very significant and I thought that I had to check it out with you before I

K: I'll have to look - frankly, can I look into what he might be talking about.

A: Yes.

K: It certainly isn't a high priority thing. The only thing that it could be, but I'll have to check it, is carrying out a longstanding commitment. I know it isn't anything new.

A: Well, if it'll help - you wrote a memo to the Secretary of Defense on October 16th about it referring to a September 13th request of his.

K: Yeh.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17251
By: H.A. Glissom

2

A: And uh...

K: Well, let me check on it.

A: I didn't know whether it was significant or not.

K: It is certainly not

A: I rather felt that this flew in the face of some of the things you were now doing.

K: It's certainly not significant.

A: That's what I wanted to find out.

K: But I'll have to check - I'm certain it is a carrying out of a long-standing obligation.

A: Fine. If you don't mind telling me what context to put it in, I'd be grateful.

K: Can it wait till this afternoon?

A: Certainly, you have my number here. And later in the afternoon I'll be at my office which is 347-4325.

K: I'll call you around 4:00

A: Thank you, I'll be in my office at that time. Thank you very much.

K: Good. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly EO17455 f
By: HAROLD B. O'Leary

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Kissinger

11:02 a.m. - 10/30/72

K: Hello.

Z: Henry.

K: Yeh.

Z: I'm going to be asked by the President of the New York Times, what your official position is as to whether or not this thing will be signed tomorrow. What should I say - no comment.

K: No, you will say it will not be signed tomorrow. We have said that we want to have another negotiation and we will not sign until we have all those provisions that we're asking for taken care of. That's what we said on Thursday.

Z: Right. Well, I just wanted to make sure I say the right thing.

K: We will absolutely not change that.

Z: Good. So I say we're hopeful of bringing about peace or

K: No, just say that we have made this breakthrough and now we will not sign an agreement until its provisions are right. And I'd just say no more. They're taking our temperature, every half hour some newsman calls to see whether the temperature's gone up a point or not.

Z: OK, Henry.

K: It's total mass hysteria.

Z: Good. Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

August 17 75 8
By: HARRIS

TELCON
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger
12:35 p.m., October 30, 1972

K: You taking your daily temperature?

T: (laughter) I didn't bother you over the weekend, I was supposed to see. I got to catch up Monday morning. I was just wondering, Henry, if you can say-when you mentioned six or seven concrete issues, you didn't enumerate all of them.

K: That's right.

T: Can you give me some of the others?

K: No, because I want to -- there are some that we want to settle through defacto actions outside the scope of the agreement. You know, in which we don't want to have a provision in the agreement but in which we want them to take certain actions and they know very well what those actions are. I deliberately stayed away from mentioning it so that it doesn't turn into a face issue.

T: I see.

K: At the press conference.

T: I see. Would one of these be the 145,000 or whatever the number of troops they have there?

K: That certainly is involved in some way.

T: Okay.
But

K: You speculate on that on your own.

T: The other thing was -- But I mean, one has to think in terms of some kind of pull back on their part.

K: That's right.

T: Uh-huh. Okay. The other thing was, will they go out to resupply in terms of non-lethal supplies -- talking about food, clothing. When you talked about no infiltration, presumably you meant just people.

K: But there was a total prohibition against people.

T: Against people, but the resupply of non-lethal stuff. Of course, you keep the body alive there.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively EOL1258
By: H.A. Dillenby

TELCON
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., October 30, 1972

K: Well, it depends on how you define war materials.

T: Oh. What I mean, would food be included in that?

K: No, we haven't really dealt with that. I would say perhaps not but I --
this is one issue that perhaps needs clarification.

T: Um-humm, um-humm. Thieu in the end does have in a sense an ultimate veto doesn't he? I mean, if he were to resign and the . . . . . . . in situations such as the kind of chaos you've been trying to avoid in Saigon does result, it will look like it's all been for naught. That is, Thieu will look like he's ensettled in the end if he really digs his heels in.

K: Yeah.

T: The word "suicide" has been used in this context.

K: By whom?

T: (laughter) By a friend of mine. But I don't mean -- I didn't think it was interpreted in literal terms but it might have been. But I mean, what are the prospects that he will be sensible? I know what you said in your press conference --

K: I think we can work it out if the North Vietnamese make some of the changes we're asking for.

T: But if they don't?

K: Well, then we won't agree so the question on Thieu is moot.

T: Um-humm.

K: If the North Vietnamese -- It's all very well for them to say that we must sign on October 31st. A number of these issues were never settled; a number of those issues they know very well what we want, especially those outside the agreement. And it's up to them to do it. A number of the issues on the international inspection machinery are perfectly obvious. But I think really for the first time, you know, for months the press corps was arousing me about ridiculing every word but a hint of a progress.

DECLASSIFIED

Article E017258
By: D. HARRIS/CLSCY

TELCORN

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., October 30, 1972

- 3 -

T: Yeah.

K: Now every 6 hours they take our temperature.

T: (laughter)

K: We've gotten it this far; we're going to get it the rest of the way.

T: Well, at least we're taking it orally. (laughter) When do you think you
might get a meeting?

K: I don't know.

T: You don't know?

K: No. Again, you know, formally when you were not also up tight -- there wasn't this concern -- Now when 36 hours pass without a meeting, we wouldn't announce it ahead of time anyway.

T: . . . taking me along with you.

K: But what would you have? Now about 200 press will want to come and --
Again don't think that at the next meeting we're going to sign it; we've nev
said this. At the next meeting we're going to see where we stand, then
we're going to consult here, then we're going to consult in Saigon, then
we'll exchange some messages with them and then we may be ready to
sign.

T: Um-humm. But you said it could be cleared up in the next meeting?
I mean, you said you would stay there until it was cleared up.

K: That is right but I have -- but we will not sign it at the next meeting.
First of all, it isn't a bilateral deal.

T: Thieu now wants to sign it himself. There's no problem on that is there?

K: No, No, we weren't going to sign it at that level.

apparently

T: But he ~~preferably~~ wants it psychologically.

K: He may but we won't sign it; he would be the highest ranking man there.

T: (laughter) But if you do, at your next meeting, have --

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 2025

TELCON

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., October 30, 1972

- 4 -

K: If we hammer -- get a basic agreement or make major progress, then we will start another round of talks.

T: But you --

K: I don't give a damn what I said; I'm telling you what we're going to do. We are going to proceed as we have. In the next meeting I think we may well finish the meeting between them and us. It does not finish the discussion between Saigon and Washington and there may still be some points to be cleared up through exchanges and messages.

T: So the timetable kind of splits --

K: I said in a matter of weeks.

T: You said weeks or less, right.

K: That's right.

T: Well, weeks have to be less than a month or else you would say month.

K: Bob, we are going to do this thing right.

T: Yeah.

K: If it takes 5 weeks, and you want to say it has now taken a month or one point two months, then okay. They're not going to judge us by that sort of a nuance.

T: Um-humm. But it certainly looks like it's well past the election then. I mean, that's sort of speculated.

K: I think it's fair to speculate that it will be past the election.

T: Well, okay.

K: But what I said the other day are holes in all essentials.

T: You're not changing from that? Because this business you said don't hold me to what I said or --

K: No, I said, you know, -- I said with good will. You know, if we're going to play this game, you're too sophisticated. If I said -- If I wanted to -- . . . said that with good will on the other side, we can do it in a matter of weeks.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1972
By DAVID HARRIS

TELCOM
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., October 30, 1972

T: Um-humm. How many of the points -- how many points are there that you didn't enumerate? I counted five. You said six or seven so does that leave us two or does it leave us one?

K: No, it'sin that area.

T: Uh-huh. But they know full well what these points are?

K: They know exactly what the points are.

T: You know, Henry, in retrospect do you have any doubt in your mind that you might have given them more reason to believe that we would have signed on October 31 than you indicated at the press conference? I mean, one always tends to re-examine and think back when such charges are made.

K: I said at the press conference that I could understand they had reason to believe that this could have happened. But let's go through the time sequence. The initial draft of this was done on the 11th, the next one was done on the 17th. No later than the 22nd we told them that it would not be signed on the 31st, so the confusion could only have arisen between the 17th and the 23rd. We told them orally a hundred times that we had to get -- to go through this whole process. They chose always to say no, no, no; we can make it.

T: Um-humm.

K: But it's possible that they -- I'm not saying they're in bad faith.

T: Well, is there any digging of heels in here at the White House now because of the way this has been broken?

K: No.

T: No, I mean, there's no petulance as far as --

K: Absolutely not. We're sticking to exactly what we have told them from October 23rd on. But there could have been an honest mistake on their part for the period of two days.

T: Two days, that would be what, from the --?

K: Well, it's conceivable that they considered that when they made those two concessions that they talked about that that completed it.

DECLASSIFIED
Acct. No 017258
By: A. M. H. 10/5/74
Date: 10/5/74

TELCONE

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., October 30, 1972

T: Um-humm.

K: But we told them within two days that we needed additional talks.

T: What were those two concessions, Henry. They mentioned this in their broadcast but you didn't mention it.

K: Well, if they didn't mention what they were, I won't mention it.

T: You can't give any guidance on that?

K: No. But they did make two concessions.

T: I mean, significant ones?

K: Significant concessions.

T: It's going to be a terrible tragedy if this breaks down just because, you know --

K: It won't break down.

T: But we've gotten pretty good signals that it won't break down --

K: That's right. We won't let it break down and they won't let it break down.

T: Yeah, well, I'm going to keep my fingers crossed. I'm always pessimistic about such things. Thanks very much, Henry, and good luck wherever you go.

K: Thank you.

T: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Add. to E01758

By: J. M. DeAlvisay

TelCon
Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

3:20 - Oct 30, 1972

K: Hello.

H: Hi. Have you heard from the North.

K: Yes. Very enigmatic. They are studying our message and will reply later. They are preparing some sort of a play this week.

H: Think so?

K: Yes.

H: Okay. But not tomorrow.

K: No, any time from tomorrow on.

H: How do you read that as what they'll do.

K: I think they'll do one of two things. They may not show up at the meeting on Thursday saying the negotiations are completed. And that anytime we want to sign this, it is fine. But they are not going to talk anymore. Then, we'll take the position, fine, we'll stick by our position and we are sure they'll reconsider. Or, they'll agree to meet, which is unlikely; or they'll take the position that we've cheated them and the agreement is no longer valid and they're breaking off all the talks.

H: That's unlikely, isn't it.

K: Well, it would be insane. But you see one problem they're facing: they're infatuated with each other. And that's the reason they're in a very weak position.

H: Well, if they sit down and talk to you, they could get one in less than a month.

K: Well, I think myself, unfortunately we sent some messages from the President to Dong in which we said the text of the agreement can now be considered complete. And we'll just have to brazen that one out, and say that's right, but then they went to Pham Van Dong and put out all these ambiguities, they put out instructions which we have to take advantage of hiatus between initialing

CLASSIFIED

Autumnal E0725f 8
By DA HAHN 09/15/72

TELCONE
Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger (Continued)

10/30/72

H: Like where we gotta be. Have we told him.
K: Yes.
H: What was his attitude?
K: Well, he's a little fakey about you know destroying hopes.
H: Yeah. Is this a fact whether or not the VP should hit them. Hit McGovern?
K: I think he ought to hit McGovern, anyway.
H: Okay, we're pushing ahead on that.
K: Yeah. Well the only risk is if they blow it up tomorrow, you have to access what the PR effect is, so the Vice President saying we've already negotiated the President's agreement.
H: I think it's okay because I think if they blow it tomorrow, that we've got to move in some way to say that McGovern is the one that blew it.
K: Okay, fine, well then he should do it.
H: I think it's an incredible thing that he would announce that he would re-negotiate the treaty.
K: Yes. I think we should do it.
H: We got to lay the ground work for that.
K: Yes, I think we should definitely do it.
H: They'll come back and say he didn't. That is the point, if we hit it hard enough, we can make that one stick maybe.
K: Okay, I think we should do it.
H: All right.
K: Good.
H: Well, have fun.
K: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal EV 12/25/72
By: HAROLD E. LISSER

TELCOM

B. Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

3:25 - Oct. 30, 1972

K: Hello.

G: Hello, how are you?

K: OKay.

G: Ah, it's a nice day today. What can I tell--

K: Look I can't everyday, with all respects, I can answer you when there is something important happening but I cannot give you leads every day.

G: The reason I--I didn't want to-- there is simply that deadline tomorrow. I just want to make sure that we don't change over night or something.

K: No, how could there be?

G: I don't see either. But I wanted to be able to say so. We are just waiting still?

K: Right.

G: Thank you very much.

K: But the basic trend is, you know, we shouldn't build on histeria what's happened this week or next week.

G: Right.

K: In the basic trend are as I described them.

G: Right.

K: Okay.

G: Thank you

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. only EO17258
Bye! HARRIS c15158

TelCon
Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

4:45 Oct. 30, 1972

K: Hello.

H: One moment sir.

K: Hello, Bob.

H: I was just over talking to the President, he thought we ought to talk for a minute and--about your thoughts at this point in the public handling of the thing tomorrow or whenever it is, assuming they do blow us out of the water.

K: Well, you know, this is a contingency plan. I have no reason to suppose they will. I called Dobrynin, he doesn't think they will.

H: Really!

K: Yes.

H: What does he think of this?

K: He thinks they'll yell and screambut they'll come back and talk.

H: I see. In other words, this is propaganda.

K: Yes.

H: Well, if they do that, we've got no problem, do we?

K: No.

H: The only real problem we got, the thing we've got to give thought to, is we can deal with anything short of a total break off without any real problem, 'cause we can just say we will keep working at it.

K: That's right.

H: But, if we get the total break off--

K: I don't think we'll get a total break off.

H: That's good.

K: Well, it would be a foolhardy thing to do, but if we get a total break off--

CLASSIFIED BY口口口/09/67

10-22-72

By A.M. Haldeman

2

H: They are mad men enough that you've got to assume the
possibility they will do the foolhardy thing.

K: Well, if they do a total breakoff, we must go on the offensive. Instead of defending ourselves, we must say we will publish everything we've offered them, we'll say they couldn't have been serious on getting papers, I'll say why did we not meet that so-called commitment. For three reasons, one because when we were in Saigon we got enumerable intelligence reports that they should receive a maximum of territory between the time of initialling and the time of signing; and that there might be a blood bath; and that is now proven by events, but they are making that effort at just this time. Second, Pham Van Dong's interview, claimed that there--something was a coalition government, but we had a clear understanding it was not a coalition government, so we had to get that straightened out. Third; we had never agreed to the fact that they could keep all their troops in the South which happens to be true, and we wanted a unilateral withdrawal of some of their troops before the thing got signed, we told them we'd work for it, it never happened. We had approached the Soviets and the Chinese for it, it never happened. Therefore, if they are in good faith this thing can be settled very quickly. And we can say these guys are obviously trying to stampede us in the last week of the National election campaign, but he will not let himself be stampeded.

H: I think that's exactly right.

K: And I think he'll gain. We will immediately shoot out of the water this argument that this is just a political ploy.

H: Right.

K: And--

H: The immediate concern here is that you, apparently, made the point strongly to them that we would be taking a murderous beating from the global press, and I think that's what he's trying to figure how we--

K: Well, but you see the liberal press in a way has made it very vulnerable because they are now moving to the right of us, the filthy sons of bitches. Sort of claiming we are letting poor old Thieu down. I don't know whether you've noticed that. But they are sort of niggling away at it. Sort of hinting at it. So, they can't very well blame us for trying to get additional safeguards.

CLASSIFIED
1975.05.26
By: HANNAH

Arlington
E.012558
By: D.

DECLASSIFIED
Actively E017258
By D. HAROLD GILSON

H: I think you're right. I don't see any--

K: I think what has to be done is, I'll just step out there again. I don't think it should be delegated to the Presidential level.

H: I think that's probably right.

K: Immediately, anyway. I mean why should he go on television and explain why he hasn't brought peace.

H: Right. Well, now there's another side of that. He is scheduled and we have not officially announced it, but the word is out, we go on television Thursday night in a political broadcast that's a sort of a look-to-the-future type thing. High level.

K: By Thursday, we'll know.

H: His point is, if this has fallen apart, he can't go on television about looking into the future.

K: No, but he should be very firm and tough.

H: Well, my view is that he can go on talking about looking at the future if he starts out a few minutes saying, you know I had asked for this time tonight to share with the American people some thoughts I have regarding the where we will be going in the next four years. But obviously, high in the minds of everyone tonight is the question of the settlement of Vietnam, and before I cover the other points, I'd like to talk to you about that for a few minutes.

K: I wouldn't even--couldn't he just say, the first item of business will be to end the war in Vietnam. I wouldn't even put it in a special category. We have made major progress. We have achieved the outlines of the draft agreement. You will have noticed that there is some, you know, whatever it is.

H: Yeah.

K: I want you to know that I am committed to a generation of peace. I will not sign a document that mocks our sacrifices, we are so close that we can get it, and I pledge to you that we will get a peace without hurting Vietnam, and we can get it in a brief time with any cooperation from Hanoi. I'd do it very positively.

H: Yeah, and then say now let's turn to what happens beyond that.

4

K: And say that since we have already that outline agreement and since we are -- let's go beyond that.

H: Then start talking about the other things.

K: That's right.

H: I still think we should go on. I still think--

K: I feel he must go on.

H: And talk about other things than Vietnam, so that it doesn't appear that he's obsessed with it even if the news is at that time.

K: And I think he should mention Vietnam anyway, no matter what happens.

H: That's right.

K: The first five minutes should be on Vietnam, very strong, very manly, very positive. We got this far by being a strong man not by being a sap. I mean, that's the difference between him and McGovern.

H: Yep. Now, we cancelled the trip to Chicago tomorrow.

K: Oh, really!

H: Yes, because of the train wreck.

K: I didn't know there was a train wreck.

H: Yes, they had a terrible collision. A commuter train, two piled into each other at 7:00 this morning and they are still trying to find people, bodies and the screaming people and all this, and it has fully dominated all the news about there and there is no point in us going out there and having a big triumphant parade tomorrow.

K: Yes. Are you doing it later?

H: I don't know. Probably not. What's out of it, we'll just drop it.

K: Well, so he'll be here.

H: He'll be here tomorrow. He should be down there tomorrow. He's coming down after dinner tonight.

DECLASSIFIED

Aero. July 22, 1969

By A.M. HARRIS

TelCon

Jack Anderson/Mr. Kissinger

5:12 - Oct. 30, 1972

K: Hello.

A: Yes, sir?

K: How are you?

MX A: Oh, fine, fine.

K: I looked into that submarine issue and this is something that goes back for two years. In fact it was first started in mid-'69 when we got the request, then in early 1970 it was inserted by Mendel Rivers in the House Armed forces bill, and in early '71 Secy. Laird committed himself to it, and this was simply the normal evolution of it. We have anti-submarines--

A: Are these the only ones they have?

K: I didn't see check on it, I think so, I'm certain.

A: Yeah, that's what I gathered.

K: And, we'll do two submarines that would have been retired here. I don't know whether you have the copy of my memo in front of you, if you do you know it requires a formal written understanding that the submariens be used exclusively for anti-submarine training.

A: I was impressed with that, but the people who gave it to me said that this a good trail of our agreements with Peking. That from this background obviously--

K: The people who gave it to you don't know anything about our agreements with Peking.

A: I'm sure they don't.

K: And, no one has a greater interest in maintaining our relations with Peking than I, who originated them.

A: I'm certain of that.

K: And he's been absolutely meticulous with Peking. This is all

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E01728
By DAVID HARDAUGH

TelCon

Hugh Sidey/Mr. Kissingaer

5:17 - Oct. 30, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Henry, how are you?

K: Hugh, how are you!

S: You're the most durable diplomat in history.

K: Never again. I'll tackle one Vietnamese but I'll never again tackle both Vietnamese simultaneously.

S: It's a pretty good feeling though, isn't it. But you've still got the last mile to go.

K: If I can keep both of my maniacal clients steady now for another month, we'll do it.

SL: Say, listen, I have just avoided impinging on your time because you've got plenty to do, but I just like for you Life to come up this week, to know you've got much to do, and said, look can you do a piece, realizing the problems you can't predict anything but kind on the atmosphere of at least the idea of impending peace, I though you might--it's so different from the ending of any war we've had in history, you know, I've been doing a little research about all this--you know even the false rumors of peace in World War II brought historical reaction to the country and all of that. This one winds down in such a different way and all= I heard you talk a little bit one day about--and you mentioned it in your briefing the other day, you know, that we face this task of bringing people together again, and I thought you just might have a thought or two I could dig in.

K: Yeah, I'll see you. What's the latest I can see you?

S: Well I have to write tomorrow of course this whole problem.

K: I'll try to see you in the morning. Unfortunately my Leader will be in tomorrow, so I can't promise anything.

S: You want me to check in earlier.

K: Yeah.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority: E01795
By: HARRY G. GILLEY

3

B: No, but Henry listen. For instance sometime you may be coming up and at the last minute you want it and you don't want to bother anybody, you can get them from here even at the last minute.

K: That's great.

B: So I don't know whether - have my secretary give who to call. Would that be of any help?

SANITIZED

K: That might be nice.

B:

K:

SANITIZED

B: All right, I'll have my secretary and you can consider it done.

K: Good. Marvelous.

B: Henry, all the best to you.

K: I hope to see you on one of my visits to New York.

B: Well, listen you know you can call me on short notice and if I'm in Washington I'll do the same. But to be honest with you at this particular moment, my last thought is to bother you because I'm surprised . . . . . . . .

K: I haven't been in New York very often.

B: OK. Take care and it's all taken care of.

K: Bye, Chuck.

GENUINE ORIGINAL

Telcon
Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger

6:20 Oct 30, 1972

H: I hate to keep bothering you, but the President thought it would be a good idea if you could get today the thoughts that he could work up for the President's TV, on what he ought to say on that opening five minutes. We ought to consider getting out either through Ziegler or Rogers tomorrow after we see what North Vietnam says, if we do, the point that the President is insisting on a delay on this thing because the deal's not made properly.

K: What do you mean the deal is not made properly?

H: Well the point that the reason for the delay is because of the problems.

K: That's right. They may not do anything.

H: Yeah.

K: You know, they have an agonizing problem. Now we just got work they have invited a bunch of peaceniks to come to Hanoi for a ceremony to release prisoners of war. And they are supposed to be there about November 3rd.

H: I see.

K: But I don't see how that necessarily hurts us.

H: I don't either.

K: They will say that this could be the beginning of the whole thing if we only sign the agreement.

H: We'll say we agree. If they only would get the agreement right.

K: That's right.

H: I think we are in good shape. He's simmering down, but you know, he still bouncing around on all this--

K: Well, I'll give him five minutes to work worth.

H: Thank you.

K: Okay.

CLASSIFIED

Auto. only
By: A. H. Deaton

TelCon
Gov. Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

6:55 - 10/30/72

K: Hello.

R: Henry!

K: Nelson! The President said he wanted to see you briefly
at 11:00 tomorrow.

R: Okay.

K: And he wanted me to sit in on it.

R: Great.

K: So, I'll--we can talk afterwards.

R: Right. Well we were planning on--my talk to you--Nancy -- we
were planning to come down to get there at 11:00 at the White
House.

K: Good.

R: So instead of going to you, we'll just--

K: No, no. Come to me and I'll take you in there.

R: Yeah, I'll check with you and we'll go in.

K: Right.

R: This is great, Henry. How do you feel about this piece, we
finally finished up the end of it--simplified it--

K: I think it's outstanding.

R: You really do.

K: Yes.

R: Well, I have not mentioned you in this thing except the reference
to your statement.

K: Oh, I don't think you should mention me. Everyone knows about
our relationship.

Oh, God, I think it's better not to.

CLASSIFIED

Allotted E01755 f
By: HARRISON

TELCORN

Helen Thomas/Kissinger

9:10 a.m. - 10/31/72

K: Hello.

T: Hi, Dr. Kissinger. How are you?

K: Helen, how are you?

T: I didn't think that you would answer this telephone.

K: You're a friend.

T: I'm very grateful. AP was saying all night that you're going to
fly to Paris probably Friday and you'll have a meeting this weekend
and sign something on Sunday.

K: Look, they keep taking my temperature every five minutes. I have
no present plans to leave. And after the next meeting just for your
guidance - all of this is not for quotation.

T: That's right. Can I use it for background?

K: Yeh, but after the next meeting there won't be any signing either.
It will be just the basis for another round of consultations so I
don't want to leave the impression that I'm going to go there and
that we'll sign there. We'll go there and we'll make major progress,
I hope in the negotiations and then that will be the basis for another
round of consultations.

T: That's in Saigon, huh?

K: Probably again with Hanoi but

T: You mean after Paris there would be Saigon and Hanoi?

K: Well, there might have to be some exchanges of cables and so forth.

T: Right. Is there anything set now?

K: No.

T: Pardon?

K: There is nothing definite set.

DRECLASSIFIED

2

T: Nothing definite. Do you think it'll come this week?

K: I just don't want to speculate.

T: You're here.

K: Well, actually I'm on a hookup from Paris.

T: But nothing definite. But you sound hopeful.

K: Well, I think we, having come this far, one would hate to think that one can't go the rest of the - the last 10% of the way.

T: Is there a possibility of a meeting this week?

T: But you've ruled out your kind of timetable a

K: I think it's improbable that we'll sign anything before the election.

T: Right. That's what I wondered.

K: But this is background. Don't say Kissinger.

T: Right.

K: Don't say somebody with a foreign accent.

T: (Laughs) How did you know?

K: OK, Helen.

T: Thanks a million. I appreciate it.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By DAVID HARRIS

TELCONE

Ambassador Sullivan/Kissinger

11:42 a.m. - 10/31/72

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Bill, our little darlings have blown their stack again.

S: Which ones? The North?

K: The North.

S: The Madame Binh statement.

K: No, no, I don't know what she said. Hanoi Radio has come out with a long statement about ______; hurts my feelings, they call me a liar. I really don't like that.

S: Well, you're being called the same by the South so you're in good company.

K: Is the South calling me a liar too?

S: No, they just say you're over zealous. Henry, I had a call from the Canadians.

K: Yeh. We can't call Trudeau today, can we?

S: No, you can't.

K: I like that good foreign policy adviser I keep getting.

S: Well, he said he'd squeak by and he didn't squeak by yet. Anyway their statement is that in view of the current situation they can't give us an answer and so - until they can refer to "the government" or "a government."

K: Yeh.

S: Their Ambassador was up in Ottawa over the weekend and should be arriving in about an hour and they'll call me if he's got any more details from that but they don't see that they can give us an answer until things clarify.

DECLASSIFIED

AUGUST 5 1972
By: HARRY GIBSON

RECLASSIFIED
Authority EO17251
By: HAROLD GIBSON

K: Yeh. Say do you want to take a look at that Hanoi Radio statement. It's essentially what they said the other day.

S: I haven't seen it; I'll take a look at it.

K: And you know they claim

S: Well, they're trying to campaign around the world. As you know, they've got all sorts of people including the

K: They've got the South Vietnamese running around the world; the North Vietnamese running around the world.

S: They'll probably meet each other. The other thing that you probably

K: And then they say that on the 9th of November - of February, I said that everyone knows all secret negotiations with North Vietnam have been conducted after all necessary consultations with President Thieu and now I'm suddenly saying there wasn't any consultation with President Thieu so obviously I'm not telling the truth.

S: Yeh, well, they'll squeal for another few days, Henry. On the POW issue you know about these five peaceniks that are going up to Hanoi.

K: Yeh.

S: I assume that's just for a separate release in advance, but it seems to me that if they should stay there, we should make clear that there'll be no signature until they get those people out of the country. We don't want to have a travesty with those guys around.

K: Well there won't be any signature that soon anyway.

S: They're maybe going to release some others now to try to bring additional pressure on us.

K: Well, I think - Can you take a look at that Hanoi thing and see - it's 28. And can you call me back?

S: I'll give you a ring back. Right.

K: Good.

S: You got the papers John and Win worked on yesterday?

K: Yeh, I think that's all right now, don't you?

TELCOM

Max Frankel/Mr. Kissinger

11:55 a.m. 10/31/72

MF: Hello Henry, I am so sorry to bother you, I wouldn't unless we were in this jam.

HK: No, not at all.

MF: K don't know whether you have seen this _Los Angeles Times_ this morning.

HK: Yeh.

MF: But thier story is being picked up rather roundly, and it is so clearly not our understanding or our readings on this matter. I wanted to double check with you.

HK: Strictly now, I don't know what background is, they got something totally screwed up--what we have wanted to arrange is for them to withdraw some of their forces from the North--not all of them--on the model that they did --that Harriman claims they did in '68, but to do that outside of the agreement--there is no question of their withdrawing all their forces

MF: Right. Right.

HK: But we have not made a public issue of it because we didn't want to turn it into a test of manhood.

MF: Well you are almost quoting what I told Gurstman I thought wasthe case.

HK: Well that is the case.

MF: In fact there had been some motions to that in recent weeks.

HK: In fact there has been one division that has started moving in that direction--we thought if we could get three of those divisions out that were the invasions divisions that would have to go a long distance back--now the reason I didn't use it in my briefing is because I wanted to let them do it on their own. But again for your guidance they had clearly understood that this is what we were looking for before the

RECLASSIFIED

Authorized ED 1258
By D.G. Harriman

CLASSIFIED
ADVERTISING

Page 2

signing and it hadn't happened.

MF: Right. Would they go all the way north?

HK: How far they would go is their business.

MF: Yeh, I mean as opposed to Laos or Cambodia--

HK: All the way north this about 30 kilometers. In fact its closer to the north and Laos or Cambodia.

MF: Right and that would still leave 145--

HK: No that would be some less--about 100-110. Right it as a speculation of what the officials say.

MF: Right. Okay.

HK: In fact I was going to have a talk with you about that later this week, just to make clear where we stood on it. But I am trying to avoid turning this into a test of manhood because both Vietnams are at this moment are screaming at the top of their lungs--I have united them in their common dislike of me.

MF: (laughing)

HK: I don't whether you have seen Radio Hanoi screaming

MF: No, I haven't--this is the day. ---Listen let me tell you one other scenario --

HK: They said we must sign today--we --not we must sign, you know they say we have no choice except to sign the agreement--

MF: Hell, they don't have anybody there to sign either.

HK: No, they don't say we have to sign today, no their position is that it is this agreement or nothing, but I am convinced they cannot maintain that position.

MF: Am I wrong in thinking that maybe Thieu's biggest demand in all this is simply time--(1) time to get ready, and (2) time to make it look like he got something.

HK: That's my interpretation.

MF: But it is not a fixed deal.

H

CLASSIFIED

Antiquity E017258

By D. H. P. Olshevsky

Page 3

HK: No.

MF: I mean it's not that you told him all right--

HK: No, no, There are some real things that have to be changed-- we really--we have when we were in Saigon, we thought got about 20 intelligence reports that they were going to start a big push around ceasefire time and ignore the ceasefire for about three days. That was one problem. The second makes us want to put the international machinery into place--secondly, we had the Pham Van Dong interview with Newsweek which is totally contrary to the legislative record which I really can demonstrate overwhelmingly that was the big one on October 8, so I want to get that cleared up and thirdly, there is that particular troop issue which we were discussing --not of all the troops but of that particular segment.

MF: But you were fairly sure of that even before Saigon that they would make some gesture.

HK: I had told them repeatedly, I don't want to get into the business of putting out the record because I really want so that we can this settled. They had no reason to doubt that this would happen. And to make sure that we reinforced it by telling some of their friends about it.

MF: Right. Okay, the rest if I read this right, what they are saying they will pull out more as Saigon demobilizes

HK: That's exactly right. And that actually works in Saigon's favor because the proportions and they can't pull out all because they had to protect their interests--this is not an offensive force Max if you look at it, that decimated force that have in the south --as you look at it from the point of view of the VC cadre who are getting nothing for their 10 years of struggle and have to leave people in Thieu's trails than they have running around free. For the whole Vietnamese army to pull out would be intolerable.

MF: Hm huh.

HK: These demobilizations provisions are basically working in favor of Saigon

MF: What about the one to one replacement factor--what would that be figured at? How does one ever agree on how many troops they had in--

HK: No, they can't replace troops. They can replace equipment, troops cannot be replaced. And that's another reason why their forces in the south have to be. They

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E017258

By DAVID HARVEY GIBSON

Page 4

HK: They can replace equipment, but not troops. But they don't have a hell of a lot of equipment down there to replace. Most of their tanks are destroyed. They have light equipment but not heavy.

MF: Okay. When are you going to Paris.

HK: Oh, I'm negotiating still. I think they now have to go through an exercise of a few days of proving their manhood. And I think--the Times has been fine--I've no complaints--everyday six newsmen call in here to take our temperature.

MF: I am sorry--Bernie told me the number of times you had kindly returned his call and I told him for God's sake don't wear out your welcome--

HK: But you've been very decent and I'll do my best. I don't look for and tremendous changes--both Vietnamese sides now have to prove their manhood but the factors that got us this far its really hard to see--Afternoon all what Hanois has done is published a peace agreement and is going to say they now won't even talk about the things that need to be done.

MF: No and what the heck they actually have achieved something in this brawl and that is they got your recommitment so what's going in blind--even if they wanted to be as hardnosed about some of the points you want to raise--they've got you hooked once you walk in that door. The point is you have to get up with an agreement--

HK: That I won't say, but I will say that they know I am not going in there and kick their old agreement over and I'm not saying we would settle for less that I have asked for. What I have asked for is for a serious--if they are serious why should they not permit the supervisory machinery to be in place. Why should they not clear up the ambiguities of the administrative structure and why should they not pull out a few divisions in an area that's a quagmire anyway.

MF: Right and why should they not realize who the pressure is on once you go into that door.

HK: Yeh, but I wouldn't count on that if I were they--I've walked in that door

MF: (laughing) no, but you guys have gone pretty far--I'm thinking of it from the point of view of negotiating from their side--

HK: We've gone pretty far from the point of kicking over the agreement
--we can't just be

MF: That's right.

HK: the agreement--but we can certainly continue to insist on what we
have asked for. But that's not a hell of a risk for them.

MF: No, I wouldn't think so and I think you'll find that half of these phone
calls aimed at you in the days to come are just to find out whether
you are still around (laughing)

HK: You really haven't really given us any trouble. Okay.

MF: Okay.

CLASSIFIED

Allotted E0172358
By: HARRY D. O'Leary

TELCONE

Ambassador Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

12:09 p.m.

10/31/72

AS: Well I read this thing I would have about three comments--one it's real anguish and I think it is probably does reflect the feeling that they have been--

HK: Screwed.

AS: Screwed. Point two that last paragraph poses a very tough stand whether that means literally what it says or not I think is open to question but it may mean that they are trying to hang that tough-- as far as they can, but the third thing I'd say is that it seems to me that has to be read against what Madam Binh said yesterday in Paris which in effect said that if this thing is reopened we will want to raise a few points of our own--that's seems to me a weak premise apriori a decision that it will be reopened and that plus the private message you received would suggest that have to hang tough for a few days before they agree to--

HK: which is great for me which means we can't meet until after the election. I think they think this is a diabolical plot to get their cadres hanging out there and two to get us through the election with a peace move--

AS: And then I think they are worried as to what we will do after the election-- and when they see some enhanced moving around, they may get even more worried, but if our basic estimate is correct--if that they really want an agreement, then I think--

HK: I'm getting very relaxed.

AS: Don't relax too much--incidentally you'll be amused--on the secure line from Paris said that the French had moved a new big cable and campaign is going on and everything else into the __________ this morning just in case there was a signing ceremony they didn't know about and now they had to move it all out. (laughing)

HK: (laughing) Okay--thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Agency E017258
Date HAR 10/31/72
By DA

TELCOM

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

2:47 p.m. 10/31/72

MK: Henry?

HK: Marvin, you keep taking my temperature, twice a week.

MK: We're in this so terribly important--I at least try to get some of this stuff right.

HK: No, no, --you've been--almost always I agree with your judgment.

MK: I don't mean to bug you.

HK: No, no, you don't bug me.

MK: Henry--Both Toth who's a guy in whom I have a lot of confidence and a great deal of respect has a story today--

HK: I saw it.

MK: I was wondering to what extent--

HK: No, he went overboard--we want the removal of some of their troops but not of all of their troops.

MK: Is the removal necessary before the signing?

HK: Not before the signing, but we have to have some understanding with respect to it.

MK: Beforehand--so this is clearly then one of the issues that you must deal with before the signing and--

HK: Right, but I don't want to make a big affair out of it not because it isn't an issue, but because I don't want to turn it into a test of manhood. So I really think--the more low-keyed you can keep it, the better it would be.

MK: Right. Now is the DMZ as well as a factor at this point--the restoration of the '68 understanding?

HK: I think we have a fairly satisfactory understanding with respect to the DMZ--that's not the big thing--because we can get the--whatever is out can't come back in and you know I think the issue has to be seen in general terms of their troops--most of the commentary on that is misleading. Because either they will keep their promise of not infiltrating in which case what they have done there really has a function primarily of protecting their interest structure and has no offensive capability.

RECLASSIFIED

Antonly ED1725f
By D.G. HARRIS-Glisson

Page 2

MK: Yeh.

HK: Or they will infiltrate and keep their undertaking in which case it wouldn't make any difference how few they had to begin with--they should always restore them.

MK: Just one other question if I might--

HK: This is for your guidance--

MK: No, I understand. Now in terms of some clear definition of the function of the National Council, I listened very carefully last night to a piece that Severied had on the air and listen especially to the point that he made concerning unanimity which is obviously your point of last week, now, my own understanding communist activities would lead me to believe that this Council cannot function if there is to be unanimity--in other words, you kind built in for condition of paralysis--if that's the case, what is the prupose--I'm trying to understand that very hard--I don't quite grasp it.

HK: First of all there are two--several aspects about that council Marvin. First it's functions are to promote observance of the ceasefire which is a nonfunction. And to organize and supervise elections, which the parties have to first have to agree--it cannot call an election. Those are its only functions. Now what is the purpose of the council? Do you want my frank, personal opinion.

MK: Yes please.

HK: My personal opinion is that here these people were having asked for a coalition government that would replace all existing institutions and they needed some facesaving vestigial thing that had some of the coalition aspects without any power. And I look at it as a facesaver for them.

MK: I see. Well it would indicated that --not just being eager but almost desperate to get a settlement.

HK: Yeh, I think that's right. And if you look at the legislative history, after we are through with a settlement, I will put it before you. During the summer they were talking coalition government and then they were gradually weakening the composition of it, but they always maintained the coalition government would replace all existing governments, and you know they changed the composition, they put safeguards in it, but October 8 they gave that up totally but that is my reading of it.

DECLASSIFIED

Act.ly E017258
By: D. MAR. Deplacy

Page 2

MK: Yeh.

MK: No, I understand. Now in terms of some clear definition of the function of the National Council, I listened very carefully last night to a piece that Severied had on the air and listen especially to the point that he made concerning unanimity which is obviously your point of last week, now, my own understanding communist activities would lead me to believe that this Council cannot function if there is to be unanimity--in other words, you kind built in for condition of paralysis--if that's the case, what is the purpose--I'm trying to understand that very hard--I don't quite grasp it.

HK: First of all there are two--several aspects about that council Marvin. First it's functions are to promote observance of the ceasefire which is a nonfunction. And to organize and supervise elections to which the part have to first have to agree--it cannot call an election. Those are its only functions. Now what is the purpose of the council? Do you want my frank, personal opinion.

MK: Yes please.

DECLASSIFIED

Actively E017258
By: D.M. DePistley

Page 3

MK: Henry, do you have a date set for your next meeting?

HK: No,

MK: You're still talking about that.

HK: Yeh.

MK: And is it possible that you would go to Hanoi.

HK: Not unless We have an agreement and I don't to discuss it--I don't know, it's not under discussion at this moment.

MK: What's under discussion is that you will have another meeting in which you can take care of some of these issues. And the importance of the National Council at this next session--

HK: The only importance is to remove the ambiguities concerning the coalition. And I think there is no ambiguity--this is why I think it is going to be solved.

MK: So that all of the talk--for example, Hanoi Radio has a long

HK: But you'd expect that.

MK: Right and they've begun to kind of picket you which I hadn't read before in terms of their deceiving opinion and that sort of thing. That doesn't disturb you at this point.

HK: Not yet.

MK: You feel the think is pretty on track.

HK: Look, it's a tramautic experience for them--they were not unreasonable to assume that it might get signed and then particularly as they tuned out every contrary statement, I have 10 pages of quotes in which I told them what the problems were, but they tuned them out and I think --if they are now in the dilemma that they don't want to do anything that helps the President gets re-elected and I think the logic of events is going to drive us back to it...the solution.

MK: But perhaps with some delay of weeks of this point.

HK: Maybe two weeks, I don't know.

MK: Thank you so very much.

HK: Not at all.

DECLASSIFIED

Act. No. 012951
By: HAROLD GLOSSER

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:03 p.m., October 31, 1972

P: I just called to ask how you got along with Lovestone, did you get along --

K: Oh, very well. Total support.

P: He understood it?

K: Absolutely, 100%.

P: Did he think he could get Meany to --

K: No problem with Meany.

P: Yeah. And incidentally, the story played well tonight in the Star at least.

K: Yeah.

P: I mean, they didn't make a big blip about it.

K: No, no. But Lovestone is 100% supportive.

P: Good.

K: I explained the plan --

P: ... it played here, I'm just looking at the headlines. It says well, that the deadline passed but that we're firm and everything like that. That sounds right to me.

K: That's right. I think we're in good shape.

P: Okay, fine. Thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Agency E01758
By DAVID B. CHESNED

TELCORN

Amb. Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p.m., October 31, 1972

J: Yes, Henry.

K: I'm returning your call.

J: Oh, oh, oh, I'm sorry -- I got a hold of Al and I forgot to cancel. It's about, you know, what they're doing in Paris.

K: Yeah, Well, it's totally intolerable.

J: Oh, yes, yes. Well, we're getting out -- Al and Bill and I talked about it and it should be over to you in a few minutes, a message that we're sending.

K: Good.

J: And then it was agreed that Al will send a backup message referring to the talk yesterday.

K: Right.

J: That Ellsworth had.

K: Right.

J: And the two will compliment each other.

K: Yeah, we sent a really scorching Presidential message to Thieu.

J: Yeah, I know. And whether this was done before that or whether Lam is being more Catholic than the Pope or what we don't know, we'll just have to find out.

K: You think we can get it changed?

J: Oh, we must get it changed.

K: Yeah.

J: Yeah. But I think it may require -- Well, I haven't seen the exact text of the exchange yesterday. If there's anything more to be said, I think that in your channel you ought to give Ellsworth the authority to use the President's name in whatever way would be appropriate in the light of the exchange that took place yesterday.

DECLASSIFIED