STATEMENT BY DAVID L. AARON
---
THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
---
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to comment
on the issues that this Commission has been
commanded to address.

Latin America has long been a major concern in my
public career. I attended college in Mexico. I
speak Spanish. My first assignment in the Foreign Service,
at the height of the Alliance for Progress, was to Ecuador,
where violence, coups and leftist insurgency were then
prevalent. As Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs in the Carter Administration,
I was the most senior White House official responsible
for day-to-day supervision of our efforts to deal with the
turmoil in El Salvador.

Nonetheless, I do not regard myself as an expert in
Central America. I have followed developments in the media,
but I do not have the benefit of the most current intelli-
gence. For this reason, I will not try to add to the volumes
of data already collected by this Commission. Rather, I
will try to comment upon some of the principal issues
central to a successful execution of your mandate: What
are our national interests, what criteria are key to defining
our objectives, and what are some of the important elements
of a bipartisan consensus. For the most part, I am going to
focus my attention on El Salvador and Nicaragua for obvious
reasons.

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Increasingly, the American public tends to impose the optic of Vietnam on developments in Central America. I want to say at the outset that this is a mistake. Central America is not Vietnam. But it would be an even greater mistake not to recognize that Washington is still Washington. And that the American people are still the American people. In grappling with the struggle in El Salvador, Nicaragua and the rest of the region, the Commission must bear in mind that Washington tends to react in predictable ways to insurgent threats. Similarly, the American people go through familiar cycles and divide along natural lines when confronted with foreign entanglements that have elements of moral ambiguity.

So this Commission faces a profound challenge in devising an approach that will meet our overall national interests. By national interests. I mean not only our strategic interests and our global political interests, but also our over-riding interest in safeguarding our national unity and strength. Let me comment briefly on each of these components of our national interest.

First, I believe our strategic interest in Central America is obvious. The leading elements within the Sandinista Government and some of the most powerful factions in the Salvadorian Front are self-avowed enemies of the United States. That they may have justification for their hostility is unfortunate but beside the point. It offers

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important lessons for our policy towards people fighting
oppression, but must not deflect our attention from
the fact that many of the key people regard us as their enemies.

As a result, they can be expected to do what they
can to undermine American power and influence in the
region and to make common cause with our adversaries
elsewhere in the world--in particular, the Soviet Union.
Their fear of United States intervention helps rationalize
their desire for solidarity with the Communist bloc, but
hostility to the U.S. is also required in order to
silence their domestic opposition and to wrap themselves
in the political legitimacy of nationalism.

Nicaragua's commitment to a "revolution without frontiers" is thus a basic political requirement as well as a central feature of the Sandinista's ideological orientation.
One does not have to believe in abstract theories about "dominoes" to be concerned that the political technology as well as the material means for such revolutions may spread elsewhere in Central America and, ultimately, to
The consequences for the United States of a revolution in Mexico, with our long undefended border and tens of millions of citizens of Mexican origin, cannot even be imagined. So we need not even get to the question of Soviet military bases in Central America in order to assert a major strategic interest in the region.

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(c)

Second, the United States also has global political interests which are affected by developments in Central America. However, it is not merely a question of proving that we can turn back the Communists in our own hemisphere. Our allies in Europe watch to see if we can protect our security interests without jeopardizing their own. Our friends in this hemisphere watch to see if we can handle the challenge in a way that does not spread the revolution, that does not undermine their own stability, legitimacy and capacity to cooperate with us.

People throughout the world who admire America as the bastion of democratic values--of respect for human rights, liberty and social justice--watch to see if we can conduct a policy that does not violate the principles that legitimize our world leadership. And our adversaries watch, too--they watch to see if in our struggle to deal with Central America, we will tear ourselves apart.

This leads me to the third and, ultimately, most important national interest--preserving our national unity. Satisfying this interest requires recognition that basic values that Americans hold dear are at war in Central America. Decent Americans suddenly transported to El Salvador today or Nicaragua under Somoza would recoil in horror at the injustice, poverty, terror and hopelessness fostered by political leaders claiming to be our

friends. Americans are naturally sympathetic to those who rise up against such oppression and feel degraded to be identified with it.

At the same time, most Americans recognize that the Marxist-Leninists who pretend to speak of a better life for their people are, in fact, willing to betray virtually every human value to maintain their grip on power.

Grenada is a current example. This has led some to argue that Central America is a moral quagmire and that we should be satisfied if we can sustain authoritarian governments, for they at least can change. Unfortunately, the record suggests that they change into totalitarian governments hostile to the United States.

Most important, large groups of Americans have repeatedly demonstrated that they will not support regimes that oppress their own people. As a democracy, we must have a foreign policy rooted in our belif in the consent of the governed. Disaffection is already far advanced in regard to El Salvador, not only among traditiona peace groups but also the Catholic Church, the Labor Movement, and the public-at-large.

We do not escape the dilemma by labelling the turmoil in the region as a product of outsiders. I do not wish to underestimate the role played by Cuba and the Soviet Union. But the American people realize that the "outside agitator" line is at best an incomplete description of the problem. They know that there are real wrongs in

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the situation, and that our policy must at the minimum
hold out some hope of righting them.

Thus, the most important task of the Commission is
as obvious as its title, to create a genuine bipartisan
approach. To deal with them, it is essential that our
leadership husband our capacity to act. The unity I speak
of cannot be orthodoxy imposed by the White House. It
must come from a genuine respect for, and accommodation
to, the deeply held views of others.

The record of this Administration until now on this
point is not encouraging. The Administration came to
power opposing the Panama Canal Treaties, and blaming
armed rebellion in Central American on the Democrats'
"weakness" and naive preoccupation with Human Rights.
After three years of deeping conflict and diminishing
alternatives, the Administration should not be surprised
if its conversion to bipartisanship is greeted with
skepticism. This places an additional burden on this
Commission to define our objectives in Central America
in terms that can secure genuine bipartisan support.

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It is evident that our interests would be best served
by stable democratic governments, friendly to the United
States. This is an objective that would command the
support of all Americans. In the long run, this objective
can only be obtained in a climate of economic growth and
social reform. The United States can make a major contri-
bution to such an environment through economic assistance--
what many call a "Marshall Plan" for the Americas. Such
assistance is all the more critical in defusing the poten-
tially explosive consequences of the massive debt crisis
in the region.

But what does this objective--stable democratic
governments friendly to the U.S.-- mean in the near term?
In the last few years, we have clearly moved in the oppo-
site direction. The whole region is less stable. Demo-
cracy and human rights are in retreat. Anti-Americanism
is on the rise, even though there is also greater fear of
Cuba and their Marxist-Leninist allies. How should we
define our objectives in this environment and what should
be our means to achieve them?

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The answer lies in what is feasible. I'm not now
in a position to make a firm judgement as to what is
feasible in Central America today. Three years ago,
Nicaragua still had strong pluralistic elements.
A moderate progressive middle sector existed in
El Salvador. Today, do these alternative political
structures still exist? Can they be made effective? The
Commission must face this difficult judgement call directly;
every conclusion as to the appropriate policy flows from
the question of what is feasible.

You will be under great pressure to be optimistic.
It is natural for policymakers to regard the desirable
as the doable. I urge you to be conservative in your
judgements. It is not defeatist to be objective. To
paraphrase President John Kennedy, sound policy is the
art of the possible.

Roughly speaking, the Commission must apply the test
of feasibility to the three broad approaches open to us:
First, we can seek a military defeat for the Marxist-
Leninists; second, we can use military and political
means to strengthen alternative political structures that
might displace them; and third, we can quarantine them.

The first approach is not a "straw man" option.
Many believe it is the policy of this Administration. In
Nicaragua, we are supporting insurgents whose avowed pur-
pose is to overthrow the Sandinistas. The recent speech

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by Dr. Iklé speaking for the Administration seems to
suggest that is our purpose, too. But no one believes
the Contras can win.

The damage they inflict only strengthens the Sandi-
nistas politically and provides a pretext for further
Cuban and Soviet intervention. If our purpose were to
set up a potential trade-off for Nicaraguan concessions,
American support for the Contras might be explicable.
But since there is no apparent American interests in serious
negotiations, the so-called Covert Action program is
inexplicable. I am afraid that the program gives us the
feeling we are doing something without really doing anything
that is effective.

In El Salvador, the Administration seems also to
be seeking a military solution. Neither reform nor human
rights are being used as important instruments of policy. But
despite talk about the increasing effectiveness of the
Salvadorian Army, which echoes the "dry season, wet
season" optimism of a different time and place, grave
doubts persist about its ability to cope with the insur-
gency.

Right Wing death squads are presently embarked on a
wave of terror unprecedented even in that block-soaked
little country. As the non-Marxist reformers are executed,
driven into exile or driven into the arms of the guerillas,

the political foundations for a successful military
campaign against the guerillas is undermined. Without
hope of reform, what have the mass of Salvadorians to
fight for?

For those who are convinced we <u>can</u> defeat the rebels
in Salvador and/or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, it is
essential to assess the price. Will American intervention
be required? If we undertake such an effort, what will
be the impact on neighboring countries--Honduras and
Costa Rica? Will we spread the flames of revolution?
What will be the reaction of our allies in Europe and our
friends elsewhere in Latin America? What will be the
response of the Soviet Union and Cuba? And if the United
States must intervene directly, what will be the price
paid at home?

Finally, even if we can win militarily, what will we
gain? Will we have advanced democracy? Liberty? Justice?
Or will we only have postponed the day of reckoning with the
people of Central America? If we fail to assess the costs
and the gains accurately, we will pay dearly in terms of our
national interests.

The second approach is to combine military and political
means to install more moderate regimes in either El Salvador,
Nicaragua or both.

In Nicaragua, this is a formidable task. The Contras
are like the Russian White Army and to succeed would need a
sizeable American expeditionary force to impose them upon

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the people of Nicaragua. This, of course, is tantamount
to the first approach. Whether any potentially effective
political opposition to the Sandinistas has survived inside
Nicaragua, I do not know, but it appears doubtful.

In El Salvador, the question is similar: Are there
sufficient centerist forces that can somehow be brought
to control the terrorist right and also deal effectively
with the leftist insurgency? By "deal effectively," I
mean pursuing a progressive domestic program that under-
cuts and divides the FDR-FMLN while maintaining military
security. This was the strategy of the Carter Administra-
tion, and I believe it was succeeding. Now we may be
past the point where that can work.

For the last several years, the extreme right has
felt it had a blank check from the U.S. Administration
which had defined the problem in terms of outside
Communist intervention and has pledged to protect the
present regime. Accordingly, its rulers have felt free
to put reform into reverse and to accelerate the liquida-
tion of moderate progressives.

The Marxists guerillas have pursued the same strategy
of exterminating reformers in the center. As a result,
American options have now reached the point where we may
well be faced with the choice of supporting the Right no
matter what, (with the obvious strains on our political
system), or of containing the consequences of the Right's
inevitable collapse.

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I hope I am not being too pessimistic. I hope that the possibility still exists of a more broadly based moderate and progressive government in El Salvador. Certainly, the Catholic Church remains a powerful force for non-Communist reform and stability. I do not believe such a government can come into being, however, unless there is a negotiated solution to the conflict. The war and its continuation has done more to decimate the ranks of the center than it has the extremes.

The important thing about serious negotiations is that they can give us leverage over both the right and the left. Now the Right feels it has an open-ended commitment. Only when we develop possible alternatives through direct contact with the guerillas will we give the Right the incentive to pursue essential reforms seriously. And only through direct talks can we assess the possibility of ultimately splitting the non-Marxist-Leninists away from the FDR-FMLN.

I am under no illusions that negotiations will be easy or even fruitful. But if there is any hope for a moderate democratic center to prevail in El Salvador, it can only come about as the result of negotiations.

The third approach is also not a straw man option. To the extent that the other options may not be feasible,

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(c)

we will be faced with the challenge of trying to quarantine Marxist-Leninist dominated governments in Nicaragua, and possibly even El Salvador. The requirements of such a quarantine are several:

- No Soviet military bases in Central America

- Limits on the scale and type of arms imported into the region

- Removal of Cuban military advisors

- A clear commitment not to facilitate armed insurrection and subversion in neighboring countries.

The fulfillment of these requirements and other points that may be necessary will be difficult. Wide-ranging negotiations, possibility with Cuba and certainly with the Soviet Union, would undoubtedly be essential. If, as has been widely rumoured, President Reagan still hopes for a U.S.-Soviet summit before the next election, establishing rules for Soviet behavior in Central America should be high on his agenda and a principal criteria by which the success of such a meeting should be judged.

These, then, are the choices I believe the Committee faces:

- If you believe that military defeat of the Marxist-Leninists in El Salvador and Nicaragua is feasible and desirable, you must make the case, including the cost, and the ultimate gain, plain to the American people;

- If, on the other hand, you believe the Marxists can be displaced or, at best, only quarantined, you should

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be equally candid. If you conclude that quarantine is the only feasible choice, you will make an incalculable contribution to our domestic political tranquillity by frankly telling the American people that this is so. And in either event, you should tell the Administration that its policy of avoiding serious negotiations is wrong.

Whatever the judgement of the Commission regarding Central America, it will also have to consider the deep division in this country on this issue. Central America is a legitimate partisan issue and was used as such effectively and, to some extent, unfairly by the Republicans in 1980. If, for the sake of national interest, the Democrats are to forego the opportunity for public debate in 1984, they have a right to ask for some consideration in return. In this connection, several things would be helpful to enhance the credibility of the Commission and bipartisan support for your conclusions.

-- First, in analyzing how we arrived at the present impasse, your findings must frankly acknowledge the errors and mistakes of this Administration, not merely those of past administrations. Democrats are simply not going to accept responsibility for the deterioration in Central America over the last three years.

-- Second, your findings should acknowledge the importance and success of the Panama Canal Treaties as

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providing an essential element of stability in the region.
Can you imagine what we would be facing if there were an
upheaval in Panama as well? Many who supported these
treaties had their foresight rewarded by being grievously
attacked by leading figures in this Administration. The
statesmanship of those who supported the Treaties should
be acknowledge by the Commission.

-- Third, the Commission should avoid any hint of a
package deal--that the Democrats get a Marshall Plan for
Central America in return for endorsement of the Adminis-
tration's deepening military involvement in the region.
That would only corrupt the bipartisan effort you have
been asked to undertake. Long-term economic aid for
Central America is desirable in its own right and should
stand on its own feet. Short-term aid and the extent
of continued military support for El Salvador should be
linked to the strategy you judge feasible and to an appro-
priate response by those who pull the strings in that
country.

-- Fourth, I would hope you could find a way to
acknowledge the undesirability of regularizing government
by commission. Commissions have their place in our
political system, but they must not be allowed to undermine
the Constitutional institutions of Government no the
democratic principle of the accountability of elected
officials. The Commission's work should be self-liquidating.

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If you can succeed in bringing about a bipartisan approach to Central America after all the partisan and ideological bitterness of recent years over foreign policy, you will have made a singular contribution. You will have shown the way to Republicans and Democrats alike to work within the Constitutional institutions of our republic toward the broad consensus needed to sustain our nation's leadership in the troubled times ahead.