If you have a time machine, go back in time and save the world.
What would that be like?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KML NAVAQ Date: 5/13/04

Henry Kissinger/Melvin Laird

5/13/72 9:15 a.m.

HAK: You sure are raising hell all over the country, aren't you Mel.

MEL: Oh no, I have been very quite.

HAK: I saw you raising hell in Texas.

ML: Well, you have to raise a little hell once in a while.

HAK: I never got a chance to call you. I think you did a great job at your press conference. Dobrynin didn't in case you want to know.

ML: He didn't like it, huh.

HAK: He thought you were a little tough.

ML: Well, it is nice to hear the doves.

HAK: I understood what you did. I admire what you did.

ML: Say Henry, we dropped the Tan Waug bridge for the first time.

HAK: Oh, it is the Tan Waug bridge.

ML: Right, the one span is in the water and this is something--another thing I am calling you about. I wanted to check out one thing, it has to do with the timing of this thing on our personnel moves, has the President had a chance to go over that memorandum

HAK: No, I am taking it up to him this morning.

ML: One of my problems over here is that everybody is throughout the services is waiting for the new Chairman and also they are waiting for the Chief of Staff for the Army. You get more damn speculation on it because --

HAK: May I make a suggestion to you Mel? Let's move on the Chairman on Monday--I will handle the Chief of Staff of the Army for you, but I think if we can wait a week, you will get a better reception.

ML: The problem that we have there is that if we go with one and not the other, I think it is better to wait a week on both. That will make so much speculation during that whole week, and I don't think that is

TELCORN

OECIASSIFIED

E.O 12958, Sec. 3.6

Page 2

good out on South Vietnam.

HAK: Yes, but who is going to replace him?

ML: We can talk about that. I think that Freddy Wyan should replace him and that we should put up some other army deputy in there with him for a period of time if you want to put in some guy who talks tough, that is alright, but I mean we got a lot of tough talkers around here that really aren't

HAK: I know what you are talking about

ML: We can do that as a deputy to him. This guy is a soft-talker, but he is no goddamn patsy, I will tell you that--I was out there when he had a --

HAK: I was out there when he had the 25th Division in Haneai--

ML: Yeh, well he is a tough guy because he doesn't talk tough doesn't mean that he isn't.

HAK: When do you want to do this?

ML: Think we should do it when we make these command changes. I wanted to move Vogt up as the Deputy Commander out there.

HAK: Well, you definitely have to get him an Army guy.

ML: Yeh, we can send him a tough talking army guy--even the guy who you think is talking tough, or we can even give him Hollingsworth. But I will tell you, this talking tough, Lamb was the biggest and toughest talking in the South Vietnamese army, and every time I talked to him he was tougher than hell, now I,

HAK: Look Mel, if we get off to the Soviet Union as it now looks we will, we will do it before then.

ML: Yeh, now I am going ahead on this NPO (Nuclear Planning Group)

HAK: When are you leaving?

ML: On Tuesday--

HAK: The one thing we should do, Mel is to knock off talk about the Soviets for the rest of next week. And also speculation of ships are

It's your first time on the open line, so don't be afraid to ask questions.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Email: 5/12/04

going to run and what blockade. Let's cool it about the Soviets. I think we made our point.

ML: That is fine with me. I can shut off as fast as I can shut on. That doesn't bother me. The problem is that I think that what might be misunderstood if I didn't show up at the NPG in Copenhagen, and then on Monday all the Defense Ministers Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of the next week meet in Brussels.

HAK: We can play it by ear. I think Mel given the absence of the President the following week, if you could cut that short a little bit.

ML: Well, we could get back here that week. We would probably be missing you 36 hours.

HAK: If you could get back say by Tuesday night.

ML: I can't get back by Tuesday night if I go to that meeting.

HAK: Well, you have good communications anyway.

ML: I have got the best. I can come back anytime and if it is needed, I can come back right away.

HAK: What we ought to do is set up a system by which you and I are in daily contact when we are away.

ML: We can do that. Now I am going to have a communication set up between my office here and the Chairman's. I am going to take the Chairman with me for only two days and send him back. Because I don't want him out of here --I don't want the both of us out and the President out, so I told him that he will not go to the Defense Ministers meeting.

HAK: That is a good idea--we need him here. He is essential. He

ML: Good, yes, he will go to the NPG with me and then he will come back. Now I think that I will just --

HAK: Will you still be here Monday?

ML: Yes, I will be here Monday.

HAK: Do you want to have breakfast?

The President has the open line to the President at 3:00 p.m. today.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/13/04

Page 4

ML: Well, we might just get together for breakfast Monday and talk.

HAK: We don't have any urgent business, but if we could just review everything before you go off, I think it might be good.

ML: Why don't we do that and why don't we take the briefing over here Monday morning.

ML: Do you mind coming early?

HAK: I would prefer it early. 7:45 a.m.?

ML: Why not at 7:00

HAK: Yuk.

ML: Can't you make it at 7:00

HAK: Listen you are just pulling my leg.

ML: No, I am here at 7:00 always.

HAK: That is why you sort of begin to get erratic at the end of the day. 7:45 Mel--you go raise hell with some others over there. Are you really there at 7:00

ML: But 7:45 okay. And then we will have the briefing right at breakfast and then we will excuse the briefers and we can have a little time by ourselves.

HAK: Are you going to have anyone there?

ML: Sure why not invite the Chairman for breakfast too.

HAK: Godd, I will invite Haig then.

ML: We can a couple of extras for breakfast and then we will have a little private meeting after breakfast.

HAK: Then we will get a clear understanding on that other move before we move on the Chief. That is set isn't it--there is no--we won't kick over the tracers on that?

Re: [insert title here]

Date: 12/2/83

Subject: [insert title here]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KM. L. NAFU Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

ML: Who's that?

HAK: Abrams

ML: Oh no, and I will send that memorandum over to you for your files.

HAK: Yes, won't you do that

ML: Yes. Just don't pass it around all over.

HAK: No, it will go into my private file.

ML: I will hand it to you Monday. You don't have problems with our taking out some of those--the NVN--it looks like they may be putting some large poles out on some sandpans to sweep some of those destructors. We would like to knock out those if they start sweeping the destructors. I don't think there is anything wrong with it. I didn't want you to be shocked by it.

HAK: No, I think the more ferocious, the better. I go right after, before they start doing it on a large scale.

ML: Just wanted you to know that I authorized that and I didn't want it to come as a surprise. Another thing--we are going to send out another carrier there--the Ticondroga--now because some of our boys have to have a few days off station once in a while--

HAK: They have done a superb job.

ML: So we will send it out there.

HAK: Where is it coming from?

ML: Located in San Diego.

HAK: There are three more Marine squadrons in Japan which I think we ought to put down there.

MAX ML: I think we should use those squadrons sort of as a replacement if we can. We--but we are looking at that right now to try to--we can't fly these guys all the time, particularly when they are living in tents.

HAK: So you won't use them as replacements.

H. E. T. U. T. A. H. S. A. L O O K
FOR THE OPENING LINES
OF THE DAY, AT 10:00 A. M. [in Japanese time]

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

ML: I would like to be able to keep up the level of activity a little later on.

HAK: Let's look at that at breakfast.

ML: We are watching it carefully. Everything is being done that can be done.

HAK: Mel, you have been a tremendous soldier.

ML: I can't think of anything more we can do. We are giving them a hell of a pounding at An Loc

HAK: Who to whom?

ML: The 52's.

HAK: No, I think this will--

ML: I don't know what the hell the No. Vietnamese continue to pounding at that An Loc thing for.

HAK: I think they can't change their plans....

Because if they get it they haven't go anything. I am beginning to think that if this keeps going for a few more weeks their combat troops are going to be in trouble.

ML: Then you come on over at 7:45 and we will have the briefing right at the breakfast. We will then excuse everyone and have a little talk.

HAK: I think we need it. I look forward to it.

TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/Senator Javits
1:00 p.m. 5/13/72

It is now 1:00 p.m. in Washington, D.C.

President Lyndon B. Johnson

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/74

HAK: Jack, how are you?

JJ: Keep your head on your shoulders.

HAK: It is a real hectic period.

JJ: We are hoping and praying that it will work out the way you want it to work out, and the way it will work out good for the country and the world. I tell you one thing just privately, it wasn't what I called you about just to express my sympathy and understanding, and friendship but I do think not enough is being done on the Hill at least to let us know as you all know

HAK: Well, I asked MacGregor to get together some of the Liberal people like you and Percy, etc, and I am trying to meet with you on Tuesday morning.

JJ: All right. Make it as early as you can. In addition I think some overture ought to be made to produce Rogers and Laird for the Committee in the Executive Session to see what is what.

HAK: Right.

JJ: I think that would be very useful both in the House and the Senate-- there is kind of the feeling of detachment. I know events have moved so fast and hard that you can't be expected to look back--but I strongly urge this. The thing I called about, do you think anything can be done with the French government to get a man for men for this Committee of Nine. And we had a man named Sonnenfeldt call us--if he could be asked to give us word as to what is going on.

HAK: Okay, I will do that.

JJ: My next meeting is up--whatever I do there--Can I rely on Sonnenfeldt?

HAK: If you have any questions about it, see me.

JJ: Then I will see you Tuesday.

Re: [insert voice mail message here]

is he still on leave?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12458, Sec. 3-6

Henry Brandon/Kissinger
2:30 p.m. - 3/13/72

NASA Date 5/12/64

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: How are you, Henry.

B: Oh, not so bad. I just wondered whether you'd like to have a swim and relax.

K: You see Nancy's here with me and she doesn't much care for the Brandon company.

B: Well???

K: I get a dirty look. I was going to call you in fact to tell you she was here.

B: Well, why don't you bring her over?

K: Because I never get invited unless she is here.

B: That's right.

K: Now I get another dirty look.

B: This I would add - that I have dropped very much from the priority list of yours.

K: How is that?

B: Well, this week I called . . .

K: Did you ask to see me this week?

B: Twice, yes.

K: I wasn't told. We're under new management here.

B: I see.

K: I just got a new assistant. I saw you on some list but . . .

B: Campbell is gone?

Re: [E]theridge's office
is the one for the mutual
 purposes list?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Seci. 3.6

By: KML V NASA Date 5/12/04

K: No, Campbell is here. Let me look. I was not conscious that you had asked to see me.

B: Well, I'm just badly informed this week, but I didn't call you for that. I really meant whether you'd like to . . .

K: I know. I'd be delighted. Either this afternoon or tomorrow afternoon. Which is better for you?

B: The only thing is that the weather forecast for tomorrow is not very good.

K: Why don't we come by in about a half-an-hour.

B: All right. Very good. See you then.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E101258
By: CHNARA Date: 6-13-72

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

2:40 p.m. - 5/13/72

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol.

D: I had really hoped for a nice quiet weekend with my wife.

K: Well, I don't know, you're just checking up on me.

D: I was checking with the Embassy. I am far from the Embassy.

K: Oh really.

D: . . . . . . (The place where he is.)

K: Oh really. I thought you were with Harriman here again.

D: . . . . . . He said that he is going to continue to support his candidate.

K: Oh really?

D: Yes, he said . . . can ask somebody else too. Some special party I don't know and have a dinner or reception - something along those lines. The day before yesterday I guess.

K: Anatol, I just had two minor things. First, I told the - The President isn't going to Key Biscayne but he'll be in Camp David so if on Thursday you wanted to come up to Camp David with me, we could have a relaxed day before we all go off.

D: I think that's all right. But then I have to leave around 6:00. The plane is leaving around 6 o'clock from Dulles Airport.

K: Well, we'll get you back. We'll helicopter you. In fact, I have to be back by 6 o'clock.

D: I should be home about 4 o'clock so I can get my luggage and go back there.

K: Ok. What we could do and I'll leave it up to you. We can either go up in the evening and sleep there or we could go up first thing in the morning, whichever you prefer.

D: I will tell you on Monday, all right?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-1258
By CNARA Date 6-20-68

K: No hurry. I just want you to know and then you can have half-an-hour with the President too.

D: Yes, I think that's very nice.

K: And we can have a relaxed time there - walk and relax. Now on this press business. We have to notify these people and I wonder if we can settle it by Monday.

D: I receive today just before leaving so probably they will call you today. Or not you, Ziegler. It was . . . instructions. . . of course we were in touch and they send us a figure around 100 or 70 or something. You see it corresponds to what Ziegler wanted.

K: All right.

D: And rather they said plus an additional 60 and this wasn't quite clear for me - what was additional?

K: If we could settle on 170 plus 64 technicians, then it's all done.

D: I will try to find out over the weekend whether they include them because if it's a new one after them, then everything is settled because ______ already OK for 65.

K: The easiest for us would be 170 plus 64; the next best thing would be the figure of 200, but if we can do it at 170 plus 64 it will be good.

D: It will be the best, of course. So I'll have to check on this and tell you on Monday.

K: Right.

D: This . . . . . . thing I don't know whether you want to know because when I was leaving I saw there was a telegram. I didn't read the whole thing but the beginning I did. It was saying that they are asking me to come to you and inform you as a member of . . . . and leave instructions which was sent to Mr. Semenov.

K: Oh, about the deferral?

D: I cannot tell you quite but it said they try to cover all . . . . some disagreement so they are giving you instruction. Some of them may be for some other discussion but just for you to know so when do you feel I could come to you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F-012357
By CNARA Date 06/01/57

K: I'll be in the office for a couple of hours in the morning.

D: In the morning?

K: Yes.

D: So around 11 or 10, what do you think?

K: How about 9:30? Or is that too early for you?

D: I think it's early. Or are you going away? About 10:00, all right?

K: 10:00. Ok, come by at 10:00.

D: OK, and I will tell them as of now I. . .

K: And I have an oral note for you which just confirms what I told you about the restrictions that we discussed yesterday.

D: Oh yes.

K: In response to your oral note.

D: I understand.

K: It confirms those restrictions but it tells you what I have already told you. And with respect to this one activity we can't really do anything.

D: OK, you'll tell me tomorrow.

K: Right.

D: So tomorrow then at 10 o'clock. We already fix it, all right?

K: Good. Fine.

D: Where I have to go - to the usual place or to your office.

K: Oh, come to my office.

D: Northwest gate.

K: Well, would you rather come to the Map Room?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By: L.B. MARA Date: 01/28/87

D: Map Room is of course easy, because they know me there. Here they don't and they always ask me all those questions.

K: OK, Anatol, don't you think it's a little funny that the Soviet Ambassador can just walk into the Mansion more easily than into the office?

D: I have no problem at all because they know me by face.

K: Also I'm working on that telephone problem. It has a lot of advantages.

D: Yes, first I mentioned it as a joke, but then I think it's a . . . . .

K: I'm looking into it. I won't be able to get an answer until next week.

D: OK, So tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock.

K: Right.

D: OK, Bye, Bye.

4

*

4:40 p.m. - 5/13/72

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/13/04

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Anatol.

K: Oh really.

D: ... (The place where he is.)

K: Oh really. I thought you were with Hatriman here again.

D: ... He said that he is going to continue to support his candidate.

K: Oh really?

D: Yes, he said ... can ask somebody else too. Some special party I don't know and have a dinner or reception - something along those lines. The day before yesterday I guess

D: I think that's all right. But then I have to leave around 6:00. The plane is leaving around 6 o'clock from Ollies Airport.

Hus. Prof. Dr. H. K. Lee
for the benefit of
the Department of
Public Administration

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.Y.

NARA. Date 5/12/04

with the President too.

D. Yes, I think that's very nice.

K. And we can have a relaxed time there - walk and relax. Now on this press business. We have to notify these people and I wonder if we can settle it by Monday.

D. I receive today just before leaving so probably they will call you today. Or not you, Ziegler. It was . . . instructions. . . of course we were in touch and they send us a figure around 100 or 70 or something. You see it corresponds to what Ziegler wanted.

K. All right.

D. And rather they said plus an additional 60 and this wasn't quite clear for me - what was additional?

K. If we could settle on 170 plus 64 technicians, then it's all done.

D. I will try to find out over the weekend whether they include them because if it's a new one after them, then everything is settled because ______ already OK for 65.

K. The easiest for us would be 170 plus 64; the next best thing would be the figure of 200, but if we can do it at 170 plus 64 it will be good.

D. It will be the best, of course. So I'll have to check on this and tell you on Monday.

K. Right.

D. This . . . . . . thing I don't know whether you want to know because when I was leaving I saw there was a telegram. I didn't read the whole thing but the beginning I did. It was saying that they are asking me to come to you and inform you as a member of . . . . . and leave instructions which was sent to Mr. Semenov.

K. Oh, about the deferral?

D. I cannot tell you quite but it said they try to cover all . . . some disagreement so they are giving your construction. Some of them may be for some other discussion but just for you to know so when do you feel I could come to you.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

Re: Is there any chance of a break in the afternoon?

By: KMLW NASA Dated: 5/13/84

D: In the morning?

K: Yes.

D: Oh yes.

D: I understand.

K: Right.

K: Good. Fine.

D: Where I have to go - to the usual place to your office.

K: Oh, come to my office.

D: Northwest gate.

K: Well, would you rather come to the Macs Room?

["H. J. S. E. C. C. C. C. C. C. C. C. C. C. C.

Hanoi Times, the open line to
the North, the source of national
strategic advice

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

TELCORN
President/Mr. Kissinger
2:54 p.m. 5/13/72

By: K.M.V. NASA Date 5/13/74

RN: Anything else new today?

HAK: No Le Duc Tho held a press conference and turned down the cease-fire. That isn't bad for us for the time being.

RN: What did he say he wanted though?

HAK: Political power in Saigon.

RN: Well, that is what we have been saying, isn't it Henry.

HAK: Exactly, he made exactly our point. That want us to hand over the government.

RN: That is right. Overthrow the present government and install one that they control in its place. If we had to fight on an issue, that is as good a one that I know of.

HAK: I don't think this is their last work anyway. I think we will have to wait to see how this offensive runs.

RN: Looking at the offensive, as I recall it is basically in III Corps where the weather comes bad first. Isn't it.

HAK: If they are not taking An Loc now, they are not going to take it. It is a rather stupid move on their part, because whatever happens to An Loc those divisions they have there aren't going to fight again in this rainy season, I don't think. You can't drop 1700 tons of bombs on them yesterday as we did without hitting something.

RN: We have been hitting a hell of a lot, we know that or they would have taken An Loc and --a long time ago. After all, this is six weeks Henry and we do have to remember reports always exaggerate everything they do and never gives any credit to the poor little South Vietnamese so.

HAK: Well, no one can say that the people in An Loc aren't fighting. They have held out in the face of the most enormous artillery barrages.

RN: How in the hell did they get all the artillery in there

Re: [insert telephone number]
and [insert name of recipient]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KMLV, NASA, Date: 5/12/04

HAK: Mr. President, I will have a study made of that.

RN: You know, we talked about infiltration and the rest--we cut off Cambodia, we cut off Seonoukville, we cut off.

HAK: What we think now is that they ordered the stuff for over two years for this time and one thing is clear that they don't make it now, this is why a cease-fire result might be better for us--they are dead for two years.

RN: Particularly what we are doing in the North. Henry--even the stuff below the 20th is pretty devastating.

HAK: We are really hitting up in the North a very tough way. That bridge across the River seems to have three spans down, a number of the bridges going up north on the rail line are completely destoryed, and this is bound to have an increasingly massive effect.

RN: Well, you will stay there the weekend then huh?

HAK: Yes, I will be available all weekend, Mr. President.

RN: Well, I would doubt if we would hear anymore from our---

HAK: Oh God, I forgot to tell you I have heard from the Russians. Dobrynin called and he said I want you to know that Moscow is sending you some substantive considerations of plans for the summit, but they don't want you to say this to the press, I said well that is fine, I never say anything to the press, why make that admonition. He said that maybe they just wanted to answer your question that they are going ahead for plans for the summit. So I think that is in pretty good shape.

RN: These are on the issues--

HAK: This was their way of letting us know that they were continuing the summit.

RN: You think so, huh? But they want to keep it changing here.

HAK: They don't want us to make a public statement on it.

Receptionist's report to the president

the press and of the public

Nuclear War?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 1293, Sec. 3.6

By: W. L. NASA, Date: 5/13/04

RN: Sure. As a matter of fact, that is really the best way for them to handle it isn't it. As far as we are concerned, I don't mind it a bit--we are not that anxious claiming there will be one for sure.

HAK: They don't mind our saying that we are continuing

RN: The main thing is that it happens--it happens that is fine, that the important thing. And I will tell you Henry these clowns I do think that this thing you recommended which I thought was a little foolish at the time, but you know as a waste of time, but seeing that little commerce minister was--did it worry some of your liberal friends?

HAK: Oh it shook them to their teeth.

RN: Because they think that has significance, do they?

HAK: Of course, it does have significance, Mr. President. And I also dangled the possibility of a statement (Zeigler) on Monday on the ratification.

RN: Oh, you told that to Dobrynin? One thing you could follow up on which might be a very subtle thing is that the President is very anxious to know what they want for gifts -- have you done that lately--if you could just say we have got these things

HAK: No, I think we could wait until Monday.

Say I called you on something else,

RN: I called you on something else, President and Mrs. Nixon would like to know

HAK: If they are planning to go ahead because for example, I had sent giving him a draft communique yesterday, --he had two things-- a statement of principles to be negotiated in Moscow which no one knows about and second a communique which also no one knows about, but that is more formalistic, but at the end of it it said, President Nixon extended an invitation to the Soviet leaders and they accepted-- now he called and said does that mean that all three of them can come, I said my judgment is that it is entirely up to them, if Mr. Breshnev wants to come alone, that is fine, if the three of them want to come that is fine too. I am mentioning this only to indicate that they are clearly planning on it.

RN: If they are this duplicitous, they are really running a terrible risk--

HAK: But also with public opinion, it is one thing for them to cancel a response--it is another maneuver us along.

The president of the government is the highest official in the country. His job is to command and direct the government.

By: KHL, VANA, Date: 5/12/04

REDCON

Page 4

RN: You got to remember this to-the time they could have cancelled it when it would have done them the most good and us the most harm, is the day after. Right

HAK: Exactly or two or three days. We notified today there is a treaty on the seabed and they want to-- it is now a question of exchanging instruments of ratification and they are willing to do that next week--not a major thing, but it shows they are doing business as usual.

RN: Seems to me you handled your neting with him just right yesterday by taking that hard line well look now you are talking about knocking off what we are already doing, there is no contest, if you are talking about not doing more, then we can discuss that is the way you put it to him, huh?

HAK: Exactly, that is exactly what I used.

RN: I hope you get some rest over the weekend--we had planned that you and I will be going to Florida this week and get ready for this damn summit--how are we going to do it now.

HAK: I think you could still go down on Wednesday, Mr. President--in fact I think you should--I think when it becomes clear that the summit is going on, if you say you are going down to prepare for the summit, I think that would be quite honestly the best use of your time. If you could go down Tuesday night or Wednesday morning and come back here Friday night, because you have a grueling 10 days ahead of you--

RN: And another thing too, I was just sitting here making my notes up for another thing--I hadn't realized what a hell of a grueling six weeks we already had. If you stop to think what we have been through--the offensive--then the April 26 speech was not easy--you remember

HAK: Then the loneliness of all of these decisions--

RN: Then I was just thinking when I was talking to Rose this morning that Saturday morning when I dictated the first draft, the goddamn tape machine wore out--I had to do it all over again--It has been a little tiring

HAK: I think if you could get about by Tuesday night you would be absolutely safe in announcing you are going down to prepare for the summit and

["H. J. M. H. H. E. R. I. E. R. I. E. R. I. E. R. I. E. R.

U. S. Air Force

U. S. Navy

U. S. Army

U. S. Marine Corps

U. S. Air Force

U. S. Navy

U. S. Air Force

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TelCon - May 14, 1972

By: K.H. V. NASA&Dated: 5/12/04

The President - 9:20-9:45

Pres: Hello Henry, how are you?

HAK: I'm fine, Mr. President.

Pres: Raining down there.

HAK: Yes, it is.

Pres: What is the situation this morning?

HAK: Well, it looks pretty good this morning. The attacks in An Loc are fairly low.

Pres: But we're not discontinuing with our air strikes?

HAK: No.

Pres: It's a pause.

HAK: That's right. We had over 200 tactical air in there yesterday.

Pres: Where did they use the B-52's?

HAK: They used almost all of the 52's in the Hue area.

Pres: The little blocking operation got quite a play.

HAK: Well, it was very successful. It came as a complete surprise. They claim 243 enemy killed, 123 weapons captured, 3 tanks destroyed, and 2 130mm guns captured.

Pres: Now are they back ?

HAK: Yes.

Pres: So it was just sort of a very small action apparently?

HAK: Well, accept that it had a psychological effect. And in that limited area it had a spoiling impact.

Pres: Will it encourage them to do more of them

HAK: I think so.

HAK: I think in fact that if they can
pattern is going to change. There were 3 B-52 strikes in An Lao over
night and the 21st Division was making a light attack. It isn't much of an
outfit but they found the graves of 100 North Vietnamese soldiers who must
have been killed in these massive B-52 strikes.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Seci. 3.6

By: K.H.V. NARA ID: 5/12/04

Pres: I wonder if Thieu can't do anything about the command of that Division.

HAK: Well, he just changed it last week as a matter of fact.

Pres: He has to go down the line doesn't he. So much for that. In terms of
the -- I told Haig one thing -- that they ought to try, or at least consider,
Abrams as a tank man. He has just forgotten so many of the things he used
to know. Take what few tanks the South Vietnamese have got left and make
one surprise attack. It's a good tactic. I mean just take 300 tanks, small
tanks. They can be god damned effective sometime and it bouys them up.
Will you tell Haig to follow up on that.

HAK: Absolutely, and I'll talk to Moorer myself, today.

Pres: You know I'm not trying to tell them what to do but they don't seem
to have too much imagination. They wouldn't have done this damn landing
if we hadn't pushed them into it. You tell Moorer that I'm still waiting for
those things he's supposed to be thinking up.

HAK: If we had waited for the things they were thinking of we'd be defending
a beachhead near Saigon.

Pres: Hell, we'd be Dunkiring 60,000 Americans.

HAK: Everysingle reinforcement - I mean this more it took them two months
before they finally made this concentration of B-52's which you have been talking
about.

Pres: Incidentally, you are ordering in the other carrier and so forth.

HAK: That other carrier is leaving Monday with three Marine squadrons.
I Think we should put those Marine squadrons into Thailand. I talked
to Laird about it yesterday.

Pres: I wrote a memorandum to you.

HAK: I think it isn't worth playing games.

Request for reissue of this document has been received, and a copy of this document will be provided.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sept. 3.6

By: J. M. V. NASA, Date: 5/13/64

Pres: I wrote a memorandum to you. I and if you put them in South Vietnam just remove some of those god damned support forces that make up the 60,000. We've got to get them out of there anyway. Don't play games.

HAK: That's what I think. I agree. And Laird agrees.

Pres: Well I see no reason - be sure he follows up, that's the only thing.

HAK: We're going to move those 3 squadrons on Monday. They've been put on the alert already. I think we've got one more big attack coming. On Hue. But we've got intelligence reports, for example, where they say they are having trouble with their logistics and they have trouble getting defensive positions. I consider that it is not a sign of great strength on their part that after they took ~~Dak To~~ they still haven't attacked Kontum. You and I know they can take Kontum any time they want to. And that after this total rout in Quang Tri they still haven't launched the attack on Hue.

Pres: Well it seems to me that this would be all the more reason - that this landing operation worked. Can't Abrams do something more like this. The psychological effect in this country is enormous. It must be something in Vietnam. Do one other thing to the PIO people. I mentioned to Haig. Get some sort of a story out of Vietnam, not on the morale of Thieu, but on the morale of the South Vietnamese forces and people of my announcement.

HAK: Absolutely.

Pres: Has that been done?

HAK: I have to check.

Pres: Well, it's not been in the papers in any event. That's something that's very important. Plant some CIA stories. Anything, you know, to say that ~~MAX SMITH~~ did something that it had an electric effect on the South Vietnamese forces. You've got to get some emotional psychology going in that direction.

HAK: Right.

Pres: Now to another subject. What are these Soviet merchant men that are supposed to be on their way.

HAK: There's absolutely no confirmation of this.

Pres: It plays high up in the Times.

HAK: The Times is looking for trouble. It is inconceivable to me that they

It's just like a film open like a door, but it's a kind of dreamy sort of thing.

wil. --

By: K.M.S. NAFI. Data: 5/12/04

Pres: ... There's some fertilizer.

HAK: If you read the Times carefully you will see that even the times says it wouldn't ______ the Ministry of Merchant Marine to make such an announcement. It is more likely to be a way of bring pressure on the Chinese than it is on the North Vietnamese because apparently the Chinese haven't so far given too much -- they haven't agreed to open their ports yet.

Pres: So they can put it on the railroads and send it down?

HAK: That's right.

Pres: That doesn't bother me. Well, that puts it really to the Russians and the Chinese. The mining's worth that alone.

HAK: Exactly. And you remember every time we did something we were told that this would bring the Chinese and Russians together and it never has.

Pres: Incidentally, you saw that stupid story by Benjamin Wells.

HAK: Dobrynin is coming in with some message on SALT and I have to get this straightened out, so that they don't have the wrong idea.

Pres: About the mines?

HAK: Yes.

Pres: Who do you think did it now Henry? ______ CIA? Because you know he quotes directly.

HAK: I think this sounds like some self-serving son-of-a-bitch at Defense.

Pres: Is it true? It can't be done, can it?

HAK: No. Absolutely not.

Pres: Well, you tell Laird to knock it down.

HAK: Absolutely.

Pres: I think that's the best way. Rather than just going to Dobrynin, I'd just say Laird that should be knocked down. That's a false story.

HAK: I'll get it done this minute.

["A. M. E. T. C. O. L. E. C. O. F. S. S. A. U. N. F. O. S. S. A. U.

["Re: [insert telephone number]\n\nRe: [insert telephone number]\n\nRe: [insert telephone number]", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6", "By: KHLV NARA, Date: 5/12/04", "6", "HAK: Absolutely.", "Pres: Only when those 2 conditions act can the mines be [x] X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x

Help! Help! Help! We are being attacked!
Help! Help! Help!

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sec. 3.5

By: KSL

NASA Date 5/12/04

that they knocked out 24 trucks, 29 guns - this is in South Vietnam --
and 132 military structures.

Pres: I wonder what the B52's have done.

Christ I hope to God he gets a little better intelligence to know where to hit.
He's doing his best.

HAK: Well I think all of this has a multiplier effect. Once it starts getting better everything is going to fall into place.

Pres: That's the way wars always are. That's why I can't emphasize too strongly I want Abrams to follow through or that. I want to take every god damn South Vietnamese tank. Listen, they're either going to lose them or capture them otherwise. Get the 300 tanks - I understand that's all they've got left - put them together and have them make a little run. Just so it looks like they're doing something. Will you tell them to do that?

HAK: I will talk to Moorer.

Pres: Talk to Moorer And tell him to use the little ones and have him do it with total surprise. This isn't like the trench warfare of World War I. This is a lot of open country. Tell them to get off their ass and do something. Don't you agree.

HAK: Right. I think we should do these offensive moves are certainly tremendous for morale.

Pres: Well people are noticing here -- everybody says is saying isn't this great what the South Vietnamese are doing. I said what the hell have they done. I said well I didn't think it was very great but at least it got a story in today's paper.

HAK: It certainly did.

Pres: What is the situation on these books. The book is not yet ready, is that right. In other words, my talking point issue-by-issue book.

HAK: That will be ready tomorrow night. Don't you think?

Pres: Don't worry about tomorrow night, make it Tuesday night. All day tomorrow and all day Tuesday I'm tied up with the domestic stuff to get it out of the way. Then Tuesday night after a dinner with Cardinal Crow I'm coming up here.

HAK: You will have it Tuesday night, without fail.

The President's Office
The State Department
Papers of the State Department

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

Pres. Now, with xerox regard to the __________, in talking to Bob, told him I told you about the __________ and he's going to discuss with Ziegler and on the press possibilities of what we ought to do if anything and naturally he leaders thing we'll have to notify them pretty soon. Probably Tuesday. He raised the point as to whether the meeting with Rogers and group was necessary. He says why don't you have it in Salzburg.

AK: I think it would be better.

Pres: Maybe you are right.

AK: I think he is right.

Pres. Well, I think maybe I'll have more time then. I think the way it can be one is if you'll get in touch with Bob, would you, and Bob can tell you and say look, the President has been so weighted down with these other things and that we'll have a meeting in Salzburg in the afternoon before going into Russia. Say's that sound to you.

AK: I agree.

Pres: Bob's point is that this whole trip is so important that I have to do whatever's best for me.

AK: Yes, you're right. These meetings will take it out of you because everything will depend on you.

Pres: That's right. I can't make any mistakes.

AK: You can't make any mistakes. You can't be disavowed.

Pres: Has Smith already given away everything on SALT.

AK: Well, I pulled him back from it again. But the point is these days there are well briefed. I think you ought to get the maximum of rest and concentration this week.

Pres: Well Henry, I'm going to read some of this background stuff on and going to read your talk with Breshnev and the briefing book because that's the one I've got to be really up on.

AK: You'll have it Tuesday night.

Pres: Bob tells me that working on this speech for the Moscow.

AK: I haven't seen that yet.

Pres: It's a 2,000 word ________. It's at least 30 m
... You can tell your fellow -- Lord -- the main
to through the agony of trying to do a speech in Mos-
lone so I can just get up and read the son-of-a-bitch

It's a 2,000 word ________. It's at least 30 m
You can tell your fellow -- Lord -- the main
to through the agony of trying to do a speech in Mos-
lone so I can just get up and read the son-of-a-bitch

OECIASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

HAK: Exactly.

Pres: It doesn't make any difference how I look to the I
Don't you agree.

HAK: XIX I agree completely.

Pres: What I have in that business about mutual respect

HAK: But we also have to make sure that our peaceniks
stuff in there that all our allies will ..

Pres: Well, that's why you've got to take a hard look at
you're going to be head over heels in Moscow.

HAK: I'm going to get on it today.

Pres: What I meant is get Lord to give you the substance
the tone to whoever is . . . maybe Price or someone.

HAK: Right.

Pres: The difficulty is that you've got both Price and S.

HAK: Are they both coming on the trip.

Pres: Yes. I figured that this time we just wanted to be
everybody that was necessary to work on arrival statement

HAK: The best is Andrews.

Pres: Well, we could take him too. He's more flexible

HAK: That's right. I mean Price just can't do anything
because it's too much. I mean he can do a great domestic or

Pres: I may just tell Bob to bring Andrews too. Because
extra people here and Andrews can go as a member of t
we can . . . because he worked very well on these last

H. W. SHERMAN

UNITED STATES

SENATE

Pres: It's a 2,000 word ____. It's at least 30 minutes so I'd prefer
... You can tell your fellow -- Lord -- the main thing is I just can't
go through the agony of trying to do a speech in Moscow. I want this
done so I can just get up and read the son-of-a-bitch.

HAK: Exactly.

Pres: It doesn't make any difference how I look to the Russian people.
Don't you agree.

HAK: XX I agree completely.

Pres: What I have in that business about mutual respect. . . (end of tape 1)

HAK: But we also have to make sure that our peaceniks don't put so much
stuff in there that all our allies will.

Pres: Well, that's why you've got to take a hard look at the draft because
you're going to be head over heels in Moscow.

Pres: What I meant is get Lord to give you the substance and then you give
the tone to whoever is. . . maybe Price or someone.

HAK: Right.

Pres: The difficulty is that you've got both Price and Saffire.

Pres: Yes. I figured that this time we just wanted to be sure that we had
everybody that was necessary to work on arrival statements.

HAK: The best is Andrews.

Pres: Well, we could take him too. He's more flexible, is that it.

HAK: That's right. I mean Price just can't do anything fast. And what he
does is too much. I mean he can do a great domestic oration. Saffire is OK.

Pres: I may just tell Bob to bring Andrews too. Because it's alright to have
extra people here and Andrews can go as a member of the press thing and then
we can. . . because he worked very well on these last two speeches.

The New York Times is open to comment, but not the President or any of his officials.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

Telecon - May 14, 1972

Secretary Laird - 9:40 to 9:55

Laird: How are you Henry?

HAK: How are you.

Laird: Good, briefings go alright for you this morning?

HAK: I haven't had it yet. I've had the President on the phone for an hour.

Laird: Oh, that's too bad, because the briefings are very good.

HAK: What? What? What? Yelling and screaming. I have seen the written report, it sounds very good.

Laird: And I thought that would be helpful for you to have.

HAK: You got me just as I was going into the briefing.

Laird, Well, I'll talk to you a little later. There are a couple of things that happened that we can talk about later. This story that's out in the New York Times . . .

HAK: Well, well. That's what he was yelling about and he wants it denied immediately.

Laird: Well, I denied that you know right at the time that Rogers put it out to the leadership. You know he told the leadership of the Congress there that night that we could set these things off and I immediately went in and pounced on that. All was there.

HAK: Could the Defense Department put something out today that the New York Times stories story is untrue.

Laird: I think we should say that we're not going to discuss the mine technology but the facts in the NYT story are in error.

HAK: I think that would be good.

Laird: But we are not going to discuss mine technology.

HAK: Absolutely not. I think Moorer shouldn't talk so much at these WSAG meetings in front of State.

Laird: I just think it's nuts. As you know, we can't handle it the way they say. On the destructors we can but that's different.

Rebuttal to the report in
the New York Times
Published on Oct. 3, 1968

By: K.L.Y. NARA, Date: 5/12/64

What do you mean? What can I say?

Well, we can sweep them. You can't sweep these others.

Well, you can sweep them but it's a pain in the neck.

It's a pain in the neck. You can't make sure you got them until you know - cause we've got them set differently. You understand the thing, but god damn it, that kind of story. I know where it came from and I know it would come out of that. Al will tell you where it came from.

Well, I'll talk to you a little later on. I was concerned - one of my former colleagues up in New York called me last evening. He had been talking with some of the Time Magazine people and they have a bad story that's going to appear. This guy told them he had talked to you about it.

About what?

Well, saying how disappointed the President was at the National Security Council meeting.

Absolute crap. Total outrageous nonsense. I don't know where they get this from.

I don't know where they're getting it from. But maybe that backgrounder that Connally had.

That's right. They came into me with that story and they came in with the story that was about you and they came in with the story that there was only one strong man at the meeting and that he's going to be Assistant President and I said listen I don't want to talk about this crap.

Well, evidently they've got this story that he was called back in and came in for a while and was told that he was glad that he had one strong man at the meeting.

Well, god damn it Mel, you did more this week to make this thing than any five others.

I don't care about that but the problem that you have on this is that don't think it's helpful because you...

It's a disgrace. It's an outrageous disgrace.

I don't want to be built up anyway and if they think they're just now tearing me down I'm not going to be around here anyway. I'm saving.

Re: [REDACTED] Title: The open file
Date: 12/15/84
Subject: [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1.6

By: K.L. W.

NASA Date: 5/12/84

Laird: I'm no challenge to anybody. I'm leaving.

IAK: Mel, what's the sense of tearing you down. You step up there, defend the Administration, give a tough talk. What's the sense of saying Mel Laird is lying when he stands up there because he doesn't believe it himself. Who the hell does that help.

Laird: And they got all that stuff in there about how what we've done is so different than what the Russians did in Hungary. Well, that's a bunch of crap. The Russians invaded Hungary. You can't compare the two actions of mining and the Russians going into Hungary.

IAK: I don't give you my word Mel not one of these things came out of the White House.

Laird: No, as a matter of fact the Time people told us that that you had gone out of your way to knock it down.

IAK: That's right.

Laird: They did say that you did admit that I had laid out all of the options and had laid out some of the pitfalls.

IAK: And I said it was your duty to do this. And I said whoever gave them this information was confused as to what goes on at an NSC meeting. That the President wants to know all the things that happen and everybody - didn't mention you - pointed out the things that can go wrong.

Laird: Well, it's a bad story evidently and I refused to talk to them.

AK: Well, it's a god damn disgrace. When you do something big and these start tearing each other to pieces.

Laird: Well, it doesn't do them any good Henry. They've got to understand that isn't the way to promote themselves around here.

AK: Who the hell does it make look good. If it makes Connally look good, who the hell is Connally as far as this operation is concerned. The secretary of the Treasury doesn't matter.

Laird: Connally shouldn't be concerned about it anyway because I don't have a God damn about any job in this Administration.

K: Mel, I am absolutely outraged because the best thing we can do now from a foreign policy point of view is to present a united front to the outside.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

The position of the open fire
is given by the command.
Precautionary Step?

And to give the impression that this
What good does it do to ask make the man who has given the toughest

talk . . .

By: KVLV, NASA, Date: 5/12/04

Laird: And I'll continue it. I'm going over to meet with all these NATO guys and tell them how important this is all the way through.

HAK: Just make sure though Mel that you lay off the Russians.

Laird: I will, I'm not laying on the Russians. What the hell, I don't have to lay it on the Russians right now. What I'm concerned about right now and what I'm working on now. I believe the Russians will put ships in territorial waters and they'll put some <u>and lighters</u> off with food and clothing on and make an announcement sometime while you're in Russia that they are delivering food and clothing by lighters and that they have naval ships within the territorial waters protecting those lighters. Now I think we'll be finished with that in about the 26th or 27th of May.

HAK: What will you do then?

Laird: Under present rules of operation, we will <u>unkill</u> attack the lighters. If they have a destroyer in there or submarines, we won't hit their submarines, but we <u>fix</u> will hit the lighters.

HAK: I think that's right.

Laird: That's the way we're presently. . . but I have them ______
even today. Just so we're well prepared and can meet this contingency
because I think they'll announce to the world that on a humanitarian basis
they're delivering food and clothing.

HAK: I think we should do that.

Laird: But I think they'll try to do it at a time when you're there.

HAK: Well, then we'll have to hit them while we are there.

Laird: Well, you get your beliefs because I think there's some improvement
today and that Marine operation worked out well up there.

HAK: We ought to do another one like that someplace else.

Laird: We will.

HAK: Good, thank you. Bye.

Helpdesk Support Call Record
Date: 10/14/72
Time: 10:17 a.m.
Title: Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMH, WASH. D.C. 5/13/72

TELCOM

Peter Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

10:17 a.m. 5/14/72

HAK:

RE: I have been trying to get one day free of harrassments and I must have it or I am going to go out of my mind.

PF: Go right ahead Henry.

HAK: Make sure we don't get that economic negotiationscrewed up.

PF: That of course depends on what is screwed up and what isn't. One way to determine that is to---

HAK: have a three hour talk with Peter this week and read a memo to me.

PF: no it isn't necessary Henry-- I think a 30 minute meeting--once every two weeks. I understand that you want to and ought to get away. I further understand that you don't want right at this moment anything signed at the summit beyond what, having a grain deal and a shipping deal, now I would like to review that with you on Monday if you have a moment

HAK: Well, what do you think?

that

PF: I would think/more on a lend/lease but not deterrments because you want us to keep the leverage--we keep the leverage anyway because you can always call those two things off

HAK: How

PF: By not making a payment under X-M (?) at which point they call of lend/lease.

HAK: But how can you call it off when all of the business communities running the mark (?)

PF: We don't have a project which we find suitable. This was only going to be on the first-half of the comarerie and the rest was subject to development in the commercial commission. My concern is that it will be too little.

HAK: My primary objective is we just give them enough to keep them salivating and to keep them behaving--no so much that they have got it and don't need it anymore.

The President's Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM
Page 2

PF: I assure you that isn't a possibility. In a week we can't get enough done to do that. As a practical matter, I am personally convinced that we are not going to give any more than what you think is appropriate.

HAK: My objective is what I described, I am not sure that I know how to get that. Practically how can we work on this.

PF: We are getting a new paper from Peterson right now in a moment or two. I will be in the office by two or 2:30.

HAK: My problem is that I have to get these briefing books done for Russia. I have got a friend here yesterday. I have had Vietnam on my hands and we have had a rather intense week. But I want to be sure we are doing it right. Let me drop up to see you for 15 minutes between 1 and 2:00.

PF: If you don't get back, forget it, we are not getting it off that track.

HAK: But your assessment is that we have to give them a little more just as long as you make sure that the being big things they want don't happen until September. If we can't keep them quiet through the summer we will crack Vietnam.

PF: Good, I understand.

HAK: I will come up then.

Receptionist who opens the door to the Secretary's office.

Mr. Kissinger's Secretary?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12993, Sect. 3.6

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., May 14, 1972

By: K.M.V. NASA Date: 5/13/74

K: Sorry; I was with Dobrynin. It's highly complex, but nothing you want to bother with. It's how many ladders(?) should be at an ICBM defense site.

P: As you and I both know, it doesn't make a hell of a lot of difference. Just so we can defend it.

K: No, no; I agree with you, Mr. President. The only point is they are playing the game keeping it a Brezhnev/Nixon ________. And therefore before they submit anything in Helsinki, they clear it with me. And therefore, it's time-consuming. I am just trying to explain to you why I'm seeing him.

P: No, no; I'm in no hurry. I just had one other thought. I wanted to pass it on to you. Were you able to get into the gift field?

K: Yeah, they want a car in the worst way. They are already looking through catalogs. Now their mind, however, is in the direction of a small AMC Cadillac.

P: Fine.

K: I told him to call me back later today so that we can get on it. It must be black.

P: Yeah, I know. But we'll have to give them what they want.

K: And I said, 'Now listen,...

P: I can give him a sports car, if he prefers.

K: No, he doesn't want a sports car. He wants a medium-size cadillac.

P: Well, that's a damn good car, incidentally. In other words, he doesn't have one with the jump seats, but just a medium-size, good-looking Cadillac.

K: That's right. I guess. In fact that's what he means is a hard-top Cadillac.

P: Right.

The President/Mr. Kissinger
Has Seen the Light of Publicity
May 14, 1972

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 p.m., May 14, 1972

By: KHLW NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: I think that's what he has in mind.

P: You tell him we picked the hydro-foil?

K: Yes.

P: Well, that'll be an interesting trade.

K: And they're going to give you a picture, Oh, God, he's just drooling.

P: You told him I didn't want modern art.

K: There's absolutely no danger of that... I've told him that, but they are against modern art.

P: Oh, are they?

K: Oh, yeah.

P: Well, they weren't a few years ago. Khrushchev was against it but...

K: No, there's no danger of that at all, but I told Khrushchev him that.

P: It doesn't mean that much to have modern art.

K: No, they won't give you modern art. They have three things in mind. They want to give you a painting; they want to give you a coffee service; and then they've got a third thing -- I think a table or something.

P: Did the matter come up of those passports that are on the way or anything?

K: Well I talked to him. I talked to him first of the stories of the mines being deactivated. I said, "Anatol, that's total nonsense, and don't you base any policies on this. They cannot be deactivated except after many months when they deactivate themselves. The President cannot do it if he wanted to, and he wouldn't want, but he cannot." Secondly, I said, "I read all these stories." He said, "Look, if we want to challenge you, we won't have it put out by the Ministry of Merchant Marines." Thirdly, I said, "I hope you are not planning to cause any embarrassment to the President." He said, "I give you my

Re: [Subject] How the open mind of a man of science can be held back by theork of a man of science?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., May 14, 1972

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/13/04

word." He said, "We want to start an epoch. we don't want to... this
is a minor incident," he said. Two years from now people won't remember
it.

P: He wouldn't have said that unless he was in touch with them would
he?

K: Mr. President he is in daily, frequent touch with them. And therefore I just do not believe - after they sign common principles with us how the hell are they going to challenge us then. Even an ex attempt - if they wanted to challenge us they should have done it last week.

P: Let me ask you this, two things. I am sitting here starting to read
two books. I must say it is hard going but if you got a minute I would like
to ask you which one you think is the best one.

K: Which books are you reading.

P: Well this is the book - background reading for the President on
the Soviet Union and there are so many different theories. There is the
Danelle Bell(?) piece on Ten Theories in Search of Reality. I am plowing
through that - that's probably worthwhile isn't it.

K: That is worth reading.

P: But I am not going to read Ezie(?) Stone.

K: No, no. I just put that in.

P: And I don't know I never had much confidence in Brezensky(?).

K: Well he is sort of - he is slightly.

P: Forty-three pages on this. And the First Circle I think that is too
historical to get into. Robert Conquest that might be good.

K: That is good. That I would read.

P: Alright. On foreign relations Richard Pipes(?)

K: I would read that.

P: And Melvin Chrone(?) on troops in Europe. No, there is nothing
on troops that we are going to discuss with them.

K: No, it will come up, but I wouldn't bother.

The president of the open class
retires from his position as confidential
PRESIDENT'S SALUTE

By: K.H. W.

NASA, Date 5/17/04

P: But what the hell - whatever you have in your briefing papers is going to be better than what these idiots write.

K: Absolutely.

P: But you would recommend Beezensky(?)

K: Well, I just sort of . . . Conquest and Pipes(?) by all means.

P: Good. Alright. Now the other thing I will read, I will read your subject by subject with Brezhnev and if you will in preparing your own papers . . . You know what I mean when I finally get down to it I'll only have a few minutes to get it all in my head at the last.

K: And I will also have the Dobrynin - anything I said to Dobrynin on any of these subject put in.

P: The one I will do - we will play more to you in this case than we did in China. There it was important that they know me but here they all know we are talking and he will be playing to. You know what I mean.

K: Well he knows who he is dealing with by your actions last week. By what you have done in September.

P: Yes. I don't have to carry the whole monologue.

K: No.

Q: One other thing. As you know there is a vote on Tuesday. I spoke to Haig about it. You are going to see some of the Republican doves to try to keep them in line. The point Colson made to me is that somebody between now and Tuesday to get across the fact that first it has a good chance to work. They people who critize it are all going back to that CIA study in 1968 where they said it wouldn't work. Well pointing out as I told Haig three solid differences - if not more than that. First Cambodia is cut off. Second that this is now a mechanized army requiring oil. Third as distinguished from the bombing we are allowing a hell of a lot more targets - you know what we mean in terms of what we are getting at. And fourth of course a total cut off from the sea. My point is - doesn't this make sense. The only one who has written on it - I have looked at a few columns - got at it a bit was Alsop. I wonder if you shouldn't tell him that and also wondering if you should get about ten of our most influential columnists for a backgrounder. Or do you think it is not worth it.

The president of the House of Representatives of the Republic of China

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12939, Sec. 3.6

By: K.L.Y. NASHA Date: 5/12/04

5

K: My strong conviction on the news Mr. President is that the events are going to speak for us.

P: Well in other words. We will probably lose this vote.

K: No.

P: You don't think this is the wrong signal to the Russians(?)
I think

K: No I think the Russians/understand that you have defeated these guys before. I mean this is the sense of the Senate. It is almost our program, it is a lousy thing to cut off funds. I would much rather win the vote and I will bleed my heart out to these liberal Senators and I think

actions

P: Then in other words as far as the effect of the XUANXINXX just let them speak for themselves.
absolutely

K: I would just/act cold bloodedly confident.

P: True, we are, we are.

K: That is my impression. Because I think Mr. President they have got one more around Hue. And we may actually win this good damn thing now.

P: Well that is what we are going to try to do now - I mean do now.
Xuan

K: Thuy saw Chou En-lai yesterday - no one has said yet what they are going to do.

P: Where did he see him in Peking.

K: In Peking on the way back to Hanoi.

P: With the Chinese - I know you are going to tell them - remember I told them and you told them too we will make absolutely no deal with the Russians that we are not prepared to make with them. So in my letter to him will you make that point. There will be some agreements - agreements that have been going on for a long time and are absolutely bilateral. They are not related to anything else. We are ready to do any that you are interested or any others that we have discussed. I think it is very important that they know - for trade for example, we are going to give them the same things we are going to give the Russians. Don't you think this is important.

The president of the executive board
and his staff in the room
President's Office

OECIASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L.V. NASHA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Absolutely, it is crucial.

P: And if we don't want our Russian things to be misinterpreted in anyway. That he can be sure - oh one other thing. Have one of the X.X.X.X. fellas that was there at the meeting, you know Lord. You may remember at one point Chou En-lai spent thirty or forty minutes telling me things he wanted me to tell the Russiand. Do you remember. If you could refer specifically in the letter that I give to him that I have noted that in the conversation I will cover that. He can be sure that we will stand firm with regard - you know.

K: Absolutely. Excellent.

P: You remember that don't you.

K: I remember it very well.

P: Something about ________ on the borders thing and the rest. But also putting it in a very hard line in a sense. He was doing that, I think, for the record.

K: Absolutely. He doesn't want you to talk about their problems to the Russians.

P: Right, right. And that he can be sure that I will not disclose to the Russians any part of the conversation I had with him. He has my personal assurance of that.

K: Absolutely.

P: And then you can proceed to disclose the part of the Russians to him.

K: Right. I think we can handle it, Mr. President.

P: Let me ask you one final thing. I was thinking a week ago when we were discussing this... You remember, you said you expect all of your staff were unanimous in their agreement that the Summit would be cancelled. Helms was of that opinion. And Rogers and Laird. And you thought it was 20 per cent. What changed your mind -- not your mind -- why did our intelligence prove to be so inaccurate?

K: Our assessment was that they would... Let me give you my assessment. I thought they would have to do something. The reason I thought they would cancel the Summit but do nothing else is because that would look dramatic but wouldn't mean anything. I thought they would postpone it to a fixed date later on. We had underestimated how badly they want the Summit. I think intelligence could possibly help one on that.

The President has the floor.
To the Sen. and Rep. of the Republic.
Please stand.

By: KH. V.

NASA, Date: 5/13/64

K: (cont'd) But it also has an ominous character to it. I think they are determined to hit China next year.

P: You do?

K: Yeah. That's the real explanation for this. They want to get their rear cleared and then they are going to jump China.

P: In other words, in going over this -- and this is what your experts and Helms and the rest take adequately into account -- is their morbid concern about China and their recognition that if they did... one of the things they would have to assume was that we would turn very hard toward China.

K: That's right.

P: Do you think that might have something to do with it.

K: That may have something to do with it. I thought they'd cancel it; but cancel nothing else. But I must say, I thought the chances were 80 per cent that they would cancel it.

P: It may be that a number of factors may have entered in -- who knows; (1) that it was known mining rather than a blocade; (2) that it was put so carefully in both the speech and your backgrounder; (3) they're just plain taking the contract -- I think that's important.

K: Oh, I think so, and also I think that the fact that these meetings we've had with Dobrynin and also with Brezhnev personally gave them the confidence that, on the one hand, they could do business with us but, on the other hand, we were very tough to monkey with.

P: Yeah. Well, in any event, we'll continue to pitch this stuff. All right, then don't bother with any press people. Do the Senators and try to keep them from pole-jumping the traces. Tell them for their own good they should do it and put in a little about -- this damn malarkey about the decision being made out of pique and anger and all that crap. You are the only one who can knock that down.

K: That I'll be glad to do. That I think should be knocked down. That hasn't been written. What I might do is you think well of it -- I could meet perhaps with some of the senior people, no so much to say that this blockade will work, although I can work that in,

P: But how it's different from the situation of 1968.

K: And also where are we pre-Summit -- say Wednesday -- including Vietnam, of course.

The following are the quotes in the report, not the actual conversation.
Please see note 1 for confidential information.

By: KM. V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

3

P: Yeah. Well, it might go out on a limb, though, if something should happen. It's tooETAlyar,

K: Well, I think on the whole,

P: Let the damn thing go.

K: The best posture is to sitting.

P: Because basically let's fit. They'll give us another pop, we'll say 'well, that's what we eted.'

K: And we have so much nevoming in the next two weeks, Mr. President, that -- this miniwill be drowned in it.

P: Haig looks at these reports carefully. He says these guys are fighting a lot better.

K: Much better now.

P: Do you agree with him on this?

K: I agree with him, yes.

P: He says he notes the various places where they've really done a hell of a job. You never know, the main effect of what we've done, Henry, may have been the psychological.

K: Not the main result but this was one of the big results.

P: On the South Vietnamese. Well, they weren't doing a damn thing before -- let's face it.

K: Well, they weren't doing much as they are doing now.

P: Well, they were sitting in their holes.

K: Because they were petrified that they were going to be sold down the drain.

P: Okay, fine. We'll let you know that other thing go. Also, I don't think you ought to take the time off talking to the press. There are more important fish to fry. Okay, we'll leave it that way.

K: Right, Mr. President.

The President's Office has received
the request for a formal reply
Re: Presidential Message

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLV

NASA Data 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Hugh Sidey

12:05 p.m., May 14, 1972

K: Hugh.

S: Yes, sir. What are you doing on Sunday?

K: I'm fighting my war. I just read an account you wrote about the 62 missile crisis and now I've moved a cot into my office. I'm not going to be left behind.

S: That's right. Sleep at your desk. That's the mark.

K: That's right. I tried to reach Gerry, but he's on FACE THE NATION. I understand TIME is doing a story on all the players and where they stood.

S: I can't imagine that. I don't think we know that.

K: That's what Gerry told Haig last night. I would just like to say that any speculation of what position I took would be just plain wrong because I just don't talk at these NSC meetings. And I don't want to be lined up... I just think it's a wrong description of how I operate.

S: To draw sides on it -- yeah.

K: That's right.

S: I can't... I didn't see the final version of it, but I can't imagine that we could do anything, because we simply don't have the information.

K: Moreover, frankly, I don't think you do have the information. All you have is self-serving nonsense by individuals, who may have been in on one or two meetings.

S: Well, let me find out a little more about and see where we stand, but my judgment is that sort of thing we have to...

K: Well, you know, you find five guys who will have me take negatives on almost any [MOSCOW] proposition because that's how I prepare these papers. You know, I deal with each of the groups and try to pick holes into their arguments. What I discuss with the President is almost never anyone present.

S: Well, that's my understanding. Well, let me find out, Henry. I can't imagine that we can have anything very definitive or even attempt anything like that. What we may do is simply echo that report in the

The Washington Post and the world's leading
PRINCIPAL NEWSPAPER

Mr. Kissinger/Hugh Sidey

12:05 p.m., May 14, 1972

By: JKH V NASA Date: 5/12/04

TIMES or say the TIMES...

K: Yeah, but that TIMES report came from one of the participants who participated in only two of the meetings. And I don't want to downgrade his role, but you have to understand that a President makes his decisions through a mosaic of conversations.

S: Yeah, as I say, I just can't imagine that we could have done anything really definitive on it.

K: You know, when this thing is well over, I may go over how the decision was made, but really there's almost no one who could tell you.

S: Well, let me take a check on that and see where we stand on it.

K: Okay. Are you coming to Moscow with us if we go?

S: If you go -- oh, yes. I'll be there, if we go.

K: Well, I'll tell you one thing. They're not going to be sweeping any snow off the streets.

S: Well, that's some improvement.

K: No, I think the chances are two out of three now that we'll go.

S: That you'll go.

K: Yeah.

S: What if that thing comes apart in South Vietnam, Henry, while we are there. Or does it look better over there.

K: It looks better over there. Besides it would be a different context now.

S: Well, that's good. Well, I'll be along. We'll be there. I'll get all my shots and get ready. I'll take a check on this, but I think your fears are premature because I just can't conceive of us giving a box-score.

K: Well, I think that would bewise. Cause I don't think I told Gerry exactly how the players lined up and I'd be the only one who'd know.

The President's Office
in the State of California
Municipal Services

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1

6/21/72 NASA Date 5/12/72

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

12:15 p.m., May 14, 1972

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Good.

K: On... I've been talking to the President ad nauseum this morning. I've got that briefing now. That's very good. Very encouraging.

L: We had the other one from the Navy guy.

K: But I don't think they'll do anything.

L: No, but I just wanted you to have it. You know. I think you should have that information.

K: Well, I'm very grateful to you for the help Mel, on these Marine squadrons, I talked to the President and he agrees to putting them into Thailand and then before we move out the ones from Danang we can take another look on how we want to handle it.

L: Okay, well I have them working on it both ways, Henry, and I'll have it for you tomorrow morning, but I had them do it both ways to see.

K: Incidentally, I want you to know, I called up Hugh Sidey again to raise hell with him about that story.

L: The one that's going to appear tomorrow.

K: The one you said is going to appear tomorrow. I just think it's self-serving and its outrageous.

L: The only problem with it is, Henry, you see, they think it's being confirmed. When I give my opinions, we've got to be able to do that without having them go all over town.

K: Mel, there is no excuse for it. There is absolutely no excuse for it. You've been a great public servant. You had a duty to tell the President what you thought and it's absolutely right.

L: You know, I feel much better after doing some things like that. If I can't do that, Henry, it's just a bad situation.

A. J. Kissinger, Secretary
the State and Government
Palo Alto, California

K: Kissinger/Secretary Laird

1:30 p.m., May 14, 1972

By: KJLW NAVAQ. Data: 5/12/04

K: Well, if you can't do it, then we can just put clerks into these jobs. Everyone here -- certainly not.

L: Well, the President didn't discipline me for that.

K: Everyone admires what you did on Wednesday, and it's an outrage.

L: But the President, even when I made the statement, did not discipline me. He did not raise hell with me.

K: But did anyone say he raised hell with you?

L: Sure.

K: Oh, that's baloney.

L: And that's just not true.

K: But you know there are guys who want to build themselves up.

L: I am no competition for any of those people. I am leaving. That's the point, see.

K: Well, I hope you let me campaign for you.

L: Well, I'm not campaigning for anything. Truly.

K: Well, if you get to be a rich man, keep a job for me.

L: Yeah, I'll do that Henry -- always you know that.

K: When I come out six months later.

L: All right. Okay. I just hate to have that kind of division going around town. You know, in my building, I don't tell even the people in my building about things like this. You know that, Henry.

K: Well, Mel, I really am ashamed that this kind of thing could ever happen. I'm really ashamed for the country and for the Administration that this could happen. I mean it.

L: Well, I know that, Henry, and I know that, but there's nothing I can do about it now.

Re: [illegible text]
Re: [illegible text]
Re: [illegible text]

Mosinger, Secretary Laird

15 p.m., May 14, 1972 ]

K: Well, I called Hugh Sidey and told him to see what they could do to... that there was no one who knew this stuff and they should consider that anyone who talks about this stuff has got to be self-serving. And they should keep that in mind. There was one other thing, while we are in Moscow, do you think Hue could be coming apart?

L: Well, I'm not... They are going to make an all-out effort there, but I'm not sure of the timing of it. I thought it would come last week -- the latter part of the week -- but they couldn't get the thing together. We're giving them hell up there, Henry. If we can have another one of these things now -- we plan another one -- at least the South Vietnamese are encouraged, and Abe says he will keep doing it and if we can keep them out on the attack, they can keep them offguard there. That is such a short distance. They've come down 23 miles now -- that's all the further they've moved in 5 weeks in W& 23 miles.

K: I think, if by the end of June, they haven't got more than they've got or maybe only Kontum in addition to what they've got, they've been defeated.

L: Yeah, well, they expected to move a lot further than this in the 5-1/2 weeks.

K: They must have.

L: There's no question about it. But you know, it's hard to give an exact -- whether they can put -- hell, I think every effort is being made to keep that from happening.

K: Well, let's talk about it tomorrow.

L: Okay.

K: Good, Mel.

L: I hope the President reads over some of the stuff today. He shouldn't ... you know, the morale is picking up over there as far as the South Vietnamese and if they have a few more ... Jeez, out there even in MR-2 yesterday...

K: Near Kontum.

K: Right.

K: Hell, they lose 200 here, 200 there. They can't keep this up indefinitely.

A. J. Lieber, as a private individual
he was not a candidate for President.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/13/72

L: No. You know, what they have to do once in a while is look at it from the other guy's point of view, too.

K: Yeah, I agree with you.

L: And we just got to try to keep... Hell, everything is being done that can possibly g be done to influence that battle, Henry.

K: That's my view.

L: Okay. Don't you worry about this other thing. It's just crappy as far as I'm concerned. I just think it's a lot of crap, to tell the truth. That kind of business around this town...

K: It's second-rate.

L: And it doesn't do anybody any good, least of all the President.

K: Least of all the President. I agree with you.

L: Okay.

K: See you at 7:45.

L: All right.

Re: person who is the ex-pat in the book
is the son of aardvark
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1293, Sept. 3.5

TELECON

Gerry Schecter/Mr. Kissinger

12:25 p.m., May 14, 1972

K: ... I thought you were on FACF THE NATION.

S: Well, I was at 11:30.

K: Oh, at 11:30.

S: But it's on at 12:30 here. I just got out of there.

K: Oh, they got it all screwed up. In addition to writing novels, you act, too.

S: I'm no longer a virgin. This is my premiere.

K: I see. I talked to Hugh in the meantime. Haig told me about his conversation with you and I just wondered whether we couldn't knock off this speculation of who takes what position. Above all, since most of it comes from absolutely self-serving sources...

S: Well, I knocked off your position. You don't say anything. You just advise the President.

K: Well, that's what I would really like.

S: Henry, I did that.

K: I don't want to be there supporting it or posing it or anything,

S: I made that clear to them, and I have just have you giving the President the alternatives -- both diplomatic, intelligence and military. Your role is NSC and there is nothing said about what you did in the NSC meeting.

K: Okay.

S: You know, I don't want to burden you with the problems ... this kind of collective journalism.

K: Of course, I had a view on it and of course it had to be played a major role, but I just don't think I can get into the business of putting it out.

S: Okay. Well, Scott is very interested.

Gerry Schecter/Mr. Kissin

12:25 p.m., May 14, 1972

By KHLV NASA Date 5/13/74

K: Scott doesn't know a damn thing. What is he saying?

S: Well, not much.

K: Hugh Scott?

S: Yeah, he defended the Administration very well, I thought. You know, the word is going around that we really let the Chinese and the Russians know what we were going to do.

K: I totally wrong, believe me. I mean, Gerry, I have never lied to you. We gave them advance notice -- that is to say, about 45 minutes ahead of time. So in that case, it's technically true that we let them know.

S: Well, that's different.

K: But we did not let them know what we were going to do. We did make our general position very clear to them, but that does not mean we let our particular strategy known to them.

S: Good. Okay. Thanks, Henry.

K: Okay, Gerry.

S: I was till 10:00 last night trying to get this thing straightened out and explain the ways of the world to them up there, but I think it will be all right. I mean you have to use a fall-back position. Mine was, God-damn it, let's make sure they say that the final decision was made on Monday and that Kissinger... they had an NSC meeting and Kissinger's position is an advisor to the President. We don't speculate on what view he took.

K: The real story is the President was opposed to it.

S: [Laughter] And you talked him into it. Okay, Henry.

K: That's what made it so hard.

S: We save that for the memoirs.

K: I tell you, if it hadn't been for one of the Cabinet Members who beat the President down, there's no telling what would have happened.

S: Okay, are we going the end of next week.

K: Good, good.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1295B, Sect. 3.6

Re: [redacted] from the open file
in the N. Van't Schtal
Preliminary Briefing

BY: K.H.V. NASA, Date: 5/12/04

I. E. DOON

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

1:40 5/14/72

DK: It has been impossible to get you t days.

HAK: You know, I have had one or two s to do.

DK: How are you--you sound tired.

HAK: I am tired.

DK: How do the chances look for the sum.

HAK: The chances are better than even.

DK: Is there anything going on privately?

HAK: There always is something going o~ivately

DK: With respect to Vietnam and the sum,

HAK: I can't talk about it--but you can sJulate that we are always
in touch.

DK: And the communications, we can speate, would be encouraging
with respect to continuing with the summit, ot letting the mining
interfere with the summit.

HAK: I think it is reasonable to presume fm Soviet behavior that
that must be the case.

DK: You don't think we are in for any sur~ses

HAK: No --could be but I don't expect it

DK: Could I speculate the communications at the highest level

HAK: Dave, I just don't speculate

DK: We have had a serious of communications over a period of year, s
but the best dialogue is to continue.

HAK: I don't know whether you would stand down if you said
that--as long as you say it on your own.

DK: How does the battlefield situation look Henry

Hanoi Times news office
of the State of Vietnam
Ministry of State

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.5

By: KVL

NASA Date: 5/13/84

HAK: An Loc looks 50/50 and Hue hasn't really started yet.

UP: Do you expect it to before you go off to Moscow?

HAK: Around that time, yes.

DK: And the outlook is still as you indicated last week. --some
uncertainty

HAK: Yes, but I think the whole ball game is different now.
Because of the action the President took. You know the nature
of panic in SVN is much less. They have to consider much more
what they will do

DK: And whatever the President's motive was, seems to be working.

HAK: Yeh, but we don't usually move without careful preparation
in foreign policy. Yes. It seems to be working.

DK: They seem to be taking it

HAK: I wouldn't put it that way--that is in the neutral interest.

DK: Are the alternate supply routes going to be very effective
(inaudible)

HAK: There are going to be alternate supply --the first decision
everyone has to make is whether they are going to crank up a tremendous
new effort. If there is some alternative open to them. That is the
first decision. Because the alternative route couldn't even begin
to operating for two months. That is a big decision. And then our
judgment is that they couldn't be as effective as the present one.
Two million tons came in through Haiphong--300,000 came on the
railways. Now I don't care how you calculate theoretical capacity,
that is a tremendous amount of stuff to re-route.

DK: 2 million a year? That would be most petroleum wouldn't it

HAK: No about 1/3 petroleum; secondly we are knocking down these
barges. Thirdly, even when we were bombarding Haiphong, they
made no effort to re-route it in previous Administration, although
then they were a little less dependent on this stuff. But of course
they can make it up to some extent, but it depends if it is really in
the Soviet and Chinese interest to keep this going at all costs.

It is possible to open it online
by using a web browser
Internet Address:
http://www.rejoiceblog.com/

6/21/04
By: KHL V
NASA Date: 5/13/04

K: And they may be coming to a conclusion that it isn't.

AK: Right.

K: Can I go on my own and say it is fair to suggest that the
President and Breshnev continue their series of communication
over the years and these communications probably have continued
after the mining was begun and that the indications so far suggest
that at least an implicit understanding by both big powers that
Vietnam should not get in the way of larger questions and that
the plan for the summit

HAK: As I said, I won't send Zeigler out to knock you down.

DK: They real ticklish question is now whether the North Vietnamese
make a big deal at Hue while the President is in route or there?

HAK: Yes, that is true.

DK: One further question. Is it still your feeling that there is
no prospect of serious bargaining in Paris or elsewhere until
the issue of Hue is settled?

HAK: That situation has changed a bit

DK: You think there may be some prospect for resumption of
bargaining.

HAK: Look, the timing is quite important. I think the balance has
changed a bit now and I thought Le Duc The statement yesterday
was very conciliatory--if you read the whole story. I have got to run, Dave

DK: Any chance of seeing you this week...

HAK: I will do my damnest.

DK: I will do my best to call you.

It is possible that the person listed
is the same as or related to the one
identified by the initial and family name of the person listed.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.5

The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

By: KHLW
NASA Date: 5/12/04

K: Mr. President.

P: How did your day go? I hope you relaxed a little.

K: Yes, I've been taking the afternoon off.

P: Lousy day, isn't it?

K: It is a lousy day.

P: Well, I read eight hours today. I caught up -- I've plowed through the books now.

K: Well, we'll have the big book for you by Tuesday evening. I worked on it a bit today.

P: Yeah. I don't want too much because I think basically that the best thing I can do -- I'm somewhat familiar with all these issues, you know.

K: Right.

P: And I think the best thing I can do; after I have skimmed the big book we'll have a talk about the thing and then I'll make up some notes, you know what I mean.

K: Exactly.

P: Because I think it is more important to have a talk and get the feel of the whole situation because we're going to have to play it, you know on some of these things not exactly by the book.

K: Exactly.

P: Any new developments abroad?

K: You might take a look -- just to get a feel for the Brezhnev mentality, to read what he said; the transcript.

P: Oh, yeah, that I have got.

K: Oh, you have got that.

P: Oh, yeah, I've got a feel of that. It's very interesting.

The President of the Republic of Vietnam

U.S. State Department

Pleasanton, California

TELECON (AT HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

By: KVL NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: Right, right.

P: I went through all three books today.

K: So you see how he really has placed quite a bit of stake on this summit for himself.

P: No, well, the way it reads you would think that in view of all that, it would be very difficult for him to move and that may explain in great part. He may just have gotten a streak of stubbornness and just decided that he has too much at stake, and so that would explain that.

K: Well, no; we have just had another interesting result. I was just going to call you about it. We are getting a Soviet Note in which they are proposing the resumption of negotiations on Vietnam to narrow the differences now. It's inconceivable that they would have done that without the Vietnamese.

P: Even though the other times we sort of felt the same thing.

K: Yeah, but the other thing actually played into our hands, Mr. President.

P: Oh, no; I don't regret. You understand that.

K: Without that --

P: Yeah.

K: No, the other time --

P: The other time they didn't --

K: They didn't take the initiative the other time.

P: Yeah.

K: They were supporting our initiative and one has to say, particularly if you read the transcript, we said -- we did exactly what I said to them we would do.

P: Oh, yes, we were very tough. Very tough that last day particularly.

K: And we did exactly what we said we would do.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12953, Sec. 3.5

The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

By: KVLW, NASA Date 5/12/72

P: Right. Oh, it was great

K: And it set it up. I mean, the trip to Moscow and it gave us the --

P: Of course, another thing too, Henry, if you hadn't taken the trip to Moscow, I think we might have lost it.

K: That's what I think.

P: You see the point?

K: Don't you think so as a result of --

P: When I read all this stuff, you see, the other things he's interested in and you know he really panted after you, you know.

K: That's right, wasn't it?

P: (laughter) Really something. And that's fine, that's fine. And also I've gotten a great deal out of reading all the background on the fellow too.

K: Right, right, right. No, I'm not saying that -- I think and Haig also thinks that this Soviet move in asking for negotiations so soon after the blockade --

P: Gives them a little space, doesn't it?

K: Well, it's also the biggest breakthrough we've had in the Vietnamese war.

P: You think so?

K: Yes, because they couldn't have done this without the North Vietnamese, inconceivable.

P: And your view is that we should move. Let me --

K: No, my view is not that. I'd like to read the Note first. It's coming; he just gave me a preview.

P: He's bringing it now.

K: He's bringing it about 8 o'clock.

TELCON (AT HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

The President/Mr. Kissinger
goes to the White House to
negotiate with the Chinese
Maoist Communists.

By: KHLW

NASA Date: 5/12/72

P: The thing is if something like that could be out before this silly vote on Tuesday, it would be helpful. Oh, well, I think we just say the hell with the vote and let these guys get out on a limb.

K: I think --

P: What do you think?

K: I think that's it exactly.

P: I was just thinking back over the whole record and except for the time we went to China, when they were all slobbering around, by God, we haven't had the support of the Congress. Now let's face it.

K: Mr. President, I don't think we should try anything to affect the vote because if we say something about negotiations, they will immediately add so many conditions --

P: That's right.

K: That they do the negotiating for us.

P: I'd just leave them very, very much in doubt.

K: Because if this thing starts again.

P: Um-humm.

K: I mean, I think this time before we start the negotiations, we should get an assurance that there will be some progress.

P: Oh, absolutely. Incidentally, I think they'll give you one.

K: I think so too.

P: If they can't, you can just say there's either be that or it's to the finish. We're ready to go.

K: Well, there is so much --

P: And they also must be having a feeling that we are -- I tell you I was just thinking back here today of the shock they had when they had -- the Madame Binh conversation, you know, I was just reading it again. When we did the original bombing in Hanoi/Haiphong --

TELCUN (AT HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

The President/Mr. Kissinger
gives his approval to
the original bomb
Kissinger's plan

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.5

By: KHLW, NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: I think --

P: What do you think?

K: I think that's it exactly.

P: That's right.

P: Um-humm.

P: Oh, absolutely. Incidentally. I think they'll give you one.

K: I think so too.

K: Well, there is so much --

P: And they also must be having a feeling that we are -- I tell you I was just thinking back here today of the shock they had when they had -- the Madame Binh conversation. you know, I was just reading it again. When we did the original bombing in Hanoi/Haiphong --

TELCOM (AT HOME)
The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

The President/Mr. Kissinger
to tell him the news of the
President's visit to the White
House, and to express his
gratitude for the President's
visit to the White House.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KLCW
NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: Oh, yes, yes.

P: Where she said she was so surprised; they didn't think I'd do it
in an election year. Can you imagine what a shock that the mining
must have been? It must have shaken them very much.

K: Mr. President, when they say they are willing to talk without pre-conditions where in the past they have always said the bombing has to stop and when they always said the only thing they will talk about is their 7 points, this in effect means they are willing to talk about anything.

P: That's right.

K: Now they're going to be tough as hell in the negotiations; I don't want to give any wrong impressions.

P: We know that, we know that.

K: but every --

P: But so are we!

K: But every communication we have ever had from them has said we are prepared to discuss your answer to our 7 points. Never have they said we will talk without preconditions.

P: Right.

K: Never have they taken the initiative.

P: That's right, that's right.

K: So the only question now is how to handle it tactually so that we don't raise too many hopes.

P: Oh, I wouldn't tell anybody: I'd just keep it going and let her -- just say maybe we'll do it after the Soviet summit.

K: Well, let me study the Note and I'll make a recommendation to you tomorrow morning.

P: Right, right.

K: But in any event, Mr. President, if anyone had said a week ago when

Re: a question about the open line
and the phone call of a mutual
Commercial Deal?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

May 14, 1972

By: KMHV NASA Date: 5/13/04

K: (cont'd) you had the enormous courage to do this in the face of all odds that you would -- that the summit would be preserved and that the North Vietnamese would ask for negotiations through the Russians within a week, they would have taken us both away.

P: That's right.

K: For making such a prediction.

P: That's right. Well, I'll tell you I think the main thing is just to remember that the establishment press now is in deep, deep trouble.

K: (laughter)

P: You know, they really are. All out on a limb and I don't think they know what the hell's going on. If I were the Restons and all these other clowns, I'd be worried right now.

K: Oh, and how.

P: I think they are actually.

K: Well, they're totally confused. Now their line is that it worked out well but it was still an unjustified gamble.

P: Oh, God.

K: As if the opposite hadn't been an even worse gamble.

P: Or are they beginning to realize there's going to be a summit in other words?

K: Yeah. I think it's beginning to shift.

P: They say, well, it's reckless but it didn't pan out.

K: I'm still poor-mouthing the summit when I talk to them but the only trouble is Dobrynin called up today and they have now agreed to our entire press list.

P: Um-humm.

K: And they say we can announce it on Tuesday.

May 14, 1972

By: K.H.V. NASA Date: 5/12/04

P: Good. I'll tell you what I do think the one thing I will do for that damn vote is this. You know, I thought we would tell the Senators and Congressmen on Thursday about the Friday meeting, I think that's too late. I think we tell them Tuesday morning. I want them --

K: Oh, yes; that we can do.

P: You see, I think I want that hanging over them. It will worry them a little. I'll say, well, just come down to the White House for a meeting and then let the sons-of-bitches know what they're voting against.

K: Right.

P: Do you agree?

K: Absolutely.

P: But no other movement. And when you're with the Doves, be very tough with them, Henry.

K: That's what I think, Mr. President.

P: I'd be cold and tough and enigmatic. And also what I would, particularly with them, lay this idea of -- you say, what the hell have you put this man through for three and a half years? He's withdrawn 500,000, he's made all these offers, he had the courage to do this thing, he knew what was on the line. Now, isn't it time once, just once, you have some confidence? And he says, Now, I'm going to predict, gentlemen, you're going to look very bad; I'm not going to happen, you're going to look very bad and that's all.

K: Because these negotiations, Mr. President, are bound to surface within a week or two.

P: Yeah. Incidentally, if they turn out bad, let me say I think you should also make the point that the responsibility -- there are very sensitive things going on, the responsibility is on your hands. I'd lay it right to them.

K: Well, the negotiations -- I don't think we should start them for another two weeks.

P: Oh, no.

May 14, 1972

It is possible that there will be open lines
sufficient for a combined
Propaganda Staff

By: KHLW
NASA Date: 5/13/72

K: The only thing we could consider is an exploratory meeting with Le Duc Tho but I will make a recommendation tomorrow morning. I'd like to see the Note just to see what it is they are proposing.

P: Yeah.

K: We've had the advantage over them -- so far we have gained from all these meetings, not in negotiations but we've always had them off balance.

P: I know. Oh, I know; I think they've all been worthwhile. And, for example, as I said your trip to Moscow was indispensable. Gee, State and those people just haven't the slightest (laughter). That was the key to the whole thing.

K: Because it showed us how they were panting after the summit.

P: That's right. As a matter of fact, it only makes us wonder whether we were a little bit too pessimistic on the 20/80 business.

K: Yeah.

P: Of course, as you know, to me it didn't make any difference. It could have been 5/95, we still --

K: Mr. President, the point was -- I may have felt 10% more optimistic but I didn't think one had the responsibility of letting you do it --

P: Particularly, when all your experts, including Helms.

K: Right.

P: He was --

K: Well, he was 100% sure.

P: You said that Helms was ready to have a heart-attack, wasn't he?

K: Oh, Helms was carrying on. Helms was actually emotional.

P: What's he going to do now? What's he saying now?

THE PRESIDENT
ON (AT HOME)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

May 14, 1972

President Richard N. Nixon
President Richard M. Nixon
President Richard M. Nixon

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. / NASA Date: 5/12/72

P: It's not going to fall.

K: And I do not believe that they can take this pace for much longer. They are taking an unbelievable shellacing.

P: Well, particularly, you see if you really look at this whole situation and you compare it with -- and I don't know why Helms didn't ever make when he was making his analyses, why didn't he point out that we had -- and you know, one of the guys raised some question that he -- that they didn't ever raise any point of what would happen if we didn't do certain things.

K: Exactly. That's the point you made so strongly.

P: ....... But anyway my point is that he never pointed out because CIA was dead wrong on it; never pointed out the fact that Cambodia was cut off now. Right?

K: Exactly.

P: He never pointed out that we're both cutting off everything by sea, everything by Cambodia and all that's left is the rails. Now what in hell can they get in there? He knows -- I'll tell you, I've looked over the CIA, you know what I mean. I think half those people have got to go, I really mean it. They are terrible, unbelievable. And that little FIAB is sort of a, you know, a nice bunch of people. But except for Teller, there isn't a strong man in the group.

K: Nelson.

P: Well, Nelson's all right but he doesn't -- but he flops a little now and then, you know.

K: Well, it's a place for retired people.

P: Yeah, it really is. But that's the most important job in this government at the present time. I'm going to get a guy in there who is my friend.

K: Rush would be a good man for that but he would be a good man for so many other jobs.

P: No, no; I want a man about 40 years of age. 40 or 45: mean, ruthless, tough.

May 14, 1972

The President/Mr. Kissinger
Has just returned from a trip to
the Soviet Union.

By: J. M. W. HARRIS, Date: 5/13/72

K: Right.

P: And working with Walters; they'd be a hell of a pair.

K: Exactly, exactly.

P: Anyway, that's very interesting, this note. Haig thinks it's important
too, huh?

K: Oh, yes. No question about it. It's the first time that they have made
an initiative for a meeting; it's the first time that they have dropped
saying it must discuss the 7 points.

P: And this is coming through the Russians?

K: Well, it is a Note from the Russians. And the Russians are putting
it on the basis that if we approve, they will recommend it to Hanoi.
They said they don't have the okay Hanoi yet but that's just a face-saving.

P: Yeah.

K: There are only two possibilities. Either they are doing it with Hanoi,
which is the only possible explanation. Or they are doing it without
Hanoi, which case Hanoi's finished.

P: Yeah.

K: But it isn't done without Hanoi. There's just no way -- that just can't be.
I mean, they can't make a peace overture to us in this much detail --

P: One thing we want to do and this is terribly important to Moscow and
that is to get it across very, very tough to Brezhnev. Henry, not in
a belligerent way but absolutely firm that we're not going to give an
inch in order to settle Vietnam. Nothing.

K: That's right.

P: We're going to say, that's our job: we'll settle it. We appreciate your
help but if you can't, we understand. That should be the line with them.
Cold turkey.

K: Right. We ought to get them some ideas on how to settle it.

P: Oh, I agree. We have to tell them about ceasefire and the rest but
don't give them too much.