TELCONE

Colson/Kissinger

12:05 p.m. - 11/1/72

K: Hello.

C: Hi, Henry.

K: Chuck, I just want you to know I've talked to Lou Harris.

C: Good. Good.

K: It's going to be worth ten points in the polls to you.

C: I think it probably is. It's not a joke you know, really. If he feels
that he has been a part of bringing the war to an end, even though
he is an Alsop type hawk, it just strokes his ego to the degree that
I'll guarantee you that

K: Well, he's offered to carry messages to the Russians.

C: Very good.

K: He told me he's delighted and then he just repeated to me what
I've already seen in the polls.

C: This has made a difference.

K: I said it helped a lot.

C: He's convinced by the way when I talked to him last night that we're
going to win 65 - 35 if we either have an agreement by election day
which I told was improbably - I didn't tell him impossible - I didn't
want to discourage him or keep the hope of peace alive.

K: That we can do. He told me we had to have another meeting before
but I think that's a double-edged sword.

C: I don't. I agree with him. I mean we're probably not in control
of that.

K: We're not only in control of that but I'm also terrified in going to a
meeting and having 200 press guys waiting when I come out.

C: Depends on when you meet.

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. only. EOL 7/25/84
By DAVID HARLAN DeGloistoy

By D.R. HARRIS

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1975

K: Well, it's out of our control.

C: Yeh, well obviously you can't

K: My guess is now it can't take place before the 8th or 9th.

C: Cannot?

K: No.

C: Will you announce that there will be one?

K: I doubt it. You know I think they know that game too and I don't think they want to play it.

C: Well, I don't think it's important, frankly. Lou does. Lou says once you've gotten hopes up you want to keep the momentum up. You want to keep the public expecting that we're on the verge of it all being over. And he said McGovern by this weekend will be charging that this was all a trick - a gimmick, that there will be no peace and there'll be four more years of war. That's part of his analysis. The way in which we handle that is by saying to the American people that it is ongoing and the way you show that is by getting Kissinger in a meeting. He made that point to me last night. For what it's worth - that is obviously something you can't stage. I realize that.

K: Yeh.

C: But I think if Lou feels that he's a part of this and that we're seeking his advice and - you know he loves foreign policy and he loves to feel he's important in it.

K: The only other show we have to navigate is the meeting tomorrow. They may walk out of it.

C: You know in a way we could leak out on Sunday that you're going back over there next week. Wouldn't that be something that could be leaked and then no official comment?

K: Well, let's see what happens tomorrow.

C: OK. We'll see what happens tomorrow. Think about that as a possible ploy.

K: Yeh, OK. Good. C: Thank you, Henry.

TelCon
Art Buckwald/Mr. Kissinger

12:27 - Nov. 1, 1972

B: Hello.

K: Art!

B: Yeah.

K: How are you?

B: Just fine. Just surprised to hear from you. Where you been?

K: Listen, you bastard, I figured if I can talk to Thieu, I can talk to Buckwald. And besides, Thieu doesn't play chess.

B: Thieu's easier--I mean I'm easier than Thieu. Well, what's your mood, do you want to play.

K: Yeah, how about tomorrow.

B: At my place.

K: Yeah.

B: What time?

K: 8:30

B: You want some food?

K: No, that'll be nice but I can eat before--

B: No, we can give you a little sandwich. That's wonderful, I'm looking forward to it. Oh, wait a minute, oh Christ, I'm going to a dinner at Dick Helms tomorrow night. How are you doing tonight around 9:00?

K: Let me see if I can shift something around.

B: Can you switch it around. Friday, I'm okay, and I'm okay tonight.

K: Friday I can't do it. I have something tonight but I won't know until 7:00 if I can switch it.

B: Okay, my problem is that I will be out of the house until I will be back in my home until 8:20. There won't be anybody

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E017258
By: HAROLD GLOSSER

TelCon
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

12:55 - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

T: Hi. I have a senior administration official denying my story at the other day, and I was just wondering whether or not that might be you.

K: No.

T: Well, was the story wrong, Henry?

K: I think it was exaggerated, but I tell you, it's tough negotiating with the Press. I mean, everybody has gone way overboard on everything. And, as I told you the other day for months the whole Press corps was saying no progress was being made now they are all negotiating.

T: Well, how was my story exaggerated, can you tell me?

K: Well, you were talking about all the troops going out.

T: No, I said a total--a sume action towards the withdrawal of the troops that was there.

K: At any rate it was not I who denied the story. I don't know whose story was that.

T: Well, there's just an AP story move now saying the administration officials denied the Los Angeles Times' story.

K: No, absolutely, not I.

T: Well I mean, is a denial really necessary on this--

K: No, I'm amazed.

T: Okay.

K: No, you did all right.

T: But think I may have gone wrong by implying that all were supposed to be withdrawn rather than the New York Times story of about 35,000.

DECLASSIFIED

Agency E017258
By: B.A. MARMADALESOY

2

K: Well, Bob, you just have to understand--

T: I don't want to get into numbers, but I mean, there's
distinction here in terms of quantity, right?

K: That's right. But I think the rest of your story was correct
and wherever--when I was asked about it, I never denied it.

T: Uh huh. Can I ask you one other thing. There was a story
in the Post today about the International Supervisors being
in North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam.

K: I'm just not going to go into any more discussion. You
know, it's just going to get ridiculous.

T: Yeah. Well I understand that. I was just a little upset when
I saw this denial.

K: Well, you didn't deserve it, that was all, and it was wrong.

T: Okay.

K: But, I don't know where it came from.

T: Well, I suspect it was Scali, frankly.

K: Well, he had his own credibility at stake.

(Laughter)

K: Between you and me as a friend, that's what I think. Because
he's been rasping at Haig and me on this issue.

T: He's terrible, Henry. He does you a disservice. Not you
personally, but I think the Administration. I don't trust any
information that comes out of him.

K: Well--

T: While I have you, I just want to ask you one other thing
about Cuba. Is there any movement there on the Hi-jackers?

K: Not that I'm aware of. But you can be sure of one thing, Bob,
I never undercut you.

DECLASSIFIED

Audio: E017258

By: A. M. HARRIS/ALSO

3

T: Okay. Well, I didn't think so, but

K: No, no, your surmise is almost certainly correct. But
this is strictly between you and me.

T: Okay.

K: I mean, it's the only possible rational basis and I have some
independent evidence of a feeling along that line.

T: I didn't understand that.

K: I mean I heard some expressions of displeasure from that
quarter.

T: Yeah, about me.

K: No, no, about the fact that he wasn't a part of that. That
he didn't know about it.

T: Yeah, fair enough. Thanks again, Henry.

K: But, that's between us.

T: Well, that's the way--it always is. Okay, thanks again.

K: Goodbye.

T: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. only E017258
By DAVID DAVIS

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

4:17 p.m., November 1, 1972

K: Mr. President

P: I just wonder if there's anything --if a fellow like Bill Buckley
is buttoned down tight enough to do a thing like this.

K: I don't think he would be staunch enough, Mr. President. He's
too frivolous.

P: No, no.

K: It's got to be a government person.

P: How about the Senator?

K: No; I wouldn't trust him enough to . . .

P: He's not . . .

K: Not in that emotional . . .

P: They wouldn't see the point. Well, we'll keep searching our brains.
There isn't an Ambassador any place in the world would --

K: No, Graham Martin could do it if he were Ambassador there, he's
tough enough.

P: I know, I know.

K: But he doesn't make that tough an impression when you first meet
him.

P: No, no, no; that say it didn't work. What about Rush?

K: Rush is a possibility. Rush or Laird.

P: No, I don't think Laird --

K: But Laird would turn it into a PR exercise.

P: But Rush is a former Ambassador who has got great toughness and
arrest. Let's think about him a bit.

K: Yeah. He isn't all that tough but --

RECLASSIFIED

Act. No. E01258
By DAVID MCGlSKEY

TELECON

Secretary Laird (Secure Phone)

11/1/72 4:20 p.m.

L: On the B-52 running them on up north, I really think it would be better if we go up as high as 18º45. That is . . . If we just go up almost as far as up in the Vinh area then to the 19th in two to three days.

K: I agree. I thought we should go up gradually to 19.

L: The first real target is Binh Tram near Vinh. I don't think there are any other good targets till you get to 19 for B-52s. Then we hold back and not go to 19 for two or three days.

K: Exactly.

L: 18º45 North will be the limit. Right now the limitation is the lower package.

K: All right, but you won't do that till tomorrow night, Thursday night local time.

L: Yes.

K: Excellent, I appreciate all you've done.

KK

(President's line rang; conversation ended.)

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E01725B
By: D4N HARN, D.C./S/C

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 p.m., November 1, 1972

P: Henry, Ray Price was in and we've been working this morning on trying to get this draft --

K: Right.

P: Because I've got to beat that up because of this --

K: Right.

P: And I'd like for him to come over and talk to you about it now.

K: Good, I'll be here.

P: Are you free?

K: Yes, I'll be free.

P: Understand if he -- I'll send him over --

K: No, no; he should come right over.

P: Okay, fine. And you'll work on it. Now I deliberately have put this in pretty strong terms in terms of, you know, that we're not going to be stampeded and so forth and so on. I don't throw it off on Hanoi particularly but the important thing is that we've got to be sure that we don't have the soft surrender view here. We can't let that set in.

K: Right.

P: But anyway you take a look and --

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: And just work on it a while without -- and then let me know. You and Ray just see what you can work out together.

K: Right.

wgh

RECLASSIFIED
Authority ED 17258
By: D.R. HARRIS/Clay

TELCONE

Dick Valeriani/Mr. Kissinger

4:23 p.m., November 1, 1972

K: I just wanted to return your call to tell you that I'm not going to take any more from now on, not because I want to impolite but because we can't conduct this negotiation by Xuan Thuy makes a statement to you, I comment to you, and this goes on and on and on. And we'll wind up negotiating this whole goddamn thing on television.

V: Um-humm. Well, what should I say, I want some judge on how serious they are. Will we put it --

K: Well, what does this mean? We've said we're willing to conclude the agreement. You have to read this carefully. If that's exactly what he said, we're willing to conclude the agreement.

V: Um-humm. But just a question of when they want to set up the meeting. But he's saying they won't have a meeting, you know.

K: Well, if what you said is, he said is they won't have a meeting we give them some guarantee we are willing to conclude it.

V: Yes.

K: Well, we're willing to conclude it. Now then the question is what the guarantee that we're willing to conclude it.

V: Um-humm.

K: I don't consider this -- this I consider perfectly consistent with what we've been saying.

V: Um-humm. You think it's perfectly consistent with what they're saying in terms of deadlines. I mean, the speculation was that while they couldn't agree to another meeting before October 31st as long as they were insisting on October 31st deadline. And once the deadline is passed, then you can arrange another meeting.

K: (chuckle) I think it's perfectly consistent with what we've outlined the procedure will be, it's consistent with the things that are going on in private channels. And what it is inconsistent with is, you know, we're niggling back and forth with each other in public -- you know, it's a senseless procedure.

V: Um-humm.

K: I mean, we haven't said we're not willing to conclude the agreement.

DECLASSIFIED

Adroly E017258
By DAVID ROBERTSON

TELCOM

Dick Valeriani/Mr. Kissinger

4:23 p.m., November 1, 1972

- 2 -

V: Um-humm. Well, do you think they'd need some kind of a guarantee. I mean, are they serious?

K: I think that the thing will be worked out. Now how it will be worked out, by what method I just won't go into. It will certainly be worked out.

V: Um-humm.

K: You know, they are conscious of what's going on in this country and they are masters at ambiguity.

V: Um-humm. And is it something -- I mean, do you think it will be stretched out because of this problem?

K: I don't think so.

V: You don't think so.

K: I think it is going to be worked out as I said last week.

V: In effect nothing really has changed from that?

K: Nothing has changed. You know, there will be -- If we comment on everything that Saigon and Hanoi are going to say over the next week or two, we'll lose our sanity.

V: (laughter) Well, we're losing . . . trying to keep up with that thing.

K: I beg your pardon.

V: We're losing ours trying to keep up with everything.

K: I know, I understand the fix you're in. But if you read this thing carefully, what he's saying is they want some guarantee that we're going to conclude the agreement. In other words, that we're not going to kick over the whole agreement.

V: Um-humm. He meant for the appearance to be that guarantee in effect, . . .

K: That's right, that's right. I think we are in the pre-private meeting state. But this is not for quotation.

DECLASSIFIED

Aut.ly ED 17258
By DA HANOI

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:44 p.m., November 1, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry

K: Don't flirt with my help.

D: (laughter) You shouldn't really be a big brother, really looking
after your girls. You've just given me a chance to have a nice
talk with her.

K: I know.

D: And you're just curious, standing by. Oh, really, you shouldn't
do this. She is a very nice girl.

K: That's all right. I'll do to you what Antonov is trying to do to me,
I'll get you involved with somebody and then blackmail you.

D: Uh-oh, oh, oh. But at least he present you very nice cake if I
remember. And it was very unusual for him to do it.

K: I was very touched.

D: So really he --

K: No, I was really very touched.

D: No, no; I think he -- he find always a nice cook who presented and
cooked it so he was really --

K: No, I really have the warmest memories of my stay there.

D: No, no; I think it was nice. Henry, I don't want to bother you about
this Kelvis (sp?) [Head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences] but --

K: Oh, goddammit!! I know, I'll get it done. It is my fault, it will be
done, I'll call you back within an hour.

D: Within an hour. I'll call you later on. and I now would like to go away but
whether I call you later on.

K: Call me later.

D: Around maybe 8 o'clock, all right?

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:44 p.m., November 1, 1972

K: I, frankly, forgot about it but --

D: But he was -- Henry, I'm always very honest with you -- if it's
very difficult, you could drop it now.

K: It is not difficult. Tomorrow -- we'll get it done tomorrow.

D: Tomorrow on second part of the day.

K: I'll do my best.

D: It will be better on the second just to have a time to bring him here.
He's in New York.

K: Good.

D: So you check with him and then I will call you later on. Okay?

K: Good. Bye.

D: Okay, thank you very much, Henry.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12578
By N.W. Ball Date 10-04-74

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:44 p. m., November 1, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry

K: Don't flirk with my help.

K: I know.

K: I was very touched.

D: So really he --

D: No, no; I think it was nice. Henry, I don't want to bother you about this Kelvin (sp?) [Head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences] but --

D: Within an hour, __________ and I now would like to go away but whether I call you later on.

K: Call me later.

DECLASSIFIED

Antonov E01755 f

By DAVID MARGEDSON

TELECON

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:44 p. m., November 1, 1972

- 2 -

H: Tomorrow on second part of the day.

K: I'll do my best.

K: Good.

K: Good. Bye.

wgh

UNCLASSIFIED

Auto. by E017258
by DA HARRY D. SLAY

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:04 p.m., November 1, 1972

P: Henry, one small thing here. I would rather say we have reached
substantial agreement not "on many of the terms of the settlement,"
I think it's a little weak. I think we could say "on most of the terms
of the settlement."

K: All right.

P: Don't you agree?

K: That's right.

P: It really is "most of the terms."

K: That's right.

P: I don't want to be too defensive.

K: Well, I was just thinking of --

P: Thieu?

K: Him going off his rocker again but "most" is all right.

P: But "most of the terms of the settlement," that leaves us a scape
hatch.

K: Exactly. That is fine.

P: Now it says "that settlement would accomplish," couldn't we just
say "that settlement" or "the settlement we have agreed" -- No.

K: "The settlement we are ready to conclude."

P: "The settlement we are ready to conclude." Is that right?

K: That's right.

P: "The settlement we are ready to conclude would accomplish the
basic ______ we have insisted upon."

K: Right.

P: Okay.

CLASSIFIED

TelCon

R. Price/Mr. Kissinger

5:05 pm, Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

P: Henry?

K: Ray, I just heard that foreign policy speech. Is that the one he's giving tomorrow night.

P: No, this is the one he's doing on the radio.

K: Well, you know, my objection to it is that it is one that Adlai Stevenson could have given. First, you have to tone down Vietnam a little bit. Don't let it sound that it's just around the corner. Secondly, I would put at the beginning some of the material about strength you have at the end. And, we must say something about our allies, or we will lose everybody. I think the theme ought to be that we build our strength, we preserved our alliances and strengthen them, and the opposite happened from what our critics kept saying, which is that it would hurt a negotiation, it provided the basis for the most fruitful negotiations. Then you could keep all the text on negotiations and could go back into it again. That would be my major suggestion. Okay?

P: Okay, good.

K: Good, I'll send it over to you.

P: Okay, while I've got you on, the President is worried over
over the Vietnam inserts for the TV, and he gave me a number
of notes which I'm trying to get out now, and will you be
around a little later if I run them by you, I've got to get them
back to him by 3:30.

K: Yes.

P: Okay, than'ks.

RECLASSIFIED

Adlo.1111 EO1725f -
By DA HARRY DeGleISer

TelCon
Vice President/Mr. Kissinger

5:27 - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello, Mr. Vice President.

VP: Henry! I'm getting ready to go to a conference in San Diego and I just wanted to touch with you--

K: The President's calling, can you hold on a minute?

5:29 - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

VP: Henry, what I wanted to find out before I get into these news conferences out here is the papers out here are headlining the Thieu demand that the North Vietnamese withdraw now. How do you want me to handle that. I'll probably get questions on it, do you want me to just say that I have no further comment to make on it, kx

K: Well, we could say this is one of the subjects now under discussion and you just don't want to say anymore.

VP: All Right. Is there anything else that is current that is a possible source of a problem, or that you may---

K: No, I think you should make clear that we have every intention to working matters out with Thieu. Lower the temperature as much as possible.

VP: Right. Henry, we are not having any problems with Thieu.

K: Well, we are, but I think we can work them out.

VP: But we are not going to emphasize them.

K: No, we are not going to emphasize them.

VP: Okay, I think I know how to handle that.

K: Thank you, Mr. Vice President.

VP: Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

5:28 - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, it's Bob. The President said he wouldn't see the
President of the Soviet Academy no matter what he screwed up.

(a pause)

H: Hello, I'm back Henry. He'll see him Friday.

K: What time?

H: I'll check with him. I don't know what time we leave, but it
ought to be a half hour before we go.

K: Okay. I appreciate that very much.

H: An hour, make it an hour before we go.

K: Okay, about 10:00 o'clock.

H: Okay, we leave at 11:00, so we'll make it at 10:00.

K: Good, many thanks.

H: Okay.

RECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258
By DA HARRISON

6:00 - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, one brief thing. As you know, I've got to kind of wrap up this damn thing tomorrow, and we will know about Paris the first thing in the morning, won't we.

K: We should know by eleven--

P: I was going to say this: My view is that what ever happens in Paris, what I'm saying here is sound, in other words if they say they don't come to the meeting, fine--

K: They won't do anything irreparable.

P: Well if they do, that's fine, too.

K: I don't think they will.

P: Fine.

K: They may give the impression that they are, but I--they're too cautious for that.

P: All right, fine. Well, I just wanted to know, I'm up here hammering away, and I'm going to -- Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Thanks's Henry.

CLASSIFIED

*

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:32 pm - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Are you calling me from the Vietnamese Embassy to celebrate their national holiday?
(Laughter)

D: You shouldn't mention it--otherwise my friends--really let's look at it this way. You going to far, Henry. (Laughter)

K: So, you weren't there?

D: No, this is much more nice a place. We having a dinner for two, my wife and I. This is an example of my life.

K: You are at a restaurant?

D: No, no--but almost. But we will be there in a few minutes.

K: I see--now you're making me--I'm going to ask your driver where you are.

D: No, we are preparing to celebrate. We are going to celebrate today, and then on the 6th and then on the 7th.

K: Oh, I see.

D: You see, and this year it coincides.

K: Well, I'll be in California on the 6th, I won't be able to come to your celebration.

D: Oh, you will be there, but why don't you stay here? Why do you have to go to vote, in California?

K: No, I vote here.

D: Yes, but where do you vote?

K: In the District of Columbia.

D: Oh, so you will be back on the 7th.

K: I'll be back on the 7th. I may go with the President to Florida on the 8th.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: E.W. Kissinger

D: I understand.

K: About Kelvis, the President will see him at 10:00 o'clock on Friday. Is that all right.

D: I am sure. In the morning?

K: In the morning.

D: I'm sure it's quite right.

K: Because tomorrow he's giving a television speech, and--

D: Yes, I know. Oh, Friday will be quite all right. Thank you very much.

Peterson

K: Good. I also wanted to tell you that we are sending ______ into Japan right after the election to discuss the gas deals.

D: Who?

K: Peterson.

D: Oh, yes, he's going there right after.

K: Yes, about November 15th.

D: Because ALK HIMOV (up?) mentioned to us their interest in continuing --

K: Peterson is going there and we will give it a big push right after the elections.

D: A big one. So, I do hope to see you on the 7th, to continue to celebrate.

K: Yes, we must do it. Well on the 7th do you have a recdption at the Embassy?

D: We have it on the 6th.

K: That's what I thought.

D: We just want to interest you in your domestic affairs.

K: On the 6th, I can't go there.

3

D: We will assembly on the 7th for drinks, all right?

K: What do you hear from your North Vietnamese friends?

D: They have been very quiet. I mean, in our communication. They have to say what they intend to say, maybe. They have displeasure but my impression is after all everything will go back the same. Of course, they may consider you, really, being politically our fellow, going to renegotiate half of what they agreed upon.

(Laughter)

K: No, only--

D: You see, I think this is main concern of theirs.

K: Only a third.

D: And the most important third.

K: Actually, strangely enough, I want some changes in the less important half, for cosmetic reasons and in the important part I'm not --two or three changes will help.

D: Well, their impression of you are trying to change into coalition. That's why they are a little bit concerned about it. You know, on two points. The points discussed the other day. The implications are in the text rather. Which sounds more like from English into-- you remember these points.

K: You mean about the administrative structure. I even have the Vietnamese word I want them to use.

D: (Laughter) But are you sure it is the right word?

K: I'm positive.

D: Because maybe is much more stronger than means the instruction. You see, you already rather in incubation, when you read the manuscript from Hanoi. And from Saigon. They have a different kind of translation. All the same word is understood.

K: That's right. Well sooner or later they'll have to face that issue.

D: I think it, but for the time being, its very difficult because both sides, from your typical analysis they of course make some-- why don't you make them calm down.

K: Okay. I'd just as soon have them calm down after the election.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01 2658
By: N.M. Dae: Cao Don

4

D: What if you oppose them.

K: Well, I think if they calm down after the election it won't break my heart.

(Laughter)

D: Well, I think it's very difficult to break your heart in any case.

K: Oh, no, no, no. ________ has tried.

D: Well, I don't know, I think you went far enough. Even my Minister was a little bit surprised when he--I was

K: But when we threw him the cake, that was really very touching.

(Laughter)

K: Okay, Anatol

D: Thank you very much for this one, so Friday at ten o'clock.

K: Right.

D: And you are invited. Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:32 pm - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: So, you weren't there?

D: No, No, this is much more nice a place. We having a dinner for two, my wife and I. This is an example of my life.

K: You are at a restaurant?

K: Oh, I see.

D: Oh, you will be there, but why don't you stay here? Why do you have to go to the vote, in California?

K: No, I vote here.

CLASSIFIED

Antonly E017258
By DAVID HARRIS/AFI

2

D: I understand.

K: About Kelvis, the President will see him at 18:00 o'clock on Friday. Is that all right.

D: I am sure. In the morning?

K: In the morning.

D: I'm sure it's quite right.

Peterson

D: Who?

K: Peterson.

K: Yes, about November 15th.

D: Because Akhiro (sp?) mentioned to us their interest in continuing --

K: Yes, we must do it. Well on the 7th do you have a reception at the Embassy?

D: We have it on the 6th.

K: That's what I thought.

DECLASSIFIED

Auto. 10:25 E.
By: H. D. Glissom

CLASSIFIED

Antiquity EO17258

By DAVID HARRIS/DREAMstime

D: They have been very quiet. I'm can, in our communication. They have to say what they intend to say, maybe. They have displeasure but my impression is after all everything will go back the same. Of course, they may consider you, really, being politically our fellow, going to renegotiate half of what they agreed upon.

(Laughter)

K: No, only--

K: Only a third.

D: Well, their impression of you are trying to change into coalition. That's why they are a little bit concerned about it. You know, on two points. The points discussed the other day. The implications are in the text rather. Which sounds more like from English into-- you remember those points.

K: I'm positive.

D: I think it, but for the time being, it's very difficult because both sides from your typical analysis they of course make some-why don't you make them calm down.

D: What if you oppose them.

(Laughter)

(Laughter)

K: Okay, Anatol

K: Right.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Anonymously E017258

By a HARRIS newsboy

TelCon
Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

6:40 pm - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

R: Hello, good evening.

K: How are you?

R: Fine.

K: Did you see that article from Jerusalem.

R: I believe that I talked to Haig---

K: I know, but at that time we thought it was a local article.

R: No, I explained to him that it came from Jerusalem.

K: Well, you know, there's just enough truth in it to make me think it's mischievous.

R: I think that you are not completely wrong.

K: You see, I have talked to you in the sense that *it's a threat* as a friend and in no sense *it's a threat* as a threat.

R: Well--

K: And always as a personal opinion, never on instructions.

R: Well, it's difficult to explain on the phone, but I cannot really explain exactly what happened. There was a leakage about a week ago, but then your name was not included.

K: But, you know, you tell your people if they are going to play games with me, I'm just going to stop talking to any Israeli.

R: Well, I'll pass it whatever you want, but really it is strange, very strange.

K: Well I believe, at first I thought it came from our domestic opponent.

R: No.

K: And now I don't believe it comes from here.

R: No, it doesn't come from here. Well, it's not too simple to explain it. But frankly I don't know exactly what are the motivations behind it.

RECLASSIFIED

Authorized E017258
By DAVID HARRIS/Alstom

2

K: Well you tell your people that I'm absolutely outraged and I just will not have any further discussions with any Israeli until I get an explanation.

R: Well, you want me to pass it this way.

K: That's right, because this is absolutely bad faith. You know very well what I did say to you was as a friend, not on instructions, and in no sense as a U.S. governmental request.

R: Well, it's more than that. I didn't understand it the way that it is proof that a---and I didn't report it this way.

K: No, no, I--

R: Even a twist or putting out of context.

K: It is certainly out of context.

R: Exactly, and therefore my report did not tell it the way--

K: Look you and I have worked together for so long, but I know that you are a man of honor, I have no question about you in this, Absolutely none. We have been in very many delicate things, there's no concern about that. But if I have to worry about the security of our conversations at the other end, we just can't have them.

K: Anyhow I told Haig that I was asked by George Sherman and I said I was not warned and no threat was used.

R: And, by the way, I once said to you privately about the meeting with the Foreign Minister, and I was wrong, the leakage came from New York, he was there. No, no, it was not, I said, I thought that it might be somebody else did it. And it was wrong.

K: When I see the comparisons with Archers, and so forth--

R: It's all too clearly who is the fault.

K: Yeah, there is no question about it, but it's a game in which I won't participate. So you can tell them in the strongest possible words, that until I get some explanation and some clarification I just won't deal anymore.

R: All right.

RECLASSIFIED

TelCon

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

8:00 - Nov. 1, 1972

K: Hello.

DK: Hi, Henry,

K: Dave. I called you earlier about that *話從事* story from Jerusalem Did you learn today that I had called Rabin and asked for a Middle East proposal.

DK: We killed the story.

K: No, it's in the paper.

DK: I know, but we killed it--

K: It's really an outrageous, inaccurate--but not even inaccurate--there's nothing to it.

DK: Henry, the story is killed.

K: Okay.

DK: It was going in our first two editions, and I killed it out later.

K: Okay.

DK: When I was told that there was serious question as to the accuracy of it, I took it out.

K: A mischiefous story. I see no basis for it.

DK: No meeting occurred in which any suggestion was made that it would be well to seek a settlement of any kind.

K: That's right.

DK: You don't foresee any settlement coming.

K: That I don't want to say, but I-- I can imagine that settlement might eventually come. But the point is I did not ask them to make a proposal--you know I may have seen him four weeks ago--I haven't seen him in three or four weeks.

DK: And there would not have been anything said even if such a meeting was--

K: No

CLASSIFIED

Auto. E017258
By: H.A. Kissinger

2

DK: Could have been misinterpreted from--

K: No.

DK: Suggested to seek out a settlement.

K: Absolutely not.

DK: That's good enough for me. How is the Vietnam thing going, Henry.
Is--are you having a little assurance.

K: Well, you know, to deal with one Vietnam is tough enough but to
deal with both of them simultaneously is--

DK: It looks like it's going to be a while before you can tie this thing
up.

K: Well, the basic prognosis I made, it is still correct.

DK: That will come into fruition soon after the election, I take it.

K: I think--whenever we start talking in two or three weeks after
that, shall we say.

DK: Still no word on another meeting in Paris?

K: We are exchanging things.

DK: All right, Henry, thank you very much.

K: Thank you, Dave.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Ray Price/Kissinger

9:28 a.m. - 11/2/72

K: Hello.

P: Hello, Henry.

K: Ray, on this Vietnam stuff, first on page 6, where he says, 'the
basic objectives that we have insisted upon:' he should mention
when. In our May 8th proposal when we mined the harbors of
North Vietnam, so the people remember it.

P: Um-hmm.

K: Then further on we cannot say there are still some details to
be worked out because we are going to insist on some more
fundamental things, too.

P: OK. It now says 'there are still some provisions of the agreement
which must be clarified'

K: Yeh, but it isn't just clarification that we want. You have to say
there are still some problems to be worked out.

P: Um-hm.

K: There's no sense making it look too minor because if it blows up
two weeks from now we'll be in bad trouble.

P: You want to go beyond clarification?

K: That's right. There are still some problems to be worked out.

P: Um-hm. OK. That was the language he took out.

K: Well, I don't give a damn. It's totally wrong.

P: I just wondered if there's some other way of putting it that - I don't
know - I wasn't with him when he did this I don't know what he had
in mind in doing it but

K: Well, I'll take it up with him.

P: OK. Fine. It may just be that the

K: There are still some issues to be resolved. Put it that way.

CLASSIFIED

Add. only E01725&
by D A HARRIS/IST

*

2

P: OK.

K: On the next page, on page 8. I would stop after "temporary truce". I would not say "not a permanent settlement." Anyone who thinks anything in Vietnam is a permanent settlement is in deep trouble.

P: Um-hmm. How about an "everlasting peace" - do you want that?

K: I would just say "which would only be a temporary truce" and stop there. Don't say "an everlasting peace", it may come back to haunt us.

P: Ok, but lasting isn't as <u>absolute</u> as permanent.

K: Right. Not a lasting peace, that's all right.

P: OK. Fine.

K: OK, those are my major changes.

P: OK. Fine

RECLASSIFIED

Authority EO17258
By DAVID M. GLOSSER

TELCONE
Ziegler/Kissinger
9:42 a.m. - 11/2/72

Z: Hello.

K: Ron, what is that Time-Life project - that film? Are you cooperating?

Z: Yes, let me tell you what it is. Teddy White, who writes his book, then does a television special that appears on one of the networks, called 'The Making of the President.'' Teddy White narrates it and so forth. And these people are in to do the film for that network special that will appear probably in September of 1973. And you're of course, a key element in it and that's why they want to film you. You very definitely should do it.

K: OK. Fine. But do they have to tear my office apart?

Z: Well, I think it's important you look good.

K: OK. Fine. Thank you.

Z: That's what it is - it's a worthwhile project.

K: Thank you.

CLASSIFIED

Autograph E017258
By: D.A. HARRIS/Dickley

TELCORN

Bill Sullivan/Kissinger

10:00 a.m. - 11/2/72

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill. The President has now read the Lam comment about me
and he hit the ceiling.

S: The one in which he said the President's all right but Kissinger
out of faith (?) ?

K: That I didn't see. The one where he said Kissinger has a different
approach.

S: Oh, a different view. Yeh, Yeh, Yeh.

K: Did he also say that there's a different between the President and me?

S: Somewhere one of them did. I can't remember whether it was Lam
or whether it was Duc, but somebody said that.

K: Yeh. He wants a sharp and brutal protest made to Lam and to Thieu.

S: All right.

K: Do you recall his letter to Thieu of October 16th that I speak for him?

K:

S: Uh-huh. / That if this does not stop it will impossible to maintain
support in this country for the GVN.

S: OK. I'd be happy to do that. I think somebody's going to have to
land on Lam with all feet anyway. He's a bumbler - that's his main
problem.

K: It's not enough to make it with Thieu. He wants Bunker to go in and
raise cain with Lam.

S: Lam, too. Does he want to do it with both Thieu and with Lam?

K: That's right.

S: OK.

K: But in brutal language because apparently Congress kindness hasn't
done us any good.

RECLASSIFIED

Aut. 12758
By D.N. HAROLD
Date 11/2/72

CLASSIFIED

S: Right. All right. That's the kind of message I love to send.

K: And to recall his letter of October 16.

S: That you speak for him

K: And that there isn't no division in the U.S. Government - there's
only one person who makes policy.

S: Right. I'll bring this over at the 3 o'clock session so that you can
see it then.

K: Good. And that still gets it done tomorrow.

S: Yes, because they're going into 10 o'clock at night out there now
so

K: OK. So you get it into NODIS channels.

S: I'll get it into a NODIS channel for Bunker and do it that way.

K: Good. Right. I'd like to see you briefly afterwards to go over
the negotiating things - I mean what we can reasonably
and what not.

S: Right.

K: Sometimes I think I'm beginning to lose my sanity when I see some
of these criticisms.

S: Yeh, some of your staff has been bugging me about them too.
Holdridge and company and giving me orders and so forth and
I said I'm not going to carry them out until I talk to you.

K: Like what?

S: Like we're not going to have the ICC in Cambodia and Laos. We're going to change all that. I said I want to wait until I talk with you. Negroponte I think is clued in on the understandings on this but Holdridge and company just thinks we can reopen the whole bloody thing.

K: No, no. That's what I want to go over with you. We have a whole
host of suggestions now and we have - I think if we reopen every
third paragraph this whole thing is going to blow up.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Ivan Head

11/2/72 10:01 a.m.

HK: How are you?

IV: Shaken. How are you?

HK: I hope we don't follow your example.

IV: (laughing) No. All it indicates perhaps polls are very uncertain devices--

HK: What did your polls indicate before the election?

IV: Good, quite good. Not nearly so good as you of course, and the rather unofficial polls that have been taken since and these are more voluntary polls by persons of all persuasions who have been flooding us with correspondence and telegrams is to the effect that their desire was not to defeat the government and they haven't quite done that but they sure came close, but rather to ______ us to clip the wings of the Prime Minister --to cut the government down to size a bit, they thought it was just being a bit too arrogant and what they wanted to do was build up the strength of the opposition but in a parliamentary system there is no real way of doing that without doing what they almost did. So I don't think that there really any comparison, to be made with what is going to happen next week in the U.S.

HK: Right

IV: At least, I hope not.
What I wanted to give you a call about but I apologize, I know that you have these other pressures upon you, but to say that, as I am sure you have heard, that the Prime Minister and his colleagues have decided to govern

HK: Right, I have heard that.

IV: And what this will require, of course, is a vote of confidence in the House of Commons and then being able continuously to retain the confidence of the Commons and we are quite --we believe quite deeply that we can do this at the present time, already we have heard from at least one of the minor opposition parties which has enough strength to support us and I think we can continue going on --not by making deals but just by being smart the way we govern-- being a little more political

DECLASSIFIED

Autumnal E017258
By: H.A. Dilsley

TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/Ivan Head

Page 2

that we have in the past.

HK: Right.

IV: In his press conference last night, however, the Prime Minister was asked and this is what triggers my call partly, what would happen with respect to trade discussions with the US if following the American election we were asked straight away to get on with them, I don't have it in front of me, I am paraphrasing--his reply, that we would be prepared to do that of course to talk with them but we would say at the outset that until such time as we have gained our vote of confidence in the Commons and that would be during the course of Drone Speech Debate (sp that the government couldn't really act as if it were a majority government and thus do anything that would bind future parliaments and future governments in Canada, and that we would have to ask in a tentative fashion, however, as soon as that vote of confidence coms through and understandably is, maybe will be reversed in weeks thereafter, but as soon as the first one came through that we intended to ask that the majority government not as the minority government to govern boldly and imaginatively and toughly, and from that point on we would deal with the US and the other foreign government--exactly the same way and maybe the same kind of commitments as if we had a majority.

HK: Right. Right. Right. Well.

IV: So it just means really that in the next six weeks or so until we get into the--and the decision hasn't been taken yet as to when we will call Parliament into session but we obviously have to do it more quickly that we otherwise would in order to keep the confidence of the people of Canada and avoid the impression that we are just clinging to power for that stake alone. We will be willing to talk but I doh't think that we can move things forward very substantively, if it doesn't seem at an official level there is no reason that people have figures to compare and areas to explore.

HK: Right. Well, we'll have to see what problems we will have here, we might have some difficult times, but we've had them before.

IV: Yeh. On a related but another issue, there--I would like to have the opportunity if you feel it would be valuable to you to give you some of background in Canada at the present time and particularly French-English and Quebec relations we could use the opportunity

DECLASSIFIED

Antonly El07258
By DAVID HARPER

CLASSIFIED
1972

By: D.R. DeGloster

Page 3

as well to--

HK: Were you think of coming down here or what?

IV: I have to be in Venezuela for a short conference not this weekend but the following weekend and I have to come back through up the eastern seaboard if you had an hour free for breakfast, lunch or dinner at any time on either Sunday the 12th or Monday the 13th I would be very happy to--

HK: I won't be here Sunday the 12th I am pretty sure, but let's aim for Monday, the 13th.

IV: Okay I will check my airline schedules if I could give you--you'd be in Washington would you?

HK: That's right.

IV: Okay because I think we could usefully have some word on Vietnam and different roles as well by that time it will be more clear in our own minds what we are able to do.

HK: Right.

IV: And one of the reasons that we have taken the decision to continue and it would have been easier to turn it over to the others and let them try to the up here is the French-English split in Canada and I think it is important--

HK: Well, let's aim for breakfast on the 13th.

IV: Breakfast on the 13th?

HK: Right.

IV: Okay, what time would you suggest?

HK: About 8:30.

IV: Good and how would I find you?

HK: In the White House--

IV: Should I come there?

HK: Why don't you.

IV: Okay, I'll plan on it--I can say everything I am sure within an hour.

HK: Good.

TELCOM

Lord Cromer/Kissinger

12:32 p.m. - 11/2/72

K: Hello Lord Cromer, how are you?

C: I'm fine.

K: The President just read something that Sir Douglas-Home said that has him climbing walls with rage.

C: About what?

K: Here it says "Sir Alec Douglas-Home complained today that the Hanoi-Washington blackout on information relating to their draft cease-fire left Britain and China unable to assess the next stages in the peace-making process in Indochina." "Neither of us has been asked to take a part in an international conference or in the supervisory machinery," and a few other similar critical things.

C: How very extraordinary.

K: And we feel that if there is one country that we have kept informed it is Great Britain.

C: Let me check it out. It sounds most extraordinary. I am not surprised you are hopping made. Let me find out about it.

K: And certainly in the last week of an election to be attacked by a friend

C: Certainly, I think it is quite extraordinary.

K: Then it goes on "China will continue total support for Hanoi if that agreement breaks down. It would prefer instead to have all the problems of cease-fire supervision, election in South Vietnam and ultimate individual settlements worked out by the Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian peoples themselves." All of this is great, but why should the British put out the Chinese point of view.

C: Sounds quite extraordinary. Let me get a hold of it and find out what the hell is going on.

RECLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Lord Cromer/Kissinger

12:50 p.m. - 11/2/72

K: Hello.

C: Oh, Henry. Look, I got a hold of the tape now and the thing is the only thing I can say is that in the opening of the paragraph is of course what AP themselves have put in. It isn't in quotes at all.

K: Yeh.

C: And I've got the statement on Hume's actual press conference - he gave out a statement - there is not one reference to Vietnam from start to finish. I'm afraid there are some people who aren't very friendly.

K: Yes, could you send it over because the President should see it.

C: Yes, of course.

K: And you know he has this special feeling about him anyway.

C: Absolutely.

K: So

C: I've got it on tape here - yes, I will send it over.

K: Right.

C: I'm also inquiring in this other thing immediately but all I can say is I was listening to CBS last night and their interpretation, I mean, couldn't have been more hostile. And you know what these damn press are like.

K: Yeh, I know what the press is like, but some of it has, frankly, the earmarks of some of the background briefing that was going on last December. So I'm not saying it was quoteable but

C: It was most unfortunate, of course.

K: But I wonder how much of it was done on the basis of some briefing.

BROOKFIELD

TELCONE

Senator Humphrey /Kissinger

2:53 p.m. - 11/2/72

K: Hello.

H: Henry.

K: Hubert, how are you?

H: Well, I'm fine, my friend.

K: I called you because I wanted to tell you how generous I thought it was of you to say what you did yesterday about that settlement.

H: Thank you very much.

K: And it was a very patriotic thing to do.

H: Well, my friend, I've been thinking of you more than you'll ever know and I don't mind telling you that I think you've done a remarkable job. I refuse to indulge in any politics on this issue at all.

K: I think really the last thing we've got left to get out of this was to end it without the bitterness with which we've conducted it.

H: Exactly.

K: And it doesn't do anybody any good to prove who was right, when.

H: Oh, it's so ridiculous.

K: We should end it now as a united people with some sense of pride in the way it was ended. At least not with any sense of shame and then go on to other things.

H: I haven't bothered you at all. What is your - I mean just privately - I certainly wouldn't violate your

K: I know you wouldn't.

H: What does it look like?

K: I think that we're going to get the talks started again next week sometime and I think that by the end of November we'll have it all done.

CLASSIFIED

Anonymously E01258
By: D. M. B. H. S.

2

H: Um-hm.

K: Anyhow, I think that's a reasonable guess.

H: Yeh, I understand your problems and you know I hope that we can
keep the rhetoric down a little bit on this. It's kind of difficult.

K: But after the election don't you think people are going to quiet
down a bit.

H: Oh, sure. Sure they'll quiet down. Absolutely they'll quiet down.

K: Well, I'd love to see you, will you be in Washington at all after
the election?

H: Let me tell you what I'm going to do - right after the election
Mrs. Humphrey and I are going to take a few days off and go to
the Virgin Islands. I'll be in Washington just a day or so before
we go on that visit. I'm coming in on the 9th and we're going to
be leaving on the 10th. Then I'm going to make a little visit to
the Soviet Union for the Committee on Agriculture. I'm not over
there to cause difficulty; I'm over there to see what they're doing
and what they have in mind.

K: You wouldn't be causing difficulty anyway.

H: And then possibly drop off in Poland just to

K: Can we do anything for you on this trip?

H: I'll tell you I would like very much to see some of the key people
over there that we need to talk to - like the Minister of Agriculture.
Henry Bellman of Oklahoma is going with me. It's a bipartisan

K: I'll talk to Dobrynin and to the Polish Ambassador because I think
in the next four years on foreign policy anyway, you and we can
work very closely together.

H: Oh, very much so, Henry. On the whole issue of national security.

K: That's what I think.

By DAVID HARRIS/GETTY IMAGES

CLASSIFIED

Autograph

E01725f

By A. HAROLD GILSON

H: You know I'm all my wrestling days are all behind me. I want very much to work with you. I've had the highest regard for you. It's just a fact of life.

K: And you know my feelings about you and we will - I will keep you fully informed and the thought that you might be causing trouble really wouldn't occur to me.

H: I would hope that - might I just make this suggestion that if the President's going to talk to the country as he is I know before the campaign is over, that on this Vietnam thing that he just let the people know that again we are working on a peaceful settlement; that it is important that it be done right and actually, in a sense if it's not before the election, it even has a political plus in the sense that we're not trying to run it through for election votes, we're trying to do it for the future and for a real lasting peace.

K: Right.

H: I think if he talks this way to the public it will be helpful in reassuring.

K: He is speaking tonight and let me see whether I can get some of these thoughts. Well, I know I'll put them before him and I'm sure - it happens to be his view so that I'm sure

H: Yeh, I know that it is and in this area, you know, there is no one else that can do it except the man that's there and it just seems to me that there were some people trying to pretend that he was doing this before the election to get the votes and

K: Hanoi trigered it, we didn't.

H: Exactly. Now the thing that I think the President needs to say to me as a citizen - not as Senator Humphrey - but to my wife and my kids is that look, we're on the track, we've made progress, everybody knows it including the North Vietnamese and I'm not going to try to make a snap judgment that will come back to plague us. We're doing this to get a peace, we're not doing this to win an election. We're doing this for the future; we're not doing this for November 7th.

3

4

K: Terrific.

H: You know what I mean?

K: Absolutely.

H: And that's what I - I'm confident that he's going to win. I'm not voting for him, but I'm confident he's going to win and I just want him to do the best he can on this issue.

K: Right. Right. Right. And after the election I really hope that you and we can work together.

H: You have my help, Henry. I just hope you'll feel free to ask me and I don't like to push and shove.

K: No, no, you can count on it and I'd love to see more of you for the country and for personal reasons.

H: Thank you friend.

K: Good. Thank you.

H: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Act.oly E01258
By a H.A. De Alvey

TELCOM

Henry Hubbard/Kissinger

5:45 p.m. - 11/2/72

K: Hello.

H: Hello there, how are you?

K: OK.

H: We have only one question for this week. We'll wait 'til next week for the complete sellout of President Thieu. We don't expect nothing will take place this week.

K: Complete sellout of President Thieu.

H: That's right.

K: Knowing how deeply concerned NEWSWEEK had always been about his future and they have been prepared to run for it.

H: (Laugs) The only question is the one I'm sure you've been asked all week long by reporters which is to what extent does any kind of an understanding on withdrawal of NVA regulars from South Vietnam - is there any kind of substance to the idea. You made the point to Trewhitt and me that you thought it would be necessary for them to remove their troops.

K: Well, I have not wanted to turn this thing into a test of manhood but there is some substance to the story but write that as your own.

H: All right. Now how about the number they've been kicking around - the 35,000.

K: I'm not going into any of that.

H: All right. OK. I think that's all. Thank you very much.

K: Right.

H: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Aut. only
E01725f
By DA HARRIS Dec 6 1975

TELCORN
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:50 p.m., November 2, 1972

K: Mr. President

P: Oh, Henry, how are you?

K: I just wanted to call to tell you that I thought your speech really went extremely well.

P: Well, it was a lot of the usual --

K: No, but it --

P: . . stuff in there but I think we got the Vietnam point across and the
______ policy in a way --

K: It was perfect.

P: . . . that nobody can now say we're being a little sappy at least.

K: I thought that the delivery was extremely effective and really very
sharp contrast with McGovern.

P: T<sub>hat</sub>'s rather easy (laughter).

K: No, but I meant that it was very statesmanlike and very strong.

P: Anything new on the -- on all the fronts today?

K: No, I think it's going to settle down. Chou En-lai babbled a little bit
again but just the usual stuff.

P: He's got to babble.

K: D<sub>id</sub> you hear what McGovern did tonight?

P: No, not the latest.

K: He got off an airplane and one of your supporters was standing there
and he said -- and your supporter said, young fellow you'll be beaten so
badly on Tuesday that you'll wish you had never left South Dakota so
McGovern went up to him, put his arm around him and said "Kiss my ass."

P: Oh, my God. He's really getting --

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Authority E017258
By DAVID HARDAUGH

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
8:50 p.m., November 2, 1972

K: (laughter) And that's on the wires.

P: Losing his cool. Like he told that woman, you know, he said "you're a horse's ass" -- you know, when she wouldn't shake hands with him or something.

K: He's an awful man.

P: My God, I've been through much worse. (laughter) You just don't react that way.

K: Yeah.

P: You don't react that way. He said, "kiss my ass" huh?

K: Yeah, he's an awful man.

P: Well, fine. Well, it's coming along and whatever happens in the next three or four days cannot affect the results --

K: Nothing decisive is going to happen now.

P: We're going to hammer right along.

K: They would be insane to break anything off now.

P: If they do, well --

K: It's almost inconceivable.

P: Well, if they do, we're ready and we're in a position to just put it on McGovern. Say he wants surrender.

K: Yeah.

P: And we're going to play it rough, if he does too.

K: It's not going to happen.

P: He may -- somebody was saying -- come out Sunday and say well, it's all shot and we've mislead the people and all that. But if he does, we'll just -- Are you going to do your thing tomorrow or not? Have you decided?

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Auto. by E017258
By: A. M. 01/15/78

K: Ron thought that it would be better to let your thing ride for a day.

P: Yeah, probably so.

K: But I could do it Saturday morning and still make the Sunday papers.

P: That's better. Do it Saturday morning, that's better because I'll be on tomorrow and I'll be out in the country tomorrow and we'll let that ride. And then Saturday morning you could have something that will hit the Sunday papers and the weekly magazines and the Saturday night TV. That's much better.

K: Good. I'll do it Saturday morning.

P: Fine. Take a rest.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Thank you, Henry.

K: Right. Bye.

wgh

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Authority EO17251
By DAVID MCGlSKEY