EIGHTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE
and WORLD AFFAIRS

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont

MEMORANDUM FROM THE CONFERENCE ADMINISTRATOR

Welcome to the Eighth Conference on Science and World Affairs!
Having corresponded with many of you over the past several
months, I am looking forward to meeting you all personally in
Stowe. I will be located in Room no. 27 at The Lodge and will
be available throughout the Conference to assist in any way I
can. Please feel free to call on me at any time. I regret
that English is my only language, but Mr. Alexander Korol will
be serving as administrative interpreter to assist me with
Russian-speaking participants.

Nearly all participants will be staying at either The Lodge, Stowehof, or the Center Motel. (Those staying at Stowehof will be served breakfast there; lunch and dinner at the Lodge. Those staying at the Center Motel will have all meals at The Lodge.) There is a short brochure in each room which describes the services and facilities which are available. You will be the guest of the U.S. Committee with regard to all services except long-distance telephone and telegraph and bar expenses. A statement of your personal charges will be given to you at the end of the Conference.

The Conference secretariat under the direction of Mrs. Ruth
Adams is located on the ground floor of the south wing of The
Lodge. We anticipate that the work load on the secretariat
in translating, typing, and reproducing papers will make it
impossible for them to provide personal secretarial service.
Please contact Mrs. Adams in connection with all matters per-
taining to the secretariat.

Miss Mary Morse will be handling all travel arrangements - making or confirming reservations, advising on flight schedules, etc.
Her desk is located in the downstairs library.

A group of student aides is available to assist in any way they
can. Please feel free to call on them to take messages, run
erands, help out as interpreters, and in other ways. Mr. George
Brewer is stationed at a desk in the lobby of The Lodge to
coordinate the activities of the aides.

Cars will be stationed outside The Lodge to take participants
to the main Conference room, Stowehof, the village, the Center
Motel, and elsewhere as may be necessary.

A schedule of social events will be distributed. I want to call
your special attention to the chamber music concert on the
evening of September 12. We are fortunate in having a group of
musicians from Rudolph Serkin's Marlboro Festival to play for us.

The management and staff of The Lodge will, I am sure, be exceed-
ingly cooperative. The Manager, Mr. Ivor Petrak, is particularly
concerned that you are comfortable and efficiently served. May
I ask that you give him your patience and cooperation.

Arthur L. Singer, Jr.

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# THE PROBLEM OF THE CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR STOCK

## I The Possible Size of a Clandestine Nuclear Stock and the Balance of Risks

Disarmament negotiations have been in virtual deadlock since May 1955. The reason given has been the danger that a disloyal Government, having agreed to general disarmament, including the abolition of all nuclear weapons, would nevertheless retain a percentage of its past production, and with this clandestine nuclear stock would blackmail or confer nations which had loyally fulfilled their undertakings.

Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer warned the UNAEC in 1946 that this danger would arise, unless an agreement for total nuclear disarmament, under adequate inspection and control, could speedily be made.

Sir John Cockcroft and Sir William Penney have now calculated that the proportion of its past production which a disloyal Government could safely conceal from an international inspectorate would not be less than 20%, and might be more.

It is credibly asserted that the US Government's present stocks of nuclear weapons amount to 30,000 megatons, and there is no reason for thinking that the stocks of the Soviet Union are substantially less.

20% of 30,000 megatons is 6,000 megatons. In 1959 a Committee of the US House of Representatives made an estimate of the effects of a nuclear attack on the American people. After taking expert evidence, they calculated that if the enemy succeeded in delivering a relatively small quantity of bombs, namely, 1140 megatons, scores of millions of

*1 Dr. Wiesner estimates the possible clandestine stock, which he calls "noise" as 50 to 500 large nuclear weapons "if past production were estimated by known methods of physical inspection."

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casualties would result and very great material damage would be done.

If under a Disarmament Treaty, a disloyal Government could in fact secrete 6,000 megatons, and could deliver them against its victim whenever it decided to commit aggression, this would be so great a gap in the treaty system that many people would conclude that it was not worth while to try to make a Disarmament Treaty at all.

On the other hand, if no Disarmament Treaty is made, the arms race will go on; ever greater sums will be spent on military research and development ($8,400 million were spent in the USA in 1960, and no doubt an equal sum in the USSR); the existing weapons systems will be still further developed, or replaced by others more potent and more instantaneous in their action; new nations will produce nuclear weapons (eg. China, Germany -- no doubt to be followed by their neighbours); other nations who cannot produce such weapons will be given them by their allies; the destructive power of world armaments will increase by no less in the next 16 years than it has increased in the 16 years since 1945. It is optimistic to hope that this process could continue for another 16 years without leading to a catastrophe, which could be started in panic, by accident, or by a madman's design: it is only 16 years since madmen were in power in Germany, Italy and Japan.

The Governments, therefore, are faced by a balance of risks. The question to be discussed in this paper is whether there are any practicable measures which will so reduce the danger of the secret nuclear stock that it becomes decisively less than the danger of allowing the arms race to go on.

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## II. The Disarmament Treaty

### 1. General Principles

It is clearly impossible to hope for any such result except as part of the general and complete disarmament which all Governments have declared to be their aim in recent years.

There is general agreement that this objective must be reached in three stages within a specified period of time, under strict inspection and control, and subject to verification at the end of each stage that the obligations of the Treaty have been fulfilled.

It has also been agreed that, at the appropriate stage, an armed military force should be established to prevent aggression, and to uphold observance of the disarmament agreement.

### 2. Phasing of Armament Reductions

It would confuse the argument of this paper to discuss the phasing of the progressive armament reductions by which the final objective of general and complete disarmament will be reached. It will no doubt require complex political negotiations; but if the final objective is once firmly accepted, there should be no technical difficulty in agreeing on the reductions and the controls to be set up at each successive stage.

One observation about phasing must, however, be made. During the disarmament negotiations since 1945, many proposals have been put forward and strongly urged by leading Governments; and then, when they have been accepted by other Governments, these proposals have been withdrawn by those who made them.

This has created an atmosphere of great distrust. To make their acceptance of the final objective credible, and to create confidence that they genuinely intend to carry out complete disarmament, it will almost certainly be necessary that the objectives to be reached at the end of

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the first stage should be more ambitious than those which have been re-
cently proposed.

3. <u>First Stage Objectives</u>

The following suggestions may be made; they are all taken from re-
cent government proposals.

(i) Reduction of manpower (Army, Navy & Air Force) to 1 or at most 1.5 million men for USA, USSR and China, with proportionately lesser figures for other nations. (Anglo-French Memorandum, 1954).

(ii) Corresponding reduction of conventional armaments and equipment. (Ibid.).

(iii) A "cut-off" of new production of nuclear weapons and of fissile material for military purposes, with perhaps the closing down of military nuclear plants. (US proposal, June 27th, 1960).

(iv) Abolition of the "means of delivery": satellites, missiles, bombing aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines, atomic cannon, launching ramps, etc. (French proposal by M. Moch, September 1959, and March 15th, 1960; "warmly supported" in principle by the British Government, endorsed by Mr. Khrushchev for the first stage in his Memorandum of June 2nd, 1960).

(v) Reduction of military budgets in accordance with above objectives, and strict budgetary control. (Anglo-French Memorandum, 1954).

(vi) Comprehensive and effective inspection and control by an international organisation to be created by the United Nations. (All proposals put forward by all governments since 1955).

All of these first stage objectives are strictly relevant to the problem of the clandestine nuclear stock. But two are especially important: the abolition of the "means of delivery", and the system of inspection and control.

III <u>The System of Inspection and Control</u>

Inspection and control may be dealt with first, and briefly, because it has been studied in some detail by Dr. Jerome Wiesner; Dr. Bernard Feld; Dr. Seymour Melman and associates; Dr. Jay Orear; and others.

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1. Physical Inspection of Military Installations etc.;
   Industrial Production Inspection; Non-physical Inspection.

There is agreement that inspection should be of the following kinds:

(i) Physical inspection of military depots, installations etc., and of all manufacturing and other plants which produce weapons and equipment of every kind. For this purpose there should be:

(a) ground inspection, with uninhibited access to everything the inspectors wish to see;

(b) permanent inspection of nuclear plants etc., by resident inspectors, with their own laboratories, and all the rights and facilities which Sir John Cockcroft and Sir William Penney propose.

(c) High altitude air photography.

(d) Low altitude "very high resolution" air photography.

(ii) Industrial Production Inspection. Systematic or random sampling inspection of all plants capable of producing weapons, or weapon components. This would be done by qualified ground inspectors, with the necessary technical knowledge.

(iii) Non-physical Inspection, sometimes called psychological inspection, or inspection by the people. Dr. Wiesner gives this summary:

(a) "Interrogation of key personnel" concerned with armaments and weapon production;

(b) "Public relations campaigns" to convince the citizens of all countries that "clandestine activities are a violation of sacred world agreements";

(c) "offers of large rewards for disclosure of violations". Professor Orear has suggested that the following provisions should be included in the Disarmament Treaty:

(d) The international inspectorate should be given the right to interrogate any citizen about possible or suspected violations of the Treaty.

(e) A legal duty should be laid on every citizen to answer such interrogations, subject to punishment for refusal or false statements.

(f) A legal duty should be laid on every citizen to report violations by his own Government.

(g) Rewards and santuary abroad for those who report violations to the inspectorate.

(h) Governments should be obliged to give the fullest publicity to these provisions, and their fullest support through their national mass-media.

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Mr. Khrushchev has given his support to these proposals for psychological inspection, including the use of Soviet mass-media to make known to the Soviet people the obligation on each citizen to report violations of the Treaty.

2. Budgetary Limitation and Control

To these three over-lapping systems of inspection must be added that of budgetary limitation and control. The League of Nations Disarmament Commissions spent many years elaborating a comprehensive system for ensuring that budgetary limitations were observed; by practical application of the system to 90% of the world's military expenditure, the Conference of 1932 proved that the system would provide an important supplementary method of detecting violations of a Disarmament Treaty.

3. The Efficacy of Inspection

Dr. Wiesner has made detailed suggestions about how the physical inspection of military preparations, and the inspection of industrial production could be made to work.

Like Dr. Seymour Melman and his colleagues, he reaches the conclusion that for all forms of armament except a clandestine nuclear stock, the three over-lapping systems of inspection with which he dealt (physical inspection of military preparation, inspection of industrial production, and psychological inspection) would:

(i) be relatively cheap in money and manpower;

(ii) give a very high degree of assurance that a violation of the Disarmament Treaty would be discovered;

(iii) give this assurance in respect to missiles and military aircraft, even in the earlier stages of disarmament, when many of these weapons would still exist.

This conclusion is confirmed by earlier studies of the subject, and by general experience.

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(i) Noone has doubted since the Disarmament Conference of 1932 that the inspection of "conventional" forces and armaments would present no difficulty, and that violations could be readily detected.

(ii) This applies a fortiori to the modern missiles and bombing aircraft (see below).

(iii) It is already the fact that, without any system of inspection at all, the General Staffs are able, by military intelligence, to discover almost everything they want to know about the military preparations of other Powers.

## 4. Inspection and Control of Missiles & Military Aircraft

As said above, Dr. Wiesner has shown that the chances of discovering a violation of a limitation on missiles and military aircraft would be very high, even during the period when considerable numbers of these instruments were still in existence.

Once they have been abolished:

(i) Their manufacture could not possibly be concealed from international inspectors who visited factories and plants where they are made;

(ii) Nor could the tests, trial flights etc., be concealed; and without tests etc., they cannot be made operational;

(iii) Nor could the training of personnel in their use be concealed; and without constant training, the personnel could not operate them.

The same considerations apply to aircraft carriers, other surface craft capable of firing missiles, submarines, launching ramps and atomic cannon.

## 5. Conclusion

The four over-lapping inspection systems outlined above would, even without any other special measures, present a disloyal Government with a very real hazard, if it decided to retain a clandestine stock of nuclear weapons.

A considerable number of people, civilian and military, would inevitably be aware of the existence of this stock; and however rigid the discipline imposed upon them, there would be a constant risk that the secret would be revealed to the international inspectors.

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IV Other Safeguards

1. A UN Commission of Scientists to Study Detection

In 1955 the British delegate, Anthony Nutting, suggested in the UN
Sub-Committee that "a group of scientists" should be invited to study the
control of nuclear disarmament in general and the problem of detecting a
clandestine nuclear stock in particular. He was forbidden to repeat the
suggestion in the General Assembly. This may mean, in view of the Brit-
tish Government policy at that time, that the suggestion was of real im-
portance.

Dr. Wiesner suggests that a search for "mechanical means for detecting clandestine stockpiles" does "not appear a promising undertaking". But he says that "the problem would be largely eliminated . . . if one knew with substantial accuracy the size of a nation's stockpile; then failure to deliver up or to disclose some weapons would be readily known." And he asserts that "much might be done to improve methods for determining past production, so as to make it possible to estimate the existing stockpiles with reasonable accuracy."

Only scientists can offer an opinion on Dr. Wiesner's suggestion; but
it may be hoped that COSWA will consider it with special care.

2. Abolition of the Means of Delivery

In the Committee of Ten, on March 15th, 1960, M. Moch said:

"There are . . . two ways in which our nuclear fears may be allayed.

"One is to tattle, while there is still time, the means of carrying
these weapons — satellites, missiles, aircraft carriers, submarines,
launching ramps, etc. Once the vehicles have been banned and des-
troyed, the military stocks will appear worthless."

*1 He also says that "the development of methods of psychological inspection would also contribute to a solution of this problem.

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The abolition of these means of delivery is in itself a crucially
important part of any real disarmament. But it appears at first sight so
vast and complex an undertaking that it is natural to think that it must
be very difficult to carry through.

In fact, the real difficulty lies in securing the political decision
in favour of general and complete disarmament within a measurable period
of years. Once this basic decision has been made, it is common sense to
start, as M. Moch proposes, with the means of delivery. Nothing else
could so swiftly and decisively reduce the dangers of the arms race and
of accidental war. Nothing could so effectively prepare the way for the
abolition of all the nuclear stockpiles.

There is no technical difficulty in destroying aircraft, missiles,
submarines, warships and launching sites. Many of them could be rendered
quickly useless by the removal of some vital part.

It is unlikely that existing aircraft, missiles, launching sites etc.,
could be hidden, if Mr. Khrushchev's plan of international, on-the-spot
control were agreed to. The Intelligence Services of both East and West
know so much about the military preparations of the other side that it
would be hazardous for a disloyal Government not to reveal its airfields,
missile sites etc; if it tried to cheat and were discovered, it would in-
cur the animosity of the whole world.

If the abolition of the means of delivery is agreed to, Mr. Khrush-
chev is probably right in thinking that the more swiftly it is done, the
less will be the risk of hitches, difficulties and misunderstandings.
Technically 12 to 18 months is clearly preferable to M. Moch's 3 to 4
years.

But how far is M. Moch justified in saying that "once the vehicles
have been banned and destroyed the military stocks" (of nuclear weapons)
"will appear worthless"? It has been suggested that a disloyal Govern-

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ment which had retained a clandestine stock could mount a decisive attack
against its victim by using civil aircraft, merchant ships, and smuggling.

V The Danger of Nuclear Attack by Civil Aircraft

1. The Problem

It was the argument that civil aircraft could be used to make a sudden devastating attack which defeated the proposal for the total abolition of national Air Forces, made by the Conservative Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, and Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Trenchard, in 1932.

Looking back, it is easy to see that the argument was then wholly fallacious and that many safeguards could have been devised to prevent the use of civil aircraft from aggression. Anyone who lived through the Disarmament Conference of 1932 and the ensuing war will treat the argument with reserve.

But how great a nuclear attack could now be mounted with the swifter
and more powerful civil aircraft which now exist?

It has been said that a resolute aggressor could deliver 100 megatons
against the victim nation; that he could do so without any considerable
adaptation of the aircraft, and with as few as 500 or 600 men to load and
fly them. It is claimed that this operation could be carried through with
no serious risk of prior detection, and that, if international inspectors
tried to interfere they would instantly be imprisoned or even killed.

Suppose this theory were correct, what conclusion should be drawn?

100 megatons is the equivalent in explosive power of 5000 Hiroshima
bombs. Such an attack would mean a terrible disaster to the victim nation,
and perhaps lasting damage to its future, no matter how great the area over
which the attack were spread.

But it is only one-sixtieth part of 6000 megatons. If the abolition
of the means of delivery cut down the damage which an aggressor could do
with his clandestine nuclear stock by 59/60ths, or even by a smaller pro-

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portion, it would have rendered a great service to mankind.

2. Could it in fact be Done?

Are the assumptions which underlie these estimates of the extent of an
attack by civil aircraft really valid?

(i) Adaptation of Civil Aircraft;

(a) The RAF have multi-purpose aircraft, designed to be used for reconnaissance, troop transport, transport of heavy weapons, or bombing. But they require a good deal of work, which takes a considerable time, to adapt them from one use to another; this work would be difficult to conceal.

(b) The same would probably be true of civil aircraft, if they were used for dropping "high yield" (megaton) bombs. They might need special rigging or other changes.

(c) Perhaps the large civil aircraft could be employed without significant adaptation for dropping "low yield" bombs through the doors used for passengers to enter. But there would have to be very many of such bombs; this would require a large organization; if it were to be militarily effective the operation would require a long time to prepare and many people would have to know about it.

(ii) Inspection of Civil Aircraft;

These facts make it more probable that the international inspectors would become aware of the intended aggression at an early stage.

It should not be difficult to organize a close and very effective inspection of all civil aircraft. The numbers of such aircraft are at present relatively small. It is estimated that by 1962 the total domestic commercial air fleet of the USA will amount to 450 planes. It would be simple to organize a daily inspection of a much greater number than this: to inspect the structure of the plane, and indeed to examine every plane and its cargo before every voyage. With such a system, the intending aggressor's risk of detection would be high.

(iii) Recruiting the Personnel for Aggression

Today, in the atmosphere of the cold war, it might be possible to find 500 or 600 men who would be willing to carry out a plan for dropping 100 megatons of bombs, and to keep the secret while it was being prepared. This is not certain; even now there have been men on each side of the "cold war" who have gone over to the other taking secret information with them, because they disapproved of their own Government's policy.

But a Disarmament Treaty would profoundly alter public thinking about the Charter-breaking use of force, and the members of the

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armed forces of all nations will not be impervious to that change.

Dropping 100 megatons of bombs after a Disarmament Treaty had been signed, and when the nations of the world had begun to carry it out, would be a crime beside which Eichmann's gas chambers would pale into insignificance. Could any nation really find 500-600 men, of whom not one would feel impelled to reveal to the international inspectors what was being prepared?

The US pilot who dropped the bomb on Hiroshima did so in the sixth year of a world war, and against an enemy who had entered that war by an aggression of unparalleled treachery, and who, in ferocious fighting, had killed hundreds of thousands of his compatriots. He not only made his raid on Hiroshima under military orders; he made it with an assurance that his act would end the war, and would save innumerable lives, both American and Japanese. That assurance was fulfilled; the war ended in a few days' time. Yet such was that pilot's sense of guilt about the destruction of Hiroshima, that he has been in a mental home for many years.

Have we really sunk so far in barbarism that the necessary personnel, on the ground and in the air, could be safely recruited by an aggressor Government for the 100 megaton attack?

### (iv) The Risk of Accidental Discovery

Even if 500-600 men could be found who were willing to prepare and do the job, there would still be a great risk for the aggressor that his plans would be accidentally or otherwise revealed. In a disarmed world, and with an alert inspectorate, so large an operation would be very likely to be known; this would be a most serious risk to the aggressor.

## 3. Conclusion on Civil Aircraft

Summing up these considerations, Seymour Melman's "evasion team", all of them experts, reached this conclusion:

"A moment of reflection on the task of recruiting the needed skills and locating them in the required places, while not betraying to an alert informer by cumulative minor disclosure the whole existence of the plot, is enough to suggest that the flaws in the inspection operation would have to be grotesque to give this sort of activity much chance of success." (Inspection for Disarmament, p. 277).

## VI The Danger of Nuclear Attack by Merchant Ships or Smuggling

### 1. Merchant Ships

It might be a simpler matter to put a large number of nuclear weapons in merchant vessels, or even trawlers, and to leave them with time fuses in the ports of the victim country while the crews escaped in other ships.

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The merchant ships would need no adaptation at all.

But as with civil aircraft, hundreds of highly skilled men would be required to plan, prepare and execute the operation; this would take time; a seaman informer would have exceptional opportunities for asylum elsewhere. Thus the risk of premature disclosure would be high. The damage inflicted on the victim nation might be very severe, but against a nation with a large territory, it could hardly be decisive.

This method of aggression may, therefore, be regarded as less probable than the use of civil aircraft.

## 2. Smuggling

This would be a hazardous proceeding. Nuclear weapons transported in parts would be liable to detection before they could be assembled at their targets. No aggressor could at present hope to subjugate his victim by smuggled bombs alone.

## VII Would a Disloyal Government Carry Out a 100 Megaton Aggression?

If all the arguments put forward in the preceding sections are fallacious; if a potential aggressor could, in fact, deliver a 100 megaton attack by civil aircraft, merchant vessels and smuggling, or by a combination of the three, is any Government likely to take the risk which, in a disarmed world, this would involve?

There are political and military considerations which make this unlikely.

(i) The aggressor could not hope to "win" the war; under the Disarmament Treaty he would have insufficient forces to occupy the victim's territory. This is a basic fact, which is often forgotten.

(ii) For such an operation, he could not rely on the help of any allies.

(iii) He would instantly earn the bitter hostility of the whole world.

(iv) This would no doubt result in an instantaneous and world-wide dip-

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lomatic and economic blockade.

(v) Not only so, but even without Treaty obligations for common action (which, of course, there ought to be) the other signatories to the Disarmament Treaty would certainly combine their "internal security" forces against him.

(vi) He would also have to face the International Force.

(vii) He would arouse such hatred that he would run the risk of mass-destruction vengeance by the other nations by means of biological and chemical weapons. These weapons can be quickly made in existing plants and at relatively low cost; the equipment for distribution could also be manufactured without delay.

(viii) The people of the aggressor nation would be instantly aware of all this, and might conclude that the only way to avert a terrible vengeance would be to have an internal revolution and destroy their Government. Indeed, it is barely conceivable that any nation would support their Government in carrying out a 100 megaton aggression after a Disarmament Treaty had been signed.

In short, the 100 megaton aggression would be a very dangerous operation for the Government that undertook it; could in no way advance the national interest of the aggressor country; could not advance, but would gravely compromise, the cause either of communism or capitalism.

Is it not, therefore, justifiable to conclude that the risk of the 100 megaton aggression is less than the risk of allowing the arms race to go on, and that the safer course for every nation is to agree to peaceful coexistence in a world that has disarmed?

VIII **CONCLUSION**

This paper is an attempt to outline the various over-lapping safeguards which might be provided against the danger of a clandestine nuclear stock.

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It may seem naive in September 1961 to discuss it in terms of the kind
of disarmament which is discussed above. But since 1919, when the first
pledges to disarm were given, there have been several opportunities when
disarmament appeared to be within the grasp of statesmanship. They have
been lost, due to crises and to other factors largely created by the arms
race itself. Looking back, it is clear that disarmament would have been
much safer and more "realistic" than the course which was in fact pursued.

If human societies had never created laws because there was a danger
that someone would violate the law, should we not all still be living in
caves? Can the nations not escape from the caves to which the arms race
confines them?

For six years, the clandestine nuclear stock has been the crux of the
disarmament discussions, and it will remain so, until a system of agreed
solutions has been found. It deserves intensive study by all those who
are qualified to undertake the task.

The task should be approached in the spirit of two declarations made by
eminent Englishmen in recent years. Sir John Cockcroft wrote in 1957:

> "The military consequences of fission and fusion have led to a revolu-
> tion in military thinking and practice which has still a good way to go.
> it is clear enough already, however, that our civilisation can be de-
> stroyed in a night if ever these great forces are released for our de-
> struction. This presents the human race with the greatest challenge
> it has ever had: to cooperate in disarmament and so to banish the
> threat which now hangs over the whole world."

"The human race"? Every citizen of every country, according to his know-
ledge, influence and power.

"The greatest challenge"? In May 1942, Sir Winston Churchill wrote the
following instructions about the synthetic harbours for invading France on
D Day, known as Mulberries":

"Prime Minister to Chief of Operations.

"They must float up and down with the tide. The anchor problem must be
mastered.

Session II

Seventh Conference on Science
and World Affairs

Disarmament and Arms Control

September 5-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

ZONES OF LIMITED ARMEMENTS IN EUROPE

Michael Howard

General and comprehensive disarmament is the declared aim of every major Government in the world today, irrespective of their ideological beliefs. The repeated statements made by national leaders reflect not only the deep seated longings of the peoples they represent for a world free, as no world has ever yet been, from the terrible menace of war; but also a conviction that a world-society in which armaments continue to multiply in number and grow in destructiveness, is one doomed to eventual suicide. There can be no reason to doubt the sincerity of any statesman, East or West, in his plea for general disarmament. But neither can there be any reason to underestimate the gigantic difficulties in the way of achieving it. The worst of these difficulties are not scientific and technical, considerable as many of the problems are in these fields. They are political. General disarmament involves the abandonment of habits and attitudes which have grown up amongst the peoples of the world since organised political societies first began some 5,000 years ago. Even nations as closely linked by ties of culture, ideology and common interest, as those of Europe were in 1899 or in 1932, found the problems of negotiating disarmament agreements almost insuperable. Today, these problems are complicated by the great ideological barrier which separates the major States of the world, inflaming mutual suspicions, inhibiting common understanding, and magnifying to a gigantic size the difficulties of communication which exist even among friendly States sharing a common language in a time of profound peace. This barrier must be accepted as a condition of our time which can be removed only by the patient work of generations. And so long as it exists, it will be immensely difficult for statesmen of either side to abandon their responsibility for the safety of their country, either by entrusting it to a supra-national authority which may fall under the control of hostile elements, or by throwing aside their weapons without the certain knowledge that their ideological adversaries had disarmed as well, and were staying disarmed.

Such certainty can be given only by an inspectorate with wide powers and complex organisation, and one which may take many years to overcome its initial difficulties and gain the confidence of both sides. Its creation and institution would involve work more laborious and bargaining more prolonged than that which preceded the setting up of the United Nations; for there was no question of any major State entrusting to the United Nations any powers over its own fundamental rights of self defence. Even when full agreement has been reached over its powers, personnel, budget and organisation, its initial steps are likely to be regarded both by East and by the West, with, at best, cautious scepticism, and at worst,

Howard

2

suspicious hostility. It is not difficult to visualise circumstances when its activity or inactivity could do more to enflame international tensions than to appease them; and it is likely to have to survive serious crises of confidence before it is fully accepted and trusted by both sides. All this must be clearly understood and accepted if we are to undertake the task of creating such a mechanism at all.

To say that our task is comparable to that of a group of engineers who, in an age before man had learned to fly at all, had to design, develop and build an airliner in which all of them were to travel on its first voyage, is in no way to exaggerate our difficulties, and may indeed provide some guidance in how to solve them. Such a group, if it did not want to commit suicide, would be likely to construct models and study their operation under favourable conditions, before building the aircraft itself. It is in the belief that the construction of such models is an essential preliminary to the creation of any scheme which would work on a larger scale that this paper is submitted to a Conference largely concerned with the more general consideration of disarmament; and the present writer believes that this would be the most useful purpose which a zone of inspected armaments in Central Europe would serve. But this would not be the only purpose. The creation of such a zone, and the further steps which might follow is indicated below, might also help towards a solution of the explosive problem of a divided Germany. But even if progress in achieving general disarmament remains slow, and even if the German question continues to appear insoluble, a limited scheme of inspection in Central Europe, reducing mutual fears of surprise attack, eliminating the danger from accidental clashes, providing the opportunity of testing inspection techniques on a small scale, and training nationals of both sides to work together in joint teams would in itself be an achievement, an important stage in a long voyage which might enable us to see more clearly how the next stage can best be tackled.

Many proposals have been put forward, by both sides, for plans of inspection and control in Central Europe during the past ten years. They can be very roughly classified under four headings. First there are plans for inspection of all armed forces within an equal distance, on both sides, of the present border of East and West Germany; plans which would not necessarily involve any redeployment or limitation of forces within the area. The area concerned has sometimes been defined as covering mainly German territory, between Longitude 6° and 16° East, and sometimes to include other NATO and Warsaw Pact territory, as did the Russian proposals of April 30th, 1957 (0° to 25° East) and the Western proposals of 29th August, 1957 (10° W. to 60° E.). The methods of inspection proposed have included over-flying with aerial photography; ground teams ranging freely throughout the area or established/principal airfields, road junctions, railway stations and ports; and radar facilities interchanged, the East to be provided with radar stations on the Western border of the inspection zone, and the West with similar facilities on the Eastern border. The object would be to provide each side with the fullest information about the strength and deployment of forces beyond the military frontier--though

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not necessarily about details of their armament and equipment--so that each could be reassured that no local surprise attack was being contemplated.

The second category of plan would add, to inspection, a limitation of the size of the forces to be held within the inspected zone, but without drawing any distinction as to the type of their armament--whether nuclear or conventional--or their country of origin.

The third category includes all plans, such as that brought forward by Mr. Adam Rapacki in the autumn of 1957, for the creation of a nuclear-free zone; that is, a limitation not on the size of the forces within the zone but on their nature. Aircraft equipped with nuclear bombs, nuclear artillery and nuclear missiles of every kind, would be prohibited. Control would extend not only to the storing and deployment of such weapons, but to their manufacture within the inspected area; which, in Mr. Rapacki's proposal, comprised the Federal German Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally there are the various proposals which have been put forward by both sides for some form of political disengagement in Central Europe, whereby all foreign troops, whether nuclear armed or not, would be withdrawn, either from Germany alone, or from the surrounding territories as well, and their place would be taken by national forces of limited size, possessing no nuclear weapons and subject to international inspection.

It is not the purpose of this paper to expound any of these proposals at length--some 172, according to one authority, have been put forward--or to discuss the reasons why none of them have ever found sufficient favour with both sides to become the subject of serious negotiation. What can be done is to set these plans in some sort of relation to one another and see to what extent they offer some hope of further progress towards mutually acceptable arrangements in Europe, even if progress in no other area can be made. But in passing, it must be said that these proposals--especially those under the third and fourth categories--have been rejected by one side or the other as much for political reasons as for military. Both the political and the military climate may alter, and measures unthinkable five years ago may, as relations between allies develop or political programmes change, become perfectly feasible for us today. But such developments may also be unfavourable to certain proposals, and further developments may occur--changes of regime, unexpected economic changes, technical breakthroughs in the military field--which interfere with or wreck the implementation of proposals even after they have been mutually and sincerely agreed. In formulating policy we must always take this into consideration, realise that any timetable or programme which we may lay down is likely to be entirely disorganised; and not be too worried if it is.

The four categories set out above are not mutually exclusive. They could indeed be regarded as successive stages in the implementation of a final plan, were it not that few of the official supporters in the West for the first or second categories are at present prepared to consider

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the third, much less the fourth, as either practical or desirable steps. To enter into an agreement for mutual inspection in the belief that this was the first step towards disengagement or a denuclearised zone, would be to court disappointment and risk complete breakdown of negotiations. The protagonists of disengagement, like those of general disarmament, would have to recognise, first, that the establishment of such mutual inspection was a desirable object in itself, even if no further measures were immediately possible; and secondly, that such a measure would not only not stand in the way of further steps towards their objective, but would be of considerable help towards it. On the other hand, those who can see no objections to a limited measure of mutual inspection, would need to be firmly discouraged from refusing to undertake it for fear that it would be either "the thin end of the wedge," or alternatively, because of its harmlessness, not be worth undertaking at all. The first attitude argues an unnecessary lack of confidence in their ability to argue their case, while the second would prevent us from entering into any form of agreement whatsoever. If, because of our ideological conflict, we can reach agreement only on "harmless" matters, let us at least register that agreement, even if we are under no illusions about the extent of its signficance.

In the autumn of 1958, at the Conference of Experts on Surprise Attack, the Russian delegation put forward fairly detailed proposals for a system of mutual inspection by ground control posts and air photography. They proposed a total of 28 control posts in the countries of the Warsaw Pact, including 6 in the Soviet Union, and 54 in the countries of NATO and the Baghdad Pact countries, including 6 in the United States. Each of the posts, which would be sited on main roads, in ports, and at railway junctions, would be manned by staff drawn from the "host" country and half from the "guest" country, while the host country would provide the commander of the post and all ancillary staff. Aerial inspection, which was to be carried on within an area of up to 200 kilometres on either side of the front line, was to be conducted by aircraft of the "host" country, though control officers from the "guest" side would be present on all flights. Each side was to process, interpret, and report on its own photographs; and each side could maintain a veto over sending photographs of its own area to the other side.

The response of the West to these proposals was extremely cool, for three reasons. First, the Western delegation to the Conference had come prepared to discuss, not specific proposals of this kind, but the scientific problems of detection of surprise attack, which they interpreted in strategic and intercontinental rather than in European terms. Secondly, the Russian proposals for inspection were firmly linked with proposals for limitation of forces and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons, which the West at that stage was not prepared to consider. And thirdly, the inspection mechanism outlined by the Russians, seemed to the West to offer very inadequate guarantees of effective performance. It was, said Mr. William B. Foster, leader of the United States delegation, "in effect, self-inspection. It would afford no indication--or at best only the most unreliable indication--of the imminence of surprise attack." From each of these reasons for the West's refusal to accept the proposals, we can learn a useful lesson for the future. The first reveals the degree of mutual misunderstanding which is

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still possible even over strictly procedural matters; and which makes it
desirable to keep all agreements and negotiations as simple and straight-
forward as we possibly can. The second shows the unwisdom of linking
together the various categories of inspection and control schemes. In
asking too much one may get nothing at all. We are likely to move much
further if we go more slowly and consolidate each stage before choosing
our moment to move on to the next. And thirdly, if the constitution and
powers of the inspectorate is a controversial issue in so limited a field
as this, it is not to be wondered at if it creates formidable difficulties
when we come to the problem of inspection of general and comprehensive
disarmament. The case for a pilot scheme where the difficulties can be
threshed out and a workable formula discovered appears all the stronger.

In spite of their failure to take up the Soviet proposals, for +he
reasons listed above, the West remains very willing to pursue the possibility
of creating a zone of mutual inspection, as the repeated statements of our
leaders have shown, and N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech of 8th July last,
showed an encouraging willingness to reciprocate. The mutual fears in this
area, that each side was preparing to launch a surprise attack on the other,
have abated considerably in recent years; but one can never have too much
in the way of assurances. Were either side to be insane enough to con-
template anything of the sort, the attack could not be launched solely
with the forces held in Central Europe. Command of the air would be needed
if such an attack were to have any hope of success, and that command would
have to be secured by destroying the defender's tactical air power by air
and missile attacks which would be launched by strike forces located deep
in the rear of the attacker's forward positions, and probably well beyond
any inspection zone. But overlapping radar-screens would give additional
warning of such an air strike; and the ground attack which it heralded
would be preceded by extensive preparations which could hardly escape
the eyes of local inspection teams. Indeed, one of the most useful
functions of such inspectors would be to provide information that apparently
menacing manoeivres did not in fact presage a hostile movement, but were
being carried out for purely internal reasons. The fact that such infor-
mation is normally provided anyhow by the military intelligence of both
sides is no argument against formalising and making easier the interchange
of information in the interests of greater confidence and relaxation
of tension.

As to the constitution of the Inspectorate, it would be premature to
discuss here what could only be settled by detailed negotiation. The
Soviet suggestion that the Commander and ancillary personnel should be
found from the host country has the drawback that it would make delay and
obstruction easier if the host country, for any reason, wished to hamper
the working of the Inspectorate; on the other hand, it would have the
advantage of making easier operations in an area whose nationals and
officials might anyhow regard the operations of the Inspectorate with a
certain lack of enthusiasm. It would in any case be for the officials of
the guest country to enumerate the areas and activities which they wanted
to inspect; and if they reported obstruction, either from their colleagues
or from nationals in the inspected zone, their governments would draw their
own conclusions. But the possibility of joint, alternating, or neutral
command systems should also be explored, and the Powers should be prepared

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to experiment with all of them, changing and adjusting as was found necessary. The same would apply to the procedure for aerial photography. The West would undoubtedly prefer a joint central developing and interpretation centre, where a complete picture of the entire inspected zone could be built up and kept under review; but the Soviet proposals for a dual system might be made acceptable, if the rights of control officers from the guest country were sufficiently defined and if access to all photographic material for both sides were adequately guaranteed. It would not be desirable or necessary for the contracting Powers to commit themselves in advance and irrevocably to any specific scheme. Whatever was agreed should be on an experimental basis, subject to review and, if necessary, revision at the end of a trial period.

The area and degree of inspection would also need to be negotiated and adjusted, rather than laid down in a formal and unalterable blue print. As to the first, where there is disagreement about the size of the zone to be inspected, it would be as will to accept the smaller of the proposed areas, so long as the balance was kept and without prejudice to a possible extension later if conditions were favourable and both sides could be brought to agree. In order to avoid offending the susceptibilities of nations whose territory would be subject to inspection, the boundaries of the inspected zone should not coincide with national frontiers, but run either along lines of longitude and latitude or along such easily recognisable geographic features as rivers and coasts. As for intensity, one might accept, as a working model, the kind of access accorded by armed forces to the military attaches of friendly foreign powers: that is, freedom to view the general appearance and performance of aircraft, vehicles, ships and weapons, in general military use, without necessarily being accorded the right to conduct a detailed examination. They might be accorded access to the records of all training camps, barracks, airbases and military checkpoints at railway stations and ports within the inspected zone; and they might be given special powers of inspection of fuel dumps and pipelines. Finally, liaison officers from the guest country might be attached to all major headquarters within the inspected zone, with right of access to information on a strictly reciprocal basis.

Such suggestions can be multiplied indefinitely, and valid objections may be found to all of them. But if agreement can be found on minimal measures, that agreement should be acted upon. And it must again be stressed, that no measures of this sort can give absolute assurance against surprise attack, launched by long range weapons from outside the inspected zone. Such total security would be almost impossible to achieve, even by the most ingenious and omnipotent of inspectorates. But it would make a surprise attack considerably more difficult, by increasing enormously the risk of detection and delation; and such an attack, if launched by either side, would no longer be a local and limited operation which the attacker might reasonably hope to restrict to precise objectives, but a strategic operation, automatically invoking strategic retaliation and spiralling up rapidly to full nuclear war.

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With the inspectorate established, the Powers concerned could consider the establishment within the inspected area of agreed force levels. In principle, this might not prove difficult. Neither side is happy about maintaining armies of their present size in Central Europe, with all the expense and dislocation that this involves. Each side does so because it believes that the other is liable to launch an attack; and if that belief could be weakened by an objectively operating inspectorate, the incentive for maintenance of forces at their present levels could be correspondingly reduced. Such reductions could be phased by agreement or they might be unilaterally carried out; but this is something that cannot be profitably discussed without reference to the political situation. At the moment of writing (August, 1961), such an agreement is out of the question, except as part of a more general settlement of Germany; and even under the most favourable of political conditions, the grave difficulty would still remain which has so far wrecked all proposals for disengagement: Russia is constricted by a land bridge to Western Europe whereas the United States is not. Russia can, thanks to her geographical situation, reinforce her armies in Eastern Europe with an ease denied to Britain and the United States; and a re-deployment of any forces that she were to withdraw from Germany and Poland would present few of the difficulties which would confront British and American commanders, compelled either to resite their divisions in the populous territories west of the Rhine or return them to their homelands from which they could not easily be recalled. This asymmetry of forces is not the fault of the Soviet Union, but it must be recognised by them as an exceedingly awkward factor, complicating any attempt to reach a balance of forces in Europe. The growth of air transportability will mitigate but is unlikely to solve the problem; and at present it appears that the only way in which the West could respond to a massing of conventional forces by Russia, either within or outside the controlled zone, would be by bringing to a greater state of readiness her land, sea and air based nuclear forces. In view of this, it is perhaps premature to discuss now, in any detail, the proposals for limitation of forces. In the event of progress with general disarmament however, this problem would be very greatly eased.

Thirdly, we come to the proposals for a demuclearised zone in Central Europe, one where, in the words used by M. Gromyko at the United Nations in March, 1956, "the stationing of military formations provided with atomic and hydrogen weapons of all kinds shall be prohibited," and which might, if M. Rapacki's proposals were adopted, include not only East and West Germany but Poland and Czechoslovakia as well. The raising of this proposal and the West's reaction to it, show the problems of mutual mistrust which divide the powers in Central Europe. The Soviet Union and its East European allies dread the revival of a nuclear armed and revanchiste Germany which may attack eastwards as she did in 1941, to reclaim her lost lands. The Western Powers fear a massive assault by Soviet land forces which could overrun Western Europe before the United States could make up its mind to nuclear retaliation. Each side may consider the fears of the other absurd. The armed forces of West Germany are so closely integrated with those of her allies that it would be technically impossible for them to launch an independent attack, even if such a policy were to recommend itself to that prosperous and pacific people,

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who have their own recollections of the horrors of war. Our Soviet colleagues can no doubt equally assure us how unthinkable it would be for their forces to fight any but a purely defensive battle against the West. Still, however groundless they may be, these fears must be treated as political realities. The West must understand the alarm which the Russians feel at seeing nuclear weapons in German hands, even with all the safeguards imposed on their use, and the Russians must understand the feeling of helplessness with which the small NATO forces, deprived of nuclear weapons, would confront the massive armies which the Soviet Union could bring to bear against them. It was this motive which led the Assembly of Western European Union in April 1958 to recommend the rejection of the Rapacki plan as "a Soviet trap."

So strong are Western feelings at present that there is little prospect of any immediate change in the attitude of official circles to the Rapacki proposals. Apart from the weakness of the conventional forces which would remain--a weakness which could be and is being remedied--there are fears that any such redeployment of forces or redistribution of weapons would create considerable political strains within an alliance, all of whose members are theoretically equal. Difficulties are foreseen about siting the forces withdrawn from the denuclearised zone; and it is sometimes suggested that anything which can weaken the probability of an immediate nuclear response to any Russian attack would only make such an attack more probable. It is easy to contest these arguments. Division of labour within armed forces and even within alliances is a rational arrangement, and no question of status need attach to those units which have nuclear weapons and those which have not. The size of the nuclear armed units at present in Germany--missile units and atomic artillery--is not such as to present any major problems in the way of resiting them. Moreover, even if such units were withdrawn, an effective nuclear response could be mounted against any attack, by aircraft or medium-range missiles, sited outside the denuclearised zone. Such a response would at first be in the nature of interception against the attacker's supply lines and bases, rather than close battlefield support; but so overwhelming would it be that its deterrent value need be no less than that of close support weapons. It is highly unlikely that the Russian High Command would consider it worth overrunning West Germany if the price was the nuclear devastation of East Germany, Poland and Western Russia; nor would West Germany or her allies be likely to invade Eastern Europe in the sure knowledge that her homeland would be laid waste. As for the argument that any weakening of the probability of immediate nuclear response involves a weakening of the deterrent, this cuts both ways. If the probability of immediate nuclear response is maximised by placing control of nuclear weapons in the hands of the local commanders, so also is the danger of accidental and unnecessary nuclear war through miscalculation. But the decision, as to which of these two risks is the greater, will depend on the political climate, and it must be recognised that in the existing state of East and West relations even the officials most enthusiastic about the possibilities of mutual inspection refuse to consider a denuclearised zone as being with the realm of practical policy.

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The same can be said of a fortiori about "Disengagement": plans for an area in Central Europe from which not only nuclear forces but all foreign troops would be removed, leaving national forces, without nuclear weapons, at an agreed level and subject to international inspection. The most recent proposals of this kind have been put forward by the German Social Democrat Deputy Herr Helmuth Schmidt, who suggested also that Russian, American, British and French token forces should remain along the existing East-West German frontier as a guarantee of the interest of those powers in the defence of their German allies; and that such forces should also, of course, remain in Berlin. In the event of aggression, the allies of the party attacked could still intervene with aircraft and missiles based outside the disengaged zone, and the balance of forces would not necessarily be disturbed. In favour of such plans, it can be said that without some such agreement it is difficult to believe that the reunification of Germany will ever be possible. Against them, it must be admitted that in the existing state of world tensions they are purely academic. A withdrawal of the forces of Germany's Western allies from the line of the Iron Curtain is at present conceivable only as part of a far more general political settlement, of which there is no immediate prospect. Not only have all Western Governments set their faces against disengagement as a dangerous weakening of their defensive posture, but even the opposition party in Germany has rejected it as an issue on which to appeal for popular support. So long as the West, rightly or wrongly, believes that an attack on Western Europe is a possible course of action for the Soviet Union they will continue to believe that there can be no substitute for all the allies standing together to meet it. And no doubt the feelings of the Russians and their allies are identical with regard to a possible attack by the West.

Such attitudes may soften. If negotiations over general disarmament are successful, they certainly will. But meanwhile they must be accepted and lived with, and we must be tolerant of one another's fears. It is because those fears, however baseless, are still so intense that the present writer believes that they can only gradually be dispelled, by a series of limited agreements, each experimental and subject to adjustment, but all accumulating to establish the necessary basis of confidence which will make easier those general agreements on disarmaments which will in their turn, enable us to make further progress along the lines sketched above. There is no reason to expect such progress to be rapid, but there is equally no reason not to begin now.

Background Paper VIII -
(Number to be assigned)

Eighth International Conference on
Science and World Affairs:
Disarmament and World Security
September 11-16, 1961
Stowe, Vermont, USA

# A PROPOSED SOLUTION OF THE GERMAN PROBLEM

Hans Thirring

I wish to draw the attention of the conference to a plan outlined here for a radical solution of the Berlin crisis. This plan is a slight modification of a project which has been drafted by Mr. Wilhelm Keller, lecturer at the Pädagogische Hochschule at Lüneburg, Western Germany.

## Plan of a UN-defended Federal Republic of Germany

(1) Both Western and Eastern Germany should be merged into a Federation of partly autonomous states. For the sake of brevity it will be called here G. F. (German Federation).

(2) The G. F. consists of the states Deutsche Bundesrepublik and Deutsche Demokratische Republik within their present frontiers. The non-violability of these frontiers will be guaranteed by an international treaty protected by the United Nations.

(3) The sole right and duty of the defense of the frontiers of the G. F. should be transferred to an ad hoc created U. N. Police force (in the following abbreviated U. N. P. F.).

(4) To finance the costs of the U. N. P. F. both parts of the G. F. should pay a certain percentage (for instance between 50 and 70 per cent) of their present defense budget to a separate fund of the U. N.

(5) No national armed forces should exist in Germany with the exception of the normally equipped Home Police Forces (called H. P. F.) of pre-war strength required for keeping order within the country.

(6) The U. N. P. F. should be recruited on an international and voluntary basis. A certain maximum percentage (below 50 per cent) may consist of German citizens. The supreme command should lie in an authority which is elected from, and responsible to, the Security

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Council or the General Assembly of the U. N.

(7) A strict limitation of the rights and responsibilities of the U. N. P. F. and the H. P. F. should be set by ruling that the former must be used only in the case of a military intervention from abroad while the H. P. F. is solely authorized to defend law and order within the country.

(8) The bases of the U. N. P. F. should be situated within and near the frontiers of the G. F.

(9) The G. F. should be a kind of pilot plant to demonstrate the possibility of peaceful coexistence of different economic systems. To ensure the implementation of such an experiment the administrations of the different states of the G. F. should be pledged to retain their respective systems for a certain period, e.g. ten years. That implies that within this period of probation no industrial or agricultural enterprise in the Eastern states should be reprivatized, nor in the Western ones nationalized.

(10) All travel restrictions within the G. F. should be rescinded. Every German citizen should be entitled to obtain a passport and travel inland and/or abroad as far as he likes, and his own finances or the rules of the destination states permit.

(11) In order to avoid local overpopulation and/or unemployment the right of settling or working at a specific place of the country may be bound to a permission granted by state or local authorities. On the other hand, everybody should be free to leave his residence for good after having paid his debts and legally solved his appointment contract.

(12) The constitution and the laws of the G. F. should comply with the human rights according to the U. N. Declaration of Human Rights.

(13) The build-up of a constitution and a federal government should be done stepwise starting with the existing authorities whose

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task it is first to administer the merger, removal of internal frontiers,
conversion of existing military forces into the U. N. P. F. setting up
a H. P. F., creation of a common market and currency. A joint committee
composed of delegates from both parts of Germany, assisted by the
existing authorities should see to it that this first step is done
orderly and with as little friction as possible.

(14) The next step would be general elections for a constituent
assembly and subsequently of a federal parliament, installation of
a federal government.

(15) During the first phase of this transformation the present
occupation forces should be gradually replaced by the U.N.P.F.

(16) The conditions outlined above should be fixed in an
international treaty made between the new Germany and the United
Nations.

(17) All foreign trade relations of the present two Germanies
should be continued and if possible widened.

(18) An undivided Berlin will be the capital of the G. F. and
the seat of her government as soon as it is installed.

Discussion of the Merits of the Plan

The advantages of the scheme outlined here will be discussed
separately from the viewpoint of East and West.

Advantages for the Western party:

(1) Definite solution of the acute Berlin crisis that is treat-
ening to deteriorate into war and world catastrophe.

(2) Restoration of a unified free Germany.

(S) Reasonation of a unified free Germany.

ending to deteriorate into war and world catastrophe.

(1) Define solution of the acute Berlin crisis that is treat-
advantage for the Western party;
separately from the viewpoint of East and West.

the end of her Government as soon as it is installed.

(18) An un divided Berlin will be the capital of the G. F. and
should be continued and it possible widened.

(11) All foreign trade relations of the present two Germanies
will be continued and it possible widened.

(10) The conditions outlined above should be fixed in an
occupation forces should be gradually replaced by the U.M.P.;

(12) During the first phase of this transformation the present
a federal Government.

seamless and undisturbedly of a federal Parliament, federation of

(14) The next step would be General elections for a constituent
orderly and with as little friction as possible.

existing authorities should see to it that this first step is done
composed of delegates from both parts of Germany, associated by the
H. P. N.'s, creation of a common market and currency. A joint committee
conversation of existing military forces into the U. M. P. setting up
that it is first to administer the merger, removal of internal troublest

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Thirring/4

(3) Economic relief by radically lowering the defense costs.

(4) Gain of manpower for productive purposes.

(5) Pioneer work done by experimenting with a scheme of defense by a supranational authority as a prototype of the system that eventually will be adopted by the whole world.

Advantages for the Eastern party:

(1) Removal of the threat from a remilitarized revengful Germany.

(2) Elimination of one of one of the strongest and perhaps most dangerous members of NATO.

(3) The opportunity of exercising in a highly industrial country the peaceful coexistence between states with different economic systems. The existence of the G.F. could clearly demonstrate the sincerity of the following statement of the New-Draft Program of the Soviet Communist Party saying: "It is not through war with other countries, but by the example of a more perfect organisation of society, by rapid progress in developing the productive forces of man, that the ideas of communism will win the minds and hearts of the masses."

In a Germany freed of the threat of foreign intervention and inhabited by an industrially talented population the conditions are quite favorable for testing what communism might achieve if the opportunity of free development is given.

So far the plan and an outline of its merits. I propose to the Conference to discuss it and in the case of a favorable judgement to forward the idea to the leading statesmen as another basis of negotiations for the next conference on the Berlin question.