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1 obviously the gentleman is too much of a gentleman and
2 not much of a strategist.

3 The point here is yes, I can see the
4 United States will not encourage another state to go
5 nuclear. I have more difficulty with that part of the
6 policy. The issue is that in fact -- the type of
7 problem that you are suggesting, which is true, that
8 the more the number grows, then the management of the
9 nuclear arsenals and their counter threat scenario
10 will be extremely complicated.

11 To which one solution would be -- and that
12 is the most likely to happen, that Japan will move to
13 its keeping a nuclear option, but not necessarily a
14 nuclear arsenal.

15 MR. KISSINGER: Who?

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Japan.

17 MR. KISSINGER: Yeah, I think that --

18 THE CHAIRMAN: India has a nuclear option,
19 but not necessarily an arsenal. And then we are
talking then of a situation where China may have an
20 arsenal (inaudible). But in a way, that gets
21 neutralized because its ability to use that is then
22

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1 conditioned by many other factors.

2 Now therefore comes the basic question,

3 that would the United States go out rigorously to

4 remove that nuclear option --

5 MR. KISSINGER: In India?

6 THE CHAIRMAN: In Japan.

7 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Or in the context of China,
9 (inaudible) farther away, and that's a little more --
10 very specific situation.

11 MR. KISSINGER: What do you mean by
12 remove?

13 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

14 THE CHAIRMAN: We will organize another
15 round table discussion on the pressures. Let's just
16 get to this basic issue. Dr. Kissinger, when I was
17 talking, I was saying that remove their option. We
18 see stated policy of the U.S. (inaudible) to say cap,
19 reduce, eliminate in South Asia.

20 So if I read that English very carefully
21 and clearly, capping, reducing, eliminating as a
22 process obviously as early as possible. Which is then

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ensuring that even an option would not remain.

Whether the (inaudible) gets signed or it doesn't get
signed becomes even irrelevant.

What is relevant is the ability to have a
nuclear option to be able to deal with a strategic
challenge.

MR. KISSINGER: But are we bringing real
pressure on you?

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, you've done a fair
amount in the last three or four years. Maybe it has
reduced a little bit --

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

THE CHAIRMAN: No, I'm coming to that.

You are telling us not even to deploy or make 150
kilometer range (inaudible) missile. You are trying
to tell us in a number of other ways. You just
mentioned about the (inaudible). We have had any
amount of dialogues and discussion. It's true that in
the last few months perhaps it is less than what it
used to be.

On the other hand, the fact still remains
that I have not yet known a change in the U.S. policy

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1 about cap, reduce, eliminate.

2 MR. KISSINGER: But you are not going to

3 pay any attention to it.

4 PARTICIPANT: May I say one thing, please?

5 Let me say one thing. No amount of pressures, no

6 amount of American philosophy or any other country's

7 philosophies ought to determine the (inaudible) of

8 India's security. Wait a minute. Now, I do not

9 believe that the pressures are there to the extent

10 they are made out in the media.

11 We ought to deploy (inaudible) are

12 necessary in the interest of security. We have a

13 nuclear option. Americans, they have their viewpoint;

14 but we ought to delay out option. I think there is

15 nobody to stop us from doing that.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. (inaudible), I have

17 absolutely no doubt on that whatsoever. My worry is

18 that there is a possibility that diplomats and their

19 diplomacy might (inaudible) something.

20 MR. KISSINGER: No, the real problem --

21 THE CHAIRMAN: The issue is something

22 else. What issues -- not what we will do or not do.

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What I'm trying to explore is Mr. Kissinger's view on
the subject as to how does (inaudible) reconcile then
with the question that (inaudible) asked about the
nuclear situation in Asia where there is a country
with a massive nuclear weapons capability.

There are other countries that don't have
this capability, but some have a nuclear guaranty, so
there's a defective nuclear weapon protection which
may not be as credible in the future as it has been in
the past. There is India that has its own set of
problems. We will do what we think is the best for
us. That's not the issue.

The issue is to try and share our thinking
to say well what is the American thinking on the
subject, no merely --

[Tape change.]

MR. KISSINGER: -- and tell you what a
diplomat would (inaudible) is one thing, and I think
that it's a limit to the intensity with which it will
be put.

What our Congress may do is another thing,
and I would not exclude that our Congress, under

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either party, might pass some laws like the (inaudible) amendment, which I would deplore.

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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THE CHAIRMAN: Would you use the microphone, please?

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MR. KISSINGER: Well, the (inaudible) could be the executive branch of the Congress -- had shifted in the direction of the (inaudible), and they have repeatedly passed laws that pass arms embargoes against Turkey, for example, which is at a time when the Soviet Union still existed, right at the border of the Soviet Union, and we could not stop it.

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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MR. KISSINGER: Who was?

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PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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MR. KISSINGER: Believe me, I cannot imagine any administration allowing itself with Pressler to -- I mean, Pressler is the flakiest Senator we've got. I mean, what they may have done is they may have paid -- Pressler may have come up with it, and then they may have tried to put it in a framework that they could live with.

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1 PARTICIPANT: I never --

2 MR. KISSINGER: That is possible.

3 PARTICIPANT: I don't think that is the --

4 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

5 MR. KISSINGER: Oh, I see.

6 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

7 MR. KISSINGER: That's very possible.

8 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

9 MR. KISSINGER: No. But probably --

10 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

11 MR. KISSINGER: Yeah. But -- no, but what
12 often happens is that the Congress does some that the
13 administration is totally opposed to.

14 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

15 MR. KISSINGER: And then they get like the
16 Cranston amendment, and then they get something that
17 they would ultimately prefer not have, but which is
18 more manageable than the Cranston amendment.

19 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

20 MR. KISSINGER: That's how these things
21 happen.

22 PARTICIPANT: There is one more element in

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1 this matter. Do you have some (inaudible) about --

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you use the mike?

3 PARTICIPANT: -- about the depth of the
(inaudible) understanding between China and Pakistan?

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5 That is also a factor, and there have been so many
indications of that.

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between --

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10 PARTICIPANT: We can never look at
Pakistan in isolation of China, and I --

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Chinese they paid a lot of attention to Pakistan, and
13 they raised the issue of Pakistan very often with us.
14 Lately, they haven't done it in conversations with me
15 one way or the other.

16 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

17
18 PARTICIPANT: Ask about the (inaudible)
from Islamic fundamentalists now that there is a
19 shared perception of that, and I would like to hear
20 your views about how serious you think the threat is,
21 because there is a feeling that if this threat is
22 targeted in directions other than the West, then there

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is less concern in the West. And some people -- and
I'm not one of them -- also say that there may be an
attempt to deflect this threat to other directions.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, the second is
ridiculous, because the West is the principle target
of Islamic fundamentalists because it is Western
philosophy and the Western style of life. India could
be a secondary target, but Hinduism is not a threat to
the Muslim world, because the Hindu religion does not
commit conversion. So what the fundamentalists are
reacting to is Western civilization almost.

Now, they will also -- that does not mean
that Muslims may not feed on fundamentalism in other
parts. They're developing in Indonesia and in
Malaysia as well, and I suppose in India. I don't
know that.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

MR. KISSINGER: Now, I make a distinction
between terrorist acts in which individual groups of
terrorists come from a foreign country (inaudible) to
do one operation, as against guerilla operations that
are being supported from a foreign country. The

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second one I don't consider it is strictly terrorist acts, although it will also be done in a terrorist way.

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With respect to the first, I make absolutely no distinction in the area in which it occurred. Guerilla actions -- I have already said I think we should crack down and (inaudible). So I don't want to take a position what one should do about guerilla operations. But that is more a problem similar to what we are facing and what we were facing in Vietnam than it is to what we consider terrorist.

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But if they were individual bands of terrorists coming to (inaudible) from India, from Iran for example, I would apply the same principle as I apply to terrorists coming to Frankfurt and blowing up an airplane, or to New York.

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PARTICIPANT: But are you -- if they are harbored by so-called guerrillas, if they are given help and they are almost connected with their movement, then does it change the situation?

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cases. I have often taken -- I have not addressed the
Indian problems, to tell you the truth. My position
has always been very firm and (inaudible). One, I am
opposed to negotiating about hostages. I think
hostages should be written off, and that is the best
way to save them. If they have no value, they are not
going to be taken, while if you ransom five, they can
take five more and there is no end to it.

PARTICIPANT: That's right.

MR. KISSINGER: Secondly, I believe in
brutal retaliation for terrorist acts against
somebody. And I believe, above all, that the host
country of terrorist groups must be punished in some
way. I have never gotten this fully accepted, and if
I were in charge, I don't know whether I would have
the nerve when a weeping family comes to you to say,
"I won't do this."

We did it once in the Nixon
administration, but that was before these things were
refined. We had 150-plus hostages in Jordan, and we
refused to receive even Red Cross emissaries to
discuss it. And we told the King of Jordan, we urged

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him to go into the (inaudible). And if we had lost
any hostages, my career would have ended much faster.

(Laughter.)

But I would not -- I'm not sure I would do
that with the same confidence. I was actually quite
convinced that they would not kill any hostages.
Today, I think they would probably kill the hostages,
because they have the same problem of credibility that
if they've committed to (inaudible).

And I don't know what I would do if they
had 150 hostages, but basically I am against
negotiation. And I am against the -- I am strongly in
favor of severe penalties. But having said this, how
do you apply it, and to whom? And I want to make
clear, I don't want people to say that I encouraged
attacks on Pakistan, I do not apply this to outside
support of (inaudible) action, although it has
similarities.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.) Two
clarifications. One is you said that you don't have
much knowledge about the support that the militants
are receiving for their terroristic duties in India.

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Would you, in return, be willing to look at the
evidence that is available of all of the --

MR. KISSINGER: Absolutely.

PARTICIPANT: -- support that the
militants in India are getting from outside quarters
and form your own view about it?

And my second question was that in the
context of what you said about measures to contain
terrorism, would you support the use of hot pursuit in
certain cases?

MR. KISSINGER: We got -- we went through
all of this in Vietnam, and we didn't get any support
for hot pursuit from India.

PARTICIPANT: That doesn't mean --

MR. KISSINGER: To tell you the truth --

(Laughter.)

-- I am -- I was then in favor of hot
pursuit, yes. I was then in favor of wiping out the
bases, and the -- but I did that as an American
action. But again, I want to make absolutely clear I
have not studied --

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

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MR. KISSINGER: -- I have not studied the
(inaudible) problem to apply it. I can tell you what
my policy was in Vietnam, that you can read in any
Henry Kissinger book.

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THE CHAIRMAN: I think we are moving on in
time, and we need to get back into some focus if we're
going to get some worthwhile discussion going. In
some respects, I think we have only double
information. I don't think we have that much time to
go back to it anymore.

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Some of the points I think which concern
how India's own concerns, and the facts of Indo-U.S.
relations, I thought I'd put them on the table.
India's own thinking about strategic issues, national
security issues, I don't think are any different from
that of any other country, even if we do not express
it in the same way.

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The important thing I think -- in that
context, I only want to put one thing on the table,
and that is that a great deal of discussion, thinking,
even this undercurrent of India-Pakistan, I think
grows out of the fact that we have adopted -- Indians

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and Americans -- adopted a concept, a framework, of a
region called South Asia.

In strategic terms, in security terms, to
use the terminology of South Asia is absolutely
misleading, distorts the pictures, creates a lot of
wrong ideas, even creates imaginary threat perceptions
amongst the smaller countries in the subcontinent.

If we have to look at the region, it will
be only as a core region from India's strategic
security concerns, and we have to look at a region
which could perhaps be better called Southern Asia.
After all, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had
a direct negative impact on India's security,
regardless of what else it did in other forms.

At the same time, I think I would agree
with Dr. Kissinger when he defines India's larger
interest from (inaudible) to Singapore. I would, in
fact, go a little beyond that to say that a wider
region has a strong interest -- economic, cultural,
political, diplomatic, and others -- is what might be
again termed as the Asia-Indian Ocean region.

That does not take away our interest in

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the Asia-Pacific region. In fact, the two start to be
overlapping, both at the core region of Southern Asia
as a -- as the larger region of Asia-Indian Ocean
region.

Even when you look at the minor aspect of
U.N. peacekeeping operations, you only have to look at
the areas wherein the Indian contingents have been
operating, not only now but historically to understand
that where is it that we think the issues were
important enough for us and close by to send our
troops in, who also picked up casualties along the
way.

The second point in the logic context also
has this question of India's participation. Dr.
Kissinger, you said in passing that the Indians were
not particularly keen to be part of the larger
international groupings or activities, which perhaps
is true, except at the U.N. itself. On the other
hand, we see for the last few years now a great
interest in India and Indian desire to be part of its
national groupings.

And we find that its other countries,

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including the United States, which probably feel that
India's participation is not that great or not -- the
time is not right. We have -- I think Mr. Nascal
(phonetic) wanted to say something to you, and I will
say my piece right now.

The U.N. Security Council -- one hears the
argument that India is yet not ready because of the
Kushmere (phonetic) problem. That was so -- merely a
dispute, a territorial dispute, or another form of
dispute with another neighboring country. I don't
think that Japan qualifies either, because it still
has a dispute on the four islands with Japan -- with
Russia on one side and the San Cocoa Islands on the
other side with China. That's what I'm talking of.

The issues are then that those aspects
must be decided, and the merits of India -- as India
as part of the -- and I will defer judgment on what is
the international order, even accepting it's a multi-
polar (inaudible). In that case, there is more urgent
necessity to ensure that India is part of the
international forum at the appropriate place. We
could be a permanent member of the Security Council.

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There is also the other international
organizations, all of the way down, and this is --
what seems to be (inaudible) that one sees is we have
here the (inaudible) dispensation into a new forum and
a great resistance, almost a rejection of the idea
itself, that India could conceivably be part of that
-- that forum, although those from whom -- against
whom the Corcoran (phonetic) was designed are the ones
that are being included.

And I could go on drawing up that list,
but in substance is the issue that where does this
India then fit into these international forums,
organizations, and where does India operate in the
regional framework, and this is where I raise this
question of the definition of the region itself.

That takes me to the key point, once
again, in the question of Indo-U.S. relations. There
are many aspects. I personally think that things are
moving substantively forward. We are, at long last,
reasonably seriously and reasonably objectively are
able to have a dialogue with each other on strategic
and security issues.

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I have no doubt that it took place even earlier. But today, the type of dialogues, at least that we've been involved in, gets us to come to a conclusion that if it is taken objectively and seriously, almost on every issue the American participants and the Indian participants have been coming to the conclusion that our strategic interests converged very strongly.

We are now beginning to explore, in fact, our -- the Institute of Defense Studies, along with our counterpart in suit which becomes another institute to collect the American leading thinkers, both official and non-official, to try and start exploring where do we go from a recognition of the convergence of interest to operationalizing -- the process of saying, "How do we operate on that?"

And I think the Persian Gulf region, the Central Asian region, even Southeast Asia, the whole Indian Ocean region, when you look at them very carefully you'll find that -- at least I find -- and most of the Americans that I talk to have agreed -- that that is where the convergence takes place, and I

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have the sense, Dr. Kissinger, that broadly speaking
that is also your position.

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We have only touched a little bit, but I
do want to -- to put this question here that when
we're talking of trying to establish an equilibrium in
the region, or the broader region -- Asia itself, if
not the larger global picture -- the elements of power
or the perception of those elements of power are
important. It is not a question of whether nuclear
weapons will be ever used or not used, but the option
to have that capability and the manner in which we
exercise restraint and yet retain that capability
becomes an important element.

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My difficulty comes when very eminent
Americans, especially in the administration, almost ad
infinitum are then saying, "Thou shall not deploy your
own missile," which also raises, then, big question
marks on this whole nature of the relationship,
because here we are building our finest airplane,
indigenously designed with strong American support.
We are supposed to roll out in a few days and
hopefully fly next year.

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Then, would we at some future date --
these are doubts everyone expresses. I have this
doubt that if indigenously produced, 150-kilometer
range missile should not be deployed in the views of
the U.S. administration, for whatever reasons it is,
although the whole area is just jam-packed with
missiles all around -- China particularly, Pakistan,
Iran, Afghanistan, even Saudi Arabia.

Then it becomes difficult to understand
this aspect, and somewhere here lies a lesson I think
that are we understanding each other's -- what might
be called bottom lines of national security interest
and concerns, and I think that is important.

And last, but not the least, is the
question of atmospherics. Atmospherics are important
if at least atmospherics, but the signals and time
that come out of -- one finds very confusing.

We've heard at length, and I don't wish to
go back to the Brown amendment from that perspective,
but in the rationalization of the Brown amendment a
great deal was being said about the U.S. President's
commitment to the Pakistani prime minister. And I

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think if agreements are made at that level that every
effort should be made to honor them. We would have
our difficulty, but we would sort them out.

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On the other hand, there was a commitment
made by President (inaudible) to Prime Minister
Nosmiral (phonetic) in May last year in a joint
statement, and it was very interesting and rather
disturbing to see a White House spokesman turning out
six weeks ago saying that he had never heard about
this.

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That (inaudible) then a certain amount of
basic question, which one understands, that where does
India then fit into the larger American perspective.
We can -- fairly clear as to say where does America
fit into our -- in our perspective, but is it only
then -- are we then talking of the -- some of the nuts
and bolts? Are we talking of the broader issues?

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I thought I'll put this on the table, and
then I'm sure many other people have many other
aspects for the next 45 minutes or so. You don't have
to respond.

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know any Americans. Very few with whom they have
regular contact.

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If more of this were taking place, then it
would be better understood in the United States. They
might not agree with you. But we had a Deputy
Secretary of State here who came to you with some
nuclear proposal, and anybody could have told him,
"You would never accept," and he is a highly
intelligent man.

There was not a chance of that proposal
ever being accepted by anybody, not by the Pakistanis,
not by the Indians. And so what -- how could that
happen? He is a highly intelligent man. Because they
believe that there are certain general principles that
if they just present them properly will be accepted.
And they wouldn't think that if they had a better
grasp of what Indians really believe.

You have so many sophisticated people I
don't really know why it is that there is so little in
(inaudible).

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PARTICIPANT: Dr. Kissinger, I just want to provide two or three points on which you may wish

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to comment, and (inaudible). But they illustrate some
of the points (inaudible) has been making.

I haven't seen any American reaction to
the naval expansion which China seems to be aiming at,
both in terms of whatever China is doing in
(inaudible) Islands, etcetera, vis-a-vis some of the
(inaudible) nations, and what China is building up on
a long range basis, seems to be building up, with
(inaudible).

Similarly, we have heard nothing at all
from any American quarter about the Pakistani effort
attempt to take over Afghanistan pretty much
thoroughly. The last figures (inaudible).

But I was talking last night to a German
correspondent, a lady, (inaudible), who has just spent
three weeks inside Afghanistan, and she told me that
people like Bolana Fulgloravan (phonetic) of Pakistan,
and the Home Minister of Pakistan, and General -- I
forget what his name is -- the former Hamidgul
(phonetic), the former ISI Chief, are all in and out
of Afghanistan as if it was their territory.

And the Pakistani efforts there are --

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seem to be bringing out some comment, some reaction,
some responses from (inaudible), especially the
(inaudible). And the one major part of the world
today, the remaining superpower of the world, has said
nothing at all, and there are hundreds and hundreds of
human rights violations of the most devastating type.

Well, you know, I realized I have lived
both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. I know the
tribal culture there, and cruelty, and all the rest of
it. But it appears rather strange that these two
distant sort of series of events one -- concerning the
Chinese navy or naval aspirations, and the other
Pakistani territorial aspirations, have drawn no
comment at all from Washington.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, you take Chinese
naval aspirations -- I mean, we are overwhelmingly
able to take care of whatever they are building. On
this (inaudible), they are really only taking the
position that Shang Kai Shek (phonetic) already took
in 1946. In due course, they may become a threat, but
I think now they are not a naval threat. Fifteen, 20
years from now there will be a Chinese -- a problem of

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significant Chinese military capabilities. There is
absolutely no question about that.

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But I don't know what we should do today
that we are not doing. There is no reason to increase
our navy against this present level of the threat.

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On Afghanistan, well, we got ourselves
into a real mess there. I mean, we wanted to stop the
Soviets, and that has been more or less (inaudible).
For the after game, for the game after the Soviet
departure, frankly, I don't think we have the stomach
or the competence. And so it's possible that things
happen there that are not -- frankly, I don't know
enough to have an opinion, but I will educate myself
when I get back.

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PARTICIPANT: I am very glad, Dr.

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Kissinger, you mentioned about (inaudible) that came
in or otherwise. It has not been sufficiently
articulated and known in the United States. that is
true. This is one of the problems we face -- when
will we have an Indo-U.S. seminar, which we had quite
a few.

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I have always asked Americans, how about

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publishing these things in the United States? The
problem is I have never been able to persuade the
American organization, the American funding agencies,
to publish them in the United States.

We had a number of seminars with the
Americans in which the Indian view was articulated.
This is one of those things which I am unable to
understand. On the whole, I find for various points
which you made about the American public not being
interested in foreign policy and various other things,
that one of the problems we do find is the like-
mindedness on the security issues in the United
States, and the difficulty of getting any other view
into the American public.

I mean, sometimes I used to say, somewhat
cruelly and in a joking manner, Stalin and Mao Tse
Tung would have (inaudible) the way in which these
views are being made -- propagated in the United
States without their being opposed by others.

This is one of the problems -- the
external (inaudible) are especially in there. Our
views are just not getting through. I don't know what

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we should be doing. You may be able to advise us.

MR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't know. It certainly is not a deliberate strategy to keep the Indian point of view. What developed with respect to Europe and to Japan, and to a lesser extent with China, are a series of study groups that meet regularly. And there doesn't seem to be anything like that with respect to India.

And one does not read enough. You're right, one doesn't read enough about India in American newspapers, which is surprising because you certainly, in terms of power and resources, and so forth, compare with China. But maybe if you have a Tienneman Square, you shoot down a few people in front of --

(Laughter.)

-- Parliament, you'll get --

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Dr. Kissinger, if you'll allow me right now at this point to say just on this business of dialogue with the United States and India, I can add a little personal experience here, which I think is actually (inaudible).

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We started the process since 1989, and it
is almost every year that we meet, a fairly high level
group from both sides to discuss exactly similar sets
of issues and questions -- strategic and otherwise.
Each one, when it finishes, is seen as very
successful, and then I spend the next one year trying
to convince my American friends in the other institute
that it is necessary to keep the dialogue going. And
every time they say that -- they seem to be awfully
hesitant to proceed with the next one.

MR. KISSINGER: What is the institute?

THE CHAIRMAN: The Institute of National
Strategic Studies in the National Defense University,
because that was decided from the Pentagon side, by
the then Secretary of Defense, that they would be the
(inaudible). It's not just the (inaudible) of the
institute, but it normally gets through a much wider
circle, including the Assistant Secretaries of
Defense, who then (inaudible), (inaudible) Chief of
the (inaudible) for three days of discussion at
(inaudible) in 1990, American Ambassadors.

What I'm saying is that there is -- we are

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trying to establish some forums, but it seems to be a
very difficult process to keep moving forward, and I
can assure you not for any lack of willingness from
the Indian side. We're willing to explain where we
stand, and where we stand we stand. But --

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Right. Right.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, sir.

PARTICIPANT: Sorry. I wanted to wait
until later, but you raised this point. I just wanted
to mention to Dr. Kissinger that in my exposure during
my stay in the United States we did try and increase
the dialogue between India and the United States in a
number of areas. And the '89 initiative that
(inaudible) is talking about, (inaudible) of the steps
that we had initiated at that time.

To remind, I might mention that it was in
1987 that for the first time a U.S. Secretary of
Defense visited India after so many years of
(inaudible). And we had in those three years two
visits by two successive secretaries of defense, and

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a return visit by the Indian Defense Ministry. And
one of the things we talked about at that time was
creating a forum which would enable a dialogue between
strategic observers on both sides to (inaudible)
something which has continued.

But it does puzzle me a little as what
(inaudible) said, that there is some reluctance to
publish, too, and so it made the views expressed at
these seminars public.

PARTICIPANT: That's right.

PARTICIPANT: So that people know about
what is happening. But part of this, what I wanted to
bring to the --

MR. KISSINGER: They don't even publish
them as monographs of the Defense University?

PARTICIPANT: No, nothing.

PARTICIPANT: No, they do. They don't get
(inaudible).

PARTICIPANT: No, they didn't publish last
year's.

PARTICIPANT: Yeah. I -- what I wanted to
bring to (inaudible) on a slightly wider scale.

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That's why I (inaudible). We did try and see -- or
let me make a comment for the -- that I found that if
we have a young President of the United States and an
old man here, there is less dialogue between the two
than when you have an old man in the United States and
a young man here.

(Laughter.)

Somehow that was -- seemed odd, but that
seems to be the -- the way it happened.

But apart from that, only a person
(inaudible) one made to initiate the dialogue at
different segments of U.S. and Indian society, somehow
didn't succeed. We tried it at the political level,
made a lot of efforts for the Speaker of the U.S.
Congress to visit India. No go.

MR. KISSINGER: Which one? The present
one?

PARTICIPANT: No, the present --

MR. KISSINGER: Or Foley?

PARTICIPANT: Tom Foley. And it didn't
work out. Sort of, you know -- we tried to encourage
groups of U.S. Senators or other representative --

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Congressmen to come here, larger groups instead of twos and threes as happens now. Didn't work out.

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When Indian Parliamentarians visited Washington, the Secretary of State had time only for a photo session -- as he called it -- outside in the lobby, rather than spend even 15 minutes with the members of Parliament from India. So all efforts at dialogue, at a political kind of level between members of the Congress and policy makers here and Parliament didn't succeed.

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What, again, puzzles me is that there is a large U.S. diplomatic presence in India. You have so many conflicts in the large-sized countries. So quite obviously, the diplomatic community, the diplomatic service in the United States would be knowing a lot about Indian views and Indian attitudes and Indian reaction. But they don't seem to get fed into the thinking and (inaudible). Somehow they get excluded, for whatever would be the reason.

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And efforts to keep a dialogue going, even at the political level, at the diplomatic level, didn't seem to succeed very well. I mean, it did

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1 progress to some extent.

2 As you rightly mentioned yesterday, that
3 the maximum interaction takes places at the
4 professor's level. You have the academics and you
5 have -- and that also is at a decreasing level,
6 because we don't allow some of them to come in and
7 (inaudible).

8 So how do you promote this kind of study
9 group establishment, universities using communities on
10 both sides, using the knowledge available in their
11 state department for promoting this interaction, is
12 quite key. Unless the thoughts about India and about,
13 you know, the role that you emphasize India will play
14 in the near future permeate or penetrate down into the
15 thinking processes, not much is going to happen.

16 Would you like to comment?

17 MR. KISSINGER: Well, I don't have a good
18 answer to that question. I am certainly going to give
19 it some thought, and I'll see whether I can come up
20 with some ideas on how to do it, and I will certainly
21 speak to some American foundations and groups like the
22 Council on Foreign Relations, whether they could have

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a special issue of *Foreign Affairs* on India, for
example. And I know the editor of *Foreign Affairs*
quite well.

THE CHAIRMAN: Okay.

MR. KISSINGER: That certainly seems to me
desirable. I have no solution for -- off the top of
my head on how to do this.

PARTICIPANT: At one time there was an
idea of a joint commission on an unofficial level, you
heading the American side, and P.K. Neru heading from
India.

MR. KISSINGER: Yeah.

PARTICIPANT: What became of that? At
this time, it was -- went right away.

PARTICIPANT: We pushed back some -- I
pushed that back to some extent. But didn't go beyond
the point. I mean, there are --

MR. KISSINGER: One problem was -- I mean,
I had a very distinguished group of Americans ready to
do it. But the Indian group seemed to be primarily
interested to discuss Pakistan, and --

(Laughter.)

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-- and I said to P.K. Neru we are
perfectly willing to discuss it, but what are we doing
to do after the first hour?

(Laughter.)

Because the American contribution to this
was going to be very limited.

PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

THE CHAIRMAN: That is a problem. Just a
second, sir, there are a couple of people waiting for
a long time.

Mr. Wara?

MR. WARA: Thank you. Dr. Kissinger, your
last observations just now seemed to have wrapped up
some of the things I very much wanted to say. I heard
you last evening, and I have heard your observations
this afternoon.

Essentially, there is no debate that we
seem to have somehow, despite our efforts, not
succeeded in establishing the kind of communication
contacts which you referred to passingly yesterday and
again today. But as Mr. (inaudible) just now and
(inaudible) mentioned, I guess in passing I will

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1 mention that I spent about a decade of my recent
career in the Ministry of Defense, and my last year
2 and a half in the Ministry of Interior.
3

4 And from '87, when Casper Weinberger came
5 -- (tape flip) -- and continued contacts with the U.S.
authorities on the defense side, and Chiefs of Staff,
the Pacific Fleet Commanders, the (inaudible)
Commanders, Pentagon officials, U.S. Department of
Defense officials, and so on.
9

10 And we seemed to be getting somewhere, and
11 after a very long time, if I may say so, after three
decades, an Assistant Secretary in charge of
international security affairs, at my personal
invitation he visited India for a week. He had a very
good round of meetings, discussions, and he seemed to
be almost on the threshold of a better understanding
of what our problems were.
17

18 Our Defense Minister also visited the
19 United States in '92, had a return visit, also had
useful discussions there, very brief, but reasonably
useful. But in between, at these various dialogues,
and what has just been referred to our seminars, our
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Indo-U.S. (inaudible) perception and discussions, they
didn't seem to, in my perception -- and I may be quite
wrong -- seem to agree to any kind of dent on the
taking of those in command, instead of Pentagon, much
less on the policy, and that's a larger issue.

And talking more specifically in the
middle 80's up to 90's, we were pursuing our
colleagues in the U.S. Government on the Pinyar
(phonetic) problem, a Pakistan problem. And
subsequently, as you know yourself, we had a problem
in Kushmere, and we've been keeping the U.S.
Government and the U.S. Ambassador very well informed
of what is happening, what we are doing, what the
ground situation is, and so on.

And in between this entire business, the
(inaudible) came to India and Pakistan, and I was
asked to meet Mr. Griggs. I had the then Army Chief
with me. We talked with (inaudible), and he told me
with great happiness and confidence that 32 training
centers in Pakistan had been closed.

MR. KISSINGER: Had been what?

MR. WARA: Had been closed down. They

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were no longer after -- consequent to his discussions
in (inaudible), over 30 centers had been closed. I
asked him very simply out of how many, and he didn't
seem to know. Perhaps he had found out and didn't
care to tell me, or he had not thought of asking, or
whatever else.

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And now I do not need to say this or
emphasize this, that U.S. intelligence has a very
reliable network, and I am personally aware of its
functioning in our subcontinent. I have dealt with
their officials, and not only that we have been
keeping them very regularly informed and giving them
all manner of documentation and information from time
to time.

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But whenever there is a problem, a real
problem, at least I personally have been very
surprised that the statements, when they come from
reasonably senior and responsible functionalities in
the U.S. Government, especially at the point of time
when we have a problem at home, these statements are
insensitive, brazen, sometimes very misleading.

22

Now, whether it is, as you've mentioned

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passing yesterday, (inaudible), mere accidents, or
that the persons making these statements are ignorant,
or they are indifferent, I do not know. But all in
all, Dr. Kissinger, my personal perception is that may
well say -- and rightly so, I would accept that --
that it doesn't do that whenever we meet any important
U.S. academic or government functionality we should
discuss Pakistan.

But kindly don't forget that for us, those
of us who have been in government for long years,
Pakistan has been a problem, to the extent of the
interference in our territories, and to the extent of
the growth of fundamentalism, to the extent of the
growth of insurgency, locking up vast resources that
we possess on the defense side, only in this kind of
fighting, which is virtually better than fighting a
war, as far as Pakistan is concerned.

So I do not know where -- I mean, you can
kindly speak to the (inaudible) of foreign affairs,
something could get printed, something will get
disseminated. But I have been at a loss to understand
that especially in regard to those issues about which

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1 U.S. Government has been consciously and publicly concerned, like terrorism, like insurgency, 2
3 fundamentalism, how is it that even if you disregard the Pentagon or the State Department view of India- 4
5 Pakistan, to the extent that Pakistan has been capable of doing certain things on the ground and it happens 6
7 to relate to India -- and forget that for the moment -- how is it that we have never seen any specific 8
9 (inaudible) move, which in my perception at the right 10
11 point of time would definitely have resulted in bringing matters to a close as between our two 12
13 countries, which is -- which continues to be a (inaudible). That didn't lead both countries 14
15 anywhere, and we must resolve these problems. They are ruinous -- ruinous to both countries. 15

16 So I'd sum up, Dr. Kissinger, by 17
18 submitting for your consideration that when you finally go back and talk to certain functionalities, 18
19 my message or my submission to you is that there has 20
21 not only to be a further effort on our part as you suggested, but I think more than a slight effort on 21
22 the U.S. part to show that they also care. 22

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I have got the feeling that they don't
care, at least those on the defense security side,
because we have never belonged to a scenario, in the
U.S. perception, where India mattered. We were allies
of (inaudible).

Thank you, sir.

MR. KISSINGER: I don't know what
incidents you referred to, and so I don't know -- I
just don't know what the reason was. It must be the
same here, though, that when people at high levels of
government are so busy that taking on new discussions
and problems often tends to be a nuisance.

And also, they deal with whatever problems
come in that day, and they rarely have the time for
conceptual discussions. That's a pity. That's only
one explanation I can give.

Then there is the problem I've mentioned
before that this particular administration is more
focused on general principles than on strategic
issues. So from that point of view it's deliberate,
but it's not because India belonged to the non-aligned
camp, because the typical representative of the

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Clinton administration probably prefers the non-aligned camp to the -- to allies. So, I mean, at least those who were in the protest movement of this late 60's, of the late 60's and early 70's, they have no particular affection for allies or for military regimes.

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So it's the only -- I take what you say seriously. When I go back, I will talk to some foundations and I will talk to -- see what can be done to raise the level.

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THE CHAIRMAN: Just one second, sir.

Quickly. We are not --

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PARTICIPANT: Yes, I'll be very brief.

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Dr. Kissinger, I really regretted very much that this India-Pakistan problem came up at all in these discussions. I say this because I believe that America, or Washington, has really no positive contribution to make in this. I am one of those Indians -- there are very few of them who wake up every morning and pray. A lot of success in (inaudible). The (inaudible) are demobilized Pakistan (inaudible), and --

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1 MR. KISSINGER: Demobilized Pakistan --

2 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

3 MR. KISSINGER: (Inaudible.)

4 PARTICIPANT: Now, if this business goes on -- please let me complete this. I think you should know this. If this goes on, Pakistan is in for a 100-year guerilla war in Afghanistan. That will be the end of Pakistan. So I think we should keep this out of India-America confrontations.

10 I think it is a wonderful thing that you have been coming here. I hope you will keep coming. 11 I think our dialogue should concentrate on larger 12 strategic issues -- security of Indian Ocean, for 13 example. Our perceptions differ on so many things. 14 They differ for foolish reasons. I think you were 15 absolutely right in saying that Pakistan is no bridge 16 for America from Central Asia. We believe the same. 17

18 The bridge, really, for the West is 19 Turkey; for us it's Iran. Americans have taken such 20 a silly view of the Iranian Sea, especially the 21 present administration. The Secretary of State in 22 particular, one of your distinguished successors, they

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don't want to talk to Iran.

Now, the Gulf situation, the Indian Ocean security, the possibility, the necessity of Indian-American cooperation (inaudible), in Southeast Asian seas, and in the Indian Ocean, these are the largest strategic issues, and the much larger issue of a certain balance or equilibrium in (inaudible) land mass, in which America has a very vital role.

I think you are absolutely right, there is no such thing as a Pacific economic region today. It may come up in 50 years, but this I think at best will be an area of tension among three or four major powers of the world. India is on the periphery, on the margins of this region. There again, some (inaudible) could be of benefit to peace in the Indian Ocean region, in Asia generally, in the world. I think these are the larger areas we should be discussing about.

We haven't touched on the United Nations at all. That I think should have come up at some stage. You have been very generous to India. You were not so generous to India in 1969 to '72 when I

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1 was there. I abdicated a mission. You were a
2 national security advisor. We had trouble with the
3 Nixon administration over (inaudible).

4 But you are a strategic thinker. You have
5 been saying that India is one of the largest, you
6 know, power centers or whatever. What is India's
7 role? Is there a way the United States can augment
8 that role? Are India and America -- do they have
9 something in common as democracies? Do they have
10 something common to their shared objectives? If so,
11 why is the United States opposing so provocatively, so
12 vigorously, so violently, India's membership as a
13 permanent member of (inaudible)?

14 I think these are areas of mutual interest
15 in your expressions and your ways of power, your
16 ability to express yourself. You can make a positive
17 contribution to Indo-American cooperation.

18 One more thought. I am also I think one
19 of the few in this gathering -- (inaudible) cross-
20 section of the Indian intellectual (inaudible) who
21 think that regardless of what happens between
22 Washington and (inaudible), this arms supply of

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1 $70 million, there are areas on which India and

2 America must cooperate -- (inaudible) is one.

3 MR. KISSINGER: What?

4 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.) And the

5 nuclear design materials (inaudible). These were

6 proposals we made years ago. They were not made in

7 the (inaudible). That came later in (inaudible) time.

8 I'm not (inaudible) to that. That package is not

9 (inaudible) -- by our cooperation with the United

10 States on (inaudible) and design materials (inaudible)

11 in the conference on disarmament and other forums.

12 I think these are the larger issues on

13 which you concentrate. Because the economic area of

14 cooperation is open, America is not willing to invest

15 the (inaudible) in India. If we create the condition

16 for American capital to come here, that capital will

17 come. But if it comes, another large area of

18 cooperation between our two countries of understanding

19 will be opened up.

20 Thank you.

21 MR. KISSINGER: Well, with respect to the

22 very last point, certainly when the number of major

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American corporations working here increases, you will
have a built-in constituency and good relations. The
Chinese have used that very effectively, and that's in
the nature of things, and that will certainly happen.

As for the rest, you know, there is no
sense going back over the old period, because from our
perception we didn't hear very many friendly words
from India --

PARTICIPANT: I agree, yes.

MR. KISSINGER: -- in that period, and I
don't -- you know, we used to be (inaudible) endless
admonitions on what was to us a very important matter
like Vietnam.

And so -- and then I've already told you
'71 was a very special circumstance for us, which had
nothing to do with our overall assessment of the
importance of India. But until the end of the Cold
War, India really didn't want to play on an
international scale, and so India is now behind. Our
people are not used to hearing from India or
(inaudible) into their considerations, but this is
something that ought to come, and that in my view will

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1 come.

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And as these visits on both sides increase -- actually, on our side the feeling was that the (inaudible) Clinton conversations went very well. So I think actually that -- that part of it -- that part of it will improve. We are now in a place in the United States we are all concerned with foreign policy and all concerned with strategy. It has to face the fact that a totally new generation is coming into power that does not feel itself threatened. And, therefore, the sort of discussions which were normal 10 years ago are now very difficult to generate.

You look at Sunday talk shows, and nine times out of 10 they deal with domestic issues. It is very rare that they deal with a foreign issue, and when they deal with a foreign issue it is always a very immediate one. Do we send troops to Bosnia? You almost never find a discussion of Bosnia, even in a historic sense, on television. That's a very real problem, and those of us who are concerned with foreign policy for America are very worried about it.

I believe, actually, that relations with

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1. India are definitely on the upswing. And we just have
2. to begin working together on common issues, and we
3. will find -- we will find ways of -- and then what
4. does not exist in America is on policy -- on those --
5. on the level of people who can influence policy. They
6. don't have Indian friends, they don't visit India very
7. much, and so the Indian constituency which you have
8. are sort of specialists and fanatics on India who are,
9. therefore, discounted on the subject.

10. But the policy making world in which I
11. move there is the people who go in and out of
12. government, who always know what is going on more or
13. less, who can pick up telephones and call each other.
14. Among them India is simply not well enough known, and
15. that's a pity.

16. PARTICIPANT: It's not known at all.

17. MR. KISSINGER: Yeah, it's maybe not known
18. at all. And the -- it's something that I will make
19. whatever limited contribution I can make to try -- to
20. try to deal with it (inaudible).

21. In case any of you have read, the Indian
22. government has hired me to promote its point of

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1 view --

2 (Laughter.)

3 -- which a number of people have said, "We
don't take any money from government."

5 (Laughter.)

6 "We are not for hire." I have read it in
7 a number of places. I was asked by a journalist this
8 morning.

9 (Laughter.)

10 And we have no relationship with the
11 Indian government other than I -- respect for the
12 manner in which we have been treated, and my own
13 personal conviction that India is a major country, and
14 my desire to promote American security and long-range
15 foreign policy, which in my view requires an Indian
16 (inaudible).

17 THE CHAIRMAN: There are just one or two
18 people who have not spoken, but very briefly.

19 MR. KISSINGER: If I may say one thing.
20 When we started with the Chinese, we knew nobody. We
21 had never heard of the Chinese. I mean, we had never
22 -- I couldn't even prepare myself. What the Chinese

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did very skillfully is for the first few years they
spent a lot of time with us on analyzing the
international situation. They didn't ask anything for
themselves. They didn't attack any particular
neighbors. They hated the Russians, and they made
that clear. But they didn't spend much time on this.

And we were visiting Russia all the time
at the time; they never said anything. And so if --
the other day I was reviewing some of those
conversations for writing an article. And it turned
out to be extremely effective, because all of us who
had to deal with them in effect got a seminar on
geopolitics from the Chinese point of view, and we
weren't threatened, and we didn't have to sell
anything.

I don't know whether that's possible, and,
frankly, I don't think we have the same personnel as
we had at the time. I mean, Nixon and I happened to
be very interested in that sort of discussion. So the
Chinese had counterparts who were willing -- who were
eager for that sort of dialogue.

But that's what the Chinese did. They

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1
didn't -- there was no commerce. There was nothing
2
for three years, other than these conversations.

3
PARTICIPANT: Was there dialogue?

4
MR. KISSINGER: No. UPMAs (phonetic). I
5
published in my book -- the first thing Mao said to
6
Nixon was, "We can wait 100 years." And --

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PARTICIPANT: Not even textile
8
(inaudible)?

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MR. KISSINGER: No.

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PARTICIPANT: Not at that time.

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MR. KISSINGER: Nothing.

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PARTICIPANT: Not at that time.

13
MR. KISSINGER: Believe me --

14
PARTICIPANT: Yes.

15
MR. KISSINGER: -- there was -- Taiwan --
16
it was settled in the sense that they said they don't
17
want -- they stated it once. They don't -- in the
18
first conversation with me, they stated their view,
19
but they didn't ask anything of us because they said,
20
"If you need it, you can keep it for a while. We can
21
wait 100 years." And they just didn't want us to
22
declare it independent. This is why this last summer

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blowup was so unnecessary. The Chinese have never
actually asked us to do anything positive. They have
asked us to stop doing negative things.

THE CHAIRMAN: General Kuzuta (phonetic)?

GENERAL KUZUTA: Dr. Kissinger, you have
been articulating that there are going to be six power
centers in the world in the years to come, perhaps in
the next century. And these six are, of course, the
U.S., Russia, China, Europe, Japan, and India. As a
followup --

MR. KISSINGER: India.

GENERAL KUZUTA: And India. As a followup
to Ambassador Roscutra's (phonetic) question, which
you have partly answered, what will be the composition
of the Security Council at that particular time?
Britain and France are presently members. Germany is
very, very keen that they should also become members,
and yet all three of them will be part of Europe as
one group, as one power center.

So, therefore, under this particular
dispensation at that time, the Security Council
membership will have to change. I think it would be

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very useful to have your views as to how well the
elite, who are already members, give up their
membership, and how would the new (inaudible) who
would come into the power play become members? And,
of course, if this thing has got to be spread within
the United States because the backing of the United
States would be important to all of them, how would
you, as an individual who is espousing this particular
six-part group, be able to influence matters?

MR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all, you're
not going to get any creative idea from the U.S.
Government for the next year.

(Laughter.)

And so don't expect any (inaudible)
initiatives. From January 1st on, the only concern
will be to get through -- to survive the election.

GENERAL KUZUTA: But I have not asked for
the American Government's interest at all. It was
your personal interest of the --

MR. KISSINGER: Well --

GENERAL KUZUTA -- very imminent man.

MR. KISSINGER: I didn't know that the

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1 American Government is opposing India's participation.

2 PARTICIPANT: They are doing that, yes.

3 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

4 MR. KISSINGER: Well, according to my
5 analysis, of course, since I have included India among
6 the major powers, I feel India should be on the
7 Security Council. I think also when the Security
8 Council is expanded it is going to be very difficult
9 what one does with France and Britain and Germany --

10 PARTICIPANT: Yes.

11 MR. KISSINGER: -- who are also members of
12 the European Union. And so the easiest would be to
13 have one member for the European Union, but this is
14 absolutely out of the question right now.

15 Now, I believe also that when the Security
16 Council is reorganized a system of weighted voting has
to be introduced, because if everybody has a veto then
18 nothing will ever happen in the Security Council.
19 Having said this, this is so impossible in the United
20 States today in the present mood about the United
21 Nations.

22 But I think that maybe there should be --

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1 there are a number of ways one can do it. One can
2 have the new members for a period of years to have the
3 members but not give them a veto. That would be one
4 way -- for, say, five years while this weighted voting
5 is being worked out. But I think the Security Council
6 will have to be expanded or the non-permanent members
7 reduced. Some system of weighted voting should be
8 introduced.

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But given the present mood in America,
this is not -- the United Nations is extremely
unpopular right now in the United States. And on all
sides, maybe not so much on the side of the
administration, but they're afraid to say so, which
means that they are -- they believe it to be
unpopular. But I think, certainly, India should be a
member of the Security Council.

THE CHAIRMAN: Admiral Govill (phonetic),
17
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very quickly. We are now --

ADMIRAL GOVILL: I meant to ask this
19
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question, Dr. Kissinger, when you were on -- meeting
with China. Are you as sanguine about China now as
you were, say, five or six years ago?

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MR. KISSINGER: You know, in 1988 -- let me tell you this. In 1988, I was in China with some delegation and Tung received this. And Tung had just read an article that nobody had read in which I had said China will be a superpower in 2020. And Tung said, "Oh, my friend Henry is -- my friend, the doctor, is too far, goes too far. It won't happen until 2050."

Every said, "Why is he starting an argument on such an obtuse point?" But he knew me. He understood me better. Because once India was -- if China was a superpower, he knew damn well that my view would be it had to be balanced. And he -- so he wanted to push it -- he wanted to push it. Sanguine is not my attitude. My attitude is right now. China is not a threat. Fifteen years from now it may be a threat. Right now, we gain nothing by treating China as if it were a threat, because we will only isolate ourselves and we will give a clear field to many others.

So for the time being, I think we should treat China as if it were not a threat. When it

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becomes a threat, I would favor balancing it, because
the -- my country -- it's senseless to say I'm pro-
Chinese. We needed China in the 70's. We need China
today, as a limited equilibrium. We are all talking
about rearm Japan. We don't want to drive Japan over
the edge back into internationalism.

I was -- the other day I saw an article in
a Japanese paper speaking of the loyalty of the
Japanese to the American alliance and saying that if
(inaudible) we are threatened. The Japanese might
even be willing to send their self-defense courses to
help us defend Taiwan. Well, then we're right back to
where we came in.

The other day I was at a business meeting,
at a meeting where one of the CEOs of one of the
largest Japanese companies was present. It was an
international advisory group of -- and that Japanese
CEO said he had been told by his representative in
Taiwan that the Taiwanese would welcome a return of
some kind of Japanese political influence and control
there.

Now, anybody who knows anything about

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China knows that if we want to start a real permanent war, this is the way to do it. And it is -- and anyone who knows the Japanese knows that they don't talk this way idly. They don't have loose cannons running around. So I am worried about if they begin to think this way already about Taiwan, which is another reason why I don't want to take on the Chinese, and certainly not on the issue of Taiwan.

Taiwan was doing very well. I signed many communiques in which I stated an American interest in a peaceful solution of the Taiwan question. There is no question where I stand. But to provoke a confrontation when Taiwan is an international institution, has $100 billion reserves, has an annual surplus, it is ridiculous. And we are fixing a problem that isn't solved -- that isn't -- that doesn't exist.

So this is -- but I have no benign view of China. China is important at this moment. Fifteen years from now this may change, and I don't see anything we need to do at this moment. We can't line up general alliances. Nobody will come, and it

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1 wouldn't be a good idea anyway.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: I --

3 MR. KISSINGER: I think I've (Inaudible.).

4 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. In fact, I am very
5 curious. I'm going to hold everybody else back and
6 probably cross their names out, but I am very curious
7 to listen to an American questioning an American here.

8 Matt?

9 MR. KISSINGER: I don't think he'll
10 question me. He is going to contradict me.

11 (Laughter.)

12 PARTICIPANT: You have to realize I first
13 worked for Secretary Kissinger in 1971.

14 (Laughter.)

15 I know better than --

16 MR. KISSINGER: (Inaudible.)

17 PARTICIPANT: I know better than to
18 question him in public. I would like to just have one
19 minute on the question of the expansion of the
20 Security Council. The United States believes that the
21 Security Council can well be expanded but would not
22 want to see that go to the point, in terms of numbers

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1 of members, that the efficiency, the effectiveness of
2 the Council would be impaired.

3 Specifically, we would envision the
4 Council as being expanded up to 20. We have supported
5 Japan and Germany, as you know, for that purpose. A
6 little arithmetic -- that leaves three other slots
7 where we have not taken a position on particular
8 countries and have referred to the need to have a
9 dialogue, to talk about the basis on which those
10 countries would be selected, the role of regional
11 support, and these kinds of issues. We most assuredly
12 have not opposed India's candidacy.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Matt, and I
14 think that's just the right thing on which I should
15 have to call the meeting to --

16 PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible.)

17 THE CHAIRMAN: No, sir. That can be done
18 after I finish with this, at the moment, because I
19 have many more hands and a few names I didn't have.

20 Dr. Kissinger, thank you very much. I
21 think we have talked at length about the need for this
22 high level dialogue. We couldn't have got something

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better than Dr. Henry Kissinger coming to us as -- to
the institute as our guest. You have done us a great
honor.

And I think more importantly even than
that is the nature and the level of exchange of views
that you have shared with us, your perceptions of the
world, and also wherein that fits, and how to manage
this, how to work this out will require a lot more
thinking together and working together, and I think we
look forward to those opportunities.

I will, at this point, late point in the
day, would like to just thank you on behalf of the
participants of this afternoon's discussion, the
institute which I have the great privilege to head at
the moment, and my personally. And to help you along
the line and in going back, I have a small little gift
for you, if you will be kind enough to kindly accept
it from us.

Meanwhile, this is part of the
(inaudible). I will send you that. This is our
annual (inaudible) that we bring out. This is our
effort at strategic views (inaudible). This may be of

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1 some --

2 MR. KISSINGER: Does that come out? Oh,

3 my God. This --

4 THE CHAIRMAN: This is now a regular

5 feature of --

6 PARTICIPANT: Mr. Kissinger, I have this
7 for you. The booklets can be (inaudible).

8 (Applause.)

9 MR. KISSINGER: Thank you very much.

10 (Whereupon, the round table discussion was

11 concluded.)

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