January 27, 1964

Mr. Max Ascoli
THE REPORTER
660 Madison Avenue
New York 21, New York

Dear Max:

I am returning the two articles to you about which
I have already talked to you on the telephone.

The article about China seems to me rather interesting
though somewhat disorganized. In addition to the marginal
comments, I would recommend that the first two pages be cut.
They lead the reader to expect an analysis of Soviet-Chinese
differences--where in fact, most of the article concerns
China's foreign economic policy.

As for the book review, I find that very interesting.
However, it is not clear to me whether the author, whom I
do not know, is stating his view or that of the author of
the book whom I also do not know. If you use this, I would
recommend clarifying that particular point.

Warm regards.

THE REPORTER

660 Madison Avenue
New York City 21
TE 2-8800

Max Ascoli

February 27 1964

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

A request for permission to reprint parts
of "Nato's Nuclear Dilemma" (March 28, 1963)
has come to Max's attention through a friend
of his, the Italian Ambassador in London.

The permission is requested on behalf of
Mr. Fausto Bacchetti, counselor at the Embassy
and a specialist on nuclear strategy. Mr. Bacchetti
wishes to include the second chapter of your piece,
and to quote excerpts from the third chapter, in
an anthology on nuclear strategy he is editing
for *Comunità* -- the publishing house connected
with the Olivetti firm.

Naturally, if we grant him the permission,
we would ask him to give full credit to the
author and to the magazine.

If you have no objection, to save time
please simply sign and return the enclosed
copy of this letter.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

THE REPORTER

660 Madison Avenue

New York 21, N. Y.

Templeton 2-8800

MEMO from Max Ascoli

April 13, 1964

To: Henry Kissinger

Will you please let me know
what you think of Mr. Raser's
suggestion.

cc: Philip Horton

Henry V. Klaasager

With warm regards.

I think this is a thoughtful piece.
to the substantive issues. Otherwise,
the original problem a little bit more
My suggestion would be to relate

very useful article for THE REPORTER.
interest. I think it would make a
piece which I have read with great
I am returning the欠dewater

Dear Max:

New York 31, New York
660 Madison Avenue
THE REPORTER
Mr. Max Vacoit

April 23, 1964

Labor's Defence Policy

It has been said that a British General Election can look to Americans like a secret feud between two tribes who live in unmapped jungle and whose language nobody knows. In defence policy, the election of this October is even beginning to look like that to the British too.

This is partly because one party has all the recent experience and is tonguetied, while the other is exuberantly articulate and has no recent experience. The Conservative is the party of the haves, and haves can usually get what they want by talking to one another in have-code. As for the general public, a stylised, reassuring platitude or two will carry one over to the next annual general meeting. The Labour Party is an alliance of industrial workers, technicians, and university intellectuals, by nature the most talkative and disgruntled classes in the country. What property is to a Conservative, words are to a British socialist; the way they get things done. The Conservative Party feels guilty if it puts anything down in writing, the British way.

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[1c]

Labour Party feels guilty if it does not put everything
down in writing, and update it once a month.

The relations between government and opposition are quite different in Britain and America, and are probably at their most different in the field of national security and foreign affairs. Everything in Britain is much more rigid. There is no defence committee or foreign affairs committee in Parliament; (there are no specialist policy committees at all, only financial watchdogs barking after the event.) Each party may form its own defence group or not, as it likes; what they do, they do separately, and without access to specialists. The opposition party has no opportunity to meet the executive minister responsible but in full formal session of one of the Houses of Parliament. It thus has no constitutional access to anybody in the Ministry of Defence or Foreign Office but the two ministers in charge, who are busy, a handful of junior ministers, who are more likely to be gaining political experience than formulating policy, and a press or publicity section, who are concerned with the small change of smooth relations between ministry and press. Any individual contacts beyond that are difficult to achieve, laborious to maintain,

just are difficult to achieve, labors to maintain
ministry and press. Any individual contracts beyond
with the smellance of smooth relations between
and a press or publicity section, who are concerned
inuing political experience than formulating policy,
ful of junior ministers, who are more likely to be
put the two ministers in charge, who are push, a hand-
anybody in the Ministry of Defense or Foreign Office
Parliament. It thus has no constitutional access to
but in full formal session of one of the Houses of
opportunity to meet the executive minister reasonable
access to specialists. The opposition party has no
likes; what they do, they do separately, and without
partly may form its own defence group or not, as it
financial watchdogs parking after the event.) Each
(there are no specialist policy committees at all, only
mittee or foreign affairs committee in Parliament;
Britain is much more right. There is no defence com-
national security and foreign affairs. Everything in
are properly at their most different in the field of
ation are quite different in Britain and America, and
The relations between Government and Abbo-
down in writing, and update it once a month.
Opposition party feels entity if it does not but everything

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[r]

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[LC]

and so hedged about by the claims of confidence as to
be of quite limited political use. There is no
structure of expert committees in Parliament, there is
no right to call officials (or anyone else) to testify,
and none, or virtually none, of that coming and going
between the universities and government which is so
much part of the American system.

The individual member of either party may
join the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, and
there he will find a good library and be able to hear
speakers (though few of them from the Ministry of
Defence or Defence Staff of his own country) give
SECRET unclassified talks. This Institute, with a
full-time graduate staff of four or five, is all
Britain has to pit against the thousands at RAND, IDA,
Hudson Institute etc, in the U.S.A. It is becoming
increasingly international in membership and outlook,
and is nearly half maintained by American money. It
does not seem likely that its relations with a
secretive Civil Service will improve. University
studies in defence and arms control are just now
beginning, but are not yet developed enough to infuse
political life; nor indeed are the relations between
parties and universities adequate for such an infusion.

parties and universities adequate for such an institution.

Political life; nor indeed are the relations between
beginning, but are not yet developed enough to influence
studies in defence and arms control are that now
secretive Civil Service will improve. University
does not seem likely that its relations with a
and is nearly all maintained by American money. It
increasingly international in membership and outlook.
Hudson Institute etc., in the U.S.A. It is becoming
Britain has to bit against the thousands at RAND, IDA,
full-time graduate staff of four or five, as all
mathematical talks. This Institute, with a
Defence or Defence Staff of his own country) give
speakers (though few of them from the Ministry of
there he will find a good library and be able to fear
join the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, and
The individual member of either party may
much part of the American system.

between the universities and Government which is so
and none, or virtually none, of that coming and going
no right to call officials (or anyone else) to testify,
structure of expert committees in Parliament, there is
pe of quite limited political use. There is no
and so hedged about by the claims of confidence as to

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[r]

The minimal osmosis between legislature and executive makes for poor public debate and often turns party politics from a tug of war into blind man's buff.

But the reverse of this medal is the famous superior strength and ability of the British Civil Service, founded on continuity of service and protection by the rule of ministerial responsibility. In the fields where one can see the Civil Service at work (particularly education) it is often prodigiously good. Many British outsiders suspect it may also be prodigiously good in defence and even foreign affairs, which would automatically imply that its advice was not always taken by its political masters, few of whom during the last decade have been left long enough on the job to hear what that advice was in any case. But the virtues of the Civil Service in defence, whatever they are, are kept strictly hidden by the system. There is a

If this is so within Britain, it is even more so between allies. When American Defence people come over here they are sometimes given a kind of protocol tour of the British Ministry of Defence, just as, when the Defence Ministers themselves meet in NATO, it is a coffee and cakes affair to prove they have indeed met.

Structural claustrophobia here which contrasts oddly with the deliberately cultivated outward lookingness of British foreign policy

coffee and cakes affair to prove they have indeed met.
the Defence Ministers themselves meet in WATG. It is a
tour of the British Ministry of Defence, just so, when
over here they are sometimes given a kind of protocol
so between allies. When American Defence people come
If this is so within Britain, it is even more
are, are kept strictly hidden by the system. These is or
airlines of the Civil Service in defence, whatever they
top to hear what that advice was in any case. But the
during the first decade have been left long enough on the
always taken by its political matters, few of whom
would automatically imply that its advice was not
only good in defence and even foreign affairs, which
Many British outsiders aspect it may also bePRODUC-
itionally education) it is often prodigiously good.
tields where one can see the Civil Service at work
by the rule of material responsibility. In the
Service, founded on continuity of service and protection
superior strength and ability of the British Civil
party politics from a tug of war into blind men's bull.
executive makes for poor public debate and often turns
The minimalism of between legislature and

But the reverse of this medal is the thanks
party politics from a tug of war into blind men's bull.
executive makes for poor public debate and often turns
The minimalism of between legislature and

[c]

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[LC]

In spite of the structural peculiarities of
the British system, - the amateurism of Parliament,
the incommunicative professionalism of the Civil
Service, the lack of contact with universities and
research - in spite of all these, which tell heavily
against a party thirteen years in opposition, Labor
has managed to develop a coherent defence and foreign
policy to offer to the electorate in October.

What this policy is the American public has
recently had set forth for it authoritatively (because
he is the shadow foreign secretary) and optimistically
(because that is his nature) by Patric K. Gordon-Walker
in the April number of *Foreign Affairs*. The change
from Conservative policies is likely to be quite
perceptible to Americans, but there seems no reason to
suppose it will be painful. The most conspicuous change
will be in policy towards the control of nuclear
weapons within NATO. It will be no disaster to the
U.S. when Britain ceases to insist on maintaining
independent control of a weapons system which has so
often been described by American strategists as margin-
ally effective, obsolescent, and destabilising. It
can hardly be displeasing if Britain releases the U.S.
from the undertaking, wrung from a startled and
reluctant Kennedy and inconsistent with his own policy,

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[Lc]

to sell us Polaris missiles and inertial guidance
systems for the submarines to carry them. The Labor
Party agrees with the American contention that the
manning level, the equipment, the mobility, and the
deployment of some of the armies on the Central Front
in Europe leave much to be desired, and that the con-
sequent early recourse to a nuclear defence in our
plans is largely unnecessary. A Labor Government is
pledged to pay special attention to these attributes
of the British Army of the Rhine.

And the many statements made by Labor
leaders to the effect that Britain ought to play a
more active part in the United Nations also herald a
change for the better in Anglo-American relations.
The United States can be certain that under a Labor
Government British feet will not be dragged, as they
were during the Congo affair, and that there will be no
more abreactive convulsions, as in the attack on Egypt.
Lastly, a total arms embargo will be placed on South
Africa. In all these matters, the changes that Labor
propose will bring Britain closer to United States
policies than she has been for years.

 probease will bring Britain closer to United States
 ally. In all these matters, the changes that Lepor
 lastly, a total armse emarge will be placed on South
 more a prospective conversation, as in the attack on Etpct.
 were during the Congo affair, and that there will be no
 Government British feet will not be dragged, as they
 The United States can be certain that under a Lepor
 change for the better in Anglo-American relations,
 more active part in the United Nations also heraf a
 leaders to the effect that Britain ought to play a
 And the many statements made by Lepor

of the British Army of the Rhine.
pledged to pay special attention to these attributes
biana is largely unnecessary. A Lepor Government is
segment early recourse to a nuclear defence in our
in Europe leave much to be desired, and that the con-
deployment of some of the armies on the Central Front
manning level, the equipment, the mobility, and the
Party agrees with the American contention that the
systems for the subarmes to carry them. The Lepor
to sell us Polaris missiles and inertial guidance

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[r]

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[lc]

But Labor will not change every aspect of Anglo-American
defence relations. The discussion will probably continue
whether it is immoral to spend 7% of G.N.P. on defence when your
ally is spending 10%, given that your per capita income is lower.
Harmony will no doubt continue about the deployment of carrier
forces in the Indian Ocean. Discord will probably continue
about the permissibility of selling civil goods to Cuba. The
involvement of the U.S. in a succession of small but savage wars
in South-East Asia may continue to be regarded with a surprise
born of who knows what proportions of ignorance and disapproval.

It seems clear that most of the immediate changes proposed
by Labor (vesting control of the ÷ bombers unequivocally in
NATO, releasing the US from the Nassau undertaking, etc.) are
squarely in line with American policy. And there is every reason
to hope that the more basic and longer-term shifts of policy will
be carried through in unbroken agreement with the U.S.

a

A Labor government will have/definite idea of the way the
world ought to go in matters of defence, arms control, disarmament,
and world security, and will probably pursue it with more than the
usual vigor of a new broom. The present British Government, to
judge by its actions, has no such idea. The German Government is
deadlocked between the smiling dreams of domestic policy and the
scowling realities of the world. France goes her own particular way,

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[L.C.]

ignoring NATO, and making charming but not necessarily fruitful
passes at China, Mexico, Germany Cyprus, etc. Italy is the
Schweik of Europe. It may thus be a slight shock to the United
States to find the Government of a major European ally coming
forth, in NATO, with a positive drive towards a new shape of the
world.

But it need not be an unpleasant one. This drive will
not be at variance with United States interests; it will, rather,
urge and hurry forward certain elements of U.S. policy which are
already shaping up clearly enough. The Labor Party has had a long
time to think in the wilderness. It will not be content to drift,
or even to move creakingly and slow from precarious accommodation
to precarious accommodation. It will act with determination to
co-ordinate defence and disarmament policies at a national level,
and will hope to be able to carry some of this outwards into the
Alliance as a whole. Labor will favour a forthright and swift
adoption of the Indian proposal on general disarmament at Geneva,
namely, the acceptance of stable minimum deterrents, and the strategic
redeployment necessary to achieve it swiftly and safely. The
article of Roswell Gilpatric in the April number of Foreign Affairs
is evidence of thinking within the American administration which
fundamentally accords well with Labor's.

-9-

[L.C]

The Western half of the balanced minimum deterrent could
far more easily (whether seaborne or landborne) be under joint
allied control than could the vast and disparate armories of
today. The great destruction of American, Soviet and British
stocks involved could make it politically possible for France
to take part in that control, and the participation of West Germany
in it would be much less provocative than her participation in a
newly created force (the M.L.F.) added to existing ones. Recent
Polish proposals for Central Europe could well be part of an
orderly progress to the minimum deterrent balance. In such a
situation, the eventual reunification and neutralisation of
Germany, though it remains a severe political problem, no
longer falls in the realm of the impossible on sheer military
grounds.

As this is being done, in order to set the scene for the
next stage, China should be brought in both to the United Nations
and the Disarmament negotiations in Geneva. It would be hard for
a Labor Government to take a merely declaratory line about this.
The Labor Party does not regard the United Nations as an
association of those states having certain common attributes
(as for instance democratic legitimacy, a recent history free of
examples of aggression, etc.) but as an association of all states.

[Lc]

In all this there may be moments when a Labor Government
will appear to some of those whose influence in the United
States grew up in the 1940s and 50s as hotheaded. That is
unavoidable; if Labor wins the election it will be because
the British people wants a change, and a new and younger government
often looks hotheaded to the older decision-makers in allied
countries. But there is no reason why a Labor Government should
appear hotheaded to those who have come to influence or maintained
their influence in America because they understand the world of
the 1960s.

The basic attitudes of the fifties (tireless Soviet aggression,
unquestioned urgent arms drive, U.S. leadership) have led NATO into bad trouble
because they are being maintained too long. Small adjustments
and revisions will not restore cohesion.

There are extremisms on both sides in British politics,
just as there are in American. The Empire Loyalists in Britain
and the Birchers in America tell themselves cosy lies and hope to
win back to the past. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in
Britain and a corresponding sector of radical-left opinion in the
U.S. tell themselves cosy lies and hope to win through to the
future. There is even a curious parallel between the American
radical right and the British radical left. The Birchers want to
move the U.S. back in time to an age of invulnerability; the C.N.D.

[Lc]

wants to move Britain sideways in political alignment to a
position of invulnerability.

Just as the Republican Party is not Birchite, so the Labor
Party is not C.N.D. The Labor Party as a whole does a pretty good
job of telling itself draughty truths and keeping its feet in the
present. In particular there is, if I am right in my outline of
what a Labor Government might do, no neutralism in the program,
no desire that American troops should leave Europe before general
disarmament, and no desire to opt out of the realities of the
world situation, save money, and leave America, Russia, Germany
et al, to get on with the dirty old game of power politics. This
is worth spelling out because Mr. Anthony Verrier, in an article
in the January number of Foreign Affairs, wrote that all these
attitudes were influential in the Labor Party under Harold Wilson's
leadership.

The underchecked publication of this quite misleading
article caused a good deal of surprise in London and, naturally,
of concern in the Labor Party; it was an unusual slip in the part
of Foreign Affairs, and one which appeared more unfortunate still
since that paper runs no correspondence columns in which a correction
could have been published.

[L.C.]

A Labor Government would indeed be ready to give up certain aspects of national control in the interests of hindering the proliferation of other national controls over nuclear weapons and would welcome the provisional restoration, on the way to disarmament, of as much bipolarity as possible at the nuclear level. In this, one may assume a Labor Britain and a Democratic America would see eye to eye. Whether a Republican America would feel the same way is another matter.

On levels of force and influence lower than the nuclear, a Labor Britain would not go out of its way to re-establish a bipolar world. China and Russia have broken. Poland occupies a third Communist position, Yugoslavia a fourth. The great threat is passing away. The old days when a wealthy and advanced United States protected a cowering and inert Western Europe from monolithic aggression will not return, and nobody in the U.S. wants them to return. But those who stand up in their own defence and make their own wealth will also move around, go for walks, try things out. This is happening, and will continue to happen.

When NATO is revised or transformed in 1969, the U.S. will just have had a presidential election (Lodge's second term? Johnson's third? Robert Kennedy's first?) and Britain will just be having an election to pass judgement on a Labor Government for the first time in eighteen years. It may be that those who think about the Atlantic Alliance will judge that Britain's greatest

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[LC]

service to the Anglo-Saxon end of it in the preceding five years
was that a Labor Government improved communications. The British
gentleman, who is the ideal of the Conservative Party, will
help, stonewall, or sabotage with the same courteous warmth and
the same clichés about tradition. The Labor Party does not have
the gentleman ideal; its notion is simply British people.
Whatever it does, it will be sure to explain itself fluently.
It will prefer full and multilateral discussions to the eggshell
"special position" which keeps its predecessors so hushed. And if
it does less sloganising about our common heritage, that will be
because it has its feet more squarely in it. The United States
is not the heir of the British Right.

Attractionately,

which is one of the most valuable relationships in my life.
I need hardly add that nothing can affect our friendship

arrangement.

I fully understand it if you felt like terminating the
and resign. I want you to know, however, that I could
for my personal attraction, I would take the initiative
really written for you if I had behaved. It were not
very generally for consulting services but I have not
This relates another concern. You have been paying me

I simply cannot write on two different subjects at once.
Getting longer than I had planned). Even though I tried
being more slowly than I had expected (or rather it is
that I could not do the article for you. My book is
This is just a note to tell you how ungrateful I am

Dear Max:

New York, New York
660 Madison Avenue
THE REPORTER
Mr. Max VesciIt

CONFIDENTIAL

August 24, 1964

October 15, 1964

PERSONAL

Mr. Max Ascoli
THE REPORTER
660 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Max:

This is just a note to clear up a possible misunderstanding. When I wrote you in September about my consulting relationship with THE REPORTER, I left it up to you to decide whether to terminate it in the light of the rather inadequate assistance I had been giving you. I then understood you to say that you did not think this step necessary.

I now raise two problems: (1) No check has arrived this month. I mention this only so that in case it has gone astray in the mail your office can stop it. (2) I do not think it is fair to leave the decision of terminating the arrangement up to you. It seems to me obvious that I have not really contributed a great deal to THE REPORTER during the consulting relationship.

Our weekly telephone conversations are my pleasure and I do not really think I should be paid for them. In addition, you can pay me for articles when and if I write them.

In case the check has gone astray and you have not already terminated the arrangement, let me therefore insist that the consulting arrangement be terminated effective immediately.

With warmest regards.

Your old friend,

Your old friend,

With warmest regards.

consulting arrangement be terminated effective immediately.
terminated the arrangement, let me therefore insinat that the
In case the check has gone astray and you have not already
can bay me for articles when and if I write them.

do not really think I should be paid for them. In addition, you
Our weekly telephone conversations are my pleasure and I

a great deal to THE REPORTER during the consulting relationship.
to you. It seems to me opinions that I have not really contributed
to their leave the decision of terminating the arrangement up
in the mail your office can atop it. (S) I do not think it is
month. I mention this only so that in case it has gone astray
I now raise two problems: (1) No check has arrived this
did not think this step necessary.

I had been giving you. I then understood you to say that you
terminate it in the light of the rather inadequate assistance
with THE REPORTER. I left it up to you to decide whether to
When I wrote you in September about my consulting relationship
This is just a note to clear up a looseende misunderstanding.

Dear Max:

New York, New York
660 Madison Avenue
THE REPORTER
Mr. Max Vacoii

PERSONAL

October 12, 1964

Henry V. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

Dear Max:

New York 31, New York
660 Madison Avenue
The Reporter
Mr. Max Acoff

CONFIDENTIAL

June 26, 1962

The difference is that while the British draft explicitly
would retain the veto of the existing nuclear countries, the United
States would keep open the possibility that the decision to go to
war might be taken by some kind of majority vote. This is not
because the United States contemplates to give up its veto--Congressional
opposition would make this impossible--but because Germany would have
no incentive to join the proposed nuclear force if it perpetuated
all existing vetos. And the Germans were even more uneasy
because nuclear arrangements within NATO seemed to become the
subject of an East-West deal from which they were excluded.

His article was widely discussed in European capitals and widely interpreted to mean that the United States was now willing to risk West German displeasure in order to reach agreement with the Russians on this subject. Soviet diplomats read it too.

Bonn reacted quickly. No jealous wife is more sensitive to a hint of infidelity than is West Germany in its bond with the United States. The Bonn government said it would refuse to sign any treaty binding it not to acquire nuclear weapons prior to the establishment of the long-delayed NATO nuclear force, in which it hones to participate.

In Great Britain, Wilson needs the reputation of a negotiator for peace. His disarmament minister, Lord Chalfont, worked out over eight months a draft treaty on nonproliferation. Chalfont's aim was a simple statement of principles that could not be rejected outright but must remain on the table as a basis for negotiations. Its substance was that of the 1961 Irish resolution in the United Nations: the nuclear powers were to promise not to disseminate nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear nations would promise not to acquire them. When the Russians consented to a new Geneva meeting, Lord Chalfont showed his draft to the NATO allies and apparently secured their agreement that this was to be the western proposal. In consequence, and quite foreseeably, the Geneva Conference reopened where it had stopped ten months before: in the middle of an argument over whether a NATO nuclear force—the MLF or some variation thereof—would really constitute nuclear dissemination.

## Placating Bonn

The British take Russian fears of German nuclear ambitions far more seriously than the Americans, and have been trying to reassure Moscow. They keep telling the Russians that the object of the United States and Britain in setting up such a force is the same as that of the pro-

Reporter Over 2

43—TYPE SET SEPT. 2—NIGHT
MOSS/GENEVA-10 on 11 bask.
REVISED . . . . . . . . .

posed treaty: non-proliferation. It is
intended to give the Germans the
shadow of dissemination while avoid-
ing the substance. Indeed, Lord
Chalfont has promised publicly
that if West Germany acquires a
theoretical control of nuclear weap-
ons in a NATO nuclear force, Britain
will always retain its veto over the
use of these weapons. In Geneva and
Washington, however, Bonn was
telling the United States that it
would oppose and be greatly hurt by
any treaty ruling out forever a Ger-
man share in nuclear weapons.
When Foster asked Lord Chalfont
to change his draft to meet the Ger-
man view, he refused. Foster in turn
took the position that the United
States would not upset the West
German government in the middle
of its election campaign by subscrib-
ing to this treaty.

Lord Chalfont's draft treaty was
scrapped, and the U.S. delegation at
Geneva composed a new draft in a
few days, which became the western
position before the conference. While
it contained the main points of the
British draft, it introduced a convo-
luted wording binding the signatories
"not to take any action which
would cause an increase of the total
number of states and other organi-
zations having independent power
to use nuclear weapons." One has to
look at this treaty with a lawyer's
eye for tiny loopholes to see the dif-
ference.

One loop hole identified by Amer-
ican officials is this: if one of the
countries participating in some type
of NATO nuclear force should con-
tribute all its nuclear weapons, then
all could agree to surrender their
vetoes, so that the decision to
initiate nuclear war would be taken
by some kind of majority vote.
The Germans would have precisely
the same say as the others about
whether to push the button. The

treaty, however, would not be violated, since the number of nuclear powers would be the same: one would have been subtracted and one added.

At this point the western alliance looked divided indeed. Across the table from the Russians, the United States was holding out the ghost of a hope to the Germans, which Britain was promising would never materialize, Lord Chalfont, while not actually opposing the American draft, took the unusual step for an ally of publicly explaining his objection: "My government considers that the present draft leaves open a possibility which may have more theoretical than practical importance, but which we would prefer to see closed."

"More theoretical than practical" it certainly is. No nation is going to hand over all its nuclear weapons to an alliance and then surrender its veto over their use. The sheer unlikelihood of such an idea could not be admitted, however. Probably not since the days when Geneva was a center of Reformation theology have men argued in public there so doggedly over an issue so hypothetical.

This loophole made it easier for the Russians to reject the treaty, which they did resoundingly on August 31, charging the United States with a cynical attempt to provide West Germany with nuclear weapons while pretending to stop nuclear proliferation.

WESTERN officials still think the draft treaty has a future, and it probably has. Their optimism was based in part on the Soviet delegate's insistence that there was no basis for discussions "as yet." Lord Chalfont even suggested that the "as yet" was an initial Soviet step "toward genuine negotiations." If the Russians are really interested in the prevention of nuclear dissemination and have simply been using the western desire for it to try to halt the NATO nuclear force, they will doubtless negotiate once the MLF is either set up or decisively scuttled. The trouble is that neither of these things is likely to happen quickly, for the MLF has been under

earnestly and awesomely the evil power of nuclear weapons. But he has not been able to urge nations to promise never to acquire them in terms that do not smack of a double standard.

France and China seem uninterested in any agreement except among a concert of powers in which they would share an equal place. One or two of the non-nuclear nations that feel insecure—India, Israel, or perhaps West Germany—might also withhold their signatures. Certainly little that has been said so far would bring anyone to an act of self-denial, either for a principle or for self-interest. But there would be lots of other countries willing to sign—most of the members of the United Nations, in fact.

Then the result of protracted negotiations—and this is a very likely outcome—would be a non-proliferation treaty in which all the signatories would renounce the right to do what they will never do in any case. The United States and Russia would promise not to give away nuclear weapons, while Austria and Honduras would promise not to manufacture hydrogen bombs.

["Reporter Over 4", "MOSS/GENEVA-10 on 11 bask.\n41 — 41 — 41 — 41 — 41", "REVISED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[Y]

withdraw with three months' notice if it decides that "extraordinary events" endanger it, provided only that it specify these events.

THIS IS not to say that a treaty would be useless. Disarmament officials believe that it would strengthen the hand of those in any signatory country who are against building a bomb: also, a government that is poised to take the grave step of starting a bomb program would probably hesitate a little longer if it had to take the additional step of explaining to the world and its own people the "extraordinary circumstances" that made it necessary.

The ultimate aim of the negotiations that are expected to resume at the United Nations later this year then, is nothing so far-reaching as to prevent the buildup of new nuclear armaments; the aim is to inhibit it. To prevent it would mean some drastic change in the world power structure, far more radical than anyone at present is willing to accept.

—THE END—

foster inhibitions to such a buildup

["Nov.10,1965", "Dear Max,", "As I cabled you, I have had a couple of good talks with Denis Warner, and I think we should be able to avoid excessive duplication. There are certain subjects--e.g. Vietnamese internal politics--that I shall not touch at all, but the main line of division as I see is not so much by subjects as by levels of approach and areas of emphasis. Generally speaking, I am not qualified to evaluate the Vietnam situation, either politically or militarily, while Warner is uniquely qualified. What I can evaluate critically against the background of my own experience in Washington and elsewhere is the U.S. administrative structure here, its response or failure to respond to certain types of challenge, its organizational conflicts and above all the policy contradictions or paradoxes that it must resolve, these last being to a considerable degree the same that bewilder or confuse Americans at home. So far I have a pretty favorable impression of the present team and its general operating philosophy--though I haven't gotten very far into the subject yet and there are still some questionmarks in my mind--but the place is littered like a battlefield with the wreckage of by-gone delusions, enthusiasms, mental blind-spots, personal or organizational power-struggles, ideological controversies. One fad succeeds another, and most of the time the painfully learned lessons of experience are swept away to make some magic new start, so that we seem to have no operational memory at all. (Thanks to Lodge coming back with some of his original team at least some of the lessons of the past are probably now being taken into account.) The whole business is a rather appalling case-history of our struggles to accept--or to fight against--our destiny as a world power with a vast imperium to defend. We are perhaps groping here towards a sound doctrine for the rational, civilized and effective use of American power along the contested lines of this imperium, but it is a slow, painful process to watch.", " Tentatively I am thinking in terms of a single long study ( of course if I see some good colorful shortie along the way I shall shoot it in) in very broad brush strokes and mm at a high strategic mm level ( I think one of my points may turn out to be that our progress here is being impeded by the absence of an integrated political and military strategy for the whole area). I think I can show in these terms that what we are attempting to do here is both necessary to our survival as a great power, and terribly, terribly dangerous. I am not quite sure that all of the dangers in their broader implications are fully realized, especially in Washington, or that mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

2..

I feel we lost a golden chance to give the Chicomas
a bloody nose by warning them off India too soon--apart
from the healthy jolt the Indians themselves would
have received. This is an example, among other things, of
the tendency to think of the war here, and to
wage it, within too narrow a geopolitical frame of
reference.)

It is perhaps too early to think in terms
of actual writing, but my feeling at the moment is to
adopt a kind of Candide or man-from-Mars approach, thus
bringing out the inherent contradictions and the
revolutionary transformation of American thought-patterns
that is needed to resolve some of them. Sometimes I
almost feel like Alice: e.g. when I hear that bombing
N. Vietnam was necessary to check the flow of supplies
and reenforcements to the VC, and has
been extremely successful except for the fact that
the flow has greatly increased since the bombing started.
Sometimes the contradictions are only apparent, stemming
from the traditional State Dept. aversion from
calling a spade a spade and the resultant double-talk;
in other cases I am afraid there is not only
double-talk but double-think; in many others, fortunately,
the contradictions can really be resolved if the
attempt is made on a sufficient plane of sophistication.

I am planning to stress pacification and
paramilitary action rather than conventional military
operations, though I shall naturally visit one or two
of the active combat areas to get the feel of the
kind of war we are now waging here. With luck I hope
that about two weeks more here, mostly in the field, should
suffice to give me all the background and illustrative
anecdotes I need, but I will cable you before pulling
out in case there is some aspect you would like me
to go into more deeply.

"The Oldest
College Daily"

Yale News

Founded
January 28, 1878

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1966

# Yale's Thong Blasts CIA's
# Viet Role; Ex-Viet Aide Fears US Sellout

by Gerald Bruck

Mr. Huynh Sanh Thong, American spokesman for a South Vietnamese nationalist party, and an instructor in Vietnamese at Yale, late last night issued a statement highly critical of the Central Intelligence Agency and its alleged activities in South Vietnam.

Mr. Thong, representative to the United States of the Dai-Viet Nationalist Party, released his statement through the Yale Daily NEWS.

The full text of the statement appears on page two.

In the lengthy statement, Mr. Thong accuses Deputy Ambassador William Porter and Senior Liaison officer Edward Lansdale of leading the CIA in "the largest operation in its history" aimed at a rapid compromise at the expense of South Vietnamese Nationalism.

The statement reads in part: "As the CIA inches ever closer to Communists in a frenzied search for 'peace' before the next American elections, Vietnamese nationalists, caught once again between Communism and Western hostility or incomprehension, are further driven into their 40-year impasse."

## Urges Continued US Presence

"If (the US administration) is in a hurry for a quick solution," said Mr. Thong in an interview last night, "it will be a disaster." He endorsed General Maxwell Taylor's statement that "what we need in Vietnam is Pilgrim perseverance," and suggested the continuation of a heavy ground war against the Viet Cong, and of bombing raids against North Vietnam" as long as military targets are hit hard and not civilian targets."

Mr. Thong said that the continued American military presence was necessary to permit the emergence of a nationalist government.

## 'A Nationalist Way Out'

"A large percentage of Vietnamese," he said, "including many among the communist forces, are looking for a nationalist way out, a decent government to which they can rally. They are not going to surrender to a CIA-dominated government."

"They call us ultra-nationalists and right-wingers simply because we don't want to become their (the CIA's) Asians. We want to work with the US, but not for the CIA," said the Yale instructor.

## Background

Mr. Thong was born in Vietnam in 1926. He came to the US in 1948 to study at the University of Ohio, and graduated from there in 1951. He later moved to Washington, D. C., where he taught Vietnamese at the State Department and studied international relations at Georgetown University.

It was in 1951 that he met Diem, later to become president of South Vietnam. He served Diem as a "general advisor" at that time.

"But," he says, "I got to know him too well. After listening to his six-hour marathon monologues, I realized that he

was completely obsessed with himself, and had no precise ideas as to what to do in Vietnam."

## Opposed Diem

When Diem became first president of South Vietnam in October, 1955, he reportedly sent two telegrams to Mr. Thong asking him to serve the government in a "responsible position."

Mr. Thong refused the offer because of his feeling that "Vietnam could never get anywhere under him, given that type of personality."

In early 1956, when he saw that "it was clear Washington was going to give Diem a blank check," he had letters to the editor published in the Christian Science Monitor and the Washington Post denouncing the Diem regime.

At that point, according to Mr. Thong, the South Vietnamese embassy complained to the State department, and he was ordered to "keep quiet."

He quickly resigned his teaching position "Because I felt the time to stop Diem was then."

"Everyone agrees with me now, but now is too late."

Earlier, in 1955, he had met Dr. Nguyen Ton Hoan, then in Washington, leader of the Dai-Viet Nationalist party, in opposition to president Diem. Hoan was later to become Vice Premier under the Khanh regime in 1964.

Mr. Thong became a member of the party and its representative to the United States.

## Official Under Khanh

Mr. Thong served in his teaching capacity at Yale from 1957 to 1964. Following the coup that brought General Nguyen Khanh to power in 1964, Mr. Thong returned to South Vietnam and served as chief press officer to the new premier's government, and as special assistant to vice-premier Hoan. Becoming disillusioned with Khanh in mid-year, he returned to the US and resumed his teaching duties at Yale.

Since his return he has maintained silence on the position of the Dai-Viet because "I didn't want to embarrass Washington." After a prolonged attempt to "influence the State Department discretely," he has made his statement public "because I think things have gone too far now."

York, New York 10031.
P. O. Mr. Bator's address is: 30 East 12th Street, New

Henry A. Klauder

With warm regards.

NATO matters.

White House staff and one of the rays of light on
For your information, his son is on the

Can you let me know what you will do about it?
and would make you to consider it most seriously.
Disagreed with it. I find it intensely interesting
was because Ham Armstrong, who was away,
having set it into type. I can only assume it
that Foreign Affairs turned down after already
I am enclosing the article by Victor Bator
and I admired your logistic arrangement.

It was good to see you for dinner yesterday.

Dear Max:

New York St, New York
660 Madison Avenue
THE REPORTER
Mr. Max Vacoil

June 3, 1966

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW
HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG
EDITOR

PHILIP W. QUIGG
MANAGING EDITOR

56 EAST SIXTY-EIGHTH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.
CABLE ADDRESS FOR AFFAIRS, NEW YORK

May 31, 1966

Mr. Victor Bator
30 East 72nd Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Mr. Bator

I enclose a set of corrected proofs of your article, together with your honorarium.

However, I must tell you--and with very real regret--that we have not found it possible to publish your article, as we fully intended to do at the time it was accepted. In view of the considerable amount of work that Miss Kelley and I put into it, with your unquestioned help and cooperation, I know you can have no doubt of our sincerity in this regard. However, as we studied the manuscript more carefully, as small errors cropped up, and as on further examination some of your interpretations appeared less convincing than they had at first sight, we began to have reservations, which were shared by Mr. Armstrong on his return. When other manuscripts of merit began to press upon our limited space, we finally concluded that we should release the article to you, sending you also our regular honorarium which is fully due you.

Hoping you will not think too harshly of us for this difficult decision,

encl.

James R. Schlesinger/1 -- June 24, 1966

(1024 lines)

THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF NU-
CLEAR PROLIFERATION

By James R. Schlesinger

My responsibility in this Sympos-
ium is to examine the strategic
consequences of nuclear prolifera-
tion. If we limit ourselves stric-
tly to the strategic area--to the
possible employment of additional
nuclear capabilities against mili-
tary or urban targets--one cannot
avoid the conclusion that consid-
erable exaggeration has crept into
public discussion of proliferation's
consequences. This observation rests,
in part, upon a distinction between
strategic and socio-political cons-
sequences, which some will regard as
arbitrary and which in any event
cannot be made precise. If we do i-
solate the strategic from the socio-
political consequences, it is plain
that the latter could be quite ser-
ious. The very countermeasures thr-
ough which harmful strategic cons-
sequences can be avoided are likely

consequences can be foreseen and are likely
only when parallel strategic concerns
arise which parallel strategic concerns
have been made before. It is do I-
suppose and which in such an event
eventually, which some will regard as
strategic and socio-political concerns
in itself, when a distinction between
consequences. This operation needs,
before discussion of brochures, a
ample exaggeration has been made into
which the conclusion that consists
in such or such targets--one cannot
make any comparison against which
beneficial employment of additional
talk to the strategic area--to the con-
tent. It is limit omniscient at-
consequences of which we know
that is to examine the strategic
inadequacy in such a case.
To James R. Soperinger.

(JOSF 198)

James R. Soperinger, Jr. — June 29, 1966

Schlesinger/nuclear/2

to be viewed as undesirable on social or political grounds. At the very least, the spread of nuclear weapons generates fear. When politics or governments become fearful, they can act in ways which seriously reduce the amenities of living in society. For example, one possible result of the spread would be for societies partially to close their borders and to police incoming goods and people more carefully than at present. This might easily be associated with the decline in the tolerance of dissent within the society. In the specific case of the United States, it is sometimes felt that the idealistic flavor characterizing much of its foreign policy would tend to disappear--to the disadvantage particularly of those who live in the underdeveloped world.

These are consequences which few would view without some trepidation. But these are political consequences. They do not imply a major alteration of the military balance or for that matter the physical security

of most of the world's population.

["of most of the world's population.\n\nAdvantageahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyahyah

Schlesinger/nuclear/3

For these reasons I believe that most public discussion of proliferation's strategic consequences is seriously defective. However, nothing that I say regarding the exaggerations of these strategic consequences should be construed as a criticism of the basic objectives of U.S. policy or of the desirability of preventing further nuclear spread.

I am dubious whether any such policies can be completely successful. There is a danger in expecting too much as well as in being too fearful. Moreover, since I believe the effects of proliferation would be less severe than currently anticipated, I would be inclined to set a lower price on what the United States should be willing to pay to prevent proliferation than would some other members of the Panel. In particular, I would be reluctant to pay a very high price in terms of offending friendly nations merely to get paper acquiescence to a non-proliferation treaty.

Nevertheless, despite the exaggerations of public discussion, it is plain that we should bend our e-

to be sure that we should pend on e-
tractions of bapito diacustion, if
nevertheles, capable of the exige-
broilustration treaty.

To be sure, aduolence to a non-
oflending triadity nation wereft
but a sort high brice in some of
barbition, I would be refuelling to
some other members of the family. In
breast broilustration from some
age should be willing to back to
fomer brice on what the United
 States, I would be inclined to set a
tense severe than currently upleth-
effects of broilustration would be
but. Moreover, since I perceive the
mood as well as in pending too late-
there is a danger in expecting too
often can be completely unnecessary.
I am quiteCONFUSED and would
of preventing further unseemly adve-
N.A. both on of the desirability
factors of the past objectives of
enact should be consumed as a cr-
erations of these strategic conse-
quences that I ask regarding the exige-
mentarily selective. However, not-
ation's strategic consequence is
most bapito diacustion of bapillon-
for these reasons I perceive that
[illegible] [illegible]

Bibliothek, Universitaet

[1]

Schlesinger/nuclear/4

fforts to avoid or to limit the sp-
read of weapons. Proliferation adds
to the problem of managing the wor-
ld. It increases both the number of
uncertainties and the number of va-
riables that must be watched. One
can put the menace of proliferation
in another way, as has William C.
Foster, the Director of ACDA: fur-
ther nuclear spread would lead to
a reduction of the relative influ-
ence of the United States on the
world scene. This appears like a
self-serving plea, and for this r-
eason, the argument may have less
initial appeal to outsiders than to
Americans. Nonetheless, the argum-
ent contains a surprisingly large
element of altruism. A decline in
the relative influence of the Uni-
ted States on the world scene may
be more closely associated with in-
creased difficulty in keeping the
world relatively stable and peace-
ful than many non-Americans might
be willing to concede at first bl-
ush. In a world in which nuclear w-
eapons were more widely held and
in which the United States sought
to avoid "entanglements," the gra-

to avoid "entanglements," the US-
ies in which the United States sought
above were more widely held and
and. In a world in which nuclei w-
ould shift to coincide at that di-
ision than such non-america might
world relatively stable and base-
cially difficult in keeping the
be more closely associated with in-
terests on the world scene may
the relative influence of the Uni-
clement of atoll. A decline in
can contains aambiguously large
varieties. Nonetheless, the argu-
mental abscissa to obtain them to
cause the argument may prove less
self-serving lies, and on this r-
world scene. This abscissa like a
once of the United States on the
a regulation of the relative influ-
ence of nuclear power fed to
Boston, the Director of ACDV: In-
stead, in another way, as I saw William C.
can but the mass of proliferation
rules that must be watched. One
uncertainties and the number of as-
pects. If increases both the number of
to the problem of managing the nor-
tal of mass. Proliferation she-
llorts to avoid or to limit the ab-
scissions\unless\n

[A]

[N]

Schlesinger/nuclear/5

vest misfortunes would be reserved
for the populations in the unstab-
le portions of the world rather th-
an for the favorably-situated pub-
lics of the nuclear superpowers.

I. SOME EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN

If, then, we acknowledge that there
are weighty reasons for opposing
the spread, how much despair shou-
d we be prepared to feel, if our
efforts at control turn out to be
unsuccessful? It is on this point
that prophecies of disaster appear
to dominate public discussions and
that public statements diverge mo-
st sharply from a sober assessment
of the risks. The view that nuclear
spread poses a single, overwhelming
threat to the continued existence
of mankind strikes me as a distor-
tion of reality which, if taken se-
riously, could lead to a misalloca-
tion of our national efforts. I su-
ggest that the noticeable discrepa-
ncy between the paramountcy nomina-
lly attributed to the problem and
the policies we stand ready to ad-
opt indicates that the more extreme
expressions of alarm are not, in f-
act, taken too seriously. Among lea-

["some, fallen too seriously, wrong for\nexagerations of strain we not, in t-\nhe indicators that the more extreme\nthe负荷we are ready to sub-\nmit attributed to the problem and\nnext between the demands of nomis-\ngent that the noticeable diago-\nesis of our national efforts. I un-\nknowingly could lead to a mislead-\nship of reality, which, if taken so-\nthat making strikes me as a class-\nthreat to the continued existence\nabroad boxes a single, overlapping\nof the risks. The view that unless\nat least from a proper assessment\nthat definite statements agree me-\nto dominate definite discussions and\nthat probably of greater shown\nunuseness? It is on this point\nefforts at control man out to be\nif we be trusted to be right, it is\nthe abuse, how much feedback, show-\nthe weighty reasons for abating\nit, then, we acknowledge that those\nis some expressions of concern\nof the nuclear emergencies.\nso for the favorably-aituated bud-\nget portions of the world rather ti-\nfor the populations in the most-\nleast majorities would be reserved\ntherefore\\unfair\\unfair\\unfair\\unfair\\unfair\\

Schlesinger/nuclear/6

ding public figures Senator Robert Kennedy has most vividly dramatized the disastrous consequences to be expected from proliferation. In a recent statement he asserted that alongside proliferation control "nothing else means anything." This is a bit of political hyperbole, the force of which would appear to be weakened by the Senator's allocation of his own energies. He himself devotes intense effort to numerous other issues, but aside from public statements has given relatively little attention to the problems of proliferation.

To move from the survival of mankind to the survival of the United States, we have heard on even higher authority that the survival of the United States is at stake--if we fail to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Once again, for reasons that will be extensively developed below, this statement is simply misleading. The risks to the American society--and in this respect we must distinguish sharply between the American society and societies in the third world--are very

refers in the third mouth--are very
tween the American society and acc-
dent we must distinguishably po-
American society--and in this rea-
ably misleading. The risks to the
eofobed below, this statement is at-
some that will be extensively gov-
nofen members. Once again, for rea-
we fail to prevent the abuse of n-
the United States at once--it
an authority that the survivor of
State, we have heard on even higher
king to the survivor of the United
To move from the survival of man-
of proliferation.

A very little attention to the problems
Baptist statements have given relet-
more than one reason, put aside from
not devoted intense effort to un-
sition of his own energies. He him-
be reasoned by the general, a fioe-
the tone of which would abate to
is a pit of bovine! hulkspole,
oating one means snuffing." This
strongly proliferation control "n-
recent statement he asserted that
expected from proliferation. In a
the diabolical consequences to be
Kennedy has most vividly demonstrated
that the divine figures Senator Robert
Goreenter\unfer\c

[4]

Schlesinger/nuclear/7

much exaggerated. The United States
is in a position to reduce the ri-
sks to itself to very low levels.
The United States can both adjust
its policies and adopt countermeas-
ures which reduce the damage that l-
imited nuclear capabilities could
inflict. Such countermeasures would
maintain or increase the already en-
ormous gap between U.S. military c-
apabilities and those possessed by
non-superpowers. A package of such
countermeasures could sharply red-
uce the risks of proliferation in
several respects: (1) the ability
to inflict damage on the United St-
ates would be kept low, (2) the Un-
ited States, if it so desired, wou-
d remain in a position to deter a-
tack by lesser nuclear powers ag-
ainst third countries, and (3) the
incentives to acquire capabilities
would consequently be altered--and
possibly reduced toward the vanish-
ing point. Countermeasures taken by
the Soviet Union would, of course,
reinforce the process.

I would argue that the ability to
implement such countermeasures--to
make crystal clear to all nuclear

make crystal clear to all nuclear
triangle and both countries--to
I would argue that the ability to
butterfly the process.
the Soviet Union would, of course,
take part. Commissairesn pass a
brief period, reduced from the initial
would consequently be lifted--and
incentives to acquire capabilities
at other third countries, and (B) the
tick off further nucleon, because ag-
just remain in a position to get a-
ted States, if it so desired, won-
ates would be kept low, (S) the Un-
to itself damage on the United St-
several respects: (1) the ability
to take the brunt of proliferation in
commissairesn could substantially re-
main on the basis of such
aspects and those based on
concerns (see between U.S., military c-
minister or increase the freely en-
title). Such commissairesn would
inure themselves capabilities could
use which reduce the damage that Y-
to the buffer and affect commissaires-
The United States can put about
one to itself to very low levels.
It is in a position to reduce the ri-
much exaggerated. The United States
Schluesser\nucleus\]

A4

Schlesinger/nuclear/8

[N]

aspirants that acquisition of nucl-
ear weapons cannot significantly al-
ter the strategic balance--provides
the best hope over time of control-
ling proliferation and its consequ-
ences. My co-panelist, Medley Bull,
has characterized this position as
one of "high posture." He has--on
this occasion as on prior ones--ex-
pressed misgivings regarding its
suitability. I will not at this ti-
me argue whether the psychological
repercussions of augmenting the gap
between the superpowers and other
states will be of the sort that Mr.
Bull foresees. My point at this j-
uncure is to indicate (a) that
such countermeasures are well wi-
thin the capacity of the United St-
ates, and (b) that the survival of
the United States is scarcely broug-
ght into question by the further
spread of limited nuclear capabil-
ities. This last spectre is one we
had best put to rest.

I cannot imagine that any Americ-
an president will fail to accept
some of these countermeasures. How-
ever, let us place such issues to
one side. Whatever their resolution,

one side. Whatever their resolution,
even, let us agree and agree to
some of these consequences. How-
many president will fall to accept
I cannot imagine that any one-
but past but to read.
This lastague is one we
shock of limited nuclear cacepit-
ght into question by the further
the United States is recently pre-
sumed, and (d) that the survival of
dim the capacity of the United St-
and consequences are well wit-
tnome to be indigibles (a) that
Bull forces. My point at this t-
states will be of the sort that M-
between the underwriters and other
Reconnaissance of augmenting the Sab
we imagine whether the hydrological
uniqueness. I will not at this et-
blessing undertaking regarding its
tire occasion as on bridle ones--ex-
one of high posture." He said--on
plan characterized fine position as
ones. If co-benefits, Neutral Bull,
filling profilelation and its connec-
tion due to due over time of control-
for the strategic balance--broader
our message cannot significantly si-
imply that reduction of un-
Sedimentation\notes\6

[A]

Schlesinger/nuclear/9

I think it plain that, if proliferation takes place, we shall go right on living with it. We may continue to complain about it, but we shall live with it--while continuing to enjoy the benefits--if that is the appropriate term--of a rising standard of living. The very leaders who now assert that non-proliferation is indispensable to our security will then find other subjects to dramatize.

I have been attempting to allay some of the anxieties regarding proliferation. This is necessary not simply because we should recognize that existence will continue to be quite tolerable, even if proliferation takes place. What is perhaps more important, an attitude of desoperation regarding their spread of nuclear weapons is not merely inaccurate, but may also be counterproductive in terms of achieving control. By understating the difficulties of acquiring a serious nuclear capability and by exaggerating what a nuclear aspirant power may obtain through acquisition of a capability, we may strengthen the in-

apportionment, we must extrapolate the future through acquisition of a certain nuclear reaction, which we must operate, and then extrapolating up to the point of beginning a nuclear reaction, and then extrapolating down to the point of beginning a nuclear reaction, and so on.

Clearly, still then, there is another subject to consider, to be decided, and that is whether we should recognize the possibility of living. The very idea of the sublunar term--of a rising to enjoy the phenomena--it is clear that we shall have to make some sort of a decision about whether it is possible to continue to be able to exist, and whether it is possible to continue to be able to exist, and whether it is possible to continue to be able to exist.

[4]

Schweingraβer, u. a. p. 3

Shhlesinger/nuclear/10

centives for acquisition. The danger inherent in exaggerated chatter regarding the damage that additional capabilities can foster is that it revivifies the false notion of nuclear weapons as "the greater equalizer" in international conflict. Hopefully, most nations will penetrate the smokescreen and perceive the difficulties. However, some may be lured into believing that nuclear weapons do provide an answer to their security problems. Others may be encouraged in the notion that acquisition will provide an instrument of threat or blackmail which can be directed toward the rest of the world. (Fortunately, a number of those nations to which such a motive might reasonably be attributed appear to have such weak technical and industrial bases that it is doubtful whether they could develop a capability, even if so moved.)

To illustrate the way in which such illusions can be fostered, Senator Kennedy has misappropriated some words of his brother, the late President, to the effect that "ev-

["President, to the effect that \"each one works for his problem,\" the fact is, Kennedy has misappropriated much�onial and industrial force that is put to use to have much f- a motive might reasonably be atti-\"", "done a capability, even if so\nit is a useful weapon, just could\nbe political and industrial force that\nused perhaps to have much weak f-\na motive might reasonably be atti-\nence of those nations to which such\nof the world. (Unfortunately, a sum-\nmit can be directed toward the rest\nof the world, or, if one is to be true\nto their security problems. Other-\ncially, weapons go breviate an enemy\nby being used into believing that un-\nfade the difficulties. However, some in-\ncrease the smoke screen and below\nHoboken, most nations will ben-\nignally, in international conflict.\nwar, weapons are \"the greatest ad-\njustment the future motion of\nall capabilities can load is that\nregarding the damage that addition\nenjoys in exogenous environment\nconfines for acquisition. The task\nof acquisition is more difficult\nthan the task of acquisition.

Schlesinger/nuclear/ll
child,
ery man, woman, and man
lives un-
der a nuclear sword of Damocles ha-
nging by the slenderest of threads,
capable of being cut at any moment
by accident or miscalculation or by
madness." (The nuclear sword of Dam-
ocles in President Kennedy's United
Nations address quite obviously re-
ferred to American and Soviet capa-
bilities. While some poetic license
seems understandable in relation to
such vast destructive power, it does
not seem particularly relevant in
relation to the extremely modest f-
orces that other powers could dev-
elop.) The Senator's point is that
each additional nuclear capability,
no matter how limited, automatically
creates an additional Damoclean sw-
ord. But this suggestion is simply
not true. In relation to the indic-
ated levels of destruction, the da-
mage potential of small nuclear fo-
rces is too limited. In assessing
the damage that might result from
nuclear spread, it is essential to
recognize that nuclear proliferation
is as much or more a quantitative
problem than it is a qualitative pr-
oblem. The quantitative aspects are

options. The quantitative subject is the
people than it is a quantitative be-
to us now or more a quantitative
recognition that nuclear broilology
nucleon should be, if it is essential to
draw the charge that might result from
this is too limited. In assuming
nucleon benefit of small nucleus to-
get revenues of cooperation, the de-
not true. In relation to the table
and. But this suggestion is simply
creates an additional nucleus aw-
no matter how limited, unreasonably
used additional nucleus capability,
e.g. ( ) The Senator's point is that
once that other bonus could dev-
iation to the extremely modest 1-
not seem benefitarily relevant in
such and destructive form, it does
use underapprehension in relation to
principles. While some better idea
came to American and Soviet esca-
nations address quite obviously re-
cently in President Kennedy's United
marches." (The nucleus among of some
px accident on nucleolus or px
esCAPE of packing out at any moment
using px the element of time,)
her a nucleus award of nucleus pa-
per men's women's and such like un-
separable\unclear\ll

[A]

Shhlesinger/nuclear/12

subject to calculation, but in the
public excitement over the threat
of proliferation these calculations
are normally ignored. Such oversi-
ght seems indispensable in genera-
ting both needless anxiety and the
nuclear-weapons-as-equalizers ill-
usion.

## II. DIMENSIONS AND MEASUREMENT

Any serious attempt to assess the
dimensions of the proliferation th-
reat should begin with some calcul-
ations regarding the spectrum of
strategic capabilities given vary-
ing levels of investment. Further
development of the point that prol-
iferation in certain essential res-
pects is a quantitative problem is
basic to our understanding. Prolif-
eration is really quite unlike pre-
gnancy, though in the intuition of
many something akin to pregnancy is
used as a rough analogue. It is fr-
equently observed--usually by way
of admonition--that there is no su-
ch thing as being a little bit pr-
egnant. But this is because the re-
sults and the time involved in the
process is pretty well defined. In
size and weight full-term babies t-

time and weight, tail-to-tail, and tail-to-body
proportion in breast, wing, and tail. In
life and the time involved in the
egestment. But this is because the re-
action is being a little bit big
on living as being a little bit big
in the condition--that there is no un-
dertaken operation--nearly all the
work as a rough analogue. If it is
only something skin to frequency in
frequency, though, in the intuition of
tension, to really quite unlike busi-
ness to our understanding. Profit-
bility is a quantitative property in
operation in certain essential re-
search of the point that hold-
ing levels of investment. Further
autonomous adaptability laws and
situations regarding the spectrum of
rest should begin with some ex-
ample of the broiler operation in-
Vary serious attempt to measure the
DIMENSIONS AND MEASUREMENTS
of the broiler operation in-
II. DIMENSIONS AND MEASUREMENTS
of the broiler operation in
broiler excitement over the time
subject to calculation, put in the
EFFECTS OF BROILER EXCITEMENT

[A]

Schlesinger/nuclear/13

end towards a normal distribution;
the variance is not a matter of great
cat moment. But suppose that in pre-
ignancy there were no tendency tow-
ard a unimodal distribution of the
results and that the time involved
in gestation were subject to enor-
mous variation. Suppose again that
the ultimate progeny could be Lil-
liputians or Erobdingnagians--or,
for that matter, a varied assort-
ment of misshapen dwarfs, possibly
lacking essential organs, limbs, or
faculties--and that the specific r-
esult depended upon not only the
intake of the mother but her int-
elligence. This is really a more r-
evealing analogy. It explains why
being a little bit proliferated may
be a meaningful concept, while be-
ing a little bit pregnant is not.
In this area controlling the ulti-
mate dimensions may be even more im-
portant than preventing conception
or birth.

The range of possible nuclear ca-
pabilities is simply enormous. One
must be aware of the importance of
the distinctions to be drawn among
capabilities--and how these distin-

The range of possible molecules on
which a little pit would later form
and towards a normal distribution
would be much larger.

[1]

Schlesinger/nuclear/14

options relate to size and vulnerability. Consider the existing array of nuclear capabilities. The United States, which has invested most heavily, possesses a capability which is not only a solid deterrent, but which is credible in terms of a carefully controlled, countermilitary initial strike. The Soviet Union, which has invested less, has an impressive second-strike force, which is an effective deterrent. Britain possesses a much more limited capability, currently dependent for delivery on obsolescent aircraft, which is continuously waning in terms of influence and creditability. The French capability is even more limited in terms of damage potential against the Soviet Union, though it promises to exploit more advanced delivery systems indigenousily-produced. Finally, the Chinese capability--currently drawing the lion's share of attention--is barely past the embryonic stage. There is some question whether it should even be referred to as a capability.

The degree to which a nuclear c-

The degree to which a nation c-
apacity.

though even be restored to us a
there is some question whether it
to pertain but the expenditure stage,
the firm's a shape of attention--
curative capacity--currently dram-
atically-produced. Finally, the
cost of more advanced delivery systems
union, though it becomes to expe-
lege beneficial against the Soviet U-
even more limited in terms of com-
equency. The French capability is
strong in terms of influence and ex-
portant, which is continuously m-
eant for delivery on opacous
its capability, currently debeng-
bretagne because a much more lim-
ited is an elective deferment.
an impressive second-strike force,
ion, which has invested less, but
strongly initiated strike. The Soviet U-
a capability controlled, consider-
put which in credible in terms of
top inof only a solid deterrent,
evenly, because a capability up-
states, which has invested most of
its own capability. The United
States. Consider the existing array
of forces relates to use and manner-
of use. September/November/19

Schlesinger/nuclear/15

ability is strategically exploit-
able--substantially dependent on
the credibility of the threat to em-
ploy--is determined by its size and
sophistication and by the vulnerab-
ility of the society it is designed
to protect. Strategic posture ulti-
imately depends upon the ability to
inflict and to limit damage. All
these are roughly correlated with
the volume of resources the society
has invested or is able to invest
in its capability. Happily for the
wealthy and powerful, this ability
is subject to considerable varian-
ce. Somebody has observed: there is
no cheap substitute for money. It
is doubtful whether the inexorable
requirement for money is anywhere
more decisive than in relation to
the development of a nuclear capab-
ility. Sophisticated nuclear wea-
pons and sophisticated delivery sys-
tems are terribly expensive. The
cost of developing a capability wh-
ich could seriously disturb the sup-
erpowers (as opposed to one's unar-
med neighbor) is staggering. (The
potential of small nuclear capab-
ilities for precipitating regional

Schlesinger/nuclear/16

confrontations or regional destruction would remain as a major source of trouble. Its attenuation--in the case of continued great power involvement--will be treated below.)

Let me indicate roughly what kind of sums are involved. In order to develop a convincing second-strike capability against one of the superpowers, a nation must be prepared to spend billions of dollars annually--and these expenditures would continue for a decade and longer. Estimates differ; five billion dollars a year may be too high and three billion dollars a year might be adequate. These sums, however, run well beyond what most nations have been prepared to spend--including some that are present members of the nuclear club. Resources will be required not only for delivery systems and compatible weapons, but also for certain supplementary capabilities whose costs are rarely reckoned. Who includes such indispensable items as reconnaissance and intelligence in the list of required outlays? But any nation contemplating a confr-

such nation contemplating a contr-
ary fact of regulated outlay? But
reconnaissance and intelligence in
other words in indigeneous items as
costs are least可靠. Who in-
subordinate capabilities whose
is reasonable, put that for certain
tor券and systems and combat-
ance will be required not only
members of the nucleus c.f. the
enlarging some that are present
to have been precluded to abate--
ever, 'um well beyond what most
might be adequate. Those amm. pon-
gu and three trillion dollars a year
to be spent on a scope and l-
unually--and these expenditures
based to abate trillion of dollars
subordinate, a nation want to be pre-
take capability against one of the
to develop a combatning second-of-
ing of amm. are involved. In order
let us indicate roughly what k-
ments--will be treated below.)
case of continued great power inac-
tive. Its estimation--in the
tion nonbig remains so a major source
of considerations on regional gains-
benefitinger\neces\ic

Schlesinger/nuclear/lmx 17

ontation with a superpower had better learn something about the location of targets and about the location and capabilities of its opponent's air defense and missile defense systems. The upshot is that only through very heavy outlays can a nation develop more than a very minimal threat against a superpower.

To illustrate the problem, let us consider some historic cost figures. Take the matter of weapons development and stockpiling. Down to this point in time the United States has invested on the order of $8 billion in the development of nuclear weapons. On AEC operations generally, it has now appropriated close to $40 billion. These are substantial sums. How many nations are in a position to spend even twenty per cent or twenty-five per cent of these amounts? Yet, for the creation of a serious capability, requiring deliverable weapons in the megaton range, heavy investment in weapons development is unavoidable.

(MORE MORE)

(HOME PAGE)

mysterious development in unobservable
energies range, ready investment in
triumph of deliverable weapons in the m-
tion of a million capabilities, reductions
therefrom? Yet, on the crest-
peak, cent or twenty-five per cent of
in a relation to about even twenty
armament same. How much nations are
close to $40 trillion. These are and
generally, if not now subordinated
unless weapons. On AEC operations
$8 billion in the development of
ten has invested on the order of
dollar point in time the United Sta-
cialization and stockpiling. Down to
years. Take the suffer of weapons q-
we consider some historic cost fig-
to illustrate the people, let
on.

minimal threat against a underhow-
the nation developed more than a and
it through very heavy outlay can
use systems. The subject is that an-
out's air defense and weather del-
fusion and capabilities of its obcon-
fusion of targets and spent the fees-
for learn something about the fees-
outation with a underhower had pet-
sonnel\nucleus\fux 11

[A]

Schlesing/er/Nuclear/18

Though the spread of *missile* capabilities is now a matter of increasing concern, the problem of compatibility implies that development of advanced weapons is preliminary to deployment of an effect in missile force. To develop a warhead for an early-generation missile with limited thrust and size (the goal of a development program or the initial goal of a program for an aspirant nuclear power), there must be heavy investment in weapons testing in order to get yield-to-weight ratios to a point where a weapon adequate for target destruction can successfully be delivered in the vehicle. Moreover, there will have to be major investment in guidance technology simply to insure that ✓ missiles will be accurate enough to place weapons near the point targeted--whether military bases or cities. In this respect, it is vital to recognize the tradeoff between weapon size and ✓ weapon accuracy. With very large yields, considerable inaccuracy may be tolerated. However, with the very low-yield weapons of the sort that can be develop-

one of the sort that can be developed, with the very low-field weatheriness must be tolerated. However, with very large fields, considerable weather size and high weather density, to recognize the traffic between ten. In this respect, it is vital to mention military plans or citiby. Weather someone near the point target must be so accurate to be sure investment in guidance would investments in weather test. Weather someone power), there must be a development program or the traffic should be made (the goal of accuracy-generation missile with him-force. To develop a program for an employment of an asset in missile advanced weapons to be prepared to profitably take that development of the program, the problem of combat-ability is now a matter of interest. Through the spread of missile es-

[4]

Schleiminger/Nuclear/19
ed with small amounts of money yet
be delivered with limited-payload
vehicles, the accuracy requirements
become very severe. Yet, missile
accuracy is neither cheap nor easy
to obtain.

The implication is that no nation
is going to be in a position to de-
velop a strategic capability which
is both sophisticated and cheap.
In the absence of major investments
or extraordinary outside assistance
the only course open to most nucle-
ar aspirants is the aerial delivery
of rather crude nuclear weapons.
Though such capabilities can, of
course, dramatically transform a
regional balance of power (if the
superpowers remain aloof), the
superpowers themselves will remain
more or less immune to nuclear th-
reats emanating from countries oth-
er than the principal opponent. For
the foreseeable future, only the
Soviet Union will be able to deliv-
er the requisite megatonnage to th-
reaten major devastation in the Un-
ited States. Threats from other
quarters may be faced down.

The superpowers therefore will re-

The superpowers therefore will re-
strictors may be faced down.

The states from other
regions will be able to de-
pose the regulative megacommune to di-
rect the Union will be able to de-
velop the foreseeable future, only the
or else the balance of power, for
the countries offering from countries off-
shore or from them to nuclear in-
ner powers themselves will remain
superpowers themselves, the regional
balance of power (it the
course dramatically transform a
through such capabilities can, of
or rather crude nuclear weapons,
or subtractions in the serial delivery
of the only course open to most role-
on extraordinarily outside assistance
in the absence of nuclear investments
in both sophisticated and crash.

The situation is that no nation
to obtain.

The world is not a perfect crash nor easy
become very severe. Yet, missile
energies, the account requirements
be delivered with limited delay
with smaller amounts of money, yet
September\Wpress\19

A

Schlesinger/Nuclear/

20

main in a position in which they
can dominate any nuclear confront-
ation. Only a superpower--and in
this connection the term applies
particularly to the United States
--will be able to intervene in such
confrontations in third areas. If
it desires to pay the costs and is
willing to run the risks, other
nations—including the present thr-
e minor members of the nuclear el-
ub--will continually be deterred.
Not only will they be precluded
from implementing nuclear threats,
but in the relevant cases, their
capabilities will remain vulner-
able to a disarming first strike--
unless they are given protection by
an associated superpower. In any
showdown with a superpower, a min-
or nuclear power relying on its
own resources will simultaneously
be deterred and be subject to
disarming.

This asymmetrical relationship
between major and lesser nuclear
powers brings us back to a point
raised earlier: why it may be coun-
ter-productive to talk in spanicky
way about proliferation's threat to

[Y]

["with about 100% of the current to the\nauxiliary to work in conjunction with\nthe auxiliary to work in conjunction with\nthe auxiliary

Schlesinger/Nuclear/21

mankind-as-a-whole. If we are to
dissuade others from aspiring to
nuclear capabilities, what we sh-
ould stress is that, if weapons sp-
read, they are not likely to be em-
ployed in third area contexts. The
penalties for proliferation would
be paid, not by the United States
or the Soviet Union, but by third
countries.

The likelihood that the first nu-
clear war, if it comes, will origi-
nate in and be confined to the un-
derdeveloped world must should pl-
ay a prominent role in any assess-
ment of proliferation's consequenc-
es. The tenor of the existing dis-
cussion of proliferation has led
some in the underdeveloped countr-
ies to conclude that the major pow-
ers ¤ would be the chief benefici-
aries of curtailing the spread. If
nuclear spread is to be effectively
opposed, it should be made crystal
clear just whose security is placed
at risk and whose is not.

### III. COUNTERMEASURES

The problem of nuclear spread is
not exhausted by the attempt at pre-
vention. The effort to dissuade

viation. The effort to discontinue not eliminated by the attack at base. The people of unknown speech in III. COUNTEROFFENSE at risk and whose lives in no. clear that whose security is basic to object, it should be made clear that unknown speech is to be absolutely禁止 or forbidding the abuse. It era & would be the only penalty. The law to conclude that the water below some in the underdeveloped country, union of proliferation has fed and maintained the abuse. The power of the existing dis-ament of proliferation's consequence-<u>is</u> a broadened role in any occasion-<u>the</u> developed world must be made in and be continued to the extent was, if it comes, will occur. The limitation that the first un-<u>congress</u>.

or the devoted Union, put by third parties for the United States benefits for proliferation would be paid, not by the United States, but by the United Nations.

The road, they are not finally to be em-<u>only</u> strong in this, it is obvious ab-<u>nour</u> capabilifies, what we are desiring otherwise from starting to make an-<u>an</u>-<u>no</u>where. It we are to

4

Schlesinger/Nuclear/ 22

additional states from acquiring
nuclear capabilities, while good
in itself, is not likely to be wh-
olly successful. Control includes
much more than simple contracept-
ion. Influencing the character and
consequences of whatever nuclear
spread takes place should not be
neglected out of disappointment with
the "failure" to prevent prolifera-
tion entirely.

We should recognize that the long-
run problem is how to live with the
spread with minimum risk. This im-
plies the control will require con-
tinuing effort ≠ over time; it is
not an all-or-none problem to be
settled in some particular time pe-
riod. If we take the position that
the issue is simply one of counting
those nations claiming nuclear wea-
pons status and that if this number
increases we are undone, then we
will fail to examine the second-st-
age opportunities for control. Giv-
en a policy of minimizing the numb-
er of nuclear powers, there should
be additional strings to the non-
proliferation how to be employed
as the number of nuclear weapons st-

at the number of nucleonucleon reactions at
proliferation pow to be adopted
be additional strategy to the non-
on of nucleon-bond, there should
on a benefit of minimizing the num-
ber the offshoots for control. Giv-
ing that to examine the second-af-
termass we are begun, thus we
have a status and that it this number
these nations claiming nucleon was-
the issue is simply one of counting
rob. It we take the position that
settled in some bacterium time be-
not an all-or-no problem to be
simultaneous & over time if it is
bites the control will reduce com-
plex with minimum risk. This im-
port problem is how to live with the
We should recognize that the long-
from entropy.
the "failure" to preventproliferators-
neglected out of disappointment with
abundant data should not be
consequence of whatever nucleon
ion. Influencing the character and
may more than simple contract-
off successfully. Control includes
in itself, if not finally to be ap-
proven capabilities, while good
additional states from studying
Schrodinger\Nucleon\ 55

[i]

Schlesinger/Nuclear/23

ates increases. What are these ad-
ditional strings? First, if new wea-
pons programs are launched, we may
hope to keep the resulting capabi-
lities as limited as possible. (Th-
is would reduce the damage potent-
tial of any nuclear wars taking pl-
ace in third areas.) Second, we
can take steps to reduce the risk
that these capabilities, whatever
their size, will actually be employ-
ed. Moreover, any actions which sh-
arply reduce the size or the risk
of employment of additional capabi-
lities may also serve to weaken the
motives for acquisition.

Under the heading of limiting the
size of additional capabilities, the
methods at our disposal are indirect
ones. Recognizing the ordinary tr-
adeoff between cost and quantity,
our actions should be designed to
keep the cost of strategic capabili-
ties at a high level, thereby weak-
ening the temptation to acquire larg-
er ≈ capabilities. This implies no
direct assistance to strategic nuc-
lear programs of other nations--save
in rare and unusual circumstances.
Through rigorous strategic trade con-

["Through rigorous strategic trade con-\ntinues and mutual circumstances.\nfarth programs of other nations--save\ndirect assistance to strategic use-\nor k capabilities. This implies no\nusing the temptation to acquire long-\ntime at a high level, thereby work-\ning the cost of strategic capabilities.\nour actions should be designed to\nachieve between cost and quantity.\none. Recognizing the ordinary tru-\nmeasures at our disposal are indirect\nsize of additional capabilities, the\nunder the heading of limiting the\nmovements for acquisition.\nfeatures may also serve to weaken the\nof employment of additional capabili-\nty, reduce the size or the risk\nof. Moreover, any sections which al-\nlow their size, will actually be empha-\nsize these capabilities, whatever\nthey take into account to reduce the risk\nof in third stress. Second, we\nfind that and more were strikingly\nin other sections was strikingly\nthe world reduce the damage potential\nof the capabilities. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould be able to reduce the resulting ad-\njustment in limited to beautiful.\n\nThird, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTwelfth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nThirteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFourteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nFifteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSixteenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nSeventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEighth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nNinth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nTenth, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nFischer, in limitation to beautiful)\nwould reduce the damage potential.\n\nEleventh, the increase of the damage poten-\ntial in limited to beautiful. (Mr.\nF

Schlesinger/Nuclear/ 24

trols we may also hope to limit in-
direct assistance. Above all, we
should make every effort to see th-
at international assistance intend-
ed for the support of peaceful nuc-
lear programs is not diverted to
support of military programs. Th-
ese are not easily achievable goals,
and we ought not pitch our definit-
ion of success at too high a level.
The instruments for control are im-
perfect. Moreover, costs by them-
selves cannot exclude other nations
from making seeking nuclear capabi-
lities. Given the existing system
of national sovereignies, the a-
bility to influence the decisions
of other states is quite limited.
Nonetheless, something can be ach-
ieved. To whatever extent we can
hold up costs, we can limit the si-
ze and the potential destructiven-
ess of budding nuclear capabilities.

The second heading--reducing the
risk that new capabilities will be
actually employed or, if employed,
limiting the potential damage--rep-
resents that aspect of living-with-
proliferation-at-minimum-risk over
which we ourselves have most contr-

which we ourselves have most contr-
利terization-at-minimum-risk over
recent that aspect of living-with-
limiting the beneficial damage--rep-
resently employed on, it employed,
that that new capabilities will be
the second meaning--reconducting the
use of bubbling nuclear capabilities.
we find the beneficial destruction-
held up costs, we can limit the al-
trem. To whatever extent we can
hondler, something can be said-
of other sides in this limited.
pability to influence the decalcu-
ot national sovereignies, the a-
tities. Given the existing system
from making seeking nuclear expe-
rience cannot exclude other nations
beyond. Moreover, costs by them-
the instruments for control are im-
portant at least as high a level.
and we ought not bite our d歌-
cose are not exactly desirable goals,
a subject of military programs. Tt-
Iem program in not directed to
be for the subject of beautiful mo-
at international assistance inde-
direct makes every effort to see it-
elect assistance. Above all, we
take we may also hope to limit in-

Concluding\Nucleus. 24

Schlesinger/Nuclear/25

There are certain hardware possibilities and other physical arrangements that can limit the potential for damage. One obvious possibility may be to buttress the air defense capabilities of threatened states. A more controversial possibility is the deployment of new systems that will sharply reduce the damage that countries could inflict on the major nuclear powers. Elsewhere in this Symposium a panel discussion has been devoted to the most dramatic current illustration of this type of possibility: the deployment of an ABM system. I would not wish my remarks to be taken as an endorsement of the ABM system, for that decision involves complex arms control, strategic, and cost-effectiveness calculations, which are beyond the scope of my responsibility. I should, however, like to stress one particular aspect that is relevant to the final decision: deployment of an ABM system or other systems that substantially reduce the damage that can be inflicted on the United States may serve to curtail the harm-

which are beyond the scope of my
concerns; however, I should, therefore,
use the best of my ability to do so.

The deployment of an AAM system
would not mean my remarks to be taken
to this type of hospitality:

> the most dramatic current illustration
> of dissemination has been devoted to
> elsewhere in this Symposium a few-
> timest on the major nuclear powers.

> see the change that corresponds could
> now be made that will immediately re-
> duce hospitality in the deployment of
> new systems that will immediately re-
> duce hospitality in the deployment of
> other systems. A more comprehensive
> air defense capability of this sort
> is necessary to reduce the danger of
> the potential for damage. One option
> arrangements that one might find the po-
> beseechments and editorship of
> the. There are certain hazards to
> [redacted]

A4

Schlesinger/Nuclear/26

ful consequences that could flow
from proliferation. Through such
damage-limiting measures, the will-
ingness and the ability of the Un-
ited States to intervene in third
areas when the use of nuclear weap-
ons is threatened is enhanced. Con-
sequently the American ability to
prevent the misuse of nuclear cap-
abilities will be strengthened.
The strongest deterrent to a lesser
nuclear power's employing its cap-
ability is the possibility that a
major nuclear power will enter the
lists against it.

Given the existing preponderance
of American power the deployment
of major new systems may not be e-
ssential to achieve this result.
However certain types of develop-
ments do appear desirable in order
to exploit the discrepancy between
major and lesser nuclear powers for
the purpose of driving home the
ill-advisedness of lesser powers
initiating the use of nuclear weap-
ons. For example, in a world of
many nuclear powers in which anony-
mity is at least a hypothetical p-
ossibility, we should invest consid-

occurrence, we should invest considerable
 effort in at least a substantial p-
ment. molecular bowers in which amon-
on. For example, in a world of
initiating the use of molecular work-
-advantage of lesser bowers
the bungee of driving none the
moton and lesser molecular bowers to
exhibit the discrepancy because
none do exist desirable in order
However certain types of develop-
eable to achieve this result.
of, molecular power the deployment
given the existing bungee
limits against it.

major molecular power will end the
occurrence of the bungee first a
molecular power, a exploiting its cab-
the strongest determinant a factor
advantage will be attained.

prevent the waste of molecular cab-
portability the American occu-
one is threatened in enhanced. Con-
sider when the use of molecular work-
ing states to intervene in existing
engine and the occurence of the un-
gauge-limiting measure, the will-
from proliferation. Through use
of consequences that could flow

[1]

Schlesinger/Nuclear/27

erable effort in developing meth-
ods for "finger-printing" nuclear
weapons and parallel systems th-
rough which we may in a crisis qu-
ickly ascribe responsibility for
any detonation that occurs. Then,
if we wish to offer protection to
threatened nations, we could see
to it that punishment for any such
irresponsible act would be swift
and condign.

An approach of this sort, which
relies on superpower preponderance
to withstand the potentially bale-
ful effects of proliferation, is
not one that is universally and au-
tomatically appealing. Hedley Bull
has characterized this approach as
"high posture" and has contrasted
it with one that he prefers: the
"low posture" in which the differen-
ces between the greater and lesser
powers are muted. Let me therefore
say a few words in defense of
the so-called high posture.

First, phrases like high posture
and low posture have a certain all-
ure, but the question must be rais-
ed whether they accurately describe
the underlying realities or the tr-

the underlying reality or the tr-
e of another that accursitly actua-
ne, but the duction must be rai-
and low pressure have a certain af-
ther, brances like high bature
the so-called high bature.
and a few words in defense of
batter are sufficient. Let me therefore
can between the bature and the lessen
"low bature", in which the citlten-
t with one that be bature: the
"high bature", and has contrased
has characterized this abrass an
tematically abating. Hadley Buff
not one that is universality and un-
fair affects of broillection, in
to withdrawing the potentially pa-
tries on suborder preponderance
in abrass of this sort, which
andougk, which we may in a crata de-
mosons and barylei system in-
one for "linger-braining" moles-
erpie effort in developing mid-
Bospiinger\Moles\51

A

Schlesinger/Nuclear 23

use alternatives. The gap in military nuclear power between the superpowers and other nations is enormous and will continue to be so. In fact, it is more likely to increase than diminish. (Pious comments regarding diminution of the strategic-military gap separating the superpowers from other nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is reminiscent of some high-flown discussions regarding the "income gap" which were particularly popular in the 1950s. It was frequently stated at that time that it was essential to eliminate the gap between the affluence of the developed nations and the poverty of the underdeveloped nations. In the intervening period per capita GNP in the United States has risen by more than $1,000, while there remains some question whether per capita income in the underdeveloped countries has risen at all. Diminution of the income gap was simply not a feasible objective. Similarly, in the strategic area we are not going to have any diminution of the gap between the superpowers and the rest for the fore-

["browers and the rest of the forces\nof the苏 between the under-\nministration, in the strategic and\nmilitary not a feasible objective.\nDistinction of the income苏 was\nobtained contracts was raised at all,\nbut assets income in the under-\nministration was raised from $1,000,000,\nwhile the GNP in the United States has\nfallen from $1,000,000, while\nthe GNP in the United States has\nfallen from $1,000,0

Schlesinger/Nuclear/ 29

seeable future. It is never sen-
sible to base one's policies on
hopes for the unobtainable. The-
fore let us avoid repetition of
this particular class of past err-
ors. Whatever else our policy is
based on, it should not be on an
expected diminution of the strateg-
ic gap). If we accept that the st-
rategic gap will continue to be e-
normous, what seems desirable is
that the character and width of the
gap be sufficient to permit the sup-
erpowers to exert a stabilizing in-
fluence on the restless third areas
of the world. Moreover, this sta-
bilizing function needs to be per-
ceived by those that may come to
possess a minor nuclear capability.

This potential stabilizing function,
should not lightly be discarded in
the quest for a somewhat mythical
low posture.

Second, the spread of nuclear ca-
pabilities into third areas will
very much intensify the existing
elements of instability and the dan-
ger in instability beyond what it
is today. The nuclear capabilities
will be unsophisticated and vulner-

will be unapprehended and unknown to us. The nuclear capability for inadaptable beyond what it is of inadaptable and the demand for such intensity the existing capabilities into third parties will soon, the square of nuclear energy be obtained.

Boseans a minor nuclear capability. Given by those that may come to utilizing function needs to be done of the worth. Moreover, this advance on the radical third areas ergonomics to exist a stabilizing input to be utilized to benefit the sub-thin the character and width of the normans, what some contributors at recent years will continue to do to the end. If we see that the expected diminution of the arising based on it, it should not be on us one. Whatever else our policy is, in particular class of basic rules before let us avoid repetition of errors for the unapprehended. The advice to put one's believes on reasonable future. If it never be Schrödinger's (1929)

Schlesinger/Nuclear/ 30

able. Given the existence of vulnerabilities and the temptation to exploit a temporary strategic edge, the likelihood of nuclear initiation through a hair-trigger response seems obvious. Most persons who seek a more peaceful world would find beneficial the ability of the superpowers to forestall the initial use of such capabilities. In seeking arms control arrangements we must keep in mind the bilateral U.S.-Soviet relationship, but we should also remember that increases in our capabilities, when matched by the Soviet Union, may serve to diminish the risks of dangerous outbreaks in third areas of the world.

Third, most nations, even when they strongly disapprove of specific aspects of U.S. policy, desire that the United States stand ready to counter nuclear threats against nations lacking in the means of self-protection. The United States, in particular, is being called upon to perform functions that other nations are not called upon to perform. If the United States is expected to

["the United States is expected to\nnot be called upon to bottom. It\nbottom functions did other nations\nparticipate, in being called upon to\nproduction. The United States, in\ntimes facing in the same of self-\ncountermand threats against us-\nat the United States should be\nsubject to U.S. policy, general in-\nvaenicity during U.S. policy, and\nexpansion of Soviet relationships, but\nwe must keep in mind the dilution\nwe must feel in mind the dilution\n

Schlesinger/Nuclear/ 31

play the role of a nuclear Calahad,
risking nuclear retaliation and
loss of population in behalf of oth-
ers, it does not seem unreasonable
for the United States to possess
protective measures of a type not
universally available. Nor does
it seem wholly consistent for th-
ose who rely on U.S. protection sim-
ultaneously to urge the United St-
ates to accept a low posture and
not to stand ready to intervene in
their defense. If a nation is ex-
pected to accept losses in behalf
of others, it seems reasonable th-
at the potential losses be held to
a minimum. That those on whom the
role of nuclear Calahad is thrust
should desire thicker armor seems
understandable.

## IV. CONCLUSION

The strategic importance of prolif-
eration has tended to be exaggerated
because the problem has been
viewed qualitatively in terms of e-
numerating those nations that might
acquire a small capability rather
than quantitatively in terms of the
destructive potential of the capability that might be achieved. As far

[Y]