Washington Post

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1999 A33

John Deutch,
Henry Kissinger
And Brent Scowcroft

# Test-Ban Treaty: Let's Wait Awhile

The Senate is scheduled to vote Oct. 12 on whether to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty has many strong supporters and equally vociferous opponents who are committed to its defeat next week. We believe, however, that the treaty's supporters and opponents are both wrong.

While we are no fans of the CTBT, our purpose here is not to argue its merits and defects. Our point is more straightforward. The simple fact is that, it is premature for the Senate to vote on the CTBT—at least during the life of the present Congress—because the treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the United States ratifies it. This means that few if any of the benefits envisaged by the treaty's advocates could be realized by such action. But if we act now, there could be real costs and risks to our security interests, including our nonproliferation objectives.

Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But even the treaty's advocates concede that for this objective to be achieved, at least the key countries that are of proliferation concern must agree to accede to the treaty. Indeed, the treaty wisely requires that each of 44 specific countries sign and ratify the document before it enters into force.

But only 23 of those countries have done so thus far. For example, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Syria have not yet acted. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT regime, and U.S. Senate ratification, early or late, is unlikely to have any significant impact on their decisions. For example, no serious person should believe that rogue nations such as Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States ratifies the CTBT.

The United States should take advantage of this situation to delay a vote on ratification, without prejudice to eventual action on the treaty. This would provide the opportunity to learn more about such issues as movement on the ratification process by the required 44 countries, technical progress in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, the political consequences of the India/Pakistan detonations, changing Russian doctrine toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and continued Chinese development of a nuclear arsenal.

We do not minimize the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only deserve but are receiving the highest national security priority. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the United States has substantially reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. The United States has also made or committed to dramatic reductions in the level of deployed nuclear force.

Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons to help deter certain kinds of attacks on this country and its friends and allies. In addition, several countries depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security. Their lack of confidence in that deterrent might lead to the further spread of weapons of mass destruction by increasing incentives for them to acquire their own nuclear or other weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to be certain that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made that over the long term the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The United States is seeking to do so by means of an ambitious effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling, simulation and other experiments. We support the kind of scientific and analytical effort that is reflected in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. At this point, however, success is far from ensured.

In light of the uncertainty, and in the absence of any compelling reasons for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future presidents' choices about how best to pursue our nonproliferation and other national security goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we urge the Senate leadership to reach an understanding with the president to suspend action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

John Deutch was undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, deputy secretary of defense and Director of Central Intelligence in the first Clinton administration. Henry Kissinger was secretary of state to Presidents Nixon and Ford. Brent Scowcroft was national security adviser to Presidents Ford and Bush.

By

John Deutch, Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft

Wednesday, October 6, 1999

The Washington Post

While we are no fans of the CTBT, our purpose here is not to argue its merits and defects. Our point is more straightforward. The simple fact is that it is premature for the Senate to vote on the CTBT -- at least during the life of the present Congress -- because the treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the United States ratifies it. This means that few if any of the benefits envisaged by the treaty's advocates could be realized by such action. But if we act now, there could be real costs and risks to our security interests, including our non-proliferation objectives.

In light of the uncertainty, and in the absence of any compelling reasons for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future presidents' choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation and other national security goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we urge the Senate leadership to reach an understanding with the president to suspend action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company

# THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY: ACT NOW OR WAIT?

## John Deutch, Henry Kissinger, and Brent Scowcroft

The Senate is scheduled to vote on October 12 on whether to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT"). The CTBT has many strong supporters and equally vociferous opponents who are committed to its defeat next week. We believe, however, that the Treaty supporters and opponents are both wrong.

While we are no fans of the Treaty, our purpose here is not to argue its merits and defects. Our point is more straightforward. The simple fact is that it is premature for the Senate to vote on the CTBT—at least during the life of the present Congress—because the Treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the U.S. ratifies. This means that few, if any, of the benefits envisaged by the Treaty's advocates could be realized by such action. But if we act now, there could be real costs and risks to our security interests, including our non-proliferation objectives.

Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. However, even the Treaty's advocates concede that for this objective to be achieved, at least the key countries of proliferation concern must agree to accede to the Treaty. Indeed, the Treaty wisely requires that each of 44 specific countries must sign and ratify the document before it enters into force. But only 23 of those countries have done so thus far. For example, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq,

and Syria, have not yet acted. Many of these counties may never join the CTBT regime, and Senate ratification by the United States Senate, early or late, is unlikely to have any significant impact on their decisions. For example, no serious person should believe that rogue nations like Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States ratifies the CTBT.

The U.S. should take advantage of this situation to delay a vote on ratification, without prejudice to eventual action on the Treaty. This would provide the opportunity to learn more about such issues as movement on the ratification process by the required 44 countries, technical progress in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, the political consequences of the India/Pakistan detonations, changing Russian doctrine toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and continued Chinese development of a nuclear arsenal.

We do not minimize the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. On the contrary, U.S. efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only deserve but are receiving the highest national security priority. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the United States has substantially reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. The U.S. also has made or committed to dramatic reductions in the level of deployed nuclear forces.

Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons to help deter certain kinds of attacks on the United States, its friends,

and allies. In addition, several countries depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their
security. Their lack of confidence in that deterrent might lead to the further spread of
weapons of mass destruction by increasing incentives to acquire their own nuclear or other
WMD capabilities.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to be certain that its nuclear weapons
remain safe, secure, and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not
been made that, over the long term, the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile
without nuclear testing. The United States is seeking to do so by means of an ambitious
effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain
adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling,
simulation, and other experiments. We support the kind of scientific and analytical effort
that is reflected in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. At this point, however, success is
far from assured.

In light of this uncertainty, and the absence of any compelling reasons for early
ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future Presidents'
choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation and other national security goals
while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly,
we urge the Senate leadership to reach an understanding with the President to suspend
action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

John Deutch served as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence in the first Clinton administration.

Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State and national security advisor to Presidents Nixon and Ford.

Brent Scowcroft was national security advisor to Presidents Ford and Bush.

OCT-05-1999 16:02

KAI DC

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JOHN DEUTCH
HENRY KISSINGER
BRENT SCOWCROFT

October 5, 1999

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Thomas A. Daschle
Minority Leader
United States Senate
Washington D.C. 20510

Dear Senators Lott and Daschle:

The Senate is beginning hearings on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT"), looking to an October 12 vote on whether or not to ratify. We believe, however, that it is not in the national interest to vote on the Treaty, at least during the life of the present Congress.

The simple fact is that the Treaty will not enter into force any time soon, whether or not the United States ratifies it during the 106th Congress. This means that few, if any, of the benefits envisaged by the Treaty's advocates could be realized by Senate ratification now. At the same time, there could be real costs and risks to a broad range of national security interests - including our non-proliferation objectives - if Senate acts prematurely.

Ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. now will not result in the Treaty coming into force this fall, as anticipated at its signing. Given its objectives, the Treaty wisely requires that each of 44 specific countries must sign and ratify the document before it enters into force. Only 23 of those countries have done so thus far. So the Treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the U.S. ratifies. The U.S. should take advantage of this situation to delay consideration of ratification, without prejudice to eventual action on the Treaty. This would provide the opportunity to learn more about such issues as movement on the ratification process, technical progress in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, the political consequences of the India/Pakistan detonations, changing Russian doctrine toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and continued Chinese development of a nuclear arsenal.

Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This cannot be true if key countries of proliferation concern do not agree to

900 SEVENTEENTH ST., N.W., ♦ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ♦ (202) 296-9312 ♦ FAX (202) 296-9395

OCT-05-1999 16:02

KAI DC

212 753 7248

2

Accede to the Treaty. To date, several of these countries, including India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, have not signed and ratified the Treaty. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT regime, and ratification by the United States, early or late, is unlikely to have any impact on their decisions in this regard. For example, no serious person should believe that rogue nations like Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States signs the CTBT.

Our efforts to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction not only deserve but are receiving the highest national security priority. It is clear to any fair-minded observer that the United States has substantially reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. The U.S. also has made or committed to dramatic reductions in the level of deployed nuclear forces. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the United States must continue to rely on nuclear weapons to contribute to the deterrence of certain kinds of attacks on the United States, its friends, and allies. In addition, several countries depend on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for their security. A lack of confidence in that deterrent might itself result in the spread of nuclear weapons.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to ensure that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made that, over the long term, the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The United States is seeking to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent through an ambitious effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling, simulation, and other experiments. We support this kind of scientific and analytical effort. But even with adequate funding -- which is far from assured -- the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not sufficiently mature to evaluate the extent to which it can be a suitable alternative to testing.

Given the absence of any pressing reason for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future Presidents' choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation and other national security goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we urge you to reach an understanding with the President to suspend action on the CTBT, at least for the duration of the 106th Congress.

Brent Scowcroft

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

John Deutch

OCT-05-1999 16:03

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While we are no fans of the Treaty, our purpose here is not to argue its merits and defects. Our point is more straightforward. The simple fact is that it is premature for the Senate to vote on the CTBT - at least during the life of the present Congress - because the Treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the U.S. ratifies. This means that few, if any, of the benefits envisaged by the Treaty's advocates could be realized by such action. But if we act now, there could be real costs and risks our security interests, including our non-proliferation objectives.

OCT-05-1999 16:03

KAI DC

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and Syria, have not yet acted. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT regime, and Senate ratification by the United States Senate, early or late, is unlikely to have any significant impact on their decisions. For example, no serious person should believe that rogue nations like Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the United States ratifies the CTBT.

OCT-05-1999 16:03

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3

OCT-05-1999 16:03

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4

TOTAL P.08

OCT-04-1999 11:41

RHI DC

212 153 1248 P.03

October 4, 1999

Ratification of the CTBT by the U.S. now will not result in the Treaty coming into force this fall, as anticipated at its signing. Given its objectives, the Treaty wisely requires that each of 44 specific countries must sign and ratify the document before it enters into force. Only 21 of those countries have done so thus far. So the Treaty is not coming into force any time soon, whether or not the U.S. ratifies. The U.S. should take advantage of this situation to delay consideration of ratification, without prejudice to eventual action on the Treaty. This would provide the opportunity to learn more about such issues as the Treaty's verifiability, movement on the ratification process, technical progress in the Department of Energy's Stockpile Stewardship Program, the political consequences of the India/Pakistan detonations, changing Russian doctrine toward greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and continued Chinese development of a nuclear arsenal.

Supporters of the CTBT claim that it will make a major contribution to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. This cannot be true if key countries of proliferation concern do not agree to accede to the Treaty. To date, several of these countries, including India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, have not signed and ratified the Treaty. Many of these countries may never join the CTBT regime, and ratification by the United States, early or late, is unlikely to have any impact on their decisions in this regard. For example, no serious person should believe that rogue nations like Iran or Iraq will give up their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons if only the

900 SEVENTEENTH ST., N.W., SUITE 500 ♦ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 ♦ (202) 296-9312 ♦ FAX (202) 296-9395

United States signs the CTBT.

As a consequence, the United States must continue to ensure that its nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. But the fact is that the scientific case simply has not been made that, over the long term, the United States can ensure the nuclear stockpile without nuclear testing. The United States is seeking to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent through an ambitious effort called the Stockpile Stewardship Program. This program attempts to maintain adequate knowledge of nuclear weapons physics indirectly by computer modeling, simulation, and other experiments. We support the kind of scientific and analytical effort that is reflected in the Stockpile Stewardship Program and we urge the Congress of the United States to provide adequate funding for this program. But funding is uncertain and, in any event, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not sufficiently mature to evaluate the extent to which it can be a suitable alternative to testing.

Given the absence of any pressing reason for early ratification, it is unwise to take actions now that constrain this or future Presidents' choices about how best to pursue our non-proliferation goals while maintaining the effectiveness and credibility of our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, we believe the Senate should forego action on the CTBT Treaty for at least the duration of the 106th Congress.

John Deutch

TOTAL P.04