conversations, phone calls, or ad hoc meetings. There
is no predictable pattern to such consultation and even
the closest members of the President's official family
may be unable to follow it. At the end, a decision
emerges, but many well-qualified observers believe this
approach to decision-making reduces the bureaucracy's
understanding of the President's views and consequently
impairs its ability to implement his wishes.

(b) Monitoring of Operations

It should be obvious that the activities described above involve the NSC staff quite deeply in the affairs of the departments. The information derived from this activity is supplemented by the receipt at the White House of a continuous flow of paper reporting the activities of the departments and events bearing on them. Through the Situation Room and the Information Liaison (IL) office of the NSC, the Special Assistant and Staff receive copies of all significant communications received and sent by the departments. This includes such diverse materials as CINCPAC orders for a bombing mission against North Vietnam, an account of a foreign official's conversation with a US representative or an outgoing cable reflecting the State Department's views on the request of some foreign government. All such telegrams are read by staff officers with a view to identifying trouble spots and items of Presidential interest as well as their consistency with known Presidential policy.

-15-

Beginning with the Kennedy administration the Department of State, and on occasion the Defense Department, was expected to refer to the Special Assist- and for approval ("clearance") any outgoing telegrams affecting Presidential interests. This was not entirely unknown in earlier years, because Secretaries of State have always required Presidential approval or signature on certain letters or instructions. The difference, beginning in 1961, was that for the first time there were staff officers in the White House with specific area responsibilities and interests reviewing a broad range of matters on behalf of the President. It is by no means unknown in the present system for messages approved by a cabinet or sub-cabinet officer to be referred to the Special Assistant for a final check on conformity with the President's views. On the basis of this review, a telegram, depending upon its importance, may be "cleared" by the Special Assistant or an NSC staff member, or it may be referred to the President himself.

This system of clearances affords the White House staff an effective means of keeping its eye on the operations of the Departments. It is clearly not the type of system which accords the Department of State great independence.

d. <u>The National Security Council</u>

The NSC as an institution does not figure significantly in
current process. It ~~does~~ meet fairly regularly but the agenda
rarely includes the big issues of the day. The latter are
dealt with either in the Tuesday Lunch (of which more later) or
in ad hoc meetings of the President with the principal NSC
figures either individually or collectively.

The decline of the Council began with Kennedy's dismantling
of the NSC system. Although Kennedy held fewer regularly scheduled
meetings, he held many meetings which, although they were not so
labeled, were _de facto_ NSC meetings since all or most of the
statutory members were present.

There were some differences other than the absence of the NSC
label. There were often no written papers before the house--or
if there were, they were not of the highly coordinated Planning
Board variety--and more often than not did not result in formal
written decisions. Nevertheless, the President obtained advice,
there was a free exchange of views, and they were oriented toward
decision-making.

The most definitive manifestation of the _de facto_ NSC gathering
was the "ExCom" group of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The President
assembled advisers and experts of his own choosing and relied heavily
upon them for advice and counsel. As testimony to the power of the
NSC image, Kennedy went to the trouble of having the ExCom arrange-
ment approved by the full NSC and enshrined in a NSAM--on October 22,
when the existence of the crisis was first made known to the NSC.

-17-

The ExCom experience points out the fallacy of the argument that the _size_ of the statutory NSC impairs its effectiveness. The original ExCom was larger in membership than the statutory NSC and included all the statutory members except the Director of the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). By the same token the Tuesday Lunch is also often larger than the statutory NSC.

The formation of the ExCom was consistent with Kennedy's tendency to form special committees and task forces to study and deal with specific problems (e.g., Laos, Berlin) rather than relying on more formal groups, the composition of which might be designated by the organization chart or rank. The more flexible approach made it easier to include specialists and outside advisers. This practice was continued by President Johnson, notably during the Middle East crisis of June, 1967.

The real reason for the Council's less frequent use is probably that explained by Bill Moyers, who wrote of President Johnson:

> "He is generally more satisfied with small groups of people he knows well. As Kennedy before him, he learned that the NSC is not a live institution, not suited to precise debate for the sake of decision. President Johnson chooses to call in a handful of top advisers, confidants, close friends."

Nevertheless, there are some who say that President Johnson on assuming office was disposed to make greater use of the NSC than had President Kennedy. The thoughts of the President and his principal advisers on this matter are now known. But in order for the Council to be more effectively used today it would be necessary to reorient other elements of the process (e.g., it has been suggested that some SIG papers be presented to the Council).

-18-

Thus today, Council sessions are generally used, in the words of those who are familiar with them, for "educational", "ratification" or "public relations" purposes. Meanwhile, its concept and potential remain alive.

### e. The Tuesday Lunch

The Tuesday Lunch is not a full substitute for the NSC because it is primarily operational, but it is the most important regular meeting in the national security process. The President views it so, since this time on his calendar is jealously guarded.

The Tuesday Lunch was devised by Bundy, Rusk and McNamara as a scheduled occasion when they could sit down with the President and deal with the most pressing issues of the week. The format is highly compatible with President Johnson's desire to maintain continuing contact with a very few of his closest advisers.

The staffs of the participants (who inevitably are more conscious of process than their bosses) regard the Tuesday Lunch as a particularly useful institution. Even those who express concerns over the lack of more adequate preparation of the agenda or the absence of any formal record of action (two frequently cited shortcomings) are nevertheless grateful that there is at least one weekly occasion when the President will sit down in a group with his closest advisers.

The basic Tuesday Lunch group now consists of the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman, JCS, the Special Assistant, and the Presidential Press Secretary and his Assistant. The Chairman, JCS,