DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger (secure phone)

11:32 a. m.

9/8/71

S: Is message I sent to you in the ________?

K: I got it this morning.

S: Do you think it's all right to follow that way?

K: That's good. Good to follow that line.

S: Send me a message so I can confirm it with the others.

K: Let me see. Proposing two and two might be acceptable.

S: Our initial reaction in Washington is positive but no definite reaction until
we have the facts.

K: Let me check with the President. I will get word to you tomorrow.

S: That will be very helpful. Do I understand the signature on agreements
will be made in Washington?

K: 30th.

S: ? ? ? ? ? ? and I assume other considerations are more important than
that.

K: His man wanted to sign in Washington with Rogers.

S: Just want you to know that Semonov made this pitch to me.

K: We get the opposite from Dobrynin. We want you back.

S: I will be back on the 24th.

K:: You will be at the signing.

S: ? ? ? ? in preamble the ultimate aim on both sides would like to see a total
ban --

K: A total ban?

S: A total ban as an ultimate aim. *This agreement and this Disarmament and reductions and say we are still shooting for it.*

K: No personal objection but will check that too.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [illegible] NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
3:05 p.m. 9/8/71

P: Any problems today?

K: Everying is quiet. Nothing of consequence happening. Yahya made an
anmesty in E. Pakistan. Ted Kennedy in to weep about India/Pakistan situation.
I figured he is too dangerous to turn him down. Essentially what it was at
the press club. He has been to see Rogers.

P: Not making much with that.

K: Can't do anything with it.

P: Not much of a story.

K: People don't want to be involved.

P: That's the problem. Haldeman says that for the first time in 6 hex years no
casualties.

K: Yesterday. Military air activity is all time low. It only takes one helicopter
crash. Le Duc Tho wasn't at the National Day celebration in Hanoi so
maybe on his way to Paris. Then it would be clear something will happen. I
notice on a draft of your speech "When America ?? ?? ?? ??. I wonder if
we can drop that before the meeting?

P: Yeah. We have changed that. I will have Ray run by the next copy. We have
modified it some. Hold it over their heads.

K: Especially in a speech we don't need it.

By NARA, Dale

TELCORN

Johnson/Kissinger

morning

9/8/71

J: On the NSDM, the textile business is confused. I spoke with the Secy. this morning. Dave Kennedy is on his way to Williamsburg to talk to --

K: I tried to turn it off.

J: What's your understanding of where you stand?

K: The President will talk with Fukudo about it. See what can be arranged. We will tell them it's a serious problem and we might have to do some unilateral steps.

J: That's what it says in here. If the NSDM comes out it's addressed to everybody. Stans and Kennedy talking from this.

K: I will put out a memo that except for Dave Kennedy's discussion today, the textile issue will be discussed by no one except the Secy.

J: That's fine. What will Kennedy do?

K: Peterson tried to turn it off. Fukuda requested the meeting as an old associate. And Kennedy only plans to say ? ? ? . I will see Ushiba this afternoon at his urgent request and I will call you.

J: What is his reading of what Fukuda plans to bring up with the President?

K: Shall I try that?

J: Why don't you?

K: Who will put together the Japanese side? Fukuda alone?

J: He asked for Fukuda without cabinet colleagues. Whether Ushiba, I don't know.

K: I recommended that you, Bill and I represent our side. Do you think that's too heavy?

J: Let's see what Ushiba says of Fukuda's desires. Not necessarily.

K: I think the Secy. should sit in.

J: Only question of whether I should be there. In some ways I would like to be.

K: You decide. You are invited. Whatever your judgment of the situation is.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/21

Johnson/Kissinger
morning 9/8/71

-2-

J: You find out from Ushiba. Is he coming up?

K: Where is he?

J: Williamsburg. Secy. called and told him last night about meeting with
President.

K: That should please him.

J: It does. He called to apologize on the leak. He knows it makes it impossible
for us to deal with them on a confidential basis.

K: I will call you immedated afterwards. One other thing because I will raise
this. The way I have handled my visit to Japan is if it's an unofficial group.
If any govt. official wants to meet me I will stay a few days.

J: Have you said anything to the Secy. about this?

K: No.

J: I haven't either.

K: They have raised it twice.

J: Ushiba?

K: ON the phone. I don't know if he will come back to it. I won't come back to it.

J: As far as timing is concerned.

K: About two months before Peking. Certainly not before much later this year.

J: I have no problem with that.

K: I will not raise it and if it comes up by him it's sufficiently vague
that I can say scheduling problems.

J: I will tell the Secy.

K: And tell him (it came) through Ushiba and ____.

J: About special agency mission and it's understandable why it's not there.
I will usggest a subcabinet meeting in Japan where there's previous precedent
with these and copies keeps it in the framework.

K: That's fine.

By NARA, Date 5/27

-3-

J: The Secy. will make that proposal during the meetings.

K: Good way of finessing that issue. If you stone wall it it will be approved on an ad hoc basis.

J: I will suggest it in the framework of subcabinet meeting. I don't know if the Japanese will accept it but it's what we will propose.

Kissinger

[Secy. Johnson called back and told typist that they had just received telephone call from Tokyo that the Japanese press there this morning has a story playing the fact that he is going to visit Tokyo as a fact.]

By NARA, Date 5/97

TELCONE

Joe Kraft/Kissinger

morning 9/8/71

K: I have a whole lot of little things on my agenda. One thing I had with John Holdridge -- does the visit to Alaska have anything to do with Cannikin?

HAK: No.

K: Not decided?

HAK: Not firmly.

K: Not a ______ note for the emperor.

HAK: I don't know.

K: You wouldn't encourage speculation. Have you made any efforts to find an economics man for yourself with a deeper political field?

HAK: It's something I have on my mind. I have an *interesting* interest, as you gathered from my conversation.

K: A new man?

HAK: Or a new procedure. A new man or a series of consultants on different aspects.

K: Is there going to be a statement on ______ and compensation policy this week?

HAK: Not this week. We have a paper in the process. Fairly soon.

K: Did you talk with Letelier about this?

HAK: I have talked to him but don't want to go into substance.

K: I heard there was a conversation before the EmIm Bank. Boeing thing which I assumed they leaked.

HAK: They leaked.

K: Japanese talks going to be the usual tiny detailed stuff.

HAK: It looks like that but we are trying to push in the opposite direction.

K: How?

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date

Joe Kraft/Kissinger
morning 9/8/71

-2-

HAK: General decision on fundamental directions.

K: Isn't it too big for that?

HAK: Probably.

K: Ministers concerned with little things.

HAK: It may be inherent in the thing. The President will see Fukudo.

K: Chirep and stuff like that?

HAK: I don't want to --

K: Are you going to Anchorage?

HAK: I think so.

K: Should I do it?

HAK: No.

K: I will be in Japan at that point. Scoop Maxx Jackson has been telling me that ? ? ? ?. Soviet hull digging. SS-9 he announced sometime ago.

HAK: I will put it this way. They won't stop unilaterally until there's an agreement.

K: No concern.

HAK: Not one batch but can't keep ignoring.

K: What's the outlook between SALT and Kosygin?

HAK: I don't see the connection.

K: Looking for a meeting with the President and occasion of tying the package wouldn't seem possible?

HAK: No.

K: When is Chirep in the UN?

HAK: Nov. But some discussion that it will come up sooner but I think end of October until middle of Nov.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

- 3

K: On Vietnam, how much is American military morale lessening? Are you the only one standing in the breach? I think the American military want to end it.

HAK: And I am continuing it?

K: Leave yourself out of it. My question is the attitude of the military and morale.

HAK: If the military want to put it behind them they haven't made a proposal to us formally or informally. When this administration is written into history it will be that the press reports were done by ESP because there was no communication.

K: I have felt that the military cannot get it up on ________.

HAK: I don't deny that.

K: What's your feeling on ? ? ? ? ? ?

HAK: That could happen. To get back to your previous question I think it's a complete misreading that some are pushing for a fast exit and some for a slow exit. That has never been the problem and it will be seen as ridiculous later. The recommendations we get from the military -- those that make recommendations -- are actions you wouldn't approve of.

K: That still exists. Right. I think that's it. Hope we can get together soon.

HAK: Before you go off.

K: Around for awhile.?

HAK: Next week. In fact until Anchorage.

K: Going from here or California.?

HAK: We will leave from the West Coast for Anchorage because it's too long a day but in the points on the West Coast isn't decided. Calif. or other state. I may go to San Francisco a day early.

K: A speech?

HAK: I have been -- two reasons. One, to meet with Sex China scholars on the West Coast and meet with the Commonwealth Club if it can be done off the record.

K: Thanks. And also for seeing Jean Lacouture.

HAK: I like him.

By NARA, Date 5/27

-4-

K: I am sorry that what he wanted to say wasn't better formulated. Sihanouk's view of Peking/____ relations is interesting. Peking is not interested in a Hk unified Vietnam. Will get away with cutting down Hanoi but keeping up to the mark. Making them stand and deliver by asking if they are for the revolution or against it. Not much slippage but there's tension.

HAK: That's plausible.

By CCO NARA, Dato 5/27

TELECON
Secretary Laird
9/9/71 8:35 a.m.

L: Wanted to check a few things out with you. I understand you're getting increasing pressure on the papers that have leaked on the Under Secretaries Committee on this test of ABM warhead.

K: Don't worry about it.

L: The problem is if you change the position. . .

K: We won't.

L: Well, if you do, just give me a day or two warning.

K: We have no intention of changing it. We are just avoiding a firm decision in order to leave as little time for demonstration as possible. But you don't want it done, do you?

L: Sure. That's why I called on as many Senators as I could. They were trying to write a prohibition in the law on it. Second item, we have got to stand together on appropriations on foreign aid for the next 5-year period.

K: The first time I heard about that was in the News Summary on Rogers' testimony yesterday. The President wouldn't sign a letter if he wanted to ________________ on it.

L: I am going to call Bill and tell him that I don't appreciate his not standing with me on it -- I'm going to do that this morning.

K: You were doing what the President wanted you to do.

L: I think in the Ways and Means Committee yesterday there was an indication that from Connally that the President has bought a bill to further expenditure limitation for defense. I can't go with any more cuts.

K: There won't be any more.

L: In expenditure limitations the only one it affects is Defense. I'm going to oppose it.

K: You'll have my support.

L: I just don't want it to come as a surprise to anyone.

K: I want you to oppose it and the President does too.

L: Okay, thank you Henry.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Dave Packard
9/9/71 8:50 a.m.

K: I wanted to ask you about this Commonwealth Club. They are
after me to meet with them and I thought on the occasion of the President's
visit I might do it.

P: It's a good forum. It's leadership and business people around
the Bay area. A civic affairs of all kinds group with emphasis on international
affairs.

K: How many people attend?

P: I don't know, but it might be as many as 500. You're sure of
a good turnout.

K: They proposed a special meeting for 3:00 in the afternoon. They've
already got someone for the evening. I can't see how they will get a good turnout
for that.

P: No, that doesn't make much sense. They have got these small
study groups.

K: And in that case I might as well wait till I get to the West Coast again.

P: I doubt that it would be worthwhile with a small group.

K: So you don't think one hundred is worthwhile?

P: I don't know, but I don't think the kind of people you'd meet with in
a small group would be effective. It would be none of the business leaders; they
couldn't take the time out for that kind of meeting.

K: That's what I think, and the students and junior professors are
usually -

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. k 9/10/71

J: I wanted to talk to you about the matter of going to Israel. If I am to go immediately it would be on the 14th. If that's too precipitate I can go on the Foreign Relations Committee anytime.

K: This time with Kennedy and Health Committee? I think it's a good idea.

J: Well, you are holding a breakfast for me after that date.

K: I have been raising hell with my staff. How about tomorrow? 8:15 a.m. here tomorrow.

J: That will be fine. We will decide this then.

By. NARA, Date 5/21

TELCORN
Gov. Reagan/Kissinger
12:10 p. m. 9/9/71

K: Ron I have to -- on my way out of the office to go with the President for
State of Economy address. I settled the airplane yesterday.

R: You are wonderful.

K: But tell Nancy by at least 50% was done for her.

R: I will tell her it was all done for her. It will be diplomatic. I hear that
John Holdridge is briefing on what to do and the PM of S. Korea has called
and said what is it about and John Holdridge has said the President has asked
him to come.

K: I will straighten it out. I will miss the motorcade if I don't go. I will call
you in 2 hours.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
Connally/Kissinger

6:12 p. m.

9/9/71

K: I was talking with the President a few minutes ago and the directive sent out to you. Let me explain what happened. I think your people are at fault.

C: It doesn't make a difference.

K: No directive will come thru my office effecting you that you and I don't agree on. I wanted to keep people from talking all over. I knew Tresize was for devaluation of the yen. We wanted to make it that you could only speak and ? ? ? ? with Volker. What the tactics are, we could care less. 45% is your business.

C: There was a misunderstanding.

K: I read the paragraph to Volker. He said he might want 45 and I said it's no problem so long as no one except the Secy. talks about re-valuation.

C: I made that point with him and he shouldn't have mentioned it. He wanted to point out what will happen.

K: I understood that. I took the liberty of discussing our conversation and how you and I see the thing alike. I want you to understand.

C: Chance to get a good visit with it. On the same wavelength?

K: On the exact same wavelength. A little more strong feeling that we did that initiating anything should be formal and wants to participate in it. Shultz, you and me and himself. He thinks we four would see it the same way. When are you going abroad?

C: Monday afternoon or Tues. Waiting until the last minute. Good speech and delivered well. Really knocked a whole ____.

K: None of the Ambassadors applauded which was a good sign.

C: You see what the Congress did when he talked about U.S. interest.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., September 9, 1971

P: I wondered if you were able to get hold of Connally.

K: Yes, I talked to Connally. He is completely straightened out now and has agreed. It was Volcker who dropped the ball on this.

P: But he knows there is running room on this?

K: This was an attempt to put the reins on State.

P: The main thing is I didn't want him to think I had signed something to him. I wasn't trying to restrict him, you see.

K: I have talked to him and told him that was your main concern. He said the matter was not of any great importance. I said that wasn't the point, if you get a directive out of the White House .................... you have a chance to go to the President first.

P: He was glad you called?

K: Oh, yes, he was very pleased. Mr. President, we got an answer to the Brezhnev letter -- the letter you sent to Brezhnev some weeks ago. It is a very long letter and I won't bother you with it.

P: They are travelling all over the world now.

K: They are launching the diplomatic .................... but so are we. ......... event earlier we appreciate what has been done by you, Mr. President, on the negotiations in Berlin. A good and useful job has been done. That's more than the New York Times has been able to get itself to say.

P: What did they say? Whine?

K: Kleinman had an article that you were not instrumental, that it was done over your dead body.

P: What did they say about the Brandt statement?

K: There hasn't been a peep out of them. The Brandt statement was on Sunday, this was on Saturday.

P: Isn't that something. What have been the reactions since the Brandt statement?

K: That cooled them. Actually, we have gotten a better ride out of Berlin than I thought we would.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:10 p.m., September 9, 1971

P: What about the leaking?

K: The leaking at State has stopped. The Brandt statement .........
We have got that pretty well on the track. We are going to announce on
Tuesday that we got the Accidental War Agreement.

P: Announce it here?

K: Announced here.

P: That is where it ought to be.

K: We will announce it at the White House and shift some of the technical
questions to State. We have got other countries -- is that a bad day for you?

P: Oh, no, no. I may do something with the press on Thursday. I
could sort of start my conference with that -- you know, the announcement
has been made and do you have any questions. Could you move it to
Thursday?

K: I will check it.

P: Are you going to come there tonight?

K: No, I won't, Mr. President.

P: You won't miss anything.

K: Right, Mr. President.

and
Berlin

By ROBERT KLEIMAN

The effort in the White House and
by American Ambassador Kenneth
Rush to portray the historic new Ber-
lin agreement as a personal triumph
for President Nixon brings a wry
smile to the lips of Western diplo-
mats. White House skepticism during
the seventeen-month Berlin negotia-
tion was a continuous burden for
West German Chancellor Willy Brandt,
whose imaginative initiatives paved
the way for the new accords.

"Ambassador Rush has postponed
his vacation." This sly comment was
the answer a high French official gave
in July when asked why he had pre-
dicted that an early Berlin agreement
had suddenly become "probable."

Mr. Rush's long summer and winter vacations last year, which had as much to do with White House strategy toward Moscow as with Mr. Rush's fondness for his Nassau retreat, has become the symbol of American foot-dragging at critical moments of the Berlin talks.

The dilatory negotiations, with meetings every third week, took a ten-week break in July, 1970, just as completion of the Soviet-West German Treaty opened the door to progress on Berlin. In December, a six-week recess set off a major crisis in Bonn-Washington relations.

Mr. Brandt had been pressing all
fall to turn the desultory talks into a
continuous conference. His conversa-
tions with Soviet Communist party
Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosy-
kin in August, plus other indication he
got later, had convinced him that the
Russian leaders wanted a Berlin agree-
ment before their party congress in
March. Bonn had made that agreement
the pre-condition for ratification of
the Soviet-German Treaty, a major
Kremlin objective.

West Germany's Chancellor sent
numerous emissaries to Washington
to urge a faster tempo. Instead, lead-
ing members of the American foreign
policy establishment who opposed
Bonn's Eastern policy—Dean Acheson,
John McCloy, Lucius Clay, Thomas
Dewey—were invited to the White
House. Mr. Acheson emerged with
a public admonition to Mr. Brandt to
"cool off" his "mad race to Moscow."

Behind this conflict was a reverse
twist on President Nixon's old thesis
about diplomatic "linkage." In 1969,
he was convinced that Moscow's de-
cline for agreement in the projected
strategic arms limitation talks (SALT)
would enable him to extract conces-
sions on the Middle East and Vietnam.
He added Berlin to that list at the urg-
ency of then Chancellor Kurt Klemmneer
in his February 1969 visit to Bonn.

But in 1973 Mr. Nixon found him-
ing in a series of confrontations with
the Soviets Union over the Middle East.
Soviet help in achieving peace in Viet-
nam had not been forthcoming. Soviet
missile submarines were calling at
Cuban ports. And the SALT talks were
bogged down. But the Soviet conflict
with China had eased off a bit and
Moscow was negotiating with Bonn
a provisional settlement in Cen-
tral Europe, based on the territorial
line.

The President can have�ento

"They have to make their Berlin deal with us."

Bonn muttered about "Nixon's go-
bal strategy" blocking Germany's vital
need for a Berlin settlement. But Mr.
Nixon reportedly believes that his tac-
tics in the end advanced both objec-
tives. Delay in the Berlin talks helped
him extract in May a Soviet summit
agreement to negotiate a first-stage
SALT pact this year. Soviet acceptance
of a NATO proposal to negotiate mu-
tual force reductions in Central Europe
came that same week. From then on,
with both Moscow and Washington
seeking accord, the Berlin talks moved
rapidly.

The terms of the Berlin settlement undoubtedly are significantly better than would have been predicted a year ago. The delay may have made Moscow more amenable. But, in return for concessions on "unimpeded" access, travel to the East by West Berliners and a presence for Bonn in West Berlin, Moscow has achieved its objective of virtual recognition of East

nature of other aspects of the new
agreement depends on the entire con-
text of East-West relations in Europe
and the world.

Mr. Nixon's global strategy, iron-
ically, has been more aided by Chan-
cellor Brandt's Soviet negotiations than
the reverse. But unless Mr. Nixon suc-
cesses in achieving an over-all Soviet-
American accommodation, the stability
of the provisional settlement now in
sight in Central Europe will remain
precautious.

Germany—a long step toward admi-
sion of both Germany's into the United
Nations.

Moreover, no agreement can alter
the geographic location of West Berlin,
110 miles within the Communist East,
and any agreement can be infringed or
decimated. Western occupation rights,
which are inalienable pending a peace
treaty and are reaffirmed in the new
Berlin settlement, remain the basis for
West Berlin's security. The lasting

8-F

By NARA, Date 5/27

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Vice President/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. 9/10/71

K: Where are you?

VP: IN NY. What I wanted to ask. I talked to Al Haig about the Iranian thing and off shoots because I ran into a memo from the Secy. who was making a recommendation which I thought wasn't in the right direction.

K: That must have been a great surprise to you.

VP: Since it's in the planning stages and not that far away I want to get a reading from you as what's a possibility of cancelling?

K: Absolutely not. Tell them to go to hell. You can talk about it when you get here there.

VP: The ______ arrival will make my mission worthless.

K: I haven't heard anyone say the President should raise with Chou En-lai that they should have democratic elections.

VP: I want to be sure I know where I stood before I make a lot of work on something that will not happen.

K: We have an understanding you will go there and no prior conditions.

VP: The companion country to that one -- next door to the east --

K: Turkey?

VP: Do you think that would be wise?

K: They might take off the heat.

VP: Especially since Cyprus situation isn't getting better.

K: It's getting worse.

VP: Especially since they want to know what my grand scheme is.

K: I think it's a good idea. I will let you know Monday. I had some bitter complaints about your endurance on the tennis courts from Dinh Shore.

VP: Lots of endurance but not much skill.

K: I must admit she didn't mention skill but she said you kept them on courts 8 hours.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

-2-

VP: ______ stayed and played 9 sets with us. Maybe we can get out there together. It would be fun.

K: That would be great fun.

vp; Basically I am thinking of those 3.

K: When are you travelling?

VP: Go directly to Sharaz. Oct. 12 or 13. Those other two possibly with a final stop at NATO headquarters.

K: That sounds fine except NATO might be a problem. Laird will be there on the 20th. Would you be back by then?

VP: I could go on the way in.

K: We can work thqt out. I think it's a good idea.

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Connally

2:53 p.m., September 10, 1971

K: We have a recommendation here that Latin America be exempted from the 10 per cent cut in foreign aid -- it's something less than $20 million. Considering the fact that we haven't done anything for Latin America, I wonder if it would be a good symbolic step to take.

C: I would like to see who would benefit.

K: No particular country because the sums are too small. But it would enable us to claim we are paying special attention to Latin America.

C: I can't do it without exempting Mexico and Canada.

K: No -- I am talking about the 10 per cent cut in foreign aid.

C: Oh, I'm sorry. I didn't understand it. I see nothing wrong with that.

K: It would be a cheap gesture we could make. In fact, it has been explained to me the way they are working it, it would be a maximum of $20 million.

C: Without having it analyzed, offhand I see nothing wrong with it. It would be good. We would be helping some of these countries down there.

K: We may have to make a decision on it before Sunday. There is a meeting of the IA-ECOSOC and it would be good to announce it.

C: Good. We are obviously setting a precedent.

K: That's what we want to do.

C: I would think that would be good.

K: Good.

lds

By

NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Vorontsov/Kissinger
4:40 p.m. 9/10/71

K: I have just had a report that the counselor of your embassy in Tokyo at a Bulgarian Day celebration in the presence of an NBC correspondent said he knew the visit of the President to Moscow was set and only a question of whether before or after the visit of the President to Peking. Since we haven't said anything to anyone in our govt., I said to State that he probably had to many drinks.

V: Probably. We know only high officials know and it's not true and he says it without any knowledge whatsoever. He will be reprimanded.

K: We are safe in maintaining our position of absolute aloofness?

V: It happens on both sides. My friends at the Hungarian embassy said that Secy. Blount in Hungary said he thought the President would be going soon to Moscow.

K: He knows absolutely nothing.

V: It's the same with our counselor in Tokyo or any other place in the world.

K: I am not saying it critically. Only that we will maintain our position here.

DECEMBER 16
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
5:00 p.m. 9/10/71

R: I was just talking to Alex about Chinese representation questions. I understand Fukuda will take it up with the President.

K: Only concern was that the President personally told him this.

R: I He probably will tell Sato.

K: So long as it's not in Shimbun.

R: Or we don't have a prayer of winning. It's going to be close anyway.
Japanese co-sponsorship is going to be the key.

K: I hear you nearly say "Jap", Mr. Secretary.

R: No, I said Japanese. I stumble but I am careful.

K: President plans to take him aside for 5 mins. and say Taiwan not end their support.

R: I talked with Fukuda about confidentiality and I will say that President going to speak privately and any conversation is for his use and PM Sato's and no one else's.

K: That's good.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Schreiber/Kissinger

5:12 p. m.

9/10/71

S: On Oct. 24 --

K: Sept. --

S: Right.

K: I agreed to the Commonwelath Club and then they had a snafu in their schedule and they want me to come in the afternoon and I don't think it's consistent with my position to be just meet with a small group of people. I don't want to make stops with the President and would like to go to (San Francisco or Los Angeles).

S: You tell Finch I called you. We have a meeting of ______ which we want you to come to talk about China. Firestone and Cummings will be there.

K: You won't be?

S: No. We will get out the right-wingers. That's better then Israel bonds.

K: I don't want Israel bonds but not all right-wingers.

S: No. Just have you come out with a stating of ______ abroad and Peking. Status with Russians and etc. 24th lunch and we need you here.

K: You call Finch. I appreciate it. It's a big help. I don't want to pre-judge the bigger thing you mentioned. I talked with the President and he thought that was good.

S: We are off and running campaign wise. I want 400-500 people.

K: A little bit ahead of campaign period but close enough to get their attention.

S: We were thinking of a fund-raiser. Heads of universities co-hosting with us. We are thinking of Dec.

K: End of Nov. or early Dec. That's good for me. The other one is a help to me.

S: I will call Bob in a few minutes and get it done. Tell him I call you and you said call Finch.

K: I will call you on the other matter. I am working on it.

By NARA, Dale S/21

TELECON
Charlie Meyer
9/10/71 5:20 p.m.

K: You can inform your colleagues in Panama that we are exempting Latin America from the 10 percent foreign aid cut.

M: O bless your heart. Thank you from the bottom of my heart.

K: As a result of our special interest in Latin America. Will you make a play out of it so the President gets the credit.

M: Damn right. Thank you very much. I just saw the letter from Fulbright; he is scheduling hearings on a sense of the Senate resolution abandoning our isolation of Cuba.

K: That hits the President's rawest nerve.

M: I wanted you to know.

K: On this subject it is almost impossible to talk to the President.

M: I know. __________ is obvious.

K: It is n't extraordinarily logical to say we want to talk to China but we won't talk to Cuba.

M: That's how it came up.

K: It would help if you make some noises that come to the President's attention opposing it.

M: We have no private session; this is a public session.

K: Okay. Thank you.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
Peterson/Kissinger
6:15 p.m. 9/10/71

P: I am having some pretty major concerns about this economic plan on negotiations, surcharge everyx and everything else. I want to talk with you about it. A lot is over in Treasury. I talked with Connally a few days ago and he thinks we need something. I don't think our playback is worth a damn in foreign policy.

K: How about Treasury? I am going out of town. Let me get some one to call your office to set a time for Tuesday. 8:15 for breakfast?

P: I think imputs are lousy. Volker was talking about political stuff. I didn't get much and likewise from State. Maybe a small group could go to Europe and work out attitudes. Just trying to get it at a fundamental level.

K: Just do it.

P: Want to be coordinated.

K: I would send someone from my office with you.

P: I want to do it with your full cooperation. I want to talk on how to get ready. Really don't know what terms are for getting rid of surcharge. We took defense and monetary into same bag. Some long terms and xhex some short and we don't know what we want.

K: I know I don't want to go back to the old system.

P: I know that but x I told John we have to find how we will negotiate out of this thing.

K: Let's have breakfast at 8:15 on Tues.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Secy. Johnson/Kissinger
early morning 9/10/71

K: I just wanted to find out since the President will ask what are the stories of clashes at the meetings?

J: No clashes. The Post story I thought was fairly accurate. Frank, friendly, and differences of view expressed. No clashes. Japanese have come forward with very little, virtually nothing. As you know, Fukuda before coming tried to come with a forthcoming Japanese package but not successful. In the briefing the package for the President this evening it was because Tanaka who is a mid-minister is a rival of Sato's. It's by far the best meeting. They are not making speeches with each other. It's really give and take across the table. Trying to give out what they take but they know they are on the defensive.

K: Are you coming to the President's meeting tonight?

J: Yes. I asked Marshall Green this morning -- I have been discussing with Fukuda's man how we handle the meeting. Fukuda said he would not make any presentation of Japanese internal problems. It took him 35 mins with an interpreter yesterday and I said the President would be briefed. He wants to talk about China. Have you seen my memo on this? I have tried to give you and the President a formula.

K: Did you send it last night?

J: Yes.

K: It will show up in the next hour, I am sure.

J: Jim Wickler. The President knows him. He is taking Ushiba and Akatani. Anything from your meeting with Ushiba?

K: I should have called you! Gave his account of the Japanese domestic situation. Everything in a total turmoil as a result of China. Don't know whether to sponsor resolution and thought we would throw it over. I said your sponsorship will prevent Formosa from being overthrown so why do you fail to sponsor? He said no reason.

J: The Secy. had the same conversation with Fukuda. Very good conversations with Fukuda. Last evening at the opera and supper last night and lunch today. Very good go-rounds. He handled himself very well.

K: We are all set for this evening.

J: In that memo I cover a number of subjects. China is really the one.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/21

Tel: on: 10:05-9/11/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Secretary Rogers

R: Hello Henry. What did the President finally tell our friend last night about the Chinese rep thing.

K: He said what you said at the press conference. I know he was going to say that we are not going to press you, you must make your own decision. . . without our support it cannot be in the UN. He dropped out one sentence though.

R: Which was the important one.

K: Said in the treaty room. He may have done that purposely though. He was so afraid of leaks.

R: As you know we have asked a lot of nations to cosponsor -- it seems to me we have Japan where we want it.

K: He is a little goosy about somethings that could be presented as a . . .

R: I think if you read the paper - the Post story we came out good. . . The Japanese could say we are selling out our friends down the river just to deal with Peking.

K: Absolutely. The thing that worries me is that we don't want the Japanese to take a cheap shot at us, if they say we co-endorsed. . . .

R: . . . we have tried - if Japan won't go along and we don't have the votes everyone in the world will think we planned this with the PRC.

K: Let me check with the President to see what he said privately and maybe I should call Ushiba.

R: The President was playing on one side of the key board. He didn't want them to think we muscled them into joining us and that was fine and at the same time he didn't want to be put in the position where they were doing us any favors. . . . Fukuda gave the option of expressing a resolution.

K: But he did say that we intend to go through with it.

R: But what Fukudo's opponents are saying we are going to go through with it in a half hearted way. They are saying publicly and privately that the U.S. made a deal with the Communist China. They had to cover up a little bit - they are just going to go through the motions. . .

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By

NARA, Date

We will support the resolution but not cosponsor because the Japanese feel we are not serious about it. We will give up the ship. . . . I don't know if Fukudo felt that the President was serious or not.

K: KAMU Why don't I call Ushiba and tell him I want to make sure that he understands that the President shares their assessment. They have to decide whether they want Taiwan in the UN but without their cosponsorship it will not be in the UN.

R: I think that will be very helpful and if they do cosponsor we should have a fairly good chance of winning.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon:10:25-9/11/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Ambassador Ushiba

K: Hello Mr. Ambassador. I was just talking to the Secretary of State and we were wondering what conclusions you might have drawn from the meeting with the President yesterday.

U: Yes.

K: What conclusions did you draw?

U: There is nothing secret behind the arrangements of the President going to Peking and he is impressed by the importance of the Chinese cosponsor program. He talked to the Prime Minister last night. The Prime Minister . . .

K: But you understood that the President agrees with the Secretary of State with the sponsorship .(by this it is very related and we want to prevail???)

U: That is right.

K: We are not pressuring you but we are not going to change our position.

U: That is understood. The Prime Minister said he would make his decision upon his return to Japan.

K: Yes that is understood. We are not asking for an answer now. We just wanted to know if he understood.

U: Yes.

K: Goodbye.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon;10:28-9/11/71

K: I just talked to Ushiba and I said I just talked to the Secretary of State and wanted to make sure we all understood what you got out of the meeting with the President and he said there is no secret deal between us and the Chinese especially on the Chirep issue and that is what worried us most. And he said we have to be patient until Fukuda comes back because Sato has to make that decision himself. I think we are all together now.

R: I think that is what the President intended.

K: I think they really are deciding to support Taiwan because they don't want to see it go into Communist hands or into Peking hands.

R: I think you are right. They want to play it two ways. If they do cosponsor I think we have a fighting chance.

K: OK.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By Cee

NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Scotty Reston

9/14/71 9:45 a.m.

K: I didn't know that you had called to Assistants to the President; I see you cavorting around with Prime Ministers. That was a fascinating interview.

R: Yes, I thought it revealed some insights and some of the things were interesting.

K: I thought your articles also were enormously perceptive.

R: Well, you'd have to be a real amateur to screw up this China story.

K: This comparison with the puritan ethics and the drive toward a new man was fascinating to me.

R: There's no doubt that it's there. Whether it can succeed is another question, but the attempt itself is . . .

K: It's a tremendous spiritual exercise. These people who say it's a capitalist country are nuts.

R: I thought maybe the time had come when I might see the President of the United States since I haven't seen him since the days of the Oregon primary. Why don't you explore that? I don't want to take his time for just anything, but on the basis of the larger perspective of where the world is going I would like to have him agree to let me tape our conversation and then revise, extend, or throw it away as he likes.

K: Let me look into it. I am not optimistic -- not because of anything about you personally -- but let me raise it. And I hope I will have a chance to see you.

R: Of course.

K: Are you in Washington now?

R: Yes, but I'm on my way to the country with my sick wife. We're both just exhausted. But I'm only a short time away from Washington. Let me give you my number there: 703/EM4-4613.

K: Okay and I'll talk to the President. And congratulations.

R: Thank you.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TelCon:12:10-9/14/71

Mr. Kissinger/
William Buckley

K: Hello Bill. I noticed I must be off the Conservative list. You didn't call me.

B: I just came in last night for an Asian meeting. I have to see Senators Proxmire and Hughes(?). How are you.

K: Are you free for dinner by any chance?

B: I have an editors quarterly meeting and must go back right away. I could return though.

K: I am quite anxious to talk to you. How about lunch on Thursday?

B: Could I check with my New York calendar?

K: Or if it is easier for you, we could have dinner on Thursday evening. I would like to get your sense on what we have to make up our minds on a personal friend.

B: I got you.

K: I will ask Haig to join us.

B: Good.

K: Wonderful.

B: I will get in touch with Mr. Coleman of your staff and let you know.

K: Good.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON
Under Secretary Irwin
9/14/71 2:37 p.m.

I: I'm calling about a document. The Department thinks is in the President's office about the hija convention adopted at the Hague last December. Nine nations have ratified it and it goes into effect with the ratification of the tenth. We thought it would perhaps be appropriate, since the President made such a point of it, if we were the 10th nation.

K: Good point.

I: All it awaits is his signature, and since we are a dxps depository . . .

K: Let me see what I can do. I'll do something this afternoon. Jack, while I have you on the phone, we want an ambassadorship for Pete Vaky. I have been patient for eight months and I may have to do something I don't want to do like hold up lists. I don't think one should be punished for being on my staff.

I: I am all in favor of it and I will see what can be done.

K: I don't think DCM in Mexico is right for him. So if you could keep a benevolent eye on it . . . I'm talking to Flanigan about it too. He is really objectively outstanding.

I: I came to recognize that during my Peruvian days.

K: Don't you think so?

I: I think he is. I think he is outstanding, and he's doing a fine job.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CEC NARA, Date 5/27

L: on: 2:55-9/14/71

Mr. Kissinger/
Robert O. Anderson

A: Hello Henry.

K: How are you.

A: I wanted to report to you on my trip. It was rather unusual. I saw 35 or 40 people. Gevishini (? spelling) was very interesting. We attended 2 or 3 meetings together. They couldn't have been more cordial. Roberts was at one of the meetings and he said there was a marked change in their attitudes. We had complete accord on the environmental meetings. There was not one political invective and rapidly came across why couldn't the U. S. and the Soviet Union work more closely together. The cost of the new military equipment was hurting them in their social goal. Gevishini especially brought out the possibility of our company or some American company coming out to the Soviet Union on an equitable basis. I kept going back to the environmental subject and at all times stressed I was there only as a personal traveller. I am going/send you a paper on a park in which American and Soviet Union scientists worked together on. Now Gevishini took this very serious and asked if this was a proposal that we could really consider. If it is of interest to your country, I said I would see what I could personally do. We also went over four other ventures. I will send you the four papers plus the park paper and the list of people I saw. Roberts will be glad to see you.

K: I would like to get your own impressions. Joe is an old friend.

A: I told Gevishini if I could arrange a meeting with my friend in New Mexico would he and some of his people - say 2 or three - come over just for a social occasion. He said yes they would. You were one of the people I had in mind but did not mention your name.

K: Well that might work out.

A: I will send you the note. I will get these papers to you. Anneshev(? spelling) is coming over next week and I am going to have breakfast with him. If you think it has any merit, I would like to tell him it has complete privacy. I can arrange to bring their group from New York to New Mexico where it will be completely private.

K: I have no problem.

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dalo 5/27

I think it would be well until your while to do this. They kept
coming back saying they wanted to improve their relations with the
United States.

Well keep me informed and let me have your note.

I will be in Washington next Thursday morning.

You mean next week.

Yes, a week from this Thursday. When I see Anneschev next week
I would like to drop the ~~word~~ that if they would like to come over.

Yes, it is OK.

Now if he sets a date, what is your choice of a date?

Early next year or later this fall. Not before November.

November or December

That is fine.

I will send you the note and papers.

Excellent.

These people are not kidding.

I look forward to seeing the note and and it sounds consistent with the
other things.

Well Joe will give you a ring tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
9/14/71: 6:55 p.m.

K: Mel, I was just talking to the President. We have been reading the STAR story. We don't know what to do about the Pentagon.

L: That's just a cheap story!

K: Pentagon sources.

L: Did you read my press conference about a week ago?

K: No. Couldn't everybody just shut up!

L: You can't get the reporters to shut up.

K: I don't mean the reporters. Who the hell is Abrams to say there will be no residual forces!?

L: McGovern came out of the meeting with Abrams and said Vietnamization program eventually would provide for the total withdrawal...

K: Now that we are in the end phase of it...

L: I understand that correctly, Henry. But no one is talking in the Pentagon. If you are going to take McGovern's...

K: I don't give a damn about McGovern!

L: They are absolutely cheap stories. What they are doing is quoting military sources but I guarantee there is no military -- there might be some Army officers -- some are getting to the point where they think Vietnam has hurt the Army.

There will be no awards for getting out 2 months earlier

K: /if we get out in a way that the Communist are in power in Saigon, All this agony will have been in vain.

L: Maybe I had better get down to the President tonight...

K: No, he has a dinner with his wife -- don't come down.

L: ... because the situation is such there is no one talking in the Pentagon.

K: If you can just do the same to scare your people.

L: I have done that but you're going to get these cheap stories.

By NARA. Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
9/14/71; 6:55 p. m.

K: Really, the President was extremely disturbed.

L: What did he say about Stu Alsop's story?

K: He didn't say. But Stu is dying and he is no longer rational.

L: These guys are taking the lead -- they think Stu is close to the White House, etc. I understand Phil Potter wrote a story -- those are cheap stories -- they don't want to be outdone by Alsop. You will find that everyone from the Joint Chiefs, Service Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, absolutely understand this.

K: Did you see what Evans quotes me as saying about you in his book? He quotes me as saying Laird is a rascal but a good rascal.

L: That's good. I have other problems, you know. I can't do anything about the selective service thing. But these cheap stories will continue.

K: We are going to have an NSC meeting on Monday where the President will make the point with great vehemence.

L: I can't stop a cheap story like that.

K: I think if you scare your people.

L: You can't scare these people.

K: Just scare your own people.

L: There have been no questions answered on troop withdrawals.

K: No conversations in the corridors.

L: I can guarantee you...

K: Okay, Mel.

I

L: I have a few problems memos on the Corps of Army Engineers, etc.

K: But they don't come from the office.

L: But the President is a them.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
9/14/71; 6:55 p.m.

K: Tell Pursley to talk to Hair and send them back to me. Okay, we are counting on you on this final phase.

L: No problem. Did you see -- I think Al has the quote -- I said that there is NO -- absolutely nothing -- goal other than the goal of the President. I will be on the TODAY Show tomorrow.

K: Don't knock out possibility of residual forces either.

L: I think you ought to start calling it remaining forces.

K: Just don't give impression that there won't be any US forces left.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

Jim Schlesinger/Mr. Kissing

7:29 p.m., September 14, 1971

K: We have a problem about the event we were discussing -- you know what I mean.

S: Right.

K: And I can't describe to you what the ~~nature~~ nature of narrowing the window, I just wanted to ask you if possible to shift the whole thing to the end of the month. If you can do that, you can have from October 27th to eternity.

S: If the weather begins to ~~deteriorate~~ deteriorate, than -- let me check tomorrow. A probable yes.

K: The problem is I really ought to know tonight. There is another message that we must send out tonight.

S: The inter-groups in the courts, ~~Kissing~~ not sure we could get through the courts.

K: We could give you some -- certainly from the 29th indefinitely.

S: The weather has gotten quite bad up there. Kissing

K: From the 27th too.

S: Okay, let me check and get back to you within the hour.

K: The 29th would be easier but could do it on the 27th if it has to be.

S: Okay.

K: Right.

By NARA, Date

5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Jim Schlesinger
9/14/71; 8:20 p.m.

S: We can do it.

K: We can give you starting the 28th for an unlimited period.

S: I don't know what your precise problem is. Our problem is that we are doing to have to disassemble the device. We have the Navy starting up to it -- we would have to call them back.

K: Wait a minute, I am not sure we want you to do all that. My *judg* worry, Jim, is this. If we give you a window of six days and then have to bracket one of those with two others, is that what you really want?

S: I guess preferably not.

K: If we give you the whole window, would you prefer that to the 28th?

S: I think not.

K: Then start on the 28th. It will not under any circumstances be cancelled.

S: It will give me a better posture.

K: 28th or 29th.

S: Okay. We are going to have to disassemble this whole operation.

K: And get a lot of publicity.

S: We will have a lot of heat.

K: We are going to have a lot of theater going which will take the heat off.

S: From the 3rd to the 9th -- I think we can do . . .

K: Which do you want?

S: Can I tell you tomorrow?

K: My problem is that I have to get a message off tonight.

S: Okay, let me get back to you on that.

By CCO NARA, Date 3/27

TELCORN

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

8:22 p.m., September 14, 1971

M: I talked to Abrams. It was just exactly like I thought -- he didn't talk about the withdrawals, the times, or anything like that. He simply told McGovern that his <u>philosophical approach in working with the South Vietnamese</u> is to go toward balanced structure that would eventually be for the good of their country. The Army, Navy and Air Force are involved.

K: I will call the President immediately and reassure him.

M: I told Abrams what you said and I will pass it around the Pentagon tomorrow.

K: <u>Tom</u>, you are not our problem. I don't know where we would be without you.

M: (laughter)

K: I am fighting like a lion over here to keep tactical intelligence under the control of the military.

M: That would be disasterous otherwise. ...... you know what this fellow is up to, he is a lightweight though.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
9/14/71; 8:25 p. m.

P: I was wondering -- I notice they got four helicopters -- don't you think that is enough provocation to give them a couple of bangs?

K: I have to look at the details of how they got them.

P: I wouldn't be too ginger about that! What about McGovern and I why is Abrams and everybody sucking around him?

K: They are protecting their flanks. I raised hell with Moorer and Laird. They are going to send out additional orders to Abrams to keep his mouth shut.

P: Do you think Abrams put out "getting out by spring"?

K: No, I think that was by McGovern but I think Abrams was protecting himself by saying there would not be a residual force.

P: That's not his business! I think we have to consider withdrawing the son-of-abitch.

K: I think so, Mr. President. He is a meritorious person but he is no longer on top of this. I think we might think of a younger man who wants a reputation. But it will look like the last days of the Johnson Administration if we withdraw him.

P: Get someone second in command that will keep him from drinking too much and talking too much.

K: We can't get anyone that will keep him from drinking too much, but we can get someone to keep him from talking too much.

P: They go together! Do you have Laird silenced?

K: I called Laird. He said he would hold a meeting tomorrow and get pretty tough.

P: I think we need a meeting of Moorer and everybody and get them shaped up. We will do it Monday.

K: In the morning or afternoon?

By CEC NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
9/14/71; 8:25 p.m.

-2-

P: Probably here in the afternoon. 3:00 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. In the meantime, if you could message Bunker to see what the hell he could suggest with regard to the election to see what a fellow can do to make this more a referendum or do you think it is too late.

K: I think it is too late but I will cable him. I will send a cable to him, Mr. President, outlining the steps that could be taken -- give Ky and Minh an opportunity to campaign.

P: A choice on the ballot is more important than their chance to campaign -- vote for Thieu or vote no. The no votes will show lack of confidence. I don't think that's asking too much. He has already indicated he would go along with mutilation or not voting or throwing away a ballot.

K: And it looks as if that could be watched. I will get a message to him

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By CCO NARA, Date 9/27

TELCOM

Admiral Moorer/Mr. Kissinger

8:35 p.m., September 14, 1971

K: We have been reading the Washington Star. The President and I are just beside ourselves -- you shouldn't care that I am beside myself but that the President is different. It is about the announcement that all troops -- the Pentagon story that all troops will be withdrawn, that Abrams comments is quoted by McGovern, that there will be no residual forces left.

M: I don't think he said it.

K: No military officer is to say one goddamn word about withdrawals!

M: Right!

K: We are not going to get an award in this Administration for getting out three months early, only for being successful. They are not to say anything -- background or on any other basis. The President just called me for the third time screaming.

M: I don't think he said it.

K: The other thing, the people in Saigon to shut up! Not just Abrams but the press guys too.

M: Fine.

K: Just fire somebody.

M: Okay.

K: We will back you 100%. As a matter of interest, could you stay with me after some meeting in the next few days. I would like to discuss some ideas about the Defense budget.

M: Anything you say.

K: Some views of the President's about the ________ on the Navy. He has that intense interest on small carriers without prejudice to existing ones.

M: Any time.