Editorial/Opinion

Friday, January 8, 1993

郵遞物業可見

THE DAILY YOMIURI

The Potsdam Dialogue

# ‘A Strong And Powerful Country Tomorrow’

The following is the fourth installment of a five-part series of excerpts from a dialogue conducted on Dec. 18, 1992, in Potsdam, Germany, between Henry Kissinger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and moderated by The Yomiuri Shimbun's Hironobu Ishikawa.

**Part 4: Predictions on the Future of Yeltsin's Reforms**

**Ishikawa:** Over the past few months, Russian President Boris Yeltsin's radical reform plan has been attacked by hard-liners and the centrist conservative Civic Union Federation. What is your prediction about the future of Yeltsin's government in view of these destabilizing factors, and do you think there is a possibility that a coup could topple his regime?

**Kissinger:** I believe that the West should stop focusing its policy on individuals in Russia. Any society, any country, which makes itself totally dependent on one man, or any process that is alleged to be totally dependent on one man, is an inherently unstable process...I respect Yeltsin, he has great achievements to his credit, but the fate of Russia will depend on the solution of two underlying problems.

> "It was a mistake to let foreign economists come up with abstract models of how a very proud country with a long imperial tradition should move."

—Henry Kissinger

Problem one is the collapse of the communist system. That is primarily due to economic mismanagement. Problem two is the disintegration of the Russian Empire, started by Peter the Great and carried on by both czars and commissars for 350 years...

Problem one, the collapse of communism, has produced the economic crisis because, in a system in which everything moves by allocation, a new feudalistic—or semi-feudalistic—class system emerges, and its shift to a free market meets massive resistance, and also in a population which does not understand the incentives of a free market.

It was a mistake to let foreign economists come up with abstract models of how a very proud country with a long imperial tradition should move from total planning to a free market in a brief period of time and, on the basis of what is essentially perceived as foreign advice.

I do not know the new prime minister, but I believe that he has certain

advantages. He is a man of the establishment, and he is a man of the People's Congress. Therefore, if he were to continue on the reform course, even if it went somewhat more slowly, it will no longer be a totally solitary initiative of Yeltsin's, reducing the Russian president's vulnerability. One should at least give him the possibility of proving that it is in good faith when he says he wants to continue on a reform course...

...I also believe that it is too simple to claim that the future of market economics and the future of democracy depend on whether we gave $10 billion or $20 billion more or less. We should focus assistance on specific areas where we can determine criteria, and we should let the Russians be freer to decide some of their own programs.

The second issue which has in my view received too little mention is this: A dominant feature of Russian history is a passionate nationalism. For Russian nationalists, the experience of the last four or five years has been profoundly humiliating and we must both understand and show sensitivity toward them...

The big foreign policy problem is this: If it is possible to help Russia in her reform program and if the reform program succeeds, will Russia then behave like historic Russia—which means she will seek to dominate all her neighbors, including most of the former Soviet republics—or will she say to itself, “We are liberated. We can now be Russians. We can go from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, which is 11 time zones. We must concentrate on developing that area.” With an inward-looking Russia we can all live in perfect harmony. We would have no problem with such a Russia. But if Russia should begin to think of herself like

Serbia, even using gentler methods, we will have the seeds of constant European crises...

**Genscher:** Henry Kissinger is quite right in saying that many foreign consultants turned up in Moscow telling the Russians...how to introduce the market economy overnight..."Flip the switch and you do not have socialism any more, you have a market economy instead." They tried to do all this without the people required, without the manpower, without the laws required for this purpose and all the other preparatory steps that have to be taken...

It was said they have to focus on the sectors where the Russians can be helped. I think, first of all, we can give them our own know-how and experience by providing on-the-spot training, for example, from the West to show people how the market economy operates...within professional organizations and also on a national or state level...

We must consider what products there are in Russia...that could already be sold in the world market today, which are already competitive in the world market.

If you look at this objectively, all you have is oil, natural gas and raw materials...Western aid must first be applied where these natural resources are recovered from the ground and made available to the world market. We see that production of energy and raw materials is going down. In other words, it is becoming more and more difficult to modernize the energy and raw materials business. But this must be done...This will pave the way for further developments.

The new prime minister has experience precisely in this very area. We must realize and appreciate this.

Therefore, I share the view that the Russians and all of us have potential in this area.

The politicians tell us that we must, of course, accept and acknowledge and endorse the successor states of the former Soviet Union, which we have done. And we must consider as well how we can embed Russia to an increasing extent within international relationships and within the European economic area.

I think it is essential for Europe to realize that beyond the borders of the EC and the central European states there is something else as well and that we must regard ourselves as a larger economic area for this purpose. We should not regard ourselves as one common market, including Russia, that we need one common market including Russia but we need one common telecommunications structure, infrastructure and energy structure.

The transport of energy alone, for example, from Russia, if it were recovered there today, still presents problems and the transport of energy to other parts of the world, to other parts of Europe. With this in mind, it is essential to build up a pan-European infrastructure to provide closer links

> "They tried to do all this without the people required, without the manpower, without the laws required...."

—Hans-Dietrich Genscher

between Russia and Europe, to our mutual advantage. It is also a big opportunity for Japan if this happens. At the same time this would give the eastern parts of Russia in particular great potential for the future.

I think that greater inclusion, a greater integration of Russia also into a world economic summit would be very important. The way Gorbachev was treated in London was not appropriate; the way Yeltsin was treated in Munich was not appropriate. This was not just due to Germany. There was other resistance at the time.

Even though Russia is an economically weak country at the moment, it will be a strong and powerful country tomorrow...The worst thing to do would be to isolate Russia...We should have as many contacts as possible and as close and competent a cooperation as possible.

**Tomorrow, Part 5: Solving the Dispute Over the Northern Territories**

Copyright (c) 1993 The Yomiuri Shimbun

THE DAILY YOMIURI

第三種郵便物便可

World

world news briefs

Kidnappers, Victim Killed

MANILA (AP)—Police killed four
kidnappers and their Philippine-
Chinese kidnap victim in a gun bat-
tle Thursday along one of Manila's
busiest thoroughfares.

Police identified the slain kidnap
victim as Charlene Sy, a third-year
high school student at Grace Chris-
tian High School.

Like many recent kidnap victims in
Manila and the southern Philippines,
Sy was a member of the influential
Filipino-Chinese community.

Most of the victims are released
after paying ransom and the fami-
lies rarely complain to the police.

Chinese Customs Bureau

HONG KONG (AFP)—China is to
set up its first customs investiga-
tion bureau in a move to curb grow-
ing smuggling activities, a report
here said Thursday.

With an initial staff of 700, the
bureau will be set up next week in
Shenzhen, which borders Hong
Kong, the semiofficial Hong Kong
China Service said.

The agency, quoting Chinese cus-
toms officials, said the bureau was
needed because smuggling was in-
creasing along with the country's
expanding trade.

Last year, customs officials in
Shenzhen uncovered more than
5,000 smuggling cases, an increase
of more than 30 percent over 1991,
with a total value of 250 million
yuan ($43 million).

Reagan Denies Vote Choice

LOS ANGELES (Reuter)—For-
mer President Ronald Reagan on
Wednesday angrily denied a U.S.
magazine report that he voted for
Democrat Bill Clinton in the U.S.
presidential election on Nov. 3, dis-
missing it as “nonsense.”

"After more than 80 years on this
Earth and several decades in public
life, I thought I'd heard everything.
But this week's 'TV Guide' (magazine)
story ranks up there with the worst
of them," Reagan said in a statement.

"To put an end to such nonsense,
I'll spell it out for you once and for
all. I actively campaigned and ener-
getically supported George Bush in
the November election and I proud-
ly cast my vote for him," he said.

Justice Minister Killed

NICOSIA (Reuter)—Libya's justice
and public order minister, Ibrahim
Mohamed Bakkar, has been killed in
a traffic accident while returning from
an Arab League meeting in Tunisia,
Libyan television reported Wednesday.

The television, monitored by the
British Broadcasting Corporation,
quoted an official announcement from
the General People's Congress, General
People's Committee and Revolutionary

Serbian Gang Rape: One Woman

ZAGREB (AP)—Aida B. has been gang-raped, she is in a strange city and she is six months pregnant. She refers to the child as “it” and “this.” Her psychiatrist says she tries never to touch her belly.

It has been months since the dark-haired for-
mer factory worker has heard from her husband
and daughter. And while the new life grows
strong and healthy inside her body, 30-year-old
Aida carries the emotional scars of the baby's con-
ception.

Aida B. is not her real name, but then little re-
mains of her former life. She is one of thousands
of Bosnian Muslim women who, Bosnian officials
claim, have been raped by Serb soldiers—includ-
ing neighbors and acquaintances—in attacks at
home or in special “rape camps.” Survivors say
many women were killed.

There are no certain figures on how many wom-
en have been subjected to such treatment, but the
stories emerging recently have caused an interna-
tional outcry. Bosnian Serb leaders say the claims
are lies, and that Serb women have been subject-
ed to rape by Muslims.

Meanwhile, Aida and her sisters deal with a
very personal tragedy.

Aida tells her story with composure, but there
is a constant edge to her voice. Before Bosnia ex-
ploded in war this spring, she lived quietly in the
eastern town of Gorazde with her husband and
10-year-old daughter Selma.

The siege of Gorazde—a town with a prewar
population that was 60 percent Muslim and 40
percent Serb—by Serb nationalists dubbed
Chetniks lasted months. But Aida says it came to
a quick and terrible end.

"While Chetniks were besieging our town, I and

10 other women from the neighborhood, some
with children, hid in my three-room apartment at
the outskirts of Gorazde," she said in an inter-
view Tuesday.

On July 12, the Serb irregulars broke into the
apartment.

"Some wore face
camouflage," she re-
called. "I recognized
two by voice as local
Serbs. Three of them
took me to one room
and raped me all
night. After some
time I grew numb
except for screams I
could hear from oth-
er rooms and apart-
ments."

Aida escaped in the morning when the soldiers
fell asleep. The others were not so lucky, and
what happened to them is uncertain.

But being out of Gorazde did not mean being
free. The next several months she was trapped with
other Muslims in territory surrounded by Serbs.

Aida noticed she was pregnant and hoped she
could get an abortion.

But it took months for her to reach safety. In
November Aida joined a group that broke through
Serb lines via Mt. Izman to the Croatian-held
town of Kiseljak west of Sarajevo. In early
December she was reunited with her sister and
brother-in-law in Zagreb.

By then her pregnancy was well into its second
trimester.

Veselko Grizelj, chief obstetrician of Zagreb's
Petrova Hospital, said Aida first came to the hos-

pital in her 29th week
and any legal et

The laws of prede-
Croatia allow abort-
weeks, and the hos-
cides on cases betwee

"If I tell, if other women like me to
the revenge will never stop, it will
on for generations. And when the
ends, Muslims and Serbs will ag-
have to live together in my city."

Serbian-Rape

bly give up their babi-

"Women who were
the children," he said
and forget."

Aida "always refers
'it,' and tries never
come to Jarmila Skrinjaric, Ai

She constantly thin-

She last heard from
the Bosnian government
broke out, she sent Se-
a village near Gorazde

There has been no
Aida has convinced her

And she struggles w-

"Nobody must know
to her belly, "especially
father-in-law."

Many Muslim wor-

Chinese Dissident Ready
To Begin New Life In U.S.

NEW YORK (Reuter)—A Chinese
dissident who has spent 3½ years in
hiding because of his role in the 1989
pro-democracy uprising arrived in New
York Wednesday to begin a new life
without fear.

Novelist Zheng Yi, 45, who arrived
at John F. Kennedy Airport with his
wife, Zhao Xiaoming, a 36-year-old
writer who uses the pen name Bei
Ming, came out of hiding in Hong Kong
after he was granted political asylum
in the United States.

They have spent 43 months in hiding
in China and Hong Kong.

"It's a totally different feeling. In
China I was on the wanted list. Now in
the United States I feel fine. I feel re-
laxed," he told reporters through a
translator on arriving at Kennedy.

He will start his new life with other
dissidents who have joined the
Princeton China Initiative, a research
group with ties to Princeton University
in northern New Jersey.

The group was founded after the
Tiananmen Square pro-democracy up-
rising in June 1989. It examines
Chinese current affairs issues.

Gxi about 100 people were eaten dur-
ing the period.

"This is not a unique situation. It
happened quite often in other provin-
ces," he said.

Zheng was one of the most-wanted
fugitives in China from the 1989 uprising
for co-writing the "May 16 Manifesto"—
a petition that scorned patriarch Deng
Xiaoping as "a senile and fatuous autocrat."

Zheng fled Beijing as Chinese troops
violently put down the protests on June
4, 1989. He was protected by sympathet-
ic officials and peasants as he worked
his way south toward Hong Kong.

Police jailed Zheng's wife for 10
months after the crackdown but failed
to flush him out of hiding. She eventu-
ally rejoined her husband in South
China, where they plotted their escape.

Their departure from Hong Kong
ended nine months of frustration and
false starts involving Canadian, U.S.
and British efforts to secure a place of
permanent refuge.

Hong Kong's British administra-
tion—which tolerated Zheng's presence
on condition it was kept secret—is re-
luctant to harbor Chinese political

Editorial/Opinion

Saturday, January 9, 1993

第三種郵便物認可

THE DAILY YOMIURI

The Potsdam Dialogue

# The 21st Century: Shared Responsibility

The following is the final installment of a five-part series of excerpts from a dialogue conducted on Dec. 18, 1992, in Potsdam, Germany, between Henry Kissinger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and moderated by The Yomiuri Shimbun's Hironobu Ishikawa.

**Ishikawa:** Japan needs a solution to the problem of the Northern Territories.

Do you think Japan is not doing enough in terms of the extension of aid and cooperation to the former Soviet Union? Could you please comment on how Japan should structure its relations with Russia.

**Kissinger:** The so-called Northern Islands are claimed by Japan itself to belong to Japan, and the United States has supported this. Still it is very inappropriate for a foreigner to prescribe negotiating tactics to the Japanese.

The two choices that have been considered up to now were: Should Japan hold back on most aid in order to give Russia the greatest opportunity to make concessions; or, should Japan join full-scale in giving aid in order to engender enough gratitude in Russia to help her make concessions?

Probably the best course is somewhere in between. At one point in the Gorbachev period I was under the impression that he was on the way to giving up those islands...

He was thwarted because the Russian republic opposed giving away territory that was considered Russian. I believe that in part this was a tactic by which to appeal to Russian nationalism. Therefore, it seems it would be extremely difficult for Yeltsin to make a 180-degree turn, whatever he intends to do.

...Is it possible for Russia to negotiate with Japan about the islands if it is part of a bigger negotiation? If the negotiation is only about the islands, then Yeltsin will have to answer immediately as to whether or not they are going to give them up. If there is a bigger negotiation on a whole host of issues—for example, Far Eastern problems—it would be easier for both sides to discuss the issue without pressure. In such a context Japan might find it possible to show greater flexibility in the issue of economic aid, especially for the Far East.

**Genscher:** The question of the Japanese islands cannot, of course, be linked to that of the German unification, although there are certain parallels. We do face the question of whether we should say, first unification,

then cooperation, or whether we should rather say “unification through cooperation.”

German policy decided very early on that unification through cooperation but not as an isolated problem....

I think that at this point is going to be difficult for Japan to solve the problem of the islands because it is too focused on the question of the islands. The time will have to come when this can be wrapped up.... There are not any other islands that they can give you, so that means you have to try to embed it in a larger or broader development in which Russia does not just have its prestige at stake but its inter-

“One has to hope that the nationalism we are seeing now in the Balkans and the fundamentalism we are seeing in the Middle East is contained, and can be given a positive turn.”

—Henry Kissinger

ests are also to be seen as pursued with advantage in the development.

My understanding is that the Japanese government has in fact reacted in those terms. When Yeltsin canceled his visit they were not looking for a confrontation against Russia. They wanted, in fact, to leave all the doors open and are now trying to create a climate in which all issues can be discussed, not just the one, because that is seen as the only possible way in the final analysis of making the problem of the islands also soluble.

Japan, without a doubt, does have a

good opportunity now, without actually giving anything up, to improve its relations with Russia because it is going to be the host of the next G-7, the next world economic summit....

**Ishikawa:** To wrap up our discussion, I'd like to slightly rephrase the question I asked at the beginning of this dialogue: What kind of world do you foresee for the 21st century and what kind of role should Germany and Japan play?

**Genscher:** In the next century I think we are going to experience a world that will face the global problems we talked about this morning.

“Also, we are going to have very much stronger regional associations because it is easier now for states to maintain their political independence and to develop economically, if they do that together with others.”

—Hans-Dietrich Genscher

Our world is going to be far more widely aware of those problems of common responsibility for the world economy...We share a common responsibility for the protection of our natural environment—the basis of our existence—and not just an environmental policy that abandons the south to its own devices. We have a responsibility for the stability of the world. That also means that we do not allow weapons of mass destruction to proliferate all over the world. There is a common responsibility

also for ensuring respect for international law....

We know today far more about each other...This has not only fostered economic development, but it has also led to increasing democracy in various parts of the world. Also, we are going to have very much stronger regional associations because it is easier now for states to maintain their political independence and to develop economically, if they do that together with others. They have before them the example of the European Community....

I foresee that many ideas of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) will also make their way in the East Asian area and in cooperation of that sort Japan will also find its place.

...What we have today is a more pluralistic world. It is not easier to cope with—at times it requires a great deal of courage and farsightedness. But there are greater opportunities for everyone. Therefore, notwithstanding our awareness of the risks and dangers, I would look forward to the next century with great confidence.

**Kissinger:** I would say that what happens in the next century will depend crucially on what we do in the next 10 years. I can imagine a positive evolution, and I can also imagine a very dangerous evolution.

The positive evolution would be one where the nations of the world learned how to handle the much more complex geopolitical situation that has arisen as a result of the end of the Cold War, and if they learn to cooperate in order to tend to the enormous positive opportunities available. That should be possible, and also easier than what they had to do in the 1945-1950 period.

Secondly, they have to learn to deal with current global problems—nuclear proliferation and nuclear power, population and the environment. That is more difficult because in hardly any governments are there institutions for dealing with these as long-range global problems....

The question is whether the generation of the '80s can be brought to see the same things that we have described here. Whether or not what we have described here is accurate, it is the opportunity that we have tried to describe.

THE DAILY YOMIURI

第三種郵便物認可

World

world news briefs

### 3 Arrested In Racial Attack

TAMPA, Fla. (Reuter)—Three white men have been charged with setting a black man on fire as they called him a “nigger” in a vicious New Year’s Day racial attack.

Hillsborough County (Tampa) police made the arrests on Wednesday night. The victim, Christopher Wilson, 31, of Brooklyn, New York, was still in serious condition in hospital on Thursday, recuperating from skin graft surgery. The burns covered nearly 40 percent of his body.

Police said two of the men forced their way into Wilson's Cadillac as he was buying a newspaper, made him drive to a remote location and robbed him. A third man followed in a van and then all three doused Wilson with gasoline and set him on fire.

### Rains Kill 14

MEXICO CITY (Reuter)—At least 14 people are thought to have been killed and hundreds made homeless by heavy rains that lashed into the northern border city of Tijuana on Thursday, a government official said.

Eduardo Navarro Gonzalez, chief of information for the state government of Baja California, said the death toll, up from 10 earlier in the day, was based on preliminary reports from rescue officials and had not yet been confirmed.

Navarro said the deaths were the result of electrical charges, collapsed houses and mudslides, all the result of steady rains that began in the early morning hours and dumped about 10 cm of water on the city by nightfall.

### Panda Experiment Fails

WASHINGTON (AFP-Jiji)—Scientists at the National Zoo have failed in an laboratory attempt to fertilize the eggs of the giant female panda Ling-Ling, who died last week.

Zoo spokesman Bob Hoage said the scientists planned to study why the attempt at in-vitro fertilization following Ling-Ling's death failed.

About 185 eggs were extracted from Ling-Ling's body after her death from heart failure, and zoo scientists tried to fertilize some with sperm from her mate.

The pandas had been the most popular animals at the zoo since they were donated by China in 1972. But their failure to produce a healthy cub drew almost as much attention. Ling-Ling gave birth five times, but all of the offspring died

# Despite Final Victories, Mediocrity

By Karen Hosler
The Baltimore Sun

WASHINGTON—Work is nearly complete on the reviewing stands in front of the White House for President-elect Bill Clinton's inaugural parade, but U.S. President George Bush is still inside busily trying to squeeze the last drops out of his presidency.

Following a tradition as old as the republic, but with more fervor than most of his predecessors, Bush seems determined in these final days in office to ensure that Americans remember him fondly—and maybe even regret they threw him out.

But historians say it will not make much difference.

The last-minute gestures for which

Bush is now being praised, such as his relief mission to starving victims of war-torn Somalia, as well as the final embarrassments, including his wholesale pardon of six Iran-Contra defendants, are likely to be little more than footnotes on a record destined to be dismissed as mediocre.

"The problem is he's not known for doing anything domestically, and internationally he didn't take advantage of the opportunities handed him, like the end of the Cold War," said James Thurber, director of the Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies at The American University in Washington. "He'll be remembered for Desert Storm, but you can't base your whole presidency on that."

Not even the hastily concluded nu-

clear arms treaty Bush signed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow last weekend can secure Bush an exalted place among his colleagues now.

"Average or less than average is about the best he can do," said William Leuchtenburg, a history professor at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

In contemporary terms, that means Bush will probably not be regarded as highly as his former ticketmate, Ronald Reagan. Despite other shortcomings, Reagan gets credit for boldly pursuing an agenda that changed the direction of U.S. politics.

But Bush can still rise above the rank of former President Carter, a poor administrator who could not get his se-

## France Informs China Of Sale Of Jets To Taiwan

BEIJING (AP)—France has informed Beijing that it has approved the sale of 60 Mirage fighter jets to Taiwan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official said Thursday.

In Paris, the French government for the first time Thursday publicly confirmed that it has given the go-ahead to the Dassault Co. to sell the warplanes.

"The French government recently informed the Chinese government of the sale of 60 Mirage 2000-5s to Taiwan," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Daniel Bernard.

As recently as Tuesday, Paris was insisting that it had only given permission for negotiations with potential customers.

Beijing's rival government on Taiwan also refused to comment on published reports of the sale. However, the Nationalist government tacitly confirmed them Tuesday when its Cabinet asked Parliament to approve a defense budget of $12.75 billion to cover purchasing new French and U.S. jet fighters. The French contract is for $6.7 billion to cover the Mirage warplanes and air-to-air missiles.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Wu Jianmin said at a weekly briefing that China asked for confirmation from France when reports that Paris had approved the sale first appeared.

### Body Postage

Elvis fan Lavera Chapel, from White Lake, Mich., sports an 'Elvis stamp' tattoo and earrings as she waits at the Rockabilly Cafe for the stamp unveiling ceremonies on

Thursday at Gracelae
which is being issued
his 58th birthday, go-

## Temperature Measurements Support Big F**

PHOENIX, Ariz. (AP)—The “big bang” passed its toughest test yet, as measurements of primordial tempera-

and particles outward uniformly in all directions. At the moment of the explosion, temperatures would have been

verse, Mather said, it had to come from
one source.

"The big bang is still the simplest ex-

10 / DOMINGO

EL PAÍS, domingo 17 de enero de 1993

El pasado 18 de diciembre, el ex secretario de Estado norteamericano Henry Kissinger y el ex ministro de Exteriores alemán Hans-Dietrich Genscher se reunieron en Potsdam para hablar de un amplio abanico de temas internacionales y dar su opinión sobre el mundo en los albores del siglo XXI. Se trataba de reproducir, aunque con menos interlocutores, aquella famosa 'Conferencia de Potsdam' que configuró el mundo moderno.

KEYSTONE

Sobre estas líneas, una imagen histórica: Winston Churchill, el presidente Harry Truman y Stalin se estrechan las manos en Potsdam el verano de 1945. A la derecha, el ex secretario de Estado norteamericano Henry Kissinger, en una fotografia reciente, y el ex ministro alemán de Exteriores Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

La conversación se desarrrolló en las afueras de Berlin, en el escenario de la histórica conference de 1945 entre Winston Churchill, Josef Stalin y Harry Truman. Hironuby Ishikawa, subdirector del periódico japonés *The Yomiuri Shimbun*, actuó de moderador del extenso análisis protagonizado por estos dos pesos pesados de la política internacional.

**Pregunta:** ¿Cómo definen la incertidumbre política que estamos viviendo tras el fin de la guerra fría entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética?

**Kissinger.** El mundo ha estado acostumbrado al conflicto entre las dos superpotencias, Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética, y le resulta muy difícil adaptarse a una nueva realidad. Esta nueva realidad es una en la que no sólo se ha desintegrado el comunismo, sino que el imperio ruso—que ha estado aquí desde Pedro el Grande— también se ha desintegrado.

En segundo lugar, por razones diplomáticas, ya no hay dos superpotencias, sino cinco o seis centros de poder más o menos iguales. (...)

En tercer lugar, también en Europa hay varias instituciones que atraviesan momentos difíciles. La OTAN ya no tiene un enemigo, y ahora es una alianza en busca de una misión. La Comunidad Europea se creó en parte como contrapeso a Estados Unidos y en parte para incorporar Alemania a Occidente sin renovar el miedo a Alemania. Esto resultaba más fácil cuando Alemania estaba dividida que cuando se unificó, porque una Alemania unida —y mi amigo

Hans-Dietrich puede corregirme—ya no siente la misma necesidad de subordinarse a instituciones multilaterales que sentía la Alemania dividida.

Todas éstas son, pues, condiciones completamente nuevas. En ausencia del conflicto entre las superpotencias, hay rivalidades étnicas, que siempre han existido, pero que se fortalecieron a causa del comunismo, porque era la única forma de afirmar la identidad nacional frente a los Estados totalitarios. Ahora afloran y representan un alejamiento del pasado.

**Genscher.** Creo que puede afirmarse con cierta seguridad que el final de la guerra fría representa una evolución más bien

revolucionaria. El pensamiento en el mundo occidental estaba profundamente marcado por el conflicto Este-Oeste. El enfrentamiento entre el Este y Occidente estaba mucho más profundamente influido por eso de lo que quizá imaginara la mayoría de la gente. Eso explica por qué hoy se están replanteando muchas preguntas para las que creiamos tender respuesta.

Un ejemplo que viene al caso es la cuestión de la necesidad de una unidad europea. Hace sólo unos años, los métodos de la Comunidad Europea se consideraban en gran medida incuestionables. Lo que hoy vemos es que (...) se plantean preguntas que recuerdan el viejo egoismo na-

cional. Los que estamos en el Mercado Común tenemos que preguntarnos si tenemos o no mayores ventajas, si somos o no más independientes.

## La OTAN y la URSS

La creación del Mercado Común puede verse como una respuesta a la amenaza que representaba la Unión Soviética, pero no es así. Si lo es que la OTAN se creó como una respuesta a la amenaza de la Unión Soviética. Pero la CE, el Mercado Común, por su parte, se fundaron por otras razones.

Si se pretende dar una respuesta en términos históricos a

las guerras fratricidas del pasado siglo entre las naciones europeas (...), la idea era crear (...) una asociación con peso para contrarrestar a Estados Unidos. Un elemento importante era introducir las nuevas partes de Alemania en una estructura europea(...)

**P.** ¿Qué clase de orden mundial creen que emergera en el siglo XXI?

**Kissinger.** Si pensamos en el siglo XXI, tendremos (...) un elemento completamente nuevo. Estados Unidos estará cada vez más orientado hacia el hemisferio oeste. Uno de los grandes cambios en la política exterior estadounidense —y la decisión más importante de la Administración de Bush— fue el Tratado de Libre Comercio Norteamericano (NAFTA). Lo situaría en algún lugar intermedio entre la política exterior tradicional y la nueva política exterior. La nueva política exterior—medio ambiente, armas nucleares y energía nuclear, población y hambre— se enfrenta al dilema de que son problemas globales que hay que resolver a nivel nacional(...)

Tenemos que encontrar nuevas formas de pensamiento. Por ejemplo, de los problemas que hay en la antigua Unión Soviética, me preocupan más las plantas de energía nuclear defectuosas, que son absolutamente inseguras, que algunos de los problemas cotidianos sobre los que constantemente leemos cosas. El nuevo orden mundial tiene que encontrar instituciones y mecanismos parecidos a los que crearon, entre 1945 y 1950, los artifices del orden internacional posterior a la II Guerra Mundial. Las posibilidades para la creatividad son mayores de lo que eran

# El mundo visto por Kissinger y Genscher

Los ex ministros de Exteriores de EE UU y de Alemania reproducen un nuevo diálogo de Potsdam

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HENRY KISSINGER?

For release Sunday, January 10, 1993?

PART 1 OF 5
POTSDAM DIALOGUE?

(c) 1993, The Yomiuri Shimbun. Distributed by Los Angeles
Times Syndicate?

On Dec. 18, 1992, former U. S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German vice
chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, met in Potsdam to
discuss a wide range of global issues -- including U. N.
intervention in Somalia, the Northern Territories dispute and
nuclear weapons control in the 21st Century. This is the first
of five parts of highlights of that discussion, held at the
suburban Berlin site of the historic 1945 conference between
Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Harry Truman. The Potsdam
dialogue was moderated by Hironobu Ishikawa, deputy managing
editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun. -- Editor?

Ishikawa: I'd like to begin the discussion by asking you to
generally discuss the current international order. How do you
characterize the political uncertainties that have developed
following the conclusion of the Cold War confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: The world has been used to a conflict between
the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union,
and it finds it very difficult to adjust itself to a new
reality. The new reality is one in which not only has

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communism disintegrated, but the Russian empire -- which has been here since Peter the Great -- has also disintegrated. <

Secondly, for diplomatic purposes there are no longer two superpowers, but five or six more or less equal power centers. I know the United States is militarily the strongest, but the circumstances in which its military power is relevant are diminishing. Yet the United States has very little experience with a world that consists of many powers and which it can neither dominate nor from which it can simply withdraw in isolation. <

Thirdly, in Europe, too, various institutions are having difficulties. NATO no longer has an enemy and is now an alliance in search of a mission. The European Community was created partly as a balance to the United States, partly as a means of incorporating Germany into the West without creating a renewed fear of Germany. This was easier when Germany was divided than when it became unified because a united Germany -- and my friend Hans-Dietrich can correct me -- no longer feels the same need to subordinate itself to multilateral institutions as a divided Germany did. <

So all of these are brand-new conditions. In the absence of the superpower conflict, there are ethnic rivalries, which have always existed but which were strengthened by communism because it was the one way to assert national identity against the totalitarian states. These are now coming to the surface and they represent departures from the past. <

Genscher: I think it can be said with some certainty that the end of the Cold War does represent a generally revolutionary development. Thinking in the Western world was very deeply marked by the East-West conflict. The East-West confrontation was very much more strongly marked by that than perhaps most people realized. That explains why today many questions are now being asked to which we thought we had answers. <

One example of this is the question of the need for European unity. Only a few years ago the processes within the European Community were regarded as largely uncontroversial. What we are seeing today is that ... questions are being asked that are reminiscent of the old national egotism. For us in the Common Market, we have to ask whether we have greater advantages, if we are more independent. <

The founding of the Common Market can be seen as one response to the threat from the Soviet Union, but that is not the case. It certainly is the case that the foundation of NATO was a response to the threat from the Soviet Union. But the EC, the Common Market, for its part, was granted for different reasons. <

If in historical terms you try to provide a response to the fratricidal wars that have taken place over the last century among the European Nations ... the idea was to create ... a weight of partnership as a counterbalance to the United States. An important element in this was to bring in the new parts of Germany into a European structure. <

The basic historical idea has lost nothing of its

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justification so far as the process of European union is concerned.... Many new answers have to be found to these odd questions. We have seen that with the Maastricht process. We are going to have to search for those answers in response to these changes.<

How do we wish to contribute to the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and in southeastern Europe? How do we wish to help to ensure that this takes place in a stable way? How can we create a prerequisite for stable development and how can we be assured that U. S. -European relations can be structured against this background?<

All of these questions have to be answered anew ... quite promptly in order to dispel the uncertainty .... <

Ishikawa: It is said the old world order has gone with the fall of the Soviet Union and we are now groping for a new world order. What kind of new world order do you foresee emerging in the 21st Century?<

Kissinger: ... As we look into the 21st Century, we will ... have a brand-new element. The United States will become more and more oriented toward the Western Hemisphere. One of the big changes in American foreign policy -- and the biggest single thing that took place during the Bush Administration -- was the North American Free Trade Agreement. I would put this somewhere in between traditional foreign policy and the new foreign policy. The new foreign policy -- environment, nuclear weapons and nuclear power, population and starvation -- suffers from the dilemma that they are global problems but are dealt with nationally.<

I am against unilateral 'humanitarian intervention.' It is something that has to be done on a multilateral basis or it should not be done at all.<

We have to find new ways of thinking. For example, among the problems in the former Soviet Union, I am more worried about faulty nuclear power stations that are totally unsafe than I am about some of the day-to-day problems we keep reading about. The new world order has to find institutions and mechanisms similar to what the creators of the post-world War II international order founded in the period from 1945 to 1950. The possibilities for creativity are greater than they were then, though the beginnings of the solutions are not yet as obvious.<

Genscher: That brings us to the key question -- which is whether we can muster the same boldness, the same farsightedness and the same conceptual capability in shaping these problems and our responses to them. Let me illustrate this by giving some examples.<

...Through its existence, NATO was able to stand in the way of Soviet expansionism. If there were to be a new development of this sort in the East, NATO would be in a position to respond to it accordingly. What it cannot do is to close the borders of Europe to millions of people driven by hunger, in need and desperation .... What NATO cannot do is to protect against the dangers presented by nuclear power stations that Dr. Kissinger has rightly mentioned.<

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We must not forget that the greatest danger facing Europe in recent years was in fact Chernobyl. It was not the use of nuclear weapons .... Many problems and many challenges are global in this new world. They are not of a conventional or classical military type. That means that the capabilities that countries have in the economic sphere, in the environmental sphere, are going to be very much more important. <

Then there is the problem of nationalism that we face in Europe .... It is much more obvious in Eastern Europe than in the West because for centuries ... there was oppression, the was an ideological strait-jacket in place and that meant that the sense of national identity was suppressed. It is now discharging itself. It is bursting out and the pendulum is swinging back in the other direction. <

The question that faces us today is: How can we respond to this development? Are we going to run away and say, "... Let this development take its course." Or will we try to offer peoples that are now seeking their national identity -- now rediscovering it and reliving it -- European prospects? ... People in central and southeastern Europe want those European prospects. They are looking to the EC for obvious economic reasons, of course, to have a European perspective. It is going to depend very much whether the European Community has the capability of shouldering its responsibilities .... <

NEXT: The Changing Role of the United Nations. <

(c) 1993, The Yomiuri Shimbun. Distributed by Los Angeles Times Syndicate.

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<
FOR RETRANSMISSION, PLEASE CONTACT BETH BARBER, L. A. TIMES
INTL<

HENRY KISSINGER<

For release Sunday, January 10, 1993<

<
PART 2 OF 5<
POTSDAM DIALOGUE<

<
(c) 1993, The Yomiuri Shimbun. Distributed by Los Angeles
Times Syndicate<

<
Excerpts from the Dec. 18, 1992, Potsdam Dialogue between
former U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German vice chancellor and
minister of foreign affairs, and moderated by Hironobu
Ishikawa deputy managing editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun. --
Editor<

<
Ishikawa: Hopes have been raised that the United Nations
will increasingly choose to intervene to resolve regional
conflicts in the world and perform other duties to protect
global peace. What increasing roles do you expect from the
United Nations in the decade to come?<

Genscher: When the United Nations was founded, an attempt
was made to draw lessons from the failure of the League of
Nations. ... The assumption then was that there was a certain
fundamental consensus among the victorious powers that emerged
from World War II. In order to secure that basic consensus for
the long term, they built the right of veto into the Security
Council so that a certain joint pressure could also be brought
to bear in world affairs. What was not foreseen, or what was
perhaps neglected, at the time was ... that there would be a

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confrontation between the Western states and the Soviet Union.

... That led to a situation where for decades the United Nations was unable to fulfill the hopes that had been placed in it. <

What we are seeing now is this basic consensus among the permanent members of the Security Council being to some extent re-established once again. ... <

My view is that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, must face up to its responsibilities more boldly than it has in the past. ... <

I would grant the U. N. a greater importance, but for that it is important for the U. N. to use the opportunities it has. Now the East-West confrontation has gone, a new kind of international practice is to be shaped, and this must not be delayed. ... <

I am in favor ... of strengthening the United Nations, particularly as far as the Security Council is concerned. ... What matters is that all opportunities should be exploited to cope with ... global challenges -- the humanitarian challenges, of course, but also infringements of international law. ... <

We can only guarantee world stability if it is a stability based on the rule of law and not on the right of the stronger. <

**Kissinger:** When the United Nations was formed, as Mr. Genscher correctly pointed out, it was based on the assumption that the victors in World War II would remain united to preserve the peace, and there was the curious assumption that the only danger to the peace of the world could come from the nations on whom unconditional surrender had just been imposed and who were -- by definition -- in no position physically to threaten the peace. <

If one reads the discussions taking place at that time, no other danger to peace was assumed to exist except from Germany and Japan. This, of course, could not possibly last, because all historical experience shows that after a war there is sometimes a greater danger from a former ally than from a defeated former enemy. ... <

The first problem that had to be solved in order to bring Germany and Japan back into the international community emerged almost immediately, so the United Nations did not get to operate as it was designed to. Instead, Germany and Japan, together with the other victors of the war, formed a powerful world community. Now that communism has collapsed and certain other changes have occurred, there is in fact, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, an international community as it was envisaged during the war. <

There is still one relic, namely that the composition of the Security Council does not correctly reflect the institutional power in the world. ... It is absolutely inevitable that a redistribution or addition of seats in the Security Council will be considered in the next decade. ... <

In terms of substance, so long as there is agreement among the major powers, the United Nations can work very well. <

There are two problems that I should like to address. <

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One is that -- assuming unity remains -- one has to be very cautious about the way U. N. military forces are now being distributed around the world. I read an interview a few days ago with Prince Sihanouk, in which he said: ''30 years ago we had one colonial ruler in Cambodia; now we have 10 colonial rulers in Cambodia...'' We have to be careful how this evolves over a period of years.<

The second, more serious problem is that, if history is any example, it would be surprising if the prevalent unity among the permanent members of the Security Council remains permanently. I am not saying it has to go back to the conflicts of the Cold War, but genuine differences of opinion do change so that sometimes one country is in a minority and sometimes another. It will be more difficult to achieve world consensus. In those cases, the regional approach, already foreseen in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, should be kept in mind. There may well be some problems that could be more easily solved on a regional (basis) than on a global basis as long as they still remain multilateral.<

Genscher: The idea of regional action has also been pursued by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) this year. The CSCE has constituted itself as a regional association within the terms of the U. N. Charter. It will not be in a position to fully exploit all the opportunities that arise in that context, but it has accepted the basic idea contained in the U. N. Charter and for the first time given practical effect to it. ... This would be an effective way of approaching many regional problems that appear to be insoluble on a global level.<

Kissinger: I agree with what Hans-Dietrich Genscher said. But, as he knows, he and I have sometimes sparred over the question of the extent of Europe -- whom it includes, and whom it excludes. If it excludes the United States and includes the Soviet Union, that is one formula and one set of problems. If it includes everybody from the occidental world but excludes Japan and China, then it is a sort of club for white people. The question of definition is important.<

Ishikawa: What do you think about admitting Germany and Japan to the U. N. Security Council? Do you have any ideas about the appropriate size of membership of the Security Council?<

Kissinger: I believe it will be historically inevitable some time in the next 10 years to find a role for Germany and Japan as members of the Security Council. ... It would be artificial to have 14 members, of which Germany and Japan are not parts.<

There are many formulas by which this could be done. ... But I believe that Germany and Japan will join. In time, India will probably have to join. Then of course, another point may be reached where regional groupings become permanent members of the Council, rather than as individual nations -- though that would be even further off in the future. Maybe the European Community could have one vote. In Asia, I cannot visualize a single grouping which could speak for Asia.<

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But at some point in the 1990s, the Security Council will have to be reformed on three levels: on the level of permanent membership, on the level of how to find a mechanism to address future problems so that one does not have to wait for the problem to arise, and on the level of how to control U. N. operations in the field because I do not believe that the secretary general's office as it is now constituted can by itself possibly control operations from Mozambique to Somalia, from Cambodia to Iraq. ... <

Genscher: Henry Kissinger has raised an interesting idea. He has asked the question as to whether regions might not be represented. ... It is clear that it is unsatisfactory for a country like India not to be represented. It is unsatisfactory for the whole of Africa to have no permanent seat, or Latin America, for that matter. We are going to have to recognize that sooner, rather than later, and there is going to be a reform of the Security Council to take that into account. <

Ishikawa: Germany is more and more involved in the operations of the United Nations. Is admission to the Security Council a long-term goal? <

Genscher: Germany is a member of the European Community. Somebody might suggest that the European Community speaks for itself. Through whom does it speak? Through the Commission, through the Presidency of the EC, or through the two members of the EC who also happen to have permanent seats on the Security Council? Then you would have Germany as a third member of the EC? What will the world say to that? How will it react? <

Assuming that Europe itself agrees to there being one seat, might there not then be misgivings in the Security Council? It would matter, of course, whether Europe had one vote or three votes in the Security Council. It would effect the voting results. <

Of course, we are in favor of strengthening the Security Council, and we are in favor of having a discussion on the composition of the Security Council. It is not necessarily a priority in our foreign policy, but we see an inevitable development. There is going to have to be a decision about the future representation of the EC, and the EC has to be ready for that. ... <

NEXT: Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century. <

(c) 1993, The Yomiuri Shimbun. Distributed by Los Angeles Times Syndicate <

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POTSDAM DIALOGUE

Ishikawa: I would like to discuss the role of nuclear weapons and how they will change the world's security in the 21st Century. What change do you foresee in the level of nuclear weapons?

**Kissinger:** The role of nuclear weapons between the so-called superpowers will diminish because, while technically the United States and Soviet Union do remain as the two nuclear superpowers, they are not -- for the foreseeable future, say for the 1990s -- likely to be in nuclear conflict with each other. Therefore, the issues of nuclear balance and arms control that preoccupied us in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s will be of much less primary importance.

I am sure the United States will maintain what it considers an adequate nuclear superiority, but the circumstances in

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which it could be employed become more and more elusive. Of all the inventions of the nuclear era that apply to the superpowers, the only one that I believe has continuing validity -- and maybe even increasing validity -- is the strategic defense initiative of President Reagan -- less as protection against the Soviet Union than as protection against Third World countries that may develop nuclear capabilities. <

I used to be considered an expert on nuclear strategy, and I used to keep informed of every detail of the strategic arms and of the INF (intermediate-range nuclear force) negotiations. I find it very difficult to generate enough interest in it these days to keep informed in detail about all the various strategic issues. I say to myself, "They know already, they will do it all right," which was unthinkable before. Mr. Genscher knows I never left him alone in all the years he was doing the INF negotiations, and with such great success, too. <

On the other hand, the distribution of nuclear weapons to other nations is becoming an infinitely greater and almost unmanageable problem, I cannot underline enough what Mr. Genscher said earlier. It is almost the last minute; maybe we are at the last minute. The confidence in nuclear technology is now so great that nations do not even experiment any more. India has announced that it will not build nuclear weapons. Israel has denied that it has nuclear weapons. Pakistan has made similar statements. What this means in practice is that they have everything at hand and can put it together in probably hours, if not less. They are technically right that they do not have nuclear weapons, but they are not practically right. We see now that Iraq, unbeknownst to us, even with the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, was on the road toward nuclear weapons. If that were to happen, nuclear weapons would again begin to play a bigger role until a point were reached where the superpowers, or even the one superpower, might assert its authority simply over the proliferation question. I do not see how one can continue to live in a world in which the possibility of nuclear attack can be tolerated on the part of any country that has no global responsibilities. The advantage the nuclear superpowers had was that they had too much to lose through a nuclear war and that kept them restrained. But would that be true of every fanatical movement in every part of the world? I would not want to make that experiment. It is another of the big problems of the 1990s, which I do not believe is being dealt with energetically enough. <

Genscher: The very existence of nuclear weapons with the two superpowers and the strategy of deterrents had one prerequisite, which was that the other party was assumed to behave rationally. The two sides threatened each other. They threatened each other with a nuclear response if they were attacked. However, this situation has changed. The question today is: In what way can we avoid proliferation? For a long period this was a question of avoiding the transfer of know-how. Now, however, with civilian use of nuclear energy

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becoming more commonplace, the point is that countries already have nuclear knowledge and, proceeding from the civilian knowledge, they might be able to build nuclear weapons. <

I said to the members of the UN Security council before their meeting in January 1991 that they must regard themselves as the custodians of the non-proliferation treaty. The non-proliferation treaty does not provide any specific instrument for non-proliferation. This must be done by the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council must ensure that we have no proliferation. Now, of course, the world organization, the UN Security Council, has a very different role. It must be in a position to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third countries, and -- even more important -- it must be able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the construction of nuclear weapons to begin with. In other words, the Security Council must take the strictest measures against any country that reaches out for nuclear weapons. If that is not done, then we will have a new type of chaos in the world, with much more far-reaching consequences than in the past. This should be put right at the top of the agenda of the UN Security Council. <

**Kissinger:** I read a great deal of discussion about the danger of the sale of nuclear weapons out of the former Soviet Union and into other regions. That might happen, but I think it is a very minor problem. The major problem is the export of knowledge into these regions, because, buying an individual weapon -- even buying 20 weapons -- in itself is not as significant as acquiring a group of scientists who can create the basis for a continuing nuclear technology. Therefore, any international regimen that is created -- and this is what makes it so difficult -- has to account not only for the transfer of materials but some limitation or method by which the movement of the scientific technology that creates the basis is put under some sort of control. That is going to be very difficult to do. <

**Genscher:** In Germany we have enacted national legislation that forbids German scientists from participating in the production of weapons of mass destruction in any other country. They will be penalized if they build nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons or develop such weapons in any other country. <

We need a legal system of this kind. In fact, we will have to establish a much more efficient international legal system in order to support the law of nations. So far the law of nations has been regarded as a law addressing the states as such. Now we see increasingly that we must also address the individual and must also punish the individual if in any way he undermines world peace. This was also the basic concept behind the Nuremberg tribunals. This aspect must be reconsidered today, given today's conditions. <

**Ishikawa:** What do you think of the possibility of Germany and Japan possessing nuclear weapons in the future and specifically the possibility of Japan developing nuclear technology? <

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Genscher: As far as Germany is concerned -- and I should limit myself to Germany -- we do not in any way or at any time want to have nuclear weapons, period. In no way and at no time. I think that is an important contribution, an important statement, made by our country in order to give life, as it were, to the non-proliferation treaty. This is why we feel

particularly committed, as well, to demand that this consequence of the non-proliferation treaty is also observed by other countries. Germany and Japan in particular must make this demand, because, if America, France or Britain were to say this, then many countries in the Third World would say, "They only say that because they have nuclear weapons already." But, if a country the size of Germany or the size of Japan says this -- that we do not have nuclear weapons, we do not want to have nuclear weapons or any weapons of this kind, and we expect other countries to observe the non-proliferation treaty -- this has a great moral and also legal authority behind it.<

Kissinger: On the question of armaments, the pressures on Germany as well as the incentives for Germany are somewhat different than those for Japan. I take very seriously what Mr. Genscher says about Germany.<

Germany is part of a system where, in its relations with France, Britain, and the United States, it can really take care of its foreseeable security problems in the nuclear field. I am not so sure what conclusion Japan would make in terms of confronting Russia, which could move her center of gravity to Asia. Or in terms of confronting China, which is already an announced nuclear power. Japan, being in a more limited defense arrangement with the United States than NATO and with a longer tradition of nationalistic defense, will reach its conclusions. The ultimate decision in my view will depend on how the situation in Asia develops.<

I can foresee really no circumstances in which Germany will acquire nuclear weapons. The risk to Germany would be too out of proportion to anything it could gain under any conceivable government. I cannot honestly say this about Japan in the year 2000. That does not mean that I ascribe any such intention to Japan. I just think the evolution in Asia will reflect the fact that there are more major states in direct conflict in Asia than there are in Europe. ... But it is a nuance of difference, not an absolute difference.<

NEXT: Predictions on Future of Yeltsin's Reforms.<

(c) 1993, The Yomiuri Shimbun. Distributed by Los Angeles Times Syndicate<
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POTSDAM DIALOGUE

Ishikawa: Over the past few months, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin's radical reform plan has been attacked by hard-liners
and the centrist conservative Civil Union Federation. What is
your prediction about the future of Yeltsin's government in
view of these destabilizing factors, and do you think there is
a possibility that a coup could topple his regime?

Kissinger: I believe that the West should stop focusing its
policy on individuals in Russia. Any society, any country,
which makes itself totally dependent on one man, or any
process that is alleged to be totally dependent on one man, is
an inherently unstable process. I respect Yeltsin, he has
great achievements to his credit, but the fate of Russia will
depend on the solution of two underlying problems.

Problem one is the collapse of the Communist system. That

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is primarily due to economic mismanagement. Problem two is the disintegration of the Russian Empire, started by Peter the Great and carried on by both czars and commissars for 350 years.<

Problem one, the collapse of communism, has produced the economic crisis because, in a system in which everything moves by allocation, a new feudalistic -- or semi-feudalistic -- class system emerges, and its shift to a free market meets massive resistance, and also in a population which does not understand the incentives of a free market.<

It was a mistake to let foreign economists come up with abstract models of how a very proud country with a long imperial tradition should move from total planning to a free market in a brief period of time and on the basis of what is essentially perceived as foreign advice.<

I do not know the new prime minister, but I believe that he has certain advantages. He is a man of the Establishment, and he is a man of the Peoples' Congress. Therefore, if he were to continue on the reform course, even if it went somewhat more slowly, it will no longer be a totally solitary initiative of Yeltsin's, reducing the Russian president's vulnerability. One should at least give him the possibility of proving that it is in good faith when he says he wants to continue on a reform course....<

... I also believe that it is too simple to claim that the future of market economics and the future of democracy depend on whether we gave $10 or $20 billion, more or less. We should focus assistance on specific areas where we can determine criteria, and we should let the Russians be freer to decide some of their own programs.<

The second issue which has in my view received too little mention is this: A dominant feature of Russian history is a passionate nationalism. For Russian nationalists, the experience of the last four or five years has been profoundly humiliating and we must both understand and show sensitivity toward them....<

The big foreign policy problem is this: If it is possible to help Russia in her reform program and if the reform program succeeds, will Russia then behave like historic Russia -- which means she will seek to dominate all her neighbors, including most of the former Soviet republics -- or will she say ... ''We are liberated. We can now be Russians. We can go from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, which is 11 time zones. We must concentrate on developing that area.'' With an inward-looking Russia we can all live in perfect harmony. We would have no problem with such a Russia. But if Russia should begin to think of herself like Serbia, even using gentler methods, we will have the seeds of a constant European crisis....<

Genscher: Henry Kissinger is quite right in saying that many foreign consultants turned up in Moscow telling the Russians... how to introduce the market economy overnight. ''Flip the switch and you do not have socialism any more, you have a market economy instead.'' They tried to do all this

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without the people required, without the manpower, without the
laws required for this purpose and all the other preparatory
steps that have to be taken .... <

It was said they have to focus on the sectors where the
Russians can be helped. I think, first of all, we can give
them our own know-how and show people how the market economy
operates ... within professional organizations and also on a
national or state level .... <

We must consider what products there are in Russia ... that
could already be sold in the world market today, which are
already competitive in the world market. <

If you look at this objectively, all you have is oil,
natural gas and raw materials .... Western aid must first be
applied where these natural resources are recovered from the
ground and made available to the world market. We see that
production of energy and raw materials is going down. In other
words, it is becoming more and more difficult to modernize the
energy and raw materials business. But this must be done ....
This will pave the way for further developments. <

The new prime minister has experience precisely in this
very area. We must realize and appreciate this. Therefore, I
share the view that the Russians and all of us have potential
in this area. <

The politicians tell us that we must, of course, accept and
acknowledge and endorse the successor states of the former
Soviet Union, which we have done. And we must consider as well
how we can embed Russia to an increasing extent with
international relationships and within the European economic
area. <

I think it is essential for Europe to realize that beyond
the borders of the EC and the central European states there is
something else as well, and that we must regard ourselves as a
larger economic area for this purpose. We should not regard
ourselves as one common market including Russia, that we need
one common market including Russia, but we need one common
telecommunications structure, infrastructure and energy
structure. <

The transport of energy alone, for example, from Russia, if
it were recovered there today, still presents problems, and
the transport of energy to other parts of the world, to other
parts of Europe. With this in mind, it is essential to build
up a pan-European infrastructure to provide closer links
between Russia and Europe, to our mutual advantage. It is also
a big opportunity for Japan if this happens. At the same time
this would give the eastern parts of Russia in particular
great potential for the future. <

I think that greater inclusion, a greater integration of
Russia also into a world economic summit would be very
important. The way Gorbachev was treated in London was not
appropriate; the way Yeltsin was treated in Munich was not
appropriate. This was not just due to Germany. There was other
resistance at the time. <

Even though Russia is an economically weak country at the
moment, it will be a strong and powerful country tomorrow ....

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[LC]

The worst thing to do would be to isolate Russia .... We
should have as many contacts as possible and as close and
competent a cooperation as possible.<

NEXT: Solving the Dispute Over the Northern Territories.<
(c) 1993, The Yomiuri Shimbun. Distributed by Los Angeles
Times Syndicate<

(END)

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FROM L.A. TIMES SYNDICATE INTL<
AVAILABLE BY SPECIAL ARRANGEMENT ONLY<
WORLD RIGHTS<

<
FOR RETRANSMISSION, PLEASE CONTACT BETH BARBER, L.A. TIMES
INTL<

HENRY KISSINGER<

PART 5 OF 5<
POTSDAM DIALOGUE<

<
Excerpts from the Dec. 18, 1992, Potsdam Dialogue between
former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German vice chancellor and
minister of foreign affairs, and moderated by Hironobu
Ishikawa deputy managing editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun. --
Editor<

<
Ishikawa: Japan needs a solution to the problem of the
Northern Territories. Do you think Japan is not doing enough
in terms of the extension of aid and cooperation to the Soviet
Union? Could you please comment on how Japan should structure
its relations with Russia?<

Kissinger: The so-called Northern Islands are claimed by
Japan itself to belong to Japan, and the United States has
supported this. Still it is very inappropriate for a foreigner
to prescribe negotiating tactics to the Japanese.<

The two choices that have been considered up to now were:
Should Japan hold back on most aid in order to give Russia the
greatest opportunity to make concessions, or should Japan join
full scale in giving aid in order to engender enough gratitude
in Russia to help her make concessions?<

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Probably the best course is somewhere in between. At one point in the Gorbachev period I was under the impression that he was on the way to giving up those islands.<

He was thwarted because the Russian republic opposed giving away territory that was considered Russian. I believe that in part this was a tactic by which to appeal to Russian nationalism. Therefore, it seems it would be extremely difficult for Yeltsin to make a 180-degree turn, whatever he intends to do.<

... Is it possible for Russia to negotiate with Japan about the islands if it is part of a bigger negotiation? If the negotiation is only about the islands, then Yeltsin will have to answer immediately as to whether or not they are going to give them up. If there is a bigger negotiation on a whole host of issues -- for example, Far Eastern problems -- it would be easier for both sides to discuss the issue without pressure. In such a context Japan might find it possible to show greater flexibility in the issue of economic aid, especially for the Far East.<

These are general ideas. My basic view is that in diplomacy one should try to avoid putting the opponent into the position where there is only a yes or no answer when you know that it is very difficult for him to say yes and where establishing the principle of a dialogue may create better conditions.<

Genscher: The question of the Japanese islands cannot, of course, be linked to that of the German unification, although there are certain parallels. We do face the question of whether we should say, first unification, then cooperation, or whether we should rather say "unification through cooperation."<

German policy decided very early on ... a unification through cooperation but not as an isolation problem. In the '50s in Germany we had a discussion as to whether unity should be seen as an isolated German solution and to be achieved as such or whether it should be seen and achieved as part of an overall European process. It was as part of an overall European process that we achieved it....<

I think that at this point it is going to be difficult for Japan to solve the problem of the islands because it is too focused on the question of the islands. The time will have to come when this can be wrapped up.... If you just discuss the islands with Russia there is only one possible solution: The Russians will have to say, "Yes, we will give you the islands." There are not any other islands that they can give you, so that means you have to try to embed it in a larger or broader development in which Russia does not just have its prestige at stake but its interests are also to be seen as pursued with advantage in the development.<

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[L]

possible way in the final analysis of making the problem of
the islands also soluble.<

Japan, without a doubt, does have a good opportunity now,
without actually giving anything up, to improve its relations
with Russia because it is going to be the host of the next
G-7, the next world economic summit. In that role Japan has
greater opportunities because it is not just the participation
of Yeltsin in an economic summit. It is not just a Japanese
affair. It is broader than that -- it is the relations among
all the big industrial powers with Russia. That makes it
easier ... for Russia and for Japan to discuss, among other
things, the nature of their future relations with each other.<

Ishikawa: To wrap up our discussion, I'd like to slightly
rephrase the question I asked at the beginning of this
dialogue: What kind of world do you foresee for the 21st
Century and what kind of role should Germany and Japan play?<

Genscher: In the next century I think we are going to
experience a world that will face the global problems we
talked about this morning. Our world is going to be far more
widely aware of those problems of common responsibility for
the world economy .... We share a common responsibility for
the protection of our natural environment -- the basis of our
existence -- and not just an environmental policy that
abandons the south to its own devices. We have a
responsibility for the stability of the world. That also means
that we do not allow weapons of mass destruction to
proliferate all over the world. There is a common
responsibility also for ensuring respect for international law
.... We know today far more about each other .... This has not
only fostered economic development, but it has also led to
increasing democracy in various parts of the world. Also, we
are going to have very much stronger regional associations
because it is easier now for states to maintain their
political independence and to develop economically, if they do
that together with others. They have before them the example
of the European Community...<

Germany in a world of that sort, and particularly in that
kind of Europe, will play its role, as it has done in
connection with the Maastricht Treaty .... We have sought,
above all, to spread awareness of responsibilities for others,
so strengthen other people's awareness of their collective
responsibility.<

I foresee that many ideas of the CSCE (Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe) will also make their way
in the East Asian area and in cooperation of that sort Japan
will also find its place.<

... What we have today is a more pluralistic world. It is
not easier to cope with -- at times it requires a great deal
of courage and farsightedness. But there are greater
opportunities for everyone. Therefore, notwithstanding our
awareness of the risks and dangers, I would look forward to
the next century with great confidence.<

Kissinger: I would say that what happens in the next
century will depend crucially on what we do in the next 10

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[L]

years. I can imagine a positive evolution, and I can also
imagine a very dangerous evolution. <

The positive evolution would be one where the nations of
the world learned how to handle the much more complex
geopolitical situation that has arisen as a result of the end
of the Cold War, and if they learn to cooperate in order to
tend to the enormous positive opportunities available. That
should be possible, and also easier than what they had to do
in the 1945-to-1950 period. <

Secondly, they have to learn to deal with current global
problems -- nuclear proliferation and nuclear power,
population and the environment. That is more difficult because
in hardly any governments are there institutions of dealing
with these as long-range global problems .... <

One has to hope that the nationalism we are seeing now in
the Balkans and the fundamentalism we are seeing in the Middle
East is contained and can be given a positive turn. <

There are two obstacles .... <

With respect to the first, in each country I know of, the
process of achieving high office has become so complicated and
so time-consuming that one questions how much time it leaves
to develop the concepts that are needed for dealing with
substance. Internal political battles cannot prepare you for
what needs to be done when you are in office .... <

The second problem is the change of generation, I believe
that these reflect very different perceptions of reality ....
We have to know how to communicate with that younger
generation in a way it can understand. Whether they perceive
the problems Hans-Dietrich and I have discussed in the same
way, I just do not know. I speak from the perspective of my
generation, reflecting the '50s and the '60s, when we had our
formative experiences. <

The question is whether the generation of the '80s can be
brought to see the same things that we have described here.
Whether or not what we have described here is accurate, it is
the opportunity that we have tried to describe. <

My only qualification is: What happens after the year 2000
will depend on what we do in the last eight years of this
century. <

END OF SERIES<

<
(END)

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d ATTENTION SUBSCRIBERS TO HENRY KISSINGER: <

On Dec. 18, 1992, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German vice chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, met in Potsdam to discuss a wide range of global issues -- including U. N. intervention in Somalia, the Northern Territories dispute and nuclear weapons control in the 21st Century. A five-part series of highlights of that discussion -- held at the suburban Berlin site of the historic 1945 conference between Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin and Harry Truman -- will move on this wire Tuesday, Jan. 5, for release Sunday, Jan. 10. The Potsdam dialogue was moderated by Hironobu Ishikawa, deputy managing editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun. <

LOS ANGELES TIMES SYNDICATE <
(END)

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TELEPHONE: 03-3242-1111
TELEFAX: 03-3246-0777

POTSDAM DIALOGUE RESUME (Draft)

1) Post-Cold War Europe

--First, what is the historical significance of violent changes taking place in post-Cold War world politics--that is, a shift from the "stability" hammered out by the framework of bipolar political balance of power between the United States and the former Soviet Union during the four decades of confrontation to current political uncertainties that followed the end of the conflict between the two superpowers?

--Second, what is your overall view of political upheavals in Europe over the past three years--the start of a pro-democracy movement in Eastern Europe in late 1989, the dissolution of the Soviet Communist Party in 1991 and an ensuing search for national pride and ethnic independence as seen in a protracted civil infighting in Yugoslavia, disputes among the former Soviet republics and the rise of neo-Nazism in Germany?

2) U.S. President-elect Bill Clinton and New U.S. Commitment to Peace and Security in Europe.

Bill Clinton is expected to play down the role of the United States as a "world watchdog" when he chooses to address himself, first and foremost, to an economic slump and other domestic issues.

--What would be some changes in U.S. political and military commitment to Europe as Clinton takes office? How do you view a possible change in the traditional bonds between the United States and Western Europe?

--I would like to hear your observations as to how the security system in Western Europe will change.

3) Peace and Stability in Asia and Japan's Role

Despite the end of the Cold War, there still remain some viable remnants of the erstwhile U.S.-Soviet antagonism in Asia, as seen in the divided Korean Peninsula and state-controlled economies and communist political systems in China and Vietnam.

--Would it be possible for Asia to create a framework of collective peace and security in the area that is similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)? Given that such a comprehensive system is to be established in Asia, what kind of framework is plausible?

--What kind of combination is conceivable as a bilateral or multilateral security setup?

Germany and Japan, both vanquished countries in World War II (in case of Germany in World War I also)--whose governments and people still feel morally indebted to neighboring nations for the great suffering inflicted upon them during

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the war--have risen to economic superpowers in the postwar years.

In Germany, revisions to its Constitution are being contemplated to allow the nations troops to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations outside the areas covered by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the Japanese Constitution still bans the country from sending Self-Defence Force personnel for military operations overseas. --What political roles do you expect Japan to play as anation of limited military power?

the future of the political fabric in China, an Asian superpower seeking open-door economic policies while preserving communism, poses a matter of major concern for the rest of Asia.

--What are your projections about what political moves China will make in the years to come, particularly concerning the reversion of Hong Kong to China in 1977?

--What impact will China's military modernization have on security in Asia? And how could China be absorbed into the overall security system in Asia?

4) The United Nations and Global Security

The United Nations is assuming greater roles in maintaining world peace and order in the form of peacekeeping operations and other activities in various parts of the world.

Hopes are higher that the United Nations will increase its roles in intervening to resolve regional conflicts in the world and perform other duties to protect global peace. A series of recent moves taken by prominent world leaders may mirror such high hopes, including a plan offered by U.N. Secretary General Boutros Ghali to step up U.N. peacekeeping efforts as well as a proposal by President-elect Bill Clinton to create the U.N. regular forces.

--What roles do you think the United Nations can assume as a global body aimed at taking precautions against possible armed conflicts and facilitating negotiated settlements to wars, especially in connection with a plan to create the U.N. regular forces? Until recently, the United Nations has been an organ confining itself to postwar missions.

--concerning a restructuring of the U.N. Security Council, do you think Japan and Germany can become its permanent members? Given an increase in the number of permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, what will be the appropriate size of the increase? How many countries and what countries should be admitted as permanent members?

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5) How will the role of nuclear weapons change the world's security in the 21st century? Do you predict that Japan and Germany will become new nuclear powers in the 21st century? What will be an effective measure to prevent nuclear proliferation?

6) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Free Trade

--Viewing a growing economic regionalism, as is marked by North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), what do you think about the future of GATT, which has served as the guiding principle for free trade in the post war decades?

--What will happen to the existing framework of world free trade if Clinton chooses to take more protectionist trade policies marked by U.S. economic nationalism?

--What roles should Japan, the United States and Germany play to maintain the free trade system?

7) European Union

In July, most of the Danish voted against the Maastricht Treaty in a national referendum on the integration of Europe, while French voters gave their approval for the union treaty by a narrow margin. Among members of the European Community, there remains skepticism about whether each member of a unified Europe can maintain its sovereignty vis-a-vis the power and authority of the union.

In addition, a planned monetary union may be clouded by differences of economic fundamentals among the individual countries. Also destabilizing the union treaty are disparities in economic and social influence among the EC members, a feud over the leadership between Germany and France, Britain's stance of circumspection toward the other European nations, and ethnic infighting in Yugoslavia.

How will the European Community go ahead with the European union despite all these hurdles?

8) The United Germany and its Future

--What should Germany do to stave off a deep-rooted concern among other European nations that the country may grow into a politically, economically and militarily dominant power in Europe?

--What are your hopes and worries about the future of the unified Germany?

--If Germany becomes inward-looking for such reasons as the financial burden it has to bear for former East Germany, what influence will it have on unification of Europe and maintenance of world peace?

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TELEPHONE: 03-3242-1111

TELEFAX: 03-3246-0777

9) Russian President Boris Yeltsin and International Aid for Russia

A series of radical reforms launched by Russian President Boris Yeltsin have been rapidly shrinking in recent months because of attacks from the centrist conservative Civic Union federation and hard-liners. Under these circumstances, it remains yet to be seen whether Yeltsin can stabilize his political base in the Russian government despite a number of domestic problems, including ethnic strife in Ossetia.

--What is your prediction about the future of Yeltsin's government in view of destabilizing factors, including possibilities of another coup being staged by his antagonists to topple him?

Until about a year ago, an optimistic view was prevalent among Western democracies that their continued aid could narrowly sustain the ailing economies of the former Soviet republics. In the face of economic stagnation on their part and a number of intractable problems indigenous to the former Soviet Union, however, these nations seem to be gradually becoming pessimistic about chances of bailing the former Soviet Union out of its worsening economic and political plight.

--Now that Russia, a recipient of aid, is in confusion, how should finance assistance to the country be carried out?

10) In connection with the world situation in the 21st century, some scholars forecast the split-ups of large countries. some of them say China will be divided into four parts--South China; the area consisting of Central China, coastal districts and Taiwan; northeast China and the inland region. Some others say the northwestern part of the United States and the southwestern part of Canada will merge into a single autonomous zone. I would like to hear your bold predictions as to the political, military and economic situations in the world at the beginning of the 21st century.

--What does it take for new world leaders to play a key role in the post-Cold War era?

--What will be the extent of the rising tide of ethnic pride and independence that are crossing national boundaries?

--Are there any possibilities of seeing any single nation take a hegemonic role in global politics in much the same way the United States and the former Soviet Union did during the Cold War period?

Given that such a superpower reemerges, what kind of country or under what circumstances?

--(In relation to the previous question) Can the United States make a comeback as the dominant superpower in the world?

1-7-1. OTEMACHI, CHIYODA-KU. TOKYO 100-55 JAPAN

THE MODERATOR: Dr Kissinger and Mr Genscher, let me start. On behalf of the Yomiuri Shimbun, our newspaper, let me first express our heartfelt thanks to you for taking time for us out of your busy schedule. We are especially pleased to have this Postsdam dialogue at this at this historic site.

We are very interested in knowing your points of view, as the world's most renowned political strategists and philosophers, about the future of the world.

Before we start, let me explain a little bit about today's proceedings for the discussion. From 11 until 1 o'clock we have the morning session; then we will have an hour at lunch time for the recess. From 2 until Mr Genscher leaves here, before 4 o'clock, we will have the afternoon session. From 2 o'clock we will have observers, about fifty people, state government people, local Assembly men, as guests and discussion will be open to the public. The morning session is just for ourselves.

DR KISSINGER: Will we be involved discussion with these people?

THE MODERATOR: No; they are just observers.

DR KISSINGER: After you leave, I will take some questions from them and correct any misapprehension you have left!

1

THE MODERATOR: We would like to change the order of the questions we have already presented to you a little. In the morning session we would like to have you discuss the post-Cold War world characterisation, what would be a new world order. Then we move to the United Nations and global security. Then we would like to have a discussion on the role of nuclear weapons and military forces in the future. Then we move to expected change in the foreign policy of the United States under President-Elect Bill Clinton and how it will affect the security of Europe, as well as the security of Asia.

These are topics we would like to take up during the morning session. In the afternoon session we would like to concentrate on the future of the European Union and a United Germany and its future and the future of Russia. These are the main topics we will discuss today.

First, let me ask you about your overall view on the current political uncertainties that followed the end of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. How do you characterise the present political uncertainties?

Dr Kissinger, can I ask you that first?

DR KISSINGER: I think the world has been used to a conflict between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and it finds it very difficult to adjust itself to a new reality. The new reality is one in

[L]

which not only has communism disintegrated, but the Russian
empire, which has been here since Peter the Great, has
also disintegrated.

Secondly, there are no longer two superpowers but
I believe for diplomatic purposes five or six more or less
equal countries. I know the United States is militarily the
strongest but the circumstances in which military power is
relevant are diminishing, at least the sort of military
power in which the United States is unique, which is nuclear
weapons. The United States has very little experience with
a world of many powers which it can neither dominate nor
from which it can withdraw.

Thirdly, in Europe various institutions are also in
difficulties. NATO no longer has an enemy and is an
alliance in search of a mission. The European Community was
created partly as a balance to the United States, partly as
a means of incorporation Germany without creating fears of
Germany. This was easier when Germany was divided than when
Germany is united because a united Germany -- and my friend
Hans-Dietrich can correct me -- does not have the same
necessity to subordinate itself to other institutions as a
divided Germany did. So all of these are new conditions
and, in the absence of the superpower conflict, the ethnic
rivalries which have always existed were strengthened by
communism because it is the one way to assert Europe
identically against the totalitarian state; those matters
have come to the surface. All of these are major changes.

3

[d]

THE MODERATOR: Thank you very much,
Dr Kissinger. May I ask Mr Genscher?

MR GENSCHER: i think it can be said with some
certainty that the end of the Cold War does represent
a generally revolutionary development. It has certainly
initiated such a development, at least in Europe,
a revolutionary development like that of the far-reaching
1917 revolution.

At the same time we see that thinking in the western
world was very deeply marked by the East-West conflict. The
East-West confrontation was very much more strongly marked
by that than perhaps most people realised. That explains
why today many questions are now being asked to which we
thought we had answers. One example of this is the question
of the need for European unity. Only a few years ago the
processes within the European Community were regarded as
largely uncontroversial. What we are seeing today is that
in the Member States questions are being asked which are
reminiscent of the old national egotism. For us in the
Common Market, we have to ask whether we have greater
advantages, if we are more independent. These questions are
being asked with a variety of different presuppositions in
the various Member States.

The founding of the Common Market can be seen as one
response to the threat from the Soviet Union but that is not
the case. It certainly is the case that the foundation of

4

[c]

NATO was a response to the threat from the Soviet Union but the EC, the Common Market, for its part, was granted for different reasons.

If in historical terms you try to provide a response to the fratricidal wars which have taken place in the last century among the European Nations, in the last century of course but certainly twice in this century the idea was to create a European counterweight, or at least a weight of partnership as a counterbalance to the United States. An important element in this was to bring in the new parts of Germany, the new Federal lender, into a European structure.

The basic historical idea has lost nothing of its justification so far as the process of European union is concerned. The question as to how our neighbours can deal or cope with Germany arises in even clearer terms for the new, unified Germany than it did before. After all, Germany, following Russia, is the largest country in Europe. We are larger than any of our European neighbours. Our neighbours have not had the happiest experiences with Germany, particularly in this century, and for these reasons it is important for this basic idea of making sure that Germany has a place within the European framework, within the European Union, that that should not be forgotten.

Many new answers have to be found to these old questions. We have seen that with the Maastricht process. We are going to have to search for those answers in response to these changes.

5

LQJ

How do we wish to contribute to the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and in South-Eastern Europe. How do we wish to help to ensure that this takes place in a stable way? How can we create a prerequisite for stable development and how can we be assured that the United States and the European relations can be structured against this background?

All of these questions have to be answered anew. What is more, they have to be answered anew quite promptly in order to dispel the uncertainty.

If we look back, we see that the time of confrontation was at least a time of relative stability and, following the Second World War, there were three important decisions which were the right answers: the Marshall Plan first of all for the stabilisation of Western Europe; the second important one was the decision to found NATO; the third important one was the decision to establish the Common Market.

I think in the historical situation following the Second World War these were three correct answers that were found. These assured stability and a certain measure of certainty. What we need now is once again to find the right answers, the right responses, to a new historical situation and this new historical situation is a far more promising one, in fact, than the post war situation was. Then it was a question of preventing a third world war, the Soviet Union assuming too great a weight. Now we have a really promising prospect, if we find the right answers.

6

Ld

THE MODERATOR: Thank you very much for your very interesting remarks about the present situation of the world. Today, it is said with the fall of the Soviet Union, the old world order has gone. Now we are groping for a new world order. What kind of new world order do you foresee will come out of the present uncertain situations towards the twenty-first century? May I ask Dr Kissinger?

DR KISSINGER: As a student of history, it is usually very difficult at the beginning of the historical process to describe exactly what you expect to come out of it. I believe that there are two sets of problems that need to be solved. The first is the classic problem of international relations, which is the relations of the various units that comprise the international system, to each other. The second is to deal with problems for which there is no precedent, problems that are of a global nature and which cannot be defined entirely in terms of national interest, nuclear questions, environmental questions, population questions, starvation, some of the issues that are classed in this new category of humanitarian intervention which we are seeing in Somalia and which people are talking about for Yugoslavia. Those are the two sets of problems for which we have to find the sort of answers that Hans-Dietrich Genscher mentioned and which were found at the end of World War II to the European problems.

7

[d]

With respect to the first set of problems, the relation of the various, I keep saying components of the international system because you cannot use the word "nation" exactly any more -- the relations of Europe/America/Russia/China/Japan -- will have to change. They will not be so dominated by nuclear weapons. It will not be so influenced by the American economic superiority as was the case in the fifties and sixties.

As I have already said, for the United States, it requires a new way of thinking in terms of equilibrium and balance which is foreign to the American tradition and which is, nevertheless, inevitable.

Then, when I mention these categories, a great deal depends on the solution of problems like the future of the former Soviet Union.

In the former Soviet Union there are two sets of issues; one, whether the political stability and economic progress can be achieved and secondly whether in the relations of these successor states to each other it is possible to avoid the same crisis as happened in Yugoslavia because if it were to happen on that territory, it would have catastrophic consequences.

This depends in part on how one defines Europe, where the borders of Europe are, what belongs to Europe, what is outside of Europe.

In Asia a new relationship has to be defined between China, Japan and Russia. This is in the traditional area.

8

[d]

As we look into the twenty-first century, we will,
however, have anew element. The United States will become
more and more oriented, in attention to East-West issues, to
the western hemisphere. One of the big changes in American
foreign policy, the biggest single thing that happened in
the Bush Administration, was the North American Free Trade
Area. This I would put somewhere in between traditional
foreign policy and the new foreign policy. The new foreign
policy, environment, nuclear weapons and power -- above all,
power -- population, starvation, suffer from the dilemma
that they are global problems but they are dealt with in a
national way.

I am totally against humanitarian intervention when it
is unilateral. It has to be done on a multilateral basis or
it should not be done at all.

We have to find new ways of thinking. For example,
among the problems in the former Soviet Union, I am more
worried about the faulty nuclear power stations, which are
totally unsafe, than I am about some of the day-to-day
problems that we read about. The new world order has to find
institutions and mechanisms similar to what the creators of
the post-World War II international order created in the
period 1945 - 50.

I want to say that I very much agree with Mr Genscher's
view that in fact this is a more open period than the

9

[Lc]

1945-50- period was. The possibilities for creativity are
greater than they were then but the beginnings of the
solutions are not yet as obvious.

MR GENSCHER: That brings us to the key question
which is whether we can muster the same boldness, the same
far-sightedness and the same conceptual capability in
shaping these problems and our responses to them. Let me
illustrate this by giving some examples.

NATO was in a position with regard to Soviet expansion
to prevent Soviet expansion in Europe. Through its
existence, NATO was able to stand in the way of the Soviet
expansionism.

If there were to be a new development of this sort in
the East, NATO would be in a position to respond to it
accordingly. What it cannot do is to close the borders of
Europe to millions of people driven by hunger, in need and
desperation where they see no further prospects for
themselves at home in their own countries. That is something
NATO cannot do. What NATO cannot do is to protect against
the dangers presented by nuclear power stations that
Dr Kissinger has rightly mentioned.

We must not forget that the greatest danger facing
Europe in recent years was in fact Chernobyl. It was not the
use of nuclear weapons; it was Chernobyl. What that means
is that it is correct to say that many problems and many
challenges are global in this new world and secondly they

10

[c]

are not of a conventional or classic military kind. That
means that the capabilities that countries have in the
economic sphere, in the environmental sphere, are going to
be very much more important and are going to come into play.
That does not mean that the nuclear potential, of the United
States for example, has become insignificant. It remains
significant as a stabilising element and as representing the
the capability of preventing further proliferation in that
area.

Then there is the problem of nationalism which we face
in Europe. We have to ask why it is arising now. Why is it
in Western Europe? It is much more obvious in Eastern Europe
than in the West because for centuries long there was
oppression, there was an ideological straightjacket in place
and that meant that the sense of national identity was
suppressed. It is now discharging itself; it is bursting
out and the pendulum is swinging back in the other
direction.

The question that faces us today is: How can we
respond to this development? Are we going to turn away and
say, "Let it run. Let this development take its course" or
will we try to offer peoples that are now seeking their
national identity, now rediscovering it and reliving it,
European prospects?

What is more interesting is that the people in Central
and South-Eastern Europe want those European prospects. They
are looking to the EC for obvious economic reasons, of

11

course, to have a European perspective. It is going to
depend very much whether the European Community has the
capability of shouldering its responsibilities.

So far as the community of nations goes, I believe that
increasingly we are going to have regional arrangements,
regional agreements. The European Community itself is a
kind of regional association of this kind. We see something
similar taking place in the ASEAN states; we see similar
regional associations in the Gulf states. The Gulf
Cooperation Council is an example of that.

I anticipate that in East Asia there will be regional
associations emerging even more strongly. That will be an
interesting possibility also for Japan.

If we look at the United Nations' Charter, for
instance, it is very interesting to note that the UN Charter
has already adumbrated that development. If you look in the
UN Charter you will see references to regional associations,
regional arrangements. That means to say that when the UN
was founded, the founding fathers already anticipated there
would sub-organisations below the world level that would be
found necessary and useful. I anticipate that these
developments will continue in the classically large and
great powers like the United States, Russia, Japan.

In addition we will have the EC, the ASEAN states, the
Gulf Cooperation Council and so on. The very advantage of
the EC is that we are able to benefit from the implications
of this for German unity and to anticipate that. It was

12

(c) 1973

undoubtedly an historically correct reaction. It helped to dispel many of the misgivings and many of the concerns that people felt in the course of that process.

THE MODERATOR: Thank you very much. With the fall of communism, Mr Francis Fukuyama has said that this is the end of history, while others say it is not the end of the history but the return of history. What do you think of this? If there is anything, what will it mean in posing a threat to democracy? Will democracy continue to survive as the dominant force or what will be the role of religion; what will be the problems with nationalism? Is there anything which may take the place of communism by posing a threat to democracy?

Dr Kissinger, may I ask you?

DR KISSINGER: May I make a suggestion, that the next time you ask a question, give my friend, Hans-Dietrich, a chance to answer it first, so we can alternate?

Let me answer the question. This idea of the end of history was developed by an American of Japanese origin, Fukuyama. It is an idea that has been around for several hundred years where in every century somebody has said this is now the end of history. The last stage of history was marked as the last.

13

[d]

Fukuyama said modern liberal democracy is the last stage of history. Of course, since he wrote that it is clear that events have speeded up rather than slowed down.

One has to be realistic. Democracy, if you look at human history, over the thousands of years of human history, has existed in only limited regions of the world for very brief periods of time. It is, therefore, arrogant to believe that it is the inevitable form of historical evolution or that, once it is achieved, it will automatically put an end to history.

14

14

It developed in Europe and America under very special circumstances as the result of a long evolution of separation a church that had its own identity in the Catholic church, and a nation which insisted on individual conscience, on capitalism, on the age of discovery. None of these conditions is exactly the same in other parts of the world. In the Mohammedan world the idea that pluralism of ideas generates truth is not self-evident when you have the Koran saying there is only truth. In the Confucian world it is not self-evident that the conflict of ideas produces truth because in the Confucian world people believe there is one truth, with different methods, perhaps, of reaching it.

Therefore when we look at democracy in Indonesia, it is different from in Western Europe or the United States. We have to be very careful not to think that the Western parliamentary form, or the United States form, with the separation of powers, is inevitably going to spread around the world. On the other hand, it is, to me, by far the best form of government, and, having lived under totalitarianism and seen it later on in life in other parts of the world, there is no question that it is the most humane and progressive form of government. But will it inevitably succeed? That is one of the big issues of our time.

As we know, in Russia there are many who say that, in order to make real progress, one has to go through an authoritarian period. In China they made that decision deliberately. The future of democracy is one of the big

15

[c]

issues of our period, in which the outcome is not self-
evident, although, of course, we must do our best to bring
it about. It is the big issue in most regions of the world.

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): I found the title
of the book itself very unhistorical. When I went into high
school at the age of 10, I came across a very smart history
teacher who knew that everything continues to flow, nothing
is definitive, that this was ancient knowledge. I do not
think he was trying to state a universal historical truth
but was saying that, even what now existed in Germany in
1937 was not definitive because it was an experience which
we had again and again. Nothing is definitive, everything
flows. That corresponds to the realities of human life and
also life in nature. You could say that history perhaps
begins with its opportunities.

The question then becomes: what are the threats to
which we are exposed, to which democracy is exposed? I
think that the principle of plurality will become stronger
in the world. The principle of plurality in respect of
human rights, also, is going to become of more importance in
all parts of the world than it was 10, 30 or 50 years ago.
But this will not necessarily lead to forms in all of these
states which correspond to our notions of Western democracy.

At the same time we also have to say that, even among
the Western democracies themselves, we have extremely
diverse structures. This is true within the European

16

[d]

Community itself. If you look at Germany, you see an out
and out federal country. If you look at France, you see a
highly centralised country. You can see that even within
the EC you have a great variety of structures that are
possible within democracy.

We are in a phase of revolutionary developments, but I
do believe that plurality and respect for human rights will
in the future loom larger and larger and will not be
contradictory to the expressions of national identity or
religious identity.

After all, in the Islamic world there is a thrust
towards greater plurality. As far as that goes, too, I am
hopeful. With the best will in the world, I really cannot
go along with the view that Fukuyama states in his book.

THE MODERATOR: Since Confucians dominate the
area, we tend to see a relative side in religion. We often
see clashes between religions, such as Christianity against
Islam, or, in India, Hindu against Islam. Confucianism is
relatively free of clashes. There are less conflicts with
other religions. Do you see any co-ordination or co-
operation among the religions in confrontation?

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): I believe it may
turn out to be inevitable that there will have to be a
dialogue between the various religions. We live with other
religions. We have already experienced that in Germany.

17

[c]

Islam is represented far more strongly in Germany today than it was in the past. As Christian nations, we have to understand that for other peoples their Islamic faith is, among other things, also an expression of their national identity. Many of those of fundamentalist persuasion represent a revolt against a Western alienation, because they feel they have been overwhelmed by Western civilisation. Very often fundamentalism is an expression of rediscovering the personal identity.

This was particularly important in developments in Iran. I said years ago in the United Nations that it was going to be necessary to institute a cultural dialogue so that cultural identities of the peoples of the nations which are given expression in their face would be more clearly and strongly expressed. This involves many nations of the Third World, where the old-style political colonialism has been superseded by a new kind of cultural colonialism which is just as alienating, where there their cultural identity is alienated. If this is recognised, step by step we can go about coping with it. But this is not something which you can decide to deal with at a conference. This is something which takes place in encounters between cultures, so it is a long-term, ongoing process.

That does not mean that we cannot have a reasonable discussion of all aspects of this problem and that there may not also be sharp conflicts arising, in the Eastern and South-Eastern area in particular.

18

[c]

DR KISSINGER: I think the impact on each other's religions depends importantly on the stage of historical evolution. As far as the Christian religion is concerned, I believe it is beyond its proselytising phase. I think that within the Christian religion, with all the various sects and groups, the dialogue described by Hans-Dietrich Genscher will be quite conceivable, but in other religions this is not so self-evident.

The Hindu religion has the peculiarity that it does not proselytise. You cannot become a Hindu, no matter what you do, which has the curious consequence that the Hindus react passionately against any intrusion into their identity and make no attempt to adjust their thinking to anybody else's, because they are not trying to convince you from the religious point of view.

Within the Islamic world the open question of the next 25 years is whether the more secular orientation of Islam prevails, in which case a dialogue of the religions, as Hans-Dietrich Genscher described, will be possible, or whether the fundamentalist direction prevails, as it exists in Iran, in which case a dialogue will be possible only after extensive confrontation.

In Asia I do not believe the religions are the primary obstacle to understanding, at least not in China, Japan and Korea and the major countries involved there. I believe that in the area of Southern Asia, the Near East and Russian

19

Central Asia, the religious issue could become the biggest political issue, depending on the orientation of Islam.

THE MODERATOR: I should like to ask a further question about this, but time is limited, so I will move to the next subject. If there is time left later, we should like to come back to this issue.

The next question is with regard to the United Nations and global security. At present hopes are higher that the United Nations will increase its role in intervening to resolve regional conflicts in the world and perform other duties to protect global peace.

What roles do you think the United Nations can assume as global body? Let me put it this way. What increasing roles do you expect from the United Nations in the decade to come?

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): When the United Nations was founded, an attempt was made to draw lessons from the failure of the League of Nations. The establishment of the United Nations was an extremely ambitious undertaking, and rightly so. The assumption then was that there was a certain fundamental consensus among the victorious powers which emerged from the Second World War. In order to secure that basic consensus for the long term, they built the right of veto into the Security Council so that a certain joint pressure could also be brought to bear

[c]

in world affairs. What was not foreseen, or what was
perhaps neglected, at the time was the realisation that
there would be a confrontation between the Western states
and the Soviet Union, leaving aside China for the moment.
That led to a situation where for decades the United Nations
was unable to fulfil the hopes that had been placed in it.

What we are seeing now is this basic consensus among
the permanent members of the Security Council being to some
extent re-established once again. That has made the UN able
to take a series of decisions which a few years ago would
have been unthinkable: for example, the decision concerning
Iraq, certain decisions concerning the former Yugoslavia and
the decision now concerning Somalia.

My view is that the United Nations, and in particular
the Security Council, must face up to its responsibilities
more boldly than it has in the past. The Security Council
faces this challenge of tackling important actions, starting
with humanitarian actions, of course, and other equally
important ones. We are against the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological in
particular. This is a very serious danger, and last-minute
decisions have to be taken. Nobody should ever under-
estimate the intensity of this danger. What about the
spread of epidemics, as well? How can we achieve a
situation where countries which have neglected the safety of
their nuclear power stations can be prevailed upon to

21

upgrade and improve the safety of their nuclear power
plants? That situation does not just concern one country.

Then there are humanitarian actions, as in Somalia, or
peace-making, for example, as in Iraq. The United Nations
needs to avail itself in these areas of the opportunities
which exist in its Constitution. It needs to use them.
Dr Kissinger has rightly said that he does not want
unilateral humanitarian action. I would say, in different
terms, that it would be preferable if we could proceed on
the basis of decisions by the Security Council in our
action, as we saw in Somalia.

I would grant the UN a greater importance, but for that
it is important for the UN to use the opportunities it has.
Now the East-West confrontation has gone, a new kind of
international practice is to be shaped, and this must not be
delayed. I have been saying for the past year that we need
a comprehensive blockade of Serbia, for example, in order to
bring the war machine to a standstill. Only the UN is in a
position to commit all Serbia's neighbours to doing that.
The EC cannot do that; only the UN is in a position to do
that. That is just one example.

I am in favour, therefore, of strengthening the United
Nations, particularly as far as the Security Council is
concerned, and, of course, the heads of state and government
have talked about reform of the structure of the Security
Council. What matters is that all opportunities should be
exploited to cope with these global challenges - the

22

[d]

humanitarian challenges, of course, but also infringements
of international law and the response that has to be found
to those infringements.

We can only guarantee world stability if it is a
stability that is based on the rule of law and not on the
right of the stronger.

DR KISSINGER: When the United Nations was formed, as Mr Genscher correctly pointed out, it was based on the assumption that the victors in World War II would remain united to preserve the peace, and there was the curious assumption that the only danger to the peace of the world could come from the nations on whom unconditional surrender had just been imposed and who were, by definition, in no position physically to threaten the peace.

If one reads the discussions of World War II, no other
danger to peace was assumed except that which could come
from Germany and Japan. This could not possibly last,
because all historical experience shows that after a war
there is sometimes a grater danger from an ally than there
is from the defeated enemy. After the Napoleonic wars,
France had to be taken into the international community at
the Congress of Vienna because there developed a fear of
Russia, but Russia stayed in the international community,
and therefore a very stable system developed.

The first problem that had to be solved, to bring
Germany and Japan back into the international community,

23

[d]

emerged almost immediately, so the United Nations could not
operate as it was designed to, and instead Germany and
Japan, together with the other victors of World War II,
formed a powerful world community. Now that communism has
collapsed and other changes have occurred, there is in fact,
for the first time since the end of the war, an
international community as envisaged during the war.

There is still the relic that the composition of the
Security Council does not correctly reflect the
institutional power in the world. This is not a question of
whether anybody asks to be a member of the Security Council,
but in a reform of the United Nations it is absolutely
inevitable that a redistribution of seats or an addition of
seats in the Security Council in the next decade should be
considered, or at least a new possibility for co-operation
by those members so that they are not rotating members. But
that is a structural problem.

On substance, so long as there is agreement among these
major powers, the United Nations can work very well.

It will have difficulty. Mr Genscher pointed out a
number of problems. On peace-keeping problems, the United
Nations will be able to do fairly well, because it is a real
issue. On issues that do not yet represent an immediate
danger, such as nuclear power plants or the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, there is not the same impetus,
and there is no staff that can force a decision. Therefore
that is one of the weaknesses in the United Nations that has

24

[c]

to be remedied, because those are the areas which in many
respects are the greatest danger.

There are two problems that I should like to address.
One is that, assuming the unity remains, one has to be very
cautious about the way military forces are now being
distributed around the world. I read an interview a few
days ago by Prince Sihanouk, in which he said: "30 years
ago we had one colonial ruler in Cambodia; now we have 10
colonial rulers in Cambodia. I have only one consolation:
they are going to run out of money next year, so maybe we
shall not have any colonial ruler." But we have to be
careful how this will evolve over a period of years.

The second, more serious, problem is that, if history
is any example, it would be surprising if the unity among
the permanent members of the Security Council which we now
see would be permanent. I am not saying it has to go back
to the conflicts of the Cold War, but you could get genuine
differences of opinion that change, where sometimes one
country is in a minority and sometimes another. It will be
more difficult to achieve a world consensus. In those cases
I believe that something which was discussed earlier, namely
the regional approach, which was already foreseen in
Article 51 of the United Nations charter, should be kept in
mind if there are some problems that may be easier to solve
on a regional basis than on a global basis and still be
multilateral, because, except when issues of vital national

25

security are concerned, intervention should not be
unilateral.

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): The idea of
regional action has also been pursued by the CSCE this year.
The CSCE has constituted itself as a regional association
within the terms of the UN Charter. It will not be in a
position to exploit to the full all the opportunities that
arise in that context, but it has thereby accepted the basic
idea contained in the UN Charter and for the first time
given practical effect to it. The question will be whether
in the CSCE the necessary instruments and institutions can
be created. The basic idea is, however, already there, and
this would be an effective way of approaching many regional
problems which appear to be insoluble on a global level.

THE MODERATOR: What do you think with regard to
whether Germany and Japan are voted on to the Security
Council? Do you have any ideas about the appropriate size
of membership of the Security Council?

DR KISSINGER: I will answer that in a moment.
May I make one comment on the previous matter? I agree with
what Hans-Dietrich Genscher said, but, as he knows, he and I
have sometimes sparred over the question of the extent of
size, whom it includes and whom it excludes. If it excludes
the United States and includes the Soviet Union, that is one

26

[L]

formula and one set of problems. If it includes everybody from the occidental world but excludes Japan and China, then it is a sort of club of white people. The question of the definition is important.

To answer your question, I believe it will be historically inevitable some time in the next 10 years to find a role for Germany and Japan as members of the Security Council, if only because it is not natural to take decisions in the Security Council if Germany and Japan are not among the rotating members. It would be artificial to have 14 members, of which Germany and Japan are not part.

There are many formulas in which this could be done. One could make Germany and Japan permanent members without a veto for a 10-year period, or a five-year period, while the whole veto question is examined, and maybe at the end of this time a formula will evolve where a four-fifths vote is obligatory, or a three-quarters vote. But I believe that Germany and Japan will join. In time, India will probably have to join. Then, of course, another point may be reached where regional groupings become members of the permanent Council and not individual nations. But that would be even further in the future. Maybe the European Community could have one vote. In Asia I cannot visualise one grouping which could speak for Asia. But some time in the 1990s the Security Council will have to be reformed on the three levels: on the level of the permanent membership; on the level of how to find a mechanism to address future problems

27

so that one does not have to wait for the problem to arise;
and on the level of how to control the UN operations in the
field, because I do not believe that the Secretary-General
as now constituted can possibly control out of his office
alone operations from Mozambique to Somalia, to Cambodia, to
Iraq. That requires a more formal and systematic
elaboration of the institution.

THE MODERATOR: Mr Genscher, Germany is more and
more involved in the operations of the United Nations. Is
Germany's admission into the Security Council Germany's
eventual goal?

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): Henry Kissinger has
raised an interesting idea. He has asked the question as to
whether regions might not be represented. If I could leave
Germany aside for a moment, it is clear that it is
unsatisfactory for a country like India not to be
represented; it is unsatisfactory for the whole of Africa
to have no permanent seat, or Latin America, for that
matter. We are going to have to recognise that sooner
rather than later, and there is going to be a reform of the
Security Council to take that into account.

As far as Germany is concerned, Germany is a member of
the European Community. Somebody might suggest that the
European Community speaks for itself. Through whom does it
speak? Through the Commission, through the Presidency of

28

[L]

the EC, or through the two members of the EC who also happen to have permanent seats on the Security Council? Then you would have Germany as a third member of the EC. What will the world say to that? How will it react? Assuming that Europe itself agrees to there being one seat, might there not then be misgivings in the Security Council? It would matter, of course, whether Europe had one vote or three votes in the Security Council. It would affect the voting results.

Of course, we are in favour of strengthening the Security Council, and we are in favour of having a discussion on the composition of the Security Council. It is not necessarily a priority in our foreign policy, but we see an inevitable development. There is going to have to be a decision about the future representation of the EC, and the EC has to be ready for that. It might already be the case today that the two permanent members, France and Britain, might say, "We implement in the Security Council the decisions taken by the EC," but they do not yet do that, rather they both say, "We are here in our own right. We are permanent members of the Security Council on the basis of the founding of the United Nations in 1945, not as members of the EC." Through strong efforts on the German side, we have reached a situation where there is intensive discussion on the composition of the Security Council, but it is not the case that the EC could decide that France or Britain are to vote "Yes" or "No" in the Security Council. Whether

29

(c)

tomorrow they might say, "We will cast the vote for Europe
in the Security Council," that would raise a whole series of
issues. Within the EC itself, that would mean answering a
number of questions. We would have to say that the Japanese
situation is easier. That would be like a fourth country,
Italy, coming along in the EC and saying, "We want to be
members of the Security Council". That is something we can
foresee happening.

THE MODERATOR: I would now like to have you discuss the role of nuclear weapons and how they will change the world's security in the 21st century. What change do you foresee in the level of nuclear weapons?

DR KISSINGER: The role of nuclear weapons as
between the so-called super powers will diminish, because,
while technically the United States and the Soviet Union
remain two nuclear powers, they are not for the foreseeable
future, say for the 1990s, conceivably in nuclear conflict
with each other. Therefore the issues that preoccupied us
in the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s of nuclear balance and arms
control will be of a much less primary importance.

I am sure the United States will maintain what it
considers an adequate nuclear superiority, but the
circumstances in which they could be employed become more
and more illusive. Of all the inventions of the nuclear
period as it applies to super powers, the only one that I

30

[c]

believe has continuing validity and maybe increasing
validity, is the strategic defence initiative of
President Reagan, less as a protection against the Soviet
Union than as a protection against third countries that may
develop nuclear capabilities.

I used to be considered an expert on nuclear strategy,
and I used to be informed of every detail of the strategic
arms negotiations and of the INF negotiations. I find it
very difficult to generate enough interest of myself in it
today to keep myself informed in detail about all these
strategic issues, and I say to myself, "They know already,
they will do it all right," which was unheard of before.
Mr Genscher knows I never left him alone for all the years
when he was doing the INF negotiations, with such great
success.

On the other hand, the distribution of nuclear weapons
to other nations is becoming an infinitely greater problem,
and almost unmanageable. I cannot underline enough what
Mr Genscher said earlier. It is almost the last minute;
maybe we are at the last minute. The confidence in nuclear
technology is now so great that nations do not even
experiment any more. India has announced that it will not
build nuclear weapons. Israel has denied that it has
nuclear weapons. Pakistan has made similar statements.
What this means in practice is that they have everything and
can put it together probably in hours, if not less. They
are technically right that they do not have nuclear weapons,

31

but not practically right. We see now that Iraq,
unbeknownst to us, even with the International Atomic Energy
Agency safeguards, was on the road towards nuclear weapons.
If that were to happen, then nuclear weapons would again
begin to play a bigger role, and then a point could be
reached where the super-powers, or even the one super-power,
might assert its authority simply on the proliferation
question, because I do not see how one can continue to live
in a world in which the possibility of single nuclear
explosions can be tolerated on the part of any country that
has no huge responsibility. The advantage of the nuclear
super-powers was that they had so much to lose through a
nuclear war that they were restrained. But would that be
true of every fanatical movement in every part of the world?
I would not want to make that experiment. That is another
one of the big problems of the 1990s, which I do not believe
is being dealt with energetically enough.

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): The very existence
of nuclear weapons with the two super-powers and the
strategy of deterrence had one pre-requisite, which was that
the other party was assumed to behave rationally. The two
sides threatened each other. They threatened each other
with a nuclear response if they were attacked. However,
this situation has changed. The question is today: in what
way can we avoid proliferation? For a long period this was
a question of avoiding the transfer of know-how. Now,

[d]

however, with civilian use of nuclear energy becoming more and more commonplace, the point is that countries already have nuclear knowledge and, proceeding from the civilian knowledge, they might be able to build nuclear weapons.

I said myself to the members of the UN Security Council before their meeting in January 1991 that they must regard themselves as the custodians of the non-proliferation treaty. The non-proliferation treaty does not provide any specific instrument for non-proliferation. This must be done by the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council must ensure that we have no proliferation. Now, of course, the world organisation, the UN Security Council, has a very different role. It must be in a position to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third countries, and, even more important, it must be able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the construction of nuclear weapons to begin with. In other words, the Security Council must take the strictest measures against any country that reaches out for nuclear weapons. If that is not done, then we will have a new type of chaos in the world, with much more far-reaching consequences than in the past. This should be put right at the top of the agenda of the UN Security Council.

DR KISSINGER: I read a great deal of discussion about the danger of the sale of nuclear weapons out of the former Soviet Union into other regions. That might happen, but I think that is a very minor problem. The major problem

33

is the export of knowledge into these regions, because,
buying an individual weapon, even buying 20 weapons, in
itself is not as significant as acquiring a group of
scientists who can create the basis for a continuing
evolution of nuclear technology. Therefore, any
international regimen that is created - and this is what
makes it so difficult - has to account not only for the
transfer of materials but somehow there has to be some
limitation or some method by which the movement of the
scientific technology that creates the basis is put under
some sort of control. That is going to be very difficult to
do.

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): In Germany we have
enacted national legislation which forbids German scientists
from participating in the production of weapons of mass
destruction in any other country. They will be penalised if
they build nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons
or develop such weapons in any other country. We need a
legal system of this kind. In fact, we will have to
establish a much more efficient international legal system
in order to support the law of nations. So far the law of
nations has been regarded as a law addressing the states as
such. Now we see increasingly that we must also address the
individual and must also punish the individual if in any way
he undermines world peace. This was also the basic concept

34

[lc]

THE MODERATOR: What do you think of the
possibility of Germany and Japan possessing nuclear weapons
in the future and specifically the possibility of Japan
developing nuclear technology?

MR GENSCHER (Interpretation): As far as Germany
is concerned - and I should limit myself to Germany - we do
not in any way or at any time want to have nuclear weapons,
period. In no way and at no time. I think that is an
important contribution, an important statement, made by our
country in order to give life, as it were, to the non-
proliferation treaty. This is why we feel particularly
committed, as well, to demand that this consequence of the
non-proliferation treaty is also observed by other
countries. Germany and Japan in particular must make this
demand, because, if America, France or Britain were to say
this, then many countries in the Third World would say, "They
only say that because they have nuclear weapons already",
but, if a country the size of Germany or the size of Japan
says this, then we do not have nuclear weapons, we do not
want to have nuclear weapons or any weapons of this kind,
and we expect other countries to observe the non-
proliferation treaty, this has a great moral and also legal
authority behind it.

35

[d]

DR KISSINGER: On the question of armaments, I believe the pressures on Germany and the incentives for Germany are somewhat different than for Japan. I take very seriously what Mr Genscher says about Germany. Germany is part of the system where, in relations with France and Britain and in relations with the United States, it can really take care of its foreseeable security problems in the nuclear field. I am not so sure what conclusion Japan, confronting Russia, which may move its centre of gravity to Asia, and confronting China, which is an announced nuclear power, in a limited defence arrangement with the United States and NATO, and with a longer tradition of a nationalistic defence, will reach over an indefinite period of time. I have no doubts about the present Japanese government or the next Japanese government. I am not saying this as a criticism. it depends on how the situation in Asia will develop.

I can foresee really no circumstances in which Germany will acquire nuclear weapons. The risk to Germany would be so out of proportion to anything it could gain under any conceivable government. I cannot honestly say this about Japan in the year 2000. That does not mean that I ascribe any intention like this to Japan. I just think the evolution in Asia will mean that there are more major states in direct conflict in Asia than there are in Europe, major states that are not aligned systems with fixed institutions.

36

[L]

THE MODERATOR: We would like you to explain further in response to the next question. It is: What kind of policy do you foresee in the new American administration of Mr Bill Clinton towards Europe and Asia? First, we would like to have you concentrate on the European scene. What kind of changes do you see, if any, in Mr Clinton's policy towards Europe and the impact on the security of Europe? What I am concerned about is that in his campaign it says that Mr Clinton, if elected, will reduce the US military presence in Europe and this may lead at an increasing rate to European forces, such as the united Franco-German forces, centring around the Western European Union or a decrease in the military significance of NATO. May I ask Mr Genscher?

MR GENSCHER: We do not know Mr Clinton's foreign policy programme so far but what he has said in terms of domestic policy, of course, also has foreign policy implications. By saying that he wants to concentrate more on domestic issues means that he will be looking, above all, at the economic resources of the United States. He will be dealing with problems of the infrastructure, economic developments, improving economic developments in the United States.

The first response we have already seen from the US economy has been positive. This obviously has repercussions on foreign policy. One of the main problems in our international scenario is the economic situation. For us in

38

[L]

Europe the question as to whether the US economy will move up or move down is of very great significance, considering the impact of the US economy. In fact, this impact applies not just to the European economy but to the world's economy as a whole.

I think, therefore, it is very important that the new administration must focus on further economic growth within the United States. It is also important that the new administration endeavours to find a common economic strategy amongst all the leading countries in the world's economy. We do not have such a common strategy at the moment.

In recent years the world economic summits, unlike their original intentions, have become press conferences to an increasing extent. Political decisions have been passed on to so-called Sherpas by the world leaders, Sherpas of varying significance, of varying importance in their countries. There has been a flood of communiques. We have been inundated by communiques, by more and more press conferences and whatever, but we have not really had what we wanted to have, what we needed, and that is a discussion or conference on strategies and a consensus established in this way and a yardstick giving standards also to the individual countries.

We must return, however, to such a common strategy. I hope the United States will contribute to this strategy.

When referring in fact to a common strategy, I mean that at the same time it is very important to reach an

39

agreement in the Uruguay Round. The EC in turn should not
try to open up this issue again after we have already
reached an agreement in an important area with the United
States. In other words, we should not return to this matter
and bring up an issue that has already been settled.

Mr Clinton said in the election campaign that he would
reduce the presence of US troops in Europe. Of course,
President Bush could also have said this because I think
there is an inherent logic in this situation. Of course, he
also means in this way that the US will be staying in
Europe. By reducing the troops, that means that they will
still be here, of course. They will still have troops in
Europe, not just symbolic troops but relevant troops, and
that is important, troops that really count.

European defence, whether we are talking about the
Franco-German core or the WEU, the Western European Union,
will become more and more significant. We will build up a
greater European defence identity but everybody has
understood now within the EC that this development may not
lead to a special burden within NATO.

Dr Kissinger said at the beginning of our discussion
nobody is looking for new tasks, for a new mission.
I anticipate that NATO will receive these tasks much faster
than one might assume.

In looking at the Secretary-General of the United
Nations asking NATO to participate in one or the other task
of the UN, we see two things. First, the United Nations

40

[c]

regard NATO as a body, as an organisation, of stability worldwide. Secondly, the United Nations prefers action taken by an alliance to action taken by individual countries because that, in turn, would create the unilateral impression. Henry Kissinger quite correctly said that this should not be the case, leaving aside, of course, the defence of national security. In that case, every country must be able to defend itself. Leaving that case aside, unilateral action should not be taken.

I think it important that, given this process, we should realise that we have a greater identity, a reinforced identify, within Europe. Given the new conditions in the world, we should also be considering the further development of the European Community. The Atlantic must not become wider. We must not grow apart; we must not become politically alienated, with the alienation of the USA on the one hand and the EC on the other. On the contrary, the USA and the EC should draw the conclusions from Henry Kissinger's correct statement; that is, that we have fewer and fewer military categories and more and more ecological categories today.

If this is so, then cooperation between Europe and the USA must also encompass and include these areas and must not focus on military considerations alone. Where this is not the case -- and we saw that, for example, in our GATT Round discussions -- we may have very unpleasant, undesirable tension which is certainly not in the interests of our close

41

Lc

cooperation within the Alliance. This would undermine our cooperation and it should not happen. Therefore, I am very much in favour of the fact that the USA and the EC should form a new forum, a new platform, as it were, for cooperation, not taking the place of NATO.

In 1990 I said that as were signing the Charter of Paris we also at the same time need a trans-Atlantic declaration linking Europe to the USA. If this term had not already been used for British-American relations, I would say that we need a kind of special relationship between the US and the EC.

DR KISSINGER: Nobody knows exactly what President Clinton will do, including probably President Clinton, because he has had to spend two or three years campaigning and he has concentrated, as he himself points out, on domestic affairs,

At the same time, the people he has appointed to the key positions in the national security area are men of experience and they are known to the leaders all over the world. Therefore, one can have confidence in his advisers. One can also have confidence in President Clinton because obviously in a campaign which may turn out to have a slight change of emphasis, in practice it sounds more dramatic than it will turn out to be in reality. President Clinton has shown no evidence of various actions in any other areas.

42

LQ

I agree with Foreign Minister Genscher, that there will be a reduction of American forces in Europe. There would have been a reduction of American forces in Europe under any circumstances and the only question is what is the purpose of the forces that remain? Some solution has to be found because it will not be possible to keep American forces in Europe in relevant quantities if one does not have a concept that relates them to some missions and that relates them to the European condition. Secondly, I believe that the dominant American attitude on European defence forces has been wrong. I am in favour of the Franco-German force, not because it shows distrust of the United States, but because we have to remember in 1954 the United States favoured a European defence community and threatened to leave NATO if the European Defence Community did not come into being.

The reason why I favour a Franco-German force or a European identity in defence is that we have to trust the Europeans enough to understand that their security is always better guaranteed in close cooperation with the United States than alone. If they do not understand that, keeping them impotent is not going to help matters either.

I am not too bothered by the Franco-German cause but if one analyses the circumstances in which it might be used, they will always be better off doing it together with the United States than doing it alone.

The key issue is the defence problem and how does one define defence.

43

[Lc]

I also strongly agree with what Mr Genscher has said about the special relationship between Europe and the United States. If that can be created on a political level, the economic and military questions will solve themselves. It does not mean that we will not have bitter disagreements occasionally, as we often had with the British. We had with the British over Skybolt missiles and Suez worse disagreements than we ever had with Germany and yet a special relationship continued.

So this is a task of political conception. I have to add a few other areas for Mr Clinton that he will have to deal with.

One is the relationship with Japan. It cannot go on that every year we argue about ten commercial projects and that the issue of the airport construction in Osaka -- and most Americans do not even know where Osaka is located -- becomes a big political issue. We have to find a bigger concept within which our economic issues are settled, so that this guerilla war, where the weakest companies on the one side are fighting with the strongest companies on the other side will be ended.

It is not easy. I am sure we will talk about Japan later. The Japanese system does not lend itself to a very conceptual approach.

The second problem in Asia we must deal with is the Chinese. We have to come to some conclusion on our intentions with China. My personal view is that we should

44

try a comprehensive negotiation with China, at the end of
which there will still be disagreements but they will by
handled by normal political channels and not by cutting off
communications or bringing economic pressures.

China nobody is going to do; that is my idea but
President Clinton will have the necessity of trying to deal
with it because Japan and Germany and all the other
industrialised states have already restored relations with
China. The third area in which I am sure President Clinton
will place a lot of emphasis is Latin America, which I
mentioned at the beginning. I believe that the next phase of
American foreign policy will be the expansion of the North
American Free Trade Area to other countries of Latin
America, and Chile for certain, Argentina probably and
Central America, and maybe Venezuela and Colombia, not all
in one year, If President Clinton is in there for eight
years, I believe that by the end of the nineties we will see
a western hemisphere grouping which is unprecedented and
which, for the first time in the history of Latin American
countries, means they are working with America as partners,
where they do not fear North America as much as they have
historically done and look at it more as a cooperative
project.

I think these are the major opportunities for President
Clinton. I am quite confident that he will have a very
creative presidency. I also want to say that most of my
Republican friends are inclined to help make the presidency

45

LJ

succeed in the foreign policy field. I do not speak for
domestic policy.

THE MODERATOR: Dr Kissinger, the security
situation in Asia is quite different from Europe where there
are various bilateral agencies in the region, between one
country with the United States and we do not have any
collective security arrangement in that area. Though ASEAN
is an economic entity and moving to the next stage, it is in
the balancing stage. Dr Kissinger, in relation to what was
said, what is the desirable security arrangement in the
Asian region?

DR KISSINGER: In Europe the security arrangements
arose first because there was a genuine threat and there
were Russian armies on the Elbe River which was historically
unprecedented. They had occupied all of Eastern Europe which
was also historically unprecedented. Out of this has emerged
a military alliance and out of the Marshall Plan emerged a
political sense of community. Then there was the European
Community which, impolite as it is, was helped by the
division of Germany. It would have been more difficult to
negotiate it with a united Germany from the beginning. Then
there was the good luck that Germany could become united. I
think it has to be said that nobody made a greater
contribution to that then Foreign Minister Genscher.

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[L]

Asia is not in the same position. Japan was never as threatened by Russia as Germany was and the alliance between Japan and the United States has been more in the attribute of a unilateral American guarantee. There has never been a joint command; there have never been joint institutions. Also, Japan has lost only one war in this century and so the national history of Japan has more continuity than the national history of Germany had and even the defeat did not interrupt Japanese continuity as much in the second war.

Therefore, I believe that the nations of Asia are dealing with each other more like the nations of Europe of the nineteenth century than the nations of Europe deal with each other today. I say this as a fact. China and Japan are cooperative but wary towards each other and, with any increase of armaments, there is a limit beyond which Japan will not watch the growth in China and Korea without doing something, in my view.

Korea will probably be unified in some form in this century; then it will have one hundred million people. Again, there will this three-cornered relationship. Therefore, I believe there is no equivalent to NATO in Asia. What could perhaps be done in Asia is to create the equivalent of the CSCE which may be a good way of dealing with China. China, Japan, Korea, Russia, America, ASEAN in some form, that is something that I think would be interesting to attempt, a CSCE-type institution for Asia. It does not have the advantage of NATO in it but at least it

47

[C]

would create an organism in which security issues can be
discussed and cooperative arrangements can be worked out and
in which Japan and China can find a place in which they do
not have to impact directly on each other and in which the
United States can play an honourable role. Perhaps if
Mr Genscher has his way, the CSCE joins in too! That is a
joke!

MR GENSCHER: The basic idea I do go along with.
It is interesting that Japan earlier this year for the first
time expressed an interest in acquiring observer status at
the CSCE. We supported that and that has in the meantime
become reality.

I regarded that as a very positive development on the
part of Japanese foreign policy. Asia presents a very
different situation than that in Europe which means that the
threats are very different too.

Many models which have served well in Europe and been
successful in Europe might not necessarily work. The basic
idea of the CSCE, to build confidence, to pursue
cooperation, to find common rules and regulations, will fit
and work as a principle in Asia and for Asia. I think that a
development of that sort will emerge.

I think it is important also to consider how relations
are to be organised with China. Is it just to be the
accumulation of numerous bilateral relationships or should
it rather be necessary to allocate a role to China but at

48

the same time also to concede to China within the framework
of a larger regional association? Within the CSCE
framework, for example, it was essential that not only the
USSR should belong, but also the United States, Germany and
Italy. It was only possible with the participation of the
USA. We were only in favour of having the USSR in it if
the USA could also be present.

When you are dealing with such a great country, such a
large country, as China, within the great Asian area, it can
only be within the framework of such a multilateral
association.

I would very much advise, as Dr Kissinger was also
suggesting, that we should not exclude but, on the contrary,
should include the United States.

DR KISSINGER: Japan is an observer in the CSCE.
Europe or the Community or some representation from Europe
should be an observer in such an institution because Europe
cannot be uninterested in what happens in Asia.

MR GENSCHER: It is basically essential that the
United States would be part of such an Asian structure.
Russia would also belong to the CSCE and also in its Asian
dimension. It would be unbalanced if you were to exclude the
United States from one of these.

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