USG Organization - 1971

Mar 16 HK Rogers agree to say nothing on troop withdrawals though Laird has been "spouting off." HK complains Laird "preempts the President and he locks us in and we can only get a blip in the newspaper." HK calls Laird, who claims he only cited average figure and did not promise a monthly rate. Laird says he quoted President's words, and insists "he's never gotten better support." Laird also notes that State's annual review "doesn't mention the Nixon Doctrine; doesn't mention the Cambodian thrust; makes it look like we are following foreign policy rather than leading it. It doesn't hurt anybody, but it doesn't help either." (telcons)

Mar 16 McGeorge Bundy letter to HK on Geneva protocol argues in favor of prohibiting tear gas and herbicides. He will present this position to SFRC shortly but writes HK that he will couch it in terms which take into account progress of past two years and problem posed by military use of tear gas in Vietnam. However, Bundy says he does not think tear gas is an effective weapon in any event. (chron)

Mar 16 Staff writes HK that Bill Barton seriously wounded in shooting incident in Vietnam. (Evidently he is a friend of Mitchell) (3/17 chron)

Mar 16 WSAG on extent of supply movements along the Trail. [Backdrop, noted in papers for mtg, is CIA-DIA dispute. CIA view is that ammunition and weapons that move down Trail at night are adequate for 'maintaining a hot war in Indochina,' according to Agency paper. DIA paper says 'throughput put of supplies this year is significantly below level achieved this time last year.' Further, CIA thinks not only that enemy is meeting its assigned quotas but that tonnage level this year might even be higher than last; DIA does not agree. (Wayne Smith analysis concludes that neither agency is doing solid analysis.)

In the meeting, WSAG members receive briefing on methodology employed in preparing estimates on supply movements. HK points out confusion in various agency views and says: "I am totally confused. I thought that we all ought at least to be able to leak the same facts." Group argues back and forth on exactly what is happening on the Trail. HK sums up: "There are two possibilities. Either there has been a change in methodology, and we can therefore challenge the figures; or the methodology has not changed and we can use the figures to indicate proportional changes...." Packard says methodology being used doesn't even permit proportional estimates. HK stresses that 'throughput' is the important issue. Agency rep. says throughput this year is at least as

USG Organizational - 1971

high as last year. HK turns to Packard for his view, asking "Is the whole of Pentagon intelligence useless on this?" Discussion turns to impact of Lam Son. (Related Wayne Smith memo for HK tells him that a formula for assessing logistics situation and impact of Lam Son has been developed). (WSAG)

(Wayne Smith back-up memo for HK in preparation for above meeting dealt with logistics and force diversion/ destruction evidence on South Laos. Noted CIA estimate and DOD rebuttal. Smith concluded that the conflicting estimates "constitute another episode in the continuous intelligence scandal of the Vietnam war....CIA and DIA could both be correct.") chron)

Mar 16 Haig gives _HK suggested agenda for meeting with Pres._ Issues to be raised: update on SEA operations; Laird desire to conduct 16 sortie attacks in DMZ to take out newly placed long range enemy artillery; recent meeting with Dobrynin; Wallace's interest in one-to-one interview with Pres; prospect of Spanish aid to Tunisia. (chron) (no minutes)

Mar 16 _Laird tells HK_ he has sent memo to President reaffirming that _HK is the channel_ for paper to and from DOD and Laird will ignore any others: "It is a compliment to you, Henry." He assures HK of his support when HK strengthens the coordinating procedures next year for departments' annual reports. (telcon)

Mar 16 Evidently as a follow-up to a recent breakfast meeting with HK, _Laird_ sends over a memo saying that some of the contingency plans on file for crisis situations ought to be revised; Laird's main concern is that _not enough non-military options are available_ or alternatives for having our friends take action. (chron)

Mar 17 Dick Kennedy sends Haig urgent telegram during his trip to SEA which requests assessment of Lam Son immediately since news reports "here are gloomy and loud. Result is predictable widespread nervousness...." (SEA bkch)

Mar 17 DPRC on _strategic forces survivability_ and to discuss basis for differences of opinion that have developed. Papers for discussion include _net assessment paper and a DOD counter paper_.

_HK says_ at outset that it is important to "develop some framework for relating the growing vulnerability, if it exists, to remedial measures....many of the threats are being dismissed by citing what we can do, but in fact we aren't doing anything...." In course

USG Organizational - 1971

of meeting, HK notes that "the OSD paper assumes that, without a strategic arms limitation agreement, there would be 90 Minuteman survivors after a Soviet strike in 1974 and 34 in 1977. The inter-agency paper puts the figure at 270 for 1974 and 50 for 1977. With a strategic arms limitation agreement, the OSD paper says there will be 190 survivors in 1974 while the inter-agency paper puts the figure at 700. Since everyone uses the same data, what is the reason for the difference in survivability estimates?...." Agency rep. questions the capability and time frame postulated in OSD paper, particularly whether the Soviets could put six MIRVs on SS-9 by 1974 even if they improved their accuracy; long discussion of vulnerability of US strategic forces. HK asks for assessments of developing threat and countermeasures US would have to undertake, setting forth relationship between time when US must take counter measures and development of threat; tasks Working Group to do this. HK raises a number of conceptual questions: "What is it that we want Triad to do?....A second issue is to find a way to bring various strategic forces and objectives into some sort of relationship....A third question concerns the relation of our strategic forces to the support of our allies... Finally, there is the whole problem of targeting...." (DPRC)

Mar 17 HK meets with Senator Bentsen following latter's trip to Vietnam. Bentsen felt Vietnamization proceeding better than expected; felt Laotian operation was more significant than Cambodia. Bentsen felt US Ambassador and Embassy in Vientiane getting overly involved in running the war there. Said morale in Cambodia high and soldiers appeared to be getting good training. HK, Bentsen compare personnel evaluations of Abrams, McCain and Westmoreland. (m-c)

Mar 18 Nixon has praised Laird's performance in criticizing the "Selling of the Pentagon" program done by CBS. [Praise was sent to HK via memo from Huntsman; HK then sent letter to Laird conveying the praise.] (chron)

Mar 18 Houdek suggests to HK via memo that HK concur in Colson recommendation that the Pres. meet with Meany to discuss issues of mutual interest, since press is trying to drive wedge between Labor and WH. Houdek points out that Meany has been a good supporter on Vietnam. (chron)

Mar 18 HK sends Nixon a letter from Sen. Brooke who plans to propose resolution soliciting advice of the Cmtes. on Appropriations, Armed Services and Foreign Relations of US disengagement from Vietnam. In related speech, Brooke said the assertion of clear legislative authority over US extrication from Vietnam would be a 'vital step toward reviving congressional powers over initiation of conflict.' (chron)

USG Organizational - 1971

Mar 18 Nixon signs a directive to State, DOD, and CIA saying that "it is imperative for diplomatic and other reasons that all follow the same principles concerning discussions of planned withdrawal of US forces from SEAsia..." Directive says not to go beyond Nixon comments of Mar 4 press conference and plans to announce further withdrawal at unspecified date in April. Nixon wants no speculation whatsoever. (chron)

Mar 18 HK backchannels Bunker saying "it would be hard to exaggerate the mystification and confusion caused here by the ARVN's latest scheme of maneuver which envisages a rapid pull-out from Laos...it is inconceivable to have the President vulnerable to constant changes of plans which are unilaterally implemented..." Bunker wires back on results of Haig, Abrams, Bunker talk with Thieu. Bunker recalls history of the need for Thieu to revise Lam Son as events moved along but he Bunker feels that "it (the operation) has achieved most of what we had hoped for." (Gives statistics on losses to enemy). (Bunker bkch)

Mar 18 Follow-up WSAG on enemy supply movements on the Trail at which HK opens by noting that "now that we have settled methodology, we can take up substance. After these discussions I will be qualified to set up a school for Jesuit priests or Talmudic scholars...." Discussion again highlights basic differences between CIA and DIA on estimates. HK tasks a big study by intelligence community to assess NVN logistical performance during 70-71 dry season and its impact on range of military options during 71-72. (See Vietnam) (WSAG)

Mar 19 HK has breakfast with Marshall Shulman, Paul Doty, Carl Kaysen. They discuss Soviet matters and SALT. On SALT, group reaffirms their position favoring breaking the link between offensive and defensive weapons; preferred zero ABM or standstill at presently deployed or authorized levels. HK says confidentially that G. Smith has been instructed to move toward a Safeguard/Moscow deal at Vienna. (m-c)

Mar 19 HK has evidently asked for research on pressures brought to bear on Israelis in 1957 re withdrawal. Jon Howe memo argues against this on grounds that leak of such a study would upset Israelis and complicate US strategy. Dick Kennedy agrees; notes HK wants it done but on classified basis to avoid problem of leak. (chron)

Mar 19 Amb. Tasca has sent in a backchannel report to HK indicating his view that Lowenstein/Moose report on Greece not as bad as it could have been. Jon Howe transmittal note to Dick Kennedy says Tasca cable interesting but self-serving. (chron)

USG Organization - 1971

Mar 19 Wayne Smith sends HK a report on his (Smith's) recent visit to SAC headquarters, commenting that Holloway made a major effort to 'sell' SAC. Smith feels that in so doing, Holloway is pursuing policies not necessarily consistent with those of USG on strategic policy. (chron)

Mar 19 HK meets with Martin for daily briefing. HK complains that he doesn't understand "how no one could have known that they were going to pull out this quickly...." HK says further re ARVN, "Are they being clobbered because they are bugging out, or are they bugging out because they are being clobbered?...." Martin says former is true. HK says "we were within one division of a decisive victory and we missed because that one division was not put in...." Martin says real problem will be that morale of ARVN troops coming out will be low; admits real objective of interdicting and completely disrupting north/south logistics lines was not accomplished. HK agrees: "For all this we paid a God damn heavy domestic price..." Re Cambodia, says ARVN is taking the day off. HK feels enemy has good intelligence going. (Laos briefings)

Mar 20 HK meets with families of POWs and MIAs. In course of meeting HK says "When the history of our negotiation positions is written we will have nothing to apologize for.....I urge you to read what was said in 1968. We have exceeded the minority platform of the Democratic convention -- that part that the Democrats wouldn't accept in 1968. It has been said that if you stop the bombing then you can go back -- you can't. Once you stop the people who sold it would be calling on you to make another concession. The history of the last ten years indicates that once you make a concession you are nailed to it no matter what the other side does..." (m-c)

Mar 20 HK sends memo to Pres. saying that peace movement charges that the US commitment to Vietnam is based on expectations of gaining oil leases there are totally untrue. HK reviews oil prospects issue and US reply to allegations -- that recent oil discoveries cannot possibly be linked to lengthy conflict in Vietnam. (HK memo was sent at request of Huntsman who had sent memo saying Nixon aware of the charges and wanted them "nailed" immediately). (chron)

Mar 20 Dick Kennedy sends a memo to HK saying that the "exercise" to get a special foreign policy 'writer' is "underway again." Haldeman has directed WH personnel office (Malek) to do some looking for a candidate for the job. Kennedy asks if HK wishes to try to turn this off again. (No indication of action taken) (chron)

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Mar 22 Flanigan sends HK a memo saying that State wants future negots. with Japanese on textiles to be handled by State, while Flanigan feels decision needs to be made as to whether WH or State should carry ball; he points out that industry does not consider State an acceptable negotiator. Bergsten memo transmitting Flanigan memo to HK strongly recommends that the issue be given to Peterson and suggests HK sign memo to Flanigan along this line. Haig note back to Bergsten indicates HK has decided not to sign note to Flanigan but wants to discuss matter orally with Flanigan. (chron)

Mar 22 President praises Laird: "When he gets cornered, no question how he will go." (telcon)

Mar 22 HK meets with Martin for daily briefing during Laos operation. HK questions Martin's report of 1500 KIA (HK: "Do you really believe that?") Haig says that "One of the things which we have found out is that the enemy is getting their men hopped up on booze -- a kind of rice wine...so hopped up that they are suicidal." HK says "That ought to make a great battle -- one army hopped up on drugs and the other army hopped up on booze...." Re Cambodia, HK questions optimistic reports on high enemy losses. (Laos briefings)

Mar 22 In luncheon meeting with reporters (Broder, Chanclor, etc at Occidental) HK says "...the problem which I face and the Administration faces at this time is that we must put out an objective point of view on what we think has been accomplished. We can't put out any private line because in several months what we say is going to be shown to be right or wrong. In keeping with this, we got together all the intelligence analysis a short while ago to try and figure out exactly where we stood, what we thought we had accomplished and what we hadn't. I must say that it is really an exercise in abstract theology, most of them are educated Talmudic scholars. But after the meeting, smoke had cleared, it emerged that the enemy had been severely hurt." HK is pressed on allegations that the ARVN "got the hell beat out of them" in the operation. HK says "I can't really debate what particular men on the ground say but I must admit that if NBC had interviewed me in the Battle of the Bulge, I wouldn't have given a very optimistic picture....I must say that the press has picked up these sorts of stories with excessive relish, and although I do not think that they are unture, I do think that they have not reported the other side...."

In luncheon in response to question on Ellsberg and the attack on HK with regard to civilian killings, HK says "I think that Dan is a brilliant fellow and someone whom I very much respect but he has no idea of what records we keep. He never worked for me...." (memcon)

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Mar 22
HK memo for Pres. transmits Abrams evaluation of the Laotian and Cambodian operations, highlights of which are: Operations were good test (though not without some costs) of Vietnamization; success of Lam Son will buy SVN additional time in which to continue strengthening their armed forces while permitting withdrawal of US combat troops as planned; collateral benefits were that large scale air mobile operations have been successfully conducted; although it will take some time to assess impact on enemy logistical capabilities, "considerable disruption has occurred." Also, in Abrams view, "While significantly different in concept, execution and results, there are many similarities between Lam Son and Toan Thang....both operations have gone well militarily and the maximum practical benefits have been realized....the willingness of the ARVN to conduct cross border operations reflects a dramatic change from the thinking which previously left the initiative entirely to the enemy...."(Nixon penned in at that point: "K - Get (last line) out to press...") No HK comment on Abrams analysis. (Memo for pres)

Mar 22
HK sends Nixon his analysis of implications of Lam Son for SVN, NVN and US. Highlights: For SVN, implications will be mixed, with some potential military benefits and some potential political disturbances (Thieu may be hurt politically for having launched a venture which was not full success; HK memo doubted Vietnamization would be slowed). Re NVN, the reactions will probably also be mixed, with some relief that the operation has ended as it did but some concern over what it demonstrates about SVN readiness to carry battle into vital areas. Re US, HK writes that "because of the very one-sided press treatment of the operation, the consequences of the operation were probably most adverse....(however these problems may be overcome) over time if it can be shown that..... our casualties have declined....(and the) rate of enemy attacks...affected." (memo for Pres)

Mar 22
Ehrlichman sends HK who sends it to Laird an amusing report on personnel problems facing President Lincoln. Exchange makes clear SecWar Stanton's opposition to a certain appointee for War office who is favored by Lincoln. In the end, Stanton refused to go through with appointment. HK note to Laird closes by saying "Things have changed!?" (chron)

Mar 21
HK, Laird agree CIA performance has been bad. DIA's figures of damage to enemy are more plausible, and CIA has no figures to contradict. HK: "All they have is moaning and groaning." (Telcon-home)

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Mar 22 Nixon interview with Howard K. Smith. Covers "credibility gap", Vietnam, general foreign policy outlook and foreign policy consultation, executive and congressional powers, the Presidency. Says events cause credibility gap; notes US reaching key point in Vietnam. Smith focusses on such Pres. statements that after Cambodia, US airpower would not be used in support of combat operations in Cambodia; Smith says they were. Nixon defends policy of protecting US forces as well as other charges by Smith that Admin. misleading on Vietnam. Nixon says he is not complaining about press treatment of him; feels LBJ got a bad rap from press. Re Fulbright charges that Congress not being consulted on foreign affairs (Cambodia, Laos operations), notes Congress has not cut off funds and defends need to protect American lives in SEAsia. Smith refers to NYT article which said a coup d'état could hardly deprive the people's elected representatives more completely of their constitutional powers than this gradual process of the White House without accounting taking over foreign affairs. Nixon says this is argument with every Administration; defends Admin. access to Congress; calls Rogers his prime foreign policy adviser; says HK can't be "hauled down" before Congress or else it would create situation of two SecStates. Nixon defends himself against charges of lack of access, including by Cabinet members. Nixon defends Exec/Congressional rivalry but says only he is Commander in Chief when it comes to protecting American lives. Nixon gives overview on effectiveness of Government and concerns of little man. On himself, "...there is not much I can do about my image. I was born with it....(but a President must have) peace at the center...."

Mar 23 HK has received a memo from Alex Butterfield complaining of John Chancellor's news report (of 2/24) which alleged that Gen. Vogt had claimed that the NVN had only the Ho Chi Minh left to them as supply route after Sihanoukville closed to them; Chancellor also said Sihanouk had closed the port to the communists six months before he was ousted, but that DOD had not put it that way. Butterfield writes that HK "has been asked" to call Chancellor directly and "give him the correct figures." Haig sends memo back on 3/23 saying HK had talked to Chancellor and explained the significance of the Trail and impact of recent ARVN operation into Laos. (chron)

Mar 23 Win Lord sends memo to HK saying he (Lord) is depressed and "shocked" at a certain memo proposing forty comte. consideration of special program for Uruguay. Lord says such a program won't influence the political situation there anyway. (forty)

USG Organization - 1971

Mar 23
HK meets with Congressmen to brief on Laos operation against backdrop of continued press reporting that ARVN got scared and did not do well (NBC news report along these lines attached to memcon). In briefing, HK admits some disappointments but says "You will see leaks all over town in the next few weeks on this issue because the intelligence community is like a hysterical group of Talmudic scholars doing an exegesis of abstruse passages..." Re reports of an end the war resolution, HK says "If they're going to pass an End-the-War Resolution, I'd rather they pass an irresponsible one. If they pass one that says 'Get out by the end of 1971' we will be able to say at the end of 1972 that we accomplished our objectives in spite of all the sniping; from those sons of bitches. If they decided on 'Get out by the end of 1972' it would look like we were pressured....We don't want (any resolution)...."

Mar 23
HK briefs NSC staff on Laos operation and in course of talk complains about intelligence community behavior on matter of logistics: "....Because their feelings were hurt at having been wrong on the amount of supplies coming in through Sihanoukville, they decided not to tell us anything. They said they knew their numbers were wrong, but they wouldn't tell us why and wouldn't say what was right...." (memcon)

Mar 23
Draft Latimer memo on procedures for declassification gives review of types of NSC documents that exist and suggested categories for determining release. (NYT-Pentagon Papers file)

Mar 24
Haig sends Len Garment some talking points for a Pres. meeting with 12 black Congressmen expected to argue against US bombing policy in Indochina. Haig talker includes a fact sheet on "Negro participation in the Armed Forces" which shows that such participation and rate of casualties in SEA have remained fairly constant and reflect approximate national percentage of Negro population. (chron)

Mar 24
HK sends letter to thanks to Walt Rostow who had sent HK a letter suggesting: That the Admin. put out a factual white paper on "progress and problems in Vietnam: to consolidate support for Pres. policy after the Laos operation; Second, that a frontier monitoring system to protect Laos and SVN after a settlement be designed (get Asians to do the job; sensors, helicopters could be used to the hilt). HK reply says Rostow's ideas are excellent and will be studied by NSC staff. (chron)

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Mar 24 Pres. statement issued expressing distress over
Senate action disapproving funds for SST. (Nixon
public papers)

Mar 25 HK transmits to Nixon a USC study on new security
assistance program which highlights the major
organizational issues: (a) whether State or DOD
will administer supporting economic assistance
(now administered by AID under general policy
direction of State). (b) Whether State will retain
its statutory authority to provide policy guidance
and program direction for all aspects of security
aid. (c) Which committees of the Congress will
have responsibility for processing annual authori-
zations.

DOD wants to take over State's present responsibilities for providing policy guidance and program direction for all security aid and wants to administer all aspects of security aid including supporting economic aid; this position implies a shift of Congressional responsibility from Foreign Affairs to Armed Services. State wants to maintain its role re security aid as well as assume AID's present role for management of supporting economic aid, while DOD would continue to administer military assistance and exercise same functions as it does now; this position implies continued Foreign Affairs Cmte. role in Congress. Rogers, OMB, WH legislative office feel Nixon would risk a major and futile confrontation with Congress by shifting venue on the Hill. Also, sticking with current program provides Presidential flexibility of relying on either DOD or State/AID funding for local forces; HK memo points out this was important for Cambodia 1970 and as fallback if supplemental fails.

HK favors State position. Suggests Nixon approve
this on interim basis (though this would not be
acknowledged publicly). HK writes that by making
present decision a "tentative one may in fact serve
as an incentive to State to develop the needed analytical
capacity to effectively discharge its responsibilities
and to the Foreign Relations Cmte. to give your pro-
grams better support...." Nixon approves HK recom-
mendation, siding with State.

(The package indicates that Laird at first misunderstood
Pres. decision and believed decision was permanent, in
favor of State position. Haig note to HK indicated the
matter was being sorted out. On March 25 HK signed a
directive to Rogers, Laird and USC conveying Pres.
decision and asking for USC study on effectiveness
of the measures approved, due by end of six months.)
(USC)

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Mar 25
HK message to Gerry Smith on backstopping problem.
(Backdrop is DOD concern that the USDEL is not
checking with Backstopping group now that Smith is
moving into less formal, more private format in
SALT phase. Smith argument had been that all agencies
were represented in the negotiations but DOD (Gardiner
Tucker and Nitze) still unhappy. Sonnenfeldt memo
transmits DOD complaint to HK, agreeing with DOD concern
and pointing out that WH is also left out in Vienna.
Haig agrees.) Upshot is that HK sends cable to Smith
suggesting he flag the major issues in advance that
are expected to arise in talks with Semenov, thus
giving Backstopping group time to reflect and provide
guidance and in light of NSDM 102 which is not
explicit on all points but needs interpretation.
Smith sends a reply back to HK defending the integrity
of USDEL; says he does not favor trying to engage
Backstopping group. (SALT IV-2)

Mar 25
Haig on HK's behalf sends note to Pursley for Laird
thanking for a recent paper which Laird sent over
on NVA/VC strengths. Laird paper analyzed differences
between the gain/loss methodology and estimates
derived by order of battle analysis -- as an attempt
to dispel concern over what is believed to be wide
disparity between the enemy's strength determined by
gain/loss vs. that resulting from order of battle.
Paper states gains/loss concept as: Infiltration +
Recruitment - Losses should equal Net Gain/Loss in
enemy strength.

Mar 25
Laird sends HK a list of the members of Congress who
are being briefed on Lam Son operation; notes
particularly that SFRC and HAC being covered.
(chron)

Mar 25
Jack Leacacos of the Plain Dealer has sent a letter
posing questions on NSC arrangements re contract
research, wanting to know where NSC funds for this
purpose are going. Jeanne Davis recommends Haig
sign a forthcoming reply on grounds that the NSC
has nothing to hide; she points out that Fulbright
is also asking for the same information and it
would be useful to get proper information into hands of
responsible journalist in the event Fulbright chooses
to use the information on a selective basis. Haig
signs the suggested reply, which notes that in fact
the NSC spends less than expected on contract research
and that research is done on almost every geographic
area; it is done by such firms as Rand, Hudson Inst.,
RAC, etc. (chron)

USG Organization - 1971

Mar 25 Special Pres. message to Congress on Executive Branch reorganization (following work of Nixon's Advisory Council on Executive Organization). Says "The Administration is today transmitting to the Congress four bills which, if enacted, would replace seven of the present executive departments and several other agencies with four new departments: Department of Natural Resources, Department of Community Development, Department of Human Resources and Department of Economic Affairs. (Nixon public papers)

Mar 26 HK meets with Dr. David to discuss: post-Apollo cooperation with Western Europe; approval of joint NSC-OST staff member (John Walsh); Serpukov computer request (UK request to export ICL computer to the Soviets; OST favors; DOD opposed on grounds it would be used for calculations relating to nuclear weapons; HK agrees with OST but says timing at issue); real-time satellite surveillance; progress of NATO studies on ground forces, tactical air and tactical nuclear weapons. (memcon)

Mar 26 Packard has sent a recommendation for the President that SOUTHCOM be disestablished; also recommends reorganization and revitalization of US worldwide military command structure to make it more efficient, eliminate unnecessary commands, reorient MAP for developing nations to better serve Nixon Doctrine and in general, to enhance US national defense structure for the 1970s "under your policy of realistic deterrence." Haig recommends to HK and HK signs a directive requesting DPRC study of Packard proposal. Haig covering note makes clear that Packard must ensure that the Service Chiefs will be represented at the DPRC because, Haig writes HK, "if this is not done, I am informed that General Westmoreland will request a hearing with the President." Haig memo feels that the UCP has been sufficiently controversial and disunifying to make a DPRC meeting important. HK also signs a separate directive laying on a DPRC for review of DOD's strategic, force and fiscal planning for FY 73-77 and providing agenda. (DPRC)

Mar 26 Laird sends HK a report on Nitze's views (via Gardiner Tucker) on SALT negotiating tactics and possible US responses and initiatives. In providing the report, Laird memo asks HK to hold it closely since "all of us are acutely aware (of) the relationships within our SALT delegation and between the delegation and various offices in Washington..." The Nitze report is that the Soviets are in a 'tough, confident attitude.' He suggests that the US take a strong public posture

USG Organization - 1971

to counter the Soviet confidence and particularly
that the US counter the Soviet 'draft treaty' with
one of its own containing only the simplest elements
- zero ABM and a limit on MLBMs, followed by a reduc-
tion of MLBMs to zero in some reasonable period of
time; place no additional offensive systems limits
at this time. Nitze forwards a suggested text of such
a draft treaty. (SALT-IV-3)

Mar 26 Prior to a planned meeting between Nixon, and Laird Packard, HK sends Nixon a memo from Laird on past progress and future plans for expanding and modernizing the armed forces of SVN. Hk feels that further study is needed and writes Nixon that he will undertake this in the NSC context. HK noted especially that the air effort seemed to be lagging developments in other areas; SVN helo capability appeared low, for example. (memo for pres)

Mar 26 State Department's state of the world message released.

Mar 27 On a memo from Bergsten enclosing a memo for HK to send the President on Connally's views on Indonesian debt rescheduling (which HK signs forward), HK pens in that in the future Bergsten should send such items to Peterson. (memo for Pres)

Mar 27 HK backchannels Bunker to give him a confidential briefing on the President's plan to announce withdrawal of 100-104,000 and seeking Bunker's views on Thieu's probable reaction (see Vietnam). HK tells him that only Rogers is informed along with HK and that Laird and DOD won't know until the last minute. (Bunker bkch)

Mar 27 In a Haig status report for HK on decisions taken by the President, Haig notes that Nixon reacted to Abrams' assessment of Lam Son by directing that we stress with the press ARVN's willingness to take up the initiative in this operation as a reflection of modified SVN attitudes. Also, re the agency program, Nixon wants stress on logistics achievements. (chron)

Mar 27 HK wrties Nixon that Luns is the frontrunner to succeed Brosio as SecGen. (memo for Pres)

Mar 29 HK, President assume that Laird is responsible for Newsweek speculation that President is considering boosting withdrawal rate to 16,000. Pres. says HK should tell Laird that it will be present level (12,500) and Laird will be caught by surprise when Pres. in fact raises it. HK says Laird is "trying to bracket every possibility....He doesn't mind being outmaneuvered. He does it all the time....He's like a little boy with his hand in the cookie jar." (telcon)

USG Organization - 1971

Mar 29 Holdridge sends Haig a report on a phonecall from Anna Chennault to debrief on her recent trip to Asia. She says Thieu asked her to say that another Nixon/Thieu meeting would be desirable.

Mar 29 HK sends Nixon a suggested strategy for handling the Kenitra issue with King Hassan of Morocco when he visits Washington (Note: visit later cancelled). Press leaks (Finney) had drawn attention to the issue and HK memo notes the King is angling for more US aid. HK says strategy should be to assure him of continuing US aid (without tying it directly to facilities at Kenitra) and to talk with him about specific aid levels through FY 72. Nixon approves. (memo for Pres)

Mar 29 Major HK summary for the President on the problem of leaks (sent in view of the press attention to the handling of security material by the SFRC). Includes the attitude of the Committee 1969-70 and complete package of items leaked to the press in that time frame. (memo for Pres)

Mar 30 Gerry Smith sends telegram to HK containing his personal impressions of progress in SALT IV. Smith says that with 3 US proposals on the table, there is some wonderment as to how the US can maintain all have equal status; Smith points out that Soviet reaction to the new third option was not to reject the proposal wholly, only the 4-to-one ratio; says there is also uncertainty as to what the US policy will be about separate agreements on the accident question and hot line upgrade (HK puts check mark next to the last item). Smith feels it is difficult to see how much can be done on offensive limitations until we negotiate more on FBS which he can't do under present instructions); HK pens in margin: "Let's give him that." (SALT IV-3)

Mar 30 At Ad Hoc Vietnam meeting, Sullivan, among other things, expresses concern over a Jack Anderson column that morning referring to Salem House and Prairie Fire operations in Cambodia and Laos and claiming that US ground combat forces had taken part; notes that beginning with the report on rain-making, this article is the latest in a series of serious leaks via Anderson. (Ad Hoc)

Mar 30 HK sends letter of thanks to Reischauer at Harvard for latter's letter which expressed concern that Pres. state of the world message might imply the US will stay in SVN for some time; Reischauer is strongly against this. (3/17 chron)

USG Organization - 1971

Mar 30
HK signs a directive to the FBI endorsing a special program for Vietnam as recommended by Colby and approved by SecDef, Vietnam Ad Hoc group, special interagency committee under NSC and Bunker. (Backdrop was that FBI was reluctant to move forward on proposal without specific WH approval, against backdrop of earlier Bunker opposition and other problems that had miffed FBI). HK directive urges FBI director to cooperate in program. (chron)

Mar 31
Sonnenfeldt sends HK latest INR report (Ray Cline) on Soviet ABMs and SALT which suggests that the Soviets are on the verge of making basic decisions regarding improvements in Moscow ABM system and possible expansion of ABM deployment beyond Moscow and that they are being affected in this by ongoing deployment of US MIRVs and Safeguard which might lead them to go ahead with ABM modernization and not wait for SALT. Sonnenfelt cover memo to HK says of the INR study: "This is another chapter in the continuing effort of State/Intelligence (and CIA) to portray the SALT negotiations as a test of American good faith, a test they seem to conclude we are failing." (chron)

Mar 31
In preparation for an SRG on Greece and Pakistan, a Saunders briefing memo for HK notes that State is already moving unwittingly from an earlier US posture of a detached position from the South Asian situation to a second posture of beginning dissociation from West Pakistanis; thus, there is a clear need to develop guidelines. (SRG)

Mar 31
HK sends letter to thanks to Ray Cline who had written HK assessing the WSAG meetings on the Lam Son operation and of the need for a more systematic approach to net assessments. Inter alia Cline had written HK that "none of your great men on the WSAG seem to have done (their) homework before rather than after the decision was reached to launch the Route 9 operation." Cline also complained that the "adversary proceedings" between CIA and DIA at WSAG prevented orderly approach to intelligence involved in estimates. Cline says he favors a revised approach for preparation of net assessments and advocates creation of a new NSC subcommittee along the lines of Net Evaluation Subcmte. of the early Kennedy years. (Tom Latimer's memo transmitting Cline letter and proposed reply to HK was not wildly enthusiastic about Cline's ideas.) (chron)

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Ap 2 Jon How calls Haig's attention to extract from ABC TV news of White House leak re Pres. April 7 speech and troop withdrawals. (chron)

Ap 2 HK retracts NSSM on Law of the Sea that had not been cleared with Ted Eliot. HK tells Rogers that "Packard has a strong view but it should be handled by State." (telcon)

Ap 3 Ehrlichman at Western White House announces Nixon would personally review Calley's court martial conviction before any sentence takes effect. (chron)

Ap 3 Laird says President, who is considering Vietnam withdrawal figures, has to go to at least 12,500 a month and could go "a little more if he really wants to," or even up to 15,000"if he really feels he has to. HK notes that 12,500 is Laird's formal recommendation on paper, and that military would prefer much lower figure. Laird agrees. HK says he'll tell President what Laird said but "I don't think that that's his mood." (telcon-home)

Ap 3
HK sends Ehrlichman a rundown of key foreign policy issues in 1972 (no backup but looks like plans for 72 election).
HK says if things fall into place the Admin. should have an excellent foreign policy record overall. Notes that Vietnam clearly will dwarf all other issues. (chron)

Ap 3
HK concurs in message to Bangkok authorizing compromise program for strengthening Thai armed forces on understanding that this will be a short term program and there will be further review re longer term. Holdridge notes package does not go as far as had been originally hoped. Shifts are result of DOD reluctance to assume any commitment for MASF add-on. Treasury objecting to 'soft' repayment terms given Thais. State is also proposing to release for other AID purposes the $14 million unexpended FY 71 supporting assistance which it believes cannot be used for Thailand consistent with FY 71 congressional presentation. (chron)

Ap 3
Win Lord sends HK Secretary Kennedy's suggestion that RN include in Vietnam speech remarks concerning a shift from the military to economic sphere of activity. Timmons suggestion for a 16,500 monthly reduction rate and a statement that no additonal troops will be required to replace rotating forces starting in Nov. of this year also passed to HK. (chron)

Ap 5
HK backchannels Bunker saying he can promise Thieu a meeting with RN but there is to be no announcement for a month for political reasons. Bunker also authorized to promise long term econ. aid and assurances of a minimum of 200,000 troops in SVN through fall elections. Plan actually advances redeployment of total by only one month. HK emphasizes importance of maintaining security of plan - only RN, Rogers, HK know figure; Laird does not. (chron)

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Ap 6 Flanigan reminds HK he was going to determine whether Walter Rice should still be removed as Amb. to Australia now that there has been a change of govt. HK notes "I have had an incontrovertible report that he is a disaster. He should go." (chron)

Ap 6 RN sends letter to Goldwater assuring the Sen. of resolve to maintain strategic force posture adequate to meet any Soviet threat. Letter is response to Sen.'s letter expressing alarm over strategic force comparisons between US and USSR as outlined in SAC briefing and belief that American people should be informed. (HK notes such briefings are often highly exaggerated.)

Ap 6 Rogers complains about 'miserable' message from Dacca in which several FSOs 'bitched about our policy and have given it lots of distribution so it will probably leak. It's inexcusable.' If 'couldn't be worse. It says we failed to defend American lives and are morally bankrupt.' (telcon)

Ap 6 New inter-agency group chaired by State convenes first meeting; purpose is to coordinate Federal research related to foreign affairs. (This is result of Pres. decision of the need for closer coordination of external research.) (Public papers)

Ap 6 Bergsten forwards Peterson request for HK concurrence on proposed structure of CIEP. Bergsten sees no problems. (Memo OBEd) (chron)

Ap 7 Nixon meets with Rogers, Laird and HK to discuss RN SEA speech; purpose of mtg. is to inform Laird of announcement of withdrawal of additional 100,000 troops between May and Dec 1, 1971. (Rogers is not to indicate previous awareness of RN decision). HK provides talking points. (Major mtgs. file-no minutes)

Ap 7 President, after his speech, tells HK: "If this staff can't stand up the hell with them." HK says key people were 'sturdy:' Connally, Haldeman etc. Pres. agrees "Ehrlichman stood up "more than he did before." (telcon-home)

Ap 7 Pres, HK respectively write Dean of Fletcher expressing dismay at firebombing of Dean's office in Mar. (chron)

Ap 8 Henry Hubbard tells HK that there was "some talk" that Laird recommended a higher withdrawal figure than the 14,300 announced by Pres. (telcon)

Ap 8 Lehman relays John March conclusions re congressional reaction to Pres. VN speech: most did not criticize omission of firm date; more concern over Pres. decision to intervene in Calley proceedings. (chron)

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Ap 8 First meeting of CIEP. HK attends. No substantive discussion. Group is told Pres. will announce shoe decision - he will defer decision in the escape clause and send David Kennedy to consult the major foreign suppliers. (chron)

• Ap 8 Haig notes BeLieu shares Sonnenfeldt concern about the lack of effort being made on the Hill by DOD on ABM. (chron)

Ap 8 HK sends RN letter from U Thant. Says positive tone apparently resulted from Thant's enthusiasm for the Global Challenges chapter of state of world message.

* Ap 8 RN memo to Laird reaffirms liaison between DOD and White House through NSC on policy matters and through Military Assistant on all other matters. Reaffirmation is in response to Laird request in effort to stop proliferation of unchannelled contacts between WH and DOD.

Ap 9
HK thanks Laird for his and Department's cooperation in preparing supporting information for RN Vietnam speech. (chron)

Ap 9 RN meets with roving Amb. Kennedy who reports on his recent Asian trip. Kennedy unimpressed with Embassy attitude and ability in Indonesia - related it to Asst. Sec. Green's domination. Also commented on problems in Micronesia arising from multitude of Peace Corps reps. actively working against US interests in the Trust Territories. RN orders immediate attention to remedying this problem, noting he had ordered Blatchford two years ago to reduce the Peace Corps presence in Micronesia. Asked Kennedy to raise issue with Secretary Morton.

Ap 9 Saunders briefing memo for HK Ap 9 SRG meeting on Ceylon and Pakistan expresses concern that State's independent actions (without WH clearance) in effect represent the beginnings of a shift in policy and notes State justification of delaying aid decisions on technical grounds while in reality wanting to send a signal of displeasure to Yahya. A related Sauders (4/9) memo reiterates the need to get a hold on State (Sisco) actions on Pak issue noting that "Sisco is thinking in a new way about Presidential commitments without any reference to a broader policy framework which has been discussed in the White House."

Ap 12 Wayne Smith poses bureaucratic complaint about State's forwarding a routine report on the recent GVN reforms (with no evaluation of mission position), duplicating work of Program Analysis office which he understands has primary responsibility for actions on the Vietnam economy. Feels no action necessary on State memo. (chron)

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Ap 12 Haig asks USC to consider the question of public disclosure of the purpose of CANNIKIN nuclear test in effort to reconcile differing views of DOD and AEC. DOD agrees to declassification of yield but not purpose since this would related to ABM and therefore, according to staff, put public flack on DOD doorstep. AEC wants both public since informed public are already aware of both. (HK notes he wants deadline put on all USC papers).

Ap 13 Wayne Smith memo prior to SRG on VN - enemy capabilities 71-72 - raises several procedural issues that may arise: *Laird* attempts to frustrate the analysis if he is fearful that results won't validate his plans; *CIA and DIA* refusal to work together (it is imperative for the NSC to serve as mediator) and the need to bring the Services and MACV on board. On last, Smith says AF must acknowledge the govt's right to consider the effect of different sorties levels and mixes of aircraft on the enemy in South Laos: "The AF and JCS should not be allowed to frustrate the intent of the highest levels of the government to look at all the respevtable options."

Ap 14 Smyser informs HK that *Amb. Lodge* is having second thoughts about making trip to VN but clearly is very anxious to get into the negotiations. (HK notes: "Over my dead body.") *Lodge* feels he can make a contribution. (chron)

Ap 14 *Pres.* approves HK recommendation for a 1 year trial period of continued US membership in ILO, making vigorous effort to correct the org. weaknesses and seeking congressional appropriations and supplemental covering previous year's arrears (if not obtained, the US would notify ILO of intent to withdraw). *Pres.* notes it is 'most important' to seek *Meany's* cooperation in getting the congressional cooperation. *M/P*

Ap 14 Holdridge informs HK of *Hoover* response regarding possible FBI assistance for SVN. *Hoover* is strongly against the proposal but would like to station an agent in Saigon to collect intelligence - idea which is opposed by Bunker. Holdridge recommends seeking Bunker's views. (chron)

Ap 15 *Pres.* transmits to Senate Convention for Suppression of the Unlawful Seizures of Aircraft; convention provides for extradition or punishment of hijackers. *M/P*

Ap 16 *HK sends RN* a State report on its efforts to emphasize its labor programs overseas. (Background to report is *Pres.* request to State for suggestions on improving labor attache program following RN-Meany meeting). *M/P*

Ap 16 *Haldeman* informs agencies of *President's* reestablishment of *White House Working Group* responsible for supervision of *Admin. policy on legislative matters involving national

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security affairs. Also directs establishment of a
Legislative Interdepartmental Group (State, AG,
DOD, DIA, NSC and WH Congressional office) which will
report to the Working Group. (Draft memo to Pres.
contains useful wrap-up of congressional issues.)
(Chron - attachment to agenda for HK meeting with AG)

Ap 17 HK meets with George Bush. Talking points of 4/16 suggest discussion of Chirep, Lodge Commission meeting with Pres, UNESCO, UN personnel matters, Yost attack on VN policy (evidently in previous Sunday Wash Post).

* Ap 17 President approves Packard recommendations on changes in Unified Command structure (institution of a Readiness Command and reassignment of responsibilities in Alaska and ME) but defers decision (as recommended by HK) on disestablishment of the Southern Command pending clarification of the political and diplomatic implications of such a move. Packard and JCS (except Westmoreland) favor disestablishment, transferring functions to the Atlantic Command. The Army and Amb. John Davis Lodge oppose. M/P

* Ap 18

    HK tells Haldeman that Pres. is dropping hints to Dole, Colson etc telling them to tell Brooke and Case to cool it for a month on SALT. HK says "While I admire him in adversity, good things tend to go to his head." These "little nuggets of hints" risk blowing it all. If the Soviets think we are too eager for a summit, we'll never get it. Colson is "an idiot" and "the less he knows, the better." HK feels "our biggest weakness is that in order to get a week's respite, we mortgage ourselves a month or two from now.....We are not badly positioned now, if we can just ride it out for a bit." (telcon-home)

Ap 19

    Heig forwards to HK a list of items to raise with Pres -- suggest RN breakfast with Laird; report on HK meeting with Laird and the SRG on Vietnam; inform him of new NSSM on possible next steps in diplomatic area re Peking; inform him of HK-Reagan discussion re possible visit by Reagan to SEA. (chron) (nominates)

* Ap 20

    Laird tells HK he is giving hardline ASNE speech on need for defense etc. and will send it to HK. "I will have to send it to State and (I'll) never get it coordinated this way." HK says Laird should send it to HK and HK sees no problem with it. (telcon)

* Ap 20

    President says Laird is "always playing both sides" on Vietnam and "the babble of these Senators" is partly due to Laird. Bureaucracy has to stand by the Laos decision. (telcon)

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Ap 20 Staff-provided agenda for HK-Mitchell meeting suggests following issues be raised: China policy developments; ME (ramifications of Rogers trip in May); Vietnam; USSR relations; congressional hearings on Laos and re-constitution of the White House Working Group to supervise Admin. policy on legislative matters involving national security and supervise activities of the LIG. Memo notes immediate focus of grup is to be on Javits' war powers resolution. (chron) (No minutes)

Ap 20 HK meets with Vaky's group of Georgetown University students. HK discusses decision-making process (in low/middle crisis) with example of East Pakistan crisis. Questions ranged over State-NSC roles ("What we're trying to do is prevent capricious decision-making procedures..."); Vietnam and Latin America.

Ap 21 Rogers tells HK that Connally is thinking of holding up all economic assistance to Turkey until they do more on drug traffic. HK agrees with Rogers that it just drives the Turks crazy and won't stop drug traffic. "We have gone through this before." HK will back Rogers. (telcon)

Ap 21 HK promises Irwin he will talk to Connally, who is blocking IDB loans to Peru for roadbuilding. (telcon)

Ap 21 HK agrees with Bush recommendation that RN call Rudy Peterson to urge him to accept UNDP position. RN writes "No - he must take it if he wants it - I shall not urge him - or anyone else on this position." (M/P)

Ap 21 Rogers suggests Jim Schlesinger for security assistance coordinating job at State. HK says: "He would be good for that. He is highly intelligent, very thoughtful, but he has this abrasive quality. When you get used to him, you realize he does it because he is a dedicated guy." (telcon)

Ap 21 HK tells President that Laird is trying to pull Koreans out of Vietnam for economy reasons but Thieu is livid. President should defer any such move until strategy review is completed. (telcon)

Ap 22 RN breakfasts with Laird. (No minutes). HK briefing memo says purpose is to "bolster the Secretary's morale and to strengthen his adherence to your policies, both in his public statements and in his numerous contacts with the Legislature." HK indicates some discouragement about his relationship with White House as result of difficulties re base closures, My Lai case and other defense related issues.

Ap 22 RN scheduled to meet with Rogers to discuss his trip to SEATO, CENTO and Mideast. (No minutes) HK briefing memo expresses concern that Rogers trip will raise expectations and further complicate matters. HK writes

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"I believe it is important that you caution the Secretary not to depart from the current state of play without keeping us fully apprised and receiving your specific approval for any departures from the status quo."
HK recommends RN ask for daily reportin on ME portion of trip. (M/P)

Ap 22 Rodman sends HK recent Yost letters on Indochina. One of Dec 1969 calls Admin. policy on VN "sensible and realistic, the best possible under the circumstances," but also agreeing with George Ball on the desirability of downgrading VN importance to cut our losses more easily; the other of May 1970 suggests a Presidential fireside chat to explain his VN policy and display confident leadership. (chron)

• Ap 22 Laird complains that the President's decision on SOUTHCOM is a blow to Packard who had worked hard on it and didn't get a chance to present his view. HK says President toughened it. Laird says SOUTHCOM "isn't worth a damn" and DOD is putting MAP under new set-up to upgrade it. Laird Says State signed off on it, too. (telcon)

Ap 23 Wayne Smith sends HK a memo noting that Laird "saves face" by informing HK he had already initiated efforts for assessment of VN situation that go beyond those requested by HK in April 15 memo and offering to work with HK on the separate topics indicated. Smith comments on evolving situation and expectation of receiving DOD study over weekend. (chron)

Ap 24 Haig provides list of items for HK to raise with Pres. on 4/26: HK impressions of Bilderberg Conference (strong reaction to Riegle's anti-war presentation and HK conversations with Bahr); discuss Paris scenario; plans for press conference and speech on return of Marine Division; Laird reaction to SOUTHCOM decision. (chron) (no minutes)

• Ap 26 HK forwards to RN a letter from Korry expressing his disappointment at termination of his service and emotionally defending his performance in Chile. HK comments that Korry "has acquired a great deal of interesting and sensitive information in his career as an Ambassador and he is presently carrying a bitter grudge against the State Department and, I suspect, considerable resentment at the White House for not defending and protecting him after his loyal service. Although there are aspects of Korry's performance and judgment which were unfortunate, on the whole I believe he has tried to serve your objectives as he saw them. I think it would be desirable to try to ease some of Korry's pain at this time, both because it would be compassionate and in the Administration's interest to avoid sending back to private life an excessively embittered, articulate

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and knowledgeable potential critic." RN approves recommended course of action - directing State to draft a warm Pres. letter of appreciation and to offer him another post. HK further recommends Prs. receive Korry following his return to Washington. (chron)

Ap 26 Pres. to meet with Lodge Commission to receive their report on improving the UN and US participation in it. HK memo tells Pres. that while some of the recommendations may be impractical, the report is unlikely to embarrass the Admin. Its recommendations included: opposition to Taipei's expulsion, "but seek agreement as early as practicable" for Peking's entry; maintain or increase US total contributions but over time seek to lower US percentage of budget to 25%; that the US accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. (M/P 4/25)

Ap 26 RN agrees to meet with Packard, Moorer and HK on 4/28 to provide opportunity for Packard reclama on decision to defer decision on disestablishment of SOUTHCOM.

Ap 27 Sonnenfeldt informs HK of brewing agency dispute re US position in the negotiations on accidental attack with the Soviets. HK agrees with NSC staff view that US should continue to oppose any general clause in an agreement on accidents/ unauthorized use and continue to oppose the idea of a separate treaty. State supports USDEL's desire to modify proposed Soviet language on general clause, which Sonnenfeldt says constitutes an invitation to the Soviets to 'request nuclear war.' Sonnenfeldt also notes this is second time in a week the working level at State has raised question of "how high up" in the White House a position on SALT originates. (chron)

Ap 27 In meeting with HK, Aust. DefMin Gorton brings up problem of deciding what the US line is - State comes out with a different line than the WH and also DOD sometimes. Gives example of recent Laird statements that there will be no combat troops in VN after May 1; HK notes it wasn't carried out.

Ap 27 Dick Kennedy memo for HK identifies areas of overlap of roles of CIEP and its subsidiary bodies with NSC staff and our subsidiary bodies and idenfities ongoing studies with an explicit economic component. Kennedy recommends against turning over any of the studies to CIEP for primary responsibility. Further recommends that NSC retain control of broad policy studies with CIEP participation in discussion of economic issues. Also recommends NSC retain security assistance program and all major country development programs and make development policy the responsibility of the CIEP. (NSC system-2)

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Ap 28 Wayne Smith memo to HK complains that Laird is getting down the track on DOD policy guidance formulation and what he is proposing is "dramatically" inconsistent with RN policies on two levels: On bureaucratic side, Laird guidance has been issued on interim basis even before DPRC had chance to meet; Laird plans to issue it finally after review by JCS and the Services -- i.e. no chance for review by agencies outside DOD. On substance, Smith says that as written Laird guidance would move the US from 1-1/2 war strategy to 1-war strategy and is inconsistent with RN policies. Smith strongly urges HK to sign directive to DPRC asking that the major issues be presented to the Pres. and that no guidance be issued until that time unless it is fully consistent with RN policies. HK agrees and signs directive. (DPRC-attached to 7/15 paper)

Ap 28 Henry Hubbard (Newsweek) tells HK that Middle East is a subject which Rogers "wants for his own....He wants this real bad....It's interesting in terms of substance but also a play for the history books..." (telcon)

Ap 29 In a press conference, RN responds to a question about differing views on China policy expressed by Agnew in an off the record midnight session with selected newsmen. Nixon also responds to a question regarding his views on the UN Commission endorsement of a two-China policy. (public papers)

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My 3 Vernon Walters message reminds that he is retiring in August unless "something else" opens up -- maintains that staying longer would damage his credibility with French and also US contacts. (CD)

My 3 Bergsten writes HK that *Connally is delaying issuance of new regulations freeing foreign assets controls re transactions with China until he returns to Washington and personally reviews them*. Bergsten notes HK may have to issue directive to Treasury. (chron)

My 3 Haig is made aware of Moorer's concern about a Laird memo to Moorer stating or implying that all US ground combat responsibilities will end this summer. (chron)

My 3 Dick Cook suggests instituting program for NSC staff briefings of congressmen on SEA and Admin. viewpoint. Kennedy tells Haig that Cook wishes to discuss idea and Kennedy adds his view there is nothing to lose. (chron)

My 4 Haig tasks staff to prepare directive for 1/3 cut in *local AID and contract personnel in SVN*, in accordance with *RN's direction for a sharp reduction so that the overall civilian presence would be reduced as military presence lessens*. (chron)

My 4 Vietnam Ad Hoc group discusses *Fulbright hearings* now in progress aimed in part at getting State's views on the record re McGovern-Hatfield Resolution and others. State is stonewalling. Sullivan says Fulbright is also asking questions about ARVN deaths, trying to build case that the war was not winding down as declared by RN. (Ad hoc)

My 4 Haig (for HK) forwards a *Laird memo* informing Pres. of his concern at the decreasing trend in the US share of *free world defense market* and of his call for a review of possible modifications in our military sales practices, to make them more supportive of US interests. RN writes: "K - I agree totally with Laird's concerned (sic) - the *Foreign Service types will of course disagree*. I don't want a leisurely study of this made. I want action - soonest possible to review this trend. Inform Connally of my concern. He shares it." Haig asks Bergsten to monitor study closely. (HK memo to Connally of My 15) (chron)

My 5 Haig responds to a *Haldeman memo* which stresses the importance of *building the POW initiative*. Haig memo *cautions* that in publicizing POW initiatives we be careful not to contribute to the overall US attitude of war weariness and frustration with war itself. Haig wants any publicity thrusts to be coordinated with his office. (chron)

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* **My 5** Haig asks Holdridge to check on and prepare memo for Pres. assuring him of the present status of press handling of the Taiwan question. Background is that RN rereacted to item in brief stating that Peking had reacted negatively to the State press spokesman position on Taiwan's status and asked why State didn't follow his (RN) line. (chron)

My 5 LIG discusses stop the war legislation and recent SFRC hearings. Haig asks Justice and State to prepare position paper on constitutional authority (for war in N. Laos) question. Also discusses Fulbright re- request for State policy on what types of information may be provided to the Committee. Issue arose from refusal to provide reporting cables on the Pak con- flict. Haig said RN would be very disturbed if anything were released that could be used to imply official USG criticism of Pak govt. Group also focusses on legis- lative situation re the draft bill; discusses approaches to interests groups, noting BeLieu and Colson offices are prepared to crank up mail in support of the Admin. bill if necessary.

* **My 7**

HK does not forward to Pres. a memo on Mansfield and Aiken statements calling for a US withdrawal dead- line from VN in order to try to get our POWs out, on grounds that "it will only fan the flames." (chron)

My 7 Haig sends a memo to Pete Peterson conveying HK agree- ment that the CIEP Review Group will have a chance to review economic aspects of the Japan NSSM prior to NSC-SRG consideration and that reps. of Treasury and Labor should be invited to participate in the IG working group (State has agreed). Suggests his representative on the Working Grup put forward Peterson's desire for consideration of various negotiating approaches (i.e. rejects Peterson desire to amend NSSM). Memo assures Peterson to attend the SRG. (chron)

* **My 10**

Laird tells HK he is trying to settle MAP dispute with Rogers. State wants to take it away from CINCS and give it to State. HK says: "Impossible! These State guys are ideologically opposed to it." (telcon)

* **My 10** Haig signs directive to State saying President wants Korry him to be offered another post (which would be "prestigious, though not necessarily substantively important") and that announcement of Korry's replace- ment be deferred pending finding another job for Korry. Directs state to prepare warm letter of appreciation from RN to Korry. (chron)

My 11 Presidential statement re US military forces in Europe is released at Key Biscayne following Senate debate on the Mansfield amendment to military selective service act of 1967, requiring reduction of US forces stationed

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in Europe by end of the year: "At this point in time, it would be an error of historic dimensions for any of the North Atlantic Treaty allies to reduce unilaterally the military forces mained in Europe for the common defense. As the most powerful member of the Alliance, the United States bears a responsibility for leadership."

May 12
HK tells LIG that RN feels very strongly that there is "no acceptable compromise (re Mansfield Resolution). This is not only because of the text of the resolution, but because once we accept the principle of such a resolution, we will be giving up one of the basic principles of our post-war foreign policy that has been supported by four Administration....The President has just given a commitment to the Europeans. Every Department has to understand that this is a Presidential policy and that it cannot be attacked by discussion in the Senate." LIG agrees to be the coordinating body, with Rogers to coordinate with WH and lead in contacting Senators. State will seek to have hearings scheduled and Rogers will address Senate in executive session; each department to make up target groups and individuals as well as media targets, re defeating resolution.

May 12
Sec. Kennedy reporting to RN on his recent trip recommends an initiative to clearly identify RN as initiator of effort to improve US-PRC relations. (Staff memcons)

May 12
HK meets Clark MacGregor and Scott/Griffin to discuss strategy for defeating Mansfield Resolution and inability to accept compromise language.

May 13
Further LIG on strategy for Mansfield Amendment. Haig briefer for HK notes Scott announced today that RN would veto Draft Bill if Amendment included. Also notes Scali status report on efforts to kill press reports of HK compromise. (No minutes)

May 13
Saunders informs Haig that EXIM is out of tune with USG on Pakistan. As recommended, Haig calls Kearns to set him straight on Pres. approved posture. (chron)

May 13
Nixon meets with former high govt officials and military officers to mobilize bipartisan support to defeat Mansfield resolution. Nixon calls NATO the "blue chip" in terms of importance to US. RN and Rogers say the amendment would undercut our position in Europe, ME and on SALT, with RN placing particular emphasis on catastrophic effect on the Germans. Discussion turns to how to handle the problem. Pres. says there should be no compromise now, and all agree on need to stand firm. (Present

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were McCloy, G. Ball, Acheson, Gen. Guenther, Katzenbach, Gen. Norstand, Gen. Lemnitzer, Gen. Goodpaster, Vance). It was agreed to issue a Pres. statement on the issue which would be signed by past senior officials. (WH releases transcript of a news briefing on the meeting by Acheson and Ball).

My 14 Further LIG on Mansfield Res. Haig talking points stress "it is absolutely essential that there be no talk or sign of compromise or the trend toward alternatives will become overwhelming. It must be kept to a vote yes or no at least until the very last minute." (Mathias substitute language attached. No minutes)

My 14 Rogers statement to SFRC on war powers stresses need to preserve Pres. ability to act in emergencies in accordance with his constitutional responsibility.

* My 14 HK memo to Pres. tells him of mounting congressional (Sen. Kennedy leading) and public criticism on the provision of relief aid to South Asia. HK stresses need to find a compromise to meet Yahya's sensitivity to foreign involvement as well as donor's requirements for assurances that their assistance will go for humanitarian and not military purposes. (chron)

* My 15 Houdek sends Ziegler and Scali for use with press transcript of Brandt press conference remarks on Mansfield resolution to effect there should be no unilateral reductions; forwards letter from Brosio to RN that US unilateral reduction would undermine solidarity of the alliance and compromise efforts towards detente. (chron) WH releases list of former USG officials supporting RN on Mansfield Amendment and also LBJ statement. Truman statement released on My 16.

My 15 Muskie speech in Milwaukee (AP) - "Our purpose must not be to create an issue next year but to end the killing now...it is more important than politics. It is worth fighting for in 1971 and it is even worth losing for in 1972." (Lib. Senators file)

* My 17 HK backchannels Bruce noting rumors Bruce thinking of leaving job and saying RN wants him to stay at least through the summer. Bruce replies back on his decision to resign as of June 30 and is irrecocable due to health reasons.

* My 17 HK meets with Victor Lasky. President had suggested that Lasky get the "inside story" on the Jordanian crisis from HK, which RN regarded as the severest test of the Admin in past year. Houdek memo notes RN intimated to Lasky the possibility of a summit and suggested he keep a chapter open. (chron)

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My 18 Staff alerts HK to possibility Rogers will raise with him U Thant proposal to invite leaders of US, PRC, USSR, France and UK to be present in Geneva week of Sep. 6. (If RN not willing to come, then would be held at foreign ministers level). Staff notes need for careful staffing. (chron)

● My 19 Dobrynin in telcon with HK regarding Salt documents notes he will be in to see Peterson with the trade delegation. HK wants to be sure D understands Peterson is only in a position to listen. D says he understands. (Salt inclusive file)

My 19 Move in Senate to reduce by half the 300,000 US troops in Europe defeated by 61 to 36. (public chron)

My 19 Harrington reports on Congressional record Salt article by Samuel Orr which comments on the tight WH control over Salt process through the NSC machinery and on policy of developing weapons systems at the same time talks are going on. (Salt 71-72)

● My 20 President meets with Cabinet and Congressional leadership to inform them about Salt announcement. Talking points for meeting caution against revealing private exchanges and against discussion of specifics of the confidential understandings with Soviets. (Salt-3)

● My 20 HK informs RN of need for legislation to continue Radio Free Europe after June 30. Effort to be undertaken to convince Chairman of Appropriations Cmte of serious problems caused by their position re funding and seek to change their position as well as to seek support for passage of proposed legislation. RN notes: "K - We should make an effort to change this."

My 20 HK authorizes Ernie Johnston to make clear to Peterson that HK strongly supprrs submission of GSP legislation to Congress as soon as possible with a vigorous Pres. message and strongly opposes a fallback to the European quota scheme as suggested by State. (This is in response to staff memo pointing out the need to give Peterson guidance on HK views. Stans had written RN suggesting that after submitting the promised legislation we be prepared to fall back quickly to a scheme that would imitate the restrictive quota provisions of the EC scheme.) HK notes he agrees with Peterson that we should not modify our requirement for prior assurances on reverse preferences (as condition for GSP eligibility). State, Defense, Commerce and Interior want to soften the requirement and loosen the criterion. (chron)

My 20 Staff memo tells HK of Congressional criticism of Admin. posture on Pakistani conflict and calls attention to NYT article alleging HK, Connally and McNamara agreed

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the previous month to a joint effort with UK to lead an international relief effort to help Pakistan. Case and others on SFRC passed "sense of Senate" resolution urging suspension of military aid; Sen. Harris sponsoring an even harder resolution calling for UN action to get others to cut off aid. Kennedy and others focussing on refugee situation. Staff notes "What all this seems to boil down to is fairly sustained Congressional criticism focussed in the (SFRC) of the Administration's alleged 'do nothing' policy on Pakistan. State and Aid's Congressional relations people find this troublesome but not yet a big issue that could jeopardize related legislation such as AID reorganization. It most likely will however make it difficult to get more money for the West Pakistanis." (chron)

My 21 Houdek responds to Bruce Kehrli query about the source of a Bob Schieffer report to the effect that the Laos operation had obviously not stopped the NVN. Response says it is virtually impossible to determine the leaker or source of the TC correspondent's information. DOD denied providing any authorized briefing. (chron)

My 21 Houdek passes on to HK the fact that "Haldeman, Colson and Company are concerned that the President is not getting enough credit for yesterday's SALT announcement, and have asked that you meet with or make phonecalls to several newsmen who did not attend your briefings yesterday." Houdek concurs with suggestion. (chron)

My 21 Nixon sends memo to agencies directing immediate end to all speculation or disclosure by officials of the Administration to any unauthorized person re possible substantive positions for SALT. Indicates disciplinary action will be taken. (Response to speculation that appeared in press that day). M/P

My 21 Staff talker for HK meeting with Peterson on China trade also notes that HK should avoid issue of the Japan NSSM. Peterson thought he had a HK promise to amend the NSSM and has swallowed decision not to do so, directing that the economic section of the study be submitted to CIEP before it goes to NSC. (chron)

My 22 Sonnenfeldt alerts HK that Lucet plans to call him on the French need for a decision by May 24 on French-Polish transistor deal. Sonnenfeldt notes badly fouled up bureaucratic situation resulting from failure to coordinate agency clearances at sufficiently high level, with DOD now holding that it cannot have its views to WH until later this week. HK should call Packard and explain urgency of situation, and Pres. intention to approve deal (assuming HK intends to overrule DOD). (chron)

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*   **My 23** President notes "loaded question based on a completely erroneous quotation" in Gallup Poll that asked "Do you agree with the President's statement that end of war will bring generation of peace." "God, I never said that." HK agrees: "The most you have ever said is that it will contribute to it and that is your goal in the whole context of your policy." President says it has to do with Soviet policy, relations with China, Middle East, everything else. (telcon-home)

*   **My 24** Wayne Smith informs HK of agenda of Senate votes on the draft extension and related issues over next 2 weeks. (Good summary of various proposed amendments and implications of each). Assesses that only the Taft (limits draft calls for 72 and 73) and Hughes (increase military pay and benefits possible resulting in necessity to reduce force or procurement) likely to pass. (chron)

*   **My 24** Peterson sends HK his suggested memo to Pres. endorsing relaxation of trade and travel restrictions with China and recommending that Pres. before such an announcement, consult with key special interests groups as a means of turning the decision to domestic political advantage. Peterson tells HK re grain sales to China and the USSR that "there is real trade potential here; there is an opportunity with Bob Dole and the farmers to win domestic political kudos; and the situation is set up to eliminate some very shortsighted shipping restrictions. While labor and Meany may oppose this latter aspect, I have reason to believe that the West Coast unions are prepared to load grains for both China and the Soviet Union. On balance, it is better from the President's standpoint for Joe Curran to be unhappy than for the American farmers to be unhappy. Particularly since grain exports do have the promise of improving the balance of payments, which is so important." (chron)

*   **My 24** Nixon sends memo to Laird to enlist his support in defeating the manpower reductions or other Senate action that would seriously reduce our ground force capability. (HK memo to Pres. had noted that the first essential step toward preserving our ground force capability is to ensure a strong and unified Admin. stand against the Senate reduction; this was basis for his recommendation that the Pres. enlist Laird's help). (chron)

*   **My 25** HK, President discuss new offer to DRV: fixed time-table for US withdrawal, ceasefire, POW return. President says "Don't open this to Laird - don't tell him a damn thing!" (telcon)

*   **My 25** Houdek tells HK that source of Jack Anderson quotes in his column on Lam Son is from a fact sheet prepared for dissemination abroad to our embassies, to Congress

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and to friendly columnists. Anderson had reported them as HK quotes reporting to the Pres. Houdek notes there is no record of any fact sheet going to the President. (Package includes 3 HK memoranda for Pres. giving final results of Laotian operation. (chron)

My 25 Haig, in cryptic memo, informs Colson that HK and Haig had met that day with Lou Harris following the Colson-provided scenario. Says "Lou left highly charged and confident he was performing an important mission. Henry asked him to pass on to us any intelligence he picked up on the Soviets either via McGeorge Bundy or directly." (chron)

My 26 HK asks Bruce to remain in his job at least through the end of June until we got a clearer idea of NVN negotiating intentions. Bruce agrees he might be able to stay through July but no longer. (CD) Pres. scheduled to meet with Bruce.

My 26 Marshall Wright fills HK in on activities relating to efforts to begin active US campaign for selection of U Thant successor as SecGen. Strong support in State for Jakobson. Wright notes Rogers may raise issue with President next day and seeks guidance on HK views. HK notes "Jakobson looks alright to me." (chron)

My 26 Agnew complains of State Department leaks about Agnew conversation with South African official. Story said "Rogers irked." HK says Agnew should tell Haldeman. (telcon)

May 26 John Scali offers to talk to Jack Anderson to get him to lay off intelligence revelations. HK says "I do not believe it will work with Jack Anderson.... There is nothing to be lost by talking to him. Think about it and talk to me before you do it." (telcon)

My 26 President reports that Colson told him we succeeded in beating back Hughes Amendment abolishing draft because of our strong showing on Mansfield Resolution followed by SALT announcement: "They were scared to death." (telcon)

My 27 In LIG discussion of Radio Free Europe and DOD problems re base disclosure, Haig says President delighted by successful Admin. effort on Mansfield res. Group discusses Case-Fulbright leaks on Thai troops; Haig wants to know what can be done about leaks. (M. Franch says we have to accept the fact that members of SFRC cannot be trusted with sensitive classified information.) Group also discusses end the war legislation and GAO

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audit in Berlin. DOD recommends firmer line than State. Haig inclined to go along with DOD to start out and see how it goes: "Berlin is one of our best sources of valuable intelligence....It could be compromised by delving too deeply into our support funds."

My 27 Wayne Smith reports on the findings of the DOD team sent to Cambodia at the Pres. request to assess the military situation. Essence of team's report forwarded by Laird is that we "have little to show for roughly $100 million of military assistance spent and a year's effort to support the buildup of FANK." Smith recommends caution in surfacing the report noting JSC already sees it as a mandate to send 100 more advisors to Phnom Penh and State will dig in and say "no more." Smith suggests circulating study to SRG and seek comments.

My 29 Ehrlichman complains that Packard has leaked anti-drug directive and stolen credit from President. HK urges Ehrlichman to call Packard, but Ehrlichman insists HK do it. Packard says package is being put together but isn't ready yet. HK calls Ehrlichman and tells him to get together with Packard. "Dave is a decent guy. All these other geys are barracudas but Dave does not mean any harm." It turns out that Friedheim is the culprit. (telcon)

My 31 Haig raises with HK the need to relook the whole Cambodian operation and sort out the growing friction between Swank, Ladd and Mataxis - i.e. State (wants minimal military role) and DOD, with Ladd caught in between. Haig says "I feel this continued friction seriously jeopardizes the type of objective policies which are so essential to our ability to walk the tightrope between overinvolvement in Cambodia and underplayed negligence in the management of our assistance program. Notes it is clear that FANK is not improving to the degree necessary and that the assistance program is not being adequately managed. HK notes agreement with the concluding comment that "Failure to standup to NVN pressures in the future will be the only criteria by which we will be judged, not the profile we adopt in a failing enterprise." HK also indicates he wants to take up the problem at June 7 SRG. (chron)

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Je 1
Laird complains of cable he got from Fred Malek telling him to fire Ted Beall and appoint Ken BeLieu. HK says he should call Haldeman: "They just don't know how to deal with you....Subtlety is not one of the strong points...." (telcon)

Je 1
In substantive talk with Japanese official of PM's office HK comments on Pres. process of preparing for press conference - said RN withdrew for two days and nobody saw him, not even HK. HK provides his guidance to the Pres. in writing and the Pres. calls by phone to discuss the questions. (m-c)

Je 2
On May 13 Senator Beall had sent HK copy of proposed Beall plan to establish a bipartisan commission to study the proper roles and relationships of Congress and President in undeclared wars as alternative to war powers resolution. On June 2, <u>HK and John Dean jointly send memo to Nixon</u>
on war powers legislation which (a) notes the numerous bills pending on this (Javits, Eagleton, Stennis, pointing out that the Admin. was able to defuse the issue in 1970 by aiding the Zablocki bill which did pass the House; (b) points out that "the Neustadts, MacGregor Burns' and Steele Commagers who glorified the Presidency and its in-
alienable and admirable right to princacy from 1932 to 1968 are found today infesting the Capitol halls testifying that shackles must be forged;" (c) reports there is like-
lihood Javits or Stennis bills could pass the Senate, thus raising potential defeat for the Admin. on this issue and lead toward shift in Constitutional power towards Congress; (d) suggests alternative strategy of getting behind Beall's alternative which would at minimum defer issue until after the 72 elections. Extreme care would have to be taken in the selection of members for the commission, their memo notes. Nixon approves the alternative, authorizing HK, Dean, MacGregor to work with Beall in refining an alternative draft bill along Beall lines and giving HK, Dean and MacG responsibility for selecting nominees for the commission. (filed 7/21 chron under Dean note)

Je 2
<u>HK meets with Finch and Rumsfeld to get report on their visit to Europe (UK, Ireland, Morocco, Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Austria, France, Romania, Germany and Switz)</u>
on drug problem; but talk actually focusses on Finch-
Rumfeld assessment of US Ambassadors: very negative on
Annenberg, complaining he ignored them; Landau - "incre-
dibly rotten and just despicable." (HK comments on in-
cident in which Landau told Rogers that HK was trying to
end-run State); Martin - arrogant; Rush - quite good.
Rumfeld added that US Amb. to Portugal was very concerned
about policy being pursued by State towards Portugal
and its negative effect for US re Azores question; he

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wants to come to Washington to discuss matter but State
won't let him. (m-c)

Je 3
Lehman writes HK that at Symington and Fulbright request, the full Senate will meet in closed session to hear *Moose and Lowenstein* who are just back from Laos and claiming they were given "full and frank cooperation" (HK asks "BY whom?") revealing the "full range of deviltries being carried on by this Administration in Laos." Lehman recommends quick action to head off a Fulbright move to pass a unanimous consent resolution banning all CIA activities in Laos and all support of Thai troops in Laos. He notes need to bring all departments into line on policy: "There is evidence that some in State and Defense have aided Fulbright." (HK asks: "What evidence?") HK suggests early meeting, perhaps tied into SRG if it can wait that long. (chron)

Je 3
Jon Howe note to Haig re *Newsweek* comment that *HK orches- trated a campaign on the Hill to defeat the Mansfield resolution points up the problems related to sending letters to Sen. Jackson's assistants: "Obviously they are friendly but one never know into whose hands this type of letter might fall." (chron)

Je 4
Nixon approves for *membership on McCloy Committee*: Eric Johnson (former Mayor of Dallas and Pres. of Texas Instru- ments) and George Smathers, numbers 3 and 5 on the prioritized list. HK memo to Pres. notes the offer to James Douglas was withdrawn. Douglas failed to sign RN statement on the Mansfield amendment. (M/P) (*Haldeman* memo to Flanigan says Jim Douglas should be taken off any list for appoint- ments. Related Haig note to Sonnenfeldt) (M/P)

Je 4
*HK forwards to RN a Helms memo (sent to HK and agencies) expressing concern over increasing incidents of public disclosure of classified information and seeks cooperation in helping to eliminate further incidents. Makes mention of the "occasional temptation to use intelligence info- rmation to foster public support of policies in such matters as weapons programs and arms control." Attaches list of disclosures since the RN Dec 21, 1970, injunction urging caution in public release. Helms memo notes that "although any single disclosure may not seem critical, the cumulative impact of this practice is quite sobering." (chron)*

Je 4
Nixon meets with PFIAB Board who requested meeting to discuss the OMB/NSC study of the intelligence community, their concerns with respect to the study and their own conceptions of organizational arrangements that should be adopted for the overall improvement of our intelligence activities. (RN has already generally approved the lines of the study recommendations.) Anderson is expected to raise the undesirability of seeking Congressional action on any organizational changes, to propose a revitalized US intelligence Board with two subcommittees and an increased support staff, and the revitalization of the

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Board of National Estimates. Intelligence study attached.
No minutes. (m-c/Pres)

Je 4 Nixon letter thanks Prince Henrik of Denmark for his efforts on behalf of US POWs in VN. (Haig for HK for Pres). Letter was requested by Amb. Dudley who is characterized by Harry Dent as "by the way, is a good big contributor."

Je 5 Flanigan memo to HK notes that, contrary to State's recommendation, HK has asked Flanigan to delay any action by the FPC (El Paso/Algeria) for 2 months. Seeks reclamation that HK continues to wish action deferred. June 8 Haig memo to Flanigan tells him to hold up El Paso loan. (June 7 Saunders memo asked approval to move ahead now that time period conveyed to Pompidou has elapsed.) M/P

Je 5 Ehrlichman complains again that DOD is leaking in Star about what it's doing on narcotics. He tells HK: "Don't let DOD get locked in." HK agrees to sign a directive. He calls Packard. (telcons)

Je 5 Helms says Scali called up late last night and asked for briefing on Laos. "These things can become unmanageable." HK agrees: "Scali under no circumstances. He gets his information from me." Helms says Scali talked as if he were a "magician hired to take care of the public media." HK will get Lehman to stop. (telcon)

Je 5 Alex Johnson says David Kennedy is arriving in Tokyo and is interested in Okinawa as well as textiles. All our reports are from Japanese, nothing from Kennedy. (telcon)

Je 7 Finch says McCone is withdrawing name from a committee because State is challenging him. HK says: "That's the reason we want him on the committee....Tell him we want him." (telcon)

Je 7 Ernie Johnston sends HK response to Peterson request for comments on his proposed briefing of the Congressional leadership on "The United States and the Changing World Economy." Johnston proposes HK suggest that PP stress more the economic progress which the US has made in the last 20 years and tone down the dark view of the innocent, declining US and the canny, rapacious foreigners - noting such a tone could be used by the troop cutters and protectionists. Johnston notes Peterson agreement with suggestions may not be easy since he believes he and Connally have a direct mandate from the President for a new 'get tough' trade and economic policy, especially toward Japan, reinforced by the Pres. decision on our posture at the OECD ministerial meeting June 7/8. He

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notes that "even though the President wants to follow
a harder line on these issues, it will be tactically
very risky to try to fire up the Congress about our
troubles before we suggest remedies, particularly
while textiles and shoes remain unsettled and just
before Chancellor Brandt's visit when offset is sure
to arise." (Related Johnston memo contains background
on Pres. decision re OECD: After sending HK memo,
Johnston cleared for HK a Peterson memo to President which
endorsed State proposal (objected to by Connally) that
the US support in the OECD the formation of a small high
level group to study future trade initiatives. In defer-
ence to Connally, Peterson recommended the group not
duplicate the work of the IMF and get into the international
monetary field and that Rogers in his statement encourage
our OECD partners to take account of military expenditures
in OECD examinations of members' balance of payments and
economic position. RN reacted by directing Rogers' state-
ment to be blurb and hard hitting and that all US reps
follow the lines of Connally's recent Munich statement
(in which Connally stated that the US must be more
aggressive in seeking trade reciprocity from others
and that others should contribute more to the cost of
Western military burden.) (chrons)

Je 7 Haig memo to HK notes State call to the effect that Rogers is terribly hurt by deletion of any reference to him in the initial China decision. Haig suggests modification to include reference to Rogers to please him noting that recommended change "will also have the benefit of linking him to the decision not to achieve parity with the Soviets. This will put the heat where it belong." Note indicates press release was modified. (chron)

Je 8 Haig forwards a list of topics all of which have been proposed by the British, on which HK talking papers for London trip required. State not to be used in this exercise since "it is important that the Department of State not be aware of the topics which Henry will discuss" with Sir Burke Trend. (Lond trip./Sens file)

Je 8 In response to HK inquiry, Wayne Smith presents details of his staff's contacts with CIA on the NIEs and defends their activities, noting their care to avoid involvement in inter-or intra-agency squabbles. Smith notes he is distressed about the complaint because he believes it is unwarranted and notes essential need to be able to deal directly with CIA and agencies to carry out their work. HK notes: "Wayne - it is unimportant. Your group is essential. I am just trying to protect it from snipers." (No background on origin of complaint.) Chron.

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Je 8 John Lehman memo for HK re Mathias luncheon notes "Mathias has consistently spoken with a forked tongue. He always proclaims his sincere desire to support the Administration, then votes against us or sneaks out of town." Lists major votes on which he has opposed Administration and suggests topics on which HK might seek his support - ABM, Laos funding and postponing war-powers legislation until after VN. (chron)

Je 8 HK approves sending White House reps to a meeting to discuss proposed procedures for opening WWII documents for research beginning in 1972. Presidential directive to be required ultimately to make the records available. (chron)

Je 9 Latimer seeks HK guidance on several points in connection with NSSM 113 on declassification procedures. HK approves Latimer recommendation that he press for including CIA publications with safeguards for sources and methods in the automatic declass. procedures. (CIA wants to exempt all its publications) Adds however that there should be no declassif. of covert operations. HK also approves Ad Hoc group's recommendation that all NSC papers receive prior review and approval for release by DOD, DOS, CIA and other interested agencies, the NSC staff and with final decision by the Assistant to the Pres. for National Security. HK also approves Latimer recommendation that the study include a provision instituting provision by which highly classified information on a current basis might be reviewed for release at the request of senior govt. officials and provision for sanctions in cases where procedures are not followed. HK approves bringing John Dean and OMB in to look at the study in its draft form. (June 18 Latimer fills John Dean in on progress of NSC study and asks for suggestions re the drafts.) (chron)

Je 11 Laird complains of White House traveling extravaganza on POWs organized by Klein and Gen. Hughes. HK agrees to try to delay it. (telcon)

Je 11 Irwin testifies to SFRC on the Admin. foreign assistance program. New legislation would create a Coordinator for Security Assistance at the Under Secretary level; supported by a specialized planning and analysis staff; transfer administration of economic supporting assistance from AID to State for administration at the Assistant Secretary level; create an International Development Corporation to administer bilateral lending program and the International Development Institute for development in the areas of transfer of technology and development research; and place administration of humanitarian aid under a new bureau in State. (public)

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Je 11 HK agrees to a q and a session with the RAMS, an organi-
zation of Republican Congressional staffers and former
staffers. Leman notes "Congressional staffers are
extremely influential and as an Administration we have
treated them with almost total neglect, and as a result, we
have very little influence with them." Korologos urges HK
to accept invitation if possible. (chron)

Je 12
HK complains to Laird about NYT Magazine article claiming
Laird is pushing faster Vietnam withdrawal and HK and
President are blocking it. Laird promises he'll hardline
it on Face the Nation. (telcon)

Je 12 Nixon responds to Gov. Reagan's expression of interest in the 1973 LOS Conference, especially the aspects relating to fisheries, and his o-fer of the cooperation of his State. RN reply generally notes that cooperation in this particularly area "can make an important differ-ence to the success of our efforts in this area." M/P

Je 14 RN meets with Rogers following the interdepartmental meeting on drugs. Haig fills HK in on substance of the meeting. It was agreed that Rogers in his June 15 press conference would avoid substantive comments on the McNamara study and would not rehash the past. Rogers expressed concerns about Midway meeting with Thieu and need for something positive to come out of it. Noted Laird had gone so far on the ground combat issue that any statement acceptable to Thieu on this issue may be counter-productive; Haig feels Rogers point is a good one. (m-c/Pres)

Je 14 Ernie Johnston informs HK of Connally effort to convince the Pres. to slow down our OECD negotiations on multilateral aid untying on the argument that completion will cause us serious congressional problems in regard to our total aid efforts. Johnston points out that Connally suggestions went to the President without any WH staff and if accepted would signify a major reversal in US aid policy and that the Pres. is on record in his public statements as committed to untying agreement. (chron)

Je 14 Marshall Wright expresses concern about NSC not being informed of instructions emanating from Pres. meetings with high level Admin. officials, specifically RN meeting with George Bush resulting in Bush public speeches suggesting hold the UNSC and UNGA meetings outside New York on occasion. Re substance, Write notes his reservations about moving UNGA - the expense and the impetus it would give "already considerable sentiment" for moving the UN out of New York. (chron)

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Je 14 Haig, in memo of miscellaneous items, tells HK of discussion with Walt Rostwo on possibility of bringing Bill Jorden on NSC staff; Rostwo recommends him for senior post or ambassadorship but no press job. Haig agrees given "Ron's age and temperament." Also notes Tom Johnson (public affairs experience from LBJ days) has indicated desire to join staff. Haig writes "The problem with both individuals is that I believe Haldeman and the rest of the White House henchment would have apoplexy, especially in light of the conversation Haldeman started with me yesterday." (Lond Trip-Sens file)

Je 14 Lehman sends HK background on effort to defeat the End the War Resolution in Senate and House in preparation for HK's presentation to Republican Leadership June 15: Admin. position is to force direct vote on Hatfield-McGovern with no compromise in Senate and to introduce substitute to compromise already introduced in House, opposing all other substitutes. Summary of various resolutions attached. (chron)

Je 15 HK to lunch with Connally. Ernie Johnston talker suggests HK discuss Connally recommendation to Pres. to halt effort on multilateral agreement on aid untying and caution Connally about the potential problems his tough statements that the US is receiving unfair treatment from our trading partners may create with Congress.

Je 15 HK thanks Hoover for FBI reporting further developments in the "Palmetto" matter. (No further information) chron.

Je 15 Saunders asks for guidance re background of HK request to Flanigan to hold up go ahead re FPC and El Paso. HK notes that suspension "grew out of Watson meeting with the Pres. and Connally meeting with the Pres. where Pres. help up loans to countries with expropriation problems."

Je 15 Scali sends HK draft text of a Pres. announcement concerning Pentagon Papers and announcing Pres. direction to SecDef to make available to the SFRC and House Foreign Affairs on a classified basis the full 47 volumes of the DOD study on Vietnam policy. Contains statement of irreparable damage caused by the violation of security statutes. (Pent. Pap. file)

Je 15 Vietnam Ad Hoc group meeting discussion touches on NYT publication of Pentagon papers, with Carver noting

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Je 15
cont'd that when McNamara had learned that the terms of reference were in effect a brief for why the US should never have become involved in the conflict, he had refused to read the study, even though he had commissioned it.

Je 15
Rodman informs Haig as result of JWD inquiry to DOD that HK was never on any distribution list for McNamara papers. Only Mort Halperin of NSC staff was. Also notes DOD says their destruction lists are complete and authoritative, except that Clark Clifford may have given out some copies personally when he was SecDef. (chron)

Je 16
HK to lunch with Pete Peterson. Ernie Johnston talker for agenda includes need to agree with Peterson on a mechanism for coordinating East-West trade issues for submission to Pres. Johnston notes Peterson believes that US commercial interests have heretofore been neglected in the East-West trade issues; and he is unlikely to welcome the idea that political considerations be governing. (chron)

Je 17
HK reports to Pres. on previous instances of unauthorized release of classified information during the WWII and Korean War eras. HK concludes: "It appears the New York Times series is the most extensive release of classified documents and information ever to occur in this country. The Times has released certain types of information which no previous Administration has believed to be in the national interest to declassify." Forwards DOS and DOD memos on the subject. (M/P)

Je 17
At NSC meeting on MBFR, Nixon discusses declassification problem. Stresses need for an effort to reduce the tendency to over-classify documents but concern that "At the same time, the President cannot get good advice from his advisers if they know it's going to be published. The interest of the Presidency is what is at stake here." He tells the AG he wants legislation prepared immediately raising the penalty for publication of classified documents "so that it fits the crime." RN tells the group, "First, be careful and very restrictive regarding debriefings. Second, take a hard line on very sensitive material and make sure that it gets only limited distribution. Third, I intend to hold the section chief responsible for any leaks from now on. Once we identify the Assistant Secretary or the appointed official in a department who is in charge of the section that is responsible for the leak, he goes. We must put the fear of God into individuals who want to leak everything this government works on. A government simply cannot run if this gets to be the general rule."

Nixon continues, "The dastardly part of this situation is that only a small part of the picture gets out. Sheehan writes with no objectivity. The pluperfect son-of-a-

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bitch. We have to protect the integrity of the process of consultation and our relationships with foreign governments. We will have to take the heat on this issue because if we should lose this issue, the ability to run a government in the United States will be destroyed." Nixon emphasizes the importance of winning this battle with the Times and with the public on this issue.

Je 17
HK informs Pres of McCloy's concern that Congressional Cmte. members may make trouble over the proposed new members of the McCloy Cmte because of a lack of experience in arms control and their political position. Fears fight embarrassing to the PRes. HK endorses McCloy suggestion that Robert Ellsworth be asked instead of either Smathers or Eric Johnson. RN approves, asking Ellsworth in place of Smathers. M/P

Je 17
Haig sends memo to the agencies conveying direction of White House Working Group that State be charged with supervision of the Diggs Subcmte. hearings on US involvement in South Africa. (Chron)

Je 17
HK does not forward a Lehman-Dick Cook recommended memo to RN with letters to Congressional supporters on the Hatfield-McGovern amendment in effort to lock them in to defeat of Cook-Stevens amendment, considered equally unacceptable. (chron)

Je 18
HK complains to Alex Johnson about Pete Vaky's treatment. Johnson promises to find him a job. (telcon)

Je 18
Sonnenfeldt informs HK of State effort to get White House green lifht on proposed instruction to Rush on Soviet presence in Berlin in order to force the DOD hand, since State expects difficulty in getting DOD clearance. HK approves Sonnenfeldt recommendation to let State seek clearances in the normal way (DOD first). but notes this should be done "in time for next meeting. Though if we are going to overrule Defense anyway why not give them an inkling."

-Shultz

Je 18
Wayne Smith memo suggests proposed HK/memo to Pres. on PFIAB recommendations on intelligence reorganization. Memo would outline PFIAB changes in the earlier NSC/ OMB recommendation responsive to RN desire to avoid legislation but still improve efficiency in the use of resources and improving the intelligence product and the alternatives for his decision. Principal NSC/ OMB recommendation was to strengthen the role of the DCI and redirect his primary emphasis to community-wide management and national intelligence productions (vs. operational role). Memo expresses skepticism that PFIAB recommended reorganization and strengthening of the USIB will succeed in accomplishing RN objectives. Memo notes

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chief difference between PFIAB proposal and NSC/OMB's
is that NSC/OMB one goes beyond restructuring the top
level committee structure, without changing the balance
of power within the community in more direct and effec-
tive ways in the direction of assigning responsibility
for community planning, programming and a budget prepara-
tion to the DCI. Final option presented is for staff
and PFIAB to work together to narrow differences. Other
major point of memo is fact that Sen. Ellander is
prepared to cut $500 million from intelligence budget
unless something is done to preempt him. HK asks Haig
what he thinks. (chron)

Je 18

Wayne Smith writes HK that the bureaucracy has already begun to make decisions on a number of major issues re US economic assistance to VN and is seeking to preempt a possible WH initiative on economic development.

He notes this is taking place in preparation for major negotiations with the GVN on a post-election economic reform package that has far-reaching consequences for US policy in VN. Smith advocates airing the issues in the SRG to make clear to the bureaucracy (especially AID and State) that the Pres is interested in deciding the key issues and that no decisions are to be taken without full analysis and consideration of range of options. Recommends VSSG be given the coordinating role on the condition that HK make clear to AID the necessity for full cooperation. Holdridge in memo to HK notes, given the status of Congressional consideration, it may not be possible to drop the AID appropriation for VN pending analyses on the dimensions of this appropriation without jeopardizing the ultimate size of the appropriation. (chron ad.)

Je 18

Dick Kennedy reports to HK that he has passed word to Huntsman that all papers having to do with trade with Soviets should be cleared through NSC before being forwarded to the Pres. Specifically, Peterson memo on "Henry Ford and the Kama River Project" not to be forwarded without clearance. HK indicates he will call Peterson about the memo. (This action taken in response to HK note on 6/12 Haig chit expressing discontent with effort to move further on Soviet trade - Kama River project. Haig said "The boys are running wild again.... A $500 million improvement in our balance of payments four years hence is chicken feed compared to the stupidity of compulsively lifting all the barriers to East-West trade on the hint of a possibility of an understanding on SALT. As you know, Mel Laird was strongly opposed to the Kama River project, as he should be, and I agree completely with Sonnenfeldt that we get these maniacs under control before we all look like damn fools." HK notes that Peterson must be curbed and instructed Haig to stop the

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Peterson memo to the Pres. and hold until we hear about
the summit. "Until further notice all trade with
Soviets must go through this office." (chron)

Je 19 Kennedy informs HK (by phone) that Ikle of RAND has called to pass on from Mr. Rowen the message that an early draft of an options paper prepared at the Hotel Pierre (precedent to NSSM 1) might be in the possession of Dan Ellsberg. Rowen remebered it as being of a type that would not be embarrassing. (Staff memcon)

Je 20 Dick Kennedy sends HK agenda for meeting with RN next day including need for clarification of division of responsibility for planned study of expropriation policy given Peterson's belief that Pres. assigned it to him; also raise HK London and July trips; case of Mrs. Rivka Alexandravich's daughter in USSR (raised by Billy Graham and Rabbi Tannenbaum with HK); fill in on HK meetings with Bahr and Rush, and scheduled meeting with Rush and Dobrynin. (chron)

Je 21 HK, Haldeman discuss cover story for HK's Asian trip. HK doesn't want to tell Rogers he has "special mission" to Yahya because "he will think I want to get into the refugee problem and that I am taking away from him some big public relations scoop." (telcon)

Je 22 HK to breakfast with Javits. Lehman talker outlines Javits' positions on range of issues from Pentagon Papers, war powers legislation to ME. Attaches paper on Admin. position on Javits Bill (war powers). Chron.

Je 22 Ehrlichman tells HK that "Your Laird did it again." DOD has announced to court that it will declassify the 47 volumes of Pentagon Papers and move them to the Hill. HK says he would have given them to the Senate under security restrictions and say that under general review they would be looked at for possible declassification. HK thinks it's a disgrace "anytime a thief can get things into the newspapers...." (telcon) Laird says he hasn't agreed to deliver any secret documents to anybody. (telcon)

Je 22 Rogers calls and argues against HK's going to India and Pakistan. HK says it was a way to avoid a Presidential trip and will be low key and informational, not tied to East Bengal problem. Rogers says the governments there will use it. He suggests going to Indonesia instead; he doesn't object to Vietnam and Thailand part of trip. (telcon)

Je 22 HK calls Irwin with repeated Pres. request for long term aid program that can be given to Thieu. "We are getting stonewalled all over the place by the community. Nooter in AID says we can't get a paper. If we can't get it out of the bureaucracy, we'll have to do it here at the White

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House, and everyone will scream White House interfer-
ence. Irwain says he'll get Sullivan working on it.
(telcon)

Je 23 Latimer informs Schlesinger at HK request of information on the ongoing interagency study on declass. procedures and current status of the study. Says Schlesinger will be kept informed. (chron)

Je 23 Pres. breakfasts with Mansfield. Lehman talker informs HK that Mansfield wants to discuss setting up a joint committee of inquiry to study the history of the VN decision-making. Lehman recommends cooperation, using the opportunity to "channel the furies unleashed by the Times affair in a controlled and possibly construc-tive manner" rather than letting it beset us in the form of war powers legislation and other iniquities. Notes such a committee would treat the 47 volume study as one of many inputs. Lehman seeks to preempt Fulbright, Proxmire and Kennedy use of the study. (chron)

Je 24
HK meets in Lond with Lord Rothschild of UK Central Policy Review staff who asks with whom he should talk in USG about research. He specifically asks about the *Prs. Science Advisory Panel*. HK says the group's mission of making scientific contributions to our defense had been altered with practice. They used their influence and knowledge of science to push their political views. Said they were very active in defense matters, predictably arguing agianst new weapon systems (he gave as examples their involvement to stop VN bombing, Cannikin test postion, etc). Said they had done a good job on purely scientific matters which were of no great concern to them. (Lond trip/sens file)

Je 24 LBJ calls White House to ask if the govt. would like to "review" his memoirs prior to publication. Request referred to State and Sullivan given the job. (June 25 Ad Hoc WG mtg)

Je 25 Ernie Johnston tells HK of agency differences on FRG offset: Treasury wants to insist on support payments of $300 million (unlikely, and above Pres. fallback position). DOD wants to push the FRG to improve their offer but defer our decision until after 6/28 mtgs with them. State wants to wrap up the negotiations now but have a vague ad referendum feature. Johnston says the basic problem is that a delayed decision would allow Laird, and especially Connally and Peterson, to come in with a negative recommendation on whatever State proposes. He writes "There is no doubt that a delayed decision is likely to make the issue more public and would make it more difficult to accept any probable German position." Notes Pres. decision hinges partially on what he told Brandt, of which there is not direct report. (chron)

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Je 25 Haig sends memo to NSC staff informing them that security
indocrination and termination statements will be executed
by all personnel currently or hereafter assigned to off-
icial duty with NSC staff, including consultants and
detailees. (chron)

Je 25 Vietnam Ad Hoc group focusses on Pentagon Papers and State exercise of listing specified items which the govt. considered of "grave and irreparable damage" to national security for the courts. Sullivan noted new Congressional tactic of "Resolutions of Inquiry" used by the war critics to ferrt out classified information from the Executive Branch with four already under consideration by House Foreign Affairs Cmte, focussing on CIA operations in Laos and South Vietnam. Sullivan notes need for coordinated effort to head off such tactics and also need for working on Stennis who is waivering on issue of Symington's resoluion which would limit US spending in Laos to $200 m annually. Sullivan notes he had recommended that Pres. invite Stennis for breakfast.

Je 28 Mitchell sends HK a letter resubmitting his idea that
(1) the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
be transferred back to NSC from Justice and (2) the respon-
sibility for coordination of US internal security programs
be removed from AG and placed back with NSC. (Russell
Ash memo staffing Mitchell letter for HK points out that
during Ike Admin, the ICIS was established as an NSC
Cmte. and the NSC provided wide range of guidance for it
on internal security programs. In 1962, JFK transferred
ICIS and coordination function to the AG. (On July 22
HK signs non-committal courtesy reply to Mitchell saying
the matter is being reconsidered.) (chron 7/22)

Je 28 G. Smith reports on SALT in closed session to Subcmte. on SALT of Senate Armed Services Cmte. Sept 29 memo indicates serious concern on the parts of Jackson, Tower and Byrd about both the timing and form of any agreements on offensive and defensive systems and lack of satisfaction with Smith's explanations. Jackson expressed the view that asking the Senate to approve an ABM treaty while handling offensive limitations in a less formal arrangement would be the same as an ABM-only agreement and would "tear the country apart." He also stated his view that an agreement which limited our ABM system to 100 or 200 interceptors would be the same as no ABM and would not be worth paying for. Jackson stressed the Committee must know our negotiating objectives and prospects as well as the details of the Admin.'s policy on Safeguard before it can act on the Safeguard authorization. (SALT 4-attached to 6/28 G. Smith memo to Pres)

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Je 28 Lehman recommends HK call Stennis on two matters on which Stennis will be the decisive influence - House/Senate conference on the Draft Bill (Mansfield amendment which the Adm wants deleted) and Symington Amendment on Laos ($200 m ceiling). (chron)

Je 28 Saunders responds to HK query on how the State-Treasury dispute over the Turkish opium program came out (over whether to provide $50 million if Turks gave up all planting....). Treasury, OMB and Krogh opposed State proposal of the $50 million program and Connally opposed any largescale assistance. State capitulated rather than take the dispute to the Pres. In discussions with the Turks, however, they insisted on help to provide real alternatives to the farmers involved ($285-400 m). State and the other agencies have thus authorized Amb. Handley to offer up to $20 million in grants in addition to the $15 million already offered to help with the subsidy. NSC staff not invited to inter-agency meeting. Staff notes Haig talked with Ehrlichman to sort out the bureaucratic problem of NSC staff being cut out of decision-making on this subject. (chron)

Je 29 Rogers wants announcement of HK Asian trip to say he will report to SecState as well as to President. HK agrees. (telcon)

Je 29 Haig chairs inter-agency meeting in Sit Room on the subject of reducing the number of Top Secret clearances. Group is tasked with providing a directive for RN signature which will cut off the think-tanks, universities and consultatns from having access to TS and compartmented information and material; rescind permission for storing or retaining such classified materials in non-govt. facilities in most cases; and drastically reducing the number of people within the USG with such clearances, per RN desire. (chron)

Je 29 Wayne Smith describes a Nooter memo which describes the current approach to economic policies in VN, a "white wash" defending the current approach and arguing that, because AID agrees with DOD, there are no issues. "In short, Nooter's memo confirms that a full analysis of our economic alternatives in Vietnam is not underway and that AID is not likely to initiate such an effort so long as it is permitted to decide issues on its own. Moreover, his memo makes development a low second priority and does not recognize the importance of adding a visible and meaningful development thrust to our AID program."
Recommends HK sign memo to Irwin forwarded earlier.
(Memo OBEd by HK) (chron)

Je 29 Sullivna opens a meeting of Vietnam Ad Hoc group with comment that we should be prepared for a Supreme Court decision against the govt. on the Pentagon Papers. He

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also noted that the Congress might begin to propose
standards of declassification not only for the study
but for all information within the Executive Branch.
Said State would be taking steps to repair the damage
with foreign embassies. DOD complained of work involved
in replying to a lengthy list of allied atrocities
devised and distributed by the PRG which Gonressman
Leggett had asked DOD to answer.

Je 30

In NSC meeting on SALT, Nixon expresses his desire to
have the House express its opinion on whatever we
do: "The country has no faith in the Senate and with
good reason; the House has the confidence of the country....
very frequently in the past the House has had to vote
against a great many measures that have been passed by
the doves in the Senate. I want to give them a chance
to vote for something - for something that is in the
interest of this country and peace." (e.g. Salt agree-
ments)

USG Organiz. - 1971

Jul
Article by Dean Acheson in Foreign Affairs entitled "The Elipse of the State Department." Gives historical look at makeup of foreign policy bureaucracy in US and elsewhere and problems inherent in nature of the job of Secretary of State. Reviews role of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs up through HK. Shoots down as "bugaboo" concerns that NSC role undercuts SecState" "....What has been occurring has not been that the White House advisers have edged the foreign office out of functions being competently performed but that they have been needed to do whatis not being done anywhere to the satisfaction of the man responsible, the President....It is a mistake to believe that the present arrangements (including eclipse of State) are a disaster ...." (filed in NSC System - #1 folder)

Jul 1
Rogers' news conference following the Supreme Court decision that publication of Pentagon Papers could not be prevented. He hopes that, despite decision, press will refrain from publication of information harmful to US security. Expresses concernthat confidence of other governments in US ability to maintain confidentiality of its exchanges will be undermined.

Jul 1
Sonnenfeldt memo to HK has recommended quiet mission by George Feldman (former LBJ Admin. Amb.) to Malta to try to clear way for constructive US policy; State policy seen as ad hoc and lacking direction, to possible disadvantage of US interests, especially naval. Dick Kennedy memo covering Sonnenfeldt memo sends further views to Haig. Kennedy points out problem of avoiding crossing wires with HK and FRG who are trying to work something out while also not sitting on our duff while Libyans and Soviets move in. Kennedy concurs in idea of Feldman mission to Malta. (Haig pens in - "Underway - Feldman quietly off to Malta") (chron)

Jul 1
On June 29 HK sends Nixon memo, transmitting memos from Larid and Rogers, on subject of military assistance for Cambodia. Laird memo recommends that MEDT in Phnom Penh be increased from 23 to 50 and that role of Counselor for Political/Military Affairs in the embassy as CINCPAC Special Representative for mil. aid in Cambodia be terminated. Rogers memo does not concur in increase in MEDT; feels SRG study underway on mil. aid for Cambodia be completed before any such decision taken; State and Phnom Penh also concerned increase in size of MEDT would