APR 20 '94 01:11PM C B M HEAD OFFICE

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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR RECONCILIATION AND PEACE
BETWEEN THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY/KWAZULU GOVERNMENT AND
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
GOVERNMENT/NATIONAL PARTY.

We, the undersigned, pledge ourselves to Peace and Reconciliation in South Africa
and agree to commit ourselves to the following:

1. The Inkatha Freedom Party agrees to participate in the April 26-28, 1994 elections for both the National Assembly and Provincial Legislatures.

2. All the undersigned parties reject violence and will therefore do everything in their power to ensure free and fair elections throughout the Republic of South Africa.

3. The undersigned parties agree to recognise and protect the institution, status and role of the constitutional position of the King of the Zulus and the Kingdom of KwaZulu, which institutions shall be provided for in the Provincial Constitution of KwaZulu/Natal immediately after the holding of the said elections. The 1993 Constitution shall for this purpose be amended before 27 April in accordance with Addendum A.

4. Any outstanding issues in respect of the King of the Zulus and the 1993 Constitution as amended will be addressed by way of international mediation which will commence as soon as possible after the said elections.

5. The South African Government undertakes to place the necessary facilities at the disposal of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) as it may require in order to facilitate the full participation of the IFP in the April 26-28, 1994 election.

6. The undersigned parties will facilitate proper provision for:

i) Registration of the IFP

ii) The IFP Candidates lists

iii) Marking by voters of ballot papers.

The undersigned parties hereby undertake to abide by the technical arrangements to be made by the Independent Electoral Commission to implement the matters referred to in subparagraphs (i), (ii) and (iii) above in accordance with the details set out in Addendum B.

This agreement shall be implemented with immediate effect.

APR 20 '94 01:12PM C B M HEAD OFFICE

P.4

ADDENDUM A

Amendment of section 160 of Act 200 of 1993.

1. Section 160 of the Constitution is hereby amended by the substitution for the proviso to subsection (3) of the following proviso:

"Provided that a provincial constitution may -

(a) provide for legislative and executive structures and procedures different from those provided for in this Constitution in respect of a province; and

(b) where applicable, provide for the institution, role, authority and status of a traditional monarch in the province, and shall make such provision for the Zulu Monarch in the case of the province of KwaZulu/Natal."

Amendment of Schedule 4 to Act 200 of 1993

2. Schedule 4 to the Constitution is hereby amended by the addition of the following paragraph to constitutional principle XIII:

"Provisions in a provincial constitution relating to the institution, role, authority and status of a traditional monarch shall be recognised and protected in the Constitution".

EMBARGO: IMMEDIATE

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE STATE PRESIDENT, MR F W DE KLERK, LEADER OF THE NATIONAL PARTY, MR N R MANDELA, PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND CHIEF MINISTER M G BUTHELEZI, PRESIDENT OF THE INKATHA FREEDOM PARTY

Delegations led by the State President, Mr F W de Klerk, Leader of the National Party, Mr N R Mandela, President of the African National Congress and Chief Minister M G Buthelezi, President of the Inkatha Freedom Party, met this morning at the Union Buildings and reached agreement on the attached Memorandum of Agreement.

The Agreement follows intensive discussions between the parties yesterday and during the preceding days. The parties would, in particular, like to extend their warm thanks to Prof W A J Okumu of Kenya who played an important and helpful role in this process.

The parties expressed their satisfaction that the Agreement will substantially contribute to their common goal of creating circumstances which will be conducive to the holding a free, fair and peaceful election. It will help to ensure much greater inclusivity in the election process and will significantly address the underlying causes of tension and violence, particularly in Natal and the East Rand.

They repeated the urgent appeal to their followers and to all South Africans which they made after the Skukuza summit on 8 April to end violence, to exercise maximum restraint and to pursue their objectives by peaceful means.

PRETORIA

19 APRIL 1994

04-17-1994 08:30

212 373 2315

P.02

PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON

1205 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019-5064

TELEPHONE (212) 373-2000
FACSIMILE (212) 787-3990
TELEK WUI 600-843

LLOYD K. GARRISON (1946-1981)
RANDOLPH E. PAUL (1946-1986)
LOUIS B. WEISS (1927-1980)
JOHN F. WHARTON (1927-1977)

MORRIS B. ABRAM
JEROME ALAN COHEN
EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN
ADRIAN W. OWIND
JAY GREENFIELD
A. LEON HIGGINSOTHAM, JR.
JOSEPH S. IBEMAN
JAMES B. LEWIS
ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.

PAUL J. NEWLON
MORDECAI ROCHLIN
HOWARD A. SEITZ
SAMUEL J. SILVERMAN
JOHN C. TAYLOR, SR.
NORMAN ZELENKO
COUNSEL

RICHARD DEHE**
PHILIPPE JAMBRUN**
Pierre Petit**
EUROPEAN COUNSEL

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

(212) 373-3135

1418 L STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20036-8624
TELEPHONE (202) 223-7300
FACSIMILE (202) 223-7420

189, BOULEVARD SAINT-GERMAIN
7500 PARIS, FRANCE
TELEPHONE (33-1) 42-82-33-85
FACSIMILE (33-1) 42-82-84-38

AKABAKA TWIN TOWER
17-09, AKABAKA 2-CHOME
MINATO-KU, TOKYO 107, JAPAN
TELEPHONE (81-3) 3800-0281
FACSIMILE (81-3) 3808-4840

SUITE 1910 SCITE TOWER
32 JIANGUOMENWAI DAJIE
BEIJING, 100004
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
TELEPHONE (86-1) 8123626-50
FACSIMILE (86-1) 8123631

NEALE M. ALBERT
MARK H. ALCOTT
ALLAN J. ARFFA
JONATHAN W. BELL
DANIEL J. BELLER
MARK A. BELNICK
MITCHELL L. BERG
MARK B. BERGMAN
BRUCE BIRENBOIM
ALLAN BLUMSTEIN
RICHARD S. BORISOFF
JOHN F. BREGLIO
DAVID C. BROOHEAD
RICHARD J. BRONSTEIN
JOSEPH E. BROWDY
CAMERON CLARK
LEWIS R. CLAYTON
JAY COHEN
ROBERT D. DRAIN
JAMES M. DUBIN
LESLIE GORDON FAQEN
DOMINIQUE FARGUE**
PETER L. FELCHER
GEORGE P. FELLEMAN
BERNARD FINKELMAN
MITCHELL S. FISBMAN
ROBERT C. FLEDER
MARTIN PLUMENBAUM
TERENCE J. FORTUNE
MAX GITTER
ERIC B. GOLDSTEIN
BERNARD H. GREENE
GAINES GWATHMNEY, III
ALBERT W. HANO
GERARD E. HARPER
SEYMOUR HERTZ
ROBERT M. HIREH
JEN CHARLES JOHNSON
ARTHUR EALISH
MEREDITH J. KANE
LEWIS J. KAPLAN
BRAD S. KARP
ALAN W. KORNBERG
RUBEN KABERNE
ANTHONY W. KURLIN
DAVID K. LAKHDIN
STEVEN E. LANDERS
JOHN E. LANGE
ROBERT L. LAUFER

DANIEL J. LEFFELT
WALTER F. LEINHARDT
ARTHUR L. LIMAN
MARTIN LONDON
EDWIN S. MAYNARD
JOHN P. MCENROE
COLLEEN MCMACHON
ROBERT E. MONTGOMERY, JR.
DONALD F. MOORE
TOBY S. MYERSON
MATTHEW NIMETZ
KEVIN J. O'BRIEN
LIONEL H. OLMER
JOHN J. O'NEIL
STUART I. ORAN
MARC E. PERLMUTTER
DEBORAH S. PRUTZMAN
JAMES L. PURCELL
LEONARD V. QUIGLEY
CANEY R. RAMOS
CARL L. RIBNER
WALTER RIEMANN
SIMON H. RIFKIND
STUART ROBINOWITZ
SIDNEY S. ROEDEITCHER
RICHARD A. ROSEN
STEVEN B. ROSENFELD
PETER J. ROTHENBERG
EINSTEIN RUBENSTEIN
WARBURNE B. RUDMAN
JEFFREY S. SAMUELS
TERRY R. SCHMID
KENNETH M. SCHNEIDER
SIMON S. SCHORR
ROBERT B. SCHUMER
STEPHEN J. SHIMSHAK
JOHN A. SILVERMAN
MOSES SILVERMAN
EINSTEIN B. SILVERG
STEVEN S. SINKIN
ROBERT S. SMITH
MARILYN SOBEL
THEODORE C. SORENSON
PHILLIP L. SPECTOR**
JUDITH R. SHOVER
JAY TOPKIS
DAVID T. WASHBURN
ALFRED G. YOUNGWOOD

*NOT ADMITTED TO NEW YORK BAR.
**ADMITTED IN FRANCE ONLY.

April 15, 1994

Via Facsimile (759-0042) and Regular Mail

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022-6022

Dear Henry:

As soon as I got into the office, I dictated the enclosed letter and faxed it to Colin Coleman. I have the impression that you share my view on some of these matters. I know that your schedule is very hectic, and I did not want to wait until we could confer before I wrote to Colin. If there are any aspects of my letter that concern you, please advise and I would be delighted to modify the letter in further correspondence.

Mike and I enjoyed the opportunity of being associated with you on this project, and I have no doubt that in the future we will be able to work on interesting projects wherein we will get a more favorable result.

I am enclosing some articles I have written on South Africa and a copy of my book in the hope that you might find them of interest.

Doc #:D82:178897.1 30-070

["04-17-1994 08:31", "212 373 2315", "P.04", "PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & CARRISON", "1285 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS", "NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019-6064", "TELEPHONE (212) 373-3000", "FACSIMILE (212) 787-3990", "TELEX WUI 666-643", "LLOYD K. GARRISON (1946-1981)", "RANDOLPH E. PAUL (1946-1956)", "LOUIS S. WEISS (1927-1980)", "JOHN F. WHARTON (1927-1977)", "MORRIS B. ABRAH", "JEROME ALAN COHEN", "EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN", "ADRIAN W. DEWIND", "JAY GREENFIELD", "A. LEON HIGGINSBOTHAM, JR.", "JOSEPH S. ISEMAN", "JAMES B. LEWIS", "ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.", "PAUL J. NEWLON", "MORDECAI ROCHLIN", "HOWARD A. SEITZ", "SAMUEL J. SILVERMAN", "JOHN C. TAYLOR, 3rd", "NORMAN ZELENKO\nCOUNSEL", "RICHARD DEHE'", "PHILIPPE JAMBRUN'", "PIERRE PETIT'", "EUROPEAN COUNSEL", "1815 L STREET, NW", "WASHINGTON, DC 20036-8604", "TELEPHONE (202) 223-7300", "FACSIMILE (202) 223-7420", "120, BOULEVARD SAINT-GERMAIN", "75007 PARIS, FRANCE", "TELEPHONE (33-1) 48 49 33 65", "FACSIMILE (33-1) 42 32 84 38", "AKASAKA TWIN TOWER", "17-23, AKASAKA 2 CHOME", "MINATO-KU, TOKYO 107, JAPAN", "TELEPHONE (81-3) 3506-0291", "FACSIMILE (81-3) 3506-4840", "SUITE 1910 SCITE TOWER", "23 JIANGQUOMENWAI DAJIE", "BEIJING, 100004", "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA", "TELEPHONE (86-1) 8123628-30", "FACSIMILE (86-1) 8123631", "NEALE M. ALBERT", "MARK H. ALCOTT", "ALLAN J. ARFF", "JONATHAN M. BELL", "DANIEL M. BELLER", "MARK A. BELNICK", "MITCHELL L. BERG", "MARK B. BERGMAN", "BRUCE BIRENBOIM", "ALLAN BLUMSTEIN", "RICHARD S. BORISOFF", "JOHN F. BREGLIO", "DAVID C. BRODHEAD", "RICHARD J. BRONSTEIN", "JOSEPH S. BROWDY", "CAMERON CLARK", "LEWIS R. CLAYTON", "JAY COHEN", "ROBERT D. DRAIN", "JAMES M. DUBIN", "LESLIE GORDON FAQEN", "DOMINIQUE FARGUE'", "PETER L. FELCHER", "GEORGE P. FELLEMAN", "BERNARD FINKELESTEIN", "MITCHELL S. FISHMAN", "ROBERT C. FLEDER", "MARTIN PLUMENBERG", "TERENCE J. FORTUNE", "MAX GITTER", "ERIC S. GOLDBSTEIN", "BERNARD H. GREENE", "GAINES GWATHNEY, III", "ALBERT P. HAND", "GERARD E. HARPER", "SEYMOUR HERTZ", "ROBERT M. HIRSH", "JEN CHARLES JOHNSON", "ARTHUR KALIB", "MEREDITH KANE", "LEWIS A. KAPLAN", "BRAD S. KARP", "ALAN W. KORNBERG", "RUBEN KRAEM", "ANTHONY K. KUKLIN", "DAVID K. LAKHDHIR", "STEVEN S. LANDERS", "JOHN E. LANGE", "ROBERT L. LAUFER", "DANIEL J. LEFFELD", "WALTER F. LEINHARDT", "ARTHUR L. LIMAN", "MARTIN LONDON", "EDWIN S. MAYNARD", "JOHN P. MCEMROE", "COLLEEN MCMAHON", "ROBERT E. MONTGOMERY, JR.", "DONALD F. MOORE", "TOBY S. MYERSON", "MATTHEW NIMETZ", "KEVIN J. O'BRIEN", "LIONEL H. OLMER'", "JOHN J. O'NEIL", "STUART I. ORAN", "MARC E. PERLMUTTER", "DEBORAH S. PRUTZMAN", "JAMES L. PURCELL", "LEONARD V. QUIGLEY", "CAREY R. RAMOS", "CARL L. REISHER", "WALTER RIEMAN", "SIMON H. RIFKIND", "STUART ROBINOWITZ", "SIDNEY S. ROBEITCHER", "RICHARD A. ROSEN", "STEVEN B. ROSENFELO", "PETER J. ROTHENBERG", "ERNEST RUBENSTEIN", "WARREN S. RUDMAN'", "JEFFREY S. SAMUELS", {"bbox": [899, 490, 102

04-17-1994 08:31

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PAUL. WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & CARRISON

Mr. Colin Coleman

2

than thirty TV cameras, innumerable photographers and scores of distinguished journalists. As we all expect of him, Dr. Kissinger's comments were appropriate and insightful and were perfectly balanced, so that the panel could move forward without any problem. However, when Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi arrived, and it was announced that he had a prepared statement he wanted to make to the media and in our presence, I was leery as to whether the process was starting to tilt with too much media exposure and media manipulation. With Dr. Buthelezi's statement, which his adversaries had to consider partisan and distorted, in our presence he was initiating a media event that would become a catalyst for the other parties to seek equal media exposure, so that they could stress their virtues and good faith in seeking a rational resolution and also offer diatribes about the deficiencies of their adversaries.

In the future, I suggest that there is no necessity for *any* press coverage, except at the conclusion of a hopefully successful mediation. We were not there as ambassadors to present our credentials to the world under the comforting glow of TV lights. We were there to get down to business on a most serious matter and to do so with maximum expedition. In the future, every effort must be made to avoid *all* public media exposure, because each media event becomes an insipid catalyst to generate other media events and questions from roving reporters. It was clearly appropriate for Dr. Kissinger and Lord Carrington to visit each of the three parties; however, the stories and photographs on the front pages of the newspapers and the repeated coverage of their visits on the TV stations merely accentuated the fact that we had *not* as yet proceeded to have an *actual* mediation process. The irony of this week was that our entire team of mediators had two full press sessions, and Dr. Kissinger and Lord Carrington (and, perhaps, in some instances, Chief Justice Bhagwati was present), had further sessions that received the media's attention. Yet, despite all of that coverage, we left South Africa without having heard one shred of evidence from even one witness in any formal session of the panel. Perhaps it would have made no difference in the final results of the mediation, but I submit that in the future, there should either be no press coverage, or a bland statement released by the Secretariat at the initiation of the process.

## 2. Terms of Reference

First, I want to stress again that your office handled the terms of reference adequately. However, we can all learn from events that were not anticipated. In the future, there must be precise terms of reference signed and approved by the highest ranking officials for each party, and anyone who had not signed in on such a term of reference should *not* be permitted to join later, unless by (1) agreement of all of the parties, and (2) unless the new party seeking entry makes

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Mr. Colin Coleman

an explicit agreement of acceptance of the terms of reference that the other parties had approved. Even if the terms of reference are amended by agreement, the panel should have the discretion as to whether it will accept the proposed amendment. Mediators and advisers who come from six or seven countries prepared to focus on a few aspects should not be entrapped with facilitating what may be a different and far more complex agenda than had been anticipated with their original acceptance.

I think the terms of reference confusion was caused solely by the South African government's attempt to enter into the proceedings late, and then not accepting the original terms of reference. They changed the agenda and, in effect, injected variables that triggered efforts to renegotiate the original agreement and caused the ANC to modify their former agreement. If the South African government had not submitted their modifications, I believe the mediation would have gone on without any difficulty, though, of course, I do not know what the final results of the mediation would have been.

### 3. Number of Mediators

You would probably be better off to have the parties agree unanimously to choose only one person as the mediator. If there is a unanimous choice of that person, then the matter should proceed with the mediator having the option of calling in as consultants individuals who have expertise on any matter involved in the process. The mediator chosen should be knowledgeable about South Africa. After consultation with the parties, s/he should have the inherent authority to set the entire protocol, the time schedules, and the contemplated date for closure. In my own mediation matters, the parties know that, as a condition precedent for my acceptance of the mediation assignment, I would have the power to deal with such issues. Thus, with the filing of the first pre-mediation order, and even before the mediation starts, I eliminate many collateral arguments as to how the mediation should proceed.

If the parties cannot agree on having only one mediator, it is questionable whether it is ever advantageous to have more than three mediators. The mediators need not be world famous, but must have sufficient expertise and available time to give the matter careful thought before and during the mediation proceedings. If you have more than one mediator, the chairperson should be designated in advance and, thus, the chairperson can do some preliminary planning.

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PAUL. WEISS. RIFKIND, WHARTON & CARRISON

Mr. Colin Coleman

4. The Venue

In the future, the venue should be, just as you had planned, at a facility that assures privacy and thoughtful deliberations where the media cannot intrude.

As I said at the closing press conference, I believe that South Africa can solve its problems and there are many individuals of good will that want to assist in that effort. South Africa can become a model to the world and demonstrate how a fractured society can move to a rational resolution of their difficulties. Of course, such success is dependent primarily on the good faith and tenacity of all the major parties; within such a context, the mediation process can be helpful if used selectively and if proceeded in a low profile style.

I am writing this letter immediately upon my return, and, without sufficient time to reflect on our experience of this week. I hope you recognize that I am not critical of your staff in any way. You were superb. I merely want to give you my thoughts as to how future mediations can be structured.

As I noted at the press conference, I am grateful to Dr. Kissinger for the superb leadership he gave this project and I was delighted to be a member of the team. I regret that the team was not able to ever enter the arena of actual mediation to make at least a valiant effort toward resolution. I look forward to our staying in touch. If Michael Higginbotham or I can be of assistance in any way in the future, we would be delighted to do so. It is probably best to contact him as follows: Professor F. Michael Higginbotham, University of Baltimore School of Law, 1420 North Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21201-5779, telephone (410) 837-4649, facsimile (410) 837-4560.

With best regards, I am

ALH:cd

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Mr. Colin Coleman

5

cc:

Via Facsimile

Justice P.N. Bhagwati

Professor Jean-Antoine Laponce

Professor Antonio La Pergola

The Rt. Hon. Lord Carrington

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Professor Paul Kevenhorster

H.E. Dr. Princeton N. Lyman

Doc #: D82:178796.1 30-070

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION
809 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA, NEW YORK, NY 10017-3580

DIRECT DIAL (212) 984-

11 April 1994

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY

Dear Henry,

Five people possibly worth seeing --

ROBERT TUCKER

Office: 011-636-4682
Home: 011-728-5089
Fax: H- 728-4678

Bob flew with me to Ulundi five years ago when Gatsha seemed to be moving erratically. We, tried as old friends to convince him of democratic practices, but failed.

I mention him because the two of us were close friends of Gatsha.

Bob has since become effectively engaged with ANC on economic matters.

OSCAR DHLOMO

Office: 031-304-3863
Home: 03231-31742
Fax: 0358-202-493

One time secretary general of Inkata and at one time very close to Buthelezi

Perhaps five years ago left Inhata to form Center for Multi-Party Democracy, a solid institution based in Durban.

REV. MVUMI DANDALA

Office: 011-337-5938
Home: 011-452-2842
Fax: 011-337-7171

Central Methodist Church, Jo'burg who at great personal risk has attempted to achieve peace between Zulu hostel dwellers in Soweto and surrounding largely Xosa people.

TELEPHONE: (212) 883-8200 • TELEX: TRT 175977 • FAX: (212) 984-5452 • CABLE: INTERED

WELLS NTULI

Office: 011-634-0161
Home: 011-802-3506
Fax: 011-634-0038

Anglo Vaal Corporation -- an example of former Gatsha leaning
person now fully ANC. Also a good example of <u>modern</u> urban
African.

The above three African are Zulu-speaking.

CHRIS SAUNDERS

Office: 0322-21000
Home: 0322-21523

Long time supporter and close friend of Buthelezi, now
disillusioned with him but has certain constitutional issues he
considers inadequately handled (talkative and long on history!).

I can be reached in London at the Sheraton Park Tower 235-8050,
fax 235-8231.

["04-09-1994 06:35", "212 373 2315", "PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON", "1265 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS", "NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10019-6064", "TELEPHONE (212) 373-3000", "FACSIMILE (212) 787-3990", "TELEX WUI 666-843", "LLOYD K. GARRISON (1946-1981)", "RANDOLPH E. PAUL (1946-1986)", "LOUIS B. WEISS (1927-1980)", "JOHN F. WHARTON (1927-1977)", "MORRIS B. ABRAM\nJEROME ALAN COHEN", "EDWARD N. COSTIKYAN", "ADRIAN W. DEWIND", "JAY GREENFIELD", "A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR.", "JOSEPH S. ISEMAN", "JAMES B. LEWIS", "ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.", "PAUL J. NEWLON", "MORDECAI ROCHLIN", "HOWARD A. SEITZ", "SAMUEL J. SILVERMAN", "JOHN C. TAYLOR, 3RD", "NORMAN ZELENKO\nCOUNSEL", "RICHARD DEHE**", "PHILIPPE JAMBRUN**", "PIERRE PETIT**", "EUROPEAN COUNSEL", "1615 L STREET, NW", "WASHINGTON, DC 20036-8694", "TELEPHONE (202) 223-7300", "FACSIMILE (202) 223-7420", "199, BOULEVARD SAINT-GERMAIN", "75007 PARIS, FRANCE", "TELEPHONE (33-1) 45-49-53-55", "FACSIMILE (33-1) 43-22-64-36", "AKASAKA TWIN TOWER\n17-22, AKASAKA 9-CHOME", "MINATO-KU, TOKYO 107, JAPAN", "TELEPHONE (61-3) 3605-0361", "FACSIMILE (61-3) 3605-4540", "SUITE 1910 SCITE TOWER", "22 JIANGUOMENWAI DAJIE\nBEIJING, 100004", "PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA", "TELEPHONE (86-1) 813-3628-30", "FACSIMILE (86-1) 813-3631", "NEALE M. ALBERT", "MARK H. ALCOTT", "ALLAN J. ARFFA", "JONATHAN R. BELL", "DANIEL J. BELLER", "MARK A. BELNICK", "MITCHELL L. BERG", "MARK B. BERGMAN", "BRUCE BIRENBOIM", "ALLAN BLUMSTEIN", "RICHARD S. BORISOFF", "JOHN F. BREGLIO", "DAVID C. BRODHEAD", "RICHARD J. BRONSTEIN", "JOSEPH E. BROWDY", "CAMERON CLARK", "LEWIS R. CLAYTON", "JAY COMEN", "ROBERT D. DRAIN", "JAMES M. DUBIN", "LESLIE GORDON PAGEN", "DOMINIQUE FARGUE**", "PETER L. FELCHEN", "GEORGE F. BELLEMAN", "BERNARD PINKELSTEIN", "MITCHELL S. FISHMAN", "ROBERT E. ROSEN", "MARTIN PLUMENBAUM", "TERENCE J. FORTUNE", "MAX GILF", "ERIC B. GOLDBSTEIN", "BERNARD H. GREENE", "GAINES GWATHMEY, II)", "ALBERT P. WAND", "GERARD E. HARPER", "SEYMOUR HERTZ", "ROBERT M. HIRSH", "JENNY CHAPIN JOHNSON", "ARTHUR KALJON", "MEREDITH J. KANE", "LEWIS A. KAPLAN", "BRAD S. KARP", "ALAN W. KORNBERG", "RUBEN KRAEM", "ANTHONY B. KUKLIN", "DAVID K. LAKOHIR", "STEVEN E. LANDERS", "JOHN E. LANGE", "ROBERT L. LAUPER", "DANIEL J. LEFFELL", "WALTER L. LEINHARDT", "ARTHUR L. LIMAN", "MARTIN LONDON", "EDWIN S. MAYHARD", "JOHN P. MCENROE", "COLLEEN MCMORRIS", "ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR.", "DONALD P. MOORE", "TOBY S. MYERSON", "MATTHEW NIMBY", "KEVIN J. O'BRIEN", "LIONEL H. OLMEER**", "JOHN J. O'NEIL", "STUART I. ORAN", "MARC E. PERLMUTTER", "DEBORAH S. PRUTZMAN", "JAMES D. PURCELL", "JAMES V. QUIGLEY", "CAREY R. RAMOS", "CARL L. REIGNER", "WALTER L. REINHARDT", "SIMON H. RIFKIND", "STUART R. ROBINWITZ", "SIDNEY R. ROSENBITCHER", "RICHARD A. ROSEN", "STEVEN S. ROSENFIELD", "FARRIN S. ROSENBERG", "ERNEST RUBENSTEIN", "WARREN S. RUDMAN**", "JEFFREY S. SAMUELS", "YERRY E. SCHIMEK", "LEON H. SCHNICKER", "BRIAN L. SCHORR", "ROBERT S. SCH

CHIEF BUTHELEZI

1
DOING IT
THE
ZULU
WAY

DENIS BECKET
FRONT LINE
SUMMER 1984

HOW, exactly, does one address the Chief Minister of Kwazulu, President of Inkatha, hereditary Prime Minister of the Zulu nation, etc?

From the easy urban, perspective of Johannesburg or even Durban this does not look too knotty a problem. Hereditary titles seem a little otherwordly and unreal, in the first place, and homeland leaders do not fit into any especially elevated category of the mind either. If you were required to address one, well, you'd just address him like you'd address anyone else, that's all. Maybe call him "Chief" or something.

But the Johannesburg perspective is a very long way away from Ulundi.

Sitting on one of the twenty or so luxurious easy-chairs in an outer waiting room in the Chief Minister's suite, leafing through the conventional waiting-room literature — a hotel brochure, a magazine about industrial diamond production, another about interactive graphics in cartography — the thought dwells heavily upon the mind.

"Chief"? That's out for a start. "Chief" is what the assistant sales managers at the Sunnyside Park on Friday afternoons call the waiter.

Down here, the atmosphere is heavily
with dignity. It's in the air, and is hugely
fortified by the environment — huge, im-
posing government buildings, armed guards
everywhere, electronic surveillance systems
with intercoms and control panels looking
like the cockpits of jet fighters.

And the baas of this plaas; the central
dominant figure around whom the entire
executive structure revolves; is Chief The
Honourable Doctor M.G. Buthelezi, Prince
of Kwaphingangeni. Let's face it; one does
not simply waltz gaily into the inner sanc-
tum and say "Hi, Gatsha"

In fact, around here one does not say that
word at all, under any circumstances. In
Jo'burg, it's all very well, one refers to
"Gatsha" in the same way as one might
refer to "PW" or "Maggie". But down
there, in the man's own bailiwick, you mind
your Ps and Qs. "Gatsha" is a pet name,
the name which intimates and close relatives
are entitled to use. Buthelezi never even
uses it himself. He invariably signs himself
"Mangosuthu G Buthelezi", not least when
firing off long and angry letters to the
editors of those newspapers which have
committed the offence of using the word
"Gatsha" in a headline.

But here, around Ulundi, one doesn't
talk of "Mangosuthu" either. One talks of
"Chief Minister", and that's about it. One
talks in hushed and reverential tones too. It
is amusing, in fact, to see people who when
in Joburg will "Gatsha" along with the best

PLEASE TURN OVER

nij

[il]

CHIEF BUTHELEZI

Three bags
full, sir

CONTINUED

of them, now suddenly adopting a com-
pletely different tone of voice and referring
respectfully to "Chief Minister". Practical-
ly the only optional extra is the possibility
of employing a "the". Whites tend to say
"The Chief Minister", when talking in the
third person. Blacks, talking English, usual-
ly drop the "The".

But this does not entirely help one with
the question of what form of address to use
in the second person. "Chief Minister"
seems a possibility, but a little obsequious
somehow: "Yes, Chief Minister, No, Chief
Minister, three bags full Chief Minister".

Thrown into temporary confusion as
Buthelezi cordially comes to his office
door to greet me, I then settle for a pallid
"Sir". Later, long after leaving him and his
entourage, I am informed that this is not
the done thing, and that the whites around
the place tend to say things like "your ex-
cellency" or "your honour"

Later yet, the answer is revealed. Shenge!

A delightful young KwaZulu government
guide explains. When you're addressing a
Buthelezi — any Buthelezi as long as he is
somewhat older than you are and male —
you can't do better than call him Shenge.
And when you're addressing this particular
Buthelezi, above all, you should Shenge

away for all you're worth. Shenge is the
principal Buthelezi praise-name. Chief Gat-
sha Buthelezi, as the principal Buthelezi,
has dozens or hundreds of other praise
names as well. These are all optional and
one can use all or any of them at will. But
Shenge is the real thing. When you're talk-
ing to him, moreover, you need say nothing
at all other than Shenge. That covers
everything, the Yes Sir, the No Sir, and
everything inbetween. Evidently this is a
highly convenient arrangement, since your
average Zulu is too overawed when speak-
ing to The Hon MG to say anything else
anyhow.

I ask the informative Ms Nxele whether I
can actually address a letter "Dear
Shenge"? No, I am informed, you don't
start a letter to an Archbishop "Dear Your
Grace". You just say "Your Grace".
Similarly I am merely to say "Shenge!"
And then if I really want to do it with class I
must sign off "Ndabezitha!" This is the
other main praise name, the royal one. In
Buthelezi's case it comes from his mother's
side. Any prince of the royal clan can and
should be addressed as "Ndabezitha", and
according to Ms Nxele, the custom remains
and is quite as strong in Johannesburg or
anywhere else as in Ulundi. No matter how
wealthy and prosperous you may be, and
not matter how humble he, you Ndabezitha
a prince, and mind your manners in his
company, and that's that.

2

Trigger issues

TO interview Chief Buthelezi is not a
restful task. He's affable, all right, no
problem there. None of the heavy
distance which politicians — particularly
politicians who are in power — so often
seem to feel makes them look distinguished.
Nor the coldness which others of their ilk
consider the obligatory attitude to jour-
nalists. Nor that infuriating tight-lipped
treatment, the barest, most formal, answer
to each question and stony silence
thereafter, which is a characteristic of in-
secure businessmen as well as politicians.
No, Buthelezi is all smiles.

His greeting is hearty. He gestures to a
coffee table. The office is small and homely
by ministerial standards. It is also
remarkably cluttered — so cluttered that it
must be murderous trying to work at the
desk.

Tea is a gracious, elegant affair, with
unusually classy cutlery and crockery —
even silver serviette rings, and sandwiches
with cheese cut into heart shapes. The lot.

The atmosphere is right, alright. It's just
that the Chief Minister has a disconcerting
habit of flying off the handle whenever
taboo subjects come up.

We start off with a lot of happily shared

ground. A shared animosity to apartheid; a
shared disdain for romantic revolutionaries
who talk in their cosy cliques of pure
change and decry the impurity of those who
actually achieve any change. A shared
despair of the self-proclaimed liberals
whose disgust of apartheid, loudly express-
ed when in appropriate company, is exceed-
ed only by their determination to avoid
democracy.

I had given a lecture at Natal University
the previous day. I told Buthelezi of a ques-
tioner who had stood up afterwards wan-
ting to know why I was so bothered about
finding a form of change in which the
whites would acquiesce. White opinions
didn't matter, she had said in effect.
Change was being wrought by the power of
the people, etc. Buthelezi spread his arms
and shook his head eloquently: "What can
you do? The only medicine which can work
in South Africa is medicine the political
stomachs of the whites can take. These peo-
ple in their dreamworld, trying to live down
their guilt . . . they do no good at all, they

just soothe their consciences . . .”

Yes, indeed, much common ground.

But the atmosphere is unstable somehow.
There are these triggers, which lead to sud-
den flare-ups, inducing disquiet on the part
of a visitor of nervous disposition. How far
can one go? This man is the next thing to
God, in the eyes of practically everyone in a
one hundred mile radius. The thinness of
his skin is legendary. It would be
humiliating to be frog-marched out of
town.

In any case, harsh words are awkward.
One is accustomed to the smooth veneer of
modern social intercourse, where strong
feelings are kept hidden and the pattern
is to shaft people silently behind their back
rather than shout at them where they can
hear you and see you.

Properly considered, Buthelezi's way is
clearly the preferable, and no-one would
ever accuse him of behind-the-back opera-
tions or of failing to speak his mind.

Yet the direct approach, as he practices
it, is apt to come across a touch alarming.

Triggers number 1, 2 and 3 inclusive
come in respect of Inkatha. Inkatha's of-
ficial membership figures have leapt
astronomically. A mere four years ago,
which was only five years after Buthelezi
had re-started the Cultural Liberation
Movement which had enjoyed a brief
flowering under his royal uncle half a cen-
tury earlier — the proclaimed membership
figure was 250 000. Then suddenly it was
300 000, then 350 000, then 700 000. Now it
is over 900 000. Numerically, that absolute-
ly dwarfs any political party South Africa
has ever known. Yet there are questions,
very common questions. It is frequently

26 - FRONTLINE - Summer 1984

CHIEF BUTHELEZI

ng

Inkatha supporters at Chaka's Day rally.

alleged, for instance, that many a member is a member solely in that his name appears on a list, sometimes without his active support and perhaps even sometimes without his conscious knowledge. It is heard too that some members are there reluctantly, and because the prospects of advancement within the KwaZulu government service do not otherwise look rosy. And it is heard also that Inkatha, although it shortly after its re-birth changed its official identity from a "Zulu" Cultural Liberation Organisation to a "National" one, has little currency outside the limits of what is now officially Zulu territory.

The President of Inkatha does not take kindly to having this kind of issue raised in his hearing.

"Members renew their membership each year. But it is like the case of a church. There are many people who are not careful about paying their church dues every month, but I wouldn't say that they are therefore not Christians, or not members of the church."

And enforced membership? "That is an insult. An insult. I will not have faeces flung at my face. I have had this over and over again. Why must I waste time answering this rubbish? I would rather do other things. Here in my office, here in my immediate staff, there are people who are not members of Inkatha. They can choose. I do not force them. Nobody forces them. Nobody hounds them."

And isn't Inkatha essentially Zulu? "That is an insult. You don't say that of the

PFP. You don't ask whether it is essentially Jewish. Why is it pertinent to us? It is because we are black. It is an attempt to denigrate me and Inkatha. I don't deny that I am a Leader here; I am a leader by birth and a leader by democracy; but my commitment is not Zulu, it is national. My conversation with Jimmy Kruger stands. As early as 1977 he was concerned about the number of non-Zulus in Inkatha. He told me I had to confine Inkatha to Zulus. I told him that as long as he let non-Afrikaners into the National Party I would welcome non-Zulus in Inkatha. I stood up to a minister of state. This matter is part of the strategy to vilify me."

Given the tone of these replies, it seems unwise to proceed immediately to further friction points, such as the question of the implications of Buthelezi and Inkatha's participation in the homeland structure. Conversation returns to safer ground. But these other issues must be raised. They ought to be legitimate subjects of discussion. They are of course precisely what the vast majority of black criticism of Inkatha involves. Eventually we return to the question of participation, and the alleged "legitimisation" of the homeland system which it involves. Immediately, the temperature rises again by several degrees.

"This is a racist thing, it is done because I am black. You don't accuse Helen Suzman of selling out by participating in a white parliament. The people who level this accusation at me are politically illiterate. They travel in black taxis, they live in black townships.

"Do they expect me to abandon my people? I inherited duties to the Buthelezis and to the Zulu nation. I am not some township trader or ambitious school inspector. I am a hereditary chief. I never campaigned to be Chief Minister. I hold that position by inheritance and by the unanimous decision of the Zulu people. KwaZulu is a place of history, it is not something created by the government like a township. I opposed the Bantu Authorities Act more than anyone. When KwaZulu had to accept it ordinary people begged me to stay at the helm. I accepted my responsibilities to the Zulu nation. I did it in order to block the consumption of the policy. I did it to stop KwaZulu becoming independent. The press's attitude to this has sickened me. People who have not abandoned a single one of their many privileges in empathy with us attack me for using the system. What cheek this is."

With an even keel again having been restored, time comes for to leave. Buthelezi rises and sees me to the ante-room. "We'll PLEASE TURN OVER

A tale of two Gumedes

INKATHA people often feel that there is a double standard in attitudes towards them.

In April, UDF President Archie Gumede wrote to Chief Buthelezi setting out his attitude towards the existence of Kwazulu in clear terms: "... for members of an oppressed and coerced community to voluntary man and daily keep institutions of oppression serviced to grind the defenceless masses under the yoke of oppression is suicidal and untenable."

Later, shortly before Mr Gumede became one of the people taking refuge in

the British Consulate, his wife Edith applied to work for Kwazulu.

Mrs Gumede is a retired teacher. According to Kwazulu's Minister of Education, Dr Oscar Dhlomo, her "service to Kwazulu has been beyond reproach." Her application to teach again next year was referred to the full Kwazulu cabinet and approved "without hesitation". "We have no problems at all with those who are ideologically opposed to Inkatha and we welcome their contributions towards social services such as education in the region."

FRONTLINE - Summer 1984 - 27

[w]

CHIEF BUTHELEZI

In jail for
a joke

CONTINUED

"Unless you don't like my story" I say.

"That doesn't matter. I still speak to people who have written stories I did not like."

By now we are at the door. Buthelezi is opening it and his aides are in earshot. But this touches on an important issue — Buthelezi's abnormal sensitivity. Many believe he limits his own impact by responding with excessive heat to anything which may be construed as personal criticism.

Ironically, there is a way in which this specifically sets back the cause he serves. It has the effect on some white people of further frightening them about "black rule", and gives then another arrow in their armoury of reasons for preserving apartheid. "See, they want hero-worship. If they get in power you can be thrown into jail for a joke in a bar ..."

The implication is that this is a peculiarly third world, or African, habit. In fact, that is hardly true. I recall a story I was told after I had written something critical about Lucas Mangope. One of his henchmen, a white one, set out to put me in my place. With much pain and many drafts he produced a blistering letter, which he proudly showed to Mangope. Mangope read the first few lines, then lightly tossed it in the wastebin and told his irate champion to acquire a sense of humour.

Standard scene — flashbulb, megaphones and microphones.

Yet it is true enough that the dignity of the Leader is a more fragile, more dangerous thing generally in Africa than it is in the stable democracies. In Britain you can buy toilet roll holders modelled as Maggie Thatcher's face, with the reel in the mouth. In Zimbabwe you don't even dare

draw a cartoon of Mugabe. It is this kind of thing which does a lot to put white people (and others) off the idea of change.

There we are at the door. I have been wanting to raise this. It is now or never. And he has just given me a perfect cue.

"I'm glad to hear it," I say, "particularly since there is, as I'm sure you know, a belief that you are very sensitive to criticism ..."

Buthelezi promptly hits the roof. "What!! Why? This bullshit. Why do they say this bullshit!? Why must I let them get away with bullshit? They think it's because they're white. I do not object to criticism, I will not object to criticism. I only object to vilification. They vilify me."

The courtiers are looking on scandalised and I am willy nilly recalling the fate of a namesake of mine, of whom a careless king had once requested riddance. That king's courtiers took him more literally than he intended and although I know that grievous bodily harm is in no way here a possibility, the parallel does not enhance my peace of mind.

Buthelezi's rage subsided. I said, lightly: "You'd better tell these chaps it's not me you're mad at," (It actually was, of course, as I had raised what "they" said, but Buthelezi had preserved the facade by railing against "them"),

Buthelezi had picked up a length of telex copy. Looking at it, he said quietly: "Why? You don't imagine it would make any difference to them, do you? You and I could argue, and your treatment here would not be different."

Then he looked up and directly at me: "Or do you think it would be? Do you?"

Pilloried by the Press

It is widely felt within the upper echelons of Inkatha that the movement, and Chief Buthelezi in particular, are the targets of a deliberate campaign of what Buthelezi refers to as vilification.

Unfortunately, in Buthelezi's mind the fine between vilification and criticism is unusually fine, which often makes it difficult for more detached observers to perceive where the vilification ends and the criticism begins.

It is clearly true that within the offices of the Johannesburg black newpapers — the Sowetan and City Press, — there are people whose hatred for Inkatha is overwhelming. Their argument is that by collaborating with the structure Inkatha weakens black resistance and enables apartheid to work.

Many Inkatha people claim that the anti-Inkatha campaign includes false letters to the editor, which are actually written by journalists on the staff. This

allegation is supported by a former executive on one Johannesburg paper, who confesses that at times when genuine letters were few, it was common practice for reporters to be assigned to knocking out phoney ones, and that taking swipes at Inkatha was a particularly popular subject for the reporters. This was not only because of their dislike of Inkatha. It also involved a kind of game — seeing who could attract the most vigorous reply from Buthelezi or other Inkatha leaders.

Recently, City Press has carried a letter from "A K" of Ansterville, heavily critical of Inkatha. This was given prime place and the R10 "Letter of the Week" prize. Subsequently an A K of Asherville also won the R10 prize for a strictly back-handed "compliment" to Buthelezi. Another recent correspondent has been A Khumalo of Austerville, accusing Inkatha of "using" black people and helping make apartheid work.●

30 - FRONTLINE - Summer 1984

CHIEF BUTHELEZI

3

"I can not be frightened"

Do you not risk inflaming feeling by going to speak there?

They have asked me to. They have called on me. And I am a Zulu, do not forget that. I can not be frightened.

*Is it true that Inkatha support in Soweto very limited?*

Why do you isolate Soweto? Do not separate Soweto from South Africa. I will not do that. Why the importance of Soweto?

I will concede that if solidarity was all that I wanted it to be, I would not be burning the candle so much.

People say that Inkatha is mobilised. They say why do we not take action. They forget that I was in the ANC. I have seen sporadic action fail. Black unity is still to be worked for.

Recently you seem to have been quite silent regarding blacks using consumer power, and extension into the trade union movement, both of which I seem to recall were matters to which you referred frequently in the past.

I have always said that blacks must use consumer power and I still say it. Remember that the Fattis & Monis boycott succeeded because Inkatha participated.

We boycotted white bread and brought the price down. There is more potential to use that weapon. I have never talked of Inkatha forming trade unions. Our constitution, which is modelled on UNIP in Zambia, provides for us to do so. But we have not urged trade unions to affiliate. We have not actively urged them. The unions need to put their own house in order. Some people try to poach members for unions, we do not.

I should mention that I am well aware that whites in some unions, Fosatu unions, are brewing dissension. They try to stop the workers from having anything to do with Inkatha. But the workers at Richard's Bay called on me, they demanded my presence to launch a Fosatu branch there. We know that certain functionaries in these organisations, especially those who are not Africans, have been got at by the ANC external mission.

*To what extent does Inkatha generate its own funds?*

Almost totally. The only money we have had from abroad was when we were publishing The Nation, and over the citizenship issue.

*What do you have to show by way of practical development achievements?*

We have an Office of Development. We encourage people to work on a basis of self-help and self-reliance. Of course, we have a problem in terms of resources. There are too many people. More are resettled with us. I had a letter yesterday from KwaNgema asking me to refuse to take the people who are being resettled from there. I cannot refuse, that is something people do not understand. All the farms which were brought by the S.A. government for consolidation have never been handed to us. They are leased to white farmers. South Africa can take people and dump them there, we have no control. A lot of balderdash is written by people who say we collaborate with resettlement, but that land is under their control, the South African government's control.

They penalise us too. They punish us for not taking Independence. The money goes to those who have done what they want (i.e. taken independence.) We are made to feel the consequences of our stand.

There is a school of thought which maintains that once all the other homelands have accepted independence, KwaZulu will too.

They do not know the Zulus.

*You must feel disappointed at the fact*

CHIEF Buthelezi speaks out frankly on issues ranging from corruption to political strategy and from Mandela to Matanzima, giving inside information on controversies which have so far been unknown to the public.

KwaZulu has a reputation for being particularly free of graft and corruption. Is this so, and is it because you have taken a very firm stand on the issue or what?

We don't even know that word, graft. I only hear about it. I'm not doing what I'm doing for what I can get. My duties are inherited, my duties are to my people. We have had complaints about pensions. We have found wrongs and frauds, inside jobs. Not only Africans in our administration have been involved. We try to eradicate it wherever we find it. I try to set a good example. I have no business. I have no farms. This is not the Transkei, I own no shares, or interest in companies which compete for government contracts. Graft is not a problem in KwaZulu, not yet. When I'm not here any longer, I don't know what will happen.

*What exactly is the root cause of your big fall-out with the ANC?*

Are you pretending? Yes, you must be pretending. You know it, that they are jealous of my power. They want to be the sole authentic representatives. All along, until 1979, they wanted me. Tambo and the others, they always distinguished between me and the others who were in homelands for other reasons. Then they wanted me to operate undercover. I could not do that, and I can not reconcile our different approaches to the use of violence.

I have often heard you quoting letters from Nelson Mandela, which show him to hold you in high regard, and lately it has struck me that those letters are getting a bit old now...

Why do you say that? You are not talking of a pair of teenage lovers, who can do somersaults between Monday and Tuesday. It is irrelevant that they are old. I do not need to use his name. When his daughter was beaten up recently I sent him a telegram, but I do not make capital of it.

*Is it true that the current troubles in Lamontville are related to incorporation into KwaZulu?*

No, they asked to be incorporated, they wanted it. The trouble is to do with rents. This burning of buses etcetera... it is all orchestrated. It has nothing to do with me. The ANC is sending money to SAAWU.

PLEASE TURN OVER

29

CHIEF BUTHELEZI

Mangope was
the fiercest

CONTINUED

that four homelands have accepted
independence.

Certainly. In September 1973 when we met in Umtata, we all agreed not to take independence. At that time there were rumours about Matanzima, rumours that he might be flirting with independence. The issue was so sensitive that Mangope made all our aides leave the room. When we were alone we taxed Matanzima. He denied. And denied again. A few months later came the announcement, Transkei was to accept independence. At that meeting, Mangope was the fiercest of all in challenging Matanzima; he was the most firm and insistent. Soon after Transkei, he took it too.

The S.A. Black Alliance was formed
with quite a lot of fanfare, but now we
hardly hear of it. What is its situation?

It still exists. We have Mabuza (Chief
Minister of KwaNgwane) and Chinsamy
(leader of the Reform Party) but Mabuza
has been much involved with the land
commission lately and has had his time
cut out. The Labour Party left when they
sold out (i.e. agreed to participate in the
new Constitution.) Dikwanetla (the ruling
party of QwaQwa) also left. I could never
understand Mopeli (the Chief Minister of
QwaQwa). We never got on. He left,
saying his party could not afford the
R1 000 subscription fee. I was not sur-
prised. Once he had crossed swords with
me right in front of the Prime Minister,
Vorster. I had objected to a certain
phrase in a communique we were issuing
after a meeting. He blurted out that I
should not object, as I was only one
person. The Prime Minister had that
phrase deleted anyway.

Another time, all of us were meeting
in Cape Town. We were caucussing before
meeting the Prime Minister the next day.
Then Mopeli wanted to go to bed at 10
o'clock. I said we had come a long way,
and should prepare ourselves further. He
took offence.

What has happened to the committee
set up to explore the prospects of fede-
ration, and how does it relate to SABA?

It is still on the rails, as far as I know.
At first, while we had SABA, we didn't
see why we should multiply structures.
They (other homelands) had asked to
send people to SABA as observers, but
then they never turned up, except for
Lebowa, which finally sent the Minister
of Education.

Then Matanzima became interested in
the federal discussions, he wanted urgent
involvement. We had nothing to do with
each other ever since he opted for in-
dependence, but then he sent his people
to tell us of his interest in this arrange-
ment. I didn't know whether to see him.
Then I thought, well, I see the Prime

Inkatha Youth Brigade rally.

Minister, if I can see him I can see any-
one.

In his messages Matanzima was speak-
ing of himself as a South African, which
pleasantly surprised me. He wanted a
meeting in Umtata, I wanted it in
Soweto, then he said that he was a Head
of State, he couldn't be going up there.
Then my feeling was that we should not

have this big indaba unless he could
persuade his brothers in the independence
league to come in as well. But that did
not work. Mangope, the other one who
matters, sees himself as home and dry
economically now. Then we settled on
Tongaat. I flew there, he flew there, and
we talked.

DENIS BECKETT

Hard question to answer

HE paraphernalia of statehood is striking. The cars have "Z" registrations; the police have "Z.P." tags on their epaulettes. There is an imposing suite for the king, replete with magnificent carved desk (not likely to see mush use, from what one hears about the king). There is a distinctly State Banquet-style dining-room. What do you do with a room like that if Kwazulu reverts to being just a part of South Africa? It wouldn't belong at all.

One feels a smack of comprehension of
what it is that gets the anti-apartheid
establishment so hysterically anti-Buthelezi.
Their fight is for a united South Africa. So
is his, and he argues vehemently that this is
precisely what he is using the homeland
platform for. Yet at the same time there is
all this sense of statehood creeping into dai-
ly consciousness. Zulu pride, which would
surely be there in any case, inevitably
overlaps with notions of self-determination.
And the more the spirit of Zulu-ness is

cultivated, the more blurred the distinction
becomes.

What if Buthelezi had flatly refused to
have anything to do with the homeland
structure? Had he stayed out — and bear in
mind that he claims virtually total support
from the entire Zulu people — would he
have hastened or retarded the aim which he
shares, paradoxically, with his bitterest
enemies, the aim of a united South Africa?

A worthwhile question to explore, but
not one which lends itself to considered
discussion. Buthelezi brooks no questioning
at all, considering even the mention of
the subject to be vilification of his
character, which he detects as readily as
Louis le Grange detects Agitators. And
the more important of his detractors
refuse even to admit discussion as to
whether there is a distinction to be drawn
between independent and non-
independent homelands, and simply
brand the entire kit and caboodle as
traitors.

30 - FRONTLINE - Summer 1984

WASHINGTON POST

MONDAY, AUGUST 16, 1993 A17

Allister Sparks

South African Spoiler

It is time Chief Magosuthu Buthelezi's admirers and financial supporters in the United States wised up to the spoiling role he is playing in South Africa's difficult transition from apartheid to nonracial democracy.

For years Buthelezi has managed to project himself in the United States as the moderate alternative to the radical African National Congress, the champion of nonviolent struggle wrapped in the mantle of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., the committed democrat wedded to American-style federalism and free-market capitalism as against the ANC's alliance with Communists.

He has also been projected as "the Zulu leader"—implying that he is the undisputed leader of South Africa's largest black tribe, and therefore a player ranking equally with Nelson Mandela and President F. W. de Klerk.

None of this is true. The latest opinion polls give Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party 3 percent support nationally and 31 percent in its stronghold province of Natal. The ANC, meanwhile, is given more than 60 percent national support and 40 percent in Natal.

But the most serious misjudgment relates to the nature of the man and the role he is playing. As South Africa enters the critical last phase of trying to agree on an interim constitution to supplant the apartheid charter and enable the country's first one-person-one-vote election to be held next April 27, Buthelezi has launched a furious campaign to try to block adoption of the constitution, stop the election and recast the negotiations.

He has withdrawn his negotiators from the multiparty talks, formed an alliance with white extremist parties demanding a secessionist Afrikaner state and threatened to launch a breakaway constitutional convention with them if he does not get his way—warning that this could be a first step toward civil war.

He is stomping the country in the company of a pliant Zulu king, warning that the present negotiations are

a conspiracy aimed at "obliterating the Zulu nation" and that "now more than ever the Zulu nation must stick together . . . for mere survival." It is a reckless attempt to light an ethnic fire in a highly combustible country.

Buthelezi's behavior has so alarmed the local media that several major newspapers have urged de Klerk to cut the government subsidies that keep him funded in his tribal "home-land" of KwaZulu, which was established under the apartheid system.

An Afrikaans-language newsmagazine, Vrye Weekblad, recently described Buthelezi as "the Jonas Savimbi of South Africa," likening him to the Angolan rebel who was supported

> "It seems clear
> Buthelezi's main
> concern is to avoid
> an election that
> would reveal his
> essential weakness."

by the United States as the supposed democratic bulwark against communism in his country, but who refused to accept defeat in United Nations-supervised elections last year, plunging his country instead back into a civil war—while an embarrassed United States stands helplessly by.

It seems clear Buthelezi's main concern is to avoid an election that would reveal his essential weakness. He wants South Africa's final constitution to be agreed in pre-election negotiations in which Inkatha would have a veto, rather than in an elected constituent assembly where it will be reduced to a minor player.

There is also the suspicion that, while he claims to be a federalist, Buthelezi's real aim in teaming up with the Afrikaner secessionists is to achieve ethnic fragmentation so that

he can head a breakaway Zulu nation in Natal province. The suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the draft constitution now before the negotiating council is a federal one that would establish Natal as a U.S.-style state.

Elections are all-Inkatha affairs, with most candidates elected unopposed. Of the estimated 3 million people living in KwaZulu, 780,000 are registered voters. Only 12,000 actually voted in the last election in 1988.

He claims to be a federalist, yet with the help of two conservative American advisers he has presented a constitutional plan for KwaZulu/Natal that appears to set the province up for secession. Stephen Ellmann, a New York Law School professor, has likened the plan to America's pre-union Articles of Confederation and warned that it would "debilitate the central government of a future South Africa."

Buthelezi's commitment to non-violence is likewise suspect. There is mounting evidence that Inkatha "war-lords" are among the prime instigators of the political violence that has racked Natal for the past three years, although the ANC is clearly culpable as well in what has become a battle over turf in that divided province.

Buthelezi accuses the ANC of having a private army although it has suspended its guerrilla struggle, while he himself has an official militia in the shape of the KwaZulu Police Force, which plays a highly partisan role in the Natal violence.

But it is Buthelezi's links with the far-rightists and suspect elements of the military-security establishment that arouse most concern. In a major scandal known as Inkathagate, it was revealed two years ago that Inkatha was secretly subsidized from police funds; for years the KwaZulu Police Force was headed by a seconded officer of the National Intelligence Service; and there have been press disclosures of Inkatha members receiving guerrilla training at a secret base in Namibia.