# The Problems of Limited War

by Henry A. Kissinger

For nearly a decade now, there have been periodic debates about the adequacy of our military establishment. Critics of our military policy assert that we are becoming increasingly vulnerable. The reply is made that we have never been stronger. It is alleged that our military establishment is unable to prevent a whole range of Communist challenges. This is refuted with the assertion that we are able to destroy any aggressor several times over.

What makes this debate so intractable is that both the advocates and the critics of our military policy are right. We are stronger than ever, but at the same time we have grown vulnerable as never before. There is little doubt about our ability to destroy any potential aggressor. But the paradox of the nuclear age is that overall power does not guarantee strength in particular situations. For power is useless without the will to employ it. The more dreadful the consequences of the primary strategy at our disposal the

ful the consequences of the brimly strategy at our disposal the
for power is useless without the will to employ it. The more dread-
overall power does not guarantee strength in particular situations.
any potential aggressor. But the paradox of the nuclear age is that
as never before. There is little doubt about our ability to destroy
stronger than ever, but at the same time we have grown vulnerable
cases and the critics of our military policy are right. We are

What makes this debate so intractable is that both the advo-
are able to destroy and aggress several times over.

of Communist challenges. This is related with the assertion that we
that our military establishment is unable to prevent a whole range
The reply is made that we have never been stronger. It is alleged
military policy assert that we are becoming increasingly vulnerable.
apout the adequacy of our military establishment. Critics of our
For nearly a decade now, there have been periodic debates

The Problems of Limited War

by Henry V. Klausinger

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greater has been the reluctance to employ it. The problem of limited
war has arisen because in the nuclear age every increase in strength
has brought with it an increase in vulnerability and a reduction in
the willingness to risk total war.

It is one of history's cruel jokes that the nuclear age, which
first
was to make us for the/time vulnerable to direct and devastating enemy
attack, was ushered in by a period which seemed to demonstrate our in-
vulnerability. We emerged from World War II with an atomic monopoly
and as the only country possessing long-range strategic striking
power. Nothing was more natural than for us to assume that the strat-
egy of the war just won was the "normal" pattern of military operations.
We added nuclear weapons to the strategy of World War II as a more
efficient explosive.

The resulting military doctrine was summed up in the famous phrase
of Secretary Dulles: "massive retaliation." According to it, the
locally
United States could not hope to defend/the frontiers of the free
world extending over twenty thousand miles. Rather we should seek
to deter aggression by threatening retaliation against the Communist

to deter aggression by threatening retaliation against the Communist
world extending over twenty thousand miles. Rather we should seek
United States could not hope to defend the frontiers of the free
locally

The resulting military doctrine was summed up in the famous phrase
efficient explosive.

We added nuclear weapons to the strategy of World War II as a more
egy of the war just now was the "normal" pattern of military operations.
Nothing was more natural than for us to assume that the attac-
and as the only country possessing long-range strategic striking
vulnerability. We emerged from World War II with an atomic monopoly
attack, was launched in a period which seemed to demonstrate our in-
was to make us for the time vulnerable to direct and devastating enemy
first

was brought with it an increase in vulnerability and a reduction in
war has arisen because in the nuclear age every increase in strength
greater has been the reluctance to employ it. The problem of limited

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homeland.

As long as we were immune from Soviet retaliation, this
doctrine was highly plausible. In the past decade, however, a
changing technology has brought about transformations in the strat-
egic situation more rapidly than they have been assimilated into
military policy. There have been four phases since World War II:

(1) the period when the United States possessed an atomic
monopoly and a monopoly on the means of delivery; (2) the period
when our monopoly of weapons ended but when we still possessed an
overwhelming advantage in the means of delivery; (3) the period when
develop
the Soviet Union began to develop a substantial delivery system but we
still retained a decided advantage because of our superiority in
numbers and the strategic location of our base system; (4) the
period when both in number of weapons and in the means of delivery
the capabilities of the two sides began to approach each other--indeed,
when in some categories the Soviet Union pulled ahead.

When defenders of the strategic doctrine of the past decade
speak of our overwhelming retaliatory power, they use the categories
of the first three phases of the nuclear age--the period of our strategic

of the first three phases of the nuclear age--the period of our strategic
peak of our overwhelming retaliatory power, they use the categories
when members of the strategic doctrine of the best decade

when in some categories the Soviet Union bulled ahead.

the capabilities of the two sides began to approach each other--indees,

the Soviet Union began to заминем a substantial delivery system put we
desire to develop

when our monopoly of weapons ended put when we still possessed an

elastic situation more rapidly than they have been assimilated into

changing technology has brought about transformations in the strate-

doquence was highly plausible. In the best decade, however, a

homeland.

homeland.

preponderance. As long as our strategic striking power was overwhelm-
ing, we could indeed think of deterrence primarily in terms of
destructive ability. Then any increase in the power of our weapons
arsenal could be considered as increasing the aggressor's inhibitions.

As long as we were immune to direct attack, our retaliation power
was a positive deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make
our response dependent on the magnitude of the threat. Rather our
primary concern was to decide that some response was called for. A
strategy of devastation could be reasonably effective as long as we
were so invulnerable that no doubts could arise about our willing-
ness to resort to it.

But those who question the adequacy of our military establish-
ment do not doubt our destructive capability. They are concerned
that our increasing vulnerability may paralyze our will to use our
power or make an aggressor believe so. Hence deterrence may fail des-
pite our strength--and, in a curious way, perhaps because of it. No
matter how vast the destructiveness of our weapons arsenal, the in-
hibitions against resorting to it must grow with every increase in

pensions against resorting to it, must grow with every increase in
matter how vast the destructiveness of our weapons arsenals, the in-
bite our strength--and, in a curious way, perhaps because of it. No
power or make an aggressor believe so. Hence deterrence may fail des-
that our increasing vulnerability may paralyze our will to use our
ment do not doubt our destructive capability. They are concerned
But those who question the adequacy of our military establi-
ness to resort to it.

were so immovable that no doubts could arise about our willing-
strategy of devastation could be reasonably effective as long as we
primary concern was to decide that some ressource was ceded for. A
our ressource dependent on the magnitude of the threat. Rather our
was a positive deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make
As long as we were immune to direct attack, our retaliatory power
arsenal could be considered as increasing the aggressor's inhibitions,
destructive ability. Then any increase in the power of our weapons
ing, we could indeed think of deterrence primarily in terms of
brebonderance. As long as our strategic striking power was overwhelm-

Soviet retaliatory power--or so the aggressor may calculate. In the age of nuclear plenty and of multiplying retaliatory forces on both sides, destructiveness may be vitiated by paralysis of will or by the low credibility of the deterrent threat.

opens

A gap inevitably up between deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. For purposes of deterrence we are tempted to threaten the direst consequences for aggression. But in order to prevent a catastrophe should deterrence fail and aggression occur, we must be equally concerned to keep open the option of a strategy which reduces risk. The mere fact that the West constantly feels constrained to emphasize that a nuclear conflict is unthinkable may raise serious questions about its resolve to resort to the chief strategy at its disposal. Similarly, none of the Western countries, though relying on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter aggression, have taken even the most elementary steps to protect their populations against nuclear attacks--an omission hardly calculated to enhance the credibility of their threat.

Whatever the strategic significance of "massive retaliation"
during the period of our atomic monopoly, it will be reckless to

rely on it in the decade ahead. For the threat of massive retaliation
to abe effective we would have to be in a position to destroy the
aggressor's strategic striking forces. Otherwise, total war will
merely guarantee mutual suicide. This in fact was the situation as
we
long as/were superior in strategic striking power. It is a situation
in the process of being reversed and incapable of being reso
the foreseeable future.

There is no dispute that a missile gap will materialize in the
period 1960-64 in the sense that the Soviet Union will possess more
long-range missiles than we. Even if the "missile gap" does not enable
the Soviet Union to risk a surprise attack against the United States--
as come critics of our military policy maintain and the Administration
denies--it will make it foolhardly to rely on the threat of allout war
to deter local aggression. As long as our missile force is signifi-
cantly smaller than that of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.S.R. can engage in
local aggression with greatly reduced fear of American all-out xmm retali-
ation. During the missile gap we do not have--by definition --sufficient
missiles to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. Even if each of our

missiles to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force. Even if each of our
station. During the missile gap we do not have--by definition --sufficient
local aggression with greatly reduced fear of American all-out mm retail-
cantly smaller than that of the U.2.S.R., the U.2.S.R. can engage in
to deter local aggression. As long as our missile force is sufficiently
---it will make it difficultly to rely on the threat of all-out war
as come critics of our military policy maintain and the Administration
the Soviet Union to risk a surprise attack against the United States--
long-range missiles than we. Even if the "missile gap" does not enable
period 1960-64 in the sense that the Soviet Union will possess more
there is no dispute that a missile gap will materialize in the
the foreseeable future.

in the process of being reversed and incapable of being reversed in
long as\were an superior in strategic striking power. It is a situation
we


merely guarantees mutual suicide. This in fact was the situation as
aggressor's a strategic striking force. Otherwise, total war will
to the effective we would have to be in a position to destroy the
rely on it in the decade ahead. For the threat of massive retaliation

---

missiles destroyed one of the Soviet's -- an extremely unlikely possibility--a substantial number would remain. And our heavy bombers, because of their relatively slow speed, are relatively ineffective in defeating missiles. If we launched a bomber attack, the Soviet Union would have at least three to four hours warning--the flying time from the Soviet radar screen to most missile installations. This is more than enough time to launch Soviet missiles, particularly in crisis situations when they would be in a high state of readiness.

Thus the Soviet Union would be able to inflict intolerable damage in retaliation, regardless of the scale of our blow. The missile gap will therefore reduce substantially, perhaps completely, the threat of our retaliatory force against any challenge to our survival, except the most direct. Even if the missile gap is never sufficient to enable the Soviet Union to attack the United States, it should provide increasing opportunities for the kind of blackmail of which the crisis over Berlin is but an augury.

After the "missile gap" ends, the threat of technology will have deprived all-out war of strategic meaning. Missiles will then be mobile. Many of them will be stationed at sea. Some will be underground.

After the "missile gap" ends, the threat of technology will create over Berlin a put an end to

vide increasing opportunities for the kind of dissemination of which the
to enable the Soviet Union to attack the United States, it should be-
except the most direct. Even if the missile gap is never sufficient
threat of our retaliatory force against any challenge to our survival,
GAP will therefore reduce substantially, perhaps completely, the
damage in retaliation, regardless of the scale of our blow. The missile
Thus the Soviet Union would be able to inflict intolerable
situations when they would be in a high state of readiness.
in

more than enough time to launch Soviet missiles, particularly in create
from the Soviet radar screen to most missile installations. This is
Union would have at least three to four hours warning--the flying time
in detecting missiles. If we launched a powder attack, the Soviet
because of their relatively slow speed, are relatively ineffective
purity--a substantial number would remain. And our heavy powders,
missiles destroyed one of the Soviet's -- an extremely unlikely boast-

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Their reaction time will be less than fifteen minutes. A condition of mutual invulnerability of the strategic striking forces is likely. With the possibility of defeating the aggressor's retaliatory force eliminated, massive retaliation becomes the most catastrophic form of strategy. As the Communist power to devastate the United States grows, the Communist leaders may become convinced that we would never risk the devastation of American cities to defend areas far away and which could not be protected from a Communist fait accompli even by this sacrifice.

Such a situation will expose our allies to the most intractable form of blackmail. Their leaders can be told that unless they accede to Soviet demands it makes little difference whether or not we retaliate against the Soviet Union. Resistance would mean certain devastation, so the Soviet argument may go, even if the United States made good on its promise to retali ate. Indeed, it would give the Soviet Union an added incentive to create a fait accompli. The destruction of their country can be prevented only by accommodating themselves to the Soviet Union. This indeed was the theme of Premier Khrushchev's

the Soviet Union. This indeed was the theme of Premier Khrushchev's
of their country can be prevented only by accommodating themselves to
Union an added incentive to create a <u>fait accompli</u>. The destruction
made good on its premise to retaliate. Indeed, it would give the Soviet
devastation, so the Soviet argument may go, even if the United States
we retaliate against the Soviet Union. Resistance would mean certain
accede to Soviet demands it makes little difference whether or not
form of blackmail. Their leaders can be told that unless they

Such a situation will expose our allies to the most intractable
this sacrifice.

which could not be protected from a Communist <u>fait accompli</u> even by
risk the devastation of American cities to defend areas far away and
Grows, the Communist leaders may become convinced that we would never
of strategy. As the Communist power to devastate the United States
eliminated, massive retaliation becomes the most catastrophic form
With the possibility of detecting the aggressor's retaliatory force
of mutual invulnerability of the strategic striking force is likely.
Their reaction time will be less than fifteen minutes. A condition

press conference after the collapse of the summit conference:

It is said that the United States would discharge their
[sic] duties to their allies. By doing so they tell
those countries where the bases are located, don't be
afraid, if the Soviet Union smashes you, strikes a
retalitory blow with rockets, we shall attend your funer-
al when you have been smashed...I

if
In short, /the options of the free world become polarized between
all out war and surrender, the possibilities for Communist blackmail
multiply. And the free countries will be increasingly faced with
the choice between suicide and yielding to pressure. Every increase
in destructiveness is purchased at the price of the credibility of
the retaliatory threat. The more we rely for deterrence on nuclear
retaliation against the Communist homeland, the more exposed the other
countries of the free world will be to Communist pressures threatening
*fait accomplie*. In this vicious circle, deterrence may fail. And if
it does, reliance on massive retaliation will guarantee the direst
outcome: surrender or the most catastrophic form of warfare.

It is therefore essential that we create a more flexible military
establishment. The need for a substantial retaliatory force remains.

1. *New York Times*, June 4, 1960

I. *New York Times*, June 4, 1960
*apportionment*. The need for a substantial retaliatory force remains.

It is therefore essential that we create a more flexible military
outcome: surrender or the most catastrophic form of warfare.

It does, reliance on massive retaliation will guarantee the direct
<u>fait accompli</u>. In this vicious circle, deterrence may fail. And if
countries of the free world will be to Communist pressure threatening
retaliation against the Communist homeland, the more exposed the other
the retaliatory threat. The more we rely for deterrence on nuclear
in destructiveness is purchased at the price of the credibility of
the choice between suicide and yielding to pressure. Every increase
multiply. And the free countries will be increasingly faced with
all-out war and surrender, the possibilities for Communist blackmail
In short, the options of the free world become polarised between
it

it when you have been amended...I
retaliatory blow with rockets, we shall stand your time-
strait, if the Soviet Union amasses you, strikes a
those countries where the passes are located, don't be
[big] duties to their allies. By doing so they tell
It is said that the United States would discharge their
press conference after the collaboration of the summit conference:

I did not say that the United States would discharge their
press conference after the collaboration of the summit conference:

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Indeed, as the missile age develops, ever greater efforts will be required to insure the invulnerability of our strategic striking power. But these efforts, for all their complexity, will only protect us against surprise attack on the United States. They cannot protect the free world against other threats, particularly against our allies. In the future, flexibility of both our diplomacy and our strategy requires that we supplement our retaliatory force by other military units capable of checking Soviet aggression at whatever scale of violence it may be initiated. Deterrence would be complete if the aggressor could not defeat the military forces of the free world whatever form aggression takes. If adequate limited war forces are coupled with an invulnerable retaliatory force, the aggressor would be unable to benefit from either limited or all-out conflict. In that case, military actions would be foreclosed to him.

Many object that a strategy of limited war is chimerical since neither side would accept defeat without employing all the weapons at its disposal. We must be clear, however, what is implied by this argument. If we refuse to resist by limited means because we fear the

argument. If we refuse to resist by limited means because we fear the
at its disposal. We must be clear, however, what is implied by this
neither side would accept defeat without employing all the weapons
would be foreclosed to him.

Many object that a strategy of limited war is chimerical since
would be foreclosed to him.
either limited or all-out conflict. In that case, military actions
retaliatory force, the aggressor would be unable to benefit from
takes. If adequate limited war forces are coupled with an invincible
not defeat the military forces of the free world whatever form aggression
may be initiated. Deterrence would be complete if the aggressor could
pie of checking Soviet aggression at whatever scale of violence it
that we supplement our retaliatory force by other military units capable
future, flexibility of both our diplomacy and our strategy requires
world against other threats, particularly against our allies. In the
surprise attack on the United States. They cannot protect the free
civilian efforts, for all their complexity, will only protect us against
a
to insure the invulnerability of our strategic striking power. But
Indeed, as the theme of age develops, ever greater efforts will be required

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danger that a war may expand, then we must yield to every Communist menace. Moreover, a country not willing to risk limited war because it fears that resistance to aggression on *any* scale may lead to all-out war can hardly make credible the threat of massive retaliation. In a showdown, its only alternative will be surrender.

The purpose of a strategy of limited war, then, is first to strengthen deterrence, and second, if deterrence should fail, to provide an opportunity for settlement before the automatism of the retaliatory forces take over. The worst that could happen if we resisted aggression by means of limited war is what is *certain* to happen if we continue to rely on the strategy of the past decade.

Limited war is based on a kind of tacit bargain not to exceed certain restraints. One side's desire to keep the war limited is of no avail unless the other cooperates: it takes two to keep a limited war limited or a local defense local. In a limited war between major powers both sides, by definition, have the technical ability to expand the war. It is easy, therefore, to "prove" the unreasonable ness of any restraints. As long as either side has un-

unreasonableness of any restraint. As long as either side has un-
ability to expand the war. It is easy, therefore, to "prove" the
tween major powers both sides, by definition, have the technical
limited war limited on a local defense local. In a limited war pe-
ties of no avail unless the other cooperates: it takes two to keep a
exceed certain restraints. One side's a desire to keep the war limited
limited war is based on a kind of tacit bargain not to

to happen if we continue to rely on the strategy of the past decade.
if we resented aggression by means of limited war is what is certain
of the retaliatory forces take over. The worst that could happen
to provide an opportunity for settlement before the automatism
to strengthen deterrence, and second, if deterrence should fall,
the purpose of a strategy of limited war, then, is first

action. In a showdown, its only alternative will be surrender.
all-out war can hardly make credible the threat of massive retaili-
ities that resists to aggression on any scale may lead to
menace. Moreover, a country not willing to risk limited war because
danger that a war may expand, then we must yield to every Communist

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committed resources at its disposal, any limitation can be made to
appear arbitrary or ridiculous.

However paradoxical as it may seem, the danger that a war may
expand is one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war
contributes to deterrence and also why, if deterrence fails, there
is a chance of keeping a conflict limited. A strategy of limited war
adds to deterrence for the very reason usually invoked against it.
The danger that a limited war may expand after all works both ways.
An aggressor may not credit our threat of massive retaliation be-
cause it would force us to initiate a course of action which will
inevitably involve enormous devastation. He may calculate,
however, that once engaged in war on any scale, neither he nor we would
know how to limit it, whatever the intentions of the two sides. The
stronger the limited war forces of the free world, the larger will
have to be the Communist effort designed to overcome them. The more
the scale of conflict required for victory approaches that of all-
out war, the greater will be the inhibitions against initiating hos-
tilities. In this sense, a capability of limited war is necessary
in order to enhance the deterrent power of the retaliatory force.

In this sense, a capability of limited war is necessarily
out war, the greater will be the implications against irritating pos-
ter the scale of conflict required for victory approaches that of all-
present the limited war forces of the free world, the larger will
know how to limit it, whatever the intentions of the two sides. The
however, that once engaged in war on any scale, neither he nor we would
inhabit inevitably involve enormous devastation. He may calculate,
cause it would force us to initiate a course of action which will
An aggressor may not credit our threat of massive retaliation pe-
cause it would expand after all works both ways.
The danger that a limited war may expand after all works both ways,
adds to deterrence for the very reason usually invoked against it.
is a chance of keeping a conflict limited. A strategy of limited war
contributes to deterrence and also why, if deterrence fails, there
expand is one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war
abpears arbitrary or ridiculous.

However paradoxical as it may seem, the danger that a war may
abpears arbitrary or ridiculous.

committed resources at its disposal, and limitation can be made to

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The risk that war could become general places constraints both on its extent and its duration. If either side wanted an all-out war, it would be foolish to alert the retaliatory force of the opponent by engaging in local conflict. The mere fact that a limited war is taking place is a signal of the desire to avoid a showdown. Experience has shown that both sides generally lean over backwards to convey their limited aims and methods to each other.

During the Korean War we did not attack the bases in Manchuria /Those-who-deride-specific-limitations-as-iiiogical-miss-the
from which air attacks against our forces were being mounted. The
central-point:--an-iiiogical-limitation-is-often-particularly-effec-
Communists
tive/ in turn did not bomb the only two ports through which we could
obtain supplies. Similar restrictions were observed in the conflict
over Quemoy. Despite the fact that Communist China has always claimed
that its territorial waters extend twelve miles, our ships were per-
mitted to approach within three miles of Quemoy without being fired
on. We then loaded supplies on small Nationalisit landing vessels.
These were shelled as soon as they crossed the three mile limit which
had been tacitly agreed upon. We in turn did not use planes against

had been tacitly agreed upon. We in turn did not see planes against
These were shelled as soon as they crossed the three mile limit which
on. We then loaded subplanes on small Nationalist landing vessels.

mitted to approach within three miles of Quenoy without being fired
that its territorial waters extend twelve miles, our ships were her-
over Quenoy. Despite the fact that Communist China has always claimed
optain subplanes. Similar restrictions were observed in the conflict
state\ in turn did not damp the only two ports through which we could
committes

senior-officer--an-titfegleaf-imitation-to-ottom-bastianarily-effic-
from which air attacks against our forces were being mounted. The

During the Korean War we did not attack the planes in Manchuria
each other.

lean over packwards to convey their limited aims and methods to
avoid a showdown. Experience has shown that both sides generally
that a limited war is taking place is a signal of the desire to
of the opponent by engaging in local conflict. The war was fact then
all-out war, it would be too late to alert the retaliatory force

both on its extent and its duration. It either sides wanted an

The risk that war could become general planes constraints

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Chinese shore batteries. Neither of these limitations came about
through explicit agreement. Neither would have been thought very
sensible had it been proposed as a model at military staff colleges.

There are three prerequisites for a strategy of limited war:
(a) The limited war forces must be able to prevent the potential aggressor from creating a fait accompli; (b) They must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that their use, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it; (c) They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in con- veying that all-out war is not the sole response to aggression and that there exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of uncon- ditional surrender.

If the limited-war forces of the free world can be overrun
easily, aggression or blackmail will be encouraged and the dilemmas
of massive retaliation will then confront us in even sharper form.
The danger of a fait accompli must demoralize our allies, whose
major concern is not eventual liberation, but protection of their
territories from Communist occupation. If we resist by measures which

territories from Communist occupation. If we resort to measures which
major concern is not eventual liberation, put protection of their
The danger of a <u>fait accompli</u> must generalize our allies, whose
of massive retaliation will then confront us in even sharper form.
easily, aggression or blackmail will be encouraged and the dilemma
If the limited-war forces of the free world can be overruled
additional surrender.

there exists a willingness to negotiate a settlement short of uncon-
voking that all-out war is not the sole recourse to aggression and that
it; (c) They must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in con-
an increased risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to
nature to convince the aggressor that their use, while involving
aggression from creating a <u>fait accompli</u>;
(a) The limited war forces must be able to prevent the <u>potential</u>

There are three prerequisites for a strategy of limited war:
sensible had it been proposed as a model at military staff colleges.
through explicit agreement. Neither would have thought very
Chinese alone patterns. Neither of these limitations came upon

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we intend to be limited but which an opponent interprets as the
prelude to all-out war, he may launch a pre-emptive attack. If
our diplomacy cannot take advantage of pauses in military operations
to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on
"purely" military considerations, any conflict is likely to
expand it by stages into a conflagration.

Our present military establishment is grossly inadequate for
this task. With fourteen divisions, some of them understrength,
and most of them less well-equipped than their Soviet counterparts,
we are in no position to fight a limited war against a first-class
opponent. And if we consider the interaction of conventional and
nuclear forces, the problem becomes more complicated still. Our
tactical airpower is the lowest priority item in the Air Force. The
Marine Corps is at the very bottom of its statutory requirements. Our
airlift is inadequate.

As for the experience of Lebanon, so widely hailed as a demon-
stration of our limited-war capability, it in reality exhibited its
futility. In order to intervene in the Middle East, we were forced

futility. In order to intervene in the Middle East, we were forced
attrition of our limited-war capability, in reality exhibited its

As for the experience of Lebanon, so widely hailed as a demon-
airship is inadequate.

Marine Corps is at the very bottom of its statutory requirements. Our tactical airpower is the lowest priority item in the Air Force. The nuclear force, the problem becomes more complicated still. Our opponent. And if we consider the interaction of conventional and we are in no position to fight a limited war against a first-class and most of them leak well-edubbed than their Soviet counterparts, this task. With fourteen divisions, some of them understrengthened,

Our present military establishment is grossly inadequate for
expand &dquo; stages into a conflagration.

"Purely" military considerations, and conflict is likely to
to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on
our diplom&yacute; cannot take advantage of bases in military operations
demands to all-out war, he may launch a pre-emptive attack. It

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to pull two divisions out of Germany and tie up most of our strategic
airlift. In other words, we weakened the most sensitive area, Europe,
at the precise moment when international tensions were highest and
the threat to it was therefore potentially greatest. And we had to
reduce the mobility of our Strategic Air Command while it was most
needed to perform its deterrent function.

As worrisome as the imbalance of our military establishment
is the inadequacy of our doctrine and the immobility of our diplomacy. We not only lack the forces for limited war. There is also
no agreement about what forces we would need provided we were willing
to make the effort and what diplomacy might most effectively convey
our notion of limitation to an opponent. Our three services operate
on the basis of partially overlapping, partially competing concepts.
It is not necessary to decide which view is correct. It is sufficient to point out that we are hardly in a position to communicate
what we understand by limitation to an opponent as long as we do
not know it ourselves.

not know it ourselves.

what we understand p limitation to an obissance as long as we do
 client to point out that we are partly in a position to communicate
 It is not necessary to decide which view is correct. It is enough-
on the part of partially overlapping, partially combating concepts.
 our notion of limitation to an obissance. Our three services operate
to make the effort and what diplomacy might most effectively convey
no agreement about what forces we would need provided we were willing
macy. We not only lack the forces for limited war. There is also
the inadequacy of our doctrine and the immobility of our diplo-

Ms worries us as the imbalance of our military establishment
needed to perform its deterrent function.

reduce the mobility of our Strategic Air Command while it was most
the threat to it was therefore potentially greatest. And we had to
at the precise moment when international tensions were highest and
syrilict. In other words, we weakened the most sensitive area, Europe,
to build two divisions out of Germany and the rest most of our strategic

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It is often argued that if both sides could agree on anything
as complicated as limited war, they could probably agree on keeping
the peace in the first place. But this is essentially a debating
point. The problem of limited war obviously will not arise if there
is agreement on outstanding issues or if the Communists do not
resort to pressure, blackmail or aggression. But at the end of a
decade marked by the Korean war, the Indo-Chinese war, the Hungarian
HUNGARY rebellion, Suez, Lebanon, Quemoy, the pressure on Berlin, the
threats over Cuba and the Congon, it should no longer be necessary
to argue about the possibility of conflict.

A capability for limited war will not end all our foreign policy
dilemmas. It will strength deterrence and give us the possibility for
avoiding catastrophe should deterrence fail through accident, miscal-
culation or design. It is not a substitute for a highly ready,
invulnerable retaliatory force, but a complement to it. Limited war
is not a cheap means of imposing unconditional surrender--that possi-
bility ended with our atomic monopoly. In a world where many tasks
confront us, the significance of a capability for limited war is that
it gives us options other than surrender or suicide. This is not the

it gives us options other than surrender or suicide. This is not the
contrary, as the significance of a capability for limited war is that
purity ended with our atomic monopoly. In a world where many tasks
it not a cheap means of imposing unconditional surrender--that becal-
vinnableable retaliatory force, but a complement to it. Limited war
calculation or design. It is not a substitute for a highly ready,
avoiding catastrophe should deterrence fall through accident, miscal-
dillemma. It will strength deterrence and give us the possibility for
A capability for limited war will not end all our foreign policy
to argue about the possibility of conflict.

THREE REPELLEN, 'Suez, 'Rumania, 'Quemah, the pressure on Berlin, the
decals marked by the Korean war, the Indo-Chinese war, the Hungarian
resort to pressure, ultimatum or aggrSSION. But at the end of a
is agreement on outstanding issues or if the Commissars do not
point. The problem of limited war obviously will not arise if there
does not in the first place. But this is essentially a deprecating
as complicated as limited war, they could probably agree on keeping

It is often argued that it both sides could agree on anything
It is often argued that it both sides could agree on anything

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