THE UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

Address Presented by

Mr. W. F. Schaub
Chief, Military Division, Bureau of the Budget

Before the

Air War College
Maxwell Air Force Base
Montgomery, Alabama

Tuesday, November 1, 1955

1. Introduction

The United States security policy from the standpoint of the Bureau of the Budget is a composite of many complex and related facts and plans all of which have the approval of the President. Specifically, the Bureau of the Budget, acting as a staff agency for the President, must pull together, each year, these many complex and related plans and produce a budget consistent with the Government's determination to carry out the constitutional mandate to "provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

This is not easy. That portion of the budget providing for our common defense, usually referred to as the Major National Security programs, has accounted for about two-thirds of our annual expenditures over the past five years. These programs, four in number, are those of the Department of Defense, Military Assistance and Support, Atomic Energy,

the Department of Defense, Writers' Association and Sub院, Atomic Energy, over the past five years. These programs, known in number, are those of common defense, similarly referred to as the Major National Security Issues not each. That portion of the budget belonging to our war effort.

General welfare, and secure the passages of properly to curtail and constitutional mandate to provide for the common defense, promote the budget consistent with the Government's determination to carry out the buffer together, even then, these many complex and related plans and programs of the Budget, acting as a staff agency for the President, must all of which have the advantage of the President. Specifically, the Budget is a combination of many complex and related plans and plans of the United States Security policy from the standpoint of the Bureau of Introduction.

Treasury, November 1, 1922

Moungfomerly, Alpama
Maxwell Vir. Force Baa
Vir. Mar. College

Before the

Crefel, Writers' Division, Bureau of the Budget
Mr. W. L. Scandless

Address presented by

OF THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
THE UNITED STATES SECURITY POLICY FROM THE STANDPOINT

10

and Stockpiling. There are other programs, of course, which support the
national security, but the four here mentioned represent practically all
of the dollar requirements for the whole of our national security needs.
Because of the preponderance of budget expenditures which support the
national security and because of the need for considering these in
relationship to the broad objectives of our national policies, the task
of preparing the budget is very difficult for the Director of the Bureau
of the Budget. Even more difficult, of course, is the task of the
President in making the basic decisions.

This relationship of our national security policy as expressed in
the annual budget and the effect of budget execution on national security
policy and programs can best be discussed under three headings:

First: What is the Federal budget?

Second: What is the role of the Bureau of the Budget?

Third: What are the relationships of our national security programs
to the total budget?

2. What is the Federal Budget

The Budget of the United States Government is the financial expression
of the President's program during the ensuing fiscal year—the year
beginning July 1 and ending June 30. The budget is sometimes called "the
financial blueprint of a work program." Just as it is true in the
development of any blueprint, a budget in its preparation modifies,
reshapes, and solidifies broad plans and programs into specific working
details. It is these details which reflect the degree of effort to be

details. It is these details which reflect the degree of effort so be
required, and difficulties crop up and programs into subjective working
development of any blueprint, a budget in its preparation mobiles,
financial blueprint of a work program," that as it is true in the
beginning July 1 and ending June 30. The budget in some times called "the
of the President's program during the ensuing year--the year.

The budget of the United States Government in the financial expression

## 3. What is the Federal Budget?

To the total budget?

Budget and programs can best be discussed under three headings:

The relationship of our national security budget as expressed in

President in making the past decisions.

of the Budget. Even more difficult, of course, is the task of the
of preparing the budget is very difficult for the Director of the Bureau
relationship to the broad objectives of our national policies, the task
national security and because of the need for considering these in
Because of the brevunditure of budget expenditures which absorb the
of the dollar requirements for the whole of our national security needs.
national security, put the Tom Here mentioned representative practically all
and stockbiling. There are other programs, of course, which absorb the

- 5 -

[10]

devoted to the numerous and varied programs of the Federal Government.
The budget system provides the occasion for detailing and reconciling
general policies developed in (1) party platforms and other basic
political pronouncements, (2) legislative enactments, (3) Cabinet
discussions, (4) National Security Council considerations, and (5) various
advisory groups.

The President, as head of the executive branch of the Government,
uses the budget to translate plans into action. The President's Cabinet
members support specialized segments of the Government's activities. As
the budget is prepared, competing programs are studied and placed in
proper perspective to the total budget. Conflicting and opposing segments
of separate departmental programs are identified and eliminated.

Consistency and unified appraisal of related programs is a "must" in
budget preparation. This process of bringing together the many complex
programs into a unified and well integrated plan for the executive branch
of the Government often presents problems and issues most difficult to
resolve. The budget process serves to overcome the natural tendency to
avoid making tough decisions. The budget forces these decisions.

Because the President is required by law to present his budget to Congress
annually within 15 days of the date on which Congress convenes, and
because this is a printed budget, there is forced into one document the
final conclusions and related estimates spelled out in specific terms.
Thus the budget process forces into unity a single plan of action.

The budget process forces into play a single plan of action. Final conclusions and related estimates are shaped out in specific terms. Because this is a printed budget, there is less need to note the usually within 12 days of the date on which Congress convenes, and because the President is required by law to present his budget to Congress without further debate. The budget forces these decisions.

Reserve. The budget process serves to overcome the natural tendency to
of the Government often presents problems and issues most difficult to
programs into a unified and well integrated plan for the executive branch
budget preparation. This process of printing together the many complex
consistency and unified abstrait of related programs is a "must" in
of substrate departments' programs are identified and eliminated.

broader horizons to the total budget. Conflicting and opposing segments
the budget is prepared, combating programs are studied and placed in
the economy and specialized segments of the Government's activities. As
use the budget to translate plans into action. The President's Cabinet
the President, as head of the executive branch of the Government,
supplies funds.

Questions, (1) National Security, (2)行政 considerations, and (3) various
bureaucratic pronouncements, (5) legislative enactments, (3) Capnet
bureaucrats developped in (1) basic platforms and other pseudo
The budget system provides the occasion for detailing and reconciling
devoted to the numerous and varied programs of the federal Government.

- 3 -

[cc]

- 4 -

The foregoing discussion would not be complete without describing,
in general terms, how these many programs, plans, and policies are
expressed in the budget. First, the budget shows how much money the
President requests from Congress to carry out the present and proposed
programs which he recommends. Second, the budget shows the estimates of
how much the Government will receive and spend in the same year in
carrying out those programs. Both sets of dollar figures operate to
reflect the financial plans for carrying out the programs of the President.

Because my discussion today is concerned with the national security
programs, the two sets of figures, appropriations and expenditures, have
particular significance. Spending for the national security programs
usually lags behind the authorizations in far greater proportion than
other programs of the Government. The reasons are easily explainable.
The national security programs contain a huge amount of procurement
necessary to equip our forces with the weapons of war. There are items
with long lead time and ones which can be produced over a period of time
which is variable. Because of the variable time factors for production,
expenditures for the same quantity of equipment can be either stepped up
or stretched out. If production is stepped up for the budget year,
expenditures are greater; if it is stretched out, expenditures are less.
Thus by controlling the tempo of production we are controlling the
expenditure level. This may be so regardless of the amount of new
appropriations requested. It is for this reason that the two different
sets of dollar figures in the budget have particular significance in the
national security programs.

national security programs, sets of dollar figures in the budget have particular significance in the appropriations recommended. It is for this reason that the two different expenditure levels. This may be so regardless of the amount of new funds PA controlling the tempo of production we are controlling the expenditures are greater; it is because of this, expenditures are less. or strengthened out. It production is attached to the budget year, expenditures for the same quantity of equipment can be either attached to the program or variable. Because of the variable time factor for production, with long lead time and once which can be produced over a period of time necessary to equip our forces with the weapons of war. There are items the national security programs contain a write amount of procurement other programs of the Government. The reasons are easily explainable. Naturally late funding the authorizations in far greater proportion than particular significance. Spending for the national security programs, the two sets of figures, appropriations and expenditures, have

Because of this discussion today is concerned with the national security reflect the financial plans for carrying out the programs of the President. carrying out those programs. Both sets of dollar figures operate to how much the Government will receive and a bend in the same year in programs which he recommends. Second, the budget shows the estimates of President Reagan from Congress to carry out the present and proposed expenses in the budget. First, the budget shows how much money the in general terms, how these many programs, plans, and policies are

- 1 -

[n]

[L]

To put it another way, the plans for the national security programs for any year are reflected in the budget in two ways. First, by the additional increment to be authorized by appropriations, and second, by the rate of carrying out previously approved programs in the same year in the form of expenditures. Generally speaking, in the national security programs the full impact of spending is not felt for 18 to 24 months after the year in which appropriations are made. I will point out in some detail later the full significance of this dual budget relationship to our national security programs and policies.

A description of the Federal budget would not be complete without describing the importance of the accompanying Presidential Budget Message. This Message, required by law, the Message on the State of the Union, and the President's Economic Report are all delivered shortly after Congress assembles. The State of the Union Message deals with the broad aspects of our national policies and programs. It is followed by the Budget Message, which is usually some 80 or 90 pages long and carries policy statements, reasons, and broad descriptions of the contents of the budget itself. But it is in the Budget Message where the United States security policy is announced in specific terms. Many statements of policy dealing with national security plans and programs are made which cannot be reflected by the dollar sign itself. For example, the degree of urgency or the level of effort can be set forth in the Budget Message for specific programs where the dollars themselves cannot adequately express the Presidential policy.

So much for what is the Federal budget.

So much for what is the federal budget.

Express the presidential budget.

for specific programs where the dollars themselves cannot adequately
of revenue or the level of efforts can be set forth in the Budget Message
cannot be reflected by the dollar sign itself. For example, the degree
budget setting with national security plans and programs are made when
security budget is announced in specific forma. Many statements of
budget itself. But it is in the Budget Message where the United States
budget statements, reasons, and proud descriptions of the contents of the
the Budget Message, which is similarly some 80 or 90 pages long and carries
proceeds of our national budgets and programs. It is followed by
after Congress samples. The State of the Union Message dates with the
Union, and the President's Economic Report are all delivered shortly
Message. This Message, required by law, the Message on the State of the
describing the importance of the accompanying Presidential Budget
A description of the federal budget would not be complete without
so our national security programs and policies.

some detail later the full significance of this great budget relationship
after the year in which appropriations are made. I will point out in
programs the full aspect of appropriation is not felt for 18 to 24 months
in the form of expenditures. Generally abating, in the national security
the rate of carrying out previously approved programs in the same year
additional increment to be authorized by appropriations, and second, by
for and here are reflected in the budget in two ways. First, by the
To but it another way, the plans for the national security programs

- 2 -

- 6 -

3. The Role of the Bureau of the Budget

Prior to the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, each executive agency transmitted its own budget to Congress, routing it through the Treasury Department only for assembling and printing. No machinery existed for the President or the executive branch to coordinate and integrate plans and actions, and much of this task was thrown into the lap of Congress, which was ill-equipped to do such a job.

With the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act, Congress established the current concept of the executive budget, under which the President has the responsibility for transmitting to Congress a budget which represents his coordinated plan of action for the executive branch. The Bureau of the Budget was created to support the President in making this concept effective. As the size of the Government has increased, the job of planning and coordination has increased proportionately. The Bureau of the Budget has the responsibility for organizing this job in the executive branch in connection with the development of the annual program as reflected in the budget. The present Administration has shown itself particularly mindful of fixing the operating responsibility, that is, the responsibility for formulating and carrying out the programs within broad policies established by the Administration. As indicated previously, general policies are established at the Presidential and Cabinet level, and the problem of putting the programs of various agencies within these policies on a coordinated basis is in large measure entrusted to the Bureau of the Budget. The Director is responsible for providing the President with his

Budget. The Director is responsible for formulating the President with his
on a coordinated basis in large measure entrusted to the Bureau of the
and the programs of buffing the programs of various agencies within these agencies
General Offices are appropriated at the Presidential and Cabinet level,
offices appropriated by the Administration. As indicated breviationally,
reasonableness for formulating and carrying out the programs within proper
benevolence, mindfully of fixing the operating reasonableness, thus far, the
reflected in the budget. The present Administration has shown itself
practical in connection with the development of the annual program as
the budget has the reasonableness for organizing due top in the executive
planning and coordination has increased proportionately. The Bureau of
etfective. As the size of the Government has increased, the top of
the budget was created to absorb the President in making this concept
the coordinated plan of action for the executive branch. The Bureau of
the reasonableness for transmitting to Congress a budget which represents
the current concept of the executive budget, under which the President has
with the passage of the budget and Accounting Act, Congress appropriated
the budget of Congress, which was fully-enacted to do such a job.

integrate plans and actions, and much of this task was shown into the
existed for the President or the executive branch to coordinate and
the Treasury Department only for事keeping and printing. No machinery
executive agency transmitted its own budget to Congress, routing it through
prior to the passage of the budget and Accounting Act of 1951, each

- 6 -

[n]

independent recommendations after assembling and evaluating the views of
the operating agencies. At this point it should be kept in mind that
Cabinet and National Security Council decisions do not in themselves
constitute adequate policy guidance for specific budget decisions.
General policies are subject to many interpretations and allow various
degrees of implementation. When you put a figure in the budget it
inevitably relates to specific programs which in turn reflect these
variations in interpretations. The figure must usually also be related
to a dollar estimate. This results often in raising questions of
judgment. It is a natural tendency of proponents of an operating program
to interpret general policies in a manner best suited to support their
particular plans. At the many levels at which these interpretations must
be made, it is not difficult to accumulate a great deal of optimism and
desire which in sum total presents a major problem for negotiation and
modification. This is the job of the Bureau of the Budget as a staff
arm of the President.

In addition to its responsibility for development of the Federal
budget, the Bureau of the Budget also has established responsibility for
apportioning the funds which Congress appropriates. Because budgets
submitted to Congress are prepared some eighteen months before the
beginning of the fiscal year, programs submitted are frequently subject to
changes. By the time the fiscal year begins, changing conditions and
changing requirements may require a review of the timing of the use of
funds. The apportionment process is a tool provided the Bureau of the

funds. The aborption process is a tool developed by the Bureau of the
changing requirements which require a review of the funding of the use of
changes. By the time the fiscal year begins, changing conditions and
beginning of the fiscal year, programs submitted are frequently submitted to
amended to Congress are prepared some eighteen months before the
aborting the funds which Congress appropriates. Because budgets
pредated, the Bureau of the Budget has established reasonabiliy for
In addition to its reasonabiliy for development of the Federal
arm of the President.

modification. This is the top of the Bureau of the Budget as a full
game which in sum total presents a major problem for negotiation and
be made, it is not difficult to accumulate a great deal of optimism and
bitterness also. At the many levels at which these interpretations must
to interpret General policies in a manner best suited to ambuscade their
judgment. It is a natural tendency of proponents of an operating program
to a dollar estimate. This results often in raising questions of
variations in interpretations. The figure must usually also be related
invariably relates to a specific programme which in turn reflects these
degrees of implementation. When you but a figure in the budget it
General policies are subject to many interpretations and allow various
consequences, adequate policy guidance for a specific budget decsions.
Capitol and National Security Committee decisions do not in themselves
the operating agencies. At this point it should be kept in mind that
independent recommendations after assuming and evaluating the areas of

- 1 -

[n]

[LC]

- 8 -

Budget to insure that such reviews are made and that the funds which
Congress appropriated are appropriately and economically used. This is
particularly the case with respect to the national security programs,
where Congress frequently appropriates funds with sufficient flexibility
to recognize changing situations. Where such large sums are involved,
it is very important that the system for continuous program and requirement
review on a current basis be strengthened. The primary responsibility for
such a review rests with the operating agency. The major problem is to
insure that such reviews are objective and realistic. A review by the
people who developed the program is not adequate. An independent
appraisal is required.

4. Relationship of the National Security Programs to the Total Budget

As mentioned earlier, the cost of operating the four Major National
Security programs of the Federal Government have amounted for the years
1952 through 1956 to about two-thirds of our total expenditure budget.
As you can see, this is the largest single element of the Federal Govern-
ment's fiscal program and is likely to remain so for the duration of the
cold war. To be more specific, the Mid-Year Review of the Budget
released in August shows that of the $63.8 billion to be spent by the
Federal Government in fiscal year 1956 no less than $38.8 billion would
be devoted to the Major National Security programs. It is apparent that
these National Security programs will continue to be the biggest undertaking
of the Government in terms of persons employed, materials consumed, and
dollars invested and spent for the indefinite future.

of the Government in terms of burdens imposed, materials consumed, and
these National Security programs will continue to be the biggest undertaking
be devoted to the Major National Security programs. It is apparent that
Federal Government in trace less 1920 no less than $38.8 billion would
released in August shows that of the $63.8 billion to be spent by the
cold war. To be more specific, the Mid-Year Review of the Budget
ment's trace program and is likely to remain so for the continuation of the
As you can see, this is the largest single element of the Federal Govern-
ment through 1920 to spent two-thirds of our total expenditure budget.
Security programs of the Federal Government have amounted to the least
We mentioned earlier, the cost of operating the four Major National
It. Relationship of the National Security Programs to the Total Budget
appropriated is required.

people who developed the program is not adequate. An independent
insurance that such reviews are objective and realistic. A review by the
and a review review reads with the operating agency. The major problem is to
review on a current basis be strengthened. The primary reasonabiliy for
it is very important that the system for continuous program and requirement
to recognize changing situations. Where such large amounts are involved,
where Congress frequently appropriates funds with insufficient flexibility
barrierly the case with respect to the national security programs.
Congress appropriated are appropriated and economically need. Due to
Budget to finance that such reviews are made and that the funds which

- 8 -

[LC]

The remainder of the total budget amounts to $25 billion and contains some $16.5 billion which the Bureau of the Budget has classified as major programs not readily subject to administrative discretion through the budget process. All other programs amount to $8.5 billion. From this it would appear that any adjustments in the level of Federal spending must necessarily have a large influence on the amount to be spent for national security. Under the present conditions of an insecure peace, it is most essential to closely relate national security costs to our total outlay because, as I said earlier, these conditions may prevail over an extended period. We must not spend our way to a defeat of our economic system. This continuing problem of how much to allow for security is coupled with the fact that our military authorities cannot and must not predetermine a single form of expected enemy action to which to gear our defense preparation. The objective, therefore, has been adopted to maintain a well-balanced defense establishment which, within the concept of collective security, will deter war or, if necessary, will provide the basis of strength to wage a war if one develops. This objective contemplates developing an establishment which can be maintained over an extended period of uneasy peace without undermining our economy or our fundamental institutions.

All national policy, including national security policy, must be the product of thoughtful coordination between our international, political, economic, and social policies and programs. As indicated above, such policies are usually established in broad terms. Detailed courses of

bureaucrates are usually classified in proud terms. Detailed cases of
economic, and social bufferies and programmes. As indicated above, such
broader of thoughtful coordination between our international policies,
VII national budget, including national security budget, must be the
institutions.

period of nearly decade without underestimating our economy or our tungsten's
developing an adaptation which can be maintained over an extended
strength to make a war it one develops. This objective contemplates
security, will defer war on, it necessarily, will provide the base of
balanced defense adaptation which, within the concept of collective
action. The objective, therefore, has been adopted to maintain a well-
specified form of expected enemy action to which to fear our defense prehens-
ive lack that our military authorities cannot and must not predecide a
period continuing problem of how much to allow for security is coupled with
period. We must not abate our wish to a defeat of our economic system.
Because, as I said earlier, these conditions will prevail over an extended
economic to closely relate national security costs to our total output
security. Under the present conditions of an uncertain peace, it is most
necessarily have a large influence on the amount to be abated for national
would abate that any adjustments in the favor of federal abating must
pmand process. VII other programme amount to $8.2 billion. From this it
programs not resupply subject to administrative discretion through the
some $10.2 billion which the Bureau of the Budget has classified as major.
The remainder of the total budget amount is to $52 billion and contains

- 3 -

[cc]

[LC]

action are left to the operating machinery of the Government. Much room
is left for various interpretations and the development of subordinate
policies. Many varying degrees of emphasis develop. Programs get out of
balance as a result. Holding these conflicting forces in line with our
unified policy objectives places a terrific burden on the Director and
the President.

The principal place where all of the pieces must come together is in
the review of the annual operating program as reflected in the budget.
Only then can the President and his advisers view the problem as a whole,
and only then can the various pieces be examined in terms of their
relative importance.

In addition to the problem of coordination, the Bureau of the Budget
is concerned with three major aspects of national security policy. First,
it must insure that adequate information is available when policy is being
considered. Next, it must insure that cost and feasibility elements, both
present and future, are recognized and related. There have been many
instances where policies and commitments adopted as desirable have run
into conflict in the attempt to implement and interpret them. Third, the
Bureau must insure that implementing plans to support policies are
realistic and have been subject to adequate review by responsible agencies
and officials. This is an area of great concern. Major changes are taking
place in the world. Major changes are taking place in our security
programs. New developments and new plans are in various stages of
evolution. We are breaking way on new frontiers of technology, new

evolution. We are working way on new theories of technology, new
programs. New developments and new plans are in various stages of
place in the world. Major changes are taking place in our security
and officials. This is an area of great concern. Major changes are taking
resulting and have been expected to adequate review by reasonable agencies
Bureau must name that implementing plane to submit policies are
into conflict in the attempt to implement and interpret them. Third, the
instances where policies and commitments adopted as desirable have run
 ahead and future, are recognized and related. There have been many
considered. Next, it must name that cost and leadership elements, paid
it must name that adequate information is available when policy is being
concerned with three major aspects of national security policy. First,
In addition to the problem of coordination, the Bureau of the Budget
relative importance.

and only then can the various pieces be examined in terms of their
only then can the President and his associates view the problem as a whole,
the review of the annual operating program as reflected in the budget.

The principal piece where all of the pieces must come together is in
the President.

multiplied policy objectives forces a terrific burden on the Director and
balance as a result. Holding these conflicting forces in fine with our
bodies. Much varying degrees of elaborate develop. Programs set out of
the felt for various interpretations and the development of elaborate
action are felt to the operating mannerly of the Government. When room

- 10 -

- 11 -

tactics, and increasing capability. At the same time, we are attempting to maintain the old and conventional. Under such conditions, most of the new programs naturally become "add-ons" to the existing programs. This results in tremendous demands on our resources--material and fiscal. It has been obvious for some time that some system for measuring the various elements of this problem must be developed. Otherwise the results will be fiscal bankruptcy or an inadequate and unbalanced program. We no longer have room for a unilateral program approach to our problems. An objective solution must be formed.

The history of military appropriations for the Department of Defense in the last several years represents the best illustration of the various factors which govern decisions on the size of national security programs.

In fiscal years 1949 and 1950 the policy for total appropriations was primarily to stabilize expenditures at a level of about $40 billion which would permit maintaining a stable defense program and a slight increase in some of the basic civilian projects which had been deferred during World War II. It was estimated in 1949 when the budget was submitted to Congress that the Government would have a surplus of almost $5 billion. A falling off of receipts, however, resulted in a deficit of almost $2 billion. In fiscal year 1950, receipts continued to decline and the deficit increased to $3 billion. There was considerable concern about balancing the budget. In spite of this, military appropriations increased from $11 billion in 1949 to $14 billion in 1950 due to increasing international tension. In fiscal year 1951, initial

increasing international tension. In fiscal year 1961, initially increased from $11 billion in FY60 to $11 billion in FY62 due to about balancing the budget. In spite of this, strictly appropriations the deficit increased to $3 billion. There was considerable concern almost $3 billion. In fiscal year 1960, receipts continued to decline and $2 billion. A staffing cost of receipts, however, resulted in a deficit of $2 billion. As Congress passed the Government would have a surplus of almost $1 billion in FY61 when the budget was increased in some of the past civilian projects which had been deferred which would permit maintaining a stable defense program and a sufficient surplus to amortize expenditures at a level of about $40 billion in fiscal year 1961 and $600 the budget for total appropriations factors which govern decisions on the size of national security programs. In the last several years represents the past inflation of the authorities. The majority of strictly appropriations for the Department of Defense objective solution must be formed.

Further have room for a further fiscal program approach to our problems. In fiscal 1962, probably or an inadequate and unbalanced program. We no elements of future problems must be developed. Otherwise the results will have been opinions for some time that some system for measuring the authorities results in frequent changes on our resources—material and trace. If new programs naturally become "add-one" to the existing programs. This to maintain the old and conventional. Under such conditions, most of the factors, and increasing capacity. At the same time, we are attempting

- 11 -

[1c]

- 12 -

appropriations were made at approximately this same level ($13.5 billion).
Following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, three supplementals were
provided by Congress bringing appropriations for the year to a total of
$48 billion. The increase in receipts as a result of new taxes, however,
resulted in a surplus in this year.

Instead of being concerned about our fiscal economy attention turned
to our industrial and material economy. It was recognized that large
amounts of dollars would have to be appropriated to provide for priming
the pump of our industrial machine. The three supplementals for fiscal
year 1951 were hurriedly prepared with practically no review and were
quickly appropriated. The governing factor on each was largely the
ability of the defense machine to make effective use of the funds and the
ability of the production machine to move fast enough. Programs were
relatively unfirm and requirements were continuously changing as the scope
of the problems varied. In addition, economic and production controls
had to be authorized and established under conditions short of full
mobilization in an attempt to keep our economy in balance.

From the confusion resulting from the sudden shift in our defense
needs, a great amount of stress and strain immediately followed. The
sudden assault on South Korea shocked the American people into a keen
awareness of our need to increase armed strength in the face of communist
military power and intentions. In time through the budget process there
was evolved a policy of limited or partial mobilization.

was evolved a policy of limited or partial modification.

Military power and intentions. In time through the budget process there
awareness of our need to increase armed strength in the face of communist
androgen assault on South Korea shocked the American people into a keen
need, a great amount of stress and again immediately followed. The
from the confusion resulting from the sudden shift in our defense
modification in an attempt to keep our economy in balance.

bad to be authorized and satisfied under conditions short of full
of the problems varied. In addition, economic and production controls
relatively small and requirements were continuously changing as the scope
applies of the production machine to move that enough. Programs were
applies of the defense machine to make effective use of the funds and the
directly appropriated. The Governing factor on even more largely the
best JDF were immediately precluded with brusquely no review and were
the bomb of our industrial machine. The three subcomponents for this
amounts to dollars would have to be appropriated to provide for bringing

Instead of being concerned about our fiscal economy attention turned
resulted in a imbalance in this case.

¥18 trillion. The increase in receipts as a result of new taxes, however,
provided by Congress printing appropriations for the year to a total of
following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, three subcomponents were
appropriations were made at approximately five times same level (¥13.2 trillion).

- 15 -

[c]

- 13 -

The goal was to prepare for all-out mobilization while at the same time carrying on the Korean War and raising the plateau of military capability. This had to be done as quickly, effectively, and efficiently as possible. This goal made budget decisions and fiscal planning most difficult. In fiscal year 1952 military appropriations jumped to $61 billion. This was in comparison with the approximately $108 billion requirements which the Departments had hurriedly pulled together as their programs and authorizations expanded. The funds were reduced because the ability to produce was still uncertain at the time the budget was processed. Production schedules were necessarily developed in a hurry and without time to coordinate with industry. At first the total program was contemplated to be completed by June 30, 1954. Then, as needs increased in Korea, decisions were made to telescope requirements to June 30, 1952. This readiness date was later changed to June 30, 1953. These changes, all in a period of months, resulted in fantastic problems of reprogramming and, as a result, appropriations were not too closely related to realistic programs. At the same time it was contemplated that the bulk of our equipment requirements could be produced in two years and then level off at a maintenance and replacement level and that during this period basic industries would be expanded so that the defense program could be absorbed in an expanded economy.

When this complete picture was finally pulled together, however, and the appropriations, material required to carry out our objectives, the critical materials, and the production machinery and facilities required

critical materials, and the production required the appropriations material required to carry out our objectives, the

When the complete picture was finally buffeted together, however, and in an expanded economy,

industries would be expanded so that the defense program could be expanded at a maintenance and replacement level and that during this period paste equipment requirements could be produced in two years and then level off.

At the same time it was contemplated that the bulk of om and, as a result, appropriations were not too closely related to resiliency off in a period of months, resulted in fantastic problems of reprogramming due to responsiveness rate was faster changed to June 30, 1923. These changes, in Korea, decisions were made to reseparate requirements to June 30, 1925.

contemplated to be completed by June 30, 1924. Then, as needs increased time to coordinate with industry. At that the total program was production schedules were necessarily developed in a hard and without

apartness to produce was a full uncertain at the time the budget was processed. Programs and appropriations expended. The funds were reduced because the requirements which the Departments had purported together as their budget. This was in comparison with the approximately $108 billion different. In their last year 1925ifferently appropriations totaled to $618 billion. This budget made budget decisions and fiscal planning meet as best possible. The budget made budget decisions and fiscal planning meet as efficiently. This had to be done as quickly, effectively, and efficiently as possible.

The budget was to prepare for all-out mobilization while at the same

- 13 -

[n]

[LC]

- 14 -

to produce it became better identified, it was obvious that to take
materials out of the civilian economy above certain estimated maximum
levels would destroy the economic support which was necessary to maintain
our defense production and that steps would have to be taken to get these
factors in balance. This required further reprogramming of production
money.

The 1953 budget was essentially developed as a requirements budget
predicated on ground rules to fit in with the levels of production which
it was felt desirable to maintain, the availability of materials, and
consideration of the level of expenditures beyond which it would be
undesirable to go. Because of the increased importance of the production
level and expenditure problem, controlling decisions on the level of
military appropriations resulted in limits on expenditures and a stretch-
out in the timing in which the goods would be delivered. The production
and requirement pictures were becoming clearer. With the exception of
aircraft, the Departments could see beyond the peak of production in most
areas and there was a growing desire to stretch out the remaining
requirements in order to maintain production lines and in order to get
the latest designs and developments. As I have indicated, aircraft was
an exception to these rules because with the tremendous build-up required
to meet the expanded needs the major influencing factor was the levelling
off of production peaks to give realism to our aircraft production and
delivery program.

defender program.

out of production banks to give relief to our aircraft production and to meet the expanded needs the major influencing factor was the ravelling an exception to these rules because with the tremendous pull-up required the latest designs and developments. We have indicated, aircraft was requirements in order to maintain production lines and in order to get areas and there was a growing desire to stretch out the remaining aircraft, the departments could see beyond the bank of production in most and requirement pictures were becoming clearer. With the exception of out in the timing in which the banks would be delivered. The production strictly appropriations resulted in limits on expenditures and a straining of level and expenditure problem, controlling geographies on the level of unibeatable to go. Because of the increased importance of the production consideration of the level of expenditures beyond which it would be it was left desirable to maintain the availability of materials, and predicated on ground rules to fit in with the levels of production which The 1923 budget was essentially developed as a requirements budget

moneely.

moneely.

moneely.

moneely.

- 11 -

[cc]

- 15 -

The rapid expansion of programs in fiscal years 1951 and 1952 could not be accomplished without causing tremendous pressure on prices and wages. Military contracts were competing with each other for critical skills, materials and facilities. Procurement officers purchased huge quantities of easy-to-get items which distorted the business economy. Unrealistic schedules generated critical material requirements, which created problems for the civilian economy.

When the 1954 budget was developed, it represented a continuation of the attempt to eliminate some of the production peaks and to maintain a mobilization base. Programs and requirements based on fixed readiness dates were still a primary influence on fund requirements. Production and delivery feasibility was already partially recognised. This had the accumulated result of building up huge surpluses of unobligated and unexpended funds which caused concern with the executive branch and Congress. It was obvious that the delivery urgency on the part of the procuring agencies decreased as production levels increased. When the new administration took office, it was decided to reduce somewhat the backlog of unobligated funds. Shortly thereafter, hostilities ceased in Korea and civilian requirements and civilian interest began to receive more attention. The national defense policy to develop a program which would maintain a high level of defense indefinitely supported by a strong and expanding economy contributory to the general welfare and readily convertible to the tasks of war should this prove necessary was reaffirmed and strengthened. Economical and political pressures began to develop

["and a strong economy. Economical and budgetary measures begun to develop and a strong program of public works were started. The general economy improved and the budget was increased. The budget was increased and the budget

[L.C.]

resulting in strong pressures to balance the budget and reduce taxes.

There was increased recognition of the huge business management problem which the large defense program had generated, and strong pressures for economy and efficiency became evident.

The 1955 budget reflected a continuation and increase in these pressures. A more conservative approach to mobilization planning and levels of mobilization reserves developed. Fixed readiness dates pointed towards preparedness for total war were removed from policy statements, although military planning still retained them. The impact of new developments and the effect of increased capacity on strategy and requirements were recognized. Pressures increased to get our fiscal economy in balance. A mild economic contraction modified this pressure. In the latter part of fiscal year 1955, during the processing of the 1956 budget, a renewed confidence on the part of business and investors resulted in an expanding economy and new pressures on the levels of defense programs developed. Employment, wages, and prices increased at a rate which created serious concern about inflation. A strong belief developed that if we were ever to balance the budget, now was the time to do it when the economy was at one of its highest peacetime levels. This situation, coupled with the increasing efforts to lessen international tension and the recognition that another total war would be disastrous to the world, has strong influences on the character and level of our current defense programs.

defense programs.

the world, has a strong influence on the character and level of our current
function and the recognition that another total war would be classifiable to
situation, coupled with the increasing efforts to lessen international
do it when the economy was at one of its highest baseline levels. This
developed that if we were ever to balance the budget, now was the time to
a rate which created serious concern about inflation. A strong policy
defense programs developed. Employment, wages, and prices increased at
resulted in an expanding economy and new pressures on the level of
budget, a renewed confidence on the part of business and investors
in the latter part of fiscal 1922, during the processing of the 1922
economy in balance. A wild economy contracted modified this breather.
requirements were recognized. Pressures increased to get our fiscal
developments and the effect of increased effort on strategy and
throughout widely planning still retained them. The aspect of new
towards brevetsness for total war were removed from budget statements,
levels of modification reserves developed. Fixed readiness dates pointed
pressures. A more conservative approach to modification planning and
The 1922 budget reflected a continuation and increase in these
economy and efficiency possible evident.

which the large defense program had generated, and a strong breather for
there was increased recognition of the huge business management problem
resulting in strong pressures to balance the budget and reduce taxes.

- 10 -

[r]

- 17 -

I hope that from this survey you will gain the impression that
national security policy and programs are determined by a great many
factors other than the budget itself--that the budget merely reflects the
results of these factors. It is recognised, however, that the budget is
controlling after it has been established. Also, the budget is a tool
which can be used to coordinate and to advise, and, if necessary, to help
enforce policy.

On the other hand, national security considerations do control the
Federal budget in wartime or times of emergency. Under such conditions,
the first call on national resources is for national security. There is
much less concern than in peacetime over the effect on the standard of
living, and on draining off resources from the private economy for the use
of the Federal Government. There is relatively little concern over the
size of the national debt and its effect on the monetary system of the
country. Major emphasis turns to material and manpower resources. This
creates a whole new set of problems. An uncontrolled approach to military
requirements under emergency conditions prevents intelligent distribution
of limited resources and results in serious delays and substantial waste.
One of our chief concerns in this period of insecure peace should be to
build a system which will function in peacetime as well as in war and
which will permit the conservation and economic use of limited resources
under conditions which are relatively unknown to us at present.

In peacetime, national security programs must be considered in
relation to all other activities of the Government. All of the problems

relation to all other activities of the Government. VII of the problems in becognition, national security problems must be considered in under conditions which are relatively unknown to us at present.

which will benefit the conservation and economic use of limited resources provided a system which will function in becognition as well as in war and one of our chief concerns in this period of intense peace should be to of limited resources and results in serious delays and unsatisfactory waste. requirements under emergency conditions prevent intelligent distribution creates a whole new set of problems. An uncontrolled abhorred to written contract. Major embattled times to material and manpower resources. This size of the national debt and its effect on the monetary system of the of the Federal Government. There is relatively little concern over the living, and on granting all resources from the private economy for the use much less concern than in becognition over the effect on the standard of the first call on national resources is for national security. There is regional budget in wartime or times of emergency. Under such conditions, On the other hand, national security considerations do control the enforcement budget.

which can be used to coordinate and to advise, and, it necessarily, to help controlling after it has been adapted. Via, the budget is a tool results of these factors. If it is recognized, however, that the budget is before other than the budget itself—that the budget merely reflects the national security budget and programs are determined by a great and

I hope that from this array you will gain the impression that

- 13 -

[c]

- 18 -

involved in balancing our international, political, and economic policies
must be considered but the task is even greater, for we are seeking to
maintain a defense program at a level which is tantamount to semi-
mobilization for an indefinite period and which requires a major portion
of the national budget. This undertaking will be impossible to carry
out unless we maintain a strong and virile economy. It will be impossible
to carry out without the necessary political support and public acceptance.
The task represents a major problem of balance and must be recognized by
program planners. So far, we have been able to grow in defense strength
while still reducing total expenditures during the past 2½ years. This
is due to a number of reasons. For one, we have set aside the former
concept of the "fixed date of maximum danger" moved forward from time to
time under which planning was designed to achieve maximum readiness for
each of various set dates. This was not only an extremely costly concept,
but it also made it impossible for the services to plan realistically on
a stable long-term basis. Expenditure reductions have also been made
possible by the introduction of new weapons and techniques into military
planning which give maximum use of science and technical knowledge with
minimum use of employment of men. Other reductions in military expenditures
reflect the growing strength of our allies, the termination of hostilities
in Korea, and the increased emphasis on the reserve forces. More
businesslike procedures have also played their part. Substantial
reductions have resulted from more orderly and better planned procurement,

regulations have resulted from more orderly and better planned broomfare, plus a more efficient procedure have also blazed their path. Substantially in Korea, and the increased emphasis on the reserve forces. More reflect the growing strength of our forces, the termination of hostilities minimum use of employment of men. Other regulations in widely applicable planning which give maximum use of science and technical knowledge with bomaople by the introduction of new weapons and techniques into military a stable long-term basis. Expenditure reductions have also been made put it also made it impossible for the services to plan realistically on each of various set dates. This was not only an extremely costly concept, time under which planning was designed to achieve maximum readiness for concept of the "fixed base of maximum danger," moved toward from time to time due to a number of reasons. For one, we have set aside the former while still requiring total expenditures equal to the beat 5½ times. This task represents a major problem of finance and must be recognized by to carry out without the necessarily political subport and haphazard acceptance. out unless we maintain a strong and vital economy. It will be impossible of the national budget. This undertaking will be impossible to carry modification for an indefinite period and which requires a major budget maintain a defense program at a level which is sufficient to semi- must be considered put the task is even greater, for we are seeking to insofar as balancing our international, political, and economic policies

- 18 -

[cc]

[1c]

from improved organization and management, from curtailment of unnecessary personnel movements, and from the elimination of duplication, overstaffing, and activities of marginal value.

We have, however, only begun to recognize the huge problem of management in peacetime inherent in this tremendous business we are trying to operate. We have only begun to realize that traditional systems must be modified and improved to meet the problem. We talk about the American tradition of civilian control of our defense organizations, but the average layman is only beginning to realize that the actual management and operation below the Secretarial level in each service is in the command channel. Thus the command channel faces a most important challenge. First, the responsibility for management and operating systems must be recognized and _accepted_. Second, such recognition and acceptance must be accomplished not only in terms of military necessity and military requirements, but recognition must be given to this huge management problem. This cannot be done with the traditional military policies of rotation and general education.

This becomes all the more important when we remember that during the last five years the United States has expended over $200 billion on Major National Security programs. Substantial improvement has been accomplished in our military effectiveness. Over $85 billion of these expenditures went into so-called military hard-goods, which has brought stocks of many of these items to a point where it is possible to taper off procurement. Because such supplies are not being consumed in combat, the bulk of the

Because such subordinates are not being consumed in combat, the bulk of the
of these items to a point where it is possible to further outdo comrade.
went into so-called military hardware, which has brought stocks of much
in our military effectiveness. Over $82 billion of these expenditures
National Security programs. Substantial improvement has been accomplished
last time here the United States has expended over $500 billion on Mater
This becomes all the more important when we remember that during the
education.

done with the traditional military policies of rotation and general
recognition must be given to the pure management problem. This cannot be
not only in terms of military necessity and military requirements, but
accepted. Second, an recognition and acceptance must be accomplished
reasonably for management and operating systems must be recognized and
Time the command channel faces a most important challenge. First, the
below the secretarial level in each service is in the command channel.
If we are only beginning to realize that the actual management and operation
tradition of civilian control of our defense organizations, put the average
be modified and improved to meet the problem. We talk about the American
to operate. We have only begun to realize that traditional systems must
management in becoming independent in this tremendous business we are trying
We have, however, only begun to recognize the pure problem of
and activities of marginal value.

benevolent movements, and show the elimination of subordination, overestimating
from improved organization and management, from curtailment of unnecessary

- 13 -

- 20 -

material now produced is adding to our capacity to defend ourselves and
increase our resources. Mobilization stocks of many military items are
thus being built to greater levels of preparedness than ever before
except in time of war.

As I have indicated before, we are facing currently and in the future
a major problem of balance. In the face of economic and political
pressures and talk about reduced international tension, we are faced with
the realization that keeping these large forces in being is going to
present a most serious problem. This is understandable when you realize
that for a number of years we have been putting several billion dollars
into research and development each year and that the results of this will
generate new demands. Unfortunately, all of these new demands, because
they are much more complex, cost considerably more per unit than previously
and change the pattern of production. The degree to which we are able to
accommodate these new developments and in some cases, new activities, will
depend on how intelligently we recognize this problem and adjust our plans
and systems to meet them.

and systems to meet them.

debound on how inefficiently we recognize this problem and adjust our plans
accommodate these new developments and in some cases, new activities, will
and change the pattern of production. The degree to which we are able to
they are much more complex, cost considerably more per unit than previously
generate new demand. Unfortunately, all of these new demands, because
into research and development each year and that the results of this will
that for a number of years we have been putting several billion dollars
brought a most serious problem. This is underestimation when you realize
the realization that keeping these large forces in being going to
bureaus and talk about reduced international tension, we are faced with
a major problem of balance. In the face of economic and better

except in time of war.

As I have indicated before, we are facing currently and in the future
except in time of war.

time being put to greater levels of preparedness than ever before.

increase our resources. Modification of many military items are

- 50 -

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.
The Harold Pratt House - 58 East 68th Street
New York 21, N. Y.

December 6, 1955

Mr. William A. M. Burden
630 Fifth Avenue
New York 20, New York

Dear Mr. Burden:

I thought it might prove useful if I sent you a brief outline of my ideas about what the sub-committee, which you agreed to chair, might hope to accomplish. As I told you over the telephone, this is a field in which questions come to me much more readily than answers. Still there might be some advantage in having a paper before us when we meet later this week and we can then determine which subjects are worth further exploration.

In thinking about military superiority, it seems important to distinguish two phenomena: physical superiority either in resources or in technology or in weapons systems, and conceptual superiority either tactical or strategic. I have the impression that the latter is not always fully recognized and yet superiority in doctrine has at least as often been the cause of victory as superiority in resources.

## Tactical Doctrine

Superior tactical doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an Allied army superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment (except perhaps for air-power), but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and use of artillery, a superior relationship between fire and movement which is the essence of tactics, furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples would be the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights (in part, of course, also a technological breakthrough), of the Prussian army against the Austrian and French in 1866 and 1870. All these were victories, not of superior resources, but of superior doctrine: the ability to break the frame-work which had come to be taken for granted and of making the victory all the more complete for facing the antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.

Thus the key to a proper tactical doctrine is the correct understanding of the elements of one's superiority and then to develop the capacity to apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of an advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing weapons systems. In the case of the U.S., it is relatively easy to

["wespena aylema. In the case of the U.S., it is relatively easy to\nan advantageous battlefield or through the superior utilization of existing\nto apply them more rapidly than the opponent either through the choice of\nding of the elements of one's superiority and then to develop the capacity\nThus the key to a proper tactical doctrine is the correct underat-\nthe antagonist with contingencies which he had never even considered.", "All these were victories, not of superior resources, but of superior doc-\nof the Prussian army against the Austrian and French in 1866 and 1870.\nthe medieval knights (in part, of course, also a technological breakthrough),\nRoman legions over the Macedonism phalanx, of the English archers against\nof Napoleon's victories. Similar examples would be the victories of the\ntire and movement which is the essence of tactics, furnished the basis\nSuperior mobility and use of artillery, a superior relationship between\nperhaps for air-power), but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare.\nan Allied army superior in numbers, at least equal in equipment (except\nSuperior tactical doctrine ensnared the Germans in 1940 to defeat", "Tactical Doctrine", "been the cause of victory as superiority in resources.\nfully recognised and yet superiority in doctrine has at least a daven\ntactical or strategic. I have the impression that the latter is not always\ntechnology or in weapons aylema, and conceptual superiority either\ntinguish two phenomena: physical superiority either in resources or in\nIn thinking about military superiority, it seems important to dia-", "further exploration.\n\nlater this week and we can then determine which subjects are worth\nthere might be some advantage in having a paper before us when we meet\nin which questions come to me much more readily than answers. Still\nhope to accomplish. As I told you over the telephone, this is a field\nmy ideas about what the anp-committee, which you agreed to chair, might\nI thought it might prove useful if I sent you a brief outline of", "Dear Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr.

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-2-

December 6, 1955

determine the nature of our superiority--technology, logistics, etc.--
it is much more difficult to devise means to make it effective. One of
the most useful tasks of the sub-committee might be to examine the geogra-
phical areas where U. S. technological superiority would be at a premium
and the weapons system and the methods of employing it which would put
the other side at a maximum disadvantage. General Gavin has thought as
deeply about this problem as anyone I know, and I suggest we ask him to
lead the discussion at an early meeting.

## Strategic Doctrine

The dividing line between strategic and tactical doctrine is not
easy to draw, of course, but if tactical doctrine is the application of
power on the battlefield, strategic doctrine comes to expression in the
choice of the battlefield and even more importantly in one's conception
of alternatives. If one maintains, for example, that *any* employment of
tactical nuclear weapons will automatically lead to all-out thermonuclear
war, then in any crisis situation we would weigh our risks in terms of the
destruction of New York. In such a case, if the Soviet bloc interprets
the utilization of nuclear weapons more flexibly, it may gain a crucial
advantage. It has, of course, always been true that the side which could
best interpret the meaning of new technological developments would obtain
a strategic advantage. Thus the ability to use railroads to concentrate
superior forces was the reason of Prussia's military successes in the 19th
century. But the problem gains a particular urgency in the thermo-nuclear
age: since there does not exist *any* body of precedent to go on, the only
guide for action in crisis situations will be the theories we have developed
in advance. It, therefore, becomes of crucial importance for the
U. S. to understand properly the significance of new scientific develop-
ments and not to paralyze itself by developing a calculus of risks according
to which all the dangers would seem to be on our side. My own opinion is
that the real problem in the thermo-nuclear age is to shift the risk of
initiating a thermo-nuclear war to the other side by means of alternative
weapons systems which have the additional advantage of enabling us to conduct
a more flexible diplomacy. The diplomatic implications of our strategic
doctrine will be discussed in another sub-committee, but the military aspect
might perhaps be taken up at one of the sessions of your sub-committee.

## Physical Military Superiority

I suspect that when you mentioned the problems of achieving military
superiority in your letter, this is primarily what you had in mind, and
it is a key problem. For the nature of military superiority is particularly
complex under modern conditions. This is due to two factors: 1) in the
thermo-nuclear period we may no longer be able to count on a period in
which we can mobilize our industry in relative safety as in World War I or II,

which we can mobilize our industry in relative safety as in World War I or II. The thermo-nuclear period we may no longer be able to count on a period in complex modern conditions. This is due to two factors: 1) in the it is a key problem. For the nature of military superiority is particularly superiority in your letter, this is primarily what you had in mind, and I suspect that when you mentioned the problems of achieving military

might perhaps be taken up at one of the sessions of your sup-committee. The doctrine will be discussed in another sup-committee, but the military sabest a more flexible diplomacy. The diplomatic implications of our strategic weapons system which have the additional advantage of enabling us to conduct initiating a thermo-nuclear war to the other side by means of alternative that the real problem in the thermo-nuclear age is to shift the risk of to which all the dangers would seem to be on our side. My own opinion is that the significance of new scientific developments and not to paralyze itself by developing its calculus of risks according to U. S. to understand properly the significance of new scientific develop- in advance. It, therefore, becomes of crucial importance for the guide for action in crisis situations will be the theories we have developed age: since there does not exist any body of precedent to go on, the only century. But the problem gains a particular urgency in the thermo-nuclear superior forces was the reason of Prussia's military successes in the 19th a strategic advantage. Thus the ability to use railroads to concentrate best interpret the meaning of new technological developments would obtain advantage. It has, of course, always been true that the side which could the utilisation of nuclear weapons more flexibly, it may gain a crucial destruction of New York. In such a case, if the Soviet block interprets war, then in any crisis situation we would weigh our risks in terms of the tactical nuclear weapons will automatically lead to all-out thermonuclear of alternatives. If one maintains, for example, that any employment of choice of the battlefield and even more importantly in one's conception power on the battlefield, strategic doctrine comes to expression in the easy to draw, of course, but if tactical doctrine is the application of

## Strategic Doctrine

lead the discussion at an early meeting. deeply apart this problem as anyone I know, and I suggest we ask him to the other side at a maximum disadvantage. General Gavin has thought so and the weapons system and the methods of employing it which would put the most useful take of the sup-committee might be to examine the geogr- it is much more difficult to devise means to make it effective. One of determine the nature of our superiority--technology, logistics, etc.--

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-S-

December 6, 1955

[LC]

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-3-

December 6, 1955

and 2) the rate of technological change is so rapid that weapons in many areas tend to become obsolescent even before they become operational. Up to World War I, and for a considerable period thereafter, a weapons system would be good for a generation at least, but now, it may be outdated when it has barely passed the blue-print stage. Yet the failure to plan on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons might create a vital weakness in our defense structure at any given point of time. Thus a great premium is placed on "ready forces" and on correct intelligence, for if an enemy should ever catch us in the wrong procurement or technological cycle, he might have us at a complete disadvantage.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that our military strength depends not on the effectiveness of any one weapon, but on the relation of various capabilities to each other. The importance of the offense-defense mix can be shown by the following example: If one nation places all its bets on strategic air-power, while the other side develops a very large defensive capability, and only moderate offensive air power, it may happen that the defensive capability of the offensively weaker power will absorb the total offense of the other side, thus freeing the initially smaller SAC for a mortal blow. It can be argued that at low levels of military expenditure, the Soviets have a great advantage in adjusting their offense-defense mix to surpass ours because, at low levels, a great deal depends on correct intelligence and we can assume that their intelligence is superior to ours. One problem for our subcommittee might then be to discuss the proper relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities in the U. S. military establishment.

Another problem seems to me inherent in the planning of our defense establishment and in our security practices. We are gearing our defense planning to a twelve months budgetary cycle and often on the basis of considerations that have little to do with military effectiveness. This tends to throw our procurement and long-range planning out of line. Ways will have to be found by which defense planning and procurement can be carried out over a longer period, perhaps by making a minimum commitment of, say, a five-year period (in Imperial Germany, the minimum military budget was established over a seven-year period). This problem of planning is compounded by our security practices which seem to me to be based on an out-moded concept. In the 19th and early 20th century, when weapons technology was relatively stable, it was very important to guard a military secret jealously because it might supply a decisive advantage, but in the thermo-nuclear period with its rapid rate of technological change, it is more important to go fast than to play safe. Present security practices tend to lead to compartmentalization, to making it difficult for one agency to find out the work of others and to tap the imagination of private industry.

private industry.

one agency to find out the work of others and to tap the imagination of
companies to lead to compartmentalization, to making it difficult for
it is more important to go fast than to play safe. Present security prac-
tices tend to lead to compartmentalization, to making it difficult for
in the thermo-nuclear period with its rapid rate of technological change,
techology was relatively stable, it was very important to guard a mil-
out-moded concept. In the 19th and early 20th century, when weapons
is compounded by our security practices which seem to me to be based on an
out of, say, a five-year period (in Imperial Germany), the minimum military
budget was established over a seven-year period). This problem of planning
tend to throw our procurement and long-range planning out of line. Why
considerations that have little to do with military effectiveness. This
planning to a twelve months budgetary cycle and often on the basis of
etsuplishment and in our security practices. We are girding our defense
Another problem seems to me inherent in the planning of our defense
sive and defensive capabilities in the U. S. military eatsuplishment.
committee might then be to discuss the broader relationship between offen-
that their intelligence is superior to ours. One problem for our au-
levels, a great deal depends on correct intelligence and we can assume
adjusting their offensive-defensive mix to absorb ours because, at low
levels of military expenditure, the Soviets have a great advantage in
initially smaller SAC for a mortal blow. It can be argued that at low
power will sap the total offense of the other side, thus freeing the
it may happen that the defensive capability of the offensively weaker
a very large defensive capability, and only moderate offensive air power,
places all its peta on strategic air-power, while the other side develops
offensive-defensive mix can be shown by the following example: If one nation
relation of various capabilities to each other. The importance of the
strength depends not on the effectiveness of any one weapon, but on the
The situation is further complicated by the fact that our military
ical cycle, he might have us at a complete disadvantage.
for it an enemy should ever catch us in the wrong procurement or technolog-
great premium is placed on "resdy forces" and on correct intelligence,
weakness in our defense structure at any given point of time. Thus a
the basis of these "prematurely asked" weapons might create a vital
it has barely passed the blue-print stage. Yet the failure to plan on
would be good for a generation at least, but now, it may be outdated when
to World War I, and for a considerable period thereafter, a weapon system
area's tend to become obsolescent even before they become obsoletions! Up
and S) the rate of technological change is so rapid that weapons in many

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-3-

December 6, 1955

[r]

[c]

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-4-

December 6, 1955

Another serious problem seems to me to lie in the field of research and development. In his book "The Decline of the West", Spengler said that the West will begin to disintegrate when its best people consider it more important to become monks than to become scientists. Even if our best people are not becoming monks, it is not certain that they are becoming scientists. Indeed, all statistics seem to indicate that the Soviets are outstripping us in training technological personnel. It might be useful to consider in the sub-committee what could be done to remedy this situation which in the long run might prove to be as dangerous as military inferiority. As a matter of fact it may force us into a condition of permanent military inferiority.

The solution of many of these difficulties depends on the willingness of the U. S. people to support adequate defense programs. History abounds with examples of nations unwilling to make a relatively small effort and which had to pay for it by failing to survive. The furrow the Roman commander Scipio plowed over the site of Carthage was the penalty for the unwillingness of the Carthaginian merchant class to support a larger defense establishment. Conversely, many nations have played an international role out of proportion to their real power because of their willingness to devote a larger share of their resources to military expenditures than their opponents. This is how Revolutionary France defeated all the other nations of Europe. This is in many respects the source of the power of the USSR. One of the most difficult tasks, then, is how to make clear to the American people the nature of the security problem facing them, to explain adequately that it is a long-range task and that the penalty of failure may be national catastrophe. It is difficult to convey such a mood to a people which has never experienced disaster and maybe our group could give some thought to the problem of gaining public support for a long-range security effort.

In addition to the above problems some of the following questions may be worth discussing:

1. What type of national defense organization will permit an objective consideration of the levels of military strength and of the weapons system to insure a maximum degree of safety?

2. What level of military superiority is of strategic significance? Of what importance, for example, is a more elegant delivery system as long as both get to the target? Of what advantage is an increment to SAC after both sides have the capability of destroying the major cities of the other?

3. What is a significant technological breakthrough? Specifically, what is the significance of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to the arms equation? What is the significance of intermediate range missiles? Will the side that achieves them first have a decisive edge or will other forms of retaliation still have to be eliminated?

Will the aide that achieves them first have a decisive edge or will other
arms equation? What is the significance of intermediate range missiles?
what is the significance of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles to the

3 What is a significant technological breakthrough? Specifically,

both sides have the capability of destroying the major cities of the other?
sa both get to the target? Of what advantage is an increment to SAC after
Of what importance, for example, is a more elegant delivery system as long
s. What level of military superiority is of strategic significance?

weapons system to insure a maximum degree of safety?
objective consideration of the levels of military strength and of the
1. What type of national defense organization will permit an

may be worth discussing:

range security effort.
could give some thought to the problem of gaining public support for a long-
mood to a people which has never experienced disaster and may be our group
failure may be national catastrophe. It is difficult to convey such a
explain adequately that it is a long-range task and that the penalty of
the American people the nature of the security problem facing them, to
the U2R. One of the most difficult tasks, then, is how to make clear to
nations of Europe. This is in many respects the source of the power of
opponents. This is how Revolutionary France defeated all the other
a larger share of their resources to military expenditures than their
of proportion to their real power because of their willingness to devote
ment. Conversely, many nations have played an international role out
of the Carthaginian merchant class to support a larger defense establishment.
Scipio blazed over the site of Carthage was the penalty for the unwillingness
which had to pay for it by failing to survive. The furrow the Roman commander
with examples of nations unwilling to make a relatively small effort and
of the U. S. people to support adequate defense programs. History shows
The solution of many of these difficulties depends on the willingness

tion of permanent military inferiority.
military inferiority. As a matter of fact it may force us into a condi-
this situation which in the long run might prove to be as dangerous as
be useful to consider in the and-committee what could be done to remedy
Soviets are outstripping us in training technological personnel. It might
coming scientists. Indeed, all statistics seem to indicate that the
beat people are not becoming monks, it is not certain that they are pe-
it more important to become monks than to become scientists. Even if our
that the West will begin to disintegrate when its beat people consider
and development. In his book "The Decline of the West", Spengler said
Another serious problem seems to me to lie in the field of research

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-4-

December 6, 1955

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-5-

December 6, 1955

4. What is the possibility of the use of other non-conventional weapons such as biological, gas, radiological? Are these inherently more or less reprehensible than nuclear weapons which produce lethal effect through explosive forces? They are less destructive of property and perhaps even less destructive of life.

5. Since tactical superiority rests ultimately on trained manpower and organized resources, is it possible to fall behind in this sector to the extent that a crash program cannot regain superiority? In other words, what is an adequate over-all research and development program? Are there weapons developments which might give us a significant advantage such as SEA DARTS to replace the necessity for long runways for heavy air transports, cross country vehicles not dependent on tracks, etc.?

6. What should be the ratio between ready forces and reserve forces in a period of nuclear parity?

7. What is the significance of the growing complexity of modern weapons to the assessment of national power? Because of this complexity, few nations can maintain a modern weapons system (in 1914 many second-string powers could maintain a complete weapons system and therefore had to be counted in great power reckoning).

8. What is the purpose of alliances when most countries will, for all practical purposes, be "priced out" of the power struggle?

9. What is the significance of different intelligence capabilities in the military equation? -- Not only intelligence concerning weapons, but concerning strategies and tactics?

10. What is the significance of U. S. constitutional arrangements and congressional enactments regarding U. S. freedom to fight and to employ certain weapons?

11. What is the significance of the mobilization base in the military equation:

(a) Is there a need for greater readiness?

(b) Greater flexibility?

(c) A need for military support to our allies who are logistically incapable of supporting their armed forces?

12. What are the possibilities of barrier warfare to prevent land excursions into vital territory in the event atomic weapons are neutralized -- consider mines, rockets, shape-charge projectors, etc.

13. How can we meet the need for technical experts in the armed forces who require long periods of training and who, in the American system, are hard to retain in the Armed Services after they have been trained.

consider mines, rockets, shape-charge projectiles, etc.

15. What are the possibilities of barrier warfare to prevent land excursions into vital territory in the event atomic weapons are neutralized --

(p) Greater flexibility?

(s) Is there a need for greater readiness?

tary equation:

11. What is the significance of the mobilisation base in the military employ certain weapons?

string powers could maintain a complete weapons system and therefore
few nations can maintain a modern weapons system (in 1914 many second-

advantage such as SEA DARTS to replace the necessity for long runways for
gram? Are there weapons developments which might give us a significant

other words, what is an adequate over-all research and development pro-
sector to the extent that a crash program cannot regain superiority? In

5. Since tactical superiority rests ultimately on trained man-

through explosive forces? They are less destructive of property and per-
more or less reprehensible than nuclear weapons which produce lethal effect
-weapons such as biological, gas, radiological? Are these inherently

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-2-

December 6, 1952

[lc]

Mr. William A. M. Burden

-6-

December 6, 1955

I am enclosing some notes which I used for a conference at West Point and afterwards for a talk at a meeting of the Senior Army Commanders at Fort Benning. They are not too coherent, but perhaps there are some ideas in them that are worth considering.

Please excuse this rather hasty dictation, but I wanted you to
have this letter before we have our organizational meeting.

Enc.

HOYT A. MOORE
DOUGLAS M. MOFFAT
CARL W. PAINTER
LEONARD O. ADKINS
MAURICE T. MOORE
DONALD C. SWATLAND
BRUCE BRONLEY
ROSWELL MAGILL
A. I. HENDERSON
ALFRED MCCORMACK
CARLYLE E. MAW
EDWARD S. PINNEY
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
THOMAS A. HALLERAN
ALBERT R. CONNELLY
L. R. BRESLIN, JR.
BENJAMIN R. SHUTE
GEORGE B. TURNER
FRANK H. DETWEILER
GEORGE G. TYLER
JOHN H. MORSE
HAROLD R. MEDINA, JR.
FREDERICK S. BEEBE
CHARLES R. LINTON
WILLIAM B. MARSHALL
RALPH L. McAFEE
ROYALL VICTOR, JR.
JOHN N. CALDERWOOD

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE

15 BROAD STREET
NEW YORK 5

TELEPHONE
HANOVER 2-3000

CABLE ADDRESS: CRAVATH, N.Y.

NEW YORK

December 16, 1955

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Enclosed herewith are the budget figures which I mentioned to you over the phone. Although my original breakdown dates back to January of this year, I have added in the case of the Air Force budget the figures showing the actual appropriations for fiscal year '56.

In preparing an extract of some of these figures for the use of the group at next Wednesday's meeting, you may want to add the present projections for fiscal year '57 as they have been recently reported in the press, viz.:

Army $ 8.6 billion
Navy 9.7 billion
Air Force 16.5 billion

The foregoing figures apparently represent expenditures and not new appropriations (obligational authority).

Also enclosed is a copy of a paper which I got up recently for Mr. Finletter on current deficiencies in the U. S. defense establishment. I am not suggesting that this paper be submitted to our group as it was prepared for another purpose, but you may be interested in reading it.

Henry A. Kissinger, Esq.,
Council on Foreign Relations,
58 East 68th Street,
New York 21, N. Y.

Encls.

R

BY HAND

1/21/55

U. S. Military Budgets for Fiscal Years 1953-56
in Terms of New Obligational Authority (including Construction)
(in billions of $)

| | 1953 Actual | 1954 Actual | 1955 Estimated | 1956 Recommended |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | 15.2 | 12.7 | 7.8* | 7.8** |
| Navy | 12.7 | 9.6 | 10.3* | 9.4** |
| Air Force | 20.5 | 11.4 | 12. * | 15.4** |

* Included in these figures are new appropriations to cover recommended increases in pay.

** Included in these figures is $1.9 billion for Public Works to be divided roughly as follows: 1/2 to the Air Force, 1/4 to the Navy and 1/4 to the Army.

Air Force Budgets for Fiscal Years 1954-56
in Terms of New Obligational Authority (including Construction)
(in billions of $)

| | 1954 Actual | 1955 Estimate | 1956 Estimate |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aircraft and Related Procurement | 3.5 | 2.8 | 6.1 |
| Major Procurement Other Than Aircraft | .6 | .68 | .4 |
| Research and Development | .44 | .42 | .57 |
| Maintenance and Operations | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.8 |
| Military Personnel | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.4 |
| Reserve Personnel and Air National Guard | .2 | .2 | .2 |
| Construction | .24 | .63 | 1.2** |
| **Totals*** | **11.4** | **11.6*** | **15.7** |

* Exclusive of new appropriation to cover pay increases.

QUARTERLY REPORT

VOL. IV January, 1956 NO. I

A NATIONAL WEAKNESS

CONCERN over the mathematical incompetence of the average—and even above-average —American has become almost a national preoccupation. Science and industry cry in vain for more and better mathematicians. Ordinary businesses ask only that their employees be able to do simple arithmetic. Neither the extravagant nor the modest demands of society for mathematicians—or arithmeticians even—are being met. And public concern grows.

A recent study shows that there are more than adequate explanations for this national weakness, and that many of them lie in the caliber of mathematical instruction. Under a grant from Carnegie Corporation, the Educational Testing Service (ETS) recently conducted a survey to identify some of the reasons why so many elementary and secondary school children either fail or drop mathematics or, at best, just manage to limp through. Here are some of the basic facts which inspired the ETS to undertake its study:

A recent national survey showed that since 1910

there has been a consistent decline in the proportion of high school students who take college preparatory mathematics. It is true that the character of the high school population has changed with the vast increase in numbers. But this does not explain away the fact that many students starting mathematics courses in high school do not see them through. Some drop elementary algebra before they finish the first year; more quit in the middle of geometry; still more leave intermediate algebra unfinished. These facts would suggest a certain indifference toward the subject on the part of many youngsters; actually in many cases it is positive detestation rather than mere indifference. Almost all available data show that students have a poorer attitude toward math than toward any other school subject; in one survey 40 per cent of the pupils honored math by electing it the subject they dislike most.

Another basic fact which impressed the ETS is that mathematical incompetence is widespread even

I

[L]

among students of superior intellectual ability. In one
high school, of 526 students with I.Q.'s above 114,
135 either dropped math, averaged C or lower, or
were retarded one grade or more. The mean I.Q. of
these 135 students was 123.

Faced with these bewildering and discouraging
figures, the ETS committee assembled data and ex-
pert opinions on the two important factors which
many people believe lie at the heart of the difficulty:
teaching and curriculum. They surveyed the relevant
literature, sent questionnaires to experts in a variety
of fields, observed classroom procedures, and inter-
viewed students. From all these sources, they learned
some astonishing facts about math teaching in the
United States today.

For instance, although all states require education
courses for secondary mathematics teachers, a third
of the states require no mathematics for certification of
math teachers. At the elementary level the situation
is even worse. In the majority of instances a prospec-
tive elementary school teacher can enter a teachers
college without any credits in secondary school math.
In most states, a teacher can be certified to teach ele-
mentary school math without any work in math at
the college level.

Under such circumstances, it is no surprise that one
professor states: "Elementary teachers, for the most
part, are ignorant of the mathematical basis of arith-
metic. . . ." As for the secondary school teachers,
one math professor interested in teacher education
says "They are not as good as our run-of-mine
juniors."

An observer who visited 60 representative math
classrooms in different regions of the country came to
the conclusion that genuine and efficient mathemati-

cal learning was going on in only eight of them. He
got the inescapable impression from the 36 elemen-
tary classrooms he observed that in most cases the
instruction is carried on in such a routine, haphazard
way that learning of any kind is probably largely
accidental. And his observation of 24 high school
classrooms led him to think that teaching on that level
is no better, and perhaps even worse, than it is on the
elementary level.

The Need for Reforms

As for the curriculum, little change has occurred in
it despite extensive changes in the nature and knowl-
edge of mathematics and despite the fact that since
1894 many authorities have been recommending
changes. The result is that the curriculum is out of
touch with the real needs for math in the world today,
and also out of touch with the interests of the pupils.
The only major development has been the growth in
a ninth-grade "general mathematics" course, a sub-
ject that the students tend to regard with disdain but
often take, as the lesser of two evils, rather than algebra.

Although the total picture of mathematical educa-
tion that emerges from the ETS survey is hardly en-
couraging, there are some moves toward reform, par-
ticularly in the curriculum. Further reforms may be
instituted as the educators and public who must meet
the problems are provided with information, such as
that contained in the ETS survey, about the actual
situation today. To give wide distribution to these
facts, the ETS will soon publish a pamphlet sum-
marizing the findings of the survey. The hope is that
circulation of these findings will stimulate schools to
re-examine their programs in mathematics to see
what measures might be taken to improve them.

$$
\begin{align*}
\frac{\Delta V}{V} &= \frac{3Kx^2\Delta x}{V} = \frac{3Kx'\Delta x}{Kx^3} = 3\left(\frac{\Delta x}{x}\right) \\
x &= \frac{x'+vt'}{\frac{1-v^2}{2}} \qquad \varepsilon = M_cL
\end{align*}
$$

2

Commentary: Mathematics in Crisis

THERE is grave cause for alarm in the failure of our schools to provide more youngsters with a reasonable command of mathematics. It is a problem which merits the attention of all men and women accustomed to concerning themselves about the future of America.

In recent years, the astonishing advances in science and technology and the prompt application of these advances to our industrial and national defense needs have created an unprecedented demand for intelligent and highly trained young men and women. It is now clear that unless heroic measures are taken the demand simply cannot be met.

What we are facing is not a shortage of talent, but of trained talent. Intelligent youngsters are not in short supply, and if we had made good use of the resources available to us we would be in no difficulty. This is not an easy fact for us to grasp. Throughout history, human societies have managed to be extremely wasteful of individual talent. The discovery and nurture of talent has been largely accidental. The needs of society have not in the past put a premium either upon gifts or upon training. Even a generation ago the world did not reckon highly intelligent, highly trained men among the most marketable commodities. Now for the first time in history a radically different condition exists. The nation needs its talented and highly trained men and women, and it needs them badly.

The national need for men with scientific and mathematical competence exists at all levels. It is not just that we need more creative scientists at the Nobel Prize level. Behind the great creative minds in science moves an army of able and superbly trained men who test and confirm (or reject) new discoveries, conduct the more mundane testing and experimenting of the scientific world, and make the numberless lesser contributions on which the structure of science rests. And beside them works an immense corps of well-trained and skillful laboratory technicians and assistants.

In the industrial world a similar situation exists. In the spotlight are the great designers, inventors, and innovators, but back of them stands an immensely able corps of technically brilliant men to put their discoveries into operation. And back of these men stretch rank after

rank of highly trained technicians and mechanics. Only in recent years have we learned that much of the strength and vitality of American technology is in this "training in depth." Several of the leading countries of the world can match us for brilliant men at the top. But we outstrip most of them in competent, excellently trained second, third, fourth, and fifth level workers.

When it became apparent two or three years ago that we were going to experience a severe shortage of scientists and engineers, and that this shortage constituted cause for the gravest national concern, some first-rate minds were put to work to diagnose the problem. Why the shortage? How can it be corrected?

There are many reasons for the shortage, and these need not concern us here. When the experts turned to the question of how to correct it, they very soon were brought up short before the great stumbling block of mathematics. You cannot make scientists out of youngsters who have not been adequately trained in the early years of mathematics. And the youngsters who had received such adequate training proved to be all too rare.

That was the situation which led to the study described in the accompanying article, "A National Weakness." It would be foolish in the extreme to waste our time and energy in fixing the blame for this disturbing state of affairs. Whatever critics may say, our schools as a whole are *not* deteriorating. They are doing a good job under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Any attempt to find a scapegoat for the present situation will simply waste everyone's emotional energies, and divert us from constructive action.

But action is necessary. We must act to draw a vastly greater number of first-rate young men and women into the teaching of mathematics. We must act to strengthen and upgrade many of those who are already in it. And we must improve the training of those who teach.

A few months ago Carnegie Corporation made a grant of $300,000 to the American Association for the Advancement of Science to support a program for the improvement of teaching in science and mathematics. The ETS study reported here is another effort to draw national attention to a truly critical problem.

JOHN W. GARDNER

3

[L]

# The Give and Take in Hospitals

The average layman pictures the hospital as an antiseptic building peopled primarily by gleaming—and potentially dangerous — instruments and machines. Actually, of course, like other great institutions, it is an intricate and delicately balanced human organization whose success depends on the skills, morale, and cooperative achievements of the people who work together in it.

Who these people are, how they work together, what rewards they expect to get, and do get, from their work—these have been the subject of a five-year study sponsored by the American Hospital Association (AHA) and the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. The research was supported during its first two years by the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, and during the last three by grants from Carnegie Corporation and other funds raised by the AHA. This month G. P. Putnam's Sons published *The Give and Take in Hospitals*, the result of this study.

## Hospital's Human Relations

The book is concerned with human relations in the hospital, a problem which has received almost no attention, particularly from those specialists best trained to advise on such matters —the social scientists. Temple Burling, M.D., a psychiatrist who directed the entire study, and sociologists Edith M. Lentz and Robert N. Wilson, were assisted at various times in the research by persons whose backgrounds were in psychology, human relations, and industrial relations. In addition, the group had the guidance of a committee of 12 persons who together represented

the viewpoints of hospital administrators, physicians, nurses, trustees, ladies' auxiliaries, hospital publications, the informed public, and the university.

The authors remind us that 150 years ago the hospital was the last resort of the helpless and dying. People then went to hospitals not to be cured, but only to receive some measure of food and care during their last days. In fact, if one wanted to be cured of illness he was better off at home; in 1788 the death rate among patients in a Paris hospital was 25 per cent per year, and that of surgeons and attendants from 6 to 12 per cent. It was noted then that attendants who lived outside the hospital were much healthier than those who lived in.

In its origin, in medieval Europe, the hospice, or hospital, was not a medical institution at all, but simply a lodging place: first for travelers, then for the homeless and destitute of the host city. Since many of these unfortunates were physically ill, eventually some sort of nursing care was provided by the hospitals, and in time medical consultation also.

The development of modern medicine of course revolutionized the hospital, both in its methods and in its relationship to the community. From being the last resort of the dying, it has now become the first resort of ill persons, often when the illness is only minor.

In other ways also its role has gone almost full cycle: "In the Middle Ages the hospital attempted to alleviate a broad range of human ills—poverty and homelessness as well as disease. It gradually narrowed its focus to the combatting of bodily disease. Now it is beginning once again to concern itself

with the patient as a whole person, in line with a broadening conception of disease to include psychic and social maladjustment as well as physical disorder."

It is these wider responsibilities, together with the impact of social, economic, and technological changes, that have placed hospitals in a state of change. The problems of administering such multi-dutied institutions are enormous; the nature of the give and take among administration and the various staffs that make up the hospital is reflected directly in patient care.

To see just how people work together in hospitals, members of the Cornell research team made on-the-spot studies of six representative hospitals—representative of private, non-profit hospitals serving the whole community, rather than special institutions for long-term or mental care.

## Working Together

Interviews were held with about a thousand persons from all levels of the hospital system, from trustees to part-time laborers. Members of the Cornell team were assigned to the various hospitals—in some cases for as long as a year—to learn how the staffs work together. There they saw the immensely complicated web of duties and relationships: the harrassed admitting room clerk trying to find non-available beds for the roomful of sick people surrounding her; the doctor in a ward instructing the nurse as to each patient's diet and medication; the dietician supervising the gleaming kitchen. During all their time in the antiseptic environment the investigators not only observed the various activities, but sometimes joined in. They "toted

4

[LC]

water, made empty beds, amused bored patients, cut meat" together with non-professional aides and workers.

And during all the time they talked with people, from administrators to surgeons to laundry workers, about their conceptions of their jobs, their relationships with people doing other jobs, their ideas about how the entire job could be done better.

From this experience the Cornell group drew a picture of the myriad forces which the hospital administrator faces: from the outside, his community, his trustees and his patients' doctors; on the inside, his patients and all the variety of skilled and unskilled staff required to take care of them. "It is the administrator who, more than any other single person, sets the tone of relationships and attitudes."

One of the administrator's most important and sensitive roles is played in his relationships with the doctors. "In a curious sense," the authors point out, "the hospital entertains the most important actors in the medical drama,

the doctor and his patient, without being in direct command of either." There are, in effect, two parallel lines of command: one for general hospital affairs, with the administrators and trustees at the top; and one for medical treatment, with the individual doctor and medical staff at the top. Cooperation between these two chains is one of the most important factors in the entire functioning of the hospital.

## Staff Morale

The hospital care of each individual patient is dependent upon the morale and efficiency of the staff. Their morale and efficiency are involved with problems common to all occupations—income, hours, status, etc.—and some peculiar to the particular occupations. For example, the nursing profession has been experiencing sharp changes, particularly in patterns of authority, division of labor, educational requirements, and developments in medical technology. Similar changes have overtaken other occupational groups

in the hospital; all the groups must be helped to accommodate to them.

In addition to the changing roles and problems of the traditional hospital staff are those of the new personnel who are joining the staff as the hospital expands its role: the social workers, the added clerical and statistical employees, the new nursing auxiliaries, male nurses, et al. These workers must be assimilated into a useful and effective pattern of relationships.

Such assimilation is not easily brought about, but the authors believe that better understanding of the give and take in good hospitals will further it everywhere. The six hospitals they studied had been chosen precisely because of their success in dealing with problems of human relations. These hospitals were not perfect, but "in general they appeared to be tackling problems with a zest and creativity which gave heart to the majority of their personnel." Such zest and creativity can give heart to all the people who work in hospitals everywhere.

# Dollars for Scholars

WHETHER some of our ablest high school graduates go on to college is dependent, to some degree, on the number and types of scholarships available to them. How much money is available for scholarships today? What are the sources? What is the ratio of supply to demand?

Confusion and waste, it is acknowledged, now exist in the area of financial aid to students. The situation is changing rapidly, with corporation and foundation scholarship and fellowship programs coming into existence at a rapid rate, and it is essential to know the truth concerning the present scholarship picture. To obtain such a picture,

the American Council on Education, (ACE) under a Corporation grant, recently compiled facts and figures from a number of scattered sources.

## Decreasing Dollar Power

Of the total worth of scholarships available each year, the highest estimate is $55 million; yet in 1952 the need for additional scholarship money was estimated by The Commission on Financing Higher Education to be in excess of $200 million per year. And although gifts and bequests appear to be increasing, in terms of actual purchasing power their value has not increased proportionately.

A dearth of money is not the only limiting factor in the use of scholarships, the ACE report points out. For much of the scholarship money that is available has various restrictions on its use, is concentrated in a few colleges and universities, and is used essentially as "prizes" rather than as aids to needy students.

## Sources of Support

Many sources contribute, directly or indirectly, to scholarship funds: alumni, business corporations, labor unions, and philanthropic and community organizations. In addition, the student support given through reduced or free

5

[Lc]

PERSONS & PLACES

tuition in state and municipal institu-
tions is significant.

The federal government's activity in
the field is limited. It gives aid only to
special groups, such as veterans; to
special fields, such as military science
or medicine; and occasionally to pro-
mote some current government policy,
such as international good will or the
formation of an officer reserve.

Yet despite the number of scholar-
ship donors, the major recorded source
is the institutions of higher learning
themselves. Many of these schools are
already running at a deficit, but are
diverting current operating funds to
give student aid.

Some Estimates

Opinions vary as to the extent of the
nation's need for scholarships. One
basic question is whether it is in the
national interest to induce as many as
possible of the top quarter, for instance,
of high school graduates to go on for
higher education. Until there is sub-
stantial agreement on the desirability
of encouraging higher enrollments, it
is of course impossible to make valid es-
timates of the cost. If, however, annual
scholarships averaging $500 were to be
given to one-fourth of the top quarter
of each year's high school graduates
(assuming that the others would have
the means to go on their own), a con-
servative figure for the cost would be
about $200 million per year. This is at
least three times the amount provided
in scholarships today.

Yet with the decrease in the dollar's
purchasing power, the real value of the
amount now available may be sub-
stantially less than the apparent value.
Taking the 1939 dollar at 100, the $89
million received by certain colleges in
1929 was worth $77 million and the
$121 million received in 1951-52 was
worth only $70 million.

There may be some argument over
the size of the nation's scholarship
need, but few would argue that it has
grown smaller.

New Tobias Dantzig Book
on Mathematics

Tobias Dantzig is a scholar who has
the rare ability to convey to laymen the
beauty and excitement of the world of
mathematics. His famous book Num-
ber: The Language of Science has been
translated into almost all the major
languages of the world. His latest, The
Bequest of the Greeks, describes in vivid
language the flashes of insight that
formed the Greeks' monumental con-
tribution to the development of mathe-
matics.

*The Bequest of the Greeks*, published
recently by Charles Scribner's Sons, is
the first of three volumes to be issued
under the collective title *Mathematics in
Retrospect*. It traces the evolution of
mathematics from the 6th century
B.C. through the last major contribu-
tions of the ancient Greeks.

Professor Dantzig's research was
supported in part by a grant by Car-
negie Corporation to the Carnegie In-
stitution of Washington. His book is
one of 30 that appeared during the last
year, under the imprints of commercial
or university publishers, reporting re-
sults of studies supported by the Cor-
poration.

Morris Hadley Elected
Chairman of Board

At the annual meeting of the Corpora-
tion's board of trustees last November
15 R. C. Leffingwell, who had served
as chairman since 1946, asked to be
relieved of that office. Morris Hadley,
who has been a member of the board
since 1947, was elected chairman, with
Mr. Leffingwell continuing as a mem-
ber.

Mr. Hadley for the past 25 years has
been a partner in the law firm which is
now Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Had-
ley. He was graduated from Yale

University and from the Harvard Law
School. His studies at Harvard were
interrupted by two years of military
service during World War I as a major
in the 302nd Field Artillery.

Mr. Hadley is president of the New
York Public Library and is on the
board of the Pierpont Morgan Library.
He is a fellow of the Yale Corporation.
In 1941 his book, *The Citizen and the
Law*, was published; in 1948 he wrote

CARNEGIE CORPORATION
OF NEW YORK

589 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK 17 N. Y.

Carnegie Corporation of New York is a phil-
anthropic foundation created by Andrew
Carnegie in 1911 for the advancement and
diffusion of knowledge and understanding. It
has a basic endowment of $135 million and
its present assets, reckoned at cost value, are
approximately $178 million. The income
from $12 million of this fund may be used in
certain British Commonwealth areas; all
other income must be spent in the United
States.

The Corporation has a continuing interest
in improving higher education. Grants are
made to colleges and universities, professional
associations, and other educational organiza-
tions for specific programs. Such programs
include basic research as well as more effec-
tive use of the results of research, increased
understanding of international affairs, better
preparation of teachers, and new teaching
programs.

Detailed descriptions of the Corporation's
activities are contained in its annual reports,
which usually are published in December.

**Board of Trustees:** MORRIS HADLEY, Chairman of the Board; W. RANDOLPH BURGESS; JOHN W. GARDNER; CARYL P. HASKINS; DEVEREUX C. JOSEPHS; NICHOLAS KELLEY; R. C. LEFFINGWELL; MARGARET CARNEGIE MILLER; FREDERICK OSBORN; ARTHUR W. PAGE; GWILYM A. PRICE; ELIHU ROOT, JR.; CHARLES M. SPOFFORD; CHARLES ALLEN THOMAS.

**Administration:** JOHN W. GARDNER, President; JAMES A. PERKINS, Vice President; FLORENCE ANDERSON, Secretary; C. HERBERT LEE, Treasurer; STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE, Executive Associate, British Dominions and Colonies Program; EUGENE I. BURDOCK, Executive Assistant; FREDERICK H. JACKSON, Executive Assistant; WILLIAM W. MARVEL, Executive Assistant; ROBERT J. WERT, Executive Assistant; ALAN PIFER, Executive Assistant, British Dominions and Colonies Program; JAMES W. CAMPBELL, Assistant Treasurer; MARGARET E. MAHONEY, Assistant Secretary; CHARLES DOLLARD, Consultant.

6

[L]

THE CORPORATION TRUSTEES

a biography of his father, Arthur Twining Hadley, president of Yale.

Mr. Leffingwell has been a trustee since 1923. He practiced law in New York for a number of years before becoming a partner in J. P. Morgan and Company.

## NEW GRANTS

Grants amounting to $1,543,000 were voted by Carnegie Corporation trustees during the last quarter. These grants were made from income for the fiscal year 1955-56, now estimated at $8,561,000. From this sum, $2,271,000 has been set aside to meet commitments, including those for teachers' pensions, incurred in previous years. It is the Corporation's policy to spend all income in the year in which it is received.

Included among the grants voted during the last quarter are those listed below:

### United States

American Council of Learned Societies, toward administrative expenses, $75,000.

American Society for Engineering Education, for a study of the training of engineering technicians, $38,000.

American Studies Association, to strengthen its program, $37,500.

Antioch College, for a study of its educational program and for the organization of experimental projects, $70,250.

University of California, for research on creativity, $150,000.

Cornell University, for research on social factors affecting mental health, $78,750.

University of Georgia, for a survey and collection of materials for the study of the arts of the United States, $110,000.

Institute for College and University Administrators, for research and training programs in academic administration, $340,000.

### Devereux C. Josephs

Vicarhand 6%

Devereux C. Josephs has seen Carnegie Corporation from several vantage points. He has served the Corporation as trustee, as president, and now as chairman of the board's executive committee.

Mr. Josephs, now chairman of the board of the New York Life Insurance Company, has been associated with Carnegie interests since 1939. At that time he became financial vice president of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, which was established with Carnegie funds to provide annuities and other benefits for college teachers. He became president of TIAA in 1943, a trustee of Carnegie Corporation in 1944, and president in 1945.

"From millions to billions" is the

University of New Hampshire, to-ward support of a program of precep-toral studies, $35,000.

Sarah Lawrence College, for a study of its educational program, $30,000.

Stanford University, for historical research on higher education, $50,000.

Tuskegee Institute, for an experi-ment in remedial English usage, read-ing, and mathematics, $25,000.

### British Commonwealth

University College, Ibadan, Nigeria,

way *Time* magazine described Mr. Josephs' move from the Corporation to New York Life. But although investment finance has been his main professional concern through the years, his interests cover many other fields. After he was graduated from Harvard in 1915, he joined an investment company in Philadelphia. At about the same time he helped found a poetry magazine, *Contemporary Verse*—an appropriate undertaking for a man who had been odist of his college class.

When he moved from Philadelphia to join TIAA in 1939 he became active in a number of civic programs in New York. He is a trustee of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the New York Public Library, and is a director of the Council on Foreign Relations. In 1955 he was president of the Harvard Alumni Association, and during a previous year chairman of the Greater New York Fund campaign.

Higher education is perhaps his dominant non-professional interest: he is a trustee of The Johns Hopkins University, has been active in work for the United Negro College Fund, and last year headed the 13-man committee that advised the Ford Foundation on the distribution of $260 million to privately supported colleges and universities.

for historical research and staff travel, $45,000.

Inter-University Council for Higher Education Overseas, for fellowships for colonial students, $130,000.

McGill University, for arctic studies, $88,000.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, for Commonwealth fellowships, $20,000.

University College of the West Indies, for development of its educational radio program, $38,500.

7

[LC]

# A 20th Century African Explorer

WHAT happens to Africans as they learn Western ways of behavior? Answers to this question depend upon the point of view of the observer. Missionaries, for instance, have described the spiritual and religious impact of Western culture. Anthropologists have reported the modes of behavior that Africans have adopted from other cultures.

Little research, however, has been done on how such peoples' actual thinking processes are affected by the assumption of Western behavior. This is essentially a problem in psychology, and an American psychologist has recently been in Africa doing research on it. Under a Carnegie Corporation grant to Yale University, Leonard W. Doob, one of only a handful of psychologists in the world who have given special attention to Africa, spent 15 months in East and South Africa conducting tests and interviews with members of three indigenous tribal groups.

## Changes in Perception

"I was trying to discover the changes in modes of perception, in values, and in methods of solving problems which occur as Africans learn more English, become trained in European schools, and follow European occupations," Mr. Doob says. "Do they, for instance, really see the outside world differently from us? And do those ways of seeing the world change as they adopt some of our institutions and our language—which is a way of describing how one sees things?

"I had, for the sake of making comparisons, to meet people who had had widely different experiences with Western culture. Consequently, I went deep into the bush to interview tribesmen

who had only indirect contact with the West; at the other extreme I interviewed Africans who were honors graduates of Oxford."

Eventually, the Yale professor interviewed about 350 carefully selected persons from three different groups: two from Bantu societies—the Baganda, who are rapidly moving toward self-government in Uganda and the Zulus in Natal who are affected by the South African Government's policy of apartheid—and one Nilotic group, the Luo, in turbulent Kenya. Some of the informants were approached because they are important people within their own group; in this way it was possible for Mr. Doob to collaborate in another Corporated-supported project related to his interest, a study of emerging African leadership which is being carried on by the East African Institute of Social Research.

The problems, personal and professional, involved in psychological research in Africa Mr. Doob found to be manifold. "Just the logistics of getting to remote places is something," he says. "Then I had to engage qualified interpreters, and I also trained a Zulu woman to interview Zulu women. Occasionally we did have captive audiences, in schools, which made things easier, although of course only very restricted information could be obtained in this manner."

The interviews with 350 Africans, which usually took almost two hours apiece to arrange and at least two hours to administer, attempted to sample the individual's behavior by including questions about values and beliefs as well as tests of perception and ways of solving problems. "As the missionaries discovered, attitudes are quicker

to change on medical questions than on social and family customs, such as polygamy," Mr. Doob reports.

Although the mass of data that he acquired during his African trip has not been finally tabulated and analyzed, some patterns of behavior were so uniform as to be striking. For instance, one of the perception tests consisted of giving the tribespeople pieces of cardboard of different shapes, sizes, and colors. They were asked to separate them into piles. Among the Baganda, those who have had relatively few contacts with Europeans tended to divide them according to size or shape but almost never on the basis of color. Yet Baganda who have been educated in Western schools and Westerners almost always respond to such a test by dividing according to color. Mr. Doob points out that the Luganda language is almost devoid of words for colors; apparently the Baganda are not accustomed to perceiving in these terms.

## Better Understanding

With traditional scientific detachment, Mr. Doob refuses to say that his study of recently primitive peoples undergoing rapid cultural changes will make a basic contribution to understanding of the human personality. Whatever its ultimate significance, however, the work can stand on its own feet as an exploration into a fascinating aspect of human development.

Mr. Doob is one of several established scholars who have worked in Africa under grants to their universities by Carnegie Corporation. Support of such undertakings is part of the Corporation's effort to encourage productive and thoughtful attention to the problems of that important continent.

8

3

DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OBLIGATIONS

(Millions of Dollars)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>FY 1955</th><th>FY 1956</th><th>FY 1957</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Army</td><td>366.3</td><td>402.0</td><td>410.0</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>395.4</td><td>480.0</td><td>470.0</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>587.9</td><td>638.0</td><td>610.0</td></tr><tr><td>Emergency Fund</td><td>a/</td><td>a/</td><td>35.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total, Department of Defense<sup>b/</sup></td><td>1,349.6</td><td>1,520.0</td><td>1,525.0</td></tr><tr><td>Atomic Energy Commission<sup>c/</sup></td><td>253.4</td><td>319.9</td><td>394.5</td></tr><tr><td>National Advisory Committee<br>for Aeronautics</td><td>43.4</td><td>50.5</td><td>55.0</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>1,646.4</td><td>1,890.4</td><td>1,974.5</td></tr></tbody></table>

a/ Included in above figures.

b/ Research and development appropriations only. Additional support of research and development is provided from other appropriations such as pay of military personnel, public works, and procurement. This additional support has been estimated at least equal to the totals shown here for the Department of Defense.

c/ Atomic Energy Commission amounts include civil as well as military research. However, civil research accounts for less than 25% of the totals shown.

GUIDED MISSILES RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND PROCUREMENT OBLIGATIONS *

(Millions of Dollars)

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>FY 1955</th><th>FY 1956</th><th>FY 1957</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Army</td><td>539.7</td><td>584.8</td><td>862.5</td></tr><tr><td>Navy</td><td>212.4</td><td>427.4</td><td>446.0</td></tr><tr><td>Air Force</td><td>781.4</td><td>1,069.3</td><td>1,593.7</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>1,533.5</td><td>2,081.5</td><td>2,902.2</td></tr></tbody></table>

* The amounts shown include research, development, and procurement programs of the Department of Defense but exclude (1) related Department of Defense costs such as military personnel, military public works, and production facilities and (2) related programs of other agencies such as the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the Atomic Energy Commission.

March 27, 1956

Air Force Budget Figures for Aircraft and Related Procurement 1951-7
(in billions of $)

| Fiscal Year | Expenditures | New Authorization |
|---|---|---|
| 1951 | 1.9 | 7.3 |
| 1952 | 4.3 | 11.9 |
| 1953 | 6.5 | 12.7 |
| 1954 | 6.9 | 3.5 |
| 1955 | 7. | 2.8 |
| 1956 (Estimate) | 6. | 6.3 |
| 1957 (Estimate) | 6.1 | 5.8 |

Research and Development
Army, Navy and Air Force New Appropriations 1954-7
(in millions of $)

| | 1954 Actual | 1955 Actual | 1956 Actual | 1957 Estimated |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Army | 345 | 346 | 340 | 410 |
| Navy | 415 | 432 | 470 | 477 |
| Air Force | 440 | 420 | 598* | 610* |
| Totals | 1,200 | 1,198 | 1,408 | 1,497 |

* Includes funds (totalling $138 millions in FY56) previously carried in other budget categories such as M&D.

Air Force Base Program 1951-7
(in billions of $)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Original Program Cost (for 143 Wing Force) | | 9. |
| Funded through FY53 | | 5. |
| Funded in FY54 | | .24 |
| Funded in FY55 | | .63 |
| Funded in FY56 | | .74 |
| to be funded in FY57 | | .85* 7.46 |
| Deficiency | | 1.54 |

* Assuming Air Force gets 50% of $1.7 billion estimate for public works authorized to be submitted later.

LETTERHEAD OF

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE

January 18, 1956

Dear Tom:

On the basis of the budget documents that were available yesterday, I have prepared the enclosed break-out of the FY57 military budget figures in comparison with those of previous years.

Perhaps a few comments are in order.

You will notice that, while new appropriations to the Air Force for aircraft procurement are to be less for FY57 than for FY56 (in contrast to the Navy aircraft procurement budget which is to go up from $900 million in FY56 to $1.7 billion in FY57), funds for Air Force procurement other than aircraft are due to increase sharply, i.e. from $350 million in FY56 to $1.2 billion in FY57. A large part of this increase is for electronic equipment destined for the SAGE and DEW programs, but some of it undoubtedly reflects stepped up procurement of guided missiles. Incidentally, the Navy Ordnance budget item, which probably embraces guided missiles, is slated to go up from $185 million in FY56 to $300 million in FY57.

As usual, what one reads in the fine print does not bear out the claims in the bold text. Note, for example, the inconsistency between the following facts and the statements about increased research and development effort:

* Projected obligations of the Department of Defense for aircraft R&D go down from $339 million in FY56 to $312 million in FY57.

* DoD obligations for guided missiles R&D go down from $268 million in FY56 to $224 million in FY57.

* During FY57 both the Army and the Navy are scheduled to obligate more R&D funds on guided missiles than the Air Force:

Army $79 million
Navy 98 million
Air Force 46 million

The AEC plans to spend less R&D funds to improve weapons systems and production in FY57 ($95 million) than in FY56 ($102 million).

Speaking generally, it is plain that, with costs going up and new categories of expense to be provided, stability in overall military budgetary levels can only mean less security. Equally disturbing to me is the fact that the base program is still underfinanced and the rate of progress is slow.

Thomas K. Finletter, Esq.,
c/o Coudert Brothers,
15th Floor, 488 Madison Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Encl.

R

R

Encyc.

New York, N. Y.
12th Floor, 488 Madison Avenue,
c/o Congent Brothers,
Thomas K. Einjetter, Esq.

Roswell L. Gilbarric

Sincerely yours,

of progress is slow.
that the pace program is still underfunded and the rate
mean less security. Efforts distending to me is the fact that
attractivity in overall military budget reveals can only
going mb and new categories of expense to be provided.

than in APE (¥705 million).
means systems and production in MVDL ($62 million)
The AEC plans to spend less R&D funds to improve

Air Force 10 million
Navy 38 million
Virginia $18 million

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

50 MEMORIAL DRIVE

CAMBRIDGE 39, MASSACHUSETTS

March 1, 1956

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
The Harold Pratt House
58 East 68th Street
New York 21, New York

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

The following remarks should be taken as a very preliminary and
somewhat general set of observations on Soviet higher technical education
but may possibly prove helpful for your meeting next Wednesday. I take
as my general term of reference your committee's interest in Soviet
capabilities for keeping up with, or perhaps out-distancing, this country
in the arms race as reflected by both quantitative and qualitative trends
in their system of higher education.

I will not spend much time with the numbers problem... You must surely be familiar with DeWitt's recently published study Soviet Professional Manpower. While we have regard for this study, we are convinced that one who relied exclusively on it would not have a completely rounded picture of the Soviet performance in this field. Perhaps the two most important qualifications that one ought to bear in mind in dealing with DeWitt's study are these: (1) in his attempt to lay out the quantitative picture of the Soviet educational performance, DeWitt has intentionally avoided any extensive attempt to discuss qualitative dimension of the problem, and (2) there is what we suspect to be an exceedingly important sector of Soviet scientific and engineering education which is scarcely mentioned by DeWitt--and for the very good reason that we know next to nothing about it in this country. I refer to the network of military academies which had traditionally played a very important role in Soviet scientific engineering education but which, since World War II, have dropped out of view behind an apparently tight and effective censorship. These academies traditionally offered some of the best training in mathematics, physics, cartography, ballistics, geodesy, and related subjects that was to be found anywhere in the Soviet Union. Alex Korol is convinced that these institutes continue to play an exceedingly important, although fully mysterious and unmeasurable role in the production of highly trained technical manpower.

You will find an illustrative reference to this class of educational institution in Trilling's discussion of the Zhukovskii Military Air Engineering Academy.

ADDENDUM TO THE STATISTICS ON U.S. AND USSR SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER

Observations on Soviet training of scientists and engineers*;

A Soviet science major spends at least 1/3 more time on sciences than an American student.

The most promising students in the Soviet Union are selected for scientific research careers.

Soviet students have more than twice the usual number of instruction hours per academic year than American university students.

It is estimated that Soviet engineering students have about the same preparation in scientific and technical subjects as do our students. There is, however, a great deal more technological specialization in the Soviet Union in engineering.

One feature of the Russian educational system which needs additional emphasis is the technical institute which is an extremely significant part of the training effort in the USSR. There is no counterpart to it in the U.S., excepting for a small number of technical schools, some independent and some set up by large industrial establishments and the junior colleges of the U. S. which emphasize technical training. There were in the USSR 3,500 of these institutes with an enrollment of 1,200,000 students in 1952, with about 350,000 graduates per year. About 50,000 seem to be in fields related to engineering.

*Based on the study by the National Science Foundation on Soviet Professional Manpower.

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Study on Scientific Manpower

Extract from a letter by George B. Baldwin, Executive Assistant to the
Director of the Center for International Studies at MIT:

...You must surely be familiar with deWitt's recently published study Soviet Professional Manpower. While we have high regard for his study, we are convinced that one who relied exclusively on it would not have a completely rounded picture of the Soviet performance in this field. Perhaps the two most important qualifications that one ought to bear in mind in dealing with deWitt's study are these: (1) in his attempt to lay out the quantitative picture of the Soviet educational performance, deWitt has intentionally avoided any extensive attempt to discuss qualitative dimension of the problem, and (2) there is what we suspect to be an exceedingly important sector of Soviet scientific and engineering education which is scarcely mentioned by deWitt—and for the very good reason that we know next to nothing about it in this country. I refer to the network of military academies which had traditionally played a very important role in Soviet scientific engineering education but which, since World War II, have dropped out of view behind an apparently tight and effective censorship. These academies traditionally offered some of the best training in mathematics, physics, cartography, ballistics, geodesy, and related subjects that was to be found anywhere in the Soviet Union. Alex Korol is convinced that these institutes continue to play an exceedingly important, although fully mysterious and unmeasurable role in the production of highly trained technical manpower. You will find an illustrative reference to this class of educational institution in Trilling's discussion of the Zhukovskii Military Air Engineering Academy.

The point just made about our ignorance of the role of the military academies is duplicated by a similar ignorance about an undetermined number of Research Institutes which are believed to be devoted primarily or exclusively to military problems but which nevertheless conduct research of a high order.

Another area about which we know surprisingly little is graduate study, even in those universities and Research Institutes that operate in the open. For example, we know relatively little about the distribution of students among various fields, about the proportion of drop-outs, about the quality of doctoral dissertations, and about similar subjects. Nevertheless, it is of course well known that Soviet higher education (and not just graduate education) is much more heavily oriented to the natural sciences and engineering than is true certainly of this country and therefore of any other country in the world. This fact accounts for the known

large numbers of scientists and engineers who are being turned out by
Soviet universities and Institutes. We know too that the quality of
secondary school training which Russian students receive appears to be
very good, particularly in mathematics, physics, and chemistry. To this
apparently good secondary preparation must be added the fact that the
university course in the Soviet Union runs for five years instead of our
four. We know too that the quality of Soviet scientific and engineering
textbooks is often very high. This series of cumulative advantages which
the Soviets seem to possess has to be discounted by our ignorance about
the degree of geographical unevenness in the quality of the educational
effort (we strongly believe that the really good higher training and
research is heavily concentrated in four or five cities). Furthermore,
there has been such a rapid expansion in the numbers of students in higher
secondary schools and in the universities since World War II, that it is
hard to believe that standards of teaching and research have not been
affected. Thus we might say that our impression is that while the quality
of Soviet higher technical education has undoubtedly risen since World
War II, it has probably not risen as rapidly or as high as some people
would have us fear. But the fact remains that there are excellent text-
books, excellent teachers, and an attractive system of liberal fellowships
and apparently adequate research facilities and equipment so that the
good student, the man who is capable of going ahead on his own steam even
if the environment should be uncongenial in certain respects, can undoubtedly
get a first-rate education.

One of the most important points to be made is that there may well
be a larger gap between the education of scientific manpower and successful
production of military goods in large quantities than is true in this
country. For example, there appear to be serious shortages of technicians
and skilled labor in the Soviet industry and this would certainly be one
important reason to expect that they may have difficulty in bringing
research results into volume production, but I should like to emphasize
that we have not been studying this particular aspect of Soviet capabilities
and this is certainly not a conclusion of our work; at best, it would be
a suggestion for further research. However, this suggestion really amounts
to saying that the Soviets probably have the "necessary" educational back-
up for a successful scientific arms race with the West, though this may
not be "sufficient."

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Proposals Made to Improve the United States
Scientific Manpower Situation

I To increase the number of science students

A. Increase the broad base of our educated population from which scientists must come. More of potentially most promising of nation's youth should be induced to go to college (Alan Waterman). This could be accomplished by some of the following means:

1. Motivation to go to college must be built up in the early stages of high school training. Schools should take the responsibility for testing and studying its pupils in an effort to help them to form appropriate vocational objectives (Dael Wolffe).

2. Arrange for better counseling services to locate and attract into the sciences youngsters with special aptitudes in this direction (Waterman). "There is the need for earlier identification of scientific talent, such identification coming as early as the seventh, eighth, or ninth grades" (James R. Killian).

3. Gifted students must be encouraged to go to college through the promotion of vocational guidance programs and of high school science clubs, science fairs and junior academies (American Association for the Advancement of Science).

4. Provide more scholarships of larger average size and without the restriction which frequently limit the range of possible applicants (Wolffe).
(If more money were available, it is estimated that about half of a group in the upper 10 per cent of high school graduates who are not planning to attend college might go to college. That would mean that three-fourths instead of the current one-half of the top 27 per cent of high school graduates would enter college).

B. Improve the quality of instruction at the elementary and secondary school levels through some of the following measures:

1. Encourage conferences along the line of those sponsored by the National Science Foundation which has summer institutes for college teachers of science at which noted scientists lecture on current research in their own field. Undertake similar advanced teaching programs for high school teachers (Waterman).

2. Make mathematics and the sciences more interesting by relating problems and exercises to the latest procedures being followed in industries and research laboratories (National Science Teachers Association).

3. Industry can help to keep science teachers up-to-date on latest discoveries and methods by inviting teachers to visit their research laboratories (Waterman).

4. Better coordination between elementary, high school and college teaching of subjects like mathematics, physics and chemistry (or arithmetic and the sciences) (John Jay Hopkins).

5. Greater "vertical organization" of education whereby the professional and the general are carried along parallel lines with fewer discontinuities between the freshman year and the graduate and professional degree (Killian).

6. Greater emphasis on the education of the talented student:

a. Acceleration programs should be encouraged to allow bright students to progress more rapidly, through a more exacting curriculum than that given to the average student. Programs such as the following would permit qualified students to finish college at an earlier age: (Wolftle)

1. Agreement by colleges to accept recommended students who have not completed their high school work (Program instituted by the Fund for the Advancement of Education).

ii. Inclusion in the high school years of some courses which carry college credit.

iii. Some exchange of teachers between high school and college with a resulting more gradual transition from secondary school to college work.

b. Make the science curriculum more challenging.

c. Provide incentives by giving awards, or seals of approval on diplomas, etc. (New York State Association of Secondary School Principals).

## II To increase the number of science teachers

### A. At the secondary school level:

1. Have working engineers and scientists conduct classes in physics, chemistry and mathematics (Lewis L. Strauss, AAAS).

2. Increase the salaries for science teachers.

3. Set up awards for distinguished teachers.

4. Upgrade the work of inexperienced teachers and keep teachers abreast of rapid advances of modern science by having, for instance, science or mathematics teaching counselors tour an area and assist in teaching and serving as a source of information to the less experienced and less competent science teachers of the region (AAAS).

5. Preparation and dissemination of appropriate guidance materials on mathematics and the sciences (AAAS).

6. Consolidation of small high schools, with 100 students or less, to enable the schools to have better facilities and more specialized teachers.

### B. At the college level:

1. Make more grants and fellowships available to enable professors of science in liberal arts colleges to have time off from teaching to do research or to have first-hand contacts with creative work in universities or in industrial or government laboratories (Killian).

2. Make physics and chemistry required subjects for admission (Strauss).

## III Miscellaneous Proposals

A. A change in the present American "climate of opinion" towards the sciences is necessary. It should be emphasized that science and engineering are not incompatible with the great humanities disciplines and that they are not narrowly materialistic and destructive of human values (Killian).

B. Greater emphasis must be placed on pure research. More young scientists must come to work under the guidance of experienced investigators. More money must be allocated for basic research (Waterman).

March 14, 1956

Dr. Mervin Kelly
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.
463 West Street
New York, New York

Dear Dr. Kelly:

I regretted that a firm commitment in Washington made it necessary for me to leave the meeting the other evening at the Council on Foreign Relations long before the discussion was at an end. I am sure that I would have profited by hearing what the other members and you had to say, and it probably would have been easier for me to make my own position somewhat clearer if the pressure of time had not been so great.

This is to tell you that I am putting in the mails for you, under separate cover, a copy of the National Manpower Council's last report on *Improving the Work Skills of the Nation*, which contains the piece by General Leavey on the Management of Skills that I called attention to in my remarks. I think you will find it interesting to glance at.

Over the weekend I had a chance to read with care your Subcommittee's report on the research activities of the Department of Defense. I can understand, after going through it, why you were peeved with me when you thought that I was arguing that the problem had not been properly reviewed. The point of my remarks at the meeting, and I would underscore them now that I have had the benefit of reading your report, was the significant gains that can come about only through strengthening the "professional" top level management of research and development activities.

development activities.

the "protestational" top level management of research and
tactant gains that can come spout only through strengthening
I have had the benefit of reading your report, was the argi-
reasons at the meeting, and I would undercore them now that
the problem had not been properly reviewed. The point of my
were beaved with me when you thought that I was arguing that
of Defense. I can understand, after going through it, why your
committee's report on the research activities of the Department
over the weekend I had a chance to read with care your sup-

Skills that I called attention to in my remarks. I think
contains the piece by General Leesey on the Management of
that report on Improving the Work Skills of the Nation, which
under separate cover, a copy of the National Manpower Council's
This is to tell you that I am butting in the mail for you,

it the breather of time had not been so great.

the other members and you had to say, and it properly would

I regretted that a firm commitment in Washington made it nece-

Dear Dr. Kelly:

New York, New York
403 West Street
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.
Dr. Merwin Kelly

March 14, 1960

- 2 -

I agree with you that it would be foolish to expect the Armed
Services to be able to develop very quickly any large number of
such persons. At best, one can look forward to improvement
only with time.

I do believe that more can be done than has been done in civilian
industry toward making, for the interim period, a larger number
of mature managers available to the Department of Defense. I
believe that it is also the burden of your report that a strengthening at the top level would yield very big returns all the way
down the line. I have a serious distaste for the alternative
approach of simply spending additional sums in order to get
resources allocated to higher priority projects.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Kissinger for whatever
use, if any, he wants to make of it in writing up the minutes.

Elliot Gissperg

Sincerely yours,

I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Krasinger for whatever
reasons allocated to higher priority projects.

Approach of simply sending additional info in order to get
down the line. I have a serious diatribe for the alternative
evening at the job level would field very big returns all the way
believe that if I also the burden of your report that a strength-
of mature managers available to the Department of Defense. I
indirectly toward making it for the interim period, a larger number
I go believe that more can be done than has been done in civilian
only with time.

andy Beroua. At least, one can look forward to improvement
Services to be able to develop very quickly and large number of
I agree with you that it would be better to expect the Armed

- 5 -

Multiplicity of Engine Types

As an example of the complexity of choice which enmeshes most research
and development and procurement programs, consider this illustration drawn
from aircraft engine development. A conservative list of possible engine
designs includes:

1. Turbojet

2. Turboprop

3. Turbofan

4. Turborocket

5. Ramjet

6. Liquid rocket

plus combinations of these types and several other classified designs. At
least 11 possible basic types are available. Within each type, the concept
of a specific design is radically altered as operational and technical
requirements are varied. A few of the possible variables are:

1. Size and weight

2. Type of fuel

3. Range and duration

4. Altitude characteristics

5. Speed

6. Thrust

The permutations and combinations of the situation are such that several
thousand different types of engine are available, each of which has radi-
cally different theoretical characteristics. A further complication is
added by the individual characteristics added by each contractor when he
makes his proposal for a development project. From among this multiplicity
of possible development paths, a relatively small number of proposals must
be selected on the basis of the operational requirements of tomorrow and
the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of each engine design.

March 29, 1956

Preprinted from AMERICAN SCIENTIST, Vol. 44-No. 2, April 1956

# THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED*

## Some Elements of a Grand Strategy for Augmenting Our Scientific and Engineering Manpower Resources

By JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR.

President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

THERE is a story about a cello player who sawed away continuously on a single note. His wife remarked to him that other cello players seemed to move their fingers up and down the strings, producing less monotonous sounds.

"Oh!" replied the cellist, "they are looking for the note. I've found it!"

Recently I have been asking myself whether, along with many others, I have the note or whether I have not restricted myself to too few notes in discussing our current manpower requirements in science and engineering. I have an uneasy feeling that we may have become bemused by numbers and by over-simplified quantitative measures and remedies in evaluating our manpower needs in the broad field of technology—defining technology as the combination of science, engineering, and production. That we have an acute shortage of available, effectively used competence in many fields of technology there can be no reasonable doubt. Neither can there be a reasonable doubt any longer that this scarcity is a clear and present danger to the nation and to the entire free world. My theme does not involve challenging this scarcity or its danger to the nation. It does emphasize the need for a better understanding of the nature of the shortage and of the paramount importance of qualitative factors in any plan for meeting our manpower needs. I wish particularly to examine ways in which our educational system must respond to our manpower needs and how current attitudes and values with respect to science may affect the supply of scientists.

* Sigma Xi Address, A.A.A.S. Meeting, Atlanta, Georgia, December 27, 1955.

1

Copyrighted 1956 by The Society of the Sigma Xi and preprinted by permission of the copyright owner

2

AMERICAN SCIENTIST

If we are to promote action on a grand scale for augmenting our scientific resources, we need to look at every factor that might help. Consequently I wish to suggest some of the elements of a grand strategy which must be stressed *along with* increasing the quality of our science teaching and countering Russia's remarkable technological build-up and the grim threat it holds for us.

With these guide lines before us, let us now look at the nature of the present dearth of scientists and engineers in the face of a greatly increased demand. It is not simply a shortage of men. First and basically, it is a shortage of intellectual talent adequately educated and in the right place. Second, it is more a shortage of specific talents and skills adaptable to specific areas than a general shortage of numbers.

The shortage of high talent is aggravated by the fact that too many young people of exceptional intellectual ability drop out of our educational system before they have achieved an education which fully exploits their abilities. The loss between high school and college graduation has been repeatedly reported. Of the ablest 50% of high-school graduates only about a third show up on the list of college degree recipients. Of the top 2% of our high-school graduates only about two-thirds now graduate from college. From these facts we draw two morals. The first is that too many of our ablest youth fail to get the kind of education their abilities deserve. The second is that without dropping standards we can achieve only a limited increase in our college population by stepping up the percentage of high-school graduates who go to college. Both these conclusions stress the importance of motivating and using more of our exceptional talent and directing our attention to its conservation and cultivation.

In a recent letter prepared for the subcommittee on school goals of the Committee for the White House Conference on Education, Mr. Dael Wolffe has made the following observations about the relation of the scientist shortage to our resources of talent:

> "We must plan our educational programs to encourage more of the bright youngsters to prepare for scientific and technical careers. It is debatable, however, as to whether the most effective method of securing that end is to concentrate on young people who may become scientists or to concentrate on those of high ability. A scholarship for a student to study science may help, but not if his high-school experience has been so discouraging as to turn him away from higher education in any form. Improved high-school instruction in science may help, but not if the youngster grew up in an environment that puts high value on getting out of school as soon as possible.

> "The loss [between high school and college] could be reduced by provision of a larger number of college scholarships. It could be still further reduced by so changing the high-school curriculum as to provide

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

3

a more stimulating and challenging four years of learning and experience for the brightest high-school students. It could be still further reduced by those, necessarily slow, social and cultural changes that would place greater emphasis upon the importance of education, as distinct from diplomas, and upon the importance of recognizing high ability and giv-ing it full opportunity for development wherever it may be found.

"Since the effectiveness of different methods is debatable, but the importance of scientific manpower perfectly obvious, my own preference would be to devote our educational, scholarship, guidance, and encouragement efforts to boys and girls of high ability, whatever their fields of special interest, to plan educational programs for as much flexibility as possible by keeping alternative paths open, to keep careful watch over the number of students preparing for careers in science, and only to abandon the broader and, I believe, more socially desirable approach in favor of special treatment for prospective scientists if it appears that we are not likely to get enough scientists out of our broader attack upon the general problem of recognizing, encouraging, and developing high ability."

I find myself in agreement with Mr. Wolfle's analysis and his preferred policy. For the long pull I think the nation would be better served by augmenting the total pool of exceptional talent so that all of our professions benefit rather than by giving exclusive attention to getting more talent into science and engineering, even though the need for manpower in these fields is at the present time the most urgent. If we attempt to build up science and engineering through methods which apparently deprive other professions of a fair share of the talent pie, we may generate a host of undesirable reactions and side effects inimical to the welfare of science in the long run. We might also attract into science too many whose talents and predilections were more compatible with other kinds of careers and who would therefore become indifferent scientists and engineers.

One of the reasons we are in trouble now is that some secondary teachers and administrators have placed a low value on science and shown an inadequate understanding of its intellectual requirements and its importance to our society. As we seek to give science its proper place and emphasis in the secondary school, I hope that we do not overshoot and place a low value on other fields and thus bring about their neglect.

Whether there is agreement among scientists with the line of action proffered by Wolfle, I think there will be agreement that any grand strategy for augmenting our scientific manpower must be related to a concerted effort to identify, encourage, and more fully educate the top talent among our youth.

In reviewing the clinical evidence on the nature of the manpower

[L]

4

AMERICAN SCIENTIST

shortage, let us next take a reading on the qualitative aspects of the current excess of demand oversupply, using as our example the field of engineering. One has only to talk with the placement officers of our scientific and technological institutions to get revealing evidence of the increasingly selective demand for engineers. Employers are not looking merely for "bodies" with degrees; they are looking with a critical eye for very special qualifications—for a sound education in fundamentals, for analytical power, for a grasp of the new and advanced fields of technology. They are looking less for specialized competence at the baccalaureate level and more for men who have the versatility to follow successfully any one of several specialties. They are looking more and more for men and women with graduate degrees.

These special placement demands indicate a great shortage of young engineers with a mastery of engineering science and thus a competence to handle new, advancing technologies, such as data processing, internal and external aerodynamics, energy conversion, communications, servo-mechanisms, "molecular engineering" and solid state physics for the design of materials, and similar functional components of technology.

Thus industry and government are pressing the colleges for engineers of more advanced education and analytical powers. They are looking for men with a fundamental, integrated education in science, engineering, and the humanities rather than for men specialized in some field of technology at the expense of fundamentals. Employers want more scientists and engineers, but they don't think they are meeting their needs by employing narrowly educated ones. In this new pattern of demand lies the pattern for a modernized engineering education as I intend later to emphasize.

Similarly in the basic sciences our most pressing needs are for those scientists who have the imagination and trained creative power to make the discoveries and generate the new concepts which advance science. Quite properly we hear much about the need for basic research and the funds to support it. These needs indeed are great, but greater still is the need for more scientists who have the trained talent, the motivation, and the conceptualizing power to make basic research really basic.

In stressing the need for exceptional talent, I do not minimize the critical shortage of the rank and file of good competent scientists and engineers. Flag officers are not enough to provide a strong scientific attack force, but the really acute shortage is now in the flag-officer group.

These qualitative characteristics of the present shortage clearly affect the design of any comprehensive strategy for relieving the present dearth.

In the secondary schools the first order of business is to shore up the sagging emphasis on science and to begin filling in the decimated ranks of science teachers and to do this, not with culls from other fields, but

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

5

with teachers possessing a grasp of science and the perception to identify and stimulate youngsters with the bent and capacity for science. The dean of one of our schools of education recently came to me with the evidence that the secondary school system was recruiting negligible numbers of top science majors from the colleges, especially our institutes of technology. In competition with other fields, it could not offer them a sufficiently attractive career. He also noted the apparent reluctance of our science departments and schools to encourage bright young graduates to go into secondary school science teaching, a situation that was also noted in the first report of the Science Teaching Improvement Program of which the American Association for the Advancement of Science is one of the sponsors. He expressed pessimism about sustained improvement in science teaching unless we could induce more really first-rate young scientist bachelors to elect secondary school teaching as a career. It is fine to upgrade existing science teachers and to supplement them with part-time personnel, but these are only partial solutions.

The influence of the secondary school vocational counsellor is growing steadily, and it is of obvious importance that these counsellors understand the scientific manpower needs of the country. It is particularly important that these counsellors not harbor misapprehensions about scientific and engineering careers, particularly because so many of them have had no opportunity to gain any insight into science. There is the need which Mr. Wolffe has stressed for earlier identification of scientific talent, such identification coming as early as the seventh grade. There is the need for more rigor, more emphasis on excellence in the secondary school. As President DuBridge has said, we need "to make thinking popular." I suspect that much of the flight from science at the secondary school level has resulted from the fear of science as a difficult subject of study. In the pejorative argot of the high-school youngster, only a "brain goes for science" and sometimes a brain is considered a "queer." With such attitudes in the ascendancy, science is avoided in favor of subjects which are less demanding, more descriptive, more easily passed, more easily taught.

Blame for this aversion to rigorous thinking rests with parents even more than it does with the schools. So far we have managed to get along in the United States by displaying an attitude of condescension toward hard intellectual labor in our schools. There has been avoidance, if not evasion, of the intellectual tax which must be paid if our intellectual budget is to be balanced. Any strategy for strengthening manpower resources must give attention to this fatty degeneration (if I may change the metaphor!) in our education. At a time when we are forced to match wits on every front with an alert enemy of growing prowess, America's survival requires that the American people attach a

[LC]

6

AMERICAN SCIENTIST.

higher value to the hard labor of rigorous thought. Certainly progress in science and technology requires this kind of intellectual work—work which can be invigorating and absorbing even though hard and demanding.

Other aspects of high-school education require attention as we seek to augment our manpower resources. The high-school program should be flexible, so that an early election of program does not commit a boy or girl irrevocably to some prematurely selected career or educational program. Too often gifted young people without all the facts before them elect a program which makes it difficult for them to go to college, if later their sights are raised or their circumstances change. The vocational high school is vitally important in our educational scheme and serves many young people admirably but it never should be so managed or organized that youngsters of college caliber who elect the vocational program find themselves too late unprepared in motivation or training for college. This need for flexibility has a direct bearing on the conservation of exceptional talent for higher education. We must avoid creating dead-end kids who become caught in educational cul de sacs when they have the ability to travel farther up the avenue of education.

In making these observations about secondary school education, I must make clear my conviction that public schools have a much more comprehensive job to do than preparing young people for college. I am surprised at the number of college people, particularly college professors teaching freshmen, who think that the exclusive mission of the high school is to prepare youngsters for college—preferably their college. I am equally surprised by others who apparently ignore the fact that one of the extremely important functions of schools is to prepare youngsters for college. Because of my natural interest in the education of scientists and engineers, I find that I must keep reminding myself that although the education of our future scientists and engineers has been neglected with effects endangering the nation, the education of other kinds of people is also important. We should not neglect any one group of youngsters in order to strengthen another.

Secondary schools, it must also be remembered, play a major part in maintaining our fluid, classless society. Criticism of the high schools for not confining their programs to teaching the intellectual skills is neither fair nor in the interest of the nation. I hope that methods for strengthening science teaching and increasing the numbers of scientists will not result in unfortunate distortion of this broader function of the public school program.

Our schools should be designed to help all children, and the needs of children of different abilities, different backgrounds, and different aspirations. But we do need to come to a better understanding of the importance of priorities and the necessity of discriminating choices so that

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

7

we can temper our prodigality of aims by sobering considerations of
quality, social and intellectual needs, and achievable goals.

At this point in the evolution of our schools the highest priorities
should be given to better provision for our intellectually gifted young
people, greater stress on the more rigorous teaching of intellectual skills,
and on higher standards of excellence for both teachers and pupils.

I feel that success in promoting these broader objectives for the
schools will carry with it improvements in the motivation and teach-
ing of future scientists. I am very skeptical of such expedients as ac-
celerated programs for those interested in science or any efforts to make
a sharp vocational distinction between those interested in science and
those who are not. It does seem desirable to provide programs in which
the intellectually gifted youngster, regardless of his ultimate specializa-
tion, can go farther and deeper. Experimental programs are showing
that such programs can make it practical to give advanced standing in
college and thus to cover more ground during the college period.

At the college level there are many improvements available to us for
strengthening our scientific and engineering education. The liberal
arts colleges are of course the principal sources of candidates for our
graduate schools of science. The Wesleyan study and others have shown
how remarkable has been the success of a number of small liberal arts
colleges in preparing men and women to become distinguished special-
ists in science. This stresses the importance of still further strengthen-
ing the teaching of science in this type of institution and thus attracting
more college students to major in science and proceed on to graduate
school. Increasing the number of science majors in the liberal arts
college is one of the quickest ways available to us to increase the number
of scientists. It will require an attitude in these institutions that does
not underrate science—an attitude, as I shall emphasize later, that sees
an understanding of science as one of the requirements of effective,
liberal living in our technological society.

As the presidents of liberal arts colleges well know, there is also a
shortage of *college* teachers of science, both in terms of numbers and
quality. As we alert the nation to the need for more teachers of science
in the secondary schools, we also should stress the equally serious needs
of our colleges, particularly those institutions where little research is
done, as industry and other agencies have drawn the promising young
material away by providing opportunities to do research and develop-
ment and by higher compensation. I advocate more grants and fellow-
ships to enable professors of science in liberal arts colleges to have time
off from teaching to do research or to have firsthand contacts with
creative work in science in our universities or in industrial or govern-
ment laboratories. More thought has been given to making such op-
portunities available to high-school science teachers than to science

8

AMERICAN SCIENTIST

teachers in the small liberal arts colleges. Wherever he may be, the
satisfactions, the professional growth, and the teaching effectiveness
of the science teacher are enhanced if he can do research or investigation
or maintain periodic contact with these activities.

It is not only the liberal arts colleges that have a problem in pro-
viding the environment and professional opportunities adequate to
attract and hold able scientists as teachers. Our professional schools
of science and engineering have suffered in the competition for top-
flight men. Again using engineering schools as an example, let me re-
view their problems as they seek to respond to the growing demand for
engineers, particularly the more selective demands which I have already
described.

Against the higher compensation and other attractions offered by in-
dustry and other non-educational organizations, engineering schools
are now more vulnerable and more in danger of serious deterioration
than other educational institutions using scientists. They are more
vulnerable, even, than the schools and departments of science. The
university and the institute of technology are natural habitats for
creative scientists. They are not, generally speaking, quite so natural
habitats for engineers, whose professional work lies so much in industry
and in the field.

The engineering schools are especially vulnerable now because their
young and imaginative graduates and teachers—especially those in
the advancing, growing fields of technology—are more in demand for
non-educational employment than any other group in our educational
institutions.

If engineering education is to meet this challenge and reverse or even
retard the spreading scarcity of quality in engineering schools that has
weakened science teaching in high schools and other kinds of institu-
tions, it must find a way to make engineering schools a more attractive
environment for top-flight engineers and thus for top-flight teaching of
future engineers.

Even though their enrollments have been down, the teaching loads
in our engineering schools—exceptions exist, of course—are very high,
with the result that their faculties have too little opportunity for the
creative work that leads to further professional development both as
teachers and engineers. An informed observer recently estimated that
only 10-20% of our engineering schools had average teaching loads as
low as twelve hours per week or less. When we reflect upon the fact
that these institutions are hard-pressed to maintain their present level
of staffing, we can readily surmise how difficult it will be greatly to in-
crease enrollments and to enlarge graduate study without further
burdening faculties and without a reduction in the quality of education.

The success of engineering education in attracting and holding more

THE SHORTAGE RE-EXAMINED

9

first-rate teachers will depend upon accelerating the development of more and stronger graduate programs. The graduate school and the research associated with it can provide engineer-teachers with the opportunities for professional activities and growth as engineers which they now find chiefly in practice outside of educational institutions. In those engineering institutions where strong graduate schools exist and where there is a fruitful alliance with basic science, an environment satisfying to first-rate engineers has been better achieved.

Of course, more graduate study in engineering is essential for another reason. We need more engineers with more advanced training to meet the increasingly complex technological needs of our society. The engineering profession or our society can no longer be adequately served by a professional engineering education that is predominately undergraduate. While this undergraduate education has great strength and a vital role in our total national educational task by providing a form of general education built around professional objectives, it must be extended by more advanced training both in educational institutions and in industry. We must also attract into the undergraduate schools more of the students who have the intellectual qualifications for graduate work.

While qualified bachelor's degree recipients in engineering frequently go on for graduate study in other fields such as the physical sciences and management, the amount of advanced study in engineering still seems small compared to the advanced study *required* by the professions of law and medicine. The degrees are, of course, not comparable, but it is nevertheless of some significance that the number of advanced degrees in engineering, both master's and doctor's, in 1953-54 totalled about 4,800 (of this total, only 594 were doctorates) as reported by the U. S. Office of Education, while the total of M.D.'s and LL.B.'s totalled 6,757 and 9,898 respectively. Without dwelling on the impropriety of comparing apples and doughnuts, the implication is clear that the engineering profession suffers in comparison with the other great professions in the amount of advanced study undertaken. If engineering is to meet the challenge of our advancing technology it must promote more graduate study of top quality.

Many educators are also advocating changes in undergraduate engineering courses, and after a long period of status quo-itis, engineering education seems to show signs of the bold experimentation and innovation that marked it in its early days in the United States when it was struggling to throw off the unsympathetic sanctions of classical education. There is a spreading conviction that the engineering curriculum must include a larger content of basic science, less of its traditional compartmentalization, more emphasis on such fundamental functional aspects of engineering as materials, thermodynamics, fluid flow and