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# NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE PROBLEM OF PEACE

By Henry A. Kissinger

PRESIDENT Eisenhower's announcement of the suspension for one year of all nuclear weapons tests and his invitation to the Soviet Union to negotiate a permanent ban on tests has raised hopes all over the world that a beginning has been made in controlling nuclear weapons and that a big step forward has been taken in the quest for peace.

The hopes which have been focused on a nuclear test ban are intense and varied. Many thoughtful people concerned about the danger of radioactive fall-out maintain that the quest for security must not be allowed to endanger the health of future generations. Others argue that the end of nuclear testing is essential to build confidence for more fundamental agreement, especially in the field of disarmament. It would prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other Powers. It would lessen the dangers of thermonuclear wars. And these arguments are reinforced by an insistent Soviet campaign to the effect that nuclear tests should be unconditionally prohibited and nuclear weapons outlawed.

The yearning for an end of the cold war reflects the deepest aspirations of the free world. So intense is it that we have been ready to stigmatize as more immoral than other weapons the weapon around which we have built our defense of that world. But the very intensity of our desire for peace may increase our peril. It may make us seek agreement for its own sake and thus set in motion a train of events which will divide the non-Communist world and undermine its resolution. The hopes which have been attached to a complete ban on nuclear tests are surely understandable. But they should not have been raised so high without a careful analysis of the political and psychological implications of such a step and its relationship to our defense policies and long-term goals. Instead we became preoccupied with technical problems of

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a test ban, which are by no means the most important. When we agreed to meet with Soviet scientists at Geneva, we clearly implied that if inspection was found to be technically feasible, we would be willing to discuss a complete ban. Therefore, when the scientists had made their report, we felt impelled to make a critical policy decision, although only its technical aspects had been fully explored.

This article questions whether a complete suspension of nuclear testing is desirable, whatever the possibilities of inspection. It argues that we should deal with the health hazard by ending tests which involve appreciable fall-out but that we should agree to a complete ban only as part of a general disarmament agreement which includes conventional weapons. The desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust and to achieve a lasting peace should be taken for granted in any debate on this problem. At issue can only be the best means to achieve these ends.

II

Because of the emphasis laid on the technical aspects of ending nuclear tests, it may be useful at the start to discuss these and to point out some of the difficulties involved. It is generally agreed that surface nuclear explosions can be detected at considerable distances by equipment which measures radioactivity and shock waves.¹ The difficulty arises with underground testing, high altitude testing and testing underneath the polar icecaps, and with the increasing civilian uses of nuclear energy.

With respect to underground testing, it is argued that a system of inspection stations spaced 300 miles apart could detect all underground explosions of about 1 kiloton explosive power except in the seismic belt where earthquakes are more frequent, requiring inspection stations on a 100-mile grid. Nevertheless serious problems remain. Methods of "buffering" explosions so that the seismic shock is weakened have barely been explored, but indications are that they can reduce the seismic wave by a very substantial percentage. Moreover, the seismic equipment can locate the shock only within an area several miles in diameter. Some but not all of the characteristics of an underground explosion can be distinguished from those of an earthquake. Conclusive proof can be obtained only by finding the precise location of the suspected eva-

¹ For a very good account of methods of detecting nuclear weapons testing see "The Detection of Nuclear Weapons Testing," by Jay Orear, in "Inspection for Disarmament," edited by Seymour Melman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 85 f.

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sion either by means of boring for radioactive samples or by discovering an entrance to the test site. This is a considerable task in an area which may cover more than 30 square miles. And the negotiators at Geneva agreed that the problem of high altitude testing was very little understood at this stage. The same difficulty may apply to testing underneath the polar icecaps.

Again, as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become more widespread other means of evasion may be developed. In fact, the United States explicitly and the Soviet Union by implication have both exempted peaceful applications of nuclear energy from their announced test bans.² One of the obvious applications of nuclear energy is in mining. It will not be easy to prevent a country from using devices for blasting which also have military applications, or from gaining militarily useful knowledge by checking the results with scientific instruments. To be sure, inspection teams could be invited to witness each peaceful use of nuclear explosives; but as the peaceful applications of nuclear energy grow more common, this will become increasingly difficult. A nation determined on evasion could overload the inspection mechanism by hiding test explosions among hundreds of ordinary ones.

In any event we must keep in mind that the best inspection system can guard only against presently known methods of evasion. In the nature of things it is difficult to protect against a contingency not yet imagined. And finally, evasion will be easier to attempt and to conceal in the Soviet Union than in the West. In the West a ban on nuclear testing will be largely self-policing, because public opinion will not countenance evasion and scientists will not lend themselves to it.³ No such inhibitions will exist in the U.S.S.R.

Yet the most vexing problem of inspection is not that of obtaining information, difficult as it is, but the political consequences to be drawn from whatever information does become available. Obviously a violation of the nuclear test ban is not a casus belli. It may not even be a sufficient cause for the injured party to start testing again. Once nuclear tests have been banned, the free world will not abrogate its agreement easily, even in the face of strong provocation. Even if it reached a decision to do so,

² The New York Times, August 23, 1958.

³ For an interesting analysis of the degree to which public opinion in free world countries would support a test ban see "An International Public Opinion Poll on Disarmament and 'Inspection by the People': A Study of Attitudes Toward Supranationalism," by William M. Evan in Melman, op. cit., p. 231 f.

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years might be consumed before tests could be resumed. For one thing, a nation like the United States which had observed the ban might by then have nothing to test. A ban extended over a period of years would almost certainly lead to the attrition of our weapons laboratories, whose ablest scientists would be increasingly tempted to concentrate on more promising fields. For another, the United States would have great difficulty reassembling its testing machinery. Present tests involve scores of installations and thousands of personnel. It would be impossible to keep these teams together once a test ban had been agreed upon. Even a strong indication of Soviet violation might therefore leave the United States at a serious disadvantage or at least without adequate recourse.

Moreover, there is a great difference between obtaining information which is technically reliable and establishing a similar degree of political and psychological clarity. It is often maintained that a violation of the test ban would have a catastrophic impact on world opinion. But this assumes a degree of certainty about Soviet intentions which is belied by all past experience. The Soviet Union has always been skillful in presenting its challenges in an ambiguous manner, partly by masking its own actions, partly by charging its opponents with similar transgressions. According to its usual tactic, the Kremlin, within a short time of signing an agreement to end nuclear tests, would quite probably accuse us of violating it.⁴ In the resulting atmosphere of recrimination it would be difficult to separate sincere charges from the customary exchanges of the cold war. The result might well be a further weakening of the will of the free world.⁵

Finally, it is quite possible that a complete ban on testing would enable the Soviet Union to overtake us in the military applications of nuclear energy. Whereas a complete test ban would magnify our already great difficulty in inducing our ablest scientists to work on nuclear weapons, it would not prevent the Soviet Union from keeping its research teams together either by compulsion or by arranging appropriate incentives. Also, the Soviets may feel less dependent on testing in order to achieve scientific progress. The experimental method is instinctive to the West. Marxist dogmatism places much greater reliance on theory. For example, the Kremlin announced its first nuclear explosion sev-

⁴ This process may already have started. See the Soviet charge that the United States "hid" 18 test explosions in the Pacific. *The New York Times*, August 24, 1958.

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eral days before it took place. Thus even if the rate of scientific progress were the same, the Soviets may gain an advantage because of greater confidence in untested data. Or else they may use a temporary cessation to prepare tests of superior weapons.

Nevertheless, the deepest concern about a complete ban on testing does not arise from the danger that it may permit Soviet technical advances or from the political and practical difficulty of inspection. We must consider whether the basic motive behind Communist pressure for a complete ending of nuclear tests may not be the Soviet Union's conviction that it would gain a substantial advantage from a complete ban which it scrupulously observed. The wisdom of a complete end of nuclear tests so often advocated as a "first step" depends on the answer to the question "first step towards what?"

### III

It may be argued that such a question is a symptom of the distrust which has produced the cold war. Unless both sides are willing to take some risks in the quest for peace, it will be said, the world will be doomed to an indefinitely continued armaments race and eventual destruction. Since the death of Stalin, great changes have occurred in the Soviet Union, brought about by the appearance of a new bureaucracy, the increasing demand for consumer goods, and the creation of the entire apparatus of an industrialized society. According to this line of thought, the Russians' expressed desire for peaceful coexistence represents a concession to the pressures of these new forces. Given time and patience, the Soviet Union may evolve into a society not unlike ours.

Because these assertions derive from attitudes which have contributed so much to the stability and often the freedom of our society and that of many of our allies, it is difficult to contradict them. A status quo Power always has difficulty in understanding a revolutionary state. All its instincts tempt it to accept peaceful professions and to refuse to believe in implacable hostility.

Were it not for this difficulty of understanding, no revolution would ever have succeeded. A revolutionary movement always starts from a position of inferior strength. It owes its survival to the reluctance of its declared victims to accept its professions at face value. It owes its success to the psychological advantage which single-minded purpose confers over an opponent who does not believe that some states may prefer victory to peace. The

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ambiguity which makes the Soviet challenge so deadly derives in
part from the skill of the Soviet leadership; but the danger is
magnified by the tendency of the free world to choose the inter-
pretation of Soviet motivations which best accords with its own
preconceptions. Neither Lenin's writings, nor Stalin's utterances,
nor Mao's published works, nor Khrushchev's declarations, have
availed against the conviction of the West that a basic change
in Communist society and aims was imminent and that a problem
deferred was a problem solved. It is only to posterity that revolu-
tionary movements appear unambiguous. Thus a status quo
Power is never certain until too late that another state intends to
overthrow the international system, especially as the revolution-
ary Power will present each demand as a specific, limited objective,
which often in itself seems quite reasonable. However weak at the
beginning, it can substitute psychological strength for physical
power; it can use the very enormity of its goals to defeat gradually
an opponent who cannot come to grips with a policy of unlimited
objectives.

This becomes a particular problem if the revolutionary Power
exploits this weakness systematically. In Soviet terminology, for
example, the concepts war and peace are inherently confusing.
Since, according to Communist theory, the social structure of
capitalist states necessarily produces war, real peace can be
achieved only by the world-wide triumph of Communism. There-
fore any act by the Soviet Union, however warlike on the surface,
is pacific by definition and any measure by a capitalist state, how-
ever seemingly conciliatory, tends toward war. Thus the slogan
peaceful coexistence has never had more than a tactical signifi-
cance in Communist terminology. "Marxism-Leninism," wrote
Mao, "does not allow concessions to be regarded as something
purely negative. . . . Our concession, withdrawal, turning to the
defensive or suspending action, whether in dealing with allies or
enemies, should always be regarded as part of the entire revolu-
tionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolution-
ary line. . . ."⁵ To be sure, the protestations of peaceful coexistence
have recently become more insistent; but the reason is not very
flattering to the West, since it consists in the assertion that war
has become unnecessary in order to encompass the downfall of
the free world.

⁵ Mao Tse-tung, "Selected Works," v. 2, 1937-1938 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 263-4.

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The argument outlined here may not prove persuasive to the increasing number of people in the free world who desire an end to the cold war so intensely that they ignore the lessons of the past and the fundamental professions of Communist doctrine. But even the most optimistic should ask themselves why Khrushchev can be expected to deal any more gently with the countries of the free world than with his erstwhile colleagues in the Soviet Presidium. What was the doctrine of collective leadership but the principle of peaceful coexistence applied among the Soviet leaders? Yet it was used ruthlessly by Khrushchev first to paralyze opposition by branding it contrary to the principle of collective leadership and then to defeat his opponents one by one. Khrushchev could not have succeeded domestically had he not been able first to convince his colleagues of his sincerity. Is it not at least possible that the men who arrested the leaders of the Hungarian revolution while negotiating an armistice with them and who executed them despite a promise of safe conduct are now seeking to apply these same methods to weaken the cohesion of the free world and then to destroy its members piecemeal? A wise policy will at least consider this contingency and will not risk everything simply for the sake of agreement.

Certainly the free world has a duty to seek to spare mankind the horrors of another war. It must strive for any agreement that offers such prospects. But a real relaxation of tensions can come about only if the Soviet leaders become convinced that they cannot use negotiations to induce us to disarm unilaterally, that any agreement must be *mutually* advantageous. We must consider, then, whether insistent Soviet demands for a complete ban on nuclear testing are not designed to paralyze the free world rather than to bring about peace as we understand the word.

IV

Rightly or wrongly, the free world has based its defense on nuclear weapons. We need not here review the circumstances nor analyze the motives that led to this decision. It is enough to note that nowhere in the Western world are there sufficient conventional forces to resist the Soviet preponderance in conventional strength; and nowhere is there any immediate prospect of developing them. Nothing now stands in the way of Soviet domination of Eurasia save the Soviet reluctance to pay the price of a nuclear war.

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That is why the Soviet Union has systematically sought to paralyze the West's will to use the weapons around which its entire defense effort has been built. It has done this both by creating a substantial nuclear stockpile of its own and by seeking to have nuclear weapons outlawed. Appealing to the most basic fears of humanity, the whole apparatus of Soviet policy, from diplomacy to "peace" congresses, has sought to undermine our reliance on the most effective—or at least the only available—means of resistance to Soviet domination.

The free world should therefore have no illusions about the implications of a complete ban on nuclear tests. For if a cessation of nuclear testing is a "first step" to anything it is to an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. If these weapons are too dangerous to test, so the argument will go, they are surely too terrible to use. That this is the aim of Soviet policy was made explicit by Khrushchev: "After the termination of nuclear weapons tests, it would be possible to raise the question of the Powers making a solemn undertaking not to use hydrogen and atomic weapons and henceforth to adopt a decision on the total prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. . . ."⁶ In the present state of Western defenses such a prohibition is tantamount to unilateral disarmament. The onesidedness of our military establishment has deprived our diplomacy of flexibility. If the free world possessed a conventional force sufficiently powerful and mobile to blunt Soviet aggression by similar forces, the complete cessation of nuclear testing would not be so dangerous. But none of the advocates of a nuclear test ban has been prepared to champion—and many have actively opposed—a build-up of conventional forces sufficient to offset the grave risks which their proposals invite.

Nor will the weakening of the free world be compensated for by a victory in the battle for the minds of men. In the current atmosphere where all attention has been focused on the most cataclysmic uses of nuclear weapons and we have failed to develop or to offer a plausible alternative, a complete cessation of tests will merely serve to shift pressures to the banning of nuclear weapons. We must be sensitive to world opinion. But we have also an obligation to contribute to shaping it. We must succeed in conveying the fact that unless the free world is prepared to accept a settlement on Soviet terms, we must have a military establishment which we are prepared to invoke for our defense. If we are not

⁶ *The New York Times*, June 29, 1958.

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willing to run some risks for the preservation of our values and
our interests, the collapse of the free world is inevitable and no
amount of rhetoric can eliminate this fact.

v

The willingness to run risks depends in part on the options af-
forded by our military establishment. We require more conven-
tional forces. We must have a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons.
We must stop pretending that we can have security on the cheap.

One of the penalties of being on the defensive is that the choices
which we must make are more difficult than the aggressor's, if
only because the dangers against which we must protect ourselves
are more varied. The aggressor can choose his point of attack; he
can select the weapons system which seems most promising; he
can concentrate on the area where his opponent is weakest either
geographically or in weaponry. The defender must be able to de-
fend all likely targets of aggression and against any weapons
system that may be employed. Two consequences follow: (a)
at equal levels of military effort the aggressor usually has an ad-
vantage; and (b) the defensive requires a more advanced weap-
ons technology than its opponent. The side which concedes the
first blow must have a more mobile and better protected retali-
tory force, for it must be able to withstand the attrition of the
initial attack. Its weapons must be lighter so that they can be
rapidly moved to threatened areas. It must possess a range of
capabilities which deters the aggressor from tilting the scales by
expanding either the area or the intensity of the conflict. The side
which concedes the first blow therefore runs major risks if it com-
pounds the disadvantage of the defensive by having a frozen
weapons technology. This is particularly true in the present stage
of weapons development.

The nuclear weapons with which we are most familiar and
which are most fully tested are also the most destructive. Any
war would have to be conducted in their shadow. Under present
circumstances they even inhibit recourse to conventional weap-
ons, for the danger of a nuclear showdown will be thought to be
inherent in any conflict. This view has already been articulated
in Great Britain where Lord Russell has insisted that even sur-
render is preferable to running the risk of war.⁷

It is therefore essential that we develop nuclear weapons of

⁷ Bertrand Russell, "Freedom to Survive," *The New Leader*, July 7-14, 1958, p. 23.

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finer discrimination, less destructive power and greatly reduced fall-out. This need exists regardless of whether we intend to rely on a conventional or on a nuclear defense. As long as the defensive effort of the free world is polarized between inadequate conventional forces and nuclear weapons of enormous destructiveness, the Soviet bloc will be able to pose the dilemma of suicide or surrender in a variety of forms. By engaging in or encouraging aggression with conventional forces it can force our leaders to choose between yielding or invoking a strategy which will involve catastrophic casualties. Even if we build up conventional forces and resist initially without recourse to nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union may be tempted to utilize a few weapons of low yield unless deterred by the knowledge that we have ample weapons of similar discrimination and superior technology.⁸ A conventional war can be kept conventional only if we are prepared with a wide variety of nuclear weapons.

This will be true whether or not the Soviet Union follows suit. The rhetorical question "Why develop clean weapons if they use dirty weapons against us?" is surely no more pertinent than the argument "Why rely on bullets if the opponent has nuclear weapons?" This reasoning would loosen all constraints and would lead to the continued elaboration of ever more destructive weapons. Moreover, the availability of clean weapons is of great importance for the protection of our own troops and also civilian populations, which may be endangered by fall-out from our own weapons. But the essential purpose of having a wide range of clean and discriminating weapons is to give the free world an option which does not involve either immediate catastrophe or surrender. Possession of them will improve the plausibility of our deterrent and reduce the possibility of Soviet atomic blackmail which has been so central a feature of Soviet diplomacy in recent years. And they will provide a shield behind which to build up conventional forces if we are prepared to make the sacrifices. The difference in will power between the Soviet bloc and the free world must not reach the point where we assume an unlimited willingness on the part of our opponent to run risks, while we recoil before the risks of even a limited defense.

In a revolutionary world rife with possibilities for upheavals,

⁸ The aggressor employing nuclear weapons against conventional forces will have a relatively concentrated target because massed firepower is difficult to achieve otherwise in a conventional war. He can therefore employ relatively crude nuclear weapons, having first dispersed his own forces.

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perhaps unsought by any major Power, it is imperative to couple
the quest for peace with efforts to mitigate the consequences of
conflicts that may occur either by accident or design. If this effort
is not made, the result must be an increasing pacifism which will
produce appeasement if not surrender; or else, if a decision to
resist is taken, it will lead to the most catastrophic kind of war.
Is it not possible that Soviet leaders have been so insistent on a
complete and unconditional end of nuclear tests precisely because
they are aware of the paralysis produced by such prospects?

VI

Would not the end of nuclear testing avoid the diffusion of nu-
clear weapons among other Powers? Of course, a nuclear test ban
will serve only to inhibit the independent development of nu-
clear weapons by "fourth" Powers; it will not necessarily prevent
the distribution of nuclear weapons from the stockpiles of the
major nuclear Powers, nor will it stop them from turning over
blueprints to an ally. Nevertheless a complete ban on nuclear
testing will have psychological and political consequences which
will make it difficult for other Powers to acquire nuclear weapons,
particularly in the free world. The issue of a ban on nuclear testing
is therefore inseparable from that of nuclear sharing.

The situation with respect to nuclear sharing can be summa-
rized as follows: The Communist bloc possesses a decisive military
superiority in all contiguous areas. The Soviet Union can threaten
with nuclear weapons all peripheral areas and much of Africa
from its own territories; Communist China is overwhelmingly
stronger than any neighboring state in conventional weapons.
In these circumstances the Soviet Union may have decided that
it has little to gain and a great deal to lose from the diffusion of
nuclear weapons. Indeed, in view of the political unreliability of
some of the satellite régimes, it probably has a positive interest
in keeping nuclear weapons out of their hands.

The immediate Soviet objective is therefore to prevent the de-
velopment of a nuclear capability under local control on the Euro-
pean continent, for then Western Europe and other contiguous
areas will eventually become neutralized. Without a nuclear
capability of its own, Europe will find it impossible to resist the
increasingly bold Soviet threats of nuclear warfare, which have
been a cardinal aspect of Soviet diplomacy in every crisis since
Suez. Europe, should it want to be defended, would then become

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entirely dependent on the American assessment of its danger. In
such a situation the Soviet leaders may well calculate that the
United States would be reluctant to invoke its own destruction
for the defense of Europe, or that even in an all-out war they
could not be prevented from seizing Europe. For after the initial
exchange of blows the Soviet Union would remain supreme in
Eurasia.⁹ That the Soviet Union is concerned with making Eu-
rope impotent and not with the threat offered by a European
nuclear establishment is demonstrated by the Soviet protest
against the plan to equip the Swiss army with nuclear weapons.¹⁰
By no stretch of the imagination can Switzerland be suspected of
aggressive intent against the U.S.S.R.

In negotiating about a nuclear test ban we must therefore take
care not to contribute to a climate of opinion which will make
our position on the Continent untenable and a local defense of
Europe impossible. Already influential groups in Britain argue
for a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and considerable
pressures exist in Germany against equipping German forces for
nuclear war. In both countries the cessation of nuclear tests is
considered as an initial move away from atomic weapons. The
more the Soviet Union succeeds in building up a distinction be-
tween nuclear weapons and other weapons, while retaining full
control of its own stockpile, the more it will undermine the will of
the Western alliance to resist. Once the Soviet Union has suc-
ceeded in bringing about a divergence between our military
establishment and that of our European allies, it may hope that
our NATO partners will be paralyzed by their impotence and we
by our unwillingness to risk all-out war.

If we permit a distinction to grow up between our military es-
tablishment and that of our NATO allies, our expulsion from
Europe is almost inevitable. Further delay in the distribution of
nuclear weapons to our European allies will give the Soviet Union
more time to persuade Europeans that they will be able to escape
involvement in any conflict by refusing to permit nuclear instal-
lations on their territory. Logically, this denuclearization of Eu-
rope will be followed by a demand that American troops with-
draw, since their equipment is so obviously nuclear. At the very
least it will expose us to great pressure to withdraw all our nu-

⁹ See Peregrine Worsthorne, "Our Bomb and Theirs: As the Russians See It," *Encounter*, July 1958. Also Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age," New York: Praeger, 1958.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, August 9, 1958.

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clear installations from the Continent. Western Europe would
then be impotent, at the mercy of Soviet Russia. NATO would
cease to have meaning.

This is not to say that Europe must obtain nuclear weapons
from its own production or that these weapons must be under
national control. From many points of view it would be highly
desirable if NATO's nuclear components were under NATO con-
trol, or if a European atomic force were formed on the model of
E.D.C. Similarly it is not essential that nuclear weapons be lo-
cally produced, but only that there be European participation in
their use and control. Before we go much further in the direction
of a complete ban on testing, we should at the very least amend
our Atomic Energy Act to permit wider nuclear sharing. And our
approach to the question of nuclear testing should be based on
premises which do not inhibit nuclear sharing and which will not
give impetus to Soviet ban-the-bomb propaganda.

Will not the possession of nuclear weapons by our allies increase
the danger of war? This would be true if our allies felt thereby
encouraged to attack the Soviet Union, or if they were to use nu-
clear weapons in their own quarrels outside of Europe. But exces-
sive adventurousness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union can hardly be
considered a European failing. Even in the less preferred contin-
gency that nuclear weapons were under national rather than
NATO control, it is difficult to conceive the circumstances which
would induce any European country to unleash a unilateral at-
tack on the Soviet Union. The individual nuclear capability will
remain so small, the disproportion in vulnerability is so great,
that they could not, by any rational calculation, use these weap-
ons for offensive ends. Their purpose would be to make the costs
of aggression, particularly of local adventures, prohibitive, and
to discourage Soviet atomic blackmail.¹¹

As for the use of these weapons to settle private quarrels out-
side Europe, this could be effectively forestalled by placing them
under NATO or an over-all European control. But even should
they be under national control, the likelihood of their use outside
of NATO is slight. The difficulty which the French army has in
Algeria is not inadequate firepower but that of finding targets
against which this firepower can be used. Atomic weapons have
little significance in guerrilla-type operations.

¹¹ For a fuller discussion of the problems of the defense of Europe see the author's "Missiles and the Western Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958.

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But what of the uncommitted nations? Is there to be no end to the diffusion of nuclear weapons? First, it must be recognized that from a technical standpoint the diffusion of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly difficult to prevent, regardless of what decision is reached with respect to nuclear testing. As the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become widespread, more and more nations will become familiar with nuclear technology. The end product of many atomic reactors is plutonium, which is also the basic component of nuclear weapons. As nuclear energy becomes more familiar, its military applications will be very difficult to control. Nothing short of the original Baruch-Lilienthal plan seems capable of arresting this trend.

It does not follow, moreover, that because the diffusion of nuclear weapons must be stopped at some point it must be stopped at this point, or that the most effective method is a ban on nuclear testing. To be sure, the more nuclear Powers exist the more difficult it will be to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. But we must weigh this risk against the danger of collaborating with the Soviet Union in the neutralization of Europe. This would leave us without powerful allies. It would place us ultimately in the position of having to defend the whole Soviet periphery alone against Soviet nuclear attack or Soviet atomic blackmail. Bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to the exclusion of our European allies are fraught with danger. It would be much better to deal with the problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons directly rather than through the indirect method of a test ban, and to include our NATO allies as nuclear Powers in any agreement, preferably through a European Atomic Community.

Of possible methods to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, a test ban is the most disadvantageous to the free world. Its relevance to nuclear sharing is primarily that it will contribute to a psychological attitude in the West making it impossible for any of our allies to acquire nuclear weapons. Communist China will not be similarly inhibited from obtaining nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union. Even if reports that the U.S.S.R. has already agreed to give nuclear weapons to Communist China are premature,¹² it does not seem likely that the Soviet Union would in the long run risk its most important alliance by refusing to share nuclear weapons in any form. It is idle to argue that in these circumstances the United States would be free to give nuclear weapons

¹² The New York Times, August 18, 1958.

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to its own allies. By that time, the public opinion of our NATO partners would not permit the possession of nuclear weapons, especially as the direct threat to these countries is not markedly increased if China possesses nuclear weapons.

The difficulty with a total ban on nuclear testing is that it stakes too much on a measure which in itself is of problematical significance. It will build up world-wide reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, the only means of defense now existing against Soviet aggression or Soviet military pressure. It will impede if not prevent the articulation of a strategy for the defense of Europe. It will increase the danger that any war that does break out will take the most catastrophic form. By freezing weapons development after only the most fearful applications of nuclear power have been fully explored, it will increase the possibilities for Soviet atomic blackmail without reducing the free world's peril. As a first step it goes too far and in a too uncertain direction.

VII

One of the difficulties the free world has had in dealing with the Soviet bloc is that we have been clearer about the things we oppose than those we stand for. This has given much of our negotiations with the Soviet Union the quality of a stubborn rear-guard action designed primarily to thwart Soviet overtures. It has enabled the Soviet leadership to define the issues in international debate, putting us in the position of respondent rather than initiator. World-wide pressures are built up against us before we have a chance to demonstrate our own purposes and values.

So it has been with the issue of nuclear testing. Our diplomacy has concentrated on problems of inspection or on belittling the danger of fall-out. Whatever the scientific basis of the fear of radiation,¹³ there is no question that we should respect the depth of that fear among many peoples exposed to fall-out from tests outside their control and against which they have no protection. Control over radioactive fall-out is therefore a requirement of any United States policy on nuclear testing. But the United States should not be asked at the same time to initiate the control of armaments by paralyzing itself and its allies without at least the beginning of a reduction of Soviet conventional strength and of some protection against surprise attack. The fact that the Soviet

¹³ See for example the recent U.N. report on radiation. *The New York Times*, August 11, 1958.

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Union has proved obdurate on a general disarmament scheme in-
dicates only that it wants to use negotiations to disarm us unilat-
erally, not that such a scheme lacks merit. If we negotiate only on
issues the Soviets declare soluble, we can be sure that diplomacy
will become increasingly a device to undermine the free world.

In the negotiations on a nuclear test ban which are about to
begin, the United States should therefore propose that we are
willing to address ourselves immediately to the problem of fall-
out but that a complete ban would depend on a comprehensive
disarmament agreement. Pending such an agreement, we should
propose that, while nuclear weapons are essential to the defense
of the free world, we are prepared to take immediate steps to
mitigate the effects either of testing or of using them. We should
invite the Soviet Union to join a U.N. committee which would
immediately set a maximum dosage of permissible fall-out from
testing well below the level brought about by recent tests. The
U.N. committee should then assign a quota to the United States
and its allies and another to the Soviet bloc on a 50-50 basis.
(Since most of the potential "fourth" Powers are in the West, this
would be a considerable concession to the U.S.S.R.) For two years
all Powers would agree to register with the U.N. all tests which
involve fall-out and both sides would agree not to exceed their
quota. During those two years the quota would be progressively
reduced, ultimately to zero. Afterwards, unless there were by then
a general disarmament agreement, nations would remain free to
conduct surface tests of "clean" weapons, underground tests and
tests in outer space, so long as they did not cause fall-out. Techni-
cal experts from both sides would agree on an adequate inspection
mechanism, which could be relatively simple.

While such an agreement would impede the arms race, it would
not stop weapons development altogether. It would permit the
continued elaboration of defensive weapons and of weapons which
can be applied with discrimination, both in terms of fall-out and
in terms of yield. Indeed it will put a premium on such develop-
ment because these weapons can be tested most easily under-
ground or within established "fall-out" quotas. It will avoid plac-
ing the United States in the position of not trusting its allies with
the development of weapons which are essential to their defense
and which their opponent already possesses in quantity. At the
same time, it will impede the too rapid diffusion of nuclear tech-
nology and thereby afford time for a careful study of this problem.

NUCLEAR TESTING

17

The easiest weapons to develop are those with major fall-out ef-
fects. The least complicated method of testing is above ground.
Thus a limited ban could channel future weapons development
into the least destructive channels. It would reduce and ultimately
eliminate whatever health hazard there may be in present testing.

Such a proposal would counteract the Soviet effort to elaborate
a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers or zones
or warfare, a distinction which can only paralyze the free world.
At the same time, it would call attention to a distinction between
forms of warfare which are unnecessarily destructive and those
which seek to confine devastation to the smallest possible pro-
portions—a condition which is essential to make our deterrent
posture plausible and to strengthen the will of the free world. If
the Soviet Union rejected our proposal, we and our allies should
impose a steeply decreasing quota on ourselves, thus forcing the
Soviet Union into the position of being solely responsible for any
health hazard in nuclear testing. In this manner, increasing pres-
sure of world opinion could be built up against the most cata-
strophic use of nuclear weapons and in favor of a general disarma-
ment agreement. This approach to the problem of nuclear testing
would have the additional advantage that it would be much easier
to inspect. Inspection could concentrate on one problem reason-
ably well understood: that of fall-out. If no radioactivity were
found, no violation was taking place.

A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would meet
many of the fears of humanity without exposing the free world to
incalculable peril. It would be a "first step" which avoids most
of the dangers of a complete ban and yet achieves many of its
goals. If the limitation of nuclear tests proved workable, the in-
spection system could be expanded, reduction of arms might fol-
low, and efforts could be made to reduce the danger of surprise
attack. None of these measures is possible, however, as long as
the Soviet Union is encouraged to believe, by the irresolution and
evasions of the free world, that through skillful and persistent
diplomacy it can break up the cohesiveness of the Western alli-
ance and undermine the will to resist aggression, with the only
effective weapon now at our disposal.

VIII

It is widely believed in the West that the issue of nuclear test-
ing is a touchstone of our sincerity. Many argue that the Soviet

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Union scored a major gain by renouncing nuclear tests and that we exhibited lack of imagination and the absence of a moral dimension by not following suit immediately. The reluctance to end nuclear testing, so the argument goes, is a symptom of the sterility and over-concern with military problems which have been at the root of so many of our difficulties.

There is no doubt that the Western world is in deep trouble. It has not been able to articulate either a philosophy or a program adequate to the challenge of the times. It has failed to identify itself with the revolutionary period through which we are living and it has not had the vision or the willingness to carry through a sustained program of world economic development. Because we have not been clear about our purpose we have often found it easier to concentrate on defensive measures than on those which might give a sense of direction to a world in turmoil.

But even in the military field we are inadequately prepared to deal with most of the issues with which we are likely to be confronted. We have insufficient strength for limited war. We are falling behind in the over-all strategic equation. The answer to our political dilemma is not to be found in reducing our defenses—for even here more effort and imagination are required—but in injecting a greater sense of purpose into our over-all performance.

As a nation of specialists we like to believe that a problem is either political or economic or military. The challenge we face, however, is that contemporary problems involve a combination of all these factors. Our choice is not between working for the things in which we believe or attending to our necessities. If we cannot do both, we will not be able to do either.

[1c]

By Henry A. Kissinger

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II

With respect to underground testing it is argued that a system of inspection stations spaced 300 miles apart could detect all ununderground explosions of about 1 kiloton explosive power except in the seismic belt where earthquakes are more frequent, requiring inspection stations on a 100-mile grid. Nevertheless serious problems remain. Methods of "buffering" explosions so that the seismic shock is weakened have barely been explored, but indications are that they can reduce the seismic wave by a very substantial percentage. Moreover, the seismic equipment can locate the shock only within an area several miles in diameter. Some but not all of the characteristics of an underground explosion can be distinguished from those of an earthquake. Conclusive proof can be obtained only by finding the precise location of the suspected eva-

[c]

NUCLEAR TESTING

3

sion either by means of boring for radioactive samples or by dis-
covering an entrance to the test site. This is a considerable task
in an area which may cover more than 30 square miles. And the
negotiators at Geneva agreed that the problem of high altitude
testing was very little understood at this stage. The same diffi-
culty may apply to testing underneath the polar icecaps.

Again, as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become more
widespread other means of evasion may be developed. In fact, the
United States explicitly and the Soviet Union by implication have
both exempted peaceful applications of nuclear energy from their
announced test bans.² One of the obvious applications of nuclear
energy is in mining. It will not be easy to prevent a country from
using devices for blasting which also have military applications,
or from gaining militarily useful knowledge by checking the re-
sults with scientific instruments. To be sure, inspection teams
could be invited to witness each peaceful use of nuclear explo-
sives; but as the peaceful applications of nuclear energy grow
more common, this will become increasingly difficult. A nation
determined on evasion could overload the inspection mechanism
by hiding test explosions among hundreds of ordinary ones.

In any event we must keep in mind that the best inspection
system can guard only against presently known methods of eva-
sion. In the nature of things it is difficult to protect against a con-
tingency not yet imagined. And finally, evasion will be easier to
attempt and to conceal in the Soviet Union than in the West. In
the West a ban on nuclear testing will be largely self-policing,
because public opinion will not countenance evasion and scien-
tists will not lend themselves to it.³ No such inhibitions will exist
in the U.S.S.R.

Yet the most vexing problem of inspection is not that of ob-
taining information, difficult as it is, but the political conse-
quences to be drawn from whatever information does become
available. Obviously a violation of the nuclear test ban is not a
casus belli. It may not even be a sufficient cause for the injured
party to start testing again. Once nuclear tests have been banned,
the free world will not abrogate its agreement easily, even in the
face of strong provocation. Even if it reached a decision to do so,

[Lc]

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[Lc]

NUCLEAR TESTING

5

### III

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6

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[lc]

NUCLEAR TESTING

7

The argument outlined here may not prove persuasive to the increasing number of people in the free world who desire an end to the cold war so intensely that they ignore the lessons of the past, and the fundamental professions of Communist doctrine. But even the most optimistic should ask themselves why Khrushchev can be expected to deal any more gently with the countries of the free world than with his erstwhile colleagues in the Soviet Presidium. What was the doctrine of collective leadership but the principle of peaceful coexistence applied among the Soviet leaders? Yet it was used ruthlessly by Khrushchev first to paralyze opposition by branding it contrary to the principle of collective leadership and then to defeat his opponents one by one. Khrushchev could not have succeeded domestically had he not been able first to convince his colleagues of his sincerity. Is it not at least possible that the men who arrested the leaders of the Hungarian revolution while negotiating an armistice with them and who executed them despite a promise of safe conduct are now seeking to apply these same methods to weaken the cohesion of the free world and then to destroy its members piecemeal? A wise policy will at least consider this contingency and will not risk everything simply for the sake of agreement.

IV

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The free world should therefore have no illusions about the implications of a complete ban on nuclear tests. For if a cessation of nuclear testing is a "first step" to anything it is to an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. If these weapons are too dangerous to test, so the argument will go, they are surely too terrible to use. That this is the aim of Soviet policy was made explicit by Khrushchev: "After the termination of nuclear weapons tests, it would be possible to raise the question of the Powers making a solemn undertaking not to use hydrogen and atomic weapons and henceforth to adopt a decision on the total prohibition of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. ..."⁶ In the present state of Western defenses such a prohibition is tantamount to unilateral disarmament. The onesidedness of our military establishment has deprived our diplomacy of flexibility. If the free world possessed a conventional force sufficiently powerful and mobile to blunt Soviet aggression by similar forces, the complete cessation of nuclear testing would not be so dangerous. But none of the advocates of a nuclear test ban has been prepared to champion—and many have actively opposed—a build-up of conventional forces sufficient to offset the grave risks which their proposals invite.

⁶ The New York Times, June 29, 1958.

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NUCLEAR TESTING

9

v

[LC]

IO

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NUCLEAR TESTING

II

VI

[LC]

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⁹ See Peregrine Worsthorne, "Our Bomb and Theirs: As the Russians See It," *Encounter*, July 1958. Also Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age," *New York: Praeger*, 1958.

[2]

[1c]

NUCLEAR TESTING

13

This is not to say that Europe must obtain nuclear weapons from its own production or that these weapons must be under national control. From many points of view it would be highly desirable if NATO's nuclear components were under NATO control, or if a European atomic force were formed on the model of E.D.C. Similarly it is not essential that nuclear weapons be locally produced, but only that there be European participation in their use and control. Before we go much further in the direction of a complete ban on testing, we should at the very least amend our Atomic Energy Act to permit wider nuclear sharing. And our approach to the question of nuclear testing should be based on premises which do not inhibit nuclear sharing and which will not give impetus to Soviet ban-the-bomb propaganda.

Will not the possession of nuclear weapons by our allies increase the danger of war? This would be true if our allies felt thereby encouraged to attack the Soviet Union, or if they were to use nuclear weapons in their own quarrels outside of Europe. But excessive adventurousness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union can hardly be considered a European failing. Even in the less preferred contingency that nuclear weapons were under national rather than NATO control, it is difficult to conceive the circumstances which would induce any European country to unleash a unilateral attack on the Soviet Union. The individual nuclear capability will remain so small, the disproportion in vulnerability is so great, that they could not, by any rational calculation, use these weapons for offensive ends. Their purpose would be to make the costs of aggression, particularly of local adventures, prohibitive, and to discourage Soviet atomic blackmail.¹¹

As for the use of these weapons to settle private quarrels outside Europe, this could be effectively forestalled by placing them under NATO or an over-all European control. But even should they be under national control, the likelihood of their use outside of NATO is slight. The difficulty which the French army has in Algeria is not inadequate firepower but that of finding targets against which this firepower can be used. Atomic weapons have little significance in guerrilla-type operations.

[L.C.]

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¹² *The New York Times*, August 18, 1958.

[2]

[LC]

NUCLEAR TESTING

15

VII

[L.C.]

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[lc]

NUCLEAR TESTING

17

A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would meet
many of the fears of humanity without exposing the free world to
incalculable peril. It would be a "first step" which avoids most
of the dangers of a complete ban and yet achieves many of its
goals. If the limitation of nuclear tests proved workable, the in-
spection system could be expanded, reduction of arms might fol-
low, and efforts could be made to reduce the danger of surprise
attack. None of these measures is possible, however, as long as
the Soviet Union is encouraged to believe, by the irresolution and
evasions of the free world, that through skillful and persistent
diplomacy it can break up the cohesiveness of the Western alli-
ance and undermine the will to resist aggression with the only
effective weapon now at our disposal.

VIII

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[4]

Sunday.

Dear Henry,

I've just completed my third reading of the manuscript, and although this is not enough for such a tremendously full and significant piece, I can't resist writing down my comments now while they are fresh. Perhaps we will have a bit more time to go into them in Cambridge. If not - and in any case - we MUST find the chance somehow to get together soon for much longer discussions of this and other things. There are few things that I have missed more in the last hectic months than our recurring chance to do this.

It would be hard to tell you how much of a privilege it has been to read the manuscript. In general, I think it *excellent*, and one which it is most important to have appear just at this time. I do have a number of comments, of course, some detailed and some of a more general character. What I will do, if I may, is first to go through the more detailed ones (many of a picyune character) listing them by pages as I have done before, if you can endure this tedious proceeding. Then I will go to some more general questions of argument and of the structure of the paper.

Before coming to this, however, I do want to do one other thing which time has not permitted in the past ten months. I want to define, as clearly as I can, my own thinking and position on this issue as it has developed, and particularly to try to define our own areas of agreement and disagreement as they appear to me. I think this is extremely important, not only in itself - to avoid a misunderstanding of my position which would be very distressing to me - but because if I do not, you may find our areas of agreement in the paper unexpectedly broad.

I have, as you know, been definitely in favor of a scientific and technical conference with the U.S.S.R. on the possibilities, the feasibility, the technical requirements and the technical cost (in its broadest sense) of adequate inspection of nuclear testing, of the general kind now going forward at Geneva. I have felt it extremely important that these exploratory discussions be rigidly confined to technical matters and be conducted solely for the purpose of gathering further information (not only of a strictly scientific but also of an "ambient" character) to serve as basic data in the formulation of policy decisions, to be made by other persons and in other areas of government.
This formal divorce from policy decision or policy implication (in the formal sense) has seemed to me, all along, to be vital to the whole effort. Therefore, at least so far as I am concerned, their *occurrence* implies no precondition of decision whatever as to the *desirability* (or indeed, at this stage of the feasibility) of adequate inspection, still further no preconditioned assumption as to the desirability of a nuclear test ban, partial or complete. (Note that the question of *public assumption* is another matter, which I will come to a bit later). At this point, therefore, I do have - and have not stated nor implied - a definitive position on the matter of the ban itself. My own thinking has

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[4]

tended more in the last months toward a form of limited ban, differing somewhat in detail from the one you have outlined in Part VI, but not very much in principle. I am not at the point in thinking, however, where I am firm enough in this conviction to state it explicitly, and it is quite possible that results from Geneva might change the viewpoint entirely. Hence I propose to reserve formal judgment on that matter, in my own thinking, until the Geneva conference is ended.

I feel that the factual aspect of the divorce of this conference from a value judgment on the question of nuclear test ban has been adequately taken care of in two ways:

(1) By the explicit public statements made reciprocally by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. that the conference is one for information only and that it is under no circumstances to be determining of policy, and

(2) By the choice of the members of the U.S. team, one of whom, as you know, has inclined toward the test ban, one is publicly committed to the reverse view, and the third (the Chairman) is agnostic and has expressed no specific view so far as I am aware.

This, I think, defines our area of disagreement. It refers to the desirability of such a study as the one now in progress as a means of attack on the problem. If I understand aright, you feel that this has not been a desirable means - and I can see some of your reasons. I do feel that it is desirable. Our area of disagreement evidently does not extend to questions of the bans on nuclear testing itself. I thought that it might, in that you might feel that the issue ought to be considered a closed one on the entirely negative side - that the matter was not one which ought to be discussed in any positive aspects because of the great dangers inherent in such discussion. It is clear from Part VI of the paper that you do not feel this way.

There is one aspect, however, in which we may disagree, though in degree more than in kind. I am, at this point, agnostic (though I must confess doubtful) about a total ban on testing: I am not completely negative. I can imagine circumstances where it might be feasible and desirable. I shall not be willing to make a final decision on this for a couple of months more. You are unequivocally negative at this time, and the arguments that you put forth for that position are one of the reasons why I think this paper is so important just now.

Let me now state some of the reasons why I feel that it was desirable for us to enter into the discussions now in progress. I do want to get on to the substance of the paper, so let me summarize them very briefly:

(I) I feel that the position that we will not look - in a fair and free - and above all, a thorough - manner at the whole problem of nuclear inspection places us in a situation of retreat, timidity, and doubt before the whole free world. It opens us (and justifiably) to the charge that we are rigid and absolutely preconditioned in a negative view toward what is widely regarded as one of the most important problems before the world. It makes us peculiarly vulnerable, once again, to Soviet charges of this kind, which we have experienced before through insufficient aggressiveness. Finally, it deprives

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(I) (Continued)

us of what could be a major defense against the Soviet propaganda offense which links the matters of stopping tests, eliminating nuclear stockpiles, and shutting down the means of production of fissionable materials as indissolubly related questions on the one hand, and separates them, on the other, from all the problems and the scientific and political costs of test inspection.

(2) It follows from this that the examination of the feasibility of test bans is only one - and in my thinking, not the most important - aspect of our task at Ueneva. A far more important task is the outlining of the technical costs inherent in such a procedure. These costs could be very severe for us, as you have pointed out in several places - the question of testing in Communist China for example, with its related problems of recognition. There are some which you did not mention and perhaps might, like, for example, the problem of tests held in the Soviet far north. It is very important that we be fully aware of these costs to us at all levels of our people and our government, and especially at policy levels. These are the costs that the Soviets have kept so glibly concealed in all their propaganda offensives.

But there will also be very important technical costs for the Soviets, inherent, among other things, in the matter of inspection stations and inspection teams. The Soviets have never been faced with a public, out-and-out challenge of whether they are willing even to consider these costs as an earnest of their sincerity. Only a scientific and technical discussion can illuminate these costs adequately and present them properly. Quite possibly we would not, in any case, want to face the costs ourselves, once we had fully recognized and assessed them. But we must not be in the position before the world where the costs to us make us pause, while the Soviet is able to escape scot-free because of the fact that they will not accept the cost to them has not been highlighted.

It can be argued (and is not unlikely) that if the Soviets do find the costs unacceptable and are unwilling to face them they will simply break off the talks, while loudly accusing the U.S. of wrecking the discussions. But I believe that, once a fairly large group of both leading Soviet and leading U.S. technical and political people has been continuously exposed to the intricacies of these discussions, on a day-to-day basis, to do this successfully, at least in the areas where it counts, will be a far harder and more subtle task than the comparatively easy one of continually denouncing us because we would not face the hard and challenging task of thoroughly examining the question.

These reasons seem important enough to make me feel that we are engaged right here, quite apart from whether the conference ends in success or failure. There is no doubting that there are penalties which we shall incur. The Soviets may be able to invent propaganda traps that will effectively exploit them and can extricate themselves from the dilemma which they now face. But I would contend that they are in a less, not a more favorable position to architect such traps than they would be had the whole matter not been undertaken. Only time can decide this. But I have been encouraged by the very evident Soviet hesitation and indecision when they finally had -

["-4-", "for the first time - to walk straight up to an all-out, open-air technical discussion conducted with detachment by a very tough-minded team as capable as their own; by their initial attempt to call off the whole thing, their subsequent decision that they had to go through with it, and their later, possibly significant, silences about it.", "It is a long risk, admittedly. But so would any course of action be, and I feel that there is a greater risk in inaction here. I think it is possible that we can, with sufficient skill, even put ourselves on the offensive by the positive course. I am sure we cannot by the negative one.", "Well! This has been a long disquisition, and not comments on the paper at all! But I did want very much to outline my position pretty thoroughly, and this for two reasons both very important to me. I didn't want you to think that I have not tried, at least, to think this problem through in considerable detail - the conclusions are not ones lightly achieved! And second, I want to be sure that my position is not carried farther than I do, or have expressed or implied that I do. This would be very distressing to me, and, more, would rob our discussion of these matters of some of its meaning.", "So now to the paper, at long last! First, if I may, the page-by-page comments.", "p. 4. \"This article seeks to deal with the issue . . . .\" But of course it goes much farther on Part VI. Should this not be indicated?", "pp. 6-8. This is a good discussion of some of the difficulties of adequate inspection. Do you want to make any mention of the associated problem of inspection of delivery systems?", "p. 12. It could be replied that it is a symptom of the complacency of the free world that it assumes \"natural\" development - I would put it more strongly and say - a symptom dangerously like that of arrogance!", "p. 14. \"There is for one thing the problem of Communist China . . . .\" This paragraph outlines what seems to me to be one of the most serious (and least analysed) questions in the whole matter. There are several related questions which I have not seen adequately explored - and no adequate attention has been called to them, at least publicly. For instance - would it be necessary, or desirable, for the U.S. to recognize China if international inspection teams were stationed there? (After I wrote this I came to Part VI and your suggestion of using the U.N. for the partial ban enforcement. Is this why?) Would it be undesirable - or otherwise - for us to have access to adequate stations in China? Would it be worth recognition? The point in the last sentence of that paragraph is all-important - so much so that I would like to see some of these related questions expanded further. But this is probably another paper!", "p. 15. \"Even if it did not exist it would still be at the mercy of . . ." This sentence, as it stands, seems to me to appear to offer a powerful reason for not making the effort to develop conventional forces."]

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p. I5 (Continued)

The reader could imply that, since the Soviet is invulnerable both
in the nuclear and conventional fields, and since the nuclear one is
controlling, there is not much point to conventional development.
This is the opposite impression, I think, to what you (or I) would
want to leave. Cannot the two arguments implicit in this one sentence
be separated?

p. I5. "Our aim should be to counteract this state of mind . . ." I could not agree more emphatically on this point. It is, of course, for me one of the important arguments for the present Geneva conference, as I have already indicated.

p. I6. "The only logical corollary of an agreement to end tests would therefore be a drastic stepup of conventional forces throughout the free world . . ." I agree emphatically and think this point ought to be expanded and underlined further for our own people. It is, of course, an inevitable price. That it is not thought of more in this context is, I think, a function of our penchant that you have mentioned elsewhere - of loosely trying to eat our cake and have it too. If the corollary were really taken to heart, it might even be a factor in favor of a test ban! It is unlikely to be, however, in a tax-reduction era.

p. I6. "It is an illusion to believe . . ." To counter just this statement of Kruschev with a hard and quantitative reply, exposing all the costs and all the realities, rather than with a simple refusal to discuss the matter at all, seems to me one of the raisons d'etres of the present conference.

p. I5. "At the same time we are negotiating about the cessation of nuclear tests (Backflash) . . . ." I do not, of course, agree with this sentence, for the reasons I have given earlier - I think the contribution might well be in the opposite direction. This is sheer opinion, however, and I would not change that argument, though I would not make it myself.

p. I8. Would it not be worth while invoking the matter of the limited war once again, specifically and by name, somewhere on this page? It is a powerful argument, of course, for the weapons spectrum - and by now a fairly familiar one which may give the reader a better point of contact. The relation between test-ban and the spectrum of weapons available to us is of course an evident one demanding the most careful thinking. Some of this thinking, at least, is being done.

p. I9. I agree completely, of course, that the nature of the weapon (given approximately equal destructive power) does not essentially change the structure of the conflict itself or the decisions made within it. The sentence "A Soviet conventional attack on Europe is more likely to unleash an all-out war than a Soviet nuclear attack on say Afghanistan" may need remolding or expansion in the context of this argument, however. There is little doubt of its truth - but is not the more relevant and searching argument, in this context "Will a Soviet attack with conventional weapons on Afghanistan be more or less likely to unleash world

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p. 19 (Continued)
conflict than a nuclear one, using weapons of approximately equal power?"

p. 20. "Unless the free world develops a military capability which offers other means of resistance than an all-out showdown . . ." This of course is a profound and powerful argument, but it deserves a context of its own - that of the weapons spectrum - rather than having to rely on the link between nuclear ban and the maintenance of a weapons spectrum. Think it should be developed further. I'll elaborate this further on in connection with a general comment on this whole section, which troubles me somewhat.

p. 20. "Conversely, if the Soviet Union fails to develop more discriminating weapons . . ." This, of course, is by implication an argument for the test ban - especially if it can be assumed that the Soviet is slightly less far along currently in its total weapons spectrum than the U.S. (a dangerous assumption, of course, but one likely to be made by the reader). It may be well to recognize this sequitur explicitly, or to hedge against it.

p. 21. "We cannot base our defense on the assumption of the Soviet willingness . . ." The argument from here to the end of that first paragraph is unclear. I don't see quite the development of the logic, and in any case it leads to a conclusion too obvious to be worthy of its premises and argument. Revamp.

The next paragraph, while true, essentially repeats arguments already made. There can be no doubt about the desirability of extending the discrimination of nuclear weapons!

p. 22. "We would then have to decide whether . . ." Don't understand the point here - perhaps I'm obtuse!

p. 22. "Our choice in short is between developing . . ." This seems to me a too-simplified, too black-and-white statement. This is one of the things we have to do continually - but one of a very large matrix indeed, including all the conventional and manpower issues. I can't see a good reason for isolating this one, unless it is to stress a connection between test-ban and the ability to develop a suitable spectrum. This is an important point, but if that is what the statement does lead to, I think here again it should be made explicit, and elaborated.

p. 22. "This in any case has been the trend in some circles in Great Britain . . ." This seems to me puzzling as to meaning, possibly loose. Do you mean that this is the choice for Britain? But if so, how does this link with the test-ban-unilateral disarmament proposal - or does this sentence refer to the one beginning "Those who argue . . ."? Needs clarification.

p. 24. "But local production will be small for the indefinite future". I agree thoroughly with the two preceding sentences - feel, indeed, that they are of major importance. But I would feel a little cautious about this last statement, on purely factual grounds. I am not sure that domestic production in some countries would take as long to initiate as is commonly assumed. I am not in a good position to judge this from the standpoint of basic knowledge - but I feel a bit of question.

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p. 24. "The only area in which the possession of nuclear weapons would add significantly to military potentialities is western Europe". But does not this run counter to the argument (which I believe) that small nuclear weapons would add significantly to military potential in many other areas - assuming they were available?

p. 24. A general point I want to make later - note *advantage* to the Soviet Union of a *lack* of diffusion of nuclear weapons - it could be that they would welcome the Fourth Power problem. I'll elaborate on this later.

p. 24. Footnote. I think this statement needs expansion. It does not seem to me obvious in certain contexts. For one, consider the case of Panama, armed with nuclear weapons and intransigent about the control of the Canal. Such issues seem to me to demand full examination, some time, of what our own policy toward diffusion should be. I think a strong case can be made that it should be positive. I hate to think of a Soviet Union making welcome gifts of nuclear weapons (or even arsenals) to proximate friendly South American powers while our hands are tied!

p. 25. "Nuclear weapons are essential because the forseeable level of conventional strength . . ." Should this be *cannot* arrest? Otherwise, what is the meaning?

pp. 24-25. The argument through here seems to me at times diffuse, with sequences not clearly indicated. Needs strengthening and tightening.

p. 26. "If the possession of nuclear weapons by our European allies . . ." The argument in this paragraph seems to me of the greatest importance.

p. 27. "As long as our Atomic Energy Act makes it impossible to give nuclear weapons . . . ." This seems to me to shift the argument about a ban on nuclear testing to other and somewhat weaker ground, in the interest of emphasizing the need to change the Act. An opponent could then argue: "Good; an adequate change in the provisions of the Act would take the seriousness out of a ban on nuclear testing" - neglecting all the complex considerations of domestic development, Soviet relations, etc. The last sentence: "Moreover, if a ban on nuclear testing . . ." further seems to assume that a ban on nuclear testing is a *fait accompli* and addresses itself to the *timing* of such a ban relative to that of changes in the Act. Do you want to do this? It seems to me to weaken the earlier approaches. The point about the Act is surely right, but cannot it be "unhinged" from the point of the ban, or at least made less contingent on it? It seems to me that it also confuses the issue of *sharing weapons* with that of *barring weapons tests*.

p. 28. This whole page, of course, relates to sharing rather than ban. I believe the distinction should be made somewhere.

p. 28. Of course the point about the denuclearized belt is of *first* importance.

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[Y]

p. 28. The argument about Soviet sharing with its allies seems to me to miss a general point, which I'll elaborate later. It might well be to the Soviet advantage *not* to share with its allies on any basis except one strictly controlled - it would then not be self-denial but self-advantage. Equally, it might be much to Soviet interest to share with some of the "free" - at least with some of the uncommitted - world.

p. 30. "If anything the mutual possession of nuclear weapons will increase the disparity of strength". How so? I can see how it might *decrease* it - though I'm not sure about this - but, out of hand, I don't see the reverse. Would a bit of expansion not be in order?

p. 31. "The possession of nuclear weapons by Israel and Egypt, for example, will not of itself increase their hostility to each other". No, but it may greatly and significantly alter their tactics, and so their impact on the world as a whole. Should not this be pointed out?

pp. 31-32. "It will be possible . . . . and this would inhibit diffusion more effectively . . ." Out of hand, I don't see how a nuclear test ban inhibits diffusion at all. The abundant and ever-growing stockpiles of weapon types already tested will always be there to draw upon if necessary.

p. 32. First paragraph of VI. Of course I agree intensely. One of the starting-points of my own opinion!

p. 35. "They would be free to conduct . . . ." I would omit surface bursts of "clean" weapons here - think underground tests alone a better basis.

p. 35. "At the same time, it will impede . . . ." 'Of course, I am not sure that fairly rapid diffusion is undesirable.

p. 37. I am not knowledgable enough of the technology here to be sure that statements as final as these are tenable. Would a very few stations be adequate, for instance? † simply don't know.

p. 37. "It would be a 'first step' which permits . . . ." But earlier, there was a strong argument about the danger of the total ban *as a first step* toward more perilous ground. Should it not be made more clear here how and why a succession of steps would differ in this case from those which might follow a total ban? As it now stands, the steps outlined as following the partial ban may not sound convincingly different from those which might follow the total one.

Similarly, the last part of the paragraph at the top of p. 38 does not seem to me to differentiate sufficiently between partial and entire bans, true as it is otherwise.

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[N]

So much for the small and detailed comments. May I now add one or two more general propositions, before commenting on the paper as a whole?

There are two general arguments against a total nuclear ban which seem to me important, but which you have not specifically elaborated. I wonder whether you want to consider them?

The first is the question whether the Soviet Union itself would not, in the nature of things, profit very markedly, relative to the free World, from a test ban which they scrupulously observed and continued to observe (assuming that the cost of continuing inspection was not too high for them to accept, or sufficiently profitable for the Free World to offset the difference). Suppose that the USSR has now concluded that, other things being equal, it is unlikely that they will overhaul the Free World in nuclear potentiality over the next few years by that overwhelming margin essential to make a general war profitable, or even to allow them as much leeway for audacity in limited wars as they would like. Suppose, also, that they would prefer to conquer the Free World without nuclear conflict if this is practicable - a reasonable assumption. Considering their current success in other fields, they might then well feel that any domestic manpower that could be released from purely military preoccupations (especially any technical manpower) to take up the fields of foreign aid, or commercial development abroad, or any of the non-military channels that they are now exploiting so successfully, would be far better employed and would represent a clear gain to the Soviet. To permit this with safety, of course, they would have to be assured of approximate weapons parity with the Free World - or, by preference, a comfortable, but not necessarily militarily decisive, margin of superiority. What more convenient way to achieve this than by a rigid nuclear ban, rigidly observed? This is one of the factors that it seems to me most important to keep in mind in judging current Soviet reactions.

The second is the matter of the "Fourth Power" problem and nuclear diffusion, already mentioned. I should think that the Soviet would be extremely careful and extremely reluctant about allowing the development of facilities for nuclear weapons production in any of its satellites or its allies except those which (a) it cannot control at all, or (b) where its control is absolute. Not only would the possession of such facilities be potentially very dangerous to a USSR anxious to avoid nuclear war if possible, but it could not help, by its very fact, drastically altering the balance between the USSR and the satellite producing such weapons. So long as the USSR remains the sole supply among its satellites of a military commodity of this importance, it possesses a moral control that, once lost, can never be regained. So I would expect the Soviet to be at least as much concerned about the Fourth Power problem on its home ground as we - and probably more so.

Abroad, however, the attitude of the Soviet might very well be reversed. Would not a royal gift of a few weapons to a strategically located South American country which had shown itself sympathetic to the Soviet cause be a very great bargain in the extension of Soviet influence? And if this began to happen would we, or would we not, wish that we had considered this possibility and the possible countermeasures to it earlier? This is highly speculative thinking, of course, but it does seem to me to demand a reexamination of what we may expect the Soviet attitude toward diffusion and the Fourth Power problem is likely to be, and what our own attitude should be on the entire matter.

-10-

Now after all these lengthy preliminaries, let me come at last to a general estimation of the paper!

First of all, I think it is a titanic job, and ought to come out now, as I have said, while our thinking on the whole question is critically labile. Second, I think that it is not one paper, but at least three compounded, and not always clearly separated. Some of the issues need separating out, I think. In particular, I think more distinction needs to be made between the specific problems of nuclear testing and test ban, to which the paper is (and should be) primarily addressed, and some of the terribly important but more general issues that arise along with it - nuclear sharing, the nuclear arming of western Europe, the problem of Nato in this connection, the importance of peripheral war and the deadly need of our recognition of it, our need to face the world realistically and with maturity, and the rest. They all need emphasizing, terribly, and they are all interrelated. But I think they must be subordinated in this paper to the central issue, and at times more specifically related to it, if the central theme is to stand out and carry conviction. Then I think that the arguments against a total ban and for the proposal for a partial, U.N.-controlled ban, ought to be collated more closely and some of what seem to me discrepancies between them ironed out.

This brings up the matter of Part VI, which seems to me one of the high points of the paper. Would you consider moving it closer to the front? It is such a positive part of the paper, and I do think that strength is gained by starting with the positive aspect as soon as possible and bringing all the negative things in to enforce the positive ones, rather than starting the other way around, with the negative ones per se. The proposal itself seems to me worthy of the most careful consideration, end of further elaboration, here or elsewhere, at this time. As I said, my own thinking has been moving in the direction of a partial ban also in the past months. It has taken a somewhat different direction, involving a limitation on yields tested (so that lower yields might be exempt - they of course pose the more difficult tasks of detection - ) and including, like your own, underground shots. I had not considered involving the U.N., however, which is an idea that I want to digest further. At any rate, I'd like to see Part VI nearer the front.

Part IV, by contrast, seems to me a rather low point in the paper, and I am somewhat troubled by it. It addresses itself perhaps too much to the more general issues, with the effect discussed above, and in additon seems to me sometimes to force connections with the nuclear test ban problem. The argument needs tightening in several places, I think. In addition, there is a good deal that clashes with Part VI I believe. Thus I think a reader could (or would think he could) apply some of the arguments of Part IV effectively in Part VI, where they do not belong. Possibly it might be worth considering breaking up Part IV and distributing its contents!

Finally, it seems to me that the brief Part VII really does belong at the beginning rather than at the end - where most of it could well serve as an introduction to the whole problem, and especially to Part IV. The exception is the final paragraph, which seems to me a most excellent conclusion.

That is all I have! Would it be possible to be more presumptuous in commenting on a paper? By the time you have reached this point, you will be so utterly weary of them that you will want to discard them - and this letter - altogether!

But I had to go into the matter at this length because of the urgency of the problem

- II -

[N]

and because I think the paper is most important and I am terribly anxious that it
be concise and "tight" as a contribution to current thinking.

Forgive me - and thanks so much again for the privilege of reading it! May I
see subsequent editions, if there are any?

As always,

P.S. And forgive the typing errors that I am sure are here in abundance! I haven't
read copy yet, but I'm sure they are there. I'm a miserable stenographer, and
since this is done in Westport on Sunday, I am my own secretary!

C.

New York Times

July 2, 1957 2-4

Representative Sterling Cole: "Humanity, decency and conscience" demand that the US continue atomic testing until 'clean' nuclear weapons are developed." "To have 'a flexible atomic capability' to meet the threat of small as well as large wars." suspension of all but those to reduce radioactivity is advocated.

July 2, 26:6

Inglis we have clean tests, then all others have to have dirty tests to get them too, and you would still not have a tolerable war (concern only with major war) "The current negotiations envisage a trial period of stopping tests and...the great value of this proposal is that it might work and be continued. # For as long as it works we should have the satisfaction that Russian development of advanced weapons is being hindered as much well as ours. We and all nations would have the valuable assurance that we are all advancing less rapidly toward the precarious day of "push-button warfare" and that the risk danger of accidental war is being further minimized by keeping the number of atomically armed powers small."

July 3, 2-4

Stassen: 10 months ban if monitoring stations set up - "first-step" advantages of first step: surprise attack eliminated; no spread of arms; no incidents; relief of arms burden (this one is almost never mentioned)

July 4 12:2

Eisenhower - share clean bombs (all won't have to test)

July 4 12:2

"Charles E. Wilson, secretary of defense, has said that the suspension of nuclear arms tests would not hurt the development of the long-range ballistic missile since the development of delivery systems could continue. In addition Secretary Wilson has said that suspension of the nuclear arms tests would constitute little more than a "nuisance" and indeed not affect the international arms race at all."

July 14 19-1

International Trades Unions warns on Soviet intentions and calls for control and inspection.

July 17 26-5

Sulzberger We want inspection for surprises, not actual ban on nuclear weapons. clean bombs are irrelevant.

August 6 1-1

World Council of Churches - "Failing international agreement on stopping tests the Council proposed unilateral action 'in the hope that the others will do the same!' The church body predicted that this calculated "risk for peace' might bring new confidence and raise the foundations for 'reliable agreements.'"

August 7 19-8 Stevenson: "But all is not lost and I hope that we will press on for the burden of arms is intolerable and nuclear war unthinkable. I believe we should now concentrate on ending nuclear weapons tests and production for that is the world's greatest danger."

August 11 IV 1-3 "the reason it rejects the Soviet proposal for a simple ban on tests is that it includes no guarantees of compliance and would be pointless so long as there are no controls of weapons production and use."

[4]

New York Times

April 1 - 16:3

Rayburn says is propaganda (Russian halt). "All the talk of the
Summit and the talk of stopping the explosions of these bombs, Russia has beaten
us on propaganda all around the world."

Hickenlooper: "The stopping of tests, in my view, is not an
important step toward world peace unless it is accompanied by responsible
and reliable stopping of production of weapons. It is just a propaganda move."

April 1 5-3

Gavin "It is in the interest of humanity for the US to continue
its testing of nuclear weapons. "Whether we like it or not, we are living in a nuclear
age..... and wants study and learning to make weapons that can be used without
destroying our planet."

April 1 14-7

Reston: propaganda. "Washington...finds itself once more on the
defensive." We want inspection and preparation. Haven either propaganda or unity.
Could have stopped tests or gone underground.

April 2 7-3

Dulles: "We want weighted very heavily all the pros and cons, and particula-
ly.... the fact that unless there can be a program which goes to the heart of this
problem, namely, the existence of nuclear weapons, we really ought to try to make
these weapons into something that could be used without human destruction,
and would could make progress toward their utility as more of a tactical weapon."

April 2 6:1

Dulles: "We have always been willing to halt tests as part of a program
which would lead to the effective elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals
of the nations." "The actual situation today is that the Soviet Union has, as
we have, enough large thermonuclear weapons to destroy the other, and perhaps a major
part of humanity. The Soviet Union is willing apparently to let it go at that.
We will not willing to let it go at that. We want to do either of two things:
Either to cut down on this and to eliminate nuclear weapons effectively from the
international arsenals, or, if that is not going to be done, to develop the weapons
so that they can be effectively used as a defense weapon without a mass destruction
of humanity. ...We... have always preferred the first choice." "Also I may say,
differently develop its uses for peaceful purposes." (a footnote)

April 3 8-2

Eisenhower: "The testing thing which you p- of which you speak, I think
is just a side issue, I think it is a gimmick, and I don't think it is to be taken
seriously." (does say only small bombs could evade detection) (Teller and
MacMillan say could evade detection)

April 5 3-4

Kenworthy of Times: 3 reasons against ban: Britain and France
would oppose cease because need tests; feasibility studies not complete; clean
-weapons need testing.

April 6: IV 1-1

Times: 3 elements are contrary: deterrent role, cannot detect, allies.
IV 3-5

"In each Soviet propaganda success - sputnik, summit and testing - the record seems to indicate that US policy rather than US propaganda failure or Soviet astuteness was chiefly responsible for the American defeat."

[N]

New York Times

April 9 1-8

Dulles: will not join in suspension without controls unless didn't need controls any more. Stresses Soviet use for civilian blasting.

"So that it won't there would have to be, we think, a considerable degree of inspection; ... the would be to have some to establish a supervision of a cessation of testing that was effective. But whether or not the Soviet Union is thinking along those lines we don't know. That is the reason why we think it would be useful to get started at least on some of the technical studies while the other problems are being studied - in case of principle." "I don't think that you can separate psychological warfare from the substantive work that we are doing. We can't have propaganda which is any better than, or any different from, what we actually are doing as a matter of practice. So that while I think we can present our case more effectively than we have been doing, I don't think we can do it by trying to put propaganda in a totally separate compartment from policy making and operations."

"We can't are not prepared to abandon the posit on that the program upon which we are embarked ought to cover as many aspects of disarmament as is possible, including the conventional which are, as I pointed out here before, of very great importance to some of our European allies and they would be reluctant to see the nuclear problem dealt with apart from the conventional. Now that doesn't mean that we are not prepared to take up technical studies which would deal just with the nuclear problem."

Sulzberger three explanations for Kremlin move: propaganda; self confidence in military posture; strategic advantage - less obvious and less discussed. West is in posture to begin to produce and USSR manpower and conventional weapons will fade. Our allies have, then, Russian have to put China and Poland into nuclear weapons - and they know would be unsteady. (Stresses our advantage if keep on and reliable? allies have nuclear weapons, doesn't stress Russian position if ban, doesn't mention what will happen if we go on to advantage and then China and Poland have from our point of view) "Inadequate attention has been devoted to the purely strategic reasons which contributed to Russia's maneuver. For the ugly is on the verge of winging our way." "Therefore such Europe must have its own nuclear warheads.... But if there is to be no more testing, France, West Germany and other NAto powers cannot every make such weapons."

April 10

Truman "The US and GB should invite Soviet Russia to go in with them to pool scientific and technical resources in a program to provide for continued nuclear experiments - but under the control of the UN organization." practical bases, not wishing security. "We cannot stop in the middle of the greatest scientific development in mankind's history". "I don't believe in propaganda. I believe in truth" "How then could anyone construe this as any kind of victory for the Russians? At most this propaganda might be axiomatic for a short time impress certain groups here and abroad who by now ought to know better." need action and leadership "There can be no genuine disarmament except through the UN and a system of international control and inspection."

April 13th. meeting of scientists: axiomatic two groups: complete ban and (Leghorn and Wiesner) can't turn clock back, must learn to live, limit production and use, countries testing for clean bombs as deterrent. ground control.

April 13th I 9-4

Kefauver suspend after spring tests and go before UN with new disarmament plan. before a bomb dropped.

[4]

New York Times

April 13 IV 1-2 To Russia's advantage to limit nuclear, to ours to link with conventional.

1-3 willing to do unilaterally, not bilaterally - afraid Russia's urging banning nuclear weapons altogether and then no deterrent and no general controls. But are not afraid of cheating - can detect.

5-6 Stassen for inspected ban - a first step.

5-8 Must get alternatives to ban proposal of Russians that may be forthcoming.

April 14th

Humphrey "We have more to gain from a suspension of testing that anyone else, from a moral point of view, a political point of view and a technical point of view." "I personally believe that if you are going to have a truly effective disarmament agreement of major proportions, you must include within it Red China."

[Y]

Herald Tribune May 1 - 15

May 5, 1958 5:5 Story on the Fed. of Am. Scientists: "The longer such an agreement is delayed the greater is the probability that nuclear weapons will get into the hands of irresponsible governments in other countries -- any one of which might be able to set off a general nuclear war," they want to limit under UN inspection, to not have a package deal because it is too broad and anyway you can detect blasts.

May 7, 9:1 Hans Bethe said, "considerably to our advantage" if an inspectable test-ban could be negotiated, since the US now excels the Soviet Union in design variety and stockpile of weapons." Soviet Union blasts would be detected unless they played dangerous game of low-yield underground tests, and even then would find out. "You have, however, complete access and immediate access for any inspection team to any suspected area, and I think without that, the inspection system would be useless." "...matter of simple logic...that it is more advantageous to stop when you know that you are still ahead." If testing continues he said the Russians "will surely attempt the same level of capability as we." Seek test ban agreement now before our tests, with inspection, but not limitation of production.

Strauss, same debate: I feel that text suspension at this time would be a disadvantage to us."

May 9, 3:1 Strauss: "He repeated his view that the texts must proceed in the absence of any cheat-proof international inspection system, and implied that the Russians may have announced their one-sided decision to halt tests March 31 in the belief that they now possess 'effective means of cancelling out' an American nuclear counterpunch."

Washington Post May 1 - 7

May 7 A5. article: small NATO nations want test ban to counter Russian one.

May 3 A9:4 Libby said, "we must have further tests" to perfect nuclear defenses against Soviet H-bombers and continent-jumping missiles with hydrogen warheads. At The moment Washington is 'essentially defenseless' except for the threat of retaliation." the weapons for defense have a long way to go to catch up to weapons for offense. Pacific tests a major role in getting anti-missile missiles. (yet most articles talk about clean bombs rather than this role) Ike says 40% "We are just at the beginning of development of defensive atomic weaponry" for clean "... the benefits of continuing testing are so great as to outweigh the minute hazard of testing fallout to health and genetics."

May 3 A14:1 Editorial: "The Soviet nuclear test suspension in itself did nothing to reduce the threat of nuclear war; and even if the U.S. were to respond with an inspection plan of its own after the new Pacific tests (as we think it should), this would not eliminate the danger from existing weapons and strategy. But it is one very important qualification. The Russians have offered to accept mutual inspection; and agreement on even a rudimentary system would establish a principle which just might be expanded into more meaningful applications."

May 6 A9:4 "There was once doubt expressed that thermonuclear energy would ever be used for peaceful purposes.... But we are getting closer and closer, and our now very close indeed, to achieving those peaceful purposes...if we are not prevented by some unreasonable international agreements."

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 57

Rabinowitch article on Pugwash: addressed to dangers of atomic energy, problems of atomic disarmament, responsibility of scientists.

1. interest in dangers because of Stevenson, bio danger, Japanese, Soviet exploitation of test ban prop. Not concerned with external but internal - genetic (slight) and somatic (more definite). Argue is ethically and religiously indefensible. Others answer has to be weighted against the defense importance of weapons testing. Others just another man-made danger - against which say is involuntarily exposed.

2. Committee II report:
"In this age of atomic weapons, the objective of all nations must be the abolition of war and even the threat of war from the life of mankind. War must be eliminated, not merely regulated by limiting the weapons to be used. The advancement of this objective calls for:

1. The lessening of tensions among nations and the promotion of mutual understanding among their peoples.

2. The ending of the arms race.

3. The provision of reasonable safe-guards in the arms control system to give substantial protection and build up mutual confidence. The development of atomic armaments has now gone so far that a completely effective and reliable control system appears to be no longer possible.

4. The initiation of a step-by-step process to develop as satisfactory a set of controls and safeguards as practicable. The prompt suspension of nuclear bomb tests could be a good first step for this purpose."
Rabinowitch: also fact U.S., G.B. and probably S.U. based on nuclear weapons on every level and in every war.

"Concerning the nuclear arms tests- whose stopping loomed very large in the minds of many participants when they came to Pugwash, not only as a measure of health protection, but also (and, for some, above all) as a significant first step toward disarmament - the report merely mentions that this 'could be a good first step.'" caused two to vote against.

3\#. one point is: "Scientific and technical progress is irreversible."

On London talks - 257 - Jerome H. Spingarn

"The appointment of Governor Harold Stassen as special presidential representative to handle disarmament matters resulted in an intensification of American efforts to try to understand the Soviet position and to convey a sense of U.S. sincerity and purpose in efforts to achieve disarmament! "To some, the Lodge announcement was a disappointment because it was not a comprehensive system of disarmament. On the other hand, those who had observed disarmament negotiations in recent years were well aware that no major power, at the present time, seriously considers a truly comprehensive plan of disarmament. The willingness to take a less dramatic approach was therefore in itself a sign of sincerity..." earlier conferences: "increasing tendency for the conferees to come into closer and closer agreement on technical details, they seemed to shy away from actual agreement when the time for the final handshake drew near. This could only indicate a lack of basic will to disarm."

"Economic pressures in the United States, in the Soviet Union and other countries, the relative stability of the Khrushchev coalition in Russia, the Japanese demand for the cessation of tests, and the dangers of air pollution and their impact on governments, were all considered possible incentives to a more serious approach."

Russia wants cuts in conventional weapons and forces, U.S. only if tied to German reunification.

3.

"(4) The problem of nuclear weapons tests must be considered in relation to the same two aims: maintaining (and perfecting) the deterrent barrier at the lowest and most all-around effective level; and reducing the tensions generated by the unrestricted arms race."

November 1957 - 315

Rabinowitch: "addresses itself to a symptom and not to the essence of the crisis."
"...at best, a symptomatic treatment of an organic illness."

William R. Frye - 334. "In order to accommodate its allies, the U.S. had to stick by the agreement not to accept a separate test ban, come diplomatic hell or high water. Not that a majority of the NSC in Wash. wanted to halt the test; on the contrary."

January 1958 - 3

Rabinowitch: "Disarmament negotiations have been a make-believe for the last several years, because the will to disarm was too weak on both sides, and all proposals were hedged with conditions intended to secure military advantages for one or the other side. ...Will (our political leaders) start looking fervently for a new approach to the problem of permanent peace?"

test bans for these reasons: no more radioactive contamination (minor) deadlock in disarmament negotiations be broken (no) only one requiring no giving up of sovereignty

Leghorn: prevent US and Su from developing long-range nuclear missile warheads (have now) prevent new nations from acquiring (but danger not in making but in getting from US or SU if bi-polar, others not agree if multi-polar.)

"As long as peace is going to be balanced precariously on mutual deterrence, to ask for the cessation of tests means asking for renunciation of the hope that 'deterrence by active defense' can be developed to supplement 'deterrence by retaliation.'" - counter-missiles, minimum fall-out.

opponents also blind faith that in our superior technology as strength and could but gain.

May Libby: 190 "I think it is necessary (nuclear testing) as long as we have an armaments race. In the absence of a safeguarded disarmament policy, I don't see how we could afford to quit testing, as long as the fall-out problem is not too hazardous." detection: "The trouble is that, if you are far enough away, you can't tell earth-quakes and nuclear explosions apart, if the test are planned right." - inspectors

2.

Bu of A.S. - September 57.

Dulles: "3. It is technically possible to devise a monitoring system which would detect significant nuclear rests and make evasion a highly risky business. But possibility of concealment is such that inspection teams will have to be numerous, and near to test areas."

"(c) Along with steps (a) no producing with control and (b) stockpiles reduced we propose a tentative suspension of nuclear testing for about ten months." "Until we see convincing proof that the Soviets are serious about arms limitation, our safety primarily depends on having the best weapons, large and small, that we can develop. This means continued testing. Testing makes it possible to develop even smaller weapons and to insure that larger weapons will have less radioactive fall-out....Therefore, we do not separate the testing from the broader issues."

Linus Pauling Appeal by American Scientists: Urgent Testing?..urge that an International agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs be made now." health - genetics. "So long as these weapons are in the hands of only three powers an agreement for their control is feasible. If testing continues, and the possession of these weapons spreads to additional governments, the danger of outbreak of a cataclysmic nuclear war through the reckless action of some irresponsible national leader will be greatly increased.

An international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs now could serve as a first step toward a more general disarmament and the ultimate effective abolition of nuclear weapons...."

Los Alamos Chapter of the Fed. of Am. Scientists:
"The dominant concern of U.S. Policy must be to seek out and to take all equitable steps in disarmament and in international relations which can be expected to diminish the risk of war. When placed in contrast with this objective, technical improvements in the means of waging war are insignificant. Therefore, it is urgent that the technical reasons recently published for continuing nuclear weapons tests be put in proper perspective. If it be true that mankind faces a future in which either 'clean' or 'dirty' nuclear bombs will be employed, then, of course, weapons testing must continue in order to develop so-called 'clearner' bombs.... A secondary technical reason offered ...is the hope that such testing may contribute to the development of peacetime uses of atomic energy.".UN. Commission better.
"Although we recognize that in the absence of any disarmament agreements, this country must continue all its military developments, including the testing of nuclear weapons, we also recognize that the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, under appropriate inspection controls, may form as essential part of an initial package proposal, such as.. HS, has recently advanced in London."are reassured by Eisenhower's firm statement will not be deflected from its offers to ban, under appropriate conditions despite technical reasons advanced. "We share the President's conviction regarding the importance of the London disarmament negotiations as a means through which this country may move closer to a basis for security through world peace."

## B. of A.S. - October 57

Rabinowitch: "The same criteria apply also to nuclear arms tests. Public excitement over this question is so strong in the whole world that a cessation of tests would be the most effective of all practically possible immediate contributions to the improvement of the international atmosphere. ... It was suggested above that any step leading to the relaxation of international tensions can be truly useful only if this relaxation is used for nurturing a policy directed toward world integration. So long as neither the U.S. government, nor that of the USSR, has committed itself to this policy...there is no reason to hope that suspension of arms tests would produce more than a temporary (and objectively unfounded) relaxation of the fear of war."

1.

Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace

Ever since the end of World War II inaugurated a period of intens-
ifying tensions and the perils of nuclear age, the free world has confront-
ed the problem of how to find peace in a situation so much at variance
with its expectations. All its inclinations impelled it in the direction
of an end to the villification of the cold war, of the arms race and of
the danger of a nuclear holocaust. At the same time Soviet intransigence
forced a concern with security which sometimes obscured other and more
constructive programs. At the same time our expectation of war and peace
as successive phases of policy and our notion of peace as a state of static
good-will made it extremely difficult for us to seize the opportunities
which have been available or to come to grip with a set of relationships
which fitted neither our concept of peace nor of war.

We thus find ourselves in a situation of seemingly endlessly
prolonged tension for which we are ill-prepared either by history or by
temperament. The resulting frustration has sometimes produced extremes
of belligerence and of conciliation; suggestions of a preventive war to
end our problems once and for all or proposals for negotiation in which
the fact of negotiation seems more important than any results likely to
be achieved. What has been lacking, however, is a clear vision of our
purpose in the world, a notion of a world-order which would permit us to
live with our perils and our opportunities.

In the absence of such a notion we have been extremely vulnerable
to every change of position within the Soviet Union and to our own frustra-
tions as well. Of late, there have been insistent demands to an end of the
Cold War, sometimes with the complication that this could be achieved

["Cofg War, sometimes with the combination that this could be achieved\ntions an eff. Of late, there have been insistent demands to an end of the\nto even end ofition within the Soviet Union and to our own transa-\ntions an end of our action we have been extremely unfortunate\nfive with om berla and om opportunities.", "Burbooe in fine world, a notion of a world-order which would benefit us to\nbe achieved. What we need is lagging, however, is a clear vision of om\nthe fact of negotiation seemore important than any results likely to\nend our problems once and for all or proposals for negotiation in which\nof difference and of conciliation suggestions of a preventive war to\ntemperament. The resulting attraction has sometimes been extreme\nprovoked tension for which we are ill-prepared either by lack of work or by\nwe find ourselves in a situation of seemingly unnecessarily\nwhich have been available on to come to grip with a set of relationships\nwhich have been extremely difficult for us to arise the opportunities\nas successive phases of policy and om notion of peace as a state of static\nconfrontative programmes. At the same time our expectation of war and peace\ntoed a concern with security which almost times opened other and more\nthe danger of a unknown后果. At the same time Soviet intelligence\nof an end to the affilification of the cofg war, of the same race and of\nwith its expectations. All its incursions impelled it in the direction\nof the problem of how to find peace in a situation so much at variance\nwith the problem of tension and the berla of unknown age, the tree world has confront-\ning tensions and the berla of unknown age, the tree world has confront-\nning tensions and the berla of unknown age, the tree world has confront

2.

with a change of definition. ¹ There has been an increasingly insistent
demand for conferences and settlements which sometimes interprets the
attempt to elaborate the aims of such a conference as a sign of intran-
sigenace.

In this connection a great deal of hope has focused on the ending
of nuclear tests. Concerned about the danger of fall-out, many thoughtful
people maintain that the quest for security must not involve the risk,
however slight, to the health of future generations. Others argue that
the end of nuclear testing is essential to build confidence. It would
be a useful first step, according to some, towards more comprehensive
disarmament agreements. It would prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons
to other powers. It would lessen the dangers of thermo-nuclear wars. And
these arguments receive additional force from an insistent Soviet campaign
that nuclear tests should be unconditionally banned and nuclear weapons
outlawed.

The yearning for an end of the Cold War is understandable. But
the paradox of a revolutionary period is that often the side which is
concerned with overthrowing the status quo can use its opponent's

L. Miller, Walter,

Fund for the Republic.

3.

quest for stability to demoralize him completely. In a situation in which one side is eager for agreements as an impression of a relaxation of tensions, the side which has concrete goals can often define the categories of discourse. The mere fact that it defines some issues as negotiable, will cause many pressures in the status quo power to settle those issues. Thus the more determined and the more purposeful power can establish the categories of discourse and use the desire for a settlement of its opponent for its own ends.

So it has been with the issue of the ban on nuclear testing, at least to some extent. All over the world hopes attach to the ending of nuclear tests which careful analysis may draw into question which should at least not have been raised so high in the absence of careful analysis. Even the opponents of a nuclear test ban have argued less about the desirability of such an agreement than the technical difficulty of controlling it. Whatever the ultimate outcome of the negotiations, the

4.

conference of Western and Soviet scientists at Geneva has
transformed an essentially political and psychological pro-
blem into a technical one; it implies the desirability of
a complete cessation of nuclear tests provided such a ban
can be inspected.

This article seeks to deal with the issue of the
desirability of ending nuclear tests completely. It goes
without saying that in the nuclear age, the desire to avoid
a holocaust should be taken for granted. At issue can only
be the best means to achieve this end.

II

Because of the overemphasis on the technical
aspect of ending nuclear tests it may be useful to begin
with a few technical facts: A cessation of nuclear tests
will not end the arms race, it will merely freeze the
technology of nuclear explosives at the present stage of
developement. Missiles will continue to proliferate. Nuclear
stockpiles will continue to grow. And it is well to keep
in mind that the most destructive weapons have already been

5.

[N]

tested.

As for inspection, a foolproof inspection system
is far from easy to achieve. The best inspection system
can only guard against presently known methods of testing
and of evasion. In the nature of things it is difficult to
protect against a contingency not yet even imagined, all the more
so as methods have not yet been systematically studied, at least
in the free world. Even in the best of circumstances an inspection
system may be made irrelevant by a technological breakthrough.

Moreover there is an inherent inequality in the
possibilities of inspection between the Soviet bloc and the free
world. The Soviet bloc is less accessible and less well-known; as
a police state it can observe its activities more easily; its leaders will have fewer inhibitions against breaking an agreement.

It has an ally in controlling any possible evasions in the public opinion
of the free world. Once a text-ban is agreed upon it would be self-
policing in the free world to a considerable extent. Secret testing
would be repugnant - and properly so - to such a majority of the

would be re宾ant - and properly so - to such a majority of the
boficiating in the tree world to a considerable extent. Secret testing
of the tree world. Once a text-pam is agreed upon it would be self-
It has an efficacy in controlling and possible evasions in the public opinion
its feseres will have fewer implications against precluding an agreement.
a bofice state it can operate its activities more easily; this means
workp. The Soviet pioe is less accessible and less well-known; an
possibilities of inspection between the Soviet pioe and the tree
Moreover, there is an inherent inequality in the
system may be made irrelevant by a technological preponderance.
in the tree world. Even in the best of circumstances an inspection
so as methods have not yet been systematically studied, at least
protect against a contingency not yet even imagined, still the more
and of evasion. In the nature of things it is difficult to
can only send against brazenly known methods of testing
it is far from easy to achieve. The best inspection system
is for inspection, a toothpick inspection system
tested.

3.

[N]

6.

population or of the scientists who might have to undertake it that it would be effectively prevented. And in any case the United States and its allies cannot enter an agreement with a secret intention to evade it without demoralizing itself. ²

No such inhibitions would apply to the Soviet Union. There no federation of scientists would protest evasions. No public opinion could be mobilized in case of violation. The tasks of inspection teams will be implicated by the much greater difficulty of access to the civilian population.

These drawbacks may be accepted as inevitable in seeking to enforce any agreement with the Soviet Union. And they may be compensated for to some extent by a tighter system of inspection. But such a system hides great complexities.

It is generally agreed that surface nuclear explosions can be detected at considerable distances by a combination of radiological and acoustical equipment which measures radioactivity and shock waves. ³

2. For an interesting analysis of the degree to which public opinion in free world countries would support a test ban see Melman, Seymour, *Inspection for Disarmament*, p. 231 ff.

3. For a very good account of methods of detecting nuclear weapons testing see Melman, Seymour, *op. cit.*, p. 85 ff.

testing see Melman, Belmon, op. cit., p. 88 ff.

2. For a very good account of methods of detecting nuclear weapons
Inspection for Disarmament, p. 83 ff.

3. For an interesting analysis of the degree to which public opinion
in three world countries would absorb a test plan see Melman, Belmon,
S. For an interesting analysis of the degree to which public opinion

and economic equipment which measures radioactivity and shock waves.

be detected at considerable distance by a combination of radiological
methods and some extent by a tighter system of inspection. But such a
enforce and agreement with the Soviet Union. And they may be compensated
These drawbacks may be accepted as inevitable in seeking to
qualify verification.

for to some extent by a tighter system of inspection. But such a
enforce and agreement with the Soviet Union. And they may be compensated
These drawbacks may be accepted as inevitable in seeking to
qualify verification.

will be implied by the more greater difficulty of access to the
conflict be modified in case of violation. The tasks of inspection forms
no legislation of scientists would prohibit evasions. No public opinion
No such implications would apply to the Soviet Union. There
it without demoralizing itself.

and its offices cannot enter an agreement with a secret intention to ease
it would be effectively prevented. And in any case the United States
bodily or of the scientists who might have to undertake it that

8.

7.

The difficulty arises with underground testing and with the increasing
civilian uses of nuclear energy.

With respect to underground testing it is argued that a
system of inspection stations 300 miles apart and 100 miles in the
seismic belt where earthquakes are more frequent could detect all
underground explosions of about 1 kiloton explosive power. Nevertheless
serious problems remain. The problem of "buffering" explosions so
that the seismic shock is reduced has barely been explored but it
seems to indicate that it can reduce the seismic wave by a very
substantial percentage. Moreover, the seismic equipment can locate
the shock only with an area approximately 10 miles in diameter.

While some of the characteristics of an underground explosion can be
distinguished from an earthquake, conclusive proof can be obtained
only by finding the precise location of the suspected evasion either
by means of borings to find radioactive samples or by discovering an
entrance to the underground passage.

Again, as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy become more
widespread other means of evasion are developed. One of the obvious

8.

[Y]

applications of nuclear energy is in mining. It will not be easy to prevent a power from using devices for blasting which also have military applications or to check the results with scientific instruments. Even if it should be argued that inspection teams could be invited to all nuclear explosions, such a course will be increasingly difficult the more "common" the peaceful applications of nuclear energy grow. A power determined on evasion could overlook the inspection mechanism by hiding test explosions among hundreds of ordinary ones.

Yet the most vexing problem of inspection is not to obtain information, difficult as it is, but the consequences to be drawn from it. For even if a violation is strongly suspected, it is not clear what options are open. Obviously a violation of the nuclear test ban is not a casus belli. It is not even certain whether it would be a sufficient cause for the injured party to start testing again. It may merely provide an occasion for diplomatic exchanges. An end to nuclear tests, once agreed, will not be easily abrogated even in the face of strong provocation. Inspection teams did not prevent violation

9.

[Y]

of the Korean armistice. Nor did we draw the conclusion from it of
ending the armistice agreement.

Even if it should be argued that the United States would
be free to start testing again in its turn, such a course may take
years to implement. For one thing, the United States may by then have
nothing to test. A test ban extended over a period of years would
almost certainly lead to the attrition of our weapons laboratories
whose ablest scientists would be increasingly tempted to concentrate
on fields in which progress seems more promising. For another, the
United States may have great difficulty reassembling its testing
machinery. Present United States tests involve scores of installations
and thousands of personnel. It would be impossible to keep these teams
together once a test ban had been agreed upon. Even a strong indication
of Soviet violation might therefore leave the United States at a
disadvantage
serious or at least without adequate recourse.

Moreover obtaining such a strong indication will not be a
simple matter. The record of the Soviet bloc shows an extraordinary
ability to present its challenges in an ambiguous manner. True to its

apability to present its challenges in an audacious manner. True to its
simple matter, The record of the Soviet bloc shows an extraordinarily
moreover obtaining a strong indication will not be a
barrier to at least without adequate results.

disadvantage

of Soviet invasion must be operator leave the United States at a
together once a test ban had been agreed upon. Even a strong indication
and thousand of personnel. It would be impossible to keep these teams
moderately. Present United States tests involve scores of installations
United States may have great difficulty reassembling its testing
on itself in which progress seems more promising. For another, the
whose separate scientists would be increasingly tempted to concentrate
almost certainly lead to the attrition of our weapons laboratories
nothing to test. A test ban extended over a period of years would
be free to start testing again in its turn, and a course may take
plenty to implement. For one thing, the United States may by then have

Even if it should be argued that the United States would
enduring the simulation agreement.

of the Korean annihilation. Nor did we draw the conclusion from it of

[A]

2.

10.

usual tactic it is highly likely that the Kremlin within a short
time of signing an agreement to end nuclear tests would accuse us of
violating it, whatever we did, if only to build up pressure against
the possibility of evasion. In the resulting atmosphere of recrimination
it will be difficult to separate sincere charges from the customary
exchanges of the Cold War. The result might well be a demoralization
of the free world which would be effectively prevented from testing
its own weapons without ever being certain of Soviet reciprocity.

These arguments do not lead to the conclusion that we should
refuse to agree to a ban on nuclear tests. They do show that even
an effective inspection system is not/conclusive argument in its favor.
It must be justified or rejected in terms of its political and military
implications.

### III

Nothing is more difficult to achieve for American policy
than to consider its measures as an aspect of a sequence which after a
certain point tends to become irreversible and which derives its
validity less from the cleverness of individual moves than from the

deficit fees from the revenues of individual states than from the
states themselves.

certain point tends to become irrevocable and which, however, it is
turn to consider its measure as an aspect of a sequence which, after a

Nothing is more difficult to achieve than American policy.

... and which, however, it is

### III

implications.

It must be unritified or rejected in terms of its political and military
an elective inspection element is not a constructive argument in its favor.
It must be agreed to a pan on nuclear tests. They do show that even

These arguments do not lead to the conclusion that we should
its own weapons without being certain of Soviet reciprocity.

of the tree world which would be effectively prevented from testing
exchanges of the Cold War. The result might well be a generalization
it will be difficult to separate正面 charges from the customs
the possibility of evolution. In the resulting consequence of recrimination
alleviating it, whatever we did, it only to put it in a position to
fire at signing an agreement to end nuclear tests would cause us to
not foresee it is fairly明确 that the Commission within a short

10.

[4]

11.

profundity of the over-all design. Our empiricism tempts us to examine each policy on its merits, a procedure which emphasizes the particularity of each situation and which makes us vulnerable to proposals which, while reasonable in themselves, are likely to set in motion a train of events difficult to control in these terms.

The cessation of nuclear testing so often recommended as a "first step" depends on an answer to the question "first step towards what?"

Such an assessment is particularly important in dealing with Communist leaders. For the one contingency Communist doctrine explicitly rejects is a static condition. To us, an agreement represents the settlement of an issue to the Soviet leaders, it is a phase in a continuing relationship, a springboard for further action. They consider all of international relationships as a balance of forces in constant flux, in which their task is to manage this inevitable flow, to being about the addition of the non-Communist world by constant, sometimes almost imperceptible pressure. "Marxism-Leninism" wrote Mao does not allow concessions to be regarded as something negative. Our concessions, withdrawals, turning to the defensive, or suspending

4. Mao Tse-Tung, Collected Works v.2, p. 263-4 (Emphasis added).

4. Mao Tse-Tung, Collected Works, v.3, p. 383-4 (Comintern ed.).

conferences, without waiting to be delegated, or subordinating
goes not allow conferences to be regarded as something negative. On the
sometimes almost impossible breviate, "Maoist-Communist" wrote Mao
flow, to being apart the addition of the non-Communist world to consent,
in constant flux, in which their task is to manage this inevitable
consideration of international relationships as a defence of forces
continuing relationship, a springboard for further action. Thus
settlement of an issue to the Soviet Union, if it is a base in a
rejects is a static condition. To us, an agreement represents the
Communist Union. For the one contingent Communist doctrine explicitly
states an assessment is判断infinitely important in dealing with
step" debate on an answer to the question "that step towards what?"
The cessation of nuclear testing so often recommended as a "that
in motion a train of events difficult to control in these terms.
problemas which, while reasonable in themselves, are likely to set
contradiction of each situation and which make us unneCESSARY to
to examine each problem entails merit, a procedure which emphasizes the
promptitude of the over-all effort. On this occasion, there is no

jj.

12.

[4]

action whether in dealing with allies or enemies should always be regarded as part of the entire revolutionary policy, as an indispensable link in the general revolutionary line.⁴

It may be agreed that such an analysis overlooks the enormous changes in the Soviet orbit since the death of Stalin, represented by the new bureaucracy, the increased demands for consumer goods, the entire apparatus of an industrialized society and the frequent protestations of peaceful intentions on the part of the Soviet leaders. Space does not permit dealing with these propositions in detail. It could be replied that it is a symptom of the complacency of the free world that it assumes a "natural" development towards its form of government.

After all a vicious dictatorship existed in Germany by an efficient bureaucracy or a highly industrialized, not excessively hampered, society. This is not to say that no transformations have arrived in Soviet society. It is merely to indicate that these changes need not necessarily reduce Soviet militancy. In fact it is difficult to see a motive for changing a course of action which in foreign policy has brought such startling successes.

As far as the protestations of peaceful coexistence, the word peace has always had a special meaning in the Soviet vocabulary. 4. Mao Tse-Tung, Collected Works v.2, p. 263-4 (Emphasis added).

13.

[Y]

since the structure of capitalist states, so Communist theory
goes, inevitably producing war, peace can be achieved only by
the world-wide triumph of Communism. Thus any art by ≪½≫ a Soviet
state however war-like ont the surface is pacific by definition
and any measure by a capitalist state however seemingly conciliatory tends
toward war. Peaceful, in start, is an adjective ascribed to any
Soviet measure and does not by itself indicate any change of heart.
To be sure, the protestations have recently become more insistent
though for a reason not very flattering to the West. Peace is now
proclaimed not because it is inherently desirably but because war has
become unnecessary to encompass the downfall of the free world.

become unnecessary to encumber thedomains of the free world.
proved not possible it is inherently impossible but because war was
to be aimed for a reason not well substantiated to the West. Because in now
to be aimed for the protestations made recently because more insatiable
Revolt measure and does not put itself in a position to make any
powerful war. Because, in a sort, is an effective argument to ask
and any measure put in a position to be settled by a definition
state power over war-like ouf the amuse is bectile by definition
the world-wide triumph of Communism. Type and sort of a Soviet
State, inevitably brooding war, because one can prove only by
since the armature of Capitalist states, so Communist theory

18.

14

Such an exegesis may not prove persuasive to the increasing number of people in the free world whose desire for an end to the Cold War is so great that they refuse to believe in the lessons of the past or to read between the lines of Soviet professions. But even the most optimistic should ask themselves why Krushchev should deal any more gently with the countries of the free world than with his erstwhile colleagues in the Soviet Presidium. After all the doctrine of collective leadership was nothing but the application of the principle of peaceful coexistence to the relations of Soviet leaders among each other. And it was used ruthlessly by Krushchev first to paralyze opposition as contrary to the principle of collective leadership and then to defeat his opponents one by one. Krushchev could not have succeeded domestically had he not been able to convince his colleagues of his sincerity before destroying them. It is at least possible that these same methods are now sought to be applied to destroy the cohesion of the free world and a wise United States policy will at least consider this contingency in planning its measures.

What then are the political and psychological consequences which Soviet leaders may promise themselves from a cessation of nuclear testing as now conceived. There is for one thing the problem of Communist China. Any inspection system that did not include China would be meaningless. But it may be difficult to establish inspection stations with complete access to any area without recognizing it first. The wisdom of recognizing Communist China is not at issue here. The point is that our position will become even more untenable if the only obstacle to a ban on nuclear testing which we have ourselves defined as desirable, should be our failure to recognize Communist China.

More important than this essentially tactical consideration are the military consequences of a cessation of nuclear testing. The free world has

15

[Y]

based its defense - perhaps unwisely - on nuclear weapons. No conventional forces exist anywhere sufficient to overcome the preponderance in Soviet conventional forces. No country seems prepared to make the sacrifices required to develop such a force. Even did it exist it would still be at the mercy of ✓ Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. Ever since the advent of the nuclear age the Soviet Union has therefore sought to place nuclear weapons into a special category by a systematic campaign which first denied the military significance of the new technology while emphasizing their special horror. Every US proposal to control nuclear energy was countered with a Soviet suggestion to outlaw nuclear weapons just as recently the Soviet Union has constantly insisted that the US agree to an unconditional end of nuclear testing as a precondition to technical discussions regarding inspection. In the process the attention of the world has been diverted from the Soviet aggression which alone can produce a conflict to the most effective means of resistance. In many areas nuclear war has already come to seem more ominous than Soviet aggression which can alone unleash it. Our aim should be to counteract this state of mind and not to aggravate it.

The free world should therefore have no illusions about the implications of present moves. The penchant for seeking to combine the advantages of every course of action - of achieving maximum security at minimum cost - has produced a military establishment which is so dependant on nuclear weapons that any defense of the free world without them is inconceivable. At the same time we are negotiating about the cessation of nuclear tests and this contributes to a climate of opinion which will increase our reluctance to invoke our only defense. For if a cessation of nuclear testing is a first step to anything it is an increased campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons altogether. If these weapons are too dangerous to test, so the argument will go, they are surely

17 [4]

they even inhibit recourse to conventional weapons for the danger of a nuclear showdown will be thought to be inherent in <u>any</u> conflict. This has already been articulated in Great Britain where Lord Russell has insisted that even surrender is preferable to running the risk of nuclear war.

Our present dilemma is the price we pay for the evasions of a decade, if a deterrent policy which <u>files</u> risks out of proportion to most issues in dispute, an alliance policy which cannot agree on a common strategy, a diplomacy which insists that it requires military backing for effectiveness but which has found it extremely difficult to bring our power into some relation with the issues that confront us. No progress can be made by Western policy until these evasions are overcome. A continued insistence on the most absolute applications of force will lead increasingly to a paralysis of will. It will reduce much of Western diplomacy - particularly in Europe - to empty posturing. It will cause our alliances to disintegrate further. It will lead to a continuation of the process by which the Soviet Empire has grown with every passing year. It will cause a continued growth of sentiment of peace at any price. This sentiment as much as the increasing strength and self-confidence of the Soviet bloc define the peril of the free world.

An end to nuclear testing as now conceived will not reduce this dilemma - in fact, it will accentuate it. By freezing weapons development at its present level it will insure that if nuclear weapons are used at all it will be in the most destructive fashion. Since the aim elimination of existing stockpiles is almost impossible to control - even should it be agreed to - it will mean that nuclear weapons remain available for purposes of Soviet blackmail while our diplomacy has increased our inhibitions against using them for Such purposes of defense. An aim course may in fact encourage Soviet aggression by giving rise to the belief that the free world is too afraid of the consequences of war to offer resistance.

18 [y]

The answer to our dilemma is not to be found in military means alone. But it is also not found in polarizing the military means we have available so that the only choice they afford is between surrender or suicide. Unless we are prepared to accept a settlement on Soviet terms, we must have a military establishment which we are prepared to invoke for our defense. If we are not willing to run risks for the preservation of our values and our interests, the collapse of the free world is inevitable and no amount of rhetoric can eliminate this fact. The willingness to run risks depends in part on the options afforded by our military establishment. It is essential that we develop a spectrum of weapons which increase the range of our choices; that we reduce the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and that we are able to develop a strategy which enables us to react to Soviet challenges with discrimination. All these efforts will be impeded, if not prevented, by an end of nuclear testing as now conceived.

It will be argued that the limitation of nuclear war is chimerical, that it is pointless to develop discriminating weapons if the opponent fails to follow suit, that death is as total if one is killed by a small number of nuclear weapons as by a large yield one. One of the difficulties about any debate on military problems in the nuclear age is that it must remain essentially academic. No nuclear weapon having ever been used in wartime, except against an opponent without the ability to retali ate, it is not possible to provide conclusively what the consequences of a nuclear war would be. No one can demonstrate that a nuclear war can be kept limited with absolute certainty. It is clear however that the possibilities of keeping it limited are greatly enhanced by the ability to conduct military operations with discrimination and by an environment in which it is understood that any conflict that may break out will be sought to be kept limited.

It is frequently argued that the concept of limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms, that once nuclear weapons were used a war would become all-out whatever the protagonists' intentions. Neither side, it is maintained, will accept defeat without resorting to ever larger weapons. No limitation previously conceived will hold once military operations begin. It is important to distinguish, however, between objections which apply only to nuclear war and those which involve limited war in general. An enemy possessing nuclear weapons who is unwilling to accept defeat in a limited nuclear war may be equally unwilling to accept defeat in a conventional war. The reluctance to accept defeat seems to depend more on the objective in dispute than the weapons used to attain it. A Soviet conventional attack on Europe is more likely to unleash an all-out war than a Soviet nuclear attack on say Afghanistan.

Moreover the primary problem of the West is not so much to defeat the Soviet Union as to deprive Soviet leaders of the belief that it can gain from aggression. Even if our military establishment enabled us only to achieve a military stalemate - the most likely result in a nuclear war - a great contribution to the security of the free world will have been made, for the great threat to the security of the free world is that we do not have at present the forces to arrest a determined Soviet advance except possibly in Europe.

But how can we be certain that an opponent will obey any limitations which we may seek to develop? It must be admitted that we cannot be certain.

20 [Y]

Any doctrine of limited war must be based on the assumption that both sides will be eager to avoid all-out war. If we cannot make all-out war an unattractive course, we will surely be confronted with it. If our readiness for all-out war is adequate, however, it does not end the range of our peril. The whole post-war period indicates that the diplomatic advantage goes to the power which can confront its opponent with contingencies from which he can extricate himself only by all-out war but to deter him from this step by an adequate retaliatory capability.

The great pressure of Soviet conventional forces throughout this period was not that these were decisive but that they gave the Soviet Union an option which did not involve a holocaust. The increasing Soviet nuclear capability will lead to the neutralization of Eurasia unless we take steps to counter it and in a manner which does not involve the destruction of civilization. The threat of nuclear attacks has been a partial feature of Soviet diplomacy over the past two years from Suez to the Syrian crisis to Lebanon. Unless the free world develops a military capability which offers other means of resistance than an all-out show-down, these threats will become increasingly plausible. Conversely if the Soviet Union fails to develop more discriminating weapons, it will face the same psychological

21

dilemma as the West: a gap between its threats and the strategy it
is willing to implement. We cannot base our defense on the assumption
that the Soviet willingness to run the risks of all-out war exceeds our
readiness to engage in limited defense. For such an attitude will make
aggression certain and defense impossible. It is not for nothing
that the Soviet Union has persistently pressed its ban the bomb campaign
and is constantly engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to increase the West's
inhibitions against nuclear resistance to Soviet aggression. For they
understand very well that without nuclear weapons no resistance is
possible at all.

One way of reducing these inhibitions is to extend the discrimination
of nuclear weapons. This will be true even if by some miracle the West
suddenly developed the spirit of sacrifice required for a substantial
conventional capability. For now that the Soviet forces are equipped
with nuclear weapons a conventional war can remain non-nuclear only if
we are prepared for nuclear conflict. Otherwise we might merely furnish
an incentive for the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons against our
forces and insure their victory. In that case we would be faced again

22

with all the dilemmas of massive retaliation. We would then have to decide whether the destruction of a few conventional Western divisions is "worth" the tens of millions of casualties. Those who now argue that an all-out war can never be considered even in defense of our very existence are not very likely to change their attitude in such a situation.

Our choice in short is between developing a spectrum of nuclear weapons or increasing sterility which may lead to impotence. This in any case has been the trend in some circles in Great Britain where the proposal to end nuclear tests has been coupled with proposals to give up nuclear weapons unilaterally.

One of the paradoxes of the contemporary situation is that the side which is on the defensive may have to take measures which place it at a psychological disadvantage. The aggressor can choose his point of attack; he can select the weapons system which seems most promising.

The defender must be in a position to defend all likely objects of aggression and against any weapon that may be employed. Thusthe logic of its position should force the side which is on the defensive into a larger military effort than its opponent, for at equal levels of effort the

26

[N]

Even more importantly, if we permit a distinction to grow up
between our military establishment and that of our allies, our
expulsion from Europe is almost inevitable. There are only two grounds
on which the refusal to give nuclear weapons to our allies or to permit
them to develop their own weapons can be justified: that we do not
have sufficient confidence in their restraint or that these weapons are
too dangerous to be invoked for the defense of Europe. If the former,
our allies will increasingly chafe at our claim to moral superiority.
If the latter, we will have contributed to a climate of opinion which
will make our position on the Continent untenable.

If the possession of nuclear weapons by our European allies is too
long delayed, great impetus will be given to Soviet overtures that Europe
will be able to escape involvement in any conflict by refusing to permit
nuclear installations on its territory. The logical corollary to this
denuclearization of Europe will be a demand that American troops be
withdrawn since their equipment is so obviously a nuclear one. At the
very least it will expose us to great pressure to withdraw all our nuclear
installations from the Continent. To be sure, the protestations have

Installations from the Continent. To be sure, the installations have
very few if will expose us to great pressure to withdraw all our forces
withdrawn since their equipment is so obviously a more serious one. At the
demonstration of Europe will be a demand that American troops be
withdrawn installations on the territory. The federal corollary to this
will be able to escape involvement in any conflict pertain to benefit
four delayed, great armies will be given to Soviet overtures that Europe
It the possession of nuclear weapons by our European allies is too
will make our position on the continent untenable.

It the latter, we will have contributed to a climate of opinion which
our allies will increasingly cause at our claim to most unilaterally.
too dangerous to be invoked for the defense of Europe. It the former,
have sufficient confidence in their restraint or that these weapons are
them to develop their own weapons can be justified: that we do not
on which the refusal to give nuclear weapons to our allies or to permit
extraction from Europe is almost inevitable. There are only two grounds
between our military expansion and that of our allies, our
even more importantly, if we permit a distraction to grow up

27

This is not to say that Europe must obtain its nuclear weapon
from its own production or that these weapons must be under national
control. From many points of view it would be highly desirable if the
nuclear components of NATO would be under NATO control or if there were
formed a European atomic contingent on the model of EDC. The same ap-
plies to the production of nuclear weapons. It is not essential that
these weapons be locally produced but that there is European participation
in their use and control. As long as our Atomic Energy Act makes it
impossible to give nuclear weapons to our European allies, a ban on
nuclear testing can only be severely disadvantageous to NATO. It will
be an expression of lack of confidence in our allies and put us in the
position of denying to our friends what our opponent already possesses.
Moreover if a ban on nuclear <u>testing</u> precedes an amendment of the Atomic Energy
Act, it may well be that we will then have created a climate of opinion
which prevents the acceptance of nuclear weapons by our allies, whatever
we choose to do later.

But will not the possession by our allies of nuclear weapons
increase the danger of war? This would be true only if our allies
would be thereby encouraged to attack the USSR or if they were to use
nuclear weapons in their own quarrels outside of Europe. But excessive
adventurousness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union can hardly be considered a
European failing. Moreover, even in the less preferred contingency
that nuclear weapons were under national and not all-European control,
it is difficult to see any calculation which would induce any European
country to unleash a unilateral attack on the Soviet Union. Their
individual nuclear capability will remain so small, the disproportion in
vulnerability is so great that these weapons can never be used for offensive

28

[Y]

ends. Their purpose would be to make the costs of aggression prohibitive, not to impose defeat on the Soviet bloc by a unilateral effort.

As for the case of these weapons outside NATO, this could be effectively forestalled by placing them under an all-European control. But even should they be under national control, the risk of their use outside of NATO is slight. The difficulty the French army has in Algeria is not inadequate fire-power but the difficulty of finding targets against which this fire-power can be used. Atomic weapons have little significance in guerrilla type operations.

But would not the failure of our allies to obtain nuclear weapons be balanced by a similar self-denial within the Soviet orbit? The equivalence is illusory. The danger to the security of the free world is represented primarily by the USSR not by its allies with the exception of Communist China which will be discussed separately. The Soviet Union is capable of threatening all the peripheral areas of Eurasia from its own territory. A denuclearized belt in Europe could only become an impotent appendage to the Soviet Union. The more the Soviet Union succeeds in building up a fear of nuclear weapons the greater its pressure on the peripheral areas will become. A world in which the possession of nuclear weapons were confined to the USSR and the United States would have a severe psychological and military imbalance. It would prevent a meaningful local defense while building up inhibitions to invoke the ultimate deterrent.

Moreover, it is not to be expected that the possession of nuclear weapons will be confined to these powers whatever agreements may be made now. The s le Soviet ally sufficiently reliable to possess nuclear weapons

now. The so-called fully autonomously reliable to possess nuclear weapons will be continued to these powers whatever agreements may be made

Moreover, it is not so be expected that the possession of nuclear

involutions to invoke the ultimate deterrent.

balance. It would prevent a meaningful focal defense while putting up
the United States would have a severe psychological and military im-
which the possession of nuclear weapons were continued to the U2E2 and
Greater Power the balance on the belligerent side will become. A world in
SoVIet Union succeeds in putting up a fear of nuclear weapons the
only power an indubitable advantage to the Soviet Union. The more the
Europe from its own territory. A denationalized past in Europe could
be balanced by a similar self-denial within the Soviet orbit?

But would not the lifetime of our affers to obtain nuclear
influences be observed.

which fire tire-blower can be used. Atomic weapons have little significance
if not indicated. Tire-blower put the difficulty of landing packages against
outside of NATO is slight. The difficulty the French and the Americans
but even should they be under national control, the risk of their use
effectively teratologically placed under an eff-Europeish control.
As for the case of these weapons outside NATO, there could be
effort.

Hypothetical, not to imitate defeat on the Soviet front by a military
angle. Their purpose would be to make the costs of attrition bro-

28

29

[4]

is Communist China. But China requires a few more years to build up
an adequate base for nuclear armaments. The Soviet Union can therefore
use this interval to create a psychological attitude in the West which
will make it impossible for any of our allies to acquire nuclear weapons.
When Communist China is ready, the Soviet Union will be able to give it
nuclear weapons from its own stockpiles, or in the form of volunteer
detachment or by the use of any of the non-overt devices in which the
USSR is so skillful. It is idle to argue that in these circumstances
the United States would be free to give nuclear weapons to its own
allies. By that time, the public opinion of our NATO partners would not
permit the possession of nuclear weapons, all the less so as the direct
threat to these countries is not markedly increased if China possesses
nuclear weapons. Thus the ban on nuclear testing as now conceived is the
opening wedge - and a not inconsiderable one - towards the nuclear
neutralization of NATO without any compensating disarmament on the part
of the Soviet bloc.

How is it
now conceived?

But how about the uncommitted? Is there to be no end to the
diffusion of nuclear weapons? It must be recognized that the diffusion
of nuclear weapons will become increasingly difficult whatever the out-
come of the negotiations with respect to nuclear testing. As the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy become widespread, more and more nations will
become familiar with nuclear technology. The end product of many atomic
reactors is plutonium, which is also the basic component of nuclear
weapons. The nuclear explosions used in mining, for example, would have
military application. A country determined on evasión could make in-
spection extremely difficult.

To prevent?

30

Assuming that many nations will possess nuclear weapons, will this increase international instability? It is necessary to distinguish the relations of many presently underdeveloped countries with the industrialized nations from the relations of those states among each other. A nuclear weapons system is very expensive and requires a very high order of technical ability. None of the presently underdeveloped countries will be able from its own resources to bring about a military establishment that could pose a substantial threat to a major nuclear power for several decades. If anything the mutual possession of nuclear weapons will increase the disparity in strength. The possession of nuclear weapons does not by itself seem to increase the likelihood of aggression by the presently uncommitted nations against a major nuclear power.

As for the relations of these countries among each other, it is important to distinguish between the increased destructiveness of any war that may break out and increased

31

international instability. These two factors do not neces-
sarily go hand in hand. The possession of nuclear weapons
by Israel and Egypt, for example, will not of itself increase
their hostility to each other. Assuming the acquisition is
symmetrical, it is even likely that as the destructiveness
of war increases the inhibitions against the resort to force
will grow as well. Whatever the hostility, the risks of
military action may come to seem prohibitively high. A local
atomic stand-off could then develop similar to the over-all
balance which keeps the major nuclear powers from a final
showdown.

This, to be sure, is not the most desirable situation.

It is discussed only to indicate that the problem of "fourth" atomic powers has ramifications requiring careful study. It does not follow, moreover, that because the diffusion of nuclear weapons at *some* point it must be stopped at *this* point.

It will be possible for the then nuclear powers at any point to make an agreement that they would not sell or give nuclear

to make an agreement that they would not sell or give any nuclear

If they do become, for the time being, belligerent at any point

unfair weapons at some point it must be stopped at this point.

atomic weapons has consequences which are very serious. It

If it is demonstrated only to indicate that the problem of "atom"

This, to be sure, is not the most desirable attraction.

showdown.

balance which keeps the major nuclear powers from a true
atomic arms race, could then develop similar to the over-all
military action may come to seem propheticy high. A few
years grow as well. Whatever the hostilities, the risks of
of war increase the inhibitions against the reason to force
anyhow, it is even likely that as the destructioniveness
their hostilities to each other. Assuming the situation is
pluristate and equal, for example, will not of itself increase
significantly go hand in hand. The possession of nuclear weapons
international inadvisability. These two factors do not neces-

sarily go hand in hand. The possession of nuclear weapons
will not of itself increase

these two factors do not neces-

31

[A]

32

weapons to any other power and this would inhibit diffusion
more effectively than a ban on nuclear testing. It will also
be possible to make international agreements which impede the
weapons race without carrying with it all the perils for the
free world described earlier. It is to the possibilities of
such a program that we must now turn.

VI

One of the difficulties the free world has had
in dealing with the Soviet bloc is that we have been clearer
about the things we oppose than those we stand for. This
has given much of our negotiations the quality of a stubborn
rear-guard action designed primarily to thwart Soviet overtures.
It has enabled the Soviet leadership to define the categories
of discourse. It builds up world-wide pressures against us
without giving us the possibility to define an issue for which
to contend.

Whatever the perils in a total ban on nuclear test-
ing, it would be wrong for us to deny that many of the pressures
on behalf of it are caused by real and deep concerns. The

33

[4]

anguish of many dedicated people in seeing an arms race seem-
ingly without issue must be taken seriously. The prospects
of a nuclear war must impel all men of good will to strive
for other means to resolve international disputes than
military conflict. If the dangers inherent in a nuclear test
ban are great, as heretofore conceived, it is incumbent on
the United States to develop an alternative program which
indicates at least a beginning of an answer to the fears
and hopes of so much of mankind.

The difficulty with a total ban on nuclear testing
is that it stakes too much on a measure which in itself is of
problematical significance. It will build up world-wide
reluctance to resort to nuclear weapons, the only means of
defense now existing against Soviet aggression on Soviet
pressure. It will impede if not prevent the articulation of a
strategy for the defense of Europe. It will increase the
danger that any war that does break out will take the most
catastrophic form. By freezing weapons development at the

catastrophic form. By treating weapons development at the
angle that any war that does break out will take the most
accurately for the defense of Europe. It will increase the
batteries. If will impede it not prevent the exploitation of a
detense now existing against Soviet aggression on Soviet
refinance to react to nuclear weapon, the only means of
propemotional significance. It will bring up world-wide
the that it affects too much on a measure which in itself is of
The difficulty with a total pan on nuclear testing
and probes of so much of mankind.
indicates at least a beginning of an answer to the lease
the United States to develop an alternative program which
pan are great, as perestroika conceived, it is incumbent on
military conflict. If the danger inherent in a nuclear test
for other means to resolve international disputes than
of a nuclear war must be limited, all men of good will to strive
ungly without time must be taken seriously. The brocade of
augment of many dedicated hoards in attending an same race as-

33

[x]

35

necessary to zero. After this no power would set off any weapons tests which involve fall-out outside a very narrowly defined zone. They would be free to conduct surface tests of "clean" weapons and underground tests.

Such an agreement while it would impede the arms race would not stop weapons development altogether. It would permit the continued elaboration of weapons which can be applied with discrimination. Indeed it will put a premium on such a development because these weapons can be tested most easily underground or within U.N. established "fall-out" quotas.

It will avoid placing the United States into the position of not trusting its allies with the development of weapons which are essential to their defense and which their opponent already possesses in quantity. At the same time, it will impede the too rapid diffusion of nuclear technology. The easiest weapons to develop are those with major fall-out effects. The least complicated method of testing is above ground. Thus the above proposal would channel future weapons development into the least

36.

destructive channels and end the accumulation of fall-out
from testing, whatever expert opinion may be about the
reality of this peril.

Such procedure would prevent the Soviet Union from elaborating a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear powers or zones or warfare, a distinction which can only paralyze the free world. At the same time, it would call attention to a distinction between forms of warfare which are unnecessarily destructive and those which seek to confine devastation to the smallest possible proportions. If the Soviet Union rejected our position we could maintain it uni-laterally together with our allies. In this manner, increasing pressure could be built up in world opinion against the most catastrophic use of nuclear weapons. While the Soviet leaders are less sensitive to this kind of pressure than those of the free world, an incentive would nevertheless be provided for following suit. To be sure, no inhibitions would apply in an all-out war, but this would not be difficult if there were

[Y]

37.

a complete cessation of nuclear tests. In a limited conflict, however, the Soviet Union might be restrained to a considerable extent by the attitudes which would be built up by this form of test ban.

This approach to the problem of nuclear testing would have the additional advantage that it would be much easier to inspect a complete ban. A very few stationary inspection stations could determine whether testing involving fall-out was taking place. If no radio activity were found, no violation was taking place. There would moreover be great built-in inducement to live up to the agreement, for the advantages to be gained by violating would be slight.

A restriction of nuclear testing as outlined here would meet many of the fears of humanity without exposing the free world to incalculable peril. It would be a "first step" which permits many others to be taken. If the restriction of nuclear tests proves workable, other measures would follow: the inspection system could be expanded, a start could be

38.

made in the reduction of conventional arms, means could be
devised to reduce the danger of surprise attack. None of
these measures are possible, however, as long as the Soviet
Union is able to believe that it can induce the free world
to disarm unilaterally or, what amounts to the same thing,
that through skillful and persistent diplomacy it can under-
mine the will of the free world to resist with the only
weapon now at its disposal against major aggression.

It is widely believed in the West that the issue
of nuclear testing is a touchstone of our sincerity. Many
argue that the Soviet Union has scored a major gain by
renouncing nuclear tests and that we exhibit lack of imag-
ination and the absence of a moral dimension by not following
suit. The reluctance to end nuclear testing, so the argument
goes, is a symptom of the sterility and overconcern with
military problems which has been at the root of so much of
the West's difficulties.

the West's difficulties.

military problems which have been at the root of so much of
Gree, is a symptom of the aferfity and overconcern with
art. The reluctance to end nuclear testing, so the argument
inflation and the absence of a moral dimension by not following
renegotiating nuclear tests and that we exhibit lack of impact
against the Soviet Union hasscored a major gain by
of nuclear testing is a touchstone of our sincerity. And
If it is widely believed in the West that the issue

weapon now at its diabase against major aggression.
mine the will of the free world to react with the only
that through skilful and deliberate diplomacy it can under-
so claim multilaterally or, what amounts to the same thing,
Union is able to believe that it can induce the free world
decide measures are possible, however, as long as the Soviet
government to reduce the danger of anблиase attack. None of
made in the reduction of conventional arms, means could be

38.

39.

There is no doubt that the free world's in deep difficulty. It has lacked the moral dynamism to identify itself with the revolutionary period through which we are living. It has been unprepared to make the sacrifices and it has not had the vision for a sustained program of world economic development. It has not been able to articulate either a philosophy or a program adequate to the challenge of the times.

But it is important that we are clear about the causes of this state of affairs. Our lack of moral dynamism is not caused by an overconcern with military affairs, rather the seeming overemphasis of military factors is due to the absence of moral dynamism. Because we have not been clear about our purpose with respect to the rest of the world, we have often found it easier to concentrate on measures to assure our security than in those which might give a sense of direction to a world in turmoil. But the measures we have taken in the military field have not been excessive. For even here we are inadequately prepared to deal with most issues with

40.

which we are likely to be confronted. In any case the answer
to our political dilemma is not to be found in weakening our
preparedness but in injecting a greater sense of purpose
into other aspects of policy. The difficulty with the
policy of containment has been that it has sought to prevent
an expansion of the Soviet sphere but that it did not convey
in the name of what this expansion was to be prevented.

No more important task confronts the free world
than to develop a positive program for the construction of
a new international order. But if in the process it weakens
its defenses, it will find its structure built on quick-
sand. Our test will be met only in how eagerly we work
for the things in which we believe; it will also reside in
the fortitude with which we attend to our necessities.

the location with which we intend to carry out our necessary
for the things in which we intend it will also lie in the same
area. Our task will be much easier if we work

the defenses, it will find the atmosphere puts on display
a new international order. But it in the process it leaves
itself open to a constructive program for the correction of
the above problems.

No more important task confronts the free world
in the name of what this examination was to be prevented.
an examination of the Soviet square put that it did not comply
with the consent has been that it has consented to prevent
any other subject of attack. The difficulty with the
barriers put in injecting a greater sense of burden
onto our attack frontiers is not to be found in reasoning on
which we are likely to be confronted. In any case the answer
is no.

To:

[2]

New Statesman May 17.

627: "This is additional evidence for the view that the Russians no longer think a conference worth the bother while Eisenhower and Dulles are in charge in Washington. But this may be going too far. The truth may simply be that when annoyed by Dulles - or anyone else - Krushchev can't help repeating the stock Leninist arguments against imperialism, even when they nullify the Kremlin's own thesis about co-existence. In exactly the same way American politicians talk about peace in terms that sound like declarations of war." Blackett

649: "In the United States the Cold War against Communism is still accepted by public opinion and there is no strongly organised pressure for relaxing the tension or ending the nuclear arms race. Here in Britain, on the other hand, voters of all parties insist that their leaders should make a genuine effort to come to terms with the Kremlin." Crossman

June 21

793: This does not mean that all agreements are impossible, or that the attempt to find ways of remaining alive in the same world must be abandoned. But since the new Soviet leadership has now shown that, just like Stalin, it will keep agreements only so long as they suit its devious purposes, and that it regards 'Soviet legality' as the relaxation of Tension', or 'peaceful co-existence' as merely tactical concessions, it is clear that the only agreements possible are those which are no more than formal statements of purpose already determined by simple self-interest. That is why the murder of four Hungarians has closed a chapter in world history. With them died the Krushchev design for a Summit conference - if that meant an East-West settlement on the basis of 'mutual confidence'.

799: Having said this, we need to go further and to show that unilateral abandonment is the best, indeed the only, method of negotiation. It is a tiny chance, but there is no other. As it is, we often give the impression of being on the defensive. We seem to admit that the country is secure now, that international negotiations are one way of getting rid of the bomb, and that we are cranks in wanting to try some other way. ...a moral challenge can be stronger than nuclear weapons. People no longer believe this. They once thought that faith could move mountains, now they doubt whether it can move molehills. ...The H-bomb is morally wrong; and it is idiotic into the bargain. A.J.P. Taylor

May 10

585: on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. "Labour stands for the unilateral ending of tests. ...But its leaders have not convinced the world that they differ fundamentally about the use of nuclear weapons from Mr. Macmillan or General Norstad. When the demonstrators are sure that the Labour leadership really means to eliminate nuclear weapons from our armoury, they will again be its enthusiastic supporters.

May 3 554: T, is this week, however, powerful support for a cessation of tests came from a large and important group of British scientists. They ask, it is true, for international agreement on suspension, and many of them might not agree to unilateral action. For this reason, their statement of the dangers of nuclear tests is addressed to all governments and peoples."

[Y]

April 26 : 518

The State Department, too, has its neurosis: Yalta. To American diplomats, the postwar strength of the SU is explained as the direct consequence of a disastrous Summit conference....Mr. Dulles will at last allow the ailing Eisenhower to go to the Summit: but only if the meeting is a formal conference, called to ratify decisions reached by hard bargaining at a lower level. ..... ..... a Summit conference would have not i g in common with Yalta. Yalta wasthe Versailles of the Second World War, the conference which divided the spoils. But today there are no spoils to divide. On the contrary, the basic function of a Summit conference is to inaugurate a mutual retreat, however gradual, from the cold War parapet, to dismantle the military relics of the pre-H-bomb age, and so clear the ground for the continuation of the `last-West struggle with the weapons of competitive prosperity...

April 19: 490 "Mr. Dulles's Summit tactics have so far been brilliantly successful.....he has been steadily approaching his two major objectives: the new and giant series of US nuclear tests, due to begin at the end of the month, and the nuclear arming of West Germany. ...All this, of course, makes an early Summit meeting more urgent, and the Russians will be ill-advised to stick to their insistence that this week's meeting of ambassadors in Moscow - the first concrete step towards the Summit - should be confined to discussing procedural problems. The Russian leaders have a right to be angry about the decision to arm Germany with nuclear weapons; it clearly introduces a new and incalculably dangerous element into the Cold War.........

April 5 426: **Russell** It is customary in the West to discount such statements as insincere (Kruschev's). I think this is a mistaken policy. They should be accepted at their face value and regarded by the West as a basis for negotiation. If, in fact, they are insincere, negotiations will reveal this. ...... I think it is clear that each side entertains suspicions of the other which are unjust.

April 5 437: K. Zilliacus "In practice, the only government likely to take an initiative in this sense is a British Labour government that translates the moral revolt of the British people against the suicidal folly and widkedness of the nuclear arms race into a foreign policy that renounces nuclear weapons and prohibits their use from British territory; tables our own proposals for disengagement and consequent wider agreements, as the basis for negotiation at a Summit conference; and is prepared if necessary to negotiate with the USSR, even without the US; and in the last resort to act on the principle that, if the US will not come to terms with us on how to make peace, we shall no longer be bound by the US on going to war.

March 22: 365: ..Russia stands to make considerable political gains from the general relaxation of tension which would follow such a meeting, even if no concrete agreements were reached - gains which would far outweigh the propaganda advantages of a confusing diplomatic exchange which led nowhere. ...Although both the State Department and the Foreign Office stand by their original analysis ...... that unless there is a real chance of definite agreement on at least one major issue, a Summit meeting would be to the West's disadvantage, overriding political considerations are driving Britain and the US towards compromise. ......No agreement is likely in any sphere which impinges on the centres of strategic military power. It is for this reason, therefore, that disengagement offers the best long-term prospects of compromise, for it is possible to devise a formula in which the forces of the two super-powers are only marginally involved. ...There remains, however, a minor sphere in which a conference could produce results: atomic tests.