Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

7/10/70 3:18 p.m.

D: How are you after your late late night?

K: Covered with blasts . . .

D: No, each hostess usually tells me wonderful stories about you.
They admire you. I don't know how you do it.

K: I've got to see your file on that some time. What I'm calling you
about is not terribly important. It's just that in the Washington Post there
have been a number of stories about what we are trying to do to you. We
have stopped saying anything after last week. You should ignore these
stories as far as we are concerned. We will get our impetuous subordinates
under control.

D: I think that would be better.

K: No question. These are not Whit e House stories. And a stop
will be put to them.

D: That will be better, especially now.

K: That is the way I feel about it and the way the President feeld about
it and he wanted me to tell you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folsom
By CHNARA Date 5/10/70

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dated 5/27

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

7/10/70 3:18 p.m.

D: How are you after your late night?

K: Covered with blasts . . .

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Robert Pierpoint
7/10/70 ca. 3:30 p.m.

P: I am sorry to bother you but I am being pushed to get from you an explanation as to where we are going in the Middle East. I understand that you are not going to tell me the whole plan but I wonder if there's anything further along the lines of the briefing that you can say. What did you have in mind when you said "expel?"

K: Oh God. I almost despair about our press. First, that was said in an off-the-record briefing and then was later released. I must have explained it three times. The Washington Post has now done a story about it every day for five days and the first one didn't appear until after I had retracted it.

P: I know you didn't mean what the Washington Post made it sound like.

K: It's one thing for Soviet combat personnel to be there in a situation in direct relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute--even though it presents problems--But it's another thing to be there as a permanent establishment. This is something that must be taken into consideration in making a fundamental settlement.

P: Yes, but once you establish a combat base . . . we've got them all over the world. It's not very realistic . . .

K: Well, I'm not sure whether it is or isn't realistic.

P: Okay, I don't want to debate that with you. The important part is that I was wondering if you could give me any more clarification and guidance on the balance of power as it became imbalanced. What are we going to do about it?

K: We hope we are leading toward negotiations.

P: I understand the hope but it hasn't yet.

K: But it hasn't been rejected yet either.

P: Are you hopeful from what Pravda said that negotiations may be possible?

K: There may be a chance.

P: But we've got to push the chance?

By. NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Robert Pierpoint

7/18/70 ca. 3:30 p.m. page 2

K: Right.

P: And the sale of the Phantoms wouldn't hurt the chances?

K: I don't want to comment on that. I think it best for me to
let it rest.

P: I understand that. I appreciate your calling. I thought you
couldn't say much, but I have been pressed to press you.

K: I understand and appreciate your trying.

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon

Joe Sisco
7/10/70 3:45 p.m.

K: I wanted to check what Murray Marder does in an unhelpful article.

S: I know. He ignored everything you and I said.

K: That son of a bitch, when he wrote the first article about "expel" he already had my retraction.

S: What John Scalli said, between you and me, is that Murray Marder won't see what you mean. He said he got onto the word "expel" and wrote it all over the place as it was originally said. He didn't give you the break on the retraction. Where he got that implication I don't know. He talked to the Israelis, but I don't believe they said this.

K: I don't know where he got the starting assessment of the Soviet move on April 23.

S: I said that at the April juncture we evaluated not only all of the intelligence and but all the other aspects of the problem.

K: Exactly.

S: You know the Kraft article didn't help either. You told Alex you were going to send the Secretary a message. I hope you did.

K: I did.

S: Good. I'll reinforce it on this end. Ben Bradlee just called me. He wanted to do an article about Robert Anderson. It relates to something 15 years ago. The problem is that Anderson is trying to get the Washington Post not to print it. He said he was about to go to the area on a mission for the U.S. government and it would hurt the mission.

K: *!? &%#!

S: I said he's not doing a mission for State. Bradlee said they didn't want to hurt a mission, but they thought it was a lot of *&%$#@! The day Robert Anderson is sent on a mission for this government, Joe Sisco will...

K: The President won't even send him to the Panama Canal because he is afraid he will use it for business purposes.

S: If you and I only had his dough. What an operator!

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON
Novak/Kissinger

4:40 pm

7/10/70

K: You are going to give me a great case of paranoia.

N: Evans tells me you think I am out to destroy you.

K: No, but you never check with me.

N: That was Davis' story. He only called once?

K: IHe told you there was no form on trade policy. We have had 3 meetings on trade policy and 2 Davis attended. We have had 4 NSC Review Groups which Davis attended. I dealt with him on textiles which Stans put in a special channel. Until he popped off I didn't know I had problems with him. What he said was wrong. I just don't give the bureaucracy a checklist of what I recommend. At meetings I attend I try to crystalize points of view. I am always flattered when people give me nefarious influences on economic policy because it's not an area I know. He expressed a view on textiles and we finally took his recommendation, after checking it thoroughly.

N: Wxx Supporting the Mills' bill.

K: The other was when he misunderstood a sentence in the President's report to the Congress on foreign policy. ? ? ? ? We explained that and worked out guidelines that everyone agreed to. I just thought a phone call to me would straighten that out.

N: The next time --

K: I don't think you are trying to destroy me.

N: I couldn't even if I was. I'm not. The next time, and there may not be a next time, I run into your name, I will call you.

K: Good.

By NARA, Date 5/97

TELCOM

Javits/Kissinger

4:45 pm

7/10/70

J: You remember I talked to you before about the group that signed the letter to the President on the M.E. There's a feeling now that this group should get together and give the President the backing that seems now the elevation of the policy. It's a matter of U.S. national interest. Ribicoff and I believe we can get that kind of backing but before laying it before them we wanted to be sure there was no problem with the WH.

K: What would you do?

J: A meeting next week. The letter they signed was helpful. The crisis deepened because of the Russians and the President has layed it on the highest level of U.S. national interest.

K: Let me check it out with the President.

J: If we did that and it were successful it would be followed again by the ______
who signed the original letter.

K: I will check.

J: I am embroiled in the Overseas Investment Corp. It has not been settled with the President. He said he would call me and he hasn't. I don't want to get into an embroilment on something of this kind.

K: Let's have a breakfast next week.

J: Let me know promptly about this.

K: By Monday.

*

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Jonathan Moore

7/10/70 6:10 p.m.

M: Thank you for returning my call. I tried to get you before I made my decision to go to HEW, but wasn't able to. I wanted to say before I went that I enjoyed the work I've done with you and leave it with great regret.

K: I think you made the right decision. I urged the Secretary to keep you. I was hoping selfishly that you'd stay, but I think you made the right choice.

M: He mentioned that and I appreciate it.

K: You made the right move. You've proven what you can do at State. You can always go back into foreign policy.

M: Well that's part of the problem. I've been wondering if I can.

K: Look at all the vacancies that will be around when these policies fail.

M: Well, I just wanted you to know about my great regrets and mixed emotions and what a pleasure it's been to work with you. And I wish you all the best.

K: We will still be working with each other. I feel that domestic and foreign policy are very strongly related.

M: I'll be tilling in a little vineyard on the other side of the mountain.

K: I appreciate your calling and I wish you all the best.

M: Thank you.

*

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon

Joseph Alsop

7/10/70 ca. 6:30 p.m.

A: It was great fun seeing you both last night.

K: I enjoyed it very much.

A: My brother just called to say that my cousins will be here on Sunday. And there's no other time I can see them but at lunch.

K: That's all right. I couldn't have come anyway.

A: But it was so good to see you and Nancy. She was looking wonderful. If she'll take you, you should marry her.

K: She's a great girl. The very idea that anyone wouldn't take me is an impossible blow to my ego.

A: You said it would be about a month on what worries me so much.

K: Things are happening all the time, but they may not be noticed.

A: For about a month?

K: Well, I think Israel is quite content with what's happening now.

A: The replacement system is enough?

K: One theory of replacement is to replace at the rate at which the Egyptians claim to have shot them down. I think that would amplify...

A: If you replace what's obsolete...

K: I don't want to go into it, but we are handling these matters to prevent too great a crystallization of the radical Arab sentiment but not be too offensive to the Israelis.

A: Is it having the effect you want on the Russians?

K: They have noticed that we are concerned.

A: Yes, but it's a question of showing a bit of steel.

K: I agree.

A: I've got a column for Wednesday that may be unjust to you, but I think something hold is essen

*

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

Sisco/Kissinger

10:55 am 7/11/70

First part of conversation missed.

S: It is equally interesting instead of having it come through the Soviets.

K: Why is that interesting?

S: Because if the Arabs said you will hear our answer through the Russians, that's just a brush off. On the Israeli side you will find an interesting three sentences in a telegram from Tel Aviv -- #3629. They came up with a crazy operation in 2-3 days which would frankly have been played by the world as a deep penetration raid and it would seem like the Israels were trying to blow the peace initiative. This morning from Golda "Rafael informed all U.S. doing for them in practical sense and in view of by Sisco, operation is off."

K: Good.

S: Tell the President that part is what he said and that has been done to press the Defense Dept. You may have to fire people over there. I am getting together with them on Monday.

K: Are they meeting the list or not?

S: I have a meeting Monday morning and you will have a report. In a week Laird will come to the President saying they are running up a $5 million credit bill. He will try to let the Israelis take the lead with Congress and without the executive branch hold to the President a substantial amount of credit. I will give you that next week. Laird will say we have been giving them bombs, etc. It's precisely what we should be doing.

K: What we are trying to do is working.

S: I don't know if it's negative or positive, but we have them sufficiently nervous. We can build on any positive elements.

K: That was always the intention.

By _NARA, Dale_

5/27

TELCON

Javits/Kissinger

2:10 pm

7/11/70

K: I was talking to the President this morning about your conversation yesterday. He was pleased by it and feels such a letter could be handy in what we are trying to do. He thinks it would be most effective if it was oriented toward US/Soviet aspects and not focused on Israel.

J: Precisely because we are now on the proper issue. I am glad he agrees and it will be done in 3-4 days.

K: A general expression of support of what he has done and what will flow from it.

J: We will draft a letter from Ribivoff and myself and without talking to you, you will have the contents. (Then no one will know that you knew or can say you were questioned.)

K: FYI - I think the Soviets are shaken. We have a different tone.

J: I don't believe that this country has gone isolation or that we are universalists. Even those not seeing eye to eye on VN. Even that is settling down. Did you read the debate on the Tonkin Gulf in the Senate yesterday? It's a good debate and well worth reading. Even for the President.

K: We have always felt that you have felt at times obliged to oppose us but that you've always been fair.

J: As high level a debate as I have seen. Did you read the L. A. Times article by Felix Belair (?). (I believe J said it was in the financial section). It's on the overseas private investment corp.

K: You have to see my swanky new office. The food is still bad but the office is nice.

J: Your office reached me at David Frosts'. He asked that you get his warm regards.

K: Please reciprocate for me. I will see you next week for breakfast.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Professor Doty
7/11/70 6:40 p.m.

D: Is there any chance of your coming this weekend?

K: Has anyone asked me?

D: I thought you were invited . . .

K: Oh yes, I regretted. I have to catch up with my social life here.

D: When will you be going to SanClemente again?

K: We'll go back around July 24 for a week and then at the end of August for two weeks.

D: I'm going to be in Aspen at the end of August for two weeks.

K: Why don't you come out? My only problem out there is all these maniace have press agents. Have you ever heard of Ann Miller? I went to a party and was talking with her, couldn't have talked for more than 10 minutes, but she had printed an item that she'd been dating me. Are you coming down here?

D: We thought July 21 or 22 or 23.

K: Let me get David Young to get back to you.

D: We can all be there except Panofsky. We can give you a summary of upgrading and some predictions.

K: Yes, I want that.

D: And most of us were at a conference in Racine on weapons. We can give you a short overview of that. [Russian name] was there with a new bit on Russia. He has been done out of SALT because of the anti-ABM paper he wrote. He has been working on a five-year budget and they have an enormous amount now to put into their agricultural budget. I think these were the main things. Rathjens was in Moscow and saw Arbatov.

K: I don't know how much he's keyed in.

D: That puzzled me too. Arbatov went to all these institutes and didn't see much going on on SALT. I don't know how we're going in Vienna.

By NARA, Dale S/27

Telecon
Professor Doty
7/11/70 6:40 p.m. page 2

K: In Vienna we are doing well. If we wanted to have a limited agreement, we could probably get in in this year, but I don't think it's right to leave out offensive limitations.

D: We might review a little about Intelligence (?) limitations/ we had before.

K: That's good. The only thing is we might want a meeting in the later afternoon or evening rather than at breakfast.

K: Okay. Was the ABM paper my secretary brought down to you useful?

K: Yes, very helpful.

D: Good. How is the protocol coming. Are you going to give it a push?

K: We can talk about that. We have made the basic decisions.

D: Okay. David will call me back about the 21st, 22nd or 23rd?

K: Yes. It will probably be the 21st or 23rd.

D: Okay. Does Laird have the numbers right in the New York Times this morning?

K: Yes.

D: That's too bad.

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Sunday, July 12, 1970

(At Home)

K: Mr. President

P: Henry. When does Bill Rogers get back? Do you know?

K: Late tonight.

P: I think it is important that tomorrow that I schedule a meeting with him and he and you and I can sit down and ... Do you think we possibly should have Laird there too? I mean just for a chat.

K: It depends what you want to discuss.

P: Well, you remember he mentioned the troop thing ...
Well, maybe just him alone. It would be more of a buildup for him
but he should know that we want to do it subject to ...

K: Well, I think you should get a report from his trip.

P: On what subjects?

K: On well the attitude of the Asians towards Cambodia, what he sees for the future of Cambodia, what his ideas are on Vietnam and then his reactions to his conversations with Hume. And I would leave it mostly on that basis. And Bruce. And say that we are going ahead with an NSC meeting in the following week on the negotiating thing.

P: Is that what that is Friday - the July 21st meeting ...

K: That's right. That's to give Bruce, I mean ...

P: How about having an NSC meeting. I think we ought to have one on something else this week. I just want to keep these people's feet on fire. If you got a good ...

K: Well we could have an update on the Middle East.

P: Let's do it. You see, just so they hear from me directly that we're not going to have any fuoling around.

K: OK. We could schedule one. It doesn't have to be a very long one.

P: A brief meeting. Just to get updated on the Middle East. So that people don't feel ... At least he said from what I saw the right thing on the Middle East. But ... about when he met the press. Did he or didn't he, I don't know?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/10

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Sunday, July 12, 1970

2

K: On the Middle East. I haven't seen the exact text yet.

P: No but I mean the papers indicated that. Because he at least brought in the Russian thing. That's what matters Henry. Unless you bring the Russian thing in there is no stroke as you know. The difficulty with State and this is not Sisco, but Bill and the others always talk as if this is Arab/Israeli. By doing that we lose the game. We have to put the Russians into the game.

K: That's the essential ingredient.

P: That's what we did.

K: And that's the only way we are going to get it to a solution. If we could schedule the NSC meeting on the Middle East on Thursday or Friday because we are having a wrap-up preliminary meeting and I think we will have a better paper for you then.

P: That's what I was thinking of. Friday. Then just go Friday on that. And also it's good to let the word get out that we had a meeting on the Middle East. Keep these people feeling . . . a great psychological game we play now and I hope that Javits gets his letter in damn fast.

K: Oh that will be in by Wednesday night.

P: Will it, good.

K: That's what he said. I'll schedule the meeting with Rogers first thing in the morning. I'll put it on the schedule and then I'll call him.

P: See what he would like. If the morning is full then have it at 3 p.m.

K: I meant I would get it scheduled first thing in the morning. But I think he would probably prefer to spend the morning in the Department.

P: 3:00 in the afternoon sounds good to me if it is good for him.

K: I'll schedule it for that time.

P: I was looking at the news magazines and I saw that Life had a article in their front cover a piece something about the fact that Cambodia was a country in itself not our . . . something about a disaster . . . That was probably written two or three weeks ago.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/70

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Sunday, July 12, 1970

Don't you think?

K: Of course, they close about three weeks early.

P: But you know. There really is a death wish, isn't it.

K: The American intellectual community has an investment in defeat.

P: Why, isn't that awful?

K: For a number of reasons. First, of all they predicted it. Second because they are afraid that if this succeeds other things like it might be tried. Thirdly, because they so distrust this country that they sort of thrive on the errors (malerrors?).

P: Well they only trust what, themselves and their brilliance? Good God, you put them in charge of anything... have you every seen... Look at this bastard Heard, put him in charge of something he comes up with nothing. Absolute dribble. dribble. I'll tell you about the intellectual community. I used to have great respect for the professors... but I have none now. Because they never come up with anything. They never have any damn guts. I have a hell of a lot more respect for George Meaney than I do for the President of Harvard. (or some school) Don't you?

K: Oh no comparison. The labor people have had to learn that words alone do not achieve objectives and they have had a very hard school. But the...

P: I have a certain intuition you know, my intuitions are seldom wrong because I have been around a long time but I have an intuition that the Cambodian thing came out better than we could have dreamed - look, the Chinese didn't intervene and we didn't put the Russians and Chinese together. I think you ought to have a backgrounder sometime and point that out. That these are the things that the intelligencia wrote - the State Department and others predicted - the Chinese would intervene, the Chinese and Russians would be pushed together and another thing that we would have huge casualties, that Cambodia would fall and that the etc. Every prediction has proved wrong Henry, everyone. Why don't you... Have you ever told anybody in those direct terms.

K: Never in a large meeting but I'll...

P: It doesn't really have to be a large meeting. Tell it to somebody who is really writing it and will get it out. And will say you know those who commented on Cambodia probably would like to go back and burn their columns. Use that phrase. They all proved wrong didn't they.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/9/19

The President/Mr. Kissinger

Sunday, July 12, 1970

4

K: That is certainly true. But so has the intellectual community on all most every foreign policy prediction in the last ten years. They predicted that the bombing halt would lead to a fruitful negotiations, it hasn't happened; they predicted that the Soviets would help us, that hasn't happened; if . . . they predicted that if you went to ABM, it would hurt SALT, the opposite has happened. They said you couldn't get along with the Russians, that hasn't happened. WXX

P: We have gotten along better with the Russians better than anybody else.

K: Certainly far better than Kennedy. So almost every prediction has turned out to be incorrect.

P: Would you do this. Sit down with an intelligent intellectual sometime and, I mean, get it printed, I mean take a symbol for example. Say all right I'll give you this KXXIX as an exclusive if you will use it. Every prediction has proved to be wrong. And they better look to their problem a little rather than to ours.

K: Right, well, without this Cambodian would today become Communist and every problem we had in May would have happened with a little less hysteria but all these people who have written the articles would be writing - John Gardner would be, Cy Vance would be, McGeorge Bundy would be, that wouldn't have changed. There wouldn't have been a demonstration on the elipse but that would have happened in October.

P: Well, the hell with that. Let's face it, the demonstrations don't mean . . . and I think as a matter of fact - and I hope they have another and this one we will play a little rougher. You see some of my staff as you know feels that I should treat them very nicely and so forth. I'll treat them nicely in order to avoid violence but I'll be damned if I am going to treat them nicely in terms of what they have done. They are wrong, I am against them and that is the thing we have to stand . . .

K: And they can't be placated Mr. President. After all, if Goodell for example, loses in New York it will be a classic example that no matter how much you such around them when the chips are down they will vote for the Democrats. Although Goodell deserves it.

P: We don't need him. . . that's the last thing I ever saw

OK,

K: I'll get the Rogers meeting set up for the first thing . . .

P: When you call you can say the President felt that there should be a meeting . . . a little of that jazz so that he feels that we want him to come in, you know. all that.

K: I'll call first thing P: We'll have our picture taken and so forth.

MJO FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/94

Joseph Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

Sunday, July 12, 1970

(at home)

S: Hello Henry

K: Joe

S: How are you?

K: OK. I saw you on Meet the Press. You were superb. I just had a long talk with the President about it. He is up at Camp David and he couldn't see it himself but I read him my notes on what you had said and he was very very pleased and he said I should tell you that he has bigger things in mind for you.

S: Well, that's wonderful. OK Henry, thank you very much.

K: Right

MJD F/O 12958
Authentic
By ____ NARA Date 6/9/84
DECLASSIFIED

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger
9:40 am 7/13/70

K: On Godley, why don't you go ahead but keep him on a tight leash.

J: OK. Ehrlichman has the proposed guidelines on this. I don't understand what happened. I understood your shop and John's had been kept informed.

K: I stay at the periphery of that so I don't follow it in detail.

J: I think it's the right decision. Nothing new has happened since Bill Sullivan testified.

K: Another thing -- A member of my staff, Sonnenfeldt, wants to be considered for the Swank position at State. He isn't sure he would move but I felt in fairness I couldn't stand in his way.

J: I will let you know. I haven't talked with Marty yet.

K: I am not urging it, you understand.

J: I understand.

By

NARA, Dale 3/97

Telecon
Ambassador Lucet
7/13/70 10:30 a.m.

L: I have a personal message from Paris from my predecessor, Alphond. He said he spoke to your ambassador, Watson, about coming to Washington in late July, the 28th, 29th and 30th. He said he would be pleased to meet you. Will you be in the city?

K: No, unfortunately, I will almost certainly be on the West Coast. Could he come a week later?

L: I will suggest that.

K: I will come back on August 2.

L: And you could receive him?

K: On the third, or no, I prefer the fourth. It would give me more time. No, I prefer the fifth.

L: Okay, I will send him a message saying you can see him on the fifth.

K: Good.

L: Could I come and see you before then?

K: Certainly.

L: Could I have my secretary call your secretary to work something out?

K: Certainly.

L: Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN

Elfin (Newsweek)/Kissinger

10:40 am

7/13/70

K: I wanted to raise one problem with you. You say in your issue of Newsweek this week that Henry Kissinger warned Moscow and the U.S. might have to expel Soviet troops. I don't think someone read what I said. I know it's all over town but pretty soon it will get a reality of its own. Did you read what I said? It's part of a 4 page answer.

E: The point --

K: It's ? ? ? ? what the peace initiative was attempting to accomplish.

E: We read the transcript of the briefing.

K: To the editors.

E: Yes, and this phrase appears in the backgrounder as part of a much longer -- it might very well have been a 4 page answer but there's the image of what you said.

K: "We are trying to get an answer in such a way ? ? ? ?" This is a close (?) part of what we are trying to do in the settlement.

E: This has reached a point -- in all honesty -- ? ? ?

K: Particularly because of mischevous reporting. Marder put it in the Post after I had explained the word was too strong.

E: We are looking again at what we said. I would like to go back and put it to rest once and for all on what we hope to go into. I have it here in shorthand --

K: What you are saying is that in a background briefing the U.S. might expel Soviet troops. That's your interpretation.

E: Particularly the last sentence. There was a warning of a possible nuclear confrontation.

K: In what the President said. What the situation might produce in any event.

E: In order to straighten this out, what should we do? Should someone sit down with you?

K: I think --

E: What about Marder's pieces last week? Were they a misinterpretation?

K: Not completely but not -- I don't know that if someone sits down it will fuel more misinterpretation. We have trouble enough as it is on genuine difficulties

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Elfin/Kissinger

10:40 am 7/13/70

-2-

K: (cont) without spending two weeks on totally fictitious one. We did get some-  
thing over. The whole point of what I said was the autonomy of the events and  
not confrontation with the Soviets next week or next month.

E: I will accept that. When we go at it again bear in mind the over all bearing (?) of the context. We won't use "expel" again.

K: There's nothing that can be done again.

E: One of your predesessors the week he left, I bet a national story would come out with the phrase " a steel trap mind." And several did. They get into the clips and they feed off each other. We will try to put this to rest this week.

K: I would appreciate it.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

11:00 a.m.

7/13/70

L: There are a couple of things -- I am getting concerned about the civilians having copies of the report to the President. It might leak out.

K: The meeting is set up for Thurs.

L: I will not be here Thurs.

K: Then it will have to be changed.

L: I am making a tour of the summer programs on Thurs. with Ed Brooke.

K: I will see if I can move it to Wed.

L: We don't have to implement it but we don't want it to leak before it gets to the President.

K: Right.

L: We are setting up a control procedure over here. We have to be careful of this Israeli stuff.

K: This Phantom stuff is awful in Newsweek.

L: That was said on "Meet the Press" yesterday. We have $130 million of equipment delivered that we don't have financed. The Israelis are saying they will pay cash. They don't have $130 million in cash and it will have to be paid. Otherwise, the Secy. of Defense will be put in jail.

K: We have confidence in his nimbleness.

L: We have to have more than that. We will get the deliveries in there but we have to have financing. The contractors will be asking for money.

K: My understanding is that the President approved the non-aircraft items on the list when he made the decision. The recent list he approved on the electronic equipment.

L: Now our problem is the fact that we expended and it's $130million (?) right away.

K: I would be worried about things we agreed to but on the new things, we should staff them.

L: That's what we understand but we want you and the President to understand the fiscal problem. We have to get that money somehow or other. I have to

By ace NARA, Date 5/27

Laird/Kissinger

11:00 am 7/13/70

-2-

L: (cont) get a military sales bill approved. We are through 1970. It's tied up with the Cooper/Church thing now. This just causes problems. We have no method to deliver it now. They might come in the next month or two.

K: What's the particular x consequences?

L: I will have to start talking and challenging the Congress to pass it through the Senate so we can take care of it so the formally approved aid to Israel -- even the old jets -- I will have to put pressure on Congress.

K: We agreed with that.

L: Have you anything else?

K: No.

L: A week from Friday we will go out early.

K: Are we going together? Great!

L: We will have a nice visit.

K: The President will probably be in S. C. so I will probably stay out there.

L: We will go out about _______. Your speech is about 12:30.

K: Do they wear sports clothes?

L: Yes. We will talk about that.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
D. Frost/Kissinger
11:15 am 7/13/70

K: I am going to stop talking to you. Every time you are here it's a crisis. First, there was Cambodia. Last time I said it was a quiet day. You were barely out of the door when Jordan blew up.

F: It's the story of my life. Three hours after I was born Hitler marched into Czechoslovakia.

H: Are you studying Henry Kissinger under stress?

F: No, I was calling to get you away from the stress. I was wondering if you could get to NY tomorrow night. Clair is giving a dinner in my honor. I asked him to invite you but he didn't because he felt that in the middle of the Middle East crisis it would be trivial.

K: I have a dinner with some newsmen tomorrow. Maybe I can change that. What's the address?

F: 323 (or possibly 322) E. 57th St.

K: How late can I let you know?

F: Anytime.

K: You are not plotting a crisis?

F: Lon Nol will not be there.

K: I will settle that. What time? 8:00?

F: yes.

K: Informal?

F: Yes.

K: I will see if I can shift something.

F: It's a nice happy group of people you will enjoy. Literate, merry people.

K: I will have to get ready for them. I will have to change my whole pace.

F: It would be lovely if to see you. Then if you can not, let's get together in the next couple of weeks before I go on vacation. My numbers are 212/736-6300 or 736-6387. K: I will call you tomorrow.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Peter Flanigan

7/13/70 11:30 a.m.

K: Are you going x in with Kearns to see the President?

F: Yes.

K: Good, then I won't go.

F: Good, if anything comes up I'll let you know.

K: You're not supposed to say "good" when I say I'm not going to be there.

F: I just want to be helpful.

K: But would you get him out of there at noon. The President has an appointment with Rogers.

F: Yes, I will.

K: What do you want to see me about at 3:00?

F: The subject we discussed yesterday, but we can put it off till tomorrow.

K: Okay.

F: You are going to be here tomorrow? You are not going to the ball game?

K: No.

F: Good.

By

NARA, Dale S/27

TELCORN
Laird/Kissinger

11:47 am

7/13/70

K: We are getting that foreign aid package ready. This idea of moving all seconday (?) assistance programs into the Foreign Relations Committee. In one coherent package.

L: It is now handled by them. I wanted them handled by the Armed Services Comm.

K: People all think it's impossible.

They

L: That just don't want to fight with Fulbright but I think it could be won.

K: On what entry (?) into the Armed Services comm?

L: Defense Authorization Bill. Military support and military assistance. The Speaker of the House when it was sent over his way (next last, said) he would have to make the decision when it reached his desk. He would go along if it were transmitted that way.

K: I will have to let the President decide. I will not add a recommendation.

L: I sent one over. Fulbright would explode but I don't think he would win that. It wouldn't be until '72. The transmittal is the important thing.

K: Good.

L: I hate to keep bugging you. I don't think I should cancel out with Brooks on Thurs.

K: I will change it and that report won't be transmitted in your absence. The President won't be here tomorrow so I will try for Wed.

L: It just bothers me that it will go before the President sees it. And the press is pressuring them to talk about the report. I just sent another memo telling them to keep their mouths shut.

By CCO NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCOM

Ed Dunn/Kissinger

4:07 pm

7/13/70

D: Just passing through and wanted to say hi. You are doing a marvelous job. I am in Providence, R.I., now.

K: You are still in the Bureau?

D: I am right now.

K: Are you seeing Sullivan?

D: A week from Friday.

K: Without you and your colleagues I would be dead.

D: It's good to be in there pitchingx for you.

K: I remember your support in the old days.

D: The old days are much better than now. It's disgraceful there now.

K: Nice talking to you.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCORN
Zeigler/Kissinger

4:25 pm

7/13/70

Z: Can you talk to me a minute? What I am going to say is that I have items
from the ticker but we have nothing official. Is that true?

K: Yes.

Z: I'll say it anyway, but is it true?

K: Yes and we have stated that the President has stated his attitude in his
April 20th speech.

Z: We are willing to think about any peace initiative.

K: He also said something about the Malak speech. We don't know what it means
but we are willing to explore it. Don't go overboard. It's a tender shoot.

Z: I will say it just as I outlined it. Then if they say, Ron, you are willing
to explore any pact of peace, then does that mean any Indochina conference? I
will refer to the April 20 speech.

K: That's right and don't go beyond that.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

TELCOM
President/Kissinger

4:47 pm

7/13/70

K: I thought you would like to know that Ferobin (sp?) who was in Hanoi stopped in Delhi on the say back and he floated the idea if we agreed to pull our forces out eventually they would agree to a Geneva-type conference. We haven't seen the specific proposal. I don't know if they have in mind a fixed deadline but it indicated there's some movement going on. They are back where they were before Cambodia.

P: Interesting. When I am talking to Bill and he didn't seem too-enthusiastic about the M. E.

K: His initiative?

P: No. No one is suggesting that we be belligerent about the Soviets.

K: No one said anything in addition to what was said.

P: On the other hand I thought his report was better than usual.

K: Except for VN.

P: Frankly, I gather that he brought Sisco on the carpet.

K: He didn't support Sisco yesterday.

P: Thank you. I will have this in mind when I meet them (Sen. Aiken & Cooper).

By NARA, Dato 5/27

TELCORN

Packard/Kissinger
5:28 pm 7/13/70

K: Where are you?

P: At home.

K: In Calif. ?

P: No, in D. C.

K: You are leaving early. I better mention this to the President.

P: I have a cold and I'm trying to get rid of it.

K: We are having trouble scheduling the DPRC we were going to do it next week.
Now I hear you will not be in town. How urgent is your presence?

P: I don't think I have to be there. You have the work done.

K: I understand you have no time on Friday.

P: We could work out some time.

K: We will need 2 hours. Do you think you could spend that much time on
Friday?

P: This is fairly important and I could find the time.

K: I think you should be there.

P: I don't think it's necessary but I would like to be there.

K: I will try for Friday then.

P: That would be better. If I cannot be there, I think we should have Mel.

K: I hate to have Cabinet members because it's tough on them if they are
overruled. On the Bohemian Grove, one wears sports clothes?

P: You know. Just be a Bohemian. Something fairly warm and sporty. Shoes to walk around in.

K: I understand there's no telephone.

P: There's one but they have to get a message to you. I will take an hour.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

-2-

K: They won't permit a WH phone?

P: That could be done. But you will be walking around.

K: So it won't be of much advantage.

P: There's an administration office and we could have a WH phone put in there.

K: I will talk to the WH communication agency people.

P: OK and if not, I will do it. You and Mel will go out there Friday morning. You talk at 12:30 and then you are free. I will have someone pick you up at Hamilton Field. You should stay through Sat. night. It's a fun night. You should leave between 10:00 & 11:00 a.m., Sun.

K: I am going to S. Clemente from there.

P: Then you can work out your scheduling. I thought we would plan to get you out to Hamilton Field and they can take you to S. C. Take a warm jacket.

By NARA, Dato 5/27

Telecon
Joe Sisco
7/13/70 5:40 p.m.

K: How did it go with Dobrynin.

S: It was a brief meeting, in which I asked him the state of play and he said they were still talking. It will probably be a little while longer.

K: He's seeing the Secretary tomorrow isn't he?

S: There's nothing I know of. Maybe later on in the week. Then I did what we talked about Saturday night. I've put that down on a piece of paper and I'll send it over to you tomorrow. It's just for you, won't go to anyone else.

K: Well, the President wanted me to tell you that he was extremely pleased by what you did yesterday. He doesn't expect it but if you get any flack from any of your colleagues, he wanted you to know that he's behind you.

S: Well, between you and me, the only flack I got was from the Secretary of State.

K: Really? The President is a terribly perceptive man. He told me he would bet me a thousand to one that you got hell from the Secretary and he wanted me to call you and reassure you. I didn't pick that up. What did he give you hell about?

S: It's a long story. Let's just say that I took it and it's over. I just don't want this thing to go on.

K: Nothing you say to me will go on.

S: Well, first, he thinks there's been too much talking. I said to him that you and I did a good job. And he's got a thing about "expel." I defended it.

K: Did he read the transcript?

S: Apparently he didn't. Of if he did, he didn't understand it. I said I thought what was done in the White House was right. You retracted it. I said the President decided to put the emphasis on the Soviet objective. He says we've started a great war crisis in the country. I said we have only alerted the people. I don't see a war crisis. But I got hell.

K: You ppor bastard.

S: What was said at the President's meeting.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Joe Sisco

7/13/70 5:40 p.m. page 2

K: Nothing really. The President said that he was very pleased with the way you conducted yourself. The Secretary didn't say anything.

S: Did he talk about a war crisis?

K: He said he had that impression in Britain.

S: That's because the British are interested in us kissing the Soviet ass no matter what the Soviets do.

K: Well, afterwards, he said you better call Sisco and tell him that I'm behind him. I said there was no need. He said 'I bet he caught hell.' He specifically told me to tell you that he was fully behind you.

S: Don't worry. The pepe of the Secretary will be over in 24 hours.

K: Did he read "expel?"

S: I told him you retracted it, the White House did, that it was one god-damned reporter, Murray Marder who pulled it out of context. There's nothing you and I can do further. We've done our job and he'll cool off in the next day.

By CCO NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCORN

Adm. Anderson/Kissinger

5:55 pm

7/13/70

A: We are well educated talking to people here at CINCPAC. We want to know your desires. We get in at midnight on the 14th. We are dropping off a member of the party in Calif. He could be in Wash. on the 16th. We could see the President on the 16th late or the 17th or 18th. Before seeing the President would he rather we wait until the 5th or 6th, after we have our next meeting?

K: The morning of the 18th would be good for me.

A: He will be in Wash. and not Calif. then?

K: I will have to check his calendar to let you know his schedule. He will be in D. C.

A: Will you let us know before 7:00 tomorrow morning here? Anything he wants we will attempt to do. The members of the party would like to work their schedules out. We want to convey to him getting competent people into Cambodia. Let me know.

K: Did you think well of Ladd?

A: Yes but he needs help.

K: I will be in touch with you before 7:00 your time.

By NARA, Dale

5/27

Telecon
Katherine Graham
7/14/70 8:50 a.m.

G: I'm not going to take any more calls of yours complaining about articles by Maxine. Suzy has one on me saying that I was staying over a week in London to see Heath. I got a call from my secretary in Washington. The Evening Standard was calling my office to ask if there was any truth to it.

K: Now admit it. Did he fly you in British jet airplanes to your meetings? I think it does you great credit.

G: It says I saw him every night and prolonged my stay to continue to see him.

K: Denials do you no good.

G: They don't? I've never before been tainted with the breath of scandal.

K: And you thought I was without resources.

G: We'll see about denials. I said just tell them there is no truth to this whatsoever. The headline said "Kay and the Prime Minister." Then they say everyone says they are smitten with each other. I just hope Walter Annenberg has seen this.

K: It explains why you wouldn't have dinner with me.

By _cc_ NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger
9:30 am 7/14/70

L: The other day when I visited with the President on military assistance, and we got into that problem of support assistance or MAP assistance or VN programs before the Congress. When we are moving on Korea and Cambodia is it time to go to Congress? Fulbright will not support this. I am afraid we will wait too long.

K: What do you think we should do?

L: We have to be willing to go for a ________ request.

K: A supplemental?

L: I thought from what the President said he was willing to do it. He said that day to go ahead. So I figured he would want to do it. The thing that bothers me is that problem with Greece and Turkey. Goodpaster has been raising hell.

K: I think what the President is thinking of is making the Korean negotiations tougher.

L: We ought to raise wrap Cambodia into it.

K: And make it the Nixon Doctrine.

L: We have to have this Korean thing ready next week. Dave is going over.

K: Why don't we aim for as soon as he returns from there.

L: And we can go on Cambodia n thing then. We should sell this as part of the Nixon Doctrine. If we let the decisions drag out, we will be in bad shape and people will wonder why we didn't do something.

K: As soon as Dave comes back we will try to move on the supplemental MAP.

L: And we will try to get the tentative thing to you Sat. or Monday. This economic assistance on VN we should put it out on the line some day.

K: It's also the Nixon Doctrine. I agree with you.

L: You will get heat on this.

K: We will get it anytime.

L: ? ? ? ? ? economic assistance program to India.

K: To hell with them. I will urge it on the President and I think he will go ahead with it.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCON

H. K. Smith/Kissinger

10:23 p am

7/14/70

K: I just read your commentary of yesterday and since I took your views seriously -- did you read what I said or what Murray Marder said what I said.

S: The second is true plus what Gill told me.

K: I don't see if you read what I said ? ? ? ? about the peace plan. I gave a long explanation about the M. E. Why it was so dangerous. The whole theme was that we were not heading in a confrontation by choice but that the small countries would have to draw the larger countries in. Now, the word "expel." I thought I would ignore it for a while but it's being made into a cause celebre.

S: Bill Gill used it the same day. I asked him to check the word and he said Zeigler was there. Zeigler said he would have a good story.

K: I really said -- on the peace plan. "What we are trying to do is very delicate. We are trying to separate the ? ? ? ? Israel ? ? ? ? Israeli assistance to which we are committed. ? ? ? ? not radical regimes. Expel Soviet military presente. Not advisors but pilots before they are firmly established." I am quoting to you. Later I drew back on the word expel. This was just military people.

S: The word expel does mean evict by force.

K: That was a bad word and two days later I said it was a bad word but that I would not change the meaning of what I said. I am not asking you to undo it.

S: I am really very sorry to give an impression --

K: You have a right to criticize. Your praise would mean nothing if you didn't. But I am just trying to make clear that this is getting out of control.

S: I won't go further into it. I read your briefing of the executives in S. Clemente and it was very good. Expel was in --

K: I admit it was but I have said 50 times since then that expel has the intention of force. This was off the record and had no intention of being released so it couldn't have been a public warning. In its context it wasn't meant as a confrontation. The newspapermen who have been riding this for two weeks -- it's a story that we made clear this isn't meant -- it should have killed it.

S: You know how the press operate.

As

K: I have told you on many occasions, I take you most seriously and you will not find another broadcaster as seriously. What you said was fair.

By NARA, Date 5/27

HKSmith/Kissinger

10:23 am 7/14/70

-2-

S: I will be awfully careful in the future.

K: I wanted to straighten this out for future reference.

S: It's really minor and it will be forgotten. I wish you luck.

K: This will clear up.

S: I have that impression, without knowledge.

K: If we could just hold out -- if we could have the minimum support that most Presidents have had.

S: Don't you think the President scored support last week?

K: Yes. Let's get together in the next few dx weeks before I go to S. Clemente again.

S: I will call your secretary.

By NARA, Date 3/27

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

10'40 am 7/14/70

S: I have just had hand-carried to you the memo of the Dobrynin thing I talked to you about. I showed it to the Secy. You can decide if you want to show it to the President.

K: I will. Are you sitting in on the other meeting?

S: No, he wants to discuss European security. I don't think he will get into the Middle East. The Secy. is fully briefed. I briefed him. You will see that when the Secy. spoke to the Secy. General --

K: I noticed it and he gives credit to the briefing at Blair House.

S: Everything is fine with the Secy. He made some good remarks about what I have done, at the staff meeting today. I told you he would come to his senses.

K: The feeling here is warm. The next time you are over we will drop in on him.

S: I don't want to be thanked for doing the job as I see it.

K: But you can't refuse to see him if he asks to see you.

S: I can. I am a terribly ornery basterd.

*

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Senator Dole
7/14/70 11:20 a.m.

D: I'm inquiring about something you may not know anything about . . .

K: Have you every met a Harvard professor who admitted he didn't know anything?

D: I'm calling about the Leer jet application to sell aircraft.

K: The truth is I don't know about that.

D: We understand it's been approved. Apparently Stans has discussed it with you.

K: State approved it. I told them I would approve it when it came up in the regular way, which it didn't do until a week ago. But it's come in and we're going to move it. Here, just a moment. Perhaps I can get more information on it for you. The situation is that the paper is still in State. It has been there for weeks. But we gave them an ultimatum that it has to be over this week.

D: Good. That means a lot to the Leer people and they had to lay off 50 percent of their work force, so it means a lot to the fellow who works for Leer.

K: Well, for your information, I think it will go through this month.

By NARA, Dale 3/27

Telecon
Hamilton Fish Armstrong

7/14/70@ 11:35 a.m.

K: I would like to try my hand at this article. I don't know what's going to come out of it.

A: Good for you.

K: How late can I get it to you?

A: I suppose Monday, August 3. That would be the last gasp. I think you can do something that would be very important influence.

K: I could if I had a week off to write it.

A: Maybe a weekend?

K: I'll do my best. How are the other problems?

A: In status quo. We're going to have a meeting next week. We had one last with no results. It's going to be a struggle. If we could have come up with something at first it would have been better. But we can't go ahead with Bob and there is no obvious alternative.

K: To Bowie?

A: Yes. So we're bogged down. I've got some people looking for names. It's not easy. It's like finding a college president.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
David Frost
7/14/70 11:40 a.m.

K: I am distressed that I won't be able to go up this evening.

F: I'm sorry.

K: I was eager to do it, but I couldn't get out of what's been arranged for this evening, and my nerves wouldn't be up to another international crisis.

F: Is there any hope of your being in New York this weekend or the next?

K: I may be there on Sunday.

F: No, I'll be in Las Vegas on Sunday. The lady's filming there and I haven't been there in a couple of years.

K: It's a good way to escape. I like those vulgar places.

F: As long as you know you can get out.

K: They're so totally out of reality that they can't touch you.

F: No, the last party I threw in England I had it a fun fair. I rather like those insane things. I may be in Washington on Thursday.

K: That would be the last day I could see you here because I'll be in San Clemente for a week after that.

F: Why don't we try to do lunch there on Thursday?

K: I have one, but I'll break it for you. But what do I tell McGeorge Bundy? Oh well, one more lie will not affect the final outcome.

F: Your secret is safe with me.

K: I'm sorry about tonight. I don't meet many people socially that I like, much less people who amuse me. But I'll see you for lunch on Thursday. I have a grand new office. Why don't you come to my office and then we'll go out for lunch.

G: Good. I'll see you for lunch at 1:00 in your office.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELCONE
Kraslow/Kissinger

11:55 am

7/14/70

HAK: I just wanted to let you know because there may not be a chance tonight that I have raised that other project.

K: With the man, himself?

HAK: With him and the people who make that kind of decision. We cannot do it this fall. There's not a sufficient state of flex that we don't want to do it. But you will be the first man considered.

K: Does Klein know?

HAK: No.

K: They will do it at the proper moment. Who would be the one to know about it?

HAK: Haldeman but I would prefer we left it between you and me.

K: Sure. Does anyone else know about it?

HAK: No. And I will turn anyone else off.

K: Thank you. Dianne says you want to make this dinner closer to 8:00. We have the room reserved at 7:30 so we will go over and get bombed. You will come as close to 8:00 as possible?

HAK: Yes.

By NARA, Dale S/27

Telecon
Wayne Smith

7/14/70 1:25 p.m.

K: I thought you were going to be able to come out, but Haig tells me probably we can settle some of these things by phone

S: I'm sorry I just can't. I've had this fungus for 6 weeks, and I think that plane trip would give it to me for another 6.

K: I understand.

S: I wanted to discuss with you a few items. One is regarding the staff. That was left somewhat up in the air. As to your plans for Phil Brehm . . .

K: I've decided to go with you. I'm not going to take Brehm.

S: Okay. I've talked briefly with Al Wohlstetter. He stressed the need for some expansion of Larry's staff.

K: What staff is needed is up to you, within budgetary limitations. I thought Larry's weakness was over-centralization. I hoped you would get people to whom you could delegate things. Secondly, don't listen to outsiders who don't know what's going on. I admire Al Wohlstetter and in this case he happens to be right, but people can't tell from the outside what the needs are here. Ok In many ways I know I'm probably a pain in the neck to work for . . .

S: I've heard another part of the anatomy.

K: . . . but my concern is that you get the job done. How you get it done is your problem.

S: Okay. Now, I've spent almost four years at the Pentagon. I don't mind the 16-hour days or the 7-day weeks. I don't mind that, in fact I probably do better at that than with an 8-hour day. But working at the White House at it strikes me that one of the necessities would be a parking place. Is that possible?

K: I really don't know. If it's possible, I'll get it. Does Larry have one?

S: No.

K: I'll look into it, but I'm told these things are almost impossible to get here.

S: Let me chat with Al about that.

By [signature]

NARA, Date

5/27

Telecon
Wayne Smith

7/14/70 1:25 p.m. page 2

K: I'll do my best, but I don't can't believe that you would make that a sine qua non.

S: No, it's not. The staff was the key question.

K: I think you ought to expand it. I think you should make some preliminary soundings, but be careful about picking people now because you happen to agree with them. You may not feel that way once you get aboard. The best people are those who make a cold-blooded analysis. What I need are analysts, not advocates. Everyone who comes to see me is an advocate. Once you have the job, you look at it from a Presidential perspective of what helps him to see the problems properly.

S: No, Brehm and the staff are the two main points I wanted settled.

K: I was going to expand, but I thought I would hold up for the new man. But you should get going on that quickly.

S: Let me think this through one more time. It's not an easy decision.

K: No, my judgment is that it's the single most important job on my staff and can make the greatest difference to the government on a permanent basis. On the 16-hour day part, I don't care about that. If you can get your work done in 8, that's fine. I don't know whether Larry works like that, except in peak periods.

S: I'm very anxious to meet you to earn the kind of confidence that Larry has had.

K: We've just begun to tap the possibilities of this position. It can make a 10-year difference to the government. In SALT we've already done it. And we are just beginning to scratch the surface of the defense problems.

S: I agree. What timing do you want from me on whether I will take it?

K: I was under the misapprehension that you had already decided to. On that basis I've turned down everybody else. Can you let me know by the end of this week?

S: By the first of next week? I need to chat with my parents. I've got to convince my father--who's a dyed in the wool Democrat--that this is in the national interest. I want to make to clear I did not want to be leading anyone down the primrose path. I thought I had no decision to make. Now that I know I do I will, but I have to have about 5 days.

k

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon
Wayne Smith

7/14/70 1:25 p.m. page 3

K: I can only say again it's the most important job on my staff and
it's not a partisan job. But I would want to be sure that you were loyal.
But that doesn't mean you would have to support the Administration pre-
ferences--on the contrary. One person you can call, who's also a
dyed-in-the-wook Democrat is McNamara. It wouldnt be proper for
him to call you, but why don't you call him?

S: I will do that, and call Allen Enthoven and I'll be talking to you
on Monday.

By CCO NARA, Dato 3/27

TELCOM

Mton Katz/Kissinger

2:35 pm

7/14/70

K: I am in a conference on pollution. I want to talk to you about that little group on which we didn't make contact.

HAK: I tried to reach you once, but you were out to dinner.

K: I know. When can I reach you this evening? To have a conversation after 6:30. ______ Johnson mentioned your conversation with him.

HAK: I have to be at a dinner by 8:00. So if you call me between 6:30 and 8:00, I should be here.

K: I will call you between 6:30 and 7:00.

HAK: Fine, Milt.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Bill Sullivan (State)
7/14/70 3:15 p.m.

K: We never got to finish our conversation the other day about your trip. But I told the part that you had told me to the President, about the mood in Saigon.

S: It was a very confident bunch. What I was calling about now was NSSM 94. It was due July 14, and will be sent over to you this afternoon.

K: You say the Smyser condensation?

S: Yes, looked it over and made some changes. Was that all right?

K: Yes, good, that wasn't to be a directive.

S: And we put in a price tag and some other items. On the role of senior negotiations, Alex told me that in your conversation on July 4 the question of Soviet contacts was raised. I gathered from him that you thought the Dobrynin circuit was over-loaded and you thought that Paris was the place to do it. Is that right?

K: That is correct, although my impression is that the President would prefer to wait a month or at least a few weeks to see what develops.

S: We suggested that it be opened right away.

K: I think the President will want nothing put there for a few weeks into August. If you can at least keep that possibility open though.

S: That channel open will be of no use though till the President moves on the proposals.

K: He may not want to approve it. I will just regard it as an option. And I don't usually tell the group the President's thinking.

S: Well, knowing your steering ability, you can get this through I think without indicating the source.

K: That piece of paper has been seen. It is based on what I said in this comment. If it is forced to a decision now, it will be rejected. I think Alex will confirm it on the basis of another conversation in which he flatly said he didn't want the two hooked together. But things often start that way and I assure you it will be

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
John Chancellor
7/14/70 3:50 p.m.

C: Have you seen that Fortune magazine thing? In all the charts you are in marvelous shape. I have been away on a vacation but wanted to ask you...

K: If you ask me about "expel" I'll scream

C: I'm not going to, but I was wondering about the story about India. The Soviet Ambassador. Are we thinking seriously about that?

K: Yes, but we can't tell if it's a Soviet ploy or a serious suggestion to us. We still don't know about the Malik suggestion. They haven't pulled back from that completely.

K: Is there anything that would have happened in the meantime to make them act as they did.

K: They might have used the Cambodian incursions.

C: They could have made a judgment that we might do it again. They may see some unpredictability in the U.S.

K: They may see before them one of two possibilities: both are in our favor in Southeast Asia. No one who's been there has come away with anything but the feeling that the South Vietnamese are simply confident that the war is won. Secondly, assuming they are wrong in South Vietnam and Cambodia and South Vietnam are overrun by the militant Peking Communism, then Moscow is out anyway. Either way, the outlook for them is not brilliant. The Cambodian operation might have given them a national interest incentive.

C: Before the Malik statement, Russia had been unhelpful. Is there anything about their changing their mind aside from what you've just been through? Is there anything else that might have changed their mind?

K: The events before the Cambodian incursions and the results of them.

C: Which, in one way, being very hard on the U.S., proved the unreliability and unpredictability of the American government or on the other hand proved that the U.S. still has options it can follow.

K: Either way, it leads to the same conclusion.

By

NARA, Dato 5/27

Telecon
John Chancellor

7/14/70 3:50 p.m. page 2

C: But we'll go on thinking seriously about what happened in Delhi?

K: I've always taken the position that we take the negotiations seriously.

C: Some people are saying that David Bruce wouldn't have accepted the new assignment if he hadn't been assured that there would be a new initiative on the way.

K: I can't answer that, but I think David Bruce is a patriot and is willing to serve the government. But still it's safe to say that he wouldn't have taken it if he thought it were at a dead end.

C: In the President's statement, he didn't mention any new initiative, but in the Conversation, in describing it he did.

K: I wouldn't look so much for any specific new initiatives or proposals, but he has flexibility.

C: What did you think of the Conversation with the President?

K: Well, what did you think of it. That's more important.

C: Quite frankly, I thought he talked too much about the language limits on/tone or style of/approach to the Middle east.

K: I have been tolerant of the press, but one can get paranoia. This has been going on and on. Usually what he says he's thought about and means. Joe Sisco doesn't think he went beyond the language limitation.

C: Well, I thought Joe was overly defensive, but it seemed to me that the President . . . early in the program he said I'll talk later about the Middle East . . . it seemed to me that he had something he wanted to say and he had worked it out. It couldn't have been an off-the-cuff, ill-considered statement.

K: No, it wasn't.

C: You or he may have chosen to increase the powder charge in the words being used. . .

K: He wanted to bring home to the people the local situation that may produce/series of confrontations, if things continue as before World War I.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
John Chancellor
7/14/70 3:50 p.m. page 3

C: Yes, the war that nobody wanted.

K: I wonder who said that.

C: I wonder too. I think it may have been you. Going back to Delhi, what might happen now?

K: The Soviets have never found it an insuperable problem to convey their ideas to us.

C: Have you had such a communication?

K: Not yet.

C: Do you look for it?

K: Probably in the next month.

C: Was this a secret thing?

K: Not very. If you want to keep something secret, you don't talk about it in Delhi, especially during the summer when their brains are addled anyway.

C: If you were taking a move like that, wouldn't it be possible for a time to use it only for propaganda advantage?

K: Yes, but the time for little propaganda moves is over. If the Soviets were to pull a ploy that doesn't change the situation at all they would lose use up all the credit they have left.

C: One more question: It wouldn't have anything to do with the postponement of the 24th party congress?

K: No.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Milton Katz

6:40 p.m., July 14, 1970

Katz: We had one meeting of that group in which we made an attempt to identify the President. We examined the position of the President as we understood it, examined various other positions. Tentative conclusion was to resolve themselves into two main courses. We decided to have a second meeting on the 2nd or 3rd of August. For the second meeting, asked various people to prepare analyses of these two alternative actions. We asked Matt Ridgeway -- broad terms of how he saw it. Dick Bonesdale to prepare a set of questions -- staff analysis for us of the pros and cons of two different alternatives.

K: (outer office noises)

Katz: Do you want me to mention it over the telephone?

K: Yes, as long as I don't confirm.

Katz: Said basically two positions with variants of each. Question we put is where we will be about mid-1971. We will be at a point where there are 250,000 American forces in South Vietnam. What then? Two alternate courses of action into various proposals boiled down by some period where all American forces would have been withdrawn or withdrawn down to a figure of "x". At that time, the South Vietnamese Regime ~~the~~ our various things that have been said and ~~what are its~~ entailments, what does it imply? Without any pre-judgment of the two options ~~. On August 2nd or 3rd, we would~~ hopefully have three or four papers of this kind.

K: When are you going to get the paper finished?

Katz: (couldn't hear -- brief comment). When we started out, we decided there are no presuppositions about publicity, ____.

K: If we can't keep Top Secret papers Secret, you can't keep this out of the newspapers.

Katz: Don't know if you recall the Bermuda experience. We had 23 or 25 people on the group -- the original statement was that there are no assumptions about what we are going to do.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Milton Katz

July 14, 1970 -- page 2

Katz: After 3 or 4 days we could just say fine, we have had very nice conversations now let's go home. But we agreed to produce a document. Contacted Dean Rusk, showed it to him. We wanted to show it to President Johnson but Rusk made it clear he did not agree with the document and would make his position clear to the President. It was taken to the White House and a copy given to Walt Rostow with the understanding that it would be given to the President (who at that time was on river/cove). Got word that Joe Kraft had it and intended to write his column short using the document. Contacted all the members of the group asking them -- do you want to publish it and do you want your name attached? Some members of the group agreed to having it made public -- some did not want their names attached. It was our assumption at that time that someone in the White House and Department of State wanted to kill it so it was leaked. We have this experience very much in mind. We are not having a large group but a small group.

K: What is your timeframe? You know whether you have the large or small group -- I take it for granted that anything you come up with will go public either by means of a small group or a large group. I have found it impossible to have a discussion on these issues that didn't leak.

Katz: The only accurate answer I can give you is that the group as a whole hasn't (interrupted by HAK).

K: You were going to come out with the ____ would come out next year, now it will be part of the debate next year.

Katz: Didn't intend to mislead you.

K: No, I deduced from what you said that the timeframe was different.

Katz: Joe tells me you suggested we get together and talk about it.

K: No, he suggested it to me.

Katz: It might be desirable.

By NARA, Dale

5/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Milton Katz

July 14, 1970 -- page 3

K: Except for you and Joe Johnson, I know everybody's view on the group. The only other things is what the impact of this is going to be. Cy Vance isn't going to change his view. Jim Thompson of the London Sun Times just sent me an article and he isn't going to change his view. Ridgeway isn't going to change his view. What are we going to get? I don't happen to know your view and I don't know Joe's view (pause). Bonesdale view isn't going to change.

Katz: It may be that what you foresee may take place. It is my hope and my intention that that not take place.

K: I would be delighted to meet with you, might even meet with the President. The basic issues by now are fairly clear and therefore most of these things get treated as political

Katz: In the course of the first meeting, some of them ____. I said President Nixon will be President at least until January 1973. ____. there is no requirement that he accept Option A, B, C, D, or E but what can we do ____. Conclusion that he can regard as fundamentally acceptable to his own position. I can see quite clearly your position, his position ____ entirely warranted. You have done all the staff analysis possible ... (interrupted by HAK) ...

K: No, no, no. From the people you found, already drawn two conclusions. There are two things, first, any recommendation on Vietnam would be in a margin of 53 to 47 on either side of this debate. The pros and cons ____ and two divided. You can't ____ back and found between these two ____ minimum degree of national authority. I saw Cy Vance today -- not on this but Yale and student problems and so forth -- If you take the John Gardner balance everybody against everybody -- you come out even. ____ is a contribution to the erosion to any authority, therefore that is one of the factors.

Katz: Let me put this to you -- 14 months to ____ most of the people you asked to call these groups regarded themselves _____. We went off to the country for a full-dress review. Just changed in Chairmanship, will be changing (couldn't hear and missed name) -- talked to several hundred people, review

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Dr. Milton Katz

14 July 1970 -- page 4

Katz: what we have been doing and what we might do. Indochina issues -- met in Executive Session -- profound skepticism. (cont'd)

K: Except by ____ or trouble makers.

Katz: ____ Let's go very steady, very tight rein, make it clear when we started not committed to make any conclusion at all, not committed to even a piece of paper. I was one of those who voted to go ahead. On a natural basis, we had reached a point where everything was confrontation ____ that the next position adopted by the President and his people and the position adopted by the rational people opposed. A large element in the opposition which is also ____ It seems to me that ____.

K: Either you will support the Administration or you will state an alternate position however close to ours that you will use to beat us with.

Katz: There is a third alternative -- would be that we can't do anything useful at all.

K: I don't know of any group that has ever decided that. Of course I haven't known any group headed by you. Why don't you and Joe come down and let's talk about it.

Katz: Right now I am tied up on Pollution, Technology and God knows what else. What are you doing August 1st -- a Saturday -- will you be there or in California?

K: California on July 24th -- back on August 2nd or 3rd.

Katz: Would like to see you before we meet again. This weekend -- what is today's date?

K: 14th

Katz: You will be gone when?

K: Friday

Katz: 25th?

K: No, 24th.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Len Garment

7/14/70 6:50 p.m.

K: There seems to be a misunderstanding about what we wanted from Javits. He was going to get the largest number possible of Senators to support the President's position on the Soviet-U.S. problem in the Middle East. He was not going to mention Israel. We didn't want him to.

G: I hadn't told him he was doing anything but that.

K: We got the impression that you thought he should go only for the key leaders.

G: No, forget that. He's not going that. He's operating in the framework of your instructions.

K: Is he going to do something?

G: Yes.

K: Good, because there's a vicious campaign going on now. We have State sending in pre-positioned cables which practically accuse me of fomenting a war on behalf of another country.

G: He has that in mind, and if there are others you think of I will speak to them too.

K: No, as long as Javits has it in hand, we can let it go. I just want to make sure he's going for the largest number.

G: I can check that.

K: No, if he hasn't gotten new instructions.

G: No, he hasn't.

K: That's what he was going to do. We can leave him alone. Good
Thank you.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon

Joe Sisco

7/14/70 7:10 p.m

S: How come you're not at the All Star Game?

K: I'm slipping in popularity with the President.

S: There's always Harvard for you and me Henry.

K: I have just read Cairo 1539 . . . you read it. I tell you we've taken about as much from you people as we are going to take.

S: I know. Which one are you talking about? Oh, now I know. I will take care of that.

K: We established the line? That was the Secretary of State, not us.

S: I will take care of it. I thought it was a terrible cable. But you know what's wrong with that fellow? That's just one of ten cables I mentioned Saturday night. He is that way.

K: What is it these guys are acting this way about? What has happened?

S: That's the point. Nothing. What he's saying is that you guys are buying the Israeli line.

K: He's taking on the President.

S: Of course he is and he's a fool. It was a stupid cable, but I get one a month from him.

K: Really?

S: You know what I'm going to do this evening? Watch the baseball game. But I'll take care of that. I'll show you my letter to him.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
The President
7/14/70 7:27 p.m.

P: How are things in your shop?

K: Going very smoothly. We haven't had any particular crises. I got in touch with Keating to see if he couldn't get more reports on the conversation.

P: That's an interesting thing. It could mean something.

K: It couldn't be inadvertent.

P: It couldn't?

K: No, it's inconceivable that two Soviet foreign ministers will move in the same direction without some design. Of course, a great deal depends on what the specifics are. If they want a commitment to ________________ on withdrawal, that we've done. If they want a fixed time on withdrawal after a successful conference, that's easy. If they want a fixed time limit regardless of the success of the conference, that we don't know about.

P: There's a possibility of a cease-fire during the conference. That we should do.

K: Yes, that would be easy for us to agree to. But asking for a fixed time limit on withdrawal during the conference, then if it fails, we're euchered into withdrawing.

P: Nothing new on the Middle East?

K: No.

P: Then we'll just keep on and in the press conference on Friday I'll zingthem again. I will say this isn't a confrontation--that's what we are trying to avoid.

K: It isn't a confrontation but it's the direction in which events were driving.

P: In Louisville it was very interesting. 150 - 250 thousand people on the street who were overwhelmingly friendly. It was a fantastic welcome. It was much bigger than in St. Louis. They were cheering and screaming and greeting all the way. And the peace signs were few and far between.

By NARA, Dato

5/27

Telecon
The President

7/14/70 7:27 p.m. page 2

K: The basic framework in the country is good and for you.

P: It knocked the press for a loop.

K: I bet--that's not their image of the country.

P: We'll see what Huntley says. That was a fantastic article. I never met the guy socially in my life.

K: I think he revealed himself. David Lawrence zinged him today. He takes on the "shallow" part. He says the opposite is true.

P: Among other things, people can say I'm complex and devious, which I am, but the word "superficial" applies less to me than to anyone who's been there for a long time. Even your friend McGeorge Bundy would say that.

K: That's not a charge I've heard. "Complex" is not a criticism for a President. One should worry if the President is not complex. John Scali was in today. He's a friend of yours.

P: He's an honest man.

K: He said the Middle East stuff is one of the most outrageous things.

P: Good for him.

K: He said this is ridiculous--people trying to create a crisis and he wouldn't max report it. Because he said it was absolutely frivolous.

P: What did he say about Cambodia?

K: On Cambodia . . . he's the guy who said for the sake of his daughter he hoped it would succeed. He thinks it has. His daughter is feeling better now. He's fix going to hit us once in a while . . .

P: He should, just like Howard Smith. People took those newsmen on for their questions, and they shouldn't have. They were darn hard. But I understand that.

K: Howard Smith is for us.

P: He's a sound man. You might have him in and tell him what the game is and tell him we've had an interesting response from Soviets. Have him in tomorrow.