HARVARD UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

2 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

30 August 1957

Dean Edward S. Mason
Graduate School of Public Administration
Littaurt 122
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dean Mason,

You were very much missed by the Defense Studies Program last year and particularly by me. The Program had a great many problems which I wanted to discuss with you, and I had some of my own. I have, as you know, called Miss Lawless to say that I would be at your disposal any time that you wished to see me, but I have felt that you must be extremely busy and that the better part of courtesy was to leave you alone for the time being.

I am writing because we have a problem which is rather larger than we can handle. We are in the midst of a housing crisis the dimensions of which I think you should know. The situation is this. The Yenching Institute will be moving into 2 Divinity Avenue. I have expected this for some time as Dean Bundy called me over to discuss it early last spring.

Mr. Trottenberg, who has been kindness itself, has assured us that we will not be cast forth into the winter snows. However, I do not know at this time what housing we will have in the future. There are two possibilities.

The first possibility involves our moving down the hall and squeezing into the office space there as best we can. We will certainly spill over, as I have suggested in the enclosed letter to Mr. Trottenberg, into the stacks below. Such a move will also have the great disadvantage of sending Bart back to his Law School Office on a semi-permanent basis. I should hate to think that his great interest in the Program here would be re-directed by change of academic scene. If this possibility becomes a fact we shall, of course, simply have to live with the situation

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despite noise and disruption. I realize that this is simply one of the hazards of academic life.

The second possibility is the one which gives me the greatest pause and about which you should be fully informed. Mr. Trottenberg and Dean Bundy have both mentioned that the Program might be moved into a house of its own. This, of course, would be a most happy solution to our housing needs if the quarters are adequate. If this movement into a house eventuates I think that we must think through our future size and associations quite thoroughly.

As you know it is my clear conviction that the staff at the DSP should continue at roughly the size that it was last year over the years in the immediate future. This will mean that we will have to have the kind of floor space I talk of in my letter to Mr. Trottenberg. But given the fact that the present date of termination of our Ford financing is 1 July of next year, a prerequisite to any kind of floor space planning is, of course, future finaning. I think that it would be a fine gesture on the part of the University to give us housing on the assumption of a continued existence. But at the same time I do recognize that remodeling is expensive.

I also believe that a part of the housing issue is the question of our future relationship with the Center of International Affairs. I have never felt that the DSP should remain an independent entity any more than I feel that it can be absorbed into the usual academic departments. However, I do feel that the Defense Studies Program would be very happy as an integral part of the Center for International Affairs. I have already indicated as much recently in a conversation with Henry Kissinger.

I have talked to Bart about this and he feels as I do. If we are to be part of the Center then it would seem only natural that we should be housed with them.

In this matter time is important as the present date for the first phase of the evacuation of this building is set for November 1. This being the case I would be most grateful if you together with Professor Lincoln Gordon, to whom I am sending a similar letter, could give me some indication of the direction in which we should move and the steps which I should take toward a solution of the problem.

Again let me say how genuinely happy I am to have you

DRAFT

28 August 1957

RE: Defense Studies Program housing in Geographical Institute Building, 2 Divinity Avenue.

Mr. A.D. Trottenburg
Mgr. of Operating Services
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Mr. Trottenburg,

In view of our past conversations on August 14 and August 27 concerning the possibility of our having to move from the Geographical Institute Building, 2 Divinity Avenue, or remain in the building making use of less space, I thought it wise to give you figures on how much space we now use and to what purpose. There is every likelihood that we will continue at our present level, we may even expand in the future.

The sketch of the floor space enclosed is, of course, not drawn to scale, but the figures are fairly accurate. As you will note the total square footage in use, not including hallways, is 4,452 square feet. The amount of wall space used for shelving is approximately 773 square feet. There are 24 files, 4 feet by 1 1/2 feet. The file space is necessary because of the large collection of newspaper clippings.

<u>Seven</u> of the rooms shown in the chart are offices of the teaching staff, <u>two</u> are secretarial, <u>one</u> the administrative office. There is also the <u>library</u> which contains many of the shelves for current publications. The library is an integral part of the program.

The <u>Seminar Room</u> (58'x27') is surrounded by glass cabinets (included in our 773 sq feet of shelf space); these contain our many publications made use of in the Defense Policy Seminar, and also for our rapidly growing library of Congressional hearings, DOD releases, and other raw material used in connection with the project. This room contains four 9x4 tables which are not only used for the seminars at which there are usually 65 attendents, including students, staff and guests, but are also in constant use during the rest of the week for assembling the material which is in production. The large size of this room also makes possible

having map stands which are essential in this work. In addition
the seminar room serves as a reading room for students (both
graduate and undergraduate) both in DSP courses as well as others
in the university which touch on military problems.

The Supply Room (31'x12') in the basement is occupied by the
DSP and contains a large part of the supplies as well as the verifax
and mimiograph machines which it would not be practical to have
in the typing room.

It should also be mentioned that in the event that the Defense
Studies Program is asked to make use of only one half of the 1st
floor of the Geographical building, it will then be necessary to
provide work space for two teaching fellows -- possibly downstairs
in the stack space. I will have to share an office with the
Administrative Assistant, but will need an additional room since
the business in her office will hardly be conducive to research and
writing! Also I think you will understand that it will be
necessary that a proper sound proofing be built across the hall
so that it will be possible to work without undue disturbance
from the builders.

In conclusion I take it that the cost of furnishings,
improvements and all housekeeping will be taken care of out of
University funds. I presume also that the University will absorb
moving costs. If there is any other information you wish, we shall
be glad to furnish it. You have been most kind and considerate.

ELK:dh
enclosure

HARVARD DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

<u>Financial Report</u>

July 1, 1957 to June 30, 1958

| Description | Amount |
| :--- | ---: |
| Salary to Director (Katzenbach) | $9,000.00 |
| Salary to Professor Leach (½) | 8,500.00 |
| Salaries to Research Associates: | 11,600.00 |
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;H. H. Ransom | $7,000 |
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;M. D. Feld | 4,600 |
| Salaries to Teaching Fellows: | 4,500.00 |
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;2 Full Year @ $1,800 | |
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;1 Half Year | 900 |
| Regular Employees (Secretarial) | 8,289.81 |
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;2 Full Time | |
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;1 Half Time | |
| Casual Employees | 560.10 |
| Student Employees | 5,121.82 |
| Retirement Allowance & Insurance | 3,492.00 |
| Pension Insurance and Social Security | 694.15 |
| Equipment and repair | 231.50 |
| Supplies, printing & stationery | 1,166.16 |
| Telephone & Telegraph | 1,354.93 |
| Postage | 267.18 |
| Travel | 738.12 |
| Subscriptions & Books | 616.52 |
| Binding | 82.73 |
| Entertainment | 420.25 |
| Services Purchased | 7.50 |
| Miscellaneous | 49.50 |
| Space Charges | 6840.00 |
| Adjustment, Prior Years Expenses | 2,394.22 |

TOTAL EXPENSES 1957-58: $60,193.99

June 18, 1958

Dean Edward S. Mason
Littauer 121
Harvard University

Dear Ed:

I thought you might like to know something about the tentative plans for the Defense Policy Seminar for next year. It has seemed to me that the Defense Studies Program at Harvard is now moving into a new phase. Initially, the major problem was to establish the limits of the field and to define the subject matter. It was therefore inevitable that during the past few years, the Seminar had somewhat the character of a survey course. In the next phase of the Defense Studies Program I would suggest combining a general survey approach with a more intensive study of individual topics and relating the Defense Studies Program as closely as possible to other work going on in the University.

The difficulties to be overcome include: (a) a top heavy participation of military personnel largely from the Business School (23 out of 37); (b) the problem of focusing a fairly amorphous range of topics; (c) the absence of graduate students from the Arts and Sciences. I therefore propose to take the following steps:

A. To limit the military participants from the Business School to 10.

B. The Government Department has agreed to list the course.

C. The topics for the year have been grouped in three major areas: Strategy and organization, basic strategic concepts, and strategy and foreign policy. At least a third of the lectures throughout the Seminar will be given by me and another substantial proportion by members of the Harvard faculty, with guest speakers taking about two lectures under each topic.

D. The enclosed syllabus has been sent to each student who has enrolled outlining the reading requirements.

E. Each student in addition to participating in the large Seminar will be required to participate in one of three groups meeting bi-weekly. Each of these groups will take one of the major topics (strategy and organization, basic strategic concepts, and strategy and foreign policy) and study it intensively throughout the year. Harry Ransom and Bart Leach will be responsible for the

throughout the year. Harry Tenen and Bart Beach will be responsible for the strategic concep<sup>a</sup>, and strategy and foreign policy, and study it intensively. These groups will take one of the major forces (strategy and organization, etc.) be required to participate in one of these groups meeting bi-weekly. Each of E. Each student in addition to participating in the large Seminar will be required to participate in one of these groups meeting bi-weekly. Each of

roiled out during the reading period.

D. The enrolled syllabus has been sent to each student who has en-

with great speakers taking apart two lectures under each topic.

py me and another superintend production department of the Harvard University, boffit. At least a third of the lectures throughout the Seminar will be given strategy and organization, etc., and strategic and foreign

C. The topics for the year have been formed in three major areas:

B. The Government Department has agreed to host the conference.

V. To limit the military participants from the Business School to 10.

take the following steps:

of graduate students from the Arts and Sciences. I therefore propose to the problem of teaching a fairly amorphous range of topics; (c) the presence of military personnel from the Business School (S3 out of 31); (p)

The difficulties to be overcome include: (a) a job heavily participation

University.

Defense Studies Program as closely as possible to other work going on in the branch with a more intensive study of individual topics and referring the work of the Defense Studies Program I would attempt compiling a general survey of the Seminar had somewhat the character of a survey course. In the next phase subject matter. It was therefore inevitable that during the best few years, the major problem was to expand the limits of the field and to define the Defense Studies Program at Harvard in a way moving into a new phase. Initially, for the Defense Policy Seminar for next year. It has seemed to me that the I thought you might like to know something about the tentative plan

Dear Ed:
Harvard University
Iffner, J.S.
Dean Edward B. Mason

June 18, 1928

Dean Edward S. Mason

2.

June 18, 1958

group on organization, Colonel Dupuy will chair the group on strategic concepts and I plan to conduct the group on foreign policy. These committees will typically be the groups with which we shall try to associate faculty members working in related fields. Thus Arthur Smithies has agreed to chair a few meetings of Dupuy's group and Ernest May will conduct two or three sessions of the committee dealing with foreign policy.

Much of this is tentative and subject to change if you do not think well of it. I would very much appreciate your opinion.

Kind regards.

Henry V. Krasinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

well of it. I would very much appreciate your opinion.
Much of this is tentative and subject to change if you do not think

sessions of the committee dealing with foreign policy.
A few meetings of Dubna's group and Ernest May will conduct two or three
months working in related fields. June Arthur Smith has agreed to chair
will accordingly be the group with which we shall try to associate Dubna
concepts and I plan to conduct the group on foreign policy. These committees
are on organization, Coloneel Dubna will chair the group on strategic

Dean Edward B. Mason

5.

June 18, 1958

Law School of Harvard University

Cambridge 38, Mass.

4 December 1959

Dear Henry,

I have had one conversation in Washington with
Jack Loosbrock and some three or four telephone calls.

He believes that there is an excellent chance that
the Space Education Foundation can raise $25,000 a year for
us by tapping ten industries in the Boston area for $2500
each. Pete Schenk of Raytheon, who is a member of the Space
Education Foundation Trustees, has undertaken to see that his
Company will provide its $2500 (he is Assistant to the
President of Raytheon) and he will make the necessary con-
tacts with the other industries in the area, calling upon you
or me to talk to each one of them individually.

At Loosbrock's suggestion I have drafted a
memorandum for your signature, copy enclosed. I have sent
a copy to Loosbrock, who will comment upon it and recommend
any changes. Then, if you approve, the program is that you
will send the memorandum to him over your signature, he will
reproduce it, and the memorandum will be used as a persuasion
document to induce contributions from the industries.
Loosbrock and I have spent a good deal of time in working
out a draft which will do the trick.

I am of course keeping my fingers crossed on this,
but as of now Loosbrock assures me that the prospects are
very favorable.

I think you ought to take this up with Don Price
promptly, including giving him a chance to make suggestions
as to this draft memorandum. It would be horrible if any
block within the University should arise after we have the
money practically in our hands.

I have tried to give Loosbrock a sense of urgency
by telling him that we must make our personnel plans for next
year pretty soon. So he is ready to go right to work.

So please get in touch with Price right away and

6

December 4, 1959

MEMORANDUM TO THE SPACE EDUCATION FOUNDATION

Subject: Support of Defense Studies Programs

If the United States is to survive and perform its mission as the military bulwark of the free world, it must vastly improve its national capability of establishing sound military policies and accepting the sacrifices that are necessary to carry them out. Four major deficiencies are now obvious to any informed observer: (a) an inadequate decision-making process on military issues, (b) inadequately informed policy-making personnel, (c) inadequately trained permanent civilian personnel, and (d) insufficient support in intelligent public opinion.

All of these defects are referable to the fact that there has not been injected into the stream of American academic life an understanding of defense policy and administration during the period when our present policy-makers and high civil servants were getting their education. This is understandable as to the past, but it becomes unforgivable for the future.

A start has been made in providing a corrective. In the academic year 1954-55 Harvard offered an experimental Defense Policy Seminar. In the three subsequent academic years this was expanded into a Defense Studies Program with financing by the Ford Foundation at the rate of $70,000 per year. Similar projects, based essentially on the Harvard model, have appeared as follows (in order of appearance):

1. University of Wisconsin, sponsored (as originally at Harvard) by the Law School, with some university financing and some foundation grants.

2. Ohio State University, sponsored by an intra-departmental committee, and handsomely financed out of the Mershon Fund now approximating $7 million dedicated to military studies at Ohio State.

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3. The U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy, presenting seminars to cadets using Harvard materials and instructed by Harvard-trained officers.

4. George Washington University, presenting a seminar using Harvard materials and originally instructed by an OSD civil servant trained at Harvard.

At the present moment (December 1959) similar projects are being actively considered at U.C.L.A., Dartmouth, and Dickinson.

Prior to 1954, and continuing to the present day, certain research projects on military affairs were instituted at M.I.T., Princeton, Columbia and Dartmouth; but none of these involved instruction and training.

Continuation and vigorous expansion of programs in defense studies is, it is suggested, vitally necessary in the national interest for the following reasons:

1. They will reach the minds of future national leaders during those formative years when the cast of their intellects is determined. If these programs are successful, they will produce in time a sufficient personnel pool of men who have acquired a basic understanding of defense issues and the motivation to continue their contact with, and study of these matters during their years of maturity.

2. The programs have shown, by direct experience, that they can capture the imagination of young men so that they are led to enter immediately various projects related to defense: service in OSD, the military departments, and those defense industries that increasingly are establishing strategic planning groups.

3. By wide faculty participation the realities of national defense become a matter of common interest, resulting in an infusion of defense matters into courses of varying content in political science, economics, history and the physical sciences.

4. A natural product of these programs is a stream of publications which fill gaps in existing literature (for example, from the Harvard program

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alone, Timothy W. Stanley's book, "American Defense and National Security" -- a full-scale study of defense organization -- and Harry H. Ransom's book, "Central Intelligence and National Security" as well as a long list of periodical items).

5. These programs tend to guide public opinion through various uses of the mass media of communication -- for example, a series of five TV programs conducted by the Harvard Defense Studies Staff.

These defense studies programs, it is suggested, deserve the widest possible support. Local conditions will govern the extent of the need in each university.

## NATURE AND NEEDS OF THE PROGRAM AT HARVARD

The Harvard Program is built around a basic graduate Defense Policy Seminar accommodating about 55 students from the Law School, the Business School, the School of Public Administration, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and a very few seniors at Harvard College. The Program has also conducted (a) an experimental Advanced Seminar in Comparative Defense Administration (U.S., U.K., Germany, France, U.S.S.R.), (b) a college course in modern American military history designed as a "feeder" for the graduate Seminar, and (c) a faculty seminar out of which came a series of papers published in "Public Policy," the annual volume of the Graduate School of Public Administration.

The basic graduate seminar is now in its sixth year. The number of qualified student applicants is so large that half must be turned away; a second parallel seminar would be justified if funds and personnel were available. The other three projects were one-year experiments; all gave promise, but all had to be discontinued through lack of resources. We also contemplate additional projects, subject to availability of resources: a text book for secondary-school education to be prepared in collaboration with experts in secondary education at Harvard or elsewhere, a text book at the college level, a regular newspaper column on defense issues to be published originally in the Boston Herald and then, if successful, to be syndicated. A more distant dream is the establishment of an "American Journal of National Defense" to provide a forum for the type of high-level objective exploration of issues of military policy similar, in their respective fields, to the Harvard Law Review, the Harvard Business Review, Foreign Affairs, and others; but such a project would require a professional editorial staff and independent financing of a greater order of magnitude.

A certain amount of research is now being done, in connection with the Harvard Center for International Affairs with additional Ford Foundation financing. But Ford has a policy against subsidizing university teaching for more than very limited periods.

The Harvard Program needs about $25,000 per year in unrestricted operating funds to continue its work effectively and to expand its activities along desirable lines designed to draw more men into careers in the Defense field. Financing at this level should be provided for a five-year period, the project then to be re-evaluated. The need for financing derives from certain facts and problems peculiar to this area of study:

1. Teaching materials do not exist and have to be created; and Harvard does this task for itself and other similar programs in other universities -- not only those now operating but others that are contemplated.

2. The subject moves very rapidly, and the basic materials (Pentagon documents, Congressional hearings and reports, and press and periodical items) are very numerous. Obsolete information is worse than useless.

3. There is an unusual need for junior staff members, "teaching fellows," to consult with students, engage in small group sessions, and monitor student theses. Furthermore, experience shows that these junior staff members are the ones most likely to be drawn into careers in Defense. All but one of our Teaching Fellows have been so drawn.

Without such financing the Harvard Program faces the serious possibility of collapse or, at best, losing its capacity to expand and germinate. Its key personnel now stick with the Program out of dedication and loyalty despite the fact that each year their positions and salaries are in jeopardy, thus causing them to take serious personal risks by declining other academic appointments in the hope that finally the money will be found. This cannot last indefinitely.

What would happen if the Harvard Program should collapse or be down-graded to "just another seminar"? One cannot surely prophesy; but certainly the development of university defense education would lose momentum. Authorities at other universities, presented with a defense studies proposal, would be inclined to say, "If it has been tried and failed at Harvard, why should we expect it to succeed here?" The

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personnel -- and they simply do not exist.)
The Harvard Program has shown that it can so
motivate its best graduate students that a
reasonable number of them will turn to defense
activities.

3. Is the Harvard Program oriented toward the Air Force? Definitely not; great care is taken to avoid any service or doctrinal orientation. The three Directors of the Program have had military service respectively in the Air Force, the Marines, and the Army. The officers who have served as guest lecturers have come roughly equally from the Army (Generals Wedemeyer and Gavin), the Navy (Admirals Gardner and Brown), the Air Force (Generals Anderson and Gerhart) and the British services (Field Marshal Montgomery and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor). Civilian lecturers have come from all three services and OSD. Student participation includes officers from all three services and from OSD, State, and the British Ministry of Defence.

4. Does the Harvard Program stress Science and Space Education? Yes, but as an integral part of the entire Defense problem. Each year we consider the relationship of the scientist to defense, the missile and space programs, the Soviet/U.S. space competition, and the organization of missile and space projects. Lecturers have included such scientists as Vannevar Bush and George Kistiakowsky and such defense administrators as Air Force Secretary Douglas. Three student papers this year deal with space programs, administration and organization. It seems to us that a large part of the trouble with the space program lies in basic defects in organization and the decision-making process; and these receive major attention.

5. Where can additional detailed information about the Harvard Program be obtained? The Trustees of the Space Education Foundation have been given (a) copies of the Program reports to the Ford Foundation for the period 1955-58, (b) the Seminar syllabus, lecture schedules, and readings for students, and (c) miscellaneous other information. The Ford reports include lists of publications, types of students, staff activities, lists of guest lecturers and subjects, etc.

6. To whom should any grant be made? To The Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration for the use of the Defense Studies Program.

7. Would the Harvard Program welcome an Advisory Committee selected from the Trustees of the Space Education

3. Is the Harvard Program oriented toward the Air Force? Definitely not; great care is taken to avoid any service or doctrinal orientation. The three Directors of the Program have had military service respectively in the Air Force, the Marines, and the Army. The officers who have served as guest lecturers have come roughly equally from the Army (Generals Wedemeyer and Gavin), the Navy (Admirals Gardner and Brown), the Air Force (Generals Anderson and Gerhart) and the British services (Field Marshal Montgomery and Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Sclaror). Civilian lecturers have come from all three services and OSD. Student participation includes officers from all three services and from OSD, State, and the British Ministry of Defence.

4. Does the Harvard Program stress Science and Space Education? Yes, but as an integral part of the entire Defense problem. Each year we consider the relationship of the scientist to defense, the missile and space programs, the Soviet/U.S. space competition, and the organization of missile and space projects. Lecturers have included such scientists as Vannever Bush and George Kistiakowsky and such defense administrators as Air Force Secretary Douglas. Three student papers this year deal with space programs, administration and organization. It seems to us that a large part of the trouble with the space program lies in basic defects in organization and the decision-making process; and these receive major attention.

5. Where can additional detailed information about the Harvard Program be obtained? The Trustees of the Space Education Foundation have been given (a) copies of the Program reports to the Ford Foundation for the period 1955-58, (b) the Seminar syllabus, lecture schedules, and readings for students, and (c) miscellaneous other information. The Ford Reports include lists of publications, types of students, staff activities, lists of guest lecturers and subjects, etc.

Henry A. Kissinger
Associate Professor,
Director, Harvard Defense Studies
Program

December 4, 1959

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flow of student materials to other universities, the War
Colleges, and the service Academies would be cut off; and,
unless someone else undertook the task, these materials
would soon become useless. Without arrogance it can be
stated that, as of now, the vigorous continuance of the
Harvard Program is important, perhaps essential, to the pro-
ject on a national basis.

## SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

1. Why cannot Harvard finance this project out of its endowment? Harvard has, in fact, been outstandingly generous to the Program. It has provided, reconstructed and furnished a whole floor of a University building, provides the salary of the Program Director, Prof. Henry A. Kissinger, and has picked up the tab for over $20,000 of deficits from time to time. But there are limits, and the University budget, like all budgets, faces the problem of competing priorities. The Program would be in trouble within the University, where it now has generally enthusiastic acceptance, if funds were provided to the Program at the expense of older and more established enterprises.

2. Why should Defense Industry consider support of this Program a proper use of corporate educational funds? There are two reasons:

a. If this country is to support on a longterm basis the defense effort that the world situation requires, there must be wide understanding of the nature and extent of the Defense problem. In the long run this understanding must come through the educational process in the universities. The Harvard Program has been the key element in stimulating university studies of this type and can continue to do so operate if it has the resources.

b. Many defense industries are wisely establishing Strategic Planning Groups to enable them to "look down the road", prepare to meet needs not yet formulated in the Pentagon, and avoid wasting corporate assets on unproductive enterprises. As strategic concepts are revised, the companies that have foreseen them are the ones that will prosper. The limiting factor in these Planning Groups is personnel. (One company is now seeking six additional

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6. To whom should any grant be made? To the President and Fellows of Harvard College for the use of the Harvard Defense Studies Program.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

December 8, 1959

To: W. B. Leach

From: Henry Kissinger

This is the memorandum for Bowie and Price
that we discussed. I would very much appreciate
your comments on it. Please feel free to make
revisions.

My trouble with this is that you do not
ask for specific action. I don't know what
you want them to do; but I think it should
end with recommendations, so that they can
say "Approve" and you are then in business.

I don't think this is the time to raise
any issue of expansion -- e.g. an advanced
seminar of some kind. But we ought not to
preclude ourselves from recommending this.

This memorandum is written to express my concern about the
future of the Defense Policy Seminar and to indicate my views about
its future development. The importance of the subject hardly requires
argument. From the point of view of public administration it seems
essential that a subject which uses up fifty per cent of our national
budget be a major topic of concern at Harvard. From the point of
view of national policy it is also clear that the nature of our diplomacy
depends on the kind of decisions we make on strategy. An understanding
of the strategic situation is of crucial importance, even if one assumes
a relaxation of tensions: this would merely mean a shift of our concern
to some phase of arms control which, in any cases, is already a subject
of seminar study. From the point of view of personnel, it seems to me
essential that we make a contribution towards training people either
for positions in government, for teaching in the defense area, or for
an improved understanding of the issues in their capacity as private
citizens.

All of this requires very little discussion and I am sure
that there is no dispute about the importance of the Seminar as such.
The problems arise from the peculiar nature of the Defense Policy Semi-
nar. These special characteristics seem to me to be the following:

(1) **Its Size.** In the past three years the number of participants in the Seminar has gone from 39 in 1957 to 32 in 1958 to 51 in 1959. The figure for this year is somewhat misleading because we turned down at least fifteen qualified applicants. In addition to the people taking it, there are at least 25 to 30 auditors at each session.

(2) **Composition of the Seminar.** The Seminar is to my know-
ledge the only one at Harvard that includes participants from four
Harvard graduate schools. In addition, because of our selectivity,
we have been able to get an extraordinary number of the ablest students,
particularly at the Law School and the Business School.

(3) The Seminar is considered by the military services as the
key factor in projects for defense studies, in civilian universities.
Both the Military Academy and the Air Force Academy give courses based
upon our seminar, using our materials and taught by instructors trained
by us. All three services are represented by officer/students. Some

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of these come to Harvard for the express purpose of getting this in-
struction.

(4) Conduct of the Seminar. The Seminar in the past two years
has established some of the most rigorous requirements of any seminar
at Harvard. It is the only seminar that requires both an examination
and a major paper. It probably requires more classroom work than any
other seminar. Every participant, in addition to attending the weekly
plenary session must participate in a sub-group. The requirements of
the sub-group are roughly analogous to those of an ordinary seminar;
that is, there are special lectures by the staff and from the end of
the first term onwards the students must present papers.

(5) Since the subject matter of national security resides
to such an important extent in the minds of the people with experience,
it is particularly important to bring guest speakers with experience
to the Seminar. A list of those who have attended over the past three
years is I think a testimony to the importance attached to this effort
elsewhere. On the other hand, guest speakers are useless unless the
session is well prepared.

For all these reasons, a Defense Policy Seminar requires more
work, more staffing and a different structure from most seminars con-
ducted at Harvard. The budget for it, which runs to around $20,000, is
not excessive if one relates it to the size and scope of other seminars.

I am concerned about the steady attrition that has been taking
place over the past few years. It seems to me that the Seminar should
not go by default but rather that an explicit decision should be made
one way or the other. The most immediate problem is that of Harry Ransom.
We have a policy of holding conferences with each student. We also have
a requirement of preparing and distributing a fair amount of mineographed
material. We seek to make it possible for the students to circulate all
the other students with their views. All of this makes it essential
that we have a full time secretary and that I have a full time assistant.
Harry Ransom has taken a major load of the responsibility for preparing
the syllabus and specialized mineographed readings. He has taken on
of the sub-groups fulltime and another one in close association with me.
It would be impossible to replace him: at least I know no one who could
discharge his responsibilities with equal skill and devotion. I also
feel that the Seminar is now at the absolute minimum of staffing. It
would be a pity if the Harvard effort, which has served as a model to so
many other institutions, should atrophy. Indeed, it would seem to me
highly desirable to have as part of the Seminar a continued effort to
keep up our clipping file and to maintain a Defense Policy Library.

There is, of course, a question of financing. Bart Leach and I are making an effort to raise the required funds. We are optimistic, although we may not be able to raise them in time to keep Ransom from accepting another offer. Then there are the funds made available by the Ford Foundation. Since I raise them, and since the Ford Foundation considers me to be the man largely responsible for them, I am perhaps in a position to say that our determination of what constitutes research would, to say the least, have an important bearing. I am sure we could justify at least half of Ransom's salary on that basis since over the past few years he has produced several books and articles and since at the moment he is working on another book.

I would make the following recommendations:

(1) A definite commitment should be made to Harry Ransom immediately, at least for next year.

(2) A meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Defense Policy Seminar should be held. This committee has never, to my knowledge, been disbanded and it is entitled to be informed about where we stand.

(3) Provision should be made for having some teaching fellows connected with the Seminar. The importance of having teaching fellows can not be measured primarily by the contribution they make to the conduct of the Seminar: rather, they should be considered a training group for potential researches in the field of as public servants. There are a number of participants who would have been eager to continue here had we had some kind of fellowship to offer. Every former staff member except one is somehow connected, either with the government, with this field or doing research.

Cambridge 38, Mass.

In fairness to my Helen, the typographical
garbles represent changes by me, not errors by her.

18 December 1959

MEMORANDUM TO PROFESSOR KISSINGER

From: W. Barton Leach

With regard to possible financing from the Carnegie
Foundation I have the following thoughts which are merely
a repetition of what I said to you on Thursday.

What we need is freedom from the financial strait-
jacket in which we have been operating for the past couple
of years and which has prevented us from thinking con-
structively about expanded operations.

an intensive, mind-stretching

At the present what we have is x/Seminar for beginners,
even though the beginners are very mature students in the
late stages of graduate study. What we need is the
financial backing to expand our instruction program into
more advanced work and to draw into such work highly
motivated and very competent personnel for the purpose of
increasing the number of effective workers in this area.

As we all know, the number of effective workers in
the defense industry in academic life is pitifully small. When
we locate a competent man who wants to engage in this area
of study we should have the resources to grab him quickly
without the delays attendant upon project approval at the
source of our foundation funds. Typically, a man whom we
might want will have several alternatives open to him
either in academic life or elsewhere. In the competition
to get such a man fast action is very important. If we can
move quickly we will have an advantage over other possible
claimants for his services who, for one reason or another,
have to move more slowly. Conversely, if our action is
subject to delay, we are at a disadvantage.

The men we could use to good effect may be in almost
any age group from 22 to 60. They would include such
people as John Lawyer, now a senior in the College, whom
we might want to bring into graduate study aiming at a
degree; or people like Timothy W. Stanley, who was a Law
student in the first year of the Seminar and whom we might
want to retain as a Teaching Fellow, possibly spending a

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portion of his time working for a graduate degree; or some
one like Professor William Emerson of Yale whom we might
want to bring in as a Visiting Professor; or someone like
General Norstad whom we might want to have with us for a
half-year or year after his retirement for a combination
of lecturing, writing, and consultation; or a scientist
who has been working with WSEG or one of the Operations
Research Organizations and who would otherwise return
immediately to his university and abandon his activities in
the defense area. And there are other possibilities.

We should not put ourselves in the position where
we have to formulate a "project" at the present time.
The project will grow out of personnel available, not
vice versa. When we locate a man or men we can then ex-
amine his capabilities and interests and tailor a project
to fit him or them. Only then will the financial require-
ments for the project become known. What we should have
is a drawing account to meet them when they arise --ile.
New Obligational Authority.

I hope that the policies of the Carnegie Foundation
are sufficiently flexible to give us this degree of
necessary flexibility.

WBL:has

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HENRY A. KISSINGER, Associate Director
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38
MASSACHUSETTS

December 22, 1959

Subject: The Defense Studies Program

I The Need. The importance of the subject of national security hardly requires restatement. Over half of our national budget goes for national security expenditures. Many of the decisions of our foreign policy are directly or indirectly affected by our choices on national security. Whatever assessment one makes about the future of national relations, the situation is hardly likely to change, for if there is to be a relaxation of tension, negotiation on arms control would seem to be a primary requirement, and this in turn presupposes an understanding of the goals of our security effort.

At the same time, there have been a number of major deficiencies in our consideration of national security:

(A) An inadequate supply of adequately trained personnel for policy-making decisions.

(B) An inadequate number of private persons to form either an intelligent public opinion or to supply personnel for government.

(C) An inadequate decision-making process on national security issues.

(The result of the limited supply is that the disparity between those with experience in the field and those who have less experience becomes ever wider and also that the few people with experience are put under so much pressure that they cannot make the contribution of which they are capable.) Many of these difficulties are due to the fact that there has not been injected into American academic life an understanding of national security policy during the period when our present policy-makers and high civil servants were getting their education. While this is understandable as to the past it will become a source of increasing weakness for the future.

II The Present Harvard Program.

(A) The Harvard Defense Policy Seminar represents an attempt to deal with this problem. It was started in 1954-55 as an experimental project with the following purposes:

(1) To reach the minds of the ablest students in all Harvard Graduate Schools during their formative years and to capture their imagination so that they would be likely to enter into various projects related to

national security either in the field of research or in actual operation.

(2) To encourage faculty participation in the realities of national security policy.

(3) To encourage research by the participants in the Defense Policy Program.

(B) The Defense Policy Seminar as it now exists accomodates fifty-two students from the Law School, the Business School, the Graduate School of Public Administration, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and a very few Seniors at Harvard College. The number of qualified applicants is so large that 40 percent must be turned away. Another way of putting this is that the participants in the Seminar represent some of the ablest graduate students at Harvard.

(C) One of the by-products of the Defense Policy Seminar has been the appearance at other universities of Defense Policy Seminars based essentially on the Harvard model. Some of these are as follows:

(1) University of Wisconsin, sponsored (as originally at Harvard) by the Law School, with some university financing and some foundation grants.

(2) Ohio State University, sponsored by an intra-departmental committee, and handsomely financed out of the Mershon Fund now approximately $7 million dedicated to military studies at Ohio State.

(3) The U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy, presenting seminars to cadets using Harvard materials and instructed by Harvard-trained officers.

(4) George Washington University, presenting a seminar using Harvard materials and originally instructed by an OSD civil servant trained at Harvard.

All of these seminars are using the basic syllabus prepared at Harvard, of which a copy is attached.

### III Special Problems of a Defense Policy Seminar at Harvard.

(A) Its Size. In the past three years the number of participants in the Seminar has gone from 39 in 1957 to 32 in 1958 to 51 in 1959. In addition to the people taking it, there are at least 25 to 30 auditors at each

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[N]

session.

(B) **Composition of the Seminar.** The Seminar is the only one at Harvard that includes participants from four Harvard Graduate Schools. In addition, because of our selectivity, we have been able to get an extraordinary number of the ablest students, particularly at the Law School and the Business School.

(C) The Seminar is considered by the military services as the key factor in projects for defense studies, in civilian universities. Both the Military Academy and the Air Force give courses based upon our seminar, using our materials and taught by instructors trained by us. All three services are represented by officer/students. Some of these come to Harvard for the express purpose of getting this instruction.

(D) **Conduct of the Seminar.** The Seminar in the past two years has established some of the most rigorous requirements of any seminar at Harvard. It is the only seminar that requires both an examination and a major paper. It probably requires more classroom work than any other seminar. Every participant, in addition to attending the weekly plenary session, must participate in a sub-group. The requirements of the sub-group are roughly analogous to those of an ordinary seminar; that is, there are special lectures by the staff and from the end of the first term onwards the students must present papers.

(E) Since the subject matter of national security resides to such an important extent in the minds of the people with experience, it is particularly important to bring guest speakers with experience to the Seminar.

(F) Teaching materials do not exist and have to be created; and Harvard does this task for itself and other similar programs in other universities-- not only those now operating but other that are contemplated.

(G) There is an unusual need for junior staff member, "teaching fellows," to consult with students, engage in small group sessions, and monitor student theses. Furthermore, experience shows that these junior staff members are the ones most likely to be drawn into careers in Defense. All but one of our Teaching Fellows have been so drawn.

For all these reasons, the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar requires more staffing and a different structure from other seminars conducted at Harvard. The budget for it at its present level, which is attached, indicates that it is actually ashoe-string operation.

## IV Future Needs.

(A) At its present level, the Seminar has been unable to take advantage of the interest generated by it. One way of accomplishing this and improving the conduct of the Seminar in general would be to establish fellowships. These

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could be given in the following categories, although it is probable that
not every one of them could be filled each year:

(1) Each year there are a number of students showing great interest in the field and working on first class papers. If some of these could be kept on as teaching fellows or as combination teaching-research fellows it would both improve the conduct of the Seminar and expand the base of available talent.

(2) It should be possible to encourage qualified graduate students in the sciences and other fields to participate in the work of the Defense Policy Seminar and therefore to take an interest in national security matters at a formative stage of their thinking. This again requires some kind of fellowship.

(3) We might attempt to interest young scientists, for example at the Lincoln Laboratories, to participate in the Defense Policy Seminar through a suitable fellowship.

Thus, for rather modest sums the maximum potential of the existing pro-
gram could be realized.

V The Extent of the Contribution. For the past two years the Defense Policy Seminar has had no regular support and has had to be carried almost exclusively by Harvard University. Contributions have been made by the Faculty of Arts & Sciences, the Graduate School of Public Administration, the Law School, the Business School and the Center for International Affairs. In any future program, the following items would continue to be contributed by Harvard University:

(A) The salary of the Director, amounting to about $6,000.

(B) The salary of Professor Leach, who attends all sessions and is to all intents and purposes a regular member of the Defense Policy staff, and whose salary is now paid by the Law School. I would estimate his contribution at $4,000.

(C) The Graduate School of Public Administration contribution of $3,000 for overhead expenses.

(D) The Center for International Affairs contribution of at least half of the Librarian's salary, amounting to about $2,500.

(E) Harvard charges no overhead for office space.

Attached is a projected budget which adds to the present level funds to provide for the fellowships mentioned above.

December 22, 1959

The result of the limited supply is that the disparity between those with experience in the field and those who have less experience becomes ever wider and also that the few people with experience are put under so much pressure that they cannot make the contribution of which they are capable. Many of these difficulties are due to the fact that there has not been injected into American academic life an understanding of national security policy during the period when our present policy-makers and high civil servants were getting their education. While this is understandable as to the past it will become a source of increasing weakness for the future.

(B) The Defense Policy Seminar as it now exists accommodates fifty-two students from the Law School, the Business School, the Graduate School of Public Administration, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and a very few Seniors at Harvard College. The number of qualified applicants is so large that 40 percent must be turned away. Another way of putting this is that the participants in the Seminar represent some of the ablest graduate students at Harvard.

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session.

## IV Future Needs.

# HARVARD DEFENSE STUDIES PROGRAM

## Projected Budget 1960-1961

## EXPENSES

### I Salaries and Services

#### A Staff Salaries

1. Harry Ransom $8,000
2. Maury Feld 5,000
3. Director 6,000
4. Professor Leach 4,000
5. Teaching Fellow 600

B Secretarial 3,300

C Maintaining Clip File
(Student Employment) 1,600

D Retirement Allowance,
Insurance 2,500

E Pension Insurance &
Social Security 250 $31,250

II Fellowships 6,000 6,000

### III Equipment and Supplies

A Equipment and Repair 100
B Supplies 300
C Telephone & Telegraph 500
D Postage 300
E Books & Subscriptions 450

IV Travel (For DPS Speakers) 400

1,650

400

$39,300

## INCOME

I Business School $4,500
II Law School 4,500
III Arts & Sciences 7,750
IV Center for International
Affairs contribution to
Maury Feld salary 2,500
19,250
V Littauer (GSPA) 3,000
$ 22,250

Request for Support for
the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar
December 22, 1959

## II The Present Harvard Program.

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The result is

serious study

(2) To encourage faculty participation in the studies of
national security policy.

(B) The Defense Policy Seminar as it now exists accomodates fifty-two students from the Law School, the Business School, the Graduate School of Public Administration, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences and a very few Seniors at Harvard College. The number of qualified applicants is so large that 40 percent must be turned away. ~~Another way to increase the number of qualified applicants is that the participants in the Seminar represent some of the ablest graduate students at Harvard. There is a continued high level of serious student interest.~~

offer instruction closely paralleling

All of these seminars are part of the basic syllabus prepared at Harvard, of which a copy is attached.

(A) **Its Size.** In the past three years the number of participants in the Seminar has gone from 39 in 1957 to 32 in 1958 to 51 in 1959. In addition to the people taking it, there are at least 25 to 30 auditors at each

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[N]

session.

(D) **Conduct of the Seminar.** The Seminar in the past two years has established some of the most rigorous requirements, of any seminar at Harvard. It is the only seminar that requires both an examination and a major paper. It probably requires more classroom work than any other seminar. Every participant, in addition to attending the weekly plenary session, must participate in a sub-group. The requirements of the sub-group are roughly analogous to those of an ordinary seminar; that is, there are special lectures by the staff and from the end of the first term onwards the students must present papers.

For all these reasons, the Harvard Defense Policy Seminar requires more staffing and a different structure from other seminars conducted at Harvard. The budget for it at its present level, which is attached, indicates that it is actually a shoe-string operation.

## IV Future Needs.

[N]

-4-

(2) It should be possible to encourage qualified graduate students in the sciences and other fields to participate in the work of the Defense Policy Seminar and therefore to take an interest in national security matters at a formative stage of their thinking. This again requires some kind of fellowship. In special circumstances

post-Ph.D.

(3) We might attempt to interest young/scientists, for example at the Lincoln Laboratories, to participate in the Defense Policy Seminar through a suitable fellowship.

a significantly increased

Thus, for rather modest sums the maximum/potential of the existing program could be realized.

(A) The salary of the Director, amounting to about $6,000 (half-time).

external