but suffers the same limited "primary sourcing" when the narrative reaches more recent events. Kissinger seems to have given the authors a look at Brezhnev's threatening message that triggered the controversial October, 1973, alert of U. S. forces. "I will say it straight," they quote the Soviet leader, referring to Russia's threatened intervention against Israeli violation of the ceasefire, "that if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally." That message, combined with electronic intelligence indicating the alert of Soviet airborne units, makes Kissinger's case for a firm U. S. response, if not a full-fledged alert. But again the Kalbs obviously have the story chiefly from the least disinterested source. More investigative reporting might have answered the disturbing question, for example, of why the President of the United States stayed in bed a floor above an unfolding nuclear confrontation with the USSR. As it is, "not even Kissinger has given Kissinger a straight 'A' for crisis management on the night of October 24-25," privately admitting that "the global nuclear nature of the alert was too extreme." "Clearly not Kissinger's finest hour," conclude the Kalbs. How did it or could it happen, and might it happen again? But the chapter is over, and we're off to the Middle East.

As for Watergate, not surprisingly, the Kalbs have been no more curious than they were about the more sordid details of diplomacy. In the wake of Kissinger's Salzburg outbursts and the new doubts about his role, at least in the wiretaps of subordinates, the Kalbs' gentle description of how the taps began is worth quoting: "Nixon's trusted palace guard suspected that the leaks had originated with members of Kissinger's newly recruited NSC Staff, and he *found himself* on the defensive. He was, in fact, outraged by the leaks; and in an attempt to demonstrate his own loyalty, he

joined the search for the leakers. He knew that FBI wiretaps were quietly placed on 13 government officials, including seven members of his own NSC Staff, and four newsmen." [emphasis added]

Later, after the scandal had broken, Kissinger told the Kalbs that he "always suspected" his own phones were bugged and the taps on the 17 were really to incriminate him. As for other Watergate issues, he never knew about plumbers, and he "recommended" that Nixon "cut all ties" with Haldeman and Ehrlichman and release "all relevant tapes" demanded by the Special Prosecutor and Senate Watergate Committee.

## The Call The Kalbs Never Made

On balance, the Kalbs pronounce, Henry comes out like "Lancelot among the brigands." Perhaps. But one could never rest the doubts with the evidence here. On an issue which Kissinger now regards, whatever his view earlier, as fundamental to his continuing in office, an issue which involves, after all, the Fourth Amendment as well as the integrity of the Secretary of State, the authors show no signs of research and investigation beyond news clippings, news conference transcripts, and the assurances of the principal.

In *All the President's Men*, Bob Woodward recounts his telephone call

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55

to Kissinger to ask whether he had
placed the wiretaps after an FBI
source told Woodward they had been
placed at Kissinger's initiative.

The White House switchboard put Wood-
ward directly through to Kissinger's office.
It was about 6:00 p. m.

"Hello," the familiar voice said in a heavy
German accent.

Woodward explained that they had infor-
mation from two FBI sources that Kissinger
had authorized the taps on his own aides.

Kissinger paused. "It could be Mr. Halde-
man who authorized the taps," he said.

How about Kissinger? Woodward asked.

"I don't believe it was true," he stated.

Is that a denial?

A pause. "I frankly don't remember."...

Woodward said that two sources had
specified that Kissinger had personally au-
thorized the taps.

A brief pause. "Almost never," he said.

Woodward suggested that "almost never"
meant "sometimes." Was Kissinger then con-
firming the story?

Kissinger raised his voice angrily. "I don't
have to submit to police interrogation about
this," he said. Calming down, he went on,
"If it is possible, and if it happened, then I
have to take responsibility for it.... I'm
responsible for this office."

Did you do it? Woodward asked.

"You aren't quoting me?" Kissinger
asked.

Sure he was, Woodward said.

"What!" Kissinger shouted. "I'm telling
you what I said was for background."

Woodward said they had made no such
agreement.

"I've tried to be honest and now you're
going to penalize me," Kissinger said.

No penalty intended, Woodward said, but
he would not accept retroactive back-
ground....

Woodward consulted Murrey Marder, the
Post's chief diplomatic reporter. Did re-
porters usually allow Kissinger to determine,
after an interview, whether it was going to
be on the record, off the record or only for
background.

Well, yes and no, Marder said. Techni-
cally, Woodward was right, but most re-
porters who covered Kissinger regularly let
"Henry" place statements on background
after the conversation. Half an hour later,
Marder came by Woodward's desk to say
that Henry had called him to complain
bitterly about his interview with Woodward.
Marder, Bernstein and Woodward went into
[managing editor] Howard Simons' office to

discuss what had happened...

Simons' phone rang. He picked it up,
gave a few grunts and switched the call to
the speaker phone so everyone could hear.

"Tell the assembled multitude, Bennie,"
Simons said.

It was [executive editor Ben] Bradlee,
speaking from his home in a stiff German
accent. "What are you guys doing?" he
asked. "I just got a call from Henry. He's
mad."...

Kissinger, moving up the line from
Marder to Bradlee, was doing what in diplo-
matic circles is known as "hardening your
position." His statement to Bradlee was that
it was "almost inconceivable" that he could
have authorized the wiretapping.

"Almost inconceivable" is not a denial,
Woodward noted, and argued for the story.

But it was nearly eight, too late for the
first editions. Simons decided to hold it...

Perhaps the most telling criticism
of *Kissinger* is that after 549 pages,
from Furth to Damascus, I literally
cannot imagine the authors ever mak-
ing that first call Woodward made to
the FBI, let alone the cool, adversary
conversation with Kissinger.

The Real Vietnam Story

The Kalbs' apparent *tour de force*,
and the section of *Kissinger* most
likely to attract attention, is their
description of the diplomacy of end-
ing the war in Vietnam. The chapter
on the collapse of the negotiations,
October to December 1972, is easily
the best in the book. Yet the Vietnam
narrative raises more questions than it
ever attempts to answer. It mirrors too
the crippling reliance on Kissinger, the
lack of independent analysis, and the
sometimes exasperating naivete that
mar the rest of the book.

The first half of *Kissinger* traces
the subject's pilgrimage from inno-
cent negotiator to sometime dissenter
on the mining of Haiphong. It is not a
path easily followed. Kissinger appar-
ently had "no trouble" justifying the
bombing in Cambodia, or lying to the
public and Congress about it, but 20
pages later, without further comment,
we learn on the eve of the Cambodian
invasion that the bombing hadn't

56

accomplished anything significant anyway. Kissinger returned from a snubbed commencement speech at Brown in 1969 "tenaciously committed to the restoration of trust between government and the campus," but three months later was uncritically accepting military intelligence (as the Kalbs do, too) that the North Vietnamese were preparing a "real slaughter blow" against Saigon early in 1970, "the sobering realities," the Kalbs say, "of approaching winter."

The secret talks with Hanoi begin in the summer of 1969; but by early April 1970 it was "pointless to continue." The Cambodian invasion and the Laos debacle by South Vietnam follow in response to Communist provocations over the next year, with Kissinger in the latter case showing "little enthusiasm" but doing "nothing to block it." Yet Henry keeps negotiating in good faith, "bending over backward to meet Hanoi's objections." And "it was only in the third year of his official negotiations with

the North Vietnamese" that he "finally" realized that Hanoi "really expected the U. S. to join them in displacing Thieu." The Kissinger here has "misread" the enemy, had his "optimism" misplaced—a man of peace counting on negotiation.

What their primary source neglected to tell his biographers was that there was an NSC study of the mining of Haiphong and the carpet bombing of Hanoi—a "savage" blow, as he told his staff, to bring "a fourth-rate" industrial power to its "breaking point"—as early as the autumn of 1969. (The distinction between the two elements of the attack—the mining of Haiphong with its risks of confrontation with the Soviets, and the bombing of Hanoi with its inevitable civilian deaths—was never drawn.) Opposed by Secretary Laird and Kissinger's own staff analysis as militarily unavailing and disastrous in domestic terms, the "option" was set aside, complete with a draft presidential speech. Kissinger began the Viet-

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57

nam negotiations as he ended them, intent less on a lasting bargain with Hanoi than on an episode of ruthless intimidation, whatever the human cost, that would allow a "decent interval" to avoid a vividly imagined right-wing recrimination in the United States.

## Thieu's Regrets

Much of the continuing frustration with the Kalbs is that they seem to be on the verge of such perspectives and are never quite interested (or informed?) enough to follow through. Nixon "had rejected" mining Haiphong, they throw in casually without discussion, when the Chiefs raised it in 1970! So close yet so far from the "record." The flaws of the Kalbs' "primary sourcing" are still more serious, however, as they try to follow their subject through the final, bloody months of war and diplomacy. Here Kissinger suffers not only its own incongruities, but also some embarrassing contradictions with a recent investigative report by Tad Szulc ("Behind the Vietnam Cease-fire Agreement," *Foreign Policy*, Summer, 1974). These questions, we should remember, are not academic; they are against a backdrop of thousands of American casualties and incalculable carnage in Indochina.

Exactly when and how did Kissinger drop his insistence on North Vietnamese withdrawal from the South? The Kalbs say, almost in passing, that it was in October, 1970. Szulc argues convincingly that it was not until April, 1972, in Moscow; that the concession broke the negotiating deadlock; and that Kissinger had clung through three years of war to the fiction of mutual withdrawal despite an NSC study in 1970 which concluded that expulsion of the North Vietnamese was impossible. The Kalbs acknowledge that the Soviets did pass along to Hanoi the non-withdrawal concession after the 1972 summit, and progress then was rapid. But Kissinger never grips the most stark

question: Was the war and its slaughter needlessly prolonged on an issue Kissinger always knew he would abandon?

Finally, and most Byzantine, how did Henry deal with General Thieu? The point seems central to Kissinger's reputation and to the savage carpet bombing of Hanoi at Christmas 1972. Szulc recounts that Kissinger deliberately deceived Saigon on the negotiations, never warned them about giving up mutual withdrawal, negotiated a political arrangement behind Thieu's back, and in total dissimulation encouraged the South Vietnamese as late as August 1972 (he was already near a deal with Hanoi) to prepare an invasion of North Vietnam! The price of all that, says Szulc, was the now-famous Thieu refusal to approve the October 1972 "peace is at hand" deal, the resulting collapse of negotiations, and the terror bombing which was designed to appease Thieu after his humiliation by Kissinger's diplomacy. On most of these major points, the Kalbs are unaccountably vague. They tell us how Henry looked in Saigon in August, 1972, but precious little of what happened. There was a breakthrough in the autumn of 1972, but Henry began somehow to "ignore" the details, "assuming" these would be taken care of by "technicians and bureaucrats." "In the grand rush toward the finale," says Kissinger, "there was simply not enough time to scrutinize the fine print... the Americans [emphasis added] were careless." So when Henry flies off to Saigon, on his way to Hanoi and destiny, it all falls apart. The acceptance of North Vietnamese troops in the South was "not new," but General Thieu seemed visibly upset about it. He balks. "This is the greatest diplomatic failure of my career!" the Kalbs quote Kissinger talking to a Thieu advisor. "I'm sorry about that," answers the Vietnamese, "but we have a country to defend."

So Kissinger "found himself" between Nixon, Hanoi, and Thieu, and entering the "three worst months

58

of his life." The upshot is an effort to get a "token withdrawal" of North Vietnamese troops and other retroactive changes from the Kissinger-Tho October agreement; Hanoi refuses (it might have been a "mistake" to present new points, Kissinger later admitted); the bombing begins, apparently to penalize Hanoi for its perfidy.

There follows a mission by General Haig to Thieu, threatening a U. S. aid cut-off if he doesn't sign after Washington has "brutalized" Hanoi. Thieu relents. Hanoi comes back to the table to sign an agreement not significantly different from that of October. Kissinger wins half a Nobel Peace Prize. But why the bombing if Thieu concedes on the Haig ultimatum? Why does Kissinger later tell the Kalbs the gains of the terror strikes and the U. S. casualties over Hanoi were "marginal," that he would have signed the October deal? It is a sadly blurred picture, intimating intellectual and political bungling by Kissinger at an awful and needless human cost.

## The Snapshot Approach

Few important subjects in Kissinger are not better reported elsewhere—for example, SALT and Pentagon policies by John Newhouse in his *Cold Dawn*, the Jordanian crisis by Henry Brandon, and Indochina by Szulc. Nonetheless, its "reporting" is typical of diplomatic journalism, the concentration on the drama and logistics of the Kissinger shuttles, the fatal reliance on "highest" sources. Kissinger is perhaps the ultimate product of this malaise. Two sophisticated correspondents write a lucrative and much-heralded 549 pages with almost no trace of a leaked document or authoritative official informant embarrassing to Kissinger, in a government bulging with both. It is as if Woodward and Bernstein had reported Watergate largely from interviews with Nixon, or Upton Sinclair had written *The Jungle* from the "primary sourcing" of the meat packers.

Kissinger might have been written

very differently from questions and sources the Kalbs never probed, and beyond the answers they settled for. First, the subject demanded—and the authors' access to Kissinger afforded —a careful examination of the man and his concept of foreign policy. Henry Kissinger (in real life) is perhaps the most sophisticated, articulate, and *purposeful* man ever to guide American diplomacy. However controversial his positions, he can explain detente, the expedient subordination of human rights, the deliberate disregard of the developing world, and more. Intent on celebration, Kissinger thus misses a superb opportunity to open foreign policy to public understanding and debate.

And of the extraordinary man himself—so much of the story—there are only episodic, puzzling snapshots. He was, drop the Kalbs, "a believer in the persuasive power of bombs;" "always ... a political chameleon;" would choose injustice over disorder; was the product of Weimar. The man and his policies merit more intellectual respect than this, and any serious book on Kissinger would proceed on such a basis. While we examine Kissinger's failures, we clearly need an equally deep exploration of his successes. SALT, the opening to China, the beginning of control on chemical-biological weapons, the brilliant Middle East diplomacy are all grand historic achievements that we should know how to emulate rather than simply cheer.

But the heart of the "record" is the man in relation to the government and country. How does he do it, we're entitled to know. Again, a serious effort to capture the subject would dig into ground the Kalbs leave sadly behind as the sleek 707 heads off to Paris or Cairo. To understand this singular dominance of U. S. foreign policy (and popular esteem) one has to write about how foreign policy is *made* in Washington (and New York), how Kissinger ruthlessly co-opted much of that world by bureaucratic skill and his remarkable relations with

59

Nixon, how he manipulated the Con-
gress, how he played with astonishing
effect on the bias and weakness of the
media, how he exploited with all his
constituencies, foreign and domestic,
their preference for him as apart from
his unlikeable chief—all themes the
Kalbs seem to find pedestrian or
irrelevant. Kissinger's story did not
take place in press conferences or
secret sessions with Le Duc Tho; it is a
vast web of relationships, battles, cir-
cumstance, and seemingly petty
events that are the stuff of govern-
ment—not the stuff of best-sellers,
perhaps, for the subject tends to be
more complex and less a star, but
much more the reality than the im-
agery here. It seems almost too ob-
vious, yet the Kalbs have missed it:
Kissinger is a phenomenon of the
politics of foreign policy; he is its
quintessential politician in every sense
of that word. Portraying him as less
not only stunts the man, but per-
petuates our ignorance about a deadly
business conducted by a few largely
unanswerable people in Washington.

We All Deserve More

Finally, this book owed us more
than the protagonist's story of the
agony of Vietnam. Seldom in history
has a moment so illuminated the way
we are governed as that last four years
of killing. Seldom too have there been
so many sources in government, here
and in Saigon, deeply divided and
disenchanted over the conduct of
policy. But from the secret, illegal
bombing of Cambodia in 1969 to the
final madness of the carpet bombing
of Hanoi, Kissinger refuses to tell
more than the surface chronology.
As for why it happened, why we and
others suffered, and what role this one
man really played in it all, we do not
know. And the tragedy is that as
many journalists know, we might
have.

Fortunately, the revisionism may
have already begun in the wake of
Kissinger's outburst at Salzburg.
Reporters have begun to ask, beyond

the communique, where Kissinger
may stand in history and have begun
to expose the darker side of the
record. But the Kalb's book suggests
how far we have to go in treating
foreign policy and its high priests with
the same sense of proportion, healthy
skepticism, and self-confidence we
now apply to local politicians. For the
Kalbs have obscured the ultimate les-
son learned by most of us who
worked for this man—in the end, he is
not an exception, but a logical (and
perhaps frightening) extension of the
way most of us do business. What is so
grave about all of this—and what can
no longer excuse superficial, mislead-
ing books on the subject—is that
business on his level is literally a
matter of life and death, paid for in
tax money, in bills at the grocery
store, and ultimately with the lives of
our sons.

There is a price here also for the
Secretary of State. Even beyond his
current crisis of character on the taps,
he has hoped for sympathy and sup-
port in the goal of restoring public
confidence in foreign policy. And
whether he realizes it or not, that
confidence, particularly among the
young, will come only as we open
diplomacy fairly and fully to public
accountability. There the Kalbs fail
him. He could have stood the test of
an investigative report, and we would
all have been better for it.

But perhaps, as Kissinger himself
seems to sense, we prefer our remain-
ing illusions to the truth that restores
the faith Kissinger longs for. It is
surely easier for journalists to write
such books, for editors to keep the
reports up-beat, for the Book-of-the-
Month Club to sell Kissinger. Yet we
will have truly lost faith in ourselves—
what Henry Kissinger fears most—if
we believe that he and his “successes”
are all we have left amid the wreckage
of a corrupt government.

"To read this book," advertises the Book-of-the-Month Club, "is an education in modern politics." What an unintended and tragic irony. We—and Kissinger—deserve better.

60

UP-080

(WIRETAPS)

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- MORTON HALPERIN, A FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AIDE, SAID FRIDAY HIS TELEPHONE WAS TAPPED IN THREE DAYS BEFORE IT WAS LEGALLY AUTHORIZED.

HALPERIN ALSO SAID ALEXANDER HAIG, A FORMER AIDE TO HENRY KISSINGER WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHIEF OF STAFF, LIED TO THE FBI WHEN HE SAID THAT HALPERIN WAS FIRED BECAUSE OF THE OVERHEARD CONVERSATIONS.

HALPERIN IS SEEKING DAMAGES FROM KISSINGER, THE FBI AND OTHER ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON GROUNDS HIS PRIVACY AND CIVIL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HIS PHONE WAS TAPPED IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT IF HE WAS THE SOURCE OF NEWS LEAKS.

HALPERIN SAID HIS PHONE WAS TAPPED MAY 9, 1969, THE DAY FBI DIRECTOR J. EDGAR HOOVER WAS ASKED TO MAKE THE TAP. HE SAID THIS WAS THREE DAYS BEFORE A WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION WAS ISSUED BY THEN-ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN MITCHELL OR ANY OTHER JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OFFICER.

"SUCH INSTALLATION, WITHOUT ANY WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE GOVERNING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE FBI," HALPERIN SAID IN HIS BRIEFS FRIDAY.

HALPERIN SAID HAIG'S STATEMENTS THAT HALPERIN WAS RELIEVED OF HIS POST AS A RESULT OF OVERHEARD CONVERSATIONS WERE MADE "IN BAD FAITH" AND "WERE FALSE AND WERE KNOWN TO DEFENDANT HAIG TO BE FALSE WHEN HE MADE THEM."

UPI 08-02 02:09 PED

They May Be Puzzled, But Other Nations Are Paying Attention

# Impeachment's Effect on Foreign Policy Is Growing

By DAVID BINDER

WASHINGTON—Has the Watergate scandal, culminating now in the possibility of Presidential impeachment, affected the conduct of United States foreign policy?

The answer would seem to be: "Here and there, yes."

Ordinarily, a President and a Secretary of State who achieved a diplomatic tour de force in the Middle East and played a role in composing the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus would not have to worry about their leadership potential on the international scene. But success abroad does not seem to be proof against the effects of Watergate.

The Soviet and West European press have displayed increasing interest in the impeachment question. Soviet and West European Governments have begun cultivating Democratic party hopefuls like Senator Edward Kennedy. Obviously, a lot of people around the world have begun to look beyond President Nixon.

## Form and Substance

That may not effect the substance of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy — "construction of world peace" through détente with the Soviet Union and China—but it may make it more difficult for the policy to be carried out. Henry Kissinger himself said in testimony before the Senate last week that there is naturally some effect on the conduct of foreign policy when "the central authority" of the United States is under attack.

He could have added that when the Secretary of State feels compelled to threaten to resign unless cleared in a wiretapping episode related to Watergate, as Mr. Kissinger did in Salzburg June 11, the

conduct of foreign policy might also be said to have been affected.

Questions about the effect of Watergate on foreign policy have been put to virtually every prominent foreigner who has called on the President and Mr. Kissinger since the affair crested a year ago. Their answers have been more or less resounding denials of any important effect. The most recent answer in this vein came from Hans-Dietrich Gen-scher, the West German Foreign Minister, who visited Washington about a week ago.

However, there are some specific instances of Watergate-impact on the conduct of foreign affairs, and some of them impinge on matters of substance.

There is, to start with, Mr. Nixon's on-again, off-again state visit to Japan. It is off for now, and one reason for this, according to some reports from Tokyo, is that advisers of Emperor Hirohito think it would not look so good.

Then there is the sensitive issue of the Panama Canal.

Last February, Mr. Kissinger went to Panama City to begin formal negotiations with the Panamanian Government on a new treaty for regulating the canal, an agreement that envisaged ultimate abandonment of United States sovereignty over that waterway.

On April 5, Senator Strom Thurmond, the conservative Republican from South Carolina, submitted a resolution in the Senate insisting on continued American sovereignty over the canal. He picked up 34 cosponsors.

Negotiations on the canal between the Panamanians and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker are now proceeding at what American officials describe as a good pace. But no one who knows Mr. Nixon's thinking believes the new canal treaty will be concluded. And the reason is simply stated: Senator

Thurmond and his 34 conservative colleagues represent the President's last barrier against impeachment. It would take 67 votes of the 100-member Senate to convict the President on impeachment articles, and this makes 34 a magic number. So forget a new canal treaty for a while.

Third, there is the problem of Cuba. This has become something of a hemisphere issue. More and more Latin-American countries are restoring relations with Havana, and there is a growing number of specialists in Washington who feel the time has come to reassess United States policy toward the Castro Government.

Mr. Kissinger and his aides have taken considerable pains to make clear that the United States has not altered and is not about to alter its stance toward Cuba, or reconsider the 12-year-old embargo imposed by Washington on trade with the island republic. The reason, again, is rooted in Watergate.

The rationale given by Administration officials willing to speak candidly, though in a private capacity, is that a shift on Cuba would offend those same 34 or 35 conservatives in the Senate who could save Mr. Nixon from conviction and removal from office. So forget about Cuba, too, for a while.

## Gestures to Conservatives

Far from doing anything that might offend conservative Senators, Mr. Nixon has made some small foreign-policy gestures aimed at pleasing them.

One involved former Senator John Sherman Cooper, the Kentucky Republican. According to State Department officials, his wife, Lorraine, developed a great nostalgia for the days when she was Mrs. Ambassador John Sherman Cooper in India and Nepal. Some conservative Southern Senators who are friendly with the Coopers—though a moderate, he is a fellow Southerner—heard of this.

The Senators passed the information on to the White House, with the suggestion that it might be nice if Mr. Cooper became an Ambassador again, particularly as he seemed to have been a good one in India and Nepal.

Last April it became known that Mr. Nixon was considering appointing Mr. Cooper as the first United States Ambassador to East Germany. It wasn't London, where the Ambassadorship is also opening up, but it was enough to appease the conservative Senators.

short of acrimony and vetoes. The
resolution was adopted, and the So-
viet Union abstained.

Both Washington and Moscow,
quite apart from Athens and Ankara,
perceive vital interests at stake in the
area. When last month it appeared
that Greece and Turkey might go to
war over their ancient "national prob-
lem" (they have fought over owner-
ship of Cyprus for 15 centuries), the
United States confronted the prospect
of two of her NATO allies at each
other's throats.

The United States worried on at
least two counts: one, that the south-
ern flank of the Alliance would be
threatened, possibly opening the way
to greater Soviet influence in the east-
ern Mediterranean, and two, that
détente might be upset. Moscow has
backed the independence of Cyprus to
prevent its becoming a Greek-con-
trolled NATO base.

In Greece,
New Old Winds
Of Democracy

Since the restoration of civilian rule
in Athens, the new Greek leaders have
gone to some pains to demonstrate
that the military has in fact returned
to the barracks, leaving the business
of running the Government to the poli-
ticians. Last week there was the best
evidence to date: Premier Constantine
Caramanlis said he was reinstating
the Constitution, and its guarantees of
civil rights, that were in force in
Greece from 1952 until the military
coup of 1967.

Mr. Caramanlis did not give a date
for the reinstitution of the Constitu-
tion, and said that until a Constitution-
al Assembly was held the Government
would have the right to rule by de-
cree. There is no date for elections or
for the lifting of martial law.

prisoners. Last week a human rights
committee from the Organization of
American States implicitly confirmed
those charges, calling on the regime
to ban the application of physical and
psychological pressure on detainees.

The six-nation group, after 15 days
of inquiry into allegations that human
rights were being violated by the
junta, did not in its statement explicit-
ly accuse the regime. It confined itself
instead to suggestions that human
rights should be honored. Among its
"suggestions" was a proposal that the
Government inform families of de-
tainees that their relatives were being
held, and the reasons.

Is Franco Well
Enough to Rule?

Generalissimo Francisco Franco has
left a Madrid hospital, described by a
doctor as "absolutely cured and ab-
solutely recovered," but no one knows
if the 81-year-old Spanish dictator is
well enough to resume the duties he
recently turned over to Prince Juan
Carlos de Borbón.

Nothing has been said officially, but
rumors persisted in Madrid and other
Western capitals that the Generalis-
simo would make the transfer of pow-
er permanent. He was admitted to the
clinic July 9 with phlebitis, an inflam-
mation of vein in his right thigh. On
July 19 he began bleeding internally
from medication, and turned over his
duties to the 36-year-old Juan Carlos.

If the transfer of power becomes
permanent, opponents of the Franco
regime are ready. They announced in
Madrid and Paris last week that they
had formed a "democratic junta of
Spain," and that it would form a pro-
visional government to liberalize the
political life of Spain when the Franco
regime ends.

John Van Doorn and Thomas Butson

Spending The Oil M

By TERRY ROBARDS

LONDON—An apocryphal story told in London's financial district is that Saudi Arabia will use its new-found oil wealth to buy control of General Motors and then announce: "What's good for Saudi Arabia is good for the United States."

The remark is not as far-fetched as it may sound.
The influx of oil money into the Middle East is so
great that a takeover of the world's largest industrial
enterprise indeed might be possible.

Many other uses for "petrodollars" are also pos-
sible, and this is the chief problem facing the oil-
producing nations: how to invest all that money.
The sums involved are so enormous that they defy
conventional deployment and, unless carefully wield-
ed, could produce chaos in the financial markets.
The World Bank has estimated that the accumu-
lated reserves of the 13 members of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.)
may rise to $650-billion by 1980 and to $1.2-trillion
by 1985—or about the value of all the goods and
services produced in the United States last year.

If the money were flowing into industrialized na-
tions such as the United States or Japan or West
Germany, it could be put to work domestically in
a multitude of ways, from building roads and fac-

tories to clearing slums
through research.

But the economies of
erally are too small and
such vast sums. It mak-
to build roads that don-
struct factories for whic-
ers, or to create consu-
are not enough consumer

So most of the pet-
abroad. They must be
say, through the treasur-
tries and back into un-
economies where a sa-
be expected.

World economic rela-
ing drastically because
flow of funds into the
is how it will all be
Treasury Secretary of
through London the
visits in the Middle
that petrodollars wou

A good example mi-
slightly over 25 per
the West German stee-
sum. This is said to be
one of the oil coun-

David V. Edwards

8/3/74 WASH POST

[10]

# A Non-Military Foreign Policy

At a news conference following the disappointing conclusion of the summit conference, Henry Kissinger explained the failure to achieve an agreement limiting MIRVs by saying that “both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that does not come easily to either side.” The remark was startling for its apparent candor, and probably pleased most of those who have long argued for a de-militarization of American foreign policy and a strengthening of detente. But it was a remark that revealed either an intention to mislead the public about the causes of the failure or a monumental misunderstanding on Kissinger's part of the real reasons for the dominance of military considerations, and the resistance of the military to policies of “restraint”, in American—and Soviet—foreign policy making.

Kissinger's remark implies that if only he could get the military off his back (and if Brezhnev could do the same) he could negotiate a significant arms control agreement that would be in the interests of American national security. The remark implies that the military leadership in this country, less enlightened than Kissinger, mistakenly believes that the U.S. must maintain a posture of paramount military readiness, and that a posture of parity or a balance of imbalances in military capability would be dangerous.

If this is Kissingers argument, he is putting the blame on the wrong shoulders. The military's "failing" is its having taken Kissinger at his deed, rather than at his word. The reason that the military in this country continues to believe that it must maintain a posture of dominance, and therefore cannot afford to submit to significant arms control "restraints", is that Kissinger's foreign policy is fundamentally a policy grounded in the resort to the deployment, use, and threat of use of military force whenever and wherever around the globe the United States finds its position seriously challenged.

Let us remember that the same Kissinger who seeks a MIRV limitation agreement endorsed and even engineered the invasion of Cambodia, the Christmas bombing of North Vietnam, and the worldwide military alert at the time of the Yom Kippur War.

And it is the pervasive acceptance and endorsement, not just by the military but by the President, the Congress, and even most of the public, of this Kissinger foreign policy, and of the theory of international relations that underlies it, that gives to the military, in this country and in the Soviet Union, the preeminent role in policy councils that Kissinger is now resent-

ing, and that encourages the military to resist counsels of "restraint".

He—and we—cannot have it both ways. If we pursue a foreign policy grounded in reliance on military force we must accept—and should probably be grateful for—a preeminent role for military considerations and, consequently, for the paramount experts on military requisites, our military leadership.

If, on the other hand, we wish to curtail the role of the military and of its viewpoint, we must consciously decide

*The writer is an associate professor of government at the University of Texas at Austin.*

to curtail the role of resort to military force in our foreign policy. And this Kissinger has been utterly unwilling even to consider.

Kissinger may well assert that it is ultimately a matter of civilian control of the military, and that it is the fundamental responsibility of the State Department and especially the White House's national security staff to integrate military considerations supplied by our military leadership into a broader political context. But this would be to miss entirely the fundamental point that the policy and theoretical framework within which this integration is engineered is such that it matters surprisingly little who is doing the intergrating.

Opposition to the proposed measures of arms control derives from the same premises that dicate military approaches to world problems, and until those premises are changed, particular small deviations from them for limited arms control will likely only appeal strongly to those actively involved in the negotiating experience and those who do not fully understand the real bases of our foreign policy and posture, and so believe that limited measures of arms control will actually reform world politics.

Kissinger's foreign policy is really fundamentally no different from that of his predecessors or from that of his adversaries in the Kremlin. It accepts the presupposition that military force is and must be the only conclusive arbiter in international affairs and the desirable early resort of a nation seriously challenged. The attitude of the military in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union in opposing arms control limitations is wholly consistent with this fundamental policy. Indeed, the military would probably be failing in its duty were it not to oppose such limitation—as long as the United States

maintains and acts on the basis of a policy of resort to force when challenged.

Whether this posture and the policy that underlies it preserves or threatens world peace is quite another question. There is good reason to believe that it does in fact threaten the peace—in deed, that only a fundamentally different policy would offer a context in which arms control measures would make real sense and would promise progress toward real peace.

Many of the newly emergent influences in international relations suggest that the bases for a fundamentally different policy are beginning to develop—from the growing challenges to state sovereignty of multinational corporations and movements for regional integration, through the international economic chaos increasingly evident as a result of worldwide inflation and currency fluctuation, to the emergence of strong pacifist sentiment among many citizens, especially the young, first in Japan, then in Europe, and now largely as a result of our Vietnam experience in the U.S. itself.

There is not the space to enter into a development of the comprehensive bases for such a fundamentally different foreign policy designed to foster cooperation rather than competition and conflict. What is important at the moment is to understand that the military position and influence on our quest for arms control—in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union—is a consistent extension and support of the foreign policy of which our chief negotiator for arms control and detente is the architect.

Blaming the military for the logical limitations and the practical failings of one's own theory of foreign policy is misleading at best. We may hope that, if Kissinger really wants "a generation of peace", he will soon learn that what is required is much more than just an occasional arms control limitation agreement to punctuate a policy of the active resort to military force whenever one's interests or postures are challenged.

The Washington Post

EUGENE MEYER, 1875-1959
PHILIP L. GRAHAM, 1915-1963

KATHARINE GRAHAM
Publisher

JOHN S. PRESCOTT JR. BENJAMIN C. BRADLER
President Executive Editor

Philip L. Geyelin, Editorial Page Editor; Howard Simons, Managing Editor; Mark Measher, Vice President-Business Affairs; Kenneth Johnson, Vice President-Operations; Gerald W. Siegel, Vice President; Jack F. Patterson, Vice President-Circulation; Thomas R. McMartin, Vice President-Sales.

Published by The Washington Post Company:
1150 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20071

KATHARINE GRAHAM
Chairman of the Board

LARRY H. ISRAEL
President

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST

Thursday, August 1, 1974

H7

# More Gaps, Distortions in Tapes

By Jack Anderson

There no longer can be any
doubt that the White House has
tampered with Watergate evi-
dence. Tapes and documents
have been altered by someone
inside the White House.

Furthermore, our White
House sources tell us that the
additional 64 conversations
which the Supreme Court unan-
imidously ordered President
Nixon to turn over to Special
Prosecutor Leon Jaworski con-
tain gaps, distortions and unin-
telligible passages.

Many of the distortions are
caused by extraneous sounds,
such as clanking cups, thump-
ing feet and even martial music
filtering into the Oval Office
from the White House grounds.
But our sources say that some of
the unexplained gaps appear to
have been caused by deliberate
tampering.

The suppressed tapes had
been in the President's per-
sonal custody until the Supreme
Court order. Then they were en-
trusted to the Secret Service to
transcribe.

Our sources have also fur-
nished us with the astonishing
details about a memo that
clearly was doctored by the
White House. This was written
on Jan. 8, 1970, by former presi-
dential aide Alexander Butter-
field.

It dealt with the tapped tele-
phone conversation of Morton
Halperin, a former national se-
curity aide, who spoke on the
phone about helping ex-Secre-
tary of Defense Clark Clifford
prepare a series of articles for
Life magazine against the Viet-
nam war.

The tapped conversation was
reported to the White House by
the late FBI chief, J. Edgar
Hoover, on Dec. 29, 1969. H. R.
Haldeman, then the White
House staff chief, passed Ho-
over's wiretap report to Jeb Ma-
gruder, with instructions to pre-
pare a "game plan" to counter
the Clifford articles.

Magruder sought suggestions
from Butterfield, who gave his
views in the Jan. 8, 1970, memo.
He stressed that "Al Haig can
get you squared away on at least
a preliminary scheme. We can
build from there." Haig was
then Henry Kissinger's deputy
and is now Haldeman's succes-
sor as staff chief.

This memo is significant, be-
cause it proves the wiretaps
were used for political pur-
poses. All along, the White
House has been claiming the
wiretaps were ordered strictly
to protect the national security.

The Butterfield memo was
mysteriously altered, however,
to make it appear that he had di-
rected Magruder's operations
against Clifford. The compro-
mising reference to Haig was
also deleted from the doctored
memo.

Butterfield was hauled before
the Watergate prosecutors early
last January for questioning
about the memo. He quickly
spotted indications that it had
been altered. He obtained ac-
cess to his White House files
and found several of his Janu-
ary, 1970, memos missing, say
our sources, including the doc-
tored memo.

But unknown to the White
House, Butterfield had kept
copies of some of his papers,
and among them he found the
Jan. 8 memo as he had origi-

nally written it. This proved the
tampering beyond any doubt.

But the big mystery is still
unsolved: who altered the
memo? Haig might be a suspect,
because the memo was changed
to shift the blame from him to
Butterfield. But our sources
doubt this, because the two men
are close personal friends.

The strange gaps in the latest
64 tapes, meanwhile, will add to
the frustration of the Watergate
prosecutors who still haven't
been able to identify who
caused the famous 18½-minute
gap in an earlier tape. This
obliterated Haldeman's crucial
first report to the President on
the Watergate break-in on June
20, 1972.

One key source believes it was
significant that the President
himself listened to this tape on
Sept. 29, 1973, at Camp David.
His secretary, Rose Mary
Woods, testified before the
grand jury that the President
donned earphones and pushed
buttons, listening to parts of the
June 20 tape, while she was
transcribing it. She did not sug-
gest, however, that the Presi-
dent had altered the tape.

Another source pointed out
that Assistant Attorney General
Henry Petersen, while he was in
charge of the Watergate prose-
cution, reported to the Presi-
dent on April 15, 1973, that H. R.
Haldeman was under investiga-
tion.

Ten days later, the President
turned over several of the most
crucial tapes not to Petersen,
who was conducting the investi-

gation, but to Haldeman, who
was under investigation.

The Watergate prosecutors
still cannot pinpoint, however,
who in the White House has
been tampering with the tapes
and documents.

Washington Whirl —Prank-
sters recently slipped into So-
cial and Rehabilitation Admin-
istrator James Dwight's execu-
tive bathroom and removed the
lid to his commode. In its place,
they installed a fire-engine red
lid, emblazoned with the insig-
nia of his favorite football team,
the Southern California Trojans

... Maj. Gerald L. Radcliff,
president of a Pentagon anti-
ques club, has written to Wash-
ington antique dealers request-
ing a discount for club mem-
bers. The requests were mailed
at the taxpayers' expense in
franked envelopes stamped "of-
ficial business." ... Joe Gon-
zales, a Senate staff member
who has been overseeing Trea-
ury appropriations, has quietly
joined the folks he used to regu-
late. He has accepted a $35,000-
a-year job at the Treasury ...

Celebrated classical guitarist
Jean-Pierre Jumez was horri-
fied recently when one of his
students showed him a new al-
bum of Jumez's recordings. The
cover featured a hairy-legged
model, without pants, strum-
ing the guitar. The album,
with its streaker-like guitar
player, was issued by ABC Rec-
ords without so much as asking
Jumez whether his legs were
hairy. The outraged classicist is
taking the case to court.

©1974, United Feature Syndicate

Kissinger to Shift Envoys

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Star-News Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger reportedly is
preparing to make exten-
sive ambassadorial changes
around the world to meet
changing political realities
and his own highly personal
concept of whom he wants
working for him.

Leading the list of those
whose transfer is regarded
as nearly certain is Henry
Tasca, ambassador to
Greece. Tasca, it is said by
usually well informed

sources, was so close to the
fallen Greek military re-
gime that he is anathema to
the new government headed
by Premier Constantine
Caramanlis.

State Department insid-
ers consider that William B.
Macomber, the ambassador
to Turkey, also might be
subject to early reassign-
ment.

THERE ALSO WERE re-
ports yesterday, denied by
State Department spokes-
man Robert Anderson, that

Kissinger is "feuding" with
his top Latin aide, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Jack Ku-
bisch, and intends to send
him to be ambassador to
Venezuela when the post be-
comes vacant with the an-
ticipated retirement of
Ambassador Robert
McClintock. Anderson
denied a published report of
a feud.

Anderson said he was
unaware of any plan to
transfer Kubisch to Cara-
cas. Reports are circulating
that Kissinger was disen-

chanted with Kubisch for
not making him aware of
some of the implications of
the recent U.S. agreement
to permit American auto
companies in Argentina to
export vehicles to Cuba.

It was said that Kissinger
did not realize when he
agreed to this breach in the
American isolation of Cuba
that Argentine ships in
trade with Cuba could not
legally use fueling facilities
in the United States.

ONE REPORT indicated
that Kissinger intends to re-
place Kubisch with former
ambassador to Chile Na-
thaniel Davis, now director
general of the Foreign Ser-
vice. But while officials did
not deny that McClintock
may soon leave Venezuela,
some pointed out that Kiss-
inger has been known to
show impatience and temper
with most people who work
for him at one time or
another. Kubisch is virtual-
ly the only assistant secre-
tary to remain since Kiss-
inger took office last Sep-
tember.

Kubisch has served for
more than a year in a job in
which his most recent pre-
decessors served 18 months
or less. He has never been
an ambassador but was
picked by Kissinger from
the post of deputy mission
chief in Paris.

Another diplomatic move
expected to take place soon
is the probable nomination
of career diplomat William
Brown to be either ambas-
sador or American repre-
sentative to Mongolia.
Brown has been studying
the Mongolian language
and is reported to be ready
for the move to Ulan Bator
whenever the United States
decides on the form of rela-
tionship it will have with
the Soviet satellite in north
Asia.

By Shirley Elder
Star-News Staff Writer

After two years of Watergate, Congress is on the edge of enacting a law to remove the taint of big money from national politics.

But the proposed law's legislative route has been marked by roadblocks and high hurdles thus far and everything must go like clockwork if campaign spending reform is to become law this year.

Ironically, the bill has come under a time squeeze caused by impeachment, an offshoot of the Watergate affair — itself an offshoot of the situation the bill is aimed at rectifying.

Once Congress plunges into debate over whether to impeach the President of the United States for some of the abuses targeted by this bill, all other legislative business will be shelved, some of it permanently. House debate begins Aug. 19.

The House Rules Committee, which meets Monday, must clear the way. The full House must debate, amend and pass the bill. Differences between the House bill and an earlier Senate version must be worked out promptly.

### UNDER CAMPAIGN
spending reform legislation and with luck, never again would presidential candi-

dates depend so heavily on fat cat donations, laundered checks, secret funds. There would be no suitcases full of $100 bills to support illegal activities, no arm-twisting for big corporate contributions with hints of favorable treatment.

And, in a larger sense, sponsors of the legislation emphasize that their bill is aimed at restoring public confidence in national government.

At the heart of the House bill is public financing for presidential elections. Tapping a fund created by the $1 check-off on individual income taxes, $20 million would be available to each major party candidate, $2 million for national nominating conventions and, for

once $5,000 was raised in contributions of $250 or less from private sources.

The bill would limit total spending to $20 million for presidential campaigns, $10 million for presidential primaries, and $75,000 for both primary and general election contests for House and Senate.

### NO CASH contributions
or expenditures above $100 would be allowed. Phony campaign committees would be ruled out; all receipts and expenditures would have to be handled by a single central committee.

Individuals would be restricted to giving no more than $1,000 to any candidate for each election, with a

the bill's goals, have joined to sponsor a number of amendments to correct what they call "loopholes and glaring defects."

### PARTICULARLY, they want to free Democratic and Republican national and state committees from the bill's $5,000 per candidate limit on contributions by organizations. These limits would weaken the national political parties, the GOP members say, and "seriously undermine" the goal of reform.

The Republicans, led by Frenzel, also oppose federal money for national political conventions and lower limits on the amount of money "special interests" can give

i

# Halperin Calls Wiretap Illegal

Associated Press

The FBI violated federal regulations by wiretapping Morton H. Halperin's telephone three days before former Attorney General John N. Mitchell authorized it, Halperin alleged yesterday.

President Nixon's former top advisers used information from the wiretap in an attempt to discredit a writer criticizing the administration's Vietnam policy, Halperin said in

papers filed in U.S. District Court.

Halperin, who resigned as a National Security Council aide in September, 1969, also accused Alexander M. Haig Jr., the President's chief of staff, of lying to FBI agents about the wiretap.

Halperin has filed suit against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, who then was Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, Mitchell and other administration officials.

Halperin said the tap was installed May 9, 1969, three days before any written authorization was issued by Mitchell or any authorized Justice Department official.

Such installation without written authorization of the Attorney General "was in violation of the government rules and regulations of the Justice Department and the FBI," Halperin charged.

CHATTER

**Retread** As a film *The Adventures of Robin Hood* has kept many stars before the public eye. Douglas Fairbanks Sr. impersonated the original, acrobatic socialist, silently, in 1922. He was followed by Errol Flynn, Cornel Wilde (as Robin's son), Jon Hall and Richard Greene. All were on the

C/0830M

Paul Newman:
Robin Hood & His
Merry Menopause

safe side of 40. But the next in line has two films to finish first, and will be past 50 before he gets around to it. He is Paul Newman.

**Eye, Eye** "There are Watergates in practically every major business enterprise at corporate level. So, it's not entirely surprising that such activities should proliferate in the largest business combine of all—namely the U.S. government." The speaker of that eavesdropped observation was a man who ought to know: CBS Chairman William S. Paley.

**Method Acting** *Short Eyes*, the New York Shakespeare Festival hit about prison life by ex-con Miguel Piñero starring a cast of former inmates and addicts calling themselves "the Family," is playing for keeps. William Carson, one of the few leads who has not done time, has taken an occasional beating in the process of dying on-stage. The other night he suffered sundry bruises and a battered nose, which called for X-rays and put him out of the show for two performances.

**Countdown** Assuming that President Nixon will be impeached by the House—as most everyone in Washington does—the Senate vote, according to the latest count of a savvy Republican member, will be 56 or 57 votes for conviction. That is about 10 votes short of the two-thirds necessary to convict, but represents a swing of 15 votes against the President since the senator's estimate just three months ago.

**Bug All** The titillating Manhattan cocktail talk these days concerns a bootleg tape in which one of Andy Warhol's girls recorded a flirtatious 25-minute phone call with Henry Kissinger in pre-Maginnes days. As the tape reaches its

giddy end, the girl coyly asks Henry to fetch her a bottle of her special perfume on his upcoming visit to Paris. The President's plenipotentiary dutifully takes down the name of the scent. But when the girl asks whether the good Dr. will personally shop for the perfume, Kissinger sniffs: "Of course not. I'll send someone to get it."

**Carte Blanket** When pop singer Cass Elliot played the London Palladium during her current British tour, the showstopper opening night was, of all things, her patter. Mid-performance, as if at a revival meeting, she announced that on a previous visit to England, with the old Mamas and Papas, she had stolen two hotel blankets. "I liked 'em, so I took 'em. We've all done something like that some time, haven't we?" She then explained how, on her next visit, she was suddenly "humiliatingly" arrested and jailed. "I was going to admit to the whole thing, but I was so angry at my treatment I told them of course I didn't steal the blankets. I was a big star and I had lots of money and I didn't need to do that sort of thing... and you know what? I got away with it!" (Actually, she did pay the hotel the cost of the blankets and legal fees.) In any case, "now," Cass told the stunned Palladium house, "you all know the truth."

**Super Fan** The woman shuttling with super-guitarist Eric Clapton (PEOPLE, July 29) from Los Angeles to San Francisco to Denver was no run-of-the-road rock fan. She was ex-model Patti Boyd, wife of Beatle George Harrison.

**Headliner Hunting** The highest-staked game in Vegas these days is headliner-hunting, and Caesars Palace has just pulled the raid of the year, shanghaiing Johnny Carson from the Sahara. The lure: bumping Johnny's $125,000 weekly take to a perhaps unequalled $200,000, plus, as additional sweetener, cutting his labor from the traditional twice-a-night grind to just one show. The latter may be more important than bread alone, because Carson is hardly hungry: his annual *Tonight* show gross from NBC is in excess of $3 million.

RON GALELLA

Johnny Carson:
Caesars & Its
$200,000 Chattel

MRS. MEIR DENIES
TALK WITH HUSSEIN

Special to The New York Times

TEL AVIV, Aug. 4—Former Premier Golda Meir denied to-night an NBC television report that she had consented to restore most of the occupied West Bank of Jordan to King Hussein.

According to the broadcast, the agreement was given during a secret border meeting of Mrs. Mir and King Hussein last May 27, shortly before she left office.

The spokesman in the office of Premier Yitzhak Rabin, Mrs. Meir's successor, said he had checked the report with Mrs. Meir and she denied that such a meeting had taken place.

She said she had been engaged that day in negotiations with Secretary of State Kissinger over troop disengagement with Syria.

However, an opposition Deputy, Haim Landu, said he had information from a reliable

source that Mrs. Meir had met the King at the end of May. He said he did not know the exact date and he could only speculate about what had been discussed.

He said he could also confirm the NBC report that Moshe Dayan, then the Defense Minister, also had attended the meeting. Mr. Landau's party, the Likud, demanded an urgent Parliamentary debate on the matter.

He also submitted a Parliamentary question to Premier Rabin asking whether he intended to pursue meetings with the Jordanian King. The issue was raised in the Cabinet today, but a news blackout was imposed on details.

## 2 Die in Japanese Quake

TOKYO, Aug. 4 (Reuters)—Two people—a 20-year-old woman and a 55-year-old man—died from shock when a pre-dawn earthquake shook Tokyo and other parts of Japan today, the police said. No other casualties were reported.

2. We'll advise you of your departure and return flights and times between 60 and 30 days before your dates of travel.

3. Pay the balance of your fare at least 45 days before you take off.

That's it.

Plan-Ahead Vacation Fare Seats available on any given day are limited. As the chart below indicates, your savings are affected by departure day. So make your reservations now.

New York to Seattle/Tacoma Plan-Ahead Vacation Fare Savings

<table><thead><tr><th>Departure Days</th><th>Season</th><th>Regular Round Trip Coach Fare</th><th>Plan-Ahead Coach Fare Round Trip</th><th>Save</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Fr.-Su.</td><td>Nov. 1-Mar. 31</td><td>$374.00</td><td>$260.00</td><td>$114.00</td></tr><tr><td>Mo.-Th.</td><td>Nov. 1-Mar. 31</td><td>$374.00</td><td>$230.00</td><td>$144.00</td></tr></tbody></table>

One-way savings are half round-trip amounts.

Some holiday dates will not be available during this period. Check your travel agent or Northwest for details.

So plan ahead! Take that long-awaited vacation—and enjoy substantial savings in air fare at the same time.

For more information and reservations, see your travel agent or call Northwest Orient:

New York: 564-2300

Westchester: 946-1184

Newark/

Hackensack: 643-8555

Long Island: 485-0200

New Jersey and

Connecticut: 800-221-7300

(toll-free):

New York State: 800-522-2177

(toll-free).

State Department
Affirms Confidence
In Envoy to Saigon

WASHINGTON, Aug. 6 (AP) — The State Department re-affirming its confidence today in the reporting of Ambassador Graham A. Martin and his embassy in South Vietnam to Washington.

In the wake of a staff report issued yesterday by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the embassy was distorting its dispatches in favor of the Saigon Government, Robert Anderson, the State Department spokesman, said in a statement, "We reaffirm the department's confidence in the integrity of the reporting from Saigon."

### Duplication Cited

Mr. Anderson said that some of the reporting from consuls in South Vietnam to Saigon was not included in information that the embassy sent on to Washington. "If significant reports are left out," he said, "it is because of an effort to avoid duplicating information."

The spokesman said that the "totality of the reporting" from Saigon has shown no significant omissions. This would include Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency reports as well as those of the State Department.

The Foreign Relations Committee report, said that over the years the United States Embassy in Saigon had acquired a reputation "for close identification with the policies of the South Vietnamese Government and for selective reporting."

"These same tendencies are apparent today," it said.

COOL, COUNTRY, CAMP, KIDS.
THE FRESH AIR FUND.

has convincingly declared himself for open-
ness and candor in the White House, which
was the overriding theme and style of Mc-
Govern's presidential campaign. Mr. Ford
promptly abolished the propaganda office
set up by his predecessor, the Office of Com-
munications, a step which McGovern prom-
ised back in October 1972. Mr. Ford's easy
manner at the economic "summit" session
last week, his effort to convey the complex-
ity of the problems rather than his
magic abilities to solve them, resembled Mc-
Govern's own style in '72 when he staged
similar theatricals with voters.

It must provide wry consolation for the
senator. In various ways, President Ford has
reached out to address the same sensibilities
which McGovern aroused in 1972—and
which generated so much scorn for him
from the "regulars" of both parties.

Gerald Ford extends a hand to the black voters represented by the Black Congressional Caucus (a cornerstone of McGovern's campaign). Gerald Ford appoints a woman as chairman of the Republican National Committee (which McGovern did for the Democrats in '72). Gerald Ford scraps the old hard-line rhetoric in favor of compassion toward Vietnam dissenters (McGovern's endorsement of amnesty was a political millstone). Even the President's wife alters the landscape with a frank statement on abortion (though her husband's press secretary immediately began modifying what she said, much the way McGovern was forced to do).

Indeed, if Gerald Ford makes any reasonable gesture toward rationalizing the nation's drug laws, particularly the harsh prison terms meted out to first-time marijuana users, then Sen. Hugh Scott and the others who painted the "triple-A" label on McGovern — for amnesty, abortion and acid — could use the same brush on their own President.

## The Mainstream Has Moved

THESE ARE MATTERS largely of style and sentiment. Gerald Ford is not George McGovern, rest assured. Still, so many of the perilous steps which McGovern took in "72 now seem to be conventional risks or even obligatory gestures. If you compare the Nixon style of leadership with the example set by McGovern, it's obvious which legacy is more relevant at the Ford White House. Instead of McGovern slipping back into the mainstream, it is more the other way around.

"I think the country now demands openness," McGovern reflects. "They didn't understand the importance of it in the pre-Watergate era, but they do now. I don't think he has any option other than to be available to the press and to be candid.

"That doesn't mean he can't be cautious and there may have been times when I should have been more cautious in what I said. But he's going to have to make himself available to the press and to the people in a way that his predecessor never did and I think he's doing that to his credit. But it's another bit of irony to see the high praise he's getting for doing something that I really think we did consistently all during 1971-1972."

McGovern has a hunch that the idea of amnesty for Vietnam draft evaders, conditional or something less, gained respectability because Republican politicians were confronted with the parallel question of amnesty for their ex-President, Richard Nixon.

"When prominent people began to say, 'I think he's suffered enough,' other people said, 'Well, by God, my kid's suffered enough in Canada, up there in exile for the last five or six years.' The discussion of amnesty for Nixon or forgiveness for Agnew or Kleindienst, all of this created a climate in the country where people who once saw it as impossible to temper justice with mercy now think it's a pretty good idea."

On a deeper level, the national government is still a long, long way from the basic ideas which George McGovern advanced as a candidate. Neither Congress nor the new President is anywhere close to embracing the full particulars of his controversial platform.

Meanwhile, McGovern's leaderless political party is still preoccupied with purging any trace of 'his brief tenure as its standard-bearer. Democrats have spent the intervening years gloating over Watergate and feuding intramurally. McGovern's own view is a grim warning: If the Democratic nominee in 1976 is not at least as progressive as he was in 1972, the party will lose and deserve to lose.

For it is clear that the political consensus is moving in his direction on some important issues, quite rapidly in several instances. McGovern assesses the progress this way:

"I think every one of the major recommendations we made in '72 on foreign policy, on defense policy, on tax reform, on open campaigning and an open presidency, the willingness to talk to the people and talk to the press, the effort to finance a campaign on small contributions and open disclosure, all of this is now almost the conventional wisdom. I can just see these things coming to pass."

When McGovern proposed his $50 billion defense budget, it alarmed the status quo. This summer, however, the Senate voted a military cut equivalent to $6.5 billion; in 1972 McGovern was proposing an annual reduction of $10 billion. The Senate cuts are far from becoming final, but they were induced by inflation pressures which are forcing even the pro-Pentagon conservatives to take a harder look at military spending.

"If the House goes along and the President accepts that," McGovern said, "it's a major victory, I think. I never was under any illusion that the figure I proposed was exactly right. I don't know whether it ought to be $10 billion or $9 or $11. But if you can get them to turn the corner and start scaling down the military outlays, it seems to me that opens the way for more critical examination of other aspects of the military budget."

When McGovern was campaigning, fiscal conservatives shrunken in horror from his proposal to guarantee a job for every working

man and woman. His idea of program of job creation tag of $10 billion. Now this has under consideration the same program to create jobs rising unemployment.

Tax reform still seems certainly the fundamental McGovern proposed is Yet, as a political issue, it rates a salute from Congress, even while delay. Across the nation come a standard item of campaign issues. It has to happen.

The issue of welfare McGovern in so much brated $1,000 per family vaning. After the 1972 less doctrinare advised town that they would not proach on a guarantee but it never surfaced. ment politics. The issue privately complained, name" by McGovern's which seems a gratuitous their own campaign a pogued the welfare issue.

The one most possible, at least, is that McGovern, when he retires as a presidential issue of war and peace

Sen. McGovern looks
count of Nixon's in-

8-8-74

STAR NEWS

[LC]

# Kissinger Dispatches Aide To Shore Up Greek Ties

By Oswald Johnston

Star-News Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has begun a personal intervention to salvage U.S.-Greek relations from years of Nixon administration support of the military regime there, now that a civilian democracy has been restored.

In an unusual short-circuiting of normal State Department procedure, Kissinger last week hurriedly called in Montteagle Stearns, an Asia specialist with personal ties to the new Athens government, and sent him to Greece to take over as No. 2 official in the U.S. Embassy there.

Stearns was vacationing on Cape Cod when Kissinger's phone call reached him last Thursday, and he was on duty in Athens by late Monday. So anxious was Kissinger to have a new face in the embassy that he called Stearns again at his Washington home Saturday, found him packing his bags and demanded to know why he wasn't already on his way.

IN THE view of Greek specialists here, Kissinger's haste was overdue. The sudden dismantling last month of the military regime in Athens has given rise to a crescendo of anti-American sentiment in the Greek press, in politicians' statements and in many quarters of popular sentiment. This development seemed all the more ominous in view of the pro-American past record of the returned civilian premier, Constantine Caramanlis.

The anti-American feeling is generally assumed to be based on the close relations U.S. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca built up with the deposed junta in its earlier years. In recent weeks, the feeling had been exacerbated by the obvious U.S. inability during the Cyprus crisis to restrain Turkey from invading the island and then, after the cease-fire, from expanding its military advantage.

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Within the State Department, it is an unspoken assumption that Tasca, believed in the earlier years of the Nixon administration to enjoy personal White House support, will be replaced as soon as a decent interval has elapsed after the Caramanlis takeover. Stearns' appointment evidently brings that moment a step nearer.

It was rumored two years ago that Tasca was slated for replacement in Athens but that fears of congressional hostility to his record as ambassador to Greece blocked him from reassignment then.

TASCA'S debit sheet lengthened considerably with recent reports, unde-

nied in the State Department bureaucracy, that he was unwilling or unable late last June to carry direct warnings to the now deposed Greek strongman, Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides not to overthrow Cyprus President Archbishop Makarios. Tasca's connections had been with the previous junta leader, George Papadopoulos, and the inside track to Ioannides was reportedly in the control of the CIA station chief, Stacy Ruhle.

Besides having become a popular symbol in Athens of U.S. support of the junta, Tasca also failed to develop good relations with then-deposed civilian politicians who might conceivably have returned to power. Now that they are in power, men such as Foreign Minis-

ter George Mavros systematically snubbed by the Americans during the junta years, are apparently not anxious to confide in the U.S. Embassy.

Stearns lists recent assignments as deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and as No. 2 man in the U.S. Embassy in Laos, but has previously served in both Greece and Turkey and Greek is among his languages.

More important, perhaps, Stearns is personally acquainted with Caramanlis, a relationship going back to the fact that his father-in-law, James W. Riddleberger, was ambassador to Athens in 1958-59, when Caramanlis was premier and when Greek-American relations were untainted.

C. M. Chief Tells House
Of $8-Million Campaign
Against Allende in '70-73

NYTimes

8874

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 7—The director of the Central Intelligence Agency has told Congress that the Nixon Administration authorized more than $8-million for covert activities by the agency in Chile between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to make it impossible for President Salvador Allende Gossens to govern.

The goal of the clandestine C.I.A. activities, the director, William E. Colby, testified at a top-secret hearing last April, was to "destabilize" the Marxist Government of President Allende, who was elected in 1970.

The Allende Government was overthrown in a violent coup d'état last Sept. 11 in which the President died. The military junta that seized power says he committed suicide but his supporters maintain that he was slain by the soldiers who attacked the presidential palace in Santiago.

## Intervention In '64

In his House testimony, Mr. Colby also disclosed that the Central Intelligence Agency first intervened against Dr. Allende in 1964 during the Johnson Administration when he was a presidential candidate running against Eduardo Frei Montalva of the Christian Democratic party, which had the support of the United States.

Associated Press

William E. Colby

The agency's operations from 1970 to 1973, Mr. Colby testified, wer considered a test of the technique of using heavy cash payments to bring down a government viewed as anti-gomistic toward the United States. However, there have been many allegations that the C.I.A. was involved in similar activities in other countries before the election of Dr. Allende.

Mr. Colby also maintained that all of the agency's operations against the Allende Government were approved in advance by the 40 Committee in Washington, a secret high-level intelligence panel headed by Secretary of State Kissinger. The 40 Committee was set up by President Kennedy in an attempt to provide Administra-

Continued on Page 26, Column 1

[L.C.T.]

THE WASHINGTON POST, SATURDAY, AUGUST 10, 1974

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

# The Road to Resignation

Highly secret talks between White House chief of staff Alexander Haig and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, together with extremely delicate planning between Haig and three senior Republicans in Congress, finally resolved the crucial question of extracting a presidential resignation: Who would bell the cat and how?

The simple facts of Richard Nixon's last four days in office, filled with emotionally draining details which compelled his resignation Friday, began with a telephone call from Haig to Kissinger on Wednesday, July 31.

Haig, trusting no one outside the closed White House inner circle so much as his former boss on the National Security Council staff, gave Kissinger the bareboned details of the infamous June 23, 1972, tapes.

Kissinger, too, was appalled. Possessing primacy in the cabinet, as well as the greatest store of national and world prestige of any American, Kissinger was immediately perceived by Haig as the single person in the Nixon administration who still could wield influence over the President.

During the next five days of the Nation's ordeal, Kissinger was approached in highly oblique fashion by powerful Republicans. Would there be some way for the cabinet to bell the cat —to inform the President that only by speedy resignation could the nation be salvaged from a far worse ordeal?

The proposal was discarded. "For such a purpose, the cabinet did not exist," one cabinet member explained. "There was only Henry."

Kissinger's central role in belling the cat was underscored by the crucial nature of his job. High State Department officials calculated the agonies that might spring from prolonged chaos and the threat to the legitimacy of the U.S. government. Outbreak of a major crisis, not then perceived but

never to be ruled out, could prove disastrous with a President lacking the moral authority to marshal the country's backing.

A more subtle problem: The longer it took to bell the cat, the more likely that foreign countries would find it irresistible to exploit the vacuum and, in one diplomat's phrase, "raise the asking price by 5 per cent in all our negotiations across the board."

So it came down to Kissinger. What he did and how he did it may never be known fully. But he fairly lived with

the President and Haig those last four days.

The aid of Republican congressional leaders was quickly enlisted by Haig. Sen. Barry Goldwater, Sen. Hugh Scott and Rep. John Rhodes knew Mr. Nixon was finished the moment Haig sent James St. Clair, the President's lawyer, to brief them on the June 23 tapes in the early afternoon of Monday, Aug. 5.

Haig's plan was terse and simple: The deadly danger of a leaderless America in world politics was being demonstrated to Mr. Nixon in undramatic

fashion by Kissinger (the tireless propounder of national "legitimacy"); the hard facts of the President's collapse in Congress must be demonstrated to Mr. Nixon in the same way by the congressional leaders.

Haig's advice to the men of Congress was sound: He himself had provided the bare facts to Mr. Nixon "with the bark on." He was buttressed in this by White House congressional liaison chief William Timmons, who provided Mr. Nixon with what Haig called "a running count on the damage assessment" in Congress. What Haig needed to bell the cat was proof before the President's eyes that there was no honorable way out except resignation.

Goldwater, Scott and Rhodes were cautioned by Haig: Don't push, be honest and fair, or resignation won't happen.

The three party elders arrived in the Oval Office agreed among themselves that belling the cat must be a purely Republican affair. As one told us: "Only Republicans could grapple with the disaster that had struck the country and the Republican Party."

And so they laid the evidence starkly on Mr. Nixon's desk. They avoided the word "resignation," sticking to the bare facts, just as Haig and Kissinger, in playing their own parts in the funereal drama, stuck to the bare facts.

The last time he cried, Mr. Nixon told them, was on the death of Dwight Eisenhower. He wanted "no tears" now and "no bloodshed." When the leaders left, Mr. Nixon's choice was simply unavoidable.

Haig, Kissinger, Goldwater, Scott, Rhodes. They had performed a horrendous task, unknown in 200 years of American history, and performed it effectively, discreetly and with a certain nobility.

Henry Kissinger

Alexander Haig

© 1974. Field Enterprises, Inc.

Juck Anderson

Are We 'Tilting' Toward the Turks?

Wash. Post

[LC]

8-11-74

Contrary to the public impression
that Secretary of State Henry Kiss-
singer arranged the cease-fire in Cy-
prus, his underlings are whispering
that he has badly mismanaged the cri-
sis. One State Department specialist
has declared bluntly that the Cyprus
situation is "a hell of a mess."

The secret cable traffic from Nicosia
shows, for example, that the Turks
have been attacking Greek Cypriot
towns without regard for the cease-
fire. Yet Kissinger has refused to ap-
ply any serious pressure on the Turks
to halt their advances.

Some of our sources suggest that
Kissinger is deliberately "tilting" to-
ward the Turks in order to keep the
strategic Mediterranean island perma-
ntly partitioned. A permanent Turk-
ish presence on the island, Kissinger
knows, would effectively remove it
from Moscow's grasp.

Not only would this undermine Cyp-
riot independence which the United
States ostensibly supports, but it
could also wreck the struggling, new
democratic government in Greece.
The Greeks have strong emotional
ties to Cyprus. The failure of the
new leaders to save Cyprus, there-
fore, could bring the military back in
power.

Both Cyprus Ambassador Nicos Dim-
itriou and Greek Minister Anthony
Nomikos have paid urgent calls at the
State Department to beg the United
States to intervene and halt the Turk-
ish advances on the island. Our State
Department sources say that Dimitriou
told Undersecretary of State Joseph
Sisco that "Hellenistic Cyprus is
threatened with extinction."

The Greek minister delivered a simi-
lar message to Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary Wells Stabier. Acting on instruc-
tions from Athens, our sources say, the
minister lodged a formal protest over
the Turkish cease-fire violations and
called upon the United States to re-
strain the Turks.

Stabler's boss, Assistant Secretary
Arthur Hartman, was in Nicosia, mean-
while, getting a similar earful directly
from Cyprus President Glafkos Cler-
ides. The diplomatic cables report that
Clerides "vigorously protested" both
the Turkish actions and U.S. policy.

Lower-level State Department aides
have implored Kissinger to bring
pressure on the Turks to end their mil-
itary operations. This is essential, they
have pleaded, to keep Cyprus inde-
pendent and to save Greek democracy.
But their appeals, we are told, "have
fallen on deaf ears."

As early as January, the Cypriots
began to warn Kissinger of an im-

pending Cyprus coup. These warnings
were confirmed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, which had close ties to
the former Greek military junta. Sev-
eral days before it happened, say our
sources, the CIA reported plans to
murder Archbishop Makarios, the for-
mer Cypriot president, and to install
guerrilla thug Nikos Sampson in his
place.

Kissinger treated these warnings,
one source told us, with "excessive ap-
athy." Although instructions were sent
to the U.S. embassy in Athens to call
upon the junta urging restraint, the
messages were given no stress and,
therefore, were ignored by the Greek
military leaders.

The Russians, acting on similar ad-
vance intelligence, approached the
State Department with the suggestion
that Britain, Russia and the United
States work together to prevent Ma-
karios' ouster. The Soviets, according
to our sources, were "cold-shouldered."

The coup, so widely heralded, came
just about on schedule. Makarios es-
caped assassination, fled to London
and then flew to Washington for an ur-
gent, secret conference with Kissinger.
The Archbishop warned Kissinger of
the impending Turkish invasion,
pleaded for U.S. help and forecast
trouble for the new Greek government
unless an honorable solution were
found in Cyprus.

United Press International

"Lower level State Department aides have implored Kissinger to bring pressure on the Turks to end their military operations."

Kissinger pledged that the United
States would do everything possible to
prevent war. But he carefully stressed
that the United States had to maintain
its neutrality, our sources report.

In the name of neutrality, he re-
mained quiet as Turkish forces in-
vaded Cyprus and blasted civilian tar-
gets with American-supplied weapons.
He continued to keep silent after
learning of Turkish cease-fire viola-
tions.

The confidential cable traffic from
Cyprus which is available to Kis-
singer, details the violations. Scarcely
45 minutes after the U. N. cease-fire
resolution was passed, the cables re-
veal, Turkish aircraft attacked Greek
Cypriot positions in the areas of Tsat-
sos, Trakona, Nicosia and St. Ilarion.
This was followed by the bombing of
the Nicosia airport.

The following day, July 23, six cease-
fire violations were reported. A day
later, the Turks attacked Greek Cyp-
riot positions 15 times. Meanwhile,
Turkish ships unloaded troops and
equipment in Kyrenia.

The cables also tell of atrocities. On
July 20 for example, Turkish troops
reportedly rounded up 150 Greeks
from the Examili area and executed a
dozen men as their families watched.
Then the Turks moved on to the vil-
lage of Fterika, where they killed eight

men, a woman and her two children.

The cables tell of homes and shops
being plundered, of women being
raped, of men being shot in cold blood.
On at least two occasions, according to
the cables, the Turks confiscated tons
of Red Cross supplies intended for
Cypriot civilians.

The Turkish aim, insiders believe, is
to establish themselves so strongly on
the island that they can't be dislodged,
thus forcing partition. This is also be-
lieved by some of our sources to be
Kissinger's goal. It would explain why
he has failed to condemn Turkey's mil-
itary moves.

In Athens, meanwhile, the new gov-
ernment of Constantine Karamanlis
is in grave danger from the crisis on
Cyprus. The democratic leaders have
been getting little more from the State
Department, however, than advice to
"restrain themselves."

Should Karamanlis fall, he likely
would be replaced by a new military
junta not entirely friendly to the
United States. If Karamanlis manages
to hold on, his government may be so
weakened by the Cyprus crisis that it
could be defeated by left-wing candi-
dates when elections are held. The
new leftist government then might
even turn to Russia for support.

Either way, the United States loses.

© 1974, United Feature Syndicate

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WODWARD & LOTHROP

Ford Signals Brezhnev
Dialogue Will Continue

NY Times 8-11-74

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10—President Ford has sent a personal message to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, signaling that he intends to maintain the top-level dialogue begun by Richard M. Nixon in 1971, Administration officials said today.

Mr. Brezhnev, because he does not hold a top government post, would not routinely receive the kind of messages sent out in the last day to heads of state, reaffirming Mr. Ford's determination to continue the main lines of American foreign policy. Such a message was sent to the Soviet President, Nikolai V. Podgorny.

But because of the special relationship built up between Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev in the last three years, Secretary of State Kissinger advised

that a note be sent to Mr. Brezhnev as well. It was delivered by Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel Jr. in Moscow.

[In Moscow, the Soviet leadership gave its first detailed explanation of the fall of President Nixon to the Russian people in a special hour-long television program that portrayed Mr. Nixon as the victim of partisan politics, the economic situation in America and malicious propaganda by the "mass media." The program did not suggest that Mr. Nixon might have done anything wrong and left the meaning of the word "Watergate" unexplained. Page 43.]

In addition to the messages sent to all heads of state or

Continued on Page 43, Column 1

Ford Signals Brezhnev on Dialogue [L.C.]

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

government and to foreign
ministers, the Administration
continued to meet with envoys
in Washington to stress the
continuity theme.

Yesterday, Mr. Ford and Mr.
Kissinger met at the White
House with nearly 60 ambassa-
dors or chiefs of mission, ei-
ther in groups or individually.
Today, Mr. Kissinger held a
group meeting at the State De-
partment with the 30 black
African envoys and met sepa-
rately with ambassadors from
Pakistan, India and Iran.

Deputy Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll met indi-
vidually with envoys from
Spain, Rumania, Poland and
Yugoslavia and then held
three group sessions. In the
first meeting, he spoke with
representatives from Australia,
South Korea, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Nationalist China
and Thailand.

In the second meeting, he
met with envoys from Burma,
Fiji, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos,
Malaysia and Singapore. The
third group session was with
envoys from Bulgaria, Czech-
oslovakia and Hungary.

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, saw envoys from Cyprus and South Africa separately and held the group meetings—one with envoys from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, and the other with representatives of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland.

Africans Report Assurance

A spokesman for the black
African group, representing the
Organization of African Unity,
said Mr. Kissinger had told
them on Mr. Ford's behalf that
the United States hoped to
pay more attention to African
affairs and would continue to
supply disaster relief to the
draught-stricken sub-Saharan
region.

Of the more than 100 mes-
sages sent abroad by Mr. Ford,
only a few so far have been
mad public by the recipients.

In his message to Premier
Constantine Caramanlis of
Greece, the President took note
of the Cyprus crisis and urged
that all sides practice caution
and moderation.

"Your emergence on the
scene is a symbol of hope to
me and to all those who are

working for a serious resolu-
tion of that difficult problem,"
Mr. Ford told the Premier, not-
ing that he had watched "the
tragic crisis over Cyprus em-
broil two of our trusted allies
and endanger the stability of
the area."

"With peace within the grasp of the parties most intimately involved, I know you share with me the conviction that cool heads and moderate behavior are essential," the President said. "Be assured that we are committed to assist in any way."

Letter to Korean

A South Korean spokesman
said that the letter from Mr.
Ford to President Park Chung
Hee said that the United States
would "devotedly carry out all
the policies and plans it has
pursued in international rela-
tions."

A message on Mr. Ford's be-

A message on Mr. Ford's
behalf to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization in Brussels
said that NATO "has had his
unswerving support throughout
his public career as it has had
bipartisan support in the coun-
try. This will continue."

He also pledged that the
United States would continue
the closest consultations with
its allies.

Premier Kakuei Tanaka of
Japan also received a message
promising that the United States
would maintain its close ties
with Tokyo.

Hopes to Meet Waldheim

Mr. Ford, in a letter to Secre-
tary General Waldheim of the
United Nations said that he
was impressed by the United
Nations role in helping put into
effect the cease-fire and disen-
gagement of forces in the
Middle East and by its "impor-
tant contribution" to stability
in Cyprus.

"The United States supports the United Nations efforts in these and other fields," he said. "I look forward to seeing you and having a chance to discuss these matters personally."

To the Israelis, Mr. Ford
promised to meet all United
States commitments toward
Israel, especially for long-range
economic and military support.

In a letter to Premier Yitzhak
Rabin, the President also said
that the United States would
preserve in its mediation efforts
in the Middle East.

Podgorev Sends Message

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Aug. 10—The new

United States Administrations
and Soviet leaders assured each
other today that they would
continue to work for peace.

This morning, Ambassador Stoessel called on Andrei P. Kirilenko, a member of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee, to convey a message from President Ford to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the party leader.

Contents of the message
were not disclosed, but the
official press agency Tass de-
scribed the 20-minute meeting
as having been "businesslike
and constructive." Mr. Brezhnev
himself is on vacation at his
Black Sea resort.

Also today, the Soviet chief
of state, President Podgorny,
sent a congratulatory telegram
to President Ford. It said:

"Major changes in the direc-
tion improving Soviet-American
relations have been achieved as
a result of the mutual effort of
our countries.

"We note with dep satisfac-
tion your statement of Aug. 9
about your intention to work
for the good of peace. We ex-
press confidence that relations
between the U.S.S.R. and the
United States will receive a
further constructive develop-
ment in the coming years for
the benefit of our peoples, in
the interests of strengthening
universal peace and interna-
tional security."

Ford Assures Pakistan

Special to The New York Times

KARACHI, Pakistan, Aug. 10
—President Ford has assured
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto of his firm dedication
to the United States policies of
strengthening world peace and
preserving the traditionally
close relations with Pakistan,
the Pakistan radio said today.

"We have admired the
strong contribution that your
people and Government have
made in building a new struc-
ture of peace in South Asia,"
President Ford was quoted as
having said.

Mr. Bhutto today paid rich
tribute to Mr. Nixon, saying
in a message to him that the
people of Pakistan would al-
ways be grateful for his stand
in support of Pakistan's
national independence and ter-
ritorial integrity at the gravest
moment of her history, the war
that ended with the indepen-
dence of Bangladesh, Pakis-
tan's former eastern wing.

Foreign Prospect

NY Times Etc.
8-11-74

It may take some time for incredulous foreign govern-
ments to be really convinced; but the United States
under President Ford is well situated to be a more
stable, reliable and forthcoming partner in the world
polity than it has been throughout the lingering twilight
of the Nixon Administration.

Instead of limping through the coming two years or
so with a discredited and insecure President, the United
States Government can now revert to the stability of
leadership which the world has come to rely upon for
decades past. Suspicions of foreign policy moves con-
ducted mainly for maximum domestic impact can be
laid to rest; honest debate over the substance of policy
need no longer appear as a challenge to the very tenure
in office of a troubled leader.

Mr. Nixon was a well-known personage in world chan-
celleries—more admired abroad, perhaps, than ever at
home. Mr. Ford is an unknown quantity, a liability he
has quickly started to overcome. The speed with which
he confirmed Secretary of State Kissinger in office gave
important assurance of continuity.

Continuity of policy does not, however, solve all the
problems. Most immediately, the Ford Administration
faces the danger of open warfare between Greece and
Turkey, two allies in NATO.

We can only hope that it was from Washington
preoccupations, and not sincere policy determination,
that Mr. Kissinger's State Department has been so
inexcusably tolerant of Turkey's blatant expansionism
on the island of Cyprus, in defiance of cease-fires and
international efforts toward a settlement. A strong
stance against the wrecking tactics of the Turkish
General Staff would be a positive and promising signal
of President Ford's leadership.

Similarly in the Arab-Israeli dispute, a clear signal
of United States military support for Israel against the
growing Soviet-stocked arsenals of Syria would be
entirely consistent with the diplomatic efforts toward
a balanced settlement that Secretary Kissinger will
surely continue. American interests in closer links with
the Arab world and in a secure Israel transcend the
personality of the man occupying the White House.

The longer-term foreign policy issues on which the
Nixon Administration made such commendable prog-
ress, relations with China and the Soviet Union, seem
to be in a holding pattern—and not entirely because of
the convulsion in Washington. The Chinese leadership
is apparently going through its own period of uncer-
tainty, and the leaders of the Soviet Union have yet to
be sufficiently forthcoming with their side of détente,
particularly in the stalled negotiations on strategic arms
controls, to satisfy some of those most influential in Con-
gress whom President Ford can be expected to consult.

On the elusive problems of the world economy, the
adequacy of energy and food resources, the United
States is better placed now than for many months past
to embark on constructive long-term initiatives in NATO,
the United Nations and other international bodies.

# DIETITIAN

ECF complex (over 900 beds) located in Manhattan seeking a full time ADA. ECF or hospital experience required. We offer an excellent salary and benefits. Please send resume in strictest confidence to:

Y7828 TIMES

We Are An Equal Opportunity Employer

## MEDICAL TECHNOLOGISTS ASCP

CHEMISTRY-Highly automated, well equipped laboratory. Must have working knowledge of auto-analyzers, spectrophotometers, gas chromatography and flame photometer. Also opportunities for experienced HEMATOLOGY and IMMUNOLOGY TECHNO-LOGISTS.

Excellent working facilities and benefits. 500-bed teaching medical center. New Jersey shore residential community. CALL or WRITE:

PERSONNEL DIRECTOR

MONMOUTH MEDICAL CENTER

Long Branch, New Jersey 07740
(201) 222-5200, Ext. 491

## ASSISTANT INSTRUCTOR

M.S. I.C.U.

An immediate opening exists in our 11 bed medical surgical intensive care unit for an experienced instructor. BS degree + experience in ICU nursing required as assistant instructor you will be responsible for teaching clinical as well as theoretical aspects of ICU nursing. Complete benefit package includes liberal salary, free medical benefits for you and your family, and 4 weeks paid vacation.

Contact Mrs. Wisham

212-920-4501

MONTEFIORE HOSPITAL

& MEDICAL CENTER

An Equal Opportunity Employer

## COLLEGE NURSE

Rapidly growing community college seeking a college nurse. BS plus 2 years' experience as a college or school nurse required. Respond in writing to:

Y 6600 TIMES

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER

CHIEF

PHYSICAL THERAPIST

Prestigious university-affiliated teaching hospital in New York City seeks a registered Physical Therapist with demonstrated leadership ability to assume responsibility for Physical Therapy in a rapidly expanding Department of Rehabilitation Medicine. This position requires extensive experience in rehabilitation and acute care. It offers an excellent salary and benefits package and a unique opportunity to play a key role in the development of a vital-service, self-resume, including salary history in confidence to:

Y 7748 TIMES

## DIRECTOR OF PURCHASING

Major voluntary teaching hospital in N.Y.C. seeks seasoned Purchasing Director, preferably with hospital or similar experience. Top-level salary, broad benefits and key management responsibility await the well-qualified candidate.

Y 7741 TIMES

## DIRECTOR OF PATIENT SERVICES

Large general hospital in Albany area. Familiarity with hospital patient support activities & philosophy essential. Must understand role of Chaplaincy, Social Services, Admitting, Food Services & Volunteers in the patient care milieu. Must be able to provide direction & integrate outside resources. Y 7496 TIMES.

### DIRECTOR - SPECIAL ED.

Nassau County mental health center seeks director to supervise, develop and expand programs for emotionally disturbed children. Master's or Doctorate with min 5 yrs exp in Special Ed., supervision and curriculum development required. Salary dependent on qualifications. Resume and salary requirements to Y7711 TIMES.

### CHEMISTRY, LEHIGH UNIVERSITY
APPT AT ASST PROFESSOR

level will be made during 1974-75. Person filling this position will be expected to develop an active (doctoral-level) research program (in an area other than synthetic or theoretical chemistry). Apply to Professor William E. Ohnesorge, Dept. of Chemistry, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, Pa. 18015. Minorities & women are encouraged to apply.

...

THE WASHINGTON POST, SUNDAY, AUGUST 11, 1974

Joseph Kraft

# The Larger Meaning of Mr. Nixon's Presidency

President Nixon has at last brought us together. The country is now united in relief at the resignation of the leader who betrayed every value and every friend in a desperate effort to save his own skin.

But the ignoble manner of Mr. Nixon's departure should not blind us to the larger meaning of his presidency. It was of a piece, from first to last, and in its virtues as in its defects.

When Mr. Nixon took office back in 1969, American pretension far outran American capabilities. American forces, especially in Vietnam, were supposed to hold the balance against any change deemed favorable to either Russia or China. The American market, opened to the world by a lopsided exchange rate and a one-way commitment to buy gold, supported prosperity in Japan and Western Europe, and such hope for development as resided in the Third World.

In this country it was widely believed that prosperity without recession had arrived, and that inflation could be held in check by the device of an income policy. It was equally supposed that government action could make decisive and rapid improvements in the welfare of minority groups long subject to government discrimination. It was said that unless government paid off its down-and-out claimants, society itself would be disrupted.

Mr. Nixon's great achievement was to bring expectations more in line with reality. He engaged the Chinese Com-

munists and brought them out of isolation. He then addressed himself to Moscow. By squeezing the Russians with the threat of a China deal, he was able to pull out of Vietnam on terms far more favorable than ever offered to previous regimes, or imagined by those of us who criticized his policy.

By the same means, he was able to start the most important barrier yet erected against the danger of nuclear war—the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty reached with Russia in 1972. Moreover, the loosening up of great power confrontation opened the way to the October war in the Mideast, and the settlement between Jews and Arabs which Dr. Kissinger is now putting together.

Finally, by unilaterally closing down the gold window in August 1971, Mr. Nixon set the stage for the dollar devaluations which have now evened out the terms of trade between this country and the rest of the world. The basis was thus laid for a new set of relations

between this country and the Europeans and Japanese.

Far less success attended Mr. Nixon's efforts at home. But during his term in office, everybody came to realize that inflation was an intractable problem. The danger that the battle against rising prices could tip into recession came dramatically home.

All of us learned that government programs do not suffice to amend the social ills of centuries—and that there was a tight limit available on what was available for such programs. It was equally shown that violent protests by minority groups could be met and mastered by a tough stance—far better than by “understanding.”

Had Mr. Nixon been able to articulate these achievements, had he been able to declare the virtue of sober realism and falling expectations, he might have come safely to the end of his term. But Mr. Nixon never saw himself as the leader of all the people. At all times he was in his own eyes the candidate of a minority. He played electoral politics, not presidential politics.

> "All of us learned that government programs do not suffice to amend the social ills of centuries."

He strained at greatness.

So instead of an adjustment in foreign policy, he announced what clearly did not exist—a structure of peace. Instead of admitting the country had lost its way in domestic policy, he proclaimed a new prosperity and a New American Revolution.

Instead of reconciling doubters, and drawing to his side old foes, he salted the wounds. He and his men battered the media. They short-circuited the bureaucracy. They insulted the Congress and sabotaged Democrats. Those of us who dared to criticize were stigmatized as “enemies.”

When trouble came in the form of Watergate, Mr. Nixon was without the human contacts which are the stuff of reality. Out of pride and syphophancy there was born a monstrous fraud. Contempt for others festered the belief that lies and tricks would work even as mounting evidence showed the truth would out. In the end, Mr. Nixon was alone, divorced from friends and reality in a psychic bunker of his own making.

His end was implicit in his beginning and his middle. At all stages, in its good parts and its bad, his presidency announces a single warning. It announces the danger of hubris. It proclaims anew the deathless message that those blinded by pride, and cut off from reality, rush headlong to their own doom.