Page 2

Jan. 28, 1975
Pres. Ford sends message to Congress seeking supplemental aid for both SVN and Cambodia. Message notes that NVN has refused to abide "by even the most fundamental provisions" of the Vietnam Agreement. US obliged to enable SVN and Cambodia to defend themselves by providing US aid.

Feb. 3, 1975
State Department official (Habib) outlines case for supplemental US aid for SVN and Cambodia. Habib elaborates on case of Cambodia on Feb. 24.

Feb. 25, 1975
HAK in press conference notes the 'immediate emergency' in Cambodia and need for US supplemental to be voted favorably promptly. Notes longer-term problem of SVN: "it was never suggested that Vietnam would be able to stand by itself without American assistance."

Feb. 26, 1975
Pres. Ford in press conference says that "As we look back at our participation in the Paris accords and the promises that were made, as long as they were willing to fight against aggression and invasion, that we had an obligation to help them with military equipment on a replacement basis." Foresees a 3-year timeframe with respect to helping SVN. Cambodia's situation is "extremely critical"; Cambodians will run out of ammunition in a relatively short period of time unless there is 'additional' US military aid.

Mar. 6, 1975
Pres. Ford opens press conference with statement appealing for emergency military and economic aid especially for, Cambodia and also SVN.

Mar. 13, 1975
State official (Ingersoll) urges Congress to swiftly pass supplementary military aid request for Cambodia and to approve lifting of ceiling on overall aid to Cambodia.

Mar. 26, 1975
In press conference, HAK says that "now that we have withdrawn our forces and have obtained the release of our prisoners, there was never any question that the US would continue to give economic and military aid to Vietnam....These agreements were negotiated on the assumption that...the US would continue economic and military aid to SVN and also that there would be some possibility of enforcing the agreements."

Ap. 3, 1975
Pres. Ford in press conference announcing emergency measures for SVN (in light of NVN onslaught) regrets that US "did not carry out" our promise to provide military aid to SVN on replacement basis, noting cuts made by Congress.

Ap. 5, 1975
HAK in press conference in Palm Springs briefs on current situation in SVN (Weyand is in US briefing President) and recounts history of NVN "flagrant" violations of Paris accord involving 18 NVN divisions in SVN at present time. Argues that there was never any debate at the time of

[11] Jan. 23

Public Papers of the Presidents

sorrow, do hereby direct that the flag of the United States be displayed at half-staff at the White House and on all buildings, grounds, and Naval vessels of the United States for a period of thirty days from the day of his death. I also direct that for the same length of time the representatives of the United States in foreign countries shall make similar arrangements for the display of the flag at half-staff over their Embassies, Legations, and other facilities abroad, including all military facilities and stations.

I hereby order that suitable honors be rendered by units of the Armed Forces under orders of the Secretary of Defense on the day of the funeral.

I do further appoint Thursday, January 25, 1973 to be a National Day of

Mourning throughout the United States. I recommend that the people assemble on that day in their respective places of worship, there to pay homage to the memory of President Johnson. I invite the people of the world who share our grief to join us in this solemn observance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereinunto set my hand this twenty-third day of January in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-seventh.

RICHARD NIXON

NOTE: On the same day, the President signed Executive Order 11700, providing for the closing of Government departments and agencies on Thursday, January 25, 1973, as a mark of respect for President Johnson.

## 12 Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. January 23, 1973

Good evening:

I have asked for this radio and television time tonight for the purpose of announcing that we today have concluded an agreement to end the war and bring peace with honor in Vietnam and in Southeast Asia.

The following statement is being issued at this moment in Washington and Hanoi:

At 12:30 Paris time today, January 23, 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was initialed by Dr. Henry Kissinger on behalf of the United States, and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

The agreement will be formally signed by the parties participating in the Paris

Conference on Vietnam on January 27, 1973, at the International Conference Center in Paris.

The cease-fire will take effect at 2400 Greenwich Mean Time, January 27, 1973. The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam express the hope that this agreement will insure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

That concludes the formal statement.

Throughout the years of negotiations, we have insisted on peace with honor. In my addresses to the Nation from this room of January 25 and May 8 [1972], I set forth the goals that we considered essential for peace with honor.

In the settlement that has now been

agreed to, all the conditions then have been met.

A cease-fire, international will begin at 7 p.m., the day after January 27, Washington time.

Within 60 days from the date on which Americans held prisoners in Indochina will be released, the government of those who are missing will be the fullest possible information of

During the same 60 days, American forces will be South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right of their own future, interference.

By joint agreement, the agreement and the program will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations, the government of the Republic of Vietnam has been in the closest contact with President Thieu and other leaders of the government of the Republic of Vietnam, and has been supporting the efforts of the government of South Vietnam to meet the goals of the agreement. The efforts of the government of South Vietnam have been well as that of our other friends.

The United States recognizes the Government of Vietnam as the sole government of South Vietnam.

We shall continue to support the efforts of South Vietnam to settle the issues of the conflict. We shall continue to support the efforts of the United States to settle the issues of the conflict.

We must recognize that there is only the first step toward a solution of the problem of Vietnam. All parties must work together to settle this peace that lasts, not only for the benefit of the people of South Vietnam, but for the benefit of the people of North Vietnam, and for the benefit of the people of the United States.

18

Richard Nixon, 1973

Jan. 23 [12]

agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met:

A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time.

Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam.

We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement, and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that healing—and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia but con-

tributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

First, to the people and Government of South Vietnam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future, and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future—friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so too will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly

19

[12] Jan. 23

our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Vietnam, it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why, during these past several weeks, I have not made any public statements about those efforts.

The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace—and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2½ million young Americans who served in Vietnam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Vietnam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met—the wives, the children, the families of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain, and so that where this generation knew war, the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact

that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American, who once occupied this office, died. In his life, President Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year's. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in asking—for those who died and for those who live—let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:01 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television. An advance text of the President's address was released on the same day.

Before delivering the address, the President met separately with members of the Cabinet and 6 members of the bipartisan leadership of the Congress.

On January 24, 1973, the President met with the expanded bipartisan leadership of the Congress to discuss the agreement. On the same day, the White House released the following related material: the texts of the agreement and protocols to the agreement; the transcript of a news briefing on the agreement by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and fact sheets on the basic elements of the agreement, the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. The texts of the agreement and protocols and Dr. Kissinger's news briefing are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 9, pp. 45-74).

20

## 13 Message to the Congress: Plan for the President's Immobilization of the Hands of the Opposing Forces

On January 5, program to start branch of the program to stave off President's immobilization of the hands of the enemy, this program prove the service they believe these forces gently necessary for cooperation of them with all of them during the coming days.

The first part of the program, newed drive to legislative proposals, pointed three Counsellors to the need of human resources and community Assistants to the President's responsibilities in fairs, economic and executive matters. The work of the newed drive was the White House.

The third part of the program, sharp reduction of Executive Office reorientation of original mission, policy formation and execution in broadened Executive Office no longer be encumbered with managing or which can be run

Text of the Agreement To Be Signed in Paris on
January 27, 1973. Released January 24, 1973

To be signed at the International
Conference Center, Paris,
Saturday morning, Paris time,
January 27, 1973:

AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND
RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on
Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peo-
ple's fundamental national rights and the South Viet-
namese people's right to self-determination, and to con-
tributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the
world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake
to respect and to implement them:

CHAPTER I

THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL
NATIONAL RIGHTS

Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity

¹For Dr. Kissinger's explanation of the signing of two versions of the agreement, see page 68 of this issue.

of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments on Vietnam.

CHAPTER II

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES—WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-
nam as of 2400 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its mili-
tary activities against the territory of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces,
wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the
territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will
remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in
the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of
North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this
Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and
to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

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46

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

- All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;

- All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21(b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

Volume 9—Number 4

47

Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Viet-
namese parties will:

- achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

- ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and assurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

CHAPTER V

THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step
by step through peaceful means on the basis of discuss
ions and agreements between North and South Viet-
nam, without coercion or annexation by either party,
and without foreign interference. The time for reunifi-
cation will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the De-
militarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military
Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Volume 9—Number 4

48

## CHAPTER VI

### THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

#### Article 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

- Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

- Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam;

- Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

- Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

- Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties;

- Article 8(b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(1) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

#### Article 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

- Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

- Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

- Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article;

- Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

- Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effects of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

#### Article 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

- Article 3(c) regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam;

- Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and

Volume 9—Number 4

49

supervision of the implementation of the following pro-
visions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the en-
forcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam,
when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has end-
ed its activities;

—Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the
two South Vietnamese parties;

—Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all par-
ties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military
Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduc-
tion of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions
of this Article;

—Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of
Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in
South Vietnam;

—Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic
general elections in South Vietnam;

—Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military
effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the
demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Super-
vision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks.
The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immedi-
ately on the location and operation of these teams. The
two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their opera-
tion.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Su-
 pervision shall be composed of representatives of four
countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The
chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the
members for specific periods to be determined by the
Commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Su-
pervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the
principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Su-
pervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of
consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Su-
pervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes
into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article
18(b) concerning the four parties, the International Com-
mission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities
when the Commission's tasks of control and supervision
regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards
the provisions in Article 18(c) concerning the two South
Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Con-
trol and Supervision shall end its activities on the request
of the government formed after the general elections in
South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the
organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the
International Commission of Control and Supervision.

The relationship between the International Commission
and the International Conference will be agreed upon by
the International Commission and the International
Conference.

Article 19

The parties agree on the convening of an International
Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agree-
ment to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee
the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Viet-
nam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental
national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right
to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee
peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the
Paris Conference on Vietnam, will propose to the fol-
lowing parties that they participate in this International
Conference: the People's Republic of China, the Re-
public of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
the United Kingdom, the four countries of the Interna-
tional Commission of Control and Supervision, and the
Secretary General of the United Nations, together with
the parties participating in the Paris Conference on
Vietnam.

CHAPTER VII

REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference
on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements
on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao
peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independ-
ence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these
countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of
Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on
Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of
Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the
sovereignty and security of one another and of other
countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military
activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from
and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries
troops, military advisers and military personnel, arma-
ments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall
be settled by the people of each of these countries without
foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese
countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on
the basis of respect for each other's independence, sov-
ereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in
each other's internal affairs.

Volume 9—Number 4

50

# CHAPTER VIII

## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

### Article 21

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

### Article 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

# CHAPTER IX

## OTHER PROVISIONS

### Article 23

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:

TRAN VAN LAM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE:

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM:

NGUYEN DUY TRINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

FOR THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH VIETNAM:

NGUYEN THI BINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Volume 9→

[97] Mar. 28

and women in the frontlines of the war against crime—our law enforcement officers. Public opinion is untying their hands, and they are once again being given the public support they deserve in their efforts to insure that we match public support with all the financial, legislative, and judicial support our police need.

We can turn the tide of crime in Amer-

ica. These statistics demonstrate that we are well on our way. Now we must have the tools we need to finish the job. I call upon the Congress to act quickly on this Administration's proposals for law enforcement legislation so that we can advance the work of providing the safe and secure country our citizens want and deserve so much.

## 98 Address to the Nation About Vietnam and Domestic Problems. March 29, 1973

Good evening:

Four years and two months ago, when I first came into this office as President, by far the most difficult problem confronting the Nation was the seemingly endless war in Vietnam. Five hundred and fifty thousand Americans were in Vietnam. As many as 300 a week were being killed in action. Hundreds were held as prisoners of war in North Vietnam. No progress was being made at the peace negotiations.

I immediately initiated a program to end the war and win an honorable peace.

Eleven times over the past 4 years I have reported to the Nation from this room on the progress we have made toward that goal. Tonight, the day we have all worked and prayed for has finally come.

For the first time in 12 years, no American military forces are in Vietnam. All of our American POW's are on their way home. The 17 million people of South Vietnam have the right to choose their own government without outside interference, and because of our program of Vietnamization, they have the strength to defend that right. We have prevented the imposition of a Communist government by force on South Vietnam.

There are still some problem areas. The provisions of the agreement requiring an accounting for all missing in action in Indochina, the provisions with regard to Laos and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam have not been complied with. We have and will continue to comply with the agreement. We shall insist that North Vietnam comply with the agreement. And the leaders of North Vietnam should have no doubt as to the consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement.

But despite these difficulties, we can be proud tonight of the fact that we have achieved our goal of obtaining an agreement which provides peace with honor in Vietnam.

On this day, let us honor those who made this achievement possible: those who sacrificed their lives, those who were disabled, those who made every one of us proud to be an American as they returned from years of Communist imprisonment, and every one of the 2½ million Americans who served honorably in our Nation's longest war. Never have men served with greater devotion abroad with less apparent support at home.

234

Let us provide veterans benefits they have with the respect again tonight, who served the amnesty to those

Tonight I want to state to the Nation, make this day a great majority me tonight, who dented barrage but vocal min with honor. I call you to do so.

We have been times together. vember 1969 was of demonstrator House, the time found it necessary to be a Communist ban in May 1972 in of Haiphong targets in North a massive Con Vietnam, and the hardest dec in the hopes for peace the North Viet the conference to order more gets in North the deadlock.

On each of these of opposition were so loud that the majority, overwhelming those who adv even if the price and humiliation

Richard Nixon, 1973

Mar. 29 [98]

Let us provide these men with the veterans benefits and the job opportunities they have earned. Let us honor them with the respect they deserve. And I say again tonight, let us not dishonor those who served their country by granting amnesty to those who deserted America.

Tonight I want to express the appreciation of the Nation to others who helped make this day possible. I refer to you, the great majority of Americans listening to me tonight, who, despite an unprecedented barrage of criticism from a small but vocal minority, stood firm for peace with honor. I know it was not easy for you to do so.

We have been through some difficult times together. I recall the time in November 1969 when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators marched on the White House, the time in April 1970 when I found it necessary to order attacks on Communist bases in Cambodia, the time in May 1972 when I ordered the mining of Haiphong and airstrikes on military targets in North Vietnam in order to stop a massive Communist offensive in South Vietnam, and then—and this was perhaps the hardest decision I have made as President—on December 18, 1972, when our hopes for peace were so high and when the North Vietnamese stonewalled us at the conference table, I found it necessary to order more airstrikes on military targets in North Vietnam in order to break the deadlock.

On each of these occasions, the voices of opposition we heard in Washington were so loud they at times seemed to be the majority. But across America, the overwhelming majority stood firm against those who advocated peace at any price—even if the price would have been defeat and humiliation for the United States.

Because you stood firm—stood firm for doing what was right—[Air Force Lt.] Colonel [George G.] McKnight was able to say for his fellow POW's, when he returned home a few days ago, “Thank you for bringing us home on our feet instead of on our knees.”

Let us turn now to some of our problems at home. Tonight I ask your support in another battle. But we can be thankful this is not a battle in war abroad, but a battle we must win if we are to build a new prosperity without war and without inflation at home.

What I refer to is the battle of the budget—not just the battle over the Federal budget, but even more important, the battle of your budget, the family budget of every home in America.

One of the most terrible costs of war is inflation. The cost of living has skyrocketed during and after every war America has been engaged in. We recognized this danger 4 years ago. We have taken strong action to deal with it. As a result of our policies, we have cut the rate of inflation in half from the high point it reached in 1969 and 1970. And today, our rate of inflation in the United States is the lowest of that of any industrial nation in the world.

But these positive statistics are small comfort to a family trying to make both ends meet. And they are no comfort at all to the housewife who sees meat prices soaring every time she goes to the market. The major weak spot in our fight against inflation is in the area of meat prices. I have taken action to increase imports from abroad and production at home. This will increase the supply of meat, and it will help bring prices down later this year.

But what we need is action that will

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stop the rise in meat prices now. And that is why I have today ordered the Cost of Living Council to impose a ceiling on prices of beef, pork, and lamb.¹ The ceiling will remain in effect as long as it is necessary to do the job.

Meat prices must not go higher. And with the help of the housewife and the farmer they can and they should go down.

This ceiling will help in our battle against inflation. But it is not a permanent solution. We must act on all fronts, and here is where the Federal budget comes in.

I have submitted to Congress for the next fiscal year the largest budget in our history—$268 billion.

The amount I have requested in this budget for domestic programs in such fields as health, housing, education, aid to the elderly, the handicapped, the poor, is twice as big as the amount I asked for for these items 4 years ago. However, some Members of Congress believe the budget in these areas should be even higher.

Now, if I were to approve the increases in my budget that have been proposed in the Congress, it would mean a 15 percent increase in your taxes, or an increase in prices for every American. And that is why I shall veto the bills which would

break the Federal budget which I have submitted. If I do not veto these bills, increased prices or taxes would break the family budget of millions of Americans—including, possibly, your own.

This is not a battle between Congress and the President. It is your battle. It is your money, your prices, your taxes I am trying to save.

Twenty-five years ago, as a freshman Congressman, I first came into this office. I met Harry Truman, who was then President of the United States. I remember he had a sign on the desk. It read, "The buck stops here." Now that meant, of course, that a President can't pass the buck to anyone else when a tough decision has to be made. It also means that your buck stops here. If I do not act to stop the spending increases which Congress sends to this desk, you will have to pay the bill.

Now I admit there is an honest difference of opinion on the matter of the Federal budget. If you are willing to pay the higher taxes or prices that will result if we increase Federal spending over my budget, as some in Congress have proposed, you should ask your Senators and your Congressmen to override my vetoes, but if you want to stop the rise in taxes and prices, I have a suggestion to make. I remember when I was a Congressman and a Senator, I always seemed to hear from those who wanted government to spend more; I seldom heard from the people who have to pay the bill—the taxpayer. And if your Congressman or Senator has the courage to vote against more government spending, so that you won't have to pay higher prices or taxes, let him know that you support him.

Winning the battle to hold down the Federal budget is essential if we are to

achieve our goal of prosperity without inflation. I ask you to port in helping to important battle.

Let me turn, finally, to great challenge we face.

As we end America resolve that we shall During the past year progress toward our of peace for America in Vietnam has 20 years of hostility have opened a conship with the People where one-fourth of the world live. We need the Soviet Union and agreements, including which takes a major clear arms.

Now there are strong views of all this people why not cut our debt?

Well, let's look at the finance budget today. Percentage of our gross that it has in 20 years I would like better duce it further. But that we would not toward lasting peace in this past year in our military strength the

This year we have tions with the Soviet limitations on nuclear be participating lat tiations for mutual peace. Europe.

If prior to these United States will

¹ A statement on the implementation of meat price controls and other anti-inflation measures by George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the Cost of Living Council, was released by the White House on March 29, 1973. The statement is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 9, p. 316).

On the same day, the White House released a fact sheet on the history of the economic stabilization program and the transcript of a news briefing on meat price controls by Secretary Shultz and Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz.

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Mar. 29 [98]

achieve our goal of a new prosperity—prosperity without war and without inflation. I ask you tonight for your support in helping to win this vitally important battle.

Let me turn, finally, tonight to another great challenge we face.

As we end America's longest war, let us resolve that we shall not lose the peace. During the past year we have made great progress toward our goal of a generation of peace for America and the world. The war in Vietnam has been ended. After 20 years of hostility and confrontation, we have opened a constructive new relationship with the People's Republic of China where one-fourth of all the people in the world live. We negotiated last year with the Soviet Union a number of important agreements, including an agreement which takes a major step in limiting nuclear arms.

Now there are some who say that in view of all this progress toward peace, why not cut our defense budget?

Well, let's look at the facts. Our defense budget today takes the lowest percentage of our gross national product that it is in 20 years. There is nothing I would like better than to be able to reduce it further. But we must never forget that we would not have made the progress toward lasting peace that we have made in this past year unless we had had the military strength that commanded respect.

This year we have begun new negotiations with the Soviet Union for further limitations on nuclear arms. And we shall be participating later in the year in negotiations for mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

If prior to these negotiations we in the United States unilaterally reduce our defense

budget, or reduce our forces in Europe, any chance for successful negotiations for mutual reduction of forces or limitation of arms will be destroyed.

There is one unbreakable rule of international diplomacy. You can't get something in a negotiation unless you have something to give. If we cut our defenses before negotiations begin, any incentive for other nations to cut theirs will go right out the window.

If the United States reduces its defenses and others do not, it will increase the danger of war. It is only a mutual reduction of forces which will reduce the danger of war. And that is why we must maintain our strength until we get agreements under which other nations will join us in reducing the burden of armaments.

What is at stake is whether the United States shall become the second strongest nation in the world. If that day ever comes, the chance for building a new structure of peace in the world would be irreparably damaged, and free nations everywhere would be living in mortal danger.

A strong United States is not a threat to peace. It is the free world's indispensable guardian of peace and freedom.

I ask for your support tonight, for keeping the strength—the strength which enabled us to make such great progress toward world peace in the past year and which is indispensable as we continue our bold new initiatives for peace in the years ahead.

As we consider some of our problems tonight, let us never forget how fortunate we are to live in America at this time in our history. We have ended the longest and most difficult war in our history in a way that maintains the trust of our allies

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and the respect of our adversaries. We are the strongest and most prosperous nation in the world. Because of our strength, America has the magnificent opportunity to play the leading role of bringing down the walls of hostility which divide the people of the world, in reducing the burden of armaments in the world, of building a structure of lasting peace in the world. And because of our wealth, we have the means to move forward at home on exciting new programs—programs for progress which will provide better environment, education, housing, and health care for all Americans and which will enable us to be more generous to the poor, the elderly, the disabled, and the disadvantaged than any nation in the history of the world.

These are goals worthy of a great people. Let us, therefore, put aside those honest differences about war which have divided us and dedicate ourselves to meet the great challenges of peace which can unite us. As we do, let us not overlook a third element, an element more important even than military might or economic power, because it is essential for greatness in a nation.

The pages of history are strewn with the wreckage of nations which fell by the wayside at the height of their strength and wealth because their people became weak, soft, and self-indulgent and lost the character and the spirit which had led to their greatness.

As I speak to you tonight, I am confident that will not happen to America. And my confidence has been increased by the fact that a war which cost America so much in lives and money and division at home has, as it ended, provided an opportunity for millions of Americans to see again the character and the spirit which

made America a great nation.

A few days ago in this room, I talked to a man who had spent almost 8 years in a Communist prison camp in North Vietnam.² For over 4 years he was in solitary confinement. In that 4-year period he never saw and never talked to another human being except his Communist captors. He lived on two meals a day, usually just a piece of bread, a bowl of soup. All he was given to read was Communist propaganda. All he could listen to was the Communist propaganda on radio.

I asked him how he was able to survive it and come home, standing tall and proud, saluting the American flag. He paused a long time before he answered. And then he said, "It is difficult for me to answer. I am not very good at words. All I can say is that it was faith—faith in God and faith in my country."

If men who suffered so much for America can have such faith, let us who have received so much from America renew our faith—our faith in God, our faith in our country, and our faith in ourselves.

If we meet the great challenges of peace that lie ahead with this kind of faith, then one day it will be written: This was America's finest hour.

Thank you and good evening.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:01 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television.

On the same day, the White House released an advance text of the President's address.

² The President was referring to Col. Robinson Risner, USAF, with whom he met on March 12, 1973. On the same day, the President also met with former prisoner of war Capt. Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr., USN.

238

99 Letters of Recollection

I HEREBY authorize the port barrier.

The projectize the Project temporarily, and value or quote or import whenever supplies of marketable prices

100 R.N.

Ladies and

I am in to greet you at the points that the things experts here are coming to give us the future Media of the United States.

I am not let me see.

First, I this moment State legislation to take Iowa and a few invitations during this

31-870 C

Richard Nixon, 1973

Apr. 3 [106]

you on the conclusion of this meeting with
President Nixon. As you know already, the two
main purposes of my visit here are to thank in
person the American people for the generous
and disinterested assistance given to us during
the past difficult years, and secondly, to have
an opportunity to discuss with President Nixon
about what needs to be done in view of con-
solidating the peace in Vietnam and in South-
east Asia.

As I said earlier in my arrival statement, my
visit here marks at the same time an end and
a beginning—an end to a very difficult period
of time during which our two countries have
endeavored to preserve freedom for the Viet-
namese people, and a beginning in the sense
that the newly achieved peace in Vietnam will

be the starting point of what President Nixon
calls a generation of peace for the whole world.

I had during these 2 days very thorough and
cordial conversations with President Nixon,
which I am sure will help lay the foundation of
lasting peace in our part of the world and of a
fruitful cooperation between the American and
Vietnamese people in the postwar period.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

I look forward to seeing you again, President
Nixon.

On the evening of April 2, 1973, the Presi-
dent and Mrs. Nixon hosted a dinner at their
residence for President and Mrs. Thieu. Presi-
dent Thieu hosted a luncheon at the residence
on April 3.

106 Joint Statement Following Discussions With
President Thieu of the Republic of Vietnam.

April 3, 1973

THE PRESIDENT of the United States, Richard M. Nixon, and the President of the Republic of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Thieu, met for two days of discussions in San Clemente at the outset of President Thieu's official visit to the United States. Taking part in these discussions on the United States side were the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the Ambassador of the United States to the Republic of Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker; the Ambassador-designate of the United States to the Republic of Vietnam, Graham Martin; and other officials. On the side of the Republic of Vietnam the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tran Van Lam; the Minister of Economy, Pham Kim Ngoc; the Minister of Finance, Ha Xuan Trung; the Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs, Nguyen Phu Duc; the Vietnamese Ambassador to the United

States, Tran Kim Phuong, and other offi-
cials also participated in the discussions.

The discussions were held in a very cordial atmosphere appropriate to the enduring relationship of friendship which exists between the governments of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. The two Presidents discussed the course of U.S.-Vietnamese relations since their meeting at Midway Island on June 8, 1969 and the postwar relationship between the two countries. They reached full consensus in their views.

President Nixon and President Thieu reviewed the progress that has been made in economic, political and defense affairs in Vietnam since the Midway meeting. President Nixon expressed gratification with the proficiency of South Vietnam's armed forces and noted their effective and courageous performance in halting the invasion launched by North Vietnam on March 30, 1972. The President also

251

[106] Apr. 3

expressed satisfaction with the develop-
ment of political institutions and noted
the political stability that has prevailed in
South Vietnam in recent years. President
Thieu reaffirmed his determination to as-
sure social and political justice for the
people of South Vietnam.

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction at the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, as well as the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam which endorsed this Agreement. They asserted the determination of their two governments to implement the provisions of the Agreement scrupulously. They also affirmed their strong expectation that the other parties signatory to the Agreement would do the same in order to establish a lasting peace in Vietnam. The two Presidents expressed their appreciation to the other members of the international community who helped in achieving the Agreement and particularly to the four member governments of the International Commission of Control and Supervision whose representatives are observing its implementation. They consider that the International Commission, acting in cooperation with the Four Parties to the Agreement, is an essential element in the structure of restoring peace to Vietnam and expressed their determination to further encourage the most effective and objective possible supervision of the Agreement.

President Nixon informed President
Thieu of his great interest in the meetings
between representatives of the two South
Vietnamese parties which are currently
taking place in France in an effort to
achieve an internal political settlement
in South Vietnam. President Thieu said
that his government is resolved at these

meetings to achieve a settlement which
will fully insure the right of self-determi-
nation by the South Vietnamese people
in accordance with the Agreement on
Ending the War. President Thieu ex-
pressed his earnest desire for a reconcilia-
tion among the South Vietnamese par-
ties which will fulfill the hopes of the
South Vietnamese people for peace, in-
dependence, and democracy.

Both Presidents, while acknowledging
that progress was being made toward
military and political settlements in South
Vietnam, nevertheless viewed with great
concern infiltrations of men and weapons
in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam
into South Vietnam in violation of the
Agreement on Ending the War, and con-
sidered that actions which would
threaten the basis of the Agreement would
call for appropriately vigorous reactions.
They expressed their conviction that all
the provisions of the Agreement, includ-
ing in particular those concerning mili-
tary forces and military supplies, must be
faithfully implemented if the cease-fire
is to be preserved and the prospects for
a peaceful settlement are to be assured.
President Nixon stated in this connection
that the United States views violations of
any provision of the Agreement with great
and continuing concern.

Both Presidents also agreed that there
could be lasting peace in Vietnam only
if there is peace in the neighboring coun-
tries. Accordingly they expressed their
earnest interest in the achievement of a
satisfactory implementation of the cease-
fire agreement reached in Laos on Feb-
ruary 21. They expressed their grave
concern at the fact that Article 20 of the
Agreement which calls for the uncondi-
tional withdrawal of all foreign forces
from Laos and Cambodia has not been

carried out.
the state should be

In assessing
throughout I
stressed the na-
of the govern-
states against
Communist
parture of U
from South
fact that this
continued pe-
tary strength
tions menace
gressive threat
resources, the
require exten-
necessary so-
for peaceful c

In this co-
firmed the
came to be
nese people
forge ahead
adequate and
reconstructin-
nomic infras-
strong and v
Vietnamese
shoulder a ge-
tenance of p-
economic pre-
Presidents ag-
the stated e-
possible, the
need greater
in the initial
President N-
hearted supp-
war rehabilit-
velopment of
He informe-
ted States in
and substan-
tially the Republi

252

Richard Nixon, 1973

Apr. 3 [106]

carried out. They agreed that this Article should be quickly implemented.

In assessing the prospects for peace throughout Indochina the two Presidents stressed the need for vigilance on the part of the governments in the Indochinese states against the possibility of renewed Communist aggression after the departure of United States ground forces from South Vietnam. They stressed the fact that this vigilance will require the continued political, economic, and military strength of the governments and nations menaced by any renewal of this aggressive threat. Because of their limited resources, the nations of the region will require external assistance to preserve the necessary social and economic stability for peaceful development.

In this context, President Thieu affirmed the determination of the Vietnamese people and the Government to forge ahead with the task of providing adequate and timely relief to war victims, reconstructing damaged social and economic infrastructures, and building a strong and viable economy, so that the Vietnamese nation can gradually shed a greater burden in the maintenance of peace and the achievement of economic progress for its people. The two Presidents agreed that in order to attain the stated economic goals as quickly as possible, the Republic of Vietnam will need greater external economic assistance in the initial years of the post war era. President Nixon reaffirmed his wholehearted support for the endeavors of post war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the Republic of Vietnam. He informed President Thieu of the United States intention to provide adequate and substantial economic assistance for the Republic of Vietnam during the re-

mainder of this year and to seek Congressional authority for a level of funding for the next year sufficient to assure essential economic stability and rehabilitation for that country as it now moves from war to peace. He recognized that the economic development and self-sufficiency of South Vietnam depend to a significant extent on its ability to promote and attract foreign investment. He also expressed his intention to seek Congressional support for a longer range program for the economic development of South Vietnam now that the war has ended.

The two Presidents expressed their earnest hope that other nations as well as international institutions will act promptly on a positive and concerted program of international assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. They also agreed that consultations should soon be held in this regard with all interested parties.

The two Presidents expressed hope that the implementation of the Agreement on Vietnam would permit a normalization of relations with all countries of Southeast Asia. They agreed that this step and a regional reconstruction program will increase the prospects of a lasting peace in the area.

President Nixon discussed the future security of South Vietnam in the context of the Nixon Doctrine. The President noted that the assumption by the Republic of Vietnam of the full manpower requirements for its own defense was fully in keeping with his doctrine. He affirmed that the United States for its part, expected to continue, in accordance with its Constitutional processes, to supply the Republic of Vietnam with the material means for its defense consistent with the Agreement on Ending the War.

President Thieu asked President Nixon

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[106] Apr. 3

to convey to the American people and particularly to families bereaved by the loss of loved ones, the deep and abiding appreciation of the people of South Vietnam for the sacrifices made on their behalf and the assistance given to the Republic of Vietnam in its long struggle to maintain its freedom and preserve its right of self-determination.

Prior to the departure of President Thieu for Washington to continue his official visit to the United States, both Presidents agreed that through the harsh experience of a tragic war and the sacri-

fices of their two peoples a close and constructive relationship between the American and the South Vietnamese people has been developed and strengthened. They affirmed their full confidence that this association would be preserved as the foundation of an honorable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

President Thieu expressed his gratitude for the warm hospitality extended to him and his party by President Nixon.

NOTE: The text of the joint statement was released at San Clemente, Calif.

## 107 Statement About Senate Action Sustaining the Vocational Rehabilitation Bill Veto. April 3, 1973

THE ACTION of the Senate in voting to sustain my veto of the first budget-breaking spending bill of 1973 is a resounding victory for the American taxpayer.

If passed into law, the excessive and unwise Rehabilitation Act of 1972 which the Senate has now helped defeat would have opened the dikes to a flood of additional overspending bills. These bills could have exceeded our budgets by as much as $50 billion between now and 1975. America's consumers, wage earners, and taxpayers would be forced to foot the bill for that spending spree, in the form of a heavy tax increase or a new surge of inflation.

But now, because enough Senators had enough courage to stand up against the

big spenders in defense of the average American's pocketbook, the tide in this battle of the budget is running in the people's favor.

I hope that millions of Americans will express their thanks and their support to those Senators and Congressmen who are holding the line against runaway spending. There will be other tough decisions to make before this battle is won, and as we face each test, I look forward to continued cooperation with this outstanding group of responsible legislators who voted to sustain my veto.

NOTE: The statement was released at San Clemente, Calif.

## 108 Veto of the Rural Water and Sewer Grant Program Bill. April 5, 1973

To the House of Representatives:

I am returning today without my approval H.R. 3298, an act to restore the

rural water and sewer grant program which was terminated earlier this year.

My recent budget proposals to the

Congress reflect an effort to identify and reformulate. In each case, the question: would an increase in taxes

The rural water and sewer grant program was launched in 1968, and it has since been expanded to cover a much larger area. In 1973, the program was amended to include an additional way in which the United States can fund its rural water and sewer systems. This was done through a special bond measure that was approved by the Congress on January 1, 1973. The program was then mined for its full effect on the rural water and sewer systems in the United States.

Now the Congress program. This is the first time that the taxpayers of this country have been prepared to accept an amendment to the Constitution.

For many years, the rural water and sewer program has been a proud and proud symbol of Americanism. It is not a program that is merely local in scope, but it is a program that is truly national in scope. It is a program that is not limited to a few communities, but it is a program that reaches out to all American families, small and large, and it is a program that is designed to cut that traditional symbol of Americanism right at the root. It is a program that is not limited to a few communities, but it is a program that reaches out to all American families, small and large, and it is designed to cut that traditional symbol of Americanism right at the root.

Resurrection sewer program was passed by Congress in 1973, and it has since been cut that traditional symbol of Americanism. It is a program that is not limited to a few communities, but it is a program that reaches out to all American families, small and large, and it is designed to cut that traditional symbol of Americanism right at the root.

This program was passed by Congress in 1973, and it has since been cut that traditional symbol of Americanism. It is a program that is not limited to a few communities, but it is a program that reaches out to all American families, small and large, and it is designed to cut that traditional symbol of Americanism right at the root.

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Richard Nixon, 1973

May 16 [156]

else the Commission might consider desirable for a comprehensive reform of Federal elections and campaign practices.

It would be directed to make its final report to the Congress and the President no later than December 1, 1973. It would also be encouraged to make interim recommendations during the course of its work, in order to expedite their consideration by the Congress.

Because it bears an intimate and vital relationship to campaign reform, I recommend that the Commission also consider the question of whether the length of the terms of office of members of the Senate, of the House of Representatives or of the President should be changed.

If the Commission is to complete its work promptly, in order to allow the Congress time to consider and possibly to act on its recommendations prior to the 1974 Congressional campaigns, it is, of course, essential that the Commission begin its work soon and pursue it expeditiously. For my part, I shall do all that I can to facilitate this, and I urge the Congress to take swift and favorable action on this proposal.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
May 16, 1973.

NOTE: On the same day, the White House released the transcript of a news briefing on the message by Leonard Garment, Special Consultant and Acting Counsel to the President.

## 156 White House Statement About Congressional Role in Indochina Peace Efforts. May 16, 1973

AFTER MORE than 10 arduous years of sacrifice and effort in Indochina, an equitable framework for peace was finally agreed to in Paris last January. This could not possibly have been achieved without the active support of Congress, especially in the last difficult years.

The President is very concerned that having persevered to success these long years, the Congress has, on the very eve of negotiations to achieve compliance with that settlement, taken action that could severely undermine prospects for success.

It is the President's hope that as the legislative process unfolds, consideration of these matters will take place in the broader perspective of continuing nego-

tiations.

The President, in full compliance with his constitutional responsibilities, is determined to achieve a cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign forces from Cambodia in accordance with the Paris agreements, and to secure the lasting peace in Indochina for which so many people have sacrificed so much.

NOTE: Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler read the statement at his news conference at the White House on May 16, 1973.

On May 15, the Senate Appropriations Committee had approved an amendment to H.R. 7447, a supplemental appropriations bill, which would prohibit the use of any funds in the bill, or subsequently appropriated, to support U.S. combat activities in Cambodia or Laos.

537

[302] Oct. 17

opments open vast opportunities for long-
term mutual economic benefit and for the
advancement of world peace through the
reduction of political tensions. I again
urge the Congress, in considering my re-
quest for authority to grant normal tariff
treatment to these countries, to work with
me in framing an authority which pre-
serves these gains.

While we may justifiably be encouraged
by our achievements in trade and mone-
tary negotiations since 1971 and by the
reversal of the downward trend in our
merchandise trade balance, we must not
underestimate the magnitude and com-
plexity of the tasks ahead. The multilat-
eral trade negotiations which have just
been opened are a fundamental building
block in the foundation of a new world
politico-economic structure. The stakes
are thus high and the bargaining will be
intense.

To realize our objectives in the trade
field, I sent to the Congress last April
proposals for new legislation entitled the
Trade Reform Act of 1973. In my state-
ment of October 4, I expressed my views
on the bill which was approved by the
House Ways and Means Committee. As

legislative deliberation continues, I look
forward to working with the Congress on
this bill in a spirit of constructive part-
nership.

The profound changes which have
taken place in the world economy and the
impact of growing economic interde-
pendence on political relations among na-
tions is now clearly recognized. While
formidable problems exist in the trade
area and while countries still differ widely
on some of the important issues, the will
now exists to negotiate the necessary far-
reaching changes instead of resorting to
confrontation or retaliatory measures
which generate political frictions. We, like
other nations, will be hard bargainers, but
with a shared spirit of mutual commit-
ment to a more open and equitable trad-
ing system, the entire world can progress
toward a new era of economic well-being
and peaceful international relations.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
October 17, 1973.

NOTE: The 53-page report is entitled "Seventeenth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program—1972."

303 Special Message to the Congress Requesting
Emergency Security Assistance Funding for Israel
and Cambodia. October 19, 1973

To the Congress of the United States:

I am today requesting that the Congress
authorize emergency security assistance of
$2.2 billion for Israel and $200 million for
Cambodia. This request is necessary to
permit the United States to follow a re-
sponsible course of action in two areas
where stability is vital if we are to build
a global structure of peace.

For more than a quarter of a century,
as strategic interests of the major powers
have converged there, the Middle East
has been a flashpoint for potential world
conflict. Since war broke out again on
October 6, bringing tragedy to the people
of Israel and the Arab nations alike, the
United States has been actively engaged
in efforts to contribute to a settlement.

Our actions the
that we must do
necessary for r
military capabil-
ity in the area
mitting today
flexibility to
responsibilities.

To maintain
thus achieve st
Government is
tary material to
losses. This is
emergence of a
sulting from a
Syria and Egypt.

The costs of
lost equipment
Forces have be-
activity has be-
both sides hav-
first 12 days o
States has autho-
of material cos-
ing transportati-

Major items:
United States to
conventional m
air-to-air and a
lery, crew-serve-
and a standard
ordnance. Addi-
tional is providing re-
craft, radios, z-
ment which ha-

Thus far, Isr
the necessary e
of cash and c
the magnitude
coupled with t
activities has c
Israel's capaci
and credit pur-

884

Richard Nixon, 1973

Oct. 19 [303]

Our actions there have reflected my belief that we must take those steps which are necessary for maintaining a balance of military capabilities and achieving stability in the area. The request I am submitting today would give us the essential flexibility to continue meeting those responsibilities.

To maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability, the United States Government is currently providing military material to Israel to replace combat losses. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union.

The costs of replacing consumables and lost equipment for the Israeli Armed Forces have been extremely high. Combat activity has been intense, and losses on both sides have been large. During the first 12 days of the conflict, the United States has authorized shipments to Israel of material costing $825 million, including transportation.

Major items now being furnished by the United States to the Israeli forces include conventional munitions of many types, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, crew-served and individual weapons, and a standard range of fighter aircraft ordnance. Additionally, the United States is providing replacements for tanks, aircraft, radios, and other military equipment which have been lost in action.

Thus far, Israel has attempted to obtain the necessary equipment through the use of cash and credit purchases. However, the magnitude of the current conflict coupled with the scale of Soviet supply activities has created needs which exceed Israel's capacity to continue with cash and credit purchases. The alternative to

cash and credit sales of United States military materials is for us to provide Israel with grant military assistance as well.

The United States is making every effort to bring this conflict to a very swift and honorable conclusion, measured in days not weeks. But prudent planning also requires us to prepare for a longer struggle. I am therefore requesting that the Congress approve emergency assistance to Israel in the amount of $2.2 billion. If the conflict moderates, or as we fervently hope, is brought to an end very quickly, funds not absolutely required would of course not be expended.

I am also requesting $200 million emergency assistance for Cambodia. As in the case of Israel, additional funds are urgently needed for ammunition and consumable military supplies. The increased requirement results from the larger scale of hostilities and the higher levels of ordinance required by the Cambodian Army and Air Force to defend themselves without American air support.

The end of United States bombing on August 15 was followed by increased communist activity in Cambodia. In the ensuing fight, the Cambodian forces acquitted themselves well. They successfully defended the capital of Phnom Penh and the provincial center of Kampong Cham, as well as the principal supply routes. Although this more intense level of fighting has tapered off somewhat during the current rainy season, it is virtually certain to resume when the dry season begins about the end of the year.

During the period of heaviest fighting in August and September, ammunition costs for the Cambodian forces were running almost $1 million per day. We anticipate similar average costs for the re-

885

[303] Oct. 19

mainder of this fiscal year. These ammuni-
tion requirements, plus minimum equip-
ment replacement, will result in a total
funding requirement of $380 million for
the current fiscal year, rather than the
$180 million previously requested. To fail
to provide the $200 million for additional
ammunition would deny the Cambodian
Armed Forces the ability to defend them-
selves and their country.

We remain hopeful that the conflict in
Cambodia be resolved by a negotiated
settlement. A communist military victory
and the installation of a government in
Phnom Penh which is controlled by Hanoi

would gravely threaten the fragile struc-
ture of peace established in the Paris
agreements.

I am confident that the Congress and
the American people will support this re-
quest for emergency assistance for these
two beleaguered friends. To do less would
not only create a dangerous imbalance
in these particular arenas but would also
endanger the entire structure of peace in
the world.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
October 19, 1973.

304 Statement on Signing the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Amendments of 1973.

October 19, 1973

I AM pleased to sign today S. 795, a measure extending for 3 years the authorization for the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities.

Government has a vital role to play in
encouraging the arts and humanities in
our national life, and this Administration
has continually reaffirmed its commit-
ment to the fulfillment of that role
through the National Foundation.

The purpose of the Foundation is not
to alter the role of private patronage in
the arts and humanities, but rather to
supplement, stimulate, and extend that
role. The Federal Government should do
its part in supporting cultural activities—
and appropriations for the Foundation
have increased almost sixfold since I took
office—but this increased emphasis on
Federal assistance should be joined by
private as well as State and local efforts.

The highest expression of the quality of

a nation is found in the development of
its arts and refinement of its humanistic
concerns. For this development to reach
its full potential, it must be the expression
of a whole people, and it must be available
for the enjoyment of the whole people.
That was the lesson of Athens. That was
the rationale for the National Founda-
tion on the Arts and the Humanities.

As a result of the increased breadth of
artistic and humanistic endeavors made
possible through Federal assistance, the
benefit of these endeavors has been made
available to larger and larger numbers of
people throughout the country.

As we approach the Bicentennial anni-
versary, the National Foundation will
have an increasingly important role to
play in helping to represent to the Nation
and the world the richness and diversity of
our artistic and cultural heritage. The
passage of this bill, with the bipartisan

cooperation of the
utive branch, the
Nation's leaders
National Founda-

305 Statement
Information
October

FOR a number
a strain imposed
by the aftermath
quiries into and
that incident.
over the possible
frontation in the
especially dan-
grous area.

Our Govern-
ment remain strong in the
ers most, in this
ity to act—and
ables us to con-
lyzed and over-
the Watergate is
of a partisan p-
rently, there are
community whic
Watergate rela-
misread Ameri-
meeting the
abroad.

I have con-
to take deci-
sion any possibility
that will lay the
we can assure
and end the
to our resolve.

It is with
considered the
Appeals for the
am confident th
which are in ac

886

Richard Nixon, 1973

Oct. 24 [311]

## 311 Veto of the War Powers Resolution.

### October 24, 1973

*To the House of Representatives:*

I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution 542—the War Powers Resolution. While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the authority of the President are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.

The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a serious challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation between the foreign policy powers of the two branches.

The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing every contingency that might arise in this complex area. They acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding to changing circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy decisions must be made through close cooperation between the two branches and not through rigidly codified procedures.

These principles remain as valid today as they were when our Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution 542 would violate those principles by defining the President's powers in ways which would strictly limit his constitutional authority.

### CLEARLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL

House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, by a mere legislative act, authorities which the President has properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in approving legislation.

I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. The only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution—and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone is clearly without force.

### UNDERMINING OUR FOREIGN POLICY

While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint Resolution 542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this resolution. For it would seriously undermine this Nation's ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of international crisis. As a result, the confidence of our allies in our ability to assist them could be diminished and the respect of our adversaries for our deter-

893

["[311] Oct. 24", "Public Papers of the Presidents", "rent posture could decline. A permanent and substantial element of unpredictability would be injected into the world's assessment of American behavior, further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and war.", "If this resolution had been in operation, America's effective response to a variety of challenges in recent years would have been vastly complicated or even made impossible. We may well have been unable to respond in the way we did during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue operation in 1964, and the Jordanian crisis of 1970—to mention just a few examples. In addition, our recent actions to bring about a peaceful settlement of the hostilities in the Middle East would have been seriously impaired if this resolution had been in force.", "While all the specific consequences of House Joint Resolution 542 cannot yet be predicted, it is clear that it would undercut the ability of the United States to act as an effective influence for peace. For example, the provision automatically cutting off certain authorities after 60 days unless they are extended by the Congress could work to prolong or intensify a crisis. Until the Congress suspended the deadline, there would be at least a chance of United States withdrawal and an adversary would be tempted therefore to postpone serious negotiations until the 60 days were up. Only after the Congress acted would there be a strong incentive for an adversary to negotiate. In addition, the very existence of a deadline could lead to an escalation of hostilities in order to achieve certain objectives before the 60 days expired.", "The measure would jeopardize our role as a force for peace in other ways as well.", "It would, for example, strike from the President's hand a wide range of important peace-keeping tools by eliminating his ability to exercise quiet diplomacy backed by subtle shifts in our military deployments. It would also cast into doubt authorities which Presidents have used to undertake certain humanitarian relief missions in conflict areas, to protect fishing boats from seizure, to deal with ship or aircraft hijackings, and to respond to threats of attack. Not the least of the adverse consequences of this resolution would be the prohibition contained in section 8 against fulfilling our obligations under the NATO treaty as ratified by the Senate. Finally, since the bill is somewhat vague as to when the 60 day rule would apply, it could lead to extreme confusion and dangerous disagreements concerning the prerogatives of the two branches, seriously damaging our ability to respond to international crises.", "## FAILURE TO REQUIRE POSITIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION", "I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces would terminate automatically under this resolution 60 days after they were invoked. No overt Congressional action would be required to cut off these powers—they would disappear automatically unless the Congress extended them. In effect, the Congress is here attempting to increase its policy-making role through a provision which requires it to take absolutely no action at all.", "In my view, the proper way for the Congress to make known its will on such foreign policy questions is through a positive action.", "", "## STRENGTH OF THE CONGRESSION", "The strength of the executive branch of government, the ability of each branch to function, and the effectiveness of the three branches of government all depend, to a great extent, on the volition of the Congress. The policy of the Congress in this respect is largely the same as that of the executive branch. The Congress has the power to declare war, to pass taxes, to issue currency, and to make all other laws. It has the power to raise and maintain an army, and to provide for the organization and equipping of the army. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the疆 and the rights of the states, and to provide for the collection of taxes and the collection of customs. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the maintenance of public order, and the protection of the public against invasion. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass laws for the enforcement of the laws of the land, and the collection of revenues. It has the power to pass laws for the protection of the person and property of the citizens, and the punishment of crime. It has the power to pass laws for the prevention of disease, and the protection of health. It has the power to pass

Richard Nixon, 1973

Oct. 24 [311]

tive action, with full debate on the merits of the issue and with each member taking the responsibility of casting a yes or no vote after considering those merits. The authorization and appropriations process represents one of the ways in which such influence can be exercised. I do not, however, believe that the Congress can responsibly contribute its considered, collective judgment on such grave questions without full debate and without a yes or no vote. Yet this is precisely what the joint resolution would allow. It would give every future Congress the ability to hand-cuff every future President merely by doing nothing and sitting still. In my view, one cannot become a responsible partner unless one is prepared to take responsible action.

## STRENGTHENING COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCHES

The responsible and effective exercise of the war powers requires the fullest co-operation between the Congress and the Executive and the prudent fulfillment by each branch of its constitutional responsibilities. House Joint Resolution 542 includes certain constructive measures which would foster this process by enhancing the flow of information from the executive branch to the Congress. Section 3, for example, calls for consultations with the Congress before and during the involvement of the United States forces in hostilities abroad. This provision is consistent with the desire of this Administration for regularized consultations with the Congress in an even wider range of circumstances.

I believe that full and cooperative par-

ticipation in foreign policy matters by both the executive and the legislative branches could be enhanced by a careful and dispassionate study of their constitutional roles. Helpful proposals for such a study have already been made in the Congress. I would welcome the establishment of a non-partisan commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs. This commission could make a thorough review of the principal constitutional issues in Executive-Congressional relations, including the war powers, the international agreement powers, and the question of Executive privilege, and then submit its recommendations to the President and the Congress. The members of such a commission could be drawn from both parties—and could represent many perspectives including those of the Congress, the executive branch, the legal profession, and the academic community.

This Administration is dedicated to strengthening cooperation between the Congress and the President in the conduct of foreign affairs and to preserving the constitutional prerogatives of both branches of our Government. I know that the Congress shares that goal. A commission on the constitutional roles of the Congress and the President would provide a useful opportunity for both branches to work together toward that common objective.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House,
October 24, 1973.

NOTE: On November 7, 1973, the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to override the President's veto. As enacted, H. J. Res. 542 is Public Law 93-148 (87 Stat. 555), which became law without the President's signature on November 7.

51-870 C - 75 - 60

895

embargo might be mitigated, because we recognize that this is also a difficult problem for the Arab countries that have to make the decision.

Our basic philosophy was stated in the last press conference here, which is that we do not think it is helpful for us to negotiate, prior to a conference which will address these questions, a separate agreement relating oil to particular issues at the conference table. And I have stated our general philosophy earlier.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you detected any change in the Arab policy on oil?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we will have to let events speak for themselves. You all heard Minister Yamani [Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Wealth] when he appeared yesterday. And while we are in the process of engaging in these discussions, before my trip I don't think I want to speculate on that.

## War Powers Legislation

12/24/73

Conference

Q. Mr. Secretary, on another subject—we have seen a resurgence of military activity in Viet-Nam. Do you foresee any possible introduction of U.S. combat forces in Viet-Nam, either through use of the war powers legislation or through any other form of current or future legislation?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the war powers legislation, there has been speculation that the war powers legislation supersedes existing legislation. It is a question that was asked of me in executive session in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I promised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that we would make a legal study. Our Legal Adviser has concluded that the war powers legislation does not supersede any existing legislation, and we will notify the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to that effect in a formal letter.

Therefore any military action that would be contemplated would be taken only in accordance with the provisions of both the

joint resolution and existing legislation—in other words, would be fully discussed by the Congress.

Q. Does that mean, sir, that if there was a decision by the administration to reintroduce forces that it would seek new legislation or simply consult over the existing status. I don't quite follow you—because the existing legislation, I believe, does foreclose the reintroduction of any U.S. combat forces into Indochina.

Secretary Kissinger: Without congressional approval—that is correct. And that is what we would seek.

Q. Would that require new legislation, in your judgment?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it would require whatever form the Congress expresses its approval. But we do not foresee this as an imminent possibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with the confirmation of a new Vice President, there is increased congressional discussion about the possibility of impeachment of the President or of the President possibly resigning. How does this discussion of impeachment and resignation affect the conduct of foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have pointed out at two previous press conferences that the constant—to the degree that the authority of those who have the constitutional responsibility for conducting foreign policy is being drawn into question by whatever process, it complicates the task of foreign policy and it creates long-term dangers.

I might say one other thing—one thing to Mr. O'Leary [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington Star-News], which is that as Secretary of State, as I said in my confirmation hearing and as I have attempted to practice, I do recognize the importance of openness and of maximum disclosure.

Q. May I follow this up. You mentioned Sheikh Yamani. When he came out I think he said that once Israel had agreed to a timetable and begins to pull back, the restrictions on the oil shipments would be grad-

ually eased. It seems that the statement. How does Israel have back although only the shipments are

Secretary Kissinger: that the Minister expressed our view that he said "constructive means that we did each other's formu-

## Soviet Union in Middle East

Q. Two brief questions. Union has more or less ground of the Middle East.

## Secretary Kissinger

Q. Has more or less ground of the Middle East sort of helpful role conference between Arabs?

The second question, explanation of decision that you frequently hear and that indeed is making appointing officers. Is that thing to the senior

Secretary Kissinger: first question—as to press conferences, pose all participants in Middle East, has that by their existing position consider some of the Union has taken that in setting up the thing to define possible framework, the constructive role. Is that East cannot be carried on by the Union, the principal several of the parties close association with several of the countries Union attempted to

Department of State Bulletin

December 24, 1973

Cont'd

ect once the negotiations
will be both a highly secret
sort of public forum?

inger: Anyone who has to
three Vietnamese and five
ies in one year qualifies for
ical help after some period.
number of differences.

e were one of the principal
actions could directly con-
tions. In the Middle East,
ese. In Viet-Nam, the issues,
complex, were nevertheless
the Middle East, they affect
ions, and they have even
ities than they do in Viet-

I would assume that once
organizes itself, there will be
and less public negotiations.
ience is any indication, the
apt to be made in the less

Middle East

inger, yesterday we were told
question at the daily briefing
in the end, find mutually
option that the ultimate guar-
agreement might be a joint
peacekeeping force in the
and making the distinction

ssinger: He was running
op there that I didn't know

g the distinction that we are
a new arrangement after a
—not the UNEF or UNTSO
s Emergency Force; United
Supervision Organization]—
at in the end, a joint U.S.-
ce might occur to you to be
acceptable from your side?

ssinger: I don't want to un-
self-confidence of Mr. Vest
, Deputy Assistant Secretary
ions], but I haven't actually

read the text of that particular remark.

We are prepared to consider the question
of guarantees in its broadest sense, and we
are willing to examine any idea that any of
the parties might put forward as to what
would constitute adequate guarantees.

We believe, however, that the issue of
guarantees can be faced in detail only after
a settlement has been reached, and on secu-
rity arrangements between the parties; that
is to say, such issues as demilitarized zones,
joint inspection teams, and so forth, that
might constitute the body of the security
arrangements between the parties. Then we
will know what it is that outside countries
should guarantee.

Now the question of U.S. and Soviet guar-
antees, or anybody else's guarantee, has two
aspects: one, the formal guarantee; second,
the force that might be used to implement it.

We are prepared to consider—I said to
“consider,” not necessarily to agree—either
individual or joint guarantees.

As to the permanent stationing of U.S. and
Soviet forces in the Middle East, we are
somewhat dubious. We do not rule it out
totally, but we are reluctant to get into this,
and our position there was expressed at the
Security Council discussions that formed the
UNEF. But I think we can make a more
reasonable decision on the nature of guar-
antees after the other elements of the settle-
ment are in place.

Maintenance of Viet-Nam Settlement

12/24/73

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your earlier peace-
keeping effort, or peacemaking effort, in
Viet-Nam and Indochina, there appears to
be some question whether it will be able to
hold together under "nibbling" operations
and one thing and another. Would you give
us your assessment, please, of what might be
expected there?

Secretary Kissinger: In Indochina?

Q. In Indochina.

Secretary Kissinger: There is always
when one discusses Indochina or any other
settlement—one has to understand that no

973

761

settlement is self-enforcing. It is not possi-
ble to write an agreement whose terms in
themselves guarantee its permanence. Any
agreement will last if the hostility of the
parties is thereby lessened, if the parties
have an incentive to observe it and/or if the
parties pay a penalty for breaking it.

If those three conditions are not met, no
matter what the terms of the agreement
there is a tendency toward erosion. In Viet-
Nam, in civil war conditions, the hostility of
the parties does not significantly lessen. The
incentives and penalties have been affected
by many events of the past year, with which
you are familiar.

So at this moment a great deal depends on
the perception of the two sides of the exist-
ing military balance. And we have succeeded
with a settlement—not in guaranteeing nec-
essarily a permanent peace, but in moving
the decision to a Vietnamese decision, which
is what we always said our objective was.
And we believe that there is a possibility of
maintaining the peace within that frame-
work.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, following up the remark
that you just made, you spoke of "civil war"
conditions in Viet-Nam. Does this mean that
the United States now regards the hostilities
between North and South Viet-Nam as a
civil war?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The conditions
in Viet-Nam—the psychological conditions
are those of a civil war in the sense that they
are people of the same general nationality
fighting for the control of political power.

And the conflict between the Saigon gov-
ernment and the NLF [National Liberation
Front] is the civil war part of it. We of
course consider the infiltration of North
Vietnamese forces, in total violation of art-
ticle 7 of the agreement, an international
event and not a civil war action.

U.N. "Consensus" on Korea

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to turn to
the question concerning Korea.

Quite accidentally, in the wake of your
recent trip to Asia, a trip through Peking,

Tokyo, and Seoul, the United States
eral Assembly adopted what is called a
sensus statement last month.—In addi-
ting the discussion of Korea for general-
but at the same time assigning to the
resolving the Korean question to the Eun-
themselves alone.

Now, I would like to have your attention
to the U.N. decision. How does the
North and South Koreans then
Could resolve their own questions as
taking what the United Nations has
United Nations, is it still deeply concerned
the Korean question? For example, in
ing the United Nations Command
And my second question is, Did the
senior State Department officials
agreement, including William—Under-
tary William Porter and Ambassador
Scali, who almost successively said that
native to the present cease-fire agree-
what does the State Department think,
in referring to that alternative?

Secretary Kissinger: We have
and we continue to encourage the plan
to between North and South Korea that
leading at first, we hope, to mitigate
conditions of confrontation that exist in
the Korean Peninsula and perhaps ultimate
a political solution.

The consensus resolution did not say
United Nations out of concern with the
tion of Korea. It deferred a debate
and 'no doubt in subsequent years the
can be re-raised by either of the parties
feels that inadequate consideration has
given to their views.

We consider the consensus resolution
constructive step taken by both sides,
which a partial progress was made in
issues such as the UNCURK [United
ations Commission for the Unification
habilitation of Korea] issue and the
some other issues were left for further
cussion and later elaboration—and
larly those that concerned the two
parties themselves.

As my two associates pointed out, we
Department of State
November 24, 1973

762

Secretary Kissinger
Washington Dip

Secretariat by Secretary Kissinger

and gentle
that in the
of the State D
of State is sup
a party in Ne
ent Represent
ed visitors—
a war in the Mi
come me a litt
affair.

course I know
this—because
nature, the
way for me to
we have or

which I had great difficulty recollecting. [Laughter.]

Nevertheless I do not believe that the course on which we are embarked in Latin America has, up to now, been significantly affected by the Cuban question. We do place great stress on vitalizing the relationships among the nations in the Western Hemisphere. We think that the Mexico City Conference made a great contribution to this. We believe that the forthcoming meeting in Washington will, hopefully, continue this process.

Up to now, the Cuban issue has not been a significant factor in these discussions.

The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

## United States Cites Major Violations of Peace Accords by North Viet-Nam

Following is a note transmitted to U.S. missions on March 14 for delivery to non-Vietnamese participants in the International Conference on Viet-Nam and to members of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).¹

From release 100 dated March 15

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to [recipient of this note] and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973, and to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973.²

The Department is informed that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on March 1, 1974, sent to the participants of the International Conference on Viet-Nam and to the

members of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, a note marking the first anniversary of that Conference. In its note the DRV seeks to shift the blame for the lack of a true cease-fire in South Viet-Nam from its own aggressive policies to alleged truce violations by the United States and the Government of Viet-Nam. It is therefore necessary once again to point out the clear fact that it is Hanoi which is prolonging the misery of South Viet-Nam's people and that the decision to end this suffering can only be made in Hanoi.

The United States has implemented the Viet-Nam Peace Agreement in good faith. There are no U.S. military advisers, nor is there U.S. intervention in South Viet-Nam; our present activities there are in strict accord with the Agreement. Our assistance to the South Vietnamese has been open and in keeping with the provisions of the Agreement dealing with military resupply, in contrast to the clandestine activities of the other side. Our inability to carry out Article 21 regarding aid to North Viet-Nam follows from Hanoi's unwillingness to fulfill its cease-fire commitments.

With regard to the true nature of the continuing conflict in South Viet-Nam, it should be recalled that the DRV did not wait until the ink on the January 27 Peace Agreement was dry before undertaking major violations of that Agreement. On the first day of the cease-fire, North Vietnamese troops pressed heavy offenses to capture Government of Viet-Nam territory in wide-ranging parts of the country. Hanoi's cease-fire violations, resulting in tens of thousands of battlefield fatalities and the totally needless deaths of nearly three thousand innocent civilians, have continued from that day. Of the numerous cease-fire violations committed by Hanoi, the following are especially flagrant:

(a) The DRV has infiltrated into South Viet-Nam over 100,000 troops since January 27, 1973, through Laos and Cambodia and through the Demilitarized Zone, in contravention of Articles 7, 15 and 20.

(b) Hanoi has shipped vast quantities of military equipment, including SA-2 missiles,

¹Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

²For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 2, 1973, p. 169; for text of the Act of the International Conference, see BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 11.

April 8, 1974

on us by the modern weap- response in more or less out casualties to the Soviet in neither of

ical, and military forces exist they are to be the ability to eating manner

the retarget-

strategy is on the ability to do this, and separate issue, then raised ex-

how up on that time we have a change in the modification of the States. In not been some Cuban policy. The agreement is outpourings

ider this in a overall Latin trip to Mexico. There was a con- v. S. change in counterproducti- when we main- Cuba?

verse my recent impression that the national individual decide with the acquired inside some dramatic particu- lar issues.

of State Bull-

361

tanks and heavy artillery into the South, also
in violation of Article 7.

(c) In violation of Article 8(b), the DRV has refused to provide the United States with information on our missing in action.

(d) The DRV has shown its disdain for international peacekeeping efforts by firing at ICCS aircraft, kidnapping ICCS personnel and blocking deployment of ICCS teams to areas under its control. The DRV seeks further to undermine the ICCS by refusing to pay its and the Provisional Revolutionary Government's legitimate share of Commission expenses.

(e) The DRV has continued its campaign of terrorism directed against the South Vietnamese people. A recent example of these wanton acts was the shelling of an elementary school in Cai Lay on March 9 which brought death to 32 schoolchildren and injuries to 55 more.

The DRV has also followed its familiar course as chief spokesman for the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government by seeking to claim governmental status for that party. The PRG was not, however, as Hanoi has asserted, one of "12 governments" to sign the Act of the International Conference since it is not and has never been a government. Article 9 of that Act expressly stated that signature did not constitute recognition of any party in any case in which it was not previously accorded. As is well known, the PRG controls but a small minority of the population of South Viet-Nam and has none of the inherent attributes of a government, such as a capital, a body of laws or jurisprudence, or any governmental institutions apart from some visible units of authority established to advance its international aspirations. Through sheer propaganda and the trappings of diplomacy, Hanoi is attempting

to place on the PRG the mantle of legitimacy which the people of South Viet-Nam have so emphatically denied it.

The DRV continues to avow that its policy is to strictly respect and scrupulously implement the Paris Agreement. Unfortunately, it is evident that this Hanoi policy is being honored in the breach.

The Department hopes that [recipients of this note] will take the occasion of the anniversary of the International Conference on Viet-Nam to urge the DRV to begin to comply seriously with the provisions of the Peace Agreement. Only then can the hopes of the world for peace in Viet-Nam be realized.

## Diplomatic Immunities Extended to P.R.C. Liaison Office and Staff

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

EXTENDING DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES TO THE LIAISON OFFICE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN WASHINGTON, D.C., AND TO MEMBERS THEREOF.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the act of April 20, 1973 (87 Stat. 24; Public Law 93-22), and as President of the United States, I extend to the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China in Washington, D.C. and to its members who are duly notified to, and accepted by, the Secretary of State the same privileges and immunities, subject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as are enjoyed by the diplomatic missions accredited to the United States and by members of the staffs thereof. This Executive Order shall be effective as of April 20, 1973.

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 18, 1974.

¹ No. 11771; 39 Fed. Reg. 10415.

### President Nixon

Following are extracts from the transcript of a telephone conference given by the President of the Republic of China on March 11, 1973.

Q. . . . In my County, there are a tremendous number of refugees from Arab countries, and I am told now that the Arab countries are about ready to merge with the people not having gasoline records with the rest of the world. Is it possible that the Arab countries will not have gasoline during the coming weekend?

President Nixon to the embargo, I think, that in perspective report from the media with regard to taken with regard

There are, of course, dedicated that some may take this weekend.

Second, there are some problems that might be caused by the embargo. They might reimpose a settlement of the very difficult ones, the disengagement problem with Jerusalem, which we are hoping for, and where a solution and where I want one thing and then I will come to your district and do it.

¹ For the complete text of Presidential

April 8, 1974

362

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger Responds to Senator Kennedy
on Indochina Policy Issues

3/25/74

Following is the text of a letter dated
March 25 from Secretary Kissinger to Sena-
tor Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary.

TEXT OF LETTER

MARCH 25, 1974.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your
letter of March 13 on various aspects of
United States policy toward Indochina, I am
enclosing our comment on the nine specific
items you have outlined. I hope this infor-
mation will be useful to you. As to the rec-
ommendations of the Subcommittee's Study
Mission to Indochina last year, which were
enclosed with your letter, I have asked Gov-
ernor Holton [Linwood Holton, Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations] to
review these and to prepare our comments
for submission to you as soon as possible.

Your letter also expresses concern over a
March 6 cable by Ambassador [Graham]
Martin commenting on a recent press article
on the United States role in Viet-Nam. I do
not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a
cause-and-effect relationship between deci-
sions in Hanoi and the views of any indi-
vidual Members of Congress or their staffs.
What he is describing is a very real and
sophisticated propaganda effort by North
Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spec-
trum of Americans its own special view of
the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador
believes, and in this he has our full confi-
dence and support, that we must counter
these distortions emanating from Hanoi and

continue to provide the best answers to the
concerned questions many Americans have
about our Indochina policy.

Warm regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

Enclosure:

Comment on Indochina Policy Issues.

The Honorable EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate.

TEXT OF ENCLOSURE

1) "The general character and objectives of American policy towards Indochina as a whole and towards each government or political authority in the area,"

There are two basic themes in our policy
toward Indochina. The first is our belief that
a secure peace in Indochina is an important
element in our efforts to achieve a worldwide
structure of peace. Conversely, we believe
that an evolution toward peace in other
troubled areas helps bring about the stability
for which we strive in Indochina. Conse-
quently, our Indochina policy has been geared
to bring about the conditions which will en-
able the contending parties to find a peaceful
resolution of their differences.

A resolution of differences can, of course,
be achieved by other than peaceful means.
For example, North Viet-Nam might seek
to conquer South Viet-Nam by force of arms.
Such a resolution, however, would almost
certainly be a temporary one and would not
produce the long-term and stable peace which

April 22, 1974

will
com-
that,
Eu-
have
as
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ared

in the
to the
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relat-
ion

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May.

by John

Bulletin

425

is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our
search for peace, and the second theme of our
policy, is to discourage the takeover of the
various parts of Indochina by force. Forcible
conquest is not only repugnant to American
traditions but also has serious destabilizing
effects which are not limited to the area
under immediate threat.

We would stress the point that the United
States has no desire to see any particular
form of government or social system in the
Indochina countries. What we do hope to see
is a free choice by the people of Indochina
as to the governments and systems under
which they will live. To that end we have
devoted immense human and material re-
sources to assist them in protecting this right
of choice.

Our objective with regard to the Govern-
ment of Viet-Nam, the Government of the
Khmer Republic and the Royal Lao Govern-
ment is to provide them with the material
assistance and political encouragement which
they need in determining their own futures
and in helping to create conditions which will
permit free decisions. In Laos, happily, real
progress has been made, partly because of
our assistance. The Vientiane Agreement
and Protocols give clear evidence of the pos-
sibility for the peaceful settlement our poli-
cies are designed to foster. We have sup-
ported the Royal Lao Government and, when
it is formed, we will look with great sympa-
thy on the Government of National Union.
We welcome a peaceful and neutral Laos and,
where appropriate, we will continue to en-
courage the parties to work out their remain-
ing problems.

In Cambodia we are convinced that
long-term prospects for stability would be
enhanced by a cease-fire and a negotiated
settlement among the Khmer elements to the
conflict. Because such stability is in our inter-
ests we are providing diplomatic and material
support to the legitimate government of the
Khmer Republic, both in its self-defense ef-
forts and in its search for a political solution
to the war.

Our objective in Viet-Nam continues to be
to help strengthen the conditions which made

possible the Paris Agreement on Ending the
War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. With
this in mind we have supported the Republic
of Viet-Nam with both military and economic
assistance. We believe that by providing the
Vietnamese Government the necessary means
to defend itself and to develop a viable econo-
my, the government in Hanoi will conclude
that political solutions are much preferable
to renewed use of major military force. The
presence of large numbers of North Viet-
namese troops in the South demonstrates
that the military threat from Hanoi is still
very much in evidence. Because of that threat
we must still ensure that the Republic of
Viet-Nam has the means to protect its inde-
pendence. We note, however, that the level of
violence is markedly less than it was prior
to the cease-fire and believe that our policy
of support for South Viet-Nam has been
instrumental in deterring major North Viet-
namese offensives.

Our objective with regard to the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and its southern
arm, the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment, is to encourage full compliance with
the Paris Agreement. We have been disap-
pointed by North Viet-Nam's serious viola-
tions of important provisions of the Agree-
ment. However, we still believe that the
Agreement provides a workable framework
for a peaceful and lasting settlement, and
we will continue to use all means available to
us to support the cease-fire and to encourage
closer observance of it. Our future relations
with Hanoi obviously depend in large part
on how faithfully North Viet-Nam complies
with the Agreement.

2) "The general content and nature of existing obligations and commitments to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane;"

The U.S. has no bilateral written commit-
ment to the Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam. However, as a signator of the
Paris Agreement on Ending the War and
Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, the United
States committed itself to strengthening the
conditions which made the cease-fire possible

426

Department of State Bulletin

and to the goal
people's right
cases which
provide to the
means necessary
its economic via-

We also recog-
 certain obliga-
 involvement in
 own interest in
 make its own po-
curaged the V-
 struggle for inde-
great human an-
port them in pro-
broader interests
ourselves very su-
and morally. W-
Government and
increasing self-re-
portant that we do
as it is needed.

Our relations with the Khmer Republic formal commitment own national interests in events in Cambodia, bitter hostilities in the region. We have sought to encourage the development of a country as a partner that is capable of governing itself and hope that its independence will encourage the Khmer political settlement conflict.

We have also un-
Laos and support
ment because of
interests, not beca-
ment to that coun-
and visible of our
a just settlement o-
china. Laos plays a
spot in Indochina
efforts to assist an
Government are m
fire based on an a-

April 22, 1974

and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Viet-Nam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability.

We also recognize that we have derived a certain obligation from our long and deep involvement in Viet-Nam. Perceiving our own interest in a stable Viet-Nam free to make its own political choices, we have encouraged the Vietnamese people in their struggle for independence. We have invested great human and material resources to support them in protecting their own as well as broader interests. We have thus committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally. While the South Vietnamese Government and people are demonstrating increasing self-reliance, we believe it is important that we continue our support as long as it is needed.

Our relations with the Government of the Khmer Republic also do not stem from a formal commitment but are based on our own national interests. Recognizing that events in Cambodia relate directly to the bitter hostilities in other parts of Indochina, we have sought to help create stability in that country as a part of our effort to encourage the development of peace in the entire region. We, therefore, support the legitimate government of Cambodia, in the hope that its increasing strength will encourage the Khmer Communists toward a political settlement rather than continued conflict.

We have also undertaken our assistance to Laos and support for the Royal Lao Government because of our own broad national interests, not because of any formal commitment to that country. The most important and visible of our interests is our desire for a just settlement of the tragic war in Indochina. Laos plays a key role in this effort to achieve the peace. Indeed, Laos is the bright spot in Indochina where the fruits of our efforts to assist and support the Royal Lao Government are most clearly seen. A cease-fire based on an agreement worked out by

the two Lao parties has endured for more than a year. The two parties have together organized joint security forces in the two capital cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang and a coalition government may not be far away. We feel that these large steps toward a lasting peace in Laos would probably not have succeeded but for our steadfast support for the efforts of the Royal Lao Government.

3) "The kinds, categories and levels of support and assistance given or projected to the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975 —including (a) a breakdown of the number, distribution, activities and agency/departmental association of official American personnel, as well as those associated with private business and other organizations under contract to the United States government; and (b) a breakdown from all sources of humanitarian assistance, police and public safety oriented assistance, general supporting and economic development assistance, and military assistance;"

(a) U.S. Economic Assistance

Our annual Congressional Presentation books provide the data requested here in considerable detail. These Congressional Presentation books for FY 1975 will shortly be delivered to the Congress. We provide these first, as a matter of course, to the authorizing and appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House and then routinely make them available to all Members as well as the interested public. We will be happy to provide your Subcommittee on Refugees with copies as soon as available.

The Congressional Presentation books focus, of course, on our proposals for the coming year, FY 1975, but also contain data on both the current fiscal year, FY 1974, and the preceding, FY 1973. This year, as last, we are preparing a separate book providing the details of our economic assistance programs for the Indochina countries.

These Congressional Presentation books form a partial basis, of course, for extensive

Bulletin

April 22, 1974

427

Hearings held each year by the authorizing committees in the Senate and House, and then by the appropriations committees. We would expect the question you pose, as well as many others, to be further explored in considerable depth during the course of these hearings.

## (b) U.S. Military Assistance

Our military assistance to South Viet-Nam and Laos is provided under MASF [military assistance service funded]. The breakdown of this assistance for the period you requested is as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Ceiling</th><th>New Obligational Authority</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>FY 1973</td><td>$2.735 Billion</td><td>$2.563 Billion</td></tr><tr><td>FY 1974</td><td>1.126 Billion</td><td>907.5 Million</td></tr><tr><td>FY 1975</td><td>1.6 Billion<br>(Requested)</td><td>1.450 Billion <sup>a</sup></td></tr></tbody></table>

The level of official U.S. military/civilian personnel in South Viet-Nam during the same period is as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Military</th><th>Civilian</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>January, 1973</td><td>23,516 (Assigned)</td><td>730</td></tr><tr><td>January, 1974</td><td>221 (Authorized)</td><td>1200</td></tr><tr><td>June, 1974</td><td>221 (Authorized)</td><td>936</td></tr></tbody></table>

The number of U.S. civilian contractors has declined from 5,737 in January, 1973, to 2,736 in January, 1974. This number is expected to decrease further to 2,130 by June, 1974. We do not yet have a projected level of U.S. civilian contractors for FY 1975.

Our military assistance to Cambodia is furnished under MAP [military assistance program]. This assistance totalled $148.6 million in FY 1973 and $325 million in FY 1974. The level of our military assistance for FY 1975 is now under review. The amount to be proposed will be included in the Congressional presentation documents on military assistance which we expect to submit to Congress shortly.

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Cambodia during the period you requested is as follows:

<sup>a</sup> Viet-Nam only; Laos will be included under MAP for FY-75.

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Military</th><th>Civilian</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>December, 1972</td><td>112</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>December, 1973</td><td>113</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>December, 1974</td><td>113</td><td>DNA*</td></tr></tbody></table>

U.S. military and civilian personnel in Laos during the period you requested is as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th>Year</th><th>Military</th><th>Civilian</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>December, 1972</td><td>185</td><td>457</td></tr><tr><td>December, 1973</td><td>180</td><td>424</td></tr><tr><td>December, 1974</td><td>30**</td><td>DNA*</td></tr></tbody></table>

4) "The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area."

In April 1973, President Thieu asked the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to help form an aid group for the Republic of Viet-Nam. The IBRD agreed to make the effort, provided that this would be acceptable to the Bank membership and that the group could be organized in association with both the IBRD and the Asian Development Bank. In May the World Bank sent a study mission to Viet-Nam to review the situation. In August, Japan suggested that the Bank arrange a preliminary meeting to exchange views on aid to the countries of Indochina. The Japanese also proposed that the member countries discuss the formation of a loose Indochina consultative group for the areawide coordination, with sub-groups for any of the four countries concerned which might request such a group and where conditions were satisfactory.

An initial meeting was held at the Bank's Paris office in October. The United States supported the Bank's efforts as well as the Japanese proposal. The Bank sent a second mission to Viet-Nam in November and subsequently proposed that a follow-on meeting be held in February of this year to discuss the formation of the Indochina consultative

* Data Not Available.

** Based on the assumption that a coalition government will be formed in Laos before the end of this year.

428

Department of State Bulletin

group. However, in some cases the Congressional Development Fund may be the only available source of funding. The United States is the largest donor in the Asia-Pacific region, with its military assistance to Laos totalling $111.4 million in 1973. The U.S. military and civilian personnel in Laos during the period requested is as follows:

The United States efforts to form a group. We also be sub-groups which donors are considered. The sub-groups are: Military, Civilian, and Military and Civilian. The request of the consultation will be considered by the Military and Civilian. The Military and Civilian are expected to be helpful in determining the amount of the request. The Military and Civilian might be held responsible for such a meeting. The Military and Civilian are the grantees of the request, and the Military and Civilian are responsible for the sultative group.

5) "The current status and problems of reported efforts to establish an international consortium for general reconstruction assistance to the area."

In addition to the assistance to the Military and Civilian, the U.S. military and civilian personnel in Laos during the period requested is as follows:

* Military and Civilian: $111.4 million
* Military and Civilian: $325 million
* Military and Civilian: $148.6 million
* Military and Civilian: $120 million
* Military and Civilian: 936
* Military and Civilian: 730
* Military and Civilian: 1200
* Military and Civilian: 936

* Military and Civilian: $111.4 million
* Military and Civilian: $325 million
* Military and Civilian: $148.6 million
* Military and Civilian: $120 million
* Military and Civilian: 936
* Military and Civilian: 730
* Military and Civilian: 1200
* Military and Civilian: 936
* Military and Civilian: 730
* Military and Civilian: 1200
* Military and Civilian: 936

UNICEF (United Nations) has recently completed its program in the Indo-Chinese border area, submitted its program to the U.S. government for approval.

April 22, 1974

group. However, the reactions of participat-
ing countries to the energy crisis and to the
Congressional decision on IDA [Interna-
tional Development Association] replenish-
ment led the Bank to postpone the meeting,
tentatively until late Spring. In February,
at the request of the Lao Government, a
World Bank team also visited Laos to assess
the situation and to discuss a possible con-
sultative group for that country.

The United States continues to support
efforts to form an Indochina consultative
group. We also favor the proposal that there
be sub-groups for each recipient country to
which donors may contribute as they wish.
The sub-groups would be formed when con-
sidered appropriate by donors and at the
request of the recipient. We remain in close
consultation with the World Bank and other
interested parties on this matter. We are
hopeful that a second meeting of participants
might be held in the near future and that
such a meeting might lead to the establish-
ment of the groups in question. A reversal
of the negative Congressional action on IDA
replenishment would clearly enhance the
possibility of success in this regard.

5) "The current status and problems of the Administration's stated intention to encourage internationalizing humanitarian assistance to the area,"

In addition to U.S. bilateral humanitarian
assistance to the Indochina countries which
totals $111.4 million for FY 1974, the De-
partment and the Agency for International
Development (AID) continue to encourage
other donors, including international organi-
zations, to provide such assistance. AID
made a grant of $2 million on November 1,
1978, to the Indochina Operations Group of
the International Committee of the Red
Cross and discussions are continuing about
an additional grant to that organization.
UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund]
has recently completed its study of the prob-
lems in the Indochina countries and has just
submitted its proposed program to possible
donor countries. We have encouraged UNI-
CEF in its study and are pleased that it is

now prepared to expand its activities in all
three countries.

The World Health Organization has had
meaningful programs in Laos, Cambodia,
and Viet-Nam which supplement and do
not overlap with activities supported by the
United States. We have encouraged that
organization to play an even more important
role, particularly in the malaria control pro-
gram, and we at the same time would phase
out of our activities in that field.

Our discussions with Indochina countries
have stressed the desirability of establishing
plans and priorities for programs and proj-
ects which require assistance so that other
donor countries and organizations can fit
their assistance efforts into the host country
requirements.

6) "The current status of negotiations between Washington and Hanoi on American reconstruction assistance to North Viet-Nam."

Following the conclusion of the Peace
Agreement last year, preliminary discus-
sions of post-war reconstruction were held
in Paris between U.S. and North Vietnamese
members of the Joint Economic Commission.
These talks have been suspended since last
July. The Administration's position, which
we believe is shared by the great majority
of members of Congress, is that the U.S.
cannot at this time move forward with an
assistance program for North Viet-Nam. To
date, North Viet-Nam has failed substan-
tially to live up to a number of the essential
terms of the Agreement, including those re-
lating to the introduction of troops and war
material into South Viet-Nam, the cessation
of military activities in Cambodia and Laos,
and the accounting for our missing-in-action.
Should Hanoi turn away from a military
solution and demonstrate a serious compli-
ance with the Agreement, then we would be
prepared, with the approval of Congress,
to proceed with our undertaking regard-
ing reconstruction assistance to North Viet-
Nam.

7) "The Department's assessment on the

April 22, 1974

429

implementation of the ceasefire agreements
for both Viet-Nam and Laos;

The cease-fire in Viet-Nam has resulted
in a substantial decrease in the level of hos-
tilities; for example, military casualties since
the cease-fire have been about one-third the
level of casualties suffered in the years pre-
ceding the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, it
is unfortunately evident that significant vio-
lence continues to occur and that the cease-
fire is far from scrupulously observed. The
fundamental problem is that the North Viet-
namese are still determined to seize political
power in the South, using military means if
necessary. To this end they have maintained
unrelenting military pressure against the
South Vietnamese Government and have con-
tinued widespread terrorism against the pop-
ulation. In particularly flagrant violation of
the Agreement North Viet-Nam has per-
sisted in its infiltration of men and materiel
into the South, bringing in more than one
hundred thousand troops and large quantities
of heavy equipment since the cease-fire be-
gan. South Vietnamese forces have reacted
against these attacks by North Vietnamese
forces and several sizable engagements have
taken place.

Despite these serious violations, we con-
tinue to believe that the Paris Agreement
has already brought substantial benefits and
continues to provide a workable framework
for peace. After more than a quarter century
of fighting it would have been unrealistic to
expect that the Agreement would bring an
instant and complete end to the conflict. What
it has done, however, is to reduce the level
of violence significantly and provide mech-
anisms for discussion. The two Vietnamese
parties are talking to each other and are
achieving some results, even if these results
are much less than we would like to see. The
final exchange of prisoners which was com-
pleted on March 7 is illustrative.

We assess the cease-fire agreement in Laos
as being so far largely successful. The level
of combat was reduced substantially immedi-
ately following the cease-fire and has since
fallen to a handful of incidents per week.

There is hope that if developments continue
as they have, the Laos cease-fire will work
and the Lao, through their own efforts, will
be able to establish a coalition government
and a stable peace in their country.

8) "The Department's assessment of the overall situation in Cambodia and the possibility for a ceasefire agreement."

Despite continued pressure by the Khmer
insurgents, now generally under the control
of the Khmer Communist Party, the Khmer
armed forces have successfully repulsed two
major insurgent operations, one against
Kompong Cham and, more recently, against
Phnom Penh, with no U.S. combat support.
Serious military problems remain, and con-
tinued hard fighting during the next few
months is expected, both in the provinces and
around the capital.

A broadened political base, a new Prime
Minister and a more effective cabinet offer
signs of improvements in the civil adminis-
tration. The enormous dislocation of war,
destroying production, producing over a mil-
lion refugees and encouraging spiralling
inflation, face the leaders of the Khmer Re-
public with serious problems.

Nonetheless, we are convinced that with
U.S. material and diplomatic support the
Khmer Republic's demonstration of military
and economic viability will persuade their
now intransigent opponents to move to a
political solution of the Cambodian conflict.
The Khmer Republic's Foreign Minister on
March 21 reiterated his government's posi-
tion that a solution for Cambodia should be
peaceful and not forced by arms or capitula-
tion. Instead, his government will continue
to seek talks with the other side. His govern-
ment hopes their efforts for peace will achieve
some results after the current insurgent
offensive.

9) "Recent diplomatic initiatives, involv-
ing the United States, aimed at a reduction
of violence in Indochina and a greater meas-
ure of normalization in the area."

Since the signing of the Viet-Nam cease-
fire agreement, the United States has been

430

Department of State Bulletin

in constant li-
parties, including
china area. Wh-
provide details
can assure the
every means at
reduction in th
orderly resolut
these measures
level of fighting
1972 and the Vi-
at least beginn-
tory accommoda-
outside parties
to building on t
fire agreement.

When Hanoi
ous violations of
its conclusion, D-
Adviser Le Duc
communique of
to stabilizing th
ger returned to
again discuss w
status of the in-
ment. We will
contacts with V-
in the hope th
persuaded that
development rat

In Laos, we h
ment to an evo-
time the Lao-
progress in the
of national union
with our sympa-
properly leaving
those most inte-

The Govern-
with our comp-
notable efforts t
that country. F-
Nam, the Camb-
ally ceased hos-
the hope that th
Unfortunately t
buffed. On freq-
Khmer Republic
move the conflict-
litical fora, with-

April 22, 1974

in constant liaison with the interested parties, including those outside of the Indonesia area. While it would not be useful to provide details of all of these contacts, we can assure the Congress that we have used every means at our disposal to encourage a reduction in the level of violence and an orderly resolution of the conflict. We believe these measures have had some success. The level of fighting is down substantially from 1972 and the Vietnamese parties have taken at least beginning steps toward a satisfactory accommodation. Further, the interested outside parties remain basically committed to building on the framework of the cease-fire agreement.

When Hanoi established a pattern of serious violations of the Agreement shortly after its conclusion, Dr. Kissinger met with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and negotiated the Paris communique of June 13, 1973, with a view to stabilizing the situation. Secretary Kissinger returned to Paris in December, 1973, to again discuss with Special Adviser Tho the status of the implementation of the Agreement. We will continue to maintain such contacts with Vietnamese and other parties in the hope that Hanoi will eventually be persuaded that its interests lie in peaceful development rather than in conflict.

In Laos, we have offered every encouragement to an evolution toward peace. At this time the Laotian parties are making great progress in the formation of a government of national union. We can help in this regard with our sympathy and encouragement while properly leaving the issue in the hands of those most interested, the Lao people.

The Government of the Khmer Republic, with our complete endorsement, has made notable efforts to terminate the hostilities in that country. Following the cease-fire in Vietnam, the Cambodian Government unilaterally ceased hostile activity by its forces in the hope that the other side would respond. Unfortunately that striking gesture was rebuffed. On frequent occasions thereafter the Khmer Republic made proposals designed to move the conflict from the battlefield to political fora, with our strong support in each

instance. Although all of those proposals have been ignored by the Khmer Communists, we continue to hope that the current relative military balance will make apparent to the other side what the Khmer Republic has already perceived, that peace is a far more hopeful prospect for Cambodia than incessant conflict.

## U.S. Representatives Named to Centre for Investment Dispute Settlement

White House press release dated March 6

President Nixon announced on March 6 the appointments of Maxwell M. Rabb, of New York, N.Y., and Margaret Capobianco Scott, of Brighton, Mass., as Representative of the United States of America and Alternate Representative of the United States of America, respectively, on the Administrative Council of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Mr. Rabb is a partner in the New York law firm of Stroock, Stroock & Lavan. Mrs. Scott is a judge of the municipal court of the Dorchester district, Dorchester, Mass.

The President also announced the designation of eight persons as members of the Panel of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment of Disputes for terms of six years. They are:

### Panel of Conciliators:

* NATHANIEL J. ELY, of Bethesda, Md., attorney specializing in administrative law.

* WILLIAM H. G. FITZGERALD, of Washington, D.C., first vice president, Hornblower and Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., New York, N.Y.

* GILBERT L. MATON, of Falls Church, Va., president, John I. Thompson and Company, Rockville, Md.

* BETTY SOUTHARD MURPHY, of Annandale, Va., partner, law firm of Wilson, Woods & Villalon, Washington, D.C.

### Panel of Arbitrators:

* DIXON R. HARWIN, of Beverly Hills, Calif., professor of economics, Glendale College, Glendale, Calif.

Bulletin

April 22, 1974

431

U.S. Protests North Viet-Nam's
Violations of Peace Accords

1/11/75

Following is the text of a note trans-
mitted to U.S. missions on January 11 for
delivery to non-Vietnamese participants in
the International Conference on Viet-Nam
and to members of the International Com-
mission of Control and Supervision (ICCS).¹

Press release 12 dated January 13

When the Agreement was concluded
nearly two years ago, our hope was that it
would provide a framework under which the
Vietnamese people could make their own
political choices and resolve their own prob-
lems in an atmosphere of peace. Unfortu-
nately this hope, which was clearly shared
by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the South
Vietnamese people, has been frustrated by
the persistent refusal of the Democratic Re-
public of Viet-Nam to abide by the Agree-
ment's most fundamental provisions. Specif-
ically, in flagrant violation of the Agreement,
the North Vietnamese and "Provisional
Revolutionary Government" authorities
have:

- built up the North Vietnamese main-force army in the South through the illegal infiltration of over 160,000 troops;

- tripled the strength of their armor in the South by sending in over 400 new vehicles, as well as greatly increased their artillery and anti-aircraft weaponry;

- improved their military logistics system running through Laos, Cambodia and the Demilitarized Zone as well as within South Viet-Nam, and expanded their armament stockpiles;

- refused to deploy the teams which under the Agreement were to oversee the cease-fire;

- refused to pay their prescribed share of the expenses of the International Commission of Control and Supervision;

- failed to honor their commitment to cooperate in resolving the status of American and other personnel missing in action, even breaking off all discussions on this matter by refusing for the past seven months to meet with U.S. and Republic of Viet-Nam representatives in the Four-Party Joint Military Team;

- broken off all negotiations with the Republic of Viet-Nam including the political negotiations in Paris and the Two Party Joint Military Commission talks in Saigon, answering the Republic of Viet-Nam's repeated calls for unconditional resumption of the negotiations with demands for the overthrow of the government as a pre-condition for any renewed talks; and

- gradually increased their military pressure, over-running several areas, including 11 district towns, which were clearly and unequivocally held by the Republic of Viet-Nam at the time of the cease-fire. Their latest and most serious escalation of the fighting began in early December with offensives in the southern half of South Viet-Nam which have brought the level of casualties and destruction back up to what it was before the Agreement. These attacks—which included for the first time since the massive North Vietnamese 1972 offensive the over-running of a province capital (Song Be in Phuoc Long Province)—appear to reflect a decision by Hanoi to seek once again to impose a military solution in Viet-Nam. Coming just before the second anniversary of the Agreement, this dramatically belies Hanoi's claims that it is the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam who are violating the Agreement and standing in the way of peace.

The United States deplores the Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam's turning from
the path of negotiation to that of war, not

¹ Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, United Kingdom, France, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

only solen-
became
crati-
the f
deep-
inter-
polit-
prog-
Viet-
conter-
the la
strength
We st
for th
Hanc
ment
Saigo-
ment
call u
Nam
the F
stabil-
JAN

Congr.
Relat

93d C

A Rec-
tering
1974

National
S. 38
50 p

Icebre-
to a
Sept.

The U
A re
Rela-
born
1974

144

Department of State Bulletin

Febru

only because it is a grave violation of a
solemn international agreement, but also
because of the cruel price it is imposing on
the people of South Viet-Nam. The Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam must accept
the full consequences of its actions. We are
deeply concerned about the threat posed to
international peace and security, to the
political stability of Southeast Asia, to the
progress which has been made in removing
Viet-Nam as a major issue of great-power
contention, and to the hopes of mankind for
the building of structures of peace and the
strengthening of mechanisms to avert war.
We therefore reiterate our strong support
for the Republic of Viet-Nam's call to the
Hanoi-"Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment" side to reopen the talks in Paris and
Saigon which are mandated by the Agree-
ment. We also urge that the [addressee]
call upon the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam to halt its military offensive and join
the Republic of Viet-Nam in re-establishing
stability and seeking a political solution.

JANUARY 11, 1975.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

A Recommended National Emergencies Act. Interim Report. S. Rept. 93-1170. September 24, 1974. 10 pp.

National Emergencies Act. Report to accompany S. 3957. S. Rept. 93-1193. September 30, 1974. 50 pp.

Icebreaking Operations in Foreign Waters. Report to accompany H.R. 13791. H. Rept. 93-1390. September 30, 1974. 7 pp.

The United States and Cuba: A Propitious Moment. A report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by Senators Jacob K. Javits and Claiborne Pell on their trip to Cuba, September 27-30, 1974. October 1974. 13 pp.

Dues for U.S. Membership in International Criminal Police Organization. Report to accompany H.R. 14597. S. Rept. 93-1199. October 1, 1974. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms of Zinc. Conference report to accompany H.R. 6191. H. Rept. 93-1399. October 1, 1974. 4 pp.

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Bicycle Parts and Accessories. Conference report to accompany H.R. 6642. H. Rept. 93-1400. October 1, 1974. 5 pp.

Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Classifications of Yarns of Silk. Conference report to accompany H.R. 7780. H. Rept. 93-1401. October 1, 1974. 6 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Methanol. Conference report to accompany H.R. 11251. H. Rept. 93-1402. October 1, 1974. 5 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Synthetic Rutile. Conference report to accompany H.R. 11830. H. Rept. 93-1404. 3 pp.

Extending Until July 1, 1975, the Suspension of Duty on Certain Carboxymethyl Cellulose Salts. Conference report to accompany H.R. 12035. H. Rept. 93-1405. October 1, 1974. 6 pp.

Extending Until July 1, 1975, the Suspension of Duties on Certain Forms of Copper. Conference report to accompany H.R. 12281. H. Rept. 93-1406. October 1, 1974. 3 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Horses. Conference report to accompany H.R. 13631. H. Rept. 93-1407. October 1, 1974. 4 pp.

Authorizing the President To Declare by Proclamation Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn an Honorary Citizen of the United States. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 188. S. Rept. 93-1216. October 2, 1974. 3 pp.

Export Administration Act Amendments. Conference report to accompany S. 3792. H. Rept. 93-1412. October 2, 1974. 14 pp.

Amending the Communications Act of 1934. With Respect to the Granting of Radio Licenses in the Safety and Special and Experimental Radio Services to Aliens. Report to accompany S. 2547. H. Rept. 93-1423. October 3, 1974. 8 pp.

Authorizing U.S. Contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces. Report to accompany H.R. 16982. H. Rept. 93-1432. October 7, 1974. 3 pp.

World Food Situation. Report to accompany H. Res. 1399. H. Rept. 93-1433. October 7, 1974. 3 pp.

Export-Import Bank Act Amendment. Conference report to accompany H.R. 15977. H. Rept. 93-1439. October 8, 1974. 11 pp.

Metropolitan Museum Exhibition in the Soviet Union. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 1115. H. Rept. 93-1444. October 8, 1974. 3 pp.

State Department, USIA Authorizations. Conference report to accompany S. 3473. H. Rept. 93-1447. October 8, 1974. 14 pp.

February 3, 1975

145

[45]

January 23

MR. BROKAW. I wonder if we can move to another area in the world, or would you like to go back to the Middle East?

MR. CHANCELLOR. I have one question I would like to put to the President.

Sir, when we talk about strangulation—and I hope we don't talk about it any more tonight after this, because I do think it is the hypothetical, I agree with you on that—what about the moral implications? If a country is being strangled by another country or set of countries that own a natural resource, is it moral to go and take that? It is their oil; it is not ours. Isn't that a troublesome question?

THE PRESIDENT. I think it is a troublesome question. It may not be right, John, but I think if you go back over the history of mankind, wars *have* been fought over natural resources from time immemorial. I would hope that in this decade or in this century and beyond, we would not have to have wars for those purposes, and we certainly are not contemplating any such action. But history, in the years before us, indicates quite clearly that that was one of the reasons why nations fought one another.

VIETNAM CONFLICT

[3.] MR. BROKAW. Mr. President, what are our objectives now in Southeast Asia, in Vietnam, particularly?

THE PRESIDENT. Vietnam, after all the lives that were lost there, Americans, over 50,000, and after the tremendous expenditures that we made in American dollars—several years, more than $30 billion a year—it seems to me that we ought to try and give the South Vietnamese the opportunity, through military assistance, to protect their way of life.

This is what we have done traditionally as Americans. Certainly since the end of World War II, we have helped innumerable nations in military arms and economic assistance to help themselves to maintain their own freedom.

The American people believe, I think, historically, that if a country and a people want to protect their way of life against aggression, we will help them in a humanitarian way and in a military way with arms and funds if they are willing to fight for themselves. This is within our tradition as Americans.

And the South Vietnamese apparently do wish to maintain their national integrity and their independence. I think it is in our best tradition as Americans to help them at the present time.

MR. BROKAW. How much longer and how deep does our commitment go to the South Vietnamese?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think there is any long-term commitment. As a matter

January 23

of fact, the American people, as Dr. Kissinger that he has arms and economic aid from the South Vietnamese.

Now, I am sure we have progress until they be started in the last few months.

I happen to think that man, and very realistically, this extra supplement to protect themselves.

MR. CHANCELLOR. Vietnamese. And give me your phrase it this way—what they $300 million?

THE PRESIDENT. That military and civilian, A year ago when the Vietnam, it was $1,400 million. Vietnamese rangers got of hand grenades and cut their military capes. Now, $300 million, it was proposed they have seen the fighting that would be广告.

MR. CHANCELLOR. I will sit in this room all right, and it will be all right.

THE PRESIDENT. I Skeptics, John, said rehabilitation of Europe, the investment we make.

A lot of people have to go through a year and a half or so.

I think an investment very likely be a k

100

January 23

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[45]

of fact, the American Ambassador there, Graham Martin, has told me as well
as Dr. Kissinger that he thinks if adequate dollars, which are translated into
arms and economic aid, if that was made available, that within 2 or 3 years
the South Vietnamese would be over the hump militarily as well as economically.

Now, I am sure we have been told that before, but they had made substantial
progress until they began to run a little short of ammunition, until inflation
started in the last few months to accelerate.

I happen to think that Graham Martin, who is a very hardnosed, dedicated
man, and very realistic, is right. And I hope the Congress will go along with
this extra supplemental that I am asking for to help the South Vietnamese
protect themselves.

MR. CHANCELLOR. Sir, that is $300 million you have asked for the South Vietnamese. And given what you have just said—well, I am just going to phrase it this way—will we see the light at the end of the tunnel if we give them $300 million?

THE PRESIDENT. The best estimates of the experts that are out there, both military and civilian, tell me that $300 million in this fiscal year is the minimum. A year ago when the budget was submitted for military assistance for South Vietnam, it was $1,400 million. Congress cut it in half, which meant that South Vietnamese rangers going out on patrol, instead of having an adequate supply of hand grenades and weapons, were cut in half, which, of course, has undercut their military capability and has made them conserve and not be as strong.

Now, $300 million doesn't take them back up to where they were or where it was proposed they should be. But the experts say, who are on the scene, who have seen the fighting and have looked at the stocks and the reserves, tell me that that would be adequate for the current circumstances.

MR. CHANCELLOR. Mr. President, does it make you uneasy to sit on that couch in this room and have experts in Vietnam saying, only a little bit more and it will be all right? We did hear that for so many years.

THE PRESIDENT. I think you have to think pretty hard about it. But a lot of skeptics, John, said that the money we were going to make available for the rehabilitation of Europe after World War II wouldn't do any good, and of course, the investment we made did pay off.

A lot of people have said the money that we made available to Israel wouldn't be helpful in bringing about the peace that has been achieved there for the last year and a half or so, but it did. It helped.

I think an investment of $300 million at this time in South Vietnam could very likely be a key for the preservation of their freedom and might con-

101

[45]

January 23

ceivably force the North Vietnamese to stop violating the Paris accords of
January 1973.

When you look at the agreement that was signed—and I happened to be there at the time of the signing in January of 1973—the North Vietnamese agreed not to infiltrate. The facts are they have infiltrated with countless thousands—I think close to 100,000 from North Vietnam—down to South Vietnam. They are attacking cities, metropolitan areas. They have refused to permit us to do anything about our U.S. missing in action in North Vietnam. They have refused to negotiate any political settlement between North Vietnam and South Vietnam. They have called off the meetings either in Paris or in Saigon.

So, here is a country—South Vietnam—that is faced with an attitude on the part of the North Vietnamese of total disregard of the agreement that was signed about 2 years ago. I think the South Vietnamese deserve some help in this crisis.

MR. BROKAW. Mr. President, underlying all of this in much of this interview is a kind of supposition on your part, I guess, that the American public is willing to carry the burdens that it has carried in the past. Do you believe that? Is that your view of the world, kind of, and the view of this country?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, and I am proud of that, Tom. The United States—we are fortunate. We have a substantial economy. We have good people who by tradition—certainly since the end of World War II—have assumed a great responsibility. We rehabilitated Europe. We helped Japan—both in the case of Germany and Japan, enemies that we defeated.

We have helped underdeveloped countries in Latin America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia. I think we should be proud of the fact that we are willing to share our great wealth with others less fortunate than we.

And it gives us an opportunity to be a leader setting an example for others. And when you look at it from our own selfish point of view, what we have done has basically helped America, but in addition, it has helped millions and millions of other people. We should be proud of it. We should not be critical of our efforts.

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[4.] MR. CHANCELLOR. Mr. President, I would like to move on, if I could, and ask you, as a reporter, if you would care to share a little information with me on a paper you read recently on the CIA. You read a paper given to you by the CIA. There have been resignations at the CIA. Officials of the CIA have

January 23

admitted some of the
they get off the reser-
vation.

THE PRESIDENT. I did
the head of CIA. An
making a judgment a
or whether there was
rector or any of his pi-
the investigation over
into the facts, take te-
number two, make it
changes within the
whether the charter of
the plan.

I asked the Vice I
seven people, three I
rience and, I think, e

It would be prema-
tion of the charter.
tions or potentially
Mr. A did something
wrong, I think it is be-
to me.

[5.] MR. BROKAW
involved in a contro-
files on Members of
the Congress.
do you think that th

THE PRESIDENT. To
of the FBI.

Number one, the
should not spy on M
law-abiding America.
a legal responsibility.

The FBI has the r
a crime—any Amer-
if they are seeking u
FBI has an obligati
of Congress at the p

102

January 28

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[53]

53

Special Message to the Congress Requesting Supplemental Assistance for the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia.

January 28, 1975

Two years ago the Paris Agreement was signed, and several weeks later was endorsed by major nations including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. We had succeeded in negotiating an Agreement that provided the framework for lasting peace in Southeast Asia. This Agreement would have worked had Hanoi matched our side's efforts to implement it. Unfortunately, the other side has chosen to violate most of the major provisions of this Accord.

The South Vietnamese and Cambodians are fighting hard in their own defense, as recent casualty figures clearly demonstrate. With adequate U.S. material assistance, they can hold their own. We cannot turn our backs on these embattled countries. U.S. unwillingness to provide adequate assistance to allies fighting for their lives would seriously affect our credibility throughout the world as an ally. And this credibility is essential to our national security.

VIETNAM

When the Paris Agreement was signed, all Americans hoped that it would provide a framework under which the Vietnamese people could make their own political choices and resolve their own problems in an atmosphere of peace.

In compliance with that Agreement, the United States withdrew its forces and its military advisors from Vietnam. In further compliance with the Agreement, the Republic of Vietnam offered a comprehensive political program designed to reconcile the differences between the South Vietnamese parties and to lead to free and supervised elections throughout all of South Vietnam. The Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly reiterated this offer and has several times proposed a specific date for a free election open to all South Vietnamese political groups.

Unfortunately, our hopes for peace and for reconciliation have been frustrated by the persistent refusal of the other side to abide by even the most fundamental provisions of the Agreement. North Vietnam has sent its forces

119

[53]

January 28

into the South in such large numbers that its army in South Vietnam is now greater than ever, close to 289,000 troops. Hanoi has sent tanks, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons to South Vietnam by the hundreds. These troops and equipment are in South Vietnam for only one reason—to forceably impose the will of Hanoi on the South Vietnamese people. Moreover, Hanoi has refused to give a full accounting for our men missing in action in Vietnam.

The Communists have also violated the political provisions of the Paris Agreement. They have refused all South Vietnamese offers to set a specific date for free elections, and have now broken off negotiations with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. In fact, they say that they will not negotiate with that Government as it is presently constituted, although they had committed themselves to do so.

Recent events have made it clear that North Vietnam is again trying to impose a solution by force. Earlier this month, North Vietnamese forces captured an entire province, the population centers of which were clearly under the control of the South Vietnamese Government when the Paris Agreement was signed. Our intelligence indicates, moreover, that their campaign will intensify further in coming months.

At a time when the North Vietnamese have been building up their forces and pressing their attacks, U.S. military aid to the South Vietnamese Government has not been sufficient to permit one-to-one replacement of equipment and supplies used up or destroyed, as permitted by the Paris Agreement. In fact, with the $700 million appropriation available in the current fiscal year, we have been able to provide no new tanks, airplanes, trucks, artillery pieces, or other major equipment, but only essential consumable items such as ammunition, gasoline, spare parts, and medical supplies. And in the face of the increased North Vietnamese pressure of recent months, these supplies have not kept pace with minimally essential expenditure. Stockpiles have been drawn down and will soon reach dangerously low levels.

Last year, some believed that cutting back our military assistance to the South Vietnamese Government would induce negotiations for a political settlement. Instead, the opposite has happened. North Vietnam is refusing negotiations and is increasing its military pressure.

I am gravely concerned about this situation. I am concerned because it poses a serious threat to the chances for political stability in Southeast Asia and to the progress that has been made in removing Vietnam as a major issue of contention between the great powers.

January 28

I am also concerned of the world. It is difficult to believe that there have been not be in our intelligen we will support

When the Univesity of Vietnam would not defend them the mean South Vietnamese have demonstrated they are provided ever, may be judge

We—the Exchequers. A the previous C

I am, therefore

-A supplement

to South Vietnam.

The $300 million for South Vietnam has been approved by the Vietnamese authorities to be used to prevent serious supplies requiring Vietnamese at

I believe that from further incentive to Agreement.

All Americans, ever, that we have and sustain the

120

January 28

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[53]

I am also concerned because what happens in Vietnam can affect the rest of the world. It cannot be in the interests of the United States to let other nations believe that we are prepared to look the other way when agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated are contemptuously violated. It cannot be in our interest to cause our friends all over the world to wonder whether we will support them if they comply with agreements that others violate.

When the United States signed the Paris Agreement, as when we pursued the policy of Vietnamization, we told the South Vietnamese, in effect, that we would not defend them with our military forces, but that we would provide them the means to defend themselves, as permitted by the Agreement. The South Vietnamese have performed effectively in accepting this challenge. They have demonstrated their determination and ability to defend themselves if they are provided the necessary military materiel with which to do so. We, however, may be judged remiss in keeping our end of the bargain.

We—the Executive and Legislative Branches together—must meet our responsibilities. As I have said earlier, the amount of assistance appropriated by the previous Congress is inadequate to the requirements of the situation.

I am, therefore, proposing:

—A supplemental appropriation of $300 million for military assistance to South Vietnam.

The $300 million in supplemental military assistance that I am requesting for South Vietnam represents the difference between the $1 billion which was authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1975 and the $700 million which has been appropriated. This amount does not meet all the needs of the South Vietnamese army in its defense against North Vietnam. It does not, for example, allow for replacement of equipment lost in combat. It is the minimum needed to prevent serious reversals by providing the South Vietnamese with the urgent supplies required for their self-defense against the current level of North Vietnamese attacks.

I believe that this additional aid will help to deter the North Vietnamese from further escalating their military pressure and provide them additional incentive to resume the political discussions envisaged under the Paris Agreement.

All Americans want to end the U.S. role in Vietnam. So do I. I believe, however, that we must end it in a way that will enhance the chances of world peace and sustain the purposes for which we have sacrificed so much.

121

[53]

January 28

CAMBODIA

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore peace and to allow the Khmer people an opportunity to decide freely who will govern them. To this end, our immediate goal in Cambodia is to facilitate an early negotiated settlement. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly called for talks without preconditions with the other Khmer parties. We have fully supported these proposals as well as the resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly calling for early negotiations among Khmer parties.

Regrettably, there has been no progress. In fact, the Communists have intensified hostilities by attacking on the outskirts of Phnom Penh and attempting to cut the land and water routes to the capital. We must continue to aid the Cambodian Government in the face of externally supported military attacks. To refuse to provide the assistance needed would threaten the survival of the Khmer Republic and undermine the chances for peace and stability in the area.

The Cambodian Government forces, given adequate assistance, can hold their own. Once the insurgents realize that they cannot win by force of arms, I believe they will look to negotiations rather than war.

I am, therefore, proposing:

- Legislation to eliminate the current ceilings on military and economic assistance to Cambodia, and to authorize the appropriation of an additional $222 million for military aid for Cambodia, and

- An amendment to the fiscal year 1975 budget for the additional $222 million.

To provide the assistance necessary, the present restrictions on our military and economic aid to Cambodia must be removed and additional money provided. The $200 million in military assistance currently authorized was largely expended during the past six months in response to the significantly intensified enemy offensive action. In addition, I have utilized the $75 million drawdown of Department of Defense stocks authorized by Congress for this emergency situation. Since the beginning of the Communist offensive on January 1, ammunition expenditures have risen and will exhaust all available funds well before the end of this fiscal year. To meet minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, I am requesting an additional $222 million in military assistance and the elimination of the present $200 million ceiling on military assistance to Cambodia. I am also requesting elimination of the $377 million ceiling on overall assistance to Cambodia. This is necessary to enable

January 2

us to provide assurance of collapse of

I know the suffering and security costs to the government, and with the progress we are achieving, we are looking beyond stability in the area would

The White House

54

Exchange
January

I HATE depriving you to come in conviction economic

The economy with the emphasis on it to balance the emphasis on

I am making the point that the short run is not the only more timely and nately, I hope, the only

more timely, I hope, the only

122

January 29

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[54]

us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, under the Food for Peace program, to assure adequate food for the victims of war and to prevent the economic collapse of the country.

I know we all seek the same goals for Cambodia—a situation wherein the suffering and destruction has stopped and the Khmer people have the necessary security to rebuild their society and their country. These goals are attainable. With the minimal resources and flexibility I am requesting from you, the Congress, we can help the people of Cambodia to have a choice in determining their future. The consequences of refusing them this assistance will reach far beyond Cambodia's borders and impact severely on prospects for peace and stability in that region and the world. There is no question but that this assistance would serve the interests of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD

The White House,
January 28, 1975.

54

Exchange of Remarks During a Briefing for Economic Writers.

January 29, 1975

I HATE to interrupt all of you experts in the field of economic writing and deprive you of a chance to talk to Bill and Alan and others, but I did want to come in and just say a word or two to let you know that I have very deep convictions about the need and necessity of moving ahead, not only in the economic field with the plan that we have but also in the energy program.

The economic plan we spent a great deal of time on. We tried to balance it with the tax reductions that we proposed, plus the need and necessity to tie in to balance the holddown on the expenditure side. Unfortunately, most of the emphasis so far at least has been in the tax reduction areas, with insufficient emphasis on the expenditure limitations.

I am more optimistic that they will do 50 percent of the tax reduction and not the other 50 percent, which is equally important as we look not only at the short haul but the long run.

I not only spent a great deal of time on the tax alternatives but probably even more time, because of the immensity of the document, on the budget. Fortunately, I had had 14 years on the Committee on Appropriations, so budget documents were not new to me.

123

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Request for Supplemental Appropriation
for Military Assistance to Cambodia

Statement by Philip C. Habib

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs¹

In both Viet-Nam and Cambodia there has been a recent significant escalation of military action by Communist forces. This has placed new and severe strains on the resources of the governments of those countries and has rendered the assistance we provide to them inadequate to meet its intended objectives. The President has therefore asked Congress to make available additional funds for military aid to Viet-Nam and Cambodia and to remove impediments to the use of funds already appropriated to provide essential food aid to Cambodia.

The Viet-Nam supplemental, a Defense appropriation, will be formally considered on another occasion. The authority to increase food aid for Cambodia does not require any additional appropriation. My testimony today therefore is primarily in support of our request for appropriations for military aid for Cambodia. But in my remarks this afternoon I will attempt to address the problem of Cambodia in the broader context of our overall Indochina policy.

Two years ago we concluded an agreement in Paris which we hoped would end the war in Viet-Nam and pave the way for settlements in Laos and Cambodia. The Paris

agreement was the end result of a long and tortuous negotiating process. In its final form, the agreement was one which we felt honored the sacrifices and respected the sense of justice of both sides. It implied a rejection of absolutes, an acceptance of restraint, an acknowledgment of limitations—as must any accord. From the standpoint of the United States, the agreement in large measure met what had been our purpose throughout the long history of our efforts in Viet-Nam: it ended our direct military involvement there and established a formula through which the people of South Viet-Nam could determine their political future without outside interference.

Things have not worked out as we had hoped. Only in Laos have the contending parties moved from military confrontation to political competition. In Viet-Nam, after a period of relative quiescence, warfare again rages and the structure created by the agreement for working toward a political settlement is endangered. In Cambodia, there has been no amelioration of the conflict, and the military balance in that country is gravely threatened.

I cannot profess surprise at these developments. The Paris agreement contained no self-enforcing mechanisms. For that agreement to be effective and to achieve its purpose, both sides were required to act in accordance with the principles of restraint, compromise, and minimal good faith which must underlie the resolution of any indeci-

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations on Feb. 3. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Bulletin

February 24, 1975

255

sive conflict. Those qualities have been con-
spicuously absent from Hanoi's approach.
In Cambodia, also, a negotiated settlement
demands that both sides accept the impera-
tives of compromise. The Cambodian Com-
munists have instead sought military vic-
tory.

While its focus was on Viet-Nam, the
Paris agreement also contained provisions
relating to Laos and Cambodia. The signa-
tories were enjoined to respect the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of those
countries, and all foreign troops were to
have been withdrawn. South Viet-Nam and
the United States have abided by those
strictures. Hanoi has not. North Viet-Nam
continues to use the territory of Laos to
send forces and war materiel to South Viet-
Nam and continues to station troops in re-
mote areas of that country. North Viet-Nam
uses the territory of Cambodia to support
its military operations in South Viet-Nam.
In addition, Hanoi gives material assistance
and battlefield advice to Communist forces
operating against the Cambodian Govern-
ment.

Let me now turn specifically to the situa-
tion in Cambodia. The conflict in Cambodia
is complex, and its origins are widely mis-
understood. Sihanouk was deposed in 1970
from a government which he himself had
formed less than a year before. That action
was ratified by a National Assembly whose
members Sihanouk had personally selected.
The United States played no role in the
matter. (Our total presence in Cambodia at
that time consisted of two diplomatic officers
and three military attaches.) Several days
after those events, North Vietnamese forces
attacked Cambodian Government outposts
in the eastern region of the country. Armed
hostilities in Cambodia date from those at-
tacks. Under North Vietnamese auspices,
insurgent forces were formed and joined the
fray.

Warfare has since been unremitting and
often intense. The human and material cost
has been high. The economic life of Cam-
bodia has been shattered. What was once a
rich agricultural country producing con-

sistent rice surpluses is now heavily de-
pendent on outside assistance for even the
most basic necessities. Perhaps as many as
1.5 million people, over a fifth of the total
population, have become refugees. Thou-
sands of Cambodians—soldiers and civilians
—have lost their lives.

Cambodia's battle against an externally
supported insurgent movement has been in-
tensified still further in recent weeks. On
January 1, Communist forces launched a
new offensive, stepping up attacks in the
area near Phnom Penh and against several
provincial capitals and making strong efforts
to cut the vital Mekong supply corridor.
Total casualties for both sides are running
at least 1,000 a day—killed, wounded, or
missing—and more than 60,000 new refu-
gees have been created. The already stricken
economic life of the country is further
ravaged.

Cambodian Government forces have fought
remarkably well in the face of difficult odds.
In little more than four years, a small and
largely ceremonial army has grown into a
sizable and increasingly effective fighting
force. In this connection, I have seen a num-
ber of recent press articles alleging waste
of ammunition by Cambodian forces. They
require comment. While this was partly true
a year ago, as noted by the Inspector Gen-
eral for Foreign Assistance in a recent re-
port, that report also notes that steps have
been taken to improve ammunition conser-
vation. Because of those efforts, Cambodian
forces are undoubtedly making better use of
their ammunition this year than last. But
combat intensity remains the primary deter-
minant of ammunition expenditure—and the
Communists have raised the intensity mark-
edly since January 1.

I would also add that it is misleading to
compare the ammunition expenditures of
defending forces with those of insurgents.
As in Viet-Nam, Communist forces—having
no population centers or fixed positions to
defend—are able to mass forces at times
and places of their choosing; this allows
them economies unavailable to widely dis-
persed defenders.

256

Department of State Bulletin

In Cambo-
the materia-
for its defe-
South Viet-
allocating c
is not inac-
no choice. I
and if the
compromise
provided wi

Our objec-
tive was to
peace and t
opportunity
future of t
our belief, c
Cambodia,
conclusive
Government
can end in mil-
tary.
We believe
is one invol-
ment has r
mise settle-
ment has r
the opposin
have fully s
as the reso-
 Southeast A
the last ses-
bly, calling
munists, ho
posed to a
tude is unli
they conclu-
possible. Th
the aim of
Cambodian
military ba
negotiations.

Present r
economic as
in the 1974
sistance Ac
plish that g
nally request
for this fis
military aid
t was expend-
on the basis
ity, in reso
Communist

February 24,

In Cambodia, even more than in Viet-Nam, the material resources the nation must have for its defense are strained to the limit. If South Viet-Nam faces a harsh choice in allocating diminishing defense resources, it is not inaccurate to say that Cambodia has no choice. If it is to avoid collapse and chaos, and if there is to be any prospect for a compromise solution, additional aid must be provided without delay.

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore peace and to allow the Cambodian people an opportunity to decide freely the political future of their country. It has never been our belief, or a premise of our policy toward Cambodia, that the conflict would end in conclusive military victory by Cambodian Government forces. Nor, however, should it end in military victory by the Communists. We believe the only logical and fair solution is one involving negotiations and a compromise settlement. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly called for talks with the opposing side, without preconditions. We have fully supported these proposals as well as the resolution, sponsored by Cambodia's Southeast Asian neighbors and adopted in the last session of the U.N. General Assembly, calling for early negotiations. The Communists, however, have been adamantly opposed to a negotiated settlement. Their attitude is unlikely to change unless and until they conclude that military victory is not possible. The first imperative, therefore, and the aim of our military assistance to the Cambodian Government, is to preserve a military balance and thereby to promote negotiations.

Present restrictions on our military and economic assistance to Cambodia, contained in the 1974 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, make it impossible to accomplish that goal. The Administration originally requested $390 million in military aid for this fiscal year. The $200 million in military aid authorized for this fiscal year was expended during the past six months, on the basis of continuing-resolution authority, in response to significantly intensified Communist offensive actions. Since the be-

ginning of the latest Communist offensive on January 1, ammunition expenditures have gone higher, of necessity, and even the $75 million drawdown of Defense Department stocks authorized for this emergency situation will not meet the needs. In addition to this stringent situation with respect to military supplies, Cambodia also faces an impending severe rice shortage.

Therefore, to meet minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, President Ford has asked the Congress to do three things:

- First, to eliminate the existing $200 million ceiling on military assistance for Cambodia.

- Second, to authorize and appropriate $222 million in military aid, in addition to appropriating the $200 million currently authorized. Our original request to the Congress for military assistance to Cambodia during the current fiscal year, $390 million, was an amount we regarded then as the minimum needed. With unexpectedly increased Communist pressures, and in view of the sharp rise in the cost of ammunition —the largest single item in the program— $222 million in additional funds is now clearly required. That amount, plus the $200 million in aid funds and the $75 million in Department of Defense drawdown already authorized, will bring total military assistance for the year to a level generally comparable to our original estimates of the need and our original request to the Congress.

- Third, to eliminate the $377 million ceiling on our overall aid to Cambodia, or at least to exempt Public Law 480 food from that ceiling. This is necessary to enable us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, as soon as possible. The inability to use funds already included in the Department of Agriculture appropriation will cause a break in the food supply pipeline beginning in June unless procurement action is begun by late March. New authority therefore is needed urgently. We anticipate, as we have throughout the year in appearances before you, that between $73 million and $100 million in

etin

February 24, 1975

257

additional rice and wheat will have to be
provided to Cambodia this fiscal year. Eco-
nomic collapse, and even starvation, may
otherwise result.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, we wish, as do
you, to see an early end to the suffering of
the Cambodian people and to the destruction
of their country. The only equitable way in
which this can be accomplished is to
strengthen conditions which will permit a
negotiated solution to take place. It is for
this purpose that additional military assist-
ance and economic assistance authority for
Cambodia is an urgent necessity.

This request—and the one we are sub-
mitting separately for Viet-Nam—does not
represent the beginning of a new and open-
ended commitment for the United States.
Nor does it reflect any change in policy on
the part of the United States. The additional
funds and authorities which we are asking
the Congress to make available for Cam-
bodia are vitally needed, for the reasons I
have set forth, in support of a policy which
has in large measure proven appropriate to
the difficult circumstances of Indochina. That
policy, borne out in the record of our actions,
is one of steady disengagement—in a man-
ner designed to prevent new upheavals in
Indochina, new instability in the East Asia
region, and renewed contention among the
major powers.

Cambodia cannot be considered separately
from Viet-Nam and Laos, and the whole of
Indochina cannot be isolated from larger
world issues. The consequences of a decision
to withhold vitally needed assistance to
Cambodia would extend beyond the confines
of Indochina—and they would be inimical
to the broad sweep of our interests in this
small and interdependent world. Such a deci-
sion would amount to a conscious act to
abandon a small country to a forcible Com-
munist takeover, an action without prece-
dent in our history. The amounts we are
requesting for Cambodia are not large when
measured against the sacrifices we and the
people of Indochina have already made. They
are, however, vital to the restoration of con-
ditions which can lead to peace in Cambodia.

93d Congress, 2d Session

Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949-50.
Historical Series. Hearings held in executive ses-
sion before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re-
lations. (1949 and 1950). Made public January
1974. 280 pp.

Reviews of the World Situation: 1949-50. Historical Series. Hearings held in executive session before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (1949 and 1950). Made public June 1974. 447 pp.

The Energy Crisis: Impact on Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 27, 1974. 41 pp.

International Terrorism. Hearings before the Sub-
committee on the Near East and South Asia of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June
11-24, 1974. 219 pp.

Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activ-
ities. Hearings before the Special Subcommittee
on Arms Control and Disarmament of the House
Committee on Armed Services. May 8-July 2, 1974.
71 pp.

Resolutions of Inquiry Into Proposed Nuclear Agree-
ments With Egypt and Israel. Hearing before the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 9,
1974. 6 pp.

Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Relations on H. Con. Res. 507 and identical and similar resolutions relating to the resumption of opium production by and the termination of foreign assistance to Turkey. July 16, 1974. 79 pp.

World Population and Food Supply and Demand Situation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Department Operations of the House Committee on Agriculture. July 23-25, 1974. 188 pp.

Cyprus—1974. Hearings before the House Commit-
tee on Foreign Affairs and Its Subcommittee on
Europe. August 19-20, 1974. 85 pp.

Report on Nutrition and the International Situation. Prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. September 1974. 57 pp.

U.S. Policy and World Food Needs. Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. September 10-12, 1974. 163 pp.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Export of Nuclear Tech-
nology to the Middle East. Hearings before the
Subcommittees on International Organizations and
Movements and on the Near East and South Asia
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June
25-September 16, 1974. 333 pp.

Briefings on Diego Garcia and Patrol Frigate. Hear-
ings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions with Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy.
Chief of Naval Operations. Executive hearings
held on April 11, 1974; made public November 22,
1974. 47 pp.

258

Department of State Bulletin

Current

Conserva-
tion

Convention

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6, 1974.

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into force

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February 24, 1

["THE CONGRESS", "## Department Stresses Urgency of Assistance to Cambodia", "Following is a statement by Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on February 24.¹", "I am very appreciative of this opportunity to appear before this subcommittee in order to discuss the situation in Cambodia and the Administration's request for aid necessary to assist the Khmer Government.", "I would like to begin my brief statement with a review of the situation in Phnom Penh as it is today, in order that you may have a clear picture of the gravity of the situation necessitating the urgency and size of the military and economic aid requests. Militarily, the situation is more serious than it has ever been since fighting began in 1970. On January 1, the Khmer Communists began their yearly dry-season offensive. Whereas last year their attack on Phnom Penh was the primary target and failed, this year they have chosen the Mekong River corridor from Phnom Penh to the South Viet-Nam border as their primary objective. They have succeeded in seizing large sections of the river-banks and, for the first time, have begun using mines. The Cambodian Government is determined to reopen this vital line of communication, and we believe that it is capable of doing so. It will, however, require time and, meanwhile, ammunition supplies are being used up once again at a considerably", "higher rate per day than during the rainy season.", "While the Mekong has been the major Khmer Communist objective, fighting has raged all around Phnom Penh and particularly to its northwest. Our Embassy has informed us that casualties since January 1 have averaged about 1,000 per day for both sides. Furthermore, attacks have continued throughout Cambodia, where opposing forces are in constant contact. Also, the insurgents have this year launched more rockets at Phnom Penh than ever before—over 500 during January alone. The latter attacks are of course indiscriminate, and the majority of the victims are women and children.", "To make the situation yet grimmer, the economic plight of Cambodia is becoming desperate. The entire economy has been completely disrupted by the war. This once rice-exporting nation is now almost entirely dependent on U.S. imports, and much of its productive agricultural population is huddling in government areas for protection. In the last few months, our Embassy has noted the beginnings of deterioration in the health of the population, particularly in Phnom Penh. As is clear from daily news reports, this has now become a serious problem, with malnutrition spreading and, in some cases, starvation. There is at this time sufficient food in Phnom Penh; but rice is too costly for the poor to buy and, to some extent, there is a maldistribution of supplies. The Khmer Government, together with U.S. and international voluntary agencies and our Embassy, has made ever-increasing efforts on behalf of not only refugees but the entire needy population; but more is needed.", "In the Administration's budget requests for fiscal year 1975, we requested $390 million for the Military Assistance Program.", "¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.", "354", "Department of State Bulletin", "(MAP), $100 million, including $100 million from Cambodia Exchange and $70 million from the U.S. Government. On January 2, 1975, it was announced that the United States would provide $377 million to the government of Cambodia. In addition, the Phnom Penh Agreement, which was signed on January 1, 1975, provided for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Cambodia and for the establishment of a government in Phnom Penh. The new government is expected to be installed in June. It is assumed that the new government will be able to provide for the transportation of goods to the United States, but it is not yet clear whether the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account.", "On January 2, 1975, a legislative release was issued by the National Assembly, imposing a sistance Act of 1974, which provides for the collection of $222 million in mental of the sum of $77 million in cash and kind. The bill was approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives on January 3, 1975, and was signed into law by the President on January 4, 1975. The bill provides for the collection of $377 million a year, with an additional $77 million to be drawn down in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $377 million which has been deposited in the U.S. bank account, and that the $77 million will be collected and used to pay the $100 million which has already been deposited in the U.S. bank account. The new government will then be able to pay the remaining $222 million in mental tax, and the $77 million in cash and kind, and to pay the $100 million which will be collected in 75 days. It is assumed that the new government will be able to pay the $37

(MAP), $100 million for economic assist-
ance, including a contribution to the Cam-
bodia Exchange Support Fund and the Com-
modity Import Program, plus $77 million for
Public Law 480. Congress authorized a total
of $377 million for all kinds of assistance.
It divided this sum into $200 million for
MAP, $100 million for economic assistance,
and $77 million left for Public Law 480. In
addition, the President was authorized to
draw down $75 million of military stocks if
he deemed it essential. As of now, all of this
authority has been used. If no additional
authority is provided, ammunition will begin
to run out in about a month and food by
June—perhaps earlier if we run out of funds
for transportation, which has now become
very expensive because of necessary airlifts.

On January 28, the President requested legislative release from the statutory ceilings imposed under section 39 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 and requested a supplemental of $222 million for MAP. Ninety percent of the sum requested for MAP would be spent on ammunition. This estimate, in turn, is based on the high level of fighting during the present dry season and assumes a lessening of fighting beginning in May and June. No extra funds have been requested for economic assistance. Lifting of the overall ceiling of $377 million for Cambodia would permit the additional flow of P.L. 480 food to Cambodia. It is estimated that at least $73 million more of P.L. 480 will be needed for the remainder of this fiscal year.

We fully realize and appreciate the nat-
ural questions which arise in your minds and
those of the American people regarding the
need for such assistance to Cambodia at a
time of economic difficulty in the United
States itself. However, Cambodia cannot be
viewed as an isolated spot of small import
to the United States. Rather, it must be
viewed in the larger context of Indochina,
which in turn affects Southeast Asia and
Asia as a whole, which, again, affects the
rest of the world. It is not to exaggerate to
say that the eyes of the world are on the

U.S. response to the needs of embattled
countries.

Our objective in Cambodia is to see an
early compromise settlement of the conflict.
The United States has been providing assist-
ance to Cambodia in the tradition of willing-
ness to help those who are willing to defend
themselves. Never have the Khmer requested
troops or advisers; only the wherewithal to
defend themselves. This we have given for
almost five years, and I do not believe that
we should consider providing inadequate re-
sources to a country that has depended on
us so heavily for so long in its own struggle
for survival.

The Cambodian Government since the
time of the Paris accords on Viet-Nam, which
called for the removal of all foreign troops
and noninterference in Cambodian affairs,
has again and again offered to enter into
discussions with its opponents without any
preconditions. The last such offer was made
immediately following last year's U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolution calling for nego-
tiations. The government in Phnom Penh
welcomed this resolution, which we also
strongly supported, and invited Secretary
General Waldheim to visit Phnom Penh. To
date, all efforts by the Government of Cam-
bodia to achieve negotiated settlement have
been rebuffed. The United States has sup-
ported these peace efforts publicly and in
bilateral efforts, also to no avail. We would
hope, however, that the opponents of the
present government will be brought to nego-
tiate once they realize that they are unable
to win a military victory. This realization,
however, will not come if the Cambodian
Government lacks adequate U.S. military
and economic assistance. As Prince Sihanouk
himself has stated, why should he negotiate
if the U.S. Congress is not going to give
sufficient aid to the Cambodian Government?
I note this remark of Prince Sihanouk's not
to irritate you, but as an illustration of the
effect of U.S. aid, or lack thereof, on the
prospects for peace through negotiation and
compromise in Cambodia and elsewhere.

ing the rainy
en the major
fighting has
and particu-
lary in the major
Embassy has
January 1
for both
have continued
opposing forces
the insurgents
rockets at
ore—over 500
ter attacks are
the majority
children.

grimmer, the
is becoming
has been com-
This once rice-
ent entirely de-
d much of its
lation is hud-
protection. In
assy has noted
in the health
rly in Phnom
news reports,
s problem, with
in some cases,
time sufficient
e is too costly
to some extent,
of supplies. The
with U.S. and
ntries and our
reasing efforts
s but the entire
s needed.

Budget requests
ested $390 mil-
tance Program

of State Bulletin

March 17, 1975

355

In conclusion, I wish to stress once again the extreme urgency of Cambodia's needs for sufficient military and economic assistance. Only through this can that nation survive, can the Khmer Communists be convinced that military victory is impossible, and can a compromise solution through negotiation be reached.

## Department Discusses Food Aid and World Food Security

Following is a statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, submitted to the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on February 18.¹

It is apparent that the task of achieving world food security in the last quarter of the century will be both more complex and more compelling than heretofore.

Up until two years ago the world had substantial food reserves, nearly all of it held in North America. Now we are down to pipeline levels, having adjusted to two successive annual shortfalls in availabilities first by drawing down stocks, then by significant cutbacks in consumption in this country (through livestock liquidation) and in a few developing countries. At present there is no more scope for adjustment without severe hardship.

Current projections suggest that a small statistical surplus in world grain supply and demand is probable this year. But even if realized, the resulting increase in stocks would leave the world vulnerable to a new grain shortfall.

Projected requirements for the medium and long term are disquieting. To meet demand generated by growing population and economic growth, the World Food Confer-

ence estimated, total food production have to continue to grow over the next 10 years at an average annual rate of 21 percent. While physically possible, sustained production growth at this level will require an extraordinary effort in every country, improving yields and bring new land into cultivation. It will require a particular achievement in developing countries, in which food production is projected—even at the current historically high annual rate of increase, 21/2 percent—to lag well behind demand, which will increase at 31/2 percent, wide the gap in LDC [less developed country] food requirements from 25 million tons present to as much as 85 million tons in 1985. Such a gap is far more than the developing countries could conceivably purchase commercially and far more than donors can conceivably provide in food aid.

There has been much discussion about the meaning of these projections, with some arguing that the world is heading for a Malthusian disaster, others that we can as in the past rely upon technological changes, the stimulus to agricultural growth of higher relative prices for food, and efforts to dampen population growth. I do not think we can know now which of these competing forecasts is closer to the truth, for the outcome depends essentially on the action which this country and others now take. But this much is clear: The penalty for calculating wrong and doing too little to celerate world agricultural production is devastatingly harsh, far harsher than the cost of doing too much.

At Rome in November, Secretary Kissinger laid out a three-point strategy for food security, which, in its essentials, the World Food Conference adopted. This strategy calls for:

First, accelerated production in both developed and developing countries. In the short and medium term, the major producing countries like the United States can expand output to meet shortfalls in the developing world. But over time the

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March 17, 1975

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of February 25

2/25/75-

Press release 103 dated February 25

Secretary Kissinger: We will go straight to the questions. Mr. Davis [Spencer Davis, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports coming from Cambodia and Viet-Nam are becoming very bleak. One of your top aides estimates only two more months of survival for Cambodia if they do not receive supplemental assistance. The question is: What good would further supplemental assistance be when so many billions in past assistance has not helped; and, secondly, what is your appraisal on a new American peace initiative that might stop the fighting?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me first separate the problem in Cambodia from the problem in Viet-Nam. In Cambodia, we have an immediate emergency. We have a situation where, if a supplemental is not voted within the next few weeks, it is certain that Cambodia must fall because it will run out of ammunition. Therefore the decision before us is whether the United States will withhold ammunition from a country which has been associated with us and which, clearly, wishes to defend itself. This is a serious responsibility to take.

With respect to Viet-Nam, we are facing a more long-term situation of the same order. The long-term problem in Viet-Nam is this: Throughout the period of the American involvement in Viet-Nam and during the negotiations that were going on, it was never suggested that Viet-Nam would be able to stand by itself without American assistance; the argument at that time was to withdraw American military forces and to enable Viet-Nam, without assistance, to stand on its own. There are many situations in the world which

have no outcome as long as there are neighbors that continue to pursue aggressive designs.

If you go around the world and ask whether the United States can give support only where there is a clear terminal point, there will be many countries that will be in the most severe jeopardy.

Now, in Cambodia the situation is imminently critical. In Viet-Nam, the situation will be critical over a long period of time if we do not give adequate support. If we do give adequate support, then there is the possibility of Viet-Nam defending itself.

With respect to negotiations, the United States has engaged in, and is supporting now, efforts at negotiations both in Cambodia and Viet-Nam. It has been our experience, however, that negotiations cannot be a substitute for a situation on the ground but that they will reflect a situation on the ground. And therefore we have urged the Congress to look at the problem, recognizing the many pressures to which they are exposed—recognizing that the American people may well be tired of many years of exertions but keeping in mind also that sometimes to give in to the mood of the moment may lead to profound regrets later on.

And I would also like to say that this debate, which is a rather solemn one, should be conducted without reference to motives—which seems to become so much of a staple of the Viet-Nam debate.

## Lifting the Arms Embargo in South Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you a question which appears to concern not only the relations with the subcontinent of India but the détente between the United States and

March 17, 1975

321

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand the Soviet view, they are prepared to discuss this as part of an overall settlement. They are not prepared to discuss it at the moment.

## Southeast Asia and American Commitments

Q. Mr. Secretary, of the vast amount of aid we have sent to Southeast Asia and our own involvement, why would any country in the world ever have grave doubts about American commitments?

Secretary Kissinger: Because if the collapse of Southeast Asia is caused by an American decision to withhold aid under conditions in which such a decision can have only one outcome, the conclusion will be inevitable that it was the United States which has the responsibility. There is no possible way that Viet-Nam can acquire the arms that are needed to defend itself until its economy has reached a point where perhaps there is sufficient surplus from oil income or other economic developments. And there are many other countries in the world that find themselves in analogous circumstances.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it reasonable to talk about any finite period of time—the three years, for example, that has been suggested by the Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: It is the second-best course. Very often, in these exchanges between the executive and the legislative, one is driven into positions which reflect the best that may be attainable. There is an argument that can be made that if aid is contained for three years at a sufficiently high level that at that period the economy of Viet-Nam could develop to a point where it would have enough surplus revenues to pay for the import of arms by itself.

I have seen these arguments. They seem plausible to me, and I would support them. I must say, quite candidly, that the preferable course is to go the route that I indicated. But, if necessary, we will accept a three-year term with adequate sums.

## Question of Guarantees in Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were on this last trip you said that Israel should be expected to give up its territory with a quid pro quo. Did you come away with your talks with President Sadat [of Israel] feeling that he acknowledges this?

Secretary Kissinger: The fact that I returning to the Middle East indicates I believe there is a chance to implement a principle, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on the point you think that it will be necessary for us to be American guarantees for the need of the disengagement?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The question of an American guarantee can arise only in connection with a final settlement and not as a substitute for a final settlement as a backup position to enhance the success of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that line briefly, do you have in mind something that would have to be ratified by the Congress of a treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have a specific idea in mind, but it has been matic in all the discussions about the Middle East that a final settlement have to have some sort of a guarantee. Some people have suggested a Soviet can guarantee. Others have suggested a Security Council guarantee. Others suggested a unilateral American guarantee. All that I have suggested is that the States is studying the problem of guarantees would be adequate for settlement, I repeat, not as a substitute for the sense of security and justice of parties concerned but as a reinforcement it once the negotiation has been complete.

It is inconceivable to me that there be any American participation in a treaty that did not have the full support of the Congress of the United States. It means that is achieved would depend on the nature of the guarantee and on the success of the negotiations.

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[109]

STATEMENT ON DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES IN THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING
COMMUNITY

[1.] Before answering questions, I have a short prepared statement that I would like to make at the outset. It reads as follows:

There have been reports in recent weeks of attempts in the international banking community to discriminate against certain institutions or individuals on religious or ethnic grounds.

There should be no doubt about the position of this Administration and the United States. Such discrimination is totally contrary to the American tradition and repugnant to American principles. It has no place in the free practice of commerce as it has flourished in this country.

Foreign businessmen and investors are most welcome in the United States when they are willing to conform to the principles of our society. However, any allegations of discrimination will be fully investigated and appropriate action taken under the laws of the United States.

Mr. McDermott [John McDermott, Miami Herald].

QUESTIONS

THE MIDDLE EAST

[2.] Q. Mr. President, what was behind Dr. Kissinger's recent observation that some day we might have to go in and destroy the oil wells of the Middle East? Do you envision such a possibility ever happening?

THE PRESIDENT. I do not recollect the precise statement that is attributed to the Secretary. I suspect you are referring to the oft-quoted statement about "strangulation."

I have answered that question, as has the Secretary, on a number of occasions. To be repetitive at this point, I think, might only increase speculation. The facts are that there was an answer to a very hypothetical question of the most extreme circumstances, and both the Secretary and I have indicated our views on the subject.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

[3.] Q. Mr. President, is what you call our moral commitment to arm South Vietnam and Cambodia open-ended? And what are you doing specifically to bring the warring parties to the peace table?

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THE PRESIDENT. Well, the commitment that we have to the South Vietnamese and the commitment that we have to some extent in Cambodia is one that we as the United States agreed at the Paris peace accords, that we would withdraw our forces and that, hopefully, peace would be established in Indochina.

Part of our commitment was that we would, in the process or as the result of the withdrawal of our own military personnel, we would continue to supply arms on a replacement basis, and that commitment was predicated on the willingness of the South Vietnamese to fight aggression from North Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese are fighting, are trying to protect their country, and are seeking to defend their country from invasion. It seems to me that as we look back at our participation in the Paris accords and the promises that were made, as long as they were willing to fight against aggression and invasion, that we had an obligation to help them with military equipment on a replacement basis.

The situation there is one that I am willing to negotiate with the Congress. I indicated that if the Congress would join with me, we would make a firm and final decision on a 3-year basis to permit South Vietnam to get over the current crisis that they face.

I think that would be a reasonable solution. I am told that the South Vietnamese in a 3-year period, with our military and economic aid, would be able to handle the situation.

Q. What about Cambodia?

THE PRESIDENT. In Cambodia, the problem there is extremely critical. Unless there is additional U.S. military aid, as I have recommended, the Cambodians will run out of ammunition in a relatively short period of time. I think that would be most unfortunate, because if they are able, between now and the end of the dry season, to maintain their national integrity—the present government—there is a possibility of negotiations that might end the war in Cambodia.

ENERGY AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS

[4.] Q. Mr. President, with reference to your energy-economic program, Congress is going off in one direction, you have suggested another direction. You have also suggested that you are willing to compromise. I wonder if you might specify some of those areas of compromise?

THE PRESIDENT. I wish there was a single plan proposed by the majority party in the Congress. It is a slight exaggeration, but there are many, many plans that have been discussed by the majority party. I can think of three in particular: the plan that is proposed by Senator Pastore, the plan that is proposed by Con-

February 26

gressman Jim Vauvindean Al Ullman stand there are no problems.

What we need to do is sit down to have something to say, "Here is our position. We have said, 'Here is our position,' and until we do that, we cannot pursue our plan or solve our problems."

Q. Are you saying that you will negotiate with the North Vietnamese?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I am not. I am saying that we have to sit down and negotiate. Now, I intend to sit down and negotiate with them and legitimate time in the last couple of months in Washington, if they do not negotiate.

[5.] Q. Mr. President, with reference to your morning's remarks on recession tax cuts, what are your views on the following?

THE PRESIDENT. I have said that I am in favor of a program of economic recovery, and I support the action of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Labor and Welfare. And then, if there is any program of economic recovery that I support, I will support it.

And our program of acting very quickly has not yet acted. I have not yet had the Senate Committee on Commerce, Labor and Welfare report to me that it will have to go to Congress, and I think that it will go to Congress with a report that it will support.

I think that it will go to Congress with a report that it will support. And if they do not take it, I will support it.

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range of employment opportunities for women can be opened. We cannot and must not permit persons to be locked into jobs not commensurate with their potential. I am looking to you and to every manager in the Federal Government to assure that employees, without regard to their race, national origin or sex, have an opportunity for advancement in accordance with individual abilities.

Moreover, men and women of all racial and ethnic backgrounds must be assured a fair opportunity to serve in positions where they can make a maximum contribution and participate in the decision-making process.

Equal employment opportunity doesn't just happen; it comes about because managers make it happen. I want equal opportunity to be reflected in every aspect of Federal employment. I have called on Chairman Hampton of the Civil Service Commission to keep me fully informed on an annual basis of the progress each Federal department and agency is making in this regard. Increased accountability on the part of Federal managers will help to promptly identify deficiencies and strengthen our EEO program at all levels.

Just as we will not condone preferences in employment decisions because of a person's race, ethnic origin or sex, we will not tolerate failure to vigorously carry out affirmative actions in support of equal employment opportunity. I am asking for your personal commitment and active cooperation in assuring that the American ideal of true equal employment opportunity is a reality in the Federal Government.

Please make my views known to all employees and managers in your organization. Their understanding of my objective is essential. Their support is required.

GERALD R. FORD

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March 6, 1975

STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CAMBODIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

THE PRESIDENT. [1.] Good evening. Before we start the questions tonight, I would like to make a statement on the subject of assistance to Cambodia and to Vietnam.

There are three issues—the first, the future of the people who live there. It is a concern that is humanitarian—food for those who hunger and medical sup-

March 6

plies for the need for more television.

I would like to thank you, Chairman, for your aid, but I feel that our body, that Congress, can do more than we can on the floor, but on the floor.

We cannot do it alone. Only together can we do it, and the bloodshed must stop.

The second question or by request from the President, States have made a cease-fire agreement about a cease-fire.

The Cambodian negotiations repeatedly expand the conflict, but they can do so only with the bloodshed continuing.

The United Nations has an outline of actions since I began my administration.

Let me assure you, that the participants in the negotiations are not being cut off by the United States.

Yet all of prevented by the United States can win its objective, but we must cut off assistance to theVN.

We want an outline of action by the United States to support the negotiations.

If we abandon our hope of success in the negotiations, we must prepare for aggression by theVN.

³On March 5, of negotiating efforts

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plies for the men and women and children who are suffering the ravages of war. We seek to stop the bloodshed and end the horror and the tragedy that we see on television as rockets are fired wantonly into Phnom Penh.

I would like to be able to say that the killing would cease if we were to stop our aid, but that is not the case. The record shows, in both Vietnam and Cambodia, that Communist takeover of an area does not bring an end to violence, but on the contrary, subjects the innocent to new horrors.

We cannot meet humanitarian needs unless we provide some military assistance. Only through a combination of humanitarian endeavors and military aid do we have a chance to stop the fighting in that country in such a way as to end the bloodshed.

The second issue is whether the problems of Indochina will be settled by con-quest or by negotiation. Both the Governments of Cambodia and the United States have made vigorous and continued efforts over the last few years to bring about a cease-fire and a political settlement.

The Cambodian Government declared a unilateral cease-fire and called for negotiations immediately after the peace accords of January 1973. It has since repeatedly expressed its willingness to be flexible in seeking a negotiated end to the conflict. Its leaders have made clear that they are willing to do whatever they can do to bring peace to the country.

The United States has backed these peace efforts. Yesterday, we made public an outline of our unceasing efforts over the years, including six separate initiatives since I became President.¹

Let me assure you: We will support any negotiations and accept any outcome that the parties themselves will agree to. As far as the United States is concerned, the personalities involved will not themselves constitute obstacles of any kind to a settlement.

Yet all of our efforts have been rebuffed. Peace in Cambodia has not been prevented by our failure to offer reasonable solutions. The aggressor believes it can win its objectives on the battlefield. This belief will be encouraged if we cut off assistance to our friends.

We want an end to the killing and a negotiated settlement. But there is no hope of success unless the Congress acts quickly to provide the necessary means for Cambodia to survive.

If we abandon our allies, we will be saying to all the world that war pays. Aggression will not stop; rather it will increase. In Cambodia, the aggressors

¹ On March 5, 1975, the Department of State Office of Press Relations had made available a summary of negotiating efforts on Cambodia.

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will have shown that if negotiations are resisted, the United States will weary, abandon its friends, and force will prevail.

The third issue is the reliability of the United States. If we cease to help our friends in Indochina, we will have violated their trust that we would help them with arms, with food, and with supplies so long as they remain determined to fight for their own freedom. We will have been false to ourselves, to our word, and to our friends. No one should think for a moment that we can walk away from that without a deep sense of shame.

This is not a question of involvement or reinvolvement in Indochina. We have ended our involvement. All American forces have come home. They will not go back.

Time is short. There are two things the United States can do to affect the outcome. For my part, I will continue to seek a negotiated settlement. I ask the Congress to do its part by providing the assistance required to make such a settlement possible.

Time is running out.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

## QUESTIONS

### CAMBODIA

[2.] Q. Mr. President, you wound up saying, "Time is running out" in Cambodia. Can you give us any assurance that even if the aid is voted it will get there in time? Is it stockpiled and ready to roll, or what is the situation?

THE PRESIDENT. If we don't give the aid, there is no hope. If we do get the necessary legislation from the Congress and it comes quickly—I would say within the next 10 days or 2 weeks—it will be possible to get the necessary aid to Cambodia, both economic assistance, humanitarian assistance, and military assistance. I believe there is a hope that we can help our friends to continue long enough to get into the wet season, then there will be an opportunity for the kind of negotiation which I think offers the best hope for a peace in Cambodia.

Mr. Growald [Richard Growald, United Press International].

### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[3.] Q. Mr. President, would you tell us what Director Colby has told you of any CIA connection with the assassination of foreign leaders?

THE PRESIDENT. I am not in a position to give you any factual account. I have had a full report from Mr. Colby on the operations that have been alluded to in

March 6

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[125]

the news media in the last week or so, really involving such actions that might
have taken place beginning back in the 1960's.

I don't think it is appropriate for me at this time to go any further. We do have an investigation of the CIA, of our intelligence agencies, by the Congress, both overt and covert, going back from the inception of the CIA. And of course, we do have the Rockefeller Commission going into any CIA activities in the domestic front.

But for me to comment beyond that, I think, would be inappropriate at this time.

[4.] Q. Mr. President, you say that there would be a deep sense of shame in the country if Cambodia should fall. If that would be the case, sir, can you explain why there seems to be such a broad feeling of apathy in the country and also in the Congress toward providing any more aid for either Cambodia or South Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT. I believe there is a growing concern which has been ac-
centuated since we have seen the horror stories on television in recent weeks—the
wanton use of rockets in the city of Phnom Penh, the children lying stricken on
the streets, and people under great stress and strain—bloody scenes of the worst
kind.

I think this kind of depicting of a tragedy there has aroused American con-
cern, and I think it is a growing concern as the prospect of tragedy of this kind
becomes even more evident.

So, I have noticed in the last week in the United States Congress, in a bipartisan
way, a great deal more interest in trying to find an answer. And yesterday I
spent an hour-plus with Members of Congress who came back from a trip. to
Cambodia and South Vietnam, and they saw firsthand the kind of killing,
the kind of bloodshed, and it had a severe impact on these Members of Congress,
some of whom have been very, very strongly opposed to our involvement in the
past in Vietnam. And I think their impact will be significant in the Congress
as well as in the country.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Q. Mr. President, the question is raised by many critics of our policy in South-
east Asia as to why we can conduct a policy of détente with the two Communist
super powers in the world and could not follow a policy of détente should Cam-
bodia and South Vietnam go Communist. Could you explain that to us?

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THE PRESIDENT. I think you have to understand the differences that we have with China—the People's Republic of China—and with the Soviet Union. We do not accept their ideology. We do not accept their philosophy. On the other hand, we have to recognize that both countries have great power bases in the world, not only in population but in the regions in which they exist.

We do not expect to recognize or to believe in their philosophies. But it is important for us, the United States, to try and remove any of the obstacles that keep us from working together to solve some of the problems that exist throughout the world, including Indochina.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China have supplied and are supplying military assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia. We have to work with them to try and get an answer in that part of the world. But at the same time, I think that effort can be increased and the prospects improved if we continue the détente between ourselves and both of those powers.

Tom [Tom Brokaw, NBC News].

Q. Mr. President, putting it bluntly, wouldn't we just be continuing a bloodbath that already exists in Cambodia if we voted the $222 million in assistance?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think so, because the prospects are that with the kind of military assistance and economic and humanitarian aid we are proposing, the government forces hopefully can hold out. Now, if we do not, the prospects are almost certain that Phnom Penh will be overrun. And we know from previous experiences that the overrunning of a community or an area results in the murder and the bloodshed that comes when they pick up and sort out the people who were the schoolteachers, the leaders, the government officials.

This was told very dramatically to me yesterday by several Members of the Congress who were there and talked to some of the people who were in some of these communities or villages that were overrun.

It is an unbelievable horror story. And if we can hold out—and I think the prospects are encouraging—then I think we will avoid that kind of massacre and innocent murdering of people who really do not deserve that kind of treatment.

Q. Mr. President, if I may follow up: As I understand it, the Administration's point is that if we vote the aid that we will have the possibility of a negotiated settlement, not just the avoidance of a bloodbath. Is that correct?

THE PRESIDENT. That is correct, sir.

Q. And yet, just yesterday, as you indicated in your statement, the State Department listed at least six unsuccessful efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Cambodia, dating to the summer of 1973, when American bombing stopped

March 6

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[125]

there. The Cambodian Government was certainly stronger than it would be with just conceivably another $220 million.

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think if you look at that long list of bona fide, legitimate negotiated efforts, the best prospects came when the enemy felt that it would be better off to negotiate than to fight.

Now, if we can strengthen the government forces now and get into the wet season, then I believe the opportunity to negotiate will be infinitely better, certainly better than if the government forces are routed and the rebels—the Khmer Rouge—take over and do what they have done in other communities where they have had this kind of opportunity.

Q. Mr. President, you said, sir, that if the funds are provided that hopefully they can hold out. How long are you talking about? How long can they hold out? In other words, how long do you feel this aid will be necessary to continue?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, this aid that we have requested on an emergency basis from the Congress is anticipated to provide the necessary humanitarian effort and the necessary military effort to get them through the dry season, which ends roughly the latter part of June or the first of July.

## THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

[5.] Q. Mr. President, if I might, I am sure you have seen news accounts to the effect that the conservatives, especially within your own party, are considering starting a third party in 1976, and they are bolting.

And I understand yesterday that a group of conservative Republican Senators met with you, and afterwards they came out and talked with reporters at the White House and told us that they were unhappy with your policies, they thought you were going too far to the left. And in fact, they said they wanted you to know that you could no longer take the right wing of your party for granted.

That being the case, sir, do you intend to go out and court conservative Republican support to woo them back for 1976, and do you think anything short of dropping Nelson Rockefeller from the ticket will do that?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, let me say the meeting that I had with about 11 very fine Republican Members of the United States Senate was a very, very frank discussion, and I think very constructive.

Some of them indicated that in certain areas they had disagreements with me. In other areas, they indicated a very strong support for the position that I have taken on various issues.

It is my feeling that the Republican Party has to be a broad-based, wide-

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I would hope that that terrorist activity would not, under any circumstances, destroy the prospects or the possibilities for further peace accomplishments in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, have you considered asking Israel to become part of NATO?

THE PRESIDENT. I have not.

CAMBODIA

[11.] Q. Mr. President, you sounded encouraged about the prospect for Cambodian aid. Can you give us an estimate of what you think the chances are now of it being passed?

THE PRESIDENT. They are certainly better than they were. I had a meeting this morning with Senator Sparkman and Senator Hubert Humphrey and Senator Clifford Case. They want to help. They say the prospects are 50-50. But if they are that, I think we ought to try and make the effort, because I think the stakes are very, very high when you involve the innocent people who are being killed in Cambodia.

Q. May I follow up? If the Congress does not provide the aid and the Lon Nol government should fall, would the country be in for any recrimination from this Administration? Would we have another "who lost China" debate, for example?

THE PRESIDENT. I first would hope we get the aid and the government is able to negotiate a settlement. I do not think—at least from my point of view—that I would go around the country pointing my finger at anybody. I think the facts would speak for themselves.

Q. Mr. President, from some of the remarks the Senators who met with you today made, they did not indicate that they were quite in as much agreement as you have indicated, but Senator Humphrey, for one, asked, as part of a negotiated settlement that you spoke of, if you would be willing to seek the orderly resignation of President Lon Nol.

THE PRESIDENT. I do not believe it is the proper role of this Government to ask the head of another state to resign. I said in my opening statement that we believe that the settlement ought to be undertaken, and it is not one that revolves around any one individual. And I would hope that some formula—some individuals on both sides could sit down and negotiate a settlement to stop the bloodshed.

Q. Could I follow up? On that, are you saying that the United States will

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support any government, no matter how weak or corrupt, in a situation like
this?

THE PRESIDENT. I am not saying we would support any government. I am saying that we would support any government that we can see coming out of the present situation or the negotiated settlement.

PROGRAMS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED

[12.] Q. Mr. President, yesterday on unemployment you requested $1.6 billion for public service jobs to run through mid-1976.³ Now, your advisers mean-time keep predicting that the problem will improve in mid-'75, just a month or two from now. How do you reconcile those two positions?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the requested additional manpower training funds that I requested will fully fund the authorized amount that was approved by the Congress last year. We believe that this amount is needed to take care of any potential contingencies.

We think there will be an improvement toward the end of this year and certainly in the beginning of next year on the unemployment. On the other hand, we think it is wise at this time to be prepared for any adverse developments.

Q. You mentioned earlier that it might go to 9. Are you revising upward the figure from 8.5?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I think I said that I was not going to agree to any figure, but I did say that if we had any such development, the better way to solve it would be for a further tax cut rather than some of these additional spending programs, and the most important thing was to get the Congress to act affirmatively, quickly, on the tax bill. I am very disturbed with their lack of affirmative action as quickly as I think it should come.

OIL PRICES

[13.] Q. Mr. President, out of the OPEC summit meeting in Algiers today came a declaration that oil prices should be pegged to inflation and the prices they have to pay for the products they buy. Do you think this kind of inflation indexing system is fair?

THE PRESIDENT. We are trying to organize the consuming nations, and we have been quite successful. I believe that once that organization has been put together—and it is well along—that we should sit down and negotiate any matters with the producing nations.

³ For a statement by the White House Press Secretary summarizing the President's observations and decisions following a meeting with economic and energy advisers, see the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 11, p. 242).

March 7

I personally by the OPEC is to be orga-

[14.] Q. nounced you proposal for $2 billion for food stamps. deficit is goin'

THE PRESIDENT. We did our tially to it by proposed.

I think I deferral, and have, in addi stamp costs. I

And I will $52 billion is the way to st are wrong. I is through a ta

MR. CORMIE

THE PRESID

NOTE: President Fo at 7:31 p.m. in 197

126

Statement of Council on

I HAVE received rity. I concur principles of th

In my view, stabilization of

330

THE CONGRESS

3/13/75

## Compelling Need for Assistance to Cambodia Reemphasized

Following is a statement made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 13 by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll, who was Acting Secretary during Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Middle East.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to address the urgent matter of assistance to Cambodia.

Since January 28 when the President asked Congress to lift the ceiling on overall U.S. assistance to Cambodia and authorize a supplemental budget request of $222 million for military assistance, many witnesses have been heard.

On Tuesday, the subcommittee on foreign relations of the Senate voted a compromise which will be voted on in the full committee next Monday. Briefly, this would provide $125 million more in drawdown authority for military aid to Cambodia, as well as an increase in the ceiling on economic assistance which will allow an additional $73 million for Public Law 480 and $15.5 million for other economic aid.

Just yesterday, this committee's Subcommittee on Investigations recommended an alternative compromise formula whereby the ceiling on military assistance would be increased to permit an additional $20 million per month from available military assistance funds plus an additional $7.5 million per month under the drawdown authority. This

formula would also permit an increase to $17.7 million per month in food aid under Public Law 480.

While the Administration's request for the full $222 million is based on our best estimate of the requirements of the situation, the Administration is prepared to accept a compromise in view of the urgency of the situation. The Senate approach comes closer to meeting what we consider to be the necessary levels of economic and military assistance. Nevertheless we hope both the Senate and the House will move expeditiously so that the necessary legislation can be enacted as quickly as possible.

I am appearing today as Acting Secretary of State to stress once more the absolute necessity for urgent congressional action.

The military situation in Cambodia has deteriorated since the President's January 28 request. For the first time in five years of war, the Mekong River has been temporarily closed to shipping. Munitions, food, and petroleum supplies must now be brought into Cambodia by airlift. Government forces, however, will be unable to continue their defense unless supplemental authority and funds are provided promptly for increased military assistance, 80 percent of which will be ammunition.

Unless the ceiling of total Cambodian aid is lifted, we shall be unable to continue the purchase and delivery of adequate foodstuffs to Cambodia. A delay on food aid means malnutrition and starvation for increasing numbers of Cambodians, particularly the very young and very old.

One of the most prevalent arguments against increased aid to Cambodia is that additional assistance may well prolong the killing and agony but will not provide any guarantee of negotiation and a compromise settlement—policy object Khmer Government.

I contend that it States unilaterally for another sovereign.

Neither we nor the Government seek a military intervention.

You will recall that the Administration provided a support of and efforts of the Cambodian government to a settlement to the Can

Let me repeat a by the President and spokesman: We hope very strongly that of the additional assistance, there is a reasonable chance of a successful resolution of the crisis. This will permit their friends, including the United States, to pursue vigorously the promise settlement. I

Without the addition can be only one result: Cambodia: a military side.

In addressing the aid to Cambodia, I hope the subcommittee will not look isolated area but as part of a whole world.

We have no legal right to request for help to continue this assistance we now simply to abrogate will is to continue defense ability to do so depending on the result.

Our policy toward Cambodia is to watch with some concern the continued by our friends many of them our friends in the direction of future U.S. policy, whether or not to be the case.

In conclusion, let me

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

450

Department of State Bulletin

April 7, 1975

ment—policy objectives long sought by the
Khmer Government and the United States.

I contend that it is not up to the United
States unilaterally to make that judgment
for another sovereign government.

Neither we nor the Cambodian Govern-
ment seek a military solution.

You will recall that last week the Adminis-
tration provided a summary of our efforts—
in support of and complementary to the
efforts of the Cambodian Government—to
find the way to a compromise, negotiated
settlement to the Cambodian problem.

Let me repeat a point made previously
by the President and other Administration
spokesman: We honestly believe—and be-
lieve very strongly—that, with the provision
of the additional assistance under discus-
sion, there is a reasonable chance that the
Khmer Government will survive the current
crisis. This will permit the Cambodians and
their friends, including the United States, to
pursue vigorously their efforts to find a com-
promise settlement. I want to stress this.

Without the additional assistance there
can be only one result to the situation in
Cambodia: a military victory for the other
side.

In addressing the President's request for
aid to Cambodia, I hope members of the com-
mittee will not look at the country as an
isolated area but as part of a mosaic which
includes Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the
whole world.

We have no legal commitment to Cambodia.
Nevertheless, we responded to Cambodia's
request for help to defend itself and have
continued this assistance for five years. Are
we now simply to abandon a friend whose
will is to continue defending itself but whose
ability to do so depends on us?

Our policy toward Cambodia is being
watched with some concern by other nations,
many of them our friends, as a possible in-
dication of future U.S. policy. It will be so
viewed, whether or not Congress intends this
to be the case.

In conclusion, let me stress once more the

compelling need for the supplementary mili-
tary aid request for Cambodia and the urgent
requirement for congressional approval to
lift the ceiling on overall aid to that country.

Department Discusses Arab Boycott
of Israel

Following is a statement by Sidney Sober,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East-
ern and South Asian Affairs, made before the
Subcommittee on International Trade and
Commerce of the House Committee on For-
eign Affairs on March 13.¹

I am sure the subcommittee will under-
stand that while we are in the middle of deli-
cate negotiations in the Middle East, this is
a particularly difficult time to be discussing
the subject before us today. I nevertheless
wish to be responsive to the subcommittee's
interest in discussing the policy of the De-
partment of State toward the Arab boycott
of Israel and actions by the Department in
connection with the boycott.

Let me begin by putting the boycott in its
Middle East context.

The Arab boycott of Israel is one mani-
festation of the basic Arab-Israeli conflict
and thus arises from deep-seated political
and emotional factors. The initial boycott
organization, which was set up as a com-
mittee of the Arab League Council at the
beginning of 1946, applied a primary boycott
to prevent the entry of certain products into
Arab countries from what is now the State
of Israel. The secondary boycott, designed to
inhibit third parties from assisting in Israel's
development, was introduced in 1951, and it
is this secondary boycott that affects Ameri-
can economic relations with a number of
Middle East countries.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

etin

April 7, 1975

451

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of March 26

Press release 172 dated March 26

I would like to begin with a brief statement concerning the suspension of the Middle East peace talks.

The step-by-step approach pursued by the United States attempted to separate the Middle East problem into individual and therefore manageable segments. Now that approach has suffered a setback, and the Middle East issues have to be dealt with comprehensively, under more difficult circumstances.

A moment of potentially great danger is not the time to assess blame between the parties or to indulge in recrimination. We need a calm appraisal of the situation and the U.S. policy best suited to the new conditions. Let me sum up the U.S. position:

- With the end of the step-by-step approach, the United States faces a period of more complicated international diplomacy. Consequently, a reassessment of policy is essential. This reassessment has been ordered by the President.

- The dangers which produced the need for progress toward peace are still with us. The United States therefore is determined to continue the search for peace in the Middle East. It is prepared to go to Geneva and will be in touch with the cochairman of the conference, the U.S.S.R., in the near future.

- The United States is prepared to consider any other approach acceptable to the parties.

- The United States remains fully committed to the survival of Israel.

- The search for peace can be nurtured only in an atmosphere of calm. The parties involved in the Middle East conflict thus

have a responsibility to moderate words and deeds and to refrain from threatening acts.

- All outside powers have a responsibility to exercise restraint and to follow a course of moderation.

We face a difficult situation in the Middle East and throughout the world. The times demand a renewed sense of national purpose.

We must understand that peace is indi- visible. The United States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere.

We cannot master our future except as a united people. Our energies should be directed, not at recriminations about the past, but toward a vigorous and constructive search for a lasting peace. And to this, the Administration is dedicated.

Now I'll take questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to American policy and what you have just said regarding selective reliability—in 1965 the United States equated the defense of South Viet-Nam with the commitment to NATO; now it appears to be equating the additional aid to South Viet-Nam with regard to the Middle East and so forth.

Do you feel that during the past five years, the policy and the techniques of diplomacy which we have pursued have been wrong? Have the conditions been wrong? Or what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, you are asking two separate questions. One is the policy, the relationship between Indonesia and other parts of the world; and the

April 14, 1975

461

second is whether the policies pursued in the
last five years have been wrong.

First, let me talk—

Q. I didn't mean "policies"; I meant "strategies."

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that's a distinction without much difference.

Q. In what way?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if the strategy is wrong—I don't see how you can have the right strategy and the wrong policy—or the wrong strategy and the right policy.

So let me answer your question.

With respect to Indochina, we are not equating the intrinsic importance of each part of the world, and we are not saying that every part of the world is strategically as important to the United States as any other part of the world. The problem we face in Indochina today is an elementary question of what kind of a people we are.

For 15 years, we have been involved in encouraging the people of Viet-Nam to defend themselves against what we conceived as external danger.

In 1973, we negotiated a settlement in which we withdrew our forces and, in return, achieved the release of our prisoners. Their settlement, it is well to recall now, was—while we were negotiating it—generally criticized for our holding out for stronger terms.

The fact of the matter is that now that we have withdrawn our forces and have obtained the release of our prisoners, there was never any question that the United States would continue to give economic and military aid to Viet-Nam. And what we face now is whether the United States—not just "will withdraw its forces," which we achieved—and not just "will stop the, or end the, loss of American lives"—but whether it will deliberately destroy an ally by withholding aid from it in its moment of extremity.

This is a fundamental question of how we are viewed by all other people, and it has nothing to do with the question of

whether we should ever have gotten involved there in the first place.

Now, with respect to whether the basic policies have been correct in the last five years, that, of course, is a rather sweeping question which would require an answer that could easily occupy the better part of this press conference.

With respect to Indochina, I would urge people to look at the newspapers and the public debate during the period that these agreements were being negotiated to see what the imperatives were on the Administration in negotiating these settlements.

And the general conviction was that the United States had done enough in expending American lives and that the people of Viet-Nam should have an opportunity to defend themselves without American support. There was never any proposition that the United States should withdraw and cut off aid.

And these agreements were negotiated on the assumption that there would be—that the United States would continue economic and military aid to South Viet-Nam and also that there would be some possibility of enforcing the agreements.

And this is the basic problem with the policy in Viet-Nam.

With respect to other policies, I would rather answer specific questions.

Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up on that question, it appears that the Congress, at least, has felt that the Nixon doctrine has outlived itself and that now supplies will not be provided as have been committed by the United States in the past. Do you plan to reassess the alternatives as a result of the demise of the Nixon doctrine, particularly in reference to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Thailand?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the fact that there are many countries in the world which have no conceivable opportunity to defend themselves without American economic or military assistance. And therefore, if it becomes our national policy

that countries rely entirely on their own resources to international efforts, fundamentally to the United States, to many of our friends.

The so-called on the assumption that would help those pared to help longer true, the massive shift in countries and a period of time that

Q. Mr. Secretary, find in your Memorandum of concern on the Israeli side, in getting rid of a factor in the

Secretary Kissinger's particular cause talks. There is Portugal, Greece, had an effect on the question of sanctions. And since to substitute American physical terrain, On the part of our friends, perhaps concessions, cause the drift of favorable.

Nevertheless, for the breakdown intrinsic to the surrounding

Q. Mr. Secretary, of the interrelated other portions of the Administration at loggerheads over fundamental qu

462

Department of State Bulletin

April 14, 1975

that countries must at some point be able
to rely entirely on their resources, we will
have brought about a massive change in the
international environment that in time will
fundamentally threaten the security of the
United States as well as the security of
many of our friends.

The so-called Nixon doctrine was based on the assumption that the United States would help those countries that were prepared to help themselves. If this is no longer true, then we are likely to find a massive shift in the foreign policies of many countries and a fundamental threat over a period of time to the security of the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how serious did you find in your Middle East negotiations the concern on the Arab—on the Egyptian—and the Israeli sides, the problems you are facing in getting aid for Indochina? Was this a factor in the breakdown of the talks?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot assign any particular cause for the breakdown of the talks. There is no question that events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indochina had an effect on the conduct of the negotiations. On the part of our friends, it raised the question of the durability of our assurances. And since one of our problems was to substitute American assurances for some physical terrain features, this was a factor. On the part of those who were threatening our friends, there was the feeling that perhaps concessions were less necessary because the drift of events was in any case favorable.

Nevertheless I think that the major reason
for the breakdown of the negotiations was
intrinsic to the negotiations themselves. But
the surrounding circumstances were certain-
ly not favorable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to pursue the question of the interrelationship of Indochina and other portions of the world, where does the Administration go from here? It is clearly at loggerheads with the Congress on this fundamental question. The U.S. policy, ac-

cording to the Administration apparently is
immobilized diplomatically on Indochina. Is
there any way over this barrier except a
constant head-on clash with Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't agree that U.S. policy is immobilized over Indochina. There is a philosophical disagreement which I have attempted to explain earlier.

I have believed ever since I came to Washington that it is overwhelmingly in our national interest to put the debate on Indochina behind us.

The Administration has proposed to the
Congress a three-year program for phasing
out American military aid to Viet-Nam,
which would, if the Congress and the Ad-
ministration can agree, remove this issue
from the yearly congressional-executive
battles.

I believe, as I pointed out, that we face
a grave situation. The Administration can-
not give up its convictions simply for the
sake of a technical compromise. But we be-
lieve that this three-year program, if the
levels are adequate, might provide an oppor-
tunity to get the debate behind us.

Reassessment of Middle East Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the reassessment of
U.S. policy toward the whole Middle East
primarily aimed at prompting Israel to
adopt a more relaxed or less intransigent
negotiating posture?

Secretary Kissinger: At this moment,
there are no negotiations going on, and
therefore we would have no concrete pro-
posals to make to Israel, even if Israel asked
us what negotiating posture it should adopt.

The assessment of our policy that is now
going on is made necessary by the new
circumstances. Our policy had been de-
signed, as I pointed out in this statement,
to segment the issues into individual ele-
ments, to negotiate each element separately,
and therefore to permit each party to adjust
itself domestically and internationally to a
process of a gradual approach toward peace.

Now that this approach has to be aban-

Bulletin

April 14, 1975

463

April 3

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[166]

166

April 3, 1975

THE PRESIDENT. At the outset, let me express my appreciation to Mayor Pete Wilson and the fine people of San Diego for the very warm welcome.

I also am delighted to see one or more of my former colleagues in the Congress here. It is always nice to see them. And Al¹ and others who may be here, good morning.

I have a short opening statement.

STATEMENT ON UNITED STATES HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

[1.] We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United States has been doing and will continue to do its utmost to assist these people.

I have directed all available naval ships to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist. We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North Vietnam to permit the movement of refugees to the area of their choice.

While I have been in California, I have been spending many hours on the refugee problem and our humanitarian efforts. I have directed that money from a $2 million special foreign aid children's fund be made available to fly 2,000 South Vietnamese orphans to the United States as soon as possible. I have also directed American officials in Saigon to act immediately to cut redtape and other bureaucratic obstacles preventing these children from coming to the United States.

I have directed that C-5A aircraft and other aircraft, especially equipped to care for these orphans during the flight, be sent to Saigon. I expect these flights to begin within the next 36 to 48 hours. These orphans will be flown to Travis Air Force Base in California and other bases on the west coast and cared for in those locations.

These 2,000 Vietnamese orphans are all in the process of being adopted by American families. This is the least we can do, and we will do much, much more.

The first question is from Mr. George Dissinger of the San Diego Tribune.

¹ Representative Alphonzo Bell of California.

411

[166]

April 3

QUESTIONS
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA

[2.] Q. Mr. President, are you ready to accept a Communist takeover of South Vietnam and Cambodia?

THE PRESIDENT. I would hope that that would not take place in either case. My whole Congressional life in recent years was aimed at avoiding it. My complete efforts as President of the United States were aimed at avoiding that.

I am an optimist, despite the sad and tragic events that we see unfolding. I will do my utmost in the future—as I have in the past—to avoid that result.

Q. Mr. President, I understand you are soon going to ask Congress for new authority to extend humanitarian aid in Southeast Asia. I wondered if you stand by your request, though, for more military aid for South Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT. We do intend to ask for more humanitarian aid. I should point out that the Administration request for $135 million for humanitarian aid in South Vietnam was, unfortunately, reduced to $55 million by Congressional action. Obviously, we will ask for more. The precise amount we have not yet determined.

We will continue to push for the $300 million that we have asked for and Congress had authorized for military assistance to South Vietnam, and the possibility exists that we may ask for more.

Q. Mr. President, how and why did the U.S. miscalculate the intentions of the will of the South Vietnamese to resist?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't believe that we miscalculated the will of the South Vietnamese to carry on their fight for their own freedom.

There were several situations that developed that I think got beyond the control of the Vietnamese people. The unilateral military decision to withdraw created a chaotic situation in Vietnam that appears to have brought about tremendous disorganization.

I believe that the will of the South Vietnamese people to fight for their freedom is best evidenced by the fact that they are fleeing from the North Vietnamese, and that clearly is an indication they don't want to live under the kind of government that exists in North Vietnam.

The will of the South Vietnamese people, I think, still exists. They want freedom under a different kind of government than has existed in North Vietnam. The problem is how to organize that will under the traumatic experiences of the present.

Q. Unilateral decision by whom?

April 3

THE PRESIDENT withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Miss Thompson.

Q. Mr. President, to Washington and that the Congress will meet.

THE PRESIDENT. North Vietnam accords. They have numerous, regular forces. We have no forces.

I still believe that we ally. And although it is a tragic, seen, it is a true.

I must say that to some of the people in South Vietnam on the Chief of Staff, I think they continue to believe that the Communists are the only force in Vietnam and that they are the only force that can stand against the enemy.

But let me continue its role as the Chief of Staff of the Army in Vietnam. I believe that the Communists are the only force in Vietnam and that they are the only force that can stand against the enemy.

Q. Well, Mr. President, what is your military ties to the South?

THE PRESIDENT. Thieu.

Q. Mr. President, what is your national security policy with respect to Vietnam and if so, how will you carry it out?

THE PRESIDENT. And I greatly support the people of South Vietnam in their effort to take over Control of the North.

412

April 3

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[166]

THE PRESIDENT. It was a unilateral decision by President Thieu to order a withdrawal from the broad, exposed areas that were under the control of the South Vietnamese military.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. Mr. President, what is your response to the South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington's statement that we had not lived up to the Paris peace accords and that the Communists are safer allies?

THE PRESIDENT. I won't comment on his statement. I will say this: that the North Vietnamese repeatedly and in massive efforts violated the Paris peace accords. They sent North Vietnamese regular forces into South Vietnam in massive numbers—I think around 150,000 to 175,000 well-trained North Vietnamese regular forces—in violation of the Paris peace accords, moved into South Vietnam. We have objected to that violation.

I still believe that the United States, in this case and in other cases, is a reliable ally. And although I am saddened by the events that we have read about and seen, it is a tragedy unbelievable in its ramifications.

I must say that I am frustrated by the action of the Congress in not responding to some of the requests both for economic and humanitarian and military assistance in South Vietnam. And I am frustrated by the limitations that were placed on the Chief Executive over the last 2 years.

But let me add very strongly: I am convinced that this country is going to continue its leadership. We will stand by our allies, and I specifically warn any adversaries they should not, under any circumstances, feel that the tragedy of Vietnam is an indication that the American people have lost their will or their desire to stand up for freedom anywhere in the world.

Q. Well, Mr. President, can you explain why President Thieu, with our close military ties as allies, did not tell you what he was going to do in terms of the retreat?

THE PRESIDENT. I think the only answer to that can come from President Thieu.

Q. Mr. Ford, recently you said the fall of Cambodia could threaten the national security of this country. Now, considering the probable fall of South Vietnam to Communist forces, do you feel that will threaten our national security, and if so, how?

THE PRESIDENT. At the moment, I do not anticipate the fall of South Vietnam, and I greatly respect and admire the tremendous fight that the Government and the people of Cambodia are putting up against the insurgents who are trying to take over Cambodia.

413

[166]

April 3

I believe that in any case where the United States does not live up to its moral or treaty obligations, it can't help but have an adverse impact on other allies we have around the world.

We read in European papers to the effect that Western Europe ought to have some questions. Let me say to our Western European allies: We are going to stand behind our commitments to NATO, and we are going to stand behind our commitments to other allies around the world.

But there has to be in the minds of some people, a feeling that maybe the tragedy of Indochina might affect our relations with their country. I repeat, the United States is going to continue its leadership and stand by its allies.

Q. Are you, in fact, a believer of the domino theory—if Southeast Asia falls, then perhaps some of the other countries in the Pacific are next?

THE PRESIDENT. I believe that there is a great deal of credibility to the domino theory. I hope it does not happen. I hope that other countries in Southeast Asia—Thailand, the Philippines—don't misread the will of the American people and the leadership of this country to believing that we are going to abandon our position in Southeast Asia. We are not.

But I do know from the things I read and the messages that I hear, that some of them do get uneasy. I hope and trust they believe me when I say we are going to stand by our allies.

PROTECTION OF AMERICANS OVERSEAS

[3.] Q. Mr. President, as you are well aware, there are about 7,000 Americans still in Saigon. They are in danger not only from Communist attack but from South Vietnamese reprisals. There are reports the South Vietnamese are in a bad temper toward Americans. Do you feel that under the War Powers Act and also under the limitations voted by Congress in 1973 on combat by Americans in Indochina that you could send troops in to protect those Americans, and would you, if it came to that?

THE PRESIDENT. I can assure you that I will abide totally with the War Powers Act that was enacted by the Congress several years ago. At the same time, I likewise assure you that we have contingency plans to meet all problems involving evacuation, if that should become necessary. At this point, I do not believe that I should answer specifically how those contingency plans might be carried out.

Q. Sir, you don't want to talk specifically. Can you tell us, however, if you do believe that you do have the authority to send in troops? You are not saying, I understand, whether you would, but do you have the authority?

THE PRESIDENT. It is my interpretation of that legislation that a President has

April 3

certain limited use that law.

[4.] Q. Mr. President, as you know, there are hundreds of Americans who is trying to help, even at American people can be done."

THE PRESIDENT. eral bureaucrat understand that.

But I am as much degree statement, to United States

Q. Do you think so?

THE PRESIDENT. done, as a private namese war or everything possible.

[5.] Q. Mr. President, about the high recession and

I would like to repeat my appeal to Congress to increase its spending. That potentialities in

THE PRESIDENT. approved the spending. That

414

April 3

April 3

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[166]

I can only assure you that to the extent that the Federal Government can do something about it, we, this Administration, will do it. The facts of life are that most law enforcement is the local responsibility.

Through the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, the Federal Government has been spending for the last several years around $800 million to help local units of government, State units of government in the upgrading of their law enforcement capability—helping police departments, helping sheriffs’ departments, helping the courts—and will continue to do it. But the principal responsibility rests at the local level.

Q. Will you be able to spend any more money, under your proposition that the line has to be drawn somewhere, on fighting the crime problem?

THE PRESIDENT. I think in the budget that I submitted there is ample money for a Federal effort to carry out the Federal role in the area of law enforcement.

## PRESIDENT'S WAR POWERS

[11.] Q. Mr. President, you spoke a few minutes ago about being frustrated by the limitations of the War Powers Act. If it were not forbidden now, would you like to send American planes and naval forces and possibly ground forces into Vietnam to try to turn the situation around?

THE PRESIDENT. I have said that there are no plans whatsoever for U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. On the other hand, I think history does prove that if a Chief Executive has a potential, it, to some extent, is a deterrent against aggressors.

Q. So, that is your frustration—because you do not have that power to at least threaten the possibility?

THE PRESIDENT. I did not use the word "threat." I said the potential for power, I think, over the years has indicated that that potential is a deterrent against aggression by one country against another.

## 1976 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

[12.] Q. Mr. President, in view of the possible primary entries by Governor Reagan and perhaps Governor Thomson of New Hampshire, would you be good enough to discuss your own timetable? When will you set up your committee, specifically, and can you also tell us, do you plan to enter any primaries yourself or through a stand-in candidate?

THE PRESIDENT. We have not defined our precise timetable nor our precise plans for the pre-convention campaign. We are in the process of putting together our timetable and our plan. I have said repeatedly that I intend to be a candidate,

419

[166]

April 3

but I have made no categorical announcement to that effect. But the matter is not being neglected.

## WARREN COMMISSION REPORT

[13.] Q. Mr. President, in light of current concerns regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and the recent showings of the Zapruder films, do you still have the same confidence in the finding of the Warren Commission that you had as a member of that Commission?

THE PRESIDENT. I think you have to read very carefully what the Warren Commission said. And I, as a member of the Warren Commission, helped to participate in the drafting of the language. We said that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. We said that the Commission had found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic. Those words were very carefully drafted. And so far, I have seen no evidence that would dispute the conclusions to which we came.

We were most careful, because in 1963 and '64, when we most carefully analyzed all the evidence available, there was none of the involvement of anybody—or anybody as a group—in the assassination.

It is my understanding that the Rockefeller Commission may, if the facts seem to justify it, take a look at it—at the problem—and I suspect that the House and Senate committees that are currently investigating CIA history may do the same.

But the Commission was right when it made its determination, and it was accurate, at least to this point—and I want to reemphasize that—as to the evidence that we saw.

## VIETNAM CONFLICT

[14.] Q. Mr. President, some people are saying this week that despite all our massive aid in Vietnam and all the lives that were lost there, that the whole thing has come to nothing. Now, how do you feel about this, and do you think there is any lesson to be learned in what has been happening over there?

THE PRESIDENT. I believe that the program of the previous four or five Presidents—President Kennedy, President Johnson, President Nixon, and myself—were aimed in the right direction, that we should help those people who are willing to fight for freedom for themselves.

That was a sound policy. Unfortunately, events that were beyond our control as a country have made it appear that that policy was wrong. I still believe that policy was right if the United States had carried it out, as we promised to do at the time of the Paris peace accords, where we promised, with the signing of the

April 3

Paris peace
South Viet
nately, we

Q. Well,

THE PRES
fiscal year
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420

April 3

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[166]

Paris peace accords, that we would make military hardware available to the South Vietnamese Government on a replacement, one-for-one basis. Unfortunately, we did not carry out that promise.

Q. Well, are you blaming Congress for this, then?

THE PRESIDENT. I am not assessing blame on anyone. The facts are that in fiscal year 1974, there was a substantial reduction made by the Congress in the amount of military equipment requested for South Vietnam.

In fiscal year 1975, the current fiscal year, the Administration asked for $1,400 million in military assistance for South Vietnam. Congress put a ceiling of $1 billion on it and actually appropriated only $700 million.

Those are the facts. I think it is up to the American people to pass judgment on who was at fault or where the blame may rest. That is a current judgment.

I think historians in the future will write who was to blame in this tragic situation. But the American people ought to know the facts. And the facts are as I have indicated.

I think it is a great tragedy, what we are seeing in Vietnam today. I think it could have been avoided. But I am not going to point a finger. The American people will make that judgment. I think it is more important for me and the American people and the Congress, in the weeks and months ahead, to do what we can to work together to meet the problems of the future.

And that is what I intend to do, and I will go more than halfway with the Congress in seeking to achieve that result. I think we have the capability in America. I think we have the will to overcome what appears to be a disaster in Southeast Asia. To the extent that I can, I hope to give that leadership.

Q. Mr. President, regardless of what caused it, it seems apparent that for the first time in our Nation's history, the enemy is about to win a war where Americans fought and died. Do you think that those 55,000 lives were wasted?

THE PRESIDENT. I do not think they were wasted, providing the United States had carried out the solemn commitments that were made in Paris at the time American fighting was stopped in South Vietnam, at a time when the agreement provided that all of our troops should be withdrawn, that all of our POW's should be returned. If we had carried out the commitments that were made at that time, the tragic sacrifices that were made by many—those who were killed, those who were wounded—would not have been in vain. But when I see us not carrying through, then it raises a quite different question.

Q. Is that a yes, then, sir?

THE PRESIDENT. I still think there is an opportunity to salvage the situation in Vietnam, and if we salvage it, giving the South Vietnamese an opportunity to

421

[166]

April 3

fight for their freedom—which I think they are anxious to do if given an honest opportunity—then there was not a sacrifice that was inappropriate or unwise.

FOREIGN POLICY

[15.] Q. Good afternoon, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT. Good afternoon.

Q. In a speech you are going to deliver here in San Diego this afternoon,² you warn against fatalism, despair, and the prophets of doom. And yet, as I look back over the past 8 months or a year—and I don't mean to suggest that these are in any way your responsibility or fault—I have a laundry list which cites Portugal as having a leftist government, raising serious questions about its future in NATO; Greece and Turkey are at each other's throats, threatening the southern flanks of that alliance; we are familiar that Secretary Kissinger's mission failed in his peace talks with Egypt and Israel; and we don't need to rehash the situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

That being the case, sir, how can you say that the world outlook—and particularly as you address it in your speech next week on the state of the world— is anything but bleak for the United States, when many of the minuses which I cited are actually pluses for the Soviets?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the speech that I am giving to Congress and to the American people next week will deal with many of the problems that you have raised. I think we do face a crisis. But I am optimistic that if the Congress joins with me, and the American people support the Congress and me, as President, we can overcome those difficulties.

We can play a constructive role in Portugal, not interfering with their internal decisions—but Portugal is an important ally in Western Europe.

We can find ways to solve the problem in Cyprus and, hopefully, keep both Greece and Turkey strong and viable members of NATO.

We can, despite the difficulties that transpired in the Middle East in the last several weeks, find a way to keep a peace movement moving in that very volatile area.

It may mean—and probably does—that we will have to take the problem to Geneva. I would have preferred it otherwise. But the facts are that if Congress and the American people and the President work together—as I expect they will—then, in my judgment, those disappointments can become pluses.

Q. But, sir, can you cite any specific reasons for the optimism you express?

THE PRESIDENT. The historical character of the American people—that is the

² See Item 167.

April 3

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422

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Palm Springs April 5

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at Palm Springs, Calif., on April 5.

Press release 183 dated April 5

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to bring you up to date on the discussions that have been taking place. The President, General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army], and I met for about an hour and one-half this morning. General Weyand gave us a report about the military situation in South Viet-Nam as he sees it and some of the options which he believes should be considered.

The President invited General Weyand to return this afternoon, and on that occasion he will bring along with him two intelligence experts, as well as the Defense Department expert who has been handling military supplies. We will then go into the question of the political situation and the long-term supply situation in detail.

The President has also ordered an NSC [National Security Council] meeting for probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip until Wednesday morning to permit General Weyand and his team to report to the entire NSC. In the meantime, he has ordered that the NSC staff, in close cooperation with the other agencies, develop for their NSC meeting a statement of the various options before us.

These are the procedures that are going to be followed. I make these points in order to indicate that we are at the very early stages of considering the report of General Weyand. No decisions will be taken while the President is in Palm Springs. Rather, we will use this opportunity for the fullest possible briefing of the President, and then

the staffs in Washington are going to analyze the reports, prepare the options, and then the entire NSC will consider the matter.

I might also point out that we are considering releasing the report of General Weyand after the President has had an opportunity to study it, with just some minor deletions, by the middle of the week so the public can have the general appreciation. This is where we stand, and I will be glad to answer questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the enormous amount of military equipment that has been lost in South Viet-Nam by the deterioration of the South Vietnamese Army, do you see any conceivable way that you can justify sending additional military equipment to South Viet-Nam until at least the South Vietnamese Army shows it can stand and hold its own territory?

Secretary Kissinger: The determination that has to be made is with respect to the military capacity of the South Vietnamese Army to defend the remaining territories. We have received another detailed analysis from General Weyand as to some estimates of what would be required to effect this.

The loss of territory in the north—I think it is important to understand what the military situation was. In flagrant violation of article 7 of the Paris accords, the North Vietnamese have introduced almost their entire army into South Viet-Nam, so that there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Viet-Nam at this moment, leaving only two or three divisions in North Viet-Nam; and this is in flagrant, total violation of solemn agreements which were endorsed by the international community.

That created an unbalanced military situation in the north in which whatever the

April 28, 1975

4/5/75

547

South Vietnamese did it would be wrong. If they stood, they were going to be defeated piecemeal. If they retreated, they ran the risk of disintegration of the units that were retreating, which is in fact what happened.

But one of the aspects of our examination is of course what the military situation is and what degree of American help can be significant.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnamese Army defend the remaining territory, and what are the requirements of their army now to defend that territory?*

*Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, this is of course one of the issues that has to be looked at. There is a possibility for the South Vietnamese military forces to stabilize the situation. The next question is for what length of time and against what level of attack.*

Then there is also the moral question for the United States—whether when an ally with which it has been associated for 10 years wishes to defend itself, whether it is the United States that should make the decision for it by withholding supplies, that it should no longer defend itself.

These are all questions that are involved in the examination that is now going on.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, General Thieu [Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam] seems to have adopted some of the Administration's language in explaining about why he retreated; namely, that the United States failed to supply him with aid. In fact, he said it would be an act of betrayal if we continued to fail to supply aid. Now, how is that going to help your problems with the U.S. Congress?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think, Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], that one of the most important things that all of us can do—the Administration, Congress, and if I may say so, the press as well—is to recognize that we are facing a great human tragedy and that we don't try to gloat over arguments that may have been made or to try to pick on things that men who obviously

are in despair now may be saying.

There are certain facts in the situation which may be difficult and unpleasant, but which are nevertheless true. It is a fact that the aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut by a third the first year and by another 50 percent the following year.

This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices, so that a situation was created, for a variety of reasons, in which almost all of the American military aid had to be given for ammunition and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

Even the ammunition had to be rationed, according to General Weyand, and so that individual guns could, for example, fire only two rounds a day. To what extent did such a situation contribute to the demoralization of the army, and to what extent the certainty, as they were looking at the situation, of constantly declining aid levels produced a decision to withdraw, which in turn produced a panic, I think is fairly evident.

This is far from saying this was the intention of those who cut the aid, and I think it is safe to say that you can tell from the public statements that senior Administration officials made that there was no expectation of a massive North Vietnamese attack this year.

So, there were a number of factors involved here, and I think there is some merit in what General Thieu is saying now. I think some of the adjectives he used are those of a desperate man who is in great anguish. And I think it is also fair to say that the United States, for 10 years, put in a great deal of its efforts and of its blood and of its treasure, and that, too, should weigh in the scale, and that we made a very great effort through a long period of time. So, we have to evaluate it over an extended period of time.

*Q. Could I just follow that a moment! We keep talking about a massive North Vietnamese invasion, and many of us have been led to believe that this was a case of withdrawal by General Thieu. The President commented on that in San Diego, saying it was a poorly planned and unnecessary affair.*

548

Department of State Bulletin

*Would you happened?*

*Secretary understanding, lowing: In D plan was to do the operation to pick off o haps to attack.*

In January, North Vietn attack, and in Paris according to Phuoc Long, operation was from the South which felt it any military by the United an all-out attack.

From the infiltration started. Prior to Thieu found Me Thuot, Phuoc Long, were flyable parts so that substantially

As he saw and as he said, in any case, the aid in any case of the North was a reason of aid would be weg, and weg this year, de of the moment use his supply and hope for. This was his

In terms made a lot of in executing it efficient care, with the logistic sy it was comp South Vietna pendents living

April 28, 1975

Would you be more precise about what happened?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of our understanding, what happened was the following: In December, the North Vietnamese plan was to continue an intensified version of the operations of last year; that is to say, to pick off outlying district towns and per-paps to attack one or two provincial capitals.

In January, for a variety of reasons, the North Vietnamese decided to make a larger attack, and they concentrated on the Province of Phuoc Long, in total violation of the Paris accords. When they succeeded in that operation without significant opposition from the South Vietnamese Government, which felt itself overextended, and without any military reaction or even military moves by the United States, they decided to make an all-out attack this year.

From the middle of January on, a massive infiltration of North Vietnamese divisions started. President Thieu at that point was faced with a situation—also President Thieu found out during the battle of Ban Me Thuot, which followed the battle of Phuoc Long, of his fleet of C-130's only six are flyable because of the absence of spare parts so that his strategic mobility had been substantially reduced.

As he saw the North Vietnamese buildup and as he saw the prospects of American aid in any case declining whatever the decision of the Congress would be—I think it was a reasonable assumption that the level of aid would be declining—he made the strategic decision of consolidating his forces this year, depriving the North Vietnamese of the momentum of this campaign season, and his supplies up in the battles next year, and hope for new appropriations in 1977. This was his strategic assessment.

In terms of a strategic assessment, it made a lot of sense. The trouble was that executing it, it was not planned with sufficient care, with sufficient understanding of the logistic system of South Viet-Nam. And it was compounded by the fact that the North Vietnamese divisions have their de-pendents living with them—so that when a

South Vietnamese division moved, all of their dependents moved with them, which in turn triggered a mass exodus of refugees, immobilizing these armies, and at some point along this retreat that turned into a panic where the soldiers were trying to take care of their families.

So, the decision was triggered by a correct evaluation of his prospects, the prospects being that if he kept his units strung out, they would probably be defeated by this massive North Vietnamese invasion; and to try to get to a more consolidated line, in executing what was probably a correct strategic decision, he of course brought about consequences with which we are familiar, which are tragic. I am just trying to explain our best understanding of what happened.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has spent about $140-$150 billion in South Viet-Nam. What is it that makes the Administration think that $300 million, or even an amount somewhat larger than that, would do any good? What is it that makes you think additional money is ever going to be able to make the South Vietnamese Army fight or solve the situation, when you spend $140-$150 billion and you are in the situation you are in now?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I pointed out, this whole situation is going to be reviewed by the National Security Council on Tuesday, and I do not want to pre-judge all of these decisions.

There is, however, also involved a question of the obligations a country has that for 10 years has fought somewhere, which has encouraged millions of people to associate themselves with the United States, and whether it should then refuse to let them defend themselves if they want to defend themselves.

This is one argument on the military side. On the humanitarian side, I think it is important and decisive that the United States has an obligation to the hundreds of thousands who were closely associated with it and must make a maximum effort on the level of refugees and otherwise.

April 28, 1975

549

["Q. I am not talking about the humanitarian side, Mr. Secretary. I am asking, in effect, whether $140-$150 billion is not as much moral obligation as the United States can undertake?", "Secretary Kissinger: That is the decision that will have to be made by first the President and then the Congress.", "Q. Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that the President would make these decisions in time to tell us about them in the so-called \"state of the world\" address Thursday?", "Secretary Kissinger: I have not had an opportunity to discuss with the President in great detail what he intends to say in this address. My impression is he will deal with the immediate foreign policy situation that he feels the United States is confronting, and I would think it is extremely probable that he would put before the Congress on that occasion at least some preliminary ideas of at least some immediate measures that in his judgment have to be taken.", "Q. Dr. Kissinger, the New York Times has a report from Paris this morning that the French Government has initiated plans to implement the Paris peace accords and to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, that the French are going to be active in all of Viet-Nam in humanitarian and refugee work. Do you have any comment on that? Have you been informed of this, and what is the outlook of this taking place?", "Secretary Kissinger: We would gratefully welcome any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate in the humanitarian effort.", "Secondly, we have attempted to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris accords to bring about their implementation; and therefore, if France is attempting to bring about an implementation of the Paris accords, we would certainly look at their proposals with sympathy.", "We have not received an official French proposal—and, indeed, I was not aware of this particular report—but the United States", "strongly favors the implementation of the Paris accords, which have been grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would support the efforts of any country that would attempt to bring about an implementation of those accords.", "Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].", "Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard around here that this is not our war. We have also seen some pretty pessimistic reports from everywhere that the ball game is over. And also, you seem to neglect the area while you are concentrating on the Middle East. What do you have to say for that? Do you think Southeast Asia is still as viable as you thought it was two years ago?", "Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my trip to the Middle East to deal with the question that I was dealing with, other problems, had been scheduled for many months; and when I left on the trip to the Middle East, we had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of which was well understood and which really required a congressional decision. It did not require decisions by the Administration.", "We did not expect an imminent crisis in Viet-Nam, and you remember that the Secretary of Defense stated a view, which all of us shared, that the attacks this year would not be of a critical nature; so that the disintegration of the situation in the northern half of Viet-Nam was quite unexpected to us in the sense that we were not told in advance of the decision to evacuate.", "It really did not reach the proportions it has until after my return from the Middle East. There is no question that South Viet-Nam faces an extremely grave situation. There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Viet-Nam, in blatant violation of the Paris accords. And there is no agreement in history that is self-enforcing. If the signatories of the agreement cannot enforce it, either by actions of their own or by aid to the aggrieved parties, then a difficult situation is inevitable.", "Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam was not permitted to infiltrate or to add any additional forces to those it already had in", "South Viet-Nam, like the other Southeast Asian states, in South Vietnam.", "Under the Paris Peace Accords, the United States was not permitted toشن the Ho Chi Minh City area except for one basis of information, and the one basis for damage, annihilation, and annihilation of the United States Army was the military situation in South Vietnam, and the military situation in South Vietnam was not good enough toشن the North.", "The North was not allowed toشن the military situation in South Vietnam, and the military situation in South Vietnam was not good enough toشن the military situation in North Vietnam, and the military situation in North Vietnam was not good enough toشن the military situation 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South Viet-Nam. At that time, it had some-
thing like 80,000 to 100,000 people in South
Viet-Nam. Today, it has closer to 400,000
in South Viet-Nam.

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam
was not permitted to introduce new equip-
ment except through ICCS [International
Commission of Control and Supervision]
checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to-
one basis for equipment that had been lost,
damaged, and destroyed.

The North Vietnamese never even per-
mitted the establishment of these check-
points and totally disregarded the agree-
ment. This is what brought about the change
in the military situation, which was com-
pounded by the fact that the South Vietnam-
ese Army inventories were running down
while the North Vietnamese inventories
were increasing.

This is the objective structure of what
happened in the last two years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Administration
any indication from the Democratic leader-
ship of Congress that Congress will be any
more receptive to providing more military
aid now than they were before they went
into recess?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the
Congress is in recess right now, and I am
confident that the President is going to be
in touch with the congressional leadership.

He has not had an opportunity, to the
best of my knowledge, to be in touch with
the congressional leadership, but again, let
me make one point: It is unavoidable that
when one analyzes the causes of a situation,
it may be taken as a criticism of this or that
group.

I think, in the history of Viet-Nam, there
is enough criticism to go around. There
have been mistakes made by the executive
branch, and there have been misjudgments
made by the legislative.

I think the major requirement for the
United States, recognizing that we will now
have a difficult set of decisions and a difficult
totals of debates, is to come out of this with
virtue and without adding to the bitter-
ness and viciousness which has so drained

us over the years. We will try to do our best
to contribute to this. Whether we will always
succeed, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said at your last
press conference, in some very strong lan-
guage, that the problem was that this was
now a question of what kind of people we
are and whether or not we will destroy de-
liberately an ally.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. The scenario that you gave us today
indicates that while that $300 million would
have been needed, there was a proper, com-
prehensible decision to make, yet it was
poorly executed, and that is why we have
the problem. Your scenario does not really
seem to back up the question of laying the
blame.

Secretary Kissinger: Wait just a minute.
It is not just a question of $300 million. It
is a question that since 1973 the combina-
tion of declining aid levels, inflation, and
rising fuel prices has led to a constant attri-
tion of the South Vietnamese Army. It is
not just a decision of this Congress to delay
$300 million. It is a process that has been
going on for a period of two years.

The statement I made in the press con-
ference, which was under slightly different
military conditions, at least as they were
then perceived in Washington, was in terms
of those decisions; but nevertheless it is a
very important moral question for the
United States whether when people who,
with its encouragement, have fought for
many years should in their hour of extrem-
ity be told by the United States that while
they want to continue fighting that the
United States would no longer help them
defend themselves against an enemy who
has never been told by its allies that there
is a limit beyond which they won't support
them.

I maintain that is a question that we
ought to ask ourselves as a people. Regard-
less of the probable outcome of the war, I
think it is a serious question. It is not meant
necessarily as a criticism of anybody, and
I really believe that at this moment, having

April 28, 1975

Bulletin

551

paid so much in our national unity on this
issue, we should conduct this debate not
with an attitude of who is going to pin the
blame on whom, but with an attitude that
we are facing a great tragedy in which
there is involved something of American
credibility, something of American honor,
something of how we are perceived by other
people in the world, on which serious people
may have different questions but in which,
for God's sake, we ought to stop talking as
if one side had the monopoly of wisdom,
morality, and insight and that serious people
trying to deal with this problem are trying
to run a confidence game. This is all that I
am trying to suggest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my question really was getting toward, are you personally convinced that if we had voted that extra $300 million that was requested for the emergency supplemental or if we had actually appropriated the full amount requested in the beginning, $1.4 billion, that we would not have faced the situation we now face, either at this time or sometime down the road?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe personally that it is not just the $300 million. It is the $300 million coming on top of a lot of other things. I believe that if it had not been for the moralities of executive authority result-in, from Watergate, if the aid levels had been appropriate over the years, and if we had been freer to conduct foreign policy than was possible under these circumstances -partly for reasons in which the executive shares a responsibility-I believe that certainly the difficulties we face this year could have been avoided for a number of years.

For how long, it is hard to say, but very
often, if we look over the postwar period, a
period of time gain gets a possibility of
things developing. But I would add, more-
over, that it would have made a lot of dif-
ference to us as a people, that if it hap-
pened, if it had more clearly happened as
a result of actions not so much under our
control. But I would finally add, since you
asked the question, and I did not volunteer
this statement, that at some point in this

discussion—we now cannot avoid the dis-
cussion—at some point in this discussion
we ought to stop this inquiry and ask our-
selves where we go from here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One is, you keep referring to the massive violations by the North Vietnamese, and in view of their record, I wonder why you thought at the time the agreements were negotiated, or at any other time, that they were going to abide by them? We knew very early, as you said, they did not allow us to establish checkpoints.

My other question is, do you think there
would be any benefit if the United States
were able to provide some military aid now,
through bombing or any other measure, to
stem the tide of what is going on?

Secretary Kissinger: The first thing I think the people ought to remember is the kind of national debate that was going on in the United States in 1971 and 1972. I think it is indisputable that there was overwhelming consensus developing that the United States should end its participation in the war.

And you may remember that before I went
on my last negotiation, the Democratic
caucus had already voted to set a terminal
date to our participation in the war; that
is, January 1973.

Let me point out this did not affect the
actual terms of the negotiations, which were
substantially agreed to before that. So, I
am simply trying to reconstruct the national
mood, which was that the American military
participation in the war had to be ended.

The major debate that then occurred was
whether the United States should deliberate-
ly overthrow the government with which it
was associated; and that we refused to do.

Now, that the North Vietnamese would
press against the edges of the agreement
was to be expected. What was not to be
expected was that, partly through legislative
action and partly through our internal divi-
sions, we would find ourselves in a position
where a forceful diplomacy became extreme-
ly difficult, and this certainly accelerated the
violations and made them substantially free.

552

Department of State Bulletin

So, we had no in-
ning with a country
violated every other
made, but under
agreement was a
American foreign
we would be abil-
fluence on the sit-
tions to managea
obtain sufficient
Vietnamese to ha-

So, those expect
one could possibly
not fulfilled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, rather than the past, One, isn't it like $300 million at a time, it would be that it would cost more to get the result? Two, then Weyand have said salvageable. I think we have to give any

Secretary Kissinger study all the re-
Weyand, plus the
senior advisers
think it is for the
judgment and
conference.

I would like to
if this situation
some negotiation
difference whether
that permits the
refugees and of
at stake in the p

So, there are
tives that can be
view, which we
situation can be
of the shortened
aid, and other m
together with ot
considered over
President will re
Congress on Th

My point in a
primarily what

April 28, 1975

So, we had no illusions that we were dealing with a country other than one that had isolated every other agreement that it had made, but under the conditions in which the agreement was made of a strong period in American foreign policy, we believed that we would be able to exercise sufficient influence on the situation to keep the violations to manageable proportions and also to obtain sufficient aid to permit the South Vietnamese to handle the problem.

So, those expectations, for reasons that no one could possibly predict at that time, were not fulfilled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a look at the future rather than the past. I have two questions. One, isn't it likely that if we provided the $300 million at this point, the likelihood would be that it would only prolong the fighting, cost more lives, and end in the same result? Two, the President and General Weyand have said they think the situation is salvageable. I wonder what evidence you have to give any hope that it is salvageable?

Secretary Kissinger: The President will study all the recommendations of General Weyand, plus the judgment of all of his senior advisers over the next days, and I think it is for the President then to make the judgment and to state it in his press conference.

I would like also to point out that even if this situation should finally wind up in some negotiation, it is not a matter of difference whether it is done in such a way that permits the maximum extraction of refugees and of those whose very lives are at stake in the present situation.

So, there are very many levels of objectives that can be set. There is a point of view, which we will be examining, that the situation can be stabilized by a combination of the shortened lines, infusion of American aid, and other measures. That point of view, together with other points of view, will be considered over the next few days, and the President will report his conclusions to the Congress on Thursday.

My point in appearing here is to tell you primarily what the status of our discussion

is at this moment; and at this moment the President has really done nothing but spend about 90 percent of his time listening and asking questions to the purely military aspect of General Weyand's report.

He will get a further discussion of that this afternoon, together with the intelligence appraisal, and then this whole matter will be submitted to the National Security Council; so I do not want to preempt his decisions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is of the essence, and with the events happening as quickly as they are over there, isn't time being wasted with the President being out here? Isn't this whole policy-making process being delayed because of the distances between here and Washington?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to answer that question. Isn't time being wasted?

Q. Isn't time being wasted in the policy-making decision with NSC being all back in Washington, you are here, General Weyand is here, the President is here. Couldn't it be done faster if everything was concentrated back there? It seems the middle of the week is awfully late for something so important.

Secretary Kissinger: There are about $175 million left in the pipeline in the current appropriations. We are expediting the shipment of that equipment to Viet-Nam. No matter what decision is made by the President, it could not take effect for a number of weeks.

Therefore we believe in decisions of this importance it is extremely crucial that there be a very careful and a very prayerful examination of all the choices before us, and there is no effective delay, no matter what decisions the President eventually decides.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the other part of that question about whether bombing is still an option and whether that would be of any assistance, help to the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the introduction of American military forces in or over Viet-Nam is prohibited by specific

April 28, 1975

553

legislation that was passed in July 1973, which was, I may say, another complicated factor in the enforcement of the agreement.

It is not so much a question of what we would have done. It is a question of what the other side knew we could not possibly do. Therefore, before any such action could be contemplated, the President would have to ask authority from the Congress to do that; and I do not anticipate that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions that is troubling many Americans and some people in this room, as you have already judged, is that what is happening in Viet-Nam today was foreseen by many people once the American troops withdrew: My question is, why then must the nation be asked to wear a hair shirt because of what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is not whether the nation must be made to wear a hair shirt. The President is trying, to the best of his abilities, to make clear what he takes to be the causes of that situation.

We will never know whether it would have happened if enforcement had been carried out more aggressively and aid had been given more substantially. He is simply trying to point out his analysis of what brought about the present situation. After all, the people who predicted this could have been wrong. Maybe they could have been right. We do not know now.

Q. You do acknowledge that a great many people did predict it?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, yes, and I am saying, of course, there were many people who made that argument, and that still does not change the question of whether the United States, having made all these investments, should not have carried out at least its moral obligations more fully.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what some of the options are that are being considered? We are not going to get a chance to talk to General Weyand, so we don't know what the suggestions are.

Secretary Kissinger: I really cannot prop-

erly go into it. Partly this is due to the fact that this morning General Weyand concentrated, I would say, exclusively on two things—his analysis of the reasons for the development of the military situation and, secondly, his analysis of the military prospects.

We have not yet covered the humanitarian problems, the evacuation problems of refugees, the possibilities that were alluded to of which we have no formal indication, or restoration of the Paris accords.

So, all of these will have to be issues that will have to be examined in developing the options, but what we are planning is to go over that this afternoon, to sketch out some of the main options as we see them.

Then, the Embassy staff, together with General Weyand, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will pull them together into a more comprehensive option paper, which will then be put before the National Security Council on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President spoke in his press conference of solemn commitments we had made to South Viet-Nam. This, I am sure you are aware, has raised many questions of secret agreements or tacit understandings or that kind of thing. First of all, what solemn commitments was the President referring to? Was he referring only to the one-for-one replacement, which, as I understand it, was not a commitment but an option? And if he was not referring to that, what was he talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have explained. I think, at a previous press conference, he was not talking of a legal commitment. He was talking of a moral commitment. I believe that the South Vietnamese had every reason to think that if they permitted American troops to withdraw and if they enabled us to retrieve our prisoners, that we would carry out what we had called the Vietnamization process in enabling them to defend themselves.

We did not give them any specific figures, and we did not give them any definite prom-

ises, except to indicate the Paris interest in its signed agreement.

But I believe was talking about something in connection with our withdrawal, particular documents

There is no question that the American economic community if you check the list on that subject are negotiating the terms of

The American question of whether there should not be and I believe, in any case, in admit to ourselves if the South Vietnamese effort to defend their great receptivity should do as well as it does, come back and die there. That is in which we will see if you read the and congressional essence of our decision.

Therefore it is of a legal character that we are violating the President's program growing out of it.

I just want to make it very clear that I have heard me be six years, and I have heard me question of those who have said that we can ask is it been critical out there is a great chance the Administration are trying to deal with the United States in the world peace.

Thank you.

Department of State Bulletin

April 28, 1975

554

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974.

Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Romania (with declaration), March 6, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program.

Done at Paris November 18, 1974.¹

Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 11, 1975.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928.

Ratification deposited: United States, April 10, 1975 (with reservation).

Entered into force for the United States: April 10, 1975.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Qatar, April 4, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 7, 1975.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

ises, except to indicate that obviously, having signed the Paris agreement, we would have an interest in its enforcement.

But I believe that what the President was talking about was a moral obligation, not a legal commitment. He was talking about something growing out of a 10-year engagement of the United States ended by our withdrawal, not about secret clauses in particular documents.

There is no question that when we were negotiating the agreement we ourselves believed that the American debate had not concerned economic or military aid; and I think if you check the record, there was no debate on that subject at the time.

The American debate had concerned the question of whether enough Americans had died there and whether the South Vietnamese should not be able to defend themselves, and I believe, in all fairness, we all have to admit to ourselves, that we all believed that if the South Vietnamese would make the effort to defend themselves, there would be great receptivity in this country to help them do it as long as our prisoners could come back and Americans could stop dying there. That was the assumption within which we were operating, and I think if you read the back files of newspapers and congressional debates, that was the essence of our debate at the time.

Therefore it was never put in the form of a legal commitment, and it is not that we are violating a legal commitment. It is the President's perception of the moral obligation growing out of the context of events.

I just want to say again, many of you have heard me brief on this subject now for 15 years, and I think none of you have ever heard me question the travail and concern of those who have opposed the war, and all we can ask is that those of you who have been critical ought to keep in mind that there is a great human tragedy that those in the Administration are viewing and they are trying to deal with it in the best interest of the United States and in the best interests of world peace.

Thank you.

April 28, 1975

555

U.S. Calls on North Viet-Nam
To End Military Offensive

4/10/75

Following are texts of a note delivered by
U.S. Missions on April 10 to non-Vietnamese
participants in the International Conference
of Viet-Nam and members of the Interna-
tional Commission of Control and Super-
vision (ICCS) and of a note delivered to the
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on
April 11.

NOTE TO NON-VIETNAMESE PARTICIPANTS
IN CONFERENCE AND MEMBERS OF ICCS

Press release 193 dated April 11

The Department of State of the United
States of America presents its compliments
to [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry
of External Affairs of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, People's Republic of
China, Great Britain, France, Hungary,
Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and Secretary Gen-
eral of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has
the honor to refer to the Agreement on End-
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-
Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; to
the Act of the International Conference on
Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973;
and to the Department's Diplomatic Note of
January 11, 1975, on the situation in Viet-
Nam.

More than two years ago, the signatories
of the Paris Agreement accepted a solemn
obligation to end the fighting in Viet-Nam
and to shift the conflict there from the
battlefield to the negotiating table. All na-
tions and peoples who love peace had the
right to expect from that Agreement that
the South Vietnamese people would be able
to peacefully determine their own future
and their own political institutions after the
Paris Agreement was signed. The parties to
the International Conference on Viet-Nam
undertook a responsibility to support and
uphold the settlement which the Agreement
embodied.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has
undertaken a massive, all-out offensive
against South Viet-Nam in total contempt
of the Paris Agreement. Their forces, which
were built up over the past two years in
violation of the Agreement, are more numer-
ous and better equipped with modern weap-
onry than ever before during the course of
the war. A human flight of historic propor-
tions has taken place before the advancing
North Vietnamese armies, and untold misery
has been inflicted on the land which has
already seen more than its share of misery.

We believe the suffering of the South
Vietnamese people must be ended. It must
be ended now. We therefore call upon the
[addressee] to join the Government of the
United States of America in calling upon
Hanoi to cease its military operations imme-
diately and to honor the terms of the Paris
Agreement. The United States is requesting
all the parties to the Act of the International
Conference to meet their obligations to use
their influence to halt the fighting and en-
force the Paris Agreement.

The United States Government looks for-
ward to prompt and constructive responses
to this Note from all the parties.

NOTE TO NORTH VIET-NAM

Press release 193A dated April 11

The Department of State of the United
States of America presents its compliments
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has
the honor to refer to the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973;
and to the Act of the International Confer-
ence on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2,
1973.

More than two years ago, the Democratic
Republic of Viet-Nam, as a signatory of the
Paris Agreement and the Act of the Inter-
national Conference on Viet-Nam, accepted
a solemn obligation to end the fighting in
Viet-Nam and to shift the conflict there

April 28, 1975

539

from the battlefield to the negotiating table. All nations and peoples who love peace hoped and expected from these Agreements that the South Vietnamese people would be able to peacefully determine their own future. Tragically, these hopes and expectations have been shattered by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's total violation of these Accords.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has now undertaken a massive, all-out offensive against South Viet-Nam in total contempt of these Agreements. DRV forces in South Viet-Nam, which have been built up over the past two years in contravention of the Paris Agreement, are more numerous and better equipped than ever before during the course of the entire war. This North Vietnamese invasion has produced a human flight of refugees which is of historic proportions. By this calculated use of immense force North Viet-Nam has inflicted untold misery on a land which has already seen its share of misery.

We believe the suffering of the South Vietnamese people must be ended and must be ended now. We therefore advise the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to cease immediately its military offensive against South Viet-Nam and to honor the terms of the Paris Agreement. If the DRV does not reverse its present military course, it should have no doubt that it will be held responsible for the consequences.

## Assistance in Evacuating Refugees From South Vietnamese Seaports

*Statement by President Ford*¹

A severe emergency exists in the coastal communities of South Viet-Nam which are swollen with helpless civilian refugees who have fled the North Viet-Nam offensive. They are desperately in need of any assistance we and other nations can provide.

To help the refugees reach safe haven

further south, I have ordered American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from the coastal seaports.

I also call upon all nations and corporations that have ships in the vicinity of the South Vietnamese coast to help evacuate refugees to safety in the south.

I have directed that U.S. Government resources be made available to meet immediate humanitarian needs, and I have appointed Mr. Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency of International Development, as my Special Coordinator for Disaster Relief.

## U.S. Personnel Evacuated From Phnom Penh

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on April 12, together with a statement issued on April 11 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated April 12

In view of the seriously deteriorating military situation around the Cambodian Capital of Phnom Penh, and on the basis of the recommendations of the American Ambassador to the Khmer Republic, I have instructed the personnel of the U.S. Mission to leave Phnom Penh.

In accordance with those instructions, American personnel have been evacuated. I also authorized that a number of Cambodians whose lives would have beenjeopardized if they had remained in Cambodia be evacuated with the American Mission.

I sincerely regret that there was not timely action on my request to the Congress to enable the United States to continue to provide the assistance necessary to the survival of the Government of the Khmer Republic. That government had asked for this assistance and had clearly proven itself worthy of our help.

The United States is in neutral, and our assistance to the South Vietnamese forces is being made effective through our military efforts, find a compromise solution of the situation in South Vietnam.

I decided to continue our support of the South Vietnamese forces in the area, and I have made every effort to ensure the safety of the people of South Vietnam while we will continue to provide them with the support they need and are entitled to.

We can all be grateful to the great skill and highest credit of our armed forces and the great skill and highest credit of our servicemen who have carried out this mission with such gallant spirit and such determination.

### DEPARTMENT 5

In view of the serious situation in South Vietnam, I regret to report that our forces are not in a position to carry on our operations of all units in the area. We regard as our primary objective the protection of its obvious objectives in the area.

This evacuation of all South Vietnamese forces in the area is not intended to be permanent. Our forces will continue to fortify and insure the safety of the Cambodian capital, and their families and their families will be provided with the necessary supplies. Our forces will continue to evacuate them as circumstances may require.

Because of the serious problems of Phnom Penh and thebaoيدanunists' rocketing of our forces, evacuation is the primary objective of our helicopter forces.

¹Issued on Mar. 29 (text from White House press release).

540

Department of State Bulletin

April 28, 1975

The United States wishes Cambodia to find
its place in the world as an independent,
neutral, and united country, living in peace.
Our assistance was sought for that purpose.
We also made numerous and vigorous diplo-
matic efforts, from the first to the last, to
find a compromise settlement.

I decided with a heavy heart on the evac-
uation of American personnel from Cam-
bodia because of my responsibility for the
safety of the Americans who have served
there so valiantly. Despite that evacuation
we will continue to do whatever possible to
support an independent, peaceful, neutral,
and unified Cambodia.

We can all take deep pride in the U.S.
armed forces that were engaged in this
evacuation operation. It was carried out with
great skill and in a manner that reflects the
highest credit on all of those American
servicemen who participated. I am deeply
grateful to them for a job well done.

## DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

In view of the seriously deteriorating mili-
tary situation around Phnom Penh, the evac-
uation of all U.S. Mission personnel is taking
place. We regret this development because
of its obvious implications for the Govern-
ment of the Khmer Republic.

This evacuation is taking place in an ef-
fort to insure the safety of U.S. citizens in
Cambodia. To the extent we have the capa-
bility in the airlift we are also undertaking
to evacuate third-country nationals working
for the U.S. Government, U.S. press services,
voluntary agencies, et cetera, as well as
Cambodian employees of the U.S. Mission
and their families and as many other Cam-
bodians who have been associated with us
as circumstances permit.

Because of the effective interdiction of
Phnom Penh airport now by Khmer Com-
munists' rockets, artillery, and mortars, this
evacuation is being carried out by U.S. mili-
tary helicopters from landing zones near the

American Mission in Phnom Penh. The evac-
uation operation is being protected as neces-
sary by a security force of U.S. marines.
Tactical aircraft are in the vicinity in the
event they are needed. There is no intention
to use force, but if necessary it will be ap-
plied only to protect the lives of evacuees.

The evacuees will be taken temporarily to
Thailand before being moved onward to
their destination of choice.

Because of the U.S. Ambassador's efforts
in the past few weeks to reduce the number
of potential evacuees to the barest minimum,
we are not certain that we have up-to-date
figures on the numbers likely to be involved.
However, we anticipate that there will be
several hundred people involved, including
some 150 Americans.

## President Ford Saddened by Deaths in Viet-Nam Orphan Airlift Crash

Statement by President Ford

I am deeply saddened at the loss of so
many lives in the crash of the U.S. C-5A
mercy flight today near Saigon.

I wish to convey my heartfelt condolences
to the families and friends of the victims,
many of whom were coming to new homes
in the United States, and to the volunteers
who were caring for them on the flight.

Our mission of mercy will continue. The
survivors will be flown here when they are
physically able. Other waiting orphans will
make the journey.

This tragedy must not deter us from offer-
ing new hope for the living. The government
and people of the United States offer this
hope in our rededication to assisting the
Vietnamese orphans as best and as quickly
as we can.

¹Issued at Palm Springs, Calif., on Apr. 4 (text from White House press release).

April 28, 1975

541

[182]

April 12

183.

Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the
Senate Reporting on the Evacuation of the United States Mission
in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. April 14, 1975

[Dated April 12, 1975. Released April 14, 1975]

AS YOU and other members of Congress were advised, in view of circum-
stances in Cambodia, the United States had certain contingency plans to utilize
United States Armed Forces to assure the safe evacuation of U.S. Nationals from
that country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communists forces had
ruptured Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defensive lines to the
north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar range of
Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of Phnom Penh. In view of this deteriorat-
ing military situation, and on the recommendations of the American
Ambassador there, I ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the planned
evacuation out of consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this
matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-
148), I wish to report to you that the first elements of the U.S. forces entered
Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M. EDT on 11 April. Military forces included
350 ground combat troops of the U.S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting
tactical air and command and control elements. The Marines were deployed
from helicopters to assure the security of helicopter landing zone within the
city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at approximately 10:00 P.M.
EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees and ground security force Marines
departed the Cambodian landing zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April
1975. The last elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire.
There was no firing by U.S. forces at any time during the operation. No U.S.
Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and there were no
casualties among the American evacuees.

Although these forces were equipped for combat within the meaning of
Section 4(a) (2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to effect the evacua-
tion of U.S. Nationals. Present information indicates that a total of 82 U.S.
citizens were evacuated and that the task force was also able to accommodate

April 14

35 third coun-
U.S. Governm-
tional exec-
Armed Forces.

The operatic-
tional execu-
Armed Forces.

I am sure yo
States and my
Sincerely,

NOTE: This is the te-
to the Honorable Ca

184

Remarks at
Federal Elect

Members of the
guests:

It is a great
six very distin-
responsibility.

The campaign
which I had the
sibilities that the
bility that I kno

It is a combi-
Congress—who
kind of election

We want clea
campaigning an

I have great a
have looked over
House have selec

476

April 14

Gerald R. Ford, 1975

[183]

35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U.S. Government.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.

I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the United States and my thankfulness that the operation was conducted without incident.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD

NOTE: This is the text of identical letters addressed to the Honorable Carl Albert, Speaker of the House

of Representatives, and the Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller, President of the Senate.

184

## Remarks at the Swearing In of the Membership of the Federal Election Commission. April 14, 1975

Members of the Congress, the designated members of the Commission, and guests:

It is a great privilege for me to participate in the actual swearing in of these six very distinguished individuals who will be undertaking a very serious responsibility.

The campaign reform legislation, which was enacted by the Congress in 1974, which I had the privilege of signing, is landmark legislation, and the responsibilities that these five men and this one most attractive lady have is a responsibility that I know they will take seriously.

It is a combination of individuals selected—two by myself and four by the Congress—who can really, in the months and years ahead, set a path for the kind of elections that we want.

We want clean elections. We want fair elections. We want the best people campaigning and the best results as the American people decide.

I have great faith in all of them. I know some better than others, but as I have looked over their records, I think the House and the Senate and the White House have selected fine people for a great, great responsibility.

477

THE CONGRESS

Military and Humanitarian Assistance to South Viet-Nam

4/15/75

Following are statements made before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on April 15 by Secretary Kissinger and before the House Committee on International Affairs on April 15 by Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development, and on April 18 by Secretary Kissinger.¹

SECRETARY KISSINGER, SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, APRIL 15

Press release 199 dated April 15

The long and agonizing conflict in Indonesia has reached a tragic stage. The events of the past month have been discussed at great length before the Congress and require little additional elaboration. In Viet-Nam President Thieu ordered a strategic withdrawal from a number of areas he regarded as n...litarily untenable. However, the withdrawal took place in great haste, without adequate advance planning, and with insufficient coordination. It was further complicated by a massive flow of civilian refugees seeking to escape the advancing North Vietnamese Army. Disorganization engendered confusion; fear led to panic. The results, as we all know, were tragic losses—of territory, of population, of material, and of morale.

But to fully understand what has happened, it is necessary to have an appreciation of all that went before. The North Vietnamese offensive, and the South Vietnamese response, did not come about by chance—

although chance is always an element in warfare. The origins of these events are complex, and I believe it would be useful to review them briefly.

Since January 1973, Hanoi has violated—continuously, systematically, and energetically—the most fundamental provisions of the Paris agreement. It steadily increased the numbers of its troops in the South. It improved and expanded its logistics system in the South. It increased the armaments and ammunition of its forces in the South. And as you know, it blocked all efforts to account for personnel missing in action. These are facts, and they are indisputable. All of these actions were of course in total violation of the agreement. Parallel to these efforts, Hanoi attempted—with considerable success—to immobilize the various mechanisms established by the agreement to monitor and curtail violations of the cease-fire. Thus, it assiduously prepared the way for further military actions.

South Viet-Nam's record of adherence to the agreement has not been perfect. It is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively far better than Hanoi's. South Viet-Nam did not build up its armed forces. It undertook no major offensive actions—although it traded thrusts and probes with the Communists. It cooperated fully in establishing and supporting the cease-fire control mechanisms provided for in the agreement. And it sought, as did the United States, full implementation of those provisions of the agreement calling for an accounting of soldiers missing in action.

But perhaps more relevant to an understanding of recent events are the following factors.

¹The complete transcripts of the hearings will be published by the committees and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

May 5, 1975

583

While North Viet-Nam had available several reserve divisions which it could commit to battle at times and places of its choosing, the South had no strategic reserves. Its forces were stretched thin, defending lines of communication and population centers throughout the country.

While North Viet-Nam, by early this year, had accumulated in South Viet-Nam enough ammunition for two years of intensive combat, South Vietnamese commanders had to ration ammunition as their stocks declined and were not replenished.

While North Viet-Nam had enough fuel in the South to operate its tanks and armored vehicles for at least 18 months, South Viet-Nam faced stringent shortages.

In sum, while Hanoi was strengthening its army in the South, the combat effectiveness of South Viet-Nam's army gradually grew weaker. While Hanoi built up its reserve divisions and accumulated ammunition, fuel, and other military supplies, U.S. aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut—first by half in 1973 and then by another third in 1974. This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices. As a result almost all of our military aid had to be devoted to ammunition and fuel. Very little was available for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

These imbalances became painfully evident when the offensive broke full force, and they contributed to the tragedy which unfolded. Moreover, the steady diminution in the resources available to the Army of South Viet-Nam unquestionably affected the morale of its officers and men. South Vietnamese units in the northern and central provinces knew full well that they faced an enemy superior both in numbers and in firepower. They knew that reinforcements and resupply would not be forthcoming. When the fighting began they also knew, as they had begun to suspect, that the United States would not respond. I would suggest that all of these factors added significantly to the sense of helplessness, despair, and, eventually, panic which we witnessed in late March and early April.

I would add that it is both inaccurate and

unfair to hold South Viet-Nam responsible for blocking progress toward a political solution to the conflict. Saigon's proposals in its conversations with PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] representatives in Paris were in general constructive and conciliatory. There was no progress toward a compromise political settlement because Hanoi intended that there should not be. Instead, North Viet-Nam's strategy was to lay the groundwork for an eventual military offensive, one which would either bring out-right victory or at least allow Hanoi to dictate the terms of a political solution.

Neither the United States nor South Viet-Nam entered into the Paris agreement with the expectation that Hanoi would abide by it in every respect. We did believe, however, that the agreement was sufficiently equitable to both sides that its major provisions could be accepted and acted upon by Hanoi and that the contest could be shifted thereby from a military to a political track. However, our two governments also recognized that, since the agreement manifestly was not self-enforcing, Hanoi's adherence depended heavily on maintaining a military parity in South Viet-Nam. So long as North Viet-Nam confronted a strong South Vietnamese army and so long as the possibility existed of U.S. intervention to offset the strategic advantages of the North, Hanoi could be expected to forgo major military action. Both of those essential conditions were dissipated over the past two years. Hanoi attained a clear military superiority, and it became increasingly convinced that U.S. intervention could be ruled out. It therefore returned to a military course, with the results we have seen.

The present situation in Viet-Nam is ominous. North Viet-Nam's combat forces far outnumber those of the South, and they are better armed. Perhaps more important, they enjoy a psychological momentum which can be as decisive as armaments in battle. South Viet-Nam must reorganize and reequip its forces, and it must restore the morale of its army and its people. These tasks will be difficult, and they can be performed only by the South Vietnamese. However, a successful defense will also require resources—arms,

fuel, ammun-
tiology.

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May 5, 1975

584

Department of State Bulletin

fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies—and these can come only from the United States.

Large quantities of equipment and supplies, totaling perhaps $800 million, were lost in South Viet-Nam's precipitous retreat from the northern and central areas. Much of this should not have been lost, and we regret that it happened. But South Viet-Nam is now faced with a different strategic and tactical situation and different military requirements. Although the amount of military assistance the President has requested is of the same general magnitude as the value of the equipment lost, we are not attempting simply to replace those losses. The President's request, based on General Weyand's [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army] assessment, represents our best judgment as to what is needed now, in this new situation, to defend what is left of South Viet-Nam. Weapons, ammunition, and supplies to reequip four divisions, to form a number of ranger groups into divisional units, and to upgrade some territorial forces into infantry regiments will require some $326 million. The balance of our request is for ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies to sustain up to 60 days of intensive combat and to pay for the cost of transporting those items. These are minimum requirements, and they are needed urgently.

The human tragedy of Viet-Nam has never been more acute than it now is. Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have sought to flee Communist control and are homeless refugees. They have our compassion, and they must also have our help. Despite commendable efforts by the South Vietnamese Government, the burden of caring for these innocent victims is beyond its capacity. The United States has already done much to assist these people, but many remain without adequate food, shelter, or medical care. The President has asked that additional efforts and additional resources be devoted to this humanitarian effort. I ask that the Congress respond generously and quickly.

The objectives of the United States in this immensely difficult situation remain as they were when the Paris agreement was signed

—to end the military conflict and establish conditions which will allow a fair political solution to be achieved. We believe that despite the tragic experience to date, the Paris agreement remains a valid framework within which to proceed toward such a solution. However, today, as in 1973, battlefield conditions will affect political perceptions and the outcome of negotiations. We therefore believe that in order for a political settlement to be reached which preserves any degree of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, the present military situation must be stabilized. It is for these reasons that the President has asked Congress to appropriate urgently additional funds for military assistance for Viet-Nam.

I am acutely aware of the emotions aroused in this country by our long and difficult involvement in Viet-Nam. I understand what the cost has been for this nation and why frustration and anger continue to dominate our national debate. Many will argue that we have done more than enough for the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam. I do not agree with that proposition, however, nor do I believe that to review endlessly the wisdom of our original involvement serves a useful purpose now. For despite the agony of this nation's experience in Indochina and the substantial reappraisal which has taken place concerning our proper role there, few would deny that we are still involved or that what we do—or fail to do—will still weigh heavily in the outcome. We cannot by our actions alone insure the survival of South Viet-Nam. But we can, alone, by our inaction assure its demise.

The United States has no legal obligation to the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam of which the Congress is not aware. But we do have a deep moral obligation—rooted in the history of our involvement and sustained by the continuing efforts of our friends. We cannot easily set it aside. In addition to the obvious consequences for the people of Viet-Nam, our failure to act in accordance with that obligation would inevitably influence other nations' perceptions of our constancy and our determination.

May 5, 1975

585

American credibility would not collapse, and American honor would not be destroyed. But both would be weakened, to the detriment of this nation and of the peaceful world order we have sought to build.

Mr. Chairman, as our Ambassador in Phnom Penh was about to be evacuated last week he received a letter from a longtime friend of the United States who has been publicly marked for execution. Let me share that letter with you:

DEAR EXCELLENCY AND FRIEND, I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it.

You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because we all are born and must die one day.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I suspect that neither Ambassador [John Gunther] Dean nor I will ever be able to forget that letter or the brave man who wrote it. Let us now, as Americans, act together to assure that we receive no more letters of this kind.

## MR. PARKER, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, APRIL 15

I come to your committee today to ask for your assistance. We are urgently proposing and seeking your approval for a humanitarian undertaking, an undertaking which I believe does credit to the spirit of charity and sympathy—especially for those with whom we as a people have long been associated—that has in the past been a well-spring of our national character.

In the past three weeks, the people of South Viet-Nam, a generation of whom have never known lasting tranquillity, have again been faced with a disruptive cataclysm of

enormous human proportions. These events are familiar to us all. In the face of an assault by North Vietnamese divisions in direct violation of the Paris peace accords, millions, motivated by a mixture of conviction, allegiance, and fear, fled the northern and central portions of South Viet-Nam. They left their villages and towns, they left their friends and sometimes their families, they left their belongings, and they left the soil from which they earned a living or the work in which they were otherwise employed. In this exodus, many died, and not all—or even most—escaped. The armies of the North rolled southward faster than those who sought to flee.

Our first thoughts and our first actions were to assist those who sought refuge in the territory still controlled by the Government of South Viet-Nam (GVN). We dispatched ships to augment the 40-odd craft made available for this purpose by the Government of South Viet-Nam and the several mercy vessels furnished by other nations. Events moved too rapidly, and we were only partially successful, but through these efforts about 150,000 people were brought to safety. Others, roughly estimated at 850,000, moved and are still moving by their own efforts on rivers and by land to the refugee sites that are under GVN control. To date, nearly 500,000 refugees have been officially registered by the government.

This process of counting by registration invariably lags behind the reality of displaced human beings, both because of the time involved in assembling data and because the movement of persons still continues. Our best estimate today—and I need not tell you that today's numbers may well be wrong tomorrow—is that the Government of South Viet-Nam will shortly face the responsibility of caring for approximately 1 million new refugees.

To assist in that effort we have allotted almost all of the limited Foreign Assistance Act resources remaining available to us; in addition, we have made 100,000 tons of rice and an additional 13,500 tons of high-protein

food supplements under Public Service. Both volunteers and Vietnamese perately in need.

Let me not maim you, but add the welfare of unem- urban areas—measure by forces and further worsen drastically its toll. Many will be tarian effort for those who suffer than for those ing is made not removed from

We are contending with South Viet-Nam, human- orderly and reasonable measure of agencies, the and AID personnel agencies and others. Ever, that wit- from outside and sickness, basis, will in-

I am here to commit you, but by no means resources. Specify, in an act of authorization, an amount, purpose, which, million previously appropriated for will make available the burden and refugees, the needs of South Viet-Nam. I am asking you, as an Indochin-ian, the humanitarian Let me empha-

586

Department of State Bulletin

May 5, 1975