-2-

the stakes of the crisis are as great as they were twenty-five

years ago. The challenge to our courage, our vision, and

our will is as awesome now as it was then. What will be our

response?

I speak, of course, of the energy crisis, and the inescapable
necessity of

and particularly cooperation among the industrial nations of
North America, Western Europe and Japan.

The economic facts, regrettably, are stark. By 1973,
worldwide industrial expansion was already outstripping
energy supply; the threat of shortages was real. And then,
without warning we were faced with an embargo, followed
by completely unrealistic increases in the price of oil. In
the course of a year, the most strategic commodity in
the international economy -- was raised 400% in a single
year, as the result of a political decision. The impact has

-3-

been massive, and destabilizing.

-- The industrial nations now face a collective payments deficit of 40 billion dollars, the largest deficit in history, and totally beyond the experience or capacity of our financial institutions to manage. We are now suffering simultaneously with a slowdown of production and a speed-up of inflation that was already at the limit of the ability of governments to control.

-- The poorer nations of the developing world now face a collective yearly deficit of 15 billion dollars, which exceeds the total flow of external aid to them. In other words, their new oil bill soaks up, for this one commodity alone, all the Rupes for payments & advancement. external assistance they have received for their economic development. Stagnation or decline is inevitable. For

countries already dependent on outside resources, the price
of oil makes it quite literally impossible to finance the imports
they require for their energy, manufactures, other goods and
services or their food. A classic crisis looms.

-- The oil producers now enjoy a surplus of 55 billion
dollars, far beyond their payments or development needs
and manifestly more than they can invest. Enormous unabsorbed
surplus revenues now threaten the stability of national economies
and indeed the institutions of the international monetary system
itself.

Yet this is but the first year of the inflated oil prices.
The full brunt of the petrodollar flood is yet to be felt. If
current economic trends continue, there will be general recession,
a compounding already serious worldwide shortages, unemploy-

-10-

The Search for Solutions

The first step to a solution is to recognize its long-term nature. There can be no solution to the problem without a substantial reduction in the price.

But this is not likely without consumer solidarity and even then it may not happen to occur sufficiently rapidly or in the amount required to

overcome the effects of burgeoning deficits, especially in the absence of consumer solidarity. The question we face is how

to achieve a meaningful price reduction.

-- We can put our faith in the eventual work of market forces alone, meanwhile borrowing from producers to finance our oil bill.

-- We can hope that our inflation will redress the balance between consumer and producer;

-- We can expect that pressure or persuasion will induce producers to lower the prices; or

-12-

Nor can the consumers <u>reliably</u> finance their oil bill
by going ever-deeper into debt to the producers. The
transfer of wealth is already phenomenal. It took the
United States more than two centuries to acquire net
public and private assets overseas of $65 billion; the oil
producers financial holdings in the industrial world will
increase by that amount in a single year.

This is manifestly unhealthy for creditor and debtor
alike. It makes the domestic structure of the consumers
hostage to far-away decisions, because producers can produce
severe consequences simply by shifting investment funds
from one country to another or even from one bank to
another. A political realignment of entirely unpredictable
consequences and highly tenuous durability is likely to result.

-13-

A new structure of financial institutions will evolve, supplanting the old; new political relationships would naturally follow. The sale of arms would play a dangerously large role in the new pattern of relations, leading towards ever-widening instability -- especially as these arms

would go to areas of chronic tension. Those who wield

financial power will sooner or later seek to dictate the terms of new relationships. Thus what is at stake is the structure

of political, as well as of economic relationships.

Nor can the consumers hope to inflate their way out of

the crisis. Inflation would be a grotesque kind of adjustment, in which all elements in our political and economic

structure would be destabilized to attempt to balance one --

the oil bill. The oil producers would respond by accelerating

-16-

Many governments are paralyzed because they confront
national energy problems to which there are no national
solutions. But acting together we have options which we do
not have separately. Alone, no country, unless perhaps
the United States, can protect itself against a new selective
oil embargo. Alone, no country, unless it is the United
States, could weather the effects of a financial collapse.
No single country's efforts to conserve oil or to find alterna-
tive sources of supply -- and that includes the United States --
can have more than a small impact on price. Nor can one
or several countries maintain the flow of trade and aid to
developing countries, if others are cutting back.

We must now realize the collective strength of the consumers.
A concerted consumer strategy can and must result in a substantial
reduction in price over the longer-term and protect our
economies in the interim.

-18-

The effect on prices of a move towards reduced
dependence would be powerful. While the demand of
the industrialized countries for imported oil would remain
static or grow only slowly, new sources of energy will
become available inside and outside the OPEC. Those
producers who need to sell more oil to the industrialized
countries to finance their development will have to bid
against producers whose need for revenue is less.
OPEC could attempt to offset new production by allocating
deeper and deeper cuts in production in an effort to maintain
high prices. But ultimately the cartel would be unable to
maintain its artificial prices, and demand and supply would
be balanced at real prices substantially lower than those
now obtaining.

-19-

Limiting demand for oil imports into the industrial
countries to a roughly constant figure is an extraordinarily
demanding goal. It will mean that the United States, which
now imports a third of its oil and a sixth of its total energy,
must become largely self-sufficient. And all countries
must make a major shift toward nuclear power, coal, and
gas, while lowering the growth of consumption.

It is not attainable that it is a possible goal, Our own Project Independence

Blueprint, and the OECD's Long Term Energy Assessment,

the multitude of options

demonstrate that we have many options for achieving it.

And if we do not set and achieve this goal, nothing else

will help us.

Second, we must protect the vitality of our economies

in the interim.

Effective action on conservation will require

months to succeed; effective action on alternative sources of

-20-

supply will take years. In the meantime, there will be two great dangers. One is that a new selective or general threat will cause a serious loss of output and employment. The other is that our financial system might prove unable to recycle the huge flows of oil dollars that must each year be invested in our economies. A financial collapse somewhere in the system -- or the threat of it -- could result in restrictive monetary, fiscal and trade measures and a downward spiral of income and jobs.

The two elements of our strategy reinforce each other. As we bring supply and demand into better balance, we reduce the threat to our economies from financial strains and interruption of supplies. As we move decisively to defend our economies in the interim period, we demonstrate to

-26-

**Second,** we must press on with the development of new sources

of oil and alternatives to oil.
supplies, which together with conservation can provide the

conditions for the ultimate resolution of the energy crisis.

**Third,** we need to complement the safety net for any

severely -- but the measures for oil emergency
new oil emergency with one to assure that no financial crisis,
and measures to safeguard the financial system
or threat of it, results in disruptive economic policies and a

**Fourth,** when consumer solidarity has been achieved by
these measures we should enter a dialogue of equals with
producers to seek a new equilibrium between our interests.

**Fifth,** we must move now to provide the additional con-

cessional aid the poorest developing countries need to escape
lives for progress.
allow development to proceed while they struggle to overcome
the disastrous impact of the energy crisis.

Let me deal with each of these in turn.

-27-

1. Conservation:

Since development of new supplies takes years, energy conservation is the most immediate road to relief from high oil prices. It also would limit the dangers to the world's economic and political structure from the concentration of financial assets in the hands of a few nations. It would demonstrate to the producers that their long-term interests will not be served by prolonged high prices.

Recent oil consumption levels in the industrial countries have been running at approximately the levels of a year ago, and far less than was predicted before the oil crisis. This savings is due to conservation measures, the effect of higher prices, and the slowdown of our economies. We must now take steps to ensure that a restoration of economic growth

-28-

does not bring with it a return to wasteful energy habits.

President Ford has set a goal for the United States of
reducing oil imports by one million barrels per day by the

a reduction of 1/2% in one year
end of 1975, compared to a present total of 6.3 million,

consumption imports,
barrels per day. Other countries have begun similar

programs.

NOP
The United States is prepared to join an international
agreement to achieve these and even further savings if that
power necessary
is required to reach our common goal.

We are convinced that to be truly effective, conservation must be collective. A reduction in consumption by

France

consuming country can be negated unless all major consumers

While
implement similar programs. It is probably neither practical

nor desirable to expect governments to commit their countries

now to specific ceilings on oil imports in 1975, we must

-32-

have already been made to carry on joint research and
development projects in coal technology, thermonuclear
fusion, and solar energy. The United States is prepared
to expand these joint activities substantially. We are
prepared to join with other IEA members to stimulate
joint multilateral ventures in the area of uranium enrichment,
to ensure that the great increase in world demand for this
alternative fuel will be met. And we will take the lead
in creating in the IEA a fund to finance or guarantee
investment in promising energy projects, both in partici-
pating countries and in countries ready to cooperate with
the IEA on a long-term basis.

resources, traditional donor programs, the new programs
of the oil producers, international loan facilities, an
unfinanced gap will remain.

For the 25 or 30 countries most seriously affected by high
oil prices the gap will total $1 to $2 billion in 1975. It could
be more in 1976.

To finance this gap the United States proposes a new
facility of the International Monetary Fund for the poorest
countries, seriously affected by the crisis. We suggest that
the oil producers provide the loan capital for this facility
and assume a third of the interest cost on loans to the poorest
developing countries. The membership of the International
Monetary Fund, for its part, would guarantee the repayment

-44-

of these funds to the producers. Members could also agree
to cover a second third of the interest cost by authorizing
the Fund to sell some of its gold holdings, and to use the
profits for this purpose. The developing countries them-
selves would pay the other third of the interest cost,
amounting to three percent or less.

The Next Step

It is now a year and a month since the oil crisis began.

We have made a good beginning, but the major test is still

ahead
before us.

There are many significant issues which I have not
addressed, including the relative emphasis to give nuclear power
vs. coal, price increases and taxes vs. administrative means
for conservation, loans vs. guarantees for financial solidarity,

E-25

# The Program of Action

Alexis de Tocqueville once noted: "There is a propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence and to abandon a mature design."

A generation ago the Western world demonstrated that it could pursue a larger conception of its destiny. Today the great democracies must once again demonstrate their will and their vision.

Let me describe the program which the United States—now in detail of action—we are now called upon to complete. must believes is now required. The consuming countries should act in five interrelated areas:

First, we must implement programs for substantial energy conservation, which offers the most immediate prospect for relief from the burden of high oil prices.

The American Approach

The challenge before Western civilization is to define
its role in an age of global interdependence. As we
move toward the 21st century we must decide our
relevance to a world irreversibly linked by dependent
economies and human aspirations, by instant
communications and nuclear peril.

The contemporary agenda of energy, food and inflation
exceeds the capacity of any single government, or even
of a few governments together to resolve:

But America, Europe and Japan have a special contri-
bution to make if we choose to make it. We are still
the most advanced societies in the world -- technologic-
ally, economically, politically. We still have a
decisive impact on world affairs when we work together.

Thus in April 1973 the United States called on the great
deocracies to engage in a cooperative response to the
entire range of global issues, to anchor our partnership

in a fresh act of creation. - We stressed that the
economic, political and security problems of the
modern world were inseparable, that we could not
simultaneously pursue cooperation in one area and
confrontation in another. And we singled out energy
as one of the new issues we faced that required our
cooperation.

A thesis then considered by some an attempt to reassert
American predominance has since the energy crisis
become a self-evident truth.

In December 1973, just seven weeks after the oil
embargo, we renewed the call for a new spirit of
common adventure, and we specifically proposed a
cooperative enterprise in energy. My address to the
Pilgrims Society in London expressed our conviction
that the only solution was a massive effort among the
major consumer nations. We proposed that within three
months these nations should develop a strategy for

In February 1974 Europe, America and Japan gathered at the Washington Energy Conference to launch that common endeavor. At a time when the temptation to take unilateral action had reached new heights, the very convening of such a meeting signalled Western determination to unite rather than to "go it alone".

But our sense of urgency, of the magnitude of the problem drove us beyond our symbolism; we developed a common strategy of great breadth and promise:

- To decrease our vulnerability to interruption of oil supplies--never again would we be held hostage to selective embargoes;

- To develop new sources of supply--never again would we be so dependent on the resources of so few;

- To conserve existing supplies of energy--never again would we return to habits which made us the prisoners of our own excesses.

-14-

An Energy Coordinating Group was established to immediately begin translating this strategy into cooperative programs.

The Energy Coordinating Group's first objective was to reduce our political and economic vulnerability to interruption of oil supplies. We have now agreed upon an unprecedented plan to share our energy supplies in another crisis. The International Emergency Program we adopt next week is an historic step toward collective solidarity and individual prosperity.

Beyond emergency sharing, we are moving to develop adequate energy supplies at a price consumers can afford. We are launching a massive, long-term program of research and development, combining American expertise and resources with those of our major allies. The International Energy Agency we will establish next week provides the permanent focus for this massive effort. Agreement has already been reached on innovative

Projects in coal technology, thermonuclear fusion and solar energy.

But until additional supplies of energy become available, we must conserve what we have. At the Washington Energy Conference we pledged our nations to a new energy ethic--we agreed to share the sacrifices and costs of conservation and thus reduce pressures on both prices and supply. The response of our peoples has been heartening. The five to ten percent increase forecast earlier for consumption growth in 1974 has not taken place. Equally important, recent consumption levels have been running five to ten percent below the levels before the oil embargo of 1973. Several decades of prosperity have not eliminated our people's willingness and ability to sacrifice in the face of a clear danger and common need.

These measures were essential, but they are not sufficient.

of energy, particularly our consumption of imported
oil; and that

-- We are determined to commit the capital and
technology required to accelerate the development
of alternative sources of supply.

Substantial energy conservation offers the most
immediate prospect for relief from the crushing
burden of high oil prices. It would reduce the
dangers to the world's economic and political struc-
ture from the concentration of financial assets in
the hands of a few nations. It would demonstrate
to the producers that their long-term interests will
not be served by prolonged high prices.

I have already noted that recent consumption levels
have been running five to ten percent below the levels

before the oil embargo of 1973. But additional savings
are necessary and we must assure that a resurgence of
economic growth does not bring with it a return to
wasteful energy habits.

President Ford has set a national goal of reducing
oil imports by one million barrels per day by the
end of 1975. This would be a 16% reduction in our
imports. Other countries have begun similar programs.

The United States is prepared to accept an international
agreement to achieve these and even further savings
if that is required to reach our common goal.

We are convinced that to be truly effective, conservation must be a collective practice. The austerity efforts of any one consuming country can be negated unless all major consumers pursue complementary objectives. It is probably neither practical nor

- 21 -

desirable to expect governments to commit their
countries now to effective specific ceilings on oil
imports in 1975. But we must bring together informa-
tion about our individual country program for 1975 to
ensure that we are collectively doing enough.

As our common goal we propose by the second half of
1975 a further ten percent reduction in consumption.
Combined with the reduction which has already taken
place, the industrialized nations would then be
consuming one-fifth less imported oil than in 1973.

The development of new energy sources offers the greatest long-term promise for economic growth. But only by starting now can we ensure that we will have substantial amounts of new energy in the 1980's. We must demonstrate to the oil producing governments the long-run futility -- and danger to themselves -- of their monopolistic decision to raise prices astronomically.

- 22 -

The United States has begun under Project Independence a massive effort to develop domestic energy resources. It is a multi-billion dollar program on the scale of our moon-landing program and the Manhattan Project, the two previous examples of what American technology can accomplish when it is so mobilized. We are now approaching major Presidential decisions on the various options open to us under Project Independence -- decisions which will call for extended national commitment of capital, technology and manpower. We will not allow ourselves to be blackmailed -- politically or economically -- by an overdependence on imported oil. Our imports must fall to at most one or two million barrels a day.

National programs such as Project Independence must carry a major burden in developing new energy sources.

- 13 -

But no one country has all the ideas and technology required for this task. An effective program of international cooperation will reinforce and enhance individual national efforts.

I have already noted our agreement on several joint research and development projects to be carried out under the new International Energy Agency in such fields as coal technology, thermonuclear fusion, and solar energy. The United States is prepared to expand these joint activities substantially.

For example, we are prepared to renew our offer to join with other countries to stimulate multinational ventures in the area of uranium enrichment -- to ensure that the great increase in world demand for this alternative fuel is met.

-24-

In addition we stand ready to explore on a multi-
lateral basis the complex problems of how to promote
international investments in domestic energy resources
and how to provide the investment security necessary
to stimulate large private expenditures in the energy
sector.

**Financial Solidarity.** Until our conservation and supply policies produce major changes in the size and source of our supplies, the industrialized countries are faced with a flood of oil-generated resources. The problem is made easier by the fact that the funds come back to the industrialized world. But they are not in the quantity and distribution which is required and certain countries confront the dangers of sudden withdrawals and chronic deficits. It is entirely within the capacity of the industrialized nations to correct this imbalance and vulnerability among themselves. No other problem

more clearly demonstrates the opportunity and the necessity for our cooperation.

For us this is both a problem and an opportunity.

Our collective institutions for 30 years have given us the practice of close intergovernmental cooperation on monetary issues. We must maintain this solidarity for the solution to the current crisis depends upon it.

Our financial arrangements must have two objectives:

- to preserve our private financial institutions so that they can safely continue to perform their essential function; and

- to assure that none of our industrial partners is forced to endure acute economic hardship, pursue protectionist policies, or submit to intolerable political and economic dependence on financial help from the producers.

- 26 -

The consuming countries have the capacity to do this
if they have the will to preserve their integrity
and manage their own financial affairs. While
producers are free to choose where they place
their funds in the industrial nations in response
to their own investment preferences, the consumer
recipients of these funds must be free and
have the capacity to redistribute or recycle
them to meet needs throughout the industrial
or the developing world.

Private financial institutions are already recycling
funds. To buttress their efforts, Central Banks
are now moving to assure support for the liquidity
of these private institutions particularly since
so much of the oil money has been invested at
relatively short term. The capacity of private
channels has not yet been reached, but we must
not assume that these channels can or should bear
all the risk in loans to governments that are
clearly under great financial pressure. We need
not wait to test this capacity.

-27-

Governments can move now to put in place a system of mutual support to augment private channels whenever needed. We can thereby provide the confidence which would allow both stronger and weaker countries to avoid internationally disruptive economic policies. Such a safety net would help assure the stability of the entire system and the credit-worthiness of participating governments. We thus should reduce the eventual requirement for official financing.

A mutual commitment to financial support would build on and reinforce our undertakings in conservation and the development of alternative sources. Financial solidarity would assure cooperating governments that the absence of external finance on tolerable terms will not undermine the political and economic sacrifice they call on their people to make. Each cooperating country would be able to assure its people that sacrifices will be shared

equitably by major Western consumers and that the
long term course can be stayed by all cooperating
states, weaker and stronger alike.

The United States will propose to its partners
who have already begun discussions that a common
fund of loan and guarantee-commitments be created
to provide the means to recycle funds up to
$40 billion. This financial solidarity will
correspond to eighty percent of their collective
oil deficits next year. This would not be an aid
fund, but a facility for redistributing at commercial
interest cost funds flowing back to the industrial
area from oil producers. Support from the common
fund would not be automatic but would follow
reasonable self-help measures and full resort to
private financing opportunities.

Countries would share the financial underwriting and access to the fund on the basis of their ability to assist and their need. Governments would individually choose the means to meet their financing commitment to the joint effort. (We have asked Enders to have something about use of these funds for R&D, etc upon your arrival.)

**The Developing World.** The Western industrial countries and Japan can reasonably approach their energy problem with the hope of mastering it by their own efforts. The developing countries have no such prospect. Their ability to reduce energy consumption is limited. Many cannot afford even commercial terms for their financing needs and have instead always depended on official

international financial institutions. Therefore
support for the poorest developing countries
cannot be on the basis of normal commercial
risk. Instead, aid, on very concessional terms,
must be provided through international financial
institutions.

The need to do this is compelling. Without this
help, the burden of their energy bills will bring
development to a halt, as resources are diverted
to meeting only the elemental needs for sustaining
human life -- for food, energy and shelter.

At the World Food Conference I outlined an international
strategy for meeting the food and agricultural development
problems of the poorer developing countries. The

United States will make a major contribution to
the realization of that strategy.

We cannot afford to let development hopes die,
or cut ourselves off from the political and economic
needs of so great a part of the world. The industrial
countries must endeavor to at least maintain aid
flows so that their actions do not aggravate a
problem made acute by the actions of the oil
producers. However, the major burden for restoring
hope to these poor nations lies with those who now
have the means to help.

The developing nations cannot afford a second or third
mortgage on their future at eight percent interest.
A fund especially designed for their needs must be
created.

Therefore the United States proposes a new facility of the International Monetary Fund for the least developed to provide them with one to two billion dollars in desparately needed financing during 1975.

In some ways, its operations would parallel those of the existing IMF oil facility. But it would share the burden more broadly and provide more relief to those least able to pay. We suggest that the oil producers provide the loan capital for this facility and assume a third of the cost of interest in recognition of the mounting debt burden of the poorest developing countries. The membership of the International Monetary Fund could, for its part, agree to cover a second third of the interest cost through a fund established

with some of the profits realized from periodic
sales of the IMF's gold holdings. The developing
countries themselves would pay the other third
of the interest cost amounting to three or four
percent.

**Relations with Producers.** We have set forth
what the major consumer nations must do together
to conserve existing supplies, to create new
sources of energy and to manage the massive
flow of oil-generated funds. And we have considered
what is required to meet the special needs of the
developing nations. Now we must address the final
element of our strategy -- the relationship between
consumers and producers.

Consumers must accelerate their programs so that we can join with the producers in a common effort to resolve the global energy problem. We cannot expect the producers to bear the entire burden by themselves. Our contribution must be solid accomplishment in the very areas of conservation, decreased dependence on oil and financial stability in which the producers have urged consumer action.

Thus we consider greater consumer cooperation a step toward cooperation with the producers, not the beginning of an anti-producer club.

The United States is willing to join any dialogue that promises positive results. Our only concern

-45-

has been that a dialogue entered into with no
clear objectives could as easily lead to con-
frontation as cooperation. Negotiations which fail
harden positions and make accommodation more difficult.
We should be reasonably certain that the conditions
exist for a mutually satisfactory outcome.

Let us be realistic about what we could expect
from an immediate consumer-producer meeting in
the present situation.

- 26 -

For example, we see no prospect that the consumers could bargain effectively with the producers at this time on the vital question of price. Our obligation to the producers as well as to ourselves is first to create by concerted acts of political will the preconditions for constructive dialogue.

First, we must put our own house in order by accepting the self-discipline to limit our demand for imported oil and develop alternative energy sources. Second, we must have a price policy.

We must have agreement on a common consumer approach to the price problem which buttresses our conservation efforts and induces lessened dependence by encouraging long-term investment in alternate sources. For this we need policies that present price increases and stabilize the prices of imported oil at hopefully lower levels than prevail at present. The ultimate economic price of oil must be discussed with producers or left to the market but unless we have common consumer objectives we risk underwriting continued dependence on high cost imported energy. Stable prices at relatively high levels will force a faster pace toward decreased dependence through the creation of alternate sources. This must be our prime long-term objective.

- 37 -

From the producer point of view, they must
see that their long-term interest will best be
served by a price policy that does not leave them
competing for a static share of the market. At present
prices, importers are likely to import no more in 1985
than in 1972. Meanwhile new sources' will come on
stream--not only in the developed world--but in the less
develop world as well. In a static situation, those
producers who need to sell more oil to finance their
own development needs may well find themselves selling
at low prices to obtain the necessary revenue. They
can avoid this longer-term effect only if they see the
wisdom of foregoing a possible short-term price advantage.

These are the complex matters we must first
discuss among consumers. A formal conference between
oil producers and consumers could be constructive and
may even be essential. When we have more firmly established
a framework of consumer cooperation and have developed
constructive proposals, we should then move to that
stage of the international dialogue.

In the meantime, we do not lack for the means of
communication. All the consumers are in regular contact
with the producers at all levels. In my recent trips
to the Middle East, for example, I have had useful and
positive discussions with the leaders of the major

A great responsibility rests upon us here in America.

Our economic and technological preeminence imposes upon us an obligation of leadership because no solutions are possible without our contribution.

For many years, this country has carried a disproportionate share of the burdens of maintaining the peace, of feeding the hungry, of stimulating global economic growth. It has been a heavy burden, which we did not seek and which we have often been tempted to put down. But we have not done so -- nor can we afford to do so now, for it is the generations who follow us who would pay the price of our abdication.

And we have a responsibility at home -- to eliminate waste, to mobilize our science and technology for the benefit of mankind, and to shape a responsible national policy and support it. This is not a time for business as usual, for government as usual, or for politics as usual.

For more than a decade we have been torn by war, and
then constitutional crisis. We have been enervated by
our exertions, and perhaps even more by self-doubt.

But we again face a world in grave danger, a world much
in need of a self-confident America that understands
that without its leadership there can be no stability,
no permanent improvement in the human condition, and no
lasting peace. Once again we must evoke the traditional
American faith that problems are soluble if we but try.
This is the kind of challenge that Americans are best at.
It asks of us ingenuity and dedication. It offers us
yet another new frontier of challenge and endeavor, and
of accomplishment.

The magnitude of the energy problem is worthy of the
total commitment of a great nation. For a great nation
cannot be true to itself without a cause beyond itself.
This must be the commitment not only of America but of
all our allies and friends, whose contribution is equally
essential. Just as we believe in America, let us all