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EXTEND SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

IN THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE 1960'S THE BRITISH WERE FORCED TO REORIENT THEIR PRIORITIES TOWARD EUROPE AND AWAY FROM ASIA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN. IT IS AN INTERESTING COINCIDENCE THAT 1968--THE YEAR THE BRITISH ANNOUNCED THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW--WAS ALSO THE YEAR WHEN THE USSR FIRST ESTABLISHED WHAT HAS NOW BECOME A PERMANENT NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN.

WHILE THIS TRANSITION FROM BRITISH DOMINANCENTO A MORE DIFFUSE POWER STRUCTURE HAS BEEN IN PROGRESS, THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION HAVE BEEN GROWING. WE HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DEPENDENT ON THE OIL WHICH IS CONSTANTLY MOVING IN TANKERS ALONG THE SEA LANES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, AND OUR ALLIES ARE EVEN MORE DEPENDENT. WE HAVE AN IMMEDIATE STAKE IN THE STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THIS VERY LARGE BODY OF WATER WHERE HALF OF THE WORLD'S SEABORNE OIL IS IN TRANSIT AT ANY GIVEN TIME.

CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED AT THE STEADY GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE REGION. I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW BRIEFLY THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS BY WHICH THIS INCREASE OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE HAS DEVELOPED.

THE FIRST SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN IN 1968 WERE SMALL AND TENTATIVE IN NATURE. LACKING ANY SHORE FACILITIES, THE ORIGINAL CONTINGENTS OF SOVIET SHIPS WERE SATISFIED TO REMAIN MOSTLY QUIESCENT, SPENDING MOST OF THEIR TIME AT ANCHORAGES IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS, WITH ONLY OCCASIONAL BRIEF PORT VISITS TO BREAK WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN A MONOTONOUS EXISTENCE. THIS CAUTIOUS PROBING OF UNFAMILIAR WATERS IS VERY REMINISCENT OF SOVIET INITIAL DEPLOYMENTS INTO THE MEFITERRANEAN SOME FIVE YEARS EARLIER.

WHEN THE SOVIET NAVY BEGAN TO DEPLOY TO THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1963, FOLLOWING AN ABORTIVE EARLIER ATTEMPT TO

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INTRODUCE SUBMARINES INTO ALBANIA, THERE WERE VERY FEW
PORTS OPEN TO THEM AND THEY SPENT MOST OF THEIR TIME
SITTING IDLY AT ANCHOR. BUT THE SOVIETS GREW MORE
CONFIDENT WITH TIMEN AND WHEN EGYPT MADE PORT AND AIRFIELD
FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO THEM AFTER 1967, THEY WERE QUICK

TO INCREASE THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF THEIR OPERATIONS.
BY THE TIME OF THE ARAB-ISRAEL WAR OF OCTOBER 1973,
THEY WERE ABLE TO INTRODUCE AND SUSTAIN AN ARMADA OF MORE
THAN NINETY SHIPS, INCLUDING THE MOST MODERN IN THEIR
INVENTORY.

AS EARLY AS 1962, THE SOVIETS AGREED TO ASSIST THE
GOVERNMENT OF SOMALIA IN CONSTRUCTING PORT FACILITIES
IN BERBERA, A SMALL PORT OVERLOOKING THE ENTRANCE TO THE
RED SEA. THE HARBOR WAS COMPLETED IN 1969, AND BY 1971
SIXTEEN SOVIET SHIPS PAID VISITS TO THE PORT. IN 1972,
MARSHAL GRECHKO VISITED SOMALIA FOR THE SIGNING OF A
SOVIET-SOMALI AGREEMENT, AND THIS WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY
AN INCREASE IN SOVIET USE OF FACILITIES AT BERBERA,
INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS
SITE AND THE ARRIVAL OF A.BARRACKS AND REPAIR SHIP WHICH
HAS REMAINED AS A PERMANENT FEATURE EVER SINCEGM IN LATE
1973, THE USSR BEGAN INITIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT HAS
SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A MISSILE STORAGE AND
HANDLING FACILITY AT BERBERA, SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIETS
HAD PLANS FOR SUCH A FACILITY EVEN BEFORE THE EVENTS OF
THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR AND THE INTRODUCTION OF A MORE
FREQUENT US PRESENCE.

IN JULY OF LAST YEAR, THE USSR SIGNED A TREATY OF FRIEND-
SHIP AND COOPERATION WITH SOMALIA, SIMILAR TO THOSE
SIGNED WITH EGYPT, IRAQ AND INDIA. SEVERAL MONTHS LATER,
APPROXIMATELY COINCIDENT WITH A VISIT BY THE COMMANDER
OF THE SOVIET NAVY, ADMIRAL GORSHKOV, WE NOTED THE
BEGINNING OF A SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION OF SOVIET FACILITIES
AT BERBERA, INCLUDING EXPANSION OF THE POL STORAGE,
CONSTRUCTION OF ADDITIONAL HOUSING ASHORE, AND THE
BEGINNING OF A VERY LONG AIRSTRIP. THE EMERGING
CONFIGURATION OF A MISSILE STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITY
BECAME AVPARENT. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE USSR IS IN THE

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PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A SIGNIFICANT NEW FACILITY
CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THEIR NAVAL AND AIR ACTIVITIES
IN THE NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN.

THE USSR HAS ALSO PROVIDED ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH YEMEN IN MANAGING THE FORMER BRITISH PORT OF ADEN, WHICH WAS THE FOURTH LARGEST BUNKERING PORT IN THE WORLD WHEN THE SUEZ CANAL WAS IN OPERATION. THIS PORT LIES DIRECTLY ACROSS THE GULF OF ADEN FROM BERBERA AND COMMANDS THE NORTHERN SIDE OF THE ENTRANCE TO THE RED SEA. IN ADDITION, THE USSR IS ASSISTING IRAQ IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PORT, UMM QASR, AT THE NORTHERN TIP OF THE PERSIAN GULF. HOWEVER, SOVIET DEVELOPMENT AND USE OK THESE TWO FACILITIES HAS BEEN MUCH MORE MODEST THAN AT BERBERA.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS BECOME A MAJOR SEA POWER IN THE LAST DECADE. THE FIRST DISPLAY OF SOVIET GLOBAL NAVAL POWER -- THE SO-CALLED OKEAN EXERCISE IN 1970 -- WAS INTENDED TO DEMONSTRATE SOVIET CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT COORDINATED NAVAL OPERATIONS IN EVERY OCEAN OF THE WORLD. A SIMILAR WORLDWIDE EXERCISE WAS HELD IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR. FOR THIS EVENT, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SHIPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS APPROXIMATELY DOUBLED. ACTIVITY WAS CENTERED IN THE NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA, AT THE CROSSROADS OF THE TANKER LANES FROM THE PERSIAN GULF. THE EXERCISE WAS SUPPORTED BY LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION, AND, FOR THE FIRST TIME, BY MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT OPERATING FROM AIRFIELDS IN SOMALIA.

IT IS WORTH REMEMBERING THAT THE ENTIRE SOVIET BUILDUP IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WHICH NOW AVERAGES APPROXIMATELY 19 SHIPS ON A REGULAR BASIS, HAS OCCURRED DURING THE PERIOD SINCE THE SUEZ CANAL CLOSED IN 1967. WE ANTICIPATE THAT, WITH THE CANAL ONCE AGAIN OPEN AS OF LAST WEEK, WE WILL SEE AN INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP TRAFFIC AND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY WITH SOUTH ASIA. WE WILL BE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY FOR ANY CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF THEIR NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS. AS YOU KNOW, THE OPENING OF THE CANAL REDUCES THE DISTANCE FROM THE

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BLACK SEA TO THE ARABIAN SEA FROM ONTPP MILES TO ONLY 2,500 MILES --- A DIFFERENCE IN SAILING TIME OF 24 DAYS. IT ALSO REOPENS TO THE USSR A WARM WATER TRANSIT ROUTE FROM EUROPEAN RUSSIA TO THE SOVIET FAR EAST, WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE IMPORTANT FOR THE TRANSFER OF NAVAL UNITS BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FLEETS. WHETHER THIS WILL MEAN AN INCREASE IN SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE ON A REGULAR BASIS IS NOT CERTAIN, BUT IT WILL CERTAINLY INCREASE SOVIET FLEXIBILITY IN SUPPORTING OR REINFORCING ITS UNITS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

THE LEVEL OF U.S. PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN HAS BEEN PRUDENT. WE HAVE HAD A SMALL PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND RED SEA SINCE 1949, CONSISTING OF THE COMMAND SHIP AND TWO DESTROYERS OF THE MIDDLE EAST FORCE CENTERED IN BAHRAIN. IN ADDITION, SINCE OCTOBER 1973, WE HAVE CONDUCTED MORE FREQUENT AND MORE REGULAR DEPLOYMENTS TO THE AREA FROM OUR PACIFIC FLEET. OVER THE PAST 18 MONTHS, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVEN SUCH DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING FIVE VISITS BY CARRIER TASK GROUPS AND TWO VISITS BY MAJOR SURFACE COMBATANTS. OVER THE PAST YEAR, WE HAVE HAD AN AUGMENTED PRESENCE IN THE AREA APPROXIMATELY ONE-THIRD OF THE TIME.

ALTHOUGH WE WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO SEE NO SOVIET BUILDUP OF MILITARY PRESENCE IN THIS REGION, IT APPEARS THAT THE USSR INTENDS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH A BUILDUP. SINCE AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY BALANCE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THIS AREA OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD, WE FEEL WE SHOULD HAVE LOGISTICAL FACILITIES WHICH WILL PERMIT AS TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE PRESENCE. IN A PERIOD OF HISTORICAL TRANSITION TOWARD A NEW SET OF POWER RELATIONSHIPS, ONLY THE UNITED STATES AMONG THE WESTERN NATIONS HAS THE STATURE TO INSURE THAT THAT BALANCE IS MAINTAINED.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT COMPLETES MY REMARKS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED ABOUT THE ONGOING ACTIVITIES AT THE PORT OF BERBERA, I HAVE HERE SOME PHOTOS AND CHARTS WHICH SHOULD ILLUSTRATE FOR YOU THE SOURCE OF

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OUR CONCERN, UNQUOTE.

SECDEF THEN PROCEEDED TO SHOW THE SASC "RECENT HIGH ALTITUDE RECONAISSANCE" PHOTOGRAPHY OF THE BERBERA PORT FACILITY. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

BERBERA PORT FACILITY

--GENERAL: BERBERA PORT HAS A SMALL NATURAL HARBOR ABOUT TWO MILES LONG AND ONE MILE WIDE. DEPTHS RANGE FROM 30 TO 60 FEET. APPROACHES FROM THE OPEN SEA ARE DEEP AND CLEAR WITH TIDE CHANGES OF APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET. CONSTRUCTION OF THE PORT COMMENCED UNDER A 1962 ECONOMIC AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE PROJECT, PROVIDING BERTHING FACILITIES FOR SHIPS OF 30 FOOT DRAFTS, WAS COMPLETED IN JANUARY 1969. THE PORT, FUNCTIONING COMMERCIALY AS AN EXPORTER OF LIVESTOCK AND FOR DISCHARGING MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE SOMALI NATIONAL ARMY, IS NOW HEAVILY USED TO SUPPORT SOVIET NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL.

--FACILITIES CONSIST OF A QUAY WITH 1400 FEET ALONGSIDE BERTHING SPACE AND ALONGSIDE DEPTH OF 30 FEET. THE BERTHING QUAY IS CONNECTED TO THE SHORE BY CAUSWAYS. THERE ARE 40 BUILDINGS IN THE AREA INCLUDING 18 STORAGE STRUCTURES WITH A CAPACITY OF 165,000 SQUARE FEET. THE MILITARY PORT CAPACITY IS ESTIMATED TO BE 2300 SHORT TONS PER DAY.

--PHOTOGRAPHY OF APRIL 1975 REVEALED A VYN CLASS SOVIET BARRACKS SHIP WHICH HAS BEEN LOCATED IN THE PORT SINCE LATE 1972. SHE IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING HOUSING FOR AT LEAST 200 TO 300 PERSONS AND HAS A MACHINE SHOP TO PERFORM MINOR REPAIRS FOR TRANSIENT SOVIET SHIPS. ALSO BERTHED AT THE QUAY IS AN AMUR CLAUS SUBMARINE REPAIR SHIP AND A SOVIET FREIGHTER. AT THE TIME OF THIS PHOTOGRAPHY SOVIET COMBATANTS NORMALLY STATIONED AT THIS PORT WERE AT SEU PARTICIPATING IN THE NAVAL EXERCISE OKEAN 75.

HOUSING FACILITIES

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--GENERAL: THIS PHOTOGRAPH REVEALS A FENCED BARRACKS AREA THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE ABOUT 1,000 PEOPLE. THE ADJACENT TRAILER CAMP CAN ACCOMMODATE AN ADDITIONAL 200 PEOPLE.

--FACILITIES INCLUDE 16 TWO-STORY BARRACKS BUILDINGS, 20 TRAILERS, AND TWO SUPPORT TYPE BUILDINGS. TEN OF THE BARRACKS WERE COMPLETED PRIOR TO MARCH 1973. SINCE THEN, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SIX MORE BARRACKS AND THE ADDITION OF

THE 20 HOUSE TRAILERS HAS EXPANDED THE HOUSING CAPACITY OF THE FACILITY TO 1,000 - 1,200 PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET BARRACKS COMPOUND PROBABLY HOUSES SOME MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISORS, AND TECHNICIANS, MOST ARE BELIEVED TO BE NAVAL PERSONNEL AND TECHNICAL/CONSTRUCTION WORKERS INVOLVED WITH THE NEARBY COMMUNICATIONS STATION, MISSILE HANDLING AND STORAGE FACILITY, AND A NEW AIRFIELD. THE SOVIETS HAVE A TOTAL ESTIMATED HOUSING CAPACITY FOR 1,200 TO 1,500 PERSONNEL IN BERBERAN SOMALIA, INCLUDING THE BARRACKS SHIP LOCATED IN THE NEARBY HARBOR.

--THE INSET DEPICTS A KNOWN SOVIET HOUSING TRAILER SIMILAR TO THOSE SEEN HERE.

## POL STORAGE FACILITY

--THE POL STORAGE FACILITY CONSISTS OF AN EXISTING TANK FARM AND A NEW TANK FARM UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THE EXISTING TANK FARM WAS ESTABLISHED BY DUTCH SHELL AND HAS A CAPACITY OF 38,800 BARRELS. THE NEW STORAGE TANKS WILL HAVE A CAPACITY OF 131,200 BARRELS. TOTAL CAPACITY WOULD EQUATE TO 170,000 BARRELS. THE COMPLEX IS CONNECTED BY PIPELINE WITH THE HARBOR AREA AND TO OFF-SHORE BUOYS FOR FUEL TRANSFER.

--THE NINE NEW STORAGE TANKS ARE OF SOVIET DESIGN AND HAVE BEEN SEEN IN NORTH VIETNAM, CUBA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE TECHNIQUE OF CONSTRUCTION ENTAILS A SPOOL OF ROLLED STRIP STEEL WHICH IS UNFOLDED AT THE SITE.

--THE BULK OF THE INCREASED CAPABILITY WILL PROBABLY BE USED FOR BUNKERING SOVIET SHIPS.

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## LONG RANGE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY

--THE SOVIETS HAVE ESTABLISHED A HIGH FREQUENCY SHORE-BASED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY JUST OUTSIDE BERBERA. THE

RECEIVER SITA IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY ONE MILE SOUTH OF BERBERA. THE TRANSMITTER SITE IS THREE MILES NORTHEAST OF THE RECEIVER SITE. BOTH HAVE RHOMBIC ANTENNAS USED FOR LONG DISTANCE COMMUNICATIONS. THEY ARE ORIENTED NORTH AND WEST. OTHER ANTENNAS AT THE SITE ARE PROBABLY USED FOR SHORTER RANGE COMMUNICATIONS WITH SHIPS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.

--ALSO IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE FENCED SITES ARE CONTROL FACILITIES AND, AT THE RECEIVER SITA, A SEPARATE FENCED AREA OF AIR CONDITIONED BUILDINGS PROBABLY FOR SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT.

## NEW AIRFIELD UNDER CONSTRUCTION

--THE SOVIETS ARE CONSTRUCTING A NEW AIRFIELD APPROXIMATELY FOUR MILES SOUTHWEST OF BERBERA. THIS PHOTOGRAPHY REVEALS TWO PARALLEL CLEARINGS 16-17,000 FEET LONG. BOTH ARE BEING GRADED FOR A 13-15,000 FOOT RUNWAY AND PARALLEL TAXIWAY. AT THE PRESENT RATE OF PROGRESS, THE FIELD COULD BE OPERATIONAL WITHIN ONE TO TWO YEARS DEPENDING ON THE PACE OF CONSTRUCTION. WHEN COMPLETED, THE FIELD SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE ANY SIZE SOVIET AIRCRAFT THAT CURRENTLY EXISTS.

--THE AIRFIELD, LIKE THE OTHER BERBERA MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE USED FOR SOVIET MILITARY PURPOSES. CONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRFIELD WITHIN TWO NAUTICAL MILES OF THE MISSILE STORAGE SITE AND FOUR NAUTICAL MILES OF BERBERA PORT WOULD PROVIDE A CONVENIENT AERIAL RESUPPLY CAPABILITY FOR SHIPS ASSIGNED TO THE SOVIET

INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON.

--THIS ENLARGEMENT OF THE AIRFIELD SHOWS INITIAL UPGRAING

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AND PLACEMENT OF CRUSHED ROCKS AS A BASE FOR THE MAIN
RUNWAY.

---THE DARK AREA IS OIL BEING PLACED AS A COAGULANT ON THE
GRADED SAND SURFACE FOR THE CRUSHED STONE.

--STONE IS BEING DRAWN FROM A NEWLY ESTABLISHED QUARRY ONE
MILE SOUTHEAST OF THE AIRFIELD (SEE INSET).

---A MISSILE HANDLING AND STORAGE FACILITY IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT BERBERA, SOMALIA. THE FACILITY IS 80 PERCENT COMPLETE WITH THREE DISTINCT, SEPARATELY SECURED AREAS. THESE ARE:

------A CHECKOUT/ASSEMBLY AND STORAGE AREA CONSISTING OF A
HIGH-BAY CHECKOUT.ASSEMBLY BUILDING, TWO DRIVE-IN STORAGE
BUNKERS, A LARGE CONCRETE APRON, AND ONE SUPPORT BUILDING.

------A MISSILE HANDLING AND FUELING AREA CONSISTING OF
EIGHT BUILDINGS, AND A CIRCULAR EXCAVATION.

------A COMPONENT STORAGE AREA WITH THREE STORAGE BUNKERS,
ONE DRIVE-THRU COMPONENT STORAGE BUNKER, A CIRCULAR
EXCAVATION, AND A SUPPORT BUILDING.

--THE FACILITY ITSELF IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES
EAST OF THE NEW AIRFIELD UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND TWO MILES
SOUTHWEST OF BERBERA PORT. WHEN COMPLETED, THIS
FACILITY COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A RELOAD CAPABILITY FOR
MISSILE-EQUIPPED SHIPS, SUBMARINES, AND AIRCRAFT OPERATING
IN AND OVER THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. KISSINGER

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UNTIL RELEASED BY THE COMMITTEE

RELEASED

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STATEMENT OF
GENERAL GEORGE S. BROWN, USAF, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
TUESDAY, 10 JUNE 1975

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to respond to the Committee's request for
my comments on the issues raised by S. Res. 160 and President
Ford's certification that the construction of the Diego
Garcia facility "is essential to the national interests of
the United States."

## Strategic Importance

Any rational analysis of this issue must begin with an
appraisal of the strategic importance of the area. The
strategic importance of the Indian Ocean is derived, not only
from its relationship to oil and minerals resources, but also
from the air and sea lines of communication running through it.

Oil from the Persian Gulf area is critical to the
industrialized world. Seventy-five percent of Western
Europe's oil requirements and eighty-five percent of Japan's
must be imported from the Middle East. These requirements
cannot be met from any other known source. Thus, these
major U.S. allies, and to a significant extent the U.S. as
well, will continue to be dependent on Middle East oil for
the foreseeable future. The energy needs of the industri-
alized northern hemisphere dictate a profound concern with

access to these resources, particularly those of the Persian Gulf, which has more than sixty percent of the world's proven reserves and with the security of the tanker routes through the Gulf and across the Western Indian Ocean in time of war or political crisis.

While the primary emphasis on the Indian Ocean area has to do with oil, it should be remembered that the Indian Ocean constitutes the principal route for access to other strategic materials and minerals in Africa, including chrome, antimony, asbestos, copper, lead, nickel, and uranium. Access to strategic minerals will be an increasingly serious national concern in the latter part of this decade. The same situation applies to the NATO countries since Africa has been a source of crucial minerals for Europe, especially with respect to the movement of copper. Access to the resources of the region is indispensable to the survival of both NATO and Japan, and we must demonstrate to both allies and would-be adversaries U.S. resolve to deter threats to the vital lines of communication in the area and to prevent closure of these lines of communication if deterrence fails.

The United States also has other important interests in the area even beyond the self-evident needs for access to oil and mineral resources. While the Indian Ocean area is remote

2

from major centers of power, it nonetheless has great potential
for unrest which could involve the major powers on short notice.

First, we have friends in the area who look to us for
support. We are related to Iran and Pakistan, for example,
through the committees of the Central Treaty Organization;
and we maintain good relations with the moderate regimes in
the Arabian Peninsula and along the east coast of Africa.
Second, political stability in a number of countries is likely
to be a continuing problem during the mid-range period as a
result of the increasing popular expectations of economic
advancement and the inability of existing governments to
satisfy many of these aspirations, and newly emerging states,
so subject to turmoil, look to us to assist them.

A moderate U.S. air and naval presence provides a counter
to adventurism from any source. Those who would be our adver-
saries must not question either our resolve or our capability
to ensure that our interests are served. We seek to demonstrate
our interests in the area and our concern that it not be
dominated by any outside power. As you have recently said,
Mr. Chairman, "It is clear that, for the present at least, no
nation is too new, too small, too weak, or too remote to
challenge the United States if the proper opportunity presents
itself."

3

Required Capabilities

Should any of these special problems require a military
presence, U.S. forces other than the small Middle East Force
must come from the Atlantic or Western Pacific. Aside from
the obvious considerations of distance and cost, two other
factors suggest themselves in determining our support
requirements. First, if we are obliged to rely totally on
long range capabilities such as B52s, airborne divisions on
C5s, or an amphibious task force embarked from North Carolina
or Hawaii, we will lose the ability to contain our reaction
by a measured and discreet application of force. We will be
confronted with an all or nothing at all circumstance in
which the only available reaction may be in excess of that
necessary.

Second, the United States was disappointed, but not
surprised when some of our allies did not perceive their
national interests as being identical to ours with regard to
the most recent Middle East War. Without the cooperation of
Portugal, which consented to the use of Lajes, the resupply
operation which made Israel's survival possible could not
have been conducted without great hazard and almost prohibitive
cost. A similar restraint could limit our response to a crisis
in the Indian Ocean area.

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If we are to be able in the future to respond to a
call for help of the nature and magnitude of, say, the
Israeli operation, or implement a decision to act in the
interests of the U.S., we must continue to develop and
invest in secure facilities where we can operate as free
of foreign political constraints as possible while still
maintaining our alliance system. The best runway, storage
facilities, geopolitical location, or deep water port is of
little utility if political constraints preclude its use.
Thus, the communications facility at Diego Garcia, being
owned by the United Kingdom, a country with whom the United
States has a historical special relationship, offers us the
opportunity to construct a modest installation on an unpopu-
lated speck of land under the sovereignty of a nation whose
interests are generally, if not almost universally, identical
to our own.

The proposed construction on Diego Garcia would enhance
our capability to provide support to U.S. Forces operating
in the Indian Ocean. However, there is no intent to per-
manently station operational forces there of any kind, and
the installation would not imply an increase in the level of
U.S. Forces deployed in that region. The only permanent
personnel will be those required for communications and
logistics support. As a refueling and resupply facility,

5

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Diego Garcia will provide us with the capability of responding to air or naval requirements in the area either in terms of logistics or surveillance. The modest expanded facility of Diego Garcia will give us an enhanced capability to respond to the requirements of U.S. foreign policy. It will not be an operating base nor will it constitute a significant increase in U.S. military presence.

We have seen how the Soviet Union views the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean to them. While we have been debating the modest expansion of our facility at Diego Garcia, the Soviet Union has nearly completed their development at Berbera in the Republic of Somalia. Whether or not this installation is called a "base," is of little importance. It is a significant facility. They have pier facilities, a large fuel storage area, a complete missile storage and preparation facility (remarkably similar to those in the USSR), a shore berthing and recreation area, and are now surfacing the airstrip, which is three miles in length. I view this as a clear signal of an increasing Soviet interest in the area; a capability to support such an interest with a military force, if desired or required, and a sign of permanency.

Even after the Diego Garcia expansion, our closest comparable capability to that which the Soviets are building at Berbera will be at Subic Bay. The charter of their naval

6

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contingent has hardened into that of a permanently stabilized
force with an embarked flag officer commanding a cruiser,
two destroyer escorts, two minesweepers, two amphibious
ships, a submarine, and six to eight auxiliaries. The
Soviets let me emphasize will see to their interests
without regard to what we do at Diego Garcia.

Our development of a capability at Diego Garcia to
more economically and efficiently support our forces in a
contingency does not signify our intent to deploy addi-
tional forces. This capability does signify that we have
an interest in freedom of the seas and the airways above
them, that we have an interest in protecting the vital air
and sea lines of communication, and that we have a commit-
ment to ensure that we are able to respond wherever and
however our important interests are challenged.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would simply state that
the Indian Ocean area is of major strategic importance,
that the United States has significant interests in the
area, and that the most feasible and economical way to
support those interests is the modest program for expansion
of the Diego Garcia facility that the President has proposed.
I fervently urge your support for that program.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7

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POINT PAPER ON DIEGO GARCIA

- What it is

--- Coral Atoll in Indian Ocean

--- 6x13 miles, 6700 acres

--- 1000 miles south of India

--- Part of British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)

--- Joint US-UK agreement (1966) permits use for defense purposes

--- Communication station under construction by U.S.

--- Authorized by Congress FY 71

--- To be completed this year

--- Island has 8000' airstrip

--- 60,000 barrels POL storage

--- 430 U.S. personnel assigned

--- Plus 600 SEABEEs for construction

--- Quarters for personnel

- U.S. intentions

--- Expand facilities for limited but more efficient/flexible use of

forces in area

--- Lengthen runway from 8000' to 12,000'

--- Construct additional fuel storage capacity (640,000 barrels)

--- Dredge larger basin for ships (for normal carrier task group)

--- Build pier for alongside berthing

--- Enlarge aircraft parking aprons

--- Expand repair shops and utilities

--- Additional quarters and storage facilities

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3

---- Club (addition)

---- Hobby shop (addition)

---- Warehouse

---- Special services facilities

- Current Congressional Status

-- President signed PL 93-552, Dec 1974 (Mil. Construction Authorization Act, 1975)

---- Sec. 613 required Pres. certification to Congress that request was essential to U.S. Nat. Security Interests

---- Did so, 12 May 1975, and sent to Congress (see Atch 1)

---- Act requires no funds be obligated until two conditions met

1) Sixty days of continual Congressional session have elapsed

2) During which neither House disapproves the project

- The need for facilities on Diego Garcia

---- Detailed White House justification is at Atch 1

---- Main points

---- Important interests in Indian Ocean area

---- Stability of area, freedom of oil routes

---- Demonstrate capability to operate forces in area

---- Exercise right to navigate freely on high seas, show continued free access to area by all nations

---- Demonstrate credibility of US military force

---- Flexibility, efficiency, effectiveness of US forces

---- Provide hedges/options in face of political uncertainties

---- Diego Garcia facilities not to support permanent, large force

---- Support limited force plus periodic visits of additional forces when required

---- Nearest logistical facility to western Indian Ocean is Philippines, 4000 miles distant

---- Alternative to D.G. is costly/inefficient increase in naval tankers/mobile logistics force

4

- Attitudes of Littoral countries/UN

— Survey of official public reactions to D.G. expansion is at Atch 3

— Additionally, IOPZ proposal has been made in UN every year since 1971

— Will be made again this year and probably will pass

— U.S. abstains

- Chronology of U.S. actions

— See Attachment 2 (SECRET)

- Arms Control Factors

— US approached Soviet Union on subject in 1971. No response.

— Would prefer Soviets to limit their own buildup in area

— Soviets are continuing buildup

— Installation at Berbera

— U.S. has nothing comparable

— U.S. ability to negotiate from such position is poor

— Should not link D.G. construction to prior discussions on arms limitations

3 Attachments

1. White House Construction Justification (U)

3. Attitudes toward D.G. Expansion (U)

4. Map of D.G. (U)

JUSTIFICATION

In 1966, the United States signed an agreement with the British Government providing that the islands of the British Indian Ocean Territory would be available for 50 years to meet the defense purposes of both governments. In this context, we concluded in 1972 an Administrative Agreement providing for the establishment of a limited communications station on the small atoll of Diego Garcia in the central Indian Ocean. In February 1974, an agreement was negotiated and to provide for the construction and operation of a proposed support facility. The British Government announced in December 1974 its agreement with our proposal to expand the facility.

The United States has an important interest in the stability of the Indian Ocean area. In particular, the oil shipped from the Persian Gulf area is essential to the economic well-being of modern industrial societies. It is essential that the United States maintain and periodically demonstrate a capability to operate military forces in the Indian Ocean. Such exercise of our right to navigate freely on the high seas communicates to others the importance we attach to the stability of the region and to continued free access by all nations.

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The credibility of any US military presence ultimately depends on the ability of our forces to function efficiently and effectively in a wide range of circumstances. Currently, the US logistics facility closest to the western Indian Ocean is in the Philippines, 4,000 miles away. At a time when access to regional fuel supplies and other support is subject to the uncertainties of political developments, the establishment of modest support facilities on Diego Garcia is essential to insure the proper flexibility and responsiveness of US forces to national requirements in a variety of possible contingencies. The alternative would be an inefficient and costly increase in naval tankers and other mobile logistics forces.

Objections have been raised to this proposal on the grounds that it will prompt an increase in the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean and give rise to an arms race in the region. Clearly, both we and the Soviets are aware of the military presence of other nations, but it would be incorrect to assume that Soviet actions are determined exclusively by the level of our force presence. The growth of Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 to the present can most convincingly be ascribed to the pursuit of their own national interests -- including the continuing expansion of

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the Soviet Navy in a global "blue water" role -- rather
than to US force levels as such.

A distinction must also be drawn between facilities and
force presence. The proposed construction on Diego Garcia
would enhance our capability to provide support to US forces
operating in the Indian Ocean. However, there is no intent
to permanently station operational units there, and the
installation would not imply an increase in the level of US
forces deployed to that region. We have, on several occasions,
expressed our willingness to consider constructive proposals
for arms restraint in the Indian Ocean, but we do not believe
that construction on Diego Garcia should be contingent upon
the outcome of discussions on such proposals. In our view,
these are two separate issues.

The Diego Garcia proposal has been criticized by a
number of regional states which favor the concept of a
special legal regime limiting the presence of the great
powers in the Indian Ocean, as expressed in the several
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolutions adopted in the
United Nations General Assembly. United States policy has
consistently been to oppose measures that would constitute
an unacceptable departure from customary international law
concerning freedom of navigation on the high seas.

We are aware of the concern expressed by some states of the region, but we do not share their conviction that the construction of support facilities on Diego Garcia will result in an arms race or that these facilities will somehow represent a threat to their interests. On the contrary, it is our belief that such facilities will contribute to the maintenance of a healthy balance essential to the preservation of regional security and stability. It is our considered judgment that the legitimate differences in perspective between ourselves and certain other nations with respect to Diego Garcia are susceptible to reasoned discussion within a framework of mutual respect and need not inhibit the development of satisfactory relations with the states of the region.

STATEMENT OF
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
BEFORE THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

10 JUNE 1975

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to clarify for you our reasons for proposing an augmentation of facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. As I have indicated in previous appearances before this Committee and elsewhere, we believe this project is necessary to provide logistical support for our forces which operate periodically in the Indian Ocean.

Since my last appearance here, the President has signed the Military Construction Act of 1975 (Public Law 93-552), which authorized $18.1 million to begin construction of these facilities, subject to certain qualifications. In response to Congressional request, as specified in Section 613(a)(1) of that Bill, the President certified to the Congress on May 12 that he had evaluated all the military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for United States facilities at Diego Garcia and concluded that the construction of such a project is essential to the national interest of the United States. In the absence of any negative action by Congress, it will be possible to commence construction of the support facilities this fall. An additional $13.8 million in military construction funds has been requested in the FY 76 Budget.

At the present time we have a limited communications station on Diego Garcia. The purpose of the new construction would be to expand this station

2

to include certain support functions beyond its present communications
role. The proposed expansion would include the following:

- The runway would be lengthened to 12,000 feet from its present
8,000 feet to permit the operation of larger cargo aircraft as
well as high performance tactical aircraft under a variety of
circumstances in the tropical climate;

- The fuel storage capacity would be increased from the present
60,000 barrels of aviation fuel to a total of 380,000 barrels
of aviation fuel and 320,000 barrels of fuel oil for ships;

- An anchorage would be dredged in the shallow coral lagoon which
could accommodate the ships of a carrier task group, and a pier
would be constructed to provide about 550 feet of berthing pri-
marily for the rapid loading or unloading of fuel;

- Various airfield improvements would include additional parking aprons, an arresting gear for emergency use, and limited aircraft maintenance facilities;

- Additional quarters for approximately 300 officers and men would
  be constructed; and

- Storage, power, and other ancillary facilities would be expanded
proportionate to the intended support functions.

The military construction funds required for this project would be
approximately $37.8 million, to be carried out by SEABEE units through
FY 79. At the present time, there are approximately 600 SEABEES on the
island completing previously authorized work on the communications

3

station and harbor, which is expected to be finished during this calendar
year. There are about 430 U.S. military personnel currently assigned to
operate the communications station and the airstrip. With the expansion
program, this number would rise to approximately 600.

The total cost of the improvements we have requested on Diego Garcia,
including the salaries of the construction personnel, their food and fuel,
the replacement costs of equipment used in the construction process, the
procurement of hardware for the communications station, and all other
operating and maintenance costs would be about $108 million, or roughly
the cost of a single navy oiler. In view of the flexibility which the
proposed installation on Diego Garcia will offer to our forces, and the
operational economies it will make possible, we feel that this is a prudent
investment.

Our principal objective in requesting this facility is to provide
secure access to logistical support for our forces operating in the Indian
Ocean. For example, our naval forces operating there today must rely
either on local sources of fuel or else must be replenished by a chain of
tankers stretching over 4,000 miles from U.S. facilities in the Philippines.
The additional fuel storage we have proposed would permit a normal carrier
task group to operate for about 30 days independent of other sources of
supply. That margin of time could spell the difference between the orderly
resupply of our forces and a hasty improvisation which could place unwieldy
demands on our support assets in other areas. The same is true of the
repair and maintenance which could be performed on ships and aircraft.

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4

In short, the proposed facility would provide the assurance of U.S. capability to deploy and maintain forces in an area which has become increasingly important over the past decade.

Mr. Chairman, for nearly two centuries the Indian Ocean was the military preserve of Great Britain, which exercised control over the vital sea lanes to India and the many outposts of the British Empire. From the early 19th century, Britain opposed Czarist attempts to extend Russian rule into South Asia, just as it later cooperated in countering postwar Stalinist efforts in Azerbaijan to extend Soviet influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf.

In the economic environment of the 1960s the British were forced to reorient their priorities toward Europe and away from Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is an interesting coincidence that 1968--the year the British announced their intention to withdraw--was also the year when the USSR first established what has now become a permanent naval presence in the northwest Indian Ocean.

While this transition from British dominance to a more diffuse power structure has been in progress, the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean region have been growing. We have become increasingly dependent on the oil which is constantly moving in tankers along the sea lanes in the Indian Ocean, and our allies are even more dependent. We have an immediate stake in the stability and security of this very large body of water where half of the world's seaborne oil is in transit at any given time.

5

Consequently, we have been concerned at the steady growth of Soviet military activity in the region. I would like to review briefly the sequence of events by which this increase of Soviet military presence has developed.

The first Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean in 1968 were small and tentative in nature. Lacking any shore facilities, the original contingents of Soviet ships were satisfied to remain mostly quiescent, spending most of their time at anchorages in international waters, with only occasional brief port visits to break what must have been a monotonous existence. This cautious probing of unfamiliar waters is very reminiscent of Soviet initial deployments into the Mediterranean some five years earlier.

When the Soviet Navy began to deploy to the Mediterranean in 1963, following an abortive earlier attempt to introduce submarines into Albania, there were very few ports open to them and they spent most of their time sitting idly at anchor. They grew more confident with time, and when Egypt made port and airfield facilities available to them after 1967, they were quick to increase the scope and intensity of their operations. By the time of the Arab-Israel War of October 1973, they were able to introduce and sustain an armada of more than ninety ships, including the most modern in their inventory.

As early as 1962, the Soviets agreed to assist the government of Somalia in constructing port facilities in Berbera, a small port overlooking the entrance to the Red Sea. The harbor was completed in 1969, and by 1971 sixteen Soviet ships paid visits to the port. In 1972, Marshal

6

Grechko visited Somalia for the signing of a Soviet-Somali Agreement, and this was soon followed by an increase in Soviet use of facilities at Berbera, including the establishment of a naval communications site and the arrival of a barracks and repair ship which has remained as a permanent feature ever since. In late 1973, the USSR began initial construction of what has subsequently been identified as a missile storage and handling facility at Berbera, suggesting that the Soviets had plans for such a facility even before the events of the October 1973 war and the introduction of a more frequent US presence.

In July of last year, the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia, similar to those signed with Egypt, Iraq and India. Several months later, approximately coincident with a visit by the Commander of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, we noted the beginning of a significant expansion of Soviet facilities at Berbera, including expansion of the POL storage, construction of additional housing ashore, and the beginning of a very long airstrip. The emerging configuration of a missile storage and handling facility became apparent. It is evident that the USSR is in the process of establishing a significant new facility capable of supporting their naval and air activities in the northwest Indian Ocean.

The USSR has also provided assistance to the Government in South Yemen in managing the former British port of Aden, which was the fourth largest bunkering port in the world when the Suez Canal was in operation. This port lies directly across the Gulf of Aden from Berbera and commands the northern side of the entrance to the Red Sea. In addition, the USSR

7

is assisting Iraq in the construction of a port, Umm Qasr, at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf. However, Soviet development and use of these two facilities has been much more modest than at Berbera.

The Soviet Union has become a major sea power only in the last decade. The first display of Soviet global naval power -- the so-called OKEAN Exercise in 1970 -- was intended to demonstrate Soviet capability to conduct coordinated naval operations in every ocean of the world. A similar worldwide exercise was held in April of this year. For this event, the number of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean was approximately doubled. Activity was centered in the northern Arabian Sea, at the crossroads of the tanker lanes from the Persian Gulf. The exercise was supported by long range aircraft operating from the Soviet Union, and, for the first time, by maritime patrol aircraft operating from airfields in Somalia.

It is worth remembering that the entire Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean which now averages approximately 19 ships on a regular basis, has occurred during the period since the Suez Canal closed in 1967. We anticipate that, with the canal once again open as of last week, we will see an increase in the level of Soviet merchant ship traffic and commercial activity with South Asia. We will be watching very carefully for any change in the pattern of their naval deployments. As you know, the opening of the canal reduces the distance from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea from 11,500 miles to only 2,500 miles -- a difference in sailing time of 24 days. It also reopens to the USSR a warm water transit

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8

route from European Russia to the Soviet Far East, which will undoubtedly be important for the transfer of naval units between eastern and western fleets. Whether this will mean an increase in Soviet naval presence on a regular basis is not certain, but it will certainly increase Soviet flexibility in supporting or reinforcing its units in the Indian Ocean.

The level of U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean has been prudent. We have had a small permanent presence in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea since 1949, consisting of the command ship and two destroyers of the Middle East Force centered in Bahrain. In addition, since October 1973, we have conducted more frequent and more regular deployments to the area from our Pacific Fleet. Over the past 18 months, there have been seven such deployments, including five visits by carrier task groups and two visits by major surface combatants. Over the past year, we have had an augmented presence in the area approximately one-third of the time.

Although we would strongly prefer to see no Soviet buildup of military presence in this region, it appears that the USSR intends to undertake such a buildup. Since an effective military balance is essential to the preservation of regional security and stability in this area of great importance to the economic well-being of the industrialized world, we feel we should have logistical facilities which will permit us to maintain a credible presence. In a period of historical transition toward a new set of power relationships, only the United States among the Western nations has the stature to insure that the balance is maintained.

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REF: STATE 132696

BEIRUT ALSO PASS BAGHDAD

MILITARY ADDRES ALSO FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISA) JAMES H. NOYES
BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON JUNE 5:

QUOTE: MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, I HAVE REVIEWED MY TESTIMONY ON MARCH 1974 AND HAVE CONCLUDED THAT IT FULLY REFLECTS MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. THEREFORE, I SHALL NOT REPEAT THE SAME POINTS HERE TODAY. HOWEVER, FOURTEEN EVENTFUL MONTHS HAVE PASSED SINCE MY PREVIOUS TESTIMONY, AND IT IS USEFUL TO REVIEW SOME OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS WHICH RELATE SPECIFICALLY TO OUR PROPOSAL TO UNDERTAKE A MODEST EXPANSION OF THE FACILITIES AT DIEGO

GARCIA.

THE U.S. PRESENCE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANNOUNCED IN NOVEMBER 1973 THAT WE INTENDED TO RETURN TO A POLICY OF MORE FREQUENT AND MORE REGULAR VISITS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. PERHAPS I CAN BEST PUT THAT POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE BY REVIEWING THE HISTORY OF US NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN SINCE MY PREVIOUS TESTIMONY ON THIS SUBJECT.

FIRST, THE THREE SHIPS OF MIDDLE EAST FORCE HAVE CONTINUED TO OPERATE THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD AS THEY HAVE FOR MORE THAN A QUARTER OF A CENTURY. THE FLAGSHIP OF MIDEASTFOR, THE USS LASALLE, HAS CONTINUED TO BE HOMEPORTED IN BAHRAIN, AND TWO DESTROYERS HAVE CONTINUED TO OPERATE IN THE PERSIAN GULF, RED SEA AND INDIAN OCEAN ON ROTATION FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE MISSION OF THIS SMALL COMMAND REMAINS, AS BEFORE, PRIMARILY DIPLOMATIC. BY

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MEANS OF REGULAR PORT CALLS, OCCASIONAL PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL EXERCISES, AND OTHER ROUTINE CONTACTS, MIDEASTFOR MAINTAINS CONTINUING LIAISON WITH THE NAVIES AND APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN THE AREA. WE CONTINUE TO REGARD THIS FORCE AS A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO THE ENTIRE RANGE OF US DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND OTHER RELATIONSHIPS WHICH WE MAINTAIN WITH THE NATIONS OF THE REGION.

THE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS TO WHICH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER HAD REFERENCE HAVE, DURING THE PAST YEAR, COME FROM THE PACIFIC FLEET. DURING MY PREVIOUS APPEARANCE IN MARCH 1974, THE CARRIER USS KITTY HAWK WAS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH THREE SURFACE COMBATANTS AND AN OILER. THIS GROUP DEPARTED IN APRIL. DURING JULY AND AUGUST OF 1974, THE CRUISER USS CHICAGO VISITED THE INDIAN OCEAN WITH TWO DESTROYERS AND AN OILER. IN NOVEMBER 1974, THE CARRIER USS CONSTELLATION WITH FOUR SURFACE ESCORTS AND A SUBMARINE VISITED THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PARTICIPATED IN NAVAL EXERCISES WITH THE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION. THE NUCLEAR CARRIER USS ENTERPRISE, ACCOMPANIED BY THE NUCLEAR CRUISER USS LONG BEACH, TWO DESTROYERS, AND A FAST COMBAT SUPPORT SHIP VISITED THE AREA IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR--A VISIT WHICH INCLUDED EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO THE ISLAND NATION OF MAURITIUS WHICH HAD BEEN STRUCK BY A VIOLENT CYCLONE ON FEBRUARY 6. SINCE THE DEPARTURE OF THE ENTERPRISE GROUP, THERE HAVE BEEN NO US DEPLOYMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INDIAN OCEAN FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA.

OVER THE PAST FOURTEEN MONTHS, WE HAVE HAD ADDITIONAL FORCES DEPLOYED TO THE INDIAN OCEAN ONLY ABOUT 36 PERCENT OF THE TIME; OR, TO PUT IT ANOTHER WAY, DURING 64 PERCENT OF THIS PERIOD OUR ONLY NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA HAS CONSISTED OF THE THREE SHIPS OF THE MIDDLE EAST FORCE. I BELIEVE THAT THIS POLICY HAS EFFECTIVELY DEMONSTRATED OUR ABILITY TO OPERATE SIGNIFICANT FORCES IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA WHILE AVOIDING ANY ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS PROVOCATIVE. IN VIEW OF ALL THE DISCUSSION ABOUT US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, IT IS SOMEWHAT IRONIC TO NOTE THAT IN

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OPERATION INCLUDED A NUMBER OF FIRST LINE SOVIET COMBATANT UNITS, NOTABLY INCLUDING THE HELICOPTER CARRIER LENINGRAD--THE FIRST VISIT OF THIS TYPE UNIT TO THE INDIAN OCEAN.

IN SHORT, THE SOVIET PRESENCE CONTINUED TO GROW STEADILY AS IT WAS EVER SINCE IT WAS FIRST ESTABLISHED IN 1968. SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE, PARTICULARLY NOW THAT THE SUEZ CANAL ONCE AGAIN PROVIDES MORE READY ACCESS. THIS FACT IS REFLECTED IN SOVIET STRATEGY, WHICH APPEARS TO BE BUILDING FOR THE LONG TERM.

I WOULD LIKE TO REITERATE WHAT I SAID HERE MORE THAN A YEAR AGO, THAT NONE OF US IN THE US GOVERNMENT BELIEVE WE SHOULD BASE OUR OWN PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN ON A NARROW SHIP-FOR-SHIP COMPARISON WITH THE SOVIET UNION. BOTH NATIONS HAVE SUFFICIENT INTERESTS IN THE REGION TO JUSTIFY A PRESENCE THERE EVEN IF THE OTHER WERE ABSENT. HOWEVER, THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION MUST NECESSARILY REMAIN A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR FOR US IN DETERMINING OUR OWN POLICY.

DIEGO GARCIA

THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES TO THE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY PROVIDED TO YOU ABOUT OUR PROPOSED EXPANSION OF FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA ARE THOSE EFFECTED BY THE CONGRESS. OUR ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR 32.3 MILLION DOLS IN FY 75 MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDS WAS REDUCED TO 18.1 MILLION DOLS, SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF A PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF THE NECESSITY OF SUCH CONSTRUCTION. WE HAVE REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL 13.8 MILLION DOLS IN THE CURRENT FY 76 MILCON BILL, AND, IF THE PROJECT IS NOT DISAPPROVED, WE WILL REQUEST A FURTHER 5.9 MILLION DOLS IN FY 77 TO COMPLETE THE PLANNED CONSTRUCTION. (ESTIMATED CONSTRUCTION COSTS IN CUT YEARS MAY INCREASE DUE TO INFLATION.)

THERE HAVE BEEN SUGGESTIONS THAT THE TRUE PRICE OF THE DIEGO GARCIA INSTALLATION WILL BE 175 MILLION DOLS.

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TERMS OF NUMBERS OF NAVAL COMBATANTS. THE US VERY FREQUENTLY RANKS THIRD, AFTER FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS, IN FACT, THE SITUATION AT THE PRESENCE TIME.

THE SOVIET PRESENCE

AT THIS TIME LAST YEAR, THERE WAS SOME DEBATE ABOUT THE TREND OF SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA. MUCH OF THAT DOUBT HAS BEEN REMOVED BY THE ACTIONS OF THE USSR ITSELF. IN JULY 1974 THE USSR SIGNED A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH THE NATION OF SOMALIA. ADMIRAL GORSHKOV, THE COMMANDER OF THE SOVIET NAVY, VISITED THERE IN DECEMBER. LAST YEAR, WE REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD ACCESS TO THE PORT WHICH THEY CONSTRUCTED FOR SOMALIA AT BERBERA, WHICH DOMINATES THE GULF OF ADEN AND THE MOUTH OF THE RED SEA. IN ADDITION TO THE NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION, THE PERMANENT BARRACKS/REPAIR SHIP, THE HOUSING ASHORE, THE POL STORAGE TANKS, AND THE PIER SPACE WHICH WAS REPORTED AT THAT TIME, WE HAVE NOW BECOME AWARE THAT THE USSR HAS COMMENCED CONSTRUCTION OF A MAJOR AIRSTRIP, HAS GREATLY EXPANDED THE POL STORAGE, AND IS CONSTRUCTING A MISSILE STORAGE AND HANDLING FACILITY. THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SHIPS WHICH VISITED BERBERA IN 1974 INCREASED TO MORE THAN 60 FROM FEWER THAN 50 THE YEAR BEFORE, INCLUDING THE VISIT OF A NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINE.

SOVIET FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN PARTICIPATED MUCH MORE ACTIVELY IN THE RECENT WORLD-WIDE SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISE THAN HAD BEEN THE CASE IN 1970. ONE INNOVATION DURING THIS YEAR'S EXERCISE WAS THE USE OF AERIAL SURVEILLANCE OVER THE INDIAN OCEAN BY SOVIET AIRCRAFT--SOME OF WHICH OPERATED FROM AIRFIELDS IN LITTORAL STATES. THE AVERAGE LEVEL OF SOVIET COMBATANT NAVAL SHIPS INCREASED MODESTLY IN 1974 OVER 1973. THE SOVIET MINESWEEPING OPERATION IN BANGLADESH WAS COMPLETED, BUT ANOTHER MINESWEEPING OPERATION WAS UNDERTAKEN IN THE NORTHERN RED SEA IN PREPARATION FOR THE REOPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL. THIS LATTER

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IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, I WOULD LIKE TO
CLARIFY THIS POINT.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE FUNDS FOR DIEGO GARCIA WHICH HAVE
BEEN REQUESTED IN FY 75 AND FY 76 WERE THE REQUIRED FUNDS
FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND IT WAS THE MILCON BILL
WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS HEARINGS. THIS SECTION

OF THE BUDGET DOES NOT INCLUDE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH
SALARIES, WITH PROCUREMENT OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT,
OK WITH THE REPLACEMENT OF ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
ASSOCIATED WITH CONSTRUCTION. LAST YEAR, THE NAVY WAS
REQUESTED TO PROVIDE AN ESTIMATE OF THE TOTAL COST,
INCLUDING THESE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS. THEY DID SO, AND
THE 175 MILLION DOLS FIGURE IS BASED ON THESE NAVY
ESTIMATES WHICH WERE PROVIDED TO CONGRESS. LET ME REVIEW
FOR YOU WHAT THESE FIGURES SHOW.

FIRST, THE FIGURES INCLUDE WORK THAT HAS ALREADY BEEN
AUTHORIZED AND COMPLETED ON THE COMMUNICATIONS STATION
AND ITS SUPPORTING FACILITIES. CONGRESS IN 1971
AUTHORIZED 20.45 MILLION DOLS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
LIMITED COMMUNICATIONS STATION ON DIEGO GARCIA. PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION COSTS OF THE HARDWARE FOR THE
STATION AMOUNTED TO APPROXIMATELY 2.8 MILLION DOLS. THE
SALARIES AND SUBSISTENCE COSTS FOR THE SEABEE UNIT
WHICH CARRIED OUT THE CONSTRUCTION CAME TO ABOUT 21 MILLION DOLS. THE FOOD, FUEL, REPAIR PARTS AND
TRANSPORTATION OF THE SEABEES WAS ANOTHER 11.4 MILLION
DOLS. AND THE REPLACEMENT OF MAJOR ITEMS OF CONSTRUCTION
EQUIPMENT AMOUNTED TO 9.8 MILLION DOLS, FOR A TOTAL OF
ABOUT 65.3 MILLION DOLS. THIS IS THE SUM WHICH HAS
ALREADY BEEN SPENT IN CONSTRUCTING AND OUTFITTING THE
COMMUNICATIONS STATION NOW OPERATING ON DIEGO GARCIA.

APPLYING THE SAME PROCEDURE TO ANTICIPATED FUTURE COSTS
IN EARLY 1974, THE NAVY ESTIMATED THAT THE PROPOSED
AUDITIONS TO THE PRESENT STATION WOULD COST APPROXIMATELY
108 MILLION DOLS THROUGH FY 76. THIS SUM, PLUS PREVIOUS
EXPENDITURES, GAVE A GRAND TOTAL OF ABOUT 173 MILLION
DOLS FOR THE ENTIRE INSTALLATION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED

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THAT THIS ESTIMATE DID NOT FORESEE THE SUCCESSIVE DELAYS
WHICH WILL NOW PUSH THE COMPLETION DATE BACK TO FY 77
OR LATER, SO THE TOTAL COST MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE
INCREASED DUE TO INFLATIONARY PRESSURES.

THESE FIGURES ARE NOT SECRET. THEY WERE PROVIDED IN
EARLY 1974. IN USING THESE FIGURES, HOLEVER, WE BELIEVE
IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT 38 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
REPRESENTS FUNDING WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN AUTHORIZED AND
APPROPRIATED BY THE CONGRESS, AND THAT THE REMAINDER
INCLUDES SALARIES AND CONSUMABLES AS WELL AS DIRECT
CONSTRUCTION COSTS.

OUR PROPOSAL FOR DIEGO GARCIA INVOLVES PRECISELY THE SAME
FACILITIES TODAY AS THOSE WHICH WERE INITIALLY PROPOSED
IN EARLY 1974, I.E., LENGTHENING THE RUNWAY FROM 8,000

TO 12,000 FEET, INCREASING THE AVAILABLE POL STORAGE,
THE BUILDING OF ADDITIONAL QUARTERS FOR PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED THERE, CONSTRUCTING A PIER TO FACILITATE CARGO
HANDLING, DREDGING OF THE HARBOR TO PERMIT SEVERAL SHIPS
TO ANCHOR THERE SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND CONSTRUCTING
ADDITIONAL UTILITY AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES. I HAVE
ATTACHED TO MY STATEMENT A DETAILED SUMMARY OF THE
PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION ITEMS.

THE MORE BASIC QUESTION--WHY DO WE NEED DIEGO GARCIA AND
WHY IS IT SO IMPORTANT TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS--IS MUCH
MORE CRITICAL TO OUR DISCUSSION HERE TODAY. I BELIEVE
THE ANSWER IS VERY STRAIGHTFORWARD. THE ADDITIONAL
FACILITIES WHICH WE HAVE REQUESTED FOR DIEGO GARCIA WOULD
PROVIDE AN ASSURED ACCESS TO LOGISTICAL SUPPORT WHICH
FOR EXAMPLE, COULD SUSTAIN THE OPERATION OF A NORMAL
CARRIER TASK GROUP IN A CONTINGENCY SITUATION FOR A
PERIOD OF ABOUT 30 DAYS IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EXTERNAL
SOURCES OF SUPPLY. IN A WORLD OF GREAT ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, THAT MARGIN OF TIME COULD MEAN
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ORDERLY, EFFICIENT RESUPPLY
OF US FORCES AND A HASTY, AD HOC, EXPENSIVE OPERATION
REQUIRING A SIGNIFICANT DIVERSION OF SUPPORT ASSETS FROM
OTHER AREAS. THUS, IN ADDITION TO THE INCREASED

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OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY WHICH WE WOULD ACQUIRE FROM ENLARGED SUPPORT FACILITIES ON DIEGO GARCIA, WE WOULD IN EFFECT BE BUYING A MEASURE OF IMMUNITY FROM EVENTS SUCH AS THOSE IN OCTOBER 1973 WHEN LOCAL SUPPLY SOURCES WERE SEVERED.

IN AN AREA AS IMPORTANT AS THE INDIAN OCEAN, WHERE OVER HALF THE WORLD'S SEABORNE OIL IS IN TRANSIT AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT, I BELIEVE THE NECESSITY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE ITS FORCES SECURELY AND INDEPENDENTLY IS SELF-EVIDENT. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#200

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON NESSEN

AT 11:40 A.M. EDT

APRIL 30, 1975

WEDNESDAY

MR. NESSEN: The President met at 10:30 this morning with the Egyptian Parliamentary delegation. This is the first official visit to the United States by an Egyptian Parliamentarian since 1967.

The meeting gave the President a chance to underline America's intention to work actively for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, and emphasized the importance the United States attaches to strengthening American-Egyptian bilateral relations.

At 11:00 this morning the President met with the Executive Committee of the House Republican Study Committee in the Roosevelt Room. The President was supposed to meet with this group last week, but they were not able to attend because of the press of business on the Hill. This group represents 70 to 75 House Republicans. They requested the meeting to talk to the President about a number of issues that Congress is considering.

At 11:45 the President will be meeting with the Republican Congressional leadership to discuss energy matters. As I am sure you are aware, May 1 is tomorrow, and the President will be making a decision soon on what to do about his energy proposal.

Q He has not made it yet?

MR. NESSEN: No.

Q There are Republicans on the Hill saying he has already made it.

MR. NESSEN: Let me back up when I say no, he has not made his decision. He has not announced his decision.

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#200

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Washington, D.C. 20230

HAND DELIVERED

November 10, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM: Kent N. Knowles
Acting Assistant General Counsel for
Domestic & International Business

SUBJECT: Secretary Morton's Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, November 11, 1975

Attached is a draft of the Secretary's Testimony. Your telephone clearance (x5301) and/or comments are requested no later than early afternoon November 10, 1975.

STATEMENT OF
HONORABLE ROGERS C.B. MORTON
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
NOVEMBER 11, 1975

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee:

I am prepared today to further discuss the Department
of Commerce's position with respect to the Subcommittee's
request for copies of exporters' reports of so-called Arab
"boycott requests" filed between December 31, 1969 and
July 28, 1975 pursuant to §369.2 of the Export Administra-
tion Regulations. As you are well aware, the Attorney
General and I have been asked by Chairman Moss to review
our positions in light of the testimony and legal opinions
given to the Subcommittee by Professors Raoul Berger,
Norman Dorsen, and Philip B. Kurland. I am of course aware
of the differences of opinion between these legal experts
and the Attorney General, the Honorable Edward H. Levi.
The Attorney General has reconsidered his opinion of
September 4, 1975 as requested by Chairman Moss, and his
reconsidered opinion is now before the Subcommittee.
The issue of Congressional access to this information has not
yet been reviewed by the courts. Until such time as the

Attorney General advises me otherwise or the courts rule
on this matter, I will continue to rely upon the advice
of Mr. Levi. Since I am not a lawyer, I would appreciate
it if you would direct your questions concerning the legal
issues to Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, who is
here with me today.

My position with respect to what I believe to be the
national interest was set forth at some length in my
statement of September 22, 1975 before the Subcommittee.
I believe the considerations set forth in that statement
are equally valid today, and I will therefore not repeat them
here. I would like, however, to mention some positive steps
that the Department of Commerce has taken since my previous
appearance before the Subcommittee. First, we have amended
§369.2 of the Export Administration Regulations to require,
effective October 1, 1975, that U.S. exporters state whether
they intend to comply with the boycott-related request which
they are reporting to the Department. If at the time they
report they have not decided whether or not they will comply
with the request, they must report their decision within 5
business days thereafter. Secondly, on September 30, 1975 I

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- 5 -

Finally, exporters have reported to the Department a few instances--I believe 7 in all--in which Arab sources have overstepped the limits of the boycott regulations and the policies of their Governments by requesting actions that would discriminate against U.S. citizens of the Jewish faith. I have recommended a further amendment to the Export Administration Regulations to prohibit U.S. exporters and related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott-related requests which seek to impose discrimination against U.S. citizens on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. The Department will continue to refer any such discriminatory request to the Departments of Justice and State for their review and action.

In closing, I would like to reiterate my personal opposition to the Arab boycott and my full accord with the policy and laws of the United States.

This concludes my presentation, Mr. Chairman. I will be pleased to answer any questions the Subcommittee may wish to ask.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am today announcing a number of decisions that provide a comprehensive response to any discrimination against Americans on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex that might arise from foreign boycott practices.

The United States Government, under the Constitution and the law, is committed to the guarantee of the fundamental rights of every American. My Administration will preserve these rights and work toward the elimination of all forms of discrimination against individuals on the basis of their race, color, religion, national origin or sex.

Earlier this year, I directed the appropriate departments and agencies to recommend firm, comprehensive and balanced actions to protect American citizens from the discriminatory impact that might result from the boycott practices of other governments. There was wide consultation.

I have now communicated detailed instructions to the Cabinet for new measures by the United States Government to assure that our anti-discriminatory policies will be effectively and fully implemented.

These actions are being taken with due regard for our foreign policy interests, international trade and commerce and the sovereign rights of other nations. I believe that the actions my Administration has taken today achieve the essential protection of the rights of our people and at the same time do not upset the equilibrium essential to the proper conduct of our national and international affairs.

I made the basic decision that the United States Government, in my Administration, as in the administration of George Washington, will give "to bigotry no sanction." My Administration will not countenance the translation of any foreign prejudice into domestic discrimination against American citizens.

I have today signed a Directive to the Heads of All Departments and Agencies. It states:

(1) That the application of Executive Order 11478 and relevant statutes forbid any Federal agency, in making selections for overseas assignments, to take into account any exclusionary policies of a host country based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Individuals must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors. They must not be excluded at any stage of the selection process because their race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age does not conform to any formal or informal requirements set by a foreign nation. No agency may specify, in its job description circulars, that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required;

(2) That Federal agencies are required to inform the State Department of visa rejections based on exclusionary policies; and

(3) That the State Department will take appropriate action through diplomatic channels to attempt to gain entry for the affected individuals.

- 2 -

[L.C.]

I have instructed the Secretary of Labor to issue an amendment to his Department's March 10, 1975, Secretary's Memorandum on the obligation of Federal contractors and subcontractors to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex when hiring for work to be performed in a foreign country or within the United States pursuant to a contract with a foreign government or company. This amendment will require Federal contractors and subcontractors, that have job applicants or present employees applying for overseas assignments, to inform the Department of State of any visa rejections based on the exclusionary policies of a host country. The Department of State will attempt, through diplomatic channels, to gain entry for those individuals.

My Administration will propose legislation to prohibit a business enterprise from using economic means to coerce any person or entity to discriminate against any U. S. person or entity on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. This would apply to any attempts, for instance, by a foreign business enterprise, whether governmentally or privately owned, to condition its contracts upon the exclusion of persons of a particular religion from the contractor's management or upon the contractor's refusal to deal with American companies owned or managed by persons of a particular religion.

I am exercising my discretionary authority under the Export Administration Act to direct the Secretary of Commerce to issue amended regulations to:

(1) prohibit U. S. exporters and related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott requests that would cause discrimination against U. S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin; and

(2) require related service organizations that become involved in any boycott request to report such involvement directly to the Department of Commerce.

Related service organizations are defined to include banks, insurers, freight forwarders and shipping companies that become involved in any way in a boycott request related to an export transaction from the U. S.

Responding to an allegation of religious and ethnic discrimination in the commercial banking community, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a strong Banking Bulletin to its member National Banks on February 24, 1975. The Bulletin was prompted by an allegation that a national bank might have been offered large deposits and loans by an agent of a foreign investor, one of the conditions for which was that no member of the Jewish faith sit on the bank's board of directors or control any significant amount of the bank's outstanding stock. The Bulletin makes it clear that the Comptroller will not tolerate any practices or policies that are based upon considerations of the race, or religious belief of any customer, stockholder, officer or director of the bank and that any such practices or policies are 'incompatible with the public service function of a banking institution in this country.'"

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[L]

I am informing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that the Comptroller's Banking Bulletin reflects the policy of my Administration and I encourage them to issue similar policy statements to the financial institutions within their jurisdictions, urging those institutions to recognize that compliance with discriminatory conditions directed against any of their customers, stockholders, employees, officers or directors is incompatible with the public service function of American financial institutions.

I will support legislation to amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which presently covers sex and marital status, to include prohibition against any creditor discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin against any credit applicant in any aspect of a credit transaction.

I commend the U.S. investment banking community for resisting the pressure of certain foreign investment bankers to force the exclusion from financing syndicates of some investment banking firms on a discriminatory basis.

I commend the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., for initiating a program to monitor practices in the securities industry within their jurisdiction to determine whether such discriminatory practices have occurred or will occur. I urge the SEC and NASD to take whatever action they deem necessary to insure that discriminatory exclusion is not tolerated and that non-discriminatory participation is maintained.

In addition to the actions I am announcing with respect to possible discrimination against Americans on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex, I feel that it is necessary to address the question of possible antitrust violations involving certain actions of U.S. businesses in relation to foreign boycotts. The Department of Justice advises me that the refusal of an American firm to deal with another American firm in order to comply with a restrictive trade practice by a foreign country raises serious questions under the U.S. antitrust laws. The Department is engaged in a detailed investigation of possible violations.

The community of nations often proclaims universal principles of human justice and equality. These principles embody our own highest national aspirations. The anti-discriminations measures I am announcing today are consistent with our efforts to promote peace and friendly, mutually beneficial relations with all nations, a goal to which we remain absolutely dedicated.

#

#

#

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

The purpose of this Memorandum is to underscore the applicability of Executive Order 11478, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-261); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 as amended by P.L. 92-269; and pursuant regulations to all Federal personnel actions, including those which involve overseas assignment of employees of Federal agencies to foreign countries which have adopted exclusionary policies based on a person's race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age.

In making selections for overseas assignment, the possible exclusionary policies of the country to which an applicant or employee is to be assigned must not be a factor in any part of the selection process of a Federal agency. United States law must be observed and not the policy of the foreign nation. Individuals, therefore, must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors without reference to race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Persons must not be "selected out" at any stage of the selection process because their race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age does not conform to any formal or informal requirements set by a foreign nation. No agency may list in its job description circulars that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required.

If a host country refuses, on the basis of exclusionary policies related to race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age, to grant a visa to an employee who has been selected by a Federal agency for an overseas assignment, the employing agency should advise the Department of State of this act. The Department will take appropriate action through diplomatic channels to attempt to gain entry for the individual.

The Civil Service Commission shall have the responsibility for insuring compliance with this Memorandum. In order to ensure that selections for overseas assignments are made in compliance with law, Executive Order, and merit system requirements, each agency having positions overseas must:

(1) review its process for selection of persons for overseas assignments to assure that it conforms in all respects with law, Executive Order, and merit system requirements; and

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET

FOREIGN BOYCOTT PRACTICES AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICY

The President is today announcing a number of actions that provide a comprehensive response to any discrimination against Americans on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex that might arise from foreign boycott practices.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT:

(1) The President has signed a Directive to the Heads of All Departments and Agencies which states:

(A) That the application of Executive Order 11478 and relevant statutes forbids any Federal agency, in making selections for overseas assignments, to take into account any exclusionary policies of a host country based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Individuals must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors. No agency may specify, in its job description circulars, that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required;

(B) That Federal agencies are required to inform the State Department of visa rejections based on exclusionary policies; and

(C) That the State Department will take appropriate action, through diplomatic channels, to attempt to gain entry for the affected individuals.

(2) The President has instructed the Secretary of Labor to issue an amendment to the Department's March 10, 1975, Memorandum on the obligation of Federal contractors and subcontractors to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex when hiring for work to be performed in a foreign country or within the United States pursuant to a contract with a foreign government or company. This amendment will:

(A) Require Federal contractors and subcontractors, that have job applicants or present employees applying for overseas assignments, to inform the Department of State of any visa rejections based on the exclusionary policies of a host country; and

(B) The Department of State will attempt, through diplomatic channels, to gain entry for those individuals.

(3) The Administration will propose legislation to prohibit a business enterprise from using economic means to coerce any person or entity to discriminate against any U.S. person or entity on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex.

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1975

THE WHITE HOUSE
FACT SHEET

(A) That the application of Executive Order 11478 and relevant statutes forbids any Federal agency, in making selections for overseas assignments, to take into account any exclusionary policies of a host country based upon race, color, religion, national origin, sex or age. Individuals must be considered and selected solely on the basis of merit factors. No agency may specify, in its job description circulars, that the host country has an exclusionary entrance policy or that a visa is required.

(B) That Federal agencies are required to inform the State Department of visa rejections based on exclusionary policies, and

(2) The President has instructed the Secretary of Labor to issue an amendment to the Department's March 10, 1975, Secretary's Memorandum on the obligation of Federal contractors and subcontractors to refrain from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or sex when hiring for work to be performed in a foreign country or within the United States pursuant to a contract with a foreign government or company. This amendment will:

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(OVER)

2

(4) The President has exercised his discretionary authority under the Export Administration Act to direct the Secretary of Commerce to amend the Act's regulations to:

(A) Prohibit U.S. exporters and related service organizations from answering or complying in any way with boycott requests that would cause discrimination against U.S. citizens or firms on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin; and

(B) Require related service organizations that become involved in any boycott request to report such involvement directly to the Department of Commerce.

Related service organizations are defined to include banks, insurers, freight forwarders and shipping companies that become involved in any way in a boycott request to an export transaction from the U.S.

(5) The President has stated that his Administration will not tolerate discriminatory commercial banking practices or policies based upon the race or religious belief of any customer, stockholder, employee, officer or director of a bank and that such practices or policies are incompatible with the public service function of banking institutions in this country. The President supports a Banking Bulletin issued by the Comptroller of the Currency to that effect and has encouraged the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to issue similar policy statements to the financial institutions within their jurisdictions.

(6) The Administration will support legislation to amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which presently covers sex and marital status, to include prohibition against any creditor discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin against any credit applicant in any aspect of a credit transaction.

(7) In regard to the investment banking industry, the President has:

(A) Commended the U.S. investment banking community for resisting the pressure of certain foreign investment bankers to force the exclusion from financing syndicates of some investment banking firms on a discriminatory basis;

(B) Commended the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) for initiating a program to monitor practices in the securities industry within their jurisdiction to determine whether such discriminatory practices have occurred or will occur; and

(C) Urged the SEC and NASD to take whatever action they deem necessary to insure that discriminatory exclusion is not tolerated and that non-discriminatory participation is maintained.

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UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Press Release USUN-107(75)

October 3, 1975

Statement by Leonard Garment, United States Representative, in
Committee III, Resolution and Amendments concerning the Decade for
Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, October 3, 1975.

At ECOSOC my government participated in the elaboration of draft resolution A on the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. We gave our support to the adoption of that resolution and looked forward to being able to support its adoption by the Third Committee.

In our history my country has known the evils of racial discrimination, but more important my government worked with the firmest resolve to eliminate this injustice. We have designed and implemented concrete and active programs, and we have achieved a significant measure of progress in reducing racial discrimination in our society.

We believe that this experience and commitment put us in a unique position to further the work of the Decade. To this end we have supported international efforts to promote the Decade's program, and we want to be in a position to continue to do so.

The United States Delegation is strongly opposed to the suggested amendments to the resolution on the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in A/C.3/L.2157 that would declare that the General Assembly "considers Zionism as a form of racial discrimination to be included in the Program for the Decade." The content of these amendments is not only unjust but ominous. It is ominous because it treats the word racism as if it were not the name of a very real and concrete set of injustices, but merely an epithet to be flung at whoever happens to be one's adversary. It turns an idea with a vivid and obnoxious meaning into nothing more than an ideological tool; it deprives us of our ability to see reality together and to deal with it together. And that, for an organization so dedicated to and so dependent upon the possibilities of reason and persuasion, can be nothing short of a tragedy.

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ENT

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[L0]

Zionism is a movement which has as its contemporary thrust the preservation of the small remnant of the Jewish people that survived the horrors of a racial holocaust. By equating Zionism with racism, this resolution discredits the good faith of our joint efforts to fight actual racism. It discredits these efforts morally and it cripples them politically.

The language of this resolution has already disrupted our efforts here to work together on the elimination of racism and it will continue to do so. Encouraging anti-semitism and group hostility, its adoption would bring to an end our ability to cooperate on eliminating racism and racial discrimination as part of the official work of the Decade.

Once again our failure to reason together has encouraged some delegations to exploit our collective shortcomings and individual vulnerabilities and impede our attempts to further the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The United Nations, throughout its 30-year history, has not lived by the force of majorities; it has not lived by the force of arms. It has lived only--I repeat, only--because it has been thought that the nations of the world, assembled together, would give voice to the most decent and humane instincts of mankind. From this thought has come the moral authority of the United Nations, and from this thought its influence upon human affairs.

Actions like this do not go unnoticed. They do not succeed without consequences, many of which while only imperfectly perceived at the time soon become an ineradicable part of a new and regrettable reality. Let us make no mistake: at risk today is the moral authority which is the United Nations' only ultimate claim for the support of our peoples.

This risk is as reckless as it is unnecessary. But it is still avoidable.

Accordingly the United States will support resolutions A and B. We support, without reservation, the work of the United Nations to combat racism and racial discrimination. We have taken part in these vitally important activities in the past and want to be able to do so without obstruction in the future. We will vote against the third resolution. We call upon other delegations to do likewise.

On its adoption the third resolution becomes inseparably linked to the first two. Therefore, if all three are sent to Plenary the United States will vote against all three at that time.

*****

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

PRESS RELEASE

FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY
CHECK TEXT AGAINST DELIVERY

Press Release USUN-118(75)

October 17, 1975

Statement by Leonard Garment, United States Representative, in
Committee Three, on equating Zionism with racism and racial
discrimination, October 17, 1975.

My delegation has read the new proposal before us. It is
unusually straightforward. It asks to determine "that Zionism is a
form of racism and racial discrimination."

As simple as this language is, we are concerned that what may
not be fully understood is that this resolution asks us to commit one
of the most grievous errors in the 30-year life of this organization.

This committee is preparing itself, with deliberation and fore-
knowledge, to perform a supreme act of deceit, to make a massive
attack on the moral realities of the world.

Under the guise of a program to eliminate racism the United
Nations is at the point of officially endorsing anti-semitism, one of
the oldest and most virulent forms of racism known to human history.
This draft explicitly encourages the racism known as anti-semitism
even as it would have us believe that its words will lead to the
elimination of racism.

I choose my words carefully when I say that this is an obscene
act. The United States protests this act. But protest alone is not
enough. In fairness to ourselves we must also issue a warning. This
resolution places the work of the United Nations in jeopardy.

The language of this resolution distorts and perverts. It
changes words with precise meanings into purveyors of confusion. It
destroys the moral force of the concept of racism, making it nothing
more than an epithet to be flung arbitrarily at one's adversary. It
blinds us to areas of agreement and disagreement, and deprives us of
the clarity of vision we desperately need to understand and resolve
the differences among us. And we are here to overcome our
differences, not to deepen them.

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GARMENT

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It would seem to our delegation that such amendments can only serve to exacerbate group hostility and increase the tensions and passions which have for so long prevented the achievement of peace in so many troubled areas of our globe. They are, in our view, entirely incompatible with the purpose of the Decade for Action which the General Assembly has proclaimed.

However one views the particular issues in the Middle East conflict, to equate Zionism with racism is to distort completely the history of that movement, born of the centuries of oppression suffered by the Jewish people in the western world and designed to liberate an oppressed people by returning them to the land of their fathers.

It is no service to the great goals of the United Nations and its Commissions, Committees and Agencies to ignore and to distort history in this fashion. The tragedy in the Middle East today stems from our failure, thus far, to find ways of protecting and accommodating the rights of all the groups in the area -- those of the Jews and those of the Arabs -- both with a long, proud history in the region.

Accordingly, if put to a vote, my delegation will vote no on the amendments contained in A/C.3/L.2157. The adoption of any of those amendments will cause the United States to cast a negative vote on the entire resolution.

I would like to state, on behalf of my delegation, that the tendency to jeopardize resolutions of primary importance which enjoy the strong support of all delegations by submitting amendments that can only sow discord in our Committee is destructive of our capacity to further the objectives of this organization and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Mr. Chairman, it has been said that the accord reached at the Seventh Special Session was a hopeful augury for the work of the Thirtieth General Assembly. A significant start was made there on the framework and first steps toward accommodating complex economic differences with common human needs. In part that success resulted from the respect paid to language.

The agenda of this Committee is filled with history and passion. It is an easy indulgence for individuals to use words which distort and divide, which inflict wounds and draw attention.

It is our collective responsibility to use language enlightened by history, to use it precisely, to use it carefully, mindful of our differences but determined to overcome, not enlarge, them.

* * * * *

Public Law 94-110
94th Congress, H. J. Res. 683

October 13, 1975

Joint Resolution

To Implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai:

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Govern-
ment of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel
may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward
peace in the Middle East;

Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975, transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an early-warning system, the text of which has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified noncombat functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof;

Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United
States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety
is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer nec-
essary; and

Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the
early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compli-
ance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agree-
ments and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore,
be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is
authorized to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early
Warning System in Sinai": Provided, however, That United States
civilian personnel assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be
removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between
Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution deter-
mines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continu-
ation of their role is no longer necessary. Nothing contained in this
resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the Presi-
dent with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not
have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEC. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described in the first section of this resolution which is introduced in either House of Congress shall be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution of the type described in section 5(c) of Public Law 93-148 is privileged under section 7 of such law.

SEC. 3. The United States civilian personnel participating in the early warning system in Sinai shall include only individuals who have volunteered to participate in such system.

SEC. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pursuant to this
resolution, participate in an early warning system, the President shall,
so long as the participation of such personnel continues, submit written
reports to the Congress periodically, but no less frequently than once

22 USC 2441
note.

Sinai agreement.

Early-warning
system.
U.S. civilian
personnel.
22 USC 2441
note.

22 USC 2441
note.

50 USC 1544,
1546.
22 USC 2441
note.

Reports to
Congress.
22 USC 2441
note.

89 STAT. 572

THE DEPARTMENT
OF STATE

Public
Statements

[LC]

News Release

September 1, 1975

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services
[Revised Release]

Following are the texts of the Agreement between
Egypt and Israel, the Annex to the Egypt-Israel
Agreement, and the U.S. Proposal for an early
warning system in Sinai.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of
Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed
that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle
East shall not be resolved by military force but by
peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties
January 18, 1974, within the framework of the
Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step
towards a just and durable peace according to the
provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of
October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just
peace settlement by means of negotiations called
for by Security Council Resolution 338, this
Agreement being a significant step towards that
end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to
the threat or use of force or military blockade
against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to
observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to
refrain from all military or para-military actions
against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations
contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the
Protocol shall be an integral part of this
Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be

deployed in accordance with the following
principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed
west of the line designated as Line E on the
attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armaments and
forces in the areas described by paragraph (3)
above shall be agreed as described in the attached
Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west
from Line M, as defined on the attached map,
there will be no military forces, as specified in the
attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is
essential and shall continue its functions and its
mandate shall be extended annually.

## ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

## ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming

Done at _______________ on the _______________ 1975,
in four original copies.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt

from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

## ARTICLE VIII

This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

## ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

For the Government of Israel

## WITNESS

# ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the ceasefire and other elements of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

## 1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. Edition).

## 2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

## 3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in

[L-C]

such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints. The United Nations Emergency Force shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

### 4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between Lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

### 5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.

(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.

(3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than

120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).

(5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

(6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between Lines J and K, and between Line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments will be:

(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

(2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

### 6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to Line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within 2 weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

For the Government of Israel

WITNESS

## PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement, (hereafter referred

to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be

[c]

entrusted to the United States. It shall have the
following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to
provide strategic early warning, one operated by
Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel.
Their locations are shown on the map attached to
the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned
by not more than 250 technical and administrative
personnel. They shall perform the functions of
visual and electronic surveillance only within their
stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide
tactical early warning and to verify access to them,
three watch stations shall be established by the
United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will
be shown on the map attached to the Basic
Agreement. These stations shall be operated by
United States civilian personnel. In support of
these stations, there shall be established three
unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of
each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station
and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall
perform the following duties in connection with
the operation and maintenance of these stations:

a. At the two surveillance stations described
in paragraph 1 a. above, United States civilian per-
sonnel will verify the nature of the operations of
the stations and all movement into and out of each
station and will immediately report any detected
divergency from its authorized role of visual and
electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic
Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency
Force.

b. At each watch station described in para-
graph 1 b. above, the United States civilian
personnel will immediately report to the Parties to
the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations
Emergency Force any movement of armed forces,
other than the United Nations Emergency Force,
into either Pass and any observed preparations for
such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian
personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal
shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall
be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early
Warning System shall be allowed to move freely
within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be
entitled to have such support facilities as are
reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune
from local criminal, civil, tax and customs juris-
diction and may be accorded any other specific
privileges and immunities provided for in the
United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of
February 13, 1957.

7. The United States affirms that it will continue
to perform the functions described above for the
duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Proposal, the United States may withdraw its per-
sonnel only if it concludes that their safety is
jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no
longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to
the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in
order to give them the opportunity to make alter-
native arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic
Agreement request the United States to conclude
its role under this Proposal, the United States will
consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the
watch stations will be worked out through con-
sultation with the United States.

Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State

Accepted by: