Log # 5565

September 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR
FROM: Rosemary
SUBJECT: Letter from Ismail Fahmy - Interview Request

At Tab A, Ismail Fahmy has written you thanking for the copy of *Years of Upheaval* and promising you "stimulating and interesting" reading when his own book comes out.

Fahmy also encloses a request for an interview on the current Middle East situation from the Chief Editor, Nabil Mograbi, of "The Arab Nation," an Arabic language weekly published in Paris, reportedly having wide circulation in the Arab world. Describing Mograbi as a "very dear friend," Fahmy asks that you agree to do the interview. Mograbi is prepared to fly to Washington for that express purpose.

(Mograbi's letter points out that he has made prior requests to this office but has been turned down because you were pre-occupied writing your memoirs. A search of our files reveals at least one prior request - see Tab B).

The only source that had any information at all on this publication was the Library of Congress who maintain that it is a privately funded periodical which may have (not clear) Saudi financial backing; its past editor was a Palestinian, possibly Lebanese; it is a political publication and perceived to be relatively moderate, presenting a wide spectrum of views rather than pushing a single political position: it is evaluated as one of the less censored publications, tolerating a freer body of opinion.

Attached is a suggested reply from you to Fahmy along with a separate reply which Chris might sign to Mograbi. Both finesse the issue of agreeing now to an interview. You could indicate your preferences below:

____ Approve (sign) my letter to Fahmy

____ Approve Chris letter to Mograbi

alternatively

____ Redo; tell Fahmy I _will_ do the interview

____ Redo; tell Fahmy I _cannot_ do such an interview

AL WATAN AL ARABI

33, Rue Marbeuf,

Paris 75008 - France

Téléphone :
2252027/8/9

Télex :
Al Watan 641411F

Son Excellence Henry H. KISSINGER
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N.W
Washington, D.C. 20006

PARIS le 6 Septembre 1982

Excellence Henry H. Kissinger,

Lors de mon dernier séjour au Caire je me suis entretenu avec mon ami, Monsieur Ismaël Fahmy, ancien Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Egypte.

Nous avions longuement parlé de vos mémoires. Monsieur Fahmy a montré sa satisfaction pour ce que vous avez dit de son rôle lorsqu'il était Ministre. Il m'a posé cette question :

"Avez vous lu les mémoires de Monsieur Kissinger ? "

Ma réponse fût la suivante :

"Est-ce qu'il est permis à un journaliste d'ignorer l'ouvrage du génie de la politique étrangère de notre époque "

J'en ai profité pour signaler à Monsieur Fahmy le "problème" que j'ai eu avec ces mémoires :

J'ai écrit à Monsieur Kissinger plusieurs fois, lui demandant d'accorder à mon journal un interview. Toutes les fois, j'ai eu comme réponse: "Monsieur Kissinger est occupé à la rédaction de ses mémoires et ne peut donner suite à votre demande".

Ainsi Monsieur Fahmy s'est proposé de vous écrire personnellement à ce propos; vous trouverez sa lettre ci-jointe.

En effet, j'aimerai bien avoir l'honneur et le plaisir de vous rencontrer à Washington pour un interview sur les problèmes du Moyen-Orient: le Liban, le Golf, la crise au Moyen-Orient, la nouvelle initiative américaine.

.../...

"AL WATAN AL ARABI" est l'un des principaux hebdomadaires arabes, connu par son sérieux et par sa grande diffusion.

Dailleurs, Monsieur Fahmy collabore avec nous à travers un éditorial hebdomadaire et nous allons publier prochainement ses mémoires en langue arabe.

Est-il possible d'espérer cette fois-ci une réponse favorable?

En attendant, je vous remercie d'avance et vous prie d'agréer, Excel-lence, l'expression de ma haute considération.

Nabil MOGRABI
Directeur

23 November 1982

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

It was very thoughtful of you to provide me with the
fine article in _The Economist_ setting forth your views on
the Middle East situation. I enjoyed reading the article
very much. You have crossed all the t's and dotted all
the i's, so let's hope that we can influence the proper
people to listen.

In case I do not have an opportunity to see you in
the meantime, I would like to take this opportunity to send
best wishes to you and Nancy from Carrie and me for a
very happy Thanksgiving and a wonderful Christmas holiday.

DEC 1 1982

[Y]

10/12

A Mr. Dominique Moisi of the French Institute for International Relations called this morning. He is in town for the Georgetown University Leadership Seminar.

His institute apparently had contacted the South African Institute where HAK spoke regarding publication of HAK's speech in the French Institute's journal at the end of October. His institute received a telex from South Africa saying HAK wished to make some changes in the speech prior to publication. His institute has heard nothing further since.

Moisi had expected to see HAK at the Leadership Seminar and ask him about it, and has learned that HAK will not be attending. He says they are getting close to deadline and would like final copy for publication.

After discussing with SSM, we think maybe his contact with the South African Institute was before HAK's speech was final. In any event, perhaps you should raise this with HAK before anyone gets back to Moisi (c/o Goodman's office, 625-4225).

Jody

OE
océano

[LC]

EDICIONES OCEANO, S.A.

Paseo de Gracia, 24 y 26
Teléfs. *301 01 82-*317 45 08
Barcelona-7

N/ref. LM/MHB/fb

Barcelona, 8th February 1982

Dr. HENRY KISSINGER
1800 K Street
N. W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20006

(U.S.A.)

Dear Sir,

FEB 16 1982

We take the liberty of addressing you this letter to kindly ask your collaboration for the work we are publishing : Encyclopaedia of World Football (6 volumes) the first three of which have already appeared and which we are forwarding by separate mail. Volumes IV, V and VI will be published on March, June and October 1982 respectively. We shall publish as well next October an extra volume devoted to the world Cup 82 in Spain.

We would be happy to have your collaboration published in volume VI, entitled "Football as social phenomenon", and your text would be its prologue. The text, one or two folio size pages, could be on Football's social dimension (causes of its settledness in the world, perspectives and future of football in the EE.UU.).

We believe the Encyclopaedia of World Football is a unique work which fills an important lack among world sport publications. Among others, chapters have been headed by Dr. Joao Havelange and Mr. Samaranch, as well as other world-known personalities : Lord Philip J. Noël-Baker, Nobel Peace Prize (1959), famous players as Cruyff, Maradona, Kempes, Gento, Yachine, etc., trainers as Menotti, Helenio Herrera, Kubala, Michels, etc., press men as J. Goddet, Max Marquis,

...

Registro Mercantil de Barcelona - Hoja 35112, folio 97, tomo 3296, libro 2658, Sección 2.º - NIF A-08-450256

OE
océano

Hoja n.º 2

...

Eric Walter, R. Pittet, personalities as Prince Rainier of Monaco, etcétera, have willingly collaborated with our work given its exceptional characters.

If, as it is our wish, we could have your collaboration, we would also appreciate to have your signature, since we reproduce it under the text in all cases.

Looking forward to hearing from you, we thank you very much for your kind attention and remain,

Yours sincerely.

Ediciones OCEANO, S.A.

February 4, 1982

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K. Street N.W.
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006

FEB 08 1982

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I hesitate to ask for your advice, but because of my father's long and deep
respect for you, I would like to consult with you on some issues that I am not
equipped to deal with alone. While he was alive, my father was concerned with
perpetuating his ideas and writings. My brother and I must now attempt to carry
out his wishes, but we do not feel confident about our ability to make well founded
decisions.

My father did not name a literary executor in his will. The general problem is the disposition of his literary estate. I do not feel competent to handle this alone and I am not sure what is involved and what kind of person would be most suited and qualified to carry out the responsibilities. I would appreciate it if you could give me some guidance in selecting one and if you would have some specific recommendations.

The second issue I am confronted with is the placement of his papers. My father's wish was to donate them to the Library of Congress. I was told by some of my father's colleagues of a backlog of cataloging at the Library. Because of the time delay, we are reluctant to donate them to the Library of Congress. On the other hand, the University of Virginia has expressed an interest in them. Before making a final decision, there are issues I am not clear about. How important is the time element in making them available? Secondly, what kinds of materials should be excluded from the literary bequest? Thirdly, do you have any specific suggestions of the appropriateness of the University of Virginia or any other possible location for the collection?

Concerning the revision of published writings, the most immediate issue is
<u>Politics Among Nations</u> and also the proper disposition of unpublished materials.
The most urgent question is the appropriate person to undertake the revision of
<u>Politics Among Nations</u>. I am uncertain on what basis to select the most qualified
person for such an important undertaking. One possibility which has been suggested
is Professor Kenneth Thompson of the University of Virginia. Do you think he would
be an appropriate person and are there any others who you might recommend?

I realize that there are other demands on your time, but these decisions are
pressing and I hope you will be able to advise me as soon as possible. I deeply
appreciate your advice on these matters.

Susanna Morgenthau
c/o
The Walworth Barbour American International
School In Israel
P.O. Box 827
Kfar Shmaryahu, Israel 46910

ROBERT MORLEY
FAIRMANS
WARGRAVE
BERKSHIRE

February 15, 1982

Mr. Henry Kissinger
1800 K Street
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Would you be so kind as to take a few minutes from your hectic
schedule to help me with a little project which will benefit autistic
children?

Several years ago, I put together a book containing a variety of
people's amusing stories concerning their most embarrassing moments or
instances of forgetfulness. All royalties from this book went to the
National Society for Autistic Children, and revenues exceeded $120,000.
Enough is never enough and the second volume is being prepared with
the idea of doing even better.

A number of kind souls have already responded with wonderful
moments of "Oh, I wish I hadn't said (or done) that," and you will
be in good company. Just a few of those already included are
Rudolph Nureyev, David Niven, Dame Rebecca West, Carol Channing,
Glenda Jackson, James Herriot, Yehudi Menuhin, Margaret Drabble and
several dozen others.

Will you join us in giving the world some amusement and, most
importantly, helping the autistic children?

Just pop your anecdote in the enclosed post-paid envelope and mail
it off to my publisher. I am already in the soup, several weeks behind
deadline, so do, please, let me know when you too were last in hot
water.

Enclosure
RM/KB/zg

South Hadley

# Details behind Kissinger story

## Editor, Safety Valve:

On Thursday, March 4, the T-T ran a story on Mrs. Nancy Kissinger, credited to the New York Times News Service, regarding her court appearance on a simple assault charge. The Associated Press report on this story, the same day, was essentially the same, but listed the charge as disorderly conduct. Both News Services left the reader with a negative view of Mrs. Kissinger, because of the incompleteness of their reports. Further investigation reveals a decidedly different and far more complete story than that reported by these News Services and subsequently by the Transcript.

The "verbal exchange" which you reported was more detailed in the United Press International coverage of the story the same day. According to the UPI coverage, Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger were at Newark airport awaiting a shuttle flight to Boston, where Dr. Kissinger was to undergo heart surgery. They were approached by Ellen Kaplan and Thomas Simpson, who were distributing literature at the terminal. Mr. Simpson approached Dr. Kissinger and asked him "why he had prolonged the war in Vietnam?" Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger tried to walk away. Mrs. Kaplan followed

them and asked, "Mr. Kissinger, do you sleep with young boys at the Carlyle Hotel?"

Both News Services started their story at this point, when Mrs. Kissinger allegedly grabbed Mrs. Kaplan by the throat. The above information, omitted by the N.Y. Times and AP report, changes the entire character of the story.

The abuses of First Amendment rights to free speech are very much in evidence in this story. Mrs. Kaplan carried her rights to the ultimate by saying what she did, and then is allowed to take legal action against Mrs. Kissinger. The news media is the first to defend these rights, for self-serving reasons. In this case, it was done promptly, blindly and in a less-than-honest fashion. There is also a degree of responsibility attached to these rights. In Mrs. Kaplan's case, it is her responsibility not to act in a boorish, obnoxious and ignorant manner in pursuit of her rights. The news media also has the higher responsibility to present accurate, factual and unbiased news to the public. This type of reporting has done a grave disservice to the Kissingers and to the readers of this paper.

Name Withheld

## Transcript-Telegram

<table><tr><td>Tom Schumaker</td><td>Editor and Publisher</td></tr><tr><td>Matthew Zawidowski</td><td>Managing Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Richard J. Murphy</td><td>Senior Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Carlton F. Vogt Jr.</td><td>Editorial Page Editor</td></tr><tr><td>Donald J. Curran</td><td>General Manager</td></tr><tr><td>William Dwight</td><td>Chairman of the Board, Emeritus</td></tr><tr><td>William Dwight Jr.</td><td>Chairman of the Board</td></tr></table>

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OWNED AND PUBLISHED DAILY (Except Sunday) By TRANSCRIPT-TELEGRAM CO.
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AKIO MORITA
CHAIRMAN
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SONY
SONY CORPORATION

T-35 KITASHINAGAWA-6
SHINAGAWA-ku, TOKYO 141, JAPAN

TELEPHONE: (03) 448-2000

CABLE ADDRESS:
SONYCORP TOKYO
TELEX: J 22263

January 20, 1982

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
U. S. A.

Dear Henry:

I have recently received notification of the dates of the 1982 International Councillors meetings from Ms. Lea Rogers.

Unfortunately, I will be unable to attend the meeting to be held in May. A prior commitment, namely to the Morgan International Council, of which Messrs. Olayan and Shepherd are also members, which is scheduled to meet that same week in Tokyo prevents me from leaving this country. I sincerely regret that an alternative date could not be set for the meeting in May.

Nevertheless, my schedule to date allows me to attend the November meeting. I will look forward, therefore, to meeting with the Councillors at that time.

I hope that we may have the opportunity to see each other prior to November.

With warm personal wishes to you and Nancy,

AM:tk

JAN 25 1982

SAKHALIN PROJECT

The purpose of the attached is to bring to your attention the
major obstacles we have faced in continuing with the Sakhalin
Project. Specifically, the economic sanctions suggested by
the U.S. to be taken by Japan against the USSR on the
Sakhalin Project following the Polish incident will have
serious economic consequences for Japan.

The General Agreement for the project between Japan and the
USSR was signed in 1975, and the exploration period under
this agreement is to terminate next year. If we cannot
obtain the Export License necessary to embark on the develop-
ment phase of the project by May of this year, the $170
million the Japanese have already invested into the explo-
ration phase of this project will have gone to waste. If
this happens, the oil and gas we have discovered up to this
point will invariably fall exclusively into the hands of the
Soviet Union as they may proceed with the project themselves
or with the cooperation of other nations. This will un-
doubtedly prove detrimental to the United States as well as
to Japan.

In considering the above and the details of the Sakhalin
Project on the pages to follow, we hope that you will re-
consider your stance on the sanction issue as it pertains to
the Sakhalin Project; for a decision of this kind will
produce favorable results only for the USSR.

[1c]

Feb. 22, 1982

# Sakhalin Project
Regarding the U.S. Economic
Sanction Against the U.S.S.R.

## A. The Progress and Present Status of the Project

1. In 1972 at the Japan/USSR Economic Joint Meeting in Tokyo, it was agreed that the possible exploration and development of oil and gas off the shore of Sakhalin Continental Shelf will be jointly studied.

2. This project has been in progress for 8 years since January 1975 when the General Agreement was signed and is still underway today.

3. The feature of this project is that the credits extended to the Soviets are to be repaid only at the time the project would prove successful. When repaid, oil and gas are to be supplied at a price with the discount as compensation.

4. By the end of 1981, about 95% of the credit in the amount of US$170 million (JNOC-70%, Private Sector-30%) have been invested, drilling 18 exploratory wells in total.

5. As a result, very promising reserves of oil and gas have been discovered in both the Chaivo and Odoptu structures. In fact, it seems to have become one of the largest fields in the Far East or the South East Asia regions.

-1-

[LC]

Particularly, in the Chaivo structure, all the exploration activities have been completed and the development operation is scheduled to begin this year. In the development phase, 50% of required funds will be financed by the Japan's Ex-im Bank and others through bank loans, according to the General Agreement.

As for the O adoptu structure, five appraisal wells are to be drilled this year and, it is almost certain to become a substantially large oil and gas field.

B. The U.S. Economic Sanctions against the USSR

1. As is widely known, the U.S. government has requested as of Dec. 30, 1981, not to supply to the USSR equipment, facilities and technology necessary for oil and gas exploration and development which are made in the U.S.A., as a result of the problems with Poland. This is the third time that such an embargo has been placed against the USSR.

Fortunately, in 1980 and 1981, we had narrowly obtained the U.S. Export License for the equipment necessary for Sakhalin operations and had worked out the exploration program as scheduled.

2. However, this year's sanction is different from last year on the following points:

a. The restriction has been issued only recently, and the scope of the sanctions are extended to the equipment relating to the pipeline as well.

b. The Department of Commerce is not even in a position to file the Export License.

-2-

[L.C.]

c. This year, the sanctions are taking into account the projects which will supply natural gas from Siberia to Western Europe. The Sakhalin project will not be excluded as an exception. This seems to be the general climate of the U.S. government concerning the sanctions.

Under the circumstances, the "Export Restriction" seems to be reinforced compared with that of the past years, and frankly speaking, we do not have any prospects for the future outcome of the sanction issue.

If and when the Project cannot be considered as an "Exception" of economic sanction against the USSR, we will be without the equipment and materials we had plan to import. Then, it will be impossible for us to run the drilling schedule this year as planned.

3. Consequently,

a. Since the exploration period is to be terminated next year under the General Agreement, it is impossible to drill the required number of wells in the Odoptu structure for appraisal unless the development plan can take shape prior to the termination.

Thus, it is very possible that we may have to abandon the substantial oil and gas we have discovered. In that event, the USSR may develop the field either by themselves or by other nations' cooperation, and that the oil and gas will be exclusively acquired by the Soviet Union.

b. Further, in such a case, "the credit to be repaid when successful," extended so far to the USSR, will become questionable.

-3-

[x]

The situation is considered to be unilaterally dis-
advantageous to the Japanese side and to be profitable
to the Soviet side only. In other words, the
sanctions will essentially act against the Japanese
-- not against the USSR.

4. Regarding the equipment and materials that require the U.S. Export License:

a. Major items are only for short-term leases and all of them do not correspond to the export or transfer of highly technical facilities or technology, and they are not objects of COCOM.

b. Moreover, the amount is more or less US$2 million in total.

c. All the items are the same as approved in 1979 and 1980, and the total amount is less than that of 1979 and of 1980.

In consideration of the above conditions, we ask to be
excluded from the sanction and thereby, the suspension
of the project, and ask to be granted the Export
License by the beginning of May at the latest, because
the working period in Sakhalin is limited only to the
months from June to October.

We have been soliciting the Japanese government
from the beginning of this year to receive the E/L by
May, however, under the present situation and timing,
it seems unlikely that the problem will be taken up
between the Japanese and the U.S. governments as
a formal issue.

We would appreciate your understanding of our existing
predicament and render your support and cooperation to
obtain the E/L.

-4-

[Lc]

5. It is understood that at this time, the people in the U.S. Department of Commerce has indicated that the Sakhalin project difficult to exclude as an exception in light of the contract of Yanburg in which Western Europe receives a supply of natural gas amounting to 42 billion $m^3/y$.

a. However, we stress that this Sakhalin project is an old contract passed 8 years ago and hence was in existence prior to the recognition of the above contract for Western Europe, which, we understand, went into effect in late 1981.

b. There is much difference in quantity of supplying gas. In this Sakhalin project, only 5 billion $m^3/y$ of gas is planned to be supplied, as opposed to the figure stated in the Yanburg contract.

Considering these points, we stress that it is unreasonable to regard the two projects on the same level.

-5-

LIST OF ITEMS, REQUIRING U.S. E/L FOR 1982 OPERATIONS

(relating to Sakhalin Project)

| MAKER | ITEM |
|---|---|
| 1. Otis Engineering Corporation | Surface Testing Equipment (Leasing)<br>$330,000 |
| 2. DOWELL-SCHLUMBERGER | (1) DST Equipment (Leasing) $160,000<br>(2) Cementing Unit (Leasing) $30,000 |
| 3. SCHLUMBERGER | Electric Logging Equipment (Leasing) $560,000 |
| 4. Core Laboratories, Inc. | Mud Logging Equipment (Leasing) $120,000 |
| 5. National Supply Company,<br>Division of Armco, Inc. | (1) Spare Parts for Drawworks 1320-UE $20,000<br>(Purchasing price of Equipment)<br>(2) Spare Parts for Triplex Slush Pump 12-P-160 $40,000<br>(3) Spare Parts for Hydraulic $50,000<br>Pedestal Crane OS-105 |
| 5. General Electric Company | Spare Parts for Generator Power Panel<br>$30,000 |
| 7. Cameron Iron Works, Inc. | Spare Parts for Well-Head $20,000 |
| 8. Vetco Offshore Group | Well-Head<br>$260,000 |
| 9. BWT International, Ltd. | Spare Parts for Surface Testing $40,000<br>Equipment |
| 10. Lynes International, Inc. | Spare Parts for In-hole Test Tools $40,000 |
| 11. Dresser Industries, Inc. | (1) Spare Parts for Electric Logging<br>Equipment $100,000<br>(2) Consultants for Electric Logging<br>Operation $200,000 |

-6-

Please note the following:

The prices listed next to items 1-4 are the <u>leasing</u> prices.

Just for your reference, the costs of the equipment themselves are
as follows:

1. Surface Testing Equipment: US$ 1,130,000
2. (1) DST Equipment (together) $ 800,000
(2) Cementing Unit
3. Electric Logging Equipment $ 1,000,000
4. Mud Logging Equipment $ 80,000

The prices listed next to items 5-10 are the <u>purchasing</u> prices
of the equipments.

The price of item 11 (2) are the expenses for the consultants.

Best Regards.

March 11, 1982

Dear Henry & Nancy,

Having safely returned to Tokyo with Akio, I hasten to write this note to you. We were quite shocked and worried when we learned of the news that Henry was hospitalized to undergo operation.

But to our delight, I learned the news of Henry's leaving hospital through TV which I happened to turn on in New York. Nothing was more relieving than this news! I immediately got hold of Akio who came back from Washington D.C. and asked him to send a card to you. We let the card convey our happiness in knowing the news so as not to disturb you.

But we were able to see you after all, and was not it nice! It was a change for us to see Henry in pajama and bathrobe, as we are so accustomed to his public image of being majestic. And we must admit that Henry was quite charming in pajama too. It made us like you even more.

.../2

[LC]

As you may know, I will be accompanying Akio
to visit New York often so that I believe
we could see you again soon.

Knowing that Henry would rush back to his
work without listening to what Nancy has
to say, (I know this because Akio acts the
same) I would like to say the same thing
I am always telling to Akio. As there is
a long road ahead of you, do not rush and
do take care of yourself. Without physical
integrity, nothing can be achieved.

But any how, we wish you the earliest recovery,
and are looking forward to seeing you soon.

WU
western union

WFA016(0344)(1-001364A042)PD 02/11/82 0346

ICS IPMWGWC WSH
00121 02-11 0328A EST

ICS IPMWF08
1-031145G042 02/11/82

ICS IPMIIHA IISS
IISS F M WUI 11 0318

PMS WASHINGTON DC
UWB6129 PSX117 ZYA340 YBH653

UWNX CO FRXX 047

PARIS 47/46 11 0914

DR HENRY KISSINGER SUIT 520 1800 K STREET N.W

WASHINGTONDC20006

YOSHIKO AND I ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED HAVING LEARNED ABOUT YOUR
OPERATION TODAY STOP WE SINCERELY WISH YOU A SPEEDY RECOVERY
AND THAT YOU QUICKLY REGAIN YOUR GOOD HEALTH AND RETURN TO YOUR

W.U. 1201-SF (R5-69)

1982 FEB 11

WU
western union

Telegram

PRODUCTIVE LIFESTYLE
AKIO MORITA
COL 520 1800 WASHINGTONDC20006
NNN
0326 EST
NNNN

FEB 11 1982

HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 15, 1982

Mr. Akio Morita
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
Sony Corporation
9 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019

Dear Akio:

I am writing to ask a special favor of Sony on behalf of The Washington Opera, for which I am serving as 1982 chairman of a major three-year fund raising effort. The Washington Opera is quickly becoming one of Washington's outstanding cultural resources and I am proud to be involved. It has always been my thought that our nation's capital should possess a world-class company, and the leadership to realize this is now in place.

In late May, the Opera will present one of its largest annual fund raising events, a radiothon, over Washington's leading classical music station. The project is expected to bring approximately $75,000 in new private contributions to the Opera. This will help significantly toward obtaining my campaign year goal of $2.4 million.

Radio listeners will telephone their contributions to the Opera and will receive donated items and services of their choice in return. For example, I have personally given several autographed copies of *Years of Upheaval*.

We were wondering if Sony could arrange to donate 100 Sony Walkmans to be sold at a special contribution premium amount over the air during the four day fund raising event. Everyone is confident that

October 25, 1982

I received your kind letter dated October 15th today. Akio is at the moment on a business trip to Europe, however, I have already spoken to him over the phone and informed him of the warm letter addressed to him.

He has asked me to write you a note in his stead which I do with great pleasure, and also to had the opportunity to meeting you while you were in Tokyo. Let me say that we truly enjoyed having you over at our house for the dinner with the young people. We all spoke of 'Nancy and Henry' late into the night after you left, and continue to remember and talk of your dynamism and warmth even today.

Your coming to celebrate my birthday was indeed such a surprise! I know very well what busy people you are, and it touched me deeply to have had you spend your precious time with us from the beginning to the end of my party.

I certainly must apologize for not having written you earlier to express all our gratitude

NOV 02 1982

[lc]

for the delightful time you have given us. I
have been quite busy preparing for my son
Masao's wedding, which is already next week.

My daughter Naoko is getting engaged within this
year, and the wedding will take place in May of
next year. The first week of May in Japan is
a holiday season, and since the wedding will
be taking place in Hawaii, I must work on all the
bookings and reservations already. Such matters
I am dealing with, and without Akio's help,
have kept me from sitting down to write you -
and I do hope you accept my sincere apology
for taking so long to thank you.

It is very nice of you to have dinner for us
once again. Akio and I enjoy every occasion
we spend with you, and we are looking forward
to seeing you both on November 21st.

Akio joins me in sending you our very best
regards.

ATT: MISS H. ONOYAMA--MAN
CONFI

FROM: A. MORITA'S OFFICE
PLS. REFER TO OUR TELEX.

SONY
SONY CORPORATION

T-33 KITABINAGAWA-3
SHINAGAWA-ku, TOKYO 141, JAPAN
TELEPHONE: (03) 646-2600
CABLE ADDRESS:
SONYCORP TOKYO
TELEFX: J 65000

October 13, 1982

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Dear Henry:

Yoshiko and I are grateful to you for arranging a dinner for us on November 21. I am taking the liberty of attaching a list of the names of some people whom we would like to see. However, let me stress that these are just suggestions, and that we would like to leave to you and Nancy the selection of guests for the evening.

By the way, my second son Masao's wedding will take place next month, on the 6th. As it is customary to read some congratulatory cable messages to the guests at wedding receptions in Japan, I would like to ask if it would be possible for you to send a congratulatory message addressed to both my son Masao and his fiancée Makiko. If the cable can be dispatched on or before November 4th, it will arrive in time. Please send it to my home addressed as follows:

Mr. Masao Morita
2-5-6 Aobadai
Meguro-ku, Tokyo 153

Att: Masao and Makiko

Thanking you in advance for your kindness,

With warmest wishes,

AM:tk

Enclosure:

P.S. I am forwarding a copy of this letter to your office.

FAX-TOK- 959

Member List -- Dr. Kissinger's Party

Mr. Isaac Stern

Mr. Benno Schmidt

Mr. Peter Glenville

Mr. Winston Lord

Mr. Felix Rohatyn

Mrs. Vincent Astor

Mr. Jean Riboud

Ms. Kay Graham

Mr. Thornton Bradshaw

Mr. Henry Fowler

Mr. John Whitehead

Mr. Michael Blumenthal

(if he is in New York)

Mr. Willard C. Butcher

Violinist

Managing Partner
J. H. Whitney & Co.

Council of Foreign Relations

Senior Partner
Lazard Freres

President
Schlumberger

Washington Post

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
RCA

Chairman
Goldman Sachs

Senior Partner
Goldman Sachs

Chairman
Burroughs

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A.

F

OK-

960

February 15, 1982

Mr. Henry Kissinger
435 East 52nd Street
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Enclosure
RM/KB/zg

MAR 3 1982

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10020

Room 5600

247-3700

June 8, 1982

Dear Henry:

Here's the transcript of our interview on Nelson,
for any edits, additions, amendments or deletions you care
to make.

I think this interview was highly productive and
I look forward to an opportunity for another session in
late June or July, as you suggested.

I'll have a new home address as of July 2 --
1 Perth Avenue, Spring Valley, New York 10977 -- and I'll
send you my new home telephone number when it's available.
The Rockefeller family switchboard, 212-247-3700, is the
best place to leave a message in the interim.

Many, many thanks -- and best regards.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
435 East 52nd Street
New York, New York

HAND DELIVERY

Room 5600

247-3700

June 8, 1982

Dear Henry:

HAND DELIVERY

1,

MORROW: Henry, I hope that someday you may do the definitive book on Nelson.

KISSINGER: Yeah, I'm playing with it, but you know, with the family, that isn't so easy, because if you do a definitive book on Nelson, it will have to have the black as well as the white; otherwise, nobody will believe it.

MORROW: I couldn't agree with you more.

KISSINGER: Now the white, in my assessment -- you know what I thought of him -- would be 80 percent, but you have to show the complexity of the man.

MORROW: Have you read the Joe Persico book?

KISSINGER: Yes. I am not as offended by it as the family is.

MORROW: I'm not either. I think Joe made an honest effort to be objective within the framework of what he knew.

KISSINGER: That's right. He just didn't know...

MORROW: I don't think he knew enough. Also I think Nelson put him off -- Nelson frightened Joe in a way.

KISSINGER: It was also -- nobody ever knew just in what of these concentric rings of advisors, where he was. I would say, for example, that if you do it on a batting

2.

average over an extended period of time, I was as
close to Nelson -- I was probably closer to Nelson
than almost anybody, if you take an eight-year period
and constancy of the relationship. But within that
eight-year period, in any one year there were always
people closer to Nelson than I was. Do you follow me?

MORROW: I certainly do.

KISSINGER: You see, if you're a constant number two or one-and-a-half, your average is higher than ------ I used to see guys with whom Nelson would discuss every major decision the way he wouldn't with me. They would come for a year or two and then they would be gone. I'd be there all the time, but you know, on the decisions to run or not to run, I'd be close enough to know, I think, ninety percent. But I was actually never in on the decision that took him out of the race in any of the years he went out.

MORROW: That's fascinating. Was that just happenstance?

KISSINGER: He would talk to me on the phone about it, but I was
not in the room when Moore, Emmet and whoever in '68 ---

MORROW: That, of course, was a crazy thing.

KISSINGER: Were you in the room?

(4)

3.

**MORROW:** I was not. I was first handed a paper saying he was going into Wisconsin and I was told (by NAR) to sharpen up Emmet's prose. I called Emmet to check out the changes I'd made in Emmet's prose because he always raised unshirted hell when anybody touched an adjective. Emmet said, "Would you ask Nelson to hold up everything for twenty-four hours, I want to see him." The next day, Emmet and Ted Braun descended upon Nelson at 55th Street and within an hour they had totally reversed the thing. That was where we had that damaging pull-out.

**KISSINGER:** The fatal pull-out. I think the only hope of winning in '68 was to get Nixon into a fight and hope that he'd make a mistake. But, in '68, I think his statement was on a Tuesday; he called me Sunday night and said he was going in and he was going over all the reasons why he was going in. Then he called me Monday night and said he wasn't.

**MORROW:** How did he explain himself just at that point? His own brother (David) was flabbergasted at that shift.

**KISSINGER:** He said that he would lose in Nebraska. He said they couldn't figure a win anywhere.

**MORROW:** That was Braun and Emmet.

[Y]

4.

**KISSINGER:** He was going in as a sacrificial lamb. The first place he had a chance of winning was Nebraska, or was it Oregon? But he would be losing every place else and he might well lose in Oregon. So, they thought they would go out, reserve their organization and then go back in after the primaries. I said to him, it would never work, that he would lose every political supporter he had by the time he came back in. There was no mechanism by which people could switch to him. But he didn't take my political views seriously anyway.

**MORROW:** Nelson had a terrible tendency to compartmentalize people. You were foreign policy, you were the in-tellect, you were the thinker. But, obviously, you couldn't possibly know a damn thing about politics in his view. And it was utterly untrue! Jesus!

**KISSINGER:** Now the ground rules of this are that you will type this up...

**MORROW:** I will type it up...

**KISSINGER:** I will have a chance to review it...

**MORROW:** Do anything you want to it...

**KISSINGER:** And edit it and amend it...

**MORROW:** Exactly...

[4]

5.

KISSINGER: And you will not publish it or anything like that...

MORROW: Under no circumstances...

KISSINGER: Or draw on it for publication...

MORROW: Oh, no...

KISSINGER: This is for the archives...

MORROW: This is for the archives, this is the possession of
the Rockefeller family. This is not me, at all.

KISSINGER: That's what I just wanted to get clear.

MORROW: Absolutely. Henry, I've done about 80 or 85 of these
interviews...

KISSINGER: Look, Hughie, we've worked together; you're a man of
honor.

MORROW: Well, what I was going to say was that if and when
you (might) decide to do such a book, it is a good
resource.

KISSINGER: The problem in doing such a book is the family. Whether
they let you get access to really everything, otherwise
it isn't worth doing. And, whether they understand
that if you write a good book about Nelson, he has to
emerge as a human being and not as a saint. There are
few people in my life I've loved as much as Nelson, so

[4]

6.

it would be favorable, it would be hugely favorable.
But if I did it, I would like people like you to be
able to say, that's right, that's the way it was.

KISSINGER:
(cont'd)

There are huge areas, as you say, in the foreign
policy field. I don't know what records I have --
I mean I can do it from my records -- more or less.
In the domestic field, in his campaigns, I know very
little for the reason that you gave. He would talk
to me about it, he would sometimes ask my opinion, he
would never have me at the meetings where the thing
was actually discussed -- almost never -- every once
in a while when it involved a speech -- but I'd see
the process. When Eisenhower's summit with Britain
had failed in '60, I wanted him to make some statement
that would show support (and also strength against the
Russians and speak of the seriousness of the situation.
It had never occurred to me that it would be a political
thing. This was two weeks before the nominating con-
vention after he'd been out, and he invited me and
Emmett to Pocantico to write it and we sat in that
little thing near the lake that Wally Harrison had
built -- the Lodge. Before Emmet got through with
that concept, we were no longer talking foreign policy.
We were saying you cannot follow a leader holding aloft
a flag with a question mark and putting what I wanted
for foreign policy into the context of an assault on
Nixon.

[Y]

7.

MORROW: On Eisenhower, as well as Nixon.

KISSINGER: But also on Eisenhower by implication because the condition he wanted to remedy was Eisenhower's condition.

MORROW: Absolutely! It is my impression, Henry, that that is the point at which Nelson permanently lost any chance of being nominated by the Republican Party.

KISSINGER: In any event, complicated it beyond belief. If he had gone in in '60 and stayed in, he would have been a young buck trying for the Presidency and he might have made it because you could never be sure with Nixon that he wouldn't blow one. If he had stayed out, he would have been a good sport. But to go in two weeks, three weeks before the election, which was sort of nuts, and then to force Nixon into a platform that most of the party didn't want -- that, frankly, didn't make any difference -- in the compact of Fifth Avenue, I think that did as much damage as any single method. *chirp*.

MORROW: That's my personal opinion and I just wondered how you felt about it. I have Emmet on tape as saying, accepting implicitly that he had given Nelson very bad advice on that point, or at least he refrained from staying Nelson's hand in the attack on Nixon.

[Y]

8.

**KISSINGER:** He did it. He, Emmet! I was there. It isn't that Nelson needed a lot of encouragement. It started out -- you know -- we had been mumbling about defense and about the inadequacy of the Eisenhower foreign policy for a long time. But we had never done anything about it, except in those reports to the nation. We thought we could use the failed summit to call attention to the gravity of the foreign policy situation and, at that point, not necessarily be an attack on Eisenhower because, after all, Eisenhower couldn't land in Japan and he had a failed summit and people knew something was wrong.

**MORROW:** Khrushchev was hammering his shoe on the table.

**KISSINGER:** No, that was a little later. That was during the campaign. We met out in the Lodge and I remember it as if it were yesterday that Emmet said, "Look, you do that and it will be on page 30 of the newspaper. You've got somehow to give it an actual relevance." He said, "You can say it's a crisis, but you also have to say that Nixon can't solve it." Then the whole thing took a turn. Now, I can't say in honesty that I resisted it because I didn't like Nixon either. I was 37 at the time and I didn't think that I knew anything about politics. So, I just figured, O.K., if that's the way it is, they must know what they're

[N]

9.

doing. I was uneasy but I cannot say I was overruled.
But, you know, once these things get going with Nelson
you never got to a point of being overruled or not
overruled. I mean, that was it and boom, off you
went drafting.

MORROW: Why do you think he wasn't better at seeing the effect down the line of a decision like this?

KISSINGER: I think Nelson fizzled because he had a lousy staff, contrary to what people say. In my view, he had very few good people around him, and that had a reason because the old Rockefeller staff had been trying for seventy years or whatever, fifty-five years by then, to keep the Rockefellers out of the news and out of trouble. Here is a guy who is actually conducting himself in such a way that's bound to get him into trouble. But, that is politics. The whole pressure of the John Lockwoods -- Frankie Jamieson was a little different because he was an old pro -- but of the John Lockwoods, the Stacy Mays and all the old family retainers, was always in the direction of caution and of getting him out of things -- and of the brothers, probably. That's on the one side of it. On the other side, the people he brought in were also not really suited for what he needed. I think George Hinman is

10.

one of the most lovable people I have met. A fine
gentleman. I'd love to have a man like this as my
father or father-in-law, but -- he had been an organi-
zation Republican all his life. The idea of fighting
other Republicans just didn't come naturally to him.
He had never thought in terms of organizing a national
campaign. It just wasn't his style. He never got a
guy like John Sears, or Cliff White, when White was
still very active, or David Garth, or anybody who was
a professional organizer of conventions.

MORROW: George believed everything people told him, too, I mean as fellow Republicans. They could be standing there with a knife held over his back.

KISSINGER: That's right, and you had to take it away from Nixon; you had to fight and that was not George's style.

MORROW: Incidentally, Henry, may I compliment you on learning to write the English language? Your second book is beautiful! I mean, just stylistically...

KISSINGER: It was hard writing... the second, you think, was better than the first, in writing...

MORROW: Just as writing, as English style, Emanuel Kant has almost totally disappeared.

KISSINGER: Well, that's an achievement...

(4)

11.

**KISSINGER:** Writing involved stringing words together. Nelson really didn't know anything about that. He thought it was a mystery. Stringing words together -- so he gets a guy like Emmet Hughes who has a lot of good qualities but he is not a political strategist. He's an essayist. Suddenly, he has a skill, though, that Nelson can't even comprehend, because Nelson can't put five words in a row. He's a good extemporaneous speaker, but he couldn't write, as we all know. So, he is, in a certain sense, in awe of Emmet who has a skill he doesn't possess. Besides that, Emmet has been with Eisenhower and Emmet came up with the "I will go to Korea" speech, so Nelson always thought this guy, somewhere along the line, he's going to strike it for me.

**MORROW:** Did you ever encounter this in Nelson -- a feeling that Emmet had a feminine intuition?

**KISSINGER:** Yes, for Nelson's moods. But you can see, there's no reflection on Nelson, the fact that Emmet was not a major leaguer is shown by the fact that he's disappeared without a trace. And nobody has ever used him again for anything in politics. I don't even know where he is. He's at Rutgers?

**MORROW:** No, he's not at Rutgers anymore. Nelson set up a professorship for him over there, endowed it and I

12.

think that ran for about five years. He's now working
on the copy desk at Life Magazine. You know, it's
strictly a routine bread-and-butter type of job. No,
he never went anywhere else.

MORROW: How would you appraise Nelson in the history of our time?

KISSINGER: I think Nelson, in a way, is a tragedy because I think he would have been a great President. I think he failed to get it partly because of his own inhibitions.

MORROW: Because he was a Rockefeller?

KISSINGER: Because he was a Rockefeller in the sense that I told you earlier -- that he was used to that family apparatus and never could quite break away from it. And, a lot of those speeches we did were a total waste of time and really were a disadvantage to him because they were so esoteric and so over the head and so little of what his Republican audiences wanted. He would have been ten times better off, stepping up there extemporaneously and handing out his programmatic speeches to the press as statements.

MORROW: I'll never forget the agricultural speech, the Stacy May special, in which Nelson proclaimed without the trace of a smile, "The problem of the low income farmer is poverty."

[4]

13.

KISSINGER: So, he should have been President. On the other hand, he was a symbol of a great period in America, in defense. He was really almost the last of the big figures that believed that ideas can change the world, and the amount of time he spent on programs and the amount of money he spent on programs. Look at a modern politician. Think of the research staff I had and often at his insistence. I would go to him and say, "Look Nelson, give me $50,000 a paper. I'll buy the papers the guys have already written. They won't write a new paper for you, they'll just rewrite an old one." No, he wanted to pay $5,000-$10,000 for a totally new paper in a political campaign. He always had the best program. He genuinely believed that if you went out to the American people -- it was his idea of what Roosevelt did, which may not even have been correct. It was his idea that he would go out there and convince the American people by the power of his programs. And he was a genuine believer that America's problems were soluble which was important, and that he could bring together the people to do it and the pity of his not getting elected, rather than the machine-type politicians, who had been elected. Really, I think his year was '68, not '60. I don't think he was quite ready in '60 to be President, but I don't know. Who knows? Either '60 or '68. I think he would have started a new era in American politics. He would have

[Y]

14.

moved the spectrum a little bit to the right, but
it would have been the broad middle basis of American
policy, uplifted with a new idealism. That's what
we missed. Instead we got politicians who were ex-
perts at getting elected. Didn't know how to govern,
didn't know how to inspire people, which was what
Nelson knew best. I think he was a major force and
a terrible tragedy because he knew what he could have
done and he always just missed it. And, what's worse,
he just missed it due to acts of his own in part at
least. Maybe he would have lost anyway in '60 and
'68, but at least he would have died less frustrated
if he had had one good run at it.

MORROW: David Rockefeller told me that he thought had Frankie
Jamieson lived, it would have made an enormous differ-
ence -- that Nelson would listen to Frankie.

KISSINGER: But I don't know what Frankie's advice would have been.
Frankie was very cautious.

MORROW: He was very cautious and sometimes all over the place.

KISSINGER: I think Frankie would have kept him from doing that
statement on Nixon. Wasn't Frankie still alive when
they pulled out of the '60 race?

MORROW: He died right that spring. He was, for practical
purposes, he was out because he simply was not func-
tioning. He was too sick, dying of lung cancer. God

(Y)

15.

knows; God knows. You kept in close touch with Nelson when you were with Nixon, as I recall. At least I recall you calling from Peking -- all kinds of exotic places.

KISSINGER: Well, there are two separate aspects. One, Nelson was humanly really very supportive to me when I was in Washington. He increasingly, as years went on, looked at me as one of the two of us who made it to Washington and he was, as far as I could tell, quite unselfish about this. He didn't seem to resent it.

MORROW: No, he didn't. It was fascinating.

KISSINGER: Not that I noticed that he resented it. I, in turn, would of course give him a sense of participation by calling him from places like Peking. On top of this, this is the human side of it that meant something humanly, but when I called him from Peking, it was just to say, Nelson I'm thinking of you, and he knew I meant, I wish you were here with me rather than Nixon. I called him from almost every place we went. I called him from Damascus. I called him when we went to some place which I thought -- you know how buoyant he was when I could say, Listen, this is where we are. But in addition to that, I'd talk to him about problems and get his judgment and he really had very good judgment when his own career was not involved. He was not a super intellect, but he had a super instinct. If you

(Y)

16.

told him, here's the problem and here's what I'm thinking, he would give very good advice -- not so much in how do you handle the negotiations with Hanoi, but a bigger problem, the relationship of things to each other and above all, governmental relationships. I was never in trouble that Nelson didn't call me and offer, at least, his moral support, and I never had a good thing happen to me that Nelson didn't call me. We really became closest humanly after I went to Washington. Before then, he had treated me like an employee in a slightly separate status.

**MORROW:** I remember your exclaiming one time when you were Secretary of State, "My God, Nelson thinks I'm still working for him!"

**KISSINGER:** Because Nelson, if he needed to know something, he would just call me up, but I would also answer him. I would never say, listen Nelson, I'm not working for you anymore.

**MORROW:** I have also happened to see occasions, or Nelson has said to me, that Henry's having a terrible time stiffening Nixon's spine on something or other. Maybe it was the Christmas bombing, or something very controversial.

**KISSINGER:** It could be almost anything.

N

17.

**MORROW:** Because you must have had a great client there on your hands -- all over the map. I want to tell you a very brief, funny story. We were having a staff meeting at the Mansion in Albany and Nelson came off the phone and said, "Henry has just won the big one, the Nobel prize, he and Lee Duc Tho." Malcolm Wilson sat there and glowered. Finally, he looked up and said, "Nelson, do you mean to tell me that Henry Kissinger has to share that prize with a communist?" So Nelson said, "Well, it takes two to tango."

**MORROW:** Yes, he was a tragedy, wasn't he, Henry?

**KISSINGER:** Yes, and that's why the last two years of his life were so sad for him, because now he knew it was over. Except that, I think, when he was dying, he was getting the itch again to become active, not as a candidate -- although I think it wouldn't have taken much to talk him into that -- but at least as a factor in the 1980 campaign.

**MORROW:** I almost had a feeling that he was deliberately taxing himself far beyond his strength in those last couple of years -- almost a suicidal kind of thing.

**KISSINGER:** Yes, he had sort of given up. Except the last night when I was with him at that Buckley thing --

[Y]

18.

MORROW: I have a tape recording of that.

KISSINGER: Could you let me have a copy of it?

MORROW: I would be glad to. It is very poorly recorded, but it's in our archives.

KISSINGER: That last night at the Buckley School -- I had been in Westchester and had spoken at his request to the Westchester Republicans the night before, and Nelson had assigned Joe Canzeri ~~to~~ me to advance the event and introduce me to the leading people. I was playing with the idea of running for the Senate at the time. At that last event, he took one reception, I took another, and then we changed places and then we walked out together. Nelson said, "I want to talk to you."

He said, "You did very well last night. You acted like a real pro, according to Canzeri." I said, "I would like to talk to you about whether I should run for the Senate." He said, "Look, I'm getting all my old troops together in February and I want to make decisions on the national scene. I'm definitely going to do something and after that, I'm going to tell you what I think you should do politically." So, he was beginning to make plans. I think what he had in mind -- he had seen Governor Clements from Texas and I think

[Y]

19.

he wanted to form a bloc without which it was impossible to get the nomination. I think that was in the back of his mind. He never told me. Anyway, that's the last conversation I had with him. He said he was in a hurry to go somewhere, he would talk to me at some time.

**MORROW:** Going back to the Open Skies, the Quantico -- how did you get involved in that in the first place?

**KISSINGER:** I was not on the first Quantico, I was on the second. He had a Quantico 1 with the Open Skies, that I was not involved in. Then he had a second Quantico in September, after the Summit -- and he had a staff director of his office, a man called Colonel Kintner who knew me and I forget how I met him. Oh, because I had been a consultant to the Army on some projects and I had met him and he thought highly of me and he recommended me to Nelson. I was brought in as a very junior guy.

**MORROW:** That clears up the point. It was always Nelson's memory that you had worked on the Open Skies proposal, that that was your idea, etc.

**KISSINGER:** No. He does me too much credit.

[Y]

20.

MORROW: Well, Nelson's memory was sometimes pretty damn tricky, too. You had very little contact with him as Governor of New York, didn't you?

KISSINGER: Well, in his capacity as Governor or during the period he was Governor?

MORROW: Well, I guess I meant it both ways.

KISSINGER: In his capacity as Governor, I had next to no contact with him. He never asked my opinion on that. During the period he was Governor, it came and went. I had a lot of contact with him in '59 and '60 when he was thinking of running for the Presidency. I was never without contact with him. He would do things with me that he would not do with normal staff members. But first, I was never a normal staff member. I was never full-time on his staff and I think if you check the financial records, you will find that I was paid - et alia ludicrously small salaries, by Rockefeller standards, because I just took academic salary, or the place went for my academic salary. If you compare what I got with what Emmet got, and we were doing comparable things in campaigns. But that's not here or there. He would invite me for dinner, or he would invite me to the country, or he would invite me to Maine just to talk about the international situation. Now, that would happen once every two months, except during '59 and '60

(Y)

21.

when he was cranking up to run, and then in '60 he
never lost contact with me. Then '61-'62, it was a
little less, except I would see him quite a bit.
That, you would really have to check his calendar as
to how often I saw him because to me these meetings
would stick in my mind, so they may seem more frequent
to me in retrospect than they really were. But I know
I talked to him a lot about Kennedy associations at
the time.

MORROW: He urged you, by the way, to have associations with Kennedy?

KISSINGER: Yes. He scolded me when I told him that I told Kennedy a lot of his problems. He said, "Never tell the President his problems unless you have a solution."

MORROW: That's something Jesse Jones said to him way, way back.

KISSINGER: Exactly. He told me it was Jesse Jones. I forgot who told it to him. Then in '63, he formed a group. I forget whether you were part of it -- with Hinman and Ronan -- that was supposed to plan his strategy for '64. That group, if I remember, started meeting very early in '63, mostly in Radio City Music Hall. So, I had that contact with him and it stepped up in '63 as he was getting in. Then he got remarried and then it turned into this mess in '64. He always wound up with

(N]

22.

one unsuitable guy running the campaign. He had
Ronan and Kresky, who were two estimable guys,
travelling with him and then there were endless
conversations about speeches. But Ronan got such
a grip on it. Nothing could have saved him in '64.
It didn't make any difference what he did, he wasn't
going to get the nomination.

MORROW: Because of the marriage?

KISSINGER: I think so. I think he would have gotten the nomination, if it had not been for the marriage.

MORROW: Did you ever have conversations with him about whether he should or should not get married at that time?

KISSINGER: He told me ahead of time he was getting a divorce.

MORROW: But, he simply told you. He didn't ask you.

KISSINGER: Well, in his way. I mean, I suppose I could have said something, but he wasn't exactly encouraging it.

MORROW: When he told me about it, I said, "Well, I don't think you'll get away with it." He said, "I didn't ask you, I was just telling you." And that was very much his attitude.

KISSINGER: He sort of asked me on the remarriage and I said, "Can't it wait until after the election?" He sort of gave me that stare.

(Y)

23.

MORROW: Did he use the argument that it would be dishonest of him to...

KISSINGER: Yeah...

MORROW: No matter what, he didn't have to compromise on anything because he was Nelson.

KISSINGER: Because that's how his life had been. And I think he also had a sort of a sub-conscious desire to emulate Kennedy and have a glamorous wife. He thought he might gain a little as well as lose a little. And, if you remember, on his honeymoon he went to some lengths to get publicity, with him running into the surf. Remember those pictures?

MORROW: I remember them well. Eisenstadt photographing him.

KISSINGER: Wasn't that in Caneel Bay? So, you have to say it wasn't likely that there would be pictures unless he invited it.

MORROW: Did he have an envy of Kennedy or what?

KISSINGER: Basically, the most natural way for him to come into office would have been in '60 and with the same message as Kennedy, only slightly more conservative and knowing how to get it done, which Kennedy didn't know. So, in that sense, he felt that Kennedy was carrying out his program and his style of leadership.

[4J]

24.

**MORROW:** Kennedy was even stealing a lot of your words. The speeches that came out of those studies in '58, '59.

**KISSINGER:** Oh, yes. So, yes, he would have liked to have done what Kennedy did. Then another good time for him to come in would have been in '68 and try to unite the country with the Vietnam war raging. Sixty-four wasn't a good year for him. The one year he went to the end. It was the worst year. In '64, especially after the assassination of Kennedy, nobody was going to beat Johnson. The American people weren't going to have three Presidents in one year. Do you think Nelson could have beaten Johnson?

**MORROW:** No, not that year. I don't think anybody could have. God, what times we've been through, though.

**KISSINGER:** We haven't had a normal President since Eisenhower, you know. We've had a movie star, we've had this Texan we've had, this madman Nixon, and we've had this unelected President. The most normal was Ford. We've had Carter and now we have a movie actor.

**MORROW:** The movie actor is in awful big trouble right now, isn't he?

**KISSINGER:** I think so.

**MORROW:** Do you see any hope for a switch around before the election this fall?

(Y]

25.

KISSINGER: In his economic policy?

MORROW: Yes.

KISSINGER: Oh, I think he'll switch to anything. I don't even think he's a conservative.

MORROW: No, he's a radical in a funny kind of way.
How is Nancy [Kissinger] enjoying being a popular heroine?

KISSINGER: She's the one Kissinger about whom there are no divided opinions.

MORROW: Everybody loves her.

KISSINGER: Who were the most interesting people you interviewed for this thing?

MORROW: Emmet, of course, was interesting. Simply because it was marvelous just watching this ego running rampant and finally coming down to an admission that he was the key to Nelson's failure. David Rockefeller was fascinatingly candid about family matters and so on. He just went on and on.

KISSINGER: I think the thing that broke Nelson's heart was his experience in the Vice Presidency and the reception by the family when he came out of government. That just about killed him. Because he had always looked

CJ

26.

to the family as the sort of a central point of his
life, even though he took them for granted in some
ways. He had a great sense of being a Rockefeller,
but when the cousins rejected him as head of the
office and his own children were asked to bring him
that message, I think he sort of gave up.

MORROW: Don O'Brien told me about one morning he arrived at work and there were seven cousins with all these documents that they'd prepared, fighting Nelson.

KISSINGER: Oh, yes. And, here are the Cousins who -- I don't know what they are contributing to the office -- $10,000 each and Nelson $500,000. I told Nelson to pull out of the office. But that was inconceivable to * happen:*.

MORROW: He was sort of a Lear -- King Lear -- being stabbed
in the back by his own family. I don't know what he
could have done about it.

KISSINGER: Well, he couldn't have done anything about it because
what he needed was love. I mean, what does it mean to
run the Rockefeller office -- nothing. Every brother
does what he wants anyway, and every cousin does what
he wants. But it would have meant to him that he'd
come home and, you know Nelson, he would have gotten
some studies going for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund

[Y]

27.

and they probably would have done a lot of good
because what the Rockefeller Brothers Fund has become
is a sort of organization that makes minor league grants
based on staff recommendations. Nelson might have
wasted a lot of money, but one out of ten would have
been something, and I think if something is a family
foundation, it should give capriciously.

MORROW: I wonder where he lost the love that he -- I think
love's the word -- or what he missed.

KISSINGER: He was always a dominant personality. He always
dragged them along. And then these cousins are a
very spoiled, self-indulgent group. They live off
their money; they're fashionably left. They pretend
to have a sense of obligation to the family, but they
really don't. They don't do much together. I take it
much more as a reflection on them than on him. I think
his children owed it to him to say -- here! Nelson
would never, at least to me, and as I said, I guess
over a period of my association with him -- if you
take the average of any one of the whole 20 years,
I don't know anybody who was closer to him, never in
any one year, except towards the end. Then it was
also visible. But in all that time, I never saw him
ask anything of anybody. He would never say, I'm in
deep trouble, I need help. But he needed help at that

(Y)

28.

point. Nancy understood it. And his family should
have shown him some love! Even if you had been wrong
in earlier years, even if he had neglected them, if his
sons had wanted to do something for him, they should
have made him feel that he was wanted and he just
missed that. They just didn't do that.

MORROW: The most shocking conversation I ever had was with Rodman Rockefeller three weeks after Nelson died. He invited me to lunch and said, "I want to write a book about my father and analyze why he failed." That was one son's approach.

KISSINGER: But didn't Ann get married on the day of the memorial service?

MORROW: Yes.

KISSINGER: That sets a high standard in bad taste, too.

MORROW: Do you see much of Happy?

KISSINGER: Yes, off and on -- sporadically. I invite her to almost every dinner party that I give here. She invites us, maybe once every six weeks. Of course, she gave that big party for me.

MORROW: That was a very nice party. I didn't know what it had to do with selling your book.

(Y]

29.

KISSINGER: It didn't sell my book ---

MORROW: How's the book going, by the way?

KISSINGER: All the editors are on vacation this week. In the first week, it had tremendous sales. They had printed 125,000 copies and they were gone in the first week and at that time were worried about whether they were running out of paper because they were printing on a special paper. You know, Little Brown is a funny Boston-type outfit. Do they gamble on buying new paper? It seems to be selling very well.

MORROW: The thing that entertained me is the way that the New York Times had to admit, "Jeezus, we don't really like Kissinger or the people he worked for, but Goddammit, it's a good book."

KISSINGER: Yeah, but they are making up for it this Sunday in the weekly review.

MORROW: Are they?

KISSINGER: It's not a negative review. Max Frankel -- everytime he has a good paragraph, he then speculates about my motives in writing the book. That way, he keeps his skirts clean with the liberals. I think, probably, on balance,

30,

it would be considered a favorable review because the
good things he says are of substance and the bad things
he says are about my motives, which, to the unwashed,
may make it look even more interesting.

MORROW: Do you have any idea as to why the New York Times was
always so rough on Nelson?

KISSINGER: It's hard to explain, because they also liked him personally.

MORROW: Certainly Punch and Carol were good friends.

KISSINGER: Because, basically they knew he was hardline on
foreign policy and strongly anti-communist -- not
that they are pro-communist by any means. First of
all, they really believed that we are almost as much
a danger of war as the Russians are. It is also what
they got against me.

MORROW: Iphigenia Sulzberger's probably the root of all that --
the last of the New Dealers.

KISSINGER: Is she the old lady?

MORROW: She's the formidable old lady. I think she still
controls that paper.

[N]

31.

**KISSINGER:** They just didn't trust Nelson. They knew that inwardly he really didn't give a damn about them. I know they felt it. But it's hard to explain.

**MORROW:** I asked you some time ago in this conversation how you would sum him up in the history of his time. The word "tragedy" is the one word that I remember.

**KISSINGER:** But also that he gave us an intuition of greatness. He wouldn't have been a tragedy if he weren't such a towering figure. Even today, you go to Albany and look at the Mall. On the one hand, you can say it's nuts. On the other hand, you can say a hundred years from now, people will still remember that Rockefeller did something and it's spectacular. It's a better governmental architecture than any other I know in the United States. So it was typically Nelson. The money it cost would have been spent on something, anyway. His idea was to give some pride to his people, and a sense of beauty. One of the subjects he spoke of always interestingly and fascinatingly, was art.

**MORROW:** Absolutely. His lecture at the New School is an absolute classic. What are your writing plans from here, Henry? Are you working on a third volume?

**KISSINGER:** To write well, you really have to get yourself totally cranked up. This operation doesn't really make it

(Y)

32.

possible for me to write consecutively on a book.
I can write articles. I am working on the research
for a third volume. But, also, I may interrupt for
a year or so because I don't know whether it's a
good idea to keep going, spending all your life writing
about something you did ten years ago. I am inter-
ested in doing some consulting for a while, then go
back to writing.

MORROW: Well, for your own sake.

KISSINGER: To write volume three, or do consulting?

MORROW: Do consulting. I am thinking of you as a human being now. It's all very well to be Churchill, to make the history, and to make sure it gets written straight, but, my God, these two volumes alone!

KISSINGER: They're a huge effort and then every time they come out, I go contrary -- I get good reviews, but I also an awful get / number of nasty reviews. The nasty reviews are not aimed at the book, usually; they're aimed at me. I may just take a rest for a year or so before I write again. What I will do eventually is one of these 13- or 16-part television series on diplomacy, and that turns into a book.

33.

MORROW: Can't see where you would fit Nelson Rockefeller into a program like this -- at least, not for five or ten years.

KISSINGER: I would fit Rockefeller in, if I ever did a 13-part series on personalities in foreign policy. I would fit Rockefeller in as an example of the idealistic streak of Americans.

MORROW: That's a good point. He was almost a small boy in a very real sense -- in the excitement, enthusiasm, the grasping of new ideas and so on.

KISSINGER: You were his spokesman, or press advisor, for how long?

MORROW: Twenty-five years.

KISSINGER: Did you immediately follow Jamieson?

MORROW: Yes. I came with him in November of '59.

KISSINGER: Where did you come from?

MORROW: From Washington. I was with Senator Keating and Senator Ives, and then, before that, 10 years with the Saturday Evening Post. Before that, newspapers -- the Philadelphia Inquirer. But a fascinating period.

[N]

34.

MORROW: Well, Henry, I have no right to tax you any further...

KISSINGER: Well, if you let me see this...

MORROW: I'm rather hoping that when you get the transcript of this, it will open up new lines of thought.

KISSINGER: I'm open for the oral history; maybe when I get the transcript of this, you'll come back again and we'll do another session.

MORROW: I'd be delighted.

KISSINGER: And you're in no wild hurray about it...

MORROW: Oh, absolutely not.

KISSINGER: So, that we can do another session -- say, in July or maybe the end of June, when I may have a little more time.

MORROW: I'll get it transcribed and send it to you -- Let's have another session at your convenience.

#

[Lc]

1 Perth Avenue
Spring Valley, N.Y. 10977

November 24, 1982

Dear Henry:

In the course of our Nelson Rockefeller interview
soon after *Years of Upheaval* was published, you said at
one point:

"I may just take a rest for a year or so
before I write again. What I will do eventually
is one of these 13- or 16-part television series
on diplomacy and that turns into a book ... I
would fit Rockefeller in if I ever did a ... (TV)
series on personalities and foreign policy. I
would fit Rockefeller in as an example of the
idealistic streak of Americans."

I write to remind you of this in the hope it may
move you to return to the subject of Nelson in your thinking
somewhere along the line.

If, in fact, this television series idea might be
showing signs of life, it could be mutually useful for us to
spend an hour or so with the tape-recorder just talking about
your recollections of Nelson the enthusiast, the idealist on
a cynical world political scene. I think you could do a
brilliant analysis, a fascinating inside story that would
supply the missing ingredients which the *Los Angeles Times*
laments in the enclosed review of the Persico book.

Anyhow, please think about it -- and let me know if
you might spare a little time to pursue this aspect. As be-
fore, whatever might go on the tape would remain under your
control and available for your use.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

WASHINGTON DC 20006

SUITE 400 1800 K STREET NW

HENRY A KISSINGER CONSULTING CO

MARRIAGE, HAPPINESS, HEALTH, FORTUNE, JOY, TODAY, REGARD2,

COF LT MR. MORITA\ATTENTION S-2-2 MEGURO-KU, TOKYO122 MAKIKO.

HENRY AND NANCY KISSINGER

WE CELEBRATE WITH YOU IN SPIRIT TODAY. WARM REGARDS,
OF GOOD HEALTH, GOOD FORTUNE, AND GREAT JOY.

TOKYO2000 PAGE S/S1

IS ONE
WE WISH YOU MANY YEARS OF HAPPINESS, AND HOPE THAT YOUR LIFE TOGETHER
CONGRATULATIONS AND WARMEST GOOD WISHES ON THIS DAY OF YOUR MARRIAGE.
DEAR MASAO AND MAKIKO, WE WOULD LIKE TO OFFER TO YOU BOTH OUR

TOKYO122
MEGURO-KU,
S-2-2 AOBADAI
MR. MASAO MORITA\ATTENTION MASAO AND MAKIITO
LT

IBM WASHINGTONDC 12\11 01 1041 PAGE 1/20
JPK HN ARMV 012 SOS8150200WAN
TOTS30E JUNOS200 SOS8150200WAN

CONFIRMATION COPY OF TELEPHONED MESSAGE VIA RCA

TMCS121

Pour choisir les livres essentiels, pour connaître l'essentiel des livres

Mr. Henry KISSINGER
Secretary of State

C/O Monsieur Jean-Bernard BLANDENIER
EDITIONS FAYARD
75, rue des Saints-Pères
75006 PARIS

February, 1st 1982

Mr. Secretary,

I am editor in chief of the French magazine **Lu**. Our review, which has been in existence since September 1980, deals with books concerning the social sciences. Our theme of operation is the following: every month we choose 10-12 essential books and for each one we present an analysis and precis written by university professors. For the most important books, we present, in addition, one or two commentaries prepared by competent personalities on the subject of the book. In our preceding editions we published a commentary by Mr. Claude Cheysson, on a book entitled "L'Afrique étranglée", a commentary by Mr. Michel Jobert on "La Vraie guerre", by Richard Nixon, as well as commentaries by Mssrs. Edgar Faure, Etienne Davignon and François de Rose, to name just a few. I join to this letter some samples of our magazine.

We would like to ask you if you would be interested in doing a commentary on Richard Sennett's book, "Authority". You would be our first American contributor, and we would be exceedingly flattered to have the honor of working with you.

I am, of course, at your entire disposition for any complementary information that you might desire.

While awaiting your response, which we dare hope positive, I remain,

FEB 09 1982

37 rue des Mathurins 75008 Paris - Tél. 265.36.15

Édité par Seja sarl au capital de 228800 F - B.R.C. Paris 309.216.711.000.23 - APE 5112 - 37 rue des Mathurins 75008 Paris