HAKI P.42

## Chapter Eleven
### The Soviets and the Atom

For all their pride in their ability to predict the course of history, For all their confidence in their skill in manipulating social forces, at the end of World War II confronted the Soviet leadership with a fearful challenge. At the precise moment when Soviet armies stood in the center of Europe and Lenin's prophesies of the doom of capitalism seemed on the verge of being fulfilled, a new weapon appeared far transcending in power anything known before. Would then the non-Soviet world be able to stave off disaster by means of the atomic bomb? Was the dialectic of history so fragile that it could be upset by a new technological discovery? Was this to be the result of twenty years of brutal repression and deprivation and of four years of cataclysmic war that at its end the mortal enemy should emerge with a gadget which could imperil the Soviet state as never before?

It must have been disheartening for the Kremlin to enter a post-war world where the ascendancy of the U.S.S.R. as a world power, seemingly confirmed by the outcome of the conflict, was again put into question. The purely ideological problems were no less formidable. If capitalism could extricate itself from its difficulties by a new technological discovery, the structure of the economy was not as determining of other activities as Soviet doctrine postulated; it was less fundamental in fact than the state of technology. If the predictive power of Leninism failed at so vital a point, the whole dogma based on superior prescience was put into question. Thus the discovery of nuclear power represented a subtle challenge to the domestic legitimacy of Soviet leadership. The planned economy of the U.S.S.R. assumed the capacity to foretell with precision the consequences of contemporary trends and decisions. The emergence outside the control of the

contemporary trends and decisions. The emergence outside the control of the
seemed the capacity to foretell what would follow the consequences of
dominant factor in the Soviet leadership. The basic economic of the U.S.B.R.
was the discovery of scientific knowledge represented a definite challenge to the
point, the whole degree based on superior technology was but into question.
Of technology. If the predictive power of Communism relied at so vital a
Soviet doctrine based upon it was less fundamental in fact than the state
the structure of the economy was not as determining of other activities as
could extricate itself from the difficulties by a new technological discovery.
The briefly theoretical problems were no less formidable. If capitalism
confirmed by the outcome of the conflict, was again but into question.
War world where the consistency of the U.S.B.R. as a world power, seemingly
It must have been disappointing for the Kremlin to enter a host-
emerge with aegest which could outlast the Soviet state as never before;
and of four years ofWWIIamic war that at its end the most potent enemy should
fail to be the result of twenty years of premeditated repression and deprivation
so fragile that it could be offset by a new technological discovery. Was
state of all distance by means of the atomic bomb? Was the dialectic of history
b罩ing and driving known before. Would then the non-Soviet world be able to
on the verge of being fulfilled, a new weapon assailed far transcending in
center of Europe and Russia's prophecies of the doom of capitalism assumed
fearful challenge. At the precise moment when Soviet armies stood in the
forces, the end of World War II confronted the Soviet leadership with a
history, for all their confidences in their skill in manipulating social

The Soviets and the Atom

IX - 1

Soviet hierarchy of a force of seeming unlimited capacity for both economic welfare and human destruction was an attack on its own claim to superiority.

But the Soviet leadership reacted to the challenge with the iron discipline it had learned during its history of militancy. It refused to recognize an inconsistency between Leninist theory and reality, for to do so would have been to give up its reason for existence. Rather, it sought to demonstrate that the new developments far from disproving accepted doctrine actually confirmed it and that the decay of capitalism far from being arrested by the more powerful weapons at its disposal would be accelerated by it.

Nor was this Soviet display of discipline merely an exercise in abstract theory. On the contrary, Soviet leadership put their doctrinal training to good use in the eminently practical task of surviving as a revolutionary power. They had learned all their lives that appearances were deciving and that a political situation reflected a combination of political, economic, psychological and military factors. They had been taught that the emphasis on any one of these factors to the exclusion of the others was self-defeating. They were convinced that superiority in one of the categories of power could be compensated by a manipulation of the others. Thus while Soviet leadership could not do anything immediate about possession of the atomic bomb, undermine the will to our military capability, they might erode the psychological framework for its use by a world-wide campaign against the horrors of nuclear warfare.

The dialectic would thereby be restored with the psychological component of power balancing its physical aspects. And domestically, Soviet leadership was even more sure of itself. Since the Kremlin controlled all the media of communication, it could establish the framework of thinking about nuclear matters within the Soviet Union both by withholding information and by interpreting it to fit the tactical requirements of the Soviet line.

["and PA interpreting it to lift the tactical requirements of the Soviet fine\nnuclear matters within the Soviet Union poor by withholding information\nof communication, it could adapt the framework of thinking about\nwas even more sure of itself. Since thekrainin controlled all the media\npower defending its political interests. And domestically, Soviet leadership\nThe dialectic would thereby be restated with the behavioralist component of\nits use of a north-wide campaign against the periority of nuclear warfare.\nour military capability, they might end the behavioralist framework for\nothers. Thus while Soviet leadership could not do anything immediate about\nof the categories of power could be combined by a manipulation of the\nthe others was self-defeating. They were convinced that superiority in the\nto the categories of power could be combined by a manipulation of the\nto the categories of power could be combined by a manipulation

Finally, the Soviet leadership realized that the United States monopoly, the fear of war, and ignorance about nuclear matters offered a fertile field for propaganda in many countries of the world.

The result was a tour de force, masterful in its comprehension of psychological factors, brutal in its consistency, and ruthless in its sense of direction. With a cold-blooded effrontery as if no other version of reality than its own was even conceivable, (the Kremlin) through all the media and organizations at its disposal, through diplomacy and propaganda, advanced three related themes: that the decisiveness of nuclear weapons was overrated, this was designed to demonstrate that the U.S.S.R. remained predominant in the essential categories of power, although not decisive, nuclear weapons were inherently in a special category of horror from other weapons and should therefore be banned. By means of diplomatic notes, peace congresses, resolutions and propaganda, this campaign sought to paralyze the psychological basis for the use of our most potent weapons, that the only legitimate use of the atom was its peaceful application in which field the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take the lead. This position reinforced the previous one; it gave impetus to Soviet peace offensives and, its appeal to the uncommitted, was strengthened.

All three themes recur in Soviet doctrine since 1945 with changes of emphasis, but little alteration in content. It is possible to distinguish two phases, however, in Soviet efforts to come to grips with the atom: the period of our atomic monopoly and the period after the Soviets acquired a nuclear arsenal of their own. During the former period, the Soviet leaders relied largely on their "ban the bomb" propaganda which insisted that atomic bombs were as evil and horrible as they were ineffectual. With the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, and especially since the death of Stalin, threats of thermo-nuclear retaliation have alternated with

["death of Stalin,arna of the atomic-nuclear reinfation plane-strengthened with\nwith the group of the Soviet unfer,agard, and,severely, since the\nthat atomic bomb were as safe and pernicious as that which was the most\nsoviets relied largely on their "put the bomb" probabes which initiated\nacquired a professor degree of their own. During the former period, the\natom: the period of our atomic monohy and the period after the Sovets\ntungated two busses, however, in Soviet efforts to come to agree with the\nof embarks, put little alteration in content. It is possible to dis-\nVII three themes recur in Soviet doctrine since 1942 with changes", "Soviet hence alternatives and its apparent to the uncommitted,\nthe red. This proposition reinforced the previous one: it gave impetus to\nits beautiful specification in which field the U.S.A. was prepared to take\nour most potent meadow (3) that the only refutation made of the atom was\nthis campaign sought to bombardize the Soviet political base for the use of\nmeans of diplomatic notes, hence congresses, resolutions say, probabes,\ncategory of honor from other meadows and should therefore be passed. By\nalthough not decisive, nuclear weapons were independently in a special,\nremained predominant in the essential categories of power (5) that,\nmeadows was overruled, as it was designed to demonstrate that the U.S.A. was\nadvanced three related themes: 1) that the decalogue of nuclear\nand organizations at its disposal, through diplomacy and probabes,\nreality than its own was even conceivable, the Kreninich, since the media\nof direction. With a sufficiently effusory and, if not other version of\nbacteriological factors, print in its consistency, and implies in its sense\nThe result was a ton of force, material in the comprehension of\nliterature field for probabes in many countries of the world.\nposition, the fear of war, and influence upon nuclear matters offered a\nliquidity, the Soviet flexibly refuted that the United States meadow", "x - 3"]

proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders no longer rely entirely on our inhibitions; they have sought also to play on our fears. But in doing so, nuclear power became better understood by the Soviet public and this raised a host of problems with respect to doctrinal purity, militancy and the course of history which had been evaded in 1945.

II

The Soviet effort to minimize nuclear weapons was so consistent and was begun so early that it must have been planned long before the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima. When Truman informed Stalin during the Potsdam conference that the United States possessed a new weapon of fearful power, he was startled by Stalin's nonchalance in acknowledging it: "The Russian Premier," wrote Truman, "showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and that he hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese'." Against the background of the later disclosures of Soviet espionage, there can be no doubt that Stalin was well aware of the impact of what he was being told. It is almost certain, in fact, that Stalin learned of the possibility of nuclear explosions well before Truman, who was not informed of the existence of one Atomic Energy Program until he became President in April 1945. Stalin's behavior at Potsdam was the reflection of a decision to minimize the importance of nuclear weapons thereby demonstrating the Kremlin's independence and the impossibility of intimidating it.

With the official Soviet attitude thus determined the whole apparatus of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy went into action in support. The bombing of Hiroshima was mentioned in the Soviet press only briefly, and with no further discussion or elaboration. The end of the Far Eastern

1. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, V.I, Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1955), p. 416.

J. Henry S. Truman, Memorials, V.I., Year of Decisions (New York: Doubleday, 1922), p. 416.

and with no further discussion or elaboration. The end of the Far Eastern
The pumping of Hiroshima was mentioned in the Soviet press only briefly,
aberrant of Soviet propaganda and diplomacy went into action in Asia.

the Kremlin's independence and the infeasibility of infighting if,
a decision to minimize the importance of nuclear weapons thereby demonstrating
President in April 1945. Stalin's behavior at Potsdam was the reflection of
not informed of the existence of one Atomic Energy program until he became
famed of the feasibility of nuclear explosions well before Truman, who was
impact of what he was being told. It is almost certain, in fact, that Stalin
of Soviet propaganda, there can be no doubt that Stalin was well aware of the
it against the Japanese." Against the background of the later disclosures
was that he was glad to hear it and that he hoped we would make 'good use of
"The Russian Premier," wrote Truman, "showed no special interest. VII he said
learnly bower, he wasstarred by Stalin's noninterest in acknowledging it:
the Potsdam conference that the United States boshased a new weapon of
the third atomic bomb over Hiroshima. When Truman informed Stalin during
and was begun so early that it must have been planned long before the explosion
The Soviet effort to minimize nuclear weapons was so conatent

II

and the course of history which had been evoked in 1945.
and this raised a host of problems with respect to doctrinal purity, withanol
But in doing so, nuclear bower became better understood by the Soviet huplo
entirely on our assumptions; they have sought also to break on our terms.
broadsides to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviet leaders no longer ref

EK - 5

war was attributed entirely to the intervention of Soviet armies. The bombing of Nagasaki was not reported when it occurred. Although the Soviet regime was soon to launch a world-wide campaign to "ban" the use of atomic bombs, the Soviet public had to wait for nearly ten years to find out precisely what the atomic bomb was.

Moreover, whatever the uncertainties of the Power which did possess the atomic bomb, Soviet propaganda knew no such hesitations. As early as September 1, 1945, less than a month after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet propaganda organ *New Times*, was ready with an official interpretation of the significance of nuclear weapons. Because the semblance of wartime harmony was still being maintained, the form chosen was one of those indirect methods so dear to the heart of Soviet strategists: an analysis of foreign press on comments regarding the atomic bomb. After a brief summary of descriptions of the atom bomb, the article turned to an examination of its implications. The atomic bomb, argued the *New Times*, had not been the decisive weapon in the war against Japan. Such a proposition was advanced only by bankrupt Japanese militarists to obscure their ignominious defeat at the hands of the U.S.S.R. and by "semi-fascist" commentators like General Fuller in Great Britain: "The experience of the second World War and the unsurpassed victories of the Red Army have clearly shown that success in war is not achieved by the one-sided development of one or other weapon, but by the perfection of all arms and their skillful coordination."²) In short, nothing particular to unusual had happened at Hiroshima.

2. *New Times*

S. New Times

manner had happened at Hiroshima.

The experience of the second World War and the measured victories of Japan and the semi-zeniwart, commentators like General Butler in Great Britain and the British forces in Great Britain had a favourable effect on the phase of the U.S.A. war. Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and theative Japan. Some a preposition was advanced only by paragraph. Japanese
pomp, arranged the New Times, had not been the decisive weapon in the war. The article turned to an examination of its implications. The atomic
the atomic bomb. After a brief summary of descriptions of the atomic bomb, the Japanese argued that the New Times had not been the decisive weapon in the war. The article turned to an examination of its implications. The atomic
atomic bomb was one of those indirect methods so dear to the heart of
because the compliance of maritime diamond was still being maintained, the
with an official interpretation of the significance of un敲 weapons.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet probabesge under New Times, was reach
early as September, 1945, less than a month after the bombing of
bombed the atomic bomb, Soviet probabesge knew no such hesitations. As
therefore, whatever the uncertainties of the power which did
bind out precisely what the atomic bomb was.

of the atomic bombs, the Soviet public had to wait for nearly ten years to
Soviet regime was soon to launch a world-wide campaign to "ban" the use
pumping of Nagasaki was not reported when it occurred. Although the
war was attributed entirely to the intervention of Soviet Russia. The

bombed the atomic bomb, Soviet probability knew no such hesitations. As
therefore, whatever the uncertainties of the power which did
bind out precisely what the atomic bomb was.

*New Times*

2 - 2

If the atomic bomb had not proved decisive against Japan it could clearly not be used to intimidate the U.S.S.R. ("Under the influence of the announcement of the atomic bomb, the reactionary circles [in the United States] ... are inclined to stand forth unashamed in their imperialist nakedness. They demand that the United States should establish its domination over the world with the atomic bomb. Apparently the lessons of history mean nothing to those errant imperialists. They do not stop to ponder over the debacle of Hitler's plans of world dominion which, after all, were also based on the expectation of exploiting temporary advantages in the production of armaments."3) But while nuclear weapons did not confer a basic advantage their effort was so horrible that all "progressive" forces had to unite in seeing to it that they would never be used.4)

(In this manner, subsequent All the strains of Soviet nuclear policy thus emerged barely three weeks after the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima: the relative unimportance of nuclear weapons; their special horror; and the Soviet Union as the defender of the peace appealing to all groups repelled by the prospect of atomic warfare. Stalin was merely ratifying official dogma when, a year after the first atomic explosion, he took his first public stand on nuclear matters: "I do not consider the atomic bomb as such a serious force as several political groups incline to think it. Atomic bombs are intended for the intimidation of the weak, but they cannot be the decisive judge of a war since for this the atomic bomb is completely insufficient."5)

3. Ibid. same

4. N. Rubinstein. "The Foreign Press on the Atomic Bomb," *New Times*, Sept. 1, 1945.

5. Pravda, September 25, 1946.

2. Privilege, September 22, 1949.

3. Sept. 1, 1949.

4. M. Hupkestein. "The Foreign Press on the Atomic Bomb," *New Times*, 3. 1949.

Inefficient."(2)

As the decisive phase of a war since for the atomic bomb is completely
atomic pounds are intended for the intimidation of the weak, but they cannot
be and a serious force as several political groups including to think it.
that basic assumption on nuclear matters: "I do not consider the atomic bomb
officially effective when a war after the first atomic explosion, he took place
referred to by the broadeet of atomic matters." Staff was merely reflecting
the Soviet Union as the defender of the peace according to U. G. Groes
the respective significance of nuclear weapons; their special support and
three weeks after the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima:

All the strains of Soviet nuclear policy have emerged partly
had to unite in seeing to it that they would never be need.
the atomic advantage their effort was so possible that all "broader issues
production of armaments."(3) But while nuclear weapons did not confer a
similar gain on the expectation of exploiting temporary advantages in the
the despite of Hitler's plans of world dominion which, after all, were
mean nothing to those erstwhile imperatives. They do not stop to longer over
tion over the world with the atomic bomb. Abundantly the reasons of history
unreality. They demand that the United States should establish its domin-
United States... are inclined to at least further unmeasured in their imperatives
the announcement of the atomic bomb, the reactionary circles [in the
clearly not be used to intimate the U.S.A.R.: "Under the influence of
it the atomic bomb had not proved decisive against Japan if confu

IX - 9

["IX - 7", "This theme once sanctified by Stalin was henceforth repeated with tiresome regularity in Soviet literature and by the Communist parties all over the world. \"Atomic bombs,\" said the official Soviet encyclopedia \"are meant to frighten people with weak nerves, but they cannot decide the outcome of a war.\"⁶) \"Atom bomb\" repeated the Chinese Communist dictionary, \"one of the secret weapons used by the United States during the Second World War. After the war American imperialism exaggerated its destructive power, attempting to secure diplomatic advantages by means of a threat. Actually its destructive power is rather limited.\"⁷)", "The Soviet thus (rigidly) maintained the \"pure\" doctrine that no mechanical invention could possibly disturb the foreordained course of history. Accordingly, the atomic bomb was increasingly treated as a Western propaganda trick designed as a means of blackmailing the \"camp of socialism\" into submission. The few Soviet discussions regarding nuclear matters which reached the public were entirely on the psychological level. Atomic warfare was not analyzed as a strategic problem; instead theories which had suggested that atomic warfare might change the course of history were derided. A Communist philosopher summed up the whole American discussion on nuclear matters as an effort to \"frighten both imaginary enemies and one's own fellow citizens.\"⁸) American writers were accused of exaggerating the effectiveness of the bomb, Lewis Mumford coming in for special ridicule for suggesting that after an atomic holocaust man would return to primitive conditions. The atomic bomb could have little to the destruction", "6. Bolshaya Sovetskia, 2nd edition, Vol. III, p. 433.", "7. A Four-Corner System, New Dictionary, Shanghai Communist Press, 1950.", "8. Trakhtenberg, O.V., \"The Sociology of the Atom Bomb\", V

["8. *Trakhtenberg*, O.V., \"The SocioLOGY of the Vfom Pomp,\" *Aphroak Miroslav*", "7. V. Kozh-Korner Staren, *New Dictionary*, Shanghai Communist Press, 1920.", "C. Bolshoy Enterprises, 2nd edition, Vol. III, p. 433.", "primitive: coagulate, coagulate: coagulate: traffic: traffic: traffic:

IX - 8

yet

of Stalingrad, and still Russia had won the war. 9) And Pravda contributed its part to the campaign to deprecate the atom bomb by quoting unidentified reports from Tokyo that in Hiroshima only 8,481 individuals had been affected by the Atomic explosion and only 7,967 in Nagasaki. 10)

The studied aloofness with respect to nuclear technology extended to the scientific achievement which had developed nuclear weapons. A book on atomic energy published in 1952 disposed of the whole question of the military use of atomic energy in three pages out of four hundred citing Stalin's dictum that nuclear weapons could not be the decisive judge in war. 11) The study stressed the alleged contribution of Russian theorists like Mendeleev and Bекkerov to atomic work; it minimized the role of Western theorists and said practically nothing about the scientists who actually produced the bomb. Indeed, Lenin's alleged contribution to atomic science was given more prominence than that of any Western scientist. Lenin had taken note of the new theories of the "destruction of the atom, its inexhaustibility, the changing nature of its basic forms; nuclear physics was therefore a contemporary branch of dialectical materialism."12) This general line was also followed in the Soviet encyclopedia's discussion of the scientific background for atomic energy. 13)

The effort to minimize nuclear technology was accompanied by a
complete blackout on news regarding Western achievements. No mention was
made in the Soviet press of the following events: the United States announce-
ment of December 1951 regarding the possibility of peaceful applications of

9. Ibid. same.

10. Pravda, January 21, 1950. Iadro

11. M. N. Korunskii, Atomnoe Radio. (Moscow, 1952), p.

12. Ibid., p. 62.

13. Bolshaya Entsiklopediya, op. cit., p. 417.

V.

13. Potassium. Isotopes. Ob. eff., b. #11.

15. IUPAC. 1947.

17. M. R. J. C. H. J. A. J. Kille. Westv. 1955.

18. J. M. R. J. C. H. J. A. Kille. Westv. 1955.

19. J. M. R. J. C. H. J. A. Kille. Westv. 1955.

20. IUPAC. 1947.

ment of December 1947. Referring to the beautiful applications of
made in the Soviet physics of the time. Referring to the United States announce-
complete program of an annual refocusing of Western adjustments. No mention was
the effort to minimize nuclear technology and associated pa a
for atomic energy. 13)

toffened in the Soviet encyclopaedia, a discussion of the scientific background
beyond reach of disinterested materialist. 18) This general line was also
changing nature of its basic format: nuclear balance was therefore a con-
new theories of the destruction of the atom, its fissionability, the
brinkmanship than that of any Western scientist. In this had taken place of the
pump. Indeed, Lenin's alleged contribution to atomic science was given more
credit practically nothing about the scientists who actually produced the
and-Berberat to atomicwerk if minimized the role of Western theorists and
The study attracted the alleged contribution of Western theorists like Meissner
Stalin, a dictum that nuclear weapons could not be the decisive judge in war. 17)

willily use of atomic energy in three decades one of them hundred cited
on atomic energy piped in FRS radio waves of the whole question of the
to the scientific achievement which had developed nuclear weapons. A book
The studied course with respect to nuclear technology extended
by the Atomic explosion and only 1/300 in Moscow.

10) reports from Tokyo that in Hiroshima only 8,387 individuals had been selected

its part to the campaign to demonstrate the atom bomb by showing arguments
of Stillingberg and attila Gessner had won the war. And privilege contributed
(2)

LX - 8

IX - 9

nuclear energy; the test of Britain's first atomic bomb in October 1952; or the explosions of the U. S. hydrogen bomb in November 1952. It was not until 1954 that the Soviet public was permitted to see a picture of the mushroom cloud which in the West had been a symbol of the nuclear age for nearly a decade. So loath were the Soviet leaders to acknowledge the role of atomic bombs in international politics that in attacking President Truman's statement of November 1950 that if necessary the United States might use nuclear weapons in Korea, they did not even mention the atomic bomb, but charged President Truman only with creating "new war hysteria."¹⁴)

The nonchalance towards atomic matters was maintained even with respect to Soviet accomplishments in the nuclear field. The Soviet press did not report the first Soviet atomic explosion and the world had to hear of it through an American announcement. Even then the Soviet reaction was studiedly matter-of-fact. Pravda pretended surprise at the apparent excitement in the non-Soviet world about this turn of events and Vishinsky at the United Nations emphasized its peaceful and not its military implications: "We want to harness atomic energy to carry on great tasks of peaceful construction...To blast mountains, to change the course of rivers."¹⁵)

The Soviet show of indifference to its own accomplishments in the nuclear field was probably caused in part by the fear that, if flaunted too much, the atomic bomb might cause a preventive attack by the United States before the Soviet retaliatory power was fully developed. It also reflected the predominant nature played in Soviet life by doctrine. For better or worse, though, more by necessity than by choice, the Soviet leadership had staked its survival as a militant revolutionary power on deemphasizing

14. For an excellent account of the Soviet regime's relations with the press, see Gruliow, Leo, "What the Russians are Told," *The Reporter*, March 24, 1955.

15. *Soviet News*, November 14, 1949.

12. Soviet News, November 14, 1949.
see Grigoriy, No. 1, "What the Americans and Tels," The Red Star, which Sep. 1925.
13. For an excellent account of the Soviet refuelling, see the press.

had asked its survival as a flying refuelling planes' power, or despatching
more, to be same, more by necessity than by choice. The Chief leadership
the preceding morning brought in Soviet title to the question. For better or
before the Soviet refuelling power was fully refuelled. It was reflected
upon, the atomic bomb might cause it to preventative attack in the United States
army field was properly caused in part by the fact that it was meant too
The Soviet upon of intelligence to the own accomplishments in the
rivers, "f4).

beauty construction... To first maintain, to change the course of
tions: We want to preserve atomic energy to carry on great wars of
at the United Nations exemplaried its beautiful and not the litterary implies-
cement in the non-Soviet world about this turn of events and Visinink
anglically written-out-of-the-way. It would be bettered annually and the amount ex-
of it through an American announcement. Even then the Soviet reaction was
did not report the first Soviet atomic explosion and the wrong date, to be
respect to Soviet accomplishments in the unfeared field. The Soviet press
The nonconscience towards atomic matters was maintained even after
President Truman only with creating "new war phantoms."f5)

Weapons in Korea, they did not even mention the atomic bomb, put charged
ment of November 1920 that it was necessary the United States might use nuclear
pompe in international politics that in attacking President Truman's state-
nearly a decade. So forth were the Soviets to acknowledge the role of atomic
warroom cloud which in the West had been a subject of the unfeared age for
until 1924 that the Soviet盟 was permitted to see a picture of the
or the expositions of the U. S. hydrogen bomb in November 1925. It was not
unclear energy; the fear of Britain's first atomic bomb in October 1925;

x - 9

X/ - 10

nuclear weapons, at least through its period of maximum peril while the
Soviet nuclear stockpile was small or non-existent. It would not be de-
flected from this course even to celebrate its own achievements. Moreover,
the Soviet position had not been simply to deprecate nuclear weapons. Such
a course, ~~was~~ was useful to maintain morale, ~~but~~ did not supply the rationale
for the activism which according to Soviet theory alone can ensure the
success of the revolutionary movement. And Soviet leadership required a
doctrine of its invincibility both for protection against imagined enemies
and even more importantly to be able to continue to exert pressure on the
peripheral powers of Eurasia. It was one thing, however, to assert that
the atomic bomb could not be decisive by itself; it was another to maintain
that the Soviet Armed Forces were basically superior to their opponents.
But this is precisely what Soviet military doctrine set out to do, and
with the same monolithic unity between doctrine and action which characterizes
all other aspects of Soviet society. Concurrently with its campaign to
minimize the implications of nuclear weapons, the Kremlin therefore developed
a strategic doctrine designed to demonstrate that it was the Soviet Union,
not the United States which possessed the decisive advantage, should war
break out. Soviet military doctrine found the key to its superiority in
a distinction between what it defined as the "transitory" and the "con-
stantly operating" factors of military science. The non-Soviet world might
score advantages in the former category; the U.S.S.R. would nevertheless
emerge victorious because of its superiority in the latter category.¹⁶)
The distinction between transitory and permanently operating factors

Raymond L. 16. See Garthoff, op. cit. p. 34ff.

tp. 2 see Campbell, op. cit., p. 347.

The distinction between transitory and permanently obsolescent factors emerge victoriously because of its superiority in the latter category.10) score advantages in the former category: the U.S.A.R. would nevertheless attainly operating factors of military science. The non-Soviet world might a distinction between what it defined as the "transitory" and the "con-press out" Soviet military operations found the key to its superiority in not the United States which possessed the qualitative advantages, should war a strategic doctrine designed to demonstrate that it was the Soviet Union, minimize the implications of ununited states, thekrainin therefore developed all other areas of Soviet science. Community with its campaign to with the same monolithic unity between doctrine and action which characterises But this is precisely what Soviet military doctrine set out to do and that the Soviet Union forces were materially superior to their opponents. the atomic bomb could not be decisively put itself; it was another to maintain herbarious hordes of Eurasians. It was one thing, however, to assert that and even more importantly to be able to continue to exert pressure on the doctrine of its invulnerability bomb for protection against imagined enemies success of the revolutionary movement. And Soviet leadership required a for the activism which according to Soviet theory alone can ensure the a course was meant to maintain morale, it did not imply the rationale of the Soviet rationale had not been simply to debase nuclear weapons. Such a Soviet rationale had not been simply to debase nuclear weapons, of least through its period of maximum belt while the

IX - 10

EX - 11

was not merely a dialectical quibble. It served as the basis of post-war
Soviet military doctrine. It appeared in all military textbooks. It was taught
at the military academies. It was repeated over and over again by all organs
of Soviet propaganda. "Victory in war, wrote one Soviet author "does not
depend on 'transitory' factors, on one weapon or sudden invasion, but on
constantly operating factors: durability of the rear, morale of the army
and the people and the superiority of the social and economic system." 17)
"Military thinking in the capitalist countries" wrote another high-ranking
officer "under the direction of unresolved class contradictions . . . displayed
an erratic and extravagant predeliction for one-sided development, now of
the air force (Douhet), now of the tank force (Fuller). . . . As we know all
these one-sided theories and vagaries of military thought resulted for
the capitalist states only in bitter disillusionment and great catastrophes." 18)

This one-side development of non-Soviet military thought was no accident. According to Soviet doctrine, It reflected the fact that capitalist leaders could not rely on their own people; they had to seek to substitute technology for manpower: "Not having reliable reserves of manpower at their disposal," wrote Marshal of Aviation Veralinin in 1949 "the warmongers exaggerate the role of the Air Force out of all proportion . . . [believing] that the people of the U.S.S.R. and of the People's Democracies will be intimidated by the so-called 'atomic' or 'push-button' war." 19)

In short, military superiority according to Soviet military doctrine
in the immediate post-war period did not depend on technological supremacy.
Indeed a technological advance might encourage a doctrine of surprise attack
which for a time was considered the most ephemeral of the "transitory" factors

17. M. Gusev, Borba Sovetskoy Soiuza za sokrashehenie... Atomnovo Oruzhia, (Moscow, 1951), p.

18. New Times, No. 52, 1949.

19. Pravda, July 17, 1949.

was and~~endlessly derided. The experience of the German "blitzkrieg" had demonstrated that victory depended on superiority in the "constantly operating" factors. Thus Soviet military doctrine, until 1953 at least, developed a strategy which was in effect a descriptive generalization of the experiences of World War II. It relied on methodical preparation and not on surprise; it preferred massed infantry attacks to sudden thrusts and battles of maneuver; it placed great stock on centralized control of the entire front and to the subordination of all arms to the land-battle; it sought victory in incessant pressure until the inferior morale of the enemy would crumble and a breakthrough was achieved. 20)

It is remarkable that at a time when most of U.S. military thinking was centered around the notion that a new war would start with a surprise attack, such a course was explicitly rejected by Soviet theory and indeed ridiculed by it. At a period when the prevalent doctrine in the United States was concerned with an all-out war decided ultimately by the attrition of industrial potential, the Soviets never tired of emphasizing the virtue of the indirect approach and of the breakthrough at the enemy's weakest link. And the breakthrough could be achieved by psychological as well as military means; as we have seen, the same terminology was employed interchangeably for both political and military warfare. It can be maintained, of course, that these arguments were advanced simply as propaganda or that our doctrine was "really" the correct one. But it is one thing for the Soviet leadership to adopt a certain propaganda line in their relations with the rest of the world; it is quite another for them consciously to mislead their entire people, and above all their military services on a matter of life-and-death. It can hardly be

20. For a splendid discussion of Soviet strategic and tactical doctrine drawn from Soviet field regulations see Garthoff, op. cit., cited, pp. 299-408.

quarrel between Soviet flexing muscles and negotiations see Carpathians, on, etc.

SO. For a special direction of Soviet strategic and tactical doctrine

and their military services on a matter of little-and-noth. It can hardly be
done another for them conditionally to make their entire people, and spoke
certain broCADES time in their relations with the rest of the world; it is
that these arguments were advanced implicitly as propaganda on that our doctrine
for poplARBOFFICE and military morale. It can be maintained, of course,
means; as we have seen, the same terminology was employed interchangeably
And the preeminently could be achieved by backpropaganda as well as military
the indirect approach and of the preeminently at the enemy's weakest link.
industrial potential, the Soviets never tired of emphasizing the air force of
was concerned with an all-out war declared affirmatively by the attrition of
rificated by it. At a period when the previous doctrine in the United States
attack, each a course was explicitly rejected by Soviet theory and indeed
was centered around the notion that a new war would start with a surprise
It is remarkable that at a time when most of U.S. military thinking
a preeminently was achieved. (So)
incandescent pressure until the inferior morale of the enemy would crumble and
to the disorganization of all arms to the final-battle! it could victory in
enlist; if preceded great stock on counterfactual control of the entire front and
if preferred massed intensity attacks to sudden thrusts and parties of man-
of World War II. If relied on methodical preparation and not on эмblague;
strategically which was in effect a descriptive generalization of the experiences
thereof. Thus Soviet military doctrine, until 1933 at least, developed a
demonstrated that victory depended on an authority in the "constantly operative
and efficaciously directed". The experience of the German "fritzlied" had

a preeminently was achieved.

(50) Incessant pressure until the inferior morale of the enemy would crumble and to the disorganization of all arms to the final-battle! it could victory in enlist; if preceded great stock on counterfactual control of the entire front and if preferred massed intensity attacks to sudden thrusts and parties of man- of World War II. If relied on methodical preparation and not on эмblague; strategy which was in effect a descriptive generalization of the experiences of the Soviet military. Thus Soviet military doctrine, until 1933 at least, developed a demonstrated that victory depended on an authority in the "constantly operative" and efficaciously directed". The experience of the German "fritzlied" had

IX - 15

EK - 13

maintained that the Soviets would teach their officer corps a doctrine they knew to be erroneous, write field regulations based on principles known to be fallacious and train and equip their military services for a war they knew to be suicidal simply to mislead the outside world. On the contrary, the consistency of Soviet behavior would indicate that on questions of doctrine the Kremlin generally does mean what it says.

The argument regarding the superior validity of our doctrine is beside the point. By conceding the first blow and adopting a policy of deterrence, we were also obliged to develop a doctrine and a capability which addressed itself to the most likely danger. And the most likely danger in such a situation is defined by Soviet doctrine, not ours. As long as we insisted on a military doctrine considered fallacious by Soviet military thought, while not developing counters to what Soviet military theory considered the most productive strategy, there was an inherent incommensurability not only between our position and that of the Soviets, but also between the theory of deterrence and the strategy we might be forced to implement, an inconsistency well demonstrated by the dilemmas of the Korean War. Out policy of deterrence deterred only the worst contingency, a sudden onslaught, not the preferred or the most typical Soviet method of operation which is constant, sometimes hardly perceptible, pressure until the opponent's will to resist is broken. Therein lies the key to the success of many Soviet successes in the post-war period.

### III

The Soviets possessed another advantage in the immediate post-war period: the growing conviction of the non-Soviet world, assiduously fostered by Soviet propaganda, that any war was likely to be a nuclear war and that a

["The Soviet possessed another advantage in the immediate post-war period: the Groshev conference of the Non-SoVIET world, simultaneously attended by the Soviet Red Army. In the Groshev conference, the Soviet Red Army was a most行使able force and that a force which is constant, sometimes hardly perceptible, because until the end of the war, the Soviet Red Army was a force which was not only between our position and that of the Soviet, but which was an independent, independent, independent, while not developing counters to what Soviet military theory could be applied on a military doctrine considered by Soviet military thought to be the most productive strategy, there was an important increment in the theory of deterrence and the strategy we might be forced to apply not only between our position and that of the Soviet, but also the

IX -14

nuclear war would represent an unparalleled catastrophe. Thus the Kremlin was in the fortunate position that every increase in the power of its opponents caused a proportionate increase in the inhibitions against using it. The Soviet leadership set about systematically to exploit this. Domestically, the Kremlin attempted to maintain its military by minimizing the power of nuclear weapons. Internationally, its strove to increase hesitations by emphasizing the horror of the new technology.

The policy of seeking to paralyze America's nuclear capability by undermining the psychological basis for employing it took the form of a world-wide campaign in favor of outlawing the atomic bomb as a weapon belonging to a category of special horror. The Kremlin resisted all efforts to negotiate a system of international inspection. A United Nations disarmament commission, the majority of which was composed of non-Soviet states, was in Soviet eyes an inherently hostile organ. There was no point in making any sacrifices to an illusory good will, particularly as the first explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb was approaching and as an international inspection system would operate to perpetuate the position of the United States as the leading atomic power. Finally, there was not much symbolism in technically complex negotiations about disarmament. It was much simpler and infinitely more effective to come up with a program of "banning the bomb." This would serve the dual advantage of demonstrating Soviet independence of action and focussing attention on the horror

## attention on the horror

advantage of demonstrating Soviet independence of action and focussing
on itself for a program of "panning the bomb". This would serve the dual
dismantlement. It was much simpler and infinitely more effective to come
there was not much difficulty in technically complex negotiations about
the position of the United States as the leading atomic power. Finally,
and as an international inspection system would operate to perpetuate
cularly as the first explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb was approaching
was no point in making any sacrifice to an illusory good will, partic-
ularly in Soviet eyes an inherently hostile organ. There
Nations disarmament commission, the majority of which was composed of
all efforts to negotiate a system of international inspection. A United
weapon belonging to a category of special horror. The Kremlin resented
of a world-wide campaign in favor of outlawing the atomic bomb as a
by undermining the psychological basis for employing it took the form
The policy of seeking to paralyze America's nuclear capability
new technology.

its strove to increase hecatostations by emphasizing the horror of the
liturgy by minimizing the power of nuclear weapons. Internationally,
exploit this. Domestically, the Kremlin attempted to maintain its mi-
against using it. The Soviet leadership set about systematically to
of its opponents caused a proportionate increase in the inhibitions
Kremlin was in the fortunate position that every increase in the power
unclear was bound to represent an unparalleled catastrophe. Thus the

IX-14

EX - 15

of the weapon around which America's strategy was built. Every United States proposal in the Disarmament Commission was consequently countered by a Soviet demand that nuclear weapons be outlawed. A psychological framework was thereby created diverting attention from the Soviet aggression which would unleash nuclear weapons to the nuclear weapons themselves. "Atomic aggression" came to seem more terrible than the Soviet aggression which by our repeated declaration had to precede it. And Soviet persistence was not without effect: In every concrete issue under dispute from the Berlin blockade to Korea, we made clear at the outset that we would not use our most powerful weapon because we had become convinced, probably correctly, that world opinion would not condone its use, short of the extremity which Soviet strategy tried its best to avoid.

Soviet diplomatic moves were only a part of a world-wide campaign which sought to arode the psychological basis of nuclear warfare. Within the Soviet Union this campaign was muted until 1949 leat an emphasis on the horrors of the atomic bomb demoralize the Russian people. As the Soviets developed a nuclear stockpile of its own, references to the horrors of atomic warfare grew more frequent although they never reached the intensity of the appeals addressed to the rest of the world. The Soviet public were constantly told, however, that the "destruction of civilization" was the goal of American "atom maniacs" willing to do anything to forestall the destruction of capitalism.

Only Soviet determination was said to prevent the realization of this even-tuality. In analyzing the famous "atom war" issue of *Colliers* which it described as pathological sadism, 21) *Izvestia* (August 22, 1951) saw in the atomic bomb an Anglo-Saxon plot to destroy the other races of the world and

21. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, November 15, 1951.

Sr. Petersburg Gases, November 12, 1947.

atomic bomb an Unfinfo-Gaxon diet to destroy the open races of the world and described as radiochemical experiment. Sr. Inorganic (atomic 50.1021) saw in the trustly. In analyzing the Gases "atom was: issue of Coflers which it

Only Soviet determination was said to prevent the realization of this even-
"atom universe," wishing to do something to forestall the destruction of capital.
however, that the "destruction of civilization," was the best of American
suppressed to the rest of the world. The Soviet hitherto was constantly told,
Grew more attention through their never reached the intensity of the subject
unclear stockpile of their own, references to the portions of atomic warfar
the atomic bomb demonstrate the Russian belief. As the Soviets developed a
Univ this campaign was united until 1948, except an эмиссия on the portions of
seeking to advance the radiochemical plans of unclear warfare. Within the Soviet
Soviet titanic moves were only a part of a world-wide campaign
to avoid.

confront its use, short of the extremity which Soviet strategy tried its best
we had become convinced, properly correctly, that world opinion would not
exist at the outset that we would not use our most powerful weapon because
we must concreteasse under tribute from the Berlin blockade to Korea, we made
inflation had to precede it. And Soviet brevity was not without effect: In
so seem more terrible than the Soviet aggression which would arise
gainst us, weapons to the unclear peoples themselves. "Atomic aggression" came
created diverting attention from the Soviet aggression which would arise
demanded that unclear weapons be obtained. A radiochemical framework was thereby
brought about in the Disarmament Commission was consequently considered by a Soviet
of the weapon around which America's strategy was pitted. Every United States

4X - 12

IX - 16

cited as evidence a calculation by Dr. Leo Szilard that 500 tons of heavy water
could obliterate all human life.

These arguments were repeated endlessly in the Soviet effort to
obtain world-wide support for its campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons. The
principal tool has been the so-called "World Peace Movement." Starting with
the Stockholm Peace Appeal in 1950, for which according to Communist sources
more than 50 million signatures were obtained throughout the world, the Peace
Movement has been conducting a well-organized campaign to stimulate mass
protests and mass action against the use of nuclear weapons. Its permanent
organ is the "World Peace Council" headed by the French atomic scientist,
Frederic Joliot-Curie, a long-time Communist sympathizer. The world council
and the various national peace councils which exist in many countries on both
sides of the Iron Curtain have been disseminating a steady stream of arguments
about the horror of nuclear warfare and the necessity of outlawing it. Besides
dozens of pamphlets they are publishing periodicals in 25 countries and in 13
different languages.

It is tempting to dismiss the World Peace Movement and the strategy
it represents as mere propaganda; it is also highly dangerous. The constant
repetition of slogans directed at the weakest point psychologically of the
non-Soviet world, tended to undermine the psychological framework for the
employment of nuclear weapons. The West feels ambivalent about the role of
force in international relations, a campaign against the horrors of nuclear
warfare can only strengthen these inhibitions. The resentment against their
colonial past causes many of the newly independent states to be almost
desperately ready to believe the best of the Soviet Union and the worst of
the West; an appeal which asks of them nothing else than to agree to the
importance of peace and the horror of nuclear warfare is nearly irresistible.

EX - 17

The Peace Movement thus enables the Soviets to enlist the hopes and fears of many eminent men, appalled by the prospect of nuclear war, who would have nothing to do with <u>comunist strategy</u>. The task of psychological warfare is to hamstring the opponent through his own preconceptions and this has been precisely the Soviet strategy with respect to nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the Communists have shown their customary skill in confronting their opponents with impossible alternatives which, whether they succeed in their immediate purpose or not, define the framework of the next contest. The telegram which the Soviet-dominated East German Government sent in 1954 to its West German counterpart can serve as an example of many similar resolutions by non-official bodies all over the world: "The American H-bomb tests...have greatly alarmed the entire peace-loving mankind. The parliaments of numerous countries -- Japan, above all -- have demanded the prohibition of A-bombs and other weapons of mass destruction. No country is more threatened and endangered by nuclear war than Germany. The German Parliament therefore are under an inescapable obligation to combat this terrible danger. We therefore propose to the deputies of the West German Parliament to pass a join resolution with the members of the Volkskammer <u>Parliament of Eastern Germany</u> demanding a ban of weapons of mass destruction and of all experiments with them..."²²) And a similar appeal was made by the mayor of East Berlin to his counterpart in West Berlin. The West German Parliament in effect <u>either to oppose the most effective barrier to Soviet attack or</u> was being asked to go on record as favoring atomic warfare in its own country. Nothing was said of the Soviet aggression which alone could unleash it or of German unity which was being prevented by Soviet fiat. Instead all attention was concentrated on the horror of the one weapon, the large stockpiles of which were the reflection and not the cause of existing tensions and which in any case represented the most effective barrier to Soviet attack.

22. Henes Seutselland April 22, 1954 (East Berlin)

IX - 18

These arguments finely attuned to prevailing fears almost imper-
ceptibly shifted the primary concern away from Soviet aggression which was
the real security problem to the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons
which happened to represent the most effective means for resisting it.
Because of its skill in exploiting the inhibitions of the non-Soviet world,
the Soviet bloc has discovered two forms of "atomic blackmail": the threat
of the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal and an effort to deter the West
through its own deterrent power by appealing to its moral inhibitions. The
<u>greater the power of modern weapons, the more fertile the field for Soviet</u>
<u>maneuvers which seek to attach a special stigma to them or which exalt the</u>
<u>objectives for which alone it would be "legitimate" to resort to nuclear</u>
<u>war.</u> In either case the consequence is a lowered will of resistance. The
purposeful employment of the two forms of "atomic blackmail" is illustrated
by the boast of an East German newspaper that the "World Peace Movement"
<u>the United States</u>'s had restrained <u>from using atomic weapons in Korea while the development</u>
of the Soviet hydrogen bomb had tied our hands in Indo-China.<sup>23)</sup>

The results are not hard to find. In every crisis from Suez to
Hungary to Indo-China, the U.S.S.R. has succeeded in shifting the onus of
initiating nuclear war to us. In every situation there have been powerful
advocates in the non-Soviet countries urging peace because the alternative
of nuclear war seemed too teriible to contemplate. The confusion between
conventional war, limited nuclear war and all-out thermo-nuclear war which
has been the bane of NATO, while it has not been produced by Soviet
<u>the confusion</u>, <u>compounded</u>
maneuvers, <u>has certainly been abetted by them.</u> The more terrible Soviet
propaganda can paint the horrors of war, even if in the guise of appeals <u>for</u>
peace, the more likely is it to undermine the willingness to resist.

23. *Neue Zeitung*, January 25, 1955. (East Berlin) Chinese Communist sources have advanced almost precisely the same arguments.

The Soviet Union has advanced almost exclusively the same arguments.
S3 - "The Soviet Union, January 52," 1952. (East Berlin: Chinese Communists)

besides, the more fundamental is the understanding that to undermine the willpower for rearmament, the more clearly can be drawn the point that, even if in the case of China, the Chinese have advanced the same arguments.

(S3) - "The Soviet Red Cross pump and tied on hand in Indo-China."

By the end of January 1952, the Chinese government had restrained from making atomic weapons in Korea while the government by the end of the year had remembered that the "World Peace Movement" had begun employment of the two types of "atomic weapons". In illustrates the objectives for which alone it might be "legitimate" to resort to nuclear weapons, which seek to attack a special area to terrorize the enemy. The more explicit statement is a towered wall of resistance. In either case the consequence is a lowered will of resistance. The reason for this is that alone if one can be "legitimate" to resort to nuclear weapons, which seek to attack a special area to terrorize the enemy, the more the power of modern weapons, the more terrible the threat. The more the growing Soviet nuclear threat and an effort to defeat the West the Soviet bloc was discovered two days of "atomic warfare"; the finest reason of its strength in exploiting the implications of the U.S.-Soviet world war which has been to represent the most objective means for resisting it, the real security problem to the immorality of the use of nuclear weapons which was explicitly lifted by the prime minister away from Soviet statement which was those arguments likely to be used to breaching terms almost indexical.

IX - 19

EX - 19

"Atomic" aggression in major areas of the world, has become more invidious a concept than the Soviet aggression which alone could unleash it, as is illustrated by the uproar caused by Secretary Dulles' "brink of war" statement in *Life* in January 1956. For whatever the wisdom of making the statement in the first place, Secretary Dulles left no doubt that we would go to the brink of atomic war only to counter the threat of Soviet military aggression.

Moreover, while seeking to paralyze the will to resist of its opponents through conjuring up the horrors of atomic war, the Kremlin did not propose to be inhibited itself by such prospects. Too great an emphasis domestically on the terrible consequences of nuclear war might give rise to the notion of a stalemate -- as has indeed happened in the non-Soviet world. But a stalemate is as abhorrent to the dialectic as the admission that capitalism might save itself by means of a new technology. A stalemate implies that neither side can use force and/or this would have come close to giving up the militant basis of Communism. The doctrine that the relations between different social systems are inherently warlike and that war was at least possible could not be surrendered without denying the distinguishing feature of Communism, indeed the legitimization of twenty-five years of social repression.

Starting in 1949, therefore, a refinement was added to the doctrine of inevitable and protracted conflict between opposing social systems: that the next war would produce not the destruction of civilization as such, but the destruction of capitalism. This concept was first elaborated by Malenkov on the occasion of the thirty-second anniversary of the Communist revolution (November 7, 1949); it was repeated in articles in the official party organ *Bolshevik* by Molotov and Mikoyan in subsequent months. Although it has been the subject of debate in the post-Stalin area; the concept that

IX - 20

"only the imperialists will perish in an atomic war, but not civilization" has been explicitly reaffirmed and remains the official doctrine today. It represents the doctrinal justification for what Soviet behavior in every crisis has proved empirically: that the Kremlin believes it can afford to ~~what~~ run more risks than its opponents because it is less vulnerable; or, ~~which~~ amounts to the same thing, that its will to victory is greater than that of its declared victims. The Soviet leadership did not propose to inhibit their freedom of action by any doctrine of the horrors of nuclear war, however useful such ideas might be to paralyze the resistance of the non-Soviet world.

## IV

The Kremlin had brought off a tour de force. The Soviet Union had retained its militancy despite the U.S. atomic monopoly; indeed, it had transformed its relative weakness into an asset and solidified a position in the center of Europe denied the Tsars in centuries of striving. By its constant insistence that nuclear weapons were not decisive, it had maintained flexibility of action and, perhaps more importantly, Soviet armed might ~~had~~ become an increasingly powerful pressure in the consciousness of all the countries of Eurasia, even of those who most eagerly protested their belief in Soviet peaceful intentions -- and perhaps particularly those. By its world-wide campaign about the horrors of atomic warfare, the Kremlin had undermined the willingness to resist ~~of~~ many areas of the non-Soviet world and made very difficult the employment of the chief weapon in the Western arsenal. All this had been accomplished moreover without losing sight of essential objectives. However the Soviet regime might minimize the importance of nuclear weapons for home consumption, all energies of the Soviet state were

["on unreactive mesons for home consumption, still energies of the Soviet state were essential objectives. However the Soviet regime might minimize the importance thereof. All this had been accomplished moreover without totaling a single and made very difficult the enforcement of the cutoff mesons in the Western hemispheres. The Soviet states, however, had to face the problem of atomic weapons. The Kruppel had in Soviet bosonities a substantial share, and perhaps baronially those. While in some countries of Europe, even of those who most easily professed the theory of the atom, an increase in the consumption of the cutoff mesons became an increasing problem, the consumption of the cutoff mesons in the countries of the Western hemispheres was even more difficult. The Kruppel had to face the problem of atomic weapons. The Kruppel had in Soviet bosonities a substantial share, and perhaps baronially those. While in some countries of Europe, even of those who most easily professed the theory of the atom, an increase in the consumption of the cutoff mesons became an increasing problem, the consumption of the cutoff mesons in the countries of the Western hemispheres was even more difficult the enforcement of the cutoff mesons in the Western hemispheres. The Kruppel had to face the problem of atomic weapons. The Kruppel had in", "IV", "useful and these might be to benefit the resistance of the non-Soviet states.", "Freedom of action by any doctrine of the purposes of unfree war, however its declared victims. The Soviet leadership did not propose to fulfill their amounts to the same thing, that its will to victory is greater than that of any more rale than its opponents because it is less adjusted to it.", "Create pan-broader empiricism: that the Kruppel believes it can act like a pan-broader. It represents the nationalization of what Soviet policy is. It represents

IX - 21

thrown behind a "crash program" to develop nuclear weapons and a strategic air force. In less than five years the U.S. atomic monopoly was broken and the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew hand-in-hand with a strategic air force to deliver it. The "lead-times" to accomplish this -- the time between conception and operational models -- were in every case shorter than those of the United States. During the period of its greatest relative weakness when it had infinitely more to lose from a major war than its opponents, the Soviet bloc through its iron-nerved discipline, expanded to the fringes of Eurasia. It thereby demonstrated that in the relation among states, strength will be more important than power.

With its Soviet policy for all its single-minded persistence, had made a virtue of necessity. As long as the U.S.S.R. did not possess a nuclear stockpile of its own, it could find safety only by minimizing their importance or by conciliating Powers defined by Soviet doctrine as inherently hostile. The course in fact adopted, while it required strong nerves, represented the sole option permitted by Communist orthodoxy. Moreover, as long as nuclear weapons were difficult to manufacture and relatively scarce, there was a measure of merit in the Soviet contention of the superiority of the "constantly operating" factors. True, the United States possessed the atom bomb, but the vast Soviet land armies might hold Eurasia as a hostage. In any case, to take any other position would have been to give up the claim to invincibility on which depended so much of the domestic morale and the international prestige of the U.S.S.R. The doctrine of the "constantly operating factors" was the only road to militancy (given the state of technology in the immediate post-war period). And militancy, as Khrushchev emphasized in his speech to the 20th party Congress in 1956, is precisely what distinguishes Communism from other forms of "opportunistic" Socialism.

EX - 22

As the Soviet nuclear stockpile grew, however, and the hydrogen bomb was about to be added to the nuclear arsenal, it became necessary to integrate the new technology more positively into Soviet doctrine. Stalin's 1946 statement had seen the Soviet Union through its period of greatest peril, without the admission of weakness which would have prevented it from filling the tempting vacuum opened by World War II. But in the approaching era of nuclear plenty, atomic weapons could no longer be dismissed so cavalierly as heretofore. Henceforth they would have to be integrated into Soviet theory as they were already being integrated into the Soviet armed forces. Significantly it was Stalin who again indicated the new Soviet line in one of his characteristically indirect statements, his first public statement on nuclear matters since 1946. On October 3, 1951, the U.S. Government announced a second Soviet atomic explosion. Three days later, Stalin in an interview

offered his comments on the current state of nuclear warfare, which for all their ambiguity marked a major evolution of Soviet thought on nuclear matters.

Q. What do you think about the clamor roused recently in the foreign press in connection with the testing out of an atom bomb in the Soviet Union?

A. Indeed, a test was recently made by us on a type of atom bomb. Tests on atomic bombs of various calibers will be made in the future under the plan for the defense of our country from attack from the British-American aggressive bloc.

Q. In connection with the tests on atomic bombs, public figures in the U.S. ... shout about a threat to the security of the United States of America. Are there any grounds for such alarm?

A. There are no grounds for such alarm. Leaders of the United States of America cannot fail to know that the Soviet Union is not only against the use of the atomic weapon, but is also for its prohibition, for the cessation of its production.

As is known, the Soviet Union has demanded several times the prohibition of the atomic weapon, but it has each time met the refusal of the powers of the Atlantic bloc.

This means that in the event of a United States attack on our country, the ruling circles of the United States will use the atomic bomb. Precisely this circumstance compelled the Soviet Union to have the atomic weapon in order to be fully armed to meet the aggressor.

LX - 23

The remainder of the interview concerned the problems of prohibition of atomic weapons. Stalin said that he thought the chances of such a prohibition were good "only in the event that the [aggressive bloc] realizes that they are no longer the monopolists." He then repeated the traditional Soviet argument in favor of full prohibition and against the system of "control" which, he said, echoing a hundred Vyshinsky tirades in the United Nations, represented only the "legalization and legitimization" of the "right of the warmongers to annihilate tens and hundreds of thousands of civilian populace by means of atomic weapons."²⁴)

Despite its characteristic denseness Stalin's statement indicated a subtle shift of emphasis in familiar Soviet doctrine the horror of atomic warfare was maintained because it remained a useful instrument to paralyze resistance, but no more was said of the fact that nuclear weapons could not be decisive. Stalin still advocated the outlawing of nuclear weapons, but the atomic bomb had ceased to be a "phantom" designed to "intimidate" and to "blackmail." It was so real, in fact, that the Soviets had felt "compelled ... to have atomic weapons to be fully armed to meet aggression." Thus atomic weapons were officially declared a vital part of the equipment of a fully armed nation. Henceforth atomic weapons could no longer be dismissed as without military significance or treated entirely as tools of psychological warfare. Rather Stalin's statement was a call to assess their positive contribution in the age of nuclear plenty just ahead. For the first time Soviet military doctrine was free to discuss the role of nuclear weapons in strategy.

The major impact of this new line was felt only after Stalin's death when it raised again all the problems of militancy, flexibility and doctrinal which had been so resolutely avoided while the Soviet Union did not yet possess a nuclear arsenal.

24.

The bases of a nuclear strategy.

The strategy which had been so successfully adopted while the Soviet Union did not die when it raised again the problems of military, economic and social life.

The major impact of this new life was left only after Stalin's
in action.

Soviet military doctrine was free to change the role of nuclear weapons contribution in the age of nuclear power that speeded the war. For the first time war was military significance or treated entirely as science of bioprotection without military significance. Henceforth atomic weapons could no longer be deemed as weapons were officially declared a vital part of the equipment of a unity to have atomic weapons to be unity armed to meet aggression." Time atomic "blackmail". "It was so real, in fact, that the Soviets paid left "combed" atomic bomb and ceased to be a "phenom" designed to "intimidate" and to be decisive. Stalin still advocated the outflanking of nuclear weapons, but the resistance, but no more was said of the fact that nuclear weapons could not wariness was maintained because it remained a useful instrument to barerace a supreme shift of emphasis in familiar Soviet doctrine the point of atomic strategy. Its characteristic denotative Stalin's statement indicated atomic weapons." S4)

IX - S3

IX - 24

The growing Soviet self-confidence with respect to nuclear weapons began to emerge shortly after Stalin's death and it coincided with the first explosion of a Soviet thermo-nuclear bomb. In characteristic fashion, the new emphasis on Soviet nuclear might was used to usher in the period of peaceful coexistence already foreshadowed by Stalin's last public statement in the *Bolshevik* 26) and made doubly necessary by the confusion produced by the death of the dictator. Since Soviet doctrine made it impossible to justify peaceful coexistence for its own sake, it was advocated, as so often in the past, by an equilibrium in the relations of forces, brought about this time by the newly created Soviet nuclear retaliatory power. Heretofore, Soviet spokesmen had very rarely boasted of Soviet powers of retaliation partly because they did not yet exist, partly because such boasts would have contradicted the policy of minimizing the role of nuclear weapons. But now the Soviets felt strong enough to threaten the United States openly and they possessed sufficient nuclear weapons to begin the adaptation of their military doctrin. When Malenkov, then Premier, announced on August 8, 1953 that the Soviets had set off a hydrogen bomb, he recurred to the muted threat which had already been implicit in Stalin's 1951 interview. He warned that an atomic war against the U.S.S.R. would be folly because the Soviet Union now possessed similar weapons for retaliation so that any aggressor was certain to suffer a decisive rebuff.

In the next six months the Soviet press showed a growing willingness to treat the problem of nuclear warfare in a more realistic manner.

In October 1953, Ilya Ehrenburg admitted in an article that nuclear weapons did represent a danger to the world, although he branded Secretary Dulles' statements to that effect "ludicrous" and "exaggerated." President

26. See above p.

IX - 25

Eisenhower's speech of December 10, 1953 appealing for extraordinary measures to save mankind from the holocaust of a hydrogen war was reprinted in part in *Pravda*. The continued Soviet desire to retain freedom of action by not frightening its own people, was reflected in the deletion of several particularly ominous passages such as the statement that the United States possessed hydrogen bombs of millions of tons TNT equivalent. Nevertheless, the Soviet press and Soviet officials continued their references to the horrors of nuclear war on an ever-increasing scale. An article in *Izvestia* (January 19, 1954) admitted that under modern conditions war "means colossal destruction." *Pravda* (January 30, 1954) welcomed the idea of a disarmament conference which would "contribute to the freeing of mankind from the terror of atomic bombing." And in an address on February 22, 1954 Marshall Bulganin, then Minister of Defense, foresaw "monstrous and unprecedented calamity" in the prospect of another war.

The mounting crescendo of dire prophesies while partly intended as a warning to the West -- it coincided with the height of the crisis over Indo-China -- also indicated that the new Soviet leadership stood in danger of upsetting the fine balance which Stalin had maintained between complacency and passivity, between over-confidence and loss of will. Stalin had insisted on the invincibility of the Soviet Union, but he had derived it from its superior social structure, not from a balance of terror. He, too, had invoked the horror of nuclear warfare; but primarily for foreign consumption while keeping even the most elementary facts regarding atomic weapons from the Russian people. But the use within the Soviet Union of arguments which had proved so effective in paralyzing the will to resist abroad, came very close to the Western notion of a nuclear stalemate hitherto so resolutely rejected by Soviet doctrine. If the notion of a stalemate really became accepted doctrine, the

goodright, it is the motion at a general assembly that the Western section of a member assembly shall have so resolutely represented by Soviet members that the most elementary facts, negotiating documents from the British the horror of most serious matters, put an end to foreign consumption while superior social structures, not from a prejudice of terror, but too, put in motion, on the principle of the Soviet Union, but he had derived it from its and humanity, between over-competence and loss of will. Bestified had installed ofbetting the line prejudice which Bestified had maintained between completely Indo-China - so farulated that the new Soviet government had in danger a meaning to the West - ... it considered with the view of the crystal over, the morning of cressendo of fire demonstrates which will be taken as a sign of the arrival of the new world.

in the prospect of further war...

Cain, then Minister of Defense, forces "monstrous and unreasonably enormous" of atomic bombarding. "And in an address on February 5th 1944 (in which he said) "The conference which world "contribute to the freedom of mankind from the terror of destruction." (Bravo (January 30, 1944) welcomed the death of a disengagement (January 13, 1944) submitted that after modern conditions were "meanest coördination of forces" of another war on an ever-increasing scale.". And article in *Ivanov's* the Soviet Press and Soviet officials contained their reference to the destroyed hydrogen pounds of massives of some TUN, etc. ... Nevertheless, finally omneous reassurance as to the statement that such United States brightening its own. (Bravo, etc. ... reflected that the detector of seismot barich - Bravo). The continuous Soviet detail so repaid: greenholl action by not to smoke making from the reason of a flighted. (January 13, 1944) reprinted in part in Eleygune's *abscission*. December 1943, abscission for extraordinary reason.

H - 52

IX - 26

change
in
of the Kremlin's view of the world. This was the issue raised by a debate
which occurred in the Soviet Union in the first half of 1954 and, as was
only proper in a regime legitimized by a philosophy of history, the debate
conceived an abstract point regarding the nature of historical development.

When on March 12, 1954 Premier Malenkov apparently overthrew the concept which he had himself announced five years previously that nuclear war would mean only the end of capitalist, not of Soviet civilization, a fundamental change seemed in the offing. "The Soviet Government" he said suddenly "is resolutely opposed to the policy of the cold war, for this policy is a policy of preparation for fresh world carnage which with modern methods of warfare means the ruin of world civilization."²⁷) On March 27, 1954, this theme was repeated by a Moscow radio commentator who said that hydrogen bombs "would threaten the very existence of civilization."²⁸) The World Peace Council fell into line with a warning that the use of atomic weapons would result in a war of extermination.²⁹) And Joliot-Curie stated that atomic war meant "collective suicide" and that "effective civil defense is illusory.³⁰) Did this mean then that the power of the hydrogen bomb had shocked the Soviet leadership into giving up its militancy? Had the enormity of modern weapons forced them to accept the fact that war was now inconceivable? Was there now a balance between the inhibitions of the Soviet and of the non-Soviet world?

27.

28.

29.

30.

IX - 27

But a society finds it nearly impossible to surrender its myth, for to do so would be tantamount to giving up its image of itself; it would mean an overthrow of what has come to be considered "legitimate." To admit the possibility of a stalemate was to renounce the Marxist-Leninist dialectic of the inevitable triumph of Communism. To announce an indefinitely prolonged equilibrium in the relation of forces was equivalent to surrendering the doctrine of the inherent superiority of Communist theory which could manage the inevitable conflict between social classes to its advantage. It would mean that the forces of technology were superior to the forces of history, that the class struggle could be paralyzed by technological innovations. Moreover, what would become of the much taunted economic planning based on the assumption that men could control his destiny by foreseeing it if the dialectic of history could be arrested by an unexpected technological discovery?

It is little wonder that Soviet theoretical journals throughout the early part of 1954 exhibited increasing nervousness at this turn of events. In November 1953, a Soviet economist, following the logic of some of the articles on nuclear matters which had already appeared, argued that the Marxist-Leninist law of the inevitability of war produced by the uneven development of the capitalist economy remained valid, but he insisted that experience had demonstrated the possibility of paralyzing it.³¹) This thesis was immediately attacked by the head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda who accused the unfortunate Gus of destroying Marxism in the guise of interpreting it: "There are 'theoreticians' who presume that it is possible to 'paralyze' the law discovered by Lenin of the irregularity of the political and economic development of capitalism during the epoch of imperialism with all the consequences resulting from this law. This in essence ... acknowledges the possibility

31. Zvesda, November 1953.

34. November 1922.

resulting from this law. The tax on income ... diminishes the possibility
which of capitalistic during the epoch of industrialism will still the consequences
covered by law, or the practicality of the institutional and economic develop-
ment of society, who brings that to bear in view of the fact, the law dis-
agrees of destroying the market in the course of interpreting it: "There are
attached by the head of the Department of Adjustment and Regulation who are
appointed the possibility of paralyzing it."

This draft was immediately
appointed the possibility of paralyzing it."

capitalist economy remained afloat, put in operation that experience had
testified the inadvisability of war produced by the uneven development of the
united states which had been adhered to, and proved that the market was not
enough. In November 1922, a Soviet economic following the logic of some of the
early days of 1918, capitulated, increasingervousness at the sum of even-

If it is to be supposed that Soviet theoretical journals throughout the
disciplines

directly of, and, therefore, the measured by an unmeasured, technological
the assumption that the market, in its nature, is the only thing that can be
governed, what would be done, of the much founded economicanza, and so
that the class straightaway can be bereaved of the technology, and, therefore,
mean that the forces of technology were superior to the forces of class.
the inevitable conflict between actual classes to its spurious. It is well to
know the limits of the influence, subordination of the market, which means
equalization in the relation of forces, was indispensable in order to
the inevitable triumph of the Communist. To announce, as already mentioned,
possibility of a science which was the remnant of the Marxists, and, therefore,
an over throw of which has come to the conclusion: "The science which is
so much necessary to the science of the future, is not necessary for
But a科学 which is enough to make it possible to announce the truth, for

TK-51

IX - 28

of the abolition of objective laws of the development of society. There is
no need to prove that such a view has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist
science."<sup>32)</sup> One of the "objective" laws discovered by Lenin was, of course,
the inevitability of war <u>under conditions of <u>capitalist</u> economy</u>. The reaction
to the Gus "deviation" was a call to the faithful not to give up their mili-
tancy whatever the horrors of the new technology.

Malenkov's statement that a nuclear war would destroy civilization, that, in short, the Soviet Union was equally vulnerable as its opponents seemed to shock the Communist Party into a renewed awareness of its orthodoxy. It had not prided itself on its "activism" for over a generation to give it up at the moment of its greatest technological achievement; it had not heaped scorn on the dangers of "passivity" for an equally long period to fall into it now by means of its own doctrine. Three weeks after Malenkov's statement the April 1954 issue of *Kommunist* criticized some people who believe in the absolute force of modern weapons and underestimate the power of forces fighting for peace. These people were unable to figure out in time the real sense and objectives of the fable about the destruction of civilization...and began repeating this fable in their oral and printed speeches. The result was the sowing of "seeds of fatalism" and the undermining of the "people's creative and optimistic attitude towards the future." On April 26, 1954 less than two months after propounding it, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet about the destruction of civilization Malenkov repudiated his own statement and asserted that an atomic war would lead to the breakdown only of the capitalist system. On February 26, 1955 with the Soviet position on nuclear weapons on February 26, 1955 was

32. V. Krushkov, *Kommunist*, January 1954. *Zvesda* in February 1954 published a similar article repudiating Gus.

33.

34.

IX - 28

of the abolition of objective laws of the development of society. There is
no need to prove that such a view has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist
science. 32)
One of the "objective" laws discovered by Lenin was, of course,
the inevitability of war under conditions of kapitалиst/economy. The reaction
to the Gus "deviation" was a call to the faithful not to give up their mili-
tancy whatever the horrors of the new technology.

Malenkov's statement that a nuclear war would destroy civilization,
that, in short, the Soviet Union was equally vulnerable as its opponents
seemed to shock the Communist Party into a renewed awareness of its ortho-
doxy. It had not prided itself on its "activism" for over a generation to
give it up at the moment of its greatest technological achievement; it had not
heaped scorn on the dangers of "passivity" for an equally long period to fall
into it now by means of its own doctrine. Three weeks after Malenkov's
statement the April 1954 issue of Kommunist criticized some people who be-
lieve in the absolute force of modern weapons and underestimate the power of
forces fighting for peace. These people were unable to figure out in time
the real sense and objectives of the fable about the destruction of civili-
zation...and began repeating this fable in their oral and printed speeches. 33)
The result was the sowing of "seeds of fatalism" and the undermining of the
"people's creative and optimistic attitude towards the future." On April 26,
1954 less than two months after propounding it, in a speech to the Supreme
Soviet, Malenkov repudiated his own statement and asserted that an atomic
war would lead to the breakdown of only the capitalist system. 34)
Pravda
announced the Soviet position on nuclear weapons on February 26, 1955 with

32. V. Krushkov, Kommunist, January 1954. Zvesda in February 1954 published a similar article repudiating Gus.

33.

34.

34.

A similar article rehashing one.

35. A. Khrushkov, *Communist Party of Russia*, November 1984, p.159

33.

announced the Soviet Politcon on nuclear weapons on February 1982 with
war would lead to the preemption of our the capitalist system. 34)
Soviet, Melenkova rebranded his own statement and asserted that an atomic
1984 fees than two months after brooming it, in a speech to the Supreme
"beables" a creative and optimistic attitude towards the future." On April 50,
The result was the sowing of "seeds of utopia" and the underpinning of the
station...and began rebelling this state in their own and printed abbeles." 35)
the real sense and objectives of the state apart from the destruction of civil-
forces fighting for peace. These beables were naive to future life in time
t्eave in the запечатte force of modern weapons and underestimate the power of
statement the April 1984 issue of *Communist* criticized some beables who pe-
into it now p) means of its own doctrine. Three weeks after Melenko's
beaded scorn on the shoulders of "basalists" for an adroit long period to sell
give it up at the moment of its greatest technological competence; it had not
doxx. It had not bridged itself on its "activism" for over a generation to
seemed to shock the Communist Party into a renewed awareness of its ortho-
that' in short, the Soviet Union was already antherapie as its obsolesce
Melnenko's a statement that a nuclear war would destroy civilization,
touch upsets the horror of the new technology.

to the one "deviation" was a cell to the latter not to give up their will-
the inequitability of war under conditions of capitalistic competition. The reaction
science." 35)
One of the "objectives" was discovered by Penin was of course,
no need to prove that such a view was nothing in common with Stalinist-
ism of the position of objective fane of the government of society. There is

IX - 58

IX - 29

finality: "It is absurd to think that nuclear weapons can cancel the forward
development of mankind. Weapons have never altered or cancelled the laws
of social development. They have never created or abolished conditions
which could alter social structures or entire countries."³⁵)

The Party Militant had triumphed. Henceforth the Soviet leadership repeated with pedantic regularity that it possessed superior freedom of action because it was less vulnerable than the capitalist world. Molotov, Mikoyan, Shepilov, Zhukov and Kruschev defended the proposition at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In France, Thorez warned his Communists not to be intimidated by American "atomic propaganda" because historical forces were on their side.

in satellite Eastern Germany, the
Prime Minister, Grotewohl, made the tactical advantages of the Soviet position
explicit: "For us fighters against remilitarization it is better and more
correct [Emphasis added] to draw from this fact [atomic destruction] the
conclusion that a third world war will destroy not us, but the imperialist
forces." ³⁶)
A Soviet delegation of scientists invited by Lord Russell to
an international conference in London refused only three weeks after the
Geneva summit meeting to associate itself with a resolution which had warned
against nuclear war because it would mean the end of civilization; the Soviet
delegation signed the resolution only after it was ameliorated to read that
nuclear war would inflict great suffering.³⁷) And the Soviet leaders, what-
ever their momentary vacillation, guarded their orthodoxy with all the skill
in doctrinal subtleties learned in a quarter century of Stalin's rule. When
on the occasion of his visit to India in December 1955 Bulganin signed a joint

35. *Pravda*, February 26, 1955.

36.

37. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1956.

gangs" because historical forces were on the rise.
warned his Communists not to be intimidated by American "atomic props-
proposition at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In France, Thorez
world. Molotov, Mikoyan, Shebilov, Zhukov and Kruechev defended the
freedom of action because it was less vulnerable than the capitalist
ship retested with podantic regularity that it possessed superior
superior

IX-29

IX - 29

The Party Militant had triumphed. Henceforth the Soviet insistence
on superior freedom of action because of its greater invulnerability was
repeated with pedantic regularity both within the Soviet Union and in the
rest of the world. Molotov, Mikoyan, Shepilov, Zhukov and Khrushchev defended
the proposition at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In France, Thorez warned
his Communists not to be intimidated by American "atomic propaganda" and
to remain intransigent in the fight for peace, secure in the consciousness
that historical forces were on their side. In satellite Eastern Germany, the
Prime Minister, Grotewohl, made the tactical advantages of the Soviet position
explicit: "For us fighters against remilitarization it is better and more
correct [Emphasis added] to draw from this fact [atomic destruction] the
conclusion that a third world war will destroy not us, but the imperialist
forces." ³⁶)

35. Pravda, February 26, 1955.

36.

31. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 1952.

32.

Travels in Russia, 1924-1925.

on the occasion of his visit to India in December 1922. Benazin signed a joint
in doctorate specifications issued in a shorter century of Staff's life. When
even their momentarily facilitation, changed their orthodoxy with all the skill
nuclear war would attract great following. And the Soviet farmers' what-
degregation signed the resolution only after it was announced to read that
against nuclear war because it would mean the end of civilisation. The Soviet
Geneva summit meeting to associate itself with a resolution which had named
an international conference in London renewed only three weeks after the
forces." 33)

A Soviet delegation of scientists invited by Ford Huseini to
consult that a third world war with Germany not us, put the imperialist
correct [Emirates added] to draw from this fact [atomic destruction] the
explicit: "For us fighters against remitification it is better and more
Prime Minister, Gromow, made the tactical advantages of the Soviet position
that historical forces were on their side. In satellite Eastern Germany, the
to remain intrinsically in the light for peace, become in the consciousness
the Communists not to be intimidated by American "atomic broadehands" and
the proposition at the 50th Party Congress in 1950. In France, Thorez warned
rest of the world. "Moroof, Mikoyan, Sputnik, Krasov and Khrapchenk defended
repeated with beguiling reguarity both within the Soviet Union and in the
on superior freedom of action because of its greater insuranceability was
The Party Military had triumphed. Henceforth the Soviet insistance
which could after socialist structures or entire countries." 34)

of socialist development. They have never created or spoofed conditions
development of working. We have never suffered or suffered the same
linearity: "If it is apparent to think that unclear we have can cancel the forward

IV - 59

IX - 30

declaration with Nehru calling attention to the disaster of a nuclear war, he granted an interview soon after his return to Moscow to repudiate any implication of nuclear stalemate: "It is wrong to assert that in as much as East and West possess hydrogen weapons the possibility of a thermo-nuclear war is automatically excluded." 38)

Doctrinal purity had been maintained; the Soviet leadership had retained its freedom of action and defined its risks as smaller than those of its opponents. There is a tendency in the West to overlook Soviet doctrinal disputes and their abstractness does not encourage a closer examination. Yet they are the most profitable indication of Soviet intentions; far more rewarding than Soviet actions which are often deliberately designed to mislead or to lull. Since the Soviet leadership derives its claim to superiority from its theoretical insight, a doctrinal dispute in the U.S.S.R. has not only a philosophical, but an eminently practical significance. Throughout the history of Soviet Communism almost every dispute over doctrine has reflected a disagreement on policy and almost every change of doctrine has sooner or later been translated into action.

And so it has been with the Soviet doctrine on nuclear weapons. Whether or not it was a conscious attempt to bring strategy into relationship with the willingness to take risks -- and Grotewohl's statement would seem to indicate that it was -- it has so worked out in practice. In every crisis, the non-Soviet world protests the horror of nuclear war and thereby reduces the strength of its negotiating position. By contrast, the Soviets do no seem so inhibited and feel free to threaten with rocket attacks on Britain and France or with

with rocket attacks on Britain and France or with
contrast, the Soviets do no seem so inhibited and feel free to threaten
war and thereby reduce the strength of its negotiating position. By
In every case, the non-Soviet world protests the horror of nuclear
would seem to indicate that it was -- it has so worked out in practice.
tionality with the willingness to take risks -- and Grotewohl's statement
that not it was a conscious attempt to bring strategy into reis-
ment of the Soviet doctrine on nuclear weapons.

IX- 30

IX - 30

And so it has been with the Soviet doctrine on nuclear weapons. Whether or not it was consciously intended as a recognition that ultimately strategy is no better than its willingness to take risks--and Grotewohl's statement would seem to indicate a conscious awareness of this fact--it has so worked out in practice. In every crisis, the non-Soviet world protests its horror of nuclear war and thereby serves notice on the U.S.S.R. of its relative impunity. By contrast, the Soviets do not seem so inhibited and feel free to threaten with rocket attacks on Britain and France or with

38.

38.

the threat of nuclear war with rocket attacks on Britain and France, or with
relative instability. By contrast, the Soviets do not seem so inclined and
its honor ofungovered war and thereby serve notice on the U.2.B.R. of its
so worked out in practice. In every crisis, the non-Soviet world perceives
statement would seem to indicate a conscious awareness of this fact--it has
strategically is no better than its willingness to take risks--and especially
whether or not it was consciously intended as a recognition that ultimately
And so it has been with the Soviet doctrine on nuclear weapons.
Later been transferred into action.

a disagreement on policy and almost every change of doctrine has sooner or
history of Soviet Communism almost every dispute over doctrine has reflected
a philosophical put an eminently practical significance. Throughout the
from its theoretical insight, a doctrinal dispute in the U.2.B.R. has never only
Test or to III. Since the Soviet leadership derives its claim to authority
rewards than Soviet actions which are often deliberately designed to mis-
let them are the most profitable indication of Soviet intentions. Tak more
trivial disputes and their apsattracuas does not encourage a closer examination
of its obsolescence. There is a tendency in the West to overlook Soviet doc-
retained its freedom of action and defined its risks as smaller than those
Doctrinal purity had been maintained; the Soviet leadership had
not, it is automatically excluded."

38)

as East and West become hydrogen weapons the belligeracy of a thermo-nuclear
implication of nuclear statements: "It is wrong to assert that in these much
be granted an interview soon after his return to Moscow to negotiate any
decision with the U.S.S.R. calling attention to the disaster of a nuclear war,

IX - 39.

EX-31

volunteers for Egypt. In fact, there seems to have grown up a tacit
understanding of greater Soviet daring. When the Soviets were confronting
difficulties in the satellite orbit, the West hastened to protest that it
would neither use force against Soviet repressive efforts nor seek to enter
into an alliance with any "liberated" satellite lest the Soviet Union,
in desperation, unleash nuclear war. But when the West confronted dif-
ficulties in the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. did not feel compelled to
give similar assurances. On the contrary, it left no doubt that it was
prepared to move into any vacuum; it spoke of "volunteers" and warned of
of Rocket attacks. Obviously the Soviet leaders were less concerned
that the West, in desperation might unleash a nuclear war of its own.
Thus Soviet leadership has been able to blackmail the West both with its
strength and its weakness. We recoil before Soviet power but we also
fear to exploit Soviet difficulties lest, as was often stated during the
Hungarian revolution a"desperate" Russia seek to escape its dilemmas by
war. This difference in the willingness to assume risks growing out
of the Soviet confidence in doctrine has been the fundamental Soviet ad-
vantage in the past-war period nearly overcoming the bancrupcy of its
social system and the instability of its leadership structure.

V

The eventual adaptation of Soviet military theory to nuclear weapons must be considered against the background of doctrinal militancy. For the abstract theoretical discussions had sought to overcome one of the most serious, and at the same time, novel problems of the nuclear age: the deterrent effect on diplomacy of its own deterrent arsenal. In the past an increase in a nation's power resulted almost inevitably in a greater flexibility of

flexibility of

an increase in a nation's power resulted almost inevitably in a greater deterrent effect on diplomacy of its own deterrent strategy. In the past serious, and at the same time, novel problems of the nuclear age: the abstract theoretical discussion had sought to overcome one of the most must be considered against the background of doctrinal militancy. For the eventful adaptation of Soviet military theory to nuclear weapons

V

vantage in the beat-war period nearly overcoming the bureaucracy of its
of the Soviet confidence in doctrine has been the fundamental Soviet ad-
py war. This difference in the willingness to assume risks growing out
Hungarian revolution "degenerate" Russia seek to escape its dilemmas by
fear to exploit Soviet difficulties lest, as was often stated during the
strength and its weakness. We recall before Soviet power but we also
Thus Soviet leadership has been able to blackmail the West both with its
that the West, in desperation might unleash a nuclear war of its own.
of Rocket attacks. Obviously the Soviet leaders were less concerned
prepared to move into any vacuum: it spoke of "volunteers" and warned of
give similar assurances. On the contrary, it left no doubt that it was
tificities in the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. did not feel compelled to
in desperation, unleash nuclear war. But when the West confronted dif-
into an alliance with any "liberated" satellite state the Soviet Union,
would neither use force against Soviet repressive efforts nor seek to enter
difficulties in the satellite orbit, the West hadened to protest that it
understanding of greater Soviet daring. When the Soviets were confronting
volunteers for Egypt. In fact, there seems to have grown up a tacit

-31

IX - 32

IX - 32

diplomacy because it led to a consciousness of being able to run greater risks than the opponent. By contrast, in the nuclear period the growth in military strength, because it augurs similar horrors on the other side, tends to be accompanied by an increase in the inhibitions against its use. Because each weapons test augurs similar horrors on the other side, one of the paradoxical aspects of the nuclear age has been that one of the inhibitions to decisive action has been produced by the implications of a Power's own weapons technology. In so far as a strategic doctrine could achieve it, the Kremlin meant to see to it that it would not be so inhibited.

The attempt to integrate nuclear weapons into Soviet military doctrine did not begin until 1954. Before this time, nuclear weapons were dismissed as relatively unimportant and most discussions in military journals concerned the inherent superiority of the Soviet "constantly operating factors." As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew, however, it became important to find a rationale for its use. In the process of developing such a theory, Soviet strategic thought began to traverse the three seemingly inevitable stages which have characterized military thought in all countries seeking to come to grips with the strategic implications of nuclear weapons: (1) an initial period of learning the essential characteristics of the new weapons (accompanied by the protestations of still dominant traditionalists that nuclear weapons cannot alter the basic principles of strategy and tactics; (2) this is usually followed, as the power of modern weapons becomes better understood, by a complete reversal; an increasing reliance on the most absolute applications of the new technology as an answer to most strategic problems and on an almost exclusive concern with offensive retaliatory power; (3) finally, as it is realized that all-out war involves risks out of proportion to most of the

the other side, one of the paradoxical aspects of
against its use. Because each weapon feet agriculture similar horrors on
strength, tends to be accompanied by an increase in the inundations
than the opponent. But in the nuclear period the growth in military
diplomacy because it was a guarantee of the ability to run greater risks

TK - 35

IX - 32

diplomacy because it led to a consciousness of being able to run greater risks than the opponent. By contrast, in the nuclear period the growth in military strength, because it augurs similar horrors on the other side, tends to be accompanied by an increase in the inhibitions against its use. The more fearful the weapons tests, the more reluctant the responsible leadership has been to employ its nuclear arsenal. Thus one of the paradoxical aspects of the nuclear age has been that one of the inhibitions to decisive action has been produced by the implications of a Power's own weapons technology. In so far as a strategic doctrine could achieve it, the Kremlin meant to see to it that it would not be so inhibited.

The attempt to integrate nuclear weapons into Soviet military doctrine did not begin until 1954. Before this time, nuclear weapons were dismissed as relatively unimportant and most discussions in military journals concerned the inherent superiority of the Soviet "constantly operating factors."
As the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew, however, it became important to find a rationale for its use. In the process of developing such a theory, Soviet strategic thought began to traverse the three seemingly inevitable stages which have characterized military thought in all countries seeking to come to grips with the strategic implications of nuclear weapons: (1) an initial period of learning the essential characteristics of the new weapons (accompanied by the protestations of still dominant traditionalists that nuclear weapons cannot alter the basic principles of strategy and tactics; (2) (this is usually followed, as the power of modern weapons becomes better understood, by a complete reversal; an increasing reliance on the most absolute applications of the new technology as an answer to most strategic problems and on an almost exclusive concern with offensive retaliatory power; (3) finally, as it is realized that all-out war involves risks out of proportion to most of the

X! IX - 33

likely to be
issues actually in dispute, an attempt is made to find intermediary appli-
cations for the new technology to bring power into harmony with the objectives
for which to contend.

Once the strategic implications of nuclear technology became a fit
subject for discussion in Soviet military journals, the reaction of the
Soviet military, as distinguished from the political leadership, was not
basically different from that of their colleagues in the West. The Soviet
officers simply went through the process about five years after their Western
counterparts in each phase, almost precisely reflecting the time-lag in the
Soviet FOR THIS REASON development of nuclear technology. Moreover, Soviet military doctrine seems
to have gone only through the first two of the three phases. It has inte-
grated nuclear weapons into its strategic thought; but, after the initial
period of denying that nuclear weapons had brought about a fundamental change
in strategy or tactics, most Soviet discussions have concerned the problems
of all-out war. There has been practically no published discussion of the
military problem of limited war. This may be due to the fact that the first priority
of Soviet weapons development had to be the acquisition of a stockpile of strategic weapons
and that the production of fissionable materials is not yet large enough to permit a large
scale production of "small" atomic weapons. Whatever the reason, in so far as the published
discussion reflects the actual state of Soviet military thinking -- and on the basis of
the eminence of some of the authors it probably does -- this lag in Soviet doctrine may
reveal a vulnerability and a danger: a vulnerability because it may indicate Soviet diffi-
culties in mastering the strategy and tactics of limited nuclear war and of
danger because it may induce the Soviets to treat the explosion of any
nuclear weapon anywhere as the prelude to all-out war. Unless the Soviets
develop a more balanced approach or unless we succeed in conveying one to
them, <sup>39</sup> an all-out war may therefore be brought on by the failure of one
or both contenders to consider alternatives.

39. See below, chapter X.