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THIS IS AN EDITED VERSION OF HENRY KISSINGER'S MARCH 16
INTERVIEW.

Q: Do you agree with every pundit who seems to think that the Cold War is, in fact, over and as a corollary question, does Moscow remain America's chief adversary in world affairs.
A: I think as an ideological force Moscow is substantially spent. But Russia as a nation-state has been unomfortable for all of its neighbors for 700 years. I would think that when a nation has acted in a certain way for 700 years, and has exhibited a certain proclivity, it would be dangerous to assume that one person can undo that. And then, the Soviet Union still has ten or eleven thousand nuclear weapons and it seems to me that one result of the present situationeven if it is not the Soviet strategyis, in effect, to denuclearize Europe to give them a capacity for a degree of nuclear blackmail down the road against Europe. In other words, what America now needs to do is shift its emphasis from the ideological conflict to a geopolitical understanding and in that I consider the Soviet Union still a potential adversary.

Q: Do you think it is an adversary under Gorbachev, or do you agree with those who think that Gorbachev has followed an ideological path to become a sort of dissident Communist.

A: I think it's an extremely dangerous course to base foreign policy on one individual, even if he is a dissident communist. I think he has certainly recognized that the communist party is an obstacle to the economic reforms that he wants to carry out and objectively he has to weaken the role of the communist party. In fact, he has moved from one-party rule to one-man rule. Now, does that make the Soviet Union no longer an adversary? Has he become a Western-style pacifist and a believer in liberal ideology in terms of world affairs?

Q: Communist democrat is one of the terms that people are using.

A: But the assumption of the people who say communist democrat is that democracies do not make wars and that popular leaders do not make wars. It's the old Wilsonian idea. But World War I was wildly popular when it started in more or less democratic governments, certainly in governments that were more democratic than anything we've seen in the Soviet Union. So I think it is very dangerous to rely entirely on Gorbachev, because no matter what you think about Gorbachev, he's mortal; his life expectancy is limited and his political life expectancy may be shorter than his personal life expectancy. If he really goes through with an election in four years, he's apt not to get reelected. For all of these reasons I think he deserves a lot of credit, especially for letting Eastern Europe go, but he is not the basis for a long-term foreign policy.

Q: What would likely replace his regime? We hear choices ranging from a rightist autocracy to a Stalinist revival to a non-ideological KGB.

A: I think he has shown breathtaking skill in dividing his opposition, and it is very difficult to see right now how he's going to be replaced because all the national organizations are

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being systematically weakened Not one of the the pluralistic forces that are emerging has a national base, they are based in the Republics and even the communist part is beginning to fragment into being a Republic shaped party. So the only thing on the face of it that could replace him would be some combination of what's left of the communist party plus KGB or plus military. And we would be the last to know. It would not be self-evident. On the other hand, how long a leader who has not hadin terms of Soviet citizens any spectacular success, could keep going without either improving the economy or restoring civility to the environment is very difficult to know. My view is that the Soviet Union will be teetering between chaos and repression for the next few years and that it's very hard to foretell which of them will prevail and that it is quite possible that they will prevail in succession. It is very possible--it is already happening--that the nationalists in the Republics, or the ethnics in the Republics, will be answered by nationalism in the Russian Republic and it is not conceivable to me that the Russian Republic is prepared to withdraw to the territory of the Republic itself. That would be going back to before Peter the Great. Are they willing to go back to Alexander the First? In other words are they willing to go back to the beginning of the 19th century, which would mean the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Soviet Union? I think they might be willing to let the Baltic countries go, but the next question is whether they would be willing to let the southern Republics go, other than the Ukraine. Well, that's the big decision. But even if they let the southern Republics go, they will have a problem with the Ukraine. So my guess is that at some point they will draw the line. Is it in the Baltics? I think that is unlikely. Is it in the southern Republics? That is more likely. Or is it with the Ukraine? I think that is certain. But the outcome of that ethnic struggle will also determine the nature of the state. If they will let the southern area goI don't think they'd let Azerbaijan go because they need the oil productionbut if they let most of the Moslem republics in the south go, then they will be forced to become an even more active Middle East player than they are now. They must want those Republics to be demilitarized and effectively neutral. They cannot have fundamentally aggressive states at their border. They will be driven into becoming Middle East players. So it is very difficult to foretell the shape of the future and the problem for the United States is that we have to learn to think in categories to which we are totally unaccustomed.

The most likely things to happen are not those we expect.
America's expectation is that a pluralistic democracy will prevail
in the Soviet Union, that it will go to market economics, and that
the Soviet Union will be more or less comparable to the United
Statesthat it will be affluent in its domestic affairs, that it
will be peaceful, that it will believe in collective security and
international law. That seems to me the least likely outcome,
whoever wins. Which means, in turn, that the Soviet Union will be
uncomfortable for us on any hypothesis. If they disintegrate, there
will be a lot of turmoil involving surrounding countries, for which
we have no intellectual preparation. If they remain a state, and if

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perestroika succeedshowever much the odds may be against that they will again become strong. Then they will be uncomfortable for their neighbors unless a whole new concept of international relations emerges, which is not impossible but which is also not self-evident.

Q: Does it seem to you that the possibility of a miscalculation or a war's originating in Europe is greater now than it was 10 years ago?

A: The possibility of local conflict originating at the periphery of the Soviet Union is greater than it was. The possibility of general war is less. And I say that not to challenge Gorgachev's motives. I think they are almost irrelevant. I don't think (ital) he (unital) knows what he wants.

Q: You have at times indicated a measure of skepticism about Europe's ability to accommodate itself to a united Germany, one that would be the leading economic power on the continent. You've done so noting that you consider a united Germany inevitable. What should we be worrying about?

A: There are 400,000 Soviet troops in East Germany, but that has not enabled the Soviet Union to keep Germany divided. Once they opened the wall, once they permitted genuinely free elections in East Germany, it was done as a Soviet outpost because there was never any justification for the East German state other than as a Soviet outpost. There's no historical basis for it. This being the case, I think it is shortsighted in the extreme for Western allies of Germany now to suddenly start nagging about the danger and the Jewish community, for that matter, that Germany may or may not represent. They have no capacity to prevent German reunification. So the only realistic course is to see whether Germany can remain emotionally tied to the West and whether structures can be built in which they remain related to the West. It isn't possible to have made Germany an ally for 45 years and then at the moment when we have achieved what we promised them in the 1950s, seriously or not, to suddenly remember that, after all, they're an enemy, they're a danger, they have to be brought under control, they have to pay reparations.

A: Of course, expressing concern is proper. The question is how often can you do it and what is the consequence that you want to achieve? The other day, a Rabbi on the West Coast sent a letter to West and East Germany and the West Germans wrote back and said there is no problem about anti-semitism and the East Germans said there is a problem. So some people said, look at the East Germans, how terrific. One has to see that in the proper perspective. The East Germans for 50 years have done nothing about anti-semitism. The Communists in East Germany who are hanging on by their finger nails are trying to establish some legitimacy for themselves at this late stage. Yes, a unified Germany has elements of danger because it's the most powerful player in Europe, it has more neighbors than anybody else, it is extremely difficult to conduct a wise German foreign policy.

Germany has no tradition of conducting a national-interest foreign policy because they spent more time getting unified than conducting policy. It took them until 1871 to get unified. As late

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as 1848, they still had 33 states on German soil. And then they
were divided again after World War II; they were really, in their
perception, delegitimized, so there is no real national-interest
tradition in Germany. All of these are problems. And I, personally,
am much more worried about a Wilhelminian type of German foreign
policy than a Hitler type of German foreign policy, which I think
is highly improbable. Still the right approach now is to try to
treat them as friends, and not suddenly treat them as if they were
antagonists with a genetic fault.

If you look at German foreign policy between 1871 and 1914,
There were two phases. One was the Bismarck phase, which was
moderate and extremely dexterous, but so complicated that it was
very difficult for any successor to carry it out. It was really
based on his phenomenal diplomatic skills and on the proposition
that Germany must not make any commitments that would draw it into
rigid blocks. After 1890, they wanted recognition internationally
but they didn't know what it meant. And they managed to creatte all
the dangers that they wanted to guard against. They were worried
about hostile encirclement and their policy certainly contributed
to it because by scaring each of their neighbors individually they
promoted the Entente Cordiale. There's a memorandum by the British
permanent head of the foreign office, I think dated on New Year's
Day, 1907, in which he says a conflict with Germany is inevitable.
He says we have much bigger conflicts, in fact, with Russia and
France but we know exactly what they are and we can always settle
them. But Germany is active in South Africa, in Morocco, in Iraq,
and is building a big navy. And that is compatible only with a
policy of trying to replace us as the leading world power and that
we will not accept.

I'm not even sure they wanted to replace Britain. I don't think
they knew what they wanted. They wanted to be recognized, whatever
that means. They wanted a place in the sun, whatever that means.
That is the danger, so one has to prevent Germany from being
neutral, rootless, located as they are. They should be anchored in
the West, and I believe a German membership in NATO after
unification is as much in the interest of the Soviet Union as it is
in ours, because a neutralist Germany is a nationalist Germany.
What else can it be? That's what they were before World War I.

Q: What do the Europeans really think of the impending
phenomenon?

A: I think Europeans are scared to death. And it's a pity,
because it's too late. What are they going to do about it? Now if
they want to do something about it, they ought to redo their
economies; Britain and France ought to get closer together. There's
no inherent reason why Britain and France could not be as
productive as Germany, but they haven't done it. As long as Germany
is the most productive country in Europe and has by itself the
largest population, it will have an influence commensurate with its
strength; that's the nature of international politics. I'm sort of
disappointed that France, which for 45 years managed to establish a
lot of credit in Germany and provided a political refuge for
Germany, is now going back to the Richelieu policy of trying
alliances with Russia if not alliances, cooperation with the Soviet

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Union and with Poland. I'm not against cooperation with Poland but if they are trying to go back to contain Germany I think it will create a very unfortunate situation with the next generation of German leaders.

I'm not saying there's no cause for worry. I'm saying that many of the Western nations the U.S. excepted; I'm in substantial agreement with the U.S. policy have been acting as if Germany poses a danger and they have no means to deal with it and at the same time they have been ignoring the Soviet Union, which they treat almost as an ally.

Q: The Eastern Europeans, the Poles in particular, have expressed a sense of concern that seems to surprise the Germans.

A: Considering what Poland has suffered, it is very understandable that the Poles are worried. It is also a big domestic issue in Poland and no political party wants to be less rigid than the others about Germany. Still I don't blame Poland. I understand that problem. The difficulty seems to be that ¡German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, from a domestic point of view, has a rational reason for acting as he does. He comes from the westernmost corner of the country, close to the French border. I do not believe that he has any great emotional feeling about the Oder-Neisse line, but he has this practical problem. The CDU ¡Christian Democratic party¿ has something like 43 or 44% of the vote. If the right-wing party, the Republicans, gets 5%, they go into parliament. The vast majority of that 5% they will get off the CDU. If he goes down to 40%, there will not be enough of a vote together with the liberal democrats for him to govern. The alternative is likely to be more neutralism, more even than before. So it's really an issue about the future orientation of Germany in which the magic formula for the Oder-Neisse line has become a domestic issue and unrelated to reality. I do not believe that Kohl would lead a charge against the Oder-Neisse line. And it's a pity that we can't get through this election year without beating that issue to death. I personally, of course, believe that line is permanent.

Q: Recent events in the communist world appear to have given American isolationism more life and vigor than it has had, both on the right and on the left.

A: That is partly because America is really a largely ideological country. If you look at statements of American presidents Richard Nixon excepted they all have more or less the same theme: The United States is immune to contamination by the balance of powers, that it is morally superior to the rest of the world, and its enemies are moral threats, not geopolitical threats. So now we see convergence in the Soviet Union, and both our conservatives and liberals are really at one on that issue, except that the liberals say there was never a danger to begin with, and they feel vindicated. The conservatives say that whatever danger there was has ended, and we have won. Neither of them accepts permanent geopolitical engagements that have no ultimate moral justification. The moral justification, in my view, is the preservation of America.

Q: Could you elaborate on that, perhaps with an answer to the

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isolationist position?

A: The isolationists, in effect, say there is no longer any danger and we have many problems at home. The answer that I would give is: We are at the beginning of a new phase of history. I do not accept the proposition that we have seen the end of history. Exactly what that new phase will be is not self-evident. But to prevent the domination of Eurasia by a single hostile power, for which we have now fought two wars, would seem to me to remain an American necessity. To retain access to oil remains an American strategic necessity. If we cop out of the whole world, we could face combinations that in the long run we could not deal with, either economically or, if worse came to worst, militarily. On the other hand, we can no longer defend it in terms of a clear and present danger. In the 1930s, Winston Churchill wrote an essay on the balance of power, in which he said that for 100 years it was a settled principle of British policy to resist a potentially dominating country, and it had nothing to do with whether they disliked the ruler. He said don't accuse me of being anti-German and pro-French; if circumstances were reversed, I'd be pro-German and anti-French. The British absorb that sense of policy with their mothers' milk; Americans don't.

Q: What is the single power that is likely to dominate the Eurasian landmass?

A: I think we have to make that assessment from time to time. We can't be sure, but we have to be in a position where we are not muscle-bound and where we have the options. It could be the Soviet Union. It could be a combination of Asian countries. I'm open-minded on this. The problem is that we have no fixed, permanent enemies, but we need a military capacity that can be expanded when it has to be and we need a presence in Europe. We need a presence because I think that the potential Soviet military threat against Europe now could be nuclear, as I said earlier. And we need a presence in Europe if we are worried about Germany to give the West Europeans a sense of assurance that they're not alone.

Q: There are those who believe that for the average Arab the notion of a sovereign Jewish state in the middle of the Arab world is an abomination and that, in this sense, for Israel to take risks that involve security makes very little sense. Others believe that we now have a circumstance in which a strong element of the Arab world is ready in a serious way to accommodate Israel.

A: The Israeli position is very difficult. They run two risks. One, that they'll wind up like the Christian part of Lebanon. The other that they will wind up like South Africa. And to navigate between those two risks requires a degree of cohesion both within Israel and within the Jewish community, of which I see not the slightest sign. I have always believed that to go back to the 1967 borders is suicidal for security reasons. On the other hand, I've also believed that to hold onto the whole West Bank is also very dangerous, for reasons of democratic principle. Israel can't navigate between these risks because, if you take these current incipient negotiations, the Likud is unwilling to admit that they are willing to give up any territory. Labor is not willing to admit that they want any territories because they don't want to give up

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their status as America's good boy. So you have two impossible substantive positions on the Israeli side which are masquerading as procedural disputes. There should be, theoretically at least, an understanding between the United States and Israel as to the nature of the possible outcome. That doesn't exist now. So, the question is not whether there should be an Arab from East Jerusalem participating in the negotiations; as a procedural issue, that's insoluble. The question is whether East Jerusalem should be available as a negotiating subject or should not. If that question isn't settled, then the participants from East Jerusalem must carry the whole play. Q: When did the notion that a West Bank, Gaza, Palestinian, Israel settlement was at all possible jump so high on the Washington agenda?

A: When the PLO said something that a (what kind?) music student could interpret as a recognition of Israel. There has always been a school of thought, probably a dominant school of thought, that a negotiated solution on the West Bank that would be permanent is possible. I believe an interim solution may be possible, but since neither the United States nor either of the major Israeli parties really don't agree on what we want or at least are not willing to state what we want. Nor the Arabs. If you read what the PLO has said about recognition of Israel, what they really recognize is the 1947 partition plan that gives them a legal status while it also gives Israel a legal status at about a third of its present size, if all refugees are allowed to return. There is no way Israel could survive that. So the flight into procedure, which is necessary for everybody's domestic politics, is going to lead to a deadlock and maybe a blowup.

Q: How long does Fidel Castro likely have?

A: I think he has become an anachronism, so it is really a question of (accident?) whether he gets overthrown while he's alive or whether the system will suffer a Romanian fate. But we also have to look at Nicaragua. Everybody celebrates the victory of Violeta Chomorro, but we have to watch the control of the military in the hands of the Sandinistas, potential economic dislocations, and the possibility that Ortega or his representative will get back under a democratic guise, so that we would then have the same problem in even more acute form.

Q: The Bush Administration has faced extraordinary developments in a short period and you seem by and large satisfied with the manner in which they approach these issues whereas pundits at large, columnists, needless to say Democrats for political reasons, say there are no goals and we need to be doing more.

A: I believe that the Administration will have to put forward at some point its notion of a new European security system. I don't blame them for not having done it yet because I think the appropriate time is after the German election. Then people say we should have a Marshall plan in Eastern Europe. I don't really think that is now America's great problem. We have a big problem in the Western Hemishpere. I would like us to do a lot more there. We now have in Brazil, apparently, a good leader. We have in Mexico a very strong leader. Argentina wants to stabilize. And if we are so concerned about democratic governments, the area where I think we

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have not shown imagination, Mexico perhaps excepted, is in the
western hemisphere. In Eastern Europe I think we will have to be
more active in the construction of a security system. There's a lot
we can do. I talked to the Czech ambassador the other day. They
want help in elections, in having people study here, so there are
lots of things that we can do but I think it is not the ideal place
for more than a symbolic commitment of major American resources.

NEW YORK POST, THURSDAY, MARCH 29, 1990

25

COMMENTARY

GORBACHEV IS NOT FOREVER

THIS interview with former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was conducted by New York Post Editorial Page Editor Eric Breindel, and by Scott McConnell, a member of the Post editorial board, in Dr. Kissinger's Washington office some 10 days ago. Kissinger, whose analyses of world events appear monthly in The Post, answered questions on a range of global issues.

**Q:** DO you agree with those who argue that the Cold War is over? And — to ask a related question — does Moscow remain America's chief adversary in world affairs?

**A:** As an ideological force, Moscow is largely spent. But as a nation-state, Russia has been a thorn for all of its neighbors for the last 700 years.

When a nation has acted in a certain way for this long a period, it's hard to imagine that one person can change everything. America needs now to shift its emphasis from the ideological conflict to the realm of geopolitics, an arena in which I still regard the Soviet Union as a potential adversary.

**Q:** What about the notion that Gorbachev himself is some sort of dissident communist?

**A:** Again, it is an extremely dangerous course to base foreign policy on one individual. Gorbachev has recognized that the Communist Party is an obstacle to economic reform and that he has to weaken the role of the party. Still, he has not moved to a pluralistic sys-

tem, but rather from one-party rule to one-man rule.

Does that make the Soviet Union less of an adversary? Does it make Gorbachev a Western-style pacifist or a believer in liberal ideology in terms of world affairs?

I doubt it. Moreover, whatever we'd like to think about Gorbachev, the man is mortal; his life expectancy is limited and his political life expectancy is probably shorter than his personal life expectancy.

**Q:** You have indicated a measure of skepticism regarding Europe's ability to accommodate itself to a united Germany, all the while noting that you con-

many as an ally for 40 years, and now, suddenly — at the very moment when we seem to be achieving what we promised our allies in the 1950s — to remember that Germany is an enemy, a threat.

The right approach now is to treat the Germans as friends and allies rather than as antagonists with some kind of genetic fault.

I also believe German membership in NATO — post-reunification — is as much in the interest of the Soviet Union as it is in our interest. A neutralist Germany is a nationalist Germany. What else can it be?

**Q:** What do the Euro-

itself, the largest population, it will have an influence commensurate with its strength. That is the nature of international politics.

**Q:** Let's move from Europe to America. Recent events in the communist world appear to have given American isolationism more life and vigor than it has had in many years. It seems to thrive both on the right and on the left.

**A:** In part, that is because America is a very ideological country. If you look at statements of American presidents, Richard Nixon excepted, they all have more or less the same theme: that the United States is immune to foreign contamination; that it is morally superior to the rest of the world.

So now we have a convergence on the subject of the Soviet Union. Conservatives and liberals are at one on the issue. The liberals feel vindicated, saying there was never any danger to begin with. The conservatives maintain that whatever danger there was has finally ended — that we have won.

Neither seems to accept the need for permanent geopolitical engagements designed to preserve long-range American security interests.

**Q:** What's the best answer to the isolationist argument?

**A:** The isolationists, in effect, are saying there is no longer any outside danger, and that we have enough problems at home. The answer I would give is this: We are at the beginning of a

the 1967 borders would be suicidal — for security reasons.

On the other hand, I also believe that to hold on to the whole West Bank is also very dangerous for reasons of democratic principle.

Israel has been unable to navigate a course because the Likud refuses to admit that it is willing to give up any territory and Labor refuses to admit it wants any territory.

What we need is at least a theoretical understanding between the United States and Israel as to the nature of the possible outcome. That does not now exist.

Nor are the Arabs willing to state their goals. If you read what the PLO has said about recognition of Israel, what they are really recognizing is the 1947 partition plan. There is no way Israel could survive this.

**Q:** In general, how has the Bush administration responded to the enormous changes of the past year?

**A:** At some point, the administration will have to put forward its notion of a new European security system and its concept of a world order. I do not blame it for not having done so yet.

I would actually like us to focus more on this hemisphere. Apparently, we now have a good leader in Brazil. We have in Mexico a very strong leader. Argentina wants to stabilize.

And if we are that concerned about democratic government, the area where I think we have not shown imagination — Mexico excepted — is in the Western Hemisphere.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

new phase of history.

I do not accept the proposition that we have seen the end of history. While the nature of this new phase is not self-evident, preventing the domination of Eurasia by any single hostile power — the reason we have now fought two world wars — would seem to me to remain an American necessity.

If we opt out of the world, we could face combinations that, in the long run, we may not be able to deal with — either economically or, if worst came to worst, militarily.

**Q:** Let's consider the Middle East. Some believe that the Arab states will always view the notion of a sovereign Jewish state in the middle of the Islamic world as an abomination. Others see possibilities for a peace agreement.

**A:** The Israeli position is very difficult.

I have always believed that for Israel to go back to

In a wide-ranging interview, Henry Kissinger tells Post editors that even a non-Communist Russia is likely to remain an adversary to the Western world, as it has been for centuries

sider a united Germany inevitable. What's the nature of your concern?

**A:** It is shortsighted in the extreme for the Western allies of Germany now to begin to nag about danger.

The critics have no capacity to prevent German reunification. So the only realistic course is to see whether structures can be built to ensure that the Germans remain linked to the West.

It is neither proper nor fitting to have nurtured Ger-

peans really think of the impending phenomenon of German reunification?

**A:** Some Europeans are scared to death. And it is a pity, because it is too late. What are they going to do about it?

If they want to do something about it, they ought to redo their economies. There is no inherent reason why Britain and France cannot be as productive as Germany.

But as long as Germany is the most productive country in Europe, and has, by

26

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for don

✓Q: Do you agree with every pundit who seems to think that the Cold War is, in fact, over and as a corollary question, does Moscow remain America's chief adversary in world affairs.

A: I think as an ideological force Moscow is substantially spent. But Russia as a nation-state has been uncomfortable for all of its neighbors for 700 years. I would think that when a nation has acted in a certain way for 700 years, and has exhibited a certain proclivity, it would be dangerous to assume that one person can undo that. And then, the Soviet Union still has ten or eleven thousand nuclear weapons and it seems to me that one result of the present situation is that it is not the Soviet strategy in effect to denuclearize and may Soviet Union's effect on Europe to give them a capacity for a degree of nuclear security, particularly if the present trend toward denuclearization Europe blackmail down the road against Europe. In other words, what can we do?

✓Q: Do you think it is an adversary under Gorbachev, or do you agree with those who think that Gorbachev has followed an

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[Y]

for don

Gua's Edit

A: I think an ideological force, Moscow is largely spent. But Russia as a nation-state has been ahorn of all its neighbors for 700 years. I would think that when a nation has acted in a certain way for 700 years, and has exhibited a certain proclivity, it would be dangerous to assume that one person can undo that. And then, the Soviet Union still has ten or eleven thousand nuclear weapons and, it seems to me that one result of the present situation even if it is not the Soviet strategic goal, in effect, to denuclearize Europe to give the capacity for a degree of nuclear blackmail down the road against Europe. In other words, what America now needs to do is to shift its emphasis from the ideological conflict to a geopolitical concept, an arena in which still regard as that I consider the Soviet Union still a potential adversary.

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economics, and that the Soviet Union will be more or less comparable to the United States that ~~that is,~~ it will be affluent in its domestic affairs, that it will be peaceful, ~~that it will be the fairness of our~~ But believe in collective security, and international law. That seems to me the least likely outcome, ~~whoever wins~~ Which means ~~ifัง that the Soviet Union will~~ be uncomfortable for us, ~~on any hypothesis. If they disintegrate,~~ there will be a lot of turmoil involving surrounding countries, ~~for which we are~~ philosophically~~ it is indefinite and~~ we provide~~ have not intellectual preparation. If they remain a state, and ~~it perestroika succeed~~ however much the odds may be against it, ~~Soviet Union, its and~~ that they will again become strong. ~~They will be once its~~ uncomfortable for their neighbors unless a whole new concept of international relations emerges, ~~which is not neither right nor wrong~~ nor exactly ~~but which it also is not~~ self-evident.

Q: Does it seem to you that the possibility of a miscalculation or a war originating in Europe is greater now than it was 10 years ago?

A: The possibility of local conflict originating at the periphery of the Soviet Union is greater now than it was. The possibility of general war is less. And I say that not to challenge Gorgachev's motives. I think they are almost irrelevant. I do not think (ital) he (unital) knows what he wants.

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the long run we could not deal with, either economically or, if worse came to worst, militarily. On the other hand, we can no longer defend it in terms of the notion of a clear and present danger. In the 1930s, Winston Churchill wrote an essay on the balance of power, in which he said that for 100 years it was a settled principle of British policy to resist a potentially dominating country, and if it had nothing to do with whether they disliked the ruler. He said, don't accuse me of being anti-German and pro-French; if circumstances were reversed, I would be pro-German and anti-French. The British absorb that sense of policy with their mothers' milk; Americans don't.

A: I think we have to make that assessment from time to time. We can't be sure, but we have to be in a position where we are not muscle-bound and where we have the options. It could be the Soviet Union. It could be a combination of Asian countries. I am open-minded on this. The problem is that we are unlikely to have a fixed, permanent enemy, but we need a military capacity that can be expanded when it has to be, and we need a presence in Europe. We need a presence because I think that the potential Soviet military threat against Europe now could be nuclear, as I said earlier. And we need a presence in Europe if we are worried about Germany to give the West Europeans a sense of assurance that they are not alone.

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should be ~~or not~~ ought to question whether East Jerusalem should be available as a negotiating subject or should not. If that question isn't settled, then the participants from East Jerusalem must carry the whole thing. Q: When did the notion that a West Bank, Gaza, Palestinian, Israel settlement was at all possible jump so high on the Washington agenda?

A: When the PLO said something that a (what kind?) music student could interpret as a recognition of Israel. There has always been a school of thought, probably a dominant school of thought, that a negotiated solution on the West Bank that would be permanent is possible. I believe an interim solution may be possible, but since neither the United States nor either of the major Israeli parties really don't agree on what we want or at least are not willing to state what we want. Nor are the Arabs. If you read what the PLO has said about recognition of Israel, what they really recognize is the 1947 partition plan that gives them a legal status while it also gives Israel legal status at about a third of its present size, if all refugees are allowed to return. There is no way Israel could survive that. So the flight into procedure, which is necessary for everybody's domestic politics, is going to lead to a deadlock and maybe a blowup.

A: I think he has become an anachronism, so it is really a matter of chance or not whether he gets overthrown while he's alive or whether the system will suffer a Romanian fate. But we also have to look at Nicaragua. Everybody celebrates the

8

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KISS INTERVI 03-19-90

here, so there is lots of things that we can do, but I think
it is not the ideal place for more than a symbolic commitment
of major American resources.

EDITED VERSION OF DR. KISSINGER MARCH 16 INTERVIEW

-As an ideological force, Moscow is largely spent. But as a nation-state, Russia has been a thorn for all its neighbors for the last 700 years. I would think that when a nation has acted in a certain way for that long, and has exhibited a certain proclivity, it is dangerous to assume that one person can undo all that. And then, the Soviet Union will still have ten or eleven thousand nuclear weapons even after a START agreement. This could have a significant effect on European security, particularly if the present trend toward denuclearizing Europe continues. In other words, what America needs to do now is to shift its emphasis from the ideological conflict to a geopolitical concept, an

[Y]

-2-

arena in which I still regard the Soviet Union as a poten-
tial adversary.

-It is an extremely dangerous course to base foreign policy on one individual. Gorbachev has clearly recognized that the Communist Party is an obstacle to economic reform and that he has to weaken the role of the Party. In fact he has not yet moved to a pluralistic system but rather from one-party to one-man rule. Does that make the Soviet Union no longer an adversary? Does it make Gorbachev a Western-style pacifist or a believer in liberal ideology in terms of world affairs? I doubt it.

-But the assumption of those who call him a communist democrat is that democracies and popular leaders do not wage war. It is the old Wilsonian idea again. Yet when it started World War I was wildly popular with more or less democratic governments, certainly with governments that were at the time more democratic than anything we have seen in the

-3-

Soviet Union. So I think it gets quite dangerous to rely entirely on Gorbachev, because no matter what we like to think about him, the man is mortal; his life expectancy is limited and his political life expectancy is probably shorter than his personal life expectancy. Now he deserves a lot of credit, especially for letting go of Eastern Europe, but a serious long-term foreign policy cannot be based on just one man.

-Gorbachev has shown breathtaking skill in dividing his opposition. All national organizations are being systematically weakened so it is very difficult right now to envision how he might be replaced. Not one of the pluralistic forces that is emerging has a national base. They seem to be based in the ethnic Republics and even the Communist Party is beginning to fragment into splinter groups based in the various Republics. So the only thing on the face of it that could replace Gorbachev would be some combination of what is

[4]

-4-

left of the Communist Party plus the KGB plus maybe the
military. And we would be the last to know because it is not
a process that would be self-evident. On the other hand, how
long a leader who has not had in terms of the Soviet citi-
zenry any spectacular success can keep going without either
improving the economy or restoring domestic cohesion is
difficult to assess. My view is that the Soviet Union will
teeter between chaos and repression for the next few years
and that it is very hard to foretell which of them will
prevail. It is quite possible that both will prevail in
succession. It is very posible - it is already happening -
that the nationalists in the non-Russian Republics will be
matched by nationalism in the Russian Republic which has
always been dominant. It is not probable that the Russian
Republic is prepared to withdraw to the territory of the
Republic itself because that would be going back to the way
it was before Peter the Great. But is it willing to go as

[Y]

-5-

far back as Alexander the First? In other words, is it
willing to go back to the beginning of the 19th century,
which would mean the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Russian
Republic? While they might be willing to let go of the
Baltic states, the real question is whether they would be
willing to let go of the southern Republics other than the
Ukraine. Well, that is a big decision. Even if they let the
southern Republics go, there will be a problem with the
Ukraine. So my guess is that at some point they will have to
draw the line. Will it be at the Baltics? I think that is
unlikely. Will it be at the southern Republics? That is more
likely. Or will it be at the Ukraine? I think that is
certain. But the outcome of the ethnic struggle will also
determine the nature of the emerging state. I do not think
they would let go of Azerbaijan because they need its oil
production. If they let go of most of the Moslem Republics
in the south, then they will be forced to become an even

[Y]

-6-

more active Middle East player than they are now. They must want those Republics to be demilitarized and effectively neutral because they cannot have fundamentally aggressive states at their borders. In the end they will surely be driven into becoming active Middle East players. So it is really very difficult to foretell the shape of the future, and the problem for the United States is that we have to learn to think in categories to which we are totally unaccustomed in terms of variable outcomes.

The most likely outcomes are not the ones we expect. America's expectation is that a pluralistic democracy will prevail in the Soviet Union, that it will implement market economics, and that the Soviet Union will become more or less comparable to the United States - that is, affluent, peaceful and optimistic about collective security. But that seems to me the least likely outcome. Which means that the Soviet Union will continue to be uncomfortable for us,

[Y]

-7-

whatever the hypothesis. If it disintegrates, there will be
a lot of turmoil involving surrounding countries, forcing us
to define unaccustomed priorities. If it remains unified and
perestroika succeeds, the Soviet Union will once again
become strong and uncomfortable for its neighbors unless a
whole new concept of international relations emerges, which
is right now neither impossible nor exactly self-evident.

-The possibility of local conflict originating at the periphery of the Soviet Union is greater now than it was. The possibility of general war is lower.

-There are 400,000 Soviet troops in East Germany, but this was not enough to keep Germany divided. One the Soviets opened the Wall, once they permitted genuinely free elections in East Germany, it became lost as a Soviet outpost because there was never any justification for an East German state other than as a Soviet outpost. This being the case, it is shortsighted in the extreme for Western allies of

[x]

-8-

Germany to now begin to nag about the danger. The critics
have no capacity to prevent German reunification. So the
only realistic course is to see whether Germany can maintain
emotional ties with the West and whether such structures can
be built to ensure they remain linked to the West. It is
neither proper nor fitting to have nurtured Germany as an
ally for 40 years and then suddenly at the very moment when
we seem to be achieving what we promised our allies in the
1950's - whether seriously or not - to remember that they
are after all an enemy, a threat, that they have to be
brought under control and make reparations.

Germany has no tradition of conducting a
national-interest foreign policy because it always spent
more time getting unified than conducting policy. It took
them until 1871 to get unified. As late as 1848, there were
still 33 separate states on German soil. And then it got
divided again after World War II or, rather, in their

[y]

-9-

perception, got delegitimized, so that there has been no
real national-interest tradition in Germany. All of these
are problems. Personally, I am much more concerned about a
pre-World War I type of German foreign policy than I am
about a Hitler-type of German foreign policy, which I regard
as highly unlikely. Still, the right approach now is to
treat the Germans as friends and allies rather than suddenly
treating them as if they were our antagonists with some kind
of genetic fault.

The curse of Imperial German foreign policy was the
inability to establish priorities. They wanted to be recog-
nized, whatever that meant. They wanted a place in the sun,
whatever that meant. They were in effect rootless. Germany
should be anchored in the West, and I believe a German
membership in NATO post reunification is as much in the
interest of the Soviet Union as it is in our interest

[Y]

-10-

because a neutralist Germany is a nationalist Germany. What
else can it be? That is what it was before World War I.

-Some Europeans are scared to death. And it is a pity,
because it is too late. What are they going to do about it?
If they want to do something about it, they ought to redo
their economies; Britain and France ought to get closer
together. There is no inherent reason why Britain and France
can not be as productive as Germany, but they have not done
it. As long as Germany is the most productive country in
Europe and has by itself the largest population, it will
have an influence commensurate with its strength. That is
the nature of international politics. I am disappointed that
France, which over 45 years established a lot of credit with
Germany and provided it with a political haven, is now
reverting to the Richelieu policy. If the goal is to go back
to trying to contain Germany, I think it will create a very

[y]

-11-

I am not saying there is no cause for worry. I am
saying that many of the Western nations, the US excepted,
are bringing about what they seek to prevent. I am in
substantial agreement with American policy. But other
nations have been acting as if Germany poses a danger though
they have no means to deal with it, and at the same time
have either been ignoring the Soviet Union or treating it
almost as an ally.

-Considering what Poland has suffered, it is very
understandable that the Poles are worried. Poland has every
right to be concerned. The difficulty seems to be that from
a domestic point of view German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has
rational reasons for acting as he does. He comes from the
westernmost corner of the country, close to the French
border. I do not believe that he has any great emotional

[Y]

-12-

feeling about the Oder-Neisse line, but he has a practical
problem: the CDU, Christian Democratic Party, has something
like 43 or 44% of the vote. If the right-wing party, the
Republicans, gets 5%, they go into Parliament. The vast
majority of that 5% will come at the expense of the CDU. If
he goes down to 40%, there will not be enough of a vote
together with the Liberal Democrats for him to govern. The
alternative is likely to be a more neutralist and a more
nationalist foreign policy regardless of the attitude on the
Polish question. So it is really an issue about the future
orientation of Germany in which the magic formula for the
Oder-Neisse line has become a German domestic issue not
wholly related to reality. I do not believe that Kohl would
lead a charge against the Oder-Neisse line. And it is a pity
that we cannot get through this election year without
beating that issue to death. I personally, of course,

-13-

believe that line is permanent and should be recognized
before unification is completed.

-That is partly because America is really a largely
ideological country. If you look at statements of American
presidents, Richard Nixon excepted, they all have more or
less the same theme: that the United States is immune to
contamination by the balance of power and that it is morally
superior to the rest of the world with threats that are
moral not geopolitical. So now we have a convergence on the
subject of the Soviet Union with both conservatives and
liberals at one on the issue. The liberals feel vindicated
saying there was never any danger to begin with. The conser-
vatives are saying that whatever danger there was has
finally ended, and that we have won. Neither of them seems
to accept permanent geopolitical engagements that have as
their moral justification the preservation of American

-14-

long-range security which they seem to think is immune to
strategic transformations elsewhere.

-The isolationists, in effect, are saying there is no
longer any outside danger and we have enough problems at
home. The answer I would give to this is: We are at the
beginning of a new phase of history. I do not accept the
proposition that we have seen the end of history. Exactly
what that new phase will be is not self-evident. But to
prevent the domination of Eurasia by any single hostile
power, for which we have now fought two world wars, would
seem to me to have to remain an American necessity. To
retain access to oil remains an American strategic necessi-
ty. If we opt out of the world, we could face combinations
that in the long-run we might not be able to deal with,
either economically or, if worse came to worst, militarily.
On the other hand, we can no longer defend our interest in
terms of the notion of a clear and present danger. In the

-15-

1930's Winston Churchill wrote an essay on the balance of power in which he said that for 100 years it was a settled principle of British policy to resist a potentially dominating country, and that this had nothing to do with whether one liked or disliked its ruler. He said, do not accuse me of being anti-German and pro-French; if the circumstances were reversed, I would be pro-German and anti-French. The British absorb that kind of policy with their mothers' milk; Americans do not.

-I think we have to make that assessment from time to time. We cannot be sure, but we have to be in a position where we are not muscle-bound and where we have options. It could be the Soviet Union. It could be a combination of other countries. I am open on this issue. In the period ahead we are unlikely to have fixed, permanent enemies, but we need a military capacity that can be expanded when it has to be, and we need a presence in Europe. We need a presence

[Y]

-16-

-The Israeli position is very difficult. They run two
risks. One, that they will end up like the Christian part of
Lebanon. The other is that they will end up like South
Africa. And to navigate between these two risks requires a
degree of cohesion both within Israel and within the Jewish
community, of which I see not the slightest sign. I have
always believed that to go back to the 1967 borders would be
suicidal for security reasons. On the other hand, I have
also believed that to hold on to the whole West Bank is also
very dangerous for reasons of democratic principle. Israel
has been unable to navigate between these risks because the
Likud refuses to admit that it is willing to give up any

-17-

territory and Labor refuses to admit it wants any territory.
So you have two impossible substantive positions on the
Israeli side masquerading as procedural disputes. There
should be, at least theoretically, an understanding between
the United States and Israel as to the nature of the possi-
ble outcome. That does not now exist. So the question is not
whether there should be an Arab from East Jerusalem partici-
pating in the negotiations because, as a procedural issue,
that is insoluble. The question should be whether or not
East Jerusalem ought to be available as a negotiation
subject. If that question is not settled, then the technical
issue of participation from East Jerusalem must carry the
whole freight.

-There has always been a school of thought, probably a
dominant school of thought, that permanent negotiated
solutuion on the West Bank is possible. I believe an interim
solution may be possible, but neither the United States nor

[Y]

-18-

the major Israeli parties agree on what they want, or at least are not willing to state what they want. Nor are the Arabs. If you read what the PLO has said about the recognition of Israel, what they are really recognizing is the 1947 partition plan that gives them a legal status while giving Israel legal status at about a third of its present size, if all refugees are allowed to return. There is no way Israel could survive that. So the flight into procedure, which is necessary for everybody's domestic politics, is going to lead to a deadlock and maybe a blow-up.

-I think he has become an anachronism, so it is really a matter of chance as to whether or not he gets overthrown while he is alive or whether the system suffers a Romanian fate. But we also have to look at Nicaragua. Everybody celebrates the victory of Violeta Chomorro, but we have to watch the control of the military in the hands of the Sandinistas, potential economic dislocations, and the

-19-

possibility that Ortega or his representative come back under
some democratic guise because we would then have the same
problem in even more acute form.

-I believe that the Administration will at some point
have to put forward its notion of a new European security
system and its concept of the world order. I do not blame it
for not having done so yet because I think the appropriate
time will be after the East German election. Some people say
we should have a Marshall Plan in Eastern Europe. I do not
really think that that is now America's great problem. We
have a big problem in the Western Hemisphere and I would
like us to do a lot more there. Apparently, we now have a
good leader in Brazil. We have in Mexico a very strong
leader. Argentina wants to stabilize. And if we are that
concerned about democratic government, the area where I
think we have not shown imagination, Mexico perhaps except-
ed, is in the Western Hemisphere. In Eastern Europe I think

-20-

we will have to be more active in the construction of a
security system and there is certainly a lot there we can
do. They will need help with elections and with training
their people over here, so there is lots we can do, but I
think it is not the ideal place for more than a symbolic
commitment of major American resources.

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001

CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.

HENRY KISSINGER INTERVIEW

For release Sunday, March 25, 1990

(c) 1990, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by

Q: Do you agree with every pundit who seems to think that the Cold War is, in fact, over, and as a corollary question, does Moscow remain America's chief adversary in world affairs?

A: As an ideological force, Moscow is largely spent. But as a nation-state, Russia has been a thorn for all its neighbors for the last 700 years. I would think that when a nation has acted in a certain way for that long, and has exhibited a certain proclivity, it is dangerous to assume that one person can undo all that. And then, the Soviet Union will still have 10,000 or 11,000 nuclear weapons even after a START agreement. This could have a significant effect on European security,

8

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particularly if the present trend toward denuclearizing Europe continues. In other words, what America needs to do now is to shift its emphasis from the ideological conflict to a geopolitical concept, an arena in which I still regard the Soviet Union as a potential adversary.

✓Q: Do you think it is an adversary under Gorbachev, or do you agree with those who think that Gorbachev has followed an ideological path to become a sort of dissident Communist?

A: It is an extremely dangerous course to base foreign policy on one individual. Gorbachev has clearly recognized that the Communist Party is an obstacle to economic reform and that he has to weaken the role of the party. In fact he has not yet moved to a pluralistic system but rather from one-party to one-man rule. Does that make the Soviet Union no longer an adversary? Does it make Gorbachev a Western-style pacifist or a believer in liberal ideology in terms of world affairs? I doubt it.

✓Q: Communist democrat is one of the terms that people are using.

A: But the assumption of those who call him a Communist democrat is that democracies and popular leaders do not wage war. It is the old Wilsonian idea again. Yet when it started World War I was wildly popular with more or less democratic governments, certainly with governments that were at the time more democratic than anything we have seen in the Soviet Union. So I think it gets quite dangerous to rely entirely on Gorbachev, because no matter what we like to think about him,

8

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✓ Q: What would likely replace his regime? We hear choices ranging from a rightist autocracy to a Stalinist revival to a non-ideological KGB.

A: Gorbachev has shown breathtaking skill in dividing his opposition. All national organizations are being systematically weakened so it is very difficult right now to envision how he might be replaced. Not one of the pluralistic forces that is emerging has a national base. They seem to be based in the ethnic republics, and even the Communist Party is beginning to fragment into splinter groups based in the various republics. So the only thing on the face of it that could replace Gorbachev would be some combination of what is left of the Communist Party plus the KGB plus maybe the military. And we would be the last to know because it is not a process that would be self-evident.

On the other hand, how long a leader who has not had in terms of the Soviet citizenry any spectacular success can keep going without either improving the economy or restoring domestic cohesion is difficult to assess. My view is that the Soviet Union will teeter between chaos and repression for the next few years, and that it is very hard to foretell which of them will prevail. It is quite possible that both will prevail

8

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PAGE 4

in succession. It is very possible -- it is already happening -- that the nationalists in the non-Russian republics will be matched by nationalism in the Russian republic which has always been dominant. It is not probable that the Russian republic is prepared to withdraw to the territory of the republic itself because that would be going back to the way it was before Peter the Great. But is it willing to go as far back as Alexander the First? In other words, is it willing to go back to the beginning of the 19th Century, which would mean the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Russian republic?

While they might be willing to let go of the Baltic states, the real question is whether they would be willing to let go of the southern republics other than the Ukraine. Well, that is a big decision. Even if they let the southern republics go, there will be a problem with the Ukraine. So my guess is that at some point they will have to draw the line.

Will it be at the Baltics? I think that is unlikely. Will it be at the southern republics? That is more likely. Or will it be at the Ukraine? I think that is certain. But the outcome of the ethnic struggle will also determine the nature of the emerging state. I do not think they would let go of Azerbaijan because they need its oil production. If they let go of most of the Moslem republics in the south, then they will be forced to become an even more active Middle East player than they are now. They must want those republics to be demilitarized and effectively neutral because they cannot have fundamentally aggressive states at their borders. In the end they will

8

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The most likely outcomes are not the ones we expect.
America's expectation is that a pluralistic democracy will prevail in the Soviet Union, that it will implement market economics, and that the Soviet Union will become more or less comparable to the United States -- that is, affluent, peaceful and optimistic about collective security. But that seems to me the least likely outcome. Which means that the Soviet Union will continue to be uncomfortable for us, whatever the hypothesis. If it disintegrates, there will be a lot of turmoil involving surrounding countries, forcing us to define unaccustomed priorities. If it remains unified and perestroika succeeds, the Soviet Union will once again become strong and uncomfortable for its neighbors unless a whole new concept of international relations emerges, which is right now neither impossible nor exactly self-evident.

✓ Q: Does it seem to you that the possibility of a miscalculation or a war's originating in Europe is greater now than it was 10 years ago?

A: The possibility of local conflict originating at the periphery of the Soviet Union is greater now than it was. The possibility of general war is lower.

✓ Q: You have at times indicated a measure of skepticism

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A: There are 400,000 Soviet troops in East Germany, but this was not enough to keep Germany divided. Once the Soviets opened the Wall, once they permitted genuinely free elections in East Germany, it became lost as a Soviet outpost because there was never any justification for an East German state other than as a Soviet outpost. This being the case, it is shortsighted in the extreme for Western allies of Germany to now begin to nag about the danger. The critics have no capacity to prevent German reunification. So the only realistic course is to see whether Germany can maintain emotional ties with the West and whether such structures can be built to ensure they remain linked to the West. It is neither proper nor fitting to have nurtured Germany as an ally for 40 years and then suddenly at the very moment when we seem to be achieving what we promised our allies in the 1950s -- whether seriously or not -- to remember that they are after all an enemy, a threat, that they have to be brought under control and make reparations.

8

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PAGE 7

II or, rather, in their perception, got delegitimized, so that there has been no real national-interest tradition in Germany. All of these are problems.

The curse of Imperial German foreign policy was the inability to establish priorities. They wanted to be recognized, whatever that meant. They wanted a place in the sun, whatever that meant. They were in effect rootless. Germany should be anchored in the West, and I believe a German membership in NATO post-reunification is as much in the interest of the Soviet Union as it is in our interest because a neutralist Germany is a nationalist Germany. What else can it be? That is what it was before World War I.

✓ Q: What do the Europeans really think of the impending phenomenon?

A: Some Europeans are scared to death. And it is a pity, because it is too late. What are they going to do about it? If they want to do something about it, they ought to redo their economies; Britain and France ought to get closer together. There is no inherent reason why Britain and France cannot be as productive as Germany, but they have not done it. As long as Germany is the most productive country in Europe and has by

8

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itself the largest population, it will have an influence
commensurate with its strength. That is the nature of
international politics. I am disappointed that France, which
over 45 years established a lot of credit with Germany and
provided it with a political haven, is now reverting to the
Richelieu policy. If the goal is to go back to trying to
contain Germany, I think it will create a very unfortunate
situation with the next generation of German leaders.

I am not saying there is no cause for worry. I am saying
that many of the Western nations, the U.S. excepted, are
bringing about what they seek to prevent. I am in substantial
agreement with American policy. But other nations have been
acting as if Germany poses a danger, though they have no means
to deal with it, and at the same time have either been
ignoring the Soviet Union or treating it almost as an ally.

A: Considering what Poland has suffered, it is very understandable that the Poles are worried. Poland has every right to be concerned. The difficulty seems to be that from a domestic point of view West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has rational reasons for acting as he does. He comes from the westernmost corner of the country, close to the French border. I do not believe that he has any great emotional feeling about the Oder-Neisse line, but he has a practical problem: the CDU, Christian Democratic Party, has something like 43 or 44

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percent of the vote. If the right-wing party, the Republicans, gets 5 percent, they go into Parliament. The vast majority of that 5 percent will come at the expense of the CDU. If he goes down to 40 percent, there will not be enough of a vote together with the Liberal Democrats for him to govern.

The alternative is likely to be a more neutralist and a more nationalist foreign policy regardless of the attitude on the Polish question. So it is really an issue about the future orientation of Germany in which the magic formula for the Oder-Neisse line has become a German domestic issue not wholly related to reality. I do not believe that Kohl would lead a charge against the Oder-Neisse line. And it is a pity that we cannot get through this election year without beating that issue to death. I personally, of course, believe that line is permanent and should be recognized before unification is completed.

Q: Recent events in the Communist world appear to have given American isolationism more life and vigor than it has had, both on the right and on the left.

A: That is partly because America is really a largely ideological country. If you look at statements of American presidents, Richard Nixon excepted, they all have more or less the same theme: that the United States is immune to contamination by the balance of power and that it is morally superior to the rest of the world with threats that are moral, not geopolitical. So now we have a convergence on the subject of the Soviet Union with both conservatives and liberals at

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one on the issue. The liberals feel vindicated, saying there was never any danger to begin with. The conservatives are saying that whatever danger there was has finally ended, and that we have won. Neither of them seems to accept permanent geopolitical engagements that have as their moral justification the preservation of American long-range security which they seem to think is immune to strategic transformations elsewhere.

Q: Could you elaborate on that, perhaps with an answer to the isolationist position?

A: The isolationists, in effect, are saying there is no longer any outside danger and we have enough problems at home. The answer I would give to this is: We are at the beginning of a new phase of history. I do not accept the proposition that we have seen the end of history. Exactly what that new phase will be is not self-evident. But to prevent the domination of Eurasia by any single hostile power, for which we have now fought two world wars, would seem to me to have to remain an American necessity. To retain access to oil remains an American strategic necessity. If we opt out of the world, we could face combinations that in the long run we might not be able to deal with, either economically or, if worse came to worst, militarily. On the other hand, we can no longer defend our interest in terms of the notion of a clear and present danger. In the 1930s Winston Churchill wrote an essay on the balance of power in which he said that for 100 years it was a settled principle of British policy to resist a potentially

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dominating country, and that this had nothing to do with
whether one liked or disliked its ruler. He said, do not
accuse me of being anti-German and pro-French; if the
circumstances were reversed, I would be pro-German and
anti-French. The British absorb that kind of policy with their
mother's milk; Americans do not.

A: I think we have to make that assessment from time to time. We cannot be sure, but we have to be in a position where we are not muscle-bound and where we have options. It could be the Soviet Union. It could be a combination of other countries. I am open on this issue. In the period ahead we are unlikely to have fixed, permanent enemies, but we need a military capacity that can be expanded when it has to be, and we need a presence in Europe. We need a presence because I think that the potential Soviet military threat against Europe now could be nuclear, as I said earlier. And we need a presence in Europe if we are worried about Germany to give the West Europeans a sense of assurance that they are not alone.

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A: The Israeli position is very difficult. They run two risks. One, that they will end up like the Christian part of Lebanon. The other is that they will end up like South Africa. And to navigate between these two risks requires a degree of cohesion both within Israel and within the Jewish community, of which I see not the slightest sign. I have always believed that to go back to the 1967 borders would be suicidal for security reasons. On the other hand, I have also believed that to hold on to the whole West Bank is also very dangerous for reasons of democratic principle. Israel has been unable to navigate between these risks because the Likud refuses to admit that it is willing to give up any territory and Labor refuses to admit it wants any territory. So you have two impossible substantive positions on the Israeli side masquerading as procedural disputes.

There should be, at least theoretically, an understanding between the United States and Israel as to the nature of the possible outcome. That does not now exist. So the question is not whether there should be an Arab from East Jerusalem participating in the negotiations because, as a procedural issue, that is insoluble. The question should be whether or not East Jerusalem ought to be available as a negotiation subject. If that question is not settled, then the technical issue of participation from East Jerusalem must carry the whole freight.

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A: There has always been a school of thought, probably a dominant school of thought, that permanent negotiated solution on the West Bank is possible. I believe an interim solution may be possible, but neither the United States nor the major Israeli parties agree on what they want, or at least are not willing to state what they want. Nor are the Arabs. If you read what the PLO has said about the recognition of Israel, what they are really recognizing is the 1947 partition plan that gives them a legal status while giving Israel legal status at about a third of its present size, if all refugees are allowed to return. There is no way Israel could survive that. So the flight into procedure, which is necessary for everybody's domestic politics, is going to lead to a deadlock and maybe a blow-up.

A: I think he has become an anachronism, so it is really a matter of chance as to whether or not he gets overthrown while he is alive or whether the system suffers a Romanian fate. But we also have to look at Nicaragua. Everybody celebrates the victory of Violeta Chamorro, but we have to watch the control of the military in the hands of the Sandinistas, potential economic dislocations, and the possibility that Ortega or his representative come back under some democratic guise because we would then have the same problem in even more acute form.

Q: The Bush Administration has faced extraordinary developments in a short period, and you seem by and large

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satisfied with the manner in which they approach these issues,
whereas pundits at large, columnists, needless to say
Democrats for political reasons, say there are no goals and we
need to be doing more.

A: I believe that the administration will at some point
have to put forward its notion of a new European security
system and its concept of the world order. I do not blame it
for not having done so yet because I think the appropriate
time will be after the East German election.

Some people say we should have a Marshall Plan in Eastern
Europe. I do not really think that that is now America's great
problem. We have a big problem in the Western Hemisphere and I
would like us to do a lot more there. Apparently, we now have
a good leader in Brazil. We have in Mexico a very strong
leader. Argentina wants to stabilize. And if we are that
concerned about democratic government, the area where I think
we have not shown imagination, Mexico perhaps excepted, is in
the Western Hemisphere.

In Eastern Europe I think we will have to be more active in
the construction of a security system and there is certainly a
lot there we can do. They will need help with elections and
with training their people over here, so there is lots we can
do, but I think it is not the ideal place for more than a
symbolic commitment of major American resources.