DPS COMMITTEE ON SELF-EVALUATION

<u>The Defense Policy Seminar</u> *

I. <u>Some Major Criticisms</u>

(a) More precise definition needs to be given the concept of the Seminar and its specific aims, organization and procedure.

(b) To date the sessions have tended to be somewhat disjointed, lacking with some exceptions a week-to-week continuity.

(c) Responsibilities of various staff members tend to be unclear and frequently there is inadequate coordination among Seminar subject matter, readings, Committee functions and Seminar format. Improvements can be made in staff-student communication and particularly in intra-staff communication.

(d) The tenor of the Seminar usually tends to be hortatory rather than analytical. Essentially we utilize the "problem" method of teaching, yet too often the specific problem is left undefined. It is not always clear what it is we intend to do with a given topic or subject matter.

(e) Lacking a clearly defined course concept, we have been unable to work the subject into an organized field of studies. Students thus do not always know what is expected of them from week to week. This undoubtedly affects their incentive for sustained hard work. This raises the danger that the course may gain the reputation of "gut" since it is impossible to impose a weekly discipline upon a field of studies, the precise objects and methods of which are not at all times clear to student and instructor alike. Standards, of course, are no more than a function of purpose.

III. <u>Some Complicating Factors in Attaining the Ideal</u>

(a) The Seminar Group is too large to be operated as a true Seminar, thus we must decide upon an effective alternative.

* This study centers on the Defense Policy Seminar. Other "self-evaluation" studies might be worthwhile of the Program as a whole.

(2)

(b) Eight-man staff, each member having a little piece of responsibility for operating Seminar, creates constant problems of a unified approach, coordination, and intra-staff communication.

(c) There is a wide disparity in student background, talent, interest and incentive.

(d) Lack of a text and organized readings demands great staff effort into their week-by-week production; their production is sometimes complicated by inadequate program coordination.

### III. A Proposed Definition of Objectives

(a) To increase civilian knowledge of military affairs.

(b) To promote the application of such knowledge in public policy formulation.

(c) To develop personnel and institutional resources for both the academic study and the practical application of such studies in defense policy formation and administration.

The objective of the Defense Policy Seminar may be said then to be multi-purpose. But essentially it should fulfill a basic function of a university graduate course: To raise fundamental questions, to develop basic principles, to enhance the knowledge of methods and procedures by which fundamental questions may be discovered, general principles developed, and solutions sought.

It is perhaps inevitable that the Seminar be policy-oriented and it is proper that major objectives be the improvement of public policy, or developing the capability of students enrolled to better perform public service. Yet concern with today's or tomorrow's defense policy should not overshadow the quest for general principles or meaningful generalizations. Emphasis in the Seminar should be placed on policy formation but this must not be narrowly treated.

### IV. Suggestions for Seminar Improvement

(a) Better defined Seminar objectives from which a more coherently organized schedule of seminar subjects can be derived.

(3)

(b) A format for each weekly session sufficiently uniform for planning, but sufficiently flexible for differences required by subject-matter and lecturer.

(c) A reduction in student enrollment in the Seminar and/or two meetings a week. A more detailed advance announcement of the requirements of the course is desirable. The full meeting would be the regular seminar, largely devoted to lecturer and the dispensing of information and ideas. The second meeting would be by sub-groups, handled in more true Seminar fashion.

(d) A clearer designation of staff responsibilities in directing the seminar and a more active weekly identifiable chairmanship of the seminar so that continuity will be provided for each session and the basic issues to be discussed each week will be more adequately framed.

(e) A clearer definition of the boundaries of the field of defense studies so that greater order can be brought to the field of study.

(f) Guest lecturers, when used, should be chosen carefully to fit precisely into the proposed curriculum. Such guests ought to have a clear conception of the purpose and specific question at issue in any given Seminar. The syllabus should guide guest lecturer selection and not *vice versa*.

(4)

V. Suggested Basic Syllabus for Defense Policy Seminar, 1957-58, to be expanded with questions and bibliography under each section.

I THE SETTING

1. National Policy: United States Objectives, International Commitments and Resources.

2. U.S. Military Strategy.

3. Military Policy as a Component of National Policy: the interdependence of foreign policy, military policy and domestic political and fiscal policy.

4. United States Military Doctrine.

5. The Concept of Civilian Supremacy in Military Affairs.

II THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS FOR DECISIONS

6. Machinery for Coordination of National Policy, Strategy and Operations -- The Presidency, National Security Council and Adjuncts.

7. The United States Congress - Organization and Function.

8. The Department of Defense.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

10. The Armed Services - THE ARMY.

11. The Armed Services - THE NAVY.

12. The Armed Services - THE AIR FORCE.

III FUNCTIONAL PROBLEMS OF MILITARY MANAGEMENT

13. The Defense Budget - Economics of National Defense.

14. The Defense Budget - The Budgetary Process.

15. Intelligence and National Security.

16. Executive Relations with Congress: Viewpoint of the Executive Branch.

17. Research and Development - Science, Technology and Modern War.

18. Research and Development - Pentagon Organization for R & D.

19. Logistics.

20. Manpower and Personnel Problems.

21. Economic Mobilization.

22. Managing Collective Security Systems.

23. Unconventional Warfare.

24. Disarmament.

IV FUTURE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS IN U.S. DEFENSE

25. Strategy and Problems of Total or Limited Nuclear Warfare.

26. Strategy and Problems of Conventional Warfare.

27. Future Trends and Problems in American Defense Policy and Administration.

28. Study and Research in Military Affairs. (Optional)