MR. BAKER: While President Bush made the determination which was fully supported by all of his foreign policy advisers, including myself, that the events in the former Yugoslavia did not rise to the stature of putting the lives of American men and women at risk on the ground. We're in there now. This was a decision made by our successors, the Clinton administration. I think they're doing the best they can with a very difficult situation. But I don't see an exit strategy, if you want me to respond to your question in a little bit partisan fashion. There is no exit strategy that I see. And I worry that we are going to get bogged down in there with this idea that we need to nation-build and create a unified or unitary Bosnian state. We know what the consequences of mission creep were in Somalia. I fear for the same thing in Bosnia.

But at least we made it clear what we -- the way we felt, and we articulated this to the American people, and we said this is not an issue that America has such a national interest in that we ought to put ground troops in there. We were consistent throughout.

MR. SHAW: Secretary Christopher, in following up on the subject of NATO and NATO expansion, do you really think that American GIs should be prepared to die for the Hungarian border?

MR. CHRISTOPHER: Well, NATO has been the most successful alliance in history. As Jim Baker says, it has both military and political aspects. It seems to me extending NATO, extending the democratic push eastward, is something that the American people ought to be very much in favor of. The issue is -- has always been whether or not the American troops should go to the defense of NATO members. They have been committed to this for a long time. It's been very much in our national interests. And I believe it is in our national interests to include these three additional Central European democracies -- Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. So, yes, just as much as I think the American soldiers ought to be prepared to go to the defense of Portugal I think it's those three countries have equal significance for the American people -- just to remind how important and valuable that alliance has been to keeping the peace that we have had in the 50 post-World War II years.

MR. SHAW: To Dr. Kissinger -- are you -- are you the famous Deep Throat Bob Woodward used during Watergate? (Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: I have never heard that I was supposed to be the Deep Throat. No, I'm not sure there was a Deep Throat, but I was not. (Laughter.)

MR. SHAW: Well, my reporter's instinct prompts me to follow up with a question: What makes you doubt that Deep Throat existed or still exists?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, first of all, in -- I have to make -- one has to understand how the Nixon White House operated. I was -- I had a lot of influence on foreign policy. I was never invited to participate in discussions of domestic policy -- luckily. (Laughter.) So I don't know -- you know, I do not have as good command of the universe of who participated in these

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discussions. But some of the descriptions of how Deep Throat contacted the journalists and how they then met -- it seemed to me extremely difficult to imagine. This had to have been a fairly high official in the White House. He then is alleged to have left a marked-up copy of the Washington Post on the stoop of either Woodward or Bernstein, which was the signal for them to meet him in an underground garage in Washington. I cannot conceive any senior White House official going through those procedures and surviving. (Laughter.) But you know I didn't know the domestic side. They might have had some really tricky characters there. (Laughter.)

MR. SHAW: You did not know the domestic side, but you knew the foreign policy side. I would like to share, if you don't mind with our audience, C-SPAN audience and here in the auditorium, the fact that during the recent handover of Hong Kong from Britain to China I interviewed you at the governor's house as Chris Patten was preparing to withdraw in Hong Kong. And at the time of the interview former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara was in North Vietnam, meeting with the very generals who conducted the war -- prosecuted the war from the side of the Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese. This question from a person in this audience, Dr. Kissinger, is a very simple one: Was the Vietnam War a mistake?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. I think -- let me say two things. (Applause.) I believe the Vietnam War was fought for noble causes, for moral reasons, in pursuit of traditional American objectives. What we did not understand properly was that you could not apply the principles which worked in Europe to Asia, that South Vietnam was not a nation in the sense that we had understood a nation to be in Europe. And then it turned out that we were not prepared to pay the price that was necessary to win that war. So I think from that point of view it was a mistake. I do not, however, agree with Secretary McNamara telling the mothers of the casualties that not only was it a mistake, but he knew all along it was a mistake. That I find very painful -- and even though McNamara is a personal friend of mine. (Applause.)

MR. SHAW: If I read faces correctly, the two of you were thinking very, very deeply, almost on an emotional level as Henry Kissinger was speaking. Can you share with us what was going through your minds?

MR. BAKER: I was wondering if you were going to ask me if I thought the Gulf War was a moral war -- (laughter) -- and I was going to say yes, absolutely. That's really about all that was going through my mind, Bernie. (Laughter.) I was -- I was really reflecting back to the earlier Deep Throat question. (Laughter.)

MR. SHAW: Well, Mr. Christopher?

MR. CHRISTOPHER: I was not thinking about the Deep Throat question. (Laughter.) Well, if this is a truth and consequences time, I was thinking about my time when I was deputy attorney general in 1967 and '68, when the nation was torn by riots in a number of cities following the death of Martin Luther King and the assassination of Bob Kennedy. And I think sometimes we've forgotten how rent our nation was at that period of time, how divisive Vietnam had turned

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out to be. Many of those riots had a very strong Vietnam content to them. And I feel so
fortunate that we have come past that time and begun to put those memories, at least the worst of
them, behind us. There are many valuable lessons that we can draw from the Vietnam War. But
our country was severely tested in 1967 and '68 by the riots that tore through 26 of our major
cities. And I think that a number of people in this audience are certainly much too young to
remember that time, but it's a part of our history that reflects -- to be honest with you, that's
what's going through my mind, Bernie. (Applause.)

MR. SHAW: Thank you. Secretary Kissinger, in a follow-up on China -- well, I correct myself -- this says in a follow-up on China to all -- colon: Should the United States be prepared to go to war over Taiwan? To go to war with China?

DR. KISSINGER: Six American presidents have made clear two principles with respect to Taiwan: One, that we recognize one China, and, secondly, that we consider that the problem ought to be solved by peaceful means. I believe that it is possible to navigate between those two extremes. President Clinton moved two aircraft carriers when there was a threat. And even though I had some disagreements with the Chinese policy at the time, I supported that move. So I think China would be unwise to challenge us militarily in the Taiwan Straits.

We should be careful not to violate in the spirit of the principle of one China, and to try to
navigate between those two policies.

MR. SHAW: Secretary Baker?

MR. BAKER: My view of that, Bernie, is that these same precedents that Henry referred to have followed a policy with respect to what the United States might or might not do in the Taiwan Straits, that could best be characterized as a policy of strategic ambiguity. We don't tell anybody what we might do, and I think that's really important. That doesn't mean that policymakers don't know what they would do under a given circumstance. If war should break out, a lot would depend upon the nature of the conflict, how it happened, who was at fault, and all the rest. Before the United States decides that we are going to fight yet another war all the way across the Pacific, we have got to be very, very careful.

On the other hand, as Henry said, we recognize the People's Republic of China and we
de-recognize Taiwan with the express understanding that we expected a peaceful resolution of
this problem. And if people will concentrate on substance and not on symbols, like a Declaration
of Independence by Taiwan for instance -- if they'll concentrate on substance and not on symbols
-- if you look at the economic contacts now between Taiwan and China, cross-straits contacts
with personnel and investment -- this problem will solve itself as a de facto matter if we give it a
chance and don't insist upon a de jure solution.

But the most important thing is for us to keep people guessing about what the United
States might or might do. Because if we say what we'll do, we could invite China's move,

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aggressive move, against Taiwan, or we could -- we might invite Taiwan to declare independence, which would almost certainly trigger a major response from China.

MR. SHAW: Secretary Christopher?

MR. CHRISTOPHER: Those have been two very thoughtful answers, and I have little to add, except to say that as we did in 1996, it's very important to the United States to counsel both parties -- that is, both China and Taiwan -- to avoid provocative acts. What we least need is something that spins out of control that would force that question on us as to what the United States' position would be. I think that this is counsel to both parties to make sure that they understand the consequences of their acts and to think hard about their provocations.

MR. BAKER: Bernie, let me just say we started this panel discussion out by recognizing that the U.S.-China relationship is extraordinarily important -- China is the emerging global superpower. It's darn important that we get it right. And we also talked about how both from the left and the right people are attacking this policy of constructive engagement with China. I think the administration would be well advised to at least consider going up to Capitol Hill and negotiating with the leadership up there, the Republican leadership, a bipartisan accord on policy toward China, so that the United States can speak with one voice with respect to this all-important relationship. This is something that we did in the Bush administration in 1989 with respect to Central America, when Central American policy was the most divisive foreign policy domestic political issue. And we took it off the domestic political agenda; then solving the foreign policy issues was quite simple. I think that kind of an approach could pay dividends today.
(Applause.)

MR. SHAW: Republican James Baker, you just urged that the Democratic President William Jefferson Clinton go up, to use your words, to Capitol Hill and negotiate a bipartisan accord with respect to China policy. What do you think about this question: Should the Republican leadership, in the form of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi and House Speaker Newt Gingrich of Georgia, give the president some slack and back away from what the White House views as decidedly partisan sniping attacks in politics?

MR. BAKER: Are you asking me that just as a general political matter or with respect to foreign policy issues?

MR. SHAW: Given your pedigree, sir, I mean it on both fronts. (Laughter.)

MR. BAKER: Well, let me give it to you on the foreign policy front. I think I said earlier that we badly need to restore the tradition of bipartisanship in foreign policy. You cannot succeed in foreign policy unless you have domestic political support for your policy. And the only way to really have that domestic political support generally speaking is to find a way to generate and engender bipartisanship. I think Secretary Albright said that, and we've mentioned a number of instances where there has been bipartisanship during the course of the Clinton administration.

[LC]

Political conflict and political dialogue and political -- the adversarial nature of domestic politics being what it is, I don't think I would counsel the Republican leadership to do anything more or less than the executive branch leadership is doing on the political front. They're having some pretty good head-knocking. That's the nature of our system. We believe in free speech and we believe in people articulating their views -- and particularly their political positions. So as a domestic political matter I don't have any problem with it at all.

I do have a problem with it when it spills over into the foreign policy national interest concerns of the United States. We need to find a way to act as one country with one voice in a unified way on some of these critical foreign policy issues like for instance China.

MR. SHAW: Dr. Kissinger, earlier from this stage you criticized President Clinton and you -- to paraphrase you, you said that Mr. Clinton looks at polls too much. What are your thoughts now following Secretary Baker's remarks?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me first make a point with respect to the last remark of Secretary Baker. The problem -- we talk of bipartisanship, but what we really need is quadripartisanship, because every party is so fundamentally divided. I think the most determined opponent that President Clinton has in foreign policy is Representative Gephardt, the minority leader of the Democratic Party in the House. And I think that worries him and the vice president at least as much as things that the Republican leaders might say. And, similarly, the Republicans, if you read some of the Republican weekly journals -- they're severely divided, because some of the Republican right wing want to use foreign policy in order to get control of the party.

Now, I do not think I said President Clinton looked at polls too much, but I think he does -- (laughter) -- so I'll take responsibility for that. But what was your question? Was that a partisan comment? Was that the question? Or should he not look at polls so much?

MR. SHAW: Well, I think I'll move on. You've made your point. (Laughter.)

DR. KISSINGER: But my basic view is that the responsibility of a national leader is to show to the American people a vision of where they should go. It is the role of the president to bridge the gap between where we are and where we should go. And whenever the president -- a president -- does that, especially in foreign policy, he has a very good chance of prevailing. And that is what I hope he will do. And, as I said, I support many of the current policies.

MR. SHAW: Okay, I don't want to get off this subject, because you said something that really aroused me. You just singled out a man who potentially could be a rival of Vice President Al Gore when it comes to getting the Democratic Party's nomination -- you mention Mr. Gephardt of Missouri.¹ But you said he as a Democrat was giving President Clinton more difficulty in matters of foreign policy. There is a man from North Carolina who is a Republican who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -- his name is Jesse Helms. Is he an innocent player in the bi-play of what's going on?

Page 40

DR. KISSINGER: No, but Jesse Helms has the position that he has always held. I mean, anyone in high office knows what he will be facing from Jesse Helms -- (laughter) -- and he has a definable constituency. Gephardt is contesting for the presidential nomination, and he is attacking within the context which is unusual such a major division within a governing party on the conduct of foreign policy.

MR. SHAW: I have a question here that is relevant to the conversation. Is there a danger of partisan politics like campaign finance diluting non-partisan foreign policy? Mr. Christopher, if you could lead off responses.

MR. CHRISTOPHER: Well, there will always be domestic issues that play a heavy role in our body politic and command a lot of time on your news show and others. I do think that foreign policy will continue to be very important to the American people, especially when dangers arise. Bernie, I do think that there should be greater cooperation between Congress and the White House. I have long advocated a compact between the two so that Congress doesn't get into so much micromanagement of foreign policy. You can see that on the sanctions issues. Congress constantly pressing the administration to agree to sanction one country or another. That's far too much micromanagement. But I don't think that we will ever been in a situation where we can rule out the significance of the debate on one domestic issue or another. Since I'm talking, Bernie, I think I ought to say that with respect to Congressman Gephardt, although he has marked out shape differences on one issue -- that is, the trade issue -- and that has historically been his issue, as it was in prior times -- he has not supported trade agreements and he is not supporting fast track. But on the great bulk of the foreign policy issues Gephardt is I think firmly in the Democratic corner. You look at most of the major foreign policy issues, you will find not difference between him and the White House. There is certainly this one sharp difference on trade issues.

MR. SHAW: Your response, Mr. --

MR. BAKER: Well, Bernie, I would firmly agree with Chris that he is not in the Republican corner, if that's what you mean -- (laughter) -- by firmly in the Democratic corner. But I really think this gets back to what we talked about initially, and that is that we have the left wing of the Democratic Party represented by Dick Gephardt on this all important issue of -- it happens to be fast track now -- but it really is an issue of whether America is going to remain engaged with the world and whether we are going to maintain our leadership role. You've got Dick Gephardt. You've got on the far right side -- and we ought not to leave the Republican Party out of this -- you've got Pat Buchanan and you've got Ross Perot out here as an independent -- all of these people are promoting an isolationist protectionist agenda that would be absolutely disastrous for America. And we need to understand it and recognize it and talk about it. (Applause.)

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I agree -- that is the overwhelming issue right now.

Page 41

MR. SHAW: Ladies and gentlemen, there is time for this last question. And I've been trying to choose which of all these questions to ask our panelists, and because of its import I have chosen this as a last question. All the others are extremely interesting -- your views on the land mine treaty, would you recommend a career in public service -- why? -- Dr. Kissinger, as a historian do you see any useful parallels between this and earlier eras? And the quality of the questions goes on and on. But as a last question I will quote it verbatim: "The military rumblings coming out of North Korea are ominous. What is the strategy that you see as potentially most successful in defusing this threat?" Mr. Baker?

MR. BAKER: Well, you've put your finger on one where I know there will be disagreement between my friend Chris and myself, because we have disagreed on this before. I happen to disagree with the administration's entire approach to North Korea, from the date when they turned the policy approach of strength and resolve upside down and went to a policy approach of compromise and negotiation, because I think North Korea is a regime that is built on force. It only understands force and strength. It understands that very clearly. I don't think it understands accommodation and compromise and negotiation.

Chris will tell you why the agreement we worked out is a good agreement. We've had some friendly discussion about this. He hasn't sold me that it is a good agreement, because what I see here is an agreement that obligates the North Koreans to do five years from now what they were really obligated to do two years ago under their commitments to the international community. And we are giving them billions of dollars and light-water nuclear reactors, and free 500,000 metric tons of oil a year free, and engaging in diplomatic discourse with them. And so far it hasn't gotten us anywhere. I think they have interpreted it as a sign of weakness on the part of the United States. I know the South Koreans have major difficulties with the approach we have taken. And therefore I think we need to demonstrate resolve and we need to demonstrate strength.

And you know we kept the peace, Bernie, in Western Europe against an overwhelming Soviet conventional weapons superiority for over 40 years. We kept that peace through the strength of our nuclear deterrent. And I think if we convey the message to the North Koreans that we have a security treaty with South Korea and we have a security treaty with Japan, and we are committed to keeping the peace in the North Pacific in the very same way, I think they'd get the message. (Applause.)

MR. SHAW: Mr. Christopher?

MR. CHRISTOPHER: Well, Jim is right, we have a disagreement. When we came into office in the beginning of 1993 we found that the North Koreans had a nuclear weapons program. It was clear that they had achieved enough plutonium to make probably one bomb. They had a problem that had the possibility of producing enough plutonium for five to ten bombs a year. That problem had not been addressed when we came into office, and we thought it needed to be addressed urgently. And we adopted an approach toward North Korea, working out finally the

Page 42

accord between the United States and North Korea that has absolutely frozen their nuclear weapons program and has caused them also to take some of their spent fuel and begin to move it out of the country. So that's what's been accomplished. Freezing that nuclear weapons program was a matter of great importance, and I certainly think that was something that was not done in the prior administration and was done under our administration.

Now, we have never let our guard down. We still have 37,000 troops in South Korea. What we have done has been in full consonance with South Korea. The nuclear accord that we reached with North Korea -- that is, to furnish some light-water less dangerous reactors -- is one to which not only South Koreans subscribe, but basically they're putting up the money for the reactors, along with Japan. So we have a program that keeps our guard up, but also freezes their nuclear program, and gives the possibility that we might be able to work out an armistice agreement between North and South Korea. Not many people know that there has been no permanent peace treaty between North and South Korea. They are still acting under an armistice. Now, this is one of those issues on which we have had the cooperation of the Chinese -- one of the reasons why Chinese engagement is so important -- because they understand the danger of North Korea, but they've been supporting our program. And I think we ought to press forward with four-nation talks -- that is, North and South Korea with the United States and China involved so as to try to work out a permanent accord with North Korea, rather than having that be the one area of hot conflict remaining in the world. (Applause.)

MR. SHAW: Secretary Kissinger, before you respond -- and none of us has any idea what you are going to say in relation to the subject of North Korea, I'd just like to remind our viewers and listeners and all of us present here, something you said from this podium about an hour and a half ago when you spoke about the three sets of challenges facing Americans in this great country. You said Asia -- the United States is facing something with which we have no experience with, the relationships among Asian countries themselves. Now, sir, the final word from you.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me, first of all, on the immediate issue of the nuclear issue, I am basically on the side of Jim Baker. But let me not pursue that. Let me indicate why Korea is relevant to that question you have just put to me. One, it is highly probable that the Korean regime as it now exists is going to face a possibly terminal crisis within the next five to ten years, which could take any number of forms. It could take the form of a military attack. It could take the form of a military coup in which the government is replaced by obviously the military. It could take the form of wanting to join the South. And one can imagine any number of other forms. Each one of these possibilities creates extraordinary challenges, first because of the surrounding countries -- Japan, China, Russia -- nobody really wants to see Korea unified except the United States and the South Koreans, because the Japanese because they're afraid it will be anti-Japanese; the Chinese because they don't want another strong country at their border. The Russians I think would be -- it's not so clear to me what the Russians would want. But -- and the South Koreans are themselves ambivalent about the economic challenges they would face.

All I'm saying is that to reconcile these different points of view requires, one, a far-sided

Page 43

diplomacy now; secondly, it is absolutely impossible without China. And the people who so easily start a confrontation with China should know that one of the results could easily be a Korean war. And there are many possibilities by which this thing might be resolved in diplomacy. But the worst way to resolve it is to wait for the explosion to happen and then to try to improvise a solution.

So Korea is an extraordinarily important test case of what I said before: Our ability to bring together different national interests in that region in a manner that preserves peace and stability and the possibility of progress. And that requires a high degree of cooperation between China and the United States. (Applause.)

MR. SHAW: We thank you, because each of you has given us so much insight. But you've also given us an awful lot to think about. And still to come from this stage and this program, former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev and the rewarding of the Enron (sp) Prize. That's coming up very, very shortly. We thank you gentlemen. (Applause.)

MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, please remain seated as we prepare the stage for the presentation of the Enron (sp) Prize.

We'd like to ask Secretary Baker and Dr. -- (inaudible) -- to come onto the stage please. (Applause.)

Ladies and gentlemen, please join us in welcoming an extraordinary statesman who has honored us with his participation in our dedication conference, His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev, former president of the Soviet Union. (Applause. Cheers.)

MR. DJEREJIAN: Indeed this is a very momentous occasion. Today we will present the second annual Enron (ph) Prize for Distinguished Public Service. As many of you know, the first award was given to a very great and courageous American, General Colin Powell. (Applause.) And the second Enron (ph) Prize will be presented to an equally great and courageous Russian, Mikahil Gorbachev. (Applause.)

Two thousand years ago when the Athenians held a funeral for their fallen soldiers, their leader Pericles said to them, "You must make up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom depends on being courageous." Pericles' words are certainly equal true today and equally true on this occasion. In our century the happiness and freedom of hundreds of millions of people depended on the courage of one man. Standing before us is the father of freedom and democracy in Russia, and most of the former Soviet Union. (Applause.)

As the leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev courageously resisted the powerful forces of bureaucracy, civilization, the KGB, and the second most powerful military in the world. By leading the government that had crushed so many before him, he had managed to unleash the forces of liberty, democracy and of course capitalism in the large powerful Soviet Bloc.

(Applause.) Not only did he unleash these forces in the former Soviet Union, but he set off movement around the world where governments have embraced democracy, liberty and liberalized free enterprise, which in fact has changed the lives again of not just hundreds of millions of people, but billions of people.

I am delighted today to join Jim Baker in presenting the second annual Enron (sp) Prize to Mikhail Gorbachev, a truly extraordinary leader of our times and of all times. Jim? (Applause.)

MR. BAKER: ladies and gentlemen, it sometimes seems today in this age of relentless hype that we often refer to public figures in news events as historic when sometimes they're not. But I don't think this ought to blind us to the fact that there are events that are truly historic, just as there are individuals that fully deserve the description, although both are rare.

One such event of course was the breathtakingly dramatic change that swept Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and 1990s. And one such individual is this year's recipient of the Enron (sp) Prize for Distinguished Public Service.

Through his policies of perestroika and glasnost, Mikhail Gorbachev forever put his country's Stalinist past behind it, and he set the Soviet Union on an irreversible path toward freedom. Thanks to his courageous efforts, hundreds of millions of individuals around the world today enjoy immensely more hopeful lives than when he first came to power. And this is not just true of the citizens of the former Soviet Union, or even the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. It is also true of Americans -- Americans who no longer fear the horror of thermal nuclear war. After 40 years -- after 40 long years, the Cold War ended peacefully, and it ended in very large part because of the high ideals and because of the consummate statesmanship; and, above all else, because of the tremendous personal and political courage of Mikhail Gorbachev. (Applause.) It was for this that he rightly received the Nobel Prize for Peace, and it is for this that the world is forever in his debt. (Applause.) He is an historic figure in the fullest sense of the word, and his presence here today truly does honor to us all.

Mr. President, the inscription on this year's award reads as follows: "In recognition of the magnificent personal and political courage which he demonstrated in making outstanding and historic contributions to world peace and security, President Mikhail Gorbachev. The Enron (ph) Prize for Distinguished Public Service, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University, October 1997." (Applause.)

MR. DJEREJIAN: It is now our honor to ask President Gorbachev to come to the podium for his presentation. President Gorbachev. (Applause.)

MR. GORBACHEV: Ladies and gentlemen, first of all I would like to thank you, to thank the Enron (sp) Corporation, to thank the Baker Institute for the honor. It's a funny situation when one is facing the audience at a time -- a moment like this, and one hears the verdict or the evaluation of what one has done. I regard myself as a balanced individual. I understand

Page 45

that on two occasions these words are spoken -- first when one receives awards, and second at funerals. (Laughter.) Fortunately it's the first occasion today. (Applause.)

I am very pleased to participate together with you in this conference that is discussing very intriguing and very important issues. I would like to salute here my old friends, the secretaries of state of the United States. These are people who are known not only in this country, but throughout the world -- people who have done many important things and who continue to do important things. Political leaders who are retired from their station, position, still have their moral responsibility for the decisions that they took -- and also responsibility for the future of their countries and for the world. Their participation in this conference I think is evidence of the fact that they are ready to take that responsibility.

The theme of my remarks today is the problems of today and the priorities for tomorrow. This is exactly -- this is precisely what you have been discussing these days.

The situation in the world today, I think, is a situation of transition; and therefore it's a very contradictory situation. And this has to do not only with geopolitics, but above all the dramatic changes in the very fundamentals of our civilization. I am making this remark, because I wanted to identify my focus in my speech. I believe that today priorities for foreign policy cannot be based exclusively on the national interests, or even on the changes that happened in the world after the Cold War. This is not a sufficient point of departure, even though the national interests are very important -- and they will continue to be important in shaping foreign policy. And of course this is not to underestimate the important changes that happened in the world in the years after the Cold War. The world in which we live today is dramatically different -- not only from the state of the world in the beginning of the 20th century, but even from the state of the world in the middle of the 20th century. We are facing a situation that I think was very aptly described by Alvin Toffler, and that is the future shock. I think it is the shock of facing the future of a global and globalizing world -- globalization, which received a powerful additional impetus as a result of the end of the Cold War and as a result of progress in arms reduction, is certainly the dominating feature of contemporary development.

I believe that we cannot speak of foreign policy priorities for the 21st century without taking into account the global changes that mankind and the international community is confronting at the end of this century.

I have given a lot of thought to these challenges, and recently the Gorbachev Foundation, of which I am president, has decided to undertake a research project to study the global challenges of the 21st century. The question is: Are we prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century? We cannot think about the future by just extrapolating the past. The question -- the key question -- can be formulated in this way: Do we have the political philosophy and the policies that are appropriate in these new circumstances? There has been a lot of debate about this. Nevertheless, I feel that the international community still lives by mostly traditional concepts. However, the challenges that mankind is facing are monumental, and they require the

Page 46

development of long-term strategies, new priorities and new principles for the relationship
between man and nature, between the individual and society, and relations between different
cultures and religions. Therefore we need a radical change in attitudes, in the mind-set.

The time has come that dictates a new quality and a new perspective in looking at things.
And therefore we need to take a very broad view of the world as an integrated whole.
Globalization is an objective process that cannot be stopped; nor can it be wished away. This
however does not mean that the world that the international community is facing some kind of
inevitable or fateful situation, that we know how the process of globalization will proceed,
whether this process will be monopolized by someone or whether it will be a process led by the
entire international community. A lot will depend on how the international politics will change.
There are always alternatives in history -- always alternative scenarios that are possible in history.
And the 20th century I think is evidence of that fact.

The real threat of global nuclear catastrophe compelled the leaders of major powers at the
end of the 1980s to make an important choice and to abandon many old stereotypes, to rethink
the priorities. I believe that this is an important lesson in the context of what we are discussing --
that is to say foreign policy priorities. The Soviet leadership at the time took -- assumed the main
part of the burden of this difficult rethinking and of the initiatives that followed from this
rethinking. It is also very important that we were supported -- initially rather cautiously -- but we
were supported by our partners. The result was the end of a confrontation and the emergence of
unprecedented opportunities for real interaction and equitable cooperation for all countries.
Unfortunately so far these opportunities have not been exploited properly. And one of the
reasons is that the end of the Cold War was presented by some people in the West -- I would say
by many people in the United States -- was presented as rather than the victory of common sense
over the logic of confrontation -- it was presented as a victory of one side -- one side that was
attained by using the method of force and confrontation. So apparently the conclusion would be
that in the future the same method should be used. I am looking here at Henry Kissinger. We are
I think looking for the truth but perhaps have somewhat different approaches.

My feeling is that if we base future politics on force, as would follow from this evaluation
from the end of the Cold War, then of course everything would seem very simple -- big stick
politics, but I don't think this is the right choice. (Applause.)

I think that this kind of politics and this kind of logic is inconsistent with the truth. And
actions based on such an approach has already done a lot of damage to international relations at a
time when the situation in the world should give rise to a lot of concern. We see instability and
we see bloodshed in Europe -- in Europe where the situation for decades seemed rather tranquil,
even though we know the price of that tranquility. We see that the process of building Europe is
going very slowly. We see the crises in the former Soviet Union that make it very difficult to
transform the process there. The process of peace settlement in the Middle East is proceeding
with a lot of difficulty. I think you will agree that international organizations -- in particular the
United Nations and the OSCE -- are in a crisis. We see economic upheavals -- first in Mexico and

now in Southeast Asia -- that indicate that international economics may encounter serious
difficulties. We see the growth in the environmental problems in the world. We see the problems
such as crime, terrorism and drug trafficking are becoming global. Those are very serious
concerns. And therefore I believe that the main priority today should be the shaping of a new
world order that would be consistent with the challenges faced by the world today.

By the way, the words "New World Order" were first used by the U.S. administration.
But this would seem that then the administration put the idea of a new world order on the back
burner. So let us sort things out.

Of course building such a world order is a monumental challenge, and today no one can
have a prescription for what kind of world order we should build.

So, how do we address that task? I feel that we should not go with the flow. We need a
set of goals. I believe that over the past years we have seen that the international community will
not accept a world order under the auspices of one power or a group of countries. We should
also avoid another temptation to think that the management of global processes requires a kind of
uniformity of nations, that the national character of economics, politics and culture should be
minimized. I believe that this interpretation of globalization is in a way similar to the well known
thesis about the withering away of the state. But I believe that the national states are here to stay.
I believe that it is the governments -- the states that in the foreseeable future will be primarily
responsible to their own citizens and to the international community.

The crisis situation in Southeast Asia for example has been analyzed by the economists,
many of whom believe that the regulating role of the state is important in overcoming that crisis.
Therefore we should find a reasonable balance between national and global politics. We should
implement that kind of balance in the organization of the international community. I believe that
that organization, the organizational structure of the international community, should be based on
a reformed United Nations. (Applause.)

I believe that the emerging global system requires legitimate governments that will reflect
the collective will of the international community, that will have sufficient powers in addressing
global problems. G-7, G-8, or whatever other organization, cannot substitute for the U.N., even
though their role is also important, and they should continue to function. But they cannot be a
substitute for the United Nations.

Also, attempts to subordinate the United Nations to the influence of one power or group
will be futile. We have seen over the past years very often that geopolitics games and rejection of
reasonable compromise developed through international effort -- results in the conflict continuing,
and results in the suffering of many people. Let us recall the fate of the Vance-Owen plan for the
settlement in Bosnia, to say nothing of the fact that in itself the Yugoslav crisis was in large
measure the result of geopolitical competition and hasty recognition of the republics, of the
seceding republics.

Today we concede that perhaps similar games could be played around the young states in Central Asia and the trans Caucasus. I have said many times that I reject this kind of politics. This kind of politics fuels confrontation in the regions of the world. We can only put an end to this kind of rivalry if we build continental and regional security systems that would work together with the United Nations. I regret the fact that in Europe we missed the opportunities that were given by the Charter of Paris that was signed in 1990 by European countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead of strengthening the OSCE and creating a Security Council for Europe, in which of course the United States and Canada will participate, we have seen the expansion of NATO -- NATO that recaptures the functions that were presumed for OSCE.

But NATO is a military alliance inherited from the Cold War, and it cannot be a substitute for the OSCE. What I am worried about is not so much the admission of a couple of new countries into that alliance; what I am worried about is the change of goals, the goals that used to be a really united Europe. And this concern has been heightened after the recent hearings in the Senate of the United States, and specifically by some remarks made by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. I sometimes want to suggest to the secretary of state to take a rather more cautious approach, because this is a very, very situation today. Europe is a focal point when many things began. And if once again we draw a dividing line in Europe, this could result in very undesirable developments.

I have been told that Henry Kissinger here has been speaking about Russia, and that Dr. Kissinger believes that interaction and engagement with Russia is important, and that the role of Russia should be understood and accepted. I welcome this fact. I welcome these remarks. At the same time, I think that there is still a line that very often is drawn, that Dr. Kissinger draws between Europe and Russia. Dr. Kissinger, who is my old friend and sometimes opponent, thinks of Europe in terms of starting in Brest, France, and ending in Brest, Byelorussia. To me, Europe is from the Atlantic to the Urals -- and to Vladivostok. And I think that this is the Europe that we accepted in the documents that many of us signed. I wouldn't want this narrower Europe to be supported. (Applause.)

The decision about NATO enlargement could result in problems in arms reduction. This decision gives ammunition to those who are trying to question the need for ratification by the Russia parliament of the START II Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. In Russia an increasing number of people believe that the United States would like to take advantage of Russia's temporary weakness, that the United States prefers a pliable regime in Russia, that the United States is somewhat hasty in taking sudden decisions. This is of grave concern to me. I must say that speaking in Russia I always defend the same position that I took during the years when we changed our relationship, when we developed a partnership and trust, and when we opened the prospect not only for our bilateral relations, but also for global politics. So I have to defend my policies. And that is very often because here in the United States sometimes decisions are taken that are not carefully thought through.

Not only in Russia, but also in other countries of Europe, people want to understand what

kind of united Europe does the United States envision -- what kind of principle of united Europe does the United States envision -- what kind of role for America and Russia. If the United States regards united Europe as a real prospect, then why does the United States give no attention to the Charter of Paris, which we signed in 1990? Why does the United States distance itself from the OSCE process? Could NATO enlargement be an attempt to continue a kind of protectorate over Europe? All of these questions are the questions that we have to ask. And this makes it even more difficult to undertake the very complicated transition in Europe.

We also see the emergence of problems in other areas, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, where Russian-U.S. interaction is particularly important. Of equal importance from the standpoint of foreign policy priorities is the Asia and the Pacific region. Here, as in Europe, the interests of the United States and Russia engage, and here we also engage with increasingly important countries such as China, India, Japan and Indonesia. The stable economic development of these countries does not yet allow us to think that their future and their foreign policy course is quite predictable. And therefore policies in this region have to be extremely responsible. I am very much against playing a card -- the policy of playing a card, the policy of confrontation, the politics of power. And this I would like to emphasize in this context. Equally unacceptable is ideologization of relations with these countries. China will definitely become one of the political and economic centers in the coming century. China will have to face the problem of conforming the political system in the country with its economic evolution. Not only China itself, but the international community as a whole has an interest in the stable and sustainable development of that country. And this interest should be reflected not only in bilateral relations with China, but also in engaging China in international institutions.

The problems of global and regional security, of international law, and the problems of bilateral relations cannot be seen separately from the global trends and contradictions from the challenges that I've mentioned. This is an interdependent complex, and this should be analyzed and assessed and taken into account, both in our domestic and international policies.

As I've told you, the Gorbachev Foundation has undertaken a research project on the global challenges, and we are inviting the research centers and international institutions to participate in that project. We have created the international board of supervisors, to which I would like to invite the secretaries of state. I would like for them to respond to this project. I hope that we will be able to cooperate fruitfully with the James Baker Institute, with Rice University, and with other think tanks in the United States. (Applause.)

I have had a meeting this morning with President Bush, and we agreed that we will also cooperate within this theme, and we will try to develop a common agenda for this project.

These fundamental problems -- these issues are of grave concern to me, and therefore I have to speak about these concerns to you. Nevertheless, I think that my remarks will be complete only if I speak about the specific situation today in the Russian-U.S. relations. Russia today is still in the throes of the crisis that is extraordinary difficulty. Russia doesn't want to

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return to the totalitarian past. Still, our society is very disappointed about what has been
happening recently. This disappointment also extends to other aspects of Russia's international
relations. The euphoria of hopes that there will be a conflict-less partnership with the West has
been replaced by increasing mistrust towards the intentions of the West. This kind of attitude is
quite strong among some members of the Russian establishment. It is also extending to broader
public opinion, and can take root. My impression is that mistrust towards Russia is also gaining
ground among some American leaders and some people. Is there reason for this?

I believe that, yes, there are some pretexts and excuses for such an attitude, but there is no
fundamental reason for this. Some people, however, think differently. Recently I read a report of
the Washington Institute, Center for Strategic International Studies, about corruption in Russia.
Two senators and three former CIA heads conclude in effect that Russia cannot be dealt with, that
Russia is dangerous to the U.S. national interests. The authors of that report, who are very
competent people, I think must know that neither today nor in the future can Russia threaten the
fundamental national interests of the United States. So what is happening?

Well, it seems that there is a demand for this kind of suggestion, as I have already said.
Last September, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, in the Wall Street Journal, explained
the American vision of Russia. Jim Baker of course remembers that I asked President Bush about
what is the U.S. vision of Russia in London when we were meeting prior to the G-7 meeting.
And I said, "Mr. President, I still feel that in America there is some vacillation about what kind of
Russia America would like to see. What kind of Russia do you want to see? A stable, democratic
free Russia or a weak Russia, or a Russia that would be fraught with all kinds of contradictions
and problems and even unpredictability?" The article by Strobe Talbott explains the kind of vision
that the U.S. has of Russia, and I believe that this vision is okay with us. This explanation is okay.
This is acceptable. But we would like the rhetoric to be consistent with the policies, with the
actions.

The German philosopher Hegel once said that the essence of things is not so much in its
object but in its realizations. So it's the realization, the implementation of U.S. policies, that is
today questioned by many people in Russia. The first question is: Is there a hidden agenda in the
Western policy, in the American policies toward Russia? Is that agenda based perhaps on the idea
of containment, and even roll-back? Is an attempt being made to shove Russia away from
important international issues, even from issues that are within its legitimate sphere of interests?
Is perhaps an attempt being made to address international problems by one country alone?

The second question: Can we perhaps expect that there is an attempt being made to
prevent any kind of integration, even voluntary integration, of former Soviet republics?

The third question: Is the model that is being imposed or recommended by Western
financial institutions to Russia -- is that a model that could result in Russia becoming a huge raw
material province, a province which is marginal to the real centers of international economics and
politics?

These questions are asked not only by people who are committed to old stereotypes and who are stuck in the past; I am the person who gave a lot of effort to normalize relations with the United States after many years of confrontation, and I hear those questions from people who are not instinctively anti-American. I hear those questions from people who are very friendly, and have been friendly for many years, toward America. And if the American leadership doesn't want -- if the American government doesn't want to undermine the psychological basis for the normal long-term relations with our country, it has to take these doubts into account.

I would say this -- I would say this about U.S.-Russian relations: Today the U.S.-Russian relationship -- I am trying to put it very mildly -- is a kind of process that is very flabby. I feel that the strategy of the United States with respect to my country, with respect to Russia, that would be based on the assumption that a weakened Russia is consistent with American interests -- this strategy is both unrealistic -- unrealistic because in large measure this will not be decided by the United States, but this strategy would be quite dangerous if it became the real national policy of the United States. I am sure that in the final analysis the best interests of the United States, today and for the future, would be best served by a stable, strong democratic and free Russia, which will be a reliable and active partner for your country. (Applause.) Taking into account the fact that in the Asia and the Pacific new centers of power are emerging that have to be balanced by others, I believe that cooperation between a united Europe, Canada, Russia, the United States, is of great importance. It would be a center that would balance the new international world order.

Perhaps the United States has not decided how to deal with Russia. And that is why my remarks might be useful in your thinking. Of course the scenario that will prevail in Russia depends above all on the Russian people themselves. After several years which have in large measure been lost in terms of real reform, Russia is still facing a choice. It has yet to decide about the fundamentals of its socioeconomic development, about its main national values, its place in the world, the model for its armed forces. All of these issues still need to be addressed, and it's our responsibility to address these issues. This is our responsibility to our people and to the international community. (Applause.)

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of future outlook, I continue to be optimistic. My concern is that we should make sure that we do not get into some kind of zig-zag or detour for another decade or two. It is important to preserve the direction of movement of Russia toward democracy, freedom, market economics and openness. This direction should not be allowed to be replaced by a confrontational direction. I believe that Russia will not turn back the clock. The people of Russia don't want a return to the past.

Last year President Yeltsin won, even though 50 percent of those who voted for him did not support him personally. But they voted for him because they didn't want the Communists to win in that election. Russia is thinking in new terms. Russia is looking to the future. And you -- it's important to support that country. It's important to support the Russian nation in its effort to make Russia a free democratic and dynamic country. And we very much hope that we will have the cooperation of Western countries, and the United States in particular

Over the past few months, I believe that there has been such a change for the better -- some change for the better. The business community in the United States, I feel, now intends to implement some important cooperative projects with Russia -- not only in the oil-and-gas sector, but also in other sectors. If this is a sign of a new trend, I believe that this is perhaps the most important evidence that things are changing, and hopefully in the policies of the U.S. administration the changes, such changes, are to be very much welcomed.

So I continue to be optimistic about the prospects for our cooperation that will be good for the United States, because that will create jobs, that will create orders from Russia's immense market, and the Russian market I believe is unique and indispensable to you.

Over the past three years I've been visiting the United States very often, and I believe that I have gained very good knowledge of America and the American people. The further away one gets from Washington and New York -- and as perhaps from Moscow and St. Petersburg -- the more interesting the discussion becomes and the more rapid the rapport is established. And that is indeed so. (Applause.)

And during my trip, wherever and about whatever I speak, I always finish by saying this: I ask people -- well, you probably want me to speak about the outlook for America and Russia. Of course. And I said, well, let me first say about the United States -- and what I said to Americans -- and I have said that many times -- and the response to what I said was really amazing. So what I said was this: In the world as a whole, in various countries which I visit and among the leaders of those countries with whom I spoke, there is a feeling that the United States should never revert to isolationism; nor should it try to be a policeman, a global policeman. (Applause.) And whenever I asked people, I said, "Do you Americans need that kind of role?," people applaud me, always agreeing with this. And I've spoken to large groups like 2,000, or even 20,000 people. So I feel that the policies of the U.S. government will have to reflect this attitude of the American people. And I believe that this should give us confidence that the attitude, the feelings of our people, will make it possible for our two countries to be long-term strategic partners. Thank you. (Applause.)

MR. DJEREJIAN: Please remain seated while our distinguished guests leave the room. This concludes the Third Annual Conference of the Baker Institute. Thank you very much for coming.

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