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We then drove to the house of the American Counsel where I had just time to get ready for a dinner to which he had invited the leaders of the Buddhist movement in Hue--specifically, the rector of Hue University, the leader of the Buddhist student association, the Secretary General of Hue University and a group of others whose names I have separately.

It is almost impossible to describe the conversations because Vietnamese deviousness combined with Buddhist vagueness to produce a rather weird atmosphere. For example, all participants bitterly complained about divisions within Vietnamese society but they also said that the way to solve the problem was to call a meeting of all contending groups whose divisions they just deplored and create a government on the consensus of all.

The most coherent of the group was the Rector of Hue University, who is very close to one of the leading Tri Quang. He said that the difficulty with the Vietnamese government was that as constituted it represented nothing. It had no popular mandate to prosecute the war and it was bound to come to a deplorable end. General Thieu, the Chief of State was a fascist. General Ky was a cipher. The existing government, in short, had to be replaced. When I asked by what, he said this would emerge through the process of replacing it. I asked whether he knew who might replace it. He was evasive. I said that I was not clear whether he did not know or would not tell me. He said he knew but would not say. I asked him then in the name of what program it should be replaced. He said that, too, was something that should be left to the process of replacement. I asked how he would determine the popular will. Specifically,

of replacement. I asked how he would determine theائر will. Specifically,
replaced. He said that, too, was something that should be left to the process
but would not say. I asked him then in the name of what program it should be
was not clear whether he did not know or would not tell me. He said he knew
I asked whether he knew who might replace it. He was evasive. I said that I
I asked by what, he said this would emerge through the process of replacing it.
was a cipher. The existing government, in short, had to be replaced. When
to a deplorable end. General Thien, the Chief of State was a socialist. General Ky
nothing. It had no popular mandate to precede the war and it was bound to come
difficulty with the Vietnamese government was that so constituted it represented
is very close to one of the leading
TRI Cuong Dung
He said that the

The most coherent of the group was the Rector of Hue University, who
they had deposed and created a government on the confluence of all.

the problem was to call a meeting of all contending groups whose divisions
divisions within Vietnamese acceded but they also said that the way to solve
atmosphere. For example, all partisans bitterly complained about
devionamea combined with Buddhist顺suanness to produce a rather weird

It is almost impossible to describe the conversations because Vietnamese
University and a group of others whose names I have already.

leader of the Buddhist student association, the Secretary General of Hue
Buddhist movement in Hue--absolutely, the rector of Hue University, the
time to get ready for a dinner to which he had invited the leaders of the
We then drove to the home of the American Geometer where I had that
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what do elections mean in the villages. He said, "Je m'en fou de democratie
dans les villages." The villagers are too ignorant to vote. We ought to
have a vote in the cities and on that basis elect a President charged with
prosecuting and ending the war. In the cities, of course, the Buddhist
organizations would be dominant--particularly if the Army had been brought
to a point where it was willing to relinquish power.

I then spoke to the Dean of the Faculty of Law of Hue University. He
repeated many of the arguments of the Rector except he felt that it was
premature to move to the election of a President. He thought that the present
military government was useful to get Vietnam out of its present mess and
to bring about a certain amount of stability. However, it would have to be
overthrown if it did not give way peacefully to a civilian government after a
reasonable time. He said that he and fifty friends of his all at the middle
and upper level of the Administration were meeting bi-weekly in Saigon to
plan taking over the government in two years. Some Generals had approached
them in order to tie in with them but his group had decided that they wanted
to be free of military influence. Also, he said that the war would have to be
prosecuted energetically. And that Communism would have to be purged both
from the North and the South.

None of this gives a flavor of the nationalism, superciliousness and
abstractness of the participants.

I was told by the members of the American Consulate later that only
four months ago this group had engaged in violent anti-American demonstrations,

four months ago this group had ended in violent anti-American demonstrations. I was told by the members of the American Communist later that only apathy of the participants.

None of this gives a flavor of the nationsman, the apersonalism and
from the North and the South.

prosecuted energetically. And that Communism would have to be buried both
to be free of military influence. Alao, he said that the war would have to be
them in order to tie in with them but his group had decided that they wanted
plan taking over the government in two years. Some Generals had approached
and higher level of the Administration were meeting bi-weekly in Saigon to
reasonable time. He said that he and his friends of his all at the middle
overthrow it if it did not give way peacefully to a civilian government after a
to bring about a certain amount of stability. However, it would have to be
military government was useful to get Vietnam out of its present mess and
premature to move to the election of a President. He thought that the present
repeated many of the arguments of the Rector except he felt that it was

I then spoke to the Dean of the Faculty of Law of Hne University. He
to a point where it was willing to relinquish power.

organizations would be dominant--particularly if the Army had been brought
prosecuting and ending the war. In the cities, of course, the Buddhist
have a vote in the cities and on that basis elect a President charged with
dana lea villages." The villages are too adamant to vote. We ought to
what do elections mean in the villages. He said, "I'm not for democracy

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and five months ago had encouraged the sacking of the USIS office in Hue.
When I asked what they really wanted the American Consular officials
were of the view that the Buddhists really wanted to take over political
power. The Buddhists felt that the Catholics had had the top jobs for nine
years under Diem. Now it was their turn. They had hounded all the Catholic
professors out of the university including the Catholic Rector who had opposed
Diem and who had been in enormous difficulties as a result of it. On the
occasion of a trip to Saigon, he had received a telegram that having not made
a public statement in support of some Buddhist demonstration they assumed
that he was opposed to it and that he was therefore deposed. All other
Catholic professors had left except one to whom I had talked this evening
but who was more Buddhist than the Buddhists.

Also I had a brief conversation with the Editor of the student newspaper
who now has some administrative position at the University which had
arranged all the recent demonstrations. He argued that the students had
demonstrated because the government was not really based on the people.
It lacked legitimacy either to conduct a war or to make peace. The only
legitimate government in Vietnam were unhappily the Vietcong, who had
achieved their legitimacy by beating the French. I asked him whether he
had any idea of how to achieve legitimacy and he smiled superciliously and
said no. He had a round Buddha face and was wearing very thick glasses and
spoke superb French. He said this is a very difficult question which would
take the whole evening to answer. He then said the only thing he wanted to
convey was that the government had to be established on a religious basis.

["convey was that the government had to be established on a religious basis. It was not that the government had to be established on a religious basis. It

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I asked whether a religious government would include all sects or just one sect. He again said this is a very difficult question which will take all evening to answer. I asked him what program a religious program would contain. I again received the same supercilious answer. On the other hand, he was verbose on the issue of what was wrong with the government even though I could not draw him into any discussion of how to alter it. One of the difficulties was, of course, that there was a mob scene--fifteen Buddhists and four Americans strategically interspersed practically leaning over them to take down their words. None of these Buddhists had been inside the consulate before and had been attracted by me.

The difficulty is that except for the Lansdale group there are few Americans here who can really talk to the Vietnamese. By really talk, I mean someone whom the Vietnamese can respect as an individual rather than as a representative of the American government. This is true not only in Hue where actually the Consul is extremely good but it is noticeable everywhere, including Saigon. The provincial reporters are fine and perceptive but they are kids. One does not have the sense of the kind of report between them and individual Vietnamese which goes beyond their official relationship. All diplomats are trying to receive specific information on specified subjects and we, therefore, miss the undercurrent on which everything depends.

everything depends.

on specified aspects and we, therefore, miss the undercurrent on which official relationship. All diplomats are trying to receive specific information report between them and individual Vietnamese which does beyond their perceptive but they are kids. One does not have the sense of the kind of everywhere, including Saigon. The provincial reporters are fine and only in Hue where actually the Conan is extremely good but it is noticeable than as a representative of the American government. This is true not mean someone whom the Vietnamese can respect as an individual rather Americans here who can really talk to the Vietnamese. By really talk, I The difficulty is that except for the Lanzedate group there are few before and had been attracted by me.

to take down their words. None of these Budhists had been inside the conclave and four Americans strategically interwaded practically learning over them the difficulties was' of comae, that there was a mop acene--fifteen Budhists through I could not draw him into any discussion of how to alter it. One of he was suppoe on the lause of what was wrong with the government even contains. I again received the same unprecedented snigger. On the other hand, evening to snigger. I asked him what program a religion program would sect. He again said this is a very difficult question which will take all I asked whether a religion government would include all sects or just one

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Another interesting aspect of the Buddhists was that they all talked as if the war against the VC was not the key problem. They strongly implied that it would be best if the Americans did all the fighting and have the Vietnamese government confine itself to pacification. But above all, they argued that their major problem was how to gain political power. This was going on while air and artillery barrages could be heard in a perimeter all around Hue so much so that the windows were rattling. But I suppose what the Buddhists mean is that it is not their war and in a way this is not unrepresentative of most Vietnamese intellectuals whom I have met.

I asked all the Buddhists whether they have ever had any contact with the Vietcong. The Rector of the University said that it was much too dangerous to do so in Hue but that occasionally when he went to Paris he corresponded with people in Hanoi.

I asked most of them whether they ever went into the villages. The Rector spoke of the villages with absolutely withering contempt. Of the others only two ever went to the villages, one because he had parents living four kilometers from Hue. This editor was the editor of the student newspaper during the riots. He tried to tell me that the villagers avidly followed politics in Saigon, a proposition that I would doubt seriously. He also claimed that there had never been any VC in his village, a proposition that is contradicted by all our intelligence reports.

there had never been any VC in his village, a proposition that is contradicted
in Saigon, a proposition that I would doubt seriously. He said claimed that
during the riots. He tried to tell me that the villagers avidly followed politics
kilometers from Hue. This editor was the editor of the student newspaper
only two ever went to the village, one because he had parents living four
Rector spoke of the village with spaconely withering contempt. Of the others
corresponded with people in Hanoi.

dangerous to do so in Hue but that occasionally when he went to Paris he
with the Vietcong. The Rector of the University said that it was much too
met.

this is not representative of most Vietnamese intellectuals whom I have
I suppose what the Buddhists mean is that it is not their war and in a way
perimeter all around Hue so much so that the windows were rattling. But
this was doing on while air and artillery barrages could be heard in a
they argued that their major problem was how to gain political power.

the Vietnamese government confine itself to pacification. But apovs all,
implied that it would be best if the Americans did all the fighting and have
so if the war against the VC was not the key problem. They strongly

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The overwhelming impression left by the Buddhists was that this is a
group eager for power--manipulative, conspiratorial, though not very
touch, determined to take over power at some point. How they will do it
and in what manner is not clear. They may well do so in a neutralist guise
and they will almost surely overestimate their ability to manipulate the VC.
Several of them said that once peace was achieved they would conquer the
Communists with Buddhist love.

After the Buddhists left I sat around talking to the Consular personnel
until about midnight. The Consul is a very good man who has written a most
thoughtful report on Danang.

thoughtful report on Dhamnd.

until spout midnight. The Conan is a very good man who has written a most

After the Budhdiata lett I sat around talking to the Conan. peraoumel

Communists with Budhdiat love.

Seversl of them said that once peace was achieved they would condier the

and they will almost amely overeatimate their ability to manipulate the AC.

and in what manner is not clear. They may well do so in a neutraliat quite
touch, determined to take over power at some point. How they will do it
droud easier for power--manipulative, conspiratorial, though not very

The overwhelming impression left by the Budhdiata was that this is a

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Unedited notes written down
at the end of each day.

Henry A. Kissinger

October 25 - Hue

I called on Father Demeres, a Canadian, and Father Deleffre, a French priest, who run the Xavier Youth Center and who have been in Hue for three years. Both of them had served in China before then. I found the talk with them among the most interesting that I have had in Vietnam. Father Demeres did most of the talking. I asked them to tell me if they noticed any difference between the Vietnamese and the Chinese. They said the differences were enormous. The Chinese were proud and difficult but once their friendship had been gained they were absolutely reliable. The Vietnamese were trustworthy only in family relationships. No Vietnamese thought anything of betraying even his seemingly closest friend and did not seem to hold a grudge against those who had betrayed him. It was next to impossible to win the confidence of the Vietnamese. They love intrigue and are professional opportunists. They work hard to overthrow almost any government that exists, but they have no idea with what to replace it. To be sure they have reason for their behavior. They view correctly that their government is corrupt and inefficient. The young people that the priests knew join the government forces only when they do not have enough pull to escape the draft or when they are to all practical purposes kidnapped. The concept of loyalty did not exist in Vietnam. One could, therefore, not say that they were for or against the Viet Cong. One had to admire the Viet Cong courage and devotion, which is extraordinary for a Vietnamese and which simply does not exist on the governmental side.

As far as the people on the governmental side are concerned, they fear the VC and they will, therefore, avoid doing anything specific to fight them. Which way they will line up depends entirely on which way

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

they believe the war is going. This is particularly true of the intellec-
tuals and those living in the cities. For example, last year the real
cause of the riots in Hue against the United States was the conviction of
most people that the Communists would eventually win. Therefore, they
wanted to establish some proof of anti-American activity. The arrival of
the Marines magically changed the attitude toward Americans because it
set up a new set of expectations. The very people who had rioted against
USIS suddenly became very friendly to the Americans. The Fathers did not
want to give the impression that the Vietnamese were liars. One had to
understand that words to the Vietnamese had a different significance than
for the West. They did not have a concept of truth. Words were something
you used to obtain favors or to protect yourself against authority. In
order to understand what a Vietnamese was saying one had to determine what
he was trying to accomplish and his words had meaning only in relation to
that. In short, truth is instrumental. That is, to Westerners the con-
cept of lying means that one knows what the truth is and that one deviates
from it deliberately for some purpose. The first step does not exist in
the Vietnamese mind.

The Fathers said that in Vietnam even Catholics were more
atheistic than Western atheists; that at heart all Vietnamese were animists.
The notion of transcendant sacrifice is incomprehensible to a Vietnamese.
At one point Father Demares said sadly: "I have the uneasy feeling that
my flock is convinced that Christ did not mount the Cross. Instead, before
being put on it, he was hit from behind by a meat-axe." What the Vietna-
mese believes depends on a balance of forces that they see existing. But

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3

the Fathers had to say that this did not seem to apply to the VC.

They said also that the students show a willingness to sacrifice for immediate objectives, but not on the government side. They are willing to work for the poor. And they will work at night in the schools that the Fathers have established. The curious thing though is that after the students have finished their studies they become as opportunistic as everybody else. The Fathers believe that the only convincing religion is animism and even the Catholic ritual had to be adapted to it. The Fathers did not see an indigenous structure capable of withstanding the VC without American support. It would require a powerful and honest man to operate without the Americans and the students and intellectuals would almost surely oppose even him. Democracy was extremely difficult because the country was so much infiltrated by the VC that any free political process was likely to lead to their taking over. The VC were everywhere. The student leaders during the riots last year in Hue had clearly scared the other students into compliance. How could they have done it unless the other students had believed that the VC were behind them? Therefore, elections would bring a VC victory. They would be preceded by accusations, betrayal, purchase—all of this in a countryside completely dominated by the VC. The political infiltration was attempted even in the Catholic church and is especially pronounced among the Buddhists. In the Catholic Church the fear of infiltration is so great that the Church now requires a waiting period of four years before it permits conversion. I asked the Fathers how, under those circumstances, they were not discouraged. They said yes, but that their mission was to save souls and they believed in

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October 26th

A few general observations.

One of the noticeable characteristics of educated Vietnamese is an almost monomaniac tendency to recite speeches with very little concern for what anyone else might be thinking--either another Vietnamese, even less an American. The single-mindedness which has enabled them to survive for 2,000 years under Chinese rule and for nearly a century under French domination may be the reason why the VC fight with such skill and tenacity.

Another striking feature for someone who is used to the European scene is the fact that the Vietnamese almost never ask about American intentions or purposes. They do not seem to have the compulsive desire for re-assurance of the Germans or simply the curiosity of wondering what the United States might be planning of other European countries. The reason may be that the Vietnamese feel that they have no choice but to proceed in what they are doing, or, even more importantly, they would not believe what they are being told anyway and therefore feel that there is no sense in asking the question. Also, I have never been asked any question by any educated Vietnamese about the world situation, about strategy, or even about the possible intention of China. The concern is entirely inward and has to do entirely with the tactics of the local Vietnamese situation. No one has inquired even what the impact of world events might be on Vietnam. Vietnam seems to be the only reality for the educated Vietnamese.

induced even what the impact of world events might be on Vietnam. Vietnam
entirely with the tactics of the local Vietnamese situation. No one has
done the possible intention of China. The concern is entirely inward and has to do
educated Vietnamese about the world situation, about strategy, or even about
saking the question. Vua, I have never been asked any question by any
what they are being told anyway and therefore feel that there is no reason in
what they are doing, or, even more importantly, they would not believe
may be that the Vietnamese feel that they have no choice but to proceed in
the United States might be planning of other European countries. The reason
for re-assurance of the Germans or imply the curiosity of wondering what
intentions or purposes. They do not seem to have the cumulative desire
acene is the fact that the Vietnamese almost never ask about American
Another striking feature for someone who is used to the European
tensity.

French domination may be the reason why the AC fight with such skill and
arrive for 5,000 years under Chinese rule and for nearly a century under
less an American. The single-mindedness which has enabled them to
for what anyone else might be thinking--either another Vietnamese, even
almost monomeric tendency to recite speeches with very little concern
One of the noticeable characteristics of educated Vietnamese is an
A few general observations.

October 26th

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A third observation: I find the Buddhists the most objectionable group, which may be due to the fact that I simply do not understand them. There is this vague, beatific smile; the tendency toward evasive answers; the atmosphere of cloaking rather selfish motives in very high sounding platitudes--all of which gives one the feeling in talking to the Buddhist leaders that one is trying to nail jelly to the wall.

I was sufficiently disturbed by the situation in Danang to ask the Consul in Hue to try to get me the figures of the relative strengths of the opposing forces. The situation seems to be as follows. The VC main force strength in Quang Nam province is four battalions with 1,768 personnel; six local force companies, one for each of the six districts into which the VC divide the province; and three companies, forty-two platoons and forty-six squads of guerrillas estimated at 2,080. Thus there is a grand total of VC in the province of more than 4,500. In addition there are an estimated 1,150 laborers and porte4s. The friendly forces are composed as follows: There are nearly 24,000 Marines; the 51st Regiment of the 2nd Vietnamese Division with three battalions; and the 11th and 39th Ranger battalions. There are 18 regional force rifle companies with a present for duty strength averaging about 60%. In addition the popular forces companies total about 4800. Despite these forces, the VC according to almost certainly excessively optimistic official figures control 60% of the province's population. Only 10.3% is under government control and the remainder is under varying stages of contested influence. Contested influence means that at a minimum the

of contorted influence. Contorted influence means that at a minimum the
10.3% is under government control and the remainder is under varying aspects
optimistic official figures control 60% of the province's population. Only
4800. Despite these forces, the VC according to almost certainly excessively
overshooting spout 60%. In addition the popular forces companies total spout
are 18 regional force rifle companies with a present for duty atrendth
Division with three battalions; and the 11th and 38th Rander battalions. There

There are nearly 24,000 Marines; the 52nd Regiment of the 2nd Vietnamese
1,150 Islanders and porters. The friendly forces are composed as follows:
VC in the province of more than 4,500. In addition there are an estimated
six adards of guerrillas estimated at 2,080. There there is a grand total of
VC divide the province; and three companies, forty-two platoons and forty-
six local force companies, one for each of the six districts into which the
atrendth in Central Nam province is four battalions with 1,168 personnel;
opposing forces. The situation seems to be as follows. The VC main force
Conan in Hue to try to get me the figures of the relative atrendth of the
I was efficiently demanded by the situation in Danang to ask the
leaders that one is trying to send to hell to the wall.

Bisturide--all of which dives one the feeling in talking to the Budqulat
the stromophere of closing rather aetiological motives in very high aounding
There is this vsque, pesitic amile; the tendency toward evasive answers;
dronp, which may be due to the fact that I simply do not understand them.
A third observation: I find the Budqulat the most objectionable

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VC control the village at night and there may be some government present
during the day.

To put it another way, it was estimated in August that the VC controlled
55% of the 115 villages in the province; that there were overt VC governments
in at least 11 more; and a covert VC administration set-up in an additional
17. One provincial official estimates that by day only about 25% of the
Vietnamese village officials dare to appear in their areas of responsibility
and a much smaller number will remain over-night--probably less than
10%. VC initiated incidents have increased since August from 58 per month
to 106 in September and October. In short, the massive build-up of forces
has yielded control over only about 10% of the population and much less
than 10% of the land area. This is a disturbing figure and more and more
of the Marines are being cast in the role of civil affair personnel for which
they were not designed.

To advance another 8 kilometers and to add another 110,000 or 5%
of the population, 15 additional popular force companies would have to be
created, for which the manpower resources do not exist.

of the population, 12 additional popular force companies would have to be
To advance another 8 kilometers and to add another 110,000 or 5%

they were not dealt with.

of the Marines are being put in the role of civil affair personnel for which
than 10% of the land areas. This is a disturbing trouble and more and more
usa fielded control over only spout 10% of the population and much less
to 10% in September and October. In short, the massive build-up of forces
10%. AC initiated incidents have increased since August from 28 per month
and a much smaller number will remain over-night--propably less than
Vietnamese village officials are due to appear in their area of responsibility
17. One provincial official estimates that by qay only spout 50% of the
in at least 11 more; and a covert AC administration act-up in an additional
50% of the 112 villages in the province; that there were overt AC governments
To put it another way, it was estimated in August that the AC controlled
during the qay.

AC control the village at night and there may be some government presence

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October 26 - Hue

For dinner the American Consul, at whose house I am staying, had invited three German doctors who had lived in Hue since 1961 and who have tried to set up a medical school at the University of Hue. They were supposed to tell me about the political mood of the students. But, having met these myself, I turned the conversation to a discussion of the differences between Western and Vietnamese ways of thinking, if any. I had a particularly long talk with a psychiatrist who had been studying the attitude of the Vietnamese toward various problems and the cultural differences between Vietnamese and Westerners. To begin with, the Germans have found that instruction is extremely difficult because the pattern of thinking of the Vietnamese is so different from that of the West. On some levels the Vietnamese are extremely talented. In brute memorizing, for example, they far excel any German students they had ever encountered. It was not rare to find Vietnamese students who remember whole books verbatim. The Vietnamese are also very talented on a very abstract level such as symbolic mathematics. On the other hand, Vietnamese seem incapable of drawing independent conclusions either from what they have memorized by rote or from what they have absorbed on the level of pure abstraction. The reason seems to be that their whole society is oriented toward the Confucian principles of submission and acceptance of authority. Another difficulty with Vietnamese methods of thinking was that the Western notions of causality could not be expressed in the Vietnamese language and thus was foreign to the Vietnamese way of thinking.

This was true even in medicine. For example, the Germans told me

This was true even in medicine. For example, the Germans told me
the Atelesnese way of thinking.

Could not be embraced in the Atelesnese language and time was foreign to
Atelesnese methods of thinking was that the Western notions of casuistry
bless of approval and acceptance of authority. Another difficulty with
the fact that their whole society is oriented toward the Germanic branch-
what they have absorbed on the level of pure absorption. The reason seems
dependent conclusions either from what they have memorized by rote or from
mathematics. On the other hand, Atelesnese seem inapplicable to drawing in-
Atelesnese are also very talented on a very abstract level and as ampolite
rare to find Atelesnese students who remember whole poems verbatim. The
they far exceed any German students they had ever encountered. It was not
the Atelesnese are extremely talented. In precise memorizing, for example,
that instruction is extremely difficult because the pattern of thinking
between Atelesnese and Westerners. To begin with, the German have
titular of the Atelesnese toward various problems and the cultural differ-
ence is a particularly long talk with a background who had been studying the
familiarity with a subject matter who had been studying the differ-
ence between Western and Atelesnese ways of thinking, if any. I had
not these wheels. I turned the conversation to a discussion of the qil-
boed to tell me about the political mood of the students. But, having
tried to set up a medical school at the University of Huel. They were ab-
ated three German doctors who had lived in Huel since 1961 and who have
for dinner the American Conan, at whose house I am staying, had

October 30 - Huel

at the end of each day.
unrelated notes written down

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about some medical students who, having been told that some typhoid
patients in delerium fell out of bed and broke their arms, said on an
examination that typhoid was caused by broken arms. They could not dis-
tinguish between symptoms, causes, and consequences.

Part of the reason was that the Vietnamese notion of time was
different from Western notions. The psychiatrist told me that it was next
to impossible to get relatives of psychotic Vietnamese patients to separate
symptoms of incidents that had occurred over a period of time. Events
from one incident would be mixed up with events from another which might
have occurred four years previously, and they were all described as if
they had occurred contemporaneously.

Another thing noticed by the psychiatrist was that some forms of
Western psychosis were completely non-existent in Vietnam. For example,
the Western form of schizophrenia where threats to identity were per-
ceived, did not exist in Vietnam because the Vietnamese identity was
established in a different way, as I will explain in a minute. Similarly,
compulsive neurosis did not exist in Vietnam because the family structure
provided a frame-work of security. Again, in the West certain forms of
melancholy depressions, in which a patient found himself feeling guilty
or unhappy as a result of events having happened a long time previously
did not exist in Vietnam because the past did not extend backward for the
Vietnamese in such an orderly fashion, nor, for that matter, did the future.
On the other hand, there are characteristic Vietnamese forms of psychosis.
Specifically, there is no sharp distinction between hallucinations, vague
dreams with mystic overtones, and what is possible. This leads on the one

dreams with chaotic overtones, and what is possible. These leads on the one
specifically, there is no sharp distinction between phenomena, vagueness
in the other hand, there are characteristic Vietnamese forms of baccante.
Vietnamese in and an orderly fashion, nor, for that matter, did the future.
did not exist in Vietnam because the best did not extend beyond for the
or unambiguously as a result of events having happened a long time previously
mediately depressions, in which a better found himself feeling guilty
brought a framework of security. Usually, in the West certain forms of
combinative semicondensed did not exist in Vietnam because the family structure
emerged in a different way, as I will explain in a minute. Similarly,
cerved, did not exist in Vietnam because the Vietnamese identity was
the Western form of acrotophavia where there is identity where ber-
Western baccante were completely non-existent in Vietnam. Not example,
another thing noticed by the baccante specialist was that some forms of
copy had occurred contemnorously.

have occurred from here brusquely, and they were all described as if
from one incident would be mixed with events from another which might
slumboms of incidents that had occurred over a period of time. Events
to imposable to get relatives of baccante Vietnamese patients to separate
different from Western notions. The baccante specialist told me that it was next
part of the reason was that the Vietnamese notion of time was
triumphant between slumboms, causes, and consequences.
examination that baccante was caused by broken arms. They could not dis-
believe in delirium told one of ped and probe their arms, said on an
apost some medical students who, having been told that some baccante
at the end of each day.

Unquoted notes written down
PERGONAT VAND CONFIDENTIAR

Henry V. Kieisinger

3

CONFIDENTIAL

[A]

[Y]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

3

hand to almost hysterical persistence in courses Westerners would consider wildly unrealistic and on the other to something Vietnamese call "lache" which we incorrectly translate as tized. Instead, it is a form of dis-sociation of mind and body, a complete suspension of action; it is the Vietnamese form both of avoiding action and supplying an alibi for inaction. It is no accident that they use the phrase for the state just before death. Again, there is no Vietnamese correlative to the Western sense of guilt in the ethical sense, especially guilt lasting over a period of time. The only thing that Vietnamese could feel truly guilty about, in his experience, was not taking care of the ancestors and ancestral shrines or letting down the family.

The reason for many of these phenomena could be found in the Vietnamese sense of identity which in turn was reflected in the Vietnamese language. In the West, the individual is distinguished by a sense of personality which adapts, creates, and modifies, but which is conceived as having a central core. The Vietnamese personality, by contrast, exists in a series of ever-changing relationships all of which are hierarchical and conceived by analogy to family structure--even linguistically. In Vietnam there does not exist a word for "I" or "you." Each relationship has its correlative pronoun and is transformed into a kind of family relationship. For example, two men of equal status will call each other brothers or cousins. One man of more senior status will, depending on the intimacy of the relationship, either be uncle, or father, or grandfather to the other. Any address, therefore, to another person--even when not related--is in terms of a family relationship that is ascribed to him, and each family relationship has a

family relationship that is ascribed to him, and each family relationship has a
name, 'cousin,' to another person--even when not related--in terms of a
relationship, 'brother,' 'sister,' 'brother-in-law,' or 'sister-in-law' to the other. And so on. One man of more senior status will, generally, be the son of the senior of the same name, two sons of equal status will call each other parents or consign
to each other. The reason for this is that the children of the senior are the children of the senior which are called, 'children,' and modifies, 'put which is conceived as language.' In the West, the individual is distinguished by a sense of personal identity of identity which in turn was reflected in the Vietnamese

ting down the family.

The reason for this phenomenon could be found in the
relationship, was not taking care of the ancestors and ancestral surnames or let-
ter, but only thinking that Vietnamese could feel truly himself apart, in his eme-
ment in the empirical sense, especially suit testing over a period of time.
Again, there is no Vietnamese correlative to the Western sense of
It is no accident that they see the phrase for the state just before death.

Vietnamese form pop of availing action and attributing an effect for action.
Sociation of mind and body, a complete submission of action! it is the
which we incorrectly translate as tied. Instead, it is a form of die-
strictly numerical and on the other to something Arabic cell "leche."
pand to emit out physical radiation in contact with water would correspond
at the end of each day.

Noted notes written down
MURPHY AND CONRADYAN

3

Henry V. Kiehlger

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger 4

strict hierarchy. For example, the older brother of one's father, that is
the senior uncle, has a different name than the younger brother of the
father, and he in turn has a different name from the brother of the mother.
Under certain circumstances the wife of the older brother of the father
can also get the same title as the senior uncle. In short, for the Viet-
namese everything is seen in terms of family relationships, and outside of
the family relationship loyalties are shifting and dependent entirely on
the requirements of the family.

The Germans have noticed that servants who have been with other
members of their team for many years and had been in tears when they left,
could barely remember them three years later. The German psychiatrist had
also read an interesting story about the first Dutch sailor who had visited
a Vietnamese village and who, when returning ten years later, had already
found himself absorbed into the mythology of the village as having been
associated with it since time immemorial as one of the ancestral gods.

The German psychiatrist said that to the Vietnamese the question
"what do you think" is almost meaningless if one puts the emphasis on the
you, because there is no such thing as a "you" for a Vietnamese--the word
does not even exist in the language. There is only a "he" in relation to
various kinds of situations and various kinds of groupings, and the answer
he would give would depend entirely on the circumstance in which he found
himself. Also, all the Germans agreed that the Vietnamese found it next
to impossible to form hypotheses in the in the Western sense. They had
found that almost any hypothetical statement was immediately transformed
into a concrete, short-term project or it was meaningless. They found that

into a concrete, sport-term project on it was meaningless. They found that
found that almost any psychopathological statement was immediately transposed
to suitable form. Haberdashers in the 19th century were able to

**VIOLENCE**

because there is no such thing as a "bon" for a Viennese--the word "that do you think" is almost meaningless if one buts the emphasis on the

**The German behaviorist said that to the Viennese the direction associated with it since time immemorial as one of the ancestral roots.**

**Found himself epoched into the mythology of the village as having been**

**a Viennese village and who, when reciting ten bears later, said already**

**also read an interesting story about the first Dutch seller who had visited**

**could perhaps remember them three bears later. The German behaviorist had**

**mempers of their team for many bears and had been in tears when they left.**

**The Germans have noticed that servants who have been with other**

**the requirements of the family.**

**the family relationship loyalties are shifting and debegant entirely on**

**name everything is seen in terms of family relationships, and outside of**

**can also set the same title as the senior male. In sport, for the Viet-**

**Under certain circumstances the title of the older brother of the father**

**father, and he in turn has a different name from the brother of the mother.**

**the senior male, has a different name than the younger brother of the**

**strict hierarchy. For example, the older brother of one's father, that is**

**at the end of each day.**

**Unwritten notes written down**

**BERGONVY AND CONDRÉNATY**

**Henry V. Kleinberg**

[Y]

[Y]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger 5

in scientific work almost any hypothetical statement would defeat the Viet-
namese. On the other hand, when things were completely abstract and had no
relationship to physical reality the Vietnamese were extraordinarily gifted.
They had no difficulty whatsoever with mathematics. Their difficulty arose
on the level between extreme abstraction and extreme pragmatism. The only
explanation for the behavior of the VC was that they had combined the
hallucinatory qualities of the Vietnamese with their learning by rote so
that what in South Vietnam is abstract, non-committal almost hallucinatory
thought becomes an almost hysterical project for the Viet Cong.

The Germans' view of the attitude of the students was that it
was impossible to tell what the students wanted because their objectives
were constantly shifting. To ask students what they thought would be
defeated by their very uncertain sense of identity. In May, when the
VC seemed to be winning, one of the German doctors said that when he was
walking along the street he heard the students say that the heads of all
Americans had to be cut off. After the arrival of the Marines the attitude
changed. There was not, however, any profound commitment. The German
psychiatrist said he felt that most of the Vietnamese were extremely
xenophobic and that most of the ones he knew wanted to see the Americans
expelled from Vietnam--a point of view which was disputed afterwards by the
American Consul. When walking through a village children sometimes threw
stones at him, the German said. This was not because they hated him but
because to them a white man is a different species whose reaction it was
interesting to observe--much as one would see Vietnamese drop lighted ciga-
rette butts into the mouths of bears at the zoo.

rattled into the months of June at the zoo.
interesting to observe--most so one would see Vietnamese droop lighted ciga-
cause to them a white man is a different species whose reaction it was
because at him, the German said. That was not because they hated him but
American Court. When walking through a village cigarette was drawn
embodied from Vietnam--a point of view which was debated afterwards by the
xenopopte and that most of the ones he knew wanted to see the Americans
behaviour said he felt that most of the Vietnamese were extremely
clevered. There was not, however, any profound commitment. The German
Americans had to be out of it. After the arrival of the Marines the attitude
warming along the street he passed the students say that the people of all
AC seemed to be winning, one of the German doctors said that when he was
defeated by their very uncertain sense of identity. In May, when the
were constantly spitting. To ask students what they thought would be
was impossible to tell what the students wanted because their objectives
The German's view of the attitude of the students was that it
thought become an almost platheical project for the Viet Cong.
that what in South Vietnam is extract, non-commitment almost bellicatory
bellicatory ditties of the Vietnamese with their learning by rote so
explanation for the behavior of the AC was that they had computed the
on the level between extreme extraction and extreme pragmatism. The only
They had no difficulty whatsoever with mathematics. Their difficulty arose
relationship to physical reality the Vietnamese were extraordinarily strict.
names. On the other hand, when things were completely abstract and had no
in scientific work almost any hypothetical statement would offset the Viet-
at the end of each day.

Unwritten notes written down
at the end of each day.

CONFIDENTIAL
FOR RELEASE

Henry V. Kiefer, 2

[A]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

The Germans also said that economic aid provided no basis of
gratitude for the Vietnamese, because, first of all, they always explained
to themselves that it was given as an aid for the refugees who were made
homeless by American bombing and, second, it humiliated them. He had
heard many professors say that the Americans were deliberately making
beggers out of the Vietnamese in order to keep them in a dependent rela-
tionship.

truly.

begun out of the Vietnamese in order to keep them in a dependent relation
beyond many professors say that the Americans were deliberately making
homeless by American pumping and, second, it annihilated them. He put
to themselves that it was given as an aid for the refugees who were made
gratuity for the Vietnamese, because, first of all, they always exemplified
the Germans also said that economic aid provided no results of
at the end of each day.

unqualified notes written down
at the end of each day.

CONFIDENTIAL

Henry V. Kieinger

6

[x]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

Unedited notes written at the
end of each day.

October 27 - Hue

I started the day with a conversation with Honang Van Giau, the former student president and how a faculty member in the faculty of letters of the University of Hue. He was the leader of the militant faction of the Hue students--the chief organizer of student riots in Hue during the past year. It was a very long conversation, but as in all meetings with Buddhists it is extremely difficult to summarize what he said, because some of it was so ambiguous and because for every affirmative statement it would be possible to record the opposite. His very manner exuded ambiguity--head thrown back, a very soft and gentle voice, a somewhat dreamy expression. Giau has an enormously expressive face and speaks French almost without accent and with great plasticity. I have also noticed that in conversations with Vietnamese one of two things happens. Either they will speak in a most tentative ambiguous fashion or they are tremendously assertive and practically monopolize the conversation and one has the impression that one's major role is to cue long prepared monologues. These may really be two sides of the same coin. Vietnamese may be so unsure of themselves that when they do not monopolize the conversation, they feel they are extremely vulnerable. Then they become so tentative and so unwilling to commit themselves that it is next to impossible to find out what they are really getting at.

I began the conversation with Giau by asking him what he thought of the situation in South Vietnam. He said the first thing to remember about Vietnam is that it is an extremely divided people. There are the Northerners,