FORD SEES DANGER
TO NATO INTEGRITY
IN 'SPECIAL' PACTS

American Aides at Brussels
Say Warning Is Directed
in Part at Portugal

LISBON AFFIRMS LOYALTY

France, Greece and Turkey
Cited by Kissinger as
Other Cases in Point

By PHILIP SHABECOFF
Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, May 29—President Ford warned today that “partial membership or special arrangements” could endanger the Atlantic alliance.

American officials here said
that the warning, coupled with
a reaffirmation of the United

The text of Ford's address is
printed on Page 7.

States commitment, was directed at least in part at Portugal, which is viewed by the United States as moving toward Communism.

After the President's speech,
Secretary of State Kissinger,
answering reporters' questions,
said that France, Greece and
Turkey were among those mem-
bers of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization that had
made special arrangements or
engaged in limited membership
in the alliance.

Portugal Asserts Loyalty

The Portuguese Premier, Vas-
co dos Santos Gonçalves, met
with President Ford and other
NATO leaders during the day.
He said that he told the leaders
that Portugal was "a loyal Eu-
ropean state and intends to re-
main a loyal NATO member."

President Ford also met
separately with Premier Con-
stantine Caramanlis of Greece
and Premier Suleiman Demirel
of Turkey.

Members of several European
delegations said that these and
other talks on the Greek-Turk-
ish conflict and developments
in Portugal left them "pessimis-
tic." [Page 5.]

The French have withdrawn
from all military functions of
NATO. They say of themselves,
that they have withdrawn from
the alliance, but remain part
of it. Following the Greek-
Turkish conflict in Cyprus last
summer, both Greece and Tur-
key reduced their military rep-
resentation.

'Integrity' of the Alliance

Mr. Ford, in what was re-
garded by many as an excep-
tionally firm and candid speech
to heads of government of the
alliance, said that NATO re-
mains the "foundation" of
America's relationship to Eu-
rope but added that important
"tasks" confronted the alliance.

One task, he said, is to "preserve the quality and integrity of this alliance on the basis of unqualified participation, not on the basis of partial membership or special arrangements."

"The commitment to collective defense," he said, "must be complete if it is to be credible. It must be unqualified if it is to be reliable."

Despite Mr. Kissinger's re-
Continued on Page 7, Column 1

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

marks about France, Greece
and Turkey, other Administra-
tion officials said that the ar-
rangements of these countries,
while damaging to a degree,
could not affect the alliance
fatally. They added that some
arrangement to give Portugal
continued standing in NATO,
even if she continued to move
toward Communism, could dras-
tically reduce the viability of
the alliance.

These officials noted that
Portugal had already had to
drop out of NATO's nuclear-
planning group.

Asked by a reporter today
if Portugal intended to remain
in NATO, Mr. Gonçalves re-
plied, "Naturally."

Jumping the Gun?

Administration officials, reportedly including Mr. Kissinger, have been saying privately for several weeks that the issue of Portugal's continued presence in NATO would have to be discussed in Brussels, State Department officials were taken aback when President Ford said it publicly last Friday in an interview with European correspondents at the White House.

The next day, Mr. Kissinger
said that the issue would not
be discussed in plenary sessions
here, but would be brought up
later. Mr. Kissinger said there
was no difference between his
position and that of the Presi-
dent.

Mr. Ford apparently brought
into the open prematurely a
position that was to have been
presented first in private talks
here in Brussels.

Mr. Kissinger reported that
in today's talks between Presi-
dent Ford and the Portuguese
Premier, the phrase "Trojan
horse" was used in connection
with Portugal's membership in
NATO. He did not describe the
context, but witnesses said the
meeting between the two lead-
ers appeared "tense."

Mr. Ford did not mention
Portugal specifically or discuss
the Portuguese issue directly
in his remarks.

Another task for the alliance,
the President said, was "de-
veloping a productive and real-
istic agenda for détente, an
agenda that serves our interests
and not the interests of others
who do not share our values."

"I envision an agenda that anticipates and precludes the exploitation of our perceived weaknesses," he said.

Mr Ford made it clear he
was talking about the Soviet
Union as possible exploiters of
East-West accommodation. He
said of the coming European
security conference that only
by "realistic steps" could the
conference be kept in perspec-
tive, whatever euphoric or in-
flated emphasis the Soviet
Union or other participants may
try to give it."

Steps must be taken, the
President said, to assure that
such a conference would had-

vance freedom and human dig-
nity for all Europeans."

Then he said that NATO
should be prepared to take
initiatives in the talks on East-
west mutual and balanced re-
duction of forces, but added
that "the Soviet Union and its
allies should also be prepared
to respond in good faith on the
common objectives both sides
should be working toward—
undiminished security for all—
but at a lower level of forces."

As an "important topic," the
President said, the alliance
should consider how to "relate
Spain with Western defense,"
hitherto anathema to some
other members of the
alliance. The President will go
to Spain Saturday on the next
leg of his week-long European
journey. From there, he will go
to Salzburg, Austria, for a
meeting with President Anwar
el-Sadat of Egypt and then to
Rome for talks with Italian of-
ficials and the Pope.

Following a state dinner
given by King Baudouin of the
Belgians, President Ford met

privately with President Valéry
Giscard d'Estaing of France,
who attended the dinner but
not the meeting of the NATO
heads of government. Mr.
Kissinger said the United States
wished to discuss energy,
the Middle East and Atlantic
relations with Mr. Giscard
d'Estaing.

The French President had
refused to attend the NATO
meetings, but flew up from
Paris tonight for the dinner
and flew home again. He was
given the place of honor at
King Baudouin's right because
of his four months' seniority in
office over President Ford, who
sat at the King's left.

on defense budgets throughout the alliance should by now have convinced each of us that we simply must rationalize our collective defense.

In the field of energy, we are still not immune from the political pressures that result from a heavy dependence on external sources of energy. Indeed, we are becoming more vulnerable each month. We have made joint progress in offsetting the effect of the action taken last year by the major oil-producing countries. But we have far more to do.

At this important stage in the history of the alliance, we must pledge ourselves to six primary tasks.

First, we must maintain a strong and credible defense. This must remain the foremost objective of the alliance. If we fail in this task, the others will be irrelevant. A society that does not have the vigor and dedication to defend itself cannot survive; neither can an alliance. For our part, our commitment not to engage in any unilateral reduction of U.S. forces committed to NATO remains valid. But that is not enough. We must make more effective use of our defense resources. We need to achieve our long-standing goals of common procedures and equipment. Our research and development efforts must be more than the sum of individual parts. Let us become truly one in our allocation of defense tasks, support and production.

Second, we must preserve the quality and integrity of this alliance on the basis of unqualified participation, not on the basis of partial membership or special arrangements. The commitment to collective defense must be complete if it is to be credible. It must be unqualified if it is to be reliable.

Third, let us improve the process of political consultation. We have made considerable progress in recent months but there is, as each of us knows— room for improvement by all parties if we are to maintain our solidarity. This is of particular importance if we are to move forward together in our efforts to reduce the tensions that have existed with the Warsaw Pact nations for more than a quarter of a century. We should further cultivate that habit of discussing our approaches to those matters which touch the interests of all so that we can develop common policies to deal with common problems.

Fourth, let us cooperate in developing a productive and realistic agenda for détente, an agenda that serves our interests and not the interests of others who do not share our values. I envision an agenda that anticipates and precludes the exploitation of our perceived weaknesses. One item on that agenda must be to assure that the promises made in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are translated into action to advance freedom and human dignity for all Europeans. Only by such realistic steps can we keep C.S.C.E. in perspective, whatever euphoric or inflated emphasis the Soviet Union or other participants may try to give it. Another agenda item should be the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. We in NATO should be prepared to take appropriate initiatives in these negotiations if they will help us to meet our objectives. But the Soviet Union and its allies should also be prepared to respond in good faith on the common objectives both sides should be working toward—undiminished security for all—but at a lower level of forces.

## Looking Beyond the Alliance

Fifth, let us look to the future of the West itself. We must strengthen our own democratic institutions and encourage the growth of truly democratic processes everywhere. Let us also look beyond our alliance as it stands today. As an important topic on this agenda, we should begin now to consider how to relate Spain with Western defense. Spain has already made, and continues to make, an important contribution to Western military security as a result of its bilateral relationship with the United States.

Sixth, we should rededicate ourselves to the alliance as a great joint enterprise, as a commitment to follow common approaches to shared aspirations. We must build on the contribution our alliance already makes through the committee on the challenges of modern society in coping with the environmental problems of industrialized societies. We must address the issues of population, food and raw materials. We must find ways to strengthen the world trading and monetary system, and to

meet the imperatives of energy development and conservation. With the wealth and technological skills which are the products of our free systems, we can make progress toward a better standard of life in all of our countries if we work together.

These six primary tasks of the alliance illustrate the breadth and depth of our responsibilities and opportunities. They reflect how very complex the world has become and how much more difficult it is to manage the alliance today than a generation ago.

Then, our problems were relatively simple to define. It was easier to agree on common solutions. Today the problem of definition seems more complicated. In many of our countries there has been a fragmentation of public and parliamentary opinion which has made it more difficult for governments to mobilize support for courses of action of importance to the alliance.

But there are constants as well, and they are—in the final analysis—more important than the complexities. Together we continue to be the greatest reservoir of economic, military and moral strength in the world. We must use that strength to safeguard our freedom and to address the grave problems that confront us.

I am proud of America's role in NATO and I am confident of the future of our alliance.

As President of the United States, but also as one who has been a participant and close observer of the American political scene for close to 30 years, I assure you that my country will continue to be a strong partner. On occasion, in the public debate of our free society, America may seem to stray somewhat off course. But the fact is that we have the willpower, the technical capability, the spiritual drive and the steadiness of purpose that will be needed. Today we in the United States face our NATO commitments with new vision, new vigor, new courage, and renewed dedication.

America's emphasis is on cooperation — cooperation within NATO and throughout the world. From diversity, we can forge a new unity. Together, let us build to face the challenges of the future.

Tests for Portugal...

At the NATO summit in Brussels, Premier Gonçalves of Portugal acted the role of good European and loyal member of the Atlantic alliance. He insisted that the ruling Armed Forces Movement was nonpartisan, denied domination by the Communists and pleaded for "more comprehension and less apprehension" from the allies.

Premier Gonçalves would have been more persuasive if he and the dominant military group he heads had not sided so consistently with the Communists in their battles with the Socialists and Popular Democrats, who together rolled up a 64 per cent majority in the April elections. But if the Premier wishes to buttress the points he stressed to the allies in Brussels, there are ample means at hand for promptly doing so.

For a starter, the military can keep hands off the elected Assembly, which gets down to serious work today on a new Constitution. Under a pact agreed to by all major parties prior to the elections, the military's Revolutionary Council will retain supreme political power for three to five years; but the Assembly has been promised full scope in writing constitutional provisions governing human rights, political freedoms, the administration of justice and the form of local government.

Broad agreement exists between the Socialists and the Popular Democrats, who together hold 197 of the 250 Assembly seats. These parties will unquestionably produce a Constitution containing strong democratic safeguards, including provisions for free elections at every level of government-unless they are blocked by the Communists with military backing.

The most timely action to relieve apprehension about Portugal, however, would be a Gonçalves order reopening Lisbon's Socialist newspaper, Republica. Even the Press Council set up by the military ruled that the Communists who seized Republica and caused the Government to shut down its plant two weeks ago violated the press law.

Information Minister Jorge Correia Jesuino, who spoke eloquently of the need for political "pluralism" in Portugal during a recent visit to this country, says the reopening of Republica is imminent. His remarks and those of Premier Gonçalves at Brussels about the nonpartisanship of the military will be judged by how quickly the Government makes good that promise.

First serious NATO split
since detente era opened

By David Anable
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

United Nations, N.Y.

Western diplomats are wrestling with NATO's first serious split of the post-cold war era.

But in trying to patch up the quarrel over Cyprus, which has alienated both Greece and Turkey from each other and their NATO allies, Western planners say they lack a vital ingredient

— what one diplomat calls the “ce-
ment of fear.”

As a result, NATO's southern flank is recognized to be in a "monumental mess" and the Russians are waiting eagerly for "things to fall into their laps."

"When the Russians don't look like anything but nice pussycats, how do you keep the alliance together?" asks one Western diplomat.

The answer now appears to be an
intense diplomatic effort on three
fronts:

* The NATO allies of both Greece and Turkey are hard at work trying to reassure these two countries that each is valued highly and has an important role in the alliance. The Ford administration, in particular, is

*Please turn to Page 6

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going all out to repair its bruised
relations with both the strategic
southeastern Mediterranean coun-
tries.

* To give weight to its words, the Ford administration is doing its utmost to persuade Congress to reverse its decision cutting off arms aid to Turkey. There is renewed administration hope of success with the introduction into Congress of a bill to this effect sponsored by the Senate's majority and minority leaders.

* Here at the United Nations, the West is trying to help work out a Security Council resolution which would enable talks to start up again between the feuding Cyprus communities.

Turkish power dominant

The power is solidly with the appar-
ently intransigent Turks and Turkish-
Cypriots. Hence the aim is to find a
face-saving formula for the Greeks
and Greek-Cypriots so that they can
salvage what they can from the wreck
of their position on the island.

The Turks, under a weak interim government, are still seething over the U.S. congressional snub. They are brandishing every anti-American "weapon" they have, from threatening to close the U.S. bases and ports to hinting stronger support for the Arabs against Israel. Premier Sadi Irmak has even talked about developing nuclear weapons.

Western diplomats dismiss much,
but not all, of this as bluff. Although it
is agreed that Turkey could conceiv-
ably switch allegiance to the Soviet

Union and thus totally sink NATO's
southeastern flank, the Turks' tradi-
tional fear of their northern neighbor
is thought more likely to prevail.

Probably, it is said, Turkey will
adopt a "plague-on-all-your-houses"
attitude. This would be less disastrous
for NATO but would still leave much
to be desired.

Greek stability seen

The Greek Government is seen as much more stable. It is therefore in a better position to be realistic. Some Western diplomats are convinced that the Greek Government has measured the situation carefully and realized it will have to cut its losses.

It is much more difficult, however,
for the Greek-Cypriots, with their
200,000 refugees, to take a positive
view. It is clear now that their appeal
to the international community here
is likely to provide only a political
breathing space, not an outpouring of
work or support which could be used as
a lever against the Turks.

The Greek-Cypriots, under President Makarios, are being given no reasonable alternative to returning to the communal talks. The danger is that, as one diplomat puts it, "On Cyprus everybody always goes too far. This is the trouble."

The U.S. administration remains extremely concerned, fearing that if the situation continues to deteriorate it could reach a point where the Soviet Union's "perceived power" in the area could become so superior that Moscow could achieve its ends without needing to resort to open threats.

Joseph C. Harsch

# Needed: machinery for today's world

By Joseph C. Harsch

Gerald Ford's first presidential journey to Europe underlines an important but not yet widely perceived fact about the world we live in. The machinery for cooperation among the modern industrial democracies was designed to meet the receding problems of the past, not the onrushing problems of tomorrow.

The NATO alliance is concerned with protecting Western Europe from the pressures of communism and Soviet imperialism coming from the East. Everything about NATO — its problems, its tasks and its answers — move along an east-west axis. President Ford went to Brussels officially to reassure the West European allies of American devotion to NATO — which the Europeans do not seriously doubt.

But the great problems weighing upon all the governments in the NATO alliance and on the others, primarily Japan, who are associated with them are not on any east-west axis. They are on a north-south axis. They concern the trading relations

between the industrial countries which inhabit the northern temperate zones of the world and the raw-material producing countries of South America, Africa, and southern Asia.

PATTERN
OF
DIPLOMACY

There is harmony among NATO members and allies whenever the conversation turns to the Soviet Union. There are differences of emphasis in perceptions of Soviet future intentions, but not on fundamentals. But the conversation on that subject tends to be perfunctory and recessive. Most of the allies feel that for the time being at least that problem is under control.

The problems not under control at all are the price of oil, the price of food, the relationship between industrial prices and raw-material prices. And for these problems there is as yet almost no machinery. True, there are piecemeal approaches. U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger preceded President Ford to Europe to speak at a ministerial meeting of the International Energy Agency. The residual organization of the British Commonwealth, which recently met in the West Indies, is a forum of sorts in which there are the beginnings of a new approach to north-south problems. The European Common Market has negotiated new relationships with African countries.

All of this underlines the fact that as yet there is no satisfactory machinery designed to take the place of the old colonial relationships which disappeared in the wake of World War II. The last of the old empires — Portugal's — is in the final process of liquidation.

NATO was never designed to provide a substitute for the imperial systems. Nothing cohesive has yet been put in their place.

So President Ford's trip to NATO is in a sense a ceremonial bow to the past which has only slight relevance to the problems which beset the governments of today.

## Intensive problems

It remains to be seen, of course, whether they can build some machinery through which the industrial countries could approach the raw-material producers cooperatively instead of competitively.

The new problems are peculiar to the industrial democracies. The Soviet Union has within its own boundaries every raw material it needs for its industrial purposes except natural rubber and quinine. There are substitutes for both.

But with the industrial democracies there is a serious danger of something similar to the 18th- and 19th-century scrambles for colonies. The choice is between a competitive scramble for negotiated special deals on a cooperative approach.

The International Energy Agency so far has not been able to get agreement on an agenda for a north-south conference between producers and consumers.

A major study of the problem has just been concluded by a private research organization called the Trilateral Commission. It recommends more new institutions such as the Energy Agency. It particularly wants a permanent institution set up after its own pattern — a trilateral organization built on North America, Western Europe, and Japan. This organization should then work directly with balancing institutions of producing countries.

26

Kissinger steps back a bit on foreign policy

# Ford moving to center stage

By Godfrey Sperling Jr.

With the Ford party, Brussels

NATO leaders assembled here now are seeing, according to sources close to Gerald Ford, a president who is beginning to put his own unique, "instinctive" stamp on the making of U.S. foreign-policy decisions.

The President, these sources assert, now is beginning to follow — and the Mayaguez episode is cited as an example of this shift his "deep instincts" that lead him to consult with a number of his top administration people before making a decision.

By relying as much as he has in the past on one man's advice, that of Henry A. Kissinger, the President was acting, according to these sources, against these instincts for wide consultation, and also against the way he was making decisions on domestic matters all across the board.

Now, in a manner which is being described as "quite perceptible," the President is seen as widening his base of advice on foreign policy, leaning more heavily on his Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, and on other members of the National Security Council.

Also, the President is said to be relying more heavily on a number of advisers in the field on international trade and global economics, notably his Special Trade Representative, Fred Dent, together with Secretary of the Treasury, William E. Simon, Chief Economic Adviser Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve chairman Arthur Burns, White House adviser William Seidman, and Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton.

"This leaves Henry Kissinger still as the dominant adviser in shaping U.S. foreign policy," these sources say. "But," they add, "as the President now moves to widen his base of consultation, Kissinger becomes a little less dominant."

These sources contend that this shift in presidential decisionmaking is "not anti-Kissinger" in intent.

Instead, they say, it is more a matter of what those who have known Mr. Ford for years foresaw as inevitable: that, at some point, his cautious nature would cause him to apply the checks that stem from wide consultation to the making of foreign-policy decisions.

One senior American official traveling with the President on this trip to this NATO summit denied that Dr. Kissinger's role has been diminished. And, on the surface one can readily get the impression that Dr. Kissinger is in control of the scene here. But President Ford, according to his associates both in and outside his administration, is definitely moving to make certain that he is perceived as the one who is providing the main U.S. leadership in foreign relations.

Thus, this presidential move toward more visibility as the chief U.S. leader in global matters — together with the widening of his base of consultation — clearly increases Mr. Ford's involvement in the foreign-policy field. And Dr. Kissinger, still an impressive figure on the stage, steps back just a little while remaining powerful and close to the President.

Is this shift one that is likely to lead to Henry Kissinger having to give up his role as Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, keeping only his Secretary of State position? There are continuing reports that this might happen — and Dr. Kissinger has critics at high administration levels who would like to see this come about.

But this reporter, in his checking of sources that would be in a position to know if this were to come about, finds nothing of this kind in the making.

Instead, there is persuasive evidence that the President is simply — but calculately — asserting himself more in the field of foreign relations. And that for Henry Kissinger there is simply no option but to step aside a bit.

Trying to mend NATO's south flank

By a staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Brussels

President Ford was at the center of diplomatic activity in Brussels for most of the day before the first formal session of the NATO summit — one of the main purposes of his first visit to Europe since he took over in the White House.

The President's chief concern in his diplomatic meetings Thursday was to assess and try to strengthen the position of the Western alliance at its two southern flanks in the Mediterranean: in the area of Greece and Turkey to the east and in Portugal in the west. He met separately with the prime ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Portugal.

In his talks with Premiers Caramlis of Greece and Demirel of Turkey, Mr. Ford heard from both their separate grievances against the United States. Both have questioned the future of U.S. bases in their

countries and their future relationship with NATO because of the impasse over Cyprus.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman said after Mr. Ford had talked with the Greek and Turkish premiers: "You can't say progress was made in these meetings." But there is hope that something more positive might emerge from the direct talks that Mr. Caramanlis and Mr. Demirel are due to have here Saturday after the NATO conference.

There was lively speculation and interest in the meeting between Mr. Ford and the Portuguese Premier, Brig. Vasco Goncalves, since the latter is the member of the Portuguese Cabinet most frequently associated with the Portuguese Communist Party. Suspected Communist influence in Portugal since last year's revolution has led Mr. Ford and others to wonder what that country's future role in NATO will be.

Whether by coincidence or design, the Portuguese Government announced virtually while Mr. Ford and Brigadier Goncalves were meeting that it had cracked down on left-wing extremists by arresting members of a Maoist group in Lisbon and Coimbra.

Elizabeth Pond cables from Moscow: The Soviet Union is greeting the NATO summit meeting with denunciations of the Western alliance. In a nimble balancing act on the ideological tightrope, Soviet spokesmen praise detente with individual member governments and leaders while still decrying the "provocations" of NATO itself.

Tass explanation of President Ford's purpose in attending the NATO summit is "to raise the prestige of the U.S., ... to confirm Washington's loyalty to its Atlantic obligations and to hint to his partners that the U.S. does not intend to give up leadership of the capitalist world."

Independent Force

# On NATO, Giscard Is A Pleasant De Gaulle

By FLORA LEWIS

PARIS—French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing found a way to avoid snubbing President Ford and at the same time avoid making a bow to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization last week. He refused to go to the NATO meeting in Brussels but he accepted an invitation from Belgian King Baudouin to a gala held between the two days of NATO sessions and a chance to chat with Mr. Ford.

The charade was a fairly accurate reflection of France's relation with the alliance.

The French still refuse to participate in NATO military meetings such as last week's Defense Ministers' Council. They stay out of most NATO matters except the political council, and Mr. Giscard d'Estaing did send Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues to rub shoulders with the premiers and presidents.

There have always been some technical NATO activities in which the French do participate, such as communications, warning systems and occasional naval exercises. Even when the late Charles de Gaulle was President, those involvements were maintained, though quietly.

The difference now, according to NATO officials and diplomats, is that the French are more courteous.

## A Change of Approach

The de Gaulle fiat that France must have an independent defense, forbidding any integration in the military structure of the alliance, remains a scriptural commandment for the French Government. But there are differing ways of applying it, as with other scripture,

Communist leader Georges Marchais claims that Mr. Giscard d'Estaing is secretly slipping France back into NATO, and has a secret deal with Germany on the use of French atomic weapons. There is no evidence to support the charge, although it is true, as Mr. Marchais said recently, that the theory of an "all azimuth" defense for France has been abandoned.

That was an idea that France should prepare against potential attack from any direction, and not adopt NATO's basic assumption that the threat to Western Europe is also from the other side of the Iron Curtain. The "all azimuth" defense was never translated into any kind of practical defense policy.

The political aspects of the policy, however, persist. "For a Gaullist," a French Foreign Ministry official said recently, "independence is defined as hostility to America"

Mr. Giscard d'Estaing is not a Gaullist and he has deliberately moved to ameliorate Franco-American relations. The French President is considered personally to be much more sympathetic to the United States than his predecessors, General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. But he is dependent on the huge bloc of Gaullist votes in the Assembly to maintain his parliamentary majority.

## De Gaulle's Framework

And feelings are not foreign policy. On the Middle East, on energy negotiations, on economic issues, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's France has followed the lines traced by President de Gaulle.

There was always a central anomaly in the Gaullist defense posture. It was the insistence on absolute control of French defense, without coordination or joint planning with allies, and at the same time an unavowed reliance on both the American nuclear shield and the allied forces in Germany.

Technology has added to the contradictions. The latest difficulty concerns the new French tactical nuclear missile Pluton. Its range is such, that if it is deployed on the French border, it will land in West Germany, and Bonn does not appreciate that fact.

But if it is moved forward into Germany, in accord with NATO's policy of "forward defense," there would have to be agreements with Bonn for its use similar to the German-American agreements, and it would probably have to be fitted into NATO plans. Paris does not appreciate that.

The French have decided to deploy the missile far enough back inside France so that it would fall on the French border.

The underlying idea in French policy is that sooner or later, America will abandon Europe. Then the Germans and other Europeans would have to rely on the French nuclear arsenal and they could get together on that basis. Further, on the "tripwire" concept, it is assumed that if the French decided the threat was so grave that they must use nuclear weapons, the United States would hurry into the conflict with its strategic weapons.

In this way, General de Gaulle who was rebuffed by President Eisenhower when he sought an Anglo-Franco-American global nuclear command, figured that France could remain in sole charge of its own force and still be assured of ultimate allied and American support.

Frenchmen have argued for years about whether this makes sense. The arguments don't change, but the French arsenal has grown. Now there are three operational nuclear submarines, two batteries of ground-to-ground missiles on the Albion Plateau in Upper Provence, airborne missiles and the Pluton.

Recently, after the Communist takeover in Indonesia, Secretary of State Kissinger's Middle East diplomatic setback and the sense of a Communist threat in Portugal, some French commentators have been saying that the French nuclear force may already be the mainstay of Europe's defense. The other allies don't think so.

But the nuclear force and the defense stance are the core of the Gaullist persuasion. It has mellowed, as militant beliefs often do, but it is still the dominant policy in France.

Flora Lewis is the Paris bureau chief of The New York Times.

# Helsinki pact could open door to the West a crack

By Eric Bourne
Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

The average East European is barely aware of the current diplomatic buildup for the European security conference's summit finale at the end of this month.

Hundreds of thousands of East Europeans are intent on preparing for an annual ritual — the strictly August vacation when many of them will be heading for the beaches on the Baltic and the Black Sea.

If anyone in the European countries allied to the Soviet Union is thinking at all of the July 30 summit meeting, it is about Basket Three: the possibility that this might make it easier next year to take a vacation trip westward instead of eastward.

Basket Three is the section of the "declarations of intent" to be signed at Helsinki that deals with human rights and civil liberties. It covers freer travel between East and West, including the right to emigrate and removal of restraints on the flow of information.

East Europeans tend to accept today's ideological frontiers as part of the status quo whose endorsement was the main goal of the Soviets in pressing for a European security conference. But some among them — primarily intellectuals, youth, and the mushrooming manager-professional groups — look to Basket

Three to make living within these borders more tolerable.

In recent years Poles and Hungarians have enjoyed considerable latitude for private individual travel outside the Communist area. The Czechoslovaks — after the post-1968 freeze — are just beginning to be allowed West again. But Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania have maintained tight controls on travel.

The East bloc's refusal up till now to allow the open sale of newspapers and publications from non-Communist countries has reflected one of its biggest inferiority complexes.

Apart from Poland, where some Western newspapers are available in public reading rooms, the Western press reaches only authorized officials and institutes whose work requires them.

Sometimes a few newspapers are sold for hard (not local) currency in the new hotels used by foreigners. None is on general public sale.

Will Helsinki change this? Slowly perhaps, although the East has been busy tightening its ideological defenses to prevent indiscriminate information and cultural imports from the West.

Even liberally inclined East Europeans are unlikely yet to go so far as freewheeling Yugoslavia with its unrestricted view of citizens' rights to travel or emigrate and with a wide choice of publications from the East and West on its newsstands.

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