DEC 9 1968

1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.W. / WASHINGTON D.C. 20036 / CABLES: BROOKINST / TELEPHONE: 202 HUDSON 3-8919

December 6, 1968

Memorandum to Authors of the *Agenda*

From: Kermit Gordon

(1) Today is publication day, and it's high time I got around to thanking you for your contribution to the *Agenda*. There wasn't much time for the amenities in the midst of the frenzy of putting the book together. We must have been out of our senses to think we could launch a project in April and publish a first-class book early in December, but we seem to have done it.

(2) The printer will make the first delivery of cloth-bound books today. The advance orders have been so heavy that we will have to *ration copies for a while*, but we hope to catch up with demand in a week or 10 days. The first printing of the cloth edition is 8,000 copies, and we will order a second printing promptly if the demand seems to warrant it. Doubleday will be out with its paperback edition (price $3.50) in late January or early February.

(3) As I'm sure you've noticed, the book has already received a great deal of attention. There was good coverage in *Business Week* and *Newsweek*, and coverage focusing on special aspects of the book in *Time* and the *New York Times*. The *Washington Post* devoted five full pages of its *Outlook section* of Sunday, December 1, to excerpts from the book. UPI put a long story on the wire which I gather was widely used around the country. The Associated Press man who was assigned to the story was stricken with the flu shortly before the advance proofs arrived on his desk, and no one at AP thought to open the package; hence the AP carried nothing, and they are full of remorse. The Gannett newspapers, of which there are 20-odd, are planning to serialize excerpts from the book. We already have a number of requests for copies from Congressmen and Senators, and I am planning to write to every member of Congress with an offer of a free copy if he wants one. Just to make sure that none of us gets a swelled head,

Authors of the Agenda

December 6, 1968

page 2.

I am enclosing a copy of a column by one Crosby Noyes in the
Washington Evening Star.

(4) Each of you will receive two copies of the book and 100 reprints of your chapter. If you would like more than 100 reprints, we can have the printer run off additional copies at your expense. If you do want additional copies, I urge you to order 400, so that we can level out the reprint order. Four hundred copies will cost you something between $100 and $150. Please notify me promptly if you want to buy an additional 400 copies. (We already have additional reprint orders from Shulman and Kerr.)

enclosure

SEP 12 1968

SEP 1 1968

September 9, 1968

Professor Henry Kissinger
400 East 55th Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Henry:

My comments commence on your important paper, by taking as starting point one
of your comments:

...(o)ne central challenge to American foreign policy
is how to help create an international order which
combines military bipolarity and political multipolarity
and which can channel the tensions inseparable from this
process in a constructive direction. (1)

1. K, p. 8

In a certain sense, as your surrounding text suggests, I take it you mean that
order should be made out of these twin facts of multi-and bi-polarity, both
of which do exist, but unstable fashion.

My comments deal with some of the problems which face the United States, in
being "America" and at the same time seeking to pursue this goal: which also
I believe to be a central one.

If we look back to the time of the first World War, we see that the world has
had an American problem for some long time. A constant element in this problem
has been the consistent relationship of American power to the international
scene. It has been the case now for half a century that while American intentions
in world politics have considerably varied from decade to decade, American
material resources--when set in ratio to those of the rest of the world--have
been enormous and in relatively unchanging proportion. The global context within

2.

which they play has seen many configurations; but American power--gauged
simply as aggregate productivity and technique--remains surprisingly constant
in the ratio: U.S. WORLD.

Nothing short of a disaster, or an unlikely self-imposed Morgenthau Plan, would
change this ratio.

The paradox you point out with respect to military power--namely, that because
of thermomuclear bi-polarity its positive strategic value is diminished--perhaps
now should be applied to the panoply of American material power as a whole.
Can American influence focus these mightily capabilities to the current tasks
of international order?

The first interesting feature of this problem is that the protracted exponential
increase rate of American technological power occurs in a world, the greater
part of which still has no discernible capacity to compete with it or match it.
This would seem to be so, regardless of whatever plausible set of policies
the United States chooses to adopt in the next decade--e.g., sharply curtailed,
or enlarged commitments, abroad. (The implications of this apolitical problem
have been intelligently talked about by Servan-Schreiber, for Europe.)

One difficulty in this situation is a growing discrepancy between the actual
effects, plus high visibility, of this expanding power, and the actual increment
of American political influence which attends it. The former far outdistances
the latter. Gauged by classic standards of national power except population,
America has been and will remain a giant. To some not fond of the United
States, this discrepancy is evidence of bigness and suffices to prove that it
is a wilful bully. But even to many American politicians and writers, it is
simple to portray or interpret the "facts of power" either as an orchestration

3. of U.S. influence arrogantly and perhaps indiscriminately performed or as capabilities timorously withheld.

The American presence in world politics will suggest to others, and to many of us, a commensurateness of U.S. power and U.S. influence, even though in most matters such commensurateness does not exist.

In fact, some elements of bigness militate against influence. A dynamic technology can widen the range of "things which can happen"; it does not in similar degree enhance American abilities to influence the shape of international events.

A second feature of the problem derives from the first. Americans, as you point out, have not psychologically adapted themselves to this current situation much better than anyone else. The shift of American attitudes in the 1940's and 1950's was from laisser-faire nonengagement to "international responsibility." This new posture had one underlying assumption which in several crucial instances proved appropriate and in others did not: namely, that technological assets plus managerial skills, corresponded to a national capacity to restructure an international system, and to foster successfully domestic infrastructural formations or reform in war-torn or "emerging" nations.

While this patronal conception of responsibility still influences the views of many critics and supporters of American policy, it does so in a historical context where such obligations widely are regarded either as irrelevent or at best marginal. There are several reasons for this, which you might have more explicitly pointed to.

One is, that since 1963 the cold war detente (which in no sense rendered the international system more stable than it had been in more fearsome days), aside

4.

from the Vietnam war, has fostered appearances of normalcy which could be tragically misleading. The risk is that the basic reasons for apparent tranquillity, especially the nuclear stand-off and underlying guarantees, fade from memory or are deprecated.

But another is that important parts of the American public are currently tiring of architectonics and institution-building. The idealism in the Kennedy style and in the Truman era accomplishments, was that of a sometimes excessively but persuasive zealous/self-confidence in institution-building in international politics. While some of this classic American temper still continues in play, it is increasingly regarded as either square, obsolescent, or even degrading to be engaged in the management and control of power. The Peace Corps is a case in point: while the idea of service today has potent influence over upper-middle-class American youth, this is largely so in instances where its purposes are neither avowedly structural nor managerially-purposive, and especially where they are clearly *not* geared to overall strategic aspects of American foreign policy. The new ethic of freedom manifested widely through this country and others, no longer is "civic," in the sense that it is increasingly indifferent or even hostile to what might be called "system-maintenance" or reform. Management frequently is equated with manipulation; structural designs are easily if superficially perceived as systems of domination, not of "order"--a significant distinction. The generation come of age after the 1950's has had Vietnam as its introduction to world politics and foreign policy, and in company of older Americans has no memory of occasions when U.S.-sponsored and supported structural innovations in world politics were successful. Nor does it have a clear picture of the special occasions which prompted these enterprises.

5.

The two poles between which American moods now oscillate--notably among many intellectuals in the United States today, are not (as Arnold Wolfers once put it) a pole of power and a pole of indifference, but rather the pole of being ashamed of power¹, and the pole of expecting too much of it too quickly. The former deprecates the use or possession of force; the latter is over-attuned to the immediate possibilities of absolute action, and overly indifferent to the likely or best-surmised consequences of action. The danger of the latter posture is that policymakers, responding to clamors, could degenerate into the performance of a spasmodic series of gestures and stylistic maneuvers, no matter of what consistency.

At the end of your excellent piece, you focus upon peculiar flaws in our ways of thinking about international politics--our reluctance to think in terms of power and equilibrium, and our tendency to dress American actions in garbs of disinterestedness and universality (pp. 38-40). You are right, But more needs to be said.

It is worth asking, with respect to America's own international engagements and commitments, whether in fact there are not extraordinary constraints in American public views of politics, which set harsh limits on the ways in which our national power can be exercised in the international community. It is true that Americans--often too vigorously--have consistently tended to identify our international enterprises with overriding universal with principles or goals (I think this has occurred in most cases with little hypocrisy. This is true in the case of the Administration's justification of our part in the Vietnam war.).

1. In conversation with an American, an official of an underdeveloped country recently remarked that his was a "backward country." "I know that that expression embarrasses you," he said, "but it correspondes to the facts."

6.

I doubt whether our imperial qualities go deep--i.e., whether our capabilities of engaging in sustained "lonely" action on behalf of unilateral guarantees are very great. Our historic image of ourselves doesn't well fit in circumstances where our own role is preponderant and singular. Our mightiest achievements in our own internal development have been accomplished with little outside help, but our most prideful recent accomplishments in internal politics invariably have been those where we have acted in concert with many others. The nature of our influence has depended in very considerable measure on the obtaining of such a reputation as member of a concert, even when this membership clearly was that of **primus inter pares**. (Harlan Cleveland a couple of years ago, appealing for help in Southeast Asia from our European friends, made the point that the chief reason for asking it was that it was hard to feel "all alone.")

I doubt very much that, given the continuing amplification of American strength, technology, and productive power, that an intensified stress upon national interest considerations can sufficiently appeal to potent domestic groups in this country--even though the invocation of the idea paradoxically might cause us to be more respected for our candor abroad. If what I am suggesting contains some truth, our principal international enterprises in the future must be grounded upon broad coalitions. This in turn must mean that in many crucial instances (Southeast Asia, for instance) we should try to encourage indigenous coalitions for regional stability, even at the risk that our own presence in them become marginal, and very small indeed for the long haul.

These are simply supplementary reflections. The range of your other comments is superb, as usual.

Best,

Paul Seabury

AUG 26 1968

The Brookings Institution

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

August 23, 1968

Professor Paul Seabury
600 Alvarado
Berkeley, California 94705

Dear Professor Seabury:

I am delighted to find you are willing to serve as a critic of
the essay by Professor Henry Kissinger on the subject of central issues
in foreign policy. The essay is part of a project which is described in
the enclosure. The enclosure also explains the nature of the critic's
task.

We are happy to offer a fee of $250 for this important service.
The first draft of the essay will be completed on Monday, August 26.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Henry Kissinger, and I will ask him
to send a copy of the essay directly to you at the above address. I hope
that you can complete your report within a week after you receive the
manuscript.

It would expedite matters if you would send one copy of your
report to Professor Kissinger at the address noted below and another
copy to me at Brookings.

With very best wishes,

enclosure

cc: Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

[dictated by Mr. Gordon and signed in his absence]

Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
cc: Professor Henry A. Klausinger

enclosure

President
Kermit Gordon

Sincerely,

With very best wishes,

copy to me at Brookings.
report to Professor Klausinger at the address noted below and another
It would expedite matters if you would send one copy of your

manuscript.

that you can complete your report within a week after you receive the
to send a copy of the essay directly to you at the above address. I hope
I am sending a copy of this letter to Henry Klausinger, and I will send him
The first draft of the essay will be completed on Monday, August 5th.

We are happy to offer a fee of $500 for this important service.

task.

The enclosure also explains the nature of the critic's
in foreign policy. The essay is part of a project which is described in
the essay by Professor Henry Klausinger on the subject of central issues
I am delighted that you are willing to serve as a critic of

Dear Professor Sesbury:

Berkeley, California 94702

900 Alvarado

Professor Paul Sesbury

August 23, 1968

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

The Brookings Institution

AUG 23 1968

Participants in the "Agenda for the Nation" Project

(as of May 31, 1968)

## Urban Problems

<table><tr><td>Nature of the Urban Crisis</td><td>(still open)</td></tr><tr><td>Housing and Public Services</td><td>Anthony Downs</td></tr><tr><td>Crime and Law Enforcement</td><td>James Q. Wilson</td></tr><tr><td>The Negro</td><td>Kenneth Clark</td></tr><tr><td>Welfare, Training and Jobs</td><td>James Sundquist</td></tr></table>

## Education

<table><tr><td>Higher Education</td><td>Clark Kerr</td></tr><tr><td>Primary and Secondary Education</td><td>Ralph Tyler</td></tr></table>

## Government Organization

<table><tr><td>The Federal Government</td><td>Stephen K. Bailey</td></tr><tr><td>States and Cities</td><td>Paul Ylvisaker</td></tr></table>

## Economic Policy

<table><tr><td>The Dollar</td><td>Richard Cooper</td></tr><tr><td>Economic Stabilization</td><td>Herbert Stein</td></tr><tr><td>Budget Priorities</td><td>Charles Schultze</td></tr><tr><td>Poverty and Income Maintenance</td><td>James Tobin</td></tr></table>

## Foreign Policy

<table><tr><td>Central Issues in Foreign Policy</td><td>Henry Kissinger (considering)</td></tr><tr><td>East-West Relations</td><td>Marshall Shulman</td></tr><tr><td>Strategic Policy and Arms Control</td><td>Carl Kaysen</td></tr><tr><td>Europe and Atlantic Relations</td><td>Francis Bator</td></tr><tr><td>China and Asia</td><td>Edwin Reischauer</td></tr><tr><td>The Middle East</td><td>(still open)</td></tr><tr><td>Rich Countries and Poor Countries</td><td>Max Millikan</td></tr></table>

AGENDA FOR THE NATION PROJECT

Notes on Meeting of May 18, 1968 (Ford Foundation, New York)

Following is a brief summary of the main points made and conclusions reached at the meeting:

(1) <u>Nature of the Target Audience.</u>

It was agreed that the essays should be written on a level appropriate to an audience of intelligent nonspecialists. As they organize their essays, participants might want to imagine that they are addressing a newspaper editorial writer or a serious-minded congressman. This suggests that the paraphernalia of scholarship - e.g., footnotes - should be held to a bare minimum.

(2) <u>Structure of the Essays.</u>

The main purpose of each essay is to give the reader a deeper understanding of the problem and a clearer appreciation of the considerations involved in choosing among alternative plausible policy strategies. Though each author is encouraged to declare his own policy preferences, the essay as a whole should be a balanced and fair-minded effort in exposition and analysis, not a debater's brief in support of the author's policy views.

It is not intended to force each essay into a standard organizational mold. However, to the extent that the material can be organized in something like the following sequence, it would be desirable to do so:

(a) Nature, dimensions, and significance of the policy problems.

(b) Description and evaluation of recent policies.

(c) Policy alternatives for the future: pros and cons.

(d) Author's policy preferences.

While most of the essays will focus mainly on policies of the federal government, there are a few in which the main emphasis will necessarily be on policy-making at lower levels of government or even in the private sector.

(3) <u>Specifications and Procedures.</u>

The length of each essay should be about 10,000 to 12,000 words.
The schedule is as follows: first drafts due August 15; critics' comments

2.

to author, September 1; final drafts due September 15. A few participants indicated that they would prefer to complete their first drafts earlier than August 15, and to advance the rest of the schedule for their essays. For example, if an author can submit an essay by August 1, we will try to arrange to obtain critics' comments by August 15, so that the revised and final draft of the essay can be completed by September 1.

It was agreed that an effort should be made to advance the publication date - to November 17 if at all possible. It is clearly imperative that every participant adhere to the indicated schedule if the whole project is not to be delayed.

### (4) Selection of Critics.

We want to have two formal critics for each essay. (Each author is free of course to solicit informal reactions from as many persons as he wishes.) Of the two formal critics, at least one should be an arms-length critic who has not been in consultation with the author prior to the completion of the first draft. It would be desirable if at least some of the critics were elected government officials who could review the essays from the perspective of the firing line.

Each author was asked to submit a list of at least four names, from which we will select two to serve as critics of the essay. Critics will be paid a modest honorarium.

### (5) Substantive Organization.

In addition to the subjects listed, it was agreed that we should try to commission two additional essays: a broad-brush essay on the central issues of U. S. foreign policy, which would create the setting for and constitute a general introduction to the more specialized foreign policy essays, and another broad-brush essay on the nature of the urban crisis which would serve a similar purpose for the more specialized essays on urban problems. We will try to do this.

### (6) Problems of Overlap and Lacunae.

It was agreed that intensive consultation among authors is necessary to sort out the many problems of interrelationship among essays. For this purpose, it was agreed to establish an informal foreign policy caucus (with Marshall Shulman acting as convener) and an urban problems caucus (with Jim Sundquist serving as convener). The authors involved in these groups will meet separately for intensive consultations at a time convenient to them; they will exchange tentative outlines of their essays in advance of these meetings.

3.

(7) Title of Project (and Book).

We are not very happy with the title "Agenda for the Nation,"
but there were no better suggestions. Participants are urged to think of
a better one.

(8) Reaching a Larger Audience.

It was agreed that we should try to work out arrangements (beyond
the publication of a hard-cover book and a low-priced paperback) to achieve
maximum ventilation of the ideas generated in this venture. We will explore
the possibilities of television, newspaper or magazine publication of con-
densations, organization of seminars with public officials, etc. Suggestions
by participants are solicited.

Kermit Gordon
May 31, 1968.

September 9, 1968

Dear Kermit,

I have just finished reading and preparing the critique on
Henry Kissinger's paper, and we also had a brief chance to discuss
it here in Washington. I am sending that critique off to Henry today,
and a copy of it is enclosed herewith.

It is, I feel, a surpassingly fine document - the most pro-
found and sensitive estimate of the setting in which our foreign
policy must be formulated and conducted over the next decade that
I have seen. Many of its insights were completely new and extremely
revealing for me, and would be so, I am sure, for any general reader
with pronounced interests in questions of American foreign policy.
It has, indeed, the quality of a "basic paper" in that field, I think -
an extraordinarily imaginative statement of preconditions. Not only,
therefore, would I endorse it with the highest enthusiasm, but I would
hope that it would be positioned in the final book at a point where it
could serve as an introduction to more specifically policy-oriented
treatments.

I had some questions and suggestions of a detailed character,
and these are included in the letter to Henry.

Altogether, it has been a fine and immensely personally
educative (as well as very exciting) experience to read the manu-
script at this stage. I have returned Henry's copy, with my marginal
notes, to him.

With all best wishes,

Most sincerely,

Dr. Kermit Gordon,
President,
The Brookings Institution,
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.,
Washington, D. C. 20036.

cc. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger.

cc. Dr. Henry A. Kieزلger,

Washington, D. C. 20008.
1712 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
The Brookings Institution,
President,
Dr. Kermit Gordon,

Most sincerely,

With all best wishes,

notes to him.

I have returned Henry's copy with my marginal
script at this stage. I have returned Henry's copy with my marginal
excessive (as well as very exciting) experience to read the manu-
Altogether, it has been a fine and immensely personally
and these are included in the letter to Henry.

I had some questions and suggestions of a detailed character,
treatments.

could serve as an introduction to more specifically policy-oriented
views that it would be positioned in the final book at a point where it
therefore, would I endorse it with the highest enthusiasm, but I would
an extraordinarily imaginative statement of preconditions. Not only,
I think, indeed, the quality of a 'base paper' in that field, I think -
with pronounced interests in questions of American foreign policy,
revealing for me, and would be so, I am sure, for any general reader.
I have seen. Many of its insights were completely new and extremely
policy must be formulated and conducted over the next decade that
found and sensitive estimate of the setting in which our foreign
It is, I feel, a superbly fine document - the most pro-
and a copy of it is enclosed herewith.

It here in Washington. I am sending that critique off to Henry today.
Henry Kieزلger's paper, and we also had a brief chance to discuss
I have just finished reading and preparing the critique on

Dear Kermit,

September 9, 1968

SEP 1 1 1968

CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON

1530 P STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20005

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

September 9, 1968

Dear Henry,

It has been a very special pleasure and privilege to read the first draft of Central Issues in Foreign Policy. It is, I believe, a truly great paper, profoundly penetrating, and dealing at a level of insight rarely if ever attained in treatments that take specific, contemporary elements of policy as their chief concern. In my view — and after several readings — this is genuinely a basic document for American foreign policy for the next decades — a statement of the dimensions of our present and future world, both inner and outer, that I have not seen matched in many years. For this reason, I hope very much that it is used as an introduction to the other policy papers of the series, for it really underlines all specific judgments and can provide an extremely significant framework for them.

For me, there were two complexes of ideas in the paper that stood out among all the rest. The first is the notion — which was a new one to me and I suspect will be for many readers — that, while the technological developments of the modern world inevitably lead to further and further concentrations of physical resources in the superpowers, and therefore in a military sense to an ever more sharply bipolar world, the very nature of power itself tends to bring about the opposite evolution in the political realm — to promote political and social multipolarity. One of the most important insights in the paper, I think, is the statement on page 33 that the heart of our foreign policy problem is indeed bound up with the issue that the facts of technology make for centralization while political and psychological realities encourage pluralism: that the supreme philosophical challenge for us in the future in the foreign policy area will be to truly comprehend and deal with this fundamental dichotomy.

The other idea that appears to me absolutely central is the

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suggestion on page 15 that a new look at the national security
policy of the United States, via a bipartisan panel, formed
somewhat along the lines of the old Gaither Committee, is long
overdue, and that a new Administration should move quickly
to constitute such a group. Recalling my own experience with
the original Gaither Committee, and the extremely important
insights — novel for the time and highly topical to it — that were
achieved, I feel extremely strongly about this. Indeed, it would
seem to me important to expand the base of discussion beyond
that of national security policy alone — and possibly into more
than one such panel.

Both these points seem so important to me that I hope
that they will be emphasized in the final draft of the paper to the
point where they cannot be missed by the most casual reader.
For if they alone are really absorbed by the average intelligent
but non-specialized reader, the essay will have done an extremely
valuable job, I think, quite apart from all the other important and
sensitive points that it makes.

There are of course a variety of other issues brought out
in the essay whose profundity struck me with great force. But
we have talked about most of these already. It would therefore
be more pertinent, I suspect, to go immediately to the relatively
few specific suggestions that I have. These I will refer to
sequentially, as they appear in the manuscript.

1. Page 1, last sentence, second paragraph: "The age of the superpowers is nearing its end..." This statement, at this point in the essay, seems ambiguous with respect to the first sentence in the second paragraph on page 6. In fact, of course, it states the first half of that thesis of "bipolar-multipolar" dichotomy that is such a powerful issue in the paper. But the essential point did not become clear — at least to me — until page 7. I think it ought to be introduced much earlier — indeed on page 1. What about altering this sentence to read: "And the age of the political superpowers that succeeded it is now nearing its end"?

2. Page 2, last sentence: "What seems as tranquility to posterity appears to contemporaries as the constant effort to adjust

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differences within some system of equilibrium". Later in the
eyay, the point is emphasized that within a system highly
heterogeneous in respect of values, goals, expectations,
legitimacies, methodologies, backgrounds of previous experi-
ence, etc., as we experience on a global scale today, such
equilibria are more than ever difficult to achieve and maintain.
But it seems to me worth while to introduce the reader to this
notion at this point.

3. Page 2, second paragraph: "Stable periods have been characterized by some or all of the following features..." Add here, in conformity with the above and to emphasize it, "reasonable uniformity of values and preconceptions among states"?

4. Page 3, top: "A stable technology removes the insecurities of a qualitative arms race". But of course it does not remove the lesser — but still considerable — insecurities involved in a quantitative race at a given level, where, also, the state with the greatest physical resources of money and technology is equally able to triumph, though on a somewhat longer time scale. I think of Russia's extreme push in the field of tanks in the inter-World War I-World War II period, for example, or, at the present time-level, in a nuclear submarine fleet.

5. Page 3, first sentence, third paragraph: "The scope of domestic claims determines the resources available for the conduct of foreign policy and therefore for conflict. The sequiteur here is not wholly clear to me. Are not the two in fact parallel growths rooted in the same domestic conditions? Expand?"

6. Page 6, first sentence, last paragraph: "In a bipolar world, diplomatic adjustments are difficult because any relative gain on one side appears as an absolute loss for the other." This distinction is not clear to me. Should it be spelled out further?

7. Page 7, first paragraph: "Hence, they see no need not to purchase..." — "no need to purchase"?

8. Page 11, second sentence: "In other words, power and influence are less related than at any previous period." In the present situation, does not influence, indeed, converge to real power?

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9. Page 15: I would repeat my feeling that this suggestion of a modern (and modified) "Gaither Panel", to be set up by a new Administration, is perhaps the most important one in the paper. In this context, I wonder whether two further points ought not to be added to the agenda, perhaps as (a) and (b), ahead of the present (a), something like this:

a. Definitions of national interest and national security for the coming decade (or perhaps some shorter period – I am reasonably sure it cannot be longer).

b. The relation of military to political power and influence.

10. Page 16, second paragraph: "The heroes of these protest movements are such unlikely figures as Guevara and Ho-leaders of backward countries and repressive societies. The absurdity of founding a claim for freedom on protagonists of the totalitarian state only underlines the fact that the travail of the new countries spills over even to societies which share none of their immediate problems." Is not one of the motivating forces of this curious phenomenon the existence of obvious huge margins for improvement in such situations? In any society, the very existence of such margins, which seem to give "reachable" opportunities to individuals to do something about them, is of course a most important ingredient of hope everywhere. May it not be that there is a subconscious psychological drive to actually induce hope by idolizing situations not only this bad, but which, in the very character of their glaring menaces and deficiences, seem to typify situations that, if they existed in the environment of the idolizers, could appear to offer real, huge, easily visualized creative tasks for a new generation? (We had a chance to discuss this the other day.)

11. Page 16, last sentence: "For all their confusion and torment..." In fact, are not such confusion and torment precisely the characteristics of the great religious movements of conversion – particularly at their inception?

12. Page 20, first paragraph: "Since they usually began their struggle for independence while in a small majority and

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are sustained... they are not likely to be repelled by the notion
that *it is possible to force men to be free.*" I don't quite under-
stand this last phrase. Expand?

13. Page 28, last sentence: "The disagreement here is caused not by a failure of understanding but because the two sides understand each other only too well." There is an apparent *non-sequiteur* here, I think, at least for the general reader. Should be expanded or clarified?

14. Page 31, third sentence: "The Atlantic nations require above all a new philosophy *not a new policy*." Will not a new policy inevitably develop as a consequence of a new philosophy? Omit "not a new policy"?

15. Page 32, second paragraph: "*But* the memory of European impotence and American tutelage..." There was for me a bit of confusion here, effectively resolved by removing the "But".

16. Page 32, paragraph beginning: "This is precisely the attitude..." Does this also imply decentralization of decision-making *within* Europe? Should this point be expanded, or met more specifically here?

17. Page 36, last sentence, paragraph 1: "It may develop a vested interest..." This seems to me a most sensitive point. But is it not *already* true – and has been for some time? It seems to me to account for a good deal in past Soviet diplomatic history – and perhaps in Russian history before that.

18. Page 36, last sentence: "Postponing the choice in turn has the result..." The meaning of this final sentence was not wholly clear to me. Expand?

19. Page 37, paragraph beginning: "In this effort, America faces a long agenda of conceptual issues..." I think there is some redundancy in this paragraph with points earlier discussed in similar terms. This may be a good candidate for tightening or cutting if such is done.

- 6 -

20. Pages 37-38: "Can anyone seriously suppose that all tensions would disappear if the Soviet Union..." Certainly one cannot. As a half-serious suggestion, to make the matter yet more dramatic, can anyone imagine the same thing if somehow, miraculously, the Soviet Union were simply to disappear?

21. Page 40, last sentence, first paragraph: "No more important challenge confronts..." This is so vital, that there should, I think, be a reference back to the "Gaither Committee" suggestion on page 15.

22. Page 43, first sentence: "But to the charismatic heads of the new nations, this seems too limited a goal. Their aims — for better or worse — are of a more heroic cast". But they too, of course, are subject to the normal evolutionary forces that affect the postures — and indeed the value-systems — of the heads of states through changes in the natures of the states themselves. The cast is likely to change with time — and possibly more rapidly than one would guess. Either the dreamed-of goals will be attained, at least in substantial part — leading logically to a "status quo" psychology — or they will not — leading ultimately to frustration, bitterness, and either new revolutionary movements by junior groups or to passive resignation — *not* to further hope and aspiration.

These were all the specific comments which I had, and I have only one broader one. I think there can be some general tightening in Section V — *A Central Issue: The Conceptual Problem*, beginning on page 34. Nowhere else do I sense any need for it.

Let me say once again that I think this is a perfectly extra-
ordinary essay. It indeed seems to me a "base document" for all
deeper thinking about our future foreign policy. It has been a privi-
leged and an exciting experience to read it. The copy (much defaced)
is enclosed herewith.

With every best wish,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

cc. Dr. Gordon.

As always,

SEP 3- 1968

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540
Telephone-609-924-4400

THE DIRECTOR

August 30, 1968

Dear Henry:

Thanks very much for your piece. I find it extremely in-
teresting and stimulating, but I fear that I find it inadequately
worked out. If I may say so without offense, this reads like a hasty
first draft, and I would urge that you take the time to redo it com-
pletely and do credit to its central insights. Without trying to give
you a detailed recipe, which would be impertinent, my own thoughts
run along the following lines.

I think sections IV and V, fairly much as they now stand,
should form the first part of your paper. Perhaps some of the material
in III, together with a suitable introduction, should be included at
the opening. The historical material of section I can, I think, be
introduced better as examples at appropriate points in the text, rather
than as a separate body. The central proposition of section II is re-
peated in IV, but it may perhaps require more explicit statement
there in a new organization than it now has. What the paper then re-
quires for completion, it seems to me, is some comment on each of the
major areas of policy from the new perspective it provides. Thus,
with respect to military power and U.S. - S.U. relations; relations
with our NATO allies and other European nations, East Asia, and the
general problem of the third world, at least a little bit of the flavor
of what kinds of questions a new conceptual framework would lead us
to ask, and what kinds of attitudes and instruments are appropriate
to seeking the answer, are needed. In its present state, the absence
of such discussion will leave all but the most academic reader up in
the air.

One other comment of a perhaps picayune nature. I don't
think this paper is an appropriate place to suggest the kind of com-
mittee you discuss on page 15.

I know this is blunt, but my respect for both your ability
and our relationship leads me to feel that you will receive it in the
friendly and honest spirit in which it is offered.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA AT 46TH STREET NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017 CABLE ADDRESS INTERPAX OXFORD 7-3131

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

29 August 1968

Dear Steve:

As you may recall, I had a good deal to do with the so-called Herter Committee of 1961-62 on Foreign Affairs Personnel. I retain an intense interest in the problems we looked into at that time, and particularly in the problem of management of foreign affairs operations, the only item we dealt with that was not exclusively one of personnel.

Hearing of Kermit Gordon's project, Agenda for the Nation, I wrote him expressing the hope that there might be something on the subject of administration of foreign affairs, and he replied that there was no special essay on that but that you were doing one on the organization of the federal government. I write now, therefore, to make a plea for you to say something about the problem of organization of foreign affairs and, if you can in good conscience, put in a plug for something like our concept of an Executive Under Secretary of State.

I look forward to reading the result of your labors. I am sending a copy of this letter to Henry Kissinger in the hope that he too can say a word on this subject.

With best regards,

Dean Stephen K. Bailey
Maxwell Graduate School of
Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York

Syracuse, New York
Syracuse University
Citizenship and Public Affairs
Maxwell Graduate School of
Dean Stephen K. Bailey

Joseph E. Johnson

With best regards,

with that was not exclusively one of beraunel.
problem of management of foreign affairs operations, the only item we desir
interest in the problems we looked into at that time, and particularly in the
Herter Committee of 1961-63 on Foreign Affairs Personnel. I retain an intense
As you may recall, I had a good deal to do with the so-called

Dear Steve:

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

29 August 1968

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT 40TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017 CABLE ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL

JUN 24 1968

MEMO

DATE 6/20/68 [LC]

To Henry Kissinger

FROM Kermit Gordon

Herewith Dick Cooper's
outline for the "Agenda for the
Nation" project.

X

792

The Brookings Institution

June 3, 1968

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

This will confirm our understanding that you will prepare an essay on the subject indicated in the attached list for the "Agenda for the Nation" project. Details concerning purpose, length, selection of critics, time schedule, etc., are contained in the attached "Notes on May 18 Meeting."

We will be happy to pay you $5,000 for this contribution. We will plan to send you a check for this amount when we receive the revised version of your essay - on September 15 or earlier. If for any reason you would like to receive a partial payment at an earlier date, we will be happy to oblige.

We will also reimburse you for travel expenses incurred in connection with meetings of participants in the project.

The manuscript prepared by you will be the property of the Brookings Institution, which will retain all of the rights comprised in the copyright and registrations thereof.

Sometime in the next several weeks I hope you will send me a list of suitable critics of your essay, from which list we will select two names. Also, I would welcome the chance to see an outline of your essay when it is available.

Finally, a personal note: I believe we have assembled as participants in this project as able a group of thinkers on these subjects as can be found in the United States. If the project elicits the best work of the participants, it could have a constructive influence on public debate and decision-making without parallel in recent times. I'm most grateful to you for your willingness to take part.

enclosures