"Softer Toward Peking Than Moscow"

Most papers ran front-page stories. Prestigious independent *Corriere della Sera* of Milan headlined: "Nixon's Strategy Toward Moscow and Peking... Flexibility in Vietnam Negotiations. Europe: A New Kind of Relationship. Middle East: Soviet Expansionist Policy Is Cause for Worry."

The paper described the President's tone as "definitely 'softer' toward Peking than toward Moscow."

"Guidelines for 'Generation of Peace'"

Influential, left-of-center *La Stampa*, Turin, headed its story, "Nixon Speaks of Global Detente. He Is Firm With the Russians... Conciliatory with Mao..." Its New York correspondent wrote:

"This is the most important document prepared by the U.S. Government in the past years. It seals the principle of the U.S. 'low profile' and the revision of the U.S. role in the world....

"It also indicates the new guidelines 'for a generation of peace,' namely, balance of power with the Soviet Union, detente with China and a reform of the trade and monetary structures of the West and Japan."

The correspondent declared that "Congress was impressed with one detail: The different tone Nixon used toward Peking and Moscow.

"Nixon was so firm with Moscow that he denounced its policy of expansion and cast doubt on its intentions.... On the other hand, Nixon was conciliatory with China....

"Another important element is the change in tone on the Vietnam issue. Nixon evidently is not prepared for further concessions.... Without saying it openly, Nixon implied that he is waiting now for an initiative from Hanoi, perhaps through Chinese or Soviet mediation..."

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Rome's middle-of-the-road _Messaggero_ headlined its view that "Nixon is becoming more rigid with Moscow but extends his hand to China..." The paper added that the "basic lines" of U.S. foreign policy as expressed in the message are "detente toward Peking, stiffening with Moscow."

Communist L'Unita of Rome headlined, "Nixon Reaffirms U.S. Rights to World Hegemony."

Vienna: "The Document of the Day"

Independent _Kronen-Zeitung_ of Vienna referred to the message as "the document of the day" which "had been awaited with great interest since the U.S. in the past year took new and surprising initiatives in the field of foreign policy."

Independent _Die Presse_, Vienna, noted that the President "put the main emphasis on changes on the entire international scene, particularly focusing on the opening of the American-Chinese dialogue."

Headlines in other dailies read: "Nixon Makes Concessions to Mao" (Kurier) and "Nixon Makes Concessions to Peking" (Arbeiter-Zeitung).

"Will Travel as Sincere Statesman"

In the only editorial comment, independent _Oberoesterreichische Nachrichten_ of Linz wrote:

"Nixon's report to Congress makes clear that the American President is flying to Moscow and Peking with some hopes, but that his old distrust of different political systems like the Chinese and the Soviet has not completely disappeared....

"Yet the Nixon of 1972 can hardly be compared with the Vice President who toured the Soviet Union in 1959 and debated with Khrushchev in a kitchen. This President will not be a battle-prone, aggressive guest, but rather a statesman who is sincere when he uses the almost utopian formula that he wants to lay the foundation for a generation of peace."

The paper asserted that "when Nixon expresses concern about Moscow's policies it is not directed just at Congress, but also to the Kremlin.

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"The President is waiting for positive reaction from Moscow.
If it comes at all, it will appear before Nixon's Peking visit.
He can emphasize as often as he wants that he will not exploit
the conflict between the two major Communist nations. The
Kremlin does not believe him for a minute."

## Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish Treatment

Swedish media gave moderate coverage without comment. Stockholm papers gave good coverage to the report on inside foreign news pages. Conservative Svenska Dagbladet, referring to the China trip, headlined "Giant Step Toward Stable Peace," while liberal Dagens Nyheter wrote, "Missile Agreement With Soviets in May."

Headlines in provincial newspapers reported, "Nixon Warns Soviets on Armaments Race" and "Nixon Pessimistic Regarding Negotiated Peace in Vietnam."

The report drew moderate coverage in Norway. The state radio carried an account by its Washington correspondent stressing Mr. Nixon's remarks concerning critics of his Vietnam policy.

Conservative Aftenposten, Oslo's largest daily, and the ruling Labor Party's Arbeiderbladet emphasized portions regarding relations with the EEC, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. There has been no editorial comment.

Five out of seven Helsinki dailies gave headline emphasis to Mr. Nixon's concern over the magnitude of the USSR weapons buildup in the last two years. Thus conservative Uusi Suomi headed its story, "Nixon Demands Soviet Leadership Slow Down Armaments." Swedish-language Hufvudstadsbladet said on page one: "Nixon Warns Soviets: New Round of Arms Race to be Expected."

Influential, independent Helsingin Sanomat carried an account from the Washington Star under the heading, "Nixon Satisfied With His Foreign Policy, Sets Preconditions for European Security Conference."

The Center Party's Suomenmaa headed its five-column spread on the first page: "Nixon's Evaluation Before Trip to China: Cautiousness, Frustrations, Expectations, Threats."

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Tokyo TV: "Greater Reciprocity With Japan"

Japanese television networks and newspapers today gave major coverage to the report, with emphasis on U.S. - Japanese relations.

NHK-TV said the President stressed "equality and greater reciprocity" in U.S. - Japanese relations. It said the U.S. is expected to take a firm stand toward Japan in the future and to call on Japan to assume more responsibilities.

TBS-TV said Mr. Nixon pointed out that "1971 was a year of tension and progress in U.S. - Japan relations."

Leading papers gave front-page top play coverage to reports from Washington correspondents. Lead-circulation Asahi of Tokyo said in its headline, "Creation of Peace Structure Urged; 'Bipolar-Type Cold War' Ends; Adjustment for New U.S. - Japan Relations..."

"Japan No Longer a Spoiled Child"

Independent-moderate Mainichi declared:

"Mr. Nixon is of the opinion that, although Japan is the most important ally in Asia, it can no longer behave like a spoiled child, since it has become an economic power...

"The postwar cooperation system under the bipolar world should give way to a new setup in which there would be stronger mutuality and greater respect for each other's independence...

"A danger to Japan is that the stronger mutuality might impose an undue burden on Japan, and that respect for independence might lead to the strengthening of independence on the American side alone... For example, while planning to approach China independently, Mr. Nixon has forced Japan to reconfirm the treaty with Taiwan to prevent Japan from carrying out an independent policy."

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"We Cannot Concur Fully..."

Moderate, left-leaning Tokyo Shimbun judged that the report "shows President Nixon's strong desire for peace" but at the same time "indicates a philosophy that the foundation of peace is strength." It said:

"We cannot concur fully with the new international order of the Nixon diplomacy which gives priority to 'balance of power.'"

## Foreign Ministry Observations

The English-language *Japan Times* today quoted Foreign Ministry sources as saying that specific mention of Japan in the report "showed the U.S. attaches importance to its relations with Japan as a member of the five big powers...

"The sources said, however, that, as the report implied, the U.S. desire to keep close ties with Japan was motivated in part by a wish to use this country as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.... Therefore, the fact that Nixon played up Japan's status as one of the big five should not be taken at face value..."

## Seoul: Stress on Defense Commitment

South Korean papers gave heavy play to the report, with special attention to the East Asia section. Headlines stressed the pledge to keep U.S. defense commitment to South Korea.

"Timely Warning on Arms Race"

In the only editorial so far, the evening independent *Joongang Ilbo* of Seoul today described the report as confirming recent U.S. moves to seek a new world order to fit the emerging global political structure of polycentrism. It also said President Nixon had warned the Soviets about their present build-up of nuclear missiles and added:

"Although we do not expect the race between the two superpowers in this field to develop to the extent of disrupting peaceful coexistence between the two, we feel there is great probability that the competition will trigger a fresh arms race. In this sense we think President Nixon's warning a most timely one."

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Conservative independent <u>Chosun Ilbo</u> of Seoul said today in a dispatch from its Washington correspondent, "President Nixon has now come up with a new concept of American involvement in Asia with a stress on finding a new form of relationship in the area. And yet he maintains a strong posture as far as regional security is concerned."

Third Annual Report "Different"

The Washington correspondent of Seoul's <u>Daehan Ilbo</u> today wrote that the report "certainly has a new element as expressed by Dr. Kissinger.

"It is different from Mr. Nixon's first report in 1970 with its emphasis on the Nixon Doctrine and from the second report last year with emphasis on implementing the doctrine, in that the third report shows steadiness and prudence."

Hong Kong: "U.S. Will Not Damage Security of Others"

Media in Hong Kong stressed the passages on China policy and reaffirmation of U.S. commitments in Asia.

Independent <u>Ming Pao</u> commented:

"The message is clearly intended to reassure U.S. allies and even the Soviet Union. The U.S. deeply desires to establish better relations with Peking, but will not damage the interest and security of others."

The paper expected a strong rebuttal from Peking emphasizing its positions on Taiwan and Vietnam.

Pro-Communist Paper on "Hostility to China"

The pro-Communist *Commercial Daily*, saying Mr. Nixon had not abandoned his "two Chinas" or his "one China, one Taiwan" schemes, held that unless he changed his policy of "hostility toward China" his Peking trip could not succeed.

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Pointing out that America could not "decide" the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, the paper remarked:

> "There is one thing which is within Nixon's power to 'decide.' This is that all U.S. armed forces should be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. But apparently Nixon has not decided to withdraw from Taiwan.... In other words, he still wants to go on occupying China's Taiwan by force. If this continues, there is no way for Nixon's 'process' to begin. He will just be 'shuffling his feet in the same place' and not 'marching.'"

## Taipei: "Nixon Does Not Expect Results"

The *Ta Hua Evening News* of Taipei stated:

> "Nixon went to lengths to discourage expectations of any solid outcome of his talks with the Communist bandits. He is fully aware, as a matter of course, that the bandits' decision to engage in contacts with America sprang not from an earnest desire for a thaw but rather from their intention to use diplomacy as a means for quelling internal chaos.... Nixon does not expect a satisfactory outcome. He has made it clear the dramatic move is a 'historic event' per se."

## "Stated Defense Obligations to ROC"

The *Independence Evening Post* of Taipei, a spokesman for the Taiwanese community, declared that "President Nixon frankly admitted there is a gulf of political and theoretical differences between America and the Maoists. And, at the same time, he also stated rather firmly that America shares diplomatic relations and defense obligations with the Republic of China.... If Nixon really goes to the extent of befriending the bandit clique, then he will make himself the enemy of all the Chinese people."

## Manila: "A Good Word for the Philippines"

These were Manila headlines: "U.S. Will Continue Military, Economic Aid to Asia, Nixon Says" (*Manila Times*); "Reality Will Shape U.S. - China Relations, Says Nixon" (*Philippines Herald*), and "Nixon Puts in Good Word for R. P. in Policy Speech" (*Manila Bulletin*).

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Madras: "Same Old Anti-India Bias"

The Hindu of Madras, leading English-language daily in south India said today in an editorial titled "Dangerous Message" that President Nixon's "observation... will make no contribution to restoration of friendly relations between his country and ours" and charged that they "reveal the same old anti-India bias plus a few more veiled insinuations against India."

Jerusalem Cites "Satisfaction" in Israel

A commentator on the Jerusalem radio's domestic service reported that "unofficially, reliable Israeli sources say that the speech was firm, forceful..." He said the sources also hoped the report "will have a positive effect on Middle East developments." It also showed, he reported, that the U.S. "is not indifferent to and does not ignore Soviet involvement in Egypt and realizes the seriousness of that involvement..."

"Another source of satisfaction... is that Nixon does not identify himself with the Rogers plan. On the other hand, he does not go into detail regarding the proposed partial settlement. Mr. Nixon has thus indicated that he adheres to the idea of U.S. good offices without adopting a stand or becoming a party to the conflict."

"In general, it is said here that the influence of the Indo-Pakistani war is undoubtedly felt in Nixon's report. This indicates that the President has learned the lesson of Soviet expansionism in this war."

An analyst on the Israeli Armed Forces Radio judged that Mr. Nixon "has considerably escalated the tone of his policy toward the Russians in the global power struggle, one of whose focal points is the Middle East...."

"Furthermore, I would even say that warning signals to the Soviets are clearly distinguishable. The U.S. under Nixon has no intention in the foreseeable future of remaining silent in the face of Soviet attempts, recently quite obvious, to disrupt the course of rapprochement, at least dialogue, between the U.S. and China...."

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"President Nixon is not prepared to give way to the Russians in their tactical and strategic drive into the Mediterranean and Egypt.... Concerning us directly, I would also say that President Nixon's report today in no way contradicts, but fully conforms, from an American point of view, to the agreement to provide for our defense needs and the U.S. commitment to prevent the arms balance in the area from being tilted to Israel's disadvantage. In this respect I believe Nixon's report has immediate significance."

The Jerusalem columnist of semi-official *Davar* reported that--unofficially--"Government sources expressed great satisfaction with the report... particularly the emphasis on deterring the Soviets." Noting a contrast between Mr. Nixon's proposals for an interim settlement and the Rogers plan, he wrote that "the President's approach is in line with the impression prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of his meetings with Prime Minister Meir."

## "Sober and Meaningful"

The paper's editorial called the report "sober and meaningful." The section on the Arab-Israel dispute, it said, "reflects the understanding reached in clarifications" between the U.S. and Israel.

## Cairo: Sidky's Reaction

Radio Cairo's domestic service last night broadcast Prime Minister Sidky's address to the Egyptian legislature on domestic reform, in which he said:

"I have just been informed that President Nixon's report to Congress... indicates that the U.S. is threatening to escalate the situation in the Middle East, alleging that this is the result of increasing Soviet support and our ability to repulse aggression."

"If the U.S. thinks that by this it will frighten us or make us desist from regaining our rights, then we say that we will not relinquish our rights, an inch of our territory or the rights of the Palestinian people. God is with us and He will grant us victory."

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The Government-run Middle East News Agency circulated a report that today's Cairo newspapers gave heavy play to Dr. Sidky's comments. A MENA dispatch also summarized a long attack on the Middle East section of the report, written by the publisher of Cairo's sensationalist _al-Akhbar_. He declared:

> "Every word in the message about the Middle East affirms more than ever the role which the U.S. has been playing since June 1967 as a principal partner in the Israeli aggression which continues to throw all its weight behind Israeli ambitions while trying to strike at the Arab liberation movement and subject the area to American influence and imperialist looting...."

> "In not one line of his discussion of the Middle East... does Nixon say that there is an Israeli occupation of extensive Arab territory, that the last session of the U.N. General Assembly denounced the continuation of that occupation and demanded the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory, and that it was Israel that brought Dr. Jarring's mission to a standstill...."

> "President Nixon has confirmed what President Sadat has revealed to us--that U.S. strategy in the Middle East has become one of open defiance and open participation in the aggression against Arab territory, and that this change in the U.S. strategy has taken place since U.S. prevarications about peace ended in the announcement about the supply of Phantoms and Skyhawks and subsequently U.S. arms to Israel. Today, this change has escalated into a threat with NATO forces."

### Buenos Aires: "Gloomy But Realistic"

Newspapers in Argentina gave exceptionally heavy coverage to the report, with emphasis on the Latin American section. Treatment reflected the feeling the message was somewhat "gloomy" but realistic.

Prestigious conservative _La Prensa_ of Buenos Aires ran the page-one headline, "Nixon's Latin America Message Gives Little Encouragement," with the subhead, "Asserts There Will Be More Difficulties in Future Relations with Area."

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Nationalistic *Clarín* of Buenos Aires bannered, "Nixon... Says His Country Must Adjust to Reality of People's China. Promises Concrete Action to Benefit Latin America. Warns USSR."

Generally anti-U.S. *La Opinión* of Buenos Aires devoted an especially objective four pages to the report. Subheads included, "Although Demanding Economic Compensation, Nixon Admits Chile's Right to Set Own Structure," and "U.S. Renounces Paternalism, Seeks Flexible Alliance with Latin American Countries..."

## Santiago, Santo Domingo News Play

Conservative-independent *Mercurio* of Santiago front-paged a LATIN news agency story with a full page of photos and excerpts inside. Oppositionist *La Prensa* headlined, "Nixon Says Latin American Nations are Partners of U.S.," while rightist *La Tribuna* ran the head, "Better Late Than Never-- Nixon Admits Latin America Is Not Back Yard of U.S.A."

Marxist *Puro Chile* headlined a UPI dispatch, "Nixon Makes Official His Blackmail of Chile."

Leading Dominican Republic dailies gave prominent front-page play to the message. Moderate independent *El Caribe* of Santo Domingo carried four separate stories under the headline, "Nixon Foresees Difficult Years."

## Caracas: "New Focus on Latin America"

The message was the lead story on TV and in the newspapers in Caracas. Independent influential *El Nacional* ran the text of the Latin American section, with a front-page head, "Nixon Announces New Focus on Latin America--A Hemisphere Divided by the Gap Between Opulence and Misery Is Not a Community."

Caracas' *Ultimas Noticias*, head paper of the Capriles chain, ran eight UPI reports and analyses and front-paged, "Nixon's Dramatic Confession: Our Dominion in Latin America Is Ended and I Go to Peking to Avoid a U.S.-Chinese Catastrophe."

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## Moscow: "No Substantial Change in Course"

Organized Soviet media treatment of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy message began very promptly yesterday with a critical Moscow TASS account which, however, noted briefly some of the President's remarks on U.S.-USSR relations, and with tailored commentary broadcast to Africa and the Arab world. A Moscow radio domestic broadcast today devoted one paragraph to the message, declaring:

> "The foreign press points out that Washington still does not intend to make any substantial changes in its foreign policy course, the characteristic feature of which is orientation toward aggression."

The TASS story, datelined Washington, said that "while asserting that U.S. policy scored outstanding progress last year, [the report's] authors admit that there were also disappointments..." These were catalogued as follows:

> --"The American war in Indochina that caused serious tension domestically."

> --"A weakening of U.S. positions in the system of world imperialism... The U.S. passed from the dominating role it played in the post-war period to a new role."

> --"Unilateral measures taken by the U.S. in the field of the economy evoked a sharp aggravation in relations with trade partners of the U.S. in the whole world... Serious tension has originated between Japan and the U.S."

> --"The President notes with alarm that the appearance of a new European grouping of ten countries will lead to a gigantic concentration of economic might and that this cannot but have consequences for the trade positions of the U.S."

TASS wrote further:

> "Touching on Soviet-American relations, the President noted that problems separating the U.S. and the USSR are real and serious ones. They involve the security and welfare of both countries and therefore require concrete agreements on specific questions that cause tension. He said useful talks were held by the two countries in 1971.

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"The number and nature of positive phenomena brought the U.S. to the conclusion that a summit meeting would be appropriate and could give an impetus to further progress, the President stated...

"Speaking of the forthcoming visit to Peking, Nixon stated that this visit is the result of a thoroughly organized series of steps and will become a culmination of three years of mutual efforts.

"Nixon admitted that certain political circles in the U.S. were exerting pressure to utilize the new approach to Peking for exploiting Sino-Soviet tension. In this connection, the President said that the policy of the U.S. was not directed against Moscow. The U.S. and the USSR should resolve problems of prime importance, and it would be costly to impede progress by new antagonisms."

TASS did not elaborate further on the President's references to the Soviet Union and China and failed to mention the SALT talks.

## Broadcasts to Africa, Arab World

Even before the TASS dispatch was disseminated, a Moscow radio broadcast in English to Africa commented on Mr. Nixon's treatment of that area:

"According to President Nixon's message to Congress... American policy in Africa aims at setting up honest relations with the people of the continent and their governments. That's the theory.

"In practice, America is glaringly violating the sanctions against Rhodesia. The New York Times has pointed out that America's violations are a colossal moral stimulus for the white government. Let me add that it's far more than a moral stimulus. America's purchases of Rhodesian chrome are also a mighty financial and economic bulwark for Ian Smith's racist regime."

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A Moscow radio broadcast in Arabic even earlier in the day (10 a.m., EST) asserted:

> "It was clearly evident that President Nixon, defining the American course toward the Middle East, completely evaded the main issue, namely the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Arab territories which they have been occupying since 1967."

No Peking Mention

No Peking mention of the message has yet appeared in available monitoring reports.

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HEADLINES OVER COVERAGE
OF STATE OF THE WORLD

February 15, 1972

Following are the headlines over stories on the State of the World.
They were often accompanied by photos of RN before the mikes. Banners
were frequent and many papers had 2 or more stories on the report. A
good number of papers also carried excerpts from the document.

RN's warning to his critics and/or defense of their patriotism turns
up more than any other headline. Breakthrus, nearer to peace, progress
etc. was seen almost as often. Appearing about half as much was the
expectation of an arms pact. PRC talks and Soviet arms buildup were
next in line in terms of headline coverage.

"Nixon Warns Candidates Not to Cause War Heat-Up" Banner, *Atlanta Journal*

"Nixon Suggests Critics Guard Viet Language" -- pg. 9, *Manchester Union*
*Leader*

"World is Nearer to Peace, President Tells Congress/'71 Breakthroughs
Lauded by Nixon" -- Banner, *Miami Herald*

"Arms Pact is Near, Nixon Hints" -- p. 1, *Herald*

"Missile Pact is Near -- Nixon" -- pg. 1, *Atlanta Constitution*

"Don't Doubt Critics' Patriotism -- Nixon" -- p. 2, *Constitution*

"Nixon Challenges Soviets to Join Search for Peace" -- Banner, *Det. Free Press*

"China Talks Might Avert a Catastrophe, Says Nixon" p. 12, *Det. Free Press*

"Nixon's State of World: A Year of Breakthrus" -- Banner, *Chic. Tribune*

"Soviets May Have 2 New ICBM Systems: Nixon" -- p. 1 *Chic. Tribune*

2

"Pres. Cautions Critics of VN on Giving Aid to Enemy" -- p. 2 Chic. Trib.

***

"Nixon Challenges Soviet to Cooperate With US in Easing World
Tension" -- Banner, Phila. Inquirer

***

"Nixon Warns of Soviet Arms Buildup" -- Banner, NY Daily News

"Nixon to Critics: Don't Peril Peace" -- p. 2, NY News

***

"Nixon Says Big Two Near Accord on Arms" -- Banner, Richmond Times
Dispatch

"Nixon Advises Democrats Not to Encourage Hanoi" -- pg. 1, Times-Dispatch

***

"Nixon, Foes Continue Hot Debate on Dissent" -- pg. 1, Richmond News
Leader

"Nixon: Reds in Arms Build-up" -- pg. 1, News-Leader

***

"Nixon Urges Dem Rivals to Weigh War Criticism/ 'Don't Give Foe
Reason to Contine'" -- banner, Denver Post

***

"Pres. Cites Progress in Foreign Affairs, Also Admits Disappointments" --
banner, Birmingham News

***

"1971 'Breakthrough' Year: Nixon" -- p. 5, Newsday

"President Softening a Blow at War Critics" - p. 5, Newsday

***

"China Trip 'giant Step Toward Peace' says Nixon" -- Houston Post - p. 1

***

"Nixon Reports Strides on Road to Peace" -- p. 1, Memphis Commerical
Appeal

3

"President Predicts Breakthrough Year" -- p. 10, <u>Commercial Appeal</u>

"Nixon's Report Fits Campaign" -- p. 11, <u>Commercial Appeal</u>

***

"Nixon Defends Peace-Plan Critics" -- p. 1 <u>Minneapolis Tribune</u>

***

"Nixon Sees Summit Trips Ways to Peace" -- banner, <u>Portland (Me)</u>
<u>Herald Press</u>

"N-Arms Accord Near, President Reports" -- p. 1, <u>Portland (Me)</u>
<u>Herald Press</u>

***

"China Soviet Ties Called Improved/Nixon, in report to Congress, cites
Foreign Policy 'breakthrough' in '71" -- banner, <u>Louisville Courier Journal</u>

"Initial U. S. -Soviet Arms Curb Pact Near, Nixon Indicates" -- p. 2
<u>Courier Journal</u>

"Nixon Hints US May Use Force to Free POWs" -- p. 2 <u>Courier Journal</u>

"Better US -- India Relations Possible" -- p. 2, <u>Courier Journal</u>

"Nixon Advises War Critics not to give Enemy an Incentive to Prolong
the War" -- p. 2, <u>Courier Journal</u>

"Nixon Calls China Policy his Major 'Breakthrough'" -- p. 2, <u>Courier Journal</u>

***

"Nixon Sees Promise of World Peace" -- banner, <u>Boston Globe</u>

***

"Nixon Sees Nuclear Arms Curb" -- banner, <u>Indianapolis Star</u>

"Peace Nearer, Nixon Says in State of World Speech" -- p. 21,
<u>Indianapolis Star</u>

***

4

"Nixon Claims Peace Breakthroughs, Half-Dozen 'Sharp Disappointments'" -- p. 1 *Sioux Falls Argus Leader*

***

"President Steps Into Fray", p. 1, *Dallas Morning News*

"Nixon's 'State of World' Notes 4 Diplomatic Gains" -- banner, *Orlando Sentinel*

"Nixon Tries to Dampen Loyalty Rift" -- p. 11, *Orlando Sentinel*

***

"Nixon Says Soviet and US, Defined Pact on Missiles" -- lead, *NY Times*

"President Urges Taipei and Peking to Negotiate" -- p. 1, *NY Times*

"Nixon Bids Rivals Not Block Peace" -- p. 1, *NY Times*

"President Appears to Hint at Raids" to Free POWs -- p. 21, *NY Times*

"Nixon Edging Nearer to Tie with Bangladesh" -- p. 20, *NY Times*

***

"Nixon Report on Foreign Policy Stresses Restraint by Foes, Self-Reliance by Allies" -- p. 4, *W. S. Journal*

***

"Nixon Hopeful on World" -- lead, *Balt. Sun*

"Nixon Feels US, Soviet near Consensus on Arms" -- p. 1, *Balt. Sun*

"Nixon Kissinger tell War Critics They do Not Question Their Patriotism" -- p. 1, *Balt. Sun*

"Nixon's World: Why he Focuses on Moscow" -- banner, *C. S. Monitor*

"Nixon Tries to Remove Haldeman's Arrows" -- p. 6, *CS Monitor*

***

5

"Nixon Sees Gains In Foreign Affairs" -- lead, <u>Wash. Post</u>

"Democrats Reject Nixon Bid to Soften War Criticism" -- p. 1, <u>Wash. Post</u>

"Nixon Says Weapons Pact Near" -- p. 12, <u>Wash. Post</u>

**

"Nixon Tells Goals for His 2 Summits" -- lead, <u>LA Times</u>

"Nixon Says He Doesn't Question Patriotism of Viet Policy Critics" -- p. 1
<u>LA Times</u>

**

"Nixon Warns Russians Against Arms Buildup" banner, <u>Phila. Eve. Bulletin</u>

**

"Nixon Reports on State of World" -- banner, <u>Wash. Star</u>

"Pakistan Tilt Is Explained" -- p. 1, <u>Star</u>

"Nixon Hopes for Arms Pact, Won't Yield Lead to Russia" -- p. 5, <u>Star</u>

**

"President to Rivals" Limit War Criticism" -- lead, <u>Jacksonville Journal</u>

"Nixon Claims Progress Toward Goal of Peace" -- banner, <u>Columbus Dispatch</u>

**

"Nixon Warns Rivals on 'Incentive' in War" -- banner, <u>Kansas City Star</u>

"Focus on China" -- p. 1, <u>K. C. Star</u>

**

"Nixon Calls on Rivals Not to Encourage Reds" -- banner, <u>Youngstown Vindicator</u>

***

# # # #

GENERAL

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1972

Excerpts From State of World Message

By United Press International

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9—Following are excerpts from "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace," President Nixon's third annual message to Congress on foreign affairs:

The Watershed Year

Taken together, the initiatives of
1971 constitute a profound change in
America's world role.

The heart of our new conception of
that role is a more balanced alliance
with our friends—and a more creative
connection with our adversaries.

Toward our two principal adversaries,
the People's Republic of China and the
Soviet Union, we faced dissimilar
problems. With China, the task was to
establish a civilized discourse on how
to replace estrangement with a dia-
logue serving to benefit both countries.
With the Soviet Union, we already had
the discourse. We had examined at
great length the general principles
upon which the policies of both coun-
tries must be based, if we were to
move from the mere assertion to the
harmonization of conflicting national
interests. The task was to make this
discourse fruitful by moving to the
achievement of concrete arrangements
of benefit both to the Soviet Union
and ourselves.

Areas of Major Change

THE SOVIET UNION

We hope that what has been accom-
plished will prove to be the beginning
of a transformation of the relationship
between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

The first requirement for such a
transformation is that we understand
clearly the sources of our differences.
They are profound and they do not
spring from transitory causes, or from
personalities or from some historical
accident. Rather, they are rooted in
the different ways our two countries
have developed. They are exacerbated
by tendencies which spring from our
national personalities and our differing
approaches to the conduct of inter-
national affairs:

Americans consider tensions in in-
ternational relations abnormal and
yearn to see them resolved as quickly as
possible. We tend to believe that
goodwill is a principal ingredient for
their resolution and that our own good-
will is beyond question. We assume
that if tensions persist, it is proof that
our adversary is implacably hostile to
us. The application of these attitudes to
relations with the Soviet Union has
led us to excessive and unjustified op-
timism during periods of détente and
to uneritable acceptance of inevitable
and unbounded hostility during periods
of tension.

"The U.S.S.R. tends to view external
tensions as the inevitable corollary of
conflicting social systems. Soviet di-
ploomy therefore is prepared to ac-
cept international tension as normal
and, too often, to view negotiations
with the United States as a form of

harsh competition from which only
one side can possibly gain advantage.
In the past this attitude has often
tempted the Soviets to treat the occa-
sional improvement in our relations as
a transitory opportunity to achieve
narrow tactical advantages. It has led
the Soviets to consider the intervening
periods of hostility as inevitable, and
the causes of that hostility as beyond
resolution.

Both these attitudes reflect the na-
tional experiences of the United States
and the Soviet Union and have worked
for two decades to frustrate a better
relationship between our two countries.
They cause periods of détente to
founder, and they protract and inten-
sify the periods of hostility.

In Moscow we will have three cen-
tral objectives. We want to complete
work on those issues which have been
carried to the point of final decision.
We want to establish a political frame-
work for dealing with the issues still
in dispute. And we want to examining
with the Soviet leaders the further de-
velopment of the U.S.-Soviet relation-
ship in the years ahead.

The tasks ahead arise logically from
the present state of relations:

A accord on an initial strategic
arms limitation agreement or on the
issues to be addressed in the second
stage of the SALT negotiations.

A discussion of the problem of the
Middle East and the reasons for the
failure to reach a peaceful settlement
there.

A discussion of the problem of
European security in all its aspects
and the identification of mutually
shared objectives which will provide a
basis for further normalization of in-
tercourse between Eastern and West-
ern Europe. No agreements in this area,
however, will be made without our
allies.

An exploration of our policies in
other areas of the world and the ex-
tent to which we share an interest in
stability.

An examination of the possibility
of additional bilateral cooperation. The
steps taken so far have been signifi-
cant but are meager, indeed, in terms
of the potential. There are a variety
of fields in which U.S.-Soviet coopera-
tion would benefit both. Our economic
relations are perhaps the most obvious
example. Bilateral cooperation will be
facilitated if we can continue to make
progress on the major international
issues.

We do not, of course, expect the
Soviet Union to give up its pursuit of
its own interests. We do not expect
to give up pursuing our own. We do
expect, and are prepared ourselves to
demonstrate, self-restraint in the pur-
suit of those interests. We do expect a
recognition of the fact that the general
improvement in our relationship trans-
scends in importance the kind of nar-
row advantages which can be sought
only by imperilling the cooperation be-
tween our two countries.

One series of conversations in Mos-
cow cannot be expected to end two
decades' accumulation of problems. For

a long period of time, competition is
likely to be the hallmark of our rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union. We will
be confronted by ambiguous and con-
tradictory trends in Soviet policy. The
continuing build-up of Soviet military
power is one obvious source of deep
c concern. Soviet attitudes during the
crisis in South Asia have dangerous
implications for other regional conflicts,
even though in the end the U.S.S.R.
played a restraining role. Similarly,
the U.S.S.R.'s position in the Middle
East reflects a mixture of Soviet inter-
est in expansionist policies and Soviet
recognition of the dangers of con-
frontation.

In the past year, however, we have
also had evidence that there can be
mutual accommodation of conflicting
interests, and that competition need
not be translated into hostility or crisis.
We have evidence that on both sides
there is an increasing willingness to
break with the traditional patterns of
Soviet-American relations. A readiness
to capitalize on this momentum is the
real test of the summit.

CHINA

The following considerations shaped
this Administration's approach to the
People's Republic of China.

Peace in Asia and peace in the
world require that we exchange views,
not so much despite our differences as
because of them. A clearer grasp of
each other's purposes is essential in an
age of turmoil and nuclear weapons.

It is in America's interest, and the
world's interest, that the People's Rep-
public of China play its appropriate
role in shaping international arrange-
ments that affect its concerns. Only
then will that great nation have a
stake in such arrangements; only then
will they endure.

"No one nation should be the sole
voice for a bloc of states. We will deal
with all countries on the basis of spe-
cific issues and external behavior, not
abstract theory.

Both Chinese and American policies
could be much less rigid if we had no
need to consider each other permanent
enemies. Over the longer term there
need be no clashes between our funda-
mental national concerns.

China and the United States share
many parallel interests and can do
much together to enrich the lives of
our peoples. It is no accident that the
Chinese and American peoples have
such a long history of friendship.

On this basis we decided that a
careful search for a new relationship
should be undertaken. We believed that
the Chinese could be engaged in such
an effort.

Both political and technical problems
lay in the way of such a search. When
this Administration assumed responsi-
bility, there had been virtually no con-
tact between mainland China and the
American people for two decades. This
was true for our Governments as well,
although sterile talks in Geneva and
Warsaw had dragged on intermittently
since 1955. A deep gulf of mistrust

1

WASHINGTON POST

10 February 1972

# '... Closer to Stable Peace'

Following is the text of President Nixon's radio statement on U.S. Foreign policy for the 1970s. It is entitled "The Emerging Structure of Peace":

Today I have submitted to the Con-
gress my third annual report on
United States foreign policy.

I want to share my thoughts with
you now on some of the highlights of
that report.

For the first time in a generation,
the most powerful nation in the
world and the most populous nation in the
world — the United States and the
People's Republic of China — have
begun a process of communication.

For the first time in a generation,
we have taken a series of steps that
could mean a new relationship with
the Soviet Union.

For the first time in a generation,
our alliances with the nations of Eu-
rope, Japan and other nations have
been reshaped to reflect their new ca-
pacity to assume a greater responsibil-
ity for their own defense.

For the first time in a generation,
we have laid a new basis for fair com-
petition in world trade that will mean
more jobs for American workers.

These are great changes. They have
brought the world closer to a stable
peace. They did not happen by acci-
dent.

These breakthroughs toward peace
took place in the past year for good
reason: Three years ago, we stopped
reacting on the basis of yesterday's
habits and started acting to deal with
the realities of today and the oppor-
tunities of tomorrow.

Where has this new attitude taken
us?

In our relations with the Soviet
Union, these were the elements of a
breakthrough that took place over the
past twelve months:

* We broke the deadlock in the arms limitation negotiation and agreed on a framework for progress in the SALT talks.

* We agreed on a treaty barring weapons of mass destruction from the ocean floor, and on another treaty to remove the threat of germ warfare.

* We agreed on a more reliable "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, and found new ways to consult each other in emergencies, which will reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

* And in a step of the greatest importance, we reached an agreement on Berlin. If there was one city where World War III could have broken out in the past 20 years, it was Berlin — This new agreement reduces the danger of the superpowers in direct confrontation.

There are other areas where we
have had and continue to have serious
differences with the Soviet Union.

On balance, however, I have concluded that Soviet willingness to take positive steps toward peace in the past year makes a meeting at the highest level timely, particularly in arms limitation and economic cooperation. That is why, for the first time, a President of the United States will visit Moscow. I will go to that meeting in May with no naive illusions but with some reasonable expectations.

Our relations with the Soviet Union
were helped by the fact that our two
nations have had long-established com-

munication. Because we deeply under-
stood what our real differences were,
we could move to negotiate them.

When it came to dealing with the
People's Republic of China, 25 years of
hostility stood in the way.

Accordingly, I began what is now
three years of the most painstaking
and necessarily discreet preparation
for an opening to the world's most pop-
ulous nation.

In two weeks I shall begin my jour-
ney for peace to Peking. The agree-
ment to meet, and the mutual trust
needed to make the arrangements for
the first American state visit to the
Peoples Republic of China is a break-
through of great importance.

We do not expect instant solutions to
deep-seated differences, but the visit is
a beginning. Now, in the relations be-
tween our countries, the old exchange
of denunciations can be replaced with
a constructive exchange of views.

Just as we have established a crea-
tive relationship with our adversaries,
we have developed a more balanced al-
liance with our friends.

Not so long ago, our alliances were
addressed exclusively to the contain-
ment of the Soviet Union and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. But now there
has to be more to our alliance. It is
fairly simple to unite about what you
are' against. It is a lot more compila-
ted to hold together an alliance on
the basis of what you are for.

We do not shy away from this com-
plexity, because now, in this time of
breakthroughs, there has never been a
greater need for a sense of common
purpose among the non-Communist na-
tions. There is no requirement that we
all march in lockstep, but there is a
need to move forward in the same
direction.

That is why we encourage initiative
and self-reliance on the part of our al-
lies. That is why our alliance is becom-
ing what we need in the real world of
the seventies — a dynamic coalition of
self-assured and independent nations.

Our former dependents have become
our competitors; that is good for us
and good for them.

But as the roles change, the rules
change. The old international mone-
tary and trading system had become
unfair to the American workers and to
American business. Facing vigorous,
healthy competitors, the United States
could no longer be expected to
compete with one hand tied behind its
back.

Nothing would have happened un-
less we made it happen. Last August,
we took action to stimulate a world-
wide settlement of the problem.

Within a few months, a general re-
alignment of currencies took place, the
first step toward complete reform.

We succeeded in moving the non-
Communist world away from the con-
stant state of monetary crisis of the
past decade; and we removed a danger
to the unity of the free world.

Let me turn now to Vietnam. This
has been America's longest and most
difficult war. It began long before I be-
came President and I have been doing
everything I can honorably do to end
it.

I have brought almost one-half mil-
lion men home from Vietnam. As high
as 300 a week were being killed in ac-

tion when I took office. This week
there were two.

We have reduced air sorties, budget
costs and draft calls. We have made
the most generous peace offer in the
history of warfare.

I have no complaint over the fact
that during this period when I have
been ending the war I did not begin I
have been subjected to vigorous criti-
cism. I do not question the patriotism
or the sincerity of those who disagree
with my policies to bring peace.

But as I said in 1968, when I was a
candidate for President, we have only
one President at a time. Only the Pres-
ident can negotiate an end to the war.
There should always be free debate
and criticism so that our policy will
represent the best thinking of our na-
tion. But a candidate for President has
a higher responsibility than the ordi-
nary critic. A candidate should make
any criticism he believes would con-
tribute to bringing an honorable peace.

But I would hope that anyone seek-
ing the Presidency would examine his
statements carefully to be sure that
nothing he says might give the enemy
an incentive to prolong the war until
after the election.

Trust in the United States among
the 45 nations with which we have
treaty commitments is essential if
peace and freedom are to be preserved
in the world.

Let us end our involvement in the
war in Vietnam in a way which will
not destroy that trust.

Looking ahead on the world scene,
how can we move ahead to make the
most of the breakthroughs of the past
year? We must advance the delicate
process of creating a more construc-
tive relationship between ourselves
and the Peoples Republic of China.

We must bring the arms race under
control, and by so doing, lay the basis
for other major steps toward peace
that can be taken together by the
United States and the Soviet Union.
And equally important, we must con-
tinue to strengthen the partnership
with our friends. We must work with
friends and adversaries to build an in-
ternational structure of peace which
everyone will work to preserve, be-
cause each nation will realize its stake
in its preservation.

We must continue the process of re-
forming the world's financial and trad-
ing systems so that workers and con-
sumers can benefit in America and in
every country that has a competitive
spirit.

Those are by no means the only
items on our international agenda. We
want to see the ceasefire in the Middle
East, which we initiated, move toward
a more secure and permanent peace.
We want to work out with our friends
in Latin America, in Africa and non-
Communist Asia new ways of helping
them help themselves. We want to
shore up the eroding confidence in the
United Nations.

There is much unfinished business.
But there is a new awareness of reality
growing in the world; movement and
progress can be felt today where there
was stagnation and frustration before.

By facing the realities of the world
today—as this breakthrough year has
shown we are capable of doing—we
can make peace a reality in the gener-
ation ahead.

3

Thursday, Feb. 10, 1972 THE WASHINGTON POST
... R

Arms Control

# Nixon Says Weapons Pact Near

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon yesterday voiced strong indications that the United States and the Soviet Union were nearing an accord marking the first small but important step toward reversing a nuclear arms race that has gone unchecked for almost a quarter century.

"Our present strategic forces are sufficient," the President said in his third annual foreign policy report to Congress, "and we are moving toward an agreement which should stabilize the strategic balance and foreclose future rounds of arms competition."

Such an agreement, the President said, "would be an unprecedented achievement not only in the field of arms control, but also in the evolution of political relations" between the two super powers.

The initial accord, the President indicated, would put stringent treaty limits on the size of rival anti-bal listic missile (ABM) defensive networks and would simultaneously "freeze" in a less formal way the number of certain types of offensive missiles in each other's nuclear arsenals.

Coupled with Mr. Nixon's optimism, however, was a stern warning.

The President indicated that he would not hesitate to order a new round of U.S. strategic weapons into production "if negotiations are protracted" while the Soviets continue to expand their land-based ICBM and missile-firing submarine force, or "if important systems are not constrained by agreements."

In words that may be meant at least in part for some of the President's more conservative critics in this country as well as for Kremlin leaders, Mr. Nixon said that "under no circumstances will I permit further erosion of the strategic balance with the U.S.S.R." He also expressed confidence that Congress would back up his sentiments.

In a candid and detailed assessment of the nuclear balance between the two superpowers, the President expressed deep concern over

the magnitude the last two years of the Soviet weapons buildup, creating nuclear "capabilities beyond a level which by any reasonable standard already seems sufficient" and raising the "inevitable" question of whether the Russians are striving for a force big enough to knock out the U.S. retaliatory arsenal in one attack.

But the President neither inflated the current—as opposed to the future—Soviet threat, nor did he undersell the heavy striking power and relative invulnerability of current American nuclear forces,

The nuclear armories of both countries are so stuffed with weapons, the President indicated, that the arms race "need not be driven by fear of minor quantitative imbalances."

The United States, he said, faced "no disadvantage" in agreeing to "an interim freeze of certain systems," implying that there was nothing to fear if certain types of offensive weapons were left out of the first stage agreement to be dealt with in subsequent negotiations.

The President said that the "exact scope" of the agreements is still being negotiated and that the extent of the "interim offensive agreement" is still the subject of "intense negotiations," so that he could provide no precise details.

But, he said, "a consensus is developing" on a comprehensive limitation of ABMs, plus an "interim solution on offensive weapons" which would freeze the ones most likely to touch off a new round in the arms race. again. "Further offensive limitations would be considered in a second phase of negotiations."

"We must weigh the advantages of prolonging the current stage negotiations in order to reach agreements on every offensive system against the consequences of allowing the current Soviet buildup to continue, perhaps for a considerable period."

Henry 'A. Kissinger the President's chief foreign policy adviser, told newsmen that he expected completion of the initial agreement either at the May sum-

mit meeting in Moscow, "or if it is completed prior to the summit, we will, at the summit, discuss the follow-on agreement."

It is understood that U.S. and Soviet negotiators have reached basic agreement on the ABM question, although the precise number of interceptor missiles and bases each country will be allowed is said to be unsettled.

On the offensive side, informed sources say the agreement is certain to include a freeze on all land-based missiles, including the huge Soviet SS-9 ICBMs which have caused great concern in this country.

The freeze would probably take effect at some future date which will allow the Soviets to complete some or all of the "nearly 100" new ICBM silos that the resident said the Soviets have under construction.

Mr. Nixon said "some" of these silos—officials privately say about 30—are apparently meant for large missiles like the SS-9 or newer ones. The U.S. has been pressing to limit the SS-9 type force—considered the only potential threat to knock out U.S. Minuteman ICBMs in a surprise attack —to about 300. The Soviets already have about 290 of these in operational status.

The United States also has been pressing for the Soviets to halt their rapidly expanding missile-firing submarine construction program and to include this weapon in an initial agreement.

Yesterday, Kissinger warned newsmen not to speculate about what would be in the initial offensive agreement. It is known, however, that the Soviets have been resisting a submarine limitation at this time, and there have been hints that this might have to await round two of the arms agreements.

One possible sign that the Russians may be ready to agree to a land-based missile cut-off, however, is an apparent slowdown over the past few months in the construction of still more ICBM-silos.

Kissinger also conceded that the United States still

does not know what kind of missiles the Soviets intended to put in those new holes, although he said the construction is significantly different to make it "improbable" that the Russians are merely going to put the same missiles they now have into them.

The President's report said "there is evidence that two new or greatly modified ICBM systems are being developed" by the Soviet Union.

One of these is no doubt a new multiple-warhead version of the SS-11 ICBM, which is smaller and far more numerous—about 100—than the SS-9.

In discussing Soviet missile, the President spoke mostly of "potential" improvements. There was no indication that the Russians currently have multiple warheads operational like the American ones which can be guided to widely separated individual targets.

On the other hand, the President stressed that U.S.S.R. has the technical capacity to do this and there should be no complacency about it because the biggest Soviet missiles carry a much larger nuclear punch than U.S. weapons, giving the Soviets potential for a "disarming strike."

The President also said the Soviets were flight-testing a new manned bomber, but gave no indication that this medium-range aircraft was in production.

While the overall total of U.S. land-based missiles has remained constant at 1,054, and the number of submarine-based missiles at 656, since the mid-1960s, the latest comparative strength chart in the President's report shows that Russian ICBM strength jumped by 250 during 1970 to a total of 1,440, and that 80 ICBMs were added in 1971.

Soviet missiles on submarines now total 500, as opposed to 350, at the end of 1970.

The United States, however, has been rapidly installing multiple V warheads on most of its missiles, and maintains numerical superiority in long-range manned bombers.

4