Secretaries of State National Security Forum

Participants: Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.; Brent Scowcroft; Henry A. Kissinger; Alexander M. Haig; George P. Shultz; Lawrence S. Eagleburger; Former Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev.

MR. FAHRENKOPF: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm Frank Fahrenkopf and I'm pleased to welcome you here this morning to the International Republican Institute's 1996 Convention Forum, *Return to Leadership*.

Now there are many, many people who think the need for coherent foreign policy ended with the end of the Cold War. But certainly recent events over the last two to four years in places like Bosnia and the Middle East have shown that is not the case.

I am so pleased, as the founder of this organization and its first president back when I was national chairman, that IRI is sponsoring this tremendous program today and we hope you'll enjoy it.

My job now is to introduce you to the individuals who are going to hopefully keep you captivated for the next couple of minutes. We're honored, first of all, to be joined by Dr. Henry Kissinger, presently chairman of Kissinger Associates. He served our country in World War II and received his bachelor's, master's and Ph.D. from Harvard, where he taught until 1969. He was National Security Advisor to President Nixon and then, of course, became Secretary of State in 1973, a post he held through the Ford Administration. Dr. Kissinger subsequently chaired President Reagan's Bipartisan Commission on Central America and was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during both the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Henry has been very busy for the last 20 years on his biography. It's been slow going because he says it is very difficult working on marble with a chisel. That's actually one of his lines. And it is worth noting today that all but one of our panelists served on Henry Kissinger's NSC staff in the 1970s.

The next is Alexander Haig, who, as all of us know, has had a brilliant military career beginning at West Point, serving our nation in Korea and Vietnam, and retiring with the rank of full general after becoming NATO's Supreme Allied Commander. He was Dr. Kissinger's deputy in the Nixon White House where he later became Chief of Staff. After serving as Chief Operating Officer of United Technologies, President Reagan appointed him Secretary of State in 1981.

Al Haig was for many, many weekends, over a long period of time my doubles tennis partner. And I always had difficulty when I was at the net, I always had to turn around and say, "I'm in charge up here, Al," because he constantly wanted total control of the tennis court.

Dr. George Shultz, a distinguished fellow today at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, a former Marine, he has held four different cabinet posts: first as Secretary of Labor, then as Director of OMB, and finally as Secretary of the Treasury under President Nixon. He became president of Bechtel in 1974, a post he held until recalled to government service by President Reagan to serve as Secretary of State in 1982. And it's really great to see you again, George.

Larry Eagleburger served in the U.S. Army during the Korean War. He began his diplomatic career in 1957. Among his policy-making posts in Washington he was Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under President Ford, Assistant Secretary for Europe and Under Secretary of Political Affairs during the Reagan Administration, Deputy Secretary of State

2

during the Bush Administration, until President Bush appointed him Secretary of State in 1982. Larry
today serves as a very valued member of the IRI Board.

And our moderator today, a special friend of all of us, Brent Scowcroft. General Scowcroft graduated from West Point, served in the Air Force as a pilot, was Air Attache in Yugoslavia, a professor at the Air Force Academy, and was Military Assistant to President Nixon. He shares with Dr. Kissinger the distinction of serving as National Security Advisor under two presidents, Presidents Ford and Bush, and was chairman of President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces. Brent's also a member, we're proud to say, of the Board of IRI.

So, ladies and gentleman, I now turn the floor over to General Scowcroft. Brent, it is all
yours.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, Frank. I hope you all are very relaxed. As you can see we certainly are. I hope we can have some fun this morning. Let me say a few words of introduction.

I think it is fair to say that the enormous success of U.S. foreign policy after World War II and a relatively benign international environment that we enjoy today are in considerable measure the product of Republican foreign policy. In the early days following World War II, the Democrats were known as the international party. And many of the early greats in setting the course of U.S. foreign policy were Democrats. But with the triumphs of President Eisenhower over the inward-looking elements of the Republican party, that situation changed abruptly. And then, when the Democrats found themselves unable to cope with the consequences of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam and, consumed by self-doubt, began a retreat from the world, the Republicans were ready.

They rescued a faltering country, put it back on the path of dynamic confidence, and established the U.S. as the undisputed and respected leader of the world now without a mortal threat for the first time in 60 years.

The giants of the foreign policy which achieved such a remarkable outcome sit here with you today. And what we're going to do is to briefly review the elements of that foreign policy, the principles. And George Shultz said, "Let's not make it Foreign Policy 101," but simply each of our Secretaries will take one of the principles that motivated him in his period of office, maybe with an illustration, and then pursue that into the new world of the future and how a Republican policy might deal with some of the contemporary problems.

I hope we'll have time for your questions. Managing this table is like herding cats, but we'll see what we can do to have time left. If we don't get all of your questions in, there will be papers for you -- slips of paper on which you can write a question and put the name of the person you would like to answer it, and we'll cover other questions at the lunch period.

We will proceed in chronological order of service as Secretary beginning with Secretary Kissinger.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Brent, thank you very much. I want to make two very quick comments about the introduction. One is, I would like to point out that for a while I was both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. I mention that only because never before and never since have relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those days.

3

[cc]

And the second point is that I'm actually not so much in the chiseling business right now. I'm trying to write an abridgement of my memoirs, and I've cut it down by over half. And I accomplished that by dropping the word "I" from the text.

Let me talk about the foreign policy problems as I see them and as I encountered them serving first President Nixon and then President Ford. The Nixon administration came into office at a moment when there were 550,000 American troops in Vietnam, and when many of those who put them there had joined the peace movement and were making the extrication extraordinarily difficult. It was also a moment when the communist world was beginning to disintegrate due to the split between the Soviet Union and Communist China, when there was a deadlock in the crisis in the Middle East, and when the domestic situation in America was extraordinarily complicated.

The fundamental approach of President Nixon to foreign policy was that foreign policy deals with the national interests and not with domestic politics. And at no time serving either President Nixon or President Ford did I ever hear either of these presidents suggest that domestic politics should have priority.

President Nixon ordered the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of the harbors of Vietnam at a time two weeks before he was supposed to go to a Summit in Moscow and six months before an election because he thought the national interest required that.

President Ford endorsed majority rule in Rhodesia before a Texas primary, which is not the political advice one usually gets in those days. And that too was vindicated by events.

When our country faces a situation of great complexity, the first thing that must be done is to define the national interest. The second is to define the objectives within that national interest. The third is to see what coalition we can form. And the fourth is to decide where we have to act alone, even if we cannot find any contingents. And finally, how does one create an international system in which the incentives and penalties are so balanced that we can achieve the overall objectives of our country?

President Nixon and his Administration are given a lot of credit for the opening of China. And I think it is deserved credit. The underlying theory, however, was not a sentimental feeling for China as a nation. The underlying assumption was that they were two communist countries, both of which were ideologically hostile to us, but whose quarrel was more intense than any disagreement they had with each other.

And therefore, the strategy of the whole pursuit was to place the United States in a position where we could be closer to each side than they were to each other. So at every critical point they had greater incentives to deal with us, and we had a greater flexibility in dealing with either of them than they had with each other.

On the Middle East. Early on we decided that the Soviet presence, military presence, in the Middle East, made it impossible to conduct a creative diplomacy because any diplomatic initiative we undertook would go to the credit of the Soviet military presence. And that, therefore, it would encourage a greater military presence. So for several years we adopted the policy of blocking every move backed by Soviet military efforts diplomatically until some Arab country or group of Arab countries decided that they might go to war with Soviet arms; but in order to make peace they needed to go through the United States.

I mention these because these were strategies that were pursued in the face of enormous criticism for many years, similarly with Vietnam. It was a war that was inherited, but the conviction

4

was that the credibility of the United States required that we do not simply abandon an ally, that in reliance on the American word, had spent ten years defending themselves against communism.

So the essence of a creative foreign policy, in my view and in our experience, is to be long range, to have a criterion of the national interest, to have enough confidence in the American people that one does not have to take public opinion polls on every tactical move, but that one is vindicated by history.

And there was a statement that President Nixon always used to make, which I found extraordinarily instructive, which is, "You pay the same price for doing something halfway as for doing it completely. So you might as well do the right thing and to do it completely."

I mention these things because we are now in a world the beginning of which we saw when we were in office, but which had become in some ways less dangerous, but more complex.

There are five or six nations whose capacity to effect events is substantial. Not necessarily in the military sense, but the military element has been reduced in significance. If the United States does not have some concept of how to find its way through this, it will become gradually marginalized and irrelevant. The danger we faced in the Cold War was defeat. The danger we face today is irrelevance, that nobody knows what we stand for. Nobody knows what we're trying to achieve.

And I would put forward two fundamental principles that could guide our policy. One is this: the Security Advisor Tony Lake said, "We have the necessity of dealing globally with every threat to the peace, but only for a limited time." I disagree with that proposition on both grounds. We cannot deal with every problem, but any problem we deal with we have to succeed, and we cannot just put an arbitrary time limit on it.

We have two tasks. There is a world of democratic countries, Central and Western Europe, the western hemisphere, and a few others, with whom we should practice cooperative relations and cooperative structure. There's another world of nations with whom we can also emphasize cooperation as much as possible, but who also deal competitively with each other and among whom strategic conflicts are possible. With respect to them, we have to understand how to do what was done, what was started in the Nixon Administration and carried out in all the successful policies afterwards, namely, to have more options for the United States than for any of the possible competitors. So we have to conduct both these policies side by side.

My concern about the present foreign policy is that it has no sense of direction. It is guided, if it is guided by any principles, by the values of the protest movement. It seems to think that the soft values that the soft aspects of international relations are the dominant elements that reject a role of power, that reject really the elaboration of our alliances, and tries to turn foreign policy into kind of a social welfare/social reform program with a very pragmatic aim.

I have this morning asked a question, "What are we? How is it possible that we have 20,000 troops in Bosnia without anybody explaining how we're going to get them out or how we're going to keep them in, when everybody knows that the military and the political side of that agreement are incompatible with each other?" I mention this only as an example of a more fundamental problem, which is a sense of direction, a sense of coherence, and, above all, a sense that when the United States avows a policy, it will stick to it and that it will prevail, because, when all is said and done, without American leadership there can be no real structure for peace in the world. Thank you very much.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, Henry. Al?

5

SECRETARY HAIG: Every time I'm on the platform with Henry Kissinger I think back to the experiences I had with him some years ago when I was his deputy and I had to tell him on an urgent basis that he was due over at the Washington Press Club to give a speech on the state of the world. He said, "How much time I do have, Al?" I said, "You have 15 minutes." He said, "What?" I said, "Relax. Relax. You can do that." I said, "You can tell them all you know in 15 minutes." He said, "I can tell them all we both know and it won't take a second longer."

Having said that, Brent, in his very abbreviated way, said to me, "Well, you just tell in your ten minutes what you thought you accomplished as Secretary of State." And I said, "My God, that's an insurmountable task." So I'll just go down to a few examples.

The first principle I think of foreign policy that I like is, "Say what you mean and mean what you say." Now, I think back to the transition of Ronald Reagan's presidency when the Democrats were negotiating over an excruciatingly long period with the Iranians for the return of our hostages. And they came to me during the transition and said, "We would like very much to have President-Elect Reagan's permission to continue on with these negotiations." I didn't even ask the President because I knew what he would say. I just said, "Hey, you tell the Iranians that our prisoners are out as of the inauguration of the next president or it's a whole new ball game." Now, I called the President and said that. He said, "Al, add anything else you want to add." Now, that got our prisoners out right at the moment of Ronald Reagan's inaugural address, I'm pleased to say.

The second one is, I would like to reiterate one that Henry Kissinger touched upon. And that is: be honest with the people; do not let domestic politics dominate the conduct of foreign affairs. When President Reagan came into office the so-called Camp David Peace Accord had not only stalled totally on the difficulties of the domestic campaign for the Democratic Administration, but things had begun to unravel. And it became essential to begin the process of Middle East peace all over again.

I'm happy to say we did that by not creating paranoia in the hearts and minds of those with whom we were trying to assist in the peace process, as has happened recently in Israel, but to work in a state of confidence and mutual respect. In that case it was to achieve the return of the Sinai to Egypt. We did that within a year and it began the restarting, if you will, of the peace process, which continues to this time and which I would be less than honest if I suggested were anything but the product of Republican leadership on that process. And recent events give me some concern in that regard.

The third principle that I would touch upon is probably associated with honesty as well. And that is to be sure that whatever policies you are pursuing, the American people know. And that suggests that you don't use covert action for big things. And both Republicans and Democrats have been guilty of that on occasion in past history. But it's very important that when you are going into a policy track that you share the risks with the American people, that you know they have your support, and you know you have their support.

The second principle is balance, and the third principle is understanding the balance between American vital interests and American democratic ideals. When we came in 1980, '81, we had lived with a Democratic administration that set aside traditional American values in a compulsive quest for American values, human rights, and other aspects of the democratic dream. Now this Administration has been doing precisely the same thing. To me that represents an arrogance of power that is highly counterproductive in this difficult, complex world in which we live. It is very important for Americans not to assume that our excellence here at home imbues us with the right to insist that other

6

societies shape their courses of action and values in accordance with our exclusive attitudes, and to put that as the condition for dialogue and good relations. That is what's tripped up our relationships with the People's Republic of China.

And I would say this: I find the Clinton foreign policy much like the work of the American lawyers; they have created problems that only they can solve. And they've been in the process as the election approached of attempting to solve all the problems they've created in the first three years of this presidency. China is a good example. Japan is another example. That would be another very important issue.

And let me add this: I don't think the American foreign policy can succeed if we set aside American values, like human rights, in a compulsive quest for selfish self-interests, real politick. On the other hand, you cannot succeed in your foreign policy if you set aside the realities of the jungle in which we live in a compulsive quest for ephemeral American democratic values. In the one case, you will not succeed because you will lose the support of the American people for violating their values. In the other case, you will not succeed because it simply won't work, as Mr. Clinton has been learning. Now, let me conclude, and in this case, I'll give you a few minutes back, Brent.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Not many.

**SECRETARY HAIG:** And that is, to recognize reality. For so many years the United States has been batting at the manifestations of reality in the conduct of our foreign affairs. And during the Reagan period, for example, we came in when no one would ever attribute to the Soviet Union the source of the problems in Central America, Nicaragua, elsewhere, in the Middle East, in Syria where the Soviet Union was a catalyst as the logistician for so much of the trouble impinging on the peace process in Afghanistan and elsewhere. And it was in the Reagan Administration, after a four-year hiatus from the period Henry Kissinger described, that we called a spade a spade. And we created a dialogue with the Soviet Union that was realistic and not self-delusionary and that they knew that when they violated the accepted rule of international law we were going to be standing there to oppose that, either directly or indirectly and even with force of arms, if necessary. And believe me, that's the best guarantee of peace and a relationship with a potential enemy that will prevent the outbreak of conflict.

And so I think it is very, very important as we face the period ahead where there is not a Soviet Union of the kind that we faced in the past -- and for that we can thank to a great measure Republican clear-headed foreign policy. But, we must also not give credit as Republicans for things that really did not bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Republicans tend to think it was our arms buildup. Well, let me tell you, that arms buildup was critical, it was a catalyst, it was not causal. Democrats claim there never should have been a Cold War in the first place if we had only had the good sense to put out a reaching hand. Now, neocons are saying they made Ronald Reagan tough and, therefore, he achieved the success. None of those things are true. Marxist-Leninism was doomed from the day Karl Marx and Mr. Lenin applied their theory to statecraft in the then Russian world. It was inevitable that it would decline and die. And it is very important for us to remember that as we apply the historic tools of statecraft to achieve peace and our objectives. Thank you.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Thank you very much, Al. George?

**SECRETARY SHULTZ:** There is a tendency to think of problems as being in two piles. One pile is labeled "Domestic Policy" and the other pile is labeled "Foreign Policy." My observation and my experiences show that there's a third pile labeled "The Interaction Pile" and its bigger than either

7

of the other two and growing. I sort of have the assignment here among this panel of thinking a little bit about economic matters. And, of course, nowhere in the field of foreign affairs is the point of interaction more visible than when you talk about finance, investment, international trade, and so on. So I'm going to focus a little bit on that.

But let me make the point about the interaction of domestic and foreign affairs first by an illustration of something that Ronald Reagan did that always seemed to me to be very important in the foreign affairs field, not purposely so. When he took on the air controllers he did something that leaders all over the world struggled with, because the air controllers are in a key position in every society. And I'm sure when they saw him do that they thought he was crazy. Then he did something that even surprised them more. He won. He managed to keep the system going and he stated a principle: they went on strike, they violated a constitutional oath, they're out, and we're going to continue on another basis. And so people all over the world had to realize there's a new kid on the block and he does screwy things and somehow he makes them work. Something new has come along here.

Now, in the field of economics, something new has come along with the Reagan period. Of course, I think it is well to celebrate him for all that he contributed to ending the Cold War and the negotiations with the Soviets and so on and so on. But there's another revolution that took place during the Reagan period that isn't recognized very much. I remember his first speech on economic matters to an international group. I believe it was in Cancun. And he spoke about the importance of free markets and free enterprise and private property and all this kind of stuff with openness. And the other leaders of the world came around and they patted him on the head and said, "Very nice. You'll learn." They tolerated him. But by the time he left office, what he said had become the conventional wisdom.

Now, following this point of interaction, let me just say that there is a huge contrast with the way we conducted ourselves after World War I and the way we conducted ourselves after World War II. In the first instance, countries were allowed to isolate themselves. And the economic framework that was created did not bring on World War II, but it certainly contributed. After World War II we did exactly the opposite. The United States led the way to opening world markets. We opened our own market, the biggest market by far in the world. And we sponsored continuing rounds of negotiations to open them further.

I took part during the Nixon Administration in the opening of the Tokyo round and in the Reagan Administration's Uruguay round of negotiations. So we've seen this continual process. And it has worked extraordinarily well. We've seen a period of immense prosperity for the United States and for countries throughout the world. And the enemies we had after World War II have been able to rebuild themselves and participate and prosper.

Now I think our issue is we have, in a sense, seen the end of World War III, the Cold War, or whatever you want to call it, and it is a sense of a new period. And how are we going to conduct ourselves? And there is this temptation, and we've heard about it during prior election campaigns and this election campaign. There is this temptation to say that we live in a new global economy where the interrelations between economies are more and more intense, where people around the world have learned Ronald Reagan's lesson, and they are adopting principles that allow them to grow. It is true in Latin America; it is true in Asia, it is true in countries that were formerly in the communist empire. And it always turns out to be the case that if you adopt these principles,

8

you prosper. So we see economies growing. And it is not surprising that they grow faster than ours
because they have a lot of catching up to do. But yet there's the sense that there's a threat and we
have to worry about that threat.

So let me examine that in the context of what President Dole -- President-to-Be Dole has proposed. He has said that our problem in the United States, this sense of unease that people feel -- where is my new next job going to be? Am I going to lose the one I have? Are my children able to get ahead? -- so this sense of unease, it is very real. It is justified on people's parts, if you look at the figures, if you look at what's happening. Real earnings are not rising. People are worried. And the rate of growth is very anemic as compared with past recoveries. It's in the range of two to two and a half percent. And the Administration has projected this rate of growth to continue right on through the end of the century. That is a formula for a catastrophe. That is a formula for a United States that becomes more and more worried about itself and more and more tempted to put barriers up that will interact with and relate to other things and cause a massive change in the whole international picture.

So President-to-Be Dole has put forward a program, a well-thought-through, strong
economic program with the objective of raising the rate of growth of the United States, of saying we
can do better. We have done better in the past and we can get up to at least three and a half percent
by doing a variety of things. I won't review the Dole program. But now let me call your attention
to the implications of growth and how growth interacts with what goes on in the rest of the world.
If we are successful -- I guess I would say, when we are successful, at once again raising our growth
rate, that means that, of course, people change jobs. And when you raise your growth rate it means
that people are, by definition, working at tasks that contribute a higher value-added per hour of their
work. That's the meaning of improved productivity. That's the meaning of having your standard of
living rise. So there are two implications to that. One is that we have to provide education and
training that will allow them to do that. So in the Dole program, that's provided for. There are some
very creative ideas, I think, as part of the program.

The other thing that happens is that the products produced by lower value-added work don't
become unnecessary in our lives. We still want to buy them. And in a world where countries are in
varying stages of economic development, there are lots of people around who are delighted to work
on that kind of a job. It's a superior job in their view.

And so from the standpoint of how the overall trading system works, this kind of interaction
is just what we want, but it isn't the way we're reacting. We say, "Gee, here are things we used to
make, and now they're being made in some other country and we're importing them. Isn't that
terrible?" I don't think so. It is a measure of the potential of improving our standard of living through
international trade and investment.

Now, I think the world is in a really momentous position right now where the possibilities for
economic growth here and all around the world are simply immense, better than they have ever been,
because of the understanding that's been created everywhere of what the Reagan economic revolution
meant. And because, in this kind of information age, people can easily see what works and what
doesn't work, and have access to the most creative ideas. So it shouldn't be surprising that you look
around the world and you see all kinds of countries that are just booming and that certainly can
continue. And we're going to boom as well if we do it right.

I think the biggest threat to this is the sort of thing that my two colleagues were talking about,
and that is the possibility of bad mismanagement of the more security-oriented problems. And if we

9

have really bad blowups, if the United States doesn't handle itself right and loses its credibility, it can wreck the economic potential. And, in the end, what people want is freedom, and they want a chance to prosper.

So once again, there is a huge interaction between these matters and a huge opportunity here. But the opportunity will only be taken advantage of fully if we manage the economic aspects of our foreign policy correctly and also the security aspects of our foreign policy well too, because they interact so profoundly.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you very much, George. Larry?

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I'm in a unique position here today because I have, for better or worse, worked for all four of the gentlemen to my left. And I know things about all four of them I could tell you, but I promised not to. I'm also in a unique position today because I'm an accident of history. I wouldn't even be sitting here if it hadn't been that Jim Baker went over to the White House and George Bush was stuck with me for the last months of the Administration.

And I want to comment this morning a little bit differently than my distinguished colleagues have done because I want to ask you now -- let me put it this way. You have seen a demonstration here already this morning on why Republicans do so much better than Democrats on foreign policy. I want you to name me any four Democrats that you could put up at this table who could talk as knowingly and with as much experience and as much strategic insight as any one of the four gentlemen to my left. They aren't there. There is in the national security apparatus -- it is a training school for boys. And in at least one case it is dominated by someone who came out of the generation of the '60s and still thinks that way. And more importantly, I suppose, than any of that is in terms of why these people have been successful is because they worked for presidents who either were deeply knowledgeable about foreign policy themselves, or, if not so deeply knowledgeable, were prepared to listen to people who were, and to make their decisions based on the wisdom of people like the four people to my left.

And I would ask you whether anyone in this room can claim that President Clinton either has any knowledge of foreign policy or indeed in the last three years has been willing to listen to anybody who did have any knowledge of foreign policy. And I think, right there in microcosm, is a strong example of why Republicans have done so much better on foreign policy and will continue to do so. And I don't intend to get as intellectual as the people around me have been here today, but let me simply say to you that if I learned anything in the some 30 years in government, it was that critical to the best interests of the United States, and indeed of the world in general, was that there had to be some leaders who were intent upon maintaining a degree of stability in the global mix. And I think it is, in fact, one of the great historic achievements of the United States that in the post-World War II era Democrats and Republicans alike, put together a system that, in fact, gave us decades of peace and prosperity. And that when the Democrats lost their rudder in Vietnam, it was the Republicans that were prepared to continue what had been developed by both parties and to make it lead in the end to the end of the Cold War, to the defeat of the Marxist system and the Soviet Union. And it is a great and superb accomplishment of the United States in general and the Republicans in particular.

I see we have a former Russian Foreign Minister here with us, so I'll be a little bit careful what I say about Russia.

But the point here is that --
(Discussion off the record.)

10

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: I'm being nice today. I'm going to interrupt myself to tell you one story about him. I complained to him at one point about the Russians selling submarines to Iran. And I got really fairly nasty and I said, "You shouldn't be doing that." And he said, "We're doing nothing more or less than you Americans are doing, it is just that you've got all the nice purchasers." Anyway, the point here is --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You didn't say if you were in office now, look at what you're doing in North Korea. You're giving them a reactor. Why are you complaining to us?

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: It's my turn, George.

If you take a look at the 20th Century, at least the first 50 years of that century were all probably the worst in human history. And the issue for us now, I think, is to learn the lessons that we learned so well in the last 45 years, in fact, creating a system that did so much to maintain the peace and lead to the end of the Cold War. To learn those lessons, take those lessons, and move them into the 21st Century, because the last thing we want to do is leave to our children 50 years in the 21st Century as awful as the first 50 years of the 20th. We have that history and those examples at our fingertips.

But fundamental to all of that is an understanding that without the leadership and the commitment and the continued involvement of the United States in the world, there is no one else to take our place. That's the first lesson we should have learned from the last 50 years.

If we're not prepared to continue to be involved in trying to make a better world, and if we're prepared instead to sort of back up and stay at home, we will all, over the period of the next decade or two, learn to regret it deeply.

The second lesson, it seems to me, is that we have to understand as well that we're not the Roman Empire and, therefore, we can't dictate every jot and tittle of what should happen in the world over the course of the next decade. We have to pick our issues. We have to pick our subjects. And, when we do get involved, we have to understand that continued involvement of the United States in those issues is critically important.

Henry mentioned Tony Lakes' you-get-in-and-then-you-get-out view of life. And that's not it -- he's right. That is not, it seems to me, the way in which a superpower ought to behave. We need to understand that the rest of the world depends upon our decisions. And, therefore, when we make them we need to make them in full understanding that once we have committed ourselves to a course of action, we will stay with it. And if you can find me one example of the Clinton Administration's being willing to stay with any foreign policy for more than two weeks, I would be glad to listen to you when we finish here today.

The classic case is their approach to the People's Republic of China where they have been all over the lot and where the Secretary of State has deigned to visit the country once in three and a half years. It is more important than that. No matter what you may think about the Chinese, it is clear that the United States, for example, in trying to figure out how we are going to maintain stability in the next century, needs to understand that the major power in Asia is one that we're going to have to pay attention to. And we're going to have to try to influence their decisions in the coming years. And that it seems to me, is -- to go back a minute -- where the Nixon Administration taught us a lesson we must not forget.

Today's China, compared with the China at the moment Richard Nixon first visited it, is like night and day. It is not yet by any means a democracy, but is far more liberal, economically and

11

politically, than it was at the moment Richard Nixon first visited it. And why is that? It is because we became involved with them. They learned what was going on in the West, and they couldn't hide it from their people. And China, with much yet to be done, is not the country it was 25 years ago. And it is a success of Western and U.S. foreign policy that we have changed them as much as we have.

And that, again, is a lesson for the next decade. And that is, you must be involved in a constructive way led by the United States, whether you like the country you're involved with or not, if they make a difference in the way in which the world is going to find itself living over the course of the next few years. And China is important and we have to stay involved with them; as Russia is important and we have to stay involved.

There are times and places when we have to learn that we don't need to be involved. And those are as difficult choices to make as any others. I can ask you whether you agree we should be in Haiti or should not. I can ask you whether we should have been in Somalia, at least in the way we were in the Clinton Administration, or not.

There are a host of these kinds of cases where we're going to have to take a deep breath and decide we're not going to become involved. And, as I say, that is as tough a decision to make as the one which says we will become involved. But once again, once you have decided to become involved, once this country has decided to commit itself to a course of action, it has to understand that we have to stay with that course of action. Why? Because the rest of the world is going to make their judgments about us and what we will do in certain cases based on what they've seen. And if they have seen, as they've seen for the last three and a half years, an administration that wanders around in the bulrushes and does not at any day or any minute know where it is going next, I can assure you that their judgments about the importance of doing things that the United States will respect is, in fact, nil. We have lost the respect of the world over the course of the last three and a half years. These four gentlemen over the course of some 20 years gained it, and Bob Dole and his next Secretary of State have got to get it back again. Thank you very much.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Thank you very much, Larry.

Just one little point. Larry said something about George Bush being stuck with him. I just want to set the record straight. President Bush had as much freedom of action about Larry Eagleburger as any President has about any Secretary of State. He was chosen because of his qualities, not because of his position at the time.

**SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:** I said that because I knew Brent would then come back with that. Can I say one other thing? I'm serious.

We have a former Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kozyrev, here. And I want you to know -- and this will get me into trouble with some people, I suppose -- but I want you to know that he was a pleasure to work with. He is a democrat from his toes to the top of his head. He was a remarkable influence over a long period of time in the reform process in Russia. And we all owe him a deep debt of gratitude and respect as well.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** We have a little time left. There are a few issues I'm not sure have been illuminated as much as perhaps they could be. So I'm going to exercise the prerogatives that I've decided the chair has and raise a couple of other issues, which I would welcome all of you to comment, but I'll ask one of you to start.

12

The United Nations was not mentioned by any of the four. And I think it is important to point out that during the period of all of them, except Larry, that the United Nations was not a significant influence in security policy for the United States. That is now very different. And I noticed one of the great applause lines at the convention last night was that American troops should never be under international command. That is only the tip of the iceberg about dealing with the U.N., which I think would be useful to spend just a moment on.

Henry, you talked about working through allies and so on. Why don't you say something about the role of the U.N. and how the United States ought to look at it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are two different approaches to international security. One is the relationship through national interests and relationship with allies. The second is to have a vague concept of collective security, which is based on the proposition that every country has an equal interest in the preservation of peace. That every country, therefore, must participate in any peace-keeping action. And that, unless such a consensus can be established, we have no right or possibility to resist aggression or to act internationally. I believe that approach has almost universally been a disaster. And very often alliances are called collective security, but alliances are geared to a specific danger with a precise obligation and a common interest. The United Nations system is neutral with respect to any issue that arises. And you have to create the consensus as it arises and then you can run up against the fact that the interest of the world community in most issues is not identical among all the nations. That, therefore, it goes to the lowest common denominator and, therefore, it is very often an excuse for inaction.

The United Nations can perform the useful role on the technical issues, it can perform a very useful role in providing a forum in which discussions can take place. It can even act in so-called peace-keeping capacities, namely, where all the parties have agreed that the peace should be preserved and the question is to find a means of inspection and verification. What the United Nations cannot do is peace-making. That is, to oblige parties to settle that are not prepared to settle, because then you will not be able to assemble the necessary consensus.

And, therefore, the attitude of the Clinton Administration, especially in its beginning, of aggressive multilateralism, or whatever it was called, was an abdication. It was an excuse for inaction. And it was also the attitude that underlay the so-called Partnership for Peace, which really confused alliances and collective security. And I want to agree with whatever my colleagues have said. We need a definition of the national interest.

Now, it should be embracing, it should take care of the views of other societies. But the reason the country has reacted so neurotically to the symbolism of putting American forces under the United Nations is because it could not see the consensus, it could not see the purpose, and it has been used more frequently. Above all, it is an abdication of America rather than an assertion of our interests.

SECRETARY HAIG: There's a saying that to a man with a hammer, every problem is a nail. And I think to a certain extent the Clinton Administration thought the United Nations was this hammer and every problem around the world would be hit by the United Nations' hammer instead of by our own policies, as Henry has suggested. But it is also true that if you're trying to build a house, there are some nails and so you want to have a hammer around. And I think one of the problems that has been created — a real problem that's been created by the Clinton approach here is that they have so misused the United Nations that they have almost ruined it by misapplying it. And then, when they

13

got in trouble, blaming the United Nations for something they did themselves.

Somehow it has been thought that the U.S. troops in Somalia were under U.N. command. They were not. They were under U.S. command. And they undertook an ill-advised mission against a lot of advice. And they wound up getting, I think, 18 or 19 American soldiers killed. That was a very poor show on the part of the United States. And what did the Clinton Administration do? Blame the U.N. for it. That was not the way to do it. I could name quite a few other examples that have tended to have the United Nations go down in the esteem of the American people.

In the Reagan Administration, President Reagan addressed the U.N. every year and it was a good forum for him. We used the United Nations. It was helpful to us in our diplomacy to bring about the independence of Namibia and change the scenery in southern Africa and persuade South Africa to get out of Namibia. That was the beginning of the end of Apartheid. That ended Apartheid in Namibia. People don't quite realize how that dynamic was achieved. The United Nations was helpful. It wasn't the center, but helpful. The United Nations proved to be a useful vehicle in getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan. They weren't the central role, that was entirely different, but it was a useful tool. The same when it came to ending the Iran-Iraq war. So it can be useful if it is respected and used properly.

Now we have this spectacle that's going on with the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. My own opinion is that he's done a lousy job. And I hope he doesn't continue it. But how do you go about diplomatically having, let's say, the U.S. view on this matter prevail? Well, first of all, you conduct yourself long before that in a way that generates respect so people are interested in what you believe. And then you quietly go around to your friends and you form a consensus about who should replace him. And then you let him go away with dignity and his head high. What has this administration done? Boutros-Ghali is a distinguished man. He's provided good service. There's no reason to try to denigrate him. They make this sudden public announcement that the United States will veto his reappointment and don't care what the rest of the world thinks. He's out. So I'm sure there are people all over the world that have their doubts about Boutros Boutros-Ghali, but the result of our announcement is practically to rally the whole world against us. What sense does that make? We did sort of the same thing when the Secretary General of NATO had to be reappointed. We were way behind the curve. So this kind of amateur -- I won't even call it diplomacy, costs you dearly.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Let me just say a word in my characteristically generous way. You know the fourth estate -- we have some here -- really began also to believe that the United Nations was going to solve our problems and never asked themselves why suddenly it had become more effective than it had been; increasingly more effective from Cambodia to Afghanistan. Now, why was this so? My friends, it was because the veto disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It doesn't mean that's an indictment of the former Soviet Union, but they did not see the world the same way we did. And the minute that veto disappeared -- it has come back sporadically -- suddenly created the impression that suddenly the U.N. is going to be able to be the solution to our problems. The U.N. will never be the solution to our problems as long as we have a National Security Council, and sovereign nations, either enlarged, or what it is today, that have their own vital interests to protect. So they can help keep the peace, but on a big issue of differences between major nations they will not create the peace. And that's something I would add.

14

Now let me add another thing, because my friend Brent was there when we talked about a new world order. And I think in a very, very intelligent way, because we were talking about a new world that had been lifted of the bipolar constraints of the old Cold War. But it didn't mean that suddenly we had reached the millennium, which so many in America and the press and politicians reported. It's the same dirty old world it's always been. Maybe a little less predictable and a little more dangerous. And it means there are states that believe in the rule of law and peaceful change and states that believe in the rule of the bayonet. And so, we are not entitled to throw away the traditional tools of foreign affairs, diplomacy, and generations and centuries of the experiences that go along with studying geopolitical reality. And that's what's happened with this Administration, I'm sorry to say. And we're going to pay a heavy price for it if it goes on. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you for defending me, Al.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Can I have two minutes here?

This won't make me very popular, but I'm going to say a few words in favor of the U.N. If you take a look at the Iraq-Kuwait war -- and Brent, I think, will support this. If he doesn't, I'll hit him. But anyway, one of the things that was clear to us at the time, and certainly clear to President Bush, was that if we were going to get Congressional support to intervene, much less get popular support within the country for the intervention, one of the important steps we had to take was to get U.N. support for the action. And maybe the public -- clearly public opinion changes, and it certainly changed after Somalia. But at the time it was very, very clear to all of us that if we wanted to get the kind of Congressional and popular support we needed, we needed to get the U.N. to go along with us. And we worked very hard on that. And it, in fact, made a difference, and a substantial difference, in terms of getting others to join us, like the French and the British and the Egyptians and so forth. So there are times and places where U.N. support, acceptance of what it is we were trying to do as in Desert Storm is, in fact, I think, substantially important.

Now, that doesn't mean it is every time, and that doesn't mean that if the U.N. were not to have agreed with us on this one we shouldn't go ahead and do it anyway. But it does mean in terms of getting popular support for what we were trying to do -- and I would remind you in the Congress, when the President first said that he wanted support, we were going to lose in both Houses with regard to the vote. And one of the things that helped us in that regard was having U.N. support.

Let me also say with regard to Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Secretary Shultz's comment, I think we've had a remarkable example of foreign policy success here. The Clinton Administration has showed us how to take a step where even if we win we lose. There is no way in the world on this one that the United States is going to come out ahead. In the end, we can keep Boutros Boutros-Ghali from being Secretary General again, but as the Secretary has pointed out, we will do so at great loss to our own prestige and to our reputation and whatever else you want with an awful lot of other countries who probably would have been silent if we hadn't gone about trying to fire him the way we have done it. It is one of the dumber things that has been done in the last three years. And that's a long list of dumb ones. Here's an additional one.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me say one word about the Iran-Iraq thing. I think it makes a huge difference whether one says, "We will ask the United Nations to endorse something which we in all likelihood will do anyway," or whether we say, "We don't know what we are going to do until the United Nations has told us." The strength of our actions in the Gulf was that once we had moved 200,000 troops into Saudi Arabia it was clear that we were going to act, or in all likelihood were

15

going to act. Therefore, if other nations wanted to gain any influence over our decisions, the United Nations was their way of doing it, which was more or less the situation also in the Korean War. If we had gone to the United Nations and said, "Please tell us whether we can send the first 10,000 troops to Saudi Arabia," it would never have happened. So with strong American leadership the United Nations can create the conditions that Larry was talking about. But what has happened recently is not that. What has happened recently is to look at the United Nations as a definition of our national purpose. And that will not work.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** I think this is a great example of the way the Republicans approach problems. The United Nations is an instrument, like a lot of other instruments. In some cases it can be very useful; in some cases it can't. But I think, as you see from the comments of all four of the panelists, there is a common approach, a sensible U.S. interest-oriented approach to a very important instrument in the world, which we should not either overemphasize nor disparage.

There is another point which we haven't discussed, which is very prominent today, and that is the issue of terrorism. And we only have about five minutes left. But, Al, one of your very famous statements was, "Go to the source." Could I get each of you to do maybe one and a half minutes?

**SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:** That's an impossibility.

**SECRETARY HAIG:** I'll start out, because I went to the source. I remember the first speech I gave as Secretary of State. And it was something to the effect --

(Discussion off the record.)

**SECRETARY HAIG:** You were still waiting in the wings. Jesse Helms didn't think you were pure enough, as you'll recall. But be that as it may, I said it is time for us to replace our preoccupation with human rights, way back in 1981, with a preoccupation for the growth of international terrorism. And I just got it from the *Washington Post*, from the experts at Georgetown University, Walter Lecours, and I think you banged me on it. You know, it is very easy to pontificate. And here we are all those years later, and I don't think we've done a very effective job of dealing with the subject of foreign-sponsored, foreign-inspired international terrorism, because we're sitting here today with terrorist camps raging in certain North African countries, in the Bekaa Valley, and the collective action of the free world to deal with that is a disgrace. And it is a disgrace because the United States hasn't led.

**SECRETARY SHULTZ:** I don't see why you have to give up on human rights in order to work hard on terrorism. There is nothing contradictory about that at all.

**SECRETARY HAIG:** I think what I said is a balance between the two.

**SECRETARY SHULTZ:** But, first of all, we have to be clear about what terrorism is. If we have military forces deployed somewhere on a military mission, which some other countries don't like, and they do something to our armed forces, I don't think that's terrorism. That is war. To me, terrorism is when you find that if you get on -- you're a civilian and you get on a bus and it gets blown up, that's an effort to create terror among civilians in a country to achieve some purpose. If you were military, then it is the responsibility of the military command, starting with the President, to take appropriate actions to protect yourself and to be able to conduct your mission. And I think when the President confuses, in my view, a military operation with civilian terrorism, you're confusing the issue.

Now, I agree with Al wholeheartedly that the existence of countries that sponsor terrorism is a major threat. It gets greater and greater because the equipment that people can get hold of and use is more and more deadly. So what do you have to do? Well, I think what you have to do is, first

16

of all, recognize the problem for what it is and say that there aren't any explanations for terrorism. This notion of saying there are root causes, "Let's get at the root causes," get rid of that idea. Terrorism is a tactic. It is not in any way acceptable. There are no explanations. There are no root causes.

Second, you have to look around and defend yourself. Be prepared to do that. Third, you have to have much better intelligence, than we now have. We got that intelligence level up pretty high during the Reagan years and it has slipped. We had a really outstanding person, Jerry Bremer, who is the counter-terrorism person in the State Department. The post doesn't exist anymore.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Henry stole him.

**SECRETARY SHULTZ:** Well, it wasn't a question of Henry stealing him. The post doesn't exist anymore.

So you need to have intelligence. And if you have intelligence, you can abort terrorist actions. And then you have to be willing to go on the offense. You have to be willing to take action, which means you have to be willing to commit your military forces to do something about the terrorists. And we aren't there yet, but we better get there.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Henry, we have one minute.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I just want to state one simple principle. I think the principle of our foreign policy should be that terrorism is not free. That if Americans get killed as a result of terrorist actions, somebody is going to pay for it. We know where the terrorist camps are. We know what they're being trained. We know what their purpose is. And I think the terrorists have to understand that they will be put on the defensive and that they cannot plan their operations. And I will point out, for example, one flagrant thing. We know who the two people are who killed several hundred Americans at Lockerbie. We know they're in Libya. Nothing has been done really to force their extradition. Here is a case where we know exactly where it is. But the basic principle that must be established is that terrorist camps become subject to attack, that countries that harbor terrorists run major risks, and that we cannot make a detailed investigation of which camp it came from, from case to case.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Thirty seconds.

**SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:** 30? He got a minute and a half.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** I know. He used your time.

**SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:** Two points I would like to make. The first is I think Secretary Shultz has made a very important point, which leads to the second point. The first point is, if it is state-sponsored terrorism, we ought to be looking at it as an act of war, not as some punk blowing up a bus somewhere. And if it's an act of war on the part of the Iranians, for example, if we can prove it -- and that takes some time sometimes. But if it is, that doesn't mean we have to declare war back, but it does mean we make our decisions on what to do within the context of deciding that these people have committed an act of war against us and we're going to get them back for it.

But the second point, and one that makes it much more complicated as we go on into the rest of this century, is that there is an awful lot more homegrown terrorism, which is not state-sponsored. And that we're going to have to watch out for and have to learn to deal with as terrorism. But I think we need to understand that the Oklahoma City thing and a number of things overseas are really done by terrorists, but they are not state-sponsored terrorists. So they have to be dealt with differently.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Pretty good National Security Council, don't you think?

17

MR. FAHRENKOPF: Ladies and gentleman, before we adjourn, and thinking of how you
can put a cap on this, and before we go across the hall for lunch and hear from Senator McCain and
Jeane Kirkpatrick, who else then to have come to the microphone for just a few seconds than the
former Foreign Minister of Russia, a member of the Duma of Russia, Mr. Kozyrev.

MR. KOZYREV: Thank you very much. I'm sorry for the interference, but I felt like spoiling the event since I came here. I will attend both conventions as a guest. And I just wanted to say that we have very good relations with the cabinet of the Democratic Administration in Washington. But we are not at all afraid of the Republican administration. And I would stress that the distinguished people at this table, I used to learn from all of them, although I was not privileged to actually work with all of them. And Jim Baker, of course, is not present here. But I learned from the Vienna Congress how to restore the world and I still learn how to put material into archives of the Hoover Institution. And I should also stress the fact that the achievement of Russian and American relations is not only in the Hoover Institution archives.

I give you only one example of the greatest achievement in Russia-American relations under the Republican Administration with Larry Eagleburger, who is too kind to me, because once I caused him almost a heart attack in Stockholm, but he was kind enough to sign -- actually to prepare and President Bush and President Yeltsin did sign, these START II Treaties, which is major arms control or even disarmament issue. And I should report to you that by now Russia's nuclear arsenal, as America's also, are cut by 50 percent. That is not archives. That is present life. And even more, the amount of 12 metric tons of nuclear material, which was in those war heads, which were threatening each of us on both sides of the Atlantic, this material is now transformed into the fuel for peaceful plans and is used in the United States. We sell it, Russia, sells it to the United States and it serves the purpose of generating energy for peaceful purposes. And the plan is to augment this amount yearly by 30 metric tons by the year 2000. And that aim will be met by, again, joint effort by Russian and American scientists, Russian and American industries. And it's now time with either Democratic or Republican administration -- that is for American people to decide -- but the time has come, I believe, to make a step further and create joint Russian-American nuclear enrichment cooperation and, thus, the material which threatened each of us for years, for decades, would be used for peaceful purposes.

And we can argue about the U.N. role in this world, but something which I believe is
unquestionable is the necessity of the Russian-American partnership.

So thank you very much and sorry for taking your time.

MR. FAHRENKOPF: How about another hand for this outstanding panel?

18

Luncheon Honoring the Secretaries of State

Participants: Michael V. Kostiw; Lorne W. Craner; U.S. Sen. John McCain; Brent Scowcroft; Henry A. Kissinger; Alexander M. Haig; George P. Shultz; Lawrence S. Eagleburger

MR. KOSTIW: Ladies and gentlemen, we thank you all for being here. Please, those that have not taken their seats, please come in and do so. We have a full schedule for the next hour or so, and we want to begin with the meal.

But first of all, I'd simply like to say good afternoon to all of you and introduce myself. I am Mike Kostiw, and I am the Vice Chairman of the International Republican Institute, of which -- of course, as you all know, Senator John McCain is Chairman. He'll be here in just a few minute; he's taking some additional questions from the media.

I want to welcome you to IRI's luncheon tribute to the former Republican Secretaries of State. As we saw this morning, Republicans offer a once and future foreign policy with vision and consistency. This afternoon we'll be hearing from two of the leading foreign policy experts in our party, including Senator John McCain and Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Ambassador Kirkpatrick isn't here yet. She'll be here at any moment. But what I would like to do is first introduce my colleagues here at the head table, all of whom I'm sure you have had the opportunity to meet at one time or another.

From my left is Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. Another member -- as some of you probably are aware, Secretary Eagleburger is a member of the IRI Board of Directors. Next to him on his right is Mr. Tom Collamore from Philip Morris. Philip Morris is an IRI chairman circle member. Next to Mr. Collamore is Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. On his right will be U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick as soon as she arrives. And I would like to let you all be aware of the fact that Ambassador Kirkpatrick is also a Board member of the International Republican Institute. Next to Secretary Kissinger we have former National Secretary Advisor Brent Scowcroft, whom you all know. General Scowcroft is also on the IRI's board. On my right, Mrs. Cindy McCain, the wife of Senator John McCain, who is seated on her right. Seated next to John McCain we have Secretary of State George Shultz. Next to Secretary Shultz we have Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Next to Mr. Haig we have former Republican party chairman Frank Fahrenkopf, who you all know quite well, and are probably aware that Frank is also on the IRI Board of Directors. Next to Frank we have Lorne Craner, who is the president of IRI.

What I would like to do at this point, ladies and gentlemen, is to ask you all to stand for an invocation and we will also remain standing for the Pledge of Allegiance, after which we will have lunch served. Let's bow our heads.

(Heads were bowed in prayer.)

(Pledge of Allegiance recited.)

MR. KOSTIW: Before we begin lunch, let me just very quickly say the IRI makes and keeps a promise in Washington, and that is that in our dinner events in Washington they all end at 9:30 PM, not midnight like in many other instances. As I'm sure you are all aware, particularly all of those that have been associated with IRI for a length of time. Senator John McCain runs a tight ship. And we definitely are going to make sure you're free to leave here sometime right after 2:00 PM.

19

I'll be back in about 15 minutes to introduce our speakers. And as you are already aware, please use the cards and pencils at your tables for questions for our speakers today. Please designate the individual to whom your question is addressed. The staff will be circulating to pick up your questions. And we'll get as many of them in today as possible. And I do hope that you all do enjoy your lunch. Thank you.

(Lunch served.)

MR. KOSTIW: Ladies and gentlemen, I trust you've enjoyed your lunch. We will continue to go forward with the lunch and the desserts. But in the interest of time I think it is important for us to move along with the program.

What I would now like to do -- it gives me great pleasure to introduce IRI's President, Lorne Craner. Lorne, a friend of mine and a friend of all of us up here, was elected to lead the International Republican Institute a year ago after serving for more than two years as Vice President of Programs at IRI. While he was Vice President of Programs at IRI he instituted the cost-effective results-oriented and now largely privately-funded programs for which IRI has become known. Lorne Craner served under three of IRI's board members: first working for Senator McCain in the House and Senate; then working for Secretary Eagleburger at the Department of State; and immediately before coming to IRI he worked for General Scowcroft at the National Security Council. So, ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Lorne Craner.

MR. CRANER: Thank you, Mike, for that introduction. I want to welcome all of you to IRI's Convention Forum, *Return to Leadership*, our salute to the foreign policy that this country once had and can have again.

First, a very special thanks to all of our contributors. Because of your generous support people around the world will live without fearing a knock on the door, without worrying that they will go to prison for what they believe, and without thinking their children will have to endure a dreary future. Because of your contributions, IRI will be able to bring a better tomorrow to millions around the world in countries important to the United States. And we will be able to get the job done free of bureaucracy and without resort to taxpayer funds. This is, after all, the International Republican Institute.

With the help of many of the men before you today, Ronald Reagan founded IRI in 1983. He believed that America should offer our values to others around the world who, like us, believe in democracy.

IRI is pursuing President Reagan's dream with President Reagan's philosophy: when freedom wins, America wins. Few foreign policy issues, for example, are as momentous as the fate of Russia, where this summer's presidential election pitted the forces of freedom against the renewal of dark communism in a hard fought campaign. IRI has worked in Russia for four years, and as the *Weekly Standard* recently noted, dozens of people working on Yeltsin's campaign had been through Campaigning 101, thanks to the International Republican Institute, which conducted hundreds of seminars and exchanges on party organization, message development, focus groups, polling methods, TV ads, and so on. The *Weekly Standard* went on to note that the Yeltsin campaign manager's own think tank translated into Russian the coveted *Republican National Campaign Handbook*.

And while funding limits our work to just ten cities across Russia, a third of the democrats in the Russian Duma were helped by IRI. IRI has had similar successes in other regions. Two East European presidents, for example, say they couldn't have won without IRI's help. Chief Buthelezi,

20

the head of South Africa's Inkatha party, says, "We cannot thank IRI enough for all you did in helping us go through our first democratic election." And then there is Asia, a region of increasing importance to the United States. A region that will soon include five of the world's six biggest economies.

Asia is also a region that needs more democracies, like Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. But as we all know, there are some in Asia who, to put it nicely, don't welcome western-style democracy.

While sitting along 2,000 miles of China's northern border is a nation where earlier this summer, with IRI's help, free-market democrats beat communists in a landslide. The first Asian communist nation to adopt a democratic system, Mongolia's first election in 1992 was won by the country's Communists who took advantage of their incumbency to sweep the voting. Democrats ended up with just 5 of 75 seats, but they decided to form a legislative caucus soon after IRI arrived to help in 1992. The trust they gained led to a coalition, again formed with IRI's help, to contest the 1996 parliamentary elections.

In the intervening years, IRI taught them about candidate recruitment, message development, grass-roots organization, and fund-raising. And when the time came to begin the campaign, they asked IRI about the *Contract with America*. IRI asked Newt Gingrich to write a letter explaining the concept. And we worked with Mongolia's Democrats as they decided which issues voters cared about most. The result was the *Contract with Mongolia*, signed by all of the candidates. And 350,000 of these fliers were distributed throughout the country.

As they gained strength campaigning with our contract, our friends began to worry that the regime might try and steal the election. And so IRI translated and adapted for Mongolia the *Texas Republican Poll-Watching Manual*.

Ballot box seals were unknown in Mongolia. And so, IRI used private funds to buy and send 10,000 of these locks to Mongolia to ensure that the votes of the people would count. The result: In Mongolia's June election, the free-market democrats went from holding 5 of 75 seats in the Parliament to winning 50 of 75 seats in the Parliament.

Now some in Asia still don't want western-style democracies in their neighborhood. They don't want their people to have the freedom that Mongolians now enjoy. But the people of Asia can now look to the newest member of the club of free-market democracies for inspiration.

Today, I would like to introduce to all of you the chairman of the coalition that is bringing democracy to his country, Mr. Elbegdorj.

In working with people of such courage and conviction, the IRI could not have a more fitting chairman than Senator John McCain. He's given a lifetime of service to this country, a lifetime defending the democracy we're seeing in San Diego this week. The embodiment of Republican ideals, he has worked to get government out of the peoples' lives. Ideas that Senator McCain has sponsored in Congress for a decade, including making Congress live by the rules that impose on the rest of us and the line-item veto that President Reagan would have used so well, were elements of the *Contract with America*. And with the Republican majority in Congress, Senator McCain was finally able to see his bill signed into law.

Like Ronald Reagan, John McCain also believes that America is the last best hope of man. Like Ronald Reagan, John McCain believes that values have a place in foreign policy. And like Ronald Reagan, he believes that we have a moral obligation to help others enjoy the same freedoms

21

so important to us. And so, Senator McCain has worked to bring liberty to the people of Russia, Poland, Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere; people like him who have had to fight for justice and liberty. Ladies and gentlemen, the Chairman of the Republican Institute, Senator John McCain.

SENATOR MCCAIN: Thank you very much, Lorne. Thank you, Lorne. And thank you for that kind introduction. And thank you to, all of you here.

Mr. Elbegdorj, we obviously extend a special welcome to you. Let me just give you one word of advice: This Christmas, don't shut down the government in Mongolia. I think that would be a terrible mistake. We certainly found that out.

But I want to thank all of you for being here. I want to thank Frank Fahrenkopf for doing such a great job. And, Frank, thank you for your many years' involvement. Frank was present at the birth of the National Endowment for Democracy and IRI. And we thank you for all of your hard work, Frank, not to mention your chairmanship of our party where you did such an outstanding job.

I'd like to just mention that a few of my friends and colleagues are here. My colleague from Arizona and dear friend Senator Jon Kyl and his wife Carol are here.

Congressman Toby Roth is here. Congressman Roth, I'm glad to see you, as always. He is a person who has been involved in foreign policy issues dating back to his days and mine together. And probably the most bitter struggle that I have ever experienced in the Congress, and that was over trying to secure freedom and democracy for El Salvador and Nicaragua. And, Toby, we're very grateful for all of your efforts there.

And, of course, a dear friend from here in the state of California, a member of the IRI Board, Congressman David Dreier. David was here. Is he still here? David, are you here? I always like to remind David that we in Arizona continue to eagerly await the next earthquake so we will be a coastal state. And since it is 113 in Phoenix today, I am told, I am glad to be here.

I'd like to acknowledge a few people, and then I'd like to quickly proceed to what I think would be most important, and that is to hear, again, from our distinguished panelists, truly great Americans in whose presence I am deeply humble, because I know that would be far more important than anything that I could emote on.

I also note the presence of Ambassador Charles Redmond here. Charles, thank you for being here and thank you for all of your service.

And I'm sure I neglected to mention someone. But I do have to thank two of our underwriters for this event, Philip Morris, who is the newest member of our Chairman's Circle, and Texaco, whose continued support of IRI's programs are deeply appreciated. AT&T and ARCO, Atlantic Richfield, are now IRI Associates through their generous contributions. And major contributors to this event also include Chevron, which was already a member of the Chairman's Circle; Mazda Motors of America; Alec Poitevint of IRI's Board; Julie Finley, already an IRI patron this year; Mayer, Brown & Platt, the law firm of IRI Board member Rich Williamson and IRI Board member Jack Laughery. Look, this couldn't happen without you. I'm very grateful. I'm deeply appreciative. And the one goal that I have is to get IRI off the government dole so that we can truly epitomize what Republicans are supposed to be all about, and that is, funded by the commitment and dedication of Americans to freedom and democracy throughout the world. So I'm very grateful to the people whose names I just mentioned. And could we give them a round of applause.

We were graced earlier by the presence of the former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. Is he still here? Mr. Minister, we're very grateful. And may I say to you, sir, that program was just

22

[cc]

carried on C-Span all over this country and there's television -- or was television from all over the world, from Japan to your home country of Russia. And we are very grateful to you for your contributions and the enormous effort you made to restore the relations between our two countries, which have been historic, and we're grateful to you.

Andre Soloman and Alberto Espena were members of Chile's National Assembly. Both have been trainers for IRI and other Latin American nations. Are you here, gentlemen? I think they are here. If not, I'm sorry they're not here. They missed a good lunch. And we have several other people here. And I'm not exactly sure if they are here, and so I will wait and confirm that.

Let me just say, to start with, that when I, after being exposed to that outstanding panel and those incredible words of wisdom, and not only that, the lessons of history, which if we ignore we are doomed to repeat, I'm reminded of a line that I use every once in a while: I feel a bit like Zsa Zsa Gabor's fifth husband, who on their wedding night said, "I know what I'm supposed to do, I just don't know how to make it interesting."

And, you know, that's kind of a cute line, and it goes over best at the Republican Women's Club meetings I have found. But it hasn't always worked for me. Some years ago I was at a retirement dinner. In fact, it was Howard Baker who was retiring from the Senate. And all of us here have been subjected to this kind of thing. I was about the tenth speaker in line, everybody saying the same thing, and so I stood up and said, "I feel like Zsa Zsa Gabor's fifth husband," da-da, da-da, da-da. The speaker who followed me immediately was Senator John Warner. He was not amused at the time.

I note the presence of the distinguished Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and House of Representatives, Congressman Ben Gilman. Thank you, Ben, for your presence.

I do have a tendency to get myself in trouble like that. Barry Goldwater was my campaign chairman in 1986 when I first ran for the Senate. He waxed nostalgic on the night before the election. He said, "John" -- he said, "If I had been elected president in 1964 and beaten Lyndon Johnson," he said, "you would have never spent all of those years in a Vietnamese prison camp." I said, "You're right, Barry, it would have been a Chinese prison camp." He wasn't amused either. Everyone of our panelists are incredibly busy men. They are sought after and their views are respected and appreciated, not only in this country, but throughout the world.

As I mentioned, we have television here from literally every corner of the world. And I'm very appreciative that they are here. And I am very appreciative of not only that, but what they have done for our country. I don't have to tell you what happened in our lifetime. I don't have to tell you that I grew up and served in a military where our constant worry and fear and concern was a nuclear confrontation. I spent my early years as a Navy pilot training primarily for one mission, and that was to deliver a nuclear weapon someplace, either in an Iron Curtain country or in the Soviet Union. And we have a tendency to forget that threat was over America and democracy and the struggle for freedom throughout the world.

These men here are the ones who made it happen. Obviously they were the loyal stewards of presidents of the United States, but it could not have happened without the foresight, the vision, the dedication and indeed the sacrifice. There is enormous sacrifice associated with what they have done. And I am very deeply appreciative. And I thank you all very much for what you have done for the International Republican Institute by gracing us with your presence, by enhancing our prestige, and your significant participation in what I believe what we saw last night is one of the most unusual

23

events in the political history of this country. We saw an event last night that -- I have been to four of them now, only four, but I've never seen anything quite like that. And the presence of these men indicate the absolute criticality that we have to have a president of the United States who has an abiding concern for the national security of this nation. And that, of course, is one Robert Dole. So I am very grateful for their presence.

And now I would like to turn this over to General Scowcroft who will moderate the questions that have been asked. But before I do, I always like to remind my friend, General Scowcroft, a distinguished Air Force officer, that when I graduated from the Naval Academy I tried to get into the Air Force, but my parents were married. Please welcome General Brent Scowcroft.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Senator, I thought you were going to do this, but I always defer to my elders and betters.

We have a number of questions that you all have submitted. And unfortunately we won't have time for all of them, but I will make sure that our panelists get the opportunity for at least one.

And starting with Dr. Kissinger: What should our policy in Bosnia be today? For example, should the U.S. and the other NATO forces remain for longer than a year? Should NATO act more aggressively to arrest Karadizic and Milosevic?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the first policy we should have is to tell the truth to the American people, which has not been done. I do not believe that what we are doing now can possibly succeed in terms in which it is performing.

We have made an agreement, the so-called Dayton Agreement, that which has a military and a political annex. The military annex separates the countries. The political annex tries to bring the three ethnic groups -- the political annex tries to bring those three ethnic groups into one state. Those two provisions are absolutely incompatible with each other.

If we want to create a single state in Bosnia, it can only be done by force. There is no conceivable way that these three nations, these three ethnic groups who so hate each other, are going to unite voluntarily under the terms of the Dayton Agreement.

So if we pull out our troops, the civil war will start again, unless there is some ethnic delimitation to begin with. So, what I believe the Administration oath to the public is some statement of what it intends to do with the American forces in Bosnia. They cannot be withdrawn at the end of this year if we don't want the civil war to start again. They cannot stay there if we are trying to unite the country, because they will be caught in the middle of an offensive war.

Now, my personal view has been that racists, the three -- some horrible crimes have been committed on Bosnia. And I've great sympathy with Secretary Shultz's often repeated view, that when these crimes were committed we should have reacted. And I would have supported this. But now there has been ethnic cleansing. Now you have three units, Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, who hate each other so much that they pick up the dead when an area has to be vacated under the Dayton Agreement and take their corpses with them.

So I believe that at this point, for the United States to engage themselves in unifying Bosnia means that we will repeat the experience of Somalia. We will get into a bitter civil war among groups that have been hating, that have been fighting each other for hundreds of years, and I do not believe we have an national interest to do this. I can understand that we want to end the fighting. And I reluctantly supported the sending of troops and so did Senator McCain. But I believe we're now heading ourselves into a terrible dilemma at the end of this year.

24

The Administration has to know what the dilemma is. It is not leveling with the American public and in this sense I think we're playing domestic politics with Bosnia. And we should stop pretending that we can produce both a withdrawal of the American troops and a unified Bosnia and a peaceful settlement there. Those three objectives are not compatible with each other.

**GENERAL SCOWCROFT:** Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**For Secretary Haig:** What role can the U.S. play in the Pacific Century now that rapidly developing economies of Southeast Asia increasingly look to China for leadership?

**SECRETARY HAIG:** Well, I think I said in the previous session that the Administration is like an effective American lawyer, that it creates problems only it can solve. And it has been very, very busy as the election approached correcting the misjudgments associated with our policies with respect to the People's Republic of China, and I may add, Japan.

Now, I would be less than frank if I were to suggest to you that the recent Lake visit to China was not a success. I think it was. And I think it tended to smooth over some of the irritations that have emerged over the last three years, which were a result of a cacophony of special interests in this Administration, which had never been brought under the control of a central policy-making mechanism. One day it is the human rights zealots; the next day it is the environmentalists. You know, we can't even sell earth-moving equipment to China to work on the so-called Gorges Dam because the Vice President has considered it to be an abuse of the earth's environment. Now, there are also fanatics on arms control running loose. And all of these things have never been brought together.

I am happy to say that the President, I think, began to realize that in the wake of the Taiwan crisis, not so long ago, when it was clear that conflict could emerge from mismanagement of this critically important relationship.

Now I think when you talk about Asia and the People's Republic of China, you're talking Asian schizophrenia. There's both great respect for the achievements of the People's Republic of China and their inevitable emergence as a superpower, as distinct from some here in the United States, and even in my own party, the Republican party, who somehow believe we have the ability to contain China. We do not. We should be working with them and bringing them into the family of nations.

And we forget also -- you remember that great domino theory at the end of World War II? We should remind ourselves that the reason it was not a domino theory is because the People's Republic of China prevented it when they moved in and attacked Hanoi in 1979 to prevent the overrunning of Southeast Asia by Hanoi that it directed and supported by the Soviet Union at that time. So China is critically important to the United States, but Japan is also.

And here, too, I have to report that the Administration has improved the relationships. The early part of it, it was bashing, bashing, bashing on trade. All these things were important. You must have a level playing field, but you do that with quiet diplomacy and not public utilization of the press to attack sovereign nations. That always makes it more difficult to solve problems, not less difficult.

Now, it has been the result of the recent meeting in May in Tokyo between the President and the Japanese leadership that Japan has agreed to reach out somewhat from its very, very narrow interpretation of its own security brought about by the treaties at the end of World War II. And now they are willing to consider more shared responsibilities for the security of the region.

25

Now, all I can say is that the important thing to remember about America's policy is that our presence in the region, our military presence, our fleets, our ground elements 100,000 strong, must not be reduced.

You'll remember President Carter in the early period of his Administration was going to pull our troops out of Korea. It almost brought about a catastrophe. Now I'm happy to say that this Administration has, after reducing, reducing, reducing, now said 100,000 is the minimum level. And believe me, it is in the current environment.

Our President, as a catalyst in resolving differences between nations of the region, is critical. We must not go in with a pedantic know-it-all approach that we Americans know how to do everything best, because, frankly, we have a lot of problems to solve here at home as well. And we better get busy doing that before we start telling other societies how to order their internal affairs.

The best way, I may add, for this Institute and for the United States to spread democracy is by example, not by pedantry. And this Administration has yet to learn that.

And having said that, I'd say, remember China is critical because it is going to be a superpower, but Japan is also a key anchor to America's future in peace and stability in the Pacific region. Thank you.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Al.

For Secretary Shultz: Is Cuba still a threat to the U.S.? How so? What is the best strategy for promoting democracy in Cuba? And how do we get our allies to be more cooperative on this issue?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think Cuba constitutes a military problem for us at all; whereas, during the Cold War it did. It was a Soviet base from which the Soviets could exercise surveillance and did. So Cuba was a genuine problem. There's also a problem in its effort to subvert other countries. The system it propounded has been thoroughly discredited. And its role as a Soviet base no longer exists. The Soviet Union doesn't exist. Russia is not there. So I don't see that Cuba is a threat to us in any way.

Now we would like to see Cuba join the rest of our hemisphere and be a decent country. It isn't. So what's the best way, given an atmosphere where it is not a threat, but it is a problem, what's the best way to go about that? The Cuban government clearly doesn't want to see any approach other than a confrontational one. You can only conclude that from the shooting down of those airplanes a few months ago, which provoked a reaction in the United States understandably. My own opinion, probably different from every other person on the panel, every member of the United States Senate and House of Representatives, and every candidate for president, is that we would be better off ending the embargo and just letting people interact with Cuba as they choose. And in the process there would be an exposure of Cubans there and here to what is going on. And we would relieve that tension and we would see change take place. But I say this with no expectation at all that anybody will pay the slightest bit of attention to me, but I'm right.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: You're not wholly without support, I think. The last one - bearing in mind the admonition that Senator McCain is a real disciplinarian on time, I picked a real simple one for Secretary Eagleburger.

With a new hard line Israeli leader who seems intransigent, openly flaunts the land for peace settlement that your Administration made historical gains with, and considering his political alliance with the most militant elements of Israeli society, i.e., the settlers and Minister Sharon, what do you

26

believe America can do to reignite the peace process? Thirty seconds.

SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER: Elect a Republican president. Let me just say to you that General Scowcroft is the most monumental pain in the ear I have ever -- I have had to go through this for so many years that for me now it is not a problem, but I know he's embarrassing to the rest of you. And I apologize to all of you for his conduct.

To try to be serious about the question, which the General didn't even read very well. Look, we have to live with and obviously work with whatever government the Israeli people choose. And I make no bones. It's their business, not ours, but since we have to work with them, I think we have a right to express our views, particularly since we have done so much to help support and maintain Israel for as long as we have, and it is a strategic interest to the United States. And everyone ought to understand, I hope, that the United States will never turn its back on Israel. Having said that, I will tell you, quite frankly, life would have been easier for us, I think, first of all, if Prime Minister Rabin -- God bless him -- had not been assassinated; and secondly, if Mr. Peres had been elected prime minister. That's my view. I'm not asking anybody else to take it, but that's not the case. We have to deal with Mr. Netanyahu, who has a substantially more conservative -- if you want to put it that way -- view of Isreal's place in the world.

First of all, he wants a much more active security program. And secondly, he is closer to those who advocate a greater Israel than was the previous administration. I think we're going to have a tough time. I, frankly, think the real test will be the issue of settlements and Mr. Netanyahu's statement that he is going to return back to the promotion of settlements in the West Bank and so forth. Which, at least in the Bush Administration, and Brent Scowcroft and I both still bear the bruises of that time, we opposed strenuously, at least in terms of the United States supporting the process, because we felt it would stand very much in the way of the peace process. I think it will again.

Let's put it this way: The United States is going to face a real problem if, in fact, the settlements issue arises again. On the one hand, we either remain silent and sort of let it proceed, at which point a lot of Arab states who have come to believe we really are in the process of trying to find a balanced settlement in the Middle East are going to decide that we have shifted; or we're going to be actively engaged in trying to prevent the development of these settlements. And that's going to get us into some trouble, both with the Israelis and with some portions of the American Jewish community. It is not going to be an easy issue, but it is one that I really do believe if Republicans, if we have a Republican president, is more likely to be dealt with in a balanced and sensible way than will be the case with the present management, who hasn't got the guts to make a decision on any tough issue. And this will certainly be one of those. And we will, therefore, waffle around and not try to solve the issue, and we'll get everybody mad at us, which is what he has succeeded in doing so many times already these three years.

But there's no way, I think, anyone can give you a long-term prescription other than to say, with Mr. Netanyahu and the Likud we still have every reason to continue to be engaged in trying to move the peace process forward, so well begun by Henry Kissinger's shuttled diplomacy many, many years ago. Which is why I weigh so much, because he ruined my health in the process.

But we have to stay engaged. But we have to understand that we need an agenda of our own as well as support for the continued independence and security of the state of Israel. It would have been much less, I think, confrontational for us if the Labor party had won.

27

I think one of the true awful disasters of the last decade was the assassination of Mr. Rabin, who was a great leader, who had more courage in his little finger than most leaders, and was prepared to do an awful lot in terms of trying to come to a peace agreement. And we're going to miss him a lot, but that doesn't mean we can quit. We can't. We are going to have to stay engaged.

And with that having been said, somebody ought to ask Scowcroft a question. The only point is, we all know he couldn't answer it.

SEN. McCAIN: Thank you very much.

You know, I heard General Haig say that they have improved, you know, and one of the things we hear now, they were terrible, but they really improved, the Clinton Administration, on foreign policy. It reminds me of that old Henny Youngman joke, where somebody would say, "How's your wife?" And he'd say, "As compared to what?" And I agree that they have improved, but -- well, anyway. I would like to say just a word in closing and thanks, a special thanks to General Brent Scowcroft.

You know, Washington is a town of a lot of personal agendas and ambitions and people who strive to get ahead. And that's very understandable and part of the process. I have never known a man who was less ambitious, who was more dedicated to the security of this country, than General Brent Scowcroft. We thank you very much, General, for all you have done.

I forgot to note the presence of Randy Schuneman, Senator Dole's Foreign Policy National Security Advisor. Randy, thank you for being here with us. And I'm sure I forgot some others.

I would like to thank C-Span for their coverage of both of these events. We're very grateful. I also note the presence of Children's Express out there in the corner there. They are reporters for a newspaper that is distributed in many, many schools throughout the country. We're glad you're here. And Dr. Kissinger would be glad to answer any questions you might have afterwards.

I want to thank you all, of our participants, again. I want to thank the staff of IRI. I want to thank our foreign visitors, many of whom are here from Cambodia, from countries throughout the world. And we're grateful for your presence. And we, again, will continue the cause of the great crusade that only the United States of America has been able to achieve because of our careful balance between the security of the United States of America and our deep commitment and crusade for freedom and democracy throughout the world. So thank you all for coming today. Thank you very much. I look forward to seeing you very soon. Thank you again.

END

28