7

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia had

8

succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it
would logically follow with demands for a political
corollary that would imply a veto over foreign
policy.

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as
the limit of the common defense, Germany will be
driven to doubt America's leadership role and to try
to influence the security position of the buffer
zone. Failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either
collision or collusion between Germany and Russia.
Either way, American abdication would produce a

9

political earthquake threatening vital American
interests.

Considerations such as these have transformed the
great Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong
advocate of early NATO enlargement. An ardent human
rights activist, he surely appreciates the argument
for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia.

But he obviously believes that even the most
optimistic outcome will take longer than is safely
compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of
power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central
Europe who does not share this view.

10

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing
of two conflicting considerations: the fear of
alienating Russia against the danger of creating a
vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia.

Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove
irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as
its economy gains strength; the nations of Central
Europe may drift out of their association with
Europe. The end result would be the vacuum between
Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous
conflicts. When NATO recoils from defining the only

11

limits that make strategic sense, it is opting for
progressive irrelevance.

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am
deeply worried about the Founding Act which seeks to
reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by offering Russia
a role in NATO councils. Alliances define a common
threat; collective security deals with a legal
contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be
defended; collective security is open-ended and is
redefined from case-to-case. §p 13

The language of the Founding Act is that of
collective security, not of alliance. The Act speaks

12

of the parties' "shared commitment to build a stable,
peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free" and
refers to the parties' "allegiance to shared values,
commitments and norms of behavior." But Russia sells
nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms to
Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist.

Russia supports, in opposition to American policy,
the lifting of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to
delineate its border with Ukraine. Of what, then, do
the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act
consist?

13

The words "common defense" apparently proved so
offensive to their commitment to collective security
that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring
themselves to invoke them and used instead (and only
once) the euphemism "commitments undertaken in the
Washington Treaty " (which created NATO in 1949).
But they did not specify the nature of these
commitments.

The view assuredly is not shared by the new
members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for
reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act
describes--not to erase dividing lines but to

14

position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by
shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles
to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is
the consultative machinery for which it provides.

The Act calls into being, side-by-side with existing
NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council
composed of the same ambassadors who form the
existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member.

The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a
month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the
foreign ministers' level. The first such ministerial

15

meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations
last month. Regular meetings of the defense
ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as
the principle venue for crisis consultation between
Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will
promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council
"in case one of the Council members perceives a
threat to its territorial integrity, political
independence and security." Thus if Poland feels
threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to
the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to

16

the letter of the Act, Russia could have insisted
that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint
Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly
states--decisions are made by consensus.

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council
deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to
perform its historic functions. That is true in
theory but will not work in practice in all but the
most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian
representatives, the membership is identical, each
country will assess the grave step of meeting without
a Russian presence in terms of its overall

17

relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons.

The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new

18

members who have to wait for ratification of the
enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement
now face is that the Founding Act has gone into
effect upon signature. As an executive agreement, it
will not have to be ratified by the US Senate, while
NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if
the admission of new members is not ratified, we will
have inherited the worst possible outcome: the
demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered
dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

19

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members
of this committee share my concerns about the
possibility that the Founding Act has given Russia
too much of a role in NATO matters. And I am aware
that you pressed the Secretary of State for
clarification on a number of these issues when she
appeared before the committee two weeks ago.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to
your questions, the Secretary reassured you and the
American people that nothing which has been agreed to
with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy.
And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers

20

the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the
ratification procedure, to address the philosophical
ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in
its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate
should explicitly reassert the central role of the
Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and
insist that nothing in any other document shall
detract from the North Atlantic Council as the
supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could
draw directly on the forthright response which
Secretary Albright gave to your questions.

21

Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare
that the United States expects Russia--after the
qualitative changes that we have made--to desist from
all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue.

In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint
resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO
members be permitted to join the Permanent Joint
Council while waiting for ratification. This would
remove the anomaly that the institution created to
reconcile Russia to NATO's expansion comes into being
years before expansion occurs.

22

If the administration does not want to be
remembered as having in effect atrophied the most
effective alliance of this century, it should welcome
efforts to clarify the many ambiguities in the
Founding Act. In this way, a truly bipartisan
approach to American-European security relations can
be restored.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

It is an honor to appear before this committee on a
matter of such importance to America's future. If this
century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is
inextricably linked with Europe's. NATO, the institution
expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in
Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from
the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the
consequences of its success.

The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the
Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental
link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into
a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium,
much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a

2

role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to
Rome--the only outstanding question being whether America or
Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America
would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to
a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect
its national genius. Without Europe, America's path would be
lonely; without America, Europe's role would approach
irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this
century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power
threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent
it.

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for
European coherence. Without it, the European Union would
founder on the fear of German domination; France would see
reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions
would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with

3

irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role,
Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of
Europe that is historically valid--that is, which includes the
nations of Central Europe.

An American presence in Europe provides a measure of
equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against German
hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European
unification slows down, as well as protection against outside
dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has
much to gain from an American presence, which is the best
guarantee against the reemergence of historical European
rivalries. Europe by itself cannot handle the two most
dangerous Russian contingencies: resurgence of nationalism or
implosion. A Russia facing a divided Europe would find the
temptation to fill the vacuum irresistible. An America cut
off from Europe would lose an anchor of its foreign policy.

4

Critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays them.

I hold the opposite view. The former Russian Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov explained Russian opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would store up endless future troubles.

5

are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that
are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to
defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east,
the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be
gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional
Central European nations from the common defense achieve its
purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military
buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a
political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign
policy.

6

Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a
political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

7

its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may
drift out of their association with Europe. The end result
would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has
tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from
defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is
opting for progressive irrelevance.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective
security, not of alliance. The Act speaks of the parties'
"shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided

8

The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive
to their commitment to collective security that the drafters
of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them
and used instead (and only once) the euphemism "commitments
undertaken in the Washington Treaty" (which created NATO in
1949). But they did not specify the nature of these
commitments.

9

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who
are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the
opposite of what the Founding Act describes--not to erase
dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed
territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200
miles to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the
consultative machinery for which it provides. The Act calls
into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a
new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors
who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full
member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a
month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign
ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held
in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular

10

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the
principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and
NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within
the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council
members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity,
political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels
threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the
Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter
of the Act, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be
brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding
Act repeatedly states--decisions are made by consensus.

11

work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new members who have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

12

13

that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare that the United States expects Russia--after the qualitative changes that we have made--to desist from all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the

14

10/24/97

Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee-10/30/97

If this century has taught any lesson, it is that our
security is inextricably linked with Europe's, and NATO, the
institution expressing this conviction, has successfully
deterred war in Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power
has receded from the center of the continent, NATO needs to
adapt itself to the consequences of its success.

2

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land
between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical
experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would
bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that
are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that
are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to
defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east,
the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be
gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional
Central European nations from the common defense achieve its
purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military

3

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit
of the common defense, Germany will be driven to doubt
America's leadership role and to try to influence the security
position of the buffer zone. Failure to enlarge NATO thus
would risk either collision or collusion between Germany and
Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a
political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

4

In the end, the nations of the Atlantic area need each
other. Without America, Europe turns into a peninsula at the
tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity,
and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar to that
of ancient Greece in relation to Rome--the only outstanding
question being whether America or Russia will play the role of
Rome. Without Europe, America will become an island off the
shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure
balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national
genius. Without Europe, America's path will be lonely;
without America, Europe's role will approach irrelevance.
This is why America concluded twice in this century that the

5

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for
European coherence. Without it, the European Union would
founder on the fear of German domination; France would see
reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions
would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with
irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role,
Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of
Europe that is historically valid--that is, which includes the
nations of Central Europe.

6

7

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply
worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia
to NATO expansion by making it a de facto member of NATO.
Alliances define a common threat; collective security deals
with a legal contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be
defended; collective security is open-ended and is redefined
from case-to-case.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective
security, not of alliance. Article 2 speaks of the parties'
"shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided
Europe, whole and free." Article 6 refers to the parties'
"allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of
behavior." The words "common defense" apparently proved so
offensive to their commitment to collective security that the

8

In the blissful collective security world of the Founding
Act, Article 4 lists "peacekeeping" and "crisis management" as
the primary NATO functions, implying global missions not
specifically related to the Atlantic region. Article 5
achieves an illusory congruence by listing the same functions

9

as among Russia's primary policy aims, explicitly on a
worldwide basis. But Russia sells nuclear power plants,
submarines and other arms to Iran, ignoring specific American
requests to desist. Russia supports, in opposition to
American policy, the lifting of the embargo on Iraq. It
refuses to delineate its border with Ukraine. Of what, then,
do the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act consist?

Ambiguity occasionally permits the parties to work out
their differences in practice rather than at the negotiating
table. With the Founding Act, the opposite is likely to
occur.

Even before the agreement was signed, different
interpretations surfaced between Russian President Boris
Yeltsin and his NATO counterparts over whether the Founding
Act is binding and whether it gives Russia a veto. Yeltsin's
interpretation appears accurate.

10

Article 1 speaks of an "enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest political level," and Article 2 repeats the phrase. The administration claims that none of this is binding because the Founding Act has been designated as a charter and can therefore be ignored. Such arguments may carry weight in law schools; they are irrelevant to the diplomacy that will result from an instrument signed by 17 heads of state and ratified by the Russian Duma. Yeltsin repeated at the signing ceremony that Russia considers the Founding Act "a firm and absolute commitment for all signatory states."

The most worrisome aspects of the Founding Act, however, are its unambiguous provisions, specifically the consultative machinery for which it provides. Article 12 calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the

11

Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers'
level. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also
envisaged, as well as summits.

Article 15 designates the Permanent Joint Council as the
principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and
NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within
the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council
members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity,
political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels
threatened by Russia, it will have to appeal first to the
Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter
of Article 15, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be
brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding
Act repeatedly states--decisions are made by consensus. Hence

12

Russia has a veto no matter how often administration spokesmen
repeat that "Russia has a voice, not a veto."

Article 20, which goes on for three pages, lists
activities within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Joint
Council that are expansive indeed, ranging from missile
defense to air traffic control and cooperative projects on the
environment and science. There is also a clause that other
areas can be discussed by mutual agreement, implying that the
enumerated topics belong on the agenda as of right. This
alone threatens existing NATO machinery with overload.

In any event, the Permanent Council's structure
guarantees that Russia will have a decisive voice in setting
the agenda. For the Russian representative, the secretary
general of NATO and a rotating ambassador from the NATO
Council will chair the Permanent Joint Council. Russia will
be permanently in the chair, while the United States will

13

preside only one-sixteenth of the time (and less after the new members join).

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory but will not work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge.

The same will be true of the biannual foreign and defense ministers' meetings provided for by the Founding Act. These will almost surely be scheduled for the traditional meetings

14

of the NATO foreign and defense ministers. And since the
presence of the Russian ministers will draw the major
publicity, the Permanent Joint Council will become the more
prominent body. Russia is approaching de facto NATO
membership. But one needs only to read statements by Russian
leaders--not to speak of the legislators in the Duma--to
realize that they have no interest in enhancing the vitality
and relevance of the Atlantic Alliance.

15

A responsible Russian role in the building of
international order does not need to be based on Russian de
facto participation in the Western defense alliance. It is a
political task for which the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is well designed. A body could
have been created within it--as French President Jacques
Chirac proposed--perhaps composed of the five powers that
negotiated German unification plus Italy and a rotating
European member. Russia's concerns about NATO deployments
could have been handled in a brief, precise unilateral
statement by NATO.

Such an approach would preserve the Atlantic Alliance as
a safety net and the key forum of the Atlantic democracies.
Instead, the Founding Act threatens to dilute NATO by grafting
onto existing NATO institutions an elaborate and convoluted

16

machinery for consultations with Russia at every level of the
alliance.

I support the ratification of NATO enlargement despite my
reservations about the Founding Act. But I also urge the
Senate to use the occasion to address the philosophical
ambiguities of the Founding Act. If the Atlantic Alliance is
not to degenerate into a UN-style talk shop, the Senate, in
its instrument of advice and consent, should reassert the

17

central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign
policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall
detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of
alliance. It should declare that it expects Russia--after the
qualitative changes that we have made--to desist from all
pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the
meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of
Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to
join at least the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for
ratification. And if the administration does not want to be
remembered as having in effect atrophied the most effective
alliance of this century, it should go along with an effort to
spell out an interpretation of the Founding Act that removes
its many ambiguities.

OCT-22-1997 12:49

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.02/09

# Statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee - 10/20/97

If this century has taught any lesson, it is that our security is inextricably linked with Europe's; and NATO, the institution expressing this conviction, has successfully deterred war in Europe for 50 years. Now that Soviet power has receded from the center of the continent, NATO needs to adapt itself to the consequences of its success.

I hold the opposite view. Russian Defense Minister Igor N. Rodionov has recently explained his opposition to NATO enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by condemning the only newly liberated nations of Central Europe to institutionalized impotence. And it would store up endless future troubles.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's-land between Germany and Russian runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this

OCT-22-1997 12:50

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.03/09

2

Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome - which is far from guaranteed - will take longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does not share this view.

In the end, the nations of the Atlantic area need each other. Without America, Europe turns into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium much less unity and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient Greece in relation to Rome --the only outstanding question being whether American or Russian will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America will become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its

2

OCT-22-1997 12:50

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.04/09

3

national genius. Without Europe, America's path will be lonely; without America, Europe's role will approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power threatens its vital interests, and has gone to war to prevent it.

Some Europeans advocate European union as a device to render America indispensable. In fact, a major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role, Russia into revanchism.

An American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium. It gives France a safety net against German hegemony and Germany an emotional harbor as European unification slows down, as well as protection against outside dangers and excessive European nationalism. Even Russia has much to gain from an American presence, which is one of the best guarantees against the reemergence of historical European rivalries.

NATO expansion represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe

3

OCT-22-1997 12:50

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.05/09

4

between Germany and Russia. A wise policy, instead of pretending that Russia has an option for NATO membership, would take two steps. It would proceed with membership for the Visigrad countries and reject a Russian veto. But at the same time, it would propose a security treaty between the new NATO and Russia to make clear that the goal is cooperation. Such a treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members, on the model of the arrangement for East Germany (or, better, no closer than a fixed distance from the eastern border of Poland).

At the same time, such a treaty could provide for consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of common interest. In such a structure, there would be no reason for Russian security concerns. Going beyond it would grant Russia a right to create a vacuum around its borders, preserving the options of historical expansionism.

Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is opting for progressive irrelevance.

While I strongly favor NATO expansion, I am deeply worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by making it a de facto member of NATO. The language of the Founding Act is that of collective security, not of alliance. Article 2 speaks of the parties' "shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free." Article 6 refers to the parties' "allegiance to shared valued, commitments and norms of behavior."

OCT-22-1997 12:51

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.06/09

President Clinton spoke in the same sense at the signing ceremony. The alliance, he said, no longer envisaged resistance to a hostile bloc but was designed "to advance the security of every democracy in Europe, NATO's old members, new members and non-members alike." If there is no distinction between members and non-members, what remains of the alliance?

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes- not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 300 miles to the east.

In the blissful collective security world of the Founding Act, Article 4 lists "peacekeeping" and "crisis management" as the primary NATO functions, implying global missions not specifically related to the Atlantic region. Article 5 achieves an illusory congruence by listing the same functions as among Russia's primary policy aims, explicitly on a world-wide basis.

Moreover, Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist. Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border with Ukraine

5

OCT-22-1997 12:54

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.02/03

and Estonia. Of what, then, do the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act
consist?

Since the Founding Act seeks to transform the Euro-Atlantic area into an
"indivisible" area in which no particular territory has a special status, it subordinates
NATO to a host of existing international institutions. The United Nations is described as
having the "primary responsibility" for international security, and the OSCE as the
"inclusive and comprehensive organization for consultation, decision-making and
cooperation in its area" (Article 10). Article 27 provides that "any action undertaken by
the Russian Federation or NATO, together or *separately* (emphasis added), must be
consistent with the U.N. Charter and OSCE's governing principles." If this becomes the
operating principle, Russian can always insist that all NATO actions, even in the
traditional NATO theater of operations, will have to be reviewed by institutions in which
Russia has a seat.

Even before the agreement was signed, different interpretations surfaced between
Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his NATO counterparts over whether the Founding
Act is biding and whether it gives Russia a veto. Yeltsin's interpretation appears accurate.

Article 1 speaks of an "enduring political commitment undertaken at the highest
political lever," and Article 2 repeats the phrase. The administration claims that none of
this is binding because the Founding Act has been designated as a charter and can

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The most worrisome aspects of the Founding Act, however, are its unambiguous provisions, specifically the consultative machinery for which it provides. Article 12 calls into being, side by side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council plus a Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

Article 15 designates the Permanent Joint Council as *the* principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it will have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of Article 15, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states -- decisions are made by consensus. Hence Russia has a veto no matter how often administration spokesmen repeat that "Russia has a voice, not a veto."

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In any event, the Permanent Council's structure guarantees that Russia will a
decisive voice in setting the agenda. For the Russian representative, the secretary general
of NATO and a rotating ambassador from the NATO Council will chair the Permanent
Joint Council. Russia will be permanently in the chair, while the United States will preside
only one-sixteenth of the time (and less after the new members join).

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO
Council remains free to perform it historic functions. That is true in theory but will not
work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian
representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of
meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow.
Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to
merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

The same will be true of the biannual foreign and defense minister's meetings
provided for by the Founding Act. These will almost surely be scheduled for the traditional
meetings of the NATO foreign and defense ministers. And since the presence of the
Russian ministers will draw the major publicity, the Permanent Joint Council will become
the more prominent body. Russia is approaching de facto NATO membership. But one
needs only to read statements by Russian leaders--not to speak of the legislators in the

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As for the new members of NATO, they are clearly joining in a second-class status subject to unprecedented restrictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be participating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in NATO two years before the new members that have to wait for ratification of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

I confess that, had I known the price of NATO enlargement would be the gross dilution of NATO, I might have urged other means to achieve the objective. The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is that the Founding Act has gone into effect upon signature. As an executive, agreement, it will not have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if the admission of new members is not ratified, we will have inherited the worst possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

Supporters of the Atlantic Alliance must therefore rally in support of the ratification of NATO enlargement even under present conditions. But we also urge the Senate to use the occasion to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act. If the Atlantic Alliance is not to degenerate into a U.N.-style talk shop, the Senate, in its instrument of advice and consent, should reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract

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from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. It should declare that it expects Russia-after the qualitative changes that we have made-to desist from all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint Resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to join at least the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for ratification. And if the administration does not want to be remembered as having in effect atrophied the most effective alliance of this century, it should go along with an effort to spell out an interpretation of the Founding Act that removes it many ambiguities.

A responsible Russian role in the building of international order does not need to be based on Russian de facto participation in the Western defense alliance. It is a political task for which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is well designed. A body could have been created within it-as French President Jacques Chirac proposed - perhaps composed of the five powers that negotiated German unification plus Italy and a rotating European member. Russia's concerns about NATO deployments could have been handled in a brief, precise, unilateral statement by NATO.

Such an approach would have preserved the Atlantic Alliance as a safety net and the key forum of the Atlantic democracies. Instead, the Founding Act threatens to dilute NATO by grafting onto existing NATO institutions an elaborate and convoluted machinery for consultations with Russia at every level of the alliance.

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2

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's-land between Germany and
Russian runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It
would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially
threatened but not guaranteed and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If
America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the
credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this
exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its
purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would
logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign
policy.

2

3

Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome - which is far from guaranteed- will take longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does not share this view.

3

4

national genius. Without Europe, America's path will be lonely; without America, Europe's' role will approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power threatens its vital interests, and has gone to war to prevent it.

Some Europeans advocate European union as a device to render America dispensable. In fact, a major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role, Russia into revanchism.

4

5

NATO expansion represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the
fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe
between Germany and Russia. A wise policy, instead of pretending that Russia has an
option for NATO membership, would take two steps. It would proceed with membership
for the Visigrad countries and reject a Russian veto. But at the same time, it would
propose a security treaty between the new NATO and Russia to make clear that the goal
is cooperation. Such a treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the
territory of new NATO members, on the model of the arrangement for East Germany (or,
better, no closer than a fixed distance from the eastern border of Poland).

5

6

6

7

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes—not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 300 miles to the east.

7

8

on a world-wide basis.

Moreover, Russia sells nuclear power plants, submarines and other arms to Iran, ignoring specific American requests to desist. Russia supports, in opposition to American policy, the lifting of the embargo on Iraq. It refuses to delineate its border with Ukraine and Estonia. Of what, then, do the shared commitments cited in the Founding Act consist?

8

9

9

10

10

11

threatened by Russia, it will have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of Article 15, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where--as the Founding Act repeatedly states -- decisions are made by consensus. Hence Russia has a veto no matter how often administration spokesmen repeat that "Russia has a voice, not a veto."

11

12

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO
Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory but will not
work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian
representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of
meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow.
Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to
merge. The free and easy "family atmosphere" of existing institutions will vanish.

12

13

13

14

Supporters of the Atlantic Alliance must therefore rally in support of the
ratification of NATO enlargement even under present conditions. But we also urge the
Senate to use the occasion to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.
If the Atlantic Alliance is not to degenerate into a U.N.-style talk shop, the Senate, in its
instrument of advice and consent, should reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance
for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract
from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. It should declare that it
expects Russia-after the qualitative changes that we have made-to desist from all pressures
and threats in Europe on this issue. In the meantime, while ratification proceeds, a joint
Resolution of Congress should urge that the new NATO members be permitted to join at
least the Permanent Joint Council while waiting for ratification. And if the administration
does not want to be remembered as having in effect atrophied the most effective alliance

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term perspective on the basis of the principles of the three
U.S.-China joint communiqués.

China stresses that the Taiwan question is the most important
and sensitive central question in China-U.S. relations, and that
the proper handling of this question in strict compliance with
the principles set forth in the three China-U.S. joint
communiqués holds the key to sound and stable growth of China-
U.S. relations. The United States reiterates that it adheres to
its "one China" policy and the principles set forth in the three
U.S.-China joint communiqués.

As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the United States and China support the UN in its efforts, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, to play a positive and effective role on global issues, including peacekeeping and the promotion of economic and social development. Both countries support efforts to reform the UN and to make the Security Council more representative, while retaining and improving its effectiveness. Stressing the need to put the UN on a firmer financial basis, both countries will participate actively in discussions on the Scale of Assessments in the UN.

As two major countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the United
States and China are ready to strengthen their cooperation to
meet various challenges and make positive contributions to
promoting stability and prosperity in the region. Recognizing
that maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula
is of great importance, the two countries are working through
the Four-Party Talks to help establish a durable peace on the
Peninsula, and will continue consultations to this end. They
also stress that it is in the interest of the two countries to
maintain peace and stability in other important regions,
including the Middle East, the Gulf, and South Asia.

The two Presidents agreed on a number of steps that will provide
a framework for further promoting U.S.-China relations and
strengthening their cooperation in international affairs.

High-Level Dialogue and Consultations

The United States and China agree to regular visits by their
Presidents to each other's capitals.

They agree to a Washington-Beijing presidential communications
link to facilitate direct contact.

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They also agree to regular exchanges of visits by cabinet and sub-cabinet officials to consult on political, military, security and arms control issues.

## Energy and Environment Cooperation

The United States and China reaffirm the importance of bilateral cooperation across the broad range of environmental issues, as evidenced by the establishment of the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development in March 1997.

They consider it a critical challenge to develop and efficiently use energy sources, protect the global environment, and promote environmentally sound growth and development. Accordingly, they agree to strengthen their cooperation in energy and environment through an initiative to accelerate clean energy projects and the appropriate transfer of related technologies. The principal areas of cooperation will be in clean energy, urban air pollution control and rural electrification. This initiative also will foster broader cooperation on global environment issues such as climate change, desertification and biodiversity. China's State Planning Commission and the U.S. Energy Department have signed the U.S.-China Initiative on Energy and Environment Cooperation to promote effective cooperation in these fields, including the use of clean energy.

## Economic Relations and Trade

The two Presidents are prepared to take positive and effective measures to expand U.S.-China trade and economic ties. As both economies move into the 21st century, information technology will be critical to spurring technological innovation and improving productivity. In this regard, China indicated its intention to participate as soon as possible in the Information Technology Agreement. In addition, in the context of WTO negotiations, China will continue to make further substantial tariff reductions.

The United States and China agree that China's full participation in the multilateral trading system is in their mutual interest. To this end, they agree to intensify negotiations on market access, including tariffs, non-tariff measures, services, standards and agriculture and on implementation of WTO principles so that China can accede to the WTO on a commercially meaningful basis at the earliest possible date.

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## Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation

The United States and China agree that it is in their mutual interest to cooperate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To this end, they each have taken the steps necessary to implement the U.S.-China Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation concluded in 1985. In addition, China's State Planning Commission and the U.S. Department of Energy have signed an Agreement of Intent to promote peaceful nuclear cooperation and research between the two countries.

## Nonproliferation

The United States and China agree to work to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force at the earliest possible date. They also agree to pursue at the UN Conference on Disarmament the early start of formal negotiations on the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Materials Used in Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.

The United States and China reiterate their commitment not to provide any assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and nuclear explosion programs. China has placed controls on exports of nuclear and dual-use materials and related technology and will take further measures to strengthen dual-use export controls by mid-1998. The United States will continue to enforce firm controls on the export of nuclear and dual-use materials and related technology.

As original parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States and China agree to cooperate in implementing the Convention within a multilateral framework. Both countries agree on the importance of government oversight of chemical-related exports.

The United States and China agree to build on the 1994 Joint Statement on Missile Nonproliferation. They reaffirm their respective commitments to the guidelines and parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

## Human Rights

The United States and China both recognize the positive role of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments in promoting human

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rights. They reiterate their commitment to the promotion and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

While the two countries have not resolved their differences on human rights, they have agreed to discuss them through dialogue at both governmental and non-governmental levels in the spirit of equality and mutual respect. The two countries agree to hold discussions on the structure and functions of an NGO forum on human rights.

Cooperation in the Field of Law

The United States and China agree that promoting cooperation in the field of law serves the interests and needs of both countries.

They will strengthen cooperation in combating international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, alien smuggling, counterfeiting and money laundering. To this end, they intend to establish a joint liaison group for law enforcement cooperation composed of representatives of the relevant agencies of both governments. They agree to begin consultations on mutual legal assistance aimed at concluding a mutual legal assistance agreement.

The United States and China will assign counternarcotics officers to their respective embassies on a reciprocal basis.

Recognizing the importance the United States and China each attaches to legal exchanges, they intend to establish a joint liaison group to pursue cooperative activities in this area. These may include exchanges of legal experts; training of judges and lawyers; strengthening legal information systems and the exchange of legal materials; sharing ideas about legal assistance; consulting on administrative procedures; and strengthening commercial law and arbitration.

As part of this program of legal cooperation, China's Minister of Justice will visit the United States in November 1997 at the invitation of the U.S. Attorney General.

Military-to-Military Relations

The United States and China have reached agreement on the establishment of a consultation mechanism to strengthen military maritime safety, which will enable their maritime and air forces to avoid accidents, misunderstandings or miscalculations.

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They agree to share information and discuss issues related to their respective experiences in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Science and Technology, Educational and Cultural Exchanges

The U.S.-China Joint Commission on Science and Technology will continue to guide the active bilateral scientific and technological cooperation program, which involves more than 30 agreements reached since 1979, and will promote the further use of science and technology to solve national and global problems. The United States and China also will identify areas for cooperative projects using space for Earth science research and practical applications.

The United States and China will expand educational and cultural exchanges. Both Presidents believe that increased people-to-people exchanges will help cultivate long-term bilateral relations.

President Jiang Zemin expressed his thanks to President Clinton and the American people for their warm reception and invited President Clinton to visit China in 1998. President Clinton accepted this invitation with pleasure.

The Washington Post
Tuesday, January 14, 1997

Henry Kissinger

# NATO: Make It Stronger, Make It Larger

As NATO heads of state prepare to admit new members at a summit in July, opponents of an enlarged Alliance are mobilizing to prevent ratification by the U.S. Senate.

Rasing European and Atlantic security on a no-man's-land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech president, Vaclav Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO enlargement. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia. But he obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome—which is far from guaranteed—will take longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacuum of power in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who does not share this view.

Their convictions are reinforced by the presence of Russian troops on the soil of the independent states of Georgia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; by Russia's support of the civil war in Azerbaijan; by Belarus's transformation into a Russian satellite; and by vocal Russian nationalists challenging the legitimacy of Ukraine and calling for the reestablishment of Russia's strategic frontiers.

NATO's enlargement represents above all an overriding American political interest. President Clinton's first term was marked by controversy over the extent to which democracy could be "enlarged" globally by political advocacy and economic pressure. Both sides of that debate should be able to agree, however, on the importance of enhancing democracy where it already exists. In its second term, the Clinton administration has the opportunity to link together the nations of the Atlantic and of the Western Hemisphere by revitalizing existing institutions and creating new ones.

Unfortunately, the Clinton administration has complicated NATO enlargement by its ambivalence. When the issue first arose, President Clinton, in a speech to the NATO Council on Jan. 10, 1994, contrasted the proposal to enlarge NATO with what he called a "better vision": "Why should we now draw a new line through Europe just a little further east? Why should we now do something which could foreclose the best possible future for Europe?" The president described the ideal arrangement as embracing a democratic Russia and democratic governments in each of the states emerging from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Such an approach is compatible with NATO enlargement only if, in the end, NATO admits Russia itself.

Even when the administration's policy on NATO enlargement changed to concentrate on Central Europe, the rhetoric did not. NATO enlargement has been considered more as a response to Central European pleas than with regard to American interests; the notion of some form of Russian membership has never been abandoned, partly because the administration has never put forward a clear transatlantic vision.

During the election campaign, the issue was handled in a blatantly political manner more in response to domestic pressure groups than as part of a long-range foreign policy.

The arrival at the State Department of Madeleine Albright, a strong supporter of NATO enlargement, should permit a more coherent public position. The administration must begin to winnow ends from means and put forward a rationale compatible with its objectives.

The proposition that NATO enlargement might eventually include Russia confuses all parties. For Russia is in, but not of, Europe; it

borders Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and it pursues policies along these borders that are difficult to reconcile with NATO objectives. Russian membership would dilute the Alliance to the point of irrelevance.

This ambivalence has produced an inconsistency between the administration's statement of its objectives and the leisurely way it pursues them. According to current plans, the NATO summit meeting proclaiming enlargement will be followed by technical discussions—planned to take two years—with each applicant about military and technical issues, including the standardization of military equipment.

This procedure, too, confuses ends and means. The significance of NATO enlargement resides in guaranteeing the frontiers of the new members, and should not wait for the resolution of every technical issue. The very dilatoriness of the procedure compounds the vulnerability of the domestic consensus and encourages Russian pressure.

(over)

Even more worrisome is the strategy of seeking to cajole Russian acquiescence by a dialogue between the NATO secretary general and Russian leaders. A whole smorgasbord of possibilities is being put forward: Russian "observers" at lower NATO headquarters and at NATO headquarters itself and the attendance of the Russian foreign minister on the last day of the semiannual NATO foreign ministers' meeting. Secretary of Defense William Perry, in a recent interview with Jim Hoagland of The Post, even implied that Russia would participate in all NATO discussions.

This approach could lead to a fatal dilution of NATO without achieving Russian agreement. It is doubtful that any Russian leader is in a position to agree formally to the enlargement of NATO unless NATO has been watered down to near-irrelevance.

The panoply of proposals comes perilously close to making Russia a non-integrated member of NATO, almost in the way France was before it rejoined the NATO command. Such an enhancement of Russia's role deflects the institution from its primary mission of defense and begins the process of turning NATO into a vague Pan-European diplomatic forum more akin to the United Nations than to a military alliance.

For example, how much access would Russian "observers" have at lower headquarters to planning devoted to the defense of Europe? How will NATO be able to concentrate on military planning? How are these observers to be excluded from tasks that must be reserved for the Alliance? How will it be possible to avoid either Russian participation in all decisions or charges of duplicity? How will the semiannual foreign ministers' meeting treat a case in which Russia brings pressure by stopping the supply of natural gas to, say, Poland—as it has threatened to do with Ukraine?

Can NATO take a position without the participation of the Russian foreign minister? And how can the proposed procedure avoid the dilemma of giving Russia a veto, no matter how often it is proclaimed that this will never happen?

Every serious student of history will recognize the importance of a European security system that allows Russia to contribute responsibly without creating new dangers. But a strong NATO consolidating security in Central Europe is a better road to this goal—even for Russia—than falling in with Russia's preference for a “friendly” buffer zone, the quest for which has drawn Russia into centuries of self-destructive adventures. No rational analysis can support the proposition that Russia, with more than 20,000 nuclear weapons, faces the threat of invasion from the West at a time when two-thirds of American forces are being withdrawn from Europe.

At the end of the Napoleonic wars, Europe faced a similar dilemma. Fearing the resurgence of French militarism, it nevertheless wanted to integrate France into the international system. It found a way. A Quadruple Alliance composed of Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia protected Europe against a militarily resurgent France. At the same time, the Concert of Europe, which included the members of the Quadruple Alliance plus France, dealt with political threats to the peace.

Some analogous construction is needed for the current European security system. Devising a responsible role for Russia is a political, not a military, challenge. A political body within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could be constituted to meet periodically to review the international situation. NATO as an institution could discuss with Russia such military issues as arms control in Central Europe on the model of the negotiations for Mutual Balanced Force Reduction. The G-7 heads of state meeting could be given an enhanced political role and Russia invited to participate. Finally, the NATO summit on enlargement could declare that it would apply the same restrictions in Central Europe as already exist for East Germany: no deployment of nuclear weapons and no permanent stationing of foreign troops. All these steps would be preferable to stretching reality and credulity by trying to make NATO enlargement palatable (and at the same time irrelevant) by tempting Russia with the prospect of de facto membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

©1997, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP—PART I

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, 1997

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms (chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Helms, Hagel, Smith, Grams, Frist, Biden, Robb, and Wellstone.

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, Dr. Kissinger. It is great of you to come after having had such a late evening last night. It is a pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the committee. The subject this morning, of course as everybody knows, is the NATO-Russia Relationship.

Now, Henry Kissinger needs no introduction by me, or for that matter by anybody else in the world. He is that well known. The Secretary and I have sometimes had slightly different views during the decades that we have known each other, but I have always respected Dr. Kissinger and particularly his appraisals of important foreign policy matters. So I say to you, sir, in addition to good morning, your views on NATO enlargement and specifically the NATO-Russia relationship will be enormously helpful to this committee.

I see the Ranking Member will be here shortly, but I suggest that you proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT,
KISSINGER AND ASSOCIATES, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I have submitted a formal statement and I stand by all of it, but in order to permit more time for questions I will just read some extracts from it and then respond to your questions.

Let me add here a comment which is not explicitly in the text. Whatever we believe about the evolution of other parts of the world, I believe that the rock bottom organization and grouping which we must foster is that of the nations which share our demo-

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184

cratic tradition and much of our history. So I believe that the rela-
tionship of the democracies in the North Atlantic and in the West-
ern Hemisphere should be the key building block of the future
American foreign policy. Therefore of course a key question is, what
is this Europe? What is this North Atlantic area to which we want
to relate ourselves, to which we must relate ourselves? I think it
is essential that the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, which
were excluded from their historical traditions by the arrangements
that were made at the end of World War II, find their place in the
relationship of the democracies.

Now, critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary threatens prospects for
the democratic evolution of Russia, and therefore magnifies perils
rather than allays them. I hold the opposite view. The Russian De-
fense Minister, Rodionov, explained Russian opposition to NATO
enlargement on the ground that it deprives Russia of a buffer zone
in Central Europe. Were NATO to fall in with this argument, it
would perpetuate the injustice of the Soviet satellite orbit by con-
demning the recently liberated nations of Central Europe to insti-
tutionalized impotence, and it would store up endless future trou-
bles.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land be-
tween Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical experi-
ence, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about
two categories of frontiers in Europe, those that are potentially
threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but
not threatened. If America were to act to defend the Oder but not
the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of all the existing
NATO guarantees would be gravely weakened, nor would this ex-
clusion of traditional Central European nations from the common
defense achieve its purpose. Once Russia succeeded in establishing
a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for
a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

If the eastern border of Germany is defined as the limit of West-
ern Europe, and the western defense, Germany will be driven to
doubt America's leadership and to try to influence the security po-
sition of the buffer zone on a nationalist basis. Failure to enlarge
NATO would thus risk either collision or collusion between Ger-
many and Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce
a political earthquake threatening vital American interests.

Considerations such as these have transformed the great Czech
president, Havel, into a strong advocate of early NATO enlarge-
ment. An ardent human rights activist, he surely appreciates the
argument for encouraging a democratic evolution in Russia, but he
obviously believes that even the most optimistic outcome will take
longer than is safely compatible with the establishment of a vacu-
um in Central Europe. I know no leader of Central Europe who
does not share this view.

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflict-
ing considerations: The fear of alienating Russia against the dan-
ger of creating a vacuum between Germany and Russia in Central
Europe. Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable.
Russian opposition would only grow as its economy gains strength.
The nations of Central Europe would drift out of their association

185

with Europe. So I would strongly urge the Senate to ratify NATO enlargement.

Now, let me turn to another matter. While I strongly favor NATO expansion and recommend its approval, I am deeply worried about the Founding Act which seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by offering Russia a role in NATO councils. Part of my objection is philosophical. Alliances define a common threat; collective security deals with a legal contingency. Alliances delineate an area to be defended; collective security is open-ended and is redefined from case-to-case.

The language of the Founding Act is that of collective security, not of alliance. I have gone through a lot of analysis of the language, which we do not have to do here.

The words “common defense” apparently proved so offensive to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them, and used instead the euphemism, quote, “commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty,” unquote, which created NATO in 1949.

This view is assuredly not shared by the new members who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes, not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles to the east.

My major concern is not philosophical. The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for which it provides. The act calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same Ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The Russian ambassador is located inside the same building as the other Council members, as are the military representatives. The Permanent Joint Council is supposed to meet at least once a month. Twice a year the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as regular summits.

The act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principal venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that, quote, “it will promptly consult,” unquote, within the Permanent Joint Council, quote, “in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security,” unquote. Thus, if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may first have to appeal to the Permanent Joint Council on which Russia is represented.

It will be argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory, but it will never work in practice. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical, each country will assess the grave step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge. The free and easy “family atmosphere” of existing institutions will vanish.

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As for the new members of NATO, they are joining in these re-
strictions with respect to the deployment of other NATO forces and
nuclear weapons. The ultimate irony is that Russia will be partici-
pating in the Permanent Joint Council and achieving a voice in
NATO 2 years before the new members, who have to wait for ratifi-
cation of the enlargement by all the parliaments of NATO.

The dilemma the supporters of NATO enlargement now face is
that the Founding Act has already gone into effect upon signature.
As an executive agreement, it does not have to be ratified by the
Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus if
the admission of new members were not ratified, we will have in-
herited the worst possible outcome: The demoralization of Central
Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this com-
mittee share my concerns about the possibility that the Founding
Act has given Russia too much of a role in NATO matters; and I
am aware that you pressed the Secretary of State for clarification
on a number of these issues when she appeared before the commit-
tee 2 weeks ago.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the
Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing
which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from the
primacy of NATO. If I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers
the Senate an opportunity in the course of the ratification proce-
dure to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that, in its instrument
of advice and consent, the Senate explicitly reassert the central role
of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy, and insist that
nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlan-
tic Council as the supreme body of the alliance. Such a resolution
could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary
Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution
should declare that the United States expects Russia to desist from
all pressures and threats in Europe on this issue. In the meantime,
while ratification proceeds, a joint resolution of Congress should
urge that the new NATO members be permitted to join the Perma-
nent Joint Council while waiting for ratification. This would re-
move the anomaly that the institution created to reconcile Russia
to NATO's expansion should come into being years before the ex-
pansion actually occurs.

In this way I believe a truly bipartisan approach to the European
security relationship can be achieved.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KISSINGER

The stakes involved are large, for the nations of the Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two. Without America, Europe would turn into a peninsula at the tip of Eurasia, unable to find equilibrium, much less unity, and at risk of gradually subsiding into a role similar to that of ancient

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Greece in relation to Rome—the only outstanding question being whether America or Russia will play the role of Rome. Without Europe, America would become an island off the shores of Eurasia, condemned to a kind of pure balance-of-power politics that does not reflect its national genius. Without Europe, America's path would be lonely; without America, Europe's role would approach irrelevance. This is why America concluded twice in this century that the domination of Eurasia by a hegemonic power threatens its vital interests and has gone to war to prevent it.

A major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option; historic European coalitions would form, compounding their traditional tenuousness with irrelevance; Germany would be tempted into a nationalist role, Russia into revanchism. That role requires a definition of Europe that is historically valid—that is, which includes the nations of Central Europe.

Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man's land between Germany and Russia runs counter to historical experience, especially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two categories of frontiers in Europe: those that are potentially threatened but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threatened. If America decides to defend the Oder but not the Vistula, 200 miles to the east, the credibility of the existing NATO guarantee would be gravely weakened. Nor would this exclusion of traditional Central European nations from the common defense achieve its purpose. 'Once Russia had succeeded in establishing a military buffer zone, it would logically follow with demands for a political corollary that would imply a veto over foreign policy.

NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable. Russian opposition is bound to grow as its economy gains strength; the nations of Central Europe may drift out of their association with Europe. The end result would be the vacuum between Germany and Russia that has tempted so many previous conflicts. When NATO recoils from defining the only limits that make strategic sense, it is opting for progressive irrelevance.

44-069 98-7

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The words "common defense" apparently proved so offensive to their commitment to collective security that the drafters of the Founding Act could not bring themselves to invoke them and used instead (and only once) the euphemism commitments undertaken in the Washington Treaty" (which created NATO in 1949). But they did not specify the nature of these commitments.

The view assuredly is not shared by the new members, who are seeking to participate in NATO for reasons quite the opposite of what the Founding Act describes— not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting the existing NATO boundaries some 200 miles to the east.

The most worrisome aspect of the Founding Act is the consultative machinery for which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council composed of the same ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian full member. The Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to meet at the foreign ministers' level. The first such ministerial meeting was held in the shadow of the United Nations last month. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

The Act designates the Permanent Joint Council as the principle venue for crisis consultation between Russia and NATO. Each side agrees that "it will promptly consult" within the Permanent Joint Council "in case one of the Council members perceives a threat to its territorial integrity, political independence and security." Thus if Poland feels threatened by Russia, it may have to appeal first to the Permanent Joint Council. Similarly, according to the letter of the Act, Russia could have insisted that the Gulf War be brought to the Permanent Joint Council where—as the Founding Act repeatedly states—decisions are made by consensus.

I was pleased to note that, in her response to your questions, the Secretary reassured you and the American people that nothing which has been agreed to with the Russians will detract from NATO's primacy. And if I may make a suggestion, I believe this offers the Senate an opportunity, in the course of the ratification procedure, to address the philosophical ambiguities of the Founding Act.

Specifically, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that, in its instrument of advice and consent, the Senate should explicitly reassert the central role of the Atlantic Alliance for American foreign policy and insist that nothing in any other document shall detract from the North Atlantic Council as the supreme body of alliance. Such a resolution could draw directly on the forthright response which Secretary Albright gave to your questions. Additionally, the Senate resolution should declare that the United States expects Russia—after the qualitative changes that we have made—to desist

189

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger, I thank you very much. I am so glad that you got into the matter that I exchanged correspondence with the Secretary about recently.

I think we will go on 5 minutes for each Senator for the time being, because as soon as this breakfast is over we are going to be joined by many other Senators. Let us see how we can do on that.

I am hesitant to do this, Dr. Kissinger, but you know about as much about China as anybody I know. I guess all of us have been thinking about the advice to give visitors, that includes me.

Dr. KISSINGER. That I give the advice—

The CHAIRMAN. To the Chinese leaders who are visiting us. That has nothing to do with NATO, but I want you to spend a minute or so saying, telling, revealing what you think would be the best course for the United States to follow in trying to work out an amicable relationship with China.

For my part, I have made several contacts over a period of time now trying to point out to the Chinese that the American people like the Chinese people and they want to do business with them and want to recognize them as the power they are, but the human rights thing is standing in the way. It certainly stands in the way as far as I am concerned. As I put it to one leader yesterday, you have no idea, Sir, how much cooperation and goodwill you would build if there could be not an expression of retreat but an expression that we are going to work on it sincerely and honorably. I do not know whether that did any good or not, but I thought the President of the United States did quite well yesterday in standing up for that.

If you would give your opinion, what would you say to the President, or maybe you have said it since he has been here, the President of China, what would you say to him?

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I am doing this really off the top of my head.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have not made any formal preparation for this, however it is obviously a topic about which I have thought. I did not have an opportunity on this trip, because I just came back from Europe yesterday late afternoon, to talk to the President of China, but I have had other occasions and I am sure I will have the opportunity.

Of course we are all influenced by our experiences. I was the first American official to visit China. I was sent there by President Nixon. In those days there was a huge philosophical gap between China and the United States. President Nixon, with my enthusiastic concurrence, agreed or felt that peace, flexibility for American foreign policy, the ability to play a significant role in Asia, required that we have diplomatic exchanges with China, even though philo-

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sophically we could not have disagreed more than we did with the
China of the Cultural Revolution.

So we have on the face of it two somewhat contradictory prob-
lems. We have a national security problem, a national interest
problem, which is that China has a population of 1,250,000,000.
There are 60 million overseas Chinese with a major influence on
the economies of Southeast Asia. China plays a significant role in
Korea, Cambodia, and elsewhere. So it is in our interest, if we can,
to find a basis for cooperation to serve our own purposes and to see
whether there are joint interests that can be developed.

Confrontation with China is not the same as it was with the So-
viet Union. China's is a different history, a different society. Its
method of conducting confrontations is to make them extremely
prolonged and exhausting. On the other hand, it is also true that,
being a democracy, our government will not find support among
the people if fundamental American values are consistently being
violated. These are the dilemmas that we face.

For somebody who has been in China in the Seventies, the
present China looks more respectful of individuals than the China
we saw then. Now, I recognize this is a relative statement, and I
believe that in terms of day-to-day life the lot of the Chinese has
greatly improved. In terms of their right to political opposition, it
has not.

Then, assuming as we must that there will be strong disagree-
ments between us and China on human rights, there is the ques-
tion of how we can influence it better. I believe we can influence
it better as a Nation by quiet diplomacy than by visible pressures.

Let me add, incidentally, that I have no problem with, in fact I
respect, the demonstrators who express their views as private citi-
zens. This is how our system operates. I, however, believe that, as
a government, we should, if at all possible, avoid sanctions and at-
tempt to find areas where we have genuinely common interests.
Therefore, if China's leaders asked me, I would tell them that they
should take very seriously expressions of concern such as the one
you mentioned. If the President asked me to what extent he should
do that publicly and with pressure, I would urge him to try to find
another way to do it if at all possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Senator Wellstone.

Senator WELLSTONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
being here, Dr. Kissinger. I have just one comment about the last
day or two, and I much appreciate your comments about people in
the parks.

Dr. KISSINGER. I was not here, though.

Senator WELLSTONE. On the question of the situation in China,
you of course have a perspective that I do not have, but I know
that one of the things that I find personally—and Mr. Chairman,
this refers to some meetings we had yesterday—really quite dev-
astating is the State Department's report on human rights in
China. It is really dismal. In fact Assistant Secretary Shattuck, I
believe met with Wei Jingsheng and because of that meeting Wei
now finds himself back in prison. He just wrote a book called, "The
Courage to Stand Alone."

It is troubling that we don't see a lot of evidence of this quiet di-
plomacy working, at least by our own State Department reports on

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the state of human rights. I quite agree with you, there is of course a very legitimate question as to what we should do, what is most effective. But, boy, the most recent empirical evidence we have on what is going on in China is not, it certainly does not give one much reason for optimism, and I think that is why many of us are speaking up and are proud to identify ourselves with the human rights community.

You can respond to that if you want to, but I want to ask you a question about NATO expansion. Do you want to respond first?

Dr. KISSINGER. Could I make a response to the Senator?

Senator WELLSTONE. Of course.

Dr. KISSINGER. If I may make a response, Senator, I have never criticized the people who express their views on human rights, and I have, on several occasions which I have chosen not to publicize, intervened on behalf of some of the cases, and in at least two cases have succeeded. But my approach requires that I do not talk about it afterwards.

What bothers me as I see this debate evolving is that we are dealing here with a huge country still in the process of evolving, and I believe it is really not in the American national interest to conduct its relations with it from a posture of confrontation. First, because I do not believe that any other Asian nation will support us. Second, because all the other Asian nations will then adopt a posture of semi-neutrality between us, which means a more nationalist policy. So our capacity to shape events will diminish.

When I became, first Security Advisor and then Secretary of State, we had 500,000 Americans in Vietnam, where we thought we would bring democracy and then found ourselves in a struggle we did not know how to end. So I am very influenced by the experience and do not believe in getting ourselves into a confrontation if it is avoidable, and second, that we make absolutely sure that when we do, the American public understands why we have done it.

If China threatens the equilibrium in Asia, and if it becomes a military threat, I will be before this committee supporting opposition to it. But I am trying to avoid the situation, and I think the future of China is now still somewhat open. I cannot believe that it is possible to change the economy as they have without political consequences. What these consequences are exactly, I do not pretend to know.

So this is my profound worry. Incidentally, I must add, it has nothing to do with economics. I would like to see trade, but that is minuscule in my consideration.

Senator WELLSTONE. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.

Dr. KISSINGER. So this is what is on my mind as we go through these dramatic few days.

Senator WELLSTONE. Let me ask one question. I very much appreciated—

The CHAIRMAN. He will have to answer it on the next round.

Senator WELLSTONE. OK. I will put the question out there. You have written that the new nations that are hoping to join NATO, and I quote: "are seeking to participate in NATO ... not to erase dividing lines but to position themselves inside a guaranteed territory by shifting existing NATO boundaries 300 miles to the

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east...." I really appreciate your candor. This position, though, at least seems to me to be in contradiction with the administration's pronouncements that NATO expansion will erase dividing lines in Europe. In the words of the President, it is intended to, "build and secure a new Europe undivided at last."

Maybe you can get to it later. I do not think it is, Mr. Chairman, an inconsequential question, because if there is anything we want to know about NATO expansion, it is whether it is going to unify or whether it will redivide Europe. I wonder whether you could comment at some point in time on what I identify at least as a contradiction here.

Dr. KISSINGER. Should I do that later?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Sir. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Dr. Kissinger, thank you for coming this morning. I have just a quick comment on China, and then I would like to get your thoughts on a couple of the elements that you talked about in your opening statement. I have always thought on the China debate that we have somehow misplaced some of the focus of the debate. It should not be about do we support human rights or do we not support human rights. Of course we all support human rights in China. The debate should be focused on how we best influence the behavior of the Chinese leaders to bring more human rights, and I only say that because as I have listened and witnessed much of this debate, it is like environmental issues and other issues, you are either for a clean environment or you are against it, and we need to get back to the real issue.

Your points about the Founding Act, what do you believe the Russians think about the Founding Act, but more importantly, what do you believe their view is of the Founding Act?

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me just make a very quick comment about your China point. I am somewhat disturbed by the impression that is being created in the debate that the only issue we have vis-a-vis China is human rights, and that the only debate we have in this country is how we can improve human rights in China. I would urge that there be examination of whether we have any common interests in terms of our national security that would drive us to some degree of cooperation with China. This aspect of the relationship must be included, otherwise we will always seem as if we are somehow inadequate.

Now about Russia. I do not agree with the administration's analysis of the Russian problem, and therefore I do not agree with the statement about erasing dividing lines in that sense. My analysis of Russia is as follows.

A dominant view of some of the administration spokesmen seems to be that the obstacle to relations with Russia is the absence of pluralistic democracy, and that once democracy is established in Russia, all other problems will disappear. Then Russia will merge into some kind of big Eurasian structure.

I think the problem of Russia is more complicated. First of all, the country is partly in Europe but also partly in the Middle East and partly in Asia, so that the pulls on Russia are much more complex than those faced by any other nation in Europe. Second, the history of Russia is quite different. It has not had a separate religion, as was the Catholic religion during the Medieval period,

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which established its own principle of justice. It did not have the Reformation, it did not have the Enlightenment, it did not have the Age of Discovery, it did not have capitalism. So the evolution toward democracy in Russia is more complex. Hopefully it will develop.

Second, Russia has also been an imperialist country that, for 400 years of its history, acquired territories, expanding from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, into the Middle East, to the gates of India, and into the center of Europe. It did not get there by plebiscite. It got there by armies. To the Russian leadership over the centuries, these old borders have become identified with the nature of the state.

So I believe that one of the major challenges we face with Russia is whether it can accept the borders in which it now finds itself. On the one hand, St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow, so they should not feel claustrophobic. But they do. This idea of organizing again the old commonwealth of independent states is one of the driving forces of their diplomacy. If Russia stays within its borders and recognizes that Austria, Singapore, Japan and Israel all developed huge economies with no resources and in small territories, they, with a vast territory and vast resources, could do enormous things for their people. Then there is no security problem.

So for all of these reasons I do not believe that in any foreseeable future it is possible for Russia to join NATO, and I think it would be a lot better if we said explicitly that this cannot happen. If I am very much in favor of negotiating with Russia, and the Chairman will remember, as I surely do, that in earlier incarnations he expressed some doubts about what he considered my excessive propensity for negotiating with the Soviet Union.

But I believe that this is a question for political and diplomatic efforts. If we created a body within the European Security Conference to conduct dialog with Russia, I would favor that. What I do not favor is giving this impression that everything sort of mergers and everything is sort of evolving toward some kind of mini-U.N. From the Chinese border to the Canadian border up in Alaska. I have been very opposed to this approach and have said so repeatedly publicly.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. It is good to see you, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for being late. I was where the Chairman was wise enough not to be. I was at the breakfast, and I apologize.

My understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong, is that on the central issue before this committee, which is whether or not we should expand NATO, whether we should vote to amend the Washington Treaty, you think that we should.

Dr. KISSINGER. I strongly support it, and I urge you to do that.

Senator BIDEN. The primary criticism is the way in which the relationship with Russia, as it relates to what was the Partnership for Peace and is now becoming the expansion of NATO, on those two fronts has changed.

Dr. KISSINGER. Correct.

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Senator BIDEN. I, quite frankly, got myself in a little bit of a bind because I quoted you in a debate. I referenced you in a debate I was having as a source of authority for a position I was taking, and was later informed that it was not your position. This was about 8 months ago. I recalled, and I had my staff go back and get it, a piece you had done in December 1994 where you called for, and it confused me, you called for a treaty with Russia, a U.S. treaty with Russia. You said such a treaty would provide that no foreign troops be stationed on the territory of new NATO members on the model of the arrangements for East Germany (or better, no closer than fixed distances from the eastern border of Poland). In the next paragraph you say, at the same time such a treaty would provide for consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of common interest.

I kind of thought that was what the President did, and that is what confused me. Now, I am not being a smart guy here or a wise guy. What is different between what you are recommending and what actually took place?

Dr. KISSINGER. First of all, that was the first article I wrote on this subject, and I do not believe that the President goes to bed at night worrying necessarily what I think of the subject.

Senator BIDEN. I do. He does not, but I do.

Dr. KISSINGER. But he can be in no doubt that I modified my thinking on this. What I had in mind then was to accept some restrictions on the deployment of troops, and I still favor that on the model of East Germany. I did not think that it could be interpreted into this elaborate machinery which makes Russia, to my mind, a de facto member of NATO, no matter what we say about a voice and not a veto.

Senator BIDEN. Again, as you know, as you were kidding me earlier today when I saw you in the hallway, you were saying you were hoping I would not be here because you and I have gone round and round. I want the rest of you to know the first meeting I ever attended as a young Senator was over in the Foreign Relations Committee room in the Senate, Mr. Chairman.

I came to this meeting room at age 30 thinking I was supposed to be here because Dr. Kissinger was at that time presenting in closed session, quote, "his world view." That is how we billed it. I was here ready and waiting, and a young staffer walked out and asked me, Senator, I had been here 2 months, what are you doing. I said I am here for the hearing. He said no, it is over in the other building.

So I went running over to the other building looking for S-116 on the little door handles, and to make a long story short, I burst into the room, perspiring, I was nervous as heck. The door opened, and remember you used to have those filing cabinets right by the door, it came out and it smashed against the filing cabinets. I think I gave everybody coronary arrest, almost everybody. Then I walked in, sat down, making myself the second ranking member of the committee, looked over at Dr. Kissinger whom I had only known from watching on television, and Senator Mansfield said, "do you have any questions?" He was the acting chairman. I said yes, and Dr. Kissinger said, "I thought this was for Senators only." At which

195

time I said, "well, Secretary Dulles, I am here to ask you whatever I can."

That is how our relationship started.

Dr. KISSINGER. Now you understand why my relations with the Senators were not always what they should have been.

Senator BIDEN. Anyway, my time is up. I truly appreciate your clarification. I am not being facetious when I say my view of the arrangement that has been worked out is what I thought you were envisioning by a treaty providing consultation between NATO and Russia on matters of common interest. My reading of the agreement we made is not, and I could be dead wrong, but as I read the text, and talking to the principals, there is no including the non-NATO members of other countries. It was literally consultation, not intertwining the, as you put it, larger matrix of relationships. But you have answered my question.

Dr. KISSINGER. I have high regard for the people who negotiated this. I can live very happily with what Secretary Albright said here. I simply think that it is difficult to make it work that way as time goes on. You have these Ambassadors sitting in the building, they meet every day. Then the NATO members go off and say we are going to have our own meeting. Legally, of course, they can do it, but the human nature of these multi-lateral parties is against it.

You asked me what the Russian strategy is. Russian strategy cannot be to build NATO. It is against their whole tradition. So they have every interest to water down NATO into some vague multi-lateral U.N. type talk shop. Therefore they will bring issues before the NATO Council that will achieve this purpose. This is my concern. I have no doubt at all that Secretary Albright means exactly what she is saying.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith.

Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, first, thank you for coming to this hearing. For those of us who are new and trying to catch up with what you know and to learn the history that you both have and have made, I for one am grateful to you.

When I listen to the President of the United States and others, well-intentioned, use words like we are not redrawing lines in Europe, Europe is undivided and free, and I see us expanding NATO, I frankly must confess I think we are playing word games. I think in fact what we are doing, and rightfully doing, is redrawing lines that say American values, western interests, principles that we value such as private property, the rule of law, human rights, that we do draw lines, and that as a community of western nations we reflect this not just economically and politically but even militarily in order to provide security arrangements. So frankly I find somewhat puzzling some of the language that we use to talk around this issue.

I think what we are doing is moving lines, but I do think we have got to allow others, other people on the other side of those lines, we have to give them an eraser. They have to be able to join the western community by taking on our values, our culture, if they will, if they want to, and we need to be prepared to receive them. In my mind that certainly includes Hungary and Poland and

196

the Czech Republic. I would have even allowed Slovenia and Roma-
nia into this first round.

I guess the real push is going to come when it comes to the Bal-
tics. Even we must be honest and say should it not also ultimately
include Russia, if they would take on the kinds of institutions and
abide by the rule of law that we share commonly with Western Eu-
rope. I wonder how you feel about further expansion, and ulti-
mately Russia's inclusion if they would join Western Europe more
than just rhetorically.

Dr. KISSINGER. Let me tell you what historic models I have in
mind. I know there are a lot of people who think I burn votive cand
dles to Metternich every night in my devotion to the 19th cen-
tury—

Senator BIDEN. We thought you were.

Dr. KISSINGER. I knew it. May I give, however, an historic exam-
ple. At the end of the Napoleonic wars France was in the position
Russia is in today, that is, it was considered to be the aggressor
in Europe. Everybody was deeply concerned about the fact that
they might start on expansion again. So they created two separate
institutions. One was the Quadruple Alliance. This was aimed at
preventing a military attack from France. Second they created
something called the Concert of Europe in which France could par-
ticipate. The Concert of Europe discussed all the political issues,
and in fact that became in time the dominant element. The Quad-
ruple Alliance was never abolished, but it never needed to be acti-
vated.

This is sort of the model that I have in mind for Russia. I think
Russia should be consulted and participate in political discussions
that affect its vital interests and the peace, and that as Russia
evolves those institutions become more and more dominant. But I
would keep NATO as a safety net, and keep it as unspoiled as pos-
sible as a community of democratic nations. If values were to be
shared, then the political organs would become more dominant.

But what worries me is that we have now created something that
in the terms of the day-by-day, competes with the NATO Council
and that historical analogy, kind of merges the Quadruple Alliance
and the Concert of Europe. And that worries me deeply. I do not
think that Russia should be permanently excluded. The Chairman
knows very well that I was in favor of exploring with Russia even
then whether there might be any common areas, and I certainly be-
lieve it even more today.

Senator SMITH. There is no more reason then to keep the Baltics
out than to keep Poland out.

Dr. KISSINGER. The problem with the Baltics or, say, Ukraine, is
that when you move former republics of the Soviet Union into
NATO and an integrated military structure, then you have, espe-
cially with Ukraine, a major challenge to Russian self-conscious-
ness. On the other hand, we have to find a way of conveying that
a threat to the independence of the Baltics and Ukraine would be
inimical to any friendly relationship with the United States, and
that this is something we would look at with the greatest gravity.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robb.

Senator ROBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger, thank
you for being with us this morning. You have indicated skepticism

197

about the consultative process and the degree of influence that
Russia might have on the NATO operations. Are there any steps
that the United States ought to pursue, in your judgment, during
this formative period that could be included in whatever charter ar-
rangements are ultimately agreed to or changes that might be
made that would restrict that role in ways that you believe are ap-
propriate?

Dr. KISSINGER. Senator, I made clear before you came in the
room that I strongly favor ratification in any event.

Senator ROBB. Unless there be any doubt, I do too.

Dr. KISSINGER. Nothing I have said should be interpreted as neg-
ative.

Senator ROBB. Nor was my question intended to imply that.

Dr. KISSINGER. I did not interpret it that way. What I have rec-
ommended to the Chairman and to the committee is that, in the
instrument of ratification, the Senate find a way of expressing its
view that the NATO Council is the dominant instrument for the
operation of the alliance that the Permanent Council is a more po-
litical instrument, and that the fundamental decisions are taken in
the first instance in the NATO Council. In order to keep the bipar-
tisan character, I have also recommended that some of the lan-
guage, or for all I know, all of the language that Secretary Albright
used before this committee in explaining how she interprets the
Founding Act, be incorporated in this so that we have a basis for
a bipartisan consensus.

I am convinced that future Secretaries of State would be grateful
to be able to point to a Senate instruction to them, so that it does
not look as if they are the spoil sports if they want to move more
issues into the regular NATO Council. I would do my utmost to es-
tablish a procedure whereby no significant issue moves into the
Permanent Council until there is a NATO Council decision with re-
spect to it, and that this not be used as an alternative method.
First there is a NATO Council decision, and then one meets with
the Russians.

Senator ROBB. Well, with respect to current or future progress in
terms of coming to decisions, I think it is fair to say that the rather
lengthy and protracted process where we move from UNPROFOR
into IFOR was not a model of efficiency. Are there suggestions you
might have to address that particular question?

Dr. KISSINGER. One of the problems with respect to Bosnia was
that the United States did not really have a policy; and history
shows that a strong American lead is usually needed to crystallize
a position. But I do not have any great structural suggestion.

Senator ROBB. There were a number of us, including members of
this committee, who made certain recommendations earlier in that
process that might have facilitated that.

Dr. KISSINGER. As to policy or as to procedure?

Senator ROBB. Really as to procedure. I take it back, as to policy
in terms of what we ought to do, when we ought to do it.

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree. If that had been done, Senator, the likeli-
hood is that there would have been a more unified NATO position.

Senator ROBB. It certainly proved to be beneficial once that was
achieved. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is about up, and I am ex-
pected to be the acting Ranking Member over in the Armed Serv-

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ices Committee at this point. I thank you for the time, and I thank Dr. Kissinger for his appearance before this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Robb. Dr. Frist.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with us. I am interested in the differing expectations that current members and prospective European members of the expanded NATO might have and what that might mean in terms of obligation and role in a postcold war Europe. These potential differences in expectations I would think would have real implications as we project ahead what the participants and potential participants would see as the future mission of NATO and how effective that future NATO can be.

First of all, there is our own expectation, and it seems to me that the United States is struggling with what we should really think and expect of a future NATO. It is something that these discussions help all of us with, I think, to a great degree. If we look at the European current participants, their visions and expectations with our European partners seem to be different in many ways, but judging from their view of NATO's role in Bosnia and of numerous comments, there seems to be an indication that their expectations are different than our own.

Then if we look at the prospective members, and you might help us with this in terms of what their expectations might be, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, clearly their expectations are very high, and understandably so, viewing NATO membership as a long overdue reentry back into the West.

With the common bond or the glue that has held NATO together in terms of an external threat clearly changing, and with members and future members having these different visions, I guess I have two questions, do we have today an internal culture in NATO that is consistent with the expectations of the three potential new members to support an alliance strong enough to hold the expanded NATO together, again, the expectations today being very different than they might have been 10 years ago?

Dr. KISSINGER. Well, I think that is a very important question. I had the privilege of being in Poland at just about the time that its membership in NATO was approved. I thought it was one of those exhilarating moments somewhat comparable to being in Europe at the end of World War II, the liberation from German occupation, in that the Polish people that I met felt they were at last, after several hundred years, rejoining Europe as an integral member and as a charter member.

A personal friend was Havel, the President of the Czech Republic. I did not see him at that time, but I saw him shortly afterwards, and he has a similar view. I might add, that when I first met Havel, he had some of the classic left wing notions of European socialism. He thought that NATO was sort of what the belligerent people do, and that the elevated people did something better. He has changed that view completely because he thinks it is now essential for the morale and cohesion of Europe.

In this respect the Central Europeans have a different view from the West Europeans. They are more like the West Europeans were in the Fifties, and they also do not have the view that dividing lines are being erased. They still feel threatened. Now, in Western

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Europe and in America the problem is that NATO has not been given a new morale impetus, or psychological impetus—or political impetus, whatever you want to call it—for a long time, and that we are running on just operating the institutions.

The Europeans are now absorbed in creating a common currency and in elaborating some kind of European identity. But what is that identity? What is it they are trying to do? There are too many voices in Europe that want to create this identity in some sort of opposition to the United States. If that becomes the dominant theme, then NATO will wither, no matter what institution we create. So I think it is very important that some new political initiative be taken to tie the Western democracies together.

I find myself in the position that, on the issue of democracy I do not go along with all the exuberant notions of the protesters on China, but I would go much further on pushing the cohesion of the democracies in the West. This is a question of emphasis, and I am very worried that our relations in the North Atlantic are sort of withering. Nothing bad is happening, but a whole new generation is growing up that does not have the experience that my generation had of working together for noble objectives. We have become sort of mechanics in operating a system, and Bosnia is a symptom of this. So in this respect I much prefer the attitude of the East and Central Europeans, for whom NATO enlargement represents a moral act, and why not ratifying it would be a terrible blow to their whole image of what recent history has meant.

Senator FRIST. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Mr. Secretary, I think you can imagine the correspondence we receive, maybe you get some of it too, that at best is an over simplification of what the problems are. Even some of the witnesses, and I respect them all, who have appeared here, some of them have appeared to suggest that this is an either/or proposition, that either we expand NATO and get drawn into future conflicts in Europe, as they put it, or we do not expand NATO and perhaps stay free of any involvement in Europe's recurring calamities.

Now, my question to you almost answers itself, but I want to get it as a matter of record. Can you foresee a major European war occurring in which the United States would not be involved?

Dr. KISSINGER. No. There has not been one in which we have not been involved in this century.

The CHAIRMAN. Our involvement in a European conflict is all but inevitable, if it happens, and, as you just indicated, it happened twice in this century. May I say what advantages does NATO expansion provide us in the best case to prevent wars and in the worst case to win them? I know that is sort of a convoluted question, but I would like to have your answer to that so that, to be honest about it, we can quote you.

Dr. KISSINGER. First, Mr. Chairman, with respect to some of the testimony you have received, I am frankly astonished that professionals of diplomacy could argue that a treaty we have signed and that is then not ratified—well, let me put it this way: If 3 years ago when this debate started, somebody had said let us not do this, I would understand that position. I would disagree with it but understand it. But I do not understand how it can be recommended

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to the Senate not to ratify an agreement which, if it is not ratified, would have such devastating impact on Eastern Europe, and which, in my view, would also have in the longer term a devastating impact even on the existing NATO countries.

How can one say to the Germans that we are absolutely determined to defend the Oder, but that the Vistula, which is a few hours' drive away, we will not defend; that Poland, which has been as much part of the West, is excluded when Germany, which in a way was the cause of the war that created this mess, is included? Therefore failure to ratify would absolutely undermine the existing NATO.

I have been astonished at some of the statements that I have seen made by people who used to be great Cold Warriors but who are suddenly acting as if history had been totally abolished.

Second, the main argument for NATO expansion is, in my view, that these countries are historically members of the community of the West, that they feel themselves to be so, and that to say we will not defend you but we will defend those a few hundred miles further east does not make any sense. Third, it then will set up a competition between Germany and Russia in this area, because that vacuum is going to be filled anyway.

Fourth, I believe that the best way to draw Russia into a cooperative relationship, which I strongly favor, is to remove its historic temptations and beliefs, because once you have declared Poland and this whole region a neutral zone, the inevitable next step for any Russian leader will be to try to influence the foreign policy of that region. Then we are right back to what caused the European wars in this century.

So I believe that NATO expansion will stabilize Europe and improve our long-term relations with Russia, provided we give Russia an honorable opportunity to participate in dialog, and these would be my major reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Thank you. Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I really appreciate the way only you can express very, very fundamental basic ideas. It amazed me, some of the people who have testified here, people I have great respect for, who seem not to understand the history, the very recent history. When in history, in the last 300 years, has there been a vacuum in Central or Eastern Europe that has not been filled? And when has there been a circumstance where countries that were part of this grey zone or supposedly neutral have not sought their own separate arrangements for their own security because they are wise enough to understand that someone is going to attempt to fill the vacuum? That seems to me to beg the issue whether we should expand.

The question in light of the way the Soviet Union has collapsed, is not whether we expand NATO or keep it the same, it is whether we have NATO or we expand it. The way you describe the attempt, the necessary foreign policy judgment would have to be made in Berlin and in Bonn and in Moscow, that they would have to compete to try to fill that Central and Eastern Europe vacuum. That seems to me the absolute last thing in the world we want—either the Germans filling the vacuum or the Russians. I am not eager for either of those outcomes.

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I am not by this question suggesting that you do not feel and believe we have a commitment to the Baltics, but I think there is a factual historical difference between Ukraine and the Baltics. For example, I think the immediate effect on the Russian psyche of admitting either the Baltics or Ukraine would be very similar. But in fact we never recognized that the Baltics, which were annexed by the Soviet Union, were legitimately part of the Soviet Union. We have never recognized that, and it seems to me that any further actions will take some time and may need some massaging. I am not smart enough to know exactly how to do it, but it seems to me as a matter of principle that it is very important to make a distinction between the Baltics, for example, and Ukraine.

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree with this. On the current schedule of NATO expansion, there is no way the issue of the Baltics can arise until well into the next term, if not later. If we simply look at the priorities that have been established, I doubt that there will be another similar hearing in this administration about new members. But that is my judgment. It is simply the way these things work. So we are talking about well into the next administration, or maybe even the one after that.

I think however that some steps should be taken immediately to make clear that the Baltics are members of the Western community, and that the European community has almost an obligation to speed up the membership of these countries in the European Union. It is absurd to say that 10 million Baltics, because their economic evolution is not quite at the right level, is going to create an insuperable problem for a union that has some 300 million population.

Senator BIDEN. I absolutely agree with this.

Dr. KISSINGER. But this is only the first thing that should be done. The second thing we should do is to study how military arrangements can be made that do not necessarily involve the advance of the integrated command, because the method of defending the Baltics does not have to be the same as the method of defending the Vistula, being geographically different. This I would recommend as a study-though I have not come to any view, I would not just sit until 2005 or whenever that issue becomes ripe on the present schedule. These are the interim steps we should be able to take almost immediately.

Senator BIDEN. Again, my time is up, Mr. Secretary. Let me just make two very brief comments. One, nothing has disappointed me more or reinforced my view of the lack of political maturation that still exists in Europe, in Western Europe, than the failure of the EU to understand how it could play, without any damage to its economic integration, a historic role here to ameliorate a circumstance that could fester in a way that causes political problems. It is one of the great disappointments, the disconnect between their view of their naked economic interests and their long-term political interests. I think it is a very little chance they would be taking, although they have made some steps now with regard to Latvia, or maybe it is Estonia, I am not sure.

The second point—

Dr. KISSINGER. But they do it as a purely economic issue. It is not an economic issue.

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Senator BIDEN. No, it is not. It is well beyond an economic issue. But the second point that I would make, if I may conclude, Mr. Chairman, is that by 5 years from now one of two things is going to happen. This progression within Russia toward democracy and a market economy will be considerably more evident or it will be in difficulty, in my view. It will not be settled, but we will have a clearer picture. That, I think, is going to impact significantly on what the next president of the United States feels he or she is able to do relative to the Baltics without upsetting the apple cart in meeting what I think is a recent historic obligation.

Again, I thank you for the way in which you phrased the di-
lemma relative to expansion of NATO and this neutral zone and
the vacuum.

Dr. KISSINGER. One slightly heretical point on the Russian situa-
tion. We have a tendency to present the issue entirely in terms of
Russian domestic politics. I could see Russia making progress to-
ward democracy and becoming extremely nationalistic, because
that could become a way of rallying the people. We also have to
keep an eye on their propensity toward a kind of imperialist na-
tionalism, which, if you look at the debates in the Russian par-
liament, is certainly present.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, following up a little bit on what
Senator Biden was talking about, your response to Senator Frist,
you mentioned in your opening comments about reasserting the
central role of NATO. You mentioned a theme, you talked about
new political initiatives, the interconnects that Senator Biden was
talking about that have been discussed here the last hour and a
half. Should we take some initiative to redefine NATO after 50
years? It is being somewhat redefined. Should we take the initia-
tive to really start focussing on its mission?

The thing that you mentioned earlier in response to a comment
I made on China it seems to me is very clear here, and that is the
interconnects here. You mentioned Bosnia. All these are going to
have major consequences and impacts on what we do with NATO
expansion. I was wondering if you could develop that a little fur-
ther.

Dr. KISSINGER. I believe that the next major, constructive phase
of American foreign policy should be an emphasis on uniting the
existing democracies as the base from which we operate, and I
would apply that to the Western Hemisphere and to the North At-
lantic. These are separate building blocks, but I would try over
time to merge them.

Right now there is no significant initiative in the North Atlantic
area. We are operating on momentum. The Europeans are creating
their own currency and are trying to evolve a new identity without
any significant input from the United States on what might emerge
in the long run. A few years ago I recommended a North Atlantic
free trade area, but there may be other, better, ideas. And unless
there is something by which we define that relationship, I think
the evolution of the rest of the world is going to make what I con-
sider the central relationship less and less relevant. If that contin-

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ues, then we will be in the strange position of being confined sort of to an island off the coast of Europe and Asia.

This will drive us into the kind of policy that, for example, my critics always say is unsustainable, namely a balance of power policy all over the world. If we do not have a community within which we operate, then we have to try to balance interests, rewards, and punishments.

Now, in Asia, we have no choice in this matter, but in Europe and the Western Hemisphere we do have a choice. One reason, to get back to the question of German tradition, is that in Asia we have to balance the various nations, but in Europe and in the Western Hemisphere we can create a community. In Europe and in the Western Hemisphere war is highly unlikely. There, we can build structures based on common values, and we should give this more emphasis. In fact we have not given it any significant emphasis. We have put much more emphasis on relations and trade with Russia and other similar things.

That would be my basic theme, even if I do not have a precise notion. If you put the best minds we have to work on it, as we did in the early Fifties, we will come up with something. I have no doubt.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Dr. Kissinger, welcome. I am sorry I am late. I do not know if I will retrace some steps that have been taken or questions that have been asked, but if I do you may be brief in answering those for me. I have a couple of questions. In June 1997, in an op-ed article in the *Washington Post* you said that you were gravely concerned that the Founding Act will dilute NATO into being a U.N.-styled system of collective security by grafting an elaborate and convoluted machinery for consultations with Russia at every level of the alliance. Now, what steps do you suggest that the Senate take in the resolution of ratification to ensure that this would not occur?

Dr. KISSINGER. I have made this recommendation. As I said, I strongly favor ratification, and nothing I have said should detract from that. I would, however, find it helpful, and I believe succeeding Secretaries of State and Presidents will find it helpful if the Senate expressed its view that the NATO Council remain the priority, that the central relationship we have in the North Atlantic area is within the Atlantic Alliance, and that relations with Russia should be friendly and cooperative but not part of the essence of NATO. I complimented Secretary Albright with respect to her forthright statement in response to a question by the Chairman, and some of the language she used might be incorporated so that it does not look like a partisan attack.

Senator GRAMS. Is that an adequate response to the argument that while the Founding Act may give Russia no formal veto over NATO decisions, Russia will acquire basically a de facto veto through the Permanent Joint Council since some NATO countries could hesitate to decide a sensitive issue in NATO's policy making North Atlantic Council. Are we giving Russia too much voice, whether de facto or actual?