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Finally, since we considered that any agreement
that we signed with respect to numbers should be the prelude
to further negotiations about reduction, it was very important
the debates for reduction for both sides represent some
equivalence that permitted a reasonable calculation.

I won't repeat on this occasion all the internal
deliberations through which we went, the various options
that were considered. There were five in number but various
combinations of quantitative and qualitative restraints seem
possible for the United States.

Finally, prior to my visit to the Soviet Union in
October, President Ford decided on a proposal which did not
reflect any of the options precisely, but represented an amalga-
mation of several of the approaches. This we submitted to
the Soviet leaders about a week before my visit to the Soviet
Union in October and it led to a Soviet counter-proposal
which was in the general framework of our proposal, and
which I have indicated to you marked a substantial step
forward on the road to an agreement.

It was discussed in great detail on the occasion
of my visit in October. The Soviet counter-proposal was
studied by the President and his advisors and it caused us
to submit another refinement, or an answer to the Soviet
counter-proposal about a week before we came here. And
then, most of the discussions last night, all of the
discussions last night, and about two and a half hours
this morning, were devoted to the issue of SALT.

President Ford and the General Secretary, in the
course of these discussions, agreed that a number of the
issues that had been standing in the way of progress
should be resolved and that guidelines should be issued
to the negotiators in Geneva, who we expect to reconvene
in early January.

They agreed that obviously, as the Joint Statement
says, the new agreement will cover a period of 10 years,
that for the first two years of that period, the provisions
of the interim agreement will remain in force, as was
foreseen in the interim agreement; that after the lapse
of the interim agreement, both sides could have equal
numbers of strategic vehicles. And President Ford and
Secretary General Brezhnev agreed substantially on
the definition of strategic delivery vehicles.

During the 10-year period of this agreement, the
would also have equal numbers of weapons with multiple,
independent reentry vehicles and that number is substantially
less than the total number of strategic vehicles.

There is no compensation for forward-based
systems and no other compensations. In other words, we are
talking about equal numbers on both sides for both MIRVs
and for strategic delivery vehicles and these numbers
have been agreed to and will be discussed with Congressional
leaders after the President returns.

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The negotiations will have to go into the details of verifications of what restraints will be necessary, how one can define and verify missiles which are independently targeted. But we believe that with good will on both sides, it should be possible to conclude a 10-year agreement by the time that the General Secretary visits the United States at the summit and at any rate, we will make a major effort in that direction.

As I said, the negotiations could be difficult and will have many technical complexities but we believe that the target is achievable. If it is achieved, it will mean that a cap has been put on the arms race for a period of 10 years, that this cap is substantially below the capabilities of either side, that the element of insecurity, inherent in an arms race in which both sides are attempting to anticipate not only the actual programs but the capabilities of the other side will be substantially reduced with levels achieved over a 10-year period by agreement.

The negotiations for reductions can take place in a better atmosphere and, therefore, we hope that we will be able to look back to this occasion here as the period or as the turning point that led to putting a cap on the arms race and was the first step to a reduction of arms.

Now, I will be glad to take your questions.

Barry, and then Peter.

Q Mr. Secretary, excuse me, but are bombers under "a"?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Bombers are included. When you say no compensation, you mean what we have in Europe counts against ourselves?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q Excuse me?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What I mean is forward bases which are not included in these totals.

Q They don't count in this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Strategic bombers are included.

Q Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Forward base systems are not included.

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Q My question follows on that. What are the advantages for the Russians in agreeing on the number of MIRVs being equal, that they would not raise questions about compensating for our forward base system.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think that we should ask the General Secretary for an explanation of why he -- I can explain to you our point of view on these matters, but I believe that both sides face this problem.

The arms race has an impetus from at least three sources: One, political tension; second, the strategic plans of each side; and third, the intent of each side to anticipate what the other side might do.

The most volatile of those in a period of exploding technology is the last one.

There is an element that is driving the arms race of insuring one's self against the potentialities of the other side that accelerates it in each passing year. I would suppose that the General Secretary has come to the same conclusion that we have, that whatever level you put for a ceiling it is enough to destroy humanity several times over, so that the actual level of the ceiling is not as decisive as the fact that a ceiling has been put on it and that the element of your self-fulfilling prophecy that is inherent in the arms race is substantially reduced.

I would assume that it was considerations such as these that induced the General Secretary to do this.

Q My question derives from the fact that no bargainer would put himself at a disadvantage and I am just wondering what, from our standpoint, would be the net advantage of maintaining our forward bases without the Soviet complaining that there is some imbalance or some inequality or inequation in the overall purpose.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as you know, the Soviet Union had maintained that forward base systems should be included in the totals and this was one of the big obstacles to an agreement previously. The progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the forward base systems partly because most of the forward base systems, or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union.

At any rate, this is an element that has disappeared from the negotiation in recent months.

Q Secretary Kissinger, have you reached agreement on the number of MIRV vehicles or the number of MIRV warheads?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: The number of MIRVed vehicles.
The number of warheads could differ and of course, there
are some differentials in the throw weight of individual
missiles at any given period, though there is nothing
in the agreement that prevents the United States, if it
wishes to, from closing the throw weight gap.

We are not going to do it just to do it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when was the discussion of SALT matters concluded and was that time used to discuss any other matter?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The discussion of SALT matters was concluded around 12:30 and all the time between 12:30 and the time I came over here was devoted to other matters. The discussions were practically uninterrupted and I will get into these other matters after we are finished with SALT.

Q I have a question on the delivery vehicles.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q You speak of equality which I take to mean some level that is roughly an equality of total U.S. delivery vehicles in a triad mix and the same on the other side.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Would this, therefore, involve a larger number of total U.S. vehicles than existed under SALT 1 or by taking in the bombers are you still maintaining roughly the same number of land bases?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: By agreement, we are not
giving up the number until the President has had enough
opportunity to brief but roughly speaking, the total number
is composed of a combination of missiles, of land-based
missiles, submarine missiles, bombers and certain other
categories of weapons that would have the characteristics
of strategic weapons, the total number that accurately
is equal and each side, with some constraints, but not
very major ones, has essentially the freedom to mix -- that
is to say the composite force -- in whatever way it wants.
There are some constraints.

Q Is there any further constraint on the total throw weight that one side or another side could have? Under SALT 1, as I remember, there was a limit on the number of heavy missiles.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The constraints of SALT 1 with respect to the number of heavy missiles are carried over into this agreement.

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Q Up to 1985?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Up to 1985. Throughout the whole period of the agreement. You said there will be a substantial reduction. Is this approximately --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I am saying it will be the objective of the United States now that we have achieved a cap on the arms race. We have achieved a cap on the arms race if we can solve the technical problems of implementing the agreement that was made here. But I believe with good will, that should be possible.

We have always assumed that once we agreed on numbers, we could solve all the other problems, that from the basis of the cap that has been put on the arms race, so that both sides now have a similar starting point it will be the United States objective to bring about a substantial reduction of strategic forces, but there has not yet been an agreement to any reduction, obviously.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is there any provision in here concerning other types of modernization -- improvements, for example, of MIRVs? Was there any limitation on MIRVs discussed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, there is no such limitation, but this is something that can still be raised in the discussions, but there is no such limitation.

Q Mr. Secretary, what does this initial statement have to do with the Trident and B-1 program, if anything?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Each side has the right to compose -- what it means is that the Trident and the B-1 program had to be kept within the total number of the ceiling that will be established by the agreement, but except for the limitations on heavy missiles, the rest of the composition of the force is up to each side.

Q Are these limits higher than the existing forces of both sides and will both have weapons to reach the --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. By the United States, this is somewhat more complex to calculate, depending on what weapons you count. For the Soviet Union, it is clearly below the limits and for both sides, it is substantially below their capability.

Q Will either side reduce its arms totals? I, was not quite certain of your answer?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say yes. But I think you will know about that better when the numbers become more --

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Q Dr. Kissinger, would you identify for us what the main hang-up was in the five earlier options and what mix the President decided upon that was the key to advancing an acceptable proposal?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The big hang-up earlier was the combination of time periods and perhaps the complexity of the proposals; that is to say, when you are trying to calculate what advantage in the number of warheads compensates for a certain advantage in the number of launches, you get into an area of very great complexity and when you are dealing with a short, or relatively short time period you face the difficulty that each side throughout this time period will be preparing for what happens during the break-out period.

So, those were the big hang-ups through July. What I believe contributed to this agreement was, first, that with a 10-year program we were able to put to the Soviet Union a scheme that was less volatile than what we had discussed earlier for the reasons of the break-out problem.

Secondly, I believe that one of the problems that was raised yesterday -- namely, that they were dealing with a new President -- may have influenced Soviet decisions because it created a longer political stability.

Thirdly, the discussions, I think it can be safe to say, moved from fairly complex proposals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to an agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, if the goal at the end of the road is the signing of a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, in terms of percentages how far down that road does this joint statement put us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Whenever I have given percentages and made predictions, I have got into enormous difficulties. I would say I would stick by my statement earlier. I would say that we are over the worst part of the negotiation if both sides continue to show the same determination to reach an agreement that they did earlier.

The issues that are before us now are essentially technical issues; that is to say, they are issues of verifications, issues of collateral restraints, issues of how you identify certain developments, but those are issues on which substantial studies were made before we made our original proposals. And therefore, had we not believed that they were soluable, we would not have made the proposals, so we think that it is going to be a very difficult negotiation which could fail. But I think we are well down the road.

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Q Sir, a couple of clarifiers, if I may, that
I am not clear on.

Do I understand that there will be a reduction
in the number of U.S. MIRVs? And secondly, is there some
limit on throw weight? Is that what you are saying or
did I hear you wrong?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. There is no restraint
on throw weight except the restraint that is produced by the
continuation of the ban of the limitation on heavy missiles
and there is a restraint on the number of vehicles that
can be MIRVed.

What was the first part of the question?

Q Are we past that point where we have to
cut back?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, we are not past that
point, but we could easily go past that point if we
wanted to.

Q I realize that, but we are not physically
past that point.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, but don't forget the
Soviets have not even begun to MIRV their missiles yet.
We are well down the road towards that goal.

Q I realize we have a larger plan at the moment.
My question is whether we have to start to subtract.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We do not have to start
subtracting.

Q One other clarification question. This
aggregate number is yet to be agreed upon?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, that number is agreed
upon.

Q It has been agreed upon?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The numbers in both A and
B have been agreed upon.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you please --

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[L.C]

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: And the President will discuss them with the congressional leaders but both leaders thought that they did not want to include them in this statement.

Q Well, they would then be included in a treaty?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Ratified?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In other words, the agreement will not fail because of the numbers. The numbers have been set and the definition of what is counted in each number has already been set.

Q Mr. Secretary, what you are saying in effect is that you have already fixed the ceiling but you are not prepared yet to disclose what that ceiling is?

Q And that will be disclosed at what point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, I would expect during the week and certainly no later than by the time the instructions are drafted for the delegation.

Q Mr. Kissinger, does this not mean -- in other words, will not our MIRV reduction be considerably greater than theirs if we have many more and will not their reduction in nuclear missiles be greater than ours because they are allowed to have more in 1972?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, when you are talking about a 10 year program, I would say within a 10 year program in the absence of an agreement both of these questions are highly theoretical because over a 10 year period both we and they could easily go over the total number of permitted vehicles and easily go over the total number of MIRV vehicles.

In starting from present programs I think it is correct to say that this strain on the Soviet total numbers is going to be greater and the strain on our MIRV numbers is going to be greater but in practice it comes out about the same because there is no question that if we both kept going the numbers of MIRVed vehicles would soon reach a point where even the most exalted military planner would find it difficult to find a target for the many warheads that are going to be developed.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that this will be acceptable to the congressional leaders, particularly those --

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think this will certainly be acceptable to the Congressional leaders that have been --

Q Including Senator Jackson?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I am sure you can find a more convincing spokesman for Senator Jackson than me but it would meet many of the criticisms that he has made in the past. It meets the point that has been made by critics of the interim agreement in my view only about the inequality in numbers because as I pointed out on many occasions the inequality in numbers was not created by the interim agreement that existed when the interim agreement was signed and it simply froze the situation that existed on the day the interim agreement was signed for a five year period. But at any rate what was acceptable for a five year period was not acceptable for a 15 year period, 5 plus 10, and therefore that principle of equality has to be maintained here.

Q Mr. Secretary, one last question, please. Would you address yourself to the question of good faith on this? This is very important and will be a very important agreement to the security of the people of both nations. What will you say as a statement of faith and a guarantee?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When the security of both countries is involved and the national survival of both countries is involved you cannot make an agreement which depends primarily on the good faith of either side, and what has to be done in the negotiations that are now starting is to assure adequate verification of the provisions of the agreement. We think that this is no problem or no significant problem with respect to the total numbers of strategic vehicles. It may be a problem with respect to determining what is a MIRVed vehicle. Nevertheless, we believe that that, too, is soluble though with greater difficulty than determining the total numbers.

Good faith is involved in not pressing against the legal limits of the agreement in a way that creates again an element of the security that one has attempted to remove by fixing the ceiling or to put it another way by putting a cap on the arms race. But I think that the agreement will be very viable and that the element of good faith is not the principle ingredient in releasing the agreement though it was an important element in producing the agreement.

MR. NESSEN: Mr. Secretary, you are going to miss your tour if you don't leave now.

Also, we are now passing out the joint communique.

The Secretary wants to make this tour.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me take another question.

Q I want to get this right. Do I understand while you are putting a cap on the future numbers this agreed upon total is higher than what each side has now in aggregate; the combination?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I did not say this, no.

Q That is the inference I get.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I said specifically it is lower than what the Soviet has and in our case it depends on how you compose the total number.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion on what each side will do for resuming the work of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East as soon as possible?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q Does that mean the end of your own efforts, for example, in the area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. This is a phrase that was also in the summit communique and it has always been assumed that my efforts are compatible with the prospective efforts of the Geneva Conference.

Q To what extent did the talks get into the Middle East situation, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a rather lengthy discussion of the Middle East. Let me go through the topics that were discussed in addition.

There was a discussion of the Middle East, of the European Security Conference and forces in Europe and a number of issues connected with bilateral relations. These were the key other topics that were discussed.

Q Can you tell us about your discussions on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think there is an agreement by both sides that the situation has elements of danger, that an effort should be made to defuse it. We are not opposed to the Geneva Conference and we have always agreed that it should be reconvened at an appropriate time and we agree to stay in further touch with each other as to measures that can be taken to alleviate the situation.

Q What role does the Soviet Union think the PLO should play in the negotiations? How should they be recognized and how should they --

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think the Soviet view has been publicly stated. We did not go into the modalities of how they would execute it since we made our position clear at the United Nations last week.

Q Specifically the trade reform bill in the United Nations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That was touched upon.

Q Where did you leave the ESC?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The European Security Conference. We had a detailed discussion of all the issues before the European Security Conference in which, as you all know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is one of the world's leading experts and we sought for means to move the positions of East and West closer together and we hope that progress can accelerate.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you compare the progress made on nuclear weapons with the progress made by the Soviets with the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not even remotely.

Q You did not make any progress on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think that progress on the Middle East is for us to make and it was a different order of discussion. The progress on SALT was a major step forward to the solution of a very difficult problem. The discussions on the Middle East I think may have contributed, and we hope will contribute, to a framework of restraint in enabling the two countries that have such a vital interest in the area to stay in touch with each other but it cannot be compared.

Q How much time do you estimate, Mr. Secretary, you spent discussing the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How much time was spent? I didn't keep track of it. An hour, but that is a rough order of --

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q Was there a question of future sale of any U. S. commodities with the Soviet Union?

Q Question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't hear the question either but it dealt with economics so I don't want to answer it.

END (AT 5:01 P.M. U.S.S.R. Time)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 24, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Vladivostok, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

1:35 A.M. (U.S.S.R. Time)

MR. NESSEN: Gentlemen, as you can see, the
Secretary will brief you on today's meeting.

Let me quickly run through the sequence of events
so the Secretary can devote his time to substance.

The first meeting lasted from 6:15 to 8:15 and
all the participants who are listed in the briefing that
Jack gave you took part in that. There was then a half
hour break during which the President and the Secretary
took a walk. The meetings resumed at 8:45 and lasted
until 11:30.

Q Ron, do you have the walk in the right
place? We were just given it in another place.

MR. NESSEN: I will straighten this out after
the Secretary. I just want to tell you quickly what the
sequence was.

The second meeting lasted from 8:45 to 11:30.
The President, the General Secretary, the Secretary of
State and the Foreign Minister attended that. Then, there
was a half hour break from 11:30 until midnight.

The last meeting lasted from midnight until 12:30.
The four participants, plus Ambassador Dobrynin, took part
in that. The dinner was then postponed. The President
walked back to his dacha with his staff and had a
snack about which I will tell you later.

The schedule for tomorrow is for the meetings
to resume at 10 o'clock until approximately 2 o'clock,
at which time the dinner that was canceled tonight
will take place at 2 o'clock.

I will give you further details later, but
I think at this point you would like to hear about the
substance of the meetings from Secretary Kissinger.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't go into too
much substance and as a matter of fact, I am here primarily
because I promised some of you on the airplane that I
would be here.

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There were two major topics discussed today on the train ride. For about an hour and a half, there was a general review of U.S.-Soviet relations and the world situation. It was a get-acquainted session between the President and the General Secretary. And I think it went very well.

All the rest of the discussions this evening concerned SALT -- that is all of the discussions that Ron Nessen mentioned -- dealt with the subject of SALT.

I think that you remember, as I told you, I believe that progress was made in October. I think that we went further along the road that was charted in October. We went into considerable detail and many aspects of it and we will continue the discussions tomorrow morning. And certainly, enough has already been discussed to give impetus to the negotiations in Geneva.

Now, how much more precise we can be tomorrow, what further details can be developed, that remains to be seen and we will, of course, brief you after the session tomorrow and let you have the results.

We will undoubtedly discuss other issues tomorrow, including the Middle East and Europe, but today, the exclusive focus after the train ride was on SALT.

Barry?

Q Mr. Secretary, did you say that there would be nothing left to discuss because you have already achieved the optimum of what you expected to achieve at this meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, if we had already achieved the optimum that is achievable, there would not be anything left to discuss tomorrow.

We had a very satisfactory talk today. I didn't have any very precise expectations about what we could get. I talked to a number of you and I think I had explained that we will try to build on the discussions of October. That has been done. How much further we can go -- we are really now in areas of considerable technical complexity and relationship of various types of forces to each other, but I would expect that we will make some further progress tomorrow morning. In fact, I am reasonably confident that we will.

Helen?

Q Do you know if what has happened today could be called a breakthrough?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I would not call this a breakthrough. The last time I used the word "breakthrough" I suffered from it for months to come.

I think, certainly, enough was discussed today to help the negotiators considerably.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was there a specific proposal that was put forward by one side or the other?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The sequence of events has been as follows: In October, in Moscow, the Soviet Union made a proposal, or advanced considerations, that I considered that we have described as constructive. Building on these considerations, the United States made some counter-proposals which will be before the Soviet leaders when we meet today.

The Soviet leaders, in turn, advanced some considerations of their own to which the President, in turn, responded today, so it is a process in which the views of the two sides are being brought closer without as yet being identical but we are in the same general ball park.

We are talking about the same thing, on the same principles, and each exchange refines the issues more clearly and brings them closer.

Q Mr. Secretary, are you talking about MIRVs? Can you give us any specifics of what area you are talking about?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are talking about comprehensive limitations including numbers as well as MIRVs.

Q Including numbers?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Including overall numbers as well as MIRVs.

Q Do you think now that you have come closer to your goal in 1975 on an agreement?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think we have come closer to our goal of having an agreement in 1975.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when you say overall numbers, as well as MIRVs, you are talking about total delivery systems or are you talking about total warheads or what?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, this is one of the issues that is being discussed, but generally speaking, we are talking about total delivery systems.

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Q Total delivery systems?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q What --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Total delivery systems.

Q Has this been one of the subjects of discussion, how to define the number that you then will make known?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, obviously, when you discuss strategic limitations, you discuss what sort of numbers would be considered appropriate as well as how you would then define them and this is part of the discussion.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to follow up what I asked before, as I understand the events as you described them, the sequence, today, the Soviets came forward with a proposal modifying their views on what we had given them earlier?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Today, the Soviets responded to what we put before them which in turn, was the response to what they had put before us in October. That is correct.

Q And when was it that we gave this response to them?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, let's see. I guess on the Tuesday or Wednesday, wherever I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin. I guess on Wednesday before we left on the trip.

Q And it was at that lunch?

Q Dr. Kissinger, in connection with this meeting, are you optimistic?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am optimistic about this meeting, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, how do the two men get along? Is there anything you can tell us about your personal view?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have the impression that the two men get along excellently. On the train ride, the atmosphere was friendly and was turning to cordiality towards the end. The subject of strategic arms is not one that lends itself to small talk, but in the breaks, there was an easy relationship and I think both sides are conscious of the responsibility they have in trying to make progress in this area and are conducting themselves accordingly. I think the relationship between the two men is good.

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Q Was the absence of the Watergate ever --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is a different atmosphere from the one in July for many reasons.

Q How so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, in any event, President Nixon was a lame duck President, leaving Watergate aside. President Ford has announced that he is running for re-election in 1976 so he is not a lame duck President.

In July, for a variety of reasons, things were not ripe for an agreement. I think now, I am not saying things are ripe for an agreement here, but I think both sides are making a very serious effort to come to an agreement during 1975.

Q Did you ask President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would you repeat that question?

Q Did you urge President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did I urge him to run to improve -- that he run?

Oh, did I urge him to run?

Q Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw that article. I am not involved in domestic politics and anyone who takes my advice on that is in deep trouble.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the amount of time you spent on SALT today and the canceled dinner indicate that you are behind schedule in terms of your own expectations of the pace of this meeting?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I would say that we have gotten into technical subjects of a complication that might indicate the opposite.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the walk that you took with the President, was this just for relaxation or was it necessary to discuss with the President in private certain decisions or other matters?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was to take relaxation in private.

Q Mr. Secretary, considering the decision to go for a 10-year treaty was a decision by a lame duck President, is it still the way to go about this? Has there been any change in your assessment?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not saying that a lame duck President cannot make correct decisions.

Q I realize that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am saying a lame duck President runs up against the difficulty that his protagonists know the time limit of his term in office and I think that the decision to go for a 10-year agreement was absolutely the correct one, remains the correct one.

Q There were suggestions that it was an option that was not the top option, but it was an option just taking what could be --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. The fact of the matter is that when we analyzed in July, we were talking primarily about a 5-year agreement, five years from now. As we analyzed the difficulties we faced, we came unilaterally to the conclusion that to try to resolve these difficulties would not be worth it because both sides would be straining against the date that the agreement would last and therefore the break-out considerations would almost dominate the agreement itself. So, President Nixon and I came to the conclusion that in any event the effort that would have to be put into negotiating a 5-year agreement and then selling it at home would not really be worth it in terms of its substantive merit and therefore, we did not attempt to narrow the gap by concession here or there which could have kept the project going, but rather, moved it into a framework which seemed on substance more promising.

Q Has the progress been such that some sort of agreement will be signed here, and is there any change in our plans to leave tomorrow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I am certain that we will leave tomorrow. It may be a few hours later in the day than had been tentatively planned.

There is no possibility of signing a SALT agreement here. Whatever is provisionally agreed to here will have to be spelled out in very detailed negotiations which are going to be extremely complicated and which can easily fail. What we can do here is reach orders of magnitude, of directions in which to go, relationship of various categories to each other. That sort of thing can be done here.

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Spelling this out, what it means, what restraints
are necessary, what inspection, what requirements there are
for this, there is not enough technical expertise here
and in any event, it is inconceivable that an agreement
will be signed here.

How the guidelines will be given, that remains
to be seen after the session tomorrow morning.

Q I take it that the Soviets are willing,
however, to go into more detail here than you anticipated.
You are saying that the Soviet Government is eager to
sign an agreement next year. How much will the chance
be improved now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I really would rather
wait with making an estimate on that after the session
tomorrow. I would think the chances have been somewhat
improved.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is it fair to say that
the Soviets were willing to go into more detail here
than what you had anticipated?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I thought that there
was a possibility that -- we knew the order of magnitude
of the discussion because we had reached a point where a
specific set of considerations had been put before us. We
had replied in somewhat those terms.

We expect the answer to come back again in
those terms but the discussion obviously required some
detailed analyses. I think that it has gone reasonably
well.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you please speculate
on what considerations, political or otherwise, may have
prompted the Russians to move in this direction and come
this far and this much progress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Don't go overboard yet
on progress. I am trying to give you a sense of movement.
I have always stressed that this is a very difficult
subject and it is quite possible that when we resume tomorrow,
it will turn out that we will not go further than where
we have reached tonight. I think both sides have realized,
and I think the Soviet side has also realized, that at
some point we will be so deeply involved on both sides in
the next round of weapons development and procurement,
that that cycle will become irreversible. The cycles
can really be mastered only at certain strategic intervals
and once they have gone a certain time, whatever that
particular cycle is, will tend to be completed and one has
to wait for the next one to come around.

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I think that realization that we have been stressing for a year, I think it is now accepted by both sides. And it is obvious that if the race continues that the United States will have to enter certain areas of weapons development that it would prefer not to have to do. I think it was a combination of factors like this that has accounted for the progress of the discussions of recent months.

Q Mr. Secretary, you seem to carefully delineate between a provisional agreement and a formal signing. Is there a possibility that by the time you leave here tomorrow evening you might have reached a provisional understanding?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have always believed, and have said so, that out of this meeting some guidelines to the negotiators could emerge, and some guides will certainly emerge. Now, whether they will take the form of announced guidelines or simply a general agreement to instruct the delegation; it is still too early to say.

I don't know what you would call a provisional agreement. There will not be a binding agreement; there will not be an agreement that reflects itself in the actions of the two sides at this meeting.

Q The question then is whether you are going to sign or not going to sign.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That we cannot say until after the meeting *tomorrow*, but it depends on what you mean by announce. There will certainly be something about SALT in the communique.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you say whether or not the Soviets want to have our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe counted into numbers, strategic weapons?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't think I should go into all the individual details but when I said that the discussions concerned the relationship of various categories of weapons to each other, that has been one of the questions -- overseas systems has been one of the questions that in the past has been raised.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the past, you talked about the desirability of trying to work out an agreement that would in fact be more simple than the complex arrangements that have previously been discussed. Are we in fact saying in our response that both we and the Soviets have started moving toward this more simple, more basic formulation?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is hard to answer this in the abstract. I think it is probably fair to say that we are moving towards simplicity, yes, but that is a very relative concept.

Q Do you have any limit on the amount of time you will devote to the SALT and how much time are you prepared to spend on the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: These meetings are not clocked and both of the principals are fairly gregarious and easy-going, so you get into a topic and it runs and we are not leaving on a scheduled airliner or from a regular airport. So, we will talk about the Middle East as long as either side has something to say about it. There is no fixed time. We are prepared to discuss it.

Q In that connection, Mr. Secretary, you also said that you would take advantage in the negotiations, of the momentum that has built up. Are you building up the kind of momentum now that would require the benefit from the additional time here? Do you feel pressured -- the fact that we are sitting here at 2 o'clock in the morning -- against some kind of a deadline?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, because we don't have anything that we must finish here. We didn't come here to make an agreement. We are not going to make an agreement here. We have come here principally, as I said before we left, for the two leaders to have an opportunity to get to know each other and to review Soviet-American relations, hopefully to give some impetus to the SALT negotiations. That probably will be achieved.

Beyond that, we have no necessity -- no intention, in fact, to reach any specific agreements because, after all, the two principals are going to meet again for a much more extended summit when the General Secretary visits the United States in the spring.

Q Mr. Secretary, why haven't the two principals met alone, President Ford and Brezhnev?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They will certainly meet alone before the end of the visit here.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END (AT 2:00 A.M. U.S.S.R. Time)

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6282

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UNCLAS TOKYO 15364

SECTO 165

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: SECVISIT: TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S IMPROMPTU

EXCHANGE WITH PRESS FOLLOWING MEETING WITH JAPANESE

FOREIGN MINISTER KIMURA IN TOKYO ON NOVEMBER 25, 1974.

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SUBJECT EXCHANGE WITH

PRESS: BEGIN TEXT:

Q. MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT YOUR MEETING WITH THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER?

A. QE HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING IN THE SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP THAT WAS STRENGTHENED LAST WEEK, AND I BRIEFED THE FOREIGN MINISTER ABOUT OUR VISIT TO KORA AND THE SOVIET UNION. HE IN TURN TOLD ME ABOUT HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER. AND I THOUGHT IT WAS A VERY FRIENDLY AND SATISFACTORY MEETING.

Q. AND YOU DISCUSSED THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ON SALT?

A. I EXPLAINED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN GREAT DETAIL THE BREAKTHROUGH THAT WAS ACHIEVED IN SALT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DO YOU FORESEE IN THE CHINA VISIT?

A WE WILL HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION, AS WE DO ON AN ANNUAL BASIS. I HAVE NO SPECIFIC EXPECTATIONS.

Q. IS THERE ANYTHING TO THE REPORTS THAT THIS VISIT TO CHINA IS MEANT TO REASSURE THE CHINESE...

A. NO, IT WAS SCHEDULED FOR A LONG TIME, AND IT'S A REGULAR ANNUAL VISIT. IT HAS NO PURPOSE OF REASSURING...

Q. AND OBVIOUSLY SALT WILL BE DISCUSSED THERE?

A. WELL, I WILL GIVE THE CHINEE A REPORT OF IT, BUT IT IS NOT THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT. THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT WAS AGREED A LONG TIME AGO BEFORE THE VLADIVOSTOK TRIP WAS SCHEDULED, AND IT IS IN TERMS OF CHINESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND IT IS NOT BASED ON ANY NEED OF SPECIFIC REASSURANCE. END TEXT.

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<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">DISTRIBUTION</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="3">ACTION:<br>E.O.11652 : N/A<br>TASS : OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)<br>SUBJECT : Press Guidance on SALT: Secretary's Backgrounder to Travelling Press November 25, 1974<br>ACTION : SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE<br>LIMITED OFFICIAL USE PEKING 2087<br>SECTO 177<br>DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN<br>1. Following SALT backgrounder given travelling press on Tokyo-Peking flight November 25, 1974 should be used as <u>no</u> guidance on background basis by all Departments, including Department Spokesman Paul Hare (questions are paraphrased; Secretary's replies are verbatim):<br>BEGIN TEXT:<br>Question: Did you expect this SALT breakthrough?<br>Secretary: One of our experts said there are two things the Soviets will never agree to: elimination of forward-based systems and equal numbers. I didn't think it would work out quite that way. I know in October we were</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">DRAFTED BY:<br>Ambassador Anderson:jeh</td><td colspan="2">DRAFTING DATE: 11/26/74 TEL. EXT: 0</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">APPROVED BY:<br>Ambassador Anderson:jeh</td><td colspan="2"></td></tr></tbody></table>

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「going to wind up in equal aggregates, but I thought it」
would be over a longer period of time.

Question: Why did they agree?

Secretary: I think any analysis of the strategic equation must lead to the conclusion that the attainable unequal advantages are not worth it, that if you want an agreement, and the only thing that stands in the way is equal aggregates, to hold out for 200 delivery vehicles is sort of silly, or 300, because they cannot affect the strategic equation with the level of destructiveness that now exists. Whether one side has 200 more or less is not decisive. Secondly, it is obvious that they wanted to get off on a positive footing with the new Administration, which they must have to consider as a six year Administration whatever happens in '76. It is not a lame duck Administration, and that, I think, tended to accelerate the process that might have happened anyway.

Thirdly, they may have calculated that if there was not going to be an agreement in 1975 there might not be the political basis for an agreement in '76, which meant then that the interim agreement might lapse in '77 without anything taking its place.

These seem to me the major considerations. There were absolutely no trade-offs, no secret understandings, no compensations in other fields. We did not say if you will do this, we will do the following for you elsewhere. This

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was really done within the framework and on the merits
of the SALT discussions.

Question: What is the definition of a delivery vehicle?

Secretary: A delivery vehicle is anything that has
international xex range. Any missile- submarine launched and
land-based and any bomber. Now there is one special
problem of bomber armament. Until these things are
published, I can't be precise. On bomber armaments only those
things that can plausibly be considered attacking
weapons from a long distance, that can attack the xexx
Soviet Union outside the range of the air defense system,
and a long distance would be considered. In other words
not those weapons which are used to attack the air defense
system.

Question: How about a missile shot from an airplane?

Secretary: It depends what range it has.

Question: Well the long range, for example?

Secretary: We don't have any like this. But if there
were one, yes.

Question: The B-1?

Secretary: None of the weapons on the B-1 would be
considered delivery systems. The B-1 is one delivery
vehicle. It is not counted as a MIRV, even though you could
make a case that it carries more than one bazk bomb.
The missiles on the B-1 are not counted as a delivery vehicle.

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Question: How do you see the timetable developing on this?
Secretary: Well, I think what we have to do now is exchange aide memoires with the Soviet Union within the next ten days on those figures. That is a technical issue, but we don't want to give out the figures until these aide-memoires are exchanged. Then the President will brief the top ten Congressional leaders tomorrow on a confidential basis.
Then early next week, Monday or Tuesday, after we've exchanged those aide-memoires, the President and I will brief a larger group of Congressional leaders and give them the figures and the details. And then in January we'll begin the implementing negotiations. But the tough conceptual problems are substantially done. The big problems now are verification type issues and, you know, they may become intractable. We had assumed when we put forward our original proposals that the verification problems--on numbers there's not problem on numbers, there's no verification problem, but on MIRV's there may be a verification problem, though I think it is a soluble one and we have always assumed it is a soluble one.

Question: You will have some trouble within the Administration on that?
Secretary: Well, we've had trouble all along in SALT and, you know, one thing has to be said, we in effect started from scratch in terms of a proposal in the Ford

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Administration. We had a number of NSC meetings in which various options were presented. But prior to my going to Moscow in October, about ten days before, the President had me put forward an amalgamation of various approaches which didn't fit any one of the approaches which had been put forward. This then invoked the Soviet response which in turn led to where we were. So, sure, we will have problems. I think, however, some of the people who were using verification to try to block an agreement will no longer be so adamant. I don't think there will be much opposition to what was done at Vladivostok. Vladivostok in terms of the numbers.

Question: Why do you think the Russians (inaudible)?

Secretary: Well, I think whatever the significance is, you know that for many military people the European concept (inconceivable) of equal aggregates became almost inconceivable even though you could give no strategic significance to it and even though, I have to repeat it, SALT I did not create a gap. SALT I ratified a gap that existed when it was signed and that was growing against us when it was signed, at a time when we had not one weapons program to close it.

Question: What about the Soviets saying the SS-17 or 19 should not be counted as a MR MIRV?

Secretary: Well, that could turn into a hang-up. But on the other hand, we cannot make any compromise. We cannot accept their assertions that a missile they have tested as a

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MIRV isn't MIRV'd because first of all the only way you onsite could tell is with outside inspection if they said it is a single warhead. And even that would not be conclusive because they could let us see the single warhead when we inspect and have another storage facility with a MIRV and just put it back on. So the one principle on which we are going to be adamant and will not yield, which is non-negotiable, is that any missile that has been tested with a MIRV mode successfully, I mean if they've run five or six tests, will be counted as a MIRV'd missile when it is deployed.

Question: What if the Soviets hold to this principle?

Secretary: The only area where this could be used against us is on the Minuteman. I mean, on our submarines we only have MIRV'd missiles. We have not claimed single warhead missiles on our submarines. But they have a better check, because they can read in our defense budget how many Minutemen II's and how many Minuteman III's we have, and we have no capacity of deploying any significant number of MIRV'd missiles secretay. We can not procure them, we cannot deploy them, and therefore if they want to scuttle what was achieved in Vladivostok, that is exactly what they will do. They will try to make us count things by our own yardsticks, but actually the Minuteman III, if we called it something else, is really a different missile from the

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Minuteman II. We will not claim that any Minuteman III hole has a Minuteman II in it, and we would have to assume that they would count any Minuteman III as MIRV'd. So they can apply it to us. And on submarines, on any modern submarine, on any submarine that has a MIRV'd missile on it they can count every missile that is MIRV'd.

Question: What are we counting as MIRV'd on them so far.
SS-18 and 19?

Secretary: 17 and 19; 18 isn't a completed program yet.

If there are X numbers of successful tests then we assume that it's operational. For the 17 and 19, is not quite /quarant completed yet, but it is so far down the road that we could not accept the proposition that those are not MIRV's. If they stopped testing tomorrow and said those are not MIRV's, we could not accept it. We could accept it still with the 18, but not for much longer.

Question: What about mobiles?

Secretary: If they are of intercontinental range, they will be counted. There are not exceptions to this.

Question: How many mobiles are acceptable?

Secretary: Each side can compose its force any way it wants to. Mobiles have a certain verification problem in terms of numbers. Our detection capability will increase over the ten-year period and even now we think we can get it within 20 percent--right now they don't have any mobiles, they're testing one--assuming they deploy 200, that means

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「we could be off by 40 to 50. That is just not worth it」,
and, in any event, the way the numbers are now they cannot
deploy another system without tearing something down. In
fact, they will have to tear things down to get to the agreed
numbers.

Question: That is what I wanted to ask you. You say here
that the number you agreed on is substantially less than
the stated number of strategic vehicles.

Secretary: If you include their airplanes. What I meant
to say, it is substantially less than what each side is capable
of doing and it is less than what the Soviet Union has now
if you include airplanes, which you have to.

Question: What is that figure now?

Secretary: You would have to use now 2500. You can
assume it's below 2500.

Question: Is there any provision or thought of onsite
inspection?

Secretary: We have never asked, at no point have we
asked for onsite inspection. On the numbers we do not
need onsite inspection. We know the numbers of submarines
they have, and we know really without the possibility of
error the numbers of land-based missiles they have. The
possibility of error will occur with land mobiles and there
we assume we could be off by 25 percent. But our detection
capability will improve over the next ten years. If you
look at it realistically they now have 1410 land-based

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missiles and they are entitled by the interim agreement
to 950 sea-based missiles, so that gives them 2360 right
there. So, how many x mobiles are they going to build?
Since I've already said they have to cut down from what they have
now--you know it is less than 2500--the number of land mobiles
they could reasonably build has got to be limited.

Question: Bombers count?

Secretary: Well, bombers count

Question: I see, you add bombers to 2360...

Secretary: Well, the 2360 are just their modern x weapons.
They still have 210 SS-7's and 8's lying around. In x order
to get the 950 submarines, they have to trade off the 210.
But as of today they have still got those 210, or part of
them lying around. They have 150 or so Bison airplanes,
so they will have a decision to make how to compose their
force. If they want to keep airplanes, then they have to
get rid of a fair number of missiles. If on top of that
they want land mobiles, then they will have to get rid of even
more missiles. Since on the other hand they have just developed
their 17's and 19's and since their silos cost a hell of a lot
of money to build, you know they are not going to build
1000 land mobiles. You know you have to make that sort of
assumption. So you are talking about, I just don't want to
guess, a few hundred. So the verification error is in the
tens and will improve. So far they have not completed

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「they are not anywhere near completing, the test program」
on the 16, which is the mobile candidate. It is a small,
Minuteman-sized weapon. So the 16 will take them at least
another year to complete the testing, a year to a year and
a half. After that it will take at least a year or two
to go into production.

Question: Is that MIRV'd?

Secretary: Not yet, but we think it will be. But it doesn't
make any difference, it will count. If it isn't MIRV'd
it will count against the overall total. If it's MIRV'd
it will count against the MIRV total. But there is no way
they can go above the upper ceiling by saying something is
not MIRV'd.

Question: What is the percentage of MRV MIRV's to the total?

Secretary: It is substantially below. Very substantially.

Question: 25 percent of the total?

Secretary: No, it may be more than that, but I don't
want to give the percentage. I can tell you both of the
figures are substantially below the median estimate of the
Soviet intentions.

Question: Does that mean that there will be no more physical
reduction?

Secretary: On the Soviet side, there has to be a physical
reduction in the numbers of overall vehicles since they
have not started deploying their MIRV's yet. And obviously

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they can build up their MIRV's compared to now. But in our judgment, based on an intelligence estimate that was made in ignorance of the MIRV numbers we were talking about--so you know it wasn't geared to that--it is substantially below the median estimate, and very substantially below the high estimate of the intelligence community of Soviet intentions as to the MIRV Program. So on the Soviet MIRV side you have to do it against the estimates, because we do not know what their program is. On the overall numbers, they will have to cut some numbers to reach the total that we have agreed upon.

Question: Are the numbers to be cut from the most obsolete of their weapons?

Secretary: Oh, yes. Now for us the problem is a little different. To reach the ceiling we can probably go up a bit. On the MIRV program where we are much further advanced than the Soviet Union, we could obviously go further in a briefer time than the Soviets on the MIRV program. But there is a ceiling on the MIRV's we can do in the sense that we have fewer missiles.

Have

Question: /Mxa we reached the number on the MIRV's that is allowed?

Secretary: No. But again if you look ahead 4-6 months through the period of ten years, we will be substantially ahead in MK MIRV's for five to six years.

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Question: Does the MIRV limit apply to a percentage of
MISSILE missiles or to a percentage of total vehicles?

Secretary: Well, MIRV's by definition apply only to missiles, and it is not given as a percentage it's given as a total number.

Question: Is that an equal number ?

Secretary: It is an equal number. It is a higher percentage of our missile force than of their missile force.

Question: Has verification there been any break-through in verification? I thought verification was a terrible problem for America. Has there been some breakthrough that gives you confidence?

Secretary: I have explained to you why we are confident on verification. Long ago, it used to be thought when things were cruder, that you could just screw a MIRV warhead on an old missile. In that case you would never have known whether a MIRV warhead was put on an old missile. And from that point of view the verification problem was insoluble. As it turns out, luckily from the verification point of view all the missiles that are MIRV'd in the Soviet Union require a modification of the silo. In addition, there are other information we think we have from which we can tell whether there are MIRV-handling facilities at an installation. So if the Soviet Union had designed their MIRV's so they could just pop them into the old silos, we would be in

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to become highly vulnerable. There is no escaping it.

And over a ten-year period I think the composition of our force, in our judgment, is a safer one than the Soviets even though the Soviets have a throw weight advantage, because we have a much smaller percentage of our throw weight in fixed, land-based missiles. At a certain level of accuracy, which we are within sight of, no silo can survive against even the x weapons we have. So you ask yourself what do you want more for.

Question: (Inaudible)

Secretary: By the time the Soviets have enough MIRV's to threaten our land-based missiles, which cannot be for five to six years, we will have so much increased the accuracy and yield of our present weapons that we can threaten their missiles, on top of which by that time we could have a bigger missile, which is not precluded x by the agreement.

We are not going to build weapons just to match every large thing the Soviets have. We are going to build weapons for our purposes, not for an exact competition. We are going to look at a larger missile and we have a program which you know about--the MX missile which is being looked at. But we have many options. We can build a larger missile to put into silos. We can put a missile on airplanes. We have just begun the Trident development on which we can get much larger throw weight. So we are not in bad shape over a

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ten-year period and we must not confuse what may happen.

There is no way the Soviets can threaten our land based missiles even theoretically for four to five years, depending at what rate they are deploying their MIRVs. Even then at the levels of MIRV's that are permitted under the agreement it is just one hell of a risk. And look at the calculation an aggressor would have to make. We have, I don't want to go into precise figures, but we have much less than half of our throw weight in land based missiles, much less than half. For the Soviet Union to threaten us, somebody would have to convince Brezhnev or his successor--there has to be a successor because it could not happen before 1980--that they are capable of firing some four to five hundred missiles simultaneously (they have never fired more than three simultaneously); that all their MIRV's would work the way they are planned; that going in a north-south direction, they are going to have the same accuracy as in an east-west direction which is the way they were tested; that we would not fire on warning when we see several thousand warheads coming, and that after all of this has been done, they would only have got much less than half our total throw weight. They would have to be crazy to do this. What would they achieve with this?

Question: Did you make a mistake two years ago on Congressional consultation?

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Secretary: Look at the Congress two years ago. We had to fight every year to get the programs we were then recommending. And the programs could have produced the gap. One of the issues was on submarine missiles. I called in the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs separately, and said we have two choices: to build more submarines or to accept the SALT agreement. Which do we do? Both of them wanted the SALT agreement because they were afraid that if we build more submarines, they would not get the Trident because the only submarine we could then build was the Poseidon. After the agreement was signed suddenly many heroes appeared talking about gaps and other things whom we never heard of before. We did not have a land based missiles program nor a proposal on land based missiles. We did not have a sea based missiles program nor a proposal on sea based missiles. We thought SALT I was a ten strike at the time because we stopped Soviet programs without giving up any of our own and as SALT II has shown it didn't turn out so badly.

KISSINGER

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Nov. 26, 1974

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<table><thead><tr><th>DISTRIBUTION</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>E.O. 11652: N/A<br>TAGS: PFOR, EO, NA<br>SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF TOASTS<br>ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE<br>UNCLASSIFIED USLO PEKING 2800<br>SECTO 182</td><td>ACTION:<br><br>DEPARTMENT PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN<br><br>1. Following is exchange of toasts between Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Secretary Kissinger at PRC banquet<br>November 25.<br>CHIAO<br>2. BEGIN TEXT OF/KUAN-HUA's TOAST:<br>The Honourable Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger,<br>All the other American Guests,<br>Comrades and Friends,<br><br>In the last three years or more, Dr. Kissinger has come to a long way across the ocean to visit our country on six occasions. We are glad that he has now come to Peking again, providing our two sides with an opportunity to continue the exchange of views on the normalization of Sino-American relations and on international issues</td></tr></tbody></table>

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of common interest. Here, I wish to bid welcome to Secretary of State Kissinger, to Mrs. Kissinger who is in China for the first time and to the other American guests accompanying the Secretary of State on the visit.

A year has elapsed since the last visit of Mr. Secretary of State. In this year the international situation has undergone great changes, which further demonstrate that the current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven. The entire world is amidst intense turbulence and unrest. This reflects the sharpening of various contradictions and is something independent of man's will. The history of mankind always moves forward amidst turmoil. In our view, such turmoil is a good thing, and not a bad thing.

The Chinese and American peoples have always been friendly to each other. After more than two decades of estrangement, the door was opened for exchanges between the two countries, and the friendly relations between

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<table><thead><tr><th>DISTRIBUTION</th><th>ACTION:</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>the two peoples have developed. Here, we ought to mention the × pioneering role Mr. Richard Nixon played in this regard. And we also note with appreciation President Ford's statement that he would continue to implement the Shanghai Communique.<br>China and the United States have different social systems, and there are differences between us on a series of matters of principle. But this does not hinder us from finding common ground on certain matters. It is always beneficial for the two sides to have candid exchanges of views and increase mutual understanding. On the whole, Sino-American relations have in these years been moving ahead. We believe that the current visit of Mr. Secretary of State will contribute to the further implementation of the principles established in the Shanghai Communique.<br>I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American</td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>APPROVED BY:</td></tr><tr><td>CLEARANCE:</td><td colspan="3"></td></tr></tbody></table>

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peoples,

to the health of the Secretary of State and
Mrs. Kissinger,

to the health of all the other American guests, and
to the health of all comrades and friends present
here! END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TOAST:

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished
guests, friends.

I appreciate this warm reception on my seventh visit
to China, which is all the more meaningful to me because
I am accompanied by my ~~wife~~ children.

I am glad that they can share what to the American
people and to all of us in public life will always be
one of the most significant initiatives of American
foreign policy.

The beginning of the process of normalization of

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of relations with the People's Republic of China, and its
continuation in the years since then, has not been a
matter of expediency but a fixed principle of American
~~foreign policy.~~

~~Since I was here last, there have been many changes~~

Since I was here last, there have been many changes
internationally and some changes in the United States.
But it was no accident that the new American President
saw your Ambassador the first afternoon he was in office,
within a few hours of having taken his oath of office,
and that he reaffirmed on that occasion that we would
continue to pursue the principles of the Shanghai
Communique and that we would continue to follow the goal
of normalization of relations with the People's Republic
of China.

And President Ford has sent me here to continue the
fruitful exchanges of views that we have had in every
year, to continue the process of normalization and to
affirm again the fixed principles of American

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<table><thead><tr><th>DISTRIBUTION</th><th>ACTION:</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td></td><td>foreign policy.<br>I look forward to my talks with the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister. I am glad that I have already had an opportunity to see the Prime Minister and to recall the many occasions of previous visits when we exchanged views.<br>We live in a period of great change and a period that is characterized by much upheaval. We believe that this change must lead to a new and a better order for all of the peoples of the world, and it is to this goal that American foreign policy is dedicated.<br>We consider the exchanges on these subjects as well as others with the leaders of the People's Republic of China of the greatest consequence.<br>We agree that in the last years, relations between our two countries have moved ahead steadily. I am here to continue this process, and I am confident that it will succeed.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DRAFTED BY:</td><td>DRAFTING DATE</td><td>TEL. EXT.</td><td>APPROVED BY:</td></tr></tbody></table>

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So, I would like [x] to propose a toast to the friendship of the American and Chinese peoples and to the health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister, and to the health and long life of Chairman Mao and to our lasting friendship. [x] END TEXT.

KISSINGER

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Toast by

SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER at Banquet Hosted by
Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Great Hall of the People, Peking, Nov. 25, 1974:

I appreciate this warm reception on my seventh visit to
China, which is all the more meaningful to me because I am
accompanied by my wife and by my children.

The beginning of the process of normalization of relations
with the People's Republic of China, and its continuation in
the years since then, has not been a matter of expediency but
a fixed principle of American foreign policy.

And President Ford has sent me here to continue the fruitful exchanges of views that we have had in every year, to continue the process of normalization and to affirm again the fixed principles of American foreign policy.

I look forward to my talks with the Vice Premier and already the Foreign Minister, I am glad that I have/had an opportunity to see the Prime Minister and to recall the many occasions of visits when we exchanged views.

We agree that in the last years, relations between our two countries have moved ahead steadily. I am here to continue this process, and I am confident that it will succeed. So, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the American and Chinese peoples and to the health and long life of the Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, and to the health and long life of Chairman Mao and our lasting friendship.

(Translation)

Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's Toast at the Banquet
in Honour of Secretary of State Kissinger

November 25, 1974

The Honourable Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger,
All the other American Guests,
Comrades and Friends,

In the last three years or more, Dr. Kissinger
has come a long way across the ocean to visit our
country on six occasions. We are glad that he has now
come to Peking again, providing our two sides with an
opportunity to continue the exchange of views on the
normalization of Sino-American relations and on
international issues of common interest. Here, I wish
to bid welcome to Secretary of State Kissinger, to Mrs.
Kissinger who is in China for the first time and to the
other American guests accompanying the Secretary of
State on the visit.

A year has elapsed since the last visit of Mr.
Secretary of State. In this year the international
situation has undergone great changes, which fur-
ther demonstrate that the current international situ-
ation is characterized by great disorder under heaven.
The entire world is amidst intense turbulence and unrest.
This reflects the sharpening of various contradictions
and is something independent of man's will. The history
of mankind always moves forward amidst turmoil. In
our view, such turmoil is a good thing, and not a bad
thing.

- 2 -

The Chinese and American peoples have always been friendly to each other. After more than two decades of estrangement, the door was opened for exchanges between the two countries, and the friendly relations between the two peoples have developed. Here, we ought to mention the pioneering role Mr. Richard Nixon played in this regard. And we also note with appreciation President Ford's statement that he would continue to implement the Shanghai Communique.

I propose a toast

to the friendship between the Chinese and American
peoples,

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SUBJECT: Exchange of Toasts at Banquet hosted by the Secretary, Peking, November 28, 1974
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED PEERING 2195
SECTO 263
DEPT PASS NSC FOR SCOWCROFT & NESSON

1. The Secretary: Begin Text:

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, Friends:

On behalf of all my colleagues, on behalf of my
wife and my children, I would like to thank our Chinese
hosts for the very warm and very friendly reception we
have had here.

The Foreign Minister and I reached a very important
agreement today, which is that we would keep our toasts
short, to spare the mental agility of the press which
is here.

I do want to say that this visit, my seventh to the
People's Republic, continues the progress that has been

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made on each previous occasion. We reviewed inter-
national problems and deepened our common understanding.
We committed ourselves to continuing the process of
normalization along the lines of the Shanghai Communique.
Beyond the formal exchanges, we gained a better under-
standing of the Chinese point of view, which we will take
seriously into account in conducting our foreign policy.

I said when I arrived here that the process of
improving relations between the People's Republic and
the United States is a fixed principle of American
foreign policy. This principle was reaffirmed and
strengthened during our conversations.

So, my colleagues and I and my family leave with
very warm feelings and a feeling of substantive satis-
faction.

In this spirit, I would like to propose a toast to
the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples, to
the good health and long life of Chairman Mao, to the
good health and long life of Premier Chou En-lai,
to the good health and long life of the Vice Premier
and the Foreign Minister. Gam bei. END TEXT.

2. PRC FonMin Ch'iao: Begin text:

Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's Toast at the Farewell
banquet given by Secretary of State Kissinger, November

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20, 1974

Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger,
all the other American guests,
comrades and friends,

First of all, on behalf of all my Chinese colleagues
present, I wish to thank Secretary of State Kissinger
for giving this banquet tonight to entertain us.

In the last few days, our two sides have, in a
candid spirit, reviewed the development of the inter-
national situation over the past year and exchanged
views on international issues of common interest and
the question of Sino-American relations. This has
increased our mutual understanding and deepened our
comprehension of our common points. Both sides have
expressed their readiness to work, in accordance with
the principles established in the Shanghai Communique,
for the continued advance of Sino-American relations.

Dr. Kissinger and his party are leaving Peking
tomorrow for a visit to Soochow before returning home.
Here we wish them a pleasant journey.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the
Chinese and American peoples, to the health of President
Ford, to the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs.
Kissinger, to the health of all the other American
guests, and to the health of all comrades and friends

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