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world's first 64-bit processor for personal computers.

The world's most advanced
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TM and ©2003 Apple Computer, Inc. All rights reserved. IBM and PowerPC are registered TM.

THIS WEEK ONLINE

MSNBC

Newsweek
NEWSWEEK.MSNBC.COM

# Top of the Week

## Poor Little Strongman

**NEWSWEEK: What soured your relations with Washington?**

**LIBERIAN PRESIDENT CHARLES TAYLOR:**

I don't know. Because I've done everything I was supposed to do. After my election, Jimmy Carter said, "President Taylor, congratulations. There are several things that you have to do, then you will get assistance from the United States." I've done them. Maybe I should have put more money into public relations in America. Nobody, nobody understands Charles Taylor.

**Will you leave Liberia?**

I said I'm prepared not to run for a second term. [On Aug. 2,

Taylor promised to step down Aug. 11.] I'll preside over the transition. President Bush said President Taylor needs to step down only to say a week later that President Taylor also has to leave. I'm stepping down; they say I should leave the country.

**Do you envision playing a political role from exile?**

Bush said I should not. The most powerful man on the planet besides God is George W. Bush ... If he had two minutes with me as a man of God he would see the light. When he gets to know the truth, he's going to be really upset.

For Tom Masland's full interview go to Newsweekonline.MSNBC.com

newsweek.msnbc.com

News, analysis and commentary updated daily by the magazine's global network of correspondents

## THE EDITOR'S DESK

IF ANYONE KNOWS DEMOCRATS, IT'S **Jonathan Alter**. As a kid growing up in Chicago, he studied the Daley machine, and his mother was the first woman elected to county office in Cook County. He was an usher at the 1976 Democratic convention, and in college was getting paid to write articles analyzing local and national politics. After graduating, he apprenticed at The Washington Monthly under Charlie Peters, the legendary editor who goaded Democrats

to adopt more centrist "neo-liberal" policies. As a reporter and columnist for **NEWSWEEK**, Jon has covered the Democratic candidates—and, of course, the Republicans, too—in the last five presidential contests, and just last year scored the first in-depth interview with Bill Clinton after

the 2000 standoff. All that, and in his spare time he's writing a book on FDR.

In short, Jon brings unique perspective to covering the 2004 race. So when we asked him to write a cover story on the surprising surge of Howard Dean, he argued against a traditional profile or "horse race" story. He wanted to put the Dean insurrection in context—of the Democratic Party's perpetual love of outsiders, and post-loss fratricidal battles between centrists and "the base." He also pointed out that Dean embodies the

dilemma that all the Democratic hopefuls face: whether to run to the right and risk a head-on collision with George Bush's political Humvee, or attack to the left and risk heading off an electoral cliff. Yet while Republicans may salivate at the prospect of running against Dean, Jon explains why the former Vermont governor isn't Michael Dukakis, and how he or one of the other Democrats could still make it a very close race if the economy, Iraq and the war on

terror continue to falter and they play their cards right on the issues.

Over the next 15 months, look for a lot more probing coverage of the 2004 race from Alter and **Howard Fine-man**, **Evan Thomas**, **Melinda Henneberger**, **Eleanor Clift**, **George Will** and **Anna Quindlen**. And

in this issue, check out **Richard Wolffe's** tale of a high-school classmate who's now one of our top Qaeda detainees, and an excerpt of Henry Kissinger's phone log during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. All these stories were completed under the watchful eye of Managing Editor **Jon Meacham**, who will edit the magazine and write this note for the next few weeks while I'm on vacation. Have a peaceful August, and I'll talk to you when I get back.

-MARK WHITAKER

## HIGHLIGHTS

In **Arts & Opinions**, Christopher Dickey on the 30 "most wanted" masterpieces from Iraq's National Museum, **Gerald Early** on the planned African-American Museum in Washington, **Will Blythe** on the director Werner Herzog and a gallery of emerging artists at the **Bronx Museum**. Plus, cast your **Live Vote** on our home page: will **Howard Dean** win the Democratic nomination next year?

## COLUMNISTS & LIVE TALKS

### The Week Ahead on the Web

On Tuesdays, log on for Diplomatic Diary by our State Department correspondent, **Richard Wolffe**.

**Jonathan Alter** will host a Live Talk on Howard Dean and the Democrats, Wednesday, Aug. 6, at noon, ET.

**Mark Starr** follows professional and amateur sports in his online column, Starr Gazing, published Thursdays.

**Historian Michael Beschloss** hosts a Live Talk on Henry Kissinger's legacy, Thursday, Aug. 7, at noon, ET.

For an inside look at Congress and the White House, read **Eleanor Cliff's** Capitol Letter, published online every Friday.

4 NEWSWEEK AUGUST 11, 2003

CLOCKWISE FROM LEFT: BEN CURTIS-AP, PHOTOGRAPH BY CHARLES OMMANNEY FOR NEWSWEEK, NO CREDIT, HARRY GABLUCK-AP, PHOTOGRAPH BY DAVID N. BERKWITZ FOR NEWSWEEK, SIGRID ESTRADA, KHUE BUI FOR NEWSWEEK

## Book Excerpt

THE

He was the master diplomat of his time. Now he's got his eye on history's verdict.

# KISSINGER FILES

BY MICHAEL BESCHLOSS

W

WHEN JOHN UPDIKE PUBLISHED HIS IRONIC 1992 novel, “Memories of the Ford Administration,” he could not know that he was writing about the future. This past spring, as George W. Bush fought Iraq, the president was being advised by some of the crown jewels of Gerald Ford’s 1970s

circle—Donald Rumsfeld, who had run Ford's Pentagon; Dick Cheney, Ford's chief of staff; George H.W. Bush, who was Ford's CIA director. But it was like a TV reunion of the “Dynasty” cast without Joan Collins.

Absent from center stage was Henry A. Kissinger, 80, who served Richard Nixon and Ford as national-security adviser and secretary of State. The onetime Harvard government professor has paid careful attention to his place in history, producing thousands of pages of elegantly written and best-selling memoirs about his Nixon-Ford years (most

recently “Ending the Vietnam War,” published earlier this year). The latest is his new book, “Crisis,” a fascinating window on two pivotal episodes—the 1973 Yom Kippur War (excerpted on the following pages) and the fall of Saigon in 1975. Unlike Kissinger’s earlier books, “Crisis” consists mainly of never-before-released transcripts of his private conversations, with his own additional interpretation.

As one of the most controversial public officials in recent history, Kissinger has followed Winston Churchill's fabled dictum that to secure your historical standing, be sure you are the first to write about it.

And Kissinger knew that sooner or later, by congressional demand, Nixon's secret tapes of his private conversations would become public, a long process that has begun but is far from complete. Whether these tapes showed him, for example, trying to prod a deeply troubled president to do the right thing (Kissinger's version) or as an aide willing to say anything to curry Nixon's favor (the critics' version), Kissinger has been inclined to fix his his-

Newsweek

Join historian Michael Beschloss
for a Live Talk on Kissinger's legacy,
Thursday, Aug. 7, at noon, ET

44 NEWSWEEK AUGUST 11, 2003

PHOTOGRAPH BY HARRY BENSON FOR NEWSWEEK

Book Excerpt

torical image in the public mind on his
own terms.

As a memoirist, Kissinger has enjoyed a formidable advantage. His books have been based on his papers and other materials. By his orders, these were secreted in the Library of Congress and were to be closed to outsiders until five years after his death. Although they were produced on government time and by government employees, Kissinger successfully argued that they were "private" and twice prevented the government's National Archives from examining them to decide whether they were or not.

Kissinger's monopoly on this historical record has driven many scholars to distraction. Groups of lawyers, scholars, journalists and archivists have used pronunciamento, lawsuit and other crowbars in a usually vain effort to open Kissinger's Library of Congress cache.

In 2001, a quarter century after his departure from government, Kissinger volunteered to let the National Archives begin processing 10,000 pages of documents from his State Department years for ultimate release. This collection includes the telephone transcripts that form the basis for "Crisis"—once dubbed the "Dead Key Scrolls" by columnist William Safire because Kissinger's aides made them using a "dead key" extension on his phone system.

His Scrolls do not quite have the tantalizing aura of the Nixon tapes. Typed up by Kissinger's staff for use in daily business, they lack the unpredictability and pungent language ("I don't give a s--t about the lira!") that bring Nixon—and the Kissinger of those years, when he appears—back to life. Still, since the revelation of Nixon's secret taping system outraged the public, high U.S. officials have not systematically preserved their private conversations by taping them. Thus for the tumultuous years from the Watergate summer of 1973 through Jimmy Carter's inauguration in 1977, we will probably get no more intimate source than Kissinger's Scrolls.

It is not hard to imagine why Kissinger chose the Yom Kippur War and the Vietnam collapse as the subjects for this book. Both are dramatic turning points and show Kissinger to excellent advantage. Truman's

Secretary of State Dean Acheson said that no man comes out of his own memorandum of conversation looking second best. The same may be said of "Crisis." The leading man looms as a tower of sanity, cool and broad-minded, negotiating with wit, stamina and skill. He is surrounded by a cast of lesser characters ranging from the beleaguered Nixon, distracted by Watergate, to the last U.S. ambassador to Saigon, the emotional Graham Martin, who shows himself inclined to make himself into a human sacrifice as other Americans flee the North Vietnamese victors.

Kissinger has defended his and Nixon's decisions on Vietnam in earlier volumes. In this new one, he manages to convey the difficulty with which, as the Viet Cong pushed for final victory, he had to balance conflicting demands from other U.S. officials, angry conservatives, angrier South Vietnamese allies and an impatient Congress.

Kissinger's fellow Republicans have far more use today for Reagan's "Why Not Victory?" strategy than for the Nixon-Kissinger détente with the Soviet Union. He may hope that they might reconsider after reading his you-are-there rendition of the Yom Kippur War, showing how his private collaborations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin helped to prevent a superpower smash-up. Readers of this book should certainly recognize that Kissinger's effective 1973 Mideast diplomacy was the forerunner of President Bush's current efforts to broker an Arab-Israeli peace.

More than anything else, "Crisis" recaptures the quality, now forgotten by many Americans, that made "Super K" in 1973 the most admired man in the country (according to the Gallup poll). Americans who worried about Nixon's psychiatric balance during Watergate or Ford's schooling to be president believed, through crisis after crisis, that they need not worry as long as Kissinger's steady hand was on the tiller. As Kissinger faces the bar of history, he shows himself with this book shrewd enough to understand that whatever future critics may think about Cambodia, Christmas bombings or the ouster of the Chilean government, this quality will be one of the strongest arguments in his favor.

MICHAEL BESCHLOSS's latest book, "The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945", will be published in paperback by Simon & Schuster in October.

SURNACE CHANNEL—AP (LEFT) PHOTOGRAPH BY DAVID M. BEZAWITZ FOR NEWSWEEK

ANATO

Listen in as Kissinger and Ni

Early on Saturday morning, Oct. 6, 1973, as Israelis celebrate their holiest day of Yom Kippur, Kissinger is awakened in a New York hotel room. He is informed that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had just privately warned the Americans that Egypt and Syria are about to wage a surprise attack on Israel. Couldn't the United States forestall the attack by reassuring the Arabs about Israeli intentions? Kissinger is worried that the Americans, siding with Israel, will be thrown into confrontation with the Soviets, who will back their Arab allies. He calls the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin:

**KISSINGER:** The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo. ... If the reason for your evacuation ... is the fear of an Is-

Kissinger warned Ambassador Dobrynin: if the Soviets

46 NEWSWEEK AUGUST 11, 2003

**SUPER K:** Kissinger ran the NSC and State under Nixon and Ford

# MY OF A CRISIS

## xon navigate the delicate shoals of the 1973 Yom Kippur War

raeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you, as well as asking us to tell the Arabs ... they have no plans whatever to attack. ... But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack, the Israeli response will be extremely strong. ... But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension. ... The President [Nixon] believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends. ... If this keeps up ... there is going to be a war. ...

Later that morning, Nixon's chief of staff, Gen. Alexander Haig, reports that the president will abruptly return from his Key Biscayne, Fla., retreat to Washington. Already plagued by Watergate, Nixon is secretly pressing his vice president, Spiro Agnew, charged with serious financial improprieties, to resign. Kissinger fears that such a sudden return will send the Soviets the wrong message about the Middle East.

**HAIG:** It is conceivable we will have an announcement about the Vice President. ... He cannot be sitting down here in the sun with what is going on in the V.P. thing. ...

**KISSINGER:** I would keep his return for later. Supposing the Soviets get tough. ... [Then] that would be a good move. [But] if he returns early it looks like an hysterical move. ... I would hold him until the first thing in the morning. ... [For now, better not to play] this as a crisis. [Instead we should] say nothing, act tough, without stirring up the atmosphere.

During a telephone consultation, Kissinger finds Mordechai Shalev, deputy chief of mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, observing the ritual Yom Kippur fast.

**KISSINGER:** How are you?

**SHALEV:** Hungry!

**KISSINGER:** Can't you get dispensation to eat

in a crisis?... What about the [Israeli] pilots? I hope they are eating.

**SHALEV:** Don't you worry. Special rations for things of this sort.

During the course of the day, Kissinger tries to get Dobrynin and the Soviets to join the Americans in a demand for an Arab-Israeli ceasefire coupled with a return to prewar lines. He dangles the promise that afterward they would together press both sides to negotiate their differences—and the threat that if they don't cooperate, the American-Soviet détente might be jeopardized.

**KISSINGER:** We can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed [the Arabs] out of every territory but before they start heading for Damascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. ... Can you not say that it was your understanding that an effort was going to be made for negotiations? [The Arabs] have proved their point, [showing] the urgency in which they see this. ... This is a good psychological moment for them to make a generous gesture, rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be thrown out of there anyway.

**DOBRYNIN:** [But the Arabs will say to us,] "You are in collusion with the U.S. and Israel."

**KISSINGER:** If you and we could find a way of settling this now, then it would be an overwhelming argument [in favor of détente]. ... If it goes the other way, Monday you and we are going to be up at the [U. N.] rostrum calling each other names. It will be a disaster. ... [We will have] to be extremely tough. ... I will be very brutal. ... We want to get it settled before then—at least with an understanding.

On Sunday morning, Oct. 7, fearful Israeli officials are asking for U.S. military supplies.

**HAIG:** Are the Israelis panicking?

**KISSINGER:** They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the president] ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the

From "Crisis" by Henry A. Kissinger.
To be published by Simon & Schuster, Inc.
© 2003 by Henry A. Kissinger

**did not get onboard, détente could be jeopardized**

AUGUST 11, 2003 NEWSWEEK 47

Book Excerpt

hard way [with the Israelis], it's the
last time they are going to listen [to
us]. If we kick them in the teeth,
they have nothing to lose.

Kissinger reports to Nixon that the
Israelis will not consent to a ceasefire
before the Arabs withdraw to the
prewar lines.

**KISSINGER:** We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a [U.N. demand for a] simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown [the Arabs]. My view is that if we cannot break ranks [with Israel] during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

**NIXON:** We don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states—the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting—will break ranks. ... PR is terribly important. ... Let [U.N. Ambassador John] Scali go out—he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem. ...

*That afternoon, Kissinger is irritated that Moscow has still sent no response to his proposal for a joint U.S.-Soviet demand for a ceasefire and withdrawal to prewar lines.*

**KISSINGER:** I am beginning to think those sons of bitches in Moscow are schnookering us. ... We are getting frantic appeals for Sidewinders [missiles] from the Israelis and the Defense Department is giving them the run-around.

**HAIG:** You can tell them the President said to do it.

**KISSINGER:** The idea was to have the stuff delivered to an air base and have them come out in El Al [the Israeli national civilian airline] and pick them up [to avoid attracting attention to the deliveries]. ...

*That evening, when Kissinger reports that the Israelis are resisting strongly, Nixon observes that if he and Kissinger can win a ceasefire, it would give the president badly needed foreign-policy prestige at a moment when critics are arguing that he has been crippled by Watergate.*

**KISSINGER:** [The Israelis are] doing damned well. ...

**NIXON:** The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be [a] great achievement. One of the greatest achievements of all. People in this country would think [the president is] really tough. ...

**KISSINGER:** It's a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together—Wednesday or Thursday perhaps. ...

**NIXON:** Why don't you come over [to the White House] and we'll have a talk. Publicize it.

*On Saturday afternoon, Oct. 13, a week after the war began, Kissinger's efforts to keep the war from growing into a superpower confrontation are coming unstuck.*

**KISSINGER:** Anatoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American planes. ... We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop.

**DOBRYNIN:** I will send that [message to Moscow] right now.

*On Oct. 14, Kissinger reports to Nixon.*

**KISSINGER:** The Egyptians are demanding a return to '67 borders. Now that's absolutely out of the question, short of a huge [Israeli] defeat as a result of the war. That has to come as a result of the subsequent negotiations that follow the war. ...

**NIXON:** As far as the Russians are concerned, they have a pretty good beef [that the U.S. has been insufficiently eager to pressure Israel for a final settlement.] ... [We have been] stringing them along and they know it. ... We've got to squeeze the

Israelis when this is over and the Russians have got to know it. We've got to squeeze them goddamn hard.

*On Oct. 16, as the fighting continues, Nixon—who, but for Watergate, might have won the Nobel Peace Prize himself—learns that it has been awarded to Kissinger and Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. The president tries to conceal his disappointment.*

**NIXON:** I wanted to congratulate you.

**KISSINGER:** I know who deserves it.

... I have told everyone that I wanted to say that I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity and, above all, for the leadership that created the conditions.

**NIXON:** Fine, fine. I was going to suggest that it might be well for you to drop over here [the Oval Office] and have a picture taken with me congratulating you.

LEONARD FRIED—MAXIM PHOTOS

WINDS OF WAR: Kissinger feared the conflict would go global

*That same day, Nixon and Kissinger share their resentment about a public appeal by Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield to end the Middle East fighting.*

**NIXON:** You see Mansfield's brilliant suggestion—urging [a] summit conference with the British, French, Japanese, U.S., and Russians? What in the name of heaven would be decided?

**KISSINGER:** Mr. President, it would kill us. It would be the Israelis and us against six other nations. Insane.

**NIXON:** It's just as it was in Vietnam. Our friends on the Democratic side are petrified [that the war] will end, and they want to be out there suggesting and urging [us to end it].

*On Oct. 19, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has invited Kissinger to Moscow to resolve their deadlock over the terms of a ceasefire. Kissinger reports to Dobrynin that Nixon has agreed.*

**KISSINGER:** You understand this will present us with enormous domestic difficulties [from pro-Israeli Americans as well as conservatives suspicious of détente]. ... I think it's important that we say publicly it was done at the invitation of the Soviet government. ... We are assuming that no unilateral actions will be taken while I am in transit. ... No military threats. And I am assuming both of us will keep the situation calm. I don't believe while I am there I will be able to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able to negotiate a cease-fire. ...

**DOBRYNIN:** Okay.

*Nixon wants to exploit Kissinger's trip to di-*

'I would not link foreign policy with Watergate,' Kissin

48 NEWSWEEK AUGUST 11, 2003

vert the public from one of the worst moments of Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Sen. John Stennis, the president is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. He is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch congressional demands for his impeachment.

**HAIG:** The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

**KISSINGER:** Impossible. ... We have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning [quietly]. ... When does he want to do it?

**HAIG:** Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room ... with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after] consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

**KISSINGER:** Why should he do it?

**HAIG:** One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that [the Stennis compromise].

**KISSINGER:** He is going to make them both at the same time?

**HAIG:** Yes.

**KISSINGER:** A disaster. ... My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

**HAIG:** The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... [It's a] very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. ...

**KISSINGER:** I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. ... I really would plead with you. ... This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We [the White House] should do it as a reasonable, low-key thing—simultaneous announcement. We call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing, but not the President's going before TV announcing it. ... If he is insisting, we will do it, but I think he will regret it.

**HAIG:** Okay. I will see what I can do.

ABBA—MAXIMUM PHOTOS

SHIFTING SANDS: The secretary of State in Egypt, 1973

During a talk with Dobrynin about his trip to Moscow, Kissinger engages in battlefield humor.

**DOBRYNIN:** Could I tell them it will be a commercial flight?

**KISSINGER:** Tell them I am coming on a B-52.

**DOBRYNIN:** [laughs]

On Oct. 23, Ambassador Scali complains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet envoy to the United Nations, is making trouble.

**SCALI:** Malik is acting like a goddamn idiot.

**KISSINGER:** You tell Malik to calm down. ... You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better than he does.

On Oct. 24, Brezhnev sends a letter to Nixon threatening Soviet military action to relieve the trapped Egyptian Third Army.

**KISSINGER:** We are assembling our people to consider your letter. I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, all right.

**KISSINGER:** This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us!

**DOBRYNIN:** All right.

A few hours later, Kissinger instructs his deputy, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to convey a message to Dobrynin:

[T]ell him to desist from all actions until we have a reply. Tell him you are not em-

powered to give any reply. I am in a meeting and can't be pulled out. There should be no unilateral actions and if they are taken it would have the most serious consequences. If he says anything, you can say you have instructions not to comment. They may as well know we mean business.

The next day, after a U.S. military alert, the Soviets withdraw their threat. Nixon and Kissinger are in a self-congratulatory mood.

**KISSINGER:** A lot of newsmen have sent notes and called in on the Middle East and realize what a role you have played. I think that is an asset.

**NIXON:** Compare this with the Cuban confrontation [the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962]. The Russians would never have called Kennedy [asking to end the crisis, even though the U.S. had] a twelve-to-one advantage [in nuclear weapons]. ... It took some nerve to

do this.

**KISSINGER:** No question. It was a tremendous victory.

**NIXON:** The thing you negotiated was fantastic. ... Well, anyway you need a good night's sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

By Oct. 27, as he relates to Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, Kissinger is arranging the first direct negotiations between Egyptians and Israeli representatives, in return for food and medical supplies for the trapped Egyptian Third Army.

**KISSINGER:** All the Israelis insisted on was that Egyptians not drive the trucks themselves but that U.N. drivers were all right. That is all right with Egypt.

**SCHLESINGER:** That is wonderful.

**KISSINGER:** Now, I don't know what can screw up.

**SCHLESINGER:** Give credit for this to the President. He needs it.

The next day, as Kissinger writes, "Israeli and Egyptian military representatives met for direct talks for the first time in twenty-five years, under the auspices of U.N. observers. ... Egypt agreed to further meetings with Israel for more permanent arrangements. While these remained inconclusive, the turn toward negotiations had begun. It soon became irreversible, culminating in a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in January 1974, a political agreement in September 1975, and a peace treaty in 1978 that is in force at this writing."

ger told Haig. 'You will regret it for the rest of your life.'

AUGUST 11, 2003 NEWSWEEK 49

## Television

# Queen for a

Bravo's 'Queer Eye for the Straight Guy' has exploded. It's a makeover takeover.

BY DEVIN GORDON AND B. J. SIGESMUND

LAST TUESDAY'S EPISODE OF "Queer Eye for the Straight Guy" made this gay-straight alliance cry—twice. The first time came minutes into Jersey

City urban cowboy John B.'s makeover (mission: help him propose to his girlfriend) when the Fab Five's clothing expert, Carson Kressley, rifled through his closet and pulled out a particularly gruesome button-down shirt. "Where did you buy this?" Kressley asked. John winced. "Um, Kmart." Kressley pressed two fingers to John's lips. "Hey," he said, "don't you use that kind of language around me." We laughed till we cried. The second time came just before the Fab Five left John to fly solo through his proposal dinner. The gay miracle workers and their straight subject raised glasses of champagne, and John—his apartment painted and redecorated, his body refitted in classic Ralph Lauren, his engagement ring stashed romantically in a box of Parisian chocolate—got choked up himself. It was pointless to resist.

In just three weeks, Bravo's "Queer Eye for the Straight Guy"—a hilarious reality show in which five gay connoisseurs of fashion, grooming, interior design, food and culture rebuild a clueless hetero from the ground up—has become the summer's most-talked-about TV series. Although its ratings are still just a blip compared with, say, "Friends"—2.8 million people tuned in to watch John B. get engaged last week—every new episode thus far has set a viewership record for the tiny cable channel, which is

owned by NBC. Those numbers can only go up as more and more people discover they actually *have* Bravo. (Until now, the 23-year-old channel was best known, and maybe only known, for "Inside the Actors Studio.") "Queer Eye" has already produced one breakout star in Kressley, a lightning-quick one-liner

**GAY PARADE:**
The cable series' Fab Five—(from left) Allen, Filicia, Kressley, Rodriguez and Douglas—on a mission to set heteros straight

**50** NEWSWEEK AUGUST 11, 2003

Revised final 8/1/03

Early on Saturday morning, Oct. 6, 1973, as Israelis celebrate their holiest day of Yom Kippur, Kissinger is awakened in a New York hotel room. He is informed that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had just privately warned the Americans that Egypt and Syria are about to wage a surprise attack on Israel. Couldn't the United States forestall the attack by reassuring the Arabs about Israeli intentions? Kissinger is worried that the Americans, siding with Israel, will be thrown into confrontation with the Soviets, who will back their Arab allies. He calls the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin:

**KISSINGER:** The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo. ... If the reason for your evacuation ... is the fear of an Israeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you, as well as asking us to tell the Arabs. ... they have no plans whatever to attack. ... But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack, the Israeli response will be extremely strong. ... But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension. ... The President [Nixon] believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends. ... If this keeps up ... there is going to be a war. ...

Later that morning, Nixon's chief of staff, General Alexander Haig, reports that the president will abruptly return from his Key Biscayne, Fla., retreat to Washington. Already plagued by Watergate, Nixon is secretly pressing his vice president, Spiro Agnew, charged with serious financial improprieties, to resign. Kissinger fears that such a sudden return will send the Soviets the wrong message about the Middle East.

During a telephone consultation, Kissinger finds Mordechai Shalev, deputy chief of mis-

[Y]

3

**KISSINGER:** They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the president] ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the last time they are going to listen [to us]. If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to lose.

*Kissinger reports to Nixon that the Israelis will not consent to a ceasefire before the Arabs withdraw to the pre-war lines.*

**KISSINGER:** We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a [UN demand for a] simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown [the Arabs] My view is that if we cannot break ranks [with Israel] during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

**NIXON:** We don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states—the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting—will break ranks. ... PR is terribly important. ... Let [UN Ambassador John] Scali go out—he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem. ...

*That afternoon, Kissinger is irritated that Moscow has still sent no response to his proposal for a joint U.S.-Soviet demand for a ceasefire and withdrawal to pre-war lines.*

*That evening, when Kissinger reports that the Israelis are resisting strongly, Nixon observes that if he and Kissinger can win a ceasefire, it*

6

[Y]

Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Sen. John Stennis, the president is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. He is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch Congressional demands for his impeachment.

HAIG: The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

KISSINGER: Impossible. ... We have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning [quietly]. ... When does he want to do it?

HAIG: Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. ... with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after] consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

KISSINGER: Why should he do it?

HAIG: One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that [the Stennis compromise].

KISSINGER: He is going to make them both at the same time?

HAIG: Yes.

KISSINGER: A disaster. ... My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

HAIG: The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. ...

KISSINGER: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. ... I really would plead with you. ... This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We [the White House] should do it as a reasonable, low-key thing—simultaneous announcement. We call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing, but not the President's going before TV announcing it. ... If he is insisting, we will do it, but I think he will regret it.

HAIG: Okay. I will see what I can do.

*During a talk with Dobrynin about his trip to Moscow, Kissinger engages in battlefield humor.*

[Y]

7

**DOBRYNIN:** [laughs]

On Oct. 23, Ambassador Scali explains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet envoy to the United Nations, is making trouble.

**SCALI:** Malik is acting like a god-damn idiot.

**DOBRYNIN:** Yes, all right.

**DOBRYNIN:** All right.

[T]ell him to desist from all actions until we have a reply. Tell him you are not empowered to give any reply. I am in a meeting and can't be pulled out. There should be no unilateral actions and if they are taken it would have the most serious consequences. If he says anything, you can say you have instructions not to comment. They may as well know we mean business.

[Y]

8

even thought the U.S. had] a twelve-to-one
advantage [in nuclear weapons]. ... It took
some nerve to do this.

KISSINGER: No question. It was a tremen-
dous victory.

NIXON: The thing you negotiated was fan-
tastic, ... Well, anyway you need a good
night's sleep. Tomorrow you knock them
dead.

By Oct. 27, as he relates to Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger, Kissinger is arranging the
first direct negotiations between Egyptians
and Israeli representatives, in return for food
and medical supplies for the trapped Egyptian
Third Army. KISSINGER: All the Israelis in-
sisted on was that Egyptians not drive the
trucks themselves but that U.N. drivers
were all right. That is all right with Egypt.

SCHLESINGER: That is wonderful.

KISSINGER: Now, I don't know what can
screw up.

SCHLESINGER: Give credit for this to the
President. He needs it.

The next day, as Kissinger writes, "Israeli and
Egyptian military representatives met for di-
rect talks for the first time in twenty-five years,
under the auspices of U.N. observers. ... Egypt
agreed to further meetings with Israel for more
permanent arrangements. While these re-
mained inconclusive, the turn toward negotia-
tions had begun. It soon became irreversible,
culminating in a disengagement agreement
between Egypt and Israel in January 1974, a
political agreement in September 1975, and a
peace treaty in 1978 that is in force at this writ-
ing."

[c]

[LC]

would give the president badly-needed foreign policy prestige at a moment when critics are arguing that he has been crippled by Water-gate.

KISSINGER: [The Israelis are] doing damned well. ...

NIXON: The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be [a] great achievement. One of the greatest achievements of all. People in this country would think [the president is] really tough. ...

KISSINGER: It's a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together—Wednesday or Thursday perhaps. ...

NIXON: Why don't you come over [to the White House] and we'll have a talk. Publicize it.

KISSINGER: Anatoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American planes.

DOBRYNIN: I will send that [message to

Moscow] right now.

*On Oct. 16, as the fighting continues, Nixon— who, but for Watergate, might have won the Nobel*

*Peace Prize himself—learns that it has been awarded to Kissinger and Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. The president tries to conceal his disappointment.*

**NIXON:** It's just as it was in Vietnam. Our friends on the Democratic side are petrified [that he war] will end, and they want to be out there suggesting and urging [us to end

it].

**DOBRYNIN:** Okay.

Nixon wants to exploit Kissinger's trip to divert the public from one of the worst moments of Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Sen. John Stennis, the president is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. He is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch Congressional demands for his impeachment.

**HAIG:** Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. ... with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after] consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

**HAIG:** Yes.

ion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if
he is using foreign policy to cover a domes-
tic thing.

HAIG: The domestic thing is not controver-
sial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very
good settlement. It would also look very
weird for him to make a major announce-
ment on Watergate and ignore the fact you
are going to Moscow when everyone wants
to know what is going on in the Middle
East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. ...

KISSINGER: I would not link foreign policy
with Watergate. You will regret it for the
rest of your life. ... I really would plead with
you. ... This will be a situation where the
President has put his prestige on the line.
Right now the Soviets have asked us to
come. We [the White House] should do it
as a reasonable, low-key thing—simultane-
ous announcement. We call some news-
men in the middle of the night. It is still a
big thing, but not the President's going be-
fore TV announcing it. ... If he is insisting,
we will do it, but I think he will regret it.

DOBRYNIN: Could I tell them it will be a
commercial flight?

KISSINGER: Tell them I am coming on a B-

[L]

52.
DOBRYNIN: [laughs]

On Oct. 23, Ambassador Scali com-
plains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet
envoy to the United Nations, is mak-
ing trouble.

SCALI: Malik is acting like a god-
damn idiot.

KISSINGER: You tell Malik to calm
down. ... You tell Malik to hold
his water or I will send him to
Siberia. I know Brezhnev better
than he does.

On Oct. 24, Brezhnev sends a letter
to Nixon threatening Soviet mili-
tary action to relieve the trapped
Egyptian Third Army.

KISSINGER: We are assembling
our people to consider your letter.
I just wanted you to know if any
unilateral action is taken before
we have had a chance to reply
that will be very serious.

DOBRYNIN: Yes, all right.

KISSINGER: This is a matter of great con-
cern. Don't you pressure us. I want to re-
peat again, don't pressure us!

DOBRYNIN: All right.

A few hours later, Kissinger instructs his
deputy, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, to convey a mes-
sage to Dobrynin:

KISSINGER: A lot of newsmen have sent
notes and called in on the Middle East and
realize what a role you have played. I think
that is an asset.

NIXON: Compare this with the Cuban con-
frontation [the Cuban Missile Crisis of

1962]. The Russians would never have called Kennedy [asking to end the crisis, even thought the U.S. had] a twelve-to-one advantage [in nuclear weapons]. ... It took some nerve to do this.

[L.C.]

**Kissinger:** The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo. ... If the reason for your evacuation ... is the fear of an Israeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you, as well as asking us to tell the Arabs. ... they have no plans whatever to attack. ... But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack, the Israeli response will be extremely strong. ... But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension. ... The President [Nixon] believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends. ... If this keeps up ... there is going to be a war. ...

**Haig:** It is conceivable we will have an announcement about the Vice President. ... He cannot be sitting down here in the sun with what is going on in the V.P. thing. ... (K: I would keep his return for later. Supposing the Soviets get tough. ... [Then] that would be a good move. [But] if he returns early it looks like an hysterical move. ... I would hold him until the first thing in the morning. ... [For now, better not to play] this as a crisis. [Instead we should] say nothing, act tough, without stirring up the atmosphere.

bold & spelled out

⊗

3

[L]

last time they are going to listen [to us]. If
we kick them in the teeth, they have noth-
ing to lose.

**Kissinger:** We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a [UN demand for a] simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown [the Arabs] My view is that if we cannot break ranks [with Israel] during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

**Nixon:** We don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states-the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting-will break ranks. ... PR is terribly important. ... Let [UN Ambassador John] Scali go out-he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem. ...

**Kissinger:** I am beginning to think those sons of bitches in Moscow are schnookering us. ... We are getting frantic appeals for Sidewinders [missiles] from the Israelis and the Defense Department is giving them the run-around.

**Haig:** You can tell them the President said to do it.

**Kissinger:** The idea was to have the stuff delivered to an air base and have them come out in El Al [the Israeli national civilian airline] and pick them up [to avoid attracting attention to the deliveries]. ...

*That evening, when Kissinger reports that the Israelis are resisting strongly, Nixon observes that if he and Kissinger can win a ceasefire, it would give the president badly-needed foreign policy prestige at a moment when critics are arguing that he has been crippled by Watergate.*

**Kissinger:** [The Israelis are] doing damned well. ...

X

[c]

4

**Nixon:** The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be [a] great achievement. One of the greatest achievements of all. People in this country would think [the President is] really tough. ...

**Kissinger:** It's a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together—Wednesday or Thursday perhaps. ...

**Nixon:** Why don't you come over [to the White House] and we'll have a talk. Publicize it.

**Kissinger:** Anatoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American planes. ... We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop.

**Dobrynin:** I will send that [message to Moscow] right now.

**Kissinger:** The Egyptians are demanding a return to '67 borders. Now that's absolutely out of the question, short of a huge [Israeli] defeat as a result of the war. That has to come as a result of the subsequent negotiations that follow the war. ...

**Nixon:** As far as the Russians are concerned, they have a pretty good beef [that the U.S. has been insufficiently eager to pressure Israel for a final settlement.] ... [We have been] stringing them along and they know it. ... We've got to squeeze the Israelis when this is over and the Russians have got to know it. We've got to squeeze them goddamn hard.

*On Oct. 16, as the fighting continues, Nixon learns that the Nobel Peace Prize, who, but for Watergate, might have won it himself, has been awarded to Kissinger and Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. The president tries to con-ceal his disappointment.*

**Nixon:** I wanted to congratulate you.

**Kissinger:** I know who deserves it. ... I have told everyone that I wanted to say that I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity and, above all, for the leadership that created the conditions.

X

[c]

5

**Nixon:** Fine, fine. I was going to suggest that it might be well for you to drop over here [the Oval Office] and have a picture taken with me congratulating you.

**Nixon:** You see Mansfield's brilliant suggestion-urging [a] summit conference with the British, French, Japanese, U.S., and Russians? What in the name of heaven would be decided?

**Kissinger:** Mr. President, it would kill us. It would be the Israelis and us against six other nations. Insane.

**Nixon:** It's just as it was in Vietnam. Our friends on the Democratic side are petrified [that he war] will end, and they want to be out there suggesting and urging [us to end it].

**Kissinger:** You understand this will present us with enormous domestic difficulties [from pro-Israeli Americans as well as conservatives suspicious of détente]. ... I think it's important that we say publicly it was done at the invitation of the Soviet government. ... We are assuming that no unilateral actions will be taken while I am in transit. ... No military threats. And I am assuming both of us will keep the situation calm. I don't believe while I am there I will be able to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able to negotiate a cease-fire. ...

**Dobrynin:** Okay.

Nixon wants to exploit Kissinger's trip to divert the public from one of the worst moments of Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Sen. John Stennis, he is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. He is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch Congressional demands for his impeachment.

**Haig:** The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

**Kissinger:** Impossible. ... We have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morn-

⊗

[c]

6

**Haig:** Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. . . with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after] consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

**Kissinger:** Why should he do it?

**Haig:** One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that [the Stennis compromise].

**Kissinger:** He is going to make them both at the same time?

**Haig:** Yes.

**Kissinger:** A disaster. ... My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

**Haig:** The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. ...

**Kissinger:** I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. ... I really would plead with you. ... This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We [the White House] should do it as a reasonable, low-key thing-simultaneous announcement. We call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing, but not the President's going before TV announcing it. ... If he is insisting, we will do it, but I think he will regret it.

**Haig:** Okay. I will see what I can do.

**Dobrynin:** Could I tell them it will be a commercial flight?

**Kissinger:** Tell them I am coming on a B-52.

**Dobrynin:** [laughs]

*On Oct. 23, Ambassador Scali complains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet envoy to the United Nations, is making trouble.*

**Scali:** Malik is acting like a goddamn idiot.

**Kissinger:** You tell Malik to calm down. ... You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send

⊗

[c]

7

*On Oct. 24, Brezhnev sends a letter to Nixon threatening Soviet military action to relieve the trapped Egyptian Third Army.*

**Kissinger:** We are assembling our people to consider your letter. I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious.

**Dobrynin:** Yes, all right.

**Kissinger:** This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us!

**Dobrynin:** All right.

*A few hours later, Kissinger instructs his deputy, General Brent Scowcroft, to convey a message to Dobrynin.*

**Scowcroft:** [T]ell him to desist from all actions until we have a reply. Tell him you are not empowered to give any reply. I am in a meeting and can't be pulled out. There should be no unilateral actions and if they are taken it would have the most serious consequences. If he says anything, you can say you have instructions not to comment. They may as well know we mean business.

*The next day, after a U.S. military alert, the Soviets withdraw their threat. Nixon and Kissinger are in a self-congratulatory mood.*

**Kissinger:** A lot of newsmen have sent notes and called in on the Middle East and realize what a role you have played. I think that is an asset.

**Nixon:** Compare this with the Cuban confrontation [the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962]. The Russians would never have called Kennedy [asking to end the crisis, even thought the U.S. had] a twelve-to-one advantage [in nuclear weapons]. ... It took some nerve to do this.

**Kissinger:** No question. It was a tremendous victory.

**Nixon:** The thing you negotiated was fantastic. ... Well, anyway you need a good night's sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

*By Oct. 27, as he relates to Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, Kissinger is arranging the first direct negotiations between Egyptians and Israeli representatives, in return for food and medical supplies for the trapped Egyptian Third Army.*

**Kissinger:** All the Israelis insisted on was that Egyptians not drive the trucks themselves but that U.N. drivers were all right. That is all right with Egypt.

**Schlesinger:** That is wonderful.

**Kissinger:** Now, I don't know what can screw up.

**Schlesinger:** Give credit for this to the President. He needs it.

*The next day, as Kissinger writes, "Israeli and Egyptian military representatives*

Tom Watson
445-5329

OX

[cc]

2

**Kissinger:** How are you?

**Shalev:** Hungry!

**Kissinger:** Can't you get dispensation to eat in a crisis?... What about the [Israeli] pilots? I hope they are eating.

**Shalev:** Don't you worry. Special rations for things of this sort.

During the course of the day, Kissinger tries to get Dobrynin and the Soviets to join the Americans in a demand for an Arab-Israeli ceasefire coupled with a return to pre-war lines. He dangles the promise that afterwards they would together press both sides to negotiate their differences-and the threat that if they don't cooperate, the American-Soviet détente might be jeopardized.

**Kissinger:** We can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed [the Arabs] out of every territory but before they start heading for Damascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. ... Can you not say that it was your understanding that an effort was going to be made for negotiations? [The Arabs] have proved their point, [showing] the urgency in which they see this. ... This is a good psychological moment for them to make a generous gesture, rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be thrown out of there anyway.

**Dobrynin:** [But the Arabs will say to us,] "You are in collusion with the U.S. and Israel."

**Kissinger:** If you and we could find a way of settling this now, then it would be an overwhelming argument [in favor of détente]. ... If it goes the other way, and Monday you and we are going to be up at the [United Nations] rostrum calling each other names. It will be a disaster. ... [We will have] to be extremely tough. ... I will be very brutal. ... We want to get it settled before then--at least with an understanding.

**Haig:** Are the Israelis panicking?

**Kissinger:** They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the President] ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the

©

3

[L]

W

5

**Dobrynin:** Okay.

**Nixon wants to exploit Kissinger's trip to divert the public from one of the worst moments of Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Sen. John Stennis, he is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. He is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch Congressional demands for his impeachment.**

**Kissinger:** Impossible. ... We have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning [quietly]. ... When does he want to do it?

**Haig:** Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. ... with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after]consulta-

X

[c]

6

tion with Chairman Brezhnev....

**Haig:** Yes.

**Haig:** The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony....

**Dobrynin:** [laughs]

**Kissinger:** You tell Malik to calm down. ... You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better than he does.

X

[Lc]

7

**Dobrynin:** Yes, all right.

**Dobrynin:** All right.

X

****************** -COMM.JOURNAL- ****************** DATE AUG-01-2003 **** TIME 13:58 *** P.01

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=AUG-01 13:55

END=AUG-01 13:58

FILE NO. = 155

| NO. | COM | ABBR/NTWK | STATION NAME/ TELEPHONE NO. | PAGES | PRG.NO. | PROGRAM NAME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OK | <02> | KENT,SECURITY | 009/009 | | |

-KMA

-

********************************************************************** - ****** - 2127590042- **********

Page 1 of 1

From Tom Watson

Theresa Cimino

From: Watson, Tom [Tom Watson@Newsweek.com]

Sent: Friday, August 01, 2003 1:20 PM

To: 'tcimino@kmaglobal.com'

<<na0206 rtf>>

hi theresa: here's a revamped version with the changes you sent over, I'll be proofing it after lunch to make sure nothing got lost in the translation but if you want to send this to dr k, fire away, thanks, tom

- 8 pgs. follow -

8/1/2003

Early on Saturday morning, October 6, 1973, as Israelis celebrate their holiest day of Yom Kippur, Kissinger is awakened in a New York hotel room. He is informed that Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had just privately warned the Americans that Egypt and Syria are about to wage a surprise attack on Israel. Couldn't the United States forestall the attack by reassuring the Arabs about Israeli intentions? Kissinger is worried that the Americans, siding with Israel, will be thrown into potentially ruinous confrontation with the Soviets, who will back their Arab allies. He calls the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin:

K: The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo. ... If the reason for your evacuation ... is the fear of an Israeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you, as well as asking us to tell the Arabs. ... they have no plans whatever to attack. ... But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack, the Israeli response will be extremely strong. ... But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension. ... The President [Nixon] believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends. ... If this keeps up ... there is going to be a war. ...

Later that day, Nixon's chief of staff, General Alexander Haig, reports that the President will abruptly return from his Key Biscayne, Florida, retreat to Washington. Already plagued by Watergate, Nixon is secretly pressing his Vice President, Spiro Agnew, charged with serious financial improprieties, to resign. Kissinger fears that such a sudden return will send the Soviets the wrong message about the Middle East.

H: It is conceivable we will have an announcement about the Vice President. ... He cannot be sitting down here in the sun with what is going on in the V.P. thing. ... K: I would keep his return for later. Supposing the Soviets get tough. ... [Then] that would be a good move. [But] if he returns early it looks like an hysterical move. ... I would hold him until the first thing in the morning. ... [For now, better not to play] this as a crisis. [Instead we should] say nothing, act tough, without stirring up the atmosphere.

During a telephone consultation, Kissinger finds Shalev, an Israeli diplomat in Washington, observing the ritual Yom Kippur fast.

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

K: Can't you get dispensation to eat in a crisis? ... What about the [Israeli] pilots? I hope they are eating.

S: Don't you worry. Special rations for things of this sort.

That evening, Kissinger tries to get Dobrynin and the Soviets to join the Americans in a joint demand for an Arab-Israeli ceasefire. He dangles the promise that afterwards they would together press both sides to negotiate their differences-and the threat that if they don't cooperate, the American-Soviet détente might be jeopardized.

K: We can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed [the Arabs] out of every territory but before they start heading for Damascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. ... Can you not say that it was your understanding that an effort was going to be made for negotiations? [The Arabs] have proved their point, [showing] the urgency in which they see this. ... This is a good psychological moment for them to make a generous gesture, rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be thrown out of there anyway.

D: [But the Arabs will say to us,] "You are in collusion with the U.S. and Israel."

K: If you and we could find a way of settling this now, then it would be an overwhelming argument [in favor of détente]. ... If it goes the other way, and Monday you and we are going to be up at the [United Nations] rostrum calling each other names. It will be a disaster. ... [We will have] to be extremely tough. ... I will be very brutal. ... We want to get it settled before then--at least with an understanding.

On Sunday morning, October 7, fearful Israeli officials are asking for U.S. military

supplies.

Haig: Are the Israelis panicking?

Kissinger: They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the President]... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the last time they are going to listen [to us]. If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to lose.

K: We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a [UN demand for a] simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown [the Arabs] My view is that if we cannot break ranks [with Israel] during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

N: We don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states-the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting-will break ranks. ... PR is terribly important. ... Let [UN Ambassador John] Scali go out-he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem. ... You keep one step removed. We can use you for the power punch,

K: I am beginning to think those sons of bitches in Moscow are schnookering us. ...
We are getting frantic appeals for Sidewinders [missiles] from the Israelis and the
Defense Department is giving them the run-around.

H: You can tell them the President said to do it.

K: The idea was to have the stuff delivered to an air base and have them come out in El Al [the Israeli national civilian airline] and pick them up [to avoid attracting attention to the deliveries]. ... If the Arabs come out ahead, they will be totally unmanageable. ... If don't help [the Israelis], they won't come out ahead and we will wind up with nothing.

That evening, when Kissinger reports that the Israelis are resisting strongly, Nixon observes that if he and Kissinger can win a ceasefire, it would give the President badly-needed foreign policy prestige at a moment when critics are arguing that he has been crippled by Watergate.

K: [The Israelis are] doing damned well. ...

N: The thing to do now is to get the war stopped. That would be [a] great achievement. One of the greatest achievements of all. People in this country would think [the President is] really tough. ...

K: It's a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together--Wednesday or Thursday perhaps....

On Saturday afternoon, October 13, a week after the war began, Kissinger's efforts to keep the war from growing into a superpower confrontation are coming unstuck.

K: Anatoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American planes. ... We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop.

D: I will send that [message to Moscow] right now.

On October 14, Kissinger reports to Nixon.

K: The Egyptians are demanding a return to '67 borders. Now that's absolutely out of the question, short of a huge [Israeli] defeat as a result of the war. That has to come as a result of the subsequent negotiations that follow the war. ...

Y

3

N: As far as the Russians are concerned, they have a pretty good beef [that the U.S. has been insufficiently eager to pressure Israel for a final settlement.] ... [We have been] stringing them along and they know it. ... We've got to squeeze the Israelis when this is over and the Russians have got to know it. We've got to squeeze them goddamn hard.

On October 16, as the fighting continues, Nixon discovers that the Nobel Peace Prize, which he had hoped to win for ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam, has instead been awarded to Kissinger and Vietnamese bargainer Le Duc Tho. The President tries to conceal his disappointment.

N: I wanted to congratulate you.

K: I know who deserves it. ... I have told everyone that I wanted to say that I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity and, above all, for the leadership that created the conditions.

N: Fine, fine. I was going to suggest that it might be well for you to drop over here [the Oval Office] and have a picture taken with me congratulating you.

N: You see Mansfield's brilliant suggestion-urging [a] summit conference with the British, French, Japanese, U.S., and Russians? What in the name of heaven would be decided?

K: Mr. President, it would kill us. It would be the Israelis and us against six other nations. Insane.

N: It's just as it was in Vietnam. Our friends on the Democratic side are petrified [that he war] will end, and they want to be out there suggesting and urging [us to end it].

On October 19, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev has invited Kissinger to Moscow to resolve their deadlock over the terms of a ceasefire. Kissinger reports to Dobrynin that Nixon has agreed.

K: You understand this will present us with enormous domestic difficulties [from pro-Israeli Americans as well as conservatives suspicious of détente]. ... I think it's important that we say publicly it was done at the invitation of the Soviet government. ... We are assuming that no unilateral actions will be taken while I am in transit. ... No military threats. And I am assuming both of us will keep the situation calm. I don't believe while I am there I will be able to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able to negotiate a ceasefire. ...

D: Okay.

Nixon wants to exploit Kissinger's trip to divert the public from one of the worst moments of Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Senator John Stennis, he is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. Unbeknownst to the public, he is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch Congressional demands for his impeachment.

Haig: The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

K: Impossible. ... We have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning [quietly]. ... When does he want to do it?

H: Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. ... with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after] consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

K: Why should he do it?

H: One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that [the Stennis compromise].

K: He is going to make them both at the same time?

H: Yes.

K: A disaster. ... My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using

4

[Y]

H: The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. ...

K: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. ... I really would plead with you. ... This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We should do it as a reasonable, low-key thing-simultaneous announcement. We call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing, but not the President's going before TV announcing it. ... If he is insisting, we will do it, but I think he will regret it.

H: Okay. I will see what I can do.

D: Could I tell them it will be a commercial flight?

K: Tell them I am coming on a B-52.

D: [laughs]

On October 23, Ambassador Scali complains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet envoy to the U.N., is making trouble.

S: Malik is acting like a goddamn idiot.

K: You tell Malik to calm down. ... You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better than he does. Ask him if he has ever been kissed on the mouth by Brezhnev, as I have.

That evening, Nixon hopes to use his and Kissinger's diplomacy with Moscow through the crisis to boost his popularity, which, thanks to his firing of Cox in the "Saturday Night Massacre" three days earlier, is at low ebb.

K: A lot of newsmen have sent notes and called in on the Middle East and realize what a role you have played. I think that is an asset.

N: Compare this with the Cuban confrontation [the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962]. The Russians would never have called Kennedy [asking to end the crisis, even thought the U.S. had] a twelve-to-one advantage [in nuclear weapons]. ... It took some nerve to do this.

K: No question. It was a tremendous victory.

N: The thing you negotiated was fantastic. ... Well, anyway you need a good night's sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

By October 27, as he relates to Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, Kissinger is completing the first direct negotiations between Egyptians and Israeli representatives, in return for food and medical supplies for the trapped Egyptian Third Army.

K: All the Israelis insisted on was that Egyptians not drive the trucks themselves but that U.N. drivers were all right. That is all right with Egypt.

S: That is wonderful.

K: Now, I don't know what can screw up.

S: Give credit for this to the President. He needs it.

25237 part 01 6/19/03 11:53 AM Page 345

CRISIS

345

K: All right. If the Soviets have decided to go in, I just think we turned the wheel yesterday one screw too much.

D: We won't go into it again.

K: Let's look at the tactics of this. We have to offer them something, which puts them totally in the wrong—I want to know if you can agree to return to the position you occupied before it all started.

D: How can this be done! I can inform the Prime Minister if you want me to, but I will tell you in advance—

K: I don't have time for this—

D: The Soviets will put forces to fight us?

K: That is not impossible. In fact, I think that is what they will do. I will read the letter to you as soon as I have it transcribed. The Soviets say if we don't put forces in jointly, they will go in unilaterally.

D: Contingents to peace or contingents to fight?

K: They are talking about peace—

D: I am just a representative of a very small country.

K: Look, I have no time for this! You have to check— They said either we will do it jointly with them or they will put in forces unilaterally. If there is nothing you can do, I will accept that too. What should we reply, as far as you are concerned?

D: I will put that to the Prime Minister.

AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN—KISSINGER

Wednesday, October 24, 1973
10:15 P.M.

K: We are assembling our people to consider your letter. I just wanted you to know if any unilateral action is taken before we have had a chance to reply that will be very serious.

D: Yes, all right.

K: This is a matter of great concern. Don't you pressure us. I want to repeat again, don't pressure us!

D: All right.

25237 part 01 6/19/03 12:44 PM Page 352

352

Henry Kissinger

send in troops. At 11:55 P.M., the meeting approved a message to Sadat in Nixon's name reiterating our previous rejection of a joint U.S.-Soviet force. In its operative paragraph, the message warned that should Soviet forces appear, we would have to resist them on Egyptian soil. At the very least, in these circumstances my planned trip to Cairo to start the peace process would have to be canceled:

> I ask you to consider the consequences for your country if the two great nuclear countries were thus to confront each other on your soil. I ask you further to consider the impossibility for us undertaking the diplomatic initiative which was to start with Dr. Kissinger's visit to Cairo on November 7 if the forces of one of the great nuclear powers were to be involved militarily on Egyptian soil.

Immediately after we instituted DefCon III, I asked Scowcroft to leave the meeting to call Dobrynin with the following instructions:

> [T]ell him to desist from all actions until we have a reply. Tell him you are not empowered to give any reply. I am in a meeting and can't be pulled out. There should be no unilateral actions and if they are taken it would have the most serious consequences. If he says anything, you can say you have instructions not to comment. They may as well know that we mean business.

> But two could play chicken. Dobrynin made no comment except that he would transmit our message to Moscow. No reassurance; no claim of having been misunderstood; no suggestion that at midnight we all go to bed and resume our discussions in the morning because there was no intended threat. Only the laconic comment that he would stand by for our reply.

If Dobrynin's pose was designed to heighten our sense of menace, it succeeded admirably. Our conviction that we were facing an imminent Soviet move was hardly diminished when we learned dur-

**Haig:** It is conceivable we will have an announcement about the Vice President. ... He cannot be sitting down here in the sun with what is going on in the V.P. thing. ... K: I would keep his return for later. Supposing the Soviets get tough. ... [Then] that would be a good move. [But] if he returns early it looks like an hysterical move. ... I would hold him until the first thing in the morning. ... [For now, better not to play] this as a crisis. [Instead we should] say nothing, act tough, without stirring up the atmosphere.

[Lc]

[u]

**Kissinger:** Anatoly, I just talked to the President and he asked me to tell you that under these circumstances he can no longer observe any restrictions that I gave you yesterday on flying American planes. ... We are prepared to stop our aerial supplies when you are willing to stop,

**Dobrynin:** Okay.

[c]

**Haig:** Yes.

**Dobrynin:** [laughs]

[6]

**Dobrynin:** Yes, all right.

**Dobrynin:** All right.

**Nixon:** The thing you negotiated was fantas-
tic. ... Well, anyway you need a good night's
sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

*The next day, as Kissinger writes, "Is-
raeli and Egyptian military representatives*

As sent to Newsweek 8/1/03

During a telephone consultation, Kissinger finds Mordechai Shalev, an Israeli diplomat Deputy Chief of Mission at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, observing the ritual Yom Kippur fast.

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

K: Can't you get dispensation to eat in a crisis?... What about the [Israeli] pilots? I hope they are eating.

During the course of the day, That evening, Kissinger tries to get Dobrynin and the Soviets to join the Americans in a joint demand for an Arab-Israeli ceasefire coupled with a return to pre-war lines. He dangles the promise that afterwards they would together press both sides to negotiate their differences-and the threat that if they don't cooperate, the American-Soviet détente might be jeopardized.

D: [But the Arabs will say to us.] "You are in collusion with the U.S. and Israel."

M

2

Kissinger: They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the President] ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the last time they are going to listen [to us]. If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to lose.

K: We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a [UN demand for a] simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown out [the Arabs] My view is that if we cannot break ranks [with Israel] during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

N: We don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states-the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting-will break ranks. ... PR is terribly important. ... Let [UN Ambassador John] Scali go out-he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem. ... You keep one step removed. We can use you for the power punch.

K: It's a little premature. One usually smells a point when one can say they see it come together--Wednesday or Thursday perhaps. ...

✓

3

N: As far as the Russians are concerned, they have a pretty good beef [that the U.S. has been insufficiently eager to pressure Israel for a final settlement.] ... [We have been stringing them along and they know it. ... We've got to squeeze the Israelis when this is over and the Russians have got to know it. We've got to squeeze them goddamn hard.

On October 16, as the fighting continues, Nixon learns that the Nobel Peace Prize, which he had hoped to win for ending U.S. involvement in Vietnam, has instead been awarded to Kissinger and Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. The President tries to conceal his disappointment.

D: Okay.

Nixon wants to exploit Kissinger's trip to divert the public from one of the worst moments of Watergate. At this moment, with help from Mississippi Democratic Senator John Stennis, he is trying to fashion a compromise that will keep him from having to surrender his secret Watergate tapes. Unbeknownst to the public, He is on the verge of firing Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox for demanding the recordings, which will launch Congressional demands for his impeachment.

K: Why should he do it?

M

4

H: Yes.
K: A disaster. ... My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.
H: The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. ...
K: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. ... I really would plead with you. ... This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We should do it as a reasonable, low-key thing-simultaneous announcement. We [the White House] call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing, but not the President's going before TV announcing it. ... If he is insisting, we will do it, but I think he will regret it.
H: Okay. I will see what I can do.

May be deleted if space is needed.

During a talk with Dobrynin about his trip to Moscow, Kissinger engages in battlefield humor.
D: Could I tell them it will be a commercial flight?
K: Tell them I am coming on a B-52.
D: [laughs]
On October 23, Ambassador Scali complains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet envoy to the U.N., is making trouble.
S: Malik is acting like a goddamn idiot.
K: You tell Malik to calm down. ... You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better than he does. ... Ask him if he has ever been kissed on the mouth by Brezhnev, as I have.
On October 24, Brezhnev sends a letter to Nixon threatening Soviet military action to relieve the trapped Egyptian Third Army.

A few hours later, Kissinger instructs his deputy, General Brent Scowcroft, to convey the following message to Dobrynin.

S: [T]ell him to desist from all actions until we have a reply. Tell him you are not empowered to give any reply. I am in a meeting and can't be pulled out. There should be no unilateral actions and if they are taken it would have the most serious consequences. If he says anything, you can say you have instructions not to comment. They may as well know that we mean business.

5

By October 27, as he relates to Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, Kissinger is arranging completing the first direct negotiations between Egyptians and Israeli representatives, in return for food and medical supplies for the trapped Egyptian Third Army.

S: That is wonderful.

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

[Y]

2

K: The idea was to have the stuff delivered to an air base and have them come out in El Al [the Israeli national civilian airline] and pick them up [to avoid attracting attention to the deliveries]. ... If the Arabs come out ahead, they will be totally unmanageable. ... If we don't help [the Israelis], they won't come out ahead and we will wind up with nothing.

3

[Y]

D: Okay.

K: Why should he do it?

[4]

4

H: Yes.

D: [laughs]

D: Yes, all right.

D: All right.

The next morning after the Soviets withdraw their threat, Nixon and Kissinger are in a self-congratulatory mood.

5

S: That is wonderful.

JUL-31-2003 16:26

KMA

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P.02/09

## UNDERLINED MATERIAL WOULD BE CUT IN SHORTER MIDEAST VERSION

K: The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo. ... If the reason for your evacuation ... is the fear of an Israeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you, as well as asking us to tell the Arabs. ... they have no plans whatever to attack.... But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack, the Israeli response will be extremely strong. ... But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension. ... The President [Nixon] believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends. ... If this keeps up ... there is going to be a war. ...

JUL-31-2003 16:27

KMA

2127590042

P.05/09

Sunday!

N: The thing to do now is to get the war
stopped. That would be [a] great achieve-
ment. One of the greatest achievements of
all. People in this country would think [the
President is] really tough. ...

N: Why don't you come over [to the
White House] and we'll have a talk. Publi-
cize it.

On Saturday afternoon, October 13, a
week after the war began, Kissinger's ef-
forts to keep the war from growing into a
superpower confrontation are coming un-
stuck.

K: Anatoly, I just talked to the President
and he asked me to tell you that under these
circumstances he can no longer observe
any restrictions that I gave you yesterday
on flying American planes. ... We are pre-
pared to stop our aerial supplies when you
are willing to stop.

K: The Egyptians are demanding a re-
turn to '67 borders. Now that's absolutely
out of the question, short of a huge [Israeli]
defeat as a result of the war. That has to
come as a result of the subsequent negotia-
tions that follow the war. ...

N: As far as the Russians are concerned,
they have a pretty good beef [that the U.S.
has been insufficiently eager to pressure Is-
rael for a final settlement.] ... [We have
been] stringing them along and they know
it. ... We've got to squeeze the Israelis when
this is over and the Russians have got to
know it. We've got to squeeze them god-

JUL-31-2003 16:28

KMA

2127590042 P.07/09

don't believe while I am there I will be able
to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able
to negotiate a cease-fire...
D: Okay.

K: Impossible... We have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning [quietly]. ... When does he want to do it?

H: Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room...with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after]consultation with Chairman Brezhnev...

K: Why should he do it?

H: Yes.

K: A disaster... My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

H: The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony...

K: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life... I really would plead with you.

M

X

2

M

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

K: Can't you get dispensation to eat in a crisis?... What about the Israeli pilots? I hope they are eating.

That evening, Kissinger tries to get Do-brynin and the Soviets to join the Ameri-cans in a joint demand for an Arab-Israeli ceasefire. He dangles the promise that af-terwards they would together press both sides to negotiate their differences-and the threat that if they don't cooperate, the American-Soviet détente might be jeopard-ized.

K: We can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed [the Arabs] out of every terri-tory but before they start heading for Dam-ascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. ... Can you not say that it was your under-standing that an effort was going to be made for negotiations? [The Arabs] have proved their point, [showing] the urgency in which they see this. ... This is a good psy-chological moment for them to make a gen-erous gesture, rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be thrown out of there anyway.

K: If you and we could find a way of set-tling this now, then it would be an over-whelming argument [in favor of détente]. ... If it goes the other way, and Monday you and we are going to be up at the [United Nations] rostrum calling each other names. It will be a disaster. ... [We will have] to be extremely tough. ... I will be very brutal. ... We want to get it settled before then--at least with an understanding.

⊗

[Y]

3

Kissinger: They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved by the President and which some SOB in the Pentagon held up. ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the last time they are going to listen to us! If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to lose.

Kissinger reports to Nixon that despite promises of U.S. arms the Israelis will not consent to a ceasefire.

K: We're going to be in a hell of a position in vetoing or voting against a UN demand for a simple cease-fire. We had a message saying they will have their equipment by Wednesday or Thursday, but they will not accept a cease-fire before they have thrown [the Arabs] My view is that if we cannot break ranks [with Israel] during this crisis, we can really do it afterwards because then they will have something to lose.

N: We don't want to be so pro-Israel that the oil states-the Arabs that are not involved in the fighting-will break ranks. ... PR is terribly important. ... Let UN Ambassador John Scali go out-he can do a lot and prattle and cause no problem. ... You keep one step removed. We can use you for the power punch.

That afternoon, Kissinger is irritated that Moscow has still sent no response to his plea for a joint U.S.-Soviet demand for a ceasefire.

⊗

M]

4

Sunday/

⊗

don't believe while I am there I will be able
to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able
to negotiate a cease-fire....

D: Okay.

H: Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. ... with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after]consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

K: Why should he do it?

H: Yes,

H: The domestic thing is not controversial [the Stennis compromise]. ... A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony....

M

6

M

7

During a talk with Dobrynin about his
trip to Moscow, Kissinger engages in bat-
tlefield humor.

D: Could I tell them it will be a commer-
cial flight?

D: [laughs]

On October 23, Ambassador Scali com-
plains that Yakov Malik, the Soviet envoy to
the U.N., is making trouble.

S: Malik is acting like a goddamn idiot.
K: You tell Malik to calm down... You
tell Malik to hold his water or I will send
him to Siberia. I know Brezhnev better
than he does. Ask him if he has ever been
kissed on the mouth by Brezhnev, as I have.

That evening, Nixon hopes to use his
and Kissinger's diplomacy with Moscow
through the crisis to boost his popularity,
which, thanks to his firing of Cox in the
"Saturday Night Massacre" three days ear-
lier, is at low ebb.

N: The thing you negotiated was fantas-
tic... Well, anyway you need a good night's
sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

By October 27, as he relates to Defense
Secretary James Schlesinger, Kissinger is
completing the fine points of the ceasefire
agreement that has ended the Yom Kippur
War.

⊗

[Y]

8

S: That is wonderful.

The next day, as Kissinger writes, "Is-
raeli and Egyptian military representatives
met for direct talks for the first time in
twenty-five years, under the auspices of
U.N. observers. ... Egypt agreed to further
meetings with Israel for more permanent
arrangements. While these remained in-
conclusive, the turn toward negotiations
had begun. It soon became irreversible,
culminating in a disengagement agree-
ment between Egypt and Israel in January
1974, a political agreement in September
1975, and a peace treaty in 1978 that is in
force at this writing."

On October 28,

⊗

Longer Mideast excerpt
ENLARGED

2

[c]

During a telephone consultation, Kissinger finds ______ Shalev, an Israeli diplomat in Washington, observing the ritual Yom Kippur fast.

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

3

[c]

Kissinger: They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the President] and which some SOB' in [the Pentagon] held up. ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the last time they are going to listen [to us]. If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to lose.

Kissinger reports to Nixon that despite promises of U.S. arms, the Israelis will not consent to a ceasefire.

4

5 [i]

damn hard.

K: Mr. President, it would kill us. It would be the Israelis and us against six other nations, Insane.

[d]

6

D: Okay.

K: Why should he do it?

H: Yes.

[i]

7

D: [laughs]

N: The thing you negotiated was fantas-
tic. ... Well, anyway you need a good night's
sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

[c]

8

S: That is wonderful.

Longer Mideast excerpt.

During a telephone consultation,
Kissinger finds ____ Shalev, an Israeli
diplomat in Washington, observing the rit-
ual Yom Kippur fast.

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

That evening, Kissinger tries to get Do-
brynin and the Soviets to join the Ameri-
cans in a joint demand for an Arab-Israeli
ceasefire. He dangles the promise that af-
terwards they would together press both
sides to negotiate their differences-and the
threat that if they don't cooperate, the
American-Soviet détente might be jeopard-
ized.

K: We can let this war continue until the
exact calibrated moment when the Israelis
have pushed [the Arabs] out of every terri-
tory but before they start heading for Dam-
ascus. If we are lucky and hit that moment
exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then.
... Can you not say that it was your under-
standing that an effort was going to be
made for negotiations? [The Arabs] have
proved their point, [showing] the urgency
in which they see this. ... This is a good psy-
chological moment for them to make a gen-
erous gesture, rather than wait until the
outcome of these hostilities. By Monday
evening they will be thrown out of there
anyway.

K: If you and we could find a way of set-
tling this now, then it would be an over-
whelming argument [in favor of détente].
... If it goes the other way, and Monday you
and we are going to be up at the [United
Nations] rostrum calling each other names.
It will be a disaster. ... [We will have] to be
extremely tough. ... I will be very brutal. ...
We want to get it settled before then--at
least with an understanding.

Kissinger: They are almost. They are anxious to get some equipment which has been approved [by the President] and which some SOB in [the Pentagon] held up. ... I think, myself, we should release some of it. ... If the Arabs win, they will be impossible and there will be no negotiations. ... If we play this the hard way [with the Israelis], it's the last time they are going to listen [to us]. If we kick them in the teeth, they have nothing to lose.

damn hard.

D: Okay.

H: Whenever we put this other mess [the Stennis compromise] together, which could be anywhere from 6:00 to 8:00. He would assemble the press in the [White House] press room. . .with cameras [and] say [that he is sending you after]consultation with Chairman Brezhnev. ...

K: Why should he do it?

H: Yes.

[L]

D: [laughs]

S: That is wonderful.

Theresa Cimino

From: Watson, Tom [Tom.Watson@Newsweek.com]
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2003 10:31 AM
To: 'tcimino@kmaglobal.com'

Hi Theresa: Following up on Jon Meacham's call this morning, I'll be sending over a copy of our cut of the first chapter of Dr. Kissinger's book shortly. As we look at it, we realize that this portion alone takes up the space our editor has set aside for the excerpt. So we're wondering: Would Dr. Kissinger prefer an in-depth excerpt looking at the Middle Eastern crisis alone, or a scaled back version that makes room for both the Middle East and Vietnam? Is it possible to check on his wishes and get back to me? The answer will affect the scope of what I'm preparing to send over. Thanks so much, Tom Watson.

7/31/2003

2

[M]

Mordechai/

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

K: We can let this war continue until the exact calibrated moment when the Israelis have pushed [the Arabs] out of every terri-tory but before they start heading for Dam-uscus. If we are lucky and hit that moment exactly right we can hit the ceasefire then. ... Can you not say that it was your under-standing that an effort was going to be made for negotiations? [The Arabs] have proved their point, [showing] the urgency in which they see this. ... This is a good psy-chological moment for them to make a gen-erous gesture, rather than wait until the outcome of these hostilities. By Monday evening they will be thrown out of there anyway.

3

[Y]

4

[v]

5

Y

damn hard.

D: Okay.

K: Why should he do it?

H: Yes.

6 [x]

7

[Y]

D: [laughs]

Talk w/
Schlesinger

S: That is wonderful.

The next day, as Kissinger writes, "Israeli and Egyptian military representatives met for direct talks for the first time in twenty-five years, under the auspices of U.N. observers. ... Egypt agreed to further meetings with Israel for more permanent arrangements. While these remained in-conclusive, the turn toward negotiations had begun. It soon became irreversible, culminating in a disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in January 1974, a political agreement in September 1975, and a peace treaty in 1978 that is in force at this writing."

8

[Y]

2

[ic]

K: How are you?

S: Hungry!

[i]

3

4

[c]

5

damn hard.

6

[x]

D: Okay.

K: Why should he do it?

H: Yes.

D: [laughs]

S: That is wonderful.

8

[c]