and signed in his absence.
Dictated by Mr. Kieasinger
Henry V. Kieasinger

Sincerely yours,

it was so late.
article to the Johns Hopkins Press. Sorry
I have finally sent off the enclosed

Dear Francis:

Washington, D.C. 20030
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
The Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies
Dean Francis O. Wilcox

June 12, 1964

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

1740 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

July 17, 1964

Dear Henry:

Some time ago I asked the Treasurer of
the University to send to you the modest
honorarium to which you were entitled as a
result of your participation in our Dedicatory
Lecture Series. You should have received it
by this time.

May I take this opportunity once more
to thank you for the fine contribution you
made. The volume, which will be entitled
Dimensions in Diplomacy, has gone to the press
and we hope it will be ready some time in the
early fall.

With warm wishes, I am

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

March 16, 1964

Dean Francis O. Wilcox
School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Francis:

Thank you for your nice letter of
February 25th.

I am not sure it will be necessary
for me to incorporate any of the material
from the Council into my piece for you.
What is your latest deadline?

With kind regards.

March 23, 1964

Professor E.A.J. Johnson
School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University
1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Professor Johnson:

Thank you for your letter of
March 20th.

I am afraid it is out of the question
for me to deliver a manuscript before the
end of May. Will that still be helpful?

Best regards.

not because of any certainty that such an event would have hostile
implications, but rather because Britain would no longer be strong enough
to resist if the worst occurred.

3. Deterrent power is the ability to prevent certain threats or actions from being carried out by posing an equivalent or greater threat.

There is no inevitable symmetry between offensive and defensive power. Some states have had little of the first but much of the second. Switzerland, for example, has managed to combine inaccessibility of terrain with the ability to mobilize a considerable proportion of the national resources. States in this position have been able to prevent other countries from imposing their will. On the other hand, they have not played a very active role in international affairs.

Power has no absolute measurement; it is always relative. In the 17th century it would have been futile to try to compare the power of China and that of France since they possessed no means of bringing their strength

This has caused the distinction between precautionary and defensive foreign policy to erode. In view of the perils, foreign policy would seem to have to be precautionary. Its aim would be to keep potential enemies from acquiring a potentially disastrous offensive power. But the actual policy of the major powers has become a defensive one, designed not to prevent the accumulation of hostile capability but to retaliate against attack -- when for many reasons it may already prove too late.

This situation has come about because power is disproportionate to most of the objectives in dispute. No matter what spectrum of power the major contenders may dispose of, the fear of escalation is inescapable. Thus the major nuclear powers recoil from the direct use of force against each other. They have the capacity to destroy each other. But this fact works to reduce their ability to threaten because the threat is not credible and the risks are great. The major powers are inhibited also, in varying degrees, from using force against minor countries because of the uncertain reaction of the international consensus.

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II. Strategic Doctrine and the Domestic Consensus

In constructing its military force, every advanced country has more
technical choices than it can afford. Whether it chooses missiles with
large or small warheads, whether it emphasizes nuclear or conventional
power will depend more on its strategic doctrine than on its technology,
But strategic doctrine must not become something theoretical or dogmatic.
Its role is to define the likelychnagers and how to deal with them, to
project feasible goals and how to obtain them. It must furnish a mode of
action for the circumstances it defines as "ordinary". Its adequacy will
be tested according to whether these ordinary events do in fact occur and
whether the forces developed in their anticipation are adequate to deal with
the real challenges.

In the inter-war period French strategic doctrine exalted the value of
the defensive and built its plans around the Maginot Line. However, the likely
German attempts to overthrow the Treaty of Versailles could be prevented only
by French offensive action. By the time the Maginot Line might prove useful,
in other words, the Versailles settlement would already have been overturned.
Thus the French strategic doctrine contributed to the paralysis of
French policy. When German armies reoccupied the Rhineland and attacked
France's allies in Eastern Europe, French power remained passive and French
diplomacy stood impotent. Even when the long-awaited attack in the West
finally came, it turned the flank of the French fortifications. In short,
French policy in the inter-war-period was hamstrung by shortchanged strategic
doctrine.

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III - 4

a respectful hearing. But what exactly does a "greater voice" entail?
A veto over all our foreign policy? A veto over SAC plans? What happens
when views differ or if interests do not coincide? These questions involve
both a technical and a political component.

On the technical level, the effectiveness of consultation depends
on the competence of the participating parties. Though in our own
bureaucracy, many departments have the right to offer their views, a
much smaller number carry actual weight. Since the weight given to advice
is proportionate to the competence it reflects, we may well ask whether in
the long run our allies could consult effectively while we possess virtually
all the technical knowledge and physical control of nuclear weapons. One
suspects that if the alliance is to remain politically vital, its require-
ments will be much broader than a technical consideration of strategy.

It is likely that the concerns expressed about the absence of joint
strategic planning are the symptom and not the cause of many allied tensions.
If the alliance cannot develop procedures for a common diplomacy or at
least agree upon a prescribed range of divergence, it would seem contradictory
to insist on unitary strategic control. It should not shock us to see countries
reluctant to entrust their survival to an ally, when NATO has not even managed
to develop a common trade policy toward Communist-bloc countries. Harsh
disagreements over such issues as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over
Berlin, or the defense of South Arabia demonstrate that differences in the
Alliance are neither strange nor new. At present we see the United States in

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the curious position of staking great prestige on the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic control, while matters so critical as East-West negotiations or the war in Southeast Asia are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

A reexamination of priorities seems in order. More emphasis should be given to common policies in those areas where interests coincide and less to essentially to technical remedies as magic cure-alls. In this process, it may be important to ask how much centralization is in fact desirable in a system of strategy and diplomacy. Is it more vital in the long run to construct a unitary Atlantic system or one that permits some autonomy? The value of united action on many issues--particularly East-West relations--is evident. In other cases, some degree of flexibility may be desirable. If over the next decades the United States finds itself increasingly engaged in the Far East and in Latin America, our European allies may not perceive their vital interest to be at stake in these areas. Even if President de Gaulle's methods of diplomacy have been original, his views on this subject are far from unique in Europe.

Atlantic policy, if centralized, might tend to be reduced to the lowest common denominator and permit the Soviets to use our global involvements to blackmail Europe. Given the European lack of interest in some of these world wide issues, this could strain the alliance beyond the breaking point.

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But, on the other hand, if Europe retains some capacity for independent
action in the military and political sphere, this could reduce the
temptation for Soviet adventures even if it gave us no greater support
from the Alliance in non-European areas. To state the proposition more
positively, a structure which allowed us to coordinate a variety of approaches
towards the new nations could reinvigorate Western policies, the self-
confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the alliance.
Paradoxically, the unity of the Atlantic area can be encouraged by a
structure which, in granting reasonable autonomy, reduces the desire for
it.

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IV. Power and Neutralism

Neutrality is not a new concept, but its forms have changed in
the modern period. Traditionally states have been able to gain formal
or legal recognition of their decision to remain non-belligerent in
war. Often this decision has been taken ad hoc. Thus, despite her for-
mal alliance with a belligerent, Italy remained neutral at the beginning
of each of the World Wars. Neutrality can also be a deliberate act of
national policy. Some states have announced in advance that they would
not join a conflict regardless of the issues of the nature of the opposing
forces unless their own territory was attacked. Sweden and Switzerland
have made unilateral declarations of neutrality. Or else, as in the case
of Belgium, neutrality may be given international status through a for-
mal agreement of the major powers.

Whether a neutral country will be able to maintain its position de-
pends both on the temptation it presents to an attacker and on the assis-
tance other countries are willing to supply. The temptations in turn
reflect the advantage to be gained by violating the neutrality. Since
Belgium lies atwart the invasion routes into France, she has been less
fortunate in escaping war than Sweden.

Countries aspiring to neutrality can rely for their defense on their
own strength or on the implied assistance that other countries may furnish.
If they aspire to self-sufficiency, they are likely to develop military
forces far in excess of those required by a member of an alliance system.
Even taking into account the difference in resources, Sweden's military

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IV - 2

power is much greater than Norway's.

On the other hand, when a neutral, either because of insufficient resources or deliberate policy has made itself dependent on the assistance of other countries, it has in the past often combined the disadvantages of alliance policy with those of neutrality. By itself the neutral was rarely strong enough to deter aggression, while at the same time its neutrality prevented it from making joint defensive preparations with a would-be protector. Belgium's position in the two world wars illustrates this point precisely. But no matter what military policy is pursued, neutrality has in the past implied the desire to abstain from close involvement in international dark diplomacy.

Though these traditional patterns of neutrality still exist, they have been significantly modified by two contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, the advent of nuclear power has cast in doubt the ability of any non-nuclear country to defend itself against a nuclear opponent. In other words, the neutral is deprived of the capacity to impose military risks out of proportion to the aggressor's objective, if the latter is prepared to use nuclear weapons and if the neutral cannot not count on foreign nuclear protection.

At the same time, the bi-polar nature of the international political structure makes the probability of protection far greater than it was in the past. In contemporary international affairs, a country suffers fewer

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disadvantages from being neutral and may even gain some international
stature through the competition of the major powers for its allegiance.
The nuclear age has unmistakably eroded the distinction between allies
and neutrals. Though neutral, India was assured of much the same protection
in the face of the Chinese attack as would have been extended in comparable
circumstances to Pakistan, a member of two alliances.

This modification accounts for the emergence of a new type of
neutral: Countries which deliberately exploit the great-power confrontation in order not so much to enhance their territorial security but to magnify their diplomatic role. Far from standing apart in international conflicts, they actively embroil themselves by attempting to manipulate the great powers and to advance their own purposes in the process.

This type of diplomacy is demoralizing for the stability of the
international system, and has adverse effects on both the great powers
and the uncommitted themselves. By setting up a contest which by its
own ground rules, can be won by neither of the two nuclear giants, the
new type uncommitted tempts destabilizing adventures and encourages
political chaos. In the long run, the new nations will find it difficult
to combine neutrality with incessant intervention. To the degree that
the uncommitted nations can convince the major powers that their support
is consequential, they are either courted or pressured. Neutrality then
becomes an invitation to be wooed.

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With no apparent feeling of contradiction, the so-called uncommitted nations have felt free to practice vis-a-vis their own neighbors the kind of power politics which they urge the great powers to abjure. Exhortations for peace, reasonableness, and compromise seem to have no logical connection with the actions undertaken by the United Arab Republic in Yemen or Indonesia in Borneo.

Thus a new element of volatility has been added to international affairs. Though many of the neutrals have a stake in the avoidance of war, they also see advantages in perpetuating the competition of the super-powers. For they see this conflict bestowing on them an enhanced bargaining position and prospects of economic development to which they could not otherwise aspire.

In their turn, the major powers are handicapped by a paradox. Though their relative superiority over other nations has never been greater, it has also never been less relevant. The use of nuclear weapons against the uncommitted is for all practical purposes excluded. The other military forces have in the meantime become less and less suitable for the low threshold warfare that is waged in the uncommitted areas.

A diplomacy of weakness has been the result. When the uncommitted nations threaten the West: "If I go Communist it will be worse for you than for me," this creates a pattern for blackmail. It encourages many

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local conflicts into which the major powers are drawn, often against
their own wishes. As a corollary it means that any major country deter-
mined to upset the equilibrium can do so at little cost. The sale of
obsolescent Soviet military equipment to the United Arab Republic or
to Indonesia can undermine the West's position in a way that would have
been unachievable by direct Soviet action. Even leaders who are not
receiving Communist military support, like Archbishop Markarios, can
strain the cohesion of the Western alliance by ruthlessly pursuing
narrow objectives and then calling on the United Nations to protect them
against the consequences of their irresponsibility. In short, the new
neutrals are protected neither by their strength nor by formal agreement
but through an international consensus.

If the uncommitted nations today have unprecedented scope for
pursuing their self-interest, they are also subject to novel pressures.
In the past, neutrality was usually the posture of very cohesive nations
certain of their identity and determined to defend it. But many of the
newly independent nations are still in search of an identity. Often the
sole link for their peoples is the common experience of colonial rule.
Domestic cohesion is only precariously assured.

Thus while the governments of many uncommitted nations are relatively
safe from the traditional military pressures that have weighed on neutrality,
they are extraordinarily susceptible to domestic subversion. Those countries

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IV - 6

with a high capacity for fomenting domestic instability can achieve
international influence because of it. The lack of traditional forms
of power, including nuclear power, may be more than counter-balanced
by the possession of guerrilla training centers; capacities for sub-
version will be taken very seriously by neighboring governments.
Similarly, the Communist advances in Southeast Asia have depended on
the exploitation of domestic instability and have been initiated by
indigenous forces.

The most frequent and likely kind of war is the one for which we
are least militarily, politically, and psychologically prepared. In
guerrilla war superior mobility and fire power lose their old relevance.
Guerrillas need only join battle where they enjoy local superiority,
but the defenders must be strong everywhere in anticipation of the un-
expected. No longer is the ability to occupy territory decisive, for
the real target has become the morale of the population and the system
of the Civil Administration. If these can be undermined through pro-
tracted struggle, the insurgents will prevail no matter how many battles
the defending forces have won.

Moreover, the *status quo* powers are at an inherent disadvantage
in these conflicts. They must be constantly successful, but the Communist
need win only once. It is easy to see why the circumstances of this kind
of conflict have put the West in an unfavorable position.

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What makes the situation particularly complex is that there is no purely military solution to guerrilla war. Pacification requires a government capable of enlisting the loyalty of the population. But such a government is difficult to establish because of the very nature of guerrilla war whose chief targets are often civil administrators. Moreover, for a Western government aiding an Asian or African ally, the criteria of what constitutes stable government may prove elusive. Government can be stable by being oppressive. By contrast, a developing society inevitably creates dislocations. How to achieve both development and stability, both progress and security?

Too often, there is a tendency to fragment the problem. Some argue that the problem of guerrilla war is essentially political. Others maintain that military success must precede political institution building. But in truth the problems are inseparable. Political construction must be carried out while the guerrilla war is being fought. And in many countries it is essential if civil war is to be avoided. There is no more urgent task for analysis than into the nature of stable enlightened government in developing nations.

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and confusion may be overlooked. It may be tempting to treat allies
as factors of a security arrangement and to forget that their ultimate
contribution depends on many intangibles of political will. In the
day-to-day press of events we may lose sight of the fact that we need
sound general criteria for measuring political progress in the developing
countries.

In all these areas the academician can be useful if he defines his
role modestly. He must not pretend that he has panaceas which the
short-sighted men in office have failed to discover, for the easy solutions
have all been found. Our remaining problems are obdurate because they
are complex. The intellectual can forewarn against the fragmentation
of policy by calling attention to the inner relationship of events. He
can supply perspective to government leaders who are overwhelmed by
day-to-day details and are unable to give their full attention to the
deeper pattern. Above all, he can insist constantly that no answer will
be better than the question which invites it. In a time which is obsessed
with answers, this alone would justify the existence of an institution
such as The School for Advanced International Studies.

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