4

S: What do you mean if they hadn't blown it?

K: If they hadn't on the 26th started releasing

S: Well that raises the question of where all that stuff in The Times
came from.

K: You mean in the box?

S: Yeh.

K: That I have no idea.

S: Well, I have.

K: No, that didn't come from me. It's also much of it is inaccurate.

S: OK.

K: I have never leaked a document as long as I'm in the government.
I don't exactly remember it but a lot of it was wrong and a lot of
it indicated to me that it came from the French because it played -
it gave the French a very exorbitant role.

S: Um-hmm.

K: Which has never been fully straightened out.

S: You going to be around this week?

K: I would think so, but you know really if I were you, you'll see in
the next weeks. You know everyone is a little hysterical now and
I think the thing to do is to recognize that we've nursed this thing
along for two years. No one can have a greater incentive to get it
done than the White House which kept it going when everyone was
sneering at the possibility of a negotiated settlement and we have
absolutely no doubt that we're going to do it. And within the frame-
work of the existing agreement. It's absolutely insane to conclude
an agreement in which you know there are ambiguities just because
there's a hypothetical deadline.

S: OK, Henry.

K: Not to speak of the fact that it isn't outrageous to want to bring along
the government of the country where the war is being fought.

S: Yeh, well OK. I like the way you put that. Do you suppose they -
the whole point it seems to me is if they were willing to go along

BROWN
AUG 27 1975 8:05

5

this whole thing could have been tied up.

K: No, I think we would have had to clean up some of these points anyway and that had become clear.

S: I see. There is certainly a lot of questioning about that point. Certainly the way he's been behaving would indicate that he's not prepared to go along.

K: Well, if he doesn't, and after we have given him a decent chance, then we will come to our moment of truth and then is the time to examine that problem, but when you have overwhelming evidence that the other side is preparing a high point to coincide precisely with the possibility of a ceasefire when you have published ambiguities, when certain things that were supposed to happen outside the agreement hadn't yet happened, then you have to observe it. And after all you read Xuan Thuy's statement yesterday. That didn't indicate to me that they won't talk, to put it mildly. So I think we'll come out with a better agreement and a firmer support for it.

S: Well, I hope so.

K: No, I think everyone is getting a little shaky here because you're talking too much to each other. And to some of the bureaucracy who of course know how much better they could have done it. OK, Jerry. It really isn't anything. You will see that within the next weeks.

S: I'm sure I will. The problem though is that for me I end up having to deal with all that stuff that comes out.

K: Look, you're in a helluva spot because you don't know the exact situation and there is such a vested interest now in this country that nothing can go right with Vietnam. But the reason I'm concerned about it - you know obviously nothing I talk to you about can possibly affect what's going to happen tomorrow.

S: Right.

K: Nor will it really affect the time frame in which the major actions will take place because if the President wins tomorrow the victory will carry him through the time frame that I'm talking about and this nitpicking isn't going to make any difference.

S: No but it makes a difference in the whole process of the thing and how people proceed.

DRAFTED

August 22, 1966

BANGKOK 10/1

6

K: But what is important, Jerry, is that I think we get out of this war
with some sense that something was done decently instead of
always assuming there's some filthy conspiracy going on.

S: Right.

K: In which people undo their own achievements.

S: Right. OK, Henry.

K: And when it's done I'm going to give a briefing and put the whole
record of what happened, when and why.

S: I don't know.

K: And then you can all make your judgments but I really think you
ought to reserve it now. You know within a month it's going to be
obvious one way or the other,

S: OK.

K: Right, Jerry. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Max Frankel

11/6/72 9:54 a.m.

F: I've already voted, so you can't have my vote.

K: God dammit, I thought I could get the editorial support of the Times at the last minute.

F: They really whopped you didn't they?

K: Well I haven't read it yet but somebody sent me a surry. Did they want me or the Administration?

F: Pardon?

K: Whom did they want?

F: Oh no, just the President.

K: Well, but that's what I wanted to talk to you about and obviously this doesn't affect the election cause there isn't anything you can do about it now. I really find it next to incomprehensible why newspapers which for months were saying the negotiations couldn't succeed now seem to develop a vested interest in destroying the confidence in what has been accomplished. Now what . . . do you really suppose that the President would make a speech that disavowed most of what I said when I draft most of them?

F: No. He doesn't seem to have disavowed it.

K: Exactly. The President didn't disavow it.

F: He used the same words almost that you had.

K: It was almost the same words and he was saying some issues have been settled. Now it will appear that the issues I listed, whether I called them procedural, whether he calls them issues, they are still the issues I mentioned. They have not changed. And we had, when I talked, we had Hanoi, you know, you had a very good article two days earlier that explained what the problem was. And that was the basic, that was, everyone things I was talking to the American public; I didn't even know I was going to be on television. I was talking much more to Saigon and Hanoi, much more.

F: Sure, that's how I took you.

K: That was my audience. I never gave 30 seconds thought to its impact on the election; I didn't talk to any political person before I stepped out there.

DRAFT
ASSIGNED
Autumn 2012 9:58
B40
FAXID: 9/10/95

Frankel, 11/6/72 9:54 a.m. p. 2

I mean except the President.

F: Right.

K: But the major thing I want to tell you Max -- I don't give a damn about the editorial page which seems to me beyond redemption -- is this thing is on the track on which I described it. Now any thoughtful observer has to recognize there are certain objective realities. For example, Hanoi asks us to sign the document on October 31st. It is obvious that Le Duc Tho won't start moving until some time after October 31st, because he'll undercut the demand of his own government by the mere act of moving. All right, if he's going to move after October 31st and you were in Hanoi when would you start moving him? Why not get at least the benefit of that last wave that you can of uncertainty in this country? That doesn't mean anything has got unstuck. I think if you read the Xuan Thuy interview in your paper yesterday with any care . . .

F: Oh, I thought it was very encouraging.

K: And you would have to assume that what they say publicly is less than what we already know. So the thing just is in no sense unstuck. The time schedule is still within weeks of whenever we start meeting again. Several days of negotiation and then some time for consultation. And that hasn't changed and all this baloney about great matters of substance have been raised, I don't know where they get that from.

F: Not from my news columns. No, I don't know what it is but I will talk to them. My guess is it was a sheer last election ditch.

K: Well you know, on election, I . . . the thing that really concerns me Max, I don't give . . . the election is now settled one way or the other and it either will be a stunning surprise or the polls will be more or less right. And nothing anybody can write or say now could make the slightest difference. But I really think that, and you know I've felt almost obsessive about that, we've got to end this war with some decency and not really piss on every god-damned thing that's being done. It's not a bunch of criminals who are trying to bring this to a conclusion. And it's a complex problem; it doesn't do us any good to end it in a way where one of the parties blows up in the process.

F: Well on the contrary, I thought, didn't you read the interview yesterday as hopeful? I mean you may know more than that privately but.

K: Of course, no, no, I read the interview as very hopeful. If you read the interview, what does this demand, that we should be serious, well that's

Frankel, 11/6/72 9:54 a.m. p. 3

obvious. On every other point I raised he claims it isn't a point because it's
already settled. Well that's fine. Now what else is he going to say? And
on the troop point he put it in a very complex way that isn't all that different
from the way we can deal with it. So I thought that the interview really in
their convoluted way should have made clear to thoughtful persons that what
the thrust of your editorial is has got to be wrong. If they thought it was
major issues of substance they'd be screaming in a much different vein.

F: Yeah, he didn't have to give the interview on election eve.

K: That's right. Okay Max.

F: Thank you. You don't have a date yet or anything like that, do you?

K: No, but we'll announce it when we have it. But certain things will
become apparent over the next few days.

F: Okay, I do thank you.

K: Good.

F: Bye bye.

TELECON
The President

11/6/72 10:00 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: How are you feeling today?

K: Oh it's a glorious day, I feel

P: Actually they have been magnificent days haven't they?

K: Magnificent. And it's really so relaxing out here.

P: Well if we lose the election you won't mind if I get you a job teaching at Pomona College will you?

K: Mr. President, I'll mind teaching at any college, but you won't lose the election.

P: I was thinking, poor Rostow, poor fellow's got to be in Texas and he's a brilliant fellow. Henry, we'll get you a good college out here. You'd like it wouldn't you? Wouldn't it be nice?

K: I don't think I'll go back to academic life.

P: Well you're not goint to have to face that decision for a long time. Hell, in four years you're going to be so damned tired you'll just want to go sit on the beach at San Clemente.

K: Well that's not the worst punishment that can befall anyone.

P: That's right. I have to do my last broadcast in about a half hour. It's just only 5 minutes, but I am going to hit the peace issue because it's the only one that really matters as far as . . . you know what I mean. All the others are very important like the real one that's underlying is the social issue. But they all know where I stand and he stands and I don't want to talk on that on election eve. Now of course as you can imagine some of the Washington boys are jittery because of his last-minute charges that we never did have peace and it's a fraud and all that.

K: He is the worst son of a bitch.

P: Right, but whether you feel I can go any further than we've gone I don't know. But you see what I mean? Now what I was thinking I might say is this. That, well I've said you know, before, that we've reached agreement on the major issues and so forth. What remains is just to negotiate the final details so that we can make sure it's not a temporary peace but . . .

The President, 11/0/72 10:00 a.m. p. 2

K: I would say ...

P: Now wait. Then I'm going to say, I can say with complete confidence tonight that those negotiations will take place.

K: That is a little rough.

P: All right then, I can say ...

K: I wouldn't say that these negotiations will take place. I would say "with confidence tonight that we will complete this treaty."

P: That we will, yeah, that we will achieve our goal. I'm gonna say "I can say with complete confidence" -- you don't mind that do you?

K: No, I just would not say ...

P: I can say with complete confidence tonight that we will achieve that goal.

K: That I would say.

P: All right. That we will achieve that goal and reach agreement. Shall

K: Right.

P: Shall I say soon? I guess we were stuck with that anyway aren't we. Everybody is saying ...

K: I would say so, yes.

P: ... will achieve that goal. Okay. Fine.

K: The only thing I'm worried about Mr. President is the negotiating position we'll find ourselves in next week. If they know we are ...

P: Then I won't say soon. I can say with complete confidence ... and uh ...

K: Although we've said it.

P: I'm in a little different position.

K: I'd say soon. I'd say soon. The hell with them. We'll play it tough after the election.

P: After the election we'll bomb the bastards.

K: Yeah, no, I'd say soon.

The President, 11, 5/72 10:00 a.m. p. 3

P: But looking at this fellow, how much he gets through I don't know with this last-minute crap, but...

K: I find him despicable. And of course the press is abetting him.

P: Abetting him by playing up what he's saying.

K: That's right. Hell if you had done this during the negotiations in '68 they'd have crucified you. I mean Xuan Thuy yesterday in the New York Times was in effect saying that they'd resume negotiations publicly.

P: Yeah, well the Times, to its credit according to Colson, I don't know whether you've seen it this morning yet -- is it here yet?

K: No.

P: Well, he says the Times gives Rogers' statement in which Rogers quotes from Xuan Thuy very very good coverage. Very positive. So maybe the Times did get through a bit. So for whatever that's worth...

K: But I understand they have a really nasty editorial.

P: Their editorials don't make any difference. On this, on the peace thing?

K: Yeah, saying that we are raising issues of substance and scuttling our own agreement.

P: Oh shit, the editorials aren't going to change one vote, not one vote.

K: No question about that.

P: Cause the editorialists you want to remember against us already and everybody that reads those sons of bitches is going to be turned off anyway. That's all right. They're going to look awful bad next week and I'm going to ream it to them when we do do it too. We're not going to let them for... I'm not going to let them get off the hook on that.

K: That's right; I've talked to a few people. I called Max Frankel on the pretext...

P: I would call him on this editorial and say...

K: Well that's why I called him... I used the pretext and...

P: I would say this on the editorial, Max, you're going to look very bad and the President is going to point this out. I would say that.

BRIEFING

AUG 21 1972 10:00

The President, 11/6/72 10:00 a.m. p. 4

K: Well he said he's embarrassed.

P: But just tell him, you're going to be very embarrassed by this Max. Listen I want you to call him on this point. This will be very impostant. Cause I've been public. I'd say you remember the President said firm at the time of May 8. The times had an editorial predicting that the summit would collapse. The President was right; the Times was wrong. Max, history's going to repeat itself and this time the President naturally will have to say something on this point. Let's put a shot across the bow.

K: Right, right, I'll call him back.

P: You see what I mean?

K: Right.

P: And I'd just say, Max, the President is totally right and I can't tell you everything but . . . Okay.

K: Right Mr. President.

P: But anyway, let's not worry about this last crack. It's just a question of how much they fritter away as a result of their lousey attack.

K: I think that that's right.

P: But you know what kills them is that we're going to win.

K: They can't stand it. They cannot stand it.

P: They can't stand it and they know it's going to be big and it's only a question of . I said well now look Chuck suppose it's 61-39 or suppose it's 58-42, I said doesn't anybody remember whether Coolidge won by 58 or 61?

K: It makes no difference.

P: If you win big, you see what I mean, it will be a big win.

K: If it's a big win Mr. President . . .

P: Well it will be over 57 I can assure you.

K: Well if it's over 57 it will be the largest Republican victory . . .

P: It exceeds Eisenhower.

The President 11/6/72 10:00 a.m. p.

K: It exceeds Eisenhower, and there will be some wise guys who will
try to say something but no one will know the difference.

P: Well and also in terms of states, the only states we now think are in
jeopardy, I've been working on Michigan a little this morning, but Michi-
gan is gonna hold all right. Some think Wisconsin is. I don't think so
because you can't have the Chicago Tribune's poll showing 62-38 in Illinois
and Illinois is right next to Wisconsin you see, so we think that that will
hold. Massachusetts naturally we think we will lose, at least we're sup-
posed to, it's just a long shot, because there the McGovern types around
Harvard will come out, you see.

K: Oh no question.

P: And they're such a bunch of hate groups and they affected by this peace
crap. Although I don't know. I'm not so sure . . . if we had peace tomor-
row I'm not sure we'd get much of that bunch anyway.

K: No you wouldn't get them.

P: No you see that isn't what the issue is, is it? The issue is they just
don't want us.

K: They don't want you; in Massachusetts that's the point.

P: Yeah, that's right. But the New York Daily News poll Henry is 62-38.

K: That's right.

P: Right now.

K: Right, I don't see that it can . . . The only thing is as you said, if it
went down to 55-45 it would still be a spectacular victory.

P: Yeah, it's going to be a little better than that.

K: But I'm sure it will be better than that.

P: But anyway I don't care. I mean we've done everything we can and all
of us know and that's why it's going to look awful good. And I want this
point for you to make it damn strong when we do announce the Hanoi thing.
Say the President knew this when he was in Greensboro North Carolina and
didn't say anything. That makes us look awful good, doesn't it.

K: Well we have proposed that we would release it next Monday because
going over there secretly is just no longer viable.

P: No, not possible, I want to knock it off. And you propose that we do it
Monday, but then I want to . . . I think we'll just go out and you should go

UNCLASSIFIED
11/6/72

The President 11/6/72 10:00 a.m. p. 6

out and say Gentlemen, this message was delivered to the President on
the plane when he was on the ground in Greensboro. And he took all this
beating from Senator McGovern in that period and didn't say anything.
And you know then walk right out of the room. What do you think?

K: Absolutely.

P: I think you ought to do it. It's time to start teaching these bastards
a lesson.

K: Absolutely I think we should do that.

P: And say we think you owe an apology and . . . okay.

K: Absolutely, Mr. President. Will you be in Miami on Monday?

P: Oh yes,

K: A week from today?

P: Oh sure, sure sure.

K: Well we can do it from down there.

P: Yeah, hell yes. You bet, that will be pleasant and make some good
news outta there.

K: Good Mr. President.

P: All right, bye.

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

11/6/72 10:12 a.m.

Z: What's the mood down there today?

K: Slight hysteria.

Z: Really?

K: Yeah.

Z: Have you talked to the President?

K: Yeah, now they all want what I wanted to do Saturday.

Z: What do you mean?

K: Put out good news about Vietnam. Now it's too late.

Z: Who wanted to do that?

K: Well I got several calls from Colson yesterday.

Z: Well we talked about that.

K: No, no, after that. But I think we are in pretty good shape.

Z: We're in good shape. What do you think I should say if I'm asked about
will Kissinger meet with the North Vietnamese as Rogers suggested yesterday?

K: Say we have nothing to add to what Rogers said; he's obviously fully
informed. What did Rogers actually say?

Z: He said "Secretary Rogers said we have every reason to believe that
peace negotiations would resume with the North Vietnamese soon, and he
predicted the settlement was possible in several weeks."

K: Just say we stick with what I said in my press conference and what
Rogers said yesterday and I would add nothing to it.

Z: In other words, Ron, what you're saying, you have every reason to
believe the peace negotiations will resume soon? "That's what the Secretary
of State said and we have no reason to __________."

K: And that's in effect what Kissinger said.

Z: Right. "That's what Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers have been
saying" . . . "Well, will the White House say it?" "We expect that . . .
Henry asked for another meeting and we expect that . . .

BRASSFIELD

Autumn, F012 9:58 -
B40, Sat, Oct 10

Ziegler, 11/6/72, 10:12 a.m. p. 2

K: Don't say I asked for another meeting; just say we expect it.

Z: We have every . . .

K: And call attention to what Xuan Thuy said.

Z: Okay. I've got it.

K: But I don't want to make all that many waves because after Wednesday we have to deal with the North Vietnamese.

Z: Right. I think I can handle it.

K: Good. Will you be asked to comment on McGovern?

Z: Will I be?

K: Yeah.

Z: Yeah, but I won't.

K: That's right, I would just say the facts speak for themselves.

Z: You gonna take me along on your next negotiation Henry?

K: I'll see. I doubt it. Good.

Z: I'll see you later.

K: Right, bye.

DEADLINE

5-21-72
BY JOE

TELECON

Irving Lazar

11/6/72 10:40 a.m.

L: Would you like me to drive out to see you at Clemente or are you coming into town? I know you're coming in to have dinner at the Douglases.

K: That's right.

L: Would you like to preceed that by about 45 minutes cause I have some things that I think would interest you.

K: Right well unfortunately I'm tied up here during the day.

L: Well why don't you come to my house which is five minutes from the Douglases.

K: Let me call you this afternoon and see when I can get away.

L: All right. If you'd meet me about 45 minutes before you went over to Kirk's you would be only about, we're about 5 or 6 minutes away.

K: What's your address?

L: 1840 Carla Ridge.

K: That's in Beverly Hills?

L: Yes sir, it's right behind the Beverly Hills Hotel.

K: Right, well look, let me call you oh around 2:30 this afternoon.

L: All right, because if I don't see you today . . . The President is going back tomorrow?

K: That's right.

L: And I'll be at the Douglases but I won't be there until late because we have other engagements.

K: I see.

L: And I can't talk to you there anyway, at least I'd prefer not to.

K: Yeah.

L: But I thought if you could preceed your going there . . . If you gave me your secretary I could give her the exact directions.

UNCLASSIFIED

B-1019 11/6/72 10:40

TELCOM (San Clemente)
Undersecretary Johnson/Kissinger

11:50 a.m. - 11/6/72

K: Alex, I wanted to get a hold of Sullivan but he isn't in. What I wanted him to do is to work up this four power commission material that we want in.

J: He has got to come back with something.

K: Well, we have got to have something we can table at the next meeting.

J: By all means. We sent it out to him late last night and said this is not what we are seeking. Tell us how you think this is going to operate and that stuff. I would hope we would have something on that tonight or tomorrow morning.

K: Yes, what he sent us is a lot of stuff for . . . . . . . headquarters.

J: We have that high on our agenda.

K: I think we ought to have everything on paper by next week. Second, there are beginning to be some signs that some of your underlings are beginning to talk again. For example, they told Time that I drafted the agreement so hastily that . . . . . . . They obviously aren't talking to anybody who knows anything because that is not what is in the agreement.

J: That's right.

K: Time is saying the agreement was so hastily drafted that now we want to have them in place immediately rather than the 30 days.

J: There was a Saigon story this morning saying that we were in such frantic haste that that is why the agreement was being held up.

K: That is another filthy story.

J: Oh yes, I know.

K: Well, it's in Time and then there is another one by George Sherman. He wrote that there was a disagreement in the administration. I said differences were minor . . . . . . . It's not a bad thing yet but I think we ought to stop it before the matter gets out of hand.

2

J: Well, I will do what I can do.

K: Right. It's really not a major thing and you will take care of the four-power thing. Now we are sending Haig out the day after the election with a very starchy Presidential message.

J: Good, but he will be prepared to take with Thieu.

K: Oh, he will be prepared to talk with Thieu but basically - he will have a written message and he will be prepared to talk and give him the changes we all agreed on the other day.

J: Now is the chance for Thieu to be a hero. He's got the Catholics, the Buddhists and everybody else demonstrating in his favor and he can say I have stood up for Vietnam and I should now take advantage of the opportunity. He will be the hero now.

K: Absolutely.

J: Is Al still here?

K: Yes, he won't be leaving until Wednesday. And we will have a WSAG meeting on Wednesday morning.

J: On Wednesday morning. It's a big day. I hope the Boss feels good about the election. I must tell you McGovern's ______ is sinking.

K: Well, I'll be seeing you on Wednesday. I will let you know about this four power.

01-11-1977 11:00:00

TELECON

Bill Sullivan

11/6/72 11:53 a.m.

K: Bill I've talked to Alex and we're all set and in fact you've already
done what I called him about.

S: What's that?

K: I thought that this stuff by Weyand on the four-power commission made
you know, was good headquarters stuff but didn't give us any operational
material.

S: Al Haig told you the message I sent out.

K: Yeah. No, Alex did but that's fine. But I think we have to have this
in shape when we resume

S: I've asked to have an answer back by 0800 on the 8th.

K: Yeah, well I don't think we'll resume before . . .

S: No

K: No, no I know we won't resume before then but I think that will give
you the weekend to work on it.

S: Yeah, I've just talked with Al Haig . . .

K: I think your other paper is in good shape now on the international commission.

S: Yes, we're having a meeting in about 5 minutes with the Canadians and
they may

K: Bill what you ought to do is to get it in shape so that really once we have
this thing finalized in Paris we can get the countries to get their troops ready

S: Yes, that's our plan. In fact I just had a meeting this morning with the Pentagon people to find out what they could provide in the way of airlifts to help our friends get their contingents there on time.

K: So that would give us two weeks and that should be enough don't you think?

S: I think so. And we're running into a little static from the Canadians but I can't see how given the state of their present they can really back off on it.

K: What's their problem.

S: Oh they want to preserve options in case things don't work out so that

D circu lated

Sullivan

they can back off.

K: Yea, but we don't have to settle that now do we?

S: I don't think so and that's what we're going to tell them. Well we'll see. They're sending down some experts from Ottawa to talk to us tomorrow and John Negroponte's going to sit in.

K: Yeah, have we heard from the Hungarians, what they intend to do?

S: Hungarians okay, we haven't yet heard from the Poles, but I asked that that be raised.

K: I thought we had.

S: No, not positively.

K: Oh.

S: The Hungarians positive, yes.

K: But not how many they're thinking of.

S: Not how many but if the Polish are corrent they're all right. They didn't bat an eye when we talked to them.

K: Yeah, well the North Vietnamese told us that both of them are okay, that they've already approached them.

S: Right. Now I've just asked the British to give us a little help on the Cmabodians so we've got that on track and I thought I'd

K: Could you make a checklist of things we ought to take up at the next meeting. We ought to do that and how to bring the ceaseifre into effect in Cambodia.

S: Okay, I just learned now that the Vietnamese have sent two Generals to Paris and they're already there.

K: To talk to whom?

S: Well I'm sure that the first thing they want to do is to reconoiter what's available in Paris and then they'll talk with us later.

K: In Paris?

S: Yeah, we told them that that's where some of this stuff will be worked out.

K: Oh I see. Okay, find. What we may have to do Bill. I may propose that

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 2012
SUN, DEC 6 2012 10:03

you and some experts stay behind to work out the technical things.

S: Where is this now, in Paris?

K: Yeah.

S: Well I had in mind George Aldrich the lawyer whom I've had working for me on this.

K: Yeah, right.

S: And hopefully we could get this all done in this time frame.

K: Yes. I think we all ought to do it in the same negotiating period.

S: Yes.

K: Okay good think you.

S: Whether it will be in the same forum or not may be somewhat a different problem.

K: Yeah, but I think that will be the best time to get it done.

S: Right.

K: Good think you.

S: Okay Henry.

DREASSIFIED

TELECON

Bernard Kalb

11/6/72 12:10 p.m.

B: . . . anything for CBS but I thought we could have a chance to talk a little bit about the book. I was hoping to talk about Vietnam and one or two other things if that were possible.

K: Well, we might aim for tomorrow morning. What time are you leaving?

B: Well my problem with tomorrow morning, I thought everybody was leaving early. I will be going out to Concordia School when the President votes and then I will be remaining in California to see that television piece so I will not be going back on that plane. So I'm a bad bet for tomorrow I guess.

K: Because I'll be here till about 10:30.

B: Tomorrow morning.

K: Yeah.

B: I see. Well, uh, there's no chance today maybe the only thing I could do then Henry would be to call you as soon as I think it's possible for me to be free in the morning if at all.

K: Okay.

B: Would that be all right.

K: Sure.

B: All right. Thanks so much.

K: Good.

B: Bye.

TELECON
The President

11/6/72 12:24 p.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Well I did the five minutes and just stuck with the old line. I said I
have complete confidence that we will soon reach agreement.

K: Excellent.

P: And that's that. I just talked to MacGregor and he said well, last
night he was terribly worried about McGovern's television and had called
Bob and said somebody ought to answer him and so forth. And then he
said this morning he sort of thought maybe he had overreacted. But the
point that I told him, I said, what's it going to do, change one point, two
points? I mean we just can't be knocked off balance on this sort of thing.
See what I mean?

K: I think that's right. I think that's right.

P: So the main thing is just not to react to anything and to be totally
responsible. You can be more responsible too when you're this far ahead.

K: That's right. But at any rate Mr. President, I think, well, it won't
help in the election, but at this hour next week everyone will know how
statesmanlike you were. In fact I would expect Le Duc Tho to start mov-
ing, in fact, oh, we had a phone call today in Paris from the North Viet-
namese and they said could they have an answer because it takes them a
week to start moving. So our fellow said he didn't have instructions yet.

P: Good.

K: I thought that was rather interesting.

P: Good, good. Well the main thing is this is one time, not on a calmness
basis, but to the whole press you've gotta say that on the airport apron in
Winston-Salem-Greensboro Airport that I received the news and knew it
all the time.

K: I'll say just as we were landing you received the news and knew it all
the time. I'll make that point when we announce the meeting.

P: Very hard. Okay.

K: Absolutely Mr. President.

DRE ASSIGNED

Authe: F012658-
Bst: May 6 1972
Dated: 9/10/72

TELECON
Barbara Walters

11/6/72 1:53 p.m.

K: Glorious.

W: You having a nice time?

K: Yes, I'm getting some rest and some sunshine.

W: I would like to see you before you go to Paris. Is that possible?

K: Why?

W: Because I want to ask you about something which I could ask you about over the phone, but I'd like to try to talk you into it and it might be easier in person.

K: Of course. It's professional?

W: Professional.

K: God dammit.

W: Oh shucks. Or should I write you a Nancy Dickerson note?

K: Well that certainly worked so well for her.

W: That did so wonderfully well for her, yes, yes.

K: Well, but that means I'd have to tell you when I'm going to Paris which I can't do.

W: I realize that and I thought of that when I called. Well then suppose I tell it to you over the telephone.

K: Okay.

W: When you, we don't know what the timings are yet in which you would be signing this document, or meeting, but from what we have heard...

K: Well you people, ... But you have the wrong idea. Whenever I go to Paris I won't sign it there.

W: Won't it eventually be signed there?

K: Eventually, yes, but that's weeks after I go there.

B Walters 11/6/74 1:53 p.m. p. 2

W: I see. Well then I guess what I'm talking about is the actual signing of it.

K: Okay, well what do you want. I mean what is it . . .

W: The way things stand now when the signing is it seemed to us that it would coincide with the time that we are on the air live. I don't have all of the times but . . .

K: The TODAY Show.

W: The TODAY Show is on the air live. Now I have no idea what your life would be like, whether you would come out of there and have a general press conference or what, but we had hoped that we could carry some statement or something or other from you live in the same way the China just magnificently came, you know, live, all the timings were live, and Moscow, you know, because of the difference in time, it turned out to be . . . If it were possible that you were going to say anything or do anything in particular, if you could do it on our show, they would send me to Paris . . .

K: Yeah, but I might not be there for the signing.

W: MMMMmmmmmmmm.

K: But that doesn't exclude that we could do it from New York while the signing is going on.

W: When they were talking to me, the head of our news department came down and said look very privately, this is the way it is. If Dr. Kissinger would come on the TODAY Show and say or do anything that morning we will send you to Paris. If he will not, I am not a White House correspondent; there would be no reason for me to go there for a general press conference, nor would I want to. I mean that's not my . . . that's not where I do my best or you know, I don't want to go along with AP, UPI and 19 people from Washington, or 119 people from Washington. So really what I wanted to find out was there a possibility of your doing something with us in which case it would be me.

K: Well yeah, but you're assuming that I'll be present at the signing which is not a hundred percent clear.

W: Well if you were present at the signing then would that be possible. If you were not present at the signing then I would come to Washington or wherever you were and it could be that day, the next day, whatever. If you were present at the signing and if there were a possibility of your coming on live afterwards to say whatever -- hello, how are you, it's been done -- then I would go to Paris. They would not ordinarily send anyone; they're not going to send Frank Magee, I mean I'm talking to you very privately, but they weren't very happy with Magee from Moscow. They did not get the kind of things that they hoped to get. He would stay here and in New York and that would be that.

B. Walters 11/6/72 1:53 p.m. p. 3

K: Well why don't we leave it at this Barbara. I will know at least 10 days before the ...

W: I feel ... you know, I always feel this with you, so strange about asking you these things, and yet that other side of me and I must.

K: No, no, but I'm going to be very honest with you. I'll ... we will know, it will be apparent about 10 days before what's likely to happen and then we can decide what we're going to do.

W: Okay.

K: I mean it's not that imminent.

W: All right, and when you go to Paris the next time it will not be for that.

K: No, it will be for a negotiation but it will not be for the signing.

W: Okay, but 10 days before that you will have some idea of what your plans are and how you want to work it out, and if it does turn out that we are on the same ... the time does coincide ...

K: I don't exclude that I'll go on the TODAY Show on the morning of the signing.

W: All right

K: Either from Paris or from Washington.

W: Okay.

K: And I'll feel less restrained after the election than before.

W: Okay. All right. Yes, I realize that; obviously the election is ...

K: What do you people think about the election?

W: When the election is done you would come on anyway whether this is the time for you to come on or whether you would like to come on at another time, but you know, whenever it is, I think one thing is one thing to talk with you about the signing obviously, that's the most important thing.

K: When are you going to have lunch with me?

W: There would also be a time when I think we would just like to talk with you and to talk about the man, not the dates, but the overall philosophy, which nobody has really done and everybody has all these rash of books about what you really think and feel and the only who's never said it is you. But that's something we can talk about later. In that sense we would want

BROWN

AUG 22 1972 10:01

B. J. SMITH

B. Walters 11/6/72 1:53 p.m. p. 4

to do what was best for you and what was kind of fun for you and so on.
Okay.

K: Good.

W: Now that we've talked about that. Again, I don't know when you're
going and I obviously don't expect you to tell me, but I'm on vacation
next week and I could come to Washington for lunch if you're free.

K: Oh marvelous. Next week is . . .

W: I'm going to be away for a little while the end of the week, but the
beginning of the week is okay . . .

K: I'm going to be in Florida later this week; are you going to be down there?

W: No, I'm going over Thanksgiving.

K: God it's hard to arrange an assignation with you.

W: It really is; it really is.

K: Once one gets the intentions lined up it's still the time.

W: I know it; I know it. And there isn't another convention for four years
and then your little boy's there. How is he?

K: Who? Oh, he's great.

W: Does he ever come to New York?

K: No.

W: He was so cute there. I'd love to take him around here.

K: He'd love it. If he ever does I'll let you know.

W: Do, do.

K: But look, next week in Washington as soon as I have my schedule let's
do it . . . Can I call you on Thursday or Friday of this week?

W: Oh absolutely. I'm going away next Wednesday; I just want to get out
of . . . I'm going out in the country someplace and just kind of hole up
for a few days cause I haven't been away at all.

K: So it should be before Wednesday.

UNCLASSIFIED

B. Walters

11/6/72 1:53 p.m. p. 5

W: It would be next Wednesday the 15th I'd be leaving but Monday I'm free or Tuesday I'm free, either, you know I could make it for lunch or for cocktails, or for, you know, whatever you'd want. Or whatever you'd not want; if not then I'd go back to work after that.

K: Well let's aim for dinner on the 13th.

W: What night is that, Monday?

K: Yeah.

W: That's fine with me if you find that you can. And you can let me know the end of the week. It doesn't matter.

K: Good, it looks fine now and let me confirm it at the end of the week.

W: All right, have a nice time.

K: Terrific Barbara, I'll look forward to it.

W: So do I. Bye.

TELECON

John Osborne

11/6/72 2:07 p.m.

K: I called you because somebody told me . . . I haven't seen it myself, that in your last column you implied or in fact stated that I had leaked the content of the agreement to the New York Times.

O: I said you gave them some of the information.

K: The only information I gave to the New York Times was in that Max Frankel story. What was in that box I had nothing to do with, directly, indirectly, myself, through any assistant . . .

O: Well Doctor, I myself didn't distinguish between the Frankel story and the box. I refer to the New York Times account.

K: Well, as I said I didn't read it.

O: Yes, well it had the sub . . . the box had the substance . . . the substance of the box was also in the story.

K: Well my recollection, the box was so quickly overshadowed by the Hanoi thing that I never studied it carefully. My impression of the box was, and my information was, that it came from Paris and that it probably came from French sources who had been briefed by the North Vietnamese. That is our understanding, that is my understanding of it.

O: Right. Well my piece does say, it quotes you at your press conference and then says, gives a sequence of the appearance of the Times piece the night before, you know it was on the street at 10:00 the previous night. They had that piece in there Wednesday. And then it says that some of the information came from Paris, some from various Washington agencies and some, and I do say including the part that gave the Times story its authoritative tone, from you. I'll be glad to send a copy down to you.

K: No, no, no. I'll get it eventually, but the impression that some people got from it and asked me about was that we were engaged in a massive maneuver to get out the peace plan anyway and you know.

O: Yeah, well I suppose they could get that impression.

K: Our intention was to straighten out some of . . . to calm down some of the wildest speculation and our intention was to leave it at that. And at that point with no document being available I thought it would have stayed in reasonable, you know, you had Time and Newsweek and so many people come out with very alledgedly precise contents.

07-11/6/72 10:00 AM

TELECON, John Osborne, 11/6/72 2:07 p.m. p. 2

O: Yes, I understand. I couldn't, you see once you said at the press, well you told me that the Times account did not come from you or your staff, well I don't even attempt to go into the question of why. Whatever exposure was made was made obviously the previous day you see. But I just state, I quote -- not you -- I quote a White House story. ________
__________ came from Paris. Well I say some of it did; some of it came from various Washington sources, some from you.

K: Well I, you know, it's not, my major concern has been to try to get the war wound up in a way that people at least can feel some sense of dignity about the end of it, not to have everything turn into a tawdry enterprise.

O: Yes, I'm sure it has been. I hope you'll succeed in that.

K: That's really the reason I call you. But not having read your story I can't say . . .

O: Yes, well I have, . . . Neill Ball has a copy I know.

K: No, no, I'll get it. There's no reason for you to send it over.

O: If I may ask you one strictly background question since this subject has come up, was there, did a feeling develop that it would be better not to have the agreement concluded before the election, for the sake of credibility?

K: That jxxx had absolutely nothing to do with it. I have always believed, I had lunch, I mean, this is off the record. I had lunch with the Time editors at the end of September and I said then to Hedley Donovan that if, as a historian, I could pick the time I'd prefer it after the election so that the issue of whether we ended the war, of you know that the war was ended on its merits and not for any extraneous reasons. But having said this when you get the breakthrough early in October, can you take the responsibility for not making a tremendous try. That's you know, if we had wanted to delay it we could have easily have delayed it by less complex moves than the ones that finally led to the delay. So, no what we decided was that we were going to make a major effort, but then when it turned out that there were still very significant differences, I mean not very significant differences, but significant ambiguities, then we decided we'd get everything cleared up, and we're essentially on course.

O: However, am I wrong, or entirely my impression which is what it is of a course, that as of last week, as of when I came down to see you last Saturday, that my impression was that you then expected to have the final meeting by now.

<table><tr><td>DR. ASSISTED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E.212.95F</td></tr><tr><td>Text: B-8F SMAD Date: 11/01/72</td></tr></table>

Osborne, 11/6/74, 2:07 p.m.

K: I had no firm expectation. And when you say final meeting.

O: The one you referred to.

K: Yeah, but after that meeting there'll still be several weeks of consultation.

O: Yes, yes, you said that at the press conference.

K: That was since we more or less left it to the other side I had no firm impression and when one thinks about it a little more one should remember since they were insisting on the signing date of October 31st it was obvious that their negotiators couldn't start moving before then and since it takes them a week or so to get there I think all of this is within a foreseeable framework.

O: I take it from what you said to the pool on Air Force Once coming down according to the pool report that you are basically as confident on this matter as you were a week ago.

K: That is correct.

O: Right.

K: Barring the fact that they'll come to the next meeting in a bloody minded frame of mind. But I don't expect that because then they'd be better off rejecting a meeting. No, I/ stick by everything that I have said. Now the one other thing that you ought to remember is this, and I think that will become clearer to you after the election, I was not talking to the American people when I spoke, first of all I didn't know it was going to be that extensively on television. I was speaking primarily to the Vietnamese parties and the overwhelming task was to reassure North Vietnam that even though they had blown the agreement, we weren't abrogating it. That was, Hanoi was target number one on that day.

O: Do you still have no definitive answer from them about the next meeting?

K: I just don't discuss our answers, but I repeat that I'm as confident today as I was then.

O: Right, well thank you for calling. If, after you see that paragraph in that piece, if you feel seriously well let me know and I'll do something about it.

K: The only reason I called you is because another newsman mentioned it to me as an example if even as just and thoughtful a man as you had some doubts about our motives . . . and then I didn't exactly know what it was so I thought it would be best if I called you.

*

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Senator Jackson/Kissinger

2:37 p.m. - 11/6/72

K: Hello.

J: Henry, how are ya?

K: Scoop, how are you? You're coming out for the President.

J: You got everything under control out there?

K: Can we announce that you came out for the President?

J: (Laughs) He might lose it. You don't want to upset the apple cart.

K: How are you?

J: Oh, fine, fine. Listen, I just wanted to check in with you. I'm in Washington. You know, I'm going to Europe on Thursday morning. You know to Italy and then I'm going on to the Middle East and to NATO and then into Central Europe, but I won't be back until December 4 and I just thought if we wanted to talk about anything.

K: How about having breakfast with me on Wednesday.

J: Wednesday morning?

K: Yeh.

J: Well, I'm going over

K: Or lunch?

J: I have a meeting - you know we've got that deal over on arms control.

K: You want to have lunch?

J: Yeh, we could do lunch on Wednesday if that's all right with you.

K: That's fine with me.

J: I think that's in the clear. I'll make it in the clear anyway.

K: Why don't we do it at the Metropolitan Club. The food in the White House is so impossible now it's embarrassing for you.

ENGLISH-IFIED

Authorized 01/2958 -

Dated 6/10/91 B.C.

2

J: Well, whatever you say. All right, I'll check in with you

K: Would you rather come to the White House and eat the lousy food there?

J: No, I think maybe it's better that we keep it.

K: Well, then let's eat at the White House.

J: I'm a little fearful that if we're outside then the Yakyaks start.

K: Yeh, let's eat at the White House.

J: All right. I'll see you down there at 12 o'clock.

K: I can only eat publicly with opponents; never with friends.

J: OK, I'll see you there at noon.

K: Let's make it about 12:30.

J: 12:30. All right. That's fine.

K: Good. Look forward to it Scoop.

J: Fine, Henry. What time do you get in tomorrow?

K: About 6 in the evening.

J: Very good. I'll see you then.

K: Good. Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Autograph E012 958- B.P. May 6 1949

TELCOM

Robert McNamara/Mr. Kissinger

11/7/72 6:20 p.m.

K: Hello.

McN: Henry, I'm leaving for Africa tomorrow and I'll be gone about 12 days. I would imagine that it's unlikely that you would need any assistance from us on that matter we worked on before while I'm gone, but if you do may I suggest that you or your people get in touch with the individual who will be in charge in my absence whose name is Knapp.

K: Right.

McN: He doesn't know anything about this and you will just have to start from scratch but just tell him that you've been working with me, I'm gone and you need some help, I told you that you could call on him to get it. You'll even have to xerox copies of those papers I gave you, he doesn't even have a copy. There's only two people in the organization that do and he isn't one of them. It isn't that I don't trust him it's just that I don't bring anybody into such discussion if I don't have to.

K: Right, right, okay.

McN: And, I'll see you when I get back.

K: Good, Bob, I'll look forward.

McN: Bye

K: Bye

UNCLASSIFIED

TelCon
General Haig/Mr. Kissinger

Nov. 7, 1972

K: Al, has Rogers ever submitted that other draft on the Berlin thing? which added the subsidiary organs?

H: Tkhey allegedly did it in Bonn.

K: What's the result.

H: Well, the problem they are having is with the British, and the Germans.

K: That's what I thought, and the French too, isn't it.

H: And the French.

K: Well, that means with everybody.

H: Yes, yes, the allies are just not going along, and what they are going to do is try to work that out with them and then come in with a compromise.

K: Okay, well get me a report by Monday morning, will you?

H: All right.

K: Thank you.

056-2127
OCTOBER 12, 1972