# THE FOURTH AREA OF THE NATIONAL EFFORT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

by W. H. Jackson

## I.

There is widespread agreement on both the terminology and functions of the diplomatic, economic and military means of promoting national objectives. There is also general agreement that there is a fourth area of effort. Thereafter the trouble begins.

The phrase "Political Warfare" is, in my judgment, too broad to describe this fourth area of effort. A distinguished British authority, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, has said that "political warfare practices every form of overt and covert attack which can be called political as distinct from military." This means to me that practically everything, except the use of force, which a government does to attain its national objectives against a potential enemy can be called political warfare. The term is obviously too broad to describe the area of effort remaining after you have dealt with the diplomatic, economic, and military means of promoting national objectives. I have chosen to probe for this fourth area of effort.

## II.

In the planning, the formulation and determination of policy and in the operations of government, it is obvious that public opinion at home and abroad must be given consideration and seriously reckoned with. Whose opinion are we talking about?

The answer, I think, is that the group varies from one action to another, and often the same action influences different groups in different, sometimes opposite, directions. To give an example in the field of diplomacy, a few months ago the Secretary of State referred to the area of Goa on the Indian sub-continent as a Portuguese province.

- 2 -

In Lisbon this remark was hailed as evidence of America's solidarity with its NATO Allies. In New Delhi, it was publicized as evidence of American imperialism and hostility to the emerging nations of Asia and Africa. The fact that the Secretary's statement was literally true was lost in the hubbub.

To give another example involving opinion at home and abroad, the United States, about two years ago, raised the import duty on foreign timepieces. The Swiss denounced us as faithless to our pro- fessed principle of world-wide liberalization of trade. An influential segment of the American public, by no means motivated solely by consideration of business self-interest, praised the action as one cal- culated to preserve the vitality of an important defense industry.

These examples are simple, but they illustrate the complexity of computing the impact of acts or statements on public opinion. Nevertheless, since that impact exists, it should enter importantly and sometimes decisively into the making of great governmental decisions.

It has not been only those who operate in a democratic society who have traditionally appreciated the power of public opinion. The most ruthless dictatorships have also recognized its power. The Nazis did. The Fascists did. The Communists did and do, generally speak- ing, but the recent ferment and bloody uprisings in the satellite states of Eastern Europe indicate that the Soviets and their puppet regimes had underestimated the strength and the staying power of public opinion even after years of suppression and tyranny.

Naturally I do not mean to validate the power of public opinion by citing recent and current totalitarian concern for it. These tyrants were and are sordid manipulators and perverters of public opinion; but the important point here is that these allegedly all-powerful dictators have depended on the continued support of their voteless subjects. Dr. Goebbels was just as active in selling the Nazi regime to the German people as he was in justifying that regime abroad.

Not that he neglected foreign audiences, of course. Dictators launching wars of aggression have always posed to the world as recti- fiers of injustice. This propaganda of dictatorship, its censorship, and its radio jamming are compliments that it pays to the force of public opinion.

[c]

- 3 -

There is in this the single best hope of the free world for lasting peace, and I use no stronger word than hope. Tyranny still respects or at least fears the power of public opinion in its own country, in its satellites and abroad.

The opinion of the subjugated peoples of Eastern Europe and perhaps even the opinion of the Russian people themselves have not yet been conquered or mastered. When we think of the years the Soviets have had in which to impose their will and of the instruments they have had at their disposal, it is indeed, heartening that these subjugated people still have opinions of their own, still dream of freedom, and still maintain their affinity to Western civilization. Certainly the events of recent weeks have confirmed these facts.

The power of public opinion is further illustrated by a striking and fairly recent example in the free world. In 1947 almost two centuries of British rule in India came to an end. It did not end because the Indians out-negotiated the British at the conference table, or brought intolerable economic pressure to bear upon them, or overcame them in an armed revolt.

British rule ended because, after years of passive resistance and civil disobedience under the leadership of an ascetic intellectual, Indian public opinion, supported by public opinion elsewhere in the world, became first uncomfortable and finally intolerable to the British, who then left with good grace. They might have tried increasingly repressive measures, including military ones, but developments in North Africa and Southeast Asia during the past few years would suggest they were wise to leave when and as they did.

In Lincoln's language: "With public sentiment on its side, everything succeeds; with public sentiment against it, nothing succeeds." Of course, Lincoln could not have foreseen the power of a modern police state. Yet in the long perspective of history, he may be proven right.

- 4 -

It is, at least, our hope that nowhere in the long run can there be any lasting rule in opposition to public opinion. We must play out this hope to the full extent of our diversified capabilities. In any event, a profound concern for public opinion in the countries affected must be a consideration and an ingredient in the whole process of government, in the planning stage, in the formulation and determination of policy, in the coordination and timing of operations and finally in the last phase of enunciation, explanation and interpretation by government officials, and expression in information programs.

### III.

In seeking to discover and define areas of effort in promoting national objectives over and beyond the functions of diplomacy, economics, and military power, let us now examine the confusing and perhaps unfortunate term "psychological warfare." It holds a fascination for many people.

In World War I, propaganda was called propaganda, at least by the Germans, and was used extensively. Later expansion of mass communications led to major efforts in this field by both sides in World War II, when the words "psychological warfare," misleading from the outset, came into professional and general usage. Such warfare employed, among other weapons, black and white radio broadcasting, loudspeakers, leaflets and assorted special covert and overt operations designed primarily for psychological effect.

These items are not a complete list, but they cover, in a general way, the stuff of psychological warfare as understood in World War II. It can be seen from them, however, that the term "psychological warfare" has been used to mean two things. In a limited sense it can mean the use of written or spoken words to affect other peoples' attitudes and actions. This meaning could have been conveyed as well by the word "propaganda," but "sykewar" or "psywar" applied to the use in war of loud-speakers and leaflets had a clear enough meaning. The term "psychological warfare" was also used to include actions or operations undertaken primarily for the effects they would have on target audiences. As an example of such a special operation, I might mention the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in 1942. It made little or no sense from a strictly military viewpoint, but was calculated to encourage our Allies in the Pacific, to raise morale at home, and to impress upon the Japanese that we intended ultimately to bring the war home to them.

- 5 -

This initial confusion and the continuance of the term "psychological warfare" in peacetime started the trouble which still bedevils us. I understand this troublesome confusion to have arisen this way. We were slow to recognize the limitations of psychological warfare as it was understood in World War II. Propaganda and other instruments of psychological warfare constituted only one of the methods of affecting collective responses. Alone, psychological warfare in all its forms did not achieve the desired results. A case in point was the unsuccessful effort to secure the surrender of the Channel Islands by means of psychological warfare when no Allied force was available for the purpose.

We also failed to recognize clearly the role of psychological warfare in relation to the general conduct of war. We did recognize that psychological warfare was most effective when it was coordinated and precisely timed with the use of other instruments of power. Hammering with propaganda on the theme of inevitable Allied victory became effective as Allied bombardment increased and our armies advanced. However, the experience of World War II led us to believe that psychological warfare, including both propaganda and special operations, was an identifiable, separate arm of the military or of the government which sought to exploit, largely with words, the actions of the military or the policies and actions of government.

In World War II the so-called psychological warriors played little, if any, role in the determination of military objectives or in the general conduct of war. Psychological implications were certainly not consciously made part and parcel of war plans, as they would be in the complicated planning and selection of objectives in an atomic global war of the future, and as they should be in the policies and actions of governments in the peace of today.

Let me cite two wartime examples of my point that even when the ultimate instrument of national power is forcefully applied, the psychological aspects involved must be constantly considered.

The first example was the decision, taken shortly after the Allied landings in North Africa, to accept the services of the French Admiral Darlan in stopping French resistance and in securing subsequent French cooperation there. The decision, which I consider to have been a sound one, was taken in the field on military grounds, and

- 6 -

permitted the Allied forces, which were barely adequate for their
assigned military mission, to push forward without having to worry
about fighting Frenchmen or about trying to replace the civil adminis-
tration of the area.

On the other hand, Darlan was identified with the collabora-
tionist elements in France. It was not surprising, therefore, that
the press and radio in the United States and Britain loosed a torrent
of criticism, alleging that the arrangement with Darlan belied our
declared principles and suggesting that on grounds of expediency we
might make similar arrangements with representatives of the Nazi
or Japanese regimes.

The second example was the unconditional surrender formula,
which President Roosevelt announced at the Casablanca Conference of
January 1943.

Critical comment usually alleges: first, that it wasted lives
by prolonging the war; second, that it stiffened the resolution of the
Germans and Japanese; third, that it indicated a lack of carefully
formulated war aims; and fourth, that by forcing Germany to fight
to the last ditch it assured an almost powerless post-war Germany
and helped facilitate Soviet domination over vast territories in Central
and Eastern Europe.

Because these criticisms appear impressive, it is interesting
to note that by the end of the war most Allied propagandists had re-
luctantly concluded that the unconditional surrender formula had prob-
ably been wise. Their reasons were these: first, as Winston Churchill
put it: "That principle wipes away all ideas of anything like Mr. Wilson's
Fourteen Points being brought up by the Germans after their defeat,
claiming they surrendered in consideration of those Fourteen Points";
second, it counteracted the accommodation with Darlan; third, it re-
assured the Soviets that we would not negotiate a separate peace with
Germany; and fourth, it stimulated the Allied home fronts into recog-
nizing that this was a war to the end, demanding continued efforts and
sacrifices.

It is obvious from those two examples that both the decision of
an Allied Commander in the field and the action of our government at
highest level involved psychological implications of far-reaching con-
sequences and of the greatest importance.

- 7 -

The relevance of these examples to this paper lies in the fact that the decisions were taken without express reference to psychological implications or to psychological warfare. The conduct of psychological warfare was subordinated and separated in its field of propaganda and special operations. I do not mean that either General Eisenhower or President Roosevelt failed to consider the effect of their actions on public opinion throughout the world. They were both past masters in their knowledge of public reaction and they were also assisted by political advisers. I do mean to point out that the great decisions affecting the conduct of World War II were taken without the advice of any individuals claiming special sensitivity to psychological implications.

After the war there was little inclination to try to rationalize in a peacetime context the role of the psychological factor in the development and execution of national policy. However, in about 1948 the cry was raised that the Free World was losing the "cold war," a phrase, incidentally, that ought now to be retired. Our government turned to the instrumentalities of this so-called cold war, and made the error of attributing unlimited and independent capabilities to psychological warfare. If the objective, it was argued, is to win "the struggle for the minds of men" then it is proper to transfer the field of policy and strategy to those whose special concern is to create psychological effects. This argument was reduced to absurdity by the suggestion of organizational changes in our government under which a chief of staff for cold war would emerge.

In fact a Psychological Strategy Board was established in 1951. This board was built upon the sands of the basic fallacies to which I have referred and was doomed to failure from the outset, despite the exceptional ability of its director and the high level of its membership. Expectation of vast capabilities was an illusion and the conception of independent planning or execution of psychological strategy was demonstrated as nonsense.

One of President Eisenhower's first official acts following his inauguration was to appoint a Committee on International Information Activities of which I had the honor to be Chairman. The President directed the Committee to submit to him by June 30, 1953, recommendations pointed toward improving the international information policies and activities of the Government, with particular reference to the international relations and national security of the United States. These public directions were somewhat euphemistic. The Committee was actually told in effect to study all aspects of our conduct of cold war.

- 8 -

After extensive study, consultations, and interviews, the Committee submitted a report which concluded with over fifty recommendations on a number of interrelated subjects. One of the key conclusions of the report was this:

> "The directive which created the Psychological Strategy Board assumes that in addition to national objectives formulated by the National Security Council, there are such things as 'over-all national psychological objectives'; PSB is indeed charged with the formulation and promulgation of these. The PSB directive also speaks of 'psychological policies' and the Board has been working to develop 'a strategic concept for psychological operations.' We believe these phrases indicate a basic misconception, for we find that the 'psychological' aspect of policy is not separable from policy, but is inherent in every diplomatic, economic or military action. There is a 'psychological' implication in every act, but this does not have life apart from the act. Although there may be distinct psychological plans and specific psychological activities directed toward national objectives, there are no 'national psychological objectives' separate and distinct from national objectives."

In addition, the President's Committee recommended the establishment of an Operations Coordinating Board to assure coordination in the execution of agreed national policies. The Committee report outlined missions for this proposed Board which, while stressing the coordinative functions implied in its name, also recommended that the Operations Coordinating Board "assure that each project or action is so executed as to make its full contribution to the particular 'climate of opinion' which the United States is seeking to achieve in the world."

Prior to the submission of the report of the President's Committee on International Information Activities and continuing to function thereafter was a Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning. He was Mr. C. D. Jackson. His mission was to initiate and sponsor ideas for governmental action in the psychological field. After the creation of the Operations Coordinating Board, this Special Assistant acted as the President's representative on the Board and as its Vice Chairman, the Under Secretary of State being Chairman. Mr. C. D. Jackson's successor as Special Assistant to the President was Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, whose mission resembled in certain respects that

- 9 -

of Mr. C. D. Jackson. However, when I succeeded Mr. Rockefeller last March, I received a letter of authority from the President which stressed the mission of assuring proper coordination and timing of the execution of foreign policies involving more than one Department or Agency. Except for the word "timing", there was no reference whatever to any responsibility for the psychological aspects of operations in the field of foreign affairs.

Now there is no individual or agency in the government solely or even primarily charged with responsibility either for devising actions intended principally for their psychological impact or for assuring that the psychological impact of all actions is duly weighed.

This does not mean that the psychological factor is neglected. Current policy provides that the psychological implications of our policies and actions will be carefully considered in advance of those policies and actions. It also provides that U. S. policy must be advanced by a flexible combination of military, political, economic, and psychological actions, coordinated so as to reinforce one another.

Here I leave for good the phrase "psychological warfare" with the hope that henceforth it be used exclusively in the planning by the military departments of government for a possible war of the future. Elsewhere in government during peacetime, we should be considering and talking about the psychological implications of our actions, implications which are predominant in some, present to some degree in most, and consciously disregarded or non-existent in a few.

#### IV.

Now in Part IV I shall attempt to analyze the difference between considering the effect on public opinion of governmental plans, policies, and operations and considering the psychological implications of such plans, policies, and operations.

There may not be much difference and some would contend that there is no difference at all. In my opinion the best way to describe this difference is to say that producing an effect on public opinion is the objective of our considering the psychological implications involved in any governmental action or pronouncement. We are, I think, talking about means to an end.

- 10 -

Surely it is far fetched to refer to psychological implications at all in recognizing the profound effect on public opinion throughout the world of the personality and character of the President, made known through his words and action, but continuing now as a basis for the interpretation of his words and action. There are other facts having profound effect on public opinion everywhere but involving no specific actions at all, much less any consideration of psychological implications of actions; as examples I might cite the standard of living in the United States, its system of justice, the extent of the freedom of its people, its problem of segregation. Of course government officials or other individuals may take actions which have a bearing on these facts and which are thus fraught with psychological implications affecting public opinion.

However, here I am primarily concerned with the psychological implications of the conduct of our Federal government, particularly in the vital field of foreign affairs. Most of its plans, policies and operations in this field must involve consideration of the effect on public opinion here and elsewhere. In many instances knowledge of social psychology and psychological techniques, backed by solid knowledge of the target audience, can be brought to bear with the objective of inducing the desired effect on public opinion.

Our national interest may compel us in some cases to disregard the effect of our actions on public opinion. In others, such as the Suez difficulty, whatever action is taken or pronouncement made will alienate public opinion somewhere. In still other actions or pronouncements, such as our Atoms for Peace plan or our proposal of an Open Skies inspection system, the psychological implications may play a major role. I can recall no peacetime governmental action which was undertaken purely for psychological reasons and which attained the desired result. The public will discover the insincerity or detect the psychological gimmick. The Atoms for Peace and the Open Skies inspection were soundly conceived proposals with heavy psychological ingredients. However, in no field have we found shortcuts or substitutes to escape the long hard road across the realities of our times.

V.

In the organization of government it does not seem important to me whether or not a difference can be found between consideration of effect on public opinion and consideration of psychological implications in the proposed actions of government in the field of foreign affairs.

- 11 -

Let us just say, then, that influencing public opinion by any means
whatever is the fourth area in the promotion of national objectives.

The major contribution of the President's Committee on In-
ternational Information Activities was its insistence that this area
was not separate or separable in the organization and conduct of
government. It is true that the Committee, in the language then
current, referred to the psychological aspect of policy and action.
Without substantial change in its meaning or intent, it might have
been described as the consideration of the effect of policies and
actions on public opinion. What was important was the Committee's
statement that this consideration is inherent in every diplomatic,
economic or military action of government. "There is," the Com-
mittee said, "a 'psychological' implication in every act, but this
does not have life apart from the act."

The original consequences of this concept were signifi-
cant. We now have the Operations Coordinating Board instead of a
Psychological Strategy Board. The Operations Coordinating Board,
in fulfilling its mission of coordinating the actions of various depart-
ments or agencies in the field of foreign affairs, can and does con-
sider the timing of such actions so that they will make their full
contribution to the particular climate of opinion which the United
States is seeking to achieve in the world. The Planning Board, the
National Security Council and the Operations Coordinating Board
taken together certainly supply sufficient governmental machinery
for the coordination of planning, policy making and operations.

Nevertheless, in abolishing the Psychological Strategy Board
and in no longer assigning any duties of a psychological nature to an
Assistant to the President there is grave danger. If consideration
of effect on public opinion is everybody's business then perhaps it
is nobody's business. Action requiring no coordination between de-
partments is taken every day by government officials. Some of these
actions have profound effect on public opinion.

This brings me to the most important observations in this
paper. The Information Committee's concept of the psychological
aspects of governmental actions, and the machinery it recommended
for the coordination of operations, are valid only if there are respon-
sible officials charged with bringing in the psychological element.

- 12 -

These officials must have the required competence and must be placed in sufficiently high positions so that they are involved in the making of important decisions. They must be distributed throughout the various departments and agencies concerned, as well as in the military services. I do not believe that such officials are so placed in government today.

Even if the organizational suggestion which I have just advanced were to be placed immediately into effect, we would have no assurance that the psychological factor in national strategy was being properly assessed unless all of us appreciate the ever increasing importance of this factor.

Let us not forget that the primary purpose of our military strength is not to defend our security by winning a massive global nuclear war; its primary purpose is to deter general war. General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, has said he has a deep conviction that the world could not stand that kind of war and that our greatest efforts and ingenuity should be directed toward its prevention. The President has said that there is now no alternative to peace.

The vulnerability of our enemies is not military weakness. Their weakness is that they must justify to their own people the unjustifiable fact of tyranny and to all other peoples the unjustifiable fact of Communist imperialism. Our best offensive weapons must be aimed at this weakness.