After 6 months at State, Kissinger's star shines on

KISSINGER, from AI

forced on Dr. Kissinger. He
still relishes it; it is doubtful
he could have avoided it.

When the Soviet leaders
were finally ready to discuss
arranging a Mideast cease-fire
Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet
party chief, asked for Dr. Kissinger in person So too have
the Arab leaders. His most
recent (and perhaps reluctant) Mideast trip was requested
by an Arab leader, regarded
here as a radical, who
wrote Mr. Nixon that only Dr.
Kissinger could "cool off" the
situation.

Whatever criticism and mis-
trust lingers in this country
about Dr. Kissinger's role in
negotiating the end of U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, he
has acquired an aura of inability
abroad, except, notably,
in Western Europe. In the
Arab world particularly, he is
accepted by realists as an honest
broker who can deliver the
goods, by romantics as a diplomatic
magician. No stranger
since Ralph Bunch 25 years
ago has been so accepted
there.

Still, as Dr. Kissinger him-
self has observed, foreign pol-
icy cannot always be conducted
in an atmosphere of
crisis by a single star "Now
we need to build on these
foundations a more permanent
structure that we can pass
on to succeeding administrations,"
he told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at
his confirmation hearing last
September.

"Durability in foreign policy is achieved in the final analysis through the deep and continuing involvement of the dedicated professionals of the

State Department and Foreign
Service."

Here there is ample room
for argument about Dr. Kissinger's achievement in the past
six months. He has made
many changes in key personnel at the department and
brought in some talented outsiders, including several close
aides from his White House
staff. Whether he has kept his
pledge to "infuse the Department of State with a sense of
participation, intellectual excitement and mission" remains
to be seen.

Those aspects of foreign pol-
icy he is personally concerned
with are closely held by the
small circle gathered around
his seventh-floor office. Some
of the regional assistant secretaries are brought in when the
problem involves dealing with
several other nations, but the
priority topics like the Middle
East, Soviet Union and China
are restricted to the trusted
few.

Despite repeated and private
declarations to the contrary,
Dr. Kissinger has shown no
more readiness to delegate responsibility to subordinates
than he did in his 4½ years as
President Nixon's national-
security adviser.

His aides have a full supply
of anecdotes about Dr. Kissinger's complaints that they are
bothering him with trivia.
"Take care of that yourself,"
he tells a subordinate. But as the
aide reaches the door, he adds,
"But check back with me before you put it out." He even
passes personally on the list of
reporters who accompany him
on his trips.

Even when they do not feel
personally involved with poli-
cy-making at the top, some

career Foreign Service officers
welcome the change. At least
it is again being made in
the department, which it con-
sequently was not under Dr.
Kissinger's lackadaisical predecessor,
William P. Rogers.

Dr. Kissinger's personnel
strategy is not yet clear. He
has changed most of the top
officials but retained Kenneth
Rush, former ambassador to
West Germany and a personal
friend of Mr. Nixon, as deputy
secretary. Yet he has passed
on little real responsibility to
Mr. Rush. In the third spot,
under secretary for political
affairs, he has named Joseph
J. Sisco, the department's
leading Mideast specialist. Neither promises to be the strong
administrator Dr. Kissinger is not.

As to assistant secretaries—
the officers who run the major
bureaus—Dr. Kissinger has followed no clear pattern. His unconventional choice as assistant secretary for Europe,
Arthur A. Hartman, is a 48-year-old career officer who has never headed an embassy. The new assistant secretary for East Asia, Robert S. Ingersoll, is a 60-year-old business executive who served as ambassador to Japan. Both show signs of being the sort of strong aides Dr. Kissinger says he wants.

To say Dr. Kissinger is not
an easy man to work for is a
massive understatement. He is
a man of many contradictions,
not the least of which are his
relationships with people.
Charming witty, and genial
with outsiders, he is arrogant,
demanding and intolerant with
his staff and sometimes foreign diplomats.

His relations with the press
are representative. At recep-

tions and on his Air Force
transport on trips, Dr. Kissinger appears to enjoy banter
with reporters accompanying
him. His humor is often self-deprecating, and he is capable of
jokingly making outrageous
statements that would cause
him serious political problems
if quoted outside their humorous
context.

Yet in the privacy of his
office his volcanic temper
erupts at articles that thicker-
skinned public figures would
shrug off, or at leaks of remarks
that he would have preferred
not to reach the public
—unless, as is often the case,
he does the leaking.

He drives his staff exceedingly hard, occasionally to the point of physical exhaustion. He is inconsiderate of their personal lives. He rages at errors. Yet those who work closest to him—those who have survived—repay him with intense loyalty. And they are not toadies.

The complexity of his behavior is more than chaff for the society writers or hushed anecdotes over lunch. It is an element in the tension of the past few months with the Atlantic allies, though by no means the major cause.

The strains within the alli-
ance are caused by diverging
national interests, but some
Western diplomats here believe
they have been exacerbated by
what they consider Dr. Kissinger's high-handedness and in-
tolerance of those who do not
see issues as he does—unless,
of course, he accepts them as
worthy adversaries, as he does
Premier Chou En-lai of
China and Michel Jobert, the
French foreign minister, but
not many others.

Dr. Kissinger's conspicuous

failure with the Western Europeans is the most puzzling aspect of his first six months. German-born, a noted scholar of European diplomacy, he has presided over the deterioration of the 25-year-old Atlantic alliance.

Not enough is yet known of
the events of the past year to
evaluate Dr. Kissinger's (or
Mr. Nixon's) responsibility for
this. Yet, as his critics frequently
note, he has achieved remarkable
success in negotiating with this nation's long-
time foes, like the Soviet
Union, China and North Viet-
nam, while failing to reverse
the growing gap with its traditional
friends.

Perhaps, as some argue, Dr.
Kissinger has a facility for
dealing with enemies, but not
allies; with totalitarians, but
not democrats. That might be
true as far as it goes, but it
does not go far enough.

Another puzzle, which involves both the Kissinger character and official performance, is the degree of his implication in the Watergate case. There is no evidence of personal complicity in the break-in or subsequent coverup. He denies any knowledge that the "plumbers" even existed. Yet he does appear to have been a precipitating factor in the process that eventually led to the whole mess.

Even in a White House noto-
rious for its fortress mentality,
Dr. Kissinger's paranoia about
what the considered security
leaks was legendary. He was
instrumental in causing the
wiretaps of 17 newsmen and
members of his own staff in
efforts to trade some of them.
It is especially ironic that he
was probably the administration's greatest originator of

what later came to be con-
demned in the White House as
the "unsourced story."

Even accepting his profes-
sions of ignorance of the
plumbers, has anger over
the publication of the Pentagon
papers, which led to the for-
mation of the special unit, was
a contributing factor to the
events that led up to the Water-
gate debacle. His role is ex-
pected to be explored in the
trial of the plumbers for the
burglary of the office of Daniel
Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

And the suspicion lurks that
the last word has not yet been
uttered about the documents
purchased from his office that
eventually wound up in the
offices of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in the Pentagon. Again
he has denied knowledge of the
"internal security" apparatus
in the White House that investigated the case, but there remain facets of the incident that seem to require further explanation.

The greatest mystery of Dr.
Kissinger's tenure is his relationship with Mr. Nixon. Superficially they would appear to be incompatible. No one really knows what their relationship is (though many talk about it confidentially) since they almost always meet alone.

As far as detente with the
Soviet Union and the opening
to China are concerned, plainly
he was implementing the President's policies. Whether he
has a freer hand now that Mr.
Nixon is wallowing in Water-
gate is a fascinating subject
for speculation, but only that.

Certainly he can go no farther than Mr. Nixon will let him. Equally certainly, he will go farther if Mr. Nixon leaves office prematurely.

III. 25 Mar 74

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES

KISSINGER TRAVELS TO USSR TO PREPARE FOR NEW SUMMIT TALKS

Preparture Meeting With Nixon

Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 2100 GMT 22 Mar 74 L

[Text] President Richard Nixon has conferred with the secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, about his coming trip to Moscow. Henry Kissinger is due in Moscow on Sunday for talks about problems of interest to both sides and to prepare a new Soviet-American summit meeting. At a news conference in Washington, the secretary of state spoke of the possibility of an early agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation.

Departure From Washington

Moscow TASS in English 0928 GMT 24 Mar 74 L

[Text] Washington Mar 24 TASS--United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger left for the Soviet Union. On the way to Moscow, he will make a short stop in Bonn.

Gromyko Present on Arrival in Moscow

Moscow TASS in English 1805 GMT 24 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS--U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has arrived here today to continue an exchange of views on a wide range of questions which are of mutual interest in connection with preparations for a visit of President of the United States Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union.

At Vnukovo airport, decked out with the state flags of the USSR and the USA, Henry Kissinger was met by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and other officials.

Kissinger Remarks at Moscow Airport

Moscow TASS in English 1836 GMT 24 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 24 TASS--U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has said the USA is going to continue the course of improvement of Soviet-American relations, the beginning of which was set during the talks between Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Richard Nixon, the President of the USA. Mr. Kissinger has pointed out the USA intends to search for ways to achieve further progress, since peace throughout the world depends in a large degree on peaceful, good relations between the USA and the USSR.

Mr. Kissinger has said he is expecting that at the forthcoming talks in Moscow a certain progress will be achieved on a number of major questions, and that the two sides will reaffirm that each of them has undertaken to promote peace everywhere in the world.

Henry Kissinger arrived in Moscow today. At the airport he answered questions posed by newsmen.

[Transmission of the above item by Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1824 GMT on 24 March renders the phrase "a certain progress will be achieved on a number of major questions" in the second paragraph as "my dostignem opredelennogo progressa po ryadu vazhneyshikh voprosov."]

III. 25 Mar 74

B 2

Talks Begin With Brezhnev, Gromyko

Moscow TASS in English 0854 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS--Talks between the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, the minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, Andrey Gromyko, and the secretary of state of the United States, Henry Kissinger, began in the Kremlin today.

Henry Kissinger arrived in Moscow yesterday.

KISSINGER STATEMENTS AT WASHINGTON NEWS CONFERENCE CITED

Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1130 GMT 22 Mar 74 L

[Text] The American secretary of state, Dr Kissinger, has touched on various aspects of relations with the Soviet Union at his news conference in Washington.

About the talks on strategic arms limitations, he said the agreement was within sight.

As regard trade, he revealed that the administration was negotiating a compromise with congressmen that would help to insure the Soviet Union an equal trading status.

Kissinger pointed to the important role of the two great powers in settling the Middle East crisis. Their cooperation has made possible the Geneva conference. The state secretary feels that a settlement in the Middle East cannot be attained without agreement with the Soviet Union.

COMMENTATOR STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow in Polish to Poland 1700 GMT 23 Mar 74 L

[Yevgeniy Makaroy commentary]

[Text] Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee William Fulbright has taken part in the television program "Issues and Answers" usually watched by all Americans. He stressed the great importance of progress in Soviet-American relations for lessening international tension. Speaking of the work of some politicians, including congressmen, opposing this cooperation, William Fulbright stated that it would be a great tragedy if their efforts were successful. He named such people as Senator Henry Jackson, who is linked with the armament industry and Zionist groups, and whose policy, according to Fulbright, harms both their country and the improvement of the international climate.

This example illustrates very well the existing attitudes in the United States and in the West toward mutual Soviet-American relations. In our opinion, the matter concerns the attitude of realism and of thoughtlessness because there is no alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Any other way leads to confrontation and conflicts.

This is proved by the long period of the cold war against the Soviet Union from the moment it was proclaimed by Winston Churchill in Fulton.

III. 26 Mar 74

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

B1

UNITED STATES

KISSINGER CONTINUES VISIT, HOLDS TALKS IN MOSCOW

Meeting With Brezhnev, Gromyko

Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS--The general secretary of the CPSU CC, Leonid Brezhnev, and Political Bureau member of the CPSU CC, USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko today had a talk in the Kremlin with the U.S. secretary of state, Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger.

During the talks that were of a businesslike, constructive character, a review was made of the state and prospects of Soviet-American relations in the light of the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by U.S. President Richard Nixon. They also discussed questions pertaining to the further limitation of strategic arms, and exchanged views on the European Security and Cooperation Conference.

Gromyko Gives Luncheon 25 Mar

Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS--USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko today gave a luncheon in honour of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. During the luncheon Andrey Gromyko and Henry Kissinger exchanged speeches.

The talks that started today, Andrey Gromyko said, have a special significance, since they are connected with preparations for the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of U.S. President Richard Nixon. So far as the Soviet side is concerned, we would like, as Leonid Brezhnev has noted, the coming summit to be marked by new major steps along the road of developing peaceful relations between our states and of improving the international situation.

Andrey Gromyko said that the two Soviet-American summits have resulted in the adoption of crucially important decisions and in the implementation of concrete measures that have put the beginning to a cardinal reconstruction of relations between the two countries. Of special importance is the agreement on preventing nuclear war signed during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the USA, and the agreements on limiting strategic arms signed during the previous meeting with President Richard Nixon.

At the same time, Andrey Gromyko stressed, there is much that still has to be done. The basic task is to advance further, leaning on what has already been achieved, in the directions outlined, so that the process of improving Soviet-American relations became a permanent factor of international life.

As to these or other concrete questions, given due sequence and a realistic and constructive approach by both sides, Andrey Gromyko said, it will always be possible to find mutually acceptable decisions. The main thing is to keep to the central line, to observe the already achieved agreements, strictly honour the commitments undertaken.

In conclusion Gromyko expressed the hope that the present meeting will be of great importance for ensuring successful results at the summit talks.

III. 26 Mar 74

B 2

Moscow Radio on Gromyko Speech

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko gave a luncheon today in honor of U.S. Secretary of State and Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger. During the luncheon, Gromyko and Kissinger exchanged speeches.

The USSR foreign minister noted the regular character of Soviet-U.S. contacts. The talks that began today are of special significance, he said, because they are connected with preparations for U.S. President Nixon's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union. As for the Soviet side, as Leonid Brezhnev noted, we would like the forthcoming summit meeting to be marked by big new steps along the road of developing peaceful relations between our states and of improving the international situation.

Gromyko said that in the past 2 or 3 years Soviet-U.S. relations had moved forward considerably. The main aspect of beneficial changes in these relations has been determined by the joint readiness of both sides to prevent the threat of war, to help strengthen international security and to develop broad, mutually beneficial cooperation. A great deal has been done along this road. As a result of the two Soviet-U.S. summit meetings, important fundamental decisions have been taken and practical measures have been carried out that have resulted in a cardinal reconstruction of relations between the two countries. The agreement on the prevention of nuclear war concluded during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the United States and the agreement on limiting strategic armaments signed during the preceding meeting with President Nixon are of special importance.

At the same time, Comrade Gromyko stressed, much remains to be done. The main task is to proceed from what has been achieved further in the directions that have been outlined so that the process of the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations becomes a permanent factor in international peace.

As for the concrete problems, Gromyko said, given due consistency and realistic and constructive approach by both sides, one can always find mutually acceptable decisions. The main thing is to keep to the general line, to adhere to the agreements already achieved, and to strictly carry out the obligations undertaken.

In conclusion, Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed the hope that the present meeting will be of much importance in insuring successful results at the summit talks.

During the luncheon, Secretary of State Kissinger made a speech in reply.

TASS Report on Kissinger Speech

Moscow TASS in English 1948 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 25 TASS--Henry Kissinger has emphasized that the U.S. Government is resolved to continue to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kissinger has stated that the USA wants to make the next summit meeting as resultative as the previous two. [paragraph continues]

III. 26 Mar 74

B 3

The principal aim is to make irreversible those trends in relationship between our two peoples and in the world as a whole, which has been growing up in the course of recent years. It is in this spirit that the USA will be having talks here. It is from such positions that the USA will pursue its policy.

The U.S. Secretary of State, assistant to the President for national security affairs, spoke at a luncheon given in his honour by Andrey Gromyko, Soviet minister of foreign affairs.

Henry Kissinger has emphasized that the name of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, will forever be associated with a turn in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States towards relaxation of tension. Mr. Kissinger has said that over the past two years many agreements have been signed between the Soviet Union and the United States, with the agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war being the major ones. All that occurred in recent years is indicative of the fact that the USA and the Soviet Union on the basis of strict equality are particularly responsible for the maintenance of peace.

The U.S. secretary of state has said the spirit of cooperation and equality established two years ago will go on strengthening in future, too. Sometimes we run into obstacles but we firmly intend to surmount them.

Further TASS Report on Speeches

Moscow TASS in English 1904 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow Mar 25 TASS--USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko today gave a luncheon in honour of the U.S. secretary of state, Henry Kissinger. During the luncheon Andrey Gromyko and Henry Kissinger exchanged speeches.

The talks that started today, Gromyko said, have a special significance in that they are connected with preparations for the forthcoming visit by U.S. President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union.

Andrey Gromyko stated that the two Soviet-American summits resulted in the adoption of crucially important decisions and the implementation of concrete measures that have put the beginning to a cardinal reconstruction of relations between the two countries. At the same time, Andrey Gromyko stressed, much still has to be done. The basic task is to advance, leaning on what has already been achieved, further in the outlined directions so that the process of improving Soviet-American relations become a permanent factor of international peace.

In his reply speech Henry Kissinger stressed that the name of CPSU CC General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev will forever be associated with bringing about a change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship towards relaxation of tension. The spirit of cooperation and equality, established two years ago, will go on consolidating also in the future.

Henry Kissinger stressed that the American Government is fully resolved to continue strengthening relations with the Soviet Union. Kissinger said they wanted to make the next summit as resultative as the previous two. The main aim is to make the tendencies in the relations of our two peoples and in the world as a whole that have taken shape during these years irreversible.

The luncheon passed in a friendly atmosphere.

III. 26 Mar 74

B 4

MOSCOW ON KISSINGER VISIT, SOVIET-U.S. RELATIONS

Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Tomas Kolesnichenko commentary]

[Text] Undoubtedly Dr Kissinger's visit to Moscow has major international significance, and Soviet-American relations are again in the limelight. A turning point in these relations came, of course, with the Moscow summit meeting of 1972, followed by the visit to the United States by General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Leonid Brezhnev last year. The two meetings resulted in the signing of important agreements, and some progress in economic and political cooperation has been made since then. The current visit to Moscow by the U.S. secretary of state is a follow-up to the exchanges of views on a broad range of issues in preparation for President Nixon's coming visit to the USSR.

The Soviet Union wants to achieve progress in Soviet-American relations on the basis of mutual respect and mutual advantage. This has been repeatedly pointed out by the Soviet leaders. President Nixon's speech last month likewise revealed that the United States is paying much attention to the development of relations with the Soviet Union. The President attaches particular important to the Soviet-American dialog in the field of arms limitation, normalization of trade and other areas.

Economic cooperation was the subject of debate in the Senate Finance Committee last week. During the debate on a government trade reform bill, a number of prominent businessmen spoke in favor of lifting restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Chairman of the International Department, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, (Goldie), said there were vast opportunities for mutually beneficial trade between American companies and Soviet foreign trade agencies. His view is shared by Chairman of the United States Council of International Chamber of Commerce McGregor. He pointed out that expanded trade and economic ties are beneficial to America as well as its trading partners.

Last week U.S. Commerce Secretary Dent also spoke of the importance of equitable trade with the Soviet Union without any discrimination. Addressing the annual conference of the (?Textile) Institute in Florida, he sharply criticized those American politicians who are trying to hamper continued Soviet-American dialog and normal economic contacts between the two countries.

Obviously it's no easy task to clear up the backlog of obstacles in the way of American-Soviet cooperation, and remove the after-effects of the long period of cold war. Late evidence indicates that opponents of relaxation in the United States have not yet laid down arms. One sign of this is the calls of Senators Buckley, Long and Byrd for using improved Soviet-American relations as an excuse for applying pressure on the Soviet Union and interfering in its internal affairs. These senators would like to make the removal of discriminatory practices in trade with the Soviet Union conditional on changes in Soviet laws. The question may be asked: What their attitude would be if the Soviet Union required a revision of United States internal laws as a precondition for supplies of goods the United States needs.

Relaxation of international tension and peaceful coexistence are incompatible with attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of a country. One would hope that Dr Kissinger's visit to Moscow will contribute to further Soviet-American cooperation on the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, and on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.

III. 27 Mar 74

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

B1

UNITED STATES

KISSINGER CONTINUES VISIT, MEETS WITH SOVIET LEADERS

Topics of Discussion

Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT 26 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS--The general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, and the USSR minister of foreign affairs, Andrey Gromyko, continued talks today with the secretary of state of the United States, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger.

Special attention was given to a study of the state of affairs as regards the peace settlement in the Middle East, to questions of security and cooperation in Europe, including the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe. Also continued was the discussion of questions of the further development of bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States, in particular in the trade and economic field. The talks were of a businesslike, constructive nature.

Meeting for U.S. Newsmen

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 26 Mar 74 L

[Text] The Press Department of the USSR Foreign Affairs Ministry arranged a friendly meeting today for the journalists who are staying in our country on the occasion of the visit of Dr Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state. Representatives of the largest American newspapers, magazines, television and radio companies and press agencies were present at the meeting.

COMMENTATOR ZAKHAROV: U.S.-USSR DETENTE BENEFITS EUROPE

Moscow in German to Germany 1743 GMT 25 Mar 74 G

[Text] Dear listeners, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has arrived in the Soviet capital. His mission is connected with the preparation of President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union. Upon his arrival Kissinger stated that the United States intends to continue the course which envisages an improvement of Soviet-American relations. Our commentator Valentin Zakharov now talks about the new quality of these relations:

Ladies and gentlemen: In the process of decisive and positive changes in international politics during the past few years, the improvement of Soviet-American relations has been one of the most important events. The meeting of President Nixon with Soviet leaders in May 1972 and Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the United States in June last year have shown that the relations between the two countries have undergone a change of historic significance. For the first time in the history of the extremely variable Soviet-American relations, it has become possible to create a basis on which stable and long-term relations can be developed.

This change occurred when the document on the "Bases of Relations Between the USSR and the United States" was signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon in Moscow on 29 May 1972. In this document on the bases of relations, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that in the nuclear age no other basis exists for maintaining relations between them than peaceful coexistence. Both states bound themselves to build their relations on the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit.

III. 27 Mar 74

B 2

The gradual improvement and the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence are of decisive importance for molding a new system of international relations. The improved Soviet-American relations are of particular importance for strengthening and deepening the process of detente in Europe, because it is in Europe where the strongest economic and military potentials of the two systems are concentrated. This requires that, in the interest of the safeguarding peace and comprehensive cooperation between states with different social systems in Europe, the principles of peaceful coexistence become the basic norm of relations. As early as at the 1972 meeting of Soviet and American statesmen in Moscow, both countries agreed, in the joint communique, to decisively contribute to the positive trends on the European continent toward genuine detente and development of peaceful cooperation. These agreements of May 1972 have led to a positive change in the political situation in Europe.

As a result of the agreements reached on a top level in Moscow in 1972 and in the United States last June, the United States participates in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of troops and arms. In this connection, the fact is also important that, in the signed Soviet-American basic documents, the United States repeatedly reiterated the usefulness of the entire set of agreements concluded in Europe since 1970, particularly the principles of the inviolability of borders on the basis of international law, and the territorial integrity of the socialist states of Europe, including the GDR.

On the whole, all this shows that the United States, under the influence of improved Soviet-American relations, has had to seek practical ways for its active and constructive participation in building a new system of collective security and cooperation in Europe. And, as reiterated in the final communique on Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the United States in 1973, both sides consider the safeguarding of a durable peace in Europe as an extremely important objective of their policy.

The development of international relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence also comprises Soviet-American measures in the field of security policy.

- 0 -

III. 28 Mar 74

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

B1

UNITED STATES

MOSCOW NOTES WASHINGTON REPORTS ON NIXON TRIP TO MOSCOW

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 28 Mar 74 L

[Text] It is reported from Washington that the U.S. public is attentively following the progress of the secretary of state's visit to the Soviet Union. The local press stresses that there are favorable prerequisites for the settlement of important problems during President Richard Nixon's visit to the USSR scheduled to take place in the summer of this year.

KISSINGER CONCLUDES USSR MEETINGS, LEAVES MOSCOW 28 MAR

Luncheon for Gromyko

Moscow TASS in English 1238 GMT 27 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS--U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave a luncheon here. The luncheon was attended by Andrey Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR; Boris Bugayev, minister of civil aviation, and other officials.

Luncheon Speeches

Moscow TASS in English 1842 GMT 27 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS--Henry Kissinger expressed the hope that considerable progress in the development of relations between the USSR and the USA will be achieved.

The U.S. secretary of state, presidential assistant for national security affairs, was addressing a luncheon which he gave in Moscow today in honour of USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.

The main thing is that the USA and the USSR are ready to continue to improve relations between the two countries. This attitude will contribute to consolidation of the cause of peace, Henry Kissinger stressed.

Andrey Gromyko noted that there have been serious positive changes in relations between the USSR and the USA. They have been achieved in the first place due to the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit talks which laid a solid foundation for progress.

Andrey Gromyko welcomed the determination of the U.S. Government reaffirmed by the U.S. secretary of state to continue the cause of improvement and intensification of Soviet-U.S. relations.

The USSR foreign minister stressed that the course towards improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, reflecting the will of the Soviet people and their Communist Party, is being consistently translated into reality by the CPSU Central Committee, its Political Bureau and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev personally.

"Now, both sides should take new concrete steps in the direction already outlined. It is precisely what, as we believe, the new summit meeting should serve," said Gromyko.

III. 28 Mar 74

B 2

27 Mar Discussions

Moscow TASS in English 1809 GMT 27 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 27 TASS--Talks were continued today between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. In the course of the talk, which was held in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, discussion of a number of issues of bilateral relations between the USSR and the USA and some international problems was continued.

Further Details on Talks

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 27 Mar 74 L

[Text] The talks of Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and minister of foreign affairs, with Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state, assistant to the President on national security affairs, were continued today.

The discussion of a number of questions pertaining to the bilateral relations between the USSR and the United States, as well as of some international problems, was continued during the talks, which took place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere.

Those taking part in the talks on the Soviet side were USSR Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin; Aleksandrov, aide to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Korniyenko and Sytenko, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collegium. On the American side were U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Stoessel; senior officials of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt, Hartman, Atherton, Maw, [words indistinct].

Departure From Moscow

Moscow TASS in English 0819 GMT 28 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS--Henry Kissinger, U.S. state secretary and assistant to the President for national security, left here today after a stay in the Soviet Union to continue an exchange of opinions on a wide range of questions of mutual interest and in connection with preparations for a visit by U.S. President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union.

At Vnukovo airport which was decorated with the national flags of the USA and the USSR, Henry Kissinger was seen off by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Civil Aviation Boris Bugayev, and other officials.

Among those present at the airport was also the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Walter Stoessel.

Replying to pressmen's questions, H. Kissinger said that he was very pleased with his trip to Moscow and satisfied with the talks, which were good and constructive. Both sides, he said, expressed the determination to further improve relations.

Henry Kissinger qualified prospects for the development of Soviet-American relations as favourable. He said he hoped that the summit meeting would be held when planned and would make a considerable contribution to peace.

III. 28 Mar 74

B 3

EARLIER PRAVDA COVERAGE OF KISSINGER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

25 Mar PRAVDA on Arrival

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Mar 74 p 1 L

[Text] TASS--H. Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state and assistant to the President for national security affairs, arrived in Moscow 24 March to continue the exchange of opinions on a broad range of questions of mutual interest and in connection with the forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union by U.S. President R. Nixon.

At Vnukovo airport, which was decorated with the state flags of the United States and the USSR, H. Kissinger was met by A.A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister; B.P. Bugayev, minister of civil aviation; V.V. Kuznetsov, USSR first deputy foreign minister; A.F. Dobrynin, USSR ambassador to the United States; A.M. Aleksandrov, assistant to the CPSU Central Committee general secretary; G.M. Kornynenko, member of the Collegium of the USSR foreign ministry; and D.S. Nikiforov, chief of the Protocol Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

W. Stoessel, U.S. ambassador to the USSR, was among the welcoming party.

White House officials H. Sonnenfeldt and A.A. Hartmann, and other officials arrived in Moscow with H. Kissinger.

Replying to journalists' questions, H. Kissinger said that the United States intends to continue the course toward the improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations which got under-way during the talks between L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and U.S. President R. Nixon. We intend to seek ways, H. Kissinger declared, for achieving further progress, because peace throughout the world depends to a large degree on good, peaceful relations between the United States and the USSR.

I expect from the forthcoming talks in Moscow that we will achieve definite progress on a number of very important questions and will confirm that each of us has a commit-ment to promote peace everywhere throughout the world.

26 Mar PRAVDA on Luncheon

[Editorial Report L] A TASS-attributed report on Foreign Minister Gromyko's luncheon for Kissinger, published by Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 26 March 1974, on page 6 includes the following additional passages to the Moscow Domestic Service item entitled "Moscow Radio on Gromyko Speech" published on page B 2 of the 26 March Soviet Union DAILY REPORT:

First paragraph, penultimate line, reads: ...Security Affairs Kissinger.

The luncheon was attended by W. Stoessel, U.S. ambassador to the USSR; H. Sonnenfeldt, State Department adviser; A. Hartmann and A. Atherton, assistant secretaries of state; other officials accompanying the secretary of state; and also diplomatic officials from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

The Soviet side was represented by I.V. Arkhipov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; S.G. Lapin, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; V.V. Kuznetsov and M.R. Kuzmin, USSR deputy ministers; A.F. Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States; D.M. Gvishiani, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Science and Technology; and other officials.

During the luncheon ...

III. 28 Mar 74

B 4

Last line of item reads:...speech in reply

In his reply, H. Kissinger stressed that the name of L.I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, will always be associated with the shift in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in the direction of the relaxation of tension.

Many agreements have been concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States in the last 2 years, H. Kissinger said. The agreements on the limitation of strategic arms and the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war are among the most important. Everything that has taken place in these years reflects the fact that the United States and the USSR bear a special responsibility for preserving peace on the basis of strict equality.

If our two states were to attempt to gain some advantages from each other or to attempt to act from positions of strength, there would be no peace either between our states or throughout the world. But if we act jointly without attempting to obtain one-sided advantages, we will secure lasting peace on earth. The spirit of cooperation and equality initiated 2 years ago will continue to be strengthened in the future. We sometimes meet obstacles, but we firmly intend to remove them. H. Kissinger stressed that the U.S. Government is fully determined to continue to strengthen relations with the Soviet Union.

We, H. Kissinger said, want to make the next summit as fruitful as the previous two. The main objective is to render irreversible the trends in relations between our two peoples and in the world as a whole which have developed in the past few years. We will conduct our talks here in precisely this spirit. We will pursue our policy from these positions.

The luncheon took place in a friendly atmosphere.

TEXT OF 'ANNOUNCEMENT' ON KISSINGER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT 28 Mar 74 L

[Text] Moscow March 28 TASS--Follows the full text of the announcement on the stay of Henry Kissinger in the USSR:

In accordance with the previously reached understanding, Henry A. Kissinger, secretary of state of the United States and assistant to the President for national security affairs, visited Moscow from 24 to 28 March. He had discussions with Leonid I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and Andrey A. Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

Taking part in the discussions on the Soviet side were: The ambassador of the USSR in the USA, A.F. Dobrynin, assistant to the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union A.M. Aleksandrov, members of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR G.M. Korniyenko and M.D. Sytenko. On the American side: The ambassador of the USA to the USSR, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., officials of the department of state Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Arthur A. Hartman, Alfred L. Atherton, Carlyle E. Maw, William G. Hyland, and Jan M. Lodal of the staff of the National Security Council.

An exchange of views was held on a broad range of questions of mutual interest in connection with the preparation for the visit to the Soviet Union of the President of the United States, Richard M. Nixon.

III. 28 Mar 74

B 5

The sides noted with satisfaction that the course taken by the two countries toward a relaxation of tension and a major improvement of relations between them continues to be implemented successfully and brings tangible results. The exceptional importance of the fundamental decisions adopted at the two previous Soviet-American summit meetings, first of all the basic principles of relations between the USSR and the USA, the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, and the agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, has been convincingly demonstrated.

The sides are determined to pursue, on the basis of strict observance of the obligations they have assumed, the established policy aimed at making the process of improving Soviet-American relations irreversible.

In the course of the discussions, considerable attention was given to the problem of the further limitation of strategic arms. The sides agree that, despite the complexity of this problem, there are possibilities for reaching mutually acceptable solutions. They are determined to continue to make energetic efforts to find such solutions. Certain other questions relative to the area of arms limitation and disarmament were also considered.

Noting the favorable development of bilateral relations in a number of directions determined by the agreements signed by the USSR and the USA, the two sides intend to develop further mutually beneficial ties and businesslike cooperation in different areas, including trade, economic and scientific and technological areas on a long-term basis.

In discussing international problems, particular attention was paid to the state of affairs regarding a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. It was agreed that, taking into account their special role at the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East, the sides would make efforts to promote the solution of the key questions of the Middle East settlement.

The questions pertaining to security and cooperation in Europe were also examined, first of all the progress of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the state of the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

The exchange of views was held in a constructive and businesslike atmosphere. The sides are convinced that it has been an important stage in the preparation for the successful holding of the forthcoming Soviet-American summit meeting and for Soviet-American relations in general.

MOSCOW SEES U.S. MANEUVERS IN PANAMA AIMED AGAINST DETENTE

Report on Maneuvers

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 25 Mar 74 L

[Text] Anti-aircraft defense exercises have begun in the Panama Canal Zone. A new squadron of Phantoms and some 1,000 servicemen have been sent there from the United States. Together with the personnel of the 14 American military bases in the Panama Canal Zone, they will take part in maneuvers which will last until 3 April.

III. 29 Mar 74

A 5

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
GENERAL

The Soviet Union, loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism, has always been a supporter of all forces struggling against imperialism and reaction, for democracy, independence and social progress. Iraqi president Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr gave the session convincing examples of fruitful cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Baghdad meeting took place following the international peaceloving forces conference in Moscow, the appeals of which were supported by the participants in this meeting. They have laid down a program in the struggle to solve the urgent problems of Asian and African countries, as well as for easing international tension.

Action Program

Moscow TASS in English 0618 GMT 29 Mar 74 L

[Text] Baghdad March 28 TASS--The eleventh session of the Council of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization which was held in Baghdad from March 24 to March 27 has approved the action programme for 1974-1975. This programme envisages the holding of joint world conferences, international seminars and symposiums of scientists and economists to discuss a wide range of questions of social and economic development of the Afro-Asian world.

The session has approved amendments to the AAPSO charter, under which, specifically, a new body, the Presidium of the organization has been set up and three assistant secretaries elected: representatives of Iran, Guinea-Bissau and Cyprus. Seven new members were admitted into the AAPSO.

The session also approved the resolution on social and economic development of the Afro-Asian countries which emphasized the importance of the development of the state sector. The resolution suggests that the developing Afro-Asian states should widen economic cooperation with the socialist countries and calls for development of regional cooperation among Afro-Asian states. The participants in the session declared that it is impossible to achieve economic independence without making radical social changes.

III. 29 Mar 74

USSR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

B1

UNITED STATES

MOSCOW RADIO INTERVIEWS KISSINGER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 28 Mar 74 L

[Text] U.S. Secretary of State and Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger was in Moscow from 24 to 28 March. An exchange of opinions was continued on a wide range of questions in connection with the preparation for the visit to the Soviet Union of President Nixon. Kissinger left Moscow today. At the airport he gave an interview to a correspondent of Soviet television and radio: [recorded--Kissinger's answers in English fading into translation]

[Question] How satisfied are you with your visit to Moscow?

[Answer] I am very satisfied with my visit. The talks were successful, very constructive, and both sides are determined to continue the work of normalization. I think we will achieve success in this.

[Question] What do you think of the prospects of Soviet-American relations?

[Answer] I think they are favorable.

[Question] What do you have to say about the summit talks?

[Answer] We expect the summit to take place as scheduled, and we hope it will contribute considerably to strengthening peace throughout the world.

Return to Washington Reported

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 29 Mar 74 L

[Text] Washington--U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger has returned here from a visit to the Soviet Union. He was in the USSR to continue an exchange of opinions on a wide circle of questions of mutual interest and in connection with preparations for the visit to the Soviet Union of U.S. President Richard Nixon. On his way from Moscow Kissinger stopped over in London.

AMERICAN PEOPLE HOPE FOR FAVORABLE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 28 Mar 74 L

[Yuriy Soltan report from Washington]

[Text] The American public attentively followed the trip to Moscow of U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. The press stresses that there are good prerequisites for the solution of important problems during the visit to the Soviet Union by President Nixon, planned for the summer of this year. The majority of Americans consider that the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States responds to the vital interests of their country and the interests of strengthening peace.

Julian (?Dowling), one of the leaders of a large corporation--the Kellogg Company--declared that Soviet-American economic cooperation not only brings practical advantages to both countries but also strengthens the foundations of the policy of detente. Julian (?Dowling) stresses: We are for the liquidation of all the obstacles on the path of the development of free trade between our countries. He expressed the conviction that the USSR and the United States could become good trade partners.

Our correspondent visited the manned space flight center near Houston, where active preparations are going on to implement the first joint Soviet-American space flight in the history of cosmonautics.

Atlantic
Charter
Waning

SCHEEL, From A1

documents in acceptable form.
This could provide the ra-
tionale for a trip to Europe
by President Nixon.

Washington Post correspond-
ent John M. Goshko reported
from Bonn that Kissinger gave
his tentative endorsement to
a plan proposed recently by
Scheel to improve consulta-
tion between Washington and
the nine. In outline, this plan
calls for the EEC's political
consultation group, which does
the basic spade work on most
internal community decisions,
to consult the United States
on important matters before
passing its recommendations
on to the foreign ministers of
the nine for final decision.

"We have welcomed some of the ideas, in fact all of the ideas, developed by the Federal Republic to strengthen the consultation between Europe and the United States," Kissinger said, "and we have encouraged the foreign minister and the Federal Republic to pursue some of these ideas with their colleagues in the European Community."

Asked about President Nix-
on's decision, announced in Chi-
cago, to call off the "Year of
Europe" trip planned for this
spring, Kissinger replied "We
shall now first have to see how
the further consultations evolve.
In principle, there is nothing
against the trip, but we want to
have a concrete basis for it."

In reference to France,
the principal target of Mr.
Nixon's Chicago remarks, Kiss-
singer said, "We are always
ready to carry further our
bilateral consultations with
France. It is not in our in-
terest to disturb the unity of
Europe or to pursue a policy
of dividing the European
states."

MONDAY • MARCH 25,

©1974 by Field Enterprises Inc.

99th Year, Number 71

46 Pages in 4 Sections

How Mideast
war almost
axed detente

By Mark Gayn

Special to The Daily News

3.25.74

On Oct. 6, 1973, Arab armies struck at Israel. A new
Middle East war had begun — with Soviet blessings.

Detente? Easing of tensions between the Soviet Union and
the United States? Peace?

Instead of peace, the world was witnessing bloodshed and
a new Cold War confrontation of the two superpowers.

And Watergate played a role in high-level Soviet strategy
sessions.

When the Mideast war finally ended, both the United
States and the Soviet Union credited detente with halting the
fighting. But, in fact, detente obligations taken by Soviet

Dean:
to hide

Inside the Kremlin wall

Mark Gayn has covered Asia and the Soviet Union for The Daily News and other publications for 40 years. In this series, he uncovers the story of the struggle inside the Kremlin over detente with the West. He got his information in Moscow from Russian friends who helped draft the detente strategy and from Asian and Western ambassadors who constructed the sequence of events for their own intelligence. This is the second of four articles.

party boss Leonid Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon
were blithely ignored.

WHEN I ARRIVED IN MOSCOW on Oct. 10, I found
myself immersed in an atmosphere I had not felt in any
capital involved in a major crisis.

The press carried little news but for the Egyptian and
Syrian communique, with their claims of defensive vic-
tories on all fronts.

Cartoons in Pravda showed Israeli generals with blood
dripping off their claw-like fingers.

Not a word was said of the delicate negotiations Soviet
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin was then carrying on in
Washington with Sec. of State Henry A. Kissinger — negotia-
tions widely reported in the West.

A group of U.S. and Canadian scientists whom I met in
Moscow complained that they could not learn what was hap-
pening.

INFORMANTS IN MOSCOW have no doubt that the Polit-
buro knew of the Arab attack well in advance.

The Soviets, after all, had between 4,000 and 5,000 "ad-
visers" with the Egyptian and Syrian armies, and the strat-
egy of the two states had been drawn jointly with Soviet
generals.

The final Soviet blessings are believed to have been given
to the Arabs a fortnight before the attack, when Egypt's

Turn to Page 4, Column I

Nixon given
extra time
by Jaworski

WASHINGTON (AP) — At the request of the White House, special Watergate prosecutor Leon Jaworski Monday gave President Nixon four more days to respond to a subpena demanding additional Watergate evidence.

The subpena, issued March
15, called for a response Mon-
day.

BUT, over the weekend
James D. St. Clair, Mr. Nix-
on's chief Watergate lawyer,
asked Jaworski for more time
and the prosecutor extended
the return date to Friday.

In a brief statement, Ja-
worski's office said, "In agree-
ing to the White House
request, Mr. Jaworski empha-
sized the grand jury's need for
the material covered under
this subpena."

The prosecutor's office re-
fused to give details about the
material subpenaed.

ON ANOTHER MATTER, a
U.S. District Court spokesman
Monday said the sealed grand
jury report on Mr. Nixon's Wa-
tergate role will be turned
over to the House Judiciary

Soft coal make

Goy, Dan, Walker, and John m.

3/25/74
wash Post

# The Game's Name Is Detente When A Job's at Stake

*A Commentary*

*By Nicholas von Hoffman*

The President is amok among us, roving from city to city alternately playing a yoyo and denouncing our European friends and allies. Dr. Kissinger is alleged to be arranging for Egypt's best belly dancer to visit us, and Pat Buchanan, the chap with the truggish personality who has taken Chuck Colson's place as top White House brute, is arguing that our non-tax-paying non-crook shouldn't be canned because we need his foreign policy leadership.

Under Nixon and Kissinger that policy is more often praised than understood. "The fact is that today no one really knows for sure what the foreign policy of this administration actually is," writes highly regarded conservative Columbia University professor Zbigniew Brzezinski in the spring number of Foreign Policy magazine.

However, you don't have to throw right-handed to see that, even with what the good Kissinger has done in the Middle East, he and his boss peaked some time ago. That the Secretary of State is still described as a genius in the public prints can be traced to journalism's continuing reluctance to criticize those with whom it breaks bread. Thirty or 40 more of the right dinner invitations from the White House to the right

people in the news business and there never would have been a Watergate scandal.

Yet while Kissinger stills criticism and discourages analysis by answering his RSVPs instead of the hard questions, it is becoming clear that he and Nixon are operating on the proposition that Washington and Moscow can, should and must jointly rule the world. It is the sort of proposition that a couple of raw power boys like N and K would naturally adopt as policy.

Neither of them has come out in public and admitted that they are attempting such an historic turn in the world power lineup, but then one of the characteristics both men share is an excessive love of secrets. Though change has been masked by much talk about our little grandchildren living in peace, the truth is that as yet our pro-Russian policies have netted us zilch.

There is detente but there is no disarmament. In addition there have been a series of not ungenerous military, technological and economic concessions by us that have not been matched by the Russians. They have smiled a lot, and when there has been an international crisis Kissinger has announced that the Russians were acting with "restraint."

What's happened is that matters have been allowed

to develop so that Nixon's and Kissinger's domestic political interest in detente now far exceeds our national interest. Those two are holding on with one last argument, namely that only they are clever, knowledgeable and adept enough to bring home world peace. This gives the Russians an opportunity to extract real concessions from us in return for the seeming face of friendship. Thus Brzezinski observes, "Claiming that so much depends on allegedly good personal relations with Brezhnev has given the Soviet side an inescapable bargaining leverage, which the experienced Soviet ambassador to Washington, Dobrynin, has done his best to nurture through sustained personal flattery and courtship of the key individuals involved."

Concurrently, the falling apart of relations with Europe and Japan has progressed from vaguely disturbing to a point of serious concern. Nixon and Kissinger may find it pleasing to call anyone who doesn't believe in them "isolationists," but it is they who have locked themselves up in the Kremlin, increasingly cutting themselves off from our allies and trading partners.

See COMMENTARY, B2, Col. 7

# The Game's Name

## COMMENTARY, From B1

For five years, we have treated our allies to an unending number of snubs, public dressings down and bolt-from-the-blue declarations. The long-needed reconciliation with China was seriously damaged by Kissinger's failure to consult Tokyo before he did it; our relations with everybody were damaged by two dollar devaluations without consultation with anybody, and Kissinger's oil policy speech in London reinforced the impression that our Secretary of State's strongest suit is the weakest kind of press agentry.

Right now Kissinger is at work paving the way for another Nixon visit to Moscow, one obviously timed to help him stave off impeachment. More than ever, then, Nixon will be liable to trade real concessions in return for the Communists' help in saving his job. However, if the cost of saving his job is our isolation from the world's major democracies, the rupture of our ancient friendships and the ruin of foreign trade and the international money system for a spurious alliance with these tyrannical Russian mink farmers, then he has indeed committed high crimes and misdemeanors.

© 1974, The Washington Post/King Features Syndicate

THE WASHINGTON POST,

Joseph Alsop

Baggage for Moscow

In a quarter century and more, the United States has never sent a negotiator into the fray carrying the kind of heavy handicaps that Dr. Henry A. Kissinger is carrying to Moscow. The handicaps begin at home, of course.

Even if some Americans are too silly to realize the fact, all of America's adversaries in the world are well aware that this is a presidential government. If the President is crippled, the government is crippled. This is the state of affairs today, and it will continue to be the state of affairs until the business of the President's impeachment is finished, one way or another.

So far, the Secretary of State has coped with this particular handicap by the characteristically shrewd device of pretending that he has hardly heard the dread name, "Watergate." The device has worked, though only barely worked, for two main reasons. The President has backed his secretary to the hilt. The Congress has not dissented. Hence Dr. Kissinger has appeared a remaining island of authority rising above the general flood of growing weakness.

Maybe another reason should be mentioned, too. This self-castrated America, dangerously weakened by Americans' actions, is still much stronger than any other Western nation. Without exception—although for several different reasons—the major Western nations across the Atlantic now have weak governments, beset by many difficulties, and pursuing uncertain courses.

But this situation, viewed in another way, also constitutes another heavy negotiating handicap for the Secretary of State. Only consider how the Western Alliance must now appear, as viewed from Moscow.

To begin with, because of the new crude oil price, there is the startling

> "This self-castrated America is still much stronger than any other Western nation, without exception."

prospect that all the major nations of the West will run balance of payments deficits—in fact, will be unable to pay their bills—during the period ahead. No one can quite fortell the consequences of universal deficits. The problem has never arisen before. But Moscow must be asking whether the long-awaited crisis of capitalism is not beginning at long last.

To go on with, the money troubles now in prospect are already making the British and the Europeans reach for the carving knife, to cut their defense budgets. This theme surfaced powerfully last week, when Allied high officials gathered here to talk about European troop strengths with their American opposite numbers.

Finally, there has never been a period of such Western disunity since the end of World War II. It is a problem little understood in Washington, but the causes are simple enough at bottom. About a year ago, the French took an important though unannounced decision, probably on the basis of that period's close new relationship between President Pompidou and the former British Prime Minister, Edward Heath.

The French decision was to veer away from narrow nationalism, toward

a new policy of trying to build a politically united Europe under French domination. Unity generally needs an "against" element. As the Europeans were too fearful to be united against the Soviets, the French also wanted a Europe united against the Americans. Anti-Americanism was to be the prime political glue, in fact.

Various steps were taken to this end, such as the new Common Market rule that all European political positions must be worked out in advance, without consultation with the United States. The instrument created for this purpose was the so-called Davignon Committee, named for its able Belgian organizer, Comte Etienne Davignon.

By this and other devices, the United States was continuously confronted without warning with European positions, mainly concerning the Mideast, that ran sharply counter to U.S. views and even U.S. interests. This led to the recent blow-up. The blow up, in turn, has now led to German suggestions to the French that the new system had better be altered to bring in the Americans more freely. Yet the Western disunity painfully persists.

Add up the score, then. Dr. Kissinger goes to Moscow first with a crippled government behind him; second, with an oil-caused economic crisis ahead of him; and third, with an Alliance all around him weaker and more fractured than at any time in the past. This is not an ideal negotiator's assignment.

Maybe one should not be too pessimistic. But even the flattering Soviet invitation to Zavidovo, the politburo hunting lodge never opened to any other Westerner, was three quarters withdrawn on the very eve of Dr. Kissinger's departure. If he succeeds in Moscow, it will be remarkable.

© 1974, Los Angeles Times

United Press International

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, flanked by his children, Elizabeth and David, chats with

West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, right, during a stopover in Bonn en route to

Moscow for diplomatic talks. At left are Mrs. Scheel and her daughter, Cornelia.

# New Optimism Marks Moscow Talks

KISSINGER, From A1

temporary limitation signed at the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit in 1972.

In addition, the same U.S. sources now specifically speak of the prospect for approaching another conceptual breakthrough on beginning the reduction of conventional East-West forces based in Central Europe.

This confirms signs discernible in Washington last week that in the Brezhnev-Kissinger talks there would be a new surge of effort to remove the

obstacles impeding a compromise on the sensitive troop-cutting issue.

American sources now rate this topic as third in importance here this week, just behind the strategic nuclear discussions and peace in the Middle East.

A compromise is needed between the opposing versions of proposals by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact for first-stop reduction in troop levels.

The NATO plan's first phase would cut American and Soviet troops only, withdrawing about 29,000 U.S. troops and 68,000 of the larger Soviet forces. The first phase of the Warsaw Pact plan would reduce all forces on both sides—not just Americans and Rus-

sians—by an equal cut of 20,000 men.

Kissinger was greeted on his arrival here by a delegation headed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. The Russian left the talking to Kissinger.

Kissinger said world peace depends to a great degree on relations between the two nations.

He emphasized that it is the U.S. attitude "that none of our countries will take special advantage of situations" in any part of the world.

"I expect," said Kissinger, that "we will make concrete progress on a number of outstanding issues..."

Tass, the Soviet news agency, used a softened version of this quotation, in both

its Russian and English versions. Tass quoted Kissinger a saying that, "a certain progress will be achieved on a number of major questions." There was no explanation available for the variation. Observers speculated that the Soviet authorities wanted to avoid telling Russian readers that the Americans anticipate anything so specific as "concrete progress." This, too, may be part of Soviet tactics to avoid blame if there is little progress.

Kissinger and other U.S. officials were given quarters in the Lenin Hills section of Moscow. This was in a shift in plans that will keep most of the meetings in the capital, rather than in a countryside villa, as originally planned.

Kissinger in Soviet, Hopeful on Arms Deadlock

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

which has indicated that it is impatient with the Nixon Administration for not having made good on promises to relax high American tariffs on Soviet goods, warned today that the issue of Soviet Jewish emigration should not be injected into he talks.

Pravda, reacting to various recent appeals for Mr. Kissinger to press for assurances that exit visas will be granted to 1,600 Jews seeking to emigrate, charged that "international Zionism" had stepped up its activities in the last week with the aim of disrupting East-West accord.

Mr. Kissinger said that the trade issue would be dealt with while he is here, but he did not indicate whether he would present new appeals to the Soviet

leadership on a specific list of cases.

Two Democratic Senators, Henry M. Jackson of Washington and Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut, leaders of the Congressional effort to get Moscow to ease the emigration restrictions, reportedly told Mr. Kissinger that they wanted him to obtain Soviet assurances that more than 35,000 jews a year would be allowed to emigrate. The Senators were said to have made this a condition of considering revision in tariff legislation concerning Soviet imports.

In recent weeks the number of Jewish applicants for emigration has reportedly dropped because new administrative regulations have made the application process more complicated and risky.

Mr. Kissinger and his party

were taken from the airport to guest houses on the Lenin Hills, overlooking Moscow. Beginning tomorrow, he is expected to have at least one or two meetings a day with Mr. Brezhnev. Mr. Gromyko and other top Soviet officials. On his way here, Mr. Kissinger stopped off in Bonn to see West German leaders. Kissinger said that his top priority was to seek a "conceptual breakthrough" with the Soviet leadership on rough guidelines for what constitutes parity in the Soviet and American offensive strategic arsenals — the core of another arms-limitations agreement.

Senior American officials here disclosed that Mr. Kissinger's negotiating list had been discussed Thursday at a meeting of the National Security Council that was devoted solely to the arms negotiations.

fare patient was coerced into accepting sterilization. Judge Gesell ruled that the regulations were not adequate to insure this and needed to be re-drafted to make the safeguards more certain.

On sterilization practices in general in the United States, the best available evidence comes from the federally funded 1970 National Fertility Study, sponsored by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development. This showed a marked rise in voluntary sterilization operations between 1965 and 1970. It was this study that showed, for 1970, the figure of 16.5 per cent of all married couples between the ages of 20 and 39 having undergone sterilization in one or the other partner.

A spokesman for Planned Parenthood - World Population said it appeared that the trend had continued upward, although far more slowly than during the last half of the decade of the nineteen-sixties.

The Association for Voluntary Sterilization, which has

BOSTON Herald Advertiser

3/24

Max Lerner

# On Kissinger's Style

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gets a better press among liberals abroad than in the United States. I suspect this will be his fate in the history books, too. Which may suggest that a prophet is often thrown for a loss on his own turf.

On the plus side of Kissinger's prestige ledger, note the reaction of Latin American diplomats to his meeting with them at the Mexico City conference before he set off on his new Middle East mission. Remember that what happens in the Middle East carries more of the world's immediate hopes and fears with it, but that the relation between the two Americas has even greater long-range importance for both.

Mexico City was a success on both sides. The talks were informal and intimate; there was no stiffness, no punctilio, no sizzling, polarizing issues and no public grandstand orations as at past conferences. Kissinger got the deep and even affectionate respect of his fellow diplomats.

The basic reason for this is not generally noted, although it says something about the Latin American mind and about the sources of good U.S. diplomacy.

The Latin Americans care about words, ideas and personal warmth. They also care about the tangible material results of diplomacy, but the intellectual and emotional elements of diplomatic style outweigh even the hard results. They are the equivalent, in diplomacy, of the embraco.

What they resent most is being taken for granted by their rich, powerful neighbor to the north. Next to that, they resent having someone outside—especially the United States—tell them what is best for them to do. A number of U.S. administrations have managed to fuse both of these, combining long periods of inattention with high-pressure attention when it does come.

The Latin American nations—scarred by rapid changes of regime, by class struggle, by military coups—are jealous of their national identity. They may themselves still be confused by it. but they don't want any outsider either to ignore or coerce it.

The Kissinger impact on Latin America may prove to be the third time in the century when the United States has had sustained prestige there. The first was the "Good Neighbor Policy" of Franklin Roosevelt and Sumner Welles. The second was the Alliance for Progress under John Kennedy. A third may be opening now— despite the U.S. boycott of Castro's Cuba, despite the Latin American economic nationalisms, despite the expropriations, despite the feeling about multinational corporations.

What the three periods have in common is attention plus charisma. Roosevelt had charisma and his wife's high visibility, and the Roosevelt name became a symbol in Latin America even though his policy was spotty in result. Kennedy cast a spell over Latin Americans, even though his program ended with little alliance and less progress.

Because Kissinger knows this, he is chary of high rhetoric and inflated titles for the new relationship and stresses continuing face-to-face meetings, with informal talk and modest but practical results.

The fact that Kissinger is linked with Mr. Nixon won't bother Latin American journalists and intellectuals as it does some of those in the United States. Even his reported remark that he couldn't carry on as secretary of state if Mr. Nixon were impeached—doubtless meant to bolster the President in a shaky time—will stir up less dust and flak abroad than in Washington.

His influence with the President is one of Kissinger's diplomatic strengths, not weaknesses, since it means he is unlikely to be ignored. The current visit of GM and Chrysler representatives in Havana may be the first tangible fruit of Mexico City. That counts in Latin America.

What counts most is Kissinger's intellectual style. In the Latin American elites, the poet, essayist, philosopher and international lawyer have a better chance in diplomacy than the land owner, general or industrialist. We have almost forgotten how much support Andre Malraux drummed up for Charles de Gaulle in his Latin American swing. Kissinger has style—and clout, too. For Latin Americans it is a heady mixture.

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3-24-74

BOSTON HERALD Advertiser
Commentaries

C. L. Sulzberger

# The Kissinger Phenomenon

PARIS — On the verge of yet another trip to Moscow, Henry A. Kissinger seems well on the way to proving himself the most remarkable secretary of state in American history. But a tricky road stretches ahead, studded with pitfalls. And the Russians have been hinting recently that they might not be averse to making trouble.

Kissinger's particular genius has been for recognizing the requirements of contemporary history for acknowledging from the start that there is only one other superpower, the Soviet Union, which is capable of upsetting the stability he seeks to compose; and for seeing the need to act swiftly to remove obstacles to peace. Such action, in our time, requires continual travel in order to negotiate at the top.

His method is to assiduously prepare the diplomatic ground before showing his hand. This was true in Southeast Asia, where American public opinion has been curiously averse to giving him the credit he richly merits for withdrawals U.S. forces and bringing down the scale of fighting.

Vietnam has for so long been a code word for disaster that most people lose all semblance of intellectual reasoning once they hear it.

The same method was applied by Kissinger in preparing for super-negotiations still going on with Russia. These required access to the Kremlin by the back door, through development of a Chinese option that had not previously existed. That was arranged by supporting Pakistan against India in the 1971 war.

Finally, to give meaning to bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R., including SALT, mutual force reductions and European security, it was necessary to defuse the Middle East, an area from which Kissinger kept clear personally, during most of Nixon's first term.

Three years ago, he became actively interested, if still on the sidelines, and sent out hints that the Russians would have to withdraw their military presence from Egypt (which they subsequently did), if Sadat were to have a chance at making peace.

For a long time, he has held definite ideas on such disparate subjects as Greece, Japan, post-Tito Yugoslavia, Cuba's future and the obvious need, some day, for small tactical nuclear weapons being deployed increasingly in Europe to make up for the permanent shortfall of NATO troops, especially as the U.S. garrison is reduced.

Kissinger has seen for years that Western Europe is an essential component of the international stability he seeks to devise. From the moment he first became Nixon's national security adviser, he favored British admission to the Common Market.

He hoped London would assume some of the burden of political leadership, thus compensating the disadvantage to America of a competing economic bloc. Also, he saw as "a fact of life" the need for linkage between Atlantic defense, commercial and monetary problems, something the French have a well-developed tic for resenting.

But, as Kissinger wrote in late 1962 just after working for President Kennedy, "a sense of outrage is not a good guide to policy." Both he and friend Michel Jobert, France's foreign minister, recently had to relearn this truth. The secretary also had to remember his own early warnings against "our somewhat schoolmasterism approach" to France which prompted his break with Kennedy.

More than 11 years ago, Kissinger forecast it was "inevitable that countries with the historical traditions of our European allies would not be content forever to depend entirely on the protection of our nuclear power."

His vision was correct, but because the Common Market has never been able to advance from an economic to a political community, that dependence remains: not that Kissinger hasn't tried to encourage a "European" atomic force.

True partnership between the U.S.A. and "Europe" was and remains "possible only between equals" and it is too bad he seems momentarily to have forgotten his earlier sponsorship of "some form of Atlantic coordinating body."

In the meantime events forced him to recall his earlier forecast that "Europe is bound to be a third force, partly because we ourselves have sought to make it so" and that "the French position has been more closely attuned than ours to the psychological realities in Europe."

Past events thus confirmed the clarity of his outlook. future events — dependent on Kissinger's own negotiating genius — will test his ability to act on the basis of his analysis, cementing a new trans-Atlantic stability even as war recedes from Southeast and Southwest Asia.

(C) N.Y. Times News Service

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WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS - 24 MARCH 1974

# No Caviar for Kissinger in Moscow

### CROSBY S. NOYES

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is a man who likes to be liked and generally succeeds. He gets along famously with Le Duc Tho and Chou En-lai. Jordan's King Hussein says he inspires hope. For Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, he is one American to be trusted. So far as Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban is concerned, his conduct of American foreign policy "refutes the view that history is the product of impersonal forces and objective conditions in which the personal human factor doesn't matter."

Yet there are times when events escape the control of the most gifted personal human factor, and Henry Kissinger may be heading toward one today. His meeting with Soviet leaders this week does not shape up as a hands - across - the - caviar type of love feast. In fact, it may be one of the grimmer sessions of his dazzling diplomatic career.

The signs have been increasing for some time now of a growing restiveness within the Soviet establishment. The policies of detente and cooperation with the West laid down by Party Chairman Leonid I. Brezhnev have been coming in for considerable thinly veiled

criticism from more hawkish elements in the political and military leadership. Many Western observers have predicted that the Kremlin at some point would be moved to exploit weaknesses within the American government and the Atlantic alliance. And today the opportunities must seem especially enticing.

Certainly, there is no lack of possibilities for Russian mischief-making if they are inclined in that direction. The Soviet press of late has been harshly critical of Kissinger's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, dismissing progress made so far as insignificant and charging that the United States still represents Israeli interests.

For their part, the Russians are demanding that all negotiations be held within the framework of the Geneva conference, in which the Soviet Union serves as co-chairman. Their espousal of the most extreme Arab demands does nothing to encourage the hope that they want peace in the Middle East. And they are in a strong position to prevent a settlement if they choose to do so.

At the same time, the So-

viet leaders have done their best to persuade the Arab states to maintain their oil embargo, hailing the energy crisis for its influence on the "whole system of relations in the camp of modern capitalism." According to Pravda, the frictions caused by the energy shortage have resulted in a break between the United States and Europe that "threatens to sink" the Common Market.

For the Russians — who have been trying to do exactly that for many years — this is hardly a calamitous turn of events. It is an indication, however, that they are anxious to do whatever they can to expand and exploit any ruptures within the Western camp. They also can be expected to step up their ideological and political pressure on a Western Europe which they perceive as becoming weak, divided and disoriented in its alliances.

The Soviet leaders probably see themselves as close to achieving their major objectives in Western Europe: The dissolution of NATO and the Common Market, the retreat of American military power and a deepening economic crisis within the capitalist world. They may be per-

suaded that the time has come to go on the offensive, politically, ideologically and even militarily, to accelerate the decline of the West.

An even more sinister possibility is that the Soviet Union will exploit Western weaknesses to settle scores with Communist China. The increasing bitterness of that quarrel, the breakdown of efforts to negotiate boundary differences and the vast buildup of military strength on both sides suggest that neither the Chinese nor the Russians are ruling out the possibility of full-scale war.

This is admittedly a gloomy reading of the prospects. It may be that none of these matters will be discussed in the course of Kissinger's visit to Moscow and that the conversation will be confined to such diplomatic banalities as the deadlocked SALT talks and President Nixon's projected summit meeting with Soviet leaders in June.

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that our relations with the Soviet Union may be at the point of taking a sudden — and even dramatic — turn for the worse. And this essentially is what Kissinger has gone to Moscow to find out.

NEW YORK TIMES 24 MARCH 1974

# Kissinger Phenomenon

### By C. L. Sulzberger

PARIS—On the verge of yet another trip to Moscow, Henry Kissinger seems well on the way to proving himself the most remarkable Secretary of State in American history. But a tricky road stretches ahead, studded with pitfalls. And the Russians have been hinting recently that they might not be adverse to making trouble.

Mr. Kissinger's particular genius has been for recognizing the requirements of contemporary history; for acknowledging from the start that there is only one other superpower, the Soviet Union, which is capable of upsetting the stability he seeks to compose; and for seeing the need to act swiftly to remove obstacles to peace. Such action, in our time, requires continual travel in order to negotiate at the top.

His method is to prepare assiduously the diplomatic ground before showing his hand. This was true in Southeast Asia, where American public opinion has been curiously adverse to giving him the credit he richly merits for withdrawing United States forces and bringing down the scale of fighting. Vietnam has for so long been a codeword for disaster that most people lose all semblance of intellectual reasoning once they hear it.

The same method was applied by Mr. Kissinger in preparing for super negotiations still going on with Russia. These required access to the Kremlin by the back door, through development of a Chinese option that had not previously existed. That was arranged by supporting Pakistan against India in

the 1971 war.

Finally, to give meaning to bilateral and multilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R., including SALT, mutual force reductions and European security, it was necessary to defuse the Middle East, an area from which Mr. Kissinger kept clear, personally, during most of President Nixon's first term.

Three years ago, he became actively interested, if still on the sidelines, and sent out hints that the Russians would have to withdraw their military presence from Egypt (which they subsequently did), if President Sadat were to have a chance of making peace.

For a long time, he has held definite ideas on such disparate subjects as Greece, Japan, post-Tito Yugoslavia, Cuba's future and the obvious need, some day, for small tactical nuclear weapons being deployed increasingly in Europe to make up for the permanent shortfall of NATO troops, especially as the American garrison is reduced.

Mr. Kissinger has seen for years that Western Europe is an essential component of the international stability he seeks to devise. From the moment he first became Mr. Nixon's national security adviser, he favored British admission to the Common Market.

He hoped that London would assume some of the burden of political leadership, thus compensating the disadvantage to America of a competing economic bloc. Also, he saw as "a fact of life" the need for linkage between Atlantic defense, commercial and monetary problems, something the French have a well-developed tic for resenting.

But, as Mr. Kissinger wrote in late 1962 just after working for President Kennedy, "a sense of outrage is not a good guide to policy." Both he and his friend Michel Jobert, France's Foreign Minister, recently had to relearn this truth. The Secretary also had to remember his own early warnings against "our somewhat schoolmasterish approach" to France, which prompted his break with Mr. Kennedy.

More than eleven years ago, Mr. Kissinger forecast it was "inevitable that countries with the historical traditions of our European allies would not be content forever to depend entirely on the protection of our nuclear power."

¹ His vision was correct, but because the Common Market has never been able to advance from an economic to a political community, that dependence remains: not that Mr. Kissinger hasn't tried to encourage a "European" atomic force.

In the meantime events forced him to recall his earlier forecast that "Europe is bound to be a third force, partly because we ourselves have sought to make it so" and that "the French position has been more closely attuned to ours to the psychological realities in Europe."

Past events thus confirmed the clarity of his outlook. Future events—dependent on Mr. Kissinger's own negotiating genius—will test his ability to act on the basis of his analysis, cementing a new trans-Atlantic stability even as war recedes from Southeast and Southwest Asia.

5-F

Viewpoints

COLUMNS • FEATURES

CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS, SATURDAY, MARCH 23, 1974

Difficult job ahead of Kissinger in Moscow

WASHINGTON — Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's oncoming journey to the Soviet Union may perhaps be another major turning point, like his first journey but a lot less encouraging. This is the current view in the small inner group of U.S. policymakers.

Superficially, many of the signs are hopeful. For example, the Soviets have already let it be known that General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev will probably receive the secretary of state at the Politburo's hunting lodge, Zavidovo.

This is a far more signal honor, with far more political importance than anyone seems to understand in this country. Prior to last year's four-day meeting between Brezhnev and Dr. Kissinger, no Western leader had ever been received at this huge, closely guarded, strongly walled lodge in the deep forest. But now Dr. Kissinger is apparently to see Zavidovo a second time.

If Dr. Kissinger's French counterpart, Michel Jobert, were ever to be admitted to Zavidovo, it would be on the French front pages for a matter of days. But showing exceptional honor to a visitor does not always ensure agreement with the visitor. Right here is the source of apprehension in the policymakers' inner group.

To balance the prospect of Zavidovo, to begin with, there have been some warning signals in Moscow. Minor criticisms of the secretary of

state have appeared in the Soviet press. Leonid Brezhnev has been a bit less optimistic about the future of "detente." The formidable minister of defense, Marshal Andrei Grechko, has roared loudly about the importance of a super-strong national defense.

Yet the main sources of concern are far more general. Month after month, the U.S. policymakers have been vainly trying to square the circle in their search for the best U.S. line in the second round of SALT talks. In other words, they have been looking for a possible basis for accommodation with the Soviets that would also meet the requirements of our national defense.

This has been like squaring the circle because of the successful Soviet tests of a whole new generation of intercontinental missiles,

embodying MIRVed warheads and other major improvements. The Soviet missile tests exploded the illusion of a permanent U.S. technological lead. And it was this illusion that really made the first SALT agreement possible.

The policymakers trying to square the circle finally had to face up to the threat of heavy Soviet superiority in nuclear-strategic power in the near future. In consequence, they agreed that circle-squaring was not feasible. They concluded they must insist upon "essential equivalence" in the nuclear-strategic power of the United States and Russia.

At a minimum, unhappily, a new SALT agreement honestly based upon "essential equivalence" will require the Soviets to put a halt to major weapons programs they are already working on. That is the rub of what Dr. Kissinger is going to have to propose to General Secretary Brezhnev and, through Brezhnev, to Marshal Grechko.

Barrels of hogwash have been written about an alleged tug of war between Grechko and Brezhnev over "detente." In reality, the evidence is almost overwhelming that Brezhnev and Grechko form an intimate partnership that is the real power center of the present Soviet government. That situation first arose when Brezhnev helped Grechko become defense minister, despite the desire of a Politburo

majority for a minister who was not a professional military officer.

The intimacy of the Brezhnev-Grechko partnership was fully confirmed during President Nixon's visit to Moscow last year. It was then possible to make detailed, prolonged observations of the demeanor of the Soviet leaders in their dealings with one another. The general secretary and the defense minister were visibly much closer to each other than any other leaders of the regime. Nor is it necessary to suppose that they have ever disagreed about "detente."

What is called "detente," after all, can easily turn out to be a policy of "tranquilizers for the West." Such a policy will be most useful if and when the Soviets decide to get tough. That is all but certainly the way Brezhnev has presented "detente" to Grechko. But it will be quite different, rather obviously, if American insistence on an honest nuclear-strategic balance turns out to require Grechko to roll back some of his key defense programs.

One can hardly imagine the Soviet government taking such a step. So you have a dilemma with the usual two horns. Either Dr. Kissinger may not really insist on an honest nuclear-strategic balance; or the recent trend of U.S.-Soviet relations may easily go into reverse.

Los Angeles Times Syndicate

By Joseph Alsop

Wiretap Data on Muskie's Plans
Reported Sent to White House

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 22— At least one of 17 wiretaps authorized by President Nixon for "national security" reasons provided the White House with political intelligence about the Democratic Presidential campaign of Senator Edmund S. Muskie, according to sources who have seen written summaries of the overheard conversations.

The reports containing references to Mr. Muskie were reportedly prepared in late 1970 and early 1971 by Federal agents monitoring a wiretap on the home telephone of Morton H. Halperin, a former National Security Council official who joined the Muskie campaign after leaving the Government in April, 1970.

The disclosures came as Mr. Halperin won from a Federal district judge today an order to the Nixon Administration

that it turn over to him the records of the wiretap, which ran from May, 1969, until February, 1971.

The order by Judge John Lewis Smith, affirmed a request by attorneys for Mr. Halperin for summaries prepared by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who monitored the wiretap.

President Nixon has said he personally approved the 17 wiretaps as part of an effort to stop leaks of classified information to the press.

The disclosure that politically useful information was being produced by the Halperin wiretap may help to explain why the former official was kept under surveillance longer than any of the others who were targets of the operation and despite the lack of any evidence

Continued on Page 14, Column 3

White House Reportedly Got Wiretap Data on Muskie

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

that he had breached security.

The White House did not respond today to a request for comment on the report regarding information on Senator Muskie.

Mr. Halperin, a Republican, served as an unsalaried adviser on foreign affairs to the Senator from Maine after leaving the Government.

According to confidential documents prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the wiretap program lasted from May, 1969, until February, 1971, and involved at various times 13 officials of the Nixon Administration and four newsmen, including two reporters for The New York Times.

## Political Motive Alleged

Mr. Halpern is suing several present and former Administration officials, including Secretary of State Kissinger and the former White House chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, on the ground that the wiretap on his home phone, which was not authorized by a court order, was illegal and was intended primarily to monitor his political activities. He is the only one of the 17 to have sought the wiretap summaries.

Judge Smith gave the Government 10 days to surrender the wiretap material. Justice Department lawyers, who opposed the motion granted by the court, have indicated that they will now argue that some of the requested documents may be subject to a formal claim of executive privilege—a doctrine that protects the confidentiality of communications within the executive branch if disclosure would impair the orderly functioning of government.

## Protests By Kissinger

To claim this privilege, Attorney General William B. Saxbe would have to act before the 10 days were up.

In general, a judge's order for the discovery of evidence, such as Judge Smith's today, is not appealable.

Mr. Halperin was one of the

first Government officials to be tapped after a report appeared in The New York Times on May 9, 1969, about the then highly secret bombing of Camvodia by American aircraft.

That article, and others outlining the United States position at the talks with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic armavents; reportedly evoked strong protests from Mr. Kissinger, then Mr. Nixon's national security adviser. As a result of his protest, the President appointed Mr. Kissinger, the late J. Edgar Hoover, director of the F. B. I., and John N. Mitchell, then the Attorney General, to coordinate an investigation of the leaks to the press.

Mr. Nixon also approved the wiretapping of those officials suspected by Mr. Kissinger as the sources of the leaks. The wiretaps were installed without the court order taht is required by law in ordinary criminal cases. The installation was made under an "inherent power" claimed by Mr. Nixon to prevent the nation's security from being compromised. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever recognized an "interest power" to wiretap for this purpose.

## Target of Espionage

Justice Department sources have said that information entirely unrelated to national security flowed into the White House from some of the 17 wiretaps. But the information relating to Mr. Muskie was the first indication that some details of his campaign planning were in the hands of high White House operatives long before the Presidential primaries in which the Senator was a target of political espionage and sabotage.

The F.B.I. documents show that the summaries of the wiretapped conversations were initially sent to Mr. Kissinger.

But in June, 1970, about midway through the 21-month, top-secret program, the summaries were divered to Mr. Haldeman. Accordingly, it would have been Mr. Haldeman who received the reports of Mr. Halperin's conversations about Senator Mus-

kie's political plans.

Mr. Haldeman was indicted by a Federal grand jury two weeks ago, along with six other men, for conspiring to obstruct the criminal investigation into the June, 1972, Watergate burglary. That break-in was linked to a wiretapping plot that illegally provided political intelligence from the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee.

Some of the reports, on Mr. Halperin received by Mr. Haldeman, sources who have seen them said, contained references to Mr. Muskie's activities in behalf of his bid for the Democratic Presidential nomination at a time when he was widely considered the front-running candidate against Mr. Nixon.

Mr. Halperin said in a telephone interview that he could

not remember whether he ever spoke with Senator Muskie himself over his home telephone during the months in question.

He said, however, that he did have discussion about campaign strategy with some of the Senator's top aides and advisers over his home telephone before the wiretap was removed in February, 1971.

## Foreign Policy Speeches

Neither the sources nor the F.B.I. documents made clear to what use, if any, the White House may have put the information on the Muskie campaign that was supplied by the wiretap. According to Mr. Halperin, the reports of his conversations might have included advance knowledge of the Senator's speeches in the foreign policy area and particularly on the Vietnam war.

KISSINGER
Backs Funds
For IDA

Associated Press

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger told Congress yesterday that legislation to authorize a $1.5 billion U.S. contribution to the International Development Association is of major importance to foreign policy.

The association is an agency of the World Bank to help developing nations.

In a letter to Chairman J. W. Fulbright (D Ark.) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kissinger said worldwide inflation means that the developing countries "face the grim prospect of massive increased import costs for items essential to their development, including foodstuffs and fertilizer."

"Concurrently, their export earnings will be adversely affected by a slowdown of the economic activity in the industrialized countries," he said.

"It would be especially cruel, and inappropriate to the United States' legitimate world leadership role, if we were to cut our concessional aid at the very time when the poorest countries most need assistance."

The Nixon administration is seeking to revive the legislation in the Senate, after its January defeat in the House during the height of the energy crisis. House members were concerned that the poorest countries would use IDA money to pay greatly increased oil prices—an indirect payment to the Arab oil producers in addition to high prices already paid here.

George D. Woods, a director of the First Boston Corp. and former head of the World Bank, told the committee that 24 other countries are contributing $3 billion.

Church leaders said IDA's development projects are crucial to the war on hunger and poverty in the poorest countries.

# Imports

Morgan

ost Staff Writer

Woodcock said that Con-
gress should empower the
President to approve quotas,
or, as an alternative, a tempo-
rary increase in tariff rates.
He said either restriction
should end in the fall of 1975,
by which time the domestic in-
dustry would have had time to
satisfy the demand for
smaller, more economical cars.
Canadian imports, which in-
clude United States makes
manufactured there, should be
exempted from the restric-
tions, he said.

"Let me underline that we
have taken this step most re-
luctantly," he said in his writ-
ten statement. "We have no in-
terest in sheltering the Ameri-
can industry from the compe-
tition of more efficient foreign
producers. . . We are not GM's
spear carriers."

According to the UAW presi-
dent, this country's 3 per cent
automobile tariff is lower than
those of the European Com-
mon Market (11 per cent) or
Japan (6.4 per cent).

The administration's bill, ap-
proved by the House in De-
cember, 272 to 140, gives the
President broad discretion to
negotiate internationally for
lower tariffs and more liberal
world trade.

The House measure also pro-
vides that workers displaced by
imports would receive 70 per
cent of an average weekly pay
for half a year and 65 per cent
for the second year.

Woodcock said this is inade-\ QUATE in light of the fact that
100,000 auto workers are indef-
initely unemployed and the
rate of unemployment in
Michigan now is 10.6 per cent.

Suit Against Kissinger

WASH. POST

3/23/74

# Halperin Is Granted Access to Documents

A federal judge yesterday granted Morton Halperin access to all government documents involved in his wiretap suit against his one-time boss, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and others.

However, the judge gave government attorneys 10 more days to decide whether they want to claim executive privilege on any of the documents. If such a claim is made, as Justice Department attorneys indicated, further hearings probably will held to determine if Halperin's attorneys could have access to the documents.

The Justice Department had contended that the tap on Halperin's home phone was made for national security purposes and that the documents should be retained by the court and examined in secret.

Halperin's lawyers contended the tap was made essentially for political reasons.

The suit originates from information.

Halperin's service as an assistant to Kissinger when Kissinger headed the National Security Council staff in the White House before he became Secretary of State.

The tap on Halperin's home telephone was disclosed by then-Acting FBI Director William D. Ruckelshaus in a memorandum submitted in the Pentagon Papers' trial of Daniel Ellsberg.

Kissinger, in May, 1973, took responsibility for wiretaps placed on his aides, saying it was an effort to stem leaks of information.

The next month, Halperin filed suit, alleging that taps of his phone for a period of about 21 months also spanned his new job in the presidential primary campaign of Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine).

Halperin seeks damages of $100 a day, the limit set by law governing the case, and to expunge all federal files of the

as stations to serve only cars which need at least one-half tank of gas.

In other energy announcements the mayor said:

* Eight gas stations throughout the city will be open Sunday from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. because of having gasoline allocated to them by the city. The mayor instituted the Sunday opening last Sunday with four stations.

* The number of stations remaining open from 7 to 9 p.m., also made possible by allocations from the city, will be reduced from 20 to 12 because business has fallen off, making some of them unnecessary. Some stations have started staying open later without special allocations of city gas.

The city's increased gas allocation for March of 19.3 million gallons, compared to 18.3 million in February, has made the odd-even plan unnecessary, the mayor said. "The long lines have disappeared and the situation is almost back to normal," he added.

"The prospects for continued improvement appear favorable based on the promise of increased gasoline allocations stemming from the lifting of the oil embargo," the mayor said.

Although he forecast normalcy, Mayor Washington added that he still intends to ask Congress for legislation giving him the right to institute some mandatory controls.

pressed hopes for American independence in fuel received a setback yesterday when new U.S. Geological Survey figures showed substantially less oil and gas under the sea than the government previously had estimated.

Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton told Congress in January that it looked as though 200 billion barrels of oil and 850 trillion cubic feet of natural gas could be obtained by drilling into seabeds off the United States.

But new government figures circulated yesterday said the offshore lode could be as low as 80 billion barrels of oil and 490 trillion cubic feet of gas—even counting that already taken from the sea bottoms.

Several major policy decisions, including President Nixon's order for a 10-fold increase in leasing of off shore tracts to oil companies, were made under the higher estimates.

Thus environmental groups who have opposed accelerated leasing of the Outer Continental Shelf on grounds it is too hurried have been handed a new argument.

The new estimates are contained in a report by the Council on Environmental Quality, an arm of the Environmental Protection Agency.

# Kissinger Asked to Get Pledge On Exit for 1,600 Soviet Jews

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 22 — Two major American Jewish organizations have asked Secretary of State Kissinger to give Soviet officials a new list of about 1,600 Soviet Jews who have reportedly been repeatedly turned down in efforts to emigrate to Israel.

A spokesman for the organizations, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, said that Mr. Kissinger was asked to get a pledge from the Soviet leaders on his forthcoming trip to Moscow that all or most of the people on the list will be allowed to leave.

The groups, in a telegram to Mr. Kissinger, also asked that he "unequivocally state" that the American people want the Soviet Union to grant unhamp-

ered and unrestricted" emigration.

Last year, on the eve of a similar trip to Moscow, Mr. Kissinger received and later gave to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, a list containing about the same number of "hardship" cases. According to a spokesman for the Jewish groups, about 400 on that list of 1,600 have left the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kissinger, accompanied by several top aides and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, will leave for Moscow at about 11 P.M. tomorrow. Mr. Kissinger will stop in Bonn for about two hours for talks with Foreign Minister Walter Scheel of West Germany. They will discuss Mr. Kissinger's trip as well as the current dispute over consultation between the United States and the Common Market.

Kissinger's Goals
On Trip Are Broad

By Jeremiah O'Leary

Star-News Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger leaves tonight for talks in the Soviet Union which the United States hopes will result in "conceptual agreements" on the broad span of superpower relations to pave the way for President Nixon's projected trip to Moscow in June.

Kissinger met late yesterday with French Ambassador Jacques Kosciusko Morizet. France has been the most outspoken critic of the relationship Washington wants with the NATO allies and went its own way when the United States urged cooperative policies at the height of the energy crisis.

The ambassador spent about an hour with Kissinger and told reporters they had discussed the whole range of Franco-American relations. State Department spokesmen said Kissinger also discussed his Moscow trip, apparently in a way that loosely could be described as consultation.

THE ENVOY said he has been trying to see Kissinger for some time. The State Department would say only that the meeting was at the request of the French. Some observers concluded that the meeting unquestionably was related to Kissinger's trip to the Soviet Union as well as the consultations Kissinger has arranged with the West Germans, British and NATO leaders in Brussels.

"This is a preparatory trip," State Department press spokesman George S. Vest said yesterday. He

added that the talks between Kissinger and the Soviet leaders will cover the stategic arms limitation talks, East-West relations, and the mutual and balance force reduction talks, the Middle East and special bilateral areas of interest.

Vest laid special emphasis on Kissinger's plans to spend several hours briefing West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel in Bonn tomorrow about the Moscow visit.

"We are going to extraordinary lengths to consult with the European allies on this trip," Vest said. "Not all of our allies have always done this."

VEST SPECIFICALLY pointed out that on the return flight Kissinger will stop in London on March 28 to brief the new British Froeign Secretary, James Callaghan. Kissinger also will send one of his top aides, probably Helmut Sonnenfeldt, from London to Brussels to brief the Atlantic Council on what transpired with the Soviet leaders.

Observers say the emphasis on the consultation planned with Bonn, London and Brussels is a calculated U.S. effort to emphasize the consultative and cooperative performance Washington expects from the European allies.

Kissinger was especially annoyed earlier this month when the European nations made decisions regarding their relations with the Arab Nations without consulting the United States beforehand.

Vest was asked what difference there was between

Kissinger reaching what he called "conceptual agreements" with the Soviet Union and the European decision made in Brussels earlier this month. Vest said that at the end of the trip to Russia, nothing will have been signed and there will be time to brief the Western allies. "This is why we will consult and brief our allies," he said.

The difference, he added, is between a "conceptual agreement" that might be reached in Moscow and a final stage of possible accords with the Soviet Union.

THE KISSINGER talks will take place both in Moscow and outside the city. Officials said the likelihood is that Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko will conduct some of the talks at the dacha known as Zavidovo, the Russian equivalent of Camp David.

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin will accompany Kissinger to Moscow on the special Air Force plane used by the secretary. Also in the official party will be Sonnenfeldt, the department controller; Carlyle E. Maw, the legal adviser; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman; John Hyland, director of Intelligence and Research; Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Alfred Atherton and Dennis Clift of the National Security Council. Ambassador Walter Stoessel will join the talks when the Kissinger party arrives.

Phone (202) 484-5000

CIRCULATION 484-3000

CLASSIFIED 484-6000

15 Cents
On newsstand

D.C. ENDS CURBS

# Pennsylvania, Maryland and Old Gas Line

## Handler

Writer

officials have no im-
district Mayor Walter E.
the alternate day gaso-
weekend.

at the District's volun-
time for the start of the
tourist influx — was
a spokesman for the
ington Service Station

tions in Maryland and
ases to the odd-even
of license plates and
cently will continue for
authorities, moreover,
ling penalty provisions

ared gasoline supplies
al,” and Washington
his action yesterday,
wide publicity.

In another development yesterday, however, the energy advisory committee of the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments adopted a resolution calling on area residents to maintain energy-conservation efforts.

"THE CURRENT easing of the gasoline shortage is no assurance that fuel will be available in customary quantities," the committee of local government officials warned.

The mayor, observing that “we’re out in front of everybody,” voiced confidence that his lifting of the sales restrictions next Friday will leave plenty of gasoline for Washingtonians as well as for cherry blossom visitors and suburban commuters.

The time lag between yesterday's announcement and the lifting of the restriction was planned to let neighboring governors consider lifting their fuel-sales restraints, according to George Rodericks, the mayor's energy advisor.

See GASOLINE, A-6

# Fares Going Up

d has
two-
that
enger

these airlines could file with the
board a new round of increases that
could boost fares 6 percent, but
could not become effective before
April 16.

thor-
insti-
conti-

The board said it was not allowing
the higher fares now because some
of the airlines' plans did not apply

THE TWA PLAN would reinstate
a slightly modified version of "de-
mand scheduling" which was first
offered last year.

Under the plan, passengers can
qualify for sizable discounts if they
book their flights 90 days in advance
and buy their tickets 45 days before

JAMES RESTON

# Kissinger's Toughest Job

Secretary of State Kissinger is going back to Moscow again fairly soon to ask and answer some awkward questions about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The reason for his visit is fairly obvious. He has to find out if his affair with Moscow is real or fake. Both sides have been supporting the notion of "detente" or "peaceful coexistence," but increasing their military budgets while talking about reducing them. They glorify trade while differing about the terms of trade, proclaim their desire for peace in the Middle East, while shipping arms to their belligerent clients.

There is something false at the bottom of this Washington-Moscow "detente" and both sides know it. On the surface, things are much better. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin talk much more and much more frankly than in the old Cold War days. The two sides meet in Geneva to discuss the control of strategic arms, and Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Chief Brezhnev will meet again soon to discuss the peace and world order their people want.

But meanwhile, President Nixon is asking for the largest peacetime military budget in the history of the republic, the Soviet Union is building up its forces in Europe and urging the Arabs to maintain their oil embargo against the United States, and President Pompidou of France is in the Soviet Union demonstrating his "independence" of the United States, and weakening the western alliance.

So there are obviously some awkward questions to be asked on both sides before Nixon makes his next appearance on satellite television from the Kremlin. For example:

* If the Soviet Union is really serious about reaching a mutual reduction of military forces in Europe, why does it now

have 10 tank and 10 motor rifle divisions with 45,000 tanks west of the Urals.

* Why some 31 or 32 Soviet divisions in Central and Eastern Europe, with 430,000 to 450,000 men in place in these areas, and more than 4,000 new armored personnel carriers since 1969?

* Why, if Moscow is really serious about the principles of the last Nixon-Brezhnev Kremlin doctrine for a new world order, should there be such a frantic buildup of Soviet naval and missile power?

The Soviets also have some unanswered questions:

* Why a record U.S. peacetime military budget when the Nixon administration is boasting about its new accommodation with Moscow and meanwhile struggling with inflation and a recession at home?

* Why all this talk out of Washington about expanding world trade, while denying to the Soviet Union equal trade terms with other "most favored nations?"

* Why does Washington defend the principle of "noninterference" in the international affairs of other nations, and still interfere in the Soviet Union's policy of deciding who should be allowed to emigrate from the USSR?

It will not be easy for Kissinger to ask or answer these questions, for there is obviously a difference between the words and the actions, the propaganda and the policies on both sides.

The result is that the Congress of the United States is not going along with Nixon and Kissinger in their appeals to grant Moscow "most favored nation" trading rights, or forget about the Soviet Union's emigration policy governing Soviet Jews. The Congress is voting for the big U.S. military budget, and saying "no" to Soviet trade and Soviet emigration policy for the simple reason that it fears the policy of "detente" is not genuine but phony.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn has contributed to this doubt on Capitol Hill, and it is odd that the Soviet leaders should not have anticipated the consequences of banishing him from his homeland. Why, he asked, in his letter to the Soviet leaders, should the Western nations have made such concessions to Moscow "simply to win the favor of the rulers of Russia?"

How could it be, he inquired, that the Western democracies would almost vie with one another to gain Moscow's favor "just so long as the Russian press would stop abusing them...?" Truly, he remarked, the foreign policy of czarist Russia never had any successes to compare with the expansion of Moscow's power into Europe, the Mediterranean and the oceans of the world.

Kissinger is clearly going to have to grapple with these questions when he gets to Moscow.

For the main argument for voting against the impeachment of Nixon on Capitol Hill, regardless of the evidence against him, is that he has been a successful, even a brilliant leader in the field of foreign affairs.

But the accommodations with China and the Soviet Union — to say nothing about our troubles in Europe and Japan — are beginning to look a little dubious on Capitol Hill.

Kissinger will be exploring all this on his forthcoming trip, looking for genuine agreements on the arms talks, and the Middle East talks, and the balance of power in Europe and on the oceans, and if he can get them, the Congress may cooperate on trade. But this time, the Congress will be looking for policy and not propaganda — certainly not for a splashy diversion from the impeachment proceedings in the House — and this could be the most difficult assignment of Kissinger's career.

SPECTRUM
Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

M. STANTON EVANS
CBS RADIO NETWORK

MARCH 23, 1974

I'm M. Stanton Evans.

The master delusion of our time is the idea that Henry Kissinger actually knows what he is doing.

The accepted line on our ubiquitous Secretary of State, affirmed by Republicans and Democrats alike, is that he is the saving grace of an otherwise disastrous Administration. While Nixon is plagued by Watergate and other domestic problems, we are told, the nation can at least take solace from Kissinger's repeated triumphs in the realm of foreign policy.

It's a good rule of thumb, that when any subject is treated with such heedless unanimity the opinion expressed is completely mistaken. That rule is borne out in full by Kissinger, who is not only not the best thing about the Nixon regime but by any reasoned standard for a Republican administration is unquestionably the worst.

For those who doubt this harsh evaluation, Kissinger's recent testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on the subject of trading with the Soviet Union should be a useful corrective. This statement makes it painfully clear that Kissinger is running our nation's foreign policy according to the discredited theories of the most far-out liberal Democrats.

Kissinger tells us, in essence, that we must offer concessions and trade deals to the Soviet Union to build a "structure" of agreement and thus avert the danger of nuclear war -- which was the strategy line of the Rostow-McNamara Democrats a decade ago. As proof that this threadbare policy is actually working, he cites the so-called peace in Vietnam, Soviet co-operation in the Middle East, and the SALT agreements. He neglects to point out that there is no peace in Vietnam, that the Mideast war was made possible in the first place by a massive Soviet supply effort, and that the principal result of SALT has been to weaken America's own strategic position.

Equally to the point, Kissinger nowhere mentions the small detail that the massive trade he is promoting has built and is sustaining the Soviet war machine -- so that the major effect of detente is simply to strengthen the enemy. The Kissinger record is fraught with menace for America, and compared to it the scandal of Watergate is tepid stuff indeed.

This is M. Stanton Evans with Spectrum.

FIRST LINE REPORT - WTOP

With Dan Rather

March 22, 1974

DAN RATHER: Good morning. Who is up and who is down in the Nixon White House inner circle? Details after this.

(Announcement)

DAN RATHER: Whenever and wherever the President travels, one of the most frequently asked questions is who counts, really counts in the Nixon inner circle. Who are the men who have real power as opposed to just the appearance of power.

The answer requires first a definition of power. At the White House it is the opportunity, the ability, the position, to influence big decisions. In most of Washington, but especially at the White House, power is indirect proportion to proximity; that is, those who have the most power are those who see or at least talk with the President most, those who are closest to him, hour in, hour out, day in, day out.

Recent examples, William Rogers was Secretary of State in name, in title, for more than four years, but Henry Kissinger was the Secretary of State in fact and for most of the time everybody knew it. Why? Because Kissinger had proximity. He was the man closest to the President. He was inside the White House all day, every day, at the President's ear and elbow. Rogers was down the street at the State Department building, out of sight, often out of mind, and out of the power pattern.

The immense, mostly secret power wielded for so long by advertising man, H. R. "Bob" Haldeman from inside the White House was a similar case. Haldeman first boxed out, then chopped up oldline Nixon friends and potential powers such as Robert Finch, Herbert Klein and eventually even John Mitchell because Haldeman had proximity.

He was inside the White House seeing the President, talking to the President more in a single day than Finch, Klein and Mitchell combined in a month.

- 2 -

But now Haldeman along with so many others
is gone, so where now is the power and with whom? Kissinger,
of course. He is still around and still at the apex of
power, now Secretary of State in title as well as in fact.
Kissinger has held onto his old White House job and staff,
plus adding the whole State Department.

In foreign policy, Kissinger's words still rank
supreme. Indeed, it is virtually unchallenged, the only
voice that counts about foreign policy in the inner
circle.

There is no Kissinger counterpart for domestic
policy. For a long while the combination of John Ehrlichman
and H. R. Haldeman came close, but that was long ago now
before those two left in clouds of suspicion. So that
leaves, in terms of power, to influence domestic policy
Roy Ash, Director of the White House Office of Management
and Budget; Ronald Ziegler, the news secretary; Alexander
Haig, chief of the White House staff, and Bryce Harlow
jack of all trades, adviser, who is expected to leave soon.

Ziegler sees more of the President and appears
to be closer to him than any of the others. Haig's star
has shown some signs of diminishing the past few months,
but Haig still sees the President much. Ash's star seems
to be gaining in brightness, A former head of Litton
Industry, Ash has enormous power, much of it hidden,
precisely because his office controls the budget.

In the pecking order of White House power right
now, Kissinger and Ziegler appear to be in a class by
themselves with Haig and Ash close behind.

President Nixon, from all outward appearances,
continues to prefer, in general, dealing himself directly
in foreign policy, leaving domestic policy as much as
possible to others.

#####