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been discussed in an earlier chapter: Europe would have lacked the
sense of security which has underpinned its economic growth and the
movement toward integration.

In the later 1950's, the most crucial post-war decisions having
been taken, Soviet diplomatic tactics became more diversified. Appeals
to German nationalism and suspicion of the allies alternated with the
stimulation of anti-German feeling in other NATO countries. Since
1956-57, however, a third diplomatic tactic can be discerned, the
attempt to achieve arms limitations in Europe (especially Central Europe)
which will not only serve Soviet security interests but also create
tension between Germany and its allies. We have seen that this was the
tendency of proposals for disengagement or nuclear-free zones in 1957-58,
and the same has been true of later Soviet initiatives in the field of
arms control: attempts to link a non-aggression pact with any partial
disarmament agreement, for example (the only concrete consequence of
which would be an improvement in the standing of East Germany, a step
toward its international recognition.). Soviet arms control policy
in Europe, indeed, always appears to be formulated with an eye to the
political effects in Germany.

The principal Soviet initiative in recent years was the Berlin
ultimatum of November 1958, renewed in various forms in the following
four years, which provided the main source of tension in international
politics until the Cuba crisis. Unlike the earlier policy offensives,
this was not directed against a specific Western relations.

Politically, the Soviet position in Europe was probably at its
strongest in the period 1945-47, before the decision to make American

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resources available for the recovery of Europe, when American passivity in East Europe and China suggested that further Soviet moves might not be resisted. Active American involvement exposed the weakness of the Soviet position in any struggle for the control of Germany. In the post-Sputnik era the Soviets appear to have thought that they had attained a position of genuine strength in Central Europe, justifying a direct political challenge. The succeeding period, that of the present, may be one in which more subtle diplomacy, the exploitation of conflicting attitudes within NATO, especially toward arms control, replaces the direct assault.

Realpolitik alone would suggest to any power in the position of Soviets the tantalizing possibility of prizing West Germany away from its partners; security alone provides incentives for obstructing the military strengthening of the Western Alliance. The distinctive way in which the Soviets pursue these ends, however, is governed by their tactical doctrine, with its emphasis on persistence counterbalanced by caution: their unfulfilled but still unquestioned ideological expectations introduce a destabilizing factor, a propensity to overinterpret the significance of favorable changes, a factor working against the dictates of caution. It is this kind of expectation, not any marked skill or foresight in the design of long-term plans, which introduces potentially the most dangerous factor into Soviet-Western relation.

Chapter Seven

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY¹

I. The Changing Soviet View of Force

It is possible that the role of armed force in Soviet policy
is coming to be as puzzling to the Soviet leaders as to outside
observers. Under Stalin, Soviet military policy was straight-forward:
the most urgent task was to break the American nuclear monopoly, and
meanwhile a large army was maintained in order to be able to overrun
Europe in the event of an attack by "American imperialism".

A general war was believed at some stage to be inevitable. Malenkov's premature suggestion in 1954 that war might be deterred because both sides could be destroyed was used as a weapon against him in the Stalin succession struggle. But since 1956, Khrushchev himself has revised the Leninist doctrine of the inevitability of war in the age of imperialism: the strength of the "socialist camp" is now held to be great enough to make it possible (not certain) that war can be averted during the imperialist decline. In the polemics with the Chinese, the Soviets have increasingly watered down the claim that they could emerge victorious from a nuclear war, increasingly argued that the socialist countries, too, would suffer intolerable destruction. Increasingly, they have emphasized the prospects

¹Despite its rather different conclusions, the following analysis in indebted to Philip Windsor, *Western Europe in Soviet Strategy*, Adelphi Paper, No. 8, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, January, 1964.

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of the peaceful transition to socialism, more and more disparaging
revolutionary violence.

Nonetheless, the Soviets maintain a large and costly military
establishment, whose claim on their resources necessarily restricts
their opportunities in other fields--not merely in the case of
individual consumption, but also that of other national power objectives,
for example the use of economic policy as a source of political
influence, pre-eminence in space activities, or the full mobilization
of economic resources to overtake the American economy.

While the greater part of the Soviet military capability can
be explained in terms of deterrence and the need to provide a balance
against the United States, we shall see that in some respects the
Soviets have been prodigal as regards the size of their armed forces,
and apart from unilateral arms reductions since 1955, have not taken
disarmament very seriously as a way of easing the arms burden.

It is possible that the abandonment of the dogma of the
inevitability of war may prove less significant than a second consequence
of Soviet thinking on nuclear war--the questioning of the Clausewitzian
view of the role of force in international politics, that is to say,
the view that the use of force and threats of force are a normal part
of politics, and that they should always be clearly subordinated to
political ends. Violence and force were viewed favorably by the
Bolsheviks as agents of change; both Lenin and Stalin were keen readers

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of Clausewitz.¹ It seems clear that when in the late 1950's, for the first time in Soviet history, Sputnik and the ICBM enabled them to make not incredible claims of military superiority, they expected to be able to profit from this politically. The meagreness of the political fruits of this claim to superiority may be leading to a re-examination of the underlying Clausewitzian assumption.² Clearly, so basic an attitude would not change overnight, but it would be of great significance if the prevailing attitude toward force were to become more utilitarian, in place of viewing each increment of force as a potential source of political power.

One of the most striking tenets of today's Soviet military doctrine--and one which provides a strong incentive for questioning the Clausewitzian approach to force--is a rigid doctrine of escalation. Any local war involving the nuclear powers, it has been asserted, would inevitably expand into a general nuclear war. Presumably intended to deter the West from intervening in local conflicts or elaborating limited war strategies, the doctrine appears to have exercised a considerable self-deterrent influence over Soviet policy. Even though they have insisted on the legitimacy of wars of national liberation, and an equivocal definition of the just war such that any war

¹The influence of Clausewitz on Soviet thinking is discussed by Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (New York, Harper, 1957), pp. 340 ff.; also Byron Dexter, "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, October 1950.

²For references to Soviet discussion of this question, see Thomas W. Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, p. 485.

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undertaken by a member of the socialist camp is by definition 1
defensive and just, they have shown no desire to avail themselves
of this standing justification for military intervention,
preferring to discourage militancy on the part of the local
Communist parties.

Thus, the Soviets themselves appear to be in a state of
uncertainty as to the objectives of military policy, over and
above deterring the West. Soviet military writings offer no
clue as to the political objectives that might be served by force;
the political context of the wars discussed is always an attack
by the imperialists. In the light of all these factors, it
is appropriate to re-examine the vexed question, to what extent
(or in what sense) there is today a Soviet military threat to
Europe. It is possible that, in the absence of radical
disarmament or a major change in Soviet/Western political
relations, the problems posed by Soviet military policy may
come to be less a reflection of Soviet objectives than of the
existence of a large military capability. Two questions
are of an especial relevance in connection with this capability;
firstly to obtain a general picture of its magnitude and its
distinctive emphases, secondly, at a time when American strategic
thinking is giving special attention to the limitation of war,
to examine Soviet thinking on this point: has there been a
significant response to the new American thought? An assessment of
the dangers inherent in Soviet military policy requires an
examination of the Soviet capability and military doctrine.

¹See, for example, V. D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, translated and annotated by H. S. Dinerstein, L. Goure, T. W. Wolfe (Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 282-283.

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## II. Soviet Military Capability Contrasted with Western Capability

Until recently a familiar image of Soviet and Western capability has remained unquestioned, that of the "overwhelming" superiority of the American strategic nuclear forces. The American Administration has taken the lead in criticizing this traditional image, mainly because of its tendency to paralyze the improvement of NATO's "general purpose forces," by its suggestions that the Soviets were so far superior that any increased NATO effort was fruitless.

As regards the strategic forces, the United States is at present far superior to the Soviets, and appears likely to remain so.¹

In early 1964 the United States possessed approximately 475 intercontinental missiles (ICBM's) to the Soviet's estimated 100,² and 650 long-range bombers (B-52s) to the Soviet's 200. The U.S. had ten nuclear submarines, each with 16 Polaris missiles, with eight more planned to enter service by mid-1964. Comparable figures for the Soviets were not available, an unofficial estimate was 100 missiles, not all capable of being launched from underwater.³ It is planned to increase the American ballistic missile force to more than 1700 by 1966 (this would include 950 Minuteman and 656 submarine-launched Polaris.) It seems unlikely that the Soviets can match such a build-up.

¹This projection could, of course, be upset by an agreed "arms freeze"; at the time of writing this appeared unlikely because of the familiar differences over verification.

²A later American estimate (April 1964) was 750 to 180 respectively. *The Times*, April 15, 1964.

³Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1963-1964*, p. 34. The data in the present section are mainly drawn from this source, generally acknowledged to be the most reliable of non-classified studies of Soviet as well as Western force levels.

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From a European standpoint, however, Soviet medium-range
bombers and still more, missiles (MRBMs) are as much strategic
weapons, as much a threat to European society, as the intercontinental
weapons from the standpoint of American society. In a Soviet-NATO
strategic balance, the position is much more even, though
asymmetrical: Soviet superiority against Europe largely
offsets American superiority against the Soviets. The latter
possess 750 MRBMs, mostly directed against Europe (a category of
weapon discontinued by the West) and 1400 medium-range bombers
(as against 800 Western); the Western bombers, and presumably the
Soviet, are being phased out.

In the case of ground forces, the Soviet-American
comparison has some relevance, the NATO-Warsaw Pact rather more so.
The American Army, of 975,000 men, is organized into 16 divisions
--a "division slice" of 60,000 men of which 14,000 are in the
division, 18,500 in the corps or army supporting units,
approximately 10,000 in the rear communications zone, the
remainder in the U.S.¹ Reserves of 6 divisions and 11 brigades
would be available within eight weeks, 21 divisions within 24 to

¹These represent the standard planning figure; Neville Brown, *Strategic Mobility*, London, Chatto & Windus, 1963, p. 208.

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1. 36 weeks. The total number of Soviet divisions is still estimated at approximately 150, but many of these are cadres requiring major reinforcements; the Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that about half of the Soviet divisions are combat-ready, the U. S. Administration less than half. The Soviet divisions and "division slices" are relatively small; the divisions consist of 9,000 or 11,000 men; since the total number in the army is somewhere between 2 million and 2,300,000, the division slice cannot be much above 20,000. An American division is credited with virtually double the combat power of a Soviet division.² The Soviet army is exceptionally strong in tanks (20,000 front-line tanks and 15,000 second-line tanks have been estimated)-- a factor of strength in the case of rapid advance, but a source of serious logistic problems in the event of protracted fighting. 26 Soviet divisions, at full strength, are stationed in East Europe; it is estimated that these could be reinforced to 70 divisions within 30 days, in the absence of interdiction; 75 divisions, at differing states of preparedness, are stationed in Western Russia.³

With the build-up of the *Bundeswehr* to 12 divisions, NATO ground forces in Germany total approximately 27 divisions (including United States 6, Britain 2 1/3, France, Belgium and the Netherlands

1. The Military Balance, 1963-1964, pp. 22-23.

2. Neville Brown, *op cit.*, p. 212.

³The Military Balance, 1963-1964, p. 5.

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each 2, Canada 1 brigade group). The German division slice consists
of approximately 30,000 men, considerably less than the American
theatre division slice (45,000 men) but half as much again as the
Russian. The number of Western troops in Germany exceeds the
number of Soviet and East German troops. But the Soviet
reinforcement potential greatly exceeds that of NATO: as against
the Soviet 45 division increase in 30 days, the Western reinforcement
potential would be less than 20 divisions.
1

The armies of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact total 850,000 men, organized in 60 divisions, relatively lightly armed, but including 12 armored divisions; with the possible exception of the latter, these are usually regarded as defensive forces making little contribution to the Soviet's offensive strength.²

The NATO tactical air forces (3,500 aircraft) are somewhat
larger than their Soviet counterpart in Europe; their performance is
significantly superior.³ These aircraft can be used in nuclear or
non-nuclear warfare; their range extends to targets in Western Russia.
They could be reinforced from the U. S. It is generally accepted that

1

The NATO members possess about 18 further divisions not
committed to Germany or other theatres, including 7 American divisions;
it is not clear how many of these could be available within the given
period; the U. S., for example, stockpiles supplies for an additional
2 divisions.

²For a comprehensive analysis of the Central European balance,
Neville Brown, "Armies in Central Europe", Royal United Services
Institution Journal, November 1963.

³The American Administration has stated that: "(NATO
has more and better tactical aircraft, and these planes can
carry twice the payload twice as far as the Soviet counterparts."
Speech of Secretary McNamara to the Economic Club of New York,
18 November 1963; text in Survival, Jan.-Feb. 1964, p. 8.

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NATO's tactical nuclear armory is larger and more diverse than that of the Soviets, though detailed data on the Soviet weapons are not available. The NATO armies are coming to be equipped with the solid-fueled *Pershing* and *Sergeant* missiles (range 400 and 85 miles respectively) in addition to the short-range *Honest John*; the warheads of *Pershing* and *Sergeant* are thought to be 20-kiloton (the size) of the Hiroshima bomb). The U.S. tactical nuclear strength (increased by 60% in 1962-63) amounts to "more than 10,000 times the force of the nuclear weapons used to end the Second War" (i.e., several hundreds of megatons).¹

From this it is clear that the Soviet forces as a whole are comparable in magnitude to the American. The comparison may be rounded out by brief reference to naval and air defense forces. The Soviet navy, having no counterpart to the American aircraft carriers, is a smaller force, its emphasis decisively on submarines (approximately 400, by far the world's largest submarine force). The Soviets have devoted greater resources to air defense than the U.S., necessitated by the relative strength of the American strategic forces.²

The total numerical strength of the Soviet armed forces has been substantially reduced since 1956, from 5.8 million to the presently estimated 3.3 million. In January 1960 a phased reduction from 3.6 million to 2.4 million was announced; when this was suspended during the acute phase of the Berlin crisis in 1961 the reduction was thought to have been half completed; by extending the period of conscription, numbers were increased to 3.6 million, maintained until 1963.

¹Speech of McNamara, loc. cit., p. 6.

²For example, the Soviets are estimated to have 8,000 fighters as compared with 1500 used in North American air defense.

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## Soviet Defense Expenditure

To maintain armed forces of this magnitude places a severe burden on the Soviet economy. There is no means of accurately measuring this, however, both because of uncertainty as to the number of defense items not included within the official defense budget and because of difficulties in principle in making international economic comparisons. The study of the Soviet forces themselves offers better evidence than the analysis of expenditure for the view that they are of comparable magnitude to the American forces.

The official defense budget is surprisingly small: in 1963 this was only 14 billion rubles ($15.4 billion), amounting to 9% of the gross national product. But it is likely that considerable expenditure in research and development, defense industries, strategic stockpiles and perhaps other supplies and construction appear elsewhere, unidentified as defense expenditure, in the Soviet budget. Thus the level of Soviet defense expenditure (defined in Western terms) is uncertain: it might amount to little more than one third of that of the U. S., if the official rate of exchange were appropriate for purposes of comparison. It is inappropriate, however, because Soviet military goods are priced low, relative to goods in other sectors of the economy in comparison with Western prices. In a detailed analysis making adjustments for

1
Cf. J.G. Godaire, "The Claim of the Soviet Military Establishment", in *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, December 1962, pp. 35-46; also Timothy Sosnovy, "The Soviet Military Budget", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964. The latter article contains useful data but does not sufficiently acknowledge the conjectural character of many of its propositions.

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this, Morris Bornstein estimated Soviet defense expenditure as almost equal to that of the United States (84% of the U.S. figure). Even if this should be a slight overestimate, it is clear that defense is a far greater burden on the Soviet Economy than the American, the Soviet G.N.P. being estimated at no more than one half of the American (in some estimates, even less).

It appears that the burden became especially onerous in 1961, the year of Soviet and Western reinforcements for the Berlin crisis. There is some evidence that the Soviets did in fact suddenly raise their defense expenditure in the course of the year--whether by 34% as announced would seem doubtful. The dislocation of economic planning and the need to accept a low rate of growth in investment in several major industries, amounted to a serious penalty for the reactivation of the Berlin crises.

1. Morris Bornstein, "A Comparison of Soviet and United States National Product", in *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress, October 1959, pp. 377-395. For a briefer discussion of the problems of international economic comparisons and a somewhat lower estimate of the Soviet defense budget, cf. Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, *The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 84-101.

2. There can be no single "correct" ratio between two economics, because goods are valued differently by each economy. Cf. Hitch and McKean, loco cit.

3. Martin J. Kohn, "The Soviet Economy in 1961: Plan, Performance and Priorities", in *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, pp. 230-232, shows that Soviet investment in a number of industries in 1961 fell very far short of the planned target, very much farther than in other years. These included chemicals, metallurgy, light industry, oil and chemical equipment; it appears likely that resources were diverted from these industries for defense purposes.

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A comparison of Soviet defense expenditure with economic aid shows that, in terms of the allocation of resources, there has not been a major shift in priorities from arms to "economic competition"; Soviet aid has been an attempt to win political influence at little cost. For the period 1954-June 1962, Soviet economic credits and grants to underdeveloped countries came to $3,560 million, approximately one quarter of which represented actual deliveries (estimated at ca. $200 million annually in the late 1950's). By 1961 U.S. economic aid exceeded $2 billions annually, approximately 4% of the defense budget; Soviet aid deliveries were less than 2% of the defense budget. In recent years the Soviets have tended to emphasize military rather than economic aid (e.g. the arms deliveries to Indonesia, usually estimated at ca. $1 billion).

## Motivation

Certain of the exceptionally large Soviet military investments --notably in submarines and air defense-- can be explained in terms of Soviet general war needs against an adversary superior in strategic power and dependent on sea communication. What appears surprising today is the degree to which Soviet capability is directed against West Europe: with reinforcement, they still would be capable of invading West Europe against the present NATO defenses if nuclear weapons are not used, yet at the same time they have built up a missile force which could destroy all major military targets in West

1. George S. Garnett and Morris H. Crawford, "The Scope and Distribution of Soviet Economic Aid", in *Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power*, pp. 457-474.

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Europe and inflict any desired amount of civilian damage.

This duplication of military effort against Europe may be largely fortuitous, a product of the overlapping of two phases of policy—that of the 1950's in which the power to invade Europe was the main instrument of Soviet deterrent policy, and that of the 1960's in which this was to have been replaced by overwhelming missile superiority in relation to Europe, the new policy being announced in Khrushchev's speech of 14 January 1960. The opposition of the military was insufficient to halt the Soviet unilateral disarmament before the acute Berlin crisis of 1961. Meanwhile, the MRBM build-up was beginning. It is possible that the 1960 policy may be resumed, tacitly if not overtly. The conflict between the claims of missile and ground forces is reflected in the doctrinal disputes between the so-called radicals and traditionalists within the Soviet military.

The reasons for the Soviet missile build-up against Europe rather than the United States are a matter of conjecture. In part, it might reflect Russian history—a carry-over from the experience of invasion from West Europe, a lingering suspicion of the Germans, a determination to remain obviously superior to Europe militarily.

1. How far this would have weakened the Soviet ground forces would have depended largely on the state of the reserve units—equipment, training and preparedness— which could not be known in advance.

2. One indication is an apparent official attempt to create a mystique around the rocket forces. cf. T. Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought", p. 479.

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It could reflect the greater technical problems in building a large force of ICBMs (the Soviets do not appear to possess a solid fuelled missile comparable to Muniteman) or the attraction of using mobile (hence relatively invulnerable) missiles. It could reflect a desire to retain the kind of asymmetrical but satisfactory deterrent relationship with the United States which had existed in the 1950's, a Soviet threat to Europe neutralizing the American threat to the Soviets. Holding Europe hostage could reflect a sophisticated deterrent strategy, superior to an attempt to emulate the United States in ICBMs, perhaps in the recognition that the United States could always win a numbers race. A European hostage might be valuable, not only for deterrence, but also in the event of a Soviet political offensive, as Khrushchev indicated during the Berlin crisis, confident that the Europeans were intimidated.

Somewhat less tangibly, the size of the Soviet forces contributes to their status as one of the two "super-powers"; it is unlikely that they could claim this sort of position in world affairs if their forces were of a lesser order of magnitude than the American. They would not inspire the same fear in Europe -- they would not automatically be taken seriously -- if they possessed nothing more than a "minimum deterrent" against America armed at its present level.

1. See Sulzberger interview with Khrushchev, *New York Times*, September 8, 1964

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### III. Implications of Soviet Military Doctrine

Soviet doctrine differs sharply from current American strategic doctrine in playing down, and at times flatly denying, the possibility of limiting a future war between nuclear powers.

However, contrary to the prevailing Western view, there are many indications that Soviet military thinking has concerned itself with limited war. The prevailing note has been the unconditional assertion of the inevitable expansion of any war between the nuclear powers: "One must emphasize that the present international system and the present state of military technology will cause any conflict to develop, inevitably, into a general war if the nuclear powers are drawn into it."

1

The second edition of Sokolovskii (editor) *Military Strategy* (not translated) criticizes the American doctrine of controlled nuclear war. See discussion in Thomas Wolfe, "Shifts in Soviet Strategic Thought", p. 480. Such polemical writing serves, whether deliberately or unintentionally, to acquaint Soviet leaders with the essence of the American doctrine.

2

Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. 299. Recently this key passage has been softened by the omission of the word "inevitably". Cf. Wolfe, *loc. cit.*, p.482.

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In justifying this assertion, the Soviet writers develop
a political rather than a technical argument: the danger of war
lies in the predatory character of imperialism, which may launch
a surprise attack or seize on a pretext (an "accident") to unleash
general war. *Ipso facto*, such a war would be the decisive struggle
between the classes, and between the socialist and capitalist
system. "The sharp class nature of such a war will compel the
belligerents to aim at conclusive political and military decisions."
While final victory would depend on the operations of all of the
armies, especially the ground forces, the initial period would decide
the outcome.

In the very first minutes of the war, the belligerents may use up their carriers, missiles and aircraft, accumulated in peacetime along with their stockpiles of nuclear weapons in order to destroy and devastate the enemy's most important targets throughout his entire territory, and to achieve their main political and military-strategic aims within a brief period of time and at the very outset of the war. Therefore the initial period of a modern missile war will obviously be the main and decisive period and will predetermine the development and outcome of the entire war. The fighting in this period obviously will be most fierce and destructive. 2

1
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 287

2
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 308

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In the Sokolovskii volume this is the only kind of war which is extensively analyzed. But a number of Soviet statements have indicated that a separate category of "local wars" is distinguished: there is no attempt in the technical military literature to insist on the inevitability of escalation. And the Sokolovskii volume itself contains several references to the limitation of local war. While these are not elaborated, they show that the problem is receiving attention.

> While preparing for a decisive struggle with the aggressor in a world war, the armed forces of the socialist countries must also be ready for small-scale local wars which the imperialists might initiate. The experience of such wars, which have broken out repeatedly in the postwar period, is that they are waged with different instruments and by other methods than world wars. Soviet military strategy therefore must study the methods of waging such wars, too, in order to prevent their expansion into a world war and in order to achieve a rapid victory over the enemy.

Since "some imperialist circles" might foist a local war on the socialist countries, "Soviet military strategy should study methods of conducting both world and local wars. The methods for conducting these two kinds of wars are essentially different, especially at the beginning of a war. This must be taken into account in theory and practice, when training our Armed Forces." And a later passage

1

The American editors of Sokolovskii refer to several such statements as: "The scale of wars as well as their intensity are determined by the political objectives of the belligerents". (pp. 229-293).

2

Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 356. Emphasis added.

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states that: 'Under modern conditions, any local military conflict,
if not nipped in the bud, can grow into a world war with unlimited
use of nuclear weapons.' This passage suggests that West Germany
might initiate a local attack--"at the beginning of such a war
nuclear weapons might not even be used." The important point here is
not the distortion of West German intentions, but the fact that the
Soviet military have considered the contingency of a local war, even
in Europe, in which nuclear weapons are not used in the early stages.
Moreover, they show a certain awareness of the possibility of
"limited strategic war" in arguing that the Americans, while shrinking
from the dangers of a general war, hope "to use nuclear weapons in
the course of expanding local conflicts... in order to alter the
situation sharply in their favor. They expect to be able to limit
the employment of nuclear weapons to the territory of their
satellites."

These passages show, what has been surprisingly overlooked
by Western commentators, that the Soviet military authorities
recognize the possibility of local wars fought on quite different
principles from general war, especially in the initial stage, and state
that military planning and training should prepare for this as well as
the more difficult case of general war. Further, they show an
awareness of the potential political value of the selective use of

1
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 396. Emphasis added.

2
Sokolovskii, op. cit., p. 396.

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nuclear weapons in such a conflict. These comments suggest a strong
probablility that planning for limited war is carried out.

It is not difficult to see reasons why the more public
declaratory policy has chosen to deny the possibility of
limitation. By asserting the probability, or more usually the
inevitability of escalation, the Soviet leaders may hope to
deter the West from intervening in local conflicts, and to avoid
a "dialogue" which might encourage an American belief in the
possibility of limited war, also to avoid Chinese pressure for
greater militancy which would be more effective if the Soviets
openly acknowledged the possibility of limited local wars.
Stalin's policy on nuclear weapons offers a precedent for such a
separation between declaratory and action policy; while asserting
that nuclear weapons did not affect the "permanently operating
factors" which are decisive in war, Stalin gave the highest
priority to the rapid development of Soviet atomic and thermo-nuclear
weapons.

Moreover, unless Soviet military planners were fettered by
restrictive political directives, it is difficult to believe that
they would not pay attention to limited local wars, given that they
have the appropriate kind of capability. This is true even of limited
strategic war, so obviously is it preferable to the all-out use of
nuclear weapons, unless indeed one is anticipating all-out nuclear
attack.

All in all, the evidence suggests, not that the Soviets are
dogmatically insistent on the inevitability of escalation, but that
they are prudently aware of the danger that local war may come to

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involve the strategic forces, and that, while in fact privately
planning with war limitation in mind, they have chosen a
declaratory policy which maximizes the chance of avoiding great
power involvement in local wars.

IV. Dangers Arising from the Soviet Military Policy

The dangers arising from Soviet military policy in Europe
must be analyzed on two different levels: firstly, that of today's
circumstances, in which the risk of Soviet attack is very slight,
but a number of potential dangers arise from the nature of the
Soviet capability and from conflict between Soviet and Western
objectives in Germany, and secondly, that of the limits of
deterrence, the circumstances (very different from those of today)
in which it might be necessary to fear a Soviet military threat
of a straightforward kind. In today's circumstances, the problem is
that of a non-deliberate war, especially war through miscalculation
in the course of a political crisis. Or local wars or crises outside
Europe could expand to involve NATO as a whole, exposing Europe to
Soviet threats.

In any of these situations the character of the Soviet
military capability could present special dangers. If Soviet
declaratory policy does faithfully reflect military thinking (we have
seen reason to suppose that it may not) there may be a tendency for
the Soviet forces rapidly to expand any fighting in which they become
engaged, for want of planning for limited uses of force. If the