Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to be here among so many friends, dating back several decades now. Here in this room are people with whom I have worked and people with whom I have argued, but always in the spirit that we were, in terms of values, essentially on the same side. When I am in Italy, obviously I am in a country with a radically different history, a longer history, but one whose fundamental values parallel most of the concerns for which America stands.

Now, first of all, for the sake of the emotional stability of the American Ambassador and DCM who have done me the honor of coming, I must make one point. I do not necessarily represent the Administration. The Administration is headed by a group of people who are personal friends and with whom I substantially agree, but obviously the official policy of the United States will be pronounced by the designated representatives. I say this only so that the Embassy does not put out a statement tomorrow (laughter) emphasizing this point.

I first came to Italy in 1946. I was a soldier in the American army of occupation in Germany. If anyone had predicted to me in 1946 what Italy looks like today, I would have considered that a

5

fantasy. For what has been achieved materially and politically is an enormous tribute to the tenacity and dedication of the Italian people and of the Italian leadership. And though it appears very changeable to the United States, if one has dealt with it, one finds that it has probably more continuity than our own Government, where every decade or so we tend to uproot some trees just to see whether the roots are still there.

I have now lived so long that I have seen the tremendous changes in Italy, the creation of NATO and the emergence of the European Union. Nobody thought it possible when all of it started, that the Soviet Union would disintegrate and that so many of our foreign policy problems today would be the problems caused by our successes and by our achievements, and successes at which we worked together. Many of the debates of the Fifties, Sixties, Seventies and Eighties are very hard to remember today, and I like to believe that ten or twenty years from now many of the disputes of which we are aware today will also be seen in such a perspective.

## 1. *The nature of American foreign policy*

I would now like to make some comments about the structure of the international system, the nature of American foreign policy, and the pro-

6

lems that have arisen as a result of the achieve-
ments of the objectives with which we started.

When I was a young graduate student and
professor, I called on President Truman, who
had just left office, and I asked him what he
had done of which he was most proud. He
said that «I am most proud of the fact that
we had totally defeated our enemies and then
had brought them back into the community of na-
tions as equals. I would like to think that only
Americans would have done this». Now, I am
not saying that *only* Americans would have done
this, but it is a fact that the United States, at
a moment of tremendous material superiority, con-
centrated on building an international system which,
in the minds of its leaders, was based on the prin-
ciple of equality of all the states, and on the prin-
ciple of consultation. It is important to keep that in
mind when one reads the current debate about
American unilateralism as against multilateralism.
In this country, every city is aware of the tempor-
ality of the human condition. Every region has, at
one time or another, seen a foreign occupation, and
there is a perspective that goes back for millennia.
The United States, obviously, has been built by
immigrants. It has felt secure between two great
oceans. It has never had a powerful neighbor,
and it is the only major country in the world
that could believe that whether or not it conducts

7

foreign policy is entirely its own decision. Every
major American program in the postwar period
has been presented to the American people as having
a limited timeframe. Every program has been offered
with the proposition, that after some period of time,
America would be able to get rid of whatever the
task was. Even as late as the American intervention
in Bosnia, together with NATO, President Clinton
presented it to the American Congress as a one-year
project. No European, no Italian, could possibly
believe that the problems of Bosnia, with its history
of hundreds of years, could be solved in one year.
But the attitude that problems are soluble within a
specific timeframe and that crises are caused by tem-
porary interruptions of some beneficent status quo
has been a fundamental American conviction which
I, to this day, still encounter when I travel around
the United States to give speeches. There is, in
American history an ambivalence between missionary
tendencies and isolationist tendencies, both of them
existing side by side. And this nation has suddenly
been propelled into global leadership. It is true that
the United States is now more powerful than any
other nation. It is true that there is no other nation
that can compete on the military level with the
United States. But, whatever the intellectuals may
say, the majority of Americans do not particularly
gloat in this, and do not think that this entitles us
to impose our preferences all over the world. The

8

majority of Americans probably think that it is an
opportunity to keep the problems of other parts of
the world away from the United States.

2. *The nature of the crisis after September 11th*

It is in this context that you have to understand the impact of September 11th on the United States. Nobody had ever thought it possible that the United States could be directly attacked. Even less did anybody think it possible that America would be attacked by enemies we didn't know we had! The vast majority of Americans did not think that radical Islam was even thinking of attacking the United States. The difference between this crisis and the Cold War was that in the Cold War there was an enemy, one could calculate what the enemy would do, rightly or wrongly, one could assume that the enemy would make its own calculation and that therefore at some point a certain balance could be achieved. But in this crisis, the purpose of the enemy is to inflict suffering. He achieves his objective by producing chaos. He doesn't mind being killed in the process of doing it, making it a challenge unprecedented in the American experience, probably to that extent even in the European experience. It is in this context that one has to understand what America is trying to do right now. When America is challenged for the reasons that I gave, a

9

country of immigrants that had turned its back on Europe, sustained itself by its belief in the superiority of the values that had brought them there, it can never be a purely practical question. It becomes a moral question. The reaction of the American public and the American leadership has been to try to overcome this danger, not as one practical solution, but to eradicate it by its roots.

By now, I think, there is very little disagreement about the first phase of what has been done. The third phase which is in the process of being completed, attempts to separate terrorist groups from the state support that generated them or that makes them possible. Italy itself has had its own experience with terrorism, and you know that terrorist groups need some sort of central organization to carry out a systematic campaign. The attempt of the third phase of American policy has been to separate these terrorist groups from state support. It has been enormously gratifying to know that in this phase we have had tremendous support in Europe and we have greatly appreciated the contribution that Italy has made to this enterprise. The presence of Italian forces, so far from the historic concerns of Italian foreign policy, is something that means a great deal to all of us.

But now the questions is, how does one sustain this effort? I am not here to advocate any particular policy. I am trying to explain – before I go on to

10

more general topics – what is in the minds of people, especially when you read about Iraq, or the axis of evil, or whatever the phrases are that are now in controversy. The fundamental question that President Bush has raised is this. We have learned that weapons can suddenly be used against any of us and, from a technical point of view, Europe is more vulnerable than the United States. What does one do about countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical and others? Countries that have no democratic balance to restrain their governments. Countries that have used some of these weapons both against their own people and against their neighbors. Can one wait until they use them or make them available to terrorists? Or can one find some means to prevent it? Our governments are going to be discussing the details of such issues, but the philosophical and conceptual questions cannot be ignored. One cannot simply say, we will wait until something happens.

Most of you do not know, I am sure, that in 1969 the United States unilaterally renounced the use of biological weapons, and announced that it would never use them, not even in retaliation. I was in the Government at the time, and was one of those who made the decision. We made that decision, – I would like to think partly on moral grounds – but partly on the grounds that we felt that nobody had a right to create a global

11

epidemic which we had no idea how to bring under control. But it was also clear that if biological or chemical weapons were used against us we would have to use other weapons of mass destruction in retaliation. So when you sometimes read speculations of what we might do, as you did in recent weeks, you have to look at the history behind this. That if these weapons were used against us, we would have to have a nuclear arsenal capable of responding.

### 3. Our concern with Iraq

On the question of our concern with Iraq, it is how to prevent these stockpiles from accumulating and being used at a moment at which a huge catastrophe can be inflicted. People who reject military means have an obligation to put forward some concrete concept of the alternatives, and these alternatives should be specific enough and concrete enough to answer the question. Nobody can possibly want a war that it is unnecessary, and nobody can want a war without our allies. But it is also not a problem that can simply be dismissed by condemning unilateralism, because when one is asked an important question one cannot give a veto on a matter of life or death for everybody.

This is the immediate situation, but there is a deeper problem that we all face. I am of the gen-

12

eration that grew up with Atlantic relations as the
central concern of American foreign policy. Some
people say that this is because I was born in Eur-
ope, but my experience in Europe before I emigrated
was not so exalted that it tied me to Europe. What
tied me to Europe was what I saw as an American
soldier during the war, and what I saw in the
reconstruction of countries like Italy and the partner-
ship that we all were so proud of in those decades.
So, for my generation, despite all the quarrels we
may have had, we all knew that we had a common
destiny. It was instinctive for all the Presidents of
the United States and for their Secretaries of State.
But now, things have changed internally on both
sides of the Atlantic. The generation that is coming
into power on both sides of the Atlantic does not
have the experience of a common war or of the
common period of construction. I was teaching at
some public school in New York a few months ago
and I said something about the Berlin crises. Those
were fifteen-year old students – they had never heard
of the Berlin crises! As well as a lot of other things,
a lot of things in America, such as who I was
exactly! (Laughter). The generations coming from
the America Middle West and Southwest, you can-
not count on the fact that they have spent their
vacations in Europe, or that they have a lot of
friends over there. Well, when I see something about
Italy that confuses me I call up Gianni Agnelli or

13

two or three others less close to me. That sort of
relationship no longer exists, but it doesn't really
exist on the European side either for a totally
new situation has evolved on both sides of the
Atlantic, and new generations are coming into office.
Moreover, these new generations grew up in a cli-
mate of domestic politics in which the process of
getting into office is so exhausting and so time
consuming that it does not permit the sort of con-
centration on substance that was the case in the
generations that grew up in more leisurely periods.
Thus whatever happens in the Middle East or else-
where, we have to rethink our relationship. In the
period in which I formed my ideas and was in
office, the European leaders were also brought
up in a time when Europe still conducted major
foreign policies, even though by then European
power had diminished. Now the concern on
both sides of the Atlantic is, above all, with do-
mestic politics. We have had three presidential elec-
tions in a row in which foreign policy was not
mentioned at all as a significant issue, and in Eur-
ope the agenda that preoccupies Europeans is Eur-
opean unification. European unification is an inter-
esting subject for Americans, but all the esoteric
debates about expanding versus deepening and de-
mocratic control of bureaucratic foreign policy is
almost totally unknown to the American public.
Clearly, the priorities of leaders on both sides

14

are not automatically what they used to be. Therefore the relationship between Europe and the United States, in my view, needs substantial rethinking.

4. Rethink the relationship between United States and Europe

I keep reading that Europeans think we are too dominant and that we need a counterweight, that Europe should unify in order to be a counterweight to the United States and balance the United States internationally. Therefore there is supposed to be some merit in opposing the United States, for the exercise of it, to learn the practice for the time when Europe gets even stronger. I think that would be a disaster for both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe, if it unifies, or when it unifies, will, by necessity, represent a major factor in world affairs. It cannot be ignored, but it does not have to unify primarily for that purpose. If this was an American audience, I would say America has to conduct policies of a different nature in different parts of the world. And since I still believe that our destinies are linked, I would say the same is true of Europe. Let me put before you what I would say to an American audience, and now say to an Italian audience. Americans tend to believe that the world can be made peaceful by applying Wilsonian principles.

15

If all were democratic, there would be no conflict,
so if we simply spread our ideas around the world,
peace will be more or less guaranteed. Now many in
this room and any historian knows that the evolu-
tion of democracy is a very complicated process. It
took hundreds of years in Europe and probably
cannot be force-fed. In any event, foreign policy
has to be conducted in the world as it exists,
and there are, I would say, three or four different
kinds of world. First of all the North Atlantic re-
gion. In that region, in fact, the dominance of
democratic principles and democratic traditions ought
to be a unifying factor. In that part of the world it
is inconceivable that disputes will be settled by war.
Of course, we could begin to consume our energies
in controversy, but it remains a basic principle that I
would assert is true. For the North Atlantic world
the immediate challenge is how to bring Russia into
this world. But when you look at Asia, you see what
Europe was more or less like in the Nineteenth
century. There, the relations between the various
states are more similar to the relations of European
states prior to World War I. They do not exclude
military conflict with each other: India, China, Japan
and others treat each other as strategic rivals. In
dealing with that world, some of the principles
of the balance of power that one learned in Europe
are applicable. If you go to the Middle East, you
are in a Seventeenth-century world. A world in

16

which ideology, religion, is a necessity, and trans-
cends ideas of national interest. For Africa, it is a
totally new problem, because there, the view is how
to create political entities out of colonial traditions
where no political entities of that kind previously
existed.

5. USA, Europe and the rest of the world

Each of these topics, of course, requires long
discussion. The main point I would like to make is
that, on relations with the rest of the world, with
Asia, the Middle East and Africa, there is no reason
why the United States and Europe should be in
conflict with each other. We Americans of course
have to conduct the foreign policy we think is ap-
propriate, but no American can believe that we alone
can manage the whole world. The President was
kind enough to point out some of my views about
peace in the world. And fundamentally I believe that
the world cannot be peaceful unless most of the
significant participants in the international system
believe in its justice. But it can also not be peaceful
if there is not enough strength on the part of those
who hold common values to defend those values. It
is not a choice, in my view, between values and
power, as has always been said, but between com-

17

[10]

bining values and power in such a way that those who challenge can be resisted, and those who can be convinced can be brought along.

I am too old now to change my views about the importance of a European-American relationship, and I have seen too much in countries like this to believe that we need to quarrel fundamentally about the issues of the day. Of course we will differ on some practical problems. But it is important to understand that the traditions which I exemplified in President Truman — who was by the way of a different party than the one I belong to — are fundamentally what changing generations of Americans continue to believe.

Some of you may have heard me use a Chinese proverb, or an alleged Chinese proverb told to me by a friend, which I think represents the challenge of the moment:

> «When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems, and little problems should not concern us.»

At this moment, the real issue between America and Europe is, can we distinguish little problems from big problems, and can we re-

18

ADDRESS TO THE ITALIAN SENATE BY DR. HENRY

KISSINGER, 19 MARCH, 2002

PRESIDENTE (Continues in English)

Let me just say a few words in a language which, rather optimistically, I would say, I take as English, and I thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for accepting our invitation to come here and for delivering your speech. I know that you don't have a complete written text, but we will do our best to have it transcribed immediately and to circulate both the English and the Italian translation.

I would like to say that I am personally and particularly glad to have you here because I am an admirer of your books and papers and your analyses about the different problems of the international situation. If I am not wrong, and if I am, please correct me, the overriding idea, or rather the underlining idea on your views about foreign policy is threefold. First, that peace is a goal for which we should make an effort, all possible efforts. Second, that our desire, or love of peace is not the same as pacifism. Peace costs, and sometimes it costs a lot. Thirdly, that in order to keep the peace, we have to establish or to fix a system of international rules – and if I am not wrong, sometimes you have mentioned something like the situation in Europe before 1914. But of course, here a set of problems crops up, especially in connection with, or related to the topic of your conversation, that is, globalization, and the problems are, for example: how can we govern the process of peace in a world which is more and more globalized? Sometimes a world which presents very strong divisions. Which rules may we adopt? How and where may we fix such rules? But, of course, I am not supposed to give the lecture myself, so I will stop here, and

thank you very much for being with us. I give you the floor and thank
you once again.

(Applause)

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

I first came to Italy in 1946. I was a soldier in the American army of occupation in Germany. If anyone had predicted to me in 1946 what Italy looks like today, I would have considered that a fantasy. For what has been achieved materially and politically is an enormous tribute to the tenacity and dedication of the Italian people and of the Italian leadership. And though it appears very changeable to the

the states, and on the principle of consultation. It is important to keep
that in mind when one reads the current debate about American
unilateralism as against multilateralism. In this country, every city is
aware of the temporality of the human condition. Every region has, at
one time or another, seen a foreign occupation, and there is a
perspective that goes back for millennia. The United States, obviously,
has been built by immigrants. It has felt secure between two great
oceans. It has never had a powerful neighbor, and it is the only major
country in the world that could believe that whether or not it conducts
foreign policy is entirely its own decision. Every major American
program in the postwar period has been presented to the American
people as having a limited timeframe. Every program has been offered
with the proposition, that after some period of time, America would be
able to get rid of whatever the task was. Even as late as the American
intervention in Bosnia, together with NATO, President Clinton
presented it to the American Congress as a one-year project. No
European, no Italian, could possibly believe that the problems of
Bosnia, with its history of hundreds of years, could be solved in one
year. But the attitude that problems are soluble within a specific
timeframe and that crises are caused by temporary interruptions of
some beneficent *status quo* has been a fundamental American
conviction which I, to this day, still encounter when I travel around
the United States to give speeches. There is, in American history an
ambivalence between missionary tendencies and isolationist
tendencies, both of them existing side by side. And this nation has
suddenly been propelled into global leadership. It is true that the
United States is now more powerful than any other nation. It is true
that there is no other nation that can compete on the military level

I would now like to make some comments about the structure of the
international system, the nature of American foreign policy, and the
problems that have arisen as a result of the achievements of the
objectives with which we started.

When I was a young graduate student and professor, I called on
President Truman, who had just left office, and I asked him what he
had done of which he was most proud. He said that "I am most proud
of the fact that we had totally defeated our enemies and then had
brought them back into the community of nations as equals. I would
like to think that only Americans would have done this". Now, I am
not saying that only Americans would have done this, but it is a fact
that the United States, at a moment of tremendous material
superiority, concentrated on building an international system which, in
the minds of its leaders, was based on the principle of equality of all

with the United States. But, whatever the intellectuals may say, the
majority of Americans do not particularly gloat in this, and do not
think that this entitles us to impose our preferences all over the world.
The majority of Americans probably think that it is an opportunity to
keep the problems of other parts of the world away from the United
States.

It is in this context that you have to understand the impact of
September 11th on the United States. Nobody had ever thought it
possible that the United States could be directly attacked. Even less
did anybody think it possible that America would be attacked by
enemies we didn't know we had! The vast majority of Americans did
not think that radical Islam was even thinking of attacking the United
States. The difference between this crisis and the Cold War was that in
the Cold War there was an enemy, one could calculate what the
enemy would do, rightly or wrongly, one could assume that the enemy
would make its own calculation and that therefore at some point a
certain balance could be achieved. But in this crisis, the purpose of the
enemy is to inflict suffering. He achieves his objective by producing
chaos. He doesn't mind being killed in the process of doing it, making
it a challenge unprecedented in the American experience, probably to
that extent even in the European experience. It is in this context that
one has to understand what America is trying to do right now. When
America is challenged for the reasons that I gave, a country of
immigrants that had turned its back on Europe, sustained itself by its
belief in the superiority of the values that had brought them there, it
can never be a purely practical question. It becomes a moral question.
The reaction of the American public and the American leadership has

But now the questions is, how does one sustain this effort? I am not
here to advocate any particular policy. I am trying to explain - before I
go on to more general topics - what is in the minds of people,
especially when you read about Iraq, or the axis of evil, or whatever
the phrases are that are now in controversy. The fundamental question
that President Bush has raised is this. We have learned that weapons
can suddenly be used against any of us and, from a technical point of
view, Europe is more vulnerable than the United States. What does
one do about countries that are developing weapons of mass
destruction, biological, chemical and others? Countries that have no
democratic balance to restrain their governments. Countries that have
used some of these weapons both against their own people and against
their neighbors. Can one wait until they use them or make them

Most of you do not know, I am sure, that in 1969 the United States
unilaterally renounced the use of biological weapons, and announced
that it would never use them, not even in retaliation. I was in the
Government at the time, and was one of those who made the decision.
We made that decision, - I would like to think partly on moral grounds
- but partly on the grounds that we felt that nobody had a right to
create a global epidemic which we had no idea how to bring under
control. But it was also clear that if biological or chemical weapons
were used against us we would have to use other weapons of mass
destruction in retaliation. So when you sometimes read speculations of
what we might do, as you did in recent weeks, you have to look at the
history behind this. That if these weapons were used against us, we
would have to have a nuclear arsenal capable of responding.

This is the immediate situation, but there is a deeper problem that we
all face. I am of the generation that grew up with Atlantic relations as
the central concern of American foreign policy. Some people say that
this is because I was born in Europe, but my experience in Europe
before I emigrated was not so exalted that it tied me to Europe. What
tied me to Europe was what I saw as an American soldier during the
war, and what I saw in the reconstruction of countries like Italy and
the partnership that we all were so proud of in those decades. So, for
my generation, despite all the quarrels we may have had, we all knew
that we had a common destiny. It was instinctive for all the Presidents
of the United States and for their Secretaries of State. But now, things
have changed internally on both sides of the Atlantic. The generation
that is coming into power on both sides of the Atlantic does not have
the experience of a common war or of the common period of
construction. I was teaching at some public school in New York a few
months ago and I said something about the Berlin crises. Those were
fifteen-year old students – they had never heard of the Berlin crises!
As well as a lot of other things, a lot of things in America, such as
who I was exactly! (Laughter). The generations coming from the
America Middle West and Southwest, you cannot count on the fact
that they have spent their vacations in Europe, or that they have a lot
of friends over there. Well, when I see something about Italy that
confuses me I call up Gianni Agnelli or two or three others less close
to me. That sort of relationship no longer exists, but it doesn't really
exist on the European side either for a totally new situation has
evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, and new generations are coming
into office. Moreover, these new generations grew up in a climate of
domestic politics in which the process of getting into office is so

exhausting and so time consuming that it does not permit the sort of
concentration on substance that was the case in the generations that
grew up in more leisurely periods. Thus whatever happens in the
Middle East or elsewhere, we have to rethink our relationship. In the
period in which I formed my ideas and was in office, the European
leaders were also brought up in a time when Europe still conducted
major foreign policies, even though by then European power had
diminished. Now the concern on both sides of the Atlantic is, above
all, with domestic politics. We have had three presidential elections in
a row in which foreign policy was not mentioned at all as a significant
issue, and in Europe the agenda that preoccupies Europeans is
European unification. European unification is an interesting subject
for Americans, but all the esoteric debates about expanding versus
deepening and democratic control of bureaucratic foreign policy is
almost totally unknown to the American public. Clearly, the priorities
of leaders on both sides are not automatically what they used to be.
Therefore the relationship between Europe and the United States, in
my view, needs substantial rethinking.

I would say America has to conduct policies of a different nature in different parts of the world. And since I still believe that our destinies are linked, I would say the same is true of Europe. Let me put before you what I would say to an American audience, and now say to an Italian audience. Americans tend to believe that the world can be made peaceful by applying Wilsonian principles. If all were democratic, there would be no conflict, so if we simply spread our ideas around the world, peace will be more or less guaranteed. Now many in this room and any historian knows that the evolution of democracy is a very complicated process. It took hundreds of years in Europe and probably cannot be force-fed. In any event, foreign policy has to be conducted in the world as it exists, and there are, I would say, three or four different kinds of world. First of all the North Atlantic region. In that region, in fact, the dominance of democratic principles and democratic traditions ought to be a unifying factor. In that part of the world it is inconceivable that disputes will be settled by war. Of course, we could begin to consume our energies in controversy, but it remains a basic principle that I would assert is true. For the North Atlantic world the immediate challenge is how to bring Russia into this world. But when you look at Asia, you see what Europe was more or less like in the Nineteenth century. There, the relations between the various states are more similar to the relations of European states prior to World War I. They do not exclude military conflict with each other: India, China, Japan and others treat each other as strategic rivals. In dealing with that world, some of the principles of the balance of power that one learned in Europe are applicable. If you go to the Middle East, you are in a Seventeenth-century world. A world in which ideology, religion, is a necessity, and

(L)

transcends ideas of national interest. For Africa, it is a totally new problem, because there, the view is how to create political entities out of colonial traditions where no political entities of that kind previously existed.

Each of these topics, of course, requires long discussion. The main point I would like to make is that, on relations with the rest of the world, with Asia, the Middle East and Africa, there is no reason why the United States and Europe should be in conflict with each other. We Americans of course have to conduct the foreign policy we think is appropriate, but no American can believe that we alone can manage the whole world. The President was kind enough to point out some of my views about peace in the world. And fundamentally I believe that the world cannot be peaceful unless most of the significant participants in the international system believe in its justice. But it can also not be peaceful if there is not enough strength on the part of those who hold common values to defend those values. It is not a choice, in my view, between values and power, as has always been said, but between combining values and power in such a way that those who challenge can be resisted, and those who can be convinced can be brought along.

I am too old now to change my views about the importance of a European-American relationship, and I have seen too much in countries like this to believe that we need to quarrel fundamentally about the issues of the day. Of course we will differ on some practical problems. But it is important to understand that the traditions which I exemplified in President Truman – who was by the way of a different party than the one I belong to – are fundamentally what changing generations of Americans continue to believe.

"When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems, and little problems should not concern us."

At this moment, the real issue between America and Europe is, can we distinguish little problems from big problems, and can we reduce big problems to little problems; and if we continue to work together as we have over the last few months on the immediate issue, I am confident that we can do this.

I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to this
distinguished group and to have the opportunity of having so many of
my friends here in a position where they cannot answer! Thank you
very much.

(Applause)

PRESIDENT:

Thank you very much Dr. Kissinger. (Continues in Italian)

..................

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

SENATOR LAMBERTO DINI:

Dr. Kissinger, you said, quite rightly when, citing President Truman,
that the relationship after the war ended was based on a principle of
respect and equality and consultation.........(No microphone) Now in

relation to these tendencies towards unilateralism, during our recent
tour of the United States as members of the Legal Parliamentary
Assembly (?). we certainly got a very clear message, and that is, after
September 11th, the American Government reserved itself the right to
intervene militarily in any area of the world when its own security
might be at stake. Now, of course this will probably be done through
the process of consultation, but no mention was made at all of the role
of the United Nations. That is the only problem. That is my first
question.

The second relates to the Nuclear Posture review in this paper that has
been linked, by the Los Angeles Times at least ... Do you think, Dr.
Kissinger, that if that involves the abandonment of the comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty or the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the spreading of
nuclear weapons, will this increase the security of the world, of the
US and of the world. How do you see this?

DR. KISSINGER:

Two very good questions. Let me first deal with the second question,
which is, does that Nuclear Posture Review indicate a fundamental
change in American strategy that would involve the abandonment of
the Test Ban? Well, of course the American Senate rejected the Test
Ban Treaty under the Clinton Administration, so we are not bound by
it legally. But we have announced, or rather the previous
Administration announced, that we would adhere to it, and I have not
heard anyone in this Administration indicating any change in that
policy. But as I said, the Ambassador and his Deputy are in a better
position to answer though I have not heard of any change in this from
several consultations I have had in Washington.

Secondly, I don't exactly know what this paper represents, at what level of the Government, or how high up it has been approved. When I saw it, my interpretation was as follows: We have always said that if weapons of mass destruction are used against us, we may respond with nuclear weapons even if the weapons of mass destruction used are not nuclear weapons. In fact, if they are biological weapons, we are obliged to use something other than biological weapons because we have renounced the use of biological weapons, even in retaliation. So, as I interpret that document, it is that, if we had to use nuclear weapons, we would prefer to use smaller and more discriminating nuclear weapons. Also I have been reading about looking for weapons that can go into deep bunkers and so forth, but I relate all of this to the weapons of mass destruction syndrome. I do not believe it reflects a fundamental change in American strategy. This is making a great drama out of something that I think is essentially inconsequential from the point of view of overall strategy.

Responding now to the first question on unilateralism. It is of course a problem. To what degree are you bound by consultations? As a general statement, to say that, when your national security is involved you will act, even reluctantly and even if Allies disagree, is, I would say, a normal position for a Government to take. You cannot permit any country to veto your survival. The question is: how do you define national security? No doubt this requires some discussion. I personally think that, among the so-called 'axis of evil' countries which were mentioned, there is an urgency about Iraq and a greater scope for consultation than with respect to the other two, Iran and North Korea. Then there is an additional category of problems which President Bush didn't specifically mention, namely countries which

do not yet have weapons of mass destruction and might develop them.
How can you get an international system that assures the world of
these weapons not going to ten other countries? That of course cannot
be done by the United States alone. So there are various levels of
multilateralism and some limiting conditions of unilateralism. It is in
that context that I believe the debate should be carried on.

SPEAKER (?):

How do you see the Israeli-Palestinian situation, and what are the
prospects?

DR. KISSINGER:

There is always, of course, one question too many! (Laughter). How
do I see the Israeli-Palestinian question? I will just make a general
observation, otherwise one would get into endless detail. The view I
hear most frequently in Europe, and sometimes in the United States, is
this. That there is some magic formula by which that problem could
be made to disappear, after which the Palestinians and Israelis would
live with a consciousness of harmony and the Islamic world would not
be angry at the West any more; and that the United States should
impose this on Israel. This is usually described as the '67 borders
and some other things. I do not believe that it is possible to go from
where we are to a final settlement in one negotiation, to go from
mutual extermination to ultimate reconciliation in one negotiation. It
is impossible, in my view, and any effort to do it that way will lead to
the same result as Camp David - that it will explode again. A more
realistic approach would be to find some interim agreement in the
course of which a Palestinian State would be created, some secure
borders are established, some principles of coexistence are devised,

and normal economic life permitted to resume. Then we can look at
such issues as refugees and holy places five or ten years from now
when the atmosphere has improved. You might well say, nobody will
ever accept this, but if they never accept it then it means they are
determined on destroying the Jewish state, and what I have said seems
to be in the realm of the conceivable. What I do not believe is possible
is to go in one jump to borders that have hitherto been considered
insecure, and also to include the refugee question. This is an issue
that, if we and the Europeans were to agree on and say to the Israelis,
there has to be a peace plan, and to the Arabs, you cannot get all you
are asking for, then we would have a basis for something to take
place. This is my philosophical, conceptual, outline on what I think
about the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

We can take one more question now.

SPEAKER (?)

Dr. Kissinger, I particularly appreciate your remark on the new
situation of relations between Europe and America. I think it is very
perceptive of you, and I think there is not enough awareness of this on
both sides. About this, I have a practical question. Italy is not maybe
in the forefront of military effort on terrorism, but it is certainly in the
forefront of the effects of this terrorism. As you know, we are
experiencing a new wave of illegal immigration. There will be more
of it. People coming from Africa, people coming from Iraq, people
coming from Kurdistan. Do you not think that this is something that
Italy should not face alone? Do you not think that the international
community should help Italy on something that is, in reality, a world
effort?

DR. KISSINGER:

I don't know enough about the details. But I know that in every
European country there is a debate about immigration. Therefore a
common European policy would seem to make sense. I would
question what role the United States can play in immigration policy
into Europe but it is a subject where I haven't seen what the various
choices are. I do agree with you that it is an important problem for the
future of Europe.

Another question? Just because you are an old friend, and then we will
end!

SPEAKER ?:

Some time ago you asked yourself the question, 'If I have to call
Europe, what number do I dial?' Now from what you said this
evening, you don't give the idea that this moment is approaching. Is
it?

DR. KISSINGER:

One of my destinies is that almost every smart-Aleck remark that has
been made is ascribed to me, and I don't remember ever having made
that remark. I am happy to take credit for it because it was true in that
period. Do we know now what number to dial? Well, if you look at
the aftermath of September 11th, in the two months after September
11th, more national foreign ministers and prime ministers showed up
in Washington than the European Community. In a crisis the
Europeans seemed to rely more on their national institutions, and one
problem is that, on the one hand the world has been globalized
economically, but it has not yet been globalized politically to a similar
extent. From an American point of view, there is no reason why we
should not welcome having a telephone number to call, and I think it
is slowly evolving in that direction. But I would like to call your

attention to one peculiarity of the European Union. When we deal
with Italy, we can deal with many levels of the Italian Government
and we don't have to bother the Prime Minister or the Foreign
Minister with every issue. There are many levels of consultation by
which we can bring our thinking closer together. When we deal with
Europe institutionally, there is no European position until the Council
of Ministers has met, and once the Council of Ministers has met, there
is no point talking because they can't change anything except by
going through the whole process that disgorged the decision in the
first place. There is an institutional rigidity, so that it isn't so much a
question of getting one phone number, but a question of getting a
system of consultation in which one is not faced with faits accomplis
and where one can have a dialogue in the process of formation. I hope
that the Constitution being worked on by Giscard d'Estaing and Mr.
Amato will help solve this problem.

(Applause)

SPEAKER (?):

Dr. Kissinger, you know that we Europeans – may we impose on you
one more question that we strongly believe you will be kind enough to
accept– we Europeans tend to believe that the peace that we have
achieved in our generation was due to one or two basic factors. One
definitely was keeping the balance of power, NATO saw to that, and
the other one was the building of institutions. Institution-building from
money onwards was our sort of polar star. Although not perfect, not
complete, as you have just mentioned, and yet we believe and tend to
think that maybe global peace maybe achieved through the same two
factors, one, keeping the balance of power, and two, building up those

imperfect global institutions whose construction began with our
generation, with American input of ideas and idealism and European
idealism. Do you think that the building of institutions is still a
feasible way towards world peace or do you think, as we tend to
believe that you have always thought, that keeping the balance of
power is more urgent and more basic?

DR. KISSINGER:

This reminds me that I didn't really answer Senator Dini's question
about the United Nations. It is true that, in the American public right
now, there is not the same belief in the United Nations that existed
originally. This is partly because, during the Cold War and for some
time afterwards, the dominant role that some of the non-aligned
groups played seemed to be very much directed against the United
States – this is a fact which you correctly noted. Now, and this relates
to your question, can you build the world entirely on a balance of
power? The answer is No, because the calculations of balance of
power get too complicated, even with traditional power. As I wrote in
my works on Bismarck, and with the changes in technology and
ideology in which you now also have terrorism, which is non-
calculable, the balance of power by itself will not do. A number of
institutions should be created, for example on the issue of non-
proliferation that I mentioned, but in the course of a gradual process.
With regard to globalization, there will be several problems. The
economic and political worlds are not in harmony with each other, and
that needs to be brought into a more institutional framework. I am not
saying that the balance of power is enough, but without it, you can't
do the other.

(Applause)

PRESIDENTE:

Dr. Kissinger, you probably know that the Danish physicist, Niels Bohr, probably one of the most eminent physicists in the Twentieth-century, used to destroy his colleagues just by saying, 'very interesting speech,' so that is the reason that I am going to thank you for your very intriguing speech! Thank you very much.

KISSINGER, 19 MARCH, 2002

(Applause)

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to be here among so many friends, dating back several decades now. Here in this room are people with whom I have worked and people with whom I have argued, but always in the spirit that we were, in terms of values, essentially on the same side. ~~So, when I am in Italy,~~ obviously I am in a country of a radically different history, a longer history, but one whose fundamental values parallel most of the concerns for which America stands.

Now, first of all, for the sake of the emotional stability of the American Ambassador and DCM who have done me the honor of coming, I must make one point. I do not necessarily represent the Administration. The Administration is headed by a group of people who are personal friends, ~~and~~ with whom I substantially agree, but obviously the official policy of the United States will be pronounced by the designated representatives, ~~and I say this only so that the~~ Embassy does not put out a statement tomorrow (laughter) emphasizing this point.

I first came to Italy in 1946. I was a soldier in the American army of occupation in Germany. If anyone had predicted to me in 1946 what Italy looks like today, I would have considered that a fantasy. So what has been achieved materially and politically is an enormous tribute to the tenacity and dedication of the Italian people and of the Italian leadership, ~~which looks very changeable to the United States, but~~ And Though it appears

which, if one has dealt with it, has probably more continuity than our own Government, where every decade we tend to uproot some trees to see whether the roots are still there.

I have now lived so long that I have seen these tremendous changes in Italy, the creation of NATO and the emergence of the European Union. Nobody thought it possible when all of it started, that the Soviet Union would disintegrate and that so many of our foreign policy problems today would be the problems caused by our successes and by our achievements, and successes at which we worked together. Many of the debates of the Fifties, Sixties, Seventies and Eighties are very hard to remember today, and I like to believe that ten or twenty years from now many of the disputes of which we are aware today will also be seen in such a perspective.

I will now like to make some comments about the structure of the international system, the nature of American foreign policy, and the problems that have arisen now as a result of the achievements of the objectives with which we started.

When I was a young professor, a graduate student, I called on President Truman, who had just left office, and I asked him what he had done of which he was most proud, and he said that "I am most proud of the fact that we had totally defeated our enemies and then had brought them back into the community of nations as equals. I would like to think that only Americans would have done this". Now, I am not saying that only Americans would have done this, but it is a fact that the United States, at a moment of tremendous material superiority, concentrated on building an international system which in the minds of its leaders was based on the principle of equality of all the states, and on the principle of consultation. It is important to

keep that in mind when one reads the current debate about American
unilateralism as against multilateralism. In this country, every city is
aware of the temporality of human <u>condition</u>. Every region has, at
one time or another, seen a foreign occupation, and there is a
perspective that goes back for millennia. The United States, obviously,
has been built by immigrants. It has felt secure <u>between</u> two great
oceans. It has never had a powerful neighbor, and it is the only major
country in the world that could believe that whether <u>or not</u>, it conducts
foreign policy <u>or not</u>, it is entirely <u>up to</u> its own decision. Every major
American program in the postwar period has been presented to the
American people as having a limited timeframe. Every program has
been offered with the proposition <u>that</u> after some period of time,
America would be able to get rid of whatever the task was. Even as
late as the American intervention in Bosnia, together with NATO,
President Clinton presented it to the American Congress as a one-year
project. No European, no Italian, could possibly believe that the
problems of Bosnia, with its history of hundreds of years, could be
solved in one year. But the attitude <u>that problems were</u> soluble within
a specific timeframe <u>and</u> that crises <u>are</u> caused by temporary
interruptions of some beneficent <i>status quo</i> has been a fundamental
American conviction which I, to this day, still encounter when I travel
around the United States to give speeches. There is, <u>therefore</u>, in the-
American history, an ambivalence between missionary tendencies and
isolationist tendencies, both of them existing side by side. And this
nation has suddenly been propelled into global leadership. It is true
that the United States is now more powerful than any other nation. It
is true that there is no other nation that can compete on the military
level with the United States. But whatever <u>intellectuals</u> may say, the
<u>The</u>

majority of Americans do not particularly gloat in this, and do not think that this entitles us to impose our preferences all over the world. The majority of Americans probably think that it is an opportunity to keep the problems of other parts of the world away from the United States.

It is in this context that you have to understand the impact of September 11th on the United States. Nobody had ever thought it possible that the United States could be directly attacked. Even less did anybody think it possible that America would be attacked by enemies we didn't know we had! The vast majority of Americans did not think that radical Islam was even thinking of attacking the United States. The difference between this crisis and the Cold War was that in the Cold War there was an enemy, and one could calculate what the enemy would do, rightly or wrongly, and one could assume that the enemy would make its own calculation and that therefore at some point a certain balance could be achieved. But in this crisis, the purpose of the enemy is to inflict suffering. He achieves his objective by producing chaos. He doesn't mind being killed in the process of doing it, and so it is a challenge that is unprecedented in the American experience, probably to that extent even in the European experience.

In this context one has to understand what America is trying to do right now. Therefore, When America is challenged for the reasons that I gave, a country of immigrants that had turned its back on Europe, sustained itself by its belief in the superiority of the values that had brought them there, it can never be a purely practical question. It becomes a moral question. So the reaction of the American public and the American leadership has been to try to overcome this danger, not as one practical solution, but to eradicate it by its roots.

By now, I think, there is very little disagreement about the first phase of what has been done. The third phase, which is in the process of being completed, and that is attempts to separate terrorist groups from the state support that generated them or that makes them possible. Italy itself has had its own experience with terrorism, and so you have experienced that terrorist groups need some sort of central organization to carry out a systematic campaign, and the attempt of the third phase of American policy has been to separate these terrorist groups from state support. It has been enormously gratifying to know that in this phase we have had tremendous support in Europe and we have greatly appreciated the contribution that Italy has made to this enterprise. The presence of Italian forces, so far from the historic concerns of Italian foreign policy, is something that means a great deal to all of us.

But now the questions is, how does one sustain this effort? I am not here to advocate any particularly policy. I am trying to explain - before I go on to more general topics - what is in the minds of people, especially when you read about Iraq, or the axis of evil, or whatever the phrases are that are now in controversy. The fundamental question that President Bush has raised is this. We have learned that weapons can suddenly be used against any of us, and, from a technical point of view, Europe is more vulnerable than the United States. What does one do about countries that are developing weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical and others? Countries that have no democratic balance to restrain their governments. Countries that have used some of these weapons both against their own people and against their neighbors. Can one wait until they use them or make them available to terrorists? Or can one find some means to prevent it? Our

governments are going to be discussing the details of such issues, but the
philosophical question and the conceptual question cannot be ignored.
One cannot simply say, we will wait until something has been done to
us.

Most of you do not know, I am sure, that in 1969 the United States
unilaterally renounced the use of biological weapons, and announced
that it would never use them, not even in retaliation. I was in the
Government at the time, and was one of those who made the decision.
We made that decision, - I would like to think partly on moral grounds
- but partly on the grounds that we felt that nobody had a right to
create a global epidemic which we had no idea how to bring under
control. But it was also clear that if biological or chemical weapons
would be used against us we would have to use other weapons of mass
destruction in retaliation. So when you sometimes read speculations of
what we might do, as you did in recent weeks, you have to look at the
history behind this. That if these weapons were to be used against us,
that we would have to have a nuclear arsenal that is capable of
responding.

On the question of Iraq, our concern, the issue that we raise is: how do
you prevent these stockpiles from accumulating and being used at a
moment at which a huge catastrophe can be inflicted. People who
reject military means have an obligation to put forward some concrete
concept of the alternatives, and these alternatives should be specific
enough and concrete enough to answer the question. Nobody can
possibly want a war that it is unnecessary, and nobody can want a war
without our allies. But it is also not a problem that can simply be
dismissed by condemning unilateralism, because when one is asked an

Now this is the immediate situation, but there is a deeper problem that we all face. I am of the generation that grew up with Atlantic relations as the central concern of American foreign policy. Some people say that this is because I was born in Europe, but my experience in Europe before I emigrated was not so exalted that it tied me to Europe. What tied me to Europe was what I saw as an American solider during the war, and what I saw in the reconstruction of countries like Italy and the partnership that we all were so proud of in those decades. So, for my generation, with all the quarrels we may have had, we all knew we had a common destiny, and this was instinctive for all the Presidents of the United States and for the Secretaries of State. But now, things have changed internally on both sides of the Atlantic. The generation that is coming into power on both sides of the Atlantic does not have the experience of a common war or of the common period of construction. I was teaching at some public school in New York a few months ago and I said something about the Berlin crisis. Those were fifteen-year old students – they had never heard of the Berlin crises! As well as a lot of other things that hadn't been a lot of things in America, they hadn't been heard of either! Like they didn't know exactly who I was! (Laughter). They knew I was famous, but they didn't know exactly for what. So for the generation from the Middle West and the Southwest, you cannot count on the fact that they have spent their vacations in Europe, or that they have a lot of friends over there. Well, when I see something about Italy that confuses me I call up Gianni Agnelli or two or three others less close to me. That relationship no longer exists, but it doesn't really exist on the

European side either. And so a totally new situation has evolved on
both sides of the Atlantic, of a new generation, coming into office.
Moreover, the new generation grows up in a climate of domestic
politics in which the process of getting into office is so exhausting and
so time consuming that it does not permit the sort of concentration on
substance that was the case in the generations that grew up in more
leisurely periods. Thus whatever happens in the Middle East or
elsewhere, we would have to rethink our relationship. In the period in
which I formed my ideas and was in office, the European leaders were
also brought up in a time when Europe still conducted major foreign
policies, even though by then European power had diminished. But
now the concern on both sides of the Atlantic is, above all, with
domestic politics. We have had three presidential elections in a row, in
which foreign policy was not mentioned at all as a significant issue,
and in Europe the agenda that preoccupies Europeans is European
unification. European unification is an interesting subject for
Americans, but all the esoteric debates about expanding versus
deepening and democratic control of bureaucratic foreign policy is
almost totally unknown to the American public, so that the priorities
of leaders on both sides are not automatically what they used to be.
Therefore the relationship between Europe and the United States, in
my view, needs substantial rethinking.

I keep reading that Europeans think we are too dominant and that we
need a counterweight, and that Europe therefore has to unify in order
to be a counterweight to the United States and balance the United
States internationally. Therefore there is supposed to be some merit in
opposing the United States, for the exercise of it, to learn the practice

for the time when Europe gets even stronger. I think it would be a disaster for both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe, if it unifies, or when it unifies, will, by necessity, represent a major factor in world affairs. It cannot be ignored, but it does not have to unify primarily for that purpose. If this was an American audience, I would say America has to conduct policies of a different nature in different parts of the world, and since I still believe that our destinies are linked, I would say the same is true of Europe. Let me put before you what I would say to an American audience, and now say to an Italian audience. Americans tend to believe that the world can be made peaceful by applying Wilsonian principles. If all were democratic, there would be no conflict, and therefore if we spread our ideas around the world, peace will be more or less guaranteed. Now many in this room and any historian knows that the evolution of democracy is a very complicated process. It took hundreds of years in Europe and probably cannot be force-fed. And in any event, foreign policy has to be conducted in the world as it exists, and there are three or four different kinds of world. First of all the North Atlantic region. In that region, in fact, the dominance of democratic principles and democratic traditions ought to be a unifying factor. In that part of the world it is inconceivable that disputes will be settled by war. Of course, we could begin to consume our energies in controversy, but it remains a basic principle that I would assert as true. For the North Atlantic world the question: how can one bring Russia into this world? is an immediate challenge. But when you look at Asia, you see a Europe more like the Nineteenth-century world. There, the relations between the various states are more similar to the relations of European states prior to World War I. They do not exclude military

NO

and

conflict with each other. India and China, Japan and others treat each other as strategic rivals, and therefore in dealing with that world, some of the principles of a balance of power that one learned in Europe are applicable. If you go to the Middle East, you are in a Seventeenth-century world. A world in which ideology, religion, as a necessity, transcends ideas of national interest. For Africa, it is a totally new problem, because there, its view is how to create political entities out of colonial traditions where no political entities of that kind previously existed.

Each of these topics, of course, requires long discussion. The main point I would like to make is that, on relations with the rest of the world, with Asia, the Middle East and Africa, there is no reason why the United States and Europe should be in conflict with each other. We Americans of course have to conduct the foreign policy we think is appropriate, but no American can believe that we alone can manage the whole world. The President was kind enough to point out some of my views about peace in the world. And fundamentally I believe that the world cannot be peaceful unless most of the significant participants in the international system believe in its justice. But it can also not be peaceful if there is not enough strength on the part of those who hold common values to defend these values. So it is not a choice, in my view, between values and power, as has always been said, but between combining values and power in such a way that those who challenge can be resisted, and those who can be convinced can be brought along.

about the issues of the day. Of course we will differ on some practical problems. But it is important to understand that the traditions which I exemplify in President Truman - of a different party than the one I belong to - is fundamentally what changing generations of Americans continue to believe.

Some of you may have heard me use a Chinese proverb, or an alleged Chinese proverb given to me by a friend, which I think represents the challenge of the moment:

"When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems, and little problems should not concern us overbalance."

(Applause)

PRESIDENT:

..........................

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

SENATOR LAMBERTO DINI:

Dr. Kissinger, you said, quite rightly when, citing President Truman, that the relationship after the war ended was based on a principle of respect and equality and consultation...(No microphone) Now in relation to these tendencies towards unilateralism, during our recent tour of the United States as members of the Legal Parliamentary Assembly (?). we certainly got a very clear message, and that is, after September 11th, the American Government reserved itself the right to intervene militarily in any area of the world when its own security might be at stake. Now, of course this will probably be done through the process of consultation, but no mention was made at all of the role of the United Nations. That is the only problem. That is my first question.

DR. KISSINGER:

Administration announced that we would adhere to it, and I have not
heard anyone in this Administration indicating any change in that
policy. But as I said, the Ambassador and his Deputy are in a better
position to answer that. But I have not heard from several
consultations I have had in Washington, any change in this.

Secondly, I don't exactly know what this paper represents, at what
level of the Government, and how high up it has been approved. When
I saw it, my interpretation was as follows: We have always said that if
weapons of mass destruction are used against us, we may respond
with nuclear weapons even if the weapons of mass destruction used
were not nuclear weapons. In fact, if they are biological weapons, we
are obliged to use something other than biological weapons because
we have renounced the use of biological weapons, even in retaliation.
So as I interpret that document, it was that if we had to use nuclear
weapons, we would prefer to use smaller and more discriminating
nuclear weapons. Now also I have read about looking for weapons
that can go into deep bunkers and so forth, but I relate all of this to the
weapons of mass destruction syndrome. I do not believe it is a
fundamental change in American strategy. This is making a great
drama out of something that I think is essentially inconsequential from
the point of view of overall strategy.

Responding now to the first question on unilateralism. It is of course a
problem. To what degree you are bound by consultations? As a general
statement, to say that when your national security is involved that you
will act, even reluctantly, even if Allies disagree, is, I would say, a
normal position for a Government to take. You cannot permit any
country to veto your survival. The question is: how do you define
national security, and I believe this probably requires some discussion.

(ND)

I personally think that among the so-called 'axis of evil' countries that were mentioned, there is an urgency about Iraq and there is a greater scope for consultation than with respect to the other two, Iran and North Korea. And then there is an additional category of problems which President Bush didn't specifically mention, which are countries that do not yet have weapons of mass destruction and might develop them. How can you get an international system that assures the world of these weapons, going to ten other countries, and that of course cannot be done by the United States alone at all. So there are various levels of multilateralism and some limiting conditions of unilateralism. And it is in that context that I believe the debate should be carried on.

### SPEAKER (?):

### DR. KISSINGER:

There is always, of course, one question too many! (Laughter). How do I see the Israeli-Palestinian question? I will just make a general observation, otherwise one would get into endless detail. The view I hear most frequently in Europe, and sometimes in the United States, is this. That there is some magic formula by which that problem could be made to disappear, after which the Palestinians and Israelis would live with a consciousness of harmony and the Islamic world would not be angry at the West any more, and that the United States should impose this on Israel. And this is usually described as the Sixty-seven borders and some other things. I do not believe that it is possible to go from where we are to a final settlement in one

negotiation, To go from mutual extermination to ultimate reconciliation in one negotiation. It is impossible, in my view, and therefore I believe that any effort to do it that way will lead to the same result as Camp David, and it will explode again, and therefore I think that a more realistic approach would be to find some interim agreement in the course of which a Palestinian State would be created, some secure borders are established, some principles of coexistence are devised, and to permit normal economic life to resume, and then we can look at such issues as refugees and holy places, five or ten years from now when the atmosphere has improved. Now you can say, nobody will ever accept this, but if they never accept it then it means they are determined on destroying the Jewish state, and what I have said seems to be, what is conceivable. What I do not believe is possible is to go in one jump to borders that have hitherto been considered as insecure, and also to include the refugee question, and I think that this is an issue that, if we and the Europeans were to agree, and to say to the Israelis, there has to be a peace plan, and to the Arabs, you cannot get all you are asking for, then we would have a basis for something to take place. This is my philosophical, conceptual, outline on what I think is about the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

SPEAKER (?)

DR. KISSINGER:

I don't know enough about the details. But I know that in every
European country there is a debate about immigration. Therefore a
common European policy would seem to me to make sense. What role
the United States can play in immigration policy into Europe I think I
would question, but it is a subject where I haven't seen what the
various choices are. I agree with you that it is an important problem
for the future of Europe.

SPEAKER ?:

DR. KISSINGER:

One of my destinies is that almost every smart-Aleck remark that has
been made is ascribed to me, and I don't remember ever having made
that remark, but I am happy to take credit for it because it was true in
that period. Do we know now what number to dial? Well, if you look
at the aftermath of September 11th, in the two months after
September 11th, more national foreign ministers and prime ministers

showed up in Washington than the European Community, and in a crisis the Europeans seemed to rely more on their national institutions, and one problem is that, because on the one hand the world has been globalized economically, but it has not yet been globalized politically to a similar extent. From an American point of view, there is no reason why we should not welcome having a telephone number to call, and I think it is slowly evolving in that direction. But I would like to call your attention to one peculiarity of the European Union. When we deal with Italy, we can deal with many levels of the Italian Government and we don't have to bother the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister with every issue. There are many levels of consultation by which we can bring our thinking closer together. When we deal with Europe institutionally, there is no European position until the Council of Ministers has met, and once the Council of Ministers has met, there is no point talking because they can't change it except by going through the whole process that disgorged the decision in the first place, and so there is an institutional rigidity, so that, and I think it isn't so much a question of getting one phone number, but it is a question of getting a system of consultation where one is not faced with accomplished facts and where one can have a dialogue in the process of formation, but I hope that the Constitution that is being worked on by Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Amato will help solve this problem.

(Applause)

SPEAKER (?):

accept- we Europeans tend to believe that the peace that we have achieved in our generation was due to one or two basic factors. One definitely was keeping the balance of power, NATO saw to that, and the other one was the building of institutions. Institution-building from money onwards was our sort of polar star. Although not perfect, not complete, as you have just mentioned, and yet we believe and tend to think that maybe global peace maybe achieved through the same two factors, one, keeping the balance of power, and two, building up those imperfect global institutions whose construction began with our generation, with American input of ideas and idealism and European idealism. Do you think that the building of institutions is still a feasible way towards world peace or do you think, as we tend to believe that you have always thought, that keeping the balance of power is more urgent and more basic?

DR. KISSINGER:

This reminds me that I didn't really answer Senator Dini's question about the United Nations. I think It is true that, in the American public right now, there is not the belief in the United Nations that existed originally. This is partly because, during the Cold War, and sometimes afterwards, the dominant role that some of the non-aligned groups played seemed to be very much directed against the United States – this is a fact which you correctly noted. Now, this relates to your question, Can you build the world entirely on a balance of power? The answer is No, because the calculations of balance of power get too complicated, even with traditional power. As I wrote in my works on about Bismarck, and with the changes in technology and with the changes in ideology in which you now have terrorism, which is non-calculable, the balance of power by itself will not do. So, I believe a

number of institutions should be created, for example on that issue of
non-proliferation that I mentioned, but ~~it will be a gradual process and~~
~~with regard to globalization, there will be a several problems. The~~
economic and political world are not in harmony with each other, and
that needs to be brought into a more institutional framework.
Therefore, I am not saying that the balance of power is enough, but
without it, you can't do the other.

(Applause)

PRESIDENTE:

Dr. Kissinger, you probably know that the Danish physicist, Niels
Bohr, probably one of the most eminent physicists in the Twentieth-
century, used to destroy his colleagues just by saying, 'very interesting
speech,' so that is the reason that I am going to thank you for your
very intriguing speech! Thank you very much.

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(Applause)

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to be here among so many friends, dating back several decades now. Here in this room are people with whom I have worked and people with whom I have argued, but always in the spirit that we were, in terms of values, essentially on the same side. So, when I am in Italy, obviously I am in a country of a radically different history, a longer history, but one whose fundamental values parallel most of the concerns for which America stands.

Now, first of all for the sake of the emotional stability of the American Ambassador and DCM who have done me the honor of coming, I must make one fundamental point. I do not necessarily represent the Administration. The Administration is headed by a group of people who are personal friends, with whom I substantially agree, but obviously the official policy of the United States will be pronounced by the designated representatives, and I say this only so that the Embassy does not have to put out a statement tomorrow (laughter) emphasizing this point.

I first came to Italy in 1946. I was a soldier in the American army of occupation in Germany, and, of course, when one lives in a country, one is always aware of many of the problems and difficulties. But if anyone had predicted to me in 1946 what Italy looks like today, I would have considered that a fantasy. So what has been achieved materially and politically is an enormous tribute to the tenacity and

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dedication of the Italian people and of the Italian leadership, which looks very changeable to the United States, but which, if one has dealt with it, has probably more continuity than our Government, where every decade we tend to uproot some trees to see whether the roots are still there.

I have now lived so long that I have seen these tremendous changes in Italy, the creation of NATO and the emergence of the European Union. Nobody thought it possible when all of it started, that the Soviet Union would disintegrate and that so many of our foreign policy problems today are the problems caused by our successes and by our achievements, and successes at which we worked together. Many of the debates of the Fifties, Sixties, Seventies and Eighties are very hard to remember today, and I like to believe that ten or twenty years from now many of the disputes of which we are aware today will also be seen in such a perspective.

I will now talk to you on the topic that has been written down: it is globalization and its problems, and I will come to globalization. I should like to make some comments about the structure of the international system, the nature of American foreign policy, and the problems that have arisen now as a result of the achievements of the objectives with which we started.

When I was a young professor, a graduate student, I called on President Truman, who had just left office, and I asked him what he had done of which he was most proud, and he said that he was most proud of the fact that we had totally defeated our enemies and then had brought them back into the community of nations as equals. I would like to think that only Americans would have done this. Now, I am not saying that only Americans would have done this, but it is a

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fact that the United States, at a moment of tremendous material superiority, concentrated on building an international system which in the minds of its leaders was based on the principle of equality of all the states, and on the principle of consultation, and it is important to keep that in mind when one reads the current debate about American unilateralism as against multilateralism, on which there is such frequent reference. In this country, every city is aware of the temporality of human conception. Every region has, at one time or another, seen a foreign occupation, and there is a perspective that goes back for millennia. The United States, obviously, has been built by immigrants. It has felt secure behind two great oceans. It has never had a powerful neighbor, and it is the only major country in the world that could believe that whether it conducts foreign policy or not, it is entirely up to its own decision. Every major American program in the postwar period has been presented to the American people as having a limited timeframe. Every program has been offered with the proposition that after some period of time, America would be able to get rid of whatever the task was. Even as late as the American intervention in Bosnia, together with NATO, President Clinton presented it to the American Congress as a one-year project. No European, no Italian, could possibly believe that the problems of Bosnia, with its history of hundreds of years, could be solved in one year. But the attitude that problems were soluble within a specific timeframe, that crises were caused by temporary interruptions of some beneficent status quo has been a fundamental American conviction which I, to this day, still encounter when I travel around the United States to give speeches. There is, therefore, in the American history, an ambivalence between missionary tendencies and isolationist

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tendencies, both of them existing side by side. And this nation has suddenly been propelled into global leadership. It is true that the United States is now more powerful than any other nation. It is true that there is no other nation that can compete on the military level with the United States, but whatever intellectuals may say, the majority of Americans do not particularly gloat on this, and do not think that this entitles us to impose our preferences all over the world. The majority of Americans probably think that it is an opportunity to keep the problems of other parts of the world away from the United States.

It is in this context that you have to understand the impact of September 11th on the United States. Nobody had ever thought it possible that the United States could be directly attacked. Even less did anybody think it possible that America would be attacked by enemies we didn't know we had! The vast majority of Americans did not think that Islam was capable of attacking the United States, or even thinking of attacking the United States. The difference between this crisis and the cold war was that in the cold war there was an enemy, and one could calculate what the enemy would do, rightly or wrongly, and one could assume that the enemy would make its own calculation and that therefore at some point a certain balance could be achieved. But in this crisis, the purpose of the enemy is to inflict suffering. He achieves his objective by producing chaos. He doesn't mind being killed in the process of doing it, and so it is a challenge that is unprecedented in the American experience, probably to that extent even in the European experience, and therefore one has to understand what America is trying to do right now. Therefore, when America is challenged for the reasons that I gave, a country of

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immigrants that had turned its back on Europe, sustained itself by its belief in the superiority of the values that had brought them there, it is therefore never a purely practical question. It becomes a moral question. So the reaction of the American public and the American leadership has been to try to overcome this danger, not as one practical solution, but to eradicate it by its roots.

By now, I think, there is very little disagreement about the third phase of what has been done. The third phase that is in the process of being completed, and that is attempts to separate terrorist groups from the state support that generated them or that makes them possible. Italy itself has had its own experience with terrorism, and so you have experienced that terrorist groups need some sort of central organization to carry out a systematic campaign, and the attempt of the third phase of American policy has been to separate these terrorist groups from state support. It has been enormously gratifying to know that in this phase we have had tremendous support in Europe and we have greatly appreciated the contribution that Italy has made to this enterprise. The presence of Italian forces, so far from the historic concerns of Italian foreign policy, is something that means a great deal to all of us.

But now the questions is, how does one sustain this effort? I am not here to advocate any particularly policy. I am trying to explain - before I go on to more general topics - what is in the minds of people, when you read about Iraq, or the axis of evil, or whatever the phrases are that are now in controversy. The fundamental question that is being raised is this. We have learned that weapons can suddenly be used against any of us, and from a technical point of view, Europe is more vulnerable than the United States. What does one do about

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countries that are developing weapons that we know are weapons of mass destruction, biological, chemical and others? Countries that have no democratic balance to restrain their governments. Countries that have used some of these weapons both against their own people and against their neighbors. Can one wait until they use them? Or can one find some means to prevent it? Our governments are going to be discussing details of such issues, but the philosophical question and the conceptual question cannot be ignored. One cannot simply say, we will wait until something is done.

Most of you do not know, I am sure, that in 1969 the United States unilaterally renounced the use of biological weapons, and announced that it would never use them, not even in retaliation. I was in the Government at the time, and was one of those who made the decision, and we made that decision, - I would like to think partly on moral grounds - but partly on the grounds that we felt that nobody had a right to create a global epidemic which we had no idea how to bring under control. But it was also clear that if biological or chemical weapons would be used against us we would have to use other weapons of mass destruction in retaliation. So when you sometimes read speculations of what we might do, as you did in recent weeks, you have to look at the history behind this. That if these weapons were to be used against us, that we would have to have a nuclear arsenal that is capable of responding. This is in reference to the nuclear debate you have been reading about in recent weeks.

On the question of Iraq, our concern, the question that we raise is: how do you prevent these stockpiles from accumulating and being used at a moment at which a huge catastrophe can be inflicted. People who reject military means then have to put forward some concrete

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concept of the alternatives, and frankly these alternatives should not simply be some nice diplomatic device, but it should be specific enough and concrete enough to answer the question. Nobody can possibly want a war that it is unnecessary, and nobody can want a war without our allies. But it is also not a problem that can simply be dismissed by saying unilateralism as against multilateralism, because when one is asked an important question one cannot give a veto on a matter of life or death to everybody. One should also respect their views in coming to decisions.

Now this is the immediate situation, but there is a deeper problem that we all face. I am of the generation that grew up with Atlantic relations as the central concern of American foreign policy. Some people say that this is because I was born in Europe, but my experience in Europe before I emigrated was not so exalted that it tied me to Europe. What tied me to Europe was what I saw as an American solider during the war, and what I saw in the reconstruction of countries like Italy and the partnership that we all were so proud of in those decades. So, for my generation, with all the quarrels we may have had over all these years, we all knew we had a common destiny, and this was instinctive for all the Presidents of the United States and for the Secretaries of State. But now, things have changed internally on both sides of the Atlantic. The generation that is coming into power on both sides of the Atlantic does not have the experience of a common war or of the common period of construction. I was teaching at some public school in New York a few months ago and I said something about the Berlin crisis. Those were fifteen-year old students - they had never heard of the Berlin crises! As well as a lot of other things that they hadn't heard of, a lot of things in America they hadn't heard of either! Like

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they didn't know exactly who I was! (Laughter). They knew I was famous, but they didn't know exactly for what. So for the generation from the Middle West and the Southwest, you cannot count on the fact that they have spent their vacations in Europe, or that they have a lot of friends over there. Well, when I see something about Italy that confuses me I call up Gianni Agnelli or two or three others less close to me. That relationship no longer exists, but it doesn't really exist on the European side either. And so a totally new situation has evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, of a new generation coming into office. Moreover, the new generation grows up in a climate of domestic politics in which the process of getting into office is so exhausting and so time consuming that it does not permit the sort of concentration on substance that was the case in the generations that grew up in more leisurely periods. So whatever happens in the Middle East or elsewhere, we would have to rethink our relationship. In the period in which I formed my ideas and was in office, the European leaders were also brought up in a time when Europe still conducted major foreign policies, even though by then European power had diminished, but now the concern on both sides of the Atlantic is above all with domestic politics. We have had three presidential elections in a row, in which foreign policy was not mentioned at all as a significant issue, and in Europe the agenda that preoccupies Europeans is European unification. European unification is an interesting subject for Americans, but all the esoteric debates about expansion broadening versus deepening and democratic control of bureaucratic foreign policy is almost totally unknown to the American public, so that the priorities of leaders on both sides are not automatically what they used

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to be, and therefore the relationship between Europe and the United States, in my view, needs substantial rethinking.

I keep reading that Europeans think we are too dominant and that we need a counterweight and that Europe therefore has to unify in order to be a counterweight to the United States and balance the United States internationally, and therefore there is some merit in opposing the United States, for the exercise of it, to learn the practice for the time when Europe gets even stronger. I think it would be a disaster for both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe, if it unifies, or when it unifies, will, by necessity, represent a major factor in world affairs. It cannot be ignored, but it does not have to unify primarily for that purpose. In fact, if you ask yourself, when you look ahead in the future, what are the challenges to be faced, if this were an American audience, I would say America had to conduct policies of a different nature in different parts of the world, and since I still believe that our destinies are linked, I would say the same is true of Europe. Let me put before you what I would say to an American audience, and now say to an Italian audience. Americans tend to believe that the world can be made peaceful by applying Wilsonian principles. If all were democratic, there would be no conflict, and therefore if we spread our ideas around the world, peace is more or less guaranteed. Now many in this room and any historian knows that the evolution of democracy is a very complicated process. It took hundreds of years in Europe and probably cannot be force-fed. And in any event, foreign policy has to be conducted in the world as it exists, and there, I would say, there are three or four different worlds that exist today. First of all the North Atlantic region. In that region, in fact, the dominance of democratic principles and democratic traditions

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ought to be a unifying factor. In that part of the world it is inconceivable that disputes will be settled by war. Of course, we could begin to split and consume our energies, but it remains a basic principle that I would assert as true. For the North Atlantic world the question: how can one bring Russia into this world is an immediate challenge. But when you look at Asia, you see a Europe more like the Nineteenth-century world. There the relations between the various states are more similar to the relations of European states prior to World War I. They do not exclude military conflict with each other. India and China, Japan and others treat each other as strategic rivals, and therefore in dealing with that world, some of the principles of balance of power that one learned in Europe are applicable, and if you go to the Middle East, you are in a Seventeenth-century world. A world in which ideology, religion, as a necessity, transcend ideas of national interest. For Africa, it is a totally new problem, because there, its view is how to create political entities out of colonial traditions where no political entities of that kind previously existed.

Each of these topics, of course, is capable of long discussion. The main point I would like to make is that on relations with the rest of the world, with Asia, the Middle East and Africa, there is no reason why the United States and Europe should be in conflict with each other. We Americans of course have to conduct the foreign policy we think is appropriate, but no American can believe that we alone can manage the whole world. The President was kind enough to point out some of my views about peace in the world. And fundamentally I believe that the world cannot be peaceful unless most of the significant participants in the international system believe in its justice. But it can also not be peaceful if there is not enough strength on the part of those

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who hold common values to defend these values. So it is not a choice,
in my view, between values and power, as has always been said but
between combining values and power in such a way that those who
challenge can be resisted, and those who can be convinced can be
brought along.

I am too old now to change my views about the importance of a
European-American relationship, and I have seen too much in
countries like this to believe that we need to quarrel fundamentally
about the issues of the day. Of course we will differ on some practical
problems. But it is important to understand that the traditions which I
exemplify in President Truman - of a different party than the one I
belong to - is fundamentally what changing generations of Americans
continue to believe.

"When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems, and little problems should not overbalance."

At this moment, the real issue between America and Europe is, can we
distinguish little problems from big problems, and can we reduce big
problems to little problems, and if we continue to work together as we
have over the last few months on the immediate issue, I am confident
that we can do this.

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(Applause)

PRESIDENT:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

SENATOR LAMBERTO DINI:

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DR. KISSINGER:

Yes, two very good questions. Let me first deal with the second
question, which is, does that Nuclear Posture Review indicate a
fundamental change in American strategy which would involve the
abandonment of the Test Ban. Well, of course the American Senate
rejected the Test Ban Treaty under the Clinton Administration, so we
are not bound by it legally, but we have announced, or rather the
previous Administration announced that we would adhere to it, and I
have not heard anyone in this Administration indicating any change in
that policy, but as I said, the Ambassador and his Deputy are in a
better position to answer that. But I have not heard from several
consultations I have had in Washington, any change in this.

Secondly, I don't exactly know what this paper represents, at what
level of the Government, and how high up it has been approved. When
I saw it, my interpretation is as follows: We have always said that if
weapons of mass destruction are used against us, we may respond
with nuclear weapons even if the weapons of mass destruction used
were not nuclear weapons. In fact, if they are biological weapons, we
are obliged to use something other than biological weapons because
we have renounced the use of biological weapons, even in retaliation.
So as I interpret that document, it was that if we had to use nuclear
weapons, we would prefer to use smaller and more discriminating
nuclear weapons, and that is how I interpreted it. Now also I have read
about looking for weapons that can go into deep bunkers and so forth,
but I relate all of this to the weapons of mass destruction syndrome, I
do not believe it is a fundamental change in American strategy and I-

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have been enough in Washington to have heard something if it
represented a fundamental change in American strategy. This is
making a great drama out of something that I think is essentially
inconsequential from the point of view of overall strategy.

Responding now to the first question on unilateralism. It is of course a
problem. To what degree you are bound by consultations. As a general
statement, to say that when your national security is involved that you
will act, even reluctantly, even if Allies disagree, is, I would say, a
normal position for a Government to take. You cannot permit a
country to veto your survival. The question is: how do you define
national security, and I believe this probably requires some discussion.
I personally think that among the so-called 'axis of evil' countries that
were mentioned there is an urgency about Iraq and there is a greater
scope for consultation than with respect to the other two, Iran and
North Korea. And then there is an additional category of problems
which the President didn't specifically mention which is countries that
do not yet have weapons of mass destruction and might develop them.
How can you get an international system that assures the world of
these weapons going to ten other countries, and that of course cannot
be done by the United States alone at all. So there are various levels of
multilateralism and some limiting conditions of unilateralism. And it
is in that context that I believe the debate should be carried on.

SPEAKER (?):

DR. KISSINGER:

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There is always, of course, one question too many! (Laughter). How
do I see the Israeli-Palestinian question? I will just make a general
observation, otherwise one would get into endless detail. The view I
hear most frequently in Europe and sometimes in the United States is
this. That there is some magic formula by which that problem could
be made to disappear, after which the Palestinians and Israelis would
live with a consciousness of harmony and the Islamic world would not
be angry at the West any more, and that the United States should
impose this on Israel, I mean there is nobody else on whom to impose
it. And this is usually described as the Sixty-seven borders and some
other things. I do not believe that it is possible to go from where we
are to a final settlement in one negotiation. To go from mutual
extermination to ultimate reconciliation in one negotiation. It is
impossible, in my view, and therefore I believe that any effort to do it
that way will lead to the same result as Camp David, and it will
 explode again, and therefore I think that a more realistic approach
would be to find some interim agreement in the course of which a
Palestinian State would be created, some secure borders are
established, some principles of coexistence are devised, and to permit
normal economic life to resume and then look at such issues as
refugees and holy places, five or ten years from now when the
atmosphere has improved. Now you can say, nobody will ever accept
this, but if they never accept it then it means they are determined on
 extermination, or destroying the state and what I have said seems to be
what is conceivable. What I do not believe is possible is to go in one
jump to borders that have hitherto been considered as insecure, and
also include the refugee question, and I think that this is an issue that
if we and the Europeans were to agree and to say to the Israelis, there

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has to be a peace plan, and to the Arabs, you cannot get all you are
asking for, then we would have a basis for something to take place.
This is my philosophical, conceptual outline on what I think is about
the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

SPEAKER (?)

DR. KISSINGER:

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SPEAKER ?:

DR. KISSINGER:

One of my destinies is that almost every smart-Aleck remark that has been made is ascribed to me, and I don't remember ever having made that remark, but I am happy to take credit for it because it was true in that period. Do we know now what number to dial? Well, if you look at the aftermath of September 11th, in the two months after September 11th, more national foreign ministers and prime ministers showed up in Washington than the European Community, and in a crisis the Europeans seem to rely more on their national institutions, and one problem is because on the one hand the world has been globalized economically but it has not yet been globalized politically to a similar extent. From an American point of view, there is no reason why we should not welcome having a telephone number to call, and I think it is slowly evolving in that direction. But I would like to call your attention from somebody who has had practice in one peculiarity of the European Union as it applies to dealing with Americans. When we deal with Italy, we can deal with many levels of the Italian Government and we don't have to bother the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister with every issue. There are many levels of consultation by which we can bring our thinking closer together. When we deal with Europe institutionally, there is no European position until the Council of Ministers has met, and once the Council of Ministers has met, there is no point talking because they

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can't change it except by going through the whole process that
disgorged the decision in the first place, and so there is an institutional
rigidity, and I think it isn't so much a question of getting one phone
number, it is a question of getting a system of consultation where one
is not faced with accomplished facts and where one can have a
dialogue in the process of formation, but I hope that the Constitution
that is being worked on by Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Amato will help
solve this problem.

(Applause)

SPEAKER (?):

DR. KISSINGER:

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This reminds me that I didn't really answer Senator Dini's question about the United Nations. I think it is true that in the American public right now, there is not the belief in the United Nations that existed originally. This is partly because during the Cold War and sometimes afterwards, the dominant role that some of the non-aligned groups played seemed to be very much directed against the United States – this is a fact which you correctly noted. Now, this relates to your question. Can you build the world entirely on a balance of power? The answer is No, because the calculations of balance of power get too complicated, even with traditional power. As I wrote when writing about Bismarck, and with the changes in technology and with the changes in ideology in which you now have terrorism which is non-calculable, balance of power by itself will not do. So, I believe a number of institutions should be created, for example on that issue of non-proliferation that I mentioned, but it will be a gradual process and with regard to globalization there will be a several problems. The economic and political world are not in harmony with each other, and that needs to be brought into a more institutional framework. Therefore, I am not saying that the balance of power is enough, but without it, you can't do the other.

(Applause)

PRESIDENTE:

- END -

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GOLDHAMMER

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GOLDHAMMER

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P.03

(Applause)

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to be here among so many friends, dating back several decades now. Here in this room are people with whom I have worked and people with whom I have argued, but always in the spirit that we were, in terms of values, essentially on the same side. Nevertheless, when I am in Italy, obviously I am in a country of a radically different history, a longer history, but one whose fundamental values parallel most of the concerns for which America stands.

Now, first of all, for the sake of the emotional stability of the American Ambassador and DTM who have done me the honor of coming, I must make one fundamental point. I do not necessarily represent the Administration. The Administration is headed by a group of people who are personal friends with whom I substantially agree, but obviously the official policy of the United States will be pronounced by the designated representatives, and I say this only so that the Embassy does not have to put out a statement tomorrow (laughter) emphasizing this point.

I first came to Italy in 1946. I was a soldier in the American army of occupation in Germany. Of course, when one lives in a country, one is always aware of many of the problems and difficulties. But if anyone had predicted to me in 1946 what Italy, look, like today, I would have considered that a fantasy. For what has been achieved materially and politically is an enormous tribute to the tenacity and

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dedication of the Italian people and of the Italian leadership, which it appears very changeable to the United States, but which if one has dealt with it, has probably more continuity than our Government, where every decade we tend to uproot some trees to see whether the roots are still there.

I will now talk to you on the topic that has been designated written-down: it is globalization and its problems. Before I will come to globalization, I should like to make some comments about the structure of the international system, the nature of American foreign policy, and the problems that have arisen now as a result of the achievements of the objectives with which we started.

When I was a young professor, I called on graduate student President Truman, who had just left office, and I asked him what he had done of which he was most proud. He said that he was most proud of the fact that we had totally defeated our enemies and then had brought them back into the community of nations as equals. I would like to think that only Americans would have done this. Now, I am not saying that only Americans would have done this, but it is a

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fact that the United States, at a moment of tremendous material superiority, concentrated on building an international system which in the minds of its leaders was based on the principle of equality of all the states, and on the principle of consultation, it is important to keep that in mind when one reads the current debate about American unilateralism as against multilateralism, to which there is such frequent reference. In this country, every city is aware of the temporality of human condition. Every region has, at one time or another, seen a foreign occupation, and there is a perspective that goes back for millennia. The United States, obviously, has been built by immigrants. It has felt secure between two great oceans. It has never had a powerful neighbor, and it is the only major country in the world that could believe that whether it conducts foreign policy or not, is entirely its own decision. Every major American program in the postwar period has been presented to the American people as having a limited timeframe. Every program has been offered with the proposition that after some period of time, America would be able to get rid of whatever the task was. Even as late as the American intervention in Bosnia, together with NATO, President Clinton presented it to the American Congress as a one-year project. No European, no Italian, could possibly believe that the problems of Bosnia, with its history of hundreds of years, could be solved in one year. But the attitude that problems are soluble within a specific timeframe, that crises are caused by temporary interruptions of some beneficent status quo has been a fundamental American conviction which I, to this day, still encounter when I travel around the United States to give speeches. There is, therefore, in the American history, an ambivalence between missionary tendencies and isolationist

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tendencies, both of them existing side by side. And this nation has suddenly been propelled into global leadership. It is true that the United States is now more powerful than any other nation. It is true that there is no other nation that can compete on the military level with the United States, ~~but whatever~~ *the* intellectuals may say, the majority of Americans do not particularly gloat *in this*, and do not think that this entitles us to impose our preferences all over the world. The majority of Americans probably think that it is an opportunity to keep the problems of other parts of the world away from the United States.

It is in this context that you have to understand the impact of September 11th on the United States. Nobody had ever thought it possible that the United States could be directly attacked. Even less did anybody think it possible that America would be attacked by enemies we didn't know we had.! The vast majority of Americans did not think that Islam was capable of attacking the United States, or even thinking of attacking the United States. The difference between this crisis and the *Cold War* was that in the *Cold War* there was an enemy, ~~and~~ one could calculate what the enemy would do, rightly or wrongly, and one could assume that the enemy would make its own calculation and that therefore at some point a certain balance could be achieved. But in this crisis, the purpose of the enemy is to inflict suffering. He achieves his objective by producing chaos. He doesn't mind being killed in the process of doing it, ~~and~~ *making* it a challenge *because* unprecedented in the American experience, probably to that extent even in the European experience. *It is in this context that one has to understand what America is trying to do right now. Therefore, When America is challenged for the reasons that I gave, a country of*

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immigrants that had turned its back on Europe, sustained itself by its belief in the superiority of the values that had brought them there, it can be therefore a purely practical question. It becomes a moral question. The reaction of the American public and the American leadership has been to try to overcome this danger, not as one practical solution, but to eradicate it by its roots.

By now, I think, there is very little disagreement about the third phase of what has been done. The third phase which is in the process of being completed, and which attempts to separate terrorist groups from the state support that generated them or that makes them possible. Italy itself has had its own experience with terrorism, and so you know that terrorist groups need some sort of central organization to carry out a systematic campaign, and the attempt of the third phase of American policy has been to separate these terrorist groups from state support. It has been enormously gratifying to know that in this phase we have had tremendous support in Europe and we have greatly appreciated the contribution that Italy has made to this enterprise. The presence of Italian forces, so far from the historic concerns of Italian foreign policy, is something that means a great deal to all of us.

But now the questions is, how does one sustain this effort? I am not here to advocate any particularly policy. I am trying to explain before I go on to more general topics - what is in the minds of people, especially when you read about Iraq, or the axis of evil, or whatever the phrases are that are now in controversy. The fundamental question that is being raised is this. We have learned that weapons can suddenly be used against any of us, and from a technical point of view, Europe is more vulnerable than the United States. What does one do about

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Most of you do not know, I am sure, that in 1969 the United States unilaterally renounced the use of biological weapons, and announced that it would never use them, not even in retaliation. I was in the Government at the time, and was one of those who made the decision, and we made that decision, - I would like to think partly on moral grounds - but partly on the grounds that we felt that nobody had a right to create a global epidemic which we had no idea how to bring under control. But it was also clear that if biological or chemical weapons were used against us we would have to use other weapons of mass destruction in retaliation. So when you sometimes read speculations of what we might do, as you did in recent weeks, you have to look at the history behind this. That if these weapons were used against us, then we would have to have a nuclear arsenal that is capable of responding. This is in reference to the nuclear debate you have been reading about in recent weeks.

On the question of Iraq, our concern, the question that we raise is how do you prevent these stockpiles from accumulating and being used at a moment at which a huge catastrophe can be inflicted. People who reject military means have to put forward some concrete

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concept of the alternatives, and frankly these alternatives should not simply be some nice diplomatic device, but it should be specific enough and concrete enough to answer the question. Nobody can possibly want a war that it is unnecessary, and nobody can want a war without our allies. But it is also not a problem that can simply be dismissed by saying unilateralism as against multilateralism, because when one is asked an important question one cannot give a veto on a matter of life or death for everybody. One should also respect their views in coming to decisions.

Now this is the immediate situation, but there is a deeper problem that we all face. I am of the generation that grew up with Atlantic relations as the central concern of American foreign policy. Some people say that this is because I was born in Europe, but my experience in Europe before I emigrated was not so exalted that it tied me to Europe. What tied me to Europe was what I saw as an American solider during the war, and what I saw in the reconstruction of countries like Italy and the partnership that we all were so proud of in those decades. So, for my generation, with all the quarrels we may have had over all these years, we all knew we had a common destiny, and that was instinctive for all the Presidents of the United States and for the Secretaries of State. But now, things have changed internally on both sides of the Atlantic. The generation that is coming into power on both sides of the Atlantic does not have the experience of a common war or of the common period of construction. I was teaching at some public school in New York a few months ago and I said something about the Berlin crisis. Those were fifteen-year old students - they had never heard of the Berlin crises! As well as a lot of other things that they hadn't heard of, a lot of things in America they hadn't heard of either! Like such as

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they didn't know exactly who I was (Laughter). They knew I was famous, but they didn't know exactly for what. So for the generations coming from the Middle West and the Southwest, you cannot count on the fact that they have spent their vacations in Europe, or that they have a lot of friends over there. Well, when I see something about Italy that confuses me I call up Gianni Agnelli or two or three others less close to me. That relationship no longer exists, but it doesn't really exist on the European side either. And so a totally new situation has evolved on both sides of the Atlantic, a new generation coming into office.

Moreover, the new generation is growing up in a climate of domestic politics in which the process of getting into office is so exhausting and so time consuming that it does not permit the sort of concentration on substance that was the case in the generations that grew up in more leisurely periods. Thus whatever happens in the Middle East or elsewhere, we will have to rethink our relationship. In the period in which I formed my ideas and was in office, the European leaders were also brought up in a time when Europe still conducted major foreign policies, even though by then European power had diminished, but

Now the concern on both sides of the Atlantic is above all with domestic politics. We have had three presidential elections in a row, in which foreign policy was not mentioned at all as a significant issue, and in Europe the agenda that preoccupies Europeans is European unification. European unification is an interesting subject for Americans, but all the esoteric debates about expansion broadening versus deepening and democratic control of bureaucratic foreign policy is almost totally unknown to the American public, so that the priorities of leaders on both sides are not automatically what they used

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that means that (10)
to be, and therefore the relationship between Europe and the United
States, in my view, needs substantial rethinking.

I keep reading that Europeans think we are too dominant and that we need a counterweight, ~~and that Europe therefore has to~~ should ~~unify in order~~ to be a counterweight to the United States and balance the United States internationally, ~~and therefore~~ that there is some merit in opposing the United States, for the exercise of it, to ~~learn~~ that the practice for the time when Europe gets even stronger. I think ~~it~~ would be a disaster for both sides of the Atlantic.

Europe, if it unifies, or when it unifies, will, by necessity, represent a major factor in world affairs. It cannot be ignored, but it does not have to unify primarily for that purpose. In fact, if you ask yourself, when you look ahead in the future, what are the challenges to be faced, if this were an American audience, I would say America had to conduct policies of a different nature in different parts of the world, and since I still believe that our destinies are linked, I would say the same is true of Europe. Let me put before you what I would say to an American audience, and now say to an Italian audience. Americans tend to believe that the world can be made peaceful by applying Wilsonian principles. If all were democratic, there would be no conflict, ~~so~~ and ~~simply~~ therefore if we spread our ideas around the world, peace will be more or less guaranteed. Now many in this room and any historian knows that the evolution of democracy is a very complicated process. It took hundreds of years in Europe and probably cannot be force-fed. After any event, foreign policy has to be conducted in the world as it exists, and there, I would say, ~~therefore~~ three or four different worlds that exist today. First of all the North Atlantic region. In that region, in fact, the dominance of democratic principles and democratic traditions

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ought to be a unifying factor. In that part of the world it is inconceivable that disputes will be settled by war. Of course, we could thus begin to split and consume, our energies, but it remains a basic principle that I would assert is true. For the North Atlantic world the question how can one bring Russia into this world is an immediate is to

immediate challenge

But when you look at Asia, you see what was or less Europe more like in the

Nineteenth-century world. There, the relations between the various states are more similar to the relations of European states prior to World War I. They do not exclude military conflict with each other.

In dealing with that world, some of the principles of the balance of power that one learned in Europe are applicable, and if you go to the Middle East, you are in a Seventeenth-century world. A world in which ideology, religion, as a necessity, and transcend ideas of national interest. For Africa, it is a totally new problem, because there,

is view is how to create political entities out of colonial traditions where no political entities of that kind previously existed.

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who hold common values to defend those values. It is not a choice, in my view, between values and power, as has always been said, but between combining values and power in such a way that those who challenge can be resisted, and those who can be convinced can be brought along.

I am too old now to change my views about the importance of a European-American relationship, and I have seen too much in countries like this to believe that we need to quarrel fundamentally about the issues of the day. Of course we will differ on some practical problems. But it is important to understand that the traditions which I exemplify in President Truman - ~~who was by the way~~ are of a different party than the one I belong to - ~~is~~ fundamentally what changing generations of Americans continue to believe.

Some of you may have heard me use a Chinese proverb, or an alleged Chinese proverb ~~given~~ to me by a friend, which I think represents the challenge of the moment:

"When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems, and little problems should not CONCERN US overbalance.

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DR. KISSINGER:

Yes, two very good questions. Let me first deal with the second question, which is, does that Nuclear Posture Review indicate a fundamental change in American strategy that would involve the abandonment of the Test Ban. Well, of course the American Senate rejected the Test Ban Treaty under the Clinton Administration, so we are not bound by it legally. But we have announced, or rather the previous Administration announced, that we would adhere to it, and I have not heard anyone in this Administration indicating any change in that policy. But as I said, the Ambassador and his Deputy are in a better position to answer that. I have not heard from several consultations I have had in Washington, any change in this.

Secondly, I don't exactly know what this paper represents, at what level of the Government, or how high up it has been approved. When I saw it, my interpretation was as follows: We have always said that if weapons of mass destruction are used against us, we may respond with nuclear weapons even if the weapons of mass destruction used were not nuclear weapons. In fact, if they are biological weapons, we are obliged to use something other than biological weapons because we have renounced the use of biological weapons, even in retaliation.

So as I interpret that document, it was that if we had to use nuclear weapons, we would prefer to use smaller and more discriminating nuclear weapons, and that is how I interpreted it. Also I have been about looking for weapons that can go into deep bunkers and so forth, but I relate all of this to the weapons of mass destruction syndrome. I do not believe it is a fundamental change in American strategy and I reflect.

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have been enough in Washington to have heard something if it represented a fundamental change in American strategy. This is making a great drama out of something that I regard as inconsequential from the point of view of overall strategy.

Responding now to the first question on unilateralism. It is of course a problem. To what degree you are bound by consultations. As a general statement, to say that when your national security is involved you will act, even reluctantly, and even if Allies disagree, is, I would say, a normal position for a Government to take. You cannot permit any country to veto your survival. The question is: how do you define national security, and I believe this probably requires some discussion.

I personally think that among the so-called 'axis of evil' countries that were mentioned, there is an urgency about Iraq and there is a greater scope for consultation than with respect to the other two, Iran and North Korea. And then there is an additional category of problems which the President didn't specifically mention, namely, which do not yet have weapons of mass destruction and might develop them.

How can you get an international system that assures the world of these weapons going to ten other countries, and that of course cannot be done by the United States alone at this moment. So there are various levels of multilateralism and some limiting conditions of unilateralism. And it is in that context that I believe the debate should be carried on.

SPEAKER (?):

DR. KISSINGER:

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There is always, of course, one question too many! (Laughter). How do I see the Israeli-Palestinian question? I will just make a general observation, otherwise one would get into endless detail. The view I hear most frequently in Europe and sometimes in the United States is this. That there is some magic formula by which that problem could be made to disappear, after which the Palestinians and Israelis would live with a consciousness of harmony and the Islamic world would not be angry at the West any more, and that the United States should impose this on Israel. (I mean there is nobody else on whom to impose it.) And this is usually described as the Six Day War borders and some other things. I do not believe that it is possible to go from where we are to a final settlement in one negotiation to go from mutual extermination to ultimate reconciliation in one negotiation. It is impossible, in my view, and therefore I believe that any effort to do it that way will lead to the same result as Camp David, that it will explode again, and therefore I think that a more realistic approach would be to find some interim agreement in the course of which a Palestinian State would be created, some secure borders are established, some principles of coexistence are devised, and to permit normal economic life to resume, and then look at such issues as refugees and holy places, five or ten years from now when the atmosphere has improved. Not yet, you can say, nobody will ever accept this, but if they never accept it then it means they are determined on extermination, or destroying the state, and what I have said seems to be in the realm of the conceivable. What I do not believe is possible is to go in one jump to borders that have hitherto been considered a insecure, and to also include the refugee question, and I think that this is an issue that, if we and the Europeans were to agree and say to the Israelis, there

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has to be a peace plan, and to the Arabs, you cannot get all you are asking for, then we would have a basis for something to take place. This is my philosophical, conceptual outline on what I think about the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

### SPEAKER (?)

### DR. KISSINGER:

I don't know enough about the details. But I know that in every European country there is a debate about immigration. Therefore a common European policy would seem to make sense. What role the United States can play in immigration policy into Europe I think I would question, but it is a subject where I haven't seen what the various choices are. I agree with you that it is an important problem for the future of Europe.

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SPEAKER ?:

DR. KISSINGER:

One of my destinies is that almost every smart-Aleck remark that has been made is ascribed to me, and I don't remember ever having made that remark, but I am happy to take credit for it because it was true in that period. Do we know now what number to dial? Well, if you look at the aftermath of September 11th, in the two months after September 11th, more national foreign ministers and prime ministers showed up in Washington than the European Community, and in a crisis the Europeans seem to rely more on their national institutions, and one problem is that on the one hand the world has been globalized economically but it has not yet been globalized politically to a similar extent. From an American point of view, there is no reason why we should not welcome having a telephone number to call, and I think it is slowly evolving in that direction. But I would like to call your attention from somebody who has had practice in one peculiarity of the European Union as it applies to dealing with Americans. When we deal with Italy, we can deal with many levels of the Italian Government and we don't have to bother the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister with every issue. There are many levels of consultation by which we can bring our thinking closer together. When we deal with Europe institutionally, there is no European position until the Council of Ministers has met, and once the Council of Ministers has met, there is no point talking because they

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can't change it except by going through the whole process that
discharged the decision in the first place, and so there is an institutional
rigidity, but it isn't so much a question of getting one phone
number, it is a question of getting a system of consultation in which
one is not faced with accomplished facts, and where one can have a
dialogue in the process of formation, but I hope that the Constitution
that is being worked on by Giscard d'Estaing and Mr. Amato will help
solve this problem.

(Applause)

SPEAKER (?):

Dr. Kissinger, you know that we Europeans – may we impose on you
one more question that we strongly believe you will be kind enough to
accept– we Europeans tend to believe that the peace that we have
achieved in our generation was due to one or two basic factors. One
definitely was keeping the balance of power, NATO saw to that, and
the other one was the building of institutions. Institution-building from
money onwards was our sort of polar star. Although not perfect, not
complete, as you have just mentioned, and yet we believe and tend to
think that maybe global peace maybe achieved through the same two
factors, one, keeping the balance of power, and two, building up those
imperfect global institutions whose construction began with our
generation, with American input of ideas and idealism and European
idealismand. Do you think that the building of institutions is still a
feasible way towards world peace or do you think, as we tend to
believe that you have always thought, that keeping the balance of
power is more urgent and more basic?

DR. KISSINGER:

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This reminds me that I didn't really answer Senator Dini's question about the United Nations. It is true that in the American public right now, there is not the belief in the United Nations that existed originally. This is partly because during the Cold War and afterwards, the dominant role that some of the non-aligned groups played seemed to be very much directed against the United States - this is a fact which you correctly noted. Now, this relates to your question: Can you build the world entirely on a balance of power? The answer is No, because the calculations of balance of power get too complicated, even with traditional power. As I wrote in my work, about Bismarck, and with the changes in technology and with the changes in ideology in which you now have terrorism, which is non-calculable, the balance of power by itself will not do. So, I believe, a number of institutions should be created, for example on that issue of non-proliferation that I mentioned, but it will be a gradual process. With regard to globalization, there will be several problems. The economic and political world are not in harmony with each other, and that needs to be brought into a more institutional framework. Therefore, I am not saying that the balance of power is enough, but without it, you can't do the other.

(Applause)

PRESIDENTE:

- END -