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In short, to leave open the two most important and interrelated problems of the MLF--that of control and that of evolution of the force--will magnify tensions later. If the MLF comes into being, the United States may be haunted for years by the inconsistencies of its arguments on behalf of it. To the Federal Republic, the MLF has been represented as a device to give non-nuclear countries an increased participation in nuclear matters. To Soviet and European critics, the MLF has been advocated as decreasing, if anything, the role of its members in the decision to go to nuclear war. Thus Gerard C. Smith, then Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

> Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by multilateral agreement, rather than by bilateral agreement as in the case of these earlier strategic missiles. The MLF will thus increase the number of states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger. [Emphasis added.]

> There would be no increase of risk of compromise of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial procedures would assure that individual countries had no greater access to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present under the NATO atomic stockpile.

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Gerard C. Smith, "The Nuclear Defense of NATO," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1299 (May 18, 1964), p. 785.

The dilemma of how to reconcile the requirement of central control over nuclear weapons with the sovereignty of our Allies is real. But for the long-term vitality of the Alliance it would have been better to face this issue head-on than to present different versions of the control problem to different audiences. If there is a German demand for nuclear

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weapons--as the advocates of the MLF have alleged--it is unlikely to be satisfied by "increasing the number of states with fingers on the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger." If other countries do wish to enter the nuclear field, they are not likely to be put off by a device which creates the illusion of participation while giving "no greater access to information about how to design and manufacture weapons than at present." The MLF cannot at one and the same time satisfy demands for nuclear sharing and assuage concerns about nuclear proliferation.

Originated to fulfill SACEUR's military requirement, pressed as a counter to a French challenge, the MLF stands in danger of compounding every problem it was supposed to solve. It has prevented a reconsideration of the strategic missions that gave rise to the military requirement. Rather than heal the rift in the Alliance, the MLF is likely to multiply divisions. There is something absurd about trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear field, often with only their reluctant assent. It makes no sense to attempt to revitalize NATO with a project which, because of the opposition of France and other Allies, will have to be set up outside of NATO. It is contradictory to advocate European political unity while urging a scheme which is certain to produce a rift between France and the Federal Republic.

To be sure, France cannot be given a veto over every measure to strengthen the Alliance. But before embarking on a collision course, we should be sure that a disputed scheme commands wide support and that

[x]

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it will in fact bring about a structure which enhances the long-term vitality of the Alliance.

There is reason to doubt that the MLF meets either of these requirements. Though the proponents of the MLF have tended to blame all objections on the manipulations of Shortsighted men, the opposition of France, Belgium and the Secretary General of NATO, the indifference of most other NATO Allies and the split within the Federal Republic cannot be simply shrugged off. Outside the Federal Republic, there is not one country whose agreement to the MLF represents anything more than acquiescence in American pressure.

Proponents of the MLF often compare their project to the Schuman Plan, which, despite heavy initial criticism, laid the basis for European economic integration. However, while many constructive innovations have had to withstand criticism when first proposed, not everything that is criticized is necessarily constructive. The Schuman Plan promoted Franco-German cooperation in areas where long-term interests were parallel. The longer the Coal and Steel Community lasted, the more obvious were the benefits of common action.

The opposite is likely to be the case with the MLF. Once established, the conflicting motives of the participants will become increasingly apparent. There is a latent difference of opinion between the Federal Republic and the United States and Great Britain about the size of the force as well as about its composition, specifically about whether land-based missiles should supplement the sea-based MLF. It is

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likely that the Federal Republic regards the MLF as the first installment
in meeting SACEUR's requirement for medium-range missiles while the
United States and Britain consider it a final satisfaction of existing
needs. Though this will not become apparent in the early stages of
the project, it is bound to lead to difficulties later on.

Another potential dispute derives from the fact that the
Federal Republic favors the Multilateral Force partly to increase its
share of nuclear control. Most other countries--especially Great
Britain--participate in order to prevent an increase of German control.
This difference can be obscured in the early stages of the MLF; it, too,
will become more and more acute as time goes on.

Finally, an extremely divisive debate in the Federal Republic
can be avoided only if the MLF treaty contains a "European" clause
providing for the possibility of transforming the MLF into a European
nuclear force once European political integration is further advanced.
The Italian government (whose parliamentary support for the MLF is
dubious in any event) has taken a similar position. Great Britain, on
the other hand, will not agree to such a prospect; indeed, its
participation in any new nuclear arrangement is conditional on a
British veto over any structural changes. It is one thing to create
an institution whose evolution is likely to strengthen common objectives;
it is quite another to stake so much on a device where conflicting
interests have been kept latent only by avoiding consideration of the
key issues.

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The MLF may therefore strengthen the very tendencies it seeks to combat. In its advocacy of the MLF, the United States has granted almost all of the propositions of its European critics. It has agreed that possession of nuclear weapons is a criterion of equality. It has granted that ownership of some strategic forces is essential for participation in strategic planning and political decisions. It has admitted that influence in the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic nuclear arsenal. It has differed only about the nature of ownership and the way control should be exercised. But since the control procedures of the MLF patently favor United States hegemony, they can be used by the nationalists and extremists as a proof of American bad faith. If the Federal Republic finds itself at odds with the United States about control, or with its other allies about the evolution of the force, a serious backlash could develop.

The MLF may backfire even with respect to its primary objective of preventing Franco-German nuclear collaboration. Having made access to nuclear weapons the test of equality, we have given an incentive to the Federal Republic to seek alternative arrangements if the MLF fails or if its control arrangements prove unsatisfactory. Disappointment could then justify a Franco-German nuclear collaboration for which prior to the MLF no significant support existed within the Federal Republic.

It was to render a poor service to the Federal Republic to seek to restore Allied cohesion by a scheme which involved access by Germany to nuclear weapons. If the MLF succeeds, the Federal Republic will be embroiled with France. If it fails, leaders who have staked a great

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deal on following the American lead will be discredited. Participation
by Germany in a nuclear fleet has resurrected instinctive fears all over
Europe. Within Germany, pro-American and pro-French factions have rent
the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union. The MLF thus
threatens internal German stability and creates the danger that the
Federal Republic will become isolated internationally.

Advocates of the MLF often argue that it is easy to pick holes
in any existing nuclear control plan but much harder to offer a constructive
alternative. To be sure, if the issue of nuclear control is, in fact, the
cause of Allied tensions, the MLF proponents have a point. However, the
issue of nuclear control is a symptom, not a cause, of NATO's difficulties.
There exists no neat solution for it so long as NATO is composed of
sovereign states. Nor does the MLF "solve" it. The basic problem in
the Alliance is political and not strategic. There is something incongruous
about NATO's absorption in technicalities of mixed-manning while it lacks
a common policy toward the Communist world, flounders dividedly in
the former colonial areas and has yet to concert a strategic doctrine.
To devote so much energy to the problem of who pushes the button in the
remote contingency of nuclear war while neglecting the issues which
confront the Alliance daily comes close to being escapism. Insofar as
the German conversion to the MLF was not the result of American missionary
zeal, it reflected above all a desire to establish a claim not to be
excluded from further East-West negotiations and to create another
organic link between the United States and Europe.

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The MLF is at best a circuitous way to achieve these goals. In fact, it reverses the correct priorities. Political unity must *precede*, it cannot follow, nuclear integration. To pursue nuclear multilateralism while foreign policy remains national must emphasize divergent interests. The imagination and dedication expended on the MLF would, therefore, have been better spent in strengthening political cohesion. Our allies are not likely to be convinced that their interests will be taken seriously during the improbable eventuality of general nuclear war when no consensus exists for the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy and for crisis situations. Rather than take the detour through the MLF, it would have been wiser to aim directly for coordination of policy by setting up a body to develop common policies for many unsolved problems of the Alliance in East-West relations, strategic doctrine, trade policy, arms control or relations with the emerging nations. If France had refused to participate, the disruptive intent would have been obvious. France would have stood apart from an effort which commanded a real consensus. Moreover, a future French government could participate in such a group more easily than in the MLF, in which French membership could well be precluded by financial considerations *G-13* alone. If a political steering body for the Alliance had then decided to include the Federal Republic in the ownership of strategic weapons, the political context would have been entirely different. It would have represented the common view of all Allies rather than the pressure of one. Regardless of the ultimate fate of the MLF, a political body to

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coordinate Alliance policy and to manage crises remains essential.²⁰

20 For an elaboration of such a policymaking body, see Chapter 8.

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If it should be argued that the Atlantic Alliance will never be able to develop a common political program, the emptiness of nuclear multilateralism becomes apparent. Nations that cannot develop common negotiating positions are not likely to be able to concert a common strategy for an apocalypse.

Even in our bilateral relations with the Federal Republic, the strengthening of political consultation should have had priority. If we had created institutions to give the Federal Republic access to strategic and disarmament planning and the conduct of East-West negotiations in general, these could have been used as a brake on eventual Franco-German nuclear collaboration much as the Franco-German Treaty turned out to be one of the factors thwarting the MLF. By reversing the process, we brought on what we feared most. We whetted German nuclear appetites without giving satisfaction to the political concerns. It is questionable whether it is in our interest to discourage Franco-German intimacy, but at least it should not be based on disillusionment with the United States.

The MLF, as originally conceived, is not likely to be realized. So much opposition exists that even the most passionate advocates will have to modify the scheme. It may be useful, however, to inquire what lessons can be drawn from the experience.

y

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The most important one is not to try to solve political problems with technical expedients. Confronted with a political and philosophical challenge in De Gaulle's exclusion of Britain from the Common Market, American policymakers reacted by staking everything on a scheme of nuclear control which they had previously treated with indifference. They then spent two years negotiating its mechanical aspects. In the process, the deeper causes of NATO's disarray were neglected. The ends and means became confused. At its best, the MLF was irrelevant to the fundamental problems of NATO. It would have repeated within its framework many of the disputes which it was supposed to overcome.

In Washington, this was obscured because one group in the government had become so deeply committed to the MLF that it acted as a lobby rather than an organ for calmly weighing alternatives. In the words of one acute observer, "engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe..."²¹ This has made it difficult

²¹ Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?" *The New Republic*, Vol. 151, Nos. 6-7 (August 8, 1964), pp. 19-21.

to determine whether what appeared in Washington as the European opinion did not really reflect European acquiescence in the passionate advocacy of one segment of our bureaucracy. The result was a whole series of

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misjudgments. European support for the MLF has been grossly overestimated. Despite the repeated criticisms of the MLF by British Labor leaders when in opposition, it was expected that the new British government would agree to a treaty setting up the MLF within two months of coming into office. The divisive impact of the threat of a German-American nuclear partnership was misjudged. The capacity of the German political structure to withstand strain was completely misconceived. Throughout, some American officials acted as if getting agreement to the MLF was an end in itself. By using whatever argument was convenient to this purpose, a number of partially contradictory promissory notes were handed out.

The pressure of a relatively small group of officials in the State Department gave our Allies a misleading impression of American unanimity and commitment. The Pentagon had accepted the MLF only on the assumption that ultimate American control would remain unimpaired. The group in the State Department that originated the MLF proposal and pressed it on our Allies was much more sympathetic to the ultimate emergence of a separate European nuclear force. Indeed, it occasionally urged the MLF as a means to this end. Although the cohesiveness of our society depends on understating conflicting views, it is dangerous to engage in major international innovations unless we are clear about our ultimate direction.

All this suggests the need for a reexamination of some governmental procedures. We need a planning focus less geared to immediate crises and more capable of developing concepts responsive to fundamental trends. There should be less reliance on the accidents of bureaucratic pressures.

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Our own aims must be clear before we commit our prestige. We should not use the process of negotiations to make up our own minds. Not to reveal what we intend to do is a question of tactics; not to know is to mortgage the future.

Fortunately, partly because of the initiative of the new British government, partly because of President Johnson's removal of previous time limits, an opportunity exists to take a new approach to the issue of nuclear control. The wise, if abrupt, decision of President Johnson to reduce the pressures for the original MLF project and Britain's initiative have smoothed the way for a new study of the entire problem. This should enable us to determine the real wishes of our Allies before irrevocable decisions are taken. In any reassessment, we must, of course, keep in mind that in many countries, notably in the Federal Republic, leaders have staked their careers on our previous proposals. Though another approach to the issue of nuclear control would have been preferable, future policy must consider that simply to abandon the MLF now would have a different significance than earlier. Moreover, some of the objectives that the MLF has sought to realize are important. For example, the goal of political equality for all members of the Alliance is crucial. Means must be found to achieve those objectives of the MLF project essential to Allied cohesion. The controversy about the MLF will have served some useful purpose if it permits the Alliance to return to fundamentals: the definition of common purposes and an answer to the question of what the members of the Alliance really want in the nuclear field.

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## CHAPTER SIX

### The Nuclear Problem - Where Do We Go From Here?

#### Strategic Weapons

The nuclear problem in the Alliance has four components: (1) The United States would like to establish central control over the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. The ideal solution from the point of view of the Pentagon is to deprive all Allies of the physical capacity to act autonomously in the nuclear field. (2) Two of our Allies, Great Britain and France, have national nuclear weapons programs. (3) It is desirable to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons within the Alliance and elsewhere.

The MLF negotiations have established or confirmed (depending on the point of view) the claims of non-nuclear Allies to participate in nuclear control and, perhaps, to some form of ownership of nuclear weapons.

No program could perfectly reconcile all these objectives, partly because each Ally has two somewhat contradictory aims with respect to nuclear policy, partly because there is an inherent inconsistency between the attempt to establish central control over nuclear weapons and the jealousy with which each major Ally, including the United States, has heretofore guarded its sovereignty.

The two contradictory aims of the Allies sometimes tend to cancel each other out: Each Ally wants to avoid being forced into nuclear war against its will, and it wants to be certain of nuclear support when its existence is at stake.

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What our Allies understand by nuclear support is less clear. They want the <u>appearance</u> of nuclear support so that the Soviets never challenge their vital interests. Whether they are actually prepared to face the consequences of nuclear war is ambiguous. Their tendency to base NATO's military policy entirely on deterrence suggests that many of them may be above all concerned with their veto if nuclear war seemed imminent. They may be more interested in not being forced into nuclear war against their will than in being able to force us into a nuclear war against our will.

The ambivalence of our Allies underlines the incompatibility between central control over nuclear weapons and undiluted sovereignty.

If no conflict of interest among the Allies were conceivable, the concern with either veto or triggering ability would not exist. But as a sovereign state is the final judge of its interests, absolute reassurance is unobtainable.

No one can predict with certainty how hard-pressed leaders will react under the unprecedented stresses of imminent nuclear war--not only with respect to the decision to use nuclear weapons but also with respect to the many nuances of bargaining during crises. The single-mindedness with which the United States has always guarded its freedom of decision is as significant a symptom of this dilemma as France's excessive claims to independence.

American proposals--including the MLF--have largely avoided this problem. The United States, starting from the technically unexceptionable premise that the conduct of nuclear war should be centrally controlled, has tried hard to create a structure in NATO which deprives our Allies of the physical capacity to act independently. We have been less ready to face the inevitable corollary: Those nations which are being asked to entrust

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their nuclear defense to the United States will urge, in return, a
commensurate surrender of American sovereignty in the political field.
To insist on centralized strategy while diplomacy remains national
guarantees the perpetuation of all disputes.

France, on the other hand, has expressed the implications of
sovereignty clearly and correctly, but it has neglected the technical
requirements of nuclear strategy. In the face of the risks of a nuclear
holocaust, no country can have complete freedom of decision--least of all
a nation with a nuclear force strong enough to start a nuclear war but
far too weak to finish it. While the United States has overemphasized
the technical aspects of central command and control, France and those
Europeans agreeing with her have pushed the legal implications of
sovereignty to a point where they clash with the technical realities of
the nuclear age.

We react bitterly when Europeans suggest that no one can foresee
how even the most solemn commitments will be interpreted in the stark
circumstances of a nuclear showdown. But when we argue against the nuclear
forces of Britain and France, we seem to understand the problems produced
by sovereignty very well. Then we tend to reverse the field and use the
arguments which our nuclear European Allies invoke against us and thereby
generate suspicions where none had been articulated before. Thus J. Robert
Schaetzel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, explained why even a joint
Franco-British nuclear force which shared command and control responsibilities
with other European countries would still not meet the need as he saw it:

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An agreed European control mechanism would still not answer the basic question of these non-nuclear countries: In the moment of crisis would the nuclear powers of the arrangement--the powers which owned and operated the nuclear forces--in fact consult and collaborate on an equal basis with their associate members?

J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Nuclear Problem and Atlantic Interdependence," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 1963-63), pp. 565-566.

Carrying Schaetzel's argument one step further, it may be relevant to ask why, if our European Allies cannot rely upon formal commitments among themselves, they should have absolute trust in the United States, which is 3,000 miles away and has a recent history of isolation.

The nuclear issue thus turns in part on how crucial it is for the United States to obtain physical control over all the nuclear weapons within the Alliance. Heretofore we have considered the objective so important that we have been prepared to bring the non-nuclear countries of NATO into the nuclear business--as long as they accepted an American veto--in the hope that this might thwart the efforts of our nuclear Allies. We have been less concerned about the proliferation of nuclear know-how which the MLF is bound to bring than about the already existing centers of nuclear decision within the Alliance. We have preferred establishing yet another nuclear force--provided it was subject to an American veto--rather than concede in theory the autonomy which France and Britain already possess in practice.

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The debate engendered by this policy has been more conducive to
self-righteousness than to sober thought. By placing so much stress on
the actual conduct of nuclear operations, we have forced our Allies into
inherently misleading justifications of their nuclear programs. They have
projected the remote nightmare of the failure of the Alliance into the
present; we in turn have confused their fears with their preferences.

But the real concern behind pressure for European autonomy goes
deeper. Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying to
the fallibility of human foresight. They have had too much experience
with nuances of interpretation which can all but nullify formal commitments;
indeed, at some point, all of them have felt obliged to leave some ally to
his fate. The concern for a European role in nuclear affairs expresses
above all a desire to obtain a measure of insurance against the unforeseeable
events of which European history is so full.

Some argue that the British and French nuclear programs jeopardize
our own security because they may force us into a nuclear war against our
will. But this is carrying logical extrapolations to extremes. France
and Great Britain must know at least as well as we--though we can hardly
expect them to advertise this fact--that using their nuclear forces
independently against the Soviet Union would be a desperate last resort.
The French and British nuclear programs are not a strategic preference but
an attempt to provide insurance against a disastrous contingency within
Europe and against nuclear developments in other parts of the world. Taking
out fire insurance does not indicate a liking for fires. On the contrary,
it may prevent a remote possibility from turning into an obsession and thus
free energies for more constructive tasks.

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For their limited objectives, the British and French nuclear forces
are not so ineffective as we sometimes insist. The ratio of the combined
British and French forces to those of the Soviet Union is more favorable
than was that of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States in the fifties.
Despite the overwhelming strategic superiority of the United States, no
one would maintain that the Soviet strategic force had no deterrent value.
And certainly in relation to any threats from new nuclear powers, the British
and French forces would be formidable.

Of course, the Soviets could launch a pre-emptive blow at the
bases of European nuclear forces. However, such a course would be
extraordinarily risky. As long as the NATO treaty is operative at all,
it would be extremely foolhardy for the Soviets to undertake a nuclear attack
on Europe without taking into account the near certainty of American
involvement. The nuclear forces of our Allies should not be viewed as an
alternative to United States strategic power, but as a complement. The
fear of some American officials that the French nuclear force of less than
a hundred delivery vehicles could be seriously considered as possible
replacement for our arsenal of thousands is to give little credit to the
ability of our Allies to perceive their own interests. Close coordination
between Europe and the United States in the nuclear field is dictated by
self-interest; and Europeans have more to gain from it than the United States.

In short, the real choice before the United States is whether to
try to build NATO nuclear policy on the existing programs of our nuclear
Allies or whether to seek to counteract these programs by creating yet
another nuclear force--the MLF. The former alternative seems far preferable,

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especially if the non-nuclear countries are given equal status in
political and strategic planning.

Basing NATO nuclear policy on the existing nuclear forces rather
than the MLF is also more consistent with the eventual evolution of a
European nuclear force. In the long term, nuclear proliferation in Europe
can be reliably arrested only by the development of an Atlantic political
community involving a real sharing of sovereignty or by European political
unity. Of these developments the latter seems more attainable. If Europe
could organize itself politically, it would reduce the number of nuclear
powers. A European nuclear force would then replace the British and
French nuclear programs, and other countries in Europe could be related
to it through whatever European political mechanisms emerge. Such a
framework would avoid what must in the long run be a highly demoralizing
relationship in which the United States is alone responsible for the
nuclear defense of the entire non-Communist world.

On both sides of the Atlantic serious individuals fear that a
European nuclear force would lead to a reckless European policy and to
an eventual withdrawal of the United States from Europe. But it is
likely that nuclear autonomy is the least divisive form of European unity.
In the economic field, competition between Europe and the United States
involves, at best, indirect risks. In the political area, the temptations
for independent action are great and the penalties small. In military
matters--and particularly in the nuclear field--the closest association
between Europe and the United States is in the self-interest of both
sides. Whatever their formal autonomy, it is inconceivable that our Allies

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would *prefer* to go to war with the relatively small nuclear forces available or in prospect for them and *without* the support of our necessarily preponderant arsenal.

Finally, we cannot withdraw from Europe even if we do not obtain our preferred strategic arrangements. To threaten to do so is both dangerous and empty. It is dangerous because it indicates that our commitment is conditional; and it is empty because we can no more withdraw from Europe than from Hawaii.

Of course there is a very real concern with arresting the spread of nuclear weapons. But when nuclear weapons have already been acquired by Communist China and may soon be in the possession of other anti-Western countries, it is not clear that nuclear proliferation is best arrested by wrecking the nuclear programs of our closest Allies. Would it not be wiser to concentrate on eliminating the programs of those countries which in fact threaten our security?

This is not to say that the United States should promote a European nuclear force. On the contrary, the United States should show more restraint in seeking to influence internal European arrangements and exert its influence in shaping Atlantic relationships. It does mean, however, that we should not seek to destroy those elements from which a European force could emerge by pressing for an alternative--the MLF--which will in time cause much greater difficulties. No final solution is possible so long as the Alliance remains composed of sovereign states. Any interim arrangement should therefore be consistent with the most constructive evolution of European and Atlantic relationships.

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Until either Atlantic or European political cohesion progresses further, the nuclear policy of the Alliance should be three-pronged:
(1) There is need for a political mechanism to plan long-term policy, to manage crises and to control the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. This may require the establishment of an Executive Committee of the NATO Council composed of the United States, Britain, France, the Federal Republic, Italy and a rotating representative of the smaller countries.² (2) The military

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The functions of this Committee are described in Chapter 8.

advice to this Committee should come from a group of senior officers from the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It might be useful to charge the NATO Standing Group with this task. In that case it would have to be expanded to include the Federal Republic, and its seat would have to be transferred from Washington to Paris. (3) An Allied Nuclear Force should be constituted from the strategic forces of the United States, Great Britain and France and from the long-range weapons in Europe under the double-veto system. The proposals made by the British government seem to move in this direction.

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Will an attempt to base NATO nuclear strategy on the existing nuclear forces, with the Federal Republic sharing equally in political and strategic planning, meet German desires? This is difficult to answer because it is doubtful whether, after two years of being told by American policymakers what their ultimate wishes might be, German leaders know what their actual desires with respect to nuclear control are. Not the least useful aspect of changing the framework of negotiations is that it gives all partners an opportunity to become clear about their actual priorities. For example, if the main interest of the Federal Republic in the MLF is to obtain a voice in eventual East-West negotiations, it should be possible to achieve this objective by less divisive and more direct methods than the MLF. If the real German aim is to participate in joint strategic planning, an effort should be made to determine whether a major German role in the targeting and deployment of existing nuclear forces might not fill the need.

But, one might ask, is not discrimination inherent in the continued existence of national nuclear forces, even if they are assigned "irrevocably" to NATO--as Britain has proposed? Would this not place the Federal Republic in the position of a second-class ally? It has been argued, for example, that unless Germany obtains exactly the same status in the nuclear field as Britain and France, its loyalty to the Alliance might be shaken. But is this really true? Is it wise to encourage even the implication that the German commitment to the Alliance depends on access to nuclear weapons?

Some argue that an Allied Nuclear Force composed of national contingents contains no assurance that these forces will not be withdrawn in a crisis. The British government has sought to get around this problem by offering to assign its strategic forces "irrevocably" to NATO. But it seems futile to devote energies to quibbling over such phrases as "assignment" and "irrevocable." It is not healthy for the Alliance to waste energies in terminological exercises which obscure reality. No sovereign government is going to be forced into war against its will--no matter what the arrangement of nuclear forces and whatever the label under which they are grouped. Should Britain be prepared to wreck NATO, it could also break the additional commitment inherent in "irrevocable assignment." In other words, the Allied Nuclear Force is no protection against situations in which the Alliance has already collapsed. But neither is the MLF, which could be even more easily paralyzed by a single veto. There is no technical or legal expedient which can serve as a substitute for political unity or which could protect the Alliance against failure to achieve it.

Almost all responsible people in the Federal Republic understand that the Alliance could probably not survive German national ownership of strategic nuclear weapons. The real test of equality for the Federal Republic must be in the political field and in strategic planning. In the long term, the solution to the nuclear problem requires the fostering of European political unity and Atlantic cooperation. The former would diminish the role of the nation-state; the latter would make the Federal Republic part of a structure capable of assuring its security. The most dangerous course is one which in the name of integrated strategic planning magnifies the divisions within Europe.

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What would be the mission of an Allied Nuclear Force drawn from national contingents? It would appear that its most useful role would be deep interdiction, say, from a distance of some 300 miles behind the combat zone. It would be important to recognize, however, that effective counterforce operations against several hundred MRBMs are unlikely. Whatever its targets, the Allied Nuclear Force should be designed so that it is able to conduct discriminating nuclear operations according to the principles of "flexible response."

All the weapons suitable for its mission should become part of the Allied Nuclear Force. It should include major portions of the British and French national forces and a comparable contingent of American strategic weapons, probably in the form of Polaris submarines. The longer-range nuclear weapons now in Europe, such as the Pershing missiles and the F-104 airplanes, which are now under the double-veto system should also be assigned to this force.

With respect to the MLF, the best course would be to admit frankly that it was a mistake and to satisfy German desires by improving the process of political consultation and by giving the Federal Republic an equal role in the control of the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. But if it appears that the German desire for access to nuclear weapons has been so stimulated as to be irreversible, we are honor-bound to proceed with a mixed-manned element as a part of the Allied Nuclear Force. However, in that case, the purpose and size of the MLF should be redefined.

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In the context of an Allied Nuclear Force, the previous extravagant claims for the MLF could be abandoned. It should no longer be the central focus of United States nuclear policy. There would be no need for American (or German) pressure on reluctant Allies to join. The decision would not be a test of friendship for the United States, but an individual judgment of the various governments. The size of the element should not be determined by the political objective of dwarfing the British and French nuclear programs but by the military goals of the Allied Nuclear Force.

The Allied Nuclear Force could be placed under SACEUR. However, it seems wiser to have SACEUR concentrate on the land battle and to create a distinct NATO Strategic Command. To symbolize a greater European influence in strategic matters, the command could be headed by a senior European officer and should be located in Europe. The purpose would be to place in one command all the weapons--European and American--relevant to deep penetration of hostile territory. Tactical nuclear weapons of ranges up to 300 miles would remain under SACEUR.

In bringing such a force into being the United States has obvious interest in insuring that its European components meet certain criteria. The following seem most important:
(1) European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite preemptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability. (2) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction. (3) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible

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response. (4) They should be coordinated as part of a common NATO strategy.

Some European Allies will undoubtedly object to the creation of a separate NATO Nuclear Strategic Command. They will see such a command as the first step toward nuclear disengagement. These Allies seem to feel that, since SACEUR is located in Europe, he will be more sensitive to European needs than the President in Washington. But such attitudes are not healthy in the long run.

SACEUR's primary responsibility should be the land battle; he should not be burdened with military or political missions irrelevant to that important and complicated task. From a military point of view, operations that involve large sections of Soviet territory cannot be conducted as an adjunct to ground operations in Europe. SACEUR does not have sufficient information about the over-all strategic context; he will be too preoccupied with conditions within the European theater of operations. Deep penetrations of Soviet territory should be carried out only as part of an over-all plan for general nuclear war. The location of a NATO Strategic Command in Europe could allay concerns that Europe's interests would be neglected; in fact, by giving it the mission to conduct the portion of general nuclear war directly relevant to Europe, a forum for fulfilling Allied needs in the strategic field would be created.

The notion that unfavorable arms control measures can best be prevented by freezing the existing NATO command structure

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underlines the need for a focal point within the Alliance to develop common political objectives. The issue of arms control in Central Europe has been before the Alliance for many years. It has been evaded because some Allies have been reluctant to express their fears and others have been loathe to voice their hopes. The absence of a consensus guarantees that the issue will always arise at a moment of maximum embarrassment. Decisions will be taken by subterfuge and under stress. Distrust will grow. A military commander cannot possibly be used to paper over this problem indefinitely. Its solution must be sought by developing a political program for the Alliance as a whole.

Within the framework of a newly created NATO Strategic Command and a corresponding political control body, the Alliance could finally address itself to the tasks which must be undertaken rather than spend energy on legalistic debates about who has a right to do what in circumstances that no one can describe. With some insurance available for the improbable contingency that the United States might interpret its interest differently from those of Europe, our Allies are likely to come to conclusions very similar to ours about the desirability of a strategy which provides multiple options.

Such a system would be more flexible than the MLF. It would give the existing strategic forces a clearly defined mission. It would create a structure that France could ultimately join, if not under its present government, certainly under its successor. As compared to the MLF, the United States would sacrifice some measure of physical control, but the

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Alliance as a whole would gain in political cohesion. This
arrangement would differ from previous assignments of nuclear
forces because it would include a political mechanism for managing
crises for the Alliance as a whole and because it would create
an explicit Allied doctrine for strategic war.

Such an arrangement provides the greatest flexibility
with respect to the future. If European political integration
progresses, the European contingents in the Allied Nuclear
Force can merge into a European nuclear force. If desired by
the European members, the Western European Union could be given
official status in the Allied Nuclear Force from the beginning.
If integration proceeds more slowly the major Allies can contribute
individually to the planning of the Allied Nuclear Force. In
either case, the United States will remain closely linked to
Europe through a structure in which the Europeans can develop
under their own initiative. An Allied Nuclear Force in which
an American contingent is an integral part and which controlled
all the weapons relevant to its mission would be a better symbol
of the indivisibility of Atlantic interests than an MLF whose
strategic role would be, at best, marginal.

For this to be achieved a change in attitude on both
sides of the Atlantic is needed. The United States would have to
abandon its futile insistence on maintaining physical control
of all the nuclear weapons in the Alliance. Some of our Allies
would have to stop extolling the theoretical virtues of autonomy
and begin dealing with the problem of how autonomous nuclear

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forces can achieve a coordinated strategy. We have often been dogmatic in defending the theoretical virtues of "integration."

But our Allies--especially the French--bear a heavy responsibility for the current state of affairs because they have never spelled out concretely what they mean by their alternative of coordination.

If abstract and doctrinaire attitudes are avoided, the solution of current disputes is far from hopeless. Arguments about the right of independent action in the nuclear field are acute only when they are theoretical. Any crisis serious enough to cause the Allies to consider the use of nuclear weapons is also likely to reveal the underlying community of interest. It is this community rather than American physical control which is the best guarantee of the cohesion of the Alliance. A wise United States policy will not invest American prestige in forcing our Allies into a structure which makes autonomous action physically impossible. Rather it will create a structure which grants autonomy while reducing the desire for it.

## TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One of the consequences of the obsession with the MLF has been that many issues requiring urgent attention have been swept under the rug in order to maintain the momentum behind the Multilateral Force. One of these problems concerns the role and control of tactical nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons have had a checkered history in NATO strategy. They were first introduced into the NATO

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arsenal in the middle fifties to offset what was then believed
to be a permanent numerical superiority of Soviet manpower. As
a result, thousands of nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe.
They included almost everything from artillery pieces with ranges
of about fifteen miles to Pershing missiles with ranges up to
700 miles (in the improved versions). The term tactical was
\*defined to include all weapons placed under the authority of
SACEUR even though some of the longer-range weapons would be
indistinguishable from those controlled by SAC. From its
\*beginning, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent
raised formidable problems of coordination that remained only
because the dominant American strategic doctrine predicted that
any nuclear war was likely to be massive and all-out.

The advent of the Kennedy Administration in 1961 changed this. Committed to a strategy of flexible response, the new administration began to evaluate the suitability of the nuclear establishment on the Continent for discriminating military operations. Its conclusions were skeptical: Early in the Kennedy Administration, the then Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric rejected the notion of tactical nuclear war with the argument that it was impossible to build any limit into a nuclear war. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Alain

3 Roswell L. Gilpatric, Press Conference on June 6, 1961, New York Times, June 7, 1961.

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Enthoven insisted that once the dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is crossed, no obvious "fire-break" exists short of large scale thermonuclear war. 4 Secretary McNamara

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4

Alain Enthoven, "American Deterrent Policy," *Survival*, Vol. V, No. 3 (May-June 1963), p. 96.

spoke deprecatingly of a limited nuclear war below some "ill-defined threshold of strategic exchange." 5

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5

Robert S. McNamara, "Major National Security Problems Confronting the United States," speech made before the Economics Club of New York, New York City, November 18, 1963, DOSB, Vol. XLIX, No. 1277 (December 16, 1963), p. 917.

These views were given urgency by the problem of exercising political control over the nuclear weapons stationed on the Continent. Controlling a few hundred strategic weapons during military operations is difficult but soluble. Controlling thousands of weapons of many different ranges and characteristics in the confusion of combat is another matter.

At the same time, while skeptical about the utility of much of the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe, both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations have muted their doubts in order not to complicate further the disputes over the role of the conventional weapons and the MLF. Indeed, tactical nuclear weapons have been

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used as a means to reassure the Europeans about the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee and to insure German support for the MLF. As a result, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent has been substantially increased since 1961--by some 60 per cent according to Secretary McNamara's announcements. The thousands of nuclear weapons on the Continent thus exist in a shadow land. To many of our Allies, they have become a touchstone of the American commitment, while American planners regard them with extraordinary ambivalence. To build up the tactical nuclear establishment without clarifying its mission would seem to emphasize the worst features of all available options.

The question whether so much reliance should have been placed on tactical nuclear weapons ten years ago must not obscure the need to deal with the current situation, which is dominated by the following facts: (1) On the Continent there exists a large and growing arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons without a clearly defined mission. (2) The United States is solemnly committed to maintain this arsenal in Europe. (3) The Soviet army is equipped with tactical nuclear weapons; therefore, the decision to use nuclear weapons is no longer entirely up to the West. (4) NATO ground forces are inadequate to withstand a full-scale Soviet onslaught. Even the proposed build-up of NATO ground forces to thirty divisions would leave the West numerically inferior to a fully mobilized Soviet army--and this does not take into account the inevitable disadvantage

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of a coalition when confronting a single state. (5) The tactical nuclear establishment in Europe is extremely vulnerable. Because strategic weapons are relatively secure, fears that they will tempt a disarming, pre-emptive blow are usually exaggerated. But the classic pre-emptive situation does exist with respect to the tactical nuclear arsenal in Europe. As now deployed it is capable of inflicting severe damage; it is, in turn, highly vulnerable to a first strike. This may well add to deterrence; at the same time, it increases the probability of escalation should war occur.

There exists yet another inconsistency between NATO's military deployment and our strategic doctrine: Pentagon officials have indicated a clear preference for existing even a major Soviet attack by conventional weapons. At the same time, they have announced repeatedly that if a conventional defeat were imminent, we would resort to tactical nuclear weapons. Considering the extreme vulnerability of the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent and the fact that the Soviets would not attack without expecting to win, these two propositions tend to cancel each other out. If there is large-scale aggression--an admittedly improbable contingency--the Soviets have every incentive to seek to neutralize NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal by launching an attack against it.

All this suggests that it is imperative to reconsider the mission and deployment of the tactical nuclear arsenal on the Continent. Some argue that all nuclear missions--including

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the so-called tactical ones--can be performed by the strategic forces, which are more easily controlled and more suitable for discriminating operations. They maintain that any use of nuclear weapons would bring about so much confusion that the situation in the combat zone would appear relatively unimportant. Finally, some officials have implied that the nuclear arsenal in Europe is militarily unnecessary. Secretary McNamara has on occasion seemed to share this view.

The notion that all tactical missions can be performed by strategic forces must be assessed in terms of three problems: (1) the probability of uncontrolled escalation if battlefield weapons are used, (2) the suitability of strategic forces for tactical operations and (3) the feasibility of conducting nuclear operations confined to a battlefield.

The problem of escalation has two aspects: escalation within the theater of operations and escalation into general war. As long as NATO's tactical nuclear establishment is so vulnerable, the danger of escalation of any military operations within Europe is enormous even if they begin with conventional weapons. The precondition of any effective use of tactical nuclear weapons--as of strategic weapons--is to enhance their invulnerability.

The probability of escalation to general war depends on the vulnerability of the opposing retaliatory forces. If the strategic forces are extremely vulnerable, any use of nuclear weapons is likely to expand very rapidly. In that case, any

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large-scale military operation--even a conventional one--in an area as vital as Europe would involve risks out of proportion to any conceivable gain. In short, the doctrine of massive retaliation will remain valid.

When retaliatory forces grow increasingly vulnerable, as Secretary McNamara has postulated, the pressures against rapid escalation would probably be great. There may be no logical stopping place once nuclear weapons are being used. There is, however, a very crucial psychological obstacle to automatic escalation. When mutual invulnerability guarantees catastrophic destruction and offers no prospect of great military advantage, neither side can be very eager to let escalation proceed automatically. Both sides are likely to look for excuses to limit, not expand, military operations.

This is not to say that in case of a full-scale Soviet attack on Europe our responses should be confined to battlefield weapons. On the contrary, there are important reasons for making sure that the Soviets are under no misapprehension that a full-scale attack on Europe could be confined to Europe. If the Soviets have shown a willingness to conquer Europe, the war is by definition no longer local. It cannot end with the status quo ante. If the Soviets come to believe that their territory would be spared but we would devastate Europe by confining the use of nuclear weapons to the combat zone, they may have an incentive for aggression. Such a strategy, even if it succeeded in stopping the attack, would eliminate Europe as a factor in international politics; it would guarantee that any other threatened area would surrender.

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Nevertheless, even though a full-scale attack on Europe would inevitably bring the strategic forces into play, there is a problem of relating their action to local operations. Strategic forces are not designed to affect a local situation *directly*. Whether used demonstratively, punitively or in discriminating counterforce operations, their purpose is to force the aggressor into ordering an end to his local attacks, not to blunt the attacks themselves.

But is it wise to neglect the local outcome? It is at least possible that once strategic weapons are used, however discriminatingly, all other considerations could become submerged in the desire to end a spiral toward ever greater devastation. If the aggressor has made major advances, the ensuing confusion and panic may well enable him to consolidate his gains.

This suggests that, together with an agreed doctrine for the use of strategic forces, the Alliance requires a nuclear capability to deny an aggressor a significant territorial advance. Tactical weapons used early in the face of a full-scale attack could perform this role. If a standstill in military operations can be forced, a major objective of the defense will have been achieved. Aggression would have no object if it were certain to result in a stalemate.

Thus the nuclear components of NATO must have two aims; (1) they should be able to force a standstill of the initial onslaught and (2) they should be able to inflict sufficient punishment on the aggressor so that he is forced into negotiations.

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The aggressor must not believe that our response will shift all the risks of nuclear devastation to the victims of aggression. But there must also be a local response capable of preventing a *fait accompli* and an attempt to negotiate on the basis of it.

To achieve these objectives, the tactical nuclear establishment on the Continent must be adapted along the following lines: (1) *Its* mission must be redefined, (2) *its* vulnerability must be reduced and (3) *its* deployment must be changed.

The current number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggests an intention to conduct a self-contained tactical nuclear war with battlefield weapons used as a more efficient explosive to defeat the opposing forces. But a prolonged use of battlefield weapons according to purely military criteria would surely obliterate the combat zone, and this cannot be in the interest of any threatened country. Thus the mission of the tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered in isolation from the other, primarily strategic, operations which will be taking place. This makes it necessary to redefine some traditional military missions. For example, given the range of modern weapons, air superiority can be obtained if at all only by deep penetration of hostile territory on a scale indistinguishable from general nuclear war. Such operations should not be conducted by a theater commander fully occupied with the land battle. This is why all weapons above a certain range (say 300 miles) should be put under the Allied Nuclear Force described earlier.

As for the nuclear weapons that remain under SACEUR's command, a careful study should determine which of them can combine

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the requirement of relative invulnerability with suitability for discriminating battlefield use. At the same time major efforts should be made to enhance the invulnerability of the tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent and to improve their command and control procedures. Tactical nuclear weapons present particular difficulties of command and control. The strategic arsenal can be fitted with electronic devices which make it possible to subject each weapon to political control. But individual control, even if technically feasible, presents different problems when close to 10,000 weapons of very different ranges and characteristics are involved. No communications system could withstand such a strain.

During the Presidential campaign of 1964, it was proposed that one way of solving this problem would be to delegate authority to a military commander, specifically to SACEUR. This was justified with the argument that communications between Washington and Paris might be interrupted. But such a scheme would create more problems than it solves. For one thing, no other member of the Alliance would be prepared to make such a delegation of authority. Also, SACEUR would be extremely ill-advised to resort to nuclear weapons without making sure that SAC is alerted. If communications are adequate for that purpose, they should also be adequate for political control to be exercised. Moreover, the real communications bottleneck is not between Washington and Paris, but between NATO headquarters and the field commanders. But if authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons were

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delegated to field commanders, this would mean that nuclear war could be started by officers least familiar with the strategic context and most subject to immediate pressures which may or may not be symptomatic of the over-all situation. Field commanders do not have access to strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union or to plans for general war. Thus the initial decision to use tactical nuclear weapons will have to be made by Washington (or by the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below). Once the decision is taken, they will have to be released by category of range, yield and, above all, geographic location. This underlines the urgent need for an agreed NATO strategic doctrine.

Another subject requiring careful reexamination is NATO deployment. Currently it is an uneasy compromise between the desire to retain a conventional option and the reality that nuclear weapons have become an integral part of the equipment of all military units. This reflects a real dilemma. To fight a conventional war, military units must concentrate; to be effective during nuclear operations, they must disperse. Units deployed for conventional operations present tempting targets for nuclear attack and may thus invite it. Units deployed for nuclear war are too dispersed to resist an attack with conventional weapons.

In all likelihood, it will be impossible to shift from one mode of deployment to another during military operations, particularly if the opponent has introduced nuclear weapons first. But current NATO deployment involves precisely this danger. Units are

C/)

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concentrated as if the likely attack would be conventional. At
the same time, even their forward echelons are equipped with
nuclear weapons. This concentration coupled with the ambiguity
of NATO doctrine and the vulnerability of tactical nuclear
weapons gives an aggressor a high incentive to use nuclear weapons
first.

It has become increasingly clear that NATO will not raise
sufficient troops for a purely conventional defense of Europe--
all trends, in fact, are in the opposite direction. It is
therefore crucial that deployment on the Continent take into
account the realities of NATO in the next decade. NATO's
conventional forces are suitable for two major roles: (1)N to
act as a screening force to determine that a full-scale attack
is, in fact, taking place and thus to discourage sudden seizures
of NATO territory and (2)N to furnish a reserve to resist aggression
on the flanks of NATO or in areas outside of Europe where the
Alliance might agree on joint action.

NATO deployment should reflect this. There should be a
screen of conventional forces deployed forward and organized for
purely conventional combat. The size of this screen would depend
on the total NATO forces available and on a military estimate of
what is required to force a major Soviet concentration before
aggression can have any chance of success. The remainder of
NATO's divisions deployed behind this screen should be equipped
and organized for nuclear war. With such a deployment, it would
be obvious to any aggressor that once operations reached a certain

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magnitude nuclear war would be inevitable. At the same time, NATO deployment and weapons design would reduce the incentives for pre-emption. Within these "nuclear" units the responsibility for operations should not be assigned to any level lower than corps. Weapons should be released to these commanders only by an appropriate political authority (preferably the Executive Committee of the NATO Council described below).

8/9 6 See Chapter 8.

In addition, there should be a strategic reserve capable of conducting either conventional or tactical nuclear war and organized to intervene rapidly either in a land battle in Europe or in distant theaters.

## CONCLUSION--THE MILITARY

### ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE

The military organization of the Alliance would then appear as follows:

1. There would be an Allied Nuclear Force, It would be constituted from existing NATO weapons above a range of, say, 300 miles, from major units from Great Britain and the United States, together with long-range delivery vehicles now on the Continent, and an eventual French contribution. If the MLF survives the reexamination of NATO strategy, a small mixed-manned element could be included. The mission of the Allied

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Nuclear Force would be deep interdiction. It would have a separate commander and be under the control of a political body in which the Federal Republic has a voice equal to that of the countries contributing nuclear weapons. This body should be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council and should have responsibility for developing common political programs and an agreed strategic doctrine.⁷

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7 See Chapter 8.

2. SACEUR would retain tactical nuclear weapons up to a range of, say, 300 miles. However, their deployment would be altered in order to create real conventional and nuclear options. Their number would be related to the existing missions.

3. The deployment of conventional forces would clearly reflect their primary mission of acting as a screening force and furnishing a strategic reserve.

However, no arrangement of military forces will, of itself, solve the problems of the Alliance. The ultimate challenge lies in the political field. It is whether NATO can develop common purposes and whether it can devise a political structure that combines community with flexibility.

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## CHAPTER SEVEN

### East-West Relations and the Future of Germany

There is a curious disproportion between the energy devoted to nuclear control and that spent on the issue of the future of Germany. This is no accident. Nuclear control, for all its complexity, has the advantage of seeming concrete. Solutions permit technical analysis. Absorption in this problem can therefore serve as an escape from issues that are intangible and much less amenable to mechanical remedies. Yet it is probable that over the next decade the cohesiveness of the Alliance will be tested more severely by the problem of German unity than by the issue of who presses the button for nuclear war.

Basic to any policy regarding the future of Germany is a common conception of East-West relations.

#### East-West Relations

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the early years of NATO our European Allies feared above all that we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, therefore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about the American understanding of the Communist threat. If anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did the rest. America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew absolute. In American thinking, the danger of Communist aggression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic aloofness from international affairs was great.

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After the death of Stalin, the previous Allied unanimity about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated. ¹

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Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that NATO was provocative.

Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the Allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic change in the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in Soviet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Republic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks regarding Berlin. They have been uneasy about most of the schemes advanced at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. France rejected--as the Federal Republic would have liked to do but did not dare--the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

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United States policy has oscillated between these conflicting views. American pronouncements include many of the phrases about Soviet intransigence characteristic of the early days of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral dealings with the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting views of its Allies but not reconciling them, the United States has retained the liturgy of the Cold War while adopting a good deal of the practice of those urging a policy of relaxation of tensions.

As a result, much of the Allied debate about East-West relations has concerned not the content of a program for negotiation but the nature of the Soviet system. Those who assume that there has been a change in Soviet policy tend to stress the impact of modernization on Soviet purposes. To them a great deal depends on establishing good personal relations with Soviet leaders and on bringing about a general atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on the unchangeable nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society immune to the erosion of time--an achievement which would be unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in dispute. The only sensible debate can concern the question of how peace can be achieved and then made secure. The issue is not whether tensions should be artificially maintained, but what their cause is and how they can best be ended. Is the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have deeper causes? Is lasting detente reached by improving the atmosphere first and moving from there to specific settlements? Or is a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied from the very beginning to a settlement of outstanding issues? Above all, what exactly is to be

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understood by a settlement? These are the questions which the Alliance must
answer for itself if it is to determine whether a given peace offensive
represents a change of tactics or a change of policy.

Peaceoffensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history.
Peaceful co-existence has been avowed since the advent of Communism
in Russia. It was stressed particularly between 1924-1939; between 1941-1946;
at the time of the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion
of Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959; and following the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each occasion the reason for the
detente was some internal or external strain on the Soviet system. In
1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, which was followed by
the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges; in 1941-1946
it was the German invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle after
the death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to push the
Allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused by the shock of the
defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an
opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself. The period of
tranquillity after 1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia,
the Baltic States and one third of Poland, as well as an attack on Finland.
World War II led to the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe.
The spirit of Geneva gave way to an attempted penetration of the Middle
East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the spirit of Camp David was
succeeded by another Berlin crisis which did not end until the installation
of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

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During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the West --including some who thought of themselves as staunchly, sometimes almost religiously, anti-Communist--hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. This demonstrates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.²

8/9 ² Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933), p. 216.

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the late Senator Tom Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts." ³ In 1956

8/9 ³ *New York Times*, May 23, 1943.

Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and

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intolerance." ⁴ This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early

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4

U.S. Department of State Press Release, No. 92, February 25, 1956.

in 1964: "They [the Communists] appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people."⁵

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⁵ Secretary Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries:

Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D.C. on Feb. 25, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1290 (March 16, 1964), p. 393.

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken--except Secretary Rusk's, which it is too early to judge. The reason is not obscure. Any system has its own dynamism that shapes its leaders and affects what is considered reasonable in internal discussions. There is need for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system that produce belligerence and those that encourage accommodation. These are delicately balanced. It should be the goal of Western policy to give a maximum spur to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist world: the qualities of the men who rise to leadership positions and the ideology on which the Communist system is built.

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Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of the
Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any decade with
its membership at the end of that decade illustrates the precariousness
of high office in the Soviet system.⁶ Turnover is rapid; the penalties

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6

The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been
described as follows by

Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are
still members of the Central Committee and occupy positions of
secondary importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland;
Mikhailov, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the Institute of
Marxism-Leninism. One (Pchomarenko) was removed from the Central
Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-rate post. Only
two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev and are now in the
front ranks of the post-Krushchev leadership.

Severyn Bialer in "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," New York Times Magazine, November 1, 1964, p. 27:

for failure in the inevitable leadership struggle are drastic. Loss
of position involves public disgrace, usually for the former leader's
family as well, and complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues
or from any public activity.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is
that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at least have
the consolation that the enormous risks they run are on behalf of
their own ambitions; those on the lower levels may find themselves
submerged as a result of events totally out of their control. Loyalty

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may turn into a source of personal danger; subordinate officials will
often share the fate of the leader even though they may have had no
real alternative.

All this creates an atmosphere of suspicion--even of conspiracy--in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruthless enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich, whose protégé he had been, and turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they nevertheless overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career--indeed their survival--has been advanced by the ability to dissemble. Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for his rivals

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to organize against him. Suspiciousness is therefore inherent in
the domestic position of Soviet leaders. It is unlikely that their
attitude toward the outside world is more benign. There is no reason
for them to treat foreign statesmen more gently than their own colleagues
or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their
survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically
this means that the power of potential competitors must be broken.
Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at
all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive.
The problem is that they feel secure only when all conceivable rivals
have been reduced to impotence. Wary of even his closest colleagues,
the type of man who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet
Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of
forces and will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to
reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure
makes them possible competitors of the U.S.S.R. This does not make
crises inevitable or settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever
their experience, are cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend
on their pronouncements alone, it would not be very secure.

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize
the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist
ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings
of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because
these writings are too contradictory and too dependent on tactical

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considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day
actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality.
It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory that will
make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing
discipline within the world Communist movement by providing criteria
of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the growing gap
between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of any
Communist system, in the immediate future ideology continues as one
of the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation.

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an
invaluable tool in understanding historical trends and the relation
of forces existing at any particular moment. According to it,
"subjective" factors, such as the personal convictions of statesmen,
matter less than the "objective" factors they reflect. These objective
factors include the social and economic conditions of society, the nature
of the economic process and, above all, the class struggle. Communists
consider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to distinguish between
appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism" inherent in an
excessive reliance on personality and the "adventurism" that risks
a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains
why Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a choice between
Western goodwill and a territorial or political gain, have unhesitatingly
chosen the latter. The friendship of the West built up during the
heroic efforts of World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the

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possibility of establishing Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of penetrating the Middle East. The spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum on Berlin. The many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not in fact favorable.

The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the reasons that negotiations with the Soviets have often been so frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions" because they believe that concessions are made to reality, not to individuals. They may change their position, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to most Western negotiators: the give-and-take of a bargaining process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients: no matter what is said, they think that they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. This is one of the reasons that exercises in personal diplomacy--even at the highest level--have been so futile. No Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposition that he has been impressed by the personal qualities of a capitalist statesman. Settlements are

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possible; but to be meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect
"objective" conditions and not a personal relationship.

The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class
struggle causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable
philosophical hostility toward the non-Communist world. Even while
advocating political co-existence, the Communist Party of the
U.S.S.R. declared:

> The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truths, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.⁷

8/9 "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4; *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter referred to as *CDSP*), Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

Thus peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the policy of "peaceful co-existence":

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228

Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the
development of the revolutionary class struggle in the
capitalist countries, the upsurge of national liberation
movements?⁸

8/9 8

"Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3; *CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

is yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet Communist

Party affirmed:

We fully support the destruction of imperialism and
capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of
capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be
accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.⁹

8/9 9
"The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," *op cit.*, CDSP, Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20

Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet leaders not
as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition.

This proposition has elicited the following exasperated comment from

George F. Kennan:

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... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in ... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life ... by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence ...

8/9

10

George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View of Foreign Affairs," Vol. XXXVII, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 174.

These factors, which almost overnight could produce again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be balanced against restraints that, over a period of time, may become dominant. First, there is the power of modern weapons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that, if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever the strategic theory of the West--even if it is not an ideal one--Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge. To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action, and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself

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with reasonable prudence, the traditional methods of military pressure
can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible
to implement one interest—the two great nuclear powers must have in
common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one
of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of
peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is
in the West's interest to see to it that it remain so.

Another factor which acts as a restraint on Soviet foreign
policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal
of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering.
It is a symptom of weakness that, over forty years after seizing power,
the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession.
Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor.

In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of
only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office. In
the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian
people may support such a style of government. At some point, however,
cynicism and demoralization are likely to set in. Sooner or later,
the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a
system which constantly invokes the universality of its maxims can
produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible
and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of
"objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration—again by
its own account—the "cult of personality."

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The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability of Communist countries to deal with each other. Communist ideology does not admit the possibility of conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear wherever Socialism has triumphed. In the absence of any provision for the settlement of disputes, Communist leaders try to deal with disputes among Communist states as they conduct their own internal struggles: by seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents. But among sovereign states, such tactics cause disputes to harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, demonstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be interpreted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a profoundly disruptive impact on the unity of the world Communist movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scientific truth supplied the inward assurance; the pre-eminence of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

The unity produced by these factors has been undermined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet split and the manner in which Khrushchev has been overthrown. De-Stalinization

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raised the question of the relationship between the scientific truth of the dominant ideology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How could a system that was supposed to end forever man's oppression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be reconciled with slave labor camps and a police state? Even if the Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres must have been assailed by doubts which must have been reinforced when Khrushchev was overthrown in his turn and denounced for "hare-brained schemes."

The Sino-Soviet split was the catalyst for the overt fragmentation of the Communist world. The causes of this rift are many and complex. There is the rivalry of two empires along the most extended land frontier of the world. Competition for a dominant role in the underdeveloped countries plays a part. But what makes the dispute insoluble is the conflict over the leadership of the world Communist movement. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up from time to time, its underlying cause seems beyond repair. A movement that claims to represent a universal truth cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist--whatever temporary adjustments may be made.

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The

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East European governments, beset by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to compete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previous monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be demoralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khrushchev's fall had also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their attitudes toward Khrushchev, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics of their Soviet colleagues--including a highly developed sense for personal power--the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves by a measure of autonomy. They must try to protect their position against possible future upheavals in Moscow. The initial hesitation of the Communist parties around the world in endorsing Khrushchev's ouster can be partly explained by this.

Personal ambition thus reinforces the dominant trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have, if anything, intensified traditional nationalism. Communism has been able to gain a measure of popular acceptance only where its

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leaders emphasize national and not Communist concerns. The autarchic organization of Communist economies compounds these tendencies. It encapsules each state in a system of total planning, which complicates relations even with Communist neighbors. A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension has been initiated by the Soviets not because a few individuals have overcome the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it. To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows: When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press for the settlement of issues that produced the tension in the first place?

Domestic considerations impel many Western leaders to present themselves to their electorate as the architects of a lasting peace. The temptation is, therefore, strong to treat a more conciliatory Communist tone as a permanent conversion to a peaceful course and to gear everything to personal diplomacy.

Such attitudes will cause the West to squander its opportunities, as has happened so often in the past. The prospects for peace are not served by leaving the Soviet leadership with the impression that any action, no matter how belligerent, can always be reversed by a change of tone. Negotiations will prove empty if they are confined to vague protestations of goodwill. If a detente is not to be part of another cycle leading to renewed tensions, it is essential that negotiations be concrete and programs specific.

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Above all, the West must conduct its policy without illusions. The same pressures that have produced a relaxation of tensions can also tempt Soviet leaders to enter upon another period of hostility. There is always the danger that the Kremlin will try to restore the unity of Eastern Europe by fostering a crisis center on Germany. Even as it is, the East European governments almost invariably support Soviet foreign policy, particularly in the underdeveloped world. Events in other continents can have a backlash in Europe. The Soviets could be drawn into an intransigent course as a result of situations over which they have no direct control. The weakening of central authority in the Soviet Union may enable various bureaucracies to operate relatively autonomously, including those with a vested interest in fomenting upheavals. The spiritual malaise of Communism could be reversed if an unchecked collapse of Western influence and power around the world seems to demonstrate the validity of the basic tenets of Leninism.

Even the split between the largest Communist countries represents danger as well as opportunity. It means that henceforth the West will confront not alternating periods of hostility and conciliation but both at the same time. It can also happen that the two Communist giants may try to outbid each other in giving so-called liberation movements an anti-Western cast--Soviet actions in the Congo are a good example.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable" form

[y]

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of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situation of
several of our Allies. One of the major achievements of the
postwar period in Europe has been the isolation of the Communist
parties. Under the impact of many factors, this isolation is
beginning to break down. In Italy, for example, the "opening to
the Left" has resulted in new-found strength for the Communist
Party. In France, the demoralization of the traditional parties
by De Gaulle and the change in tactics by the Communist Party
has opened up prospects of a Popular Front for the first time in
thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in
the new countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders
were restrained from joining the Communist camp because this action
reduced them to the status of satellites. With the growing disarray
in the Communist world it will seem increasingly possible to combine
nationalism and Communism. Many in the West draw comfort from this.
But it is important to distinguish between a national Communist
government in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example,
Latin America or Africa. A national Communist regime in Eastern
Europe is an improvement over the previous condition of absolute
Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin America or Africa would
inevitably become a center of anti-Western policy.

If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it
must develop a common policy and a specific program. The temptation
for bilateral approaches is great. Each national leader, depending

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on his temperament, has visions of appearing as the arbiter of a
final settlement or of adding Communist pressures to his own as
a bargaining device within the Alliance. This sets up a vicious
circle. Since leaders generally do not reach eminence without a
touch of vanity and since some stake their prestige on their
ability to woo the Soviet leaders, they tend to present their
contacts with the Soviets as a considerable accomplishment. But
the real issues have gone unresolved because they are genuinely
difficult; hence they are usually avoided during summit diplomacy
in favor of showy but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer
the East-West discourse, the greater will be the confusion in the
West. Moreover, each leader faces two different audiences: toward
his own people he will be tempted to leave the impression that he
has made a unique contribution to peace; toward his allies he will
be forced to insist that he will make no settlement in which they
do not participate. Excessive claims are coupled with reassurances
to uneasy allies which are in turn tempted to pursue bilateral
diplomacy.

Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate
distrust within the Alliance. The traditional Western balance of
power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Kremlin. Any
Soviet incentive to be responsible will vanish. The Soviet leaders
will be able to overcome their difficulties with the assistance of
the West and without settling any of the outstanding issues. Since
in the Kremlin--as in the West--there must be many who consider the

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status quo preferable to change, the result is likely to be
diplomatic paralysis obscured by abstract declarations about
peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies:
(1) the willingness of the members of the Alliance to subordinate
short-term advantages to a long-term conception of the future
and (2) their ability to develop a concrete and common program.
A united West would have unusual opportunities for negotiation.
The disarray in Eastern Europe should permit the West to adjust its
policies to the degree of autonomy shown by the various East European
countries. Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered
in a new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy urgently
requires a comprehensive solution. All these approaches presuppose
some consensus in the West about the shape of international affairs
over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the
future of Germany. No other issue illustrates so dramatically the
need for unity and for purpose, for an agreed Allied policy as well
as for concrete proposals.

## The Future of Germany

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's
press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-German Treaty
of Collaboration has become increasingly complicated. After the
initial period of shock, the United States undertook an assiduous

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wooing of the Federal Republic. One motive behind the MLF was
to prevent West Germany from accepting a possible French offer of
nuclear cooperation--an offer which has not yet been made and,
given De Gaulle's awareness of the European equilibrium, might
never have been extended. In order to tie Germany to us, successful
efforts were made to have German arms purchases funneled to the
United States. The culmination of this process was an agreement
between Secretary McNamara and Defense Minister von Hassel signed
on November 14, 1964, which in effect made the German armed forces
dependent on the United States for their military equipment.

In the political field the United States, while welcoming
Franco-German rapprochement, has made clear that it does so only
as long as this does not lead to a new power grouping--a condition
inherently impossible of fulfillment. Thus, George McGhee, U.S.
Ambassador to Bonn, has said:

> ...It is true that the signature of the Franco-German Treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been accomplished without a formal treaty. . . . Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle. . . for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so. 11

8
9
10
11
12

11

George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues," July 16, 1964,
DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), pp. 140-141.

CJ

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American pressure and high-handed French actions have placed the Federal Republic in an extremely uncomfortable position. Germany, though courted on all sides, runs the risk of finding itself isolated. The MLF has produced strains between France and the Federal Republic and misgivings in many other countries. The shift of United States tactics on the MLF just prior to Prime Minister Wilson's visit to Washington in December 1964 raised fears in Germany that major issues were once more being settled unilaterally. Because of its understandable insecurities, Germany requires, above all, a calm and steady senior partner. The constant changes in American policy on strategic doctrine, nuclear control and the emphasis on various partners must radicalize German political life, whatever the merit of individual United States positions. Franco-German rivalry threatens to split the pro-Western elements in Germany into pro-American and pro-French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists. Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry between France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations.

Thus Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet cajolery or Communist blackmail--a trend further magnified by American hints that Germany should be more flexible toward the East. As long as Germany could avoid a direct confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other relationship--the Western Alliance or the Franco-German Treaty--these dangers were minimized. The combination of De Gaulle's abruptness and America's short-sighted reaction to it threatens to bring

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about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly absorbed in its own unfulfilled national aims and aware of the bargaining position conferred on it by its central position and growing power.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, 17 million of whose people are Communist hostages, has become the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be equal to this strain. There are signs already that the conflict may tear apart the governing party, the Christian Democratic Union, which largely forged the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will liberate tendencies in the other parties that are now restrained by their desire to present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-established consensus. France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-German Treaty by which it has sought to limit the Federal Republic's freedom of action has had the practical consequence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be tempted to seek reinsurance by improving its relations in Eastern Europe. Thus the current situation contains a series of time bombs.

The most serious potential conflict between the Federal Republic and its Allies--and the lever which the Communist countries may hope to use to pry Germany loose from its Atlantic ties--concerns reactions to the division of Germany. The problem is complicated by three factors:

(1) NATO is an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal members seeks a basic change in the status quo.

(2) None of

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Germany's allies shares her national aspirations with equal intensity.

(3) Germany's past has left a legacy of distrust that creates special obstacles to its international role. These divergences would be difficult enough for a cohesive Alliance to reconcile; the rivalry between France and the United States threatens to make them insoluble.

These problems become particularly severe whenever there appears to be some relaxation in East-West tensions. To most of the members of NATO, detente comes as a welcome respite. To the Federal Republic, it implies the danger of a tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most of the Allies do not find the status quo intolerable, whereas the Federal Republic considers consolidation of the East German regime a sacrifice of basic national aspirations.

This is why German leaders are always extraordinarily ambivalent during periods of detente. They welcome relief from pressures against Berlin; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between "peripheral" settlements which they welcome and "central" agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. If this progress is delayed too long, there will be increasing pressures for purely German initiatives. The Alliance may soon have to choose between developing a common, active policy on German reunification or seeing the Federal Republic pursue the goal independently.

Many in the West find both possibilities disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy about the prospect of having international tensions focus on Germany

EP

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for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its
memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in
part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests
against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to restore
Germany to a respected place in the international community, it is
unfair to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy
alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have
been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a
responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the 17 million people in East Germany is one of
those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only
to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect
to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept their
country's division as permanent. Growing prosperity in the Federal
Republic tends to magnify the uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility.
Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue
to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely
shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called
Rapallo policy--a change of fronts toward the East--is extremely unlikely;
but the consequences for the West would be serious enough if Germany
thought that its national aspirations were being thwarted by the
Alliance. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use
a national appeal to Germany and an appeal based on the fear of Germany
to the other Western countries.

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Any policy on Germany must deal with three problems: (1) relations with the Soviet Union, including the complex of issues involved in any relaxation of tensions, (2) relations with the East German satellite regime and (3) relations with the East European governments. In all three respects the interests of the Western Allies and of the Federal Republic are potentially divergent; at the very least they must be carefully synchronized.

With respect to the detente, German concerns are often met with almost any measure that eases tensions also promotes German unification. According to this theory, once a policy of co-existence is firmly established, Eastern Germany may grow dispensable in Soviet eyes. As the Soviet Union begins to pursue more national policies, the ideological impetus for maintaining a Communist regime in Eastern Germany may decline.

However, it is dangerous to arouse German expectations that are not likely to be fulfilled. Arguments that a detente automatically furthers the cause of German unity must be balanced against others which, on the whole, seem more likely. A statesman can always escape his dilemmas by making the most favorable assumptions about the future. A wise policymaker will also consider the consequences if his hypothesis should turn out to be wrong. The Soviet Union, even if it becomes less committed ideologically, is unlikely to relinquish its hold on Eastern Germany simply as a result of an improvement in the international atmosphere. On the contrary, to the degree that a detente with the West exists, Soviet leaders may well calculate that concessions on the unification of Germany

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become unnecessary. The German concern that a detente may freeze the status quo in Germany is, therefore, not wholly unjustified.

Granting that the problem of German unification cannot be left to the more or less automatic operation of a detente, the question becomes how German unity is to be promoted: is it a task for the Alliance as a whole or should the primary initiative come from the Federal Republic? Many leaders in both Washington and London seem to favor a more active role for the Federal Republic. They wish to avoid constant criticisms and to induce the Federal Republic to assume greater responsibility for its future.

But toward whom is the Federal Republic to assume these responsibilities? It would be highly desirable for the Federal Republic to participate more actively within the Alliance in formulating common policies on Germany's future. Some American and British officials go further, however. They argue that the Federal Republic should take the lead in dealing with the East, principally with the East German satellite.

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They are convinced that increased contacts between the two Germanys will promote the erosion of the East German regime. According to this school of thought, the superior cohesiveness and strength of the Federal Republic will give it by far the stronger bargaining position. At a minimum, such negotiations may make life more bearable for the East German population. In time, the East German regime would become more humane, comparable perhaps to the Kadar government in Hungary.

Such reasoning has caused Western proposals for reunification gradually to move toward enhancing the status of the East German regime. In 1955, the Western plan still called for unification through free election. In 1959, a new plan called for a technical commission composed of twenty-five West and fifteen East Germans to engage in preliminary negotiations for a year. Decisions were to be taken by a majority of three-fourths, giving East Germany an effective veto. In the schemes of 1962, the composition of these commissions had become equal and the time limit of one year had been removed. Also in 1962, the West proposed an International Access Authority to Berlin, in which the East German regime was given equal status with the Federal Republic.

This policy has in recent years found support even in the Federal Republic. The West German government has accepted--albeit reluctantly--the principle of technical commissions in which East and West Germany would enjoy parity. Others in Germany have begun advocating a "policy of little steps" toward the East German regime. By this time they mean agreements between the two German states leading to expanding cultural and perhaps economic

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ties. They argue that contacts between the two Germanys will carry the "bacillus of freedom" into the East and thus "infect" the East German satellite with Western values.

But enhancing the status of Eastern Germany is a dangerous course. It could lead to a situation where two German states will be competing for adherents all over the world; it could defer indefinitely any hope for unification. It is risky also because the bargaining position of the Federal Republic is precarious. In all such contacts, humanitarian concerns will outweigh political considerations. Even if these negotiations do not succeed in luring Germany out of its formal Western ties, they may produce a serious political split in the Federal Republic.

Germany's Allies should not contribute to the already considerable confusion between three partly incompatible objectives: improvement of conditions in Eastern Germany, consolidation of the East German regime and progress toward German unification. Ameliorating conditions in Eastern Germany is desirable for humanitarian reasons. At the same time, it is likely to help the East German regime consolidate itself and thus make unification more remote except on East German terms. As the respectability of the East German regime grows, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining the division of Germany is diminished. As the East German regime gains stature, its pressure on the Federal Republic will almost surely mount.

This process is likely to be gradual. While the East German regime is striving to establish its international status, its demands may be moderate. But once it is recognized--or even if its international status

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is substantially enhanced--it will have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Republic. It will, in fact, be driven to do so by its precarious position. National feelings in Eastern Germany, unlike those in Eastern Europe, are hostile to the existing government. In Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia patriotism can lead to the conclusion that the national interest is best served by liberalizing the existing governments. They seem to have become permanent; no focus for alternative loyalties exists. In East Germany, by contrast, national aspirations clash with the existence of a Communist regime. A prosperous, democratic West Germany acts as a powerful magnet. Thus the East German regime has every incentive to seek to weaken the Federal Republic, and it can use its own population as a hostage.

The superiority of West Germany's bargaining position--which is postulated by some American policymakers--may, therefore, be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves facing a growing dilemma. In return for easing the fate of their population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at what point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn, every West German concession to the German Democratic Republic will strengthen those in the West who favor recognition of that satellite regime. The result is more likely to be that two hostile, competing German states will become permanent than progress toward unification.

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249

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue
this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it. But we should make
certain that the West cannot be blamed for the probable consequences. And
we should do nothing to promote policies that may lead to a growing
demoralization of the Federal Republic. In 1962, the United States
encouraged an "opening to the Left" in Italy that was supposed to isolate
the Communist Party. Instead it has undermined the center and opened the
way to respectability for the Communists. The same role could be played in
Germany by the policy of "technical contacts" or of "little steps" and with
much more dangerous results.

Those in Washington and London who believe that the so-called
"flexible" Germans will always follow their lead may, moreover, be in for
some unpleasant surprises. The Germany version of flexibility could become
indistinguishable from traditional nationalism. This mood was expressed
by Berlin's Senator Hoppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party.
Criticizing the Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives
in West Berlin, Senator Hoppe said:

> Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. Faith in the strength of the West, in its political superiority in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests.

8/9

12 Spandauer Volkszeitung, September 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany, for calling my attention to this quotation.

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP minister for all-German affairs, later supported Hoppe. Unless relations are handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic, such an attitude carries within it the seeds of

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serious misunderstandings.

VII-35

Finally, as German activity toward the East increases, the fear of another Rapallo may create a vicious circle. Germany's Western neighbors will draw closer together; they may also seek to anticipate the Federal Republic by speeding up their own contacts with Moscow. This cannot be in the interest of either Atlantic or European cohesion; in the long run it will prove disastrous for the Federal Republic as well, because it may lead to its eventual isolation.

Only a united Atlantic Community facing jointly the issue of Germany's future can minimize the danger of a sharp conflict between Germany's national goals and its Atlantic ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essential not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance, but also for the peace of Europe as well. It is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the continent that gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as two German states exist, they are bound to interact with each other. If they consider that their social and political systems are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the other. Since they contain the same basic population and a similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will be beyond the control of either East or West--and perhaps of the Germans themselves.

[Y]

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The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own interests, they will realize that the present course may have the gravest long-term consequences.

If Germany unification is to be a central concern of the Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East, it should be given every encouragement to make a major contribution to the formulation of an *Allied* position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder proposed to the NATO Ministers' Conferences of May and December 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification, he deserved a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the Western Allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. If we can discuss only those items the Soviets have declared negotiable, the agenda of any conference will be determined by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that, if no progress toward unification is made, the onus for it rests on the Soviets.

In developing a German program, two areas of policy require particular attention: relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the definition of Germany's eastern frontier.

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Today the East German regime is being widely supported in Eastern Europe at least in part because of the historical fear of Germany and the memory of the Nazi occupation. The East European countries are much less committed to the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany than to a divided Germany, which may seem to them the best guarantee of their security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified Communist Germany might worry the East European states hardly less than any other powerful unified German state. There is reason to believe that the East German regime is despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot be fully exploited so long as the Federal Republic is not able to pursue a more active policy in Eastern Europe.

Heretofore, the Federal Republic has refused to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the East German satellite. Recently the Federal Republic has sought to avoid the issue of the Hallstein Doctrine by establishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. One possible method for ameliorating the Hallstein Doctrine further would be for the Federal Republic to announce that in order to promote a final settlement it would establish diplomatic relations with all of Germany's neighbors, enabling it to bring about direct contact with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Such a policy will not in itself lead to unification. Nor will it make the East European countries abandon their preference for a divided Germany. It will, however, contribute to the isolation of East Germany and hence promote its demoralization. It is likely to reduce the already small East European

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incentive to support Soviet or East German pressures against exposed Western positions such as Berlin. And it could be an opening wedge into the difficult problem of Germany's eastern frontiers, which is perhaps the most sensitive issue in relations with the East European governments.

The tragic issue of Germany's eastern frontier, particularly the Polish-German border, has its origin in 1945, when the Potsdam Agreement placed the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, which had been German for centuries, under Polish administration pending a final settlement in a peace treaty. Poland then proceeded to expel the 13 million Germans living there and to replace them with Polish settlers, mostly from Polish territories taken over by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly because of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed territories, most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the human tragedies of our time. Expelling 13 million people from their ancestral homes cannot be justified by citing German crimes during the war. The reluctance of the Federal Republic to renounce territories which had been German for centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something cynical about the insistent East European demand that the Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East German satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East European countries. The Eastern European countries obviously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany

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divided along the Elbe; but they also insist that the Federal Republic
recognize the eastern frontier of the Soviet puppet regime on the
Oder-Neisse. These inconsistencies complicate a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these obstacles, the perpetuation of
German claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line complicates
progress on the issue of unification. It provides the Soviets with a
convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements
Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to
territories that no longer contain any German settlers perpetuates foreign
rule over 17 million Germans between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line. The
refusal to face the issue of the Polish border guarantees that the frontier
of free Germany will remain on the Elbe.

To be sure, it is an important tactical question at what point the
Federal Republic should make this gesture. It is possible to sympathize with
the reluctance to offer such a painful sacrifice gratuitously. But it is
essential to recognize that acceptance by Germany of its eastern frontiers
will have to be part of any responsible program for unification. Unification
is impossible so long as it is considered an inevitable prelude to a new
set of pressures in Eastern Europe.

Any new approach to the problem of German unification should seek to
escape the process whereby every succeeding Western plan has moved closer to
the Soviet position. If every new Western proposal incorporates additional
features of the Soviet proposals, no incentive for accepting any particular
program exists. Imperceptibly the Soviet framework for German unity becomes