38

a greater concern with technology than with doctrine. The penalty
for miscalculation in the technical field is obvious and demonstrable,
that for falling behind in the doctrinal field is obscure and
diffused. Mastery of the technical problems is so difficult that it
leaves little time for the consideration of their strategic implic-
ations; it gives rise to the maxim that there exists no other
component of strategy except weapons systems.

Moreover, the complexity of weapons systems brings with it
an unparalleled specialization of functions. Traditionally, weapons
which were useful for offense were broadly useful for defense as
well. But today this maxim equation no longer holds to the same
extent. A superior tank could dominate the battlefield; but a
superior bomber does not necessarily dominate the sky. For bombers
do not fight each other. Their performance can be compared only in
terms of their ability to reach their target. The test of a modern
weapon is not so much whether it is superior to its equivalent on the
other side but whether it can perform its strategic mission.

During the hearings of the Symington committee on American

During the hearings of the Washington committee on American

other side put whether it can perform its strategic mission.

A weapon is not so much whether it is superior to its equivalent on the terms of their ability to reach their target. The test of a modern do not fight each other. Their performance can be compared only in an superior pomper does not necessarily dominate the sky. For pomper's extent. A superior tank could dominate the battlefield; but a well. But today this maximum education no longer holds to the same which were useful for offense were broadly useful for defense as an unparalleled specialisation of functions. Traditionally, weapons Moreover, the complexity of weapons systems brings with it

operations; it gives rise to the maximum that there exists no other
notion
leaves little time for the consideration of their strategic implicit-
diffused. Master of the technical problems is so difficult that it
that for falling behind in the doctrinal field is obscure and
for miscalculation in the technical field is obvious and demonstrable,

a greater concern with technology than with doctrine. The benefit

38

40

to
be given/either and on the "mix" which will provide the greatest flexibility.

In these circumstances it is not surprising that there exists a greater
concern with technology than with doctrine. The penalty for miscalculation
in the technical field is obvious and demonstrable, that for falling behind
in the doctrinal field is obscure and deferred. Mastery of the technical
problems is so difficult that it leaves little time for the consideration of
their strategic implications; it gives rise to the notion that there exists no
other KOREAN component of strategy except weapons systems.

other communications component of strategy except weapons systems.

their strategic implications; it gives rise to the notion that there exists no
problem as so difficult that it leaves little time for the consideration of
in the doctrinal field in advance and deferred. Masterly of the technical
in the technical field in advance and demonstrable, that for leaping beyond
concern with technology than with doctrine. The penalty for misalignment

In these circumstances it is not surprising that there exists a greater
to be given either and on the "mix" which will provide the greatest flexibility.

to be given to either and on the "mix" which will provide the greatest flexibility.

But however difficult the problem, the test of strategy is its skill in resolving it. History will not excuse the inadequacy of the US response by the enormity of the challenge. Strategy cannot avoid the problems of the nuclear age by identifying military policy with the maximum development of power, for under present circumstances such a course must paralyze the will. Whether strategy gives an impetus to policy or paralysis paralyzes it therefore depends on the alternatives which it presents to the policymakers. In 1936 the French General Staff possessed no doctrine for any conflict except all-out war and it believed in no strategy save the defensive. It did not provide for any dealing with strategic transformations which did not violate the boundaries of France; nor did it anticipate the strategic defense balance might be upset by small increments of power, which, by themselves, did not seem "worth" all-out war. As a result, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, the French political leaders was