MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: September 22, 1971

PLACE: 767 Fifth Avenue
Offices of the Dreyfus Fund

PARTICIPANTS: List Attached

Following dinner Mr. Jerry Hardy introduced Bill Moyers. Moyers then proceeded to introduce Dr. Kissinger in a humorous manner, making reference to the Johnson years. Among the particulars, Moyers indicated that President Johnson had the habit of calling Dr. Kissinger "Dr. Schlesinger."

**Dr. Kissinger:** Thank you very much for your introduction, Bill. You know this habit of Johnson's to call me "Schlesinger" is one that he has picked up only after I have come with the Nixon Administration--only where he knows it could do some damage. Actually, I always have somewhat of an identity crisis when I think about President Johnson. When he didn't think that I was Schlesinger, he honestly thought that I was Chancellor Kiesinger. I remember one time he told me that he had called Dean Rusk into his office and told Rusk to "get on your horse." Johnson then turned to me and said, "In English that means high priority".

When I was a professor, I was always infuriated by government officials who came to speak and said that all options had been considered, that all points of views had been taken into account, and that if we, the professors, knew as much as the government officials, we would realize that what they were doing was the only reasonable course of action. I come here tonight gentlemen and indicate to you that in the arena of foreign policies, we have considered all the options, taken into account all points of view, and if you only knew as much as we in the Administration know, you would realize that our course of action has been the only one possible. (Laughter)

I would like to make a few opening remarks and then answer questions from the floor. I will confine my opening remarks to a general point

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about the philosophy of foreign affairs. Gentlemen, without regard to which political party was in office in 1969, the nation then faced a major foreign policy crisis. The basic problem at that time was that our foreign policy had run out of ideas. Even the trauma in Vietnam is actually a reflection of the disintegration of the post-war (1949-1950) world.

More than a full generation has elapsed since the end of the Second World War. Indeed that is a period of time longer than the space between the First and Second World Wars. But now, at the end of that period, it is clear that the old ideas were responsible for basic failures--that in the foreign field, the United States was deluded by the characteristics of the post-war era, an era in which we possessed huge military superiority over the other nations of the world.

We mistook that strategic accident for an historical pattern. The Marshall Plan was actually a wholesale transfer of New Deal ideas into the area of foreign affairs. The ideas were simple. First, the cure for political instability around the world was thought to be economic development. Second, it was thought that we had to resist aggression wherever it occurred. But what we didn't see in the world of foreign affairs was that instability in some nations reflects more than economics. It can, for instance, be a reflection of political illegitimacy. We also didn't focus on something that has now become a fact--that the economic development which we so eagerly sought would produce economies which would compete against American products in world markets. So, as we developed political entities, we also produced economic competitors.

I believe that history will look back on the Kennedy era not as the beginning of a new period of foreign affairs, but as the last flower of the old period. It was there that the post-war philosophy reigned supreme, there that we continued to believe that with energy and decisiveness the United States could succeed in its efforts to produce a modern and dynamic post-war world.

Even before the Vietnam trauma, however, it should have been clear to us that the policies of the 40's and 50's simply were not working in the Europe of the 1960's. We had failed to confront the problem of reducing U.S. involvement in Europe without reducing our commitment there. We had failed to avoid the development of a new international balance of power system as we built new political entities around the world. In a few words, the major problem we have not solved is the problem of pursuing historical change without war.

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In this Administration, we have attempted to reduce dogmatic hostilities around the world. Our policies are not idealistic, moralistic. We do not plead altruism--a tendency far too common in the history of American foreign affairs. Dean Rusk was wont to speak of our dealing with other people's problems, to indicate that we had no stake in the matter ourselves. This is not a stable basis on which to conduct foreign policy. We must know our own interest and pursue it, in order to avoid the frustrations and fluctuations which always threaten the conduct of foreign affairs. Our current policies toward Russia and China are unsentimental, and serious; they are matters of grave concern. We need the Soviet Union and the Mainland Chinese, as well as other major nations, to have stakes in a stable international system. We do not seek a bi-polar world. We do not want a world in which nations must run to Washington in order to make decisions. We want each nation to have a stake in the world order, and to pursue a course which maximizes the stability of the international system. We are trying to build bases for that system now.

That serious post-war problems in Europe have now matured seems rather obvious. Economic unity in Europe--a goal for which we have been striving, will increasingly result in competition for United States economic entities. We should have recognized that, also, we should have recognized the Defense cannot be the only basis for unity in the NATO region.

I will try to deal with Japanese problems during the question period; but now I would like for a moment to turn to Vietnam. I had no illusions on the Vietnam issue when I came to my current job. And I will not defend each of the many decisions in Southeast Asia that have been made over the past three years of this Administration. Let me, however, say that I do not believe in its current status that the Vietnam war should be a moral or a political issue of consequence. The war is ending. There is no question about that. The only question and issue is the rate at which it is drawing to a close. Gentlemen, these arguments about the rate that the war should be ended are marginal at best. Is it worth it now to tear the nation apart domestically and to threaten international world order over an issue of months? Is it worth it for the United States Government to be stampeded out of Vietnam by demonstrations or withdrawal of public support in the United States? It is important that this war be ended with a positive execution of government policy. I think the Administration's position on the Vietnam situation can be analogized to DeGaulle's role in settling the Algerian war. It wasn't so important that DeGaulle ended the war--anybody

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could have done that. The crucial fact was that he did it without destroying France. The Vietnam issue, gentlemen, will have no glory in this coming election year for either political party. What is crucial now is that this war be ended with dignity, be ended in a manner that is not a mockery of our past commitments. I think we can achieve this for a variety of reasons, some of which I can perhaps articulate during the question session.

On a slightly more dispassionate front, let me say that I believe this Administration to have swept away a number of foreign policy myths in the last three years. We have pursued an initiative with the Chinese while at the same time making diplomatic advances with the Russians on SALT and regarding Berlin. This Administration, or at the latest its successor, will also end the war in Vietnam. Talk about the end of old notions about foreign policy is essentially negative. Foreign policy in 1973 will add a genuine positive note. On the affirmative side, let me say that our philosophy is to reduce dependence on a crisis atmosphere, in which decisions are taken exclusively as to other events. We must define what we stand for, not just what we stand against. But let me now take some questions. I will try my best to be candid.

**Question:** You mentioned the need for a dignified end to the Vietnam war. Let me ask you: if the decisions regarding the Vietnam war had been left to the leaders of the nation, without pressure from people like Howard Stein, would the war be ending now as rapidly as it is?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) There have been various stages in the Vietnam situation. In 1968, public pressure was essential to reverse the course of a predominantly military view of possible solutions in Vietnam. After that course had been turned, however, (though I recognize that my objectivity may be questioned) I do not think that the pressures of public opinion were necessary to keep the Administration steady on its course of withdrawal.

Parenthetically, let me say that I believe many of the people who have protested the Vietnam war to represent some of the best values that our society has to offer. I say this not because it is politically desirable for me to say it, but because I believe that those voices that have protested need to be heard. But it is not valuable now to argue about the past. Today I believe that continued exaggerated public pressure would be counter-productive in the area of Vietnam policy. The process of ending the war, especially to the extent that that involves negotiations, is a delicate process, and one that can be easily destroyed by confusion and disorder. The quality

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of the national problem about Vietnam is different now from what it was earlier. It has been a severe national problem; but it is vital now that we do not add salt to the wounds of the war. The war wounds in the United States seem to be healing. Continued pressure now from outside the Administration is not what is needed to effect that healing.

**Question:** (Bill Moyers) The moral issue in Southeast Asia might be extended to raise questions about our clandestine operations in Laos, our equipping of the South Vietnamese and Thais, and our use of airpower in Southeast Asia. Do you see these as moral issues of conscience?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I see and know the arguments against our involvements in Southeast Asia. I see and accept practical limits on our aid in that part of the world. But what I cannot see is the argument that the North Vietnamese can go into Laos and Cambodia, but that nobody else can go into Laos and Cambodia to help the Cambodians and the Laotians. In this whole Vietnam situation, we, of course, would vastly prefer a negotiated settlement either to Vietnamization or to a petering out of the war. But on the issue of morality, I do not follow or respect the argument-- the argument of the opponents to the war that one side has the right to enter a foreign country, but no other side has the right to help out that foreign nation itself.

**Question:** In negotiations to end the war, will the settlement be with Hanoi or higher up?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The actual settlement, of course, must be with Hanoi, though negotiating a settlement could, of course, be affected by surrounding circumstances which might include the views of other powers. Leaving aside general questions about China for the moment, let me refer to the fact that people ask about Peking's role in settling the Vietnam war. Dedicated revolutionists like the Chinese certainly cannot be expected to cooperate with the major capitalist power to effect a tactical settlement in Vietnam. The issues regarding our relationship with China are of a broader nature. We are looking for a new perspective in Asia. We are looking to reduce the Vietnam megalomania psychology. We hope to avoid an obsession with the exegesis of the seven points from Hanoi--an obsession that appears more appropriate for a reader of a detective story than for an analyst of a diplomatic negotiation.

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**Question:** President Thieu has said that the Vietnam situation will be settled in 1973 by a major military battle. Are we going to leave South Vietnam only to see the North and the South tear each other apart? Are we going to stand by just to see this happen?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Those who follow the statements of North Vietnamese politicians know them to have been somewhat like epic poems. Every two years, they predict Armageddon. Gentlemen, we are not involved in any subterfuge here. I object to the view that we would stand aside to watch the Vietnamese people tear themselves apart. This is not our policy. It is very difficult for me to say anything more; but I will say that when the history of our negotiations is made fully public--and I cannot give you the details of those negotiations now--this Administration will not look bad. Gentlemen, one thing is true: we simply will not end aid to the South as a means of ending the war.

**Question:** But should we have been in Vietnam in the first place?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I really don't want to get into that question. I don't think it is proper for me to answer. Bill [Moyers] will agree, I think, that if the restrictions that have been imposed on our conduct of the war had been known in April, 1965, we might not have become so involved. By the way, I trust it is understood tonight that my remarks are completely off-the-record.

[Off-the-record status was confirmed by assent from members of the dinner party.]

**Question:** If the war is ended by negotiation, where will it take place: in Asia or Paris?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You mean the locality of the negotiations?

**Question:** Is there any chance for successful negotiations in Paris?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes, I think so.

**Question:** In response to your thought about our current relations with the Russians, may I say that I take the Soviet Union is our competitor. They seem often to focus us in one place while they are milling up trouble elsewhere. Here we are mired in Vietnam while they are stirring trouble in the Middle East. Is the Middle East situation our next real problem?

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**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The Russians, of course, didn't start the Vietnam war.

**Question:** But they know that we are preoccupied there.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I have dealt directly with the Russians now for three years, and studied them as a professor before that time. Let me say that from my perspective the Soviets don't look like master planners in foreign affairs. The Chinese are different. The Russians look more like muddling bureaucrats. Anyone that knows the Russian Establishment knows their decision-making procedure is not one which is geared to produce a bold, Grand Design in foreign affairs. The Russian strong-point is not a Grand Design, but rather a singleness of purpose. I believe that the Russians are bumbling in the Middle East about as much as they are evidencing national purpose. The real problem in the Middle East is the total environment surrounding the Israelis and the Arabs. The Israelis and the Arabs are both vitally concerned about local security, and neither is particularly concerned about maintaining international peace. Each, of course, is tied to a major superpower. The real danger of a major world confrontation is not from situations like these which existed in Laos or Cambodia. It is the escalation potential of some of the smaller event; and the Middle East could provide just the spark necessary to ignite a major conflagration. After the highjacking incident last year, and the Syrian invasion of Jordan, we came the closest to war that we have been during this Administration. There was a 48-hour period then which was very crucial and could have resulted in war. Everything happened so rapidly, however, there was very little public attention focused on it.

The Middle East situation is somewhat of an enigma for the Russians. Their presence in Egypt is marked by both military personnel and arms supply. Due to these ties, the Egyptians cannot stray far from the Soviet Union. But in the Sudan, where the Egyptians used Soviet-provided air power to lift troops, the Russians saw the major Communist leader of North Africa done away with by Soviet arms. So Soviet influence in the Middle East is of an interesting potential; but the Soviets so far have not evidenced a particularly skillful use of that influence there.

I am not optimistic about the overall situation in the Middle East. The long-term trends there are not in our favor. The Middle East is a part of the world that has a very high concentration of indigenous radicalism, and an interim settlement of the Middle East disputes now might actually

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strengthen the radicals. If the moderates lose the anti-Israel issue, they may lose their capacity to maintain a consensus in the Arab world.

**Question:** I hope you are not taking this question from me just because I am a woman; but regardless, I am willing to ride the Women's Liberation movement tonight for this purpose, anyway. It is obvious that the Administration must maintain contingency plans for all situations in Vietnam. What if after our withdrawal from Vietnam there is a counterrevolution followed by civil disorder and chaos in Vietnam? Will we move back in, or will we stay out?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) This is not a question that I think is proper for me to answer now. I will say, however, that I would not think it likely that we would move in on a massive scale under such circumstances.

**Question:** I have two questions on the China initiative. First, why were the Japanese not brought in on the China matter? Second, couldn't the China trip be made by some Administration official lower down than the President himself? Wouldn't that involve lower risks?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) On the Japan matter, it must, of course, be obvious that the question whether to notify the Japanese was raised and considered during our planning for the China venture. The fact, of course, is that if we were going to inform any nation about the China initiative, we had to inform the Taiwanese. To inform Japan alone would have been suicide. First, it would not have been fair to Taiwan; second, with the possible exception of the United States, Japan is the leakiest government in the world. We really have problems with the Japanese; we still cannot even tell them general, philosophical plans without reading the plans the next day in the Japanese press. If we had told the Japanese about the venture, it would have been a public matter.

The question then, really is why secrecy was so important. There are two major reasons: first, the Chinese wanted it that way; and second, we wanted to avoid speculation in the United States which could have resulted in tremendous disappointment if the initiative had failed. We wanted to low-key our China effort in the early stages.

Regarding your question about President Nixon's personal trip to China it is clear that there are very few people in China to whom you can talk conclusively in matters of national affairs. To deal with lower levels is absurd. We have had 116 meetings in Warsaw and made no progress whatever. The game plan there is this: they make a statement; we answer,

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and they return to their original statement. No one has the authority to vary from the original statement. So we had to make an arrangement worth our effort, and this required the top level itself.

One mustn't compare the China initiative with other types of negotiations, as, for example, those in Helsinki, where there are detailed technical issues that are not appropriate for the President personally to pursue. The China development is in its beginning stages. We are currently dealing with broad, philosophical questions about general directions to pursue; these are matters that the President can appropriately deal with. Subsequently, there can be instructions to the lower levels of the government bureaucracies to deal with further matters, if necessary.

**Question:** Did the publication of the Pentagon Papers damage our diplomatic effectiveness?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I want you first of all to know that I think that the publication of the Pentagon Papers was extraordinarily unfair. They were papers from the Assistant Secretary level taken totally out of the adversary context in which they were written. They resulted in misunderstandings regarding the people and issues involved. Any papers, gentlemen, that can show John McNaughton to have been a hawk are absurd. On the question, though, as to whether there has been an adverse effect on our diplomatic channels, one thing has happened in delicate situations: we have noticed a tendency on the part of other governments to want to use a White House channel. So far, gentlemen, we haven't had any major leaks out of the White House itself, but it is really too early to tell what total impact the publication of the Pentagon Papers will finally have on diplomatic channels.

**Question:** Our interests are being seriously eroded in Chile, aren't they?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The White House is often accused of being alarmist in this Chile situation. Let me say that I have great respect for Allende's leadership abilities. Twenty-four years ago, without any prospect of success, he dedicated himself politically to a Socialist ideal. Now that he has come to power it is not realistic for us to believe that he will turn into a safe administrator, and abandon his principles. He is highly skilled. To my knowledge, he has not yet made a single mistake. He is building a one-party system in Chile. The political opposition to his minority regime has already been denied access to news media and television, and

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the government has a strangle-hold on the economy. From our
perspective, the question is whether or not we should oppose Allende's
regime. On this question, serious people disagree. In expropriation
matters, Allende has acted pretty much as we expected him to act. Our
dilemma is that if we help Allende now, we make more certain his
consolidation of power. But if we refuse to help him, we strengthen
his arguments that we are fascist capitalists. In the long term future
in Chile, however, I do see Allende leading with acumen a one-party
government of a socialist nature-near to communism.

**Question:** I would like to return to Vietnam for a moment. How can we end this war with dignity in the current situation?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me put the immediate question aside for a moment. I must emphasize again that our withdrawal course in Vietnam is set. No one wants to keep the Vietnam war going for "goings-sake." If the political situation in South Vietnam disintegrates, circumstances will have changed; but our analysis does not indicate that such disintegration is likely. The Vietnamese, both South and North, have an incredible capacity to break your heart with some unforeseeable conduct, just at a stable point in your relationship with them, just when you think everything is tied together.

In our Administration we recognized the problem arising from the fact that
Washington had been dependent upon field reports from Vietnam. Accordingly,
in National Security Council we developed a small group of very bright
specialists to do our own analysis of reports from Vietnam, and to go to
Vietnam themselves to make independent evaluations. These watchdogs
have been producing judgments in the Vietnam area throughout the
Administration. So far, their judgments have always been correct. We
recognize, of course, as with the regulatory agencies, that there is always
an incentive for watchdogs and parties being watched to work out some form
of non-aggression treaty. Seriously, we are looking into the question of
political stability in the South right now, and we have not decided for certain
what course of action to pursue. One thing is clear, though; it will be
a disaster for the United States if the American people can say that all
people who have had anything to do with the Vietnam issue over nearly
a full decade, including this Administration, were either fools or liars.
You can rest assured that we will look very closely at the Vietnam political
situation, and analyze it to the best of our abilities.

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**Question:** I wonder if the Administration is sensitive enough to the economic atmosphere in Europe today regarding the value of the dollar. We are making enemies there. Our policy is totally unrealistic. We are asking the Europeans to create a surplus for us which will make it possible for the United States to buy up the world.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) For me to speak on international economics is a strong argument against universal suffrage. But, generally, let me first say that the Europeans must be prepared now to pay a domestic price which they have long avoided. We cannot continue to carry their economic burdens. This is an impossible basis for a stable world order. Second, it seems obvious that a system of fixed exchange rates inevitably results in crises. This is a problem which cannot be solved by increasing reserves, or buying more time. What is needed is a qualitative change to reduce the promise of regular international monetary crises.

The problem here may seem to some capable of solution through a reasonable, equitable, burden-sharing agreement with the Europeans. Sure. But my experience shows that burden-sharing discussions are very unlikely to produce reasonable agreements. Parties simply do not accept burdens unless they are inevitable. In our operation, we had to have a shock effect in order to gain flexibility. People are now pleading for a "cooperation" --what that means is a return to a fixed exchange rates. Don't draw any too serious conclusion from Secretary Connally's remarks in England; his purpose there was to indicate that the party is over, that we are serious in these economic matters. The Europeans, of course, want to take an attitude of abstract cooperation; but if we continue this indefinitely, the final result would have to be confrontation. Now that our initial hard stance is clear, you may see us in a more conciliatory posture. But we do want to change from the policies of fixed exchange rates, which have always involved imbalances--one nation exporting its domestic problems to another.

**Question:** But haven't we gone from one extreme to another?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Yes, if our current policy lasts too long, we will be in a dangerous situation.

**Question:** (Bill Moyers) Time is growing late. We promised Dr. Kissinger we would have him out of here by 9:30.

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**Question:** China is the new dimension in foreign affairs to me. Can you say anything about Mao's death; and also, what do you see as a role for China in world politics; and how about the UN problem?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) China has existed for 3,000 years, and I became a Chinese expert in 60 hours. First, though, regarding Mao's death: we really don't have much more information than the press has. My judgment is that Mao is not dead. There has been a stand-down of military and civilian aviation in China for some two weeks now. The stand-down was announced before it hit certain regions in China. Due to the length of the stand-down and its regional progressions, my judgment is that there is a power struggle going on in China today. It could be that the old Cultural Revolutionist group is purging the moderates headed by Chou En-lai. Or it is possible that Chou is purging the Cultural Revolutionists. Another possibility is that the Russians and Chinese are mobilizing due to some threat along the Sino-Soviet border; but I have reason to believe that this is not what is really at stake.

On UN representation, you know, if you read Scotty Reston, it becomes clear that he is more interested in having China in the United Nations than Chou En-lai is. This UN issue is a pragmatic, specific problem that exists now. But Chou En-lai is not so concerned about that single aspect of the Taiwan problem. What mainland Chinese want, of course, is the expulsion of Taiwan from the UN. They want to put another nail in the Taiwanese coffin. Outside of its Taiwan dimension for the Chinese, the UN issue does not appear all that important to them. They will leave it to evolution. The UN issue seems more important politically in the United States and in Japan than it does in China.

**Question:** Are we moving into a three-power world?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) We are moving to a world with many power centers. Japan, of course, has the potential to become a superpower. Parenthetically, let me say that we will do our best to see that Japan is not a nuclear superpower. Europe, of course, also has the potential to become a superpower. Even India cannot be excluded from the list of possible superpowers. In the immediate future, what is important for the Chinese is that they are eager to enter again the international scene. That does not necessarily mean the United Nations to them. The Chinese today are weak. They are not as strong as the Soviet Union; but they are talented, and they have a long history as a cultured and educated people.

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**Question:** And they do have enormous natural resources; don't they?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The real question here is whether or not it is possible for 800 million people to be governed. The Chinese are conducting a unique experiment in government with this huge number of people. It is impossible right now to generalize about what the results will be. In an area like nuclear weapons, where the Chinese have created a high priority item, their results have been astonishing; but it really is too early to generalize. Simply to plan and run an economy for 800 million people must require some 20 million bureaucrats at least.

[Dr. Kissinger's remarks ended.]

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List of Attendees at Howard Stein Dinner

Wednesday, September 22, 1971

Paul Miller
President,
Miller, Anderson & Sherred Assoc.
Philadelphia

Leo Model, Partner
Model, Roland & Co.

William Grant, President
Smith, Barney & Co.

Harry Jacobs, President
Bache & Company

William Salomon, Partner
Salomon Brothers

Lawrence B. Morris, Jr.
Partner, Dean Witter & Co.

James Lane, Vice President
Chase Manhattan Bank

John Diebold, President
Diebold Group

J. Frank Forster, President
Sperry Rand Corporation

Dr. Paul Marks
Director, Dryfus Fund
and Dean of Columbia Univ.
College of Physicians and Surgeons

Edgar F. Bunce, Jr., Vice President
Prodential Insurance Company

John B. Lovelace, Jr. President
Capital Research & Management Co.
Los Angeles

Felix Rohayton, Partner
Lazard Freres & Co.

James W. Bavant, President
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis

Salim Lewis, Partner
Bear, Stearns, & Company

Lloyd Peterson, Sr. Vice President
Mellon National Bank

Wilbur Cowett, Partner
Wertheim & Company

Robert Haack, President
New York Stock Exchange

Emil Patberg, President
First Boston Corporation

Ralph De Munzio, Partner
Peter Peabody and Company and
Chairman of the Board of
Governors, N. Y. Stock Exchange

James Dunn, Financial Vice President
American Telephone and Telegraph

Crocker Nevin, President
Marine Midland Bank

Melvin C. Holm, Chairman of the Board
Carrier Corporation

William Pardoe, Vice President
and Chief Financial Officer
Union Carbide

Robert M. Gardiner
President, Reynolds & Co.

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Robert M. Foman, President
and Chief Executive Officer
E. F. Hutton & Company

Morton Meyerson, President
F. I. Dupont, Glore Forgan & Co.

Fred Stein, Partner
Neuberger & Berman

Bill Moyers, Director
Dryfus Fund

Warren Manshel, Partner
Coleman & Company

Lucy Benson, President
National Urban League

Mrs. Howard Stein ("Janet")