PAPER NO. H-2

- 2 -

### III. PROBABLE FUTURE COMMUNIST STRATEGY

A. "Peaceful coexistence" will continue for 3-5 years, until the Communists feel that their military strength is greatly superior to that of the free world. "Peace" propaganda, economic competition, "disengagement" will be the watch words, with parallel Communist toughness to frighten Western appeasers into concessions.

B. If the "coexistence" gambit lulls the West into weakness, the Communists in the next phase may:

1. Launch all-out war if the risk seems acceptable.

2. Launch non-nuclear aggression if the West has preserved nuclear parity but not non-nuclear deterrent strength.

3. Use nuclear blackmail to break up our collective security arrangements. (Note: this may well come sooner than in three years. It is indeed happening now over Berlin.)

### IV. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING U. S. NATIONAL STRATEGY

U. S. Strategy must be so strong and so flexible as to counter each element in the spectrum of Communist strength. U. S. strategy must encompass political, economic, spiritual, technological and military endeavors.

#### A. Military Technology

Technological potentials and military strategy must be merged faster and better. Lead time is too long because scientists consider soldiers reactionary and soldiers consider scientists too impractical. (Also, DOD organization, slow decisions in NSC and the annual budget process stretch out lead time.) The JCS and scientists have no regular exchange of information but scientists without adequate military knowledge presently have too much influence on strategy.

#### B. The Meaning of Mass Destruction Weapons

New weapons "represent a quantum jump in the technique of killing." We have to guard against ways they could come into use - insanity in high command, totalitarian fanatism, irresponsibility by a minor nuclear power, etc., which might provoke a war between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. so that it might rule the world on their ashes.

(HAK Note: This possibility is slight for reasons I can explain.)

PAPER NO. H-2

- 3 -

C. Lesser New Weapons

New conventional, chemical and other weapons make the individual soldier more effective. Weapons which are increasingly available include chemical and bacteriological agents which are temporarily incapacitating, better means of transportation and communication, and detection devices for warning or intelligence. However, the Communists have produced many more of these weapons than the free world has.

D. Tactical Atomic Weapons

We must have enough tactical atomic weapons to offset those the Communists have. They must be so plentiful and widely deployed that we can retaliation instantly against Communist aggression. However, we must not integrate tactical atomic weapons into our forces to the extent that the forces can no longer fight purely conventional wars. This would rob us of flexibility.

V. A CONCEPT FOR U. S. MILITARY STRATEGY

A. Develop an invulnerable deterrent against thermonuclear attack. This requires ICBM's, balanced offensive - defensive forces, civil defense.

B. Improve and increase conventional forces, some ready, some in reserve, with adequate lift. Ready forces do not have to be of World War II size because if thermonuclear deterrent works, the reserves and the free world industrial power become significant again.

C. Provide tactical atomic weapons to all forces, but do not integrate them to the degree that they become indispensable.

(HAK Note: There are major practical and political problems here. If used for a speech, check with HAK.)

D. Make the U. S. a strong "home base" of weapons, manpower, and spirit.

VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE U. S. STRATEGIC CONCEPT

A. During the "missile gap," we must depend on a mix between planes and missiles for our thermonuclear deterrent.

1. If the Soviet missile advantage grows, we may have to keep many B-52's continually airborne. This could be financed, without increasing the DOD budget by cutting out B-47's, Bomarc missiles and spending on SAGE which is obsolescent.

PAPER NO. H-2

- 4 -

2. To close the "missile gap" we must get an invul-
nerable retaliatory force (Polaris, Minuteman),
warning systems and anti-missile missiles (NIKE-
ZEUS).

3. These things, if properly planned, will not cost much more than present expenditures for wasteful programs and obsolescent weapons. For example, NIKE-ZEUS, HAWK, interceptor-reconnaissance aircraft and better warning systems would cost only a billion a year more than the obsolescent anti-bomber defenses. (HAK Note: How about the argument that if we leave ourselves open to bomber attack, they will switch back to building planes?)

B. U. S. non-nuclear Army forces should over a five-year period be rebuilt to 18 top-flight divisions with organic airlift. This would require an Army of 1.2 million men by 1965 (including continental air and missile defense forces.) One of the new divisions should be sent to NATO, another to the Far East. U.S. reserve forces should be brought to 1,000,000 in paid drill strength. (Note: such conventional forces are the only way for the U. S. to use its mobilization potential.)

(HAK Note: I can see a conventional defense of Europe, but how about Asia? Individual countries, even with U. S. support, are not strong enough for conventional defense, or are they?)

1. For NATO, the Lisbon Force goals of nearly 60 ready divisions and 60 reserve divisions should be realized. The U. S. was to contribute 7 active divisions and 10 reserve divisions.

2. CENTO and SEATO need more reserve strength through the creation of added reserve units.

3. Korea and Taiwan are basically defended well enough.

4. The National Guard and Army reserve should be im-
proved. The Marine Corps should be modernized.
Navy carriers and amphibious shipping should be
matinained.

5. Airlifts to the battle scene and tactical lift must be greatly increased.

6. New air vehicles for tactical air support for non-nuclear warfare must be developed.

PAPER NO. H-2

- 5 -

C. Mobile, invulnerable tactical nuclear weapons - loosely integrated with conventional forces - must be available for ground, naval and air warfare.

D. At present we are putting just over 10 per cent of our GNP into defense programs. An increase of 2 per cent of GNP in our defense budget would provide adequate funds for all the added U. S. programs suggested, thermonuclear and non-nuclear. (If our GNP reaches the $500 billion figure during the next year, as is anticipated by economists, the proposed increase in defense spending would approach $10 billion.) For non-nuclear programs the cost, additional to the present budget, should be $3 - $5 billion annually for up to ten years.

## VII. CONCLUSION

The U. S. needs adequate forces to cope with the full spectrum of Sino-Soviet power. These forces fall into three general categories.

### A. Balanced thermonuclear forces

1. A thousand ICBM's on mobile or hardened bases.

a) Polaris and Minuteman with light warheads.

b) Titans, which is heavy enough to carry equipment that confuses enemy anti-missile missiles.

2. Ultramodern bombers for precise attack missions and to force the Communists to maintain an air defense.

3. Extensive defense forces

a) Nike-Zeus anti-missile missile

b) Nike-Hercules and Hawk for anti-aircraft defense and defense against missiles launched from enemy planes. (Bomarc is obsolete and SAGE should be used for civilian air traffic control.)

4. Better intelligence systems

a) Space satellites

b) Early warning

c) Communications

PAPER NO. H-2

- 6 -

5. Civil Defense

a) Shelters

b) Reserve stocks

c) Reserve military forces

B. Conventional Forces

1. Larger ground forces as described above, with adequate (and possibly integral) lift.

2. Naval forces

a) Possibly doubled number of ships available for anti-submarine warfare.

b) Carriers for non-nuclear air support.

3. Air forces

a) More ground support planes like the Army's "flying jeep," transports, reconnaissance planes are needed.

b) Single command of the air-ground nuclear team is important.

C. Tactical nuclear weapons

Proper development of U. S. military power can lead to disarmament, first through the abolition of mass destruction weapons, then to the reduction of conventional forces.

Paper No. H-3

by: E. Hobbing

# SUMMARY

DEFENSE

ORGANIZATION

Dr. H. H. Ransom
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

December, 1959

I. Trends and Issues

A. The trend of defense organization since 1947 has steadily been toward greater centralization. However, the federal concept of organization has survived through equal service representation on the JCS and the retention of the basic service "roles and missions" agreed on in 1947. The trend toward more unification persists even after the 1958 DoD reorganization, with the following new proposals before Congress:

1. A recommendation for the re-unification of the Army and the Air Force - made by a House Government Operations subcommittee.

2. A request by Senator Engle (D-Calif) that the Senate Armed Services Committee study the possibility of DoD unification into a single service with a single chief of staff.

3. A bill introduced by Senator Cooper (R-Ky.) to down-grade the service departments by making each service secretary an Under-Secretary of Defense.

4. Continued advocacy of unification by Air Force spokesmen.

5. Continued resistance to unification by Navy spokesmen.

B. The basic issues debated in the reorganization dispute are:

1. The charter and composition of JCS.

2. The various "agreements" within DoD, from Key West to McElroy.

3. The power of the Secretary of Defense.

C. The defense budget process.

c. The defense budget process.

McIntosh.

S. The various "agreements" within DOD, from Key West to

R. The basic issue debated in the reorganization commission

2. Continued resistance to multination by Navy adepts.

adepts.

4. Continued advocacy of multination by Air Force

3. A bill introduced by Senator Cooper (R-KA.) to down-

of attack.

miltitication into a single service with a single chief
Amied Services Committee study the possibility of DOD

and the Air Force - made by a House Government
f. A recommendation for the re-miltitication of the Army

Congress:

reorganization, with the following new proposals before
toward more multination policies even after the 1988 DOD
service "roles and stations" agreed on in 1984. The trend
representation on the JCS and the retention of the state
concept of organization has arrived through each service
been toward greater centralization. However, the federal
A. The trend of defense organization since 1947 has steadily

I. Trends and Issues

Cambridge 38, Massachusetts
c Divinity Avenue
Harvard University,
Dr. H. H. Rounow

December, 1988

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
DEFENSE
SUMMARY

PA: E. Hopping
Paper No. H-3

Paper No. H-3

E. Hobbing

-2-

## II. Historical Background

A. For over a hundred years after the Navy Department was created in 1793, it and the War Department went their separate ways.

B. In the 1920's, two main arguments for unification were advanced (in vain):

1. Unification would permit the development of a strategy based on air power, the air force advocates argued. A third service should be created and then a unifying organization.

2. Unification would save money by ending duplication. This was the most popular argument.

C. During World War II, the War Dept. advocated a powerful Secretary of Defense and Single Chief of Staff. The Navy was opposed. The Air Force primarily wanted independent status. Much Congressional opposition to centralization existed.

## III. DOD Organization 1947-1958

### A. The Compromise of 1947

1. The preamble to the National Security Act of 1947 was deliberately ambiguous.

a. It provided for "integrated" defense policies but also for "separately administered" services

b. The Secretary of Defense was to give the services "unified direction" but "not to merge them."

c. The Act was amended in 1949 specifically to forbid "a single Chief of Staff (or a) general staff."

2. Forrestal soon found his authority too limited, and asked for more.

### B. The 1949 Reorganization

1. Service secretaries lost reserve powers i.e. those not given to the Secretary of Defense.

2. Services lost cabinet rank and seats on NSC.

3. The Secretary of Defense got a little more specific authority.

4. But Congress kept control of the roles and missions of the separate services.

5. JCS were strengthened by non-voting chairman and bigger Joint Staff.

prigger, bound staff.

2. 102 were strengthened by non-acting chairman and
   of the separate services.

4. But Congress kept control of the forces and misappropriated
   authority.

3. The Secretary of Defense had a little more specificity.

5. Services lost cabinet rank and seats on WMD.

6. Not given to the Secretary of Defense.

B. The 1949 reorganization.

served for more.

S. Forestal room found the authority too limited, and
   a single Chief of Staff (on a) general staff.

c. The Act was amended in 1949 specifically to forbid
   "shifted direction" but "not to merge them."

p. The Secretary of Defense was to give the services
   also for "separately administered" services.

r. It provided for "integrated" defense policies but
   was differently administered.

t. The precedent to the National Security Act of 1947
   was appropriately sufficient.

### III. DOD Organization 1944-1958

Staff existed.

b. The Air Force primarily measured under-
   Navy was opposed. The Air Force administrational objection to cent-
   bment stems. Much Congressional opposition to cent-
   bment existed.

s. Staff was the most robust segment.

A third service should be created and then a uniting
   based on air power, the air force should be amended.

t. Utilization would permit the development of a strategy
   advanced (in air).

b. In the 1950's, two main arguments for multination were
   separate make.

v. For over a hundred years after the Navy Department was
   created in 1903, it and the War Department went their
   separate ways.

### II. Historical Background

-S-

E. Hopping

Super. No. H-2

Paper No. H-3

E. Hobbing

-3-

6. Uniform budgetary and fiscal procedures were established.

C. The 1953 Reorganization

Recommendations of NAR Committee were largely accepted despite Navy and Congressional opposition, and service autonomy was reduced.

1. The Chairman of the JCS received more power to manage the Joint Staff.

2. Boards with equal service representation were abolished.

3. New Assistant Secretaries strengthened the hand of the Secretary of Defense.

IV. The 1958 Reorganization

A. Changes by Presidential Directive

1. Services are no longer executive agencies for unified commands.

2. Orders to unified commands from JCS are issued in the name of the Sec. Def.

3. JCS became assistants of Sec. Def. and are no longer independent.

4. The Joint Staff is integrated.

5. The authority of the Sec. Def. is strengthened by

a. More authority over funds

b. Elimination of interdepartmental committees

c. An Assistant Secretary of Defense centralizes legislative liaison.

d. The Sec. Def. passes on all promotions above two-star rank.

B. The Debate Over the Administration's Reorganization Bill

1. Administration Recommendations (AR 11958)

a. Full unity of operational commands under Sec. Def. and President.

b. All operational responsibility, including readjudication of functions, to Sec. Def.

resulting in functional, to Sec. Det.

p. All operational responsibility, including
and briefens.

I. Administration Recommendations (AR 1108)

two-star rank.

q. The Sec.Det. bases on all promotions above

justifative reason.

c. An Assistant Secretary of Defense centralises

p. Elimination of interdepartmental committees

s. More authority over funds.

2. The authority of the Sec.Det. is strengthened by

Independent.

3. JCS become assistants of Sec.Det. and are no longer

name of the Sec. Det.

S. Orders to multiple commands from JCS are issued in the

commande.

I. Services are no longer executive agencies for multiple
services by Presidential Directive

IV. The 1983 Reorganization

the Secretary of Defense.

3. The Assistant Secretary is strengthened by the hand of

appointed.

S. Burds with each service representation were

managing the Joint Staff.

I. The Chairman of the JCS received more power to

autonomy was reduced.

Despite Navy and Congressional opposition, and service
Recommendations of NAR Committee were largely accepted

C. The 1983 Reorganization

established.

c. Uniform, regulatory and fiscal procedures were

E. Hopping

Paper No. H-3

-3-

Paper No. H-3

E. Hobbing

-4-

c. A larger Joint Staff

d. More power of the Chairman of the JCS over the Joint Staff

e. Authority for a service chief to delegate his duties to the Vice-Chief

f. A vote for the Chairman of the JCS

g. Elimination of two Assistant Secretaries of Defense and one Assistant Secretary in the Departments

h. Appointment of a Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE)

1. Authority for Sec. Def., Deputy Sec. Def. and DDRE to sign procurement contracts

j. Authority for President to transfer officers, with their consent, from one service to another.

2. Congressional Reaction

a. A "bargaining" bill running sharply counter to President intent was introduced in both Houses to force the President to compromise.

b. Much Congressional opinion feared centralization in DoD and wanted to keep a Congressional voice in controlling roles and missions.

c. After negotiations with the White House, A House bill still contradicted Presidential wishes by

1) Preserving the integrity of the services

2) Limiting the Sec. Def.'s right to alter or abolish functions to anything that was not a major combatant function, and declaring that such a function was one that any of the service chiefs defined as such. A concurrent Congressional resolution could block change in a major combatant function.

3) Preserving the right of service chiefs to bypass the Sec. Def. in order to defend their cause before Congress.

d. After further negotiations with the White House

1) Point c 1) above was compromised

Paper No. H-3
E. Hobbing

-5-

2) On point c 2) above, the chiefs were not allowed to define a major combatant function but Congress retained a veto power over such changes

3) Service chiefs kept their freedom of speech

### C. Results of 1958 Reorganization - Directive and Bill

1. Unified Operational Commands report to Sec. Def.

2. Sec. Def. authority is strengthened by de-emphasis of services, right to change functions (subject to Congressional veto), new powers in officer nomination, control of R & D, etc.

3. The Chairman of JCS is stronger since he has a vote and runs an enlarged and integrated staff.

4. The roles and missions of the services remain substantially unchanged.

5. The services can still go to Congress on their own

6. The National Guard Bureau receives statutory status

### V. The Debate Continues

A. While the 1958 reorganization was another slight shift toward DoD centralization, the basic debate between unification vs federation goes on. The Air Force Association and the Navy League are as much at odds as ever. Congressional statutory language is also split between the two points of view.

B. The extreme increase of centralization in the future would logically entail the following steps

1. Power of Secretary of Defense

a. More discretion in funds, at expense of Congress

b. More freedom, at expense of Congress, to assign military functions

c. Full authority over DoD

2. The status of the Services

a. Consolidation under Sec. Def.

b. Elimination of separate services

c. Reorganization in functional units

Paper No. H-3
E. Hobbing

-7-

## 2. Unified Commands

The unity of the present unified commands is still undermined by the fact that the training, equipment and supply of the forces in the commands is administered by the separate services. In short, the unified commands policy and administration are separated. There should be "a gradual transition into a functional rearrangement of forces." This might begin with standardization of forms and procedures throughout the services and a revision of military education.

## 3. Defense Secretariat

"Deputy Secretaries of Defense for each of the major military missions" may ultimately be desirable.

(Note: the paper makes no comment on the future of the Assistant Secretaries.)

## 4. Defense Budget Procedures

Congress should be persuaded "to grant sums for a two-year period for general categories of military functions, leaving wide discretion for their allocation to the Defense Secretariat."

## 5. Congressional Organization

The "fractured committee system" in Congress "does not permit a unified approach to defense policy making." At least, Congress might create House and Senate Committees on Military Security which would unify many committee jurisdictions. At most, Congress might establish a Joint Committee on Military Security.

## 6. Military Procurement

This should be restudied to cut down on lead time.

PAPER NO. H-4

by: N. Hoepli

# SUMMARY
## DEFENSE DEPARTMENT BUDGET

Roswell L. Gilpatric
Cravath, Swaine & Moore
15 Broad Street
New York 5, New York

date of paper: February, 1960

### I. BASIC FACTS

#### A. Background

Defense spending has increased from an annual rate of $38 billion to $41 billion during fiscal years 1958-1960. The dollar increase does not necessarily correspond to an increase in military effectiveness. Due to inflation the defense dollar buys less. The growth of U.S.S.R. nuclear weapon capabilities makes our deterrent less reliable.

The R.B.F. Special Studies Panel II in late 1957 recommended a $3 billion annual successive addition to the $38 billion budgetary level. The Administration's FY'60 budget reached the level recommended by Panel II for FY'59. The delay resulted from:

1. DoD indecision on procurement of manned aircraft;

2. determination by the Defense Secretary in 1957 not to provide the Army with additional aircraft;

3. lead-time factors which, in the absence of a crash program prevent spending from rising by $3 billion in a single year.

#### B. Recent developments

1. The U. S. deterrent policy has become less reliable because of the growth of U.S.S.R. nuclear capabilities.

2. The need for a capability of "flexible response" is now clearer.

3. The "bomber-missile gap" of '60-'63 is more apparent.

4. Due to inflation the defense dollar will buy less in FY'61.

### II. GOVERNMENT POLICY

The current Administration policy of holding defense costs to the $41 billion level is based on three premises:

-2-

PAPER NO. H-4

1. Missiles can take over the strategic penetration role before the present generation of manned aircraft becomes obsolete.

2. Because of the diversity of U. S. strategic forces, we do not need as many first generation ICBMs as the U.S.S.R. will apparently possess by 1963.

3. With dual purpose forces it is not necessary to provide more conventional forces.

### III. PROPOSALS

A. Democratic Advisory Council (D.A.C.) in June 1959 recommended a $7.5 billion annual increase in the defense budget, apportioned as follows:

1. Acceleration of missile development. (Of this figure approximately $2 billion would be budgeted for the Air Force for gap-fillers, more ICBMs, extra jet tankers.)
   $3 billion

2. Five additional Army Divisions (at a cost of approximately $1.5 billion) and speed-up of Army modernization:
   $3 billion

3. Additional anti-submarine warfare measures
   $1 billion

4. Research and development
   $5 billion

The D.A.C. also recommended substitution of missiles for manned aircraft in air defense at a saving of $1 billion.

### B. Author's Proposals

1. Bomber vs. missile. The author takes issue with the D.A.C.'s emphasis on the missile phase of the "deterrent gap." He finds the bomber phase more significant for the following reasons:

(a) the probability that manned bombers will not be sup- planted in strategic penetration missions by the current generation of ICBMs until the advent of the Minuteman;

(b) the value of ICBMs may be less for a strike-second force such as ours than for the strike-first force of the U.S.S.R. because of the difficulty of locating the enemy's aircraft and missiles after the initial strike.

(c) the vulnerability of ICBM launching sites.

2. Rate of spending. The DoD budget for FY61 should be increased by $3 billion to a total of $44 billion. The author criticized the $7.5 billion annual increase recommended by the D.A.C.

-3-

PAPER NO. H-4

"In the present state of weapons systems technology with few production lines in being, it would be impossible to step up defense spending as steeply as suggested by certain of the D.A.C. proposals without the waste involved in crash programs."

3. Savings should be made by reducing personnel and installations, not by curtailing or abandoning expensive programs which the DoD has done. The author's recommendations:

(a) there should be no significant cuts in personnel at present;

(b) the surplus installation problem must be undertaken "on an across-the-board basis as a major Administration measure with the highest priority and full Presidential support."

## IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: FY'61 BUDGET

A. Additional defense allocations which would raise the DoD Budget for FY'61 by $3 billion to a total of $44 billion.

### 1. Air Force

(a) $1/4 billion more in FY'61 for the production of an additional squadron of B-58s. This would bring total procurement of B-58s, including 30 provided for in the Administration's budget proposal, to 132. An alternative, if the Air Force does not press for reinstatement of the B-70 program, would be to proceed with an improved model of the B-58, the B-58c, at a saving in time and money. For a squadron of super B-58s to be combat ready by '63, $300-500 million would have to be spent during FY'61.

(b) $1/4 billion to double the production rate and the inventory of Minuteman missiles by mid-'63 - with a total inventory of 300 missiles.

(c) $1/2 billion (in addition to the $90 million already in the program) to put SAC's B-52s on airborne alert beginning in mid-'61. In FY'62 and subsequent years $1 billion a year must be made available. 15,000 military personnel would have to be added to the Air Force manning ceiling.

### 2. Navy

(a) $1/4 billion more in FY'61 for the production of 6 more Polaris submarines (in addition to the 12 already programmed). The total cost of the additional 6 submarines would be $975 million.

(b) $1/4 billion more to improve our capabilities in anti-submarine warfare.

-4-

PAPER NO. H-4

3. Army

(a) $1/2 billion for equipment modernization in FY'61.

(b) $1/4 billion for additional air lift capacity.

(c) $1/4 billion for initial production in the Nike-Zeus anti-missile defense program.

(Note: These increases would not mean the delivery of additional airlift units or anti-missile missiles because of lead time factors.

4. DoD: $1/2 billion in FY'61 to accelerate military R & D.

B. Savings: "No part of this increase could be offset by immediate cost savings of major consequence not already taken into account in formulating the Administration budget proposal."

C. A $1/2 billion program of non-military defense should be undertaken in FY'61, including $200 million for research and planning and $300 million primarily for a system of improvised fallout shelters outside large cities. (Cf. Rand Corp. Report R-322-RC, 7/1/58.)

D. The Administration should formulate a program to reduce surplus installations and eventually cut back personnel as Air Force and Naval air units require less manpower.

PAPER NO. I-1
by: J. F. Carter

# SUMMARY
## SCIENCE
### SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
#### NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT

Author Unattributed

Date of Paper: December, 1959

This report consists of a number of related essays written over a 2-year period, rather than a unified treatment of the subject. It coincides with Paper I-3 in recommending the development of limited ("clean") nuclear weapons. The authorship is unattributed but the nature of his reports indicates a high degree of official responsibility in this field.

## I. Validity of British Concept for On-Site Inspection
(August 26, 1959)

a. Only on-site inspection can determine fact of underground nuclear test.

b. No one could investigate <u>all</u> underground shocks. (earthquakes)

c. Random inspection would deter would-be violator.

d. Mathematical analysis of chance of detection (of chances in 100,000) shows this assumption to be illusory.

e. Danger of exposing negotiations over number of inspections to expert Soviet haggling.

f. Only practical (detectible) proposal is Eisenhower's ban on atmospheric tests.

## II. U. S. vs Soviet Nuclear Weapon Capabilities

A. U. S. lead over Soviet slight or non-existent: Soviet would not propose complete ban otherwise.

1. U. S. lead might be illusory.

2. Opposition to tests a temporary manoeuvre.

3. Seek to stop U. S. nuclear weapons in tracks.

4. Possible Soviet desire to ease world tensions.

C. Situation is Improving

1. Air Force regaining control over SAC.

2. Army has consolidated its atomic weapons and missiles under competent young general.

3. JCS atomic team now engaging in "Rube Goldberg" thinking.

D. Development of "Universal" Weapon a Goal

Adaptable to bomb, rocket or missile

Adjustable to high or low yield and radio-
active contamination,

Medium weight and size,

Other stimulating possibilities: "shaped"
atomic explosives, burst which minimizes
lethal radiation, very high altitude bursts, etc.

V. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

(Note: This is the most immediately useable section of this report.)

1. No small nuclear weapons available due to high priority assigned to other nuclear weapons.

2. Small weapons represent heavy and expen-
sive use of atomic materials. Need for
intensive scientific research in this field.

3. Small fusion weapons are possible, can avoid some of horror involved in large weapons and prevent all-out nuclear war.

No limited war can be won against an enemy
using nuclear weapons if the other side
does not. (Cf. Poison gas, bacteriolog-
ical warfare, etc.)

No way to guarantee that enemy will not
use nuclear weapons in a limited war.

4. It is foolhardy to enter conventional limited war without a tactical nuclear back-up. Therefore, no logical excuse for failing to develop flexible and discriminate nuclear weapons.

a. They would be ideal to give our Allies.

b. Present Soviet propaganda offensive effectively deters their development.

c. Way out of present psychological straitjacket and Soviet blackmail.

## VI. Nth Nation Problem (Aug. 13, 1959)

### A. We cannot stop the spread of nuclear weapons

1. We have lost our initial monopoly through parallel advance of worldwide science.

2. Natural incentives strong for nuclear weapons, a sign of virility. France, Sweden, etc.

3. Science will continue to develop.

Peaceful reactors will produce atomic materials.

Control impossible.

4. Cost will decline, cessation of testing will not be universal.

5. We could only slow the trend, not halt it.

### B. We should not try to stop the trend

1. Our allies would resent it,

Because of our air of superiority or suspicion

Because they would be forced into costly programs.

2. Allied Possession of Nuclear Weapons could enhance deterrence of Soviets.

Virtual certainty of atomic war.

Enable Allies to resist nuclear blackmail.

Share moral responsibility with Allies.

3. Sharing would accelerate nuclear development and cooperation with allies.

- 7 -

4. Military

Clean weapons reduce area and amount of contamination of target areas.

Facilitate military use of such areas.

C. Objections and Justification

(Note: As with V. C above, this is a series of straw men knocked flat by logic. It is of little practical value.)

VII. Present Situation

1. Soviet stress dangers of nuclear holocaust, and press for nuclear disarmament.

2. International balance of power is shifting to the Soviet.

- nuclear blackmail

- Soviets will avoid all-out attack on U. S., a "Dunkirk" with U. S. troops, etc.

3. Western governments do not recognize actual situation.

- Some western nations aid Soviet aims.

- Western nations fear to use nuclear weapons, yet will not pay for possible alternatives.

4. Khrushchev's attitude, etc., gives evidence of these facts.

- he believes balance of power in his favor.

- peril of over-boldness as with Hitler.

- no sign of Western determination.

- need for public education.

5. Over-all Conclusions

a. A nuclear war cannot be limited.

b. Only minor improvements in military nuclear capability will come from further testing.

c. Continued testing increases fall-out which threatens health of present and future generations.

VIII. U. S. SHOULD OPPOSE BAN ON OUTER SPACE TESTING

1. Soviets admit tests can avoid detection.

2. U. S. scientists recommend tests in outer space and underground.

3. Ban vitiates Western principle for assured and adequate inspection to police agreements.

4. To compromise principle in outer space, weakens principle for atmospheric testing, etc.

5. For tactical bargaining purposes we should reserve our position.

IX. Dangers of Stopping Tests During Prolonged Negotiations

A. Soviet tactic of long-drawn negotiations.

1. Focus attention on nuclear weapons.

2. Stimulate unwise Western moves through boredom, frustration, dissension.

3. Support Soviet thesis that no inspection needed to end tests.

4. Leaves Soviet free to test at will.

B. Clearly to Soviet advantage to drag out talks.

1. Little they could gain by swift agreement.

2. Western resumption of testing could expedite agreement.

Paper No. I-2

by: E. Hobbing

# SUMMARY
## SCIENCE
### GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE

Dr. Chalmers Sherwin
Department of Physics
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

Date of paper: December, 1959

## I. The Definition of Military R & D

Military R & D is the government managed process by which science and technology are applied to the discovery and development of new weapons and weapons systems.

R & D requires about 10% of the total military budget.

R & D Proceeds in three stages:

1. <u>Basic research</u> to discover new principles, like nuclear fission. This absorbs 2% of the current R & D budget. The cost of mistakes is <u>very small</u>.

2. <u>Exploratory development</u>, such as the building and testing of "working models" of new weapons. This absorbs about 8% of the current R & D budget. The cost of mistakes is <u>relatively small</u>.

3. <u>Development for production</u>. The testing of military prototypes to discover the best way to manufacture operational weapons. This absorbs about 90% of current R & D budgets. If development for production does not lead to a practical new weapon, great sums and years of time may be lost. Thus the cost of mistakes is <u>very large</u>.

## II. Basic Facts

1. <u>In many areas</u>, R & D now provides <u>the principal</u> basis of military power. In the future, R & D will become <u>dominant in every area</u> of warfare.

2. R & D is highly <u>complex</u>, and will become more so.

3. Development of new weapons is increasingly expensive. This creates a trend to fewer but very expensive weapons systems.

Weapons systems. This creates a trend to fewer but very expensive. 3. Development of new weapons to increasefully.

no.

S. R & D is a highly complex, and will become more

component in every area of warfare.

J. In many areas, R & D now provides the principle of military power. In the future, R & D will become

II. Basic Facts

To: This the cost of mistakes is very large.
practical new weapon, great arms and tons of time may be
brought. It development for production does not lead to a
operations! weapons. This search about 60% of current R & D
military prototypes to discover the best way to manufacture
3. Development for production. The testing of
is relatively small.

S. Exploratory development, such as the puffing
and testing of working models of new weapons. This search
about 3% of the current R & D budget. The cost of mistakes
is relatively small.

Budget. The cost of mistakes is very small.
J. Basic research to discover new principles, like
R & D Proceeds in three stages:

Budget.

and development of new weapons and weapons systems.
by which science and technology are applied to the discovery
Military R & D is the government managed process

Irrane, Illinois
University of Illinois
Department of Physics
Dr. Charles Sherwin

Date of paper: December, 1959

GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE
SCIENCE

SUMMARY

by: E. Hopfing
Paper No. 1-5

Paper No. I-2

-2-

4. R & D is advancing very rapidly, and will speed up. In as little as five years, a weapons system can be developed that can change the balance of power.

5. Military R & D expenditures in recent years have been a constant fraction of the defense budget.

6. The average 10-year span that it takes in the US for a new weapons system to go from the idea stage into service use is excessive. The delay is due to poor management. Development time in the USSR averages only about five years.

7. Military R & D management is expensive, badly compartmented and without continuity.

a) R & D management costs $250 million a year, or 6% of the R & D budget.

b) The R & D top echelon consists of civilians who largely lack scientific, government and military know-how. Next come layers of military managers. Way at the bottom are the scientist-"doers." All along the line are part-time advisory committees.

c) R & D personnel is constantly shifting around inside the structure or in and out of it (to business, science, military line duty, etc).

ARPA was the one organization that tried to give the scientific community both management and operational responsibility. The military fought it strenuously, and now Army Brig.-Gen. A. W. Betts has taken it over as director.

### III. Obvious Defect in R & D Management

1. Development time is twice as long as necessary (see II-6 above).

2. R & D management is top-heavy -- scientists do not have enough authority and non-scientific managers interfere too much in details.

3. Basic research is not supported with enough generosity, stability or imagination. The accumulated capital of scientific ideas that has been exploited for military purposes since 1940 is about exhausted and new ideas are missing. There is no known technique for defense against ballistic missiles -- if an aggressor finds the technique first, he can take over the world at will.

Paper No. I-2

4. Exploratory development is not properly supported unless it is "tied" to an already approved weapons system. Big rockets, needed today for space, were ruled out five years ago because they did not seem necessary for ICBM's.

5. Development for production goes on concurrently with exploratory development, instead of following it. Contrary to appearances, this method wastes time and money rather than saving it, because the production development becomes plagued by a great deal of guess work.

6. There is too much project review.

7. The normal rotation of military officers is incompatible with good R & D management.

8. Turnover of civilians in R & D is too high.

9. The Budget Bureau exercises excessive control over R & D programs.

## IV. Fundamental Defects of R & D

### 1. The people in R & D

a) Civilian and military managers understand too little of the scientific issues involved. The simpler "inventor's shop" technology of the past was comprehensible to managers with a good general education. The sophisticated "intellectual" technology of the present and future is much harder to understand -- and more crucial.

b) Scientists generally do not understand government management and do not want responsibility for it.

c) A solution to the problem of manager-scientist co-operation may be found along the following lines:

1) a better scientific understanding among the top managers -- and the Budget Bureau

2) a transfer of management responsibility for basic research and exploratory development to scientists

Paper No. I-2

-4-

3) bigger and stabler budgets for <u>basic research</u>, with support of established <u>people and institutions</u>, not "project proposals." (Such budgets would still be very small because basic research is cheap.)

4) more money for <u>exploratory development</u>
under scientific management.
This work should be made <u>profitable</u> in
<u>its own right</u> so that its costs do not
<u>have to be recouped by production contracts.</u>
Such work would produce assortments of
"<u>working models</u>" from which sound, cost-
<u>saving production development choices</u>
can be made. Since it guards against
<u>expensive error</u>, the system of completing
<u>exploratory development before</u> making a
<u>production development choice</u> would
<u>minimize time-consuming reviews</u>.

5) by the foregoing devices, replenish the capital of new ideas and cut the enormous waste that comes when exploratory and production development are done concurrently.

2. <u>The bigness of government</u>

<u>Production development</u>, being so costly and involving so many <u>tactical and strategic considerations</u>, is the hardest to streamline. However, if research and exploratory development are more creative and efficient, the choices for production development are clarified and its administration is simplified.

V. <u>Current Government Action</u>

The government is trying to get better management of
the scientific effort by a series of steps, but there also
remain significant obstacles.

1. <u>Influx of scientists into DOD</u> at <u>high civilian</u>
levels, i.e. <u>service assistant secretaries</u>, Dr. York, etc.
However, competence at <u>high level</u> is <u>no remedy</u> for lack of
competence at <u>lower levels</u>.

2. ARPA has done good work in <u>research</u> and <u>exploratory development</u>, but has added to top-heaviness of management.

Paper No. I-2

-5-

3. A proliferation of high-level committees has sometimes saved much money by expert advice, but also made management more unwieldy.

4. Civilian salaries in R & D are still too low.

5. Among the military, no significant increase in technical competence. New scientific trainees are offset by men returning to live duty.

6. Fewer civilian scientists in military R & D live organizations.

7. No reduction of top-heavy R & D management.

8. The only major effort to increase the effectiveness of the working level was when the Air Force hired Ramo-Wooldridge to supervise Atlas, Titan and Thor. The results of this experiment are not fully evaluated.

## VI. R & D Management in the USSR

1. Technicians and scientists are given high-level civilian and military management posts.

2. Soviet Air Force technical officers, after operational experience, get a five-year course in scientific studies.

## VII. Recommendations For Public Policy

1. Be sure principal Secretaries in DOD know scientific and technical management. Avoid men from consumer-oriented industries (Wilson, McElroy).

2. Set up a new scientist-run division of DOD that reports directly to the OSD and handles research and exploratory development. This division should compete with the service research and exploratory development units and be funded as they are ($400 million a year). This division must be divorced from operational responsibilities. Employment in it must carry scientific prestige.

3. Greatly raise the salary of the Secretary of Defense and higher-level DOD personnel, military and civilian, (and elsewhere in government). If 1,000 salaries were raised $50,000 each, the net cost after taxes would be marginal but such salaries would attract top people.

4. Make military services greatly expand scientific education of officers.

Equation of Officers.

4. Make military services presently expand scientific

but such salaries would attract top people.
$20,000 each, the net cost after taxes would be marginal
(and somewhere in government). If 1,000 salaries were raised
defense and higher-level DOD personnel, military and civilian.

if we must carry scientific pretence.
divided from operations/commodities. Employment in
research and exploratory development units and be funded as
development. This division should compete with the service
reports directly to the OOD and handle research and exploratory

5. Set up a new scientific-inn division of DOD that

VII. Recommendations for Public Policy

operational experience. Get a five-year course in scientific
training.

S. Set up Air Force technical officers' after
civilian and military management boards.

I. Technical and scientists are given high-level

VI. H & D Management in the USAR

Woolridge to appraise Affairs, Titan and Thor. The results
based on the working level use when the Air Force fired Remo-

8. The only major effort to increase the effective-

I. No reduction of job-heavy H & D management.

five organizations.

G. Set up civilian scientists in military H & D

men returning to five duty.

technical competence. New scientific trainees are raised by

2. Among the military, no significant increase in

4. Civilian salaries in H & D are still too low.

management more firmly.

sometimes saved when money by expert advice, but also made

3. V. Profilization of higher-level committees has

-2-

Paper No. 1-8

Paper No. I-3

by: E. Hobbing

# SUMMARY
## GOVERNMENT & SCIENCE
### Military Technology

Date of paper: Nov. 4, 1959

## Author's Premises

The author of the paper on Military Technology proceeds from the premises that all-out nuclear war would not mean "the end of civilization" and that with proper civil defense "suffering need not be much greater than in past wars." This boldness leads him to call for broad and rapid technological development as a deterrent to war, rather than as something that will hasten the oncoming of war and make war more devastating. With his emphasis on the role of civilian populations in future wars, whether all-out or limited, the author is in favor of scientific research and development that affects civilian morale -- as space successes and failures do -- as well as research with purely military applications.

The author believes that the Russians probably have numerous technological achievements that we do not know about.

## Nuclear Weapons

### a. Status of the science

(1) Megaton explosions can be produced by small warheads that bombers and missiles can carry.

(2) Nuclear explosives of less than a kiloton can be produced for tactical and guerrilla use.

(3) It takes less nuclear material per explosive than previously estimated. Stockpiles can therefore be bigger.

(4) The possibilities of producing cleaner bombs are constantly increasing.

### b. Soviet progress

(1) In big explosives, Soviet progress is known to be abreast of that of the U. S.

Paper No. I-3

-2-

(2) For small explosives, detection is inadequate. It may be presumed that the Soviets are abreast of us there too.

### c. Military Uses of Nuclear Weapons

(1) The use of the big explosives by the U. S. can only be for deterrence of a Soviet all-out war, because we will never strike the first blow. This means our counterforce must be invulnerable.

(2) Our massive deterrent will not prevent Soviet limited aggression. If we threaten to enlarge the war, the Soviet massive deterrent will stop us from doing so.

(3) To meet Soviet limited aggression, we need limited nuclear weapons. Our massive deterrent will keep the Soviets from enlarging the war.

(4) Limited nuclear war is possible. The nuclear weapons can be discriminating. Since limited nuclear war requires dispersion and does not require massive mobilization, population centers can be spared, and only military concentrations attacked.

### d. Nuclear Weapons Development

(1) Nuclear weapons can be made lighter, and thus more mobile, to make our all-out war counterforce invulnerable.

(2) Nuclear weapons must be made so light that eventually a single person can deliver them, in guerrilla war.

(3) The speed with which nuclear weapons can be made ready for firing, and the safety with which they can be handled, must be improved.

(4) Nuclear weapons must be made continually cleaner, to reduce fall-out from big explosions, to protect our own troops from contamination in limited war.

(5) Since we need a great variety and number of nuclear weapons, we must make them cheaper.

Paper No. I-3

-3-

e. Nuclear Test Moratoriums

(1) As long as one considers nuclear weapons to be appropriate only to one huge blast of destruction, and ignores the need for a refined, mobile counterforce or for limited war weapons, one can stop tests. This is the present U. S. official attitude.

(2) Tests above one kiloton in the atmosphere can be detected, identified and policed. Smaller Soviet shots will go undetected without inspection on site.

(3) Underground explosions above one kiloton cannot be distinguished from earthquakes without on-site inspection. Underground explosions up to one hundred kilotons can probably be hidden. The U. S. needs much more knowledge of the hiding and detection of underground shots.

(4) Space shots up to half a megaton can be concealed. Policing of space shots is impeded by the lag in U. S. rocket technology.

(5) Thus an atmospheric test ban alone has no serious effect on nuclear weapons development, and does prevent fallout.

(6) But a complete test moratorium, underground and in space too, which the U. S. obeyed and the Soviets violated, could add an atomic gap to the missile gap.

(7) There should be international exploration of the hiding and detection of tests.

(8) A test ban without inspection will keep other free nations from joining the nuclear club, while permitting the lawless dictatorial regimes to join.

Paper No. I-3

-4-

Non-Nuclear Weapons of Limited Warfare

(1) Little progress has been made in this field since World War II. Therefore predictions must be vague.

(2) Possible developments in conventional weapons may come in increasing accuracy of fire, the use of lighter materials, and tactical rocketry.

(3) Chemical agents may well be the least obnoxious of any weapons. They can kill quickly or not at all; they can temporarily disable without any bad aftereffects. Much more U. S. research should be done in this field.

(4) Biological warfare agents are indiscriminate, slow in effect, and hard to improve without repugnant experiments on humans. They can be made more discriminating; their slowness may be useful against enemy concentrations that remain in place. However, research on biological warfare should be pursued mainly as a defensive precaution.

(5) Radiological warfare can be used to contaminate ground that one wishes to deny to the enemy. But where it incapacitates, it also kills. It is not a good major method of defense.

Means of Delivery

(1) The most important naval vessel of the future will be the submarine. Nuclear subs can hide, stay submerged indefinitely and travel faster than surface ships. Nuclear subs should get smaller reactors, more automatic operation, smaller size, cheaper construction, more silent running by direct conversion of reactor energy into electricity. Thus they could be used in a retaliatory force carrying nuclear rockets, or as limited war supply engines towing underwater cargo hulls. Better, cheaper sonar and smaller, faster surface craft that can carry nuclear rockets should also be developed.

Paper No. I-3

Space and Arms

(1) Satellites may obtain intelligence and be used for communications. They can carry nuclear explosives, although delivery problems here are acute. Satellites can obtain weather data of decisive importance to military operations.

(2) Beyond satellites, the author says "I believe that this wider field of space travel should be pursued for the purpose of its intrinsic interest. Otherwise we may notice in 1970 that the mistake of neglecting rocket development in the late 1940's has been repeated ten years later when we failed to pursue a vigorous space program."

Electronics

(1) Transistors and short-range radio and radio relay stations should be improved.

(2) Radio communication can be disturbed by exploding nuclear weapons in the ionosphere. The continuation of atmospheric testing would give us more information about this phenomenon.

(3) Despite the progress of electronics, "active anti-missile defense is not practical." The combination of enemy missile capability, decoy capability and counter-measure capability shows this.

(4) However, electronic defense research is useful to show us what defensive systems our own missiles will meet, and to keep our eyes open for surprise possibilities in anti-missile defense.

Civil Defense

The author makes a very important point, in line with his thesis that all-out war need not "end civilization as we know it," by pleading for adequate civil defense as a "most effective deterrent" to war. He says "effective preparation (for civil defense) on our part will make it clear to the Russians that an all-out blow will not break our will to survive and to fight for our type of society."

The author's detailed suggestions on civil defense cover the total recuperation of society. He believes in stockpiling not only food, but also spare machine tools, etc. He believes in preparing ahead of time emergency political decrees on rationing, price control, etc.

Paper No. I-3

Science in the Cold War

(1) Oceanography, meteorology and the exploration of the universe are very important. The oceans are the cradle of life. Weather may soon be totally observed and possibly manipulated. The observation of the universe has propaganda value.

(2) The use of atomic explosions to work civilian good, like diverting streams and digging tunnels, is a fine idea in the Cold War.

(3) In the U. S. we should recognize that we are losing the scientific race. Since we are behind, we might as well exchange scientific information that is no longer secret to the Soviets with our free world partners.

(4) The most important spur to scientific achievement would be for political leadership to dispel the gloomy notion that scientific progress can only lead to more horrible war. If science can again be understood as a deterrent to war and an improvement on the human condition, it will flourish -- and so will its beneficiaries.

////

ADDENDUM TO PAPER NO. I-3

Additional comments by author of paper

January 11, 1960

GOVERNMENT AND SCIENCE

The reason for clean explosives for peaceful purposes are, I believe, quite obvious. If, for instance, radioactive contamination is produced during the digging of a canal, evacuation may become necessary for a period of weeks, possibly of months. This is a nuisance that need not be decisive. But coupled with the great psychological effects connected with fallout, contamination might turn out to be a major political obstacle.

Your real question probably relates to clean bombs rather than to clean peaceful explosives. Here again there are two considerations.

First, let us consider the case of an all-out attack (probably a retaliatory act) by us on Russia. In a massive attack of this kind radioactivity from dirty bombs will needlessly kill many millions of people in the attacked country. What is worse ---radioactivity from these explosives may kill many people, again possibly amounting to millions in a neutral country. This we may wish to accept as a consequence of a situation, which in any case is dreadful. But I do not believe that it is justifiable to accept this situation provided it is possible to avoid it without weakening our retaliatory power in an essential manner. Whether or not this can be done, I do not know. For some types of nuclear explosives we can greatly reduce the radioactive contribution. Since the problem of retaliation is in any case difficult, it is not clear to me whether the additional limitation of clean retaliation can be accepted. It certainly seems to me important to do everything in our power to make our retaliatory capability as clean as possible.

The other side of the same question is the use of clean nuclear explosives as tactical weapons. In this case the total amount of radioactivity is not great and we need not worry about worldwide effects, about killing people in neutral countries, or even about very widespread destruction in the embattled countries. At the same time there are important effects on the battle field itself.

Immediately following a nuclear blast by a tactical weapon, we can have strictly localized deposition of quite high activity. This will be the case when the nuclear weapon was burst on the ground. The position of this deposition will depend on the wind direction. In many cases it may endanger our own men.

Radioactive contamination on the battle field may cause some damage and a great amount of alarm even after the battle is over. While the activity released from a tactical bomb is quite small compared to that of a megaton bomb, effective use of tactical bombs may require that many thousands of these latter should be employed. In this case contamination of the battle areas may become in the long run a somewhat serious problem.

Altogether, I would not rate the cleaning up of tactical weapons as a job comparable in importance with the cleaning up of the strategic weapons. Nevertheless it is a job worth doing.

The main task in connection with tactical weapons is in my opinion not to achieve complete cleanliness, but to adapt them to the battle requirements: make their delivery easy, their costs small, and their effect selective. For the last purpose, cleanliness is desirable. So is achieving the proper range of destruction and also the introduction of methods whereby the invasion force can be damaged without unnecessary destruction to local property.

Your second question is much more difficult for me to answer. Space is a more recent subject and to evaluate its potentialities is correspondingly more difficult.

About some of the purely scientific possibilities I have had some thoughts and discussions. In all probability, so have you. Perhaps the two most interesting topics are the observatory outside the earth's atmosphere and the exploration of life or traces of life on other planets.

But this is not what you are interested in. You want to know, it seems to me, in what military way we might suffer. There are a few things in this field that one can foresee at the present time.

Comprehensive weather observations from satellites might become extremely important. This is particularly true if such satellite observations are coupled with well-supported general research in meteorology. All this may result in the course of time in as ambitious an undertaking as the influencing of weather. Satellites are only a link in this chain. They may turn out to be an important link.

Another function of satellites is connected with communications. The satellites move in the belt and can explore the belt in which there are located the electrons and ions which reflect our radio signals. By exploring this belt a better general understanding of the communication problems can be obtained. Furthermore, local observations may be valuable in connection with more prompt and complete information about the day-to-day or even minute-to-minute

behavior of this ionosphere. We believe that the eventual source
of ionospheric disturbances is located in the sun. The satellites
will certainly contribute to solar research and thereby indirectly
to ionospheric and communication research also.

The satellites themselves can be used as units which transmit
messages. Thus a sufficiently great number of satellites might
revolutionize the whole problem of communications. This is
certainly true in the positive sense in that the satellites can
be used in such a manner that more messages can be more completely
transmitted over arbitrarily great distances.

The influence of satellites on communications may also be
present in a negative sense. Satellites may be used to jam com-
munications in a more or less selective manner. It is also pos-
sible for satellites to degrade in a general manner the means of
communication to various extents. A dramatic demonstration of
this possibility was given by our two big nuclear explosions above
the atmosphere in the Pacific which interfered with communications
in the Pacific for several hours.

Satellites have been considered for the purpose of military
intelligence. There is no doubt that they can be so used. The
information obtained from satellites can make valuable contri-
butions in alerting us to new construction projects or other mas-
sive undertakings within the Soviet Union. Satellites can also
be used to give information to either side about any sudden change.
I would not be surprised if the use of the satellites could be-
come extremely important in connection with detecting and possibly
foiling a surprise attack.

All of this means that satellites and instruments which are
to be used on satellites must be developed vigorously. There is
in particular one additional field which I want to single out for
attention. This is the possibility of using satellites as plat-
forms from which to launch weapons.

In one respect this particular application does not seem to
me exceptionally promising. One can, of course, not use a satel-
lite merely to "drop" a nuclear bomb. In order to aim a bomb from
the satellite to the ground, you have to provide quite a bit of
deceleration. This takes an amount of energy similar to the amount
needed to lift an object into a satellite orbit. Since this energy,
however, has to be delivered in a somewhat inaccessible spot, this
particular method of bomb delivery does not seem promising. There-
fore I would imagine that satellites will not be appropriate for
bomb delivery.

On the other hand, satellites might conceivably be well a-
dapted to shoot down other satellites. I would not know whether
this will be actually the case and if so, what particular techniques

-4-

will be developed. To consider a specific idea: it is not incon-
ceivable that the Russians should put thousands of satellites into
orbit within a short period. This population of Russian satellites
might have all kinds of orbits so that any satellite which we put
up would then have an orbit not very different from some Russian
satellite orbits. These Russian satellites could then fire on
our satellites with small expenditure of energy.

The question of whether either side can establish a domination
of space and the corresponding question whether there is a defense
against spying by satellites depends on the means by which a satel-
lite can be destroyed by a weapon shot from the surface of the
earth. At first consideration this does not seem to be difficult
to accomplish. If on the other hand you put enough apparatus in-
to the satellite so that the satellite can sense the firing and
can evade the missile or, alternatively if the Russians send up
a sufficient number of decoys with the satellites, it may well turn
out that satellites will be able to maintain themselves in the face
of opposition from the ground.

Paper No. I-4

-3-

(g) These circumstances, taken together, give us a **slower rate of progress** than that of the Soviets and, unless corrected, promise to let the Soviet space lead grow. Under present programs, the U. S. can only hope to beat the Russians to a manned landing on the moon and to the development of space vehicles for meteorology, reconnaissance, etc. These accomplishments cannot compete politically or militarily with the successes that Sputniks and Luniks have already achieved, or with presently expectable Russian "firsts" in recovering a man from space, making the first manned flight around the moon, making the first successful planetary probe and interplanetary flight, etc.

### 3. How to Catch Up with the Soviets and Pass Them

(a) Under the best of circumstances, it will probably not be possible to develop effective space weapons systems in less than 15-20 years. It would therefore be unwise to try to leapfrog missile weapons systems. A policy decision should be taken to develop massive offensive and defensive missile systems in the next ten years. Meanwhile, space systems should also be energetically pursued to see if they promise any striking **technological breakthroughs** and to promote consistent development toward the possible space warfare beyond the missile age.

(b) Funding for space should be nearer the $69 billion figure for the next decade than the presently projected $31 billion.

(c) The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 should be modified to make military use of space as important as "peaceful" uses.

(d) The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 should be modified to establish co-equal military and civilian divisions within NASA, and to give the military generally a larger role in NASA.

In the Department of Defense, there should be established a unified command for all space research, development and operations.

PAPER NO. J-1a

E. Hobbing

-7-

# IV. HISTORY OF DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS 1945-1960

## A. The Baruch Plan, 1946

1. The U.S. proposed to the UN an international Atomic Development Authority. It would control all atomic production and nations would gradually give up their weapons stockpiles. Penalties not subject to UN veto would follow violations.

2. The Soviet counterproposal demanded

a. Prohibition of atomic weapons production.

b. Elimination of existing stocks.

c. No inspection.

d. No UN ownership of production facilities.

e. Punishment of violations by domestic action.

3. The UN vote on the U.S. plan was 40 to 6, with the Soviet bloc opposed.

## B. UN Commission on Conventional Armament, 1947

This commission made no progress. The U.S. was pushing its unilateral disarmament and the Soviet Union made only propaganda offers to disarm partially.

## C. UN Disarmament Commission, 1951-1954

This body, composed of the eleven Security Council members plus Canada, was supposed to consider atomic and conventional armament. (Truman in 1950 had declared that the two problems had to be handled together.) From 1951 to 1954, the UNDC did little because this was a period of most intensive weapons development, requiring re-evaluation of previous disarmament proposals.

PAPER NO. J-1a

E. Hobbing

-8-

## D. 1954 Western Proposals

1. The U.S. proposed to the UNDC that

a. An arms control organization, _operating under majority rule_, would conduct inspections without restraint.

b. Action on violations would be taken by the Security Council.

2. Britain and France proposed that

a. Nations pledge not to use mass destruction weapons except in self-defense.

b. Control mechanisms be set up.

c. Disarmament proceed in three stages

1) A freeze on military manpower and expenditures.

2) A 50% cut in conventional arms and cessation of nuclear arms production.

3) Another 50% cut in conventional arms, destruction of nuclear stockpiles and prohibition of nuclear arms production.

## E. 1955 Proposals

1. The USSR on May 10, 1955, proposed

a. Reduction of conventional forces to levels suggested earlier by the West -- U.S., USSR and China, 1,500,000 each, Britain and France, 650,000 each.

b. Staging of the reduction by

1) Freezing manpower and expenditures

PAPER NO. J-1a

E. Hobbing

-9-

2) A 50% cut and a nuclear ban.

3) Another 50% cut and destruction of nuclear stocks beginning halfway through the stage.

c. Establishment of rules on what armaments were permissible.

d. No inspection or control program.

2. The U.S. at the 1955 Geneva Summit proposed

a. Aerial inspection of the U.S. and USSR.

b. Bilateral exchange of military blueprints.

3. France at the Summit proposed close inspection of national military budgets.

4. Britain proposed mutual inspection of forces in Central Europe.

5. The USSR proposed stationary ground observers at key points.

6. The U.S. in the fall of 1955, in the person of Harold Stassen, said negotiations for warning against surprise attack had to precede other proposals.

F. 1956 Proposals

1. Stassen in April 1956 proposed to the UNDC

a. An exchange of missions between the U.S. and USSR to study inspection and control, and tests of such procedure in small areas in both countries.

b. A preparatory armaments regulation commission of the Big Four and Canada to

1) Work out troop reduction formulas.

2) Work out control and inspection plans.

PAPER NO. J-1a

E. Hobbing

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c. Thereafter there would be

1) an exchange of military blueprints.

2) a freeze on expenditures.

3) installation of the inspection and control system.

d. A permanent armaments regulation commission, would monitor the first phase of cutting back troops and reduction of atomic stockpiles.

2. The USSR at the UNDC called for

a. An immediate ban on nuclear tests (which the U.S. made contingent on "open skies").

b. Neutralization of Germany.

c. A cut back of forces in countries other than the Big Four and China to 150,000 (not 500,000 as the U.S. proposed). This would chiefly affect South Korea and Nationalist China.

3. In November 1956, the USSR called for a thin-out in Central Europe, to be verified by aerial inspection.

G. **1957 Proposals**

1. In January, the U.S. proposed to the UN General Assembly that

a. ICBM testing be conducted under international inspection. (The USSR said it needed its own ICBMs since it did not have foreign IRBM bases.)

b. Nuclear weapons stockpiles should be frozen and only production for peaceful purposes permitted (The USSR said inspection would be too cumbersome.)

PAPER NO. J-1a

E. Hobbing

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c. Advance notice should be given of nuclear tests and limited international observation established prior to an eventual total test ban (The USSR insisted on a total test ban -- five days later it exploded a hydrogen weapon.)

d. USSR and U.S. force levels be 2.5 million (The USSR argued for 1.5 million.)

e. Mutual early warning systems be set up, on a more limited basis than "open skies".

2. In March, five-power disarmament talks in London considered zones of inspection. They proposed zones included Europe, which caused Western European resentment.

3. In June, the Soviets proposed a 2-3 year nuclear test suspension. The U.S. in July offered a 10-month suspension.

4. In August, Dulles proposed Arctic inspection as a precondition of European inspection plan.

5. The London talks ended without agreement at the end of August. Meanwhile the USSR successfully test-fired an ICBM.

6. In September, a Western package plan was put before the UN, proposing

a. A two-year test ban

b. A cut-off on nuclear weapons output (The USSR objected)

c. Ground and air inspection against surprise attack

d. Curbs on space missiles

e. Manpower and money cuts.

PAPER NO. J-1a

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7. In October the USSR launched Sputnik I and the U.S. and USSR in the UN proposed rival disarmament plans. The U.S. plan included control of space devices, the USSR one did not. The U.S. made its plan contingent on a political settlement in Germany. The USSR suggested reduction of troops in Germany by one-third and dismantling of foreign bases.

H. 1958 Proposals

1. In January, Eisenhower proposed

a. Peaceful uses of outer space.

b. Limits on nuclear arms production.

c. An indefinite test ban, with control.

d. Reduction of conventional arms.

e. Measures against surprise attack.

2. In March, Dulles declared the test ban was not important, but cessation of nuclear weapons output was.

3. On March 30, the USSR unilaterally suspended testing.

4. In July and August, Eastern and Western scientists discussed nuclear test control and agreed on the feasibility of an inspection system of 180 stations around the world.

5. On October 1, the USSR resumed nuclear testing.

6. In December, U.S., British and USSR negotiations at Geneva on cessation of nuclear test agreed:

a. Any nation can join a test ban treaty.

b. A control organization should be set up.

c. The control organization would be run by a seven-nation commission (but the functions and powers of the organization were not defined.)

PAPER NO. J-12

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7. Also in December, the Geneva meeting on surprise attack collapsed.

I. 1959 Proposals

1. The U.S. in January declared that new evidence on the difficulty of policing underground tests cast doubt on the adequacy of the 180-station system.

2. The Geneva test ban conference resumed from April to August. The Soviets insisted the three powers had to agree for "on-site" inspections. They then changed to a quota plan of inspectors and inspections, which the U.S. accepted in principle provided the quota was set on the basis of scientific considerations.

3. In October, Khrushchev proposed sweeping disarmament at the UN.

4. Selwyn Lloyd proposed

a. A test ban agreement at Geneva.

b. Studies toward control of nuclear production and conventional forces cuts.

c. A ban on weapons for war and a ban on the military uses of space.

5. On December 29, Eisenhower announced the U.S. reserved the right to resume nuclear testing.

J. Prospects for 1960

1. A new comprehensive U.S. disarmament program.

2. More fruitless Geneva test ban talks.

3. 10-power UN disarmament negotiations in March.

4. Lodge-Kuznetsov talks on an Outer Space Committee.

Paper No. J-3
by: E. Hobbing

# SUMMARY
## INTERNATIONAL PAPERS
### THE STATUS OF THE COLD WAR

Col. William R. Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Room 203, 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Date of Paper: December, 1959

This paper contains a series of observations on Communist attitudes and tactics in the Cold War, and U.S. responses to them. It does not describe the "status" of the Cold War in the sense of analyzing what stage, between its past and its future, the Cold War has presently reached.

## I. Tensions and Co-Existence

We are in a period of "relaxation of tensions." Tensions have been relaxed by the Soviet Union that created them in the first place.

The purpose of a Soviet "relaxation of tensions" is to weaken Western resistance to Communism.

Intermittent Soviet "relaxations of tension" are designed to make the long-range concept of "co-existence" attractive to the West.

The more the Communists succeed in selling the idea of "co-existence," the more they succeed in persuading the West that such "co-existence" must be on Communist terms. Under the impact of the "co-existence" concept, the West has largely abandoned ideas of "rolling back the Iron Curtain," pursuing a "forward strategy" or even practicing "containment" of Communism. "Co-existence" has bred widespread Western inclination to disengagement, etc.

This paves the way for Communist attainment of its ultimate objectives. In Warsaw in April 1955, Khrushchev said: "We must realize that we cannot co-exist eternally, or for a long time--(Eventually) we must push them (i.e the Western nations) to their grave".

## II. The Ideological Area

Soviet Communism as an ideology is beginning to rot in Russia and Europe where it originated, although it retains considerable appeal in underdeveloped regions.

Paper No. J-3

- 2 -

Khrushchev's "liberalization is an attempt to revitalize
Communist ideology without changing its fundamentals.

However, the Soviet Union is increasingly relying on
power strategy instead of ideological persuasion.

The Soviet Union will not make any significant con-
cessions in the ideological area, nor will it allow free
thought in the U.S.S.R.

The primary target of Soviet ideological attack will
continue to be private property, which is the bedrock
of democratic freedom and strength.

(Note: this last assertion is difficult to reconcile
with increasing British "softness" toward the U.S.S.R.
amid mounting British prosperity, or with American budget
consciousness).

### III. The Communist Price for Prolonged Co-Existence

1) Dissolution of free world military alliances and base systems.

2) Western acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe.

3) Western evacuation of West Berlin.

4) A free hand in Asia for Red China.

### IV. How the Soviets View U.S.

The Soviets believe we are declining in strength. At
the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev declared that wars
were no longer inevitable because imperialism was no
longer an all-embracing world system.

President Eisenhower's profession of peaceful intent at
Geneva in 1955 helped convince the Soviets that we were
soft.

### V. Soviet Options

The Soviets can either:

1) Continue their present armaments race, political aggression, etc., or

2) Shift their emphasis to the production of more consumer goods in the U.S.S.R. and the more rapid industrialization of China.

3) Launch all-out attack

Paper No. J-3

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Khrushchev is probably wavering between these three courses.

At the present, there is not enough internal or external pressure on the Kremlin to compel abandonment of the first course. However, the Kremlin probably knows it cannot maintain the Iron Curtain indefinitely. Attempts to raise living standards in the U.S.S.R. may be designed to keep the Soviet people in line even after the Iron Curtain is raised.

The test of whether Khrushchev wants to pursue the second course will be whether he offers the West a reasonable settlement of the German issue and an enforceable disarmament agreement.

Even under the second course, however, Moscow-directed subversion would continue. And the second course can be called off at any time in favor of a return to more militant Communist policy.

As for the third course, Soviet military doctrine is full of exhortations against letting a good opportunity pass. The maximum point of the missile gap might afford the Soviets a great temptation to attack. On the other hand, Soviet doctrine also warns against military adventurism and against jeopardizing the Soviet base of world revolution.

## VI. Communist Opportunities and Obstacles

1) In South America, Communist strength has grown considerably in the last 25 years and Communist pressure will expand. Take-over attempts may be made. Or Communist strength may be used to force governments into pro-Soviet neutralism.

2) In the Middle East, Communist strength built up during the last decade is meeting growing resistance.

3) Indonesia is heavily Red-infiltrated and any significant further increase of Communist strength would lead to a take-over attempt.

4) In India, a major increase in Red strength would probably still not suffice to permit a take-over attempt.

5) Africa will be strongly infiltrated.

6) A major Communist objective in Asia will be to detach Japan from the U.S. and gradually align it with Peking and Moscow. The turning point in this effort may come if Japan recognizes Red China over U.S. objection.

Paper No. J-3

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# VII. Short-Term Prospects of Communist Change

The Soviet regime confronts several major challenges:

1. Decentralization of authority without loss of control.

2. Improvement of agriculture.

3. Abolition of forced labor.

However, no matter what responses are made to these challenges, the Soviet system will remain essentially unchanged.

This can be predicted on the basis of Khrushchev's record and personality. His rise to power shows that he is a master of duplicity. And he has been a brutal executioner both in the Ukraine and in Hungary.

# VIII. Aspects of the Cold War

## 1. Nuclear

The Kremlin leaders can face the human price of nuclear war with equanimity, since they hold human life cheap. They will not renounce war as an instrument of policy.

## 2. Political

If the Kremlin should negotiate a valid disarmament agreement, this will be only to set the stage for an intensive campaign of political warfare. The U.S. should test the Kremlin's intentions by proposing political disarmament as well as military. On balance, it is even less likely that the Kremlin will accept political disarmament than that it will accept military disarmament.

Political disarmament would require the Soviets to abolish their organized training of Communist agents and their financial and political support to Communist groups anywhere outside the U.S.S.R. It would also require the Soviets to eliminate all barriers to a free exchange of persons, ideas and communications--in short, elimination of the Iron Curtain.

## 3. Psychological

The Communists will continue to employ negative propaganda--attacks on the West--and positive propaganda--promises of a better life under Communism. "Peace" propaganda will continue to be a major psychological weapon.

Paper No. J-3

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4. Economic

The Kremlin will continue to use economic aid for strictly political purposes. It will also provide military assistance and advice to create dependence on Russia and to create guerrilla forces that could aid Communist take-over attempts.

5. The U.S. Military Posture

U.S. arms must be strong enough, not only to protect the U.S., but "to preserve a world environment in which our way of life can flourish." "Continued U.S. demonstration of the limitation of Soviet power is of utmost importance."

IX. Recommendations for Public Policy

1. Set national sights on more than the maintenance of the status quo.

2. Score some "firsts" in the space race.

3. Demand the abolition of Soviet censorship and jamming.

4. Debunk and unmask Soviet propaganda more vigorously.

5. Send politically trained Americans out in the cultural exchange programs.

6. Tailor our economic aid programs to political ends. For example, a parallel effort to aid programs should be the training of indigenous not--Marxist elites who will foster mixed economy solutions to economic problems. On a larger scale, aid programs should concentrate on countries that will exert anti-Communist leadership in Soviet threatened areas.

7. Encourage Western Europe to counterbalance the Soviets in Europe so that the U.S. and Canada can develop Latin America, the U.S. and Japan neutralize Red China in Asia and the U.S. carry the anti-communist burden in the Middle East and Africa.

8. Revitalize U.S. and Western will to resist Communism and "prosecute the Cold War with vigor and wisdom."

Paper No. J-4
by: E. Hobbing

# SUMMARY
## INTERNATIONAL PAPERS
### U. S. INFORMATION POLICY

Dr. Fritz G. A. Kraemer
Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

December, 1959

1. Scope of Study

The study deals with the overseas information program of
the US government.

It appraises the information program, not from an ideal
or abstract, standpoint but from the standpoint of what is practi-
cally possible, "considering the basic realities of our form of
government and national character."

11. The US Overseas Information Effort and its Critics

A. <u>Organization</u>

Since 1953, USIA has been an independent agency whose
director sits on the NSC and reports directly to the
President. USIA handles all official information
activities abroad except the exchange of persons pro-
gram which is run by State.

B. Budget and Personnel

1. In FY 1958, USIA had a budget of $95 million. Only $40 million was available to pay salaries and operating expenses at 202 USIA posts in 80 countries. These posts were staffed with 918 Americans and 6,324 foreign employees. The budgetary and personnel limitations severely restrict what USIA can accomplish.

2. The State Department <u>exchange of persons program</u> in FY 1958 brought 4,238 foreigners to the US and sent 2,114 Americans abroad. This cost <u>$20 million</u>.

C. Policy Objectives

1. To expose the nature of communism.

2. To develop a spirit of unity and confidence in the free world.

3. To inculcate in other peoples a desire to cooperate with the US.

4. To build up resistance to Communism behind the Iron Curtain.

In pursuit of these objectives, truth is to be the major weapon. The tone of the information output is to be dignified, not flamboyant.

Targeting output to specific groups - by area or by type of person - is virtually impossible because USIA resources are so limited.

### D. Common Criticisms of USIA

#### 1. Quantitative

a. Government propaganda is wicked by nature.

b. US deeds need no advertising.

c. Propaganda is better conducted by private groups.

d. USIA efforts are much too small and should be expanded to cost about $500 million (Benton, Sarnoff plans.)

#### 2. Qualitative

Critics of USIA quality often disagree sharply i.e. some say USIA output is too anti-Communist, others say it is not anti-Communist enough, etc. All critics agree that USIA output is not adequately targeted, dull and ineffective.

Disillusionment with US propaganda is virtually universal - but this may be because expectations of what the US can accomplish in propaganda are unreasonably high.

### III. US Propaganda Capabilities.

1. Our objective is *respect*, not love - political support abroad, not necessarily personal friendship.

2. Propaganda can only *supplement* the military, economic and diplomatic weapons. It cannot change basic factors that speak louder than words.

3. It is practically impossible to "prove" the success or failure of propaganda in statistical terms.

- 3 -

4. Appropriations for USIA and exchange of persons will continue approximately at current levels.

5. The content and general tenor of USIA output will probably remain about the same, because it now reflects the "cross currents of US public - especially Congressional - opinion". US propaganda will continue to be non-ideological and sober.

6. Congressional scrutiny of USIA activities, which seeks domestically understandable justification for USIA expenditures, will continue to prevent the creation of novel and imaginative information programs that have greater impact abroad.

7. Private propaganda will not replace governmental. The People-to-People Foundation failed utterly to raise funds or adopt a sensible propaganda approach (it sought "friendship"). US tourists, commercial ventures, etc. are either incapable of conducting propaganda or interested in other things. US moves are either non-political or actually misleading. US news media, with their objectivity, often frighten foreigners into thinking the US is weak and divided.

## IV. Conclusions

1. USIA will continue pretty much as it is.

2. US propaganda will help friendly elements abroad to defend the American position.

3. US propaganda will not convert significant numbers of Neutralists or Communists to pro-Americanism.

4. Radio propaganda directed behind the Iron Curtain simply maintains a last link to the captive peoples - which is justification enough.

5. The true target area for US propaganda is the free world, where it must help prevent Communism from gaining ground unapposed.

6. Our propaganda capability is defensive instead of offensive, static rather than dynamic.

## V. The "Personal Touch"

1. One of the most effective Communist devices is to recruit people on an individual basis and to keep them enlisted by giving them individual responsibilities.

enforced by giving them individual reasons and动力 to do so. One of the most effective communication devices is to present the ideas of an individual person and to keep them in mind.

## V. The "Personal Touch."

alternative, static rather than dynamic.

C. On propaganda capability is a defensive instead of offensive ground bombardment.

D. Where it must help prevent Communism from world war, which is justification enough.

E. Radio propaganda directed against the Iron Curtain simply maintains a fast link to the captive peoples - which is justification enough.

F. Radio propaganda directed against the Iron Curtain

G. Radio propaganda on Communists to pro-Americanism.

H. Radio propaganda will not convert significant numbers of tend the American position.

I. U2 propaganda will help friendly elements abroad to defend the American position.

## IV. Conclusions

their effectiveness, often threatened foreigners into political or semi-femiating. US news media, with interest in other things, US moves are either non-etc. are either impossible of conducting propaganda or bought "friendship". US propaganda, commercial revenues, funds of US abroad a sample propaganda approach (if people-to-people Foundation staffs after to make

J. Private propaganda will not replace governmental. The greater impact should be

K. Congressional activity of U2A activities, which seeks to further the creation of a domestically understandable justification for U2A ex-

kational opinion." U2 propaganda will continue to be the "giant current of U2 podfile - especially congress-arily remain apart the same, because it now reflects

L. The content and general tenor of U2A output will continue approximately at current level.

M. Appropriations for U2A and exchange of persons will continue approximately at current level.

- 3 -

- 4 -

2. USIA also recognizes the need for such a personal approach. But its staffs abroad are too small to pursue it, and personnel rotation every two to four years prevents USIA officers from sinking local roots. Furthermore, Americans are not given to the intellectual argument needed to convert foreigners.

3. But Americans who can be person-to-person propagandists exist and must be recruited. This will require:

a. <u>non-bureaucratic recruiting procedure</u>

b. establishment of a Research and Testing Center for training.

c. Such a Center should also be used for the discreet political indoctrination of Americans and foreigners in the exchange programs.

ADDENDUM TO SUMMARY J-4

comments by: Enno Hobbing
subject: Paper J-4, U. S. Information Policy

December 28, 1959

1. I believe we can go considerably beyond this paper.

2. The principal conclusion of the paper is that over a period of 15 years of U. S. propaganda, a consensus has been established - chiefly between Congressional opinion and USIA - on the content and tone of U. S. information output. This consensus, the paper contends, will not alter in any material fashion. As a result, U. S. propaganda will continue to be of limited but necessary usefulness.

Neither this analysis of past U. S. performance nor the prediction as to future performance appear warranted.

U. S. propaganda as a whole has not achieved a consensus at all, but has sporadically altered its tone and content to meet the presumed and shifting requirements of U. S. foreign policy.

From 1945 until late 1947, the accent was on the honeymoon with the USSR.

Beginning with Operation Backtalk in late 1947, proceeding through the Berlin blockade, the Communist take-over in China and the Korean War, U. S. propaganda spoke in explicit, strident anti-Communist tones.

Since the death of Stalin, U. S. propaganda has generally accommodated itself to the theme of "peaceful co-existence" and has been progressively shorn of forthright political comment and has become progressively less anti-Communist in tone. Much of the propaganda emphasis today is on cultural matters.

These three general post-war phases of U. S. propaganda show the U. S. information machine in three very different postures:

1945-1947, a self-determined but deluded attempt to evoke East-West harmony in the world.

1947-1953, a generally correct reaction to Communist aggression.

1953-1960, a rather passive and aimless acquiescence in the tone of international discussion set by Moscow.

These shifts of propaganda policy do not add up to a consensus anymore than our embattled foreign policy does. They represent a vacillation permitted by the lack of clear long-range purpose and by the lack of a clear concept of an ultimately desirable world order.

The British government and the lack of a clear concept of an
in the tone of international discussion set by Moscow.

1929-1930, a rather basic and naive statement.

Aggression.

1941-1943, a generally correct reaction toCommunist
enactment of a new anti-Communist policy.

1942-1944, a self-determined but defied attempt to
the U. S. information machine in three very different postures.

These three general boat-wars between U. S. and Germany show
watters.

The end of the propaganda era today is on environmental
comment and has become progressively less anti-Communist in
and has been progressively grown or to the right of political
agitated itself to the degree of "behead co-existence"
since the death of Stalin. U. S. propaganda has generally
arised anti-Communist zones.

and the Korean War, U. S. propaganda arose in explicit,
through the Berlin Puckadee, the Committee take-over in China
beginning with Operation Berlin in late 1943, proceeding
with the USAR.

From 1945 until late 1944, the accent was on the honeymoon
policy.

Meet the dreamers and shifting redemptions of U. S. foreign
sail, put its absorption altered its tone and content to
U. S. propaganda as a whole has not achieved a consensus at
agitation so to future performance abet her warranted.

Neither this fluctuation of beat U. S. performance nor the pre-
of limited put necessarily naughtness.

Fashion. As a benefit, U. S. propaganda will continue to be
consensus, the paper considers, will not suffer in any material
on the content and tone of U. S. information output. This
supplanted - accordingly between Congressional opinion and U.S.A.
of 12 Years of U. S. propaganda, a consensus has been ea-

S. The principal consideration of the paper is that over a period

Subject: Paper J-4, U. S. Information Policy

Comments by: Enno Hopping

December 58, 1958

ADDENDUM TO SUMMARY J-4

-2-

Addendum to Summary J-4

By the same token, the past record of U. S. propaganda does not prejudge the future. Even granting the limitations on propaganda imposed by the American mentality and character, it constitutes a mean estimate of that mentality and character to make a fatalistic assumption that they cannot produce better propaganda than we have today. Moreover, any major increase in U. S. defense and Space capabilities and a greater U. S. exertion of leadership in foreign policy would quickly bring a better propaganda stance in its train.

3. The paper concludes that the budgetary allocation to USIA of approximately $100 million a year will remain constant. This will preclude substantially more effective operations because it will continue to keep the 202 foreign posts of USIA, which absorb $40 million of the funds, understaffed and under-budgeted.

This conclusion is challengeable on two counts:

First, a considerably increased USIA budget can be placed before the Congress by any Administration that desires to do so and can be gotten through substantially intact, if USIA can devise new programs that will sufficiently capture Congressional imagination. In early 1957, USIA had projected progressive increases in its budget to a level in the neighborhood of $150 million by 1960 (check figures). The setback to USIA was due largely to a personal clash between Congress and President Eisenhower's new USIA director, Arthur Larson, who was ousted as director by the end of 1957.

Secondly, even within the $100 million budget, considerable shifts of funds can be effected to make the USIA operation more effective overseas where it counts. The Washington policy review and intelligence staffs of USIA are probably too large and probably act more as inhibitors of effective output than as promoters of it. The $30 million-odd spent on Washington production of press materials, films, etc., might on close examination be found to bring better results if spent on staff and production in the field. Even in the field, important shifts of emphasis may be advisable. USIA has been gradually decreasing the relative importance of its Western European operations, but if budgetary limitations continue to prevail the operations in publication-saturated Western Europe might be much more sharply curtailed in favor of increased effort in the uncommitted areas. (Much of the European effort might be shifted from libraries and publications to a more sophisticated liaison of a few Public Affairs officers and State Department personnel with influential local editors.) Finally, if cost-cutting is essential, more consideration should be given to eventually self-sustaining commercial publication abroad.

-3-

Addendum to Paper J-4

4. The paper further concludes that because of the scarcity of USIA funds and personnel abroad, selective targeting of propaganda to specific foreign social and intellectual groups is virtually impossible.

This would appear to be a fallacy both in fact and in concept.

First, as to fact, the handful of able USIA officers abroad engage in precisely such selective targeting. The instance of USIA officer "Bob Maile" in "The Ugly American" documents the point, and so do numerous other examples within the present writer's experience.

Secondly, as to concept, the vast bulk of USIA officials should be ordered by USIA policy to concentrate on specific local targets - politicians, labor leaders, etc. - whose winning-over would have a multiplier factor, in that the captured targets would base their own political decisions partly on U. S. propaganda and also spread the word among their countrymen. Information diffusion among inchoate and relatively voiceless masses - "keeping the situation covered" - never has the same impact as targeting on crucial people and groups. If the village headman is sold, he will sell the villagers.

5. The paper concludes that Congressional insistence on tangible, statistical results from USIA operations will continue to preclude imaginative, locally effective propaganda that is not readily explainable to Congressmen. While the handicaps of the present type of Congressional scrutiny of USIA (Rep. Rooney, Rep. Clevenger, etc.) should not be minimized, neither may it be assumed that better propaganda, properly explained, will not be more impressive to the Congressmen concerned.

Here is a vicious circle that must be broken by USIA personnel. Indeed, one of the most self-defeating aspects of USIA output is the extensive efforts USIA makes to flatter Congressmen by repeating their speeches and doings to areas of the world where no one cares about them. This may please Congressmen in the short run but surely adds to their frustrations about USIA in the end - and makes for boring output abroad.

6. The paper makes a valid point about the need for non-bureaucratic recruitment of better USIA personnel. It correctly quotes Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart to the effect that "propagandists are born, not made."

But the paper's proposal to train such recruits in a new Research and Testing Center must be regarded with extreme caution. If the Research and Testing Center is in the operational line of command of USIA, it might be useful because it would directly gear training to doing. Such a center would have a minuscule administrative staff and would draw its teaching staff entirely from operational USIA, State,

Addendum to Summary J-4

Defense, etc., personnel on a guest-lecturer basis. But
a Research and Training Center in a staff status would
probably tend to be little more than a poor, remote college.

7. The paper's proposal of a corps of person-to-person propagandists in USIA must also be carefully qualified. Actually, person-to-person propaganda should be the normal duty of USIA officials, as noted under (4) above. Moreover, such propagandists will be severely inhibited at the outset if they are given a "person-to-person" appellation. U. S. Embassy status, which confers some aura of power, is generally necessary in order for a propagandist to be persuasive.

8. The paper rightly deplores the excessive rotation of USIA personnel. The often-proposed adoption of some form of the British diplomatic system, which has combined rotating top staffs to express the will of London with long-time British residents abroad to guage local sensitivities, might be reconsidered. At the other end of the length-of-service scale, more consideration should be given to employing suitable Americans for very short-term propaganda missions on a contract - not a civil service - basis. This might help to draft the variety of skills available to U. S. wartime propaganda.

9. A major requirement for USIA operations abroad is greatly enlarged flexibility on the part of local USIA officials and a sharp reduction in inhibiting, "safe" propaganda guidance from Washington. Washington USIA guidance should concentrate on preceeding major events, not on delaying field exploitation or defensive measures after events have occurred. Where field officials are capable, they should be given maximum discretion to respond to the swift changes in the news in the light of U. S. policy as they best understand it. Field officials who cannot interpret policy to foreign editors, etc., should be dismissed.

10. The important issue of actual propaganda content will presumably be solved piece by piece as our series of positions is elaborated.

11. The role and voice of the Director of USIA must be upgraded to the extent that, if he is capable, he gets a voice in the timing and method of major policy announcements and other matters of national concern.

12. For our private studies, if not for public discussion, a better scheme of overt and covert propaganda coordination must be worked out. USIA constantly tries to dabble in the "black" field, while CIA all too often chastely adheres to "overt" themes.

PAPER NO. K-1

N. Hoepli

# SUMMARY
## ECONOMIC - INTERNATIONAL
### THE U. S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT

John V. Deaver
Foreign Economist
Chase Manhattan Bank
18 Pine Street
New York 5, New York

date of paper: March, 1960

The purpose of the paper is to define the balance of payments problem, determine what remedies are required, suggest alternative solutions, and set a target for the U. S. balance of payments deficit.

## I. BASIC FACTS AND TRENDS

### A. Balance of Payments

#### 1. Trade Account

The trade account includes exports of merchandise and services, which account for almost nine-tenths of total U. S. receipts from abroad, and imports which account for about two-thirds of U. S. foreign payments.

**a. Growth:** Growth in U. S. imports and exports since 1950 has been impressive. In the years 1946-1959, the real growth of imports has averaged 5½% and exports 1½%. (However, since 1950 exports have risen an average of 5%. ) GNP in the same period rose an average of 3½%. The export surplus has largely enabled the U. S. to finance foreign aid and overseas defense expenditures. If these commitments continue at their present size, trade must continue to expand, with exports growing as fast, or almost as fast, as imports.

**b. Trade and Business Cycles:** There is a cyclical relationship between U. S. payments and business activity. Exports, however, fluctuate more than imports, because import demand in other countries is affected not only by business activity but also by dollar availability. Peaks in the trade balance in the postwar period have either coincided with or preceded the peak in business activity. A sharp increase in exports is expected in 1960, with a peak in the trade balance expected in 1961 or 1962.

**c. Price Trends and Foreign Competition:** U. S. prices have risen more slowly than prices in most other countries since World War II, giving the U. S. a trade advantage. Two factors have reduced this advantage: (1) postwar inflation in most countries outside the dollar area was largely offset by devaluation, and (2) export prices of countries competing with the U. S. have fallen relative to domestic prices.

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Since 1952, the U. S. trade advantage has continued to diminish. While the U. S. export price index rose 5% between 1951 and 1959, export prices fell 9% in Western Europe and 29% in Japan. The fall in export prices outside the U. S. does not mean that other countries are more successful in combating inflation. Rather it shows that their export prices rise more slowly or fall faster than domestic prices and also reflects higher productivity abroad.

### d. Trade Outlook:

1. Short-term factors associated with the business cycle are largely responsible for the recent balance of payments deficit. Cyclical recovery in such exports as cotton, steel-mill products and aircraft could bring merchandise exports to $18 billion in 1960, compared with $16.3 in 1959.

2. In the long-run exports of goods and services may not expand as rapidly as imports due to increasing price competition and foreign producers' ability to improve efficiency rapidly through economies of scale. Exports might expand at an average of 4% a year compared to a probable 5% increase in imports. Relaxation of dollar restrictions would stimulate exports.

3. The U. S. still has competitive advantage in research and development as well as in commodities such as cotton and wheat. If price supports were removed, exports might expand substantially.

### 2. Private Investment Account

Since 1945, U. S. investments abroad have yielded more in dollar remittances than they have absorbed in capital from the U. S. The investment outflow has increased at an average rate of about 12% annually. Income remitted from all overseas investments has increased by 11% annually. The rates of increase in both investments and income from investments will probably fall during the next decade. However, the U. S. foreign investment account will probably continue to be more or less in balance.

### 3. Government Account

The government account includes foreign aid and defense expenditures abroad. All government accounts are self-balancing from the foreign payments aspect, except overseas defense expenditures. The latter have steadily increased since 1950 and have averaged $3 billion in the last three years.

### 4. Balancing Accounts

The balancing items include U. S. sale and purchase of gold and foreign long term investments in the U. S. A proportion of a given balance of payments deficit in the U. S. is sensitive to relative interest rate changes. When U. S. interest rates fall, there is an outflow of gold. Therefore, it is important when a

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recession arrives and short term rates fall that the U. S. deficit be relatively small so that any gold outflow would be small.

## B. Balance of Payments Deficit

In the past nine years, the U. S. balance of payments deficit has averaged about $2.2 billion a year. 1958-59 deficits rose to an average of $4 billion. A deficit of $3-4 billion a year for a protracted period will exhaust free U. S. gold stocks.

### 1. Current Deficit

U. S. gold holdings are now about $19.4 billion, of which over $12 billion are committed as legal reserves against Federal Reserve Bank liabilities,

### 2. Impact of Deficit on Free World

In 1945 the U. S. held almost two-thirds of the Free World's gold and its holdings increased through 1948. The turning point came in the fall of 1949 when the U. K., followed by most Free World countries, devalued its currency in terms of gold. By the end of 1959 U. S. gold stocks were equal to about 50% of Free World gold and only 32% of Free World gold plus foreign exchange.

U. S. deficits have helped other countries increase their gold and dollar reserves, enabling them to reduce their trade and exchange restrictions. Bilateral trade agreements have been gradually eliminated.

### 3. Trends in U. S. Deficits

If the U. S. monetary reserve requirement is maintained and Federal Reserve liabilities grow 2-3% a year, an annual $2 billion deficit would be likely to lead to a payments crisis some time in the 1960's. If the reserve requirement is reduced or abolished, an annual deficit of $2 billion could continue for several years. (Cf. Roy Rierson)

A $1 billion deficit would give approximately ten years' leeway before exhaustion of free gold reserves.

## II. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

### A. Gold Standard

A return to the gold standard is not recommended because it does not permit manipulation of the money supply to maintain internal equilibrium.

### B. Gold-Like Monetary Standard

1. In a country with a managed monetary system, a large balance of payments deficit can be met by decreasing the stock of

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money, which would have the same effect as an outflow of gold under the gold standard. Interest rates would rise and prices fall. A country with adequate reserves might be able to maintain internal and external stability within reasonable limits.

## 2. Disadvantages:

a. It would be difficult to gear the economy to falling prices. Deflation might involve a politically intolerable amount of unemployment.

b. With the present financial structure, it would take a long time to produce inflation or deflation by monetary means.

c. In order effectively to inflate or deflate according to the needs of international equilibrium, it is necessary to maintain large buffer reserves. Large reserves, however, would impede growth of trade and a more equitable distribution of reserves.

## C. Enlarging International Monetary Fund

1. A plan proposed by Professor Robert Triffin advocates enlarging the functions of the IMF.

a. Members would hold a minimum fraction of their international reserves on deposit with the new Fund.

b. Deposits, redeemable in gold or any foreign currency, would thus constitute a new medium of international payments

c. IMF would make loans in the form of investments in short-term securities markets to countries with balance of payments deficits.

2. This proposal would benefit the U. S. in three ways:

a. Eliminate the danger of a run on the dollar.

b. Allow the U. S. to borrow more than its present $8.25 billion limit from the IMF.

c. Increase international liquidity.

3. The proposal, which the author considers an improvement over the present IMF, has one disadvantage: It doesn't alleviate any long-run balance of payments problem.

## D. Dollar Devaluation

### 1. Advantage:

Dollar devaluation could correct fundamental dis-equilibrium, provided other countries did not devalue by an equal amount.

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## 2. Disadvantages:

a. Would result in loss of confidence in U. S. dollar.

b. The U. S. would have to compensate foreign holders of dollar assets who would lose from devaluation.

c. Devaluation would not change the U. S. payments mechanism or provide a long-range solution.

## E. Floating Exchange Rates

1. Would allow the exchange rate of the dollar to fluctuate within limits set by exchange authorities, with the aid of a buffer stock of gold. Eventually only a small buffer stock would be required.

## 2. Advantages:

a. Permit maximum flexibility in meeting changing world trade conditions.

b. Permit U. S. to hold minimum gold stocks.

## 3. Disadvantages:

a. Dollar could lose its attractiveness as a medium of international exchange.

b. Speculative changes in dollar exchange rates would create uncertainty.

c. Lack of recent experience in free exchange rates for a country as important financially as the U. S. would make the proposal politically unfeasible.

## III. CONCLUSIONS

A. The U. S. would benefit from a continued redistribution of the world's gold and foreign exchange consistent with each country's monetary stability and international responsibilities and at a pace that will maintain the stability of the dollar. Free multilateral trade and unrestricted payments mechanism is a major U. S. goal.

B. The U. S. economy could gain by having a deficit large enough and lasting long enough to reduce gold reserves to a level just adequate for trade needs - about $10 billion. This would permit an exchange of excess gold for goods and services or income-earning investments abroad.

C. The author recommends a target for the U. S. balance of payments deficit of $1 to $1½ billion. This target can be met if recent moves for free world trade, a more vigorous export campaign

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by U. S. companies, and rapid economic growth abroad permit U. S. exports to increase at a rate almost equal to imports. If exports increase more slowly than imports by even one percentage point, deficits are likely to grow and require adoption of new policies.

D. The U. S. may have a fundamental balance of payments problem, i.e., that U. S. prices are out of line with those of our major competitors. If this is correct, some kind of reform is unavoidable. The need for new policies would be demonstrated should exports increase by even one percentage point slower than imports.

E. It is unlikely that there will be conclusive proof of whether reform is necessary until the next downturn in business conditions. If the U. S. deficit at that time reaches 1958-59 proportions, this would point to serious disequilibrium. However, if deficits can be kept to an average of $2 billion, the present level of U. S. gold reserves will be sufficient to allow for a waiting period of several years. During this time alternative corrective measures should be studied and debated. Among reforms to be considered should be the reduction or removal of the reserve requirement.