AUG. 30 '88 11:54 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

28

the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States.
Thus the careful calculators in Beijing will lower their
estimate of the dangers of a direct quest for hegemony by the
Soviet Union. Moreover they will take care not to be isolated
by a US-Soviet rapprochement. They will not want to be the last
to man the ~~forte~~ of the Cold War.

The likely outcome is a steady improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations--especially as the Soviets meet Chinese conditions,
~~such as~~ above air by encouraging Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. At
the same time Chinese planners are not sentimental. They will
keep in mind that rapprochement with Moscow cannot shorten the
3,000 miles of the Sino-Soviet frontier. They know that
professions of good will can always be reversed. They will try
to improve relations with the Soviet Union without weakening their
ties to the United States which China will continue to require as
counterweight to any hegemonic aspirations in Asia. And in that

AUG. 30 '88 11:59 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

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34

the United States has not been successful--ironically closest to its borders in Nicaragua--none of these conditions have been met.

It is important to see the successes in perspective. Foreign policy knows no plateaus; each advance is an admissions ticket to a new set of challenges. There is too much of a tendency to look at the various agreements as final destinations and by analogy to the American experience in Indochina. But in Vietnam the United States not only withdrew but abdicated. But this cannot happen with respect to the Soviet Union and Afghanistan; nor between Vietnam and Cambodia. Neither of these nations will abandon its historic ambitions with respect to a country at their borders. They will pursue these objectives by more indirect means.

To maintain a new balance to sustain what has been achieved will be a tricky, enterprise. Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan maintaining Congressional and public support for what are now called freedom fighters will surely

AUG. 30 '88 12:05 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P. 41

41

Any catalogue of contemporary problems is bound to look formidable especially at the onset of a period of dramatic change. But it is important to maintain perspective. The problems outlined here are almost without exception susceptible to policy adaptations; those of the Communist world are structural--a much more difficult challenge. The United States and its friends are thus in the unusual position of being able to shape their own future.orbader will not save us from inevitable dissolution, but the democracies must do that job themselves.

AUG 29 1988 19:59 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P. 20002

August 29, 1988

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

A gap between expectation and reality is characteristic of a revolutionary period, and ours is no exception. We are living through witnessing the end of the post-war structure of international relations--a process which in the past has been always involved turmoil and commitment. But public discussion in the democracies celebrates peace as if it were a static condition occurring almost automatically and the world lives with a consciousness of harmony.

In the idyllic picture of the world ahead of us painted by too many leaders of the democracies (Gorbachev is turned into a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are treated as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global

AUG 29 '88 19:43 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P. 2 f. 003

2

appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer
and
society with its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs.

Therefore the democracies are said to have an obligation to
"help" Gorbachev achieve these goals.

To be sure this idyll is punctuated by frequent
protestations of wariness as to Soviet intentions. But this
is ritual. The dominant theme is one of incipient
friendship between the democracies and the Soviet Union and
even of personal friendship between western leaders and
Mikhail Gorbachev.

No doubt progress has been made on several fronts in
East-West negotiations. But a new era cannot be based on
personalities - by definition.

To be lasting must reflect an underlying reality. The way the
principal countries assess and shape that reality will
determine whether there will be tranquility or turmoil:

AUG 29 '88 19:44 KISSINGER ASSOC

3

P.3 004

--Whatever Corbachev's intentions, he has started a process within the Soviet Union and even more in Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell.

--Whatever the ~~intentions~~ of the leaders of democracies, they have contributed to a ~~process~~ of the US&N which within the next decade will bring about major changes in Atlantic relations.

--These twin events make the future of Europe--East and West--a central political issue and not simply an arms control problem.

As the US-Soviet ideological rivalry diminishes, traditional geopolitical factors will become more prominent. The decline of Communist ideology--real or imagined--will require increasing attention to historic Russian expansionism.

AUG 29 '88 19:45 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

P. 4005

4

--This will occur while Japan, China and India will grow in strength and become increasingly important in international affairs.

--The regional conflicts—which are being settled—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern Africa—result in part from the changed priorities of the US and the USSR. And each of the so-called settlements creates a dynamism of its own and therefore the need for a new approach to the issues and interests at stake.

--To deal with such a world the United States must reassess its historic approach to international affairs with its emphasis on intentions rather than capabilities—and its reluctance to be involved with maintaining a balance of power.

## The Impact of Mikhail Gorbachev

The most immediate issue is whether the democracies are wise in putting so much reliance on a single personality in

AUG 29 '88 19:45 KISSINGER ASSOC' HIES N.Y.

P. 506

5

the Soviet leadership. Indeed whether it is "helpful"--to use a fashionable phrase--to Corbachev for them to do so.

To be sure, Corbachev's success in overcoming the Soviet Union's isolation of 1985 when he took office is an astonishing tour de force. Many Western leaders, President Reagan included, seem to believe that their personal relationship with Corbachev eases diplomatic negotiations, that Corbachev virtually alone is responsible for the domestic changes apparently taking place in the Soviet Union, and that these changes in turn will bring about a new era of peace.

Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True, major, perhaps historic, changes are under way in the Soviet Union. But it defies all reason to believe that a man who has never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party (without any reference to his position) and who was in the Politburo during the Brezhnev era would abandon the Marxist belief in the predominance of objective

AUG 29 '88 19:46 KISSINGER ASSOCATES N.Y.

P. 607

6

factors in favor of a "subjective" affection for a
democratic leader. No member of the politburo, much less
its General Secretary, would dare approach his colleagues
with the proposition that his personal ties to a democratic
leader could justify changes in Soviet policy.

For all his panache and intelligence, Gorbachev like
most statesmen, is to some degree a product of circumstance.
He seeks--with courage and imagination--to overcome the
stagnation of the late Brezhnev era. It is not a commitment
to peace in the abstract but to a more competitive Soviet
Union, though he undoubtedly needs a period of relative calm
to achieve his domestic goals. Another Soviet leader would
in all likelihood feel compelled to pursue similar policies,
if with less verve and psychological skill. After all, the
present phase of Soviet policy was inaugurated when
Marked at the May conference as a step in the
Brezhnev era--called on President Reagan in 1984 during the

AUG 29 '88 19:48 KISSINGER ASSOC "HILDS N.Y.

P. 8. 009

remembered the west developed only after World War I--the criteria on the basis of which he is to determine it are far from clear. There is little in the history of either tsars or commissars to supply him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by Communist ideology or Russian historical expansionism has been debated ever since the existence of the Communist state. During World War II the democracies convinced themselves that Stalin, having defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution, would pursue Russian national objectives rather than Communist ideology after the war... was defeated.

And they proved to be right though not in the sense they had imagined. After the war Stalin returned to the program Molotov submitted to Hitler in November 1940 as the price for Soviet support. It could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination of the Balkans and of the Straits;

AUG 29 '88 19:49 KISSINGER ASSOC CHATES N.Y.

P. 9 P. 010

9

a major voice in Poland; and Soviet hegemony over Iran.

Soviet policy did not reach all these objectives but it was not through lack of trying.

The role of ideology has been threefold: it gave Soviet leaders an inner assurance that their tsarist predecessors ~~sometimes~~ lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters and in the 70's it tempted them into distant enterprises such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an abandonment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the historical Russian agenda.

Even should Communist ideology decline, historic Russia would still remain as a great power whose objectives are not determined in the light of its goals.

AUG 29 '88 19:50 KISSINGER ASSOC

10

P. 10011

~~experience~~ And for four hundred years it has been a major
challenge for world peace how to establish a relationship
between that giant otot of eleven time ~~PORES~~ and its
smaller neighbors... Often breached by invaders, Russia's frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably outward in all directions.

The reliance on one Soviet leader created four dangers:
Since every new Soviet leader has disavowed his predecessor,
such a course is inherently precarious. Second, by creating
the impression that tensions were caused by idiosyncracies
it strengthens the neutralist elements who have claimed all
along that the risks of the Cold War were frivolous and
unnecessary. If tensions increase the democracies will once
again be torn between those who blame tensions on the
failures of leadership and those who maintain that the
Soviet leopard never changes its spots. Third, should
Gorbachev leave office for essentially internal reasons a

AUG 29 '88 19:51 KISSINGER ASSOC

11

P.11312

wave of despondency and self-flagellation will sweep over
the democracies that will no doubt accuse themselves of not
having made enough concessions.

Most importantly, the psychiatric approach to foreign policy tempts not only escapism on the part of the democracies but adventurism on the part of the Soviet Union.

In the contemporary world even a nationalistic Russian leader should have incentives for moderation. Almost all emerging power centers are at or near the borders of the Soviet Union. An expansionist policy would run the risk of creating a coalition among them. This introduction is prudent cause. But such an insight is far from automatic. Adjusting to the new realities is inevitably painful, involving as it does the abandonment or modification of cherished preconceptions. It is much easier to exploit the confusion of the adversary for unilateral benefits than to explore a new relationship based on true reciprocity.

interview 11.

P. 12(13

12

The often repeated phrase that we should help Gorbachev is therefore devoid of meaning unless "help" is properly defined. Does it imply that we should make agreements that we would not make on their merits? Does it mean that we must accept the Soviet definition of the issues? Should we side with Gorbachev in his internal disputes? Do we understand them well enough to do so? Or do we help him - or other moderate elements - most by putting forward a reasonable concept of a more peaceful world that takes account of changing realities and that he can submit to his colleagues?

I believe the letter is the only responsible course. It is to render no service to Gorbachev--whatever his motives--to ascribe to him Western liberal values. Nothing could undermine him more rapidly with his colleagues. The opportunity presented by the Soviet need for a respite and the defense of new power centers must not be wasted by making the most favorable assumptions about the future, even if it means avoiding all differences.

AUG. 29 '88 19:52 KISSINGER ASSOC FES N.Y.

P. 13

13

conducting foreign policy largely as an aspect of domestic

politics. Not Nuclear weapons demand coexistence,
but if the world democracies are to avoid
blackmarbles themselves they must learn that

In the emerging new era coexistence requires a careful
assessment of the legitimate interests of both sides and a
serious effort to determine whether and how they can be
reconciled. This is all the more important because the
diplomatic results of recent years create their own dynamism
and because the growing power of some countries increasingly
affects the global equilibrium.

Three sets of issues will shape the new era whatever
one thinks of Gorbachev's motivations:

The nature of Third World conflicts now that the
nuclear superpowers seem to be disengaging in certain key
areas.

The political impact of the successful arms control
negotiations especially in Europe.

AUG 29 '88 19:56 KISSINGER ASSOC 'ATFS NY

P.1715

14

--The relationship of countries like Japan, China and India (and later Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico) to the from Jadegada P19 to P13 international equilibrium. [Signature]

Third World Issues

Major progress has been made on so-called regional issues during the course of this year. The Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has indicated that it would leave Cambodia by 1989; there is an agreement in principle for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. [Signature]

All this indicates at a minimum that the Soviet Union has found itself overextended in theaters that with the exception of Afghanistan are far from areas traditionally identified with Soviet national security. But foreign policy knows no final solutions; each advance is an admission ticket to a new set of challenges.

AUG 29 '88 19:58 KISSINGER ASSOC. (HITS, WHEN, etc.)

P. 19

In stage in
points of East-West relationships. And especially in Europe
appearances are deceptive. A seeming calm could be the
prelude to a major crisis--unless the current preoccupation
with arms control is accompanied by a serious effort to master
~~style~~ evolution.
and shape foreseeable political conflicts.

Unlike his predecessor who ~~seemed~~ above all concerned with
safeguarding the status quo in Europe Gorbachev seems to have
chosen to undermine the cohesion of the Western Alliance. Soviet
theoretical journals justify peace not so much for its own sake
as to deprive US policy of the fear with which it rallied its
allies to the common defense. Soviet emissaries taking the cue
from their General Secretary are promoting a so-called "European
House" from the Urals to the Atlantic which is supposed to achieve
European security and prevent European civilization from being
overwhelmed by American materialism. Its practical consequence
is to diminish American influence in Europe if not to expel us
from it. And that slogan is gaining in appeal especially in the
Federal Republic of Germany.

AUG 29 '88 20:00 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.212

A Gorbachev's strategy to already made
significant progress. But while the negotiations
are still very difficult, there is a good deal of hope.
This is not the first time that the Soviet Union has
tried to start negotiations with the United States.

In that context, the significance of arms control negotiations
is political. Soviet policymakers understand very well that the
~~Soviet Union~~ N.O.P.

various nuclear arms control agreements either concluded or in
the process of negotiation must ~~undertaken~~ tend to
the existing NATO
strategy which is based on nuclear weapons. How often can the
phrase "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"
be repeated in US-Soviet communiques before the nuclear deterrent
loses its credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons
are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes
unfeasible? And which Western statesman is prepared to initiate
it? And which Soviet statesman is prepared to initiate
an all-out nuclear war? In the existing climate of relaxation
of tensions it is escapist to believe that conventional rearmament
can serve as a substitute; NATO will be fortunate if it can
maintain its present level of conventional forces. Step-by-
patient-step the Soviets are elaborating a claim to a veto over
nuclear weapons. For example, NATO's defense policy.
A point has been reached where the modernization
of short-range weapons introduced into Europe ten years ago

AUG 29 '88 20:02 KISSINGER ASSOC "1HIES, WHSH. DC

P.234

23

augment or to modernize NATO forces or to strengthen NATO
are already
cohesion will meet increasing resistance. Even European
my
integration in the military field will become controversial.

We may then well witness a repetition of the debate of the
Fifties whether prospects for German unity are being sacrificed
on the altar of Western ties.

Conventional wisdom argues that the Soviets will become so
dependent on Western Europe economically as to preclude a return
to Cold War tensions. But dependence is double-edged. It is
equally possible--and perhaps more likely--that some Western
leaders will become so dependent psychologically and domestically
on good relations with Moscow that they will not run any risk
of the Kremlin's displeasure thereby giving the Soviets a veto
over a wide range of their policies.

These trends are being exploited by the Soviets with a
daring inconceivable in the Brezhnev period. But it remains to
be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as farsighted as it is

AUG 29 '88 20:03 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.245

24

daring. For one thing the Soviet Union is operating from a
position of domestic weakness.

Revolutionaries rarely foresee all the consequences of
their actions. They attack the existing structure by forming
a coalition of all resentments. But having undermined the status
wind up having to reestablish discipline among their followers.
This is why revolutions usually consume their own children.

Gorbachev's situation illustrates this observation. Until
he also becomes President as he has proposed his sole official
position is that of General Secretary of the Communist Party.
He has repeatedly and passionately avowed his commitment to
one-party rule. At the same time he seems to recognize that his
reforms can only be achieved by overturning the encrusted party
bureaucracy which supplies his power base. Because the Soviet
system by the account of its own leaders at the party conference
is run like a feudal state on the basis of personal relationships
every new General Secretary has begun his reign with a purge.

"AUG 29 '88 20:04 KISSINGER "ASSOC" HIES WHSH. DC

P.25

25

What is novel in Gorbachev's approach is not the purge
~~which is clearly under way with the traditional public humiliation~~
~~of the victims~~ but his obvious conviction that his goals cannot
be achieved by the traditional method of taking over the Communist
Party. His solution is a complicated structure in which the
governmental and the party bureaucracies balance each other out.
They are joined only at the apex in the new office of the
President with unprecedented powers. When fully elaborated this
~~structure will lend itself to authoritarian control, especially~~
~~are men rule.~~
~~after the purge is completed.~~ At this point glasnost is a means
to bring pressure on the party bureaucracy not a permanent form
of government. Like many reformers Gorbachev may believe that
all reasonable people will come to similar conclusions; like
many revolutionaries he will be disappointed in that expectation.
Will he then attempt to destroy his critics, now his supporters?

As de Gaulle said over two decades ago: "During my lifetime
Communist ideology has been personified by many people. Each

AUG 29 '88 20:05 KISSINGER ASSOC. PHILS., WHEN. DL

P. 26

(M)

26

of these leaders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event he fights firmly against the personality cult of the others."

It is impossible to predict at this point whether Gorbachev will prove an exception. What is certain is that the process started by Gorbachev will produce a substantial period of turmoil and uncertainty. The established bureaucracies will not give up their power and their privileges easily. In an empire of many peoples, decentralization is bound to run into the nationality question. There is no entrepreneurial tradition. The secret police and the military--two of the most potent bureaucracies--have not yet been heard from.

It is possible that this turmoil will lead to a more restrained foreign policy--though as I explained above surely not automatically.

It is equally possible that in the end the regime will appeal to the nationalism that has historically unified at least the Russian part of the population. It would befoolery.

for the West to take everything on the possibility of involving possibility requiring all efforts.

'AUG 29 '88 20:06 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.278

6D

27

Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove even more unsettling in the countries of Eastern Europe. Even after hearing that every leader since Lenin was responsible either for a cult of personality, adventurism or stagnation a Soviet citizen can still take patriotic pride in the victory in World War II, the industrialization of the Soviet Union and its achievement of high status in international affairs. No such comfort is available to the East Europeans. Their ruling parties were imposed by a country which now advertises publicly the corruption and inefficiency of its system. The Gorbachev reforms are thus bound to increase the challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling groups in Eastern Europe. These will not be able to operate the subtle balancing act between government and party envisaged by Gorbachev for the Soviet Union. It is no wonder that some of the East European Communist parties--in East Germany explicitly and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia--are dissociating openly from the Soviet pattern. When the East

WHSH. UL

P 1.10

29

to hysteria repeating--with even wider swings--the postwar
cycle between excesses of conciliation and excesses of belligerence.

It may thus happen that the new Soviet policy has created
a Frankenstein. As the Federal Republic and to a lesser extent
the other countries of West Europe increase their activities
and investments in Eastern Europe the centrifugal tendencies in
the Soviet empire will be accelerated--especially if there is
not some political understanding of how this process might evolve.

In short Soviet policy whether by design or inadvertence is
returning the focal point of diplomacy to Europe. This may
well require more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than by
Washington.

Soviet policy can embarrass the Atlantic Alliance but the
long-range dilemma is on the Soviet side. To weaken NATO Moscow
must pursue a policy of moderation both internationally and
domestically. But such a policy encourages autonomy in Eastern
Europe and tempts Western Europe and especially the Federal

'AUG 29 '88 '21:21 KISSINGER ASSOC' 'CITIES' WHSM. DC

P.2 11

30

Republic into seeking to dissociate Eastern Europe from the
Soviet Union by economic and even political penetration. Then
we might see a reemergence of the competition between Teuton
and Slav that produced one world war or a partition of Eastern
Europe into spheres of influence which led to another. Either
contingency is certain to lead to a traumatic crisis. If that
occurs in a vacuum the danger of brutal Soviet intervention is
real, perhaps designed to demonstrate Western impotence in shaping
the future of Eastern Europe. A new crisis over Berlin may seem
farfetched today but is conceivable in that context.

When the major foreign policy problems are political arms control negotiations cannot continue to bear the principal burden of East-West relations. They are too esoteric; they turn political leaders into ratifiers of agreements among technicians. It is time to face the fact that no agreement so far negotiated-- including those in which I participated--has made a strategic difference. Indeed they are justified domestically on precisely

AUG 29 '88 21:23 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.4.13

the mercy of unforeseeable events. Has the time come to separate the nature of the regimes from the security of the Soviet Union? Are not in the long run arrangements in Finland more conducive to Soviet security than those of Eastern Europe? Is it possible to devise security arrangements for Eastern Europe that meet Soviet-security concerns even very widely defined while permitting a political evolution compatible with popular aspirations? In the context of such a House of Europe it would be possible to conceive a security system involving drastic reductions of all outside forces—including those of the US—that might in fact revolutionize present concepts of security.

This is not a negotiation that lends itself to the formal diplomacy conducted by coveys of diplomats and negotiators. Ideally it should be conducted by some form of fully integrated treaty leading to a new characteristic of arms control negotiations. It requires above all a strategy worked out with some care and closely coordinated with our allies. It would be most effective in the context of rapid progress towards West European integration in which case

'AUG 29 '88 21:24 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.5.14

Europe should play a major exploratory role in the sensitive,
confidential talks without which the concept is doomed.

## Asian Perspectives

The emerging multipolar world will produce major changes in Asia as well: indeed, Asia will be one of its principal components. Gorbachev has made essentially the same appeal in Asia as in Europe: a suggestion that the United States has become dispensable and a proposal for some vague Asian security system to parallel the House of Europe. But the impact has been different.

The Asian nations have gone to school in the European power politics of the age of colonialism and have grafted onto it their own unsentimental national experiences. They do not look for a transcendent end of international tensions. They will try to assess the trade-off between a decline in Soviet ideological dynamism and its increase in real power if perestroika succeeds.

AUG 29 '88 21:26

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P. 70

OY

35

eyes--create a Soviet temptation to set back Chinese modernization.

But that temptation finds a limit in the Soviet need to maintain its standing elsewhere. Too overt pressure on China would weaken the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States.

Thus the careful calculators in Beijing will lower their estimate of the dangers of a direct quest for hegemony by the Soviet Union, and will feel less inclined to gear their foreign policy to preventing it.

Moreover they will take care not to be isolated by a US-Soviet rapprochement. They will not want to be the last to man the forts of the Cold War.

The likely outcome is a steady improvement in Sino-Soviet relations--especially as the Soviets meet Chinese conditions, by encouraging Vietnamese withdrawal above all Vietnamese withdrawals from Cambodia. At the same time Chinese planners are not sentimental. They will keep in mind that rapprochement with Moscow cannot shorten the 3,000 miles of the Sino-Soviet frontier. They know that professions of good

AUG 29 '88 21:29 KISSINGER ASSOC

Wash. DC

P. 10 19

38

leaders are likely to have the same conception of security as their colonial predecessors. This is why they have insisted on all the boundaries established during British rule. They will seek to be the strongest power in the subcontinent and will attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian Ocean and in Southeast Asia. Thus whatever the day-to-day initiatives between New Delhi and Washington, its own geopolitical interests will impel India over the next decade to assume some of the security functions now exercised by Washington in those areas.

Thus the balance of power in Asia involves the United States less directly than in Europe. In Europe for the foreseeable future, the United States must be part of the balance. In Asia, Korea excepted, no American troops are in the front line. In the '90s there will exist in fact two balances of power in Asia: between China, Japan, and the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia and between Japan, India and to some extent the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. The American role with respect to these two

P. 11

(N)

39

balances should be similar to that of Britain with respect to
the European continent: we are the balancer of the equilibrium.
Whatever our legal obligations an Asia under hostile domination
is as much against US interests as an enslaved Europe. This
after all was the proximate cause of US involvement in the
second World War. As a balancer the US must support the weaker
against the stronger and the potential victim against the potential
aggressor. Such a policy has to be carried out in the face of
the almost certain degradation of our Philippine bases over the
next decade and the need to restructure both forces and command
arrangements in Korea in the same period. This requires a sense
of national strategy yet to be acquired by American foreign policy.

## Conclusion

The basic US foreign policy problem is conceptual. The
evolution in Moscow, the change in weapons technology and the
emergence of new power centers have combined to hasten the end of

AUG 29 '88 21:30 KISSINGER ASSOC

WASHINGTON, DC

P. 12, 21

the world as it existed in the forty years since the end of
the second World War. This is often identified with a decline
of American power. In fact absolute American power has grown
in the past forty years and is increasing still. But the
strength of other nations has increased even more rapidly partly
because as a result of the devastation of the second World War
they started from a smaller base.

The emergence of a multipolar world does not diminish
America's importance but requires us to change our involvement
from a principal actor to a supporting role at least in some areas.
If our relative power is shrinking, if ideology is declining and
if new power centers are emerging it is clear that we can no
longer do everything simultaneously. It follows that peace
presupposes a balance of power--a concept which Americans of all
persuasions have historically resisted.

It is part of America's historic legacy that we have
considered our situation as unique and immune to the experiences

AUG '89 '88 21:32 KISSINGER ASSOC

P. 14

by domestic politics, conducted by experts who have studied
the issues for as many years as the political leaders have hours
to deal with them they threaten to slip out of control of any
long-range policy. For example all experts agree that a reduction
of present strategic forces by 50% increases the vulnerability of
America's strategic deterrent. There is wide consensus, too,
that this increase in vulnerability could be avoided by measures
such as mobile missiles or fewer missiles on each submarine or
strategic defense. But these measures have not been taken or
even publicly outlined and they are being opposed by one of the
candidates for the Presidency.

Modernization of the strategic forces is therefore a
prerequisite to arms control negotiations and it must be related
as well to a sustainable concept of conventional defense. It is
highly probable that the next President will face early on a
renewal of the Gorbachev tactic of accepting some Western proposals
made for domestic considerations and insufficiently worked out in

AUG 29 '88 21:33 KISSINGER ASSOC

WASH. DC

P. 15.24

strategic or political terms. This could involve some reduction
of Soviet forces in Hungary, perhaps Czechoslovakia, or even
from Eastern Germany. What should the West's response be then?
How will it affect nuclear modernization in the Federal Republic
in the light of the statement by the Federal government that
modernization would not take place if there were progress towards
conventional arms control? What will be the defense strategy
of NATO after nuclear weapons have been stigmatized and conventional
weapons frozen or reduced in a strategically irrelevant manner?
Historically conventional deterrence has never worked. What then
is the Western concept of conventional arms control?

Arms control negotiations are an integral part of Western
diplomacy. They will turn into a trap, however, if they are not
embodied in a concept of defense on one side and a vision of a
political future on the other.

This requires a new look at the organization by which
national security policy is developed in the United States. The

AUG 29 '88 21:34 KISSINGER ASSOC

WASHINGTON, DC

P. 1625.

emphasis is on adversary procedures between increasingly autonomous departments that specialize in solving day-to-day operational problems. There is in practice no focal point for long-range strategy especially since the decline in the role of the National Security Council staff and its diversion into the very short-term operational management that it should seek to overcome. It has been fashionable to deprecate the role of the national security advisor. But without some focal point in the White House to make sure that the options are sorted out, a new President will be swamped by pet projects without the means of evaluating them. And the great departments must take a look at their own structure to make sure that strategy is not overwhelmed by tactics.

AUG 29 7888 21:35 KISSINGER ASSOC

WHSH. DL

45

August 29, 1988

Draft #2

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

A gap between expectation and reality is characteristic of a revolutionary period and ours is no exception. We are witnessing the end of the post-war structure of international relations--a process which in the past has always involved turmoil and commitment. But public discussion in the democracies celebrates peace as if it were a static condition occuring almost automatically and the world lives with a consciousness of harmony.

In the idyllic picture of the world ahead of us painted by too many leaders of the democracies Gorbachev is turned into a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are treated as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global

2

appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society with its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs. Therefore the democracies are said to have an obligation to "help" Gorbachev achieve these goals.

To be sure this idyll is punctuated by frequent protestations of wariness as to Soviet intentions. But this is ritual. The dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the democracies and the Soviet Union and even of personal friendship between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev.

No doubt progress has been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But a new era cannot be based on personalities. Major changes in the international order, to be lasting, must reflect an underlying reality. The way the principal countries assess and shape that reality will determine whether there will be tranquility or turmoil:

--Whatever Gorbachev's intentions, he has started a
process within the Soviet Union and even more in Eastern
Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell.

--Whatever the convictions of the leaders of
democracies, they have contributed to a view of the USSR
which within the next decade will bring about major changes
in Atlantic relations.

4

--The regional conflicts which are being
settled--Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern Africa--result in
part from the changed priorities of the US and the USSR.
And each of the so-called settlements creates a dynamism of
its own and therefore the need for a new approach to the
issues and interests at stake.

--To deal with such a world the United States must
reassess its historic approach to international affairs with
its emphasis on intentions rather than capabilities and its
reluctance to be involved with maintaining a balance of
power.

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the Soviet leadership. Indeed whether it is "helpful"--to
use a fashionable phrase--to Gorbachev for them to do so.

To be sure, Gorbachev's success in overcoming the
Soviet Union's isolation of 1985 when he took office is an
astonishing tour de force. Many Western leaders, President
Reagan included, seem to believe that their personal
relationship with Gorbachev eases diplomatic negotiations,
that Gorbachev virtually alone is responsible for the
domestic changes apparently taking place in the Soviet
Union, and that these changes in turn will bring about a new
era of peace.

Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True,
major, perhaps historic, changes are under way in the Soviet
Union. But it defies all reason to believe that a man who
has never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party
and who was in the Politburo during the Brezhnev era would
abandon the Marxist belief in the predominance of objective

6

factors in favor of a "subjective" affection for a
democratic leader. No member of the Politburo, much less
its General Secretary, would dare approach his colleagues
with the proposition that his personal ties to a democratic
leader could justify changes in Soviet policy.

For all his panache and intelligence, Gorbachev like
most statesmen, is to some degree a product of circumstance.
He seeks--with courage and imagination--to overcome the
stagnation of the late Brezhnev era. It is not a commitment
to peace in the abstract but to a more competitive Soviet
Union, though he undoubtedly needs a period of relative calm
to achieve his domestic goals. Another Soviet leader would
in all likelihood feel compelled to pursue similar policies,
if with less verve and psychological skill. After all, the
present phase of Soviet policy was inaugurated when
Gromyko--attacked at the party conference as a relic of the
Brezhnev era--called on President Reagan in 1984 during the

7

leadership of the decrepit Chernenko, who has become a non-person. No one can know—including Gorbachev himself—what he will do if he should succeed in his goal of infusing the Soviet economy with dynamism and Soviet society with higher morale.

The struggle in Moscow is not over democracy but primarily over the creation of a modern state to overcome the feudal baronies which are the practical result of a centrally planned Marxist economy. It is thus akin to the struggles by which the modern state emerged in Europe in the 17th century at the end of the feudal period. That did not lead to democracy in France nor to a restrained foreign policy anywhere. In England it ushered in two centuries of colonial expansion. In France it led to a century and a half of seeking to dominate Europe.

Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense as a static condition of good will— which it must be

8

remembered the West developed only after World War I--the criteria on the basis of which he is to determine it are far from clear. There is little in the history of either tsars or commissars to supply him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by Communist ideology or Russian historical expansionism has been debated ever since the existence of the Communist state. During World War II the democracies convinced themselves that Stalin, having defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution, would pursue Russian national objectives rather than Communist ideology after the war. And they proved to be right though not in the seuse they had imagined. After the war Stalin returned to the program Molotov submitted to Hitler in November 1940 as the price for Soviet support. It could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination of the Balkans and of the Straits;

9

The role of ideology has been threefold: it gave Soviet leaders an inner assurance that their tsarist predecessors sometimes lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters and in the 70's it tempted them into distant enterprises such as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an abandonment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the historical Russian agenda.

Even should Communist ideology decline, historic Russia would still remain as a great power whose objectives Gorbachev would have to determine in the light of its

10

experience. And for four hundred years it has been a major
challenge for world peace how to establish a relationship
between that giant state of eleven time zones and its
smaller neighbors. Often breached by invaders, Russian
frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably outward in all
directions.

11

Most importantly, the psychiatric approach to foreign
policy tempts not only escapism on the part of the
democracies but adventurism on the part of the Soviet Union.
In the contemporary world even a nationalistic Russian
leader should have incentives for moderation. Almost all
emerging power centers are at or near the borders of the
Soviet Union. An expansionist policy would run the risk of
creating a coalition among them. But such an insight is far
from automatic. Adjusting to the new realities is
inevitably painful, involving as it does the abandonment
or modification of cherished preconceptions. It is much
easier to exploit the confusion of the adversary for
unilateral benefits than to explore a new relationship based
on true reciprocity.

12

The often repeated phrase that we should help Gorbachev is therefore devoid of meaning unless "help" is properly defined. Does it imply that we should make agreements that we would not make on their merits? Does it mean that we must accept the Soviet definition of the issues? Should we side with Gorbachev in his internal disputes? Do we understand them well enough to do so? Or do we help him most by putting forward a reasonable concept of a more peaceful world that takes account of changing realities and that he can submit to his colleagues?

I believe the latter is the only responsible course. It is to render no service to Gorbachev--whatever his motives--to ascribe to him Western liberal values. Nothing could undermine him more rapidly with his colleagues. The opportunity presented by the Soviet need for a respite and the defense of new power centers must not be wasted by making the most favorable assumptions about the future or

13

- The nature of Third World conflicts now that the
nuclear superpowers seem to be disengaging in certain key
areas.

- The political impact of the successful arms control
negotiations especially in Europe.

14

--The relationship of countries like Japan, China and India (and later Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico) to the international equilibrium.

## Third World Issues

15

To deal with foreign policy as a continuum is particularly difficult for the United States which historically has treated foreign policy as a series of discrete problems capable of final resolution. During America's geographic remoteness the United States could indeed choose its involvements and withdraw into isolation after having achieved its objectives. But nations with narrower margins of survival and less of a geographic buffer from world affairs have not had this legacy. It is surely not the way the Soviet Union looks at foreign policy. For the Soviet Union--as its tsarist predecessors--is playing chess not poker. It is patient and persistent; its basic objectives are not easily altered.

This is why it is a mistake to analyze the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as analogous to the American experience in Vietnam. In Vietnam the United States not only withdrew but abdicated. That will not be the Soviet

16

attitude--indeed cannot--with respect to a country on its border. The Russian interest in Afghanistan asserted for a century and a half under tsars and Communists, will surely be pursued in the future by more indirect methods.

There are three possible outcomes after the Soviet troops withdraw:

(a) the emergence of a government of national reconciliation whose writ runs throughout the country; (b) the maintenance of the Communist regime in the principal cities if the mujahedeen find themselves incapable of frontal assaults on taking fortified towns; (c) the collapse of the Communist regime leading to a confused struggle between pro-Pakistani, pro-Iranian, pro-Soviet, fundamentalist and secular factions.

The first outcome, having never occurred in Afghan history, is extremely unlikely. The other two will involve some kind of civil war. If the Communist regime maintains

17

itself in the principal towns, the Soviets will have
achieved their strategic objective: Afghanistan would be a
Soviet forward strategic base in the historic Russian thrust
towards the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. In
these conditions maintaining the resistance even in the
countryside will grow increasingly difficult. The Communist
government is internationally recognized; for example, the
United States still maintains an embassy in Kabul. In the
contingency described here it will shed the stigma of Soviet
occupation. Public and Congressional support for supplying
the resistance in these circumstances will surely decline.
As time goes on Soviet pressure on Pakistan will increase.
For the agreement leading to Soviet withdrawal prohibits
Pakistan from letting its territory be used for arms
shipments. The American declarations that it will continue
to equip the resistance are unilateral statements not
self-evidently compatible with the terms of the agreement.

18

Even before the death of President Zia the Soviet warnings
to Pakistan __________ [line illegible] __________

And the death of President Zia will undoubtedly introduce an
element of uncertainty into Pakistani policy at least for
the many months needed until a new leadership emerges.

This will be even more true if the influence in Kabul
collapses. A civil war of all against all is then almost
certain. Pro-Iranian, pro-Pakistani, pro-Soviet, secular
and fundamentalist factions will contest for preeminence in
a manner reminiscent of Lebanon. If that happens the Soviet
Union might well play the role of Syria in Lebanon as the
ultimate arbiter of the conflict. Public support for the
resistance in the United States will diminish; indeed a
definition of what is a legitimate resistance will almost
surely become controversial. And the perceived interests of
Pakistan and the United States may well diverge. Indeed
America's Pakistan policy itself may become an issue.

19

In other words, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
ushers in a new and complicated diplomacy in which it
becomes important to prevent the implementation by the
Soviet Union of Lenin's dictum: one step backwards, two
steps forward. This requires a careful definition of (1)
American interests in that country (2) US relations in the
Indian subcontinent (3) American attitudes towards the
Afghan resistance (4) long-term American attitude towards
Pakistan. It is beyond the scope of this article to answer
these issues. It is enough to stress that the '90's are apt
to be more dangerous than even the preceding decade.

Afghanistan will present a challenge to America's
ability to define its natural interest. Cambodia emerges as
a moral nightmare. Of course Vietnam for thirty years has
specialized in promising withdrawals and then brazenly
breaking its promises. But if for the first time Hanoi's
most recent promise should turn out to be the exception to

20

the rule, it could leave the field to the largest and best organized group of the anti-Vietnamese resistance: the unspeakable Khmer Rouge that killed perhaps two million of its own population in the three years it governed from 1975-78.

The trauma of Indochina has prevented America from coming to grips with reality on the ground. Self-righteous moralists have propagated the outrageous proposition that American bombing of a three-mile strip of Cambodian territory in 1969-70 occupied by the North Vietnamese was the proximate cause of the genocide of its own people by the Khmer Rouge. And the same one-sidedness led to the cut-off of American aid which at a minimum accelerated the defeat of the anti-Communist forces.

When the Khmer Rouge were in turn defeated by the Vietnamese, America's own civil war prevented us from facing the realities on the ground. The national policy was to

21

make the position of the Vietnamese in Cambodia untenable;
but also not to become involved militarily--even to the
extent of supplying military equipment to the forces which
were at once anti-Vietnamese and anti-Khmer Rouge.

Inevitably the Khmer Rouge, historically supplied by China,
has emerged as the strongest force. When Vietnam leaves
Cambodia, it will be extremely difficult to keep the Khmer
Rouge from seizing power. It is naive to appeal to
China--the principal sponsor of the anti-Vietnamese
resistance--to rein in their clients. China has already
shown its good will by giving some arms to Prince Sihanouk's
forces. But Beijing cannot create a balance of forces in a
vacuum. And America must learn that the view that
negotiations do not have a momentum of their own is
illusion. Negotiations can ratify an equilibrium; they
cannot create it.

22

Ironically the best hope for an equilibrium in Cambodia is to use the Cambodian army trained by the Vietnamese as a counterweight to the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese army leaves. This is not an uplifting prospect. But it is the choice we have imposed on ourselves. If the Khmer Rouge cannot be stopped by exhortation, some local force must be created. If the democracies cannot or will not support the armed forces of Prince Sihanouk they will have to rely on a morally less attractive alternative.

Similar analyses could be made for Southern Africa or Central America. But this would go beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes it is enough to stress that none of the solutions to regional conflicts worked out in recent months are conclusive. In Afghanistan we can lose our strategic position and in Cambodia our moral position. These regional issues impose on the United States an unprecedented need for a sober analysis of its interests,

23

its resources and its long-term strategy. And, failing
that, these regions will erupt again in a much more
insidious way than previously.

* * *

AUG 28 '88 18:51 KISSINGER ASSOC CHIESA, WHSH. DC

P. 2.00

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

It is the essence of a revolutionary period that there is a gap between expectation and reality. We are witnessing the end of the post-war structure of international relations--a process requiring a more complex diplomacy than anything with which we are familiar and requiring strenuous efforts. But public discussion in the democracies celebrates peace as if it were a static condition in which the hand for effort evaporates and the world lives with a consciousness of harmony.

In the idyllic picture of the world ahead of us painted by many all the leaders of the democracies Gorbachev is turned into a romantic figure single-handedly altering the course of history. Class and class antagonism are viewed as the key to the end of international tensions. Communism is thought to lose its ideological dynamism, hence its global appeal. The Soviet Union is expected to become a consumer society with its leadership preoccupied by domestic affairs. Therefore the

August 26, 1988

Draft #1

AUG "28" '88 18:52 KISSINGER ASSOC CHIEF, WHICH DC

P.3.63

2

No doubt progress has been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But it is important to remember that a new era <u>cannot</u> be based on personalities. Major changes in the era <u>will</u> come into being smoothly. The new international order which is emerging brings with it a host of new challenges. <u>They</u> must be met as an underlying reality. The way the democracies respond to them will determine whether there will be tranquility or turmoil.

--Whatever Gorbachev's intentions he has started a process within the Soviet Union and even more in Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell.

H

conferences nor even if he can foresee.

The way the democracies responded to the war will determine whether

order will be made of existing things with it a host of new challenges

ers themselves come into being smoothly. The new international

can only be achieved in circumstances which are unique. What negotiations

democracies and the Soviet Union and even of personal friendship
dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the

ofwartiveness as to Soviet international. But this is rather. The

To be able to do this really is precluded by frequent negotiations

achieve these goals.

2

AUG 28 '88 18:52 KISSINGER ASSOC IATES, WASH. DC

P.484

3

--Whatever the convictions of the leaders of democracies they have contributed to a view of the USSR which within the next decade will bring about major changes in Atlantic relations.

As the US- Soviet ideological rivalry diminishes, traditional geopolitical factors will become more prominent. The decline of Communist ideology--real or imagined--will require increasing attention to historic Russian expansionism.

but a new挑戰, in this instance and interest or array,
settlements creates a dynamism of its own and therefore the need
priorities of the US and the USSR. And each of the so-called
Cameroon, Southern Africa--result in part from the changed

--The regional conflicts which are being settled--Afghanistan,
attrition.

in strength and become increasingly important in international
--This will occur while Japan, China and India will grow
attention to historic Russian expansionism.

Communist ideology--real or imagined--will require increasing
governmental pressure will become more prominent. The decline of

We are the US government's ideological laboratory, stimulating traditional
radical political and not simply an arms control problem.

--These twin events make the outcome of Europe--East and

they have contributed to a view of the USA which within the

3

B-19A

AUG. 58. 88:18:25 KRESSINGER APOC. TIER? WHEN IN

P.5

4

--In these circumstances exclusive concern with arms control is a diversion from the dominant trends of the new period.

The most immediate issue is whether the democracies are wise in putting so much reliance on a single personality in the Soviet leadership. Indeed whether it is "helpful" to Gorbachev--to use a fashionable phrase--for them to do so.

To be sure Gorbachev's success in overcoming the Soviet Union's isolation and stagnation of 1985 when he took office is an astonishing tour de force. Many Western leaders, President Reagan included, seem to believe that their personal relationship with Gorbachev eases diplomatic negotiations, that Gorbachev

H

With Gorbachev, Gorbachevese diplomatic negotiations, that Gorbachev
had begun, seemed to relieve this personal relationship.

Ansat临ing court de force. Many Western leaders, President
Union's isolation and isolation of 1982 when he took office in
1984.

to use a fashionable phrase---for them to do so.

Soviet leadership. Indeed whether it is "helpful" to Gorbachev--
wise in putting so much reliance on a single personality in the

on international rather than economic and its reliance on its

its dominant approach to international affairs with its emphasis

period.

control is a diversion from the dominant trends of the new
trend in the world economy, and the new control is a

13

AUG 28 '88 18:53 KISSINGER ASSOC

P.6.00

Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True,
major, perhaps historic, changes are under way in the Soviet
Union. But it defies all reason to believe that a man who has
never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party and who
was in the Politburo during the Brezhnev era would abandon the
Marxist belief in the predominance of objective factors in favor
of a "subjective" affection for a democratic leader. No member
of the Politburo, much less its General Secretary, would dare
announce his colleagues with the proposition that his personal
ties to an American president could justify changes in Soviet
policy.

seek to ... with courage and imagination--to overcome the arduous
statement, is to some degree a product of circumstance. He
For all his banality and inefficiency, Corapchev like most
boffy.

tires to an American audience could justify changes in Soviet
unanimity in his allusions to the propagation of utopian
of the Poltrepuro, much less its General Secretary, would be
of a "subjective" affection for a democratic leader. No wonder
Marxist belief in the predominance of objective factors in favor
was in the Poltrepuro during the Brezhnev era would elapse the
never held any boat outside the Soviet Communist Party and who
Union. But it delays all reason to believe that a man who has
waited. In that sense, Winston Churchill is the under way in the Soviet
Each of these assumptions is extremely dubious. True,
changes in turn will bring about a new era of peace.
apparently taking place in the Soviet Union, and that these
virtually alone is reasonable for the domestic changes

P.7

6

of the late Brezhnev era. It is not a commitment to peace
in the abstract but to a more competitive Soviet Union, though
he undoubtedly needs a period of relative calm to achieve his
domestic goals. Another Soviet leader would in all likelihood
feel compelled to pursue similar policies, if with less verve
and psychological skill. After all the present phase of Soviet
policy was inaugurated when Gromyko--attacked at the party
conference as a relic of the Brezhnev era During the leadership
of the decrepit Chernenko, who has become a non-person, called
on President Reagan in 1984. No one can know--including Gorbachev
himself--what he will do if he should success in his goal of
infusing the Soviet economy with dynamism and Soviet society with
higher morale.

The euphoria in the democracies must therefore be based
on that in the masses. But if we are to have a real民主in the state
that believes most ardently in Gorbachev must assume that he
cannot proven; hence that the Soviet Union will remain permanently

(M)

10

["The embodi in the democracies what therefore he passed\nthat he will do if he should succeed in his host of\ninsulting the Soviet economy with dynamism and Soviet society with\nhimself--what he will do if he should succeed in his host of\nins

AUG 28 '88 18:54 KISSINGER ASSOC

WISH. DC

P. 8. 68

weak. The act of faith assumes that a strong Soviet Union will abandon both three hundred years of expansionist Russian foreign policy and seventy years of Soviet policy based on the correlation of forces.

That is not the order. Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense as a static condition of good will--which he remembered / which the West only developed after World War I--the criteria on the basis of which he is to determine it are far from clear. There is little in the history of either states or commissars to supply him a guide comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors.

The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by Communist ideology or Russian history, expansionism has been debated ever since the existence of the Communist state. During World War II [it was needed to DEMOCRAT the DEMOCRATs] the Soviet Union provided comfort from the general conviction that Stalin had defeated Trotsky on the issue of world revolution, and hence would pursue Russian national objectives rather than expand [the] expansion after the war.

encounter after the war.

(that Stalin defeated Trotzky on the issue of world revolution

World War II

Communist countries from anti-fascist社会主义

deposed ever since the existence of the Communist state. During

Communist ideology or Russian history, experimentalism has been

substantially a bridge comforting to the Soviet Union's neighbors. There is little in the history of either state or commission to on the part of which he is to determine it is far from clear.

which the West only developed after World War I--the criteria which he was considering.

What in a state right even were corroboration committed to

correlation of forces.

foreign policy and seventy years of Soviet policy based on the will of the people, three hundred years of experimentalist Russian weak. The act of faith seems that a strong Soviet Union

B

P.9

8

And they proved to be nijer
In fact Stalin did pursue Russia's traditional goals:
Clang not in the sense they had unleased
this distinguishing feature was that he pursued them all
simultaneously. Whatever the illusions of the democracies,
Stalin after the war returned to the normal way of life
to Hitler in November 1940 so the price for Soviet support.
It could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet domination
of the Balkans and of the Straits; a major voice in
Soviet predominance over Iran. Soviet policy did not reach all
these objectives but it was not through lack of trying.
The role of ideology has been fulfilled: it gave Soviet
leaders an inner assurance that their tsarist predecessors
sometimes lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of
in the future
supporters and it tempted them into distant enterprises such
as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina to which traditional
Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline
of ideological elan is thus most likely to be reflected in a
willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an

A

willingness to trim distant commitments. It does not mean an
of ideological sin is due most likely to be reflected in a
Renaissance rulers might have given a lower priority. The decline
of Yiddish, Cops, Nicosia and Ingolins to which traditional
supporters and it tempted them into distant enterprises and
sometimes lacked; it sublimed them with a global capre of
jeasders an inner assurance that their tarsied predecessors

The role of ideology was seen from within: it gave Soviet
these objectives but it was not through lack of trying.

Soviet霸權主义 over Iran. Soviet bohemian did not reach all
of the Balkans and of the Arabia: dominion of Poland; and

It could have been crafted by Peter the Great: Soviet dominion
to Hittur in November 1940 in the bate for Soviet sabbath.

Arresting the West: the DRUMMAHILL in the DRUMMAHILL LU the DRUMMAHILL IN THE DRUMMAHILL
Whatever the illusions of the democrats
the distorting feature was that he interested self

In face of Stalin's Big Bureaucracy's parasitical nature:

8

HOU 18 88 18 OCTOBER 1988

F.1

9

abandonment--indeed it could lead to an enhancement--of the
~~pursuit~~ of traditional Russian objectives.

In the end geography, geopolitics and history define the
limits within which personality and ideology operates. Even
should Communist ideology decline there would still remain
historic Russia as a great power whose objectives Gorbachev
would have to address in the light of its experience, and
for four hundred years it has been a major challenge for world
peace how to establish a relationship between that giant state
of eleven time zones and its smaller neighbors. Often breached
by invaders Russian frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably
outward in all directions.

The reliance on one Soviet leader creates three dangers:
Since every new Soviet leader has disavowed his predecessor,
such a course is inherently precarious. Second by creating the
impression that tensions were caused by idiosyncracies it strengthens
the neutralist elements who have claimed all along that the risks

H

The newspapermen who have caused such a stroud that the traks
invasion that tensions were caused by the tensions it extends
and a course is inherently precluded. Second by creating the
since every new Soviet leader has drawn toward his predecessor.

The reliance on one Soviet leader creates one danger: an
outwardly alluring person.

By invaders Russian frontiers have nevertheless moved inexorably
of eleven time zones and its ammeter neighbor. Often prescribed
because now to satisfy a relationship between that giant estate
tor four hundred years it has been a major challenge for world
military power to demonstrate in one day all the techniques. And
historic Russia as a great power whose objectives Gorbachev
themselves Communist Hungary defined almost wholly still remote
states within which personality and official character, even

in the end geostratification and history settle the
unquestioned creeds of Soviet objectives.

The Soviet Union

H

HIT IS DEyatIRy LIsSOn

B

AUG 28 '88 18:57 KISSINGER ASSOC

10

Third should Gorbachev leave office for essentially internal
reasons a wave of despondency and self-flagellation will sweep
over the democracies that will no doubt cause thornsalvos of not
having made enough concessions.

The often repeated phrase that we should help Gorbachev is
devoid of meaning unless help is properly defined. Does it
imply that we should make agreements that we would not make on
their merits? Does it mean that we must always let the Soviet
definition of the issues? Should we side with Gorbachev in his
internal disputes? Or do we help him most by putting forward a
reasonable concept of a more peaceful world that takes account
of changing realities and that he can submit to his colleagues?

of changing revenues and that we can submit to his colleagues?
unanimous意见 of a more favorable world that such an economic
internal dispute? Or do we help him most by putting forward a
definition of the issue? Should we side with Gorbachev in his
their words? Does he mean era of war with Soviet Union?

imply that we should make agreements that we would not make on
discord of meaning unless help is properly defined. Does it

This often referred issue that we should help Gorbachev is
having made enough concessions.

over the democracies that will no longer demonstrate the
reasons a wave of gauging and self-titling will sweep
through should come to an end for essentially internal
moyest that the Soviet leaguer never changes its shots.

who blame tensions on the failures of leadership and those who
increase the democracies will once again be found between those
of the Cold War were私von and unnecessary. It is tensive

This is not true.

10

B3...

AUG 28 '88 18:57 KISSINGER ASSOC CIATES, WASH. DC

11

It is to render no service to Gorbachev--whatever his motives--to ascribe to him Western liberal values. Nothing could undermine him more rapidly with his colleagues. For the struggle in Moscow is not over democracy, as many about here in the Western world, but primarily over the creation of a modern state that overcomes the feudal baronies which are the practical result of a centrally planned Marxist economy. It is thus akin to the struggles by which the modern state emerged in Europe in the 17th century at the end of the feudal period. That did not lead to democracy in France nor to a restrained foreign policy anywhere. In England it ushered in two centuries of colonial expansion. In France it led to a century and a half of seeking to dominate Europe.

To be sure there were then no nuclear weapons commanding
quiescence. But the opportunity presented by the Soviet need
for a respite must not be wasted by wallowing in psychiatry-
and the horror that attends it.

The opportunity presented by the Soviet need
of every possible channel

P.5.15

12

assessments of Soviet leaders or in escaping every dilemma

by making the most favorable assumptions about the future of
the Soviet Union, conducting foreign policy largely as an aspect of a domestic
policy.

In the new era that is emerging coexistence requires a
vigorous
 carefull assessement of the legitimate interests of both sides
 and a serious effort to determine whether and how they can be
 reconciled. This is all the more important because the
diplomatic results of recent years create their own dynamism
and because the growing power of some countries increasingly
affects the global equilibrium. And the United States has little
precedent in its history for dealing with such a fluid international
environment.

--The political impact of the successful arms control
superpowers seem to be misleading in certain key areas.

--The nature of Third World conflicts now that the nuclear
thinks or Gorbechev's motivations:

Three areas of issues will shape the new era whatever one

ENVIRONMENT

precedent in its history for dealing with and a third international
attitude the aloof equilibrium. And the United States has to
and because the drawing power of some countries increasingly
diplomatic results of recent years create their own dynamism
reconciled. This is all the more important because the
and a serious effort to determine whether and how they can be
careful assessment of the legitimate interests of both sides
in the new era that is emerging coexistence requires a
broadening.

In the new era that is emerging coexistence requires a
wide range of instruments for building a new order.

In the most favorable assumptions about the future of the
international community, the most favorable coexistence requires a
wide range of instruments for building a new order.

B

13

B.E.12

NOC 20'S 88-10 SORCIEREN 18800 # 1H1F.7. WH3M III

R. 6. 11

13

Third World Issues

All this indicates at a minimum that the Soviet Union has
found itself overextended in theaters with the exception of
Afghanistan far from areas traditionally identified with Soviet
national security. But foreign policy knows no plateaus; each
is an advancing tumor of a larger advance creating a new set of challenges.

To deal with foreign policy as a conundrum
This is a particular problem for the United States which
tends to treat foreign policy as a series of discrete problems

13

because so great a threat foreign policy as a series of discrete problems

advance creates a new set of challenges.

national security. But foreign policy knows no boundaries; each
Afghanistan far from areas traditionally identified with Soviet
to found itself overextended in theaters with the exception of
All this indicates at a minimum that the Soviet Union has
principle for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from Afghanistan.

that it would leave Cambodia by 1989; there is an agreement in
withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan; Vietnam has indicated
during the course of this year. The Soviet Union has agreed to
Major progress has been made on so-called regional issues

### Third World Issues

national equitization.

India (and later Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico) to the inter-

13

AUG '28 '88 18:58 KISSINGER ASSOC VULCHIES, WASH. DC

P. 7.02

14

capable of final resolution. But this legacy of America's

retrospectiveness would

geographic isolation which permitted the United States to

indeed + withdraw after with isolation after

(choose its involvements is not the way foreign policy has been

rooted by nations with narrower margins of survival and less

leave not led this legacy)

of a geographic buffer from world affairs. It is surely not the

Each move is part of a design. And it is patient and persistent,

its basic objectives are not easily attained.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has been too widely
This is only it is a write up & analysis
acknowledged as analogues to the American involvement in Vietnam.

But the analogy is misleading. In Vietnam the United States not

only withdrew but abdicated. That cannot be the Soviet attitude

with respect to a country on the Soviet border. The Soviet Union

has surely abdicated an interest in Afghanistan which it has

asserted for a century and a half under tsars and Communists--

will surely be pursued in the future by more indigenous

it will seek to assure it by different more indirect methods.

18

HUGO 26.08.68 18:59 KISSINGER ASSOC III

P. 8

15

of the Communist regime in the cities because the mujahedeen
find themselves univable of fentah ansul an
while controlling the countryside (take fortified towns;

(c) the collapse of the Communist regime leading to civil war
a confused
stirrple

The first outcome is extremely unlikely having never occurred
in Afghan history. The other two will involve some kind of civil
war. If the Communist regime maintains itself in the principal
towns, the Soviets will have achieved their strategic objective:
Afghanistan would be a forward base towards the Persian Gulf
in the historic position of the Kush
and the Indian subcontinent. Maintaining the resistance even in
that condition
the countryside will grow increasingly difficult. The Communist
government is internationally recognized; for example, the United
GHAARA APRI MAINTAIN AN EMBASSY IN KABUL. It will face the
agreement of Soviet occupation. The agreement leading to Soviet
Public Security support for
supplying the resistance in those
resistance will surely succeed
At the same time the Soviet programs on
radicalization will continue.

H

["PROGRAM OF THE GENERAL OFFICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS", "THE GENERAL OFFICE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS WILL BE LOCATED IN THE NEW YORK OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE.", "The government is internationally recognized; for example, the United\nthe countrywide will show increasingly difficulties. The Communist\nand the Russian government. (Mussolini, the Security Act 1949)\nthe Soviet Union would be a forward base for the German war\nin World War II.", "The other two will involve some kind of civil", "war. It is the Communist regime maintaining itself in the principal\ntowns, the Soviets will have achieved their strategic objective:\nthe Russian subordination. (Mussolini, the Security Act 1949)", "The first outcome is extremely unlikely, having never occurred\nand secular factions.", "between Pro-Bolshevist, Pro-Irano-Viet, Pro-Soviet, Pro-Communist", "(a) the collaboration of the Communist regime leading to the annihilation of the Soviet Union, the destruction of the Soviet Union, the liquidation of the Soviet Union, the liquid

> war on diminutive states must be a definition or must be a legitimate
> and public support for the resistance in the United States to
> in Lebanon as the ultimate apportion of the courtier. In this...

> that happens the Soviet Union might well play the role of Syria
> conduct for prominence in a manner reminiscent of Lebanon. It
> Pakistan, pro-Soviet, secular and fundamentalist factions will
> be the main force in the struggle for Lebanon's independence.

But if the Community sees in Lebanon a civil war
> which will mean a civil war in Lebanon, BRO-LEO will have to
> be the only one to deal with it. The Community's interest in Lebanon
> will be the same as the Community's interest in Lebanon as a whole.
> And the degree of pressure it will generate will depend
> on the degree of uncertainty about the Community policy
> which the Community will adopt.

The Community will have to decide whether it will continue to
> support the resistance in Lebanon, or whether it will continue to
> support the resistance in Lebanon and it should support it from
> Lebanon and it should support it from Lebanon and it should support
> it in the event of a civil war in Lebanon.

And the Community will have to decide whether it will continue to
> support the resistance in Lebanon, or whether it will continue to
> support the resistance in Lebanon and it should support it from
> Lebanon and it should support it from Lebanon and it should support
> it in the event of a civil war in Lebanon.

B

AUG 28 '88 20:01 KISSINGER ASSOC'

F.1

In other words, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan ushers
in a new and complicated diplomacy in which it becomes important
to prevent the implementation by the Soviet Union of Lenin's
dictum: one step backwards, two steps forward. This requires
a careful definition of (1) American interests in that country
(2) US relations in the Indian subcontinent (3) American attitudes
towards the Afghan resistance (4) long-term American attitude
towards Pakistan. There is no scope in this article to answer
these issues. It is enough to stress that the '90s are apt to
be more dangerous than even the preceding decade.

The situation in Cambodia is comparably complex. Of course
Vietnam has made a specialty of offering withdrawals that never
take place. But if for the first time in thirty years Hanoi
should keep its promise to withdraw from a neighboring nation in

~~take place.~~ But for the first time in thirty years Hanoi

Vietnam has made a specialty of withdrawing withdrawals that never

~~The situation in Cambodia is considerably complex. Of course~~

~~be more dangerous than even the preceding decade,~~

~~there-to-be scope in this article to answer~~

~~towards the Afghan resistance (4) long-term American attitude~~

~~(3) US relations in the Indian subcontinent (3) American attitudes~~

~~a careful definition of (1) American interests in that country~~

~~dictim: one step backwards, two steps forward. This requires~~

~~to prevent the implementation by the Soviet Union of Lenin's~~

~~in a new and complicated diplomacy in which it becomes important~~

~~In other words, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan under~~

~~become an issue.~~

towards Pakistan. ~~There-to-be scope in this article to answer~~

~~become an issue.~~

perceived interests of Pakistan and the United States way

AUG 58 '88 50:81 K122INGER A2200-111H 11:11:00

AUG 28 '88 19:02 KISSINGER ASSOC'OCIATES' WASH. DC

P.1.06

18

Indochina a moral nightmare will present itself. Due by
far the largest and best organized military force of the anti-
Vietnamese resistance is the unspeakable Khmer Rouge that killed
two million of its own population in the three yeras it governed
Cambodia from 1975-78. The trauma of America's Indochina
involvement has prevented American military assistance to the
anti-Khmer Rouge resistance forces. It is naive to appeal to
China--the principal sponsor of the anti-Vietnamese resistance--
China has already shown its good will by sending some
army to Panayi town in Cambodia to rein in their clients. Beijing cannot create a balance of
forces in a vacuum. And America must learn that the view that
negotiations do not have a momentum of their own is illusion.
Negotiations can ratify an equilibrium; they cannot create it.

Ironically the only hope for an equilibrium in Cambodia
is to use the Cambodian army trained by the Vietnamese as a
counterweight to the Khmer Rouge after the Vietnamese army leaves.
This is not an uplifting prospect. But if it is the case
we have imposed on ourselves
that we must deal with the material and human problems in the Khmer Rouge area.

The main point with the military group is that the Khamer Ronge

This is not an splitting prospect. But essential policy in one-

counterweight to the Khmer Ronge after the Vietnamese army leaves.

It is to use the Cambodian army trained by the Vietnamese as a

Ironically the state does for an equilibrium in Cambodia

Negotiations can reach an equilibrium they cannot create it.

Influencing the state and mean a equilibrium of their own is inflation.

Forces in a vacuum. And America must learn that the view that

to remain in their clients, getting cannot create a balance of

anti-Khmer Ronge resistance forces. It is naive to appeal to
involvement has prevented American military assistance to the
Cambodia from 1972-78. The tr认 of America's Indochine

two million of its own population in the three years it governed
Vietnamese resistance is the unbreakable Khmer Ronge that killed
for the largest and best organised military force of the anti-

Indochina a mean minimum still resistant to France, No. 1.

AUG 58 1985 K122105-R2205.001ATEA 14M2H DC

AUG 28 '88 19:02

THIES, WHSH. DC

P. 2

19

> he stepped by arbitration, must be corrected.
> to be opposed there must be some local force to do so. If
> the democracies cannot or will not support for example the
> armed forces of Prince Sihanouk they will have to rely on a
> morally less attractive alternative. What they must not do is
> posture or ask Beijing to do their work for them.

Similar analyses could be made for Southern Africa or
Central America. But this would go beyond the scope of this
article. For present purposes it is enough to stress that
none of the solutions to regional conflicts worked out in recent
months are conclusive. In Afghanistan we can lose our strategic
position and in Cambodia our moral position. These regional
issues impose on the United States an unprecedented analysis of
its interests, its resources and its long-term strategy. And
failing that these regions will erupt again in a much more
insidious way than previously.

XI

institutions may then previously
failing that these regions will exhibit again in a much more
its interests, its resources and its long-term strategy. And
to be imposed on the United States an unprecedented analysis of
position and in Cambodia our worst position. These regional
months are conclusive. In Afghanistan we can lose our strategic
value of the solutions to regional conflicts worked out in recent
months. For present barcodes it is enough to address that
Central America. But quite would go beyond the scope of our
similar analyses could be made for Southern Africa or
beneath our existing so-called needs for them.

worstly less attractive alternative. What else was not to be
altered forces of Prince Bimanum they will have to rely on a
the democracies cannot or will not authorise the
to be addressed there unless in some local force to be so.

It was helped by the Americans.

13

AUG '28 '88 19:03 KISSINGER ASSOC'

P.3

6

of the late Brezhnev era. It is not a commitment to peace
in the abstract but to a more competitive Soviet Union, though
he undoubtedly needs a period of relative calm to achieve his
domestic goals. Another Soviet leader would in all likelihood
feel compelled to pursue similar policies, if with less verve
and psychological skill. After all the present phase of Soviet
policy was inaugurated when Gromyko--attacked at the party
conference as a relic of the Brezhnev era--during the leadership
of the decrepit Chernenko, who has become a non-person called
**NenGDANNEE REAGAN IN 1984** No one can know--including Gorbachev
himself--what he will do if he should success in his goal of
infusing the Soviet economy with dynamism and Soviet society with
higher morale.

The euphoria in the democracies must therefore be based
either on a paradox or an act of faith. The paradox is that
those who believe most ardently in Gorbachev must assume that he
cannot succeed; hence that the Soviet Union will remain permanently

X

cannot succeed hence that the Soviet Union will remain permanently
those who believe most significantly in Gorbachev who assume that he
either on a paradox or an act of faith. The paradox is that
The authority in the democracies must therefore be passed
higher morale.

influencing the Soviet economy with dynamism and Soviet society with
energy--what he will do if he should succeed in his host of
the Soviet Communists in Jalta

the Soviet Communists, who has become a non-person, called
conference as a relief of the Brezhnev era--during the leadership
policy was formulated when Brezhkov--attacked at the party
and psychological skill. After all the present phase of Soviet
total compelled to burrow similar policies, it with less nerve
domestic policies. Another Soviet leader would in all likelihood
be undoubtedly needs a period of relative calm to achieve his
in the abstract but to a more numberless Soviet Union, though
of the late Brezhnev era. It is not a commitment to peace

9.3