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CONTENTS

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2 STATEMENT OF PAGE

3 HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 3

4 HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 8

5 HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON, D.C. 15

6 HON. DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER DISTINGUISHED

7 FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST

8 POLICY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 54

9 ROBERT MALLEY, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM DIRECTOR,

10 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C. 67

11 HON. MARTIN INDYK, DIRECTOR, THE SABAN CENTER FOR

12 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTE,

13 WASHINGTON, D.C. 80

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THE MIDDLE EAST: RETHINKING THE ROAD MAP

Tuesday, February 24, 2004

United States Senate

Committee on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 2:35 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Sununu, Biden, Feingold, and Nelson.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR

2 FROM INDIANA

3 The Chairman: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is
called to order.

5 Conflict in the Middle East is one of our most
6 intractable foreign policy problems. It has brought not only
7 bloodshed and suffering to the people of Israel and Palestine,
8 it has contributed to the poison ideology of radical Islamic
9 extremists who have perpetuated terrorist acts on people in
10 countries all over the world. American national security
11 would be dramatically improved by the achievement of an Arab-
12 Israeli peace agreement.

13 Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee welcomes
14 former Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, to help us
15 rethink prospects for the Middle East Road Map and to consider
16 new ideas to stop the cycle of violence. We look forward to
17 having the benefit of his extraordinary expertise as we
18 analyze United States options.

19 We are also pleased to welcome our second panel of
20 experts: Ambassador Dennis Ross, Director and Ziegler
21 Distinguished Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East
22 Policy; Mr. Rob Malley, Middle East Program Director of the
23 International Crisis Group; Ambassador Martin Indyk, Director
24 of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings
25 Institution.

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We have asked our distinguished experts to help us
challenge the prevailing pessimism that as we enter this
election year, no progress can be made toward peace in the
Middle East. Despite election year politics, the United
States must remain engaged in the Middle East peace process.
We must take advantage of any opportunities to promote new
strategies that might lead to a viable settlement.

The United States should explore with our partners in the
Quartet, the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union,
whether the momentum of the Road Map can be restored.

We also must encourage Arab nations to take on greater
responsibility for moving the Palestinians toward decisive
actions to stop terrorism.

In addition, as I mentioned in a speech at the Vercunda
Conference in Munich a few weeks ago, NATO should consider how
it can expand its alliance intervention into the Middle East
security and how that might improve the climate for a Middle
East peace settlement.

Accepted last summer by the Israelis and Palestinians as
a route to a comprehensive and permanent two-state settlement,
the Road Map appears to have reached a dead end. A 6-week
cease-fire last fall bolstered optimism that the violence
could be stopped through the steps in the Road Map, but over
the past few months, these hopes have been shattered by
suicide bombings, targeted killings, and charges of deceit and

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1 bad faith. Egypt's effort to reestablish the cease-fire have

2 been Stymied.

3 Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Qureia has yet to meet

4 with Israeli Prime Minister Sharon to discuss the Road Map:

5 The divided Palestinian leadership appears unable or unwilling

6 to control the extremist and terrorist factions that continue

7 to undermine the peace efforts.

8 Claiming that progress through negotiations is impossible

9 under present circumstances, Israel has announced plans to

10 unilaterally withdraw from 17 of 21 settlements in Gaza and

11 disengage from further talks. These moves have been viewed by

12 some as imposing a unilateral settlement. Others worry that

13 Israel's move will harden Palestinian positions.

14 Terrorist groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian

15 Islamic Jihad may attempt to portray the withdrawals as a sign

16 of Israel's weakness that vindicates their use of violence.

17 Others consider Israel's move an opportunity to create a new

18 opening for a stalled peace process.

19 Whether Israel's unilateral approach can reinvigorate the

20 peace process depends on the details of the plan on how the

21 Palestinians, other Arab nations, the United States, and the

22 international community respond. As Secretary of State Colin

23 Powell stated before our committee just 2 weeks ago -- and I

24 quote -- "we want the settlements closed, but we want to know

25 exactly how that is going to be done and where those settlers

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1 will go and how does it affect settlement activity in the West
2 Bank. We have to understand the total picture." The end of
3 quote from Secretary Powell.

4 At the same hearing, Secretary Powell underscored the
5 administration is closely following Prime Minister Sharon's
6 proposals and pressing the Palestinians to come forward with a
7 plan to control terrorism. He added -- and I quote -- "I
8 would do anything to find a magic bullet to solve this one,
9 but the problem is terrorism, terrorism that emanates from
10 Hamas, from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other
11 organizations that are not interested in peace, not interested
12 in a state for the Palestinian people. They are interested in
13 the destruction of Israel. Until the Palestinian leadership
14 and authority goes after those organizations that feel that
15 way, it will be difficult to get the kind of progress we need
16 moving down the Road Map." The end of quote from Secretary
17 Powell.

18 Now, despite these difficulties, I believe that the
19 broader context of events in the Middle East can improve the
20 chances for a peace agreement. The United States and the
21 coalition forces are working to bring new freedoms, economic
22 growth, and political change in Iraq and Afghanistan. If we
23 can succeed in stabilizing those countries, the political
24 calculations of leaders and populations in the Middle East
25 will change.

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In a recent New York Times editorial, Thomas Friedman cites numerous examples of leading Arab opinion-makers arguing for political reform in the Middle East in the wake of Saddam Hussein's downfall. Already Libya has opened its weapons of mass destruction program to international inspectors. Syria has sent messages to Israel it is ready to restart peace talks. Moderate Arab nations increasingly are focused on their own internal economic and security problems, many of which would be improved by an Arab-Israeli settlement. There are indications that both the Israelis and the Palestinians have had enough of violence.

The United States and our allies must be prepared to take advantage of these trends. Given the new dynamics in the region, what additional steps can the administration take now to move the peace process forward? Are there alternatives to the Road Map or detours that should be considered?

This committee looks forward to our experts' discussion of these questions this afternoon and their assessments of the way ahead in the Middle East.

I call now upon the distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.

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STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR

FROM DELAWARE

Senator Biden: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to have you back. For
real. Thank you. It is great to see you. I have never been
at a hearing -- and they began as early as 1973 -- with you
that I have not learned something, and I mean that sincerely.
I am happy to have you here.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this
meeting and join you in welcoming Dr. Kissinger. I am also
eager to hear from our experts on the second panel as well,
all of whom have devoted many years, and collectively more
than they probably want to have me add up, to the cause of
peace.

We have assembled a wealth of experience to help us
grapple with one of the most vexing enduring conflicts of our
time. Secretary Kissinger, much has changed in the 3 decades
since your well-known peacemaking efforts in the Middle East.
Today Israel no longer faces an existential military threat
from the Arab world that it once did. But it faces a more
insidious enemy in my view, one that we share in common, that
is, terrorism. It also is seized with a changing demography
which threatens its very survival as a Jewish state. As the
old phrase goes, Jonah has swallowed the whale. So while
Israel has never been in a stronger position relative to the

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1. Arab world militarily, it still suffers from a very pervasive
2. sense of insecurity.

3. Another paradox is that while we have never been closer
4. to a consensus on the details of a solution, the solution on
5. the ground seems increasingly distant. A solution is as
6. obvious as it is elusive. We all know that any viable peace
7. agreement will have to have a few key components. Israel will
8. have to abandon the vast majority of its settlements and trade
9. territory for those they wish to retain. The Palestinians
10. will have to exercise the right of return to Palestine, not to
11. Israel. It seems to me these two factors are the core of any
12. bargain.

13. And interestingly enough, more than two-thirds of the
14. people of both sides, Israelis and Palestinians, consistently
15. say that they favor a two-state solution. The problem is that
16. neither believes the other side means it, and that has
17. permeated the people as well as the leadership.

18. One issue which I cannot dance around is the absence of
19. responsibility on the part of the present Palestinian
20. leadership, and here, Mr. Chairman, I think our country should
21. accept its share of blame for not having lent more support to
22. Prime Minister Abu Mazen, who we have hosted here more than
23. once, and who made it clear why he resigned. And I believe
24. Israel could and should have done more as well. Giving Abu
25. Mazen so little to deliver to his people played directly into

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1. Arafat's hands, and I am not sure when we will get another opportunity as significant as the one that presented.

3. But as the saying goes we are where we are. The world does not stop turning. In fact, it only seems to turn ever faster when we talk about the Middle East.

6. We are facing an unprecedented set of challenges in a region that has become our primary strategic focus of late.
7. We are struggling to help Iraq move in the direction of stability, unity, and a representative government. We are facing an Arab world seething with discontent and badly in need of political and economic transformation, and we have not yet achieved a meeting of the minds with our traditional allies in Europe on an overreaching strategy for the Middle East beyond Israel and the Palestinians. The Arab-Israeli conflict must be viewed in the context of this volatile strategic climate in my view, and it explains why making progress, in my view, has never been more important than now.

18. But some problems do not lend themselves to immediate solutions. Secretary Kissinger, I am intrigued by your argument which essentially boils down to the view that the best we may be able to do now is to help create the circumstances that allow for a solution later.

23. Israel's Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is considering to pull out of the settlements and military installations in Gaza. If the move is carefully coordinated with the United

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1. States to ensure a peaceful transition, it could -- it could
2. -- create the conditions for a future rapid breakthrough that
3. you mention in your written testimony. I am referring to the
4. rapid breakthrough.

5. I deeply sympathize with the Israeli predicament, but I
6. am concerned, as many Israelis are, including some of the
7. leadership in the Opposition Party, with whom I have recently
8. met here, that absent a buy-in from both sides, no lasting
9. settlement is possible. Indeed, a unilaterally improvised
10. solution runs the risk of boosting rejectionists in the
11. Palestinian camp and giving them an excuse to perpetuate
12. violence.

13. While the new Palestinian Prime Minister has shown no
14. inclination to confront Yasser Arafat, there are signs of
15. ferment among the next generation of Palestinian leaders,
16. evidenced by not only the comments in articles of Tom
17. Friedman, but much else has been written and those of us who
18. have visited the region can feel it and see it and taste it in
19. the young Palestinians with whom we have met. Strengthening
20. these reformers is not going to be easy, though, but it is
21. essential if we are to help the Palestinians achieve the
22. responsible leadership they deserve and do not now have in my
23. view.

24. We must also demand more from the Arab world at large. I
25. agree with you that among the chief obstacles to peace is the

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1. Arab world's failure to demonstrably accept Israel's existence.
2. I have suggested to Arab leaders who I have met with throughout the region and in one not-so-recent visit, but one of the visits along with both my friends, Senator Lugar, the chairman, and Senator Hagel, and once alone with Senator Hagel, that Arab leaders have to do something more demonstrable than they have done so far.
3. They cannot just have a peace plan that they write in another country and let it be known and, at the same time, not do anything to normalize relations with Israel.
4. Arab leaders proclaim support for the Geneva Accord. Yet, they will not entertain the idea of inviting Geneva's Israelis signatories to places like Riyadh.

14. Finally, Mr. Secretary, I want to underscore a point in your testimony when you say, "the American role is central."
15. Quite frankly, Mr. Secretary -- and I do not mean to draw you into this but to make it clear -- I am not at all certain the White House understands that point.
16.
17. Promoting peace and securing Israel requires a whole lot of hard work, day in and day out, the willingness to risk serious amounts of political capital.
18.
19.
20. And as our next panel can attest to, all of those things were required in the past, as you know, and are required in the future.

21.
22.
23.
24. Benign neglect, punctuated by episodic engagement, imperils America's strategic interest in the region in my

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1. We have no choice but to be involved. Each of us has
2. put forward thought-provoking ideas on how best to move
3. forward. No one has any monopoly on the truth and no one
4. suggests that if the Lord Almighty came down and sat in the
5. middle of these tables and told us the path, that we would
6. still have much more than a 60 percent chance of succeeding.

7. So it is not to suggest this is not incredibly difficult,
8. but it is to suggest -- it is like that phrase attributed to
9. G.K. Chesterson who said, it is not that Christianity has been
10. tried and found wanting, it has been found difficult and left
11. untried. I think that is where we are right now in terms of
12. the peace agreement. And to use a Christian metaphor is
13. absolutely ironic.

14. But at any rate, I will cease and desist. Thank you for
15. being here. I am anxious to hear your testimony, Mr.
16. Secretary.

17. The Chairman: Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

18. Dr. Kissinger, you, as a person who covers comprehensive
19. diet of subjects every day, would appreciate the vigor of our
20. committee today. We commenced with a classified briefing on
21. Haiti, which was timely. We had a visit from the new
22. President of Georgia and six members of his cabinet, a very
23. engaging and terrific group. We broke a while for our party
24. caucuses and this afternoon have the climax, an appearance by
25. yourself before our committee and three distinguished friends

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1 who have meant so much to American history.

2 So we look forward to your testimony. I would encourage

3 you to take the time that you require to give the full

4 statement. It will be put it in the record in full in any

5 event, and I would allow you to proceed as you wish.

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1 STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, it is
3 always a great pleasure for me to appear here and especially
4 under circumstances where I substantially agree with the two
5 opening statements that have been made, with the one proviso
6 that I believe the White House has done as much as can be
7 done. But on the general philosophy of the two statements, I
8 am in general agreement.

9 I have submitted a rather lengthy statement, and I will
10 summarize my views so that we can get to the question period
11 as efficiently as possible.

12 The major problem in bringing the conflict to a
13 conclusion is that the two sides are talking about
14 incommensurable issues, producing a psychological crisis
15 between them.

16 The Israelis, living in a state that has never been
17 recognized by its neighbors in its history and dealing with
18 countries that consider recognition a concession, are, above
19 all, concerned with questions of survival. They are
20 militarily overwhelmingly strong, but their margin of safety
21 is very narrow. In 1973, they came close to defeat in a
22 surprise attack, and with the nature of their territory and
23 the nature of their attack, they consider their existence
24 inherently precarious.

25 For some period, the Israeli peace movement believed in

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1 the possibility of trading land for peace. This belief has

2 been destroyed by the intifada, and so much of the Israeli

3 population want victory and the defeat of their Arab

4 adversaries.

5 At the same time, they are a middle class society, and

6 the open-endedness of a terrorist conflict produces a sense of

7 resignation and a sort of undifferentiated desire for peace,

8 which is difficult to express for them in concrete conditions.

9 On the Arab side, I believe there is one overwhelming

10 obstacle which is the psychological reluctance of the

11 Palestinians to accept the permanence of the state of Israel.

12 I had a personal experience of this on the day the Oslo

13 Agreement was signed, and I spoke to one of Arafat's deputies

14 who said to me that he was returning to Palestine for the

15 first time in 40 years, and that was a tremendous experience.

16 And I asked him how would he feel once he got there if he saw

17 the lights of some Israeli citizens. And he said, the lights

18 I can see are not what bothers me. What bothers me is that if

19 you ask me where my home is, I have to tell you it is in Java.

20 And if you ask my children where their home is -- and they

21 have never been there -- they will tell you it is in Java. It

22 is this psychological undercurrent that, for many

23 Palestinians, if not most Palestinians, these negotiations are

24 stages in a process towards the gradual elimination of Israel.

25 The Palestinians have not yet found it possible to generate a

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1 gesture like President Sadat when he visited Israel in 1977

2 and produced a psychological breakthrough that led to a

3 settlement.

4 On the other hand, despite the stalemate, one has to note

5 some significant progress. The Israeli Government under Prime

6 Minister Sharon has agreed to the creation of a Palestinian

7 state with contiguous territory. The Likud Party had never

8 done that before. And contiguous territory is the code word

9 for the elimination of some settlements that stand in the way

10 of contiguity. Sharon has now announced the unilateral

11 withdrawal of all the settlements in Gaza, and as I also point

12 out, I think the fence implies the dispensability of some of

13 the settlements on the other side of that.

14 On the Arab side too there have been movements towards

15 negotiations. Crown Prince Abdullah made a formal proposal

16 for normalization of relations with Israel after return to the

17 1967 border.

18 So some of the preconditions for a solution in my view

19 exist. The question is, how does one define a solution? And

20 can one achieve the solution in one step?

21 The solution that is generally put forward by our allies

22 is a return by Israel to the '67 border, the abandonment of

23 its settlements, and partition of Jerusalem in return for

24 normalization and some sort of international guarantees. I

25 have two difficulties with this particular formula.

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1 The first is I have never met an Israeli Prime Minister
2 or chief of staff who considers the '67 border defensible.

3 This is going back over a period longer than I care to admit,
4 but shall we say over 40 years. I probably could do so longer if
5 I were less vain.

6 Secondly, I do not believe that international guarantees
7 are very meaningful. I had, of course, a personal experience
8 with the international guarantees that accompanied the Vietnam
9 Treaty in which the guaranteeing powers never even answered
10 our requests calling attention to the invasion of South
11 by the entire North Vietnamese army. Obviously, this is a separate case, but I find it
12 difficult to imagine that the European nations would go to war
13 over the issues that are likely to threaten Israel's security.
14 And above all, the most serious of those are terrorism, and to
15 terrorism, the deployment of troops is not an adequate answer.
16 If the Israeli army which has a maximum incentive to prevent
17 the terrorist acts cannot stop them, I do not see how the
18 deployment of an international force can be relevant to the
19 terrorist problem.

20 Thirdly, there are some aspects to the negotiations that
21 seem to me to guarantee a protracted negotiation such as the
22 return of refugees. I do not believe that any Arab leader can
23 today sign an agreement that does not provide for the return
24 of refugees, and I cannot imagine an Israeli leader who will
25 sign an agreement that provides for anything less. Therefore,

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1 this guarantees in itself a protracted stalemate.

2 The Road Map is useful as a consensus statement of
general principles. It has some similarities to Resolution
3 242, and these general principles usually have the quality
4 that they have a lot of adjectives that each side defines in a
different manner. For example, with respect to refugees, the
5 Road Map calls for an agreed just, fair, and realistic
6 settlement. To the Palestinians, fair and just means the
7 return of most refugees. To the Israelis, realistic means, at
8 most, a token return of refugees. So the Road Map is useful
9 in calling attention to terrorism, in setting up a schedule by
10 which agreement could be reached, but I do not think that in
11 itself it can provide us the guide for a breakthrough.
12

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I am agnostic on the issue of whether one should
negotiate an overall settlement immediately or a series of
partial settlements, and I would be open-minded to either
approach.
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My instinct is that a negotiation for an overall
settlement will have two problems. One, it will be extremely
protracted, and secondly, at its end, it would still have to
have some interim stages. I cannot believe that Israel would
withdraw in one move to whatever final borders are negotiated
before there is a demonstrated end to the terrorist apparatus
on the Palestinian side and to a demonstrated interval without
terrorist activities. And this cannot happen in a very brief
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1 period of time.

2 I believe that the security fence that Israel is building
3 may be a means to accelerate negotiations, and therefore I
4 have advocated that the United States take a positive
5 attitude, provided that it is placed in a relationship that
6 defines a strategic necessity and not simply another form of
7 territorial expansion.

8 So what we need is a negotiation on final borders. These
9 final borders should recognize strategic necessities and
demographic realities. It cannot be in Israel's interest to
10 acquire additional Arab populations. Indeed, if one were
11 dealing with a really serious effort at a permanent solution,
12 one would look for territory that is today an undisputed part
13 of Israel that is heavily populated by Arab populations that
14 could be traded for territory of strategic importance to
15 Israel and perhaps including some of the settlements that are
16 close to the Israeli border. That would take care of the
17 strategic and political necessities.
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19 In principle, I agree with the statements that have been
20 made that the United States must play a major role at the
right moment. Our European allies could make a significant
21 contribution if they would suspend the flood of paper plans,
22 by which they seek to improve their position in the Arab
23 world, and help us in the major problem in which we use our
24 influence with Israel and they help bring the Arab countries
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1 to a recognition of the importance of putting an end to
2 terrorism and a genuine normalization of relations with
3 Israel.

4 I also favor the Mideast Initiative that has been put
5 forward recently by the German Foreign Minister that is trying
6 to develop an Atlantic concept of Middle East development
7 within which the evolution of a Palestinian state could be
8 placed and within which a specific commitment could be made to
9 the development of a Palestinian state.

10 In my view, the overwhelming problem we face now is not
11 so much to define the word peace as to define a pattern of
12 coexistence. If one could create a Palestinian state side by
13 side with an Israeli state, if those borders reflected
14 demographic and strategic realities, and if a normal life
15 could develop in such a framework, then one could think that a
16 fundamental breakthrough has been made. And I think with all
17 the difficulties that we see, the opportunities for such a
18 breakthrough objectively exist.

19 Thank you very much.

20 [The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]

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1 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

2 I will suggest that the committee have 8 minutes per
3 Senator in the first round of questioning, and then we shall
4 see if there are additional questions of Senators.

5 I will begin by asking this question, Dr. Kissinger. You
6 have mentioned that the refugee issue is deep-seated, perhaps
7 insoluble in the short run, and really a feeling of place and
8 possession by many people, this perhaps coupled with a fairly
9 general feeling, although it is hard to tell, I suppose, how
10 pervasive on the part of many Palestinians, many Arab states
11 that Israel might not be permanent after all, that at some
12 point it might go away.

13 And third, sort of over in the short run, but we do not
14 know for how long, some persons in the situation express
15 themselves through terrorist acts, and the call of at least
16 the United States and others who are friends of Israel has
17 been for the terrorism to cease and someone must be
18 responsible for bringing that to conclusion. But it is not at
19 all clear how and when.

20 So as I listened to your testimony, you are suggesting
21 that perhaps the best we can hope for in the present issue,
22 perhaps utilizing the fence -- and you have guided the
23 direction of where the fence ought to go -- offers at least
24 some basis for, as you say, coexistence of the parties. Maybe
25 for a period of time, maybe a generation has to pass before

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1 the feeling of the end of the permanence of Israel or the
2 refugee yearnings or even the terrorism passes all
3 understanding.

4 But in any event, are you testifying essentially that in
5 the meanwhile pragmatically there could be a degree of
6 coexistence and the United States might be able to support at
7 least meaningful talks and negotiations among parties who
8 might find it possible to coexist? And then as you have
9 expressed, perhaps in a greater Middle East strategy in which
10 more commerce comes, hopefully more wealth, more prospects
11 politically and economically for people who have not had very
12 much, that some of the discontent is ameliorated. Will you
13 sort of guide me through that?

14 Secretary Kissinger: Well, start with the refugees, Mr.
15 Chairman. I cannot conceive of a negotiation in the immediate
16 future under which Israel will permit the return of any
17 refugees or of any number except a number so token as not
18 possibly meeting the problem. I can understand the Arab
19 position that they cannot sign an agreement in which they
20 renounce the return of refugees. If they were willing to do
21 that, of course, the problem would go away. But that is
22 probably the hardest of all the steps for the ~~Israelis~~ Palestinians to
take, and this may have to wait an evolution as was the case
23 in the German Polish refugee problem where this was not put at
24 the very beginning of the process.
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1. So on the other hand, what fuels the terrorism, it seems
2. to me, is not so much the refugee problem as a general
3. condition in which there is no normal life whatever on the
4. Palestinian side. Therefore, the beginning of an effective
5. way towards peace is to create conditions in which honorable
6. people can coexist. So if one could come to some agreement
7. about borders, the future of settlements, the demographic
8. adjustments that I have suggested, and create a Palestinian
9. state, this would be major progress.

10. Now, if in the course of such a negotiation, it suddenly
11. appeared that the desire for peace had grown so great that the
12. other issues can be settled too, I would surely not oppose
13. this. But I would think the immediate objective of the
14. negotiations should be to see how the Middle East can be moved
15. from the present condition of inherent terrorism as part of
16. the political expression on one side and reprisals on the
17. other to a concept by which the two societies could begin
18. coexisting with each other, and then let coexistence produce a
19. process.

20. The Chairman: If a border agreement could be made, a
21. Palestinian state defined, what are the prospects that the
22. Palestinian state or the people living at least in that area
23. might be able to improve economically? In other words, their
24. prospects improve materially enough that they begin to like
25. the idea. What is feared on occasion, even with the fence

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1 idea, is that the commerce back and forth that now involves

2 Palestinians and Israelis might be thwarted, might be stopped,

3 and the difficulties therefore for income for the Palestinians

4 is rather dim under those prospects.

5 Secretary Kissinger: I am not suggesting, Mr. Chairman,

6 sort of buying off the Palestinians and making them happy with

7 whatever exists today. I believe that a serious effort at

8 defining a final border between Israel and a Palestinian state

9 should accompany the creation of a Palestinian state, but that

10 should take into account the special nature of the '67 border

11 between Israel and the Palestinians as compared to that

12 between Israel and Egypt and Syria and Lebanon.

13 The other three were international borders that had been

14 recognized internationally and established through some

15 process of negotiation that had been given international

16 sanction by practice. The '67 border is a more or less

17 accidental cease-fire line that *reflected* military conditions

18 as they existed in 1948, and they were not drawn with any idea

19 of being a permanent border.

20 So if these two states are to coexist effectively, I

21 think it is important that the border is drawn in such a way

22 that it takes care of reasonable Israeli security concerns

23 and, at the same time, makes adjustments in favor of the

24 Palestinians that such an approach would generate.

25 Now, I have advocated the movement, even out of existing

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1 Israel, of Arab populations that are contiguous to the
2 territory. And when I say movement of the populations, I do
3 not mean moving the populations, I mean moving the border so
4 that the populations would be part of a Palestinian state.
5 This concept is resisted today because Palestinians do not want to
6 accept yet the notion of the separation on that basis. But
7 the realities that have produced terrorism, under which people
8 live, makes it in my view desirable to make the demographic
9 adjustments of that nature and to trade them for Israeli
10 settlements that enhance the security of Israel strategically.

11 Now, I have also stressed repeatedly in my public
12 statements that once such a border is drawn, either by
13 recognizing the security fence or through negotiation, the
14 Israeli settlements on the other side of that border become
15 subject to Arab jurisdiction or to Palestinian jurisdiction so
16 that that border has to be drawn with the consciousness that
17 the Israeli populations in those settlements may prefer to
18 return to Israel.

19 The Chairman: Thank you.

20 Senator Biden.

21 Senator Biden: Thank you very much.

22 Mr. Secretary, I am going to ask a couple of specific
23 questions. Then I would like you to -- in my lifetime I have
24 known of no one who could do it better -- talk to us about
25 some strategic notions here about the whole region, if you

27

1 will.

2 But, first, let me ask you. With regard to the notion of
3 settling on borders now that would -- nothing guarantees --
4 have reasonable Israeli security built in, one of the tenets
5 upon which -- since the days I watched you actively as
6 National Security Advisor and then as Secretary of State as a
7 young Senator to today have observed is that it has always
8 been talked about in terms of land for peace. And peace,
9 defined by most Israeli leaders, both Likud and Labor, over
10 the years, has meant security as it relates to the right of
11 return. In other words, they attach this notion of right of
12 return, which you pointed out is the most difficult for
13 Palestinians to deal with. And I agree with you
14 intellectually that the only way that may get solved is if
15 there are conditions of coexistence and a maturation of both
16 societies over a period of time that allow that to be
17 addressed and both peoples get their arms around it.

18 But in establishing borders, is that not a hard call for
19 the Israelis? Because part of this rationale is their
20 bargaining chip to get these other serious divisive issues
21 addressed and settled has been the land. Once they give the
22 land, once the border is set, even though it may not be cast
23 in stone and be an internationally recognized border -- or
24 maybe that is what you have in mind -- they are not likely to
25 get the kinds of concessions they believe they need from the

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1 Palestinians specifically, Arabs generally. Could you speak to that for a moment? Maybe I am misunderstanding your initial proposal.

4 Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Historically the Israelis have thought of this as bargaining chips, and the late Prime Minister Rabin used to say, a little bit of land for a little of peace. One trouble with that is that peace is not so easily divisible and another problem is also that almost everything that the Arab side gives is revocable and almost everything the Israelis give is irrevocable. They give land and they get --

12 Senator Biden: A promise.

13 Secretary Kissinger: But your fundamental question is if one pursues the course that I have suggested of settling the border and creating a Palestinian state and leave refugees, does that not create a situation in which that refugee issue will forever disturb the relationship.

18 Well, I think there is another issue that is also not fully settleable now. That is Jerusalem. There too one can make an interim arrangement, but the ultimate arrangement -- and I think one would have to decide to what extent these two issues will be kept open -- will balance each other.

23 Finally, I would not object if, in the course of a negotiation, they would prove to be resolvable.

25 Senator Biden: And I understand that.

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1 Secretary Kissinger: It is a very good point you make,
2 that the dilemma of what I put forward is that if you leave
3 something open, do you give a pretext for reopening
4 hostilities. And one has to analyze that in terms of the
5 people who want to reopen hostilities are really opposed to
6 the existence of Israel and not to any specific condition.

7 Senator Biden: Precisely.

8 Secretary Kissinger: And can one create a pattern of
9 life in which those who want to destroy Israel itself are
10 marginalized and therefore a general atmosphere develops?
11 That's the open question.

12 Senator Biden: I understand now better what you are
13 saying. I happen to agree with you. It is easy. You know
14 that old joke they used to tell about the chicken and the pig
15 in the barnyard saying they are going to give Farmer Brown a
16 birthday gift, and the chicken says, let's give him a ham and
17 egg breakfasts. The pig says, for you it is a contribution.
18 For me it is a total commitment. Well, it is a little bit
19 like what we ask of the Israelis.

20 I guess the point I want to establish -- to make sure I
21 understood, not establish -- is that it would require a mind-
22 set change on the part of the Israelis to go the route you are
23 going, which, easy for me to say, were I an Israeli leader, I
24 would find worth taking the chance. It is not my job to tell
25 them their business, but I just wanted to make sure I

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1 understood it.

2 Secretary Kissinger: I think it requires a mind-set

3 change on both sides.

4 Senator Biden: Yes. And by the way, I think that is the
5 context in which it would happen.

6 Secretary Kissinger: I think we are beginning to head in
7 that direction.

8 Senator Biden: What I am worried about is we are going
9 to head in a direction that Israel is going to be increasingly
10 at a disadvantage. This is a case where I think time does not
11 work on the side of the Israelis. What I am worried about is
12 we move from a point of a two-stage solution to the acceptance
13 of a notion on both sides that there is only a one-stage
14 solution, that there is no possibility of a two-stage
15 solution. But that is a different issue. Not a different
16 issue. That is a path I would rather not go down at the
17 moment.

18 I would like in the few minutes I have remaining --
19 because I know of no one else who is able to speak to these
20 kinds of issues better than you. I have been at a loss to
21 convince myself that I do understand the European -- EU
22 European -- and there is no single European view, but the
23 official position of the EU or individual nation states within
24 Europe -- at a loss to understand their attitude toward Israel
25 and what solutions are most appropriate. I realized they

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1 signed onto the Road Map, but I still am not convinced they

2 share our view. And I would like you to try to explain to me

3 what I thought in your statement you indicated is that some of

4 our European allies are using -- maybe I misheard you --

5 Israel to better their position in the Arab world. If you did

6 not say that, maybe it is that old, you know, I am thinking

7 that. That is what I think. I do not know if that is what

8 you said.

9 Secretary Kissinger: I did not understand the sentence.

10 Senator Biden: That the Europeans use their attitude

11 toward Israel, their position toward Israel to better their

12 European position in the Arab world.

13 Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely.

14 Senator Biden: That is my view. Is that what you said?

15 Secretary Kissinger: No, I did not say that, but I agree

16 with it.

17 [Laughter.]

18 Senator Biden: Well, I am smarter than I thought I was.

19 Secretary Kissinger: I said it in a longer sentence.

20 [Laughter.]

21 Senator Biden: What I would like to do for a moment is

22 kind of explore that because it seems to me that there are

23 really four parties -- five parties to any ultimate settlement

24 in the Middle East. The two critical parties are the

25 Palestinians and the Israelis. The indispensable party is the

32

1 United States. But the other parties are, quote, the

2 Europeans and the Arabs, the Arab leadership.

3 I have been at a loss to understand why there is not
4 anyone in the Arab world since Sadat who has a more strategic
5 vision of Arab interests, of the interests of the Arabs and
6 the interests of that particular Arab country, whether it be
7 Saudi Arabia or Egypt today or anyone other than Jordan a
8 little bit, but they do not have much muscle.

9 The idea that if the Arab leadership in the identifiable
10 countries were literally willing to recognize in a tangible
11 way -- that is, invite Israeli diplomats to their capitals, to
12 visit Israel -- that seems to me, coupled with a change in
13 attitude of leveraging Israel for their benefit with Arabs, a
14 change in attitude on the part of the Europeans, creates an
15 environment that is fundamentally different than the one that
16 exists now.

17 And I just wondered if you would talk with us for a few
18 minutes. My time has been up about 2 minutes and 5 seconds.
19 Maybe on the second round tell me what you think they are
20 thinking. Tell me what the European perspective is, why they
21 are not being more progressive, for lack of a better word, and
22 why, beyond the obvious issue of fearing their own populations
23 in a backlash, Arab leadership has shown so little imagination
24 out of their own naked self-interest, unless I am
25 miscalculating what I think they have not done. That is an

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1 awful broad question, but if you could speak to any of that.

2 Secretary Kissinger: On Europe, what the Europeans mean

3 when they put forward their proposal is that the United States

4 should impose it. And if the United States would only impose it,

5 ~~this~~ that then the problem would go away, the parties would

6 live happily together, Europe would furnish some sort of

7 guarantees, which on the basis of history cannot be credible.

8 So I think this is an abdication of statesmanship, and it

9 appeals to anti-Americanism for one thing so that if there is

10 no progress in the Middle East, it is by definition America's

11 fault despite the fact that every progress that has been made

12 in the Middle East historically has come through American

13 participation in the process. Even the Oslo agreement grew

14 out of the Madrid Conference.

15 So part of it is domestic politics. Part of it is the

16 view that Europe can establish a special relationship in the

17 Arab world by taking this position.

18 I do not believe that either of these approaches are in

19 the long-term interests even of Europe. Europe would make a

20 much greater contribution if it convinced the moderate Arabs

21 that this is a problem not only for a small group of

22 Palestinians, but for all those who want to prevent a

23 fundamentalist or radical outcome in the Islamic world and,

24 more than that, who want to give the Islamic world a modern

25 direction in which the aspirations of the people can be met.

34

1 So if this were some seminar at a university, I would say
2 an ideal outcome would be if the Europeans and we could
3 develop a common approach that took into account the
4 psychological and strategic necessities of both sides and
5 presented it with some degree of understanding, even
6 compassion to both sides.

7 As for the moderate Arabs, I had the honor of working
8 closely with President Sadat. When I first met him, I had a
9 very ambivalent attitude, but one of the very first things he
10 said to me is this is, above all, a psychological problem and
11 my contribution to it has to be to show that we genuinely want
12 peace. He also added, the Israelis have to see to it that
13 they do not humiliate our people that are dealing with them.
14 That is a fair request.

15 So I believe that it may be impossible for Palestinian
16 leaders by themselves to jump the psychological hurdle that
17 has to be jumped. And it would be highly desirable, probably
18 necessary, for the moderate Arab leaders to say this frontier
19 is one we consider reasonable and you are not traitors if you
20 accept it. This, of course, means there have to be reasonable
21 compensations.

22 Therefore, I agree with the presentation you will hear by
23 Dennis Ross that even in the process of unilateral withdrawal
24 of the Israelis, they would be wise to engage the Egyptians
25 and other moderate Arabs to create a sense of Arab

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1 participation in this as a process. And one of the roles of

2 American diplomacy should be, and I believe attempts to be, is

3 to bring the moderate Arabs and the Europeans to a less

4 tactical approach and to take a more far-sighted look at it.

5 I did not answer the chairman's question. Is it

6 possible, you asked me, to bring the Palestinians to a point
are prepared to
where they can coexist?

7 I think within such a framework and

8 if we could come up with a Middle East initiative in which the

9 Atlantic nations were to put before the peoples in the Middle

10 East what peace can bring through collaboration of the Middle

11 East nations with the Atlantic nations and under conditions of

12 peace with Israel, I think one can at least imagine what a

13 structure would look like.

14 Senator Biden: My time is up. I will just close with

15 this comment.

16 I cannot imagine, Mr. Secretary, notwithstanding the

17 existence of these young Palestinians we have talked to and

18 know and we know exist -- I cannot fathom how an ultimate --

19 wrong phrase -- how a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict,

20 as it relates to the Palestinian question, could be

21 accomplished at the hands of these new leaders alone, for them

22 alone to do it. I do not see how it can happen absent the

23 leadership in the Arab world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, saying

24 first it is okay because I do not know how -- I think we

25 approached this the wrong way.

36

1 We have to get the Arab world to say under conditions

2 that are in this shape and form, you go ahead. We will bless

3 you if you do it. You are not only not a traitor, you are

4 helping us all. Right now, that psychological leap that was

5 referenced by Sadat is so high on the part of any Palestinian

6 leadership, I do not know how it gets accomplished.

7 Secretary Kissinger: The most important aspect of Middle

8 East policy is to understand that one has to deal with all

9 these four or five issues simultaneously, with the moderate

10 Arabs, the Europeans, the two parties, and other interested

11 groups. But those are the key elements that one has to move

12 towards this process.

13 Senator Biden: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

14 I thank my colleagues for letting me go over.

15 The Chairman: Senator Hagel.

16 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, thank you. And welcome,

17 Dr. Kissinger.

18 Picking up on the theme of your conversation with Senator

19 Biden, you mentioned in your opening statement the proposal

20 put forward by Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Abdullah. I take

21 it from your comments that you thought there was some

22 substance, some opening, some hope, and it seems to me it

23 reflects a bit on what you and Senator Biden were talking

24 about, the moderate Arab leadership of the Middle East

25 becoming involved. And I happen to agree with the assessment

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37

1 that to place this on the Palestinian limited, fractured

2 leadership, as it is, will not get us where we need to go.

3 And in light of your statement here, as you note on page 5 of

4 your testimony, no progress is possible without a major

5 diplomatic effort by America.

6 So my first question is what do you believe happened to

7 Crown Prince Abdullah's proposal? Why did it not ever get the

8 attention that some thought it would?

9 Secretary Kissinger: The importance of the proposal of
10 the Crown Prince was that it was the first proposal by an Arab

11 country that did not have a direct national conflict with

12 Israel. So it was not one of the neighboring states, and

13 therefore it was an approach in the name of moderation and

14 peace by a country that did not have a direct issue with

15 Israel. That was important.

16 Secondly, the fact that he spoke of normalization was an

17 important contribution.

18 On the negative side of the proposal or on the incomplete

19 side of the proposal, I do not believe that the '67 border,

20 for the reason I gave, can be the dividing line and I think

21 there has to be a negotiation on that subject.

22 Secondly, the concept of normalization needs to be
23 fleshed out because the way it is defined now, it is something

24 like diplomatic recognition. Now, diplomatic recognition is

25 the way most negotiations begin, not how they end. It is a

38

1 peculiarity of the Middle East situation that wars break out

2 between countries that are technically at war with each other

3 and that the chief nations do not recognize each other's

4 existence, which has the implication that if the recognition

5 is withdrawn, the right to existence is questioned. So the

6 normalization point is something that would have to be

7 elaborated.

8 So I do not think it can be negotiated just as it is, but

9 one can take the positive elements in it and from that point

10 of view, I think it was a contribution. I believe that in a

11 comprehensive approach it should be taken seriously with the

12 qualifications I gave.

13 Senator Hagel: How do you believe we should handle

14 Arafat? We have obviously tried to marginalize him, not deal

15 with him. That apparently has not been very effective. What

16 is your suggestion as to how we deal with Arafat?

17 Secretary Kissinger: The problem about Arafat is, does

18 he create the Palestinian mood or does he reflect the

19 Palestinian mood? Is he a cause or a symptom? Surely he has

20 spent all of his life as a revolutionary leader, and therefore

21 settling down to civil administration does not hold a great

22 attraction for him. And probably he believes that his

23 legitimacy derives from the fact that he has been an

24 uncompromising opponent, in effect, of Israel's existence.

25 The challenge we have put to the Palestinians to come up

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1 with a responsible leadership is a valid request. It is not
2 clear whether the Palestinians by themselves can generate this
3 or whether, at a minimum, the other moderate Arab states
4 should play a role in legitimizing a leadership that deals
5 with the issue of terrorism and final borders.

6 Senator Hagel: In your opinion -- and you held two of
7 the most significant, important responsible offices in the
8 Government of the United States at one time actually -- with
9 all of the responsibilities, commitments that America has
10 today that consume the time of the President, the Vice
11 President, the Secretary of State, the National Security
12 Advisor -- and the agenda is long and we know the items,
13 Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, India, Haiti now,
14 others, in addition to the Israeli-Palestinian issue -- are we
15 stretched too thin in having enough focus of leadership, of
16 resource base, of commitment to do the things that apparently
17 are not being done in the Middle East in trying to forge some
18 kind of a process, the Road Map you spoke of? You talked
19 about a protracted stalemate. We have not been able to break
20 that stalemate. Is it in any way related to too many
21 commitments, or does that not have anything to do with this
22 elusive effort that we have been at since 1948?

23 Secretary Kissinger: The question has two parts. One is
24 are these issues so complex that they cannot possibly be dealt
25 with in a comprehensive way, and the second is can the U.S.

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
1111 14th Street, N.W., Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005

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1 Government be organized to deal with them in a comprehensive
2 way.

3 With respect to the first question, I would argue that if
4 they are not dealt with in a comprehensive way, they will not
5 be dealt with at all effectively because then one always takes
6 a piece of it and there will be some part that is not -- that
7 disturbs whatever progress you have made.

8 I believe that it will be seen that what we did in Iraq
9 -- that American actions in Iraq are contributing to an
10 atmosphere in which peace can be negotiated more effectively
11 between the Israelis and the Palestinians if only because it
12 removes the possibility of a conventional war for the
13 foreseeable future between Arab-organized armies and the
14 Israelis.

15 It is, however, a fact that in a world in turmoil, in
16 which you not only have the Middle East but one has to think
17 about North Korea, how to put China into an international
18 system, what to do with a Russia that is redefining itself and
19 reemerging, plus the European integration, that the management
20 of a comprehensive foreign policy becomes a huge task.

21 It is inherent in the nature of the governmental process
22 that the urgent may have priority over the important. If you
23 ask yourself where do I want to be 5 years from now, that is a
24 question you can defer until tomorrow. How to deal with the
25 latest crisis in Baghdad or a suicide bomber is something to

41

1 which you have to respond immediately and that will absorb

2 your energy. This is a question that any administration has

3 to deal with, and I believe we are dealing with it, but it is

4 something that one always has to look at carefully.

5 Senator Hagel: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

6 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

7 Senator Nelson.

8 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 Mr. Secretary, last year Deputy Prime Minister Olmert
dropped the equivalent of a political earthquake when he said
that major portions of the West Bank settlements should be
disbanded, withdrawn from, a political earthquake because he
had been one that had been articulating the whole Israel,
followed by 2 or 3 months by the Prime Minister making a
statement that he thought that some settlements should be
withdrawn, and then when he went in front of the Likud Central
Committee, was booed for that position. And Prime Minister
Sharon continues to talk about a one-party solution instead of
a two-party solution.

20 Where do you think that is taking us?

21 Secretary Kissinger: Prime Minister Sharon, to go back
to the question of Senator Biden, is vilified in Europe as a
hard-liner, as somebody similar to some of the totalitarian
it is not adequately recognized that
 types  has made huge changes in the Israeli perception
 of the world. Whatever one thinks of the settlements, for an

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1 Israeli Prime Minister to announce the possibility of their

2 being abandoned goes against the whole history of the Zionist

3 movement for which settlement was a part of the Israeli

4 identity. So I think it is not just a political move, it is a

5 spiritual move, even though it is not put in those terms, and

6 for this to become part of the Israeli internal discussion,

7 however limited it is put forward in its initial stages.

8 Now, it is also important, it seems to me, for Sharon and

9 also for the peace process, that this come about as expression

10 of Israeli security policy and not as something extorted from

11 them through American pressure, or in a negotiation. So it

12 seems to me that the combination of the security fence and the

13 unilateral withdrawal, provided the security fence is brought

14 into a rational relationship with Israeli strategic

15 necessities, it is a major step towards an ultimate

16 negotiation.

17 Senator Nelson: If you overlaid in that if the Israeli

18 policy was to pull out of the Gaza, does that create the

19 circumstances where then, in your opinion, there would be such

20 an atmosphere for a settlement?

21 Secretary Kissinger: I think the objective conditions

22 for a breakthrough in negotiations exists not necessarily in

23 the next 6 months but, say, within the next 2 years or the

24 next 18 months. Once all the parties recognize, which I think

25 actually the Israelis have recognized, that there is no deus