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KOWLOON, HONG KONG.

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MAX FASHIONS

SUITE 915, STAR HOUSE, 3, SALISBURY ROAD,
KOWLOON, HONG KONG.

MAILING ADDRESS:
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HONG KONG.

CABLES:-
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CREATORS OF ORIGINAL FASHIONS FOR LADIES & GENTLEMEN

Prof. Henry Kissinger,
2527 Waterside Drive,
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

April 14, 1970.

ART DEPARTMENT

Dear Professor Kissinger,

Our Art Department, which is always on the look out for unusual and attractive portraits of important people around the world, came up with the idea of doing this portrait of yours in oil, and we are taking the liberty of sending it to you. We do hope you will receive it safely and appreciate our efforts in doing your portrait and sending it to you by air. No import duty is payable by you on Art goods.

As a piece of Art, this portrait is priceless, as you will also appreciate. But its cost to us however, in terms of time, materials, labour, airfreight etc. is U.S.$590. If you appreciate our efforts in sending you this portrait, you may send us a cheque for this amount, but you are certainly under no obligation to send us anything. It would be still our pleasure if you will retain this portrait with our compliments.

Kindly acknowledge safe arrival of the portrait and let us know what you think of it.

We shall be happy to do an oil portrait of any one dear to you.

With all good wishes.

Yours very truly,
MAX FASHIONS,

Director.

HM/al

MAIL ORDER DIVISION OF EAST WEST ENTERPRISES (H. K.) LTD.

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A. / M*

March 26, 1970

Dear Miss Maxey:

I am writing to you at Mr. Kissinger's request in response to your letter of March 16. Our office has arranged for you to be included in the VIP tour of the White House on the morning of April 8. The tour begins at 8:15, but it would probably be a good idea for you to arrive 15 minutes or so ahead of time. It lasts for about 45 minutes. The enclosed ticket will admit you at the White House East Gate when you arrive for the tour.

I understand from your letter that you plan to leave Washington on the 8th, but hope that the tour takes place early enough in the morning that it will not conflict with your travel plans.

Mr. Kissinger extends his best wishes to you for a pleasant stay in Washington.

★
Miss Barbara L. Maxey
1604 White Oak
Costa Mesa, California 92626

March 16, 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
THE WHITE HOUSE
1600 Pennsylvania NW
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was Jack Richardson's secretary when he made his trip back to Washington, D.C. last fall and when he returned he spoke repeatedly about his "behind-the-scene" tour of the White House.

I was speaking with Jack & Sara last night and he suggested that I write you direct. I shall be in Washington from the first to the eight of April and am writing to see if it would be possible to see the White House "at work". My brother, stationed at Coast Guard Headquarters, is getting married on the fourth of April which is the main reason for my trip but have been long interested in our history(my major in college) and this is the reason for writing you.

I realize that this does not leave you much time for a reply but I shall anxiously be awaiting your reply.

Thank you in advance and I remain,

92626

CAMBODIA: ENTRIES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S YELLOW PAD

By Francis M. Bator, Ernest R. May, Thomas C. Schelling, and
Adam Yarmolinsky

Just before Cambodia, President Nixon toted up prospective gains and losses on a yellow pad. Soon after June 30, he must add up results thus far and report to the public.

In earlier statements, he set forth at least four objectives: reducing American casualties, speeding troop withdrawals, influencing actions by North Vietnam, and protecting American prestige. When hearing his statement, we should bear in mind what he has said about these objectives. We should also hope to hear whether he thinks we should be prepared again to escalate our violence somewhere in Indo China.

First, the President said on April 30 and reiterated on May 8 that the operation "will reduce American casualties." Over three hundred Americans have died in Cambodia. Undoubtedly, the President recognized that the offensive would entail higher casualties in the short run. The President should explain why the net loss of American lives will be less over the long run. But he has not explained how American lives have been saved over the long run. The Cambodian sanctuaries menaced the IV and III Corps Areas of South Vietnam. The former is already Vietnamized; the latter is to be Vietnamized by September. Did the President expect to save American lives because his Vietnamization plans call for sending U.S. troops back into combat whenever the South Vietnamese are hard pressed?

Second, the President pointed to a map on April 30 and said: "North Vietnam already occupies this part of Laos. If North Vietnam also occupied this whole band in Cambodia or the entire country, it would mean that South Vietnam was completely outflanked and the forces of Americans in this area as well as the South Vietnamese would be in an untenable military position."

-2-

The President should explain how the Cambodian operation has reduced this danger. News reports tell of the Cambodians' inability to check the North Vietnamese. If U.S. troops, helicopters, and air support are withdrawn from Cambodia, what is to prevent the North Vietnamese from re-establishing the threat? Will the situation be more tenable in May, 1971, when the United States has 150,000 fewer troops in Vietnam? Are there grounds for confidence that the South Vietnamese will be able to withstand next year a threat of "outflanking" that the President judged them unable to withstand this year?

Third, the President has predicted that the Cambodian operation will influence decisions by Hanoi. When announcing on April 20 his schedule for withdrawing 150,000 troops, he took occasion to "remind the leaders of North Vietnam that . . . they will be taking grave risks should they attempt to use the occasion to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia or in Laos." When ordering action in Cambodia, he cited this warning, and on May 8, he observed that President Johnson had erred in escalating the war "step by step." Referring to the move into Cambodia, Mr. Nixon said, "This action is a decisive move, and this action also puts the enemy on warning that if it escalates while we are trying to deescalate, we will move decisively and not step by step."

There must have been earlier signals to Hanoi, for the President surely did not imagine that the North Vietnamese could reach a decision and have that decision carried out by field commanders within ten days. But by June 30, sixty-one days will have passed since the President demonstrated that his words were not empty and that he was prepared to exercise

-3-

his full powers as commander in chief even at the risk of a public storm
and jeopardy to his own prospects for reelection. Has he evidence that
the North Vietnamese have scaled down their operations in South Vietnam,
Laos, or Cambodia? News reports suggest the contrary.

The President said earlier, "It is Hanoi, and Hanoi alone, that
stands today blocking the path to a just peace for all the people of
Southeast Asia." Has he had indication since April 30 that the North
Vietnamese are more willing to bargain?

If the answers to both questions are negative -- that is, if the
North Vietnamese have not limited their operations or shown signs of
negotiating -- what is the next step? The President warned on June 3:
"if their answers to our withdrawal program, and to our offer to negotiate,
is to increase their attacks in a way that jeopardizes the safety of our
remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall, as my action five weeks ago demon-
strated, take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation."
What "strong and effective measures" are available? Does the President
contemplate renewed bombing of North Vietnam? Could a bombing campaign
be more effective, militarily and politically, than that of 1965-68? Or
does the President contemplate stepped-up ground force action? What happens
then to casualty rates and to withdrawal?

Fourth, Mr. Nixon asserted that the action in Cambodia would work to
restore American prestige and credibility elsewhere in the world. He
asked on June 3: "If an American President had failed to meet this threat
to 400,000 American men in Vietnam, would those nations and peoples who
rely on America's power and treaty commitments for their security -- in
Latin America, Europe, the Middle East or other parts of Asia -- retain any

-4-

confidence in the United States?" The question was of course rhetorical, and White House officials conceded that many capitals reacted initially with alarm and misgiving. The President should indicate whether these attitudes have since changed and whether he sees in Europe, the Middle East, and Japan increased faith in the restraint, wisdom, and reliability of his administration.

There is a fifth criterion for judging the Cambodian operation. Admiral Smedberg quoted President Nixon as saying a few days before April 30, "I am not going to let Cambodia go down the drain." His remark on April 30 about the military untenability of South Vietnam should the Communists control "this whole band in Cambodia or the entire country" was consistent with such a position. On the other hand, he and Secretary Rogers have declared that the United States has no commitment to Cambodia. The President's forthcoming statement should clarify his stand.

If Cambodia now falls, will that event not arouse the same concern that the prospect of it apparently aroused in late April? Will not the President's credibility be at stake once again?

These are not all the questions that we hope to hear addressed. The President could shed light on his "Vietnamization." Does it mean that South Vietnamese forces must be able in any circumstances to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese? Or does it admit the possibility of defeat in a Vietnamized area -- or in a Vietnamized South Vietnam? The President might indicate what he expects of the 240,000 U.S. troops that stay in Vietnam after May, 1971. Will they provide helicopter lift and air and artillery support? Will they fight off attacks on their own installations? What rate of casualties are they expected to suffer? Are their functions

-5-

eventually to be Vietnamized? Over what time? If the North Vietnamese
do not negotiate and if the South Vietnamese prove no stronger in the
future than in the past, does the President nevertheless foresee a time
when the United States can disengage from the war? Does ultimate with-
drawal depend on permanent North Vietnamese fear of the "strong and
effective measures" he has threatened?

It may be too much to hope now for answers to these longer-term
questions. There ought, however, to be one further element in the
summing-up. According to Stewart Alsop, the President noted on his yellow
pad that the Cambodian operation would cause "deep divisions" at home.
No doubt, these divisions were reinforced by the violence to which they
gave rise. But does President Nixon now estimate that the benefits of
the operation justified the damage to domestic peace and to faith in
America? And is this the last time we shall be asked to buy time with
lives, to prove our nationhood by resort to sudden violence, to punish
the enemy for warnings ignored, or to keep South Vietnam from being out-
flanked by Communist forces in Cambodia or Laos?

["Steigenberger\nAirporthotel", "6 Frankfurt/Main\nFlughafenstraße 300-304 · Tel.: (08 11) 6 98 51", "1/13/71", "DSAR HENRY-", "I THOUGHT THE NEWSESD ARTICLES,\nWHICH APPEARED IN TODAY'S FRANKFUR-\NTER ALLGAMING ZISTUNG MIGHT BE\nOF INTEREST TO YOU. I HEAR THROUGH\nTHE GRAPHLING THAT YOUR DING-PONG\nGAME IS IMPROVING CONSIDERABLY\nTHREE DAYS. WHILE ON THIS SUBJECT,\nI APPROVED FOR A VISA TO VISIT CHINA\n(IN YOUR FOOTSTEPS) WHICH INTERESTS\nME AS AN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNER. HOPE\nYOUR HOLIDAYS WERE JOYFUL.", "Kindly, PERSONAL REJARDIS,", "Absender ist Gast im Hotel"]

Verpackungs- und Gerüste-Industrie

Kinderzuhörer Gedenkstätter

DIE HSCHUH-

11/12/81

Unglückliche 300-304 - Tel: (0) 111 - 9 88 21
6 Frankfurt/Main

Airpoiners!
Steigungerger.

# Viele der Jüngen in den Fußstapfen der Alten?

## Umfrage zu politischen Ansichten / Von Key L. Ulrich

BONN, 13. Januar

Wie nachhaltig die Meinung junger Deutscher noch von den nationalsozialistischen Ordnungsvorstellungen der älteren Generation beeinflußt wird, zeigt eine Parallelbefragung von 470 Jugendlichen und 1124 Erwachsenen durch das „Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaften“ in Bonn. Das Ergebnis lasse sich „mit den bei Umfragen üblichen statistischen Vorbehalten“ verallgemeinern, heißt es im Vorwort des Tabellenbandes. Bezahlt wurde die Befragung zu politischen und sozialen Themen vom Zweiten Deutschen Fernsehen.

Mehr als die Hälfte der befragten Fünfzehn- bis Zwanzigjährigen sind Volksschüler, die anderen (44 Prozent) besuchen oder besuchten weiterführende Schulen; 90 Prozent von ihnen wohnen zu Hause. In den Ansichten, die sie über Staat und Gesellschaft äußern, spiegeln sich häufig Ordnungsvorstellungen aus Schule und familiarer Umgebung wider, obwohl sie meistens liberaler urteilen als die Generation der Eltern und vor allem der Großeltern. Wenn auch nicht immer mit überzeugender Mehrheit, klingen Meinungen von Jugendlichen und Erwachsenen, die weiterführende Schulen besucht haben oder besuchen, weniger obrigkeitshörig als die von Volksschülern.

Auf die Frage, ob Lehrer ihre Schüler in bestimmten Fällen schlagen dürfen, antworteten 41,5 Prozent der Erwachsenen ja, nur 54 Prozent nein und 4,5 Prozent schwiegen dazu; von den Jugendlichen sagten 80,4 Prozent nein zur Prügelstrafe, 14 Prozent — meistens Jüngere — fanden Prügel in der Ordnung. 82 Prozent der jungen Leute waren dagegen, daß die Jugend „vor allem harte Disziplin und strenge Führung“ brauche — aber 60 Prozent der Erwachsenen stimmten dafür. 47 Prozent der Erwachsenen waren auch der Meinung, daß man den Staat nur „in Ordnung halten“ könne, „wenn einige befehlen“. Bei den Jugendlichen vertraten immerhin 33 Prozent diese Meinung und 20 Prozent möchten anstelle des Parlaments sogar „endlich einen Mann an der Spitze sehen, der einmal hart durchgreift“.

Von den Jugendlichen meinen 38 Prozent, man könne zwar über die DDR denken, was man wolle, „aber wenigstens herrschen dort Ruhe und Ordnung“; von den Erwachsenen dachten sogar 52 Prozent so. 15 Prozent der Jugendlichen bezeichneten es als eine gute Seite des Nationalsozialismus, daß er „für Ruhe, Ordnung und Disziplin“ sorgte und daß es damals „weniger

Verbrechen und harte Strafen“ gab; bei den Erwachsenen unterstrichen 40 Prozent diese „gute Seite“ des Nationalsozialismus. Gastarbeiter, meinten 47 Prozent der Jugendlichen und 61 Prozent der Erwachsenen, sollten „unter sich bleiben und zusammen wohnen“.

Daß Reformen rundum notwendig sind, bestätigten die meisten der Jugendlichen und viele Erwachsene. Nur 32 Prozent der Jungen wollen an den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Strukturen der Bundesrepublik „nicht rütteln“, 45 Prozent sind für „tiefgreifende Veränderungen“. Erwachsene wurden gefragt, ob das politische und gesellschaftliche System in der Bundesrepublik so rückständig sei, daß „grundlegende Reformen“ nötig wären: 32 Prozent stimmten für Reformen, 43 Prozent dagegen. Was der einzelne unter Reformen versteht, erläutern die Tabellen allerdings nicht. Tolerant äußerten sich die Jugendlichen zur Kommunistischen Partei; 67 Prozent meinten, ein demokratischer Staat sollte sie zulassen.

Nutzen Jugendliche das Angebot an politischer Information? Fernsehsenden wie die Tagesschau werden verhältnismäßig häufig gesehen. Zur Tageszeitung, die ins Elternhaus kommt, greifen zwar 67 Prozent der Befragten regelmäßig, 43 Prozent von ihnen lesen Berichte über Politik aber nur gelegentlich bis gar nicht. Wochenzeitschriften wie „Der Spiegel“ oder „Die Zeit“ interessieren nicht sonderlich, 76 Prozent lesen dafür „Illustrierte“. „Bild“, ermittelte der Bonner Computer, wird am meisten von den Jüngsten, den Ungebildetsten und von jenen gelesen, die schon früh berufstätig sind. 46 Prozent der Fünfzehn- bis Zwanzigjährigen fanden, daß sich die SPD am meisten für ihre Forderungen einsetze, 17 Prozent meinten, die CDU/CSU tue das; 36 Prozent wußten keine Antwort. 51 Prozent würden die SPD wählen, 22,6 Prozent die CDU/CSU, 2,8 Prozent die FDP. Weniger als 1 Prozent hatten jeweils Sympathien für die NPD und die DKP.

## Ehrung aus Israel

ma. MÜNCHEN, 13. Januar. Der israelische Konsul in München, Pinchas Samir, hat am Donnerstag die Schwefern Josy Scherer-Hoffmann und Gisela Scherer dafür geehrt, daß sie während des Zweiten Weltkriegs die Jüdin Rosl Vetter bei sich versteckt und so gerettet hatten. Die beiden erhielten eine Urkunde und dazu das Recht, in der „Allee der Gerechten“ in Jerusalem einen Baum zu pflanzen.

[Lc]

Die lachende Masche

„... und dann fährt der Idiot bei ‚Grün‘ an!!“

Stellen Sie sich vor, meine Katze hat kürzlich Benzin getrunken und lief dann wie verrückt im Kreis herum. Plötzlich lag sie da und rührte sich nicht mehr. Was meinen Sie, was sie hatte?

Antwort: Logischerweise kein Benzin mehr!

GENERAL

FG-6-11-1/KISSINGER, HENRY A.
KISSINGER, HENRY A. /M+

4975 ROCKWOOD PARKWAY, N.W.

WASHINGTON 16, D. C.

PERSONAL

The Honourable
Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

8 September 1970

Your office called last week from San Clemente to say that you were extremely busy during September and did not think you could see me. I wanted to let you know that I shall be here until September 22nd. with the exception of Sept. 13th. to 16th. when I am in New York. On the 22nd. I leave again for Europe. I realise that your time is limited but I would have liked very much to discuss with you several problems of major importance, especially the very serious consequences of the Bonn-Moscow treaty and the very poor image of the Nixon Administration in Europe as well as the continuous attempts of a certain American Ambassador to undercut his own government.

I have already discussed all these points extensively with Alexis Johnson who had lunch with me last week, also with Peter Flanigan and shall do so tomorrow with Frank Shakespeare who is lunching with me.

If September is quite impossible for you, we could perhaps meet after I return from Europe on October 7th. Incidentally, I am going to talk about the Bonn-Moscow treaty at our Foreign Policy Discussion Group dinner on October 8th.

With every good wish, I am,

4975 ROCKWOOD PARKWAY, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016

16 October 1970

The Honourable
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am really sorry that so far it has not been possible to arrange a mutually convenient time for me to come to see you. I am just back from Europe and leaving again on Monday for a week, but I should be in Washington the week of October 26th. except for the 28th. and also the week of November 2nd. On the 8th. I am off for California. I do hope that you can find a free moment during those two weeks.

I also wanted to ask you if you would be willing to come back to our Foreign Policy Discussion Group for an evening early next year, perhaps? We would like to give a dinner in your honour with the wives of members present. I am being besieged by the fair sex as they are all anxious to meet you and listen to your remarks.

With every good wish, I am,

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

20 May 1971

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

A brief note to tell you that Count Franz Ludwig Stauffenberg, the son of Klaus Stauffenberg who made the attempt on Hitler's life on July 20th., will be in Washington from June 1st. to 3rd. You undoubtedly know that he is the "Stellvertretender Bundesvorsitzender der Jungen Union Deutschlands CDU/CSU. He is also the son-in-law of Karl Theodor Guttenberg. I recently saw Franz Ludwig in Germany and invited him to come and speak to our Foreign Policy Discussion Group. He will do it on the evening of June 2nd. On that day I am also giving a private lunch for him to which I am inviting some ten friends from the Hill, The White House, the Pentagon and the State Department. I suppose you will be too busy to attend but perhaps you would like to send one of your collaborators.

This will be Franz Ludwig's first visit to the United States and I think it would be very important that he establish good and close contact with the Administration. There is little doubt in my mind but that in the years to come Count Stauffenberg will play a major role in German conservative politics.

May I suggest that I bring Franz Ludwig to see you at your office sometime during the day of June 2nd. He will probably be in Washington that one day only. You can reach me by telephone either at the office (363-5449) or at home (362-9648). I am leaving on June 5th. on an extended trip to Europe, Vaduz, Brussels, Germany, Austria, and shall be back at the end of August.

Looking forward to hearing from you,

RECEIVED
JUN 1 1971

CENTRAL FILES

JULIUS MAYER

141 WEST JACKSON BOULEVARD
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60604

November 17, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I hesitate to write you this personal note, however I was quite interested in reading the article in the Sunday New York Times Magazine Section about your career and origin.

I was particularly excited about seeing your picture in your Mother's home town Leutershausen, Germany. My own Mother was born in Leutershausen and moved to Seeheim on the Bergstrasse. On my occasional visits to Europe I have visited Leutershausen several times, including this past June.

I am wondering if you would be kind enough to tell me your Mother's maiden name, as one of my older brothers and myself quite clearly remember people from Leutershausen and I am just wondering if we can identify your Mother's people.

My Mother's maiden name was Carolina Hirsh, and she was born in Leutershausen in 1860 and moved to Seeheim in 1884, and died in Chicago in 1942, after having to leave Hitler Germany in 1934.

I was born in Seeheim, Germany, in 1905 and came to this country in 1922 and have been engaged in the commodity business since 1923.

I want to take this opportunity to congratulate you on your tremendous success and on the fine work you have done during President Nixon's administration, and to wish you continued success.

J. Mayer
LER

Dr. HANS MAYRZEDT

University of London Internat. Hall of Residence
Brunswick Square London W.C. 1

30th June, 1969.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant for National
Security

White House
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Professor Kissinger,

Unfortunately I shall not be in Harvard next year because I was unable to get a grant. I was told that there were no grants available for special auditors coming neither from NATO nor from developing countries. It is in the U.S. apparently a very bad thing to come from a European neutral country. And in fact, the U.S. Government was never in favour of the Austrian neutrality.

Meanwhile my book "Die Neutralen in der europäischen Integration - Kontroversen, Konfrontationen, Alternativen" is finished. I am also in negotiations with Chatham House to write a book on the position of the three neutral countries (Switzerland, Sweden, Austria) and the other European non-aligned countries (Ireland, Finland, Yugoslavia) to the European integration process. The first book was more concentrated on the EEC. The new one will also take into consideration looser forms of integration and future prospects of some form of political integration as well as the model of a narrow unification of Europe. I believe that under certain conditions European unification could be an excellent alternative to neutrality.

Next year I shall presumably be a research fellow and lecturer at a university in Switzerland. I want to do what we call in German Habilitation.

Einladung
zur Subskription des Buches

Schriftenreihe der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik und internationale Beziehungen (Band 5):

Kontroversen — Konfrontationen — Alternativen

Herausgegeben von
**Hans Mayrzedt** (Wien) — **Hans Christoph Binswanger** (St. Gallen)

ca. 480 Seiten, Glanzband,

Subskriptionspreis: S 320.—, DM 50.—, sFr. 55.—

Späterer Ladenpreis: ca. S 380.—, DM 58.80, sFr. 64.80

Nach etwa zehn Jahren europäischer Integrationspolitik und Integrationsdebatte, an denen auch die drei neutralen Staaten Europas lebhaft Anteil genommen haben, soll nun unter Beteiligung von Wissenschaftlern, Experten und Diplomaten aus der Schweiz, aus Schweden und aus Österreich aus Sicht der Neutralen eine sehr umfassende *Bilanz* gezogen werden, in der wirtschaftliche, juristische (völkerrechtliche und verfassungsrechtliche) und politische Gesichtspunkte in gleicher Weise berücksichtigt werden.

Zunächst geht es um die Beantwortung der Frage, welche Probleme sich bei der Integrationspolitik gestellt haben und letztlich warum die intensiven Bemühungen um eine Assoziierung neutraler Staaten mit der EWG bisher nicht von Erfolg beglcitet waren. Das Buch will überdies *Perspektiven* aufzeigen: Es wird auch untersucht, welche Möglichkeiten sich kurz- und mittelfristig zur Milderung der Außenseiterposition der Neutralen gegenüber der EWG anbieten, und ob langfristig Alternativen zur Assoziierung denkbar sind. Es interessieren sowohl die gemeinsamen Probleme der drei neutralen Staaten (die Neutralitätsvorbehalte) als auch die Frage, inwieweit die Probleme der drei Neutralen voneinander verschieden sind.

[LC]

Gliederung des Werkes:

Vorwort

I. TEIL: Allgemeine Fragen der Neutralität

Mit Beiträgen von: Waldemar Hummer (Wien) und Hans Mayrzedt (Wien-London).

II. TEIL: Politische Aspekte der europäischen Integration

Mit Beiträgen von: Alois Riklin (St. Gallen), Jean-Claude Favez (Genf), Hans Christoph Binswanger (St. Gallen).

III. TEIL: Die Neutralen und die EFTA

Mit Beiträgen von: Jean Komaromi (Genf), Nikolaus Martell (Genf).

IV. TEIL: Die Neutralen und die EWG — Alternativen einer Verbindung

Mit Beiträgen von: Waldemar Hummer (Wien), Heinz Stranner (Bern), Willy Zeller (Zürich), Hans Mayrzedt (Wien-London), Tord Ekström-Gunnar Myrdal-Roland Pålsson (alle Stockholm), Dietrich Schindler (Zürich), Hans Christoph Binswanger (St. Gallen), Theo Oehlinger (Innsbruck-Wien), Bo Siegbahn (Stockholm-Tel Aviv).

V. TEIL: Die Neutralen außerhalb der EWG — Entschärfung der
Außenseiterposition

Mit Beiträgen von: Hans Mayrzedt - Helmut Romé (beide Wien), Willy Zeller (Zürich), Viktor Frank-Steiner (Basel), Franz Aschinger (Zürich), Ewald Nowotny (Linz/Donau-Wien), Egon Matzner (Linz/Donau-Wien), Michael Fitz (Wien-Paris).

Zusammenfassung

Schlußbetrachtungen

Autorenverzeichnis

Register

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