JUL 21 1983

Edward N. Luttwak
Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies, CSIS, Georgetown University.

# OBSERVATIONS ON THE WAR IN EL SALVADOR

## NOTE:

The following is based on a short visit (May 19-23), but also on prior experience with foreign military forces in several countries. Thus the military issues were not evaluated exclusively in terms of US military concepts & preferences. Communication with locals was facilitated by fluency in Spanish.

## Summary:

1. It is generally agreed that at present the war is being lost: the guerillas are inflicting cumulative physical and political damage on the GoS without being themselves reduced in the process. A sudden debacle, precipitated e.g. by the ambush and destruction of a major GoS field force in a locality close to San Salvador is possible. The not-so-temporary loss of control over a peripheral province, is probable. The deterioration of the GoS situation over time is certain, under present US-GoS policies.

2. The GoS army, though corrupt in the manner of an old-time municipal machine does have a sound tradition as a fighting army, as shown by the combat spirit of its officers. It is also grossly under-equipped and mostly poorly trained (see below, Annex I). It remains, however, in that privileged category of armies which have officers and men who do want to fight. They march towards the sound of gunfire, not the other way. In theory, this means that the war could be won; in practice, a defeat is more likely.

3. Because of crippling material inadequacies, the agile, small-unit tactics now being insistently preached to the GoS Army are not in fact feasible. Such tactics assume an abundance of well-maintained radios, helicopters, etc. To look for guerillas by small patrols at night is fine--if the patrol can rapidly call in reinforcements, and airpower too in a crisis. But the GoS army moves on foot (it has only a handful of helicopters and few trucks), it has few radios and no gunships; it must fight in large bodies to avoid destruction in detail. Training junior officers and trying to change command attitudes, as we are now doing, cannot help if the gross material inadequacies are not remedied.

4. The war is now being fought by methods that compromise between US-preferred tactics and practical GoS shortcomings. Worst outcomes often follow: by the Salvador method, soldiers guard a bridge; by the US method they should seek out guerillas at night. The compromise is a daytime march up the road to look for guerillas--the guerillas of course get away, and the unguarded bridge is destroyed.

page 2. Luttwak

5. At present aid levels it will take many years before GoS forces will be able to implement the tactics USG is now preaching. The volume of military aid is of course very small, and moreover some of the equipment supplied (naturally designed to suit the needs of the rich & well-trained US forces) is inherently unsuitable for the poor and ill-trained GoS army. (See Annex II, below). In the meantime, worst-outcome compromise methods must persist, and the actual effect of US advice is to dissuade the GoS command from doing things which could be done, i.e. the static defense of valuable infrastructures. Moreover, the insistent pressure on GoS officers to do what cannot be done must be demoralizing.

6. At the same time, the US involvement in military assistance prevents the GoS from using the traditional method of counter-insurgency (ie. mainly static defense, occasional ambushes of betrayed guerilla bands, and punitive raids against villages that cooperate with the guerillas). A 19th Century army can win against guerillas by using sound 19th century-type methods, (Compare Guatemala) but the US cannot countenance such methods, for obvious humanitarian reasons.

CONCLUSIONS:

A. While US prestige is fully engaged, and a high political price in being paid for the war at home and abroad, US military aid is not sufficient to allow the GoS to implement the modern method of counter-insurgency. At the same time, the US presence in the country precludes the traditional method. Therefore there is at present no valid military option. Further small aid increments cannot suffice to make US methods feasible.

B. If no drastic increase in military aid is possible, the major alternative is to end US military aid, withdraw the 55-man Mil. Group, and provide budget aid instead. (Congress might well grant a sharp increase in financial aid if the 55 are withdrawn). Certainly the military value of the 55 does not warrant their very high political cost to the Administration. This option would allow the GoS to economize by purchasing lower-cost items in lieu of US Mil. Spec. equipment. (See Annex II). The GoS forces do badly need the technical/military training now provided by Mil. Group's sergeants, but this could also be provided by contract-personnel, US or foreign.

C. Needless to say, this alternative cannot guarantee against a guerilla victory, but at least the damage to US prestige (if not to the strategic interests of the US) would be reduced since the GoS would no longer be a recipient of military aid. At present, US prestige is fully engaged, while USG has failed to provide the aid level needed to win.

D. Alternatively, see the lesser suggestions in Annex III, below.

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ANNEX I: The state of the GoS army

**Training:** the GoS army has no basic training facility; troops join units as raw recruits. In peacetime, in-unit training can work well (it is used, e.g., by the Soviet army). But at present raw recruits are plunged straight into combat, untrained. Moreover, because of high wastage (no medevac, health problems) the proportion of raw recruits in field units is high.

**Officers:** the Salvador officer corps has been far superior to its regional counterparts and chiefly responsible for Salvador's distinguished record in local wars. It has the traditional military virtues (fighting spirit, leadership by example); it lacks the modern military skills needed to implement US methods of war. The present infusion of US-trained junior officers helps, but also hurts by disrupting the corporate spirit that generated the traditional military virtues.

Material Aspects:

1. The GoS army has no more than 10+/- operational utility helicopters at any one time; this amounts to a maximum lift of roughly 80 soldiers if no helicopters are provided for scouting, liason, emergency transport and medevac. At a very rough estimate, US tactics would require at least ten times as much helicopter lift (as well as much else).

2. The GoS army distributes resources between the 14 territorial "departments" and the mobile field forces according to quasi-political criteria. Each force and each commander "owns" his resources (e.g. the very active Morazan dept. in the endangered town of S.Francisco Gotera only has two 81mm mortars; reportedly the Guardia Nacional has 40 [forty] mortars totally idle). In other words, there is no true logistic system at all, ie. one that conveys scarce items to units engaged in highest-priority operations. And if a true logistic system were in place, then the necessary transport would be lacking.

3. The GoS army has no packaged field rations; food is bought locally by each unit commander, as in the 18th century, and this can easily reveal planned movements to any guerillas in the vicinity.

4. The GoS has no centralized intelligence system to collect, evaluate and disseminate Intelligence on the guerillas. At the national level, the police forces and army depts. do not systematically share intelligence; at the unit level, dead guerillas are not fully identified; captured guerillas are not properly interrogated, captured documents remain as personal souvenirs.

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ANNEX I, Cont.

5. GoS field forces are short of all equipment that must be imported including radios, trucks (the Morazan Dept. had 6 trucks on May 20, to support forces that needed 60+); they are short of even the simplest of support weapons.(ie. light mortars); however they also lack combat-critical but low cost ancillaries such as sandbags, stretchers etc.

6. GoS field units generally fight with little or no supporting fire from mortars, let alone howitzers; such weapons are very scarce and often barely operable due to age (an ancient Yugoslav mortar was seen inoperable due to a cracked baseplate).

7. Individual soldiers are short of boots, ponchos, (40 ill, mainly pneumonia cases in the Atlacatl battalion on May 20, 1983, versus 4 wounded), field dressings, webbing, and cleaning gear for their rifles (The US-supplied M.16 must be kept very clean -- unlike the AK-47, Galil etc.; all M.16s seen were dirty, some barely operable). There is no organized medevac and this must affect morale.

ANNEX II: On US military aid:

1. The GoS is of course very poor. That explains the shortage of helicopters, radars and all costly high-technology items. But its field units also lack very simple essentials that could easily be produced in-country: e.g. field dressings, stretchers, ponchos, cleaning rods & bore brushes, sandbags and packaged and field rations. In addition, the field units also lack essentials that could be imported cheaply enough to be affordable even by the GoS, such as commercial short-range, hand-held radios (Toshiba/ Motorola type), small trucks etc.

2. It seems therefore that the GoS has not mobilized local resources, and neither are the GoS forces sharing what they do have to meet the most critical needs. One factor in the situation may be the hope that US military aid will greatly increase & take care of all needs.

3. It must be recognized that US military equipment is mostly suitable for rich, highly-trained armies, i.e. the opposite of the GoS forces. E.g. M.60 machine-gun ammo belts must be kept clean in their containers till use; that is easy for a motorized/airborne army which can deliver ammo as needed. But GoS forces move on foot, and carry M.60 ammo belts "bandito" style, draped across the body--but then they gather dirt and malfunctions are common. Similarly, US field radios etc. are very expensive and over-elaborate for GoS needs, US C-rations are over-luxurious, etc.

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ANNEX II: Cont.

4. This suggests that direct budget grants could advantageously replace US military aid. If, say, 20% is misappropriated and only 80% remains, that 80% might still buy more capability by substituting cheaper/simpler items for current US MilSpec items (e.g. Motorola hand-held radios in lieu of PRC 77s, etc.) In addition, the termination of item-specific US military aid might induce a greater mobilization of local resources. (Compare in this regard Guatemala equipment purchases.

ANNEX III: Possible improvements within the framework of the current policy.

(a): a combined military-economic change.

Provide US financial aid for the local purchase of low-technology military essentials (boots, ponchos, sandbags, stretchers, uniforms, packaged field rations, webbing, medical packs). This would save much money as compared to US-issue items and would stimulate local industry, creating employment etc.

(b): re-orient the Mil and/or add non-Govt. contract-personnel.

US specific training (e.g. in the use of mortars etc.) is very useful while US operational/tactical advice is counterproductive, since it actually yields worst-outcome compromises. If so, it follows logically that the 55 men of the Mil. Group are best used to provide specific training in detail. High-quality SF master sergeants can train mortar crews, institute proper weapon-cleaning, teach simple micro-tactics (weapon and CP siting etc.); if two could be sent to each Departamento visible improvement should follow quickly. In other words, reduce the number of officers in the MilGroup and increase the number of high-grade, versatile NCOs. Additionally, the GoS might hire such people from the ranks of the retired to thus augment the Mil.Group indirectly: in the US there seem to be many aficionados available who would be willing to help for small wages and the excitement.

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ANNEX III, cont.

(c): an operational suggestion.

At present rates of progress, the upgrading of the GoS forces as a whole to the point where they can implement US-style counter-insurgency would take years; in the meantime, purposeful offensive action that will actually reduce guerillas is unfeasible; there are only futile sweeps. A very selective "Gideon" solution should therefore be considered, since it could yield guerilla-reducing capabilities in a matter of months.

A "Gideon" solution would leave the bulk of GoS forces for static defense duties and concentrate virtually all US training and material aid as well as scarce GoS resources (helicopters etc.) to upgrade just one GoS field force (say of 1000 men, plus another 1000 in training at all times), to make it truly mobile and effective for US-style counter-insurgency. The best format combines heli-borne troops, parachute troops (the GoS army does have a parachute battalion of sorts), attack aircraft (the present GoS A-37s would do fine, if properly maintained), and ground scouts. The scouts find guerillas and designate their location; heli-borne troops then come in to attack with air support; the parachute troops are then dropped where they are most likely to catch fleeing guerillas.

Obviously, it would take very high-level USG persuasion to induce the GoS to accept this solution, which would violate the army's traditional spoils system. Moreover, at present very low levels, US aid might not suffice even for a small 1000-man force and its replacement force-in-training (the latter is essential troops used for such high-stress tactics cannot be kept in the field for more than a few months). On the other hand, an elite-force solution could reduce the guerillas, while the present attempt to upgrade and expand the GoS army concurrently may not attain minimum adequacy for years.

END.

DAEDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

July 28, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

I delayed writing to you earlier, mostly because your appointment came at precisely the time that I returned from a four-week stay in Europe and my desk was laden with paper. Rather than just say, perfunctorily, that I am delighted by the appointment, and that I wish you all success in it, I preferred to wait until I had a few minutes to write a more substantial note.

First, obviously, my warm good wishes for success in your mission. It is going to be an immensely difficult one, and I am very pleased indeed that you agreed to undertake it. I am sure that you have heard from dozens of people about what you ought to do, and what you must studiously avoid. I will not add to that company, giving you my own thoughts on a subject that can by no stretch of the imagination be called my own.

However, I can say that I do see some of the difficulties of your task. The fact of the matter is that there is very little understanding of the present administration's policy in Central America, considerable suspicion of it, and no evident open support for it in the outside world. All this makes it seem surprisingly like Vietnam, at least Vietnam after things began to go very wrong. However, what is so surprising here is that nothing terrible has happened so far, and the feeling already exists.

In my view, no greater public service could be given than to achieve a certain candor about the kinds of situations that Americans are obliged to live with in this part of the world. Just as Soviets have to be very aware of what three hundred years of historical relations with a place called Poland create in the way of problems for them, the American public needs to understand what a century and a half of relations with Central America create in the way of problems for us. It is pointless to think of this area as one might have thought of Western Europe in the years after 1945, or even after 1917. The relations are very different, and they are at the heart of our difficulties in the area.

More than that, it is by no means certain that appreciable elements in the rest of the world, more friendly to us, have much understanding or sympathy for what we have been doing or for what we presumably now intend to do. Therefore, the most explicit accounting of the problems that exist

Norton's Woods • 136 Irving Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 491-2600

AUG 01 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

July 28, 1983

in this region of the world, the problems that exist for the United States, not simply those that exist for the people of the area, needs to be attempted. It is the kind of analysis that you are admirably suited to doing. I am confident that you will do it boldly, for I think that anything that smacks of conventional argument in this area is bound to seem stale. In a very literal sense your report can be a success only if it transforms the dialogue entirely.

That is easier said than done, and I know that. However, I also happen to believe that you are one of the few people who have the experience (and the historical imagination) to realize what is called for. I really do think that a quite remarkable feat can be pulled off here, if you realize that your purpose is to make comprehensible why the world sees the situation as it does, why this country is divided as it is, why the options are as difficult as they are. At the same time, one must choose between the options that are available, indicating the hazards of each of the courses, indicating also the likely consequences of any of them. It is an extraordinary opportunity for you, and I wish you every success with it.

It has been much too long since we last saw each other, and I fear that your new duties are not going to make you suddenly available for long evening talks. Still, I hope that there will be a chance to see you. Important, for you, however, is to know that people like myself are immensely elated by what we think to be a very good decision, to bring you back in what may be an even more difficult situation, with possibly even more serious consequences, than the one that has preoccupied us for over thirty years in the Middle East. How good is your Spanish?

With all good wishes,

SRG/dlb

RICHARD H. SOLOMON
Head
Political Science Department

3 August 1983

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

It was good to see you for a moment two weeks ago. May your efforts on Central America be as successful as was the Scowcroft Commission on strategic force modernization issues.

I received a request today from the State Department people associated with the Commission for a number of sets of our research reports on Caribbean Basin security issues. These should be in the hands of Harry Shlaudeman early next week, in time for the first meeting of your Commission on August 10th. A number of these studies are still in working draft form, but hopefully they will be useful to your efforts.

If our Latin American specialists can be of further assistance, please let me know. We have had a very productive team working on Caribbean security problems with modest and sporadic government support; but they have created an important body of research.

RHS:my

AUG 05 1983

THE RAND CORPORATION, 1700 MAIN STREET, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90406, PHONE: (213) 393-0411

5 August 1983

Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman
Commission on Central America
Room 1004
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ambassador Shlaudeman:

At the request of Dr. Henry Kissinger, as conveyed to me by Luigi Einaudi, I am sending you under separate cover 25 copies each of six studies prepared by The Rand Corporation for its project on Caribbean Basin Security Issues, an effort funded primarily by the U.S. Air Force. Although the majority of these studies are currently in draft form, the Air Force has approved their use by the Presidential Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by Dr. Kissinger, for the purpose of providing fresh policy perspectives as well as relevant background on current trends and developments in the region. The research, of course, does not necessarily imply that the USAF endorses the views or recommendations contained in the analyses.

Rand initiated an intensive research effort on the Caribbean Basin in 1981 because of its concern over the security implications for the U.S. of politico-military developments in the region. This project was sustained under our Air Force contract until early 1983. A separate contract with the Department of State provided additional funding for the Cuba study, which was jointly sponsored with the Air Force.*

Two of the six studies deal with the geopolitical and strategic contexts of the Caribbean Basin, and their implications for U.S. security and policy:

* *Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin (WD-1717-1-AF)*, by David F. Ronfeldt, focuses on the underlying geostrategic principles that have guided U.S. policy in the

* The Cuba study was completed as a Rand Report and released to the public earlier this year. The remaining five analyses are in the final stages of revision and review as Working Drafts. Except for the Nicaraguan study, all the Working Drafts incorporate comments and suggestions received at a State Department conference held last April.

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August 5, 1983

Basin since the 19th century. The analysis places the region in a larger global context and argues that a secure Basin facilitates the role of the United States as a world power. It calls for the development of "collective hegemony" as the means to ensuring the Basin's security, while accommodating rising nationalist sentiments in the region.

* *Profiles of the Caribbean Basin in 1960/1980: Changing Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions* (WD-1679-1-AF), by Joseph H. Stodder with Kevin F. McCarthy, surveys the major changes that have occurred in the Basin over the two decades prior to the increased U.S. involvement in El Salvador. By analyzing two time-slices, 1960 and 1980/81, it shows how the Basin has been transformed in three critical dimensions: in its geopolitical, economic, and socio-demographic profile; in the growth of Soviet and Cuban military capabilities; and in the relative decline in the U.S. military presence in and economic ties to the Basin.

Two of the analyses use a case study approach to explore different dimensions of low-intensity political and military conflict in Central America:

* *Nicaragua: The Internationalization of Conflict and Politics in Central America* (WD-1716-1-AF), by Adriana Bosch-Lemus, examines the role and consequences of external actor participation in the Nicaraguan revolution before and after 1979. It shows how the Nicaraguan conflict was increasingly internationalized through a sandinista strategy that solicited active external support from Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama, Mexico, Western Europe, and Cuba, but which ultimately left Cuba as the most influential player in Nicaragua after the FSLN victory.

* *Military Politics, Internal Warfare, and U.S. Policy in Guatemala* (WD-1709-1-AF), by Caesar D. Sereseres, analyzes the complexities of Guatemala's guerrilla war and its impact over the years on that country's relations with the United States. Assessing the nature of the March, 1982 military coup by young officers, and the new regime headed by General Efrain Rios-Montt, it suggests guidelines for developing a prudential, constructive U.S. security relationship with Guatemala.

The last two studies focus on the emergence of two regional actors in the Basin, and the challenges they present for U.S. policy as either an ally or adversary:

* *Venezuela's Pursuit of Caribbean Basin Interests: Implications for United States National Security* (WD-1676-1-AF), by David J. Myers, examines the range of interests, and the capabilities and limitations, of Venezuela as an important regional actor in

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the Basin. While emphasizing that Venezuela is likely to remain
generally supportive of U.S. policy, it also cautions that there
will continue to be points of divergence between Washington and
Caracas in the future over Basin security-related issues.

* A *Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s* (R-2954-DOS/AF), September 1982, by Edward Gonzalez, assesses the security implications of growing Cuban and Soviet military and revolutionary capabilities in the Basin, and the advantages and limitations of several policy options towards Cuba. It then elaborates a long-range leverage strategy: carefully coordinating pressures and inducements to exploit Havana's vulnerabilities and interests, the strategy's objective is the "Finlandization of Cuba" as an approach to safeguarding Caribbean Basin security and building a national consensus in the United States on the Cuban problem.

I trust that these analyses will be of value to the Commission. Our staff
of Latin American specialists is prepared to be of further assistance to
Dr. Kissinger and the members of his Commission. I am enclosing brief
biographical statements on our senior staff who have taken the lead in
this Caribbean Basin study effort--Edward Gonzalez, David Ronfeldt, and
Caesar Sereseres. They all have active security clearances and pursue
their research with the full range of Rand institutional support.

RHS:my
Enclosures as noted above

cc: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

[C]

EDWARD GONZALEZ

A resident consultant at Rand, and a Project Leader for Caribbean Basin Security Issues, Edward Gonzalez is also Professor of Political Science at U.C.L.A. Dr. Gonzalez is a nationally recognized specialist on Cuban domestic and foreign affairs, Cuban-Soviet relations, U.S. policy towards Cuba and Latin America, and is also investigating the use of international leverage by different states.

He is the author of more than twenty-five publications, among them articles in *World Politics*, *Problems of Communism*, *Foreign Affairs*, and he is the author of *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1974). His most recent work is *A Strategy for Dealing with Cuba in the 1980s* (R-2954-DOS/AF), The Rand Corporation, September 1982.

[L]

DAVID F. RONFELDT

David Ronfeldt is a staff member of the Political Science Department of The Rand Corporation, where his research has primarily concerned U.S.-Latin American security relations. He has done topical studies on arms transfers, terrorism, energy, and immigration issues, and country studies of Mexico, Cuba, and Iran. He is a noted expert on U.S.-Mexican relations, and is interested in future research on North American interdependence among the United States, Canada, Mexico, and other nations around the Caribbean Basin.

His most recent work is *Geopolitics, Security, and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin*, The Rand Corporation, forthcoming. Other works, all published by The Rand Corporation, include: *U.S. Immigration Policy and Global Interdependence* (co-authored, R-2887-FF/RF/RC/NICHD, June 1982); *Options for U.S. Policy on Terrorism*, (co-authored, R-2764-RC, July 1981); *Mexico's Petroleum and U.S. Policy: Implications for the 1980s* (co-authored, R-2510-DOE, June 1980); *Superclients and Superpowers: Cuba: Soviet Union/Iran: United States*, (P-5945, April 1978); and *Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of Mutual Respect*, (co-authored, R-1173-DOS), June 1973.