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in Southeast Asia will live henceforth with a consciousness
of reconciliation, then I would say that that day is very far
off.

The essence of the settlement was that the military
issues were settled in some detail, at least in the document,
and the political issues were left to further evolution.
The political issues were not solved; they were left to hopefully
a political rather than a military contest.

The parties that had fought for 25 years did not
suddenly give up their differences. Therefore, the issue in
Southeast Asia is not whether a consciousness of harmony can
be brought about or the absence of tension but whether the
political evolution that will inevitably occur take place
essentially in peaceful forms or at least without large-scale
conflict.

We have stated repeatedly that we are disappointed
at the way the agreement has been implemented, but is also
true that for all of the parties there is a difficult process
of adjustment.

We are not pessimistic about the long-term prospects
in the negotiations that we are conducting with the North
Vietnamese. We are approaching them with the attitude that
the difficulties can be ameliorated, if not solved, and that
one should look at this as an evolutionary process rather than
a final settlement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how much progress is actually
being made in both Cambodia and Laos toward a political settle-
ment within those countries?

DR. KISSINGER: Just to give myself some possibility of
avoiding some questions later on, I must point out that this is
not exactly related to the subject of this press conference, which
is to explain the report.

The situation in Laos and Cambodia differs in the
sense that in Laos -- they are similar in one respect.
Article 20 of the agreement provides for the withdrawal of all
foreign forces and for an end to the use of Laos and Cambodia
as bases against any neighboring country.

In this sense, the obligation is clear and unambiguous,
and obviously is not being fulfilled. There is a difference,
however, in the sense that in Laos there exists a cease-fire
agreement between the Laotian parties.

We are not formally a part of that agreement, and this
is why the agreement provides that within a fixed time period
after a political settlement, which in turn was supposed to
come 30 days after the cease-fire agreement, all foreign forces
should be withdrawn.

This is not, strictly speaking, in accordance with
Article 20, which makes no prior conditions to the withdrawal
of foreign forces.

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If this agreement is implemented among the parties, then a definite deadline will exist for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Up to now, the political agreement has not been achieved, so the negotiating problem in Laos would be for the outside countries to encourage a conclusion of the political negotiations, which would automatically produce a deadline for the withdrawal of foreign forces. This, in turn, would achieve one of our principal objectives as far as Laos is concerned.

Q How much progress has been made in that respect?

DR. KISSINGER: Our judgment is that enough progress has been made so that a settlement could be achieved rapidly if it were wanted by both sides. The obstacle to a settlement right now is the reluctance, I would think, to withdraw troops rather than the conditions of the settlement. If a decision were made to have a settlement, it could come fairly rapidly.

Q Dr. Kissinger ---

DR. KISSINGER: I am not finished yet with Cambodia. In Cambodia, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the forces opposing the Government were divided among various factions, some of which were receiving their support from different capitals, it did not prove as feasible to arrange a global negotiation as it turned out to be in Laos.

However, we believe that some of the same process that operated in Laos can be applied also in Cambodia, particularly now as all the opposing forces claim to be rallied under one central direction and that the government in Phnom Penh has broadened its base.

We are not too pessimistic that over a period of weeks, maybe some months, some cease-fire negotiations could start. Cambodia is somewhat behind Laos in this process. What form these negotiations would take, we would leave to the parties.

Q Dr. Kissinger, since three-quarters of the Senate and almost two-thirds of the House are opposing MFN for the Soviet Union, why is there no mention made of this matter in your report to the Congress dealing with the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: We have made very clear -- and I will repeat here -- that the Administration has strongly supported the provision in the trade bill that would enable the President to grant MFN to the Soviet Union.

If this provision is approved, it is the President's intention to grant MFN to the Soviet Union. It is furthermore the belief of this Administration that the issue of MFN for the Soviet Union is part of the whole fabric of our negotiation with the Soviet Union over a period of two years and should not be separated as an issue to be addressed in isolation.

Finally, we believe that the exchanges that took place between the Soviet leadership and the President on the issue of the exit visas substantially meets the concerns that were expressed by many of the signers of these resolutions.

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We hope that as the Congress studies the problem in
its entire range, and as we continue our discussions with Soviet
leaders on some of the problems that gave rise to these
concerns, that by the time the Congress votes on MFN it will
see matters in the same light.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you proposing some sort of
consortium consumer union with Europe in terms of the energy
crisis in the Middle East, to put the pressure on the Arab
nations to provide more oil? There seems to be some sort of
an ambiguity in the report.

DR. KISSINGER: May I point out, incidentally, that
MFN is mentioned at the bottom of page 34 and at the top of
page 35 of the report.

Q I am thinking in terms of the issue of immigration,
in terms of MFN.

DR. KISSINGER: That issue we did not deal with
separately, it is true.

With respect to Miss Thomas, her question was whether
we were implying a consortium of consumer nations to bring
pressure on the producer nations to produce more oil. Frankly,
we have not thought of this problem in terms of pressure.

Indeed, we have not completed our own deliberations
on the international implications of the energy problem. The
Energy Message dealt primarily with the domestic implications,
and we are now engaged in the NSC process in an investigation
of the international implications.

It is clear that we face here a number of problems with
which we have had no previous experience in the international
field. For example, the dollar reserves of the oil producing
nations are going to increase enormously as the dependence on
mid-East oil and foreign oil increases.

This fact alone creates a new reality for the inter-
national monetary system, and frankly, we have not thought through
all of the implications, but we know we have to study the
implications.

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It is a fact that many of the producing nations... are operating in the form of a consortium. What that means for the consuming nations is really not clear, and there are totally different points of view on the subject. How you define the national security interests in this respect is, in itself, a question that I must tell you honestly we have not yet fully resolved.

There is one school of thought that argues that it is to produce as much of our energy requirements, at least in the Western Hemisphere, as possible. There is another school of thought that points out that this would deplete the resources in the Western Hemisphere at a very excessive rate, and that, therefore, under peacetime conditions it is best to increase one's imports from the more distant areas and to preserve the Western Hemisphere reserves for crisis situations.

I just want to put before you the sort of issue that we are looking at. If the national security definition were in the sense of relying on Western Hemisphere sources primarily, then the pressure on the producing nations in the Middle East, for example, as far as this country is concerned, would be much less.

So until we have completed this study, we will not be in a position to make any very definitive statements. We have had preliminary talks with some of the Arab nations, when the Saudi minister of oil production was here, and we are in constant contact with the Iranians, and with others.

We are having some preliminary conversations with some European countries, but this is really one of these areas of new exploration where we have to get our own intellectual house in order first, before we can make any definitive statements. But we are definitely not approaching it with the attitude of wanting to bring pressure, because at this point we first have to define what our objectives are.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the European chapter puts great stress on the need for developing a new security concept, especially in the field of nuclear strategy. On one point, would you amplify on that a bit; and secondly, could you explain the concept of the timetable that you have in mind in relation to what is mentioned on page 207; namely, the need for the alliance to set its security goals before it enters into effective negotiations on MBFR, in view of the fact that those negotiations are currently anticipated in the fall?

DR. KISSINGER: The two questions are really two sides of the same point.

With respect to the first question, we have felt that obviously NATO today is in a strategic environment entirely different from the time when it was conceived. When it was conceived in the late '40s, and when it received impetus after the beginning of the Korean War in the 1950s, the security of Europe depended almost entirely on the American strategic nuclear guarantee, and the American forces in Europe were conceived primarily as a means to trigger the American nuclear guarantee and to deprive the United States of any great freedom of action with respect to it.

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But as the years have gone on, as the nuclear stockpiles on both sides have increased and the delivery systems have multiplied, the reliance on strategic nuclear war is bound to have a different significance.

We find ourselves today in Europe with a deployment that was designed in the late '50s, that was adapted at various stages, but which requires an explicit adaptation to new circumstances in a number of areas, and we believe that this is one of the pre-eminent tasks of the alliance.

This task becomes particularly acute as we begin the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reduction.

Murray is quite right: We anticipate these negotiations starting in the fall. We believe that they can be conducted effectively only if the allies first understand what the elements of their security are, so that specific proposals can be related to their understanding of how they affect the security situation, rather than to be caught in a negotiating process in which abstract figures are thrown around, and in which, then, domestic pressures and pressures within the conference room become predominant.

Now, in terms of the timetable, we have submitted to NATO, I believe this week, a document which outlines, on the one hand, our perception of these elements of security in Europe, and secondly, two principal approaches by which one can look at these mutual balanced force reductions from the point of view of security with some additional models by which they could be approached.

We want to elicit from our European allies, first, a response to the security section, and equally a response to the approaches we put before them to the issue of mutual balanced force reduction. That doesn't mean that every figure we put before them is necessarily the final one. It is really a more conceptual approach at this stage of the game in order to define where are we trying to go, how should we look at this problem, how can we have security, how can we have equal security at lower force levels and how do we reach these lower force levels, how can we make the cuts in such a way that they enhance the sense of security of all of the participants, hopefully to reduce both sides' capacities for offensive action, and thereby give each side a sense that the danger has been lessened.

This is the reason why we are linking conceptually the security issue and the MFBR issue, and we are really following a procedure we adopted in the early stages of SALT and which then has enabled us, once the basic principles and building blocks were understood, to move fairly rapidly in the actual negotiations.

Q Can I follow that up?

DR. KISSINGER: First this gentleman who has been very patient, and then I will come to you.

Q Doctor, a rather parochial question, if you please.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know what parish you represent. (Laughter)

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Q Do you want me to tell you?

When is the President going to visit, this year, Latin America, and what countries is he going to visit? Does he still believe, as he said, that "As Brazil goes, so goes the rest of Latin America," and finally, don't you think that we are being left out on a limb in relation to the whole question of recognition of Cuba, inasmuch as half a dozen countries have already recognized Cuba and others are making noises, and the obvious way to undercut the prestige and effectiveness of an international body, the argument doesn't hold any more, since that prestige has already been undercut?

DR. KISSINGER: The gentleman asked about six questions.

Q In direct proportion to the time I had to wait.

DR. KISSINGER: All dealing with Latin America, specifically, when is the President planning his trip to Latin America, which countries does he intend to visit, what relative importance does he attach to Brazil specifically in the light of a comment he made during the toast for the President of Brazil, and various questions connected with our Cuban policy, particularly as the questioner believes it is being eroded anyway.

Q That is right.

DR. KISSINGER: Now, with respect to the President's trip, he announced some weeks ago that he was planning a trip to Latin America this year. There has been no further, detailed planning on this, and, therefore, I haven't much that I can add to what the President said. He has not yet decided which countries to visit, although it would probably be that countries whose leaders visited here would have a special claim on a return visit.

Now, we attach great importance to Brazil as geographically the largest country in Latin America, the greatest population, and making great progress. Therefore, we attach great importance to our relationship with Brazil, but this does not mean that we do not think other countries in Latin America also play a very major role or that we will hingour whole Latin American policy on one country alone.

With respect to the Cuban policy, I think the basic considerations have been stated in the report, which are related to the policy that Cuba is pursuing and which can be affected by changes in Cuban policies.

Q Well, this went to Murray's question on MBFR. It seemed to me in reading last year's report you were much firmer against symmetrical reductions on both sides than you are now. You said it was inherently unstable, I think. In this report, it seems to me that you are backing off that position and leaving open various options. Is this correct?

DR. KISSINGER: In the interval we have, of course, made many more studies, and the complexity of our argumentation always increases with the number of studies that we conduct, not necessarily our lucidity. It depends how you define symmetrical.

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Basically, our view remains that if you have an unequal number of forces, and if the forces on one side are composed heterogeneously, and the forces on the other side have a predominant element, then having cuts of exactly the same size is not necessarily the most sensible way of approaching the problem. Therefore, if there is an implication in this report that we have backed away from our attempt to wind up with equal security rather than to look at it in terms of the cuts that have to be made, then that is wrong. That is not our intention.

We have this year really made extensive studies. We have looked at eight different ways of approaching it. We finally have gotten it down to two or three.

In general, our approach is that the answers will have to be somewhat complex, and that the straight percentage approach is probably not the most realistic, but since we are in the process of discussing this with our allies, we don't want to pre-judge that question.

Q If you would indulge a question that is not directly related to this report, but which is connected with stories in this morning's paper concerning a former staff member of the NSC who, according to these stories, was implicated in wiretapping efforts, I wondered, first, if you knew about this, or what your response to these stories is.

DR. KISSINGER: First, I have no knowledge whatever of the activities to which this report refers.

David Young, who was a trusted member of my staff, was detailed on July 1, 1971, to join the Domestic Council which, under the direction of Mr. Ehrlichman, was conducting a study of declassification procedures and the security procedures within the Government. These studies led to a new classification system which was promulgated by the President, and this study was publicly announced.

Upon the completion of these studies, or of this report, which occurred in the early fall of 1971, David Young, whose interest was more in the domestic than the international area -- he was a lawyer when he joined me -- remained with the Domestic Council, and he continued to be paid from National Security Council funds because the Domestic Council had no budget of its own, and as most of you will note, most members of the White House staff are paid by some agency that has a budget for them.

He continued to be on the Domestic Council until he left in March of this year, before these stories became known. What his duties were, I do not know, and, therefore, I cannot make any comment about what he did except for the study on declassification. But I knew him as a trusted junior member of my staff.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, in the Cambodian section, the report says there has been little progress in Cambodia and the military picture at times has remained spotty and precarious. You said that you were not pessimistic that a cease-fire might evolve in the weeks or perhaps months ahead.

This seems a bit inconsistent with the estimation of the Cambodian situation in the report, and would you please square the two?

DR. KISSINGER: I wanted to point out that in the report, which of course was written several weeks ago, we described the situation as well as we could in the light of the conditions that then existed.

The military situation in Cambodia is uneven, and in some sense precarious. We do not judge that the opposing forces have the military capacity to occupy the whole country and, therefore, the problem is whether the political structure in Phnom Penh will become so demoralized that it collapses.

If the political structure can be maintained, then we believe a basis for a negotiation exists. Recently, the political base of the government in Phnom Penh has been broadened. The rainy season is approaching, there has been no major change in the military situation in recent weeks, and in fact, there has been probably a slight slackening of pressure.

Therefore, we say that the conditions exist for a negotiation. Anyone who would say flatly that he is certain it will come about would, of course, be excessively optimistic.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you possibly provide an answer to the "fundamental question" on page 79 as to the possibility of reconciliation of the old Atlantic concept of unity in defense as opposed to what you call European regionalism and what would happen if European regionalism persists.

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let me explain there has been some comment in Europe that we wanted to confine Europe to a regional European role while we reserved for ourselves the right to conduct a global foreign policy.

The references to regionalism, both in this report and in the speech that I made some weeks ago, were intended to be descriptive and not prescriptive. It has been the whole thrust of American postwar foreign policy to encourage the Europeans to assume a responsibility in the world commensurate with their economic power and their political vitality.

It is the Europeans who have preferred to concentrate primarily on their region. To the extent that the Europeans want to play a global role, we welcome it, and we will be happy and eager to consult with them and to cooperate with them.

In the economic field there are strong tendencies towards regionalism in Europe, and it is the nature of the economic field, in any event, in both the United States and in Europe that as negotiations are prepared, pressure groups and special interests will advance their particular claims, which on their merits are usually quite reasonable and which in the

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absence of an overriding framework are extremely difficult to
resist by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

Therefore, what we are attempting to do, what the
President is urging, is that the political leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic and in Japan first set themselves some
general political goal in the name of which they can then
adopt a more generous, a more flexible and a more farsighted
aproach to their economic relationships.

If regionalism is continued or if regionalism is
enhanced, then the consequences will, of course, be a conscious-
ness on both sides of the Atlantic of constant conflict, of
every negotiation turning into a test of strength. Sooner or
later this is bound to affect other relationships.

When I say this, I am not saying this as a threat.
We expect that there is enough statesmanship on both sides of
the Atlantic and on both sides of the Pacific to recognize the
overriding political imperatives and that, therefore, we believe
we can avoid the development of regional blocs and these
autarchic groupings confronting each other.

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Q To what extent do you think oil would be a dangerous destabilizing influence within the Western Alliance? Specifically, as one example, I refer to the differences in posture vis-a-vis the United States and France in the Middle East.

DR. KISSINGER: It is obvious that as energy becomes a growing concern for all of the industrialized nations that it is conceivable that the competition for energy, for sources of energy, will take forms that could threaten other political relationships.

If Western nations engage in a process where if one is expropriated and expelled, the other one moves in to pick up the pieces, as sometimes has been done by every Western nation with regard to every other Western nation, then, of course, you are creating a high premium on all sides to continue this process.

On the other hand, we expect again, as in the other areas, that as we look ahead 10 or 15 years it should be possible to develop policies that assure the energy supplies of all nations and in a manner that is consistent with the dignity of the producing nations.

It has to be consciously pursued from a long-range prospective and in a generous framework. If it isn't done, and if it is permitted to run wild, then the divisive tendencies may easily predominate.

Q Doctor, on page 11 of your report you refer to the political relationship with Japan as not yet having been fully defined. Could you explain that a little further, please?

DR. KISSINGER: As we explained in the chapter on Japan, Japan went through a phase in which its predominant effort was on economic recovery and then on this tremendous industrial expansion.

The degree of political activism was not commensurate to the economic power that had been developed. The political change from the occupation era and the post-war era to one in which Japan pursues a diplomacy that is more in keeping with its economic strength and its new vitality began in the last years of the Sato prime ministership, but took symbolic form when Prime Minister Tanaka acceded to office.

For example, he has now announced the trip he is intending to take later this year is in pursuit of his multi-polar diplomacy, which is a different word than Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers used in the past.

The adjustment of Japan is from pursuing a rather single-track foreign policy to a more complex foreign policy. After all, last year was the year when Japan restored or normalized its relations with the People's Republic of China. They are now engaged in peace negotiations, or of seeing whether they can get them started with the Soviet Union so that the political role of Japan is now in the process of transition.

How we relate ourselves to this change and how we can maintain, as we intend to, our traditional friendship while at the same time taking account of the greater complexity of the Japanese role is the task that the President attempted to describe in this report.

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