American Diplomacy for a Changing World [cc]

FORWARD

In May of this year the American Academy of Diplomacy created a task force to look at the challenges facing American diplomacy in the 21st Century. We did not set out to analyze the many specific regional and functional issues which the next administration would face. Rather we looked at ways in which American diplomacy could be revitalized and strengthened to meet the very complex foreign policy agenda with which America must deal in the years ahead.

We are firmly convinced that for the United States to confront these new issues successfully and to project its message to a skeptical world with clarity and vigor, we will need professionals of the highest quality, familiar with the worlds of science, business and public affairs. Success will also require a reordering of priorities in the foreign affairs agencies, greater efforts to build constituencies at home and abroad for American policies and values, and a willingness to engage multinational institutions and rising powers with energy and imagination. Diplomacy and force, of course, go hand in hand. Diplomacy will be more effective when backed by quality intelligence and a military force structure that can credibly support our foreign policy objectives.

We have been supported throughout this effort by the Chairman of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Joseph J. Sisco, its Vice Chairman Arthur A. Hartman and its President L. Bruce Laingen, and many other distinguished Academy members whose names are listed in the annex to the report. We are enormously grateful for the time they have spent attending meetings, reviewing drafts and encouraging our efforts. We should also mention with gratitude the work of the task force's rapporteur, Anthony Quainton, whose patient reworking of the drafts over these months has given us a product which is both elegant and thoughtful.

The recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the Academy of Diplomacy but are the consensus conclusions of those consulted in the drafting process.

It is our hope that the Administration and the Congress will take steps to implement our recommendations which are designed to make our diplomacy an indispensable tool for advancing American interests around the world.

Kenneth W. Dam
Co-Chair

James R. Jones
Co-Chair

November 29, 2004

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new war against terrorism the dynamics of American foreign policy have changed dramatically. Although the United States has unparalleled power, it also finds itself in a position of paradoxical vulnerability. Against this background of change and uncertainty the exercise of American leadership will be critical. Diplomacy, as America's first line of defense, will have a central role to play both with respect to the style as well as the substance of our foreign policy. American society is largely unprepared to support an active and engaged foreign policy or to deal with the emerging issues which confront the United States. This report analyzes seven critical challenges which our diplomacy must address if America is to be effective in promoting its national interests.

1. **Addressing the Threat of WMDs and Catastrophic Terrorism.** Preventing WMD proliferation must be the first priority of our foreign policy, as no issue poses a greater threat to our national security. Creating a robust capacity to deal with the potential consequences of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism is essential. The White House, as a matter of urgency, should convene a task force of military, foreign policy, scientific and business experts to develop appropriate recommendations for action.

2. **Reaffirming American Leadership.** Our policies should confirm America's commitment to a viable international system. We must invest significant resources in public diplomacy and build the kind of bipartisan consensus that will give added credibility to our foreign policy.

3. **Refocusing America's Message.** Although the United States throughout its history has made a unique commitment to the promotion of liberty and freedom, we have not always promoted just societies. As a result our image in much of the developing world, where institutionalized injustice is prevalent, has been impaired. A conscious effort should be made to develop and publicize activities which support social, political and economic justice.

4. **Building Support at Home and Abroad.** American foreign policy requires broad domestic support as well as publics around the world that better understand America, its institutions and values. America is falling short on both counts. Yet, exchange programs are in decline as is the study of international relations, foreign languages, and geography. To remedy this situation Congress should create a multi-billion dollar "Endowment for America" to fund exchange programs and to make selective grants to educational institutions in the United States to enhance the teaching of international relations and foreign languages.

5. **Promoting Equitable Economic Development.** The gap between rich and poor countries is of growing significance in a world where inequalities fuel hopelessness and terror. Failed states represent a grave threat to American national interests. Greater and more rapid economic growth throughout the world, driven by open markets and free trading systems, is essential. Growth and poverty reduction should become twin priorities for America's economic engagement with the developing world. For that to

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happen, the foreign affairs agencies must more actively recruit a cadre of professionals with appropriate skills. In addition, the United States should take the lead in insisting that poverty be reduced through more effective targeting of international aid to reach intended recipients at the grass roots.

6. **Addressing Evolving Global Scientific Issues.** In the last two decades the world has confronted a new generation of science-related problems. International scientific cooperation will be essential in addressing such 21st century subjects as terrorism and non-proliferation, global warming, space, ocean and atmospheric issues, biotechnology, natural disasters, desertification and the ominous threat of pandemics. Coordination of scientific issues within the government is inadequate and the cadre of scientifically knowledgeable diplomats in foreign affairs agencies is woefully lacking. The President's Science Advisor should be given explicit authority to coordinate international science policy. The State Department should have a formal mandate to manage international science negotiations and should make an aggressive effort to recruit officers with the ability to understand sophisticated scientific issues and methodology.

7. **Managing Relations with China, India and Other Rising Powers.** Relations between the United States and major regional powers are increasingly challenging. China and India, with almost half the world's population, are of special concern. Rising powers such as Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa require special strategies within our overall foreign policy. The President should instruct all foreign affairs agencies to develop appropriate long-term policy options and to recruit sufficiently qualified staff with appropriate area skills to manage relations with these emerging powers.

Since the end of the Cold War it has become increasingly clear that both the style and substance of American foreign policy need to evolve. We must build support for America's core values and project those values with vigor and imagination. Both our message and our programs must be managed by diplomats of the highest integrity and skill, so that we can respond to emerging challenges with courage, clarity and decisiveness.

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INTRODUCTION

Diplomacy is an indispensable tool for defending and advancing U.S. interests and val-
ues. The end of the Cold War has altered America's place in the international system and
posed new and daunting challenges for its diplomats. For the first time in modern history,
one country occupies a dominant position of power and influence. The shock of 9/11 has
introduced a new sense of vulnerability into the calculus of American foreign policy. The
boundaries between international security and homeland security have become increasingly
blurred. Powerful though we are, we face a world in which envy, hatred and suspicion have
mobilized significant forces against us, notably in the Islamic world. We are forced to con-
front the growing significance and global reach of non-state actors, most importantly the ter-
rorist organizations which are arrayed against us. In this complex and emotionally charged
international environment, American diplomacy has a critical role to play. Our diplomacy
will be judged not merely on the substance of our policies but also on the extent to which we
interact with the international community in the making and implementing of those policies.

American society is largely unprepared to deal with these challenges, either in terms of
knowledge about the world or the complex technological, economic, cultural and political
issues that face it. Since the end of the Cold War America has not crafted a message that
adequately explains its purposes either to its own people or to those other countries, cultures
and societies with which it interacts. While it is clear that we cannot police the world or ad-
dress all of its problems alone, we must accept the fact that others look to us to lead. Effective
leadership requires a network of friends, alliances and multilateral institutions to support our
efforts to achieve a more just and democratic world. We have much work to do to strengthen
that institutional framework.

This report analyzes seven overarching challenges for American diplomacy and suggests ways in which they can be addressed. It does not provide a comprehensive diplomatic/security strategy nor does it review the many geographic and functional issues which make up the fabric of American foreign policy. These have been addressed in numerous other reports. However, success in managing these diverse problem areas will require sustained public support and the talents of well-trained, highly motivated diplomats, who are sensitive to the ambiguities and complexities of international relations. However, diplomacy, important though it is, cannot manage the task alone. Our diplomacy must be supported by a vigorous intelligence collection and analysis capability, and by a military force structure able to respond quickly and effectively when the tools of diplomacy fail.

THE CHALLENGES

1) Addressing the Threat of WMDs and Catastrophic Terrorism

2) Reaffirming American Leadership

3) Refocusing America's Message

4) Building Support at Home and Abroad

5) Promoting Equitable Economic Development

6) Addressing Evolving Global Scientific Issues

7) Managing Relations with China, India and Other Rising Powers

# 1. ADDRESSING THE THREAT OF WMDs AND CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM

The gravest danger facing the world today is that of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the hands of terrorists and/or failed states. The spread and use of these weapons represents the greatest immediate threat to our national security. Preventing WMD proliferation must be a central concern for American diplomacy. At present we have virtually no defense against unconventional delivery and inadequate deterrence against those who value our death more than their life. Although the G-8 countries, now joined by the European Union and half a dozen additional states, have pledged $20 billion to address this issue, much remains to be done.

There is a dangerous gap between the pace of our progress and the scope and urgency of the threat. Significant amounts of weapons-grade nuclear material and many tactical nuclear and chemical weapons are unsecured or unaccounted for. The biological weapons facilities of the former Soviet Union are not open. Former Soviet scientists working in them have not been given sufficient opportunity to use their talents in peaceful ways. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program has made very significant contributions in terms of reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and should be made the model for a parallel effort to counter the biological and chemical warfare threat.

We must strengthen infectious disease surveillance and develop the necessary healthcare infrastructure to respond to biological, radiological, nuclear or chemical attacks. We must also develop an effective and creative global action plan to address the threats posed by these agents of mass destruction. We must find ways to encourage members of the international scientific community, including the private sector, to design a system of self-policing security practices that assure that our technological advances are not turned into mechanisms for mass murder. This effort will not only require sophisticated use of scientific skills, but also energetic diplomatic efforts to develop an action plan to tackle the problem.

**Recommendation:** The White House, as a matter of urgency, should convene a commission of prominent military, foreign policy, scientific and business leaders to develop recommendations on how the United States government can address these WMD threats. While part of the commission's mandate would inevitably have to address the homeland security aspects of this challenge, the commission should also be asked to come up with a detailed action plan to build the necessary international consensus and to identify the human and financial resources that will be needed to implement the plan.

# 2. REAFFIRMING AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

The need for America to play a leading role in the world is widely acknowledged. If the United States wishes to be effective in securing its national security, promoting its economic well-being and extending its values, it can not do so in isolation. It must work in concert with like-minded states in support of the global common good. That judgment does not mean the abandonment of American ability to act unilaterally when circumstances require, but it does assume the need to build a network of alliances and ad-hoc coalitions and to make creative use

of existing multilateral institutions. Maintaining that network should be a priority task for
our diplomacy.

Neither existing alliances nor multilateral institutions are without flaws. Both are made up of disparate groupings of countries of varying power, political orientation and economic weight. Even an expanded NATO, the most successful alliance in modern history, shares some of these flaws. It is in our interest to strengthen NATO since it, almost alone among international institutions, brings together countries with a common commitment to democracy and a more just international order. The United Nations and regional and specialized organizations in which the United States participates also have important roles to play. They are capable of mobilizing resources to meet the challenges of starvation, epidemics, and the human dislocations created by local wars. However, there is clearly a need to repair, update and promote innovation in these institutions if they are to fulfill their potential as constructive actors on the international scene.

Our leadership must be clear and unambiguous. Our policies must be based on a broad public and bipartisan consensus. For our diplomats to be effective in addressing issues as complex as the war on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their skill will be as important as the substance of the policies they promote. Although some may see us as overbearing, we must exercise our leadership in ways that counter this negative perception. The serious failure to invest significant resources in public diplomacy after the end of the Cold War has undermined our ability to change this perception.

**Recommendation:** The President should reaffirm America's commitment to vigorous participation in the international system, working closely with our allies and with those who join us in the pursuit of a more just and peaceful world order. This commitment must be backed by the necessary commitment of resources to sustain America's front line: its embassies.

3. REFOCUSING AMERICA'S MESSAGE

For all of its national history the United States has proclaimed a commitment to freedom. We have been a beacon to the world and a symbol to other nations of the power of liberty and democracy. Under administrations of both parties we have spoken of the need to make the world safe for democracy and have espoused the "non-negotiable" demands of human freedom. We have stood for basic rights: democracy, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, free markets and free trade. The positive resonance of these ideals has been extraordinary. We have touched the aspirations and hopes of peoples on every continent. If we have fallen short, it has been the result of our failure to live up to those ideals.

However, that message may not be fully adequate in today's world. We have been successful over the years in using our public diplomacy to articulate this commitment to liberty. We have done well in articulating our longstanding national commitment to "liberty and justice for all". We have tended to assume that democratic institutions would inevitably lead to just societies. Across much of the world, particularly the so-called "developing" world, that promise remains largely unfulfilled. During the Cold War we were often seen as uncritical supporters of brutal and unjust regimes. In some cases we have been tardy in dealing with

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humanitarian crises and have not always addressed cases of genocide or gross abuses of hu-
man rights on a timely basis. We have not confronted directly the injustices that have fueled
internal dissatisfaction, provided recruits for terrorist organizations and created a climate of
hostility within which it has become harder for the United States to achieve its strategic goals.

American diplomacy must strive to redress this imbalance both in terms of its rhetoric and the substance of its policies. We must also recognize that we are dealing with a governance and stability crisis of multi-regional proportions and that this crisis requires us to speak with clarity in defense of those who share our commitment to liberty and justice. Although there may be different views about how to give programmatic substance to this message, it is critically important that we forthrightly address international crises where issues of fundamental human rights are at stake. We must also recognize that the pursuit of freedom and justice is constantly in tension with our desire for a stable world order.

**Recommendation:** In articulating America's purposes to the world, our diplomacy must be instructed to make a conscious effort to balance our strong and ongoing commitment to democracy and freedom with an equally clear commitment to social, political and economic justice. We must also develop and publicize our many activities in support of social, political and economic justice worldwide. Our national message must include both: freedom *and* justice. Our public diplomacy must systematically convey to the world an unshakable commitment to the rule of law and to the building of the civil society that underpins a free and just society. It must have the resources to do the job.

4. BUILDING SUPPORT AT HOME AND ABROAD

American foreign policy cannot be successful if it does not enjoy broad popular support within the United States and if there are not constituencies in foreign countries that understand America's institutions, values, and people. One obvious problem is the lack of attention to the outside world in the American educational system. The study of history, geography and foreign languages has dramatically declined over the last two generations. Our difficulty in finding sufficient human resources to meet the challenges of American engagement in places as diverse as Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans and Africa, points to the same problem. Our population at large has little experience of foreign countries. While increasing numbers of students, particularly at the college level, are studying abroad, many are still unable to do so for financial reasons or because of security concerns and often do not realize the immense excitement and challenge of living and working in foreign societies.

The other side of the coin is the world's understanding of America. Throughout the Cold
War we invested substantial resources in bringing current and potential foreign leaders and
scholars to this country. The Fulbright program was the flagship of this effort, but it was by
no means the only program of its kind. Funding for exchange programs has steadily eroded
since the end of the Cold War. Fewer foreign students and scholars are coming to this country
for long-term study. The post-9/11 environment has exacerbated this problem as visa proce-
dures have been tightened, particularly for students, journalists and leaders from Muslim
countries. While prudent security measures are essential, we must make a long-term commit-
ment to building the communities of interest and support which America will need in the

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remainder of this century.

The problem which has consistently bedeviled efforts to sustain exchange programs has been the vagaries of the budget. What is needed is a new institutional basis for these valuable exchange programs outside the annual appropriations process. We must also provide ongoing support and encouragement to school systems inside the United States that want to improve their studies of other countries and cultures.

**Recommendation:** In order to achieve a long term and sustainable commitment to both exchange programs and the improvement of international understanding in the American education system, we recommend that Congress create a multi-billion dollar "Endowment for America." Such an endowment would be funded in the first instance by a major congressional grant. Resources, perhaps on the order of magnitude of the Millennium Challenge Account, could then be supplemented by contributions from foundations, corporations, NGOs, and private citizens. The Endowment would be managed by an independent non-partisan board. The purpose of the Endowment would be to fund youth exchange programs, to underwrite the Fulbright program and to make selective grants to educational institutions in the United States to enhance the teaching of international relations, history and foreign languages. The Endowment after its initial infusion of funds would be essentially self-sustaining, carrying out programs from the proceeds of the Endowment itself.

A great deal of America's attractive power comes not from government, but from its vibrant civil society. In addition to the Endowment, we should be exploring ways in which the government can help our civil society to engage with peoples in other countries. One way might be the creation of an independent corporation for public diplomacy, but other means should be explored as well.

## 5. PROMOTING EQUITABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The polarization between rich and poor countries and the growing income inequality within developing countries pose challenges with which the United States and international development institutions have been grappling for decades. There are no easy solutions. There is a vigorous debate in the academic community and within developmental organizations between those who believe that the focus should be on economic growth, which in turn will yield increases in per capita income, and those who argue that there must be some form of targeted strategy focused on the poor. However, there is little disagreement that priority must be given to the task of promoting development within a context of democracy, free markets and transparent governance. The track record of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies is not reassuring. Aid has often failed to reach its intended recipients at the grass roots level.

In some situations, the failure of state institutions not only makes economic development impossible, but poses a direct threat to the local population as well as to the United States. Afghanistan in the 1990s was a prime example. We, and the international community, are poorly equipped to deal with such situations. Our military is properly configured to win wars, not peace. We will need to work with other countries and international institutions to develop capabilities for constabulary, peacekeeping and reconstruction before we can hope

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to see economic development in such situations.

It is clear that the United States must continue, as the world's richest and most powerful nation, to be a leader in promoting development. Programs focused on education, health and the elimination of poverty are essential. Trade liberalization offers enormous potential for stimulating economic growth in developing societies. Successful completion of the WTO's Doha round is a critical component of any development strategy since it will make possible a more dynamic involvement of the private sector in the creation of wealth.

We cannot remake the world alone. We need to work with other countries, international institutions and non-governmental organizations. Making growth and development central themes of American diplomacy is an essential element in the projection of American values as well as in the fight against terrorism. Failure to give these issues adequate priority over the next decade will undoubtedly lead to political, social and economic instability in many regions of the world of strategic importance to the United States. We can not afford a proliferation of failed states.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the allocation of substantial resources to it will significantly supplement contributions to international lending institutions and bilateral aid programs. Yet effective development assistance requires not only carefully targeted resources, but also trained and committed personnel. The cadre of development professionals working for the United States government has steadily shrunk over recent years. USAID is a shadow of its former self. State Department professionals are still largely focused on political issues. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is barely up and running.

**Recommendation:** The President should continue to articulate a compelling vision of the importance of stimulating growth and reducing poverty, emphasizing the dynamic contribution of the private sector. Congress should provide the substantial resources needed to give that vision tangible reality. The Millennium Challenge Account and the HIV/AIDS initiative are important steps in this direction and must be fully funded. At the same time, we need to ensure that aid reaches the individuals and communities for which it is intended. The foreign affairs agencies must actively recruit from business schools, economic faculties and the private sector, a cadre of professionals to manage America's developmental programs in those hundred-plus countries that continue to chafe under the burdens of underdevelopment, corruption and poverty.

## 6. ADDRESSING GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC ISSUES

During the past two decades the agenda of America's foreign relations has evolved. Cold War concerns have given way to new global issues. The nature of the disarmament debate has shifted from SALT and START to the issues surrounding proliferation by second and third-tier powers. Efforts to deal with terrorism, drugs and transnational crime have become priorities for our diplomacy.

The emergence of a new global scientific agenda has received less systematic attention. The efforts to limit proliferation of WMDs and the war on terrorism have important scientific dimensions. This new agenda is also reflected in growing concerns about the environment,

notably global warming, as well as in issues such as desertification, acid rain, ocean pollution and reduction of biological diversity. Epidemiological issues have become increasingly apparent. The global HIV/AIDS pandemic has received the most attention, but the outbreak of SARS, the emergence of the Ebola virus, the persistence of TB and malaria, and the evidence of antibiotic resistant diseases make clear that the potential for a catastrophic health event at some point in the next generation is high. Catastrophic weather events, whether as a result of global warming or other factors, can also be expected. None of these issues can be handled on a strictly bilateral basis. All require careful coordination among nations and through the multilateral organizations charged with monitoring these issues. They should also be addressed through the private sector's unique resources and energy to bring education, agricultural improvements and scientific research to the developing world.

More effective coordination inside the United States government is also needed. International science policy has largely been a stepchild of other policy concerns. Authority is widely diffused among different agencies. The President's Science Advisor should be a key player in the development of international science policy. The State Department's Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science (OES) should play the central role in international science negotiations. OES today, however, does not attract the best and the brightest. Recruitment into and assignments within the Foreign Service pay little attention to the scientific knowledge or background of potential candidates and serving officers. This reality needs to change.

**Recommendation:** The President should give explicit authority to his Science Advisor to develop and coordinate international science policy and to work directly with the State Department on the implementation of that policy overseas. Such authority may exist in theory, but effective implementation does not. The President should instruct Ambassadors to give priority to science-related issues. In addition, the State Department, given its lead role in science negotiations, should make an aggressive effort to recruit into the Foreign Service officers with a sophisticated understanding of scientific issues and methodology. The President will thereby have available a cadre of individuals able to work knowledgeably to help develop science policies in coordination with other parts of the government and to implement those policies in the field.

## 7. MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA, INDIA AND OTHER RISING POWERS

No set of relationships is more problematic for American foreign policy than relations with major powers. Russia evidently poses critical long term challenges in terms of both democracy and economic viability. Considerable attention must also be paid to our relations with China. It is already a major international power and its economy is a significant competitor of ours. It consumes dramatically increased amounts of energy. It represents environmental challenges of the first order. Its human rights posture is of constant concern. Management of our relationship with Russia and China should remain at the forefront of American diplomacy.

But America's relations with rising powers also need attention. India, with over a billion inhabitants, is a power in its own right. It is a source of domestic policy concern because of

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concerns about the outsourcing of technology, and of foreign policy concern because of fears that tensions with Pakistan might trigger a nuclear conflict. Pakistan, with its rapidly growing population in a strategic region of the world, risks becoming the world's largest failed state. Iran, on the verge of acquiring nuclear capability and with a history of support for radical terrorist organizations in the Middle East, is a constant preoccupation. Nigeria, South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia are emerging powers in Africa, South America and Asia. These countries are pressing for reform of the United Nations Security Council to make that body reflect the realities of the 21st Century. We should take the lead in shaping these growing pressures for reform, for the UN will only be as strong and effective as the United States, its strongest member, wants it to be.

If we are to give these new powers adequate attention, we must develop clear and coherent strategies that are backed by high level mandates and political capital. We must be sure that we are adequately represented in these countries, so that we have the ability to understand and interact with these complex and rapidly evolving societies. Language and area training for service in all of these countries remains inadequate across the United States government. Even in the State Department, which has training programs focused on these key areas, the number of qualified and readily deployable personnel is insufficient. We must have a substantial core of area-qualified professionals in every agency to ensure that we have a genuine understanding of developments and trends important to our national security.

**Recommendation:** The President should identify countries of priority interest to the United States and should require agencies to report on steps they are taking to ensure that we are appropriately represented and that, when they deploy personnel to any of these countries, such personnel have adequate preparation and training. Similarly, all foreign affairs agencies should adopt recruitment strategies which ensure that they have qualified staff to fulfill their area specialization needs, and develop training programs to bring existing personnel up to a sophisticated level of language proficiency and cultural understanding.

## CONCLUSION

Given the challenges of the 21st Century, American diplomacy must play a dynamic role. To that end, creative and collaborative engagement of the United States with the world is essential. This engagement will require alliances, both formal and informal, sustained interaction with international organizations, and the support and cooperation of the private sector as well as of influential non-governmental and civil society institutions.

To build support for America's core values, we must project them with vigor and imagination, making clear that freedom is not a narrow set of institutional propositions and that for democracy to survive a more just international order is needed. The implementation of this agenda will require America to deploy a cadre of diverse, experienced and professionally competent representatives. Our message and our programs must be managed by diplomats of the highest professional quality and integrity, who understand the changes that have taken place in the world since the end of the Cold War and who can respond to those changes with courage, clarity and decisiveness. Diplomacy will then indeed be our first line of defense.

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ANNEX II: ABOUT THE CO-CHAIRS

Kenneth W. Dam

Kenneth W. Dam served as Deputy Secretary of State from 1982 to 1985 and as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2001 to 2003. In the latter position he focused on international matters ranging from the financial war on terrorism to international financial and economic development issues to international taxation.

He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago, where he served for many years as the Max Pam Professor of American and Foreign Law prior to joining the U.S. Treasury.

He has extensive private sector international experience as a corporate vice president of IBM, as an international arbitrator, and as a corporate director.

James R. Jones

James R. Jones served as U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from 1993 to 1997, demonstrating leadership during the Mexican peso crisis and the passage and implementation of NAFTA, developing new, cooperative efforts to combat drug trafficking, and assisting U.S. businesses with commercial ventures.

Ambassador Jones was President at Warnaco International and Chairman and CEO of the American Stock Exchange in New York from 1989 to 1993. As a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Oklahoma (1973-1987), he was Chairman of the House Budget Committee and ranking member of the House Ways and Means Committee. He was only 28 years old when President Lyndon Johnson selected him as Appointments Secretary, the position presently titled Chief of Staff.

Ambassador Jones currently is Co-chairman and CEO of Manatt Jones Global Strategies, an international marketing firm.

As delivered

Remarks at American Academy of Diplomacy
Fifteenth Annual Diplomatic Awards Luncheon
honoring the late Joseph Sisco
December 9, 2004

Joe Sisco was an original; when they made him, they threw away the mold. Indefatigable, dedicated, knowledgeable, a superb diplomat, and a skillful bureaucratic infighter, Joe was an indispensable colleague and a valued friend. We met in the early days of the Nixon administration. The Cold War has, in retrospect, acquired an almost nostalgic quality as being relatively simple because it was seemingly bipolar. But it did not look that way to those of us required to manage it. The Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia; there was no contact of any kind with China; India was aloof; hostilities were raging along the Suez Canal. And Vietnam was tearing the country apart.

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department.

This issue is often put in terms of prerogative. In my experience, the problem is best overcome by a demonstration of indispensability.

Joe Sisco understood this and set about to implement his insight. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye out for him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could wear down any objections by sheer persistence and outwork any aspirations to arbitrary decisions using three methods: (1) In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted - preferably into the Situation Room, which had the added advantage of assuring his participation in all meetings. (2) From his office issued a seemingly endless array of

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policy proposals. Some say he offered more solutions than there
were problems. But it kept me busy and cut down the time
available for interfering in his concern. (3) Finally, he knew that, in
the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and he made certain that the
process started with his draft. By these methods, Joe helped us
through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black
September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that
followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of
1971.

When I became Secretary in 1973, Joe had already established
himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no
longer a question of jurisdiction. And what a group Joe had
assembled: Roy Atherton, Hal Saunders, Dean Brown, Dick
Murphy, Hermann Eilts, and others. Any Secretary would look good
with their help. And the country had every reason to be proud of
them, and the Foreign Service that produced them.

Joe and the team he assembled were simply indispensable. They
helped manage the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the diplomacy that
followed. Together we navigated the war, a nuclear alert, shuttle
diplomacy, two disengagement agreements and one political
agreement between Israel and Syria and Egypt. And then Joe
became my emissary when the Cyprus crisis erupted and
contributed decisively to preventing the outbreak of war between
two NATO allies.

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor, and great
serenity sometimes belied by Joe's stentorian voice. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.
And he was enormously proud of that distinction. First, Joe viewed
the United States as embodying a special responsibility for peace
and progress. He was impatient with self-pitying righteousness.
The disputes of the Vietnam and Watergate period were to him
challenges to America to demonstrate that it retained its sense of
mission and was capable of translating it into a contribution toward
a better world.

A great deal has been written about shuttle diplomacy. Not enough
credit is given to those whose dedication and ability provided the

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framework and the impetus. I did the negotiating under the wary
eye of Joe and his team. But the professionals here know who
sustained it. No matter how late in the night the negotiations
lasted, I could count on finding the next morning a summary of
what had happened, a report to the President, and an outline of
necessary next steps.

Joe's buoyancy made the enterprise a lot of fun. On one of our
shuttles, a Xerox machine got loose from its moorings on the
airplane and began rolling around, with Joe frantically trying to
corral it. One of my assistants shouted, "Grab him before he falls
into it; if there were a duplicate of him, we would never get any
sleep." On another occasion, Joe was with me on a shuttle in
Damascus even after he had been promoted to Political Under
Secretary. I explained to Assad that I had brought along such a
high-ranking officer because Joe had been caught measuring the
curtains in my office when I left him alone in Washington. Coups
were something Assad understood, and Joe reported to me gleefully
that after that remark, his protocol treatment in Damascus
improved dramatically.

Joe left the Foreign Service in 1975 because the opportunity came
along to head a university. It had always been his dream to follow
his service to American diplomacy with a career in education. In
1974, he had been asked to head Hamilton College, but he could
not yet bring himself to separate from his beloved Foreign Service.
Eighteen months later, however, the opportunity to preside over
American University proved irresistible.

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored
his family. His wife Jean – beautiful, charming, worldly – provided
the emotional ballast and security that was the foundation of his
ebullience. And he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him to
my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter
Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell
me something about the battles where we stood shoulder-to-
shoulder in trying to repay our country for the opportunities it had
given us.

After Joe retired from the Foreign Service, he and I remained in
contact by telephone and occasional dinners. He never fully

4

recovered from Jean's premature death. In his last years, he threw
himself with characteristic relish into the service of this institution.
I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the
hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. But
he would not dwell on his disabilities. He wanted to know what I
thought of Iraq. When he got better, he would devote himself to
healing the rift between the administration and some of his
colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior saddling his horse for
another adventure.

Joe's passing leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired
his gallantry, his wisdom, and his humility. I shared many of his
attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day
events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there - a national
treasure, a personal safe haven. We who loved and admired Joe
will miss him for as long as we live. But we would not trade places
with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit from the
dedication, the love of country, the humanity, and the inspiration of
our honoree today.

Edited
For Final

EJ

JW

1,246 WORDS

12/7/04 #2

With edits

Joe Sisco

2

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained or aloor.

4

When I became Secretary, Joe had already established
himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no
longer a question of jurisdiction. And what a group Joe had
assembled: Roy Atherton, Hal Saunders, Dean Brown, Dick
Murphy, Hermann Eilts, and others. Any Secretary would look good
with their help. And the country had every reason to be proud of
them, and the Foreign Service that produced them.

5

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor and
great serenity punctuated by a stentorian voice. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.
And he was enormously proud of that distinction. First, Joe viewed
the United States as embodying a special responsibility for peace
and progress. He was impatient with self-pitying righteousness.
The disputes of the Vietnam and Watergate period were to him
challenges to America to demonstrate that it retained its sense of
mission and was capable of translating it into a contribution toward
a better world.

6

A great deal has been written about shuttle diplomacy. Not enough credit is given to those whose dedication and ability provided the framework and the impetus. I did the negotiating under the wary eye of Joe and his team. But the professionals here know who sustained it. No matter how late in the night the negotiations lasted, I could count on finding the next morning a summary of what had happened, a report to the President, and an outline of necessary next steps.

7

A year later, however, the opportunity to preside over American University proved irresistible.

8

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored his family. His wife Jean – beautiful, charming, worldly – provided the emotional ballast and security that was the foundation of his ebullience. And he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him to my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell me something about the battles where we stood shoulder-to-shoulder in trying to repay our country for the opportunities it had given us.

After Joe retired from the Foreign Service, he and I remained in contact by telephone and occasional dinners. He never fully recovered from Jean's premature death. In his last years, he threw himself with characteristic relish into the service of this institution.

9

I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. But *warrior* that he was, he would not dwell on his disabilities. He wanted to know what I thought of Iraq. When he got better, he would devote himself to healing the rift between the administration and some of his colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior saddling his horse for another adventure.

Joe's passing leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired his gallantry, his wisdom, and his humility. I shared many of his attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there – a national treasure, a personal safe haven. We who loved and admired Joe will miss him for as long as we live. But we would not trade places with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit

1,246 WORDS

12/7/04 #2

w/HAK edits

(Just file)

Joe Sisco

2

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense
of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that
greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic
turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the
relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking
apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service
represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the
intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must -
especially in times of upheaval - lead our country from where it is
to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead
to a sense of alienation - especially when relations at the NSC level
are strained or aloof.

3

It is not a question of loyalty; it is a challenge of perspective.

It is often put in terms of prerogative. In my experience, the problem is best overcome by a demonstration of indispensability.

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye out for Joe, if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could wear down any objections by sheer persistence and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Iraq, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. He knew that, in the

4

5

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor and
~~all these qualities prevented from being expressed by~~ great serenity punctuated by a stentorian voice. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.
And he was enormously proud of that distinction. First Joe viewed
the United States as embodying a special responsibility for peace
and progress. He was impatient with self-pitying righteousness.
The disputes of the Vietnam and Watergate period were to him
challenges to America to demonstrate that it retained its sense of
mission and was capable of translating it into a contribution toward
a better world.

6

7

8

LYJ

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored his family. His wife Jean - beautiful, charming, worldly - provided the emotional ballast and security that was the foundation of his ebullience. And he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him to my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell me something about the battles where we stood shoulder-to-shoulder in trying to repay our country for the opportunities it had given us.

9

I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. But warrior that he was, he would not dwell on his disabilities. He wanted to know what I thought of Iraq. When he got better, he would devote himself to healing the rift between the administration and some of his colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior saddling his horse for another adventure.

1,246 WORDS

12/7/04 #2

Joe Sisco

2

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained or aloof.

3

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye out for him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could wear down any objections by sheer persistence and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. He knew that, in the

4

5

6

7

8

9

1,243 WORDS

12/7/04 #1

with HAK edits

Joe Sisco

2

LVA

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained as shown.

3

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be

by his own resistance ignored. He could wear down any objections and outthink any problems, or his aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe suggested to me how helpful he helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of

4

1971. He knew that, in the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and
the process
he made certain that we started with his draft.

When I became Secretary, Joe had already established
himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no
longer a question of jurisdiction. And what a group Joe had
assembled: Roy Atherton, Hal Saunders, Dean Brown, Dick
Murphy, Hermann Eilts, and others. Any Secretary would look good
with their help. And the country had every reason to be proud of
them, and the Foreign Service that produced them. Joe and the
team he assembled were simply indispensable. They helped
manage the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the diplomacy that
followed. Together we navigated the war, a nuclear alert, shuttle
diplomacy, two disengagement agreements and one political
agreement between Israel and Syria and Egypt. And then Joe

5

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor and
great serenity, slightly obscured by a stentorian voice. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.
And he was enormously proud of that distinction. Like most first-
and second-generation Americans, Joe viewed the United States as
embodying a special responsibility for peace and progress. He was
impatient with self-pitying righteousness. The disputes of the
Vietnam and Watergate period were to him challenges to America
to demonstrate that it retained its sense of mission and was
capable of translating it into a contribution toward a better world.

6

Lyd

A great deal has been written about shuttle diplomacy. Not enough credit is given to those whose dedication and ability + the computers provided the framework. I did the negotiating under the wary eye of Joe and his team. But the professionals here know who sustained it. No matter how late in the night the negotiations lasted, I could count on finding the next morning a summary of what had happened, a report to the President, and an outline of necessary next steps.

Joe's buoyancy and humility made the enterprise a lot of fun. On one of our shuttles, a Xerox machine got loose from its moorings on the airplane and began rolling around, with Joe frantically trying to corral it. One of my assistants shouted, "Grab him before he falls into it; if there were a duplicate of him, we would never get any sleep." On another occasion, Joe was with me

Don the other land

7

Joe left the Foreign Service in 1976 because the opportunity
came along to head a university. It had always been his dream to
follow his service to American diplomacy with a career in education.
In 1974, he had been asked to head Hamilton College, but he could
not yet bring himself to separate from his beloved Foreign Service.
A year later, however, the opportunity to preside over American
University proved irresistible.

8

[N]

9

I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. [But warrior that he was,] he would not dwell on his disabilities. He wanted to know what I thought of Iraq. When he got better, he would devote himself to healing the rift between the administration and some of his colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior saddling his horse for another adventure.

Joe's passing leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired his gallantry, his wisdom, and his modesty. I shared many of his attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there – a national treasure, a personal safe haven. We who loved and admired Joe will miss him as long as we live. But we would not trade places with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit

1,243 WORDS

12/7/04 #1

Joe Sisco

2

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained.

3

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could wear down any objections and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of

4

1971. He knew that, in the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and
he made certain that we started with his draft.

5

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor and
great serenity slightly obscured by a stentorian voice. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.
And he was enormously proud of that distinction. Like most first-
and second-generation Americans, Joe viewed the United States as
embodying a special responsibility for peace and progress. He was
impatient with self-pitying righteousness. The disputes of the
Vietnam and Watergate period were to him challenges to America
to demonstrate that it retained its sense of mission and was
capable of translating it into a contribution toward a better world.

6

A great deal has been written about shuttle diplomacy. Not enough credit is given to those whose dedication and ability provided the framework. I did the negotiating under the wary eye of Joe and his team. But the professionals here know who sustained it. No matter how late in the night the negotiations lasted, I could count on finding the next morning a summary of what had happened, a report to the President, and an outline of necessary next steps.

7

[Y]

Joe left the Foreign Service in ______ because the opportunity
came along to head a university. It had always been his dream to
follow his service to American diplomacy with a career in education.
In 1974, he had been asked to head Hamilton College, but he could
not yet bring himself to separate from his beloved Foreign Service.
A year later, however, the opportunity to preside over American
University proved irresistible.

8

9

1,243 WORDS

12/6/04 #2

w/ NK edits

Joe Sisco

2

[Y]

3

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could shut down any objections and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of

4

5

6

capable of translating it into a contribution toward peace and

progress.

7

9

Joe's passing leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I
admired his gallantry, his wisdom, and his modesty. I shared many
of his attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-
to-day events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there - a
national treasure, a personal safe haven. We who loved and

10

admired Joe will miss him as long as we live. But we would not
trade places with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit
from the dedication, the love of country, the humanity, and the
inspiration of our honoree today.

1,243 WORDS

12/6/04 #2

Joe Sisco

2

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense
of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that
greeted it. The combination of a new presidency and domestic
turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the
relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking
apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service
represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the
intangible and the practical. But the political leadership must -
especially in times of upheaval - lead our country from where it is
to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead
to a sense of alienation - especially when relations at the NSC level
are strained.

3

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. When I was appointed National Security Adviser, Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could shout down any objections and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself physically as close to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of

4

5

6

capable of translating it into a contribution toward peace and
progress.

7

8

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and
adored his family. His wife Jean - beautiful, charming, worldly -
provided the emotional ballast and security that was the hallmark of
his ebullience. And he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him
to my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter
Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell
me something about the battles where we stood shoulder-to-
shoulder in trying to repay our country for the opportunities it had
given us.

9

recovered from Jean's premature death. In his last years, he threw
himself with characteristic relish into the service of this institution.
I spoke to him the last time a few days after he entered the
hospital on his final illness. He mentioned the infirmity of age. But
warrior that he was, he would not dwell on his disabilities. He
wanted to know what I thought of Iraq. When he got better, he
would devote himself to healing the rift between the administration
and some of his colleagues. I could imagine the old warrior
saddling his horse for another adventure.

10

1226 WORDS

12/6/04

Joe Sisco

Joe Sisco was an original; when [they made him], they threw
mould.
away the ~~.~~ Indefatigable, dedicated, knowledgeable, a [superb]
diplomat, and a skillful bureaucratic infighter, Joe was an
indispensable colleague and a valued friend. We met in the early
days of the Nixon administration. The Cold War has, in retrospect,
acquired an almost nostalgic quality as being relatively simple
~~it was seemed~~ because bipolar. [But] it did not look that way to those of us
required to manage it. The Soviet Union had just occupied
Czechoslovakia; there was no contact of any kind with China;
~~India was alway~~; hostilities were raging along the Suez Canal. And Vietnam was
tearing the country apart.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 011

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new [presidency] and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the *psychological*. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained.

CJ

12/06/04 09:17am P. 012

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

3

~~the Foreign Service demonstrates its indispensability.~~

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. Before I came to Washington,

Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe; he [simply] presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He could shout down any objections and outthink any aspirations to arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself as [simply] ~~as close~~ to my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the 1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. He knew that, in the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and he made certain that we started with his draft.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 013

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

4

When I became Secretary, Joe had already established himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no longer a question of jurisdiction. [Joe and the team he assembled were simply indispensable.] This helped manage the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the [ensuing] diplomacy [it required]. [He began by] waking me up at 6:30 in the morning to tell me that there was a crisis, and if I got on the phone quickly, we could overcome it.

Joe was a bit too optimistic [in this case]. But he and his [colleagues] were indispensable in dealing with the crisis and its implications. Together we navigated the war, a nuclear alert, shuttle diplomacy, two disengagement agreements and one political agreement between Israel and Syria and Egypt. And then [the Cisco team] became my emissary when the Cyprus crisis erupted and contributed decisively to preventing the outbreak of war

12/06/04 09:17am P. 014

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

5

between two NATO allies. And what a [group] Joe had assembled:

And the country had every reason to be proud of them and the
Foreign Service that produced them.

a stentorian voice, notwithstanding great serenity. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 015

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

6

to demonstrate that it retained its sense of mission and was
capable of translating it into a contribution toward peace and
progress. Amidst the wreckage of Vietnam and Watergate, Joe
would express this in his bearing and his devotion, not in self-
righteous assertions.

A great deal has been written about the shuttle diplomacy.
But not enough credit is given to those who sustained the
enterprise with their dedication and ability. I did the negotiating
under the wary eye of Joe and his team. But the professionals here
know that it was they who sustained it. No matter how late in the
night the negotiations lasted, I could count on finding the next
morning a summary of what had happened, a report to the
President, and an outline of necessary next steps.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 016

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

7

Joe's buoyancy and humility made the enterprise a lot of fun. On one of our shuttles, a [Xerox] machine got loose [from its moorings] on the airplane and began rolling around, with Joe [corral] frantically trying to [catch] it. One of my assistants shouted, "Grab him before he falls into it; if there were a duplicate of him, we would never get any sleep." [On another occasion,] Joe was with me on a shuttle in Damascus even after he had been promoted to Political Under Secretary. I [told Assad that I had brought [along] such a high-ranking officer because Joe had been caught measuring the curtains in my office when I left him alone in Washington. Coups were something Assad understood, and Joe reported to me [gleefully] that after that remark, his protocol treatment in Damascus improved dramatically.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 017

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

8

Joe left the Foreign Service in ______ because the opportunity came along to head a university. It had always been his dream to follow his service to American diplomacy with a [career in] education. In 1974, he had been asked to head Hamilton College, but he could not yet bring himself to separate from his beloved Foreign Service. A year later, [however,] the [opportunity to preside] over American University proved irresistible.

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored his family. His wife Jean – beautiful, charming, worldly – provided the emotional ballast and security that was the hallmark of his ebullience. [And] he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him to my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell

12/06/04 09:17am P. 018

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

9

mine something about the battles where we stood shoulder-to-

shoulder.

Joe leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired his
gallantry, his wisdom, and his modesty. I shared many of his
attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day
events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there - a national

treasure, a personal safe haven. Those of us who loved and

admired Joe [will miss him deeply]. But we would not trade places

12/06/04 09:17am P. 019

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

1226 WORDS

12/6/04

Joe Sisco

Joe Sisco was an original; when [they made him], they threw
away the die. Indefatigable, dedicated, knowledgeable, a [superb]
diplomat, and a skillful bureaucratic infighter, Joe was an
indispensable colleague and a valued friend. We met in the early
days of the Nixon administration. The Cold War has, in retrospect,
acquired an almost nostalgic quality as being relatively simple
because bipolar. [But] it did not look that way to those of us
required to manage it. The Soviet Union had just occupied
Czechoslovakia; there was no contact of any kind with China;
hostilities were raging along the Suez Canal. And Vietnam was
tearing the country apart.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 001

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

2

A new American administration was seeking to distill a sense of direction from the conflicting pressures, fears, and hopes that greeted it. The combination of a new [presidency] and domestic turmoil raised an issue that periodically preoccupies this city: the relationship between the Foreign Service and the policymaking apparatus beyond the State Department. The Foreign Service represents accumulated experience; it has a fine sense of the intangible and the psychological. But the political leadership must – especially in times of upheaval – lead our country from where it is to where it has never been. This difference in perspective can lead to a sense of alienation – especially when relations at the NSC level are strained.

200 12/06/04 09:17am P. 002

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

3

problem is best overcome by a demonstration of indispensability...

...the Foreign Service demonstrates its indispensability.

This was Joe Sisco's strategy. Before I came to Washington,
Dean Rusk had urged me to keep an eye on him if we ever needed
help in times of trouble. As it turned out, I did not have to find Joe;
he [simply] presented himself, and he was not to be ignored. He
could shout down any objections and outthink any aspirations to
arbitrary decisions. In crises, he would move himself as [close] to
my office as circumstances permitted. Joe helped us through the
1970 crises along the Suez Canal, the Black September, the Syrian
invasion of Jordan, and the diplomacy that followed. He was a
steadying element in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. He knew that,
in the end, strategy winds up as a cable, and he made certain that
we started with his draft.

12/06/04 09:17am P. 003

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

4

When I became Secretary, Joe had already established himself and the role of the Foreign Service. Now there was no longer a question of jurisdiction. Joe and the team he assembled helped manage the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the [ensuing] diplomacy [it required]. [He began by] waking me up at 6:30 in the morning to tell me that there was a crisis, and if I got on the phone quickly, we could overcome it.

Joe was a bit too optimistic [in this case]. But he and his [colleagues] were indispensable in dealing with the crisis and its implications. Together we navigated the war, a nuclear alert, shuttle diplomacy, two disengagement agreements and one political agreement between Israel and Syria and Egypt. And then [the Sisco team] became my emissary when the Cyprus crisis erupted and contributed decisively to preventing the outbreak of war

12/06/04 09:17am P. 004

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS

5

All of this was accomplished with buoyancy, good humor, and
a stentorian voice, notwithstanding great serenity. Joe was very
conscious of his background as the son of Italian immigrants. He
had entered the Foreign Service laterally from the Civil Service.

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A great deal has been written about the shuttle diplomacy.
But not enough credit is given to those who sustained the
enterprise with their dedication and ability. I did the negotiating
under the wary eye of Joe and his team. But the professionals here
know that it was [they] who sustained it. No matter how late in the
night the negotiations lasted, I could count on finding the next
morning a summary of what had happened, a report to the
President, and an outline of necessary next steps.

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On one of our shuttles, a [Xerox] machine got loose [from its moorings] on the airplane and began rolling around, with Joe frantically trying to [catch] it. One of my assistants shouted, "Grab him before he falls into it; if there were a duplicate of him, we would never get any sleep." [On another occasion,] Joe was with me on a shuttle in Damascus even after he had been promoted to Political Under Secretary. I told Assad that I had brought [along] such a high-ranking officer because Joe had been caught measuring the curtains in my office when I left him alone in Washington.

Coups were something Assad understood, and Joe reported to me that after that remark, his protocol treatment in Damascus improved dramatically.

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Joe left the Foreign Service in ______ because the opportunity [arose] to head a university. It had always been his dream to follow his service to American diplomacy with a [career in] education. In 1974, he had been asked to head Hamilton College, [but] he could not yet bring himself to separate from his beloved Foreign Service. A year later, [however,] the [opportunity to preside] over American University proved irresistible.

Joe loved his country, was proud of the Foreign Service, and adored his family. His wife Jean - beautiful, charming, worldly - provided the emotional ballast and security that was the hallmark of his ebullience. [And] he was devoted to his daughters. I invited him to my 80th birthday party and seated him next to my daughter Elizabeth so that he could talk about his family and perhaps tell

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Joe leaves a huge void, also for me personally. I admired his
gallantry, his wisdom, and his modesty. I shared many of his
attitudes derived from his origins. Amidst the bedlam of day-to-day
events, it was reassuring to know that Joe was there - a national
treasure, a personal safe haven. Those of us who loved and
admired Joe [will miss him deeply]. But we would not trade places
with those who were never fortunate enough to benefit from the

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JODY WILLIAMS