Prof. Dr. C. L. PATIJN

Tel. 241833

Den Haag, October 4th, 1971

van Ouwenlaan 30

Dr.Henry A.Kissinger, White House, WASHINGTON D.C.

Dear Dr.Kissinger,

During a brief holiday in Switzerland I had the privilege
of reading your book on the years of the Congress of Vienna:
"A World Restored".

Allow me to convey to you my profound admiration for this
study of the problems of legitimacy and international order. It
was not only an intellectual delight, but your presentation gives
us much to think about for our present world.

It is good to know that so much wisdom is directly available
to the President of the United States.

KENNETH KATZNER

279 EAST 44TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

November 1, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We are drowning these days in anti-Vietnam literature; here is a piece that for a change tries to take the administration's side. Perhaps it can be put to some worthwhile use.

THE New Leader

REPRINTED FROM THE ISSUE OF NOVEMBER 1, 1971

PLAIN TALK
ABOUT
VIETNAM

BY KENNETH KATZNER

NGUYEN VAN THIEU

The withdrawal of both op-
position candidates from
the recent Presidential elec-
tion was a grievous setback for dem-
ocracy in South Vietnam. Right?

Wrong. Democracy, as the term
is understood in this country, has
never existed in Vietnam or, for that
matter, anywhere else in Southeast
Asia. A Presidential contest with
only one candidate may not be our

idea of a true election, yet the fact
that an opposition party did enter
candidates in most of the legislative
races, and that many of them won,
puts the South Vietnamese electoral
process far ahead of that of three-
fourths of the world's nations.

Hardly a country in Southeast
Asia has held a genuine election at
all in the last decade or so, unless one
counts this year's single-party affair
in North Vietnam, where policemen
carefully scrutinized each "voter" as
he filled out his ballot. In fact, the
story is the same over most of the
globe. Two-party elections, offering
a real choice to the voter, are the
nearly exclusive property of nations
with a stable political system and a
long-standing democratic tradition.
It is totally unrealistic suddenly to
expect full-fledged Western-style
democracy in an area that has vir-
tually no conception of what the
word means.

But we did not send troops to fight
and die in other countries. For rea-
sons that are still unclear, we did de-
cide on South Vietnam, committing
half a million troops to battle for
what we were told was democracy.
And now we get a one-man Presi-
dential race that makes a joke of

democracy and proves once and for
all that 45,000 U.S. soldiers have
died for nothing. Right?

Wrong. The American objective
in Vietnam was never the immediate
establishment of Western-style de-
mocracy. That was clearly out of the
question for a nation with such a
fragile political base and a savage
guerrilla war on its hands. The
United States intervened to prevent
a forcible Communist takeover—
which would most certainly have
taken place by now—and the impo-
sition of a harsh, oppressive, single-
party system that, rather than merely
intimidating or harassing the oppo-
sition, physically destroys it. There
is hope that, given time and patience,
democratic institutions can gradual-
ly emerge in South Vietnam; they
are beginning to develop already, and
it cannot be denied that the Ameri-
can presence has greatly accelerated
this evolution.

So we've been fighting to prevent
the imposition of a Communist dic-
tatorship in South Vietnam and have
wound up with another kind of dic-

KENNETH KATZNER, an editor with
American Heritage Publishing Co.,
often writes on international affairs.

[6]

tatorship instead. When you come right down to it, an illiterate peasant would be no worse off under a Communist system than he is under the Thieu regime. It is therefore ridiculous to try to prevent South Vietnam, or any other country with a totalitarian government, from going Communist. Right?

Wrong. In the first place, there is a huge difference between a system in which candidates drop out of the running because they feel the election is rigged, and one in which elections by definition allow a solitary candidate for each office. The former is a situation that hopefully will be corrected in time; the latter, if the history of the past 50 years is any indication, is utterly permanent—with the rigid exclusion of unorthodox ideas as well as opposition parties, it tends to become even more absolute as time goes by.

Furthermore, is it valid to assume that a less than democratic non-Communist country might just as well fall into the Communist orbit? If a given nation has not held an election in a decade or two, does it follow that we could not care less if it went Communist tomorrow? Few African countries have ever held elections; they are too busy trying to get themselves on their feet. Were they all to be swallowed up next week, would we simply shrug our shoulders?

The meaning of the word Communism has changed significantly over the iast 10-20 years. In the '50s it was truly a monolith; all its members spoke with one voice and acted as if one. Today, however, each is going its own way, many are bickering among themselves, and the two great Communist powers are virtually at swords' points. There are so many kinds of Communism now—Soviet Communism, Chinese Communism, Rumanian Communism, Vietnamese Communism—that the doctrine of containment has become an anachronism. Right?

Wrong. It is true that the Communist world is vastly different from what it was a decade ago. The rift

between the Soviet Union and China, to say nothing of the shock waves it has sent through other Communist countries, is profound, and will probably widen rather than narrow in the years to come. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the arguments between the various Communist powers are exclusively about internal issues—independence of the small nations from the big ones, orientation of the economy, personal freedoms, and the like. When it comes to any sort of confrontation with the non-Communist world, they are remarkably quick to paper over their differences and work together. All Communist countries have consistently thrown their support behind the Vietcong; no non-Communist country has dared do so.

Especially revealing is the Middle East situation, where the Soviet Union, for reasons of its own, has decided to cast its lot with the Arab side. Though it is not an area of vital interest to any Communist country, virtually every one of them has gone along with the game, lending its voice to the shrill chorus denouncing the "Zionist aggressors." This monolithic unity vis-à-vis the outside world remains the overriding consideration in determining our approach to the Communist Bloc.

And now President Nixon is going to Peking to make peace with our erstwhile enemies, after years of telling us that our presence in Vietnam was necessary to prevent Communist expansion in Asia. The China trip clearly negates the entire purpose of our adventure in Vietnam, and points up once again the wholly illogical and contradictory nature of American foreign policy. Right?

Wrong. While our new relationship with China does represent a dramatic departure from the past, it is fully consistent with the stance we have taken toward the other Communist countries for the past 15 years. Our policy toward the Soviet Union has always been to resist with all

available means any attempt to subjugate an independent country, trying at the same time to achieve a better understanding and to find areas of common interest.

During the numerous "Berlin crises" of only 10 years ago, President Kennedy made it absolutely clear that under no circumstances would he allow West Berlin to be gobbled up, even if that meant using nuclear weapons in its defense. Simultaneously, a series of exchange agreements were worked out that led to a noticeable lessening of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, eventually resulting in a number of important treaties and concords. It is to be hoped that similar progress can be made with China now that the first step has been taken.

Today, after their experience in Vietnam, the American people are no longer willing to "bear any burden or pay any price" to resist Communist expansion, as they were a decade ago. This makes an entirely new ball game out of the international situation, and the big question is to what extent the other side will attempt to exploit this advantage. Judging by the way North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops are currently overrunning Laos and Cambodia, prospects are not encouraging.

Well, I still say that the American intervention in Vietnam was a ghastly mistake and that the recent one-man election was simply the last straw. History will undoubtedly judge this as one of America's saddest hours. Right?

We cannot tell at this stage. One should be wary of anticipating the verdict of history before the final returns are in. Most people have made up their minds already, but future generations may see things differently. With the progress of time history tends to gloss over the personal suffering inflicted by wars and to pass judgment largely on the basis of what was accomplished and what the consequences were. And on this basis its verdict may not be all that unkind.

The New Leader 212 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10010

Copyright © 1971 by the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, Inc. All rights reserved.

KISSINGER, HENRY A./Articles

NOV 1 1 1971

Dear Dan:

Many thanks for sending me "Hubris" and "The Roman Triumph." It is a pleasure to be provided with non-classfield reading material.

I hope you were serious about your open-ended invitation for a drink. I will take you up on it if I ever find myself in New York and not on a dead run.

Please give my best to Joanna.

Mr. Daniel Rose
895 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.
10021

jlp:11/10/71

RECEIVED
NOV 1 2 1971
CENTRAL FILES

BY STEWART ALSOP

WASHINGTON—It is highly likely that one of these days soon, probably before Christmas, quite possibly before Thanksgiving, CIA director Richard Helms will call the White House and ask for an urgent appointment with the President. A great deal will then depend on what Helms tells President Nixon, and what President Nixon decides to do about it.

Helms, of course, is the No. 1 man in the U.S. intelligence community. The intelligence community is braced for "the other shoe to drop." The other shoe is a series of Soviet missile tests that the intelligence specialists are sure—rather mysteriously sure—will take place before the end of this year, most probably in November or early December.

These tests will tell a great deal about the real purpose of the very great Soviet investment in offensive strategic weapons. This investment is the first shoe, and it is symbolized by the missile silos—"holes," they are called in the intelligence trade—that the Russians have been constructing with extraordinary urgency throughout this year. The tests will show what kind of missiles the Russians intend to put in their holes.

## PEACE AND THE HOLES

This is not, admittedly, a subject that much interests most people in the present, curious mood of this country. But it is a subject that has to interest the intelligence specialists—and the President, too. For what goes into the Russian holes may well determine whether or not it is rational to hope for what the President likes to call "a generation of peace."

The facts about the holes are as follows (and these facts are indeed facts, for the Pentagon's reconnaissance satellites bring back pictures of the holes almost as detailed as a picture of a building across the street). A total of 91 new holes has been dug so far this year. Twenty-five of these new holes are very large—larger than the holes that used to be dug for the huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missile. Sixty-six of the holes are somewhat smaller than the regular SS-9 holes but larger than the holes for the 1-megaton SS-11 missile.

These smaller holes are dug in a big circle, with ten missiles to a circle. In the middle of a half dozen or so of these circles, a very big hole, bigger than any missile silo ever built, has

# OUR TURN TO BLINK?

been dug. None of the holes has as yet been fitted with a missile, and the experts do not expect them to be operational until about July 1972.

There are no doubt innumerable papers marked Top Secret filled with details about the Russian holes, but the essential facts are as stated above. These facts make it possible for any reasonably intelligent reader of this magazine to be his own intelligence analyst. What are the holes for?

## WHAT ARE THEY FOR?

It is very unlikely that they are simply for more first-generation SS-9s and SS-11s. Otherwise, the missiles would already be in their holes. They could be for improved versions of the SS-9 and the SS-11. Or they could be for entirely new weapons.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the Russians want to do one thing to improve the SS-9, and another thing to improve the SS-11. The SS-9, or an entirely new version of the big missile, could be provided with multiple warheads, or "MIRVed." Because its warhead is so immense, the missile could be MIRVed six, or even ten times over. Given sufficient accuracy, even a relatively small number of MIRVed megaton missiles could be used to destroy, in a first strike, this country's main strategic deterrent—our 1,000 land-based Minuteman missiles.

Greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11, or some new version of such a missile, would have a similar effect. The SS-11 is an "anti-city" weapon; it is only roughly accurate, since only rough accuracy is required to destroy a city with a 1-megaton warhead. But if it could be rendered accurate enough to dig a Minuteman missile out of its concrete silo, then it would become a direct threat to our strategic deterrent.

How about the enormous new holes? The reader's guess may be as good as the specialists', for the specialists do not pretend to have the answer. These huge holes could be for hardened control centers. Or they could be for some new kind of offensive strategic missile, perhaps filled with penetration aids to blind the U.S. defense, perhaps with an enormous warhead designed to black out the defense's radar and control systems. Nobody knows.

After the expected tests, a lot more will be known, for the tests tell us al-

most as much as they tell the Russians about such factors as accuracy, range and megatonnage. Suppose the tests show (a) a MIRVed SS-9-type missile, (b) greatly improved accuracy for the SS-11-type missile, and (c) an entirely new offensive strategic missile of immense size. Even if the tests showed only one or two of these things, Richard Helms would have to ask for that urgent appointment with the President. What would the President do then?

Already, it is too late to talk about missile "parity." The Russians have 1,600 intercontinental missiles against 1,054 American missiles, and in terms of missile megatonnage, they have between five and ten times the thermonuclear capacity we have. Their anti-bal listic-missile complex is fully operational in the Moscow area and being urgently extended, whereas our ABM system will not be operational for several years.

## A NEW CONFRONTATION

They are ready to produce an entirely new swept-wing attack bomber, with an undoubted "anti-U.S. attack capability," whereas our B-52s are Model T bombers, terribly vulnerable to the new SA-5 Soviet anti-aircraft. The Soviet Y-class nuclear submarine fleet of 41 boats now equals ours, and instead of halting production, the Russians have doubled their production capacity. The Soviet conventional fleet is already in several categories superior to ours.

The new Soviet missile tests could indicate at least the serious possibility that the Soviets are building up for a new eyeball-to-eyeball nuclear confrontation, like the 1962 Cuban crisis, in which it would be our turn to blink. The likely locale of the confrontation is obvious—the Middle East. It is easy to dismiss this possibility as mere Pentagon propaganda. But it is also silly.

The intelligence analysts, including the Pentagon's, have consistently underestimated the Soviet missile program. As for the President, his political future may be at stake. If he were to abandon hope for successful SALT talks and ask for very large new appropriations to regain nuclear parity with the Russians, he might well be throwing away his chance of re-election, in this country's present mood.

So what would the President do? If some of the gloomier analysts are right, what will the President do?

100

Newsweek, November 1, 1971

SCIENCE AND SPACE

Is This Blast Necessary?

There is little to attract tourists or other visitors to the barren Aleutian island of Amchitka, a 75-square-mile dollop of American territory that is much nearer Japan and the Soviet Union than it is to the U.S. mainland. But last week Amchitka was a busy place. Working almost around the clock, Atomic Energy Commission technicians slowly lowered a 5-megaton anti-ballistic-missile nuclear warhead down a 5,875-foot shaft. The warhead is tentatively scheduled to be detonated in a week or so; if it is, the blast may go down as the most powerful nuclear explosion in history—which is just one of the reasons a rising chorus of foreign and domestic protest was demanding last week that the White House step in and order the test halted.

The protesters are an impressive lot. They include the governments of Japan and Canada (though not, so far, the Soviet Union), the governor of Alaska and the state's entire Congressional delegation, the Federation of American Scientists, the Sierra Club, the Aleut League and even some Federal agencies in Washington. They contend that the planned test—code-named Cannikin—threatens to trigger natural disasters of unknown proportions, that it will severely damage the environment in and around Amchitka, and that it is unnecessary, anyway, because U.S. nuclear strategy has been drastically revised since the test was first programed.

**Giant:** In some respects, the controversy over Cannikin is a replay of the clamor that surrounded the underground detonation of another nuclear device on Amchitka two years ago. That device, code-named Milrow, exploded according to plan, and caused no apparent damage to the environment. But Milrow was a 1.2-megaton bomb, similar in explosive capacity to other devices that have been detonated underground at the Nevada test site in recent years. Cannikin, however, is a 5-megaton giant, perhaps the largest nuclear bomb ever tested underground by the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

And the protesters note that Amchitka lies close to a major earthquake belt that runs from the Far East all the way to the U.S. West Coast; some fear that the Cannikin explosion could trigger a severe tremor. While any such effects would probably be localized, it is possible that they could also cause a tsunami, a kind of tidal wave that could inundate the shores of Japan and Hawaii, as did one tsunami triggered by an Aleutian earthquake in 1946.

Another concern of Cannikin's critics is the possibility that radiation will be released from the blast into the Bering Sea and the North Pacific, contaminating the Pacific salmon that migrate through the Aleutians. Conservationists also fear that the blast will kill many of Amchitka's sea otters and damage the nests of the bald eagles and peregrine falcons that congregate there in large numbers.

**Most Unlikely:** The AEC concedes that all these consequences are within the range of possibility, but contends firmly that they are most unlikely. Basing its judgment on the Milrow experience, the agency expects that one of the eight eagle nesting sites within range of the blast will be destroyed and that perhaps twenty to 100 sea otters and a few fish may not survive the test. But AEC officials think that the ecological impact of Cannikin will be less than that of natural mortality. As to earthquakes, the agency insists that the possibility that the Cannikin test could trigger an earthquake comparable to or greater than that produced by the test itself is very unlikely; it dismisses the possibility that Cannikin might touch off a severe tsunami as equally improbable. To questions about the risk of radioactive seepage from the test, the agency declared that "the worst conceivable release of radioactive groundwater would reach the sea commencing in two or three years, in which case potential radiation doses would be below all established radiation criteria, because of dilution by sea water."

These assurances, however, failed to mollify the critics of Cannikin, and they pressed on with the arguments that the

Henry Peck—Anchorage Daily News

The shaft: Workmen at bomb site

test is also unnecessary. According to Jeremy J. Stone of the Federation of American Scientists, Cannikin was originally conceived as a test for an anti-bal listic-missile system whose purpose was to defend cities against Chinese missile attacks. Since then, the target of anti- ballistic defense has changed to Soviet missiles, Stone asserts, rendering the Can- nikin warhead obsolete. In reply, the AEC says that the warhead is far from obsolete, and that the test is necessary to see that it produces the anticipated yield of X-rays and neutrons. To support this argument, the agency disclosed that a full-scale test four years ago showed the Minuteman 3 warhead to be defective and forced a drastic redesign of the en- tire system.

**Critical:** Late in the week, while the bomb was being readied at Amchitka, the critics concentrated on a court action brought in Washington by 33 congressmen, who are trying to persuade the Administration to release a document on Cannikin prepared by a panel of Under Secretaries from seven Federal agencies, most of them highly critical of Cannikin. According to the AEC critics, only two agencies—the Department of Defense and the AEC—favor going ahead with the test. The critics say the other five, including the State Department and the Office of Science and Technology, are opposed to Cannikin.

Under the law, the explosion cannot be detonated until the President formally gives the order, but as of last week there was no indication from the White House that any response to the request for postponement would be forthcoming. But with the legal action, the critics hoped that they could tie Cannikin up in the courts until the severe Aleutian winter closes in and by this tactic delay the controversial nuclear test at least until next spring.

Ib Onissan

November 1, 1971

99

35368

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Articles-Books

LIBRAIRIE JULES TALLANDIER
17 RUE REMY DUMONCEL PARIS 14

LE PRÉSIDENT DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL

Mr. H. KISSINGER
White House
WASHINGTON D.C.

Paris, le 29 novembre 1971

Monsieur le Conseiller Special,

Je possède en France un groupe de journaux. Parmi eux un journal d'histoire, *Historia*, qui depuis vingt-cinq ans est le leader, en Europe, des mensuels historiques : plus de deux millions de lecteurs par mois.

Nous sommes très intéressés par la série de conférences que vous avez faites à l'Université de Harvard sur le Pacte Germano-soviétique, à la veille du déclenchement de la 2ème guerre mondiale.

S'il y avait une possibilité de les publier en France, nous serions très heureux et très honorés de pouvoir le faire. Auriez-vous l'obligeance de nous donner votre sentiment à ce sujet et de nous faire parvenir un texte de ces conférences.

A l'avance, je vous en remercie et vous demande de croire, Monsieur le Conseiller Special, à l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Maurice Dumoncel

Jan. 23rd 1972

librairie ernest flammarion

Mrs. Julienne L. Pineau
Personal Secretary to
Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington
D.C.

flammarion et cie
26 rue racine
paris 6e

téléphone
033-94-10

adresse
télégraphique
flammedit paris

r.c. seine
56 b 6157
c.c. postal
paris 156.72

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Mrs. Pineau,

(Would not you be from French origin ? We are having
here a minister called Christian Pineau).

You have been so kind in sending me the list of
works of Henry A.K. What a list !

You're right. It is difficult to get his books.
<u>American foreign policy</u> unfortunately is sold here to another
<u>house</u>.

We are thinking about his next book. He is so clever,
so organized, probably is he (maybe in planes ?) taking notes
about a work on <u>China</u>, or <u>Far-East policy</u>.

What would you suggest us to do, in order to be his
new, next, and happy publisher ? As he will stay four years and
a half more to the White House, he will get the unique opportuni-
ty to make history with his own hands. For the benefit of
mankind.

I am glad he is a friend of Alfons Dalma I like very
much. If, by any chance, you are knowing his literary agent, if
he is having one, we shall be proud to get in touch about his
next book.

With best regards, dear Mrs. Pineau,

Thérèse de Saint Phalle

RECEIVED
MAY 9 1972

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Roberto:

Many thanks for your letter of July 21 and
for sending me Affari Esteri. It was good
to hear from you, as always.

I, too, am sorry that we were unable to
meet during your visit to Washington. A
few quiet days in Italy sound wonderful and
I shall keep your thought in mind for some
time in the, hopefully, not too hectic future.

Please stay in touch.

Mr. Roberto Ducci
Ministero degli Affari Esteri
Il Direttore General Degli
Affari Politici
Rome, Italy.

jlp:8/12/72

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

IL DIRETTORE GENERALE DEGLI AFFARI POLITICI

Rome, 21st July, 1972.

Your name makes the front page every day
in all the newspapers of the world and is heard on
all communication mass-media that its mention in
foreign policy articles will not add to the fame you
have acquired for yourself over the last few years of
being the most creative diplomatist of the second half
of the twentieth century.

I am taking the liberty, however, of sending you herewith the July issue of *Affari Esteri* (the Italian *Foreign Affairs*) where in its first article entitled "The Struggle for a New System of World Balance" (under a pen-name which hides a person not unknown to you and to the writer of this letter) you are mentioned at pages 6 and 9: in the second instance with regard to your beautiful book "A World Restored".

In connection with this book (pages 37/39) it was not without interest and a certain sense of amusement that I discovered the origin of the Soviet plan for a CSCE in Alexander I plan submitted in 1940 to Pitt the Young.

I was sorry not to have been able to see
you even for a minute when I was in Washington last
week, but Hel Sonnenfeld, with whom I had a most

Contd......

Professor Henry A. Kissinger,
Assistant to the President for National
and Security Affairs,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

INSTITUTO didattico Statale

Ministero degli Affari Esteri

2.

interesting chat, told me that you had been kind enough to send me your greetings over the 'phone from San Clemente.

Shall you ever be able to spend a couple of quiet days in Italy in coincidence with one of your Paris errands? If so, you might have a private talk with our Prime Minister, who is a very interesting man under many angles. But otherwise your privacy and your repose would be respected, even by your friends, even when I hope you come back soon.

Roberto Ducci

ISTITUTO POLITICO DELLO STATO

International Journal of Group Tensions

Editor
BENJAMIN B. WOLMAN, PH.D.

Editorial Associate
FLORENCE DENMARK. PH.D

7 WEST 96TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10025
SUITE 17C

(212) 999-9577
(212) 222-8267

June 20, 1972

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Our present times have created a strange, and perhaps paradoxical situation. On the one hand, we are witnessing the ever-growing power of huge social structures. Multimillion dollar corporations, multimillion member trade unions and great super-powers, such as the USA, the USSR, and China, seem to dominate the present-day life, imposing their will on lesser groups and individuals. At the same time, however, small groups and even individuals seem to be able to impose their will on large segments of the world population. Consider hijacking; self-righteous individuals have terrorized hundreds of passengers and disrupted the travel schedules of several international airlines. Small ethnic groups, racial radicals, religious and political fanatics everywhere in the world seem to be able to stop the normal process of life of millions and terrorize Belfast, Tel-Aviv, or any other place.

The INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GROUP TENSIONS, being a cross-disciplinary journal, devoted to the study of conflict and violence in human relations, is preparing a special issue about the special problem of Tyranny by a Few, analyzing the usurpation of power by individuals and cliques. We are inviting a small group of distinguished scholars and civic leaders to take part in that issue.

I shall feel greatly honored by your agreeing to write an essay or an article of between 1,000 and 10,000 words for this special issue. I shall appreciate receiving your manuscript as soon as possible. You may wish to know that our Journal is published by the Book Division of the New York Times.

BBW:km

P.S. You may wish to know that Professors Z. Brzezinski, A. Etzioni, D.A. Rustow, H. Morganthau, and Senator H.H. Humphrey and others will participate in this issue.

EDITORIAL BOARD

MICHAEL BALINT (LONDON)
GREGORY BATESON (HAWAII)
JOSHUA BIERER (LONDON)
URIE BRONFENBRENNER (UTICA)
DORWIN CARTWRIGHT (ANN ARBOR)
ISIDOR CHEIN (NEW YORK)
OSCAR COHEN (NEW YORK)
NORMAN COHN (LONDON)

SUGATA DASGUPTA (NEW DELHI)
MORTON DEUTSCH (NEW YORK)
AMITAI ETZIONI (NEW YORK)
FRANCO FORNARI (MILAN)
JOHAN GALTUNG (OSLO)
MARTIN GROTJAHN (LOS ANGELES)
LOUIS GUTTMAN (JERUSALEM)
AUGUST HOLLINGSHEAD (NEW HAVEN)

OTTO KLINEBERG (PARIS)
WILLIAM LANGER (CAMBRIDGE)
PAUL LAZARSFELD (NEW YORK)
PETER LENGYEL (PARIS)
JULES MASSERMAN (CHICAGO)
W. WALTER MENNINGER (TOPEKA)
WARNER MUENSTERBERGER (NEW YORK)
THEODORE M. NEWCOMB (ANN ARBOR)

ROBERT R. NEILD (STOCKHOLM)
TALCOTT PARSONS (CAMBRIDGE)
HAROLD PROSHANSKY (NEW YORK)
BERNARD RIESS (NEW YORK)
B. V. A. ROLING (GRONINGEN)
EMMANUAL K. SCHWARTZ (NEW YORK)
JOHN SPIEGEL (WALTHAM)
M. N. SRINIVAS (NEW DELHI)
SILVAN TOMKINS (NEW BRUNSWICK)

Santiago Fernandes
Av. Visira Souto, 620 ap. 1003
Rio de Janeiro (Ipanema)
Brasil

Rio de Janeiro, 28th August 1972

To the Chairman of
Council of Economic Advisers
of the U.S.A. Presidency
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

This letter is related with two subjects which I believe you
are in a position to answer complying with my request.

A) The first deals with the present state of the dollar convertibility, after the speech of Mr. Nixon, August 15, 1971. We all know that, from that time, he recommended the Treasury to suspend the convertibility of dollar balances into US gold. But what I wonder is whether the opposits is also true. I mean, in case a Central Bank or Government has a stock of gold available, but not USA dollar balances, can such a Bank or Government remit the gold stock to the Fed of New York and request it to convert such gold into dollars, at the parity agreed among the so-called Group of Ten ? Or there is no conversibility in both ways ? Please do clarify me on this subject, because there is some doubts and confusion on the second hypothesis I mention.

B) The other information is related with the book or thesis
by Mr. Henry Kissinger, the special adviser of the President, which he wrote at
Harvard, on the balance of powers based on the special study of the figure of
Metternich. One wonders whether this book is available to those interested on
it, and again I am believing that the Council of Economic Adviser may be in a
position of helping me by sending my enquire to the proper department of the
White House where Mr. Kissinger has his office. If such a book is available, I
certainly would remain particularly obliged for the kindness of sending it to
the above address, with the bill of expense attached.

With my thanks in advance for the kindness of your attention
regarding the two questions, I close, expressing my desire of reciprocating the
courtesy of your attention. In the meantime, under separate cover I am sending
you my book "Ouro - A Reliquia Barbara (1967), which is the development of a
paper I wrote in 1944, at the University of Columbia, and which appears as an
appendix of my book. Given the stimulating words I have received from outstand-
ing American Economists to whom I have sent my book, I hope it may also offer
some interest to you.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY SUPPORT, THAILAND
Special Services Division
APO San Francisco 96232

THPER-SSD

5 March 1973

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Executive Office of the President
Executive Office Building
17th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

National Library Week sponsored by the National Book Committee, Inc., in cooperation with the American Library Association, will be observed 8-14 April 1973 throughout the United States Army. The slogan is "Widen Your World-Read".

All Army Libraries in Thailand participate in this event for the purpose of emphasizing the military person's responsibility toward his development as a citizen, a soldier, and the role reading and libraries play in his life. A wide variety of programs are held at this time throughout Thailand, involving both the military and local civilian population.

The Special Services Library in Bangkok, Thailand, is planning an exhibit called "Leaders Are Readers." We will have a display featuring an international group of photographs and letters from notables.

We would like to have a short statement from you on what reading for libraries have meant to you. If you have a small photograph for use with our exhibit, it will be greatly appreciated. We will be glad to return it after the Library Week. We plan to have an Open House, with the military and the civilian population of Bangkok invited, during the period 8-14 April with the display as the featured attraction.

We greatly appreciate your taking time from your busy schedule to assist us in making our program a success.

RECEIVED
APR 25 1973
CENTRAL Fines

3/25/73