[LC]

17 September 2004

TO: Dr. Henry Kissinger

FROM: Mark Falcoff

SUBJ: Your upcoming trip to Mexico

Bill Rogers just told me this morning that you will be in Mexico early next week and are wondering what kind of backlash you might be facing on the basis of recent allegations in the press concerning your role in events in Argentina and Chile.

First point: expect a hostile press environment generally. This will have little to do in the first instance with Argentina or Chile—it has to do with the institutional anti-Americanism of the Mexican press, which constantly looks for ways to belittle or denigrate the U.S. as a society and to condemn its foreign policy. There is a deep psychic need for this because Mexico is such a failure as a country and it must live next door to the world's most successful society.

Mexicans wallow in victimhood. It is their least attractive national characteristic. They still weep crocodile tears over every single soldier killed by the U.S. in the 1848 war, or the U.S. expeditionary force in Veracruz in 1914, or by General Pershing pursuing Pancho Villa in 1916. The most famous line attributed to the dictator Porfirio Diaz is: "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States." But as historian Enrique Krauze once asked, "which is the country we would prefer to exchange for the United States as our closest neighbor?" He added that he doubted strongly it would be Canada or Luxembourg.

Second point: Chile is a hot button in Mexico because so many Marxist academics and politicians from the Allende regime took refuge there in the 1970s. They have left a strong imprint on academic life in Mexico, just as an earlier generation of Republican (mostly Communist) refugees from the Spanish civil war did in the 1940s. Madame Allende lived there too, for most of the Pinochet regime. Again, this is mainly in the press and in intellectual circles; needless to say, most Mexicans hardly know where Chile is and care less, except as a stick to beat the U.S. with.

Third point: Argentina is less of a hot button in Mexico because, as you know, the Soviet Union was an important trading partner of that country and the Argentine Communist party was the only leftist group that was left reasonably alone by the military. (Not generally known: the CP "conditionally" supported the military government.) Also, Mexicans regard Argentines as racist snobs—it is the country in Latin America where they are most disliked.

If you are asked about our supposed intervention in these countries, you
might well take the line that so-called U.S. hegemony has its limits, as we have
discovered often in Latin America. Mexicans above all should be aware of its
limits, since they have often pursued policies contrary to the U.S. national
interest or national objectives—the most recent being their plan to vote against
us at the UN on Iraq.

They might also be reminded that we take these countries seriously—as
real societies with lives of their own, not just extensions of the CIA. They have
their own conflicts and contradictions, and hardly need the U.S. to stumble into
trouble.

I think it best to handle inquiries in a very general way and not descend
into haggling over this or that allegation which has managed to find its way into
the press these last few months.

I hope these observations may be useful.

DATE 1/22/04

CORR. FILE

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

Jessee Theresa Stephanie

Don Amanda Suzanne

COMMENTS:

1/a3 Sent to Kent per HAK w/other weekend materials.

SUBJ. FILE WDR memos

CROSS REF.

STAFF MEMO

DC OFFICE:
Christie / Jody / Tiffany

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED

Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee Incao [jincao@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 2:49 PM
To: tcimino@kmaglobal.com
Subject: FW: Message for

69 Election

Chapter 3(Ed).doc

Chile Edit1.doc (106

chapter.doc (115 K..)

(138 KB)

KB)

IFrom: William_Rogers@aporter.com

[mailto:William_Rogers@aporter.com]

Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 2004 2:46 PM

To: jincao@kmaglobal.com

Subject: Re: Message for

Sir:

I have stumbled across a Cambridge (UK) doctoral candidate who has done some quite responsible historical work on Chile and US involvement. Herewith three chapters. Well worth reading and useful for distribution to others to illustrte the kind of conclusions responsible analysts can come to who approach the issue without bias. As you will see, he sensibly finds himself in agreement with Mark Falcoff on many issues.

I am meeting with him next week..

Bill

----- Forwarded by William Rogers/Atty/DC/ArnoldAndPorter on 01/21/2004

02:33 PM -----

Subject: Re: Your message of 1/15

01/21/2004 11:27 AM

Sir;

Please find attached the papers. I have taken the liberty of attaching
another (draft) chapter, on the subject of the 1969 Congressional
Election in Chile. Please feel free to read and pass-around any of these papers.
No problem on the accidentla erasal: I do it all the time, and I am
supposedly of the 'computer generation'.

Apologies that the phone number didn't work: T-Mobile (who was providing
my phone service) and I had a dispute over the cost of my using the phone,
so I was forced to switch carriers. My new number is 202-368-4772. I will
call you soonest to arrange a meeting time.

Yours,
Kristian Gustafson

On Jan 21 2004, William_Rogers@aporter.com wrote:

> Dear Mr. Gustafson:

> Thank you for your earlier message. I read the two papers you enclosed and was impressed. But would you be good enough to resend them? I read them in hardcopy, and intended to share them with others, as admirably professional histories of these difficult subjects, only to find that I had erased your electronic message. My mistake.

> I would very much like to meet with you as well. The rest of this week or next would be quite convenient. The phone number you referred to in our message is not functioning.

> This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying

> of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

> by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

>

> William Rogers William_Rogers@aporter.com
> Arnold & Porter Telephone: 202-942-5915
> 555 Twelfth Street, NW Fax: 202-942-5999
> Washington, DC 20004-1202

> For more information about Arnold & Porter, click here:
> http://www.arnoldporter.com

--

Kristian

(See attached file: 69 Election Chapter.doc)

(See attached file: Chapter 3(Ed).doc)

(See attached file: Chile Edit1.doc)

This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or

2

Supporting the Moderates

The 1969 Congressional Election

Kristian C. Gustafson

After the 1964 presidential election, the next significant U.S. operation in Chile took place in mid-1968 through to 1969: the manipulation of the Chilean congressional election of March 2, 1969. American activities in Chile in this period were not a continuation of any previous effort the Americans had undertaken there, and can be viewed as something of a fresh start. While the US had, through the CIA, undertaken missions to influence the Presidential elections of 1964, and the subsequent congressional elections in 1965, no operation had been maintained with the aim of preventing the dominance of the communist party in subsequent elections. This despite the fact that the political climate in Chile had not altered, and the chances of a communist victory had increased due to notable changes in Chilean demographics and electoral law. Throughout 1968-1969 the goal of the United States in Chile remained stable if simple: keep the communists from power. The various agencies in the US government responsible for Chile, however, were not able to adapt their policies in Chile to the growing radicalism of Chilean politics, nor could they in their minds easily abandon their old political allegiances to the increasingly communist and anti-American PDC. The American operation to influence the 1969 election therefore reflect a period of ambiguity and misunderstanding of Chilean politics. The efforts surrounding the 1969 election were haphazard and they progressed without and clear executive direction—a fact perhaps compounded by the handover of the lame-duck Johnson Administration to the incoming team of Nixon and Kissinger. Drifting along without significant executive-level input, both Ambassador (a State Department functionary) and CIA HQ provided conflicting direction, with neither side having a clear image of what strategic foreign policy goal they were pursuing. Furthermore, at critical points the CIA's political analysis was crucially flawed, misreading the impact their measures would have on the Chilean political environment. Likewise, disagreement between the COS and the Ambassador highlighted the differing political predictions of the various American players. The ultimate result of the confused American action was to actually split the anti-Marxist vote and contribute to an electoral environment that actually *favoured* Marxists in the period following the election. The hallmarks of the operation are a meandering mission, confused chain-of-command and insufficient executive control.

If the benefits were so small, so undeterminable, why was the US government willing to risk an operation in the first place? Covert action is, in the greater scheme of things, a war undertaken without the knowledge of one of the participants. Likewise, one does not initiate a war without some tangible goal. Was this war worth waging for the Americans? Did it have a goal? Examination of the evidence shows that the effort to influence the 1969 congressional election in Chile was a waste of time and effort, a procrastinating half-effort that compounded future troubles for American operations in Chile.

41

The Genesis of the Operation

The genesis for the 1969 election operation apparently came from the Ambassador, Edward Korry. He had approached the CIA Station Chief, Henry Hecksher, in late 1967 or early 1968 and asked him to request 303-Committee permission to undertake a "limited covert election operation aimed at Congressional elections."¹ The political arena seemed fairly clear to the US Embassy team during this period. On the conservative right was Arturo Alessandri's National Party. In the centre was the governing PDC, surrogate Democrats in Latin America. On the far left, were the constituent parties in the FRAP and, wavering between them and the government, were the Radicals, formerly centrists like the PDC but now moving into the Communist-Socialist orbit. The congressional elections, the CIA team imagined, could be used to stiffen the resolve of the PDC to resist the UP, while at the same time promoting moderate centrists within the Radical party as well as any other leftist party that had more democratic tendencies.

In May of 1968 the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, William V. Broe, in a meeting with State Department representatives, formally made the suggestion that the USG should attempt to influence the Chilean congressional elections of 1969, and by extension the Presidential Election of 1970. That they had to make a proposal to start such a programme for this election is telling from the point of view that the Embassy in Santiago had not made an effort to sustain any covert mechanism to influence the Chilean political system in which they had such great interest. Generally, this was because of a reduction in the size and number of covert operations as the sixties drew to a close. This scale-back had to do with budgetary concerns, as well as the beginnings of more public scrutiny of the agency. "By the end of the decade, internal concern developed over the problem of exposure for large-scale operations...Gradually, senior Agency personnel began to recognise the cumulative effect of long term subsidies to and associations with political parties, media, and agents overseas—a large presence invited attention and was vulnerable to exposure."² This is not to say that the CIA had not maintained any assets in Chile—it is clear that they did—but that the level of commitment had waned significantly from their effort in 1964. Yet, in the case of Chile the reduction in commitment originated from more than just a concern of general risk, but also out of confusion about the general political situation. In the last presidential election the choice had been very clear cut for the Americans: There was only one non-Marxist party that had any hope of beating the Socialist-Communist FRAP, and that was the PDC. The decision to subsidise the PDC as heavily as they did was an easy choice to make for the Americans, as the PDC, and their champion, Eduardo Frei, were icons to the American Democratic party. After having cleared the major hurdle of the 1964 election, the PDC was left to its own devices under the trustworthy hands of President Frei. It was assumed, perhaps due to a mistaken mirroring of the permanence of political institutions in the US, that the PDC could be relied upon to remain a bulwark of the Democratic-style social reform that

¹
² Leary, P. 81.

42

Kennedy and Johnson had favoured. Politics in Chile evolved much faster than the US, however, and the PDC of 1968 did not resemble the PDC of even four years previously.

The Embassy staff was persistent if anything, and it was decided that the PDC should be the focus of their plan regardless. An old soldiers' maxim asserts that 'no plan survives first contact with the enemy' and in this case the maxim held true. The PDC was, in any case, the only party to which the US could actually make an open approach. The PDC, however, did not have the same view of their relationship with the CIA as the latter did with them, and the CIA did not receive a favourable response. "STA overtures," wrote one CIA officer "have evoked no response suggesting PDC leadership's election planning encompasses [a] role on any terms STA would entertain."³ The reasons for this had, for some time, been clear to many within the Chilean political environment, including President Frei himself. In January of 1968 Ambassador Korry had spoken at length with Frei about the PDC's current drift to the left, and he noted "High personalities in the PDC had argued...that some kind of broad popular movement [in conjunction with the Communist Party] was needed in Chile to assure the execution of PDC goals."⁴ Essentially, the PDC had ceased to be the reliable pro-US machine it had been in the past. Indications came from recent manifestos issued by the party, which showed that the moderate reformist President Frei was in a struggle for control of his party mechanism with a group led by the FRAP-friendly Radomiro Tomic. Of all the Chilean politicians aside from Frei and Alessandri, the US government and CIA had the most information on Tomic. For two years he had been the Chilean Ambassador to the US, and so had become quite well known, politically and personally in Washington. The CIA understood that Tomic was the representative of the new, vigorous left wing of the PDC. They knew of his ambitions to lead a broad leftist front in the next election, and dismissed his chances of doing so, for Tomic was "not trusted—let alone liked—by the other leftist parties...he envisions himself as leader of."⁵ As far as the Chilean right was concerned—in this case represented by National Party founder Miguel Otero—the right believed that "Tomic was *very* close to what Allende was saying. Only a very slight difference....I would say that Tomic would have been completely anti-American."⁶ The CIA no doubt understood this fact, for they wrote that the rise of the Tomic wing within the PDC "casts into more striking relief fundamental incompatibility of [Station/USG] role in support of PDC and PDC's dedicated travel of *via no capitalista*."⁷

Yet, for some reason, the CIA could not move past the fact that the PDC was the only party that offered an alternative to a Communist-Socialist front in the coming elections. The CIA's conclusion, announced in a DI 'Special Report', was that "in the absence of a strong Christian Democratic showing in the 1969 congressional elections, Chile probably will stumble along until a new administration—possibly with communist support—takes over in 1970."⁸ In March of that year a Board of National Estimates Special

³ Cable, Santiago Station to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Korry with President Frei, "Aboard Presidential Aircraft on route to Concepción," 3 January 1968. (DDRS)

⁵ Special Report Weekly Review, "Chile: A New Opening to the Left?", 12 April 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

⁶ Interview, Miguel Otero, Santiago Chile, 12 May 2003.

⁷ Cable, Santiago Station to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

⁸ Special Report Weekly Review, "Chile: A New Opening to the Left?", 12 April 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

43

Memorandum titled "Chilean Problems and Frei's Prospects" stated that Frei was a lame-duck President who could not control his increasingly left-leaning party. In view of the hostility to the PDC in the conservative-dominated Senate, "there appears to be little chance that he could secure passage of additional reform measures his [left-wing] opponents within the PDC are demanding." The estimate further stated, "this could result in the Christian Democrats losing to the Communist-Socialist coalition in both the congressional and presidential elections."⁹ While in retrospect we know the conclusion of the prediction was correct, but what about its premise, the need for a strong PDC?

Aside from the PDC there existed two other non-Marxist parties that the CIA would consider for support. The first and most interesting of these was the Radical Party, which had been part of the right-wing Coalition that elected President Alessandri in the 1958 Presidential race, but had been defeated by the PDC juggernaut in 1964. Yet, where the PDC had been left to its own devices, the CIA had maintained collaborators within the party and had been providing financial support to 'moderate' elements within it since 1964.¹⁰ To no avail, apparently, for in 1965 "the balance of power within the Radical Party shifted and the left wing came to dominate... no possibility remained in the near future to recapture the party."¹¹ With perhaps little head to warnings of 'good money after bad' in July of 1967 the 303 Committee approved a programme to spend an unspecified amount of money "in an effort to discourage the movement of important elements of the Radical party toward a working alliance with the Communist party and Socialists."¹² This was a fool's errand as the party continued to move left and seek alliance with the FRAP. Nonetheless, in the debate about what to do with the Radical Party, the CIA decided to maintain 'minimal' support for the PR in order to retain some influence within the party. This might be a useful tool for the CIA, as the PR was entering into informal cooperation with the FRAP, so continued influence in the PR might give the CIA either information on the plans of the FRAP, or might perhaps serve to cause some sort of vote-stealing split in the PR later on.¹³ It is notable that this was the only party to receive US funds through this period, and perhaps serves as something of a foreshadow for CIA relations with the PDC through the congressional election to the presidency.

The second and more obvious party that the CIA considered was the National Party (PN), the right-of-centre party that had elected the popular and very conservative President Alessandri in the 1958 election. As it approached the 1969 Congressional election, it appeared that Jorge Alessandri would once again seek the leadership of this party for the crucial Presidential election in 1970. The CIA noted that this party was basing its election strategy "exclusively...upon his undeclared Presidential candidacy."¹⁴ Nonetheless, the PN draws curiously little comment from the CIA in this period. For

⁹ Board of National Estimates Special Memorandum, "Chilean Problems and Frei's Prospects", 4 March 1968.

¹⁰ Memorandum, CWH/D to DDP, "Request for Renewal of Project", 20 March 1968.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Memorandum to File, INR/DDC Records, "CIA Operations", 1 August 1968. (State)

¹³ DI Special Report/Weekly Review. "The Popular Front in Chile as a Communist Path to Power", 2 August 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

¹⁴ Cable, COS to 'Director', 'Foll not to be Considered', 8 August 1968.

44

some reason, and despite the fact that the PN polled very high and was seen as controlling most of the not-inconsiderable right-of-centre vote, the CIA cables do not reflect consideration of this party as a universally suitable alternative to the PDC. Drawn by their concern over the left, the embassy seemed to be ignoring the right.

## The Plan Takes Shape

The plan to influence the election began to take shape in June of 1968, a timing based on the fact that the parties would not select their congressional candidates until the autumn of that year. "It was decided" stated the CIA in a brief to the NSC, "that because the 1969 election might hold the key for 1970, an operation should be undertaken to help elect moderate candidates of the PR, PDC, and PN where it is decided, on the basis of hard information, that our support could be decisive."¹⁵ The Ambassador's election team had a massive piece of work ahead of them; there would be upwards of 750 listed candidates for 180 congressional seats.¹⁶ Korry, himself a JFK appointee, was very clearly of the camp supporting the PDC, and his tactics reflected his trust that this party would continue in its reformist approach in a manner that would benefit US (or Democratic?) interests. In view of the increasing leftward drift of the party, however, he felt that something had to be done to 'encourage' the PDC to refrain from supporting the FRAP. Moreover, Korry perceived the general trend that politics in Chile were abandoning the centre entirely, moving towards extreme-left and ultra-conservative, leaving no room for the gentle reformist. His idea was apparently simple: the Ambassador and his chosen staff would canvass the field of candidates from all the non-Marxist parties and would hand-pick a number of these candidates who appeared sufficiently 'moderate' to suit the American (Democratic Party? State Department?) political interests. These candidates would be chosen with no consideration to their parent party, merely on their own political merits and a rough system of triage: the chosen ones would be those moderates most likely to benefit from US support. Despite the PDC's drift left, or the Radical Party's confirmed support of the FRAP, candidates from these parties stood a chance of being chosen for American support based on their own political views. The programme, however, was not entirely without guile. Support would continue for one potential splinter group from the Socialist Party, the Popular Socialist Union (USP) in the express hope of drawing votes away from its parent party, and with the general hope of sowing discord in this most important FRAP constituent party.¹⁷ While it does not receive a lot of attention, and cables and memos regarding the topic are heavily excises, the support for the USP was considered of primary importance to the election program. The logic being that the USP candidates would draw votes away from the PS, splitting the left-wing vote and paving the way for the win of a PDC or PN candidate.¹⁸ The Embassy staff believed the entire plan was sound and was timed to provide a good start on the project. "By early planning, a country team setup, and

¹⁵ Memorandum for the Record, Briefing of Viron Vaky by DDP, 6 August 1968.

¹⁶ Memorandum, CWH/D to DCI, "Progress Report: March 69 Chilean Congressional Election, 4 December 1968.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ December progress report...cited elsewhere.

45

personal direction from Ambassador Korry," wrote the COS, "significant results are
possible."¹⁹

Discussion on the embryonic plan began at a meeting between the CIA and the State Department on 24 May of 1968, and quickly seized on some of the tactical and political problems facing the CIA Country Team (CT) and the Embassy in the execution of the operation. As it appears, the CT was simply not positioned to provide all the information required by the Ambassador's team to choose the candidates. William Broe, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, noted, "our biggest trouble at the moment was lack of information." Indeed, for the agency was considering appealing to "its European and Latin newspaper contacts for information about political temperatures in the Chilean hinterland; the sort if information on other words that our Embassy could not readily produce"²⁰ Moreover, the CIA did not have any ability to ensure that moderates were chosen by their parties as candidates in the first place; Santiago had already determined that this was impossible, for the system was too complex, and the Station "lacks sufficiently detailed intelligence to second-guess party decisions/deals" nor, they admitted, "does the STA have covert political muscle to impose its will."²¹ In addition to lack of information and covert leverage, however, the State Department official present, one Mr. Sayer, brought up a serious issue of command and control: who would be choosing the candidates, and by what criteria? Being informed that it was to be the Ambassador directing a team of CIA and Embassy staff, Sayer posited that the principal difficulty "would be to get the Ambassador to be specific enough to give us a fair idea of exactly what he wanted to do and how we would go about it."²² While it is clear that the State Department was not entirely convinced by the plan—nor by the "inadequate" quality of the CIA's staff-work—they gave the CIA and Ambassador the benefit of the doubt and gave State's endorsement for further planning by both agencies.²³ "The ARA agrees with the objectives of the proposal program" wrote State Department officer Covey T. Oliver, adding that he thought the CIA's tactics were sound and that "the survival and health of [these democratic, reformist] forces is desirable and congenial to our interests."²⁴ The programme was recommended to the Assistant Secretary of State with no reservations. Accordingly, the incomplete plan moved forward along the approval process and, with the basic support of all the agencies involved, was approved by the 303 Committee, with a budget of $350,000, on 12 July 1968,²⁵ stating that the support given to moderate candidates would be made "in an effort to brake the leftward drift toward a popular front which threatens to engulf" the PDC and President Frei.²⁶ Nonetheless, it was noted that "the 303 Committee would be just as satisfied if we were

¹⁹ Memorandum, William Broe to DDP, "Request Approval of Project", 13 August 1968.

²⁰ Memorandum, INR/DDC, "ARA/CIA Meeting 24 May 1964", 27 May 1968. (State)

²¹ Cable, Santiago Sta to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

²² Memorandum, INR/DDC, "ARA/CIA Meeting 24 May 1964", 27 May 1968. (State)

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Memorandum, ARA-Covey T. Oliver to Ambassador Bohlen, "Chile: Assistance to Congressional Candidates", 5 July 1968. (State)

²⁵ Memorandum, CWH/D to Director, Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting, "ref: Minutes of 303 Committee", 1 August 1968.

²⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval of Project", excerpt of 303 Committee approval of 12 July 1968.

46

not involved in this election, even on a limited scale." This was hardly a ringing
endorsement of the plan, and a budget that perhaps reflected this enthusiasm.

The Plan In Execution:

Both the CIA and the State Department moved forward with the plan that had
been agreed upon, but it would not be long before they were not reading off the same
sheet of music. While the CIA had been relatively clear on what the tactics of the
operation would be, there was soon divergence between the 303 Committee and the CIA,
between the CIA and State Department, and within both departments, as to what was the
overall intent of the mission. As far as the State Department understood it, the object of
the proposal was to:

Promote the election in 1969 of the greatest possible number of moderate senators and deputies in order to maximise effective opposition to the popular front candidate in 1970 and to create a body of moderates who could act as a restraint on the policies of any popular front president, should one be elected.²⁷

This diverges by a few degrees from what the 303 Committee stated in its
approval note. Indeed, when briefed by William Broe in August of 1968, Viron P. Vaky,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was told that the
operation would be undertaken, quite sensibly, "because the 1969 election might hold the
key for 1970."²⁸ The State Department, in its internal communications, added "The
rationale for this assistance, which is generally recognised as probably only the first
instalment, is that there is {Perhaps} at stake the survival in Latin America of the sort of
democratic reformism that President Frei represents."²⁹ This was closer, but again faintly
different, for while the 303 Committee talked about preventing the (short-term, tactical)
collapse of Frei's hold over his party, the State Department was here discussing the
(long-term, strategic) stability of Frei-style democratic reformism over all of Latin
America. While this would appear to be different only in style, enthusiasm and syntax of
expression, it is an important difference in that it shows the vastly different
understanding of both the scope of the operation and its overall intent. The cause is a
lack of a 'mission statement' sent from the executive level, telling everyone the object of
the operation. Some thought it was to be a precursor mission to the 1970 election, but as
things developed this would prove not to be the case. Regardless, as the plan moved into
execution the gap in understanding between all the organisations would grow greater still.

27 Memorandum, ARA-Covey T. Oliver to Ambassador Bohlen, "Chile: Assistance to Congressional Candidates", 5 July 1968. (State)

28 Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Mr. Viron Peter Vaky", 6 August 1968.

29 Memorandum for the Record, INR/DDC, "CIA Operations", 1 August 1968. The word 'perhaps' is a marginal note. (State)

47

The 303 Committee, as stated when they approved the document, were not entirely interested in supporting an operation for the congressional elections, begging the question as to who was pushing the mission onwards. The answer, clearly, was Ambassador Korry. There can be doubts, however, that Korry really understood what was going, and this doubt was shared by the COS in Santiago. "I suppose one can feel fairly comfortable about Ambassador Korry's judgement and lack of experience in Latin America, even though he certainly cannot qualify as an expert on Latin American affairs", offered the COS. Moreover, because the selection mechanism was entirely in the ambassador's hands, any change in the Administration, and perhaps the introduction of a neophyte ambassador, might put the whole election mechanism into disarray.³⁰ An unanswered question might focus on the nature and strength of the Ambassador's political biases, and how they might affect his choice of candidates. More importantly, however, comes the question of overall focus. If the 303 Committee was disinterested, and the ambassador was pushing the mission, who was there to bring the two constituent departments, CIA and State, into concert on the intent and aim of the operation? The answer might be 'no one.'

A member of the election team sent the 303 Committee the first status report on the mission on the 3rd of September 1968. Very little was said, and the committee was told that "the lack of spic-and-span picture at this time is largely due to the fact that particular candidates are not selected until November, and the campaign gets under way only later in December."³¹ The first discouraging words to be uttered about the 1969 election programme, however, came only two weeks later. Though the full titles of the recipient and originator of the document are partially deleted, it appears that someone in the US wrote it to the Chief of Western Hemisphere division. A three-page long document, it argues at length that the entire operation lacks focus, is likely to produce negligible results, and is potentially embarrassing for the US. The author starts by admitting that though it was perhaps too late to do anything about the mission, stating he...

...should like to go on record as having serious reservations about the basic concepts underlying the proposal...By and large, the subsidies will go to individual candidates in the absence of any real indication of how they will use the funds, and without any control over the manner in which the funds are expended....the mere insertion of funds to individual candidates does not assure us of any positive results.³²

Furthermore, it did not appear that all the candidates selected for support would have needed support. Early estimates made of the PDC war chest indicated to the Station "that PDC's vigorous fund-raising drive yielding more than satisfactory results, (amounts as high as 2 million dollars have been mentioned). Come Nov 68, PDC campaign managers should be able launch (sic) campaign without overpowering financial worries."³³ If

³⁰ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968.

³¹ Memorandum, to C/WHD for files, Extract of 303 Committee minutes, 3 September 1968.

³² Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968.

³³ Cable, Santiago Sta to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

48

money was not needed, then what was the point of giving the candidates money, and small sums of it at that?

On the other hand, it is clear that the National Party, as one example, was perennially short of money, and in 1969 "near bankruptcy" stated Miguel Otero.³⁴ One could argue that it was a waste of resources to give money to one organisation that was flush with funding, and which in any case was not sure to act in your interests while, at the same moment, restricting support of another organisation that was more likely to act in their interests and *was* short of money. Lastly, the writer of this cable did not like the way the operation was being run from a tactical standpoint, and thought it had a "more than normal flap potential." Simply, its mechanism of using priests as couriers "seems to raise more security problems than it solves"³⁵, for large numbers of these unknown quantities were required to sponsor the number of candidates to make it an effective operation, therefore inversely decreasing the security of the operation. Miguel Otero was sceptical of this funding mechanism as well, and said that there were individuals who bragged at the time that in working for the CIA, in either receiving money or moving it to candidates, they did not see the funds to an honest end; rather, "they pocketed it."³⁶ The drafter of the CIA cable may have had his suspicions, and was not enthusiastic about the operation, indeed much less enthusiastic than the lukewarm, perhaps disinterested 303 Committee. He wrote that: "In sum the proposed project appears simple, both in conception and execution. I would maintain that is deceptively simple and that it will come back to haunt us sooner or later."³⁷ This not-so resounding endorsement for the operation is wonderfully dramatic foreshadowing of subsequent operations in Chile.

This dissenting cable appears not to have had any effect on the progress of the operation, and as it proceeded the conflicts and contradictions brought up by the plan continued to flourish. In mid-October, the Chief of Western Hemisphere division was given a memorandum explaining a State Department's paper designed to brief the incoming Nixon administration about the problems relating to Chile. The CIA would have a chance to review this paper a few days later, on October 18th, and (the DDP? DCI?) wanted Western Hemisphere's views and consent on a few issues. First of all, they wished to agree with the State Department that the aim of the entire US policy towards Chile, both overt and covert, was "to keep both the Chilean Presidency and Congress free of Marxist control."³⁸ On the other hand, they disagreed on the aim of the Congressional election operation's intent, contradicting State's (and Western Hemisphere Chief William Broe's) apparent belief that this mission would effect the 1970 Presidential election. First disagreeing with the view that the Christian Democrats could somehow control both houses of the Chilean Congress after the 69 elections, the drafter of the memorandum posited that even "this would not substantially reduce the prospect of a FRAP victory in 1970 (40% FRAP/Radical vote vs. 60% remainder, which split.)".³⁹

³⁴ Interview.

³⁵ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968. The indication that it was priests being used as couriers comes from the CEP interview with Ambassador Korry.

³⁶ Interview.

³⁷ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968.

³⁸ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "State Draft Policy Paper on Chile", 17 October 1968.

³⁹ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "State Draft Policy Paper on Chile", 17 October 1968.

49

Calling into question the suitability of the PDC as the American's choice party in Chile, and the continued American support for them, the memorandum went on to argue that the overall party-outlook of the PDC in terms of the 1970 election was more important than the outcome of the congressional elections. "The point will be made that [the current] strategy runs counter to US objectives," and that this point needed to be made quite clear.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the CIA was directed to still move money to the PDC, in hopes of fortifying that party's moderates, despite the fact that continued support for the Radical Party through the first years of the Frei presidency had not stopped that party from moving to a type of alliance with the FRAP. This left the National Party as the only non-Marxist party in the upcoming election, and Alessandri as the only non-Marxist candidate. So what did the 303 Committee make of all this? "On the negative side...his candidacy would split the democratic, anti-Marxist vote should be a three-way presidential race in 1970 as now seems possible."⁴¹ It was not the pro-FRAP PDC that would be the problem in the 1970 election, but the conservative PN, the only remaining party not to have some designs for an alliance with the FRAP. Old habit dies hard, and the US had been supporting the PDC for a long time.

In preparation for the visit of Ambassador Korry to Washington on November 20th, 1968, for consultations with the White House, as well as with the DCI and C/WHD, the latter sent a cable to Santiago outlining its briefing notes that it planned to go over with the Ambassador. It begins by pointing out that the 69-election operation was never designed to be more than a 'minor' covert part of a total overt US government diplomatic strategy aimed at preventing the rise of Marxist power in Chile. The posture would be to support moderates from all the non-Marxist parties "in absence of a clear-cut choice [of Presidential candidate] for 1970 which is the real test facing the US in Chile."⁴² Developments pointed out in the progress report in early August, however, brought this strategy into question, specifically the fact that the PDC was now under the control of Tomic to a degree that was indisputable and, furthermore, that the support to the Radical Party, which had been going on since 1967, was going to a party that had to be considered "as hostile [to US interests] and in pursuit of an alliance with the FRAP."⁴³ Conversely, Alessandri was now clearly the PN's candidate for the 1970 election, and was exerting influence on them. Western Hemisphere HQ then began to draw its conclusions. First, it said the "election program is now basically [PN]-oriented by virtue of both the preponderance of financial support we will provide...and the propaganda climate." More critically, however, the HQ's cable made one statement that seemed to suggest the unthinkable for Ambassador Korry, for it suggested "We are building what might eventually become a pro-Alessandri machine for 1970."⁴⁴ Worse, the cable did not suggest that this was a bad thing.

⁴⁰ Ibid (17 October).

⁴¹ Memorandum, CWH/D to DCI, "Progress Report: March 69 Chilean Congressional Election, 4 December 1968.

⁴² Cable, C/WHD to Santiago Sta, "In Preparation for Amb's Visit", 14 November 1968.

⁴³ Ibid. (14 Nov 1968)

⁴⁴ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Sta, "In Preparation for Amb's Visit", 14 November 1968.

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To this point, it appears that none of the major players involved in the election
operation—Ambassador, State Department, Santiago Station, CIA WHD, and the 303
Committee—really had a clear idea of what was the unifying aim of the mission. Was it
to prevent a communist dominated congress, or to prevent a communist President?
Would this be achieved by the support of moderates, even when those moderates
belonged to FRAP-associated parties? The Station's rebuttal to the last cable, however,
was not based on these questions but on questions of practicality. The Station did not
agree with HQ's logic, "particularly that our modest Ops machinery could either
influence or significantly benefit possible Alessandri candidacy in 1970." This, the
station argued, was because "both financially and in terms of number of persons involved
[the mission] continues [to] be minor part of total US govt package..."⁴⁵ Their operation
was simply too small for them to be considering the scope of their operation as including
the presidential election. The Station's outlook, by force of resources, was distinctly
short-view. As it filtered its way up the chain-of-command, however, the message
became a bit diluted. Perhaps, as it turned out, the 69 election would not directly effect
the outcome of the presidential election, as was stated in August 1968. Perhaps it had
been mentioned earlier that "the 1969 election might hold the key for 1970"⁴⁶ but really,
the DDP wrote to the DCO, "The program for 1969 was designed to be limited in scope
and flexible in political terms, thus leaving all options open for the 1970 election."⁴⁷ The
Election operation changed colour, if not shape, once again.

The confusion about what was going on in Chile could not have been helped by
the input from Ambassador Korry. It is unclear where Korry truly stood with regards to
his support of the PDC and its leading contender, the left-leaning Tomic. The
aforementioned Mr. Sayre of the State Department had commented in May of 1968 that
"he felt he detected in Korry's correspondence and attitude hostil[ity] to former
Ambassador Tomic" which would be alright in consideration of Tomic's left-wing
views.⁴⁸ The Station perceived the opposite, and mentioned later that year that "There is
a difference in outlook between the Ambassador/Embassy and the Station, the former
being inclined leftward towards the Christian Democrats and Tomic and the latter
inclined right-of-centre towards the nationals and Alessandri." (This disagreement, they
noted, did not impair the Station's "fine relationship with Ambassador Korry."⁴⁹) In the
same month, "The Ambassador...made it abundantly clear that he lines up with President
Frei and the Christian Democrats....he gave the impression that Tomic is out and that a
more moderate candidate...would rise as the party's candidate....the ambassador took
repeated swipes at Alessandri..."⁵⁰ This was despite the fact that the CIA had reported
that the most-likely presidential candidate for the PDC was Tomic, who had in August
ushered in a new directorate composed primarily of Tomic supporters, which had in

⁴⁵ Cable, Santiago Sta to Director. "Station Agrees with HQS Briefing", 18 November 1968.

⁴⁶ Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Mr. Viron Peter Vaky", 6 August 1968.

⁴⁷ Memorandum, DDP to DCI, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry on 20 November 1968", 19 November, 1968.

⁴⁸ Memorandum, INR (William Trueheart) to Messrs. Hughes and Denney, ", 27 May 1968. (State)

⁴⁹ Memorandum, DDP to DCI, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry on 20 November 1968", 19 November, 1968.

⁵⁰ Memorandum for the Record, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry/ Working Lunch", 22 November 1968.

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October formally adopted Tomic's political strategy of an opening to the left.⁵¹ In light of his earlier comments, and this information, the note that "Ambassador Korry has been skilfully trying to perpetuate Communist distrust for Tomic by making it appear as though the US and Tomic have 'an understanding'"⁵² takes on a more conspiratorial tone. Ambassador Korry may not have been 'shooting straight' in all his dealings with the PDC and the CIA, and was perhaps ensuring the continued pre-eminence of JFK's favourite party before a more hostile Republican President Nixon took office. Korry's most recent remarks, in an interview with the Santiago-based think-tank Centro de Estudios Públicos, make his contemporary reports at the time all the more curious. There, in 1998, when asked why the PDC was supported after it had clearly gone to the left under Tomic, Korry responded with: "Why did we [support the PDC] at all? Because if we hadn't done it, the Democratic Congress would have been on my back in two seconds, as having reversed the Kennedy policy, taken it out...."⁵³ Was Korry pressured by some part of the Johnson administration to support Tomic and the PDC? There is no evidence for this, for the 303 Committee seemed untroubled by Chile, and even the State Department were unsure of supporting Tomic. While the contradictory information makes it unclear where Korry stood with regards to Tomic, it can be offered that the former was less than transparent in his dealings with this party. What can be stated with certainty is that these conflicting expressions, from the man who was responsible for the direction of the election effort, did not contribute to the mission in a positive manner.

## Selection of Candidates

Thus, it was with some conflict in aim between the main players in Chile that the election operation pushed on. While the operation had been inaugurated in July, there was little to report until the beginning December, when the parties had finalised their candidate lists (a complex matter under the *D'Hondt* electoral system). While it had been thought, originally, that upwards of 40 candidates would be selected for support, the realities of the Radical Party's communist tendencies, and concerns over some in the PDC, sharply limited the number of suitable candidates.⁵⁴ Thus, in the first week of December 1968, "in full recognition that the election program is a limited one which cannot in any significant way be expected to affect the prospects for 1970, that the Embassy/CIA election team approved ten candidates for support."⁵⁵ Within two weeks an additional five candidates had been added to the list. These fifteen candidates were from all three 'non-Marxist' parties, a list that still included the FRAP-allied Radicals, as well as the PDC and the conservative National Party. While the number of candidates from each party has not been released, it is firmly recorded that these fifteen candidates

⁵¹ Memorandum, C/WHD to DCI, "Progress Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 4 December 1968.

⁵² Memorandum, DDP to DCI, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry on 20 November 1968", 19 November, 1968.

⁵³ *Estudios Públicos*, 72 (primavera 1998). "El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP", p. 19.

⁵⁴ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC).

⁵⁵ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Progress Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 5 December 1968. *Italics Added*. (NSC)

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were moderates for whom additional covert support might make the difference between election and defeat.⁵⁶ Additional moneys were spent on propaganda to support the moderate candidates, and in support of the dissident USP in a vote-stealing endeavour—indeed, they would ultimately provide the splinter USP with up to one half of their campaign budget.⁵⁷ By December 26th, the election team had spent roughly one half of the approved total funding for the operation, or $175,000.⁵⁸ (This was, in an important foreshadow, the first briefing that Kissinger received on the topic of the US operation in Chile. It is also interesting to note that at this point, the DDP considered the election effort to be on the 'A-list' for having the highest "flap-potential" amongst all the CIA's covert operations at the time.⁵⁹) It would be unlikely if they found any more candidates than the fifteen (which were spread between the 150 Deputies and 30 of 50 Senate seats open for election) as the Station election team was having a hard time keeping grips on the political upheavals in Chile, and in the PDC specifically. The COS apologised that his reporting was "bereft of all insight" for "a significant section of the spectrum of events no longer registers on our [Deleted: 1 word] radar screen. To substitute speculation where facts are unobtainable strikes us as dangerous practice."⁶⁰ The Station's fifteen candidates, trimmed down to 12 by February,⁶¹ represented a small knot of moderate politicians within a much larger and very confusing political scene the Americans were grappling to understand. Through most of January and February 1969, there is little further traffic between Santiago Station and Langley: it is impossible to determine whether this is due to continued classification of these documents, or an actual lull in communications. Informed speculation might indicate a drop of communications volume after the candidates had been chosen and the campaigns begun, but this can only remain speculation.

## Propaganda Production:

Throughout the entire period of the political analysis and candidate evaluation the CIA was in fact carrying on an operation independent of the individual candidates, if united in general aim. This mission, directed at the production of propaganda for the Station, was also the only operation undertaken by the CIA in this period that had any continuity with previous CIA actions in Chile. While the CIA had ceased to support any party but the Radicals in the period after the 1964 PDC victory, they had carried on in the production of certain propaganda, albeit at a low level. Several cables and memorandum show the existence of propaganda efforts covering "anti-Communist...activities, mainly in the form of wall posters, leaflet campaigns and other similar street actions" dating back

⁵⁶ Memorandum, "Briefing Memorandum for Mr. [Deleted]", 17 December 1968.

⁵⁷ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

⁵⁸ Memorandum, "Chile: March 1969 Congressional Election" (Hand written: "Memo to DCI to Brief Kissinger"), 26 December 1968.

⁵⁹ Memorandum, [Deleted] to C/WHD, "Covert Action Activities to be Covered...for Mr. Kissinger.", 19 December 1968.

⁶⁰ Dispatch, COS Santiago to C/WHD, "For Reasons Too Complex", 6 January 1969.

⁶¹ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Summary of Chilean Congressional Election Operation", 4 March 1969. The exact date that three of the candidates for support were dropped is not listed in the material.

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to the 1967 fiscal year and before.⁶² That this propaganda was considered important is made clear by developments through the 69-election mission: by the end of 1968, the CIA was noting that propaganda rather than selective support had become the primary thrust of the election operation.⁶³ The examination of this propaganda effort becomes interesting in light of the fact that it began as a separate effort, but was soon rolled into the programme of selective support. Of all its operations, the CIA holds its cards closest on those dealing with media and propaganda. For understandable reasons, the CIA does not want to have the reputation of being able to warp facts and sully the 'truth', nor does it want its particular methods and mechanisms known: there is a visibly higher degree of deletions from those CIA cables dealing with propaganda than those that deal with, say, political analysis of parties or their methods of supporting candidates. Evidently, the CIA considers well-placed propaganda to have a significant 'force multiplying' effect on its target audience. Accordingly, propaganda took a major role in the 69-election campaign that, as is noted, grew as the operation progressed. The propaganda mechanism developed for the 1968 fiscal year—which coincides with the beginning of the selective-support election mechanism—was a more sophisticated operation in organisation, production, and scope.

If propaganda became a very important aspect of the election operation, it did so in sharing the confusion in mission of the greater project. One can detect a slight confusion in direct *intent* of the mission, and several different explanations of it are given in cables. Overall, one cable says, the aim of the CIA's propaganda efforts was to promote moderate politics amongst "the leadership class and the opinion moulders."⁶⁴ Alternately, it was explained that the main thrust of the Station's "broad spectrum propaganda is plea to independent voter to exercise his vote...subsidiary function [is to] provide guidance to the uncommitted voter on how to choose among candidates the one best qualified to help steer Chile on course of moderation, eschewing summons to class warfare which in long run bound to lead to alteration of existing constitutional order."⁶⁵ Alternately, one could believe the cable that asserted "The propaganda woven into the daily radio news casts is designed to influence those vocal groups—public and private—which play a role in the political process of the country. Over the long run and aiming particularly at the Congressional election of 1969 and the Presidential election of 1970, the purpose is to [one line deleted]...to discourage an alliance of the democratic opposition to the Government with the FRAP."⁶⁶ One might take as the CIA's propaganda mission the statement of another cable, which believed that:

> By promoting an anti-communist climate, the objective is to curb growing radical tendencies among the Chilean populace and, more specifically, to create tensions between the Government and the Soviet Bloc representation in Chile...⁶⁷

⁶² Memorandum, Acting Chief, WH/[Deleted] to C/WHD, "Termination of Project", 23 April 1969.

⁶³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Sta, "In preparation for Amb's Visit", 14 November 1968.

⁶⁴ Memorandum, CIA, "Propaganda Production", 12 March 1968.

⁶⁵ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 Feb 1969.

⁶⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 Mar 1968.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968.

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Lastly, one might take the mission to be as stated later on in the operation, in February
1969, which was a "plea to independent voter to exercise his vote and counteract present
state of lethargy (aggravated by distractions of summer vacation period) and repugnance
at Chile's party system as a whole."⁶⁸ The impact of this confusion may have been to
diffuse the effectiveness and focus of the messages that the CIA was trying to
disseminate, though some additional focus may have been given by the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in late August of 1968, thus providing a touchstone for materials aimed
at the doctrinaire, Moscow- and Havana-oriented Communist and Socialist parties.

If there was a slightly confused mission, however, this did not affect the crisp
functioning of the propaganda mechanism itself, as opposed to the message. In March of
1968, a full year before the election and months before the CIA's election mechanism
was brought into action, the Station in Santiago had established a 'propaganda workshop'
aimed at disseminating Station produced propaganda through all mass media
instruments.⁶⁹ This 'workshop', of unknown scale, was needed to meet the large amount
of propaganda demanded by the Station's media operations. The cost of the workshop is
also a guess. We know from other cables that a perhaps significant portion of the
$350,000 earmarked for the operation was going to 'media operations.'⁷⁰ We also know,
however, that none of this money was expended until sometime after mid-August,
meaning that the propaganda effort running until this time was operating on a much
smaller budget.⁷¹ Regardless, the propaganda machinery seems to have been very highly
developed. One memorandum reported that "Agency-prepared news-items and editorials
are inserted daily in the programs of [deleted: one word] radio networks. These comprise
some [deleted: one word] radio stations (of the 126 operating in Chile)" and that this
coverage reached the majority of the Chilean working class, who derived most of their
information from the radio.⁷² The Station also sponsored some programs directly, feeling
that these were sufficiently anti-Communist. In general, the propaganda attacked "the
nature of communism, PCCh attempts to subvert and/or divide other parties...and
implications of Czech invasion...", a very exploitable example of Communist aggression,
they believed. Furthermore, as with the selective-support actions, it was thought that the
"propaganda benefits moderates in PDC, PR, and PN without stressing support for any
one party." Yet, it was noted that "Propaganda must... be selective and sharp hitting
rather than massive because of limited amount of funds..."⁷³ The Station believed it was
handicapped by the election mechanism, which barred them from cooperation with any
political party, leaving them with an absence of "non-affiliated political mechanisms to
which propaganda can be attributed."⁷⁴ Some tailor-made propaganda, however, was
produced for the usage of the chosen candidates.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 February 1969

⁶⁹ Memorandum, "Project [Deleted]", 12 March 1968.

⁷⁰ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval of Project," 13 August 1968.

⁷¹ Cable, Santiago COS to DDP, "As Required by the 303 Committee", 14 August, 1968.

⁷² Memorandum,

⁷³ Cable, Santiago COS to DDP, "Station Agrees with HQs Briefing", 18 November 1968.

⁷⁴ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 February 1969

⁷⁵ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC).

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While significant paper was generated by this propaganda effort—sadly, the total number of articles placed is removed—a seemingly failed excision tells us the amount of money being spent on this propaganda effort. The sum is remarkably modest. From an initial funding approval in April of 1968,⁷⁶ an unknown increase was granted bringing the total to $16,780.⁷⁷ A parallel project, which supported “individual propaganda assets”⁷⁸ received an increase to bring its total funds to the lofty heights of $8,050.⁷⁹ (These were below the awareness of the 303-Committee, which by an unwritten rule only judged activities with budgets over $25,000.⁸⁰) While it is difficult to determine precisely, this project was most likely supporting an individual or individuals, most likely known freelance journalists or correspondents, who were placing propaganda onto a wire service for general usage. Numerous statements, describing the how and where the Station’s product was carried, back up this guess.⁸¹

A fairly clear picture emerges of the CIA's propaganda mechanism, though some conjecture is required. Desirous of producing a wide-scale propaganda campaign, the CIA established a 'workshop' that wrote articles and general editorial pieces for all three media (TV, print, radio). Simultaneously, the CIA maintained several correspondents, editors or free-lance journalists as its own media 'stringers' (these paid for by the two smaller operational funds). These media assets would then take the CIA media product (and, presumably, money) and place the pieces on a wire service for pick up by unwitting media outlets throughout Chile. Others would place it in editorial pages of papers and magazines as their own work, or place it over the airwaves via radio (and in TV, to a much lesser extent). Still again, articles could be seeded into foreign journals or news services controlled by the CIA, with the knowledge that CIA media assets could pick up these stories with full credibility. They could, the CIA notes proudly, even seed American propaganda through Communist press services, an operation technique that they thought added much credibility to their product.⁸² William Broe noted in a cable that since the CIA's propaganda product was 'salted' into material from other sources and carried as straight news rather than rightist propaganda, and "it does not usually draw any measurable or heated response."⁸³

CIA propaganda did make it on to the media in a widespread fashion, and we have CIA assurances that it was effective. Indeed, Miguel Otero's comments about the visibility of CIA propaganda show that it may have been fairly effective, if subtle. Otero noted "I didn't really see anti-Communist propaganda. That was made mostly through the TV, or the panels, or the radio, or people that were speaking in a forum or something like that. But that you would see on pamphlets or posters, against the communists...I

⁷⁶ Cable, Santiago COS to C/WHD, "Request Amendment", 31 May 1968.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Amendment to Station Santiago's Project", 29 May 1968.

⁷⁸ Memorandum, to C/WHD, "FY 1969 Renewal", 22 April 1968.

⁷⁹ Project Approval Notification, C/WHD Authority, 5 August 1968.

⁸⁰ Leary, p. 82.

⁸¹ Memorandum, William V. Broe to [Unknown], "Thematic and Effectiveness Data", 23 May 1968.

⁸² Memorandum, Unknown to Unknown, "Renewal of Project [deleted] (WH/Chile)", 3 March 1969.

⁸³ Memorandum, William Broe to [Unknown], "Thematic and Effectiveness Data", 23 May 1968.

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don't recall. There might have been, but I don't recall that it was important."⁸⁴ Overt, over-the-top anti-communist poster campaigns or pamphlets would have been clumsy and transparently American, as noted by Labarca's comments about the 'obviousness' of American propaganda in the 64 Presidential campaign. Television, print, and especially radio placement of articles critical of the communists would have been much more effective in the Chilean context of an advanced media environment—though this didn't stop the Americans from believing that they were better at producing their favourite "anti-Communist posters which darkly predict" the bleak results of a communist victory.⁸⁵ Regardless, close monitoring by the CIA team led them to congratulate themselves for a job well done, as their material was being "skilfully used, and the finished product compares favourably with material deriving from the international news services with which the items are frequently interwoven."⁸⁶ The Station was even able to produce in Washington "voluminous samples" of all the articles and broadcasts that it had originated.⁸⁷ As the cables note, however, the true impact of this propaganda campaign can never been determined: Chile had no established polling organisations, the CIA itself could not conduct scientific polling and, most importantly, they lacked information on public opinion outside of Santiago.⁸⁸ The subsequent un-answerable question is whether propaganda was the best use of the money granted the CIA for the congressional election mission.

## Election Results & Plans for 1970

On March 2, 1969, the Chilean electorate went to the polls and the result was, at least initially, pleasing to the CIA and those concerned in Washington. "According to initial reports" said a State Department memorandum, "the congressional election operation in Chile has been successfully executed." The report when on to state that ten of the twelve candidates supported had been elected, but most significantly the breakaway United Socialist Party, which the CIA had cleverly supported, polled 52,000 votes and had thus deprived the regular Socialist Party (PS) of about seven congressional seats, all of which were won by PDC or the PN, save one to the PR.⁸⁹ Clearly the operation had achieved its aims for, depending on one's methods of accounting, 17 seats had been denied to the Marxist parties. This was good news, many believed, and the congratulations were cabled from party to party. One cable comes from Ambassador Korry to the DCI, thanking him for the hard word of the CIA officers in Santiago. He congratulates the CIA, and comments that this small operation had an outstanding effect on the political climate in Chile. The ambassador wrote:

⁸⁴ Otero.
⁸⁵ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 February 1969
⁸⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968.
⁸⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Project Renewal for FY 1970", 20 February 1969.
⁸⁸ Memorandum, Unknown to Unknown, "Renewal of Project [deleted] (WH/Chile)", 3 March 1969.
⁸⁹ Memorandum for the Record, "The Chilean Congressional Election of 2 March 1969", 4 March 1969. (Marginal Ink Annotation: 'Acc@#980643000012, Safe A-2, Drawer Box 19'). See also Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

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I would appreciate the 303 Committee being informed of my great appreciation for the excellent contributions to US goals in Chile by the first rate contribution of the COS and his colleagues...I am persuaded that we had a maximum impact in electoral terms for modest resources employed and that we benefited greatly from carefully selected multiplying-effect choices...⁹⁰

Not everyone believed that the operation should be celebrating its success. If the missions' stated aim had been to support a political climate of moderates for the 1970 election campaign, or to act as a 'break' on any popular front leader elected in 1970, then it was not as successful as some thought.⁹¹ A document submitted to the 303 Committee noted that the CIA thought their operation had been a limited one—it did not spend its entire $350,000 budget⁹²—which had achieved limited objectives, and could not be celebrated as a major victory over the forces of Marxism.⁹³ In the post-election wrap-up, even Korry was shocked into admitting that “the Chilean Right, born by a resurgent wind of Alessandrism, rose...to a strong vote that cut deeply into the strength of President Frei’s Christian Democratic Party.” While the PDC was still the largest vote getter, Korry admitted, “the facts remain that is has suffered a grave defeat.”⁹⁴ The 303 Committee, in a rare burst of attention to Chile, produced a direr verdict on the operation. The minutes of the meeting record:

> In the total picture, however, it should be realised that Chile's political moderates suffered a clear setback in the 2 March 1969 elections. What happened was a movement toward political polarization with the conservative right and the Marxist left coming out the greatest beneficiaries. In the present political climate the Communist-Socialist front would stand perhaps an even chance of victory for the presidency.⁹⁵

This reality seems to have caught up with the Ambassador. Speaking to the CEP in Santiago in 1998, Korry had changed his opinion from his on-the-record celebration of the mission of the operation in a dramatic way. When asked to elaborate on the process and success of the election operation, Korry expresses doubt about the effectiveness of the operation overall:

> ...we did the minimal that would hurt and was targeted very specifically not at any one party, but to where possible a little amount of money would defeat a Unidad Popular candidate.

So it went to all sorts of candidates of all persuasions, not many of them, it had a so-so effect, we never will know whether it had any effect.

⁹⁰ Cable, Ambassador Korry to DCI, 7 March 1969.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

⁹³ Memorandum, Proposed Agenda, Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 April 1969. (NSC)

⁹⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to Director, "The Chilean Right", 3 March 1969.

⁹⁵ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

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But some of the people we supported did get elected, some of the people we opposed did not get elected, and the total of that was minimal, because with a hundred, say a hundred and fifty thousand dollars to spread among twenty or thirty people, it can't be very much, not even in this country, and moreover not one candidate knew he got it. It was delivered by priests, I don't know who, by all sorts of people.⁹⁶

Eight months of CIA work, and close to a third of a million dollars spent, thus was productive to a degree that no one can measure with any degree of certainty. The congressional election operation mechanism, it turned out, would not be maintained. When the COS in Santiago requested a renewal of budget and permission to look for new contacts to effect the upcoming presidential election—itself now 8 months away—he was rebuffed. A cable from Langley stated: "While we appreciate the reasons to project operational thinking and planning beyond 2 March 1969, it is felt that it would be best to wait for the results and the post-election assessment before taking any action which might imply [Deletion: 1 word. 'USG'?] commitment to a [deletion: 1 word]-type undertaking in 1970." The COS was free to keep up his contacts, but had no funding for further operations until a new operation mandate was given.⁹⁷

## Too Little Too Late?

When taken together, the propaganda effort and the assistance provided to moderate candidates provide an interesting if confusing image. What, precisely, was the American goal in both of these operations? What was the overarching *intent*? And what end-state was envisaged? The trouble with the 1968 operation is that there was no unifying political control over the effort. While the mission was important enough for the CIA to give it 'A' listing for 'flap potential,' it was basically not considered to be an important mission from the point of view of the policy makers. This is not to say that they did not give it their proper intention. Quite to the contrary, they took bi-monthly reports on the mission. Yet, there is no evidence of direction being given to the CIA or the State Department (and so to the ambassador) about what the executive branch of government hoped to get for the $350,000 they were willing to expend. One might say that the goal was 'to keep the communists from power' but this does not fully qualify as a mission. While all parties implicitly understood that the ultimate goal was to keep the FRAP-candidate from winning the 1970 presidential election—numerous documents cite this as the reason for starting the 1969 election operation—at no point does any higher authority explain how the smaller operation will link with the bigger intent. Ultimately, we see that the operation cannot possibly help the process of the 1970 election; it is simply too small and too restricted. This left each organisation, primarily in this case the Ambassador and the CIA Country Team, to situate the mission as they felt best. In failing to provide direction the 303 Committee, which was apparently (and appropriately) more concerned with affairs in Vietnam, as well as the Soviet invasion of

⁹⁶ *Estudios Públicos*, 72 (primavera 1998). "El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP", p. 19.
⁹⁷ Cable, C/WHD to COS Santiago, 19 February 1969.

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Czechoslovakia, dropped the ball.⁹⁸ The result was eight months wasted in supporting a party—the PDC—that the CIA thought was communist, while it could have been eight months spent supporting the pro-American PN under Alessandri, who in any case everyone but Ambassador Korry thought was the most likely candidate to win the upcoming presidential election. Had the executive promulgated a clear objective, a mission clearly attached to a greater US foreign policy goal, the mission would either have been fully resourced and more successful; or it would not have been carried out at all, for lack of any ability to alter circumstances.

Politics clearly effected the execution of the mission. The PDC had been a darling of JFK and the Democratic Party, and the current Democratic administration was loath to give up on its old stand-by of non-communist reform. This despite the fact that the PDC was coming closer and closed to the communist left, while the favourite but lame-duck President Frei was unable to influence his party. The State Department was still committed to its policy of propping-up the moderates, long after the moderates in Chile had gotten off the fence and chosen sides. No one, for some reason, was willing to support the only party that was actually pro-American, Jorge Alessandri. Meanwhile, the CIA, unable to push a coordinated agenda of what it wanted to do, and without a clear mandate or mission, was left by want of alternative running a small mission with a small aim, while bigger concerns were left unanswered. As Chilean historian Joaquin Fernandois has stated, "Korry insisted on very attentive observation (and intervention) in Chile, and the CIA assisted him discreetly, but the CIA still undertook operations that Korry believed were absurd. On the other hand, the State Department considered the threat minimal, and thought that Korry was living too much in the spirit of the 'Cold War.'"⁹⁹ This is perhaps too simple a view of things. Korry was clearly, at this point, not working in a Cold War paradigm. More accurately, he was working in the paradigm of US party politics. Throughout the whole mission he seemed reluctant to abandon the PDC, the Chilean avatar of the US Democrat Party that was his home. This loyalty continued after it was clear that the PDC was not the pro-US reformist organisation it had previously been. Korry actually favoured a pro-Marxist party, hardly the actions of a cold Warrior as commonly depicted. Indeed, there needs to be a clear reappraisal of Korry's actions throughout his tenure as ambassador in light of his unwavering support for the PDC.

One may judge the wisdom of this operation by different standards. First, one might argue that it was too little too late. Support to a dozen candidates, most of whom were successful, might be considered a great success if one could judge for certain that they would have failed without the support. But with a maximum outlay of $30,000 per candidate, and apparently rarely in cash, it is uncertain whether these funds really contributed to their success, especially to a party (the PDC) which already had a plentiful election coffer in the millions.¹⁰⁰ In retrospect, did these ten candidates make a difference? The other view one may take is that in their assistance to the congressional

⁹⁸

⁹⁹ Fermandois, *Chile Y El Mundo 1970-1973*, p. 285.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Summary of Chilean Congressional Election Operation." 4 March 1969.

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election, the CIA were 'cutting off their nose to spite their face' in that they continued to focus on the PDC as the main alternative to the Communist-Socialist front, ignoring the fact that in the upcoming Presidential election the PDC candidate would most likely have been inimical to US interests had he won, but more importantly that the continued strength of the PDC stripped support not from the Communist-Socialist bloc, but from the only candidate likely to defeat that organisation: Alessandri and his Partido Nacional. Instead of supporting a Right versus Left campaign, the US actually funded a Centre versus Right fight.

The choice between these views is one that requires one to judge the prescience of the CIA and State Department, and their motives for support in the first place. In the NSC's final report on the topic there is a hint of realisation that what the CIA had actually achieved was minimal, and showed an awareness of the erosion of any moderate position in Chilean politics. This erosion is the critical misinterpretation of the political scene in Chile. The CIA clearly understood that the PDC had drifted left, and they knew that the party mechanism was in the hands of pro-Marxists. Likewise, they knew that the PN was the party most likely to defeat the FRAP in any upcoming election. So the short-term goal of electing moderates to the congress made sense, but not in the long-term where the PN was the only party that stood a chance of defeating the Marxists in a Presidential election. By favouring the middle ground, the US was stealing potential support from the one party able to achieve the longer-term goal of keeping a Marxist president from office. In view of the political climate and direction of the time, the better choice would have been to provide strong support to the most important party for the US in the long-term, and that was the PN. Old party loyalties, and an ambassador that could not bury his bias, prevented this from happening.

Timeline

<table><thead><tr><td>Date</td><td>Event</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>24 May 1968</td><td>First CIA / State Meeting about Congressional Election</td></tr><tr><td>12 July 1968</td><td>303 Approval of election program</td></tr><tr><td>3 September 1968</td><td>First progress report. No candidates selected</td></tr><tr><td>5 December 1968</td><td>First ten candidates selected</td></tr><tr><td>27 December 1968</td><td>Second progress report. Half of $350,000 budget expended</td></tr><tr><td>12 February 1969</td><td>Final slate of 12 candidates for support.</td></tr><tr><td>2 March 1969</td><td>Election. Ten of the selected candidates win their seats, a further 7 Socialist Party seats denied by splinter party.</td></tr></tbody></table>