D/A PAMPHLET No. 20-255

## THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN POLAND (1939)

The German attack on Poland precipitated World War II, making the Polish campaign of particular significance. The lessons learned by the German Army in Poland were put to use later against the Western Allies, the Balkan states and the Soviet Union. Poland also formed the testing ground for new theories on the use of armored forces and close air support of ground troops. The complete destruction of the Polish state and the removal of Poland from the map of Eastern Europe were grim portents of the fate of the vanquished in the new concept of total war.

$2.00

D/A PAMPHLET No. 20-244

## THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT 1941-44

The purpose of this text is to provide the Army with a factual account of the organization and operations of the Soviet resistance movement behind the German forces on the Eastern Front during World War II. This movement offers a particularly valuable case study, for it can be viewed both in relation to the German occupation in the Soviet Union and to the offensive and defensive operations of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army.

The scope of the study includes an over-all picture of a quasi-military organization in relation to a larger conflict between two armies.

$2.25

D/A PAMPHLET No. 20-261a

## THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA-PLANNING AND OPERATIONS (1940-1942)

Clausewitz observed of Russia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Russia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the student will realize how dearly the Germans paid for ignoring Clausewitz's advice.

This study describes German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. It starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends with the battle for Stalingrad.

$1.25

D/A PAMPHLET No. 20-212

## HISTORY OF MILITARY MOBILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 1775-1945

Mobilization is the assembling and organizing of troops, matériel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or other national emergency; it is the basic factor on which depends the successful prosecution of any war. The purpose of this study is to provide staff officers, students at Army schools and other interested persons with usable and detailed information on the procedures of past mobilizations and the lessons learned. It is hoped that errors of previous wars may be avoided by this account of mobilization in the United States Army.

$3.75

The United States
Armor Association

(Established 1885)

President

GENERAL WILLARD G. WYMAN

Honorary President

MAJOR GENERAL GUY V. HENRY, Ret.

Vice Presidents

MAJ. GEN. DONALD W. McGOWAN, NG

MAJ. GEN. JOHN L. RYAN, JR.

MAJ. GEN. WM. M. STOKES, JR., USAR

Honorary Vice Presidents

GEN. JACOB L. DEVERS, Ret.

GEN. WILLISTON B. PALMER

LT. GEN. EDWARD H. BROOKS, Ret.

LT. GEN. JOHN H. COLLIER

LT. GEN. WILLIS D. CRITTENBERGER, Ret.

LT. GEN. HOBART R. GAY, Ret.

LT. GEN. ALVAN C. GILLEM, JR., Ret.

LT. GEN. GEOFFREY KEYES, Ret.

MAJ. GEN. ERNEST N. HARMON, Ret.

MAJ. GEN. JOHN C. MACDONALD, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. SIDNEY R. HINDS, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. WILLARD A. HOLBROOK, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. HENRY CABOT LODGE, USAR

BRIG. GEN. PAUL M. ROBINETT, Ret.

BRIG. GEN. HARRY H. SEMMES, Ret.

Secretary-Treasurer

LT. COL. WILLIAM H. ZIERDT, JR.

Executive Council

LT. GENERAL GEORGE W. READ, JR.

MAJ. GEN. L. L. DOAN

MAJ. GEN. HOMER O. EATON, JR., NG

MAJ. GEN. EDWARD G. FARRAND

MAJ. GEN. H. H. HOWZE

MAJ. GEN. ALBERT S. JOHNSON, NG

MAJ. GEN. W. P. JOHNSON

MAJ. GEN. PAUL M. JORDAN, NG

MAJ. GEN. ANDREW P. O'MEARA

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT W. PORTER, JR.

MAJ. GEN. PATRICK E. SEAWRIGHT, NG

MAJ. GEN. ALBERT H. STACKPOLE, USAR

MAJ. GEN. EDWARD O. WOLF, NG

BRIG. GEN. CREIGHTON W. ABRAMS

BRIG. GEN. FRANK H. BRITTON

BRIG. GEN. JAMES I. KING

BRIG. GEN. GEORGE R. MATHER

BRIG. GEN. ALMERIN C. O'HARA, NG

COL. F. W. BOYE

COL. ANDREW J. BOYLE

COL. JAMES H. CRITCHFIELD, USAR

COL. SAMUEL MCC. GOODWIN

COL. WALTER S. SCHLOTZHAUER, JR.

COL. HOWARD SNYDER

ARMOR

The Magazine of Mobile Warfare

Continuation of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

EDITOR

Lt. Col. William H. Zierdt, Jr.

BUSINESS MANAGER

M Sgt J. William Joseph

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITOR

Sfc Michael E. Kekker

CIRCULATION MANAGER

M Sgt William Coley, Jr.

Volume LXVI

JULY-AUGUST, 1957

No. 4

CONTENTS

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 2

THE CREATING OF SUPERIOR UNITS 4
By Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke

IN REPLY TO A RESOLUTION 7

THE RELATION BETWEEN FORCE AND DIPLOMACY 8
By Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

BASIC FORMATION TANK PLATOON 11
By First Lieutenant Alexander P. Dyer, Jr.

RESUPPLY OF AN ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT 14
By Major Lowell O. Nutting

SPOTLIGHT ON ARMOR 17
By Captain William T. Mahaffey

QUALITY MANPOWER AND THE MODERN ARMY 22
By Major Roy Moore, Jr.

RECONNOITERING 24

ORDNANCE ACTIVITIES AT VILSEECK 26
By Sergeant Author W. House

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS OF 1957 ARMOR GRADUATES 29

OPERATION BILGE WATER 30
By Captain Thomas W. Bowen

THE 2D ARMORED CAVALRY: A Pictorial Feature 32

THE KEY—MOBILITY 34
By Lieutenant Colonel W. F. Frank

MINIATURE TANK TARGET FIRING RANGE 40
By Colonel Thomas O. Blakeney

U. S. ARMOR ASSOCIATION AWARD 43

EXPERIENCE KEEPS A DEAR SCHOOL 44

NEWS NOTES 46

OUTSTANDING SENIOR 1957 ARMOR ROTC CADETS 50

HOW WOULD YOU DO IT? 51
A US Army Armor School Presentation

FROM THESE PAGES 53

NEWS FROM THE US ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL 54

THE BOOK SECTION 56

GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN: Shield of the Union 56
Reviewed by Colonel John M. Virden, USAF, Retired

ARMOR magazine is published under the auspices of the United States Armor Association, and is not an official publication. Contributions appearing herein do not necessarily reflect official thought or indorsement. Articles appearing in this publication represent the personal views of the author and are published to stimulate interest in, provoke thought on, and provide an open forum for decorous discussion of military affairs.

Publication and editorial offices: 1757 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Copyright 1957, by the United States Armor Association.
Second-class mail privileges authorized at Washington, D. C.; additional entry at Richmond, Va. Terms: Domestic subscriptions, including APO's, $4.75—one year and $8.00—two years. Foreign, including Canada & Pan America, $5.50—one year and $10.00—two years.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Tanker's Hat

Dear Sir:

I have read with interest several letters concerning the loss of the former distinctive uniform for tankers. I have just read Major Leach's article concerning the Armored Force cap, and fully agree that it should be retained and worn tilted to the left as was previously done.

I also firmly believe that the return of coveralls, the tanker's field uniform (especially the jacket), and the tank boots would not only be good for esprit but would be more practical than the usual issue uniform. The old tanker jacket was warmer and was more practical for a tank crewman than the M43 field jacket. And the winter cap couldn't be topped for warmth and comfort by any other issue field cap (especially by the present winter field caps). The pre WWII type coveralls were neat looking and practical and when worn with the Armored Force overseas cap of HBT material made for a very snappy appearance.

I also believe the armor shoulder patch should have been retained for separate Tank Battalions, etc. The wearing of an army shoulder patch tends to identify the wearer as a member of some rear area service unit rather than as one of a proud armor unit.

Let's tilt the caps to the left, and bring back the tanker combat jacket, and the coveralls, etc. Tankers have pride.

CAPTAIN VIRGIL M. GORDON

148th Tank Company
Ohio National Guard
Port Clinton, Ohio

* Please see the resolution in the Secretary's report of this year's Annual Meeting in the May-June issue. Also the reply from the Chief of Staff in this issue. Ed.

ROTC Awards Stimulate
Competition

Dear Sir:

Thank you for the membership card and books for our honor Armor graduate, Mr. Thomas N. Sess.

Mr. Sess has forwarded the completed application blank to your office. His membership in the U. S. Armor Association and the two books awarded to him will be presented at a suitable ceremony.

The U. S. Armor Association is performing an excellent service for out-

standing ROTC graduates choosing Armor. I am sure that your acceptance of the nomination of Mr. Sess will stimulate future competition at this University.

COLONEL CARL T. SCHMIDT

PMS&T

University of California
Berkeley 4, California

* This is one of several letters received from PMS&Ts at institutions instructing in the General Military Science Course. We intend to repeat this practice each year and hope that more colleges and universities will contact us. We also believe that in some small way we are assisting our Army representatives in their important public relations work. Ed.

A Command Vehicle

Dear Sir:

Major Moore's article on the inclusion of a specialized command vehicle in the tank platoon can only meet with sympathy from platoon and troop commanders of all nations.

It is absolutely true that the task of controlling two separate sub-units and one's own mount is too great for efficiency. There is, however, a bigger disadvantage still, to be found in Major Moore's own suggestion. If a platoon consists of six identical fighting vehicles and a radically different vehicle, with lesser powers of self-defense, it is a foregone conclusion that once the

enemy finds out what that vehicle's function is, a lot of our platoons will have to operate without any commander at all. Or, rather, command of the platoon will go to the next senior rank who will be mounted in a tank. Anyone who has taken off his rank badges because of snipers, and plenty of us have, will confirm this.

If this is in fact so, only one other course is open, reduce the size of the platoon. A platoon of four tanks enables two to move while two support from hull defilade positions. This provides a 100% reserve in case of tank losses before the ultimate minimum tactical element of two tanks; one firing, one moving, is reached. Otherwise, the present British organization could be used, in which the troop (our platoon—Ed.) consists of 3 tanks, commanded by a junior officer, a sergeant, and a corporal respectively. This corresponds to the proposed tank section, and the chain of control is squadron/troop/tank instead of the proposed company/platoon/section/tank, thus removing one link in the chain, and shifting the main burden of command to a more senior, and therefore more highly qualified officer.

However, if Major Moore can answer my original criticism, or if a reduction in tank size and alteration in design makes it possible for the command vehicle to pass as a tank, I shall be the first to applaud, as history shows us repeatedly that efficiency of command is 95% of the victory.

PHILIP BARKER

99 Brentford Road

Kings Heath, Birmingham 14, England

Heritage and Traditions Encourage
Reenlistments

Dear Sir:

I enjoy your *Letters to the Editor* section. It gives me a pretty good comparison of my ideas and those of my con-

ARMOR is published bimonthly by the United States Armor Association.

Copyright: ARMOR is copyrighted 1957 by the United States Armor Association.

Reprint Rights: All Rights Reserved.

**Advertising:** ARMOR is the professional magazine of the United States Armor Association; a nonprofit, noncommercial educational publication. We DO NOT accept paid advertising. Such advertising as does appear in ARMOR is carefully selected by the Editor and concerns only those items which may be considered an adjunct to a professional career.

**Manuscripts:** All content of Armor is contributed without pay by those interested in furthering the professional qualification of members of the Armed Services. All manuscripts should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 1757 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

**Change of Address:** All changes of address should be sent to the Editorial Office in time to arrive at least weeks in advance of publication date of each issue, which is the 25th day of the even month of the year: i.e., Dec. 25 for Jan-Feb issue, Feb 25 for the Mar-Apr issue, etc.

**Rates:** See bottom of contents page.

2

ARMOR—July-August, 1957

In Reply to a Resolution

At our 68th Annual Meeting, during the business session, a Resolution was proposed and unanimously passed by the members present to advocate the wearing of the Garrison cap on the left side of the head as a badge of distinction among Armor personnel. At the same time the Secretary was directed to forward a copy of this resolution to the Chief of Staff of the Army. This was accomplished by letter on the 18th of April. The reply from the Chief of Staff to our Resolution appears below.

UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

29 April 1957

Dear Colonel Zierdt:

Thank you for your letter of 18 April transmitting the resolution of the Armor Association advocating the wearing of the garrison cap in a distinctive manner by Armor personnel.

I fully share the desire of the Armor Association to preserve and foster the spirit and tradition of Armor in the United States Army. Moreover, I recognize that the wearing of the garrison cap tilted on the left side of the head was considered the prerogative of Armor personnel for several years and contributed in some degree to Armor esprit. However, I believe that the advantages of standardized uniform wear by all of the arms and services outweigh the gain in Armor branch morale that might result from the adoption of your proposal. This is especially true in view of the existing distinctive devices which are now available -- branch insignia, branch colors, guidons and the like -- which coupled with the outstanding history and traditions of Armor provide a substantial basis for a high state of Armor esprit.

Although I cannot agree with this particular suggestion by the Armor Association, I sincerely appreciate the continued interest in the Army expressed by your organization. Needless to say, I shall welcome future suggestions and you may be sure they will receive careful consideration.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Lieutenant Colonel William H. Zierdt, Jr.
Secretary-Treasurer
The United States Armor Association
1757 K Street, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

ARMOR—July-August, 1957

7

The article on the next three pages was extracted from a speech made by the author before the National Military-Industrial Conference held in Chicago on the 14th of March. Force and diplomacy are so intertwined that they cannot be delineated and treated separately. Hence we, in the military, must be conversant on both subjects to understand our profession.

# THE RELATION BETWEEN FORCE AND DIPLOMACY

By DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE subject to which I would like to address myself is the relation between force and diplomacy. It is perhaps the most important problem we are facing today, because power by itself is meaningless unless we can use it in the disputes with which we are likely to be confronted. And diplomacy by itself cannot be effective unless we know what transformations we are willing to resist and unless our opponents know what pressures we will be willing to bring to bear. Throughout history force and diplomacy have been closely related. Because of our past of an uninterrupted domestic development, we like to think that all disputes are settled by reasonable argument, and that men of good will sitting around a conference table can resolve all disagreements. I would suggest that this is a dubious interpretation even of our domestic experiences. Domestically, the orders of a court are accepted precisely because the court represents a monopoly of force. By the same token, throughout history it was always understood—and because it was always understood it never had to be made explicit—that a conference which failed did not return things to the starting point, but that it might bring other pressures into play. Force has always been the ultimate sanction at a conference table; the willingness to apply

force has been the ultimate test of will, and the ability to use force has been the ultimate test of the strategic concepts of a society. There are many people who argue that we are now living in a different period, that with the development of nuclear weapons war has become impossible. It has been said that nuclear energy makes it possible for every state to bring about an increase in its productive capability which makes it unnecessary to resort to war, and it has also been said that there is no alternative to peace.

I CANNOT add anything to the remarks of Mr. Barnett and General Gavin about the situation in which we live. We are confronted by a power which, for over a generation now, has built its whole domestic control apparatus on the assertion that there is an irreconcilably hostile world. We are living in the middle of a revolution which is gripping not only the Communist areas but the areas which had formerly been under Colonial rule, and I would like to suggest that if force has indeed abdicated, diplomacy, too, may turn sterile, and that what we have been witnessing over the past ten years has been no accident: A succession of conferences which become tools of propaganda, at least for one side, in which any

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, Director of Special Studies at the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, received his BA, MA and PhD from Harvard University. He served in the 84th Infantry Division and CIC during World War II. He holds a Reserve CIC commission. He is consultant to the ORO, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of JCS, and other government agencies. He has written articles for many scholarly journals, and is Editor of Confluence, Executive Director of the Harvard International Seminar and Study Director of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of A World War Restored: Metternich, and the Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822, and a new book entitled Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy which was published last month.

8

ARMOR—July-August, 1957

proposal can be made without penalty, in which the failure of a conference entails no consequences, and the success of a conference reveals only a tactical move almost invariably on the part of our opponent. After the Summit Conference of the four heads of state many of our political commentators asserted that it ushered in a period of peace in which diplomacy would reign supreme. I would suggest that you follow the consequences of this conference. If the Soviets became convinced that war was impossible, they took this not as an opportunity to "engineer total peace," but rather as an opportunity to subvert the existing system with impunity. Not two months after the Summit Conference they sold arms to Egypt, and there could be no doubt what the sale of arms to Egypt would mean for the peace of the Middle East. Not three months after the Summit Conference, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers about the unification of Germany, the Soviets chose the most abrupt, the most brutal means of breaking up the conference to demonstrate to the Germans that the United States had become powerless to affect events, and to lay the groundwork eventually to achieve unification on their own terms. They had learned at Geneva, if they had learned anything, that they could negotiate with us without risks of penalty, that they could use the conferences for propaganda.

IF force has abdicated, the role of the weak and irresponsible powers has been greatly exalted. While the West speaks of no alternatives to peace, we have seen, time and again, how states with few resources, with no ability to sustain military operations, achieve great international transformations by the threat of committing suicide, by the will to throw their existence into the scale. We have come to live in a paradoxical period where irresponsibility becomes a political weapon, where there are no limits either in diplomacy or in the field of strategy to what third rate and fourth rate powers can do.

Now it may be said that there are substitutes to force, that we have international organizations which settle disputes, and there is what has been called the opinion of humanity. As a historian I take a rather dim view of what has often been called the opinion of humanity, at least the way we have interpreted it. There is, as any military man knows, no substitute for leadership. The opinion of humanity will be one thing given one set of American actions, it will be something entirely different given another set of American actions. Every power has an interest in getting a definition of international morality which will help it in its hour of need. It will not risk its existence if we are not willing to risk ours. If you compare the reaction of the United Nations to the Egypt and to the Hungarian situation, I think you will find my point illustrated. In Egypt, the United Nations was effective because they knew they could pass resolutions without risk. They knew that Britain and France by themselves were too weak to continue the operation and we were not prepared to back them up. In Hungary, a resolution by itself was meaningless unless backed up by the willingness to run some risk. The slow pace with which the Hungarian debate was conducted is a good example of what one can expect from

an international organization in which leadership is lacking. I would therefore suggest that unless we are willing to use force, and unless we can find a use of our force which is adapted to the issues that are likely to arise, the international community will be more and more demoralized, and even some of those of our international critics who are most insistent that we are militarists, will when the chips are down make their assessment not on the basis of whom they like but on the calculation of their risks. In this respect we have a very important educational task to perform in the world. Millions of people have become independent since the end of World War II. They have become independent in a strange and peculiar way, more through the weakness of their rulers than through their own efforts; more through the moral inhibitions of the former colonial powers than through their own national exertions, with the result that many of the areas which are newly independent have strange notions of what can be achieved in the world through the power of proclamations alone. To them the achievement of their independence must seem nothing short of miraculous. Powers that had ruled them for hundreds of years disappeared without a shot being fired. They, therefore, have a tendency to overestimate what can be achieved by words alone, and they are encouraged in this by another strange circumstance of the nuclear period. When Nehru wanted to redraw the state boundaries of India he soon had a rebellion on his hands, but in the international field no boundaries seem to exist. Because of the contest between us and the Soviet Union every state has been able to play her role in the international field out of proportion with its power and out of proportion with its willingness to assume responsibility, with the result that very often they seek to escape tough domestic problems by entering the international arena. To escape a situation where every action has a price into a field where no action seems to have a price, and where one can be a hero by reading proclamations from a rostrum.

Now, in part, this situation has been brought about by our notion of power and our notion of peace and war. We have had the idea that relations among states are either peace or they are war, that aggression was always unambiguous and that it should be dealt with by the maximum development of our power, that we would punish our enemy and destroy him utterly. We have found that we are living in a world which is neither total peace nor total war, that we are confronted by an opponent conducting a strategy of ambiguity in which the risks always seem out of proportion to the objective in dispute, or in which the grievance that our opponent advances seems somehow legitimate, if not to us, at least to the rest of the world. We have also found something very strange to us, that at a time when our power was never greater the Soviets made extraordinary gains. We had a technological break-through, the like of which we will never see again, when we possessed the atomic bomb. But during our possession of the atomic bomb the Soviets took over the Satellite orbit, China went Communist, and the Soviet Union developed an atomic bomb which itself was one of the most important transformations of the post-war period. Indeed, one could argue

ARMOR—July-August, 1957

9

that because of our notion of war, the atomic monopoly
may actually have hurt us. It made us feel guilty about
our power. It lulled us into believing that no matter
what gains the Soviets scored it didn't make any dif-
ference because we were technologically superior. It made
us believe that we could always defer a showdown to
a more propitious moment or to a more unambiguous
aggression, the precise kind of aggression which the
Soviets strained every effort not to present to us. We
should have learned from this period that the relations
among nations depend not so much on the maximum
development of one power but on the ability to bring
the power into some relationship with the issues that
will be contested. The Soviets learned that if they kept
the increase to their strength sufficiently small, they
could deter us through our own preconception. I recently
read the MacArthur Hearings, on the Korean War. It is
fascinating that at a time when we possessed an atomic
monopoly, when we could not have lost an all-out war,
there seemed to be complete unanimity that it somehow
was up to us to avoid the all-out war, that we couldn't
risk expanding the war in Korea, that we couldn't afford
to win because the Soviets, we thought, couldn't afford
to lose.

WE'VE been basing our strategy too much on a notion of revenge, that it is our task to punish the enemy, to inflict more damage on him than he has inflicted on us. We have been obsessed with a danger of surprise attack because of our memory of Pearl Harbor, and again because we think that any war will necessarily be all-out. At the Symington hearings on American Air Power last year, almost every military commander who testified, except General Gavin, took it as a point of dogma that any war would start with a Soviet attack on the territorial United States: it would be a surprise attack, it would be directed against the installations of our Strategic Air Command, and within a very brief period of time, something like forty-eight hours, the decision would be reached. Nothing in the Soviet behaviour indicates that this is the most likely contingency. On the contrary, the obsession with surprise attack may very well keep us from developing more subtle applications of our power. We've been obsessed by a certain kind of technology. Again, if I may refer to the Symington hearings. There was a great deal of talk about the thrust of jet engines, about which bomber could fly higher or longer; no one examined the fact that bombers do not fight each other. That the test of a modern weapon is not so much whether it is superior to its equivalent on the other side but whether it can perform its strategic mission. There was a great deal of talk on technology. There was very little talk about strategic missions. Our thought has therefore lagged behind development. The threat of all-out war, which may have been a good deterrent during our monopoly of atomic weapons, is no longer effective. We are somewhat in the position of the first manufacturers of the automobile who, having a new technological discovery, made it as much as possible like the previous means of transportation. The first automobile looked like a horse and buggy wagon. The first electric light bulbs looked like gas fixtures. The tendency is always to develop a weapon or to integrate a new discovery into

what is familiar. But we are living with a new order of
technology and it requires appropriate tactics and its
appropriate strategy. Until the military and the political
leadership adjust their thinking to the new technology
we will live with the paradox of the nuclear age that our
power will serve to paralyze our will.

Now, it is difficult in a few minutes to speak about
what such a strategy might look like, but it is clear
that our military have the responsibility for coming up
with a strategic doctrine with which policy makers can
live. One is struck when one reads the literature about
strategy in the last ten years, how the individuals who
seem so tough in the abstract are forced into a position
which in practice leads to inaction. The people who want
to obliterate the Soviet Union tomorrow morning are
very often the very ones who insist on world government
the day after tomorrow morning. The individuals who
assert that the only war we can fight is an all-out war,
never seem to be able to apply their strategic doctrine to
the disputes that actually do come up. This is no acci-
dent, and one cannot blame them for this. An American
President, knowing that military action will involve the
obliteration of American cities, must think twice before
he accepts the destruction of Chicago, New York or Los
Angeles. Unless our military doctrine can present him
with alternatives that are less fearful, he is in every
concrete case going to be stymied by the alternatives
that are presented to him. In 1936, the French General
Staff had only one strategic doctrine, that of all-out war.
It could react to foreign moves only by total mobilization.
When the German Army moved into the Rhineland, the
French General Staff was paralyzed. It knew the country
would not support full mobilization for it seemed like
a German move into its own territory. It therefore did
a subtle thing. It adjusted its estimates of German
strength to its own strategic doctrine instead of its stra-
tegic doctrine to the estimates of German strength, and
it alleged that the Germans had fifty divisions, which
they were very far from possessing. Finally they took
refuge in a political guarantee of their boundary instead
of a military one and four years later German armies
occupied Paris.

But if the military have to come up with a strategic
d doctrine for a more subtle application of our power,
the policy makers require a more dynamic conception of
world affairs. Great revolutions like the coming together
of the Soviet Revolution and the revolution of the colonial
powers cannot be mastered merely by negative motives.
They cannot be mastered merely by the desire to hold
what one has or by contesting issues selected by the
opponent. There is a tragic element in the history of
nations that unless they are willing to fight for what
they stand for, and unless they believe that what they
stand for can be projected into other areas, they must
decline. The challenge that the nuclear age holds to us
is that at a time of unparalleled strength we are driven
to realize that everything depends on our ability to use
this strength with subtlety and with discrimination; and
looking at history, the fate of the dinosaur might serve us
as a warning that brute strength does not always apply
to mechanism in the struggle for survival.

10

ARMOR—July-August, 1957