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We confront the dynamism of a strategic competition which is historically unique:

- Each side has the capacity to destroy mankind.

- The penalties for failing to maintain at least equality can be to risk national survival.

- The lead time for technological innovation is so long, and the pace of change so unremitting and rapid that military postures competition and strategic policy are in danger of being driven by technological necessity. Considerations.

- When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over ten thousand warheads, the combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities that would give one side a kind of superiority is not obvious. In any event, changes in the strategic balance can be achieved only by increments so large that the quest for them is highly destabilizing.

- The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if technically possible, is politically intolerable, and neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance.

- Thus, the probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is almost bound to be the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher force levels.

The United States will sustain this competition if it is forced upon us. Indeed, it is likely that the United States would emerge from such a new era of competition with larger numbers than the Soviet Union in most significant categories.

The issue remains what political or military benefit will result. The enormous destructiveness of weapons, their uncertainties in the absence of operational experience, combine to make their use increasingly incredible. This, again, makes ever more difficult to calculate. Numbers alone no longer gain spell measurable advantage.

In short, while we can and must maintain the nuclear balance, ~~by our own efforts~~ the overall relationship with the Soviet Union will not ~~be equally stable or the threat of conflict equally manageable if this balance is sustained through competitive programs. The opposite almost certainly will be the case. Sustaining the buildup would mean exhorting our people to accept it, partly by ascribing a hostile and threatening purpose to Soviet strategic weapons. If we have no other choice we shall do so. But we must recognize that one of the consequences of such a process is that it can only reinforce attitude, and can only reinforce a similar process on the other side.

This is why every President since the early 1960's
has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms
simultaneously with the military programs necessary to maintain
a strategic balance.

We have done so in our interest + in the interest of overall stability.

If there are more subtle doctrinal reasons for our interest in SALT, Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of
nuclear war through maintenance of sufficient political and
strategic power. There is no argument, really, on how best to
avoid nuclear war. Long ago, we decided that a sufficiency
of balanced nuclear forces was the main protection, or assurance,
against this remote possibility. On the other hand, judgments
of what constitutes "sufficiency" -- what forces we need for
the purpose -- have been subject to change. Our judgments
have changed, for example, as our experience in deploying
these weapons and thinking about them has altered our perceptions.
And our judgments, of course, have changed as the Soviet
Union began first deploying and then expanding its own nuclear
forces.

Briefly, the doctrinal underpinning of our strategic
posture was in a process of almost constant change and adjustment
until the late 1960's, when it became apparent that the Soviet
Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough
parity with the United States in nuclear forces.

long ago,

At that time, we determined that the strategic forces of both sides should not be vulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. With the achievement of parity, At the same time it became apparent that neither side could realistically expect to develop a credible disarming capability against the other. The term "disarming capability" means a force of nuclear weapons whose number, destructive power and accuracy could reliably destroy all or nearly all of the nuclear forces of the other side. To pin down this point and to avoid misunderstandings, we concluded, however, that neither side should risk arousing suspicions and fears on the other by creating forces that might even appear to be designed for a disarming role.

In short, after more than two decades of possessing a clear superiority in nuclear weapons, we reconciled ourselves to a condition of strategic sufficiency based on invulnerable second strike U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, each of which, if attacked, could inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage on the other's society. For ourselves, we also determined that in the unlikely event of some nuclear attack, the President of the United States should have a wide range of options in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. Thus, we

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built into our strategic forces a substantial measure of flexibility, meaning that the United States response need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities, thus inviting the destruction of our own, but could instead avoid population centers or heavy collateral damage to society and thus try to avoid rapid escalation. Translating this capability of our strategic forces into a coherent system of planning became a novel, as yet

In our view it enhances the certainty, uncompleted, task of great complexity, but progress has been of some retaliation, and therefore makes war even less likely. It also made. And more will be made. decision even in the ultimate crisis. Our preserves some the capability of human military action cannot be driven by its own pre-planned rigidity the way military actions were driven by railroad timetables in 1914.

The foregoing are the main elements of a strategic doctrine which we arrived at only after perceiving that the time had passed when either great nuclear power would permit the other to gain any significant or appreciable advantage in nuclear weapons. SALT became one means by which we and the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding

on these doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. For years, academic analysis had perceived - wisely - the importance of strategic stability and the importance of communication and understanding between the two sides to reduce the risks of cataclysm. In short, we intended that SALT might establish, or help to establish, an alternative to the ever more elusive quest for strategic superiority.

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Thus specific in SALT have been:
Our SALT objectives are:

(1) to break the momentum of ever-increasing levels of
armaments;

(2) to try to circumscribe the qualitative characteristics
of weapons systems;

(3) to moderate the pace of new deployments; and

(4) to achieve reductions in force levels.

~~The SALT agreements already signed are judged in terms~~
~~of the actual programs at the time, their contribution to~~
~~strategic stability, and the enhanced possibilities for a more~~
~~permanent agreement, they represented a major advance.~~

~~These~~

~~The strategic situation in 1972, when the first agreements~~

~~were signed, was as follows:~~

-- The Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program to close the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBMs, at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching about 8 submarines annually with 16 ballistic missiles each.

-- The United States had ended its numerical build up in the late 1960s at a level of 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs; we were pursuing technological improvements, particularly

in MIRVs for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles; our
replacement systems were intended for the late 1970s and
early 1980s.

By most reasonable measures of strategic power, we
held an important advantage, which still exists.

But it was also clear that over time the Soviet Union
would be able, first, to exceed our numerical levels by a
considerable margin, and then develop the same technologies
we had already mastered.

Our aim, therefore, was to achieve some breakthrough
and to halt the momentum of the Soviet programs. This was
achieved in the *Treaty* which limited
anti-ballistic missile defenses and froze the level of ballistic
missile forces on both sides.

This agreement and our further goals must be judged in
the light of the need for a less volatile strategic environment.
By formally restricting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) to very
low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union
have removed a potential source of instability for one side to
build an extensive defense of its cities against missile attack
would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward a
first-strike capability, by ensuring oneself against retaliation.

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With the five-year SALT Interim Agreement freezing the
numbers of offensive strategic missile launchers, the two
governments took the essential first step toward setting longer-
term limits on these and other offensive weapons. Some have
alleged that the Interim Agreement, which expires in October,
1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet
Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-
based and sea-based. It did not permit them; the Soviet Union already had them.
Such a view is misleading. When the
agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union already
possessed more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM's) than the United States, and, given the pace of its
submarine construction program, could have reached the point
over the next few years of having virtually twice as many
nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. The effect of this
interim Agreement was to halt a dynamic Soviet ICBM program
at the then existing level; to put a ceiling on the heaviest
Soviet ICBM's, the weapons that most concern us; and to set an
upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) program. No American program was abandoned or
curtailed because of this agreement; no advantages were foregone.

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We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No restraints
were placed on bombers. Indeed, the US lead in missile
warheads may be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement
than at the time of its signature.

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We have defined our goal as essential equivalence in strategic capabilities. What constitutes equivalence involves subjective judgment. Because US and Soviet forces are different from each other-- in type, in technological advance, in composition -- they are difficult to compare.

For example, we shall have to compare heavy bombers, in which the United States is ahead to heavy missiles which the USSR has emphasized. We shall have to decide whether to insist on equivalence in every category or whether to permit trade-offs in which an advantage in one category compensates for a disadvantage in another. And it is not a static equation. We shall have to measure present advantages against future benefits, against existing disparities with future trends. This is a difficult process, but we are confident that it can be solved, in a way that is fair.

Thus, our second task is to limit the scope of technological change in such areas as missile throw weight, multiple reentry vehicles and missile accuracy. In order to achieve the stability that we deem essential, it will be necessary not only to limit numbers of strategic weapons but to restrain the process of increasing the destructive potential of these weapons. Thus, we are dealing not only with disparate levels of forces but with the kind of disparate capabilities that MIRV technology, to take the

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most conspicuous example, can supply. As a result of the
technology of multiple warheads, the rate of increase of war-
heads is surging far ahead of the increase in delivery

warheads should be the weapons that we seek ultimately to control.
This is why the United States considers the restriction
limitation of MIRV's must be the essential component of
of the number of multiple warheads an essential component of

If we fail, the pace of technology will outstrip our capacity for arms limitation.
the next phase of the SALT negotiations. This is all the more
The urgency lies not only in the fact of current MIRV

urgent because we face the problem that as the yield of missile
deployments, but in the inevitable that will give
warheads is coupled with refinements of accuracy, the next

generation of missiles could acquire capability for striking at
ICBM silos.

In short, quantitative limits in the next phase of SALT
are essential, but they must be linked to qualitative limitations,
lest technological advances undermine the stability achieved
through numerical limits.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments
of new or more modern systems. Neither side is likely to be
content for a decade with their present strategic arsenal. The
Soviets are already embarked on a testing and initial deployment
of a third generation of ICBMs and a third modification of sub-
marine-launched missiles, though the rate of deployment so far
has been far short of the maximum pace of the late sixties.

For our part we are planning to introduce the Trident
system, and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the

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capability of improving our Minuteman ICBM system, adding
to the level of MIRV missiles, and, if we choose, of deploying
mobile systems, land or airbased.

is to see whether the two

Thus, the problem for SALT negotiations is whether two

slower pace of deployment or
sides can agree on a rate of modernization, that does not threaten
innovation is less likely to threaten

the overall balance or trigger an excessive reaction by the
opponent.

Finally, a ten-year program will permit the negotiation

real

of reductions. Reductions have occasionally been proposed as

an alternative to limitations, especially on the number of war-
easier to negotiate. In fact, it is a more complicated problem.
heads. But reductions in launchers, if not accompanied by

restrictions on the numbers of warheads, will only magnify the
vulnerability of the remaining force. The fewer the aim points,
the easier it will be to calculate an attack. At the same time
reductions can only be from some base line, and therefore they
must be preceded by some ceilings, if only of an interim nature.

But a ten-year program should permit the negotiations of stable
ceilings, and hence of the beginning of a process of reductions.

In sum, our objectives in SALT are (1) to define the
ceilings for major strategic systems that are the prerequisite
for eventual reductions, (2) to negotiate some limitation on the
qualitative characteristics of weapons systems that if left