KISSINGER, HENRY A.

May 17, 1971

Dear Ed:

Thanks to you, I look forward to being
the picture of sartorial splendor on
the courts, the links, etc. Now if I
can just find the time!

At any rate, my wardrobe has been
brightened considerably, and I really
appreciate your thoughtfulness.

Thanks again, Ed, and I hope to see
you soon.

Best personal regards,

Mr. Ed Barner
President
Uni-Managers Incorporated
10889 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 950
Los Angeles, California 90024

RD:tln-

x file

thank you

RECEIVED
MAY 20 1971
CENTRAL FILES

GENERAL
T924
KISSINGER, HENRY A. 1/2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 18 1972

Dear Doak:

Many thanks for your letter of October 25. I am sorry that the hectic pace here has prevented me from responding more promptly. I was very interested to read your article on China and appreciated your passing it along to me. Your observations are, as always, acute and interesting.

Unfortunately, as you may have guessed, the time for getting together with anyone has been extremely limited in the past few months, and I have no indications that my schedule will be growing any lighter in the near future. I will keep the meeting you want in mind and hope you will stay in touch.

Mr. A. Doak Barnett
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

- 2 -

the U.S., China, Soviet Union, and Japan - will be significantly different
from what they have been in the past.

My primary assignment tonight is to discuss with you China's emergence
on the world scene and the changing pattern of U.S. and China relations. One
cannot deal with these subjects, however, in isolation. It is true that domestic
forces in both China and the U.S., and the new bilateral interaction between Wash-
ington and Peking, have been important factors in the recent changes in our poli-
cies. In addition, however, both Washington and Peking are clearly responding
to much broader developments that are altering the overall international scene
and pattern of international relations, particularly in Asia.

Later, in my comments tonight, I would like to focus attention on the
President's forthcoming trip and share with you my own personal views on the sig-
nificance of the trip and what we as Americans should expect - and not expect -
from a U.S.-China summit meeting of this sort, at this particular point in history.
Before doing that, however, I would like to spend some time examining with you the
background of this dramatic turn of events. What factors, forces, and trends have
led both China and the U.S. to decide upon such a bold and startling departure
from their past policies?

The announcement of Nixon's trip came as a total surprise to all but a
very few persons in the U.S. and Chinese governments. What was surprising, however,
was the boldness of the President's decision to make a trip to Peking, not the idea
that significant changes in U.S. policy toward China, and in U.S.-China relations,
might now be possible. It has been clear for some time that many factors have been
at work that were likely to lead to some change in Sino-American relations. It is
these factors that I would like to discuss with you first. Unless one understands
them, I think, it is extremely difficult to comprehend either the historical or con-
temporary context in which the Nixon-Chou meeting should be viewed.

-7-

with the problems of political reconstruction, but this process has been slow and painful, and it will obviously continue for many years - certainly until after the death of Mao. There are continuing debates and struggles within the leadership in China, over both domestic and foreign policy, as well as over the internal distribution of power, and there is great uncertainty about what will happen in the country when Mao dies and China faces a difficult succession problem. In a sense, therefore, China is now in a major transitional period, and its political base at home is at least somewhat weaker than it was in earlier years. This fact may well reinforce Peking's sense of vulnerability - despite the steady growth of China's nuclear and missile capabilities - and it probably reinforces the arguments within the Chinese leadership of those who work for a more flexible foreign policy, to help China to break out of its isolation, to broaden its base of international political support, and to improve China's defense capabilities, by skillful maneuvering on the world stage. Steps to increase contacts with the U.S., as well as efforts to gain entry into the U.N. and into the U.N. international collective security system, are very logical steps for China to pursue under existing circumstances.

Today, the leadership in China is a coalitional or collective leadership, containing very diverse elements - which include military men of several sorts (a high proportion of whom are probably inclined to put great weight on realistic power factors, as opposed to ideological factors, in determining Chinese policy) and political figures of various kinds, some of whom can be labelled radical or leftist, in Chinese terms, and others of whom are clearly conservative or pragmatic, at least relatively speaking. In the past two years, gradually but steadily, the political balance within the leadership has shifted against the radicals and in favor of the conservatives and pragmatists. In this period, although military

- 10 -

All of the trends and factors that I have mentioned undoubtedly help to explain why Peking decided earlier this year that it should invite President Nixon to Peking. There seems little doubt, however, that the decision was by no means an easy one for Chinese leaders. In fact, it was probably an extremely difficult one - perhaps even more difficult than the decision made in Washington. In making such a major shift in its policy towards the U.S., Peking had to abandon a position that it had held inflexibly since the 1950's - that no significant improvement in U.S.-China relations would be possible until the Taiwan problem could be solved. It also clearly compromised, and damaged, its image throughout the world as the world's headquarters of extreme revolutionary radicalism and anti-imperialism. It is plausible to believe that there must have been intense debate within the Chinese leadership about the advisability of such a radical shift, with the costs that it involved, and it seems possible that the debate may well be continuing today.

Turning to the question of what led the U.S. to decide to abandon a two decade's old policy of "containment and isolation" directed against China - and in particular to take such a bold step as agreeing to a summit meeting with the Chinese in Peking - let me make just a few comments. All of you are familiar, at least in a general way, I know, with the gradual step-by-step changes that have occurred in U.S. policy toward China in recent years. I will be much briefer, therefore, in commenting on what has moved the U.S. than I was in analyzing Chinese motives. I would like to briefly summarize, however, what I believe to be some of the most important factors involved.

First of all, it seems clear that American official and public attitudes towards China have been slowly but steadily changing, in a very significant way, for quite a few years. By the mid 1960's, it seems to me, the intense passions

- 18 -

relations with mainland China.

If the United States were to make these changes in its position, would Peking then be willing to compromise on its side, in terms of its formal position in regard to Taiwan? The answer is probably not, at least not at present. It is difficult to see, therefore, what concrete agreements might be reached in Peking, in regard to Taiwan. Perhaps none is possible now. If that is the case, probably the best that we can hope for, is, in effect, a tacit agreement to disagree and to avoid armed conflict in the area - as well as a greater degree of understanding on both sides regarding basic policies and objectives in the Taiwan area.

The unlikelihood of reaching any agreement now that will quickly solve the Taiwan issue means that it is also unlikely that the Nixon-Chou meeting will be able to produce an agreement formally normalizing U.S.-China relations in any full sense - that is, a normalization that would involve an exchange of ambassadors and establishment of full-scale diplomatic relations. To date, Peking has consistently refused to exchange ambassadors with any nation that maintains relations with Taiwan. It would be a great surprise it is now proved willing to abandon this position.

However, it may well be possible now, and in my view this is something Nixon should now try to achieve in his talks with the Chinese, to exchange small official missions that would be called something other than embassies. In the past, Peking has agreed to do this with other countries, and our hope should be that Nixon and Chou can agree to do something of this sort - in order to provide a much better mechanism than we have had in the Sino-American talks in Warsaw for continuing contacts and negotiations on a broad range of important issues.

The bilateral issues on which the possibility of concrete agreements

- 19 -

seemsgreatest, at the present time, relate to cultural, scientific, and
journalistic exchanges, to travel, and to trade. It should be possible to
reach agreements or understandings on how best to encourage systematic exch
either unofficial or official or both, and now that the U.S. has opened up
U.S.-China trade, there is a definite possibility that Peking may be willi
authorize direct trade with us.

It is important, I think, to try to get concrete agreements or un-
ings on these matters, even though they are obviously not the most importa-
lems that will be discussed in Peking. If the President returns from China
nothing concrete in hand - and only a bland general communique - the danger
that many Americans, probably quite wrongly, would judge the meeting to be a
whatever progress might have been made in discussions on the most important

I am convinced, myself, however, that the most crucial discussion
be those related to very broad international problems -- the overall balance
area, problems of security and arms control, and basic issues of war and peace
problems inherent in the triangular U.S.-China-Soviet relationship will come
very much in the minds of both Chinese and American leaders, but it is by
certain that this is a subject that will be discussed in any great detail.
is, I am sure it will be treated with the greatest delicacy. The U.S. can
could reiterate its position that in the U.S. view any Sino-Soviet conflict
be highly undesirable and might endanger the stability of the region.

It is almost certain, however, that the U.S. would not wish to
than that. President Nixon must wish to avoid doing anything that would
Soviet fears of a U.S.-China entente directed against Moscow.

In contrast, the problems of the triangular relationship among
China, and Japan will almost certainly be discussed. Judging from Chou En-
recent statements, he is likely to urge that it be high on the agenda. The

- 24 -

with China that had "anti-Soviet implications," would the kind of dire adverse consequences that I have mentioned become real possibilities. What seems more likely is that the kind of gradual improvement in U.S.-China relations that is now possible may, in a subtle fashion, exert pressure on Moscow to modify its policies in ways that are to be hoped for. It is conceivable, for example, that the Russians may become more rather than less accommodating in relations with the U.S. in Europe and elsewhere. It may also be induced to become less rather than more threatening towards China itself. It is probably too early to predict confidently what the Soviet response will be. Yet to the extent that one can see any effects to date, I would say that the bulk of evidence suggests that the Soviets may be responding by becoming more flexible, and that therefore the net results might be favorable from our point of view.

There are greater real risks, however, in terms of the effects that our new approach to China could have on Japan and the U.S.-Japanese relationship. The announcement of the Nixon-Chou meeting, without any prior discussion or forewarning to Japan, was a great shock to the Japanese. It was one of several so-called "Nixon shocks" that have put severe strains on the relationship between Washington and Tokyo in recent months. If we were to allow the U.S.-Japanese relationship to deteriorate seriously, while focusing our primary attention on the problem of improving relations with China, the results could be dangerous.

For obvious economic as well as security reasons, Japan is and should be at present the keystone of our policies and position in Asia. If there was a basic change for the worse in relations between the U.S. and Japan, and a split between us, we would have to reassess our entire position in Asia. In short, although it is extremely important to work toward improved U.S. relations with China, this must not be done at the expense of our relationship with Japan. If the U.S. were forced

- 26 -

the foreseeable future, probably the most that we can hope for is the trans-
formation of open hostility into a limited adversary relationship, one in
which both sides, while competing with each other in many ways, will make signifi-
cant concessions to avoid conflict and will search for ways to cooperate on basic
security and other issues directly relevant to survival in the twentieth century.

We should, in short, be sober and realistic in facing up to the many
problems we will doubtless continue to confront in our relations with the Chinese.
We should strongly encourage our government to move further along the path it has
now chosen. We should be gratified that for the first time in two decades there
is now a basis for genuine hope that both we and the Chinese are willing to draw
back from past policies that could only lead to tension, confrontation, and
conflict, and we should be grateful that the possibilities for gradual mutual
accommodation and eventual normalization of relations with China, now appear to
be better than they have been in a generation. In this situation, let us all
do what we can do to ensure that we fully explore those possibilities, realistically
and without illusions, but hopefully and with very serious intentions.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JAN 19 1972

Dear Doak:

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

130 EAST 67th STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021

KISSINGER, HENRY A./B*

Area Code 212 861-8260

FRANK R. BARNETT*
President

DR. FRANK N. TRAGER
Director of Studies
Professor of
International Affairs,
Director, National Security Program
New York University

GENE E. BRADLEY*
International Vice President
President, International
Management Association
New York, New York

ROBERT G. BURKE*
Secretary, Treasurer and
General Counsel
Chapman and Burke
New York, New York

DOROTHY E. NICOLOSI
Assistant Secretary and
Assistant Treasurer

DIRECTORS

WILLIAM J. CASEY
Hall, Casey, Dickler & Howley
New York, New York

GENERAL HAROLD K. JOHNSON, USA (Ret.)
Member, Executive Committee
Research Analysis Corporation
Arlington, Virginia

JOSEPH M. KIRCHHEIMER
Burnham & Co.
New York, New York

ARTHUR E. KLAUSER
Vice President
Dow Corning International
Tokyo, Japan

MORRIS I. LEIBMAN
Leibman, Williams, Bennett, Baird & Minow
Chicago, Illinois

JOHN G. MCKAY, JR.
Dixon, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell
Miami, Florida

REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM C. MOTT, USN (Ret.)
Executive Vice President
U. S. Independent Telephone Association
Washington, D. C.

JOHN C. NEFF
French and Polyclinic Medical
School and Health Center
New York, New York

O. E. PACE

HUGH MCGOWAN

Assistants to the President

*Also Directors

JAMES M. SPIRO
Vice President
134 North LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 368-0196

ROY GODSON
Research Associate
1332 31st Street N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20007
(202) 337-4753

11 December 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

Does it strike you that Public Affairs Svengalis --
in TV, publishing and academic circles -- are
trying to launch Ramsey Clark as an anti-GOP
missile for '72?

Not only does he appear on all the TV panel shows;
now the Council on Foreign Relations has billed
him to speak on Priorities in American Foreign Policy!!

As a Member of the Council, I couldn't resist
"applauding" the Novelty of the Act; and I thought
the enclosed copy of my letter might amuse you.

With best regards, I am

FRB:nmcg
Encl. (1)

INTERPROFESSIONAL COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

(Partial List)

CARL E. BAHMEIER, JR., KARL R. BENDETSEN, NELSON BROMS, NORMAN E. CARIGNAN, J. CLARENCE DAVIES, PAUL E. FEFFER, CONRAD M. FOWLER, HENRY V. GRAHAM, RICHARD C. HAM, DR. FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON, BENNETT E. KLINE, JOHN R. LEHMAN, EDWIN A. LOCKE, JR., EDGAR F. LUCKENBACH, JR., R. DANIEL McMICHAEL, LOUIS B. NICHOLS, ROBERT H. PARSLEY, MAX E. RICH, ROBERT R. RICHARDSON, DR. GERALD L. STEIBEL, JOHN A. SUTRO, DR. W. HOMER TURNER, DR. RICHARD L. WALKER, WILLIAM F. WARD, F. CLIFTON WHITE, EVELLE J. YOUNGER

Area Code 212 861-8260

FRANK R. BARNETT*
President

DIRECTORS

MORRIS I. LEIBMAN
Leibman, Williams, Bennett, Boird & Minow
Chicago, Illinois

O. E. PACE
HUGH MCGOWAN

Assistants to the President

*Also Directors

11 December 1970

Dear Henry:

With best regards, I am

FRB:mmcg
Encl. (1)

(Partial List)

CARL-E. RAMMEIER, JR., KARL P. BENDEZESH, BISCOM-BROMES, MORRAN-E. CARICMAN, J. CLARENCE DANES, PAUL E. PEFFER, COTIENDA-M. FOWLER, HENRY V. GRAHAM, RICHARD C. HAM, DR. FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON, BENNETT E. KLINE, JOHN R. LEHMAN, EDWIN A. LOCKE, JR., EDGAR P. LUCKENBACH, JR., & DANIEL MICHAIL LOUIS P. HUANG

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

MAR 9 1971

Dear Frank:

Many thanks for sending me the material
on the National Strategy and Foreign Policy
conference. I will be interested to hear
what comes out of it.

Please stay in touch.

Mr. Frank R. Barnett
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
130 East 67th Street
New York, N. Y. 10021

jlp:3/8/71

## Forum on
# NATIONAL STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY
Fort Lauderdale, Fla., War Memorial Auditorium

March 4, 1971

## PURPOSE

The purpose of the Forum is to provide to the residents of this area presentations on United States national strategy and foreign policy by top-level government officials and private sector leaders. It is a non-partisan effort to create a dialogue concerning America's role on the world scene and to provide factual information in this regard from knowledgeable and responsible sources. The Forum hopes to encourage better citizenship through better understanding.

## PROGRAM

* 12:30 p.m.—Registration of Attendance

* 1:00 p.m.—Welcome and Introductions

* 1:10 p.m.—Purpose of Forum

* 1:15 p.m.—"United States Foreign Policy—The Nixon Doctrine"
  Dr. David Abshire
  Assistant Secretary of State
  United States Department of State
  Washington, D.C.

* 2:15 p.m.—"Crisis in the Middle East"
  Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell
  Director of Research, The Center for Strategic and International Studies
  Georgetown University
  Washington, D.C.

* 3:15 p.m.—Coffee Break

* 3:30 p.m.—"Outlook in Southeast Asia and Vietnam"
  Mr. Dolph Droge
  National Security Council
  The White House
  Washington, D.C.

* 4:30 p.m.—"Soviet Power and National Will—The Decade Ahead"
  Mr. Frank Barnett
  President, National Strategy
  Information Center, New York

* 5:30 p.m.—Summary
  Mr. Gene Bradley
  Director, Atlantic Council of the United States

* 6:00 p.m.—Adjourn

## SPEAKERS

### DAVID M. ABSHIRE

Dr. David M. Abshire is Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds the Ph.D. from Georgetown University. He served in the United States Army during the Korean conflict as a front line officer. He has served in government in various capacities and is well qualified by background and experience to speak on U.S. foreign policy and national strategy. Dr. Abshire served as Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University and has published extensively in this field. He holds membership in the Foreign Policy Association and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. His present position requires direct contact on a daily basis with the affairs of state.

### ALVIN J. COTTRELL

Dr. Alvin J. Cottrell is Director of Research of The Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. He received his Ph.D. degree from the University of Pennsylvania, and served on the faculty of The National War College in Washington, D.C. Previously, he served as an instructor at the University of Pennsylvania; staff member, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Department of Defense, and Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute. Dr. Cottrell was Project Director of a Panel, largely consisting of British scholars and statesmen, which published a report on the implications of British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. He has visited the Middle East several times and spent much time in England studying the area with British specialists. He visited Tehran, the Persian Gulf, and Lebanon recently.

### DOLPH DROGE

Bachelor's degree in political science from Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, 1950; political science scholarship for graduate studies at Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, interrupted by Korean War; served with United States Air Force 1951 to 1954, including 31 months as a reporter and information officer; also a newsman for NBC-TV affiliates in mid-west 1955-56; joined USIA in 1956 and served in Eastern Europe, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, and as Chief of Vietnamese Broadcast Division of the Voice of America; joined AID in 1966 as Chairman of Vietnam Training; was detailed to White House in 1968. Has just returned from a visit to Southwest Asia and Vietnam.

### FRANK R. BARNETT

Mr. Frank R. Barnett is President of the National Strategy Information Center, Inc. A Rhodes Scholar and co-editor of a Doubleday anthology entitled "Peace and War in the Modern Age", he has lectured at the National Defense College of Canada and the NATO Defense College. He is a former Wabash College professor and a

Area Code 212 861-8260

FRANK R. BARNETT*
President

DIRECTORS

PAUL E. FEFFER
President
Feffer & Simons
New York, New York

JOHN G. MCKAY, JR.
Bradford, Williams, McKay, Kimbrell, Hamann & Jennings, P.A.
Miami, Florida

*Also Directors

ROY GODSON
Research Associate
Washington, D. C.

10 January 1972

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

In re: Formal Academic Courses on
"National Security"

Given your concern with "anti-militarism" on
campus, you'll be pleased to know we have
now identified some 300 professors who are
willing to help develop and use materials on
National Security Affairs.

By the fall of 1973, we expect that nearly one
hundred universities will be offering a formal
course, for credit, in the fields of U.S. De-
fense Policy, Strategy, Geopolitics and
Politico-Military Affairs.

The enclosed brochure describes the Seminar we
sponsored last summer for 24 young professors
who intend to enter this field. (This Seminar
will be repeated this coming summer for another
group of young university teachers.)

In the meantime, we are preparing a teaching
syllabus, bibliographies and other pedagogical
tools for the use of scholars who are
pioneering the introduction of National Security
courses.

With New York University as a full partner in
this educational enterprise, and five senior
professors on our editorial board, we
are encouraged to believe we can persuade the

(Partial List)

CARL E. BAHMEIER, JR., KARL R. BENDETSEN, NELSON BROMS, NORMAN E. CARIGNAN, J. CLARENCE DAVIES, CONRAD M. FOWLER, HENRY V. GRAHAM, RICHARD C. HAM, DR. FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON, BENNETT E. KLINE, JOHN R. LEHMAN, EDWIN A. LOCKE, JR., EDGAR F. LUCKENBACH, JR., R. DANIEL MCMICHAEL, LOUIS B. NICHOLS, ROBERT M. PARSLEY, MAX E. RICH, ROBERT R. RICHARDSON, DR. GERALD L. STEIBEL, JOHN A. SUTRO, DR. W. HOMER TURNER, DR. RICHARD L. WALKER, WILLIAM F. WARD, F. CLIFTON WHITE, EVELLE J. YOUNGER