The first section of Article 16 (as adopted 28 April 1919) specifies that violators of the Covenant are to be subjected immediately to economic and other sanctions:

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

The second section of Article 16 authorizes the League Council to recommend certain preparations for military measures if necessary:

> It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

Much reliance, as we shall see, was placed on the so-called Economic Weapon of the League, for this was seen as a potent sanction most compatible with the League's desire to banish the use of force entirely from international relations. The First Assembly (1920) saw that detailed elaboration of the workings of this instrument was needed, and entrusted the question of the Economic Weapon to its Committee No. 6. A sub-committee studied the matter, and Committee No. 6 submitted a report to the First Assembly on 10 December 1920. It recommended that machinery be set up to make Article 16 operational and that an International Blockade Committee be set up to draw up a scheme. The First Assembly thereupon established the International Blockade Committee,

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which met in August 1921 and submitted its report to the Council at the end of that month. The Council sent it to the Assembly, which sent it directly to Committee No. 3, the "Armaments and Blockade Committee, headed by Branting of Sweden.

Committee No. 3 presented its report to the Second Assembly on 26 September 1921. This report offered 18 resolutions and three amendments to the Covenant, most of which modified the automatic nature of the sanctions provision but were less radical than the proposals of the International Blockade Committee. One of the resolutions was seen as better treated as an amendment (see below, p.19). The 17 resolutions were all passed unanimously by the Second Assembly on 27 September 1921. The amendments (now four) were first submitted to the Amendment Committee and then adopted unanimously by the Assembly on 4 October 1921. On the same day the Assembly passed a further resolution declaring the 21 proposals, including the amendments pending ratification, to be "rules for guidance" (see below, p.21). France failed to ratify the amendments, but in 1935 they were indeed taken as guiding principles by all, including France, in the discussion of sanctions against Italy.

Most of the arguments below in defense of the proposals come from a speech by Carlo Schanzer of Italy, the rapporteur of Committee No. 3, who explained and defended the general principles of the report he was submitting on behalf of his Committee. Most of the reservations expressed about the proposals come from Reynald, the French delegate, who nevertheless did not block the unanimous passage of the proposals in the Assembly.

*All page references in this Introduction refer to the material following.

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The points raised in the debate can be grouped according to five (obviously interrelated) themes: the League's commitment to the avoidance of force, the credibility of the sanctions provision, the possible harmful effects of sanctions on the Member States applying them, the need for planning joint action, and the question of extending the Covenant.

1. The League's commitment to the avoidance of force.--- The proposers of the new measures pointed out that the rationale of the League was the avoidance of force, and that the League should therefore make sure that the sanctions provision did not itself increase the likelihood or scale of violence (see Schanzer, p.⁹). This was indeed the main advantage of economic as opposed to military sanctions. (Schanzer, p.⁸). Moderation, though with the possibility of later "graduation," was the keynote of the new scheme (Schanzer, p.¹⁴). The "moral weapon" of public opinion could be relied upon to come into play (Schanzer, p.¹⁰f.); some thought this a stronger weapon than the economic blockade (Motta, p.¹⁹).

The doubters (i.e. the French) suggested, on the other hand, that the cause of peace required strengthening, not weakening, the sanctions provisions. The French were confident that the economic weapon was effective, but only if rigorously and universally applied (Reynald, p.¹⁸). The prospects for disarmament depended upon the Members' confidence in the League's guarantees of security (Reynald, p.²⁰). Moreover, the moral force of public opinion ought to have the support of practical measures (Reynald, p.¹⁸).

2. The credibility of the sanctions provision.--- Both sides

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understood that the prospects for peace and the public's confidence
in the League depended upon the credibility of Article 16's provisions,
but there were different views as to what enhanced this. The
<u>proposers</u> of the modifications felt that they were tempering the
idealism of the Covenant with their own more "realistic" appraisal
of world conditions. They pointed out that the <u>universality</u> of
League membership, assumed by the Founding Fathers of the Covenant,
had not been realized, and that this was the major obstacle to the
success of Article 16. The absence of the United States, in
particular, threatened to undermine the economic sanctions and
indeed to harm the economic interests of Members joining in the
sanctions. (Schanzer, p.8; Report, p.7; Motta, p.19). They felt
therefore that some modification of the automatic nature of the
sanctions, by taking into account the difficulties and by
minimizing the inconvenience to law-abiding nations, would make
more Members more willing to commit themselves to Article 16 and
thus make its success more likely and its deterrence more credible
(Schanzer, p.8f., p.14).

The <u>French</u>, on the other hand, felt that, in spite of the
difficulties involved, the credibility of Article 16 depended
simply upon its categorical nature. (Reynald, p.17 and p.18).

3. <u>Possible harmful effects of economic sanctions on the Member States applying them.</u>— This prospect seems to have been the immediate motivating cause of the new proposals. Scandinavian, Austrian, and Latin American delegates pointed out in committee sessions that some States, because of limitations of size and geographical and political circumstances, incurred great risks

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in applying economic sanctions immediately to a powerful law-
breaker. Moreover, some delay might minimize the inconvenience
of adjustment for all Member States participating (Schanzer, p.12).
The hazards were military as well as economic: The blockaded State
might be driven, say, to seize certain strategic points of a
neighboring State if the latter joined immediately in the blockade
(Schanzer, p.12). Delay was also a way of preventing precipitate
or vengeful action by Member States (Frangulis, pp.19f; Schanzer, p.14).
These are, of course, aspects of the fear of escalation mentioned
above.

As already seen, the *French response* was that the stringency
of the provision and the possible sacrifices were required for
the success of the common cause, viz., the maintenance of peace.
(Reynald, p.17 and p.20).

4. The need for planning for joint action.--- The proposals gave the League Council a certain role in coordinating and timing the application of sanctions, since the success of the operation clearly required centralized effort and a joint plan. The resulting scheme was aimed at reconciling the Members' national sovereignty of decision with this need for coordination (Schanzer, p.10).

The *French* replied that the new role entrusted to the Council
was an alteration of the Covenant and also a weakening of the
automatic nature of the sanctions operation as described in
Article 16 (Reynald, p.18).

5. The question of extending the Covenant.--- The proposers asserted that their scheme was not an alteration in principle of the Covenant, although certain of their recommendations had to be

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treated as amendments. With striking ingenuity, they were able
to argue that the procedure for postponement in no way contradicted
Article 16's requirement of applying sanctions "immediately," and
that the option of letting some vulnerable States off the hook
did not violate the sacred principle of universal -- and exceptionless --
obligation (Schanzer, p.12, pp.13-14, Report, p.13; Poullet, p.21).

The *French* replied that the new role of the Council was
inconsistent with the automatic nature of Article 16's injunction,
and that "immediately" ought to be taken to mean "immediately."
Any proposed changes in the substance of the Covenant should be
subjected to formal constitutional procedure and not treated as
simple resolutions. Public confidence in the League might otherwise
be seriously weakened. (Reynald, p.18).

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## II. Source Material

The document which presented the proposals for modifying Article 16 to the Second Assembly was "The Economic Weapon of the League," Report of Committee No. 3 of the Second Assembly, adopted by the Committee on 21 September 1921 and submitted to the Assembly on 26 September 1921. It addressed itself to the following questions, as indicated by its chapter headings:

I. Under what conditions should sanctions be applied? Effect of a Member of the League having resort to war in violation of the Covenant.

II. Whose duty is it to decide that the necessity for sanctions has arisen? Nature and limitations of the powers of the Council.

III. At what moment and by whom should the sanctions be applied?

IV. How should sanctions be applied?

The Introduction to the Report stated the problem as it appeared to Committee No. 3 and to the International Blockade Committee (which had studied the issue the year before). The failure to achieve universality of membership would make Article 16 in its present form hard to apply:

> The starting point of the argument and of the conclusions arrived at by the Blockade Committee has been as follows: The authors of the Covenant had considered the League of Nations as an organisation embracing all or nearly all States, and capable of prompt action in the event of a breach of the Covenant. In the view of the International Blockade Committee, the application of Article 16, even had the League been universal, might have formidable consequences either for the League of Nations in general or for some of its Members. But the aforementioned committee was of the opinion that, as the League of Nations has not yet attained a world-wide or nearly world-wide character, a very rigid application of Article 16 would not only meet with very great obstacles, but might also place the States Members of the League in very difficult situations. ...

Your committee has accepted this point of view, and accordingly

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submits to you a new drafting of Article 16, embodying the
amendments which it thought necessary to introduce.
(League of Nations, The Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary
Meetings (5 September - 5 October 1921), Geneva, 1921, Annex
to the Twentieth Meeting: "The Economic Weapon of the League,"
Report of Committee No. 3 of the Second Assembly, adopted by
the Committee on September 21st, 1921, p. 425)

Carlo SCHANZER of Italy, rapporteur of Committee No. 3, spoke
at length to the Twentieth Plenary Meeting, 26 September 1921,
introducing, explaining, and defending the Report. First of all,
he emphasized the significance of the Economic Weapon as a buttress
to public confidence in the League, and the need to be "realistic"
in view of the League's lack of universality:

Why is there still so much scepticism in many countries and
in certain political circles with regard to the League of
Nations, and why is there still so much doubt in regard to its
vitality and its power for effective action?

May I say quite frankly that the chief reason for this lies in
the fact that, in general, the public has no confidence in the
power of the sanctions at the disposal of the League of Nations
to compel respect of the law by a State which desires to escape
its obligations? Hence the great importance we attach to the
correct interpretation of Article 16; that is to say, to the
employment of the Economic Weapon, which certainly constitutes
the most powerful sanction at the disposal of the League of
Nations; and I would add, the most characteristic sanction, and
the sanction most in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant
and with the idea which inspired the creation of the League of
Nations, since it allows us, as far as possible, to avert wars
and to settle international disputes by peaceful means.

In approaching the problem of the application of Article 16,
we are bound to recognise that this article has established a
new system of law which, by reason of its very novelty, raises
many questions and gives rise to many difficulties of interpreta-
tion.

We must remember also that the system of Article 16 was
conceived (as was the whole of the Covenant) on the hypothesis
and on the assumption of a peaceful world and a universal or
practically universal League of Nations. Unfortunately, this
assumption has not been realised up to the present, and this
is the chief cause of the difficulties of application which
confront us. Nevertheless, we must not allow ourselves to be
discouraged, nor give up the idea of the application of
Article 16; we should, on the contrary, study every possible
means of ensuring the operation of the system it contemplates,
and of overcoming the obstacles which may hinder its execution.

Schanzer, cont'd.

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... [This Committee] has / sought to appreciate the difficulties, and it has proposed solutions corresponding to the present state of development of the League of Nations and to the international conditions under which it is called upon to carry out its mission. (League of Nations, The Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings (5 September - 5 October 1921), Geneva, 1921, Twentieth Plenary Meeting, 26 September 1921, pp. 402/403)

Schanzer was anxious to assure his listeners that the Report limited the use of this weapon to the most strictly defined cases, and that an act of war would not be taken as the automatic signal of a general state of war:

... [W]e have thought it necessary to lay down that the economic measures of Article 16 shall be applicable only in the case provided for by the first paragraph of the Article itself:

> "Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15..."
> 
> [This ellipsis in original]

That is to say, when the State has recourse to war without having previously employed the means of peaceful solution of disputes provided for by the Covenant.

A second important point is that which concerns the action to be taken as a result of a State having recourse to war against another State in disregard of its undertakings in the Covenant. In this case there is a definition of [in?] the article itself, which lays down that the said State --

> "shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other Members of the League."

Must we conclude from this that, as the result of the act of the Covenant-breaking State, there ensues immediately a general state of war? We have emphasized the difference which exists between an act of war and a state of war. We agree in stating that the unilateral act of the Covenant-breaking State is not sufficient to create a general state of war.

No doubt the Covenant confers on the other States Members of the League the right to proceed to acts of war against the Covenant-breaking State, and even to declare war on it, but it cannot be held to create a general state of war by itself.

It appeared to us that this solution was in conformity with the spirit of the Covenant, and that, at any rate at the outset, it was necessary and obligatory to seek to avoid violent methods and to have recourse to an economic pressure which might be intensified according to need with a view to the re-establishment of a normal situation. (Ibid., p.403)

Schanzer, cont'd.

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Under the second chapter heading, the Report discussed the key role to be played by the League Council in determining the timing of the sanctions:

It also appeared to us necessary for the application of the sanctions of Article 16 to provide for a centralisation of effort, the establishment of a joint plan of action, and to entrust to the Council the task of guiding this joint action. Thus we came to lay down a method of procedure which would reconcile the principle of independence and autonomy of sovereign States with the necessity for co-ordinating the action of those States in order to ensure the successful application of the Economic Weapon.

Our suggestion is as follows:

"All cases of breach of Covenant under Article 16 shall be referred to the Council as a matter of urgency at the request of any Member of the League. Further, should a breach of the Covenant be committed, or if there arises a danger of such breach being committed, the Secretary-General shall at once give notice thereof to all the Members of the Council. Upon receipt of such a request by a Member of the League, or of such a notice by the Secretary-General, the Council will meet as soon as possible. The Council shall summon representatives of the parties to the conflict and of all States which are neighbours of the defaulting State, or which normally maintain close economic relations with it, or whose co-operation would be especially valuable for the application of Article 16."

Thus, whether there is a breach of the Covenant or merely a threatened breach, the Council would immediately be informed by the action of the Secretary-General or by that of a State Member of the League of Nations, and it would have to meet to give an opinion as to whether there had been a breach of the Covenant or not.

On this point the conclusions of your Committee differ somewhat from those of the International Blockade Committee. The latter considered that the Council should have powers of decision, while we only recognise its right to give an opinion. (Ibid., p. 404)

In giving an opinion, the Council would not count the votes of the parties immediately involved. This was not because unanimity was required, but because it maximized the moral weapon:

When the Council gives such an opinion, the votes of the State charged and of the State bringing the charge, whether Members of the Council or not, should not be reckoned in determining whether or not there has been a unanimous decision.

But the Committee did not consider that the Council's vote need be absolutely unanimous. It might be a majority vote only.

Schanzer, cont'd.

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There can be no doubt, however, that this vote would have all the more moral significance if it were unanimous, but if it were not laid down that the vote of the accused State did not count, this unanimity of which you will appreciate the importance, would never be attained. (Ibid., p.405)

In its third chapter, the Report discussed the timing of the application of economic sanctions and noted that some states might have to undergo exceptional hardship if they were required to meet their obligations immediately. The International Blockade Committee had allowed for exemptions in this regard, at the discretion of the Council. But Committee No. 3 now felt that no exemptions could be tolerated, if the sanctions were to have any chance of success. However, to minimize these exceptional hardships and to minimize the inconvenience to other Members as well, the Council could allow a postponement:

> There is a further question [Schanzer continued] of even greater importance. It concerns possible exemptions from the obligation, laid down by Article 16, immediately to sever relations with the State which resorted to war in contravention of the Covenant. All financial, commercial and personal relations must be broken off, whether the Covenant-breaking State is a member of the League or not. The seriousness of any such exception is obvious. Last year it was pointed out that there might be States which, by reason of their geographical situation, their political circumstances and the insufficiency of their resources, would find themselves in an extremely difficult situation if the sanctions were to be applied immediately.

The Scandinavian Governments have already presented amendments on this point.

In our Committee several delegations, among others the Austrian delegation, pointed out the difficulties which might be entailed for certain countries by the immediate application of these sanctions, and the interruption, at a moment's notice, of all relations with the Covenant-breaking State.

A long discussion took place in the Committee. The Committee felt that it could not agree with the solution adopted by the International Blockade Committee. The latter considered that the amendments of the Scandinavian States should be met to a certain extent, and had proposed an amendment to Article 16 running as follows:

> "The Council may, however, at the request of a Member which can show that the facilities demanded are essential for its economic or political security, grant such exemptions

Schanzer, cont'd.

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as, in its opinion, will not conflict with the aims of
Article 16 of the Covenant."

This amendment contemplates the possibility of a derogation
in certain definite cases.

Your Committee was of the opinion that it was not possible
for any State to withdraw from the engagements laid down in
Article 16, and that such a derogation even in special cases
was inadmissible; indeed, such a derogation might threaten to
disturb the whole system, and fail to take into consideration
the difficulties which might arise, and we were compelled to
consider the question, not from the point of view of the private
interest of a State, which would not desire to apply immediately
all the measures prescribed (the rupture of commercial and
financial relations, etc.), but from the point of view of
joint action and the necessity of ensuring its success.

This success might be compromised if any single State, in a
special geographical or political situation, were compelled
at the outset to make an immediate application of all the
sanctions; it might then happen that the blockaded State would
be driven to take military measures -- for example, to seize
certain strategic points of the other State. It would therefore
be to the interest of all -- at any rate, for a certain time --
not to oblige the neighbour of a blockaded State to make an
immediate application of the sanctions of Article 16 to their
full extent.

It was also considered necessary to reduce to a minimum,
as Article 16 itself enjoins, the loss and inconvenience
which might result from the application of the economic sanctions
to the States Members of the League, and to avoid as far as
possible that the consequences of the employment of the
Economic Weapon should recoil upon the latter.

After long discussions, we adopted an amendment which does
not absolutely allow of exemptions from the obligations of
the Covenant, but which lays down that, under certain circum-
stances, the Council may, in the case of particular Members,
decide upon the postponement of any of these measures for a
specified period where it is satisfied that such postponement
will facilitate the attainment of the desired object, or that
it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience
which will be caused to such Members.

But we have not admitted that a State can withdraw from its
obligations under Article 16, or that any exemptions from them
can be contemplated. (Ibid., pp.406-407)

How does this postponement provision square with Article 16's
express injunction to act "immediately"? If we look for a moment
at the relevant section of the Report itself, we find the reply
that (a) some delay must be allowed for organizing any joint
action, and (b) there is a difference between the timing of an
obligation and that of its execution:

Report, cont'd.

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The Committee agrees with the International Blockade Committee as regards the following statement: In view of the fact that it is necessary in the general interest that the economic weapon should be effective, and that for this purpose efforts must be centralised and a common plan of action adopted, the Council should fix a date on which the measures in question should be taken, and it should give notice of this date to all the Members of the League.

It is true that in paragraph 1 of Article 16 the word "immediately" is used, but this word may, in the opinion of the majority of the Committee, be reconciled, according to circumstances and common sense, with the necessary and inevitable period required for the adoption and putting into practice of a common plan for the application of the economic sanctions.

... [T]he expression "immediately" used in Article 16 must, in the opinion of the majority of Your Committee, be interpreted as meaning that the act constituting a breach of the Covenant entails an immediate obligation for all Members of the League to break off their relations with the defaulting State. This, however, does not mean that, as far as time is concerned, certain States may not, by common agreement and in the general interest, be absolved from the immediate carrying out of this obligation. In interpreting the word "immediately" in the light of the existing situation and of common sense, we are therefore inclined to the view that the execution of the obligation must be effected without delay, when, having regard to the common object in view, such execution is essential. (Report, pp. 430/431)

Schanzer made the same points in his speech, adding that the new flexibility safeguarded the credibility of the sanctions:

In the same part of the report we have formulated a further draft resolution dealing with the application of economic measures. We have suggested that the Council should fix the date for the application of the economic pressure contemplated in Article 16, and should give notice of that date to all States Members of the League.

This suggestion is justified by the reasons I had the honour to state just now. When the application of the Economic Weapon is decided upon, a joint action must be commenced according to a concerted plan. It will be the duty of the Council to determine at what time the application of the projected measures should begin.

It might be objected that this proposal is in contradiction to Article 16, which lays down in its first paragraph that the States shall undertake immediately to submit the Covenant-breaking State to the severance of all relations; but we considered that this contradiction was only apparent. The word "immediately" concerns especially the obligation. As soon as the situation contemplated in Article 16 arises, all

Schanzer, cont'd.

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the States are under an immediate obligation to break off their relations with the Covenant-breaking State. But we must draw a distinction between the obligation and its execution. There may be a common interest in delaying the execution for a time. Moreover, it is both reasonable and natural that a certain time should elapse in order that the various States may arrive at an agreement, with a view to preventing any State from beginning to enforce the measures prescribed by Article 16 on its own account, which would not correspond to the spirit of the article. It would be equally dangerous for a State to expose itself to serious consequences by applying alone the prescribed measures to the defaulting State, the more so because this single intervention would run the risk of not producing the required effect on the Covenant-breaking State, which would constitute a danger for the League itself. (Twentieth Plenary Meeting, p. 407)

Schanzer cited the virtues of the principles of moderation and graduation, arguing that the latter allowed for increasing stringency if necessary and for leniency if possible:

I might add that in the solutions we have the honour to submit to your consideration we have endeavoured to be guided by principles of moderation and graduation, whilst having regard to realities, the general condition of the world and the sphere in which the League of Nations must operate. We have also considered the necessity, which I have already mentioned, of reducing as far as possible the inconvenience which might result for the States Members of the League from the application of these measures. That is why, for example, we suggested that the interruption of diplomatic relations should, in the first place, be limited to the withdrawal of the heads of missions, and that consular relations might possibly be maintained.

We have affirmed the principle of the graduation of the sanctions. In case of prolonged application of economic pressure measures of increasing stringency can be taken, but the cutting off of food supplies of the civil population of the Covenant-breaking State should be regarded as an extreme and drastic measure, which should only be applied if the other measures available are clearly inadequate.

We have suggested that humanitarian relations should be continued.. (Ibid., p.408)

The Report for which Schanzer was rapporteur offered to the Assembly the following resolutions and amendments:

## I. Chapter I, Resolutions:

1. Subject to the special provisions of Article 17, the economic measures referred to in Article 16 shall be applicable only in the specific case referred to in this article.

Resolutions and Amendments, cont'd.

2. The unilateral action of the defaulting State cannot create a state of war: it merely entitles the other Members of the League to resort to acts of war or to declare themselves in a state of war with the Covenant-breaking State; but it is in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant that the League of Nations should attempt, at least at the outset, to avoid war, and to restore peace by economic pressure.
(Report, p. 427)

II. Chapter II, Resolutions and Amendment:

1. It is the duty of each Member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been committed. The fulfilment of their duties under Article 16 is required from Members of the League by the express terms of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them without breach of their treaty obligations.

2. All cases of breach of breach of Covenant under Article 16 shall be referred to the Council as a matter of urgency at the request of any Member of the League. Further, should a breach of Covenant be committed, or if there arises a danger of such breach being committed, the Secretary-General shall at once give notice thereof to all the Members of the Council. Upon receipt of such a request by a Member of the League, or of such a notice by the Secretary-General, the Council will meet as soon as possible. The Council shall summon representatives of the parties to the conflict and of all States which are neighbours of the defaulting State, or which normally maintain close economic relations with it, or whose co-operation would be especially valuable for the application of Article 16.

3. /This resolution calls for adequate notice and full publicity for all Council actions./

4. /This resolution allows for the establishment of a technical advisory committee to assist the Council./
(Report, p. 429)

Amendment: The Council has to give an opinion as to whether a breach of the Covenant has taken place or not. ... /In Council deliberations, votes of accused and accusing parties are not counted./ (Ibid., p. 430)

III. Chapter III: Resolutions and Amendment:

1. The Council should fix the date on which the enforcement of economic pressure, under Article 16, is to be begun, and should give notice of that date to all the Members of the League. /

2. All States must be treated alike as regards the application of the measures of economic pressure, with the following reservations:

(a) It may be necessary to recommend the execution of special measures by certain States.

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(b) If it is thought desirable to postpone wholly or partially, in the case of certain States, the effective application of the economic sanctions laid down in Article 16, such postponement shall not be permitted except in so far as it is desirable for the success of the common plan of action, or reduces to a minimum the losses and embarrassments which may be entailed in the case of certain Members of the League by the application of the sanctions.

(Ibid., pp. 431-432)

Amendment: Insert after first paragraph of Article 16:

Nevertheless, the Council may, in the case of particular Members, postpone, the coming into force of any of these measures for a specified period where it is satisfied that such postponement will facilitate the attainment of the object of the measures referred to in the preceding paragraph, or that it is necessary in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience which will be caused to such Members. (Ibid., p.432)

## IV. Chapter IV, Resolutions and Amendment:

1. It is not possible to decide beforehand, and in detail, on the various measures of economic, commercial and financial nature to be taken in each case where economic pressure is to be applied.

When the case arises, the Council shall recommend to the Members of the League a plan for joint action.

2. The interruption of diplomatic relations should, in the first place, be limited to the withdrawal of the heads of missions.

3. Consular relations may possibly be maintained.

4. Members are to sever economic relations with residents of the Covenant-breaking State, rather than with all nationals of that State.

5. Food supplies are to be denied to the blockaded State only as an extreme and last resort.

6. There are to be separate special regulations to deal with postal relations with the blockaded State.

7. Humanitarian relations are to be continued.

8. Arrangements shall be made for coordination of efforts with non-Members whose cooperation would be valuable.

9. Technical arrangements are to be worked out for carrying out an effective blockade.

10. Member Governments are urged to make legislative and other arrangements beforehand for their participation in possible League blockades.

(Ibid., pp. 435-436)

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Amendment: The word "residents" is to replace all instances of the word "nationals" in the text of Article 16's provisions for severance of economic relations. (Ibid., p.436)

In the debate which followed Schanzer's speech and presentation of the Report, the French delegate REYNALD urged that Resolution III.1, which gives the Council the power to establish the date of the imposition of sanctions (see above, p. 15), should be treated as a draft amendment to the Covenant. He felt that the proposal was a significant change in the Covenant, and that so serious a matter should not be dealt with so casually as to damage the prestige of the League. Moreover, he argued, the potency of Article 16 depended upon the categorical nature of its provisions:

> I do not deny ... that the economic weapon, as provided for in Article 16, may give rise to considerable inconvenience, and have very serious effects upon the interests of many nations. By requiring them thus to unite in an act of immediate and energetic pressure, the Covenant has obviously required of them certain sacrifices; but it requires them for the success of a cause which is essential to all, the maintenance of peace.

> It is therefore, in the service of the higher interests that we have asked that no modifications affecting the text of the Covenant should be adopted, either in Committee or in the Assembly, unless these modifications are qualified as amendments and submitted to the same examination and the same ratification as other amendments, and I hasten to apologise to those delegates of whom the sacrifices to which I have just referred are, I admit, demanded by the categorical provisions of the Covenant; -- I apologise, I repeat, for expressing the belief that it is absolutely necessary that Article 16 of the Covenant should preserve its full force and its categorical nature.

The distinguished speakers who preceded me have agreed with this principle.

They added that the various draft resolutions or declarations adopted by the Committee in no way infringed upon the rigorous character of Article 16.

I cannot completely share these views. I consider that it is not for us to decide alone on this point, and it is for this reason that we must have amendments in cases where doubt might arise.

I would go further and say that, wherever there is even the

Reynald, cont'd.

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slightest conceivable uncertainty, we are bound, in the very
interest of the League of Nations, for the sake of its future,
its authority and its prestige, to accept the qualification of
an amendment, and to require the ratifications which are
indispensable.

.... The day must never come when a people could consider
that decisions of such a nature as to weaken a text or modify
it have been taken without due regard to its constitutional
forms, and it must not happen that peoples who have thus
decided, by virtue of Article 16, upon stringent economic
sanctions, which they purposely/desired stringent because
they wished them to be effective, should be able to consider
that at any given time this weapon has been shattered, or
impaired by an outside agency, and that it no longer offers
the same value, the same security, or the same guarantee.
(Twentieth Plenary Meeting, pp. 417/418)

He argues that the word "immediately" in the relevant part of
Article 16 is the key word in the passage and decisive for the
Article's deterrent effect:

Now my first point is this: the word which dominates the
whole passage regarding the severance of relations is the
adverb "immediately." On reading the text this word produces
the impression that immediately a State commits an act of
war, by that very fact, *ipso facto*, all the other States
should at once sever economic, commercial or financial
relations with it, the postal system should not operate, the
railways no longer reach their former destinations, etc.
This, therefore, involves a formidable pressure operating
in a minor degree on the State which exercises it, and having
great effects on the State against which it is applied. It
consequently may cause a State which desired to declare war,
or to commit an act of war, to consider the implications of
its action, or it may even prevent it, at the last moment,
from having recourse to this extremity, which is, of course,
what we desire to achieve.

When the Committee proposes the adoption of words the force
of which is to entrust the Council with the duty of fixing
the date of the beginning of the application of the economic
measures constituting the pressure, it is introducing a new
idea into the Covenant.

This addition may possibly be necessary; I do not propose
to discuss the question. . . . (Ibid., p. 418)

Public opinion must have the support of practical measures:

If an act of war takes place public opinion must feel that
it has the support of measures of a practical nature. We
desire that war should cease; we wish to prevent war. It is
believed that economic pressure, rigorously imposed by all, is
a practical and effective means of pressure. (Ibid., p. 420)

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At the same meeting of the Assembly, the Swiss delegate MOTTA spoke of the great power of the League's "moral weapon:"

The League of Nations has two weapons at its disposal -- a moral weapon and an economic weapon.

The moral weapon is the force of public opinion; the economic weapon is the blockade.

In spite of appearances, I maintain that of these two weapons the more deadly and the more effective is the force of public opinion. Indeed the blockade itself when applied could hardly yield decisive and final results unless supported by the public opinion of all countries. (Ibid., p.412)

He also pointed out that the League's lack of universality of membership was a serious obstacle:

> It is, indeed, difficult to imagine how a blockade could operate completely as long as the United States do not participate in it, or have not recognised it. (Ibid., p. 414)

The next day, 27 September 1921, the Twenty-First Plenary Meeting of the Assembly decided on a few minor but interesting changes in regard to the proposed resolutions. The rapporteur made no objection to Reynald's motion to treat Resolution III.1 as an amendment, and it was formally submitted to the Amendment Committee (Twenty-First Plenary Meeting, p.444 and p.456). Before submission, however, Sir Robert Cecil, delegate from South Africa, suggested that the word "fix" in the passage "The Council should fix the date of the beginning of the application of sanctions..." should be changed to "propose." This sounded too weak to the Belgian delegate Poullet, who suggested "recommend." This was accepted (see p. 440, p.448). All 17 resolutions were then passed (pp.450-458).

At the Twenty-Ninth Meeting, 3 October 1921, the Greek delegate Frangulis proposed to add "Before any of the sanctions are put into force," in front of the proposed amendment "The Council has to give an opinion as to whether a breach of the Covenant has taken place

Frangulis, cont'd.

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or not..." He saw this delay as an additional safeguard against precipitate or vengeful action by a Member State:

> We have, in fact, to decide whether we should surround the application of a measure of justice with all indispensable guarantees, or whether, on the contrary, we are to leave to chance, or possibly to the spirit of vengeance, the application of a weapon which constitutes for us all the supreme sanction. (Twenty-Ninth Meeting, p. 737)

This additional specified delay was seen as unsuitable, however, and Frangulis's sub-amendment was defeated the next day, 4 October 1921, at the Thirtieth Plenary Meeting. A number of small powers voted in favor: Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Greece, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serb-Croat-Slovene State. The same meeting thereupon passed the four proposed amendments unanimously (see pp.806-812).

During this debate, the French delegate Reynald spoke again of his country's belief that peace, and such noble aims as disarmament, depended upon the firm guarantees provided by a strong Article 16:

> It is because France ardently desires peace that she wishes to make the economic weapon in the hands of the League of Nations as strong a weapon as possible. We must remember that the peoples will be the more inclined to reduce their individual armaments in proportion as they are conscious of greater strength and greater guarantees from the League of Nations. It is for this reason that, while fully recognising the difficulties which might arise from the application of a rather rigorous provision, we accept the text with all its consequences, because we wish to arrive at the essential end -- the maintenance of peace; in our view, all secondary and individual considerations should give place to this fundamental consideration. (Ibid., p.810)

At the close of this Thirtieth Meeting of the Second Assembly, a resolution was passed unanimously, which declared all the resolutions and proposed amendments to be guiding principles in the interval before the final ratification of the amendments:

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The resolutions and the proposals for amendments to Article 16 which have been adopted by the Assembly shall, so long as the amendments have not been put into force in the form required by the Covenant, constitute rules for guidance which the Assembly recommends, as a provisional measure, to the Council and to the Members of the League in connection with the application of Article 16. (Ibid., p.814)

ADDENDUM:

The Belgian delegate POULLET pointed out to the Twentieth Meeting (26 September 1921) that to reduce the inconvenience to Members was not laxity but a way of serving the common interest:

To reduce to a minimum is not to reduce for the sake of reduction alone, nor to exempt certain States from bearing a burden which others accept. It is a reduction in the common interest, maintaining the minimum of sacrifices necessary to ensure the success of the joint action. (Twentieth Meeting, p. 411)