EP

July 13, 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH FREIHERR ZU GUTTENBERG, June 30, 1962.

From: Henry A. Kissinger

Guttenberg began our conversation with a discussion of the German domestic political situation. He said he was extremely unhappy with Schröder, who was pursuing a policy which was extremely reckless and which would end with concessions on vital interests in Berlin. Schröder had always been an opportunist, according to Guttenberg, and he was now trying to build himself up as a potential Chancellor of a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats. He said that two-thirds of the people who knew something about foreign affairs in the CDU were unhappy with Schröder. On the other hand, this represented only a minority of the CDU.

Guttenberg was worried that the full implications of Schröder's policy would not be apparent for a few years. At that point, many of the CDU people now supporting him would turn against him and also against the United States. In any case, it was a rather sad situation that all the people who had supported NATO and who had been the authors of the pro-Western course for Germany were now on the defensive, while people like Mende and Erler could come back from conversations in Washington claiming to have the full endorsement of the United States. He said the Berlin negotiations had produced a serious crisis of confidence. The proposals that had been leaked to the press were absolutely unacceptable. (He also said it was not the Germans alone who had leaked them, but a combination of Germans

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and American officials.)

There were three points which were not negotiable as far as Gutten-
berg and his friends were concerned: (1) the Oder-Neisse frontier; (2) recog-
nition of East Germany; (3) a change in the political status of Berlin.
Even _de facto_ recognition of East Germany was unacceptable, because it was
only a thin cover for a full acceptance.

The Rusk visit had improved personal relations and had restored
confidence to a certain degree. However, he continued to fear that the
change was above all due to a relaxation of Soviet pressure. If Soviet
pressure increased again, the Federal Republic would have to be ready to
confront some proposals like Rusk's once more. Guttenberg personally was
disquieted by a comment made to him by Kohler on the occasion of the Secretary
of State's visit. When asked about United States long-range aims in
Central Europe, Kohler reportedly replied that the United States wanted a
relaxation of tensions in Central Europe so that the greater magnetism
of West Germany could make itself felt. Guttenberg thought that this was
framing a policy which was bound to weaken Berlin in provocative terms.
How was West Germany going to be a magnet without being accused of revanchism?
He thought that the next few years would see a revival of German nationalism.

Guttenberg then turned to the military situation. He said that
he had had a long conversation with Strauss after the latter's return from
the United States in May. He said that Strauss had the impression that our
policy was being made by abstract theoreticians on drawing boards. It
was absolutely senseless to talk about gross national product, percentages
of the labor force, etc., in the face of German political realities. For

example, the program submitted to Strauss in Washington would require a
German military budget of forty billion marks within five years. No
German government would accept this, least of all the Social Democrats,
who were claiming to be in favor of conventional forces. Similarly, it
was politically impossible to increase German force to 75,000 men as had
been suggested. Also, Strauss was extremely disquieted by what he took to
be our downgrading of tactical nuclear weapons. Guttenberg said Strauss
had told him he would accept the proposal in principle but would make so
many reservations that it could not be realized. Guttenberg said that he
personally agreed with Strauss.