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# CHAPTER VII
## EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

There is a curious disproportion between the energy that has been devoted to the issue of nuclear control and that which has been spent on the issue of the future of Germany. This is no accident. Nuclear control for all its complexity has the advantage of concreteness. Solutions permit technical analysis. Absorption in this problem can therefore serve as an escape from issues which are intangible and much less amenable to mechanical remedies. Yet it is probable that over the next decade the cohesiveness of the Alliance will be tested more severely by the problem of German unity than by the issue of who presses the button for nuclear war.

Basic to any policy regarding the future of Germany is a common conception of East-West relations.

### A. East-West Relations

East-West relations have been a cause of disagreement within the Alliance at least since the death of Stalin. In the early years of NATO, our European allies feared above all that we might return to our traditional isolationism. They, therefore, suppressed whatever doubts they might have had about the American understanding of the Communist threat. If anything, they had an interest in exaggerating the extent of the immediate danger. Stalinist intransigence did not do the rest. America's commitment to the defense of Europe grew absolute. In American thinking the danger of Communist aggression became as ominous as our nostalgia for our historic aloofness from international affairs was great.

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After the death of Stalin, the previous allied unanimity about the nature of the Communist threat evaporated. Under the impact of periodic Soviet peace offensives and the schisms within the Communist world, differences in the allies' approach to the Communist challenge became apparent. Great Britain, Italy and the Scandinavian countries tended to treat every Soviet peace offensive as the beginning of a new era of international cooperation. Each sign of Communist moderation was hailed as a basic transformation of the Soviet system. In these countries the predominant view was that Soviet ideology had become transformed into a Marxist form of moderate nationalism.

In the Federal Republic and in France after the advent of De Gaulle, the attitude has been quite different. The Federal Republic, divided by Communist intransigence and repeatedly subjected to Communist pressures, has seen in Soviet peace offensives merely a variation of tactics, not a major shift in objectives. Supported by France, the Federal Republic has been uneasy about East-West negotiations and fearful that any settlement would legitimize, at least indirectly, the division of Germany. In 1962, Paris and Bonn disagreed with the United States about the utility of the exploratory talks regarding Berlin. They have been uneasy about most of the schemes advanced at the Geneva disarmament conference. France rejected --as the Federal Republic would have liked to do but did not dare--the limited nuclear test ban treaty.

1

Throughout, there had been significant opposition groups in each country which maintained that the threat was exaggerated or even that NATO was provocative. - see the footnote reference? After all you are saying, the sum of actions and attitudes, not argument, leading up to stated positions.

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United States policy has oscillated between these conflicting views.
American pronouncements include many of the phrases of the early days.
of NATO. Our actual policy has tended toward bilateral dealings with
the Soviets. Seeking to straddle the conflicting views of its
allies but not reconciling them, the United States has retained the liturgy
of the Cold War and adopted a good deal of the practice of those urging a
policy of relaxation of tensions.

As a result, much of the allied debate about East-West relations has
concerned not the content of a program for negotiation but the nature of the
Soviet system. Those who see a change of policy in every Soviet change of
tone tend to transform foreign policy into a form of psychotherapy. To them
a great deal depends on establishing good personal relations with Soviet leaders
and on bringing about a general atmosphere of goodwill. Those who insist on
the unchangeable nature of Soviet hostility postulate a Soviet society immune
to the erosion of time--an achievement unprecedented in human history.

But the desirability of easing tensions should never be in dispute.
The only sensible debate can concern the question of how peace can be
achieved and then made secure. The issue is not whether tensions should
be artificially maintained, but what their cause is and how they can best
be ended. Is the Cold War the result of personal malice or does it have
deeper reasons? Is the road to a lasting detente to improve the
atmosphere first and move from there to specific settlements? Or is
a relaxation of tensions reliable only if it is tied from the
very beginning to a settlement of outstanding issues? Above

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all, what exactly is to be understood by a settlement? These are
the questions which the Alliance must answer for itself if it is to determine
whether a given peace offensive represents a change of tactics or a change of
policy.

Peace offensives, of course, are not new in Soviet history. Peaceful
co-existence has been avowed since the advent of Communism in Russia. It was
stressed particularly between 1924-39; between 1941-46; at the time of the
Geneva Summit Conference of 1955; again on the occasion of Khrushchev's visit
to the United States in 1959; since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. On each
occasion the reason for the detente was some internal or external strain on
the Soviet system. In 1924, it was the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky
followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture and the purges; in
1941-46 it was the German invasion; in 1955 it was the succession struggle
after the death of Stalin; in 1959 it was part of a Soviet attempt to push
the Western allies out of Berlin; since 1962 it has been caused by the shock
of the defeat in Cuba and the internal strains on the Soviet system.

On each occasion the period of relaxation ended when an opportunity
for expanding Communism presented itself. The period of tranquility after
1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, of the Baltic States, a
third of Poland, and an attack on Finland. War War II led to the creation of
the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to an
attempted penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And, the
spirit of Camp David was succeeded by another Berlin crisis which did not end
until the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

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During each previous Soviet peace offensive, many in the West --including some who thought of themselves as staunchly, sometimes almost religiously anti-Communist--hailed a fundamental change in Soviet attitude. This demonstrates the extent of the American consensus that conflict is usually the result of individual malice rather than of structural causes. The corollary is that East-West tensions can be ended by a simple change of heart on the part of Communist leaders. In 1933 a noted historian wrote:

> The former crusaders of world revolution at any cost have exchanged their swords for machine tools and now rely more on the results of their labor than on direct action to achieve the ultimate triumph of the proletariat.²

When Stalin abolished the Comintern in 1943, the then Senator Connally from Texas commented: "Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of communism and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."³ In 1956 Secretary Dulles was impelled by the spirit of Geneva to say: "The Soviet leaders are scrapping thirty years of policy based on violence and intolerance."⁴ This is matched by Secretary Rusk's statement early in 1964: "They [the Communists]

² Michael T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the USSR* (New York: The MacMillan Co. 1933), p. 216.

*New York Times*, May 23, 1943.

U.S. Department of State Press Release, No: 92, February 25, 1956.

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appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction
between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of
the Soviet state and people."⁵

Each of these assessments turned out to be mistaken--except
Secretary Rusk's about which returns are not yet in. The reason is not
obscure. Any system has its own dynamism which shapes its leaders and
affects what is considered reasonable in internal discussions. There is
need for an assessment of those factors in the Soviet system which produce
belligerence and those which make for accommodation. These are delicately
balanced. It should be the goal of Western policy to give a maximum spur
to the peaceful trends.

Two factors encourage intransigence in the Communist world:
the kind of man who rises to leadership positions and the ideology on which
the Communist system is built.

Any comparison of the composition of the Presidium of the Communist
Party of the U.S.S.R. at the beginning of any decade with its membership at
the end of that decade illustrates the precariousness of high office in the

⁵ Secretary Rusk, "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries: Differently," address to the Full Citizenship and World Affairs Conference of the International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers at Washington, D.C. on Feb. 25, 1964, DOSB, Vol. L, No. 1290 (March 16, 1964), p. 393.

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[N]

6. Soviet system. Turnover is rapid; the penalties for failure in the inevitable leadership struggle are drastic. Loss of position involves public disgrace, usually for the former leader's family as well, and complete separation from all erstwhile colleagues or from any public activity.

Even more poignant than the fate of the top leadership is that of the middle and lower echelons. The top leaders at least have the consolation that the enormous risks they run are on behalf of their own ambitions; those on the lower levels may find themselves engulfed as a result of events totally out of their control. Loyalty may turn into a source of personal danger; subordinate officials will often share the fate of the leader even though they may have had no real alternative.

6. The fate of the first groups of post-Stalin leaders has been described as follows:

Two (Beria and Bagirov) were shot. Six (Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Saburov and Pervukhin) were denounced and expelled from leadership and have disappeared from public life. One (Voroshilov) was publicly denounced, expelled from the leadership but admitted to Khrushchev's banquet circuit. Two (Ignatiev and Melnikov) gradually disappeared from public life following censure.

Three are no longer in positions of leadership but are still members of the Central Committee and occupy positions of secondary importance. These are Aristov, the Ambassador to Poland; Mikhailov, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Pospelov, the director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. One (Ponomarenko) was removed from the Central Committee without censure and occupies a fourth-rate post. Only two (Mikoyan and Suslov) outlasted Khrushchev and are now in the front ranks of the post-Krushchev leadership.

Severyn Bialer, "Twenty-four Men Who Rule Russia," *New York Times Magazine*, November 1, 1964, p. 27.

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All of this creates an atmosphere of suspicion--even of conspiracy--in the Communist leadership groups. There is no legitimate succession. Power goes to those skillful and ruthless enough to seize and hold it. It becomes its own justification because it brings control of the only source of legitimacy: the Communist Party apparatus. In the past, no attempt at collective leadership has lasted. One leader has eliminated all rivals and has not felt restrained by ties of loyalty or by past obligations. Stalin had all the individuals who helped him into power executed. Khrushchev disgraced Kaganovich whose protégé he had been and he turned on Marshal Zhukov six months after being saved by him from a conspiracy of his own colleagues. Brezhnev and Kosygin owed their careers to Khrushchev; they, nevertheless, overthrew him and started a campaign of calumny against him within twenty-four hours of his dismissal.

Only an enormous desire for power can impel a man to enter such a career. Anyone succeeding in Communist leadership struggles must be single-minded, unemotional, unsentimental and dedicated. Nothing in the experience of Soviet leaders would lead them to prize peace as an end or to accept protestations of personal goodwill at face value. Their own career --indeed their survival--has been advanced by the ability to dissemble.

Khrushchev's success, as Brezhnev's after him, depended on his ability to hide his ambition until it was too late for his rivals to organize against him. Suspiciousness is, therefore, inherent in the situation of Soviet leaders. It is unlikely that their attitude toward the outside world

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is more benign. There is no reason for them to treat foreign statesmen more gently than their own colleagues or to expect more consideration from them.

The Soviet system tends to produce leaders who identify their survival with the elimination of all possible rivals. Domestically this means that the power of potential competitors must be broken. Internationally it implies that opponents must be neutralized if at all possible. The motives of Soviet leaders may well be defensive. The problem is that they feel secure only if all conceivable rivals are reduced to impotence. Wary of even his closest colleagues, the type of person who rises to a position of leadership in the Soviet Union will identify security less with goodwill than with a balance of forces and will be tempted to engage in constant probes designed to reduce the power and influence of countries whose size or structure make them possible competitors of the U.S.S.R. This does not make crises inevitable or settlements impossible; Soviet leaders, whatever their experience, are cautious and patient. But if peace were to depend on their pronouncements alone, it would not be very secure.

Soviet tendencies to exert maximum pressure and to emphasize the importance of a balance of forces are reinforced by Communist ideology. To be sure, Communist leaders do not follow the teachings of Marx or Lenin literally; they could not, even if they wished, because these writings are so contradictory and so dependent on tactical considerations. However, if ideology does not guide the day-to-day actions, its basic categories shape the Communist sense of reality. It is considered to be the guarantee of the ultimate victory which will make all sacrifices worthwhile. It is the means for establishing discipline within the world Communist movement by providing

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criteria of legitimacy for the settlement of disputes. While the
growing gap between ideology and reality is one of the latent weaknesses of
any Communist system, in the immediate future ideology continues as one of
the prime obstacles to a basic accommodation.

Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism supplies an invaluable tool
in understanding historical trends and the relation of forces existing at any
particular moment. According to it, "subjective" factors, such as the
personal convictions of statesmen, matter less than the "objective" factors
which they reflect. These objective factors include the social and economic
conditions of society, the nature of the economic process and, above all, the
class struggle. Communists consider that Marxism-Leninism enables them to
distinguish between appearance and reality, to avoid the "subjectivism"
inherent in an excessive reliance on personality and the "adventurism" which
risks a historical movement on one throw of the dice.

Belief in the predominance of "objective" factors explains why
Soviet leaders, whenever they have had to make a choice between Western
goodwill and a territorial or political gain, have unhesitatingly chosen the
latter. The friendship of the West built up during the heroic efforts of
World War II was ruthlessly sacrificed to the possibility of establishing
Communist-controlled governments in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva
did not survive the temptations offered by the prospect of penetrating
the Middle East. The spirit of Camp David ended with another ultimatum
on Berlin. The many overtures of the Kennedy Administration were rebuffed
until the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated that the balance of forces was not
in fact favorable.

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The Soviet reliance on "objective" factors is one of the reasons that negotiations with them have often been so frustrating. Communist negotiators cannot admit that they could be swayed by the arguments of opponents whose understanding of the basic laws of historical development is, by definition, inferior to their own. They cannot reciprocate "concessions" because they believe that concessions are made to reality, not to individuals. They may change their position, but they will go to great lengths to demonstrate that they did so of their own volition and at their own pace. For them a great deal depends on avoiding what seems basic to most Western negotiators; the give-and-take of a bargaining process. Their attitude toward Western negotiators is very similar to that of Western psychiatrists toward their patients: no matter what is said, they think that they understand their Western counterpart better than he understands himself. This is one of the reasons why exercises in personal diplomacy--even at the highest level--have been so futile. No Soviet leader could make an agreement based on the proposition that he has been impressed by the personal goodwill of a capitalist statesman. Settlements are possible; but to be meaningful in Soviet eyes they must reflect "objective" conditions and not a personal relationship.

The ritualistic belief in the importance of the class struggle causes Soviet leaders to adopt a posture of irreconcilable philosophical hostility toward the non-Communist world. Even while advocating political co-existence, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. declared:

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[N]

The C.P.S.U. [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] resolutely opposes peaceful coexistence in the province of ideology. These are elementary truths, and it is time for everyone who considers himself a Marxist-Leninist to master them.⁷

Thus, peaceful co-existence is never advocated for its own sake. It is justified primarily as a tactical device to overthrow the West at minimum risk. In replying to Chinese charges that it was abandoning world revolution, the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. proposed the following test for the policy of "peaceful co-existence":

> Does the policy of peace and peaceful co-existence favor the development of the revolutionary class struggle in the capitalist countries, the upsurge of national liberation movements?⁸

In yet another reply to their Chinese tormentors, the Soviet Communist Party affirmed:

> We fully support the destruction of imperialism and capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable death of capitalism, but are doing everything possible for it to be accomplished through class struggle as quickly as possible.⁹

7 "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," open letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as it appeared in *Pravda*, July 14, 1963, pp. 1-4, *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* [hereafter cited as *CDSP*], Vol. XV, No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 23.

8 "Another Statement Answering Chinese on Test Ban," statement of the Soviet Government as it appeared in *Pravda*, September 21, 1963, pp. 1-2, and September 22, 1963, pp. 1-2; *Izvestia*, pp. 1-2 and 1-3, *CDSP*, Vol. XV, No. 38 (October 16, 1963), p. 12.

9 "The Soviet Reply to the Chinese Letter," *op cit.*, *CDSP*, Vol. XV. No. 28 (August 7, 1963), p. 20

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Moreover, "peaceful co-existence" is advanced by Soviet leaders not as a new insight, but as the continuation of Leninist tradition. This proposition has elicited the following exasperated comment from George F. Kennan:

> ... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in ... their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life ... by pleading that such an attachment flows inevitably from the nature of the social and political system prevailing in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed; it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did not need to change in order to meet the requirements of peaceful co-existence...¹⁰

These factors, which almost overnight could produce again an expansionist Communist foreign policy, must be balanced against restraints which, over a period of time, may come to predominate. First, there is the power of modern weapons. Ideological hostility comes up against the stark risks of nuclear warfare. Soviet leaders must be acutely aware that if they press intransigence beyond a certain point, they run the risk of hazarding what they have built up at so much sacrifice over four decades. Whatever strategic theory predominates in the West--even if it is not an ideal one--Soviet planners will not be easily convinced that the danger of escalation in any direct confrontation is not enormous. The West would have to behave extraordinarily foolishly before the Soviets risk an overt military challenge.

To be sure, in some circumstances aggression does not need to take the form of direct military action and this accounts for the persistence of the so-called "wars of national liberation." However, if the West conducts itself with reasonable

10

George F. Kennan, "Peaceful Co-existence: A Western View", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (January 1960), p. 174.

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prudence, the traditional methods of military pressure can be made increasingly unattractive. Then agreements may be possible to implement one interest the two great nuclear powers must have in common: to prevent a nuclear holocaust. It is significant that one of the principal arguments advanced by Soviet leaders on behalf of peaceful co-existence is that nuclear war is too dangerous. It is in the West's interest to see to it that it remains so.

Another factor making for restraint in Soviet foreign policy is the instability of the leadership group. A great deal of the energy of Soviet leaders is absorbed in internal maneuvering. It is a symptom of weakness that over forty years after seizing power, the Soviet Union has not solved the problem of legitimate succession. Each ruler has felt secure only by villifying his predecessor.

In almost half a century of Soviet rule, the reputation of only the first leader (Lenin) has outlived his tenure in office. In the short term, the patience and capacity for endurance of the Russian people may support such a style of government. At some point, however, cynicism and demoralization are likely to set in. Sooner or later, the Communist leaders will be asked by the younger generation how a system which constantly invokes the universality of its maxims can produce leaders who, by the account of their successors, are so fallible and so corrupt; how an ideology which prides itself on its mastery of "objective" forces could have as its pervasive aberration--again by its own account--the "cult of personality."

The difficulty of settling domestic disputes is closely related to the inability of Communist countries to deal with each other. Communist ideology makes no provision for conflict among Communist states. Since national rivalries are thought to be the result of class conflict, they are expected to disappear

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wherever Socialism has triumphed. Since conflict among Communist states is believed to be impossible, no provision for the settlement of disputes exists. Consequently, Communist leaders try to conduct disputes among Communist states as they do their own internal struggles by seeking first to ostracize and then to destroy their opponents. But since Communist states remain sovereign, such tactics cause disputes to harden into irremediable schisms. Each schism, in turn, demonstrates that a supposedly universal orthodoxy can be interpreted in various ways. This must, in time, erode confidence in the universality of Communist ideology as well as the discipline of the world Communist movement.

Thus, events of the past decade have had a shattering impact on the world Communist movement. The enormous tactical flexibility of Communist parties in the past has been due to two factors: belief in the scientific truth of Communist ideology and the existence of Moscow as the center of Marxist infallibility. Belief in scientific truth supplied the inward assurance; the pre-eminence of Moscow provided the discipline without which tactical flexibility easily degenerates into opportunism.

The unity produced by these factors has been undermined by three developments: de-Stalinization, the Sino-Soviet split, and the manner in which Khrushchev has been overthrown. De-Stalinization raised the question of relationship between the scientific truth of the dominant ideology and the murderous cult of personality of Stalin. How could a system which was supposed to end forever man's oppression produce an even more pervasive tyranny than the one it replaced? How could belief in scientific truth be reconciled with slave

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labor camps and a police state? Even if the Russian people did not ask such questions, Communist cadres must have been assailed by doubts which must have been reinforced when Khruschev was overthrown in his turn and denounced for "hare-brained schemes".

The Sino-Soviet split produced the overt fragmentation of the Communist world. While the actual manifestations of the rift may be patched up, its underlying cause seems to be beyond repair. A movement, which claims to represent a universal truth, cannot tolerate two centers of orthodoxy. As long as Peiping rejects the doctrinal pre-eminence of Moscow, the most important reason for discord will persist--whatever temporary adjustments may be made.

The mere assertion of Peiping's independence on doctrinal matters was bound to alter the nature of Communism. Once the Soviet Union's doctrinal infallibility was challenged, the pattern of relationships within the Communist world changed irretrievably. The East European governments, bevet by economic difficulties, saw an opportunity to solidify their sometimes tenuous hold by appealing to the national feelings of their populations. The Soviet Union was no longer in a position to command their loyalty but had to compete for it. In the face of Albanian and then Rumanian defiance, the previously monolithic unity of the Communist world has been eroded. Convinced Communists must be demoralized by the disarray; technicians see in the Sino-Soviet split an opportunity for striking the maximum bargain for their country.

Khruschev's fall has also had unfortunate consequences for the cohesiveness of the Communist world. Communist leaders, whatever their views about Khruschev's merit, must have realized that they were jeopardizing their

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own position by tying themselves too closely to whoever might be in power
in Moscow. Since foreign Communist leaders share many of the characteristics
of their Soviet colleagues—including a highly developed sense for personal
power—the instability of the Kremlin hierarchy impels them to protect themselves
by a measure of autonomy. They must try to prevent their position
from being shaken by every upheaval in Moscow. The initial hesitation of
the Communist parties around the world in endorsing Khruschev's ouster can
be partly explained in this manner.

A more independent attitude corresponds in any event to the dominant
trends in East European countries. A decade and a half of Communist rule have,
if anything, intensified traditional nationalism. Communism has been able to
gain a measure of popular acceptance only where its leaders emphasize national
and not Communist concerns. The autarkic organization of each Communist
economy compounds these tendencies. It encapsulates each state in a system
of total planning, which complicates relations even with Communist neighbors.
A particularly virulent form of nationalism results.

All of this suggests that the current period of relaxation of tension
has been initiated by the Soviets, not because a few individuals have overcome
the opposition of some unnamed Stalinists, but because conditions require it.
To the West the challenge presented by this detente can be defined as follows:
When the Communist world faces internal difficulties, should we bask in the
relative calm of the Communist tone, or should we use the opportunity to press
for the settlement of issues that produced the tension in the first place?

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It can also happen that the two Communist giants may try to outbid each other in giving so-called liberation movements an anti-Western cast--Soviet actions in the Congo are a good example.

Moreover, to the degree that the Soviet Union is certified as the more conciliatory Communist country, a "respectable" form of Communism begins to intrude in the domestic situation of several of our allies. One of the major achievements of the post-war period in Europe has been the isolation of the Communist parties. Under the impact of many factors, to which United States policy has occasionally contributed, this isolation is beginning to break down. In Italy, for example, the "opening to the Left" has resulted in new-found strength for the Communist Party. In France, the demoralization of the traditional parties by De Gaulle and the change in tactics by the Communist Party has opened up prospects of a Popular Front for the first time in thirty years.

Similar factors influence the approach of Communism in the new countries. Until de-Stalinization, ambitious leaders were restrained from joining the Communist camp because this action reduced them to the status of satellites. With the growing disarray in the Communist world it will seem increasingly possible to combine nationalism and Communism. Many in the West draw comfort from this. But it is important to distinguish between a national Communist government in Eastern Europe and a similar regime in, for example, Latin America. A national Communist regime in Eastern Europe is an improvement over the previous condition of absolute Soviet control. A similar regime in Latin America or Africa would inevitably become a center of anti-American agitation.

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If the West is to act purposefully in this situation, it requires a common policy and a specific program. The temptation for bilateral approaches is great. Each national leader, depending on his temperament, has visions of appearing as the apostle of a final settlement or of adding Communist pressures to his own as a bargaining device within the Alliance. This sets up a vicious circle. Each approach to Moscow is followed by a tour to uneasy allies to reassure them. Since leaders generally do not reach eminence without a touch of vanity and since some stake their prestige on their ability to woo the Soviet leaders, they tend to present their contacts with the Soviets as a considerable accomplishment. But the real issues have gone unresolved because they are genuinely difficult; hence they are usually avoided in favor of showy but essentially peripheral gestures. The vaguer the East-West discourse, the greater will be the confusion in the West. An attitude of sentimental optimism will make it impossible to distinguish real progress from surface gesture. The tendency to use East-West relations for domestic politics will in time foment a narrow nationalism.

Such a course is suicidal for the West. It will stimulate distrust within the Alliance. The traditional Western balance of power diplomacy will reappear manipulated by the Kremlin. Whatever incentives the Soviets will have to be responsible will vanish. They will be able to escape their difficulties with the assistance of the West and without settling any of the outstanding issues. Since in the Kremlin--as in the West --there must be many who consider maintaining the status quo preferable

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to change, the result is likely to be diplomatic paralysis obscured by
abstract declarations about peace and friendship.

A great deal depends, therefore, on two related policies: (a) The willingness by the members of the Alliance to subordinate short-term advantages to a long-term conception of the future. (b) The willingness to develop a concrete and common program embodying the West's vision of the future. A united West would have unusual opportunities for negotiation. The disarray in Eastern Europe should permit it to adjust its policies to the degree of autonomy shown by the various East European countries. Measures to discipline the arms race could be considered in a new atmosphere. The problem of East-West trade policy urgently requires a comprehensive solution. All these approaches presuppose some consensus in the West about the shape of international affairs over the next decade or so.

Central to any long-term policy is some conception of the future of
Germany. No other issue illustrates as dramatically the need for unity and for
purpose, for an agreed Allied policy as well as for concrete proposals.

B. The Future of Germany

The position of the Federal Republic after De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, and the Franco-German Treaty of Collaboration has become increasingly complicated. After the initial period of shock, the United States undertook an assiduous wooing of the Federal Republic. One motive behind the MLF was to prevent West Germany from accepting a possible French offer of nuclear cooperation--an offer which has not yet been made and, given De Gaulle's awareness of the inter-European equilibrium, might never have been extended.

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In order to tie Germany to us, successful efforts were made to have German arms purchases funneled to the United States. The culmination of this process was the agreement between Secretary McNamara and Defense Minister von Hassel of November 14, 1964, which in effect made the German armed forces dependent on the United States for their military equipment.

In the political field the United States, while welcoming Franco-German rapprochement, has made clear that it does so only as long as this does not lead to a new power grouping--a condition inherently impossible of fulfillment. Thus, George McGhee, U.S. Ambassador to Bonn, has said:

> It is true that the signature of the Franco-German Treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been achieved without formal commitments. Fears which have been expressed that the Franco-German Treaty might be used as a vehicle for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.

American pressure and high-handed French actions have caused the Treaty of Collaboration to become largely a dead letter, and the MLF has transformed the previous cordiality into coolness. With progress toward European integration blocked, and with the Franco-German Treaty ineffective, the Federal Republic, courted on all sides, finds herself in an extremely uncomfortable position. Among responsible Germans the impression has grown that the Federal Republic is being asked to choose between France and the

11

George McGhee, "Some Thoughts on Current Issues," July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), pp. 140-1.

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United States. This threatens to split the pro-Western elements in Germany into pro-American and pro-French factions. Over a period of time, the beneficiaries must be the nationalists or the quasi-neutralists (who sometimes appear in the same guise). Thrown on its own resources by the rivalry of France and the United States, the Federal Republic has been forced to become increasingly conscious of its own national aspirations.

Thus, Germany is growing more vulnerable to Soviet siren songs and Communist blackmail--a tendency which is further magnified by American hints that Germany should be more flexible toward the East. As long as Germany could avoid a direct confrontation by pleading the pre-eminent role of some other relationship--the Western Alliance or the Franco-German Treaty--these dangers were minimized. The combination of De Gaulle's abruptness and America's short-sighted reaction to it threatens to bring about what each of the rivals should fear most: a Germany increasingly absorbed in its own unfulfilled national aims and aware of the bargaining position conferred on it by its central position.

All this threatens to upset the delicate balance on which Germany's integration into the Atlantic Alliance was built. It exposes the Federal Republic to dangerous pressures and unfulfillable temptations. Germany has emerged as the balance wheel of the Western Alliance. The most exposed Western ally, seventeen million of whose people are Communist hostages, becomes the focal point of all disputes. Its internal structure may not be

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equal to this strain. There are signs already that the conflict
may tear apart the governing party, the CDU, which is largely responsible
for the pro-Western orientation of the Federal Republic. This will liberate
tendencies in the other parties which are now restrained by their desire to
present themselves as responsible trustees of a well-established consensus.
France, in turn, seeing that the Franco-German Treaty by which it has sought
to limit the Federal Republic's freedom of action has had the practical
consequence of enhancing Germany's national role, may be tempted to seek
reinsurance by improving its relations in Eastern Europe. Thus the current
situation contains a series of time-bombs.

The most serious potential conflict between the Federal Republic
and its allies--and the lever which the Communist countries may hope to use
to pry Germany loose from its Atlantic ties--concerns reactions to the
division of Germany. The problem is complicated by three factors: (a) NATO
is an alliance of status quo countries; yet one of its principal members
seeks a basic change in the status quo. (b) None of Germany's allies
shares her national aspirations with equal intensity. (c) Germany's past
has left a legacy of distrust which creates special obstacles to its
international role. These divergences would be difficult enough for a
cohesive Alliance; Franco-United States rivalry threatens to make them
insoluble.

These problems become particularly severe whenever there appears to be
some relaxation in East-West tensions. To most of the members of NATO, detente
comes as a welcome respite. To the Federal Republic, it implies the danger of

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a tacit acceptance of the status quo. Most allies do not find the status quo intolerable whereas the Federal Republic considers consolidation of the East German regime a sacrifice of basic national aspirations.

This is why German leaders are always extraordinarily ambivalent during periods of détente. They welcome relief from pressures against Berlin; but they are uneasy lest all other aspects of the German situation become frozen too. They make a distinction between "peripheral" settlements which they welcome and "central" agreements which they oppose unless they bring some visible progress on the German question. If this progress is delayed too long, there will be increasing pressures for purely German initiatives. The West may be confronted increasingly with the choice whether the goal of German unification is to be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or by Germany as a separate national policy.

Many in the West find either prospect disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy that international tensions should focus on Germany for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to rearm Germany, it is too late to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

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[Y]

The fate of the seventeen million people in East Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept their country's division as permanent. Growing prosperity in the Federal Republic tends to magnify the uneasy feeling of guilt and responsibility. Any determined, perhaps demagogic, group could suddenly bring the issue to the fore. Coupled with setbacks in other fields, this could severely shake the political stability of the Federal Republic. A so-called Rapallo policy--a change of fronts toward the East--is extremely unlikely; but it would be serious enough if in German eyes the Alliance seemed to clash with basic national aspirations. The Soviet Union would then be able simultaneously to use a national appeal to Germany and an appeal based on the fear of Germany to the other Western countries.

Any policy on Germany must have three components: (a) relations with the Soviet Union, including the general problem of relaxation of tensions; (b) relations with the East-German satellite regime, and (c) relations with the East European governments. In all three respects the interests of the Western allies and of the Federal Republic are potentially divergent; at the very least they must be carefully synchronized.

With respect to the detente, German concerns about freezing the status quo in Central Europe are often met with the argument that almost any measure which eases tensions also promotes German unification. According to this theory, as co-existence becomes established, Eastern Germany may grow

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dispensable in Soviet eyes. As the Soviet Union begins to pursue more national policies, the ideological impetus for maintaining a Communist regime in Eastern Germany may decline.

However, it is dangerous to arouse German expectations that could easily be disappointed. The arguments that a detente automatically furthers the cause of German unity must be balanced against others which on the whole seem more likely. A statesman can always escape his dilemmas by making the most favorable assumptions about the future. A wise policymaker will also consider the consequences if his hypothesis should turn out to be wrong. The Soviet Union, even if it becomes less committed ideologically, is unlikely to relinquish its hold on to Eastern Germany simply as a result of an improvement in the international atmosphere. Russia even as a national state has been pushing its frontiers westwards for over two hundred years. Russian leaders may well calculate that to the degree that a detente with the West exists, concessions on the unification of Germany become unnecessary. The German concern that a detente may freeze the status quo in Germany is, therefore, not wholly unjustified.

Thus, progress on other East-West agreements may be stymied by a German veto or by Allied concern about German reactions unless they are coupled with a specific program for German unification. Or else, a relaxation of tensions may appear to Germans as having been purchased at their expense.

This suggests the necessity of relating the interests of all allies in a relaxation of tensions to a specific program for the unity of Germany.

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Granting that the problem of German unification cannot be simply
left to the more or less automatic operation of a detente, the question
becomes how this objective is to be promoted: is it a task for the Alliance
as a whole or should the primary initiative come from the Federal Republic?
Many leaders in both Washington and London seem to favor a more active role
for the Federal Republic. They wish to avoid constant criticisms and to
induce the Federal Republic to assume greater responsibility for its future.

But toward whom is the Federal Republic to assume these responsibilities?
It would be highly desirable for the Federal Republic to take greater initiatives
within the Alliance in helping to develop common policies on Germany's future.
Some American and British officials go further, however. They argue that the
Federal Republic should take the lead in dealing with the East, principally
with the East German satellite. They are convinced that increasing contacts
between the two Germanies will promote the erosion of the East German regime.
According to this school of thought, the superior cohesiveness and strength
of the Federal Republic will give it by far the stronger bargaining position.
At a minimum, such negotiations may make life more bearable for the East
German population. In time, the East German regime would become more humane,
comparable perhaps to the Kadar government in Hungary.

These arguments have found considerable resonance in Germany both
in the Free Democratic Party (FDP) on the right and among the followers of
Willy Brandt in the Socialist Party. They advocate a "policy of little steps"
toward the East German regime. They believe that contacts between the two
Germanies will carry the "bacillus of freedom" into the East and thus erode
the East German satellite.

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But to many in the Federal Republic enhancing the status of Eastern Germany has a different significance. It means that two German states will be competing all over the world; it seems to defer indefinitely any hope for unification. To them the East German regime can, never be simply another East European government. Any attempt to treat it as one will lead to a serious rift in the Federal Republic.

Such a course is, moreover, extremely risky, because the Federal Republic is exposed to exceptional pressures if it is to assume primary responsibility for negotiating about the future of Germany. Its bargaining position will be precarious. Humanitarian concerns will outweigh political considerations; purely German interests will be stressed which cannot be of equal significance to Germany's partners. Even if such negotiations do not succeed in luring Germany out of its formal Western ties, they may demoralize political life in the Federal Republic.

It would be dangerous were Germany's allies to contribute to the already considerable confusion between three partly incompatible objectives: improving conditions in Eastern Germany, consolidation of the East German regime and progress toward German unification. Ameliorating conditions in Eastern Germany is desirable for humanitarian reasons. At the same time, it is likely to help the East German regime consolidate itself and thus make unification more remote except on East German terms. As the respectability of the East German regime grows, the moral cost to the Soviets of maintaining the division of Germany is diminished. As the East German regime gains stature, its pressure on the Federal Republic will almost surely mount.

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This process is likely to be gradual. While the East German regime is striving to cement its international status, its demands may be moderate. But once the East German regime is recognized--or even if its international status is substantially enhanced--it will have major incentives to seek to undermine the Federal Republic. It will, in fact, be driven to do so by its precarious position. National feelings in Eastern Germany, unlike those in Eastern Europe, are hostile to the existing government. In Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia patriotism can lead to the conclusion that the national interest is best served by liberalizing the existing governments. They seem to have become permanent; no focus for alternative loyalties exists. In East Germany, by contrast, national aspirations clash with the existence of a Communist regime. A prosperous, democratic West Germany acts as a powerful magnet. Thus, the East German regime has every incentive to seek to weaken the Federal Republic and it can use its own population as a hostage.

The superior bargaining position of the Federal Republic on which some American policymakers count may, therefore, be an illusion. On the contrary, German political leaders may find themselves increasingly facing a dilemma. In return for easing the fate of the population, the East Germans can demand concrete political gains. Confronted by popular pressures and moved by humanitarian impulses, no German government will find it easy to be dispassionate in deciding at what point an accumulation of seemingly marginal concessions has produced an irreversible trend. In turn, every West German

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[N]

concession to the German Democratic Republic will strengthen those in the West who favor recognition of that satellite regime. The result is more likely to be two hostile, competing German states than progress toward unification.

To be sure, if German political leaders are determined to pursue this course, there is nothing we can do to prevent it. But we should make sure that the West cannot be blamed for the probable consequences. And we should do nothing to encourage policies which may lead to a growing demoralization of the Federal Republic. In 1962, the United States encouraged an "opening to the Left" in Italy which was supposed to isolate the Communist Party. Instead, it has undermined the center and opened the way toward respectability for the Communists. This process could be repeated in Germany with much more dangerous results.

Those in Washington and London who believe that the so-called "flexible" Germans will always follow their lead may, moreover, be in for some unpleasant surprises. The German version of flexibility could become indistinguishable from traditional nationalism. This mood was expressed

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by Berlin's Senator Hoppe at a convention of the Free Democratic Party.

Criticizing the Western powers for insisting on their special prerogatives in West Berlin, Senator Hoppe said:

> Our elementary national interest is paramount. We cannot be satisfied with safeguarding the status quo. Faith in the strength of the West, in its political superiority in the inventiveness of the free world all can be maintained and strengthened only if we exercise initiative in that which we are free to act on in accordance with our national interests. ¹³

Erich Mende, Vice Chancellor and FDP minister for all-German affairs, later supported Hoppe. Unless relations are handled with great delicacy on both sides of the Atlantic, such an attitude carries within it the seeds of serious misunderstandings.

Finally, as German activity toward the East increases, the fear of another Rapallo may create a vicious circle. Germany's Western neighbors will draw closer together; they may also seek to anticipate the Federal Republic by speeding up their own contacts with Moscow. This cannot be in the interest of either Atlantic or European cohesion; in the long run it will prove disastrous for the Federal Republic as well, because it contains the seeds of its eventual isolation.

Only a united Atlantic Community facing jointly the issue of Germany's future can minimize the danger of a sharp conflict between Germany's national goals and its Atlantic ties. The effort to devise a common German policy is essential not only in order to retain Germany as a willing member of the Alliance, but for the peace of Europe as well.

13 Spandauer Volkszeitung, September 13, 1964. I am indebted to Hans Speier, author of a forthcoming book on Germany, for calling my attention to this quotation.

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It is against all probability that a large and dynamic country can be kept divided indefinitely in the center of the Continent which gave the concept of nationalism to the world. As long as two German states exist, they are bound to interact with each other. If they consider that their social and political systems are incompatible, each will be driven to try to subvert the other. Since they contain the same basic population and a similar tradition, each has unusual scope for doing so. The Soviet formula that the two German states should settle their own future is a short-sighted, if clever, move to consolidate the status quo. It guarantees that sooner or later events will be beyond the control of either East and West--and perhaps of the Germans themselves. The permanent division of Germany into hostile, competing states is inherently dangerous. If Germany's neighbors to the East understand their own interests, they will realize that the present course may have the most dire long-term consequences.

If German unification is to be a central concern of the Alliance, a clarification of objectives is necessary. While the Federal Republic should not be urged into bilateral dealings with the East, it should be given every encouragement to make a major contribution to the formulation of an *Allied* position on Germany. When Foreign Minister Schroeder proposed to the NATO Minister's Conference of May 1964 that the three Western powers make new diplomatic overtures on behalf of German unification and when he again pressed for an initiative in December of that year, he deserved a more positive reaction than he received. To be sure, the Western allies were probably correct in their view that any proposal acceptable to the Federal Republic would not prove negotiable with the Soviet Union. But negotiability is only

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one criterion for diplomacy and not always the decisive one. If we can discuss only those items which the Soviets have declared negotiable, the agenda of any conference will be determined by them. On the issue of Germany, in particular, one purpose of Allied negotiations should be to demonstrate that if no progress toward unification is made, the onus for it rests on the Soviets.

Two areas of policy require particular attention: relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the definition of Germany's Eastern frontier.

Today, the East German regime is being widely supported in Eastern Europe, at least in part, because of the historical fear of Germany and the memory of the Nazi occupation. The East European countries are much less committed to the existence of a Communist regime in East Germany than to a divided Germany which may seem to them the best guarantee of their security. Though they cannot admit it, a unified Communist Germany might worry the East European states hardly less than any other powerful unified German state. There is reason to believe that the East German regime is despised in Eastern Europe; but this attitude cannot prevail against the image of a belligerent and hostile West Germany which the Soviets have built up.

Fear of a resurgent Germany is given impetus by some policies of the Federal Republic designed to isolate the East German regime. The Federal Republic refuses to maintain diplomatic relations with any government that recognizes the East German satellite. The so-called Hallstein Doctrine prevents formal diplomatic ties with Eastern Europe though recently the Federal Republic has sought to avoid the issue by establishing trade missions in Eastern Europe. Another obstacle to a West German rapprochement with Eastern

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over by the Soviet Union. The Federal Republic has refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final. This is partly to retain a bargaining lever for an eventual peace conference, partly because of the pressure of the refugees from the disputed territories most of whom now live in the Federal Republic.

The problem posed by the Oder-Neisse line is one of the human tragedies of our time. Expelling thirteen million people from their ancestral homes cannot be justified by citing German crimes during the War. The reluctance of the Federal Republic to renounce territories which had been German for centuries is understandable. Moreover, there is something cynical about the insistent East European demand that the Federal Republic accept the eastern frontier of the East German satellite regime which, in turn, is recognized by all East European countries. The Eastern European countries obviously want to have it both ways: they prefer to keep Germany divided along the Elbe; but they also insist that the Federal Republic recognize the eastern frontier of the Soviet puppet regime on the Oder-Neisse. These inconsistencies complicate a meaningful discussion.

Nevertheless, even granting all these obstacles, the perpetuation of German claims to the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line prevents any progress on the issue of unification. It provides the Soviets with a convenient excuse for maintaining their hold on Eastern Germany; it cements Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. Reluctance to cede a claim to territories which no longer contain any German settlers perpetuates foreign rule over seventeen million Germans between the Elbe and the Oder-Neisse line. The refusal to face the issue of the Polish border guarantees that the frontier of free Germany will remain on the Elbe.

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To be sure acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line will not automatically advance unification. But it is an essential step toward isolating Eastern Germany. It would permit a maximum differentiation in the treatment of the Eastern European states and the East German regime. Coupled with a new approach to the problem of unification, such a gesture by the Federal Republic could demonstrate that the maintenance of a Communist regime in Eastern Germany is not required to safeguard their security and that progress toward German unification is not an inevitable prelude to a new set of pressures.

What could be the elements of a new approach to the German problem?
Three factors must be reconciled: (1) the German desire for self-determination, (2) the East European concern for security, and (3) the Soviet concern lest a unified Germany impair its own security and shake its international position.
These objectives are, of course, incompatible to some extent. A great deal depends on whether it proves possible to convince those most concerned that to strive for absolutes will lead first to stagnation and ultimately to crisis.

For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a detailed program.
The primary need is to agree on a new concept the details of which could be filled in later. One possible course would be to separate the issue of self-determination from that of unification for an interim period, say fifteen years.
Pressure for immediate unification consolidates all opponents of Germany in Eastern Europe and *sub rosa* in Western Europe as well. Self-determination, on the other hand, is a moral imperative commanding a wide consensus. If rejected by the Communists, it would place them at least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: The Western countries, including the Federal Republic, could declare that, while the unification of Germany remains the ultimate goal, their immediate aim is to enable the population of East Germany to choose the form of government which it prefers. The Western allies could, therefore, declare their willingness to acquiesce in the existence

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[N]

of an East German state provided its government emerges from a process of free elections. For a period of fifteen years the territory now comprising the German Democratic Republic would have a status similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A commission composed of the European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps, Finland, would supervise the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebisite supervised by the commission of neutrals to determine whether East Germany wanted to continue as a separate state in a loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral commission certified that a freely elected government had taken over in East Germany, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist.

Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany. Within the Federal Republic foreign troops would retire an average distance of one hundred kilometers from the Western borders of the new East German state and the number of West German troops in that belt would be limited. The Federal Republic would renounce access to the ownership of strategic nuclear weapons.

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Even if there were agreement in principle, many details would remain to be worked out: The precise definition of demilitarization, for example, or what international undertakings would be consistent with the neutral status of the new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution for East Germany is taken, the advantages would be plain: while Germany would have to defer full unification for fifteen years, the German states which emerged would no longer be antagonistic. There would be opportunity for conditions within Germany to be equalized gradually. A foreign regime detested by the population would be removed. The East European states would gain the security of a divided Germany for fifteen years and a demilitarized belt along their borders for the indefinite future. The East European economies could adjust to the loss of the East German partner over a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Germany's frontiers would be settled both juridically and psychologically because the generation which was expelled from Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time Germany was unified. Arms control schemes for Europe could be considered in a new atmosphere. Under present conditions, the Federal Republic is driven to oppose them whatever their merit. By using the dividing line in Germany as the line of demarcation, they reinforce a status quo which is intolerable for Germany in the long run. With the dividing line along the Oder-Neisse, a demilitarized zone established in what is now the German Democratic Republic and a zone of limited armaments in the Federal Republic, the whole issue could be considered in a new light.

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The price, of course, would be high. The Federal Republic would have to defer its hopes for immediate unification in return for agreement on a terminal date to the division of Germany. The Soviet Union would have to be prepared to give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East European governments would have to change their policy of acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior partner. The Western allies would have to overcome inertia and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

But the rewards would be great. Such a program would end a situation which is bound to become more dangerous the longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program rejected initially by the Soviets, it could in time become the basis for an over-all settlement. And it would provide a platform on which the West, as well as the Federal Republic, could stand for the indefinite future.

No major progress is possible, however, as long as the rift in the West continues. The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by holding out vague hopes for the achievement of Germany's maximum objectives. German leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special friendship, it was braking temptations of nationalism and providing

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for the construction of Europe. Washington's attitude towards the Treaty of Collaboration was motivated by a desire to combat Third Force tendencies. These competing efforts stand in danger of producing what they seek to prevent: the attempt to use Germany as a balance-wheel must complete the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country, and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both. It is to the construction of this larger community that we must now turn.