FOREIGN POLICY
REPORTS

September 15, 1947

The United Nations: *Its Record of Achievement*

BY LELAND M. GOODRICH

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# The United Nations: *Its Record of Achievement*

BY LELAND M. GOODRICH, Professor of Political Science, Brown University

The UN shortly will have completed its first two years. During this time, it has had to deal with many difficult problems affecting the peace and welfare of the world. Inevitably it has experienced varying degrees of success. Uncritical optimists have been disappointed. Skeptics have had their doubts confirmed. While the UN to date has achieved little in the way of definitive solutions of the many problems before it, there is no denying the range and intensity of its activity, and the seriousness with which it is being taken by the governments and peoples of the world. A review and evaluation of its work to date may help to orient present and future thinking about the role of the UN.

## ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

The UN Charter was signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945 by the representatives of fifty nations.¹ At the same time interim arrangements were concluded for the establishment of a Preparatory Commission, which was to make provisional arrangements for the first meetings of the principal organs of the UN. The Commission completed its work on December 22, 1945, and submitted a report² which became the basis for subsequent decisions regarding the structure, procedure and functioning of the principal organs of the UN.

The Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945.³ The General Assembly held its initial meeting in London on January 10, 1946. The Security Council met for the first time on January 18, and

1. For description of the background and work of the San Francisco Conference, see Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hanbro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1946), esp. pp. 3-50; and Vera Micheles Dean, *The Four Cornerstones of Peace* (New York McGraw-Hill, 1946), esp. pp. 1-103. See also, Department of State, *Charter of the United Nations. Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference by the Chairman of the United States Delegation, the Secretary of State*, June 26, 1945, Publication 2349, Conference Series 71. For records of the Conference, see United Nations Conference on International Organization, *Documents* (New York, 1946), 16 vols.

2. *Report of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations* (London, 1945).

3. Department of State *Bulletin*, October 28, 1945, pp. 679-90.

the Economic and Social Council on January 23. On February 1 Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, was appointed Secretary-General by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The International Court of Justice held its first meeting at The Hague on April 3. Because of difficulties encountered in the drafting of trusteeship agreements, there was a considerable delay in the constitution of the Trusteeship Council, which did not hold its initial meeting until March 26, 1947.

The original Members of the UN were the states which, having participated in the work of the San Francisco Conference or having been signatories of the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, signed and ratified the Charter. Poland, not represented at San Francisco, subsequently signed the Charter and became the fifty-first original Member.

The Charter provides for the admission of new Members by vote of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. To qualify for membership, states must be "peace-loving," accept the obligations of the Charter, and be able and willing "in the judgment of the Organization" to carry out these obligations. The terms of the Charter clearly allow considerable latitude to the Security Council and the General Assembly in determining how these qualifications are to be interpreted.

During the year 1946, nine membership applications were considered. Three of the applications—those of Afghanistan, Iceland, and Sweden—were approved without difficulty. The application of Siam was initially opposed by France on the ground that a state of war still existed between the two countries, but later, following the conclusion of an agreement between the two countries on November 17, it received the necessary approval. The other applications were rejected by the Security Council. Both the United Kingdom and the United States opposed the application of Albania on the ground that it had not shown ability or

## FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, VOLUME XXIII, NUMBER 13, SEPTEMBER 15, 1947

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willingness to carry out its international obligations. The application of the Mongolian Peoples' Republic was opposed by the same two countries on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of ability to assume international obligations. The applications of Trans-Jordan, Ireland and Portugal were opposed by the Soviet government on the ground that a country which did not have diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. could not be considered as satisfying the requirements for membership. On the final vote in the Security Council, the applications of Trans-Jordan, Ireland and Portugal received the necessary seven affirmative votes, but the negative vote of the Soviet Union prevented the necessary concurrence of the permanent members of the Council. The applications of Albania and the Mongolian Peoples' Republic failed to receive the necessary seven affirmative votes.⁴

The Council's action on membership applications was criticized by the General Assembly during the second part of its first session on the ground of its arbitrary character. After full discussion, two resolutions were adopted. The first of these recommended to the Security Council that it re-examine the applications regarding which no recommendations had been made.⁵ The second requested the Security Council to appoint a committee to confer with a General Assembly committee "with a view to preparing rules governing the admission of new Members which will be acceptable both to the General Assembly and to the Security Council."⁶

After the conclusion of the first session of the General Assembly, applications for membership were made by Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Yemen and Pakistan. These were studied in August by the Security Council, together with the five applications which received unfavorable consideration in 1946 and were re-examined at the General Assembly's request.⁷ The Security Council again rejected the five applications disallowed in 1946, as well as those of the former Axis satellites, but approved the applications of Yemen and Pakistan.

The provisions of the Charter regarding admis-

sion are proving in practice to be a greater barrier to ultimate universality of membership than the corresponding provisions of the League Covenant, due to the fact that a permanent member of the Security Council can prevent favorable action on any application.

## MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

### PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

By the terms of the Charter, all Members are obligated to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." Moreover, parties to a dispute "shall, first of all" seek to settle their disputes by "peaceful means of their own choice." It is only after the Security Council has decided that the maintenance of international peace and security is likely to be endangered by the continuance of the dispute or situation that it may make recommendations as to procedure or terms of settlement. While the Security Council is exercising its functions under the Charter with respect to any dispute or situation, the General Assembly is not to make recommendation, except at the Council's request, although it can discuss the matter.⁸

In the short period of the UN's existence the Charter provisions have been well tested. During 1946, six different questions were before the Security Council: (1) the alleged Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Iran and violation of the 1942 treaty, first brought before the Council by Iran on January 24; (2) the situation created by the presence of British troops in Indonesia, brought before the Council by the Ukraine on January 21; (3) the Greek question, first brought forward by the Soviet Union on January 21 as a dangerous situation resulting from the presence of British troops in Greece, then revived by the Ukraine on August 24, with the additional claim of persecution of minorities by the Greek government; (4) the Balkan question, presented by the Greek appeal on December 3, alleging support by Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to guerrilla warfare in northern Greece; (5) the claim of the governments of Syria and Lebanon, brought before the Council on February 4, that British and French troops were illegally present in these two countries; and (6) the Spanish situation, brought before the Council by Poland on April 9, with the subsequent allegation that the Franco regime constituted a

4. For summaries of the action of the Security Council on these applications, see UN, *Weekly Bulletin*, August 19, 1946, pp. 3-5; September 2, 1946, pp. 2-6; September 9, 1946, pp. 8-11.

5. *Journal of the United Nations*, November 21, 1946, A/P.V./49, p. 334.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 335-37. Admission of new members is covered by Rules 113-116 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly, as amended during the first session, and Rules 58-60 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council. For texts, see *International Organization*, February 1947, pp. 184-208.

7. UN, *Weekly Bulletin*, August 5, 1947, pp. 207-209.

8. For summary of Charter plan, see Leland M. Goodrich, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," *American Political Science Review*, October 1945, pp. 956-70.

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THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS RECORD OF ACHIEVEMENT

threat to the peace.⁹ On January 10, 1947, the British government brought before the Security Council its dispute with Albania over certain incidents that had occurred in the Corfu Channel.¹⁰ Following an extended deadlock in diplomatic negotiations, Egypt brought before the Council on July 11 its dispute with the United Kingdom over the Sudan and the continued presence of British troops in its territory.¹¹ On July 30, the Australian and Indian governments brought to the attention of the Council the situation in Indonesia resulting from conflict between Dutch and Indonesian armed forces.¹²

At first there was considerable confusion in Council action resulting from the absence of satisfactory rules of procedure and the rather loose manner in which the business of the Council was conducted. The Charter envisaged certain decisions of a preliminary nature, such as the ordering of an inquiry and the determination whether the continuance of the particular dispute or situation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The fact that these decisions required the concurrence of the permanent members, except for parties to a dispute, encouraged the use to the full of the right of discussion which it was agreed at San Francisco¹³ was not subject to the veto, and the manipulation of Council procedure so as to minimize the consequences of the use of the veto. This development seemed all the more necessary since the Soviet Union, contrary to the interpretation placed on the San Francisco statement by the other parties to it, claimed the unqualified right of veto whenever the preliminary question whether a matter was procedural or not was raised.

Recent months have witnessed definite improvement in Council procedure. Beginning with the Spanish question, the practice has been followed of appointing a committee of inquiry to determine the facts and provide the basis for subsequent decisions. This procedure was followed when the Balkan question came before the Council, and again when the Council was called upon to consider the British-Albanian dispute. The appointment of committees of inquiry has not given any guarantee that the Council would be able to take

a decision, but it has at least helped to assure a more intelligent and orderly discussion of the case. Moreover, in practice the hard edge of the great power veto has been somewhat dulled. According to the precedent set by the Soviet delegate, a member of the Council can abstain from voting without attaching to the act the effect of a veto. In the Syrian and Lebanese case, the British and French governments set a promising example by agreeing to accept the result of a majority vote which technically did not constitute a decision. Finally, by the terms of the act providing for assistance to Greece and Turkey, the United States waives in advance the exercise of the veto on any finding of the Security Council that such aid is no longer necessary or desirable.

In order to avoid restrictions placed on the Security Council by the detailed provisions of Chapters VI and VII and the rule regarding voting procedure, it was found desirable in the Spanish case to have the question removed from the list of matters with which the Council was seized in order that it might be brought before the General Assembly. This permitted greater flexibility of treatment since the General Assembly can make a recommendation by a two-thirds vote, and under the terms of Articles 10 and 14 can even recommend coercive measures, as it did against Spain,¹⁴ without the need of finding that a present threat to the peace exists. Experience with the Spanish and Palestine questions, as well as the United States proposal to refer the Balkan question to the General Assembly, suggests that the General Assembly may come to play an increasingly active role with respect to situations threatening friendly relations.

It cannot be said that the UN to date has achieved any clear-cut and impressive successes in the field of peaceful settlement. Much of its activity has seemed the unfortunate result of the play of international power politics, especially the growing rivalry between the United States and Russia. Its failure thus far to make use of the advisory functions of the International Court of Justice is discouraging to those who would like to see greater emphasis placed on the role of law in international relations. And yet one can fairly conclude that the UN has performed at least two useful services: (1) it has provided a public forum where accusations can be brought out in the open and fairly considered; and (2) it has assisted in formulating patterns of good international conduct which, in spite of an unfavorable political atmosphere, have an appreciable influence on the course of international relations.

14. For text of Assembly resolution of December 12, 1946, see *Journal*, Suppl. A-64, Add. 1, January 15, 1947, pp. 825-26.

9. For summary of the action of the Security Council on these questions see UN, *Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly*, October 3, 1946, pp. 3-82; and *International Organization*, February 1947, pp. 74-90.

10. For summary, see *International Organization*, June 1947, pp. 326-29.

11. *New York Times*, July 12, 1947.

12. UN, *Weekly Bulletin*, August 12, 1947, pp. 215-25.

13. UNCIO, Doc. 852, III/1/37(1).

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## ENFORCEMENT ACTION AND BREACHES OF THE PEACE

Under Article 39 of the Charter, full responsibility is placed on the Security Council for determining whether there is a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression, and for making recommendations and deciding what measures shall be taken under Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 40 empowers the Council to call upon the parties to comply with provisional measures intended to prevent aggravation of the situation before making the recommendations or taking the decisions provided for in Article 39. Great flexibility in the handling of a given situation is thus permitted.¹⁵ Taking full advantage of these provisions of the Charter, the Security Council promptly proceeded within forty-eight hours after the armed conflict in Indonesia was brought to its attention by Australia and India, to call upon the parties to cease hostilities at once. The Dutch and Indonesian governments acceded to this request. In this case the Security Council, with the permanent members acting in accord, took the necessary first step toward restoring peace and creating conditions permitting further efforts at peaceful settlement.¹⁶ Subsequent developments have been far from encouraging. In the Balkan case, where the permanent members of the Council are in open disagreement as to the responsibility for the situation and the measures to be taken, the Council has thus far been alarmingly impotent. The weakness of the UN as a peace-preserving agency in the face of open great-power conflict is here vividly shown.

Article 106 of the Charter recognizes explicitly that the Security Council will not be in the position fully to exercise its responsibilities under Article 39 until the special agreements provided for in Article 43 are sufficiently in force to enable it to do so. Until then, the permanent members of the Security Council are to consult together with a view to such joint action as may be necessary to maintain international peace and security. Thus far no special agreements have been concluded. In February 1946 the Security Council directed the Military Staff Committee to examine the general principles governing the organization of armed forces under Article 43. Starting in March 1946, the Committee spent over twelve months examining the issues involved. On April 30, 1947 the

Committee submitted its report to the Council.¹⁷ The recommendations of the Committee were set forth in 41 articles. Of these only 25 were accepted unanimously. The points on which agreement was not reached included the nature of the contributions to be made by the permanent members of the Security Council, the location of such forces when not employed, the extent to which right of passage and the use of available bases are to be guaranteed, the organization of command, and the time within which armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council are to be withdrawn. Obviously, these are all questions which must be decided before the agreements envisaged in Article 43 can be made.

Thus it would appear that, so far as military action is concerned, the enforcement provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter will not become operative for a considerable time. That, of course, does not mean that the Security Council is necessarily impotent so far as its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security by measures described in Chapter VII of the Charter is concerned. It can determine whether there is a threat to the peace or a violation of the peace, it can decide on provisional measures to be taken by the parties concerned under Article 40, and it can call upon Members to apply measures not involving the use of armed force under Article 41. Furthermore, in the absence of effective action by the Security Council, it is possible for individual Members or groups of Members, in case of armed attack, to exercise the right of self-defense under the terms of Article 51.

## REGULATION OF ARMANTS

The Charter places far less emphasis on the limitation of armaments than did the League Covenant. In fact it seems to stress the idea of regulation of armaments, instead of limitation or reduction, suggesting that it is concerned with establishing minimum requirements as well as maximum levels. The Charter provisions might have been different if the destructiveness of the atomic bomb had been known at the time of the San Francisco Conference. The use of the bomb convinced Members that it was necessary to put into operation a plan for the effective international control of atomic energy. By the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946, an Atomic Energy Commission was established to make specific proposals for the international control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes.¹⁸

15. For summary of Charter system of enforcement action, see Grayson Kirk, "The Enforcement of Security," Yale Law Journal, August 1946, pp. 1081-96.

16. UN, Weekly Bulletin, August 12, 1947, pp. 215-25.

17. See Donald C. Blaisdell, "Arming the United Nations," and text of Report by the Military Staff Committee in Department of State Bulletin, Supplement, August 3, 1947.

18. Journal of the General Assembly, March 7, 1946, pp. 1-2.

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From the deliberations of the Commission it has become clear that the United States and the Soviet Union are in fundamental disagreement on certain basic issues. These relate to (1) the extent of power to be given to the international authority proposed by the United States; (2) the voting procedure of the Security Council when performing its duties under the proposed agreement; and (3) the time and extent of the release by the United States of information regarding the use of atomic energy. The United States is unwilling to relinquish its present advantageous position until it has the best possible guarantees of protection against the consequences of willful violation of the agreement by another state. The Soviet Union opposes any plan which would permit interference by the international authority in its internal economic affairs or which would deprive the Soviet Union of the veto it now enjoys in the Security Council.¹⁹

The problem of the international regulation of armaments in its larger aspects was raised before the General Assembly during the second part of its first session. After an extended debate, the Assembly finally adopted a resolution recommending that the Security Council "give prompt consideration to formulating the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces and to assure that such regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces will be generally observed by all participants and not unilaterally by only some of the participants."²⁰ In the course of the discussion the old arguments dating back to League of Nations days were revived. States in a favorable armament position were reluctant to agree to any reduction without guarantees that the agreement would be respected and without further provision for collective security. States in a less favorable armaments position, or convinced that they could best attain their objectives by internal political action, favored the immediate reduction of armaments as a step toward peace.

When the question of carrying out the General Assembly's resolution came before the Security Council, the United States insisted that priority be given to the international control of atomic energy, while the Soviet Union proposed that the

general principles covering the whole range of armament reduction be considered. The action finally taken conformed closely to the American position. Questions relating to the international control of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction were referred back to the Atomic Energy Commission, while those relating to the reduction of other forms of armament were referred to a new body, the Commission for Conventional Armaments.²¹ After further debate, in which the fundamental difference between the American and Soviet approaches was again emphasized, the Security Council on July 8 approved a plan of work for this Commission.²²

Without necessarily being able to conclude that history repeats itself, one is forced to recognize a close similarity between the results of the attempts made after World War I to achieve the reduction and limitation of armaments by international agreement and the results thus far of current endeavors. One recalls the conclusion, reached after extensive experience with the efforts of the League, "that no general disarmament is possible in the absence of a well organized World Community."²³ Certainly it would appear necessary at least for the principal Members of the UN to adjust some of their political differences and to achieve some measure of confidence in each other's purposes before any substantial success can be achieved.

## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Included among the purposes of the UN is the achievement of international cooperation "in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Secretariat are the principal organs concerned with carrying out these purposes. Members pledge themselves "to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization" for their achievement.

The Charter recognizes the possibility, and under certain conditions the desirability, of autonomous functional organizations for achieving certain of these particular purposes. Thus Article 57 of the Charter assumes the existence of such agencies "established by intergovernmental agreement

19. For United States and Soviet proposals, see *Atomic Energy Commission, Official Records*, June 14, 1946, pp. 4-14; and June 19, 1946, pp. 23-30. For further details of Soviet position, see statement of Mr. Gromyko before the Security Council, March 5, 1947, UN, Doc. S/P.V. 115, March 5, 1947, and *Proposals on Atomic Energy Control Submitted by the Representative of the U.S.S.R.*, Doc. AEC/24, June 11, 1947.

20. UN, Doc. A/267, December 13, 1946, reprinted in *International Organization*, February 1947, pp. 223-25.

21. For summary of Security Council action, see *ibid.*, June 1947, pp. 320-26.

22. UN, *Weekly Review*, July 22, 1947, pp. 129-30.

23. Salvador de Madariaga, *Disarmament* (New York, Coward-McCann, 1929), p. 42.

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and having wide international responsibilities as defined in their basic instruments," and Article 59 empowers the Organization to take the initiative in setting up such agencies. Their relation to the UN is to be determined by agreements negotiated by the appropriate organs of the UN and the specialized agencies.

The powers of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, acting under its authority, are essentially those of study, discussion and recommendation. Neither organ can adopt a decision on a substantive matter of policy binding a Member, without its specific consent, to any modification of its national law or policy. In other words, the function of the UN and its organs in the economic and social field is to facilitate voluntary co-operation. This must be kept in mind in evaluating the results that have been achieved to date.

Article 68 of the Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council "shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions." The Preparatory Commission took the view that "the organization of commissions of the highest competence, adequately coordinated, is indispensable for the effective discharge of the Council's responsibilities."²⁴ The Council has established eleven commissions as follows: (1) Economic and Employment Commission; (2) Transport and Communications Commission; (3) Statistical Commission; (4) Commission on Human Rights; (5) Social Commission; (6) Commission on the Status of Women; (7) Commission on Narcotic Drugs; (8) Fiscal Commission; (9) Population Commission; (10) Economic Commission for Europe; and (11) Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. In general these Commissions have been set up to examine and study matters within their general field of competence, to advise and make recommendations to the Council, and to assist it in the performance of its duties.²⁵

The Commissions are composed of representatives appointed by designated Members of the UN. In this respect there is an important departure from the League practice of appointing individual experts in their private capacities in appropriate cases.

24. *Report of the Preparatory Commission*, cited, December 23, 1945, p. 34.

25. For a useful listing of the composition and terms of reference of the first nine of these Commissions, see Anne Winslow, *Toward Freedom from Want* (New York, Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, March 1947), pp. 57-68. For Economic Commission for Europe, see UN, *Weekly Bulletin*, June 3, 1947, pp. 601-604; for Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1947, pp. 75-76.

The rule adopted by the Council²⁶ does not apply to subcommissions, members of which are appointed in their individual capacities. Furthermore, in the cases of the Statistical and Economic and Employment Commissions, provision is made for the appointment by the Council of corresponding members serving in their individual capacities, but with the approval of the governments concerned.

While seeming to place great emphasis upon the idea of official representation in the constitution of Commissions, the UN has recognized the important contribution that private organizations can make in the economic and social field. Article 71 authorizes the Economic and Social Council to make suitable arrangements for consultation with such organizations. Under the plan adopted by the Council,²⁷ an organization to qualify for consultation must be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the Council, have aims and purposes conforming to the purposes and principles of the Charter, have a recognized standing, represent a substantial portion of the organized persons within the particular interest field it represents, and be international in structure. Organizations are divided into three categories, depending upon the range of their interests and the nature of their activities. The nature and extent of consultative privileges are determined by the classification of the organization.²⁸ These arrangements would seem to afford a fair opportunity to such organizations to be heard, while protecting the Council against irresponsible groups. Under these arrangements it is possible to canalize pressures that are inevitably brought to bear on public bodies under democratic conditions, and to give the organs of the UN the benefit of experiences and points of view which have not succeeded in finding adequate expression through official channels.

Important functions in the field of economic and social cooperation are performed by specialized agencies established by intergovernmental agreement. These agencies include the International Labor Office (ILO)²⁹ established in 1919; the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO);³⁰ the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-

26. *Journal of the Economic and Social Council*, July 13, 1946, pp. 526-29.

27. *Ibid.*, July 13, 1946, pp. 481-86.

28. For list of organizations with consultative status, by categories, see UN, *Weekly Bulletin*, April 8, 1947, p. 361.

29. See Ernest Hediger, "International Labor Organization and the United Nations," *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 1, 1946.

30. See Blair Bolles, "World Nutrition and Agrarian Stability—Proposals for a Food Board," *Foreign Policy Reports*, December 1, 1946.

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ganization (UNESCO);³¹ the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); the World Health Organization (WHO); the International Refugee Organization (IRO); the International Bank and the International Fund. The constitution of a proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) has recently been signed at Geneva. Agreements defining their relationship to the UN have been made by the UN with four of these specialized agencies—ILO, FAO, ICAO, and UNESCO—and have entered into force.³²

### ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF ECOSOC

The work of the UN in the field of economic and social cooperation, by its very nature, is bound to be slow in coming to full fruition. During the less than two years that the UN has been in existence, many projects have been initiated, but few have been brought to the point of producing measurable results. It is, therefore, unfair to judge the organization on any other basis than that of promise at the present time.

Judged in this light, the more significant achievements of the UN up to the present can be listed as follows: (1) the establishment of the World Health Organization; (2) following the decision to discontinue UNRRA for which the UN was not responsible, the establishment of the International Refugee Organization, the assumption of advisory social welfare functions formerly performed by UNRRA, and the establishment of an International Children's Emergency Fund; (3) the first realistic analysis of the problem of economic reconstruction of countries and areas devastated or disrupted by the war in the report of the Temporary Subcommission on the Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas, followed by the establishment of Economic Commissions for Europe and for Asia and the Far East; (4) preliminary work with a view to the establishment of an International Trade Organization; (5) the re-establishment of effective international control of narcotic drugs; (6) initial steps with a view to the drafting of an international bill of rights; (7) preparatory work for an International Conference on Freedom of Information now scheduled for early 1948; and (8) preliminary consideration of ways and means of developing and strengthening international law. This list does not, of course, cover the achievements of the specialized agencies themselves.

31. See C. Mildred Thompson, "The Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization of the United Nations—with Text of Constitution," *Foreign Policy Reports*, February 15, 1946.

32. Detailed analyses of the work of the specialized agencies and their relationship to the UN will appear in two *Foreign Policy Reports* scheduled for autumn publication.

However, no such listing of specific achievements adequately portrays the full value of the work of the UN. Perhaps one of its greatest benefits lies in associating representatives of various countries together for constructive work to meet common needs. Those who participate in this process should develop a breadth of view and sympathy of understanding which are essential to the successful handling of common problems. Such attitudes are bound to permeate and affect thought and policy in the participating countries. A serious obstacle to greater accomplishment has been the deep rift between East and West, evidenced in the economic and social field by the failure of the Soviet Union to take part in the work of any of the specialized agencies, except the World Health Organization, and the limited interest and, on occasion, the obstructive attitude which the Soviet Union has appeared to show with respect to some of the economic and social projects of the UN itself. A further consequence of this rift has been the decision of certain of the European powers, justified from their point of view by the obstructive tactics of the Soviet Union, to proceed with programs of economic reconstruction outside the framework of the UN.³³ So long as this condition of fundamental disagreement between East and West on the basic purposes and principles of economic and social organization continues, it is difficult to see how the UN can function with real effectiveness in dealing with the controversial problems in this field.

### NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

The Charter provisions regarding non-self-governing territories represent a considerable advance over the corresponding provisions of the Covenant.³⁴ The Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories, contained in Chapter XI, constitutes an "international Charter of colonial administration." It establishes the principle of the paramountcy of the interests of the inhabitants and requires regular reports by the administering authorities. It is being applied in practice to provide a system of international accountability for colonial administration which promises to be one of the really significant contributions of the UN.

33. See Harold H. Hutcheson, "International Agencies for European Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, July 15, 1947.

34. On drafting of Charter provisions and early efforts at implementation, see Ralph J. Bunche, "Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories," Department of State *Bulletin*, December 30, 1945, pp. 1037-44; and Vernon McKay, "International Trusteeship—Role of United Nations in the Colonial World," *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 15, 1946. For reasons of space and because a detailed study is planned for future publication, the treatment in this *Report* is highly summarized.

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The trusteeship system, provided for in Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter, follows more closely the League system. After a long delay, largely the result of inability to agree on questions of procedure, eight trusteeship agreements for former mandated territories received General Assembly approval in December.35 The trusteeship agreement designating the United States as the administering authority for the former Japanese mandated islands is the only example to date of the application of the trusteeship principle to strategic areas.36

## THE UN IN PERSPECTIVE

### A SYSTEM IN EVOLUTION

The Charter as written at San Francisco provided the legal basis for a working organization. By reference to the terms of the Charter it was possible to foretell with some degree of accuracy the structural lines of this organization and how in general it would function. It remained, however, for actual practice under the Charter to give it flesh and blood. It is now possible, after almost two years of experience, to draw some additional conclusions with regard to the nature and promise of the Organization. Of course it must always be borne in mind that the UN, so long as it is a living thing, will be in a state of transition, adapting itself by usage as well as by formal amendment, to changing conditions and needs.

As the UN has become an established functioning organization, forced to deal realistically with a variety of international problems by the slow methods of international cooperation, there has been an inevitable tendency for it to draw upon League experience and to become in fact the successor to that organization, continuing, by much the same methods, the important work which the League first undertook.37 Thus the UN is no longer generally regarded as representing an essentially new approach to the problem of international organization, but rather is viewed, in proper historical perspective, as a phase of the evolutionary process by which social organization is developed to meet new problems and new needs.

Quite in line with League experience and with the emphasis at San Francisco, the economic and social work of the UN has come to occupy rela-

tively a much more important place than was anticipated by some. During the war and in the months immediately following there was an inevitable tendency to emphasize the role of military power in international relations. While the importance of power is still recognized, we are coming to see that man cannot live by force alone. The disruption of the economic and social life of the world by the war has brought recognition of the need of more emphasis upon social and economic reconstruction. Even those primarily interested in the maintenance of international peace and security are coming to recognize that only under favorable economic and social conditions does peace have the best chance to endure.

### "TOWN MEETING OF THE WORLD"

Partly as the result of this emphasis on the economic and social, but also because of its more representative character and the greater flexibility of its powers and procedures, the General Assembly has come to assume a central role in the UN. Senator Vandenberg's characterization of it as "the town meeting of the world" has already been realized in practice. It has not only provided a forum, but it has shown itself capable of taking decisions. It has come to play an important, although not dominant, role in the maintenance of international peace and security for which the Charter declares the Security Council to be primarily responsible. Significant is the fact that it was the General Assembly which in the end was able to adopt an acceptable decision in the Spanish question, and that the knotty Palestine problem, charged with serious implications for world peace, was submitted to the General Assembly for investigation and report. Of course it remains true that within the sphere of its special responsibilities the Security Council can, if it so chooses, limit the General Assembly to discussion, and it can disregard such protests as the Assembly made with respect to the use of the veto and the action of the Council on the admission of new Members. Still the General Assembly has at its disposal means of exercising pressure through public sentiment and political influence, the effectiveness of which should not be underestimated.

So far as the Security Council itself is concerned, its principal work has been in connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, not enforcement action. Here again the failure of great power agreement to materialize has been an important factor. With the veto operating absolutely, the Security Council cannot be expected to take any important decisions regarding the organization of enforce-

35. See Elizabeth H. Armstrong and William I. Cargo, "The Inauguration of the Trusteeship System of the United Nations," Department of State Bulletin, March 23, 1947, pp. 511-21.

36. See R. T. Robbins, "United States Trusteeship for the Territory of the Pacific Islands," Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1947, pp. 783-90. For text of agreement, pp. 791-92, 793-94.

37. See Leland M. Goodrich, "From League of Nations to United Nations," International Organization, February 1947, pp. 3-21.

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ment measures or their execution so long as the permanent members of the Council are in fundamental disagreement. On the other hand, the Council can function under Chapter VI, though its effectiveness here too is admittedly reduced. In any case, it is likely that the Security Council will continue to be primarily concerned with the peaceful settlement or adjustment of dangerous disputes and situations, and that the taking of enforcement measures will be highly exceptional.

A significant development in the UN system in practice has been the importance of the role the Secretary-General has come to assume. For reasons largely of a personal nature, the Secretary-General of the League had failed to provide leadership and direction of the organization. The need for such leadership is particularly great in the case of the UN, in large part because of the necessity of properly coordinating the work of the UN and the specialized agencies.³⁸ Furthermore, the nature of the UN organization is such that unless the Secretary-General is prepared to take initiative, there is great danger that the broad international point of view will be lost sight of in the welter of conflicting national interests and departmental and agency jealousies.

### WEAKNESSES: INHERENT OR REMEDIAL?

Two years of experience have inevitably revealed weaknesses in the UN system. Some of these are fundamental in character. They are inherent in the type of organization that it is. Others, and the ones to which chief consideration will be given here, are those which have appeared in the actual structure or functioning of the UN as an international cooperative enterprise. While their importance can be overstressed, there can be no doubt that elimination of such defects would considerably improve the chances of success.

The inherent weakness of the UN is that it is an organization based on the principle of the sovereign equality of its Members, which as worked out in detail means that the organs of the UN have no authority to deal directly with individuals, to levy taxes, and to raise armed forces, but instead must always deal with national governments which may or may not cooperate. Obviously a world government organized on federal principles would be a stronger instrument for achieving world purposes but, theoretically superior as it may be, there is no practical possibility of realizing it at the present time. The question then arises whether a more highly integrated regional system, which in

all likelihood would be regarded as directed against the part of the world left out, would be preferable to a loose global system which has possibilities of developing into a stronger system at a later time.³⁹

More relevant for our purposes are those weaknesses which are not inherent in this type of organization but which are peculiar to the UN as it has been set up and has developed. For one thing, it would seem that the Charter, in certain respects, is poorly drafted. It is much longer than the Covenant of the League and one result is that its provisions are much more detailed. In addition to introducing an undesirable element of rigidity into the Charter, this encourages wrangling over technicalities and in the present state of international relations full advantage on occasion has been taken of this opportunity.

An important need of such an organization is the attainment of universality of membership. The League suffered from having failed to attain that goal. Without passing judgment on the question whether all states should be admitted or only those which satisfy certain prescribed conditions as to conduct and intent, it can be stated that the provisions of the Charter make it possible for the attainment of universality to be indefinitely postponed by the action of one permanent member of the Security Council. This particular application of the so-called "great power veto" can be more serious in its consequences than the other uses more commonly discussed.

Another weakness of the UN, more the result of the manner in which the Charter is applied than of the actual phraseology, is the emphasis placed on the participation and representation of states to the exclusion of individuals in their private capacities. Of course, in any organization based on the principle of international cooperation, no important decision can be taken except by the official representatives of states and much of the preparatory work should no doubt be done by those possessing official character if the results are to have the best chance of being accepted. Nevertheless, in the work of the League of Nations, the private person, selected on the basis of individual competence and free to express his own views, had an important role, particularly on advisory committees. If the organs of the UN are to provide leadership in setting standards, particularly in the economic and social field, it would seem desirable that more use should be made of the individual as such.⁴⁰

39. See Leland M. Goodrich, "The Amount of World Organization Necessary and Possible," *Yale Law Journal*, August 1946, pp. 950-65.

40. See A. Loveday, "An Unfortunate Decision," *International Organization*, June 1947, pp. 279-90.

38. See W. H. C. Laves and D. C. Stone, "The United Nations Secretariat," *Foreign Policy Reports*, October 15, 1946.

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The Charter has frequently been criticized for its failure properly to recognize the role of law in international relations. Practice under the Charter has done little to date to remedy this situation. It is symptomatic that the United States, in accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, refused to be bound by a decision of the Court as to whether a particular dispute related to a matter "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." It is a ground for real concern that the more powerful Members of the UN are reluctant to submit their cases to legal judgment. Past experience would seem to indicate that in the long run peace must rest on a legal basis. Law without force may be weak, but force without law is tyranny.

The voting procedure of the Security Council, at least as it has developed in practice, has been another element of weakness. In several cases, the taking of formal decisions has been prevented by the exercise of the so-called veto, leading to the charge of willful obstruction. The remedy is not easy to discover, since the condition is primarily the result of basic conflicts among the permanent members. The exercise of greater restraint, as urged in the General Assembly resolution of November 19, 1946,⁴¹ would obviously help. Much can be said for further limiting the unanimity requirement so as to make it no longer applicable to decisions taken under Chapter VI. Finally, less emphasis might be placed on the actual voting process. At times it has seemed as though members of the Council were more interested in recording a majority or a veto than in reaching agreement. Considering that the full effectiveness of the Security Council depends on agreement, there is something to be said for more restraint in having recourse to voting.

In spite of many encouraging examples of liberal interpretation of the powers of the UN organs with the practical effect of narrowing the application of the domestic jurisdiction clause, Article 2, paragraph 7, still remains a serious threat to the effectiveness of the Organization. This is particularly the case where it is possible for one Member to prevent a decision, or to prevent a decision from being implemented, by a narrow view of what is a matter of international concern. The Soviet invocation of the domestic jurisdiction concept in atomic energy discussions and in the consideration of the Balkan question, and the United States reservation covering domestic jurisdiction when accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are examples of action under this paragraph which

can greatly weaken, if not nullify, the work of the UN.

Another weakness, at least potential, of the UN is the very complexity of its organization, especially in the economic and social fields. The existence of a large number of specialized agencies, in addition to the numerous UN councils, commissions, committees, subcommissions, and subcommittees, not only creates difficult problems of coordination but places heavy demands upon available facilities for meetings, and upon Members to provide money and personnel. Considering the reluctance of governments to appropriate large sums of money for international purposes, and the very special financial and personnel difficulties facing many governments at the present time, it can well be a matter of concern whether the UN is not in danger of becoming over-organized. Would not a more simplified and streamlined system be just as effective and more likely to survive the pruning of economy-minded legislatures?

## FUTURE ROLE OF UN

While the UN has thus far in its short life produced a solid body of achievement, there is as yet no reasonable assurance that it will succeed where the League failed. To be sure it started with certain advantages over the League. It had the benefit of League experience and all the great powers were Members of it from the beginning. But it is under one great handicap which the League did not initially experience. It is called upon to operate in a world rent more than ever by conflicting ideologies and conflicting political and economic systems. Under such conditions the measure of general agreement necessary to the success of international cooperation is difficult to attain. The question of greatest immediate concern for the future of the UN is the ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to discover sufficient basis for genuine cooperation to permit them to work together constructively instead of working at cross purposes. If such bases of cooperation could be found there is every reason to be optimistic regarding the ability of the UN to achieve its purposes. If the present quasi-deadlock persists, some useful results, within the limited areas where both parties see advantage in cooperating, will be obtained, but the organization will fall short of its initial promise. If, on the other hand, relations between the two countries should deteriorate to the point that no cooperation, even on a limited basis, is possible, the UN as originally conceived will in all likelihood cease to exist, and may assume

41. UN, *Journal*, cited, January 15, 1947, p. 826.

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the form of a limited partnership, serving primar-
ily the security interests of its members.

In view of the certain consequences of another
war, waged with the new weapons which modern
science provides, it is difficult to understand why
any government should follow a line of policy
which courts the risk of war. Even though the
world today is deeply divided by ideological con-
flict and the rivalry of national interests and com-
peting political and economic systems, we have
the assurance of responsible leaders on both sides

that peace above all is necessary, and that peaceful
competition between rival systems is possible with-
out resort to armed force. If we accept this assur-
ance at its face value, it is possible to foresee a
useful, in fact, necessary role for the UN. It be-
comes the indispensable instrument for promoting
international cooperation within those areas where
common interests can be served. But its success
depends upon the willingness of its Members to
use it continuously, and to use it for the purposes
it was originally intended to serve.

Publications on the U.N.

BY ONA K. D. RINGWOOD

Research Consultant, Foreign Policy Association

The documentation of the UN is largely mimeo-
graphed and not generally available to the public
except for special purposes, but may be used at
the UN Reference Center at Lake Success and at
depository libraries selected by the American Li-
brary Association. Some of the mimeographed
material is subsequently printed and may be pur-
chased from International Documents Service,
Columbia University Press, New York.

Each main organ of the UN has a distinctive
color in which all its documents appear—for ex-
ample: Security Council, yellow; Economic and
Social Council, blue. All edited verbatim speeches
will ultimately be printed as part of the *Official
Record* of each organ but the *Official Record* ap-
pears very slowly. However, convenient summaries
of matters being discussed are given in the *United
Nations Weekly Bulletin*, and in the unofficial
monthly *United Nations News* published by the
Woodrow Wilson Foundation, New York.

In *Four Cornerstones of Peace* (New York, Whittlesey House, 1946), Vera Micheles Dean presents lucidly the achievements of the Dumbarton Oaks, Chapultepec, Yalta, and San Francisco conferences.

Denna Frank Fleming in *The United States and the World Court* (New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1945), traces the steps in this country's failure to

join the Court and urges the United States to take
a responsible part in international cooperation.

*Charter of the United Nations* by Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro (Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1946), gives the historical background of the Charter with a commentary on its provisions.

A concise, useful handbook concerning the
structure and functions of the UN is Louis Doli-
vet's *The United Nations* (New York, Farrar,
Straus, 1946).

*The United Nations* by Allen W. Dulles and Beatrice Pitney Lamb (New York, Foreign Policy Association, *Headline Series*, 1946), outlines what the UN aims to do, and analyzes the views of advocates of world government.

*United Nations Primer* by Sigrid Arne (New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1945), is a simplified explanation of the fifteen meetings which laid the foundations for world peace, and includes documents of these meetings.

A pamphlet on the *Structure of the United Na-
tions*, (Lake Success, New York, The United
Nations Department of Public Information, 1947),
offers a guide through the intricacies of commis-
sions and subcommissions and enables the reader
to locate documentation quickly.

*In the October 1 issue of FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS:*

THE TURKISH STRAITS AND THE GREAT POWERS

by Cyril E. Black