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# Statement on Defence, 1955

## I.—INTRODUCTION

### Defence Policy

1. Overshadowing all else in the year 1954 has been the emergence of the thermo-nuclear bomb. This has had, and will continue to have, far-reaching effects on the defence policy of the United Kingdom. New and revolutionary problems are posed requiring courage and imagination for their solution. Nevertheless our problem is still fundamentally a dual one. We have to prepare against the risk of a world war and so prevent it; it is on the nature of these preparations that the existence of thermo-nuclear weapons has its main effect. At the same time we must continue to play our part in the defence of the interests of the free world as a whole, and particularly of the Commonwealth and Empire, in the “cold war”; and we must meet the many other peacetime commitments overseas arising from our position as a great Power with world-wide responsibilities.

### Nuclear Weapons

2. In the Statement on Defence, 1954 (Cmd. 9075), Her Majesty's Government set out their views on the effect of atomic weapons on United Kingdom policy and on the nature of war. Shortly afterwards the United States Government released information on the experimental explosion at Eniwetok, in November 1952, of a thermo-nuclear weapon many hundred times more powerful than the atomic bombs which were used at Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. On 1st March, 1954, an even more powerful thermo-nuclear weapon was exploded in the Marshall Islands. There are no technical or scientific limitations on the production of nuclear weapons still more devastating.

3. The United States Government have announced that they are proceeding with full-scale production of thermo-nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government are clearly following the same policy; though we cannot tell when they will have thermo-nuclear weapons available for operational use. The United Kingdom also has the ability to produce such weapons. After fully considering all the implications of this step the Government have thought it their duty to proceed with their development and production.

4. The power of these weapons is such that accuracy of aim assumes less importance; thus attacks can be delivered by aircraft flying at great speed and at great heights. This greatly increases the difficulty of defence. Moreover other means of delivery can be foreseen which will, in time, present even greater problems.

5. If such weapons were used in war, they would cause destruction, both human and material, on an unprecedented scale. If exploded in the air, a hydrogen bomb would devastate a wide area by blast and thermal radiation. If exploded on the ground, the damage by blast and thermal radiation would be somewhat less; but there would be additional extremely serious indirect effects. A great mass of atomised particles would be sucked into the air. Much of it would descend round the point of the explosion; but the rest would be carried away and descend as radio-active “fall-out.” The effect on those immediately exposed to it without shelter would certainly be fatal within the areas of greatest concentration of the “fall-out”;

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it would become progressively less serious towards the outer parts of the affected region. Large tracts would be devastated and many more rendered uninhabitable. Essential services and communications would suffer widespread interruption. In the target areas, central and local Government would be put out of action partially or wholly. Industrial production, even where the plant and buildings remained, would be gravely affected by the disruption of power and water supplies and by the interruption of the normal complex inter-flow of materials and components. There would be serious problems of control, feeding and shelter. Public morale would be most severely tested. It would be a struggle for survival of the grimmest kind.

6. It is essential that these facts should be known not only to our people but to all the world. All should realise the magnitude of the disaster war would bring. Such understanding may bring home to people in all lands the consequences of war and generate a compelling will to peace, strong enough to enforce itself on the most arbitrary of rulers. That is the first implication of the nuclear weapon. It is one not of despair but of hope. In the hands of the free world, which at present has a marked superiority both in the weapon itself and in the means of delivering it, and which has no thought of aggression, it is a most powerful deterrent. In the Government's considered view this deterrent has significantly reduced the risk of war on a major scale.

7. In these circumstances our immediate duty and our policy are clear. To build up our own forces, in conjunction with those of our allies, into the most powerful deterrent we can achieve. By this means to work for peace through strength. Thus we shall hope to obtain real disarmament and relaxation of tension. But we must also so equip and train our forces and so organise the country as to enable us to survive and to defeat the enemy if all our efforts for peace should fail. Nevertheless our long-term policy remains unchanged.

## Disarmament

8. The Government will continue to strive for a practical scheme of disarmament as a contribution to the alleviation of international tension and the avoidance of war. Their ultimate aim is abolition of the use, possession and manufacture not only of all nuclear weapons, but also of other weapons of mass destruction, together with simultaneous major reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces to agreed levels which would redress the present Communist superiority.

9. The whole programme would have to be carried out to an agreed timetable, and an essential feature would be the provision of machinery to supervise and enforce agreed prohibitions and reductions. Detailed proposals on these lines have been put forward by Her Majesty's Government in recent years. Until recently there has been no indication that the Soviet Government were ready even to entertain any workable scheme; indeed, there were many indications to the contrary. In September, 1954, however, the Soviet Government announced that they were prepared to accept "as a basis" certain proposals put forward last June by Her Majesty's Government in conjunction with the French Government. But the recent debates in the United Nations General Assembly indicate that they are still not prepared to agree to the essential safeguards provided in these proposals although it is

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hoped that in the forthcoming discussions they will be ready to discuss disarmament more realistically. If the free world were to disarm without such safeguards it would incur a double risk. It would be threatened with conventional forces which it could not hope to match; and it would have no guarantee that such forces would not be reinforced by nuclear weapons over the clandestine production of which there would be no adequate control. In short, disarmament must be real and comprehensive, and there must be secure and workable safeguards. Until the Communist world is prepared to accept such a system our "Grand Alliance" must build and maintain its strength.

## Co-operation in the Free World

10. The deterrent to aggression does not consist in military strength alone. The political unity and resolution and the economic as well as the physical strength of the free world must be maintained. This has been the basis of our policy ever since the clear emergence of the Communist threat after the last war. On it were founded the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949. To this end, too, the agreements resulting from the London and Paris Conferences are of supreme importance. Among other advantages of these agreements is the fact that none of the forces under SACEUR's command can be used for an independent recourse to war. Their ratification will enable Western Germany to make her essential contribution of forces, under suitable safeguards. They will also, by "recognising that a great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people" and by associating the Federal Republic as an equal partner in Western European Union and in N.A.T.O., strengthen the solidarity and unity of purpose of both these communities.

11. The United Kingdom's undertaking, subject to the ratification of the agreements and to certain other understandings, to maintain her forces on the mainland of Europe, contributed powerfully to the success of the London and Paris Conferences, and will certainly continue to strengthen the stability and effectiveness of N.A.T.O. and Western European Union. The British initiative was followed (and this was not the least important result of the Conferences) by an expression by Mr. Dulles of the willingness of the United States to consider complementary assurances regarding the continued maintenance of United States forces in Europe.

12. Further evidence of the desire to unite for mutual protection against possible aggression is provided by the conclusion of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. The development of this organisation, which is about to be further discussed in Bangkok, should contribute much to the stability of this troubled area.

13. Naturally it is within the Commonwealth that we look for the fullest co-operation in defence. The closest liaison is maintained at the Service level with other Commonwealth countries between whose forces there is considerable standardisation of equipment, weapons and training techniques. Besides frequent inter-Governmental consultation, of which the recent meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers is an example, regular Service conferences are held and there is close and intimate co-operation with the individual countries concerned over regional planning and strategy.

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## The Cold War

14. Political unity and armed strength would be of little value if the will of the free peoples to maintain, and if necessary defend, their independence and way of life were in doubt. For this reason economic, social and political progress must be maintained and consolidated, particularly in the less developed countries which might otherwise be undermined by Communist infiltration and subversion.

15. It is certainly no part of the Government's policy to abandon resistance to Communist imperialism in the cold war. Weakness and irresolution in the face of limited aggression will not avail to avert a major war. The existence of the nuclear weapon may discourage overt armed intervention by the Communist Powers, such as occurred in Korea, because of the risk that it might develop into unlimited war. But equally it may encourage the indirect approach through infiltration and subversion. We shall therefore, in parallel with our effort to develop the deterrent and to prepare against a major war, strengthen by all means at our disposal, including where necessary the maintenance of adequate conventional forces, our defences against this method of attack. We must play our part with the other countries of the Commonwealth and with our allies in resisting the spread of Communism throughout the world.

16. The United Kingdom is responsible for many dependent territories overseas. We must be ready to defend them against external attack. We have also to protect them, by assistance to the civil power, against internal disruption. The rapid transition through which many colonial societies are now passing in their progress towards self-government creates conditions which are in some cases capable of being exploited by international Communist techniques. This immediately, but as we hope only temporarily, must increase the actual and potential commitments for British forces in support of Colonial Governments and Administrations. At the same time the measures already being taken to strengthen the ability of the Colonial Governments themselves to deal with threats to internal security must be progressively improved.

17. Our reduced commitments in Trieste, Korea and the Middle East now make it possible to rebuild a strategic reserve of land forces in this country. Coupled with the mobility of the Navy and increasing use of air transport, this will greatly increase our ability to exercise our world-wide responsibilities effectively and economically.

## The Deterrent

18. Apart from these responsibilities, in a situation in which the Communist world maintains large and increasingly powerful armed forces, the strength of our forces and those of our Allies must also be developed and sustained against the possibility of a major war. To this end, increasing emphasis must be placed on the deterrent.

19. This deterrent must rest primarily on the strategic air power of the West, armed with its nuclear weapons. The knowledge that aggression will be met by overwhelming nuclear retaliation is the surest guarantee that it will not take place.

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20. This counter-offensive strength is also our most effective defence against aggression should it ever occur. The enormous power of nuclear weapons is such that in war the outcome of the first few exchanges would be of critical importance. Great advantages would probably flow from surprise and from the first assault. In these circumstances the enemy might well initiate the use of nuclear weapons at the outset of hostilities. A prompt and overwhelming counter-offensive with the most powerful weapons available offers at present the surest means of limiting the scale of such attacks.

21. But we cannot rely only on strategic air power. Our policy must aim at impressing on the potential enemy that a sudden attack even with nuclear weapons would not be conclusive. It must also demonstrate that we have both the will to survive and the power to ensure victory. The vast conventional forces controlled by the Communist world include a large and growing Navy. On our side, we must have a Navy capable of dispersal and concentration at will which, with the allied navies, can seek out and destroy the enemy's naval forces and preserve effective command of sea communications.

22. The Communist world also maintains, and can continue to maintain, a great preponderance of conventional land forces. These, moreover, operate on internal lines of communication. The Soviet Union and her Eastern European Satellites have some six million men under arms backed by enormous reserves. On the German front the Soviet Army could be increased to well over 100 divisions within 30 days. Over the whole field of deployment East and West the Soviet and satellite land forces could be raised to the level of 400 divisions. Even allowing for the essential German contribution the free world cannot put into the front line anything comparable to this strength in conventional forces. The use of nuclear weapons is the only means by which this massive preponderance can be countered. But with their aid and with the German contribution we can adopt a forward strategy on the ground in Europe and so defend the Continent, instead of contemplating again the grim process of liberation. If we do not use the full weight of our nuclear power, Europe can hardly be protected from invasion and occupation—with all that this implies both for Europe and the United Kingdom.

23. It was for these reasons that the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, at its meeting in Paris in December, 1954, approved a report by the Military Committee on the most effective pattern of N.A.T.O. military strength which assumed the use, in a major war, of nuclear weapons. The report will, henceforward, form the basis of N.A.T.O. defence planning and preparations. Decisions on putting such plans into effect are specifically reserved to Governments.

24. Thus, until the Soviet Union agrees to participate in a secure system of disarmament, the free nations must base their plans and preparations on the assumption that if a major war were precipitated by an attack upon them they would have to use all the weapons at their disposal in their defence. The consciences of civilised nations must naturally recoil from the prospect of using nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, in the last resort, most of us must feel that determination to face the threat of physical devastation, even on the

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immense scale which must now be foreseen, is manifestly preferable to an attitude of subservience to militant Communism, with the national and individual humiliation that this would inevitably bring. Moreover, such a show of weakness or hesitation to use all the means of defence at our disposal would not reduce the risk. All history proves the contrary.

## The Tasks Before Us

25. We must therefore contribute to the deterrent and to our own defence by building up our own stock of nuclear weapons of all types and by developing the most up-to-date means of delivery. We must, moreover, in making our plans for dealing with aggression against our alliance, not flinch from the necessity to use these weapons. For in the knowledge of our resolve lies the best hope, and it is a real hope, that it may never be put to the test.

26. Meanwhile, the development of nuclear weapons does not mean that the use of naval and land forces in a major war is now obsolete or outmoded. Naturally their weapons, organisation, tactics and training will be profoundly affected. But the Navy is still required to contain and destroy enemy forces at sea so as to allow free movement of supplies and troops and to give both our land and air forces support in their operations. We still need troops on the ground to hold the enemy well to the East in Europe in the vital initial stages of a war. This would give time for the effects of our strategic air offensive to be felt. It would also hold back from the United Kingdom the threat of shorter-range aircraft and ground-to-ground missiles. The presence of a firm shield of troops and tactical aircraft similarly reduces the danger that the Communists might be tempted to try to over-run Europe with conventional forces in the hope that the West would refrain from using nuclear weapons in its defence or that it could be used as a pawn in a shameful negotiation. It is from this point of view that a German defence contribution is militarily so important.

27. At the same time we must make all possible provision for the defence and continued functioning of the home base. This will demonstrate that we have the will to survive and have no intention of surrendering even if it should come to nuclear warfare. For this purpose the R.A.F. Fighter Command must be armed with the most powerful aircraft and weapons we can develop and maintained at a high state of readiness. Home defence is no less vital than before. It is true that its character has changed. It is no longer a question of dealing with local and isolated incidents. The whole country, the Services no less than the civilian population, is involved and must be organised accordingly. For this work the Services must themselves be trained, local civilian organisations developed, and a link provided between the two. The Government have therefore decided to form a Mobile Defence Corps as part of the Army and R.A.F. reserve forces.

28. We also need defensive strength to take toll of the enemy if he attacks. To this end the Reserve Army, apart from its overseas commitments to N.A.T.O. and for other purposes, will continue to play a vital rôle. Within our resources, full preparedness in all these fields is not possible. We must apply flexible and carefully assessed priorities.

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29. The discharge of our many overseas commitments in cold war conditions must continue to absorb a large share of the resources which we can make available for defence. For the rest we must, in our allocation of resources, assign even higher priority to the primary deterrent, that is to say to the production of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Other elements of our defence effort must be adjusted to conform to these priorities and we must, in particular, eliminate those parts of our forces which have become or are becoming obsolete in modern conditions. We must have regard also to the kind of war in prospect; and here the governing factor is the critical importance of the initial phase. We cannot, however, be sure that the initial phase will be decisive; certainly all our efforts must be directed to securing that it is not decisive against us. Some provision, though on a lower priority, must therefore be made for continuing operations after the initial phase, particularly at sea.

## Conclusion

30. To sum up; there are inescapable difficulties and dangers in this period of uneasy truce with the Communist Powers whose aims and policies are fundamentally opposed to our own. The monolithic nature of the Communist system seems to remain basically unaltered. Its military strength continues to grow at an impressive rate. On the surface Communist policies may appear, from time to time, more accommodating. But Communist actions have so far provided no real ground for believing that the threat to the free world has sensibly diminished.

31. These difficulties may, however, be overcome if we are patient and resolute, and these dangers avoided if we are united, vigilant and prepared. We must not be lulled into a false sense of security, nor frightened into a state of paralysis, nor provoked into hasty or ill-considered action.

32. Above all, if the free world stands together determined if necessary to defend itself with all its resources, then the nuclear weapon, in the words of the Prime Minister, "increases the chances of world peace far more than the chances of world war." There seems reason to hope that this will remain true even when the present great predominance of the West both in stocks of nuclear weapons and in the means of delivering them has been reduced. In fact, from a universal realisation that the results of a major war can only be utterly disastrous for both sides may emerge a new hope. The armed truce of recent years may develop through "co-existence" into real peace.

## II.—THE PROGRAMMES OF THE SERVICES

33. This broad review of the strategic implications of the thermo-nuclear weapon does not radically alter the rôle of any of the three fighting Services. Each has a contribution to make to the three main aims of our defence policy—to build up the deterrent against aggression, to fight the cold war, and to prepare for a major war in case it should come to that.

34. Their rôles in these three contexts are not competitive but complementary. Moreover, particularly in considering their preparations

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for a major war, we must always remember that we shall not fight alone but as a member, though a leading member, of a great alliance. Thus, within limits, the pattern of our own forces must conform to that of the whole.

35. The main contribution to the deterrent is made by the Royal Air Force whose primary task now is to build up the V-Bomber force, with its nuclear potential, to the highest possible state of efficiency and preparedness. The first squadrons of V-bombers will be introduced during this year.

36. The Navy also makes its contribution of heavy carriers to the allied striking fleet whose great mobility and offensive power, to be augmented by guided missiles and by the other modern equipment which is under development, will add powerfully to our ability to hit the enemy either independently or in support of allied land forces and land-based air forces.

37. The importance of strong land forces prepared for instant action in the defence of Western Europe has already been explained. Elsewhere they are no less an essential part of the deterrent.

38. The main burden of the cold war and of our other peacetime military commitments in the Colonial Empire is borne by the Army whether in active operations against Communist guerillas in Malaya, in helping to restore law and order as in Kenya, or in maintaining confidence and stability elsewhere, for example in the Middle East. For these purposes conventional forces and conventional arms are required.

39. The Army is now able to re-build a strategic reserve in the United Kingdom. This has for long been a primary aim of our defence policy: it is essential both in the cold war and in our preparedness for a major war. In the cold war it can be used promptly to restore situations which might otherwise grow into serious or lasting commitments. It will also reduce the present high proportion of overseas service in the Army. In this way, through concentration and the better training facilities available in this country, it will increase the standard of efficiency.

40. The traditional task of the Navy in peace-time is, as it always has been, to sustain our foreign and colonial policy. The presence of Naval forces is often sufficient to provide a steadying influence. The Navy is moreover essential to the support of our strategic reserve. And in limited conflicts of the Korean type it can provide quickly, by reason of its mobility, powerful assistance to the land battle.

41. The value of the R.A.F. in the cold war is exemplified by the squadrons now engaged in active operations both in Kenya and in the Far East. In Malaya the Naval Helicopter Squadron continues to give valuable assistance. The overseas commands of the R.A.F. are receiving new equipment and will continue to maintain close liaison with other Commonwealth Air Forces. Great emphasis is placed on mobility, and the ability to reinforce overseas theatres with all types of aircraft at short notice is constantly improving. Special attention is being paid to the re-equipment of Transport Command so as to provide increased mobility for the strategic reserves of both land and air forces as well as greater capacity for co-operation with the Army in tactical airborne operations.

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42. These are the various tasks of the Services in peace, or cold war. Their performance requires continuous effort and patient vigilance. But, if it should come to global war, or hot war, the tempo will change dramatically. In the critical initial stage the primary rôle will fall to the Air Force. But the tasks of the Navy and of the Army will also be vital. Above all, the highest possible state of readiness in all the three Services is essential.

43. We rely upon the striking power of the Air Force for an immediate and decisive counter-blow; for a major contribution to the defence of this country against air and sea attacks; and for air support to the allied front in Europe.

44. The threat of nuclear attack presents grave problems to our air defence forces. The control and reporting system in the United Kingdom, the overhaul of which was begun at the outset of the rearmament period, and which is already highly developed, will be further improved. The expansion of Fighter Command has been completed. Its re-equipment is now proceeding. The balance of the Command will be improved by a further increase in the proportion of all-weather radar-equipped fighters. High priority continues to be given to the development of guided missiles. Orders have been placed for air-to-air guided weapons and progress is being made with the development of other types.

45. The 2nd Tactical Air Force will be maintained at the highest possible efficiency in support of the front in Europe. Improvements will be made in this force so as to increase its fighting capacity. Coastal Command will be strengthened by the addition of some Seamew aircraft for short-range anti-submarine reconnaissance.

46. Throughout the R.A.F. means to improve the state of immediate readiness are constantly being studied and applied. To this end, aircrew with recent flying experience in operational squadrons are now chosen as immediate reserves. Changes are being made in the organisation of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Reserve ground personnel are being organised into reserve flights for individual regular stations. They will report to these stations immediately in emergency or on mobilisation.

47. Our Army in Europe, which will be maintained at a strength of 4 Divisions, is being organised, trained and equipped with a wide variety of up-to-date weapons. But the threat of hot war is not limited to Europe. The Army must plan and prepare for eventualities which may arise in the Middle East or the Far East as well.

48. The main effect of nuclear weapons on the land battle is greatly to increase the need for flexibility so as to be able to move from dispersion to concentration as quickly, and with as little confusion, as possible. Greater elasticity of outlook by commands at all levels will be required; the organisation of fighting units and their equipment also need modification. Experimental organisations and a revised scale of weapons and equipment, including transport, are being worked out. These will be tried out in manœuvres this year. The organisation of supporting arms and services will also have to be adjusted to enable them to back up the fighting units.

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49. In the field of anti-aircraft defence it has become obvious that anti-aircraft guns are no longer effective against the speed and height of aircraft carrying thermo-nuclear weapons in attacks on area targets. Consequently, as already announced, the A.A. Command structure in the United Kingdom is being abolished. Anti-aircraft guns will still, however, be needed in the field and for the local defence of certain vital targets against which the most likely threat is from precision bombing.

50. In a major war, the task of the Navy would be to secure the sea communications without which we cannot for long survive. For this purpose we need ships and naval aircraft equipped with the latest weapons, well trained and ready to fight from the outset of war. Special attention is therefore being given to immediate readiness. In particular, a radical reorganisation of the Reserve Fleet is now in progress. The emphasis will be put on those ships which are, or can be made, ready for almost immediate service in an emergency and all these will be refitted and maintained at the shortest possible notice. Consideration is also being given to the further dispersal of the Reserve Fleet both within and outside the United Kingdom.

51. The new developments must clearly have an important effect on the character of the tasks to be undertaken by the forces stationed in the United Kingdom in the initial stage of a future war. Even under conditions of nuclear attack some of these will be engaged on Service duties of absolute priority, for example, in the bomber counter-offensive; in the air defence of the United Kingdom; in getting the Navy to sea; in reinforcing, to the extent that is practicable, overseas theatres of war and in particular the Western front in Europe; and in protecting this island against airborne invasion. The Territorial, as well as the Regular, Army will have a vital rôle to play. It is clear, however, that Service units at home not directly employed in operations would have to be used largely to aid the civilian population. Plans to enable them to carry out this task are, therefore, being developed. Section VIII of this Statement deals with these plans in more detail and outlines the proposed functions and organisation of the Mobile Defence Corps.

52. Within the limit of our resources, therefore, we are planning for a better equipped and maintained Active Fleet and a reduced but much more highly prepared Reserve Fleet; a smaller, better disposed, more mobile Army; and a more powerful Air Force including, in particular, an effective strategic bomber force. All these forces must be armed with the most modern weapons.

### III.—FINANCE

53. Despite the economic progress of the United Kingdom in the past year, the importance of maintaining a proper balance between the demands of defence and other claims on our resources necessarily imposes a financial limitation on the defence programme. As explained in the Statement on Defence 1954 our balance of payments is also affected, directly by our

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overseas military expenditure and indirectly through the diversion of production resources from exports and capital equipment. The defence programme has been reviewed over the past year in the light of these considerations, as well as of the strategic background outlined above.

54. There are two further relevant factors. The first is the progressive reduction in the external economic aid on which we have hitherto been able to rely. The second is the probability that, from about the beginning of the financial year 1956-57, the bulk of the local costs of our forces in Germany will no longer be met by contributions from the Federal Republic and will fall on our own Defence Budget. Both have budgetary and balance of payments implications.

55. In addition, the Defence Estimates for 1953-54 were, and those for 1954-55 will be, considerably underspent mainly because of development difficulties associated with the newer equipments and also because of unavoidable delays in works services. The experience gained in the last two years of a whole range of factors which condition the rate of expenditure in these fields has been taken into account in preparing the estimates for 1955-56.

56. Taking all these factors into account, the total of the Defence Budget proposed for 1955-56 (not allowing for receipts from American Aid) is £1,537.2 million compared with £1,639.9 million for 1954-55. Allowing for American Aid the figures are £1,494.2 million for 1955-56 compared with £1,554.54 million for 1954-55.

## Summary of Estimates 1955-56

57. The following tables compare the estimates for 1955-56 with those for 1954-55. An analysis of the 1955-56 figures is provided in Annex II.

NOT ALLOWING FOR RECEIPTS FROM AMERICAN AID

£ million

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Estimate<br>1954-55</th><th>Estimate<br>1955-56</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Admiralty</td><td>367.0</td><td>347.0</td></tr><tr><td>War Office</td><td>561.0</td><td>484.0</td></tr><tr><td>Air Ministry</td><td>537.0</td><td>540.4</td></tr><tr><td>Ministry of Supply</td><td>151.0</td><td>147.5</td></tr><tr><td>Ministry of Defence</td><td>23.9</td><td>18.3</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td></td><td>1,639.9</td><td>1,537.2</td></tr></tfoot></table>

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£ million

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Estimate<br>1954-55</th><th>Estimate<br>1955-56</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Admiralty ...</td><td>353.00</td><td>340.5</td></tr><tr><td>War Office ...</td><td>535.00</td><td>474.0</td></tr><tr><td>Air Ministry...</td><td>491.64</td><td>513.9</td></tr><tr><td>Ministry of Supply ...</td><td>151.00</td><td>147.5</td></tr><tr><td>Ministry of Defence ...</td><td>23.90</td><td>18.3</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td></td><td>1,554.54</td><td>1,494.2</td></tr></tfoot></table>

American Aid

58. The total of £1,537.2 million for the Defence Budget includes provision for expenditure in 1955-56 representing £43 million of the sterling equivalent of aid from the United States of America. This aid, which is of four types, has been allotted as follows:—

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="4" style="text-align: right;">£ million</th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Navy</th><th>Army</th><th>Air Force</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Defence Support Aid ...</td><td>3</td><td>5</td><td>...</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Agricultural Commodity Aid ...</td><td>3.5</td><td>5</td><td>...</td><td>8.5</td></tr><tr><td>Special Aircraft Purchase ...</td><td>...</td><td>...</td><td>16.5</td><td>16.5</td></tr><tr><td>Additional R.A.F. Programme ...</td><td>...</td><td>...</td><td>10</td><td>10</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td></td><td>6.5</td><td>10</td><td>26.5</td><td>43</td></tr></tfoot></table>

The nature of Defence Support Aid and Agricultural Commodity Aid was described in paragraph 21 of the Statement on Defence 1954. Receipts in these categories in 1954-55 will be lower than expected and the amounts provided for 1955-56 represent the balances outstanding, together with £6 million of Defence Support Aid previously allotted to the United Kingdom and expected to accrue in 1955-56. The provision for Special Aircraft Purchase (£16.5 million) is made up of two elements. First, the £30.36 million provided in the 1954-55 Estimates and described in paragraph 21 of Cmd. 9075 will not all be received in that year, and the 1955-56 provision therefore takes account of the balance still to be received. Secondly, legislation passed by the United States Congress in 1954 provides that surplus agricultural commodities to the value of $35 million may be sold to the United Kingdom and the sterling proceeds used by the United States Government for payments in respect of military aircraft manufactured in the United Kingdom and required by the United Kingdom forces for the defence of the North Atlantic area. The provision of £16.5 million includes those receipts estimated to accrue in 1955-56 under this new arrangement, upon which, however, final decisions remain to be taken by the two Governments. The remaining item of aid is £10 million in respect of aircraft and equipment to be bought, under contracts already placed, from Her Majesty's Government by the United States Government, and to be made available to the Royal Air Force in support of the expansion and modernisation of that Service. The £10 million covers the initial part of a programme from which receipts are to be spread over approximately three years.

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IV.—MANPOWER

Active Forces

59. Regular Recruitment and Strengths.—The following table gives the number of male regular recruits entered in each Service in each of the financial years 1951-52 to 1953-54, and the number which it is estimated will be entered in the financial years 1954-55 and 1955-56:—

MALE REGULAR RECRUITS

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Actual</th><th colspan="2">Estimated</th></tr><tr><th>1951-52</th><th>1952-53</th><th>1953-54</th><th>1954-55</th><th>1955-56</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Navy</td><td>...</td><td>11,100</td><td>10,100</td><td>9,100</td><td>8,100</td><td>8,100</td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>...</td><td>32,700</td><td>50,800</td><td>41,300</td><td>39,000</td><td>39,000</td></tr><tr><td>R.A.F.</td><td>...</td><td>41,200</td><td>38,600</td><td>30,700</td><td>27,000</td><td>26,100</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>Total</td><td>...</td><td>85,000</td><td>99,500</td><td>81,100</td><td>74,100</td><td>73,200</td></tr></tfoot></table>

60. The following table gives the male regular strength of officers and other ranks at April 1953 and April 1954 and the estimated strengths (allowing for normal outflow and wastage, and for present regular recruiting trends) at April 1955 and April 1956:—

MALE REGULAR STRENGTH

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Actual</th><th colspan="2">Estimated</th></tr><tr><th>1 April 1953</th><th>1 April 1954</th><th>1 April 1955</th><th>1 April 1956</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Navy</td><td>...</td><td>133,700</td><td>121,000</td><td>114,700</td><td>108,400</td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>...</td><td>211,300</td><td>216,900</td><td>222,900</td><td>203,000</td></tr><tr><td>R.A.F.</td><td>...</td><td>188,900</td><td>186,500</td><td>181,100</td><td>171,900</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>Total</td><td>...</td><td>533,900</td><td>524,400</td><td>518,700</td><td>483,300</td></tr></tfoot></table>

61. In the Statement on Defence 1954 (paragraph 29) it was pointed out that because so large a proportion of the regular recruits of the Army and R.A.F. entered on the new three and four-year engagements, there was considerable difficulty in building up and maintaining a "hard core" of men of long service and experience. It was essential, for this purpose, that a good proportion of the short-term regular recruits should prolong their service. It was mainly to provide inducements for prolongations of service that selective increases in service emoluments were introduced in April 1954 (Cmd. 9088). The results of these pay increases cannot yet be finally assessed. In the Navy, which is particularly concerned that as many men as possible should extend their medium term seven-year engagements, the results so far are not encouraging. In the Army, while prolongations by men serving on the older (five-year and longer) engagements have shown a welcome increase, it is still too early to assess the effects on men serving on the three-year engagement. In the R.A.F. the results have been distinctly better, and there has been a definite improvement in the trades of highest skill as a direct result of the April 1954 pay increases. It remains, however, our principal manpower problem to induce adequate numbers of men to prolong their engagements. If it is not solved, not only will it be necessary

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to devote excessive resources to training, movements and administrative overheads inseparable from too high a proportion of short-service men, but the general level of skill and experience in the Services will inevitably suffer.

62. **National Service Requirements.**—On present estimates of regular recruiting and prolongations of engagements, the Services will require in 1955-56 to enter about 198,000 national service men, or men who undertake regular engagements in lieu. These are allocated as follows:

<table><tr><td>Navy</td><td>7,500</td></tr><tr><td>Army</td><td>130,500</td></tr><tr><td>R.A.F.</td><td>60,000</td></tr></table>

63. **Total Size of Active Forces.**—During 1955-56 the total strength of the active forces is expected to decline by about 35,000 to about 788,000. In the following table, total strength at April 1954 is compared with estimated strengths at April 1955 and April 1956. A detailed analysis is given in Table 1 of Annex 1.

## TOTAL ACTIVE STRENGTH

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Actual</th><th>Estimated</th><th></th></tr><tr><th></th><th>1 April, 1954</th><th>1 April, 1955</th><th>1 April, 1956</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Regulars</td><td>524,400</td><td>518,700</td><td>483,300</td></tr><tr><td>National Service</td><td>298,300</td><td>283,400</td><td>285,500</td></tr><tr><td>Women</td><td>23,100</td><td>21,200</td><td>19,200</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td></td><td>845,800</td><td>823,300</td><td>788,000</td></tr></tfoot></table>

## Reserve and Auxiliary Forces

64. The strength of the reserve and auxiliary forces, including part-time national service men, increased during 1954 from about 571,000 at 1st January, 1954, to about 647,000 on 1st January, 1955. The number of volunteers increased from 114,000 to 117,000.

65. The total strength of the national service reserve increased from about 457,000 at 1st January, 1954, to about 530,000 at 1st January, 1955. It will remain at about this latter figure for the further five years ending in 1959, for which Parliament has sanctioned the continuance of the current national service scheme, since the numbers completing their period of obligatory part-time service will be about balanced by new entries into the reserve on completion of colour service. The number of men who had undertaken a voluntary engagement in the reserve and auxiliary forces in lieu of part-time training liability increased from about 62,500 to about 64,500 during 1954.

66. Table 2 of Annex I compares the strength of the volunteer reserve and auxiliary forces at 1st January, 1954, and 1st January, 1955.

## Future of the National Service Scheme

67. The Government have naturally considered whether any of the changes in defence policy which flow from the development of nuclear weapons affect the current scheme of national service.

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68. Apart from building up trained reserves for an emergency, national service makes an essential contribution to the efficiency of the active forces in two main respects. First it provides the number of men necessary to ensure that the active forces are able to carry out their commitments; secondly it provides skilled men and junior leaders, both officers and non-commissioned officers.

69. Some redeployment of our forces will take place following reductions in strength in Korea and the Middle East and the withdrawal of the Trieste garrison. But there will be a considerable reduction in regular strength during the course of 1955-56; and it will still be necessary for us to maintain strong forces in many parts of the world. The building up of an adequate strategic reserve in the United Kingdom is an essential feature of our policy. Any appreciable reduction in the present period of two years' colour service for national service men would mean that there would not be sufficient numbers of fully trained men to fulfil our commitments. Moreover the ratio of productive service to time under training would be reduced. In general, our forces would be less effective and less efficient. The Government would therefore be failing in their duty were they to propose, at the present time, any reduction in the current period of whole-time national service.

## Colonial Forces

70. At the present time the Malay Regiment, the Federation Regiment and a Battalion of the Fiji Regiment, in addition to the Royal Malayan Navy and the R.A.F. Regiment (Malaya), are actively engaged against the terrorists in Malaya. Six King's African Rifles Battalions are in Kenya, the seventh provides the garrison of Tanganyika and Mauritius, and two companies are in Uganda. The Kenya Regiment, the East Africa Independent Motor Squadron and the East African Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery are also serving in Kenya.

71. The present strength of the armed forces raised by the Colonial territories is about 63,000. This figure is expected to fall to about 43,000 by March 1956 as pioneer units hitherto employed in the Middle East are disbanded. In addition, in certain Colonial territories local personnel are enlisted in the United Kingdom forces. These now number 14,000. The number of United Kingdom Officers and N.C.O.'s providing the necessary leadership and cadres for the organised units of the Colonial forces is about 5,000.

## V.—RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

72. The financial provision for research and development in 1955-56 is about the same as in 1954-55.

73. As has already been stated, until there is international agreement on effective disarmament, our defence policy will continue to be based primarily upon the maintenance of the nuclear deterrent to aggression. This is reflected in the defence research and development programme. The work

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carried out in previous years is coming to fruition in a steadily growing stock of nuclear weapons. Further work is proceeding with the object of increasing the variety and power of these weapons.

74. The development and production of manned bombers, which are at present the primary means of delivering nuclear weapons, are proceeding satisfactorily. The manned bomber may eventually be supplemented by the ballistic rocket and we are therefore working on the development of such a rocket as an addition to our deterrent strength. We are also considering methods of defence against this form of attack.

75. For the air defence of the United Kingdom, the development of high performance manned fighters and guided missiles will continue. The development of new fighter aircraft has been passing through a stage of great difficulty. This matter is discussed in a separate Statement on the Supply of Military Aircraft (Cmd. 9388).

76. The main effort in the development of guided weapons is devoted to providing defence against bombers flying at high speeds and at great altitudes. Against this threat heavy and medium A.A. guns will in the future be of little value. The future air defence system of the United Kingdom will have as its main components the manned fighter and the ground-to-air guided weapon. The balance between these weapons will vary with new developments, but it is clear that for a long time to come both will be needed to combat the bomber threat. The effectiveness of our manned fighters will be increased by fitting air-to-air guided weapons capable of engaging enemy aircraft at longer ranges and with a much greater certainty of success than is possible with aircraft armed only with cannon. Development of these air-to-air guided weapons, incorporating a variety of techniques, has reached an advanced stage.

77. The surface-to-air guided weapons which are under development for use from the land and from ships are of greater complexity than air-to-air missiles, and the time required to develop an effective operational weapon system is necessarily longer. Nevertheless good progress has been made and numerous trial firings are taking place both in this country and in Australia.

78. The Long Range Weapon Establishment and the Woomera range, set up in Australia under the Joint United Kingdom/Australia Guided Weapon Project, are playing a rapidly increasing and essential part in the later stages of development and testing of both air-to-air and surface-to-air guided weapons.

79. There is close collaboration with the United States in the guided weapon field. Comprehensive arrangements have been made for the exchange of information and of visits by technical personnel. The nature of the potential threat from the air to the two countries differs in many significant aspects. As a result, the weapons required by each country must often have different characteristics. Nevertheless, we derive great advantage from the larger development effort and the more extensive resources that the United States have been able to devote to the subject, and at the same time we make a valuable contribution of our own.

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80. New possibilities for development of guided weapons are opening up with great rapidity. In planning the programme for the equipment of the Services, it is essential, therefore, to avoid the danger of devoting our necessarily limited resources to the development and production of weapons employing techniques which will quickly become obsolete owing to the advent of new knowledge.

81. It may be asked why we are not as advanced as our American allies. The simple answer is that we did not start until three years after them. The experimental establishments and the firms associated with the guided weapons programme have every reason to be proud of the work they have done: it will stand up favourably to comparison, both in quality and in rate of progress, with any in the world.

82. In framing the research and development programme of the Navy, its offensive and defensive rôles have both been closely studied. The work of improving high speed submarines of great underwater endurance, long range aircraft and weapons for use against fast and heavily armed cruisers has made considerable progress, and technical advances of high operational importance are at this moment being achieved. The development of shipborne guided weapons systems is well under way. The success of recent developments in aircraft carriers and their equipment will make it possible to use at sea heavier and faster fighter and strike aircraft, the latter being capable of carrying atomic bombs.

83. The research and development programme as a whole has recently been fully reviewed taking account of the existence of nuclear weapons. Though at first sight it might appear that the introduction of these devastating weapons would permit wholesale reductions in our activities in other directions, there are many military situations in which the use of nuclear weapons would be unsound, and it is still necessary for us to maintain our effort in the development of other weapons. Moreover, many of the projects on which we are expending a great deal of work at the present time are unproven, and with so much at stake it would be wrong prematurely to abandon all other lines of development.

84. The Statement on Defence 1954 pointed out that, because of their extreme complexity and novelty, the time taken to put the newer types of weapons through all the various stages of research and development into production "tends to be very much longer than in the past." It can be dangerous and misleading to ignore this fact. It is a mistake to assume, because it is announced that nuclear weapons, guided missiles and supersonic aircraft, for example, are under development, that they are practically ready for use in operations. This applies to all other countries as well as to the United Kingdom.

## VI.—PRODUCTION

85. Expenditure on production was a good deal less than the estimate in 1953-54 and there will again be underspendings in the current financial year. It is now apparent that, in framing the estimates for both years, an inadequate allowance was made for the development difficulties associated

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with the newest equipment. For this reason and also because the production of some types of equipment can in present circumstances be reduced, the total amount to be provided for defence production in 1955-56 is estimated at about £600 million.

86. There have been no serious production as distinct from development difficulties. In general the current rate of development leads, if we are to keep pace, to relatively short runs of production. This factor, added to technical complexities, makes the organisation of production by no means easy. The problem to-day is less one of mass production of relatively simple equipment, than of the "tailor-made" production of relatively small quantities of highly complicated equipment.

87. The production programmes of the three Services in 1955-56 will be described in detail in the memoranda accompanying their respective Estimates. The following are among their principal features.

88. In the Navy the design of a new system of power-operated armament has been sufficiently proved to make it possible to resume work on the three Tiger-class cruisers which will have exceptionally high fire-power. The submarine new construction programme will continue; a high-speed experimental submarine will, it is expected, be completed in 1955-56. An experimental guided weapon ship, converted from a maintenance ship, is nearing completion and her trials are planned to begin in 1956. In the meantime, action is being taken to enable a start to be made at the earliest practicable date on the construction of a class of guided weapons ships which will replace our older cruisers. Increased effort will be devoted to refitting ships of both the active and reserve fleets to improve their efficiency and readiness. Economies in the provision of naval aircraft will flow from the reduced accident rate expected with the introduction into our carriers of the angled deck and the mirror landing device.

89. The long-term plan for the re-equipment of the Army will continue. During the year the first of a new range of wireless sets will be issued; new L.A.A. guns, new radar for the field forces and new sub-machine guns will also reach the troops. Large-scale trials of the F.N. rifle will be carried out both at home and overseas.

90. The re-equipment of the Royal Air Force with more modern and advanced types of aircraft and equipment will be accelerated in 1955-56. The first stage of the expansion and modernisation of the radar network in overseas theatres will be completed and a start will be made on the next stage of the programme both for the United Kingdom and the Continent.

91. **Offshore Procurement.**—Contracts to the value of about $200 million were placed in the United Kingdom in 1954 under the off-shore procurement programme for the purchase by the United States of military equipment for N.A.T.O. countries, bringing the total value of such contracts up to $650 million. The main items covered were aircraft (Hunters, Javelins and Sea Hawks), ammunition, Centurion tanks and electronic equipment.

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92. Military Aid from the United States and Canada.—We have continued to receive equipment under the United States Mutual Security Act, some being produced in this country under the off-shore procurement programme. The United States has also assisted in expanding our capacity for the manufacture of propellants and explosives by providing the plant under off-shore contracts while we bear the cost of the buildings.

93. The Canadian mutual aid programme has continued. Among the items received by the United Kingdom are anti-aircraft radar, ammunition, propellants and explosives.

## VII.—CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH AND WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

### Commonwealth

94. Close co-operation and day-to-day consultations on defence matters between the United Kingdom and the other Commonwealth countries continue at all levels.

95. During the recent conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers opportunity was taken not only to review the international scene but also to hold a series of meetings on regional defence problems. These meetings covered the main areas in which the forces of Commonwealth countries may have to be deployed in the event of war. Each was attended by representatives of those Commonwealth countries whose forces might in war be operating in the particular area under discussion. Their purpose was to enable the representatives of those countries to join together in reviewing the plans for the defence of each area and most useful progress was made.

96. It was announced last autumn that, consequent on the reduction of the American forces in Korea, it had been agreed that the Commonwealth land forces in Korea should be reduced by two-thirds. This reduction is nearly completed. The forces remaining will continue as a separate Commonwealth formation. In the Middle East and the Far East units from other Commonwealth countries have continued to serve alongside United Kingdom forces.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

97. At their meeting in Paris in December, 1954, the North Atlantic Council, in addition to considering the report on the most effective pattern of N.A.T.O. military strength referred to in paragraph 23, also considered the Annual Review for 1954. They noted that there had been an increase in the strength of N.A.T.O. forces and further steady improvements in their efficiency over the past year. This improvement in quality resulted from increases in operational and support units, from the supply of large quantities of new equipment and from large-scale combined exercises.

98. The Agreements signed in Paris in October, 1954 (Cmd. 9304) provide for a number of organisational changes which will strengthen the cohesion and unity of N.A.T.O. forces on the Continent.

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Western European Union

99. The Paris Agreements also revise and extend the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and provide for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Western European Union. On the political side they mark a further movement towards the unity of Europe. On the military side this organisation will control the level of armaments and the size of the forces of member countries on the Continent and will thus provide the instrument for a controlled rearmament of Germany.

100. In September, 1954 a collective defence treaty for the South-East Asia area was signed by the Governments of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Siam, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Foreign Ministers of these Governments are to meet shortly in Bangkok to consider arrangements for the fulfilment of the provisions of the treaty and to exchange views on matters affecting the peace and security of the treaty area.

VIII.—HOME DEFENCE

101. Home defence measures, by demonstrating the country's determination to resist aggression in all its forms, buttress the resolution needed to sustain an effective deterrent policy. Against the thermo-nuclear attack of the future the best defence of the civil population in this small, crowded and vulnerable island is to try to ensure that it never materialises. But we must also in common prudence continue to provide financial and other resources for a measure of insurance in case we should fail in our main aim of averting war. The extent of these precautions and the speed at which they should be put in hand will vary from time to time with changes in the international situation and with the progress of our defence effort.

102. An outline has been given in paragraph 5 of the effect which the use of thermo-nuclear bombs would have. The very grimness of this prospect is a potent influence in restraint of war. Yet if war should come despite our efforts to prevent it, there is still much that can and must be done to mitigate the effects of a thermo-nuclear attack.

103. The new form of this threat to our security calls for a complete overhaul of our home defence plans. These must be conceived not in terms of our experience in the last war nor even of the threat posed by the atomic bomb. The advent of the hydrogen bomb calls for an entirely new approach. But the Government have not yet been able, with the information in their possession, finally to assess the implications of the latest weapon developments. This applies particularly to the extensive radio-active contamination which may be caused by the "fall-out" from a hydrogen bomb burst at ground level. Until an appreciation has been completed, it would be unwise to embark upon measures which may later prove to be misdirected.

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## Civil Defence Services

104. We are not, nor shall we ever be, able to forecast the precise effect or the extent of any nuclear attack against this country. Some areas would be destroyed, some would be on the fringe of devastation, others would escape direct damage by blast and heat. Still less can we forecast the pattern of radio-active contamination which might result from the attack. It would be quite wrong for people to assume that their neighbourhood would be sure to receive a direct hit and that they would therefore be unable to help themselves or others. It would be equally mistaken to assume that any part of the country would escape the effects of the attack and have no need of help. We are all in it, and we must all learn to help ourselves and to help each other.

105. Obviously the need for rescue, fire-fighting and welfare operations would be as great as ever. The presence of radio-activity would have to be detected and measured, and the necessary warning given to the public. The first call would have to be met by the civilian services on the spot organised by the local authorities, with the help of the Civil Defence Corps, the Industrial Civil Defence Service, the Auxiliary Fire Service and the Women's Voluntary Services, and by the National Hospital Services (including the National Hospital Service Reserve) supported by the voluntary aid societies. Every individual citizen would be needed; common sense and good neighbourliness demand that everyone should be ready to take part.

## The Rôle of the Armed Forces

106. But the local services, though vital, would not in themselves be sufficient. They would need to be supported by all the formed and disciplined bodies of the armed forces that were available in this island. The Government have therefore decided that all members of the armed forces, including the Home Guard, will in future receive training in elementary civil defence duties as part of their normal military training. This will enable them to play an effective part in assisting the local civil defence services, in addition to carrying out their active operational rôle.

## The Mobile Defence Corps

107. For this purpose an effective link is needed between the local civil defence forces and the organised bodies of the armed forces. This must be a disciplined body under direct military control, consisting of Service personnel and capable of rapid deployment in support of the local civil defence services wherever the need is greatest.

108. To provide this vital link the Government have decided to establish a Mobile Defence Corps specially trained in, and equipped for, fire-fighting and rescue and ambulance duties. The scope of these duties may be enlarged in time in the light of experience. Initially the aim will be to build up during the next three or four years a force of 48 reserve battalions, each of a minimum strength of about 600. Some of these will be trained and equipped to perform fire-fighting duties, others to perform rescue and ambulance duties. In an emergency these battalions, which will be distributed over the whole country, would be mobilised like any other unit of the reserve forces.

109. Men will be selected for the new Corps from the Army and R.A.F. and will receive one month's whole-time training during the course

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of their active service. Special training depots will be opened in various parts of Great Britain and the intention is that about 10,000 men a year will receive whole-time training at these depots. Sufficient accommodation will be ready to receive the first intake of whole-time trainees towards the end of this year. On completion of their active service these men will be posted to reserve battalions as near as possible to their homes. They will carry out their 15 days' annual reserve training with their battalions.

110. As the new scheme develops the Government will consider the practicability of expanding the number of reserve battalions.

111. General responsibility for the new Corps will rest with the War Office, but a certain proportion of the training depots and of the reserve battalions will be manned by the R.A.F. In the event of mobilisation the reserve battalions would come under the operational control of the local Army Commander who would deploy them in consultation with the civil defence regional authorities.

112. The permanent instructional and administrative staffs required at the training depots will be found from within the active Army and R.A.F. and by the employment where appropriate of civilians. The more senior officers and N.C.O.s. of the reserve battalions will have to be found from volunteers and the Government are confident that adequate numbers with the necessary Service experience will see in this new development an opportunity for serving their country in a vital and exacting rôle.

## Scheme for Training R.A.F. Class H Reservists in Civil Defence Duties

113. As a supplement to the Mobile Defence Corps the scheme announced last autumn for giving national service reservists part time training in civil defence duties under the Civil Defence (Armed Forces) Act, 1954, will be continued though in a somewhat modified form. All the men concerned will be trained in fire-fighting duties. In the event of war they would perform those duties with the fire service, which, as has already been announced, would be under unified and central control. The fire service would thus be able to carry out a rapid and very necessary expansion. One training depot will be ready this summer. It will accommodate about 10,000 reservists a year for their first period of basic training. A second depot will be needed for the more advanced instruction to be given to reservists in their second year's training.

## Evacuation and Shelter

114. Besides reviewing the rôle of the armed forces in home defence the Government are also re-examining all civil defence policies, notably those on evacuation and shelter. These must now take account not only of blast and heat but also of radio-active "fall-out." The distinction between evacuation, neutral and reception areas will be far less easy to make than in the past, since the effects of "fall-out" might be felt over wide areas of the countryside and the relative safety of rural areas correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless some areas, primarily those with the greatest concentration of population and industry, would still be more vulnerable than others.

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There would therefore be some advantage in spreading the risk by a measure of dispersal so long as this enabled the community to continue to function effectively.

115. Within a few miles of the point of burst it would be quite impracticable to provide protection against the violent explosive power of a hydrogen bomb. But beyond the area of devastation by blast and heat a considerable degree of protection against the effects of "fall-out" during the period of intense radiation could be secured by shelter which need not be of very elaborate construction, for example by a trench with overhead earth cover. This would have to be allied with disciplined behaviour on the part of the population and with the strict observance of suitable precautions after the attack.

116. Further study of the implications of "fall-out" must, however, be carried out before the Government can decide the best policies both for shelter and evacuation.

## Casualties and Homeless

117. A single hydrogen bomb explosion on a built-up area would take very heavy toll of life and leave very large numbers of people injured and homeless. To the increased casualties resulting directly from the greater destructive effects of the hydrogen bomb there would have to be added the large numbers of people affected or suspected of being affected by radioactivity. Planning of the casualty services must, therefore, take account of this tremendously increased burden.

118. The need to care for those who have had to leave their homes, whether in the course of evacuation or through the destruction or contamination of their houses, would present a formidable problem in providing billets and rest centres. Full use would have to be made of every type of building in the areas to which the homeless were moved, and emergency feeding arrangements would have to be provided. Plans prepared in advance to deal with such a situation would have to be supplemented on the widest possible scale by improvisation and by readiness on the part of local authorities and the public generally to do whatever they could to help themselves and each other.

## Communications

119. The maintenance of communications would be vital, not only to meet the operational needs of the fighting services and of civil defence, but also to make possible the organisation of supplies and movement and to disseminate essential information. The Post Office are, therefore, planning to build up a special network, both by cable and by radio, designed to maintain long-distance communication in the event of attack.

## Ports

120. A large part of the imports into this country enters through the major ports which are vulnerable to thermo-nuclear attack. Plans have, therefore, been drawn up for the provision of alternative facilities, including the use of smaller ports and harbours. Much practical work has been done to

26

implement them. These arrangements cover dry cargo and oil and take account of the internal distribution of cargoes once landed.

## Stockpiling

121. After the initial attack there would doubtless be a period during which the import and distribution of normal supplies of food and materials would be very seriously disrupted. It would be necessary to have available stocks of essential commodities, widely distributed so that they might so far as possible escape destruction or contamination. Those which would be chiefly needed would be food, in the most convenient form for storage and emergency feeding purposes; and oil, which would be required in large quantities for emergency transport and also for other purposes such as heating and cooking. Progress will be made in the coming year in building up reserves of such essential supplies.

## Finance

122. In the financial year 1955-56, which will be an interim year while policy is being reshaped, £70 million has been provided for defence expenditure by Civil Departments (including loan expenditure by the Post Office). In addition there will be the cost of the Mobile Defence Corps. The Government will keep under review the balance between expenditure on the active forces and on home defence. It is the former which provides for the main deterrent to war and so for the basic security of the civil population. An analysis of defence expenditure by Civil Departments is given in Annex III.

## Conclusion

123. The new problems posed for home defence by the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons do not admit of simple or immediate solution. What is said here will be amplified by further statements as studies and planning proceed. The Government believe, however, that the country is entitled to know the gravity of the possible threat and to be given an indication of the lines on which they are working to meet it. They are confident that the people as a whole will be ready and willing to play their part in building that will to resist which is an essential part of the deterrent to aggression.

ANNEX I

TABLE 2.—ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTEER RESERVE AND AUXILIARY FORCES AND NATIONAL SERVICE RESERVES

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="4">Strength at 1st January, 1954</th><th colspan="4">Strength at 1st January, 1955</th></tr><tr><th>Normal Volunteers</th><th>Volunteers from N.S.</th><th>Part-time N.S.</th><th>Total</th><th>Normal Volunteers</th><th>Volunteers from N.S.</th><th>Part-time N.S.</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Royal Navy</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Royal Naval Reserve ...</td><td>3,738</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>3,738</td><td>4,198</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>4,198</td></tr><tr><td>Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve</td><td>9,042</td><td>1,070</td><td>439</td><td>10,551</td><td>8,910</td><td>1,674</td><td>861</td><td>11,445</td></tr><tr><td>Royal Marine Forces Volunteer Reserve</td><td>1,055</td><td>149</td><td>—</td><td>1,204</td><td>1,046</td><td>347</td><td>—</td><td>1,393</td></tr><tr><td>Royal Naval Special Reserve ...</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>9,629</td><td>9,629</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>7,817</td><td>7,817</td></tr><tr><td>Women's Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve ...</td><td>1,252</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>1,252</td><td>1,344</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>1,344</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Army</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Territorial Army ...</td><td>60,310</td><td>55,776</td><td>136,694</td><td>252,780</td><td>65,101</td><td>54,900</td><td>177,443</td><td>297,444</td></tr><tr><td>Women's Royal Army Corps (T.A.) ...</td><td>9,569</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>9,569</td><td>8,567</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>8,567</td></tr><tr><td>Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps (T.A.) ...</td><td>200</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>200</td><td>197</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>197</td></tr><tr><td>Army Emergency Reserve ...</td><td>10,245</td><td>3,019</td><td>123,366</td><td>136,630</td><td>11,243</td><td>4,538</td><td>143,088</td><td>158,869</td></tr><tr><td>Women's Royal Army Corps (A.E.R.) ...</td><td>37</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>37</td><td>37</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Queen Alexandra's Royal Army Nursing Corps (A.E.R.) ...</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>25</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td><strong>Royal Air Force</strong></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Royal Auxiliary Air Force ...</td><td>5,745</td><td>763</td><td>—</td><td>6,508</td><td>5,631</td><td>774</td><td>—</td><td>6,405</td></tr><tr><td>Women's Royal Auxiliary Air Force ...</td><td>2,415</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>2,415</td><td>2,036</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>2,036</td></tr><tr><td>Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve ...</td><td>9,913</td><td>1,659</td><td>—</td><td>11,572</td><td>8,722</td><td>2,181</td><td>—</td><td>10,903</td></tr><tr><td>Women's Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve ...</td><td>523</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>523</td><td>388</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>388</td></tr><tr><td>Royal Air Force Reserve of Officers (N.S.) and Class H of the Air Force Reserve ...</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>124,364</td><td>124,364</td><td>—</td><td>—</td><td>136,314</td><td>136,314</td></tr><tr><td>Total ...</td><td>114,044</td><td>62,436</td><td>394,492</td><td>570,972</td><td>117,445</td><td>64,414</td><td>465,523</td><td>647,382</td></tr></tbody></table>

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