29 July 1988

This is a translation of my article in the Bungei-Shunju (July 1988), which is the most well-read monthly magazine among Japanese intellectuals.

The arguments advanced here are primarily directed towards Japanese audience, but may be of some interest to American readers, particularly those who have concern over future U.S.-Japanese alliance.

Hisahiko Okazaki

THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

INTRODUCTION

The future of the U.S.-Japan alliance has become somewhat unclear. There are various apparent and latest trends which indicate that the nature of the U.S.-Japanese alliance is changing. While there is a common recognition of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance to both the United States and Japan, there are a number of contradictory interpretations of the impacts of these trends. This lack of a consensus on the future of the relationship is a matter of grave concern.

Even though the U.S.-Japan relationship encompasses a wide spectrum of bilateral relations, including political, economic, social and cultural, its core is a military alliance. A look at the genesis of the postwar alliance reveals that the other aspects are subsidiary.

In the second World War, the U.S. objective was to destroy Japan's economic potential. With the advent of the Cold War in 1948, however, the U.S. decided that it could not neglect the strategic importance of Japan, and its policy changed to one of protecting the Japanese economy. The potential economic competitiveness of Japan, based on its cheap labor which had threatened the American and European economies during the pre-war period, was seen on the horizon already in 1948, but in the late 1940s

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economic problems were overshadowed by East-West global politics.

Since then, there have been many serious economic frictions between Japan and the U.S., and between the European Community and the U.S., but eventually these frictions have been resolved. As long as the Soviet Union exists and the alliances against it are necessary, the economic frictions - however serious they are - will have to be settled by mutual concessions. This has been the basic structure of both postwar U.S.-Japan relations and U.S.-EEC relations.

This structure continues to affect current U.S. policy towards Japan. In my private conversations with Americans recently, I have heard opinions such as there would be no market for Japanese cars if Japan was not a U.S. ally, or, economic frictions might have been forgotten if Japan had dispatched mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf in cooperation with the Americans. It is common knowledge in Washington that President Reagan and the Pentagon have defended Japan when the majority of the U.S. government has advocated a tough policy against Japan on economic issues. In fact, many Japanese are intrigued by the excessive praise of Japan in the recent testimony of Pentagon officials. But a careful reading of this testimony clearly indicates that the Pentagon's purpose is to shield Japan from criticism. At the same time,

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however, the Pentagon continues to quietly encourage Japan to increase its defense efforts.

The current tension between America's various economic and security interests has created a measure of uncertainty in relations with Japan. Needless to say, this threatens Japan's security. The main focus of this essay is how to restructure the U.S.-Japan military alliance in order to put it on a more stable foundation that will ensure its maintenance for yet another 30 years regardless of any future economic friction.

## CHANGING AMERICAN VIEWS OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

American expectations of Japan have changed. Several factors account for this. The main reason for this change of American expectations of Japan is certainly America's "twin deficits" of the government budget and balance of payments.

These deficits were in part created by the Reagan Administration's defense build up. The U.S. has greatly increased its defense budget since 1980, recording a net average growth of more than 7% annually. This unprecedented during peacetime. As a result, Americans regained their confidence in a "strong America," reinforced the credibility of their alliances, and successfully dealt with the Soviet Union both by deploying Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe and by negotiating their total abolition. This is certainly to

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be welcomed by the Western nations, but the expense that
this policy incurred was tremendous. To make matters
worse, the U.S. incurred this expense before fundamental
economic conditions had improved to the point where such
expenditures could be sustained. Therefore, to slow the
growth of the budget deficit, the U.S. began to cut back
on defense spending in 1986.

Under these circumstances, it is understandable that
the Congress and the American people think it unfair that
the U.S. spends more than 6% of its GNP on defense while
the NATO countries only spend 4-5% and Japan only spends
1%. The policy implication, of course, is that the U.S.
should demand greater burden-sharing from its allies for
defense.

There are countless quotable examples of
Congressional support for such a demand. One of the
clearest expressions is the resolution passed by Congress
in June 1987 which demanded that Japan spend at least 3%
of its GNP on defense.¹

Meanwhile, Yale historian Paul Kennedy's new book,
entitled *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*,² focused

¹House Resolution #1777, June 18, 1987.

²Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House, 1987

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national attention on the question of whether Americans
should continue to assume excessive defense burdens in the
future. Japan, therefore, has to expect that the question
of burden-sharing will remain a major issue between the
two countries over the coming years. In fact, many
experts believe that the main source of tension between
the U.S. and Japan will shift in the near future from
trade liberalization to burden-sharing.

Yet, when asked what kind of roles and missions the
U.S. expects Japan to fulfill with 3% of GNP expenditure
on defense, few Americans have a clear answer. Japan only
began to significantly build its defense capability in the
1980s, and thus its defense posture still has numerous
deficiencies. Therefore, it may be possible to spend 2$
of GNP on defense if all of these deficiencies were to be
corrected. It is difficult, however, to visualize the
practical use of an additional 1% of GNP. If 1% of GNP
equals $25 billion, the addition that this 1% would make
to Japanese defense expenditures through the end of the
century would be $300 billion. With that amount Japan
could possibly build 10 aircraft carrier task forces, or
the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal. However, when
Americans are asked if that is what they expect Japan to
do, most answer no.

It may not be difficult, therefore, to get the
American Congress and public to agree that Japanese

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defense expenditures of 2% of GNP would be a sufficient
contribution to the common burden by Japan.

Although reaching this compromise with the U.S. may
sound easy, the domestic Japanese reaction to such a
proposal would make its implementation difficult. If we
consider how difficult it was in Japan to break the 1% of
GNP limit on defense spending by only 0.004%, achieving a
defense budget of 2% of GNP would clearly be a tremendous
task given the prevailing Japanese domestic atmosphere.
That means that in the coming years, U.S.-Japan defense
frictions will continue as long as Japan finds it
difficult to increase the percentage substantially and as
long as the U.S. considers figures of 2% or 3% of GNP as
the least Japan should contribute.

A second reason for the change in American
expectations is the shift in the military balance in the
Far East. In the postwar period, the Far Eastern military
balance has not been as bad as the balance between NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, at least not until the
beginning of the *detente* era in the 1970s. On the NATO
front, it has been taken for granted over the past 40
years that there is no way of dealing with Soviet
conventional superiority other than relying on the U.S.
nuclear deterrent. The Far Eastern situation has been
different, however. The balance was at its worst during
the Korean War when the PRC and North Korea were closely

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allied and the Soviets supported them. Yet, even then, the U.S. succeeded in defending South Korea by conventional means. Since then, the monolithic Sino-Soviet bloc has dissolved.

Furthermore, with regard to the defense of Japan, the threat to Japan is minimized by the small-scale of Soviet amphibious landing capability. It is estimated that the Soviets have a maximum of a few divisions with which to launch an initial attack on Japan, in contrast to an estimated 3 echelons of 100 divisions deployed on the NATO front.

The Soviet threats has only been fully appreciated in Japan since the middle of the 1970s. While the U.S. reduced its defense capabilities because of *detente* and because of its "Vietnam syndrome," the Brezhnev regime continued its global defense buildup with surprising speed. The Soviet military posture in the Far East, which used to be concentrated on the Sino-Soviet border, was transferred to the Pacific coast after the 1978 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and Sino-American normalization in 1979. A relatively larger share of Soviet global naval deployments was dedicated to the Pacific, and, as a consequence, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has become the largest fleet in the Soviet navy. Thus, the period from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was the most critical period in the Far Eastern military balance.

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In response to the Soviet build up, the U.S. increased its defense budget annually in the first half of the 1980s. Japan also increased its budget by 5-6% a year, although Japan's budget was initially small. The U.S. and Japan thereby managed to close the gap with the Soviets, who in the 1980s were estimated to be increasing their defense expenditures by 2% annually. The effect of the tremendous Soviet investments of the 1970s were still being felt in the early 1980s, and the U.S. and Japan only gradually regained their confidence by the mid-1980s - in fact, only in the past few years.

This recent shift in the military balance has heightened the need for a Japanese strategy. I first pointed this out in an article in the March issue of *Bungei Shunju* in 1986.³ The gist of my argument was that when Japan's defense capability had been minimal, the government sought any increase in capability that it could. However, Japan's defenses are now coming out of what I then referred to as their "starvation phase," and Japan can now afford to be more selective in making its choices. Japan now needs to devise a long-term strategy, so that it can design a defense posture based on it.

³"Hisahiko Okazaki, "Now is the Time for Strategic Thinking on Our Defense," *Bungei Shunju*, March 1986.

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During the "starvation phase" of Japan's defense build up, it was easy to reach a consensus among American and Japanese military experts: to increase the defense budget by all means. Now that the military balance around Japan has improved, suddenly both Japan and the U.S. have to face the problem of what should be their long-term strategy in the Far East.

In the two years since I wrote that article, many ideas have been suggested by American experts on the future of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. One formulation has been offered by Richard Solomon.⁴ Solomon perceived that the Far East is now an integral part of global American strategy. He also recognized that the Far Eastern military balance is more favorable to the Western camp than the balance on the NATO front. Thus, he concluded that this advantage could contribute to the American deterrent against global war. According to Solomon, the objective of American defense planning should be to make the Soviets understand

> ... that a war in Europe will involve the U.S., that it will encounter determined and protracted resistance, and that such a conflict will not be confined to a battlefield of Soviet choosing. We must be prepared to open a second front in Asia.⁵

⁴"The Pacific Basin: Dilemmas and Choices for American Security." Speech by Dr. Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, to the Naval War College, June 17, 1986.

⁵Ibid., p. 6. Emphasis added.

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America has always wanted Japan to make increased defense efforts in order to lighten the American burden of the defense of Japan and to free American resources for other global purposes. Solomon's thinking is not new. However, his argument does present a rationalization for continued U.S. demands for stronger Japanese defense efforts at a time when the U.S. admits that there is a favorable military balance in the Far East.

Because this argument is an extrapolation of American policy over the past 30 years, we can assume that this way of thinking will continue to be the orthodox line in future American expectations of Japan's defense posture. A more recent example of this can be found in the statement by the Secretary of the Navy, James H. Webb, to the effect that the Japanese should participate in the defense of the tanker routes in the Indian Ocean. Citing Japan's status as the largest creditor nation in the world, and pointing out that half of the oil that passes through the Straits of Hormuz goes to Japan, the Admiral argued that Japan should "include the defense of its sea lanes even as far as the Indian Ocean in its constitutional interpretation of self-defense."⁶

Dr. Henry Kissinger has a completely different conception of the future Japanese role in the region.⁷ His argument can be seen as a present-day version of the 19th century British policy of trying to actively

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encourage a regional balance of power by supporting the
weaker party. Kissinger would like to achieve an
equilibrium in the Asian theatre between Japan and China
so that one country will not dominate the region. He
stated that the Japanese defense build up is already
sufficient, and he expressed his doubt on the advantages
to be gained from a further build up. He was also
apprehensive about Japan reverting to a policy of autonomy
as it had in the 1930s - an apprehension that is shared by
some intellectuals in both the U.S. and Japan.

Another argument can also be drawn from those who
advocate a modern version of isolationism for the U.S.
Doug Bandow, of the Cato Institute, reflects this
sentiment in his paper on U.S. policy in Korea, where he
discusses the merits of withdrawing American forces from
the peninsula.⁸ Although some parts of his argument
have become dated by recent progress towards democracy in
Korea, his argument for the cancellation by the U.S. of
its commitment to South Korea remains relevant. He argues
that the U.S. should withdraw its forces now that South

⁶Remarks by Admiral James H. Webb, Jr., Secretary of the Navy, at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., January 27, 1988.

⁷Henry Kissinger, "The Rearming of Japan--and the Rest of Asia," *The Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 1987.

⁸Doug Bandow, "Korea: The Case for Disengagement," Cato Institute, December 8, 1987.

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Korea can match the conventional capabilities of the North and can meet a Northern attack on its own. Since isolationism remains a permanent undercurrent in American politics, there is clearly the potential for this argument to also be used on Japan when the U.S. perceives that Japanese defense capability reaches the level of sufficiency.

Clearly, there is a variety of arguments in the U.S. on what U.S. policy in the Far East should be in the future, and each of those presented here have implications for Japanese security. It is an undeniable fact that the Japanese defense build up, implemented within the special climate of postwar Japanese domestic politics, has been developed more by American pressure or expectations than by Japan's own strategic judgement. Therefore, this lack of a consensus on America's expectations of Japan may confound the future of Japan's defense posture. As long as Japan's defense budget stays around 1% of GNP, American criticism of Japan's uncooperative and irresponsible attitude will remain. On the other hand, if the expectations expressed by Richard Solomon or Secretary Webb are increasingly stressed, a new type of friction between the U.S. and Japan is likely to emerge over the roles and missions of Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Unless both sides have a clear vision on the future of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, conflicting conceptions of the alliance will become a source of tension.

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As it is perceived that the Japaense defense build-up
has produced conventional sufficiency, there is a
possibility that support for isolationism in the U.S. and
for autonomous defense in Japan -- respectively, deeply
rooted traditions -- may increase. If this support is
combined with the popular emotions that result from
economic and defense friction, the foundation of the
U.S.-Japan alliance may be weakened.

Within Japan, defense experts fear that the
perception of sufficiency may impede the on-going effort
of building Japan's defense forces. As I noted earlier,
Japan's defense posture has been neglected for a long time
and it has just begun to take shape. It is necessary to
complete the present build up in order to achieve a
certain level of national security. Even if this build-up
plan is fully implemented, sufficiency will be achieved
only in the amount of hardward procured. Other problems
exist: Japan's reserve forces are negligible, shelters
for aircraft and radar are insufficient, air fields and
other facilities are still scarce, and, there are no
emergency regulations for the use of civilian facilities
in case of a conflict. Thus, Japan's defense posture will
continue to demand attention if it is to contribute to
the provision of an adequate deterrent against Soviet
forces in the Far East.

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Moreover, the U.S.-Japan advantage in the military balance may not be long-lasting. In fact, it may currently be at its peak. The American defense build up began to stall in 1986, and if the Soviets continue to increase their expenditures only slightly each year, it is possible that the gap will again widen. Should *perestroika* succeed, it is possible that even more resources could be devoted to the military. In several years, we may no longer hear Americans talking about the favorable balance in the Far East, but instead they may speak with alarm about the deteriorating balance. If so, there will be strong pressure on Japan to develop its defense forces further. Fluctuation of American opinion is not unusual. We should be prepared for it.

## A JAPANESE STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

So what shall we do about the future of Japan's defense? We cannot expect the Americans to give us an answer. The scarcity of American literature on the defense of Japan is, in fact, appalling. Nonetheless, Japan's defense strategy should be considered by the Japanese and presented to the Americans for their comment. This will then start a process of redefining a common conception of the future role of Japan in the Far East and of restructuring of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

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Let me offer several proposals in the hope that they
can serve as a step towards an in-depth debate over the
future of the U.S.-Japan military alliance and thereby
contribute somewhat to the achievement of a consensus.

I would like to make it clear at the outset, however,
that the purpose of my proposals is to determine how to
maintain a stable and long-lasting U.S.-Japan alliance.
Alliance with the U.S. is the key to Japanese security.

It is a historical fact that the Japanese people have
felt secure, have enjoyed economic prosperity, and have
supported democracy in Japan during two periods of modern
Japanese history: the period of the Anglo-Japanese
alliance, 1902-1921, and the period of the U.S.-Japan
Security Treaty, 1952-present. Therefore, my proposals
are based on the premise that alliance with the
Anglo-American world is the best choice for Japan. In
connection with this premise, I would like to make two
points. First, if Japan opts to follow a policy of
cooperation with the Anglo-American world, it will mean
that Japan should accept a secondary role in international
society. It will join other countries which once competed
for world hegemony with Britain -- like the Netherlands
and France, or which, like Germany, fought twice against
this world -- and which are now happily ensconced in
secondary roles in an Anglo-American dominated world.
They enjoy security, prosperity, and liberty at home. In

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short, the final objective of Japan's grand strategy
should be the security, prosperity, and liberty of its
people, and Japan should avoid using diplomacy and defense
for the purpose of a conceptual reassertion of national
sentiment or for the dissipation of national frustration.

Secondly China does not offer Japan an alternative.
Again, Japan's own history illustrates this point.
Whenever the Japanese people get tired of this peaceful,
but unexciting secondary role in the Anglo-American
dominated world, the alternative that inevitably emerges
in Japan is to turn towards China. In the 1930s and
1940s, Japanese thought that the annexation of the
population and wealth of China, supported with the
resources of Southeast Asia, would give Japan a national
strength equal to that of the Soviet Union or the U.S. In
the postwar period, the idea of cooperation with China has
always been suggested whenever people were dissatisfied
with the "imperial" attitude of the U.S. It is precisely
because of this latent element in Japanese public
sentiment that I take such strong exception to
Dr. Kissinger's argument. I am afraid that if America
were to weaken its tie of alliance with Japan and try to
play the role of balancer with China against Japan, the
Japanese people would immediately feel insecure. They
would seek security in the form of either a stronger
autonomous defense or alliance with China, which is not

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really based on the power balance but rather on the
sentimental and xenophobic Asianism.

The strategic significance of China should not be
overestimated. China is expected to maintain an
independent and autonomous foreign policy for a long time
to come. It had been the center of the world for 30
centuries, but it experienced indescribable humiliation
and misery in the past century. It regained independence
through a war of liberation against Japan and overcame
Soviet tutelage through the conflict with the Soviets.
Any future leader of China will not lose this precious
independence. Therefore, China is not a country that is
likely to come to help Japan against the Soviet Union
unless its own security is threatened, no matter how
friendly Japan becomes with China. Furthermore, the
Soviet Union can never completely neglect the Sino-Soviet
border and concentrate its forces on an attack on its
Pacific coast. Thus, while recognizing the great
strategic importance of the existence of an independent
China, Japan should continue to attempt to achieve a
reasonable balance against the Soviet Union through its
own defense efforts and through the maintenance of the
U.S.-Japan military alliance.

THE PRINCIPLES OF ALLIANCE

I would like to propose to re-structure the
U.S.-Japan alliance in light of the three following

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principles. First of all, the most important point in
allying with the U.S. for any country is to secure
American participation in an attack against it. France
has claimed a special relationship with the U.S. since the
American War of Independence and has also shared the
common interest of defending democracy. However, it took
2-3 years for the Americans to come to rescue France in
both World Wars. Both Wilson and Roosevelt strongly hoped
to intervene, but were prevented to do so by the
opposition of the Congress and of the American people.
When General de Gaulle criticized American hegemony and
proposed that France divorce itself from the NATO
alliance, Maurice Faure, de Gaulle's main critic, argued
that the real American threat does not exist in its
domination, but in its isolationism.⁹ At this moment,
the U.S. has an automatic obligation to go to war under
the NATO Treaty. But the U.S. has never entered a war
under the duty of a treaty. Therefore, this is still an
unexperienced area in American foreign policy. American
involvement is considered to be automatic in spite of this
because of the existence of American troops in Europe.
The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty imposes upon the U.S. a
less clear duty. But it is assumed that the American

⁹Luncheon Speech at Pavillion Dauphine, 18 June 1964, Boulogne, Paris

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commitment to Japan is equally as strong as its commitment
to Europe. Of course, the importance of Japan -- which is
certainly comparable to that of Western Europe --
underlies this commitment, but as in NATO the existence of
American forces in Japan is the guarantee.

Furthermore, however sufficient Japan's conventional
capabilities may become, Japan has to rely on the American
nuclear deterrent. In order to strengthen this nuclear
commitment, the existence of American forces in Japan is
significant. In spite of the prospect of the attainment
of conventional sufficiency by Japan's defense forces, it
is absolutely necessary to keep American forces in Japan.

The second principle is for Japan to maintain a
defense posture which does not appear "unfair" to the
American Congress and people. There is no clear recipe
for satisfying the American sense of fairness, however.
It is inscrutable to outsiders and often changes with the
circumstances. let me give you an example. The
suggestion was made to me that since the U.S. is trying
very hard to pay for the construction of 15 carrier task
forces, the U.S. could maintain 10 and Japan should
maintain 5. The rationale for this breakdown was that
Japan's GNP was half the size of that of the U.S. Even
this type of argument could sound fair to ordinary
Americans who have no special knowledge of defense affairs
or of Japan. I spent a considerable amount of energy

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pointing out why this argument was not feasible. The extent of criticism that Japan receives about its "unfair" defense policy may vary with the extent to which Japan can convince the American people of the reasons for its policy. American criticism will not be ameliorated by requesting that Japan be shown special favor. For example, Japan's Self-Defense Forces are suffering from a shortage of missiles. After a few engagements, the present amount of missiles in Japan will be exhausted. Although it may be possible to convince Americans that Japan should not spend 3% of its GNP on defense, it would certainly be considered unfair of Japan to justify a request that the U.S. supply Japan with ammunition in case of a conflict in terms of budgetary constraints. No one can argue against the opinion that Japan should spend the money required to purchase a sufficient amount of missiles.

The third principle is not related to immediate plans for building Japan's defense forces, rather it is connected with Japan's future policy. Allied nations should trust each other and support each other. They should fight shoulder to shoulder if necessary. Americans are particularly sensitive to this aspect of alliance. During the Vietnam War, America's allies in ANZUS, Australia and New Zealand, participated in the war. Korea dispatched two divisions, as did Thailand. And, the Philippines, another SEATO ally, dispatched personnel to

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American military hospitals. Even the Philippine gesture was appreciated. Asian assistance was highly valued by the U.S. because the Americans justified fighting in Vietnam in terms of the defense of all of Southeast Asia - they believed in the "domino theory," and thus in the need to keep South Vietnam from falling under Communist influence. In short, the U.S. does not like to see its regional allies adopt a neutral stance or to criticize U.S. policy. Even symbolic participation carries a message.

France understands this aspect of alliance relations very well. General de Gaulle was among the first to support the Cuban blockade. During the hostage crisis, Giscard D'Estaing supported the participation of the European Community in the economic sanctions against Iran, and said that when the chips are down, you have to support the Americans - however wrong America is. This is a principle for Japan to bear in mind in the future.

## CLARIFICATION OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY

Now let me make a concrete proposal as to how Japan should incorporate these principles into its defense policy. First, we have to have a set-up that would insure American participation in the defense of Japan in case of an attack. Second, we should reduce the American burden for maintaining its forces in Japan and also reduce our expectations as to the size of American reinforcements in

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case of an attack. Whatever else is necessary should be
Japan's responsibility. These two ideas involve some
change in Japan's official policy on defense, but they do
not necessarily affect the substance of that policy.

In the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, Japan's official policy statement on defense, it is stated that Japan should counter limited and small-scale aggression against it on its own. In reality, however, if any aggression takes place or if war breaks out, whatever scale it may be, American F16s at Misawa Air Base or the U.S. 7th Fleet will participate in the fighting almost automatically. This is a premise of the U.S.-Japan alliance. It is a matter of fact, in spite of the Japan's official policy, that the U.S. and Japan will jointly deal with the contingency from the beginning. Both Japan and the U.S. know this, as does the Soviet Union. Therefore this question is already solved.

But the public policy of the Outline may create
problems when Japan's defense capability reaches the level
of sufficiency. If the logic of the 1976 Outline is taken
to its conclusion, it follows that the U.S. forces in
Japan would become unnecessary if Japan's Self-Defense
Forces could meet the Soviets on their own. A proposal
already exists within Japan for the autonomous defense of
Hokkaido. Since Hokkaido is the main front, the
autonomous defense of Hokkaido implies the autonomous

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defense of Japan against the Soviet Union. There is an
obvious potential for the Outline's doctrine to become
entangled with support in Japan for a policy of autonomous
defense and with support in the U.S. for a policy of
isolationism. This, of course, would undermine the
U.S.-Japan alliance.

Another aspect of the Outline's doctrine is that
Japan will wait for American reinforcements if Japan's own
forces cannot repel an attack. This conception reminds me
of a scene from a Western movie where the settlers are
holed up behind their wagons, defending themselves the
best they can from the Indians while waiting for the
cavalry to arrive. At the sound of the bugle, the
audience knows that they are saved. Japan's defense
policy, as stated in the Outline, suggests a similar
scenario: the Self-Defense Forces will try to hold off
the Soviets while anxiously awaiting the U.S. bugle.
Because unlimited U.S. reinforcements are assumed in this
doctrine, there is little incentive to adopt another
policy. In practice, therefore, Japan unilaterally
decides the size of its defense capability and then
expects the Americans to fill any residual needs. U.S.
criticism of this practice is not therefore entirely
unjustified given the assumption that U.S. forces will
come to the rescue. This lack of coordination has been at
the center of U.S.-Japan defense frictions over the past
30 years.

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In case of an emergency, however, Japan's National Defense Program Outline does stipulate that Japan should be able to expand its defense capability. But the effectiveness of this proviso has always been in doubt. In a world where the situation could deteriorate in a period of weeks or months if an unexpected event provoked insecurity, this is somewhat unrealistic. Changing Japan's entire defense structure would require at least one year. In fact, no one has ever seriously studied how to execute this proviso in any of the on-going emergency studies. Therefore, it would appear that Japan's current defense doctrine supposes that any deficiency in Japan's defenses will be corrected by unlimited American reinforcements.

In reality, however, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to mobilize its domestic human resources and send division after division in a convoy across the ocean as they did during the second World War or the Korean War. The Pacific Ocean is no longer an "American lake." Also, if the conflict is global, in addition to reinforcements for the NATO front, American forces would be required for the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Korean peninsula. American reinforcement capabilities, therefore, are far from limitless.

In fact, it is likely that only one or two divisions might be available for Japan's defense. Japanese today

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ought to feel humiliated to hear a cavalry bugle that only
accompanied one or two divisions, when Japan's
Self-Defense Forces possess 13 divisions. Of course, the
firepower of one American division is far superior to a
Japanese division. The natural solution, therefore, is to
spend more money to strengthen Japan's firepower. We
cannot avoid U.S. criticism of unfairness if we do not
spend the money to achieve this.

Certainly, actual Japanese defense planning does not
assume American reinforcements to be unlimited. On the
contrary, we will have to consider the likelihood that
further reductions in America's reinforcement capability
will accompany the current cutbacks in American defense
spending.

Therefore, I propose that Japan should have a clear
idea of the limitations of American reinforcements and
should plan accordingly. The Americans would certainly
appreciate the resulting reduction of their share of the
burden. It is important, however, not to lose the
linchpin of the alliance, that is, the idea of fighting
together - shoulder to shoulder. Reinforcements should
not be nominal, but substantial enough to show American
commitment. Just for the sake of inviting comment and
inducing argument, let me offer the following suggestion
(assuming a possible range of error of plus or minus
50%!) For the ground force, Japan should ask the
Americans to dispatch one heavily equipped division. Its

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equipment should be prepositioned in Hokkaido. For the
air force, a minimum of 5 squadrons should be requested as
potential replacements for the 2 squadrons in Misawa and
the 3 squadrons in Okinawa. Japan should provide
everything else. In this way, Japan can avoid the risk of
making Japanese security entirely dependent on the large
U.S. response.

In keeping with the terminology of Japan's official
defense policy, my proposal could be summed up as a policy
of joint Japan-U.S. operations from the onset of conflict,
limited reinforcements, with Japan assuming responsibility
for the residual needs of the defense structure. This
departs from the current doctrine of the Outline which
states that Japan will repel limited and small-scale
aggression without external assistance, and when this is
not feasible, it will resist until assistance arrives from
the United States. In fact, I am advocating what Japanese
defense authorities are actually doing. Joint operations
are already taken for granted, and limited reinforcements
from the U.S. are seen as a fact of life. In short, the
reality has already departed from the official government
doquence, and we should face this change squarely.

Japanese efforts to fill any residual needs of Japan's
defense posture are a natural duty of Japan's defense
authorities to protect the Japanese people. Once we can
modify the official doctrine, it will become much easier

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to talk with the U.S., to correct their misunderstandings
about Japanese "unfairness," and to jointly seek a stable,
long-term, and common defense strategy between the U.S.
and Japan.

## JAPAN'S DEFENSE BURDEN

How much will this cost Japan? In order to execute
the above proposal, we should strengthen the firepower of
Japan's ground divisions and increase our air squadrons.
Let's assume that instead of two only one U.S. division
will reinforce Japan's Ground Self-Defense Forces. If so,
Japan will have to increase its ground firepower to
compensate for the missing one U.S. division. If we
suppose that one American division is 3 times as big as
one Japanese division, we would have to double the
firepower of 3 Japanese divisions in Hokkaido. And, if we
also suppose that 10 squadrons are the reinforcement
required to match Soviet air capability in the Far East,
Japan should buy an additional 5 squadrons (120
aircraft). It is obvious that the money necessary for
this build up would not require a surprising increase over
1% of GNP.¹¹

¹¹ As a hypothetical calculation, if one aircraft costs 5 billion yen and 120 aircraft are necessary, this will cost 600 billion yen. If they are procured over 10 years, the annual cost will be 60 billion yen. The 1988 defense budget of Japan amounts to 3,700 billion yen, and therefore, 60 billion yen could be considered as a fractional increase.

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Of courses, what is necessary is to prove to the U.S.
that Japan's "fairness" is not limited to the above
requirements. There is currently little complaint about
Japan's naval capability because of the increasing
confidence in the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the close
cooperative relationship between the two countries'
navies. However, now that the U.S. program for a 600-ship
navy is facing budgetary difficulties, we can expect new
demands for Japanese burden-sharing which focus on naval
roles and missions. Also, an increase of host nation
support for U.S. forces in Japan will be necessary.

Furthermore, Japan should improve its defense
infrastructure, including increasing its stockpile of
ammunition. Japan's concentration of the acquisition of
hardware has resulted in an appalling neglect of
infrastructure. A personal experience serves to
illustrate the paucity of funds available. I once sent a
brilliant young Ground Self-Defense Force Officer to study
abroad, and because the Japanese defense forces have no
budget for sending its uniformed officers to non-military
academic institutions abroad, he had to rely on the help
of the Ford Foundation. No one in Japan would deny the
necessity of giving Japan's young officers the opportunity
to be exposed to a broad climate of opinion to guard
against their isolation, but it is certainly unfair of
Japan to count on American resources for this kind of
program.

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I am in no position to estimate the total costs involved in meeting all of Japan's defense needs; however, a tentative calculation by defense experts suggests that a gradual increase in annual defense expenditures through the end of this century would be sufficient. The end result would be a defense budget of no more than 1.5% of Japan's GNP. If we assume this estimate is accurate, it is certainly worth trying to devise a new approach to the U.S.-Japan alliance that would relieve the U.S. of some of the cost of defending Japan. This increase in Japan's burden would contribute to the construction of a more solid basis for U.S.-Japan relations that could be expected to last for yet another 30 years.

## OTHER ASPECTS OF BURDEN-SHARING

American public opinion may still consider Japan's burden to be insufficient if our defense expenditure were equivalent to 1.5% of GNP. However, with this additional effort, our defense policy would at least be defensible. Other means are available for further burden-sharing. We could increase Japan's share of the burden of economic cooperation. Official Development Assistance is currently equivalent to 0.3% of GNP. In order to double that figure, Japan will have to relax its definition of foreign assistance so that political or strategic aid could be included. But if Japan succeeds in both doubling its ODA

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and increasing its defense efforts as suggested above, the
total Japanese contribution to the alliance would be
substantial.

Japan should keep the third principle of alliance in
mind. Here I would simply state what I felt while serving
in the Persian Gulf area. When Japan refused to send mine
sweepers to the Gulf, it occurred to me that if - in a
hypothetical, but similar situation, China had offered to
send the requested mine sweepers, American public opinion
would perceive China as a more reliable ally than Japan.
During the first World War when the Western front was
under severe German pressure, Great Britain repeatedly
requested the dispatch of Japanese Army divisions. Japan
refused, and sent destroyers to the Mediterranean, but the
U.S. dispatched troops. From that moment, the real ally
of Britain was no longer Japan but the U.S. American
participation in the war began in December 1917 and the
Anglo-Japanese alliance lapsed in 1921. It was the
beginning of the chain of events that led to Japan's
isolation, the Manchurian Incident, the Tripartite
Agreement, and war against the Anglo-American world. In
the Persian Gulf, Japan participated in joint operations
in the form of contributing accurate navigation systems, a
form of participation comparable to Philippine
participation in the Vietnam War. Future cases should be
judged on a case-by-case basis, but the recent Gulf

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situation provided Japanese diplomacy with a valuable
lesson.

CONCLUSION

The U.S.-Japan alliance serves many functions.
First, it is the pillar of Japan's security. Second, it
is a built-in stabilizer for peace and democracy in East
Asia; and, third, it is a valuable asset in the East-West
balance. Finally, the alliance reassures our Asian
neighbors that Japan has no intention of reverting to a
policy of relying on solely military power to achieve its
foreign policy aims.

Therefore, it is vital to clarify our thinking on how
to coordinate the U.S. and Japanese strategic premises on
which the alliance is based. Intensive discussion on a
long-range strategy for the alliance is necessary, both
within Japan and between the U.S. and Japan. Only then
can the foundation of the future U.S.-Japan relationship
be laid. Once this foundation is secure, the alliance
will be able to survive the potential political changes in
the region and the economic frictions between the U.S. and
Japan over the coming decades. I have offered a few
suggestions on how this might be achieved in the hope of
furthering this discussion.