DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON

Senator Stennis/Mr. Kissinger

10:10 a.m., July 22, 1970

By. NARA, Date 5/27

S: I won't keep you but one minute. There is one point I wanted to touch base on. The military procurement bill will come up for debate on Thursday and the Southeast Asian military aid is in there for our allies. I wrote the report part and it is perhaps more limited than you might want.

K: That is correct.

S: I had said all the time -- I am just refreshing your recollection -- that with regard to assault on the sanctuaries and Vietnamization, I was with you all the way. I have continued along that line and will continue to do so. But as for the big undertaking for Cambodia itself, you will remember I didn't go for that. An additional point is that if a real request for some definite program for further aid to Cambodia as such, within the limits, I might support it. But for this bill which is just a money authorization without policy having been formed, my position is as I have described.

K: Senator, anyone who has ever dealt with you knows your motives and your concern for the national interest. I wouldn't be in any doubt about you anyway. I remember well what you said, and I know the President needs more latitude than you are giving us, but not in Cambodia. We are at the razor's edge now. It seems the Cambodians might show enough counter to the North Vietnamese. We are not interested in Cambodia as such, but we are interested in winning the war in Vietnam.

S: I know your great purpose there. I wanted to be sure you remembered -- you deal with so many people.

K: We understand your motives. I will check with the President and Secretary Laird.

S: If there were a defined policy and a request on a matter of policy, I might be willing for something further, but I think it ought to be spelled out.

K: I understand exactly. Let me see whether we can respond.

S: I'm not asking you to do that.

K: You are saying if the President should decide to put a specific proposition to you, it isn't foreclosed.

S: Right. Nice to talk to you. K: It is always a privilege to talk to you.

lds

TELCOM

Amb. Rabin/Kissinger

10:18 am

7/22/70

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

R: I think I put a question to you about a week ago.

K: I will get you an answer in a day. One thing I must clarify is this. If the visit were around the time of the General Assembly there would be no problem. What' time is she planning on coming?

R: I have no instructions about timing except the sooner, the better.

K: XXX If she came for the General Assembly then the President would be delighted to see her.

R: Can I report this?

K: The middle of Sept. Let me get you a firm answer tomorrow.

TELCORN
Sisco/Kissinger

12:05 pm

7/22/70

By CCO

NARA, Date 3/27

S: Well, I must say I haven't seen the fine print from Cairo. I will reserve judgment. If it's borne out it's better than I would have expected.

K: If we had hadn't screwed it up for you, it might have been better.

S: Anything that Anytime they bitch about what the President and Sisco and Kissinger are doing, we probably know we are under their skin. Was my conversation with Nasser taped! Now I am being quoted and no one took notes at the meeting. Will we say today now we should proceed?

K: I haven't seen it on his bitching about us.

S: I will send it over. We will try to figure out how we convince Israel. My judgment is that this will shake up the _______. We will have to do all required to produce them.

K: There's no problem about that. If some of the people had realized we had to XXXX build a record --

S: If we can produce this it will be for this Administration the first major breakthrough on this since the June war. The next step is bringing the Israelis abroad.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
12:15 pm 7/22/70

K: I was wondering if before I went off or on the West Coast you and I shouldn't get together to chat.

R: Wen do you leave.

K: First thing Friday morning.

R: How about tomorrow. Have any free time.

K: I will make some. Around noon? or 2:30?

R: Let's make it at 2:30. Hell it! It's when the President of Finland is here. I am having a lunch for him. Let me look at my calendar.

K: 4:30 or 5:00 today?

R: 5:00 would be good. What do you think of Egypt's answer?

K: It far exceeds --

R: God, yes. Unless they want to improve their position during the cease-fire.

K: We always knew that whatever their answer would be, the next round would be sticky. We never thought their answer would be so unconditional.

R: I never did.

K: Never thought it would be unclarified.

R: The whole of the Jarring statement which is the guts of the statement. Now we have to get Israel.

K: But the next two weeks make that easier.

R: Rabin has been good.

K: The pattern of the next month will gell.

R: It will be the first progress since '67 and even further than that. Everything prior to '67 lead up to the war.

K: And a major step by the Egyptians to commit themselves to the existence of Israel. This is a considerable achievement.

R: I have cautioned everybody over here to be quiet. Not take credit or background information and I called U Thant and asked that no comment be made.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/27

R: (cont.) until we had a chance to study it. He appreciated that and would
do it. The less we say now will keep it on the trakc.

K: I couldn't agree more and I will see we do the same over here.

R: See you at 5:00.

By Cc NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon

Gerard Smith

7/22/70 2:25 p. m.

S: I talked to Phil and he has the document, but it has a hold for
technical reasons.

K: No, it's been resolved.

S: Well good.

K: I talked to the President and he wants you to go ahead within the
spirit of what I told you this morning. So you'll know how to play that?
All the best GerryX

TELECON

Phil Farley/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 p.m., July 22, 1970

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

F: I hope you are keeping your cool.

K: Yes, why shouldn't I? I got the memorandum from the Secretary.

F: I saw it, and I want you to know I had nothing to do with it.

K: For your information, it has already been overruled.

F: I just spoke to him -- Gerry had called him. I told him we would probably go ahead on what we have.

K: The Soviets raised the point of equivalence in airplanes.

F: And formulating SS-9's.

K: I think we can live with it.

F: I will get this in Gerry's hands. He will send in tomorrow the text of his Friday statement.

K: Good. He called me just now, but we had to speak on an open line. You better make it clear to him. I didn't blame you for the memorandum.

lds

Telecon
Secretary Laird
7/22/70 ca. 3:00 p.m.

L: Davie came in last night with Moorer and with a proposal that one of the F-4 wings be transferred from Japan during FY 71 to Korea. This is a wing that the Koreans at the end of the conference would be able to state that one of the wings from our Pacific assets would be going into Korea.

K: What does State think?

L: They think it's all right. There's a difference as to where it should come from. State wants to take it out of __________ (next to Tokyo) and the Air Force wants to take it out of __________ (in the northern part of Japan. I think that we shouldn't resolve it now, but I see no reason why it shouldn't be done and it gives the Koreans something to talk about. There is no expense involved as far as the U.S. is concerned.

K: If you and State agree let's do it.

L: I have talked to Alex and he thinks it's fine, but I didn't want to do it without talking to you.

K: I appreciate your doing so.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon

Alex Johnson

7/22/70 ca. 3:05 p.m.

K: I just had a talk with Laird about moving an F-4 wing from Japan to Korea. He says you agree, but I just wanted to be sure that he understood you correctly.

J: Yes, we had a difference as to which we should move from where...

K: I told him we should leave that open.

J: I'm agreeable to that.

K: But if they want to announce today, why not, just saying "a wing will be moved" and settle the place later.

J: Okay. We have got to have time to tell Japan in Tokyo before we announce it.

K: You take care of that.

J: Okay.

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Dr. Murphy/Mr. Kissinger

4:40 p.m., July 22, 1970

M: Henry, two things -- I gave General Haig all the stuff on Bob Aldman, National Cash Register. Did he give it to you?

K: Yes

M: He's a man you should look at for this job. He is responsible and capable. I have no personal reason for wanting him on except that he is the kind of man whose background is what you want. Second, the Board is meeting in August. It is their regular meeting. Will you be out here?

K: I will be on the Coast next week.

M: Will you be in Washington on August 5th?

K: Yes.

M: Could you and I dine on the night of August 5th?

K: We can put it down tentatively.

M: OK. I'll call you on the 3rd or 4th to confirm.

K: OK. I'd like very much to get together -- it's been much too long.

M: Good, Henry. I'd like to give you some of my insights.

K: Right. Look forward to seeing you.

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

4:50 p.m., July 22, 1970

By NARA, Dale

S: Henry, I transmitted to you from Ted Elliot the letter which the President wants to Golda.

K: President wants?

S: The Secretary called the President about 2 or 3 o'clock and informed him that we were doing a little letter. The President call me and I assumed you had put him up to it. He gave me some guidance which I have included. Elliot will transmit in about ten minutes.

Also, I'd like to pass on to you that I am satisfied -- have looked through all cables from Burgas and found no wrinkles. This letter is intended to convince Golda you go along with purpose. You will see what I have done in it. Nothing in letter goes beyond anything we have said to the Israelis before. These are assurances -- a restatement of American assurances. Golda can use this to convince Cabinet. She can say with backing like this from the President, how can we go wrong.

K; OK.

By: Ace NARA, Date: 5/27

Telcon
The President
7/22/70; 7:10 p.m.

P: How did you get along at your meetings?

K: I think I shook Percy except he is so... and it is hard to know.

P: What about Hart and Saxbe?

K: Saxbe was there. Mathias was also there. I put it entierely on SALT. Went into 5 minutes of strategic analysis to show it had got worse. I think I got Fong from Hawaii. I think he got very sympathetic.

P: What did Percy finally say? The point is that if they are for arms control they will destroy arms control and then I am going to blame them.

K: I said if after we get an agreement you vote against the permitted levels you and I are going to have an argument. You will have altered the course of history. Today I am telling you anyone voting against it will have the failure of arms control on their hands. Percy was weaseling. He said, what if we put it in escrow for a specified time. What are you going to achieve? I told them if we get the agreement of course we wont do the thing and the whole ball game is changed.

P: Well good. How did you get along with Stewart Alsop?

K: I had a good talk with him. I told him about the Mid-East thing.

P: Did he recognize our viewpoint?

K: Yes. He had planned to write a column about the middle east. I gave him a little about this thing.

P: You told him and what did he say? I told Sisco myself and let him know that I was watching. He said they were preparing a letter. I told him to put in something to remind Mrs. Meir of what I had said on July 1.

K: My recommendation about the letter is not to send it before Thursday or Friday.

P: We have plenty of time. Bill was not pressing me.

K: He thought you wanted the letter tonight.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

-2-

P: No, I said I wanted to look at it. I said I agree completely on delaying it but I want to take it with me. I don't want to send the letter until we know what the offer is.

K: And until Nasser speaks tomorrow, and there is a Supreme Soviet meeting tomorrow. We should look those two things over.

P: Go on with Stewart.

K: I told him it was essential to bring the Soviets back into the ball game. He got it completely.

P: You didn't tell him about the real things.

K: I saw Bill this afternoon.

P: How did you get along with him?

K: We had a good talk.

P: How did it go?

K: I think it is better. It is not good for the country for two senior advisers to be...

P: He initiated it. I think it is a good idea.

K: I will certainly try to make it work.

P: He told me on the phone today that he felt that x what was said on July 1 helped.

K: He told me that now that he has thought about it he thinks what was done in San Clemente is having a big effect.

P: I told him if you can get that out it will be helpful. He said we are all together. It would be helpful if he would say so.

K: It is hard now to fly-speck what was done.

P: This makes it possible now for us to do what we have to do with the Israelis. Mrs. Meir would never stand still for anything without my having made it strong. Also the fact that we xk said what we did reassures them and they know that we are not going to sell them down the river.

By NARA, Date 5/27

K: It was a prerequisite and brought the Russians back in. Gromyko told Beam before you spoke there was nothing in this offer and it wouldn't go anywhere because it had all the failings of our previous offers, which was partially true. And now they are accepting something they rejected 6 months ago. All the screaming helped with the Russians because it showed the Russians that somebody must believe it to be serious or they wouldn't scream so much.

P: That is right.

K: You know the stock market shot up today.

P: What happened?

K: Madame Binh made a number of half conciliatory statements.

P: How did the stock market know it?

K: It was in the newspapers. She said it in a press conference. She said they would be willing to include members of the Thieu government in a coalition. This in itself is something we cannot consider.

P: But it indicates an opening.

K: Maybe not that but it emphasizes a softer part in their program. She didn't say we will fight to the death.

P: Thank heavens we are not putting Bruce in the position of rushing to Paris on the 3d of August with a note to the third secretary of the Embassy. We can have him sit there and wait and talk and then we will do it. This measured pace is going to drive them up the wall.

K: Absolutely. This Egyptian thing indicates Soviet pressure.

P: You think it is going to leak tomorrow?

K: Yes. Tomorrow or Friday at the latest it is going to be out.

P: Hanoi will be watching the effect that we are not driving it to a showdown in the Middle East.

P: The Senators?

K: I think Mathias and Percy were wavering except Percy has said I voted with you yesterday on the crime bill. I said you always tell the President

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

8:05 p.m., July 22, 1970

By NARA, Dato

K: I have just talked to the President and on a quick reading of the letter. There were no major (changes ??). He feels very strongly, he doesn't want to send it today. We will wait for the response to the Nasser speech tomorrow and after the Dobrynin response.

S: Rabin called -- holding their response till they hear from us.

K: You could call Rabin and ask him not to say anything.

S: Holding their fire.

K: Wait until Rabin response.

S: Not overriding tonight.

K: Okay

S: Let me see how it goes.

K: This is the President's thinking.

S: I can understand that. We will take a reading tomorrow night and you and I will see what the situation is.

wgh

TELECON

7-23-70 9:45 a.m.

Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

By CCO NARA, Date 3/27

S: ...reservation should have been made last week night. Don't be too shocked if there is blood and thunder out of Nasser. If they have accepted this proposal, they will have to cover their tracks, particularly with the Palestinians. So whatever comes out of their people will not be too surprising if it is strong. We should watch our intelligence to see whether the Russians primarily influenced the Egyptians or the Egyptians influenced the Russians. WHADD

K: What do you think?

S: I have the feeling the Russians moved them toward a more constructive reply. It is only a guess.

K: That's what I think and I think also that the President's statements didn't hurt any.

S: You're being too modest. I told the President yesterday that they have been helpful. The Secretary agrees.

K: How about getting your men to stop making me out the villain.

S: Who should I tell. (laugh)

K: OK, if President sees purple language on the ticker, he should not be surprised.

TELCON
Sen. Javitts/Kissinger
10:00 am 7/23/70

J: I just talked to Nelson on the campaign. I called you yesterday because of the decision on Foreign Relations Committee. I wanted to talk to you about what happened here yesterday, The Committee and the President are headed for aix collision course on effective executive privilege because ambassadors and all are told not to appear before the committee or give a written transcript. I have urged and ? ? ? ? ? ? agrees that Fulbright and Aiken should tell the President what's going on. It was Bill Fulbright who lead the committee in great restraint. The blue ____ have come when they are not going to hang you. I have mentioned this before. Bill and Aiken if I report back that they will be recieved with a forthcoming felling they will be ? ? ? ? ? to the Pres. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Hoping that it will be a more forthcoming? ? ? ? and the advice and constant ____ can be developed. I don't think this committee is lost to the President.

K: I have to go to the President.

J: We will talk later. I have to have a report.

By _cc_ NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Mr. Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

7-23-70 10:00 a.m.

K: Joe, Rabin called me again yesterday about the trip of Mrs. Meir. He said she didn't know when she wanted to come. I think if you agree we should tell him that if she comes for something clearly not official and if she doesn't come with a big shopping list, it may be good to twist her arm in this new phase

S: This new phase isn't really relevant to her coming. I don't disagree with this. I told Rabin that my concern is that if she comes here, she would find it very difficult to come here without really pumping us about what America has got to do. I told Rabin that we have now finally established this military relationship.... We don't want Golda to come here asking for credit. What good would it do when we're doing so well. On the other hand, if she insists, how can the President turn her down.

K: XMK If you don't get a reply for a week, when you ask again, we can wait another week. Then if you don't get a reply, we don't go. Since he's pressed twice, I don't think we can refuse. Tell me if you think we can refuse.

S: It is not a good idea. I told him it is not a good idea. He said you owed him an answer. He possibly wants an answer before he goes home -- he goes home next week. You better check it out with the President.

K: Check it out with Rabin. Our concern is that you not create any deadlines, etc. But if you insist the President will see her -- very reluctantly.

S: That's the way I would handle it. If you want, he will stay on the limb for personal judgment.

K: President commented that your report was superb. I'll talk to you when you're out here because the President has very much in mind what happened in the last two weeks.

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

12:37 pm

7/23/70

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

S: I have discussed this letter with Rabin off the record. He has a good suggestion for a change. If you have it in front of you, I will tell you.

K: Just a minute. Call Al Haig, I don't seem to have it. I don't know if he does.

S: I want to report the following. They have left with a ? ? ? without condition. Secondly, whether they accept a military standstill. He said yes. That's about what it amounts to.

K: He mumbled something to me this morning. I have the letter now.

S: 3rd paragraph, that sentence "The Egyptians have informed us . . . " The sentence that says "our position is . . . " Strike the phrase 'in Oct. and December, 18 documents that provide."

K: Good.

S: On Golda thing I have another thought. Rabin thinks that she may go to a UJA thing in Calif. and see the President for an hour. I said that was probably all right. I said k if she is going to see the President in S. Clemente, is the Israeli reply in the affirmative. But if she comes in to argue and goes away and says she has turned the President down -- my advice to you is in principle yes but msk in connection with the UNGA and that she is not coming with a new shopping bag.

K: Within the GA. I have talked to the President about it --'

S: If she wants to come in the next week, she does so only if she agrees.

K: Not that quickly. Maybe next S. Clemente trip.

S: But I would put it in context of the GA.

K: We have your people busy these days.

S: The story of my life is work.

K: If you didn't have it you wouldn't know what to do.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01252
By CNAR Date Stot

TELCOM
Dobrynin/Kissinger
1:00 pm 7/23/70

K: In light of one of the comments you made on modifications and positions I hadn't explained to you. There's one feature of the proposal that was developed after I spoke to you which doesn't change the basic principal which you should know we are on the private equivalents but within the ceilings, each side should have a ceiling on the number. On the large ones within the separate ceiling we have asked for the possibility also for ours. We don't have that fully developed before. It doesn't change the numbers. I should know how quickly we will present (?) this. for discussion.

D: I understand. For a matter of clarification.

K: And so you are correctly informed.

D: I think it is simple for me to understand and they will know too. And if you have something on the subject we discussed, let me know.

K: Of course, and you too.

TELCORN
Dobrynin/Kissinger
1:00 pm 7/23/70

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

K: In light of one of the comments you made on modifications and positions I hadn't explained to you. There's one feature of the proposal that was developed after I spoke to you which doesn't change the basic principal which you should know we are on the private equivalents but within the ceilings, each side should have a ceiling on the number. On the large ones within the separate ceiling we have asked for the possibility also for ours. We don't have that fully developed before. It doesn't change the numbers. I don't know how quickly we will present (?) this. for discussion.

K: Of course, and you too.

By ace NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Rowland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

3:00 p.m., July 23, 1970

K: When we goof things up, we really goof.

E: What happened?

K: Were you going to yell at me about the Middle East?

E: No. You can't see me before you go?

K: No, I'm booked up. It looks as if things are working out. Nothing is more boring than to say "the way we planned them."

E: What if Israel rejects it?

K: We are in a better position to go to them than we would have been without the last three weeks. I'm not sure they will reject it.

E: Didn't they almost reject it right after June 25? It was my understanding Rabin talked them out of it. I had dinner with the Soviet Ambassador the other night and I want to talk with you about that, but not on the phone. Would you have 10 minutes before 7:00?

K: Check with me at 5:30. I will find 10 minutes -- but only 10 minutes -- around 6:00.

E: I will call you. I can be there in two minutes.

lds

Telecon
Ron Ziegler

7/25/70, 1:15 p.m.

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

Z: I ddn't get the SALT question the way I thought I would.

H: How did you get it?

Z: Somewhat unusual: it was aimed at "what do you mean the SALT negotiations will be finished sooner than other negotiations?" I said we are optimistic because both parties realize it's in their mutual interest to reach an agreement. We think the agreement will be reached sooner than in some other negotiations with the Soviet Union, such as the NPT.

H: I don't know about that. Where did "sooner" come from?

Z: You've said that a lot; Henry has, the President has, that an agreement in SALT will be reached in a shorter period of time than in other negotiations we've had with the Soviet Union.

H: Okay, that's all right.

Z: It's been said by Kissinger a number of times, also by the President.

H: Well, I don't know whether we'll have to sooner.

Z: It took four years for the NPT--we think this will be shorter.

H: That's okay.

Z: Are you worried about that?

H: No, it's okay.

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

7/27/70 8:45 a.m.

D: Two things I would like to mention to you. First, I am going home for consultations on Wednesday. Before I go I have something I would like to tell you about the question you raised.

K: Would you like to come out here?

D: No, I will probably write to you. I will put it in a paper than and give it to your man. The essence is that we are prepared to do this one but it should be on a mutual basis and take into consideration the political settlement.

K: What does mutual mean?

D: I mean only one side . . . obligation.

K: But we don't have any.

D: Then it is better for you.

K: I understand and that is the right way to put it.

D: Same as on the question of arms limitations. Same as before and in the same context we are prepared to discuss the second question you raised. I will put it as briefly as possible and give it to your man.

K: I will send Colonel Kennedy again.

D: My government considers it very important our contacts on the Middle East.

K: Between our governments or you and me?

D: It is the same thing. I mean our contacts, you and me and then general. But first our contacts.

K: I appreciate all of this--how long will you be gone?

D: I don't know--maybe two to three weeks. After the consultations I will spend some time with my family. Maybe to the end of August. You don't have anything to say about the European thing I discussed with you?

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

K: No, except we are going to try to apply them in a constructive spirit.

D: If you have anything to tell me I will be here till Wednesday.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

EX-102358

By

CHARA Date 07-27-70 8:45

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin

7/27/70 8:45 a.m. page 2

K: Let me talk to the President today. I will call you in any event before you leave. And don't be gone to long--you don't want me to get into mischief.

D: No, I am sure there will be no problem.

K: It seems to be going along well.

D: I will tell you what--I will not not a unilateral approach and second is the political settlement and third--there are really three things--the importance of the contacts and we can work out a settlement on the Middle East.

K: I will talk to the President, but should I send Colonel Kennedy over immediately?

D: Yes.

K: I will send him over in the next hour.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CNRA Date El01

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
7/27/70 9:55 a.m.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

R: How did it go at the Bohemian Grove?

K: It went well I think. I spoke in quite general terms about the Nixon Doctrine and a little bit about Vietnamization--why Vietnamization and negotiation reinforce each other. Talked very little about the Middle East--about two minutes worth. You might want to cover it more; there is intense interest in it.

R: Yes, and it's timely.

K: I said we are encouraged, that it's the beginning of a procedural thing now. I didn't want to raise false hopes. That's the area everyone asked about.

R: And I'm going to talk about the future as far as isolationism is concerned. I have figures that are very interesting on how much we own in the world. We own about a fourth of the world. That's an exaggeration but we own so much all over the world. That approach to businessmen is good. It shows that our security commitments are essential for if we are going to continue our commitments all over the world.

K: That's right because they have a tendency toward isolationism. They also asked about the divisions in the Administration--Mel and I hit that very hard. There was no formal question and answer session. At lunch I asked what I should talk about. Two or three said that they were concerned about the stories that the Administration is divided.

R: Maybe by the time I get there they'll have forgotten that.

K: Yes. These were not nasty questions. I just wanted to bring you up to date.

R: The President called this morning. He's going to give a press conference on Thursday night. He said on the Middle East he's going to put the questions aside and say we are mildly encouraged but don't want to make any commitments while the negotiations are going on. Also, on the Spanish Bases, we've got to soften them up a little bit-- Fulbright is really mad.

K: I know--he's angry.

R: If you can talk to Ehrlichman and Timmons it would help. The committee is not homogeneous and we should stop treating them like we are.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
7/27/70 9:55 a.m.
page 2

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Fulbright, Gore and some others are against us. But Dave Abshire spent
time with ________ and Aiken this weekend and Aiken said he'd
support. They can take some of the steam off of Fulbright.

K: But we're not holding up the signing for long?

R: Not for long, but I don't want to do it as an affront to the whole
committee.

K: I know Fulbright's really angry about it.

R: I want to get Mansfield on our side too. I'll talk with the
President. They've really got a hold over us. They can hold up our ambassador to Cambodia.

K: Timmons wants to have it signed before Thursday.

R: That was before he talked with Dave Abshire. I think he's
changing his mind on it. We should wait a few days--see how it looks.
If it doesn't look like a major rupture with the whole Senate we can go
ahead. The Spaniards don't care as long as we sign it before long. I
will see how it is and call you.

K: Okay or if pressures build up I will call you first.

R: On the ________ testimony we made a mistake. There
was nothing he said that wasn't already public. I recommend that on things
like that rather than John Ehrlichman saying 'no' we should talk it over a
little bit.

K: That's the sort of thing you and I should discuss all along and
stay in close touch about. We've had a request for Shrike missiles to
Israel. That's an air-to-surface missile. The President is inclined to
do it on the ground that it might speed up favorable consideration. Sisco
is for it as I understand. Do you have any view? They have made an
urgent request in order to keep the thing from creeping up to the Canal.

R: If we get a favorable response from Moorer.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
7/27/70 1:15 p.m.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

R: I talked to Joe. I told him the idea of agreeing to it is okay but to be sure the weapons aren't delivered, or at least used, till we get the answer. It might upset the whole applecart.

K: Why don't I talk to the President and call you back?

R: I don't think he will object to this. We won't ever get them there that soon anyway. But we should be careful. If the Arabs could claim we introduced new weapons it would give them reason to go ahead.

K: Well, what do you recommend?

R: We recommend 'yes' to Israel. Encourage them to go ahead but we want to be sure it's not introduced in the wrong way.

K: Shall we leave it that if you don't hear from me you will go ahead?

R: Good.

K: And do the notifying.

R: Okay. One other question: what did Mel talk about at the Bohemian Grove?

K: Defense budget.

R: And talk about ABM?

K: Very little.

R: I'll say a few words about that. It's timely.

TELECON

7-27-70 1:30 p

Rogers/Kissinger

By NARA, Date 5/27

R: We sent papers through on our new Ambassador to Jordan and also one to Lebanon. I talked to the President and he had question. If you could get people to approve this, we could get airgram and President could announce on Friday.

K: Who are the men involved?

R: Bill Buffim for Jordan. He fits in pretty well because he has been with the UN on this subject.

K: We'll get the approvals within 48 hours.

R: It would be better if you could do it quicker than that.

K: I'll get it done by tomorrow.

R: It doesn't have to be announced. Saudi Arabia has been taken care of.

K: It's just a formality?

R: Yes.

By

NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Amb. Rabin

7/27/70 3:05 p.m.

K: How are you?

R: I am surviving.

K: Through no fault of ours I'm sure. The President has approved the sale of the Shrike missiles. You either will be informed or have been already.

R: I have just been informed.

K: If there is any problem about delivery let me know.

R: I will if there is.

K: And we will see what we can do. I am also looking at the other items.

R: This is only one part--there is another I have not had a chance to discuss in the political arena. In continuation . . . are we taking a safe line?

K: I doubt it.

R: May I communicate through the White House?

K: Yes but just tell me, continuation of what?

R: The letter that was sent last week.

K: Yes, how would you . . .

R: I have a request for clarification or I would put it in a different way: I want to be certain my understanding is correct about the two basic principles that are expressed in the letter.

K: You didn't get a satisfactory answer?

R: Not completely.

K: Why don't you go to the White House and talk me on a secure line.

R: All right.

Telecon
Amb. Rabin

7/27/70 3:05 p.m. page 2

By NARA, Dale

K: Of you could write it out and give it to some body.

R: I have got it in writing already.

K: I will send Colonel Kennedy to get it.

R: I will send it to Col. Kennedy in the White House.

K: But make sure only he gets it. Is it an official letter from the Prime Minister?

R: No, a clarification I was asked to make here and respond to her. In all but two points it is satisfactory. But there are two basic points regarding the question of veto.

K: Of a settlement?

R: No, question of a total withdrawal and question of a certain interpretation of the refugee problem.

K: I get it. Why don't you send it over and I will be in touch with you.

R: Fine.

K: Some day you are going to call me with some good news.

R: It doesn't look so in the foreseeable future. It depends on what you consider good news.

K: I look forward to seeing you when I get back.

R: Yes.

TELECON

7-27-70 3:25 pm

The President/Kissinger

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

P: As you know, Reagan will be here at 6:30 for a drink. I was thinking it would be a good idea that you stay over for dinner afterwards.

K: I would be delighted, Mr. President.

P: Murphy's wife is ill. We decided it would be better to invite you. Reagan likes to talk about other things besides state matters.

K: I would be delighted.

TELECON

7-27-70 3:30 p.m.

Nancy Dickerson/Kissinger

By

NARA, Dato 5/27

D: I wanted to come down to talk to you in person. I would dearly love to interview you on the Today show. I think it could be a very profitable time.

K: The last time I was told that I couldn't do it for less than 25 minutes.

D: You can have an hour.

K: An hour would be more than I could handle.

D: I talked here and they said that you could have an hour. We would break with commercials and then go on for the second 25 minutes. If the President can handle it, you can.

K: I am not worried about whether I could handle you. My problem is I never speak on substantive issues for the record. If you want to talk to me about how the President works, etc., I would be willing to put it to our people. I wouldn't want to get into a discussion on Vietnam or anything like that.

D: In talking about it, I can't give you the questions beforehand. It would be too complicated. If we talked about Vietnam, it would be like how much does our Government control their decision-making processes.

K: If you won't give me your questions, I won't give you the answers.

D: Frankly, I think the President would like you to do this.

K: I will talk with him about it.

D: I anchor the show August 10 and August 31.

K: I will be on the Coast August 31.

D: I agree with President Nixon that people do better live.

K: Do I have to come to New York to do it.

D: You're important enough for me to come to Washington. If your schedule finds you in San Clemente, we would do it at your convenience. It would be profitable.

Dickerson/Kissinger

By CCO NARA, Date 5/27

K: Profitable is a little exaggerated. We haven't gotten into terms yet, have we?

D: I almost feel I need my lawyer here.

K: Let me talk to Haldeman. I don't have a PR sense about these things.

D: For anyone who doesn't have any PR sense, you do better than anybody I know. (Began to talk about Maxine Cheshire) I think people have gotten to the point now where they are feeding her falsehoods just so that she'll print them. I think they do it because she is stupid enough to print them. How was Bohemian Grove?

K: It was magnificent.

D: I'd love to go there.

K: You can't - it's for boys.

D: I like to be with boys, etc. etc. Are you going to leave in January?

K: That's a story I put out to keep up the morale of my staff. Where does everybody get that story. . . They have a new belly dancer at the hotel there and I want to get to know her.

D: Maybe we could help you get to know her.

K: I haven't really focussed on that problem. All these stories have no basis.

D: I just wondered off the record whether you were going.

K: I just have to keep my staff together.

D: (She wanted to get together with Mr. Kissinger in the future)

K: I have been trying for a long time.

D: It has been a long time.

K: There is all the ingredients for a mutual bargain. Let's hope no one is tapping this phone.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

Dickerson/Kissinger

-3-

By NARA, Dato

D: It would be most interesting.

K: How should we leave the first part of this discussion.

D: I'll call you in a week. May I call you on Friday?

K: OK

D: I think it would be an exciting conversation and it would be helpful.

K: Except I prefer stupid interviewers.

D: I have seen you enough at these interviews to know how you operate.

It would be a great thing for me.

Telecon
Bob Haldeman

7/27/70 4:40 p.m.

By NARA, Dato

K: I am talking to Frank Shakespeare about his observations on his trip. I think it would be good if the President could get 15 minutes tomorrow to hear them.

H: It depends on his inclination after the budget meeting.

K: That's when I thought it could be done--about 15 minutes. I think it might be worthwhile--he was at the chiefs of missions meeting and it would be good if he could give the President his impressions.

H: Okay, why don't we shoot for it after the defense budget tomorrow? Why don't you ask Frank to come in after that?

K: Okay.

Telecon
Secretary Stans
7/27/70 5:00 p.m.

By C.C. NARA, Date 5/27

S: You're a lucky guy. My file is in the office and I can't remember all the things I wanted to talk about.

K: Do you want me to call you back tomorrow?

S: No, let's talk right now about the things I have in mind. I am worried about the President boxing himself in on the textile thing. He's got to keep his options open. He doesn't know when they'll dump the bill on his desk--it might be just before elections. I hope he can be encouraged to keep his options so he can go where he wants. We've had discussions in the office about this. He ought to say now that if there are shoes in the bill he'll veto it. He's got a lot of options now: exclude exempt countries, exempt products--the way it is now he can administer it any way he wants. I would love to talk to him about it.

K: I will get it across to him.

S: I have talked to Mitchell about this--has he called you?

K: Not yet.

S: Well he will be talking with you.

K: What do you think of reopening the textile negotiations on less than a comprehensive basis?

S: I think it would be a bad idea. As the matter stands these people have the votes in the Congress. Anything we do would lose the President all the credit he's gained. Peter Flanigan called me and said what about using the Kendall Plan. At the moment the textile people think the President's a great hero, but that would just irritate them.

K: What about when he vetoes the bill?

S: We'll look at that when we get to it.

K: How can we?

S: We'll see how it looks then. Two other quick subjects: On the British sale of arms to South Africa, how much longer do we have to hold up on telling Rhodesia?

K: I thought I approved that.

S: Yes but we can't get it through State or your staff.

By

NARA, Date 5/27

page 2

K: It isn't possible thy staff is holding it up. It must be in
State. I can control my staff but I can't control State. But I am going
to get after that immediately. I am going to move it this week.

S: Okay, and do you have anything on the trip to Russia?

K: Don't take it now.

S: Abandon the idea?

K: Wait a few weeks. I September it might be great. I have it
in mind. And I have moved a paper to the President recommending that
we go ahead on the Union Carbide thng. It hasn't come back yet.

S: What about the other?

K: I think Union Carbide had the best case.

S: Okay, I will call you tomorrow if I find there's anything we've
left out.

Telecon
Prof. Doty

By NARA, Dale 5/27

7/27/70 ca. 6:00 p.m.

(after a previous, lengthy conversation)

D: As of the moment, if there is a private Middle East discussion is there anybody in the U.S. you would feel more useful than someone chosen at random.

K: Let me think about that. Roger Fisher was pretty good.

D: Yes, we thought of him.

K: I don't necessarily agree with him on everything.

D: No, but he's informed and sees both sides.

K: Let me think about it.

D: Okay and on arms control, I think we agreed I would make a speech on it. I think the whole Soviet gang will be coming. We were wondering if we could come down.

K: What do you mean the whole gang?

D: Well, because of the Congress it might happen...

K: Oh yes, I'll be delighted to meet with our people or the Soviet group.

D: Okay. Is there any shchedule in Vienna yet?

K: Not yet.

TELECON

July 27, 1970

Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

By NARA, Date 5/27

R: As you always say, I do not bring the best news to you. Since Saturday on three occasions, first on Saturday and today twice, the Russian pilots participated in some coverage of the Egyptian Air Force activity up to the Suez Canal. Saturday they intercepted two Skyhawks.

K: I saw that record.

R: Today there was no engagement but they gave air coverage without great success to Egyptian planes on positions at our side.

K: Right.

R: They are moving toward the Canal Zone, at least. On the other hand, when it comes to our request on the question of the planes and on the other items -- since the big shipment which we got three weeks ago, I can't see that much has been achieved and it will be very helpful if some sort of encouragement will be given to those who have to tackle it.

K: OK, what are you talking about particularly -- the [signature].

R: The reconnaissance plane.

K: The Drone. I thought we had approved this?

R: To the best of my knowledge, there's no formal approval that we have been informed by Defense.

K: I have to see the President now. I will be in touch in couple hours.

R: I will talk to you about political issue later.

K: OK, let's do that.

TELECON

7-28-70 9:10 a.m.

Harold Brown/Kissinger

By NARA, Date 5/27

B: I just got back last night from Vienna and since the President and you are out here, if you want me to pass on my personal observations, I would come down.

K: Right. I would like to talk to you about it. Let me call you within a day. We are going through a series of budget reviews and testifying about what is going on is not easy.

B: The decisions are very hard. One might wish success so the SALT talks would be easier. I am hopeful -- slightly optimistic. I was thinking it will be long and tough. I think the Soviets are likely to drag in all the questions that we tried to throw out. They would like to limit everything we do and have a free hand themselves. I think we can bring them around.

K: Do you agree that the ABM is a good bargaining weapon?

B: Yes, indeed.

K: If someone could talk to the Senators.... I just wonder if the
Congress would like to table it.

B: That doesn't mean we should let them do it.

K: The Soviets brought up last week that we are going to build 250 new missiles. But with their proposal, we could build all the missiles we want. Well, let's get together while I am here. I may be in Los Angeles on evening.

B: Well, one way or the other.

Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

By: KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

7-28-70 2:30 p.m.

Rogers/Kissinger

K: The President is in transit. He left before the thing got through.

R: Israel has raised a point which is very unfortunate. It may be a device that they're using to ______ the whole initiative. They say that because Jordan didn't accept the commitment to control the fedayeen, they don't feel Jordan makes them a partner to the agreement. We told them that the King can't do that and that we recognize that Israel has the right of decision and do what they're doing now. I have got Rabin coming in to tell him that this will be constructive. We will tell him to put pressure on Jordan. If a ceasefire goes into effect... Israel response done to undercut the whole initiative. It is a very serious matter. I wanted to tell you I am going to take the same line with Rabin and it will not be necessary for President to take action.

K: My former student delivered... I don't see why their view vis-a-vis the fedayeen is different if they accept a ceasefire.

R: I don't either. They say that it is a fedayeen ______ and that Nasser will not observe it. Israel can manage the fedayeen with no trouble. It appears that this is a way of shifting the whole initiative. I am going to talk to them and I am going to be firm and it may be necessary for the President to take some action.

K: I don't see what other view he would take.

R: I don't either.

K: Did Joe Sisco call you about 10 questions. I didn't know what he was talking about.

R: We'll try to keep you advised. The thing is moving so fast.

K: You are not modifying any of those ______.

R: on the veto one, we will look at it sympathetically. We can't approve veto.

The President made some pretty ______ announcements about the Golon Heights.

R: That can't possibly arrive now because Nasser has accepted the proposal. So I'll try to give as much assurance as I can without

Telecon
Senator Javits

7/28/70 2:35 p.m.

J: I've got this letter circulating--we've got about 2/3 of the Senator.

K: Good.

J: I talked to Goldwater and he said he talked with you and decided against signing.

K: I never talked with him.

J: He didn't really say that you talked him out of it but he sort of linked the two things, but that settles that. Naturally there is a certain amount of concern by the Senators signing it over the question of whether security arrangements would not leave the Israelis vulnerable.

K: We will do our best to avoid it by insisting on a military standstill in new construction.

J: A freeze?

K: No we don't want a freeze because of some things we are doing.

J: On this Opic (?) thing, any new word?

K: I got them to reconsider it.

J: I know and you have been a strong help on that.

K: You have got one advocate.

J: And an important one.

K: But don't turn against me if they should go against it. I wouldn't pick you as an enemy.

J: You have no choice in that.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
McGeorge Bundy
7/28/70 2:43 p.m.

B: I have to bother you with small things.

K: Not at all--after a whole morning on the defense budget there
is nothing you can do with me.

B: I am calling for McCloy who is on his way to Africa. This
budiness of guaranteeing lending of the UN Development Corporation is
coming to a head in the housing bill in Sparkman's Committee. Spark-
man needs to head that the Administration is in favor of this. The
problem is that HUD--which isn't against it--is not a very resonant
advocate. Your man Wright is not against it but doesn't like to do it
without clearance from you.

K: I like this disciplined staff.

B: The next 24 hours look like they are going to be decisive to
fool me.

K: Good. I will give Wright a call. On the Black idea, you
thought it would be a good role for him to be an American based coordinator?

B: He needs staffing and he is 72 years old but he'd damn good.

K: And use his existing structure?

B: Well, it's been dismantled but before he used only two or
three guys. If the President is interested in the economic reconstruction
aspects of his job then you ought to work around that carefully. It's no
problem to put Black in business on the Mekong issue. That, at the end
of the Johnson Administration, was admirable. But to stop further using
the arts of peace to lower the arts of war is another problem. (?) The
Dick Coopers and the Roy Whorley's of the world and your own Peterson
Commission, which has done quite a lot, have made a lot of sense for
looking into that. But he has enormous salability.

K: I know. The only problem is that I have got to come up
with a plan.

B: I would think your own crowd would know specifics on that
better than I. But thank you again for doing this for John.

K: There are few people it is more pleasurable to do things for.

By: KH V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
7/28/70 3:05 p.m.

R: I talked to Rabin. I think I smoothed it over. I made it clear that when we were talking about the ceasefire we were talking about the cessation of all incursions and the stopping of all shooting. When Jordan accepted unconditionally, Jordan agreed to do these things. The only thing is that we are not sure Jordan is able to control the Fedayeen. And if the Fedayeen takes things into its own hands, then Israel taking action would be acting in self-defense.

K: And it puts them in a better moral position if they are attacked in a cease-fire.

R: And it weakens the position of the Fedayeen. Well I think it's all straightened out in his mind.

K: You know he called here--I didn't respond at all.

R: I told J ______ to give you all the information he can as fast as possible.

K: Good.

R: A lot of it is being done orally.

K: It's just a question of having the information in case someone calls in here.

R: At the end of the meeting he summarized it, and I agreed.

K: So I will not call him, but if he calls me I will take the same position. Dobrynin called yesterday and told me he would be going back to Moscow for consultations.

R: He told me and told me the same thing. If I see him I will tell him we think it vitally important that if the Israelis accept this, the Soviet Union do everything they can to see that it is observed and to be sure agreement is arrived at quickly.

K: And that they exercise the greatest restraint. I told him that I didn't have any messages. He said that he will be back in three weeks.

R: Also, I'm going to talk to the President about the Spanish Bases when I get there. I talked to our Ambassador there and we have a tough problem. They don't want a treaty but some of them want to be sure they have an opportunity to be heard. Don't raise this with the President until I get there. I am going

By: KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

7/28/70 3:05 p.m. page 2

to suggest that the President see Mansfield, Scott, Fulbright and Aiken. He won't want to do it I think and I don't blame him. But if anyone can sell it to him it will be you. Javits called in suggesting the President see Fulbright and Aiken and he wouldn't hear a fix of it. I think that's why he's talking to you. But that was on another subject; executive privilege.

K: I don't think he should ask anything. Just say 'here's what we are doing and why. This is my attitude and I know how you feel" and so forth and so forth. That would soften the blow.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

The Attorney General:

7/28/70 3:15 p.m.

AG: I hope some rationality approaches this tariff bill and that the President doesn't get himself in any more boxes with veto statements.

K: I wish you'd talk to him. He's under enormous pressure to go the other way.

AG: Yes, and I understand you are one of the ones pushing him that way.

K: No, I think foreign policy consequences of the shoe bill would be unfortunate.

AG: He has a tremendous amount at stake in the textile issue.

K: No, I used to be a hard liner on the textile thing, as you know. But as it stands now I am not up enough on the other.

AG: He ought not to take the veto because that's putting off his friends and helping his enemies and if this Administration works for the reasonable whole they have got something good. As far as the oil import quota is concerned, I think you could get something useful.

K: What do we do about shoes?

Ag: We should turn it to our advantage to get the best bill we can. If it comes out with the textiles, shoes and oil import quota, I think he ought to veto it. The shoes are not of that magnitude.

K: I wish you would call him.

AG: I will do that. I had reports that you wanted it vetoed.

K: No, I just think if he wants to veto he should get the bill sufficiently bad that he's got a good excuse.

AG: Yes, but you can't do that before the Christmas tree has been decorated. The other thing I had for you is that Javits has been bugging me about the relationship between the White House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Now he's asking for advice from me.

K: Well, the President is not prepared to see Fulbright and Aiken which was his suggestion.

AG: His suggestion to me gets right down to seeing Case and Javits.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The Attorney General

7/28/70 3:15 p.m. page 2

Did you ever get a letter from Javits?

K: No.

AG: Then the honest broker Mitchell is not involved yet.

K: Not yet. Mr. Mitchell doesn't scare me as much as the other. Every day in the newspaper I find out that the Attorney General is getting almost Santa Clausish.

KG: Do you think any dialogue should be carried out?

K: The President is particularly tough on them now.

AG: He's in the driver's seat.

K: My inclination is to do some of it. You wouldn't find me objecting to that, but there's no sense recommending a meeting with Fulbright. On Mansfield he might be more receptive and wouldn't reject it a priori.

AG: He wouldn't take the same posture as some parts of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

K: And I don't think that there's much wrong with seeing Javits. He's done pretty well within his limitations. He's played the game pretty decently.

AG: The President respects Javits--he can talk to him and deal with him. But the President is now in the driver's seat: these fellows are looking for an audience.

K: You'll mention it to him?

AG: Yes, and you will mention the ________ bill?

K: Yes, Aiken though is worse than nothing.

AG: I hope to see you when you get back.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: CHNARA Date: 07-28-70
Date: 7-28-70 3:25 pm

CON
7-28-70 3:25 pm

Abassador Dobrynin/Mr, Kissinger

K: I am sitting on back patio thinking about peaceful coexistence.

D: Good for you, Henry. I am living with the same thought. I will be in Moscow thinking in the same way.

K: When you talk to your leaders I hope you convey that thought to them. I gave your message to the President. This is not the way to give you an answer but we thought it was a constructive reply and we will be taking a personal interest, as you have also recommended to us on this problem from now on. We will also know some of the details from now on, but not as well as our friend Sisco.

D: I understand.

K: On the other matter which you brought up with me, we also looked at this and we also find elements of discussion on it when you return.

D: Elements for discussion?

K: What we need, Anatol, on that is some program of how to get from here to there which I have often suggested to you. We need to work out some procedure for getting things going on the European thing.

D: On the European?

K: On the European. We will talk to you when you return. We are looking at it in a constructive attitude.

D: From here to there? On the main question..

K: Well, that too but I am assuming that you will reply when you are ready. We have never really had any discussions on European matters, you and I, and it would be useful to clarify some of that. The President has asked me to let you know of our constructive spirit.

D: This is No. 2

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsinger
By: CHARA DATE: April
Date: 1961

Dobrynin/Kissinger

2

K: When are you leaving?

D: Tomorrow night.

K: When are you coming back?

D: I hope by four weeks -- just enough to gain strength to conduct
discussions.

K: That will give you an unfair advantage.

D: What about you?

K: I am working on the budget. You are building so many SS-9's.
You are upsetting the balance.

D: Do you expect reply only on what I said to you -- but on when we
begin to move.

K: Well, I would think fairly soon after that but it would be helpful
to have you where we can talk to you, particularly on the issue which
you brought back in your message to me. I think that would be easier
to discuss on a restricted basis.

D: Yes. This is out of question. I was thinking on the more diplomatic
side.

K: What way? Do it in Moscow?

D: On your proposal on how we will move.

K: We would then try to get the ceasefire agreed to.

D: I think you already discussed this with the Egyptians in my impression.

K: Yes. If I may make suggestion, it would be extremely helpful if
you would exercise restraint.

D: I think meeting productive.

K: I think shortly afterwards one can start activating the

D: It could begin in New York.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

Erolaix
By CHARA Date 6/2/67

By

Dobrynin/Kissinger

K: That would be one possibility. I have heard Cyprus as another.

D: We will say nothing. New York is a good place.

K: We have no objection to that. It is a natural place.

D: I think it can be worked out.

K: Whom do I deal with when you are gone.

D: I hope you won't spoil my vacation. I hope that there will be no surprise like last time, when I went home to Moscow on major issues. There will definitely be no answer to No. 1 question.

K: WAXXX Watch your language. I don't anticipate anything. You know our basic position. If your friends in Hanoi do something, we would have to react. But you should expect nothing from us.

D: I am talking about our conversation.

K: I understand very well.

D: I also.

K: Come back reasonably rested but not so much that you have the
advantage over us. I will be dealing with Vorontsov.

D: I will be here.

K: I don't anticipate any bilateral business but if we want
to get urgent message to you

D: I will be the man.

K: We look forward to seeing you when you come back.

D: I got letter today thanking me for very good reception at White
House when your assistants were there. They gave your personal
greetings.

K: Thank you very much.

TELECON

7-28-70 3:25 pm

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr, Kissinger

D: I understand.

D: Elements for discussion?

D: On the European?

D: This is No. 2

K: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3:0

F, 489, PTF, D/K 1970 [p. 27], V. 1

Dobrynin/Kissinger

2

K: When are you leaving?

D: Tomorrow night.

K: When are you coming back?

D: What about you?

K: What way? Do it in Moscow?

K: I think shortly afterwards one can start activating the ______

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3:0

Reproduced from the open files
of the Biden Presidential
Office

NARA Dkt 117-20-1

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3

K: WAXX Watch your language. I don't anticipate anything. You know our basic position. If your friends in Hanoi do something, we would have to react. But you should expect nothing from us.

K: I understand very well.

D: I also.

D: I will be here.

D: I will be the man.

K: Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3:6

LF, 489, PTF, D/K 1970 [P.2], V.1

Reproduced from the open files
of the Ministry of

By KHU NARA, Dale 5/12/04

TELECON

7-28-70 4:00 p.m.

The President/Kissinger

K: Just wanted to tell you I have talked to Dobrynin and I just told him we considered his reply. I said be absolutely sure it stays in channel. I said we would get answer to big question when he returns. He said he hoped we would not surprise him as the last time. I said unless our frien ds in Hanoi do something, we anticipated nothing He was slobbering all over me. He said he and I would have a lot of business when he returns.

P: You figure about three weeks.

K: About the middle of August.

P: What we mainly want to do is keep all of this in strictest of
confidence. On the Middle East thing, it may break. If we could
just keep the situation confused for a while -- keep it from breaking
down.

K: On the one hand, keep it confused but also keep the Israelis
from starting something and also from telling so much
that the Israelis would bring their troops out. That would be a
tremendous coup.

P: A reduction of arms too. That would put the Israelis in a pretty
good position.

K: I talked with Bill several times about his conversation with Rabin.
I am going to xxx stay out of it. We have given Rabin assurances on the
first two points. Bill is working the rest out. We will get answer
today or tomorrow.

P: It will be interesting. You gave him exactly the right line. We
are not going to be quiet if other side does something.

K: I think they want meeting as much as we do. They didn't
have to give us these two answers.

P: I have the feeling that they want a meeting to solidify their framework.
More and more they have historical prospective. They cannot look without
concern on the enormous colossus of China. Also they feel that the Chinese

*

President/Kissinger

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

may not give a damn. They could not only wipe out 20 or 30 Russian cities. What do they care.

K: They could march into Siberia. That is pretty unpopulated.

P: It is desolate there.

K: Things are certainly travelling much more than we though they would.

P: We must be quite firm but not give them anything to bitch about.
I know that their position is not changed.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon
The Secretary of State
7/28/70 ca. 4:00 p.m.

R: I thought that the President might be going to start thinking about his TV thing...

K: Yes, I asked Sisco to send out suggestions on the Middle East.

R: I wanted to say one thing about Indochina. We'll be getting questions about the cease-fire because Thieu has been making speeches you know. If you don't already have them, you should have copies of Thieu's comments because the President will be asked.

K: Excellent.

R: We have been not answering on that.

K: His intention is to do the same thing--wouldn't you recommend that?

R: On the other hand, we have been asked only by asking what about all this new interest in cease-fire on Thieu's part. We say it's not a new interest. We say we've talked about a lot of things, but we're not going to comment on any particular thing. When asked if this would be considered a new initiative we say no, not new.

K: If they recall Thieu has been speaking about it since last week, October and he mentioned in his May 14 speech and others.

R: Yes, if we got Israel's reply today...

K: That doesn't look likely.

R: Rabin said we might. The only hitch in it would be what he happens to the right wing in Israel? Some are talking about leaving the cabinet-- not Dan though.

K: No, but the guy who headed the Irgun (sp?).

R: We'll have a prepared statement for him if that happens.

K: Good and would you get that out here?

R: Yes. And on SALT, we say we've made a proposal and we're hopeful? And on the Middle East we follow your guidance.

By: KLC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Dr. Franklin Murphy
7/28/70 p.m. (in S.C.)

M: Did you tell the President about your experience [at Bohemian Grove]?

K: Yes. He's been there. It didn't surprise him.

M: Several items. One, I am going to see you I understand tomorrow night. At the Bradens' for dinner.

K: Oh yes. Great.

M: Two, I will not be able to get to San Clemente so I think the next time we will cross paths will be in Washington in August. I get in at 4:30 in the fifth. Maybe we could have dinner together on the evening of the 5th at about 8:00?

K: Good.

M: Third, did you go over the thing with Bob Haldeman?

K: Yes. He doesn't know what you are talking about--you invited him and he didn't want to go. He's flattered, delighted and full of affection for you but he's under the impression that you had invited him. But he doesn't like that sort of activity--he likes to stay in the background.

M: I feel much relieved.

K: He says he doesn't want to come next year either.

M: I will change his mind. And if he can't come, you can come again.

K: That's a fine thing to say.

M: Or maybe you two can both come.

K: I have one thing: the President thought you might be willing to drop in on Bill Rogers and give him some of your impressions for Marshall Green. Or better, why don't you talk to him at the Grove this weekend?

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
(Secure Voice Phone)
7/29/70 11:10 a.m.

L: The other day, the Israelis came in and wanted Shrike missiles. We have this group just back from Israel to check on what they need. After my conversation with you, I thought it better not to volunteer anything at this time. What the Israelis need now is the RF4C [could be RF4E or RF14--I couldn't understand him] . . . won't get the RF?? until January. We could do it now and then take them back. For the kind of equipment they need on the Shrike missile, we would have to retrofit their planes. I talked to Rogers about this. He may be calling you. If we are going to volunteer anything it should be the RF4C.

K: But Rogers has already told them we approved the Shrike.

L: He didn't know about the equipment change. The way they are now you would have to go over the target to fire the missile and you would lose a lot of planes that way. You can't use the present planes from a standoff position.

K: Do the Israelis understand this?

L: I have offered to brief them on this.

K: The problem with the Shrike is that on the day Rogers and Sisco were beating Rabin over the head he called here for assistance to get the President to intervene on those ten questions. I refused to do that but told him I understood that the President had just approved the Shrike.

L: But I sent this military evaluation team over. We can't redo all their aircraft now. It won't do them any good now.

K: Then they shouldn't want it.

L: They don't know what they need.

K: If you can get them not to ask for it we don't want to force it on them.

L: Especially if you go into cease-fire, the reconnaissance planes are something they do need. We also have some other things for upgrading their camera equipment. The Shrike missile won't do them any good.

K: We were told on Monday that in order to get them to agree we ought to authorize the Shrike. So how should we leave it?

Telecon
Secretary Laird

7/29/70 11:10 a.m.

By KHLW NARA, Dale S/12/04

L: I am going to talk to Rogers about talking to the Israelis about the things that would be must useful for them now. We can give them a few items here that will really help them. & Another thing. Do you know about the 6 Navy people on shore in Sihanoukville?

K: Yes.

L: With communications equipment?

K: Yes, but they won't stay long.

L: They were discovered today. I hadn't known about that.
[said something about WSAG]

K: You have people on the WSAG.

L: But they shouldn't have done that without letting me know.
That's my problem, I know Henry. I am telling you this because I
wanted you to know. It has been picked up by the newspeople. They
were discovered in Sihanoukville and if we don't get them out of there . . .

K: We geter get a question and answer for the President on that
for tomorrow night.

L: Yes, we'll send that out. The only reason I bring it up is
that I thought you should know.

K: Yes thank you. Will you send that out right away?

TELECON

7-29-70 11:25 a.m.

Rogers/Kissinger

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: I want to tell you Mel just called me about these strikes and he now takes view that they don't fit on the Phantoms.

R: I told him yesterday.

K: That fellow Pranger is highly emotional on these subjects. He wants to offer some other equipment for reconnaissance and other stuff. I have no interest in it. I only want you to be aware of that after you and I talked on Monday and when Rabin called me to intercede with the President to get a positive answer, we told him -- Haig told him -- that we couldn't get into that and he would hear from you on favorable interest on the strike. I did this because of your view and Sisco's -- this might speed up positive response.

R: Joe's view is that of just letting him know affirmative status.

K: Rabin called again saying that they would go along with President's letter to them but they were still exceedingly unhappy. I wonder if Laird confused about what they will do. He wants to give them a briefing.

R: Let's do nothing now until we get an answer.

K: That is my instruction. That is status of situation from our side.

R: As it came out, you had already told him about the strike.

K: I said we would hear from you and that showed President's good will and we didn't get into other business. I knew you had already told him.

R: We'll get in touch with Bill.

K: We told Rabin that any formal requests should be put into formal channels,

R: I am thinking the same thing. Any requests should go through Joe.

K: I said it would be good to make decisions to get some credit. We said put through regular channels. I didn't talk to him myself. Haig talked to him.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Sisco/Haig

7-31-70 8:30 a

S: What we have had is that the director general of the foreign office has the ______ of the cabinet vote to approve acceptance of the US initiative. The full detailed normal reply won't be given to us until Sunday. I have talked to the Secy and he feels that based on this, it is sufficient to give a statement. It is all over the wires. He told me to be cautious, but I have the feeling the pressure is a little strong around you in terms of putting something out. I have suggestions for changes.

The second paragraph should read: " We have been informed by the government of Israel of the cabinet vote to accept the U.S. proposal. I am gratified to be able to say that all three governments to whom we have addressed our initiative have now responded positively and accepted the U.S. proposal.

The next paragraph where the President says: In this connection, let me make one... President said this last night so it should read: "In this connection, let me reiterate one point..."

In the paragraph starting "For our part" write the sentence: We shall continue to remain engaged in the two and four power talks

" We expect these efforts to continue."

Strike entire sentence: Our Ambassador and UN will request meeting with Four Powers. Include: "We wish Ambassador Jarring and the parties well in their efforts and stand ready to help whenever and whenever we can."

I think there should be a little discussion. We are not going to get fine points until Sunday. There is an advantage in treating this as an acceptance. In tying the Israelis -- the disadvantage that we could get something on Sunday that we are not expecting. I am a little cautious. The Secretary is less so. There is some risk of a danger in going ahead but not a great deal.

I don't want a sentence saying we are awaiting a full reply. The people will be looking for wrinkles. If you can type that clear, we will do it here.

H: Go to you.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Sisco/Haig
2

S: We have seen the wire services report. Any comment on this will be coming from San Clemente.

H: Fine, Joe.

S: What time is it there. 8:30?

H: Yes

S: Israelis are having a press conference right now. I will call Secy now to say I have revised copy with you and you will make clean copy.

H: Alright.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Senator Percy/Mr. Kissinger

7-31-70 9:30 a.m.

P: Have you got time to talk about ABM? I talked to Rogers yesterday. He called me and we had three of their top people over here. I have met now three or four times with Senators Cooper, Symington, Muskie, Mansfield, Case, Huyett and Javits, and I think gradually we have made progress with the group. I have taken hard position with the group. The range of thought goes from those who feel we should vote against any ______ on up. I took the hardest position and consistently have with them. ... I said that I would not only vote for those two sites, but XAAS also would speak for it and influence others. John Cooper and I have talked many times on this. He is not at all unfriendly to you. The Cooper XAAS amendment will now go in as of Monday and as you probably know it does call for only cutting out funds for the deployment BE beyond two sites. So it is a cut of $322 million out of a total amount in the bill of $1 billion 349. So we have made progress on this thing. I am not trying to compromise my own good judgment because I have many reservations on it. I am looking on it from point of leverage of bargaining. I told John Cooper that, although I would agree with all of them that I would have difficultly supporting deployment of Whiteman. I feel for bargaining position that to authorize amendment for advance preparation of two out of three national control authorities in Washington... I prefer Washington. It is probably more likely that they would leave Moscow and we could build Washington without starting escalation and we could start agreement. I think wouldn't give up 0 ABM. But certainly if we are going to have possible success, an investment of advance preparation funds for a national control authority in Washington is more sensible than going ahead with additional site at ICBM sites. What I am working on is making an amendment or subamendment to Cooper Amendment, which would add Whiteman or Washington, D. C. and if it is desireable, ...to keep production in a readiness position.

K: What is the difference?

P: The difference is deployment of Whiteman -- allows to cut budget. Some cut here would be highly desirable. I don't want any cuts which take away your bargaining position. So you could cut 1/2 million dollars out of it. I think that if I put that amount in, I might get good co-sponsorship for it and I think I can get quite a few of the anti-ABM votes.

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

So you wouldn't hold up with sacrificing Whiteman but get your money to go ahead with it. I am talking about 60-70 Senators rather than having it squeeze through. My own plea with them is that I don't want a confrontation with Senators and President and if it is at all possible, I would like to work out vote of confidence. There is going to have to be some sacrifice. The question is where can we sacrifice without injury to your bargaining position. I have been working like hell to get as many signatures as possible on this amendment. Cooper says we are on right track. We have to put amendment in on Monday. He said he might vote for my amendment. Now the question to you is.. I'll call Laird and talk talk it over with him. I did not get through to Rogers.

K: Well, we have Rogers here so I can talk to him.

P: You can report to him. I have been on this steadily. We are making progress. We are a lot farther than a few days ago. I think we can prevent amendment from being put in. Amendment to strike out all of Phase 1 as well as Phase 2.

K: Striking out Phase 1 is so unbelievably responsible that I can't imaging

P: There are a copy of Senators who said it and said if it didn't go in they would like it to go in. Will you be back Tuesday.

K: Yes in the morning.

P: Why don't we get together on Tuesday, if you have time, after you have had a chance to think about this.

K: Let me make sure I have this -- You think you can get them to go along with Phase 1 and permit advance preparation at two of the three sites but not deployment.

P: Simply have deployment now at Whiteman. Only advance preparation in this year's authorization. We don't want to loose momentum on production. I think we could procure for lead items at Whiteman and an adequate allowance to keep your production facilities in a state of readiness. I had told Abshire and the group that I was willing to throw out my calendar. I would sit down with the people and figure out what the problems are so that the Soviets won't say by a delay we cut gaining anything. We want limitation on SS-9s and SS-11s.

K: Let me think about this and talk it over with President and Rogers today. I think this is a responsible proposal.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: A constructive proposal.

P: They realize that if I go off their way, this would be destructive. When we left yesterday, Cooper said that he realizes that we are not trying to discourage pressure. We realize that we are trying to accomplish. We are not sure about the Democrats. Their interest is different from ours. We want to avoid a fight. None of them disputed me. I think it would be a good thing that you talk to Henry to see what his feeling would be. I support what you are trying to do now. We have gone a long way to any thought of touching Phase 1. With great reluctance the group agreed.

K: I will be in touch first thing Tuesday.

P: I have done a lot of thinking about MIRV. If we are successful in the SALT talks limiting ICBMs and ABMs, then what is the reaction when the country and world realizes that the limitation increases none of our nuclear warheads. I would love to talk to you Tuesday on whether anything should be done in the talks on that. That is for my educational value and I want to help.

K: I would be delighted to do that.

P: Bill Rogers, Abshire, Ray Klein. They were very good. We also clarified the question that the Administration will go along with the Armed Services Committee some additional site in Northwest. I told them yesterday that that would be ______ because then you are fighting against Stennis, etc. That would be a setback to the Administration.

By: KH W NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
7/31/70 2:00 p.m.

K: I wanted to tell you that the Soviet Charge has called and said he wanted to see me. He has a message. It might be about the four planes, but that would be awfully quick.

P: Interesting.

K: Or SALT, I don't want to speculate...

P: No.

K: But it shows they are in active communication.

P: And it's the Charge who's going to see you?

K: Dobrynin is in Moscow.

P: What do you think--if it were really important they would wait until Dobrynin gets back?

K: No I think it shows that it is important. Tomorrow they are going to bring a letter from Kosygin to you at the State Department. If it weren't important they wouldn't bring it to me. It's interesting that even since July 1...

P: There's been action. Before April 30 there wasn't much action either. But since July 1 there's been action all over the lot.

K: That's right.

P: I think part of this is what you mentioned that they are worried about the threat from the east. This may be building up their point for the time they may jump them.

K: And I said to them if they want to do something this is the time. Later on in your Administration they may be too late.

P: Very interesting. Okay Henry, go to the ocean.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Nancy Ball

7/31/70 3:20 p.m.

B: We are writing a lead story on the Middle East proposal. I was wondering if I could come over and see you or talk to you on the phone. I have three basic questions to fill things out. Ron didn't give us ...

K: What Middle East proposal?

B: What Middle East Propsoal!? The agreement ...

K: What are your questions?

B: First, the President mentioned last night the understanding that there would be no military advantage for either side derived from this, no chance for a military build-up. I was wondering about other implicit or included conditions. Will this preclude building up back from the cease-fire lines? Secondly, how do we enforce these restrictions, by aerial reconnaissance? Third, what do we do about the commandos outside the talks and the agreements?

K: Well, without any attribution--don't say a White House source with a German accent--my understanding is that some aerial surveillance would be allowed. The commandos--it depends on what they do. But if they break the cease-fire, it can't apply to Israel either vis-a-vis them. And it is expected that there will be a standstill regarding military build-ups in combat zones.

B: Do you have any indications from the commandos?

K: I read in the newspapers today that the Palestine groups indicate they are taking a second look. We don't expect it formally, but de facto.

B: And you expect a military standstill in the immediate area?

K: Yes.

B: Where there any other conditions implied in this? Any understandings?

K: None I can right now think of.

B: Will there be any other kind of surveillance beside aerial?

K: I think I better stop at this point. We are trying to keep things in the area of quiet diplomacy. But I hope this information has helped you.

B: Yes, I appreciate it very much.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
The Vice President
7/31/70 3:25 p.m.

K: I talked to the President about your call the other day and mentioned it to Bill Rogers. The President is very anxious for you to make this trip. He wants you to go to Cambodia, Korea, Indonesia, South Vietnam and Thailand. And if you want to go to Formosa (?) that is okay.

VP: When should I plan on it?

K: Not before the next available vote. We need you here for that. The President wants you to go, even if you have to cancel one or two engagements.

VP: You mean campaign engagements?

K: Well, when would you start campaigning? I thought about the second half of September would be good.

VP: When are you coming back?

K: Monday.

VP: Let's sit down and talk about it. I want it to be a strictly working trip--minimal staff, like he did it.

K: You could do a lot of good. We have a lot of problems and ticklish situations there and they need to see a strong man.

TELECON

The President/Kissinger

7-31-70 a.m.

By: KHU NARA, Dato' S/12/04

K: I just wanted you to know that the Israelis have announced today that they would accept ceasefire. Official notification will come on Sunday. It is on the radio. There may be some conditions attached. We really don't know the official answer except that it is affirmative. Bill will want to make a statement today. Joe Sisco doubts we should make a statement without official notification.

P: We might as well let them do it. I have a feeling that it would be good to have it come while he's here. I also just looked at the morning Times. Lurrey says something about the Israeli cease-fire.

K: If we get statement in such a form that we are preempting their statement... I just wanted you to know.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

7-31-70

Ambassador Freeman/Kissinger

K: Welcome back.

F: Thanks very much. I am going off tomorrow morning, probably to Cape Cod. Kathleen is expecting you to spend the day with us Sunday week.

K: Would Monday be alright instead of Sunday.

F: Sunday is her birthday.

K: Ok, I didn't know. I'll come up for her birthday.

F: I have a message from the Prime Minister. I've been talking to him at some length in London last week. He is expecting to see the President and is anxious to do this. He has been very much thrown by Ian McLeod's death. Left him with many things. He is having great difficulty getting time that won't tax him too much. If you don't want full dress visit, how about working a day at San Clemente. He just wants to see the President -- with just the minimum duty.

K: We would want whatever you want. Which would he prefer -- Washington or San Clemente?

F: He would like San Clemente. He asked me to find out whether, in principle, the President would be willing to consider this. He would like to find this out without committing himself to the idea until ...

K: We will be here from the 22nd to Sept. 8. We will be in Mexico the 20-21. Not best time for you. Let's say from 25th on.

F: May I say to him, while you give no commitment, that this is done out of hand and that suitable dates might be found.

K: Would the foreign secretary come?

F: If Mr. Heath did it like this, the foreign secretary would not come. Secretary will be here at UN. I am not definite.

K: I will have to talk this over with the President. He might think less about it than a few weeks ago. I will make absolutely sure that there is no commitment.