CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

I. What Kind of Atlantic Partnership?

The fundamental solution to allied disunity must come from the political
field. Coordination of strategy cannot be effective without coordination of
policy. On too many issues where the vital interests of allies were at stake--
from Suez to the Congo, from Southeast Asia to negotiating tactics over Berlin--
the policies of the major allies have been unilateral or divergent. Unless
this condition is remedied, efforts to integrate military forces will only
emphasize the underlying problem of how to reconcile unity with respect for di-
versity, how to combine community with the need for flexibility.

Two solutions are usually given to these problems: (a) For the
immediate future an improvement in the process of consultation can ease strains
and revitalize the Alliance. (b) Ultimately a united Europe with federal in-
stitutions will make possible a true partnership among equals.

a. <u>The Problem of Consultation</u>

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified

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under present conditions by three factors:

(1) The firm commitment of the two superpowers to the existing balance provides allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

(2) The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums. The United States tendency to confine consultation to elaborating its own blueprints reflects less a quest for hegemony--as our European critics occasionally assert--than a desire to avoid complicating still further its own increasingly complex decision-making process.

(3) As governments have found in their domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, and with widely varying histories, differences are almost inevitable. And they are likely to be made all the more intractable by a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

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The American experience causes our policy-makers to be reluctant to admit that there may be objective obstacles to the process of consultation.

United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise.

A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that by getting the interested parties around a table, a consensus will emerge through the process of consultation.

Attitudes as these have their counterpart in Europe, particularly among those countries used to the leadership of a strong ally and content to confine their role to advice regarding the technical attainment of clear-cut goals.

They are especially common among individuals connected with the various European communities and commissions. Charged with the performance of tasks which are largely technical or the goals of which are very clear, they tend to believe that an intangible "community spirit" acts as the catalyst of agreement. This new, somewhat bureaucratized version of Rousseau's general will represents an attempt to conduct foreign policy by analogy to the domestic policy of stable societies.

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However, when coalition diplomacy deals with political instead of
economic issues, it grows more complicated. Nations are interchangeable
units only to economists or to island powers. In any concrete situation, dif-
ferences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. Then
the analogy of coalition diplomacy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because
there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled consider maintenance
of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if that condition
is not fulfilled, violence erupts and domestic policy acquires some of the
characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy--in extreme cases it leads to
civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the hope of winning
another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision.
In democracies, there is always the possibility of changing the government.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves do not exist.
Legitimacy resides in the individual governments. Decisions require their con-
sent--this is the essence of sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by
majority vote--a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with NATO--

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their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the treaty. In short, those who
dissent and are prepared to insist on their sovereignty cannot be bound inde-
finitely. Beyond a certain point the cohesiveness of an Alliance can be increased
only by a sharing of sovereignty and not by more intensive consultation among
sovereign units.

If fundamental differences occur among sovereign states which remain
aligned, frustration is the inevitable consequence. Then partners are torn be-
tween the need to maintain an appearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate
their views. The difficulty of differing openly has the result that alliances
 tend to regulate their internal affairs by means of a series of critical
confrontations.

The need to maintain an appearance of unity has at least three consequences: (a) It puts a limit on the pressure that can be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (b) Since agreement depends on the act of a sovereign government, its allies are tempted to mobilize domestic pressures on it, thus multiplying resentments. (c) It distorts the nature of the dialogue. Misgivings are sometimes subordinated to a facade of amity. Simultaneously--and somewhat contradictorily--a premium is placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use

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their partners' desire for harmony to impose a given course. But if this
happens too frequently, the result is that a dangerous build-up of frustration
occurs side by side with declarations of friendship. This has been happening in
the Atlantic Alliance.

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective
when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of conception or of
assessment. It works best in *implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it.
Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the
primary objectives of the Alliance.

In assessing the prospects, it is important to distinguish two types of
consultation: (a) functional consultation which concerns the implementation
of an agreed objective and (b) political consultation which concerns the defini-
tion of the objective or the reconciliation of conflicting interests.

The rationalistic bent of American policy-making and the dominant position
we have enjoyed in the Alliance cause many of our proposals for strengthening NATO
to amount to a form of functional consultation. The thrust of these proposals
is to create a structure which makes it physically impossible for any ally (except

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the United States) to act autonomously. The MLF is an example. Since its weapons
are American and since it can perform its mission only if used in conjunction with
American forces, consultation with respect to it must take place within the frame-
work of American strategic doctrine. Similar suggestions have been made in
Europe, where it has been argued that some of our allies might give up some of
their national aspirations in return for a greater voice in Washington. For ex-
ample, some British Labor leaders have urged that Britain give up its independent
deterrent in return for more influence on American decisions.¹

In assessing these proposals, it is important to distinguish between the
situation of a political community involving an effective sharing of sovereignty
and consultation under conditions where each of the allies remains fully sovereign
but becomes an adviser to the dominant partner. If there is an effective sharing
of sovereignty, to include political as well as military decisions, a unitary
system of decision-making is inevitable and desirable. If the allies--and par-
ticularly the United States--insist on their sovereignty, however, it becomes
relevant to inquire whether a system of functional consultation is as useful for

1
See Patrick Gordon Walker, "The Labor Party and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, pp. 391-8.

the long-term political vitality of the Alliance as it is for the conduct of
general war.

Any process of consultation must be responsive to the following questions:

Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three levels are not necessarily identical. Many agencies in our
government have a right to express their views, but not all carry the same
weight. When some of Britain's Labour leaders suggest that they want a greater
voice in our decisions in return for giving up British nuclear weapons, the answer
has to be: Like whose voice? Like that of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce
Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, clearly, the outcome often depends
on the consistency which the agency or department represents. The weight given
to advice is inevitably related to the competence that it reflects.

If the United States retains indefinitely an effective monopoly of nuclear
power, and freedom of decisions with respect to it, we would probably find in time
that Europe simply does not have sufficient technical competence for its views

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to carry weight. None of our allies would have an incentive to conduct the
studies required for effective consultation. This in turn is likely to breed
irresponsibility on both sides of the Atlantic. A right of consultation without
the ability to make a serious judgment may be the worst possible system. Over
a period of time it is bound to reduce Europe's voice in Washington; while within
Europe it must produce a sense of impotence or extreme nationalism.

In short, when the conceptions of national interest do not conflict or
when allies are prepared to accept a secondary role, functional consultation can
be useful. But in an Alliance in which each member--and especially the senior
member--jealously guards its sovereignty the crucial problem is to provide not
only a forum for the expression of a point of view, but also a focus for decision.
If that issue is evaded, coalition policy is reduced to the lowest common denom-
inator. Otherwise a vicious circle is set up with a sense of impotence on one side
and a "father-knows-best" attitude on the other. In such structures, difficult
decisions can be avoided or blamed on the short-sightedness, weakness or belli-
cosity of other allies. Tutelage, in other words, cannot be made a healthy rela-
tionship in the long run.

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American policy has been characterized by a profound ambivalence with
respect to this problem. In the field of strategy we have insisted on a unitary
system of command and control. With respect to East-West relations, the pre-
dominant tendency has been to deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union. For
example, American disarmament schemes have typically been discussed with our NATO
allies only when they were on the verge of being formally submitted. Finally,
the United States has enunciated a "grand design" of Atlantic partnership in
which the United States and Europe are to share equally in the burdens of world
responsibility.

This mixture of approaches is self-defeating. The emphasis placed on a
unitary strategic system for the Alliance has reversed the proper priorities. The
real challenge to the consultative process is less in the field of strategy than
in diplomacy. The ability to fight a centrally controlled general war is useful;
but the ability to devise common policies in the face of a whole spectrum of
eventualities is much more important. Most of our allies are less concerned
with nuclear operations than with their influence on diplomacy in peace time or
during periods of crisis. They consider joint planning the conduct of day-to-day

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diplomacy important because major changes can occur through an accumulation of
seeming nuances. They are concerned with the development of diplomacy and crisis
management. They are interested in an agreed definition of what issues are to
be considered a _casus belli_. And they seek an opportunity to participate in
political control over any war which might break out.

Bilateral East-West diplomacy is inconsistent with the insistence on uni-
cary strategic control. Over a period of time such diplomacy will enable the
Soviets to appeal to each ally on the basis of the unreliability of the other.
Sooner or later our allies will protect themselves by initiating direct negotia-
tions of their own. When NATO has proved unable to develop even a common trade
policy toward the Communist world, it is not surprising that countries are reluc-
tant to entrust their survival to a NATO ally, however close. Policies on a
whole range of issues such as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over Berlin
or the defense of Southeast Asia have been unilateral or divergent. The United
States is now in the curious situation of staking a great deal of its prestige
on establishing the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic

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control while East-West negotiations for arms control are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

These inconsistencies are all the more disruptive because the United States finds its concept of consultation challenged within the Alliance for the first time. According to the American concept, influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company with the partner holding the largest number of shares having the greatest influence. Influence is an intangible quality, of course. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality has put his finger on the fact that among sovereign states influence is related importantly to the availability of options. To the degree that a country is known to be committed, other nations have a reduced incentive to pay a price for its cooperation. American influence within NATO decreased in part because our allies are convinced that they do not hazard our support to the defense of Europe if they disagree with our policy. And the influence of many new nations--weak, disorganized and confused as they are--depends almost entirely on the belief that they are still free to choose their side.

In short, a contribution, no matter how large, that is known to reflect
no significant range of options may not increase the influence of the contributor
significantly. A country can gain a major voice in an alliance of sovereign
states only if its effort is considered essential and if its partners do not take
it for granted--in other words, if the partners believe that there exists a
possibility that the contribution could be withdrawn. In determining an ally's
real--as opposed to its formal--role, one can do worse than inquire what its
choices are in case of disagreement.

Thus one of the points at issue between the United States and President
de Gaulle concerns conflicting conceptions of what constitutes influence. The
United States takes the view that since the interests of the Alliance are indi-
visible, each ally should play his role on the basis of a division of labor
within a plan developed by the United States. De Gaulle tries to demonstrate
that alternatives to United States leadership are possible because he considers
that this will enhance the bargaining position of France and of Europe. He relies
not on a legal right of being consulted, which in his view may not be honored in
a crisis, but on bringing about a situation where he must be consulted because
no settlement is possible without him.

Thus rather than discuss the mechanics of consultation, the United
States will have to address itself to the kind of future it envisages for the
Atlantic area. It will prove impossible in the long run to combine our pre-
ferred strategic doctrine with an unimpaired insistence on our sovereignty. If
we insist on our freedom of action while depriving our allies of theirs, either
NATO will fall apart or we will break the political will of our allies.

If it is impossible to envisage a true political community of the nations
bordering the North Atlantic, it becomes important to ask how unitary a system
of control for strategy and diplomacy is desirable. What kind of structure is
more vital in the long run: An Atlantic system that automatically involves all
its sovereign partners in every crisis around the world? Or one that permits some
autonomy? On many issues--particularly East-West relations--united action is
essential. With respect to others, some degree of flexibility may be useful.

Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly engaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies will probably not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas.

President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from unique in Europe, even if his methods are.

If the Atlantic system is absolutely centralized, policy may be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. On the other hand, if Europe is accorded some capacity for autonomous action--military and political--its concern would be no greater, but the temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Put positively, a structure which permits a variety of coordinated approaches towards the new nations could enhance the vigor of our policies, the self-confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.

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B. <u>The Grand Design and European Integration.</u>

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961, the United States
had argued that the most effective structure for Atlantic cooperation is a
partnership between the United States and a united Europe. Heretofore, coopera-
tion has been inhibited by the weakness and division of Europe. "When one
partner possesses over fifty percent of the resources of an enterprise and the
balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relationship is unlikely to
work very well." Real partnership was possible only among equals.

As a result, American policy has often equated the building of an Atlantic
Community with the progress of European integration. This concept of Atlantic
partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, has
been described by the image of "twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary
of State Herter wrote:

I believe the present Administration holds the view which
has come to be termed the dumbbell concept--meaning that an
economic and political alliance is stronger if it has been
agreed to by partners of equal weight on both sides.²

¹ Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963, p. 301.

² George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia on February 6, 1962, DOSB, XLVI, March 5, 1962, pp. 366-67.

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The European side of this partnership is to be a United States of Europe organized on federal lines with supra-national institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents one form of Atlantic partnership. The drawback of an excessive, almost doctrinaire commitment to it is that we run the risk of accepting the symbol as a reality. This may cause us to beg the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept is pursued obscures four fundamental questions which the United States must answer for itself if it is to make progress towards building an Atlantic Community: Is it true that partnership is possible only among equals? If it is true, what has been the real progress towards European political integration? To what extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans? Will a Europe unified along federal lines inevitably see its world responsibilities in the same light as we?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that partnership is possible only among equals. In the Western

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Hemisphere alone, we are trying to construct a viable system composed of nearly a score of countries very unequal in size and strength. And in every other part of the globe the precept that we can deal effectively only with countries of equal power is unlikely to inspire confidence in the prospect of cooperation with the United States.

Aside from its psychological impact, the proposition is open to substantive doubt. History would seem to indicate that the most difficult partnerships are those among equals. The advantage of shared burdens must be weighed against possible disadvantages created by the improved bargaining position of the equal partner. The increased difficulty of negotiating with a strong partner may well be a price worth paying; but we should recognize that it is a price we would have to pay.

But granting that a strong Europe is on balance in our best interest, it becomes important to inquire whether it is wise--both from the point of view of Europe and even more from that of the United States--to insist that there is only one reliable method of bringing about unity: that of federal, supra-national institutions. In the aftermath of de Gaulle's abrupt rejection of Britain's membership in the Common Market, a myth has grown up to the effect that the willful

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act of a single individual interrupted what would have been a uninterrupted
advance towards political integration. Britain would have entered the Common
Market, an "outward looking" Europe would have been constructed and progress
towards European supra-national institutions would have been constant.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences
ascribed to de Gaulle. For de Gaulle's policy to prove so disruptive, signifi-
cant underlying factors must have been operating.

It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which
economic integration had been achieved could be transferred automatically to
the political area. To question the automaticity of the development Jean Monnet
and his disciples have envisaged is not to deny their great contribution to
European unity and to the concept of Atlantic partnership. The fact remains that
their exaltation of what they call "community spirit" may have been excessively
mechanical. In their view, European integration will grow out of a "community
spirit" which in turn is being fostered by joint efforts. Expert judgment
undiluted by the blinders of national interest will move European political
integration forward, step-by-step, towards a final culmination where the
supra-national authorities are dominant.

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But this "community" approach--which equates method and purpose--works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in defining this common objective.

Immediately after the war, this problem was not apparent. Europe had been so shattered by the war that its immediate necessities seemed to exhaust the range of options open to it. Most countries on the continent had governments so weak or a past they were so eager to overcome--or both--that an abdication of some of their sovereignty came as a respite from uncertainties and insecurities. For many in Europe, an absorption in economic activity was a device to avoid facing seemingly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that it seemed sensible to turn them over to supra-national experts.

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the traditional repository of European loyalties: the national state. This process took place with varying intensity in different countries. Germany and Italy, partly to escape the temptations of their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a united Europe than

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Britain and France. Smaller countries, accustomed to being within the orbit of some major power, had less difficulty with a federal concept than those states which had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain--whose sense of national identity was least damaged by the war--have consistently opted for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution. Four years before de Gaulle came into power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated that political integration was much more difficult to achieve than economic integration and was unlikely to be reached by the same methods.

Ironically, the success of the Monnet method in the economic field has complicated its applicability in the political realm.

Moreover, the European integrationists have advocated incompatible goals. They passionately wanted Britain in the Common Market; they were equally passionate in their advocacy of federal institutions. They have never explained how they propose to reconcile these two objectives.

But if de Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for completely confusing the debate within Europe in at least three ways: a) The debate between

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the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes
towards de Gaulle, and the line-up is not a reliable guide to the state
of mind of Europe. b) Many who strongly oppose de Gaulle's style and domestic
policy are in agreement with him about the shape of Europe and, indeed, about
the tactics to pursue towards the United States. c) Many of the most ardent
advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents
of a federal Europe. Thus, opponents of European integration can combine with
 dedicated advocates to advance sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the
 French President. The result is to stifle the attainable in visions of the
 desirable.

This confusion is compounded by the role of the United States. Though

American policy has ardently supported a federal Europe, its impact has often

been the contrary of what was intended. While affirming the need for European

unity, we have unintentionally tended to undermine a European sense of identity.

This is partly due to the fact that to some Europeans an Atlantic com-
munity based on the existing NATO states seems preferable to the dumbbell
concept. The smaller countries in particular see in European integration the
threat of the hegemony of powerful neighbors. If they have to choose between

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hegemonies, they prefer the leadership of a country three thousand miles away
and with a tradition of using its power with restraint.

Moreover, during the long period of American predominance, there has
come into being on both sides of the Atlantic a group of experts comfortable
with the existing relationship. Having worked well together for many years
they tend to see problems from the same perspective. Committed to the notion
that all problems are soluble through pragmatic, cooperative analysis, they
resist the implication that the capacity for pressure may be inseparable from
the political process. Thus, both in Europe and the United States many who
urge European integration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European policy
--which in turn is one of the likely consequences of European integration.

On both sides of the Atlantic many consider the quest for European autonomy
inherently divisive. They tend to put the issue in terms of trust of the United
States. They argue that they have more confidence in the United States than
in any of their neighbors. If United States policy is wise, European unity
will be unnecessary. If it is mistaken, an autonomous European policy would
only magnify the disaster.

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This attitude in particularly noticeable in the field of defense.

Were Europe thrown on itself, it would undoubtedly unite sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to do so. But, having been sheltered for nearly two decades by American power, many Europeans are concerned lest the emergence of a European identity in the area of defense undermine the American guarantee. In times of crisis, Europeans are conscious, above all, of the need of American protection; in periods of calm, they have no incentive to undertake a joint European enterprise.

American pronouncements sometimes encourage these tendencies. The threat of the withdrawal of American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic views and even to sway our allies on essentially economic issues such as tariffs against American poultry. These threats have, on the one hand, inhibited a European quest for autonomy; on the other hand, they have encouraged some advocates of European unity to give their case an anti-American cast.

In short, there have been many reasons--besides the arbitrary decision of an individual--which have contributed to the slow progress towards European

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political unity, and it is a reckless policy which overlooks them. When Europe
was economically shattered and in fear of Soviet invasion, it was united by
common necessities and perils. But economic recovery has removed some
imperatives and the periods of detente have diminished the fear of foreign
dangers. Finally, American policy has been extremely ambivalent: it has urged
European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences. We have
sought to combine a politically integrated Europe with a closely integrated
Atlantic Community under American leadership. It is unlikely that these objec-
tives can be reconciled.

Official American doctrine assumes that the only reason Europe has not
accepted a greater share of world responsibility is that the scale of the nation-
state is inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. Once Europe is
politically integrated and commands adequate resources for a global role, it
will, so the argument goes, be prepared to assume world-wide responsibilities.
Indeed, one of the motives for European integration is often said to be the pos-
sibility it provides for assuming world responsibilities. Under Secretary of
State Ball has expressed the American view as follows:

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The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on further with the achievement of its own unity--until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of such responsibility under post-colonial conditions must be based on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid--and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.¹

The implication is sometimes strong that the nature of world responsibility is self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador to Germany, George McGhee spoke on July 16, 1964 as follows:

> This Atlantic Partnership entails increasing contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute.²

American policy clearly considers that its goals in these areas are in the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge; what it desired was a sharing of the cost.

1. George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Summer 1964), p. 216.

2. George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964 to DOSB, LI, 1310, August 3, 1964, p. 138.