- 24 -

Bismarck knew the particularist self-will of the secondary German states too well not to be able to count on an effort on their part to eliminate all risks to themselves.

And he was not to be disappointed. A meeting of the secondary powers in Bamberg called attention to the fact that the treaty of April 20 lacked reciprocity, because it failed to couple a request to the Western powers to cease military operations with the demand that Russia evacuate the Principalities. In any other situation, Bismarck would have dismissed this gesture with biting irony as an act of impudence by minor powers emboldened to conduct a European policy through the protection afforded them by Austria and Prussia. But now when it was a question of paralyzing Austria Bismarck could not speak highly enough of the statesman-like demeanor of Saxony and Bavaria and he expressed the fear that Prussia might "brutalize the little ones proud of the fact that Austria appreciates us."²⁷ He did not deny that the secondary powers were weak reeds, but he replied that Prussia by using their desire for peace was merely catching "their wind in its sails." In the meantime, the King again had a change of heart and had sent another of his special emissaries to Vienna to urge restraint.

So it happened that all of Austria's maneuvers had availed nothing because great goals can not be attained by a policy of limited risks. On June 3, Austria finally took the 297. L. W. p. 157, June 10, 1854.

- 25 -

irrevocable step which a year previous might have avoided
its dilemmas or at least minimized them. A sharp note was
dispatched to Russia requesting that a date be set for the
evacuation of the Danube Principalities and threatening
military measures in case of refusal.²⁸ It only underlined
the futility of its position that Austria did not dare to
submit the note in Berlin before dispatching it. It did
not matter that Frederick William was induced through a
personal meeting with the Austrian Emperor to support the
ultimatum nor that the German Confederation on July 24 agreed
to the treaty of April 20 exactly two months too late. In
its hour of greatest peril Austria, the state which could
not survive without allies, had been forced to take its risks
alone and only the instability of the Prussian monarch had
prevented Austria's total isolation. The events of the sum-
mer of 1854 were an augury of what might be in store for the
anachronistic Empire if a man ruthless enough to exploit its
embarrassments should ever govern in Berlin. The capacity
for mischief by a determined Prussian policy was being demon-
strated every day in Frankfurt by the Prussian envoy who chose
the precise moment when Austrian troops were preparing to
enter the Danube principalities to propose that Austria con-
duct all its negotiations with Russia through the Assembly
of the Confederation²⁹ -- which would have amounted to an ab-
dication of Austria's position as a great power. Bismarck,

28. Stern VIII, p. 79.

29. W. I., p. 471, July 25, 1854.

- 26 -

at any rate, had no illusions about Austria's dilemma: "The policy of Buol [Austria's foreign minister] is wrong even from the narrow Austrian point of view, because sooner or later Austria must come to an agreement with Russia about the fate of Turkey and a moment as favorable as the present will not soon recur. Every concession exacted from Russia by Austria will only force Russia to wait for the moment when it will be able to take revenge as the ally of an enemy of Austria and the latter has too many conflicting interests in Germany with us, in [Italy], with France and at home with its own subjects for that moment not to come ... It is already a great gain for us that the coalition of Russia, Austria, and the secondary states, which we had to contend with in our Germany policy, has now been dissolved."³⁰

Statesmanship can be defined as a calculus of probabilities. For the statesmen must weigh not only his own objectives but his risks, that is, the objectives of other powers. A policy which knows only its goals will involve a tour de force beyond its resources. A policy which is oppressed by the consciousness of its risks will become the prisoner of events. The former pays the penalty for hybris that man cannot escape the finiteness of his scale by an act of will; the latter leads to futility because the statesman does not have the privilege to decline to respond to a problem put to him. The statesman moreover must always

30. W. I., p. 454, June 17, 1854.

- 27 -

act on insufficient knowledge, for if he waits until all
facts are in it will be too late to do something about
them. Each act of policy therefore represents a balance
between the opportunities of a course of action and its
dangers. This is a question not only of calculation but
of timing. To act precipitately may mean to conjure up
the very eventualities one seeks to avoid; to fail to act
may lead to the surrender of all opportunities. The art
of statesmanship is therefore to a large degree the art
of finding the right moment for action.

It was the curse of Austrian policy during the
Crimean war not so much that its measures were badly con-
ceived but that they took so long to conceive that by the
time they were executed they hastened the contingencies
they attempted to forestall; not that the Imperial Cabinet
behaved recklessly but that it was so afraid of reckless-
ness that it left itself no room for maneuver save in sud-
den fits of panic. Thus Austria gradually found itself
isolated in Germany despite its recognition of the need for
the backing of the German Confederation and separated from
Russia despite its dread of Napoleon's design on Italy. And
the more desperate its position grew, the more fitful be-
came its measures because the Austrian cabinet sought to
compensate for each opportunity lost by redoubling its ener-
gy when it finally brought itself to act usually at the
wrong moment. There was about the diplomacy of the Crèimean

- 28 -

war a quality of repetitiveness therefore, only that each succeeding phase deepened the schisms and increased the risks and thereby contributed even more to Austria's con-fusion. Each phase began with a long period of Austrian hesitation followed by an impetuous act almost of desper-ation; then came a sudden return to the realization of the limits of its own strength and a frantic search for support above all in Germany; all this accompanied by an almost contemptuous demonstration of Austria's impotence by Bis-marck wherever he had the slightest discretion and an over-powering concern on his part lest the Prussian government fail to grasp its opportunities.

So it was after Russia accepted the Austrian summation of June 3 and agreed to withdraw its troops from the Danube Principalities. It is in the nature of a policy of petty advantage to be panicky in adversity and immoderate in victory. Thus Austria when its worst premonitions had failed to materialize, acted as if all risks had disappeared and sought to exact another benefit by joining the Western powers in submitting four demands to Russia as the sine qua non of a peaceful settlement. The "Four Points" insisted on a European guarantee of the constitutional po-sition of the Danube Principalities and of Serbia; freedom of shipping on the Danube; a revision of the treaty regulat-ing the passage through the Straits in the interest of the European equilibrium; and a surrender by Russia of its claims

- 29 -

as the sole protector of the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire.31 Their real significance was not their content, however, but that Austria had crossed its Rubicon. Henceforth its measures in the Balkans could no longer be justified by its fears for the survival of the Austrian Empire. It was not the return to the status quo ante which was now at issue, but a strategic gain which for Austria at Russia's expense. The Austrian troops which entered the Danube Principalities on the heels of the withdrawing Russians "to prevent clashes with the Turks" symbolized that the Holy Alliance was irrevo-cably finished.

But to the extent that Austria raised its sights, it separated itself from its support within Germany partly because Austria's diplomacy was beginning to outrun the legal basis furnished by the treaty of April 20; partly by supplying Prussia a pretext to escape its commitments. For Bismarck chafing at the bit and the Camarilla could not fail to see that here was another opportunity to appeal to their King's irreso-luteness if not to his statesmanship. In this manner the contest of the previous spring was repeated with Austria pressing for Prussian assistance to clinch the fruits of its recklessness and Frederick William IV vacillating in the face of the onslaught of the Camarilla with its lectures of the unity of conservative interests and of Bismarck with his preachments of the reality of power relationships. It was expressive of Bismarck's view of international relations that

31. Stern VIII, p. 83.

- 30 -

he was more afraid of an accretion in Austria's power than of
a temporary isolation of Prussia. As soon as he learned of
the Austrian invasion of the Danube Principalities, he was
convinced that the Austrian troops would never leave. But
equally he was certain that Prussia should prevent this con-
tingency even at the risk of war. For any increase of Aus-
tria's strength would lead to a relative weakening of Prus-
sia in the inevitable clash over Germany. 32

The effort to deprive Austria of the spoils of its
policy was only the reverse side of a proposal that Prussia
utilize the estrangement between Austria and Russia to re-
duce Austria's power. But where Bismarck in the spring had
sought to achieve this through so arranging the commitments
of the powers that Prussia's greater freedom of action would
enable it to exact concessions as the price for its assist-
ance, he now spoke of more forceful measures. Nothing could
have demonstrated the disintegration of the Metternich sys-
tem more clearly than the fact that a Prussian diplomat could
openly counsel an attack by Prussia on Austria. The proposal
was revolutionary not so much because of its disregard of
Confederate bonds, important as this was, as for its chal-
lenge to the very legitimizing principle of the Vienna set-
tlement. That a state might seek to obtain an improvement
of its strategic position had not been unknown in Europe after

32. W. I. p. 471, July 25, 1854.

- 31 -

1815 although every effort was made to endow territorial
changes with the legitimacy of a European consensus. But
that such a transformation should be justified by nothing
more than the vastness of the opportunity, that not even
lip service was paid to existing treaty relationships --
this involved more than a territorial change but a revo-
lution of diplomatic methods. Heretofore the legitimacy
of the international order had been thought to reside in
the consensus of its components which treated the basic
outline of the Vienna settlement as inviolate; but now the
European consensus was derived if at all from a calculus of
strength, the legitimacy of which depended on the precise-
ness of its calculations. To be sure, the difference was
one of degree, that the Metternich system was not unaware
of considerations of power even while channeling it into
European congresses; while Bismarck would have been the last
to reject the practical efficacy of a moral consensus. But
on this precise nuance depended the stability of the Euro-
pean order. For when the definition of justice cannot
transcend the changing requirements of power, it becomes
either an instrument to retard all change or a symbol to
animate the clash of the contenders. Stable orders have
therefore always been distinguished by their ability to con-
duct their conflicts as an aspect of a system of legitimacy
-- this indeed has been the condition of their cohesiveness.

- 32 -

Revolutionary orders have reduced justice to the require-
ments of victory -- this is the condition of their dynamism.

"Could we succeed in getting Vienna to the point
where it does not consider an attack by Prussia on Austria
as something outside of all possibility," Bismarck wrote to
Gerlach, "we would soon hear more sensible things from
there."³³ This was followed by a flood of letters reiter-
ating the theme of the need for a maximum of ruthlessness:
"...We should not wait until France has 200 to 300 thousand
men at our borders and Austria has mobilized its army against
us. Instead we should march into Austria, quickly and un-
expectedly, while Bohemia is still without troops ... I
will insist at least until experience has taught me other-
wise: Austria will not make war as long as it does not have
Germany and us behind it and certainly not if we threaten it
...We have three threats available: 1. An alliance with Rus-
sia; and it is nonsense always to swear at once that we would
never go with Russia; even if it were true we should retain
the option to use it as a threat; 2. A policy in which we
throw ourselves into Austria's arms and compensate ourselves
at the expense of perfidious confederates; 3. And a change
of cabinets to the left whereby we would soon become so
"Western" that Austria would be out-distanced and would seek
in vain to cling to our coat tails. The others are prepared
really to commit any villainy against us; why should we not
threaten with it at least?"³⁴

33. L. G., p. 170, October 13, 1854.

34. L. G. p. 172, October 18, 1854.

- 33 -

Here was the distillation of Bismarck's tactics and of the new diplomacy. The same report listed among possible options an alliance with Russia, an alliance with France and a liberal ministry as if only considerations of utility determined the choice. Here was the Russophile discussing an alliance with France, the reactionary speaking of a shift to the left. Even domestic politics was reduced to a factor to be manipulated for its contribution to the primary task of undermining Austria's influence in Germany. No wonder that Gerlach to whom a pro-Russian policy was an article of faith and not of national interest reacted with horror to these proposals. He invoked the word of the apostle that those who do evil to achieve good will surely be damned and he inquired incredulously whether it was true that Bismarck had spoken of his willingness to cede the Rhine-province to France in return for a French alliance against Austria.³⁴ Bismarck for very good reasons evaded a reply to the last query but the reiterated his basic position: "The weakness of our position lies in the belief of the other German cabinets in our inexhaustible good nature ... If we reject with an appearance of moral indignation every suggestion that we have an option either toward the East or toward the West, then the most limited politician in the smallest village will know that we must submit ... All my colleagues seek to convince me that we cannot persevere in our present policy lest we lost the Rhine-province

- 34 -

to France. I am too polite or I should answer: In that case
we shall regain it within the territory of your Sovereign.
The only effective approach to the German capitals from Munich
to Bueckenburg is fear and nothing but fear."³⁵ And he summed
up the essence of his policy in this epigrammatic sentence in
a letter later: "Please do not consider me a Bonapartist but
a very ambitious Prussian."³⁶

This was the real meaning of Bismarck's policy. The
Metternich system had restrained Prussia by creating a myth
which restricted its options in effect to the closest rela-
tionship with Austria and Russia. If Prussia was to find a
position commensurate with its real power it had to dissolve
the restraints of the international order, to achieve a po-
sition whereby having a maximum of options, it could sell its
assistance for the highest price. But it was a policy which
required cool nerves. For it sought to achieve its ends by
the calm acceptance of great risks, of isolation or of a sud-
den settlement at Prussia's expense. Its success depended on
the correct evaluation of power-relationships, above all that
Prussia's superior flexibility was not an illusion. In Bis-
marck's scheme every diplomatic act had consequently not only
a substantive but a symbolic aspect: to demonstrate Prussia's
self-confidence and not only its ability but its willingness
to stand alone. "If the German governments come to the con-
victions that a unilateral action on the part of Austria would
in all probability lead to a split within the Confederation ...

35. H. p. 199 - October 24, 1854

36. L. G. p. 175, October 25, 1854.

37. L. G. p. 181, December 16, 1854.

- 35 -

they would do their utmost to restrain Austria. Everything
depends therefore on our ability to make the German govern-
ments believe that we shall persevere in our course even at
the risk of a break with Austria. A particular impression
in this respect is made by every hint which indicates a con-
tinuation of our good relations with France."³⁸ In every
alliance the partner best able to afford a break is in the
strongest position to shape the common policy. This was all
the more true in the case of the Austrian-Prussian alliance
as Bismarck had no scruples to utilize Prussia's domestic
politics to bring pressure on his colleagues. "Toward my
colleagues," he reported to Manteuffel, "I use privately
the following language: Prussia has adopted a policy of
peace ... without ulterior motive and on behalf of Germany
in the process risking the enmity of half of Europe. It
can continue this policy only if the Confederation remains
firm ... Should the other German states desert Prussia,
however, then it must think of its own security... No choice
will be left to us, then, but to join the enemies of Russia.
But such a shift toward the West can win the confidence of
Britain and France only if carried out by a more liberal
government, which would soon outdistance Austria, carried by
the Westwind of public opinion. I trace this possible de-
velopment of Prussian policy in the tone of someone who is
unhappy about events which are unfortunately outside his

38. W. I., p. 497, October 9, 1854.

- 36 -

control and everyone of my colleagues seemed very upset and
disquieted by it. They fear such eventualities more than
the cholera."39

A statesman is ultimately distinguished by his con-
ception of alternatives. And it was Bismarck's skill that
he perceived combinations which had been thought impossible
for over a generation. To be sure, he was hampered not only
by the lack of imagination of his government but by that of
his colleagues who could not believe in his "seriousness."
Their reports abound in excuses for him or in almost despe-
rate efforts to reconcile the violence of his language with
his "conservative" political views. But much as they might
make allowances for his impetuosity, they were again and
again confronted with experiences which demonstrated that
Bismarck would let no doctrines of confederate loyalty inter-
fere with his conception of the requirements of Prussia's
greatness. Thus at the very moment that Prussia was nego-
tiating with Austria about adapting the alliance of April
20, to the new situation, Bismarck showed his diplomatic
reports counselling an attack on Austria to his Russian col-
league in Frankfurt. He even went so far as to suggest that
Russia conclude an alliance with France with which it was at
war, and directed against Austria with which Prussia was
just then allied. In short, states were conceived as units
of infinite adaptability inhibited only by their inherent

39. W. I., p. 505, October 20, 1854.

- 37 -

dynamism. And when the Russian ambassador, true to the canons of the "old" diplomacy, attempted to demonstrate the impossibility of a Russo-French alliance by invoking the Tsar's conservative political principles, he received a reply which in its sober tone exhibited the full measure of Bismarck's revolutionary quality: "Necessity will force you into it."⁴⁰

Against this background of Bismarck's enunciation of his policy and the bold postulate that necessity furnished its own legitimacy, the actual measures of the Prussian ministry appear anti-climatic. As in the Spring, the King's vacillations brought about an approximation to the policy Bismarck sought to achieve consciously and once more Austria played into its opponents hands by its inability to clinch its gains. No sooner had a Prussian circular note of September 3 announced that Prussia could not recommend the "Four Points" to the other German states, than Frederick William IV repented his act of independence and began to negotiate with Austria about including the "Four Points" in the Alliance of April 20.⁴¹ On November 9, he finally accepted the "Four Points" and on November 20 he even agreed that Austria could count on Prussian assistance if Russia attacked the Austrian troops in the Danube Principalities.

But Austria did not know what to do with its diplomatic triumph. Far from utilizing the Prussian alliance to

40. EYCK I, p. 247.
41. Stern VIII, p. 84.

- 38 -

extricate itself from its Balkan involvements, it saw in
it a guarantee which enabled it to challenge Russia with
impunity. Frederick William IV had hardly accepted Aus-
tria's unilateral invasion of the Principalities than he
was confronted by another accomplished fact. On December 2
Austria concluded an alliance with Britain and France de-
spite the fact that Russia had meanwhile accepted the "Four
Points." And even if the ministry at Berlin could not
profit from its opportunities, its envoy in Frankfurt saw
clearly that Austria had mortgaged its future both towards
Russia and towards Prussia: "The combination of cowardice,
avarice, and insolence, which characterizes the present
policy of the [Austrian] Empire will result in a severe
handover ... The arrogance of the imperial cabinet does
not permit them to admit that they need us; they prefer
to enmesh us but they badly declared themselves as long as
they treat political relationships like private business
deals. For alliances of great powers are of value only when
they express mutual interests and all their clauses and
interpretations cannot furnish a substitute for good will
and energetic action." This appraisal of the result of a
year of confusion, in which Prussia had achieved freedom of
action despite itself, gained in force from the concluding
paragraph with its aphoristic vision of the future: "It
is already a great advantage for us that after the war our
relations with Russia will be better than those of Austria...

- 39 -

[y]

The day of reckoning is sure to come, even if a few years pass ... Austria has put itself as a barrier in Russia's way; the latter's policy will henceforth be directed against this barrier ... Through this transformation of the constellation of power we can only gain in freedom of action. Indeed it is a very favorable result of our hesitating policy that it has caused the antagonism between Austria and Russia to become deeper and more permanent."42

Austria, however, while aware of these dangers seemed paralyzed by their enormity. It is the fate, of course, of governments whose domestic structure has become rigid that the internal difficulties of arriving at decisions seem more complex than the problems which gave rise to the need for a decision in the first place. When a bureaucratic rationality reigns supreme, the process of making policy is so complicated that the very existence of an agreement on a course of action seems to supply its own justification. It is difficult in such structures to formulate a policy; it becomes almost impossible to change once formulated. So Austria throughout the Crimean war had been motivated more by risks to be avoided than by goals to be achieved, but for this very reason the increasing difficulty of its position seemed to furnish an argument for persevering in the existing course lest all the sacrifices be in vain. Thus every Austrian gain was followed by a frantic quest for some 42. W. I., p. 515. December 9, 1854.

42.

- 40 -

advantage, as if a fitness of the universe was certain to
reward a policy adopted with so much anguish. "Austria
wants to garner all the fruits along the road which fear
forces it to take," Bismarck said sarcastically. "I am not
sure that Buol has a clear goal unless it be that Austria
should pocket everything it can obtain by slight of hand."⁴³

Thus the Austrian cabinet found itself with an
alliance with the Western Powers which it dared not imple-
ment and with an army in the Balkans that threatened it
with bankruptcy. It therefore sought to transform its in-
vastion of the Danube Principalities into an act of the
German Confederation to ease the financial strain and to
spread the risk. But its effort to mobilize the army of
the Confederation only revealed its panic. For the state
under the aegis of which the Germany Confederation had come
into being should have understood that all the pressures
would make against adventures in an area so far removed
from the main concern of most German governments. And
the vacillations of the Prussian government over the past
18 months should have made clear that Prussian support would
remain formal at best and that by attempting to force
Prussia into one distasteful decision after another, Austria
might undermine its prestige and demonstrate its impotence.

43, W. II, p. 55.

- 41 -

When Austria formally proposed that the contingents of the Confederate army be put in readiness and that the Austrian army in the Danube Principalities constitute a part of them, Bismarck had a field day. "Bismarck is profuse in his concern for the interests of the German governments," reported the Austrian envoy in Frankfurt, "for their finances, for their freedom of action, for their right to be informed _before_ decisions are taken ... No one knew for what and against whom to mobilize."⁴⁴ In his frustration the Austrian foreign minister answered with a circular dispatch which promised the German governments which supported Austria "a share of the benefits which might be obtained in an eventual war." Whatever this enigmatic phrase meant, it was easy to interpret it as an offer by Austria to compensate its supporters in Frankfurt at the expense of the other German states.

Nor was Bismarck the man to miss such an opportunity. He knew that outraged particularist self-will was more likely to produce unity of purpose than national consciousness, all the more so if Prussia took over the leadership of the opposition. He therefore never tired of emphasizing Prussia's determination not to submit; he again spoke darkly of a liberal ministry at Berlin and at the proper moment came up with a formula which enabled the minor German states to cloak their fears in the garb of Confederate loyalty without giving Austria the support it so desperately sought. After failing in a move

44. EYCK I, p. 253.

- 42 -

to have the Confederate army assembled on Confederate territory, which would have forced Austria to evacuate the Danube Principalities, Bismarck came up with a proposal that the Confederation mobilize its army but motivate it with a desire to protect the territory of the Confederation "in view of the threatening situation in Europe."<sup>45</sup> This formation, of course, included France as well as Russia and to underline Bismarck even sought to have the fortresses facing France put in a state of readiness.<sup>46</sup> Austria's effort to demonstrate its power to its new-found allies in the West had ended with its humiliation.<sup>47</sup>

With the collapse of Austria's last effort to mobilize the resources of Germany behind her, the pattern of the Crimean war was set as a mosaic of incongruities. A struggle for the control of the Balkans had to be fought out in the Crimea because Austria's vacillation interposed an effective barrier between the chief protagonists in the Danube Principalities and Britain and France found themselves forced to look for a theater of operations accessible to sea power. But in the face of an effective stalemate in the Balkans, the war had lost its meaning and the year 1855 therefore saw an increasing effort by the powers to extricate themselves from their involvement culminating in the Congress of Paris.

45. Poschinger II, p. 158, February 7, 1855.

46. Poschinger II, p. 175, February 28,

47. "Bismarck" seeks to deprive Austria of all the spoils of its tremendous exertions," reported the Austrian envoy to Frankfurt (for once an Austrian envoy saw clearly), "to reduce it to an object of ridicule and of pity thereby to achieve Prussia's hegemony in Germany. That in the process he supports Russia is incidental."
EYCK I, p. 258.

- 43 -

There is no need to trace the precise diplomatic
moves which brought this about because the significance of
the Crimean war did not reside in the terms of the settle-
ment which concluded it. Rather the importance of the Cri-
mean war was to be found in the diplomatic revolution the
seeds of which it sowed. The stability of the Vienna set-
tlement had been due to the conviction of the three Eastern
powers that only their unity prevented a revolutionary chaos
or a domination of Europe by France. But the Crimean war
demonstrated that the requirement of unity no longer super-
seded all other considerations of national strategy. Aus-
tria, the "chamber of peers of Europe," as Talleyrand had
called it, found itself in an uneasy alliance with a France
governed by a usurper. Prussia had been paralyzed by the
instability of its King. And the German Confederation had
demonstrated its impotence in a European crisis. All the
pillars of the Vienna settlement had thus been shown as
contingent. Stability could no longer be found in a rigid
adherence to the status quo, which rejected any fundamental
change as inconceivable. France had ended its isolation of
a generation; the myth of Russian invincibility had been
shattered; and Austria which had staked its survival on
exalting the sanctity of treaty relationships had been forced
to subordinate them to its Balkan interests.

But it is the fate of revolutions that contemporaries rarely understand their significance. Trained in the school of a period of stability, they seek to return to fa-