as a way to help without spending much money and
it could also be pointed out that with luck it
would be a sort of a revolving fund.

Clements: This program would require Congressional
action. Is that feasible?

Bergston: I am not sure, but I am encouraged by the
passage of the CBI and by the subsequent
increase in foreign assistance to the Caribbean
Region. The Stabex program could also be
portrayed to Congress as a contingency sort of
program. I would note that Congress has not
criticized export earnings stabilization
programs even though Congress has had the
opportunity to criticize the IMF's compensatory
financing facility.

Clements: I still think agricultural interests could kill
this idea.

Strauss: With the Congressional representation we have on
the Commission, we have a good chance of
securing favorable Congressional consideration
of this proposal.

Kissinger: Unless Mr. Bergston has additional points which
he had intended to make, I declare this session
closed.

ARA/ECP:RBAsh:rc:jd

9/20/83:29460

Wang 4655E

Notes of Meeting of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

SUBJECT: World Bank and Economic Development

WITNESS: Mr. Monteagle Yudelman

DATE: September 13, 1983
TIME: 10:00-11:15
PLACE: Rm 1105

SUMMARY:

Mr. Yudelman spoke of the Central American countries in relation to other countries in the international system, reviewed overall agricultural production and the types of programs needed to increase agricultural exports. Agriculture, he indicated, needed to be reviewed in terms of exports and domestic production and consumption. High population growth rates, lack of opportunities in the rural areas, and low agricultural yields means that the US should play a significant role in assisting to increase agricultural production. The World Bank's strategy has been partially successful in Mexico, Colombia and northeast Brazil. Elements of increasing production are: continued funding for research, seed distribution system, mobilizing the private sector, infrastructure activities and incentives to farmers through sound economic policies.

NOTES:

Kissinger: Need to have Ambassador Schlaudeman convey to the appropriate persons that our trip is not conditioned on projects of others. We are not a government agency and our trip, therefore, can not be conditioned on a country's performance. Commission should not be used as leverage.

Strauss: It is an outrage.

Kirkland: A blunder.

Strauss: Due to shortage of time, might take position that Commission understands that we will not

be one day experts. We may, however, accomplish other objectives: interest in the region, consult with heads of state, extend an invitation for others to visit us in US. Public relations trap. We have limited goals and these can be accomplished. Press conference by Kissinger only; read goals, no substance.

**Kissinger:** Dr. Walsh and I met with persons to discuss role of church on trip. Meetings should be small. Church can be of great support in areas such as education. Paper will be written and distributed.

Major Robarge will arrange trip. Requests and inquiries directed to him.

Today, we have director of agriculture programs at World Bank and faculty person at University of Michigan and Stanford Research Center. Appreciate you're being here. Written statement?

**Yudelman:** Short presentation focuses on three aspects: 1) put Central America in international perspective, comparing countries to others; 2) role of agriculture in these countries; 3) types of programs needed.

First, the Central American countries are middle income countries. Role of agriculture is critical. 20-30 percent of national product comes from agriculture. 4-5 commodities are the basis for significant foreign exchange. Agriculture production employees 30-60 percent of the population. This is similar to other countries. Agriculture contributions to food supplies.

These agriculture countries have in common a dual economy: export production that is relatively efficient with large land holdings and inefficient and small land holdings supplying the domestic food production. This has implications for US strategy.

Second, except for coffee, look at agriculture production. Yields are low and can be improved. High population rates and lack of opportunity in

rural areas suggests an upcoming urban
explosion. Numbers of rural people is
increasing and approaching a turning point.
These factors, too, tell type of strategy nec-
essary.

Third, what it takes. Some issues, like coffee
and sugar need to resolved in international
arena. Food producing sector affects the poor
sector and where the poverty is greatest. World
Bank has invested over $10 billion with mixed
results.

Conditions necessary include: security, govern-
ment commitment. Success in Mexico, Colombia
and northeast Brazil. Need to look requirements
to increase production. These include:
research. Strongly recommend strengthening link
between US and research centers, CGIR, etc.;
seeds needed. Private sector can play an im-
portant role and this is weak link. Other areas:
infrastructure, incentives, markets,
fertilizers.

Ways of thinking: yield levels, what can be
done, look at institutions, for example, credit
and fertilizer, special institutions needed.
In sum, Central America is similar compared
with other countries; agriculture has two
sectors but there is problem of external mar-
kets and small producers; look at successes
and what can be done.

Kissinger: Grateful for elaboration of programs and structures. Land reform we have heard about. How do you define land reform and its utility for political stability and progress, and what is the relationship between land reform and increased productivity?

Yudelman: Security and distribution aspects in Japan provided security for people who tilled land. Land reform means distribution of output better. Increase production where land is not utilized. Large estates that are efficient are changing distribution resulting in reduced output. Poor people are a little better off, able to keep more of what they

produce, even if overall agriculture production
drops.

Kissinger: Best system is increasing production, distri-
buting results and redistributing ownership.

Strauss: Does ownership change in Japan?

Yudelman: No.

Clements: Agree that if government sets quotas (price or export), it doesn't matter who owns. Price set by government, person caught in middle.

Yudelman: Incentive and opportunity to sell at highest price is key.

Kirkland: On farm, need to have farm-to-markets, coops
access, fertilizer and other inputs.

Yudelman: Colombian experience a model. Government pro-
gram to increase production of carbohydrates.
Administrative weakness in bureaucracies. Non-
governmental institutions from US, indigenous
private sector can go long way in helping.

Johnson: World Bank spent billions to increase
agricultural production with mixed results.
What was success and failure rates?

Yudelman: Asia success. In Central America small pro-
grams and World Bank spent little money. No
real test in Central America. In Mexico, dry
land agriculture lagged behind irrigated ag.
World Bank provided decentralization and ran
into problems. Easier to build hospitals than
change cropping patterns of farmers. On major
export commodities, need to deal with in inter-
national market, but small farmer crops, wheat
and corn, there can be more produced and there-
fore importing less. Not necessarily true that
too much produced reduces price for small
farmer.

Clements: USSR garden plots an appropriate approach?

Yudelman: Community farms that raise enough to live and

sell rest in black market. Domestic production
can not be sold in market. Not ownership
questions but selling output.

Kissinger: Programs and ideas?

Yudelman: Look at special credit programs, e.g. seed pro-
grams. Small farmer production key, not export
to international market.

Kissinger: Pleased to have any material.

Kirkland: Issue of squatter protection of land.

Strauss: Purview of Commission is not tactics of food
production but what kind of structure is needed,
hopefully regional. Alliance blueprint?

Kissinger: Need to define objectives, structure and some
order of magnitude to address issue.

Notes on Meeting of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

SUBJECT: Economic Development: Lessons Learned from Alliance For Progress

WITNESS: Dr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

DATE: September 13, 1983
TIME: 11:15-12:15
PLACE: Rm 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Schlesinger spoke on the goals of the Alliance For Progress (AFP): economic growth, structural change, and political democratization. While partially successful, he indicated, it suffered from a variety of factors. Military shields work, he claimed, when the host governments are already committed to an agenda of democratic reform. Unilateral US military intervention over the past twenty years has been a "gross error". Dr. Schlesinger recommended that the US follow the suggestions of the Contadora group and if they fail "we may have to resign ourselves to turmoil in Central America for some time".

NOTES:

Kissinger: Welcome an old and dear friend of mine. When I was a marginal consultant during the Kennedy period, he was passionately involved in the Alliance For Progress. Consultants have suggested that the Alliance has benchmarks that may serve as the basis for our Central American policy. Would like your observations of lessons learned.

Schlesinger: Most can agree that the underlying cause of Central America tragedy is legacy of poverty, oppression and underdevelopment. Contributing cause may be exploitation by outsiders.

Can the US take effective steps to change tragedy? My twenty year experience in attempting to improve conditions may have relevance for your deliberations.

Alliance represented belated US recognition of
savage contrasts between poverty and oligarchy,
both inviting extracontinental meddling and local
unrest. Goals of Alliance were: economic growth,
structural change, political democratization.
These, in theory, were reciprocally dependent.
In the short term, however, they may be in
conflict but over the long-
term they are mutually reinforcing. AFP,
however, never received long-run test. After
Kennedy it lost distinctive thrust and abandoned
two goals: structural change and democratization.

AFP was partially successful based on Punta del Este goals of, inter alia, 2.5 percent per capita per year. Growth rate between 1961-7 was 4.5 percent, but with population growth, net benefit was under two percent. Alliance For Progress was responsible for some gains of growth to social development- hospitals, housing sewage, irrigation, etc.

AFP did not stop outflow of capital, lighten external debt nor improve Latin America's share of world trade. Didn't reduce unemployment nor inequality of income distribution.

Not impressed with arguments that AFP was oversold
or that it created excessive expectations and
therefore produced disillusionment. It was effort
to alter consciousness of continent. Kennedy
frequently spoke of difficulties of success.

Excessive expectations were more problem for US,
especially since postwar occupations of Japan and
Germany and Marshall Plan nourished ideas about
nation-building and US superhuman
capacity to work out destinies of others.
Successes proved very little except in
capacity to help nations that already possessed
industrial discipline, managerial skills, educated
work force, physical infrastructure and historical
and cultural prerequisites for development.

While not an economist, surmise that all-out magic
of the marketplace approach would be mistake, as
would an all-out statist approach. US developed
with mix of public and private and Latin America
will likely develop that way, too. Essential

problem is not economic technique but political will.

Kennedy recognized that future depended on Latin governments, parties and leaders committed to Punta del Este goals. AFP was wager for capacity of progressive democratic governments and parties to bring about social and economic development. When social democratic parties, such as Romulo Betancourt's Accion Democratica in Venezuela and Christian Democratic parties, such as Eduardo Frei's Chilean party, were strong twenty years ago the Alliance made a difference. Wager failed because democratic parties rendered impotent by oligarchy and revolution.

Strong local government dedicated to national development for the general welfare must exist. The military-shield fallacy lies within this notion. Military regimes call for shields against their own people and that is why they are under attack. As we provide a shield we lose leverage, and find it hard to force an oligarchy to take measures it sees fatal to privilege and power.

Many nationalist leaders are skillful con men and will promise anything to get support to stay in power. Must be wary of military involvement in regimes that show no concern for their people. Military shield works when it helps governments already committed to agenda of democratic reform, but most of the time it nourishes the folly and arrogance of regime.

Unilateral military intervention by US in past twenty-five years has been gross error. Lead should be with Contadora group, which knows problems and terrain and are more directly threatened. We get into trouble when we delude ourselves into thinking that we know interests of other countries better than they. If they fail, we may have to resign ourselves to turmoil for some time -- turmoil that is part of historical process and is part of our national identity, too.

Central America is a windfall, a target of opportunity for Soviet Union, but not a target of

strategic purpose. It can't establish nuclear
bases in 1983 in western hemisphere any more
than it could in 1962. Soviets would be foolish
to make major investment in economic development
in Latin America.

Future does not lie in our hands. Approach of
AFP is still offers best hope in long run. US
assistance can be most effective when domestic
will is democratic, organized and resolute. They
must decide. It goes against American grain to
suggest that we can not readily solve problem with
sufficient arms and money. Abstention may be
difficult choice. The road to nationhood is often
bloody and on this road the US can only be
marginal. As Kennedy said: we are not omnipotent
nor omniscient and there can not be an American
solution to every world problem.

Kissinger: Devil's advocate approach. Could you argue that Alliance is an approach you warned against at end of statement?

Schlesinger: Alliance attempt to get countries to get themselves to do things. Alliance was not American initiative, but based on ideas of Latin American economists, such as Presbisch. Alliance facilitated.

Kissinger: If we follow theory, you would argue that creating
democracy is best way to curb guerrilla activity?
What is democratization and how can US participate
in helping?

Schlesinger: Can't do it alone. Must have indigenous forces
and, outside of Costa Rica, this doesn't exist.

Strauss: How would you compare political environment, will
to accept multilateral help and chances of success
then and now?

Schlesinger: Back in 1961 with Punta del Este meetings, it was
more take the money and run, without commitment
and attempt to change. But demands were too
great by mid-1960s, where democratic parties were
seen as parties of older generation. Alliance was
gamble on progressive democratic regimes for staying
power that failed. Now, not optimistic;
tensions tearing societies apart.

Diaz-Alej: But Duarte is no different than others in Kennedy era. Would liberals be betraying if they left Duarte to guerrillas? Would this threaten Costa Rica?

Schlesinger: Bottom line: do we help Duarte or D'Aubisson? The more militarization, the less Duarte can survive. More pessimistic due to undue American activism.

Kirkland: During Johnson era, were two AFP objectives formally renounced?

Schlesinger: Assistant Secretary Tom Mann's speech concentrated on economic growth and omitted other objectives. Change in direction was striking.

Kirkland: Did we link reform and democratization during Kennedy era? Did we stop aid?

Schlesinger: Can't recall suspension of aid under Alliance.

Kirkland: Is there a point at which we abandon activities and judge the situation to be stalemated? It is easier to talk about pulling out than actually getting out. If we bug out are we signing their death warrants?

Schlesinger: Heartbreaking problem. Extent to which problems can be mitigated is through nongovernment entities.

Clements: How to put into context the continuing revolution in Mexico. Is this why they are more tolerant and opposed to US intervention?

Schlesinger: Mexican revolution is triumph of rhetoric, to defraud the Mexican people. It is useful to win acclaim and understanding in Latin America. Regime manipulation of revolution can be more violent the longer held down. Revolution is familiar part of their experience.

Kissinger: Is one lesson of Alliance for Progress in effect, that it is too late because it would get

you mixed up with guerrillas and would require military shield? There is paradox: Republicans and Democrats here are, mostly, believers of Kennedy approach. But what is posture of less than perfect governments? Do we support them in gradual process? You seem to be saying that this is no longer valid question, let nature take its

[47]

course.

**Schlesinger:** Rather drastic statement and hate to reach this somber point, but at this moment, except for Costa Rica, notion of military shield will not work. Their is little we can do.

**Kissinger:** Any part of world worth defending with this theory?

**Schlesinger:** Western Europe.

**Clements:** Strategic value in Latin America?

**Schlesinger:** Some, but greater value seven years ago.

**Stewart:** Is it your conclusion that there be no initiative except in Costa Rica due to lack of political will? That governments will not take necessary action and therefore our response should be limited?

**Schlesinger:** Latin American countries should take initiative.

**Kirkland:** If Contadora group endorsed Alliance objectives, would you support?

**Schlesinger:** Yes, if they took political domestic action

**Scammon:** You accept a Contadora recommendation to resolve border proposal with Nicaragua?

**Schlesinger:** Latin Americans should be military shield. Shield might mean American involvement after local can not handle situation.

**Walsh:** Contadora group doesn't imply getting out of Latin America, and they will probably ask our support. How to respond to Contadora group and limit ourselves, as you suggest?

**Schlesinger:** We need to respond to them. Would support even aid program if they wanted.

**Kissinger:** We have problem in what Contadora group tells us officially, privately, and what US bureaucracy tells us they are saying. Three positions.

**Clements:** Root of problem in Caribbean is Cuba, some say. What are your current thoughts on Cuba?

Schlesinger: Situation would not be radically different even if Batista were here today. Cuba is complication but not root cause, nor decisive. In last days of Kennedy era we attempted to normalize relations. We should consult friends in Latin America to see if they want us to. Their judgment for progressive democracy should be considered.

Kissinger: Appreciate the special effort you made in taking time to come here. Perhaps our final report conclusions will reflect the Kennedy era objectives and we hope you aren't disappointed.

SUBJECT: Economic Consultants Review and Recommendations

BRIEFER: Mr. Alan Stoga, First National Bank of Chicago
Dr. Sidney Weintraub, University of Texas

DATE: September 13, 1983
TIME: 1:15-2:15
PLACE: Rm 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Weintraub mixed philosophy, technical review and personal comments in responding to ideas presented by other speakers. He recommends that the Commission focus on institutional structures and avoid the tactics and techniques of implementation. The Commission should be aware, he stated, of AID's ability to implement quickly and respond to foreign policy interests. He is a great admirer of the non-government organizations, but indicated that the Commission must involve the host governments. Without the political commitment by the host government no amount of funds will be effective. He recommended a multilateral model for the region.

Mr. Stoga also recommended a multilateral approach, utilizing aspects of the Alliance for Progress and other models. He articulated different mechanisms, including a stabilization program, a commodity earnings stabilization structure, increased exports, etc. The cost, both agree, is a political issue and that AID already spends over $626 million. They will return on October 7, 1983 to discuss specific objectives, assumptions and costs.

NOTES:

Weintraub: Following observations are a combination of political philosophy, technical review of ideas presented and personal reactions to ideas of other consultants.

First, there is a tendency for detail. Bergsten's idea regarding debt forgiveness may or may not be appropriate, but is probably negligible. We

could discuss 30-40 techniques, such as revolving funds and the like. The IMF compensatory financing scheme is another that has advantages and disadvantages.

The point is the you need to keep an eye on the institutional structures and then look at the tactics. In any case, avoid gimmicks.

Second, during tenure as AID Mission Director in Chile, we moved money and I disagree with Dr. Kissinger's statement of yesterday and today that AID can't respond in an expeditious fashion. You may want to consider changes in the AID structure, but AID can move the money.

Kissinger: The question is how to move money where I want not where they want.

Weintraub: AID can respond to political priorities -- look at Jamaica.

Strauss: With Pete McPherson, you've got a very good man, a first rate fella.

Weintraub: My only point is that AID should not be layered.

Third, private voluntary organizations, whether they be labor or health institutions, are very important and I'm a great admirer. But we must also involve host governments. Without their commitment, our assistance will make no difference.

Fourth, we have heard about institutions. I believe there are institutions, ones that grew out of the Alliance and servicios.

Points on structure that need to be made. We have heard about assistance without commitment and cutting off aid. But there are many in-between positions and discussions of total cut off are not realistic. Also, the Alliance effort took place in Colombia, Chile, Brazil - not Central America. In fact, there was never a great effort made in the region. I agree that we must involve the indigenous population, a point that Dr. Schlesinger made. I suggest you view a multilateral structure that would leverage

resources and bring in additional donor
assistance. Also, as the Commission reviews a
possible structure and studies the *quid pro
quo*, we need to make an assessment of develop-
ment plans, using as one model the Nine Wise
Men. Finally, you may want to consider adding
the Caribbean countries when a structure is
considered. Any structure, however, must go
beyond an aid program and will necessarily have
to focus on trade. We must recognize that aid
can have a short term effect, while trade may be
longer term.

Now let me make some comments on the Common Market ideas discussed. In some ways the Common Market failed because the benefits were unequal; investments were made, for example, in Guatemala and El Salvador, since they exported manufactured goods. Benefits went to countries with high tariffs. Weaker countries paid higher prices to stronger countries. Also, the division of industry is difficult in varying countries in stages of development. Finally, don't overexpect from Common Market. Concept of Central America is important and US can help by compensating "losers" through concessional financing, regional programs, providing funding for payments union and other techniques.

Nicaragua may or may not play ball vis-a-vis
Common Market. Own judgment is to include
Nicaragua.

Magnitude of US response difficult at this juncture. Depends on amount of projects. Funding is political answer and any amount can be rationalized. AID FY 1983 spends $626 million including supplemental, plus $140 in military assistance. FY 1984 is lower, but that is due to no supplemental. Almost $1 billion now.

Strauss: Possibly, spending capacity could start off at $1 billion and increase overtime. This would also help budgetary concerns in the Congress.

Weintraub: Countries need hard currency for import capacity.

Strauss: Everyone in Congress would support more money if

purchases were for US products, but if money goes
to buy sugar from Central America then we have a
major political problem.

Weintraub: Agree. Not appropriate for me to make specific proposal now on magnitude.

Kissinger: Doesn't help to say funding is political decision; we need some criteria to make recommendation.

Clements: Can't give funding until we have framework for programs.

Kissinger: Need specific recommendations. Shooting at numbers by others will provide positive contribution. Need to make funding level recommendation even if arbitrary. Changes in, for example, population rates, will not happen, unless we can make difference in economies. Total economies in Central America smaller than Baltimore. How can we make a difference?

Weintraub: We could justify $1 billion or $1.5 billion ...

Kirkland: Useful and worthwhile projects to spend money on?

Weintraub: Yes. 250,000 new jobs in labor force costing about $4000 to create new job. Absorptive capacity is not boundary because new jobs can be created and industrial base can be broadened.

Strauss: $7.5 billion, current thought. What would sell? $5 - $7.5 billion over five years. Small number before Congress in first two years. Possibly, $2 billion in fourth year. This is politically sustainable position.

Stoga: Economies collapsing now.

Strauss: If you had money now, could it be spent?

Stoga: Yes

Weintraub: AID is currently trying in Panama a trade credit facility, support to venture capital firms, export trading companies, infrastructure, money for education, skills training, etc.

Clements: Skills training should be emphasized.

Walsh: Higher education needs to develop strong middle class, too.

Scammon: Need to concentrate on agriculture production for domestic consumption. Need "para-agriculture" training to increase capacity for helping food production and in-take.

Clements: Need "country-agent" type of structure that could be put into place.

Kirkland: Would compensation to owners for land reform absorb money, where peasant titles have been withheld? Ways to strengthen banking system?

Weintraub: Difficult political issue. Money is fungible. Why not fund agronomists, credit, etc and stay away from expropriation issues?

Scammon: Current political mechanisms don't permit agriculture competition. Need agriculture changes.

Stoga: Many mechanisms possible. Need program to meet problem. One way is to establish a multilateral structure jointly with Central Americans. Other countries would participate, countries outside the region might eventually join in associated status. International institutions would participate as consultants. Private sector would be invited to establish a consultative council. Purpose is to mobilize foreign assistance in support of regional and national development programs. Broad macro-economic and social targets would be defined over five years. Must be rationalized with available credit.

Need mechanisms to fund stabilization and development programs. Short term stabilization through increase balance of payments support. More needs to be done due to unwillingness of commercial banks to make available short term trade financing. Need to discourage capital flight through sound financial policies.

Debt relief does not impose significant constraint on economic activity, except Costa Rica and

Nicaragua. Need a facility to purchase foreign debts from commercial banks in return for trade financing facilities.

Commodity earning stabilization, like STABEX, would reduce the volatility in export earnings.

Export recovery necessary through improved intra-regional trade. Over medium term, export expansion requires development of manufacturing good exports to countries outside Central America. Liberalization of tariff policies and reduce impediments to foreign investment are also necessary.

Regional integration should be supported by US.

Massive inflow of financial assistance will strengthen public sector relative to private sector. Need to encourage efforts to local businesses. Council of Americas recommended: establishment of reconstruction fund for local businesses; development of small loan facility within EXIM bank; enlarge OPIC risk guarantee program.

Programs could absorb almost any amount of money. Possible $3-4 billion over five years.

Brady: Need to figure out what is needed and then let political people worry about money.

Kissinger: Take $3 billion, for example. If $600 million leaves due to capital flight, this must be stopped.

Stoga: Need political stability to stop capital flight. In Costa Rica, need to change economic policies.

Kissinger: Our strength is to say what is right; to make recommendations on Central America and say this is what it takes for growth rate to change from 1% to 3%. Need to be immunized from political pressure with a money figure.

Kissinger: We seem to be doing enough to stop an explosion but not enough to fix the problem. Overtime, however, it will explode.

Weintraub: Alliance for Progress was $10 billion, not arbitrary.

Clements: We are now exploring the kind of program in mind. Need broad philosophic outline, then look at menu and decide what we want.

Strauss: And AID can help in the costing. I'm comfortable with this discussion.

Scammon: Difficult to price land.

Strauss: Capital flight is difficult issue. It will get to Miami overland, underland; it will get there.

Kissinger: Come back on October 7th. Want philosophic ideas and give us your general approaches together.

Weintraub: We'll put AID to work on differing assumptions and growth rates.

Kissinger: You put questions together and get AID to cost out.

Brady: Grateful for your time and come back with numbers.

Wang 0532m
mcfreedman, AID

CHAIRMAN
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS:
MR. NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEHOS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR. CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR. WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR. LANE KIRKLAND
MR. RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR. JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR. WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB. HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN. LLOYD BENTSEN
REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN. PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON
REP. JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR. WINSTON LORD
SEN. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR. WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP. JAMES C. WRIGHT

SESSION ON SECURITY

SEPTEMBER 21-22, 1983

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21

<table><tbody><tr><td>9:30 - 11:00</td><td><strong>Department of Defense:</strong><br>Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense<br>Mr. Nestor Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs</td></tr><tr><td>11:00 - 12:00</td><td>Dr. Harold Brown, Johns Hopkins University, SAIS</td></tr><tr><td>12:00 - 12:15</td><td><strong>SANDWICH BREAK</strong></td></tr><tr><td>12:15 - 1:30</td><td><strong>Overview:</strong><br>Dr. Margaret Hayes, Senate Foreign Relations Committee<br>Dr. Gregory Treverton, Harvard University</td></tr><tr><td>1:30 - 2:20</td><td>Dr. Edward Luttwak, Center for Strategic International Studies</td></tr><tr><td>2:20 - 2:30</td><td><strong>BREAK</strong></td></tr><tr><td>2:30 - 3:20</td><td>Dr. Jiri Valenta, Woodrow Wilson Center</td></tr><tr><td>3:20 - 4:10</td><td>Dr. Richard Millett, Air War College</td></tr><tr><td>4:10 - 5:00</td><td>Consultants' Wrap-Up</td></tr></tbody></table>

2201 C STREET NW. ROOM 1004. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 TEL. (202) 632-7804

SESSION ON SECURITY

-2-

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22

10:00 - 10:45 Dr. Jose Antonio Pastor-Ridruejo, Special Reporter for UN Human Rights Commission on El Salvador issue

10:45 - 11:15 Mr. Keith Kreul, National Commander, American Legion

11:15 - 12:20 General Jack Merritt, Director, Joint Chiefs of Staff

12:20 - 2:00 LUNCH BREAK

2:00 - 2:50 Dr. Constantine Menges, Central Intelligence Agency

2:50 - 3:40 Mr. Sam Dickens, New World Dynamics Co.

3:40 - 3:50 BREAK

3:50 - 4:40 Dr. Jack Child, American University

4:40 - 5:30 Overview and Wrap-Up:
General Gordon Sumner (USA Ret.)

W0325B

(09/20/83: 5:00 p.m.)

Biographies
Witnesses and Lead Consultants

September 21, 1983

Fred Ikle

Dr. Ikle is currently Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He has served as Director for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1973-1977). From 1977 until 1981, he was chairman of the Conservation Management Corporation and President of the Transat Energy Corporation. He has also worked or taught at the RAND Corporation, the Harvard Institute of International Affairs, and MIT. His publications include *How Nations Negotiate* (1964) and *Every War Must End* (1971).

Nestor Sanchez

Mr. Sanchez is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs. He is also the President's representative to the Consutlative Committee on the Panama Canal. Mr. Sanchez is a former career employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, with 30 years of service.

Harold Brown

Former Secretary of Defense Brown is currently Visting Professor of National Security Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Prior to his selection as Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown served as the Department of Defense's Director for Defense Research and Engineering (1961-1965) and as Secretary of the Air Force (1965-1969). From 1969 until 1977, he was President of the California Institute of Technology.

Dr. Brown holds a Ph.D in Physics from Columbia University. During the 1970s, he participated extensively in the work of the SALT teams in Helsinki, Vienna, and Geneva. He has recently published *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*.

Margaret Daly Hayes

Margaret Daly Hayes has served as staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1981. Prior to joining the Senate staff, she was Associate Director of Brazilian Studies at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies. From 1974 until 1977 she was a private consult with C.A.C.I., where she worked on the Department of Defense's contract study of Panama Canal operations.

-2-

She is a graduate of Northwestern University and received
her Ph.D. from the University of Indiana. Ms. Hayes was a
Fulbright Fellow in Brazil from 1971 to 1972.

Gregory F. Treverton

Dr. Treverton is currently Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. From 1978 until 1981, he was Assistant Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He served as a staff member of the National Security Council, specializing in European Affairs, from 1976 until 1978. He was also a staff member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. He received his Ph.D in Public Policy from Harvard University.

Edward N. Luttwak

Mr. Luttwak is Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. He was formerly Associate Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research. Mr. Luttwak was schooled in Italy and England and is a graduate of the London School of Economics. His most recent of many publications is *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*.

Jiri Valenta

Professor Valenta is currently a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center. He is also Associate Professor and Coordinator of Soviet and East European studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has been a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and at the Rockefeller Foundation. Mr. Valenta is the author of *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (1979).

Richard Millet

Professor Millet is currently on leave from Southern Illinois University to the Air War College. He is the author of *Guardians of the Dynasty* (1977), a study of the Nicaraguan National Guard and the Somoza regime and co-editor of *The Restless Caribbean* (1979).

-3-

September 22, 1983

## Jose Antonio Pastor-Ridruejo

Mr. Pastor-Ridruejo is Special Representative on El Salvador for the United Nations Human Rights Commission, a position that he has held since 1981. He has just returned from El Salvador and is preparing the annual report to the Human Rights Commission. He is a professor of international law at the Autonomous University of Madrid and was a member of the Spanish delegation to the Law of the Seas Conference.

## Keith A. Kruel

Mr. Kruel is the National Commander of the American Legion. He was elected to that post in August 1983. Mr. Kruel is the co-owner of a cattle farm in Wisconsin. He is a veteran of the Korean War, serving in the US Army.

## General Jack N. Merritt

Lt. Gen. Merritt is currently the Director, Joint Staff, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He served as the Commandant of the Command and General Staff College (1982-83) and the U.S. Army War College (1980-82). In 1977 he was Chairman of the Military Professional Development Committee, dealing with the Corps of Cadets, military education and the Honor Code. He has also served with the NSC and is a veteran of the Vietnam War.

## Gordon Sumner, Jr.

General Sumner is a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs with the rank of Ambassador. He is a former chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board (1975 - 1978). He also served as Regional Director for the Near East and Southeast Asia in the International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense. He is a veteran of the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

## Constantine C. Menges

Dr. Menges is currently the Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Officer for Political and Paramilitary Threats and former National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (September 1981 until September 1983). He was a member of the Hudson Institute and the editor of *International Strategic Issues*. Dr. Menges also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of HEW for Domestic Social and Economic Policy Issues. He has done consulting work for the NSC, State, and Defense.

-4-

Jack Child

Lt. Col. Child is an Associate Professor of Spanish and Latin American Studies at The American University. He served in the U.S. Army for 22 years, spending two of those years in Vietnam. He has written extensively on security issues in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America. He received his Ph.D. from the American University in 1978.

Sam Dickens

Col. Dickens is currently President of New World Dynamics, a private consulting firm. Col. Dickens was a career officer with the Air Force and a fighter pilot in the Korea and Vietnam wars. Born in Argentina, Col. Dickens has also lived in Chile and has traveled extensively throughout Central and Latin America. He is a West Point graduate.

SUBJECT: Security

PRESENTATION BY: Dr. Harold Brown (Former Secretary of Defense; Johns Hopkins University, SAIS)

DATE: September 21, 1983
TIME: 11:00 - 12:00
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY

Dr. Brown commented that in order to address the security issue in Central America, one must first define our security interests and decide whether a situation is unacceptable or uncomfortable as well as what we can do about it at what cost. Marxist-Leninist control of Cuba has not been unacceptable, and the same would be true of a Marxist-Leninist state in Central America. Panama and Mexico are more important, and their fall to Marxist-Leninists might be unacceptable, as might aggression against neighbors, depending on the form of the aggression. Soviet bases would be unacceptable, and we do not need to draw the line on this only when it comes to nuclear bases. Lines should be drawn so that we know how to respond, but the drawing of lines makes our response predictable and we need to keep the other side guessing. We need to look at all of this in terms of a 15-20 year plan, in terms of what we want for the year 2000.

It is possible to argue that the question of Nicaragua could be resolved by taking action against Cuba. We should ask the military what it would take to accomplish an overt invasion. There is a military question with a military solution. If Cuba goes, we don't need to worry about Nicaragua. What happened in Nicaragua with Somoza could happen in El Salvador: a combination of revolt against tyranny and oppressive economic conditions coupled with anti-US sentiment and Soviet support. We must separate the external from the internal. If El Salvador were sealed off, who would win? Probably the government. If not, we should not allow the government to lose simply because we do not like what it is doing. Losing cannot be justified by saying our position was morally superior, but if the government does not have enough indigenous support, it cannot win. In this, our security and human rights policies work together. We must push the Salvadorans to do what is necessary. At some point, it may be necessary to cut off our support for a government, but we should try to arrange what will replace it. All of this argues for a political solution, if we can afford the cost, both

-3-

NOTES:

**Kissinger:** Our guest is Harold Brown, who has combined reflection with activity, the former in his current position at Johns Hopkins and the latter as Secretary of Defense under the previous administration. Welcome.

**Brown:** I am speaking to you on a subject whose difficulty is manifest, as you all well know. I recently sent you a letter commending the Linowitz report on Central America. It's good, but its short on immediate specifics. You will need balance between the long term and the short term. First what you have to do is define our security interests, what is unacceptable, what is uncomfortable, and what we are prepared to do about it. Some say the presence of Marxist-Leninists in the region is unacceptable. The Cubans have been in the region for over 20 years, disproving this thesis. My own view is that Marxist-Leninist control of Nicaragua, El Salvador and Cuba is not unacceptable, though perhaps uncomfortable. Panama and Mexico are more important than the Central American countries. Is a takeover of the Panama Canal unacceptable? Maybe. Military aggression against a neighbor? Maybe, it depends on the form of the aggression. That's why the question is difficult. You have to consider the reactions of other nations. Soviet bases in the region would be unacceptable, and I'm not talking about drawing the line only at the presence of nuclear bases. Cuba is a problem as a potential base in the event of war because of our Caribbean sea-lanes in the case of resupply of Europe or of an initial supply to the Persian Gulf. It's already a problem. Soviet access to the Caribbean from Central America doesn't make the situation much worse. Panama and Mexico are different. Drawing the line is the key, but we have to be careful not to get involved in salami tactics here in Washington, all trying to slice up the salami.

**Kissinger:** What if a Marxist-Leninist becomes president in Mexico?

**Brown:** We must keep that from happening. It would be difficult, but we must remember that no Marxist-Leninist has ever been elected by a majority.

**Kissinger:** Mexico has a strange system of...

**Brown:** We don't know how they go about nominating candidates internally. We must slice the salami beforehand, we must know when we must fight; but we do need to keep the other side guessing. We need to think over the

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long range, where are our strengths and weaknesses. Other countries' opinions count as well. The Soviet Union does not allow critics on its borders, but then we are not the Soviet Union. We're not playing by the same rules, and I find this troublesome. The Marxist-Leninist states are not inevitably friendly to the Soviet Union, and China and Yugoslavia are good examples of this. It is likely that in the course of history, when these countries have to look for help, they will look to the US, not to the giant on their borders. In the same manner, the Central American countries will fear the US most. Look at Cuba. As Porfirio Diaz once said when he was the Mexican president, "Poor Mexico, so far from God and so near the United States." Cuba will be hard to wean because of this phenomenon, but I wouldn't give up. We need a 15-20 year plan. What do we want in the year 2000? Start there to get a consistent policy, to find out what you should do now.

**Kissinger:** About Cuba: we have a sort of coexistence and it's logical to ask, "Why not again?" But it has also been geopolitically costly. Who would have thought of massive Cuban involvement in Africa? It is a big strain to contain this over an indefinite period of time. When we're weakest, they react. When Nixon resigned, they moved in Angola. I proffer these thoughts as a devil's advocate.

**Brown:** We can make the argument, "Why not deal with Nicaragua by working on Cuba?"

**Kissinger:** Supposing we can't stand the presence of Marxist-Leninists in Nicaragua. What do we have to do?

**Brown:** We should ask the military what it would take to accomplish an overt invasion. How many divisions? There is a military question with a military solution. If Cuba goes, we don't have to worry about Nicaragua.

**Kissinger:** The nationalist Marxist-Leninists have all had problems with the Soviet Union. But neither China nor Cuba have helped us elsewhere in the world. As long as Nicaragua sees the problem as the US, it must be militarized. Any Latin regime that makes defense principal has problems with us.

**Brown:** The key is to negotiate, to find the basis on which we can get along.

**Brady:** Going back to your thoughts on asking the military what it would take, if we aren't having problems with Cuba why should we pay so much attention to the Nicaraguans?

-5-

Brown: No, it's that it's for military to think of the war options. I'm playing devil's advocate.

Brady: There is a logical sequence to what I said.

Clements: But it's not a logical sequence. What we are looking at is hemispheric business.

Kissinger: We have to remember that what Nicaragua means to the Soviets is very different from what Cuba means to them.

Brown: We have to consider how much of the problem is internal and how much is external. For instance, in El Salvador there is a general lack of liberties and economic rewards within the country. What we saw in Nicaragua has parallels in El Salvador: a revolt against tyranny and oppressive economic conditions combined with anti-US feelings and Soviet support. What is the prescription? We don't want the Nicaraguan problem to spread, so we must have a combined strategy to protect against the outside. If El Salvador were sealed off, who would win? Probably the government. The US shouldn't say no to assistance because what the government is doing is wrong. We can't justify losing by saying that what we did was morally superior. But, taking the Vietnam example, most of which isn't applicable, the government cannot win if it does not have indigenous support. We must push them to do what is necessary. They may be better informed on what to do but they're also biased. In the last administration we tried to keep El Salvador from being defeated by outside support, but we pressured for more responsiveness. We're not fooling anybody by thinking that a centrist government is immediately likely. The pressure vacillated, but there was some. With this administration there is no pressure except that which comes from the Congress.

Kirkland: How much leverage would you exert?

Brown: With Somoza, we should have done it earlier.

Kissinger: If you move against a Somoza, do you replace him or do you let nature take its course?

Brown: We tried to replace Somoza, but it was too late.

Kissinger: Do you let El Salvador just fall to the Marxist-Leninists if that seems to be the course of events?

-6-

Brown: No. You try to replace them with others.

Ikle: But if you fiddle around too much internally, you get in trouble.

Brown: You don't want to be seen fiddling around, or you're in trouble.

Kirkland: If we make demands, and make our demands conditions for our assistance, should we go so far as to just cut off the government if it doesn't perform?

Brown: We should try to replace the government, but I suppose there comes a time when we simply must let go.

Kissinger: There's a human rights paradox: our intervention to cause necessary changes can be resented.

Brown: It's a dilemma.

Cisneros: We intervene with helicopters and arms, but not in the social problem.

Brown: The idealistic and the practical reinforce each other in this instance. Without human rights awareness, the government cannot survive. The idealistic becomes practical.

Cisneros: If we hadn't stayed with Somoza so long, would something have changed? The longer we stayed with him, the worse the situation became.

Clements: There is a parallel with Cuba. Now we're out and the situation keeps getting worse.

Brown: In any situation, the most ruthless will survive. All of this argues for a political solution, if we're strong enough to survive it.

Ikle: The only situation from which a democratic solution came was in the Dominican Republic.

Brown: It was a success because the parties wanted us in to arrange a political solution. They agreed to the solution, and it stands today.

Kissinger: When you say a "political solution," are you looking at one within El Salvador? Between El Salvador and Nicaragua?

Brown: Both. We can promise Nicaragua security, and Nicaragua can promise the same to El Salvador. I don't know if it will work.

-7-

Kissinger: And if this is rejected?

Brown: I'm not sure.

Strauss: How about help from the Contadora countries. Are they reliable enough? Strong enough?

Brown: Some are. They can take the point politically, but not militarily. They might be able to give some cosmetic help on the military side. But the US will have to come through with economic assistance. I don't believe in a Marshall Plan -- it's not a case of Western Europe. But it could be an important carrot. Also you have to give aid to the other Latins so that they'll agree to take some of the heat of a political solution. I'm not against a little bribery.

Walsh: The difficulty is that as Contadora moves forward, the M-19 acts up in Columbia. Costa Rica is threatened by Nicaragua. We always have to be up front while they terrorize. How do we win?

Brown: Militarily, if we tie, we win. The long term political and economic considerations are with us.

Kissinger: But if you study the history of guerrilla movements, they are the ones who seek to win by tying.

Brown: I'm talking about supplies, outside intervention. In Malaya, the British had to defeat the guerrillas, not fight the Chinese.

Kissinger: Many favor a political solution over a military victory.

Brown: The issue of supplies from the outside is separate. The argument that a successful fence would cost millions doesn't impress me. My impression is that the supplies from the outside are significant, but not predominant. Inside, we have to combine political and military efforts. You can't just negotiate power. You can negotiate non-military procedures for determing who holds power.

Diaz-Alejandro: What probability is there that a fence would work?

Brown: The supplies aren't all that necessary. What I'm arguing for is a political solution over a military one. Any solution that creates a Czechoslovakia is no good. Any deal you cut must leave the government in a postion to survive.

Silber: Have their been any successes in achieving political solutions?

**Brown:** I'd say yes, in the Dominican Republic.

**Silber:** That's not political. At the time, at least, it was considered purely military.

**Brown:** The political parties we see today evolved and the system functions.

**Cisneros:** What if we set specific criteria for Nicaragua, on the size of their forces, if they set out to invade or intimidate? What is the likelihood we could get our forces there fast enough if there were a pact in place? Would this be an effective safeguard?

**Brown:** I think we could do it with planning, if we move our stocks closer. We could have a battalion there in a day, a division in a week.

**Cisneros:** If the Hondurans can hold for a couple of days, can the threat be countered?

**Kissinger:** For those of us who have had to think of these things on the National Security Council, we find that we can set up a hair-trigger reaction just about everywhere in the world. Logistically, it's easy; but the political process that goes into the decision is something else.

**Brown:** The political decision just isn't that easy.

**Kissinger:** You'd think the President just has to call the legal advisor in the State Department and ask, "What's our obligation?" The political decision is tough. Second, one must assess the Nicaraguan threat. A Soviet base threatens me the least. Nicaragua must be seen by how it exercises its strength and influence on those around it. A simple assessment of the balance of forces, a pure NATO assessment, is not enough.

**Brown:** I have one idea for you. Ask yourselves if covert action is useful. I find it hard to see that any covert action has worked in the last 25 years. In the case of Nicaragua, even if it stays "covert", what sense does it make. We should want to act openly.

**Kissinger:** This is a subject for another time.

**Brown:** A closing thought. If you can reach an consensus, I'll be pleased but mostly surprised.

Notes on the Meeting of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

SUBJECT: Security Issues

BRIEFER/WITNESS: Margaret Daly Hayes and Gregory Treverton

DATE: September 21, 1983
TIME: 1:00 - 2:15
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Hayes argues that Central American issues should be appraised within the context of the wider Caribbean Basin framework. The goal of the U.S. is to maintain stability at relatively low costs. Among the recommendations made by Hayes were those calling for a building stable political institutions, greater policy definition of a scale of tolerance for radical change in the region, as well as improved intelligence capabilities and assessments. She concluded that in order to achieve a more stable environment, the U.S. may be committed to a significant short-term effort to rebuild security in the region.

Treverton defined a "broad" and "narrow" approach to security in the region. The "narrow" concentrated on the threat posed by hostile regimes in geopolitical proximity to the U.S. A "broad" approach looked at U.S. global commitments and weighed the costs to other strategic commitments such as the Middle East and Europe. Considerable debate developed over steps necessary to deal with Soviet strategy in the region and the stakes required to force a Soviet withdrawal.

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NOTES:

**Korologus**
Began with an update of Congressional activity. He stated that a formal recommendation had been made to the White House naming Senator Inouye to replace the late Senator Jackson. He reported on the passage of a compromise Radio Marti bill, defense appropriations, the current compromise on the War Powers Act for Lebanon. He stated that Secretary Shultz was testifying to the Senate on convert operations in Nicaragua, pointing out that the Administration had apparently shifted its emphasis away from arms interdiction to a position based on preventing the Nicaraguans from supporting guerillas outside of Nicaragua. He also reported that the Congress was considering a measure that would give Congress veto power over any covert action. Finally, he added that a continuing resolution would provide federal funding, probably until November. He stated that he met with a number of key staffers to inform them of the activities of the Committee and reported on the request to testify by Senator Hart and Congressman Sijlander.

**Dr. Kissinger**
Noted recent criticism of the witnesses who had appeared before the Commission. Some found them too liberal, others found them too conservative. If any commission members want to explore a significant point of view, then please recommend them. I do not mind the criticism as long as the Commission understands that we will be prepared to hear any point of view.

**Amb. Strauss**
It is not the points of view that bother me, but the occasional poor quality of some of the witnesses.

**Dr. Kissinger**
I welcome any additional views as to what we can do to improve the quality of the witnesses.

**Gov. Clements**
We have heard much about the need for improvements in agriculture. But these have been generalists. We need to hear from people who have gone down to Central America and done things. We need more on the agricultural economy in Central America.

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Amb. Strauss One of the best witnesses was the man from United Brands.

Dr. Kissinger In the mean time, let me make a suggestion. Please give us the names of people we should hear from. It is in the interest of the Commission to hear from the broadest possible spectrum of opinion. Let me now introduce Dr. Hayes and Dr. Treverton.

Dr. Hayes I will begin with a brief presentation and then respond to questions. I also add the disclaimer that the views that I hold are not those of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I would like to look broadly at the concept of security in the Caribbean Basin and some possible remedies. Greg will then look at specific issues.

The U.S. does have important security interests in the broader Caribbean Basin. We must conceptualize Central America as one side of this area. I think that the first responsibility of the Commission is to focus on the question of how to assure the protection of these interests; rather than defining exactly what they are. We should also not think only in worst case scenarios. Our interest is therefore in stability and predictability in order to preserve security at relatively low costs. We must remember that other areas such as Europe, the Middle East and Asia will generally be higher on the agenda of globally important security interests.

A basic key to the region is political instability. Political instability is generated by inherent conditions: weak political institutions; weak to backward economies; few human resources. Also we must pay attention to play of outside forces - the Europeans, the Soviets, the Cubans - who exacerbate the problems of coping with change. In general, the U.S. has not focused its attention on the solution to this problem.

-4-

Justice Stewart Then you advocate that we look at the entire Caribbean Basin?

Dr. Hayes

You cannot conceptually separate Jamaica from Grenada or Nicaragua from El Salvador. There is also the political threat from increased Soviet and Cuban interest in the area and their desire to weaken U.S. influence. The mechanisms are not always military. They include trade, education, radio propaganda. Cuba, for example, provides a significant cadre for leadership. In these areas we have been less active.

The key to the region is institution building. If the problem is based on the weakness of unadaptable institutions, then we must be more active participants in the process of institution building. We must ask ourselves, for example, could we have created a centrist regime in Nicaragua. Was the critical mass for such a development present in Nicaragua. I feel that in Nicaragua or El Salvador is such a mass present. There are mechanisms, however, for strengthening political institutions which include exchange scholarships; increased broadcasting efforts; the coordination of efforts at exchanges of political leaders to demonstrate the democratic system and enhance comprehension of the U.S. system. In El Salvador, political parties are largely interested in the advancement of party interests and not in the construction of broaders coalitions. Until an alternate system exists it will be difficult to establish a favorable political outcome. The U.S. should also work to promote legal and judicial reform and encourage more meaningful elections. In countries where there have been stolen elections, such as the 1972 election in El Salvador, there events were turning points and alienated moderates from the electoral process.

Another area that we need to explore involves cooperation with allies in our approach to the region. For far too long Latin American leaders have let the U.S. take the initiative on difficult questions. There are also

-5-

different perspectives and agendas. Yet, over
time, the Contadora Group countries have begun
to put their names on the line. We need to
elicit from them greater political
responsibility and demonstrate that there are
compelling reasons for the Contadora Group to
work directly in providing political direction
to the region. Because of the vast disparities
or gap in power and economic strength that
exist between the Latin American countries and
the U.S., we are generally seen as imposing our
will.

The goal of the U.S. should be the
establishment of a system by which with a low
level of resources we are able to maintain
stability. It is important that the Latin
Americans help us to defend our values and
interest. There is no vast disparity between
there point of view and ours. On a regional
basis, the U.S. must be prepared to deal both
with the insurgency and long term institutional
instability. There is very little controversy
over the need to address instability, but it is
much more difficult to deal with the
insurgency. There has been some discussion
about tolerating Marxist-Leninist governments,
but we have yet to define a scale of tolerance
for governments that are not fully enrolled in
the Marxist-Leninist camp. We need to
establish a measured scale. I would like to
suggest a couple of tests: 1) is the government
aligned with the Soviet Union or is it
non-alignenred and independent; 2) does the
government contribute to political instability
in the region. Some say that the left in El
Salvador does not fail this test.

This also raises another important point - that
is the need to engage in detailed intelligence
gathering. In Central America, we are dealing
almost in the dark on such key issues as what
is the left, who are the representative
leaders, and what is the range of political
preferences of the leaders. All of these are
important to our information gathering.

I would argue that the U.S. requires more
innovation. Our range of tolerance for the

-6-

left is limited. We need to reconsider a more
positive role. Our current economic and
military roles are so small that we cannot
expect to accomplish much in Central America.

Dr. Kissinger I am then to understand that our main threat is long-term political instability?

Dr. Hayes Yes.

Dr. Kissinger Then how does one classify the military threat posed by a guerilla war?

Dr. Hayes I would relate this to political instability. In general these were domestically based insurgencies until Cuba began to increase its role after 1979.

Dr. Kissinger Is it possible after a war starts to deal with the necessary long-term political institution building?

Dr. Hayes To an extent yes. I believe that there are possibilities for avoiding a major crisis in Honduras and even Guatemala through domestic means. There is also the example of Venezuela.

Dr. Kissinger How can we apply this to El Salvador. Here we are constrained by the fear of making a mistake that will allow a victory by the Left.

Dr. Hayes The U.S. should continue to use its influence to support the development of institutions. Leaving things to the Salvadoran military may allow for a temporary defeat of the guerrillas, but unless there are major institutional changes there will be another insurgency.

Dr. Treverton I will begin by describing what I see as two major conceptual approaches to the problems of security in the region. These are the broad and the narrow approach. Those who argue that security interests are broad maintain that the countries in the region are in our backyard, that sea lines of communication are vital, and that developments there could eventually pose a threat to interests that are strategic. The narrower approach seeks to define specific

-7-

threats generally arising from Cuba expansion and Soviet penetration, concentrating on direct military threats. We must also ask ourselves to what extent does a mere movement to the left in some of these countries matter to us.

Amb. Strauss I feel that the broad view is influenced by the geographical proximity of the region.

Dr. Treverton Except for the fact that these countries are somewhat close to us, there significance is somewhat limited.

Dr. Kissinger Many in the U.S. use to feel that they were pretty important.

Dr. Treverton Geography is not the sole determinant of importance. Western Europe is further away than Central America, but certainly more important to us. Yet, we do retain this image of closeness as a guiding factor. What is important are things such as Soviet bases. A anti-U.S. government is not the same as a military base.

Dr. Kissinger Then you are saying that short of the establishment of a Soviet military base, there are no vital interests?

Dr. Treverton Some of the security issues are complex. The Grenada airport is one such example. In thinking about our security interest, however, one should focus on military threats. This again calls for a comparison of the broad and the narrow views. It leads us to examine several possible options: a combination of carrot and stick to deterr the Cubans and the Soviets and to get them to leave the region alone, a need to look at the U.S.- Soviet agreements regarding Cuba. There is also the need to arrive at some sort of consensus on what price the Soviets are willing to pay for continue activity in the area. We must ask if the Soviets can be a source of constraint.

Amb. Strauss Are you saying that Soviets have a limit on the price that they are willing to pay? If we make it more costly for the Soviets to play, will they get out?

-8-

Dr. Treverton I feel that the Soviets are not willing to pay too high a price for the region.

Amb. Strauss Then if we follow that line, there is a price that the Soviets are unwilling to pay.

Dr. Treverton To a certain extent yes, but we are also talking about arriving at some form of mutual restraint.

Amb. Strauss I would like to stay with this for a while longer. I disagree strongly with the premise that the Soviets can be encouraged to get out or negotiated out. There is nothing in it for them. Let us make the reasonable assumption we might need to raise the stakes. What if they in fact get higher? Then is there not the danger that we will get into a trap from which it will be difficult to escape?

Dr. Treverton I am thinking about their forces and military bases. I do not favor raising the ante. We should be prepared to pursue talks. The Soviets have paid a price for their current involvement.

Dr. Silber The Soviets have not paid a price that I know of. If they have; what is it?

Dr. Treverton The price is that Central America has become a major irritant in our relations with the Soviets.

Dr. Silber That is no price. They have forced us to deal directly with the crisis.

Amb. Strauss They have also heightened political division in the U.S.

Dr. Walsh When Margaret started out, she spoke about achieving long-term stability at a low cost. Yet you have argued that the Soviets set the level of the stakes. You also seem to have implied that the low cost option is the best. You also maintain that the Cubans and the Soviets did not move until 1979 and seem to imply that Communist regimes are acceptable.

-9-

Dr. Hayes
I said that we desire to have a low cost environment. But we may have to pay a high initial price to achieve this. There are limits as to what we can pay for the maintenance of stability. Today we will have to pay a certain level of costs to create a low cost environment.

Amb. Strauss
I am one of those free spending Democrats and I want to know. I want to know what it is that we want; how do we get there; and what are the costs? I think that what counts is our willingness to pay the price to get there. It is not from a lack of strategy.

Dr. Hayes
Our goal is the creation of stable, friendly governments.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro
I would like to recall one point and that is to note that the Soviets do pay a cost for maintaining their alliance with Cuba. There subsidies to the Cuban economy are a considerable burden. The costs for full support in Nicaragua would also be high.

Dr. Kissinger
They are not doing this out of charity. They see the possibility of political gain.

Dr. Silber
What does this cost the Soviets? I believe that we would be willing to pay three times as much to get the Soviets out of Cuba.

Dr. Hayes
The Soviets have a big foothold in Cuba and a little one in Nicaragua. I feel that there is little lieklihood of success if we try to get them to reduce their anti-U.S. actions.

Amb. Struass
The Soviets have bought in on the cheap. Cuba may be different than Nicaragua and there may be a cost factor involved in the Soviet decision to aid the Nicaraguans. But, we have no strategy for raising the stakes and make the Soviets think twice about supporting the Nicaraguans. Say your game stakes range from 1 to 10. How do we raise the stakes to seven?

Dr. Treverton
The Soviets are probably willing to spend very little on Nicaragua.

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Gov. Clements We really have no idea of how much they are
willing to spend.

Dr. Treverton We can raise the price.

Amb Strauss How?

Dr. Treverton We can continue doing what we are doing now;
but also make clear our willingness to talk.
We can protect El Salvador in exchange for
guarantees not to attempt to overthrow the
Sandinistas.

Amb. Strauss How do we do this?

Dr. Treverton We make this pledge to Cuba.

Dr. Walsh I thought that we made this type of pledge to
Cuba before.

Dr. treverton Our understandings were with the Soviets. They
actually had little to say about Cuban
activities.

Dr. Silber Let us assume that negotiations do not work
with Nicaragua. What do we do if we cannot
agree with Nicaragua?

Dr. Treverton We can draw firmer lines. I would also like to
point out that there are other actors that
account for our problems in Central America.
Even if the Soviets pulled out, problems would
continue. If negotiations failed then I would
advocate some form of destabilization and
economic sanctions.

Dr. Kissinger Much seems to hinge on one's conception of
negotiations. Negotiations basically assume a
good faith effort. Yet the Soviet and
Communist position is generally based on a
balance of forces. What has to first be
determined is what is the current balance of
forces. Secondly, one must consider that if we
escalate the risks, what is the best and safest
way. When I was a Professor of Government,
most argued that any escalation of threats
should be measured, rational, and scientific.

Now I feel, however, that success is often
obtained with big jumps in a display of force.
Probably the surest way to fail is a strategy
of little dribbles that do not force the
issue. I feel that the policy of phases has
not been very successful. What one side sees
as unresponsiveness may in fact be their
inability to see that the threat level has
actually increased.

Dr. Treverton

Several factors are involved here. From a military stand point, balance of forces cearly favors the U.S. In the military sense we can do what we want. What we are doing now, however, is the worst of both possible worlds. One there is no serious threat to warrant the over use of force; yet we are pursuing a policy of covert action.

Dr. Scammon

We should look at the basic objectives of the government in Nicaragua. I feel that it is comparable to Lenin's NEP. Also if we talk of negotiations this tends to abnegate the will to pursue stronger policies.

Mr. Kirkland

Ms. Hayes, I would like to review a section in paper dealing with outside influences in Central America. I do not understand your position. You seem to speak of all the players in a negative sense. Yet many such as the Social Democrats and the Socialist International are responsible for support to Monge, which see as good. You also seem to disparage the work of the Christian Democrats and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Dr. Hayes

I did not mean to imply that the role of these forces was a negative one. Rather I meant to reflect the complexity of the issues. While the Social Democrats support Monge, they also support Ungo. We should also remember that European political positions are taken for domestic purposes. Yet the stake in the outcomes is greater in the U.S. Because of the role of the Europeans, it is often more difficult for us to deal with. What is important is the part that these political forces can play in restoring political stability. I feel that the role of groups such as AIFLD is very important and positive.

0385B

SUBJECT: Security Issues

BRIEFER/WITNESS: Edward Luttwak

SUMMARY:

Mr. Luttwak offered a conceptual approach to the current situation in El Salvador. He stated that the insurgency was not the result of socio-economic conditions, but of political actions resulting from the support of Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union. He predicted that Nicaragua would continue to serve as a base for the export of subversion for the forseable future and that serious consideration be given to ending the threat posed by Nicaragua. He was critical of the ability of the U.S. Armed Forces, with it emphasis on mutlti-service, global deterrence, to deal with a small wars. He recommended the selection of a senior level official with functional responsibility for devising a comprehensive and effective strategy for El Salvador. He also called for longer service, additional military aid above current levels, greater flexibility in equipment acquisition, and the possible use of professional soldiers employed by the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

-2-

Dr. Kissinger
Dr. Luttwak is one of the most creative minds on geostrategy. He has been assigned the task of talking on security issues. I have told him that he could be his normal unconventional self.

Mr. Luttwak
Let me begin with some personal observations In Nicaragua we see an all too familiar pattern developing. The future prospects include less economic growth than Haiti, but a state apparatus that has excellent military, intelligence, and security organizations. If we don't knock them off, we will have problems for the next 20 years.

A second observation based on my semi-professional opinion is that the Soviet Union, when faced with a semi-resurgent U.S. views Central America as a marvelous opportunity to divide the U.S. through its aid to the insurgency.

A third observation is that one may conduct extensive social and economic analysis to show that local conditions are ripe for rebellion. Such conditions exist in dozens of countries. But it requires the input of leadership and the insertion of arms to start an insurgency. To have an insurgency you need external encouragement and sanctuary. Any self respecting guerrilla needs both psychological and physical support - a place to rest, a hot shower, a hotel. So far I have found much of the discussion about Central American insurgencies to be less than Talmudic. Insurgencies occur because they are willed. Furthermore I am not comforted by those who say that such actions are a burden for the USSR. The real costs are being borne by the U.S.

Now let me discuss what I call the professional part of my presentation. The Armed Forces of the U.S. are designed to confront the USSR. Their responsibility is to deterr large scale aggression in vital areas. They do this with large-scale, multi-service structures. A prime example of this multi-service structure is SOUTHCOM. The duty of the officer is to manage

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Mr. Luttwak and administer this operation. The methods are therefore commensurate. Yet the problem comes when you apply the large scale machine to the small scale. You cannot down scale the operation. The enemy is also elusive. U.S. forces are for the most part designed to attack large fixed objectives and large concentrations of forces.

I support the current policy. We need to defeat the insurgency and knock off Nicaragua.

I have a number of technical recommendations with regard to the current military structure. The current organization of the military is not designed to deal with the small scale. The purpose of current manpower policy is to provide material for the global machine. In El Salvador, we do not have 55 advisers; we have 55 slots. The slots do not necessarily belong to the infantry. They are largely shared out among the services. It is very easy to justify the presence of each of the services. But it does not mean that these 55 men are working, teaching, and learning to the our best advantage.

The British would have sent in a training platoon for a long period of time. Let me give you an example. Col. Waggelstein was there for 15 months, then it was time for him to make the next move in his career development. Yet one only begins to learn something in 15 months. One begins to learn who tells the truth and who lies. Yet, from the military standpoint, it is important to share his experience with the system. We have had recently then two changes in key personnel in Waglestein and the Ambassador.

Lets look at another case. You go to Panama where they are assigned the task of planning a means to intimidate Nicaragua. Someone puts forward the idea of gunboat diplomacy. It is an attractive idea. It is a diversion; no lives are lost and you often attain your goals. But there is a problem. What if you go there and the natives refuse to be intimidated. Then, unless you use force you

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Mr. Luttwak have no solution and you have devalued the currency. This recalls the classic exchange between Lord Palmerston and the First Lord of the Admiralty in the Dom Pacifico case. There the British used force even though it was later discovered that Pacifico was a crook.

There is a technical point that goes with such exercises. What you really want is a sinister convergence of forces, without the Nicaraguans knowing what it is coming for. But if you go through the multi-service organization, all members have to get a piece of the pie. There has to be a role for the Navy Seals, for the Special Forces, another for the battalion of engineers, something for the small boats people, the Marines, the Coast Guard, etc. In all you need to give everybody a piece of the operation.

To do this you generate paper and leaks. The operation begins to loose much of its sinister attributes. The machine is not structured for the discrete display of force.

Another problems comes in training of the Salvadoran military. The Salvadorans need to acquire training in, among other things, the cleaning of their weapons. You then plan for training in Hinduras. You begin with a small 7.5 acre camp, but overnight the camp becomes a massive multiforce base of 7,400 acres. You have a general collision of responsibilities and specific requirements and as a result we cannot do small things quickly. There is a kind of law of unequal development at work here. The richest cannot respond to the poorest.

It is the American officers who have told the Salvadorans that they are no good. We have not only said that they are fascists, but we have accussed them of being dumb. The source of such accussions is generally from their U.S. colleagues. They are reluctant to engage in night operations and we citicize them. Yet the Salvadoran military is without enoguh radios

-5-

Mr. Luttwak and helicopters. If they go out at night without the necessary support, they know that they will be killed. In El Salvador there are good fighters and there are reasonably good officers, but they have been exposed to an erosion of confidence. In some respects we are guilty of proposing the Marie Antoinette diet: three stuffed capons for a starving peasant.

Much of our training is not appropriate for the needs of the Salvadorans. Small, but important details, such as the cleaning of rifles are ignored or given inadequate attention. SOUTHCOM and others generally think in the large scale. My feeling is that if we had 55 good sergeants in there, most of the guerrillas would be dead.

Yet, even if you kill off the Salvadoran insurgents, Nicaragua will start another insurrection. Besides in El Salvador you have a miserable trickle of military aid. Despite the charges that we are providing massive assistance, current aid is running at about $26 million. Today an M16 cost $400 to $500. The cheapest helicopter is $4 million. Also of the equipment that the Salvadorans have to purchase is inappropriate for their needs. Radios are a good example. We equip them with the PRC-77 which is a very expensive radio. They could have many more radios if they were allowed to purchase Toshibas for example.

I support the current policy, but want to make some technical recommendations. 1) When there is a military action underway, create a suitable office with a DOD policy official. Give him power and responsibility and a free hand to take from the larger system what is needed to manage the smaller conflict. Do not try to craft a response from the larger system. The system is set up for large scale conflicts. It fails when it is dealing with the elusive and the small scale. We should think about doing it like others do it.

Dr. Kissinger What should this individual do when he encounters the system?

-6-

Mr. Luttwak He would be armed with a presidential mandate.

Gov. Clements It might work, but the JCS would select the individual.

Mr. Luttwak The JCS will create a multi-service team.

Gov. Clements I disagree. I believe that the JCS would obey, but you cannot abort the current system.

Mr. Luttwak What is the situation with General Gorman. He is a four star general and arose to that position because of his ability to manage the global system. If you send in 3,500 people for maneuvers, you send in another 1,500 in support.

Gov. Clements But if you are given X number of dollars for practice, it makes little difference whether you practice in Honduras or off of Norfolk. They are going to practice in one place or the other.

Dr. Kissinger What is your other suggestion.

Mr. Luttwak Here we are dealing with a broader geo-political problem for which there is a tremendous reluctance to confront the issue. There is clear evidence that the insurgency is stimulated from the outside. Yet we find it difficult to deal with the strategic reality. Most overlook the fact that we are dealing with the greatest empire in history. People forget about the most subtle and powerful phenomenon in strategy - the dynamic current. Some powers appear to be moving up. If we, for example, shoot down a Korean airliner; people say that we are violent. If the Soviets do it; it shows that they are tough.

In Central America, there a clever process of geo-political outmaneuvering going on. Even the hawks don't understand this. In Central America, we cannot withdraw. Our greatest obligation is to win. In order to win in Central America, we must remove the current regime in Nicaragua.

-7-

Mr. Luttwak
In the contra operations, they receive small arms and propaganda aid from the U.S. Technically they cannot win. The only way is if they generate success. This would involve penetration, the stimulation of local insurgency, and U.S. support. They can't do it with only small arms from the U.S

Dr. Kissinger
Most argue against covert action because of the high political price that one must pay.

Mr. Luttwak
It is a question of capital vs. running costs. I have talked with friends, including the wicked ones. They put up an analogy. You are sick, you got to the hospital and have an operation and you feel better. The regime in Nicaragua is desinged to propagate revolution. It is programmed to foul the economy, but they will succeed in areas involving security and external agitation.

Dr. Kissinger
When we talked you had an idea about the advisers. You felt that we were paying an exorbitantly high price in Congress for maintaining 55 advisers in El Salvador.

Mr. Luttwak
My preference is for the establishment of an overall manager for the system. But I do feel that we are paying a high price. We should withdraw the slots and ask for an increase in military aid. Training can be obtained by hiring experts or professionals. From a broader perspective, we should approach the problem from the top with a program. If we cannot afford the cost of the advisers then we should put in contract people.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro
Let me follow up on your hospital analogy. What are the costs for this operation. How long will we have to stay in the hospital. What type of regime are we going to install there.

Mr. Luttwak
The problem with the contras is the problem of which force is behind them. Is it the impalacble will of the U.S. to win that stands behind them. If we really want to win, we

-8-

shouldn't diddle; we should do it with force -- confront the Sandinistas. If the FSLN is removed there will be a guerrilla threat. But instead of a loose structure, the new government will control the apparatus of the state.

There is also a big difference between Cuba and Nicaragua. Because Cuba is an island, it is more difficult to export revolution. Cuba is also different because it has the mantle of Soviet support over it.

**Mayor Cisneros** Do we care what people in Nicaragua want? We have no clear indication as to their desires.

**Mr. Luttwak** I would not say what I have said if I did not feel that the people of Nicaragua are opposed to the Sandinista system and in fact wanted it. We know how the Sandinistas feel about elections. They call them petty bourgeois.

**Mayor Cisneros** Shouldn't we give the Nicaraguans time for elections.

**Mr. Luttwak** These people did not suffer and die in order to give the wishy-washy bourgeois power. They have their own program to save Nicaragua and all of central America.

**Dr. Kissinger** Then we assume that the Sandinistas do not hold bourgeois elections. But assuming the improbable and that is that the Sandinistas win a majority. Are there vital U.S. interests that override the result of these elections.

**Mr. Luttwak** If the Nicaraguans knowingly and willingly accept economic stagnation, a potent military-security apparatus, a nomenklatura, I would be amazed. No they can't win an hoenst election.

**Mr. Kirkland** Then you are sympathetic with the Administrations policy.

**Mr. Luttwak** I fully support it.

Mr. Kirkland They with regard to the contras. Isn't the U.S. policy dangerous because of its costs and its failure to engage in the interdiction of supplies to the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Mr. Luttwak If I were a public official, I would have to dissemble. Yet, there appears to be some relevance to the idea that the contras can be used for interdiction. A Washington Post article reports that the contras destroyed a small port in Nicaragua that was used as an arms transfer point.

Amb. Strauss It appears to me that President Reagan's program does not seem to be very close to yours. What would you do if the President called you end and asked for your recommendations? What would you do in the real world, in a real policy environment?

Mr. Luttwak I would say that there is no point in doing the contra operations halfway. We are paying a high cost. We need to win. Mr. President you have engaged in this undertaking and you must seek to win. You should be prepared to use the Air Force. If the President had a chance to build his case he could have reached a point where pressure would have shown to the Nicaraguans the underlying dynamic of power.

Dr. Kissinger Your presentation has been both fascinating and helpful.

0385B
9/27/83

SUBJECT: Security Issues

PRESENTATION BY: Dr. Jiri Valenta (Woodrow Wilson Fellow, US Naval Postgraduate School)

DATE: September 21, 1983
TIME: 3:30 - 4:20
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Valenta discussed Soviet/Cuban objectives in and perceptions of the Caribbean Basin crisis and offered alternatives for US responses to Soviet actions. He noted that while in the past, Cuba and the Soviet Union disagreed on some foreign policy issues, they now share the objective of supporting anti-US trends in the Caribbean. To promote this goal, the Soviets take advantage of both US domestic debate on foreign policy and international crises in other parts of the world. There are, however, constraints on Soviet activities in the Caribbean which the US can use to its advantage.

NOTES:

Brady: Dr. Kissinger will be a few minutes late, but has asked us to welcome our speaker and to begin.

M. Hayes: Introduction of Dr. Valenta as an expert on Soviet foreign policy, particularly in Eastern Europe.

Valenta: I have for years specialized in Soviet military activities along the Soviet periphery, but since 1975 have also been studying Soviet military involvement in the Third World.

Let me say first that I do not believe Soviet/Cuban activity is the sole cause of the political unrest we are experiencing in the Caribbean Basin today. But I do believe this dimension of the problem is often overlooked. The truth is that there is Soviet involvement in the Caribbean Basin which presents a threat to US security.

To understand what is behind Soviet activities in the Caribbean, we need to look at the region not through Western eyes, but from a Soviet perspective, a Leninist perspective. You notice I use the term Leninist, not Marxist - Leninist. This is an important distinction. A Leninist regime is one which follows the broad Soviet dictates of socialism, not European Marxist philosophy.

While Leninists themselves mistakenly use the term Marxist - Leninist, the Soviets are very careful in what terms they use to describe various stages of political development. For example, they refer to Nicaragua and Grenada as "anti-imperialist" states or "popular democracies", indicating that they are still evolving toward Leninism.

In addition to the ideological objective of promoting the establishment of Leninist states in the Caribbean Basin, the Soviets have political and military objectives in the region. And the Cubans share these objectives. They have overcome past foreign policy disagreements with the Soviet Union and agree that the primary goals is to support "anti-imperialist" i.e., anti-US trends in the Caribbean.

In conceptualizing their strategy in the Caribbean, the Soviets distinguish four kinds of regimes:

- revolutionary client states, like Nicaragua and Grenada, which must be assisted with various types of Soviet aid;

- progressive capitalist states, like Mexico and Panama, which the Soviets view as independent and essentially anti-US in foreign policy matters;

--bourgeois liberal states, such as Costa Rica and Venezuela, which are perceived as more or less dependent on the US and where the Soviets use peaceful tactics to gain influence; and
--reactionary states, such as El Salvador, where the Soviets promote violent revolution.

The Soviet military objective is to secure military facilities and legitimize the Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean. This includes modernizing the armed forces of client states as they have improved the Cuban forces, which today are second only to those of the US in the hemisphere.

Tactics used to secure the military objective also include Soviet arms transfers to Nicaragua, which have fueled the arms race and, by introducing more sophisticated weapons, have destabilized the balance of power in Central America. Further, the Soviets may use Nicaragua as a training and transit center for guerrillas destined for other Latin countries.

There are limits on Soviet activities in the Caribbean. Geography is the most obvious: the Caribbean clearly is not one of their peripheral areas, but is part of the US periphery. The Soviets have acknowledged this by, for example, allowing US naval vessels to check the cargo of Soviet ships bound for Nicaragua this past summer. The Soviets have also recently said they will support Nicaragua only "politically", an important message for the US.

While the Soviets and Cubans do not control the activities of the Salvadoran guerrillas on the ground, they do provide strategic advice, particularly on timing. Since the Soviets are keen observers of the US domestic scene, it is reasonable to expect that within the next year, guerrilla offensives will be timed to affect the US electoral process. Indeed, Soviet support to guerrillas throughout Latin America may increase about the time of the 1984 elections. At any rate, the outcome of the US primary process will affect guerrilla activities.

Kissinger: In what way will the primaries have an effect?

Valenta: The Soviets are well aware that US public opinion is divided on Central America policy, and they will try to manipulate events to make it appear as though the guerrillas are defeating local forces and greater US involvement, a la Vietnam, is inevitable. If the President is reelected, the guerrillas may mount a new offensive after the election, as they tried to do in January 1981.

Strauss: Are you saying the Soviets will try to draw a Vietnam analogy for the US public?

[4]

Valenta: I think there is a certain analogy at least with regard to Soviet attempts to influence US elections.

Strauss: It's certainly true that the Soviets try to take advantage of every opportunity, including our electoral process, to advance their policy, but I'm not sure we can say what outcome they would prefer from the elections.

Valenta: Their perception of President Reagan is that he is an unpredictable hardliner.

At any rate in this regard I believe the 1984 elections campaign may signal a turning point for guerrilla movements in Central America. And when I say to expect a major offensive at some point, whether during the campaign or after the election, I mean something much bigger than the January 1981 offensive.

I should also note that I have seen a change in Soviet/Cuban behavior and rhetoric since the beginning of our Caribbean military/naval exercises. Cuba is pushing more forcefully and openly for negotiations on Central America. And the Soviets, who had previously been ambiguous about how much they would do to defend their interests in Central America, have now said they will support Nicaragua only politically. So I think the display of US military power has had an impact on their perceptions of our policy.

Clements: What do they mean when they say they will support Nicaragua only politically?

Valenta: They will use the UN and other diplomatic fora to make their case, as they did during the Falklands crisis.

Clements: Do they consider arms transfers to be a type of political support?

Kissinger: I think the message is that they will continue to provide supplies to Nicaragua, but they won't respond with military support if the US becomes involved militarily.

Valenta: That's right. What they are saying is that they won't undertake any significant military action.

Clements: I wouldn't expect them to do that at any rate, but they will do everything short of that.

Valenta: The question is not even so much what would the Soviets do as what would the Cubans do, and I think the Soviets would also restrain Cuban action.

[4]

Clements: I think the Cubans would consider any direct military involvement very carefully.

Valenta: In their consideration the Cubans would include as an important factor the likely US reaction, and they would predict that reaction to some extent based on what President they are facing.

Strauss: This Commission's recommendations must be operative for any President, regardless of party.

Kissinger: But it is fair to note that the Cubans will act or not depending on their assessment of the US response.

Clements: Would you agree that the US public looks at Cuba in one way and at Central America in an entirely different way?

Valenta: Yes, I would agree with that.

Strauss: I would also. I dare say the US public would sooner support an invasion of Cuba than of Nicaragua.

Valenta: I have been impressed by the US public's reaction to the KAL incident. Fifty percent believe our response should have been stronger.

Kissinger: You have said that the Soviet willingness to run risks in the Caribbean Basin may be more limited than in other areas. How can we create the kind of situation in which the Soviets will be forced to make the choice that the risk is unacceptable?

Valenta: We should establish clear limits on the kind of Soviet behavior we will tolerate in the Caribbean, making it clear, for example, that we will not accept the establishment of Soviet military and naval facilities, that we want an end to arms transfers. Also, we should expand our own presence in the region, particularly our naval presence.

In addition, while Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union share the goal of promoting anti-US trends in the region, there are differences among the three on tactics, and we should exploit these.

As long as the Cubans and Soviets accept our limits, we can deal with Caribbean problems by political and economic means. The main source of the problems is social and economic. At the same time, we must build domestic support for our policies.

Clements: Do you see any connection between Central America and what is happening in Lebanon?

**Valenta:** There is no proof, but in my opinion the Soviets have always viewed problems in global terms and have used opportunities created by our overriding concern with a crisis in one area to move in another. For example, the Soviets moved into Afghanistan when we were totally involved in Iran. In his memoirs, Khrushchev said they waited for a strategic opportunity to take action in Hungary in 1956, and the Suez crisis provided that opportunity.

**Clements:** My feeling is that there is some linkage.

**Kissinger:** The Soviets' policy is to create strategic conditions which will provide those opportunities. Another question: What if we set limits for Soviet behavior in the Caribbean and they were accepted. Do we then have a basis for co-existence with the Sandinistas, or will the Nicaraguan government remain a threat to other Central American countries?

**Valenta:** In my judgement, there is a congenital problem with the Sandinistas. Although it still may be possible to change their perceptions, it will be very difficult. I believe we have a better chance to change attitudes toward the US in Grenada and Suriname. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union now deals with Nicaragua on a party-to-party basis, indicating they consider the system there now to be at least semi-Leninist i.e., further down the road than in the other two client states.

**Walsh:** If we did set limits for Soviet behavior, would they accept them?

**Valenta:** Before the KAL incident, I would have said yes. Now, I am less sure because of the role the military has played in that incident. The editor of Pravda has publicly criticized the military for its handling of the crisis, reflecting both a difference of opinion within the government over how to respond to international criticism on the incident and a power struggle between the military and the civilians.

**Strauss:** I think it's clear that you can devise a strategy for dealing with Nicaragua if you are operating in isolation, but in the real world you need a policy that will not only be effective, but that will be supported by the US public. How do we define that kind of policy? I don't believe the American public will support an expansion of the US naval presence in the Caribbean, for example.

**Valenta:** I agree it is difficult now to get that kind of support, in part because we are still operating under a Vietnam syndrome, but this is where public diplomacy comes into play. We used to have a

foreign policy consensus in this country, and the
Administration is responsible for creating a new one
by explaining how US interests are at stake in the
Caribbean.

Kissinger: The task of the Commission, however, is to give our best recommendations for a policy. Then it becomes an Administration responsibility to decide which of our recommendations are realistic and how best to garner public support for them. One thing I have learned is that there is no reward for losing with moderation.

Valenta: When the time comes to make those recommendations, I would note that there is much more we could be doing in the political/economic field. For example, we should increase markedly the number of scholarships we provide to Central Americans. Now the Soviets provide more scholarships to just one country -- 35 in Panama -- than we do in the entire region. We need to make a bigger investment in the people of Central America.

Kissinger: I am convinced from what this Commission has heard and discussed so far that we will be able to devise a first-rate, creative program for economic and social support. The fundamental question I see now is how to relate that assistance to our security needs and those of the Central Americans. It is not sufficient to say that if the fundamental economic and social problems are solved, the security threat will take care of itself.

Thank you for coming, Dr. Valenta.

9/22/83

#5241N

SUBJECT: <u>Security Issues</u>: <u>Central American Militaries</u>

PRESENTATION BY: Dr. Richard Millett (Air War College)

DATE: September 21, 1983
TIME: 4:30 - 5:15
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Millett gave a brief overview of the military establishments in each of the Central American countries, noting particular problems in each country. The challenge is to convince the military that it does not have the option of allying itself with anachronistic, feudal elements of the right. The natural ally of the military is not the extreme right, but the military itself. Its basic interest is the survival of that institution. The military will not go out of politics; it dominates the structure. Talking too loudly about Soviet/Cuban responsibility for instability in the region absolves the military of responsibility. Talking too publicly about human rights convinces the military we seek its destruction.

The best one can hope for in Nicaragua is a country which has open borders and does attempt to subvert its neighbors. To achieve this goal will take the rest of this decade and call for continued economic and military support to Nicaragua's neighbors. It will take a worsening on Nicaragua's economy together with an improvement in its neighbors' economies. Any new government in Nicaragua as a result of military action would be perceived as a creation of the U.S. Guerrilla activity in the hills would continue indefinitely and could not be stabilized without U.S. bayonets.

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NOTES:

Millett: Intend to give brief country review of military establishments.

The *Panamanian* military faces a serious situation. Paredes has resigned and his supporters vanished. There is a bitter struggle between Col. Diaz-Herrera and Gen. Noriega, who seems to be winning. The scheduled elections are in doubt; uncertainty as to candidates. Noriega is a skillful manipulator.

Johnson: Is there no outside influence on events?

Millett: Basically. But the Cubans have threatened that they will no longer restrain the left. There is the perception that the U.S. is in Central America for the long term. Noriega is betting on the U.S., but he is hedging his bet.

Sumner: Noriega was the head of the intelligence section under Torrijos?

Millett: Yes.

In *Costa Rica* the military is extremely weak without a career army or officer corps. There are serious problems with communications, equipment, and transportation. It has a limited absorptive capacity. They are in need of significant U.S. assistance to enable them to secure their own territory without threatening their neighbors.

Silber: Isn't that a contradiction?

Millett: Yes. It is both a military and political problem.

*Honduras* faces a very serious security dilemma, but the situation is different from that in El Salvador and Guatemala in fundamental ways. The officers come from a wider social base and have supported moderate reforms. Officers have been tried, convicted and imprisoned for offenses. The air force is independent from the army. The army has a clear view of its mission as defending this country, which has been invaded more often than any other country in Latin America.

-3-

Kissinger: In Latin America?

Millett: Yes. The army believes it must have U.S. support to survive and has limited belief in our willingness to do so. They were at one time willing to invade Nicaragua because they thought we wanted them to do so. Training for the Salvadorans at the RMTC is an anomaly because they perceive El Salvador as a greater long-term threat than Nicaragua.

There are problems with absorption of U.S. aid, the limited size of the officer corps, and the danger of being converted into an instrument of U.S. policy. They need strong assurance of U.S. support in the face of an external threat.

Walsh: What about the letter to Reagan requesting $400 million in aid?

Millett: I have no information on the letter.

In El Salvador some segments of the officer corps are fighting to preserve the military; others are fighting to preserve the privileges of certain elements of the military. Loyalty to the tandas, the classes at the military, is paramount. It is difficult to get the officer corps to focus on the problem at hand rather than in-fighting among themselves. There are problems with morale and the high casualty rate. The army sees its own population as the enemy. There is no responsibility for actions taken by the officers. The population doesn't like the guerrillas or the army.

Guatemala is the toughest problem of all. The officer corps is tight knit, conservative, well-lead at the tactical level, and divided.

Kissinger: What about the social level of the officers?

Millett: Middle class and urban. Many are the sons of officers. They resent U.S. influence. The challenge is to break their alliance with the extreme right. Guerrilla activity is at a reduced level and restricted to two provinces. The army resents foreign domination. If the army can break its ties with the right, the U.S. can help. If the MLN comes to power, the game is over.

-4-

Nicaragua has a high defensive capability. It is increasingly politically indoctrinated and is benefitting from the contras' attacks. They are using second line troops from other areas against the contras to gain political benefits. An influential minority within the Sandinista leadership has a death wish and would like to see the U.S. intervene in order that they can fight U.S. imperialism. Others overestimate their ability to manipulate events in the U.S.

Pastora's movement is extremely premature and overestimates his ability to divide the Nicaraguan military.

We should not discount the Sandinista leadership's ability to support an uprising in Honduras.

**Kissinger:** What does democratization mean in these countries? How do you get there from her?

**Millett:** The entrenched right in Guatemala and El Salvador are the real enemies. The primary task is to demonstrate that the militaries do not have the option of allying with anachronistic, feudal elements.

**Kissinger:** A program of gradualism?

**Millett:** There are many intermediate steps. The military will not go out of politics; it is the dominant structure. They must understand that the most brutal are the enemies of the system. They must tolerate dissent. One must not talk too loudly about Soviet-Cuban responsibility. It is read by the entrenched right as absolving them of responsibility.

**Cisneros:** Is it possible to coexist with the Sandinistas over the long haul?

**Millett:** It is possible, but difficult. The ideologues would like to see U.S. intervention. The pragmatists want to preserve the Sandinista revolution. It would take a worsening of the Nicaraguan economy together with an improvement in the economies of its neighbors in order to give an incentive to modify their behavior. It will also require sharp defeats of Nicaraguan efforts to aid

-5-

insurgents in neighboring countries. The best one
can hope for is a Yugoslavia with open borders and
no attempts to subvert its neighbors.

Kissinger: How long will it take to modify their behavior?

Millett: It will require strong economic and military
support for Nicaragua's neighbors for the rest of
the decade.

Kissinger: Can the U.S. sustain such a policy for ten years?

Millett: While I am pessimistic, there is no viable option.

Brady: How do we do bring around the military in these
countries?

Millett: We must allay fears that the U.S. is out to do in
the system.

Kissinger: Is a certification of certain steps likely to be
counter-productive in Guatemala?

Millett: The more public things become, the less successful
they are likely to be. I am an advocate of human
rights, but if we push human rights too strongly,
we will drive the army to the right.

Kissinger: Can the war in El Salvador be won?

Millett: It can be kept from being lost. The alliance
between the military and the right is unnatural as
is that between the peasants and the student
guerrillas, and between the guerrillas and the
Social Democrats.

U.S. prestige is too much on the line in Central
America. It has been made too important. But if
we cannot prevent revolution here, the price will
be high elsewhere.

Diaz-Alejandro: What can be done in Nicaragua?

Millett: Things can be made more costly for the Nicaraguans
in political and economic terms. For example, the
U.S. could urge repatriation of the Miskito Indians
under UN supervision. Put them on the spot.

Kissinger: What is your judgment of the price to paid for a
military option in Nicaragua?

-6-

Millett: It would drive Costa Rica to the left and result in crises in Colombia and Mexico. Any new government in Managua would be seen as our creation; it would be difficult to stamp out guerrilla activity in the hills. There would be no way to stabilize a Nicaraguan government without U.S. bayonets.

Walsh: Is the price higher if Nicaragua is stabilized under our bayonets or Soviet-Cuban bayonets?

Millett: The price is higher if we do it.

Cisneros: Have you been to Nicaragua?

Millett: Over 17 times. I know every actor.

Cisneros: Is there popular support for the Sandinistas?

Millett: They are stronger in the urban areas. Nicaraguans are by nature skeptical towards all governments. But they hate intervention. The contras have strengthened the Sandinistas.

Kissinger: Would they win free elections?

Millett: With a plurality of perhaps 40 - 60 percent of the votes.

Walsh: Then why don't they hold elections?

Millett: Because they cannot admit that so many do not like them.

Kissinger: Thanks. Please submit your presentation and add recommendations and options. I hope you can come back so we can test your hypotheses.

5234N

-7-

SUMMATIONS BY DR. HAYES AND MR. TREVERTON

Dr. Hayes:

We are not yet at the critical point where "surgical"
removal of government is necessary. Change will call for
the investment of economic and military resources as well
as building common values. As to the question of investing
so much in Central America given the demands of competing
priorities, I do not believe that we are talking about so
much money.

It must be kept in mind that Congress objects toa negative
program, i.e. overthrowing governments or bolstering
governments whose objectives we do not share. But a
positive policy for Centarl America is within the realm of
possibility.

Mr. Treverton:

There are three themes:

-- This isn't Viet Nam. There are plenty of
viable options.

-- Can we manage the sophisticated policies
necessary? I am personally very skeptical.

-- What to do with the Sandinistas. Can we
separate support for the contras for their
purposes from support to them for our purposes?
What would be the aftermath of a fall of the
Sandinistas?

SUBJECT: Human Rights Situation in El Salvador

PRESENTATION BY: Dr. Jose Antonio Pastor Ridruejo (Special Rapporteur on El Salvador of the UN Human Rights Commission.)

DATE: September 22, 1983
TIME: 10:00 - 10:45
PLACE: Room 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Pastor Ridruejo, who visited El Salvador last week found a slight improvement in the human rights situation in El Salvador over last year. An Amnesty Law has been enacted and more than 500 political prisoners have been released. 550 guerrillas have availed themselves of the amnesty. A Human Rights Commission is promoting respect for human rights, with independence and credibility. While the concern of the Government of El Salvador for human rights is sincere, its ability to achieve the observance of human rights is questionable. The principal problems are the high number of assassinations, the inability of the judicial system to establish culpability and punish human rights violators, and the destruction of the Salvadoran economic infrastructure by terrorist activities. Laws must be updated, criminology techniques improved, and more and better qualified and more independent judges must be recruited. The difficulty of providing security for leftist candidates endangers the success of national elections planned for March, 1984.

NOTES:

Kissinger: Welcome. Dr. Jose Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, the Special Rapporteur on El Salvador of the UN Human Rights Commission, has just returned from El Salvador and is preparing a report on that country for the UN Human Rights Commission. He is a professor of the Autonomous University of Madrid, and represented Spain at the Law of the Sea Conference.

Pastor-Ridruejo: I wish to introduce Miss Kathryn Hinkle, an official of the UN Human Rights Center, who accompanied me on this mission.

I was first appointed Special Rapporteur on El Salvador by the UNHRC in 1981. At the 1983 Session of the UNHRC this mandate was renewed. Last week I spent six days in El Salvador, where I met displaced persons, visited military hospitals, saw the rural pacification process in St. Vicente, and met US military advisors at Ribera Seca.

The principal human rights problems in El Salvador are assassinations, the inability of the judicial system to investigate and punish human rights violations, and the destruction of the Salvadoran economic infrastructure by terrorist activities.

The estimated number of political assassinations of civilians varies by source. Roman Catholic Church figures are higher than the estimates of the Government of El Salvador, the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission and the American Embassy at San Salvador. This inconsistency makes estimation difficult. Common crime can be represented as political crime and vice versa. Combattant killings are not carefully distinguished from political killings.

As to whether the number of assassinations is stabilized or decreasing there is also diversity of opinion. The Church considers it to be stable. The American Embassy and the Human Rights Commission think it is decreasing. In any event, it continues to be too high. In my opinion, the army, the security forces and the death squads are responsible for the majority of assassinations. However, according to the testimony of guerrillas who have surrendered, the guerrillas also have some responsibility for assassinations.

- 2 -

The judiciary lacks mechanisms for investigating
crimes. They are hampered by threats, by the fact
that witnesses fear to testify, by the low number
of judges and the high number of offenses.

The Government of El Salvador has appointed a
commission to improve the judiciary. I am not
very optimistic about their immediate success. They
need a new law code, they need more and better judges,
and they need a better system of investigations.
Reform of the judiciary system is imperative.
Individuals who are unable to obtain justice from the
system take revenge into their own hands.

Another grave Salvadoran problem is the effect of
terrorism on the economic infrastructure of the
country. Guerrilla terrorism is directed not only
against the army but also against crops, roads, rail-
ways, buses, and electrical installations. This
worsens the economic situation. In my earlier reports
I said that this kind of terrorism violates important
economic and cultural rights of the people.

There have been reports of forced recruitment into
guerrilla ranks.

There is a slight improvement in the human rights
situation in El Salvador over last year. In May, 1983,
an amnesty law was enacted, making possible the libe-
ration of more than 500 political prisoners. 550
guerrillas chose to avail themselves of the amnesty.
Some of them have been admitted to foreign countries,
such as Canada, Australia and Belgium. The US intends
to take two hundred. The Government of El Salvador
has been facilitating their departure and providing
physical safety for those amnestied.

Prior to the enactment of the Amnesty Law, the Salvadoran
Human Rights Commission obtained the freedom of 51
political prisoners, and investigated reports of missing
persons. Their highly courageous investigation of the
massacre at Las Ojas last May is an indication of
their independence and credibility. They are effec-
tively promoting respect for human rights.

Another hopeful development is the dialogue the Peace
Commission has begun with the FDR and FMLN.

- 3 -

I think the concern of the Government of El Salvador for human rights is sincere. Its ability to achieve the observance of human rights is questionable.

Kissinger: Thank you for your balanced and thoughtful remarks. We would appreciate a copy of your text. Do you have statistics in support of some of your general statements, and if so could we have them?

Hinkle: Dr. Pastor did not develop any statistics of his own, but used statistics provided by the American Embassy.

Kissinger: I wonder if the situation in El Salvador is at all like the situation in Vietnam, where human rights violations on our side were easy to discover and to document, whereas on the guerrilla side of the line it was very difficult to get to know about them, much less to document them.

Pastor-Ridruejo: Yes. It was like that in El Salvador. It was difficult to discover human rights violations perpetrated by the guerrillas and to obtain documentation of them. With respect to assassinations it is very difficult to determine whether the security forces or the guerrillas are responsible.

Kissinger: Are they both after the same targets?

Silver: It would be to the advantage of guerrilla groups to assassinate members of the clergy in such a way as to make it look like the work of the other side.

Pastor-Ridruejo: If the victim was a member of the Government, his assassination was likely to be the work of the guerrillas. If the victim was an unknown person, it is difficult to determine who was responsible.

Kissinger: Do you have any ideas for improvement of the system of justice in El Salvador?

Pastor-Ridruejo: In general, the laws must be updated - not to an Anglo-Saxon system, but a Latin system. And all

- 4 -

processes must be reformed, especially an investi-
gative system depending on the judiciary rather
than on the government. Criminology techniques
must be improved. Also the judiciary needs more
and better qualified and more independent judges.
Witnesses' fear to testify must be dealt with.
However, I am not an expert on these things.

Diaz-
Alejandro: What is your opinion of the possibility of free elections this year? Is there too much fear for that?

Pastor-
Ridruejo : It is the government's intention to have elections in March, 1984. Nobody knows whether they will be legislative, municipal or presidential. It depends on constitutional provisions yet to be devised. However, the Board of Elections is preparing an electoral register. Participation of the left is crucial. The Government is ready to accept participation of the left. The problem is to guarantee the physical security of the candidates. The left says there are no facilities for the physical security of the lives of the candidates. I agree.

Dr. Walsh: Is there an alternative? Is it a good idea to have elections now?

Pastor-
Ridruejo : It is not so urgent to have elections now.

Kissinger: Is it conceivable to develop safety and procedures for elections now or is it culturally impossible?

Pastor-
Ridruejo : It is very difficult. I include in the left the FDR and the FMLN. The problem is to ascertain the amount of popular support that exists for the left.

Walsh: In the assessment of human rights violations it is easy to get a body count. But it is less easy to determine the importance of the destruction of economic infrastructure. Have you projected the ultimate loss of life by malnutrition because of harassment by guerrillas which prevents people going to market, working in the fields, and so on? Have you estimated the harm this does to the people?

- 5 -

Pastor-

Ridruejo: I place more importance on the destruction of human rights by the guerrillas. I say in my report that the taking of life and liberty is attributable for the most part to members of the army and the security forces. To some small part it is attributable to the guerrillas. The guerrillas are responsible for the economic destruction. I do not understand why the guerrillas attack the economy. Possibly this means they do not intend to win the war. If they win they would be faced with a country without a productive system.

Kissinger: Historically guerrillas aim to lower the standard of life and undermine confidence in the government. This is the traditional guerrilla tactic. They assassinate the best, not the worst officials, out of a vested interest in creating a sense of insecurity. To induce the people to accept anything to get peace, they wish to push the economic level so low as to make the margins insignificant.

Walsh: Did you ask the guerrillas about this? What response did you get?

Diaz-

Alejandro: Was there any evidence in their talk of an ideology like that in Kampuchea. Did they speak of introducing a different economic system?

Johnson: Was there any evidence that the guerrillas are interested in negotiating a compromise?

Pastor-

Ridruejo: Yes, they want dialogue and negotiation to follow. I don't know what their objectives are in this respect. I believe they want a regime like those in Nicaragua and Cuba. Yesterday I talked to a guerrilla and asked him, "Do you fear that if you win your country will be like Nicaragua and Cuba?" He said it would not be the same. "We might have a single party, but in El Salvador there will be many tendencies in the party. The international socialists will not accept us for that reason." This was an intellectual.

Clements: What kind?

- 6 -

[v]

Pastor-

Ridruejo: Lawyers, and engineers; members of FDR on the political side of things. The FMLN are peasants.

Clements: Where were they educated?

Pastor-

Ridruejo: I think in El Salvador. Perhaps even by some sectors of the Church.

Kissinger: Dr. Pastor Ridruejo's primary duty is not analysis of the guerrilla movement, but the human rights situation as it exists. We would appreciate your personal recommendations if you would send them to us, together with any observations you can make on the observance of human rights in the surrounding countries.

Pastor-

Ridruejo: That is outside my mandate. I will send you my report.

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: U.S. National Security Interests in the Caribbean
Basin

PRESENTATION BY: Col. Samuel T. Dickens, USAF (Ret.)

DATE: September 22, 1983
TIME: 3:45 - 4:45 p.m.
PLACE: Room 1105

SUMMARY:

Col. Dickens stated that the threat posed by Somoza's fall was predictable in 1979 and is clear now. He recalled the tools of the Inter-American system available to us, but unused, and analyzed U.S. Government actions which have eroded Latin American support for the United States and exacerbated the Caribbean Basin security situation. Col. Dickens summarized Soviet military involvement in Cuba and Nicaragua, including offensive weapons, and the constrictive effect it would have on U.S. deployments to NATO under the standard wartime scenarios. The prevalence of Marxists in Latin American universities and the large Soviet scholarship program were also emphasized, and Col. Dickens called for more U.S. scholarships.

Col. Dickens presented a prepared statement, a copy of which is attached. His oral remarks synopsized this written presentation. The session was chaired by Mr. Walsh in the absence of Dr. Kissinger, who joined during Col. Dickens' presentation.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-2-

Mr. Walsh: Welcome.

Gen. Sumner: Introduced Col. Dickens as expert on Central American security issues.

Col. Dickens: Many years of experience with the U.S. military overseas in Latin America and at home. Last assignment before retiring: 4 years as head of the Western Hemisphere policy staff to the Chief of Staff, USAF. Retired in 1979 as Somoza fell; have since worked to inform public of threat in Latin America.

When Somoza fell in 1979, we in Pentagon could predict what would happen with the Sandinistas. Now, their intentions are clear to anyone.

In starting to discuss Caribbean Basin security, I should refer to the collective security mechanism the Inter-American System offers us, based on the Rio Treaty. Some believe this treaty only covers aggression by a power alien to the hemisphere. Not true: the Rio Treaty was invoked in the Dominican Republic crisis and we received a lot of Western Hemisphere support, especially from Brazil and Argentina.

Two other key Inter-American system decisions we have not invoked:

- The Caracas Decision of Solidarity of 1954, condemning international Communist activity as an intervention in hemispheric affairs, following closely the ideas of the Monroe Doctrine; and

- The San Jose Declaration of 1960, which, in point 2, rejected Sino-Soviet attempts to exploit internal conditions of hemispheric states.

Why do we ignore these tools today?

A first real chink in hemispheric solidarity came in 1959 with Castro's ascent to power. Now, the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis was hailed as a victory -- removal of Soviet bombers, missiles, etc. But I see it as a fiasco, for the Kennedy-Khrushchev understandings obliged us to prevent *any* - not only a USG - invasion of Cuba, and we tipped Castro off to exile invaders, who he then beat up.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-3-

The feeling was that Cuba was no real strategic concern -- it was a backwater and we could take it anytime if necessary.

2 factors guide US action in Latin America:

- The US must play leadership role; and

- Latin countries worry about their neighbors, thus advocating self-determination for all and mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, so as not to upset domestic conditions.

The USSR probes American weaknesses constantly. Made evident by Soviet and Cuban surrogate involvement in Africa, and now by Soviet military involvement in Western Hemisphere. Each time the Soviets introduce a new military angle in Cuba -- be it bases, MiG-23's, combat troops -- the procedure is that the US addresses Castro to demand a change. Nothing ever changes, some euphemism is always found to call the offending Soviet presence "non-offensive." Certainly, the MiG-23's are more "offensive" than were the bombers of the early 60's, but they've remained. Also, we have virtually constant presence of Bear aircraft via back-to-back "temporary deployments."

In 1981, the USSR shipped Cuba 60,000 metric tons of military equipment, in 1982 68,000 tons, highest since missile crisis. That's a lot of material -- a MiG 23 weighs only 14 mt. You would expect the Soviets to give Cuba defensive items, but shipments now include offensive items -- Koni-class frigates, MiG-23's, helicopters, 650 tanks, SAM's, amphibious assault ships.

The Soviets are active elsewhere:

- Grenada: 10,000 foot runway (can accommodate arms flights from Libya), Soviet 4-star general as Ambassador.

- Nicaragua: expansion of numerous airfileds, obviously planned in advance.

- Guyana: Venezuelan aerial photographs show 10-15 6-8000 foot concrete runways on Brazil and Venezuela borders, with barracks, microwave facilities. For whom? Guyana has few aircraft. Will Cubans and Soviets use for missiles? guerrilla training? Nobody knows.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-4-

Runways in Nicaragua are the immediate, greatest concern. Only the US could take Nicaragua out now, but with all the pilots that have been sent to the USSR for training and planes available, overnight there could be squadrons of MiGs and Bear bombers in Nicaragua. Then what could the President say to the USSR? Remove them? This would be unlikely and we could do little to force their removal. One day, we're going to see those planes there.

Standard NATO scenario is attack by Soviets across European plains. What effect would Soviet action on Caribbean sealanes (through which vital shipments must move) have? Recall German depredations on WWII shipping. The Soviets are developing positions to allow them at least as much flexibility of operations.

Under the NATO scenario, F-5s and F-14s based in the U.S. southeast are to move to Europe. Will they be able to deploy given this Soviet threat? Castro will tie down these planes. We are told we can take Castro out and we probably can, but for how many critical days would this effort tie down these needed forces, causing havoc with our strategy?

The U.S. is the only country that can take out the Sandinistas. They know this, and have shown great concern. Just a year ago, when Sandinista fever over an alleged invasion plan was at its highest pitch, then-Assistant Secretary Enders offered the Nicaraguans a non-aggression treaty, in his San Francisco Commonwealth Club speech. This unprecedented and unwise offer met with no positive Nicaraguan response.

I was in El Salvador recently, and our aid is piddling -- I was ashamed when talking with the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Col. Bustillo. People here think we are giving a great amount; actually, El Salvador pays market rates for the samll amount we offer. Our security assistance methodology is unsuited for a crisis, it is a peacetime modus operandi.

We must face up to root problems. One of these is infiltration of Marxism-Leninism into Latin

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-5-

American universities, along with numerous
Soviet scholarships given over the last twenty
years. Creates a new leadership group imbued
with Communist teachings.

If we refuse to recognize the true situation,
all of Central America and Mexico will be in
Communist hands. The guerrillas know that the
war really will be won or lost in Washington,
and are very active here in propaganda, etc.
Privately, Latin leaders commend us for
forcefulness and desire more, but publicly they
cannot, for domestic political reasons,
advocate firmness.

Illegal immigration important, up 40% from the
first quarter of 1982 to the first quarter of
1983. Very possible the Soviets will achieve
goal of breaking up NATO via surrogates in
Central America, by creating a flood of
refugees. This will result in U.S. public
opinion forcing a redeployment of our armed
forces to our borders to stem this flow, making
it impossible to maintain the commitment of
forces upon which NATO depends.

Much rhetoric over solutions -- political and
military. Few go beyond rhetoric to analyze
what is being asked. When we look for a
peaceful solution, it is fine to talk with the
guerrillas to have them test themselves in the
democratic system; talk over powersharing,
which will lead to a guerrilla victory, is
wrong.

Those who criticize a military solution equate
it with carnage. In fact, protracted war is
the debilitating Communist strategy and leads
to greater suffering. A military victory in El
Salvador is necessary for a climate for a
lasting solution. No development, no
investment, with a continuing conflict.
Military victory is not the whole solution, but
a necessary factor.

Historical perspective: prior to WWII, U.S.
Introduced military groups into Latin America.
Then and during the war, we developed bilateral
agreements, training and supply relationships,
and great influence. In one year this was torn
apart by State Department careerists and
Congressional staffers. Pentagon officials

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-6-

were opposed to removing the MAAGs, but not at the senior levels. Limited groups were installed solely to manage our small security assistance programs. As Ambassador Shlaudeman cabled at the time, "seldom has a country unilaterally relinquished so much power so easily." This withdrawal told the Latins they were unimportant in our strategic calculus.

The situation further deteriorated during the Carter administration, when Latin America became an area for human rights experimentation. Human rights was used as a club, not the integral part of our policy it should be -- we alienated Brazil, among others, through this indiscriminate application of a harsh standard to Latin America.

Paternalism also characterized our policy -- "the Latin Americans 'do not need' advanced weapons." In fact, they could decide for themselves and did, going to the Europeans, who were happy to sell. Peru turned to the Soviets, giving us a problem we still have. The case in point was our blanket refusal to sell supersonic aircraft.

**Dr. Kissinger:** This demonstrates the nature of bureaucracy. I "approved" cutting the MAAGs -- actually, I had no idea I was doing so and would have disagreed had I known. But the defense budget is so huge that only issues DOD cannot agree upon internally even come to White House attention. The same was true with the supersonic aircraft sales policy. If you asked Presidents Nixon or Ford, neither would have any idea of the issue. Such decisions were reached at a lower level. In the Carter Administration, I believe they were referred to the White House level.

**Col. Dickens:** This demonstrates what a backwater Latin America was in our policy. The policy was extreme under Carter. Mexico wanted F-5s; we made an extraordinary effort to persuade them not even to make a formal request. When they finally did, our turndown was rough and they were very upset.

**Gen. Sumner:** Now, of course, we have sold the F-5s and the Mexicans cannot support, arm or maintain them, so they're a big problem.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-7-

Col. Dickens: During the Carter Administration, there was no presidential policy memo on Latin America, and it appeared we had ad hoc decisions. There had been a transition paper by Sol Linowitz and Robert Pastor. When we saw it at the Pentagon, there were several really bad proposals in it we grimaced over. It later transpired that this paper was in fact the road map to decisions made during the Carter administration.

One of the worst Carter initiatives was secret negotiations with the Soviets in Mexico City on reducing both countries' arms sales in the Western Hemisphere. DOD was not involved, nor our Latin allies. Talking with the Soviets on an area they had no business being involved in in the first place was a signal that they could freely increase their involvement -- it was one factor leading us to where we are today.

As an aside, on the proliferation of nuclear weapons: if our Latin American friends have confidence in our nuclear policy, they will entrust themselves to our nuclear umbrella. If they perceive vacillation, they will try to develop national nuclear capacities. This is what we see happening now with Argentina and Brazil.

Questions?

Mr. Walsh: Thank you very much. I just recall that, in Costa Rica, which some see as great hope of Central America, medical students must study and pass an exam in Marxism, then spend a year in a rural health program run by a Communist. This just shows how wrong assumptions about Latin America can be.

Mr. Stewart: Should we increase our scholarships to match the Soviet effort?

Col. Dickens: Yes. The USG should give more scholarships, and also private sources should be encouraged to participate.

Mr. Stewart: Would this suffice to combat the Soviet presence?

Col. Dickens: No, but it would be an important component of our policy.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-8-

Mr. Walsh: Should we reinstitute the MAAGs removed years ago?

Col. Dickens: This would be too difficult now -- circumstances have changed in intervening years both here and in Latin America. You will recall a recent NBC program which discussed the U.S. Army school in Panama and implied we had trained those who now lead coups in South America. It was such innuendo which contributed to ending the MAAG program, and it clearly is still alive.

Mr. Walsh: Again, thank you.

ARA/AND:LGRossin

9/25/83 632-3360 1759D

UNCLASSIFIED

COMMISSION MEMBERS
MR. NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. C. SNEPOS
GOV. WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR. CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR. WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR. LANE KIRKLAND
MR. RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR. JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB. ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR. WILLIAM B. WALSH
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB. HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

SESSION ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

SEPTEMBER 28 - 29, 1983

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28

10:00 - 10:30 Commission discussion of Central America trip

10:30 - 12:00 President Nixon

12:00 - 1:10 Overview by Lead Consultants

Ambassador Viron P. Vaky, Georgetown
University

Dr. Howard Wiarda, American Enterprise
Institute

1:10 - 2:30 LUNCH BREAK (No lunch will be served)

2:30 - 3:30 Political Systems

Dr. Roland Ebel, Tulane University

3:30 - 4:30 Civil-Military Relations

Dr. Ronald McDonald, Syracuse University

4:30 - 4:40 BREAK

4:40 - 5:40 U.S. Policies Toward Nicaragua and El Salvador

Dr. William LeoGrande, American University

SENIOR COUNSELLORS
REP. MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN. LLOYD BENTSEN
REP. WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN. PETER V. DOMENICI
SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON
REP. JACK F. KEMP
AMB. JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR. WINSTON LORD
SEN. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR. WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP. JAMES C. WRIGHT

2201 C STREET NW, ROOM 1004 WASHINGTON D.C. 20520 TEL. (202) 632-7804

-2-

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 29

10:00 - 11:00
**Democratic and Humanitarian Diplomacy**
Dr. Tom Farer, Woodrow Wilson Center

11:00 - 12:00
**The Relevance of Democracy**
Dr. Allen Weinstein, The Democracy Program

12:00 - 12:10
**SANDWICH BREAK**

12:10 - 1:00
**Consultants' Wrap-up and Recommendations**

1:00 - 2:00
**Human Rights**
Mr. Aryeh Neier and associates, Americas Watch

2:00 - 3:00
**Human Rights**
Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

3:00 - 3:10
**BREAK**

3:10 - 4:10
**U.S. Policies Toward Nicaragua and El Salvador**
Mr. Bruce McColm, Freedom House

4:10 - 4:45
**Human Rights**
Mr. Mark Benenson, Attorney, New York City

0350B:GMS/bjr

09/27/83:6:45pm

Notes of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

Witness: Dr. Howard Wiarda, AEI
Ambassador Viron Vaky, Georgetown University

DATE: September 29, 1983
TIME: 12:10-1:10
PLACE: Rm 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Wiarda articulated the realities facing Central America and in the United States, posed a model and policy options. Ambassador Vaky outlined conceptual guidelines and described a pattern of assistance.

NOTES:

Wiarda:

Variety of realities we must deal with. Including: a fragmented political system in US which makes it difficult to carry out foreign policy. Also, Central American countries are more independent and assertive than twenty year ago; US is more dependent on trade, manufactured goods; rapidly changing structures in Central America and new political and social movements undermining legitimacy. Also, countries are experimenting, searching for development models; nontraditional issues are discussed such as narcotics, immigration, human rights, etc. All this means complex process of how to conduct business.

Policy options include: hands off policy, beniegn neglect, active engagement in democratic developmentalism, pro-consularism, where US takes over and runs country, or gunboat diplomacy.

Engagement in democratic developmentalism is dictated by prudence and need for US restraint, requires greater US understanding of area. Metaphor: US is locomotive to restore economic stability. Heart of crises is economic crisis and more importantly, prohibited stability. Must address economic issues due to negative

growth that is undermining able political leaders
and is increasing societal tensions.

Formal paper gives matrix of model. Includes:
political component & US role to encourage demo-
cratic developmentalism but more restained than
previously treated; human rights where the US
should be beacon but balanced approach taking
into accout security interests; military where
the US should not have allusion that we can
create nonpoliticized military. US can help with
aid and training. Social sphere where US
can help through Peace Corps and people to
people programs; economic to re-
store legitimacy and capacity to gain access to
sales in US; cultural programs to promote demo-
cratic values and training.

Conclusion: model needs context. US can play a
leadership role but with greater restraints.

Vaky:

Conceptual guidelines: how to best use power?
Also, need to define goals that will not limit
effectiveness. Need to be more precise, cost of
options. Also, support for political, economic
and social objectives must have domestic support.
Finally, social justice and equity and open
regimes is essential for security interests.

Essential question on how best to use power
relates to the kind of hegemony acceptable.
Bilateral mode may result in overextension and
this could create nationalism backlash. US
may want to support multilateral regional and
shared hegemony.

Pattern of this model may involve economic dev-
elopment and utilization of financial institu-
tions, World Bank, as major vehicle. Economic
policy must be consultative process along lines
of Alliance for Progress and Marshall Plan.
Institutional cooperative consultation needed to
decide what is democratic process. Under aegis
of OAS? Human rights important but too difficult
under bilateral mode. Need ad hoc human rights
groups. Need to set up collection security and
conflict resolution process for regional mech-
anism, possibly through Inter-American system

or even Contadora group. Mechanisms can be
used to lower temperature; verification, etc.

Kissinger: Need to compile list of all recommendations and have meetings on them.

One problem, issue may have Superpower implications although not perceived as Superpower. Also, multilateral effort is one way to handle hegemony, but if consultations don't work, how to balance? At what point do we decide to take action?

Brady: Theoretically, couldn't we have large bilateral fund and make countries contest for use? Criteria could include strong judicial systems, etc?

Vaky: Difficulty in mixing development funds with non-economic issues.

Strauss: We should ask consultants to get together and talk through issues, let them boil them down.

Silber: Specific recommendations on how to influence revolutions, to assist needed revolutions?

Vaky: Can't predict outcome.

Wiarda: Need to review Atlantic Council report.

SUMMARY:

Dr. Howard Wiarda, American Enterprise Institute
Ambassador Viron Vaky

September 29, 1983

Dr. Wiarda reviewed the current realities facing the US and Central American countries and concluded that our model must take into account these realities. He recommended following the policy option of active engagement in democratic developmentalism. His matrix model includes a political, military, economic, human rights, social and cultural component.

Ambassador Vaky outlined conceptual guidelines to address the question of how best to use power. He recommends a multilateral approach including economic development, institutional cooperative consultations, human rights, collective security and conflict resolution through regional mechanisms.

Witness:
Dr. Robert H. Ebel, Tulane University
Dr. Ronald H. McDonald, Syracuse University

DATE: September 28, 1983
TIME: 2:30-4:30
PLACE: Rm 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Ebel discussed the structural changes in Central America and the implications for American policy. He discussed the breakdown of the socio-political system and the city-state, a polity where elements of modern life are in the capital city. He offered various recommendations on how to protect the city state and concluded that US policy needs to distinguish short, medium and long term external/internal pressures that impact on security interests.

Dr. McDonald identified misconceptions of US perceptions of Central America and concluded from his analysis that US policy can, at best, hope to moderate the radical insurgents since a victory is inevitable.

NOTES:

Ebel:

Structural changes in political systems in Central America have implications for US. Need to explore nature of breakdown. Central American polity described as concentrating elements of modern life in capital city or tied closely to it. Characteristics include bulk of industry, societies with dual economies in geographic sense and culturally and socially modernized population. Also, urban centers protected masses and demands by armed forces.

Multinational corporations tied city-states to US. Finally, modernized urban core paradox of stability and instability with strikes and resistance to social and economic change.

Variety of mechanisms to achieve stability, including licensed political parties, limited opposition with minority status, payoffs

to middle and upper sectors in exchange for political quiescence. Military populism & democratic reformism are others. Somewhat successful. Negative results: increased alienation; accellerated mobilization into radical groups, etc. System lost viability. Trade union organization and militancy were natural consequences. Walling off modern urban centers from countryside failed to create electoral base large enough to create electoral base.

Future: replacement of city state by nation state or city state will become fully developed garrison state. US policy oriented to saving city state. Implications include protecting city state but can not over long term due to eroding structure. Second, defeat insurgent movements but this isn't enough to save city state. Third, economic growth in urban centers not enough to help majority. Must be prepared for shake-up of political structures.

In El Salvador, US should protect city state up to elections, although we should be prepared for power sharing formula. In Honduras, continue to supply military for security needs and continue to seek regional settlement. In Guatemala, regime must promise fair elections. City state now can't survive social changes and a new sociological basis for democracy may be created in new social structure. Conclusion: policy needs to distinguish short and long term requirements, and help Americans understand policy.

McDonald: Different personal political affiliations over twenty years.

* Military solution in El Salvador not permanent. What after 'fight'? At what cost? Domestic political impact?

Nature of Salvadoran military not professional military but new social economic class. Political instability not caused by poverty but process of modernization. US policy had enormous opportunity and leverage. US should listen to Contadora group.

Misconceptions wide-ranging. 1)professionalism of military corps leading to greater polarization of military and civic spheres not true. New class

not ties to upper class; they protect themselves
and build coalitions. 2)without outside
assistance there would be no guerrilla movement.
Not true. Insurgents robbed banks, extort land,
etc. Outside arms are received, but open market
where anything is available. 3)we distinguish
between military and civil regimes is not important
question. Who controls whom is important.

Kissinger: "No military solution to civil war" slogan is not true if Communists win and the conclusion is therefore irreversible.

Your point is: insurgents bound to win on current
course. Policy option to US is to improve relation
with insurgents and not to push them to greater
radicalization. Must create US policy for
flexibility to moderate insurgents. Mexicans
cynical and North Americans must judge intents by
statements.

Walsh: Nicaragua a military solution?

McDonald: Yes.

Walsh: Let insurgents shoot way into government? Confusing argument.

Kissinger: Difficult to accept that only role for US is to
moderate Marxist groups. China twenty years ago;
could not have supported Communists as being in
best interest of US. Why now?

Ebel: We are pushing Sandinistas into less pluralism.
Short time, nations can be protected. Over time,
must work out own destiny.

Silber: Criteria for pluralism in Nicaragua is not just
election that allows consolidation of party
in power. Your analysis indicates that military
solution can only occur if you want Himmler
running country. Not pluralistic.

Wiarda: McDonald's point is that military incapable of
solving problems. Unrealistic that turning people
into professional military will help.

SUBJECT: **Social Development: Population Issues**

PRESENTATION BY: **Dr. Tom Farer, Woodrow Wilson Center**

DATE: September 29, 1983
TIME: 9:30 - 10:30
PLACE: Room 1105

SUMMARY:

Dr. Farer said that our principal goal in Central America is to ensure that the region does not come under Soviet domination. He suggested the Finlandization of Central America as a simple way to achieve that aim. The President should declare that it would be unacceptable to the US for any country in the Caribbean Basin to have a military relationship with an extra hemispheric power. We could enforce such a policy, but it would not be necessary to do so. The declaration itself would be a deterrent, backed up by the political, diplomatic, economic and military power of the US.

Dr. Farer said revolution is inevitable in Latin America. Our second aim, the achievement of major social reform and authentic democratic regimes in Central America, can be fostered by skillful diplomacy, using the threat of leftist terrorism to induce the right to limit its human rights excesses. We can link the provision of economic aid and investment to the adoption of more enlightened social and political policies.

NOTES:

**Vakey:** Dr. Farer is presently with the Woodrow Wilson Center. He is a former member of the OAS Human Rights Commission, and was Commission Chairman from 1980-1982. He has had practical experience in the Department of State as Special Assistant to Bill Rogers when he was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

**Farer:** To reconcile the goals of human rights and democracy with the need for security is a difficult task. The obstacles to these goals in our context are the political, social and economic realities of Central America.

Costa Rica is and remains a democracy because of the absence of highly concentrated land ownership and a highly organized officer corps. In 1948 they recognized that the only real function of an army in Central America is to foster middle class mobility and to repress challenges to wealth and power. At the present time Costa Rica is experiencing difficulties. Their financial condition is grave. However, it cannot be said that this reflects a lack of concern for the impact of their financial policies on ordinary people.

Nicaragua has every ugly feature of the generality of Central American countries: a heavy concentration of land ownership, political processes designed to hide the true system of government, and the use of the military to guarantee the status quo. In Nicaragua the Somoza family ran a system that was seen as government by theft. By the time he fled, Somoza controlled companies producing 25% of the national product. Other factions in Nicaragua either collaborated with him or tolerated his activities, thereby lending credibility to the electoral farce. While the economy grew in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was concentrated in Somoza's hands. The Somozas ruled with their civilian retainers and the National Guard, which gave its loyalty to Somoza himself.

The OAS Human Rights Commission made a report to the General Assembly of the OAS on all aspects of the revolution one year after Somoza's departure. In 1982 the Subcommission visited Nicaragua to report on the Miskitos. This report is confidential, but I will be pleased to answer questions on the subject after my presentation.

The Sandinists wish to preserve a private sector because they recognize a need for management and

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enterpreneurial skills. However, they experience some difficulty in maintaining this stance while condemning capitalism.

The junta is extremely inexperienced. Their perception of the US is personified by former ambassadors friendly to Somoza and American officers who provided technical assistance to Somoza's goons. These factors color their view of the US and of Cuba. They have a naive conception of Marxism, although they begin to understand that the US is not a monolith.

Nicaragua had different agricultural arrangements from those traditional to Cuba. In Nicaragua, even the peasants on large estates had their own small land holdings, and they hoped for more after the revolution. The Sandinists refused to countenance minifundia as too small to be economic. Inflation and their policy of lowering the price of food, which was produced by these small holders, worsened the small holders' living standards. This made it possible for the Contras to recruit the small holders into their forces.

The idea of land reform seems to be growing in Nicaragua now. It will create an obstacle to Marxist development. When I last visited Nicaragua the country was very accessible. The political, social and economic systems were still in flux.

The Sandinists intend to heighten political participation and thereby to facilitate the perpetuation of their regime. However, a mobilized, politicized electorate will not perpetuate their regime. There is in Nicaragua disparity of political ambitions and a semi-autarchic economy. Our economic sanctions deprive the economy of essential goods except those the regime controls. This facilitates the mobilization of the people.

However, it is erroneous to subscribe to pessimistic assumptions concerning the ability of stable authoritarian regimes to perpetuate themselves.

An example is El Salvador, where the intense concentration of land holding led to extreme poverty for most of its people. Three months after Somoza's regime collapsed, Salvadoran army officers led their revolt and announced land reform. The force behind the Salvadoran coup was fear that what happened in Nicaragua could happen there. They hoped that land reform, together with the nationalization of finance and export, would break the political power of the oligarchy and appease the US, and also preserve the

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military as a self perpetuating force.

Since 1979 there has been some dissillusionment.
The tension between the utility of reform versus
massacre as a means of maintaining power is still
unresolved. The diminished momentum or reform coincides with heightened terror.

There is a dilemma insofar as systems of reform are
advocated only in response to a threat to the survival of the status quo. By guaranteeing the survival of the regime, we remove their reasons for affecting reforms.

We could try to inculcate democratic values in our
officer training program. During the Kennedy Administration the Alliance for Progress tried to encourage Latin Governments to reform themselves. It was later decided that the inculcation of democratic values was not a priority. Furthermore there is an instinct among Latin American military officers which sees Communists behind every effort to question the status quo, and to them national security considerations justify the elimination of every threat. As objectives become more incongruent with theory, the status quo and survival become more important.

Can external forces be blamed for Central American problems? I believe they played an important role. For the twenty years ending in the early 70s there was sustained high growth in Central American economies. The resulting wealth was largely transported to Miami and Geneva, but it did help the middle classes. The net effect on the poorer 50-80% of the populace varies from hardship to deprivation by reason of the resultant inflation and the rapid growth of machinery and wages as opposed to tenant farming. When the international economy penetrates a country, the government makes extra legal land seizures, the traditional patterns of the peasants are disturbed and the middle classes expand. This kind of growth is destabilizing and it generates opposition.

The spread of humanitarian ideas develops as an alternative to Marxism. It creates class requisites for the building of democracy, within obsolete anti-democratic forms. We must present the idea of alternative changes or be defeated. Alternatives as a lever to be used against the authoritarian right.

Stewart: We were told that in El Salvador army officers are mainly drawn from humble origins, and achieve social mobility in the army. Is that true of other Latin

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American countries?

Farer:
It is true of most of Latin America. I am not aware
of any Latin American country that has an officer
corps drawn from the upper class. In Argentina it
is only the middle-middle class. They are not humble
by the standards of the country.

Scammon:
That is not uncommon in the US, if you look at your
college friends who became important in the Army -
like Eisenhower.

Johnson:
Do you think Nicaragua is unlikely to get as closely
allied to the Soviet Union as Cuba is? Do you think
we should maintain rapport with Nicaragua?

Farer:
A low cost way to preserve the national security interest
of the US would be the Finlandization of Latin America.
The means to do so would be to make it clear we will
not tolerate military ties with extra hemisphere coun-
tries; no bases, no monitoring stations and no training
cadres that could be put to other purposes. We can
enforce such a policy. Stating the policy is a
deterrent. And it can be backed up by the use of
political, diplomatic, economic and military power.

Should we be concerned with the internal affairs of
these countries? No. Not on national security grounds.
Maybe on other grounds. If we are promoting human
rights we will be concerned.

Dias
Alejandro:

Central Americans are not Finns. Traditionally their
guerrillas see the US as the enemy. Internationalist
revolutionaries are the tradition. They feel towards
the US as the Poles feel towards the Soviets. Next
day we would have to contend with Mexico. Revenge
would be exacted for the killing of Sandino.

Farer:

The behaviour of the Sandinists after they won the
revolution was irrational. They should not have identi-
fied themselves with the Soviet zone of influence,
since they are situated in the US zone of influence.

These countries do need revolutions. But what kind?
They do not want continued centralization of power in
new hands.

Our principal concern is with their military relations
with the USSR and Cuba. Also we must insist that they
may not provide military assistance to guerrilla groups.
It would be alright for them to grant asylum. Modest
shipments of arms and advice would be acceptable; but

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not large scale shipments of arms which could tip
the scales.

Dias

Alejandro:

What about the psychological effect of an apparently
irreversible tide of revolution?

Farer:

In South America they have institutionalized terrorism
of the right. Initial military victory buoys adherents
elsewhere.

We can live with this if we have a policy of also taking
an active interest in managing the revolutions which
will occur, because the crust is obsolete. Revolution
can be delayed but is inevitable. We can use economic
analysis. How much should we invest in Latin America?
Should we cut and run or stay? This is not a shrewd
set of alternatives. But how can we invest in limited
alternatives? By hanging tough we can occupy all Central
America. We can win outright a military victory. But
is it in our interest to do so?

What do we want to achieve? Beating the Marxists is
not an adequate goal. Our minimum goal is to make
sure that the region does not come under Soviet domina-
tion. The maximum goal includes major social reform;
an authentic democratic regime.

Strauss:

How would you accomplish the first goal easily, and
how would you accomplish the second, more significant
goal?

Farer:

The President should make a pronouncement and say it
would be unacceptable to the US for any country in
the Caribbean basin to have a military relationship
with an extra hemispheric power.

Walsh:

The Monroe Doctrine in modern dress.

Farer:

This would not be enforceable in Argentina and Brazil.

Silber:

Would you include Cuba?

Farer:

Everything but Cuba; because we can't make it stick
there.

We can decouple Cuba from the Soviet bloc. Once that
is done it too comes under our policy.

We should start with a declaration. Try to get an
OAS resolution to that effect; if not, make a simple
declaration. Say we are prepared to use all the
weight of US political, economic and diplomatic force.
The only possible justification to counter this is

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fear of the US, and part of our declaration should
be an avowal of our respect for international boun-
daries and a statement that we would not seek to
alter the existing political arrangements in other
countries. We distinguish between negative sanctions
and positive sanctions. We won't reward unless internal
policies are consistent with our values.

Will Congress agree to positive incentives like trade
advantages, etc? There might be a country that would
challenge us. Nicaragua may be doing so. My sources
say that Nicaragua is encouraged by Cuba and the USSR.
They might enter an agreement with us to back off from
an intent to grant a base to the USSR. I think we are
in a position to enter an agreement if Nicaragua con-
cedes that it cannot enter military relations with
Cuba and the USSR. A demonstrative policy doesn't take
more than one case.

To what extent do we want to influence internal affairs?
Our national values of open democracy, cherished by the
American people, would encourage us to do so. Money
and investment can be extended.

If you want a democratic regime in El Salvador and in
Guatemala you must use the threat of leftist guerrillas
to challenge the government's right to maintain the
status quo, which is increasingly totalitarian. In a
time of economic growth it is harder to maintain the
status quo. This induces the military to penetrate
deeper into society - to suppress trade unions, grass
roots political parties and other political movements,
such as church sponsored groups. The right wing becomes
totalitarian because of the difficulty of maintaining
the status quo.

This means telling the right we don't guarantee their
survival, but we want them to take the following steps.
This is intervention. We use their fear of guerrillas.
We cannot use that fear if we guarantee their survival.

Stewart: We're told this is the age of dichotomy?

Silber: The use of the left to break down the right. Coherence and consistency would be broken if we aided Ungo and Zamorro to strengthen their influence, unless the Government of El Salvador enables them to participate.

What if we said the same thing to the Nicaraguan Gov-
ernment about Pastora, and stopped support for the
Contras to be consistent with our policy in El Salvador?

Farer: If the only objective were military security. If there
are larger objectives. Take up the point about using

SUMMARY

Q's and A's from appearance of Dr. Alan Weinstein before the
NBCCA, Thursday, September 29, 1983.

Kissinger: Historically, democratization has taken time. How do you relate the creation of democratic institutions to the immediate security problems in Central America. Some have suggested that we should support only democratic regimes. Do you agree with this view? What criteria do we use to judge whether a government is making progress toward democracy?

Weinstein: I think drawing sharp distinctions between democratic regimes and dictatorships begs the question in Central America. Let me say first that I will speak now not on behalf of the Democracy Project board, but personally. I disagree with Farer, for example. After listening for hours to both Calera and Robelo, I can't see a difference in their visions for Nicaragua. I would stress that there is still a very strong democratic opposition inside that country, including the head of the human rights groups, Pedro Chamorro, and the heads of the political parties who are working in a multi-party alliance.

My message to you is that there are people still within Nicaragua who are doing work and who want to meet with the Commissioners when you make your trip. This is not true only of Nicaragua, incidentally; the democratic forces in Guatemala are also anxious to speak with the Commission. The fact is, however, that the opposition under right-wing dictatorships has greater access to the US media than the democratic opposition in Nicaragua.

At the meeting of Christian Democratic leaders which I attended in Costa Rica, the participants tried hard to create a consensus on US involvement in Central America. There were many private comments critical of our military and naval maneuvers, but the group was basically pro-US and and in the final resolution, which was made public, they removed a reference that would have equated the interference of both super powers. They also announced their decision to hold their next meeting in Nicaragua, although they feel certain the GRN will reject that idea. The CD's were also more concerned about overt US military intervention than covert aid.