AMERICAN INTERESTS SHOW NO. 948

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NARRATOR: In the waters of the Persian Gulf, and in the deserts of Saudi Arabia, war is in the air. The American-led build-up of Western and Arab military forces nears completion, while Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein holds tightly on to Kuwait behind a desert shield of his own. Western hostages he's moved to potential military targets to discourage attacks.

As the Midcast crisis enters its fourth week, analysts are asking just what is the American mission in the Gulf? Could George Bush declare victory if, feeling the pinch of the economic blockade, Iraq withdraws from Kuwait under diplomatic covers, and restores, in some form, Kuwait's former government? That scenario would leave Saddam Hussein in control of Iraq with an arsenal of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles ready to strike again at the next opportunity.

Must Saddam Hussein be destroyed for America's Gulf intervention to be a success? From Washington, this is AMERICAN INTERESTS.

Major funding for AMERICAN INTERESTS is provided by Maytag Corporation, a family of companies continuing the quality tradition in home appliances and vending products throughout the world. Additional funding is provided by these foundations.

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NARRATOR: Joining us is Henry Kissinger, former national security adviser and secretary of state. Dr. Kissinger has come out in favor of a U.S. military strike to destroy Saddam Hussein's military machine.

MORTON KONDRACKE: Welcome to AMERICAN INTERESTS. I'm Morton Kondracke. Dr. Kissinger, The New York Times said that you were a hasty hawk because you seemed in a Op Ed piece to want to bomb Iraq soon. Aren't you being hasty in not giving diplomacy a chance?

HENRY KISSINGER: My point was not that we should bomb Iraq soon. I said the scale of our deployment requires us now to succeed. I also agree with the scale of our deployment, so this is not meant as a criticism of the Administration. I don't know whether sanctions can work fast enough, or whether we can hold the requisite number of countries together during the sanctions.

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If there is any chance that the sanctions should not work, then I would prefer to take other measures. The thing we cannot afford is that the Iraqi army stays in Kuwait, the U.S. forces stay in Saudi Arabia for an indefinite period of time. We cannot afford a long stalemate. It will overthrow the Arab countries that are associated with us. It will be difficult to hold our allies together when the oil—if an oil shortage should occur. And I don't know whether we can hold American public support through a long hostage crisis and through a prolonged stalemate. So in that case, I would prefer to use other measures—to bomb, if necessary.

There's a second problem. I do not think it would be a brilliant outcome if Saddam Hussein comes out of this crisis with a status quo ante. And I would think it would be better for his neighbors and for the peace of the area, if, at the end of this crisis, the military capacity of Saddam Hussein and of Iraq were reduced.

So it's for these reasons that I think that option should be considered. But I'm not saying it should be done quickly.

MR. KONDRACKE: The president is in favor of the status quo ante. He's set the terms for American involvement there as being—

DR. KISSINGER: That's right. The president has stated that Iraq has to withdraw from Kuwait, and that the legitimate government of Kuwait should be restored. And if that should be offered to us, I believe we probably have no choice except to accept it, and to hope that the humiliation will be so great for Iraq that it would bring about a change in the attitudes.

I don't think the president can ask for more than he has. But still, I do not believe it would be a brilliant outcome, but it would be, nevertheless, a great achievement for the administration.

MR. KONDRACKE: Wouldn't we be better off if we struck early, and on our terms, rather than responding, say, to a Scud missile attack on our forces?

DR. KISSINGER: But the danger of waiting too long is that sooner or later pressures will develop to keep us from doing what, in my view, we will have to do, unless Iraq begins to withdraw soon, and

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I think this is the major consideration. If Iraq were foolish enough to launch a Scud attack, then all bets would be off and we could even raise our political terms very easily, and I don't think they'd be foolish enough to do that. And I wouldn't mind waiting for that. But there is a limit beyond which we cannot wait. There is a limit beyond which the normal inquisition by the media of what the purpose is--the endless reassurances that are required, the nervousness that will develop if an oil shortage should occur, and all the attendant excitement when you see ships following tankers through the Gulf-all of this can, in my view, not be sustained for many months without beginning an erosion of international, and to, some extent, domestic support, and this is what the president really has to weigh.

And I think what he probably has in mind--and I can speak, not knowing what he has in mind--he must have in mind that he wants to get enough forces into Saudi Arabia to prevent an Iraqi attack, in case he should do--in case we should start attacking their military installations. And I think that's reasonable. He just has to balance psychological against military factors.

MR. KONDRACKE: You think he does have in mind to launch an air attack against the Iraqi military machine?

DR. KISSINGER: I would say one has to make a big distinction between Iraq and Vietnam. Vietnam was a guerilla war. This is a normal war. Vietnam had a powerful, adjoining neighbor that had supply lines open. Vietnam had a superpower as a military supplier. None of this exists in Iraq. There's no jungle. There's no powerful neighbor. All the neighbors of Iraq are hostile to it, with the possible exception of Jordan.

And if Iraq should be on the verge of losing its military capacity, it would be another oil rich, desert country surrounded by hostile neighbors, and in a country that depends for domestic control on its military machine, I do not believe the leadership will--the Iraqi leadership will risk that.

MR. KONDRACKE: You are making a strong case for an attack to destroy his military, are you not?

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DR. KISSINGER: I think there is a strong military argument for destroying his military. There is, however, a good reason why--there's (inaudible) military reason to wait until we have what is necessary in place, and I understand that the president will want to balance the requirements of the international consensus against the local situation.

MR. KONDRACKE: But if the phone rang right now and it were George Bush at the other end of the line and he said, what should I do, what would you tell him?

DR. KISSINGER: I would tell him what I told you. I would tell him that these are the elements you have to weigh. Now you have to tell me whether you think the sanctions can work. If he were to tell me the sanctions can work, I would tell him wait. If he tells me it's 50-50, I would tell him you better think of the military options.

MR. KONDRACKE: Do you think the sanction can work?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know enough of what supplies they have. What will make the sanctions work is not the inability of Iraq to export oil but the inability of Iraq to import food and other essentials and whether the United States is the ideal country to watch starvation develop under its aegis. I do not know.

MR. KONDRACKE: How long do you think we should persist in the diplomatic and economic squeeze that's going on before we decide that this is not working, and we've got to do something militarily?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I would count it in weeks rather than in months.

MR. KONDRACKE: So, six weeks from now? Three weeks from now?

DR. KISSINGER: It really would depend on an answer to the questions I put before, about how we think the blockade is working. I would think weeks. I would not like this crisis to be in its present shape by the end of this year.

MR. KONDRACKE: It would seem that one of the arguments in favor of taking military action

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soon, that you've made, is that a long, drawn-out stalemate would gradually deteriorate in the United
States--support for the operation would deteriorate. Now, is this a sound judgment? I know that it's based
probably on your experience with Vietnam, but the United States did spend five years in Vietnam before
the Nixon administration even arrived on the scene, and then four years thereafter. We've spent 45 years
in NATO sitting in Europe with troops and spending lots of money. I mean, don't you underestimate the
tenacity of the American people?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the European situation is not comparable at all, because there were no
risks involved. There was a long tradition, at least a tradition established in two world wars, of the vital
importance of Europe. I don't believe it is just the American people that will—that will fall away. In fact
the American people, as you pointed out, even in Vietnam, was very sturdy. But if you watch the talk
shows every Sunday, and the questions that people like you must ask, all of which have to be probing, and
all of which will elicit answers that will appear inconclusive the longer the stalemate lasts, that must—and
then when congressional investigations start, that will mean that there will be very— increasingly few
arguments for success, and increasingly strong arguments that indicate at least a stalemate, which indeed
will have happened.

Secondly, it's one thing—in Europe you had stable governments. In the Middle East, to build a
wall like in Europe around a minor country like Iraq and then just sit there is a demonstration of weakness,
not a demonstration of determination, and it will lead to it some time over an extended period there will
be severe crises in the countries where we are now stationed.

DR. KISSINGER: People keep saying give diplomacy a chance. I have great difficulty visualizing
what the diplomacy could be, unless they withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and permit a restoration
of the previous government. Those are the absolute minimum conditions for which we can settle.
Containment of Iraq now is an American defeat, and we should not kid ourselves about this.

MR. KONDRACKE: Okay. So that's another argument in favor of destroying his military

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machine in some way?

DR. KISSINGER: Mort, you're maneuvering me into the position where this whole program is an advocacy by me of a specific course of action. What I feel is necessary is that the administration faces not just the opening game, which was brilliantly done, but the end game, and they will get no awards for losing with moderation. If they can win with moderation it would be terrific.

MR. KONDRACKE: If it comes to a military attack by the United States, what about the hostage situation now? Saddam Hussein shortly will have Western hostages distributed around his various military targets.

Can an American president afford to bomb under those circumstances?

DR. KISSINGER: It's easy to sit here and say yes. It is the most painful decision he has to take. But I would rephrase it, your question, this way: Can an American president refuse to do what he considers to be in the vital national interest, because some outlaw has captured innocent Americans and threatened their lives? Because whether he threatens them directly, or threatens them by putting them in a position where somebody else endangers them, the effect is the same.

At any one moment, there are tens of thousands of Americans around the world, all of whom in my view would be in jeopardy, if an American president backed off from what he considers to be in the vital interest.

I assume he wouldn't risk the soldiers whose lives would be involved unless he thought vital American concerns were involved. If he has come to that decision, then with a bleeding heart, he would probably have to take the other decision as well.

I personally believe that the Iraqis will not risk the lives of that many Americans in a hostage situation, when push comes to shove, because they know that if any Americans get killed, that they have deliberately put in harm's way, that the American public would be implacable, that this would then end the way World War II ended, and that none of them—none of the leaders would get away with that.

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MR. KONDRACKE: Do you think that the argument that the Arab masses would rise up and that Arab unity would be directed against the United States is all hogwash?

DR. KISSINGER: No, it's not hogwash. It's a serious argument, and I certainly am no expert on the Arab masses. I'm convinced that in a prolonged stalemate, that by definition shows the inability of the United States to achieve its objectives, that the Arab masses will gradually surely turn against us. That we will then see acts of terrorism, acts of hostage-taking in various Arab countries, and a general deterioration of our situation. So weighing the risks, I think that we are in a maximum position to do it for the next month or two, and I really don't want to add to the pressure on the president now. That is not my point. My point is to make clear that there is no exit from this except success, which of course should be achieved with a minimum of suffering, and if we can do it by a blockade, I would far prefer that.

MR. KONDRACKE: What do you understand the Soviet role in all of this Iraq business to be? Now, there are these reports of Soviet advisers that were still participating—

DR. KISSINGER: Very ambivalent. Iraq was a valued client of the Soviet Union for a long time, then a good friend. After all, there are 8,000 civilians there, plus several hundred military advisers who are servicing the equipment, plus the fact that the general who has the greatest combat experience, who was in Afghanistan, was assigned there now partly in order to get him out of the Soviet Union where he was criticizing the conduct of the war in Afghanistan, but also partly because Iraq is considered a very important post.

The Soviet Union has not yet progressed to the point where it welcomes great American victories. It still inhabits the territory of imperial Russia. But, I think they're torn, but they will not risk lightly the improved relations with the West which they absolutely must have if their economic program has to have even the slightest chance of success.

MR. KONDRACKE: Do you think that the administration has been forceful enough in moving

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MR. KONDRACKE: Do you think that the administration has been forceful enough in moving the Soviet Union into line?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know what is being said to the Soviet Union privately. I think what we need from the Soviet Union is a vote on this U.N. stoppage of ships. I think we're going to do it anyway from what the president said yesterday. I think that's a tactical question, whether it should be done visibly, or quietly. If the Soviet Union takes an ambivalent position, they must know that sooner or later it will be noted, and probably be noted publicly.

MR. KONDRACKE: Has the president set the wrong symbolism by being on vacation? You've been in this kind of situation, crisis before. Where should a president be at a moment of crisis?

DR. KISSINGER: If he were trying to head it into a quick action, then he should be in Washington. If he has the idea that it will take him another X weeks to get enough force in there so that Iraq cannot retaliate by occupying parts of or all of its neighbors, then he's better off in--or, at any rate, it doesn't do any damage to be in Kennebunkport. I think this is really a decision I would leave up to him.

I have no doubt that he's on top of it, and again he'll be judged by how it comes out. If he succeeds, nobody will remember that he was on vacation, and if he fails, nobody will care if he spent the time in Washington.

MR. KONDRACKE: Does it make any difference that the secretary of state goes on vacation during a crisis like this?

DR. KISSINGER: It really depends on the president-- which advisers he feels he must have--he must have close by. And there has to be a working quorum close by so that if he has to make a key decision, he can discuss it. But I would say the same about the secretary of state.

MR. KONDRACKE: Dr. Kissinger, thanks very much for being with us. For American Interests, I'm Morton Kondracke.