["TELCONE", "Dobrynin/Kissinger", "10:40 a.m. - 11/26/72", "D: Hello.", "K: Anatol.", "D: Oh yes. Hello, Henry.", "K: How are you?", "D: Well, thank you, I was sleeping and then at eight o'clock I hear\non the radio that you are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

K: No, it will be a press conference by me. And if we can't
outmaneuver them here then. . .

D: (Laugs) So today you decide it.

K: Yeh.

D: I think you intend in any case to make this press conference.

K: But I wanted to see what they would do first.

D: Oh I see. Now it's easier for you to handle. You see they do that
really to help you.

K: No, we're getting all the benefits now. Now we can put out the
agreement and we don't pay any of the price for implementing it.

D: Because before it was very difficult to handle. You have only one
side of the story, now you have two sides of the story.

K: That's right.

D: And with these two sides of the story you will go. . . . .

K: Exactly.

D: That is my feeling.

K: But quite seriously if Moscow can exercise any restraining influence
on them - I'm not asking it for us because you know the situation here.

D: Well, you see I will put it this way. I know what was done up til now
and it was really a . . . . . . clear positions and restrain in terms
of

they

K: It's very stupid because if we had followed what we told them there
would certainly have been an agreement in three weeks.

D: Well, you see I think one of the reasons was that they really wanted
you to come there. This was my impression. And if you come and
if you explain them the same position I think it was much better.
They would be much more quiet because in this sense they see that
you refuse to go to Hanoi and I still don't see - well I know your
reasons.

K: Because it would have led to an explosion in Saigon.

3

D: It will not change very much

K: I'm a better judge of what can be done in Saigon.

D: No, no, I'm not arguing with you. I thought it be better for Hanoi
from their point of view.

K: I would have been - well, it's done now.

D: Well, I don't know what is now because I am going to write today
about the statement. You know I am sorry about it but there is
a lot of fear with our people because our point was wrong to them.
They have really high emotions . . . . . in Hanoi. This I can
tell you quite frankly. But we let them know - we tell you our
point of view once again . . . . . . today they are all looking for
where we stand. They themselves would like to know.

K: We will maintain our offer of having another session with them.

D: Yeh, I understand. It will be on the record your press conference?

K: Oh yes.

D: Direct quotation.

K: Yes.

D: It is better. . . . . . . . .

K: Right.

D: Because . . . . . . when you finally come to Hanoi you have completely
different kind of picture. It is better to be straight on the record
what you said because they really think of you as a man whom they
respect but now they are angry with you.

K: With me personally.

D: Yes, with you because you deal personally with Le Duc Tho. They
respect you but they're angry with you because they feel that it was
. . . . . . . . and Le Duc Tho make this report. Now everything
is OK except with Henry and . . . . . . . . From the point of view
I receive a report from Moscow how they react.

K: I will let you see the transcript. I've told them again and again that
I would have to get the approval of Saigon and elsewhere. They just
always said no, you can always do what you want.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By MWGala5004

D: I brought one telegram to Haig. . . . . the President had said while you were there and I have everything. . . . . . . . . . we get the impression that everything is all right. And after while you say everything is agreed but now it looks . . . . . . So they were so sure that they make a report to Moscow. . . . I don't know what you mention to the Chinese but I guess just about the same. And then we receive message from Hanoi for my leadership saying here we are, everything is all right and they leave us. . . . . . over the schedule so to speak, you know. That for your information. I read the whole schedule to Haig because I have it from them.

K: We had every intention to do it. It just couldn't be done.

D: Yeh, well I understand. So I think it a good idea - it's my personal observation - about a moderate response.

K: It will be a very moderate response.

D: Because mutual accusations are not good anywhere.

K: Oh no, I'll make a very moderate response. I'll maintain our position but it will be very moderate.

D: I understand. OK. Henry. Bye. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012004
By: N.W. Hain

TELCONE
Sec. Laird/Mr. Kissinger

8:39 am, November 27, 1972

K: Hello.

L: Henry, Welcome back. Henry there's a cable that came in over the weekend from Bunker and then there are some stories coming out of Saigon, I don't know whether you've seen them or not, raising hell with the fact that having some civilians over there--

K: Well, all I can tell you is that if people do not shut up we'll lose everything we've ever achieved.

L: Well, the problem here, Henry, is if the State Dept. have some objections to these plans we've worked out---

K: It isn't a question of the State Department, Mel, it's a question of the Vietnamese. Every God damn second rater talks his stupid head off when we've excuses out of them every time <u>CHUYÊN CƯỜNG</u> a news story appears, the Vietnamese raise the ante.

L: Yeah, well, my problem is here that I think we gotta get people to shut up for a while, Henry, that's why I'm calling you. This God damned story, and then Bunker's cable coming in here this Sunday, I just don't understand that.

K: Well, I haven't seen that.

L: Well; it's almost the same thing that's in the New York Times. You've read the New York Times this morning?

K: Yes, and it's going to kill us.

L: And the Bunker cable that was sent out Friday night is the same damn story almost.

K: We have two questions, one is "how can we stay within the agreement", but we have a more important question "how we can maintain the God damned agreement in the face of these stories".

L: Well, I understand that, Henry, but I just think it's a serious problem and I'm not try to--evidently you are alerted to it.

K: No, no, but what can we do, Mel.

L: Well, what we can do about it is that God damn it people have got to shut up out in Saigon, now the Embassy evidently is upset because this Major General is going over there. Well, God damn it, we can't

2

L contd: put a civilian in charge of that.

K: Well, that's a minor problem, the major problem is that we leak out all these things these people are going to do.

L: Right. Well --

K: And, it comes out of the Pentagon, it comes out of Saigon, and I don't doubt it comes out of the State Department.

L: Well, the situation is such that I think it's just got to be shut up all over, and this story, I'm sure that came out of the Embassy. I think it's damaging.

K: Well, I don't know--I tell you it's damaging from the point of view of the negotiations. It's killing us. It isn't just damaging, it's absolutely killing us.

L: Well, I'm sure that people don't understand--

K: It's killing us in the talks. Now, these talks are going to blow up if this talking doesn't stop. Now they are demanding that all the civilians we had in the agreement the first time, who maintain military equipment, be removed. Now, would you like to keep the war going on the issue that we need civilians to service military airplanes?

L: Henry, you can't keep that thing going right now-- it was with a group of Senators and House Members this weekend, I'm going to have another group over for lunch today, and I can tell you very frankly that their so God damned mad at the South Vietnamese, they won't even give them economic aid next year. The whole thing has reacted against the South, not against the North.

K: This being our position, frankly one, should shut up our people, everything that we have nearly achieved <u>has being</u> destroyed because of a bunch of self-serving maniacs fighting inter-departmental battles for what? We had it all set. We could have been at each others throats for six months for all I care after it is signed, but now they're killing us with all these leaked stories over an agreement that will never be signed this way.

L: Oh, I agree with you. And we can't get tied up on that issue anyway. That issue can't be the issue that ties you up.

3

K: But that's the issue we are going to be would up with, because the others I can see solving. And we would have had that one solved if everyone would have just shut up.

L: Well, my point is I think we have got to get them to shut up.

K: Okay, can you get your people to shut up, and I will brutalize State.

L: I can get my people to shut, I guarantee that. Now, this story is not from our people.

K: Well, but there were a lot of other stories from the military people.

L: On contracting?

K: Yes. Not this week, but last week.

L: Dammit, I'll--Jesus I've ridden <u>hexx</u> herd on that about as tough as you can, I'll do it again today. I'll personally crush the ass of every body.

K: Okay, Mel.

L: I'll personally crack the ass of everybody once again, but I just thought that this was terrible today.

K: It's awful.

L: And you know, you can't get tied up on something like that, you can't live down that issue anyway.

K: Well, then that's what's going to kill us.

L: Yeah. Okay, Henry, welcome back, I'm sorry to have called you on a matter like that--

K: No, no, I was going to call you.

L: But I'm concerned about it.

K: I was going to call you.

L: Okay

K: Bye.

L: Anything else, any other problems.

CLASSIFIED

August 27, 1965

B&H MARY DATED 10/05

4

K: No, that's the biggest one.

L: Well--

K: Actually, in the negotiations, that's the biggest issue now.

L: Henry, on a little side thing, just a personal thing with you, I understand there's some objections to the fact that I've been meeting privately with this Christian Leadership Group that I've met with for the last nine years, with people like Smith and Schroeder and Lopez Bravo and Carmel.

K: I've never heard that objection.

L: But you knew I was doing that.

K: Oh, yes, and I've never heard the objections.

L: This is a fellowship thing. They have been my friends for years, we are meeting again on--you know, when I go to the NATO meetings, I take one afternoon and they all come in and we go out in the country some place.

K: But, who has supposed to object to this?

L: Oh, I understood that the President was upset about the private meetings I was having with these people.

K: I don't believe it frankly. I don't know whoever told you that, but I wouldn't believe it.

L: Okay.

K: I'm going to see him today, and I am going to just find out. I think somebody is trying to spook you. I have never heard him say one word about it, and he would certainly say it to me before he said it to someone else.

L: And those friendships are something I've built up over a long period of time and I want to retain that relationship, you know.

K: Yes.

L: He knows about it, I'm sure. I'm sure that some people--and I told him once you know.

K: I don't believe it.

L: All right, thank you.

K: Bye.

DROPPED

AUTHOR FEB 12 1965

BASBANDS DEC 10 1965

TelCon
Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

9:10 am, November 27, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry, How are you?

K: Fine. We've heard Bunker has delivered these messages to Thieu who again in Saigon didn't say a God damn thing.

S: Right.

K: And that he wasn't sure that Nha -- that he could spare Nha long enough to come over here.

S: Well, has he taken off yet--Nha?

K: Yeah. That's where we are. On--I had a call from Laird this morning saying this stuff about civilians is leaking out of State.

S: (Laughter) That's almost a reflex action of his.

K: I know, I know. But could--

S: It's a possibility in Saigon, we'll send some sort of cable out there to tell them to cut if off, but I think, as he points out, these guys are advertising in the press, he just walks around and talks to the people.

K: Well, the trouble is we are killing ourselves.

S: I know.

K: Well, could you do what you can to shut people up about the peace terms and about everything else.

S: Yes, I've already, I talked last evening with our own on that.

K: Good, how's the mood there.

S: Okay, I gave them the impression that we have got it now so that we think there's about an equal strain on both members, North and South, and hope to be able to jiggle them in together. No great problems.

OCTOBER 1972

2

K: What is your reading of the situation in terms of the press, you think they're gonna--

S: Well, it was a nasty one this morning by your friend Rather.

K: Who?

S: Dan Rather.

K: I didn't hear that. What did he have to say?

S: Oh, he's saying that now we've--they are beginning to believe that the whole thing was a fraud and we are being decieved.

K: Yeah, that doesn't bother me and that the North Vietnamese don't get.

S: I don't see any press pressure from yesterday's press or from this morning's press.

K: I mean, I'm much more worried as far as North Vietnam--the domestic press we can handle because either we will bring it off or we won't. If it fails next week, we are going to get a hell of a lot of this; if it doesn't fail Rather is going back into the lead mine.

S: But I don't see any other great pressures building up. Your midnight dinner companion didn't see--(strange noise on phone)-- what is that?

K: What?

S: Your midnight dinner companion didn't seem to have any pressures.

K: You mean on Friday?

S: Yeah.

K: No, no. Oh no, God no.

S: And that call you had from your other friend sounds as though you
g feel is going all right. I can't, I think December 4 is--if we tried
to stretch further than that I think we would have problems.

K: Yeah.

S: But I think this one is all right.

CLASSIFIED

Autograph 7-12-65 -

BROOKLYN NEWSPAPER 1/10/65

TELCONE

John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., November 27, 1972

O: ... Number two, are you aware that Ron Ziegler has said at successive briefings on-the-record that both in Florida during the 3 1/2 days you and the President were down there and on the Saturday when the President flew down from Camp David -- it was announced to consult with you before you took off for Paris; I just saw that a week ago -- but you and Haig had conversed only by phone, is that right?

K: Well --

O: ... said that.

K: Yeah, so?

O: Well, what does it mean? Particularly the Saturday thing. I'm told you were at the White House when the President was.

K: Well, look, you have had a theory which I've thought has been really extraordinarily mischievous; that there's been some trouble between the President and me.

O: Yes, sir.

K: And that I overstepped my instructions and all that sort of baloney.

O: Yeah.

K: Well, I assure you it is totally 100% wrong and whoever told you this, you should never put any credence into again.

O: Well, let me just say, Dr. Kissinger, if there's an error there and when you say there was I don't question there was, it was my reading of what was said publicly by you and others then not anybody telling me that I assure you.

K: Well, at any rate, I want to tell you that some day I'll ex -- when the Administration is over, I may tell you what significance if any this has but it has no significance as to the relationship between the President and me.

O: Right. The telephone thing I know must sound terribly petty to you but it sounded very strange, you know, particularly the Saturday business.

K: Well, that's more of a PR problem, between you and me. It's more of a PR problem that wasn't handled very smartly.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 27 1972 5:01PM

TELCOM

John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., November 27, 1972

- 2 -

O: Well, is it a fact -- I'm sorry to ...... You know, it was announced that the President flew down from Camp David on that Saturday to consult with you. Ziegler said that you and he talked only by phone. I am told that you and he were both at the White House at the same time, you know. Is that much a fact, regardless of what it meant?

K: Yeah, it's a fact but it doesn't mean what you think it means.

O: Right.

K: I assure you (laughter) what it does mean I don't want to get into but it has nothing to do with him and me or any strain between him and me.

O: Right.

K: Which is absolutely totally wrong.

O: Right. Well, when you say that, I buy, accept and believe it.

K: You know, it's -- I mean, this is simply not the case.

O: Uh-huh.

K: Well, I just don't want to go any further into it.

O: All right.

K: But that is not the case, that is not the problem. The problem now is to keep both of the Vietnamese parties in some sort of tandem.

O: Right.

K: And not get ahead with one of them of what the other one is going to do.

O: Right.

K: And I think it will appear that it's essentially on the rails.

O: Right. Last question, am I right in my assumption, and I think it's all it is, that you will be staying on for some time into the second term?

K: I will make my final decision -- You know, I will not leave with the general reorganization but I will make my final decision about my future relationship after this Vietnam thing is wound up and I have a chance to go away for a few weeks and think.

TELCON
John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., November 28, 1972

O: Right. As to the error that you say I've made, and when you say it, I believe I made it ________ way to acknowledge as much.

K: I don't think you need to do it publically but it's up to you whether you want to or not.

O: Well, I did read that into mainly actually into your October 26 press conference and hooked them with the ______ Hanoi graft and so forth.

K: But believe me, really ______.

O: ...

K: ... I mean, in understanding how the President ______, which simply isn't the case.

O: Right, I accept that.

K: And there is no problem in that area of any kind.

O: Right. I sure am glad to hear it. I wish you luck.

K: Right. Thank you.

O: Thank you.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCONE

Dr. Kraemer/Mr. Kissinger

11:06 a.m., November 27, 1972

FK: Henry, a tough trip behind you.

HK: (laughter) I'm going to Camp David. I don't know when I'll be back but if I should be back at a reasonable hour, are you free tonight?

FK: Oh, yes.

HK: Because I have a...

FK: It doesn't have to be reasonable, you know, my habits. I go to bed late and the only thing is just get one of your people call because as I say I might go to bed at 11:00.

HK: No, no, no. I won't be that late; it isn't that urgent. I wanted to discuss two things with you. One, really to explain to you in some greater detail than I had a chance to the first time exactly where we stand on Vietnam. And the second, I will have to make some decisions about what I am going to do.

FK: You as a person?

HK: I mean in relation to the Administration. And I wanted to get your judgment on that also.

FK: Yes. That has to be certainly most -- shall I say, persistingly looked into. But anyway nothing rushed should be done I think.

HK: Well, I won't do anything rushed but I would like to see what to think about.

FK: Yeah, all right.

HK: I can't do anything anyway until these negotiations go one way or the other.

FK: That I understand. That's right. Why don't you do this --

HK: You know, it will now decide itself next week one way or the other, it can't go any further.

FK: You might either probably go again to the South, might you not?

HK: No question. But I mean, I will know next week whether --

FK: Oh, I see. I understand.

DREASSIGNED

TELCONE

Dr. Kraemer/Mr. Kissinger

11:06 a.m., November 27, 1972

HK: What's going to happen.

FK: Yeah. Henry, why don't you do this, let your people --

HK: I will aim to get to your place around 8:30 or 9:00.

FK: Very good. Now I am either here till probably tonight 6:00 or 7:00 or so and if they can't reach me, then they shall call my home and tell me also out tonight.

HK: Okay. Well, I'll be there, Kraemer, around 9:00.

FK: Well, all right. Let's do it that way. 9:00, and if it is different and if you --

HK: Then I'll call you.

FK: Have your people phone me. But I only warn they might be just unable to get me here and nobody at home, it simply means that I'm on my way in my car from the Pentagon to my home.

HK: Okay, good.

FK: 9:00 otherwise.

HK: Right.

FK: Very good.

HK: Bye.

wgh

TELCON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:25 p.m., November 27, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. I was just looking at *The Star* and saw some headlines to the effect that Saigon is buoyed and the Reds are mad. What the hell is that? Nothing to it, huh?

K: Well --

P: Nothing has happened as far as we know. But I mean, is that because of the delay?

K: Because of the delay.

P: Um-humm. Well, but we'll shake Saigon off too.

K: Well, Hanoi had been publishing the De Vallen (sp?) articles. Because after all we promised them we'd finish it in one session.

P: Right. I understand, I understand. Yeah, I just wanted to know if there was any development I hadn't known about.

K: No, no, no; but Saigon has to be brought back to a sense of reality. Because they think that the longer they can delay, the better their position is. . . . . . . . and the whole thing . . . . . .

P: Well, my view, you see, is not to give -- I mean, we're not going to say that there's going to be that chance to talk again. I'm going to lay an ultimatum down and say this is it, we're going to go ahead and it will be done in a way that they'll get the message. So let's get the message out that we see them at 3 o'clock.

K: Right, Mr. President, that's gone off.

P: All right. Because we have to get it done with. Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President. Bye.

wgh

JUN 27 1972 10:00AM

*

TELCORN

Ambassador Khan (Pakistan)/Mr. Kissinger

6:40 p.m., November 27, 1972

HK: Hello.

SK: Sultan Khan here.

HK: Yes, how are you?

SK: How are you?

HK: All right.

SK: There is something quite important that has come up from Pakistan. I Know how busy you are but if it's possible for me to see you before you set out on your travels again, I'd appreciate it very much.

HK: Certainly. You mean, sometime this week?

SK: Yes, before you leave. And the only problem I have is that on the 30th of November and 1st of December I have to be in Kansas. I have a couple of speaking engagements there at the University. So, short of those dates, any date, any time.

HK: Well, so it will have to be within the next two days.

SK: So if it is, I would appreciate it very much.

HK: Good, we will definitely do it.

SK: Thank you very much. So I'll wait for a call from your office.

HK: Right.

SK: Okay. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

HK: Bye.

SK: Goodbye.

wgh

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

B: Oh, golly. God, you scared me when you say two questions, I've got to get my ducks in a row. Can I tell you one thing before I ask you a question.

K: Yeah.

B: I don't know if you'll like this. My girlfriend who helps run the *Hudson Review*, has a husband who runs the *Hudson Review* and he keeps pictures of nude women up, so she put yours up.

K: The one that's in *Cosmopolitan*?

B: Yes. (laughter)

K: (laughter) It's not mine; I wish it were.

B: I read -- no, I'm sure. I won't comment on that. Would you say that the next round -- do you anticipate that the next round beginning November 4th could be the final round?

K: All I can tell you is peace is in sight?

B: It is in sight; you remain optimistic? How can I use that? Administration ...

K: No, I'm kidding you.

B: Aw, come on; I thought you were being serious. I know it gets closer every day obviously.

K: No, you can't quote any Administration sources or anybody else.

B: All right. Some people were saying that they believed the atmosphere in the talks was good. You know, leaving aside scolds and smiles and everything else and that they still think a deal can be struck by the end of the year on a ceasefire.

K: Yeah, that's reasonable.

B: That's reasonable.

K: But you're writing all of this as your own.

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

- 2 -

B: Yeah. Now what about this idea of the last rounds with the North Vietnamese?

K: I think there's a good chance.

B: Uh-huh. When Duc comes, is it your understanding that we will then -- What I have understood is pretty much what I wrote. We have presented all the demands that we could --

K: I told you it was a sensible article.

B: All right. So then it's true we presented the Saigon demands. They said no to some and yes to others. We can go back to Saigon and say look, we've gotten what we could get, we can get no more, now is the time, let's go back and make a deal.

K: Well, I won't go quite that far but it's a generally correct direction.

B: Uh-huh. By the way, did you hear what CBS said this morning.

K: No.

B: One of the Saigon -- some Saigon officials were now referring to you as "that Jew" which I felt ... has all but said myself and I'm told that there's correspondence by which some South Vietnamese were gearing up this apparent split between you and Nixon in order to make it easy for them to turn down an agreement.

K: Oh, they are encouraging that I dare (out there)?

B: Yeah. That some Saigon out-of-office people.

K: Yeah. There is no split between the President and me.

B: Well, it doesn't seem possible that there would be, to tell you the truth.

K: There isn't any. It's complete nonsense.

B: Um-humm. Would you say that next week is a good time to go to Paris with you? I don't mean me, probably Murray but is that a time that we ought to have --

K: Well, but what the hell do you think is going to happen there?

B: I don't know.

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

- 3 -

K: The press is doing more damage in panicking the North Vietnamese than any information they can possibly get out of it. They run around, they look at the expression of Le Duc Tho's face when he leaves. He is no idiot. By now he's learned how to play that game.

B: Um-humm. What do you mean, they're panicking the North Vietnamese?

K: Well, by giving them all that crap of what Nixon can or cannot do.

B: Do you think they're hurting very seriously now, the North Vietnamese, and that they desperately need an agreement?

K: That's what I think, yeah.

B: You do?

K: Yeah.

B: Are they giving on substantive things or mainly on technical things?

K: Well, I don't want to go into that.

B: Are both sides making concessions? Can I say that?

K: uh -- no.

B: Just them, in other words?

K: I'm not saying anything of the kind. But I think -- I just don't want to characterize the negotiations.

B: Would you say the atmosphere was good between you?

K: Oh, yeah.

B: All right. And are the withdrawals that have been taking place so far in any way significant to you? I understand just a small number and the people over in I&R don't know what to make of it. It doesn't look like much. Are they sending us a signal?

K: Well, that's not clear. Marilyn, I've given you more answers than you deserve --

TELCON

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

- 4 -

B: You said I deserved a lot because you liked my article.

K: That's right. I even like you but you're too bright.

B: Atmosphere's good, might be the last round --

K: Yeah, but that's --

B: ... with North Vietnam, you said.

K: But that's all your guess.

B: Why is it Bernie Gwertzman always gets "high Administration sources" to quote and I'm not allowed to quote anyone?

K: Because I'm not talking Gwertzman at all!

B: (laughter)

K: No, I haven't talked to him at all.

B: Well, he certainly -- I wouldn't characterize anyone else as a "high Administration official." Henry, have you ever gone to see Rogers before?

K: Oh, God, yes, for Christ's sakes! I've done it a million times!

B: (laughter) At the Department?

K: How?

B: At the Department?

K: At the bloody Department!

B: At the bloody Department (laughter). Do you want to take over that bloody Department?

K: No.

B: Well, are you going to stay on?

K: I haven't decided yet.

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

- 5 -

B: Everybody says to me very worriedly, "Is Henry going to take over the Middle East next?"

K: They're afraid I might succeed.

B: (laughter)

K: Who, at State?

B: Foreign Diplomats, all sorts of people. Oh, no, at State too I guess they're concerned about it?

K: Why?

B: I'm convinced though that you can find enough ambiguity in the idea that the Egyptians want a promise of total withdrawal and that the Israelis are ready to withdraw a little bit from the Canal. I know you can find a formula.

K: (laughter) Marilyn --

B: That's the nicest thing I've ever said to you.

K: Marilyn, you have said many nice things to me.

B: No, I haven't.

K: I have not forgotten them. It is not your fault that you're too bright and that you're covering things now where you can only do damage.

B: You know what I did last week? I did SALT, China, Russia, Vietnam and I did something else, I've lost track. It's been incredible. Murray goes away on vacation just because you leave town; he figures we don't need him anymore.

K: (laughter)

B: Are you going to have a briefing at all with the Press?

K: No.

B: This week is absolutely out of the question?

K: Out of the question. And I'm really not returning calls from the press this week.

TELCOM

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

- 6 -

B: Well, I'm very grateful. Thanks very much. I can never think of brilliant questions to ask you right away but I --

K: What?

B: You don't want to tell me anything about troop withdrawals or about this National Council of Reconciliation? Did we get into --

K: What about that goddamn National Council of Reconciliation? I saw that Joe Kraft yesterday has concluded that the existence of that Council

B: prevents the efficient utilization of economic aid?

B: All I know is that nobody understood Joe Kraft and if you did, you have proved that you're smarter than all of us, which you've already proven. Did you understand that piece?

K: No, he was just -- No.

B: I thought he had interviewed you.

K: Well, that goddamn Council has nothing to do with economic aid.

B: No, but that Council -- I guess the North Vietnamese are banking on it breaking down so that Thieu will fall apart and --

K: Yeah, but why will Thieu fall apart if that Council breaks down? The Council has no functions.

B: It has none. It is pinned down that it will act by unanimity.

K: It will act by unanimity and its only specified function is to supervise elections.

B: Elections at what level?

K: Elections that have later to be agreed upon.

B: And did you get the ceasefire pinned down in Indochina?

K: What?

TELCONE

Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

7:23 p.m., November 27, 1972

B: That's not been mentioned. The ceasefire throughout Indochina has not been mentioned much, which we seem to believe you got what you wanted.

K: Marilyn, dear, it is all in good hands. (laughter) Just relax, come to Paris with me, do something sinful --

B: Oh, that's the nicest invitation I've had all day.

K: And don't be so clever.

B: You don't mean that?

K: (laughter)

B: Did you get it so Thieu could sign it?

K: (laughter)

B: I think it's a great . . . . . . . . . . as a matter of fact, I'd love to go there and stay. Look, I'm applying to go to China with this group that's going -- the Estein group (?). I figured they won't let anybody knowledgeable in so maybe they'll let me in.

K: Well, you would be an experience they would not easily forget.

B: (laughter)

K: Let me know if you go, will you, Marilyn?

B: I'll cable you in Paris.

K: Bye.

B: Thanks.

wgh

TELCONE

Amb. Jha/Kissinger

9:00 a.m. - 11/28/72

K: Hello.

J: Hello, Henry.

K: OK. How are you?

J: How are you?

K: OK.

J: You called me yesterday?

K: I returned your call.

J: Really?

K: Yeh.

J: No, I hadn't called.

K: Oh,

J: I had been away in the evening and when I came back I found that you had called.

K: OH no, I thought that you had called me. Somebody must have taken the message wrong.

J: No, it wasn't me. How are things?

K: They're getting along fine despite what the press says.

J: Despite what the press says.

K: Yeh.

J: That's what I thought.

K: You know they're about as right as they were in the middle of September.

CLASSIFIED

Dated: 12/28/72
Box: 6105

TELCOM

Jack Anderson/Kissinger

9:30 a.m. - 11/28/72

K: Hello.

A: Good morning.

K: How are you?

A: Just fine. I can see that you've been busy.

K: Yes.

A: I've been given from a White House source - and a source who's been reliable in the past - an account of what's been going on in Paris. I don't know whether this is something you want or can comment about, but if it is I'd be glad to go over it with you.

K: Right. Well, I can't imagine that anyone would know.

A: Well, I just don't know whether he knows or not but he professes to, he is a source in the National Security Council area.

K: Well what's his account?

A: His account is this: He said that you had become convinced originally or a while ago during the negotiations, that the North Vietnamese simply would not agree to the explicit withdrawal from the South but that it would be possible, it might be possible, to get them to reach an understanding that they would withdraw rather than spelling it out.

K: I will listen to your account. I'll almost certainly not comment, but I'd like to hear it.

A: Well, I'd be glad to go over it and I understand why you wouldn't want to comment if you can't comment. That therefore in your negotiations you sought to find a formula that would reduce Hanoi's troops without having to force Hanoi to acknowledge that they were so doing because of their sensitivity in this area and that the draft agreement that was reached therefore made no mention of the North Vietnamese troop withdrawal. But that there was an understanding as part of the demobilization on both sides that there would be a progressive withdrawal of the North Vietnamese troops from the South.

DROPPED

Autograph
Date: 11/28/72
Page-footer: 10-01

2

A:(cont.) That you had achieved an agreement that would pull them out and that the substance was more important than the shadow and that, therefore, you had an agreement and of course President Thieu disagreed and this is where he held out and this is what he refused to go along with because he couldn't keep North Vietnamese troops out in writing. - spelled out explicitly - and that this was the hangup. This was the thing that

K: You understand that

A: Paris, and furthermore that the President went along with Thieu and that the President went along with him because he had the intelligence reports which showed that North Vietnam was hurting, and hurting rather badly and that they had reached a point where they needed the truce and he felt that just as he had succeeded in his gamble on the Haiphong mining and so forth that by holding firm he would succeed again. And it was basically a Presidential decision to back this up. Now that's the story he gave me. Is there any enlightenment that you feel I ought to have because I'm interested only in accuracy.

K: I won't go into the substance of the negotiations. I can't do that.

A: Of course.

K: But the story that's being put around that the President pulled away from it is total absolute malicious nonsense.

A: Uh-huh.

K: And that can be documentarily proved.

A: Let me see if I understand you that the President backed Thieu on this.

K: There has not been any difference in our positions on this.

A: Your position and his.

K: That's right.

A: Fine. Fine.

K: So whatever else has happened on the substance, which I can't comment on, that other part of the argument is malicious nonsense.

TELCONE

Ron Ziegler/Kissinger

11:09 a.m. - 11/28/72

K: Hello.

Z: Yeh, Henry.

K: Ron, I notice all these news stories about how the President has
pulled away from me. I want to tell you two things: One, if these
are put out by us we're going to look like horses' asses because
the chances are 9 out of 10 that it's going to work.

Z: What is the story you're referring to, Henry?

K: Well, that - it's just all over the place.

Z: Where?

K: Haig can get them for you. Read the Daily News Summary, for
example.

Z: I haven't read it today yet; I'm working out announcements. Nothing's been put out along that line from here, Henry.

K: And secondly, if we're going to have a repetition of the India/Pakistan situation no one should think that I'm going to take it a second time.

Z: I don't think we will. I've already denied it's unfounded, the
of this and I'll do it again.

K: Well, OK. And there should be no doubt about my attitude this time.

Z: Henry, your South Vietnamese friends are doing this to you. It's quite obvious and I'm hitting it from the other side saying that

K: Yeh, but I think some of it is coming out of Klein's shop.

Z: Well it sure as hell better not be.

K: Well, for example, Jack Anderson called me this morning and he said
a White House staffer. And then gave him a rather good account of
what had gone on and then that the President slapped me down.

Z: I know the calls that the President has made to the PR types. No
one is pushing this line from here. Believe me, they're not.

CLASSIFIED

Authe: FEB 12 72
B: Mar. 13 72
D: Mar. 14 72

TELCONE

Fred Brisson/Kissinger

12:07 p. m. - 11/28/72

K: Hello.

B: How are you, Henry?

K: Freddy, how are you?

B: Wonderful to talk to you. I know there's probably no chance but if there is any chance and you're still in Washington on Sunday, we'll be in. They're doing a tribute to Rosaland at the Kennedy Center.

K: Oh, what a pity! No, Sunday I'm on the way to Paris.

B: I'm sure you are. That's obviously what we've been reading and hearing, you know. They're running a wonderful picture. The first time they had this thing done at the Kennedy Center it was called "_________ the Women" I don't know if you saw it.

K: Oh yes, I loved it.

B: And they're doing a big do and so forth, but I figured there was no chance but I thought I'd call you anyway in case

K: Well, I would be hurt if you ever came to Washington without letting me know.

B: We missed you in California but Rosaland was out working like a demon for Nixon. She was all over the damn state, you know. And they did a wonderful job apparently.

K: Yes, it turned out beautiful.

B: It certainly did. But you were only out there a few days, weren't you?

K: I was there only over a weekend.

B: When are you coming back?

2

K: Between Christmas and New Years.

B: Oh, between Christmas and New Year's.

K: Yes.

B: And otherwise you'll be in Washington.

K: That's right.

B: You know I'll be in when you get back from Paris next time. I'll be in because I got the ______ opening there too which I don't think you've seen. I'm opening that in Washington on the 18th of December.

K: Well, I hope to be there then.

B: All right. Well, I'll tell you what. I'll check with you when I know you're back and then - because I'll either be coming back to New York or direct to Washington around that time.

K: Well, it'd be marvelous!

B: All right. Your ______ is doing great. It's almost completed. You're doing a fantastic job.

K: You're a good friend.

B: You really are.

K: Well, I think we'll get it finished.

B: I'm sure you will, Henry, and if there's anything - you know we're at the Carleton and we'll be there - Roz will be there starting Thursday night and I'll be there starting Saturday.

K: Oh, well maybe we can get together Saturday.

B: That'd be great if you're free. Roz will be there definitely Thursday night and she'll be there through Tuesday.

K: Well, let me find out. I may have to go to Key Biscayne to see the President but if not let's plan on Saturday.

B: Right. Fine, because we're having dinner with the Harrimans on Monday and then she's going back to California Tuesday.

DECLASSIFIED
Autumn 2021
B4 For Dated 10/03

TELCOM

Frank Pace/ Kissinger

2:28 p.m. - 11/28/72

K: Hello.

P: Henry.

K: Frank, how are you?

P: Quick question. I have a feeling that your requirements abroad are going to make it very difficult for you to be with us.

K: I was just going to call you today. I just have no way of knowing.

P: I understand. I'm just going to leave it open.

K: It's risky.

P: I understand that. I'm still going to leave it open.

K: Or do you want to move the dinner?

P: I can't do it. I'm committed already; I've got 500 people coming and so there's no way I can do it.

K: Well, look, if this thing breaks up I'll be back in a hurry.

P: I know that.

K: And if it succeeds, I could also be back in a hurry.

P: I know. I hope it's the latter, but I understand, and I understood all along, that this was subject to what you're doing and, as you know, I think it's exciting and superb.

K: Aren't you nice.

P: Oh no, no, Henry, hell it's a lot of you're old friends, Hedley, Andrew, all are going to be there and

K: Maybe I am going to be there - it's not impossible.

P: Right.

DROPPED
Author: E212958-
Date: 11/28/72
BGP

2

K: What is my role in this?

P: Your role in it is to talk for about 8 minutes, off-the-cuff, on any subject that moves you.

K: In response - is somebody going to make a speech about me or?

P: I will. What will happen is, I introduce you saying the things I think about you. I will read a citation that I think you will find maybe a little exceptional. Then I will ask you to speak and then you will be presented with the gold medal.

K: Well, aren't you nice. Look, could you invite, if I come, my parents?

P: Oh, I'd love to. I had that in mind all along. Will you just let Gay get on and get their telephone number and address?

K: Right.

(At this point, Mr. Pace's secretary, Gay came on the phone.)

G: Yes, Mr. Pace.

P: Gay, Dr. Kissinger would like his parents to come if he is able to be there. He feels that he might and if you will get their address and telephone number I will have arrangements made so that they will be there if he's there.

G: Certainly.

K: Their phone number is WA 8-0730 in New York and their address is 615 Fort Washington Avenue.

G: 615 Fort Washington Avenue.

K: Yes.

G: Fine, I have that.

P: Henry, they'd love this occasion because it's just the sort of thing that you enjoy. I mean your extempore and the people who are there are your kind of people.

K: And that's what I'm sure of and I really would love to come. There is a chance. I tell you there's a 50-50 chance that I can make it.

CLASSIFIED
Authentic
FAX NO. 22958
Date: 6/10/93
B-68

*

3

P: This would be tremendous. If not and you can't make it, unfortunately I can't award the medal in your absence. I'm going to suggest to the medals committee that you be invited next year.

K: Right. Well, you're terribly nice.

P: And believe me, Henry, I can't tell you how proud Peg and I are of you and what you've done.

K: You've been a tremendous friend.

P: Well, I'm a friend, believe me and I mean that anytime.

K: Well, it really means a lot to me.

P: Thank you, Henry. Bye. Bye.

556 2127 Mobile

CITIZENS SERVICE

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3:13 p.m. - 11/28/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: You don't call your old friend anymore, I got to call you.

D: Well I thought that you were at Camp David.

K: Well, I read in the papers that you people are inquiring whether I'm on the way out.

D: Who inquired?

K: I saw a newspaper article saying officials of the Soviet Embassy made inquiries all over town last week.

D: Oh, I think it was just, you know, sometimes the press just try to make up things. It's important that I know that you are in, no doubt.

K: I'm relaxed.

D: Yes, so there is not any problem. How is it going on?

K: Well, they're going along. Your friends are trying a little maneuver.

D: I receive yesterday a rather extensive expose (?) of how it was there. Five pages. And what the position is. Henry, if you are free I would like to sit down.

K: Yes, I would like to talk to you about it tomorrow because we absolutely will not change that prisoner clause. I mean we'll fight it.

D: You mean about political ones.

K: Yeh, they want to change that clause.

D: Well there are several points that I think I should - so we should go through all this if you don't mind.

2

K: No, I would like to talk to you.

D: Because I have to

K: Can it wait 'til tomorrow, do you think?

D: How do you think? I could come today or tomorrow. Anytime you really prefer. It depends on your schedule, not mine. I'm free really. This one I receive in a telegram yesterday from Gromyko in addition to what I discussed with you on the telephone and he specifically, on behalf of Mr. Brezhnev, ask me once again when I see you to tell you that Mr. Brezhnev would be delighted to do everything in his power to make a pleasant journey for Tricia and her husband.

K: Aren't you nice. The President really deeply appreciated that. He was very touched by it.

D: And he just asked me really when you

K: I'll give you a suggestion by the end of this week.

D: Yes, he asked what exactly the date and what they would like to see besides Moscow. What other towns. It is no problem.

K: Well, I'll warn them that if you lure them to Moscow with the promise of other towns and they'll never see them.

D: (Laugs) Oh no. And by the way when I discuss with ________ he mentioned that I hope to see/before this is realized, he said he saw Mr. Kissinger in Moscow and he said jokingly, you may assure him this time he'll get a chance to see Leningrad. Because you remember last time it was impossible.

K: I talked to the President about it and he thinks it worked so well last time that he's decided to do that. Maybe towards the beginning of April or the middle of April or whenever you think.

D: No, if you think about April; we were thinking about March, but

K: We think when it's far enough along.

D: March, he mentioned, but he mentioned

K: March is possible too.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205544
By: W.M. Sargent

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3:13 p.m. - 11/28/72

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

D: Who inquired?

K: I'm relaxed.

OCTOBER 22, 1972

2

D: Because I have to

D: (Laugs) Oh no. And by the way when I discuss with you he mentioned that I hope to see/before this is realized, he said he saw Mr. Kissinger in Moscow and he said jokingly, you may assure him this time he'll get a chance to see Leningrad. Because you remember last time it was impossible.

K: March is possible too.

CLASSIFIED

Author: E012958

Date: 01/01/01

TelCon
Marilyn Berger/Mr. Kissinger

4:05 pm, November 28, 1972

K: .................... I thought you'd ask me a hard one.

B: Perhaps.

K: Let me get the memo where we wrote it all down and I'll read it to you.

B: I'm also told that the President sent a letter recently to President Thieu saying that Dr. Kissinger has faithfully followed my instructions, is that correct?

K: How would I know, they don't tell me---

B: Oh, they don't tell us like that behind your back, do they.

K: Certainly.

B: You take it from that, huh?

K: No.

B: By the way, in the Time story today, it says that---

K: I haven't read it yet and I didn't talk to Gwurtsman.

B: Well, he's got high Administration sources, I ---

K: I did not talk to Gwurtsman.

B: Well, he says that---

K: Nor to anyone else on the Time.

B: He said the negotiations in Paris were to iron out ambiguities, there was much discussion of the thinning out of forces and there was no naive escalation of demands such as has been reported.

K: I just won't talk about it.

B: Yes, sir. Would it be fair to assume that you have informed Duc about the latest paly in the negotiations.

K: Well, they were informed every evening while we were there.

B: What is the purpose of his coming here? Is it window dressing.

2

K: No, no, I want to tell him where we think we stand.

B: At the highest level, meaning the President, right.

K: Well if want to give him that title, yeah.

B: Well, he is at the highest level in this government. I mean--

K: That is true, that is true. Haig doesn't accept it, but it's true.

B: Jesus (laughter). Is he the one---

K: *Ex话 just talking* Haig is getting towards Bonapartism

B: Is he the one giving Bernie all this wonderful stuff?

K: I don't know. Literally, I was in Camp David all day yesterday.

B: Well, the same day that we have presented the demands, we've
gotten

K: Listen, Marilyn, I'm not gonna tell you. I thought you wrote a
good article yesterday, you wrote two good ones in a row, you're
bound to do a bad one now.

B: No, no, no, I---

K: All I have to do is give you all our secrets and you'll be great.

B: Well, I'm not doing badly, am I?

K: No, you're doing fine.

B: Otherwise I have to devine them.

K: Can't we get Murray back, he's less persistent.

B: Oh, come on. That's the thing, I'm afraid Murray is going to come back and say Marilyn you played in their hands.

K: We've never lied to you.

B: All right. Would the scene be, look if you withstand a ceasefire---
there is an understanding that they will withdraw some troops/

K: I will not discuss it with you. I will not discuss with you what
the troop withdrawal.

DECEMBER 1967

AUGUST 1967

B-J. MARCHMILLER'S DEPARTMENT

3

B: Would it be far fetched to look at this SALT agreement as a way of getting out of part of the difficulty that we're having as far as the assistance with North Vietnamese troops by making unilateral statements, either secret or public. Attached to the agreement in the way the SALT ones were.

K: Marilyn, really, I think I've exhausted everything I can tell you.

B: You haven't told me anything. You know when you say Hello, you've told me everything you'll say.

K: I know, I just wanted to say that I thought you wrote a good article yesterday. Look it's awfully tough. You know the disaster with these negotiations if they went public, and now many things that are perfectly normal that are not a bit different from the way they've always been, people look at faces, at nuances and so on and so forth, I just can't discuss methods of how we might break this.

B: Well you told me that after this next time in Paris as the TIME says there will be another trip to Saigon either by General Haig or you or some---

K: It's my turn now. Why should he go. Why should he get all the fun.

B: Are you going back to Saigon after Paris.

K: I thought if I could get a trip to Delhi, Saigon and Tokyo, I could evoke great public feelings. What do you think.

B: Oh, come on, be serious with me.

K: I mean, Marilyn, what do you think. Delhi and Saigon in particular would be a great combination.

B: You are pretty popular in both of those locations.

K: That's what I thought, I could really produce crowds.

B: All right, look, can we a ceasefire in place at the time of the agreement.

K: Why not.

B: All right. Well, we have a ceasefire throughout Indochina?

K: That remains to be seen.

4

B: That's not first being negotiated.

K: I would think it's very possible.

B: All right. On the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South are you satisfied that the understanding you have made at this point.

K: I understand their position. I don't want to go into it now. But once it's done, I'll be glad to explain how these mature, it's a much more complex situation than they both maniacal parties are presenting it.

B: Would you like to explain that to me?

K: No.

B: Okay. Can you say that the agreement, the essential parts of the agreement, have been--

K: Have you ever thought of becoming a lawyer?

B: clarified now and that the situation will be that when you go back to Paris it will be more for tying up rates or miscellaneous agreements.

K: Oh, no.

B: No. Further negotiations are to come.

K: Some discussions, yes.

B: Discussions.

K: Negotiations, if you want. Marilyn, I really better stop because it's just--and if you keep calling me with that sharp brain of yours every day, you're gonna get everything out of me.

B: Well you're very nice, but you say I go too deeply, it's only because I don't understand you, and you are ambiguous.

K: Well, the reason I'm ambiguous is because I don't want you to understand me. Has that thought occurred to you?

B: Well, I'm sure, though, you want a story tomorrow that's correct. And you do want to see a story in the paper.

DAILY NEWSPAPER
Author: EQ12958-
Date: 6/10/93
Page: 80

5

K: Not particularly. I'd be delighted if there were no stories.

B: Well, you realize---

K: Will you come to the Caribbean with me for the next few days?

B: q The Caribbean! Is that where you're going.

K: No, but I'd go if it would shut you up for three days.

B: Well, where shall we go. Do you prefer Martinique of Jamaica?

K: I've never been in Martinique.

B: Neither have I. I have a houseboat in St. Thomas available.

K: Do you really?

B: Oh, I have an apartment in Cingne.

K: Where?

B: In Cingne, near Paris.

K: Oh, do you really?

B: Listen, this is being monitored by everybody. Quite seriously, we have to a story which makes some kind of sense. The President is meeting with Is the President going to meet with Thieu. This is a story out of Saigon, that they would like to meet with Thieu.

K: Well, I wouldn't expect that.

B: Well, the basic scenario that we've gotten is--do we expect to get more out of the North Vietnamese than they've given us so far?

K: Look, Marilyn

B: I'm not going to write that, I'm trying to understand this.

K: It's much too complex to put a thing like this into yes and no.

B: Well, put it how you'd like.

K: Marilyn, I will recommend you, I know a lot of heads of movie studios, I really think you ought---

B: Oh, I had an offer from CBS after they saw me on television. Would you talk to me more.

DRAFT, 7/2/66

AUG 27 1966 8:05

BASIN FEBRUARY 1966

6

K: Of course. Nice to talk to you.

B: But Henry, you haven't told me anything.

K: Well, that's exactly the intention. Now, I can't tell you anymore, I really can't, and I don't believe anyone else.

B: Are you going to be present at the Duc meeting.

K: Yes.

B: And is it going to be at=Camp David or Washington?

K: In Washington.

B: Well you said that we were going to tell them where we stand. That sounds to me like, you know, come along with us folks.

K: That's up to you to conclude. I'm not saying it, I'm saying we now have to get ready for the next meeting, and it's obvious that we won't to discuss it.

B: Well, they say in one of their broadcasts of the Vietcong today that we are fighting U.S. aggressors. In a way that says to me, once the U.S. aggressors are gone, meaning in 60 days, we can pull some of our troops out. Would that be a fair explanation of what you think they are going to do.

K: That could happen, but I don't want to speculate. Marilyn I really can't tell you anymore. I really cannot, I'd like to, and when we get on SALT or something else, I'd be glad to talk to you.

B: Would you rather tell me about SALT, I'll listen.

K: No, not now. Marilyn, Bye.

DRLASSIFIED

Autograph, E212958

B: B, MAF, Dated 6/10/01

TelCon

George Sherman/Mr. Kissinger

4:15 pm, November 28, 1972

K: Hello.

S: Dr. Kissinger? I suppose I should start by welcoming you back.

K: Thank you.

S: I've been away as I explained to your secretary. Certain things I'd like to discuss if I could based on the--

K: You know I won't be able to tell you a hell of a lot, I hope you understand that.

S: Right. Well, just for guidance, are you fairly confident that you can get this thing wrapped up by mid-December.

K: I don't want to put any time limit on it. If I think that the basic things we've said is too old.

S: In other words, this is what my girl just gave me in terms of that report that came out I guess it was on Saturday, based on the story I received by the North Vietnamese.

K: Maybe the North Vietnamese.

S: Whichever, it sounded sort of contradictory was my impression of your position before you left about this business of Hanoi never expressing any specific withdrawal in the agreement.

K: Well, let's wait and see how it all comes out. You know, there are many people that have many motives. All of this is not to be ascribed to anybody. You know, many people have many motives for leaking things and you know this may not have been the North Vietnamese who leaked it, it may have been the Vietcong.

S: Right. I gather I reported felt it was the neutralists.

K: Well, but where did the neutralists get it from.

S: Right. Okay.

K: So you may have what -- a factor to take into account here.

2

S: Is it still basically our approach that whatever is done in terms of their regroupment or withdrawal would have probably be passive rather than written into the agreement as it was in the original draft.

K: Well I--as was what written in the original draft.

S: It wasn't specifically mentioned in the agreement.

K: Well, you see, when the-- the original agreement has never been published and that was always more complex than what was in the papers, and I just can't discuss the strategy of these negotiations. Except to say that we are following roughly what has been discussed-- when you are in a negotiation you can never totally control the timing of it. Because there are always two parties involved.

S: Right. But you are not deeply disturbed by the fact this is being drawn out.

K: No. The thing that will be--what I said is officially addressed to Hanoi. I believe it can be done in a number of days--three or four days. We could handle them the same attitude, and the end result is what will determine this. No one will feel that if it takes eight days of negotiation rather than four--

S: Over the whole stand of history, you mean.

K: Over the next--even in three months it won't make any difference.... Whether it takes eight negotiating days or four negotiating days.

S: Right. But you're not saying their attitude changed are you.

K: No, I'm saying the problem is when you are dealing with three parties openly it is a more complex situation.

S: What's your betting in terms of whether Theiu is angling for a summit meeting with the President.

K: I wouldn't bet on that. I just--you know when does it finish. If it succeeds which I'm still quite confident it will, then we can put all these pieces together and explain them. Right now I just can't explain everything that's going on.

S: On that point, I hope are viewing favorably your--Dave's suggestion. You might be willing to do that for us?

K: Yes, definitely. I'm thinking about it very seriously. I've mentioned it to Haldeman and to the President. You mean Kraslow's suggestion.

RECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1972

Dated Nov 10 72

3

S: Right.

K: And I've talked to no one else about this.

S: It would be fascinating. There's just one other thing, now--

K: One thing I'm confident that when we put it all together, you ~~were~~ will see that there were reasonable grounds for saying everything that was said.

S: Would you--do you feel that the Saigon attack on you was absolutely predictable.

(Laughter)

K: I wish I was--

S: You said at the Embassy you've got both sides hating you now.

K: Shall we say, I'm not astonished. I don't know whether it was predictable, but it doesn't surprise me.

S: Would you say that the line their taking probably rules out your return to Saigon or not.

K: No.

S: Do you think you'll be going back after the next negotiating--

K: It's quite conceivable.

S: Another thing is the Canadian Ambassador today at lunch indicated that the discussions as far as the ~~Canadians~~ were concerned for supervisory commission just involves South Vietnam. It wasn't quite clear to me what connection--presumably there has to be some ~~ICC~~ for Laos and Cambodia.

K: Yes, but they already have ICCs.

S: Oh, I see, under the 1962 agreement.

K: Right.

S: But there's nothing for Cambodia--

K: They have one under the 154 agreement.

4

S: So the new one would merge with the 154 one in Cambodia you mean.

K: Well, that's a conceivable way of approaching it.

S: In other words you feel if you get the agreement on South Vietnam the other things can be fitted in easily. The legal problems.

K: Well, that won't be left to chance.

S: Right. Is there any more you can give me in terms of guidance on this withdrawal issue.

K: No.

S: It has been suggested, for instance, that the concentration now is on those two sentences in the draft agreement about--

K: I just don't want to go into it and I'd stay from too much speculation.

S: Would you agree that this is--the remaining problem or not.

K: Well, it's one of the problems.

S: You mean there's so many you can't--

K: No, no.

S: You sound tired.

K: No, I don't sound tired, I'm trying not to discuss the specifics of a long going negotiation.

S: Okay. The meeting tomorrow, is Rogers going to be in on that do you know.

K: No, he will see them separately.

S: Separately, how long is he staying, do you know. Does that depend on the--

K: How long is Duc staying.

S: Yes. Oh--(laughter)

K: I thought you were asking me long--

S: Oh, I'll ask you that as well.

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

5:28 p.m.

11/28/72

MK: Henry!

HK: Marvin, how are you?

MK: How are you sir?

HK: Okay.

MK: Good. I just called--I haven't had a chance to take your temperature lately. I left you in strange hands in Paris

HK: Oh yes, that's true.

MK: Listen--what can you say--do you still feel all right on this--

HK: I feel all right--we have to keep these Vietnamese parties in tandem and we are moving them along--you know we won't get any award for beating self-imposed deadlines.

MK: Right. Right. But I have been trying all week as a matter of fact to--

HK: No, I read your commentary and I think it's been very good. trying

MK: I have been hard to hold the pessimism line off because I simply don't believe it.

HK: I think--Of course it can fail, but there is no more reason--there is less reason to believe that now than there was on November 20.

MK: On November 20?

HK: Right.

MK: Well that's good to hear--that's very good. Do you think in this next session you might be initialling something?

HK: No.

MK: No. And this old idea about having to go back to Saigon --is that still

*

Page 2

HK: That's still very much in the cards.

MK: Right. And what about all of this Saigon-pushed line about South Vietnam wanting a summit--any possibilities?

HK: I wouldn't have thought so.

MK: And you don't think so now either.

HK: No.

MK: That's good. Listen I was wondering--

HK: I don't absolutely rule that out. But I --I would say the odds are 3 to 1 against it.

MK: Right.
Have you ever met --you know Duc?

HK: Oh yes, I know Duc.

MK: Somebody has a line here that--you are the Washington Duc.

HK: Well that's my line.

MK: It's yours? ----around the State Department very quickly.
(laughing) I was just wondering if on a guidance basis there would be
any chance of going along to Paris this next time --

HK: On my plane?

MK: Seeing you or going along in any capacity--

HK: Well I can't take you on my plane--if you are there, I'll find a way of seeing you.

MK: That'd be wonderful. Is there any way--that we could even--I was
just looking at the Life stuff by which you know from the television
point of view would be just terrific--whether there would be any
possibility of getting something from you while we were there in a
film sense and I don't want to pressure you--but if it was possible
I'd love to.

HK: I think that will probably be difficult.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Bob Haldeman

11/28/72 7:30 p.m.

BH: ...obviously that is impossible--he's already been told that by Shultz

HK: Oh he has?

BH: Yeh, he's trying to double play you I think. The President's view is that under no circumstances would he consider having an Ambassador-at-Large based in Washington to fill that job. What he is after is one matter to be based in Brussels to represent the U.S. in Europe, in NATO and the---

HK: Okay, that's what I needed guidance on--because he's--but if he has already been told, then there's--

BH: Well, he told George he was going to talk to you about it and he'd decide after that.

HK: Well, I should steer him then towards Brussels?

BH: Tell him that there is no other alternative--that the President won't consider having him based in Washington--also he said he wants to have six or eight weeks to figure it all out and then he'll decide whether or not he'll take it, and that isn't acceptable either, he's got to decide now or not take it--he's got to decide tonight.

HK: Okay fine.

BH: And the job is as offered, the combination of the community and NATO based in Brussels as the U.S. Ambassador to those two European organizations. And it does not carry Cabinet rank, which he is also holding out for, he will not be given a limousine and an airplane at his disposal--

HK: Is that what he is asking for?

BH: Yep.

HK: Don't Ambassadors get limousines?

Page 2

BH: Oh, I don't know he may get one over there, but he wants a limousine in Washington, too.

HK: Yea.

BH: that is a little psycho--(?). power-mad or something.

HK: I just wanted to--so I can--so--I can then strongly discourage him.

BH: Well, we want to encourage him to take the job we offered.

HK: No, I'll strongly encourage him to take the Brussels job--

BH: Tell him the other job is out of the question--another State Department is just what we don't need in Washington.

HK: Right. Right. Right. And I think the thing he wants to do here, he can do there.

BH: That's the whole point.

HK: I don't see why he can't revise the European policy over there.

BH: Well, and our problem is that we need the representation in Europe not that we need more people thinking about it in Washington.

HK: Yea. Okay well that's clear. Now number 2, ah, and I hate to keep coming to you with this--as soon as our friend at State came up for air, the whole mess has started all over again.

BH: Which one?

HK: I know for a certain fact that all last week, State was putting out stories that I had goofed terribly, that the President has disassociated from me that Rogers had to step in to insist that the loopholes in the agreement would be closed and to a point where Henry Hubbard has called us a few times to say that they were going to go with that story--you will see in *Time* they specifically refer to State Dept. stories that were being put out all last week. Now he's proposed that while I am in Paris, he go to Saigon and hold the fort there--

BH: (laughing) That Rogers go to Saigon ?

HK: That Rogers go to Saigon next week.

RECLASSIFIED

Authorized E012957-1
Date 01/01/01

B-01

Page 3

BH: Who'd he propose that to?

HK: to me. I mean, he hasn't--he had Alex Johnson do it.

BH: Good God.

HK: I am not even saying that he is asking people to put out these stories, but I am saying he's creating an atmosphere where these stories then get put out and for the last four months while he was on his knees you didn't get any stories like this and starting last week, he must have put out the word to build him up by any means. This is exactly what I predicted would happen. Now you know for one thing it's personally maddening. But actually if Thieu reads stories like this that the President is disassociated from me, that Rogers had to ride to the rescue, you read the Boston Globe today--

BH: Thieu is going to get the story from Duc tomorrow, so

HK: I know, that explains also why Le Duc Tho asked me last week whether I was being asked to resign--it explains the Sorshev story--why do we have to put up with it another four years?

BH: We don't have to put up with it another four years, Jesus Christ, Henry let's not be ridiculous.

HK: Well, we have it now--

BH: Okay, we probably do, and I know it is a problem--what do you want to do about it?

HK: Well what I want to do about it is first of all, to tell Alex Johnson that I passed the request up to you--that Rogers go to Saigon -- and then

BH: I don't think you want to get into that--than you get me in the channel of foreign policy decisionmaking.

HK: Yeh, but if I disapprove it--if I say no, then we'll have stories that I keep him going from Saigon

BH: No, no, just say you'll raise it with the President--then tell him tomorrow the President said for Christsake, you're out of your mind.

HK: Okay. Can you raise it--

BH: I don't think you want to put me in the foreign policy decision channel.

Page 4

HK: Well, no I don't want you in the foreign policy decision channel, but I also --

BH: What you're saying to Alex then is that you won't raise it with the President, you'll ask me.

HK: No, I'll say I'll raise it with the President, but he may get the answer from you, because you're up there with him.

BH: We can do that if you want to. It seems to me what we have to do is --if we've told him that he's got to work within the system, I don't think we should let him run around the system. Alex is following the system--

HK: All right, I'll be glad to say no, if you can guarantee me that the President will back it up.

BH: Oh sure. You don't have any question about that do you?

HK: No, I think it would be an absolute disaster to have Rogers in Saigon and why does he want to go to Saigon, no because he thinks we are in trouble but because we know we're going to settle it next week.

BH: I don't know if he's that confident.

HK: Well, I'm pretty confident.

BH: I know it, but I am surprised he is.

HK: I had a talk with Dobrynin just now and I am quite confident that we're going to make it.

BH: Good, I think you should just tell him and then I'll cover with the President, you know--I won't be talking to him tonight, I don't think--but I will cover it in the morning.

HK: Okay fine.

BH: And then you can--or you can wait until the President gets down tomorrow and then tell him.

HK: I'll tell him after the President has been down, but if you could cover it in the morning and I'll tell him that I have raised--

BH: Wherever I can help you internally on something like that, I think it's a good idea--I don't think you want to get me in the channel over there.

Page 5

HK: I think that's a good point.

BH: Because you're just undercutting yourself.

HK: No, I think that's a good point. I'll --

BH: Because then you're going to get him coming to me for asking the questions and that's the last thing you want.

HK: Right. Are you going to be down tomorrow?

BH: Yeh.

HK: Maybe we can have ten more minutes. One other thing which has
is not major--is there anybody with whom I am working who's
been offered something--let me tell you what I have in mind--
I ran into Dick Helms today at a meeting and afterwards he said
I look forward to cooperating closely with you. And he's been offered
the ambassadorship in Iran--and I thought that it meant that he was
staying on--

BH: No, no. He has accepted Iran--I've got to go through that whole cycle with you because we have to work out the whole--what you do--

HK: I think it is a very good appointment, incidentally, so it's not a
reflection on the count--it just makes me look--

BH: I understand--he called me this morning and gave me that and I should
have let you know, but I was going to go over it with you when I got down
there. I have a whole series of notes on that because we have to work
out the whole state department at that level cycle--that sets a whole ser-
in motion of assistant secretary and whatever--you know the whole shot.

HK: Yeh. I am seeing Casey tomorrow morning, I won't discuss personnel
--I am just seeing him to get things established. Okay then we can have
a talk briefly tomorrow afternoon--are you going back with the President
or staying here--

BH: He's going to stay there overnight--and the ______ will be down there
on Thursday. Then we'll leave for Florida from there at noon--
and then we're--are you coming down Saturday morning?

HK: I'll come down--(ha huh--on the protest) no I'll come down Saturday morning.

BH: He's got to see you Saturday.

UNCLASSIFIED

AUG 22 1967
B4567-1010

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Shultz

7:35 p.m. 11/28/72

HK: George, you called me.

GS: Yes, about Pete. I understand you are meeting with tonight.

HK: Yes.

GS: He said he got up that memorandum -- one to you and one to me and a copy also went up to Camp David--

HK: Right, but I just talked to Haldeman, so they don't want it.

GS: Right. I think at least as I would size it up--basically, analytically
Pete is right.

HK: I think Pete is right.

GS: We need to organize ourselves to consider Europe in a broad way
as his memorandum suggests and

HK: Oh I think Pete is right and ah, but they want him out of town.

GS: Now the President wants him in Brussels and I guess that's partly
him and partly the desire to have somebody who is over there and
is physically present.

HK: I think the former--

GS: ---the desirability to that and so it's back and forth and also with the
idea of Cabinet rank and so on till the bill.

HK: I understnad.

GS: Still in all, the--

HK: I don't think Pete will take it.

GS: Well, I don't either, but I think he is a hell of a good man -- I hate
to see him--

HK: I think we are nuts to let him go--with all the deadheads I see around
here--he is the only guy who has some creativity--or one of the few
guys with some creativity--he may be a little long-winded but I must
say on the Soviet trade stuff, he has done exactly what he was told

RECLASSIFIED

Page 2

He did it unselfishly--he was the heavy--He didn't mind playing the heavy

GS: Well, I agree with you--

HK: And I will badly miss him--I think whomever we get over at Commerce won't have his subtlety and this East/West trade negotiations are just going to go down a purely economic rail now--I really like Pete.

I

GS: Well, I do too. You and/have the same view.of him.

HK: I have to do my duty and I'll put it--try to sell Brussels to him.

GS: Right. The atmosphere up there at Camp David is --I'm not up there-- I go up every once in a while or damn near every day when there is somebody I am supposed to escort in. But the atmosphere changes by the hour.

HK: What's that in reference to: Pete? or me?

GS: To Pete--not in reference to you. Ah in the sense how he is evaluated.

HK: Basically the President doesn't like him--I don't know why--basically I think Connally did a job on him--

GS: Plus the fact that he doesn't like Percy and he's associated with Percy= that's a cross that Pete bears. But he is an awfully good man and my suggestion would be tonight to not to try to oversell this thing-- and ----something it isn't. Nevertheless---

HK: I cannot in good conscience tell him that he's going to be formulating policy over there because you know how Washington works--

GS: I agree with that, but at the same time he isn't going to be --he won't be a pure recipient of policy either.

HK: No, but he will not be able to do in Brussels what he proposed in his memos--he won't have the resources or the clout

GS: That's clear.

HK: He will have direct access to me and he'll have direct access to you but I have just never seen it work that you put something body abroad and have him become a major formulator or policy.

GS: I think that is right. But that doesn't mean that he won't have important input--

CLASSIFIED

Author: E012 98F-
Date: 6/10/93

B4

Page 3

HK: He'll have major inputs particularly given the sterility of the whole field--

GS: So I--

HK: I frankly liked his proposal.

GS: Yeh, so did I, so did I and I told him so--I gave him this feedback from Camp David, so he knows it.

HK: Right.

GS: Anyway I think we have to keep this thing alive until tomorrow--that is let's not have him decide it going home and saying all right, the hell with it.

HK: No, no, I'll --

GS: But at the same time not oversell and we'll see how the sunshines tomorrow, or if it shines.

HK: I'll get a promise out of him to --within 48 hours--

GS: They want to--a decision on this particular thing, but I think they ought to sit on that with the fact that they're going to lose them and I think it would be worthwhile if you registered in your viewpoint that he is a hell of a good man.

HK: I have done that three times--

GS: I registered that myself.

HK: And I got kicked out every time I raised it. I wanted to keep him on as Secretary of Commerce --there are a few Cabinet members I find a lot more dispensible than him.

GS: Yeh. I think that would be worth re-registering.

HK: Including my client (?)

GS: (laughs) Well you have Elliott Richardson anyway.

HK: Yeh, that's one of the few consulations. A

GS: Are we on the track on Vietnam?

DREASSIFIED
Autumn 2012 9/8
B-6F SAW DATE 9/10/9