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The Security Council resolution also affirms the need to guarantee the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through a variety of measures, including the establishment of demilitarized zones. We hope that practical arrangements can be made on the ground which will help guarantee a peaceful settlement. We hope, too, it will prove possible for the UN to perform a useful function in this and other respects. We are fully aware of the limitations and imperfections of the world organization. But the fact of the matter is that the UN Emergency Force helped maintain quiet along the demarcation lines for over a decade, and it may prove possible to have the UN involved in ways which will not make it possible for one party to eliminate its presence unilaterally.

Thirdly, How can such elements of a settlement be put into effect in order to achieve a permanent peace?

Operative paragraph 3 of the UN Security Council resolution calls on Ambassador Jarring "to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." His job, therefore, is to promote agreement between the parties. We underscore this because we are convinced that if a peace is to be lasting, it will require the assent and full cooperation of the parties in the area.

Our hope is that the Four Power talks which began last week will find ways to reinforce future efforts of the UN representative with the parties. This will be no easy task. We realize that common ground between the major parties cannot be achieved quickly -- and indeed may not be realizable at all. We submitted some concrete substantive ideas at the opening meeting as did some of the others. The early sessions indicate that all four powers agree the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and there appears to be considerable concern over the continuing wide gulf between the parties. Whether this concern can be translated into common or parallel positions which could be conveyed to Ambassador Jarring and the parties for their consideration, only further time and explorations will tell.

We do not conceive of the Four Power approach in lieu of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council resolution. Our purpose is to help him buttress future efforts with the Arabs and the Israelis.

We do not see four power talks as a mechanism to impose peace. As President Nixon has said: "The Four Powers ... cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future where their vital interests are involved."

We do not see a four power solution as a substitute for agreement between the parties.

But common or parallel four power views could influence the parties at least to narrow their differences and to make progress towards peace which ultimately could enhance the security of both Israel and the Arab

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the Arab states. As Secretary Rogers said on April 7, the force of reasoning and the force of public opinion have a lot to do with influencing nations.

Conclusion:

We are determined to use all appropriate approaches, bilateral and multilateral, to seek a rational and enduring settlement which will advance U.S. national interests, ensure Israel's survival, safeguard legitimate Arab interests and take fully into account the interests of the world community. If there is to be a settlement there must be compromises on both sides; this is the essence of negotiated settlements.

I cannot predict the results. We have no illusion about the difficulties ahead. But I am reminded of a remark of a great American when he said: "Optimism is to the diplomat what courage is to the soldier." We have no prescription for instant peace. I am certain, however, that no opportunity to achieve a fair settlement so necessary and potentially beneficial to all the peoples of the region will be overlooked by the United States.

* * * * *

PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 4

of the

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

12:00 Noon

March 14, 1969

Friday

In The East Room
At The White House
Washington, D. C.

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, today I am announcing a decision which I believe is vital for the security and defense of the United States, and also in the interest of peace throughout the world.

Last year a program, the SENTINEL antiballistic missile program, was adopted. That program, as all listeners on television and radio and readers of newspapers know, has been the subject of very strong debate and controversy over the past few months.

After long study of all the options available, I have concluded that the SENTINEL program previously adopted should be substantially modified. The new program that I have recommended this morning to the leaders, and that I announce today, is one that perhaps best can be described as a safeguard program.

It is a safeguard against any attack by the Chinese Communists that we can foresee over the next 10 years.

It is a safeguard of our deterrent system, which is increasingly vulnerable due to the advances that have been made by the Soviet Union since the year 1967 when the SENTINEL program was first laid out.

It is a safeguard also against any irrational or accidental attack that might occur of less than massive magnitude which might be launched from the Soviet Union.

The program also does not do some things which should be clearly understood. It does not provide defense for our cities, and for that reason the sites have been moved away from our major cities. I have made the decision with regard to this particular point because I found that there is no way, even if we were to expand the limited SENTINEL system which was planned for some of our cities to a so-called heavy or thick system -- there is no way that we can adequately defend our cities without an unacceptable loss of life.

The only way that I have concluded that we can save lives, which is the primary purpose of our defense system, is to prevent war, and that is why the emphasis of this system is on protecting our deterrent, which is the best preventive for war.

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The system differs from the previous SENTINEL system in another major respect. The SENTINEL system called for a fixed deployment schedule. I believe that because of a number of reasons, we should have a phase system. That is why, on an annual basis, the new safeguard system will be reviewed, and the review may bring about changes in the system based on our evaluation of three major points.

First, what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the threat, whether from the Soviet Union or from the Chinese; and, second, in terms of what our evaluation is of any talks that we are having by that time, or may be having, with regard to arms control; and, finally because we believe that since this is a new system, we should constantly examine what progress has been made in the development of the technique to see if changes in the system should be made.

I should admit at this point that this decision has not been an easy one. None of the great decisions made by a President are easy. But it is one that I have made after considering all of the options, and I would indicate before going to your questions two major options that I have overruled.

One is moving to a massive city defense. I have already indicated why I do not believe that is, first, feasible, and there is another reason: Moving to a massive city defense system, even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system, tends to be more provocative in terms of making credible a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation which might deter arms talks.

The other alternative, at the other extreme, was to do nothing, or to delay for six or twelve months, which would be the equivalent, really, of doing nothing, or, for example, going the road only of research and development.

I have examined those options. I have ruled them out because I have concluded that the first deployment of this system, which will not occur until 1973, that that first deployment is essential by that date if we are to meet the threat that our present intelligence indicates will exist by 1973.

In other words, we must begin now. If we delay a year, for example, it means that that first deployment will be delayed until 1975. That might be too late.

It is the responsibility of the President of the United States, above all other responsibilities, to think first of the security of the United States. I believe that this system is the best step that we can take to provide for that security.

There are, of course, other possibilities that have been strongly urged by some of the leaders this morning -- for example that we could increase our offensive capability, our submarine force, or even our MINUTEMAN force or our bomber force. That I would consider to be, however, the wrong road

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because it would be provocative to the Soviet Union and might escalate an arms race.

This system is truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only. It safeguards our deterrent and under those circumstances can, in no way, in my opinion, delay the progress which I hope will continue to be made toward arms talks, which will limit arms, not only this kind of system, but particularly offensive systems.

We will now go to your questions.

Mr. Smith?

QUESTION: Mr. President, the war in Vietnam has been intensifying recently, and if there has been any notable progress in Paris it has not been detectible publicly. Is your patience growing a little thin with these continued attached, particularly such as came out of the DMZ today?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith, you may recall that on March 4 when I received a similar question, at an earlier stage of the attacks, I issued what was interpreted widely as a warning. It will be my policy as President to issue a warning only once, and I will not repeat it now. Anything in the future that is done will be done. There will be no additional warning.

As far as the Paris talks are concerned, I have noted the speculation in the press with regard to whether we will have, or should have, or are, for example, approving private talks going forward. I will not discuss that subject. I trust there will be private talks.

I think that is where this war will be settled -- in private rather than in public. This is in the best interest of both sides, but public discussion of what I think is significant progress which is being made along the lines of private talks, I will not indulge in.

Mr. Cormier?

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QUESTION: Mr. President, will you make your own State of the Union address, and what will your legislative program encompass?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not plan a State of the Union address in the traditional manner. I will, within approximately a month, however, state a general domestic program. By that time the program will be at the point that I think it should be completely summarized and set forth, not only for the Nation, as to what we have done, but particularly to the Congress as to what we expect for the balance. I would not want to anticipate now what will be in that program.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been a great deal of criticism in Congress against deployment of any type of antiballistic defense system. What kind of reception do you think your proposal this morning will receive there?

THE PRESIDENT: It will be a very spirited debate, and it will be a very close vote. Debates in the field of national defense are often spirited and the votes are often close. Many of my friends in Congress who were there before I was there remarked that the vote on extending the draft in 1941 won by only one vote.

This might be that close. I think, however, that after the Members of the House and the Senate consider this program, which is a minimum program, and which particularly provides options to change in other directions if we find the threat is changed, or that the art has changed, our evaluation of the technique has changed, I think that we have a good chance of getting approval. We will, of course, express our views, and we hope that we will get support from the country.

QUESTION: Mr. President, I understand that your first construction or deployment of antimissile systems would be around two MINUTEMAN retaliatory operations. Do you think that deploying around these two provides enough deterrent that would be effective?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me explain the difference between deploying around two MINUTEMAN bases and deploying around, say, 10 cities.

Where you are looking toward a city defense, it needs to be a perfect or near perfect system to be credible because, as I examine the possibility of even a thick defense of cities, I have found that even the most optimistic projections, considering the highest development of the art, would mean that we would still lose 30 million to 40 million lives. That would be less than half of what we would otherwise lose. But we would still lose 30 million to 40 million.

When you are talking about protecting your deterrent, it need not be perfect. It is necessary only to protect enough of the deterrent that the retaliatory second strike will be of such magnitude that the enemy would think twice before launching a first strike.

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It has been my conclusion that by protecting two
MINUTEMAN sites, we will preserve that deterrent as a
credible deterrent, and that that will be decisive and
could be decisive insofar as the enemy considering the
possibility of a first strike.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there have been charges
from Capitol Hill that you have stepped up the war in Vietnam.
Have you?

THE PRESIDENT: I have not stepped up the war in
Vietnam. I actually have examined not only the charges, but
also examined the record. I discussed it at great length
yesterday with Secretary Laird.

What has happened is this: For the past six months,
the forces on the other side have been planning for an
offensive, and for the past six months they not only have
planned for an offensive, but they have been able, as a
result of that planning, to have mounted a rather substantial
offensive.

Under those circumstances, we had no other choice
but to try to blunt the offensive. Had General Abrams not
responded in this way, we would have suffered far more
casualties than we have suffered, and we have suffered more
than, of course, any of us would have liked to have seen.

The answer is that any escalation of the war in
Vietnam has been the responsibility of the enemy. If the
enemy de-escalates its attacks, ours will go down. We are
not trying to step it up. We are trying to do everything
that we can in the conduct of our war in Vietnam to see that
we can go forward toward peace in Paris.

That is why my response has been measured,
deliberate and, some think, too cautious. But it will con-
tinue to be that way, because I am thinking of those peace
talks every time I think of a military option in Vietnam.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, your safeguard ABM system, I understand, would cost about $1 billion less in the coming fiscal year than the plan which President Johnson sent up. Would this give you the opportunity to reduce the surcharge or will the continued high level of taxation be needed for the economy?

THE PRESIDENT: That question will be answered when we see the entire budget. Secretary Laird will testify on the defense budget on Wednesday.

Incidentally, my understanding at this time, and I have seen the preliminary figures, is that the defense budget that Secretary Laird will present will be approximately $2-1/2 billion less than that submitted by the previous Administration.

Whether after considering the defense budget and all of the other budgets that have been submitted, we then can move in the direction of either reducing the surcharge or move in the direction of some of our very difficult problems with regard to our cities, the problem of hunger and others -- these are the options that I will have to consider at a later time.

QUESTION: Mr. President, last week you said that in the matter of Vietnam you would not tolerate heavier casualties and a continuation of the violation of the understanding without making an appropriate response.

Is what we are doing now in Vietnam in a military way that response of which you were speaking?

THE PRESIDENT: This is a very close decision on our part, one that I not only discussed with Secretary Laird yesterday, but that we will discuss more fully in the Security Council tomorrow.

I took no comfort out of the stories that I saw in the papers this morning to the effect that our casualties for the immediate past week went from 400 down to 300. That still is too high. What our response should be must be measured in terms of the effect on the negotiations in Paris. I will only respond as I did earlier to Mr. Smith's question. We issued a warning. I will not wam again. If we conclude that the level of casualties is higher than we should tolerate, action will take place.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you have reason to believe that the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalating move in the arms race?

THE PRESIDENT: As a matter of fact, Mr. Kaplow, I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own ABM system, and, as you know, they have 67 missile ABM sites deployed around Moscow, they rejected the idea that it escalated the arms race on the ground that it was defensive solely in character, and, second, when the United States last year went

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forward on the SENTINEL system, four days later the Soviet
Union initiated the opportunity to have arms limitation talks.

I think the Soviet Union recognizes very clearly the
difference between a defensive posture and an offensive
posture.

I would also point this out, an interesting thing
about Soviet military and diplomatic history: They have always
thought in defensive terms, and if you read not only their
political leaders, but their military leaders, the emphasis
is on defense.

I think that since this system now, as a result of
moving the city defense out of it, and the possibility of
that city defense growing into a thick defense, I think
this makes it so clearly defensive in character that the
Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the
arms race.

QUESTION: Mr. President, last week at your press
conference you mentioned negotiations with the Russians at
the highest level being in the wind. Could you tell us if
since then we have moved any closer to such a summit meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: I should distinguished between
negotiations at what you call the highest level, and
what I said was the highest level, and talks. Talks
with the Soviet Union are going on at a number of levels
at this time, on a number of subjects.

However, those talks have not yet reached the point
where I have concluded, or where I believe they have concluded,
that a discussion at the summit level would be useful. Whenever
those talks, preliminary talks, do reach that point, I
anticipate that a summit meeting would take place.

I do not think one will take place in the near
future, but I think encouraging progress is being made toward
the time when a summit talk may take place.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there have been several
reports from your staff members that Kennedy and Johnson
hold-over people who made policy have sown themselves into
civil service status and this may mean some problem for you
people in personnel. I wonder if this means that you
will transfer a lot of these people or abolish jobs?

THE PRESIDENT: I have heard a lot from some of my
Republican friends on Capitol Hill on this point, as well as
from, of course, Republican leaders in the Nation. It seems
that this is a rather common practice, when one Administration
goes out and the other one comes in. We will do what we think
will best serve the interest of effective Government, and if
the individual who has been frozen in can do the job, we are
going to keep him.

However, we are moving some out, but we wouldn't
do it through subterfuge. We will try to do it quite
directly.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, in your recent European trip, did you find any willingness on the part of our allies to increase their military and financial contribution to the alliance?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that matter was discussed with all of our allies, and particularly will be a subject for discussion when we have the 20th Anniversary meeting of NATO here in April.

I think it might be potentially embarrassing to allies to suggest that we are urging them, any one specifically, to do one thing or another in this field. I think it is best for me to leave it in these terms:

Our allies do recognize the necessity to maintain NATO's conventional forces. They do recognize that they must carry their share or that the United States, and particularly our Congress, representing our people, will have much less incentive to carry our share. I believe they will do their share, but I think we are going to do the best through quiet conversation rather than public declaration.

Yes, sir?

QUESTION: In any talks with the Soviet Union, would you be willing to consider abandoning the ABM program altogether if the Soviets showed a similar willingness or, indeed, if they showed a readiness to place limitations on offensive weapons?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Scali, I am prepared, in the event that we go into arms talks, to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks, that at least preliminarily have been discussed, do not involve limitations or reduction. They involve only freezing where we are.

Your question goes to abandoning. On that particular point, I think it would take two, naturally, to make the agreement. Let's look at the Soviet Union's position with its defensive deployment of ABM's. Previously, that deployment was aimed only toward the United States. Today their radars, from our intelligence, are also directed toward Communist China.

I would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat. So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think these developments of the Soviet Union and the United States are compatible with the aims of the NPT?

THE PRESIDENT: I considered that problem, and I believe that they are compatible with the NPT. We discussed that in the leaders' meeting this morning and I pointed out that as we consider this kind of defensive system, which enables the United States of America to make its deterrent

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capability credible, that that will have an enormous effect
in reducing the pressure on other countries who might want
to acquire nuclear weapons.

That is the key point. If a country doesn't feel
that the major country that has a nuclear capability has a
credible deterrent, then they would move in that direction.

One other point I wish to make, and make an announce-
ment with regard to the NPT: that I was delighted to see the
Senate's confirmation or consent to the treaty, and this
announcement -- I hope President Johnson is looking. I
haven't talked to him on the phone. I am going to invite
President Johnson, if his schedule permits, to attend the
ceremony when we will have the ratification of the treaty,
because he started it in his Administration and I think he
should participate when we ratify it.

Mr. Lisagor?

QUESTION: Mr. President, I wonder if I could turn to the campus disorders and unrest. They are continuing and we haven't had an opportunity to ask you your views of them. But particularly, would you favor the cutting off of Federal loans to the offenders?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Lisagor, I have asked the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to examine this problem, particularly in view of a
Congressional report that 122 of the 540 who had been arrested
at San Francisco State were direct recipients of Federal funds.

I will have a statement on that that I will be making
either Monday or Tuesday, in detail. I would prefer not to
go into it now.

Mr. Semple?

QUESTION: To follow up Mr. Bailey's question on
Vietnam earlier, is there any evidence that your measured
response to the enemy attacks in South Vietnam has produced
or yielded any results in Paris or in the attitudes of the
North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi?

THE PRESIDENT: Our measured response has not had the
effect of discouraging the progress, and it is very limited
progress, toward talks in Paris. That is the negative side
in answering your question.

As to whether or not a different response would
either discourage those talks or might have the effect of
even encouraging them is the decision that we now have to
make.

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Page 10

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, on *Vietnam*, in connection with Secretary Laird's visit, we have heard for sometime predictions that American troop levels could be cut as the South Vietnamese capabilities improve, and again last week, while he was in Vietnam, we were getting similar reports from Saigon despite the high level of the fighting that is going on now.

Do you see any prospect for withdrawing American troops in any numbers soon?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Mr. Bailey, in view of the current offensive on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, there is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

When we are able to reduce forces as a result of a combination of circumstances -- the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves in areas where we now are defending them; the progress of the talks in Paris; or the level of enemy activity -- when that occurs, I will make an announcement. But at this time there is no foreseeable prospect.

Mr. Theis?

**QUESTION:** What effect, if any, will your safeguard program have on the shelter program? Can you tell us anything about your long-range plans?

**THE PRESIDENT:** Congressman Holifield in the meeting this morning strongly urged that the Administration look over the shelter program and he made the point that he thought it had fallen somewhat into disarray due to lack of attention over the past few years.

I have directed that General Lincoln, the head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness -- I had directed him previously to conduct such a survey. We are going to look at the shelter program to see what we can do there in order to minimize American casualties.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, if I recall correctly, at the last press conference when you were discussing the meeting with *General de Gaulle*, and the *Middle East* situation, you said you were encouraged by what he told you, because he was moving closer to our position.

I wonder if you can tell us what our position is in the Middle East, and if it has changed significantly in the last year?

**THE PRESIDENT:** We have had bilateral talks not only with the French, but also with the Soviet Union, and with the British, preparatory to the possibility of four-power talks. I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point.

We are closer together than we were, but we still have a lot of yardage to cover. And until we make further progress in developing a common position, I would prefer not to lay out what our position is.

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PRESS CONFERENCE

of the

11:00 A.M. EST

February 6, 1969

Thursday

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, as you will note from a release from the Press Office, I will leave on the 23rd of this month for a trip to Europe which will take me to Brussels, to London, to Berlin and Bonn, to Rome and to Paris.

I will be accompanied on the trip by the Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, and by my adviser for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger.

The purpose of the trip I will describe as being a working trip rather than a protocol trip. I plan to see in each of the countries I visit the head of government, and in addition to that, I will have a visit with the members of our United States Delegation in Paris, headed by Ambassador Lodge, and will have a meeting with Pope Paul in Rome.

While I am in Brussels, I will see leaders of the NATO community. As far as the agenda is concerned for these meetings, it is wide open. I have some ideas about the future of the European community which I will discuss, and I am sure that my colleagues in that community have some ideas that they will want to discuss.

I have requested that in addition to the usual group meetings which will take place, that I have an opportunity to have an individual, face-to-face meeting with each head of government, with no one present except a translator when needed.

As I look at this trip and what it may accomplish, I want to make very clear that this is only a first step in achieving a purpose that I have long felt is vital to the future of peace for the United States and for the world. That is the strengthening and revitalizing of the American-European community.

This will be the first, I would hope, of several meetings of this type that will take place in the years ahead. I would trust that as a result of this meeting, and as a result of other meetings that will take place, this great alliance which, in my view, has been the greatest force for peace, to keep the peace, over the last 20 years -- this great alliance which was brought together by a common fear 20 years ago -- will be held together now and strengthened by a common sense of purpose.

I will now go to your questions. Mr. Smith?

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Page 2

QUESTION: Mr. President, in connection with your visit to Paris and your talks with Ambassador Lodge, do you see any possibility of your having any direct contact with the other side in these negotiations, specifically, the representatives of North Vietnam or the NLF?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Smith, I do not see any possibility of that kind of conversation at this time. I would not rule it out at some later time, if Ambassador Lodge and others who have responsibility for negotiation thought it were wise.

With Ambassador Lodge and his colleagues, I hope to get a complete report on the progress of the negotiations and also any recommendations that he or they may have with regard to new initiatives that we might take to make more progress than we have made.

I think we have made a good start in Paris, incidentally. I believe that we can now move forward to some substantive achievements.

Mr. Cormier?

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[1c]

Page 3

QUESTION: Mr. President, looking beyond this trip, can you give us a clue of your attitude on the possibility of future meetings with Soviet leaders?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe that a meeting with Soviet leaders should take place at a future time. I should make clear that I think that where summitry is concerned, I take a dim view of what some have called instant summitry, particularly where there are very grave differences of opinion between those who are to meet.

I believe that a well prepared summit meeting, where we have on the table the various differences that we have, on which we can perhaps make progress, would be in our interest and in their interest, and it will be my intention after this trip is completed to conduct exploratory talks at various levels to see if such a meeting could take place.

I should point out, incidentally, that one of the reasons that this trip takes precedence is that I have long felt that before we have meetings of summitry with the Soviet leaders, it is vitally important that we have talks with our European allies, which we are doing.

Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Mr. President, this morning South Vietnamese President Thieu said that the South Vietnamese army is capable of relieving a sizable number of American troops in Vietnam. What is your understanding of sizable, and do you think that there will actually be a reduction of the number of American troops?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, speaking personally, and also as the Commander of the Armed Forces, I do not want an American boy to be in Vietnam for one day longer than is necessary for our national interest. As our Commanders in the field determine that the South Vietnamese are able to assume a greater portion of the responsibility for the defense of their own territory, troops will come back. However, at this time, I have no announcements to make with regard to the return of troops.

I will only say that it is high on the agenda of priorities, and that just as soon as either the training program for South Vietnamese forces and their capabilities, the progress of the Paris peace talks, or other developments make it feasible to do so, troops will be brought back.

Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Mr. President, on your trip to Paris, do you plan to see the South Vietnamese negotiators there? In that connection, a general question on the talks themselves: Do you think you can continue to separate the military issues from the political issues, and the political settlement of South Vietnam in the negotiations in Paris?

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, Mr. Lisagor, that is one of the matters that I want to discuss with Ambassador Lodge, to get his judgment on that point. It is our view that at this time the separation of those two items is in our interest and in the interest of bringing progress in those talks.

Now, as far as meeting with the South Vietnamese leaders is concerned, we have no present plans to do so. If Ambassador Lodge advises that it would be wise to do so, such meetings will be scheduled. There will be enough time in the schedule for a meeting if he does suggest it.

Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Mr. President, your nominee and now your Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Yost, has been under attack from some conservative groups, such as the Liberty Lobby, for his past associations with certain individuals, particularly including Alger Hiss. In light of your more than passing familiarity with the Hiss case, will you comment on these attacks on Mr. Yost and whether they should be given credence?

THE PRESIDENT: As far as Mr. Yost's background is concerned, I am completely aware of it because, of course, all of these matters are brought to my attention before appointments are made. But what I am looking to now is his capability to handle the problems of the future and not events that occurred over 20 years ago.

There is no question about his loyalty to this country. And I also think there is no question about his very good judgment on critical issues confronting the United States, particularly in the Mideast.

As I pointed out, he is one of our prime experts in the Mideast. He sat in on the National Security Council meetings when we discussed the Mideast and made some very valuable contributions.

QUESTION: Mr. President, on the Middle East, now that you have completed your review with the NSC, you spoke of the need for new initiatives, can you tell us what your policy is going to be now and what initiatives you do expect to take?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Bailey, our initiatives in the Mideast I think can well be summarized by that very word that you have used. What we see now is a new policy on the part of the United States in assuming the initiative. We are not going to stand back and rather wait for something else to happen. We are going to assume it on what I would suggest five fronts.

We are going to continue to give our all-out support to the Jarring Mission. We are going to have bilateral talks at the United Nations, preparatory to the talks between the four powers. We shall have four-power talks at the United Nations. We shall also have talks with the countries in the

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QUESTION: Mr. President, how do you feel about the Johnson Administration's tax reform proposal that would exempt many poor families from paying any taxes at all, but would guarantee that wealthy families at least pay some minimum income tax? We are told that you are sending up a tax reform proposal and would like to get your opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: Tax reform has been a matter of discussion within Administration councils during the past week. In a discussion which I understand has already been widely publicized that I had with Chairman Mills of the Ways and Means Committee, and the ranking Republican, Mr. Byrnes, we went over the agenda and also the timetable as to when the proposals should come down.

The Secretary of the Treasury will have a preliminary announcement to make on tax reform tomorrow. He will make major tax reform recommendations to the Congress at a later time.

But at this time I do not want to indicate in advance the areas in which we are going to move. I will say that the two areas that you mentioned were considered and were discussed in the conference that we had here in the White House with the ranking members of the Ways and Means Committee.

QUESTION: Mr. President, would you please tell us how you plan to move in solving some of the problems of Latin America? Have you decided on your Assistant Secretary of State in that field?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe we have decided on the Assistant Secretary of State, but I am not yet prepared to make the announcement because the necessary clearances have not taken place.

May I make one thing very clear: I have noticed news stories to the effect that the job was going begging and we were unable to find a qualified man. We have several qualified people but the Secretary of State and I agree that this is an area of top priority. We think we need new initiatives with regard to the Alliance for Progress.

I would describe that in this way: I think the difficulty in the past, a well-intentioned difficulty, has been that we have been putting too much emphasis on what we are going to do for Latin America and not enough emphasis on what we are going to do with our Latin American friends. The new Assistant Secretary will attempt to remedy that and we shall attempt to develop new policies.

QUESTION: Mr. President, the Pentagon announced this morning that Secretary Laird had ordered a temporary halt in the construction of the Sentinel System, pending a high level review. Does that represent a change in policy on our part? Does it indicate that maybe we are getting somewhere with the Russians toward an agreement whereby neither one of us would have to build it?

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THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Kaplow, answering the second part of your question first, there has been no progress with regard to the arms control talks with the Russians. I have made it clear in the appointment of Mr. Smith to that position that we are going to put emphasis on those talks, but I do believe we should go forward on settling some of the political differences at the same time.

As far as the decision on the Sentinel is concerned, Secretary Laird and his colleagues at the Defense Department will make decisions based on the security of the United States, and he will announce those decisions and justify them at this point.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been some apprehension, sir, in Asia that your re-emphasis on U.S. relations with Europe would mean a lessening of U.S. interests in Asia. Would you comment on that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: This gives me an opportunity to perhaps state my philosophy about emphasis on different parts of the world.

The reason that we have been discussing the Mideast a great deal lately is that it is an area of the world which might explode into a major war. Therefore, it needs immediate attention. That does not mean, however, that we are not going to continue to put attention on Latin America, on Africa, on Asia.

I think you could describe me best as not being a "half-worlder", with my eyes looking only to Europe or only to Asia, but one who sees the whole world. We live in one world and we must go forward together in this whole world.

Yes, sir?

QUESTION: Mr. President, you know the ABM system was planned originally to protect us against the threat of a nuclear attack by Red China early in the 1970's. Does your information indicate that there is any lessening of this threat, or greater, or just where do we stand on that?

THE PRESIDENT: First, I do not buy the assumption that the ABM system, the thin Sentinel system, as it has been described, was simply for the purpose of protecting ourselves against attack from Communist China.

This system, as are the systems that the Soviet Union have already deployed, adds to our overall defense capability. I would further say that, as far as the threat is concerned, we do not see any change in that threat, and we are examining, therefore, all of our defense systems and all of our defense postures to see how we can best meet them consistent with our other responsibilities.

QUESTION: Mr. President, as you are aware, I am sure, there has been discussion on the Hill about trying to set up a Department of Peace to include the Peace Corps and the Disarmament Agency and other organizations. I wondered about your reaction to that idea.

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THE PRESIDENT: In fact, one of my task forces recommended a Department of Peace. I think, however, that derogates, and improperly downgrades, the role of the Department of State and the Department of Defense.

I consider the Department of State to be a Department of Peace. I consider the Department of Defense to be a Department of Peace, and I can assure you that at the White House level, in the National Security Council, that is where we coordinate all of our efforts toward peace.

I think putting one department over here as a Department of Peace would tend to indicate that the other departments were engaged in other activities that were not interested in peace.

QUESTION: Mr. President, will you support the FCC proposal to ban cigarette advertising on radio and TV?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as a non-smoker, it wouldn't pose any problems to me. I, however, have only had that FCC proposal brought to my attention by the late TV reports last night and the morning papers. I have not yet had an opportunity to evaluate it. After I have evaluated it, I will make an announcement as to my position.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been conflicting speculation about the extent to which your Administration will seek to advance school desegregation. Could you tell us what your policy will be on that, specifically including the so-called "freedom of choice" plan?

THE PRESIDENT: That was a subject, as you will recall from having covered me in the campaign, that I addressed myself to on several occasions.

First, as far as freedom of choice is concerned, freedom of choice must be defined in terms of what it does. If freedom of choice is found to be simply a subterfuge to perpetuate segregation, then funds should be denied to such a school system. If a freedom of choice plan, however, is found to be one which actually is bringing an end to segregation, then a freedom of choice plan, in my opinion, is appropriate and should receive funds.

As far as school segregation is concerned, I support the law of the land. I believe that funds should be denied to those districts that continue to perpetuate segregation. I think that what we have here is a very difficult problem, however, in implementing it. One is our desire, a desire that was emphasized by Dr. Allen, to keep our schools open, because education must receive the highest priority. The other is our desire to see to it that our schools are not segregated.

That is why I have, in discussing this with Secretary Finch and with Dr. Allen, urged that before we use the ultimate weapon of denying funds and closing a school, let's exhaust every other possibility to see that local school districts do comply with the law.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, do you support Dr. Allen's statement of yesterday that he believes massive aid to urban schools is necessary?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I support the proposition that there needs to be a massive infusion of assistance to education. Let me make one thing very clear in that respect, so that you can get my thinking directly. You will note yesterday that I supported a $10 million increase in the fund for the National Science Foundation, which will go to higher education.

I believe higher education needs more assistance, too. But at the present time the great need is in the area described by educators of "K through 12," kindergarten through 12th grade -- preparing students in those years for the higher education which is now available to virtually every student who is capable of meeting the standards for getting into college.

As far as Dr. Allen's method of doing so, I do not believe that he, sophisticated as he is as the Superintendent of a State School System, would suggest that we go around the states. We cannot do that because the cities and the school systems within a state cannot exist without the state government.

However, the area of need is primarily in the city school systems. We will try to meet that problem as best we can.

QUESTION: Mr. President, may I ask you two questions about the disaster in Santa Barbara. One, do Secretary Hickel's actions so far accord with your policies; and two, what implications does this disaster have for future conservation policy here?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, answering the second part of your question first, I have found that for 15 years we have not had any up-dating of our policies with regard to off-shore drilling. Secretary Hickel has now initiated a study within the Department for up-dating those regulations so that this kind of incident will not occur again.

With regard to the action that he has taken, I think he acted promptly in temporarily stopping the drilling and then insisting on very stringent requirements on the Union Oil Company and others involved so that this would not happen.

Looking to the future however, we have got to get at the source of the problem. That means very stringent regulations in off-shore drilling, because there isn't any question that if the companies involved will make the necessary expenditures in setting up their wells off-shore, there is minimal danger of this kind of an activity.

QUESTION: Mr. President, we were told yesterday by the Congressional Leaders, that in dealing with labor disputes, like the dock strike, you preferred a permanent, long-range approach. And yet there seems to be real scepticism on the Hill that anything will be done. Can you give us your views currently on this?

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, my view with regard to the dock strike is that for the White House to indicate publicly that we are going to do this and that generally has the effect of telling the parties to do nothing. For that reason, I think Secretary Shultz very properly is playing a mediating role but making it very clear that the primary responsibility is on the parties themselves.

Now, long range, I believe that the Taft-Hartley Act's provisions for national emergency strikes, which I helped to write along with other members of the Labor Committee 20 years ago, that those provisions are now outmoded. I do not believe we have enough options in dealing with these kinds of disputes and breakdowns. I have, therefore, asked the Department of Labor to develop some new approaches in this field, and we will submit them by legislation to this Congress.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you agree with those who say that you and your Administration have a serious problem with distrust among the blacks, and whether you agree that it is one of your more serious problems or not could you tell us specifically what you are doing to deal with what some consider to be this distrust among the blacks?

THE PRESIDENT: I am concerned about this problem; and incidentally, let me make it very clear that those who have raised this question are not simply those who are political opponents. My Task Force on Education pointed up that I was not considered -- I think the words they used -- as a friend by many of our black citizens in America.

I can only say that, by my actions as President, I hope to rectify that. I hope that by what we do in terms of dealing with the problems of all Americans, it will be made clear that the President of the United States, as an elected official, has no state constituency. He has no Congressional constituency. He does not represent any special group. He represents all the people. He is the friend of all the people.

Putting it another way, as a lawyer, the President is the counsel for all the people of this country, and I hope that I can gain the respect and I hope eventually the friendship of black citizens and other Americans.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been some confusion this week on the relationship between the National Security Council and the State Department. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State reporting to the NSC. Could you clarify that for us, please?

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THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Secretary of State is my chief foreign policy adviser and the chief agent of this Government in carrying out foreign policy abroad. As one of my very close friends, personally, he advises me independently as well as through the National Security Council.

The question has also, I know, been raised as to who makes the policy and the decisions? Are they made in the National Security Council or are they made in the State Department?

The answer is, neither place. The State Department advises the President. The National Security Council advises the President. The President has the authority to make decisions, and I intend to exercise that authority.

QUESTION: Mr. President, during the election campaign, sir, you said that you would seek international agreements to limit the import of certain textiles. Can you tell us when you plan to get around to doing that?

Also, could you give us some idea as to what you feel about the growing feeling of protectionism in Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: Let me start at the second part of the question first. I believe that the interest of the United States and the interest of the whole world will best be served by moving toward freer trade rather than toward protectionism.

I take a dim view of this tendency to move toward quotas and other methods that may become permanent, whether they are applied here or by other nations abroad.

Second, as far as the textile situation is concerned, that is a special problem which has caused very great distress in certain parts of this country, and to a great number of wage earners, as well as those who operate our textile facilities.

For that reason, exploratory discussions have taken place and will be taking place with the major countries involved to see if we can handle this on a volunteer basis rather than having to go to a legislation which would impose quotas, and I think would turn the clock back in our objective of trying to achieve freer trade.

QUESTION: Mr. President, there has been a court of inquiry in the city of Coronado for several weeks now on the PUEBLO seizure. Do you think it is proper for the Navy, in effect, to be sitting in judgment of itself, or do you see any need for any kind of Presidential commission on this?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as a Navy man, I know that the Navy has procedures which I think very adequately protect the rights of defendants in courts martial.

Second, I believe those procedures, from my investigation to date, have been very scrupulously followed.

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Third, however, because of the great interest in
this case, the Secretary of Defense has asked, as you know,
Mr. Packard, the Deputy Secretary, to conduct a thorough
investigation, not only of the handling of this case, but
also an investigation as to how we can avoid this kind of
an incident occurring in the future.

I also want to make it clear that I, as the Chief
Executive of the Nation, will examine the whole record myself,
both with regard to the individual guilt or innocence of the
people involved, and also with regard to the even more impor-
tant objective of seeing to it that this kind of incident
can be avoided in the future.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have now asked the Senate to ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty. On your trip to Europe, do you have any hopes of trying to persuade particularly West Germany and France to move a little closer toward signing that treaty?

THE PRESIDENT: My view about asking other govern-
ments to follow our lead is this: They know what we think,
and I am sure that that matter will come up for discussion.

I will make it clear that I believe that ratifica-
tion of the treaty by all governments, nuclear and non-nuclear,
is in the interest of peace and in the interest of reducing
the possibility of nuclear proliferation.

On the other hand, I do not believe that we gain
our objectives through heavy-handed activities, publicly
particularly, in attempting to get others to follow our lead.
Each of these governments is a sovereign government. Each
has its own political problems. I think in the end, most of
our friends in Western Europe will follow our lead. I will
attempt to persuade, but I will not, certainly, attempt to use
any blackmail or arm-twisting.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in staffing your Admin-
istration, you have so far made about 200 high-level Cabinet
and other policy position appointments, and of these only
three have gone to women. Could you tell us, sir, whether
we can expect a more equitable recognition of women's abilities,
or are we going to remain a lost sex?

THE PRESIDENT: Would you be interested in coming into
the Government?

Very seriously, I had not known that only three
had gone to women, and I shall see that we correct that im-
balance very promptly.

QUESTION: On the Non-Proliferation Treaty again,
last fall during the campaign, Mr. President, you opposed
ratification of the treaty because of the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia. Can you tell me, sir, how you feel that
situation has changed since then?

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THE PRESIDENT: It has changed in the sense that the number of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia has been substantially reduced.

It has changed also in the sense that the passage of time tends somewhat to reduce the pent-up feelings that were then present with regard to the Soviet Union's actions.

I want to make it very clear that in asking the Senate to ratify the treaty, I did not gloss over the fact that we still very strongly disapproved of what the Soviet Union had done in Czechoslovakia and what it still is doing. But on balance, I considered that this was the time to move forward on the treaty, and have done so.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

END

(AT 11:30 A.M. EST)

PRESS CONFERENCE NO. 1

of the

11:00 A.M. EST

January 27, 1969

Monday

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, since this
is my first press conference since the Inauguration, I can
imagine there are a number of questions. Consequently, I
will make no opening statement and we will go directly to
your questions.

Mr. Cormier?

QUESTION: Do you plan to make your own State of the Union Message, and do you have a major legislative program to send to Congress this year?

THE PRESIDENT: I shall have a major legislative
program to present to the Congress this year. Whether that
would best be presented by a series of individual messages
or a State of the Union Message, supplemented by some indivi-
dual messages, is yet to be determined. I will make a deter-
mination within the next two weeks, after consultation with
the Legislative Leaders.

Miss Thomas?

QUESTION: Mr. President, what is your peace plan
for Vietnam?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe as we look at what is
happening in negotiations in Paris, as far as the American
side is concerned we are off to a good start. What now, of
course, is involved is what happens on the other side.

We find that in Paris, if you read Ambassador Lodge's
statement, we have been quite specific with regard to some
steps that can be taken now on Vietnam. Rather than sub-
mitting a laundry list of various proposals, we have laid
down down those things which we believe the other side should
agree to and can agree to: The restoration of the demili-
tarized zone as set forth in the Geneva Conference of 1954;
mutual withdrawal, guaranteed withdrawal, of forces by both
sides; the exchange of prisoners. All of these are matters
that we think can be precisely considered and on which pro-
gress can be made.

Now, where we go from here depends on what the
other side offers in turn.

QUESTION: Mr. President, now that you are President,
could you be specific with us about what your plans are for
improving relations with Communist China, and whether you
think they will be successful or not?

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THE PRESIDENT: Well, I have noted, of course, some expressions of interest on the part of various Senators and others in this country with regard to the possibility of admitting Communist China to the United Nations.

I also have taken note of the fact that several countries -- including primarily Italy among the major countries -- have indicated an interest in changing its policy and possibly voting to admit Communist China to the United Nations.

The policy of this country and this Administration at this time will be to continue to oppose Communist China's admission to the United Nations.

There are several reasons for that. First, Communist China has not indicated any interest in becoming a member of the United Nations.

Second, it has not indicated any intent to abide by the principles of the UN Charter, and to meet the principles that new members admitted to the United Nations are supposed to meet.

Finally, Communist China continues to call for expelling the Republic of China from the United Nations and the Republic of China has, as I think most know, been a member of the international community and has met its responsibilities without any question over these past few years.

Under these circumstances, I believe it would be a mistake for the United States to change its policy with regard to Communist China in admitting it to the United Nations.

Now, there is a second immediate point that I have noted. That is the fact that there will be another meeting in Warsaw. We look forward to that meeting. We will be interested to see what the Chinese Communist representatives have to say at that meeting, whether new changes of attitude on their part on major, substantive issues may have occurred.

Until some changes occur on their side, however, I see no immediate prospect of any change in our policy.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, what problems that you have to cope with do you feel require your most urgent attention now?

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Kaplow, the major problems with which I have been concerned in this first week have been in the field of foreign policy, because there only the President can make some of the decisions.

The Security Council, as you ladies and gentlemen are aware, has had two very long meetings, and, in addition, I spent many long hours at night reading the papers, which involve the foreign policy of the United States.

This afternoon I will go to the Pentagon for my first major briefing by military officials on our military situation.

Going beyond that, however, I would say that the problems of our cities, which have been discussed at length at the Urban Affairs Council, and our economic problems, which were discussed at the meeting we had in the new Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, require urgent attention.

It is very difficult to single one out and put it above the other. There are a number of problems which this Administration confronts; each requires urgent attention. The field of foreign policy will require more attention because it is in this field that only the President, in many instances, can make the decisions.

QUESTION: Mr. President, on foreign policy, nuclear policy, particularly, could you give us your position on the Nonproliferation Treaty and on starting missile talks with the Soviet Union.

THE PRESIDENT: I favor the Nonproliferation Treaty. The only question is the timing of the ratification of that treaty. That matter will be considered by the National Security Council, by my direction, during a meeting this week. I will also have a discussion with the leaders of both sides in the Senate and in the House on the treaty within this week and in the early part of next week. I will make a decision then as to whether this is the proper time to ask the Senate to move forward and ratify the treaty. I expect ratification of the treaty and will urge its ratification at an appropriate time, and, I would hope, an early time.

As far as the second part of your question, with regard to strategic arms talks, I favor strategic arms talks. Again, it is a question of not only when, but the context of those talks. The context of those talks is vitally important because we are here between two major, shall we say, guidelines.

On the one side, there is the proposition which is advanced by some that we should go forward with talks on the reduction of strategic forces on both sides; we should go forward with such talks, clearly apart from any progress on political settlement, and on the other side the suggestion is

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Page 4

made that until we make progress on political settlements, it would not be wise to go forward on any reduction of our strategic arms, even by agreement with the other side.

It is my belief that what we must do is to steer a course between those two extremes. It would be a mistake, for example, for us to fail to recognize that simply reducing arms through mutual agreement -- failing to recognize that that reduction will not, in itself, assure peace. The war which occurred in the Mid-East in 1967 was a clear indication of that.

What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks in a way and at a time that will promote, if possible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time-- for example, on the problem of the Mid-East and on other outstanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you or your Administration have any plan outside the United Nations' proposal for achieving peace in the Middle East?

THE PRESIDENT: As you ladies and gentlemen are aware, the suggestion has been made that we have four-power talks. The suggestion has also been made that we use the United Nations as the primary forum for such talks. And it has also been suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union bi-laterally should have talks on the Mid-East.

In addition to that, of course, the problem finally should be settled by the parties in the area. We are going to devote the whole day on Saturday to the Mid-East problem, just as we devoted the whole day this last Saturday on the problem of Vietnam.

We will consider on the occasion of that meeting the entire range of options that we have. I shall simply say at this time that I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mid-East. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be de-fused. I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mid-East, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid.

I think it is time to turn to the left side now.

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[c]

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QUESTION: Mr. President, could you tell us whether you have had a chance to examine the Johnson budget, and whether you see any hope for a reduction in the Johnson budget?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have examined it. As far as hopes for reduction are concerned, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget has just Friday issued instructions to all of the departments to examine the budgets in their departments very closely and to give us recommendations as to where budget cuts might be made.

This is for two purposes: One, because we would like to cut the overall budget; and two, because we want to have room for some of the new programs that this Administration and the new approaches that this Administration would like to implement.

At this time I cannot say where and how the budget can be cut. I will say that we are taking a fresh look at all of the programs and we shall attempt to make cuts in order to carry out the objectives that I set forth during the campaign.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you consider it possible to have a cease fire in Vietnam so long as the Viet Cong still occupy Vietnamese territory?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that it is not helpful in discussing Vietnam to use such terms as "cease fire" because cease fire is a term of art that really has no relevance, in my opinion, to a guerrilla war.

When you are talking about a conventional war, then a cease fire agreed upon by two parties means that the shooting stops. When you have a guerrilla war, in which one side may not even be able to control many of those who are responsible for the violence in the area, the cease fire may be meaningless.

I think at this point this Administration believes that the better approach is the one that Ambassador Lodge, under our direction, set forth in Paris -- mutual withdrawal of forces on a guaranteed basis by both sides from South Vietnam.

QUESTION: Back to nuclear weapons, Mr. President. Both you and Secretary Laird have stressed, quite hard, the need for superiority over the Soviet Union. But what is the real meaning of that in view of the fact that both sides have more than enough already to destroy each other, and how do you distinguish the validity of that stance and the argument of Dr. Kissinger for what he calls "sufficiency"?

THE PRESIDENT: Here, again, I think the semantics may offer an inappropriate approach to the problem. I would say that with regard to Dr. Kissinger's suggestion of sufficiency, that that would meet, certainly, my guideline, and I think Secretary Laird's guideline, with regard to superiority.

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Let me put it this way: When we talk about parity, I think we should recognize that wars occur, usually, when each side believes it has a chance to win. Therefore, parity does not necessarily assure that a war may not occur.

By the same token, when we talk about superiority, that may have a detrimental effect on the other side in putting it in an inferior position and, therefore, giving great impetus to its own arms race.

Our objective in this Administration, and this is a matter that we are going to discuss at the Pentagon this afternoon, and that will be the subject of a major discussion in the National Security Council within the month -- our objective is to be sure that the United States has sufficient military power to defend our interests and to maintain the commitments which this Administration determines are in the interest of the United States around the world.

I think "sufficiency" is a better term, actually, than either "superiority" or "parity".

QUESTION: Mr. President, you talked quite a bit during the campaign about crime in the District of Columbia. That crime has increased since January 1st, and I wondered how you proposed to deal with it.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Realy, it is a major problem in the District of Columbia, as I found when I suggested to the Secret Service I would like to take a walk yesterday. I had read Mary McCrory's column and wanted to try her cheesecake. But I find, of course, that taking a walk here in the District of Columbia, and particularly in the evening hours, is now a very serious problem, as it is in some other major cities.

One of the employees at the White House, just over the week end, was the victim of a purse snatching, which brings it very close to home.

Incidentally, I might point out in that case that my advisers tell me that by seeing that the area is better lighted, that perhaps the possibility of purse snatching and other crimes in the vicinity of the White House might be reduced. Therefore, we have turned on the lights in all of that area, I can assure you.

But to be quite specific with regard to the District of Columbia, it was not only a major commitment in the campaign; it is a major concern in the country. I noted an editorial in one of the major papers, The New York Times, for example, that Washington, D. C. was now a city of "fear and crime." That may go too far, but at least that was their judgment. All three of the Washington papers indicate great concern.

Consequently, I have on an urgent basis instructed the Attorney General to present to me a program to deal with crime in the District of Columbia, and an announcement of that program and also an announcement as to what we will ask the Congress to do, in addition to what we will do administratively, will be made at the end of this week.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, why did you decide to withdraw all the appointments that had been sent to Capitol Hill by your predecessor, and can you tell us why you decided to cancel the decision, for the time, in the Pacific airline case?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, first, with regard to the appointments, I had two precedents to follow. Consequently, I took my choice. In the one instance, President Kennedy, as you will recall, did not withdraw the appointments of judge-ships which he inherited from President Eisenhower. On the other hand, President Eisenhower had withdrawn all appointments and then proceeded to make new appointments, including some from the list that had been withdrawn.

I felt that the Eisenhower approach was the more efficient way to handle it.

I should point out that among those names that have been withdrawn, I already know that some will be reappointed. But I felt that the new Administration should examine the whole list and make its own decision with regard to whether the individuals that had been appointed would serve the interests of the Nation according to the guidelines that the new Admin-istration was to lay down.

With regard to the action that had been taken by the previous Administration on the airlines, I received recom-mendations or, shall I say, requests on the part of both the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Chair-man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this matter be returned to the White House for further examination.

As you know, the President has authority in this field only where it involves international matters. Under the circumstances, since both chairmen were members of the other party, and since also I had received suggestions from a number of other Congressmen, both Democratic and Republican, as well as Senators, that this should be re-examined, I brought it back for re-examination.

One other point that should be made: There is no suggestion, in asking for a re-examination of that decision, of impropriety or illegality, or improper influence. We will examine the whole situation, but particularly with regard to its impact on foreign relations.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, Ramsey Clark stated this morning that you gave President Johnson assurances through Attorney General Mitchell that you would not withdraw the traditional nominations of Mr. Poole and Mr. Byrne and several others. Could you comment on that, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: I remember exactly what did occur, and it may be that we did not have an exact meeting of the minds in the event that Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General Clark, had that understanding. What happened was that Ramsey Clark discussed this matter during the period between the election and the inauguration with Attorney General Mitchell. He asked Attorney General Mitchell to ask me whether I would object to action on the part of President Johnson in the event that he did submit these appointments to the Senate.

My reply was that I would not object to President Johnson submitting such names to the Senate just as I do not object to his action in the Trans-Pacific case or any other area. As you ladies and gentlemen are quite aware, I have scrupulously followed the line that we have one President at a time, and that he must continue to be President until he leaves office on January 20.

However, I did not have any understanding with the President directly, and no one, including Attorney General Mitchell, as far as I was concerned had any discretion to agree to a deal that these nominations, having been made, would be approved by me. I have withdrawn them and now I am going to examine each one of them. As I have already indicated, I have decided that in at least some instances some of the names will be re-submitted.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in the last Administration, the McClellan Committee ran into a considerable problem in obtaining ~~information~~ on costs, performance and development on the TFX, F-111 contract. I wondered if you would open the records on this, and what your general view is with regard to dealing with Congressional committees?

THE PRESIDENT: I understand not only the McClellan Committee, but Mr. Mollenhoff did some examination in this field, too.

With regard to the TFX, and also with regard to all of the matters that you have referred to, this Administration will re-examine all past decisions where they are not foreclosed, where the re-examination is not foreclosed, by reason of what has gone before.

I will not, however, at this time, pre-judge what that examination will indicate. I believe that it is in the best interests of the nation, when a new Administration comes in, with a new team, that the President direct the new team, as I have directed it very strongly during this first week, to re-examine all decisions that may have been questioned, either by Senate committees or by responsible members of the press, or by other people in public or private life. This we are doing and this is one of the areas in which a re-examination is going forward.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, inflation and rising prices are of great concern. What specific plans do you have to curb these?

THE PRESIDENT: In the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy, which I set up, one of the three new institutions I set up -- I say three new institutions -- if I might digress for a moment, I suppose the nation wonders what a President does in his first week and where is all the action that we have talked about. We have done a great deal, particularly in getting the machinery of Government set up which will allow us to move in an orderly way on major problems.

I do not believe, for example, that policy should be made, and particularly foreign policy should be made, by off the cuff responses in press conferences, or any other kind of conferences. I think it should be made in an orderly way. So it is with economic policy. That is why, in addition to the Cabinet committee, in addition to the Urban Affairs Council and a re-vitalized National Security Council for foreign affairs, we now have a Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy.

That Cabinet committee has considered the problem of inflation, and the problem is, first, that we are concerned about the escalation of prices to a rate of 4.8 percent, and we do not see, if present policies continue, any substantial reduction in that.

And, second, we are considering what actions can be taken which will not cause an unacceptable rise in unemployment. By unacceptable rise in unemployment, I want to emphasize that we believe it is possible to control inflation without increasing unemployment in, certainly, any substantial way.

I should make one further point. Unless we do control inflation, we will be confronted, eventually, with massive unemployment, because the history of economic affairs in other countries indicates that if inflation is allowed to get out of hand, eventually there has to be a bust and then unemployment comes. So what we are trying to do, without, shall we say, too much managing of the economy, is we are going to have some fine tuning of our fiscal and monetary affairs in order to control inflation.

One other point I should make in this respect: I do not go along with the suggestion that inflation can be effectively controlled by exhorting labor and management and industry to follow certain guidelines. I think that is a very laudable objective for labor and management to follow. But I think I am aware of the fact that the leaders of labor and the leaders of management, much as they might personally want to do what is in the best interest of the nation, have to be guided by the interests of the organizations that they represent.

So the primary responsibility for controlling inflation rests with the national administration, and its handling of fiscal and monetary affairs. That is why we will have some new approaches in this area. We assume that responsibility. We think we can meet it, that we can control inflation without an increase in unemployment.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, during the transition period in New York, several persons who conferred with you came away with the impression that you felt the Vietnam War might be ended within a year. Were these impressions correct?

THE PRESIDENT: I, of course, in my conversations with those individuals, and all individuals, have never used the term "six months," "a year," "two years," or "three years," because I do not think it is helpful in discussing this terribly difficult war, a war that President Johnson wanted to bring to an end as early as possible, that I want to bring to an end as early as possible.

I do not think it is helpful to make overly optimistic statements which, in effect, may impede and perhaps might make very difficult our negotiations in Paris. All that I have to say is this: that we have a new team in Paris, with some old faces, but a new team. We have new direction from the United States. We have a new sense of urgency with regard to the negotiations.

There will be new tactics. We believe that those tactics may be more successful than the tactics of the past.

I should make one further point, however: We must recognize that all that has happened to date is the settlement of the procedural problems, the size of the table, and who will sit at those tables.

What we now get to is really that hard, tough ground that we have to plow: the substantive issues as to what both parties will agree to; whether we are going to have mutual withdrawal; whether we are going to have self-determination by the people of South Vietnam without outside interference; whether we can have an exchange of prisoners.

This is going to take time, but I can assure you that it will have my personal attention. It will have my personal direction. The Secretary of State, my Adviser for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense -- all of us -- will give it every possible attention and we hope to come up with some new approaches.

END

(AT 11:32 A.M. EST)