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policies. The inevitability of a choice in the present crisis can be force-
fully illustrated by the experience in Korea. It will be necessary to impress
the Japanese with the fact that what happened in Korea does not represent an
event peculiar to that country, but that it is the inevitable consequence of
a political vacuum from which Japan is no more immune than any other area. It
will be necessary to convince the Japanese that the U.S. does understand the
complexity of Japanese conditions and the subtlety of their relationships. Pro-
paganda must be conducted by indirection, by adaptation to the Japanese mind,
and cannot be measured in quantitative terms.

The U.S. will not be able to ignore the influence of China on Japanese
thinking. It can attempt to minimize it propagandistically, not by attempting
to win Japan away from Chinese culture, but by stressing the betrayal by the
present Chinese government of its own cultural heritage. At the same time it
should stress the virility and the meaning of American culture to avoid Jap-
anese fears of being a mere pawn in the struggle for power.

It should be emphasized that an abstract statement of a propagandistic
effort must remain unsatisfactory. Much will depend on the quality of the per-
sonnel and on the subtlety of the conception of the program. This paper has
intended to be an informal consideration and outline possible solutions. It
has emphasized the difficulties of the American position, since any American
propaganda effort must be directed against these problems. Above all, it
should be clear that this is the best time for the initiation of the program
outlined above. After the ratification of the Peace Treaty, the psychological
climate may be expected to deteriorate and technical difficulties multiply.

COMMUNISM & INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence operations can not be discussed in abstraction. They are related to the total political and psychological situation -- in fact they are an aspect of it. Such problems as recruiting informants and developing networks of agents depend on a pattern of loyalties; they reveal a principle of obligation that causes an individual to accept a measure of discipline or to impart *unearned* information. This principle of obligation may be supplied by money - but not necessarily. And more often money is used to provide the possibility for intelligence operations, not the motive.

An understanding of the nature of the motive and of the discipline used by hostile intelligence operatives is therefore of crucial importance for the CIC agent. Intelligence informants have always existed. Their activity represents a "break" with the society in which they operate. But the nature of the "break" has altered drastically. Under conditions prevailing until the outbreak of the Russian revolution, the "break" with society was always marginal. It occurred on the fringes of society. It was an aspect of criminal activity in the sense that individuals working for foreign governments were placing themselves consciously outside the pale of the existing social structure. Their motives were almost invariably personal - financial need, disappointed ambition, clashes of temperament. Their targets were individual - specific pieces of information, acts of sabotage or derision. Even when the motives could be induced they depended on an individual combination of circumstances. Discipline could not be formalized because motivations were too heterogeneous. The task of counterintelligence in such circumstances was essentially technical - the detection of specific acts or their prevention. Its effectiveness reflected the success of its investigative methods which did not, however, require any substantial insight into political processes.

The advent of modern totalitarianism, particularly Soviet Communism, radically altered the situation. No longer were international conflicts confined to limited objectives in which even war was only an episode in a continuing relationship. Present conflicts are total and social. The "break" with society occurs no longer at the periphery but in its middle. The motivations have ceased to be personal but make universal claims. The target of intelligence operations has ceased to be confined to specific objectives - it permeates all aspects of life. Recruits for intelligence operations are sought everywhere. The motivation has often less to be created than exploited and even where it is created provides an effective discipline.

This has come about because Soviet Communism is not merely a political movement, but a revolutionary one. It therefore asserts the need for the overthrow of the existing social structure and on an international scale. Basing itself on a materialist interpretation of history, it asserts the supremacy of the economic factors and appeals to the discontented of all nations. But where previous revolutionary movements tended to peter out because of the difficulty of organizing such heterogeneous elements, Soviet Communism has realized that the power of a movement is no stronger than the discipline that binds it. Since Lenin, every effort has for this reason been exerted to assure an organization that is both cohesive and disciplined. Emphasis has been placed on the development of cadres, of elite leadership, and of unquestioning obedience.

The best means for achieving this is ideological conformity. It enables the Communists to create tight groups of dedicated individuals to whom money may provide a tool for intelligence activity but rarely the impetus. This explains the ferocity with which Lenin and Stalin purged

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individuals for differences seemingly so minor, that they appear almost hair-splitting. But Lenin was not concerned with the nature of the differences but with their existence as a symbol of the possibility of divergence. Similarly, the espionage group of which Alger Hiss was a member spent its time during the period of its "sleeper" activity in discussion groups. Finally the atomic espionage cases almost invariably involved individuals who had become "available" through ideological infiltration and who only required the opportunity to become effective.

The counterintelligence problem, therefore, no longer presents itself simply as the detection or prevention of easily delimitable, overt acts occurring against specific targets. Rather, such acts as will occur become comprehensible only as an aspect of a specific social and political situation and in terms of a basic conception of Communist strategy. The intelligence agent who is not prepared to understand Communist tactics or their exploitation will be operating in a vacuum. He will have to wait for the accomplished act or the penetration all the more potent for being slow and imperceptible. His ability to interrogate, no matter how effective his formal technique, will be limited because effective interrogation involves the psychological domination of the subject. In short, subversion and espionage become meaningful only as components of a political situation, not as isolated incidents. Any subversive group, to be effective, must be organized. Any organized group requires leadership, funds and some measure of indoctrination. The source of funds and leadership represents the political and social aspirations of a segment of the population.

The problem can be summarized as a threefold one: (a) The requirement of an understanding of the nature of modern intelligence operations, specifically the nature of the Soviet intelligence apparatus and its methods in general, and in specific countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, E. Germany.

(b) The motivations that induce individuals to become part of a Communist intelligence apparatus. This involves a comprehension of Soviet ideology and of specific Soviet intelligence activities. (c) The motivations that might induce individuals to become effective as part of U.S. intelligence activities. This involves an understanding of democratic beliefs and of efforts to combat Communism.

The task of the Department of International Affairs can never be to teach the prospective agent the substance of this in the form of political science lectures attempting to present all aspects of Communism. The Department of International Affairs must be selective. It has to choose certain areas as significant and thereby indoctrinate the prospective agent and give him an awareness of the importance of the above factors.