NOTES ON A MISSION

September 9. After my arrival in Paris I saw A and M, who in turn agreed to call on Bo and urge him to see me. At their meeting Bo made the following points: (a) Hanoi was interested in maintaining the channel and he was willing to see A and M anytime of day or night; and (b) there was no answer yet to the US message of August 25 (Appendix A). Bo also asked what was the meaning of the McNamara line; he took it to be an American attempt to keep the country divided. M replied that one could also see in it a US attempt to de-escalate.

September 10. Bo called M for an urgent meeting.

September 11. Bo handed M the text of Hanoi's reply (Appendix B). This action was accompanied by the following dialogue:

Bo to M: Give this to K. As soon as (aussitôt que) there is a reply, please communicate it to me anytime of the day or night.

M to Bo: This reply puts A and me into some difficulty. It may be due to our failure to explain the American message adequately. This makes it all the more urgent that you see K.

Bo to M: Give K the message and after there is a reply we shall consider a meeting.

Bo commented on the second sentence of the text as follows:

"Le bombardements de Hanoi au même temps que l'envoi du message constitient une pression. L'arrêt des bombardements la menace d'une reprise ont le caractère d'un ultimatum."

-3-

At noon, one one hour's notice, M saw Bo. Bo read my
letter without showing it to M.

Bo: I repeat that I have nothing against Mr. K personally; it is
a question of principle that I cannot see him when Hanoi is
under the threat of bombardment.

M: Now no limit is given and no menace exists.

Bo: We consider that a menace does still exist.

M: Do you want some assurance that no menace exists and will you
then see Mr. K?

Bo: En raison de la menace de bombardement sur Hanoi qui a un
charactère d'un ultimatum dans ces conditions il n'y a pas
possible de prendre contact avec M. K.

M: Do you still believe that you should maintain contact through the
A/M channel?

Bo: Definitely yes. We consider that we wish to continue talking
through that channel.

M: Considering what you said about the character of the bombing
of Hanoi, what assurance would be considered acceptable?

Bo: Nous verrons.

M: With respect to the contact, whatever the channel may be, do
you accept any text from the United States Government--open
or sealed?

Bo: I accept any kind of communication.

M: Besides the text of the United States Government, would you
accept any explanatory text coming from K and coming through
our channel, orally or written, sealed or open to our know-
ledge?

Bo: Any kind will be acceptable. We want to keep the channel open.

M: In order to authenticate the comments of K, do you think his
signature should be added to any comment?

Bo (laughing): That never occurred to me. I see no need, but if he
wants to sign a document that is up to him.

Bo spoke at great length about the bombing of Haiphong.

He emphasize that according to news reports it took place within
the city limits. However, he did not relate this to the message.

He stressed that they will not let themselves be blackmailed by the
bombing; Schoenbrun's articles underline our ability to continue
fighting no matter how badly we are bombed. Pham Van Dong had
told him personally that even the destruction of Hanoi would not
alter their determination. They have nothing against Americans;
they are eager to show them VN.

M's main impressions after the conversation were that
they were talking in a tortuous way and that Bo was eager to re-
ceive messages.

In the afternoon I received word that Washington had
accepted my revision of its message. I urged delay in delivering
the message in order to see whether the assurance of a removal
of the time limit would produce a meeting with Bo.

September 14. I gave M a note in a sealed envelope for
Bo, the text of which was:

Hanoi's attitude with respect to the kind of restraint we have employed in this channel is baffling. If we bomb near Hanoi we are accused of bringing pressures. If we voluntarily and without any suggestion from Hanoi impose a restraint on our actions and keep this up without time limit we are accused of an ultimatum. In fact the American proposal contained neither threats nor conditions and should not be rejected on these grounds.

I told M to tell Bo that these were excerpts from my instructions.

I then dictated a set of notes about the bombing of Haiphong (drawn from a DoD cable) to M. If M leaves them with Bo and he publishes them, they can be disavowed as misinterpretation. At the same time, however, they serve to establish our bona fides. The notes were as follows:

"(1) Ceci est l'explication que j'ai été autorisé à fournir en rapport avec la signification de l'arret des bombardements.

"(2) Explication personel de K. Cette lettre doit etre lu dans le context des pressions multiples qui s'exersent au milieu dans le gouvernement de USA. Elle represente une declaration qui efface toute interpretation d'ultimatum.

"(3) J'ai rapporte à Washington le conversation de M avec Bo selon lequel il est difficile de communiquer en plein escalade. J'ai supplie le commentaire de Mai Van Bo qui connait la ville de Haiphong.

[N]

-6-

"(4) Commentaire personel de K: (a) Actuellement il semble le plus efficace de rechercher une solution à la situation presente que de commencer à distriber des composants originelles. Rappellons que le dernier message offrait l'arret des bombardements, ce message dans son esprit le considerait comme inconditionnel. Ce point meriterait d'etre clarifié. (b) Bo doit se rappeller que le nombre de personnes informé de l'ensemble de cette discussion est très petit et n'inclu aucun militaire. Il est donc difficile d'arrete des decisions prise avant l'envoi du message de 25 août exigé en ce qui concerne Hanoi.

"(5) Le commentaire officiel: Washington ne croit pas que les attaques du 11-9-67 sont une escalade--les objectifs sont le port de Haiphong et un chemin de fer à 3.2 km. du centre de la ville; un point à 1.6 km. du centre de la ville; et ainsi qu'un magasin à 2.4 km. du centre. Toutes ces objectifs, selon Washington, sont a distance de la region de peuplement principal et separé du centre une petite canal que transchissent la route et la voie ferrée. Toutes ces objectifs sont situé de telle sorte, que selon les estimations elle peuvent etre attaqué avec le minimum de risques pour la population civile. L'objectif le plus proche du centre, un pont routiere du chemin de fer sont pratiquement dans le même site qui ont été bombardé dans la passée plus récement

[LY]

-7-

le 26 juin et deux fois avant. Tous les autres objectifs etaient a
significantly a plus grande distance du centre de la ville.

"K's comment: Je désire contribuer à une meilleure
comprehension de la part de deux parties. Un des prochaines
fait à Washington c'est que l'essai de dialogue ont été toujours
dans une seule direction."

At noon Bo saw M and accepted the message. He asked
M whether he could keep his handwritten notes for a day (as I had
expected) and M agreed.

**September 15.** There was an exchange of cables with Washington about the text of the message of September 13. I urged making it consistent with my note to Bo of September 14 and Washington agreed.

**September 16.** A arrived from Rome. I met him at the
airport to discuss his appointment with Bo at noon and also to make
sure that he and M understood our position. We agreed that they
will press Bo for an initiation of dialogue. After A and M saw Bo
at noon, I debriefed them at lunch. The notes of their meeting are
as follows:

Bo offered whiskey, which A refused because of a sciatic
condition. Bo said he did not like whiskey either, but it might help
to reduce M's anxieties. Bo then offered tea. M delivered

-8-

(Appendix C)

Washington's message/saying that I considered it "conciliatory".

Bo accepted but did not open it. He returned M's notes of his conversation with me. He declined M's offer to have them typed up, presumably to maintain the position that no exchange had taken place.

A mentioned yesterday's press story to the effect that Hanoi would negotiate three to four weeks after a bombing pause. Bo said that that delay was invented by the journalist; those had not been the Prime Minister's words. A reminded Bo of what Pham Van Dong had said: no delay, just enough time to become organized for a conference. Bo reiterated that no specific waiting period was specified in the Prime Minister's statement.

M said, why not invite K for tea or coffee, to which Bo replied that he wanted to think of a way to do it. A said he was a bit embarrassed to do mailman's work; he would not like it if it were also embarrassing to the Vietnamese. He felt that he and M were au fin de notre rouleau now that they had established contact--and more than that was never intended. Bo replied that A and M were not at the end of their role. They have been received as friends and what they have been doing is useful; if Bo thought otherwise he would tell them. He said their usefulness can be seen in that he has received a message from the United States Government, which has been answered--even if negatively--and now they have another reply

-9-

to deliver. Bo said that if they had received a visa after the bom-
bardment of Hanoi, it would not only have discredited all of them,
but it would also have undermined their usefulness. (A thinks this
is a result of the hard-line faction.) Bo could see no end to their
usefulness; he was eager to receive communications and saw no
need to bring anyone else in.

M mentioned that if this effort failed he would report to
the Elysée. Bo, addressing A, said M had already mentioned his
concern about reporting to Pugwash; he thought M had a confessional
streak. Bo said to A that M wants to end things quickly because he
is sentimental, but he felt that things are moving at a speed "normal"
for such exchanges.

M said that as long as we are talking about Pham Van
Dong, would Dzu have been acceptable in the broadly-based govern-
ment for Saigon mentioned by the Prime Minister? Bo said he knew
Dzu from student days and he had always engaged in money manipu-
lations. Dzu was untrustworthy, but the NLF was willing to co-
operate with all reasonable people in the South, including the high-
ranking military. Asked about Thieu, Bo said he did not under-
stand how a Vietnamese could run on a platform advocating that
foreigners bomb his own people.

At the end of their conversation, Bo said that he would
call them as he had called them the last time.

General conclusions: M said there was a great desire to maintain contact. A agreed that Bo obviously wants to keep the channel open, but for what reason is not clear. A believes also that Bo has instructions to see me but will wait until close to my departure.

**September 17.** I urged A to make it clear to Bo that this channel need not be the only one. The United States Government would accept any channel which Hanoi feels is technically possible for its purposes. Bo replied that the channel is not the problem. A returned to Rome.

**September 20.** A returned to Paris. In the afternoon there was a security flap. M had talked to his brother and the brother had talked to a CIA agent. The situation was complicated by the fact that the CIA was not informed of the current exchange. A few telephone calls to Washington enabled me to sit on the story.

A called Bo and jokingly invited him to dinner with me. Bo declined on the grounds that seeing me was complicated by the US bombing of Haiphong.

I dictated a note to M for delivery to Bo telling him that the last time I could be effectively reached was the evening of September 23. After that time Hanoi had three options: (1) to use the K/A/M channel; (2) to use A and M together with some US official; or (3) to set up a totally different channel.

September 21. Bo saw A and M for one and a half hours.

Part of their conversation was as follows:

Bo: The channel is very convenient for us. If I have anything before Saturday, I will let Mr. K know. I have no answer yet, but there may be one. In the light of the declaration of the 19th, however, it is my personal impression that one may not come.

A: K is not an official and he has demonstrated good faith. I can vouch for him and feel that personal contact is important. You have had a very long time to meet him and it is disappointing that you have not done so. It may be very difficult to maintain this channel.

Bo: I am not allowed to talk to anyone in touch with the United States Government without specific instructions.

M: Would you talk to Doty?

Bo: No. The US is engaged in a politique de double jeu. D'un côté ils nous offrons la paix; à l'autre côté ils augmentent le bombardement de Hanoi, Haiphong et Lin Vinh. I want to keep the channel open. I will accept communications at any time and will be in touch with you if I have any message.

M: Is the channel useful?

Bo: Ne vous en faites pas. (Do not worry.) Si vous communique par K nous l'acceptons. Si jamais nous pensons que vous memes ne devez pas continuer nous vous le dirons.

M showed him the draft report for the Elysée and Bo accepted it. He stressed that if A and M gave it to the Elysée, they should make it clear that it was not transferred at his request.

September 22. I sent a note in a sealed envelope to Bo, the contents of which were as follows:

Washington is waiting for an answer to its message of September 13. The offer of August 25, as explained in the message of September 13, remains open. At present Washington has nothing further to say.

Washington attends une réponse à son message du 13 septembre 1967. L'offre continue dans le message du 25 août 1967 telle qu'elle est expliquée dans le message du 13 septembre 1967 reste ouverte. Presentement Washington n'a rien dire de plus.

**September 23.** Bo called M and asked him to come over.

The interview lasted an hour, during which time Bo read a long statement to M, which was to be communicated to me before my departure. M took notes which he read back to Bo. Translated into English, the text was as follows:

--The whole world knows that the United States has pursued a constant policy of escalation in Vietnam. After Hanoi, United States planes bombed Cam Phê and then Haiphong.

--As regards Haiphong, United States planes have bombed it several times in a row and very violently.

--In addition, B-52s have violently attacked the demilitarized zone of Vin Linh. As a result, everyone agrees that the bombing of North Vietnam has been intensified in recent weeks.

--Washington's explanation about the bombing of Haiphong cannot be accepted.

--These are the circumstances in which you have suggested that I see K. I accept your confidence in K, but I cannot see him at a moment when the United States is increasing its escalation.

--Turning to a more general topic, I have spoken to you of the double policy of the United States. What has happened has confirmed me in that opinion. The attitude of the United States has all kinds of contradictions. It is possible to highlight a few examples:

(a) Together with the message of 25 August, K has let me know through you as intermediaries that the United States had stopped the bombing of Hanoi for ten days, then for 72 hours, and now the USA tells us that the bombing is suspended without time limit. What do you think of this assertion that the United States Government of its own free will has suspended the bombing without time limit?

(Note: This was a comment on our message of September 13, which M had not seen.)

(b) In fact, what has happened is the stopping of the bombing of Hanoi but the intensification of it elsewhere (Cam Phê, Haiphong, Vin Linh) where the attack has the character of extermination and systematic destruction.

(c) To say that by stopping the bombing of Hanoi the United States has wanted to create a better atmosphere is not true.

--With respect to the message of August 25, the essence of the American position is to offer to stop bombing with conditions. The United States in a message delivered by sealed envelope has replied that the offer is without conditions while asserting that the message of August 25 is still valid.

--As far as you and A are concerned, I receive you as you wish; I listen to you; I accept messages; I transmit messages; and I report to Hanoi. I believe that this demonstrates our good will sufficiently. I call you when I have something to say. However, as I pointed our earlier, we have no illusions about American policy.

When Bo asked what he thought of all this, M replied as follows:

(a) Leaving his role as passive messenger, he had to agree that each delivery of an American message had been accompanied by a new escalation. With respect to Haiphong he only knew what I had told him, which seemed to be confirmed by the fact that the attacks had as their target the communication links and were not a systematic destruction of Haiphong. Still, he had to admit that it was difficult to discuss in such an atmosphere.

(b) With regard to the sequence of suspension of the bombing of Hanoi for ten days, then for 72 hours, then without time limit, this was not a contradiction but the evolution of United States policy through the reconciliation of conflicting tendencies.

(c) With respect to the message of August 25, the question was whether a return to the level of bombing of early August would permit a discussion.

Bo replied to (c) by saying that Pham Van Dong had already answered that question.

[4]

-15-

Finally, M put a question to Bo which I had asked him to submit at their last meeting on September 22 but for which M had judged the moment inopportune. It was to repeat his understanding of Pham Van Dong's remarks to A and M in July and to ask whether they had been correctly understood. The exchange which M read to Bo from A's notes was as follows:

Pham Van Dong: We want an unconditional end of the bombing.

A: Must this be confirmed by a public declaration?

Pham Van Dong: We would prefer a public declaration but we understand that this may be difficult so we will accept a *de facto* stoppage. This can then lead to negotiations.

A: Do you have in mind a delay of six months before negotiations start?

Pham Van Dong: There is no problem about a delay; we know how to meet each other.

M pointed out that a stenographer had been present when these remarks were made. Bo said that the remarks were different from the public position and he would query Hanoi about them.

Bo closed by again enjoining M on the need for the greatest secrecy.

**September 24.** I came through Paris on the way back to the US to pick up Bo's message from M, who met me at the airport. Since I suspected that M's answer to Bo was probably more sympathetic to Hanoi's viewpoint than he had told me, especially under (a)

[Y]

above, I told M that he should request an appointment with Bo for
later in the day and give him the following message from me:

(1) I would transmit Bo's observations to the appropriate authorities in Washington immediately upon my return later in the day.

(2) I saw no point in trading charges and countercharges about actions in the past. The fact was that the United States had offered to stop bombing. This offer, based on the understanding that it would lead to prompt and productive discussions, remained open. It was sincere.

(3) The exchange indicates to me that Washington and Hanoi have great difficulty understanding each other's thought processes. Direct contact is in my opinion therefore necessary. Intermediaries, however trustworthy, cannot substitute for this.

(4) American military actions in North Vietnam reflect in part the extreme secrecy with which this exchange is handled in Washington. Washington has considered it unwise to change decisions made before the receipt of my report of A and M's trip to Hanoi (except for the bombing of that city) because it wanted to keep the circle of those aware of this exchange as small as possible and to avoid premature public debate.

(5) The difference between the two positions seems to me as follows: Washington has indicated its readiness to stop bombing and has only asked that its understanding of Hanoi's view that this would lead promptly to productive negotiations be confirmed. Hanoi has implied that an end of bombing would in fact have this result. If these are indeed the views of the two sides the remaining obstacles can and must be overcome. I am certain that I correctly reflect the United States viewpoint; would Bo confirm the viewpoint of Hanoi?

(6) If Hanoi gave any sign that this exchange would in fact lead promptly to productive negotiations, reciprocal action by the United States to demonstrate its good faith would not be lacking.

M took all this down; checked it and agreed to transmit it. I also asked M to see whether he could get Bo to clarify his reply to M's query under (c) above. (Note: I take Bo's statement to constitute Hanoi's answer to our message of September 13. It seems to me much less intransigent than the note of September 11; indeed, it is almost plaintive in tone. It leaves the door wide open for a reply. It is interesting that Bo called M well before the deadline for effective communication with me in Europe given in the note to him of September 20.)

I talked to Read to report the latest conversation and said I had sent a personal message to make sure that M's answer was not the only reaction to be cabled to Hanoi. Read suggested that he might get the agreement of the principals to my message and thus turn it into an official one. He called back an hour later and said that Rusk and Katzenbach agreed with my note. They suggested deleting the point about de-escalating in case of preliminary talks lest this be interpreted as another ultimatum. I called M and told him that my private message had official backing and that the sixth point should be deleted.

**September 25.** McNamara called at 0700 and asked me about my impressions. I said that a channel of communication had been established with three types of messages: (1) via sealed envelopes with contents unknown to A and M; (2) by dictation to A and M; and (3) through conversations with A and M which they report to the best of their ability. We have used all three methods; Hanoi only (2) and (3). The key issue seemed to me to be whether we were prepared to end the bombing. If not, I doubted that much progress was possible in this or any other channel. If so, my recommendation was to inform Hanoi that (1) we would end the bombing two to four weeks from the date of the communication; and (2) as a sign of good faith we were reducing our bombing immediately

to July levels. The purpose of the interim period was to permit
each side to prepare for talks. McNamara said that he doubted it
would be possible to go this far.

M called immediately afterwards to report on his talk
with Bo. Bo had read the message very carefully. He said that
the escalation in August had made everything complicated. M asked
whether a return to the bombing levels of July would make prelimi-
nary conversations possible. Bo replied that he would have to think
about that. He added that A's record of the conversation with Pham
Van Dong had been sent to Hanoi for confirmation.

I repeated this conversation to Read. He said that im-
patience was building up in Washington. LBJ wanted to "wind the
thing up", "was being screwed", etc. There was great pressure
to bomb Hanoi.

I called M and told him that A should return to Paris Fri-
day and use this as a pretext for seeing Bo on Saturday.

<u>September 26</u>. Katzenbach called to ask whether I con-
strued Bo's remarks about preliminary conversations as possibly
indicating a tortuous movement toward acceptance of paragraph 2
of our message of August 25. I said that I doubted it. Katzenbach
then asked whether I really expected anything to come back through
this channel on Saturday. I reminded him that we--not Bo--had
asked for the appointment.

I called M and gave him the numbers at which I could be
reached during my trip to the Midwest.

McNamara called to go over the same material as yesterday and to set up a back channel communication to Turkey, where he was to attend a nuclear planning group meeting. He was very discouraged by the "Tuesday luncheon" with LBJ, who had attacked both him and Katzenbach for being too "soft". McNamara was doubtful that we would be able to make a comprehensive offer.

**September 27.** I spoke with Read from Chicago. He told me that the "impatience quotient" at the White House was very high. Katzenbach and McNamara had been given hell for being too soft. The President would just as soon wind up the channel. Read urged that I impress on A and M the importance of having something come back on Saturday to quiet matters down in Washington. I replied that it was unwise to call A and M. No matter how hard they pressed Bo, he was probably in no position to speed up Hanoi's answer. At the same time, repeated demands would give an impression of needless anxiety. It was well to remember that the Saturday appointment was ours, not Hanoi's.

**September 28.** There was a telephone call from Read while I was in Kansas City asking me to convey the following points to M for transmission to Bo:

-21-

(1) Washington is happy to continue the A/M/K channel. It notes, however, that Hanoi has before it a proposal and several questions. So far Washington has put much more into the channel than Hanoi.

(2) M and A should indicate that the offer of 25 August remains open without conditions.

(3) M and A should make clear that there is no commitment not to attack Hanoi again.

(4) Washington remains interested in preliminary discussion between Bo and me.

(5) M and A should query the story from Hanoi by AFP indicating that Hanoi would be interested in "serious" and "significant" discussions some three to four weeks after the bombing stopped. M and A should try to find out the meaning of the adjectives and indicate that Washington considers the time interval too long.

(6) If Bo raised the issue of the bombardment of the North, M and A should point out the heavy shelling along the DMZ (1000 shells a day).

(7) If Bo claims that attacks have been shifted from Hanoi to Haiphong, A and M should point out that missions since August 25 have been reduced by 25 per cent over the comparable period last month. (This was due to weather, but Read felt that motives mattered less than facts.)

[y]

-22-

I pointed out that point (3) was likely to be jarring and unnecessary. If negotiations broke down we clearly recovered freedom of action; it they succeeded it was gratuitous. Read checked with Katzenbach (Rusk being in New York) and authorized me to make sure that M and A understood our position without a formal commitment to Bo.

September 29. I called M and gave him the seven points. I left (3) to his interpretation and told him that (6) and (7) were to be used only if Bo initiated the discussion. In effect I have M *carte blanche* to omit points six and seven.

Read called and told me that the President would include two sentences from the August 25 offer in his speech on Vietnam in San Antonio, which would represent a formal public commitment to a bombing cessation. I should notify M of this *before* his appointment with Bo, but *after* the President's speech. Since I was going out to dinner we left it that Read would listen to the speech and call me *if* it contained the two sentences.

Read called me at 2145 at Joseph's to say that the sentences were delivered. I went home and called M (0400 his time); he promised to communicate the sentences to Bo.

At midnight I watched the President's speech and was appalled. The two sentences were part of a paragraph which explained why negotiations were fruitless. The whole tone of the speech

-23-

was in terms of an analysis likely to be considered anything but con-
ciliatory by Hanoi. (For example, South Vietnam is _not_ a foreign
country to Hanoi.) Leaving aside the rest of the speech, what is
the sense of a ploy that calls attention to two sentences taken en-
tirely out of context and the disingeniousness of which is bound to
become obvious within twenty-four hours?

<u>September 30</u>. A and M called after their meeting with
Bo. Since Bo was still without instructions the meeting was incon-
clusive. Bo was very friendly, serving tea and chatting pleasantly.
He made the following points:

(1) Until the bombing stopped, Hanoi would not talk to any official or officially-validated American. When asked by M whether he would see me after the bombing stopped, Bo replied: "Tell Mr. K that as soon as the bombing stops he can put on his hat."

(2) Hanoi did not believe in American sincerity. Every
overture had been accompanied by escalation. Why should the
notes be taken more seriously than the bombs?

(3) Hanoi was determined not to be bombed to the con-
ference table. (A added his interpretation: Hanoi will talk only
when it is on its knees or when its principles are respected.)

-24-

(4) Hanoi thought the international climate tended to support its views. The speeches of Canada and France at the UN had been very constructive.

(5) Nevertheless, Hanoi was interested in maintaining the channel. This alone should show its good will.

I called Read and gave him the gist of this message. He said this would probably knock the bottom out of the barrel. The White House, already eager to wind up the channel and convinced that the President was getting "screwed", would probably go back to bombing Hanoi. I said that it was not clear to me how we were getting screwed when the sole restraint we had exercised was in a ten mile radius around Hanoi. Moreover, how could we maintain the position that we were reaffirming an offer without conditions on Saturday and then go back to bombing on Tuesday on the basis of a conversation sought by us with a man clearly without instructions? Read said he would see what he could do.

Read called back an hour later and said that Rusk was prepared to sit tight for a meeting of the President's "Tuesday luncheon", which this week was meeting on Wednesday. Another factor aiding a delay was the British Labor Party conference. Considering Wilson's helpfulness, we should not embarrass him needlessly.

**October 1.** I called M to tell him of Washington's patience. I said if nothing was received from Hanoi by Thursday I could not answer for the consequences. M said he would see Bo and give him my personal impression--not an "authorized" communication. He also accused Washington of duplicity with respect to the speech. Its key passages were very intransigent and the two sentences I had called about were taken out of context.

I called Read to tell him of M's reaction. Read pointed out that the American press had seized on the two sentences as the key elements. Also, Pham Van Dong's interview with Schoenbrun *after* the delivery of our message of August 25 hardly helped calm the atmosphere.

I called M back to make Read's points and to read him an editorial from the *New York Times* praising the conciliatory tone of the speech. M said that he would see Bo the next day. I told him to make clear that he was conveying my personal impression and not an official US message.

**October 2.** M called from Rome. He said that he had seen Bo in the morning. Bo had been very disturbed by my description of the Washington scene. He had dictated some comments to him explaining his positions of last Saturday. They seemed so important to M that he flew to Rome to discuss them with A; he did not wish to discuss them with me on the telephone. He could say

that Bo had indicated various scenarios and had said that talks among
officials could begin almost as soon as bombing stopped. M could
say no more.

I called Read, who told me that the White House wanted to
wind things up. There was a meeting scheduled between Rusk,
McNamara, Walt Rostow and the President for tomorrow at 1800 to
settle the bombing issue--which almost certainly would be to resume
the bombing of Hanoi.

**October 3.** I called McNamara, who seemed very discouraged. LBJ had given him hell the day before. He doubted that the channel could be kept open. I told him about M's message. He said that he could hold on for a few more days, but if M's letter had not been received by Wednesday afternoon (tomorrow), I should call and ask M to give me the message on the telephone, whatever the security considerations.

On my arrival in Washington for a meeting of the Board of
the Atlantic Council, I called Read. He said a lunch had been scheduled between Walt Rostow, Katzenbach, Bundy, Harriman, Read and myself to review the situation. (McNamara could not come because of another engagement.) The basic issues were: (1) whether M's telephone call from Rome had changed the situation; and (2) whether the bombing of Hanoi should be resumed. With respect to (1), I said that we would have to wait for M's report. All I could say was that

-27-

I was not aware of any contact with Hanoi which they had nurtured so persistently. In the past verbal bellicosity had always led to a rupture of contacts. Bundy confirmed this. As to the second issue-- the bombing of Hanoi--it seemed to me we should be clear about what was involved. I did not know whether Hanoi wanted to talk, but if this channel failed, we would know that Hanoi was not interested in talks until after (or just before) the United States election. (I bet on just before so that both candidates would be committed to peace talks.)

If this channel broke, I did not see that a bombing pause would be anything other than a public relations gesture; or, to put matters another way, either this contact led to a pause or the pause could not produce negotiations. To my surprise, Bundy agreed.

Rostow said that he thought we had explored the contact far enough. Hanoi's primary purpose was to keep itself from being bombed. One could look at this entire exchange as a sophisticated attempt to reduce pressure on Hanoi. I said this seemed to me highly improbable. The channel was inaugurated *before* Hanoi was bombed.

The issue of Hanoi arose only when the delivery of our first message coincided with the attacks on Hanoi. Moreover, it seemed to me that the most that Hanoi could achieve through stalling tactics was a three-week respite. This was too petty a motive for the stakes involved--all the more so as the targets would not go away between now

-28-

and November. Rostow said something about the bridge being par-
tially repaired; Read said that only single trucks could cross it and
then only very slowly.

Rostow then said that the whole thing might be a public
relations stunt. I said that this channel was poor for public relations.
M was not too well-known; A was discredited by his Communist past.
For propaganda some official channel, such as the Polish one, was
much better; it guaranteed uncheckable leaks. Rostow suggested
that maybe A was setting up M as a Communist mouthpiece. I re-
minded him that M had brought in A, not the opposite. Harriman
blew up to say that there was always a tough and a conciliatory faction
in every Communist hierarchy; we should strengthen the conciliatory
faction by giving it something to work with.

I said that I was not certain that Hanoi wanted only to talk.
Even if they did, it was in their interest to act tough. We had to
recognize that we presented a problem to them. Vietnamese were
congenitally suspicious; being Communists too this trait was no
doubt compounded.

Rostow had to leave at this point. Katzenbach said that it
was hard to tell whether Rostow stimulated the President or reflect-
ed his growing impatience. LBJ wanted to take out some of the
targets inside Hanoi as well as an airfield eleven miles outside.

[v]

-29-

300 planes were scheduled for the latter operation, which with attacks on SAM's and AA's would create a pretty mess. He urged me to talk to McNamara. He also asked me to do a paper for the meeting of principals scheduled for the evening. Since I had a meeting at the Council on Foreign Relations, I had to decline the latter.

I saw McNamara for fifteen minutes. He said the President was getting very impatient. He wanted to reduce the list of targets on the JCS list to the smallest number possible. He, McNamara, disagreed because he thought (a) that the JCS would generate new targets as quickly as the old ones were destroyed; and (b) that within a month the JCS would be asking for restrikes on the existing targets. They were already doing this with respect to the Hanoi targets attacked in August. I mentioned the attack on the military airfield north of Hanoi. McNamara said that he did not think this was too serious since it was clearly a military objective. I disagreed, but we reached no meeting of the minds. McNamara said that last evening he was ready to give up, but now he was willing to make another try to keep the channel open.

**October 4.** Rostow called and we talked for about an hour. He asked me whether I really believed that Hanoi did not trust us. Or was not the problem rather that Hanoi's objectives and ours were incompatible. Hanoi could be sure that we would withdraw within six months of a settlement. All we wanted was to

give South Vietnam a free choice. If Hanoi wanted to settle, it would
find a way of doing so. This led to a long analysis to the effect that
the war was actually being won. It only took a while in a guerrilla
war for this fact to become manifest.

Around noon a letter from M arrived containing his notes
of the meeting with Bo on October 2. (See Appendix D for the text.)
These were supposed to have been taken down verbatim. They outl-
ed three contingencies for negotiations after a cessation of the bomb-
ing: (1) a public declaration about the end of bombing; (2) an official
but not public declaration through the K/A/M channel; and (3) a
cessation followed by an official declaration. He also mentioned
that North Vietnam had made a solemn commitment to negotiate if
the bombing ceased. The language of point (2) being unclear, I called
M. He said he had slightly edited Bo's words for clarity. I told him
to go back to Bo and obtain an agreed version of the point. In the
meantime I called Read, dictated the note to him, and indicated that
point (2) might be altered. I also talked to McNamara. We agreed
that the note might give us a handle toward a cessation. McNamara
said me that the President had called a meeting for 1830 to discuss
a reply.

At 1530 M called from Paris to say that Bo disavowed not
only paragraph (b) but also the other sections and he refused to

[7]

-31-

verify the words "solemn commitment". M said that in the case of
such a breakdown of communications his utility as a channel was at
an end. Bo disagreed strongly saying the channel had to continue.
Bo had given M an official statement simply reiterating that a stop-
page of bombing had to preceed negotiations. Reacting very strongly,
I told M that I would not transmit such a message. Six senior
Americans were assembling in a few hours on the basis of a report
we had every reason to trust. I doubted that we would ever trust
this channel again. M, nearly in tears, asked whether I would mind
if he called Bo and told him of how Washington had been prepared to
react to the original message as well as of my strong objection to
the disavowal. I told him that he was free to do so but he should,
above all, make clear that we were not jockeying for position, but
were deadly serious.

I called Read and we agreed on a set of questions to be put
to Bo should he agree to see M again. M called back at 1630 to say
that Bo had asked him to come right over. I told him to impress on
Bo that I might be able to delay the start of our meeting by an hour,
but that everything that had been achieved in recent weeks would be
jeopardized if Bo could not be more forthcoming. Promptly at 1930
(0030 Paris time), M called with the following message to me, every
word of which had been checked by Bo. (See Appendix E for the
French text.)

"After having discussed with Bo and after having obtained confirmation of his country's position regarding the even-tuality of talks, you should know that if you really want to talk you should stop unconditionally the bombing and all other acts of war. I deduce myself, and remembering one of our previous conversa-tions in the presence of Raymond, that the following scenario could be envisaged: your people would send a first message through our channel announcing unequivocally the unconditional cessation of bombing. Once the stopping has been achieved, a second message also through our channel might suggest the opening of the dialogue at a date and site suggested by you. If your friends and you agree on such a scenario, let Bo know through a written message to be conveyed by the same channel. I do not know at this stage if what I say is appropriate. You know this better than I."

I told M to stand by and to tell Bo that we might need clarification. I called Read and Katzenbach and dictated the message to Read. I recommended not replying for 48 hours, to tell M and Bo that we were studying the message and would reply when we had formulated an answer. This was accepted and I called M to that effect around 2100 (0200 Paris time). He, in turn, telephoned Bo that no further messages would be coming in for the present.

-33-

**October 5.** There was a rather long conversation with Rostow. He said that for the first time Hanoi seemed to show more anxiety than we. He asked for my recommendation for procedures about a bombing pause. I suggested a simple declaration that the bombing would stop in ten days time. In the interval before the actual cessation of bombing, this channel or some other semi-official one could be used to fix the time and site of a meeting.

I received a letter from M explaining how the note of October 2 came to be written. (See Appendix F.)

I had a conversation with Read along the same lines as the one with Rostow.

At 1830 Read called again to say that Bundy would arrive in Boston the next day (October 6) with a draft message from me to M and Bo, which we would cable to the Embassy for delivery to M. Read said that he considered the message very subtle and in the direction of our joint efforts.

**October 6.** Bundy brought the text of the note to Hanoi (Appendix G). It coupled an offer to end the bombing with clauses already declared objectionable by Hanoi, such as that the cessation must lead to "prompt" and "productive" negotiations. It also said that the note was in accordance with the message of August 25, which Hanoi had already declared as conditional. I told Bundy that these

-34-

phrases would produce endless difficulties. Whether negotiations
would be productive or not did not depend on a formal commitment
to that effect. We called Katzenbach, who said that the phrase about
August 25 had been added by LBJ to give him a handle for dealing
with the troop build-up along the DMZ facing the Marines. I pointed
out that nothing in the August 25 message was relevant to the DMZ
problem. Katzenbach agreed and suggested that I talk to Read.

Read said that he would take my point of view up with
Rusk. Rusk replied that he agreed with my objections, but that the
President was adamant.

I called McNamara, who said he shared Rusk's view and
added that if any point of the document was reopened the whole text
was likely to be subject to revision. It was easier to modify the
text *after* Hanoi objected. (In other words, three responsible
Cabinet officers were more prepared to have a clearly unacceptable
and meaningless text as part of the record than to confront the
President.)

Read then told me that Rusk wanted the note delivered
that night at 2200. I called M to inform him that the note was being
transmitted via Walnor (Minister at Paris). I asked him to call me
after he had read the text. M called back at 1930. He found the
text a great step forward but was very worried about the reference

-35-

to the message of August 25. I said it could not be changed. M then asked whether because of the importance of the note A could be present when it was delivered. This would involve a delay of 36 hours. I told him that I would check. I called Read and McNamara who agreed to the delay. I called M and set up a telephone conference with A for 1800 (my time) on October 7.

**October 7.** I called A as agreed. He had read the text and told me that it was surely unacceptable in its present form. Could I not delete the reference to the message of August 25? Even if meaningless it would arouse suspicion. I said I would give it one more try. I called McNamara, who said that he agreed, but could not as Secretary of Defense raise a negotiations issue. I called Read who in turn telephoned Rusk and Katzenbach. They repeated their position of the day before. I thereupon made an approach to Rostow. Rostow pointed out that the President was deadly serious about not leaving our troops in a trap at the DMZ. I pointed out that the message of August 25 said nothing about the DMZ. Rostow answered that we could interpret the reference to refer to that special situation. I called A to that effect. He said that he would do his best, but he doubted that it would be enough.

**October 8.** M and A called at 0600 to inform me of the delivery of the message. Bo had greeted them cordially. He told M

[4]

-36-

to transmit the following note to me: "M and A ont remis la note de K à Bo. Dans le cas où il aurait une réponse il communiquer cette réponse dans la même canal." Bo then made the following oral points: (1) The words "prompt" and "productive" were conditional.

(2) The reference to the message of August 25 was conditional.

(3) The oral comment (3) when read in the context of the message of August 25 implied secret talks during a bombing limitation; this had already been rejected. (4) The whole note was reminiscent of the President's San Antonio speech which had been insulting. And (5) Hanoi would rather accept any kind of damage than to change its position about the need to end the bombing unconditionally.

Bo refused A's suggestion that he say he was studying the note. A said that it was his view that only a personal trip by me could save the situation.

I called McNamara, who said he would do anything to keep the channel open. A trip by me would restrain at least for a few days those looking for a pretext to start bombing Hanoi again.

I then called Read, who notified Rusk and Katzenbach. Rusk said that this first reaction was not surprising in a diplomat who wanted to make some "brownie points" at home. We should play it cool. They would call with instructions around 1230.

Read called back to say that I could communicate the following three points to M. I was not to ask him to transmit them,

-37-

but I should not resist any attempt by him to do so. The points were:

(1) The message from me to Bo had been prepared with great care. M and A must recognize that it represented an entirely genuine and new approach for dealing with US-DRV differences.

(2) The United States had made two major moves: offering to stop bombing and offering to set a specific date for doing so. There had been a discouraging absence of considered response from Hanoi.

(3) We are not accepting or rejecting the possibility of my going to Paris. The utility of such a trip would be decided in part on the basis of what comes back through the channel.

When I read this to M on the telephone he said that the last clause was a condition. I told him very sharply that I could understand Hanoi's reluctance to accept conditions for an end to the bombing, but they could not demand unconditional acceptance of all their points. I told him that it was essential for Hanoi to give us some proof of good will. M replied that they had already done so in their message of October 4. I told him that he should know that this note had no standing at all, since it represented only his impression of Bo's views. M thereupon agreed to see Bo the next morning.

[Y]

-38-

**October 9.** I was called at 0400 by M, who pleaded with me to come to Europe the following weekend. He saw that as the only hope for reviving the talks. I told him that I would think about it.

At 0500 A called from Rome to add his request to M's. Both were reluctant to deliver the three point message to Bo, fearing that it would lead to a rupture. My view was that Bo does not have the authority to break off the contact. Also, since my message of yesterday was addressed to Bo, he had to reply toughly to prove his vigilence. However, I did not express these opinions. Instead, I told A that M could delete the third point and that he should invite some counter-proposal or at least comment.

M called again at 1030. He had seen Bo, who was very cool. When M told him that the US believed it had taken two major, genuine, and new steps, Bo acted surprised and inquired what they were. As instructed by me, M said that the first decision was to offer an end to bombing, the second to offer a specific date for cessation. Bo said he had not understood the October 8 message in that sense. He would inform Hanoi. M then asked whether he had received verification of the Pham Van Dong statement as contained in A's account. Bo said: "Qui ne dit pas non consent". I told M that a proverb was a slender reed on which to base policy. M's basic conclusion was that Bo now distrusted him.

I repeated these conversations to Read, who said that Bundy, Katzenbach and Rusk were opposed to my going to Paris this weekend. Everybody was determined to wait until Wednesday before making any decisions.

**October 10.** There was another frantic telephone call from M offering to come to the United States this weekend if I thought that US dignity would suffer if I came to Paris. I told him I would discuss it with my friends, but that I could no longer come as a private individual. I told him that the "flexible" element in Washington was growing restless with having every overture answered with a charge of bad faith.

I called Read and Katzenbach to report this conversation. They agreed that a visit by M and A to Washington would combine the disadvantage of every course. It would make us appear restless without facilitating communications with Bo.

Harriman called to ask what I recommended. I told him that a weekend visit was unwise. My recommendation was for me to go to Paris next week on October 19. We should give Bo a few days advance warning and tell him that I was available to receive communications and/or to answer questions either directly and through the channel. This would tend to provide a spur to an answer by Hanoi and if rejected would put us in the best possible public posture. I would oppose

-40-

resuming the bombing of Hanoi until about ten days *after* the channel
is ended.

**October 11.** Read called to tell me of a White House meeting in which the President expressed great impatience. Pressure was again building up for bombing Hanoi and for a B60-plane raid on the military airfield eleven miles north of the city. I said that I strongly opposed the bombing. I did not expect this channel to succeed any longer, but it seemed to me that we had everything to gain and little to lose by leaning over backwards. In the best of circumstances Hanoi requires ten days to make a response. If we bombed now we would be accused of having wrecked another peace initiative by our impetuosity. I offered to call McNamara to that effect. Read replied that this would be preaching to the converted. Rostow was a more suitable candidate for a telephone call. Accordingly, I called him and repeated essentially the above arguments.

John Roche called to ask what I knew of peace feelers. I replied that I knew only what I read in the papers.

Henry Owen called to say that Eugene Rostow had urged him to look at my reports before preparing his program for next year. Since my reports are held in a NO DIS basis in the Secretary's office and unavailable to Rostow, I said that I did not know what reports he was talking about; he should give me specific references.

[Y]

-41-

Read called again to say that the Committee of Principals had decided to defer the bombing of Hanoi and the airfield for at least a week. They had asked me to call M and tell him to deliver the following message to Bo either late tonight or first thing tomorrow morning: (1) My friends and I had decided against a trip to Paris this weekend; (2) The US position was clear; we saw no need to clarify it--although we were prepared to respond to specific questions; and (3) The channel remained open. Read added that I could tell M that I was arriving October 19, but that this fact should not be communicated to Bo until early next week.

I called M with this message. He expressed great reluctance to see Bo and flatly refused to do so without A, who was not arriving until Friday. Apparently Bo was chillier and ruder on Monday than M had let on. M was very depressed. He felt that there was no need to say that there was nothing to say. If we had nothing to communicate, silence was the best response. I told him that we all appreciated his efforts, that this channel had been open longer than any previous one, and that if it should fail this would be due to constraints in Hanoi not to any failure on his part. I said that I agreed with his views about seeing Bo; unless I called him back to the contrary he should forget about the message.

I called Read and made this recommendation. He said that he would take it up with Rusk and Katzenbach. I also recommended that

[N]

-42-

we tell Bo next Tuesday morning that I was coming to Paris on October 19 to discuss the impasse in the channel with A and M and would be available on October 20 and 21 to receive communications or answer questions, although we had nothing further to say. Read said that all the principals seemed agreed on this approach, although no formal decision had as yet been taken.

**October 12.** Nothing happened.

**October 13.** Read called to say that Washington wanted a message delivered on Monday morning summing up the history of the negotiations in this channel, calling attention to DRV actions along the DMZ, and indicating an end to restraints in Hanoi. I pointed out that we need not announce the end of restraints. Our correct attitude was to lean over backwards to demonstrate our willingness to settle. This suggested repeating our offer, indicating that the channel was still open and announcing my visit to Paris. If this brought no response, we could return to the bombing policy in the best posture.

**October 14.** I called M in Paris and found that he had gone to Rome to consult with A. I told M that we might want to deliver a message on Monday. He objected violently, saying that the next meeting with Bo was likely to be the last one and that he, therefore, wanted A present. Moreover, the positions were clear; there was nothing to add. I said that we thought we owed it to ourselves to

-43-

make one more effort. M pointed out that we did not take adequate
account of the Vietnamese domestic situation. After all, Bo had
said that Hanoi's silence indicated agreement with A's notes of his
conversation. I replied that three days earlier Bo had stressed that
in the absence of confirmation he could do nothing about the three
points in M's memorandum of October 2, which he had finally dis-
avowed. After some more conversation M agreed to deliver a message
if I insisted.

I called Read to report the conversation. We agreed to draft
a message the next day.

October 15. Read and I spent several hours drafting a very
conciliatory message, which omitted the offensive portions of the
message of October 8 and summed up the state of the conversations
and analyses about the cause of the impasse.

October 16. I called M, who was still very reluctant to deliver any message, claiming that Bo had lost confidence in him. I pointed out that a decision as important as maintaining the channel was not likely to depend on personal relations or the accident of a telephone call. M pleaded with me to defer delivery until A could arrive on Friday.

I called Read who, after consultation with Rusk, agreed to
defer delivery.

-44-

At 1500 I called M to inform him of this decision. He had
had a telephone call from Bo ten minutes earlier asking him to call
at 1000 tomorrow.

**October 17.** I was awakened at 0630 by M, who had just seen Bo. M was in one of his merrier moods. Bo had greeted him in an extremely friendly fashion. He had said: "I know you have spent a lot of time on this. You no doubt have more important things to do from your point of view; there is nothing more important from ours."

Bo then commented on the phrase "productive" in our message of October 8. Hanoi had interpreted it as an attempt to include South Vietnamese issues on the agenda; this they had always rejected. He then handed M the following note:

> Actuellement les Etats-Unis poursuivent l'escalade de la guerre de facon extremement grave. Dans ces conditions le propos de paix ne sont que duperie. Au moment où les Etats-Unis poursuivent l'escalade nous ne pouvons ni recevoir M. K ni commenter les opinions Americaines transmise dans ce canal. La position du gouvernement de DRV est parfaitement clair. C'est seulement lorsque les Etats-Unis auraient cessé sans condition les bombardements que des conversations pourront avoir lieu.

M called attention to the difference between "escalation" and "end of bombing" and also the use of the words "can" (pourront) instead of "could" (pourraient). I said that I would transmit the message to responsible quarters and whatever happened we appreciated his

-45-

dedication. I said that in case he was talking to Bo, to keep him
from thinking we were over eager.

I then called McNamara and told him of the message, interpreting it along the lines of the memorandum attached (Appendix H). McNamara said that he would get a copy immediately. It would no doubt be discussed at the Tuesday lunch (LBJ, Rusk, McNamara and Rostow).

I called Read and gave him the text. We discussed the meaning of "escalation" and the significance of the change in tense from "could" to "can". Read said that he would circulate the message and let me know if there were any responses before the Tuesday lunch. Read called back later in the morning to say that Katzenbach had to leave town and that no consensus existed as yet.

There was no further word until around 1600, when Read called in a very dejected mood. The Tuesday luncheon meeting had turned into a harangue by LBJ, who claimed that the DRV were engaged in a gigantic ploy to gain immunity within a ten mile radius of Hanoi. The decision was for me to get A and M's agreement to a common understanding of what had transpired by Saturday evening. On Sunday morning the bombing would resume. I told Read that in these circumstances it was senseless for me to go to Paris. A and M associated my visits with an initiative toward peace. If Hanoi

-46-

were bombed within twelve hours of my departure, they would be con-
vinced that the whole exercise was in bad faith. No agreement with
them would be worth the paper on which it was written. A and M
would almost certainly publicly accuse us of bad faith. We would lose
the good public posture we had built up over the last eight months.
I said I could understand terminating the contact; it made no sense
not to give Hanoi the usual turn-around time to react to this fact.
Read, who was crestfallen, said that I was preaching to the converted.
He suggested I call McNamara and get his sense of the meeting, after
which Read and I would discuss what could be done.

I called McNamara, who was exceedingly depressed. He
confirmed Read's understanding of the Tuesday lunch. He said that
an influential factor in producing the decision was an intelligence
estimate that the DRV was not serious in this channel. Neither he
nor Rusk had seen the estimate before the meeting. McNamara
added that the real problem was that the key people had not really
made up their minds whether they wanted a bombing pause or not.
They, therefore, could not steer for a clear objective. I asked
whether we could not have at least an interval of two weeks between
the termination of the channel and the resumption of bombing.
McNamara said that he would try, but that it would be rough going.
I asked whether a

to Rostow would make any sense.

-47-

McNamara said, not unless I thought my powers of persuasion were
greater than his.

When I reported this to Read, he said that I should try
Rostow anyway; meanwhile, he would have a go at Rusk. Accord-
ingly, I called Rostow. He launched into a monologue to this effect:
He could read the last communication from Hanoi only as a flat
refusal. Hanoi realized that the San Antoinio speech was a dignified
exposition of our point of view. It understood, too, that the President
was a serious person. To their credit they had returned a serious,
dignified "no" to our message of October 8. I said that I did not
think Hanoi's mind worked that way. Their behavior seemed to me
consistent with an attempt to get into talks rather than the opposite.
I saw little point in their teasing matters along like this if a flat "no"
was in their mind. Rostow asked for my analysis of the recent mess-
age. He then asked for my recommendations. I said we had essen-
tially two choices: to play this exchange into a pause whatever
Hanoi's response (perhaps especially if it was negative) or to termin-
ate the channel. In the latter case we should not resume bombing
before ten days had passed. Rostow said that my case would be pre-
sented to the Principals.

I called McNamara to inform him of this conversation. In
the meantime, he had called Katzenbach, who was in Connecticut to

-48-

give a speech, to urge him to return to Washington as quickly as
possible. Harriman, he told me, was also out of town, but there
was no point in bringing him back; he would only slow up matters.

I called Read to inform him of the two conversations. He
had meanwhile spoken to Rusk, who had decided to call a dinner meet-
ing of the principals (except the President) for 1900 the following
evening. Read had also received Rostow's summary of the conversa-
tion with me. It was a fair, brief statement of my views. Neverthe-
less, Read urged me to write a fuller statement. He would then cir-
culate it among the principals during the day. This would give them
something to think about before the meeting.

October 18. I started the day by dictating my memorandum
(Appendix H) to Read's secretary. I also arranged for a stand-by Air
Force plane in case I missed the last flight to New York.

I arrived in Washington at 1630 and was met by a State De-
partment car. When I reached Read's office he told me that when the
President had heard of the principals' meeting he moved it to the White
House. Read let me see the latest intelligence data (including special
intelligence) and messages from the Embassies bearing on prospects
for negotiation. We then adjourned to Katzenbach's office, where
Bundy and Holbrook (Katzenbach's assistant who had worked with me
in Saigon) joined us. Katzenbach, speaking in his usual elliptical,

[7]

-49-

sarcastic way, said he liked my memorandum. He preferred Option 1 because we could implement it unilaterally and it was better to enter a pause with an established diplomatic framework than without warning. We would have to have a bombing pause before the elections.

Bundy said that he was terrified of a "jump pause"--the possibilities for Communist obfuscation would be endless. Option 1 gave us a chance to test the water and to establish some ground rules. Holbrook said that one could not equate DMZ activities with the bombing of Hanoi. Hanoi had a special significance for the DRV; the new DMZ build-up could have been a response to Westmoreland's boast that recent withdrawals were a Dienbienphu in reverse.

Rusk called and asked me to ride to the White House with him. On the way he asked me to give him a brief description of the personalities of M and A. I described M as well-meaning, honorable, and inclined to believe that peace can be achieved by the strenuous exercise of good will. He would report to the best of his ability, but he might omit matters that in his view complicated his aim.

A was tough, sophisticated, and wary. He might falsify, but only for a political purpose. He was a safer, though humanly less appealing, means of communication. Rusk asked whether M understood that intermediaries were not supposed to have positions. I replied that I doubted it; after all, it was precisely his having a position

that made him so eager to be an intermediary. As we entered the White House grounds, Rusk said that nothing had hurt him as much personally as the charge that his actions were motivated by a notion of the Yellow Peril. After all, he added wryly, the people being endangered were yellow, too.

We entered the Cabinet Room through the garden in order to keep the fact of a meeting secret from both the press and other staff members. Present were Rusk, McNamara, Katzenbach, Taylor, Clifford, Fortas and Rostow. It soon became apparent that Clifford, Fortas and Taylor had not had access to any of the documents, thus missing the element of movement in Hanoi's position and concentrating on the lateral meaning of Hanoi's message.

The President entered pulling various pieces of paper from his pocket and mumbling something about a House decision to cut domestic expenditures. He then asked Rusk to state the problem posed by the A/M/K channel. Rusk made a brief and very fair summary of the history of the channel and outlined the different interpretations of the last message. The President asked for my views. I gave him some background on the origin of the mission, amplified Rusk's account and gave precise dates for the various events. The President then asked about the next move. I told him that that would depend on where he wanted to go. If there was to

-51-

be a pause in the next four or five months, this exchange could be
used to lead up to it--essentially by the Option 1 route; if he want-
ed to terminate the channel, Option 2 was indicated. (I did not use
the terms Option 1 and Option 2, but rather gave their content.) I
stated that the channel had had these consequences: (1) It was the
only channel now open; (2) It had produced more replies, however
tortuous, than any other; (3) There had been a noticeable drop in
the level of acrimony between Hanoi's note of September 11 and the
message of October 16; and (4) The possibility of interpreting the
message in a favorable sense existed.

LBJ then read from a memo by Rostow which stated three
options--my two and that of further escalation. Rusk said that as a
matter of fact there were more options than three and he listed a
number of different procedures for negotiation (chairmen of the
control commission, ambassadors in Moscow, etc.).

The President then turned to Katzenbach. Katzenbach made
a strong and very effective argument for Option 1. He said that he
could see no motive for Hanoi stringing out the channel unless it
wanted to keep open the possibility of talks. LBJ said that "if
somebody had blown my bridges and had knocked out my power
plant, I would grasp at anything that gave me a respite". Katzen-
bach said that the restricted area was not that important to Hanoi;

-52-

that they had opened the channel *before* we bombed Hanoi and *before*
we announced restrictions; that they had not asked for this restric-
tion. Clifford asked whether Bo was stringing us along on his own
initiative. Rusk rejected that hypothesis. We knew that there was
a certain correspondence between the receipt by Bo of instructions
and the messages to M and A. Moreover, given the risk of public
disclosure, Bo would never dare to proceed on his own.

The President then asked McNamara what would happen if
during a pause Hanoi "hit us in the eye". McNamara replied that
then we should hit them in both eyes. LBJ asked about the nose and
McNamara continued his two-for-one formula. The President was
wacking his way down the body when suddenly he shot: "When can
I hit them in the nuts?" McNamara was flustered, so LBJ pursued
the theme. Finally McNamara recovered and said: "I don't consid-
er Hanoi their nuts".

LBJ turned to Taylor. Taylor said that he had not left his
prejudices outside the Cabinet Room. He argued strongly against
a pause as tending to demoralize the tenuous government in Saigon,
to dishearten our Asian allies and to encourage Hanoi. Moreover,
the last message from Hanoi was a clear rejection. We should
resume full-scale bombing and terminate the contact.

Clifford supported Taylor. He said that Hanoi had once
more slapped the President's face. The contact should be terminated.

-53-

Moreover, unofficial contacts were unsatisfactory; if Hanoi wanted to talk we had plenty of ambassadors to address. Why not Moscow, for example? Katzenbach interjected: "If even Henry is too official for them, what chance would Tommy have?" Clifford argued strongly against a bombing pause on much the same grounds as Taylor.

Fortas made a very emotional speech, picturing the President as generous, warm hearted and taken advantage of. "How many pauses have you had, Mr. President?" LBJ held up one hand. "And what has been the response?" LBJ was the picture of put-upon innocence. Fortas then described Hanoi's behavior during the Tet pause. As for this channel, I had been given fantastic credentials. Still, if words had any meaning, the last message from Hanoi was an unequivocal "no". He favored the termination of the contact and a resumption of the bombing of Hanoi. He also opposed a pause. The President would just have to face down public opinion. Clifford interjected that his only objection to bombing Hanoi was the impact on public opinion.

Rusk said he saw no point in terminating the contact, since we might want to use it someday. Nor should we send a message. I should simply go over to Paris and tell A and M more in sorrow than in anger that my friends had nothing more to say.

[N]

-54-

McNamara asked for the floor. He said that in his judgment a pause during the next year was inevitable both for international and domestic reasons. If this was true, then to give up this channel would be to transform a pause later into a public relations exercise. Moreover, the President should understand what he was letting himself in for by continuing the war. He had asked the JCS to list ten steps to shorten the war. Everyone of them involved escalating the effort against the North; not one included actions in the South. The President pulled another paper out of his pocket, which listed the JCS-recommended targets not yet struck, and pointed out that the number was shrinking. McNamara said that the figure was irrelevant because the JCS invented new targets and restrickes faster than they could be eliminated. The President fished out of his seemingly bottomless pockets another private memorandum warning against escalation. He read parts of it aloud.

Finally, he turned to Rostow. Rostow made the same speech as the day before. Hanoi recognized that its military position in the South was disintegrating. It could only fight with regular divisions along the DMZ. They knew, too, that the President was serious and being serious themselves they had turned him down.

LBJ said that he accepted Rusk's recommendation. I should go to Europe and play it cool, warning of growing US impatience.

-55-

He said nothing about the bombing, but the implication was that
existing restraints would remain in force a little while longer. He
called for another meeting tomorrow to discuss the whole concept
of a pause.

By this time it was 2200. LBJ invited everyone for dinner. However, Rusk said he had work at State and asked me to join him there for dinner. In the end Rusk, Katzenbach, Read and I dined together. Rusk amplified his remarks at the meeting. He listed unilateral US initiatives that had been rejected. He said that the situation along the DMZ was extremely grave. The DRV had recently brought down 100 mm guns, which were a threat to B-52s. The fact of the matter was that while we had observed restrictions, Hanoi had escalated. I should stress this to A and M. On the way out Katzenbach and Read took me aside and said: "Get us the words 'will negotiate' and we will be in business". I was flown to New York in an Air Force plane and arrived in Kennedy at 0200.

**October 19.** Before leaving for Paris I had a brief talk on the telephone with McNamara. He said he thought that existing restrictions would be maintained for a week or two. I also talked to Read, who said that an editorial in a Hanoi paper had formally rejected the offer of a pause.

I arrived in Paris at 2200 and was greeted by M, who was in an advanced state of euphoria. He thought the last message was a practical commitment to negotiations. He stressed the words "escalation" and "pourront" much along the lines of my memorandum, although we had reached this conclusion independently. I quickly disillusioned him. I described the growing impatience in Washington and summarized the main arguments heard at the meeting the night before (without identifying the participants). I told him that the main objective of this trip was to try to obtain a clear statement from Bo that Hanoi would negotiate if the bombing ceased. It might sound like a fine nuance, but a great deal depended on it. Things would now go either one way or the other rather dramatically. M agreed. We decided to call A in Rome and urge him to come on the first available plane in the morning instead of in the afternoon as he had planned.

**October 20.** I went to the Embassy to send a brief message about the previous evening's conversation. I spoke briefly to Bohlen who said that he thought we were getting at this whole business too elliptically; the way to cut the Gordian know was to tell Hanoi of a fixed date we would cut off bombing.

I went with M to the airport to greet A. We spent several hours in the airport restaurant reviewing the situation. A said

-57-

that he had perhaps made a mistake in not having gone to see Bo
alone and not having relied more on his friendship with Ho. He
said that he was actually quite encouraged by my account. It seem-
ed that two new sentences might make the Hanoi proposition accept-
able. A tried to call Bo for an appointment, but he was told that
Bo would be out of town with a visiting Vietnamese delegation until
2100.

I saw A and M for an hour and a half at 1900 at M's house
to review our position prior to their calling Bo again. M said that
a French judge had told him that "pourront" implied a moral commit-
ment. I replied that one of our highest judges held a different view.
A then wrote down the following phrases and asked me about my
reaction. "The bombardment and other acts of war against the
territory of the DRV are the sole obstacle to meaningful negotia-
tions. As soon as the bombing ceases negotiations can begin." A
said that he was prepared to put his personal position with Ho behind
these phrases. I replied that while I could not speak for the US
government, these phrases would be a big step forward. The
DMZ problem would still have to be dealt with.

I left M's house at 2030 and returned to my hotel to await
word about the appointment with Bo. At 2130 A called in great
distress; Bo had refused to see them. We agreed to meet at 2230.

[7]

-58-

The following is their report of the conversation. A did the talking and M listened on the extension and took notes.

A: We would like to see you urgently.

Bo: There is nothing new to say. The situation is worsening. There is no reason to talk again.

A; There is something new and very important.

A: There is something very important. We are at perhaps the most important juncture of our exchanges.

Bo: There is nothing new to say. The situation is worsening. There is no reason to talk again. What is the important matter?

A: It has to do with the meaning of the last sentence of your last message and the sequence with which steps have to be taken.

Bo: Our position is perfectly clear. We stand on the Trinh interview with Burchett of January 28. There is nothing new to say. The situation is worsening. There is no reason to talk again.

M and A were distraught. M was close to tears and A was extremely depressed. In these circumstances I confined myself to thanking them for their dedication and meticulousness. The channel failed not for lack of good-will or imagination but because Hanoi either could not or would not talk. M said that at least we had learned what Hanoi meant by "unconditional". I replied that no serious person could believe in an absolutely unconditional relationship. Our concerns had really been minimal: to make sure that

Hanoi would talk promptly; that the talks would be serious; and that Hanoi would not take advantage of the situation. A and M agreed. They half-heartedly urged a unilateral bombing pause, but I said that this channel gave little encouragement for such a pause. I told them again how much Washington appreciate their efforts. I told them that I would maintain strict secrecy; they promised that they would not comment no matter what might be said in other quarters. We agreed to meet the next day at 0930 to review the history of this channel.

**October 21.** I met A and M, but none of us had much stomach for reviewing the history of the channel. We talked of a possible visit by A and M to Washington and an agenda for such a visit. At one point A said that his impression was that one group in the United States wanted peace while another group was reluctant. The resulting compromise gave American policy its appearance of uncertainty. I agreed that there was something to that, but it was also true that the absence of the slightest encouragement from Hanoi complicated matters. If any of our messages had been received with even a hint of encouragement, many things would have been possible. But that was now neither here nor there.

## Appendix A

### Message of August 25

The United States is willing to stop the aerial and naval bombardment of North Viet-Nam with the understanding that this will lead promptly to productive discussions between representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam looking toward a resolution of the issues between them. While discussions proceed either with public knowledge or secretly, the United States would assume that the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation. Any such move on the part of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam would obviously be inconsistent with the movement toward resolution of the issues between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam which the discussions are intended to achieve.

The United States is prepared to enter into discussions either openly or secretly. It would seem, however, that a total cessation of the bombing is inconsistent with keeping secret the fact that discussions are taking place. Accordingly, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam may prefer to consider the alternative of a cutback in the magnitude or scope of the bombing while secret discussions are in progress.

The United States is ready to have immediate private contact with the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to explore the above approach or any suggestions the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam might wish to propose in the same direction.

## Appendix B

### Viet-Nam Message of September 11

L'essence des propositions américaines est l'arret des bombardements sans conditions. Le bombardement américain de la République Democratique de Vietnam est illegal. Les Etats-Unis doivent mettre un terme aux bombardements et ne peuvent poser n'importe quelle condition.

Le message américain a été communiqué après une escalade des attaques contre Hanoi et sous le menace d'une continuation des attaques contre Hanoi. Il est clair que cela constitue une ultimatum à l'égard du peuple Vietnamien.

Le gouvernement de la République Democratique du Vietnam rejette energiquement ces propositions américaines.

La position du Gouvernement de la République Democratique du Vietnam est que les Etats-Unis doivent cesser définitivement et sans conditions les bombardements et tout autre acte de guerre contre la République Democratique du Vietnam. Ils doivent retirer les troupes américaines et satellites du Sud Vietnam, reconnaitre de factuel et laisser le peuple vietnamien regler lui-même ses affaires intérieures. C'est seulement après la cessation unconditionnelle par les Etats-Unis des bombardements et de tout acte de guerre contre la République Democratique du Vietnam que la République Democratique du Vietnam et les Etats-Unis pouvra engager des conversations.

[Y]

## Appendix C

### United States Message of September 13

The United States Government believes that the September 11 message from the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam may be based on a misunderstanding of the American proposal of August 25. The American proposal contained neither conditions nor threats and should not be rejected on these grounds.

It has been the understanding of the United States Government that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would be willing promptly to engage in productive discussions leading to peace when there was a cessation of aerial and naval bombardment. The United States Government sought to confirm this fact in its proposal of August 25--a proposal which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has in front of it.

As a demonstration of its good faith and in order to create the best atmosphere for the consideration of its proposal the United States voluntarily undertook not to bomb Hanoi from August 25 onward--the day on which its proposal was submitted to Hanoi. This restraint has been maintained without time limit even though activities by opposing forces in the South have, in fact, been stepped up since August 25.

The August 25 proposal of the United States Government remains open.

Appendix D

NOTE ETABLIE PAR M.A. APRES ENTRETIEN DE M. AVEC PAUL

le 2.10.1967 à 09.00 (heure de Paris)

La position de la RDVN reste toujours la même. Si les US veulent réellement causer qu'ils cersent d'abord sans condition les bombardements sur le territoire de la RDVN.

En partant de cette position, diverses éventualités :

a - une déclaration publique du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis sur cette cessation. Cette déclaration pourrait avoir lieu soit avant, soit après cette cessation.

b - une déclaration officielle mais non publique précédant la cessation des bombardements. Cette déclaration pourrait être communiquée par le canal KAM officieusement puis après indication d'acceptabilité être transmise officiellement par une personne accréditée.

c - une cessation des bombardements sans déclaration officielle préalable, suivie d'une communication officielle mais non publique du Gouvernement des USA.

L'éventualité (a) correspond à une déclaration publique répondant à celle faite le 28 janvier par M. Trinh, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la RDVN, qui constitue un engagement solennel à dialoguer après cessation inconditionnelle des bombardements. Cette déclaration publique serait suivie de la remise du texte officiel par une personne accréditée.

Les éventualités (b) et (c) sont des propositions M.A. telles qu'elles résultent de leur compréhension des entretiens de juillet à Hanoï avec le Premier Ministre. Une confirmation est attendue prochainement.

Appendix E

Après avoir discuté avec Bo et avoir reçu confirmation
de la position de son pays concernant l'eventualité des conversa-
tions à savoir si les Etats-Unis désirent réellement des conver-
sations il faut d'abord qu'il cesse les bombardements et les
autres actes de guerre. J'en deduit moi-même et nous rappellons
une de nos conversations antérieure en presence de Raymond que le
scenairo pouvrait etre les suivant:

Le gouvernement d'Etats-Unis enverrait un premier
message dans notre canal announcant sans equivoce la cessation
inconditionnelle des bombardements. Une fois ceci effectivement
realisé un deuxième message toujours par notre canal suggerait
d'ouverture d'un dialogue à un date and site souhaité. Si vos amis
et vous-mêmes êtes d'accord sur un tel scenairo faites en la
proposition à Paul par un message ecrit que je lui transmettrais.
I do not know whether this is appropriate. You can judge it better
than I.

Appendix G

The following message from Kissinger should be delivered to M:

M should tell B that K would be authorized to deliver to B in writing the following message whenever B is prepared to meet with him officially or unofficially:

"The USG understands the position of the DRV to be as follows: That upon the cessation by the United States of all forms of bombardment of the DRV, without expression of condition, the DRV would enter <u>promptly into productive discussions with the United States</u>. The purpose of these discussions would be to resolve the issues between the United States and the DRV.

"Assuming the correctness of this understanding of the position of the DRV, the USG is prepared to transmit in advance to the DRV the precise date upon which bombardment of the DRV would cease and to suggest a date and a place for the commencement of discussions."

In addition M should convey to B the following oral points from Kissinger:

1. K believes that this understanding is consistent with B's statement to M on October 4 and with the proposal of the USG of August 25, as applied.

2. When B meets with K, K would also be prepared to state the precise date on which cessation would occur and to give the suggestions of the United States with respect to the date and site of the discussions following cessation of bombardment, and K would be authorized to receive the views of the DRV with respect to these and other modalities.

3. K noted that the DRV had not commented on observations by the USG on August 25 with respect to secrecy of the fact of discussions between the DRV and the USG.

4. K observed that officials of the USG had taken note of a reduction of military activities in the vicinity of the DMZ. Undoubtedly, the DRV had noted the absence in recent weeks of aerial bombardment in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi.

Appendix H

18 October 1967

Memorandum to the Principals

From K

The decisions with respect to the A/M/K channel involve
complex considerations in which the balance of judgment is inevitably
close. This memorandum sets out three assumptions for discussion
and two policy options.

The assumptions are:

(1) The policy of Hanoi reflects the internal stresses of a group of men largely cut off from world affairs concerned partly with reconciling differing views and partly with building a record for the contingency of failure. It is complicated by an extremely complex external situation. As a result, what appears to the outsider as long-range deliberation may in reality be navigating between Peking and Moscow, coupled with uncertainty about internal cohesion under the stress of negotiations (especially if Peking disapproves) and deep distrust of the US. The prospect of talks thus confronts Hanoi with a series of dilemmas which it may resolve by a set of uneasy compromises between individuals jockeying for political survival.

(2) Whatever the ultimate decision, Hanoi's course is not likely to be clear-cut but tortuous and complicated, groping rather than definite, and seeking to keep open as many escape hatches as possible.

[Y]

-2-

(3) Whatever our reading of Hanoi's intentions, the minimum US interest with respect to the present channel should be to demonstrate that we have gone to the limit to test Hanoi's willingness or ability to negotiate, especially if this can be done without paying an appreciable price.

It is the purpose of this memo to argue (1) that the last communication from Hanoi contains--among the usual intransigent formulations--sufficient grounds for positive elements to raise doubts about a rupture announced by an oral refusal to answer the communication followed by an immediate resumption of full-scale activity; and (2) that even should we decide to end the channel it would seem better to give Hanoi a reasonable time to react to the announcement of this fact before we terminate current restrictions.

The following punitive aspects can be found in the note on the assumption that it was carefully drafted: The first two sentences speak of what Hanoi will _not_ do under conditions of _escalation_ (talk to me, comment on our message of October 5, etc.). The last sentence states a precondition for talks but adds for the first time that in that case talks _can_ (not could) take place. If this interpretation is correct, the intransigent passages may reflect Hanoi's fear of seeming to _ask_ for a bombing pause.

[7]

-3-

Two options present themselves, both involving a formal
reply.

(1) A message which contains the following elements: (a) We interpret the note in the above sense; (b) We announce a unilateral de-escalation to set the stage for preliminary talks to establish the timing and mode for substantive negotiations; (c) We offer that at the first preliminary exchange we would announce a date for a complete cessation; and (d) The rest of the message would repeat the essential elements of our message of October 15.

(2) A message containing the following elements: (a) We sum up in a conciliatory and non-argumentative fashion the offers made in this channel--to end the bombing, to accept unilateral restrictions without time limit, to set a date for the cessation; (b) We would then say that the last note appears to us as a flat rejection and leaves us nothing further to say; (c) Since we do not want to reach this conclusion lightly, the purpose of this communication is to ask Hanoi to confirm our interpretation or to tell us where it is mistaken; and (d) We would affirm that the offers remain open. In that case we should wait ten days (the average turn-around time in so complicated a situation as Hanoi's) before resuming activities (to avoid the charge of ultimatum). This time limit would not be part of the note but would in substance be communicated orally to M and A as my impression of the Washington mood.

[y]

-4-

Option 1 involves risks of domestic debate and of leading to another set of delays. The latter danger could be minimized by a personal word to A and M of growing US impatience. It has the advantages following: (a) It would offer Hanoi a pause under the most face-saving circumstances and thus test its reaction to this step; (b) If a pause is thought inevitable over the next six months it would approach it with an existing channel; and (c) If rejected it could muffle for a while at least the debate about the utility of a pause--at least among the more responsible elements.

Option 2 seems to me the minimum indicated whatever our reading of Hanoi's intentions. To close the channel abruptly and follow it immediately with a removal of restrictions will in all likelihood trigger A and M into a public declaration against us; it will give color to the argument that we did not give Hanoi a sufficient opportunity to consider our last offer or that we did not respond to a conciliatory change in phraseology. Option 2 would be accompanied by a grave warning by me to A and M of Washington's growing impatience. The marginal cost of an additional delay of ten days does not seem to me to outweigh the benefits.

#

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 3, 1967

Dear Henry:

The attached is for your use,
nonx-use or modification, as you see
fit.

Nick would still be willing to
see M and A if they do come now.

Do M and A have any funds left
in the account they set up with the check
you gave them in August? If so, would
you request return of the balance at a
convenient time.

What do you make of the reference
to "after discussions with Paul ____"
in the October document?

Best wishes,

Benjamin H. Read

PERSONAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 2, 1967

PERSONAL

Dear Henry:

With our full knowledge and approval during
your last visit in Paris you extended an invitation
to Messrs. Aubrac and Marcovich to visit the United
States at an early date convenient to them. We do
look forward to an opportunity to review our mutual
efforts with them.

Unfortunately the Congress has stayed in session
far longer than anticipated, and the schedules of
Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Katzenbach, Governor
Harriman, Assistant Secretary Bundy and others
familiar with this matter are now doubly occupied
with final Congressional hearings and work on the
new Fiscal 1969 budget and the initial submissions to
be submitted to the second session of the 90th Congress
in January. Although it will be difficult at any time
to work out appointments, which would be convenient to
all of these officials, I am certain that it would be
more feasible at a mutually convenient time after the
turn of the year.

All of us from the highest levels of the US
Government down to yours truly who worked on this
matter remain most grateful to Messrs. Aubrac and
Marcovich for their untiring, faithful efforts in
the pursuit of an objective of overriding importance.

Dr. Henry A. Kissiner,
Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.