NBC

Dear Peter,

When I was in Argentina, I saw a picture of Foreign Minister Costa Mendez reading HAK's Memoirs during a flight from NY to BA. It appeared in Gente Magazine, a copy of which I thought I had brought back with me. But I can't find it. You might try to get it from the Argentine Embassy if you're interested enough.

As for the book, here's the smallest nit picked of all time: At the bottom of page 503, I do believe the proper cliche is ripped to "shreds," not "smithereens." Something is blown to smithereens." Perhaps the translation from the German was faulty.

HAUSSERMANN, DAVISON & SHATTUCK

ONE BOSTON PLACE
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02108
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RONALD F. KEHOE
JOHN TAYLOR WILLIAMS
H. ADAM SONNENSCHEIN
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DAVID W. FITTS
RONALD R. CLOUTIER
EDWARD M. BLOOM
FRED A. ANDERSON, JR.

R. ROBERT WOODBURN, JR.
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WILLIAM F. MILLER
BARBARA BRUCE WILLIAMS
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LEWIS L. WADSWORTH, JR.
RETIRED PARTNER

December 18, 1981

William D. Rogers, Esquire
Arnold & Porter
1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Re: <u>MEMOIRS OF HENRY KISSINGER (Volume II)</u>

Dear Bill:

As we understand it, Peter Rodman has proposed various
changes for the extant page proofs of Volume II in response
to our letter of December 4, 1981. Those changes are as
follows:

## Chapter XVIII and XXIV

p. 806 - The words "administrative espionage" have been deleted.

The words "like many successful international spies" have been deleted.

p. 807 - The words "allowed to leave the service"; "who had spied" and "purloining" have all been deleted.

p. 853 - The word "spy" has been deleted.

We understand that the changes we requested in our
letter of December 4 which appeared on manuscript pages 22
and 25 of Chapter XVIII and Chapter XX page 9A were not
revised because the author has independent proof of accuracy
or that they are fair and accurate summaries of public
records or proceedings. We would appreciate a confirmation
on this.

## Chapter XXV

p. 1182 - The changes made regarding wiretapping of the Democratic National Committee are acceptable.

William D. Rogers

Page 2

December 18, 1981

## Chapter XXV

p. 1200 - As the reference to Diane Sawyer involves the exact reproduction of a quotation attributed to her, any revision would require the deletion of the quotation marks and words "she said".

Finally, as to the "General" comments set forth in our letter of December 4, 1981, we are satisfied with the representations as to the provenance of such materiale contained in your letter of December 14, 1981.

With best wishes for Christmas and the New Year, I remain

JTW/rs

cc: Arthur H. Thornhill, Jr., President

December 15, 1981

MEMO FOR HK

FROM: Peter PMR

SUBJECT: <u>N.Y. Times</u> Policy on Quotes from Editorials

Little, Brown is in the process of requesting permission
from newspapers, magazines, etc., to quote the excerpts
that appear in the book. This is normally routine,
as it was when Volume I was prepared.

The new book includes three quotations from unsigned
editorials in the _New York Times_ and one quotation
from a James Reston column. (They are attached.)

Little, Brown is now informed by one Barbara Langenberger
of the _Times_ New York office that, with respect to
editorials: "Our policy is to permit quotation only
of the entire editorial or not at all." Apparently,
they dislike being quoted out of context.

This is outrageous. No problem arose with the first
volume and no other newspaper imposes such restrictions.
I cannot think of a more obscurantist, anti-intellectual,
mean-minded, and generally gutless policy. We have
the option of paraphrasing, but I object on principle.

I wonder if you could call Punch Sulzberger or Sydney
Gruson and get them to grow up.

Ch. VII

Détente: Zavidovo to San Clemente

251

islature; they were more likely to move in the opposite direction. Far from spurring emigration, the Jackson amendment in fact wound up substantially reducing it.

But the times were not propitious for a rational dialogue. Jackson suddenly found supporters among liberals who had consistently fought his views on national defense and foreign policy. The *New York Times*, which in 1969 and 1970 had castigated us for what it considered the outrageous proposition that trade should be linked to Soviet foreign policy conduct, suddenly discovered the importance of using it to accomplish the domestic transformation of Soviet society. In an editorial on November 25, 1972, the *Times* began its conversion to its own definition of linkage:

> Russia's brutal repression of the civil rights of many of its own people, the imposition of a head tax on Jews to prevent them from leaving the Soviet Union and the threat of more serious restrictions still to come, the encouragement of other countries to expropriate American interests — all such actions are calculated to inflame American public opinion and to jeopardize the future growth of Soviet-American economic relations.

On February 21, 1973, the *Washington Post*, another long-time advocate of East-West trade, turned a hard-won and tacit change in Soviet practice into a nonexistent formal Soviet pledge:

> The strong Hill sentiment to tie trade and emigration gives the President the solid practical ground he needs to inform the Russians that in order for him to make good his pledge on tariff equality, they must make good their pledge on Jewish emigration.

Later in 1973 this debate, like many others, became mired in Watergate. On September 3 the *New York Times* professed to see no difference between Watergate and Soviet police-state repression of dissidents; indeed, it made its own contribution to the prevailing paranoia by discovering a Nixon-Brezhnev alliance to suppress opposition in both countries:

> The administration announced that Treasury Secretary Shultz will soon lead a high level delegation to Moscow to renew discussions on expanding Soviet-American trade. Soviet repression apparently disturbs the White House as little as Watergate bothers the Kremlin. The world now sees a de facto Nixon-Brezhnev alliance against dissent in each other's country.

On October 10, 1972, Representative Charles Vanik of Ohio introduced an amendment similar to Jackson's in the House. He was supported by such previous stalwart defenders of East-West trade as Representatives Donald M. Fraser of Minnesota and Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, who joined Representative John H. Buchanan, Jr., of

Ch. XVI

Troubles with Allies

719

Many people expect Europe not merely to react but to actually be born at last. . . .

Jobert's speech amounted to a suggestion that Europe articulate its identity as a permanent challenge to the United States. European and American interests were assumed to be divergent. Europe could vindicate its views only by a readiness for confrontation with its ally across the Atlantic — even while Jobert proclaimed that that ally remained indispensable to the common defense.⁶ How long it would be possible to maintain a credible American security guarantee for a Europe that dissociated over vital interests we considered common was the subject of little private and no public discussion.

In mid-November, Brandt picked up the theme in a speech to the European Parliament: "In a world whose destiny cannot and should not be determined by two superpowers alone, the influence of a united Europe has become indispensable." On November 20 the foreign ministers of the European Community met in Copenhagen to prepare for a European summit to deal with the Mideast crisis. We were given no hint of their preliminary conclusions even though we were then engaged in delicate negotiations designed to move the Mideast toward peace and to assemble the Geneva Conference.

Normally, such an assault by our allies would have produced a closing of ranks in America. The bipartisan leadership group that had sustained America's involvement in world affairs with NATO as its cornerstone would have rallied to defend its achievement — much as it had done in 1971 against the Mansfield amendment to withdraw troops from Europe.

But 1973 was not a normal year. In the Watergate atmosphere, the European accusation of high-handed American diplomacy found a receptive audience; many traditional supporters of Alliance ties could not bring themselves to believe that there was any issue on which Nixon might be right. A *New York Times* editorial on October 31 echoed other leading journals:

> Washington's failure to consult, despite countless promises to do so, and its decision not to give its allies advance warning of a military alert that inevitably affected their interests, fits a dismally familiar pattern for this Administration. Mr. Nixon and Secretary Kissinger can speak eloquently about the indispensable American-European connection; but their actions, particularly in crisis, do not match their words.

In early November, Senator Edward M. Kennedy published a five-page paper accusing the Nixon Administration of "heedlessly creating a crisis in the Atlantic alliance" and urging a reaffirmation of "the principle of allied consultation."⁷ On November 21, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski

Ch. XXIII

The Syrian Shuttle

1091

could not control. But giving an assurance to that effect was something else again. Sadat had had no problem with it because there were no fedayeen in Egypt and because the disengagement line was over 100 miles from Israel's borders. But the drive into Damascus from the airport past Palestinian refugee camps made vivid the importance of the issue in Syrian political life. No Syrian leader could afford publicly to disavow the Palestinians' cause even as he sought to restrict their impact on Syrian politics and to influence PLO policy through Saiqa, the Palestinian element that Damascus controlled. Nor was the Israeli position without its elements of contradiction. Refusing an agreement would not end the guerrilla threat but compound it with the prospect of a military confrontation.

In solving these various remaining issues I would get little help from other Arab leaders. They had been willing to encourage a compromise over the line of separation because they recognized that it involved a major, otherwise unattainable, retreat of Israeli forces from the salient. But except for Sadat, they would find the limitation of forces too technical and the Palestinian issue too deadly; their response was bound to be to side with Asad. So while I kept the key Arab leaders generally briefed, I did not ask for their support. Nor was there enough time left for a side trip even to Cairo to explain the various deadlocks.

And the situation in Washington was deteriorating. As early as May 17, James Reston in the *New York Times* had ascribed the prolonged shuttle to my desire to stay out of the Watergate battles at home:

> Mr. Kissinger is the key figure in this Cabinet question. He is staying out of the Watergate and impeachment battles. One suspects he may even be prolonging his shuttle diplomacy in order to avoid the even more complicated and poisonous controversies of Washington.

It was untrue, but by May 22 this had become a general theme taken up by both the CBS and NBC television correspondents on my shuttle.

If some of the media were eager to get me home — or to criticize my prolonged absence — the White House suddenly decided that it had to keep me in the Middle East as a way of demonstrating its control of the negotiations. On May 18, the day of the breakthrough on the line of separation, the White House press office let it be known that the President had asked me to stay in the area as long as necessary. This was a near-disaster. My most effective means of putting pressure on both Israel and Syria was to threaten that I would leave. On May 21, after I had in fact given both sides an ultimatum that negotiations had to be completed by Friday, May 24, Nixon's press aides, with him in Key Biscayne, mindlessly repeated the original statement. It was not even intended to contradict me; it was simply the most convenient way

JOB: YEARS OF UPHEaval COPYWRITER: Jim Lindquist DATE 11/10/81 PAGE 1 of 1

Please return to copywriter by :

HK
12/3/81

In Years of Upheaval, Henry Kissinger recalls the turbulent years of the second Administration of Richard Nixon, which began January 20, 1973. Two momentous events and their consequences dominate this account: the Watergate scandal, and the 1973 October war in the Middle East.

The book opens at the Western White House on a Spring afternoon in May of that year, when Dr. Kissinger learns during a poolside conversation (with the President) that he is to become Secretary of State. The memories that follow are a rich compendium of his experiences in the months before and after appointment: (his) eerie trip to Hanoi shortly after the Vietnam ceasefire; diplomatic efforts to settle the war in Cambodia; two Nixon-Brezhnev summits and the Year of Europe; and a crisis in the Western Alliance; the controversy over détente; the Shah of Iran and the oil embargo; the U.S. military alert (that was ordered, and of the) shuttle diplomacy; undertaken, after the October war; and secret contacts with the PLO; and the fall of Salvador Allende in Chile.

Dr. Kissinger's dramatic, day-by-day account of how the Mideast war was transformed into (a) peacemaking (process) involving the combatants, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council, and others; shapes the climactic chapters of the book, in counterpoint to the worsening crisis at home which culminated with Richard Nixon's resignation. His frank portrait of Nixon's last days is perhaps the most perceptive (and balanced) to date.

Candid appraisals of other world leaders--Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, King Faisal, Chairman Mao, Leonid Brezhnev, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Georges Pompidou, to name several--appear throughout the book, as do Dr. Kissinger's insights on war, peace, diplomacy, (crisis management) and the (true) nature of political leadership. At once illuminating, fascinating, and profound, Years of Upheaval is a lasting contribution to the history of our time, by one of its chief protagonists.

JOB: YEARS OF UPHEAVAL

COPYWRITER: Jim Lindquist

DATE 11/10/81 PAGE 1 of 1

In *Years of Upheaval*, Henry Kissinger recalls the turbulent years of the second Administration of Richard Nixon, which began January 20, 1973. Two momentous events and their consequences dominate this account: the Watergate scandal, and the 1973 October war in the Middle East.

The book opens at the Western White House on a Spring afternoon in May of that year, when Dr. Kissinger learns during a poolside conversation with the President that he is to become Secretary of State. The memories that follow are a rich compendium of his experiences in the months before and after appointment: his eerie trip to Hanoi shortly after the Vietnam ceasefire; diplomatic efforts to settle the war in Cambodia; the Year of Europe and a crisis in the Western Alliance; the controversy over detente; the Shah of Iran and the oil embargo; the U.S. military alert that was ordered, and the shuttle diplomacy undertaken, after the October war; and secret contacts with the PLO.

Dr. Kissinger's dramatic, day-by-day account of how the Mideast war was transformed into a peacemaking process involving the combatants, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Nations Security Council, and others, shapes the climactic chapters of the book, in counterpoint to the worsening crisis at home which culminated with Richard Nixon's resignation. His frank portrait of Nixon's last days is perhaps the most perceptive and balanced to date.

Candid appraisals of other world leaders--Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, King Faisal, Chairman Mao, Leonid Brezhnev, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Georges Pompidou, to name several--appear throughout the book, as do Dr. Kissinger's insights on war, peace, diplomacy, crisis management, and the true nature of political leadership. At once illuminating, fascinating, and profound, *Years of Upheaval* is a lasting contribution to the history of our time, by one of its chief protagonists.

Copy to be used in the *Book* magazine, as dictated by Gene Young's Office.

In *Years of Upheaval*, Henry Kissinger recalls the turbulent years of the second administration of Richard Nixon, [which began in January 1973 and ended prematurely in August 1974].

Two events and their consequences dominate this account: the Watergate scandal, and the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East. Other highlights are an eerie trip to Hanoi shortly after the Vietnam ceasefire; efforts to settle the war in Cambodia; the Year of Europe and a crisis in the Western Alliance; the controversy over détente; the Shah of Iran and the oil price rises of 1973; the nuclear alert and shuttle diplomacy that followed the Yom Kippur war; secret contacts with the PLO and the fall of Salvador Allende. Dr. Kissinger's dramatic account of how the Mideast war turned into the beginning of a process of peacemaking shapes the climactic chapters of the book, in counterpoint to the worsening crisis at home that culminated in Nixon's resignation. His frank portrait of Nixon's last days is perhaps the most perceptive and balanced to date. Candid appraisals of other world [and American] leaders appear throughout the book--Golda Meir, Anwar Sadat, the Shah of Iran, King Faisal, Chairman Mao, Leonid Brezhnev, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Georges Pompidou, Masayoshi Ohira, and many others--as do Kissinger's insights on war, peace, diplomacy and crisis management, and the nature of political leadership. At once illuminating, fascinating, and profound, *Years of Upheaval* is a lasting contribution to the history of our time, by one of its chief protagonists.

NEW YORK OFFICE TO BOSTON

ATTENTION Betsy Pitha

SUBJECT Search by Fleming

NEW YORK. 10/15/81

FROM: Gene Young

This is to put into writing the new arrangement for supply-
ing proofs to foreign publishers:

Because the security changes requested by the State Depart-
ment have not been incorporated into either the copyedited manu-
script or uncorrected galleys, we have abandoned plans to supply
these to foreign publishers, at the author's request. Instead,
we will supply them with page proof which will contain the State
Department corrections and all the author's and proofreader's
emendations. I understand that the author will be returning
corrected galleys of the first three chapters this week, and the
balance by October 19th. Page proof will be returned by the plant
a week after they receive the corrected galleys from you, in
chapter by chapter or proofs of chapters, in dribbles. We expect
to have page proof of thirteen chapters by Nov. 6th.

We have agreed that we will make getting page proof of this
half of the book our first priority.

We will follow the same procedure in getting to page proof
of the second half of the book. While it is too early to tell,
since we do not yet have Chapters 22 or 25, I am hoping that the
last half of the book will be in page proof by December 15th.

We have agreed to supply Xeroxes of the corrected page proof
and the author's office seven sets.

:sr

cc: Arthur H. Thornhill, John Maclaurin, Lesley Arnold, Chris
Vick, Marvin Josephson.

LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
PUBLISHERS

34 BEACON STREET
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02106

1837

October 15, 1981

Dear Peter:

Herewith three sets of proof of Chapter XVIII, plus the copy of the
copyedited ms. The set with the yellow queries and tags is the only
one that I've marked; the other two are pristine. I put the queries on
the tags rather than directly on the proof in the hopes that this would
be more convenient for you.

I'm sending from here all this material which would have normally
come directly to Washington. For the remaining galleys, I have arranged
that Vail will send directly two sets of galleys plus the ms. copy to
you, but send the third set of your galleys to me, so that I can continue
to flag or query here. Then I will send that set down to you. I think
it will come only a day later than the other material - at least, I
hope so!

It should all work efficiently - let me know if there is anything
else I can send concurrently with proof, if the yellow tags stay in
situ, if you need more explanations, etc.

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 25, 1981

TO: HAK

FROM: Peter

Gene Young, on reading Chapter XI on the Mideast war, felt that it has lost a lot of its dramatic impact since the last draft she read (1/15/81 draft).

She proposes restoring some of the language that has been dropped. In particular:

-- She thinks the recitation of precise times (like your Jordan crisis chapter in Vol. I) had an impact, building suspense, that is now lost.

-- A paragraph was dropped on p.23 -- about "the breathtaking vision of Sadat's strategy"-- that was a high point of the chapter.

-- The discussion of Hafiz Ismail's first message during the war was the second high point of the chapter. Its impact has been watered down considerably.

She has a point. See the attached edits. Recall, however, that the precise times were fudged partly because of the telcon/FOIA problem. The gushing lines about Sadat were toned down partly because of Israeli sensitivities.

1837

GENEVIEVE YOUNG
SENIOR EDITOR

July 21, 1981

Dear Peter,

I'm coming down to Washington on August 13th and 14th to read as much of the new material as is available. (I have read up through Chapter 19, The Energy Crisis.)

I think Betsy has talked to you about getting map copy as soon as possible. It is my feeling that we will need less maps in this book than we did in the last one, is it yours?

I hope that while I am there we can make at least a preliminary selection of the photographs to go into the books. I have a feeling that we may be able to do all of the photographs in 32 pages this time--that means about 60 photographs. Do you think we can set aside some time while I'm down there to go through them with you? The sooner that we can get the illustrations and captions done, the better. As you know they are printed at an entirely different place and have their own publishing schedule; they also take longer to put together than the text.

None of us is clear about whether the State Department needs to review this manuscript, and if so at what stage. Can you give me any information about this? Obviously, if they're going to have a lot of minor corrections and changes we will have to let them see the material as early as possible, when changes can still be made. Or perhaps you have already taken care of this?

NEW YORK OFFICE - 747 THIRD AVENUE - NEW YORK 10017 - 212-688-8380

1837

GENEVIEVE YOUNG
SENIOR EDITOR

June 12, 1981

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

The four new chapters--XVI through XIX--are excellent, and the shuttle chapter is downright thrilling. I applaud the instinct that made you pause to describe the interior of the shuttle plane; it adds an immediacy and warmth to the entire chapter. If there is only one thing I could ask on behalf of your readers, it would be for more of this kind of personal material. I hope that you will find time, after the arduous work on the substantive part of the manuscript is completed, to relax with some of your associates for the purpose of dredging up more of these stories to plug into the text.

Such notes as I have on these new chapters (which Chris Vick has) are attached to those chapters or marked with clips, as has been the custom. They are all pretty minor, the most important being a request that the background of the energy crisis--the exponential growth in demand--be documented more solidly. I think you would have done this anyway.

In the meantime, chapters I-VI are being passed on to Betsy as I read them; she has received the first four chapters already and will get the balance on Monday. She will return them to you for your final edit in a few weeks--she'll give me an exact date as soon as she's into the material. This preliminary look at the material is enormously helpful, and will save time in the final copy editing stage.

The reorganization of the opening works splendidly, and the revised Watergate chapter is superb. It will stand out like a beacon in the ocean of words that have been written about Nixon for its insight, compassion, and sheer saneness. I have a few comments on these opening chapters that will be passed on to you with Betsy's when the manuscript

(CONTINUED)

JUN 15 1981

LITTLE. BROWN AND COMPANY
PUBLISHERS

1837

GENEVIEVE YOUNG
SENIOR EDITOR

May 21, 1980

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was a real pleasure to see the excellent progress
you are making on your book and to talk to you about it.
Here, as promised, are some notes on our discussions:

1. The opening

We agreed, I think, that the present first chapter of
the book is ineffective for several reasons. The complex
time structure of the first chapter is confusing, for one
thing, as it moves back and forth from your being named
Secretary of State, to the Federal Club meeting, to your
decision to resign, to a mention of the discovery of the
Watergate break-in, to the Len Garment interview, etc.
Furthermore, the sense of disorientation continues beyond the
first chapter since many of the ensuing sections begin well
before the time of the first chapter; the book seems to lack
a beginning. Finally, the reader finds himself mired in
Watergate before he's had a chance to comprehend, much less
savor, the pleasant vista that seemed to lie before this
country at the beginning of the second Nixon Administration.
The story of missed opportunities and blighted prospects
which will, alas, comprise a large part of the narrative
would stand out in bolder relief if the optimistic aura of
early 1973 were conveyed in a more sustained way.

I believe that you can accomplish the purposes the
opening chapter should achieve if you will open the book

MAY 23 1980

NEW YORK OFFICE

747 THIRD AVENUE

NEW YORK 10017

212-688-8380

- 2 -

(perhaps in a Prologue) in January of 1973:

--Start with the 1973 Inaugural or an episode that occurred around that time. You should not be bothered by the fact that WHITE HOUSE YEARS begins with the first Inaugural. Indeed, you might turn that fact into an advantage by contrasting this Inaugural with the first one. This would give the book an authentic sense of beginning; symbolically and chronologically, the Inaugural is a beginning.

--Then report on your own situation. The material in Chapter I, pp. 69-72 covering your thoughts about resignation could be amplified, particularly on your relations with the President and your own emergence as a public figure. Overlap with Vol. I may be inevitable, but no strenuous efforts should be made to avoid it, since this volume should, in effect, be self-contained. This section might end with your feeling of detached optimism, which would lead naturally into

--A report on the situation of the United States, drawn from I, pp. 8-12 *passim*. This might consist first of an overview of foreign affairs, then a description of the domestic situation ("Societies become great not by their domestic victories but by their reconciliations").

--Conclude with a "little did we know" piece foreshadowing the eruption of Watergate. This section should remain general, focussing on the blighting effect of Watergate on the aforementioned prospects, domestic and foreign.

## 2. Hanoi Acts as Host (now Ch. II)

The first section of this chapter, "The Legacy of Vietnam," seems a particularly suitable topic to follow on the Prologue. However, you do not bring to your discussion of the domestic opponents of the war the same largeness of spirit and understanding of motive that you give to the account of how previous Administrations expanded the war or even, in a later chapter, the single-mindedness of Hanoi.

The discussion on opposition to the war on pp. 13-14 leaves the impression that you attribute it to the increasingly strident radical fringe. I think you need to distinguish between the radicals and the far larger group of well-meaning

- 3 -

liberals who came to oppose the war. You could devote more
space to this larger group, tying them in to the strain of
idealism and moralism which you mention in later chapters.

3. The first Watergate chapter (now Chs. I and V)

You mentioned that, if you undertook a Prologue, you
would then move the first Watergate chapter to come earlier
in the book. It seems to me to be fine in its present
location as Chapter V—but I suppose it could also precede
the Year of Europe, Chapter IV.

In any event, most of Chapter I can simply be attached
to the material in Chapter V; even the opening of the
present Chapter V would be appropriate in the middle of the
new double chapter. It might be effective to plunge right
into the Watergate chapter with the Len Garment story, the
"beginning of the nightmare," with the Federal City Club
speech trimmed down and moved into the Len Garment interview
as a flashback. I am not sure this will work; it may have
to stay where it is, preceding Garment.

Where the Secretary of State material, II, pp. 1-6, will
be placed is up to you. I believe it should appear in its
appropriate place in the chronological narrative but I
know you want to use it at the very beginning of the book.

4. The Year of Europe (now Chapter IV)

This long and interesting chapter could possibly be en-
livened by more "oases"—sketches of some of the figures, and
anecdotes. I do hope you will do one on Willy Brandt.

5. Detente (now Chapter VI)

Even with the removal of the sections on the Agreement
on the Prevention of Nuclear Warfare (pp. 144-180) and the
MBFR (pp. 203-227), this chapter will run well over 200 pages,
and it is a long haul between Zavidovo and the summit. Would
it be possible to also move the arms control material out of
this section? This thought occurred to me just recently, so
I can't check the manuscript to see if this suggestion makes
sense. However, my intention is to break up a passage of
roughly 150 pages which shades from dullish ("A New Debate,"
pp. 23-57 and "Travel and Emigration," pp. 57-90) to dense and
very difficult ("The Shifting Strategic Balance," pp. 91-110