As prepared for delivery

"The Atlantic Community's Global Strategy"

by Henry A. Kissinger

Speech to the 2005 Congress of the Free Democratic Party
of Germany

On the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the End of World War II

Cologne, Germany

May 5, 2005

It is an honor for me to speak before this gathering of the Free Democratic Party, a party which has stood for freedom in the society and economy throughout its existence. It is the first time I have addressed a political convention outside the United States. I do so not with any partisan intent. I have had the honor of knowing every German Chancellor from both parties from Konrad Adenauer on. Leaders from both the CDU and SPD have been friends of mine – much as of the FDP.

I do so today for three reasons: (1) because my friend, Otto Lambsdorff, has asked me; (2) because of the warm memories of my association as Foreign Minister with such FDP leaders as Walter Scheel and Hans-Dietrich Genscher; (3) because I believe that the international situation imposes a number of choices beyond the politics of parties. I will therefore speak to you of general principles underlying contemporary world affairs.

Otto Lambsdorff is an outstanding representative of the FDP whose friendship has meant much to me over the years. I have admired his wisdom, valued his opinions and respected his dedication for all the years I have known him.

Hans-Dietrich Genscher was a young sapper in General Wenck's 12th Army during the Battle of Berlin. I first got to know him almost thirty years later, as Foreign Minister in Helmut Schmidt's government. For three years we forged a close working relationship that has turned into a personal friendship. Genscher was a brilliant diplomat, a practical negotiator, who never let the goal of German unity escape

2

[Y]

from his vision, nor the ultimate need to anchor Germany in European integration and Atlantic partnership.

Genscher made all the Foreign Ministers with whom he dealt promise to accompany him to Halle once Germany was reunified – an act of faith in his country's future. Most agreed to do so; their hearts sympathizing with Hans-Dietrich, but their heads doubting that it would be accomplished in their lifetime. Genscher's faith prevailed, and I owe to it participation in a very moving ceremony when Hans-Dietrich invited Mikhail Gorbachev and me to visit Halle two years after unification.

For someone of my generation with memories of such comradeship, the recent controversies between the two sides of the Atlantic are especially painful. Some progress has been made in restoring a working relationship. But it remains true that, partly as a result of decisions and mistakes on both sides of the Atlantic, partly as a result of changed conditions, the issue of the nature of Atlantic partnership has become more controversial than ever before. Too often it is argued as if common policies should emerge – if at all – from mutual pressures rather than common conceptions. Europeans criticize America for too great a propensity to resort to force and excessive unilateralism. Americans charge that Europeans insist on a greater voice in decisions without being willing to assume corresponding responsibilities.

Having seen German-American friendship follow the conflicts of the Second World War, I continue to believe in the lasting importance of the Atlantic partnership. But it must be adapted to new realities. There is no longer a clear-cut military threat as there was during the Cold War. Or rather, security threats have become more complex and more global. Economic issues have achieved a new significance. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Can the democracies solve these challenges cooperatively, or will they return to the competitiveness that nearly destroyed Western civilization in two World Wars?

The issue is not unilateralism against multilateralism. It is the ability to devise a common purpose. When it exists, the issue of unilateralism cannot arise. In that spirit, let me examine some of the issues before us to show why a new Atlantic partnership needs to be forged.

Non-proliferation

3

[Y]

All Cold War US administrations - and to some extent, their allies - forged their policies against the awe-inspiring calculus of deterrence: the decision to use nuclear weapons could involve tens of millions of casualties, yet a demonstrated willingness to run this risk - at least up to a point - was essential if the world was not to be turned over to ruthless totalitarians. Deterrence worked because there were only two major nuclear powers in the world. Each made comparable assessments of the perils to it from the use of nuclear weapons. But as nuclear weapons spread into more and more hands, the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly abstract, and deterrence less and less reliable. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring whom and by what calculations. Even if it is assumed that aspirant nuclear countries make the same calculus of survival as the established ones with respect to initiating hostilities against each other - an extremely dubious judgment - new nuclear weapons establishments may be used as a shield to deter resistance, especially by the United States, to terrorist assaults on the international order. Finally, the experience with the "private" proliferation network of apparently friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya and Iran demonstrates the vast consequences to the international order of the spread of nuclear weapons, even when the proliferating country does not meet the formal criteria of a rogue state.

This raises three questions for all of us: (1) What diplomacy can prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology? (2) What should be done if diplomacy fails and the spread of nuclear weapons technology continues? (3) What kind of world order do we need if nuclear weapons technology spreads, despite our best efforts or because of our failures? Such a world will face dangers unimaginable today. Instead of casualties in the hundreds, its citizens will face destruction in the tens of thousands, under conditions of the breakdown of all civil institutions. At that point, an entirely new concept of world order will be imperative. We will then face the situation predicted by Immanuel Kant two hundred years ago: that world order will emerge either from catastrophe or human insight. A joint policy by the Western democracies will be crucial to give human insight a chance to avoid catastrophe.

## The Palestinian Issue

Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, long believed to be hopelessly deadlocked, is beginning to show signs of movement. Almost imperceptibly, a psychological framework

4

for an agreement is emerging. Israel is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that its biblical claim may lead to a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority in Palestine and demand control of the entire territory of Palestine. This change of mood implies a willingness to give up much of what Israel gained in the 1967 war in return for Palestinian acceptance of the division of the land of Palestine.

At the same time, the Palestinians seem to be in the process of learning that they have no military option and that, at least for tactical reasons, coexistence with Israel is unavoidable. An increasing number of Arab states would settle for any terms acceptable to Palestinians.

To achieve a breakthrough, Middle East diplomacy must be freed from some of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. The Palestinians must make a choice between the requirements of genuine acceptance of a Jewish state that marks a major step toward dealing with the settlement issue and maintaining the entire range of their traditional aspirations, such as the right of return. Israel must concentrate on the minimum terms for its security rather than on holding onto its present territory and all settlements while excluding the other parties. The European allies need to view the Middle East peace process as something more complex than using the United States to extract concessions from Israel for few concessions other than the word "peace."

For both sides, a resolution will be traumatic. For many in Israel, the abandonment of settlements and the partition of Jerusalem will be perceived as a repudiation of much of the history of the Jewish state. For the Palestinians, it will be an end to the myth by which their society has lived, of the eventual collapse of Israel and the return of all refugees. America's role is central: It needs to move the parties with determination toward a goal that seems, at last, conceptually within reach.

Such an outcome requires the cooperation of other democracies. European commentators have too often confined themselves to exhortations or to creating the impression that everything could be solved by American pressure on Israel. But the issues are more complex. Real progress will be traumatic for all parties. American influence must play an important role in Israel. But Europe should help the Palestinians to make their own indispensable concessions. Common American-European policies could encourage the moderate Arab states to ease the emotional resistance the Palestinians have to a

5

process that preserves and legitimizes an Israeli state. America and Europe should combine on a program urging both sides to make the concessions necessary to end their conflict. Israel has implied that settlements beyond its new security fence are negotiable; the fence is already being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been discussed in Camp David and Tabba. Moderate Arab leaders are needed to sustain such Arab initiatives. An effort to develop a European-US position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might encourage reluctant parties to break the deadlock. In this process, the Atlantic alliance could rediscover its common purpose.

## Terrorism

In the last few years there has developed a growing agreement that, if our societies are to live in safety, it is necessary to prevent terror attacks, not to punish the terrorists responsible after the event; that some preemptive action is justified against such states or private groups operating on the territory of these states. What remains the subject of debate is how to establish the international framework for such actions. It is not possible in the long run that each nation defines the nature of preemption unilaterally or that one nation reserves the right of preemption to itself. Some common multilateral method for doing so must be devised. The Atlantic alliance could make a major contribution by working out such a concept.

The list of issues necessary to create a new world order and in which European-American partnership is important is vast. I shall briefly mention two of them: democratization and globalization.

All Western democracies are committed to spreading democratic ideals. But how to apply this principle in support of a new world order is a relatively new role for them. It requires an answer to the following questions: (1) Is there one standard definition of democracy, or does it need adaptation to the culture and history of different societies? (2) If so, what are these adaptations? (3) What can outside countries do to foster this process? (4) How can the democracies unify their effort?

Former Secretary of State George Shultz and I tried to answer these questions in a joint statement on the Iraq situation, stating the following four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis under Saddam; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping

6

into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

The answers cannot be a solitary undertaking of any nation. No nation possesses the power or the wisdom to undertake global democratization by itself.

All this occurs at a moment when the center of gravity of world affairs is shifting toward the Pacific. As China and India emerge into potential new superpowers, Japan rethinks its national policies and countries like Brazil and Indonesia wait their turns, how will the Western democracies deal with that state of affairs? Are they going to see in it an opportunity to restart the rivalries which characterize so much of Western history and ultimately caused its decline? Or will they focus on the opportunities for a true global world order?

The subject of energy is a good example. Consumption is increasing rapidly as countries like India and China industrialize. But supply is limited and cannot expand rapidly. A scramble for resources is certain. Countries will not let their economies be strangled by price-driven competition and may take desperate measures. Some attempt at cooperation is necessary. A consumer organization or at least a consumer conference could discuss such remedies as alternative sources, conservation and allocation of emergency supplies. This could be the basis of a dialogue with producers.

It is the essence of an alliance that it involves some special obligations beyond the dictates of pure national interest. That was the distinguishing aspect of the Atlantic alliance before the collapse of communism. Even in its heyday, the alliance faced many controversies. But they were resolved within the framework of a common purpose. What are these obligations today? How do we define the common purpose?

This is our challenge today. I belong to the generation that on both sides of the Atlantic built a partnership of democracies. I believe its vitality can be restored. The partners that won the Cold War can cap their effort by winning the peace and establishing a new world order.

I thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak of an Atlantic future, and I wish you every success in your deliberations.

As prepared for delivery

by Henry A. Kissinger

Cologne, Germany

May 5, 2005

2

[Y]

Non-proliferation

3

[Y]

## The Palestinian Issue

4

[Y]

5

[Y]

## Terrorism

6

EJ

2237 words

4/19/05-#4

# The Atlantic Community's Global Strategy

by Dr. Henry Kissinger

May 5, 2005

2

[x]

association as Foreign Minister with such FDP leaders as Walter Scheel and Hans-Dietrich Genscher; (3) because I believe that international situation imposes a number of choices beyond the politics of parties. I will therefore speak to you of general principles underlying contemporary world affairs.

3

[Y]

Genscher made all the Foreign Ministers with whom he dealt
promise to accompany him to Halle once Germany was reunified – an
act of faith in his country's future. Most agreed to do so; their hearts
sympathizing with Hans-Dietrich, but their heads doubting that it
would be accomplished in their lifetime. Genscher's faith prevailed,
and I owe to it participation in a very moving ceremony when Hans-
Dietrich invited Mikhail Gorbachev and me to visit Halle two years after
unification.

4

5

Non-proliferation

All Cold War US administrations – and to some extent, their
allies – forged their policies against the awe-inspiring calculus of
deterrence: the decision to use nuclear weapons could involve tens of
millions of casualties, yet a demonstrated willingness to run this risk –
at least up to a point – was essential if the world was not to be turned
over to ruthless totalitarians. Deterrence worked because there were

6

7

[Y]

This raises three questions for all of us: What diplomacy can
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology? What should be
done if diplomacy fails and the spread of nuclear weapons technology
continues? What kind of world order do we need if nuclear weapons
technology spreads, despite our best efforts or because of our failures?
Such a world will face dangers unimaginable today. Instead of
casualties in the hundreds, its citizens will face destruction in the tens
of thousands, under conditions of the breakdown of all civil
institutions. At that point, an entirely new concept of world order will
be imperative. We will then face the situation predicted by Immanuel
Kant two hundred years ago: that world order will emerge either from
catastrophe or human insight. A joint policy by the Western

8

## The Palestinian Issue

Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, long believed to be hopelessly deadlocked, is beginning to show signs of movement. Almost imperceptibly, a psychological framework for an agreement is emerging. Israel is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that its biblical claim may lead to a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority in Palestine and demand control of the entire territory of Palestine. This change of mood implies a willingness to give up much of what Israel gained in the 1967 war in return for Palestinian acceptance of the division of the land of Palestine.

9

10

M

11

[Y]

Common American-European policies could encourage the moderate
Arab states to ease the emotional resistance the Palestinians have to
process that preserves and legitimizes an Israeli state. America and
Europe should combine on a program urging both sides to make the
concessions necessary to end their conflict. Israel has implied that
settlements beyond its new security fence are negotiable; the fence is
already being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and
some compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been
discussed in Camp David and Tabba. Moderate Arab leaders are
needed to sustain such Arab initiatives. An effort to develop a
European-US position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might
encourage reluctant parties to break the deadlock. In this process, the
Atlantic alliance could rediscover its common purpose.

Terrorism

12

13

[Y]

Former Secretary of State George Shultz and I tried to answer
these questions in a joint statement on the Iraq situation, stating the
following four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the
political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed
by the Sunnis under Saddam; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping
into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for
terrorists; (3) to keep Shia government from turning into a theocracy,

14

[Y]

15

supply is limited and cannot expand rapidly. A scramble for resources
is certain. Countries will not let their economies be strangled by price-
driven competition and may take desperate measures. Some attempt
at cooperation is necessary. A consumer organization or at least a
consumer conference could discuss such remedies as alternative
sources, conservation and allocation of emergency supplies. This
could be the basis of a dialogue with producers.

16

2320 words

4/15/05-#3

by Dr. Henry Kissinger

May 5, 2005

2

The sixteenth anniversary of the end of the Second World War is a momentous and sobering occasion on which to speak. Hans-Dietrich Genscher was a young sapper in General Wenck's 12th Army during the Battle of Berlin. I first got to know him almost thirty years later, as Foreign Minister in Helmut Schmidt's government. For three years we forged a close working relationship that has turned into a personal

3

[4]

friendship. Genscher's impact on twentieth-century German history was enormous. Genscher was a brilliant diplomat, a practical negotiator, who never let the goal of German unity escape from his vision, nor the ultimate need to anchor Germany in European integration and Atlantic partnership.

It may interest this convention to hear of Genscher's experience in Germany. He made all the Foreign Ministers with whom he dealt promise to accompany him to Halle once Germany was reunified. Most agreed to do so; their hearts sympathizing with Hans-Dietrich, but their heads doubting that it would be accomplished in their lifetime. Genscher's faith prevailed, and I owe to it participation in a very moving ceremony when Hans-Dietrich invited Mikhail Gorbachev and me to visit Halle two years after unification.

For someone of my generation with memories of such comradeship, the recent disputes between the two sides of the Atlantic

4

[Y]

are especially painful. Some progress has been made in restoring a
working relationship. But it remains true that, partly as a result of
decisions and mistakes on both sides of the Atlantic, party as a result
of changed conditions, the issue of the nature of Atlantic partnership
has become more controversial than ever before. Too often it is

- if at all -
argued as if common policies should emerge from mutual pressures

rather than common conceptions. Europeans criticize America for too great a propensity to resort to force. Americans charge that

5

[Y]

Non-proliferation

us

amernyprin

and to some extent three allies - 

against other

tens of millions of casualties set a demonstrated willingness to

6

[Y]

not to be turned over to ruthless totalitarians. Deterrence worked
because there were only two major players in the world. Each made
comparable assessments of the perils to it from the use of nuclear
weapons. But as nuclear weapons spread into more and more hands,
the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly abstract, and deterrence
less and less reliable. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is
deterring whom and by what calculations. Even if it is assumed that
aspirant nuclear countries make the same calculus of survival as the
established ones with respect to initiating hostilities against each other
- an extremely dubious judgment - new nuclear weapons
establishments may be used as a shield to deter resistance, especially
by the United States, to terrorist assaults on the international order.
Finally, the experience with the "private" proliferation network of
apparently friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya and Iran
demonstrates the vast consequences to the international order of the

7

[Y]

This raises three questions for all of us: What diplomacy can
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology? What should be
done if diplomacy fails and the spread of nuclear weapons technology
continues? What kind of world order do we need if nuclear weapons
technology spreads, despite our best efforts or because of failures?

Such a world will face dangers unimaginable today. Instead of casuities in the hundreds, its citizens will face destruction in the tens of thousands, under conditions of the breakdown of all civil institutions. At that point, an entirely new concept of world order will be imperative. We will then face the situation predicted by Immanuel Kant two hundred years ago: that world order will emerge either from catastrophe or human insight. A joint approach by the Western

8

## The Palestinian Issue

Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, long believed to be hopelessly deadlocked, is beginning to show signs of movement. Almost imperceptibly, a psychological framework for an agreement is emerging. Israel is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that its biblical claim may lead to a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority in Palestine and demand control of the entire land. This change of mood implies a willingness to give up much of what Israel gained in the 1967 war in return for Palestinian acceptance of the division of the land of Palestine.

[Y]

9

To achieve a breakthrough, Middle East diplomacy must be freed
from some of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. The
Palestinians must make a choice between the requirements of genuine
acceptance of the Jewish state and a Palestinian state immediately
that marks a major step toward dealing with the settlement issue, and
maintaining the traditional status as a nation of Israel
even if it falls short of the entire range of their aspirations, Israel
must concentrate, in close coordination with the United States, on the
minimum terms for its security rather than (its present territory).
Allied allies
European partners need to view [the] Middle East peace process as
something more complex than using the United States to extract
concessions from Israel for little more than the word "peace."

10

[Y]

will be perceived as a repudiation of much of the history of the Jewish state. For the Palestinians, it will be an end to the myth by which their society has lived, of the eventual collapse of Israel. America's role is central: It needs to move the parties with determination toward a goal that seems, at last, conceptually within reach.

Such an outcome
This cannot be achieved by the United States alone. It requires the cooperation of other democracies. European commentators have too often confined [themselves] to exhortations or to creating the impression that everything could be solved by American pressure on Israel. But the issues are more complex. Real progress in Palestinian diplomacy will be traumatic for all parties. American influence must play an important role in Israel. But Europe should help the Palestinians to make their own indispensable concessions. Common American-European policies could encourage the moderate Arab states to ease the emotional resistance the Palestinians have to process that

11

[Y]

preserves and legitimizes an Israeli state. America and Europe should combine on a program urging both sides to make the concessions necessary to end their conflict. Israel has implied that settlements beyond its new security fence are negotiable; the fence is already being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been discussed in Camp David and Tabba. At the same time, moderate Arab leaders have called for new Arab initiatives. An effort to develop a European-US position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might encourage reluctant parties to break the deadlock. In this process, the Atlantic alliance could rediscover its common purpose.

## Terrorism

If our societies are to live in safety, it is necessary to prevent terror attacks, not to punish the terrorists responsible after the event.

In the last few years the Middle East has developed. There is a growing understanding that, insofar as states sponsor the terrorist organizations that they fund, they are responsible for the carnage that takes place in them.

12

[Y]

private groups that are the essence of terrorism, preemptive action is
against pre existing states or private groups operating in territory
justified. But what remains the subject of debate is how to establish
the international framework for such actions. It is not possible in the

long run that each nation defines the nature of preemption unilaterally
that one nation receives the right of preemption itself
Some common multilateral method for doing so must be devised. The
Atlantic alliance could make a major contribution by working out such
a concept, for its members.

All Western democracies are committed to spreading democratic
ideals. But how to apply this principle in support of a new world order
is a relatively new role for them. And it is important to understand its
complexity. Western democracy developed over centuries in
homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable

13

because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities
were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary
status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an
equation does not operate where minority status is permanently
established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic
differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such
circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression
of the weak by the powerful. In multi-ethnic societies, minority rights
must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.
Federalism mitigates the scope for potential arbitrariness of the
numerical majority and defines autonomy on a specific range of issues.

Former Secretary of State George Shultz and I applied these
principles in a joint statement to the Iraq situation in the following four
objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process
to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis

[Y]

14

under Saddam; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shia government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

Europe and America have differed on security issues. But the evolution of democracy cannot be a solitary effort of any nation. No nation possesses the power or the wisdom to undertake global democratization by itself.

All this occurs at a moment when the center of gravity of world affairs is shifting towards the Pacific. As China and India emerge into potential superpowers, Japan rethinks its national policies and countries like Indonesia wait their turns, how will the Western democracies deal with that state of affairs? Are they going to see in it an opportunity to restart the rivalries which characterize so much of

[Y]

15

[Y]

The subject of energy is a good example. Consumption is increasing rapidly as countries like India and China industrialize. But supply is limited and cannot expand rapidly. A scramble for resources is certain. Countries will not let their economies be strangled by price-driven competition. Some attempt at cooperation is necessary. A consumer organization or as least a consensus conference could discuss such remedies as alternative sources, conservation and allocation of emergency supplies. This could be the basis of a cooperative with producers.

16

2106 words

4/14/05-#2

by Dr. Henry Kissinger

May 5, 2005

It is an honor for me to speak before this gathering of the Free
Democratic Party, which has stood for freedom in the society and
economy throughout its existence. It is the first time I have
addressed a political convention outside the United States. I do so not
with any partisan intent. I have had the honor of knowing every
German Chancellor from both parties from [Konrad] Adenauer on.
Leaders from both the CDU and SPD have been friends of mine – much
as of the FDP.

2

The sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War is a
momentous and sobering occasion on which to speak. Hans-Dietrich
Genscher was a young sapper in General Wenck's 12th Army during the
Battle of Berlin. I first got to know him almost thirty years later, as
Foreign Minister in Helmut Schmidt's government. For three years we
forged a close working relationship that has turned into a personal

3

vision, yet pursued that goal with a flexibility that made that very goal
in European litigation & Atlantic partnership attainable.

may be interpreted as a convention & loan of

It is necessary also to stress [Genscher's] permanent act of faith in Germany. A good example is that he made all the foreign ministers with whom he dealt promise to accompany him to Halle once Germany was reunified. Most agreed to do so; their hearts sympathizing with Hans-Dietrich, but their heads doubting that it would be accomplished in their lifetime. Genscher's faith prevailed, and I owe to it participation in a very moving ceremony when Hans-Dietrich invited Mikhail Gorbachev and me to visit Halle two years after unification.

with memories of our mutual joy

For someone of my generation, the recent disputes between the two sides of the Atlantic are therefore especially painful. I am happy

4

that some progress has been made in restoring a working relationship.

But it remains true that, partly as a result of decisions and mistakes on both sides of the Atlantic, party as a result of changed conditions, the issue of the nature of Atlantic partnership has become more

mistaken
Two often it is argued as if common people should
embrace each other's common purposes and purposes
controversial than ever before. Europeans criticize America for too

Having seen German-American friendship follow the conflicts of
the Second World War, I continue to believe in the [sl lasting]
importance of the Atlantic partnership. But it must be adapted to new
realities. There is no longer a clear-cut military threat as there was
during the Cold War. Or rather, security threats have become more

economic issues that we must solve
complex and more global. The center of gravity of world affairs is
shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Can the democracies solve

5

The issue is not unilateralism against multilateralism. It is the
ability to devise a common purpose. When it exists, the issue of
unilateralism cannot arise. In that spirit, let me examine some of the
issues before us to see why a new Atlantic partnership
needs to be forged
[Terrorism]

If our societies are to live in safety, the social issue is, to prevent
terror attacks, not to punish the terrorists responsible after the event.
There is a growing understanding that, insofar as states sponsor the
private groups that are the essence of terrorism, preemptive action is
justified. But what remains the subject of debate is how to establish
the international framework for such actions. It is not possible in the
long run that each nation defines the nature of preemption unilaterally.

6

Some common multilateral method for doing so must be devised. The Atlantic alliance could make a major contribution by working out such a concept for its members.

## Non-proliferation

All Cold War administrations navigated in the awful calculus of deterrence: the certainty that the decision to use nuclear weapons could involve tens of millions of casualties, coupled with the awareness that a demonstrated willingness to run this risk - at least up to a point - was essential if the world was not to be turned over to ruthless totalitarians. Deterrence worked because there were only two major players in the world. Each made comparable assessments of the perils to it from the use of nuclear weapons. But as nuclear weapons spread into more and more hands, the calculus of deterrence grows increasingly ephemeral, and deterrence less and less reliable. It becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring whom and by

7

[Y]

8

[Y]

technology spreads, despite our best efforts or because of or failures?

We will then face the situation predicted by Immanuel Kant: the furthest age in which world wars can be imperative. A joint approach by the Western democracies will be crucial to prevent human error from calashyple or human error. We must emerge from calashyple or human error into a world of liberty and justice to avoid calashyple.

## The Palestinian Issue

Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, long believed to be hopelessly deadlocked, is beginning to show signs of movement. Almost imperceptibly, a psychological framework for an agreement is emerging. Israel is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that the biblical claim may lead to a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority in Palestine and demand control of the entire land. This change of mood implies a

9

To achieve a breakthrough, Middle East diplomacy must be freed
from some of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. Our
can be seen as something more complex
than a device for using the United States to extract concessions from
Israel for little more than the word "peace." The Palestinians must
make a choice between the requirements of genuine acceptance of the
Jewish state and a Palestinian state immediately that marks a major
step toward dealing with the settlement issue, even if it falls short of

10

[Y]

the entire range of their aspirations. Israel must concentrate, in close coordination with the United States, on the minimum terms for its security rather than its perceived necessity. Lfless Pflug

For both sides, a resolution will be traumatic. For many in Israel, the abandonment of settlements and the partition of Jerusalem will be perceived as a repudiation of much of the history of the Jewish state. For the Palestinians, it will be an end to the myth by which their society has lived. America's role is central: It needs to move the parties with determination toward a goal that seems, at last, conceptually within reach.

11

diplomacy will be traumatic for all parties. American influence must
play an important role in Israel. But Europe should help the
Palestinians to make their own indispensable concessions. Common
American-European policies could encourage the moderate Arab
states to ease the emotional bi the Palestinians have to process that
preserves and legitimizes an Israeli state. America and Europe should
combine on a program urging both sides to make the concessions
necessary to end their conflict. Israel has implied that settlements
beyond its new security fence are negotiable; the fence is already
being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some
compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been discussed in
Camp David and Tabba. At the same time, moderate Arab leaders
have called for new Arab initiatives. An effort to develop a European-
US position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might encourage

12

[M]

* Insert Terrorism section

I will not review the list of issues necessary to create a new world order. I shall briefly mention two of them: democratization and and in view of European American participation globalization.

a relatively new role for Europe. And it is important to understand that Western democracy developed over centuries in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such

13

[Y]

Former Secretary of State [George] Shultz and I applied these principles in a janitress statement (under Seddon) to the Iraq situation in the following four objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shia government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

Whatever Europe's view on security issues, the evolution of
democracy cannot be a solitary effort of any nation. No nation

2106 words

4/14/05-#2

by Dr. Henry Kissinger

May 5, 2005

2

[M]

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[y]

friendship. Genscher's impact on twentieth-century German history was enormous. Genscher was a brilliant diplomat, a practical negotiator, who never let the goal of German unity escape from his vision, yet pursued that goal with a flexibility that made that very goal attainable.

4

But it remains true that, partly as a result of decisions and mistakes on both sides of the Atlantic, party as a result of changed conditions, the issue of the nature of Atlantic partnership has become more controversial than ever before. Europeans criticize America for too great a propensity to resort to force. Americans charge that Europeans insist on a greater voice in decisions without being willing to assume corresponding responsibilities.

Having seen German-American friendship follow the conflicts of the Second World War, I continue to believe in the [lasting] importance of the Atlantic partnership. But it must be adapted to new realities. There is no longer a clear-cut military threat as there was during the Cold War. Or rather, security threats have become more complex and more global. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Can the democracies solve

5

The issue is not unilateralism against multilateralism. It is the
ability to devise a common purpose. When it exists, the issue of
unilateralism cannot arise. In that spirit, let me examine some of the
issues before us.

Terrorism

If our societies are to live in safety, the social issue is to prevent
terror attacks, not to punish the terrorists responsible after the event.

6

Non-proliferation

7

8

[Y]

Such a world will face dangers unimaginable today. Instead of casualties in the hundreds, its citizens will face destruction in the tens of thousands, under conditions of the breakdown of all civil institutions. At that point, an entirely new concept of world order will be imperative. A joint approach by the Western democracies will be crucial.

## The Palestinian Issue

9

To achieve a breakthrough, Middle East diplomacy must be freed
from some of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. Our
partners need to view Middle East peace as something more complex
than a device for using the United States to extract concessions from
Israel for little more than the word "peace." The Palestinians must
make a choice between the requirements of genuine acceptance of the
Jewish state and a Palestinian state immediately that marks a major
step toward dealing with the settlement issue, even if it falls short of

10

the entire range of their aspirations. Israel must concentrate, in close coordination with the United States, on the minimum terms for its security.

11

diplomacy will be traumatic for all parties. American influence must
play an important role in Israel. But Europe should help the
Palestinians to make their own indispensable concessions. Common
American-European policies could then encourage the moderate Arab
states to ease the emotional bloc the Palestinians have to process that
preserves and legitimizes an Israeli state. America and Europe should
combine on a program urging both sides to make the concessions
necessary to end their conflict. Israel has implied that settlements
beyond its new security fence are negotiable; the fence is already
being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some
compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been discussed in
Camp David and Tabba. At the same time, moderate Arab leaders
have called for new Arab initiatives. An effort to develop a European-
US position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might encourage

12

I will not review the list of issues necessary to create a new
world order. I shall briefly mention two of them: democratization and
globalization.

All Western democracies are committed to spreading democratic
ideals. But how to apply this principle in support of a new world order
is a complex assignment. Western democracy developed over
centuries in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule
acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and
majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their
temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such
an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently
established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic
differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such

13

Former Secretary of State [George] Shultz and I applied these
principles to the Iraq situation in the following four objectives: (1) to
prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind
of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any
areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment
centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shia government from turning into a
theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional
autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

14

All this occurs at a moment when the center of gravity of world affairs is shifting towards the Pacific. As China and India/ emerge into potential superpowers, Japan rethinks its national policies and (only if Indonesia ??) countries like Indonesia wait their turns, how will the Western democracies deal with that state of affairs? It is the essence of an alliance that it involves some special obligations beyond the dictates of pure national interest. That was the distinguishing aspect of the Atlantic alliance before the collapse of communism. Even in its heyday, the alliance faced many controversies. But they were resolved within the framework of a common purpose.

This is our challenge today. I belong to the generation that on both sides of the Atlantic built a partnership of democracies. Is it still vital? Can we revitalize it, or are we doomed to repeat the divisions

15

and rivalries that consumed the Western world in the first half of the
twentieth century?

To make a contribution to restoring this unity, I have agreed to
deliver a number of speeches in German. I thank you for giving me
this opportunity, and I wish you every success in your deliberations.

2292 words

4/11/05

by Dr. Henry Kissinger

May 5, 2005

It is an honor for me to speak before this gathering of the Free
Democratic Party. The FDP, the "Liberals," - in the old sense of the
word, that is, liberalism and freedom in the economy and in society -
has produced many statesmen of distinction through the course of
German history. I have had the honor of working with the post-World
War II generation: Foreign Minister, and later Bundespresident,
Walter Scheel; his successor, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher;
and Economy Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff are names that I
remember not only as indispensable partners but also as personal
friends.

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[Y]

In the United States, "Liberals" in the old FDP sense of the word, have dwindled as a political force. "Liberal" has taken on an entirely different meaning in today's American political discourse, being associated with the wing of the Democratic party that, on the whole, favors a more active role for the state in the management of the economy.

The sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War is a momentous and sobering occasion on which to speak. Hans-Dietrich Genscher was a young sapper in General Wenck's 12th Army in those final days of madness during the Battle of Berlin. I first got to know him almost thirty years later, as Foreign Minister in Helmut Schmidt's government. For three years we forged a close working relationship, but that changed in 1965 when a personal vendetta ended his impact on twentieth-century German history was enormous. Genscher was a brilliant diplomat, a practical negotiator, who never let the goal of German

tactician, a practical negotiator, who never let the goal of German

3

[Y]

unity escape from his vision, yet pursued that goal with a flexibility
that made that very goal attainable. ~~Beyond from his dexterous~~
leadership of German foreign policy, I shall always value Hans-Dietrich
Genscher's friendship. It was a friendship that was offered
~~generously, and one that has been held to loyalty for thirty years.~~

I have described Hans-Dietrich as a tactician, but it is necessary
also to stress his permanent act of faith in Germany. A good example
is that he made all the foreign ministers with whom he dealt promise
to accompany him to Halle once Germany was reunified. Most agreed
to do so; their hearts sympathizing with Hans-Dietrich, but their heads
doubting that it would be accomplished in our lifetime. Genscher's
faith prevailed, and I owe to it participation in a very moving
ceremony when Hans-Dietrich invited [Mikhail] Gorbachev and me to
visit Halle two years after unification.

[Y]

4

Otto Lambsdorff is another outstanding representative of the FDP whose friendship has meant much to me over the years, and who indeed convinced me to speak to this party Congress. I have admired his wisdom, valued his opinions and respected his dedication for all the years. [I have known him].

This sense of comradeship has characterized relations between Europe and America for half a century after the end of the Second World War, during the administration of every President in the United States and every German Chancellor, regardless of party.

For someone of my generation, the recent disputes between the two sides of the Atlantic are therefore especially painful. I am happy that some progress has been made in restoring a working relationship. But it remains true that, partly as a result of decisions and mistakes on both sides of the Atlantic, party as a result of changed conditions, the issue of the nature of Atlantic partnership has become more

6

Terrorism

The issue of terrorism has been clarified in recent years. It is
becoming clear that it must be dealt with preemptively in the sense
that, if our societies are to live in safety, the social issue is to prevent
terror attacks, not to punish (the terrorists responsible) after the
event. There is also a growing understanding that, insofar as states
sponsor the private groups that are the essence of terrorism,
preemptive action is justified. But what remains the subject of debate
is how to establish the international framework for such actions. It is
not possible in the long run that each nation defines the nature of
preemption unilaterally. Some common multilateral method for doing

7

[Y]

Non-proliferation

All Cold War administrations navigated in the awful calculus of
deterrence: the certainty that the decision to use nuclear weapons
could involve tens of millions of casualties, coupled with the awareness
that a demonstrated willingness to run this risk - at least up to a point
- was essential if the world was not to be turned over to ruthless
totalitarians. Deterrence worked because there were only two major
players in the world. Each made comparable assessments of the perils
to it from the use of nuclear weapons. But as nuclear weapons spread
into more and more hands, the calculus of deterrence grows
increasingly ephemeral, and deterrence less and less reliable. It
becomes ever more difficult to decide who is deterring whom and by
what calculations. Even if it is assumed that aspirant nuclear countries

[Y]

8

make the same calculus of survival as the established ones with
respect to initiating hostilities against each other - an extremely
dubious judgment - new nuclear weapons establishments may be used
as a shield to deter resistance, especially by the United States, to
terrorist assaults on the international order. ~~Nor is it certain how~~
~~nuclear powers will react to nuclear war on their doorstep.~~ Finally, the
experience with the "private" proliferation network of apparently
friendly Pakistan with North Korea, Libya and Iran demonstrates the
vast consequences to the international order of the spread of nuclear
weapons, even when the proliferating country does not meet the
formal criteria of a rogue state.

9

## The Palestinian Issue

Amidst the turmoil in the Middle East, the Palestinian-Israeli issue, long believed to be hopelessly deadlocked, is beginning to show signs of movement. Almost imperceptibly, a psychological framework for an agreement is emerging. In Israel, the dominant Likud party is undergoing soul-searching based on the recognition that the biblical claim may lead to a demographic time bomb as Arabs become a majority in Palestine and demand control of the entire land. This

10

To achieve a breakthrough, Middle East diplomacy must be freed from some of its formalistic, almost doctrinaire, constraints. Our partners in the Quartet need to view Middle East peace as something more complex than a device for using the United States to extract concessions from Israel for little more than the word "peace." The Palestinians must make a choice between the requirements of genuine acceptance of the Jewish state and a Palestinian state immediately that marks a major step toward dealing with the settlement issue,

11

even if it falls short of the entire range of their aspirations. Israel
must abandon a diplomacy designed to exhaust its counterparts and
concentrate, in close coordination with the United States, on the
minimum terms for its security.

12

Israel. But the issues are more complex. Real progress in Palestinian
diplomacy will be traumatic for all parties. American influence must
play an important role in Israel. But Europe should help the
Palestinians to make the indispensable concessions. Common
American-European policies could then encourage the moderate Arab
states to ease the emotional bloc the Palestinians have to process that
preserves and legitimizes an Israeli state. America and Europe should
combine on a program urging both sides to make the concessions
necessary to end their conflict. Israel has implied that settlements
beyond its new security fence are negotiable; the fence is already
being brought into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some
compensatory territory from present-day Israel has been discussed in
Camp David and Tabba. At the same time, a few moderate Arab
leaders have called for new initiatives. An effort to develop a
European-US position as part of a reinvigorated peace process might

13

14

15

All this occurs at a moment when the center of gravity of world
affairs is shifting towards the Pacific. Any such change historically
involves massive adjustments that in the past have led to conflicts,
some even military.

As China and India emerge into potential superpowers, Japan
rethinks its national policies and countries like Indonesia wait their
turns, how will the Western democracies deal with that state of affairs?
It is the essence of an alliance that it involves some special obligations
beyond the dictates of pure national interest. That was the
distinguishing aspect of the Atlantic alliance before the collapse of
communism. Even in its heyday, the alliance faced many
controversies. But they were resolved within the framework of a
common purpose.

16

This is our challenge today. I belong to the generation that on both sides of the Atlantic built a partnership of democracies. Is it still vital? Can we revitalize it, or are we doomed to repeat the divisions and rivalries that consumed the Western world in the first half of the twentieth century?