Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON

Secy Packard

Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 9:45 AM

P said he would not be at 303 Committee meeting today because he has to go to the Hill with Mel. P said on Hexagon/MOL program the consensus is solid that Hexagon should not be cancelled - MOL needs a little more study and unless K is on tight time bomb P would like a couple of more days. K agreed.

K said State is concerned that our planes don't start shooting up ships in our rescue area. P said he and Mel had talked about this and they concur - P will make sure instructions are given to this effect.

K said Mel said his people are running around giving orders and that is not true. K's people are under strict orders to go thru P's office or Mel's - there is no intention to bypass either of them. P said he did not know about this. P asked if there was anything they should be doing. K said Mel said he is sending over some contingency plans and K asked if they could be gotten over as quickly as possible - particularly the one for <u>USSR</u> fighter escort for reconnaissance mission.

jm

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCON
Richard Sneider

Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 9:48 AM

K said the North Koreans have asked for an Armistice Commission Meeting on the 18th and S ts to tell State not to go until we have agreed to it. K will turn off the 18th with Defense. K asked S for a paper on the pros and cons on closing down Panmunjom.

jm

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Captain Wilson (Packard's Office)

Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 9:50 AM

K said he was calling about the Armistice Commission meeting on the 18th - he wants to make sure we do not go until there is a consideration of it in the White House. W said there is a message in from Bonesteel asking for Washington guidance before reacting. K said to tell Bonesteel not to react one way or the other. W said he would take care of it.

K asked for a paper on the pros and cons of (a) going to the Armistice Commission meeting and (b) closing down Panmunjom altogether. W said he would do and K asked that it be done as soon as fairly quickly (thru the Secretary's office, of course).

jm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCORN

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 10:00 AM

K said he wanted to tell him that specific orders given by the President
that these planes cannot fire on anything unless they are attacked.
K said it was a very strong point of R's and he told the President
immediately.

R said he was going to have Dobrynin in at 12:00. K said President
does not want any protest to anyone. R said he was not going to
protest - he wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men.
R said he was coming over soon and would talk to the President.
K said he thinks the President is inclined to play this in low key
and to say nothing to anyone until we know where we are headed.
R repeated that he is going to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save
the men. R said he might also tell him we have asked that no
ships engaged in rescue mission be fired on. K said he saw no harm
in that.

jm

*

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 12:40 pm

By KHC NARA, Dale S/12/04

Rogers asked if HAK had had a chance to talk to the President about Harlan Cleveland and Italy. HAK said he would do it immediately-- he was sure the President would be favorable. At the end of the conversation, HAK said he would let Rogers know about this by tomorrow.

(another subject)

R: I'm upset about a memo he wrote us about what George Meany said, and what Bud Wilkinson said. This business about what I said about the plan-- that we have no magic formula. I couldn't say we didn't have a plan.

K: What you said was right. Where the Vietnamese were off their rocker was to think we had a plan which we were proposing to someone.

R: If there's anyone who should understand that the press doesn't report things accurately, he is the one. In my situation, it's all a matter of record.

R: Bud Wilkinson--I bet he's never read any of these press conferences! I don't mind a memo which indicates a line he wants to follow. And if it appears there's some lack of emphasis...

HAK: This he dictated on his own over the weekend. I got my copy yesterday.

R: I don't mind criticism as long as it's based on fact. If we have Bud Wilkinson and someone in Saigon criticizing us for something we didn't say, and if the President takes it seriously...

HAK: I also made a p. c. statement which in effect said the President knows what he is doing. It didn't mean we are submitting a plan to Hanoi.

R: I wanted to make it clear we had no magic formula; we think things are progressing; that kind of stuff. You can't say "we don't have a plan," or "no comment."

HAK: His basic concern was with the positive parts where he felt what the line should be rather than with the critical part.

R: The only thing I've said that I would have said differently is a question I was asked in the Senate committee about disarmament. They asked about whether ABM would affect adversely the disarmament talks, and I said no, I felt sure if the Soviet Union, for example, said, let us get out of the defensive missile business altogether, we would be pleased about it. I said

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

obviously they're not going to tear down all their ABM's. But it was
interpreted maybe we weren't serious about defense against the Chinese
threat. From that standpoint it would have been better the other way.

HAK: I don't think this is a commitment that you will ever be called on
to make good.

R: It strengthened our argument if the Soviet Union wanted to make a big
play this way we would be in the market for considering it.
I'm writing a memo back to him....

HAK: I wouldn't do that. This was done over the weekend at Camp David and I think really his major concern is to put out some guidance so everyone says essentially the same thing.

R: I think that's a wise idea.

HAK: I didn't have the sense of any lingering unhappiness there.

R: Why the hell did he attach a memo from Bud Wilkinson? Have I got
to take my foreign policy direction from a football road coach?

H: I don't even know what he does.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

April 15, 1:30 p.m.

Secretary Laird

Laird said he had been in the Arms Services Committee all morning. HAK said he had talked to Packard since he tried to reach Laird and it only concerned the matter of making sure our planes in the area had orders not to fire on rescue ships.

Laird said he had put out the order this morning. He said that ship they were trying to find is at sea but it has Dutch crew. They switched the crews from Korean to Dutch when word got around at the time of the Pueble thing that we might have to take the ship.

HAK said the President wanted to devote the NSC meeting tomorrow to this subject. He will want to have all the military and diplomatic options. Laird said he ought to get himself and Wheeler out of the Committee tomorrow. HAK agreed this should most certainly be done.

Laird said there was a question as to where the orders were coming from. HAK said unless they came directly through Laird, they were not official. WH crders.

Laird mentioned the letter from Bud Wilkinson and was rather shocked at it. He (L) said he had never talked about reductions and had held a pretty hard line saying this wasn't the time to discuss it. HAK said it was necessary to put out a letter to a lot of people to get the point to a few. HAK said anyway, now that we have the President's philosophy on record, we will be able to take action on deviations.

HAK said the briefings should be short and fairly general. A more detailed plan can be put to the President in smaller groups. Laird said he would list the options and not go into detail.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
McGeorge Bundy

April 14, 1969 1:45 p.m.

Re the Harvard situation, Bundy said he had a call from Goodwin. HAK said he hoped Goodwin didn't think he agreed with him because he didn't. Bundy said the problem wasn't going to be solved by Goodwin. Bundy thought they had the best possible mediator in Merill (sp) but they don't seem to have anybody that enough people can trust.

HAK said he had talked to the President about Bundy's memo. The President is willing to go ahead with the project and secondly that he feels if Bundy would be willing to see it through the next stage this would seem the most efficient way of proceeding and then we can decide later on where to go. Bundy suggested that since Frank Long would be taking over the NSF, he would be a good candidate for the U.S. representative. Bundy said he would do it though. The President also agreed that it would be o.k. to go ahead with the plan to tell the British to go ahead with the first stage planning.

On the Korean situation, Bundy said it was a terribly thing. They (recon.) are essential but terribly overdone. HAK said it was well off the coast. Bundy said these are people who will do what they can do and whether you are technically right doesn't help. HAK said we have asked everyone to keep quiet on this and Bundy said that would last only for awhile. He added that you have to be philosophical about these things.

HAK agreed to see Bundy next week and said he would appoint Osgood to be the staff man for Bundy to work with. (This was actually at Bundy's suggestion and HAK thought it was an excellent idea).

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCONE

Alex Johnson
Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 4:00 PM

K said we are putting this whole business through the NSC tomorrow.
President is concerned that once working level at State gets hold
of some of these hoptions, there would be leaks. K said he told
President he would have a talk with some of the senior people
at State to make sure we could handle this XXXXX without its leaking.
K said he just wanted to appeal to J. J said Win Brown is working
on this and he will speak to him - K can assure the President that
it will not leak.

jm

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/64

TELCORN

Ambassador Waller (Australia)
Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 5:30 PM

W said he had just talked with Mr. Sneider - it is about proposed
joint facility at (could not understand what he said). W said full
story is reaching newspapers and some of technical journals
have published all technical details. Reuters now has garbled version
re ground station. W said they now feel they should more or less
say what the station is and have made a proposal to Hilbert of
Department of Air. K asked if they had to go beyond what
we agreed to and W said yes. W said he thinks K will have to take
a look at it and Sneider will have whole story. K asked whether W
had been informed that the Agriculture Dept. W interrupted to say
yes, everything has been taken care of.

jm

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/15/69 5:40 p. m.

P: Anything further on the plane?

K: Nothing further yet, no.

P: It should be daylight there pretty soon.

K: We should be getting word within two hours.

P: Probably no survivors.

K: Or picked up -- strong probability no survivors.
We are getting reports on North Korean assets abroad and they're
very discouraging. One Korean ship which is sailing with Dutch
registry, and Dutch crew and flag--so it's almost impossible to
seize that.

P: Check with the Dutch; they ought to want to help us.
It's a question of doing that or something else.
You say: Why not pick up a half-dozen fishing boats?

K: They don't come out in the open seas.

P: No North Korean ships on the high seas at all?

K: The largest ship is the PUEBLO and of course they're keeping that in the port. It hasn't been out at all since they captured it.

P: Well, the more I think about it--there has to be some reaction here.
I have a feeling they're testing us.

K: That's clearly true.

P: I'm not among those who think that this matter may not be pretty
directly related to the other side.

K: It could be related. Domestically, there will be among the intellecturals
considerable heat if we do the other thing. Curiously enough, some
of the members of my staff feel we ought to do what you and I were
talking about earlier. They feel to let this one go again will be taken
very seriously. There was an intelligence report of Nasser's
conversation with Hussein to the effect, "After all, it isn't so risky
xx

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

to defy the United States -- look at North Korea and the PUEBLO. "

P. And look at Peru. No, I think that's right. OK, I certainly lean
in that direction.

K: I'm going to have a complete plan for this over to you this evening.

P: I wonder what the situation is on...

K: And we won't present it to the NSC.

P: Rogers is going to be before the press tomorrow--editors -- at noon.
Don't put this before the NSC.

K: We will present to the NSC what happened and a whole list of actions
on what could be taken, but with no emphasis on any one, and
no details.

K: I talked to Rogers about Cleveland and he would prefer him as Ambassador
to Italy.

P: That wouldn't bother me.

By KHLW NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCORN

Gerard Smith

Mr. Kissinger

4-15-69 6:25 PM

K said S was trying to see him yesterday. S said he was trying to show him draft paper but wanted Packard to see it to make sure he had no trouble with the arithmetic and he has not gotten it back from Packard yet. S said if K has a few minutes tomorrow he would like to come over and show it to him.
K said he would see how the aircraft business is going. K is becoming an it-Korean as it is ruining his schedule. K said there is less you can do against a little country than a big one. S said he was glad he does not have to make decision - K said he was going to pass it to the SecState.

jm

By: KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

April 14, 1969 6:30 p.m.

The President wanted to know what the situation on the Dutch ship and crew was. HAK said they still haven't located it yet. It has been reported to be in the high seas. The P said he would assume HAK has checked with the lawyers but not the State lawyers. The P said his view would be to pick up the ship. As soon as it has been paid for, is that impossible? HAK said the first reports were that it was. After their discussions, he told them that another look had to be taken. The President said it was impossible to pick up the Pueble too but they did. We should pick up the crew and take them back to Holland. When they give us the Pueblo, we'll give them their ship. He asked what kind of ship it was. HAK said it was one of their largest fishing ships. The President said O.K., "I think we should just pick the darn thing up." We should check with the Dutch to see where it is and all the circumstances. He said he would be willing to take heavy criticism for this.

HAK said he had already put this on a high priority basis. The President said to find a way that international law can be breached. The U.S. became a great nation by breaking international law. The President said we certainly have concluded that we won't just sit here and do nothing. HAK agreed. The President said even if the peaceniks on HAK's staff didn't agree. HAK said he didn't have any peaceniks on his staff. The President said he was just kidding. HAK said the State Department had a paper on diplomatic actions. The President said the price is too high to pay not to do anything. He said you recall Nasser's statement and said "I just think we have to do something here. If we don't face up to the Dutch, we have to face the Navy action." HAK said the Navy was coming in with a plan and that we would suffer little or no losses. They would come in low. The President said (someone) is trying to pursue the line that recon plans are fair game. This was not a regular recon plan, was it? HAK said it definitely was not. This plane has been doing the same thing for 15 years without protest. It had been a deliberate plan to get it done. They were moving two mig 21s which would not signal anything in particular to us about their intentions. The President wanted to know what Defense has said. HAK said they have just put out the facts. That the closest point was 15 miles and that it was attacked 100 miles out. The President said Rogers would have to say something tomorrow to the editors he is meeting with and that he probably wouldn't be able to attend the NSC meeting. HAK said the President wouldn't be making any decision on this tomorrow anyway. The President said, "no, no, I won't even discuss it, just listen."

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

The President said that ship must not get to North Korea. We'll just tell
the Dutch we'll buy the darn ship. HAK said he would run it through again.

The President wanted to know if HAK had any lawyers on his staff. HAK
said no and that he would have to work through State. The President wanted
to know if Justic would do anything. HAK said yes, I'll try them. The
President said, I just happened to have Mitchell here in my office. "I'll
let you talk to him".

Mitchell wanted to know what the problem was. HAK said he didn't have the
full facts. There is this ship (North Korean) sailing under Dutch crew. The
N. K. sent the ship to the Netherlands and when we made some point about
picking it up because of the Pueblo, they changed their crew. The President
wants to know if its illegal to pick up the ship. Mitchell asked if we knew
the contractual arrangements between the Dutch and North Korea. HAK said
we have very sketchy facts. Mitchell said we should contact the proper
Embassy in Holland; they must have the information on the legal arrangements.
HAK said he would get all the facts together. The reports have been very bad.
Mitchell said do we know where the ship is. HAK said it is reported to be on
the high seas but that hasn't been confirmed as yet.

The President came back on and said we will do all we can do here but he
has determined in his own mind that we are going to do something "even if I
have to go to Washington everybody in the State Department."

HAK said when we move the carrier to another position, we should make it
public. If we try to keep it a secret, they will think we are serious, otherwise
it might come off as a bluff.

The President wanted to know if HAK had anything good to tell him. HAK said
no. The President said he thought HAK's conversation with Dobrynin was
good. HAK said he was concerned; that we should look dangerous. The
President said how about doing the lunch plan and getting caught. They took
the ship so we get Cambodia. HAK said the lunch plan would be used only if
they turned us down on the other. The President said he wanted every plane
into South Korea. HAK said they were all ready to go but that we should go
careful on this. The President agreed. The President said it should be easy
to pick up that ship. Just go out and get it. HAK said Defense and CIA were
working on the location.

The President called back to say that HAK should call Loyds of London; they
should know where the ship is. If not, call that man in the Hauge and tell
him we have this problem and want to know where the ship is. HAK said he
would follow through.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

April 15, 1969 9:30 p.m.

Prof. Doty

HAK opened the conversation by saying that Doty was probably calling to tell him to take strong measures against North Korea.

Doty said (the Russian) was in Cambridge. He was originally scheduled to go to Mexico but that was cancelled but he decided to come to Boston anyway. MIT had asked him to do a small seminar. He would be in Washington this weekend and would very much like to see HAK. HAK said he would love to see him and they agreed that HAK could probably do it Saturday morning. The dinner was almost over and he had hoped to talk to HAK before to get an idea of what to ask him. HAK wanted to know what they did discuss. The Russian said when the agreement comes he hopes it can be very simple and more matters of principle. Doty said his (HAK) idea about an annual review or exchange once a year seemed to go over very well. It should be made understandable and executable. Doty said he would get more out of him before he left for Washington and keep HAK posted.

(They went on to discuss the Harvard situation)

Doty asked about the Frank situation. HAK said he was having dinner lunch with Lee tomorrow. He didn't want to discuss it on the phone.

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4-15-69 10:00 PM

President said another option had occurred to him with greater
symbolic meaning - a Navy blockade of the one port of significance.
K said he was sure it could be done. President referred to
Cuban blockade and said question is how long can it be maintained.
K said that is the problem. President said he was thinking of the
impact. President said people say it does not mean anything, but it
means a lot to a lot of people. President said it is good when there
is something specific that you want to get done - there is nothing
they can do to get the blockade lifted. K said except to pay damages.
President said that is what he meant - we want that and the return
of the Pueblo. President said it would not take a lot to blockade that
place. K said on the other hand there is not much going in or out
either so it may be an empty gesture. President said they have to live
so there is something going in and out. President referred to three
Polish ships which have to come in - they could be kept out. K said
they could unload elsewhere and ship down by 12:00. K said he would
have it looked into. President said he wants to get something that
has symbolism - that is what we are talking about. President said it
could be signal of what we are going to do down below. President said
we could keep it for a few months and then lift it but not say anything.
K said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every
day - harrassing us, etc. K said he would look at it and give the
President pros and cons tomorrow.

K said he has some more information on ship - it is in the area of
Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to
Korea. Told President about payment breakdown - 20% down payment
had been made by Koreans and they owe 80%; loan has been guaranteed
by Dutch government. President asked about title. K said we do not
think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. K said we would have to
compensate the Dutch Government 5 1/2 million dollars. President
said that is awful small compared to risks taken in other areas.
President said there is a lot of symbolism in that.

K said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting
President if he decides to seize ship. President said throw the blockade
one at them too. K said o.k. - all of this will be discussed at 3:00
meeting tomorrow. K said the Cuban blockade worked because they
thought we were heading for an invasion. President said he knows it
is not on all fours at all.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

President said he was just looking over military plans. They want to
hit two other air fields because they are not so close to the Soviet border.
President said there is something to be said about fields not so close
to Soviet border. K said he told them to make a plan and give the President
all reasons why they are opposed to it and then President can choose -
K said we will throw blockade into it too. President said he thought
blockade was better than mining.

President said he would like to make meeting in the morning relatively
brief. K agreed.

jm

*

By KLC NARA, Dalo 5/12/69

TELECON

Dr. Kissinger to
Dr. Kramer
11:00 p. m., 4/15/69

K -- Asked Kramer how much he would press for strong action in the current situation.

Kramer -- Recommends immediate reaction in the strongest possible fashion in order that it would avoid that this would be repeated. Believe that any indication of our not immediately reacting strongly will only lead to further action on the other side.

K -- My worry is the domestic situation.

Kr -- The nation will essentially follow strong leadership [x] regardless of what certain people or certain groups will do. Sixty-five per cent will follow the President of the United States if he goes before the people and says, 'this is the situation -- I had to act.' Thirty-five per cent will be against the President. I don't think we can take it because otherwise we will be involved in the Mid-East, in Korea, in South Vietnam, in Berlin and in Latin America by more or less coordinated action against us. I feel we should react immediately and strongly. Have you talked to General Woodward?

K -- I know what to do. My problem is, is it psychologically wise?

Kr -- You will find the NY Times and the Washington Post against you, but not the nation. Talk, for example, to Meany. People like that have untold members, who will endorse strong action. There will not be a reaction in this country that will be [x] adverse to the President except for that small percentage which would be [x] adverse anyway. I would not be afraid of that, and I don't say it because of my well-known prejudices, but based on an objective analysis of the situation. Even if you read today's NY Times, the nation will follow a strong leadership. The President doesn't have anything to fear. He will only find the same critics who would criticize him anyway. I recommend you talk with M/Gen Woodward who for years has negotiated with the North Koreans. He is a cynic, but unbelievably brilliant. He is very unpleasant but very bright and realistic. In this country, nobody will be able to do any harm to the Commander-in-Chief. I, for instance, have been of the opinion that if, in Vietnam, you should be relatively statesmanlike, we would have a crisis in Korea. It is one of the crises I have predicted -- next the Middle East. These are interconnected. North Korea might hit, but they

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

can't continue it. Talk with General Yarborough. I'm sure you will get the same answer as from me. I assure you of one thing. If ever we seem willing to give in one area, we will immediately be in greater difficulties than ever in all others.

K -- However, there is a domestic problem here which I think Haig has explained to you.

Kr -- Referenced the NYTimes article again -- concerning various members of Congress -- everybody is willing to give President Nixon some time to think it over. Even the most hostile members of Congress. The nation would definitely go along. If you do not react immediately, then these probing actions from the other side will finally lead to something that goes beyond probing action -- then you are in a real crisis. I will be here at Ft. Benning for the next two or three days -- please feel free to call me.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON
Gov Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69 12:42 PM

Discussed President's OAS speech - R said he thought it went off very well. He stayed and had coffee with Ambs and then lunch with Galo Plaza who thinks things are going very well. R said he was pleased and grateful to K.

K said President feels strongly that R's mission will be something that can put his Latin American policy on a new basis. R said he was sure it will contribute to good will. R plans to say he is going to listen and to report to the President - he will not get into policy. R said if his mission results in suggestions that will be useful, fine - then the President can announce policy.

R said he is pleased with way it is shaping up. K said re Guatemala he has special intelligence estimate that there is some chance that Castro groups there will make an effort to do something. K has mentioned this to President because he did not think R should be put in position of being concerned about his own safety. President does not think R should run any risks at all. K said it could be dropped and we could find something else - we will do whatever R wants. K said if R does not go to Guatemala it will be because of Presidential orders. R said he thought Secret Service and CIA should appraise situation down there. R brought up possibility of helicopter and K said we could probably get one from Canal Zone. R said he could fly to some spot, meet and make it a short visit. K agreed that it should be short and that R should not stay overnight by any means. R said if this cannot be done, the alternative would be to meet with the five Central American countries together because they are in the common market. K said that is what he thought too. R said he would like to go through with Guatemala if possible - if Guatemala is skipped then another country should be too. K agreed. K said excuse should be that R is cutting down trip. R said no - it would be that he wanted to meet with five together. K said he has talked to the head of the Secret Service and they are giving it high priority.

R said he had a couple of questions: Asked about substituting Sam Gould for Jim Hester. K said he would run by the President. R said this fellow is a possibility (from Miami), but he would like to get more people from West Coast. R mentioned Buff Chandler (the mother). K said the Chanders are good friends of President and he could clear that one. R was apparently reading something and said he noticed that George Woods is against

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Mrs. Chandler - she is a wonderful woman but no one else can get a word in when she's around. R said he thinks she's great. R said on the business side, there is Arthur Watson of IBM and Beverly Murphy, President of Campbell Soup (Wood recommending latter). R said maybe K could check those names out. K said he would let him know by tomorrow evening. R then mentioned Dr. Emile Merk(?) who is at U of California at Davis - President of the Agricultural College.

R said re ABM Commission, he does not see how he could take on anything else. K said he was not aware of this - had he been called? R said yes, he was asked to chair a committee and he just cannot - he is in an awful bind. K said BeLieu must have called him and he would talk to BeLieu. K said if someone could talk to Goodell it might help - R said he would be glad to do so.

R said Ted Braum has made a suggestion about forming a women's committee - they could talk about defending their homes, etc.

K said that was a very good idea. K asked R if he thought we should fight for this - R said yes. K said Percy is giving us a hard time.

R said he would talk to him, but K said it would not do any good.

R said he was coming down for FIAB. K said he looked forward to seeing him

jm

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Ambassador Yost
Mr. Kissinger

4-16-69 1:30 PM

K said he wanted to get Y's judgment on Korea and UN. Y said simplest way is sending letter from President to Security Council explaining what has happened, giving our point of view, etc. K asked if someone would then call a SC meeting. Y said no it would be circulated than published. Y said more formal procedure would be to ask for urgent meeting of SC and present case. Y said we would, of course, know from the beginning there would be no substantive action - all we would get would be a forum to present our case. K said President's cancer is that he does not want the Soviets to go on record against us, if he can xxx avoid it - he is eager to keep four-power talks going if possible. Y said if we go into SC and make our speech, the Soviets will box feel obliged to make this speech for other side. Y said also that he is not sure we could get nine votes and Soviets would veto. Y said this would mean a confrontation between us at a time when we have these other things cooking. K asked if there is some way Y could get his views to the President. Y said he would send a telegram right away.

K said the President is pleased with the way Y has been handling the four-power talks. K said at early opportunity he is going to try to get Y in to see President for first-hand appreciation of what he has been doing. Y said he would be in town on Wednesday of next week. K said he would try to get an appointment for Wednesday afternoon or Thursday morning.

jm

By KAL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 2:10 p.m.

Laird said they have picked up two pieces of fuselage which had bullet and shrapnel holes in it, and that really confirms it was a shoot-down. They also picked up a flare. But no survivors. HAK noted "so it wasn't a missile."

When HAK asked if Laird should put out that info, Laird said no, not until it is confirmed by another source. He wants to wait and make sure the report is verified. HAK agreed, and wondered if we shouldn't ask the Russians to return to us the pieces of airplane they've got -- wouldn't that be a good ploy? Laird said yes, he would check into that.

Laird asked, "What do you think about this afternoon?" HAK said he was musing about it, that the President and he talked for a bit after the meeting. HAK asked, "What do you really think?"

Laird: Well, if there was some way we could hit one of their aircraft or ships, I would do it in a minute. I think the next thing we can do is to go out....that second airfield. I am going to think about this until 3:00. But I have got concerns over what this might mean from the standpoint of our force commitments in that area, and we must bear in mind that we can't put ourselves in a position where we are forced to pull back, as far as Vietnam is concerned. But I'm also concerned about how this might be interpreted by the people in Paris, particularly the North Vietnamese.

HAK: Yes, you stated the case exactly -- that's exactly the problem.

Laird: And this problem concerns me. I'm not worried about the public opinion. We'll have a bad reaction here whether way. What we're trying to do is get the war in Vietnam over with.

HAK: Either these guys are getting irrational and we better settle it; or now they're in the same mess as their predecessor and we don't have to settle it.¹

Laird: The statement has to be very strong and get some of their planes out their on the reconnaissance, and if we had a chance to knock a few planes down it would be terrific. I don't think we'll get that chance.

HAK: You stated the issue exactly.

Laird and HAK said they would see each other at 3:00.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon
The President
2:35 p.m. April 16, 1969

HAK said he wanted the President to know that our destroyers had picked up some of the debris and it had bullet holes and shrapnel in it. Now we have incontrovertible evidence that it was shot down. HAK said we might ask the Soviets to return the debris of the wreckage they picked up also. The President said he wondered whether it was worth it or not and added that we might request it in a low key but wasn't sure. HAK said we could hold off on this and if no other action is contemplated this might be one avenue.

The President mentioned that his 3:00 meeting would be delayed to 3:15.

*

By: KHLU NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Joseph Alsop
Mr. Kissinger

4/16/69 6:15 p. m.

HAK referred to a comment Alsop made to Rogers at lunch, which
Rogers repeated to the President, and the President wants to know what
Alsop really thinks. Alsop at first didn't recall what he had said to
Rogers, and HAK reminded him that he said "whatever we did would have
public support." Alsop said, with respect to North Korea, Yes, I think
that's correct.

HAK said the President wants to know what Alsop thinks we should do. Alsop's first answer was: I don't know. Then he went on to say he thinks you have to start by asking the motive of this behavior. He is inclined to believe that from the beginning the policy of North Korea is primarily to take pressure off the North Vietnamese. HAK said, "so they would like us to divert ourselves up there--so that would be a sign of weakness." Alsop said the situation that would confront them in North Korea if the North Vietnamese have to cease and desist. China is in chaos. The old Wave of the Future has come to a dead halt. And in both countries you have the contrast of economic disaster and tyranny in the North; and economic progress and a better life in the South. Alsop thinks this is what bugs them.

HAK said his advice, then, is ignore them essentially and concentrate
on Vietnam.

Alsop said VNam certainly is most important at the moment. Any
serious diversion from VNam is a mistake. Win in Vietnam and you
win the ball game.

HAK said he followed that reasoning, and they had thought that's one
of the things Alsop might have had in mind, but we just wanted to be sure.

Alsop said whatever we do he'll support us. Alsop also suggested that
Dean Acheson is the man to get an opinion from--"he is a wiser man
than I am by far. I rather think one war at a time, is what he would say."

HAK: Well, I don't think one's tendency to take on another war is overwhelming at this moment. You don't find people trying to break down the President's door in order to urge him into another war. Alsop said that he can well believe. Alsop extended every kind of good luck to the President. HAK thanked him saying he appreciated this, and he would be seeing the President in a little while.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

TELCON

Max Frankel
Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69 6:25 PM

F said aside from the two obvious - UN and MAC - he could not think of any options - is he overlooking anything? K said no, we have not made any alarming statements. F said quite to the contrary. K said our present view is we do no see any sense in a lot of diplomacy if we do not know what we want to accomplish. There has been a lot of protesting in the past. What we have been trying to do is find out where things stand and try to get as good an assessment as to what happened as possible. K said we knew yesterday what had happened but to know in exact detail took a little more time. K said we will be talking to people diplomatically fairly soon. F asked if we were under much pressure. Referred to clips of President on campaign trail - restore respect for America, etc. K was unaware of clips. K said he thinks the President feels on this he has to do what is right. K said we have been looking at it carefully. We go over these reports and look at situation but we are not going to have a huge trauma in any sense. K said we are talking for background. F said absolutely. K said unless you know what you are trying to do and what you are trying to achieve - we have had meetings; we did talk to Dobrynin about it yesterday. F said they have been helpful. K said they have been helpful in rescue operation and that is all we have talked about. There is not much we can ask them to do at this moment - there is also not much we can ask the Russians to ask them to do. K said he did not know whether this conversation was very helpful but would give F something of our mood. K said our mood is that we do not like to say things we do not do and do not like to imply things just to prove our manhood. F said conversation was very helpful. K said we of course talked to our Korean people to get their judgment and we have been collecting judgments on motives, etc. We will make a decision on a specific course of action. F referred to concern about lingering possibility of President hemmed in by his own rhetoric.

K said he could not say what final conclusions will be reached - no decision now and no crisis atmosphere here. F said there certainly is not. K said we meet and discuss and we had an NSC meeting. K said he worked last night trying to lay out all options and that is where we are right now. F said K might not think he has said much, but he has said enough and F appreciates it. K said quite frankly yesterday was spent determining whether there were any survivors.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

David Rockefeller Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger

4-16-69 6:40 PM

R said he was seeing King Hussein and wondered if there was anything special he should be aware of. K said no, we had good sessions with him here. Basic problem is what we need from Arabs is maximum commitment to state of peace. The more commitment they can make the more we can press the Israelis to be reasonable. K said he thinks Hussein is willing to go as xx xx far as Nasser. K said we are not inclined here to bring pressure on Hussein to go in a way that would jeopardize his position.

R said one of his colleagues has been talking to Saunders on K's staff about an idea he has re Saudi Arabia and Libya. Both countries have recently discovered wells and underground rivers. If those areas could be developed and a certain number of refugees taken, this would help Israeli problem. R said there was some indication that if Saudi Arabia and Libya were willing to take the refugees, some negotiation might be possible with respect to Jerusalem. R asked whether K had any objections to his mentioning this to the King. K said he would take it easy on Jerusalem - that is most complicated issue. R said what amazed him was that there was any favorable response from Israel that there was room for negotiation. R said he would just say he had a friend who had mentioned this to him.

R asked whether there was any chance of K's going to the next meeting of their group in Paris. R asked whether K was going to Bilderberg. K said he has not decided yet, but it is on his calendar and barring any crises, he is hoping to go. R said K might consider staying over and attending meeting in Paris the following Tuesday. K said he would try.

(FYI - Bilderberg is week end of May 8)

jm

*

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/64

TELCON
Prince Bernard
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 6:45 p. m.

Prince B asked if HAK were coming to the Bilderberg meeting. HAK replied that he would love to come, but it depended on his workload here, and on whether or not there is a crisis going on at that moment. HAK went on to say that he requested an appointment for the Prince, and he would call the Prince about it in the morning.

The Prince asked if HAK were free for lunch tomorrow (Thursday) or on Saturday, and HAK said perhaps on Saturday. The Prince mentioned that if he were to see the President would be on an informal basis, and HAK said that is clearly understood. HAK said there was absolutely no problem about the appointment, but the President's schedule has been thrown off by the fact of his press conference on Friday for which he needs time to prepare, and also by this Korean incident of the plane shoot-down.

Prince said if HAK can't make lunch, could he let him know in the morning when he could come in to see HAK for a moment?

HAK clarified that lunch would be with him alone, not with the President, and the Prince understood that, and what he had in mind was lunch at the Embassy.

Prince said he was leaving at 10:30 but would be back at 12. And he admonished HAK not to overwork himself--he knows how quickly it can happen...

###

*

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Secy Rogers

Mr. Kissinger
4-16-69 7:05 PM

K said he had personal view (not Presidential) about Panmunjom business.
K said he thinks we should not show a nd say nothing - no explanations,
no complaints. R said that is what they are going to do - he has already
told his people. R said they will have a letter that could be sent to
U Thant or SC getting on record - very low key.

R asked if K had seen statement by FM of Japan about retaliation. K said
no.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
4/16/69 8:10 p.m.

Richardson decided he would go later on tonight to Airlie, getting there around 9:30. He was disappointed not to get the straight dope on our foreign policy, because he could afford a little guidance. HAK said that what Richardson would say, HAK would probably agree with,

Richardson is appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tomorrow afternoon for a briefing on the shoot-down. He feels it is probably better that he do it before the President talks than afterwards. HAK said the President doesn't want to imply that there will be a clear-cut decision; he doesn't want to have the impression that we're building up for a climactic decision one way or the other. Richardson said he can duck that. What concerns him most is that they will undoubtedly focus on the process by which decisions like this are made, who is consulted, etc. (referring to the 303 business); did the President know, and, if not, who in the White House, etc.? HAK said he would tell them the truth. He would say there is a monthly review.

Richardson said that's what he'd like to do. HAK said it's the only thing to do. They can't expect the President to know every individual mission. But he thinks it's essential that we say that this has had full political clearance, so it doesn't look as if the military are running loose. Richardson said he agrees 100%. Richardson asked if HAK reports to the President on 303 decisions. HAK said the Pres gets a minute of every meeting, which he approves. On top of that, HAK gives him every disagreed item and every item that might embarrass him, even if it is agreed.

Richardson asked what would you want me to say about his participation, knowledge or approval. HAK would say the WH chairs this committee. HAK will check it with the President in the morning to be absolutely sure. He wouldn't give the name of the committee--but it doesn't make any difference. Richardson said he thinks it would be a good idea if HAK would check it. He doesn't think there's anything to be apologetic about.

HAK said he thinks it's a very conscientious system, and he certainly looks at every one of these things, and he thinks Richardson probably does before he goes to these meetings. Richardson has been to one, but Alex, of course, is there. HAK said the book they get goes thru another committee--the Joint Reconnaissance-or-something-committee.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

Richardson said he kept waiting for General Steakely to tell them this morning what the value of this intelligence was, but he decided not to raise the question. HAK thinks this is a question we ought to ask when this is over. It won't help us now.

Richard had a conversation with someone from which he got the impression that in the conduct of this study there's a lot of US investment in hardware and US personnel abroad which isn't subject to anyone's review in terms of justification. HAK said the problem is once a thing like this is approved it goes on forever. He spoke of putting a terminal date on every operation -- this would force an automatic review every six months. Richardson said that doesn't go far enough. He referred to 24,000 US personnel in West Germany, in this business, and over 12,000 in Okinawa. HAK said of course that sort of thing is not reviewed.

HAK asked if they were luncheing tomorrow, or was R preparing for the meeting. R said he was counting on lunch.

HAK asked R to give the group at Airlie his apologies -- (he has to work on the press conference). R said he would apologize to the group for having to take a watered-down and second-hand version. HAK said "and then you will deny it if they put our stories of White House dominance over State." Richardson said of course. In this connection, he was interviewed by Peter Lisagor, and he told Peter how well the system is working, and how smooth our cooperation is, and how firm our mutual understanding. He said Lisagor seemed to believe it.

###

By: KHV NARA, Date: 5/12/94

TELCORN

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4-17-69 9:05 AM

K said President just wanted to make sure that none of them speculate
how far plane was from shore. R said K did not have to caution him.
K said he knew that but President asked him to call all Departments
and make sure. R said he had some reservations about issuing Mel's
proposed statement - not much has been said about it. R said Richardson
is testifying today before SFRC. K said he was not too crazy about
it (statement) yesterday when it first came up. R said it was o.k. if
a question came up, but did not think much of putting out as a special
statement. R said it is in the paper this morning because it was in the
Defense paper. K said he thought that was enough. R said he and
Elliot talked last night about what he might say and they tentatively
agreed he should just say what the procedure is; interdepartmental
group at under secretary level, etc.

K said the President asked him to put together some sort
of contingency plans for the various things to be done in connection
with yesterday afternoon's discussion. K asked whether R could give
him the name of someone at State (perhaps Alex Johnson) to deal with.
R said he would let K know.

jm

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/89

Telecon
The President

9:25, April 17, 1969

P - In terms of the reaction - speaking of public handling, do you think some kind of diplomatic protest should be made?

K - I am exploring now what would happen if we were to go to the UN. We won't get a favorable vote. I'm doing this on a very low key. We can go to the Security Council on Saturday. We really would have done everything possible at that point.

P - The unsophisticated citizen might feel, why don't we make them pay for the plane, thinking back to the Pueblo. We should at least make a gesture. We are not going to get ourselves into a long debate over this.

K - I wouldn't go to the UN unless we are going to do the other thing.

P - Oh, we'll do the other thing. but suppose the UN says they are going to investigate?

K - I have a call in to Joe Sisco who handled these matters before. This is not in full authority, but if we don't press too hard, they might be glad to wind the whole thing up.

P - Is there some other way.

K - We can launch a formal protest and demand compensation.

P - I have a feeling that's better. The UN is not going to do anything about this. We can do something so that they will turn it down fast.

P - That's why the Panmunjom thing might be a good idea. H - I don't think we should show up there.

(something missing here)

K - I told Rod, subject to my checking with you, that he could indicate a bit more concern so that everyone does not think the crisis is over.

P - Tell them I met with you and members of NSC staff until after midnight last night - I think it would be a good thing to do.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

*

- 2 -

K - We do not want this thing to cool before we act but we have to
have some thin thread of trying.

P - o.k. The UN thing worries me - they will take a week to debate.

K - I am going to check on what happendd when we had the Pueblo. I'll
check other diplomatic possibilities.

President and K discussed idea of formal protest - decided should not
be done with Soviets. K said it would be sign of distain if we did
thru Poles, for example. K said protest thru Hungary or some minor
country would get us on record. P said what about Romania.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Bus Mossbacher
9:50 April 17, 1969

Bus said "your calling to apply for a job at Dartmouth." HAK said "yes, as Riot Control Director." HAK said at this point he didn't think he would ever go back to Harvard. He was sick about the way the faculty handled the situation. Maybe in a year he would change his mind. Mossbacher said he hoped he wouldn't have the chance to change his mind in a year.

HAK said the President was going to do the presentation of credentials this morning but had a sore throat and would like to limit the whole thing. He wants to save his voice for the press conference. HAK said he would be there to help move it along and wondered if M could help also. The President wanted to receive them in the Roosevelt room, walk through the Oval Room and then escort each one to his ear. M said this could be done.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato S/12/04

TELCOM

Joe Sisco
Mr. Kissinger
4-17-69 9:55 AM

S said he would get to K during course of morning (thru Hal) a piece of paper he has done - he would like K's informal reaction before going thru channels. S said he would like to do it this way in order to cut the time span in form of memo to the President, but it would have no status. K said fine.

K said President wanted him to talk to S about something totally out of
Middle East area, having to do with Korean business. K asked what
would happen if we put it before the Security Council. S said you would
get a series of speeches but you could not get formal action by the SC
which would condemn this. S said you might get 7 to 8 positive speeches
which would condemn Korean action but no vote. In S's judgment
we could not get nine votes so question of Soviet veto would not become
operative. K asked how quickly we could bring it to a vote. S said timing
is flexible - if you wanted to move quickly and got wound up, you
could get it inscribed and a series of speeches within 24 hours.
S said he was clear that we could not get a condemnation. K said suppose
we wanted to demonstrate that we could not get it. S said you can
demonstrate it, but it will be played as political damage defeat of Nixon and
S strongly recommends against it. K said so they would ask for an
investigation. S said he does not think we could even get that.

K asked S to get a half page over on what he thinks. S asked how soon
K needed it and K said this morning. S said he would get to work on it.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Laird

10:10, April 17, 1969

HAK said just so he could avoid bothering Laird every 10 minutes could Laird suggest someone on his staff to work with HAK's people -- someone from Defense. HAK said the President wanted a contingency plan and HAK is forming a working group at the staff level. Laird said he would appoint Warren Nutter. HAK said anything on an operational matter, he would talk to Persley -- anything above that of course he would deal directly with Laird. LAIRD said he would call Nutter and notify him of the arrangement.

Laird had talked to Bill since he sent his (Laird's) statement over to HAK. He feels that he doesn't want to get into the legalities (that is Bill) of these kinds of flights now. The only problem as Laird sees it, is that we have to keep the President away from having to make the defense for this. This is a matter that Defense and State has to handle. The President shouldn't be shot down for making the decision on this.

HAK agreed with this and would put it to the President. Laird said he would try to avoid the subject in his speech today. HAK said if it came up in the Q & A he should say that these flights are cleared at a high level on a monthly basis and add his condolences for the families. Laird doesn't want people to think he is pressing for this statement but it would save the President from justifying these flights at his news conference. There is some merit in getting the President off this kind of a pitch.

*

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
11:50 AM 4-17-69

K said he had just been with the President and after thinking about it a bit, President feels we should try to make a protest and to do at Panmunjom after all. K said he wants record of having protested and having done something and asked R if he could get that laid on. R said he did not know - meeting is on the 18th and it is now 2:00 in the morning there. R said he would check and let K know but he thought it was a little late. R said he did not like the idea of compensation. K said we did not have to do that - just protest. R said we were going to have protest in UN. K said Pres does not want it in the UN. R said it is just a letter. K said Pres is concerned that someone will put it before the SC. R said he thought that could be avoided. R said in any event, he would look into the other thing and let K know.

K asked whether he had State Dept man - R said Alex is the one to handle.

jm

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Secy Rogers

4-17-69 12:00 N

R said on question of timing, people working on it think it could be prepared by but if we had 48 instead of 24 hours it would be better. K said meeting is scheduled for 9:00 tonight. President is eager to show some action and some rebuff in case we go ahead with what we was discussed yesterday. K is certain he will not wait 48 hours. R said we will have to ask that it be put over - it could be put over until 9:00 tomorrow night. K said o.k. K said if there is no chance of doing tomorrow morning, how about 9:00 tomorrow morning. R said they may not show up at all. K said we can hand our protest to joint duty officer. K asked whether they have already been told that we will not show up. K said why don't we show up and hand them protest. R said under the rules we have to accept 24 hours in advance. K said it is now 21 hours before the meeting so we could just accept for 9:00. R asked whether we should give facts of Defense Department statement and protest. K said that is basically what the President wants - we want to be on record of putting facts before them and having it rejected. R said some of his people feel facts are mixed up but we can eliminate anything we are not sure of. K said we know their facts are wrong. R said he will see if they can do it - they will try to. K said President feels very strongly about it. He needs it in order to have option to do the other thing so that he can say it was put before them and rejected.

jm

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCOM

Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 12:40 PM

R said he told Elliot if he has to testify today he could say we were going to appear at Panmunjom tonight at 9:00. K said he thinks that is right. K said he mentioned the problem to the President after they had talked and he wants to go ahead. R asked if we would have a meeting before President makes decision and K said yes. K said we have this contingency KREX group which will look at two options - doing nothing and this. Then tomorrow afternoon the President will want to meet with his senior advisers again and look at those two things. K said President has put off time for doing it, if at all, to Monday.

R said at an embassy last night Dean Acheson came over to him and said he was a hawk but not to let them do anything - when you have finished you will not have accomplished anything. K said we cannot consider what was done yesterday as a decision to do it but if there is even a two per cent chance that the President will do it, we have to work out contingency plans. K said he will do no less than continue reconnaissance with armed escort. R said he has filled in no one over there so when Alex shows us at meeting he will be blank on it. K said he will say military retaliation and not say what it is, or nothing doing nothing - we will not even ask for recommendation. K said we have to have scenario tomorrow and all meet again.

K mentioned telcon on Paris meeting - four points interesting. K said he has not seen KREX actual report. R said one thing he thinks the President is not quite filled in on is that he does not realize the NVN are having some problems. K said he has been telling him.

jm

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Kermit Lansner (newsweek)
Mr. Kissinger

4-17-69 3:15 PM

L said he was calling about the call K had made to Kay Graham - L understands K was annoyed. L said that was a little strong. L said the statement about Dobrynin being baffled interested him. L said he has made some inquiries but did not ask name of source. One of Washington guys (15 years experience) got it from a competent government source. L said when he questioned him, he said source was impeccable. L said he did not want to push to too far. Source apparently said even the Russians must be confused - Rogers gives them soft line one ~~xx~~ day and next day Kissinger gives hard line. L said he worries about things like this. L said amazing thing is that he never has seen Dobrynin on his own initiative and he ~~x~~ never talked to him about SEA. L said he thought it was so outrageous the Russians must have put it out. L said if he goes back and finds out on what evidence this man says it, it may be that it came through the Russians. L said he has never talked to Dobrynin within any time frame relevant to conversations with Rogers - unless Rogers has had conversations with him that K does not know about and he does not think that is possible. L said his contacts with Dobrynin are very rare and mainly at social functions. L said he had been thinking about what could possibly have led to this and the only thing he could ~~x~~ think of was that someone from the Russian Embassy came to see him to deliver a letter from a man whom K had seen in his office - it was a thank you letter. It occurred on a Wednesday - the day after the news story broke that K was in charge of a China review and the Emb man asked K what we were doing about China. Man also asked about pulling out of SEA and L said we would certainly have an interest in it. K is ~~xx~~ sure Rogers would have said that too. L said he does not want to push this. L said there is nothing that can be done about it now.

L said the second thing he objected to in the story was that he was contemptuous of amateurish dabblings. L said it would be absurd of him to make any statements about Cabinet members. L has highest regard (both humanly and otherwise) for Rogers and would challenge anyone to say anything else. L said annoyance or impatience might have been a better word, but K might object to that too. L said he would. L said in interviewers notes there was some reference to blabbermouthing which L used appropos of one of Laird's statements. L said also at Overseas Writers thing, L said something about there goes another Cabinet member. This apparently came up in connection with a question about Rogers and trading off our ABM for Russian ABM. L said in the beginning they were pitting him against Laird and then when they brought in Rogers, he said there goes another Cabinet officer.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K said he does feel there are a lot of leaks around and he does not appreciate foreign policy being made by press leaks, but that is different from being impatient with substance of what Rogers and Laird are saying as individuals. L said everyone is as exercised as K about this story in different way than K. They feel whether it is a question of manner or stringency of intelligence, this comes through in interviews with K. K said he has seen a number of people from Newsweek because he has a high regard for the magazine and because he likes the people on Newsweek staff. On the other hand, K is under enormous pressure and talks in shorthand.

L referred to Lloyd Norman's interview with K - protocol of interview was strictly respected. L said it was a fascinating interview.

L said the point of the story was not anit-Kissinger or anti-anything. K understood that. K said he may have an arrogant manner, but the first statement about Dobrynin is just not true - literally or in spirit because that would be an insane way to run a government. K said the second point about being contemptuous of amateurish dabblings, L has explained to K and there is nothing that can be done about it. L said he thought their usage was overly harsh and that was unfortunate. L said perhaps there is something instructive about this - K did project some sort of impatience or annoyance. L will be doubly careful in the future.

K thanked L for calling.

jm

*

By: KHLU NARA, Dalo. 5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 3:45 p. m.

HAK had a call from Kermit Lansner about the NEWSWEEK story about which he had complained to Kay Graham.

It appears they got the first item from an "impeccable governmental source" who, so far as HAK could tell, was wrong on both counts. The item referred to Rogers' saying to Dobrynin he is so eager to get out of Vietnam he can taste it; and then HAK's telling Dobrynin that we propose to stay in South East Asia, xxx Since HAK knows Rogers didn't make the first statement, the so-called "impeccable governmental source" is now peccable. HAK went on to say that no matter what our private views would be, he can't imagine our saying a thing like that on either side of that argument.

HAK said Lansner told him to call Rogers and tell him of his affection and that he felt sorry if there was embarrassment to either HAK or Rogers.

On the second point, apparently at the Overseas Press Club--when they asked HAK a lot of questions about Laird. And then they asked "how about Rogers' statement?" At that point HAK said "now here comes Rogers -- first you pit me against Laird, and now you pit me against Rogers." Actually that was the statement where HAK said Rogers spoke for the President.

Rogers said he thought HAK had done all he could -- they'll probably be more careful now. HAK said the first item was really stupid for them to believe -- that the fast way to get out of Vietnam is to tell the Russians we are so eager to get out we can taste it. HAK said he told him (1) he never sees Dobrynin; (2) the people who know what the Secretary says to Dobrynin are so few--and those who know don't talk--that it has to be speculation.

Rogers mentioned that "the speech went well yesterday; there were no repercussions." HAK said in fact the tone he gets out of the news stories is very good. It is restrained and calm.

Rogers asked how Mel's speech went, and HAK said he hadn't heard anything yet.

mz

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Peter Flannigan

4:25, April 17, 1969

F said DuBridge was crying in his beer -- we are going to have an uprising in the universities because we have not gotten a man for him and the Long situation. Stevers and Piori (sps?) turned it down. We have two alternatives that Teller doesn't object to and they are Carter and John Wheeler. HAK thought Wheeler had more prestige but DuBridge doesn't like him. F said if DuBridge is complaining about not having someone, we'll give him Wheeler. They both agreed that Long would have been a distinguished appointment for Kennedy or Humphrey but not for us. F asked if HAK had any further suggestions. HAK said he didn't.

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/64

TELCORN

Under Secy Richardson
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 7 05 pm

Richardson, apparently referring to the Airlie conference last night, said "we did pretty well." It was very cordial, and a worthwhile exercise. He was not pressed with what the President's plans are and didn't even come up about HAK's role. HAK said that must be a relief.

At that point Jonathan (Moore) told Richardson about a statement they were to sign off on concerning rescue ships moving in within 20 miles of the coast. (of Korea). Richardson can't figure out what this is about. HAK asked if we haven't put out an instruction that no announcement is to be made on Korean matters without clearance with us. HAK said he hadn't seen this one and he didn't think we should do it. At least he'd like to know what the explanation is.
(HAK said we have located it--it has been called in here)
Richardson said they're being asked to clear off on the public release, but the measure itself doesn't make any sense.

At this point HAK had to take a call from Laird and HAK said he would call Richardson back.

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE
The President

Mr. Kissinger
4-17-69 8:00 PM

P said another call that might be useful in lining up support would be to
Rockefeller. P suggested K give him a call and use his own judgment
as to how much you want to disclose. K said he talked to Mel - as
result of consultations he finds they are content with what President is
doing - there is no pressure to do anything more. President said he
(Laird) has been brave soldier - he has taken a lot of heat on
these things and you can't just let State get credit for checking with
Congress and being the good guys and Mel the bad guy. That is why
President asked him to check with them - he understands them and knows
what we are trying to do. President asked whether Laird still thought
we had to do this. K said yes. However, K said they were talking
on phone that was not secure. Laird still believes it is right thing to do
but no longer thinks there is Congressional pressure to do it.
K said he thought Rockefeller would support it but he will check with him.
P said it was not high priority - give him a call tomorrow.

President said he is still affirmative. He has to be sure we are leading
the charge with other people coming along a bit. K said it is about the
boldest course President can take. In long run it may turn out not to be
so risky. Pres said when you come right down to it here's the Soviet
Union finally flushing Czech Revolution down the drain and no one gives
a dam; here we are on isolated basis and we do not do a thing with 31 lives
missing. Pres said he looked at editorial in Star - he really thinks we
should have gotten across the fact there was no question about where
plane was. K said he (pres) could nail that down tomorrow. President
agreed. P said they made check and no question whatever and they know it.
K said Korean radar showed it was 40 miles off the coast and Russian
radar showed 60. They know we are not playing provocation into a crisis.
Russians have their hands full in Czech now - they have to be ready for
next few days against some riots. K said there will be some reaction in
the Ex West. President said he doubted Britain, France and the rest
would do anything. K said there might be some bad editorials
against them but they will have their hands full for a few weeks.

K said if we do this, we have to be ready to go very, very far in case it
leads to ground action. I think we can stop if we are willing to look
down and that is a very tough one to bite early in Administration and I
owe it to you to say that. K said his judgment is that it will not come to
that.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

-2-

Pres said he trusts Mel is not backing off. K said he is uneasy about it. K said if Pres says he wants to do it, Mel would agree to do and take public responsibility for it. President said Rogers would not. K said he believes to do this will make or break President's Administration - they owe it to Pres and must stand behind him.

President said take the people on the other side - take Kennedy, country will be strongly against him. They will say, K said, K said they will say Pres risked another ground war in Asia. K said Pres will have to say we will not tolerate another ground war in Asia - to Dobrynin we will have to say more. When it happens, we might have to go to tactical nuclears and clean it up. All hell will break loose for two months, but at end of road there will be peace in Asia. K said that is something that is easy for him to say.

Pres discussed press stories - they are not praising us, they are trying to get us to do something. They are eroding self-confidence of this country. President said that is another problem that is not answered by option 2. K said he has come to feel that option 2 with lunch is not feasible. This gives other side incentive not to make public as there is nothing they can do about it. Pres said that leaves option 2 without lunch. K said yes and then do that two weeks after. K said this is low risk course and he would favor if there were no VN war going on and if we had not slipped back so much in last 10 years. Because there is VN and because there is general erosion of moral fiber of country, President said a bold move is indicated. K said in his view we may be forced into an even bolder move a year from now if we do not do this one. President said you mean VN - K said that and anything else that might happen.

P said if question comes up tomorrow, should he indicate that we are going to continue reconnaissance. K said absolutely. Pres said he thought he should say too that we can't expect Americans to take these activities when they are in open sea and open air unless Government backs them up. K said unless Government protects them. P said he would put in context of looking toward future. Pres said he could use some of option 2 at press conference tomorrow. K said he could say he will protect but not how.

K said if Pres uses option 2 he will not lose much, if anything, but general trend is against Pres and this is problem. P will not be significantly worse off. K said his talks with Dobrynin had effect. P said with their troubles in Czech they may need us more than we need them. K said he did not think to do nothing is a calamity - Pres said as K points out, to do option 2 is not a calamity. Pres said with option 1 the gains are great and risks very great. P said with option 2 there are no gains and no risk except perhaps down the road. K said the risk in option 2

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

over the next period of time, which will be cumulative, will be greater than risk in option 1, which will be enormous in brief period. Pres agreed. P said everytime US fails to react, it encourages some pipspeak to do the same thing something.

Pres said not to let Laird move off now - when they meet Saturday morning he does not want him wobbling around. K said he would talk to him. Pres asked why no pressure was being put on State by South Koreans. K said he thought our Amb was telling them to keep quiet. P speculated about effect this action would have on averting another Korean confrontation - can't brush off fact that they say they will take us on. K agreed they might do it. K talked of gain of taking on toughest character in Communist camp and facing him down - this would be enormous. P said we will not take any more heat from moving too much force in - have to be ready to stop them.

P said he would read briefing book now for tomorrow

jm

*

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4/17/69 8:45 p. m.

The President felt the stuff in the briefing book on the Korean thing was not
adequate for the press conference. First question asked will be: What
are the facts? What are you going to do about it? How many Americans
are stationed in South Korea? The fact the number of missions the first
three months was 90. The material doesn't show something that needs to
be in there--something with regard to the number of Americans that have
been lost already. HAK said we are getting that right now.

P: There are 50,000 Americans there. The North Koreans threatened them, etc. As a matter of fact, over the past two years ________ men have been killed. I have the responsibility for the safety of these men. They (the flights) have been made and they will continue. ..... that's the kind of thing. Then you go on to the other question: What are you going to do now? I'd like a view of what we're planning to do. For example, there's no question and answer here: What are you going to do diplomatically? What are your diplomatic options? UN. Panmunjom. Have you protested.

H: I'll have it over within an hour.

P: I think that's right. Just sit down and figure out questions... I need to know about the Panmunjom thing. Has it been put out to the press?

H: It was supposed to be put out by State simultaneously.

P: There's too much of a buildup for this press conference. That would be a dead giveaway we will do something. Better to fuzz it up a little. We are checking with the UN. Leave that little crumb bun for them.

H: You ordered your Ambassador to file a protest with the President of the Security Council.

P: The Ambassador of the UN--I have asked him also to explore any other ways the UN could help. How are you going to react? What are you going to do? I'm not going to announce that decision. What's your suggestion as to how that has to be handled?

H: You could say we will announce measures that your government as they are being taken for the time being. We have taken the following steps, and not indicate that there will be others.

P: Plan it in your own mind. Sort of talking points rather than questions and answers. In answer to the first question, I might talk 3 or 4 minutes.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

-2-

H: On the Panmunjom meeting, it's supposed to begin at 9 o'clock our time.
We won't be signing our protest until 11 tonight. It won't be released until 11.

P: We have filed a protest. I have instructed our Ambassador to the UN to file this protest with the President of the Security Council. I'll be able to do the toe-dancing. Talking points in the light of what we are preparing to do. Get talking points to lay the foundation for later action. If you say too little they're going to know damn well you're going to do something. On the other hand, fuzz it up. Let them think we are just going to explore the possibilities.

P: Suppose they ask are our aircraft carriers being sent up there?

H: I think you could say certain precautionary alert measures have been taken.

P: I think we should say that such measures will continue. How about saying such measures will continue in this area and such measures will be protected. There will be reaction in event there is any attack on them. Give the warning thing. Use Game Plan II. That will be a good cover.

H: If you take Option 2, you can wind it down at that point. You can leave it right there. You don't have to make another announcement.

P: That's not our intention, you understand. It's a way to keep Option 1 more of a shocker.

H: I've talked to John and Bob about it. John wants to think about it overnight.
Bob leans toward option 1.

P: Have you talked to Rockefeller yet?

H: No, I will do it first thing..... I will do a draft speech for Monday, too.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
President - Kissinger
4-17-69 11:20 PM

P said he did not have figure on how many Americans were killed. K said it is on other chart. P said (after finding it) that it was not high enough figure and he would not use it.

P asked why in protest there was no demand for compensation. K said Bill was opposed to it. P said he thought protest was little too mild. K said we deliberately made it mild. P said we will see how press reacts - it is his feeling that this is somewhat mild - whole thing is an empty gesture.

P and K discussed Sihanouk matter. Pres said it was pretty good. K said it was practically an invitation.

P said talking point paper was good and he would use as basis for what he says tomorrow. K said Yost will transmit message tomorrow to President of SC. P said we can say we have ordered resumption of flights and K said yes. P said he did not know in what other ways the UN could help. K said Yost is consulting with other members on this matter. P said what if he is asked whether he is going to take this to UN. K said this depends on whether we see any indication that it can succeed. P said what if asked whether he plans any further action. K said we are reviewing situation and it depends on reaction to protest. P said he was trying to think of some way to get off the hook quickly and asked K to think about it and send it over in the morning.

jm