TELCONE (San Clemente)

Richardson/Kissinger

12:45 p.m. - 7/3/73

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Eliot, how are you?

R: Pretty good, how are you?

K: OK. I was going to ask you for a favor. That always is a prelude to asking for immunity.

R: I'd be happy to do anything I can, Henry, you know that.

K: No, what I wanted is this. I'm getting an award tomorrow for Distinguished Public Service from a together with John Gardner and I think one other person, but mine is in the public service category and they've just asked me about an hour ago - I had told them I wouldn't be able to come - whether there would be somebody that would possibly be willing to accept it on my behalf and I thought given our long association I'd be very honored if you'd be willing to do this.

R: Where is it, Henry?

K: It's in Washington. Charlie Bartlett is one of the organizers and he could give you the details. It's in the evening tomorrow on the grounds of Mt. Vernon Junior College. It's a rather prestigious award. It's the first year they're giving it.

R: All I would do would be to get up and is there anything you would want me to say for you?

K: Whatever you feel appropriate to say.

R: Would you like to have something I could read for you?

K: Well, I might just send a few lines and anything you would like to say on your behalf, but that's not required. It's just - I wanted somebody who'd work with me and who represents some of the better things in our Administration.

R: I'd be glad to do it Henry. I'd be honored.

K: I'd be very pleased and it's not - Charlie can tell you. I think this is the last award that's going to be given. It's not a very heavy occasion so what they had asked me to do is to say something for 5 minutes.

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R: Yeh, well, if you'd then - I'm sure they'd like to have at least part of what I say be in your own words so if you have a chance to do something and get it to me, I can, depending on its length and so on, I can put it into a setting of my own words.

K: That would be very nice, Eliot and it really would mean something to me.

R: OK, I would be more than glad to do that.

K: I'll tell Charlie Bartlett to get in touch with you.
was to meet

R: As a matter of fact, ironically I ~~just~~ was Charlie at lunch. Some day I'll tell you why this has been in many ways the worst day I've ever seen. Just awful.

K: Well, I know what you are - you know I hear occasional, I don't know what happened today, but I hear occasional rumblings and I know what you're up against.

R: Some day I'll tell you. Today the rumblings are worse than any day. The problem is I've been on the phone most - a lot of the morning with Haig on problems arising at that end but there are some others. I'll tell you some day.

K: Well, It's one of the most

R: Anyhow I was supposed to have lunch with Charlie today and he spent an hour and a half here waiting for me to show up.

K: May I tell him to get in touch with you?

R: Yeh, fine, sure.

K: Good, thank you. And thank you very much and let's you and I have lunch when I get back.

R: I would like to very much.

K: On the NSC part of your responsibilities.

R: Good. OK. I haven't seen you since the Brezhnev production but I thought it was great.

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TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Bernard Gwertzman

2:30 p. m. 7/3/73

BG: How are you Dr. Kissinger.

HK: Okay, how are you

BG: Okay, sorry I'm not out in the sunny West. My wife had a baby you know.

HK: Oh congratulations.

BG: Right in the beginning of Brezhnev's trip.

HK: Boy or girl?

BG: Boy. Pretty hectic week though.

HK: I'm delighted

BG: Well, thank you. I'm just calling because we getting deluged now with the typical rollercoaster effect from Peking--there is an AFP story and there is a Keoto (sp?) News Agency all saying flatly you're coming to Peking and you are going to meet with Sihounok, and

HK: I'm just not going to commet on any of that until---

BG: Until --in other words, it's just where we left you yesterday that it is a possibility.

HK: That's right. We do not have a date set or a specific--

BG: The problem with Sihounok of course is a more --provocative in a sense

HK: Yeh

BG: I imagine it would be rather fruitless to talk to him unless you had something set up ahead of time.

HK: I'm not prepared to say yet that I am prepared to meet with him

BG: And ah--since

HK: Since I'm not sure yet I'm going, since--it is senseless to say what I'm doing when I get there.

BG: Right so could we just say that it is being considered but nothing is firm --would that be best?

HK: That's right.

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BG: Now on Friday when Huang Chen is out there in San Clemente is there expected to be some jaor announcements after that--

HK: Certainly not.

B: Right. He'll be coming back that weekend?

HK: You know we have somany heads of state coming to the US that even if the Chinese were to come we wouldn't consider that a major announce-ment.

BG: I think it would be.

HK: No, no, there--I do not anticipate a major announcement and if one were to happen it is really--nothing is going to happen, it's almost inconceivable. I mean it's just not that sort of meeting.

BG: Right. Wouldn't be an ______ occasion to announce Chou En-lai is coming.

HK: Certainly not.

B: Right, Okay much thanks.

HK: You know if he were to announce to us that he's arriving, we wouldn't reject but, look--don't take that seriously. I do not expect there is no plan, there is --there has been no preliminary discussion, and nothing is going to come out of this meeting other than the fact of it. Nothing is going to be announced that I can now foresee.

BG: Right. Okay. I had lunch today here with the Cambodian ambassador--seems like a bright fellow and he of course is rather interested in what might take place as far as these negotiations. All I could tell him was to sit tight. Do you expect any kind of conference developing any time soon

HK: In Cambodia?

BG: On the Cambodian question, yeh.

HK: I don't right away.

BG: Is going to take some time. It's a tough one.

HK: That line is not doing us any good. And you know it. I don't see what earthly good it did.

BG: Although I guess the mood of the Congress was such that that was the best you could get.

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TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Tony Day

2:45 p. m. 7/3/73

HK: Tony, how are you?

TD: All right, Henry.

HK: I want to protest which is one of the most futile exercises about your
Cambodian editorial.

I understand your point of view and I have never harrassed you on it,
but to accuse us of cheating really goes a little far.

We stopped any military activity for three weeks, we got the Cambodians
to observe the unilateral ceasefire, and it wasn't until the other side,
aided by the NVN started an offensive that we did anything. Now you can
still argue that we should be out anyhow, but to say we cheated is just
--and to quote what we said on Jan 24 without also pointing that the
Cambodians declared a unilateral ceasefire and we stopped all military
activities for three weeks is just not fair.

TD: Of course we have been dealing with this for some time and have pointed
out that in fact --addressed both sides of the argument-- the cessation of
one is--we argue--is not the grounds for resuming the other.

HK: You know, I have a different view on that too, but that I'm not debating.
That is what the editorial page is for.

TD: Hm huh.

HK: To state points of view and you know, the channel to state different ones
but that I have never complained about the substance of an editorial.

TD: Your complaining--you think it is unfair to say that we --

HK: It's unfair to say we've cheated, to quote something as if it had been
a misrepresentation when we did what I said we would do. and
well you know--I just wanted to make the point.

TD: Hm huh / Well consider it made. How are you otherwise.

HK: I'm fine. I--you know I respect your editorial page very much.

TD: If you think we've been unfair--everybody else tells us when we think
we have been unfair and we appreciate it.

HK: You know I am bound to disagree with your point of view on Cambodia.
Because I think the strange thing that is happening now is that people
are fighting in Cambodia all the arguments that were made in Vietnam
and they are talking as if we didn't have a Vietnam settlement, and

Page 2

as if this were not --as if without it, we wouldn't have ended it anyway
this summer. So the only difference between us and our critics was
to be given an opportunity to negotiate a conclusion. And one of the
paradoxical results of this cutoff may be that the negotiation has become
inifinitely tougher if not impossible, but that we will have to see.

TD: Yes, but that is the fundamental disagreement. O<sup>r</sup> you on this point
and your opponents.

HK: I know. But our opponents had the same view when we were doing
the other negotiation and they didn't turn out to be right.

TD: We would argue that the prolongation of it -- we all know what the argument
are. I think someone is going to invite you to come up and visit us. I
don't know when you are going back.

HK: I'm going back next Monday probably.
So it probably won't work.

TD: I'm sorry about that.

HK: But with all these complaints, I think your editorial page is always
gentlemanly and always worth reading.

TD: We try to be--we do not always succeed. We try to be worth reading.
We don't always succeed there.

HK: I have no basic complaint.

TD: We try to be honest --

HK: Good.

TD: Well we thought of inviting you before Brezhnev and I figured you would be
incredibly busy.

HK: No that wouldn't have worked. But I'm bound to be out here in August
and I'd be delighted to come down.

TD: Certainly hope we see you.

HK: Right. Bye.

TD: Bye.

TELCON

Bernard Gwertzman/Mr. Kissinger

3:07 p.m. 7/3/73

BG: I take two days off and go to the beach and come back and am faced with speculation of about the Chinese.

HK: You are the one who started it.

BG: I started it? I didn't know Huang Chen was coming out to San Clemente.

HK: Oh yeh, I didn't clear that with you.

BG: I've been charged by my office to write something tomorrow about what is likely to happen. Can you give me any help.

HK: No, because it's just a regular discussion. There won't be any major announcements.

BG: But there are two lines of speculation it seems to me, that I'm picking up--one on the after effects of what happened during the Brezhnev summit in terms of our relations and the other thing is the Cambodian situation. My own inclination would give more emphasis to the Brezhnev end of it more than Cambodian would that be accurate or not.

HK: Ah--I just don't want to get into it. It's--I don't want to go into what the subject of the conversation is going to be.

BG: Let me put it another way--would I be wildly wrong if I wrote on my both things would be touched or not.
Just trying to get a sense of how far you go with Huang Chen on this thing-- how do you consider him--has he become something-- have relations with Peking reached the point where you would discuss some depth of our particular--

HK: He's a member of the central committee.

BG: But on the two subjects I mentioned--I mean that they could be subjects I should say that would come up--that could be discussed with him

HK: That's not impossible--he is one of their senior diplomats.

BG: I gather you are giving him a dinner on Friday night.

HK: That's right.

BG: And no likelihood of an announcement on a possible visit of you coming out of the talks.

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HK: I don't think so. No.

BG: Because it has been pointed out to me by several people who are rather antagonistic to what I have been writing in the bureaucracy that Dick Solomon has gone off two weeks to Peking and that if you were preparing to go to Peking, he wouldn't be out with these Congressman.

HK: Who put that out Dick Solomon

BG: (laughs)

HK: (Laughts)

BG: One of his press agents.

HK: Because it is true, I never make a move without my staff. Right. I never move without my staff knowing it.

BG: Where do we--would you stand on the possible visit the same way we stood when we talked on the phone...

HK: Yeh, all I said then and --is that there are no fixed plans now and then when we have them we'll announce them.

BG: Yeh is it when or if?

HK: When and if--but

BG: (laughs) I feel like I'm doing a crossword puzzle. And what about the other possibility of your seeing Sihounok in Peking.

HK: Let me announce a trip first and then you can start speculating on that.

BG: When are we likely to have an announcement if one is coming.

HK: Friday night?

BG: Friday night?

HK: No, no. I really don't expect one in the immediate future.

BG: Two weeks?

HK: I just don't know.

BG: What was your impression of Sihounok's interview in the NY Times on Sun.

HK: We went through all of this -- previously when we negotiated, you know this endless speculation about every word that is being said and I just don't

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to comment on it.

BG: What I was struck by was the little passage about ______ whispering in his ear.

HK: Yeh I saw it.

BG: The other thing is the great emphasis on his--on the fact that they are not actually involved in the negotiations--my impression was total emphasis on --no one has talked to us but the French, Russians and Americans, Hanoi and Peking are all talking among themselves--if that a fair impression.

HK: That's the impression he would leave, yeh. Yeh.

BG: Have you heard anything more about P Neuf (Sp?) -the possibility of his going--or is that still wrong?

HK: I think it is wrong. I haven't heard it anyway.

BG: So there has been--

HK: There isn't any massive change. No significant change. Okay, George--

BG: And the bombing is not tied to the political situation--I mean to the <u>negotiation</u> negotiating situation?

HK: Of course it is.

BG: I mean is this a repeat of the Dec. bombing over NVN

HK: Not to that extent.

BG: Just in terms of showing hard determination.

HK: In terms of what is thought to be necessary. As long as we have the authority.

BG: Good thank you.

HK: Bye.

TELCORN

Mr. George Sherman/Mr. Kissinger

3:15 p.m. 7/3/73

HK: George, this was for your guidance.

GS: Before you opened your mouth I was going to say, no I'm not going to quote you.

HK: Yeh, but also --not indirectly. Me either.

GS: Okay, you know it is basically a question of style, as far as I'm concerned--can I use informed sources, I mean since I'm in Washington anyway. I mean I have to have some sort of formulation rather than just saying--we're not allowed to say I believe type thing--

HK: Okay. Fine.

GS: Thank you.

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TELCORN

3:18 p.m. 7/3/73

HK: Bernie, I just wanted to make sure that what we discussed wouldn't be quoted.

BG: Here is what I wrote, I said a high-White House official

HK: With a German accent

BG: (laughs) I say no firm plans for Mr. Kissinger to visit Peking has been made although the possibility of such a trip is under study.
Two or three paragraph story. It follows this Peking story we have.

HK: Why don't you just say informed sources.

BG: I can say an Administration official all right?

HK: Yeh, why don't you say this, because if you say a high White House source-there are only two possibilities--he's either an imposter or me.

BG: All right. One other think just to clear my own mind, when --a
had you offered the Senate a unilateral ceasefire in Cambodia that they
turned down, I haven't--I didn't understand what you meant by that.

H: Yeh, I told them we were willing to do this.

BG: In mid-Sept.

HK: Around, yeh.

BG: They didn't like the date or the secret.

HK: They didn't like the secret aspect of it.

BG: Yeh, yeh.

HK: But this you can't ascribe to anybody.

BG: I understand. I had known that when you talked to the Foreign Relations Committee you talked about trying to wind it up in Sept, but didn't know you were that specific about it.
Hope they didn't screw you on this, although I don't know--in the past you always said with a deadline the other side would just sit and wait until the day after the deadline came.

HK: That is a distinct possibility.

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BG: You fairly think the pressure on detente and all would be so heavy on their shoulders that they would have to make some gestures here.

HK: I had no doubt whatever in my mind that if we had been able to play out the string, that it would have worked. It's you know I'm speaking personally and not for any attribution, but it is one of the most counterproductive things I've ever seen. Senseless-- doesn't achieve anything. You ask yourself what can it possible achieve.

BG: Yeh. I knew it was in the cards there because of them--

HK: But that doesn't make it right.

BG: Look at Bill Sullivan. They still won't confirm him--

HK: That's another outrage.

BG: Yeh. Want to call up again next week. A certain passion takes over up there.

HK: Yeh. Okay.

BG: Fine.

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TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz

July 4, 1973 10:30 a.m.

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador

A: Dr. Kissinger good morning to you and a happy holiday to you.
Sorry to disturb you on the holiday.

K: That is all right.

A: I got the reaction from our Prime Minister to our conversation yesterday on the one point that was urgent.

K: Right.

A: I am giving to you her words in reaction to the new initiative is totally and definitely negative. The Prime Minister urges you to do everything in your power to nip it in the bud.

K: Right.

A: The Prime Minister's decision is based on a whole set of government of Israel decisions and arguments some of which I refer to in our last talk and other are too well known to be repeated.

K: And can I repeat that to the President as--

A: She knows that this reaction is to you for the President.

K: Right, so this would then be her official position also if the initiative emerges.

A: If the thing emerges which we also want--

K: No, no, I understand. I understand that what you are telling me is that this initiative in your judgment should not emerge, but that if it does emerge against your judgment, you would then take the same attitude officially as you are now doing in your private communication.

A: Absolutely. I made it clear in my communication yesterday that this attitude should be consistent with the attitude that we take should this thing surface in the State Department initiative.

K: Right. Now you should know it is not exactly relevant that in official channels, our people have had to be now pressing from some Arab

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countries for in effect for 67 borders.

A: I'm sorry--you mean American

K: Americans.

A: Are pressing for 67 borders--

K: I mean our diplomatic representatives.

A: I see. I see.

K: In this general context.

A: In the context with the Department.

K: And with us

A: and with Arabs.

K: No, no, nothing is authorized with Arabs.

A: I see. You mean internally.

K: Yes.

A: I see. May I comment on two other items that appeared in the prime Minister's communication. She also points out that if you are going to reply to this gentlemen that we talked about when just the two of us on anything of substance--

K: No, no, if I reply it will be to propose another meeting without substance.

A: Fine, because if you are reply in substance he would appreciate the chance to give her remarks.

K: I don't think anything substantive is needed from me right now

A: Right, right. That was my question but I just wanted to be sure--

K: You cantell her what I would do if I do it and I won't do it until next week is to say that in light of the circumstances maybe we should meet to review the situation. And that will lead to a 4-6 week bickering,

A:

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A: I understand. That is the way I understood it.

K: No that you can tell her there will be no substantive move nor will there be anything along the lines of what you have seen yesterday and commented on.

A: I understand.

K: In that channel.

A: Yes, now I'm coming to this point. The Prime Minister said that she is not commenting now on the other items about publication because she understands that there is no urgency to it. And that

K: That's right.

A: And that probably remarks would be forthcoming sometime in the future and we will have plenty of time to discuss it.

K: That is correct, but there is no active status now.

A: That last point, Dr. Kissinger, refers to our talking on Russian Jewry. I had a talk today with Jeb Stein (sp). I convinced him that there is no need of having the meeting down there were you are

K: Ah excellent.

A: And he has agreed to it and ______ is leaving the country I think until the 17th. He would appreciate it very much if the meeting would take place some time after the 17th. If you --at your convenience

K: No, that is excellent.

A: Secondly, I told him with regard to the other meeting that he was planning for the 20th, with that guy that you talked to--

K: Yeh, I understand

A: I told him that my advice to him is that they should call him and tell him that while he agreed to meet with him in principle, it is only logical that such a meeting would take place he hears from his own government, what has happened in the summit.

K: Excellent.

DEC 25 1969

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A: And thereforesuch a meeting would take place beoore the 20th, they could keep the date, but if he would have to postpone the meeting -- but if he would not hear by that time from his own government, he would have to postpone the meeting to a later date.

HK: Good. But he will--does he know that I'm seeing that man?

A: No, no, no, no, no.
not

K: Because he should/refer to that.

A: No, no, no, no, I am no divulging any information which has--

K: Good, It is a good strategy because it will force them now to get me an answer by next Tuesday--

A: That is exactly what I had in mind.

K: And I will get in touch with you then after I have talked.

A: Fine, fine. now you recall, Dr. Kissinger that I'll be away the 12th (?) BUT my embassy will be able to reach me and the Minister will be able to reach at any point.

K: Right, as I said I don't expect==we won't be back until the morning of the 10th, and I don't think that matters will move with that much speed.

A: I hope not.

K: I don't see what could be happening, but I have no indication that we'll be getting any overtures.

A: I just wanted for you to know my movements so in case something develops I can be 2 hrs anyhow by plane, so there is no problem.

K: All right. I will keep you informed on the various matters so that you will know--

A: I appreciate it very much and I thank you for the long talk --

K: I thought it was useful.

A: Right. Bye.

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TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Dinitz

July 4, 1973 10:45 a.m.

D: There was one item that I forget. If you recall yesterday when we discussed it, I mentioned that it was said in the UN in a speech of Scali, I now found the quote -- it is from June 14, '73, in which Scali says the resolution to neither endorses nor precludes, let me repeat he says, neither endorses nor precludes, the arms which exist between Israel, Jordan, Egypt and Syria as the final, secure and recognized boundaries.

K: Right, That is essentially the same thing.

D: So I thought you should have this piece of information because some of my friends try to sell old merchandize in new packages.

K: Yeh.

D: So I think you wanted to have this information.

K: I appreciate it.

D: All right and excuse me for bothering you again.

K: Not at all, have a good trip.

D: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

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(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Ron Zieger/Kissinger

July 4, 1973

Z: Adviser Kissinger will fly to Peking in August according to sources at the Western White House which confirmed it Tuesday night.

K: That's what I was going to blow my stack about.

Z: It was not me. I mean I just wondered where that's being confirmed from.

K: Who could it have been? I thought it was you.

Z: No, sir.

K: I didn't talk to anybody yesterday from the press.

Z: Then AP just comes out on the wire and I haven't talked to AP at all. It says "The California White House announces that Henry Kissinger will go to Peking in about one month to meet with Chou En-lai."

K: Now who could they be talking to?

Z: I don't know unless they're picking it out of your briefing and my briefing which you know left some feeling that you would, and picking it out of - you know drawing those assumptions on the basis of the AFP report which is very flat, our of China.

K: Well, I have heard now that in China their Vice Foreign Minister has been putting it out.

Z: See that's what they're going on. I mean the AFP

K: Yeh, but how can they say sources at the White House. What sources exist?

Z: I don't know.

K: I have not talked to any newsman.

Z: The point - I haven't in any degree either. The other day I left it pretty loose in the briefing, you know.

K: Yeh.

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Z: Well, I think the way to handle this is just say

K: We have nothing more to say.

Z: Nothing official on it. And on a background basis, Henry

K: I think we should confirm it next week. Don't you think?

Z: Well, I think on a background basis, we can indicate that

K: But you cannot indicate that I'm talking to Sihanouk because

Z: No, absolutely not. I'm totally not.

K: Because we have made some prior conditions.

Z: Yeh. And these stories don't suggest Sihanouk I don't think, do they?

K: Well one of them I saw suggests Sihanouk.

Z: That was AFP, out of China.

K: Yeh. Well, I told Laird. Laird is the guy who did it. That's it because I told Laird.

Z: Could be.

K: It has to be Laird.

(End of this section)

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TELCONE

Amb. Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

7/5/73 9:15 a.m.

C: Oh Henry, how are you?

K: okay, how are you.

C: Not too bad. Look I'm calling to say to you that I have heard
from Burt Trend

K: Oh good.

C: And it is rather difficult for him to get over next week.

K: It is?

C: But I'm going back to London on Wednesday night myself
--is there a chance that I could visit you here in Washington before
I go back, to tell him about whatever it is that you have.

K: Yeh. Certainly.

C: Your coming back--

K: Does it mean that it is difficult for him to come either next week or
the week after?

C: Well, I didn't put to him the week after, but the thing is I'll be
seeing him on Thursday, so that if you have anything that would be
useful for me to tell him

K: Well we would like some clear understanding of what you propose to
do about the Year of Europe,

C: Yes sure. They aren't quite ready on that because they have to do
so work on it. They are working on the paper that you gave me,
but they wouldn't be ready by next week to discuss it substantively.

K: Right, well my concern is that if we cannot--if the French insist
on bilateral talks then the result is they only ones who talk bilaterally
are the French and the others shy away for whatever reasons.

C: Oh, no, we are not shying away--it is just the question of time

K: Because we then just drop the whole project--

C: No, no, there is no question about it at all, it is merely that they
don't think that between now and next week they will have been able

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
D. H. NARAYanan 6/2/94

Page 2

to give it sufficient depth of thought. But it is no question of shying
away from it in the slightest.

HK: Hm huh. All right, well certainly I can see you next week, but if I could get some indication of what you intend to do which is more important to me

C: What other paper-- (or want it on paper)

K: Well in general--

C: In general, okay.

K: I mean we are well into July--

C: Are you planning to go to Europe

K: Well I was playing with the idea--but I wanted to have an initial round first.

C: I see, fine. Let us talk about it more when you get back here. There is one other thing--on the more sensitive subject we discussed--

K: --because the other thing is of course if Burke wants to come the following week that is fine too.

C: Let me put that to him. I think it would be easier to put it to him when you and I have had a word together.

K: Fine.

on the sensitive thing--

C: One other thing--we would very much like to send a technician out early next week and wondered whether he might be able to meet with Duckett (sp?) or General Giller.

K: Ah Are those the people you have been dealing with before?

C: Yes, they are, but if it is okay by you, I'll get Charles Powell to get in touch with Scowcroft on the logistics

K: All right.

C: I think it--apparently there is one technical point which has come up which is too technical for me to deal with

K: All right certainly.

Page 3

C: Wehn you get back to Washington, Henry?

K: I'm getting back Monday evening.

C: If we could have a meeting say Tuesday--

K: Certainly

C: And we'll try that out.
But don't worry that there is any back peddling on this --there is
no intention of that at all.

K: Well what I would like is some concrete schedule of what we have in mind--

C: Okay, we'll see what we can do.

K: Because we have a decision to make if this thing is going to turn into
endless second rate talks--

C: Oh I don't think it need do that.

K: Then we will drop it, but then the Europeans have to be prepared to
face the domestic consequences

C: There is no intention of that on our part--it has been dealt with very
seriously at the top level.

K: So by the end July we cannot project where we are going to be in
October, the whole Presidential trip ought to be considered.

C: I think there is every intention of getting done well before July

K: Okay, good.

C: I--so you shouldn't worry about that.

K: Good then let's talk about it Tuesday.

DECE. ASG.EDG
Authority E012958
Dated NABADGE 9/29/89

TELCONE

Edward Teller/Mr. Kissinger

7/5/73 10:00 a.m.

HK: Hello Edward I'm sorry I couldn't return your call earlier.

ET: Fine, and one of your people, I forget his name did return it--you know the main thing I want to talk to you about and your people in Washington are aware of it, I'm here for you Boulder (?) and one of the people who is lecturing as I am is Charles Malek (?)--

HK: Oh yes, and he wants to come to see the President.

ET: And I told him that he should see you as well and have a good talk with you if you possibly could do it.

HK: Right, when is he coming--is it today?

ET: He will be in Washington all of next week.

HK: Good.

ET: And I don't see why I shouldn't tell you--he didn't make a secret of it what is on his mind and I think earlier I did not to transmit it the secretary--he says and perhaps it makes no sense that I tell you ahead of time, that the main question is not between Israel and Egypt but between Israel and Syria.

HK: Yeh.

ET: And the present situation in Lebanon is critical, that they need support and need it rather urgently and he is planning is in the sense of bringing Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria together, the last point of course is essential and impossible.

HK: Yeh.

ETC: Which is not unusual in politics. And I think that is as far as I can easily transmit in a few words, but if you know the trend of his thought before he starts, it might be of some slight help to you.

HK: Good. And I will be in--I will be seeing him. --you let me know when you come east. I haven't seen you in too long.

TELCONE (San Clemente)
Amb. Von Staden/Kissinger
4:06 p.m. - 7/6/73

K: Hello.

VS: Good evening, Dr. Kissinger. Von Staden.

K: How are you?

VS: Thank you, I'm fine. Excuse me please for calling you but I just got the message which I can't ... for tomorrow and so I wanted to give you the essence over the telephone. It is an answer and it says that your proposals are accepted as to the date and the place. Does that say anything to you?

K: From whom?

VS: From the Head of Government of the

K: I beg your pardon.

VS: Well there has been a proposal it seems to be for a meeting with you.

K: With whom? With me.

VS: Yeh and this has been accepted.

K: But who is coming? Scheel?

VS: Yeh.

K: Right.

VS: The 11th in the evening.

K: Good, so I'll meet with him on the 12th.

VS: Yeh.

K: Good. Excellent.

VS: That's all.

K: I'm delighted.

VS: Well, I'm happy for you then. So maybe the letter itself will be transmitted tomorrow to the White House.

K: Fine. Now I understand. Thank you. VS: Have a good time. Bye.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Amb. Khan/Kissinger

4:12 p.m. - 7/6/73

K: Hello.

AK: Hello, my friend, how are you, Doctor?

K: Fine, how are you?

AK: Very well. Just a few minutes ago I got through to General Scowcroft and I don't know if he's spoken to you.

K: No, not yet.

AK: This little problem since I spoke to you last time and there is the question of President Bhutto offering return hospitality to President Nixon. I had explained the position to my government and they were gently sort of accepting it, but I got some news today from the Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Zahedi, which has worried me considerably so far as my President's visit is concerned, Dr. Kissinger. I understand that President Nixon has been pleased to accept a dinner invitation from the Shah of Iran during his stay in Washington.

K: Well, our problem here was that the President had personally agreed to that when he was in Tehran and that he therefore, felt that he had to go through with it.

AK: But you see now my President's position is being made very embarrassing. Because the Shah's visit takes place two days after President Bhutto has left. We are in the same region, our relations are very friendly.

K: Yes, but indeed one reason we are paying such special attention to him is precisely for reasons concerning you.

AK: My friend I would appeal to you - you see this would be really misunderstood in Pakistan, comparisons would be made and it would be said that the President of Pakistan was not honored by the President's presence at his dinner whereas the Shah was. Very few people will know the background but President Bhutto has got his own political opposition in the country and all manner of meaning will be drawn from it. And I would appeal to you as a friend because it also puts me in a very embarrassing position as the Ambassador of Pakistan here. It will be only seen that whereas Mr. Zahedi was able to persuade that this maybe accepted, I failed in that. But more than my position which can go to hell really, is the President's position and I would really appeal to you not to expose him to this embarrassment.

K: Let me see what I can do. I'll have to call you back.

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:36 p.m. - 7/6/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Hello, Anatol, where are you?

D: I am just leaving for Pioneer Point. Now I am in the Embassy.

K: You're in the Embassy. I see.

D: Yeh, well I'm watching you, of course.

K: Watching me?

D: Of course. How you behave!

K: What did I do?

D: Nothing for the time being, that's why I'm going for vacation on a Pioneer Point.

K: Anatol, I just wanted to mention to you about the meeting with the Chinese Ambassador. It was essentially what we had - what I had told you it would be, an expression of unhappiness about various things. I'll discuss it with you on Monday - on Tuesday. And there will be no startling announcements of any kind.

D: When you are going?

K: Oh, sometime in August, but that was always foreseen.

D: No, no, has a date been set yet?

K: It isn't definitely fixed yet, but in the first half of August.

D: I understand.

K: But again there is nothing very precise on the agenda for that.

D: I understand. So you will be on Monday here?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: WW1 A12 Dated: 06/07/73

2

K: Well, I am coming back Monday night. So we have lunch on Tuesday.

D: Yes. I will wait until I see you. There is nothing I have to tell now to - there will be no announcements made during the weekend.

K: No, no. I just wanted to tell - you can tell Moscow that it was really very routine.

D: I understand. Was there any specific message?

K: Yeh, which I'll discuss with you when I see you. But it was more in the form of a complaint than in the form of anything very constructive.

D: It was constructive?

K: No, more in the form of a complaint than in the form of something very constructive.

D: I understand.

K: He may be going home for a few weeks and this is one reason there was some urgency to see us, but that last fact you should keep secret.

D: I understand. OK, Henry. I am waiting to see you when you will be here on Tuesday and I hope you will stay during July here.

K: Oh yes. No, I won't leave before the end of July.

D: All right. Thank you very much for calling.

K: Right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012658
By: WW. APAR. 50401

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:36 p.m. - 7/6/73

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Watching me?

D: Of course. How you behave!

K: What did I do?

D: When you are going?

D: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01298
Dated MAR 16 1973

2

D: It was constructive?

D: I understand.

K: Right. Bye.

DECEMBER
Authority E012958
DATE NARA DRE 6/2/04
D: A

TELCONE (San Clemente)
Secretary Schlesinger/Kissinger

10:30 a.m. - 7/7/73

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Jim, I just read in the LA Times that we have cancelled SCAD or
that we have reduced it or something.

S: Well, we might be reducing. What we are doing is combining it
with another cruise missile program, but I told Clements to protect
your position in the SALT program.

K: I think the Air Force is opposed to any long-range missile because
of the B-1.

S: They have been in the past.

K: They are now. We are talking about $7 million out of a $7 billion
Defense budget and I just don't understand. We told Clements not
to do it.

S: Let me get a briefing arranged that can be given to Scowcroft if you
don't want to get it.

K: Incidentally I thought your press conference was superb.

S: Yes, some of my friends are beginning to thing of me as a blood thirsty
hawk.

K: There is nothing left for any of us except to do the right thing.

S: We got to get straightened out the central problem of the White House
and get it out in front then right away.

K: You mean Laird?

S: No, I mean the President's got to get out in front again.

K: I couldn't agree more. On substance, not on Watergate.

S: Let us look at the program and see the way we want to talk about it
and get the public tack on it because I think that's what you're interested
in.

DECE ASSIGNED
Authority ED 12958
DATE 6/2/73
ATT

K: I am concerned about the public tack but I am in general concerned about what you discussed on Monday. If you are shrinking budgets you are not . . . . . . strategically.

S: We have a cruise missile program and it is a cruise missile program that should continue to scare the pants off the Soviets. The only point is someone is using the label scared and saying it doesn't have any effect anymore.

K: If you can do that you meet my major point.

S: Yes, I will get someone to pull it (the article) out of the Times and get it reversed and say that we have a program headed towards a capability . . . . .

K: I think, incidentally Jim, you and I ought to have breakfast or lunch soon. What do you think?

S: I think it's a good idea. Now Brent has probably told you we are pulling a squadron of B-52s out of Guam starting the week of the 13th and putting together a withdrawal program which would stretch out over a period of time more or less packaged the way you changed it.

K: Let me tell you my concern, Jim. I am going to Peking. The only thing I have got left is an implausible ______ that we might go to the Congress and ask for something. What effect could it have if we dismantle our capabilities while we are threatening that. I wonder if you could hold off until August 15.

S: The rest of the 52s?

K: They don't understand that do they?

S: I think they do and in any event we can handle that problem. What I would like to do is

K: What is a squadron?

S: 15

K: All right. Then can you not pull any more until August 15.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Ref. 6/2/69

TelCon

Mr. Kissinger/Roland Evans

5:25 pm, July 9, 1973

K: Hello

E: Let me buy you a decent breakfast tomorrow.

K: Oh, God, I notice I--

E: None of those White House mess--

K: I can't do it.

E: Why not?

K: But I notice they put somebody on here.

E: Why, so you have a date; I just cancelled out on Mel Laird.

K: Oh, you liar.

E: No kidding.

K: You're the only guy who's---Laird is the only guy who has a column that is a press agent.

E: Can't you do it, really.

K: Where are you now?

E: I'm in my office.

K: Can I call you within the next half hour.

E: Yeah, absolutely. I've got to leave here at about 6:30 because it's Kathy's birthday and we are going to go on the town.

K: I'll call you within the next hour.

E: And, how are you doing?

K: I'm doing fine.

E: When did you get in?

K: About 10 minutes ago.

E: Well are you going to try to fix it up for tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958
Dated NARA Dated 6/2/73

TelCon
Roland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

6:32 pm, July 9, 1973

K: Hello.

E: Hi Henry.

K: I'm afraid I cannot have breakfast with you tomorrow.

E: Okay, can we make it Tuesday, or Wednesday.

K: I'll have to check on that, I've been--

E: How about a drink after work or something.

K: Can I call you about that?

E: Oh, sure.

K: Okay, I'll call you tomorrow morning.

E: That'd be great. Henry, did you read Hugh Sidey this morning?

K: Yes.

E: Did you. What do you think.

K: Two people should resign.

E: They won't and it's gonna linger.

K: If he resigns, we are not going to have a foreign policy for three and a half years. If Agnew gets defeated--no if Agnew wins in '76 we won't have a foreign policy for 3-1/2 years, if he gets defeated we won't have one for five years. We can't afford that. If they don't want him to resign--

E: I would have put it differently, I would say if he won in '76 we wouldn't have a foreign policy for 7 years because I don't think he's competent to conduct a foreign policy.

K: I believe that too. But I have seen two competent presidents for foreign policy when they took over.

E: Kennedy and Nixon.

K: Kennedy and Nixon. And it takes 20 to 24 months before you are on top of it no matter how good you are.

CLASSIFIED

DEPT. E01288

Dated: July 9, 1973

2

E: You see the trouble is you guys in the White House are beling logical. I mean the way they are handling this Ziegler thing, Henry, is handling it logically and it's just criminal what Ziegler's doing to the White House.

K: What's Ziegler doing.

E: Well, he ought to be out of there. Did you read Hugh Sidey today.

K: Yeah.

E: Well, that's what I'm saying. That's just rediculous.

K: I'm not blaming anybody, Rollie, I'm just really--I have never been in a situation where I was -- you know, we've been in tough situations but at no crisis in the last 15 years did I think the country was in danger. But I genuinely now believe that we could suffer irreparable ddamage.

E: I agree. And I think he's on this--worried about the extent to which he's apparently -- on this China/Soviet business.

K: Oh, no, no.

E: You don't think so.

K: No, but that is nonsense.

E: This is the big club he has politically, it's the only club he's got. He's got something going with the Chinese and the Russians, and it puts him in a position of enormous power.

K: Look, you name one thing that we have done. I can assure that there is nothing that has been done that hasn't been planned for over a year long before we ever heard of Watergate as a national issue. What is happening is that by making it an issue now, and by making it tough to do anything else, when the Russain saying we could have bombed Eichnam at the end of April would have been a brilliant move.

E: Yes. Well--

K: I'm mean everything is being thrown out of kilter. That will not happen as long as I am here, there is no move being planned with the Russians or the Chinese. But on the other hand, we've got to get a bipartisan foreign policy. Every time one makes a move in foreign policy, the Democrats thinks we are selling out the country in order to save the President, it's a disaster.

DECEMBER 9, 1968
Authority E012958
Dated NARADY 6/2/68

3

E: And they are gonna think that. Nothing can change it. There's no way you can get the Democrats out of that orbit because that's the logic of events.

K: And it has lead to the insane situation that by doing the things the Democrats are screaming for, for years, we are being accused of doing it for political reasons.

E: Oh, it's politics. You just have to expect it.

K: Rollie, I know all of this.

E: You had all that going the right way until this happened and then suddenly it becomes very critical.

K: I know it.

E: Well, look, let's hope that maybe you can make breakfast with me on Wednesday or Thursday or Friday, and if not, maybe we can work something else out.

K: Well, we'll definitely meet.

E: I'll call your secretary--

K: We'll definitely meet this week.

E: Yeah, I'll call you in the morning.

K: Right. Give my best to your wife.

E: Listen, that was damn nice of you. She was tickled.

K: I like her.

E: Okay, I'll call you in the morning.

DELEGATED
Authority E012858
Dated NARA Doc. 6/2/04

TELCONE

Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

6:55 p. m., July 9, 1973

K: Hello

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Ken, I just saw a news ticker in which the State Department made two statements today on Cambodia relating or at least an implication to the President's conversation with Quong Chen including one, "the US Government believes that the restoration of Peters is a question to be resolved through negotiation among the parties themselves". These are the times when we are trying to get negotiations started.

R: Henry, this was a news release sent over from your people for us to release.

K: It was sent over by our people?

R: By your people to be released at 11:00 -- or 12:00 o'clock by us, yes.

K: Okay.

R: The text came from your people.

K: Okay. Well, if blood reaches Foggy Bottom, it's my people.

R: At least I had . . . . . .

[change in tapes]

K: Boy, Stearman. My apologies.

R: Not at all, Henry.

K: We don't -- You know, whoever said the White House was in control of its personnel.

R: [Laughter] Not like the State Department.

K: Oh, Jesus. Okay, my apologies.

R: Henry, we would not have -- At least I was not familiar with anything that we said.

K: That's why I was so amazed.

DECE 17 1973

Authority ED 12958

Dated NARA Dkt 6/2/73