56 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

invoked to interfere with our rights in this respect." Presumably, this
statement meant the allies would rely on an airlift if the Soviets
blocked ground access.

On February 16, the Western powers replied to the Soviet note of
January 10. On the basis of an unqualified right to remain in Berlin,
they proposed a four-power foreign ministers' conference to discuss
the entire German problem "in all its aspects and implications."⁷⁶
Unexpectedly, they offered the Soviets a concession: "German ad-
visors should be invited to the conference and should be consulted."
This gesture acknowledged Moscow's case that the Germans them-
selves should be responsible for achieving unity between them-with-
out granting the full Soviet position that two Germanies existed and
should be diplomatically recognized.

6. *Macmillan's Initiative and the End of the "Deadline Crisis"*

In the late winter of 1959, Britain acted as chief spokesman of the Western powers. A few days before the note of February 16 appeared, Secretary Dulles was hospitalized with the illness which led to his death later in May. Until April, when Under Secretary Christian Herter succeeded Dulles, the leadership of the alliance passed to Macmillan. Like Dulles, he believed the "deadline crisis" to be a political one not requiring unusual military preparations.⁷⁷ He hoped, like Dulles, that Moscow's interest in avoiding war could be used to formulate a new, written Berlin *modus vivendi*.

Macmillan's initiative—his visits to Moscow, Paris, Bonn, and Washington in the winter of 1959—should be examined in the context of the arms limitations schemes given wide currency in Britain after 1955. At least four plans had gained popularity in London. The Eden plan, presented by Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden at the 1955 Geneva summit conference, included a proposal for demilitarizing an area of Central Europe, provided this limitation of forces included a system of inspection. The Rapacki plan, drawn up by Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957, featured a nuclear-free zone to embrace the Federal Republic, the DDR, Poland, and

76. *Ibid.*, p. 414; they left the date of the conference open to placate the French.

77. On November 21, Macmillan stated: "I have the very strong impression this is a diplomatic rather than a real move by the Russians." *The New York Times*, November 22, 1958, p. 1.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 57

Czechoslovakia. In 1958, Rapacki amended his plan to include a
reduction of conventional forces in the zone.

In 1957, Hugh Gaitskell, Chairman of the British Labour Party—
and his colleague, Denis Healey—offered an even broader set of pro-
posals. These encompassed the unification of Germany, the with-
drawal of foreign forces, and the inspection of local force levels not
only in Central Europe, but in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria as
well. The same year, George Kennan, in British Broadcasting Cor-
poration home lectures, proposed withdrawing American and Soviet
troops to their own soil, unifying and demilitarizing Germany—all in
the context of a European security system guaranteed by the great
powers. The authors of these several plans intended to make German
unity palatable to the Soviet Union and, therefore, end the division
of Europe.⁷⁸

Khrushchev endorsed Eden's plan for a demilitarized area and
Rapacki's for a ban on nuclear weapons in a zone principally featur-
ing the territories of Bonn and the DDR. Khrushchev's notion of
arms limitations tended to discriminate against Bonn, as evidenced in
the Soviet draft treaty proposal.

Dulles, with Acheson's support, opposed each of the arms proposals, especially Kennan's. They believed that unless changes in the status quo were carefully phased and circumscribed a worse situation than currently existed could be produced. They argued, for example, that a withdrawal of American and Soviet troops each to their own soil would give the Red Army an advantage of proximity to Central Europe while United States forces remained at a greater relative distance. Leaving Bonn to fend for itself without even the authority to raise an army would make the Federal Republic an open target for the Soviet Union. Kennan acknowledged this argument when he later amended his plan to allow for twelve German divisions, once the Western powers withdrew.

Dulles and Acheson were not altogether opposed to controlled arms
limitations in Europe. They insisted, however, that the Eastern side
had to reciprocate Western reductions and that some agency be
allowed to inspect the Eastern side to verify reciprocation. They
agreed with Kennan that German unity would be highly desirable.
They looked to the Soviet Union to indicate a reciprocal desire.

78. See Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310. For a comprehensive analysis of the disengagement debate, see his chapter 10.

58 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

Otherwise, they perceived no alternative to "the basic thesis of Adenauer," as Dulles described it, that the most practical solution for preventing a resurgence of German nationalism was "to tie Germany in"—to integrate the Federal Republic into Western Europe through the developing institutions of NATO, the Western European Union, the European Economic Community, the European Atomic Energy Agency, and others. One weakness, of course, in Dulles' and Acheson's argument was Berlin's exposure in the Eastern camp, a point Dulles felt acutely during the "deadline crisis."

The disengagement debate swirled about Macmillan in his tour of capitals because he drew upon the plans so controversial at the time in his approach to the Berlin crisis. Much of the heat in his arguments with Adenauer, de Gaulle, and Eisenhower over Berlin can be traced to his interest in arms limitations, particularly his interest in the Eden plan or revised versions of it.

On his departure for Moscow, Macmillan sounded a theme of arms limitations: "All the same, in these atomic days, each side has a tremendous interest in peace. I would call it almost a vested interest, and we therefore must in that spirit somehow find agreement."⁷⁹ Arriving in Moscow, he engrossed himself in discussions with Khrushchev, listening to a great extent, asserting himself where he considered the Soviets mistaken about Western policies toward Germany. The Berlin discussions did not prove productive; the trade discussions did. The first round proved inconclusive.

On the fourth day of Macmillan's visit, Khrushchev interrupted the bilateral discussions to deliver a re-election speech. Starting from Macmillan's premise that war had to be avoided, he drew quite different conclusions. If war were absurd, then, he insisted, the DDR could not be overturned through outmoded Western schemes of German unification.⁸⁰ He continued to propose a summit meeting instead of the foreign ministers' conference proposed by the Western powers. Khrushchev spoke disparagingly about Bonn's influence in the Western alliance and about the Geneva nuclear test ban negotiations, both subjects in his presumably confidential discussions with Macmillan. And Khrushchev addressed Macmillan from his election platform, offering him "a treaty of friendship and non-aggression" for a twenty- or fifty-year period. He did not mention this offer during the private discussions.

79. *The Times* (London), February 23, 1959, p. 6.

80. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 59

Khrushchev's thunderbolts "stunned" Macmillan, who felt insulted and contemplated returning immediately to London.⁸¹ He decided instead to press Khrushchev to clarify his charges. Publicly, the British delegation put as good a light on Khrushchev's speech as possible. In the second round with Khrushchev in private, Macmillan warned him that unless the Soviets consented to negotiations—as proposed in the note of February 16—the Western powers would feel compelled to move quickly toward preparing extraordinary measures to defend West Berlin.⁸² At this point in the visit, Macmillan's initiative had completely failed.

On February 28, before a third round, the Soviets turned amiable again. Mikoyan joined the British delegation on tour in Leningrad, inviting Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd to a meeting with Gromyko. The next day Mikoyan identified the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence with the "wise" old British phrase: "Live and let live."⁸³ With more confidence that he was being heard, Macmillan replied: "I have been struck by the universal approval with which I have met during the short tour of your country when I have said that we both have a common interest in peace."

Although the stage was set for the third round, the Soviets decided to relay a diplomatic note in reply to the Western note of February 16. Their note deflated the third round as effectively as Khrushchev's speech soured the second. In their note of March 2, the Soviets finally agreed to a foreign ministers' conference—on the terms they had originally proposed in their note of November 27—to consider their free city proposal and a peace treaty. In consenting to talk, they removed the six-month deadline of May 27, proposing an April conference lasting not more than "two or three months."⁸⁴ They urged, however, that a foreign ministers' conference should prepare the way for a summit conference with a broad agenda. This note terminated the so-called "deadline crisis." Khrushchev did not achieve negotiations at the level he preferred, but he did succeed in achieving negotiations on the future of Berlin.

Khrushchev let Macmillan examine the note before he sent it. He did not discuss it with him. A British counterproposal to the Soviet suggestion for a nonaggression pact proved to be the only tangible

81. *The New York Times*, February 25, 1959, p. 1; March 25, 1959, p. 1.

82. *The Times* (London), February 28, 1959, p. 6.

83. *The New York Times*, March 2, 1959, p. 1.

84. Embree, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

60 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

product of the third round, although other arms limitations measures were discussed. The conversation must have been awkward, since the Soviets had again pre-empted the diplomatic exchange through their latest note. Twice during the British visit, they spoke to the world at large, first rejecting a foreign ministers' conference, then accepting one. Both statements tended to ignore the bilateral Anglo-Soviet discussion in progress. Macmillan was twice insulted for his efforts.⁸⁵ The Tories glossed over the insults later with election slogans that Macmillan had resolved the "deadline crisis."

The Anglo-Soviet communiqué at the conclusion of Macmillan's visit asserted the dubious claim that "the free interchange of views and ideas which has taken place has created a better understanding of the respective attitudes of the two governments and has thereby made a useful contribution to the forthcoming international discussions in a wider circle."⁸⁶ The passage arousing most interest abroad, inserted by the British, referred to the usefulness of further study of "the possibilities of increasing security by some method of limitation of forces and weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in an agreed area of Europe, coupled with an appropriate system of inspection."

Khrushchev's chicanery during the visit discouraged any conclusion that Macmillan broke the deadlock over the level-summit or foreign ministers'-that negotiations would initially assume. However, the visit certainly indicated to Khrushchev that sentiment existed in the Atlantic alliance for early negotiations and for exploring alternatives to the status quo in Central Europe and probably in Berlin as well. The most that can be said about Macmillan's visit, ironically, is that it probably further encouraged Khrushchev's expectations previously aroused by Dulles' flexibility.

Macmillan returned to London with a peace platform on which to electioneer. But across the Channel, he faced angry neighbors.⁸⁷ He upset de Gaulle and Adenauer with the communiqué reference to "some method of limitation of forces and weapons . . . in an agreed

85. Emrys Hughes wrote an amusing and critical account of Macmillan's journey to Moscow from an accompanying Labour M.P.'s perspective, *Pilgrims' Progress in Russia* (London: Housman's Publishers, 1959).

86. *The New York Times*, March 4, 1959, p. 3.

87. Adenauer and de Gaulle commiserated in Paris, March 4, about Macmillan's initiative. It rankled Adenauer for months to come that Macmillan had even gone to Moscow at this juncture. *Ibid*., March 5, 1959, p. 1.

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 61

area of Europe. . ." They understood from what Dulles had said earlier that incentives would be offered the Soviets only in exchange for steps toward the 1955 free elections formula. The communiqué did not state that any progress had been made on the German problem to justify the statement on security measures. They suspected Macmillan had found the Soviets adamantly against German unity and had turned to arms limitations as a substitute for progress on the essentials.⁸⁸ Adenauer believed that Macmillan had made concessions without counterconcessions.

Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd went to Paris and Bonn in March to mend fences. They clarified the security measures they had in mind. No disengagement, they said, but a "thinning out" of troops and nuclear weapons more accurately described their thinking.⁸⁹ Specifically Macmillan proposed a "controlled limitation of forces" within a Central European zone.⁹⁰ The British intended to improve the status quo, reducing the tension associated with the armed division of Europe. To Adenauer, the improvement Macmillan suggested appeared too one-sided. Bonn did not want changes in the military side of the status quo until a settlement of the political side-involving the division of Germany, the future of Berlin, and other issues-seemed possible. Macmillan, in practice, did not support Bonn's Eastern interests. Not very sincerely, Macmillan suggested

88. *The Times* (London), March 5, 1959, p. 8; *The New York Times*, March 6, 1959, p. 3; one should keep in mind the general distrust that Adenauer and de Gaulle had for the British in this period because of Britain's opposition to and attempted obstruction of the formation of the Common Market. Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblenz, *Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power* (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), p. 59; more generally consult Dorothy Pickles, *The Uneasy Entente: French Foreign Policy and Franco-British Misunderstandings* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); D. C. Watt, *Britain Looks to Germany* (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965).

89. *The New York Times*, March 11, 1959, p. 3.

90. *Ibid*., March 13, 1959, p. 1. Macmillan did not always explain whether he proposed a "freeze" on forces in Central Europe or a "thinning out," a different but, related possibility. At the 1955 Geneva foreign ministers' conference following the summit of that year, he put forward on Prime Minister Eden's behalf a proposal similar to his own in 1959. *Documents*, pp. 194-195. Macmillan discussed plans both for a "freeze" and a "thinning out," the "freeze" to precede the "thinning out" in a process of reducing tension. Since progress really lay with the latter, he placed his emphasis there. Eugene Hinterhoff, *Disengagement* (London: Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1959), p. 263; cf. pp. 180, 260-264, 275-276.

62 THE "DEADLINE CRISIS"

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY 69

that his proposal would advance the cause of German unity. Adenauer, equally insincere, refused to accept a reciprocal reduction of forces unless accompanied by a general disarmament agreement.⁹¹

De Gaulle backed Adenauer, insisting on a linkage between German free elections and arms limitations.⁹² France, like Britain, did not have any enthusiasm for Bonn's Eastern interests. De Gaulle and Adenauer apparently reached an understanding—how explicit one can only speculate—that if Adenauer supported de Gaulle on Common Market policies, de Gaulle would support Adenauer on Berlin and other Eastern issues.⁹³

Macmillan expected greater support from Eisenhower than he got from either Adenauer or de Gaulle, or for that matter, from Khrushchev. To make headway with Eisenhower, Macmillan had to persuade the President that the 1955 German free elections formula could be advanced through arms limitations. He argued that the reduction of tension in Central Europe through arms limitations would create an opportunity for Bonn to take the initiative itself and work to overcome the division of Germany. Eisenhower, still leaning on the 1955 formula, said he would consider only an inspected arms "freeze" and, then, only if it would not change the local balance of power in Central Europe, discriminate against Bonn, or damage NATO's military posture.⁹⁴

Macmillan also argued for a summit conference. Eisenhower, after spurning Bulganin's offer for over a year, now shared this interest. He changed his mind because Khrushchev consented, in the Soviet note of March 2, to a prior foreign ministers' conference.⁹⁵ Eisenhower insisted, as Dulles did, that the prior conference would have to be a productive one, although he did not specify how productive. Adenauer and de Gaulle were beginning to change their minds about a summit meeting because of the wider agenda suggested in the Soviet note.

Macmillan also impressed the President with the following argu-

ment: consent now, in March, to a summit rather than in some greater crisis where Khrushchev could confine the choice to either a military confrontation or concessions—both undesirable options. Proceeding from Dulles' flexibility to the point of developing proposals for a negotiated settlement of Berlin and related issues, Macmillan pressed his allies to move toward a summit to avoid a worse crisis than they had already experienced since November.

### 7. The "Inflexibles"

While Macmillan led the way to the summit, President de Gaulle, as a prospective conferee, objected to the British agenda. Specifically, he categorically opposed Macmillan's arms measures for arms limitations. In the first of his semiannual Elysée monologues with the press on March 25, he intimated that if the Soviets worried about their own security, they might follow France's example and put away "the memory of trials suffered" at German hands.⁹⁶ He remained unconvinced that Moscow had no alternative to its current German policy. "We shall thus support nothing which would be such as to lead the German people to despair or to compromise its peaceful future. ..." In French foreign policy, the DDR—"this arbitrary construction"—would in no case be treated as an equal of Bonn.

He sketched the solution to the German problem that he believed all parties should accept. It had to allow for an "entirely free" Germany. It had to have two provisions: (1) the present frontiers should remain and (2) the Germans should "move toward integrating themselves one day in a contractual organization of all Europe for cooperation, liberty, and peace." "A contractual organization of all Europe" would include the Soviet Union or, at least, European Russia. How precisely an all-European organization would be constructed could only be glimpsed in the kind of structures being developed for Western European cooperation. In other words, German unity should be part of a general European settlement. Admittedly, this solution did not seem possible at the moment, and no other was acceptable. "Awaiting the time when this ideal can be achieved," he recommended that the Germans "multiply between themselves links and relationships in all practical fields." But de Gaulle went on, rather unexpectedly, to endorse the Oder-Neisse

96. For his complete text, see *ibid*., March 26, 1959, p. 8.

91. *The New York Times*, March 14, 1959, p. 1.

92. *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 11, 1959, p. 2.

93. Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "France under de Gaulle," *Headline Series*, January-February, 1960, p. 49; see also Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle*, trans. Lois Ames Pattison (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 66-67.

94. *The New York Times*, March 23, 1959, p. 1.

95. *Ibid*., March 18, 1959, p. 1.

64 THE 'DEADLINE CRISIS'

DULLES' FLEXIBILITY

line as a frontier between Poland and Germany and to urge Germans on both sides of the dividing line to cooperate where they could. Clearly, he had limits to his support for Bonn's Eastern policy.⁹⁷

De Gaulle opposed Dulles' and Macmillan's flexibility. His opposition did not mean that he opposed all negotiations or that he opposed the agenda they suggested. He regretted their tactics and their timing. He preferred not to offer to negotiate at a time when the Soviet Union tried to intimidate the Western powers in a Berlin crisis.⁹⁸ He felt vindicated in his views when he observed Khru-shchev's rude treatment of Macmillan in Moscow. He finally agreed to negotiate only when the Soviet Union relinquished its six-month deadline in the note of March 2.

Although Bonn did not have a legal role in the Berlin occupation regime, the Adenauer cabinet worried terribly about the outcome of the "deadline crisis." Contrary to some British and American opinion at the time, Bonn seriously wanted to retain an option for Germany with Berlin as the capital of a restored state because the legitimacy of the Federal Republic as the representative of all Germans was at stake. Adenauer perceived dangers for the Federal Republic in changing the status quo that his allies scarcely considered. They were much less sensitive than he to the risks incurred in any negotiations on the status of Berlin. He did not consider the Soviet draft peace treaty a mere expression of Soviet fears for their security. He saw it as very radical surgery for his own country's political life and limb. Indeed, if West Germany became part of a nuclear-free zone, its sovereignty, legitimacy, and entire foreign policy would be affected, not just its military policy.

The fate of the regime in Bonn is closely tied to the fate of West Berlin. Through a system of special subsidies, Bonn remained largely responsible for the standard of living in West Berlin. The Federal Government obligated itself to maintain a sufficient level of Deutschmarks for circulation in West Berlin, to promote markets abroad for West Berlin products, to include West Berlin in the

97. Bonn had unsettled territorial claims against Poland. Thus, Bonn was upset and Moscow pleased that de Gaulle endorsed the Oder-Neisse frontier. Some West German officials have since suggested that he later retracted this endorsement in an address to a joint session of the United States Congress in 1960, but this conclusion is not apparent from a reading of the address. See *The New York Times*, April 26, 1960, p. 18.

98. *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1959, p. 9.

Federal social insurance programs, to extend credits to Berlin industry, and to allow tax concessions for Berliners. These measures stimulate purchasing power in the city, more purchasing power than the city could command simply on the basis of goods sold.⁹⁹

The Federal Government and the West Berlin Senate by practice and by law treat West Berlin as a land or state within the Federal Republic. The United States, Britain, and France, as occupying powers, continue as the ultimate legal authority in West Berlin. They acknowledge and support the economic, political, and legal connections of the city to West Germany, defining the viability of the city as a vital interest of their own.¹⁰⁰

The Soviets' free city proposal would have severed the network of connections between West Germany and West Berlin. Not surprisingly, Bonn directed efforts in the "deadline crisis" to deflecting prospective negotiations away from Berlin, toward general disarmament and other unlikely projects. As soon as he received the Soviet note of November 27, Adenauer proposed to his allies—in a rather obvious diversionary tactic—that the note should be exploited to convene a four-power conference on Germany.¹⁰¹

Adenauer's critics—Lippmann and others—argued that the international trade agreements between Bonn and Pankow contradicted his rigid opposition to a peace treaty and to diplomatic relations with Pankow.¹⁰² On November 22, 1958, for example, Bonn reached a supplemental trade agreement with Pankow on the exchange of Ruhr coal for East German brown coal and wheat.¹⁰³ Many similar agreements operated between Bonn and Pankow relating to transportation, health, and postal services.¹⁰⁴

99. Franz Kluge, "The Economic Viability of Berlin," *Berlin-Pivot of German Destiny*, trans. and ed. Charles B. Robson (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1960), pp. 146-148; see also Bruce L. R. Smith, "The Governance of Berlin, *International Conciliation*, Number 525, November 1959.

100. For a discussion of the legal aspects of the Berlin question, see Roland J. Stanger (ed.), *West Berlin: The Legal Context* (Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1966).

101. *The New York Times*, December 3, 1958, p. 3.

102. Lippmann in *The Herald Tribune*, January 8, 1959, p. 16.

103. *The Times* (London), November 23, 1958, p. 6.

104. The trade agreements were negotiated by the Agency for Interzonal Trade in Berlin, representing Bonn, and the East German Ministry for Internal German and Foreign Trade. Federal railway officials met with East German Reichsan officials on a regular basis. Postal, inland waterways, and health authorities met irregularly. *Ibid*., November 20, 1958, p. 10.