[Y]

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The cohesion of the industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan has been for thirty years the bulwark of peace and the engine of global prosperity.

This unity has been the keystone of our foreign policy in every Administration from President Truman to President Carter. The first permanent peacetime security alliance in American history was with the democratic nations of the Atlantic Community; it was soon followed by our commitment to the security of Japan. Since then, the agenda of cooperation among the industrial democracies has spread from collective defense to common action on energy policy, economic recovery, the international economic system, relations with the Communist countries, and with the Third World. This cohesion rests not simply on material considerations of wealth and power but on a common moral foundation as well -- on the shared conviction that the consent of the governed is the basis of government and that every individual enjoys inalienable rights and is entitled to constitutional liberties.

It is ironic that at the moment when the industrial democracies are most cohesive in their opposition to external threats, at a time when our cooperative efforts cover a broader range than ever, the unity developed with so much effort and imagination over a generation should be jeopardized by an internal danger -- the growth of Communist Parties and the danger of their accession to power in some of the countries of Western Europe.

In Italy, in the parliamentary elections of June 1976, the Communist Party obtained 34% of the vote, strengthening its position as the second largest party and as a powerful rival of the Christian Democratic Party which has governed Italy throughout the post-war period. The Communists' growth since the 1972 election has been primarily at the expense of the democratic socialist groups, and is part and parcel of an increasing and dangerous polarization of Italian politics. The Communists have already achieved a virtual veto over government programs in the Italian Parliament.

In France, in the Presidential election of April 1974, a coalition of the Communist and Socialist Parties came within one percentage point of victory on the final ballot. A majority for this coalition in the parliamentary elections which must take place by March 1978 would bring Communist leaders into key ministerial positions. It would do so, moreover, in conditions of constitutional crisis, for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic has not yet faced the test of a President and a Prime Minister from different parties.

-2-

In *the Iberian peninsula*, where hopeful steps are being taken towards democracy, Communist Parties have fought with ruthlessness and disciplined organization to increase their already considerable influence. Portugal is a member of NATO; Spain is strategically crucial and tied by special agreements to the United States. Communist participation in the government of either country would have serious consequences for Western security.

And these Communist challenges do not exist in isolation from each other. There is no doubt that a Communist break-through to power or a share in power in one country will have a major psychological effect on the others, by making Communist Parties seem respectable, or suggesting that the tide of history in Europe is moving in their direction.

Most of the causes of this phenomenon are indigenous to the individual countries. And by the same token, the response to this challenge must come in the first instance from European leaders and voters who are persuaded that democracy is worth the effort. America cannot make their choices for them or decide the outcome of free elections.

But *America must* recognize the significance of what may lie ahead. We *must* not delude ourselves about what the accession of Communist leaders to executive power will mean to the most basic premises of American foreign policy. We *must* not confuse either our own people or those in allied countries who take our judgments seriously about the gravity of the threat. We *must* not weaken their resolve either by treating a Communist victory as inevitable -- which it is not -- or by imagining that a Communist electoral victory would be an accidental, transitory or inconsequential phenomenon. The ultimate decisions are for the voters of Europe to make. But they -- and we -- would be indulging in wishful thinking if we all did not acknowledge now:

- that the accession to power of Communists in an allied country would represent a massive change in European politics;

- that it would have fundamental consequences for the structure of the post-war world as we have known it and for America's relationship to its most important alliances;

- and that it would alter the prospects for security and progress for *all* free nations.

## The Communist Parties and Western Democracies

Those who take a less grave view of these prospects often claim that the European Communist Parties are independent of Moscow, that they have been effectively democratized and

[v]

-3-

assimilated, and that they therefore pose no international
issue in the broader East-West context.

It is true enough that the centrifugal and polycentric
tendencies in the Communist world are one of the most striking
developments of our age. These schisms, moreover, are made
doubly intense by the passions of a quasi-religious battle
over what is true dogma and what is heresy. Symptomatic is the
fact that the Soviet Union has used military force in the post-
war period only against other Communist countries -- in East
Berlin, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, and on the Sino-Soviet
border. The Sino-Soviet conflict may indeed be the most
profound and potentially explosive current international con-
flict. Nor is there a serious observer who disputes that the
Communist Parties in Western Europe have in fact occasionally
demonstrated some degree of independence from the Soviet Union.

But this hardly exhausts the issue. For we must ask: In
what sense and on what issues are they independent? And what
are the objective consequences for the West of their policies
and programs?

We are entitled to certain skepticism about the sincerity
of declarations of independence which coincide so precisely
with electoral self-interest. One need not be a cynic to
wonder at the decision of the French Communists, traditionally
perhaps the most Stalinist Party in Western Europe, to renounce
the Soviet concept of dictatorship of the proletariat without
a single dissenting vote among 1700 delegates, as they did
at their Party Congress in February 1976, when all previous
Party Congresses had endorsed the same dictatorship of the
proletariat by a similar unanimous vote of 1700 to nothing.
Why was there not at least one lonely soul willing to adhere to
the previous view? Much was made of this change as a gesture
of independence. Now it turns out that the new Soviet Con-
stitution, in preparation for years, drops the phrase as well.

Throughout their existence, the guiding principle of the
Communist Parties has been their insistence that a minority
had to seize power as the vanguard of the working class and
impose its views on the rest of the population. This disdain
for democratic procedures -- whether it is presented in the
traditional form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or
wrapped in Gramsci's more elegant phrase, "the hegemony of the
working class" -- is precisely what has historically distin-
guished the Communist from the Socialist Parties. I find it
hard to believe that after decades of vilifying Social Democracy
and treating it as their mortal enemy, especially in every

[Y]

-4-

Communist country, Communist Parties have suddenly become Social Democrats. Whether or not they are independent of Moscow, Communists represent a philosophy which by its nature and their own testimony stands outside the "bourgeois" framework of Western constitutional history; they are a movement that appeals to a different tradition and uses a largely misleading vocabulary.

To be sure, the French, Spanish, and Italian Communist Parties have all recently declared their resolve "to work within the pluralism of political and social forces and to respect guarantees and develop all individual and collective freedoms." Enrico Berlinguer and Georges Marchais pledged their devotion to national independence and political pluralism at a conference of Communist Parties in East Berlin in June 1976.

But can we take these declarations at face value? After all, Marchais has listed Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany as countries having a "pluralistic" party system. As recently as 1972, French Communist doctrine was that "there can be no return from Socialism to Capitalism." And a few weeks ago, to the great irritation of their Socialist allies, the French Communists estimated the cost of the economic program of the two parties at over 100 billion dollars. The Communist program -- by definition -- calls for the radical transformation of society; by the very nature of their beliefs Communists will be driven to bring about institutional changes that would make their ascendance permanent.

Moreover, are these professions of the national road to Communism and of devotion to democratic principle really so new? Let me read some quotations from European Communist leaders:

- First: "The crux of the matter, and we Marxists should know this well, is this: every nation will effect its transition to Socialism not by a mapped-out route, not exactly as in the Soviet Union, but by its own road, dependent on its historical, national social, and cultural circumstances."

That was from a speech by Georgi Dimitrov, leader of the Bulgarian Communist Party, in February 1946.

- Second: "We take the view that the method of imposing the Soviet system on (our country) would be wrong, since this method does not correspond

[Y]

-5-

to present-day conditions of development....We take the view rather that the overriding interests of the...people in their present-day situation prescribe a different method..., namely the method of establishing a democratic anti-Fascist regime, a parliamentary democratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties for the people."

That is from a proclamation of the (East) German Communist Party in June 1945.

- Third: "The great national task facing the country cannot be solved by either the Communist Party or by any other party alone. The Communist Party holds that it does not have a monopoly, and it does not need the monopoly, to work among the masses for the reconstruction of the new (nation). The Communist Party does not approve of the idea of a one-party system. Let the other parties operate and organize as well."

That is a statement by Erno Gero, Communist Party leader of Hungary, in November 1944.

- Fourth: "In (our country) there is a division of functions, and State power is based on parliamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is not essential. (Our country) can proceed and is proceeding along her own road."

That is from a speech by Wladyslaw Gomulka, Communist Party leader of Poland, in January 1946.

- Fifth: "The Communist Party seeks to attain Socialism, but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the only road to Socialism. ....The coalition of the Communists with other parties is not opportunistic, a temporary limited coalition, but the expression...of all strata of the working people....We seek at present to make certain that our new democratic parliamentary methods....be expressed in constitutional law. If you want the view of the Communists, I can only say that they will be the strictest guardians of the new Constitution."

That is a statement by Klement Gottwald, Communist Party leader of Czechoslovakia, in January 1947.

-6-

— Sixth: Marchais speaks of "Socialism in the
colors of France." But in 1938, George Orwell
described French Communist strategy as "marching
behind the tricolour."

In short, what the leaders of the Western Communist
Parties are saying today about their affection for the processes
of democracy is not significantly different from what East
European Communist leaders declared with equal emphasis in the
1940's -- before they seized the total power which they have
never relinquished since.

Certainly Communist Parties are willing to come to power
by democratic means. But could they permit the democratic
process to reverse what they see as the inevitable path of
"historical progress?" Would they maintain the institutions --
press, parties, unions, enterprises -- that would represent
the principal threat to their power? Would they safeguard the
freedoms that could turn into instruments of their future
defeat? No Communist Party that governed alone has ever done
so, and the vast majority of those democratic parties which
entered coalitions with European Communists are now in the
indexes of history books rather than in ministries or parliaments.

The Italian Communist Party, to be sure, left the govern-
ment following its disastrous defeat by the Christian Democrats
in 1948. But the situation today is greatly changed. In 1948,
the Communists were a far smaller party, with little regional
or municipal power. They had to contend with a younger and
more united Christian Democratic Party, a strong Socialist
Party, and a determined Western Alliance alarmed by Stalin's
adventures in Greece and Czechoslovakia. Today, Italian Com-
munists participate in the governments of most major cities
and regions, have enormous trade union strength, substantive
support from intellectuals and the popular culture, and have
reduced the strength of the Socialists to a fraction of what
it was three decades ago.

The French Communists were similarly removed from the
government in 1947, following the intensification of the cold
war. But, just as in the Italian case the following year, the
popular revolt against the Communists took place within the
framework of a united West with a clear perception of an ex-
ternal and internal threat to its survival. By contrast there
are now many people on both sides of the Atlantic who have per-
mitted themselves to be convinced that European Communism is
only Social democracy with a Leninist face.

[Y]

-7-

We cannot know, with certainty, whether a fundamental
change has occurred in these parties' traditional goals and
tactics. But their internal organization and management speak
against such a view. It is not democratic pluralism but the
stern Leninist precept of "democratic centralism" which con-
tinues to guide the internal structure of all European Commu-
nist Parties. This is a doctrine of iron discipline, not a
principle of free and open dialogue. It is a system of dogma,
of a "party line", of authority and obedience, of suppression
of dissent and purge of dissenters. There are too many recent
instances of resorts to violence, attempts to censor newspapers
and broadcasting, and efforts to control the functioning of
universities to be optimistic about their character.

Only in Western Europe and the United States are there
still illusions about the nature of Communist Parties. In
Eastern Europe, boredom, intellectual emptiness, inefficiency,
and stultifying bureaucratism have been obvious for decades.
Countries which used to be leading industrial powers have been
reduced to mediocrity and stagnation; nations with long demo-
cratic traditions have seen the destruction of civil liberties
and democratic practices. The countries of the West would
mortgage their future if they closed their eyes to this reality.
Societies that try to avoid difficult choices by making com-
forting assumptions about the future win no awards for restraint;
they only speed their own demise.

## Communist Parties and the Atlantic Alliance

It is sometimes asked: If the United States can deal with
Communist governments in the Soviet Union, China, Eastern
Europe, and even Cuba or Vietnam, why can we not accept and
learn to deal with Communist Parties seeking power in Western
Europe? Is not the Soviet Union uneasy about the prospect of
new Communist regimes that they may not be able to control?

These questions miss the central point. There is a crucial
difference between managing conflict with adversaries and
maintaining an alliance among friends, particularly when the
prospects for stable East-West relations depend vitally on
the cohesion of the Western Alliance. And even if some West
European Communist Parties should prove more difficult than
the better disciplined satellites of East Europe, and thus pose
new problems for Moscow, they would pose far more serious pro-
blems for the West.

For the key issue is not how "independent" the European
Communists would be, but how Communist. The dynamics of the
Communist Parties and the program on which they would be

-8-

elected suggest that their foreign and domestic policies are
not likely to be consistent with the common purposes of the
Atlantic Alliance.

The solidarity of the great industrial democracies has
maintained global security for thirty years. Western collective
defense provided the shield behind which the United States,
Western Europe and Japan developed the institutions of Euro-
pean unity and the progressive world economic system. All
these relationships would be severely jeopardized if Communists
came to power in allied governments.

Specifically:

The character of the Alliance would become confused to
the American people. The signatories of the North Atlantic
Treaty pledged in 1949 that "they are determined to safeguard
the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and
the rule of law." If Communists entered governments in allied
countries, the engagement to help maintain the military balance
in Europe would lack the moral base on which it has stood for
a generation. The American people would be asked to maintain
their alliance commitment on the basis of two highly uncertain,
untested assumptions: that there is a new trend of Communism
which will in time split from Moscow, and that the West will
be able to manipulate the new divisions to its advantage.

Both of these propositions are open to the most serious
doubt. No major Communist split has ever been generated or
maintained by deliberate Western policy -- in fact the Soviet
Union's disputes with Yugoslavia and with China had been
festering for months and even years before the West became
aware of them.

But even such a split -- which would surely take years
to develop -- would hardly diminish the danger to current
Allied relationships. By the time it occurred, the damage to
the NATO structure would probably have become irreparable.
And the character of the Atlantic relationship would be totally
transformed, even should the United States, for its own reasons,
eventually decide to support a revisionist Communism. While the
United States can never be indifferent to the extension of
Soviet hegemony to Western Europe, the permanent stationing
of American forces in Europe could hardly be maintained for
the object of defending some Communist governments against
other Communist governments. Such a deployment could be justi-
fied only on the crudest balance of power grounds that would be
incompatible with American tradition and American public sentiment.

[v]

This is not a personal recommendation as to a desirable policy, but a judgment of stark reality. Significant participation by Communist Parties in West European governments will over time undermine the moral and political basis for our present troop deployment in Europe.

The effect on Alliance cohesion generally would be disastrous. The Western Alliance has been held together by a system of close consultation based on shared goals and compatible philosophies. President de Gaulle cherished France's independence from the United States, but in major crises, over Berlin or Soviet missiles in Cuba, he stood firmly with his allies. By the same token, Communist governments in Western Europe, however independent of Moscow they may be on intraparty issues, can be expected to demonstrate their basic Communist convictions on major international issues.

If Communist Parties come to power in Western Europe, significant divergences on foreign policy would be bound to develop between Europe and the United States, and between European states in whose governments Communists participate and the others.

-10-

In February 1976, Italian Communist leader Berlinguer stated to a London Times interviewer that "the Soviet Union's peace policy is in the general interest of mankind." The Italian Party newspaper denounced NATO last year as "one of the fundamental instruments for American manipulation of the politics and economy of our country and Western Europe," and urged that "the relations between the countries of Western Europe and the two superpowers must be rediscovered." A leading member of the Italian party's Central Committee was asked in a recent interview with Radio Free Europe: If the French and Italian Communist Parties were in power, what would you do in the event of "a grave international crisis between the Soviet Union and the West?" He answered: "We would choose the Soviet side, of course." Such "support" of NATO as is expressed is explicitly tactical, and rests upon a distortion of detente. It is coupled with the proposition that a Soviet threat against Western Europe is inconceivable. No European Communist Party suggests that it wishes to be part of a Western Alliance to withstand Soviet expansion. And, indeed, how could Leninist parties dedicate themselves with any conviction to a military alliance whose primary purpose was and remains to counter Soviet power?

To be sure, these parties have had their differences with the Soviet Union, but in practically every case it has been on a matter of relations within the Communist movement. They have rarely, if ever, diverged from the Soviet position on an international issue. The Italian Communist Party has hailed the Cubans in Angola as "freedom fighters," condemned the Israeli rescue of hostages at Entebbe as an "intolerable violation of Uganda's national sovereignty," applauded Soviet policy in Africa and denounced America's diplomatic efforts in Southern Africa as an attempt to "save the neocolonial and military-strategic interests of imperialism."

At best, West European Communist Parties can be expected to steer their basic policies closer to the so-called non-alligned bloc and in an anti-Western direction. Yugoslavia -- whose independence from Moscow on East European issues is by now traditional -- has emerged as a champion of anti-Western and anti-American positions on most international issues outside of Eastern Europe. Why should we expect that Communist parties in Western Europe would be more friendly to us than the most independent East European state which has been engaged for nearly three decades in an open dispute with Moscow and whose government the Kremlin has sought repeatedly to undermine?

The strong role our allies play in defending Western interests in many regions of the globe -- such as President Giscard's courageous actions in Zaire -- could not be expected from a nation where Communists share power. In the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in relations with the third world,

-11-

[M]

on Berlin, on arms control and European security, the parallelism of views that has existed between the United States and its European allies would almost certainly be eroded. On the contrary, active opposition especially in regions of traditional European cultural and political influence is probable. In our common efforts to improve the world economy and stimulate progress in both the developed and developing worlds, in the OECD, in the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation and at Heads of Governments Summits, divisions would soon be apparent. How could Atlantic unity possibly be maintained in such circumstances, even on the security issue?

The military strength and unity of NATO would be gravely weakened. The Communist Parties of Western Europe pay lip service to NATO. In fact, it is hard to visualize how the present NATO structure could continue, with its exchange of highly classified information, its integrated military planning and political consultation, if Communists had a significant share of power.

The participation of Communist Parties in West European governments would force a major change in NATO practices, as occurred temporarily with Portugal, which had to exclude itself from classified discussions within the Organization when its own political future was in doubt. These parties are unlikely to give NATO defense a high budgetary priority. Communist Parties would surely use their power to diminish the combined defense effort of Western Europe and inevitably sap our own will to pay the costs of maintaining US forces in Europe.

Furthermore, if Communists participate in a significant way in the governments of key European countries, NATO may turn by default into a largely German-American alliance. This specter could then be used in other West European countries to undermine what remains of Atlantic cohesion. With NATO thus weakened, while the Soviet Union continued to increase its strategic and conventional strength and maintained its grip on the Warsaw Pact, the essential equilibrium of power between East and West in Europe would be fundamentally threatened. The freedom of many European countries, allied or neutral, to chart their own future would be diminished in direct proportion as the fear of Soviet power grows. Eventually, massive shifts against us would occur, not because a majority freely chose such a course, but because the upsetting of the overall balance left them no alternative.

The hopeful progress toward European unity would be undermined. The French and Italian Communist Parties opposed the creation of the European Common Market as a conspiracy of monopoly capitalism. Until quite recently, they have consistently fought progress toward European unity. Lately they have come to accept the European Community as a fact of life; they now say they seek to make it more "democratic" and to transform it, by "a process of

-12-

innovation...in the spheres both of institutions and of general orientations," as Berlinguer expressed it. They can be counted on to re-orient the Common Market towards closer relations with the state economies of Eastern Europe and toward the more extreme of the Third World's demands for a "new international economic order." It can be assumed that they will not encourage European political unity to foster cooperation with the United States; rather they will urge it, if at all, to encourage Third Force tendencies. And over time either governments with Communist participation will pull the others towards them, or deep fissures will open up between the traditional Atlanticists and the "New Left" in the European Community. Either outcome would be destructive of European unity and Atlantic solidarity.

Thus whatever hypothesis we consider, Communist participation in governments of Western Europe will have a profound impact on the international structure as it has developed in the post-war period. We cannot be indifferent or delude ourselves that the advent of Communists to a significant share of power in Western Europe would be less than a watershed in Atlantic relationships.

## The American Response

The attitude of the United States towards such developments must of necessity be complex. The crucial role must be that of European governments; the final decision must be that of the European voters. We cannot substitute for either.

In the end, the Communist Parties in Western Europe find their opportunities less in their inherent strength than in the demoralization, division or disorganization of their opponents; they succeed only when the democratic system seems unable to solve the social problems of the day; when the center does not hold and societies become polarized. Violence -- such as that currently tormenting Italy -- drives many to support Communism in desperation, convinced that drastic remedies are required to end a state of siege which has now spread to the press and other media.

The basic causes of Communist gains thus go deep and are not easy to remedy. In many European countries disillusionment with democratic government and democratic leaders is pervasive. In an era of peace, in a world of bureaucracy and mass production, there is no galvanizing crisis and little opportunity for heroic performance. A relativist age debunks authority and puts nothing in its place as an organizing principle of society. Massive impersonal bureaucracy disillusions the citizen with the responsiveness of his government, and simultaneously makes the task of elected officials more difficult. In too many democratic countries the young are offered too little inspiration; their elders too often have lost confidence in their own values. Too frequently democratic leaders

-13-

are consumed by winning and holding office and are unable
to demonstrate the force of conviction and philosophical
self-assurance of their radical opponents.

The very success of Western societies in maintaining
prosperity at a level undreamt of even forty years ago
sometimes contributes to their malaise. Intellectuals condemn
society for materialism when it is prosperous and for
injustice when it fails to insure prosperity. The widespread
economic difficulties of the last four years -- recession and
inflation unparalleled in a generation, to a large extent
induced by the extraordinary increase in oil prices --
fuel the frustration of all whose hopes for economic
advancement are rebuffed. The interdependence of economies
causes inflation and recession to surge across national
boundaries, compounding the sense of individual impotence.

And yet, with all these difficulties, the democratic
forces of the West have it in their power to determine
whether the Communist Parties have opportunities to succeed.
They have the capacity to put their economies on the path
of steady non-inflationary expansion. They have the intellec-
tual capital and the resources to usher in a new period
of creativity. Anti-Communism is not enough; there must be
a response to legitimate social and economic aspirations, and
there must be a reform of the inequities from which these
anti-democratic forces derive much of their appeal. With
able leadership -- and Western cohesion -- the democracies
can overcome their challenges and usher in a period of
dramatic fresh advance.

In this process it is vital that the United States
encourage an attitude of resolve and conviction.

First of all, we must frankly recognize the problem
that we will face if the Communists come to power
in Western Europe and we must understand the practical
decisions this will impose on us as a nation. We must
avoid facile projections which seek to escape difficult
choices by making the most favorable assumptions about what
might happen. We must have a program for encouraging
the forces of moderation and progress in this critical
period and for rallying them should a Communist Party
nonetheless prevail.

Second, we must avoid giving the impression that
we consider Communist success a foregone conclusion by
ostentatious association or consultation with Communist
leaders or by ambiguous declarations. Communist success
is not a foregone conclusion; United States hesitation or
ambiguity can, however, contribute to it. Communist Parties
are riddled with weaknesses and internal strains, and
marked by a fundamental flaw: parties that do not speak
for the humane values which have inspired the peoples
of the West for centuries are unlikely to appeal to a
majority in a Western nation except in a moment of

[Y]

-14-

unsettling crisis. In no Western European country has the Communist Party ever fairly won more than about a third of the vote. Their most powerful weapons are fear, distrust and discouragement; their principal asset is the myth of their inevitability. Therefore, we do our friends in Europe no favor if we encourage the notion that the advent of Communists and their allies into power will make little or no difference to our own attitudes and policies. I am talking less of formal statements -- which depend on tactical judgments difficult for any outsider to make -- than of a clear and unambiguous US attitude.

Some have argued that such a policy would be counter-productive, that it would encourage Communist protest votes. I believe the opposite to be true. On balance, I consider it important that Europe know of America's interest and concern. Many voters in allied countries value the friendship of the United States and appreciate the security supplied by the Atlantic Alliance. We should not ignore them, or demoralize them, or undercut them. The gradual gains scored by the Communist Parties over the past years occurred -- by definition -- at the margin, among voters who had not voted Communist before; who did not vote by anti-American reflex; who for one reason or another were persuaded that the Communists have now become acceptable or indispensable.

There is no evidence that voters are influenced to vote Communist by American attitudes. On the contrary, the real danger may well be the other way; many usual opponents of the Communist Parties may be lulled by voices, attitudes and ambiguities in this country implying that our traditional opposition has changed. Paradoxically, we even weaken whatever moderate elements may exist in Communist movements by settling too eagerly for verbal reassurances.

If the United States has a responsibility to encourage political freedom throughout the world, we surely have a duty to leave no doubt about our convictions on an issue that is so central to the future of the Western Alliance and therefore to the future of democracy. Human rights is not an abstraction concerned only with judicial procedures and unrelated to basic questions of political and geopolitical structure. We cannot fail to reckon the setback to European freedom that will result if Communist minorities gain decisive influence in European politics; we must not close our eyes to the effect on freedom throughout the world if the global balance tips against the West.

Thirdly, the United States should conduct its policies toward its allies in a way that strengthens the moderate, progressive and democratic governments of Western Europe.

-15-

We must, on the one hand, avoid demands or lecturing which, whatever the intrinsic merit, magnify domestic fissures in European countries or the sense of impotence of European governments. At the same time, the United States can contribute to a sense of accomplishment by offering vigorous cooperation in joint efforts to solve common problems in the fields of diplomacy, arms control, energy and economic growth. This was the purpose of the economic summits among Western leaders begun by President Ford at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico, and continued so successfully in London by President Carter.

The unity and cooperative action of the democracies is crucial to all that America does in the world. Western unity defends not only our security but our way of life and the most basic moral values of our civilization. On this we cannot be neutral. To foster these principles deserves the same dedication and commitment that inspired the most imaginative periods of American diplomacy.

The stagnant societies of the East to which I have referred serve as both a warning and a hope. They remind us that the West's latent intellectual and political vitality, even more than its material prosperity, is the envy of the world. The winds of change are ultimately blowing from the West. The men and women of Eastern Europe are certainly aware that the West, for all its doubt and sense of spiritual dilemma, is the vanguard of modernization, the vital source of learning and of much of modern culture, and the haven of the free human spirit. The developing countries yearning for progress also turn to the West, not the East, for assistance, support, and the measure of what man can achieve when he aspires. Our technology, our creativity, our unequaled economic vigor, not some bureaucratic doctrine of economic determinism, are the forces that will shape the future if we mobilize the energies of free peoples.

This is not the time for resignation or acquiescence. It is a time for confidence, determination and hope. The power of free men and women and free nations acting in concern, confident of their strength and of their destiny, cannot be matched by any totalitarian regime or totalitarian movement. The spirit of freedom can never be crushed. But freedom can be lost gradually. Such a danger exists today in Western Europe, and that threat could have consequences not only in Europe but throughout the community of democracies and the world.

If we cherish freedom, we will face the peril, marshal joint efforts to overcome it and begin a period of new fulfillment for our peoples. Western Europe, our closest partner and the cradle of much of our civilization, is too precious to us for us to do otherwise.

Thank you.

[i]

# Introduction

Austin Ranney

The tradition of the scholar as statesman is longstanding in our history. It includes such illustrious names as John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John C. Calhoun, and James Madison. But the exemplar most relevant to this place and this occasion is the 28th President of the United States. Long before he entered public life, Woodrow Wilson was the most eminent academic political scientist of his day. In one of his books, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, he set forth a striking new theory of how the presidency should be used to lead the nation. And five years after Professor Wilson published his theories, President Wilson was inaugurated with a unique opportunity to test Professor Wilson's theories. He did not waste it.

Our speaker this evening has followed a similar course. Henry A. Kissinger served as professor of government at Harvard University from 1957 to 1969. During that time he published four major books exploring the purposes, resources, and limits of American foreign policy—and makers of foreign policy. One of those books, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, in 1958 won the American Political Science Association's highest scholarly honor, the Woodrow Wilson Award for the best book on government and politics published in the preceding year. And eight years after he received that award, Dr. Kissinger became assistant to the President of the United States for national security affairs and

1

director of the National Security Council. As all the world
knows, from 1973 to 1977 he served as secretary of state.

Since retiring from public office, Dr. Kissinger has returned home to the academy. During the current year he has been affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, and this fall he will take up his appointment as professor in Georgetown's Foreign Service School.

I have no doubt that his students there will profit greatly
from studying with him, as did his students at Harvard. I am
also confident that our understanding of the processes and
substance of foreign policy will continue to be enriched by his
books, articles, and speeches.

[c]

# Communist Parties in Western Europe
## Challenge to the West

Henry A. Kissinger

This unity has been the keystone of our foreign policy in every administration from President Truman's to President Carter's. The first permanent peacetime security alliance in American history was with the democratic nations of the Atlantic Community; it was soon followed by our commitment to the security of Japan. Since then, the agenda of cooperation among the industrial democracies has spread from collective defense to common action on energy policy, economic recovery, the international economic system, and relations with the Communist countries and with the Third World. This cohesion rests not simply on material considerations of wealth and power but on a common moral foundation as well—on the shared conviction that the consent of the governed is the basis of government and that every individual enjoys inalienable rights and is entitled to constitutional liberties.

broader range than ever, the unity developed with so much
effort and imagination over a generation should be jeopard-
ized by an internal danger—the growth of Communist parties
and the danger of their accession to power in some of the
countries of Western Europe.

In *Italy*, in the parliamentary elections of June 1976, the
Communist party obtained 34 percent of the vote, strengthening
its position as the second largest party and as a powerful
rival of the Christian Democratic party, which has governed
Italy throughout the postwar period. The Communists'
growth since the 1972 election has been primarily at the
expense of the Democratic Socialist groups, and is part and
parcel of an increasing and dangerous polarization of Italian
politics. The Communists have already achieved a virtual veto
over government programs in the Italian parliament.

In *France*, in the presidential election of April 1974, a
coalition of the Communist and Socialist parties came within
1 percentage point of victory on the final ballot. A majority
for this coalition in the parliamentary elections, which must
take place by March 1978, would bring Communist leaders
into key ministerial positions. It would do so, moreover, in
conditions of constitutional crisis, for the constitution of the
Fifth Republic has not yet faced the test of a president and a
prime minister from different parties.

In *the Iberian peninsula*, where hopeful steps are being
taken towards democracy, Communist parties have fought
with ruthlessness and disciplined organization to increase
their already considerable influence. Portugal is a member of
NATO; Spain is strategically crucial and tied by special
agreements to the United States. Communist participation in
the government of either country would have serious consequences
for Western unity and Western security.

And these Communist challenges do not exist in isolation
from each other. There is no doubt that a Communist break-
through to power or a share in power in one country will have
a major psychological effect on the others, by making Com-
munist parties seem respectable, or suggesting that the tide of
history in Europe is moving inexorably in their direction.

4

But America *must* recognize the significance of what may lie ahead. We must not delude ourselves about what the accession of Communist leaders to executive power will mean to the most basic premises of American foreign policy. We must not confuse either our own people or those in allied countries who take seriously our judgments about the gravity of the threat. We must not weaken their resolve either by treating a Communist victory as inevitable—which it is not—or by imagining that a Communist electoral victory would be an accidental, transitory, or inconsequential phenomenon. The ultimate decisions are for the voters of Europe to make. But they—and we—would be indulging in wishful thinking if we all did not acknowledge now:

* that the accession to power of Communists in an allied country would represent a massive change in European politics;

* that it would have fundamental consequences for the structure of the postwar world as we have known it and for America's relationship to its most important alliances;

* and that it would alter the prospects for security and progress for *all* free nations.

Those who take a less grave view of these prospects often claim that the European Communist parties are independent of Moscow, that they have been effectively democratized or assimilated, and that they therefore pose no international issue in the broader East-West context.

5

[1c]

striking developments of our age. These schisms, moreover, are made doubly intense by the passions of a quasi-religious battle over what is true dogma and what is heresy. Symptomatic is the fact that the Soviet Union has used military force in the postwar period only against other Communist countries—in East Berlin, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, and on the Sino-Soviet border. The Sino-Soviet conflict may indeed be the most profound and potentially explosive current international conflict. Nor is there a serious observer who disputes that the Communist parties in Western Europe have in fact occasionally demonstrated some degree of independence from the Soviet Union.

We are entitled to certain skepticism about the sincerity of declarations of independence which coincide so precisely with electoral self-interest. One need not be a cynic to wonder at the decision of the French Communists, traditionally perhaps the most Stalinist party in Western Europe, to renounce the Soviet concept of dictatorship of the proletariat without a single dissenting vote among 1,700 delegates, as they did at their party congress in February 1976, when all previous party congresses had endorsed the same dictatorship of the proletariat by a similar unanimous vote of 1,700 to nothing. Why was there not at least one lonely soul willing to adhere to the previous view? Much was made of this change as a gesture of independence. Now it turns out that the new Soviet constitution, in preparation for years, drops the phrase "dictatorship of the proletariat" as well.

Throughout their existence, the guiding principle of the Communist parties has been their insistence that a minority had to seize power as the vanguard of the working class and impose its views on the rest of the population. This disdain for democratic procedures—whether it is presented in the traditional form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" or wrapped in Gramsci's more elegant phrase, "the hegemony

6

[d]

of the working class”—is precisely what has historically distinguished the Communist from the Socialist parties. I find it hard to believe that after decades of vilifying Social Democracy and treating it as their mortal enemy, especially in every Communist country, Communist parties have suddenly become Social Democrats. Whether or not they are independent of Moscow, Communists represent a philosophy which by its very nature and their own testimony stands outside the “bourgeois” framework of Western constitutional history. The Communist movement appeals to a different tradition and uses a largely misleading vocabulary.

To be sure, the French, Spanish, and Italian Communist parties have all recently declared their resolve “to work within the pluralism of political and social forces and to respect guarantees and develop all individual and collective freedoms.” Enrico Berlinguer and Georges Marchais pledged their devotion to national independence and political pluralism at a conference of Communist parties in East Berlin in June 1976.

But can we take these declarations at face value? After all, Marchais has listed Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany as countries having a “pluralistic” party system. As recently as 1972, French Communist doctrine was that “there can be no return from Socialism to Capitalism.” And a few weeks ago, to the great irritation of their Socialist allies, the French Communists estimated the cost of the economic program of the two parties at over $100 billion. The Communist program—by definition—calls for the radical transformation of society; by the very nature of their beliefs Communists will be driven to bring about institutional changes that would make their ascendancy permanent.

Moreover, are these professions of the national road to Communism and of devotion to democratic principle really so new? Let me read some quotations from European Communists leaders.

* *First:* “The crux of the matter, and we Marxists should know this well, is this: every nation will effect its transition to Socialism not by a mapped-out route, not exactly

7

[i]

as in the Soviet Union, but by its own road, dependent on
its historical, national, social, and cultural circum-
stances."

That was from a speech by Georgi Dimitrov, leader of the
Bulgarian Communist party, in February 1946.

*   **Second:** "We take the view that the method of imposing the Soviet system on [our country] would be wrong, since this method does not correspond to present-day conditions of development. . . . We take the view rather that the overriding interests of the . . . people in their present-day situation prescribe a different method . . . , namely the method of establishing a democratic anti-Fascist regime, a parliamentary democratic republic with full democratic rights and liberties for the people."

That is from a proclamation of the (East) German Com-
munist party in June 1945.

*   **Third:** "The great national task facing the country cannot be solved by either the Communist Party or by any other party alone. The Communist Party holds that it does not have a monopoly, and it does not need the monopoly, to work among the masses for the reconstruction of the new (nation). The Communist Party does not approve of the idea of a one-party system. Let the other parties operate and organize as well."

That is a statement by Erno Gero, Communist party leader of
Hungary, in November 1944.

*   **Fourth:** "In [our country] there is a division of functions, and State power is based on parliamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is not essential. [Our country] can proceed and is proceeding along her own road."

That is from a speech by Wladyslaw Gomulka, Communist
party leader of Poland, in January 1946.

*   **Fifth:** "The Communist Party seeks to attain Socialism, but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the

8

[u]

only road to Socialism. . . . The coalition of the Communists with other parties is not opportunistic, a temporary limited coalition, but the expression . . . of all strata of the working people. . . . We seek at present to make certain that our new democratic parliamentary methods . . . be expressed in constitutional law. If you want the view of the Communists, I can only say that they will be the strictest guardians of the new Constitution."

That is a statement by Klement Gottwald, Communist party leader of Czechoslovakia, in January 1947.

* *Sixth:* Marchais speaks of "Socialism in the colors of France." But in 1938, George Orwell described French Communist strategy as "marching behind the tricolour."

In short, what the leaders of the Western Communist parties are saying today about their affection for the processes of democracy is not significantly different from what East European Communist leaders declared with equal emphasis in the 1940s—just before they seized the total power which they have never relinquished since.

Certainly Communist parties are willing to come to power by democratic means. But could they permit the democratic process to reverse what they see as the inevitable path of "historical progress?" Would they maintain the institutions—press, parties, unions, enterprises—that would represent the principal threat to their power? Would they safeguard the freedoms that could turn into instruments of their future defeat? No Communist Party that governed alone has ever done so, and the vast majority of those democratic parties which entered coalitions with European Communists are now in the indexes of history books rather than ministries or parliaments.

The Italian Communist party, to be sure, left the government in 1948. But the situation today is greatly changed. In 1948, the Communist party was far smaller, with little regional or municipal power. It had to contend with a younger and more united Christian Democratic party, a strong Socialist party, and a determined Western alliance

9

alarmed by Stalin's adventures in Greece and Czechoslovakia. Today, Italian Communists participate in the governments of most major cities and regions, have enormous trade union strength and substantive support from intellectuals and the popular culture, and have reduced the strength of the Socialists to a fraction of what it was three decades ago.

The French Communists were similarly removed from the government in 1947, following the intensification of the cold war. But, just as in the Italian case the following year, the popular revolt against the Communists took place within the framework of a united West with a clear perception of an external and internal threat to its survival. By contrast there are now too many people on both sides of the Atlantic who have permitted themselves to be convinced that European Communism is only Social Democracy with a Leninist face.

We cannot know, with certainty, whether a fundamental change has occurred in these parties' traditional goals and tactics. But their internal organization and management speak against such a view. It is not democratic pluralism but the stern Leninist precept of "democratic centralism" which continues to guide the internal structure of all European Communist parties. This is a doctrine of iron discipline, not a principle of free and public dialogue. It is a system of dogma, of a "party line," of authority and obedience, of suppression of dissent and purge of dissenters. There are too many recent instances of resorts to violence, attempts to censor newspapers and broadcasting, and efforts to control the functioning of universities to be optimistic about their character.

Only in Western Europe and the United States are there still illusions about the nature of Communist parties. In Eastern Europe boredom, intellectual emptiness, inefficiency, and stultifying bureaucratism have been obvious for decades. Countries which used to be leading industrial powers have been reduced to mediocrity and stagnation; nations with long democratic traditions have seen the destruction of civil liberties and democratic practices. The countries of the West would mortgage their future if they closed their eyes to this reality. Societies that try to avoid difficult choices by making

10

comforting assumptions about the future win no awards for
restraint; they only speed their own demise.

It is sometimes asked: If the United States can deal with Communist governments in the Soviet Union, China, Eastern Europe, and even Cuba or Vietnam, why can we not accept and learn to deal with Communist parties seeking power in Western Europe? Is not the Soviet Union uneasy about the prospect of new Communist regimes that they may not be able to control?

These questions miss the central point. There is a crucial difference between managing conflict with adversaries and maintaining an alliance, when the prospects for stable East-West relations depend vitally on the cohesion of the Western Alliance. And even if some West European Communist parties should prove more difficult than the better disciplined satellites of East Europe, and thus pose new problems for Moscow, they would pose far more serious problems for the West.

For the key issue is not how "independent" the European Communists would be, but how Communist. The dynamics of the Communist parties and the program on which they would be elected suggest that their foreign and domestic policies are not likely to be consistent with the common purposes of the Atlantic Alliance.

The solidarity of the great industrial democracies has maintained global security for thirty years. Western collective defense provided the shield behind which the United States, Western Europe, and Japan developed the institutions of European unity and of the progressive world economic system. All these relationships would be severely jeopardized if Communists came to power in allied governments. Specifically:

*The character of the Alliance would become confused to the American people.* The signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty pledged in 1949 that "they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples,

11

[u]

Both of these propositions are open to the most serious doubt. No major Communist split has ever been generated or maintained by deliberate Western policy—in fact the Soviet Union's disputes with Yugoslavia and with China had been festering for months and even years before the West became aware of them.

But even such a split—which would surely take years to develop—would hardly diminish the danger to current Allied relationships. By the time it occurred the damage to the NATO structure would probably have become irreparable. And the character of the Atlantic relationship would be totally transformed, even should the United States, for its own reasons, eventually decide to support a revisionist Communism. While the United States can never be indifferent to the extension of Soviet hegemony to Western Europe, the permanent stationing of American forces in Europe could hardly be maintained for the object of defending some Communist governments against other Communist governments. Such a deployment could be justified only on the crudest balance of power grounds, which would be incompatible with American tradition and American public sentiment.

This is not a personal recommendation as to a desirable policy, but a judgment of stark reality. Significant participation by Communist parties in West European governments will over time undermine the moral and political basis for our present troop deployment in Europe.

*The effect on Alliance cohesion generally would be disastrous.*
The Western Alliance has been held together by a system of

12

close consultation based on shared goals and compatible
philosophies. President de Gaulle cherished France's inde-
pendence from the United States, but in major crises, over
Berlin or Soviet missiles in Cuba, he stood firmly with his
allies. By the same token, Communist governments in West-
ern Europe, however independent of Moscow they may be on
intraparty issues, can be expected to demonstrate their basic
Communist convictions on major international issues.

If Communist parties come to power in Western Europe,
significant divergences on foreign policy would be bound to
develop between Europe and the United States and between
European states in whose governments Communists partici-
pate and the others.

In February 1976, Italian Communist leader Berlinguer
stated to a London *Times* interviewer that "the Soviet Union's
peace policy is in the general interest of mankind." The
Italian party newspaper denounced NATO last year as "one
of the fundamental instruments for American manipulation
of the politics and economy of our country and Western
Europe," and urged that "the relations between the countries
of Western Europe and the two superpowers must be redis-
cussed." A leading member of the Italian party's central
committee was asked in a recent interview with Radio Free
Europe: If the French and Italian Communist parties were in
power, what would they do in the event of "a grave interna-
tional crisis between the Soviet Union and the West?" He
answered: "We would choose the Soviet side, of course." Such
"support" of NATO as is expressed is explicitly tactical, and
rests upon a distortion of détente. It is coupled with the
proposition that a Soviet threat against Western Europe is
inconceivable. No European Communist party suggests that
it wishes to be part of a Western alliance to withstand Soviet
aggression. And, indeed, how could Leninist parties dedicate
themselves with any conviction to a military alliance whose
primary purpose was and remains to counter Soviet power?

To be sure, these parties have had their differences with
the Soviet Union, but in practically every case it has been on a
matter of relations *within* the Communist movement. They

13

[x]

have rarely, if ever, diverged from the Soviet position on an
international issue. The Italian Communist party has hailed
the Cubans in Angola as "freedom fighters," condemned the
Israeli rescue of hostages at Entebbe as an "intolerable viola-
tion of Uganda's national sovereignty," applauded Soviet pol-
icy in Africa, and denounced American diplomatic efforts in
Southern Africa as an attempt to "save the neocolonial and
military-strategic interests of imperialism."

At best, West European Communist parties can be ex-
pected to steer their basic policies closer to the so-called
nonaligned bloc and in an anti-Western direction. Yugo-
slavia—whose independence from Moscow on East European
issues is by now traditional—has emerged as a champion of
anti-Western and anti-American positions on most interna-
tional issues outside of Eastern Europe. Why should we ex-
pect that Communist parties in Western Europe would be
more friendly to us than the most independent East Euro-
pean state, which has been engaged for nearly three decades
in an open dispute with Moscow and whose government the
Kremlin has sought repeatedly to undermine?

The strong role our allies play in defending Western
interests in many regions of the globe—such as President
Giscard's courageous actions in Zaire—could not be expected
from a nation where Communists share in governmental
power. In the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in relations
with the Third World, on Berlin, on arms control and Euro-
pean security, the parallelism of views that has existed be-
tween the United States and its European allies would almost
certainly be eroded. On the contrary, active opposition, espe-
cially in regions of traditional European cultural and political
influence, is probable. In our common efforts to improve the
world economy and stimulate progress in both the developed
and the developing worlds, in the OECD, in the conferences
on international economic cooperation, and at heads of gov-
ernment summits, divisions would soon be apparent. How
could Atlantic unity possibly be maintained in such circum-
stances, even on the security issue?

*The military strength and unity of NATO would be gravely*

14

weakened. The Communist parties of Western Europe pay lip service to NATO. In fact, it is hard to visualize how the present NATO structure could continue, with its exchange of highly classified information, its integrated military planning and political consultation, if Communists had a significant share of power.

The participation of Communist parties in West European governments would force a major change in NATO practices, as occurred temporarily with Portugal, which had to exclude itself from classified discussions within the organization when its own political future was in doubt. These parties are unlikely to give NATO defense a high budgetary priority. Communist parties would surely use their power to diminish the combined defense effort of Western Europe and inevitably sap our own will to pay the costs of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe.

Furthermore, if Communists participate in a significant way in the governments of key European countries, NATO may turn by default into a largely German-American alliance. This specter could then be used in other West European countries to undermine what remains of Atlantic cohesion. With NATO thus weakened, while the Soviet Union continued to increase its strategic and conventional strength and maintained its grip on the Warsaw Pact, the essential equilibrium of power between East and West in Europe would be fundamentally threatened, the freedom of many European countries, allied or neutral, to chart their own future would be diminished in direct proportion to the growth of fear of Soviet power. Eventually, massive shifts against us would occur, not because a majority freely chose such a course, but because the upsetting of the overall balance left them no alternative.

*The hopeful progress toward European unity would be undermined.* The French and Italian Communist parties opposed the creation of the European Common Market as a conspiracy of monopoly capitalism. Until quite recently, they have consistently fought progress toward European unity. Lately they have come to accept the European Community as a fact

[i]

15

[c]

of life; they now say they seek to make it more "democratic"
and to transform it, by "a process of innovation . . . in the
spheres both of institutions and of general orientations," as
Berlinguer expressed it. They can be counted on to reorient
the Common Market towards closer relations with the state
economies of Eastern Europe and toward the more extreme
of the Third World's demands for a "new international eco-
nomic order." It can be assumed that they will not encourage
European political unity to foster cooperation with the
United States; rather they will urge it, if at all, to encourage
Third Force tendencies. And over time either governments
with Communist participation will pull the others towards
them, or deep fissures will open up in the European commu-
nity between the traditional Atlanticists and the "New Left."
Either outcome would be destructive of European unity and
Atlantic solidarity.

Thus, whatever hypothesis we consider, Communist par-
ticipation in governments of Western Europe will have a
profound impact on the international structure as it has de-
veloped in the postwar period. We cannot be indifferent or
delude ourselves that the advent of Communists to a signifi-
cant share of power in Western Europe would be anything
less than a watershed in Atlantic relationships.

The American Response

In the end, the Communist parties in Western Europe
find their opportunities less in their inherent strength than in
the demoralization, division, or disorganization of their op-
ponents; they succeed only when the democratic system seems
unable to solve the social problems of the day—when the
center does not hold and societies become polarized. Vio-
lence—such as that currently tormenting Italy—drives many
to support Communism in desperation, convinced that

16

The basic causes of Communist gains thus go deep and
are not easy to remedy. In many European countries disillusionment with democratic government and democratic leaders is pervasive. In an era of peace, in a world of bureaucracy and mass production, there is no galvanizing crisis and little opportunity for heroic performance. A relativist age debunks authority and puts nothing in its place as an organizing principle of society. Massive impersonal bureaucracy disillusions the citizen with the responsiveness of his government, and simultaneously makes the task of elected officials more difficult. In too many democratic countries the young are offered too little inspiration; their elders too often have lost confidence in their own values. Too frequently democratic leaders are consumed by winning and holding office and are unable to demonstrate the force of conviction and philosophical self-assurance of their radical opponents.

The very success of Western societies in maintaining
prosperity at a level undreamt of even forty years ago some-
times contributes to their malaise. Intellectuals condemn so-
ciety for materialism when it is prosperous and for injustice
when it fails to insure prosperity. The widespread economic
difficulties of the last four years—recession and inflation
unparalleled in a generation, to a large extent induced by the
extraordinary increase in oil prices—fuel the frustration of all
whose hopes for economic advancement are rebuffed. The
interdependence of economies causes inflation and recession
to surge across national boundaries, compounding the sense
of individual impotence.

And yet, with all these difficulties, the democratic forces
of the West have it in their power to determine whether the
Communist parties have opportunities to succeed. They have
the capacity to put their economies on the path of steady
noninflationary expansion. They have the intellectual capital
and the resources to usher in a new period of creativity.
Anti-Communism, while important, is not enough; there
must be a response to legitimate social and economic aspira-

17

tions, and there must be reform of the inequities from which antidemocratic forces derive so much of their appeal. With able leadership—and Western cohesion—the democracies can overcome their challenges and usher in a period of dramatic fresh advance.

In this process it is vital that the United States encourage an attitude of resolve and conviction. The governments of Europe must know that they can count on our moral and political support in resisting the accession of communism to governmental power.

*First,* we must frankly recognize the problem that we will face if the Communists come to power in Western Europe, and we must understand the practical decisions this will impose on us as a nation. We must avoid facile projections which seek to escape difficult choices by making the most favorable assumptions about what might happen. We must have a program for encouraging the forces of moderation and progress in this critical period and for rallying them should a Communist party nonetheless prevail.

*Second,* we must avoid giving the impression that we consider Communist success a foregone conclusion by ostentatious association or consultation with Communist leaders or by ambiguous declarations. Communist success is not a foregone conclusion; United States hesitation or ambiguity can, however, contribute to it. Communist parties are riddled with weaknesses and internal strains, and marked by a fundamental flaw: parties that do not speak for the humane values which have inspired the peoples of the West for centuries are unlikely to appeal to a majority in a Western nation except in a moment of unsettling crisis. In no Western European country has the Communist party ever fairly won more than about a third of the vote. Their most powerful weapons are fear, distrust, and discouragement; their principal asset is the myth of their inevitability. Therefore, we do our friends in Europe no favor if we encourage the notion that the advent of Communists and their allies into power will make little or no difference to our own attitudes and policies. I am speaking

18

[cc]

less of formal statements—which depend on tactical judgments difficult for any outsider to make—than of a clear and unambiguous U.S. attitude.

Some have argued that such a policy would be counterproductive, that it would encourage Communist protest votes. I believe the opposite to be true. On balance, I consider it important that Europe know of America's interest and concern. Many voters in allied countries value the friendship of the United States and appreciate the security supplied by the Atlantic Alliance. We should not ignore them, or demoralize them, or undercut them. The gradual gains scored by the Communist parties over the past years occurred—by definition—at the margin, among voters who had not voted Communist before, who did not vote by anti-American reflex, who for one reason or another were persuaded that the Communists have now become acceptable or indispensable.

There is no evidence that voters are influenced to vote *Communist* by American anti-Communist attitudes. On the contrary, the real danger may well be the other way; many usual opponents of the Communist parties may be lulled by voices, attitudes, and ambiguities in this country implying that our traditional opposition has changed. Paradoxically, we even weaken whatever moderate elements may exist in Communist movements by settling too eagerly for verbal reassurances.

If the United States has a responsibility to encourage political freedom in the world, we surely have a duty to leave no doubt about our convictions on an issue that is so central to the future of the Western Alliance and therefore to the future of democracy. Human rights is not an abstraction concerned only with judicial procedures and unrelated to basic questions of political and geopolitical structure. We cannot fail to reckon the setback to European freedom that will result if Communist minorities gain decisive influence in European politics; we must not close our eyes to the effect on freedom throughout the world if as a result the global balance tips against the West.

*Third*, the United States should conduct its policies to-

19

[u]

ward its allies in a way that strengthens the moderate, progressive, and democratic governments of Western Europe. We must, on the one hand, avoid demands or lecturing which, whatever the intrinsic merit, magnify domestic fissures in European countries or the sense of impotence of European governments. At the same time, the United States can contribute to a sense of accomplishment by offering vigorous cooperation in joint efforts to solve common problems in the fields of diplomacy, arms control, energy, and economic growth. This was the purpose of the economic summits among Western leaders begun by President Ford at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico, and continued successfully in London by President Carter.

The unity and cooperative action of the democracies is crucial to all that America does in the world. Western unity defends not only our security but also our way of life and the most basic moral values of our civilization. On this we cannot be neutral. To foster these principles deserves the same dedication and commitment that inspired the most imaginative periods of American diplomacy.

The stagnant societies of the East to which I have referred serve as both a warning and a hope. They remind us that the West's latent intellectual and political vitality, even more than its material prosperity, is the envy of the world. The winds of change are ultimately blowing from the West. The men and women of Eastern Europe are certainly aware that the West, for all its doubt and sense of spiritual dilemma, is the vanguard of modernization, the vital source of learning and of much of modern culture, and the haven of the free human spirit. The developing countries yearning for progress also turn to the West, not the East, for assistance, support, and the measure of what man can achieve when he aspires. Our technology, our creativity, our unequaled economic vigor, not some bureaucratic doctrine of economic determinism, are the forces that will shape the future, provided we mobilize the energies of free peoples.

This is not the time for resignation or acquiescence. It is a time for confidence, determination, and hope. The power of

20

[c]

free men and women and free nations acting in concert,
confident of their strength and of their destiny, cannot be
matched by any totalitarian system or totalitarian movement.
The spirit of freedom can never be crushed. But freedom can
be lost gradually. Such a danger exists today in Western
Europe, and that threat could have consequences not only in
Europe but also throughout the community of democracies
and the world.

If we cherish freedom, we will face the peril, marshal
joint efforts to overcome it, and begin a period of new fulfill-
ment for our peoples. Western Europe, our closest partner
and the cradle of much of our civilization, is too precious to us
for us to do otherwise.

21

Draft IV 5/31

EUROCOMMUNISM SPEECH

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The cohesion of the great industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Japan has been for thirty years the bulwark of peace and the engine of global prosperity.

This unity has been central to the foreign policy of every American Administration in the post-war period, from President Truman to President Carter. The first permanent peacetime security commitment in American history was with the democratic nations of the Atlantic Community. It was soon followed by a commitment to the security of Japan. Since then, the agenda of the industrial democracies has gone beyond collective defense, to common action on energy policy, economic recovery, the international economic system, relations with the Communist world, and with the Third World.

its position as the second largest party and a powerful
rival of the Christian Democratic Party which has governed
Italy throughout the post-war period. The Communist
Party's growth since the 1972 election has been at the
expense of the democratic socialist parties, and is part
and parcel of an increasing and dangerous polarization of
Italian politics. The Communist Party has almost achieved
a de facto veto over government policy and programs in
the Italian Parliament.

In France, in the Presidential election of April 1974,
a coalition of the Communist and Socialist Parties came
within one percentage point of victory on the final ballot.
A majority for this coalition, in the parliamentary elections
which must take place by March 1978, would bring Communist
leaders into key ministrial positions. It would do so,
moreover, in conditions of constitutional crisis, for never
yet has the Constitution of the Fifth Republic been tested.

-4-

by having a President and a Prime Minister from opposite parties.

In Spain and Portugal, both taking their first hopeful steps toward parliamentary democracy,

Communist Parties have fought with ruthlessness and disciplined organization to gain a foothold. Portugal is a member of NATO; Spain is a strategically located country with whom the United States has had a long-standing defense relationship.

These Communist challenges do not exist in isolation.

There is no doubt that a Communist break-through to power in one country will have a major psychological effect on the others, by making the Communist/respectable, or suggesting that there is a trend in their direction.

Most of the causes of this phenomenon are indigenous to the individual countries. And so, too, the response to this

-5-

challenge must come in the first instance from the
European leaders and people who are persuaded that
democracy is worth the effort. America cannot decide
make there
free elections. But what America must do is to face recognize
the facts about the significance of what may lie ahead.
We must analyze dispassionately what the accession of
Communist leaders to executive power will mean to the most
basic premises of our foreign policy. We should not
intervene in free elections, but equally we must not
own
confuse our/people and those in allied countries who take
our judgments seriously about the gravity of the threat,
-- which it is not --
either by treating a Communist victory as inevitable or by
acting as if it were a transitory phenomenon. The decisions
are for the voters of those countries to make. But they --
and we -- would be indulging in wishful thinking if we all
do not acknowledge now:

-- that a Communist Party's coming to power in an
allied country would represent a massive change in

-6-

the fundamental geopolitical circumstances of the
post-war world as we have known it;

-- that it would have fundamental consequences for
America's relationship to its alliances;

-- and that it would alter the prospects for security
and progress of <u>all</u> the free nations.

## How Democratic are Communist Parties?

Those who take a less grave view of these prospects
often claim that the European Communist Parties are
independent of Moscow, and don't pose a
geopolitical problem in the broader East-West context and
that they should be treated as indigenous political forces;
they work within the political system and raising no interna-
tional issue. The existing structure, according to this
school of thought, should be able to adjust to these new
more radical forces.

Admittedly, the history of the Communist and Socialist
movements in the last century and a half is a tale of

-7-

schisms and divisions, doubly intense because of the
passion of a quasi-religious battle over what is
true dogma and what is heresy. It is true enough that
the centrifugal and polycentric tendencies in the Communist
world are one of the most striking developments of our
age. The only times the Soviet Union has used military
force in the post-war period have been against other
Communist countries -- in East Berlin, in Hungary, in
Czechoslovakia, and on the Sino-Soviet border. The Sino-
Soviet conflict may be the most profound and potentially
explosive international conflict of the present period.

Finally, no serious observer disputes that the
Communist parties in Western Europe have in fact demonstrated
some degree of independence from the Soviet Communist
Party, in doctrine and action. Their leaders have asserted
with great fervor -- as the French, Spanish, and Italian
Communist leaders stated in March in Madrid -- their

-8-

commitment to the "full independence" of each of the
three parties, and their belief in "original solutions
for the building of Socialist societies, which correspond
to the conditions in each country".

But this hardly exhausts the issue. For the problem
arises first as to the definition of independence and
secondly as to its significance.

We are entitled to a certain
skepticism about the sincerity of these declarations of
independence, coinciding as they do with electoral self-
interest. One need not be a committed cynic to wonder at
the decision of the French Communists -- traditionally perhaps
the most Stalinist Parties in Western Europe -- at their
Party Congress in February 1976 to renounce the Soviet
model of dictatorship of the proletariat, by a unanimous vote
of 140 to nothing, when all previous Party Congresses had
endorsed the same dictatorship of the proletariat by a similar
vote of 140 to nothing. Why was there not at least one

- 9 -

lonely soul willing to adhere to the previous view? The
record suggests something about the independence of
thought of those voting.

Throughout their existence, the distinguishing feature
of the Communist parties has been their insistence that
a minority had to seize power as the vanguard of the
working class, regardless of democratic procedures, and
impose its version of history on the rest of the population.

It has been, in fact, precisely their disdain of
democratic procedures that has distinguished the Communist
from the Socialist parties. I find it hard to believe

-10-

that these parties have become Social Democrats --
after decades of vilifying Social Democracy and treating
it as their mortal enemy -- especially in every Communist
country. Whether or not they are independent of Moscow, Com-
munists represent a party which by its nature and by their
own testimony stands outside the "bourgeois" framework
of Western constitutional history; they are a movement
that appeals to a radically different tradition and uses an
entirely different vocabulary.

To be sure, the French, Spanish, and Italian Communist
parties have declared their resolve "to work within the
pluralism of political and social forces and to respect
guarantees and develop all individual and collective
freedoms." But French Communist leader Marchais has
listed Bulgaria, Poland, and East Germany as countries that
he regards as having a "pluralistic" party system. As
recently as 1972, French Communist doctrine was that
"there can be no return from socialism to capitalism". The

-11-

Communist program -- by definition -- calls for the
radical transformation of society; by the very nature
they are driven to
bring about institutional changes in the society that
would make their ascendancy irreversible in the name of
"history" and "the interests of the working class" — *irreversible*.
Could they really permit the democratic process to
reverse what they see as the inevitable path of "historical
progress"? No Communist party in power has ever permitted *that* to be done.
*So*, this.

The devotion to national independence and political
pluralism has been affirmed by both Georges Marchais and
Enrico Berlinguer at a conference of Communist parties in
East Berlin in June 1976 as follows: Georges Marchais said:

"In making this definition of our path to Socialism,
we take careful account of our national reality, our
country's specific conditions and traditions. Each

-12-

country has its own.

...Socialism in France will be a Socialism in the colors of France."

Enrico Berlinguer stressed at the same conference:

"Some of our opponents maintain that Socialism and Communism are and will be the same everywhere.

This is not true...In Italy....we are struggling for a Socialist society based on the assertion of the importance of personal and collective freedom and of guaranteeing them: of the principle of the secular and not ideological nature of the state and its democratic articulation; of a multi-party system and of the possibility of the government majorities alternating; of the autonomy of the trade unions, of religious freedoms, of freedom of expression, culture, art and science."

But is this a new development? Can we take at face value their declarations of national independence and

-13-

dedication to democracy? Let me read some other
quotations from European Communist leaders:

-- First: "The crux of the matter, and we
Marxists should know this well: every nation
will effect its transition to Socialism not by
a mapped-out route, not exactly as in the Soviet
Union, but by its own road, dependent on its
historical, national, social, and cultural
circumstances."

That was from a speech by Bulgarian Communist Party
leader Georgi Dimitrov in November 1945.

-- Second: "We take the view that the method of
imposing the Soviet system on [our country] would
be wrong, since this method does not correspond to
present-day conditions of development...We take
the view rather that the overriding interests of
the...people in their present-day situation prescribe

-14-

That is from a proclamation of the [East] German
Communist Party in June 1945.

-- Third: "The great national task facing the country
cannot be solved by either the Communist Party
or by any other party alone. The Communist Party
holds that it does not have a monopoly, and it does
not need the monopoly, to work among the masses for
the reconstruction of the new [nation]. The
Communist party does not approve of the idea of a
one-party system. Let the other parties operate and
organize as well."

That is a statement by Hungarian Party leader Erno Gero
in November 1944.

-15-

— Fourth: "In [our country] there is a division of functions, and State power is based on parliamentary democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat or of a single party is not essential. [Our country] can proceed and is proceeding along her own road."

That is from a speech by Polish Party Leader Władysław Goumlka in January 1946.

— And fifth: "The Communist party seeks to attain Socialism, but we are of the opinion that the Soviet system is not the only road to Socialism. ....The coalition of the Communists with other parties is not opportunistic, a temporary limited coalition, but the expression...of all strata of the working people.....We seek at present to make certain that our new democratic parliamentary methods...be expressed in constitutional law. If you want the view of the Communists, I can only say that they will be the strictest guardians of the new Constitution."

That is a statement by Czechoslovak Communist leader Klement Gottwald in January 1947.

- 16 -

In short, what the leaders of the Western Communist
Parties are saying today about their affection for the
processes of democracy is no different from what East
European Communist leaders declared with equal emphasis
that they had never put down
total power in that region.

There is no doubt that Communist parties now protest
a commitment to pluralism and democratic freedoms.
Certainly they are willing to come to power by democratic
means. But would they relinquish power by the democratic
process? Are their methods and intentions compatible with
democracy over the long term? Are the Communist leaders in
Western Europe today in fact more committed to democratic
procedures than their colleagues in Eastern Europe were?
If they achieved office, would they maintain the institutions
that would represent the principal threat to their power.
Would they support the instrument of their future potential defeat?

- 16a -

We cannot know, of course, but in their own party
organization and management the Leninist precept of
"democratic centralism" is the guiding principle. It
implies iron discipline, the rigid dogma of a "party line",
the suppression of dissent

- 17 -

and the purge of dissenters. It is not a structure of free
debate and association, but of authority and obedience.

There are too many instances of resorts to violence,
of attempts to censor, newspapers and broadcasting through
trade union editorial committees, and to control the
functioning of universities through mass demonstrations and
intimidation, to warrant any optimism.

One of the ironies of the growth of what has been
called Euro-Communism is that only in Western Europe and
the United States are there still illusions about its nature.
In Eastern Europe the moral bankruptcy of the existing systems
has been obvious for decades. The boredom, intellectual
emptiness, inefficiency, and stultifying bureaucratism of
their societies is self-evident. Countries which used to
be leading industrial powers have been reduced to mediocrity

- 18 -

and stagnation. Their youth, their intellectuals, their managers know full well the incompatibility of Communist programs with civil liberties, the rule of law and democratic procedures. The countries of the West would mortgage their future if they closed their eyes to this reality. History gives no award to societies that speed their demise by making assumptions that avoid the necessity of difficult choices.

## Euro-Communism and the Atlantic Alliance

The question misses the central point. Even if some West European Communist parties should act differently on certain measures than some of the better disciplined

- 19 -

for the West. The issue is not

really how "independent" the European Communists would be,

but how Communist. Are their foreign and domestic policies

Atlantic Alliance, which has insured the security of the

Western democracies for nearly thirty years? I believe

that the internal dynamics of the Communist Parties and

of the forces that would bring them to power suggest

a negative answer.

The solidarity of the great industrial democracies
has maintained the global balance of power for thirty
years. Western collective defense provided the shield
behind which the United States, Western Europe and Japan

- 20 -

developed this cooperation, the institutions of European
unity and the world economic system. All these relationships
would be transformed if Communists came to power in allied
governments.

Specifically:

The character of the alliance would be unrecognizable
to the American people. The North Atlantic Treaty began as
a partnership of the democracies to deter a threat from the
tyranny of the East. The signatories of the Treaty pledged
in 1949 that "they are determined to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and
the rule of law."

If Communists come into power in allied countries, the
engagement of the American people to help maintain the
military balance of power in Europe would lack the moral

- 21 -

based on which it has stood for thirty years. The American people would be required to maintain their alliance commitment on the uncertain, untested assumption that there was a new trend of Communism which would split from Moscow, and the equally unlikely assumption that the West would be able to manipulate the new divisions to our advantage.

Both of these propositions are dubious. No major Communist split has ever been generated by Western policy -- in fact the Soviet-Yugoslav and Sino-Soviet rifts had been festering for many months before the West became aware of them. But even a split -- which would surely take years to develop -- would hardly alter the danger to current Allied relationships. For one thing, by the time it occurred the damage to the NATO structure would probably have been done. More importantly, even support for a revisionist Communist party would imply a policy quite different from the current Atlantic relationships. While the United States would not be indifferent to the extension of Soviet hegemony to Western Europe, the

- 22 -

permanent stationing of American forces in Europe could not be maintained for the object of defending some Communist governments against other Communist governments. It would require a balance-of-power approach incompatible with the American tradition and the current American mood. In the past, statements such as these have been interpreted as policy threats. Aside from the fact that I am no longer in a position to enunciate policy, these statements reflect, in my view, not an individual recommendation but a statement of reality. Major participation by Communists in European governments would over time undermine the moral and political basis for our present deployment in Europe.

The effect on Alliance cohesion would be disastrous.

The Western Alliance has been held together by shared democratic values and a system of close consultation based on compatible philosophies. President de Gaulle cherished

- 23 -

France's independence from the United States, but in major crises, such as in Berlin or over Soviet missiles in Cuba, he was clearly a man of the West. Communist governments in Western Europe, however independent of Moscow they may be on national issues, can be expected on major international issues to respond with a tilt towards the East as their shared doctrine would impel them to do.

In February 1976, the Italian Communist leader Berlinguer stated to a London Times interviewer his conviction that "the Soviet Union's peace policy is in the general interest of mankind." The Italian Party newspaper denounced NATO last year as "one of the fundamental instruments for American manipulation of the politics and economy of our country and Western Europe," and said that "the relations between the countries of Western Europe and the two superpowers

- 24 -

must be rediscussed." A leading member of the Italian
Party's Central Committee* was asked in a recent interview
with Radio Free Europe: If the French and Italian Communist
Parties were in power, what would you do in the event of
"a grave international crisis between the Soviet Union
and the West?" He answered: "We would choose the Soviet
side, of course." The declaration in Madrid three months
ago of the French, Italian, and Spanish Party leaders re-
iterated the familiar Communist demand for the dissolution
of NATO and the removal of American forces: It called once
again for "ending the division of Europe into antagonistic
military blocs" and for "a peaceful democratic, and inde-
pendent Europe, without foreign bases."

* Lucio Lombardo Radice, interview reprinted in *Encounter*
May 1977.

- 25 -

These parties have had their differences with the
Soviet Union, but in every case it has been on a matter of
relations *within* the Communist movement. They have rarely,
if ever, diverged from the Soviet position on an inter-
national issue. The Italian Communist Party has hailed the
Cubans in Angola as "freedom fighters", condemned the
Israeli rescue of hostages at Entebbe as an "intolerable
violation of Uganda's national sovereignty", and
America's diplomatic efforts in Southern Africa last year
as an attempt to "save the neocolonial and military-
strategic interests of imperialism." Communist Parties can
be expected to steer their countries' basic policies closer
to the so-called non-aligned bloc and into an anti-Western
direction. Yugoslavia -- whose independence from Moscow
on East European issues is notorious -- has emerged as a

- 26 -

champion of radical anti-Western and anti-American positions
on practically every international issue outside of Eastern
Europe. Why should we expect We should have no illusion that Communist parties
would be in Western Europe more friendly to us. What under such
conditions would become of the system of Allied consultations?
How would Atlantic unity possibly be maintained when,

If Communist parties come to power, in Western Europe,
major divergences would therefore be bound to develop
between Europe and the United States on foreign policy.

The strong role our allies play in defending Western
interests in many regions of the globe -- such as France's
recent role in Africa -- could hardly be expected to continue
in a government where
in a government in which power is shared with a Communist
Party. In the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in relations
with the Third World, on Berlin, on arms control and European

- 27 -

security, the parallelism of views that has existed
between the United States and its European allies would
almost certainly be eroded. In our common efforts to
improve the world economy and stimulate progress in both
North and South, in the OECD, in the Paris Conference on
International Economic Cooperation and at Heads of
Governments Summits, a new divisiveness would soon be
apparent.

The military strength and unity of NATO would be
<u>gravely weakened</u>. The Communist Parties of Western Europe
pay lip service to staying in NATO. <u>There is reason to</u>
<u>assume such pronouncements represent a tactical decision.</u>

In fact, a major deterioration of Western defense if they came to
power would be inevitable. They would hardly conceive
of NATO defense as a national priority for budgetary

- 29 -

If the countries of Western Europe emerge with major Communist participation in their governments, NATO may turn by default into a largely German-American alliance. This specter can then be used in the other West European countries to undermine what remains of the Atlantic cohesion.

If NATO is thus weakened while the Soviet Union continues to increase both its strategic and conventional strength in Europe, and shows no sign of easing its grip on the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, the essential equilibrium of power between East and West in Europe would be fundamentally altered. The freedom of many European countries, large and small