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Orig. D

SPEECH FOR THE BILDERBERG CONFERENCE

The establishment of partnership in the Atlantic world will require the concerted endeavours of a whole generation, a joint effort to ensure balanced growth in all spheres. But to feel its effects we shall not have to wait till the task is completed; they are with us today as we press forward towards our distant aim.

This partnership will prove possible only if we are ready to
defend our own position and at the same time to recognize our obliga-
tions towards the other States in the world. It cannot and must not
founder on the issue of equality of status, which is a *sine qua non*
of partnership. This equality cannot apply to one sector only. Nor
is it a requirement that is already met at the beginning of our
collaboration. Equality of status will be the practical result of
equality in achievement.

The demand for equality between the partners is concentrated today largely on the question of joint control over nuclear weapons. While I would not query the soundness of this claim, which after all only reflects the desire of each country to maintain its individuality, it is unfortunate that exclusive attention is being given to this aspect of our common objective. "War is the continuation of politics by other means". For any citizen of the Atlantic world who thinks in terms other than those of power politics, these words of Clausewitz imply that war is nevertheless the exception, not the rule. If you want to maintain your position in the world, it follows that you must be prepared for this exception. At the same time, however, you must seek to act in such a way that you can maintain your objectives, yet avoid war.

Consequently, the non-military aspects of partnership - I am
thinking of internal growth and external responsibilities - merit
closer attention than they are receiving today, while the discussion
is going on under the shadow of nuclear weapons.

In the context of the general economic problems of partnership,
I should like to put forward my ideas on agricultural policy so that
they may be discussed. Where in all these problems are we to find the
break-through to an Atlantic concept which meets both the requirement

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of a satisfactory internal solution and that of recognizing our obligations to the world beyond the Atlantic area?

The first point to be noted is the lack of harmony between economic policy in general and agricultural policy in particular. The first urgent task that presents itself is therefore to fit agriculture into our overall economic policy.

The lack of harmony between current agricultural policy as practised in all industrialized countries of Europe and the principles of general economic policy in the Western world is obvious. It arose - and it is growing bigger - as a consequence of the advances made in industrial techniques and of the consequent changes in the social order. In less than two hundred years the percentage of farm workers in the total labour force has dropped from 80 to 10 or 15, while production has increased many times over. Far fewer people are producing very much more. This state of affairs is proof of the advances made by agriculture, but it also brings out the difficult problem of social change, with all its material and psychological consequences.

As far as output is concerned, then, agriculture has by no means lagged far behind general developments. Government attitudes and the psychological reaction of the people affected, however, have been quite different. During the industrial revolution there was only one short period of opposition to the process of industrialization - the period of the Luddite movements. Since then we have moved forward along the path of industrial revolution with optimistic faith in progress. At any rate, the hardships of proletarianization have been overcome by the great achievements of a hundred years of the modern trade union movement - a movement understood by the more intelligent employers and finally given the moral support of the churches - to such an extent that Marx's phrase from the Communist Manifesto needs to be revised: for the workers do have more to lose than their chains. There has always been a universal side to this industrial optimism - one that encompasses the internationalism of a world whose economy is based on the division of labour.

Although agriculture could not stand aside from this technical and industrial development, it has not in general seen its way to accepting

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it boldly. In Europe more than elsewhere it has, for various reasons, opposed this irreversible trend. It allowed itself to be carried unwillingly on the tide of events, instead of taking a bold decision to master them, control them, guide them. It would be wrong to look for the causes of this exclusively or even chiefly among the farming population. There is no doubt that the structure of agriculture - particularly in Europe, with its millions of small farms - has obstructed a process that could not but lead, here as elsewhere, to proletarianization, to a flight from the land. But the distortion of this process and its temporary artificial obstruction, together with the lack of any preparation for a satisfactory solution to the problems that inevitably arose with technical progress, and particularly the problem of gearing agriculture to a world in which division of labour is the order of the day, was the result of the strategic policies followed in the various countries. Every State wished to have its food supply secured in case of war. In the face of what was good for the health of the economy, both national and international, a minimum of self-sufficiency in agriculture had to be maintained by each State. To a much greater extent than in the industrial world, with its division of labour, agriculture was forced for reasons of State to remain in the nature reserve of an industry ready for war even in the halcyon days of peace. This explains the contrast between the ways in which industry and agriculture have developed. Whereas the economy in general was encouraged to move forward, agriculture had to accept a patchwork policy which meant avoiding any confrontation between the country's agricultural economy and the world economic system.

As difficulties arose, emergency solutions were found. In our countries agricultural policy consists almost entirely of a mass of conflicting attempts to keep control of developments which cannot be halted but which you try to cope with more or less helplessly, more or less aimlessly, by extending the patchwork of solutions - to the detriment of the farming population.

It is therefore no accident, but the result of differences in the concept applied to the industrial and to the agricultural economy, that in all international agreements agriculture is almost automatically excluded. Even in the EEC the Member States could not agree on a

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common agricultural policy when the Treaty was drawn up. They left this task to the EEC Commission, which was required under the Treaty to put forward its proposals within the first two years of the transitional period.

This, then, was the option facing the Commission:

a) It could undertake the task of harmonizing the patchwork of "solutions" adopted by the six countries and still keep the rest of the world at a distance - as national policies for agriculture had done. This would mean transferring to Community level the whole system of licences and quotas, compulsory deliveries and mixing regulations, and all the other machinery normally employed in state trading;

b) Or it could realize that the concerting of policy within the Community should not be limited to breaking through national agricultural policies, that the task of formulating a common agricultural policy presented a unique opportunity for a bold step forward which would fit farm policy into the general economic policy and so give agriculture a place in the world-wide and outward-looking economic order which is taken as a matter of course in the case of the industrial economy.

The Commission took the second option. It is aware that this requires courage and imagination. It seems to me that the Commission's decision cannot be disputed by anyone who is conscious of the need for a world-wide development of the economy as a whole.

I would go so far as to say that the means by which the Commission will attain its objectives are simple - as is basically the case with all really important decisions: it must replace the tattered patchwork of national quasi-state-trading practices by a system of variable levies, comparable in character with the variable duties found in the tariffs for industrial goods.

This is an evolutionary measure, the psychological effect of which will be completely revolutionary. It needs firm political intent and

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great courage to take this decisive step towards aligning agriculture with the rest of the economy and its basic principles. The road we shall have to travel if we are to achieve this end is overshadowed by many difficulties - some artificial, some very serious.

Traditional ways of thinking and decades of habit naturally lead to anxiety complexes in people confronted with any innovation. Within the Community, however, what farmers fear is exactly the reverse of what is feared by farmers outside the Community. Resistance inside the Community is based on the fear that under this system the Community's agriculture will be exposed without any protection to every form of fair or unfair competition. Resistance outside the Community, on the other hand, is based on the fear that the Community may become agriculturally self-sufficient so that non-member countries would be excluded from its internal market.

It cannot be denied that there are arguments which lend some support to both these fears, although they really cancel each other out.

Even when we disregard the psychological resistance of all those who are against the new system just because it is new and despite the fact that it is reasonable and accords with general economic ideas, we do need to see how far there are really difficulties of substance.

The first of these difficulties is that the transfer from separate policies to a concerted policy must take place simultaneously with the process of formulating a joint intra-Community agricultural policy. For someone like me, who has always refused to accept that there is any contradiction between the internal development of the Community and the determination of the Community's attitude to the rest of the world, it is neither permissible nor possible for our allotted task to be split up in this way. The Community cannot build up its internal organization without reference to the world around it and leave it until some future date to negotiate with other countries on the Community's relations with them. The world economy is developing at the same time as the Community is integrating, and so the two can never be dealt with in isolation.

But it must be recognized that considerable difficulties may arise from the fact that the two processes are going on concurrently. We are

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negotiating with other countries as if we were already a fully fledged
Community; but they can see that we are involved in a difficult process
of internal harmonization.

Part of the difficulty of this process derives from the fact that
the levy system must be applied - even if degressively - among the
Member States until the end of the transitional period on 1 January 1970
to facilitate the process of alignment. This alignment requires that
there shall be an agreed price towards which all shall move, and it is
around this price that controversy rages.

The system of variable levies proposed by the Commission and adopted
by the Council is not in itself either a good thing or a bad.
Whether it produces good results or bad depends on the policy
it is used to implement. The policy in question here is price policy.
And price policy finally brings agriculture back within the framework of
general economic policy. This, however, brings it face to face with
the two problems of internal policy and of external trade.

Within the Community, prices that are too high may produce the
threat of autarkic development. But a "fair" price should ensure that
the past failure of national agricultural policies to get to grips with
realities should not be put right at the expense of the present genera-
tion of farmers. This does not apply only to the countries of our
Community. National policies everywhere should abandon the patchwork
approach, the country-by-country manipulations; this is a task which
can only be achieved by stages, and it is here that the Community's task
of internal harmonization impinges on the problem of relations with the
rest of the world.

The Kennedy Round will be the occasion of a grand confrontation
of these two obligations in the Atlantic area.

For these negotiations the Community will need to know the price
of the major agricultural products. It will have to be prepared - and
is prepared as a result of the Council decisions of 23 December 1963 -
to bind the support given (the difference between the Community price and
the world market price) provided the other negotiating powers reciprocate.
Any alteration of the support given will then be subject to GATT rules
as in the case of industrial products.

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As a consequence, the arrangements for fitting agriculture into the rest of the economy are now for the first time being applied in world-wide trade negotiations. The dangers must not be underestimated. Within the Community these dangers arise in connection with the fixing of a price bracket that could give reasonable and defensible protection to our own agriculture, but the upper limit of which would throttle the trade we need by producing autarkic tendencies. I realize where this limit should be in theory, and I also realize that this price formation will demand considerable effort. The battle on this point has now been joined in the Community. Plenty of attempts are being made to evade the decision by going back to the old practice of state trading.

If the Community is putting every effort into finding a reasonable solution that will be consonant with its responsibilities towards its Atlantic partner and other non-member countries, then it must be entitled to call on these countries to assume their share of responsibility. If our friends across the Atlantic are not fully aware of the importance of these efforts or if, through short-sightedness or for the sake of convenience, they ally themselves with those forces inside the Community that prefer state trading, theirs will be the full responsibility for a double failure:

1. The failure to fit agriculture into the rest of the economy, a move which is absolutely essential, and consequently

2. The failure to produce an Atlantic policy for agriculture as a contribution to the solution of the agricultural problems of what is now being called the "third world".

To be a wholehearted supporter of Atlantic partnership does not imply a lack of awareness that there are difficult negotiations ahead of us. I am not advocating an unrealistic mood of fraternity. What matters is whether or not we seize this unique opportunity of working out a solution and thus freeing agriculture from its isolation, whether or not our Atlantic partner takes a hand in wrecking the first great attempt to fit agriculture into the economic system adopted by the world today.

The idea of Atlantic partnership originated with the late President Kennedy. The Kennedy round of negotiations will show whether the assassin's bullets have destroyed the idea as well as the man.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

Paper Prepared for Discussion at Meeting at
Williamsburg, Virginia, 20-22 March 1964

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE OF:

1. <u>Apparent Changes in the Communist World</u>

(a) <u>Soviet Internal Developments</u>

Fluctuations in Soviet outlook and tone stem from the fluctuating state of Soviet
economy. From 1956 to 1960 rapid economic growth led to expectation of a shift in the
balance of power through "peaceful coexistence." The failure of these prospects, to-
gether with low agricultural production, deflated the mood of buoyancy.

Far-reaching Party and administrative reorganization was undertaken and economic planning revised. Their purpose was to loosen the grip of a cumbersome and resistant bureaucracy upon management of the economy and to face the failure of Soviet agricultural policy. Over time, the needs of industrialization have pushed Soviet policy toward positive incentives as against overt coercion as the energizing force; hence, de-Stalinization and the growth of pragmatism in Party practice.

Such changes have been hailed in the West as steps toward "liberalization" of the regime -- a misleading term in its western sense. The Party has strengthened its position relative to other groups -- managers, the military, and the police. In the main, "independence" among artists and intellectuals springs, not from dissident opposition, but from resistance to over-zealous controls. The system has become more complex, but continues to control all aspects of society; and Khrushchev controls both Party and system.

Soviet economy has a great potential for growth and power. The recent CIA estimate
on the retardation of the Soviet economy should be received with caution, and cannot be
extrapolated over the entire 15-20 year course of the transition to Communism. The

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central factor of strength in the building of a "mighty material-technical base" is the
8-10% per year compounding of heavy industry growth and the even more rapid pyramiding
of science and technology. Efforts to improve the lot of the consumer are alternately
intensified and cut back, but basic investment in the real sinews of power goes on.

Agriculture is a stubborn problem, which can be mitigated if the regime perseveres in
expanding the chemical and agricultural machine industry and improving production methods.

The economic system, despite waste and inefficiency, is not likely to be halted or turned
into the creation of domestic affluence, and thus of a less aggressive society.

(b) The Communist Bloc

The Sino-Soviet dispute is not the only problem which has complicated the Soviet
imperial structure. Among the Eastern European states repercussions of the dispute,
of the de-Stalinization campaign, and of the Common Market, during the period of its
highest promise, led, on the one hand, to satellite pressure for increased local autonomy
and more favorable economic arrangements with the USSR, and, on the other, to Russian
efforts for greater integration within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. Out-
side the bloc, the same forces encouraged a more independent and nationalistic attitude
among West European communist parties.

The contradiction between Mao and Khrushchev for the moment appears to be
intractable. The West is generally at a loss as to how it can be exploited, if at all.

While the Chinese and the Soviet leaders are in controversy over tactics, priorities, and
methods, both proclaim quite correctly that their strategy is directed toward furthering
"the triumph of socialism and communism on a world-wide scale." The West must con-
clude that both follow a single dynamic principle, the end of "capitalism-imperialism"
and the erection of a "socialist-communist" world order.

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## 2. Possible Changes in the Attitude of the USSR Toward the West

Changes in the attitude of the USSR toward the West are not likely to be fundamental, but short-range tactical shifts, primarily extensions of "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful competition." The Cold War will not end. Ideological and class struggle will continue. We may look forward to negotiations and moderate agreements on such matters as, e.g., nuclear delivery systems. Khrushchev, like the West, regards general and complete disarmament as merely a subject for propaganda manipulation. Within the International Communist Movement, the West will be "the enemy" until there is a basic change in its nature, the roots and shape of which are not at present discernible.

Economic disappointment and the continued prospect of nuclear inferiority have had two contradictory effects: one is the prolongation of the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and the atmosphere of detente; the other to seek short cuts to an improved power position, as in Cuba, and to continued awareness of the political uses of military capabilities, including assistance to local conflicts, described as "wars of national liberation."

Advanced industrial areas continue to hold first place in Soviet attention. Here revolutionary appeals to the proletariat have been replaced by appeals to the bourgeoisie based on peace, nationalism, and trade -- the last intensified by Soviet economic difficulties. Soviet purpose is to divide non-communist nations and entice into closer relationship the important economies of Germany and Japan.

In the undeveloped areas Soviet policy has shifted from a social revolutionary appeal to an anti-Western nationalist one.

Present policy, described in Russia as "creative Marxism," and in China as "revisionism," is defended as more prudent in the nuclear age and more effective than

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Stalinist practice. Its supporters expect it to bear fruit in from five to fifteen years, when it is hoped that political deterioration in Europe and economic competition among capitalist countries will make both Europe and Japan more amenable to Soviet approaches.

Pressure will be sustained at all existing critical points (Berlin, the division of Germany, the alliance and base system), and new ones will be exploited as opportunity arises (Cyprus, Zanzibar, Panama, the underdeveloped areas generally). Significant changes in the territorial status quo cannot be achieved by resort to force without excessive risk. Therefore, in Soviet view, non-aggression treaties are useful in forestalling attempts to alter frontiers by military action. Despite the nuclear test ban treaty there will be no entente with the West, let alone an alliance against the Chinese. The primary concern will be to divide, not to accommodate, the Western alliance. Nothing, the Communists believe, will hinder the progressive conquest of the world by the "peaceful" advance of the "socialist system," by the "struggle" for "national liberation" and by the final destruction of imperialism and "old and new colonialism." The threshold of "brinkmanship" will always be carefully calculated, but the USSR and Communist China may converge in their estimate of the extent to which nuclear deterrence permits a more aggressive policy.

These developments are favorable for the West as they tend to reduce immediate hazards. Their longer-term effect will depend on the adequacy of Western response. Both bellicosity and Western weakness, disunity, and concessions under pressure will invite Communist probes and encourage Communist militants. Modest measures of collaboration may reduce the hazard of war, but only if undertaken with full awareness of the underlying conflict of purpose between adversary societies. The West may also be able to encourage limited autonomous trends in Eastern Europe by carefully devised military policy and by differentiated trade policies and cultural exchanges. But it is fundamental and essential to remember that Western unity, vitality, and strength are the most effective means to

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encourage evolution of the Communist world in a desirable direction.

3. Recent Developments Within the Western World

(a) Political Interest Centered on Two Issues

(i) How the Atlantic Nations Should Organize Themselves. Should this be done on the concepts of European integration and Atlantic partnership, or on the French idea of "l'Europe des patries" at arms length from the U.S.? This issue will be confused in 1964 by the fact of elections occurring or imminent in important NATO states. Uncertainty and some mutual irritation within the alliance is likely as the political maneuvering develops. But over the longer term, the choice will remain to be made.

(ii) East-West Relations. Euphoria has given this subject more importance than it deserves. Talk of "dialogue," "initiatives," etc., obscures the fact that Soviets reach agreements when "objective realities" of the situation, as they see them, make such agreements desirable -- not otherwise. Necessary "realities" are created not by talking with Soviets, but by building up strength of the West. To enter into extensive discussions with the USSR before this "reality" exists is not only to waste time but to divert energy from more needful tasks and to confuse and divide the alliance.

To some extent, this has occurred in the last year.

(b) Military Developments Have Focused on Two Issues

(i) NATO Strategy. Considerable progress has been made in the development of usable conventional power. Further progress is obstructed by growing confusion as to the purposes for which military power is needed in Europe. There are three such purposes:

**First:** To deter, and if unsuccessful, to meet, a deliberate Soviet attack on Europe. This is the least likely (though most discussed) contingency so long as U.S. strategic nuclear power provides risks wholly unacceptable to the USSR.

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**Second:** To increase USSR caution in taking steps to halt or prevent by force constructive evolution in Eastern Europe which they would regard as weakening Communist regimes. Here nuclear weapons are of no use, while increased allied conventional strength is the only form of military power which can affect decisions in any way.

**Third:** To restore order in event of a blow-up in East Germany (undesired and unsought) when the situation along the border might be entirely chaotic with refugees streaming across, guards trying to stop them, fighting by East and West Germans to overpower guards, and substantial -- if unintended -- transgression of the border by Soviet and Western forces trying to recapture or assist would-be refugees. Here, a NATO force posture based on forward deployment and early use of tactical nuclear weapons would greatly increase the chances of unwanted escalation. Only the threat of strong conventional forces could lead to "negotiations" under favorable circumstances.

(ii) **Sharing of Responsibility for Nuclear Deterrence.** Recent developments point toward the following conclusions in this field:

**First:** The machinery for NATO nuclear consultation set up at Ottawa has not so far fulfilled its promise. The participants lack a real stake in the manning and ownership of strategic forces. Hence the consultation fails to grip them.

**Second:** The attempt to acquire such a stake via national nuclear programs has proven increasingly economically wasteful, militarily ineffective, and politically divisive.

**Third:** The MLF will give allies a stake in ownership, manning and control of strategic weapons in a way that avoids these disadvantages of national programs.

(c) **Economic**

(i) **Kennedy Round.** Preparations during the past year have pointed up three important developments:

**First:** The Europeans are not willing to negotiate a major reduction in

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agricultural trade barriers. The key question here is not whether this is good or bad for the Alliance -- it is clearly bad -- but whether the agricultural problem can be kept from destroying the entire Kennedy Round. This means (i) careful tactical handling of the issue in the Kennedy Round; (ii) dispassionate study of the problems of temperate agriculture, to identify what the long-run solutions might be.

**Second:** Despite strong pockets of protectionism, Europeans are willing to negotiate a meaningful reduction in trade barriers on industrial goods. Sporadic protectionist actions are atypical responses to special situations.

**Third:** U.S. and even European liberal traders disagree among themselves on such issues as disparities and exceptions. Resolution of their differences, which appear to involve no more than mechanical details, will determine the extent to which the Kennedy Round cuts trade barriers. Resolution can be found through judgment of all proposals by their effect on increasing the flow of trade, rather than by dogmatic formulae.

(ii) **European Integration.** The EEC has largely recovered from the trauma of the UK veto. Continued growth and prosperity has permitted accelerated execution of the Rome Treaty. Simultaneously, continued prosperity in other European countries, e.g., the UK, has somewhat dulled interest in joining the EEC.

(iii) **Monetary Matters.** The problem of imbalance between Europe and the U.S. has been joined by a problem of imbalance within Europe itself. The Italians are troubled by a large deficit, while the Germans again find their surplus growing rapidly. The Bretton Woods agreements are in urgent need of modernization. Intra-European capital shifts, e.g., German loans to Italy, would also be useful.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

Enclosed you will find a provisional list containing the names and
principal functions of all those who can be expected to attend the
Bilderberg Meeting at Williamsburg on 20, 21 and 22 March 1964.

A definite list of all the participants will be handed over to
you on your arrival at Williamsburg.

If you wish to have any changes made in the way your name and
principal function are mentioned in this provisional list, you are
requested to inform the Bilderberg Secretariat (1 Smidswater, the Hague)
as soon as possible.

Persons attending a Bilderberg Meeting for the first time are
requested to inform the Secretariat at the Hague if they wish to receive
all correspondence and documents in English or in French.

Confidential

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

Williamsburg conference

20, 21 and 22 March 1964

PROVISIONAL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

H.R.H. the Prince of the Netherlands
Chairman

Ernst H. van der Beugel
Honorary Secretary General for Europe

Joseph E. Johnson
President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Honorary Secretary General for the United States

Paul Rykens
Honorary Treasurer

Arnold T. Lamping
Former Ambassador,
Deputy Secretary General for Europe

ACHESON, Dean
Former Secretary of State
United States

AGNELLI, Giovanni
Vice-Chairman of the Board and Managing Director
FIAT Company
Italy

ARLIOTIS, Charles C.
Banker
Greece

BALL, George W.
Under Secretary of State
United States

BAUMEL, Jacques
Senator, Secretary General "Union pour la
Nouvelle République"
France

BAUMGARTNER, Wilfrid S.
Former Minister of Finance
France

BEER, Henrik
Secretary General League of Red Cross Societies
International

BENNETT, Frederic
Member of Parliament
United Kingdom

BERG, Fritz
President Federation of German Industries
Germany

BIRRENBACH, Kurt
Member of Parliament
Germany

BIRGI, M. Nuri
Ambassador to NATO
Turkey

BOLLING, Richard
Congressman
United States

-2-

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>BRAUER, Max<br>Former Burgomaster of Hamburg, Member<br>of Parliament</td>
    <td>Germany</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>BUCHAN, Alastair<br>Director Institute for Strategic Studies</td>
    <td>United Kingdom</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>BUNDY, McGeorge<br>Special Assistant to the President for<br>National Security Affairs</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>CABOT, Louis W.<br>President Cabot Corporation</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>CARLI, Guido<br>Managing Director "Banca d'Italia"</td>
    <td>Italy</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>CATTANI, Attilio<br>Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
    <td>Italy</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>CISLER, Walker L.<br>Industrialist</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>COLLADO, Emilio G.<br>Vice-President Standard Oil Co. (N.J.)</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>DEAN, Arthur<br>International Lawyer and Diplomat</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>DEBRÉ, Michel<br>Former Prime Minister</td>
    <td>France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>DEFFERRE, Gaston<br>Dep. National Assembly, Mayor of Marseille</td>
    <td>France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>DUNCAN, James S.<br>Company Director</td>
    <td>Canada</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>ECZACIBASI, Nejat F.<br>Industrialist</td>
    <td>Turkey</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>ERLANDER, Tage F.<br>Prime Minister</td>
    <td>Sweden</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>ERLER, Fritz<br>Member of Parliament</td>
    <td>Germany</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>FORD, Gerald R.<br>Congressman</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>FRELINGHUYSEN, Peter H.B.<br>Congressman</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>FULBRIGHT, J. William<br>Senator</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>FULTON, David<br>Leader Conservative Party British Columbia</td>
    <td>Canada</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>GISCARD d'ESTAING, Valéry<br>Minister of Finance</td>
    <td>France</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>GRIFFIN, A.G.S.<br>Banker</td>
    <td>Canada</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>GUBBINS, Sir Colin<br>Industrialist</td>
    <td>United Kingdom</td>
  </tr>
</table>

-3-

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>HAEKKERUP, Per<br>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
    <td>Denmark</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HAUGE, Gabriel<br>President Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HEALEY, Denis<br>Member of Parliament, Labour Party Spokesman<br>on Defense</td>
    <td>United Kingdom</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HEENEY, Arnold D.P.<br>Former Ambassador to the U.S.A., Chairman<br>Canadian Section Int. Joint Commission</td>
    <td>Canada</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HEINZ II, Henry J.<br>Chairman of the Board Heinz Co.</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HERTER, Christian A.<br>Former Secretary of State, Special Representative<br>for Trade Negotiations</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HØEGH, Leif<br>Shipowner</td>
    <td>Norway</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HOLIFIELD, Chet<br>Congressman</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>JACKSON, Charles D.<br>Publisher Life Magazine</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>JACKSON, Henry M.<br>Senator</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>JAVITS, Jacob K.<br>Senator</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KERCHOVE d'OUSSELGHEM, Nicolas W. de<br>Assistant "Ecole des Sciences politiques et<br>sociales"</td>
    <td>Belgium</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KISSINGER, Henry A.<br>Professor, Associate Harvard University Center<br>for International Affairs</td>
    <td>United States</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KLEFFENS, Eelco N. van<br>Chief Representative in the United Kingdom of<br>the European Coal and Steel Community</td>
    <td>International</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KNUDTZON, Harald<br>Director of "Den Danske Landmandsbank"</td>
    <td>Denmark</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KOHNSTAMM, Max<br>Vice-President Action Committee for a United<br>States of Europe</td>
    <td>International</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KOSTER, Herman J. de<br>President of the Employers' Organisation</td>
    <td>Netherlands</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KRAFT, Ole B.<br>Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member<br>of Parliament</td>
    <td>Denmark</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>KÜHLMANN-STUMM, Knut Freiherr von<br>Member of Parliament</td>
    <td>Germany</td>
  </tr>
</table>

-4-

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>LA MALFA, Ugo<br>Member of Parliament</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>LAMONTAGNE, Maurice<br>President of the Queen's Privy Council<br>for Canada</td>
      <td>Canada</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>LANGE, Halvard<br>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
      <td>Norway</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>LENNEP, Jonkheer Emile van<br>Chairman Monetary Committee E.E.C.</td>
      <td>International</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>LITCHFIELD Jr., Lawrence<br>Chairman of the Board Aluminum Co. of America</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>LOLLI, Ettore<br>General Manager "Banca Nazionale del Lavoro"</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>LUNS, Joseph M.A.H.<br>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
      <td>Netherlands</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MAJONICA, Ernst<br>Member of Parliament</td>
      <td>Germany</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MALAGODI, Giovanni F.<br>Member of Parliament, Secretary General of<br>the Liberal Party</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MALFATTI, Franco M.<br>Under Secretary Ministry of Industry and Commerce</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MANSHOLT, Sicco L.<br>Vice-President E.E.C.</td>
      <td>International</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>McCLOY, John J.<br>Lawyer and Diplomat</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>McGHEE, George C.<br>Ambassador to the Federal Republic</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>McGILL, Ralph<br>Publisher</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MEYNEN, Johannes<br>President A.K.U.</td>
      <td>Netherlands</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MOREIRA, Adriano<br>Director Institute of Political and Social<br>Sciences Overseas, Former Minister of Overseas<br>Territories</td>
      <td>Portugal</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>MURPHY, Robert D.<br>President Corning Glass International</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>NEBOLSINE, George<br>International Lawyer</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>NYKOPP, Johan<br>Former Ambassador, General Manager of Tampella</td>
      <td>Finland</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>PEARSON, Lester B.<br>Prime Minister</td>
      <td>Canada</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>PECCEI, Aurelio<br>Managing Director Italconsult</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

-5-

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>PEDINI, Mario<br>Member of Parliament, Member of European Parliament</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>PINAY, Antoine<br>Former Prime Minister</td>
      <td>France</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>QUARONI, Pietro<br>Ambassador to the United Kingdom</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>RICHARDSON, Gordon<br>Chairman Schröder, Wagg and Co. Ltd</td>
      <td>United Kingdom</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>ROCKEFELLER, David<br>President Chase Manhattan Bank</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>ROLL, Sir Eric<br>Economic Minister at the British Embassy to the United States</td>
      <td>United Kingdom</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SAMKALDEN, Ivo<br>Professor of International Law</td>
      <td>Netherlands</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SCAGLIA, Giovanni Battista<br>Member of Parliament, Vice-Chairman Christian Democratic Party</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SCHMID, Carlo<br>Vice-President Federal Parliament</td>
      <td>Germany</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SCHWEITZER, Pierre-Paul<br>Managing Director International Monetary Fund</td>
      <td>International</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SHULMAN, Marshall<br>Research Associate Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Professor of International Politics Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SNØY et d'OPPUERS, Baron<br>Managing Director "Compagnie d'Outremer pour l'Industrie et la Finance"</td>
      <td>Belgium</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SPAAK, Paul-Henry<br>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
      <td>Belgium</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>SPEIDEL, Hans<br>Special Adviser on Defense Matters</td>
      <td>Germany</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>STEWART, Michael<br>Member of Parliament</td>
      <td>United Kingdom</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>STIKKER, Dirk U.<br>Secretary General of NATO</td>
      <td>International</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>STONE, Shepard<br>Director International Affairs Program, Ford Foundation</td>
      <td>United States</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>TERKELSEN, Terkel<br>Editor</td>
      <td>Denmark</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>UMBRICHT, Victor H.<br>President CIBA Corporation New York</td>
      <td>Switzerland</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>VITTORELLI, Paolo<br>Senator</td>
      <td>Italy</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>WALLENBERG, Marcus<br>Chairman Federation of Swedish Industries</td>
      <td>Sweden</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

-6-

<table><tr><td>WATSON, Thomas J.<br>Chairman International Business Machines Corp.</td><td>United States</td></tr><tr><td>WINTERS, Robert H.<br>Industrialist</td><td>Canada</td></tr><tr><td>WOLFF von AMERONGEN, Otto<br>Senior Partner Otto Wolff Köln</td><td>Germany</td></tr><tr><td>WOODS, George D.<br>President International Bank for Reconstruction<br>and Development</td><td>International</td></tr><tr><td>WESTON, Walter B.<br>Executive Vice-President First National<br>City Bank</td><td>United States</td></tr><tr><td>WYNDHAM WHITE, Eric<br>Executive Secretary G.A.T.T.</td><td>International</td></tr></table>

24 February 1964.

Addendum

In addition to the persons mentioned above a United Kingdom as well as a German Cabinet Minister will attend the Meeting: their names were not yet definitely known when this list was composed.

Moreover, the following names should be added to the list:

<table><tr><td>GALLOIS, Pierre M.<br>General, Specialist in nuclear problems</td><td>France</td></tr><tr><td>LA MALENE, Christian de<br>Member of Parliament</td><td>France</td></tr><tr><td>LIPKOWSKI, Jean de<br>Diplomat</td><td>France</td></tr></table>

Addendum

A part les personnes mentionnées ci-dessus, un Ministre du Cabinet britanique, ainsi qu'un Ministre de la République Fédérale de l'Allemagne Occidentale prendront part à la Conférence: leur noms n'étaient pas encore définitivement connus au moment de clôture de cette liste.

En outre les noms suivants doivent être ajoutés à la liste:

THE BILDERBERG MEETINGS

The idea of the Bilderberg Meetings originated in the early fifties. Changes had taken place on the international political and economic scene after World War II. The countries of the Western World felt the need for closer collaboration to protect their moral and ethical values, their democratic institutions, and their independence against the growing Communist threat. The Marshall Plan and NATO were examples of collective efforts of Western countries to join hands in economic and military matters after World War II.

In the early 1950's, a number of people on both sides of the Atlantic sought a means of bringing together leading citizens, not necessarily connected with government, for informal discussions of problems facing the Atlantic community. Such meetings, they felt, would create a better understanding of the forces and trends affecting Western nations; in particular, they believed that direct exchanges could help to clear up differences and misunderstandings that might weaken the West.

ORIGIN

One of the men who saw the need for such discussions was the late Joseph Retinger. In 1952 he approached H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands with the suggestion of informal and unofficial meetings to discuss the problems facing the Atlantic community. Others in Europe wholeheartedly supported the idea, and proposals were submitted to American friends to join in the undertaking. A number of Americans, including C.D. Jackson, the late General Walter Bedell Smith, and the late John Coleman, agreed to cooperate.

The first meeting that brought Americans and Europeans together took place under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard at the Bilderberg Hotel in

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Oosterbeek, Holland, from May 29 to May 31, 1954. Ever since, the meetings have been called Bilderberg Meetings.

## No Strict Rules of Procedure

From the outset it was the intention of the Bilderberg founders and participants that no strict rules of procedure govern the meetings. Every effort was made to create a relaxed, informal atmosphere conducive to free and frank discussions.

Bilderberg is in no sense a policy-making body. No conclusions are reached. There is no voting and no resolutions are passed.

The meetings are off the record. Only the participants themselves may attend the meetings.

## Participants

It was obvious from the first that the success of the meetings would depend primarily on the level of the participants. Leading figures from many fields - industry, labor, education, government, etc. - are invited, who, through their special knowledge or experience, can help to further Bilderberg objectives. Representatives of government attend in a personal and not an official capacity. An attempt is made to include participants representing many political parties and points of view. American participation has included members of Congress of both parties.

Over the years, Bilderberg participants have come from the NATO countries, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria and Finland, and have included prominent individuals such as Dean Rusk, Christian A. Herter, Maurice Faure, Franz-Josef Strauss, Amintore Fanfani, Panayotis Pipinelis, Reginald Maudling, the late Hugh Gaitskell, Omer Becu, Guy Mollet, the late Michael Ross, Herman Abs,

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

13 March 1964

THE BILDERBERG MEETINGS

for information:
Bruce Nelan OX 7-3131
New York City

BILDERBERG MEETING

TO BE HELD IN WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA

U.S., Canadian and European Figures to Meet on March 20
for Informal Discussions of International
Affairs

Leading figures from the United States, Canada, and Western Europe -- representing industry, labor, government, education, and other fields -- will meet on March 20, 21, and 22, in Williamsburg, Va., for the thirteenth in a series of informal Bilderberg Meetings on international affairs.

Chairman of the forthcoming meeting will be H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, who has served as host for all Bilderberg Meetings since the first one in 1954. The first meeting was held at the Hotel Bilderberg in Oosterbeek, Holland, and ever since, the meetings have been called Bilderberg Meetings.

About one hundred participants are expected to attend. Among them are George Ball, Arthur H. Dean, Dean Acheson, David Rockefeller and H. J. Heinz II, of the United States; Arnold D. P. Heeney and James S. Duncan of Canada; Sicco L. Mansholt, Dirk U. Stikker, Denis Healey, Marcus Wallenberg, Fritz Erler, and Wilfrid S. Baumgartner of Western Europe. Several members of the Congress are expected to be among the American participants.

Topics for discussion include the political, military and economic relations of the Atlantic Community, and recent developments within the Communist world.

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The Bilderberg Meetings were designed to bring together leading figures in the United States, Canada and Western Europe for informal round-table discussions of international problems, particularly those affecting the Atlantic Community. The meetings provide an atmosphere in which responsible citizens may hear and express a wide variety of viewpoints. At the first meeting, in 1954, it was decided that no conclusions were to be reached nor resolutions adopted. The round-table was conceived as a helpful step toward increasing mutual understanding on both sides of the Atlantic through a free and relaxed exchange of ideas.

The Bilderberg Meetings attempt to include participants who can bring special knowledge and experience to the problems under discussion. Participation over the years has varied, although some participants have attended several or most of the Bilderberg Meetings.

Representatives of governments who are invited to attend do so in a personal and not an official capacity. In order to permit full and frank discussion of all issues, the meetings are private and off the record, and attendance is confined to those actually participating. A brief statement is made public after the meeting.

The meeting in Williamsburg is the second to be held in the United States. The first took place on February 15, 1957, on St. Simon's Island, Georgia. Previous meetings have also been held in the Netherlands, France, Germany, Denmark, Italy, Great Britain, Turkey, Switzerland, Canada and Sweden.

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA AT 46TH STREET

NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS INTERPAX

OXFORD 7-3131

12 March 1964

To the American Participants in the
Bilderberg Meeting

From: Joseph E. Johnson

Subject: Topics for Discussion at Bilderberg Meeting

I enclose for your information a list of the topics on which the discussions at Williamsburg will be focussed. These are based on the papers by Mr. Acheson and Mr. Mansholt, which were sent to you earlier.

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BILDERBERG MEETINGS

## Topics for Discussion

The Chairman suggests that the discussion be mainly focussed on the following points:

### The Consequences for the Atlantic Alliance of:

1. Apparent Changes in the Communist World

(a) Soviet internal developments

(b) The Communist bloc

2. Possible Changes in the Attitude of the USSR to the West

(a) Political

(i) How the Atlantic nations should organize themselves

(ii) Attitudes toward relations with the Communist countries, including China

(b) Military

(i) NATO strategy

(ii) Sharing of responsibility for nuclear deterrent

(c) Economic

(i) Recent developments in the Common Market, notably in relation to agriculture, and their impact

(ii) UN Conference on Trade and Development/GATT "Kennedy Round"

(iii) International finance

a. Balance of payments adjustment and capital markets

b. Liquidity and further evolution of the international monetary structure

- 2 -

(iv) East-West trade

a. Trade with the USSR and European satellites

b. Trade with Communist China and Cuba

c. Trading rules and restrictions of credits

d. Coordination of Atlantic Community policy

N.B. The order of the discussion will be decided upon at the time of the meeting.

# INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS

Participants may wish to note the location of the meeting rooms, dining rooms, Secretariat office, etc., as follows:

## Meeting Rooms

* The Conference will be held in Room A-B-C on the upper level of the Conference Center.

* The Steering Committee will meet in Room D on the lower level of the Conference Center.

* The Secretariat Office is located in Room G on the lower level of the Conference Center (telephone extension 139).

## Dining Rooms and Social Activities

<table><tr><td>Thursday evening, 19 March</td><td>Reception and dinner at Williamsburg Inn</td></tr><tr><td>Friday morning, 20 March</td><td>Breakfast in West Dining Room of Lodge or by room service</td></tr><tr><td>Friday - Sunday</td><td>Luncheons in Room D-E-F on lower level of Conference Center</td></tr><tr><td>Friday - Saturday</td><td>Dinner in Room D-E-F on lower level of Conference Center</td></tr><tr><td>Friday and Saturday evening</td><td>Informal hospitality after dinner in West Wing Lounge (Lodge)</td></tr><tr><td>Saturday and Sunday morning</td><td>Breakfast in Virginia Room on upper level of Conference Center</td></tr><tr><td>Saturday evening</td><td>Pre-dinner reception at Bassett Hall</td></tr></table>

## Important Notices

1. Enclosed are two lists of participants, one in alphabetical order and the other by country.

2. Participants are urgently requested to wear the enclosed badge during the entire period of the conference in order to indicate their identity.

3. May we ask that participants sign (and include room numbers) or pay cash for all orders outside full pension.

- 2 -

Practical Arrangements

1. For your convenience, facilities for currency exchange will be available at the Cashier's desk in the Lodge during the following hours: 8:30 - 10:00 a.m., 12:30 - 3:00 p.m., and 6:00 - 7:00 p.m.

2. For assistance with travel arrangements, particularly for return travel, please see Mr. Hut in Room H on the lower level of the Conference Center. Participants are requested to fill in the attached form concerning departure plans and to leave it with Mr. Hut. (This applies also to participants leaving by private plane.)

Williamsburg, March 19, 1964