January 25, 1984

MEMO FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: Congressman Wolf on Video Link with Moscow

Congressman Frank Wolf (Rep. from Northern Virginia), searching for ways to improve communications between Washington and Moscow "to reduce tensions and build confidence," has written you to say he might introduce legislation advocating a secure video link-up; this might augment the existing Hotline and would be for use particularly in crisis situations by the heads of state. His letter is at Tab B. Page 1 describes the technical possibilities of this project for more "face to face" contact. He says he is assured that the transfer of sensitive technology to Moscow in such a project "would be minimal."

Wolf seeks your views on the proposal *before* he submits such legislation and also wants to know whether your think there are any other measures which would improve communications with the Soviets. (He poses four specific questions on page 2).

Whatever you think of the proposal, you may want to avoid taking any position in a reply. (Your answers to his questions might become part of a legislative history). *At Tab A is a suggested bland letter to Wolf.*

______ Approve Tab A and signed it.

Alternatively, you may want to imply a negative reaction, and also pass along a copy of your recent Brussels speech in which you talked generally about the need for enhanced dialogue with the Soviets. Such an *alternate draft* is at Tab C.

______ Approve Tab C and signed it.

Note: Wolf wrote you last summer suggesting a commission on social security, a project you also avoided by saying you would keep the matter in mind. I tried to vary the blandness of Tab A a bit, with your last turndown in mind.

FRANK R. WOLF

10TH DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
130 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-5136

CONSTITUENT SERVICES OFFICES:

1651 OLD MEADOW RD.
SUITE 115
MCLEAN, VIRGINIA 22102
(703) 734-1500

19 E. MARKET ST.
ROOM 4B
LEESBURG, VIRGINIA 22075
(703) 777-4422

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

January 6, 1984

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am considering introducing legislation to propose that a secure video conferencing capability be established between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, in the belief that more direct, face-to-face communication at the appropriate levels could contribute to improving our relationship, and might help to forestall or defuse potential crises. I am seeking advice and ideas from persons such as yourself who have had personal experience in negotiations and other relevant direct contact with Soviet officials.

In researching this matter, one possibility which has surfaced would be to augment the present Direct Communications Link (Hotline) with a teleconference system, designed for the exclusive use of the heads of state in times of emergency. I believe such a system could provide a vehicle by which the persuasive powers and sincerity of a U.S. president could be advantageously used--perhaps to critical advantage--during times of crises.

Technology is available to implement such a system which, in addition to providing face-to-face contact between heads of state, could: permit the users to use only part of the system at one time, i.e. the visual contact could be turned off until it is needed; allow any communication to be delayed by adjustable time increments to allow for editing of remarks; transmit either written translations of the spoken word or voices that have been scrambled to remove traces of emotion; permit the users to rapidly transmit and receive maps, photographs, and other prepared material either on screens or as hard copy; and use computer stored information, including maps and photographs, in transmissions. I have been assured that secure transmission is possible and that the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union would be minimal.

In my consideration of a legislative initiative, I would appreciate your comments on the following issues:

COMMITTEES:
PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION

SUBCOMMITTEES:
AVIATION
SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION

POST OFFICE AND
CIVIL SERVICE

SUBCOMMITTEES:
CIVIL SERVICE
POSTAL PERSONNEL
AND MODERNIZATION

SELECT COMMITTEE
ON CHILDREN, YOUTH
AND FAMILIES

JAN 10 1984

THIS STATIONERY PRINTED ON PAPER MADE WITH RECYCLED FIBERS

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
page 2

January 6, 1984

1) Would face-to-face contact between the two heads of state using a video system significantly contribute to the resolution of a crisis? Or would the benefits of such a capability be outweighed by the potential dangers of misstatement, misinterpretation, or misunderstanding?

2) If you find merit in such a system, would you recommend that it augment the existing Direct Communications Link?

3) Would such a video conferencing capability have merit at other levels of government or for other purposes beyond crisis management, such as information sharing to promote understanding in cultural, scientific, military areas?

4) Finally, are there any other measures to improve communication with the Soviet government which should be explored as part of an effort to reduce tensions and build confidence?

Thank you for taking the time to express your opinions on this issue. I value your comments based on your personal experience in dealing with the Soviet government. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please do not hesitate to call me.

FRW/tmf

I thank you.

ISSUES BEFORE THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

BY
HENRY A. KISSINGER

There are two conventional ways of speaking about NATO. The first is to praise its achievements: the peace that has been maintained for thirty-five years; the cooperation between 16 sovereign nations that has been sustained for longer than any modern alliance; the crises that have been overcome; and most recently the decision that was upheld to redress the nuclear balance in Europe.

Alternatively, it is also possible to deplore the unresolved issues: the gap between the announced military strategy and what is being implemented; the imbalance between detente and defense; the pace and direction of arms control; and the growing mistrust--nurtured by the Soviets--between a generation of Americans and Europeans who have lived their entire lives sheltered by the Alliance they assault.

Both interpretations offer elements of the truth. NATO is one of the most successful alliances in history. It has also increasingly maintained the appearance of unity by evading some fundamental issues. The newly elected Secretary General of NATO, Peter Carrington, walked the fine line between optimism and despair with elegance and wit in a seminal speech at the Institute of Strategic Studies last April. He will no doubt lead NATO with vigor, intelligence, vision and humanity; he is in fact one cause for optimism. I tend to be--let us be frank--somewhat apocalyptic. What I say hopefully reflects the spirit of his remarks; but freed of the responsibilities that inhere in a diplomat, I am more explicit about some of the unsolved problems of NATO as I see them.

There is no immediate crisis. Yet the demonstrations in the streets and the timidity of some governments bring home to us that there is no cause for complacency. Sooner or later a price must be paid for evading key problems--unless one is very lucky. And luck usually comes only to those who do not rely on it; luck, it has been said, is the residue of design.

In this spirit I shall deal with three issues:

a. The perennial nuclear problem--especially the growing trend towards the no first-use doctrine

b. INF negotiations

c. East-West relations

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# I The Strategic Issues - The No First-Use Doctrine

The dilemma posed by nuclear weapons has been repeated so often over the past three decades that it scarcely requires even a brief summary. In the late forties and fifties the leaders of the West thought they could compensate by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons for what they believed to be Soviet superiority in manpower. But nuclear weapons could fill the gap--real or postulated--only so long as leaders and public opinion were convinced that they had the capacity to reduce a Soviet counterblow to tolerable proportions, and even then only if a Western first strike would involve Soviet casualties compatible with our moral convictions.

These conditions began to evaporate in the sixties. Technology tended towards equality at least in the sense that a strategic exchange was certain to produce casualties on both sides such that any additional capacity to cause damage would lose all relationship to conceivable objectives.

That trend was accelerated by the Vietnam trauma. Western military budgets came under increasing public scrutiny and assault. Since the early seventies no strategic weapons system has been deployed in the United States without debilitating controversy and protracted delay. Parity became fashionable even before it became inevitable. Arms control theory and practice institutionalized it.

The premises of NATO strategy have thus been systematically eroded partly by choice, largely by inevitable trends. But NATO doctrine did not change. Lip service was paid to increased conventional defense; some increases in fact did take place though never enough to catch up with the massive Soviet rearmament effort. Flexible response based on the gradual though systematic escalation up the nuclear ladder has remained the NATO doctrine.

The result is the anomalous nature of the strategic debate. NATO's defense rests ultimately on nuclear weapons. Yet public uneasiness about nuclear war is growing; stirred to near irrationality by groups, some well-meaning, who believe that engendering panic is the best means of accomplishing their purpose of preventing nuclear conflict. Governments afraid to fight for their operational policies have compounded the confusion.

No leader of the West today dares to affirm what his strategy dictates: that to avoid defeat he would be obliged to resort to nuclear weapons. President Reagan and Secretary

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Weinberger were widely condemned in Europe when they referred to the "winnability" of nuclear war. The idea of "winning" a nuclear war was hardly felicitous. But the verbal formulation probed for an elemental truth: unless some rational military objective can be assigned to nuclear strategy, both leaders and publics will become increasingly demoralized by the still firmly enshrined NATO doctrine.

Since then both the President and his Cabinet have not only retreated; they have explicitly disavowed their claim that nuclear war is winnable. It is a tragic symptom of the gap in understanding between our Administration and its European critics that these fervent affirmations are disregarded and disbelieved; that most of our critics insist on holding President Reagan and Secretary Weinberger to their original declarations.

What political leaders hint, private citizens make explicit. In 1982 four distinguished Americans, all having held high office--Robert McNamara, Gerald Smith, McGeorge Bundy, and George Kennan--proposed the unilateral renunciation of the first-use of nuclear weapons. Mr. McNamara reinforced that statement later by asserting that as Secretary of Defense in the early sixties and originator of the concept of flexible response, he had urged his Presidents never to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. That view has since spread; public opinion is in fact tacitly sliding towards a no-first-use doctrine.

There can be no question that NATO should be in a position where it is not forced to resort to use nuclear weapons at an early stage of a conflict. Hopefully it will become strong enough so that it can repel any level of conventional attack by conventional means. The need to build up NATO's conventional capability has been passionately affirmed for a long time; for an equal period the target has proved elusive. The United States will not reintroduce the draft; its allies will give priority to domestic concerns over a serious defense build-up.

Thus it is one thing to advocate a strengthened conventional defense--as I have consistently done with many others here. It is quite another to renounce the first-use of nuclear weapons. If history teaches anything, it is that deterrence with conventional weapons is a chancy enterprise. Europeans have seen wars break out for hundreds of years between armies that were thought to be evenly matched. (Even at the outset of World War II the French army was considered to be--and in fact was--superior in numbers and equipment to the German army.)

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In conventional war, leadership, concentration of force, and tactics, play a role which make comparative systems analysis calculations a hazardous guide to deterrence. It can be no accident that <u>all</u> wars in the postwar period have occurred where there were <u>no</u> American forces and <u>no</u> nuclear weapons; during that period Europe under American nuclear protection has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its history.

The tenuousness of conventional deterrence does not go to the heart of my concern over the spread of the "no first-use" doctrine, however. For paradoxically the growing acceptance of the concept may well invite nuclear blackmail or even nuclear war. If the no first-use doctrine makes any sense it must mean that we and our allies would rather be defeated with conventional weapons than to resort to nuclear weapons. But once the readiness to accept defeat is granted, why should it matter with what weapons it is accomplished? Why should one make the readiness to submit depend on the weapons used to impose an adversary's will? If an aggressor analyzes the implications of the no first-use doctrine in this manner, he would have an incentive to warn that <u>any</u> war will quickly become nuclear. This would face the West with the choice of surrender or the kind of war of which our countries will then be incapable as a result of years of stigmatizing the weapons around which their defenses are built and with which our adversary's arsenal is replete.

But if we <u>are</u> prepared to use nuclear weapons rather than see Europe overrun, we are back to our original problem: the proper mix between conventional and nuclear forces and the appropriate strategy for the use of nuclear weapons albeit as a last resort. The question of how nuclear weapons should be used without destroying mankind remains unavoidable.

A rational treatment of this reality has yet to occur. Some experts--though declining in numbers and shell-shocked by the assault of the peace movement--still want to treat nuclear weapons as "conventional". This is clearly absurd. Another, larger group--ironically composed in its majority by individuals generally advocating humane and "progressive" domestic policies--have insisted that nuclear war must necessarily involve the deliberate extermination of civilians; they are convinced that governments can be kept from nuclear adventures only by committing them to the most gruesome strategy.

Politics and morality both demand that so long as nuclear weapons exist and nuclear war is at least conceivable, governments seek ways to limit their use and to terminate such a war <u>before</u>

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it turns into a world holocaust. In a world of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, it is reckless to teach that any nuclear incident must automatically escalate into a cataclysm. If the worst happens--for whatever reason--governments have an obligation to humanity and to history to limit the consequences. Only nihilists or abstract ideologues can shirk that duty.

At the heart of the problem is that in nearly every country the consensus on defense and foreign policy has broken down. As a result, national security policy is too often overwhelmed by domestic politics. This could not happen but for two comforting illusions. Europe chooses to believe that in the end America will either prevent aggression or resist it with its ultimate weapon if it has no other choice. America chooses the illusion that with intensive consultations Europe will be induced to increase its defense contribution in the conventional field. Neither expectation is realistic--the European one slightly more so than the American.

If present trends continue we run the risk that we are left with a precarious combination of the formal NATO doctrine of flexible response which, however, now--unlike when it was first developed--has to be applied under conditions of nuclear stalemate, growing nuclear pacifism and continued inadequacies in conventional forces. Left with no coherent defense policy we will ourselves have crippled our capacity for military response while sitting on the most destructive stockpile of weapons the world has seen and against an adversary whose political and economic system seems to have lost all vitality.

## II Arms Control and Intermediate Range Weapons

Not surprisingly public bewilderment has turned into anxiety evoking an increasing clamor for agreements to end the so-called arms race. Arms control is being asked to banish the danger of nuclear war and to reverse the trend in East-West relations. This places a greater burden on these negotiations than they can possibly carry; it is no accident that the Geneva negotiations have frozen at the precise moment that governments and public opinion in the West more fervently insist on them. Arms control is in danger of being transformed from a technical quest for strategic stability into *deus ex machina*. Indeed it is in danger of turning into a tool of Soviet political warfare--and both the West's strategic incoherence and its anxiety are principal contributors to that development.

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The very idea of arms control is of course novel, if not revolutionary. Developed in its present form in the 1950's it strove explicitly for stability by reducing the incentive for surprise attack not through arms but through agreement. The historically extraordinary notion emerged that a country's vulnerability was a strategic asset; with the civil populations of both sides at risk--so the argument ran--neither side would dare to launch its weapons. Arms control theory contributed--in the West--to an aversion to defensive weapons such as the ABM; it also caused every offensive system to be subjected to extended scrutiny lest it somehow "destabilize" the military equation. Never before in history had military policy been judged by such criteria; but then of course never before had weapons posed such risks.

This is not the place for an analysis of arms control theory which included many valuable insights. However, arms control, to be effective, requires an unusually delicate understanding of the elements of strategy. Nations had often suffered catastrophe in the past even when they fancied themselves superior; negotiating equality with an adversary calls for an unprecedentedly sophisticated analysis. The measurement of equality has been maddeningly complicated by the novelty of the weapons, by the asymmetry in the design of the weapons system of the two sides and in their geostrategic positions. Thus even were the Soviets more ready for a serious study than they appear to be, negotiations would be difficult because the weapons of the two sides are designed by different criteria and serve different strategic ends.

The near chaos in Western strategic and political thought has magnified obstacles to arms control just when a definition of "progress" has grown elusive, and when Western governments consider progress in arms control a requirement of political survival.

The history of the INF negotiations illustrates these points. In response to the massive deployment of Soviet intermediate range missiles, the United States in 1979 encouraged its NATO allies to invite it to station similar weapons in Europe. The vast majority of these intermediate range missiles was in categories--such as cruise missiles--less threatening than their Soviet counterparts, which being all ballistic required much less time to reach European targets. But even in 1979 NATO did not dare to announce its decision in military terms, subject as all deployments--to subsequent arms control negotiations. The deployment became political with the

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so-called "dual track" approach which called for *prior* negotiations to ban the weapons altogether and make their ultimate deployment dependent on a *failure* of the negotiations.

The decision was fateful. Experience with arms control negotiations--or Soviet diplomatic practice--should have warned that an unambiguous outcome of such talks was nearly impossible. In its absence the deadline guaranteed a domestic crisis in almost all countries slated to receive missiles as the time for deployment approached. Indeed it almost surely supplied an incentive for the Soviets to procrastinate in the negotiations to test the resolve of the Western governments.

More important, the NATO decision evoked a debate about the reasons for deploying the intermediate range missiles--a debate which soon became bogged down either in domestic politics or in all the evasions and contradictions of the general NATO controversy. Opponents, appealing both to fears and nationalism--especially in the Federal Republic--invented the argument that the intermediate range missiles reflected our desire to confine a possible war to European territory. It was absurd. We already had thousands of short-range 'tactical weapons in Europe. Intermediate range missiles added nothing to our capacity to devastate Europe; their distinguishing feature was, after all, the ability to reach beyond Europe into the Soviet Union.

The real justification for deployment was quite the opposite of what our critics alleged: to prevent the nuclear blackmail of Europe by linking the strategic defense of Europe with that of the United States. With intermediate range American weapons in Europe the Soviets could not threaten Europe selectively; any nuclear attack and any successful conventional attack would trigger an American counterblow from European installations. The Soviets would have to calculate even in case of conventional attack that we would use our missiles before they were overrun. Hence the Soviets would have to attack the missiles if they used even conventional weapons in Europe; that in turn would trigger our strategic forces.

In that sense the American offer of intermediate range missiles was a selfless act. If we needed intermediate range weapons for purely *American* purposes at all--which is doubtful--we could have deployed them more easily and with much less controversy on ships.

Not surprisingly, the Soviets grasped the significance of the new deployment immediately; they had no difficulty understanding

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that a "linkage" was thereby established between the defenses of Europe and the strategic nuclear forces of the United States. The Soviet chief of staff, Orgakov, has repeatedly warned us publicly that the use of European based intermediate range weapons would trigger an immediate Soviet retaliatory blow against the United States itself.

Instead of welcoming this linkage which strengthened deterrence by facing the Soviets with risks they were almost surely unprepared to run, our European allies used it to press us to pursue the dual track approach as an alternative to deployment. We in turn confused matters by putting forward the so-called zero option: the readiness to abandon our European deployment if the Soviets gave up their own intermediate range missiles. In fact the offer reflected a characteristic Washington compromise. It brought together three disparate groups: those who opposed the deployment of strategic weapons in Europe because they preferred a more purely American decision whether to initiate strategic nuclear war; those who were opposed to *any* agreement but supported the zero option convinced that the Soviet Union would never accept it; and lastly genuine devotees of arms control who considered *any* reduction, whatever its rationale, a step forward.

Had the Soviets snapped up the offer--or even made a counter proposal limiting the zero option to Europe--the United States would have been permanently barred from any *new* deployments. At the same time, the Soviet capacity to blackmail Europe would have remained unimpaired either through new tactical weapons or the redundant warheads in their long-range strategic forces.

Symptomatic of the confusion in allied strategic thought, many of our European allies interpreted our offer as intransigence. The Soviets having declared that they would never accept our offer, we were being urged to come up with a new position-- that is to abandon the zero option. In practice this meant being asked to propose an agreed, reduced level of weapons. For reasons of European internal politics, not strategic assessment we were being pressed to reestablish the linkage between the nuclear defense of Europe and the United States which our offer had abandoned: to deploy some intermediate range missiles in Europe; this time in the name of arms control.

The lack of clarity about strategic and political objectives continued to bedevil allied policy. Yielding to allied entreaties we did abandon the zero option for an interim agreement on a reduced level of missiles for *both* sides.

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But no sooner had we accepted their advice than some European governments sought to mollify an increasingly restive public opinion by pressing for more concessions. This required lowering the proposed ceiling and indeed to permit some disparity in Moscow's favor. And when in effect we went along with that approach we were still being blamed for the deadlock. The intransigence of the Reagan administration having achieved an almost folkloric character in European critical literature, the myth developed that the United States had missed a great opportunity by not following up sufficiently rapidly on results of the so-called "walk in the woods" between Soviet and American negotiators at Geneva in July 1982. On that occasion, U. S. Ambassador Paul Nitze had proposed a ceiling of intermediate range missiles on both sides and the abandonment of Pershing II missiles; the Soviets either had or had not--depending on whose version one heard--participated in drafting the document before agreeing to transmit it to Moscow.

This is not the occasion to analyze what actually occurred. It is undisputed that our decisionmaking process reacted to the Nitze formula in its usual cumbersome way--but then it had had no advance notice. This was neither surprising nor particularly significant. Nor does it sustain the charge of a missed opportunity. For the Soviets rejected the Nitze formula in September 1982 and did so again in October 1983 when they dismissed the latest American offer which was very close to the original Nitze concept. The sole difference in the current US proposal of a ceiling of 100 intermediate range missiles is the retention of 36 Pershing II's, a number not even the most paranoid Soviet leader could--given the thousands of Soviet warheads aimed at Europe--consider a threat of surprise attack.

The Soviets rejected the offer not because of the inclusion of the Pershings or the inadequacy of the ceiling, but because in the INF talks their strategy has been consistently offensive. Their objective has never wavered; they were bent on ejecting American intermediate range missiles from Europe altogether--showing that they at least grasped the strategic and political issues involved. And all of this agitation occurred when the Soviets had already deployed over 200 SS-20's in Europe and the first American missile had yet to arrive in Europe.

The Soviets understand very well from our current proposal--and many public statements--that the United States is willing to settle for a relatively small number of missiles stationed

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in Europe. Their argument about the shortened warning time
caused by Pershing II is for the gullible. What decisive
impact could 36 Pershings have? A Pershing takes 8-10 minutes
to reach the Soviet Union from Western Europe. An ICBM takes
25-30 minutes from the United States; a submarine launched
missile, depending on its location, requires 15-20 minutes.
Were the Pershings to be removed what would the Soviets do
with the extra few minutes of warning time? And since our
offer does not require counting the SS-20's deployed in Asia,
the Soviets have a numerical advantage even in Europe, for
two-thirds of their Asian deployment can cover most of Europe.
(I say this not as a criticism of our offer, for the essential
element of our deployment is the linkage of the nuclear defense
of Europe and the United States, which our offer retains.)

The Soviets again dismissed our proposal and walked out
of the talks because contrary to the arguments of our critics
and the ambivalence of many governments, they are at present
conducting the negotiations as a political maneuver. They
have so far refused to settle for less than expelling American
intermediate range missiles from Europe because they are
striving for a larger objective than stability. It is nothing
less than changing the political complexion of NATO.

If they were to succeed, for the second time in ten years,
the Soviets would stop a NATO deployment to which governments
had committed themselves for many years--the neutron bomb
in 1978 and now the intermediate range missiles. The practical
effect would be to give the Soviet Union a veto over future
NATO deployments--at least in the nuclear field. And the
way would be open for the selective nuclear blackmail of
Europe. After a brief period of relief the NATO countries
would recognize the weakening of the American nuclear shield.
This would be especially true in the non-member countries.
They would realize their special danger; neutralism or a
resentful kind of nationalism could develop. The Soviets would
be close to achieving what they first proposed to the United
States during the negotiations for the Agreement on the
Prevention of Nuclear War in 1974: that in case of a
European war the use of nuclear weapons be restricted to
the countries of Europe excluding the Soviet Union and the
United States. We rejected that proposal then. It would be
ironic to create the objective conditions for it now in the
guise of arms control.

The argument that the British and French forces can
balance the Soviet SS-20's is either sophistry or a
misunderstanding. Given the huge disparity in warheads

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between France and Great Britain on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other, it is self-evident that British and French nuclear forces can deter only a nuclear attack on these countries--if that. They can offer no protection to other NATO allies; they create no threat of a first use--whatever the extremity in which NATO conventional forces might find themselves. At some point, when the number of their warheads increases the British and French forces should be included in the START talks. At present unless linked to the American deterrent, they are nearly irrelevant to the defense of Europe.

The fundamental INF problem is quite simple. If the Soviets objective is truly to prevent a surprise attack from our European deployments, an agreement on numbers and composition will be easy and rapid. What we should not do is to abandon the deployment of missiles in Europe altogether. And if the Soviets insist on that it will be clear proof that their objective will be to wreck the Western Alliance. If our allies cannot bring themselves to say this clearly to their publics, they will only have themselves to blame when they are engulfed by creeping pacifism and neutralism. And in that case, the psychological basis for keeping the missiles in Europe will erode first in Europe but eventually also in the United States.

To be sure, it is highly desirable for the INF talks to resume. But the very plaintiveness of Western appeals gives the Soviets an incentive to continue on the political offensive. And if and when the talks resume, it is essential that the Western countries show more fortitude and unity than heretofore. The attitude of too many allied governments towards deployment is like that of a host to an unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it would be too embarrassing to withdraw. So long as their exists a nearly desperate longing for a negotiating gimmick, so long as the United States is automatically blamed for any impasse, Soviet intransigence is likely to be spurred by the hope that persistence in their present course will unravel the Alliance.

When and if negotiations start again, our allies in the interest of the very progress they seek, should cease to demand new concessions before the Soviets have agreed even to the principle of equivalence. There have been three major and two minor adjustments in our INF position in one year, in large part to placate allied public opinion. But when positions succeed each other at a dizzying pace none is understood any longer. Fuel is given to the argument that we are cynical, that we do not know what we are doing, that

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our basic position is flawed. The Soviets will have no incentive to change course if they perceive the Alliance engaged in competitive gimmickry. The United States has made its share of mistakes but the root cause of the difficulty in INF negotiations is a Soviet assault on the existing political equilibrium in Europe.

There are many technical means to overcome the impasse. If the Soviets require a facesaving formula to renew talks the START and INF talks could be merged--though I suspect it would prolong and complicate both sets of negotiations. It will not solve the root problem, however. Progress is not possible until the Soviets accept the principle that U. S. intermediate range missiles must be included in any agreed levels for the intermediate range forces of both sides. Once that principle is accepted progress will be rapid.

(Continued on next page)

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### III East-West Relations

In the public debate within the Alliance it has become nearly axiomatic that East-West relations have never been worse. Many Europeans profess to be convinced that American unpredictability and changeability have combined with confrontational and bellicose rhetoric to drive the Soviets into resentful hostility. Many Americans are of the opinion that European irresolution and domestic weakness encourage the Soviet assault on the post-war political balance in Europe.

As in all family quarrels there has been an element of truth on both sides.

Since the collapse of the post-war consensus during the Vietnam War, American policy has been extraordinarily changeable. The detente of the early '70s was assaulted by an odd and unprecedented coalition of liberals and conservatives who could never have been united but for the collapse of Executive authority caused by Watergate. The liberals attacked detente for being too concerned with the balance of power while conservatives damned it for being insufficiently ideological or "moral." That coalition succeeded on the one hand in destroying both the incentives and the penalties on which detente was based; on the other hand still in the thrall of the Vietnam trauma it was not prepared to face the consequences of renewed Soviet intransigence.

The critics of detente had a point when they pointed out that the American public was unused to power politics; that there is no tradition in America for conducting relationships simultaneously cooperative and adversary. But that is precisely the challenge before our leaders. Any other course loses public and allied support and enables the Soviets to capture the global yearning for peace -- as the Reagan Administration has painfully learned.

The Carter Administration announced a "new approach" which criticized the Nixon and Ford Administrations for its alleged preoccupation with resisting communism. After first rejecting the structure of SALT II inherited from the Ford Administration, the Carter team embraced it; but delayed so long that the invasion of Afghanistan defeated all prospects of ratification. The current Administration arrived in office rejecting the position of all its predecessors. It derided detente, refused to ratify SALT II even while observing its provisions, only to turn in the past year towards an obvious desire to improve East-West relations, even a summit.

The issue here is not what incarnation of American policy was right. Each was professed by reasonable people pursuing reasonable arguments. The trouble has been that each new administration has felt no responsibility to the legacy of its predecessor; indeed has prided itself on starting all over.

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Each reassessment of American policy left victims among European leaders who -- trusting American representations and briefings -- had committed themselves to the previous dispensation. Each reassessment shook confidence and encouraged European neutralism to become less dependent on our restless quest for novelty.

Nor has the United States been alone in changing its view. Our allies have changed with us though in a contrapuntal manner. When President Nixon came into office he had a reputation as a hardliner. This triggered a succession of eminent European visitors to urge him into a rapid dialogue with Moscow -- even though the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not yet a year old. A few years later some of the same Europeans warned against "excessive" detente. During the Carter Administration it was European leaders who first called attention to the need to counterbalance the Soviet build-up of SS-20's. And the Reagan Administration has become almost legendary if one reads the allegations of bellicosity, insensitivity and major responsibility for the current East-West impasse.

And yet amazingly while it is easy to compile a record of ill-considered remarks of the Reagan Administration it is difficult to point to much in the way of rash actions. Beyond muscular rhetoric the Reagan Administration has actually behaved with considerable restraint. What has it actually done to earn such opprobrium among our European critics? Why should intelligent leaders feel impelled to base internal politics on their ability to domesticate, as it were, the Reagan Administration? Why has the recent change of tone of the Reagan Administration -- sometimes verging on the repentant -- been largely ignored by critics and most allied leaders? Is it because the critics seek an excuse for a barely disguised neutralism and the leaders require -- or believe they require -- at least the pretense of "moderating" American obtuseness and intransigence as a unifying element in their domestic politics?

European critics should remember that the wider the gulf between Europe and the United States the more difficult an East-West dialogue becomes. And the East-West dialogue urgently needs a fresh impetus. In a world of thousands of nuclear weapons the two sides cannot risk staring each other down or seeking to drown each other's proposals in invective or propaganda. The minimum requirement is that both sides understand each other's thought processes so that crises do not escalate by inadvertence.

For crises are almost inherent in the current structure of international politics. Both superpowers are associated with countries more concerned with their local rivalries than with the global equilibrium much less with global peace. Our period should not be compared with the period preceding World

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War II when an aggressor launched himself into a quest for world domination -- nuclear weapons are likely to inspire great hesitation, even among the reckless. Rather than the appropriate model is the period prior to World War I when client states pursuing regional rivalries drew their protectors into a holocaust by gradual increments, the full significance of which was not understood until it was too late. Which of the statesmen who entered war in 1914 thinking that the issue would be settled quickly would not have recoiled in horror had he had an inkling of the shape of the world in 1917?

Theoretically there are as well what the Soviets would call "objective reasons" for a constructive dialogue. The Soviet system is in trouble. It must deal with a leadership in transition, a decrepit economy and restive allies. By any rational calculation the Soviet Union should seek a respite. It should know that a continuation of its present course runs a large risk of confrontation. Its leaders cannot be so encapsulated in their prejudices as to believe that they can defeat America without our noticing it sooner or later. The longer the process lasts, the more "successful" as it were, current Soviet strategy the greater is the risk of some escalation. It is even possible that whatever the current invective Soviet leaders when convinced that the current Administration is likely to be reelected may well make some agreement by the summer. A reelected Administration, hence unconstrained, may be a prospect they would prefer to avoid.

But it is also possible that the Soviet leaders are under domestic pressures which prevent any policy adaptation or any farsighted policy for that matter. Before we yield to this proposition however we must test the possibilities of a dialogue systematically and persistently.

A number of principles ought to govern Western approaches.

1. Democracies have no reason to fear negotiations with a stagnant and brittle dictatorship. But neither should talk become an end in itself. The importance of a dialogue should therefore not be the subject of debate either within the countries of the Alliance or between them. The debate should concern the subjects appropriate to an East-West dialogue, not the fact of it.

2. There is need for calm in the domestic discourse of the various allies. There is a tendency to adjust the assessment of Soviet strength to preconceived notions of the Soviet Union rather than the other way around. The Soviets are neither as powerful or cunning as the opponents of detente claimed; nor are they as close to disintegration as some self-proclaimed apostles of peace allege. History will not do our work for us; but neither will liturgical rhetoric.

[Y]

-16-

3. If we want to avoid that the East-West dialogue divides the Alliance or becomes an end in itself, the United States and its allies must agree on a long-term East-West strategy. This will have to include the whole gamut of East-West relations including East-West trade in its opportunities as well as its perils.

4. For arms control cannot possibly carry the entire or even the principal burden of the East-West dialogue. If too much weight is put on arms control, it is more likely -- in Peter Carrington's words -- to expose the raw nuclear nerve of the Alliance than to resolve it. Were Moscow to make a political decision to settle for the presence of some American nuclear intermediate range weapons in Western Europe the INF issue could be settled rapidly. As for START, I have stated elsewhere my conviction that we have not thought the problem through adequately -- but at least we have tried to think while the Soviets have engaged in sterile repetitions of shopworn slogans. Still even if attitudes should change, it will lead to a prolonged technical haggle; the subject is simply too difficult to permit a rapid resolution. And the best forseeable outcome would be primarily symbolic. Some twenty thousand strategic warheads are in the arsenals of both sides. Even were the Soviets to accept our proposal to cut this total in half, the remaining warheads would be more than sufficient for catastrophe.

In short, arms control separated from a political dialogue cannot end the current tensions or even significantly ease them. Indeed if the quest for arms control becomes too frantic it will turn into a weapon of Soviet political warfare. Or else it will become a safety valve which the Soviets turn off to increase Western nervousness and on to reduce the impact of a new act of aggression.

5. The urgent need is for a serious political dialogue at the highest levels. The so-called confidence-building measures so beloved by professional diplomats cannot advance us very far. The opening of consulates or cultural exchange programs -- even the prenotification of maneuvers -- have at best a peripheral significance. In my experience every real breakthrough occurred by principals or their key aides who then gave marching orders to subordinates.

The problem is how to define the highest level. A premature summit meeting would involve exorbitant risks -- though Andropov's health almost surely excludes it in any event. Heads of State cannot talk freely at the summit; their constituencies are always with them mentally; sometimes they are even in the room. Summit meetings, moreover, leave little time for real discussion. There is an inevitable time limit imposed by the schedules of the principals; there is an unavoidable protocol; there is the time wasted on translation. The possibilities of a breakthrough are usually

[y]

-17-

outweighed by the penalties of failure. When heads of state
disagree there is no appeal to a higher authority; they would
hardly have reached their eminence without a strong ego;
abandoning a firmly held position would run counter to
psychological as well as political imperatives. Summits can
put the finishing touches on agreements reached previously;
they are not well suited to break the ice.

One way to avoid this dilemma would be for each side to
designate a special representative enjoying the full confidence
of its head of government and foreign minister. He should be
authorized to conduct private, exploratory conversations on
their behalf, preferably without publicity. Each of these
special representatives should have access to the head of state
of the other side. Both parties would commit themselves to a
global review of their entire relationship. As soon as the
conversation between the special representatives demonstrates
hope for progress, preparations would begin for a summit meeting
which would then approve a full-scale work program for
coexistence. But the method is less important--there are
several approaches possible--than to decide on the direction.

6. So far, attempts to discuss political problems
systematically have been dismissed as "linkage" and linkage is
supposed to be bad because it is alleged to be an obstacle to
arms control. By now we should have learned that the opposite
is true. Arms control spearated from any political context is
likely to run into a dead-end. The danger of war, after all,
resides less in the existence of the weapons of mass
destruction than in the minds of the men who are in a position
to order their use. And such men will be driven by political
conflicts, not systems analyses.

A serious dialogue must come to grips with how coexistence
is to be defined. Abstract though this may sound it is at the
heart of the problem. No detente can be sustained if all it
does is to give rise to a political offensive designed to
unhinge the global balance of power. One can cite several
Western failures of omission and commission. But no spurious
objectivity, no effort to find both sides equally guilty can
overlook the provocations that accelerated the hardening of
American attitudes. The dispatch of proxy troops to Angola
and Ethiopia; the revolutions in Aden and Afghanistan followed
by the occupation of Afghanistan; the Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia; the encouragement of terrorist groups; the massive
delivery of arms to Cuba and thence to Central America mark a
foreign policy that at least since 1976 has missed no
opportunity to undermine Western positions.

I say this not to sabotage hopes for a dialogue but to
define its essence. The Soviet Union must decide whether it
is a country or a cause. It must be willing to define
security in terms other than the impotence of potential
adversaries. Some ground rules for coexistence are
essential. Once that bridge is crossed opportunities for

-18- [Y]

increased cooperation in trade and culture would be high on
the agenda. And out of such an exchange, progress on arms
control would flow naturally, almost inevitably.

7. Such a process requires the restoration of bipartisanship in the United States and an end to the constant "reassessments" that disquiet our friends and confuse when they do not embolden our adversaries. The national interest does not change every four or eight years; at some point it must be fixed in the public mind if we are not to become an element of instability through our endless quest for ever new dispensations. And it is time for our European allies to abandon the charade that their principal foreign policy goal is to moderate an intransigent America -- a role more appropriate for neutrals, than allies. Those committed to the proposition that the preconditions for peace is to insist on the moral equivalence of the two superpowers are in fact tempting a continuation of tensions by abdicating their judgment. The same will be the impact of those who confuse foreign policy with the liturgical condemnation of our adversary. The Soviets are realists. Sentimentality on the left tempts them into aggression; sentimentality on the right tempts them to exploit domestic and allied divisions.

3. Finally, we in the West must be prepared to face the fact that even with our best efforts a thaw in East-West relations may simply not be in the cards. It is possible that Andropov is too ill and his collegues too preoccupied with succession issues to change their intransigent course. Perhaps the emergence of the secret police in leadership positions means that the Soviets are applying intelligence methods to the conduct of foreign policy. They may have come to the conclusion that a relentless political and psychological offensive will wear down the democracies and they may be far from discouraged when they study some Western pronouncements. Or perhaps the whole Soviet system is frozen in inertia.

If any of these hypotheses turns out to be accurate we
have no choice except to stand on our best proposals,
thoughtfully devised. The West need not panic at a period of
deadlock. Its economy for all its shortcomings is more vital;
its governmental structure stabler and its overall power
greater. The Alliance can thus face a period of holding firm
with confidence -- provided it preserves its unity.

## Conclusion

It has become ritualistic to speak of the need for allied
unity. It is indeed periodically reaffirmed. But it exhausts
itself in tactical agreement. Too rarely -- if ever -- is
there a real attempt to project a strategy for the rest of
this century.

[y]

19

And yet that is the single most important problem before the Alliance. I do not believe the present structure of NATO lends itself easily to such an effort. And I do not have much confidence in "wise men" exercises. Still a way must be found to deal with the unsolved issues before us. Nothing is possible without reexamining strategic doctrine without blinking. An approach to arms control must logically parallel this effort. It will be time also to look at the question whether every NATO deployment decided a generation ago must be sacrosanct for all eternity. East-West relations in all their manifold aspects need a sense of direction. The Reagan Administration has in practice abandoned its confrontational style. Our allies need now to avoid using the past as an alibi to avoid difficult choices.

The process is overdue and since it depends on the members of a democratic alliance it provides no excuse for failure. The greatest encouragement to Soviet foreign policy in the West is the lack of clarity of the Alliance about its purposes. But that problem being self-made can be undone by our own efforts. Since the democracies have this possibility, it is also their duty.

JAMES E. WOOD
BOX 426
KITTY HAWK, N. C. 27949

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL,
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1984

MAR 13 1984

Soviet Oil Strategy

Contrary to Hodding Carter III (Viewpoint, Jan. 19), I think the Kissinger Commission was eminently correct in saying "The Soviet-Cuban threat to make Central America part of their geostrategic challenge is what has turned the struggle in Central America into a security and political problem for the United States and for the hemisphere."

In contending that it is just another "wolf" cry, and pooh-poohing the danger of a Soviet oil squeeze, Mr. Carter may be speaking too soon. The Russian wolf (as a change from the bear) is very patient when and where oil is concerned, and has by no means gone away.

He is still at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, not far from the Indonesian oil fields; still in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, watching over Mid-East oil shipments; and in Angola within easy submarine or bombing range of Nigerian oil shipping; and, of course, in Cuba, all too close to the oil fields of Mexico and Venezuela.

But the oil is still flowing, says Mr. Carter, as if that means we need not worry about the Soviets cutting it off someday. If he is right, then it's all much ado about nothing, and the Soviets are giving Castro $4 billion a year just to help the poor Cubans, and have positioned themselves or their surrogates close to our major oil suppliers just to be neighborly.

JAMES E. WOOD

Kitty Hawk, N.C.

BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

NEW BROADCASTING HOUSE PO BOX 27 OXFORD ROAD MANCHESTER M60 1SJ
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAMS 061-236 8444

14th June 1984

Dear Dr Kissinger

I am writing to you about your speciality, diplomacy - but diplomacy of the Bronze Age. I know you are presently involved in a lengthy lecture tour - but I wonder if you might be interested. We are making a series of six films about the Aegean Bronze Age, with the historicity of the Trojan War as the central theme. One film is devoted to the Hittites and to their diplomatic archive discovered at Boghaz Köy in central Turkey. This fascinating archive has been the focus of academic controversy since it was translated after the First War, with particular interest in the alleged presence of Mycenaean Greeks in the Hittite tablets as the shadowy but powerful kingdom of Ahhiyawa. Ferdinand Sommer argues strongly against this identification in *Die Ahhijava-Urkunden*, but in the last year or so new evidence has made the letters much clearer and opinion is now moving strongly towards acceptance of the idea that the Greeks of Mycenae were a 'Great Kingdom' on a par (roughly) with the Hittites and Egypt, the superpowers of the day. The key work has been done in the States, especially by Prof. H. Güterbock in Chicago, who, as you very likely know is the greatest living Hittitologist. These new discoveries have put our whole view of Bronze Age Greece on a different footing, and enable us to reconstruct in detail the diplomatic manoeuvres between two 'superpowers' at the time to which tradition assigns the Trojan War (the letters *do*, incidentally, give us clear evidence of diplomatic and military intervention by the Greeks in Asia Minor, just as the legend has it).

We are hoping to interview Professor Güterbock in Chicago in July of this year, and I wonder whether you might just be interested in doing an interview, from your practical - and academic - perspective, on your impression of the conduct of diplomacy in the Bronze Age?

We are interviewing many of the world's top scholars and archaeologists in the series - Geoffrey Kirk at Cambridge on Homer, George Mylonas at Mycenae, Ekrem Akurgal in Turkey, Jacovides from Pennsylvania and so on, but we are trying to give an 'overview' by an eminent non-specialist in each episode. The series "In Search of the Trojan War" is to be shown on BBC 2 here and doubtless on PSB in the States: obviously your expertise would make the audience look at this distant period of history in a very fresh way, particularly as the Bronze Age personalities come out so vividly in the letters.

JUN 20 1984

KICK
[LC]

Kick Enterprises, Inc.
575 Lexington Ave.
Suite 2700
New York, NY 10022
212/935-8147

August 29, 1984

Dr. Henry Kissinger
55 East 52nd Street
Suite 1100
New York, New York 10055

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

At the meeting scheduled for Friday, August 31, 1984, at 11:00 a.m. at your office in New York, Werner Fricker, the recently elected President of the USSF, Steve Caspers and I will be representing the Federation. Steve and I left the NASL in August 1983 to establish a marketing and sales agency, and now represent the USSF Youth Division (1.2 million boys and girls registered, aged 5-19 years), USSF Senior Division (110,000 registered men and women over 19 years of age) and the USSF National Team Program (nine national team categories) in an attempt to expand those programs and secure corporate sponsorship support.

I have enclosed a copy of an agenda of items and supporting documents which we wish to discuss with you and although, at first glance, it might appear to require a great deal of time, I can assure you that it can be completed comfortably in 30 minutes.

We look forward to seeing you on Friday.

PW/jk
enclosure

cc: Werner Fricker
Steve Caspers
Chris Vick

AGENDA OF MEETING

August 31, 1984, 11:00 a.m.

1. Review of Meetings with FIFA Representatives at Olympic Games in Los Angeles

2. Marketing Program for USSF (Caspers/Woosnam)

a) Youth Division (U-19 years) - 1.2 million boys and girls

b) Senior Division (19 years and over) - 110,000 men & women

c) National Teams:

Male - World Cup

U-23 (anticipated 1988 Olympic Team)

Senior Division (PanAmerican Games)

U-19 (Chile - World Championship 1985)

U-16 (Chile - World Championship 1985)

Indoor Soccer

Women - Senior Division

U-19

U-16

3. Television of US National Team Games

a) NBC - US vs Netherland Antilles (World Cup Preliminary) 10/6/84

- World Cup '86

- Other

b) Cable Networks

4. Strategy for US award of World Cup '94 by FIFA

a) Decision process 1986-88

b) Hosting FIFA approved tournaments 1985-87

1985 Tournament of Champions

1986 World Championships ?

1987 World Championships ?

c) Key FIFA personnel

5. National Team Program - September 1984 - August 1986

1. Concept 2-year advance planning

2. Complexities of professional leagues

3. Proposed home games 1984/85, 1985/86

4. Television

5. Sponsorship

6. Locations for home games

7. Concept for ticket sales - local soccer programs

8. Local political and business community involvement

9. Foreign tours - Income/foreign relations

6. USSF Good and Welfare

1. Advisory Committee

2. Foundation Support

3. Role of Individuals

[4J]

HK:

The attached letter is from
Bernhard Zgoll from Seoul Korea.
He wants to offer his services in
making US soccer internationally
competitive.

He claims that the German and English
Soccer Federations are discussing
with him setting up a youth program
in those countries as he has done
in Korea.

Explain I appreciate his offer
but have no use right now

Show it to Woosnam in case
he has any interested

Prefer

Bernhard Zgoll
c/o Deutsche Botschaft
Seoul/Korea
CPO Box 1289

Seoul, den 6.11.1984

An Herrn
Dr.Henry Kissinger
United States Soccer Federation
Empire State Building
New York, New York 10118

Sehr geehrter Herr Dr.Kissinger:

Von der FIFA erfuhr ich, daß Sie sich wieder dem Fußball zugewandt haben und sich jetzt gezielt der Entwicklung dieser Sportart in den USA widmen wollen.

Damit hoffe ich, daß jetzt endlich der große Durchbruch für den Soccer in den USA geschaffen wird. Es ist zu bedauern, daß man die Wichtigkeit dieser Sportart Nr.1 in der Welt, auch deren enorme politische Bedeutung für die USA, in Ihrem Lande bisher nicht erkannt hat.

In Sachen Fußball habe ich Sie bereits einmal vor sieben Jahren ange - schrieben. Ich weiß nicht, ob Sie mein Brief erreicht hat.

Hier möchte ich Ihnen nochmals meine Dienste anbieten, denn ich glaube, Ihnen bei Ihrem Vorhaben, den USA-Soccer weltkonkurrenzfähig zu machen, besonders behilflich sein zu können.

Im Fußballgeschäft bin ich als Trainer, Organisator und Berater seit 25 Jahren mit sensationellen Erfolgen tätig. Anbei finden Sie mein Curriculum Vitae mit den Stationen meiner Tätigkeit. Über meine erfolgreiche Arbeit besitze ich ausgezeichnete Zeugnisse und Dokumentationen.

Seit 1983 bin ich im Auftrage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Regierungsberater und Berater des koreanischen Fußballverbandes in Seoul tätig. Wie Sie bestimmt wissen, wurde Korea bei der letzten Jugendweltmeisterschaft in Mexiko zur größten Sensation. Nach Siegen über Mexiko, Australien und Uruguay scheiterten die Koreaner erst gegen den späteren Weltcupsieger Brasilien mit 1:2 und belegten zur größten Überraschung

CURRICULUM VITAE

Bernhard Zgoli

Date of birth: June 25, 1927, Bismarckhütte (Upper Silesia)

Education

MA in Economics, Warsaw University (SGPiS);

Soccer Coach Diploma - Jagielony University (UJ) Cracow

Soccer Coach Diploma - Sporthochschule Cologne

Football

1938 - 1947 "Ruch" Chorzow (many years Polish Champ)

1948 "Gornik" Janow (Silesian Champ)
Coach-Player

1949 -1950 "Gornik" Szombierki (1st Division)
Coach-Player

1950 -1958 Chief-coach of the Federation "Gornik"

1953 In charge of the Polish National Team
Under 23 (Olympic Squad)

1960 -1969 Research work on football
Sportsacademy Warsaw (AWF)

1970 -1972 Coaching in Germany

since 1973 working on behalf of the German Government,
the German Football Federation (DFB) and
the Olympic Committee for Germany abroad:

1973 -1977 National coach and Soccer Adviser in Kenya

1978 -1982 National coach and Soccer Adviser
in the Philippines

since 1983 Soccer Adviser in South Korea

1974 - 1982 Conducting courses for coaches in different parts of the world on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Football Federation and the Olympic Committee for Germany

Seoul/Korea, July 13, 1984

TRANSLATION - jw - 11/29/84

6 November 1984

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I learned from FIFA that you are again devoting yourself to soccer and now want to work specifically towards development of this sport in the USA.

With this I hope that the big breakthrough for soccer in the USA will now finally be created. It is regretful that the importance -- as well as the enormous political significance for the USA -- of this #1 sport in the world has not yet been recognized in your country up to now.

I wrote to you once before seven years ago concerning soccer. I don't know whether my letter reached you.

Now I would like to offer you my services again as I believe I can be particularly helpful to you in your work towards making USA soccer internationally competitive.

I have been active in soccer for 25 years as a trainer, organizer and advisor with spectacular success. You will find my resume attached listing the various positions I have held. I have excellent references and documentation on my successful work.

Since 1983, I have been working under contract with the Federal Republic of Germany as a government consultant and advisor to the Korean Soccer Association in Seoul. As you undoubtedly know, Korea became the greatest sensation at the last international youth championship in Mexico. After defeating Mexico, Australia and Uruguay, the Koreans first foundered against the eventual World Cup victor, Brazil, by a score of 1-2 and to the greatest surprise of the entire soccer world took fourth place.

I achieved my successes primarily by creating suitable soccer structures, by adapting development programs and through new training methods I developed.

The German Soccer Federation (DFB) and the English Soccer Association (FA) are currently discussing with me setting up a large youth program in these countries on the basis of my new methods.

WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE
A CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH

1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006, Telephone: 202-638-6300

August 10, 1984

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Walt Roberts and I want you to have the enclosed statement and agenda for action that emerged from a recent conference on global resource issues. It is particularly impressive that 75 leaders in science, government, industry, agriculture, energy and environmental affairs from 20 countries should come to such broad agreement on specific proposals.

The conferees reached the very hopeful conclusion that adverse environmental and resource trends can be reversed. "We can stabilize human populations, improve people's quality of life, provide more food, save tropical forests and disappearing life species, and protect the environment using means that are within our grasp, and we can at the same time further other critical goals, both economic and humanitarian," said the statement.

The statement warns, however, that "these things will only be accomplished if a concerted effort is made, with some urgency, to change many current policies and practices." Failure to act boldly, it said, can result in growing threats to resources, health, economic development and international security.

The _Global Possible_ is an important document that we believe you will find helpful. We call your attention particularly to the issue-by-issue recommendations.

Enclosures

AUG 15 1984

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: Chairman: Matthew Nimetz; Vice Chairman: John E. Cantlon; William J. Baumol; Robert O. Blake; John E. Bryson; Carleton D. Burtt; Adrian W. DeWind; Marc J. Dourojeanni; John Firor; Donald Kennedy; Alan R. McFarland; Robert S. McNamara; Paulo Nogueira-Neto; Ruth Patrick; Amulya K. N. Reddy; Nathaniel P. Reed; Soedjatmoko; James Gustave Speth; Mostafa K. Tolba; Russell E. Train; Arthur C. Upton; Frank von Hippel; Konrad von Moltke; Michael H. Walsh; Melissa Wells; George M. Woodwell. Secretary-Treasurer: Curtis A. Hessler.

President: James Gustave Speth Vice Presidents: Jessica Tuchman Mathews and Wallace D. Bowman

Mark S. Wozmak
15 East 54th Terrace
Kansas City, Missouri 64112

May 1, 1984

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K. Street Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20006

Re: NATO

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I read recently with great interest your thoughts on the re-organization
and re-addressing of needs of NATO (TIME Magazine, March 5, 1984).

Your dissertation on NATO as it relates to our current state of world
affairs is the most comprehensive and well thought out review I have
read.

Obviously I am not an expert in world affairs, but I do make an attempt
to read as much as possible on the direction of world events, whether or
not directly related to the United States.

I believe your thoughts and recommendations are excellent and urge you to
continue in your efforts at obtaining the re-organization and re-development
of the NATO concept for I believe, as you, that the NATO Alliance must be
a strong, cohesive, constructive, diplomatic, as well as a military
partnership. Without this both Europe's and the United States future must
be considered in jeopardy.

MAY 3 1984

[L]

TOM C. KOROLOGOS

1850 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 850
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

August 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHRIS VICK

FROM: TOM C. KOROLOGOS T&K

SUBJECT: Majority Leader Wright/
Texas Trip

When we saw the Majority Leader of the House
on August 3, 1983, Rep. James Wright (D-Tex.),
Henry promised him that he would attend
"something"--not a fundraiser--(a seminar,
speech or somesuch event) in North Texas for
the Leader.

This would take place after the Commission's
report is finished and I send it along for your
pending file after we return to real life.

AUG 05 1983

FY 1984
ENDING

If you have an approved ACP practice, please
keep in mind our fiscal year ends in September.
Please send in all necessary paperwork - bills, etc.
as soon as possible for payment, and so that we may
close our books for the year.

TROUT
FOR
POND

The Fairfield County Soil and Water Conservation District is offering brown and rainbow fingerlings (3-5"). The price is $50. for 100 fingerlings with delivery and pick up at the Bethel office some time in October. The deadline date for ordering is September 28th. For orders or questions call the District Office at 744-6108.

COUNTY COMMITTEE

Russell Gerow
Chairman

Charles D. Ferris, III
Vice-Chairman

Paul Osborn
Regular Member

For the County Committee

Howard E. Rood, Jr.
(Acting) County Executive Director

Prepared by Mary Lou Randall
County Operations Trainee

Rory Harner
Program Assistant

Eligibility to participate in all programs administered by ASCS is established by law without regard to race, religion, color, national origin or sex.

U. S. Department of Agriculture
Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Service
Fairfield County ASC Committee
RD 2, Box 165A, Route 6
Bethel, CT 06801

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE PAID

USDA - ASCS

TIMOTHY C. WU

15-J Madison Green
5 East 22nd Street
New York City, NY 10010
212-254-0290

10-B Mountain Lodge
44 Mount Kellett Road
The Peak, HONG KONG
5-96777

## EDUCATION:

Princeton University, A.B., Politics, June 1984.

Summa Cum Laude.

Thesis: "Season of Darkness, Season of Light;"

A Political-Historical Novel of the Chinese Communist

Conquest of Shanghai in 1949.

Singapore American High School, Singapore, 1980.

## ACTIVITIES:

**Princeton University Trustee**, Elected June 2, 1984. Serve four-year term until June 1988 as Young Alumni Trustee of the university. Electorate consisted of four most recent graduating classes. As trustee, serve on at least three standing committees, act as full voting member on Board of Trustees, and serve as member of the Politics Department Advisory Council. Currently youngest person to be made a Princeton University Trustee.

**Senior Class President**, Coordinate Class Activities, Graduation Ceremonies, 38-Member Steering Committee, $200,000 budget; serve on Alumni Council and Undergraduate Student Government Executive Committees.

**University Council Delegate**, 1982-1983. Served as one of ten elected student representatives to the council, and on Executive Committee of council, with President and Provost of University.

**University Press Club**, Worked as reporter for United Press International, Reuters, Courier News, and Asbury Park Press, covering Princeton and Central New Jersey related events.

**Sophomore Class Secretary-Treasurer**, Coordinated $35,000 class budget, composed class correspondence, served on Student Government Projects Board.

**Projects Board Chairman**, 1982-1983. Coordinated budget of $38,000 from Student Government to be allocated for special projects or programs initiated by student groups on campus.

**Peer-to-Peer Counselor**, Peer counselor for students; trained in crisis intervention skills ranging from stress and academic pressure management techniques, to family disorders, interpersonal relation problems, eating disorders, and suicide prevention.

**Area Solicitor**, Worked to solicit funds for Campus Fund Drive, to benefit Student Volunteers Council, a community-service organization.

## WORK EXPERIENCE:

Summer '84
**Scriptwriter**, Freelance writer for "Made in Hong Kong," a situation-comedy about culture clashes between an English man married to a Chinese woman, and living with the woman's traditional Chinese mother. Production by Robert Chua Productions, under contract by

[LC]

British and Hong Kong television networks. Also worked as freelance scriptwriter and narrator for television commercials, editor for a documentary on Hong Kong advertising practices, and features writer for *Ming Pao* Chinese language newsmagazine.

**Summer '82, '83**

*On-Air Reporter*, Worked for two consecutive summers as on-air spot reporter for Hong Kong Television Broadcasts (HK-TVB), appearing on one to two nightly newscasts, covering a wide range of stories; murders, robberies, political reporting, investigative reporting.

**1983-1984**

*Resident Advisor*, Work as advisor to nineteen incoming college freshmen, advising on academic matters, adjustment to collegiate life, university rules and regulations, planning social events, personal counseling, and changes in university life due to recent implementation of Residential College System.

**Summer 1980**

*Volunteer Teacher*, United Nations High Commission on Refugees. Worked as volunteer English teacher for Vietnamese Boat People stationed at Singapore Refugee Camp while awaiting resettlement.

**HONORS AND AWARDS:**

*W. Sanderson Detwiler Award*, received June 4, 1984. The Detwiler Award is given each year at Princeton to the graduating senior who, in the opinion of his or her classmates, has done the most for the class during its four years at Princeton.

*Most Promising New Newscaster of 1982*, named the most promising new newscaster of 1982 by the Hong Kong Television and Entertainment Times Magazine.

*Summa Cum Laude*, received June 5, 1984. Of the 120 graduates in the Politics Department, only five were awarded this distinction of Highest Honors.

**SPECIAL SKILLS AND INTERESTS:**

Extensive travel experience to five continents, including rarely frequented nations such as Borneo, Burma, China, Nepal, Russia, and Tanzania. Schooling and residency overseas for more than 10 years, in Singapore and currently in Hong Kong. Other interests: photography, skiing, tennis, debate, creative writing, Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation certification.

**REFERENCES:**

Available upon request

HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 30, 1984

Dear Tom:

I am writing in support of the Atlantic Council's
request that you approve the NATO 35th anniversary
advertising campaign as a public service.

I believe to deny the NATO endorsements on the basis
of being "too political" and/or "controversial" is
incorrect. NATO being a political organization the
endorsements of it are, of course, political. Yet,
the networks carried the NATO advertising as a pub-
lic service on the occasion of its 20th and 25th
anniversaries. NATO has not changed since then; it
is still dedicated to defending the political values
of its members. Those political values have not
changed; sanctity of contracts, guarantees of the
rights of individuals, and respect for the sover-
eignty of other states are still central to NATO's
members. I might add that these political values
have allowed the countries which make up NATO to
develop a degree of freedom and prosperity unrivaled
in the history of civilization.

To call controversial endorsements of the political
organization that is supported at all levels of gov-
ernment--not only here, but in the other NATO coun-
tries--is to question the political values that gov-
ern them. Surely, endorsements of NATO, which has
defended our way of life steadfastly for 35 years,
cannot be judged as anything but public advertising.

Therefore, I strongly urge you to reconsider your
decision and restore the public service status to
the NATO advertising campaign.

Mr. Thomas H. Wyman
Chairman and President
CBS Inc.
51 West 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019

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