Please Deliver to: Suzanne McFarlane

OCT 09 2003

FROM TRIBUNE MEDIA SERVICES INTERNATIONAL.
Available by Special Arrangement Only.

For retransmission, please contact Gabe Gutierrez in Los Angeles.

Phone: 213-237-7903 or e-mail: gabe.gutierrez@latsi.com

HENRY KISSINGER -- BONUS

10/9/03

EDITORS, CAUTION: The following article is strictly embargoed. It appeared in Welt am Sonntg Oct. 5 and is being offered as a bonus to subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstance be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.

KISSINGER: FAILURE IN IRAQ WOULD BE A DISASTER FOR THE WEST

This interview with Henry Kissinger was conducted by Waltraud Kaserer, foreign editor of Welt am Sonntag. It appeared Oct. 5.

QUESTION: What do you think of the current situation in Iraq?

HENRY KISSINGER: Whatever the opinion about the origin of the war -- and I supported it -- we are now at a point where a failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the West. This would encourage all the radical elements and all who believe that the West is in retreat, and therefore there is a necessity for cooperation between Europe and the United States in Iraq.

A: Was the war and the aftermath planned well enough?

KISSINGER: America always succumbs to the temptation, whenever it engages itself internationally, to believe that there is a uniform recipe for the solution of problems. And there was too much of a belief that there was an analogy between the occupation of Germany and Japan and the occupation of Iraq.

Those were totally different issues. Germany was a national state. Iraq is a sovereign state but not a national state. In Germany there was not only a military defeat of the ideology but by that time a consciousness of a catastrophe caused by that ideology that left no residue.

[c]

In Iraq this was not the case, because the ideology of the past was not only tied to Saddam Hussein but to the Sunni-Shiite conflict. In Germany there was no guerrilla conflict. In Iraq there is. In Germany the surrounding countries were favoring the occupation. In Iraq the opposite is the case.

The original assumption was probably mistaken. On the other hand, other assumptions would not have made any difference where matters stand now. Because once we overthrew Saddam, we would have faced roughly the same problems, whether we compared it in our mind to Germany or whether we recognized it as a (ital) sui generis (unital) issue.

Considering the objective difficulties, the fact that you have Kurds, Sunni, Shiites and tribes, the fact is a certain amount of turmoil was inevitable even could we have arrived with a fully trained civil affairs team. One can say that we are now face to face with the real problems in Iraq. We could probably not have speeded up the process even if we had made a better analysis at the beginning.

A: You mentioned the guerrilla war. Was it inevitable?

KISSINGER: Probably.

A: How could it have been prevented?

KISSINGER: The guerrilla war is conducted by remnants of the Baathist structure and the Republican Guards and groups encouraged probably by Iran and Syria. None of the neighbors has an interest in an Iraq settling down, at least not an immediate interest. All countries have an interest in getting a role in the solution. The guerrilla war was not provoked by our actions; it was provoked by our presence.

A: Would it have made a difference if Saddam Hussein had been caught?

KISSINGER: Not much. It would have been a psychological achievement.

A: A lot of analysts say that Iraq is the new home for all sorts of terrorist groups like Al Qaeda.

KISSINGER: That may be true. But they were in the region anyway. They did not come into being because of Iraq. They are trying to use Iraq to fight their battles. They existed anyway, and they were going to be active somewhere.

A: But not in Iraq.

KISSINGER: No, but somewhere else.

A: So, did the war make Iraq more stable or more unstable?

KISSINGER: More unstable in the short term. In the long term, if we all act wisely, more stable in the sense that we should create a representative, if not a fully

[L]

democratic, government conducting progressive policies, keeping in mind the interest of its people. And even if they don't meet all these objectives, it should be a great improvement over the previous situation. And a country that hopefully will contribute to a moderate international policy.

A: Will the Americans stay long enough?

KISSINGER: If they don't stay long enough, the whole enterprise will be very dangerous. They have to stay long enough, together with other concerned countries.

A: How can the Americans win the support of the international community, especially France and Germany?

KISSINGER: I am saddened by the fact that every time one talks about common efforts, one singles out France and Germany as a problem. France and Germany anyway are different problems. France is conducting traditional French nationalist foreign policy. For Germany, this is a part of the questful identity of the third generation after the war and the first generation after unification. So, for Germany, it is more a psychological problem. I don't think it is Germany's desire to cut down the influence of the United States in the world. It is rather to define a particular German mission in the world. We have to try to rediscover some sense of common destiny. I don't look at this problem from the point of view of which specific German demands may reflect tactical assessments. I hope German and American leaders would now ask what could be the common objective in a region that is of such consequence for the Middle East and for Europe. This will, of course, require some tactical adjustments at this moment. But a sense of common destiny should be the fundamental objective.

A: What are these tactical assessments?

KISSINGER: For America, how much of a role we grant Germany and, for Germany, how much assistance it is able to provide. When we were in a period when Germany and the United States considered themselves part of a comparable destiny, there were many disagreements, but they were done within a framework of common purpose. Now there is the danger that there is a fundamental disagreement, but a lot of tactical agreements that get us through the public relations problems in each countries. I hope that the debate can be raised.

A: Is the U.N. Security Council the right forum to discuss this?

KISSINGER: I don't think the U.N. Security Council is the right forum. The Security Council is the right forum to

Please deliver to: Suzanne Morattane

[c]

reflect agreements; it's not the right forum to settle disagreements.

A: What should the United States have done now instead of addressing the U.N. Security Council?

KISSINGER: Whatever happens in the Security Council, there will be some resolution. Then the problem is to give content to a program that both sides can really believe in and that both sides can support. And if Europe and the United States are together, the Security Council problem will resolve itself. Because then Russia will join, China will join, and the smaller countries will be relieved that they don't have to choose between two power points of view.

A: Will France join?

KISSINGER: France will join if Germany and the United States do better in coordinating their policies. But I am not asking Germany to choose between the United States and France. Both sides of the Atlantic need to make adjustments.

A: Can we trust the Iraqi Governing Council enough to leave it alone, as the Germans and the French demand?

KISSINGER: When people say, Iraq should be sovereign, it can have two meanings. It can mean that they want to make them legitimate to their own people or to create an institution that can contest with the United States for influence. It can have both intentions. If it's the latter intention, it will be putting a heavy strain on the governing council. If Europe and the United States are together, that might give enough support to the governing council to impress the population. At this stage it is premature to talk of sovereignty. But it should be achieved next year.

(c) 2003, Welt am Sonntag/Tribune Media Services International

For immediate release (Distributed 10/9/03)

END

Message

Page 1 of 3

OCT 0 8 2003

Theresa Cimino

From: Kaserer, Waltraud [wkaserer@wams.de]

Sent: Wednesday, October 08, 2003 9:36 AM

To: 'Theresa Cimino'

Subject: Interview with Dr. Kissinger as published

Dear Theresa,

please find enclosed my interview with Dr. Kissinger as it was published on Sunday, Oct. 5. I will give
the paper version to Dr. Kissinger when he is here next week. Thank you for the very good cooperation.

Looking forward to seeing you again soon.

"Misserfolg wäre Desaster"

Henry Kissinger über Gefahren und Chancen im Irak

WELT am SONNTAG: Wie schätzen Sie die aktuelle Lage im Irak ein?

Henry Kissinger: Wir sind jetzt an einem Punkt, an dem ein Misserfolg im Irak für den Westen ein
Desaster wäre. Das würde alle radikalen Elemente auf der Welt bestärken, die glauben, der Westen sei
auf dem Rückzug. Deshalb besteht die Notwendigkeit der Kooperation zwischen Europa und den USA.

WamS: Waren der Krieg und vor allem der Wiederaufbau ausreichend geplant?

Kissinger: Wann immer sich Amerika international engagiert, unterliegt es der Versuchung, für alle Probleme eine einheitliche Lösung anzuwenden. Außerdem glaubte man zu sehr an Parallelen zwischen der Besetzung Deutschlands und Japans und der im Irak. Die Lage nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg war aber gänzlich anders.

WamS: Was sind die Unterschiede?

Kissinger: Deutschland war ein Nationalstaat. Der Irak ist zwar ein souveräner Staat, aber kein Nationalstaat. In Deutschland wurde nicht nur die Ideologie militärisch besiegt, sondern es gab zum Ende des Krieges ein breites Bewusstsein für die Katastrophe, die diese Ideologie ausgelöst hatte. In Irak ist das nicht der Fall, weil die Ideologie nicht nur an Saddam Hussein festgemacht war, sondern auch am Konflikt der Sunniten und Schiiten. In Deutschland gab es keinen Guerilla-Konflikt. Im Irak schon. Die ursprünglichen Annahmen der USA waren vielleicht falsch. Auf der anderen Seite hätten andere Einschätzungen die aktuelle Situation nicht maßgeblich verändert. Wir sind jetzt erst im vierten Monat der Besetzung, und der Umstand, dass wir es mit drei Ethnien, den Kurden, Schiiten und Sunniten, zu tun haben, macht ein bestimmtes Maß an Aufruhr unumgänglich.

WamS: Hätte man den Guerilla-Krieg vermeiden können?

Kissinger: Der Guerilla-Krieg wird geführt von Überbleibseln des Baath-Regimes, von den Republikanischen Garden und von Gruppen, die womöglich von Syrien und Iran dazu ermutigt werden. Keiner der Nachbarn hat ein unmittelbares Interesse, dass der Irak zur Ruhe kommt. Jedes Land möchte in den Veränderungen eine Rolle spielen. Der Guerilla-Krieg wurde nicht durch unsere Präsenz provoziert, sondern durch unsere Aktionen.

WamS: Würde es einen Unterschied machen, wenn Saddam gefasst worden wäre?

10/8/2003

Message

Page 2 of 3

Kissinger: Keinen großen. Es wäre aber ein psychologisches Signal.

WamS: Viele Experten sagen, dass nicht nur die von Ihnen genannten Gruppen den Guerilla-Krieg führen, sondern auch Terroristen von Al Qaida ...

Kissinger: Das mag so sein. Die Terroristen versuchen nun, im Irak ihre Kämpfe auszutragen. Aber sie waren sowieso schon aktiv in der Region.

WamS: Wie können die Amerikaner die breite Unterstützung der internationalen Gemeinschaft gewinnen, speziell die von Deutschland und Frankreich?

Kissinger: Ich bin traurig über den Umstand, dass bei jedem Gespräch über gemeinsame Anstrengungen Deutschland und Frankreich als ein Problem hervorgehoben werden. Außerdem reden wir von zwei unterschiedlichen Problemen. Frankreich betreibt eine traditionell französische nationalistische Außenpolitik. Hinter dem deutschen Verhalten steckt die Frage nach der Identität der dritten Generation nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und der ersten Generation nach der Wiedervereinigung. Es ist ein psychologisches Problem.

WamS: Und was muss jetzt passieren?

Kissinger: Deutschland und Amerika müssen den Sinn für das gemeinsame Schicksal wiederfinden. Die beiden Länder sollten sich auch fragen, was das gemeinsame Ziel in einer Region ist, die so bedeutend für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten und auch für Europa ist.

WamS: Ist der UN-Sicherheitsrat das richtige Forum, um diese Dinge zu diskutieren?

Kissinger: Nein. Der Sicherheitsrat ist das Forum, um Übereinstimmung zu reflektieren. Er ist nicht das richtige Forum, um Streitigkeiten zu schlichten.

WamS: Hätte die USA also keine weitere Resolution in den Sicherheitsrat einbringen sollen?

Kissinger: Was immer auch passiert, es wird irgendeine Resolution geben. Das Problem wird dann sein, ein Arbeitsprogramm aufzustellen, an das beide Seiten glauben und das sie unterstützen. Wenn Europa und die USA einer Meinung sind, wird sich das Problem im Sicherheitsrat automatisch lösen. Denn dann werden auch Russland und China mitmachen, und die kleineren Länder werden aufatmen, weil sie sich nicht zwischen zwei gegensätzlichen Sichtweisen entscheiden müssen.

WamS: Das hieße, dass Frankreich kein Veto einlegen wird.

Kissinger: Frankreich wird mitmachen, wenn Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten ihre Politik besser koordinieren. Aber ich fordere Deutschland nicht auf, zwischen den USA und Frankreich zu wählen. Auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks müssen die Positionen angepasst werden.

WamS: Können wir dem provisorischen irakischen Regierungsrat und den politischen Strukturen schon genug trauen, um die Iraker allein regieren zu lassen, wie das Deutschland und Frankreich fordern?

Kissinger: Die Forderungen nach einem souveränen Irak können zwei Dinge bedeuten. Erstens eine Legitimierung der irakischen Regierung in seinem Verhältnis zum irakischen Volk. Oder zweitens die Schaffung einer Institution, die mit den USA um Einfluss wetteifert. Falls die Forderungen die letztere Intention haben, wird das für den Regierungsrat große Spannungen bedeuten. Wenn Europa und die USA gemeinsam agierten, könnte das dem Regierungsrat genug Unterstützung geben, um die Bevölkerung zu beeindrucken. Es ist jetzt jedenfalls zu früh, über Souveränität zu sprechen. Aber sie sollte nächstes Jahr erreicht werden.

Das Interview führte Waltraud Kaserer

Artikel erschienen am 5. Okt 2003

Waltraud Kaserer
Foreign Editor
WELT am SONNTAG

10/8/2003

10/1/03

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER INTERVIEW

WITH WELT AM SONNTAG

September 23, 2003

**WELT am SONNTAG:** What do you think of the current situation in Iraq?

**Henry Kissinger:** Whatever the opinion about the origin of the war— and I supported it—we are now at a point where a failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the West. This would encourage all the radical elements and all who believe that the West is in retreat, and therefore there is a necessity for cooperation between Europe and the United States in Iraq.

**WamS:** Was the war and the aftermath planned well enough?

**Kissinger:** America always succumbs to the temptation whenever it engages itself internationally to believe that there is a uniform recipe for the solution of problems. And there was too much of a belief that there was an analogy between the occupation of Germany and Japan and the occupation of Iraq. Those were totally different issues. Germany was a national state. Iraq is a sovereign state but not a national state. In Germany there was not only a military defeat of the ideology but by that time a consciousness of a catastrophe caused by that ideology that left no residue. In Iraq this was not the case, because the ideology of the past was not only tied to Saddam but to the Sunni/Shiite conflict. In Germany there was no guerrilla conflict. In Iraq there is. In Germany the surrounding countries were favouring the occupation; in Iraq the opposite is the case. The original assumption was probably mistaken. On the other hand, other assumptions would not have made any difference where matters stand now. Because once we overthrew Saddam, we would have faced roughly the same problems, whether we compared it in our mind to Germany or whether we recognized it as a "sui generis" issue. We have to remember we now are only in the fourth month of the occupation and, considering the objective difficulties, the fact that you have Kurds, Sunni, Shiites and tribes, the fact is a certain amount of turmoil was inevitable even could we have arrived with a fully trained

2

**WamS:** You mentioned the guerrilla war. Was it inevitable?

**Kissinger:** Probably.

**WamS:** How could it have been prevented?

**Kissinger:** The guerrilla war is conducted by remnants of the Bathist
structure and the Republican guards and groups encouraged probably
from Iran and Syria. None of the neighbours have an interest in an
Iraq settling down, at least not an immediate interest. All countries
have an interest in getting a role in the solution. The guerrilla war was
not provoked by our actions; it was provoked by our presence.

**WamS:** Would it have made a difference if Saddam Hussein would
have been caught already?

**Kissinger:** Not much. Would have been a psychological achievement.

**WamS:** A lot of analysts say that Iraq is the new home for all sorts of
terrorist groups like Al Qaida...

**Kissinger:** That may be true. But they were in the region anyway.
They did not come into being because of Iraq. They are trying to use
Iraq to fight their battles. They existed anyway, and they were going
to be active somewhere.

**WamS:** But not in Iraq.

**Kissinger:** No, but somewhere else.

**WamS:** So, did the war make Iraq more stable or more unstable?

**Kissinger:** More unstable in the short term. In the long term, if we all
act wisely, more stable in the sense that we should create a
representative if not a fully democratic government conducting
progressive policies, keeping in mind the interest of its people. And
even if they don't meet all these objectives, it should be a great
improvement over the previous situation. And a country that hopefully
will contribute to a moderate international policy.

3

**WamS:** Will the Americans stay long enough?

**Kissinger:** If they don't stay long enough, the whole enterprise will be very dangerous. They have to stay long enough together with other concerned countries.

**WamS:** How can the Americans win the support of the international community, especially France and Germany?

**Kissinger:** I am saddened by the fact that every time when one talks about common efforts, one singles out France and Germany as a problem. France and Germany anyway are different problems. France is conducting traditional French nationalist foreign policy. For Germany, this is a part of the questful identity of the third generation after the war and the first generation after unification. So, for Germany, it is more a psychological problem. I don't think it is Germany's desire to cut down the influence of the U.S. in the world. It is rather to define a particular German mission in the world. We have to try to rediscover some sense of common destiny. I don't look at this problem from the point of view of which specific German demands may reflect tactical assessments. I hope German and American leaders would now ask what could be the common objective in a region that is of such consequence for the Middle East and for Europe. This will, of course, require some tactical adjustments at this moment. But a sense of common destiny should be the fundamental objective.

**WamS:** What are these tactical assessments?

**Kissinger:** For America, how much of a role we grant Germany and, for Germany, how much assistance it is able to provide. When we were in a period when Germany and the U.S. considered themselves a part of comparable destiny, there were many disagreements, but they were done within a framework of common purpose. Now there is the danger that there is a fundamental disagreement, but a lot of tactical agreements that get us through the public relations problems in each countries. I hope that the debate can be raised.

**WamS:** Is the U.N. Security Council the right forum to discuss this?

**Kissinger:** I don't think the U.N. Security Council is the right forum. The Security Council is the right forum to reflect agreements; it's not the right forum to settle disagreements.

4

Y

**WamS:** What should the U.S. have done now instead of addressing the UN Security Council?

**Kissinger:** Whatever happens in the Security Council, there will be some resolution. Then the problem is to give content to a program that both sides can really believe in and that both sides can support. And if Europe and the U.S. are together, the Security Council problem will resolve itself. Because then Russia will join, China will join and the smaller countries will be relieved that they don't have to choose between two power points of view.

**WamS:** Will France join?

**Kissinger:** France will join if Germany and the United States would do better in coordinating their policies. But I am not asking Germany to choose between the U.S. and France. Both sides of the Atlantic need to make adjustments.

**WamS:** Can we trust the Iraqi Governing Council already enough to leave it alone, as the Germans and the French demand?

**Kissinger:** When people say, Iraq should be sovereign, it can have two meanings. It can mean that they want to make them legitimate to their own people or to create an institution that can contest with the U.S. for influence. It can have both intentions. If it's the latter intention, it will be putting a heavy strain on the Governing Council. If Europe and the U.S. are together, that might give enough support to the Governing Council to impress the population. At this stage it is premature to talk of sovereignty. But it should be achieved next year.

10/1/03-#2

WITH WELT AM SONNTAG

September 23, 2003

2

ideology but by that time a consciousness of a catastrophe caused by
that ideology that left no residue. In Iraq this was not the case,
because the ideology of the past was not only tied to Saddam but to
the Sunni/Shiite conflict. In Germany there was no guerrilla conflict. In
Iraq there is. In Germany the surrounding countries were favouring
the occupation; in Iraq the opposite is the case. The original
assumption was probably mistaken. On the other hand, other
assumptions would not have made any difference where matters stand
now. Because once we overthrew Saddam, we would have faced
roughly the same problems, whether we compared it in our mind to
Germany or whether we recognized it as a "sui generis" issue. We
have to remember we now are only in the fourth month of the
occupation and, considering the objective difficulties, the fact that you
have Kurds, Sunni, Shiites and tribes, the fact is a certain amount of
turmoil was inevitable even could we have arrived with a fully trained
civil affairs team. One can say that we are now face to face with the
real problems in Iraq. We could probably not have speeded up the
process even if we had made a better analysis at the beginning.

**Kissinger:** Probably.

3

M

**WamS:** But not in Iraq.

4

5

[Y]

**Kissinger:** For America, how much of a role we grant Germany and, for Germany, how much assistance it is able to provide. When we were in a period when Germany and the U.S. considered themselves a part of comparable destiny, there were many disagreements, but they were done within a framework of common purpose. Now there is the danger that there is a fundamental disagreement, but a lot of tactical agreements that get us through the public relations problems in each country. I hope that the debate can be raised.

6

**WamS:** Will France join?

7

[y]

10/1/03

WITH <u>WELT AM SONNTAG</u>

September 23, 2003

**Henry Kissinger:** Whatever is said about the origin of the war, I supported it. We are now at a point where a failure in Iraq for the West would be a disaster, because this would encourage all the radical elements and all the believe that the West is in retreat and therefore there is an necessity for cooperation between Europe and the United States in Iraq.

Kissinger: America always comes to the temptation whenever it engages itself internationally to believe that there is a uniform recipe for the solution of problems. And there was too much of a belief that there was an analogy between the occupation of Germany and Japan and the occupation of Iraq. Those were totally different issues.

2

[Y]

ideology but by that time a consciousness of a catastrophe caused by
that ideology that left no residue. In Iraq this was not the case,
because the ideology of the past was not only tied to Saddam but to
the Sunni/Shiite Conflict. In Germany there was no guerilla conflict. In
Iraq there is. In Germany the surrounding countries were favouring
the occupation, ~~in other words.~~ The original assumption was probably
mistaken. On the other hand ~~it would not have made any difference,~~ as
~~matters stand now~~
Because once we overthrew Saddam we would have faced roughly the
same problems, ~~Whether we compared it in our mind to Germany or~~
whether we recognised it as a "sui generis" issue. We have to
remember we now are only in the fourth month of the occupation and
considering the objective difficulties. the fact that you have Curds,
Sunni, Shiites and tribes the fact that ~~there is~~ a certain amount of
turmoil was inevitable ~~and probably~~ could we have arrived with a fully
trained civil affairs team. Maybe in theory. But the test of One can say
that we now face to face with the real problems in Iraq. We could
probably not have speeded up the process even if we had made a
better analysis at the beginning.

**WamS:** You mentioned the guerilla war. Was it inevitable?

**Kissinger:** Probably.

3

[Y]

**Kissinger:** The guerilla war is conducted by remnants of the Bathist structure and the Republican guards and groups encouraged probably from Iran and Syria. None of the neighbours have an interest of an Iraq settling down. At least Not an immediate interest. All countries have an interest in getting a peace, a role in the solution, therefore this guerilla war was provoked by us. Guerilla war was not provoked by our actions, it was provoked by our presence.

**WamS:** Would it have made a difference if Saddam Hussein would have been caught already.

**Kissinger:** Not much. Would have a slight difference. Would have been a psychological shock.

**Kissinger:** But that may be true. But there were there anyway. They did not come into being because of Iraq. They are trying to use Iraq to fight their battles. They existed anyway and there were going to be active somewhere.

**WamS:** But not in Iraq

4

Y

**WamS:** So. Did the war make the Iraq more stable or more unstable?

Kissinger: More unstable in the short term. In the long term if we all act wisely more stable in the sense that we should create a representative if not a fully democratic government conducting progressive policies, keeping in mind the interest of its people. And even if they don't meet all these objective it should be a great improvement over the previous situation. And a country that hopefully contribute to a moderate international policy.

**Kissinger:** If they don't stay long enough the whole enterprise will be very dangerous. They have to stay long enough *tagetly met* after unreined countries

**Kissinger:** I am saddened by the fact that every time when one talks about common efforts, one singles out France and Germany as a problem. France and Germany anyway are different problems. France is conducting traditional French nationalist foreign policy. For Germany this is a part of the questful identity of the third generation after the war and the first generation after unification. So for Germany it is more psychological problem. I don't think it is Germany's desire to cut

[Y]

5

down the influence of the U.S. in the world. It is rather to define a
particular German mission in the world. It will be in the long run very
dangerous for everybody if we approach these issues as how can we
placate Germany or how can Germany placate us. We have to try to
rediscover some sense of common destiny. I don't look at this problem
from the point of view of which of the specific German demands can
we meet, partly because the specific German demands by the desire to
stay instead with France and have their own tactical assessments. If I
was Germany it would now ask what could be the common objective in
a region that is now of symbolic consequence for the Middle East and
for Europe. This will of course acquire some tactical adjustments at
a sense of common destiny should
this moment. But that should be the fundamental objective.

**Kissinger:** How much rule can we grant Germany and for Germany
how much can they do of what we ask for. But that's not the basic
issue. Because when we were in a period when Germany and U.S.
considered themselves a part of comparable destiny there were many
disagreements but they were done within a framework of common
purpose. Now there is the danger that there is a fundamental
disagreement, but a lot of tactical agreements that get us through the

6

[Y]

Public Relations problems in each countries. I hope that the debate can
be raised.

**WamS:** Is the UN Security Council the right forum to discuss this?

**Kissinger:** I don't think the UN Security Council is the right forum.
The Security Council is the right forum to bring out agreements it's not
the right forum the bring out disagreements.
~~It's not the right forum~~

**Kissinger:** Whatever happens in the security council, there will be
some resolution. The resolution will be sort of meaningless, ~~will not~~
mean a great deal. Then the problem is to give a content to a program
that both sides can really believe in and that both sides can support.
And if Europe and the U.S. are together, then the security council
problem will resolve itself. Because then Russia will join, China will join
and the smaller countries will be relieved that they don't have to
choose between two power plants.
points of view

**WamS:** Will France join?

**Kissinger:** France will join if Germany and the United States would do
coordinating their policies. But if
better in its policies.

an and asking Germany & slave
between the U.S. & France. Both sides
of the Atlantic need & make adjustments

[Y]

7

**Kissinger:** When people say, they should be sovereign, it can have two meanings. It can mean that they want to make them legitimate to their own people or to create an institution that can contest with the U.S. for influence. It can have both intentions. If it's the latter intention it will be putting a heavy strain on the Governing Council. If Europe and the U.S. are together that might give enough support to the Governing Council in time to get enough support by the population. At this stage it is premature to leave them alone.

10/1/03

WITH WELT AM SONNTAG

September 23, 2003

**Henry Kissinger:** Whatever is said what was the origin of the war. I supported it. We are now at a point where a failure in Iraq for the West would be a disaster, because this would encourage all the radical elements and all the believe that the West is in retreat and therefore there is an necessity for cooperation between Europe and the United States in Iraq.

Kissinger: America always comes to the temptation whenever it engages itself internationally to believe that there is a uniform recipe for the solution of problems. And there was too much of a believe that there was an analogy between the occupation of Germany and Japan and the occupation of Iraq. Those were totally different issues.

2

ideology but by that time a consciousness of a catastrophe caused by
that ideology that left no residue. In Iraq this was not the case,
because the ideology of the past was not only tied to Saddam but to
the Sunni/Shiite Conflict. In Germany there was no guerilla conflict. In
Iraq there is. In Germany the surrounding countries were favouring
the occupation. In other word. The original assumption was probably
mistaken. On the other hand it would not have made any difference.
Because once we overthrew Saddam we would have faced roughly the
same problems. Whether we compared it in our mind to Germany or
whether we recognised it as a "sui generis" issue. We have to
remember we now are only in the fourth month of the occupation and
considering the objective difficulties. the fact that you have Curds,
Sunni, Shiites and tribes the fact that there is a certain amount of
turmoil was inevitable and probably could we have arrived with a fully
trained civil affairs team. Maybe in theory. But the test of One can say
that we now face to face with the real problems in Iraq. We could
probably not have speeded up the process even if we had made a
better analysis at the beginning.

**Kissinger:** Probably.

3

Y

**WamS:** But not in Iraq

4

**Kissinger:** More unstable in the short term. In the long term if we all act wisely more stable in the sense that we should create a representative if not a fully democratic government conducting progressive policies, keeping in mind the interest of its people. And even if they don't meet all these objective it should be a great improvement over the previous situation. And a country that hopefully contribute to a moderate international policy.

**Kissinger:** If they don't stay long enough the whole enterprise will be very dangerous. They have to stay long enough.

5

down the influence of the U.S. in the world. It is rather to define a
particular German mission in the world. It will be in the long run very
dangerous for everybody if we approach these issues as how can we
placate Germany or how can Germany placate us. We have to try to
rediscover some sense of common destiny. I don't look at this problem
from the point of view of which of the specific German demands can
we meet, partly because the specific German demands by the desire to
stay instead with France and have their own tactical assessments. If I
was Germany I would now ask what could be the common objective in
a region that is now of symbolic consequence for the Middle East and
for Europe. This will of course acquire some tactical adjustments at
this moment. But that should be the fundamental objective.

6

The Security Council is the right forum to bring out agreements it's not the right forum to bring out disagreements.

**Kissinger:** Whatever happens in the security council, there will be
some resolution. The resolution will be sort of meaningless, will not
mean a great deal. Then the problem is to give a content to a program
that both sides can really believe in and that both sides can support.
And if Europe and the U.S. are together, then the security council
problem will resolve itself. Because then Russia will join, China will join
and the smaller countries will be relieved that they don't have to
choose between two power plants.

**WamS:** Will France join?

**Kissinger:** France will join if Germany and the United States would do better in its policies.

7

Kissinger: Not much. Would have a slight difference. Would have been a psychological shock.

WamS: A lot of analysts say that Iraq is the new home for all sorts of terrorist groups like Al Qaida...

Kissinger: But that may be true. But there were there anyway. They did not come into being because of Iraq. They are trying to use
Iraq to fight their battles. They existed anyway and there were going to be active somewhere.

WamS: But not in Iraq

Kissinger: No, but somewhere else.

WamS: So. Did the war make the Iraq more stable or more unstable?

WamS: Will the Americans stay long enough?

Kissinger: If they don't stay long enough the whole enterprise will be very dangerous. They have to stay long enough.

WamS: How can the Americans win the support of the international community, especially France and Germany?

Kissinger: I am saddened by the fact that every time when one talks about common efforts, one singles out France and Germany as a problem. France and Germany anyway are different problems. France is conducting traditional French nationalist foreign policy. For Germany this is a part of the questful identity of the third generation after the war and the first generation after unification. So for Germany it is more psychological problem. I don't think it is Germany's desire to cut down the influence of the U.S. in the world. It is rather to define a particular German mission in the world. It will be in the long run very dangerous for everybody if we approach these issues as how can we placate Germany or how can Germany placate us. We have to try to rediscover some sense of common destiny. I don't look at this problem from the point of view of which of the specific German demands can we meet, partly because the specific German demands by the desire to stay instead with France and have their own tactical assessments. If I was Germany I would now ask what could be the common objective in a region that is now of symbolic consequence for the Middle East and for Europe. This will of course acquire some tactical adjustments at this moment. But that should be the fundamental objective.

WamS: What are these tactical assessments?

Kissinger: How much rule can we grant Germany and for Germany how much can they do of what we ask for. But that's not the basic issue. Because when we were in a period when Germany and U.S. considered themselves a part of comparable destiny there were many disagreements but they were done within a framework of common purpose. Now there is the danger that there is a fundamental disagreement, but a lot of tactical agreements that get us through the Public Relations problems in each countries. I hope that the debate can be raised.

WamS: Is the UN Security Council the right forum to discuss this?

Kissinger: I don't think the UN Security Council is the right forum. The Security Council is the right forum to bring out agreements it's not the right forum the bring out disagreements.

WamS: What should the U.S. have done now instead of addressing the UN Security Council?

Kissinger: Whatever happens in the security council, there will be some resolution. The resolution will be sort of meaningless, will not mean a great deal. Then the problem is to give a content to a program that both sides can really believe in and that both sides can support. And if Europe and the U.S. are together, then the security council problem will resolve itself. Because then Russia will join, China will join and the smaller countries will be relieved that they don't have to choose between two power plants.

WamS: Will France join?

Kissinger: France will join if Germany and the United States would do better in its policies.

10/1/2003