4/20/59

BEYOND THE SUMMIT

Henry A. Kissinger

When the Soviet Union by a unilateral act threatened on November 27 to sever the life-lines to Berlin, it brought to a head not only the issue of Western relations with the Soviet bloc but also the nature of allied relationships, the purpose of its diplomacy and the goals of its strategy. In an alliance, disagreements are unavoidable and different approaches may contribute to the vitality of a consensus finally arrived at. Democracies function by means of public debate; since their policies are dependent on popular support, they are inevitably developed by a process which stresses conflicting approaches.

With all these qualifications there is nevertheless reason for serious concern. The reaction to a clear Soviet menace to the very vitals of the Western alliance has been tentative and unimaginative. Instead of producing a closing of ranks, there has been a sterile dispute about slogans such as flexibility, new approaches and relaxation of tension which are generally advocated but rarely specified. There has been a strange tendency to argue as if the end of the Cold War and a relaxation of tension depended entirely on the good will or negotiating skill.¹ There has been a curious reluctance

1. New York Times, April 8, 1959.

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[Y]

to admit that the cause of tension may be Soviet hostility or that Soviet
measures may be offensive instead of defensive, that the Soviet Union may be
less interested in confirming the status quo than in consolidating a base for
a further advance. Too much of the current debate addresses itself to the
mechanical aspect of negotiations and it has therefore enabled the Soviet
leaders to establish the categories of discourse. "Disengagement," "troop
freezes," "confederation," "the de facto recognition of two governments in
Germany," all designed to protect the Soviets from the consequences of their
intransigeance, have become symptoms of flexibility. The demand for free
elections, which in whatever form represent the principles of our democracy
as well as the aspirations of the German people, is interpreted all too frequently
as a symptom of Western intransigeance. There has been a great deal of debate
about neutral zones; the question has rarely been raised whether one cause of
our difficulty in Europe is not that our strength menaces the Soviet Union but
our weakness invites attack; not what NATO can concede but what it requires
to achieve the safety of its members. The tentativeness of Western approaches
has made it difficult to determine what it is that the West stands for in
Europe beyond assuring itself an interim of tranquillity.

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Mr. Kennan is undoubtedly correct in pointing out that the Soviet Union does not break treaties frivolously. On the other hand, the motives for maintaining an agreement are different than in the legalistic West. As long as a treaty reflects the Soviet understanding of power relationships one can be confident that it will be observed, scrupulously. If this relationship changes it will as surely be violated. In these terms, the current crisis is caused at least in part because according to the Soviet understanding of "objective" factors the situation of Berlin represents an anomaly.

On the other hand, the Western eagerness to justify negotiations by Soviet concessions enables the Soviet leaders to benefit from largely formal changes of front. Thus when President Eisenhower indicated his willingness to attend a summit conference he explained that the Soviet note of March 2 had been "more reasonable." It may be pertinent to inquire "more reasonable than what." For the note represented a reiteration of every Soviet position since the inauguration of the current crisis. Its only "concession" was to attend a foreign minister conference proposed by the Western powers while at

5. Disengagement Revisited.

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the tensions that the British believe helps maintain the Communist system."

But if the tension is required by the Communist leaders to maintain their
rule - if it is an organic requirement - little hope exists. The settlement
of the Berlin crisis even on Soviet terms would not deprive the Kremlin of
points of tension. All around the Soviet periphery opportunities exist
to activate disputes. Communism can not be dealt with this mechanically.

On the contrary, concern with the technical aspect of negotiations
enables the Soviet Union to shift all disputes to our side of the line. The
West is asked to "solve" problems which the Soviet Union creates and to
consider as a compromise a willingness by the Soviets to settle for something
less than originally asked for. The confusion of form and substance causes the
diplomatic debate to be confined to issues of maximum embarrassment to the
West - the issues that is which the Soviet Union has raised and on which
the West feels obliged to negotiate because, as the saying goes, no avenue of
settlement must be neglected and because the mere readiness of the Soviets to
talk about anything is considered "encouraging." Conversely, the West is
estopped from raising issues of possible embarrassment to the Soviet Union
such as the freedom of the satellite orbit or even of East Germany because,

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it is said, such a course would destroy the climate of confidence. The
Soviet Union is thereby enabled to withdraw problems from negotiations
simply by declaring them insoluble and any Western effort to elaborate
some principles for which to contend is denied as intransigent. Diplomacy
becomes a subtle device of Soviet pressures in which the inward uncertainty of
the West is made to contribute to encompassing its downfall. If we can only
negotiate on issues that the Soviet leaders have declared as soluble, it is
not surprising that the attention of the world is focussed on the symptoms
but not the cause of the difficulties, on NATO but not the Soviet hostility
which produced it; on the all-too-inadequate Western defense effort but not
on the preponderant Soviet strength which has made it necessary; on the
dangers to peace should there be another satellite upheaval but not on the
Soviet repression of human dignity without which the danger of upheaval would
not exist.

The situation is compounded by an insistence on establishing a
the
moral equivalence between/free world and the Soviet system. Too many in the
West confuse peaceful coexistence with moral equivalence - indeed they
derive the former from the latter. This leads to the preposterous argument

derive the former from the latter. These leads to the preposition argument which could be useful coexistence with moral coexistence - indeed they are in contrast to the moral coexistence between free world and the Soviet Union. Too much in the other sense.

The situation is compounded by an inconstance on safety. In the other sense the moral coexistence with moral coexistence - indeed they are in contrast to the moral coexistence between free world and the Soviet Union. Too much in the other sense.

not exist.

Soviet repression of human dignity without which the danger ofuschاذ would
demands to be passed should there be another offshore安全 island but not on the
on the preponderant Soviet strength which has made it necessary; on the
which proved it; on the self-sustained Western defense effort but not
but not the cause of the differences, on NATO but not the Soviet power.
not authorizing that the attention of the world is focused on the offshore
negotiations on issues that the Soviet leaders have declared as simple, if it is
the West is asked to contribute to encompassing itsown. It is our only
becomes a simple device of Soviet broadesides in which the inward uncertainty of
some branches for which to contend is denied as intransigent. Diplomatically
simply by declaring them indefinite and ask Western effort to evaporate
Soviet Union if thereby enabled to withdraw problems from negotiations
if it is asked, and a course would clearly the climate of confidence. The

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an injustice if we give the impression that we must engage in an elaborate pretense in order to justify a conference. We must always be ready to negotiate; but we cannot do so effectively unless we define for ourselves a world compatible with our allies.

a world compatible with our offices.

negotiate; but we cannot do so effectively unless we define for ourselves
preference in order to justify a conference. We must always be ready to
an injustice if we give the impression that we must engage in an elaborate

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IV

The primary task before the West is to become clear about the
challenges before it, about the threats as well as the opportunities. What
then are the issues in Central Europe? There are three: the political
problem of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe, particularly the division
of Germany; the problem of military security; and the future course of German
policy.

These three problems are inextricably connected. It is well to
remind ourselves that the existence of NATO reflects rather than causes
present tensions. Soviet policy was no less hostile during the period of
Europe's defenselessness and America's demobilization. The insecurity of
Europe has not been caused by Western military programs but by the Soviet Union's
acquisition of the satellite orbit, the preponderant force of Soviet [arms]
and the continued insistence on the division of Germany. All of this is
familiar. It requires reiteration only because so much of the contemporary
debate proceeds from the premise that it is possible to alleviate the
Cold War by treating its symptoms. It may therefore be well to deal with
the various components of it separately.

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fait accomplis. If the Soviet Union felt safe in resting on the fact of
possession it would hardly be so insistent on recognition of the status quo.
It is, to be sure, usually wise to accept the status quo; but nothing would
ever have been changed if this rule were elevated into a principle of universal
validity. Flexibility cannot take the form of surrendering the principle of
the self-determination of people. We are already at a sufficient disadvantage
because our defensive stance obliges us to refrain from exerting pressure on
the Soviet orbit, while the Soviet Union feels free to exacerbate all tensions
in the free world. We are in any case conducting policy by rules by which
the Communist empire can only gain but not lose: "Everything that falls
off the capitalist wagon," Khrushchev said in his press conference in March,
"is irrevocably gone." If we add to this the doctrine that our contribution to
the relaxation of tensions is the acceptance of the Soviet fait accompli
in Germany we are saying in effect that our principles
are valid only when they involve no risk. During Suez it was said that we
would uphold our principles even against our allies. It can hardly be
maintained that we will uphold them only against our allies.

Even apart from the issue of principle, it is not in the interest

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through separate dealings with the East. Such a course on the part of the Federal Republic would create an atmosphere of insecurity which would at the very least end all achievements of European integration and may start a demoralizing race to Moscow. German "flexibility" may thus be used to disrupt the unity of the West and to start a race for Moscow from which ultimately only the Kremlin can profit. Maintaining the Federal Republic as a willing partner of the Atlantic community is important not only for the future of Germany, but perhaps even more vital for the peace of the world.

Nor is the Soviet Union interested simply in a perpetuation of the status quo. "On what foundation should Germany be reunited?" Khrushchev said in Leipzig on March 7. "I think that the question of reunification should be approached primarily from class positions... Can we agree when the capitalist world proposes to achieve the reunification of Germany at the expense of the German Democratic Republic and thus narrow down the front of socialism (italics supplied). We have not been and we do not live to yield to capitalism. We must firmly abide by the principles of proletarian internationalism... The question can also be put thus: Why not reunite Germany by abolishing the capitalist system in West Germany and establishing

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there the power of the working class? But it would be *unrealistic today* (Emphasis added)... I repeat we are for German unity and the German people will be reunited. Therefore, do not hurry, the wind does not blow in your face, consider everything thoroughly. Have patience but also act...

If you want your children and grandchildren to remember you with gratitude, you should fight for the conclusion of a German peace treaty which would be an important step towards the reunification of Germany..."

If reunification is inevitable but unacceptable on a "capitalist" basis, it is obvious that it can be achieved only by the absorption of the Federal Republic by the East German satellite. The proposed peace treaty then is not the end but the beginning of a process: it is a measure to consolidate a tactical base. The recognition of East Germany will relax tensions only until the Soviets are ready to press for a reunification of Germany under Communist aegis. The history of coalitions in Poland, Romania, Hungary and even China indicates that as soon as the Communists feel strong enough they will withdraw their recognition of the Federal Republic and claim that their puppet regime represents all of Germany, much as was done with the Lublin Government in Poland. This was already foreshadowed by

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[Y]

and imaginative in devising all reasonable guarantees against attack. But
the Soviet quest for security cannot be permitted to take the form of
imposing puppet regimes and thwarting the legitimate aspirations for self-
determination. Here we must turn to the problem of military security.

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In order to put into focus the military implications of the various disengagement proposals, it is essential to discuss the problem of NATO strategy. Unhappily something less than clarity exists about the military basis for NATO. It is argued for example that NATO has prevented a Soviet attack without ever meeting the force levels planned for it. Since Soviet ground strength has been preponderant throughout the existence of NATO, so the argument goes, peace has been maintained for one of two reasons or a combination of them: either because the Soviet Union never had any intention of making a military attack on Europe in the first place or because it was deterred from such an attack by the threat of a general war with the United States. The corollary of this line of reasoning has been that a limited war in Europe was "unthinkable." Disengagement in these terms would merely shift the starting line for a Soviet advance one hundred or five hundred and fifty miles to the East without reducing the sanction against such a move. To be sure, the Soviet Union might decide to reoccupy the territories once vacated, but it could do so in Mr. Kennan's words "only once and only for the highest stakes: in the contingency, that is, of general war." Massive retaliation would furnish the deterrent against Soviet attack whether on the Elbe, the Oder or the Bug.

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of the nuclear age, it failed to take account of the changing weapons
technology which has in fact caused strategy to pass through four phases:
(1) the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and the
monopoly of the means of delivery, (2) the period when our monopoly of
weapons was ended but when we still possessed a monopoly of the means of
delivery, (3) the period when the Soviet Union began to develop a substantial
delivery system but our superiority in numbers and the strategic advantage
of our base system was so great that we possessed a decided advantage in any
all-out war, (4) the period when both in numbers of weapons and in the
means of delivery the capabilities of the two sides begin to approach each
other - indeed where the numerical advantage is, if anywhere, on the side of
the aggressor.

During phases one and two of the deterrent equation - during the period, that is, of our atomic preponderance - our retaliatory force could be conceived of as a deterrent to any aggression we chose to resist. It was a positive deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make our response dependent on the magnitude of the threat. Rather our primary problem was to decide that some response was called for. Massive retaliation could be effective because

["Some response was cuffed for. Negative retaliation could be effective because on the magnitude of the threat, further our primary problem was to decide that deterrent in the sense that we did not have to make our response dependent of us a deterrent to such aggression we chose to resist. If we a positive that is, of our strategic preponderance - our retaliatory force could be conceived during phase one and two of the deterrent operation - during the period, the aggressor.", "Other - indeed where the numerical advantage is, if anywhere, on the side of means of delivery the capabilities of the two sides begin to approach each other - indeed where the numerical advantage is

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substantial forces for a local defense. Then in fact "disengagement" might
have been less dangerous, provided it had been possible to devise a
substitute for the political commitment represented by the shield forces.

In the era of nuclear plenty, the defense of Europe can no longer
rest on the threat of all-out war alone. The statement that a local defense
of Europe is impossible has been so often repeated that it has almost been
elevated into a dogma. The issue need not be decided in the abstract, however.
It can surely be agreed that all governments in NATO must have a common
interest in seeking to avoid the outbreak of an all-out war. But they must
have an equal interest in preventing a situation in which such a war can
be avoided only by surrender. And they must not create temptations for
Soviet pressure either through weakness or irresolution. It is often
argued that Europe is too vital a prize to permit to fall into Soviet
hands without resorting to every weapon at our disposal. But the postulate
that an attack on Europe may lead to all-out war *ultimately*, should not be
taken to mean that it must *begin* with such a defense. The stronger the military
establishment on the Continent, the larger must be the Soviet attack
designed to overcome it. The more the required effort approaches the

designed to overcome it. The more the redried effort subsumes the
captachment on the Continent, the larger must be the Soviet attack
taken to mean that it must **pen** with such a defense. The stronger the military
that an attack on Europe may lead to all-out war **ultimately** should not be
pande without reporting to every weapon at our diabeast. But the bearificate
argued that Europe is too vital a prize to permit to fall into Soviet
soviet pressure either through weakness or insecurity. It is often
be avoided only by surrender. And they must not create temptations for
have an actual interest in preventing a situation in which such a war can
interest in seeking to avoid the outbreak of an all-out war. But they must
It can surely be agreed that all Governments in NATO must have a common
elevated into a dogma. The faze need not be decided in the abstract, however.
ot Europe is unfeasible but been so often repeated that it has almost been
rest on the threat of all-out war alone. The statement that a local defense
In the sense of morelexi plenty, the defense of Europe can no longer
endastitute for the **politik** commitment represented by the **armistice** forces.
have been less dangerous, provided it had been possible to depart a
suppletial force for a local defense. Then in fact "disengagement" might

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at all obvious why Western Europe and the United States whose combined resources of manpower and industrial potential far exceed those of the Soviet Union should not be able to make a much more substantial effort. The obstacle is the attempt to combine the advantage of every course of action: to seek to attain maximum security at minimum cost, to achieve deterrence by the threat of frightfulness and yet to conduct a "flexible" diplomacy.

From the security point of view the task before NATO then is to redress the military balance on the Continent rather than perpetuate an inequality which is one of the contributing causes to the current Soviet challenge and which will represent a growing invitation to further adventures as the Soviet nuclear arsenal grows. From a military point of view, then, all forms of disengagement so far proposed represent a weakening of the West, if only by perpetuating a disproportion in local power which will grow progressively more perilous. It cannot be maintained that a deterrent which is losing its credibility even in areas with which the United States maintains an alliance and where American forces are in the line of Soviet advance would not lose further effectiveness if moved 550 miles further east and into territory which has never been part of the Western

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defense system. If, as Mr. Kennan maintains, only the threat of general
war will protect these newly liberated areas, the deterrent will be very
tenuous indeed.

The argument for disengagement must then be that the political
gains outweigh the military losses, specifically that a relaxation of tensions
would accompany the disengagement schemes. The argument would be more
convincing if it took the Oder as a dividing line and not the Elbe.

By removing one of the principal causes of political tensions, it would give
the reduction of armaments a different connotation than the present one in
which the Soviet demands to be protected by the West from the consequences
of its own intransigence. The various disengagement schemes enumerated
above can therefore be grouped into two broad categories: those which are
advocated for their own sake and those which are tied to a political
settlement. The former in turn have many variations but they can again be
grouped into two broad categories: those that envisage a reduction or
limitation on the basis of numbers of troops or types of weapons and those which
seek to remove "extra-continental" troops from Central Europe.

The difficulty with the schemes that deal with the military