*

Telecon
Secretary Laird

8:20 a.m.

6/12/69

Laird said BOB put out a story about MOL. He was going over to the committee and said he couldn't deny the story very well but was going to tell that there is an arrangement that the BOB is not in control of this program. If the committee comes to HAK, he wanted to make sure HAK would back him up.

HAK said certainly. We made a full study on this and it didn't have any meaning on a BOB decision. He said he would set up a procedure for next year.

Laird said he would send HAK a copy of a letter he sent to Mayo that we work out something more adequate than this.

HAK assured him he would back him up.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCONE

Richard Helms

Mr. Kissinger

6-12-69 8:35 AM

K said someone has been giving the President some papers which
K has not seen - concerning what Helms has been saying in last
few days about what Russians are doing, etc. H said he testified
this week before Senate Appropriations Cte and gave K brief run down.
K said after meeting with various intelligence people, he told Pres
consensus was did not look like MIRVES now - CIA looking for
last bit of evidence. H said he should tell K something he did not know.
He went to see Mel last Thursday - they misread the tape. H said
he then saw Beecher story which was in error. K asked whether it
is wrong to say whatever it is they have been testing it because
of its radius. H said that is about right. K went over with H what
he had gotten out of meeting and H agreed that K was right. (This was
all over my head and much too fast to get down)
H said he wanted to tie down the SS-9 single warhead production -
wasn't interested in MIRV thing at that point.

H said Symington was only unfriendly one. K said what he has been
telling Pres is not inconsistent with what H has been saying.
Everyone agrees it is not a MIRV

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCOM
President
Mr. Kissinger
6-12-69 8:45 AM

K said he has talked to Helms and story is what K has told President.
Pres asked if Helms had made up his mind yet which side he is on.
Pres asked why Helms told Russell opposite story. K said he has
been telling Pres that whatever they are they fall within radius that
fits minutemen silos. Pres said point is Helms has downgraded
them to Russell.

K said he thinks we would be better off not talking about this if we
can vax avoid it until we get the piece of paper. President said
Helms is chairing meeting today and he has to make up his mind -
Pres wants to know where he stands; he has to stop vascilating,
telling Congress one thing and telling K another. K said Helms
is telling the truth to everyone. No evidence that they can be
independently targeted. K said he thinks he has Helms on the ball.

President said to K: "You will give this report to both the Senators and Margaret." K said right, before moving with Senators he wants to make sure we are internally o.k.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCOM
Chalmers Roberts
Mr. Kissinger

6-12-69

11:35 AM

R asked what K thought the new front or whatever the provisional government means. K said he thinks it is logical evolvement of their position. R asked what it is designed to do and K said to strengthen their claim - it is consistent with our position as well as theirs unless they claim that provisional government should run elections. R said they are not saying that. K said you could imagine this laying claim for ______ commissions which we have never rejected. R brought up possibility of deal to get coalition. K said he thought what R said the other day was sensible analysis. R asked what that was and K said their view of elections is certainly borne out. R said K seems to be leaving open then what he said about local control evolving some kind of deal in different areas. K said we do not want to nail ourselves to one position. R said we are trying to leave flexible and K said depends on how you define it, etc. R asked if Thieu's remarks when he got back home struck K in any way. K said he had someone with him and could not talk very freely but our test would have to be Thieu's actions - he has many constituencies. K said what Thieu said about elections, for example, we can live with. R said Thieu is signed on for that but seems to be saying he got us to sign on harder against any possibility of a coalition. K said he has not seen full text of what Thieu said. R said Rogers self-determination statement worried Thieu - he is concerned about some kind of deal where he would have to share power. R asked if Thieu was hard on coalition thing. K said we did not talk in those terms really - more about political evolution. R said he (Thieu) said when he got back that Nixon agreed not to push into direction of coalition. K said that is what we have been saying all along. R said it all depends on words - there are all sorts of ways to look at it. R said he thinks we will sit flat in Paris for a while and asked if K agreed - K said no for a little bit.

R asked if Lodge was in town and K said he is in Beverly.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Peter Flanigan
12:40 p. m. 6/12/69

Flanigan said Borman had been in to see him before he got HAK's letter. Borman was invited by the Russians to come to Russia. They would let him see anything and everything he wanted and could bring his wife and family. Borman had planned on doing this in connection with his trip to Helsinki. Flanigan had to tell Borman of the President's plans for him so Borman is holding himself available. Flanigan thought it would be possible to let Borman go before the Apollo 11 shot (the thought being, that if the shot failed, the Russians could not use Borman as publicity for its failure). HAK agreed that this could be possible, and added that he had promised Borman to Dobrynin.

shot

Flanigan said the plans for the breakdown were as follows: The President would go down on the 15th for dinner -- the shot being on the 16. Then he would leave the evening of the 22nd for San Clemente, spend the night and fly to Johnston Island next morning six day arriving the 23rd. Pick up would be the morning of the 24th at 6:50 a.m. He could leave there at 9:00 and get a lot of distance in that day.

HAK thought that was a good plan.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger

President Johnson

June 12, 1969 -- 7:00 p. m.

K -- told President Johnson he called for two reasons: (1) to thank him for all the courtesies he extended when K visited, and (2) at the request of the President to tell him briefly about the Midway meeting. K said they followed pretty much what he had discussed with President Johnson and that, in addition, we wanted President Johnson to know that President Thieu and we agreed completely about the direction to take over the next year; even with regard to a coalition government and no unilateral bug-out. There was rather marginal adjustment, frankly to buy us some time. President Thieu strongly agreed with these steps -- genuinely, we think, because it was not under pressure. Negotiating strategy for the next phase (which will begin in July) was settled with Thieu. We won't be doing much in the next few weeks, and President Johnson will be provided a briefing beforehand.

President Johnson thanked K and asked him to thank the President. He knows the President will do what is best and he wants to support him. He passed along to K his desire that General Wheeler, at some point in the near future if he were traveling in the proximity of Texas, stop by and brief him on the general world picture so he will feel abreast of the current situation. He would feel he was not completely speaking without knowledge and authority, since he can be helpful to the President and the country on some of these things. He said he spent most of the day working on the tax bill (but he doesn't want anybody to know that). K said we would send General Wheeler down within the next two weeks, and hopefully during the first part of that period.

lds

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/1969

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
7:20 p. m. 6/12/69

HAK said the President told him about his discussion with Laird and both agreed that it will not happen again. The President wanted HAK to talk to Laird next week about whether we can give the opposition a face-saving formula. Laird agreed.

HAK had read Laird's letter to Mayo and the stories and they were inexcusable. Laird said he was glad HAK wanted to take the responsibility for the MOL. HAK said he didn't want it. (Laird meant the White House vs. Defense, I think).

## SECOND CONVERSATION ABOUT 1/2 HOUR LATER

Laird said he had talked to Abrams and McCain and they wanted to know if there would be any objection to putting Marines on Okinawa. They wanted to put the regimental landing team which would be about 4,500 troops. HAK said he would talk to the President about it. Laird said that State objected to the placement because of negotiations that would start in November. Some troops would go to Hawaii and some to U.S. HAK wanted to know where the troops would go if they weren't put on Okinawa. Laird said Hawaii and U.S. HAK said he wanted to check out the State objection and would get to Col. Pursly by 10:00 to day with an answer.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
7:20 p.m. 6/12/69

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCORN
Attorney General
Mr. Kissinger
6-13-69 9:25 AM

K said we are having a problem with intelligence community on some
of these projections and K wants to get analysts in tomorrow and get
them to come up with agreed position. K said he does not want to do
this alone and will assemble some of the members of the 303 Cte.
K thinks it important for AG to be present and asked if he would be
free. AG said he has 10:00 meeting, but thought he could be free
by 11:00. K agreed to try for 11:00. K said he would explain the
state of play to AG before meeting. K said he wants to go thru latest
projections paragraph by paragraph and get them to say what something is
and is not. K and AG agreed to meet at 5:00 (after NSC) today.
K said he had meeting with Richardson but would put off until tomorrow.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCON
Senator Javits
Mr. Kissinger

6-13-69

11:45 AM

J said he had a talk with Sisco and told him what really is inside situation in Israel and asked whether Sisco had briefed K. K said no. J said he thinks he should then. J said he sees in morning papers that very thing the Israelis are concerned about is happening - proposals being made very precise; there is nothing left to negotiate if there is only one choice. K asked what is in the morning papers. J referred to story on front page of Times - as far as US concerned only minor border readjustments. J said they need more than that. J said in a nutshell, the Israelis think if the thing gets very specific and they are not in a position to accept, it will be very embarrassing for the US. J said he therefore made suggestion to Joe that there be much greater amplification of authority of our Ambassador there. J said he is most agreeable to them and this just cannot be done in Washington. Fellow here gets hardest line on instruction because no one wants to make a chance or give less instruction. J said he would like to meet with K at his earliest convenience. J feels he can have some influence and he has a great interest. K suggested next week and said he would call J's office to set something up.

jm

(TL: O.K. to set up?)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCONE
Dr. Arthur Burns
Mr. Kissinger
6-13-69 7:10 PM

B said he has another problem in connection with foreign assistance.
There is notice on calendar of item submitted to K for comment on
appropriation amendments for foreign assistance and
B requested to see what the item was. B said he finds that some of
his worst suspicions are confirmed. B said he thinks some heads will
have to roll this time but he is not referring to Bergsten. K asked
what item was all about and B said memo for the Pres concerning
appropriation amendments for foreign assistance which K was to comment
on by June 13. B said because of earlier history he had asked to see it
and it is very disturbing - this time he will have to go to the Pres.

B said people involved are in AID or BOB or both. K asked what issue is.
B said it is exact same issue with regard to those prohibitions - they
are now being deleted. K said Pres has ruled they could not be.

B said this is BOB submittion to the President and read paper.

B said it is from Mayo and dated June 9. K said it has not come across
his desk. B said this is third time it has come up and there is no sense
in putting it up to the President again. K said B should write a memo.

B said he wanted to talk to Pres and wanted K to be there - B wants
individuals involved dealt with properly. K said he supports B.

B said he would put Martin on who knows more about this. K asked if
he could call back in 10 minutes - he has someone with him now.

7:30 - Martin Anderson/ Arthur Burns - Mr. Kissinger

A said he had called Fred this afternoon at 5:00 to find out what story is.
Fred came across it, was disturbed and called someone at AID and told
them it was not in line with President's approach and suggested the rework
and rewrite it. At 6:00 A talked again with Fred and they decided to throw
whole thing up. K asked if it would have been caught if A had not caught it.
A said according to Fred, he talked to them this morning and no action
will be taken until Monday. A said he thinks Fred would have caught this one
without him. K thought it was strange they would write memo in the first
place. Until Pres makes heads roll there will be no end to it. Burns
said he may have gotten too emotional and on reflection he thinks he should
know a good deal more than he does before he worries Pres about it. K said
if B can run it down he should take it to the Pres.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELCON
President
Mr. Kissinger
6-13-69 7:40 PM

Pres said he was reading papers and sees "allies sweeping below
Danang". Pres said he does not mind the sweep but why are we
trying to seek to make a lot of publicity in the US about it -
PR guys are working over time. K said impossible to control
newsmen running around with all these units - he asked about
Hamburger Hill and they attach and start writing. K said he would
see if he could get some of publicity turned off. Pres said he does
not want any of our boys to put out anything - fire half of the PR
people. K said they think they have to go and talk to these men.
K said he wondered about having a talk with Wheeler and have him
speak up a little more. Pres said tell him he expects him too - do
not want him to be a bump on a log. Pres said we will get a couple -
he will get Mitchell, he is tough. K agreed - said he has good
steely mind. Pres said Mitchell will be foil for Rogers - he will
face him down with those cold eyes of his. Pres said reason he put
Kissinger in is he is guy who could be in his place. They
have to treat him with respect. Pres referred to Johnson - look
what happen; these are possibilities. Pres said that is why he
is using these two men. Pres said if Haig can take it on he can
give him same thing he gives Pres - talking points and everything.
K said he would take care of that. Pres said it is really something
to have to fight his own people. K said it should not happen. Pres
agreed, particularly after way he has treated him. Pres asked
how K got along with Sidey - and K gave him rundown.
K pointed out that Life deadline was missed but Sidey will get signed
article in Time.

Pres wished K good luck to morrow and K said he would inform him
right away of results.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
7:55 p. m., 6/13/69

The President said he wanted K to get State on the telephone right away and tell them that the President is going to recognize the provisional government for Cuba. P said he saw the picture in the newspaper of Kosygin receiving the others P said get State on the telephone tonight and say we are going to recognize the provisional government for Cuba and the President wants a recommendation on his desk by 8:00 o'clock Monday morning. P said this is very important. P said we can't allow the Russians to recognize a provisional government -- if they do, we are going to, also. K said it is going to be a little harder for us to make it stick. P said he wanted to worry the hell out of State and CIA and he said K knew what he meant. P said it would probably be in all the newspapers. P said tell them that the President has decided to move because Kosygin recognized them. P said for K to follow up on this very hard.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCON
Elliot Richardson
Mr. Kissinger

6-13-69 8:25 PM

K said he was not going to Camp David after all so would be free
for breakfast - R and K agreed to 8:30 in HAK's office tomorrow
morning.

K said he has problem which requires delicate handling. President
has felt generally agrieved today about a variety of things and then
read in evening papers that Russia has recognized provisional govt
in VN. K said Pres wants to now recognize provisional govt in Cuba.
K said we have to have a plan ready by Monday but we must not have
any leak on this. K and R can then take a care of it on Monday.
K said he knows the objections R will raise and K considers it his
duty to bring them to President's attention. Nothing will be done
until they look at it but K has been ordered to get started on this.
K said for everyone's sake it should be done in smallest channel
possible. R agreed. K said if R adds whatever recommendation he
wants to make to it, it will give K a point of departure for what
K wants to recommend.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Cmdr Larson
9:55 p. m., 6-13-69

K had called to speak to the President and Cmdr L got on the telephone saying that he would check to see if P was still awake because he had said goodnight about one-half hour ago. K said don't bother him, let me give you a message for him. K said tell him that the Soviets have asked to deliver a message to us about Sino-Soviet relations. They want to deliver it to State in about one-half hour, and said that it was an important message. Don't disturb the President, give him the message if he is awake, or when he awakens. I'll call if it is important.

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger
Cmdr Larson
10:00 p. m., 6-13-69

K called to tell L that we weren't absolutely sure if the Soviets are going to deliver the message tonight or early tomorrow morning. K said to inform the P that we will be in touch with him immediately.

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELECON

TELECON

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon

Mr. Toon - State Dept.

11:05 a.m. 6/14/69

Mr. Toon said he received Tcherniakov, at his request. He passed on the Soviet's paper re border disputes. Soviets have passed this to other governments also in response to inquiries. Toon asked Tcherniakov if he could give an assessment of the seriousness of the problem. The Soviets feel some people tend to underestimate the problem which is wrong but also they tend to overestimate think the Soviets are so bogged down with other things they don't have time for this. The Soviets want to put this problem in its proper perspective.

HAK said he hand't read the noteyet. Toon said it gives the Soviets
historical version of the border dispute and proposes talks between
Soviets and China to be held in Moscow. Toon said he would send
the paper over.

HAK said he hoped to see Toon before he left for Czechoslovakia.
Toon said he hoped HAK wouldn't be too busy and HAK said he would
insist on the meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
The President
3:15 p.m. 6/14/69

HAK apologized for not being able to take the President's call earlier. He thought it essential that he not leave the meeting. The President understood.

The President wanted to know what the reaction was to his letter. HAK said he read it word for word and has asked them all to prepare a written reply. The President wanted the answer by 10:00 in the morning but HAK thought it best to wait so Helms could sign it. He didn't think it right to have Cushman take the blame for something that was Helms' responsibility. The President agreed and said he wanted the document signed by all three members of the committee before his press conference and wouldn't take no for an answer. Helms would be back in the country on Tuesday. The President said he wanted the facts separate from the opinions this time. HAK explained that these people are against the ABM, mostly Democrats and are not going to break their backs to make the President look good. In questions of judgment, they all tend to remain against us. HAK thought that Fullbright could take many passages out of context as the report was written and make us look bad. HAK said Helms has to get fired if the report is written badly again. The two questions the President was specific about were (1) what the Soviets do the Soviets know about the U.S. capabilities, and (2) if there is no change in what we are doing, why is it that they are going forward with this other project.

The President was adamant about not sending Hughes to London. Richardson should find someone else -- someone who would be more loyal to the President. If this is a Presidential appointment, he would not sign it.)

HAK said Harriman was in to see him and said that if one more American is killed it would be the personal responsibility of HAK's and the Presidents and that there would be riots.

why

The President wanted to know what the Soviets made such a big deal out of nothing(?). He said if they have any trouble with China, we will accelerate the mining operation. HAK said that certainly will finish it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/69

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger

6-16-69

11:25 AM

R said he was calling about Jean Rey and he gathers he will not see the President. R said he came back from the West Coast for this purpose and asked if K was seeing him. K said yes and R asked if there was any chance of taking him to say hello to the Pres. K said he would try but Pres was violent on subject on Friday. R said he has just had meeting with his people and told them they have to cut down on requests. R asked if Pres had seen Rey in Europe and K said yes - actually Rey is dull and has nothing to say. K said he is seeing him but knows that is not a substitute.

K said he wanted to check two other things with R. (1) K said he finds there is outstanding NSSM (from last Administration) according to which he is Chairman of a Committee on underground tests. K would like to rescind and put under Under Secretaries Cte. K does not think it should be at Cabinet level and if it is he should not be Chairman. R concurred with putting it under the Under Secretaries Cte and if further guidance is needed it will be put to the NSC. (2) K said conversations re trip are still in very exploratory stage and Pres does not want any discussions yet. R said he had heard from an airline stewardess that Pres was taking a trip. K could not understand this as there are absolutely no plans. Only plan that exists to request to AF to check out travel times. K said no change charter reservations could have been made because there is nothing. R said he would not say anything to anyone over there. R discussed his trip to Philippines and Indonesia - he could stay with Pres there. R said other places Pres is thinking of he has been already. R said other cabinet members will go to Japan and he could then join them there.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

Telecon
Eliott Richardso

11:40 a.m. 6/16/69

HAK wanted to know the status of the Hughes appointment. The
President was unhappy and wanted it stopped. Someone told
hime about these leaks to Fullbright.

Richardson said it was not a Presidential appointment. Hughes
had been fully checked and even though he is a Democrat didn't
think this would creat any problems. Annenburg had been
notified of the placement as had Hughes and thought that this
would creat problems of the appointment was not stopped.
Richardson did not know what Rogers had said though.
Richardson said he also talked to Flanigan about this. Flanigan
raised some question of Hughes political activities and found no
valid basis.

HAK said he thought Hughes was bright but did not know him personally. He said he would do a further reading on this and get back with Richardson.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

Telecon
Hillenbrand

1:00 p.m. 6/16/69

Hillenbrand was worried that Jean Rey would leave the country
in a bad state of mind.

HAK explained that Rey had been put on the President's schedule
and when the President was in a bad mood about several other
things, cancelled Rey. After talking with Rogers, HAK tried to
get Rey up for at least five mintues. The President was out of
the building and when he returned, Rey had already left.
Rey should be aware of this. HAK said Hillenbrand could tell
Rey that the President would personally write him a letter in
the next day or so.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELECON

Bryce Harlow (or member of his staff)

Mr. Kissinger

June 16, 1969, 2:50 p. m.

H -- An informant has told me that in a closed meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee today, Senator Fulbright said he had received answers in writing to questions he posed to Helms which he plans to use to discredit all Laird has said on the ABM. Cooper and Symington urged him to be cautious, but it's not known whether he will be.

K -- I know nothing of this but, if it's true, we'll have a new Director. Thanks for telling me.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06