Global Outlook

The secret dream of American intellectuals and of those who laid down the basic principles of American foreign policy is essentially theological: it is to prevail by conversion, not by balance of power, and to make other peoples democratic. For when they become democratic, it is believed they will automatically become peaceful. Moreover, the belief is that this can be achieved and is desirable in every part of the world more or less simultaneously.

Vietnam turned into such a tragedy because decent and honorable people were attempting to apply principles learned from European policy to an area with a totally different history, no tradition of self-government, and altogether different strategic requirements. But in all of the literature which has since evolved out of the Vietnam experience, what is forgotten is the unanimity with which American leadership groups had entered that war. There was no dispute about the correctness of what we were doing in and for Vietnam when we entered it. There was no questioning of the proposition that we could both fight a war and spread democracy — simultaneously — in the midst of a guerrilla war. And one reason why such extraordinary bitterness developed (which we have seen boil up all over again in recent weeks) was in the disappointment that this prescription could not be universally applied; and that it was not possible to fight a guerrilla war and promote democracy simultaneously. In part, it is, therefore, also a reflection of enormous self-hatred against the idealism which produced the commitment in the first place.

We now face the rather amazing situation that those of us who watched the evolution of the Vietnam War are now opposed to military adventures whose end we cannot define — as in Somalia or in Bosnia. Yet, we are attacked by the very people who consider Vietnam a crime but who would like us to involve ourselves in Bosnia. The moralistic, idealistic approach to foreign policy — the belief that we can solve every problem and must right every wrong — is one of the constant temptations of the American public debate in both political parties. And it explains why the same people who are at this very moment attacking Vietnam also want us to enter Bosnia.

Without arguing about the merits of individual policies but in terms of the structure of the debate, I believe that once we have had a debate, the United States will be driven by reality to understand that we will henceforth be obliged, like the European nations have been throughout their history, to attempt to improve the world gradually through an endless process requiring constant adjustment and continuing analysis. But we have neither the personnel nor a tradition for this sort of approach, which explains much of the confusion one observes.

If this were an academic lecture, I would say that the United States has two broad choices. It could, theoretically, behave like Britain did in the 19th century, when the British foreign policy was one of "splendid isolation." Britain stood apart from

Europe, which was the center of world affairs, but threw its weight in whichever direction best suited British interests — which, broadly speaking, was onto the weaker side in any European struggle. Britain did not want Europe to unite under the tutelage of a single country — regardless of its views about individual leaders — much as Winston Churchill said in the thirties when he was accused of being pro-French and anti-German: "If circumstances were reversed, I would be pro-German and anti-French. I'm not pursuing a personal policy but a fundamental principle that has preserved the liberties of the European States." Now, that is a theoretical policy for the United States: we could look at the world and say, "We will back whoever is most likely to oppose the country which threatens to dominate Eurasia because we have a national interest not to have Eurasia dominated by a hostile power."

There are, however, huge obstacles to this. The first is that, whereas Britain needed to conduct this policy in Europe, we would have to conduct it on a global scale. Secondly, Britain had a leadership group that had trained itself in the conduct of public policy. America does not have such a leadership group or such a tradition. Third, when communications are instantaneous, economics global, and politics democratic, it is probably not possible to conduct the same kind of cold-blooded, national interest-oriented policy in every part of the world simultaneously, as such a policy would require.

We are facing a difficulty intellectually — all of us — in that technology, economics, and communications have become global, while political loyalties are still national, even more and more sub-national. In a world of such global connections, there are ever more splinter groups with no interest in the global equilibrium at all. These, in fact, are using the major countries' desire for global order to achieve objectives that are of concern primarily to them. For the United States to practice "splendid isolation" under these circumstances would exhaust us physically and psychologically. And, above all, it is incompatible with American values.

Whatever we academicians might say about the nature of foreign policy, to the American people it must have a moral component. Woodrow Wilson was a strange President. He had no experience in foreign policy at all when he appeared on the scene in 1917 and announced that everything that had gone before was nonsense, and that the world had to be organized according to principles nobody had ever practiced and for which there was no historical evidence whatsoever. The fascinating thing about it is that you will look in vain for any American discussion that questioned the intellectual basis of these propositions, propositions which have, moreover, been received as wisdom in the United States for the balance of this century and which produced a peace settlement after the First World War that left the international situation infinitely more precarious than it had been before. Yet, in the American debate that is rarely blamed on Wilson. At any rate, it is not possible for the United States,

10

Global Outlook

intellectually, to conduct foreign policy purely on the balance of power principles. There has to be a moral anchor somewhere.

And its temptation is to seek that moral anchor on a global basis. In this, it cannot succeed. For example, every year there is a meeting of the heads of government of the Asian-Pacific region (the APEC) where the standard speech is all of an Atlantic-Pacific Community that will act on the basis of common values and common interests. Yet, the reality of our period is that there is no Asian Community. The relation of the Asian nations to each other is very similar to that of the European nations of the 19th century, but quite different from that of the European nations of today. China, Japan, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, even India, look at each other as strategic opponents. And while they're not planning wars, they also do not totally exclude them. In Europe, this is not the case. No matter how much the European nations may quarrel, a war between European nations is out of the question. More than that, the military establishments of the European nations are in no way directed against each other. In Asia, we are really facing competing nations which oblige all of us, and especially the United States, to look at foreign policy in balance of power terms.

But, simultaneously, the United States needs to look at those areas of the world in which it is possible for us to work in a cooperative manner, and in a way that reflects basic American values. And those areas, are, on the one hand, the Western Hemisphere, and, on the other, Europe. When I was in government, as Europe began to form itself, there were endless debates (particularly from the French side) about the need to establish a European identity and to be rescued from American domination. That tendency still exists. But the European problem, in my view, is not American domination. It is far too easy to get rid of the United States; the challenge is to keep America tied to Europe. For, it is in our own self-interest as well. When one looks around the world at the roots of Islamic fundamentalism or the emergence of societies driven by different categories of values than the ones now dominant in the West, Europe, America, and the countries of Latin America would be committing spiritual suicide were they to conceive of their relationships as primarily competitive.

This now seems to me the fundamental challenge to both European and American policy. And it has a number of requirements (I leave Latin America aside for the purposes of this discussion). First, it requires a definition of what one conceives of by Europe in the present circumstances. Where does Europe begin and whom does it include? That, of course, raises the question of Russia.

The history of Russia is extraordinarily complex. It has interacted with Europe certainly since the 18th century, but it has also had interests in Asia, the Middle East, and at the borders of India that had nothing to do with Europe. In fact, Russia has been historically torn, equally by the requirements of Europe and by the temptations of Asia. It is

significant that, in the 19th century, Russian foreign policy was conducted by two departments: the Foreign Ministry, which dealt with Europe and which practiced more or less the balance of power; and the Asiatic Department, which included everything in Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Thus, every area in which Russia could make territorial gains was under the Asiatic Department, which preferred to operate unilaterally and not by the rules of European diplomacy.

Russian policy today is viewed by many in the West as the equivalent of bringing democracy to Russia; and that that will automatically solve the Russian problem. But bringing democracy to Russia must inevitably take place against a different backdrop than in the West. Church and State were always united in Russia. There was no Reformation, no Enlightenment, no capitalism, and there were no democratic institutions or national state; the Russian state has been an empire through most of its history, and its current crisis is not only due to the collapse of communism but to the collapse of imperialism. So, I would argue that the problem of Russian's foreign policy is that it must learn, for the first time in its history, that expansionism does not produce security, and that to develop the resources of a country with eleven time zones ought not to produce claustrophobia.

In this interim period, we should be receptive to Russia and cooperate with it, but it cannot as yet be an institutional part of Europe. Thus, the issue of NATO expansion should be settled quickly; endless debate over it will only create needless tensions. But there is a second problem, which is the relationship of Europe to the United States.

In the United States, there are now three generations: there is my generation, which grew up during the war and in the post-war period and which, on the whole, looks on America's role in international affairs as beneficial and believes that, on the whole and despite all the shortcomings of a modern society, America stands for freedom and humanity in the world. Then, there is the generation which was forced to grow up in the intellectual debates of the Vietnam period, based as they were on the self-hatred I mentioned earlier, and which interpreted the American experience as hypocritical and imperialistic. Hence, this generation wants to turn away from international affairs towards self-improvement and a radical reform of American society. Finally, there is the younger generation, which does not have the self-hatred, indeed has a great pride in America, but which also does not have the international experience or the benefit of participation in the truly creative periods of American foreign policy. Similarly, when I look around at European statesmen, the generation which built the Marshall Plan and created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is also passing from the scene though Europe, of course, did not have the Vietnam generation.

On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a need for projects we can do together. In the past, this was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to which, as I have said, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia

11

Global Outlook

and Hungary, should be added as quickly as
possible. This is not a problem for reflection but a
problem for decision-making. There's nothing we
can learn by studying the problem; it can only
confuse everybody. And it is not in our interest to
create a gray area between Germany and Russia,
which both nations will then be tempted — not just
tempted but obliged — to fill with their national
policies. Nor is it good for Europe, and, in the end,
not even for Russia, to create a vacuum around its
borders.

But for the long term, now is the time to create
new institutions for the nations on both sides of
the North Atlantic, to the building of which they
can dedicate themselves. The European Union is
a reality and America is beginning to build a North
American Free Trade Association — which may
merge into a Western Hemisphere one later on. It
is time to begin building a North Atlantic Free Trade
Area, and to dedicate ourselves to it as an
objective.

Security alone is no longer sufficient to tie the two
sides of the Atlantic together. We shouldn't
conduct the NATO discussion entirely in terms of
whether Russia is or is not a danger. History will
determine that. What we do need is the moral
equivalent of what was done in the late 1940s:
some construct that corresponds to the needs of
the democracies working together on the industrial
side. On both sides of the Atlantic, wage scales
are more or less equivalent and social services
comparable. Competition, therefore, depends on
merit. There is no need for protectionism based
on huge inequalities of social, environmental, and
economic conditions. For these reasons, I think
we should move towards the construction of such
institutions.

Now in this context, I have not spoken about
Germany as a nation, yet the unification of
Germany has created a whole set of new realities.
The European Union and NATO were both
designed, in part, to provide a home for a divided
Germany. Throughout nearly the entire post-war
period, German foreign policy was driven by the
need to establish legitimacy superior to that of the
East German State via special relationships with
the West. This involved a degree of subordination,
both to the United States and to France, which a
unified Germany cannot, by the nature of things,
carry out forever. As a result, Germany is now
both more powerful and freed of some of its
previous constraints.

Germany will be a major player in this process.
The relationships which now exist, and which have
existed through successive German governments
of both parties with the United States, are already
close and can be strengthened. It is also the case
that Germany can play a huge role in bringing a
unifying Europe into the organic relationship with
the United States that I believe to be essential.
That, I think, is a German role which is crucial for
both sides of the Atlantic.

The view of some West European countries —
which refines all the differences between Europe
and America and attempts to import the policies

that had been appropriate to keeping Central
Europe divided from its relationships with the
United States — is incompatible with the broad
view and the broad canvas upon which foreign
policy now needs to be constructed. On the other
hand, a Europe which divides itself into national
states will also be too impotent to affect internation-
al events. Thus, the crucial balance of unity and
diversity is one in which Germany can play a vital
role in the unification process of Europe, and can
make a significant contribution to the construction
of the Atlantic relationship of which I spoke.

Now, for the sake of the emotional equilibrium of
the American Consul Generals here, I want to
stress that I am not speaking about current Ameri-
can foreign policy: what I have said here is not
necessarily the foreign policy of today, but, in my
view, the foreign policy of tomorrow. Nor is it an
approach based on any particular party. The
strong periods of foreign policy are always those
carried out by both American parties. Building an
Atlantic relationship is not a partisan matter; but it
is the crying need of the next period because, if
both sides of the Atlantic attempt to manipulate on
behalf of their own self-interests in the various
conflicts foreseeable in many parts of the world,
we will exhaust ourselves and not be able to take
advantage of the opportunities before us.

I'm told that there is a Chinese proverb which goes
as follows: when there is turmoil under the
Heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they
were big problems, and big problems are not dealt
with at all. When there is order under the
Heavens, big problems are reduced to little
problems, and little problems need not obsess us.

What I'm talking about is not removing all the
problems of the world, but of the democracies
working together to reduce big problems to little
problems so that they can, therefore, continue to
build freedom and well-being for their peoples and
for all of mankind.

I would be pleased to take a few questions. Thank
you very much.

12

Teilnehmerliste

A

Adelhardt, Anton, Ministerial-
dirigent, Bayerisches Staats-
ministerium für Ernährung,
Landwirtschaft und Forsten,
München

Albat, Stefan, Landesverband
der Bayerischen Industrie e.V.,
München

Alberts, Helgo, Stellv. Hauptgeschäftsführer, Industrie- und Handelskammer für München und Oberbayern, München

Altmann, Dr. Franz-Lothar, Stellv.
Institutsleiter, München

Ammerschläger, Thomas,
BMW AG, München

Anderer, Die Bunte, München

Angermeier, Anton J., Project
Manager Infrastructure,
Planning and Engineering,
Hochtief International Div.,
Essen

Aranda, Luis Gómez de,
Generalkonsul, Spanisches
Generalkonsulat, München

Arbogast, Bernd, Vizepräsident,
Industrie- und Handelskammer
Regensburg, Amberg

Armbrecht, Dr. Wolfgang,
BMW AG, München

Artmann, Dr. Heinz, Präsident
a. d., Gauting

Auer, Dr. Bernd H., BMW AG,
Dingolfing

Avenarius, Dr. Horst, Studien-
leiter, Gauting

B

Bachheibl, Lothar, OStR, Gmund
am Tegernsee

Bachmann, Dr. Michael,
Vorstand, Deutscher Lloyd
Versicherungs-AG, München

Bähr, Dr. Helmut, München

Balbo di Vinadio, Gregorio Graf,
Managing Director, Francesco
Parisi GmbH, Feldkirchen

Ballestrem, Prof. Dr. Karl Graf,
Lehrstuhl für Politikwissen-
schaften, Katholische Univer-
sität Eichstätt

Bartelheimer, Prof. Dr. Hans-
Peter, München

Barth, Wolfgang, Bayerische
Vereinsbank AG, München

Bauer, Richard, Direktor, Rohde
& Schwarz GmbH & Co. KG,
München

Bäumer, Günter, Mitglied des
Vorstands, Landeszentralbank
im Freistaat Bayern, München

Baumgartner, Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c.
Albert, München

Bayer-Machule, Prof. Dr. Charles
K., Garmisch-Partenkirchen

Becker, Detlev, München

Becker, Prof. Dr.-Ing. Karl
Eugen, Vorsitzender des
Vorstands, TÜV Bayern
Holding AG, München

Behles, Dr. Franz, München

Bender, Roland, Geschäftsfüh-
rer, EN-OP Institut, Offenau

Benz, Thomas, Geschäftsführer,
Alois Zettler GmbH, München

Berg, Dr. Axel, Rechtsanwalt,
München

Bergmann, Winfried, Creative
Director, Serviceplan Werbe-
agentur, München

Berz, Dr. Gerhard, Mitglied der
Direktion, Münchner Rück,
München

Bhamroyal, Amarjit, Vorsitzender
des Vorstands, VPJKG + KE
Holding, München

Bils-Baumann, Dr. Lynne,
Language Multi-Services,
München

Binder, Dr. Hans-Peter, Direktor,
Deutsche Bank AG, München

Binder, Wilhelm, Studienrat,
Rosenheim

Bock, Wolfgang, Geschäftsfüh-
rer, Anitra Medienprojekte
GmbH, München

Böhm, Werner-Hans, Regie-
rungspräsident, Regierung von
Oberbayern, München

Böhme-Dürr, Dr. Karin,
München

Bonk, Dr. Madeleine, München

Bopst, Dr. Wolf-Dieter, Vorsit-
zender der Geschäftsführung,
Osram GmbH, München

Bormann, Dr. Peter, BMW AG,
München

Botzenhardt, Josef, Geschäftsführer, Botzenhardt & Obermayer GmbH, München

Bracklo, Enno, Starnberg

Brauner, Hjalmar, Vertriebsleiter,
Anzing

Bräuning, Brigitte, Prokuristin,
München

Brecht, Matthias, Jurist,
Forstinning

Brockmeier, Bernd, München

Bücher, Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c.
Theodor, München

Buckenmaier, Dr. Heinz, Wirt-
schaftsprüfer, München

Bülow, Jochen von, Dresdner
Bank AG, München

Burbiel, Manfred, StD,
Taufkirchen

Burger, Prof. Dr. Hans,
München

Burgess, Harold T. A., Konsul,
Generalkonsulat der Vereinig-
ten Staaten von Amerika,
München

Burgsdorff, Armgard von,
Leiterin Public Affairs,
BMW AG, München

Busch, Nikola, München

C

Cermak, Rudolf, Pers. Referent
des Landesgeschäftsführers,
Bayerisches Rotes Kreuz,
München

Christopeit, Dr. Joachim, Spre-
cher des Vorstands, AVIA
Mineralöl-Aktiengesellschaft,
München

Coqui, Helmut, MdL, Neubiberg

Correns, Claus, Tutzing

Coy, Klaus, Regierungsdirektor,
Bayerisches Landesamt für
Umweltschutz, München

Cremers, Anton, BMW AG,
München

Cronauer, Karl A., München

D

Dersch, Karl J., Direktor, Daimler
Benz AG, München

Dettling, Dr. Warnfried,
München

Diehl, Karl, Direktor, Bayerische
Hypotheken- und Wechsel-
bank AG, München

Dielert, Prof. Dr. Dr. Eckhard,
Grünwald

Dietz, Prof. Dr. Georg,
München

Dihm, Herbert, München

Dillinger, Jürgen, Vorsitzender
des Vorstands, Heilit +
Woerner Bau-AG, München

Dirscherl, Josef, BMW AG,
München

Dittmar, Dr. Rolf, Ministeralrat,
Bundesministerium für Wirt-
schaft, Bonn

Dobbelstein, Prof. Dr. Hendrik,
Chefarzt der Inneren Abt.,
Krankenhaus der Missions-
Benediktinerinnen von Tutzing
e. V., Tutzing

Dotson, Richard M., Stellv.
Generalkonsul, Amerikanis-
sches Generalkonsulat,
München

Döttling, Dominique, München

Draf, Oliver, Neukeferloh

Draxler, Gerold, Geschäftsführer,
Bayerngrund GmbH, München

Dreher, Renate, Redakteurin,
Informationszentrale der
Bayerischen Wirtschaft,
München

Drevs, Dr. Sabine, StD,
München

Dreyer, Dr. Uwe, BMW AG,
München

14

Dürr, Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter, Geschäftsführender Direktor, Max-Planck-Institut für Physik, Werner-Heisenberg-Institut, München

Duschek, Werner, BMW AG, München

E

Eckfellner, Susanne, München

Ederer, Georg, BMW AG, München

Eichler, Helmut, Protokollab-
teilung, Bayerische Staats-
kanzlei, München

Elmendorff, Gloria Y., Honorar-
konsulin, Honorarkonsulat von
Jamaika, Unterföhring

Elmendorff, Franz J., Geschäftsführer, FJE Film-, Fernseh- und Handels GmbH, Unterföhring

Engel, Dr. Norbert, Stv. Senats-
direktor, Senatsamt, Bayeri-
scher Senat, München

Engler-Hamm, Dr. Horst, Zahn-
arzt, München

Ertel, Henner, Geschäftsführen-
der Vorstand, Gesellschaft für
Rationelle Psychologie,
München

Essenpreis, M., BMW AG,
München

Everling, Wolfgang, Gymnasial-
lehrer, München

F

Faust, Dr. Klaus, BMW AG,
München

Fehm, Stefan, Öffentlichkeitsar-
beit, Bertelsmann Fachinfor-
mation, München

Feldmann, Prof. Dr. Dr. Knut,
Zentralkrankenhaus Gauting

Felgentreu, Dr. Dieter, Ge-
schäftsbereich Fernverkehr,
Regionalbereich Süd,
München

Fendt, Johann Georg, Bavaria
Kopierwerke GmbH, Geisel-
gasteig

Ferbar, Harald, Filialleiter,
Deutsche Bank AG, Rochlitz

Feuerer, Helmuth, StD, Otto-
brunn

Findl, Karl, Karl Findl & Partners
GmbH & Co., Icking

Fintel, Siegrid von, Bayerischer
Rundfunk, München

Firnhaber, Dietrich, Rechtsan-
walt, München

Fischer, Dr. Gerhard, Mitglied
des Vorstands, Süddeutsche
Bodencreditbank AG,
München

Fischer, Hans, Hans Fischer
GmbH, Papierfabrik-Vertretun-
gen, München

Fischer, Dr. Werner, München

Fleissner, Rainer, BMW AG,
München

Fluhrer, Dr. Helmut,
Burda GmbH, München

Flusser, Generalkonsulin, Gene-
ralkonsulat Brasilien, München

Förschler, Arthur, Wort- und
Bildjournal, München

Fourie, Daniël G. M., General-
konsul, Südafrikanisches
Generalkonsulat, München

Fournell, Dr. Hans D., BMW AG,
München

Frank, Fotograf, München

Freymann, Dr. Raymond,
BMW AG, München

Fried, Wolfgang, BMW AG,
München

Friedrich, Hans, Deutsche
Aerospace AG, München

Frings, Joachim, BMW AG,
München

Frohne, Dr. Ronald, Rechtsan-
walt, Rechtsanwälte Nörr,
Stiefenhofer & Lutz, München

Frost, Prof. Dr. Hans J., Haar

Frost, Michael, München

Fuchs, Helmut, Geschäftsführer,
GVD Leasing GmbH & Co. KG,
Grünwald

G

Gabanyi, Anneli Ute, Wissen-
schaftliche Referentin, Südost-
Institut, München

Gabler, Helga, München

Galonska, Ulrich, BMW AG,
München

Garrett, Cristen, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, München

Gatz, Klaus M., StD, München

Gaul, Richard, Leiter Presse-
und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit,
BMW AG, München

Gebhard, Georg, OStR,
München

Gebhard, Volker, Mitglied des
Vorstands, Löwenbräu
Holding AG, München

Geißendörfer, Apoth. Herbert,
Senator, München

Glaubitz, Prof. Dr. Joachim,
Anzing

Goth, Günther, Leiter, Zentral-
abt. Personal Beschäfti-
gungsbedingungen und
Sozialpolitik, Siemens AG,
München

Götte, Hubert, Institut für
Werkzeugmaschinen und
Betriebswirtschaften, Techni-
sche Universität München

Gottlieb, Sigmund, Bayerischer
Rundfunk, München

Graf, Raoul A., Resident
Executive Director, Merrill
Lynch International Bank
Limited, München

Gramolla, Matthias, Unterneh-
mensentwicklung Raumfahrt,
Deutsche Aerospace AG,
München

Graves, William H., Konsul,
Direktor, Amerika Haus,
München

Grosch, Gerhard, München

Groscurth, Christoph, Direktor,
Bayerische Landesbank
Girozentrale, München

Gross, Prof. Dr. Hermann,
Gauting

Groß, Anita, OStR, München

Grünewald, Liselotte, Leitung
Presseabteilung, ifo Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung,
München

H

Habereder, Bernd, München

Hadden, Dr. Betsy, München

Haensel, Claus, Direktor,
Bankhaus Reuschel & Co.,
München

Haiber, Prof. Dr. Erich,
Grünwald

Hämmerl, Alfred, Dingolfing

Hann, Martin, OStR, München

Hausmann, Dr. Klaus, München

Heigl, Wunibald, München

Heilmair, Martina, BMW AG,
München

Heim, Martin, Loiching

Heinemann, Rudolf, München

Held, Carlos E., Botschaftsrat,
Beig. Generalkonsul, Argenti-
nisches Generalkonsulat,
München

Heller, Manfred, BMW AG,
München

Hemberger, Rainer, BMW AG,
München

Henrici, Julius, Icking

Hentschel, Andrea, Herbert
Quandt Stiftung, München

Herbst, Dr. Gerhard, Präsident
a. D., Bayerisches Oberstes
Landgericht, München

Hermanns, Prof. Dr. Arnold,
München

Herrmann, Imke, München

Herrmanns, Erbo, BMW AG,
München

Hieber, Otto, Vertretung der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
Europäische Kommission,
München

Hiebl, Ulrike, Herbert Quandt
Stiftung, München

Hilscher, Gottfried, Hechendorf

Hiltscher, Wolfgang, München

Hilz, Andrea, BMW AG,
München

Himpel, Nicole, München

Hintermeier, Abendzeitung,
München

15

Hippchen, Christoph, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter,
Militärgesch. Forschungsamt,
Potsdam

Hofmann, Andreas, Traunstein

Holzbauer, Angela, Elle Verlag
GmbH, München

Holzer, Prof. Dr. Ernst,
München

Holzinger, Stephan, Herbert
Quandt Stiftung, München

Honnefelder, Norbert, Mitglied
des Vorstands, Dyckerhoff &
Widmann AG, München

Hoock, Reinhard, BMW AG,
München

Hörlein, Ulrich, Ministerialrat,
Bayerisches Staatsministerium
für Unterricht, Kultus, Wissenschaft und Kunst, München

Hötzl, Hans, OStD, Theresien-Gymnasium, München

Hoyos, Dr. Martin, Mitglied des
Vorstands, KPMG Deutsche
Treuhand-Gesellschaft AG
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, München

Huber, Dr. Ursula, Historikerin,
München

Hupfer, Johann, Stellv. Direktor,
Münchener Hypothekenbank
eG, München

Huß, Christoph, BMW AG,
München

J

Janssen, Lutz J., BMW AG,
München

Jindrák, Dr. Rudolf, Generalkonsul, Generalkonsulat der Tschechischen Republik, Unterföhring

Jüngst, Prof. Dr. Dieter,
Gräfelfing

K

Kaczorowski, Andrzej, General-
konsul, Generalkonsulat der
Republik Polen, München

Kaiser, Karin, CAMP, München

Kaiser, Klaus, Geschäftsleitung,
Mail Order Kaiser GmbH,
München

Kalbfell, Karl-Heinz, BMW AG,
München

Kalthoff, Axel, BMW AG,
München

Kaske, Prof. Dr. Karlheinz,
Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats,
MAN AG, München

Kasper, Mechthild, München

Kaupa, Gustav, Inning am
Ammersee

Kemmann, Dr. Christof, Vor-
stand, BHS-Bayerische Berg-,  
Hütten- und Salzwerke AG,  
München

Kerlikowski, Dr. Horst, Etage,
München

Kerschensteiner, Franz, Ministerialdirigent, München

Khuon, Prof. Dr. Ernst von,
Deisenhofen

Kilgert, Theodor, Partner, KPMG
Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft AG
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft, München

Kindermann, Siegfried,
BMW AG, München

Kissinger, Dr. Henry A.,
Washington, D.C., USA

Kleebinder, Hans-Peter,
BMW AG, München

Kleekämper, Dr. Heinz, Generalbevollmächtigter, DATAG
Deutsche Allgemeine Treuhand, München

Klein, Georg, Lehrstuhl für
Wirtschaftsprüfung, Universität
Augsburg

Klement, Sepp, Vaterstetten

Klingshirn, Dr. Heinrich, Ministerialdirigent, Bayerisches Staatsministerium des Innern, München

Knauss, Georg, Ministerialdirigent, Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Unterricht, Kultus, Wissenschaft und Kunst, München

Knebel, Eberhard, Geschäftsführer, Bavaria Wirtschaftsagentur, München

Knöpfle, Prof. Dr. Franz, Rektor,
Hochschule für Politik,
München

Kober, Dr. Ernst, Gauting

Koch, Hans C., Starnberg

Köffler, Dr. Wernfried, General-
konsul, Österreichisches
Generalkonsulat, München

Köhne, Dr. h. c. Franz,
München

Kopf, Nicolaus, Journalist,
München

Kopinic, Vladimir, Generalkonsul,
Generalkonsulat der Slowakischen Republik, München

Koppenhöfer, Sigrid, Rechtsan-
wältin, München

Koppl, Frederick, München

Körber, Hildegard, OStR,
München

Kortas, Ulrich, BMW AG,
München

Korte, Dr. Hans, Karlsfeld

Kraeft, Marianne, BMW AG,
München

Kreitl, Nikolai, Münchner
Merkur, München

Krempl, Thomas F., Geschäftsinhaber, Germering

Kretschmer, Manfred, Public
Relations, Haindl Papier
GmbH, Augsburg

Kreyerhoff, Magda, Leiterin
Firmenkundenbetreuung,
Bayerische Landesbank,
München

Krieger, Prof. Dr. Wolfgang,
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik, Ebenhausen

Krips, Ulrich E., Geschäftsführer,
Publicis MCD Werbeagentur
GmbH, Erlangen

Krug, Dr. Heinz, Präsident,
Bayerische Versicherungskammer, München

Kubatzky, Alena, München

Kuenheim, Dr.-Ing. E. h., Dr.-Ing. E. h. Eberhard v., Vorsitzender des Kuratoriums, Herbert Quandt Stiftung, München, und Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats, BMW AG, München

Kürten, Klaus D., Kulturreferent,
Amrika Haus, München

Kurz, Gotthilf, MDE, München

Kussl, Dr. Rolf, München

L

Lamsfuß, Peter, Rethmann
Energiewirtschaft GmbH & Co.
KG, München

Lang, John, Konsul, Kanadisches Konsulat, München

Lasz, Dieter, Austria Presseagentur

Laub, Dr. Wolfgang, Geschäftsführer, Optima-Aegidius-Gruppe, München

Laumer, Dr. Helmut, Mitglied des
Vorstands, ifo Institut für
Wirtschaftsforschung,
München

Lederle, Petra, BMW AG,
München

Leisch, Hans, OStD, Klenze-Gymnasium, München

Lenze, Bernd, Ltd. Ministerialrat,
Zentrale Aufgaben, Informati-
on, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit,
Bayerisches Staatsministerium
für Wirtschaft, Verkehr und
Technologie, München

Leuchten, Dr. Alexius, Rechtsan-
walt, Beiten, Burkhardt, Mittl &
Wegener, München

Leutheusser, Helmut, Gmund
am Tegernsee

List, Karlheinz, Grünwald

Löhr, Peter, BMW AG, München

Lotz, Klaus Werner, Präsident,
Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichthof, München

Lübbert, Erich, Gräfelfing

Ludorf, Hans Heinz, Landsberg

M

Maendle, Herbert, Rethmann
Energiewirtschaft GmbH & Co.
KG, München

16

[LC]

Maetzke, Heinrich, Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik,
Ebenhausen

Mahn, Erwin, Geschäftsführer,
Berufsförderungswerk
München GmbH, Kirchseeon

Maier, Susanne, München

Malik, Daniel, München

Martignoni, Prof. Dr. Klaus,
Direktor, Institut für Strahlen-
hygiene, Oberschleißheim

Mathé, Dr. Ladislaus, OStR,
Mammendorf

Mattler, Helga, BMW AG,
München

Matuschka, Gräfin, München

Maus, Abendzeitung, München

Mayer, Norbert, BMW AG,
München

Meggle, Toni, Geschäftsführen-
der Gesellschafter, Meggle
GmbH, Wasserburg

Mehler, Hubert, Präsident a. d.,
Bayerisches Landesamt für
Verfassungsschutz, Grainau

Meister, Sabine, Geschäftsfüh-
rende Gesellschafterin, Meister
Group, München

Melzer, Klaus A., Deutsche
Lufthansa AG, München

Mensch, Prof. Dr. Gerhard,
Gräfelfing

Menschikow, Dr. Peter W.,
Konsul, Generalkonsulat der
Russischen Föderation,
München

Menzel, Friedrich, Geschäftsfüh-
rer, Junge Europäer, München

Merkel-Baptist, Ilse, Staats-
institut für Schulpädagogik,
München

Mertel, Helga, CSU BA 11,
München

Meßler, Günther, BMW AG,
München

Metz, Dr. Norbert, BMW AG,
München

Meyer, Louise, Konsulin der
Republik Südafrika, München

Miesbach, Dr. Hermann, Minist-
erialdirigent, München

Milberg, Prof. Dr.-Ing. Joachim
von, Mitglied des Vorstands,
BMW AG, München

Mönnich, Horst, Breitbrunn

Moog, Prof. Dr. Martin, Lehrstuhl
für Forstliche Wirtschaftslehre,
Freising

Moritz, Die Bunte, München

Möslein, Kathrin, München

Mühlfenzl, Rudolf und Frau,
Sefeld

Mustica, Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, Ebenhausen

N

Naumann, Prof. Dr. Hans Heinz,
Gräfelfing

Naundorf, Helmut, BMW AG,
München

Nebe, Monika, Chefredakteurin,
Informationszentrale der
Bayerischen Wirtschaft,
München

Nehls, Jürgen K., Geschäftsle-
tung, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH, München

Neufurth, Klaus, Ltd. Regie-
rungsdirektor, Ludwig-Maximi-
lians-Universität München

Neuhauser, Eduard, Kempten

Nichols, Patrick J., Generalkon-
sul, Generalkonsulat der
Vereinigten Staaten von
Amerika, München

Niederhofer, Helmut, Mitglied
des Vorstands, BMW AG,
München

Nipperdey, Vigdis, Icking

Nolte, Prof. Dr. Eckhard,
Puchheim

O

Oehmen, Hansjoachim, Mitglied
der Geschäftsleitung/Finanz-
direktor, Optische Werke G.
Rodenstock, München

Oelker, Tino, BMW AG,
München

Oertel, Wulf-Dietrich, Leiter
Zentrale Vertriebsaufgaben,
Rohde & Schwarz GmbH &
Co. KG, München

Oesterreich, Sonia, BMW AG,
München

Oroschakoff, Graf und Gräfin
Haralampi G., München

Ostendorf, Dr. Annette, Wissen-
schaftliche Assistentin, Tauf-
kirchen

P

Pache, Prof. Dr. Walter, Universi-
tät Augsburg, München

Paesler, Dr. Reinhard, Institut für
Wirtschaftsgéographie, Lud-
wig-Maximilians-Universität
München

Pallmann, Roswitha, BMW AG,
München

Pappke von Wille, Heinz Karl,
Honorarkonsul, Honorar-
konsulat von Peru, München

Pastor, John Louis, TCP Team
Consult Pastor, Bernried

Paul, Dr. Germán, Mitglied des
Vorstands, Süd-Chemie AG,
München

Permanetter, Prof. Dr. med.
Willibald, Pathologisches
Institut, Klinikum Landshut

Pfitzner, Gunda, München

Pfützner, Robert, München

Pinheiro, Barbara W., StD,
München

Pinker, Michael, Rechtsanwalt,
Spitzweg & Partner, München

Platzöder, Dr. Renate, Lehrbe-
auftragte an der Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universität Mün-
chen, Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, Ebenhausen

Polensky, Dr. Thomas, Akademi-
scher Direktor, Universität
München

Possmann, Rainer, StD,
München

Prommesberger, Adolf,
BMW AG, München

Prophete, Barbara, Rottach-
Egern

Pückler, Hermann Graf von,
Eurotechnik Vertriebsgesell-
schaft mbH, München

R

Rabl, Dr. Peter, Regierungsdirek-
tor, Bayerisches Landesamt
für Umweltschutz, München

Raff, Dr. Joachim, BMW AG,
München

Ranft, Thomas, München

Rattel, Paul Norbert, Richter am
Bayerischen Obersten Land-
gericht, München

Ratz, Erhard, Kirchenrat,
Landesrat der Evangelisch-
Lutherischen Kirche in Bayern,
München

Rauh, Dr. Wolfgang, München

Ravaglia, Dr. Christina, Konsulin,
Italienisches Generalkonsulat,
München

Redlich, Robert B., München

Reimpell, Peter, Mitglied des
Vorstands, Bayerische
Vereinsbank AG, Gräfelfing

Reitzle, Dr.-Ing. Wolfgang,
Mitglied des Vorstands,
BMW AG, München

Remus, Francine, BMW AG,
München

Ross, Waltraud, BMW AG,
München

Roth, Dr. Jochen, Institut für
Wirtschafts- und Sozial-
pädagogik, München

Rudolf, Dr. Peter, Wissenschaftli-
cher Referent, Stiftung Wis-
senschaft und Politik, Eben-
hausen

Rudolph, Heinrich, Vertriebsleiter
Wohnbau, Hebel Emmering
GmbH & Co., Fürstenfeldbruck

Ruso, Hans Hermann, Ge-
schäftsführer, Russo & Partner,
München

17

S

Saake, Gunhild, München

Salamander, Dr. Rachel, Literaturhandlung GmbH R u S, München

Salat, Dr. Rüdiger, Geschäftsführer, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, München

Sandfort, Horst G., Eching

Saur, Stefan, GWP Marketingen, Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt GmbH, München

Sawallisch, Walter, Managing Partner, Sawallisch & Associates Ltd., Tokio, Japan

Schaible, Dr. Bernd, BMW AG, München

Scheibe, Joachim, Erding

Schippl, Peter, BMW AG, München

Schirmer, Dr. Armin, BMW AG, Essen

Schmid-Preissler, Christine, Unternehmensberaterin, Schmid-Preissler GmbH, München

Schmidt, Dr. Gerhard, BMW AG, München

Schmiedt, Prof. Dr. h. c. Egbert, ehem. Direktor der Urologischen Klinik und Poliklinik der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Grünwald

Schmitt, Horst, Ministerialdirigent, Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Ernährung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, München

Schmitt, Rudolf W., Mitglied des Vorstands, Bayerische Landesanstalt für Aufbaufinanzierung, München

Schmitz, Dr. Georg, BMW AG, München

Schmitz-Justen, Dr. Clemens, BMW AG, München

Schneider, Franziska, München

Schubert, Dr. Venanz, Akademischer Direktor, Philosophisches Institut, Interdisziplinäre Studien, Universität München

Schüler, Wilhelm, BMW AG, München

Schulte-Steinberg, Dr. Ottheinz, Starnberg

Schulz, Friedrich, WP/StB, KPMG Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft AG, München

Schulz, Manfred, BMW AG, München

Schumacher, Hans-Ulrich, München

Schwaiger, Walter, München

Schwarz, Prof. Dr. Jürgen, Institut für Internationale Politik und Völkerrecht, Universität der Bundeswehr, Neubiberg

Schwarzkopf, Dr. Dietrich, Starnberg

Schweigler, Dr. Gebhard, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Sefzig, Udo D., Bankdirektor, Pentenried

Sieber, Dr. Rolf H., Wacker-Chemie, Burghausen

Siebourg, Dr. Peter, BMW AG, München

Simek, Dr. Ivan, Generalkonsul, Generalkonsulat der Republik Kroatien, München

Sing, Prof. Dr., Prodekan, Russische Fakultät, Kath. Stiftungsfachhochschule, München

Singer, Peter, Gmund am Tegernsee

Steele, Frank, The English Institute, München

Stegen, Arno, BMW AG, München

Steidl, Günther, Verlagsleitung, Carl Hanser Verlag, München

Stemme, Prof. Fritz, Bremen

Stern, Johann, Vorstand, Hacker-Pschorr-Bräu GmbH, München

Stolze, Sylvia, München

Storch, Sönke, München

Strauß, Max Joseph, Rechtsanwalt, München

Stübiger, Björn, Firmenkundenbetreuer, Deutsche Verkehrsbank AG, München

Studer, Paul, Generalkonsul, Schweizerisches Generalkonsulat, München

Studnitz, Prof. Dr. Dr. Wilfried von, München

Summerer, Cornelia, Herbert Quandt Stiftung, München

Sumpf, Joachim, BMW AG, München

T

Teltschik, Dr. h. c. Horst, Vorsitzender des Vorstands, Herbert Quandt Stiftung, München, und Mitglied des Vorstands, BMW AG, München

Theisinger, Prof. Dr. Werner, München

Theissen, Dr. Mario, BMW AG, München

Thurn und Taxis, Karl Prinz von, Vorstand, Deutsche Private Finanzakademie, DPFAG, München

Toepel, Prof. Werner, Holzkirchen

Tschochner, Gerhard, Ministerialrat, Oberste Baubehörde im Bayerischen Staatsministerium des Innern, München

U

Urban, Eva, BMW AG, München

V

Vedder, Prof. Dr. Christoph, München

Veitenhansl, Josef, OStD, München

Viglione, Juan Carlos, Generalkonsul, Argentinisches Generalkonsulat, München

Vogt, Joachim, BMW AG, München

Volkmann, Rainer, Stadtrat, München

Volz, Martin, Neubiberg

W

Wachtler, Manfred, München

Wackerbauer, Dr. Heinrich, Direktor, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, München

Wagner, Dr. Wilfried, Richter am Bundesfinanzhof, Pressereferent, München

Waldburg, Marie von, Abendzeitung, München

Waldburg-Wolfegg, Sebastian Graf von, München

Wangen, Dr. Edgar, Generalbevollmächtigter, Gabriel Sedlmayr Spaten-Franziskaner-Bräu KG aA, München

Weigand, Waltraud, München

Weis, Dr. Wolfgang, Gauting

Weiss, Carl, München

Weiss, Johannes, Geschäftsführer, TeleTime, Geiselgasteig

Weissenbacher, Prof. Dr. Dr. Ernst-Rainer, Frauenklinik, Klinikum Großhadern, München

Weissgerber, Dr., Geschäftsführer, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Großhesselohoe

Werner, Helmut K., Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats, Germania Vermögensanlagen Vertriebs-GmbH, München

Wertschulte, Josef F., Mitglied des Vorstands, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank AG, München

Weusten, Sylvia M., Präsidentin, Columbus Society, München

Wever, Prof. Dr. Rütger, Andechs

Wieland, Carl Paul, Präsident, Weltbund der Österreicher im Ausland, Baldham

Wietersheim, Viggo von, Rechtsanwalt, Wietersheim, Berg-Grünenwald & Partner, München

18

Wilhelm, Ulrich, Stellv. Presse-
sprecher, Bayerische Staats-
kanzlei, München

Wilhelm, Ulrich, BMW AG,
München

Willenberg, Klaus, BMW AG,
München

Willke, Ursula, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, München

Winkler, Klaus, Generaldirektor
a. D., Hilton Int., München

Wissmeier, Dr. Kilian, Universität
der Bundeswehr München,
Neubiberg

Wittig, Dr. Thomas, BMW AG,
München

Wolf, Horst-Henning, BMW AG,
München

Wolf, Karlheinz, Prokurist,
Botzenhardt & Obermayer
GmbH, München

Wolf, dpa, München

Wolff-Diepenbrock, Bundesfi-
nanzhof, München

Wolffsohn, Prof. Dr. Michael,
Universität der Bundeswehr,
Neubiberg

Wunderlich, Dr. Otto, Ltd.
Regierungsdirektor, Bayeri-
sches Landesamt für Umwelt-
schutz, München

Würfel, Gerhard, BMW AG,
Landshut

Z

Zabel, Dr. Ulf J., Mitglied des
Vorstands, Herbert Quandt
Stiftung, München

Zaisserer, Angelika, Raubling

Ziebart, Prof. Dr.-Ing. Erwin,
München

Zimmerer, Fritz, Vizepräsident
a. D., München

Zimmer, Herbert, Vizepräsident
a. D., München

Zöllner, Dr. Gabriele, Ärztin,
München

19

Jüngste Veröffentlichungen:
Recent Publications:

„Denk ich an Deutschland"
Dokumentation zur internationalen Diskussions-
runde über die zukünftige Rolle Deutschlands in
der Gemeinschaft der Nationen, Paulskirche,
Frankfurt, 26. April 1991

"Conflicts and Negotiations"
International conference proceedings,
South African Reserve Bank, Pretoria,
August 29 - 30, 1991

"The United States, Europe and the Structures of a
New World Order"
International conference proceedings,
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.,
October 17 - 18, 1991

„Religiöser Fundamentalismus – eine Bedrohung
für den Weltfrieden?“
Dokumentation zum Sommerkolloquium mit
Professor Martin E. Marty, Kardinal Wendel
Haus, München, 23. Juni 1992

"The United States, Japan, Europe and the
Global Challenges. Partners in Leadership or
Adversaries in Economic Conflicts?"
International roundtable discussion proceedings,
BMW AG, conference center, Munich,
July 24, 1992

„Die Vereinigten Staaten, die Wiedervereinigung
Deutschlands und die Überwindung der Teilung
Europas“
Dokumentation zum Vortrag von Botschafter
Robert M. Kimmitt, Dresdener Schloß,
23. November 1992

„Auf dem Weg ins Jahr 2000“
Dokumentation zur internationalen Konferenz
über die Zukunft Europas, Neues Palais,
Potsdam, 17. - 18. Juni 1993

„Vorbildliche Ausnahme: Liberalismus in
Amerika und Europa“
Dokumentation zum Sommerkolloquium mit
Professor James J. Sheehan, Konferenzbereich
der BMW AG, München, 8. Juli 1993

„Die Entwicklung der Luftqualität in Bayern“
Dokumentation zum Kolloquium,
Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften,
München, 14. Juli 1993

"Living in Revolutionary Times"
Lecture given by James A. Baker, former U.S.
Secretary of State, University of Munich,
October 5, 1993

"The United States and Europe: Transatlantic
Relations Beyond 2000"
International conference proceedings,
Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.,
March 3 - 4, 1994

„Wertorientierung in Europa und den USA“
Lehrerfortbildungsveranstaltung,
Gut Schwärzenbach am Tegernsee,
18. - 19. Februar 1994

"Property as a Guarantor of Liberty," "Politicized Economies in Limbo: America, Europe, and the World, 1994"
Lectures given by Professor James M. Buchanan, Economics Nobel Laureate, Jena, Munich, and Bayreuth
June 7 - 15, 1994

„Europäischer Verkehrsverbund –
Herausforderung der Zukunft“
Dokumentation zur Fachtagung,
Konferenzbereich der BMW AG, München,
6. Juli 1994

„Ökologische Steuerreform“: Spielräume
staatlichen und industriellen Handelns –
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des
Verkehrssektors
Dokumentation zur Fachtagung, Kardinal
Wendel Haus, München, 28. November 1994

„Europäische Verkehrspolitik zwischen
Integration, Wachstum und Umweltschutz“
"European Transport Policy Amid Integration, Growth
and Environmental Protection"
Zweisprachige Dokumentation zur Fachtagung,
Concert Noble,
Brüssel, 12. - 13. Januar 1995

Bücher/Books:

„Die Rolle der Wissenschaften und der Politik in
den deutsch-amerikanischen Beziehungen –
Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektiven“
Herbert Quandt Stiftung (Hrsg.), 1990,
Profil Verlag GmbH München

„Ist Public Relations eine Wissenschaft? Eine
Einführung“
Horst Avenarius, Wolfgang Armbrecht (Hrsg.),
1992, Westdeutscher Verlag

„Image und PR. Kann Image Gegenstand von
Public Relations sein?“
Wolfgang Armbrecht, Horst Avenarius, Ulf Zabel
(Hrsg.), 1993, Westdeutscher Verlag

„Normative Aspekte der Public Relations.
Grundlagen und Perspektiven. Eine Einführung“
Wolfgang Armbrecht, Ulf Zabel (Hrsg.),
1994, Westdeutscher Verlag

Herbert Quandt Stiftung
Eine Stiftung der BMW AG

1

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

ich werde mir erlauben einige Worte auf deutsch zu sagen, nur damit Sie verstehen, warum ich auf deutsch nicht weitermache.

Leider, ausgerechnet wird mein Deutsch außerhalb von Franken angesehen, als würde ich mit einem Akzent auch in Deutschland auch in deutsch sprechen.

Aber mein Vokabular hörte auf sich zu entwickeln als ich 15 Jahre war, und ich kann auf deutsch alles natürlich verstehen, aber nicht sehr elegant ausdrücken.

Und so werden Sie mir verzeihen wenn ich, selbst wenn ich ganz in der Nähe hier geboren bin und mich sehr mit diesem Land verbunden fühle, trotzdem auf Englisch weitermache.

Now I want to talk to you about American-European relations in the post-Cold
War period. When I travel around the world I'm very often asked what is
American foreign policy at this particular moment. And the truthful answer is:
there is no clear cut American policy at this moment. I don't say this as a
criticism of the current administration, but to explain that we are in a period of
transition.

At the end of the Second World War, it took over four years before what came to
be known as the containment policy was clearly formulated. We are now only in
the second or third year of the post-Cold War period and we have not yet had a
systematic debate in the United States about our direction. I believe that all the
democratic nations, but especially the United States, need to think through how
to conduct foreign policy in a world in which there is no longer a clear cut
ideological conflict or strategic opponent. This is a particular problem for the
United States.

The United States' foreign policy is unique among the great powers. It is the only major country whose history can be precisely dated, namely there is a precise date from which you can say that America has existed. It is the only major country that is populated almost entirely by immigrants turning away from their own societies, and the only major country that has never had a powerful neighbor on its border. It therefore is the only major country that, until very recently, believed that the decision whether to engage in foreign policy at all was largely up to its own leaders. For no other nation was the idea of such isolationism even conceivable. Thus America has oscillated between a missionary and an isolationist tendency; between thinking that it was too good for this world and believing that it had a mandate to re-educate the entire world. The American approach to foreign policy has almost always been extraordinarily moralistic and ideological. When America entered the First World War, it transformed what had been a typical European war with heavier casualties than normal into a war to spread democracy all over the world and to replace existing governments. And there is no tradition of geopolitical analysis in American foreign policy.

For all these reasons, America right now finds the post-Cold War world to be a somewhat unsettling experience. The Cold War world was difficult, but it recalled two seminal American experiences - the experience of World War II, and the experience of the New Deal. There was as well the conviction that we were dealing with absolute Evil. Indeed, President Reagan, as late as 1982, could call the Soviet Union the "Evil Empire". And there was also the belief that, by closing the gap between expectation and reality in the economic field, political stability could be achieved. On the whole, these assumptions turned out to be correct.

The United States now finds itself in the position of having achieved almost everything -- indeed everything -- it had set out to do, say in 1950. It is very rare

in history that you can point out such a close correspondence between what
leaders said they wanted to achieve and what they in fact accomplished. Yet as
George Bernard Shaw once said, there are two tragedies in life: the first tragedy
is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire, and the second tragedy is to fulfill your
heart's desire. That, now is the position of the United States.

As we look around the world, we find that there are five or six major power
centers: the U.S., Europe, Russia, China, Japan, probably India, and possibly
Brazil. These power centers have more or less equal capacity to affect the major
events of our period. It is said that the United States is the only superpower.
But the United States is the only superpower primarily in the military field, and
the issues which can be settled by military means are diminishing. Moreover
the military categories -- nuclear weapons -- in which we are the strongest are
not relevant to many of the crises which now exist -- such as the Balkans. If you
look at the American dollar, you realize that we are not the only superpower
economically -- to put it mildly. In a world in which there are five or six more or
less equal powers, a whole new challenge presents itself before the United
States.

The challenge is, first of all, that there are no longer definitive solutions to our
problems. Every major post-war initiative of the United States has been
presented as having a terminal solution to a specific problem. In the world in
which we now live, there are no such definitive solutions. Every solution is the
admission price to some other problem. This is no news to most other countries,
but it is unprecedented for America. Secondly, in such a world there are
basically only two ways of achieving order. One is by hegemony and the other is
by equilibrium. To say this at a European university is a platitude; to say it at an
American university is an invitation to a riot -- at least by the faculty. If you say,
in most countries, that America now has to define its national interest and that it
has to learn to relate its national interest to the national interest of other

countries, one is stating the obvious. In America, that statement is
extraordinarily controversial. I wrote a book last year, to which our Chairman
kindly referred, in which I made this, among other points. Many of its reviewers
took strong exception to that proposition.

The secret dream of American intellectuals and of those who laid down the basic
principles of American foreign policy is essentially theological: it is to prevail by
conversion, not the balance of power, and to make other peoples democratic.
For when they become democratic, it is believed they will become automatically
peaceful. Moreover, the faith is that this can be achieved and is desirable in
every part of the world more or less simultaneously.

Vietnam turned into such a tragedy because decent and honorable people were
attempting to apply principles learned from European policy to an area with a
totally different history, no tradition of self-government, and altogether different
strategic requirements. But in all of the literature which has since evolved out of
the Vietnam experience, what is forgotten is the unanimity with which American
leadership groups had entered that war. There was no dispute about the
correctness of what we were doing in and for Vietnam when we entered it. There
was no questioning of the proposition that we could both fight a war and spread
democracy -- simultaneously -- in the midst of a guerrilla war. And one reason
why such extraordinary bitterness developed (which we have seen boil up all
over again in recent weeks) was in the disappointment that this prescription
could not be universally applied; and that it was not possible to fight a guerrilla
war and promote democracy simultaneously. In part it is therefore too a
reflection of enormous self-hatred against the idealism which had produced the
commitment in the first place.

We now face the rather amazing situation that those of us who had watched the
evolution of the Vietnam War are now opposed to military adventures whose end

we cannot define -- as in Somalia or in Bosnia. Yet we are attacked by the very people who consider Vietnam a crime but who would like us to engage ourselves in Bosnia. The moralistic, idealistic approach to foreign policy -- the belief that we can solve every problem and must right every wrong -- is one of the permanent temptations of the American public debate in both political parties. And it explains why the same people who are at the very moment attacking Vietnam also want us to enter Bosnia.

Without arguing about the merits of individual policies but in terms of the structure of the debate, I believe that once we have had a debate, the United States will be driven by reality to understand that we will henceforth be obliged, like the European nations have been throughout their history, to attempt to improve the world gradually through an endless process requiring constant adjustment and permanent analysis. But we have neither the personnel nor a tradition for this sort of approach which explains much of the confusion one observes.

If this were an academic lecture, I would say that the United States has two broad choices. It could, theoretically, behave like Britain did in the 19th century, when the British foreign policy was one of "splendid isolation". Britain stood apart from Europe, which was the center of world affairs, but threw its weight in whichever direction best suited British interests -- which, broadly speaking, was onto the weaker side in any European struggle. Britain did not want Europe to unite under the tutelage of a single country -- regardless of its views about individual leaders -- much as Winston Churchill said in the thirties when he was accused of being pro-French and anti-German: "If circumstances were reversed, I would be pro-German and anti-French. I'm not pursuing a personal policy but a fundamental principle that has preserved the liberties of the European States." Now that is a theoretical policy for the United States: we could look at the world and say, "We will back whoever is most likely to oppose the country which

6

threatens to dominate Eurasia, because we have a national interest not to have
Eurasia dominated by a hostile power."

There are, however, huge obstacles to this. The first is that, whereas Britain needed to conduct this policy in Europe, we would have to conduct it on a global scale. Secondly, Britain had a leadership group that had trained itself in the conduct of public policy. America does not have such a leadership group or such a tradition. Third, when communications are instantaneous, economics global, and politics democratic, it is probably not possible to conduct the same kind of cold-blooded, national-interest-oriented policy in every part of the world simultaneously, as such a policy would require.

We are facing a difficulty intellectually -- all of us -- in that technology, economics, and communications have become global, while political loyalties are still national, even more and more subnational. In a world of such global connections, there are ever more splinter groups with no interest in the global equilibrium at all; which, in fact, are using the major countries' desire for global order to achieve objectives that are of concern primarily to them. For the United States to practice "splendid isolation" under these circumstances would exhaust us physically and psychologically. And it is above all incompatible with American values.

propositions, propositions which have moreover been received as wisdom in the United States for the balance of this century and which produced a peace settlement after the First World War that left the international situation infinitely more precarious than it had been before. Yet in the American debate that is rarely blamed on Wilson. At any rate, it is not possible for the United States, intellectually, to conduct a foreign policy purely on the balance of power principles. There has to be a moral anchor somewhere.

And its temptation is to seek that moral anchor on a global basis. In this, it cannot succeed. For example, every year there is a meeting of the heads of government of the Asian-Pacific region (the APEC) where the standard speech is all of an Atlantic-Pacific Community that will act on the basis of common values and common interests. Yet the reality of our period is that there is no Asian Community. The relation of the Asian nations to each other is very similar to that of the European nations of the 19th century, but quite different from that of the European nations of today. China, Japan, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, even India, look at each other as strategic opponents. And while they're not planning wars, they also do not totally exclude them. In Europe, this is not the case. However much the European nations may quarrel, a war between European nations is out of the question. More than that, the military establishments of the European nations are in no way directed against each other. In Asia, we are really facing competing nations which oblige all of us, and especially the United States, to look at foreign policy in balance of power terms.

But simultaneously the United States needs to look at those areas of the world in which it is possible for us to work in a cooperative manner, and in a way that reflects basic American values. And those areas, are, on the one hand, the Western Hemisphere, and on the other, Europe. When I was in government, as Europe began to form itself there were endless debates (particularly from the French side) about the need to establish a European identity and to be rescued

8

from American domination. That tendency still exists, but the European problem, in my view, is not American domination. It is far too easy to get rid of the United States; the challenge is to keep America tied to Europe. For it is in our own self-interest as well. When one looks around the world at the roots of Islamic fundamentalism or the emergence of societies driven by different categories of values than the ones now dominant in the West, Europe, America, and the countries of Latin America would be committing spiritual suicide were they to conceive their relationships as primarily competitive.

This now seems to me the fundamental challenge to both European and American policy. And it has a number of requirements. (I leave Latin America aside for the purposes of this discussion.) First it requires a definition of what one conceives of by Europe in the present circumstances. Where does Europe begin and whom does it include? That of course raises the question of Russia.

The history of Russia is extraordinarily complex. It has interacted with Europe certainly since the 18th century, but it has also had interests in Asia, the Middle East, and at the borders of India that had nothing to do with Europe. In fact, Russia has been historically torn equally by the requirements of Europe and by the temptations of Asia. It is significant that, in the 19th century, Russian foreign policy was conducted by two departments: the Foreign Ministry, which dealt with Europe and which practiced more or less the balance of power; and the Asiatic Department, which included everything in Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Thus every area in which Russia could make territorial gains was under the Asiatic Department, which preferred to operate unilaterally and not by the rules of European diplomacy.

[LC]

backdrop than in the West. Church and State were always united in Russia. There was no Reformation, no Enlightenment, no capitalism, and there were no democratic institutions or national state; the Russian state has been an empire through most of its history, and its current crisis is not only due to the collapse of communism but to the collapse of imperialism. So I would argue that the problem of Russian's foreign policy is that it must learn, for the first time in its history, that expansionism does not produce security, and that to develop the resources of a country with eleven time zones ought not to produce claustrophobia.

In this interim period we should be receptive to Russia and cooperate with it, but it cannot as yet be an institutional part of Europe. Thus the issue of NATO expansion should be settled quickly; endless debate over it will only create needless tensions. But there is a second problem, which is the relationship of Europe to the United States.

In the United States, there are now three generations: there is my generation, which grew up during the war and in the post-war period and which, on the whole, looks on America's role in international affairs as beneficial and believes that, on the whole and despite all the shortcomings of a modern society, America stands for freedom and humanity in the world. Then there is the generation which was forced to grow up in the intellectual debates of the Vietnam period, based as they were on the self-hatred I mentioned earlier, and which interpreted the American experience as hypocritical and imperialistic. Hence this generation wants to turn away from international affairs towards self-improvement and a radical reform of American society. Finally there is the younger generation, which does not have the self-hatred, indeed has a great pride in America, but which also does not have the international experience or the benefit of participation in the truly creative periods of American foreign policy. Similarly, when I look around at European statesmen, the generation which built the

[LC]

10

On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a need for projects we can do together. In the past, this was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to which, as I have said, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, should be added as quickly as possible. This is not a problem for reflection but a problem for decision-making. There's nothing we can learn by studying the problem; it can only confuse everybody. And it is not in our interest to create a gray area between Germany and Russia, which both nations will then be tempted -- not just tempted but obliged -- to fill with their national policies. Nor is it good for Europe, and in the end not even for Russia, to create a vacuum around its borders.

But for the long term, now is the time to create new institutions for the nations on both sides of the North Atlantic, to the building of which they can dedicate themselves. The European Union is a reality and America is beginning to build a North American Free Trade Association -- which may merge into a Western Hemisphere one later on. [It is time] to begin building a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, and to dedicating ourselves to it as an objective.

Security alone is no longer sufficient to tie the two sides of the Atlantic together. We shouldn't conduct the NATO discussion entirely in terms of whether Russia is or is not a danger. History will determine that. What we do need is the moral equivalent of what was done in the late 1940s; some construction that corresponds to the necessities of the democracies working together on the industrial side. On both sides of the Atlantic, wage scales are more or less equivalent and social services comparable. Competition therefore depends on merit. There is no need for protectionism based on huge inequalities of social, environmental, and economic conditions. For these reasons, I think we should move towards the construction of such institutions.

[L]

11

Now in this context I have not spoken about Germany as a nation, yet the unification of Germany has created a whole set of new realities. The European Union and NATO were both designed, in part, to provide a home for a divided Germany. Throughout nearly the entire post-war period, German foreign policy was driven by the need to establish legitimacy superior to that of the East German State via special relationships with the West. This involved a degree of subordination, both to the United States and to France, which a unified Germany cannot, by the nature of things, carry out permanently. As a result Germany is now both more powerful and freed of some of its previous necessities.

The view of some West European countries -- which refines all the differences between Europe and America and attempts to import the policies that had been appropriate to keeping Central Europe divided to their relationships with the United States -- is incompatible with the broad view and the broad canvas upon which foreign policy now needs to be constructed. On the other hand, a Europe which divides itself into national states will also be too impotent to affect international events. Thus the crucial balance of unity and diversity is one in which Germany can play a vital role in the unification process of Europe, and can make a significant contribution to the construction of the Atlantic relationship of which I spoke.

[LC]

12

Now, for the sake of the emotional equilibrium of the American Consul and
Generals here, I want to stress that I am not speaking about current American
foreign policy: what I have said here is not necessarily the foreign policy of
today, but in my view the foreign policy of tomorrow. Nor is it an approach based
on any particular party. The strong periods of foreign policy are always those
carried out by both American parties. Building an Atlantic relationship is not a
partisan matter; but it is the crying need of the next period because, if both sides
of the Atlantic attempt to manipulate on behalf of their own self-interests in the
various conflicts foreseeable in many parts of the world, we will exhaust
ourselves and not be able to take advantage of the opportunities before us.

What I'm talking about is not removing all the problems of the world, but of the
democracies working together to reduce big problems to little problems; and that
they can, therefore, continue to build freedom and well-being for their peoples
and for all of mankind.

I am pleased to take a few questions. Thank you very much.

1

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

5

EY

6

8

10

11

1

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

[LC]

[LC]

4

5

[LC]

9

10

[LC]

[LC]

[L.C.]

1

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

[LC]

2

[LC]

3

6

[LC]

7

8

[LC]

[L.C.]

10

[L.C]

[L.C]

[Y]

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

I greatly appreciate your very friendly remarks. Indeed many of the statistics you gave were new to me. Somebody once introduced me in the United States by saying that there are not many people who are more difficult to introduce. But there are surely even fewer people who enjoy a friendly introduction more than I do, and I certainly appreciate very much what you said and how you said it.

[Y]

As we look around the world, we find that there are five or six major power centers: Europe, Russia, China, Japan, probably India, and possibly Brazil. These power centers have more or less equal capacity to affect the major events of our period. It is said that the United States is the only superpower. But the United States is the only superpower in the military field, and the issues which can be settled by military means are diminishing. Moreover the military means in which we are the strongest are not relevant to many of the crises which now exist -- such as the Balkans. If you look at the American dollar, you realize that we are not the only superpower economically -- to put it mildly. In a world in which there are five or six more or less equal powers, a whole new challenge presents itself before the United States.

The challenge is, first of all, that there are no longer definitive solutions to our problems. Every major post-war initiative of the United States has been presented as having a terminal solution to a specific problem. In the world in which we now live, there are no such definitive solutions. Every solution is the admission price to some other problem. This is no news to other countries, but it is news for America. Secondly, in such a world there are basically only two ways

3

[Y]

The secret dream of American intellectuals and of those who laid down the basic principles of American foreign policy is essentially theological: it is to prevail by conversion, not the balance of power, and to make other peoples democratic. For when they become democratic, they will become automatically peaceful. A great belief is that this can be achieved and is desirable in every part of the world more or less simultaneously.

We now face the rather amazing situation that those of us who had watched the
evolution of the Vietnam War and are now opposed to military adventures whose
end we cannot define -- as in Somalia or in Bosnia -- are attacked by the very
people who consider Vietnam a crime but who would like us to engage ourselves
in Bosnia. The moralistic, idealistic approach to foreign policy -- the belief that
we can solve every problem and must right every wrong -- is one of the
permanent temptations of the American public debate in both political parties.
And it explains why the same people who are at the very moment attacking
Vietnam also want us to enter Bosnia.

If this were an academic lecture, I would say that the United States has two
broad choices. It could, theoretically, behave like Britain did in the 19th century,
when the British foreign policy was one of "splendid isolation". Britain stood
apart from Europe, which was the center of world affairs, but threw its weight in
whichever direction best suited British interests -- which, broadly speaking, was
onto the weaker side in any European struggle. Britain did not want Europe to
unite under the tutelage of a single country -- regardless of its views about
individual leaders -- much as Winston Churchill said in the thirties when he was

Now that is a theoretical policy for the United States: we could look at the world and say, "We will back whoever is most likely to oppose the country which threatens to dominate Eurasia, because we have a national interest not to have Eurasia dominated by a hostile power."

We are facing a difficulty intellectually -- all of us -- in that technology, economics, and communications have become global, while political loyalties are still national, even more and more subnational. In a world of such global connections, there are also ever more splinter groups with no interest in the global equilibrium at all; which, in fact, are using the major countries' desire for global order to achieve objectives that are of concern primarily to them. For the United States to practice "splendid isolation" under these circumstances would exhaust us physically and psychologically. And it is above all incompatible with American values.

appeared on the scene in 1917 and announced that everything that had gone
before was nonsense, and that the world had to be organized according to
principles nobody had ever practiced and of which there was no historical
evidence whatsoever. The fascinating thing about it is that you will look in vain
for any American discussion that questioned the intellectual basis of these
propositions, propositions which have moreover been received as wisdom in the
United States for the balance of this century and which produced a peace
settlement after the First World War that left the international situation infinitely
more precarious than it had been before. Yet in the American debate that is
rarely blamed on Wilson. At any rate, it is not possible for the United States,
intellectually, to conduct a foreign policy purely on the balance of power
principles. There has to be a moral anchor somewhere.

And its temptation is to seek that moral anchor on a global basis. In this, it
cannot succeed. For example, every year there is a meeting of the heads of
government of the Asian-Pacific region (the APEC) where the standard speech is
all of an Atlantic-Pacific Community that will act on the basis of common values
and common interests. Yet the reality of our period is that there is no Asian
Community. The relation of the Asian nations to each other is very similar to that
of the European nations of the 19th century, but quite different from that of the
European nations of today. China, Japan, Korea, the Asian part of Russia, even
India, look at each other as strategic opponents. And while they're not planning
wars, they also do not totally exclude them. In Europe, this is not the case.
However much the European nations may quarrel, a war between European
nations is out of the question. More than that, the military establishments of the
European nations are in no way directed against each other, another reason why
in the foreseeable future a European war can be excluded. Therefore, in Asia,
we are really facing competing nations which oblige all of us, and especially the
United States, to look at foreign policy in balance of power terms.

[Y]

Thus what United States needs to do is to look at those areas of the world in which it is possible for us to work in a cooperative manner, and in a way that reflects basic American values. And those areas, are, on the one hand, the Western Hemisphere, and on the other, Europe. When I was in government, as Europe began to form itself there were endless debates (particularly from the French side) about the need to establish a European identity and to be rescued from American domination. That tendency still exists, but the European problem, in my view, is not American domination, for it is too easy to get rid of the United States, but to keep America tied to Europe. For it is in our own self-interest as well. When one looks around the world at the roots of Islamic fundamentalism or the emergence of societies driven by different categories of values than the ones now dominant in the West, it would surely be a continuation of the Western Civil War which started in 1914 if Europe, America, and the countries of Latin America were now to conceive of their relationships as primarily competitive.

The history of Russia is extraordinarily complex. It has interacted with Europe certainly since the 18th century, but it has also had interests in Asia, the Middle East, and at the borders of India that had nothing to do with Europe. In fact, Russia has been historically torn equally by the requirements of Europe and by the temptations of Asia. It is telling that, in the 19th century, Russian foreign policy was divided into two departments: the Foreign Ministry, which dealt with Europe and which practiced more or less the balance of power; and the Asiatic Department, which included everything in Asia, the Middle East, and the Balkans. Thus every area in which Russia could make territorial gains was

8

Russian policy today is viewed by many in the West as the equivalent of bringing
democracy to Russia; and that that will automatically solve the Russian problem.
But bringing democracy to Russia must inevitably take place against a different
backdrop than in the West. Church and State were always united in Russia.
There was no Reformation, no Enlightenment, no capitalism, and there were no
democratic institutions or national state; the Russian state has been an empire
through most of its history, and its current crisis is not only due to the collapse of
communism but to the collapse of imperialism. So I would argue that the
problem of Russian's foreign policy is that it must learn, for the first time in its
history, that expansionism does not produce security, and that to develop the
resources of a country with eleven time zones ought not to produce
claustrophobia. That in my view is the big challenge of this period.

In this interim period we should be receptive to Russia and cooperate with it, but
it cannot be apart of the Europe I have talked about in this period. Thus the
issue of NATO expansion should be settled quickly; endless debate over it will
only create needless tensions. But there is a second problem, which is the
relationship of Europe to the United States.

In the United States, there are now three generations: there is my generation,
which grew up during the war and in the post-war period and which, on the
whole, looks on America's role in international affairs as beneficial and believes
that, on the whole and despite all the shortcomings of a modern society, America
stands for freedom and humanity in the world. Then there is the generation
which was forced to grow up in the intellectual debates of the Vietnam period,
based as they were on the self-hatred I mentioned earlier, and which interpreted
the American experience as hypocritical and imperialistic, hence which wants to

turn away from international affairs towards self-improvement and a radical
reform of American society. Finally there is the younger generation, which does
not have the self-hatred, indeed has a great pride in America, but which also
does not have the international experience or the benefit of participation in the
truly creative periods of American foreign policy. Similarly, when I look around at
European statesmen, the generation which built the Marshall Plan and created
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is also passing from the scene though
Europe, of course, did not have the Vietnam generation.

On both sides of the Atlantic, there is a need for projects we can do together. In
the past, this was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to which, as I have said,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, should be added as quickly
as possible. This is not a problem for reflection but a problem for decision-
making. There's nothing we can learn by studying the problem; it can only
confuse everybody. And it is not in our interest to create a gray area between
Germany and Russia, which both nations will then be tempted -- not just tempted
but obliged -- to fill with their national policies. Nor is it good for Europe, and in
the end not even for Russia, to create a vacuum around its borders. I advocate
this in order to put an end to the debate and to get on to more important things.

But gentle laymen

And in terms of the more important things, now is the time to create new
institutions for the nations on both sides of the North Atlantic, to the building of
which they can dedicate themselves. The European Union is a reality and
America is beginning to build a North American Free Trade Association -- which
may merge into a Western Hemisphere one later on. [It is time] to begin building
a North Atlantic Free Trade Area, and to dedicating ourselves to it as an
objective.

[Y]

is or is not a danger. History will determine that. What we do need is the moral equivalent of what was done in the late 1940s; some construction that corresponds to the necessities of the democracies working together on the industrial side. On both sides of the Atlantic, wage scales are more or less equivalent and social services comparable. Competition therefore depends on merit. There is no need for protectionism based on huge inequalities of social, environmental, and economic conditions. For these reasons, I think we should move towards the construction of such institutions.

Some people in the United States say -- and you will surely have heard this -- that we should switch the "special relationship", which the United States has had with Britain to Germany, a relationship which had implied special consultations and close ties. Now I believe this is not desirable because it would isolate Germany as a national state and would resurrect all the complexes that we should have overcome. Germany will always be a major player --without being given a title. The relationships which now exist, and which have existed through successive German governments of both parties with the United States, are close enough that it should not be necessary to single Germany out. It is also the case that Germany can play a huge role in bringing a unifying Europe into

[Y]

The view of some West European countries -- which refines all the differences between Europe and America and attempts to import the policies that had been appropriate to keeping Central Europe divided to their relationships with the United States -- is incompatible with the broad view and the broad canvas upon which foreign policy now needs to be constructed. On the other hand, a Europe which divides *internationally*, will also be too impotent to affect international events. Thus the crucial balance of unity and diversity is one in which Germany can play a vital role in the unification process of Europe, and can make a significant contribution to the construction of the Atlantic relationship of which I spoke.

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

[LC] 3

As we look around the world, we find that there are five or six major power centers: Europe, Russia, China, Japan, probably India, and possibly Brazil. These power centers have more or less equal capacity to affect the major events of our period. It is said that the United States is the only superpower. But the United States is the only superpower only in the military field, and the issues which can be settled by military means are diminishing. Moreover the military means in which we are the strongest are not relevant to many of the crises which now exist -- such as the Balkans. If you look at the American dollar, you realize that we are not the only superpower economically -- to put it mildly. In a world in which there are five or six more or less equal powers, a whole new challenge presents itself before the United States.

The secret dream of American intellectuals and of those who laid down the basic
principles of American foreign policy is essentially theological: it is to prevail by
conversion, not the balance of power, and to make other peoples democratic.
For when they become democratic they will become automatically peaceful.
Moreover, the great belief is that this can be achieved and is desirable in every
part of the world more or less simultaneously.

We are facing a difficulty intellectually -- all of us -- in that technology, economics, and communications have become global, while political loyalties are still national, even more and more subnational now. In a world of such global connections, there are also ever more splinter groups with no interest in the global equilibrium at all; which, in fact, are using the major countries' desire for global order to achieve objectives that are of concern primarily to them. For the United States to practice "splendid isolation" under these circumstances would exhaust us physically and psychologically. And it is above all incompatible with American values.

Thus what United States needs to do is to look at those areas of the world in which it is possible for us to work in a cooperative manner, and in a way that reflects basic American values. And those areas, are, on the one hand, the Western Hemisphere, and on the other, Europe. When I was in government, as Europe began to form itself there were endless debates (particularly from the French side) about the need to establish a European identity and to be rescued from American domination. That tendency still exists, but the European problem, in my view, is not American domination -- it is too easy to get rid of the United States -- but to keep America tied to Europe. For it is in our own self-interest as well. When one looks around the world at the riots of Islamic fundamentalism or the emergence of societies driven by different categories of values than the ones now dominant in the West, it would surely be a continuation of the Western Civil War which started in 1914 if Europe, America, and the countries of Latin America were now to conceive of their relationships as primarily competitive.

In this interim period we should be receptive to Russia and cooperate with it, but
it cannot be a part of the Europe I have talked about in this period. Thus the
issue of NATO expansion should be settled quickly; endless debate over it will
only create needless tensions. But there is a second problem, which is the
relationship of Europe to the United States.

Some people in the United States say -- and you will surely have heard this --
that we should switch the "special relationship", which the United States has had
with Britain to Germany, a relationship which had implied special consultations
and close ties. Now I believe this is not desirable because it would isolate
Germany as a national state and would resurrect all the complexes that we
should have overcome. Germany will always be a major player -- without being
given a title. The relationships which now exist, and which have existed through
successive German governments of both parties with the United States, are
close enough that it should not be necessary to single Germany out. It is also
the case that Germany can play a huge role in bringing a unifying Europe into

The view of some West European countries -- which refines all the differences between Europe and America and attempts to import the policies that had been appropriate to keeping Central Europe divided to their relationships with the United States -- is incompatible with the broad view and the broad canvas upon which foreign policy now needs to be constructed. On the other hand, a Europe which divides international states, will also be too impotent to affect international events. Thus the crucial balance of unity and diversity is one in which Germany can play a vital role in the unification process of Europe, and can make a significant contribution to the construction of the Atlantic relationship of which I spoke.

05-03-95 02:56PM

TO KAI

P002

Henry A. Kissinger

Meine Damen und Herren,

I greatly appreciate your very friendly remarks and, in fact, I must say many of the statistics you gave were new to me. Somebody once introduced me in the United States and said, there are not many people who are more difficult to introduce; but also there are even fewer people who enjoy a friendly introduction more than I do, and I certainly appreciate it very much what you said and how you said it.

Now I want to talk to you about American-European relations in the post-Cold War period. When I travel around the world I'm very often asked what American foreign policy is at this particular moment. And the truthful answer is: there is no clear cut American policy at this moment. I don't say this as a criticism of the current administration. I say it to explain that we are in a period of transition.

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Cold War period and we have not yet had a systematic debate in the United States about where we should go. I believe that all the democratic nations, but especially the United States, need to think through how to conduct foreign policy in a world in which there is no longer an ideological conflict and no longer a clear cut strategic opponent. It is a particular problem for the United States.

The United States foreign policy is unique among the major powers. It is the only major country whose history can be precisely dated. There is a precise date from which you can say America existed. It is the only major country that is populated almost entirely by immigrants turning away from their own societies. It is the only major country that has never had a large country on its borders. It therefore is the only major country that until very recently believed that the decision whether to engage in foreign policy at all was largely up to its own leaders. For no other nation was the idea of isolationism even conceivable. And so America has oscillated between a missionary and an isolationist tendency; between thinking that it was too good for this world, or between believing that it had to re-educate the whole world. The American approach to foreign policy has almost always been extraordinarily moralistic and ideological. When America entered the First World War it transformed what had been a typical European War with heavier casualties than normal into a war to spread democracy all over the world and to replace governments. There is no tradition of geopolitical analysis in American foreign policy.

So, for America right now the post-World War world is a somewhat unsettling experience. The Cold War world was difficult, but it coincided with the American experience. It recalled the experience of World War II and it recalled the experience of the New Deal. There was the belief that we were dealing with absolute evil. Indeed,

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President Reagan, as late as 1982, could call the Soviet Empire the "Evil Empire." And there was also the belief that by closing the gap between expectation and reality in the economic field, political stability could be achieved. And on the whole these assumptions turned out to be correct.

The United States now finds itself in the position that it has achieved almost everything--I would say everything--it set out to do, I'd say in 1950. It is very rare in history that you can point out such a close correspondence between what leaders said they wanted to achieve and what they, in fact, accomplished. George Bernard Shaw once said there are two tragedies in life: one tragedy is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire, and the second tragedy is to fulfill your heart's desire. And the United States is now in that position.

As we look around the world we find four, five, six major power centers: Europe, Russia, China, Japan, probably India, possibly Brazil. These power centers are of more or less equal capacity to affect the major events of the period. It is always said that the United States is the only superpower. But the United States is the only superpower only in the military field, and the issues which can be settled by military means are diminishing. And the military means in which we are strongest are not relevant to many of the crises that now exist, like the Balkans. If you look at the American dollar, you know that we are not the only superpower economically--to put it mildly. And so, in a world in which there are five or six more or less equal countries, a new challenge presents itself to the United States.

The challenge is, first of all, that there are no final solutions to problems. Every major post-war initiative of the United States has been presented as a terminal solution to a specific problem. In the world in which we now live there are no final solutions. Every

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solution is an admission price to some other problem. This is no news to other countries, but it is new for America. Secondly, in such a world there are basically only two ways of achieving order. One is by hegemony and the other is by equilibrium. To say that in a European university is a platitude. To say it in an American university is an invitation to a riot --at least by the faculty. If you say in most countries, that America now has to define its national interest, and that it has to learn to relate its national interest to the national interest of other countries, one is stating the obvious. In America it is extraordinarily controversial. I wrote a book last year, to which our chairman kindly referred, in which I made this, among other points. And many reviewers took strong exception to this proposition.

The secret dream of at least American intellectuals and of those who laid down the basic principles of American foreign policy is theological. It is to prevail by conversion. It is not balance of power, but to make other people democratic. And when they become democratic they will become automatically peaceful. Moreover, it is a belief that this can be achieved in every part of the world more or less simultaneously.

Vietnam was such a tragedy, because decent and honorable people were attempting to apply principles they learned in Europe--in European policy--to an area which had a totally different history, and no tradition of self-government, and totally different strategic requirements. But in all of the literature that has since developed about Vietnam, it is forgotten the unanimity by which American leadership groups entered that war. There was no dispute about Vietnam when we entered it. There was no questioning the proposition that we could both fight a war and spread democracy--simultaneously--in the middle of a guerrilla war. And one reason such an amazing bitterness developed, which we have seen boil up again

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in recent weeks, is the disappointment that this prescription could not
be universally applied. That it was not possible to fight a guerrilla war
and promote democracy simultaneously. A rebellion against a world
in which one had to deal, if one dealt with it at all, to use strategically.
And therefore it is enormous self-hatred against the idealism that
produced the commitment in the first place.

And we now face the amazing situation that those of us who saw the
evolution of the Vietnam War and who are opposed to military
adventures whose end we cannot define, like in Somalia or in Bosnia,
are attacked by the very people who consider Vietnam a crime, but
would like us to engage ourselves in Bosnia. The moralistic, idealistic
approach to foreign policy, the belief that we can solve every problem
and that we must right every wrong is one of the permanent
temptations of the American public debate in both political parties.
And it explains why, at the very moment, that people are attacking
Vietnam, the same people also want to enter Bosnia.

And I don't want to argue now about the merits of the individual
policies, I am talking about the structure of the debate. I believe that
after we have had a debate, the United States will be driven by reality
to understand that our use is over. We will now be obliged, like the
European nations throughout their history, to attempt to improve the
world gradually, in an endless process requiring constant adjustment
and permanent analysis. We do not have personnel for this or a
tradition for this. This explains many of the confusions that you can
observe.

If this were an academic lecture I would say the United States has two
broad choices. It could, theoretically, behave like Britain in the 19th
century, when the British foreign policy was one of splendid isolation.
Britain stood apart from Europe which was the center of world affairs.

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And it threw its weight in whatever direction most suited British interests--which, broadly speaking, was the weaker side in any European struggle. Britain did not want Europe to unite under the tutelage of a single country--regardless of its views about those leaders in which cause Winston Churchill (in the thirties) used to say when he was accused of being pro-French and anti-German. He said, "If circumstances were reversed I would be pro-German and anti-French. I'm not pursuing a personal policy but a fundamental principle that has preserved the liberties of the European States." That is a theoretical policy for the United States and we could look at the world and say we will back whoever is most likely to oppose the country that threatens to dominate Eurasia, because we do have a national interest not to have Eurasia dominated by a hostile power.

There are, however, huge obstacles to this. The first is, Britain needed to conduct this policy in Europe. We would have to conduct it on a global scale. Secondly, Britain had a leadership group that had trained itself in the conduct of public policy. America does not have such a leadership group or such a tradition. Third, when communications are instantaneous, and economics is global and politics democratic, it is probably not possible to conduct a kind of cold-blooded, selfish, national interest-oriented policy in every part of the world simultaneously, that such a policy would require.

We are facing a difficulty intellectually, all of us, that technology, economics and communications have become global, but political loyalties are still national, and even subnational now, more and more. In a world of global connections, there are more and more splinter groups that have no interest in the global equilibrium at all; and that, in fact, are using the desire for global order of the major countries, to achieve objectives that are of concern primarily to them. For the United States to practice splendid isolation under those

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circumstances will exhaust us physically and psychologically. And it
is also incompatible with the American values.

Whatever we academicians might say about the nature of foreign
policy, to the American people it must have a moral component.
Woodrow Wilson was a strange President. He had no experience in
foreign policy at all. He appeared on the scene in 1917 and
announced that everything that had gone before was nonsense, and
that the world had to be organized on principles nobody had ever
practiced, and for which there was no experience whatsoever. The
fascinating thing about it is that you will look in vain at any American
discussion that questioned the intellectual basis for these
propositions. These propositions have been received wisdom in the
United States for the remainder of this century and they produced a
peace settlement after the First World War that left the situation
infinitely more precarious than it was before. But that is rarely blamed
on Wilson in the American debate. Therefore, it is not possible for the
United States, intellectually, to conduct a foreign a policy purely on
balance of power principles. It must have a moral anchor somewhere.

Its temptation however, is to seek the moral anchor on a global basis.
And that cannot succeed. For example, every year there is a meeting
of heads of government of the Asian-Pacific region called APEC and
the standard speech is always of an Atlantic-Pacific community that
will act on the basis of common values and common interest. But the
reality of our period is that there is no Asian community. The relation
of the Asian nations to each other is very similar to that of the
European nations of the 19th century, and quite different from that of
the European nations of today. China, Japan, Korea, the Asian part of
Russia, even India, look at each other as strategic opponents. And
while they're not planning wars, they also do not exclude them totally.
So, in Asia, we really face competing nations that oblige all of us, and

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especially the United States, with looking at foreign policy in balance of power terms. In Europe, this is not the case. However much the European nations may quarrel, a war between European nations is out of the question. More than that, the military establishments of the European nations are in no way directed against each other, and therefore a European war is excluded.

So, when I look at what I believe the United States needs to do--it needs to look at those areas of the world in which it is possible for us to work in a cooperative manner, in a way that reflects basic American values. And those areas, are on the one hand, the Western hemisphere, and on the other, Europe. When I was in government there were endless debates, as Europe began to form itself (particularly from the French side), about the need to establish a European identity; to be rescued from American domination. And that tendency still exists. But the European problem, in my view, is not American domination--it is too easy to get rid of the United States. The European problem is to keep America tied to Europe in our own self-interest, when one looks around the world and one sees the riots of Islamic fundamentalism or the emergence of societies driven by different categories of values than the ones now dominant in the West. It would be a continuation of the Western Civil War that started in 1914 if now Europe, America, and the countries of Latin America were to conceive of their relationships as primarily competitive.

And so, this seems to me the fundamental challenge to European and American policy. Now, this has a number of requirements. First, I leave Latin America aside for this discussion. It requires a definition of what one conceives of by Europe under present circumstances. Where does Europe begin and who is included? And that raises the question of Russia.

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The history of Russia is extraordinarily complicated. It has interacted with Europe since certainly the 18th century, but it has also had interests in Asia, the Middle East, and at the borders of India that had nothing to do with Europe. In fact, Russia has been torn historically by the requirements of Europe and the temptations of Asia. And it is interesting that in the 19th century, Russian foreign policy was divided into two departments: The foreign ministry which dealt with Europe, and which practiced more or less the balance of power, and the Asiatic Department which included everything in Asia and the Middle East, but also the Balkans. So that every area in which Russia could make territorial gains were under the Asiatic Department, which preferred to operate unilaterally, and not by the rules of European diplomacy. Russian policy today is viewed by many in the West as equivalent to bringing democracy to Russia; and that this will automatically solve the Russian problem. But bringing democracy to Russia takes place against a different background than in the West. Church and State were always united in Russia. There was no Reformation, there was no Enlightenment, there was no capitalism, there were no democratic institutions, there was no national state; the Russian state has been an empire through most of its history and its current crisis is not only the collapse of communism but the collapse of imperialism. So I would argue that the problem of Russian foreign policy is to learn, for the first time in its history, that expansionism does not produce security, and that to develop the resources of a country that has eleven time zones, should not produce claustrophobia. That is the big challenge, in my view, of this period.

So, for this interim period we should be receptive to Russia, we should cooperate with Russia, but it cannot be part of the Europe that I talk about in this period. This is why I believe the issue of NATO expansion should be settled quickly; while an endless debate on it will

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In the United States you now face three generations: there is my
generation, which grew up during the war and in the post-war period,
which on the whole, looks at the American role in international affairs
as beneficial and which believes that, on the whole, with all the
shortcomings of a modern society, America has stood for freedom and
humanity in this world. There is the generation that grew up in the
intellectual debates of the Vietnam period, that based on the self-
hatred that I mentioned before, interpreted the American experience
as hypocritical and imperialistic, and that wants to turn away from
international affairs, towards self-improvement and towards a radical
reform of American society. And then there is the younger generation,
which does not have the self-hatred, which has, indeed, a great pride
in America, but does not have the international experience or the
participation in creative periods of American foreign policy. Similarly
in Europe--when I look around at European statesmen--the generation
that built the Marshall plan and created the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is also passing from the scene. Europe does not have
that Vietnam generation.

But on both sides of the Atlantic there is a need for projects of
something we can do together. In the past, this was the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. I believe, as I have said, that Poland, the Czech
Republics, Slovakia and Hungary, should be added to NATO as
quickly as possible. It is not a problem for study, it is a problem of
decision. There's nothing we can learn by studying the problem; we
can only confuse everybody. It is not in our interest to create a gray
area between Germany and Russia, which both nations will then be
tempted--not just tempted, obliged--to fill with their national policies. It
is not good for Europe and in the end it is not even good for Russia to

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create a vacuum around its borders. But I advocate this in order to put an end to that debate and to get on to more important things.

And in the more important things, I believe it is now the time to create new institutions, for the nations on both sides of the North Atlantic, to the building of which they can dedicate themselves. Therefore, I believe, especially now that the European Union is a reality, and that America is beginning to build a North American Free Trade Association--which may merge into a Western Hemisphere later on-- that we begin building a North Atlantic Free Trade Area. And that we begin dedicating ourselves to this as an objective now.

Security is no longer enough to tie the two sides of the Atlantic together. And we shouldn't conduct the NATO discussion entirely in terms of "is Russia a danger or not." That, history will determine. But what we do need is the moral equivalent of what was done in the late 1940s; some construction that corresponds to necessities of the democracies working together on the industrial side. On both sides of the Atlantic wage scales are more or less equivalent, social services are comparable. Competition therefore depends on merit. And there is no need for protectionism based on huge inequalities of social, environmental, and economic conditions. So, this is why I think we should move towards the construction of such institutions.

Now I have not spoken about Germany as a nation in this context, and yet the unification of Germany has created a whole set of new realities. Germany, the European Union and NATO, were both designed, in part, to provide a home for a divided Germany. And German foreign policy was driven, through almost the entire post-war period, by the need to establish a legitimacy superior to that of the East German State by special relationships with the West. And, therefore, it involved a degree of subordination, both to the United

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States and to France, which a unified Germany, in the nature of
things, cannot permanently carry out. So, Germany now is more
powerful and freed of some of the previous necessities.

Now some people say in the United States--and you will have heard
this--that we should switch the special relationship, that the United
States has had with Britain, to Germany. The special relationship with
Britain implied particular consultations, special consultations, close
ties. I believe this is not desirable. It would isolate Germany as a
national state, it would resurrect all the complexes that we should
overcome. Germany will always be a major player without being
given a title. The relationships that now exist, and that have existed in
successive German governments of both parties with the United
States, are close enough so that it is not necessary to single Germany
out. But Germany can play a huge role in bringing a unifying Europe
into the organic relationship with the United States, that I believe is
essential. That, I think, is a role which is crucial for both sides of the
Atlantic.

The view of some West European countries, which refines all the
differences between Europe and America, and which attempts to
import the policies that were appropriate to keeping Central Europe
divided to the relationships with the United States, are incompatible
with the broad view and the broad canvas on which foreign policy now
has to be constructed. But on the other hand, a Europe that divides
international states, will also be too impotent to effect international
events. So the balance of unity and diversity is one in which
Germany can play a crucial role in the unification process of Europe,
and can make a significant contribution to the construction of the
Atlantic relationship of which I spoke.

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Now for the sake of the emotional equilibrium of the American Consul,
Generals here, I want to stress I am not speaking about current
American foreign policy. What I have said here is not necessarily the
foreign policy of today, but it should be, in my view, the foreign policy
of tomorrow. It is not an approach based on any particular party. The
strong periods of foreign policy are those that are carried out by both
American parties. Building an Atlantic relationship is not a partisan
matter; it is the need of the next period because, otherwise if both
sides of the Atlantic attempt to manipulate for their self-interest in the
conflicts that are foreseeable in many parts of the world, we will
exhaust ourselves and we will not be able to achieve the opportunities
before us.

I'm told there is a Chinese proverb that goes as follows: when there is
turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they
were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When
there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little
problems, and little problems need not obsess us. What I'm talking
about is, not that we can remove all problems of the world, but that the
democracies could work together to reduce big problems to little
problems, and that they can therefore continue to build freedom and
well-being for their people and for all of mankind.

I'll be glad to take a few questions. Thank you very much.

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