p.47, line 8) "would not add to the military strength of the Soviets"?

from bot. p.50 on) Whether the different points of view and nuances of the conference discussion should be brought together here or treated topically throughout the chapter presents a difficult problem.

p.51) The issue not fully considered here is whether the Communist ideology inevitably generates aggressive and expansionist policies or whether its drive for expansion will tend to quiet down, either through internal changes or through effective containment.

p.53, last sentence) "fall of its own weight"?; more likely, to evolve into a regime more livable for its own people and for other peoples.

p.54) The issue is whether Communism is unaggressive only when on the defensive, and therefore its expansionist character is inherent in the power philosophy of its leaders. If the aggressive spirit is inherent in its ideology, then both India and the United States will be in the gravest danger at any time when the Communist leadership no longer feels restrained by superior power.

p.57, lines 3-6) Why should we not fight a moral issue by moral and intellectual means? Avoidance of war except for the supreme purpose of survival is also a moral value, side by side with our preference for freedom over despotism

Philip E. Mosely

Butth E. Moseby

for freedom over geoboy
ot arrivaft is aiso a mora! asne', aige pa aige with om baterence
intellecfual means? Vaciance of war excep for the anbreme burbose
b.21' times 3-6) Wsh should we not light a mora! tane pa mora! sw

restrained pa anbrior bower.
Braveat cangar at any time when the Communia! ferendsur no lourar lees
in ita ideofon, then pot! Indis sw the United States will be in the
bower bulloobah of ita fesgera. It the aggressive spirit is inherent
celenave, sw therefore its exbensionat character is inherent in the
b.24) The tane is whether Communia! is muk aggressive cowl when on the
into a regime more tiaple for its own beobje sw for other beobes.

b.23' that sentence) "sail of its own weight"! more likely, to evolve
interwut changes or through effective containment.

whether its drive for exbension will tend to drive down, either through
ideofon, inevertably, generates aggressive sw exbensionat boffles or
b.21) The tane not fully considered here is whether the Communia!

tobrofiil throughout the chabter presents a difficult problem.
of the conference discussion should be brought together here or treated
trow pot. b.20 on) Whether the citterent boffes of item and issues

b.41' line 8) "would not add to the military strength of the Soviete"?

- 6 -

[n]

February 27, 1958

Mr. Frank Collbohm, President
The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street
Santa Monica, California

Dear Frank:

My good friend and colleague, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, plans to be in the Los Angeles area on or around April 21, and I thought it would be very helpful to him and interesting to some of our RAND people if he could spend some time at RAND. You are, as I know, familiar with his study of Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, which he prepared with the assistance of a Council study group. I do not need to say that Henry Kissinger is one of the genuinely original and profound people whom I know and I recommend him very strongly to you and other officers of RAND. I have suggested to Dr. Kissinger that he write you as soon as he has received a carbon of this letter, to indicate the exact time(s) that he would have available.

With best wishes,

cc: Dr. Kissinger

Columbia University in the City of New York

EUROPEAN INSTITUTE 622 West 113 Street Wris Hall.
New York, N.Y. 10027 10025

September 9, 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Henry:

Many, many thanks for your good note
of August 23 and for sending me a copy
of "The White Revolutionary: Reflections
on Bismarck." I am taking this to the
country to read with special pleasure
and, I know, benefit.

It was good to have at least a glimpse
of you at the time of our broadcast.
I wish we had been given adequate time
to go further into the very crucial
issues that have been raised by the
new outburst of Soviet fears and
aggressiveness combined.

With all best wishes,

P:m