RECEIVED

-6 JUN 1975 19 12

6 JUN 75 15 40

SECSTATE WSH
TLX A 111 WAA 085(1149) (2-018697E 157)PD 06/06/75 1149
ICS IPMTZZ CSP
2122450500 TDMT NEW YORK NY 134 06-06 1149A EST

PMS SECRETARY OF STATE AND MRS HENRY KISSENGER, DLR

DEPT OF STATE
WASHINGTON DC

DEAR DCOTOR AND MRS KISSENGER

YOU DOUBTLESS KNOW THAT THE BOLSHOI OPERA OPENS THE FIRST VISIT TO UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AT THE METROPOLITAN OPERA HOUSE IN NEW YORK ON WEDNESDAY JUNE 25 1975 THE COMPANY WHICH INCLUDES THE FULL CHOROUS AND ORCHESTRA OF THE BOLSHOI THEATRE WILL PRESENT MUSORGSKY'S BORIS GODUNOV IT WOULD GIVE US GREAT PLEASURE IF YOU WERE ABLE TO ATTEND THIS HISTORICAL OCCASION AS OUR GUESTS BECAUSE WE FEEL IT IS AN EVENT OF THE HIGHEST ARTISTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE THE BLACK TIE PERFORMANCE BEGINS 730PM IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THERE WILL BE A SUPPER DANCE IN HONOR OF THE ARTISTS OF THE BOLSHOI THEATRE AT

THE RIVER BOAT 350 5 AVE NEW YORK CITY WE DO HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE
TO JOIN US WITH VERY BEST WISHES SINCERELY

SHELDON GOLD PRESIDENT HUROK CONCERTS CORP 1370 AVENUE OF
THE AMERICAS NEW YORK CITY 10019
.220P EDT

SECSTATE WSH

[L.C.]

The following article is a synthesis of various lectures and writings by the author relating to this subject, including a lecture delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, England, on April 6, 1971, and an article published in Volume 12, Number 2 (1973) issue of the Columbia University Journal of Transnational Law.

The present article has been updated to take into account current developments affecting peace efforts and prospects in the Middle East.

[L.C.]

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 242 AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

*Arthur J. Goldberg*

It is a matter of record that after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreements following the 1948 war, the Arab States were unwilling, as they are now, to negotiate with Israel to settle their differences, and to conclude permanent peace agreements, notwithstanding that the Armistice Agreements contemplated such negotiations and treaties of peace.

Today, this unwillingness to engage in negotiations is justified on the ground that Israel is in occupation of Arab territories. A commitment by Israel for total withdrawal is insisted upon by Egypt, in particular, as a pre-condition of any form of negotiations—direct or indirect.

It is a simple fact of international life, however, that a refusal to negotiate on this ground is unprecedented and contrary to international custom and usage. But Egypt thus far has been adamant on this critical point.

In light of this unswerving position by Egypt, and of recent events which have added to tension in the area, it may seem academic to discuss the prospects of peace in the Middle East. Present circumstances are hardly propitious for negotiations and settlement.

Yet, the goal of peace must never be forsaken and must be constantly pursued.

In this article, I wish to offer some general observations about the road to peace in the Middle East.

* Permanent United States Representative to the United Nations from 1965 to 1968 and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1962 to 1965.

3

[LC]

Perhaps the best way to start is to recall the rationale that guided the United States and many other governments at the United Nations, during the long period of debate and negotiations following the Six Day War and culminating in the unanimous adoption of the critically important Resolution 242 by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. This principle was often stated by me, in these words: "To return to the situation as it was on June 5, 1967 is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities."

I believe that this principle was sound then. I believe it is sound now.

I think it is appropriate to recall also what the United States, immediately after the June war, said, at the highest level, about the nature of a peace settlement in the Middle East:

"But who will make this peace where all others have failed for 20 years or more? Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later, it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together. . . . There is no escape from this fact: The main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region. What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East. . . . The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction and war."

Again, I believe that this insight was right then. I believe it is right now.

There was another concept insisted upon by the United States in 1967, namely, that others can and should help, but their contribution should be "to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement." I also am of the view that this remains a sound principle.

I think it essential, in analyzing the prospects of peace in the Middle East, to recall these statements and, importantly, the

4

[LC]

language and legislative history of Resolution 242 of the United Nations Security Council.

United Nations resolutions, particularly in recent times, are more honored in the breach than in the observance.

Notwithstanding, there are several reasons why Resolution 242 may, ultimately, prove to be the framework for the settlement of the Middle East impasse.

The Resolution has been "accepted" by the principal contending parties, although their respective interpretations of the Resolution widely differ. It is the only substantive resolution (excluding calls for a cease-fire) relating to the Middle East accepted both by the parties and the Security Council since the Six Day War and virtually even before. And, despite recurring threats by both sides to repudiate the Resolution, their acceptances have never been withdrawn.

Notwithstanding pejorative expressions and resolutions in recent times by the General Assembly and other organs generally critical of Israel, and a recent resolution proposed to the Security Council but vetoed by the United States, seeking to re-interpret Resolution 242, the Resolution continues to command the support of the U. N. "world" community and, particularly, the great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It is true that the Peoples Republic of China, the newly-seated U. N. member and permanent member of the Security Council, has condemned the Resolution, but its opposition appears to be largely propagandistic rather than based upon deep felt opposition to its terms.

King Hussein of Jordan has all but made it explicit that he is ready to make a peace agreement provided East Jerusalem is restored to Jordan rule and the West Bank given back. Whether this could encompass demilitarization of both areas and border rectifications is not clear, although there are intimations that there is negotiating flexibility in these matters.

President Sadat, of Egypt, despite rhetorical flourishes about renewing the conflict with Israel, has declared that if his terms for total withdrawal by Israel are met, he would not balk about

5

[LC]

concluding a peace agreement with Israel. We have no way of knowing whether this is President Sadat's only condition. It is highly likely that at the crunch, Israel's demand for some form of direct negotiations, guaranteed access to the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, tenable and secure borders, the incorporation of Jerusalem and limited absorption of refugees would present further obstacles. But one thing seems certain, Egypt recognizes that it cannot now and for the foreseeable future wage war against a militarily more powerful Israel.

Israel, on its part, seems ready to negotiate a compromise settlement with its Arab neighbors, although its notion of a compromise would seem, in public expression, wide apart from those of the Arab States. The financial burden of supporting its military establishment in a state of "no peace" and "no war" is straining Israel's economy. Further, Israel's strong-minded leader, Prime Minister Meir, unlike some of her cabinet colleagues, remains wary of incorporating substantial Arab populations which, in the long run, would prejudice the essentially Jewish character of the state she helped to found and seeks to preserve. Although Mrs. Meir is very much in command, would she, in negotiations, be able, in light of Israel's internal politics, to make reasonable compromises for a peace agreement? Her public expressions, qualities of leadership and wide support by the Israeli public would indicate that she can make a just peace, given the opportunity to negotiate without prior conditions. Mrs. Meir obviously will be in even a better position to deal after the forthcoming Israeli elections in which she seems assured of success.

Recent guerilla terrorist actions and reprisals by Israel obviously have a deterrent effect upon settlement efforts, but cannot and should not indefinitely delay a peace initiative involving the adversary states.

The United States, at long last freed from its preoccupation with the Vietnam war, has indicated that a settlement of the impasse in the Middle East is of high priority on its foreign policy agenda. Further, it has likewise made clear that it is

6

[LC]

ready to renew its good offices and influence in helping to bring about such a settlement, although to date its success has been limited to the Suez cease-fire. The energy needs of the United States are obviously a factor despite recent disclaimers by President Nixon.

The Soviet Union, disillusioned by its summary ouster from Egypt, may be prepared to support a realistic peace settlement involving concessions to Israel bound to be distasteful to its erstwhile Arab friends. Judging by recent development, it would seem that Mr. Brezhnev's first priority is a detente with the United States, linked with Soviet concern about China, and that the Middle East, like Vietnam, occupies a secondary role in Soviet foreign policy. It also seems evident that the Soviet Union takes a dim view of a new round of war between Israel and the Arab States—a war which all objective military analysts agree the Israelis would win, and a war which might carry with it the possibility of a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

If I am correct in my postulate that ultimately—better sooner than later—a peace initiative in the Middle East will take place and that it will be based on Resolution 242, it becomes important to examine both the text and the legislative history of this Resolution.

Resolution 242 is a carefully—some would say artfully—drafted set of guidelines designed to promote agreement and to assist the parties to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement.

The stated goal of Resolution 242 is the establishment of a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security.

The Resolution expressly and by implication repudiates the concept of an imposed peace and opts for "agreement"—an "accepted settlement" by and between the parties. Thus, the experience of the 1957 imposed settlement, following the 1956 war, is not to be repeated. The Resolution contemplates a consensual peace agreement—scarcely surprising in light of the

7

[LC]

collapse of the 1957 imposed settlement and the shattering of
the pre-existing Armistice Agreements.

Resolution 242, in most explicit terms, rejects the long asserted
claim of the Arab countries of the existence of a state of bel-
literacy against Israel. The Resolution recognizes that belliger-
ency cannot coexist with peace.

The Resolution calls for respect and acknowledgment of the
sovereignty of every state in the area. Since Israel never denied
the sovereignty of its neighboring countries, this language obvi-
ously requires these countries to acknowledge the sovereignty of
Israel. The legislative history of 242, as reflected in the debates
and votes in the Security Council and Special Session of the Gen-
eral Assembly held in 1967, shows that there was little support
in the U. N. community for the view that, after two decades,
Israel's very existence could be denied by its Arab neighbors.

The Resolution, in dealing with the withdrawal of Israel's
forces, does not explicitly require that Israel withdraw to the lines
occupied by it on June 5, 1967, before the outbreak of the war.
The Arab States urged such language; the Soviet Union proposed
this to the Security Council in June of 1967, and Yugoslavia and
some other nations to the Special Session of the General Assem-
bly which followed the adjournment of the Security Council. But
such withdrawal language did not receive the requisite support
either in the Security Council or in the Assembly. Indeed, Resolu-
tion 242 simply endorses the principle of "withdrawal of Israel's
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," and
interrelates this with the principle that every state in the area is
entitled to live in peace within "secure and recognized bounda-
ries." In light of Arab unwillingness to acknowledge Israel's right
to sovereign existence, this language, though speaking in terms of
all states, is designed primarily to assure Israel's right to secure
boundaries recognized by its Arab neighbors.

The notable omissions in regard to withdrawal are the words
*the* and *all* and *the June 5, 1967 lines*. In other words, there is
lacking a declaration requiring Israel to withdraw from *the* or

8

[LC]

all the territories occupied by it on and after June 5, 1697. Rather, the Resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories, without defining the extent of withdrawal. And the notable presence of the words "secure and recognized boundaries," by implication contemplates that the parties could make territorial adjustments in their peace settlement encompassing less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories.

The Arab nations, to buttress their claim that the Resolution calls for a complete Israeli withdrawal, say the Israeli interpretation of the Resolution's withdrawal language is overly restrictive. They point to the language of the Resolution emphasizing "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." This language, the Arab States argue, in effect, calls for complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all of the territories occupied by them in the Six Day War. Further, the Arab States contend that the U. N. Charter itself, in spirit, supports their contention that military conquest of territory is inadmissible—a moot concept, however desirable, under international law.

It is passing strange that the concept of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war is insisted and relied upon by the Arab States and the Soviet Union. The Arab States acquired territory as a consequence of the 1948 war, contrary to the U. N. Partition Resolution. The Israelis also acquired additional territory in the aftermath of this war, which they justify on the basis that they were willing to abide by the partition lines but were forced to war and acquired territory as a result of the attack upon them by the Arab States.

More surprising, is the Soviet support of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. The Soviet Union holds territory in its firm grasp acquired in recent times by war from Finland, Poland, Rumania, Japan and other states. Even our own country, some time ago, acquired territory by war from Mexico and Spain, and numerous other examples involving many nations could be cited.

The Resolution speaks of "respect and acknowledgment of

9

[LC]

... the territorial integrity of every state in the area." This, too, is much relied upon in support of the demand for complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all of the Arab territories. It is rather ironic that, for many years, it was the Israelis who sought respect for their territorial integrity which was denied them by the Arab States.

But the territorial language of the Resolution is part of and qualified by language in the same sentence, declaring the right of all states "to live within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force." The secure and recognized boundaries language, the legislative history shows, represents a major concession to Israel which, as I have pointed out, found the armistice lines often violated and insecure.

The logic of coupling the territorial and secure boundaries concepts is that both territorial integrity and secure and recognized boundaries are to be reconciled in the give and take of negotiations between Israel and the Arab States culminating in peace agreements.

The most that can be said of the withdrawal and related language of Resolution 242, in light of its legislative history, is that it neither commands nor prohibits territorial adjustments in the peace agreements contemplated by the Resolution, although it "tilts" in favor of adjustments to ensure secure boundaries for Israel. This is not to say that the Resolution contemplates a complete redrawing of the map of the Middle East. Further, the withdrawal language of the Resolution would seem to indicate that its patent ambiguities, and the differing interpretations of the parties, can only be resolved by an accepted and agreed upon settlement concluded after negotiations between the parties.

On certain aspects, the Resolution is less ambiguous than its withdrawal language. Resolution 242 specifically deals with free passage through international waterways. In precise language it affirms "the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area." This language demonstrates the lack of sympathy of the powers, big and small,

10

[L.C.]

against interference with free passage in international waterways. With an end of belligerency, no good reason would exist under international law for denial to Israel of access to the Suez Canal and, particularly, to the Straits of Tiran—the closing of which by President Nasser of Egypt was universally recognized and forewarned by Israel to be a causus bellum.

It is true that in the early 1950's, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Israel's right to free passage in the Suez Canal and that this resolution was ignored by Egypt. It is likewise true that the understanding negotiated by Secretary General Hammarskjold, that the Straits of Tiran would be open to Israeli shipping as a condition for Israeli withdrawal from Sharm el-Sheikh in 1957, was likewise not honored by Egypt in 1967. But there has been an important change in circumstances; this time, unlike what occurred in the aftermath of the 1956-1957 war, the Israelis have made it crystal clear that, whatever the pressures, they will continue to insist upon direct contractual assurances from Egypt, territorial adjustments, and other guarantees of their right to passage through these international waterways as a condition of a peace settlement.

The Resolution by its very words, the action of the Security Council and the legislative history also recognizes that Israel, the Arab States and the world community jointly share responsibility to afford better justice to the refugees—the casualties of the 1948, 1956 and 1967 wars. The Resolution does not reiterate the language of prior U. N. resolutions calling for total repatriation or optional compensation for these refugees, a concept-long resisted by Israel. Rather, it implicitly recognizes that all must participate in solving this problem—Israel by a more generous policy of repatriation and compensation, the Arab States by ceasing to utilize refugees as political pawns and their camps as breeding grounds for hate and despair, and the world community both by more generous financial assistance and liberal immigration policies.

The Resolution refers to the utility of the establishment of

11

[LC]

demilitarized zones in assuring peace and guaranteeing territorial inviolability. The location of the demilitarized zones is left, obviously, to the parties to negotiate.

By design, all of the foregoing provisions of the Resolution are stated in preambulatory language or as principles or guidelines for a peace agreement. The only truly operative parts of the Resolution are the paragraphs requiring the Secretary General "to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution," and requesting the Secretary General to report on the Special Representative's progress. These paragraphs strongly support the view, which I have already expressed, that a peace settlement is not to be imposed and that the Resolution is not self-implementing. In fact, it is impossible to see how the Resolution, in light of its terms, can be self-implementing. Rather, its plain meaning is that with third party assistance, the parties are to negotiate and to agree upon an acceptable settlement peace and peace agreements.

A notable and purposeful omission in the Resolution is any specific reference to the status of Jerusalem and its failure to reaffirm past U. N. resolutions for the internationalization of the city. Resolution 242 thus realistically recognizes the desuetude of the internationalization resolutions. It further reflects the belief on the part of a considerable number of U. N. members that King Hussein, having rejected Israel's offer not to engage in war and having been ousted from East Jerusalem by force of arms, cannot now hope to partition Jerusalem again, but, at best, might in a peace agreement negotiate with the Israelis for some special status for Jordan with regard to Moslem holy places—a status compatible with the unity of Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty and administration.

There is further light on the ambiguities and meaning of Resolution 242 in its legislative history. This history dates back to the

12

[LC]

days preceding the very outbreak of the war.

In May of 1967, the late President Nasser moved substantial
Egyptian forces into the Sinai, ejected the U. N. peacekeeping
forces, reoccupied the strategic and previously demilitarized
Sharm-el-Sheik, and proclaimed a blockade of the Straits of Tiran.
In so doing, President Nasser disrupted the status quo in the
area which had prevailed since the war of 1956-57.

These were ominous measures. Israel, which under American
pressure had withdrawn its forces from Sinai and Sharm-el-Sheik
in 1957, had consistently affirmed that a blockade of its ships
and cargoes seeking to pass through the Straits of Tiran would
be a cause of war. Moreover, faced with divisional forces of
well-armed Egyptian troops on its borders and increasingly pro-
vocative statements by Nasser and other Arab leaders, Israel had
little choice but to order mobilization of its largely civilian army.
Tension in the area became increasingly acute.

It was justified concern which, therefore, prompted the Western
powers, including the United States, to take the initiative in con-
voking the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to
avert a conflict by restoring the previous status quo.

These attempts in the Security Council and through private
diplomatic channels failed because of Arab objections supported
by the Soviet Union. Apparently, whatever the reason, both
were ready to risk war rather than re-establish the conditions
which had previously prevailed in the area.

When the war did break out on June 5, 1967, attempts were
renewed again by the Western powers to bring about an effective
cease-fire that very day, in the hope of stabilizing the situation
before it changed beyond repair. Whether because of faulty
intelligence or prideful unwillingness to face the facts, the Arab
states supported by the Soviet Union refused to permit a cease-
fire resolution to be voted on the first day of the war, even though
this was obviously to their advantage. It will be recalled that in
the first few hours of the fighting, the Egyptian air force was
effectively destroyed and the fate of the war thereby determined.

13

[LC]

It was only on the second day of the war, after it became publicly apparent that Israel, for all practical purposes, had already won the war, that agreement was reached in the Security Council on a simple resolution calling for a cease-fire. And even then, it took time to get acceptance from Jordan, and even more time to obtain Syrian acquiescence to a cease-fire, although Israeli forces were advancing on their fronts.

The cease-fire resolutions which were ultimately adopted during and following the Six Day War differed dramatically, however, from previous resolutions of the Council in the Israeli-Arab wars of the preceding nineteen years. In the earlier resolutions, the call for a cease-fire was usually accompanied by a demand for a withdrawal of troops to the positions held before the conflict erupted. In June of 1967, however, no withdrawal provisions were incorporated as part of the cease-fire resolutions. This was not by accident but rather as a result of the reaction by a majority of the Security Council to what had occurred.

As the debates revealed, the requisite majority of the Council was unwilling to vote forthwith withdrawal of Israeli forces because of their conviction that to return to the prior armistice regime would not serve the goal of a just and lasting peace between the parties. Proof that this was so is provided by the action of the Security Council with respect to a resolution pressed at the time by the Soviet Union. The Soviet delegate offered a specific resolution not only reaffirming the Council's call for a cease-fire, but, additionally, condemning Israel as the aggressor and demanding a withdrawal of its forces to the positions held on June 5, 1967, before the conflict erupted. But this resolution of the Soviet Union, although put to a vote, did not command the support of the requisite nine members of the Security Council.

Israel was not condemned as an aggressor because of the conviction of a majority of the Security Council, shared by world opinion, that President Nasser's actions, particularly the eviction of the U. N. peacekeeping forces, the substantial movement of his troops into the Sinai, and the blockade of shipping in the

14

[LC]

Straits of Tiran, were the causes of the war, regardless of who fired the first shot.

But even more fundamentally, the debates in the Council made it clear that a majority of members felt strongly that something more was needed to assure peace than the fragile Armistice Agreements that had prevailed for the previous 19 years and had frequently been breached.

In short, the unwillingness to support the Soviet resolution for a withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they held before June 5, 1967, was based upon the conviction of this substantial number of the Security Council members that, whatever the extent of withdrawal of Israeli troops, it should this time be in the context of accepted and agreed upon peace settlements, ensuring secure and recognized boundaries for Israel.

The Soviet Union did not allow the matter to rest with its defeat in the Security Council. It called for a Special Session of the General Assembly which convened on June 17, 1967. It is important to recall that the General Assembly also refused to adopt by the requisite two-thirds majority a resolution offered by Yugoslavia and several other members and supported by the Soviet Union and the Arab states, differing somewhat in tone but not in substance from the prior Soviet resolution, rejected by the Security Council.

With the adjournment of the Special Session of the General Assembly in September 1967, the matter once again reverted to the Security Council, and again became the subject of further public debate, as well as intensive private negotiations. These finally culminated in the November 22 Resolution 242.

This Resolution offered by the British Representative, Lord Caradon, stemmed in substantial degree from a General Assembly resolution offered by the Latin American states to the Special Session and a United States resolution offered to the resumed Security Council meeting. The unanimous support for Resolution 242 was the product in considerable measure of intensive diplomatic activity by the United States both at the United

15

[LC]

Nations and in foreign capitals throughout the world. This is not to say that Great Britain, the various Latin American countries, India and others were not actively engaged in the negotiations and diplomatic activity, but it cannot be gainsaid that the United States took the primary role in the adoption of the November 22 Resolution.

It should be noted that before the vote on the November 22 Resolution, the Soviet Union offered a draft resolution again calling for withdrawal of Israeli troops to the June 5 lines. It did not, however, press this resolution to a vote. Then, and only then, was the stage set for the adoption of the November 22 Resolution.

It is only fair to say that too much cannot be made of not pressing a resolution to a vote by the Security Council. The United States itself resorted to this practice in the Middle East debates. The significance, in a particular instance, of withdrawing a resolution can only be evaluated by comparing the resolution withdrawn with the one adopted. Thus, in this situation, the proposed Soviet resolution differed in tone and approach from the resolution adopted. On the other hand, the United States resolution was closely akin to the final version.

Arab unwillingness to face up to the realities persisted throughout the debates at the Security Council and the General Assembly and until November 22, 1967. The Arab States, during the Special Session of the General Assembly, even rejected a compromise urged upon them by the Soviet Union because the compromise entailed the renunciation of belligerency and acknowledgment of Israel's right to exist as a sovereign nation with secure borders and with full access to the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Why then did the Arab States accept Resolution 242, incorporating these principles, and why do they still profess acceptance of it? Why did Israel accept, and why does it still adhere to its acceptance?

Having been rebuffed both in the Security Council and in the Assembly, the Arab States belatedly came to the conclusion that

16

[LC]

the language of Resolution 242 was the best they could hope
for from the U. N. They obviously counted on the Resolution's
ambiguities to permit them to assert their own interpretation
of the Resolution. They also heavily relied upon major Soviet
support both diplomatically and militarily. Further, they con-
ceived that the passage of time would erode the support of the
United States and like-minded states for Israel.

To a certain extent, Arab calculations have been realized.
World opinion overwhelmingly supportive of Israel as the
"underdog" at the time of the war has, in some degree, shifted
to a measure of sympathy for the defeated and now "underdog"
Arab States. Some countries have watered down their prior
support of the Resolution's principles-witness the recent resolu-
tion proposed to the Security Council and vetoed by the United
States which sought to re-interpret Resolution 242, although
purporting to adhere to it.

But the United States has not departed from its support of 242.
It still remains the position of the United States that the way to
peace in the Middle East is a negotiated peace agreement by and
between the parties, based on Resolution 242, rather than the
restoration of the prior and often breached Armistice Agreements.

The United States continues to hope that the negotiations for
a full settlement can be furthered by an interim one involving a
limited withdrawal of Israeli forces from an area bordering on
the Suez Canal, thus permitting the opening of the Canal by
Egypt. But this proposal, while accepted by Israel, has been re-
jected by Egypt.

The leaders of Egypt obviously understand that the Soviet
Union's priority, as I have already said, is a greater detente with
the United States, rather than encouraging and promoting a re-
newed conflict in the Middle East which may militate against such
a detente. Also, elements in the Egyptian leadership and its popu-
lation, as is apparent from the ouster of Soviet personnel, have
resented the presence in Egypt of a considerable number of Soviet
military advisers and technicians whose critical attitude concerning

17

[L.C.]

the state of Egypt's preparation and capacity has infuriated the proud and sensitive leaders and people of this sovereign nation. Moreover, the Soviet Union, while giving some military and economic support to the Arab States, is not giving them all the sophisticated hardware and offensive weaponry which they desire. The Arab States have come to recognize that while the Soviet Union is willing to give them diplomatic and vocal support and limited military assistance, it is not willing to support a new war.

The Israelis accepted Resolution 242, interestingly enough, for some of the same reasons as their Arab antagonists. It was the best Israel could hope to get from the U. N. under the given circumstances. They were rightly fearful that their diplomatic support would erode if Israel proved to be intransigent. Like the Arab States, the Israelis concluded that the Resolution's ambiguities permitted them to assert their own interpretation of the Resolution. Despite inflammatory Soviet speechmaking and declarations, the Israelis were unwilling to unduly provoke the Soviets, fearing greater involvement by them in the area. Israel likewise conceived that time would be on its side. Most important, Israel recognized the danger of alienating the United States government and American public opinion by an overly-inflexible position in light of Israel's need for military hardware and economic assistance which has been forthcoming.

The foregoing analysis of the text and legislative history of Resolution 242, for reasons of space, cannot be all-encompassing. Nevertheless, I believe, despite its brevity, it accurately summarizes the spirit, intent and background of 242.

Despite the passage of time since the adoption of Resolution 242 and, perhaps, because of it, I adhere to the view that the Resolution does provide the basis to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement between the parties, provided they will come to share the will and courage to achieve a just and lasting peace, which is the goal of the Resolution. Perhaps my "optimism" is based on the fact that the Resolution gives something to both sides.

18

[LC]

I do not, however, wish to minimize the difficulties in achieving a peace agreement. There are continuing signs of instability in both President Sadat's and King Hussein's regimes—not a hopeful omen for peacemaking. Mrs. Meir's regime is a stable one, but she is not without political difficulties in this sensitive area. Only strong and secure leaders, buttressed by popular support, can consummate a peace settlement; for peace, if it is to be lasting, necessarily involves compromise and political risks. It is an historical truth that the making of peace often calls for greater courage than the making of war.

A final observation: Resolution 242 contemplates that the principal third party in helping make peace will be the Special Representative of the U. N. Yet, it seems to me, although Egypt in particular today professes unwillingness to accept the good offices of the United States, that at an opportune time only the United States is in a position to act effectively as an "honest broker" in bringing the parties together. This should not reflect adversely on Ambassador Jarring, the U. N.'s designated mediator and a most distinguished and experienced diplomat. He tried his best, failed, and by failing has made himself unacceptable, particularly to Israel which has repudiated his public proposals for settlement. But experience in third party good offices teaches that a mediator is always expendable. If his efforts succeed, he is applauded; if his efforts fail, he must be replaced. While Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has undertaken personally to explore the situation, it is highly unlikely that his efforts will be more successful than Ambassador Jarring's in bringing the parties together. The U. N., as an institution, regrettably does not seem to have the necessary "muscle" to bring the parties to agreement, although it can play an important role in guaranteeing a negotiated settlement. The security assurances to the non-nuclear powers by the Security Council in connection with the Non-proliferation Treaty point the way to this potentially useful role of the United Nations.

The United States, as I have indicated, will, in my view, prove

19

[LC]

to be, in due time, the only acceptable mediator. Although Israel will not submit to dictation by any other country, including its "great" friend, the United States, nevertheless, it cannot be gain-said that the United States, in light of its support of Israel, diplomatically, militarily and economically, possesses considerable influ-ence with Israel.

Although diplomatic ties between key Arab States and the United States have been severed, nevertheless, precisely because of Israel's special relationship with the United States, it is privately recognized by the Arab States, whatever their public disclaimers, to be the logical good officer.

In assuming the role of honest broker, however, the United States would not be acting contrary to the spirit and intent of Resolution 242. Under Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, all members are pledged to give the U. N. every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter. The Security Council, discharging its Charter responsibilities, has taken action by adopting the guidelines set forth in Resolution 242. Under Article 33 of the Charter, the parties to a dispute involving a threat to international peace and security are enjoined to seek a solution of their dispute by, among other means, negotiation and mediation. It is, therefore, within the spirit and letter of the Charter and Resolution 242 for the United States, all other means having been tried and proved unsuccessful, to take the lead, at an appropriate time, in assuming a mediatory role to bring the parties together to negotiate a settlement of their long-standing conflict.

But we must accept the fact that today an impasse exists and may continue for some period to come. Indeed, a further military confrontation cannot be excluded. The time seems hardly propitious for a settlement. But it is important to recognize the value of patience and restraint in the resolution of grave diplomatic dilemmas such as this. For example, who, just a few years ago, could have predicted the recent agreements relating to Berlin and Germany, so long an acute cause of international tension? Patience and restraint can bring their own rewards.

20

[LC]

My ultimate conclusion is that peace in the Middle East is not at hand, but, that it is ultimately achievable, on the basis of the guidelines set forth in Resolution 242. But peace will not come into existence of its own accord. For, although we all acknowledge peace as the will of God, yet, it remains true, as President Kennedy said, "that here on earth God's will must truly be our own."

That a shared desire for peace and a realistic approach by the parties to negotiations and peace treaties may emerge is my profoundest hope, for common interest dictates its necessity.

21

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY
COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/242 (1967)

22 November 1967

LCl]
S

RESOLUTION 242 (1967)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1382nd meeting,
on 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the
need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live
in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter
of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with
Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

P750142-1804

ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

September 5, 1975

73

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish to congratulate and commend you and President Ford for
the consummation of the interim agreement between Israel and
Egypt initialed on September 1 and executed at Geneva by the
parties on September 4.

I personally welcome the interim agreement as a positive
achievement.

I trust that Congress will approve the accord, notwithstanding
misgivings by some members about the participation of a limited
number of American civilians in monitoring early warning devices
in the Sinai Desert.

It seems to be overlooked that 36 U. S. military officers
already perform inspection assignments as observers with the
United Nations Emergency Force under the 1973 disengagement
agreement.

This is nothing new. American officers have performed similar
functions over the years under the old armistice agreements.

The risks taken by the parties and by the United States in this
accord are outweighed by the risks of a continuing impasse and
a breakdown in the negotiations.

There existed a clear and present danger of a further war--a
war which would be a disaster for the parties and a threat to
world peace and security. Hopefully, this interim agreement
will provide the impetus for further movement towards a
comprehensive settlement.

With all good wishes for the New Year, I am

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

1975 SEPT. 10 AM 11:20

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION
is assigned to

NEA

RICH'S
ATLANTA, GEORGIA • 30302

JOEL GOLDBERG
PRESIDENT

May 24, 1974

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Nothing could have pleased me more than finding your
letter on my desk when I returned from an extended
business trip.

Having the Organization of American States meet in
Atlanta was an exciting and pleasurable experience
for our City and one we shall long remember. I know
that I speak for everyone on the Adelante Atlanta
Committee when I say that we shall always consider
this one of the highlights in the history of Atlanta.

Your kind words will be treasured. Thank you very
much.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, DC