CHAPTER V
The Role of Nuclear Power in-
THE MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF)

A. <u>History of the Multilateral Force.</u>

Few major departures of American policy have grown out of
so much ambivalence as the NATO Multilateral Force (known by its
initials as the MLF). Fewer still have been pushed so far by so
small a group of energetic and dedicated men. The MLF, which
emerged in February 1963 as America's principal policy to restore
the cohesion of NATO, had previously been treated at arms length by
the Kennedy Administration. After De Gaulle's veto of Britain's
membership in the Common Market, it was resurrected and pushed with
increasing passion. The United States concentrated its energies on
the problem of nuclear control partly because France's claim to political
autonomy seemed to be based on an attempt to achieve nuclear inde-
pendence, partly because it sought to dispose of the twin specters of
a German national nuclear program and Franco-German collaboration in
the nuclear field.

[Y]

IV - 2

The original proposal for a NATO multilateral force grew out of a military "requirement" which the prevalent NATO doctrine of the late Fifties generated. According to the then-current concept, SACEUR should have under his command the capability necessary to destroy whatever weapons might be aimed at Europe. (This concept has not been changed.) Thus when the Soviet Union began to deploy large numbers of Medium-Range Ballistic missiles in Western Russia, two NATO requirements emerged: a program to modernize the missiles by replacing vulnerable tactical aircraft with missiles; an interdiction mission giving NATO the capability to destroy the Soviet MRBM's.

When the issue of counteracting the Soviet MRBM's first came up in 1960, the first tendency of the Eisenhower Administration was to go along with a proposal of SACEUR (then General Norstad) which envisaged the installation of a mobile land-based version of the Polaris missile in Europe under the double-veto system. Upon further

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IV - 3

consideration this proposal was rejected. It was argued that a large number of missiles constantly moving on European roads might disquiet the populations and thus encourage neutralist tendencies.

The double-veto system was believed to provide inadequate safeguards against the ultimate control of nuclear weapons by Germany. Accordingly, a State Department study group headed by Professor Bowie of Harvard University proposed that NATO's MRBM requirement be met by Polaris missiles. installed on ships (in the early version, submarines).

These ships were to be jointly owned, operated and financed by the participants and remain under SACEUR's control at all times. To prevent the withdrawal of national contingents, each ship was to be manned by crews of mixed nationality. Each participant was to have a veto. The multilateral scheme was submitted to the NATO Council by Secretary of State Herter in December 1960 for study. A final decision was delayed until the new Administration could assess the problem.

Thus there occurred a hiatus of several months while the new

Administration reconsidered NATO strategy. Finally on May 17, 1961,

President Kennedy gave a highly qualified endorsement to the scheme—

in a speech at Ottawa. He urged the European allies to meet the conventional goals of NATO before "... we look to the possibility of eventually establishing a NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control if this should be desired and found feasible by our allies once NATO's non-nuclear goals have been achieved." In the course of the next

1. John F. Kennedy, "The Common Aims of Canada and the United States," Speech at Ottawa, May 17, 1961, _DOSB_, _XKIV_, 1145 (June 5, 1961), p. 841.

year Administration spokesmen invited United States allies to analyze the problem and to come up with a satisfactory control plan.

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The two conditions put forward by the United States--a prior
non-nuclear build-up and European agreement about a control plan--sug-
gested that the proposal could not have a very high priority. Most
of America's allies doubted the need for a conventional build-up.
None could afford both to strengthen their ground forces and to
contribute to a NATO nuclear force. Moreover, none of our allies
possessed a sea-borne nuclear system. Since a command and control
system for even a national nuclear force is far from a simple matter,
the probability that our allies would come up with a meaningful
control system for a multilateral sea-borne force was not great.
Indeed there were many in the Administration who held the view that
the problem would be found insoluble. It was then expected that the
allies would ask the President to act as Executive Agent for the
Alliance on nuclear matters. Central control over nuclear
weapons would then be achieved.

V - 6

When this did not happen, the United States in 1962 continued
its gingerly approach to the multilateral force. In September 1962,
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,
McGeorge Bundy, spoke hedgingly

of a multilateral <u>European</u> force.

It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which
we feel with respect to individual, ineffective, and uninte-
grated forces would be extended automatically to a European
force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively
integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in
the whole nuclear defense of the alliance. Any possible ar-
rangements for assistance and cooperation would, of course,
require full consultation and approval by all appropriate
agencies of our Government.

The speech said nothing about what the United States understood by "multilateral,"
"unified" or "integrated."

A month later Under Secretary of State Ball returned to the theme of
a NATO nuclear force. He insisted that it was militarily unnecessary and he
continued to stress the priority placed by the Kennedy Administration on the
build-up of conventional forces. But he added:

From a strictly military standpoint, we do not feel that
the alliance has an urgent need for a European nuclear
contribution. But should other NATO nations so desire,
we are ready to give serious consideration to the creation
of a genuinely multilateral medium-range ballistic missile
force fully coordinated with the other deterrent forces of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

McGeorge Bundy, "Building the Atlantic Partnership: Some Lessons from the Past," speech on September 27, 1962, DOSB, October 22, 1962, LXVII, 1217, p. 604-5.

George W. Ball, "NATO and the Cuban Crisis," speech on November 16, 1962, DOSB, December 3, 1962, XLVII, 1223, p. 835.

In the following weeks an American briefing team toured Europe explaining the American concept of a multilateral force, including the provision for crews of mixed nationality. They did not elicit a significant European response.

In December, Secretary Rusk spoke vaguely of a force "not . . . so heavily dependent upon the United States alone." But he stressed that it was up to the Europeans to formulate a concrete proposal:

> We also have expressed our willingness, if our allied wish to do so, to consider a multilateral nuclear force which would not be so heavily dependent upon the United States alone. Now, we have not ourselves put forward a precise plan in this regard. This is something that our friends across the Atlantic would presumably wish to do if they conclude what it is they would like to propose in this field."

At the regular NATO ministerial conference in December 1962, the United States took no initiative with respect to the NATO multilateral force. A week later at Nassau the United States and Great Britain made two decisions: to subscribe part of their national nuclear forces to NATO and to create a NATO multilateral force:

> Returning to Polaris the President and the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of Polaris missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies. They will use their best endeavors to this end."

Dean Rusk, News Conference on December 10, 1962, DOSB, December 31, 1962, XLVII, 1227, p. 995.

Text of the Communique, DOSB, January 14, 1963, XLVIII, 1229, p. 44.

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[Y]

One of the many confusions in the Nassau Agreement concerned the meaning of this clause: Did multilateral mean the assignment of national contingents to a NATO force, as Great Britain argued? Or did it involve a commitment to create a mixed-manned, *de-a*-borne force as the United States urged? For a few weeks after the NX Nassau Agreement the term multilateral was in fact used interchangeably for either arrangement. This sequence of events suggest that until De Gaulle's press conference on January 15, 1963, the multilateral force was far from a high priority goal of American foreign policy.

In the face of indifference at the highest level, it had in fact been kept alive in the government only by a very small group of enthusiasts who, in the words of one acute observer, engaged in "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe. . ."

6

Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?"

*The New Republic*, August 8, 1964, p. Vol. 101 (Aug. 8, 1964) pp. 19-21

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Whatever the hesitations of the Kennedy Administration, they
were resolved after De Gaulle's press conference. On January 21, 1963,
Secretary Rusk said in a television interview that the United States
would proceed with the NATO multilateral force even without France
(though he did not make clear whether he was using multilateral in
the American or the British sense). On February 9th, the Legal

7
Dean Rusk, "Today," NBC Television, January 21, 1963,
DOSB, XLVIII, 1233, (February 1, 1963), p. 205-G.

Counsellor K of the State Department, Abram Chayes, explicitly advanced
the multilateral force as an alternative route to the "grand design"
which De Gaulle had sought to block with his veto of Britain's entry
into the Common Market.

8
Abram Chayes, "European Integration and American Foreign
Policy," February 9, 1963, DOSB, XLVIII, 1236 (March 4, 1963), p. 321.

V - 11

By March 1963 the United States had dropped the conditions
of a non-nuclear build-up and of a prior European agreement to a
control plan. Indeed, it was now argued that a final decision on
the control problem should await the actual creation of the multi-
lateral force. Ambassador Livingston Merchant was assigned to carry
out the negotiations to bring the multilateral force into being.
On April 27, Under-Secretary Ball laid down four criteria for the
multilateral force: (a) there must be many participants; (b) the
force must not be based predominantly in one country; (c) the components
must be made unavailable for withdrawal by mixed manning; (d) the
decision-making must be collective. He went on to describe the MLF
in glowing terms:

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The kind of multilateral force I have described has much to commend it. Not only is it the best means of dealing with the nuclear problem in the present political framework; it is also a means of promoting gradual and constructive evolution within that framework. The multilateral force would offer the great advantage of a further opportunity to work toward greater unity in Europe and closer partnership between Europe and the United States.

George W. Ball, "The Nuclear Deterrent and the Atlantic Alliance," speech April 27, 1963, DOSB, May 13, 1963, XLVIII, 1246, p. 739.

During 1963, the multilateral force became the main focus of American NATO policy. The original posture of responding to European wishes was abandoned. American spokesmen ever more insistently urged the MLF as a major contribution to restoring Allied cohesion--indeed as the principal available step.

Thus, on October 27, Secretary Rusk speaking in Frankfurt said:

> Such a multilateral missile fleet would be militarily effective. Its accurate and well-protected missiles would be counted toward the total needs of Western deterrence.

> It would strengthen Atlantic partnership by binding the United States and Europe in an inextricable nuclear tie. The missiles and warheads would be jointly owned and controlled; they could not be unilaterally withdrawn.

> And it would strengthen European cohesion by providing the presently non-nuclear powers an opportunity to share in ownership, manning, and control of a powerful nuclear force on the same basis as other members of that force.¹⁰

Dean Rusk, "Toward a New Dimension in Atlantic Partnership," speech at Frankfurt on October 27, 1963, DOSB, November 11, 1963, XLIX, 1272, p. 730.

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This was supplemented by a flood of emissaries--official, semi-official and unofficial--pressing the MLF on our European allies with whatever argument seemed best suited to the particular circumstances. Salesmanship has on occasion superseded sober analysis.

The MLF has been advocated with arguments so extravagant and sometimes so contradictory that American policy may suffer from the unful

In the face of this onslaught the initial reserve of at least some of our allies melted. After a brief period of hesitation, the government of the Federal Republic agreed to the scheme. While its original motive may well have been to prove that the Franco-German treaty of friendship was not inconsistent with continued loyalty to the American alliance, the Federal Republic soon became nearly as enthusiastic an advocate of the MLF as the United States--so much so that many senior United States officials have come to believe that Germany's stability depends on the future of the MLF.

V - 14

Greece, Turkey and Italy have agreed in principle to participate.

Britain and the Netherlands have joined the other countries in a study about the technical feasibility of mixed manning. France has refused any degree of participation.

However, the large number of participants is deceptive.

United States insistence has made it difficult for allied governments to face the issue of the MLF on its merits. The Defense Ministries of our allies (except Bonn)--which might be thought to have a vested interest in the MLF--are opposed or lukewarm while the Foreign Offices, fearful of the political consequences of a refusal, have been pressing it. The scepticism or indifference of the military has been overcome by the concern that to refuse an American overture which is being urged to insistently might jeopardize the American commitment to the defense of Europe. Moreover, American negotiating tactics were deliberately designed to avoid the political issues raised by the MLF.

V - 16

nation was to contribute more than forty per cent of the total.

Command of the ships was to be in proportion to the financial contribution. (In practice this would mean that the Federal Republic and the United States would each contribute forty per cent leaving twenty per cent to be divided among the five or six other participants.) The control system had not yet been decided, but it seemed certain that an executive body comprising the total membership was to make decisions--at least initially on the basis of unanimity. The time-table called for signing a treaty on the MLF by the end of 1964, with ratification taking place sometime during 1965.

But the idea that so radical a departure as the MLF could be
implemented without sooner or later running up against the political
problems which it was supposed to solve. The attempt to move from
the hypothetical to the actual forced the always latent opposition of
France into the open and impelled a new British government to make
explicit misgivings which had been previously obscured only by the

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[4]

imminence of elections. What had started as a means to restore allied
cohesions thus triggered a debate about the future of the Alliance
with profound consequences for the political stability of many allied
governments, and the cohesion of the Alliance. Whatever the ultimate
to create an alternative to Western conceptions of European reorganization
fate of the MLF, it behoves us to understand how this state of affairs
became a symbol of further division. How did such a state of affairs
came to pass.

As with many policies it took the partly accidental coincidence
of several pressures and points of view (some of them conflicting) to
produce the elevation of the MLF into the keystone of American NATO
policy. The immediate impetus as we have seen, was supplied by the
SACEUR requirement for medium-range missiles to counteract Soviet
missiles aimed at Europe. This proposal was transformed from a
agreed
significance which
technical into a political one by the uneasiness in the Federal
Republic about the emergence of at least the early versions of the doctrine
of flexible response. The emphasis in U.S. doctrine on conventional

V - 18

forces and the attempt to control nuclear operations even after the
onset of hostilities brought into the open, as we have seen, the issue
of nuclear control. Though formal German proposals generally concerned
the disposition and use of tactical nuclear weapons on German soil, they
were interpreted in Washington as the forerunner of more sweeping
XX demands. The multilateral force was intended to channel these
tendencies in the most constructive direction.

Another motive behind the MLF was to prevent the arguments
made on behalf of the British and French nuclear programs from
infecting other allies. To the extent that national weapons programs
were justified by the possibility that American assistance was less
than certain, they supplied an incentive for other allies to develop
a nuclear arsenal of their own. According to this line of reasoning
the British nuclear program led to the French and that of France would
inevitably produce similar aspirations in Germany.

11

Indeed President Kennedy saw prospects of nuclear proliferation
to countries who must have been started to find themselves listed as
possible candidates for the nuclear club. Thus in his television interview
of December 18, 1962, President Kennedy said: "The question is whether the
United States should join in helping make France a nuclear power, then Italy,
then West Germany, then Belgium. How does that produce security when
you have 10,20, 30 nuclear powers who K may fire their weapons off under
different conditions?"

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Yet another motive behind the MLF was the reluctance of the NATO nuclear powers to share their planning and strategic decisions with their non-nculear allies on a multi-national basis. Though it is not clear whether the MLF was the cause or the result of this state of affairs, the fact remains that the Nuclear Committee of the NATO Council which was created in April 1962 to provide a forum for the nuclear powers to discuss their strategic policy, remained stillborn.

Another pressure for the MLF came from American strategic doctrine. The <u>MUMLIXXX</u> emphasis on central command and control over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance produced considerable hostility to the existing national nuclear programs in the Alliance. The prospect of any further proliferation could only compound the Pentagon's dismay. <u>XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX</u> Though the United States Defense Department would have preferred that all nuclear weapons of the Alliance remain under American control, it accepted the MLF as the next best expedient <u>as</u> long as the American <u>Veto</u> remained unimpaired. The Pentagon was

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attracted by the proposition of some of the advocates of the MLF that
it might provide a "safety net" into which the nuclear allies might
jump in order to dispose of their nuclear arsenal.

An opposite view was taken by the European integrationists in
the State Department and their counterparts overseas. Their objection
to the nuclear programs of France and Britain was less that they
divided the Alliance than that they divided Europe. Too weak to
encourage self-reliance, too nationally oriented to provide a focal
point for wider royalties, these programs prevented both European
integration and the "dumbbell concept" of Atlantic partnership. It
would be different with a European nuclear force. This had the advantage
of promoting integration and it would be strong enough to serve as
a respectable partner for the United States. The MLF was accepted by
Jean Monnet's influential Action Committee for a United Europe for
precisely the opposite reason that the Pentagon resigned itself to it.

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The European XXXXXXXXXXX integrationists (and their allies in the State Department) saw in the MLF the kind of a separate European nuclear force, they wanted to provide a basis for a united Europe not exclusively based on French nuclear claims and X at the same time build a bridge for Britain to enter it in united Europe."

12

For a splendid historical account of the MLF see Alastair Buchan, "The Multialteral Force: An Historical Perspective," Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, November Thirteen, October 1964.

Thus many things were hoped for from the MLF. It was supposed to revitalize NATO and strengthen allied cohesion while reducing the role of France in Europe. It was to prevent nuclear proliferation and yet satisfy supposed German desires for a share of nuclear control. It simultaneously sought to meet the requirements of the Pentagon for

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central control over nuclear weapons and the hopes of many Europeans
for an evolution into a European force. These aims were perhaps
not irreconcilable. But by avoiding an explicit consideration of
them in favor of the technical problem of mixed manning, the final
debate when it occurred in the winter of 1964 was mortgaged by many
previous maxims and ambiguities, some of them deliberate.

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B. MLF Reconsidered

Three questions must be asked about the MLF: 1) How valid was the original analysis? 2) How good is the remedy? 3) Where do we go from here?

Turning first to the military use for the MLF, the argument is usually put in terms of the MRBM "requirement" developed by SACEUR in the late Fifties. The MLF is to be the devise by which missiles replace tactical aircraft. This "requirement" hides however many of the unsolved problems of NATO doctrine. Whether the MLF contributes to the cohesion of NATO or becomes merely another forum for articulating disputes depends in part whether its military mission makes sense or at XXX least commands a consensus. But there is reason to believe that the view of the military role of the MLF current in the Federal Republic and at NATO headquarters differs from the dominant view in

Pentagon
the P~~AN~~AG~~E~~M~~N~~ and Great Britain.

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SACEUR's requirement assumes that all the missiles necessary
to conduct a counterforce operation against the Soviet MRBM's in
Russia should be under NATO command. But should this really be a top
priority mission for SACEU R? Indeed does it make any strategic
sense when missiles on both sides are numbered in the hundreds? Those
who cite the SACEUR "requirement" on behalf of the MLF encourage later
pressures for increasing the MLF to a size where it can conduct
effective counterforce operations. This would require many more
missiles than the two hundred projected in the initial MLF plans. It
is unlikely that the Pentagon would be prepared to segment nuclear
operations in this manner. If, on the other hand, the task of neutralizing
the Soviet MRBM's is to be given to the MLF in conjunction with SAC,
the wisdom of segmenting this operation into two parts becomes relevant.
It will also raise formidable problems of coordination. Why create
nuclear forces in both of which the United States predominates, in that event?

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[Y]

And since the key planning relates to the role of SAC the MLF emerges as a cumbersome and costly device to accomplish what remains a necessity in any event: to give our allies greater access to American strategic planning. The MLF will not end the conflict over the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy; it will shift it to a different forum.

But if the MLF is to be given some other mission, new difficulties arise. For one thing, there does not yet exist an agreed NATO doctrine for the use of such a strategic force for MM purposes other than those foreseen in SACEUR requirements. More importantly, if the doctrine of flexible response is to be maintained any such mission requires delicate control not only with respect to the decision to initiate hostilities but also during military operations.

But it is not easy to see how such control is to be exercised on a multilateral basis. Taking/decision to use the MLF will prove cumbersome.

[Y]

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enough; controlling the MLF during military operations may prove
insuperable. To avoid these questions before irrevocable decisions
are taken is to invite endless controversy later on.

However, the military argument on behalf of the MLF has never
been decisive. The key argument has always been the political one:
the need of equal status for Germany, the process of European integration
which the MLF is supposed to further and the contribution of the MLF in furthering
the cohesion of the Alliance.

There is no doubt that the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance
depends importantly on the long-term orientation of the Federal Republic.

It is also true that Germany cannot be kept in a second-class status
The Federal Republic must be treated as an equal and must be able to
participate fully in developing common policies. What is less clear
is whether access to nuclear weapons should have been made the key test
of equality. It will never be known whether a subconscious desire for

the possession of nuclear weapons did exist in Germany or
what form it could have taken if it had. Was there a nuclear issue
in Germany or did the United States create it by the passionate
advocacy of a remedy for it?

In retrospect, it is impossible to demonstrate conclusively
which interpretation is correct. The fact is that the MLF which was first
perpetrated that is suspected impossible to demonstrate
devised primarily as a means to satisfy a military requirement over
military propaganda predicted or caused what happened.
the years became more and more focussed on meeting supposed German
demands. Once the theory of German appetite for nuclear weapons had
become established, every German proposal was interpreted to accord with
it. Thus in 1960 Chancellor Adenauer stated that the possession by
France and Britain of nuclear weapons should not give them a privileged
position within NATO. The advocates of the MLF used this to demonstrate
a veiled German desire for nuclear weapons. It is more likely that
Chancellor Adenauer was concerned about the establishment of a Directory

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proposed by President de Gaulle which might exclude the Federal
Republic. It was a demand for political equality not nuclear weapons.

A similar interpretation was put on the strategic views of
former Defense Minister Strauss. He argued for more information
about the nuclear stockpiles in Germany, for a guarantee that these
would not be withdrawn without the consent of NATO and for a degree
of unspecified joint control over weapons fired from German soil.

13

See, for example, The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*,
April 21, 1962.

But Strauss' concern was primarily with control of tactical nuclear
weapons already in the NATO stockpiles and of a range not suitable
for a retaliatory strategy.

Whatever the *arriere-pensees* of Chancellor Adenauer and Minister Strauss, the question remains whether it would not have been wiser to take their statements at face value rather than psycho-analyzing them. It was a serious mistake to act as if German acquisition of nuclear weapons depended on its own unilateral decision. No country faced greater obstacles in developing a national nuclear program. The treaty establishing the West European Union prohibited the Federal Republic from producing or testing nuclear weapons on its soil. Throughout the next electoral period, until 1969 at least, it would have been impossible to mobilize domestic support within Germany for such a program. Above all, any attempt to develop German national nuclear weapons would have awakened latent distrust of Germany all over Europe. It is doubtful that NATO could have survived, if the Soviet Union had used possession by Germany of national nuclear weapons as a protest to unleash a series of crises. No European country will run any major risks so that Germany might have nuclear weapons under national control. Whatever Germany's real desires, with respect to nuclear weapons, a wise policy would have faced explicitly the fact that a measure of discrimination against the Soviet Union with respect to nations about ownership of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Equal status for Germany applies to the political realm, not to the entire gamut of modern weapons. American policy would have been better advised to seek to give Germany fuller access to political decision-making in the Alliance than to stake everything on a device which can, at best, be a detour to that goal.

Such a course would have also dealt with the real pressures behind the spread of nuclear weapons within the Western Alliance. Was the French nuclear program--begun by De Gaulle's predecessors--really inspired by the example of Great Britain? It is likely that the experience of Suez with its dramatic demonstration of how American and European policies and interests might diverge was a more powerful catalyst than speeches in the House of Commons. France's incentive to enter the nuclear field came less from adopting British theories than from American practice. The fact that we gave Britain a special status in East-West negotiations did more to emphasize the centrality of Britain's nuclear arsenal than the claims of British Defense Ministers. By the same token, whether the Federal Republic in fact felt a sense of discrimination would depend above all on its political role. A serious concern for German interests--especially in the conduct of East-West negotiations--and an intimate system of political consultation might well have met the demands likely to be articulated by any foreseeable German government in the Sixties.

As it is, a vicious circle has been created. The United States put forward a proposal based on a theoretical model of unfeasible German desires which the Germans felt obliged to accept because they did not want to thwart American wishes. What was intended originally as a device to tie the Federal Republic to NATO and the United States to Europe has become an end in itself.

V - 32

until later. Official spokesmen have also implied that the United
States would be willing later on to consider a modification of
the initial control arrangements, including perhaps giving up the
veto. Both of these arguments raise serious questions. Physical
operation of the MLF will offer next to no insight into the problem
of political control. Know-how in the operation of a missile-carrying
ship is not relevant to making a judgment about how a coalition of
sovereign states decide to enter a nuclear war. To transform this
complex issue into a technical one is an evasion which may cost
us dearly as time goes on.

The United States may be haunted for years to come by the
inconsistencies with which it has advocated the MLF. To the Federal
Republic, the MLF has been represented as a device to give non-nuclear
countries an increased participation in nuclear matters. To Soviet
and European critics, the MLF has been advocated as decreasing, if
anything, the role of its members in the decision to go to nuclear
war. Thus Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State for the MLF, said on April 22, 1964:

> Any wartime decision to fire the missiles would be by
> multilateral agreement rather than by bilateral agreement
> as in the case of these earlier strategic missiles. The
> MLF will thus increase the number of states with fingers
> on the safety catch, rather than on the nuclear trigger.
> (Emphasis added.) There would be no risk of compromise
> of weapons design data under MLF. Multilateral custodial
> procedures would assure that individual countries had
> no greater access to information about how to design and
> manufacture weapons than at present under the NATO Atomic Stockpile.

I4

¹⁴ Gerard C. Smith, "The Nuclear Defense of Europe," speech on April 22, 1964, DOSB, May 18, 1964, L, 1299, p. 785.

Can the United States consider giving up the veto as United States

spokesmen have occasionally hinted? It is not easy to see how so fateful a
decision as the use of nuclear weapons can be abdicated to a majority vote

even very close
of/allies, however close. The Constitutional provision that a declaration of
war requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate may well prove insur-
mountable. The Congressional debate on such a proposition could not avoid
going into the circumstances in which a nuclear war might break out. The
acrimony generated by such a discussion may do more damage than any benefit
that it could possibly bring.

For precisely what commitment would giving up the veto imply?

Does it mean that when requested by a majority of our allies we would agree
to go to war with the small part of the total nuclear arsenal of the Alliance

① See for example the speech by Robert Bonie & the U.E.U Assembly Dec 3, 1963 (with this correctly)

IV - II - 28

represented by the MLF while SAC remains inactive? Or does it mean that we would be prepared to go to war with our entire nuclear arsenal? The former interpretation is utterly inconsistent with United States strategic doctrine. It would be utterly contrary to the strategic doctrine elaborated so persistently by Secretary McNamara and his associates to go to nuclear war with only the MLF which is a small part of the total nuclear force of the Alliance and one not exceptionally well-suited to discriminating targeting. It would make no military sense, 24 would make impossible the strategy of flexible response, to which the United States is committed. And Soviet retaliation against a blow from a force in which we participate could hardly take into account our negative vote on the control body.

But if the second interpretation is correct--that we would be committed to go to war with our _entire_ strategic force--it is not clear why a special multilateral force must be set up. Then it would be wiser to create a political control body for the Alliance as a whole and agree to go to war on the basis of whatever majority vote seems indicated.

What about the schemes that eliminate not the American veto, but that of the minor participants (for example, those contributing less than

IV - II - 29

ten per cent). This, in effect, would transform the MLF into a German-American nuclear partnership. Even should Great Britain ultimately join the MLF, its share could not be very large. The Polaris program agreed to at Nassau will absorb most of Britain's resources in the nuclear field. At the same time, Britain will surely refuse to be considered a "minor" European power on nuclear matters. Similar considerations may well apply to Italy and perhaps even to the smaller countries. No country can have a high incentive to share in the costs of a force when it can neither influence the decision to use it nor prevent its use.

Difficult as it will be to decide on a control mechanism for the decision to enter nuclear war, the political control over the actual military operations of the MLF will be even more complex. For who is to make the decisions about retargeting or the scale of individual attacks? How is the MLF to participate in a fight against nuclear weapons?

IV - II - 30

The multilateral force would also inevitably make easier the eventual development of a European nuclear force, should this be the desire and within the grasp of the Europeans. For a European nuclear force presupposes the application of the same principles of integration and of organization and communal structure as those which would govern the MLF.¹

The then Vice President Johnson said much the same thing more concisely.

The movement to Atlantic partnership makes this MLF possible. The movement to European unity makes this desirable--as a first step toward a greater European voice in nuclear matters. Evolution of this missile fleet toward European control, as Europe marches toward unity, is by no means excluded.²

The influential Action Committee for Europe headed by Jean Monnet has endorsed the MLF as the precursor of a European atomic force.

But if a European Atomic Force is the goal or even a significant option, it is important to be clear about it early in the development of the MLF or bitter acrimony will be unavoidable. Many of the participants of the MLF have joined precisely to avoid a European force. In many European countries the MLF is urged as a device to tie the United States more closely to Europe. Most European participants have an overriding

1 J. Robert Schaetzel, " *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 63-64, p.

2 Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Brussels on November 8, 1963, *DOSB*, December 2, 1963, XLIX, 1275, pp. 853-4. See also Robert K. Bonnie speech before the UN.

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is minimal and their share small. Lines of communication will run from Washington. The framework of the discussion will inevitably have to be American. The weapons are American and the strategic concept must perforce originate in Washington. Since the MLF can deal with only a small fraction of the targets assigned to it, its utility will depend largely on how well it fits into American plans. For a European sense of identity to emerge, some country would have to act as the catalyst. As the MLF is presently conceived, that country would have to be the Federal Republic, which is the largest European shareholder in the MLF.

Such a prospect is not in the interest of NATO, of European cohesion, of the Federal Republic, or of international stability. It would push the most exposed ally into the forefront of every dispute. It would again raise fears in Europe that a decade and a half of farsighted German policy have begun to submerge. It might dangerously fuse anti-German, anti-American and anti-nuclear feelings into a new wave of neutralism.

Many of these difficulties will arise whether or not the MLF evolves towards a European force. Participants have been promised command of a number of ships and influence in the control body proportionate to their

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financial contribution. Thus the spokesman for the European point of view within the MLF will inevitably be the Federal Republic. It will have the chief voice in urging a modification of the veto. It will probably urge an expansion of the MLF to include land-based missiles. This is not because the leaders of the Federal Republic are "trouble-makers" but because the logic of the MLF will drive them in the direction of making it a significant institution. All of this suggests the wisdom of a reduction in the German share of the MLF--even if this means that initially the MLF will be smaller than now envisaged.

Some of the advocates of the MLF argue that the prospect of German domination of the MLF will make Britain and France more eager to join it. This may be the case. But it is also possible that Britain and France will move closer to each other and away from a United States that threatens to turn NATO into a special German-American arrangement. Even if the assumption proves correct, however, such a process for solving NATO's nuclear problem would be extremely worrisome. It would be better for the long-term stability and cohesiveness of Europe for the Federal Republic to join an institution in which France and Britain are the senior partners, than for Britain

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and France to be obliged to seek membership in a grouping to which Germany
is the largest European contributor and in which ultimately it may play the
same role as France in the Common Market. History has been altered by
smaller nuances.

In short, to leave open the two most important and interrelated
problems of the MLF--that of control and that of evolution of the force--
is to mortgage the future. Failure to face these problems will magnify
tensions later. The MLF cannot be both a step towards European unity and
a device to vindicate the indivisibility of NATO strategy. Soon after it
is established, a choice of priorities will have to be made. Nor can the
MLF both satisfy the desires for increased European participation in the
nuclear field and merely multiply safety catches. There, too, a choice
is imperative; if the decision is begged indefinitely, even the minimum
objective of isolating France by wooing Germany will backfire. Then we
may yet see the Federal Republic participate in two MLF's: one sponsored
by the United States and the other by France.

The years ahead promise complex debates in which a clear American
view is essential. The nuclear debate will shift from a dispute over

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concern with preventing German dominance of the nuclear field. Anything
that diluted American participation would raise the problem of Germany in
its most acute form. A European force growing out of a structure in which
the Federal Republic controls close to seventy per cent of the European
share will be intolerable to all other European countries.

The MLF is a poor chrysalis for a European force. A European force
could grow out of the MLF in only one of two ways: (a) by an American
decision to withdraw from the MLF, or (b) through a European request that
we leave it. Either course will be divisive in the extreme. It is one
thing for a European force to grow out of present national programs which
have been in existence for many years. It is quite another for a European
force to come about through a United States withdrawal, voluntary or forced,
from a joint Atlantic enterprise.

The MLF is the most disruptive road to a European force. It is also
likely to prove the most circuitous. Cooperation in the MLF is not likely
to strengthen a European sense of identity. None of the presently non-
nuclear European members of the MLF, with the possible exception of the
Federal Republic, had any desire to enter the nuclear field. Their competence

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In short, to leave open the two most important and interrelated
problems of the MLF--that of control and that of evolution of the force--
is to mortgage the future. Failure to face these problems will magnify
tensions later. The MLF cannot be both a step towards European unity and
a device to vindicate the indivisibility of NATO strategy. Soon after it
is established, a choice of priorities will have to be made. Nor can the
MLF both satisfy the desires for increased European participation in the
nuclear field and merely multiply safety catches. There, too, a choice
is imperative: if the decision is begged indefinitely, even the minimum
objective of isolating France by wooing Germany will backfire. Then we
may yet see the Federal Republic participate in two MLF's: one sponsored
by the United States and the other by France.