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Marshall Visitor Address

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

October 7, 1991

In the last two years, a truly extraordinary series of events
has occurred. I do not know of anybody who foresaw them. In fact,
it is a lucky thing that you invited me to speak this year because
I am sure that two years from now I will have convinced myself that
I saw it all clearly and had predicted it all along. But since we
are not yet at that stage, I can say freely that I know of no
analyst who expected this. Of course there were a lot of general
statements about how Communism went against human nature and that
it surely could not last, but I do not recall any serious person
ever predicting that it would collapse quite so totally, or so
quickly, in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union.

I must say that I have been a great admirer of John
Whithead's. When I was a consultant to Goldman Sachs we formed a
friendship which I consider one of the great events in my life. I
was thrilled when he was made Deputy Secretary of State -- that is
until he appeared in Budapest and announced that he thought Hungary
should leave the Warsaw Pact. At the time, being such a great
expert on foreign policy, I thought to myself, they just cannot put
amateurs in these jobs, they're bound to do something disastrous.

So now here we are in a truly extraordinary situation. All

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the more extraordinary because almost everything - actually, I would say everything - that the United States set out to do forty years ago has pretty much come to pass as we expected. But that also presents us with a new and rather interesting problem.

George Bernard Shaw once said, "There are two tragedies in life. One is not to achieve your heart's desire. The second is to achieve it." By reaching one set of goals we have been projected into a world for which we have historically relatively little experience, and in which many of the patterns that stood us in good stead in the previous period will have to be re-examined. The period of the Cold War, the reconstruction of Europe and Japan and everything surrounding it in military alliances and economic aid programs, corresponded very well with fundamental American convictions. For Americans have historically believed that peace is the normal state among nations and that wars occur as a result of either evil men or of misunderstandings among men; and that evil can be punished while those who misunderstand can always be converted.

Thus through much of our American international experience we have oscillated between acts of crusade and acts of conversion. Even at the height of the Cold War, there was a certain nostalgia for conversion, as evidenced by the hope that maybe Soviet leaders were really just regular fellows. When they came to visit they were invariably taken to see a farm in Iowa. In this I am reminded of a friend of mine who is of the view that there is no such thing as an English accent. He believes the English speak the way they do

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to intimidate Americans and that if you were to catch an Englishman unawares, for instance by waking him up at four in the morning, he would talk like a normal human being. Now this personifies the American attitude toward most foreign relations. It worked particularly well during the Cold War because there was always a real danger throughout and because Communism represented a truly terrible system. Human nature did correspond more closely to our own values than it did to Communist ideals.

The other major impact on the American experience in this century was The New Deal, which cured political instability by closing the gap between expectation and reality, a method first applied in this country, then exported to Europe via the Marshall Plan, and to Japan in the 1950s. All that worked very well. But now we are in a different world. Communism is collapsing both as an ideology and as an economic and political system. The security considerations that produced NATO, the Japanese security treaty, and a whole network of relationships is in a process of fundamental re-examination -- at least it should be in a process of fundamental re-examination. Because there is no longer a single, permanent, enemy, we now have a somewhat abstract popular objective called the New World Order.

I am at work on a book on the various conceptions of world order that have existed throughout history up to the present period -- something that will not be inflicted on you in the immediate future as it is a huge assignment. I find it fascinating that the United States did not conduct any foreign policy for 120 years,

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and prided itself on having no experience with foreign policy at all. The Europeans conducted their foreign policy, for better or for worse, with elaborate theories, machineries, and interactions for some 300 years. Then Woodrow Wilson appeared on the scene in 1918 and proclaimed a set of eternal verities of foreign policy, much of it extraordinarily elevated, for which there was not a shred of evidence. What he was expressing was a hope, not a truth. And yet if you read statements by American leaders since, you will find that Wilsonian principles dominate throughout - the essentially pacifist nature of man, the sense of shared responsibility by the international community to carry out legal principles, and the notion that aggression is universally recognized and resistance to it is equally universal. In the interim, evidence of the validity of these principles has not exactly been overwhelming. Rather, we have witnessed the triumph of faith over experience. I do not say this as a criticism because, after all, this is a country built by people of faith, for nothing else could have propelled them to these shores, or all the way across the continent.

The world that is emerging will have many power centers, and more are coming into being at every moment. Nor will it have a uniform perception of security because there will not be any one particular threat. On the other hand, for the first time in history, we have instantaneous communications. Some issues - nuclear, environmental, and of population - have never existed on a global level before. In the 18th century, the empires of Asia

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and of Europe had next to no connection and hence no relationship with each other. In the 19th century, policy became global but was defined solely in the European capitals. This is the first time in history that there has existed a truly global policy, and therefore, a global order.

For the United States, it presents the unprecedented problem of defining our national interest. During the Gulf crisis, President Bush, whom I strongly supported, nevertheless made a number of speeches in which he emphasized in classically American terms that we were conducting a disinterested foreign policy. A great nation cannot afford to conduct disinterested foreign policy. We are not a philanthropic organization; we are a nation. We are bound to have our purposes. And they should be acceptable to enough of mankind so that we can speak in terms of an international order. But when you have an international system as the one I have described, there are only two ways in which it can be organized - either by hegemony or by equilibrium. Ours is not a country made for domination. In any case, had we wanted hegemony in the world we should have done it in the '50s and '60s when we had the overwhelming economic and military advantage. It is now beyond our moral, material, and political capabilities -- and I do not say this regretfully. Anyway, we must begin to think in terms of some kind of equilibrium for our world.

Now if all this were being said before a British audience, it would not be found worth the time to talk about. Nor can you read any textbook on foreign policy in the United States in which the

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term "balance of power" is not preceded with some sort of
opprobrium. You will also find in the public statements of most of
our Presidents derogatory statements about the idea of balance of
power. But that, in fact, is the world into which we are heading.

Let me illustrate this with some examples. I begin with the
Soviet Union, which is very much on our minds these days. Right
now we are witnessing two revolutions in the Soviet Union: a
revolution against 75 years of Communist history, and a revolution
against some 400 years of imperial history. These are not the same
phenomenon. Not everybody who uses the word "democracy" is
referring to pluralistic institutions. Some mean opposition to
Communism but not the break-up of the Soviet Empire. Some mean the
break-up of the Soviet Empire but not necessarily pluralistic
institutions. Some of the advocates of historic change have spent
most of their adult lives as leaders in a totalitarian system. All
in all, it is an extraordinarily complicated state of affairs. If
you pressed democratic principles in the Soviet Union to their
extreme, it would be impossible to keep it together in its present
form. For many of the republics, given a free choice, would break
away. The President of the Ukraine shocked Washington last week
by making it rather clear that he was bent on independence and
would not even participate in economic relationships with the rest
of the Soviet Union if it means the Ukraine having to sell what
would otherwise be foreign currency earners for rubles. This
confronts the United States with an extraordinarily volatile
situation.

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If you look at Russian history, you will see that this country has expanded from a small area around Moscow to the center of Europe, the gates of India, and the shores of the Pacific in a sweeping, uninterrupted rhythm. Nor did they get to all these places by plebiscite. They got there by conquest. I know of no Russian ruler in the whole period between Peter the Great and Gorbachev who did not seek to expand the territory of the state. And I would say that a nation's acting in a certain way for 300 years indicates a proclivity which one cannot assume can be abolished by an individual or even a particular group of individuals.

In terms of my own experience with the leaders of the Russian republic, I have found very few, if any, who are prepared to envisage the breakup of the Soviet Empire -- or, at any rate, of its major parts, namely the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. On the other hand, I have met very few leaders of the constituent republics who want to remain within that empire. That is a fact of life.

Now, what should be America's role in relation to that process? In the world I have described, the United States has to learn to distinguish between what is desirable and what is essential and, from among the essentials, to distinguish those items it is within our power to effect. My own view is that a highly centralized state on the territory that is now the Soviet Union will almost certainly be drawn into conflict with its neighbors. It will be drawn into conflict because it cannot

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maintain the desired degree of centralization without repression.
That repression will not be internationally accepted, which will
in itself create tension.

Secondly, history has shown that the only way the various
nationalities comprising the Soviet Empire can be held together,
or at least have been held together in the past, is by creating the
feeling that the outside world is more hostile than its internal
divisions. Thus the inherent suspiciousness that has been a
principal aspect of Soviet policy is built into the very nature of
the system. On the other hand, the United States should not delude
itself. We cannot really fundamentally affect or determine the
outcome. The best we can do is to be somewhat modest in our
aspirations.

I read these days that there are many who urge a single focal
point for receiving American economic aid. I think that might be
helpful, but I would personally gladly trade one central focal
point for greater pluralism in decision-making on Russian
territory, even if it is a little less convenient. I believe we
can be helpful in encouraging democratic institutions in the many
towns and centers of decision throughout the Soviet Union if we ask
for it. Whenever possible, we should deal directly with the
republics, as well as with the central government. But the outcome
of the Soviet situation is essentially out of our control. I favor
giving food and technical assistance but do not believe that
large-scale economic aid can make any significant difference until
the political problems I have briefly sketched are solved because,

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right now, even though Gorbachev is described in the American press as an Executive President, he has no prime minister, no cabinet, and no parliament. At this point he is more like the presidents of Italy or Germany, who simply represent the unity of the state and have no executive responsibility, than he is like the Soviet leaders of yesteryear. And we must be prepared for the foreign policy consequences of whatever the outcome.

For 250 years Russia has been pressing on Europe. Even if the Russian Republic emerges out of this intact, it will still have a population of 160 million and a huge nuclear stockpile. We should not too lightly deprecate the tremendous achievements of the Russian people over the centuries, for they will no doubt emerge again as a strong nation. In the interim, it would be highly desirable to tie the countries of Eastern Europe, especially of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, as closely as possible to Western institutions so that the historic Soviet rhythm of using these countries to expand its security belt is interrupted. But there are two other major changes still ahead of us.

One is that, in my view, the center of gravity of Russian policy will shift eastward. The most organized part of the state - whether it remains the Soviet Union or becomes a smaller unit - will be in Siberia, certainly in the region between Moscow and the Pacific. Therefore, it must be expected that Russia will become a much more active Pacific player. Secondly, there are 60 million Muslims in Central Asia. Whether they stay in the Soviet Union or become independent will affect Soviet/Russian policy in a

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fundamental way. There are at present two major migrations from Russia into the Middle East: the Jewish emigration into Israel, and the Muslim emigration into the politics of the Middle East. And the Soviet Union (or whatever it ends up being called) will be a much more active player.

Let me come back to Asia for a moment. There we see a Japan that is economically more and more powerful and self-confident, and with very good reason. My friend, the Japanese Ambassador, will probably disagree with me, but I believe it is historically inevitable that Japan will become a significant military power, whether in this decade or in the next. Inevitable, because security is no longer homogeneous throughout the world. Neither Europe nor Asia can permanently accept American military protection against indefinable, constantly changing, threats. Hence both Europe and, especially, Japan will try to gain greater control over their own destinies.

North and South Korea, which are entering the United Nations and could well be unified by the end of this century, would constitute a nation larger, in terms of population, than any single European country with the possible exception of Germany. Vietnam and China are reconciling, and Southeast Asia is getting settled. With all these changes going on in Asia, how can we conceive of the United States conducting a serious foreign policy without high-level dialogue with the leaders of The People's Republic of China, regardless of how we feel about their domestic conduct? We never broke off high-level contact with the Soviet Union after Hungary,

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after Czechoslovakia, or after Afghanistan. It represents no approbation of what goes on in China to discuss the evolution of the most dynamic area of the world with an ancient society that has governed itself for 5,000 years -- and, may I say, without conspicuous advice from the United States for all but the last 200 of them.

So when we talk about a New World Order we have to deal with some of these issues. Given the fact that John Whitehead still feels about my knowledge of economics the way I used to feel about his pre-Budapest days in foreign policy, I will spare him the necessity of using his chairmanship to rebut my views. I do believe that, even in the field of economics, we are moving into a different era. It is very well to say that the Common Market should be nondiscriminatory. The only problem is that what makes it a common market is that it is discriminatory. It is the very essence of a common market that its external frontiers are higher than its internal barriers. And there is a tendency in the world toward regional groupings, which can then perhaps work to reduce the barriers. In my view, they too will be a significant feature of the so-called New World Order.

Let me conclude by stressing the following: I have obviously described many problems, but we should keep in mind that these are the problems of an exciting period. It very rarely happens in history that the canvas is as open or that it is as possible to create new relationships. It happens very rarely that all the fundamental factors are in flux simultaneously. International

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orders change when the political units constituting them also change their character -- as in the movement from feudalism to the nation-state, from the nation-state to something bigger. When the means of interaction change, the principles of justice are altered. All of this is happening simultaneously in our period, and much of it has been brought about by American initiatives and by American dedication.

The biggest change we have to make in our thinking is this: in the past, Americans have always thought that complexity in the world was represented by some specific disturbance that could be relieved by a mobilization of resources or by dedicated effort, after which we could again retreat into isolation. We still talk of peace as if on some magic day all problems will disappear and the world will live with a consciousness of perfect harmony. In fact, that has never been the case at any recorded period of history, and it is not likely to be the case now. And if that is what we want, then the next decade will be extremely disappointing. For it will contain much turmoil and will surface definitions of democracy quite different from those we are used to. It will see new political forums emerging and will be a more constructive period than the one we have just surmounted, less shadowed by the danger of nuclear catastrophe and capable of achieving more cooperative structures.

I have a Chinese friend who alleges that there exists the following Chinese proverb (I say alleges because there cannot be as many Chinese proverbs as they lay upon us): "When there is

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turmoil under the heavens, little problems are dealt with as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to smaller problems, and little problems should not upset us." That, precisely, is the opportunity ahead of us. That is the road toward a New World Order. I believe that the American contribution to it, though in an altogether new and different way, will be as constructive as the one we made in the period just surmounted.

Thank you very much.

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