[Lc]

MR. McCLOSKEY: This will be FOR BACKGROUND, the usual ground rules. Anything used will be in paraphrase, may be attributed to State Department sources.

MR. MARDER: In view of the magnitude of this subject, Mr. Secretary, and in view of the controversy about an issue of this consequence, I would like to strongly urge you to reconsider putting it ON THE RECORD because the charges, as you well know, are coming and published and the defense is coming on an anonymous basis.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Murrey, the Secretary will have a press conference at some point -- hopefully, soon -- and there it will be ON THE RECORD.

It was my impression, and that of others, that a BACKGROUND briefing would be welcome on this subject.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I just wanted to remind you that I will try to have a press conference on Monday. I will be prepared to say some of these things ON THE RECORD. This gives us an opportunity to have a smaller group, and perhaps

A-2

to speak more freely. I will, however, at an early
opportunity be glad to say ON THE RECORD that I think
throw-weight is a phony issue. (Laughter.)

Q "Throw" what?

Q Throw-weight.

Q Oh, throw-weight.

Q Could you say that ON THE RECORD, Mr.
Secretary?

A (Secretary Kissinger) No. I will say it
on an occasion in which I can explain it.

But could I, perhaps -- I don't know how you
want to conduct this. I thought perhaps I would start with
few minutes of what I believe to be the significance of
this agreement and then take questions on it. This
would be the most effective way of proceeding.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you start, perhaps,
by telling us what's in the agreement? Have we gotten
everything that's in the agreement?

A It's a secret agreement. (Laughter.)
It's not going to come out in Senator Jackson's hearings.

Well, let me sum up what can be said about the
agreement.

The President stated yesterday that the ceiling

A-3

on strategic delivery vehicles is 2400; the ceiling on MIRVs is 1320. The number of land-based silos will remain constant, though they are subject to the same modifications that are permitted in the interim agreement -- which is to say that their dimensions can be increased by 15 percent and that airborne missiles of a range of more than 600 miles will be counted as individual missiles, though not as MIRVs.

I think these are the essential elements of the agreement -- which means that each side is free to compose these 2400 in any way it wishes, except that it cannot add land-based silos. It can add land-based mobiles; it can move land-based missiles to sea.

The numerical limitations of the interim agreement with respect to submarines, as well as to the total numbers of submarine-based missiles, will not be in effect. The only number of the interim agreement that will remain in effect is that of the land-based silos; and those are, of course, the most vulnerable part of the strategic forces.

Those are the essential elements of the agreement.

Q What would be the limitation?

A-4

A 600 kilometers --

Q What?

A 600 kilometers -- or, roughly, four hundred miles.

Q What does that refer to?

A I said airborne missiles of a range of more than 600 kilometers, not 600 miles.

Q Mr. Secretary, do the silos remain so that they're limited to 15 percent in size, even though there's not anything specifically said?

A Well, that does not happen to be exactly true because the United States, either because of great foresight -- as the Russians believe -- or for other reasons -- as some others believe -- designed its silos in such a way that they can take a considerably larger missile than is presently in it, so that it's within our capability, even without increasing the size of the silo substantially, to reduce Soviet throw-weight advantage, and, if we increase the silos by 15 percent, to come close to eliminating Soviet throw-weight advantage -- if that's the decision that we want to take.

But -- I repeat -- I believe that the throw-weight issue has been vastly overstated and the decision of whether

A-5

we will attempt to close the throw-weight will be taken
by us for our reasons and not simply because the
Soviet Union has heavier missiles than we do.

Q Mr. Secretary, since the Soviet Union
has not deployed any MIRV missiles and since the United
States does not plan as many as 1320 MIRV missiles,
why couldn't you get a lower MIRV figure?

A We could have probably gotten a slightly
lower MIRV figure, 1320 is slightly above the American
MIRV plan and, therefore, gives us some degree of
flexibility. We could have gotten a slightly lower MIRV
figure; it wouldn't have made any real difference.

Q Where did you get the 1320? How did
you arrive at that figure?

A We arrived at the figure of 1320 by taking
some of the planned programs and, in effect, adding to it
TRIDENT force -- which is 28 missiles.

(5 LINE DELETION)

Q Mr. Secretary, the President talked yesterday:

A-6

about some ambiguities in the Soviet Union in connection
with verification. Could you go into that?

A Before I get into
all these technical questions, let me make a general
statement of what the significance of this agreement is
before we get lost in a lot of technicalities.

First, in terms of the negotiating history
of this agreement, there were the following items throughout
the negotiations:

- One, total aggregates.

- Second, limitations on MIRVs -- for which
the code name was "qualitative restraint."

- Third, there was the issue of forward-bases.

- Fourth, there was the issue of the British
and French nuclear forces.

- Fifth, there was the fact that the Soviet Union
claimed compensation for a more vulnerable geographic
position -- the fact that some of its potential enemies
were geographically closer to it than they were to us -- or,
so put it into less complicated language, that China
would have nuclear weapons aimed at the Soviet Union.

A-7

Therefore, these were the parameters of the negotiations as they had been going on for several years until this summer.

What we attempted to do is approve immediately a comprehensive agreement that would take care of all of the issues simultaneously. Therefore, until this summer, we attempted to bring about an extension of the Interim Agreement, in which the Soviet Union had a differential in missiles and for which we wanted to compensate by obtaining a differential in MIRV vehicles. Even though we were prepared to give them a differential in total missiles until the end of 1979, the differential in missiles for which we asked was not to be negotiable during the time of the Summit.

Secondly, as we analyzed the problem at the time of the Summit, it became clear that this was really a very precarious agreement -- that you extended the Interim Agreement for a number of years at a time when the production program of both sides of MIRVs would reach a certain peak -- that, therefore, the breakout potential was very substantial -- and where the Soviet Union, or we, simply by deferring the deployment of one year's production, would have a massive breakout potential at the precise moment.

A-8

that the agreement ended.

Therefore, it was decided at the Summit meeting -- as I pointed out to this group before -- that we would, in July, aim for a 10-year agreement, in which it would be more easy to catch several cycles of the program and to attempt to bring about a negotiation in this manner.

As far as the United States is concerned, we had a number of preparatory Verification Panel meetings, out of which emerged five to eight options which were presented to the President and to the NSC meeting which took place in October.

I was just trying to give you a history of how this evolved; and then I will talk briefly about the significance, as I see it, and then we can answer your questions.

These options range from some that were extraordinarily simple to others of great esoteric complexity.

Out of these options, the President chose not one of the options but a combination of two of the simpler ones and asked me to present those in Moscow when I was there in October.

We had two days of very difficult and very

A-9

inconclusive meetings, which then led to a meeting of the Politburo on the last day that I was in Moscow -- it doesn't matter what it was; it was Saturday -- at which, apparently, some fundamental decisions were taken by the Soviet Union, because that evening they made a proposition to us, which I made clear afterwards brought the issue within negotiating range.

Now, what brought it within negotiating range was the Soviet Union accepted then the principle of equal aggregate at some stage of the 10-year problem. They, nevertheless, still insisted on compensation for the British and French nuclear forces and some compensation for forward based missiles.

The reason why equal aggregates become more important in a 10-year agreement than a 5-year agreement was that if we gave up on the principle of equal aggregates in a 10-year agreement following a 5-year agreement, it would mean that the period of 1972-through 1985 the United States would have accepted a position of numerical inferiority in strategic delivery vehicles, which whatever it actually invites strategically -- which I never thought was much -- neverthe symbolically, could have had some political impact on the potential of other countries.

A-1

This was the situation when I left the Soviet Union at the end of October.

On the basis of the proposal that the Soviet Union made to us in October -- which they also put in writing to us -- we formulated a counter-proposal, in which equal aggregates were to be achieved earlier, sometime during the 1975 to 1985 period, and in the interval before the United States achieved total equal aggregate, there would be a MIRV differential in our favor.

I don't see that there's any point being served in going through all this back-and-forth of negotiations. This, more or less, was the situation in Vladivostok.

I brought it out only to make clear that there was not a pre-cooked agreement. that was simply ratified in Vladivostok. The negotiations were, roughly, as I had described it to you upon our arrival in Vladivostok.

Saturday evening, we had an extended negotiation on what differentials in total numbers and what differential in MIRV numbers for what period of time might be acceptable, and this is where it stood about midnight, when we adjourned.

It was the next morning that General Secretary Brezhnev made his proposal on moving to equal aggregates.

A-1

immediately -- not asking
for compensation for the British and French nuclear
forces. And out of this developed a more extended
discussion having to do with bomber armament and the
position of heavy missiles -- the limitation of heavy
missiles, the agreement which we have discussed.

Now, I have since read -- I have since
discussed -- with mounting amazement, I must say. For
example, let me deal with some of the arguments that I
have heard.

I have heard it said that the United States gave
the Soviet Union rather large figures. Now, I think the
fact of the matter is quite the contrary. The overall tota
is below the figures which the Soviet Union has today --
so that the only way that the Soviet Union can -- we hope t
the Soviet Union will be forced to reduce numbers to achiev
the agreed level by 1977.

Secondly, before we went to Vladivostok -- and
not necessarily connected with Vladivostok -- we asked the
intelligence community to give us three projections
of Soviet development, both in the MIRV field and in the
missile field -- and in the total strategic delivery field.
These estimates were made by people who had no idea of the
figures that we were debating.

B 1

The intelligence estimates were made in three estimates -- a low estimate, a medium estimate, and a high estimate.

All three estimates -- well, the lowest estimate, was considerably above the lowest estimate of what the Soviet Union would do without an agreement -- was considerably above the figures of both the MIRVs and the delivery systems. The medium estimate was substantially above, and the high estimate was out of range.

In our experience, our medium estimate is the one that is the most probable Soviet course.

So with all due respect, it is total nonsense to say that the United States "gave the Soviet Union figures that were granted to them by us."

The United States agreed with the Soviet Union on figures below their present figures in total numbers of missiles and well below our estimate of where they would be -- well below their lowest estimate of where they would be without an agreement -- and substantially below our estimate, our most likely estimate of where they would be without an agreement.

And all of this was done without counting...

B 2

British and French nuclear forces, without counting the forward based systems, and without any of the other frills that used to be associated.

The second argument, as well, "all we are doing is continuing the race." That, too, is not true.

If the Soviet Union had built to the level that was what our intelligence estimate predicted -- and I repeat that our intelligence estimate projected without any knowledge of the figures we were discussing with the Soviet Union -- if the Soviet Union had built up to those figures, we would have been faced with the following problem:

We would have been faced with the problem of whether we wanted to match all those, or exceed all those figures or whether we were going to permit, as a result of an arms race -- a gap to exist -- which many in our countries considered intolerable, though it was ratified as part of a SALT Agreement.

In other words, the gap which we had permitted to arise without an agreement, before 1972 -- which we had frozen as a result of the interim agreement -- would have grown against us as of 1977.

Therefore, the only way the United States could

B

have responded. is either to let the gap grow or to make
a massive effort in order to close it.

So that our expenditures on the strategic forces
would have had to go up rapidly, and would have had to go
up now.

Now if we had permitted the gap to grow -- in
other words, if we had kept our strategic expenditures
down -- our capability of bringing the arms race under
control would have declined substantially, because what
arguments could we have used against the Soviet Union in
order to induce them to accept figures -- even roughly
comparable to the ones we have accepted. If we had
gone into an arms race of our own, the consequences would
have been quite unpredictable.

We had constantly felt that one of the primary
objectives of these negotiations would be, not to bring
about a level in which the destruction of human life
was not possible -- that is beyond our ability -- but
rather, to get the perceptions of both sides into a framework
in which they are not a series of self-fulfilling prophecies
-- a fuel wasting arms race which can be sustained only
by the argument of "an imminent surprise attack" which

B 4

in turn, then makes political accommodations more and more
difficult.

Now whether the level of forces is 2400, 2200
or 2,000 has some financial difference. But in
 terms of the capacity to destroy human life, it is almost
irrelevant.

Therefore, the arguments that the levels below
us are not uninteresting, but they do not go to the center
of the issues -- to reduce the strategic forces to a level
where they cannot destroy human life -- the reductions would
have had to be to the level that are inconceivable today.

Now I would like you all to remember that in 1962
at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States was
at something like 1,500 warheads -- maybe 2,000 -- fifteen
hundred or two thousand warheads. The Soviet Union possessed
something like 70 ICBM warheads.

But in the records of the deliberations at that
time, the policy makers at that time had the perception to
see that the delivery of even a fraction of those Soviet
warheads on the United States would present quite un-
manageable problems for the United States.

We are now in a period where, with MIR's and other

B 5

the proliferation of strategic nuclear weapons, the level at which human life could be substantially -- or at least civilized life as we now know it -- could be substantially reduced, is not affected by whether the total ceiling is 2400, 2200, 2,000, or any of the ceilings that anyone has talked about.

In fact, if you want to make a sophisticated argument you can make the argument that at certain levels of MIRV, the fewer the aimpoints, the more precarious the situation becomes. because if one of the risks of the contemporary situation is disparity between warheads and aiming points so that a first strike again becomes a possibility, then the fewer the number of aimpoints and the larger the number of warheads, the greater the disparity between the number of warheads and the aimpoints.

And therefore, from the point of view of either the destructiveness or the destruction of human life, I see no significant difference between the figure of 2,400 or any of the other figures that have been talked about -- even though we would have preferred lower figures.

The significance of this agreement is that a ceiling

B6

has been put on the total number for a ten-year period,
so that the argument can no longer be made
that the other side is racing into
newer and newer fields.

In this respect, incidentally, the argument that
"this isn't saving any money" is also incorrect, because
if the Soviet Union had built to our expectations of its
program, and our reactions would have had to be in terms
of our expectations of their program -- if indeed we were
going to make a reaction -- we would have had to expend
a substantial additional sum to that which we now face.

Now let me come to the throw-weight.

Q Dr. Kissinger.

A Yes.

Q Were these intelligence estimates based on
intentional capability?

A These intelligence estimates were based on the
best judgment -- well, on a combination of both, really.

We have some indications -- we know, for example,
that they have recently converted a certain number of their
SS-11 missiles to a newer type. We are, therefore, subtracting
those and we are assuming that they wouldn't go through

B7

the expense of converting those to a new, and non-MIRV type -- and then immediately replace them with MIRVs -- so we deducted those from the total number, and assume that the remaining number were candidates for MIRVs.

And similar estimates were made.

Also, we have some information about some other activities -- so it is a combination of capabilities and intentions.

But it is certain, all of these estimates were well within their capabilities. Indeed, if we are talking about total numbers, the Soviet Union is modernizing its force now because of the constraints of the Interim Agreement by rebuilding the existing silos. That process is at least as difficult and at least as costly as the building of new silos.

Therefore, the Soviet Union would have an almost infinite capability of expanding its force by leaving the existing missiles in the silos and building new silos -- and the expense to us of attempting to match this program would have been substantial.

Now let me say a word about the throw-weight.

I believe, as I have said before, that the throw-weight

B 8

is not an important part of the issue, because throw-weight
is not an entity in itself. Throw-weight is a means to an end.
Throw-weight is significant if it is translated into numbers
of warheads and accuracy -- and that, in turn, matters if
you have specific targets against which to use them.

As I pointed out earlier, to the extent that the
United States considers throw-weight significant, there is
nothing in the Agreement to prevent us from building things
a bit larger.

On the other hand, there is no point in building up
a larger throw-weight just for a theoretical quality.

The danger that is seen by us in the Soviet throw-
weight, is that it will enable them to multiply numbers of
warheads on their missiles, and thereby threaten our land
bases.

This danger is not very probable in the existing
generation of MIRVs which we are now testing, because the
numbers of warheads they have on theirs is not significantly
larger than the number of warheads we have on ours; and
in some categories, it is smaller than the numbers we have
now.

However, if you try to analyze throw-weight, you also

B 9

have to analyze the vulnerability of the target.

The Soviet Union has 85 percent of its throw-weight in the most vulnerable target, that is to say in its land-based missile.

The United States has only about 25 percent of its throw-weight in its most vulnerable targets -- i.e. our land-based missiles.

In the 1980s the greater flexibility of our force, and the greater vulnerability of their force, is very likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their forces is likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force -- regardless of what the weight of the individual warhead is.

So we believe that this agreement has, for the first time in the nuclear age, established a ceiling -- for the first time in the nuclear age, enabled both sides to plan without the fear of an escalating numerical arms race in both the overall numbers and in the numbers of those vehicles which have multiple warheads.

For the first time, it gives us the base from which to negotiate for our reduction and it has eliminated from the negotiations those items that were

B 1

!!

most divisive within the Alliance.

So if we are worried about the arms race, not only about the numbers, but about the self-fulfilling properties about the perceptions by each side of the other -- and about the arguments that will have to be used to continue this -- then I believe that the achievements of this ceiling will turn out to have been of considerable historical importance.

Now this is particularly true if you look at the alternative:

The alternative to making this Agreement was for the United States to begin a substantial additional building program of its own.

Certainly, the Soviet Union was not likely to reduce its numbers, if the United States, perceiving its beginning of its MIRV program and its escalation of its own numbers, would do nothing more than maintain its presence. Therefore the realistic choice for the United States was either a substantial buildup now, beginning now, after which, perhaps, somewhat lower levels might have been possible -- or to settle for what was achieved.

Our judgment was that the risk

B 11

of this escalating to an arms race -- not to speak of the
probability of obtaining it from the Congress -- all combine
to argue for making this preliminary settlement now.

So let me stop here.

Q Mr. Secretary, how did it come to pass that
the Soviets became unconcerned about the matter of
compensation for the British and French and the Chinese
missile sites?

A Because -- recognize that somebody had to
come to the conclusion that some level of destructive power..

Q Was that a throw-weight point with them, in
the first place, or were they really --

A Well, I can only tell you that Alex Johnson
used to say to us that there are two points on which the
Soviet Union would never give ground:

One is equal aggregate.

And the other was forward based systems.

So I must say that we had all expended an enormous
amount of ingenuity, trying to figure out ways of bending
these issues, and we were unprepared for the position of
the Soviets.

B 12

Q. They just made it -- huh?

A. they just made it.

We had no advance warning and in Moscow, the last word I heard from the Soviet Union was that they were giving us theoretical equality, but they wanted us to deduct from that the British and the French and --

Q. Is it thinkable that Brezhnev would have gone to Vladivostok to agree to something that had not been pre-approved by the Politiburo?

A. No.

(12 LINE DELETION)

B 13

(12 LINE DELETION)

Q So that is to say that the Agreement was not
fully negotiated in tough bargaining in Vladivostok?

A That is to say it was negotiated in tough
bargaining in Vladivostok?

Q If he checked back for Politburo approval
after the fact it -- I thought you said.

A I would have thought that he obeyed the guidelines before he came to Vladivostok -- and then the evolution of the negotiations in Vladivostok was, in my

B 14

judgment checked back in Moscow overnight -- and the
new proposal he made on Sunday morning, almost certainly
resulted -- at least from a Politburo decision.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you speak of the 25 percent
of the U.S. throw-weight being land-based, are you speaking
of the present configuration or future configuration?

A That is the present configuration. That is
likely to be less.

Q Well, we have 1,054 land-based missiles --

A This includes our bombers.

Q This includes the bombers?

A Yes.

Q So if you take the 450 bombers, plus the
600 odd submarine missiles -- that amounts to 75 percent
of our throw-weight?

A Give or take a few percent, yes.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President seemed to hint
last night that the forward based systems that you
mentioned a few moments ago might be entered into the MBFR
talks. Is that likely to --

A Well, this depends on the evolution of the
MBFR talks. They have received no such proposal up to now.

B 15

(15 LINE DELETION)

5

Q Mr. Kissinger, you indicated in Vladivostok that you felt that the Agreement would meet the approval of Senator Jackson. Had you had some previous discussion with him ?

A I may have been a little bit hasty, because it seemed to me that since he criticized the previous Agreement for setting levels too low, that I was not quite

B 16

prepared for having disagreement attached for setting the
levels too high.

And secondly, since Senator Jackson had always
insisted that the major fault of the previous agreement was
the absence of equality -- and since this Agreement achieved
an equality in all of the categories and excluded all of
the items that he had always said should be excluded --
I got carried away by the heady atmosphere of Vladivostok.
It must have been the heat. [Laughter.]

Q You were dazzled.

Q Mr. Secretary, could I -- I am having a
little difficulty with your discussion about whether or not
there are permitted additional weapons and that sort of
thing.

And also, the whole thing of the intelligence
estimate, that you are suggesting that they may be going ahead
with future programs that we hadn't heard of yet.

A Just a minute, now just a minute, that just
isn't true.

In every NSC briefing, for a period of over a year
and a half, we have been presented intelligence estimates
of what the Soviets would be likely to do in the near future.

B 17

and what they were likely to do in the field of total numbers
So that this is nothing new. These numbers were
substantially accepted by the whole intelligence community
but they were refined in the period before -- but they
didn't change much of the intelligence estimates that had
been basically accepted and never challenged.

Q Well all right --

A The fact that you may have not heard of them
before --

Q If I have the content of this straight,
if I understand it correctly, on the basis of generally
understood publications --

A Yes.

Q We have had about 800 deployed MIRVs.

We have had publicly announced plans for something
in the neighborhood of a thousand.

And this Agreement sets a level of 1,320.

The Soviets, at this point, as far as we know, don't
have any MIRVs.

A That is right.

Q So the Agreement in 10 years would permit
them to build up to this 1320. And each one of those

B 18

missiles would have a certain number of warheads.

Now the thing that I'm having difficulty with
here is, obviously, it would cost billions of dollars
for them to build up to the level where we are now,
and it would take a great period of time to do it, too.

A Yes.

Q And this is a catch-up for them, as far as
the MIRVs are concerned.

A Yes.

Q And what you are saying is that we have set
this number "high" if I understand correctly -- or the
number has been set high -- or we have been satisfied with
the number set this high -- because of our fears that
they might have wanted to go way beyond where we are now.

Is that right?

A Way beyond --

Q 1320?

A Way beyond the 1320, that is right.

Q So we actually believe that they not only
were prepared to spend the billions of dollars to catch up
with us, but to go way beyond?

A That we believe that this might well be the case.

B 19

!!

yes.

Q How long have you had that conception?
About a year and a half?

A I think any of you who have heard me speak about this problem, have heard me speak with a great sense of urgency, that if the MIRV development were not brought under control, that it would drive both sides in a direction which would become unmanageable.

And it was based on these intelligence estimates plus the fact that if the Soviet Union had decided, after the expiration of the Interim Agreement to put its MIRVs into new holes, rather than into the old holes -- then if you assumed that they were aiming to give any number -- 1,500 missiles -- 1,500 MIRVs -- we might have faced a missile force of 4,000 rather than 2,500 -- if that had been their decision. I am not saying it would have been their decision, but it was certainly their option.

Now, it is not true that our program was only a thousand. Our program was well above a thousand.

Q Our program is publicly announced.

A Well our program is publicly announced, whatever it is -- we have set the level at roughly our program.

B 20

Q It speaks -- the intention of our program was "about 1320."

A Give or take --

Q And publicly announced -- we have about a thousand.

A I haven't followed what the publicly announced program is -- I think they have announced it for five years but I haven't seen what the publicly announced program is.

Q It was projected for 1286.

That is based on what -- on the TRIDENT?

A You had the TRIDENTS and the Poseidon the Minute men -- and you will come to the figure that Murrey said.

C-1

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same question that he raised, how does one logically reconcile the fact that the Soviet Union, which you say was going to be far beyond any of these projections last October and previously, or last June, was talking with us about a figure half the size of the 1320? What is the logical rationale there?

A First of all, the Soviet Union did not accept the figure--which was a little higher than half -- for a five-year period. Here we are talking about a ten-year period. Since the Soviet Union did not accept the figure, which was somewhat larger than half of what we ettled for for a five-year period, which was the beginning of their MIRV program, you have a rather good estimate that for the second five-year period they would have done at least as much again, and, therefore, in a ten-year period you would have been well above 1320.

Q Who wanted the 1320? Is that the Russian figure or the American figure?

A It's substantially our figure. I'm not saying we couldn't have had a hundred less.

Q Mr. Secretary, we could have had three or four less would you say?

A I doubt it.

C-2

2

Q Mr. Secretary, that raises a basic question --
and this is the last one I want to ask -- but essentially --

A We were told, incidentally, by the Defense
Department that once you got above 700 MIRVs we might just
as well [inaudible] our program.

Q Why is that, because the cost gets
phenomenal?

Q The MIRV deployment began since you became
advisor to President Nixon.

A That is right, but the development didn't
begin.

Q Not the development; the deployment.

A Yes.

Q Now, very seriously, as you look back at
it now are you sorry you went ahead with the MIRV?

A Well, that's a good question. And I think this
is the same question that people faced when the hydrogen
bomb was developed. And it raises the issue whether your
development of MIRVs or of a weapon produces the development
on the other side, or whether by not going ahead you then
simply give an advantage to the other side.

I would say in retrospect that I which I had
thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more

3

C-3

thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did. What conclusion I would then have come to I don't know. But I would like for you gentlemen to remember this, megalomaniac as I am, I do not claim that I made the basic weapons decision in 1969 and '70. But I still wish I had thought through the implications of the MIRVed world more fully in 1969 and 1970. But this was not the problem we faced from '72 on.

Q Mr. Secretary, it seems to me there is a basic conflict here I would like to get squared away. If I understand correctly --

A My relation to the various bureaus is that of the Queen of England and her Cabinet, each bureau gets two hours of my time. Go ahead.

Q I wanted to ask about what appears to be a conflict between what you and the President are saying about putting a cap on the growth of weapons development and what this agreement actually provides to the extent that I understand it.

A It puts a ceiling on the numbers of weapons, in certain categories.

Q Right. And you have always said, if I understood correctly, that warheads and in many respects a key figure simply because one is killed by warheads and

4

C-4

not by vehicles.

A That is true.

Q Now, since numbers of warheads are not limited and throw-weight is not limited -- indeed, we have said that we maintain the option to build up our throw-weight -- isn't it misleading to say that a ceiling has been put on the numbers of weapons?

A In the sense that you argue that the number of warheads can be increased.

Q Yes.

A Well, we have a good estimate -- in fact, we have a certain estimate -- of the number of warheads that the Soviet Union had deployed on their present missiles because we have some idea of their testing program. And they are not likely to deploy a warhead that they hadn't tested. That's axiomatic.

So to all practical purposes we have an estimate of the total number of warheads that are going to be deployed at that period. And they have a rather good estimate of the total number of warheads that we are likely to deploy in that period.

Now, it is, of course, possible that the true number, within the total limit of 1320, could develop warheads which

5

C-5

have larger numbers -- could develop MIRVs which have
larger number of total warheads on them than the MIRVs
that are presently designed. The question will soon have
to be raised. In fact, it is a question that will have to
be raised now: What is the advantage in multiplying the
number of warheads beyond a certain point? As all of you
know, I have never taken the view of numerical equality
as seriously as some other people.

First of all, our estimate is that in the number
of warheads, we will remain ahead in this ten-year period,
for a variety of reasons, including the greater sophisticatic
of our MIRVs. But in any event, we will reach a total
number in which whether you build more warheads or not it
seems extremely unlikely to give you a decisive, or even
significant, superiority. You have that theoretical
capability within the 1320 limit.

And, moreover, I would like to point out that we
intend as soon as this agreement is ratified and begins
to operate to begin negotiations on the reduction.

Q Mr. Secretary, two questions about the
reduction. One you have just answered. One, does this
agreement as it now stands commit both sides to enter into

C-6

negotiation for reduction at some point, and, if so,
at what point?

A It permits both sides to enter into
negotiations for reduction no later than 1980.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I follow that up, please, if I may? As I read it, you are not committing yourself to begin the negotiations before December of 1981.

A 1980 or 1981.

Q Right, but it could begin as late as December 1980 as I read the agreement. The question really is, realistically do you have any expectation that such arms reduction talks will begin seriously long before that?

A That will be our effort. And I think that once proposals on both sides have stabilized -- you see, the Soviet Union will have to reduce their forces to get to the level of 2400. If they deploy some of their new forces, some of the land-based mobiles that people are talking about, they will have to reduce even more forces. I think once the equal aggregates have been reached -- or put it another way, once the Soviets have gone down to the level that is required, I think we will certainly urge the beginning of talks on reduction. And I have great hopes

C-7

that we will succeed.

Q Well, at what point -- how long will it take them to MIRV up to a point where they will be willing to enter into arms reduction talks?

A Well, supposing the arms reduction brings about a reduction in the number of MIRVs and they haven't yet reached that level. So what? Then they would just not build up to the presently permitted and only build up to t newly permitted levels. I think it will be easier to have reduction talks once you are not in an open-ended arms race in which both sides are watching production programs of the other, whose scope they cannot assess.

Q Mr. Secretary, you described here, if I get it correctly, a process over these last months in which the Soviet Union point by point gave in to us while we resolutely held our ground. I guess I have two questions. What did we give up to them? And if you did not yield at some point in the last month anything to them, what's your reasoning on why this came about?

A I believe that one of the difficulties of the previous negotiations was the uncertainty of our domestic situation. Conversely, I think that they confront a new President as an individual with whom they might have

C-8

to deal for a six-year period. Secondly, they dealt with
a President unencumbered by past history, who, therefore,
if he failed to get an agreement could go back to his
original defense orientation and really pick up the arms
race. Thirdly, I believe that they probably attempted to
vindicate the significance of detente by getting off on
the right foot with a new President or with a new
Administration.

I think it was a combination of all, plus fourthly.
they probably analyzed what I believe any thoughtful
analyst of the strategic situation would have to do--that
the field of strategic forces superiority is an illusive
concept. And I think it was a combination of all of these
factors that produced rather significant movement between
July and December -- and I must tell you quite candidly,
rather unexpectedly.

Q How many warheads do you foresee on each
side in 1985?

A A very substantial number.

Q Well, we can multiply out and figure about
what we would have. And do you anticipate the Russians
about the same number.

C-9

A Well, I would expect us to have somewhat
above 10,000, and I would expect the Soviets to have less.

Q Do your figures work out to about 11,000,
Mr. Secretary?

A That sounds reasonable to me. I haven't
multiplied it out. I expect the Soviets to be below that.

Q Somewhat less?

A Maybe 9,000. It depends how many warheads.

Q Mr. Secretary, you say the Soviets would
have to reduce their force level --

A Could we put all the figures ON DEEP
BACKGROUND. All the figures I give I would like
to put on DEEP BACKGROUND so that you multiply it out.

Q You mentioned the Soviets would have to
reduce their forces. You mean the forces they actually
have deployed?

A The Soviet Union under SALT I are permitted,
and would reach, something like 950 plus 1401. 2350.

Q But they are not at that level now?

A Well, it depends. If you count the SS-7,
they are at that level now because what they are doing now
is to trade in SS-7s and ss for submarine-launched missiles.

[LQ]

C-10

So if you count the 210 SS-7s and 8s, they are in the area between 2300 and 2400. And if you add the 150 bombers that they have, they are about at a total level of 2500 right now. So they will have to give up probably their bomber force.

Q Mr. Secretary, what's your estimate of the Chinese nuclear capacity five years from now at a time when the reduction talks are supposed to start between here and Moscow?

A Insignificant.

Q Still insignificant?

A Well, if you talk about strategic nuclear forces, I believe it will be insignificant.

Q Dr. Kissinger, just on the subject of throw-weight again, you conceded here this afternoon that, at least theoretically, the Soviets have the potential of increasing the number of warheads that a given missile could deliver given their greater throw-weight, theoretically.

A So do we. We could increase the number of warheads on our missiles at least as fast as the Soviet Union could, because you have to assume that the Soviet Union is going to deploy the warheads which they have recently tested. You cannot assume that they are going to deploy a larger number of warheads than those they have

C-11

tested. Therefore, you have to assume that this generation of Soviet MIRVs is going to use the number of warheads that they have tested. That number is comparable to the number of warheads that we carry on smaller missiles because of our superior technology.

If either side considers it more important, we could, if we wanted to, put more warheads even on our existing missiles. We have the additional option if we wanted to design a larger missile to put into the existing holes which could carry many more warheads. So if you are asking about who could expand the number of his warheads more rapidly, the Soviet Union or we, I would say that over the period of the agreement I would bet on us.

Q What I was really asking is what is to prevent there being, in effect, another arms race in that given area?

A The fact that it doesn't make a great deal of sense to increase the number.

Q Yes, but you have frequently told us that what is important is the perception that each side has of the other. And I can easily see this becoming a political football in this country.

[LL]

C-12

A The capacity of this country to develop political footballs seems to me to be unlimited. (Laughter) But I'll tell you what my recommendation to the President would be. It would be that we would not go into wild multiplication until we see the Soviets actually testing something.

Q On this question of policing the MIRVs, Mr. Secretary, would you dwell briefly on that? Isn't that an area we are going to have to go into now, and isn't it tough and intricate, a major issue?

A The major issue in the negotiations now is going to be the verification issue. And it is because of an accident of Soviet design, luckily not as difficult as it might easily be. Let me explain.

The Soviets have developed missiles to carry their MIRVs which do not fit into the existing silos; in other words, which require extensive modifications of the existing silos. Therefore, we will assume that any silo that is being substantially modified will be carrying a MIRV missile. Therefore, we will be able to count the number of their missiles by the number of silo modifications of that type, with which we are very familiar and which are undisputed.

C-13

Or to put it in another way, any missile that has been tested in a MIRV mode successfully will be counted by us as being MIRVed. In other words, we will not permit the Soviet Union to claim that they are deploying an SS-17 or 19 with the argument that it will only have a single warhead since we believe that the testing program on the SS-17 and 19 has been substantially successfully concluded. Any silo that we see modified to take an SS-17 or 19 we would count as being MIRVed.

This is one of the issues that will have to be discussed in the verification. Otherwise, there is almost no other way of verifying because you could not accept the unsupported statement of the Soviet Union that certain silos have only single warheads.

Q How can they find out about ours, Mr. Secretary?

A Because they read *Aviation Weekly*.

Q But, Mr. Secretary, to get back to this question. Might it not come down to the need for on-site inspection.

A Dobrynin told me the other day about a weapon I didn't know we possessed, and his description of it was perfect. I checked in the Pentagon. It was exactly the same the characteristics. It won't come along until 1980. He

C-14

had read it in a technical journal. It didn't help us
in the negotiations.

Q Can I ask this? Might we not have to go to
on-site inspection to make certain that they are obeying
the limit?

A No. There may have to be certain collateral
restraints, into which I do not want to go now. But I
believe that it is quite possible -- we have gone over this
in the Verification Panel on innumerable occasions -- that
if we can obtain the position that any silo that accepts
a 17 or 19 missile -- and we have already told the Soviets
that this is going to be our definition -- and after the 18
program is completed, which it is not yet, any silo that
accepts SS-18 missiles will be treated as MIRVed, I think
we have a largely fool-proof method of inspection, with a
few collateral restraints.

On submarines, the problem is going to be
 somewhat more complicated because we have not yet seen
any tests of their submarine-based missiles. Therefore,
don't know what the characteristics will be. But on
whole we would have to again assume that any submarine
has of carrying a MIRVed missile, once the missile has

C-15

been tested, likely will have to be counted as
MIRVed, just as all of our submarines will have to be
counted as MIRVed.

Q Well, could they have 17s and 19s in silos' that haven't been modified?

A No.

Q All those that have the new missiles have been modified?

A That's right. And on that we have no question.
And they have never --

Q You said they had never what?

A This is the argument that we have put to them. They have never rejected it. They've also never accepted it. But it's the only possible -- if that is rejected, I see no other basis for inspection.

When you talk, Peter, of on-site inspection, we went through
that drill in '69 and '70 when we didn't understand the
MIRV problem well enough and thought you could simply screw
a MIRV warhead on an existing missile. And actually, on-site
inspection wouldn't help you very much because you would
have to have a random inspection, you couldn't inspect
every missile every day. With the time delays that would
be involved until you get to the site, they could easily take

C-16

off the MIRV warhead and put on a single warhead, have a
MIRV storage, and when you leave put the MIRV back on the
missile.

Q Just like used car dealers? (Laughter)

A Really I would not know how you would run
on-site inspection.

Q Would it be fair to say that if they rejected
the verification formula there is no deal?

A If they reject the verification formula, unless
there is enormous ingenuity in which we come up with another
one, I really wouldn't know where to begin. I think if they
reject verification it will be very hard to conceive how
there can be a deal.

Q What is your feeling? Do you think they will
accept it?

A I think they will accept it. I cannot
conceive that they have gone this far in order to blow
up the agreement now when verification is used, when it was
very easy to blow it up on numbers.

Q Unless they are buying time.

A What time are they buying? Maybe one cycle
of the defense budget. If we find out by next April that
they are stalling on verification, and if they are worried

C-17

about us going into a bigger defense program, I think we
would have a much better chance with Congress having in
good faith accepted these numbers and then finding that
the numbers evaporate because they won't agree to really
the only reasonable inspection system that can be designed.
And there is no alternative to this inspection.

Q What is your *aide memoire*? How detailed is
that?

A It is about what I have described.

Q Is it a very lengthy agreement?

A It's about a page. It has the numbers. I
gave you the numbers.

Q Mr. Secretary, given the psychology of the
arms race up to now, why do you think that pressures
won't develop to keep improving the weapons that are
agreed on?

A Well, but to say that you haven't got
anything because you haven't got everything is a very
dangerous course.

Q I'm saying for the future, spending for
example.

A Well, whether you are improving weapons
within an accepted ceiling or whether you are driving

[L]

C-18

the ceiling while you are improving the weapons seems to
me two different problems. It's quite possible that some
improvements within the existing weapons would be possible.
Again you have to distinguish two categories. The improvement
in the Soviet force after they reach their ceiling will be
composed of 1320 MIRVs and 1080 unMIRVed
vehicles. My guess is that most of them will be ICEMs.
The improvements that you can make in single-warhead weapons
in relation to the strategic utility are relatively marginal.
So you are asking -- we have greater flexibility making
improvements because our force is going to be composed of
bombers and other elements. Now, the area of improvement
is likely to be, therefore, in MIRVs. Now, you can improve
accuracy, and you can improve yield. Then you have to
ask yourself again, why?

The strategically unsettling effect of improvement
in accuracy and yield is not as large when it is constricted
within fixed numerical limits as it is when it is also
driven by larger numbers. I find it conceptually very hard to
see how you could get a decisive advantage by technological
innovations that are now foreseeable in the offensive forces
over the period of this agreement. I may be wrong, but I

C-19

think that by limiting the numbers of both the qualitatively
worrisome and the overall figures you have put some very
significant constrictions on the arms race.

Q But the Pentagon will surely want to try
in the technological area to see if they can do this?

A Probably. But at some point I think the
futility of this -- it's one thing when you say the other
side is building at this curve and if you don't match them
they are going to get strategic superiority. That's one
argument. Another argument is when you say you have
relatively stable forces and they are going to get
marginal improvement in accuracy and marginal improvements
in yield against fixed forces where you cannot define how
you would use it. I think that's a more difficult problem.

Q Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say at this
stage that the agreement in Vladivostok rules out the
possibility that either side could achieve in the next
ten years a first-strike capability?

A I would say that yes. With the limitation you
can say that there is a first-strike capability against
certain categories of weapons. I would think that the
land-based missiles on both sides are going to become
increasingly vulnerable. And that is in any case going to

[LJ]

C-20

happen, with or without this agreement. Then it is up
to each side to compose its forces so that the land-based
forces are not the most significant element in its force.
And this I must say is a bigger problem for the Soviets
than for us because over that ten-year period our land-
based force is not going to be the most significant element
in our force.

Q How are we going to verify that there is
not an increase in their land-based mobiles?

A The factor of
confidence we have with respect to land-based mobiles is,
of course, much less than it is with respect to land-based
fixed. Land-based fixed we have almost a hundred percent
confidence. Land-based mobile we could be off by some 25
percent.

You have to remember now that any land-based
mobile of any quantity will have to come out of either
the submarines or the land-based fixed. So if you talk
of a few hundred, we might be off by -- you know, it
depends -- 25 to 30 percent of the total number of land-based
mobiles. And we believe that our accuracy of verification --
we know that our accuracy of that will improve over ten
years.

!! C-21

Q So we are depending on their good faith to take off of something what they add on to the land-based mobiles?

A We are not at all counting on their good faith. In our judgment, we will catch two-third to three-quarters of their land-based mobiles. They could hide the percentage which we think -- the percentage of inaccuracy. But since they don't know the percentage of our inaccuracy, it would be running a risk. But that margin exists.

Q Mr. Secretary, I got the impression from you in Moscow that the breakthrough on FBS was made in Moscow on your last trip there rather than Vladivostok.

A The breakthrough on FBS was substantially made in Moscow, but the breakthrough on the British and French nuclear forces was made at Vladivostok.

Q How can you say, Mr. Secretary, that the Joint Chiefs agreed to this proposal when you say it was not completed until Vladivostok?

A First of all, there are two separate issues. The main lines of our proposals were completed before Vladivostok. And the fact that we were willing to concede somewhat lower numbers in return for larger MIRVs than the

C-22

Soviets were willing. We were in touch with Secretary Schlesinger on several occasions on Saturday. But I think one can always assume that if the Soviet Union gives you slightly larger numbers than you were prepared to accept that this would not be vetoed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were reasonably confident that the Joint Chiefs would approve, and we were not disappointed.

Q No, that part is clear. What about the other side of it though? You were saying by implication if you had tried to go down two or three hundred you would have had a battle on your hands from the Joint Chiefs.

A Not only with the Joint Chiefs. It depends in what category the going down would have taken place.

Q Mr. Secretary, can I go back to the reduction thing just once because of the importance that Senator Jackson, amongst others, at least professes to attach? From what level, at what point, do we hope again to negotiate reductions?

A From the level agreed in these numbers.

Q Before they are attained?

A We are perfectly prepared to discuss this before they are attained.

C-23

I must say, to say that this agreement is inadequate because it doesn't reduce defense spending, and that what we should have done is to get lower numbers when the only way we could have even talked about lower numbers is to drastically increase defense spending and to hold the increase for a large number of years long enough to convince the Soviets that we were going to drive the race through the ceiling with them, at which point we would have got vested interests in this country to accept even the figures that we were going to talk about, seems to me an argument that I find very difficult to deal with. And when at this particular point in terms of the threat to civilization, the strategic stability or any other criteria you can think of, it does not make a great deal of difference whether you have 2400 or 2200, as long as you have a ceiling against which both sides can plan for a ten-year period, something that has never happened in the entire nuclear age when both sides were constantly driven by their fears of what the other side might do. Then I believe that we had an obligation to try to settle for this and not haggle about -- well, there was no possibility for haggling except by driving the arms race.

If we had gone back to Geneva when obviously the

C-24

Soviets attach great symbolic importance to the first meeting between Brezhnev and President Ford in light of all the pressures that had existed against detente -- and I must say one other thing, that if this agreement in which the Soviet Union made very major concessions should suffer the fate of some other negotiations, then we must ask ourselves whether on the other side the whole process of detente may not be drawn into the most serious question. Because here they met every point that all the critics of detente had consistently made, actually quite unexpectedly, in which equality is achieved in all significant categories, in which the arms race in terms of numbers is at least limited, and even qualitative improvements will have to be affected by the fact that they cannot be translated into quantity, I believe that really as a country we should not denigrate this thing.

Q. For comparison purposes, could you give us the figures that the intelligence community came up with about Soviet intentions or capabilities?

A. Well, it's not as simple as Soviet intentions. There are some pretty sophisticated analyses that go into it. If you look at it, analyze the number of Soviet sunsets, for example, that are capable of taking the missile large

C-25

enough to be a plausible candidate for a MIRV. They look at the number of SS-11 silos that have been recently modified. You know, we could easily claim that every SS-11 silo could take a 17 or a 19. And it probably could, and it probably will over a ten-year period. If the Soviet Union had converted every silo it has and every submarine it has, it could have gone well over 2,000 MIRV missiles.

We tried to make it a more realistic assessment on the basis of those silos that had recently been modernized to take another type of warhead which is not MIRVed but more similar to our Polaris warhead, deducted those from the total number of SS-11s, made some analysis of what a rational allocation would be between SS-9s and SS-18s, looked at the submarines to see the likely candidates for MIRVing, and came to the conclusion that the number of MIRVs would be substantially above the figure of 1320.

And the lowest intelligence projection was substantially above 1320. And I might add that at no time in the last ten years have the Soviets operated at our lowest intelligence projection. The median intelligence projection is more reasonably regarded as significant both in total numbers and in MIRVs.

PR #518

28

So the fundamental point we are making is that
military assistance to Turkey is not a favor we do to
Turkey. It is a reflection of a basic relationship.

Secondly, on negotiations with respect to Cyprus,
the United States has indicated on a number of occasions that
in our view, concessions should be made by Turkey -- that
we would use our influence in that direction. And we
have talked to the Greek, Cypriot and Turkish Governments
in that sense.

The Congressional action in October provided a
major setback to these efforts. The domestic crisis in
Turkey was another principal factor.

We believe that over a period of the next few
months, progress in getting negotiations started can be
achieved. Indeed, it was my intention, well known to the part
long before this issue came up and the appointments had been
made, to talk to both the Turkish and Greek Foreign
Ministers at some length, within the framework of the NATO
meeting, to see whether matters could not be moved forward.

Now I would like to emphasize that the question
of military aid to Turkey does not indicate any particular
predeliction towards Turkey -- nor does it indicate any

PR #518

29

support for Turkey on the particular issues that are before us in Greek-Turkish negotiations, or on the Cypriot issue. It is to be seen in the context of the overall security of the West.

I do believe that progress is possible in negotiations on Cyprus, and the United States is certainly prepared to use its influence in the direction that I have indicated.

Q Mr. Secretary, last Tuesday, during your second session before the Senate Finance Committee, you were asked by Senator Byrd to confirm that Soviet action during the October war was a violation of the May 1972 U.S. - Soviet Agreement on Detente.

And you candidly admitted that Soviet action was, indeed, in violation of that Agreement.

What has happened since the last war to indicate to you that Soviet action during another war, if another war would erupt in the Middle East, would not be a violation.

A My answer -- the question was a little more specific, and my answer was more precise.

PR #518.

30

The question was: If the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate in the war in the Middle East, that this would constitute a violation of the principles that have been established.

And I would have to say that if the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate, this would be considered a violation of the principles.

We are seeking to produce the maximum incentives for Soviet restraint on a global basis, including the Middle East, through a variety of measures, including of course direct conversations on the subject.

I would say that in fact the SALT Agreement ought to provide incentives for restraint if it is viewed as it should be -- as a political and not only a military decision.

What the Soviet Union will do in a specific crisis, I cannot now foretell. Our attitude, in any event is clear: We do not believe that either of the super powers should encourage a widening of any conflict that might arise.

Q Mr. Secretary, as you are aware, sir, the governments of the Middle Eastern countries and citizens

PR #518

31

of those countries are using their oil money to buy into
Western industries -- most recently in Germany, and there
was an unsuccessful attempt to buy into Lockheed Aircraft
in this country.

Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense indicated some
reservations about any third countries and their nationals
buying into key American industries, particularly defense
industries and particularly those which have access to
classified information.

What could you tell us is the official U.S.
position on this, and have we made representations to
other governments?

A. No, we have not made representations to
other governments, partly because we are not absolutely clear
what the nature of the representation is that we ought to
be making -- since on the one hand we are trying to get
them to spend oil income in this country.

What we are doing, is to start a study on the
implications of substantial investments, at least in the
United States -- how we can keep track of them, and what
the complete implications are -- or at least to identify
the dangers against which we should guard. We have just

PR #518

begun thinking about this, and it will take us several
weeks to form a clear judgment.

Q Mr. Secretary, this morning the Venezuelan
Government announced nationalization of U.S. Steel and
Bethlehem Steel the first of the year.

Now the companies, apparently, have agreed to
the terms of the settlements, so that legalities don't
arise -- but I was wondering whether you, in general, have
any attitude toward this, and whether you foresee any
trend in Latin America along this line?

A Well I have not yet seen the precise
terms of the settlement.

It is my understanding that the expropriation
was negotiated with the companies, and my impression is
that the companies are not dissatisfied by the terms.

The U.S. position is that while we do not
recommend expropriation, and indeed, while it runs counter
to the investment of private capital, which may be one of
the best sources for the underdeveloped countries of
capital -- we do not, as a government, object to it if there
is fair compensation and due legal process. And this seems
to have been the case in Venezuela, though I want to study

PR #518

33

the precise terms.

Q Mr. Secretary, let's just get back to
your Chicago speech:

What kind of time scale do you envisage, and
when do you think, and how will you certify that the
consumers have made -- in the main -- expressed sufficient
solidarity to the producers -- and in that sense, how do you
envisage bringing France into it?

A We believe that
substantial progress towards consumer solidarity can be
made within the next three or four months. We will
know when adequate consumer solidarity has been achieved.
We have rather clear ideas. They are after all the
yardsticks that we have laid down in the Chicago
speech.

On the other hand, we won't pretend that there
is consumer solidarity when there isn't, and if there
isn't, we will continue our own consumer-producer
dialogue.

Q Well at what point -- I mean at what
point do you think France can be persuaded that she has
made the right gestures?

PR #518

34

A We are not interested in "gestures" -- we are interested in reality. And we are not looking for excuses by which to pretend that solidarity has been achieved.

There is a rather clear program -- progress towards a program -- that would enable us to proceed with a multi-lateral producer dialogue, and we think this can be settled amicably and with goodwill.

I believe that the conversations between President Ford and the French President in Martinique are going to make major progress towards this objective -- at least this is the attitude with which we will approach it.

Q At Rabat -- but before the Arafat visit to the General Assembly, where he was hailed -- President Sadat, of Egypt promised you that he would continue along with your step-by-step strategy on the Middle East.

Now that position of Egypt seems a good deal more awkward than it may have seemed at the time, and you are seeing Allon, and Mr. Brezhnev is going to Cairo in January.

Is Egypt still able to deliver on this promise, and what initiatives do you have with the Egyptians between

PR # 518

35

now and the Brezhnev visit?

A. As I have pointed out, we believe that the next phase of Middle East diplomacy will be most effective if we don't speculate about the intentions of various parties.

I have heard nothing so far to indicate that the positions that were publicly announced at the beginning of November, have changed.

Obviously, the Middle East is a volatile area in which conditions can change. I have not heard anything to this effect, nor do I have any indication that it has happened, so we just have to see what --

Q. To follow up -- when are you going to see your next Egyptian official? And where?

A. No plans exist, right now, for my seeing any Egyptian official.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson, in the memorandum he distributed yesterday, called on his colleagues to send back the SALT Agreement, as it stands now, on the grounds that the numbers are too high.

What would be the effect on overall political relationships with the Soviet Union, if in fact you were

PR #518

not able to get approval of the Agreement, if in fact it
were signed with the numbers as they are now?

A - I would say two things:

If the Senate or the Congress wants to send back
the Agreement to us with instructions to get lower numbers,
they better send with it an authorization in the Appropriat-
ions Bill for $5 to $10 billion to increase our strategic
forces. It doesn't make any sense to instruct us to get
better numbers without, at the same time, being prepared to
pay the price of the arms buildup that will be the only
possible incentive by which an Agreement for lower numbers
could be achieved

Of course, the point might then also be reached
at which 2400 would represent a reduction of the overall
forces of both sides -- and so some theoretical satisfaction
might be achieved politically.

One would have to say that the Soviet Union made
very major concessions in Vladivostock. Anybody familiar with
the negotiating record must know that the Soviet Union gave up
its position on a whole range of issues..

Now if this, too, leads to a divisive debate in
the United States, and if the pattern of the Trade Bill is

PR #518

37

repeated, I think then the Soviet Union will only be able
to conclude that a political detente with us faces
domestic difficulties of an insuperable nature in the
United States.

And therefore, I believe that the consequences
of such an action would be extremely serious on the political
level. And the consequences in terms of the arms race
would be equally serious. To refuse this Agreement without
being prepared for a massive increase in defense spending,
especially on strategic forces, would compound all the
difficulties that we confront.

Q Mr. Secretary, when you were in South Korea
with President Ford, did you discuss with President Park the
release of the political prisoners and the restoration of a
democratic government -- in view of the strong Congressional
opposition to further military aid to such a repressive
regime?

A The Presidential Press Secretary pointed
out in Korea that the subject was discussed, but it wouldn't
be appropriate to go into detail.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your
time this morning.

[Proceedings terminated at 11:25 a.m.]

THE HONORABLE HENRY KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr Speaker, Mr Ambassador, Distinguished guests,

I am in a difficult position, since I did not know
Sir Winston, but I have admired him all my life. And I asked
myself, after I was handed a commemorative speech draft by
the Department of State, what I might say that would be
significant. And it seemed to me that the only meaningful
thing I could say - I could talk about - is to speak to you
extemporaneously about what Winston Churchill means to those
of us who attempt to practice, inadequately, by comparison to
him, the art of statesmanship today.

And one has to begin by asking oneself how it is that
this son of the Victorian Age, who grew up before the First
World War, is more relevant to us today than most of our
contemporaries. What is it that he did and said that moves
us so in our time?

As far as I am concerned, it is not only because he led
his people and all of civilisation in a victorious war,
for no British Statesman would have had another choice. But
it is that his convictions, his style and his nobility make
us all proud to have been his contemporary. In our time,
which is confused by detail and obsessed by difficult choices,
of which it knows all the parameters and few of the purposes,
it is well to remember a heroic leader, who was willing to walk
alone and who illustrated the profoundest problem of leadership;
which is not intelligence, since most leaders are of roughly equal
intelligence; and it is not technical skill, which can easily be
hired; but it is to have a vision of the future and the courage
to walk towards it.

Peoples learn only from experience. They know only when it is too late to act. But their leaders must act as if their intuition were already experienced, as if their vision were the truth. If they get too far ahead of their contemporaries they may find themselves isolated. If they confine themselves to the experience of their contemporaries, they doom themselves to irrelevance. Winston Churchill knew much isolation, but he was *never* irrelevant.

And I would like to follow some of the remarks that were made by Sir Christopher about, not what Sir Winston did before the war and during the war, but about his vision of the period after the war, because his foresight was as unfailing then as it had been throughout his life.

He understood, having just emerged from a desperate war, that the most overwhelming problem that mankind faced was the problem of peace. In 1945 he wrote: "The bomb brought peace, but men alone can keep that peace and henceforward they will keep it under penalties which threaten the survival not only of civilisation, but of humanity itself. In these years we must remould the relationships of all men, wherever they dwell, in all the nations. We must remould them in such a way that these men do not wish or dare to fall upon each other for the sake of vulgar and outdated ambitions, or for passionate differences in ideology; and that international parties of supreme authority may give peace on earth and decree justice among men."

No better statement of our contemporary agenda has been stated in the nearly 30 years that have passed. And, as Sir Christopher pointed out, this leader, who all his life had been a passionate anti-communist, profoundly distrustful of the Soviet Union, nevertheless realised that the fundamental problem of the post-war period was to achieve what we would today

And where others were waiting to build situations of
strength, he realised that time was short and that we must
bring matters to a head as rapidly as we possibly could for a
rapid settlement. He said, in 1946: "Our difficulties and
dangers with the Soviet Union will not be removed by closing our
eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see
what happens. Nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement.
What is needed is a settlement; and the longer this is delayed
the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers
will become".

He knew too that the United States had a major
responsibility and that the unity of the English-speaking
people was at the core of Atlantic unity. And again he evoked it
with his usual eloquence. "The price of greatness" he said
about the United States "is responsibility. If the people
of the United States had continued in mediocre station,
struggling with the wilderness, absorbed in their own affairs
and a factor of no consequences in the movement of the world, they
might have remained forgotten and undisturbed beyond their
protecting oceans. But one cannot rise to be in many ways the
leading community in the civilised world without being involved
in its problems, without being convulsed by its agonies, and
inspired by its causes".

In 1946 he said "The American Eagle sits on his perch,
a large, strong bird with formidable beak and claws. There he
sits motionless; and Mr Gromyko is sent day after day to prod him
with a sharp pointed stick - now his neck, now under his wings, now
his tail feathers. All the time the Eagle keeps quite still. But
it would be a great mistake to suppose that nothing is going on
inside the breast of the Eagle." And when the Eagle stirred,
Sir Winston knew that it had to be based on the friendship of
the English-speaking people.

And when I quote him so much, it is because I could not
presume to match his eloquence, even as I share his views.
"In these last years of my life," he said "there is a message
of which I conceive myself to be a bearer. It is a very simple
message. It is that we should stand together. We should
stand together in malice to none, in greed for nothing, but in
defence of those causes which we hold dear. We ought, as I
said to the Congress of the United States in a dark hour in
1941, to walk together, in majesty and peace."

And, as Sir Christopher pointed out, just as he was not a
little Englander, he was also not confining his inspiration to
the English-speaking people. He, who had fought Germany in
Europe in two wars, was the first leading statesman to call for a
united Europe which knew no victors or vanquished; in which all the
little children in this tormented world may find themselves not
victors nor vanquished, but the heirs of all the treasures of
the past; and masters of all the signs, the abundance, and the
glory of the future.

And it is a measure of our contemporary travail that
the agenda which was sketched by Sir Winston in 1945, 1946
and 1947 is still unfulfilled. The problem of peace has still
eluded us. Indeed its definition is still disputed. The unity
of Europe has not yet been achieved and the Atlantic Community
has remained illusive. And the measure of our success still
remains the fulfilment of Sir Winston's wishes.

But if perchance we should succeed, a generation too late,
to achieve his inspiration, he would be with us still, because
we would still need and remember his style of leadership. We
would still remember that here was a leader who knew who he was
and who did not need success to define his values. He did not
need power to measure his quality and he knew his worth regardless

of approbation. He wrote once: "the only guide to a man is his conscience. The only shield to his memory is the rectitude and sincerity of his action. It is very imprudent to walk through life without this shield, because we are so often mocked by the failure of our hopes and the upsetting of our calculations. But with this shield, however the fates may play, we march always in the ranks of honour."

This theme of honour and nobility recurs through all the speeches and all the writings of Sir Winston, because he knew that all people live by a sense of continuity; that they must treat challenges as an elevation of their spirit and not as a technical issue to be overcome by tactics. "When danger is far off, " he wrote once, "we may think of our weakness. When it is near, we must never forget our strength." And in 1940 he said: "these are not dark days. These are great days - the greatest that our country has ever lived. And we must all thank God that we have been allowed to play a part in making these days memorable in the history of our race".

He understood that it matters not only *that* things are done, but *how* things are done. And therefore he showed man of what he is capable; and he demonstrated that cathedrals are not built by saints, that politics become insoluble only when it is purely tactical.

And therefore he fulfilled his life and our future in words that he wrote nearly 70 years ago. "What is the use of living", he wrote in 1917, "if it be not to strive for noble causes and to make this world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone. How else can we put ourselves in harmonious relation with the great varieties and consolations of the infinite and the eternal. And I avow my faith that we are marching

towards better days. Humanity will not be cast out. We
are going on; and already behind the distant mountains is the
promise of the sun".

Thank you very much.

DR JAMES BILLINGTON: DIRECTOR, WOODROW WILSON
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS

Mr Speaker, Secretary of State, Mr Ambassador, Ladies and
Gentlemen.

As the national memorial to a President who symbolised
Anglo-American Unity in World War I, the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars is pleased to participate in
this commemoration of a Prime Minister who symbolised that same
unity in World War II. It may, moreover, not be altogether
inappropriate to involve a center for scholars, since Winston
Churchill, like President Wilson, was a man who wrote as well as
made history, who studied as well as practised politics. One might
say the same for our distinguished Secretary of State.

Whether Churchill was writing on the times of Marlborough,
or the World Wars, or the History of the English Speaking peoples,
the history that he wrote was of a piece with that which he made.
It breathed an expansive, epic optimism, a confidence that people
and leaders still matter, and a sustaining belief in Parliamentary
traditions and civilised decency. Churchill was indeed that
rarest of all phenomena - in our century at least - a militant
leader of a moderate cause. He was an individualist among
conservatives, projecting ideology of all kinds, opposing zealots
of racial as well as class warfare, describing the fanatic as

(ic)

"someone who can't change his mind and won't change the subject".
Yet he was not intimidated by such people. Standing alone in
1940, his Britain, as we will recall this evening, refuted Yeats'
vision of the Apocalypse. Things did not fall apart, the centre
did hold and it was the best who were filled with passionate
intensity.

Here to speak for the many distinguished Americans present
and absent, who eventually joined Britain and the Commonwealth
in that heroic war-time struggle is the first of our reminiscers
tonight, Lt Gen Ira Eaker, Commander of the Eighth Bomber Command
beginning in February 1942, then of the Eighth Air Force, and
finally of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean. General
Eaker had many meetings with Churchill and will provide us with
our first retrospective view.

LT GEN IRA C EAKER: COMMANDER, US EIGHTH AIR FORCE
GROUP 1942-1944

Mr Speaker, Mr Secretary, Mr Ambassador, Distinguished
Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It was my curious privilege to spend a considerable time in
conferences presided over by the Prime Minister. My first
meeting with the Prime Minister was indeed unforgettable. I had
gone to Chequers with Air Chief Marshal Harris, the RAF Bomber
Commander, to attend a briefing for Mr Harry Hopkins and General
McNarney, who were taking off later that evening to fly to
Moscow. After dinner the Prime Minister went round the table
calling the Army, Navy and Air Force leaders present by the names
of their opposite numbers on Hitler's staff. When he came to me
he said, "You are Hermann Goering". He then proceeded to berate
me in true Hitler fashion concluding "Your miserable Luftwaffe is

not even able to defeat the pitiful little package of British Spitfires in the Battle of Britain to clear the way for my cross-Channel invasion". Then the Prime Minister pulled a lock of imaginary hair, curled it over his expansive forehead in Hitler fashion and beat his chest and said, "I am your Fuehrer - now what do we do". Hitler's pantomime staff devoted several hours advising Germany what to do to win the War. The Prime Minister then said, "Well, Gentlemen, if I have been correctly advised we now know what the devils will do - we had better circumvent them".

In a subsequent visit to him at Chequers I showed him some photographs of German aircraft factories our bombers had destroyed that week. He handed me an intercepted message from Albert Speer to Hitler which reported that aircraft production for the month was up, saying, "What do you make of that?" I replied, "Sir, I suggest that you were expected to intercept that signal since it might induce you to discontinue the bombing as ineffective: does Speer ordinarily communicate with Hitler in the clear?" He said, "Perhaps you are right, time will tell; in the meantime whenever you can bring me photographs of bombed out German factories you will be most welcome".

While riding with the Prime Minister to Portsmouth on his private train - where he had gone to welcome the first US Division arriving in England for "Overlord" - I said in the course of our time together, "Mr Prime Minister, one of the boldest decisions you have made since I have been in Britain was to send the last armoured division out of England to Cairo to stop Rommell. I know the little that was left in England to meet the expected German invasion; how could you take that chance?" Mr Churchill said that he had gone to school in Germany as a young man and he knew the Germans well. He also said he had taken the measure of

the boastful house-painter who was now their leader and knew that
the "mad corporal" would never dare to invade this Island. He
concluded with a slight smile, "I also had complete confidence
that when the build-up of landing craft in the French Channel
ports reached alarming proportions our allied air forces would
slice it."

Mr Churchill as some here well know had a very wry sense of
humour and sometimes a devastating sarcasm. After one of the weekly
anti-submarine meetings at No 10 Downing Street, when the Prime
Minister suggested that the Navy try a certain course of action,
an Admiral observed that that might not be in line with Navy
tradition. Whereupon the Prime Minister replied, "Ah, yes, Naval
tradition - Rum, Sodomy and the Lash".

Shortly after the Yalta Conference a signal came to me at
my Mediterranean Allied Air Force Headquarters in Italy saying
that a British plane would arrive shortly with a VIPI aboard.
When the plane landed out stepped the Prime Minister. Somewhat
later I said to his RAF aide that I knew, of course, what VIP
signified, but what about VIPI? He replied promptly, "Very
Important Person Indeed". I could find no fault with that.

The last time I saw Britain's great War-time leader was
when he last visited the United States, at a dinner given by
President Eisenhower - I see many Flag Officers here tonight who
will remember that occasion. Sir Winston looked old, tired, ill
and listless - but a shadow of the vigorous, vital personality
of the War years. But after President Eisenhower's toast to him
he rose and delivered an eloquent response - almost in his well-
remembered War-time manner. It was obvious that he had conserved
his waning strength all evening for that final brilliant effort.

As General Spaatz and I walked out of the White House that evening, we were depressed and mostly silent, for we realised that we had seen Britain's great War-time leader, now ravaged by the passing years, for the last time. We agreed that he was the most eloquent, inspirational leader of our time - perhaps of all time.

DR JAMES BILLINGTON

Our second retrospective view is provided by a man who, like Churchill himself, is a writer capable of extending horizons and uplifting spirits, while reaching an audience far wider than the classroom. Sir Fitzroy Maclean is esteemed for distinguished service in diplomacy, the Army and Parliament alike. We look to him tonight particularly as the Commander of the British military mission to the Yugoslav partisans in 1943.

Enjoying a close relationship with Sir Winston, Sir Fitzroy assumed the uncertainties of dealing with Marshall Tito and the dangers of communication between partisan countries and allied headquarters. He has been decorated by the French, Yugoslav, Soviet, American and British Governments. We wish, Sir, that the Franklin Mint might have made available yet another medal to express our thanks to you for coming over from Britain especially to share with us tonight your remembrance of the man you served so well.

SIR FITZROY MACLEAN: COMMANDER, BRITISH MILITARY MISSION
TO YUGOSLAV PARTISANS 1943-1945

I want to tell you a very short story about Winston Churchill's first meeting with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It caused me a moment of the most acute personal anxiety.

The meeting took place in the high summer of 1944 in a villa overlooking the bay of Naples, once occupied by Queen Victoria. It was an immediate success. Tito and his Yugoslavs were one of the Prime Minister's favourite subjects and now, here was Tito in the flesh, in Naples, and ready to be talked to. Nor was Tito, for his part, any less delighted. He had put on a splendid new uniform for the occasion and, though suffering somewhat from the heat, looked every inch a marshal. With him were his two gigantic body guards, Bosko and Prlja, who, with submachine guns at the ready, kept a constant watch over him. Having greeted each other enthusiastically, the two great men, Prime Minister and guerilla leader, got down to work.

The talks went well and at one o'clock precisely we broke for lunch. The villa was large enough to provide separate washing facilities for each delegation. Accordingly the Prime Minister and I disappeared down one long corridor and Tito and his two body guards, their submachine guns still at the ready, disappeared down another, running at right-angles to it. Having washed our hands, we made our way back, converging from different directions on the same corner.

It was thus that the Prime Minister, on rounding the corner, found himself looking down the barrels of two submachine guns. This, I realised too late, was the sort of situation that appealed to him immensely. He at once entered into what he conceived to be

(lc)

the spirit of the thing. In his pocket he was carrying, as usual,
a heavy gold cigar case, about the size of a Colt automatic.

Whipping this out of his pocket like a pistol and suddenly
lunging forward as he did so, he presented it in one abrupt
movement at Tito's stomach.

What he did not know (but I did) was that Bosko and Prlja,
after three years as guerillas, were men of lightening reflexes
who took no chances and who, if they thought their Marshal's life
was in danger, would gladly have wiped out all three of the Big
Three with a single burst.

For the space of a split second I saw their trigger-fingers
twitch and only had time to hope that I for one would not survive
what came next. But then Tito began to laugh. Winston, seeing
that his little joke had been a success, laughed too. And Bosko
and Prlja, observing that the danger had passed, lowered their
guns.

Following on into Queen Victoria's fusty dining room, I
took out a large khaki handkerchief and wiped the cold sweat from
my brow. This was one of many such incidents, some hilarious,
some solemn, some worrying, but none ever by any chance dull.

Today, looking back on a fairly long life, almost the only
things in which I take any conscious pride arose in one way or
another from my association with Winston Churchill.

I was lucky enough to work with him a couple of times and
also, with my wife, to be asked every now and then to join him
and his family in their noisy, affectionate, often uproarious
family life. And that, as Christopher has said, was something

that left you both wiser and warmer at heart.

After their meeting, I asked Tito, who is far from stupid, what had struck him most about Winston. He replied instantly: "His humanity". By his essential humanity, as well as by his statesmanship and courage, Winston Churchill did something that very few politicians seem to do nowadays. He caught people's imagination and won their affection.

When I heard of his death, I was on the hill at home in Scotland with my head-shepherd. He is not a man much given to sentiment, but he was greatly moved. "I feel", he said, "as if I had lost one of my own family." And that, I think, is how many of us felt.

DR JAMES BILLINGTON

Churchill was not just a statesman, an historian, a strategist. He was also an artist - a cellist in early life, a painter in later years as we have been able to see in the halls this evening. But always and above all an artist with words. If parliamentary institutions were his bricks, to allude to yet another of his skills, language was the cement: it held things and people together.

His world was not just that of battlefield tactics at Agincourt, but of those haunting speeches, the night before the battle, in Shakespeare's Henry V. And he made us all part of an even greater drama: his uncommon speech. Ennobled our common language even as it defined our common cause. As President Kennedy said when conferring Honorary American Citizenship on Churchill in 1963: "He mobilised the English language and sent it into battle".

To us in America these words came largely by radio, a medium which he helped redeem, stylistically as well as politically, from its debasement into harangue and incantation by the totalitarian loud speakers of the 1930s. It seems appropriate therefore that our last recollection tonight should come from a representative of that pioneering generation of radio reporters who helped bring a new international consciousness - from the world of Churchill to that of ordinary Americans. Eric Sevareid was present in London during the Blitz in 1940 and again in 1944 and 1945. It is a pleasure to introduce him as our last retrospective view tonight.

## MR ERIC SEVAREID

I feel uneasily honoured. Averell Harriman was to have been here. I can take his time, but not his place.

Many of you were movers and shakers in those awful and glorious days. I was a very young watcher and listener, and an awkward speaker of the news that you were making.

We are dealing in memory tonight. I am sorry that so many of the young intellectuals, here and in Britain, seem to wish to forget the past, to abolish memory. For a nation cut off from its past would be like an amnesiac, disoriented and lost.

That summer of 1940 - London's bright days and livid nights - that was Camelot for those of my age who were there.

A thing called radio had happened and professionally, I, and others happened with it. And with it, Winston Churchill helped save the world. Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, my own mentor and

beloved friend, Ed Murrow. These above all in the English tongue.
Never in the history of human travail had so many owed so much to
so few human voices. They were the bells that sounded sunrise
in the middle of the night. Language is the essence of culture,
and our common tongue saved our common civilisation.

What I wrote of London and the year 1940 in a youthful book
still seems to me no more than the truth:

"The spirit of Britain called up from despair the spirit of
other men, and, wearing the borrowed armour of Britain's example,
men assembled in this bright, beleagured citadel of courage from
France, from Czechoslovakia, from Poland, from Belgium, Holland
and Norway. Backed by the spiritual credit of Britain and that
alone, they scattered their promissory notes everywhere in their
own lands until they stopped the run on the bank of faith; and
their countrymen, first by tens, then by thousands, then by
hundreds of thousands, put their separate funds of courage together
again - new armies were called up in uniform and in mufti."

"It was this spirit and example that tipped the scale in
America and won there a momentous battle for the minds of the
people."

"Almost certainly the historians will misinform posterity. In
the War's full terrible scale, the bombs that fell upon us that
endless summer were few. Several acres would contain the bodies
of those who died. But who can compute the whole result when each
such fall pulled unnamed, unregistered others up from their knees?
What instruments will history possess to recapture the echoing of
Churchill's voice in the empty places of the world, to measure its
decibels in the eardrums of millions who, until then, had thought
that they would never hear again?"

I talked with Churchill only once in a private setting. After the Fulton speech when Randolph took a few of us to his rooms at the Waldorf. I expected the bulldog giant of the photographs, the news reels and the distant view. But he was a doll-like figure of a man. His head was small, the features tiny, his hands the chubby soft hands of a boy. Even the famous cigar was not really part of him. It was a clumsy instrument which he held as one would hold a bat.

I was, conscious of a fey, feline, almost feminine quality. But then he fixed those agate blue eyes upon me. I was helpless and hypnotized. The beam of blue light never wavered. Other people in the room faded away - I felt I was suspended in mid-air.

Then followed the phenomenon of the photographs and the platform. The tiny head grew enormously large. The voice and the body swelled and filled the room.

When he departed, I felt drained. I had been hit by an elemental force - the human will in its most intensely concentrated form. One of Nature's miraculous mutations. A timely gift from History's quixotic Gods.

I have been thankful ever since for that moment, for all those years, and for all the years that have followed. In considerable measure, we owe them to him.

## HIS EXCELLENCY HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR

Mr Speaker, Mr Secretary, Ladies and Gentlemen.

We have talked and reminiscent this evening about a great man: a British Prime Minister; an American citizen and a

defender everywhere of democracy. Let us, as the evening draws
to a close, reflect on all we have learnt from Winston Churchill
and think again of what we have heard this evening. For he was
not only a man for his time. He was a man for our time and for
all time.

As a final salute this evening to his memory, it would, I
think, be fitting to recall the words he wrote to President Kennedy
in April 1963 in a letter accepting, with deep gratitude and
affection, Honorary American citizenship.

"I am, as you know, half American by blood, and the story of
my association with that mighty and benevolent nation goes back
nearly ninety years to the day of my Father's marriage. In this
century of storm and tragedy I contemplate with high satisfaction
the constant factor of the interwoven and upward progress of our
peoples. Our comradeship, and our brotherhood in war were
unexampled. We stood together, and because of that fact the free
world now stands. Nor has our partnership any exclusive nature:
the Atlantic Community is a dream that can well be fulfilled to
the detriment of none and to the enduring benefit and honour of
the great democracies."

So let us now stand and drink a last toast, at the close of
his centenary celebration, to the memory of Sir Winston Churchill.

It is an unusual experience to be heralded by a fanfare of trumpets. But this is an unusual occasion. The fanfare, of course, is not for me, but for my pleasant duty, which is twofold.

First to welcome you all as guests of my wife and myself and of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. You have done us an honour in coming tonight. But may I express my particular appreciation to those who have travelled across the Atlantic, some of you for this dinner alone. Others, for whom travelling is not easy, or for whom time is precious, have made a special effort to be here tonight. By your presence you honour the memory of the man whose birth, a century ago we are celebrating. Churchill's Centenary has, in this past week, been celebrated in many places all over the United States, as in Britain. He was, after all, an Honorary citizen of the United States. But this occasion is, I think, unique, in being truly Transatlantic.

Perhaps I could underline this by reading out a special message I have received.

"I send my best wishes to those dining at the Embassy tonight to commemorate my husband's Centenary. Loving America and its citizens as he did, he would have been gratified that such a distinguished gathering is assembled in Washington to honour his memory. I wish I could be with you.

Signed: Lady Clementine Spencer-Churchill"

Churchill's years spanned nearly half of the life of the

American Republic. He died less than a decade ago. Yet
already he has become an epic figure - a hero in history.

I shall leave to others more eloquent than myself to
recall for you the character and the achievement of his
extraordinary life. But, in turning to my second duty, I
should like to quote one of the tributes paid to Churchill
on his death in January 1965, in the House of Representatives:
"Mr Speaker, from time to time in the history of nations there
emerges a man, as human as the rest of us, but one able to
capture for himself and his country the respect and imagination
of all of us. By native intelligence, force of personality,
diligent effort, determined leadership and a sense of the
historical, Sir Winston Churchill became that kind of man.
He belongs first of all to Great Britain; but every nation in the
free world is richer because he lived."

Those words were spoken by Congressman Gerald Ford, who
perhaps little expected that he would later be occupying as
prominent a place in world affairs as Churchill once did.

So it is my privilege to call upon you now to stand and
raise your glasses to the continuing greatness of Churchill's
mother's country and to the health of the President of the
United States.

THE HONORABLE CARL ALBERT, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr Secretary, Mr Ambassador, Distinguished Ladies and
Gentlemen of both sides of the Atlantic.

On behalf of myself and all those present I feel that I must
thank the Ambassador for the wonderful dinner he is giving tonight

A memory of the twentieth century's greatest statesman.
I suppose the hand of fate had something to do with the fact
that Winston Churchill was the son of a British father and
an American mother.

When Nazism started its ghastly spread across Europe
he became - when I was a student at Oxford in the early 1930s -
the most eloquent voice in Britain, though a voice crying in the
wilderness. A prophetic voice nonetheless for he became - if
I understand anything about the second Great War - the leader
of the free forces of the Western World that put down Nazi
tyranny.

We are happy to participate in this celebration because
Americans love Churchill just as much as Englishmen. We
appreciate him just as much as the British people. We appreciate
the relationship by blood, by descent, by tongue; and as a result
of our comradeship in two World Wars, between the great mother
country and the United States.

Will you rise please for a toast. "The Queen".

This fanfare invites me to introduce our speakers for
this evening, and our first speaker - Sir Christopher Soames - is
one of Britain's leading statesmen, a former Cabinet Minister and
senior spokesman for the Opposition, a great Ambassador to France,
and for the last two years bearing the responsibility of the
European Commission's relationships with the whole of the rest
of the world - and, perhaps, who knows, a precursor one day of
the Foreign Minister of a United Europe. But for us this
evening he is something more than this. During those years after
the war, as the son-in-law of Winston Churchill he was perhaps

his closest collaborator and came many times with Sir Winston
on his visits to this country, staying with him in this Embassy.
And he learned much from him - not least his deep affection for
the American people. He has been described to me as "Nature's
Churchill" and I think you will come to understand what that
means.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Sir Christopher Soames.

THE RT HON SIR CHRISTOPHER SOAMES GCMG, GCVO, CBE
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Mr Speaker, Secretary of State, Ambassador, Ladies and Gentlemen. How grateful we are to you, Sir, for your most felicitous idea in arranging this dinner, together with the Woodrow Wilson International Center, and to give us an opportunity to stand back for a brief moment from the weighty problems which crowd upon us, so that we may rekindle our memories of the times and the man, Winston Churchill, the centenary of whose birth fell a few days ago. For many of us here in this room, the memories are intensely vivid and personal and give rise to feelings of devotion, of admiration and of gratitude for his life. And one is conscious, moreover, that these feelings are shared by multitudes throughout the world, who never knew him but nonetheless sensed his qualities of greatness and goodness.

How particularly fitting that we should be gathered for this
purpose in the British Embassy in Washington, for the Anglo-American
relationship was one of the great themes of his political life and
thought.

Churchill's love of America had more than one origin. He
was proud of his American ancestry, which came to him through

his beautiful and remarkable mother, Jenny Jerome, whom he adored.
Some among us will have heard him say that had he been alive at
the time of the War of Independence, he would have had to fight
on both sides, and on the occasion of his address to Congress
in December 1941, he reflected that had his father been American
and his mother British, he might have got there on his own.
But it was his early visits to the United States in fact,
beginning at the end of the last century and the lasting
friendships that he then made with some remarkable Americans,
which had a profound and lasting influence on him. He was
gripped by the drama of American history, and knew his way round
those fateful battlefields of the Civil War better than do most
Americans. He understood the drama and the agony of that conflict.
and the long legacy it left in American life and thought.

Then American literature was a very special pleasure to
him - Mark Twain a great favourite, and Walt Whitman. Much
American poetry he knew by heart as my wife and I can testify.
His family were often treated to spirited recitals of Whittier's
poem on Barbara Frietchie's heroism, clutching the Union flag,
"Shoot if you must this old grey head, but spare your country's
flag, she said". And long before she read it in a book, Mary
knew by heart the words of the Battle Hymn of the Republic, learnt
from her father's lips.

Then, of course, in his public life, the unity of the
English speaking peoples in general and the intimacy of the
relationship between Britain and the United States in particular,
was something for which he cared passionately. It was among his
most constant and consistent themes and the solid rock on which
he based his foreign policy, to the point that even in the
darkest days he felt serenely sure that the support of mighty -
America was at hand. He ended that same speech to Congress
shortly after America's entry into the War with these words:

"Still I avow my hope and faith, sure and inviolate, that
in the days to come the British and American people will, for
their own safety and for the good of all, walk together in
majesty, in justice and in peace".

Sir, I hope you will bear with me if, this evening, I
indulge in a few personal reflections of this most remarkable
and lovable of men. From the day I got married he extended to me
the warmth of his affection and the gift of his friendship.
As time went by, I was to be privileged with his confidence and to
work very closely for him in his last years of office. I grew
to have with Winston a close, and intimate relationship, which
has warmed and coloured and influenced my whole life and thought.
I certainly owe more to him in a very real and personal sense than
to any other man.

All of us who knew him well do not recall him only, even
indeed principally, as a Statesman of world stature. Rather do we
remember him as a man of great and greatly varied talents. A
man who loved life and lived it to the full, a man with an
amazing appetite and capacity for work - I remember once when I
asked him what was the motor that drove him in politics and he always
said "If I ever think that I can do a job better than the next man
I would sooner do it myself". A man combining to a rare degree
a remarkable intellect such as could produce serious, historical
and literary works combining that with all the taste for action
and decision of the warrior Statesman. We remember a man with the
real magic of leadership who could capture the imagination of
people with his thoughts and his words. Few left his company
who did not feel warmer and wiser. We remember a man with a great
sense of family whose capacity for enjoyment in things great and
small made it not only interesting to be with him but also hilarious
fun. It is indeed probably his robust and glowing companionship
that his family and close friends miss most of all. There was never
a dull moment with Winston.

One is often asked what would Winston Churchill have thought, what would he have said, what would he have done, in the face of today's massive and menacing problems. It would surely be not only fruitless, but also an impertinence to try to read the mind of the dead, even worse, to mouth reconstructed words on their behalf. The heroes of our countries have passed to their rest, having fought their good fight with the monsters of their day, whether they were monsters of flesh and blood, or the powers of darkness, or just what seemed at the time massive political problems.

But as our generation tries to shoulder the burden ourselves, it is good to remember the principles and themes, and to hold tight to those principles and themes, which guided our great forbears, and many of them have a direct bearing and meaning for us today as they did for them.

How Winston would have welcomed and praised all the efforts being made towards detente. I remember very well when he came to Washington, as Prime Minister, to see President Eisenhower shortly after the death of Stalin. He recommended that a major effort should be made by the West with the new rulers of Russia to break out from the purposelessness and perils of the cold war. He was just twenty years ahead of his time.

Then what today of Churchill's Anglo-American patriotism which served so well not only our two countries, but the whole free world. But it was always just a part of a wider patriotism directed towards the unity of Western civilisation as a whole. Winston was not just an AngloSaxon patriot - he was also a European patriot. He could no more have been a Little European than he could have been a Little Englander, and all the principles that led him to put so much into the Anglo-American relationship in his day would now have been devoted to the European-American

relationship today. And just as he attached importance to the
strength of Britain's voice in that old relationship, so it
is for us to seek a strong European voice in the circumstances of
today. He believed, and rightly, in America's ability to carry
the mantle of world power which history had thrust upon her - and
when in history have we found an occasion when a country has risen
to such power so swiftly and altruistically. But he would always
have insisted on the need for a strong and influential voice from
the other side of the Atlantic. Today, this can only be a
European voice, and it is this he would have sought to strengthen.
He would have seen the need as strongly as ever for Atlantic
solidarity today in the face of the dark and looming dangers which
press around the warm hearths of the Western world.

Churchill was a great Englishman. He was never ashamed of
his patriotism, but running neck and neck with that through the
whole course of his adult life was his love and admiration for
America. He died the most loyal of British subjects and also a
proud and loyal American citizen. For their part, both his
countries are proud to have had such a son. It is for others now who
bear the heavy responsibilities of leadership to sustain the
vision of Atlantic solidarity within a coherent and progressive
world order. This is the trust which he has bequeathed to us.

Ladies and Gentlemen. Our second speaker surely needs
no introduction. How can I record for you the achievements and the
very special qualities of this outstanding statesman of the modern
world on whose shoulders rest so many of the world's burdens.
As Her Majesty's Ambassador nothing could give me greater pleasure
than to make way for the Secretary of State of the United States.