Greater Boston Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy

142 Mt. Auburn Street • P.O. Box 75 • Cambridge 38, Massachusetts • University 8-8340

Chairman
L. HAROLD DEWOLF

Vice Chairman
WILLIAM Z. LEAVITT

Treasurer
JOHN N. M. HOWELLS

Secretary
STEPHAN THERNSTROM

Executive Secretary
ANNE HAWES

COMMITTEE SPONSORS

Dr. Gordon W. Allport

Dr. Joseph C. Aub

Richard Burgin

Dr. Allan M. Butler

Dr. Allan Knight Chalmers

Mrs. Julian Lowell Coolidge

Dr. Charles D. Coryell

The Rev. Gardiner M. Day

Dana I. Farnsworth

Michael C. Flaherty

Dr. Herbert Gezork

Dr. Philip Giles

Rabbie Roland B. Gittelsohn

Francis G. Goodale

The Rev. Dana McLean Greeley

Walter Gropius

Dr. Edwin Kemble

Lt. Rev. W. Appleton Lawrence

Dr. Erich Lindemann

Bishop John Wesley Lord

Kevin A. Lynch

Dr. Kirtley F. Mather

Bishop James K. Mathews

Dr. Walter G. Muelder

Dr. William E. Park

Dr. David Riesman

Rabbi Joseph Shubow

Dr. Pitirim A. Sorokin

Dr. Walter H. Stockmayer

Dr. Howard Thurman

Dr. Victor Weisskopf

Mrs. E. Sohier Welch

Dr. Norbert Wiener

Dr. J. Wendell Yeo

April 12, 1962

Col. William Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Col. Kintner:

This is to confirm the date of Wednesday, May 2, 1962 as the final date for the debate here in Cambridge at Kresge Auditorium, MIT, at 8:00 PM.

Dr. Stanley Hoffman, Arthur Waskow, and Prof. H. Stuart Hughes will be the other participants.

We will be most happy to secure a hotel room for you, if you will be staying over night here and so desire. Will you confirm the date and advise me about the hotel?

We appreciate very much your willingness to come such a distance and assure you that we are doing everything possible to make this a large public function.

Please let me know if there is anything I can do for you while you are here.

Affiliated with the National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy

c.c. Dr. Henry V. Kieزل

Air Mall

WR:Kee

Deputy Director
William R. Kinner

Sincerely yours,

some good.
means to get our Latin American project underway. I trust it will do
you come up to the states. Incidentally, we finally obtained enough
I hope that I will have a chance to see you the next time
perhaps introduce him to others of your associates.
you will find it to your advantage to talk things over with him and
that we seem to have in the non-communist world. I am certain that
Office. Henry is a long-time friend of mine and one of the few resists
currently visiting Brazil at the invitation of the Brazilian Foreign
This letter is to introduce Dr. Henry A. Kieزل who is

Dear Luke:

Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL
Rui Desembargador Viana, S.
Língua Telefónica Brasileira S.A.
Director-President
Mr. Gilbert J. Hopes, Jr.

May 28, 1965

Enclosures
WRK:kec

Deputy Director
William R. Kinniter

Sincerely,

With all good wishes,

picture of things as they seem increasingly to be.
was a real gem, and, unfortunately, like all good satire it gave a too realistic
position which you have taken on our foreign policy. The "Seattle settlement"
As I wrote you some time ago, I am much pleased by the consistent

he might be the man to take a crack at it.
when he was with the психological strategy board. If you feel inclined,
in THEReporter. You may know that I did some work with Edmund Taylor
in this book. If you do, I hope that you will consider paying it reviewed
you will find yourself in general sympathy with the points of view expressed
political warfare entitled, THE NEW FRONTIER OF WAR. I believe
With this letter I am sending you a copy of my latest book on

Dear Max:

New York, New York
136 East 28th Street
The Reporter
Mr. Max Vasoli, Editor

June 13, 1965

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

Room 102 - 133 South 36th Street

PHILADELPHIA 4, PENNSYLVANIA

EVERGREEN 2-0685

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPÉ, Director

July 9, 1962

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

I am forwarding, under separate cover, a copy of my latest
book *The New Frontier of War* which covers the subject of the
communists political warfare.

Anything that you can to call attention to it among people in
the publishing world would be greatly appreciated. Enclosed is a letter
which I have received from Max Ascoli which is self-explanatory.
Perhaps you could reinforce my request. Robert tells me he saw you
in Germany and that you helped hold the line.

I found your article in foreign affairs first rate. I am enclosing
one which I did with some help from Stefan Possony which will appear
in this next issue of Orbis.

I hope to have a chance to see you soon. I'd be particularly
interested in finding out about your trip to Brazil.

With good wishes,

WRK:CMN

Enclosure

Article by W.R. Kintner and
S. T. Possony, "Nato's Nuclear Crisis"
Letter from Max Ascoli

CJ

July 20, 1962

Mr. William R. Kintner, Deputy Director
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 102- 133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

I want to thank you, first of all, for sending me your book, *The New Frontier of War*. I was extremely touched by your inscription.

I will do what I can at the Reporter, but the limit of my influence is demonstrated by the fact that they never even reviewed my book.

I read your paper on "NATO's Nuclear Crisis" with great interest. I basically agree with much of what you say. I started out being strongly in favor of a NATO nuclear capability, and I still would like to see it for tactical weapons. As for the deterrent forces, I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that a European force would be preferable to a NATO force. I do not believe that this will inevitably lead to a third force grouping. Why should it? They will still need us.

My trip to Brazil was fascinating. I loved the people there, but the Brazilian political situation was very bad.

It has been much too long since we have had a chance to talk.

Warm regards as always.

Henry V. Kissingor

Warm regards as always,

na.

I lead to a third force grombing. Why should it? They will still need preferable to a NATO force. I do not believe that this will inevitably come reflectively to the conclusion that a European force would be to see it for tactical weapons. As for the deterrent force, I have strongly in favor of a NATO nuclear capability, and I still would like I practically agree with much of what you say. I started out being I read your paper on "NATO's Unclear Crisis" with great interest.

my book.

influence is demonstrated by the fact that they never even reviewed
I will do what I can at the Reporter, but the limit of my

The New Frontier of War. I was extremely touched by your inscription.

I want to thank you, first of all, for sending me your book.

Dear Bill:

Philadelphia 4, Pennakivania
Room 103- 122 South 26th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Mr. William R. Kintner, Deputy Director

July 30, 1965

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

January 7, 1963

Dear Henry:

It was good to hear from you as I have had on my mind writing a note to you for exactly the same reason. I do most of my traveling to Washington and the general tenor of trends is a matter of much concern.

Perhaps you may be going to either the Warrenton, Va. "Conference to Plan a Strategy for Peace" or the Burke Strategy Seminar in Washington. If we do not have a chance to meet then, we will work it out in New York in the near future.

I found your latest *Foreign Affairs* article on the European situation excellent. We have just sent off to Harper our latest book on BUILDING THE ATLANTIC COMMONWEALTH, and our views on most of the issues you raised in your "Strains on the Alliance" were compatible.

With all good wishes,

WRK:cmn

August 26, 1963

Mr. William R. Kintner
Deputy Director
University of Pennsylvania
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Room 102-133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

Thank you for sending me Robert's
statement to the committee. I will read
it with the greatest interest.

It reminded me that it has been
much too long since we have had a
chance to talk. Why don't you let me
know your schedule so we might see where
and when we might coincide.

Warm regards.

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards.

and when we might coincide.
know your schedule so we might see where
chance to talk. Why don't you let me
much too long since we have had a
It reminded me that it has been

it with the greatest interest.
statement to the committee. I will read
Thank you for sending me Robert's

Dear Bill:

Philadelphia 4, Pennylvania
Room 103-133 South 36th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Deputy Director
Mr. William R. Kintner

August 26, 1963

February 17, 1964

Mr. William R. Kintner
Deputy Director
Foreign Policy Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Room 102-133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia 4, Pennsylvania

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter of
February 12th. It was a joy, as always,
to see you.

Let me just tell you again how
eager I am to be in closest touch with
you and Robert.

I look forward to seeing the
studies we discussed.

With high regards.

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

133 South 36th Street - Room 102

PHILADELPHIA 4, PENNSYLVANIA

EVergreen 2-0685

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

February 25, 1964

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

Enclosed is a copy of our preliminary report
to the Air Force on the Alternative Strategies Study.
Would you, when you have time, send us your critique
on it? It would be much appreciated.

I am sorry I will miss your first lecture at the
Council on Foreign Relations but hope to make the others.
If you have a copy of the address you are giving on
March 2nd, I'd like to have one.

It was a real delight for me to see you in Boston.
We'll keep in touch.

With all good wishes,

WRK:mgt

Enclosure: Copy of <u>Critical Choices</u> paper and bibliography

LUCI

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19104

EVERGREEN 2-0685

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

April 14, 1964

Dear Henry:

In the event that you are not busy shooting down Senator Fulbright, we wonder if you would be in a position to be of some help to us. Would it be possible for you to write a composite book review for the Spring issue of *Orbis* (deadline May 1st) or the Summer issue (June 15th) on three books dealing with the Atlantic World. These are, *Atlantic Crisis* by Robert Kleiman, *Atlantic Dilemma* by Frank Munk and *The End of Alliance* by Ronald Steel. The honorarium we could offer is $75.00 and not worth your time, of course. We would appreciate the review nonetheless.

On another subject, have you had a chance to look at the preliminary report we did for the Air Force, entitled *Critical Choices*? From time to time I would like your advice and

Dr. Henry Kissinger

-2-

April 14, 1964

critique as the study progresses. We could work out a formal
consulting arrangement, if you would like it. But I would, in any
event, appreciate your suggestions as the chorus of those who
believe that the Cold War is over and that it is time to convert
the arms industry to the production of baby carriages seems to
be growing.

Our friend seems to be having his troubles on the West
Coast. I hope we can get together soon.

With all good wishes,

WRK:mgt

Henry V. Klaeujger

With warm regards and all good wishes.

terrible tragedy.

unrestlest atmosphere that prevails now. It is a
and quantico were sea barriers compared to the somewhat
you will understand when I tell you that Special Studies
going through with our friend. As a veteran of many years
and (p) it would be hard to describe what I have been
report before this is that (a) I thought it very good
The reason I have not written to you about the

arrangement. I leave this up to you.

Critical Choice with or without a formal consulting
I would be glad to advise from time to time on

in the Fall.

for Orbis sometime and perhaps you would ask me again
other writing assignments. I do want to do something
blue other commitments make it necessary for me to do and
unsquare it, the futile activities of our friend

Thank you for your letter of April 14th.

Dear Bill:

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Room 103-103 South 36th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Deputy Director
Mr. William R. Kintner

April 22, 1964

In the July 6th, 1964 issue of the _New Leader_, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey reviews a book entitled _Winning without War_ by Amitai Etzioni. Although the Senator voices his disagreement on a few matters of detail, he praises the author as "idealistic but not visionary," and commends him on "his understanding of the complexities of world power relationships." Concluding his review, the Senator writes as follows:

> The policy which Etzioni advocates for United States strategy in military terms is in fact our policy. . .
> In that sense the book is a solid support for the policies of the Johnson Administration.

Since the appearance of this review article, its author received the nomination for Vice President on the Democratic ticket. Thus, his general approval of Professor Etzioni's views merits the attention reserved for a statement of public policy.

Professor Etzioni has summed up his "understanding of the complexities of world power relationships" in one sentence: "It is my central thesis that the relationship of the United States and the U.S. S. R. is changing in such a way that they are gradually coming to fulfill the prerequisites of competition under rules, and that several limited steps have already been taken to shift away from cut-throat competition." In his review, the Senator appears to be in full agreement with this, the "central thesis" of

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["-1-", "Senator Abbe to be in full agreement with this, the \"central thesis\" of\nthe bill to split away from out-throat competition.\" In his review, the\ncompetition under rules, and that several limited steps have already been\nmade in a way that they are gradually coming to fulfill the prerequisites of\nthesis that the relationship of the United States and the U. S. R. is changing\nbienesses of world power relationships. In one sense: \"It is my central\nProtestor Etsioni has summed up his \"understanding of the com-\nter for a statement of public policy."", "General approval of Professor Etsioni's views merits the attention received\nthe nomination for Vice President on the Democratic ticket. Thus, his\nSince the appearance of this review article, its author received\nof the Johnson Administration.", "In that sense the book is a solid support for the policies\nstrategy in military terms is to set our policy...\nThe policy which Etsioni advocates for United States\nappears.\"", "Concluding his review, the Senator writes as follows:\n\n> In his understanding of the complexities of world power relation-\n> ship he braves the author as \"idealiistic but not visionary,\" and commends\n> although the Senator voices his disagreement on a few matters of detail.\n> \n> Humphrey reviews a book entitled *Winning without War* by Amiral Etsioni,\n> in the July 4th, 1964 issue of the *New Leader*, Senator Robert H.", "6-1"]

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the author. How valid is Professor Etzioni's thesis?

In a "competition under rules" the first prerequisite is that both sides agree with the rules. Furthermore, it is necessary that both sides fully understand the rules on which they have agreed. It is perfectly possible that one side mistakes a condition which has obtained for a long time, as a "rule" simply because the other side, being temporarily unable or unwilling to change that condition professes to abide by it indefinitely.

Wars have been fought under "rules" of this kind. Thus, for example, between September 1939 and May 1940, the European belligerents "competed" with one another under "rules" which restrained them from "cut-throat competition." They eschewed major engagements; on both sides, the casualties were few; and, in the West, neither side won or lost any territory to speak of. The British and French publics and, apparently, the British and the French Governments accepted this condition as tolerable and lasting. They settled down to playing by the "rules" of the _Drole de Guerre_. When the Nazis had honored their agreement with the Soviets and conquered Poland, they were ready to change the "rules:" They over-ran France and drove the British into the Channel.

In private business -- and Professor Etzioni borrowed his analogy of "competition under rules" from American corporate practice -- two or more firms may compete with one another under "rules" tacitly agreed upon.

France may compete with one another under "rules" tacitly agreed upon.

"Competition under rules" from American corporate practice -- two or more
In private business -- and Professor Etzioni borrowed his analogy of

conquered Poland, they were ready to change the "rules." They overran
Guerre. When the Nazi had cornered their agreement with the Soviets and
and lasting. They settled down to playing by the "rules" of the Droie de
the British and the French Governments accepted this condition as tolerable
any territory to speak of. The British and French judges and, abstrusely,
 sides, the casualties were few; and, in the West, neither side won or lost
 "cut-throat competition." They eachened major engagements: on both
 "competed," with one another under "rules" which restrained them from
 example, between September 1939 and May 1940, the European pelligerares
 Were have been taught under "rules" of this kind. Thus, for
 initially.

unable or unwilling to change that condition because to spite itidel-
time, as a "rule" simply because the other side, being temporarily
possible that one side misstates a condition which has obtained for a long
tally understanding the rules on which they have agreed. It is perfectly
sides agree with the rules. Furthermore, it is necessary that both sides
in a "competition under rules" the first precedent is that both the
author. How valid is Professor Etzioni's thesis?

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-3-

This contest, together with its more or less explicit "rules," is circumscribed by public opinion, especially the opinion of the customers, and other "rules" which the contestants neither have established nor can change, namely the laws of the land. The United States and the Soviet Union may agree -- or think that they agree -- on "competition under rules" and on the avoidance of "cut-throat competition." Yet, here and now, there is no umpire to supervise the proceedings and, in case of violation, there is no one, be it public opinion or be it judicial tribunal, to interpret, enforce, rescind or declare illegal these "rules." Professor Etzioni, alive to the need for such an empire, proposes that, in the fullness of time, the United Nations be given the job of universal arbiter. With commendable realism, he concedes that, in the foreseeable future, the writ of the United Nations will fall short of that of a world government. Thus, following Professor Etzioni's reasoning, we must repose our faith in a future-without-war upon the existing relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and its potentiality for beneficial change. According to Professor Etzioni, the existing relationship reveals the following characteristics: mutual deterrence; nuclear stalemate; and hence the increasingly cautious response by the two super-powers to challenges which, in pre-nuclear times, were wont to trigger war. The task now is to sublimate this existing relationship, admittedly somewhat precarious, into a more stable one. In order to do so, the Soviets and we must perceive of one another no longer as enemies "locked in an unlimited conflict" but rather as rivals in a competition to be continued under rules, formulate the rules, and set up the

petition to be continued under rules, formulate the rules, and set up the
as enemies "locked in an unmitigated conflict," put rather as rivals in a com-
order to do so, the Soviets and we must perceive of one another no longer
relationship, admittedly somewhat precocious, into a more stable one. In
were want to trigger war. The task now is to sublimate this existing

reasons by the two super-bowers to challenges which, in pre-ancient times,
natural deterrence: nuclear stalemate! and hence the increasingly cautious
Etison's the existing relationship reveals the following characteristics:

Union and its potentiality for beneficial change. According to Professor
upon the existing relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Etison's reasoning, we must repose our faith in a future-without-war
will fall apart of that of a world government. Thus, following Professor
concedes that, in the foreseeable future, the writ of the United Nations
be given the top of universal arbiter. With commendable realism, he
such an empire, proposes that, in the wellness of time, the United Nations
declare illegal these "rules." Professor Etison, alive to the need for
public opinion or be it judicial tribunal, to interpret, enforce, reining or
emphasize the proceedings and, in case of violation, there is no one, be it
of "cut-throat competition." Yet, here and now, there is no umbre to
think that they agree -- on "competition under rules" and on the avoidance
laws of the land. The United States and the Soviet Union may agree -- or
which the contestants neither have established nor can change, namely the
by public opinion, especially the opinion of the customers, and other "rules"
This contest, together with its more or less explicit "rules," is circumscribed

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machinery which will enforce the rules. It can be readily seen that Professor Etzioni's solution to the world problem hinges on the validity of his basic assumptions: one degree of error at the starting point may wreak navigational havoc far out at sea.

The most important stipulation sustaining Professor Etzioni's thesis is the "global stalemate." Underscoring it, Professor Etzioni writes:

> ... The Communist Bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years.

Professor Etzioni's second major assumption is closely related to his first: the nuclear stalemate not only exists as an objective fact, but also determines Soviet strategic thought. Professor Etzioni finds that the Soviet Union has always been "extremely reluctant to endanger its survival in its expansionist efforts." Now, however, the peril of nuclear devastation counsels even greater circumspection. Although the communists are still set upon communizing the world, they are less willing than they have ever been to incur excessive risks. The level of violence acceptable to Soviet strategy has been declining continuously throughout the last years. The Soviet Union tend to shun armed invasion and only sparingly use armed subversion; Soviet strategy is shifting towards the employment of non-military and non-violent techniques of conflict such as political warfare, propaganda and economic penetration. To Professor Etzioni, this change of instruments

economic penetration. To Professor Etzioni, this change of instruments
violent techniques of conflict such as political warfare, propaganda and
Soviet strategy is editing towards the employment of non-military and non-
Soviet stand to aim armed invasion and only sparingly use armed subversion;
strategy has been declining continuously throughout the last years. The
been to incur excessive risks. The level of violence acceptable to Soviet
set upon communicating the world, they are less willing than they have ever
connects even greater circumspection. Although the communists are still
in its expansionist efforts. " Now, however, the peril of nuclear devastation
Soviet Union has always been "extremely reluctant to endanger its survival
determines Soviet strategic thought. Professor Etzioni finds that the
first: the nuclear stalemate not only exists as an objective fact, but also
Professor Etzioni's second major assumption is closely related to his
in the last fifteen years.
... The Communist bloc has purely expanded
writes:

The most important stipulation sustaining Professor Etzioni's
thesis is the "global stalemate." Underlying it, Professor Etzioni
writes:

military which will enforce the rules. It can be readily seen that
of his basic assumptions: one degree of error at the starting point may
Professor Etzioni's solution to the world problem hinges on the validity
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D11

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appears as the overarching fact about Soviet conduct: It can be ascertained
from observed Soviet behavior; and, in order to grasp its full significance,
we need not lose ourselves in the controversy over the political-social changes
which have occurred in the communist bloc, such as the "liberalization"
or "mellowing" of Soviet society. As Professor Etzioni sees it, it is not
enough to contemplate happily the observable "de-escalation" of Soviet
strategy. The West must change its own strategy in order to take
advantage of historic opportunity.

Professor Etzioni defines the purpose of the U. S. policy of contain-
ment as having been either to actively encourage internal change in the
Soviet Union or, according to another interpretation, hold the West's
position until forces working within Soviet society will have brought about
the liberalization of the regime. In any case, if containment has been
a successful policy and Soviet society is liberalizing, then the time has
come to replace the Cold War and the arms race with some other forms
of East-West relationship. There can be no doubt that Professor Etzioni
deems containment an unqualified success. He states categorically that
"the communist bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years. " The
task is now to think of new ways for hastening the liberalizing trends
within communist society, forestall a Stalinist reaction and terminate the
Cold War. Professor Etzioni gives the Kennedy-Johnson Administration
fair marks for trying to do just that. He writes:

His marks for trying to do just that. He writes:

Cold War. Professor Etzioni gives the Kennedy-Johnson Administration within communist society a a Stalinist reaction and terminate the task is now to think of new ways for patterning the liberalizing trend "the communist bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years." The comes containment an unmitigated success. He states categorically that of East-West relationship. There can be no doubt that Professor Etzioni come to replace the Cold War and the arms race with some other forms a successful policy and Soviet society is liberalizing, then the time has the liberalization of the regime. In any case, it containment has been position until forces working within Soviet society will have brought about Soviet Union on, according to another interpretation, held the West's ment as having been either to actively encourage internal change in the Professor Etzioni defines the purpose of the U. S. policy of contain-

advantage of historic opportunity.
The West must change its own strategy in order to take
enough to contemplate happily the observable "de-escalation" of Soviet
or "mellowing" of Soviet society. As Professor Etzioni sees it, it is not
which have occurred in the communist bloc, such as the "liberalization"
we need not lose ourselves in the controversy over the political-social changes
from observed Soviet behavior; and, in order to grasp its full significance,
appears as the overarching fact about Soviet conduct: It can be ascertained

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-6-

Some such indication is given in the U. S. proposal for complete and general disarmament; still this proposal deals largely with questions of verification and enforcement of disarmament and has little to say about the nature of the political community the United States is aiming for, and the place it sees in this community for non-aligned, as well as 'mellowed' communist societies.

Plainly, we ought to encourage communist societies to "mellow."
Clearly, Professor Etzioni expects communist society to "mellow,"
provided the communists can be shown exactly where they will fit in
and how they can play a fulfilling role in the "world of peaceful coexistence."

Professor Etzioni advances a number of proposals for "community
building activities" in which the Soviets might honorably and contentedly
participate. Thus, for example, the United States and Soviet Union might
join in "more actively condemning the very small group of nations that
attempt to hide inhuman hypocrisies behind the rational area of non-
intervention" (vide South Africa). They might share in a global radio and
TV network; they might cooperate in mass exchanges of students, teachers
and political leaders; they might explore together space; and they might
partner geographical, weather, and medical research. Communist
countries might be invited to participate in various regulatory bodies
set up to guide the world economy, for

the more global institutions the Soviet-led camp
is involved in, the more integrated the world
community and the more stabilized peaceful
competition becomes.

competition becomes
community and the more stabilised peace
is involved in, the more integrated the world
is involved in the more global institutions the Soviet-led camp
the more global institutions the Soviet-led camp

partner geographers, weather and medical research. Communist

and political leaders: they might explore together above: and they might

TV network: they might cooperate in mass exchanges of students, teachers

interconnection" (vide South Africa). They might share in a global radio and

attempt to hide immense hypocracies behind the rational area of non-

building activities" in which the Soviets might honorably and consistently

Proponent Edison advances a number of proposals for "community

and how they can play a fulfilling role in the "world of bestial coexistence."

Clearly, Professor Edison expects communist society to "mellow".

Plainly, we ought to encourage communist societies to "mellow".

communist societies.

community for non-specified, as well as 'mellowed',

States is aiming for, and the place it sees in the future

apart the nature of the political community the United

broader deals largely with questions of verification

for complete and general disarmament; still the

communist societies.

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-7-

Professor Etzioni commends, as right steps in this direction the ratification
of the limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the sale of American wheat to the
Soviets, and the negotiation for increased consular representation in both
countries. Thus, Professor Etzioni notes with satisfaction: "The door
was opened for an accelerated transition from duopoly to nonviolent
competition, which could proceed on many fronts."

With judicial detachment, Professor Etzioni examines the foibles
of "duopoly." There is little to choose between Soviet behavior and
American behavior in a bipolar, "duopolistic" world. Distraught, each
side stares at the mirror image of the other. Goodies opposed to baddies;
between deep-black and luminous white there are no shadings. Crudely,
Americans view communism as unrelievedly evil; Soviet citizens, in turn,
are haunted by the fear of capitalist aggression. The Soviets will not let
us inspect their missile sites of the status of their national minorities; we
will not let the Soviets intervene in the domestic struggle over civil rights.

As the power blocs dissolve, the gradualist approach towards peaceful-
competition-under-rules gathers momentum, and the practice of "limited
accommodation" issues into psychological disarmament, the United States and
the Soviet Union will come to "recognize that they have some common interests
and responsibilities above and beyond their commitments to their respective
allies."

sides."

and responsibilities above and beyond their commitments to their respective
the Soviet Union will come to "recognize that they have some common interests
accommodation," issues into psychological disarrayment, the United States and
competition—under-rules fatherhood momentum, and the practice of "limited

As the power piece dissolve, the socialist approach towards peaceful

will not let the Soviets intervene in the domestic struggle over civil rights.
we inspect their miserable sites of the status of their national minorities; we
are prouder by the fear of capitalist aggression. The Soviets will not let
Americans view communism as unrelievedly evil; Soviet citizens, in turn,
between deep-black and luminous white there are no slumbers. Cruelty,
side streets at the mirror image of the other. Goodies opposed to puddles;
American behavior in a bipolar, "nuclearistic" world. Distracted, each
of "dyspely." There is little to choose between Soviet behavior and

With judicial detachment, Professor Etzioni examines the toldies

competition, which could proceed on many fronts.¹

was opened for an accelerated transition from drably to nonviolent

Soviets, and the negotiation for increased conual representation in part

Professor Etzioni commends, so right steps in this direction the ratification

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Not so surprisingly, Professor Etzioni takes a dim view of the Western alliance. The Europeans are unhappy with America's absolute control of the deterrent; and the Americans will not give the Europeans a finger on the trigger or allow them to build their own deterrent. If the European allies were to develop their own deterrent, the United States "cannot allow the Europeans the capacity to involve the United States in a nuclear war." It must "dissociate" itself from them, this being "one function the 'hot line' between Washington and Moscow is designed to serve." In any case, the ties of NATO "will decrease, not increase as many in Washington hope and, which is worse, still expect." This is Professor Etzioni's world, the world of peaceful competition "under rules."

Let us first explore the cause-and-effect relationship of U. S. policy -- "containment" -- and Soviet strategy. Then let us examine the capacity of communism to "mellow" sufficiently to make it possible for communist states, including the Soviet Union, to take their place in civilized world society and to compete peacefully in the world's work with the democratic states of the West. Clearly, it is the findings of this investigation which must decide how valid is Professor Etzioni's thesis.

Containment has been not only a unilateral American foreign policy but also a formidable system of collective security. In Europe, the vast arc of allied bases and the forward deployment of ready forces, backed by

area of allied forces and the forward deployment of ready forces, packed by
but also a formidable system of collective security. In Europe, the vast
Containment has been not only a unilateral American foreign policy

thesis.

this investigation which must decide how valid is Professor Etzioni's
with the democratic states of the West. Clearly, it is the findings of
civilised world society and to compete peacefully in the world's work
communist states, including the Soviet Union, to take their place in
capacity of communism to "mellow" sufficiently to make it possible for
policy -- "containment" -- and Soviet strategy. Then let us examine the
Let us first explore the cause-and-effect relationship of U. S. and
"under rules."

This is Professor Etzioni's world, the world of peaceful competition
increase as many in Washington pibe and, which is worse, still expect."
designed to serve. " In any case, the tie of NATO "will decrease", not
being "one function the 'hot line', between Washington and Moscow is
States in a nuclear war." It must "disassociate" itself from them, this
States "cannot allow the Europeans the capacity to involve the United
the European allies were to develop their own deterrent, the United
a finger on the trigger or allow them to build their own deterrent. If
control of the deterrent; and the Americans will not give the Europeans
Western alliance. The Europeans are uncapable with America's specious
Not so abruptly, Professor Etzioni takes a dim view of the

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United States strategic air power, has confronted the Soviet Union.
Throughout the last fifteen years, the strategic situation lacked precisely
that attribute which would render plausible the essential assumption under-
lying Professor Etzioni's central thesis, namely, symmetry. The West
enjoyed clear-cut strategic superiority; the Soviet leaders, Stalin as well
as Khrushchev, fully grasped this fact.

The sum and substance of Soviet policy was the endeavour to annul
the West's strategic superiority by a mix of military-technological and
psycho-political strategies. In and out of season, Premier Khrushchev
has reiterated the prime objective of Soviet policy, namely, the dissolution
of NATO. With that candidness which more effectively than the various
communist techniques of deception has outfoxed the Western democracies,
Premier Khrushchev has spelled out the tactical steps leading to this
goal: the dismantling of NATO bases; the removal of nuclear weapons
from the European Continent; and disarmament measures designed first
to freeze and then to scale down the military/technological effectives
which sustain the West's strategic superiority. All schemes for arms
control and arms inspection presuppose symmetry. Such notions as
"nuclear stalemate" and "balance of terror" signify an even-Steven
strategic relationship. Yet the East-West strategic relationship has
been far from even. The West was strategically superior. It had to
be. All throughout the post-World War II period, the Western democracies
confined themselves to a defensive posture whereas the communists,

defined themselves to a defensive posture whereas the communists, ie. All throughout the post-World War II period, the Western democracies been far from even. The West was strategically superior. It had to strategic relationship. Yet the East-West strategic relationship has "nuclear stalemate", and "balance of terror", slightly an even-Steven control and arms inspection preponderance symmetry. Such notions as which sustain the West's strategic superiority. All scheme for arms to these and then to scale down the military\technological effects from the European Continent; and disarmament measures designed first goal: the dismantling of NATO paces; the removal of nuclear weapons Premier Khrushchev has expelled out the tactical steps leading to this communist technique of deception has outpaced the Western democracies, of NATO. With that candidness which more effectively than the various has reiterated the prime objective of Soviet policy, namely, the dissociation of the West's strategic superiority by a mix of military-technological and the Psycho-political strategies. In and out of season, Premier Khrushchev

The arm and armament of Soviet policy was the endeavour to slow

enjoyed clear-cut strategic superiority; the Soviet leaders, Stalin as well
using Professor Etsion's central thesis, namely, symmetry. The West
that attribute which would render plausible the essential assumption under-
throughout the last fifteen years, the strategic situation lacked precisely
United States strategic air power, has confronted the Soviet Union.

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militants of world revolution, remained on the offensive. At the heart of
the East-West confrontation is the aggressor-defender relationship.

When Professor Etzioni writes that "the communist bloc has barely expanded in the last fifteen years," he establishes the _condition sine qua non_ upon which the plausibility of his symmetric model of world politics and, hence, his central thesis depends. Exactly what does he mean by "barely"? In the last fifteen years, the communists have conquered large chunks of Southeast Asia, all of Cuba and all of Tibet, and penetrated deeply into Africa and Latin America. In the same period, the West has not succeeded in pushing back the Iron and Bamboo Curtain by one inch. In brief, the entire contest between West and East, sometime non-military, sometime quite bloody, has been waged on the territory of the Free World.

For the West, the one and only compensating factor has been its strategic superiority. It does not require superior political-psychological insight to envisage where the West, offensively and reactively minded, would be now if the communists, aggressive and nimble, had commanded superior military/technological resources. Barring a miracle, the West would be nowhere.

The West's strategic superiority has blocked the communist movement in that very area where it needed most to expand in order to retain its world revolutionary momentum, namely, Europe.

In that very area where it needed most to expand in order to retain its world
The West's strategic superiority has blocked the communist movement
momentum.

Barring a miracle, the West would be
now it the communes' aggressive and nimble, had commanded superior
insight to envisage where the West, offensively and reactively minded, would
strategic superiority. It does not require superior political-psychological
For the West, the one and only compensating factor has been its
the Free World.

non-military, sometime quite bloody, has been argued on the territory of
by one inch. In fact, the entire contest between West and East, sometime
the West has not succeeded in pushing back the Iron and Bamboo Curtains
and penetrated deeply into Africa and Latin America. In the same period,
conquered large chunks of Southeast Asia, all of Asia and all of Tibet,
mean by "barely"? In the last fifteen years, the communes have
politics and, hence, their central threats depend. Exactly what does he
alone can do upon which the plausibility of his asymmetric model of world
paresly expanded in the last fifteen years," he establishes the condition
When Professor Etsioni writes that "the communist bloc has
the East-West confrontation is the aggressor-defender relationship of
militants of world revolution" remained on the offensive. At the heart of

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Long ago, Lenin and Stalin realized that industrial Europe, especially Germany, had to be added to the Soviet base in order to tip the scales decidedly against the capitalist order. Since then, the chronic malfunction of the communist economic system has greatly increased the need for additional resources which, for a variety of reasons, cannot be developed at home. In Europe, the single greatest reservoir of technical hardware and technical intelligence is Germany. Hence the perennial attempt of the Soviets to yank West Germany out of NATO. The failure of this mission touched off the latent divisive forces which have always fomented in communist society. Forced to live at home, the communists have found it increasingly difficult to live with one another. Thus the West's strategic superiority, embodied in NATO, is the true author of the various communist "splits."

The communists, whenever they have been stymied in their expansionist ventures abroad and thus forced back into the economic mess at home, abandoned the strategy of "flow" and switch over to the strategy of "ebb." They have professed themselves enthusiastically in favor of the "coexistence of systems" and "peaceful exchanges." To relieve shortages of the domestic economy, they have loosened state controls over the marketing of certain agricultural products. They have directed fraternal communist parties in capitalist lands to join with enlightened bourgeois factions in denouncing the "arms race" and, if feasible, to join "popular fronts" or even to enter coalition governments. In brief, they "liberalized."

even to enter coalition governments. In brief, they "liberalized" denouncing the "army race" and, if feasible, to join "belligerent fronts" or parties in capitalist lands to join with enlightenedньbourhoods in certain agricultural products. They have directed fraternal communist of the domestic economy, they have loosened state controls over the marketing "coexistence of systems" and "peaceful exchanges." To relieve shortages "app." They have processed themselves authoritatively in favor of the abandoned strategy of "flow" and switch over to the strategy of ventures abroad and thus forced back into the economic mess at home.

of the various communist "splits".

the West's strategic superiority, embodied in NATO, is the true subject of the West's attempt to live with one another. Thus always commented in communist society. Forced to live at home, the com-
tization of this mission touched off the latent divisive forces which have perennially attempted to yank West Germany out of NATO. The technical hardware and technical intelligence is Germany. Hence the
be developed at home. In Europe, the single greatest reservoir of the need for additional resources which, for a variety of reasons, cannot malfunction of the communist economic system has greatly increased the scales decidedly against the capitalist order. Since then, the chronic especially Germany, had to be added to the Soviet base in order to tip Long ago, Stalin and Stalin realized that industrial Europe,

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The years have gone by; there have been many changes. But some of the "loosening" and "opening up" in the communist bloc as well as the well-advertised assertion of independence from Moscow by communist leaders abroad look Old Hat. Thus, for example, the Italian Communist Party, assuming the stance of autonomy, makes itself available for collaboration with the left-of-center parties - the "popular front." It is by no means clear why this maneuver should redound to the detriment of the World Communist Party and, in the long run, not accrue to the advantage of Moscow. Premier Khrushchev has labored manfully to deepen the belief of Western publics that, this time, the détente is real and, if the "militarists" can be kept in leash, is here to stay. The ample publicity which he gives to communist troubles need not be destined entirely for home consumption.

The spirit of the détente has become far more articulate in the West's free press, intellectual milieux and democratic parliaments than in the censored press and controlled one-party debates of the communist states. A cozy feeling of relaxation has seeped into NATO, aggravating the long-standing problem of its political future. More important still, bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have cast doubts upon the United States' determination to maintain its own and the West's strategic superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. These doubts may be wholly unjustified. The fact that they are widely entertained by the United States' European allies grievously harms NATO. Thus the crisis of NATO which Professor Etzioni views as having been caused by uncontrollable changes in the balance of world power well might have been engendered

changes in the balance of world power well might have been engendered
which Professor Etonian views as having been caused by uncontrolable
States' European allies gravitationally permeates NATO. Thus the criteria of NATO
wholly unqualified. The fact that they are widely entertained by the United
strategic superiority via-a-vis the Soviet Union. These doubts may be
upon the United States' determination to maintain its own and the West's
rotations between the United States and the Soviet Union have cast doubt
standing problem of its political future. More important still, political ne-
A cozy feeling of relaxation has been eased into NATO, aggravating the long-
censored press and controlled one-party debates of the communist states.
free press, intellectual milieu and democratic parliaments than in the

The spirit of the détente has become far more articulate in the West's
to communist troubles need not be destined entirely for home consumption
can be kip in less, is here to stay. The ample publicity which he gives
of Western publics that, this time, the détente is real and, if the "militarists"
of Moscow. Premier Khrushchev has labored manually to deoden the peat
of the World Communist Party and, in the long run, not accrue to the advantage
by no means clear why this maneuver should succeed to the detriment
for collaboration with the left-of-center parties - the "popular front". If it
Communist Party, assuming the stance of autonomy, makes itself available
mussel leaders abroad look Old Hat. Thus, for example, the Italian
as the well-advertised assertion of independence from Moscow by com-
some of the "loosening" and "opening up" in the communist bloc as well
The years have gone by there have been many changes. But

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by no one else but the United States itself. Far from being inscribed
in the nature of things, the disarray of the Western Alliance derives
from policy decisions and realignments of domestic political forces in
America.

Be that as it may, there is not the slightest reason in the nature
of things why the United States should dumbly watch the "decrease of
(NATO) ties" as if it were a natural event like an earthquake. The
United States has many means at its disposal for strengthening NATO.
In Europe, France included, the United States has millions of friends
prepared to cooperate in this endeavor.

If the American people hold on to the fact that the West's strategic
superiority has kept the communists at home, then they are likely to
make the necessary effort to maintain it - no matter how heavy the costs.
In this contest, the Soviets cannot compete, and it is we, not they, who
can set the "rules." No wonder that the Soviets would like us to agree to
a revision of the "rules" and to settle for strategic parity - until they
achieved a decisive military/technological breakthrough. In sum, Professor
Etzioni does not grasp the inwardness of the West-East strategic relationship.
Hence he misunderstands the key problem of NATO. Incidentally, this
key problem is posed neither by De Gaulle nor those unpredictable West Germans
who, among all potential troublemakers for the West, arouse Professor
Etzioni's deepest concern.

Etzioni's deepest concern.

who, among all potential troublemakers for the West, arouse Professor
key problem is based neither by De Gaulle nor those unpredictable West Germans
hence pe memberstands the key problem of NATO. Incidentally, this
Etzioni does not grasp the inwardness of the West-East strategic relationship.
achieved a decisive military/technological preeminence. In sum, Professor
a revision of the "rules" and to settle for strategic parity - until they
can set the "rules." No wonder that the Soviets would like us to agree to
In this context, the Soviets cannot compete, and it is we, not they, who
make the necessarily effort to maintain it - no matter how heavy the costs.
superiority has kept the communists at home, then they are likely to

In Europe, France included, the United States has millions of friends
United States has many means at its disposal for strengthening NATO.
(NATO) ties, as if it were a natural event like an earthquake. The
of things why the United States should dumbly watch the "decrease of

America.

from policy decisions and realignments of domestic political forces in
in the nature of things, the disorder of the Western Alliance derives
by no one else but the United States itself. Far from being inscribed

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If my central thesis, namely, that the West's strategic superiority
has kept the peace and is likely to keep it as far as we can see, is valid,
then plainly his central thesis falls to the ground. Then we have to go about
the business of hastening the "liberalization" of communist societies and find-
ing for them a place in the world political community in a manner different
from that suggested by Professor Etzioni.

It is highly probable that Premier Khrushchev's rule is based upon
a compromise between the "soft-liners" and "hard-liners," the "reformists"
and "radicals," or whatever we may call the rival factions in the Soviet
Communist Party. Two rival schools of thought built upon the assumption
of the existence of such a balance within the top echelon of Soviet leadership
argue with one another over the appropriate Western policy towards the
Soviet Union and the other communist states. The first school holds that
the Soviet government is seeking a lasting peace with the Western world
and has all but formally abandoned plans for world revolution; that the de-
velopment of "polycentrism" is irreversible; that a new generation of
bureaucrats and managers wants to preserve and expand domestic economic
gains rather than engage in risky ventures abroad; and that, in increasingly
urbanized, industrialized and sophisticated Russia, ideological fervor is
on the wane. This school of thought points to current Soviet behavior as
evidence for the conclusiveness of its argument.

on the same. This school of thought points to current Soviet behavior as
unsanctioned, industrialised and sophisticated Russia, ideological terror is
began rather than engage in risky ventures abroad; and that, in increasingly
paleocracies and managers want to preserve and expand domestic economic
development of "polycentrism," it is irreverent; that a new generation of
and has all but formally abandoned plans for world revolution; that the de-
the Soviet government is seeking a lasting peace with the Western world
Soviet Union and the other communist states. The first school holds that
argue with one another over the appropriate Western policy towards the
of the existence of such a balance within the top echelon of Soviet leadership
Communist Party. Two rival schools of thought built upon the assumption
and "radicals," or whatever we may call the rival factions in the Soviet
a compromise between the "soft-finers" and "hard-finers," the "reformists"

It is highly probable that Premier Khrushchev's rule is based upon
it

from that suggested by Professor Etonson.

ing for them a place in the world political community in a manner different
the principles of patterning the "liberalization" of communist societies and fund-
then plainly his central theme falls to the ground. Then we have to go about
has kept the peace and is likely to keep it as far as we can see, is valid.

If my central theme, namely, that the West's strategic superiority

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The other school of thought, too, observes Soviet behavior - and comes up with the opposite conclusion. Conceding that the motivation of the Soviet rank and file may have weakened considerably, and that internal difficulties have impeded the forward momentum of communist expansionism, this school holds that the communists, faithful to their operational doctrine, have adjusted their strategy to circumstances. It points to Soviet doctrinal statements which explain "peaceful coexistence" as a strategy for disarming the West while stoking "wars of national liberation" in the West's backyard. Most importantly, it takes its cue from well-briefed Soviet behavior in the military sector, namely, the allocation of a proportionately high and rising percentage of the gross national product to armament. It cites as evidence observed trends of the last two years: The Soviets are about to deploy an elaborate anti-missile system and very long range missiles capable of carrying warheads of tremendous yields, if not of genocidal destructiveness; they maintain their lead in the technology of inner, militarily significant space. If this school of thought has deduced the right conclusion from current Soviet behavior, then the communists are up to their old tricks of deception, seek to demoralize the West by new twists of an old strategy, and are laboring to achieve military and technological superiority so overwhelming as to enable them to defeat or overawe the West.

Obviously, a Western policy based upon the premises of one school of thought would turn out to have been disastrous were the other school of thought proven to have been right. In one case, the "mellowing" of the

thought proven to have been right. In one case, the "mellowing" of the
to thought would turn out to have been disastrous were the other school of
Obviously, a Western policy based upon the premises of one school

as to enable them to defeat or overcome the West.

Investing to achieve military and technological superiority so overwhelming
seek to demoralize the West by new twists of an old strategy, and are
Soviet behavior, then the communists are up to their old tricks of deception,
space. It this school of thought has deduced the right conclusion from current
they maintain their lead in the technology of inner, militarily significant
carrying warheads of tremendous yields, it not of genocidal destructiveness;
elaborate anti-missile system and very long range missiles capable of
observed trends of the last two years: The Soviets are up to deploy an
percentage of the gross national product to armament. It cites as evidence
military sector, namely, the allocation of a proportionately high and rising
Most importantly, it takes its cue from well-priested Soviet behavior in the
the West while stoking "war of national liberation" in the West's back yard.
statements which explain "behave coexistence" as a strategy for disarming
adjusted their strategy to circumstances. It points to Soviet doctrinal
school holds that the communists, faithful to their operational doctrine, have
have impeded the forward momentum of communist expansionism, title
rank and file may have weakened considerably, and that internal difficulties
up with the opposite conclusion. Conceding that the motivation of the Soviet

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communist system would have been thwarted and the Cold War needlessly and dangerously intensified; in the other case, the West would court military defeat, communist domination and, physical annihilation of genocidal proportions. Both schools-of-thought have "facts" on their side -- the "facts" of observed communist behavior as well as a wide selection of authoritative statements, especially by Premier Khrushchev, which, too, must be classified as "behavior."

Unfortunately, an estimate of future Soviet behavior and developments within the communist bloc cannot be based exclusively on available evidence. It must resort to deduction. Future Soviet behavior is unpredictable. It is this fact which must govern Western strategy. Thus far, the West's strategy of deterrence rested upon the assumption that the Soviet leaders, once they understand that Soviet aggression does not pay, will desist from aggression. Nevertheless, there is the danger that "opportunity," such as a technological breakthrough, irrational impulse or the very frustration of world revolutionary drive, will propel them into action. Obviously, the "soft-liners" will be deterred from such a gambit more easily than the "hard-liners." The task is to deter a Stalinist rather than a reformist Kremlin. Hence, the West must retain its strategic superiority. Obviously, this, too, is not a sure-fire formula. By dropping its guard, the West might encourage a neo-Stalinist reaction. On the other hand, the West's strategic superiority might provide the

On the other hand, the West's strategic superiority might provide the
By dropping its guard, the West might encourage a neo-Stalinist reaction.
its strategic superiority. Obviously, this, too, is not a sure-fire formula.
Stalinist rather than a reformist Kremlin. Hence, the West must retain
gambit more easily than the "hard-liners." " The task is to deter a
into action. Obviously, the "soft-liners" will be deterred from such a
or the very frustration of world revolutionary drive, will propel them
"opportunity," such as a technological breakthrough, irrational impulse
will defeat from aggression. Nevertheless, there is the danger that
Soviet leaders, once they understand that Soviet aggression does not pay,
to the West's strategy of deterrence restated upon the assumption that the
predictable. It is this fact which must govern Western strategy. True
evidence. It must resort to deduction. Future Soviet behavior is un-
ments within the communist bloc cannot be based exclusively on available
Unfortunately, an estimate of future Soviet behavior and develop-
which, too, must be classified as "behavior."

selection of substantive statements, especially by Premier Khrushchev,
side -- the "facts" of observed communist behavior as well as a wide
genocidal proportions. Both schools-of-thought have "facts" on their
military defeat, communist domination and, by logical summation of
and dangerously intensified; in the other case, the West would court
communist system would have been thwarted and the Cold War needlessly

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"hard-liners" with an argument for accelerated armament, and hence for the "de-liberalization" of Soviet society. Yet, here the communists come up against the absolute advantage of the West: the West can afford the arms race while advancing its general prosperity; manifestly, the communists cannot afford the arms race without running into even more grievous economic troubles. Even under the most favorable conditions -- a monolithic bloc and ruthless exploitation of the satellite economies -- the Soviets could not break the West's strategic superiority. They are unlikely to accomplish this feat under the present, more complex and more restrictive circumstances.

It follows that among the alternative available to the West, the safest is to hang on to its strategic superiority, and thus, to encourage and sustain the "reformist" faction in the Kremlin. As yet, the present party leadership may not have thrown its lot in irrevocably with that "reformist" faction.

The maintenance of the West's superior posture will make sure that it will.

The West's power need not be increased to provocative proportions which might incite a Soviet response of desperation and lend plausibility to Soviet propaganda charges of "capitalist imperialism" and "aggressiveness." If it is possible to "signal" by unilateral measures our willingness to proceed further on the road to disarmament and arms control, then it should be possible by the discriminate development of weapons systems to convey to the Soviets our willingness to maintain a defensive posture and to abstain from a genocidal strategy. The Soviets, for their part, can "signal" their intention to ease the

The Soviet, for their part, can "signify" their intention to ease the
strategy. The Soviet, for their part, can "signify" their intention to ease the
our willingness to maintain a defensive posture and to sustain from a fencorial a
by the discriminate development of weapons systems to convey to the Soviets
further on the road to disarmament and arms control, then it should be possible
If it is possible to "signify" by military measures our willingness to proceed
Soviet propagandists charge of "capitalist imperiumism" and "regressiveness."
which might incite a Soviet reaction of desperation and lend belligerity to
The West's power used not be increased to provocative proportions

The maintenance of the West's superior posture will make sure that it will
may not have shown its lot in irrevocably with that "reformist" faction.
the "reformist" faction in the Kremlin. As yet, the present party leadership
is to hang on to its strategic superiority, and thus, to encourage and sustain
it follows that among the alternative available to the West, the least

this test under the present more complex and more restrictive circumstances.
break the West's strategic superiority. They are unlikely to accomplish
and ruthless exploitation of the satellite economies -- the Soviets could not
troubles. Even under the most favorable conditions -- a monolithic bloc
cannot afford the same race without running into even more grievous economic
race while advancing its general prosperity; manifestly, the communists
up against the absolute advantage of the West: the West can afford the same
the "de-idealization" of Soviet society. Yet, here the communists come
"hard-liners" with an argument for accelerated armament, and hence for

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totalitarian yoke and to refrain from forays into our garden. They could
breathe life into their Constitution. They could introduce free elections, at
least on the party level, and thus ensure orderly succession to the highest
places of government. They could, in accordance with their own party
statutes and Constitution, provide for full debate of policies and legislations
in the legislative branch which now serves as a mere rubber stamp for
decisions made by the autocrat in the Kremlin. Abroad, the Soviets are
free to evacuate Cuba, to raze the Berlin Wall, and to return to the status
quo of, let us say, 1960 which Premier Khrushchev himself hailed as the
terminal stage of "capitalist encirclement." None of these measures
would impinge one iota on the national security of the Soviet Union or even
the integrity of communist institutions in the Soviet Union as provided for by
the Soviet Constitution and the statutes of the Soviet Communist Party.
Once these steps are taken, it will be time enough to turn to Professor
Etzioni's concluding chapter and ponder his prescriptions for "community
building activities."

What stands between a peaceful, a humane world community and
mankind is the totalitarian nature of communist rule. Peace is not
threatened by nuclear arms that might go off by their own volition or by
that pathological hostility of which, if only "reason" were to reign supreme,
cosmopolitan psychiatrists -- guardians of international sanity -- could
cure both the Soviets and us. The power of tyranny remains the one and only
threat to world peace.

threat to world peace.

care both the Soviets and us. The power of Communism remains the one and only cosmopolitan beachhead -- guardians of international sanity -- could that pathological hostility of which it only "reason" were to reign supreme, threatened by nuclear arms that might go off by their own volition or by manning the totalitarian nature of communist rule. Peace is not

What stands between a peaceful, a human world community and

building activities."

Estati's concluding chapter and border lie prescriptions for "community Once these steps are taken, it will be time enough to turn to Professor the Soviet Constitution and the statutes of the Soviet Communist Party. the integrity of communist institutions in the Soviet Union as provided for by would imbue one tot on the national security of the Soviet Union or even terminal stage of "capitalist encirclement." None of these measures due of, let us say, 1960 which Premier Kruschev himself failed as the free to evacuate Cuba, to raise the Berlin Wall, and to return to the status decisions made by the autocrat in the Kremlin. Approad, the Soviets are in the legislative branch which now serves as a mere rubber stamp for statutes and Constitution, provide for full debate of policies and legislations places of government. They could, in accordance with their own partly least on the parity level, and thus ensure orderly succession to the highest breathe life into their Constitution. They could introduce free elections, at totalitarian yoke and to retrain from forays into our garden. They could

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Professor Etzioni does not dissimulate his partiality to the planned society. His denunciation of authoritarian practice falls heaviest upon those Western peoples whom he finds guilty of ethnic discrimination. Yet he does not see in the denial of democratic rights to the peoples of Russia and the rest of Eastern Europe that flagrant abomination which poisons the international atmosphere and rules out a durable agreement with the communist powers on anything worth having.

Professor Etzioni exhorts us to win without war. I, too, propose to win without war. I offer a strategy which will enable us to do so as surely as any other strategy which the West can pit against an unpredictable future. Professor Etzioni and I disagree not only about how to win, but also about what kind of victory the West ought to strive for. The American people might conceivably be assured of survival in Professor Etzioni's brave new world. I doubt that they would find it to their liking for it bears only a faint resemblance to that free and good society which, in spite of its imperfections, comes as close to the idea of human freedom than has come any society on earth, past or present.

Intelligent, erudite and sober, Professor Etzioni stands head and shoulders above the throng of scholars who now eagerly add their mite to the growing heap of accommodationist literature. He argues his case with rigorous logic. The effect is stimulating and pleasing -- at least, as long as we are prepared to overlook his mistaken assumptions. His asides on the economic and psychological problems which beset the develop-

sages on the economic and benthological problems which pertain the develop-
ment as long as we are prepared to overlook his mistaken assumptions. His
with rigorous logic. The effect is stimulating and pleasing -- at least.
the growing pace of accommodationist literature. He argues his case
shoulders above the strong of scholars who now eagerly add their voice to
intelligent, erudite and sober. Professor Etzeloud stands head and
any society on earth, past or present.

imperfections, comes as close to the idea of human freedom than has come
a faint resemblance to that free and good society which, in spite of its
new world. I doubt that they would find it to their liking for it peses only
people might conceivably be assured of survival in Professor Etzeloud's prose
also spout what kind of victory the West ought to strive for. The American
future. Professor Etzeloud and I disagree not only spout how to win, but
surely are any other strategy which the West can hit against an unpredictable
to win without war. I offer a strategy which will enable us to do so as
Professor Etzeloud exports us to win without war. I too, propose
communist hordes on anything worth having.

international atmosphere and rules out a durable agreement with the
and the rest of Eastern Europe that fratrantiation which beloone the
he does not see in the denial of democratic rights to the peoples of Russia
those Western peoples whom he finds guilty of ethnic discrimination. Yet
society. His demarcation of autrocracy practice falls heaviest upon
Professor Etzeloud does not annihilate his barbity to the planned

-18-

-20-

ment of regional communities reflect his intimate knowledge of the history
of European integration. Last but not least, the general endorsement by
so distinguished a critic as Senator Humphrey counsels close scrutiny of
Professor Etzioni's offering. There is much in Professor Etzioni's
book that is worth pondering. Alas, his central thesis is no more solid
than his basic and untenable assumptions. For good and sufficient reasons
it would be a disaster were the policy which Etzioni advocates for U. S.
strategy to become, in fact, "our policy."

it would be a disaster were the policy which Etzioni advocates for U. S. than his basic and untenable assumptions. For good and sufficient reasons book that is worth pondering. Also, his central thesis is no more solid Professor Etzioni's offering. There is much in Professor Etzioni's so distinguished a critic as Senator Humphrey Connors close scrutiny of European integration. Last but not least, the General endorsement by ment of regional communities reflect his intimate knowledge of the history

-50-

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

EVERGREEN 2-0685

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

September 1, 1964

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Henry:

Thanks for your note of August 30th. The Rapoport
book would be a good one but could you let us know if
you would also be able to include the Etzioni book which
has already been fulsomely endorsed by Hubert Humphrey.
Otherwise, we would hope to have these other books
reviewed by someone else. Naturally, of course, we
would prefer you.

I personally tend to agree with your remarks about
the candidate. Unfortunately, the inner trend of the
present crew could eventuate in an inescapable disaster.
The choice is, indeed, a lousy one!

With good wishes,

WRK:mgt

Secretary
Joan Blanchard (Miss)

Sincerely yours,

at that time.

will bring your letter to his attention
office the end of September and I
He is scheduled to return to the

of your letter of September 1st.
writing to acknowledge the receipt
In Dr. Klausinger's absence, I am

Dear Mr. Kintner:

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Room 102-133 South 36th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Deputy Director
Mr. William R. Kintner

September 3, 1964

Secretary
Joan Blanchard

Sincerely yours,

time.

bring your letter to his attention at that
office the end of this month and I will
He is scheduled to return to the
10th.

the receipt of your letter of September
Cambridge, I am writing to acknowledge
In Dr. Klaasen's absence from

Dear Mr. Kuntner:

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Room 102-133 South 36th Street
Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Deputy Director
Mr. William R. Kuntner

September 14, 1964

[Lc]

UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA

EVERGREEN 2-0685

ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director

October 5, 1964

Dear Henry:

For the past year and a half, the Foreign Policy Research Institute has been conducting a study for the U.S. Air Force on Alternative U.S. Strategies. The study is now in draft form. The enclosed table of contents reflects the scope of the analysis.

The problem studied is complex and subject to various possible solutions. We believe, however, that the study has reached the point at which we will benefit from the critique of others who have pondered the security problems confronting the U.S., including those who may disagree sharply with the views set forth in this report.

We invite you to review our work in the course of a two day working conference to be held in Philadelphia on November 6th and 7th, 1964. If you are able to attend this conference, please advise us as soon as possible so that we may send you the entire draft study and the program of the conference.

The complete version of Chapter 11, "Technological Restraints," is classified secret - restricted data. Would you please request your cognizant security office to advise Mr. Arthur A. Brennan, Contracts Administrator, University of Pennsylvania, 3400 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104, of your clearance and the address of your repository for classified material.