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ing one unless, indeed, the President should not go himself. In that event, I
would want to be a delegate. From what the President has said I am sure he will
leave this to me. It is a matter of indifference to him whether I go as a dele-
gate or merely in an advisory capacity to him. He always speaks of us as one.
There are many reasons why it would be better for me to be on the outside and,
unless I change my mind, I shall go in that way. It would be consistent with my
entire career.

After we had finished our conversation we strolled to the beach, the Secret
Service men following. I introduced several of our neighbors to him and we then
sat alone with Grayson and on the veranda of the Billy Coolidge bungalow and watch-
ed the bathers, talking fitfully of national and international affairs.

The President and Mrs. Wilson took lunch with us. The only other guests
were Gordon and Janet, Grayson and Wiseman. After lunch we took a long motor
ride, and in the evening we dined with them at the Coolidge home, which is with-
in a stone's throw of ours. We left early.

August 16, , 1918.

The President played golf this morning with Grayson and Mrs. Wilson. He
later came over to lunch. The other guests were Mona and Randolph, Mrs. T. Jef-
ferson Coolidge Jr. and her son Billy. After lunch the President and I went into
my study for an hour's conference. There were many matters discussed. The
vacancy at Copenhagen, the possibility of Walter Page breaking down in London
and his successor, and various other subjects. I suggested Frank I. Cobb for
London. The President thought well of Cobb but did not think well of having
newspaper men head our embassies. He thought Cleveland Dodge was not physically
equal to it. As a matter of fact, I do not believe he thinks Dodge is the right
type of man, and in this I am in partial agreement.

There are two vacancies on the Federal Reserve Board, and two vacancies on

["(208)", "the Federal Trades Board about which he is anxious. I had no suggestions to make.\nI cannot get my mind upon appointments and he is very much in the same condition.", "In speaking of the Irish he surprised me by saying that he did not intend to\nappoint another Irishman to anything; that they were untrustworthy and uncertain.\nHe thought Tumulty was the only one he had come in contact with who was. It is\ncurious that he should pick him as an exception to the rule. Dudley Malone and\nsome others have brought him to this frame of mind and he does the Irish an injus-\ntice. However, he never means half he says and so stated to the crowd when we\nreturned to the veranda. He said \"House is always afraid that I am about to do\nsomething foolish because I unload my mind on him without reserve, and he is\nafraid I might do some of the things I tell him I want to do.\"", "I sounded him on another term, and I see evidence of his being a candidate.\nI have had such a long and wide experience in this direction that I am able to de-\ntect the trend of a candidate's mind before he, himself, is more than half aware of\nit. The President, x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x

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practically deserted, the people being in the country since it is a purely residential town of the wealthy.

When we drove up in two automobiles and went into the house a policeman on the beat eyed us with suspicion. After remaining in the house a few minutes the President, Grayson and I walked out the back way, strolling around the grounds and taking a walk in the neighborhood. We did not know until after we returned that the policeman had followed us and had stopped one of the Secret Service men to tell us of his suspicions. He said he knew the owners of the house were away, and having seen us drive up to the front door with two machines, one of which he thought was for the "loot", and then come out the back way bare-headed convinced him something was wrong and he was about to put us under arrest. The Secret Service man had some difficulty in making him believe that it was the President of the United States he had under suspicion.

We had an excellent supper and afterward motored back through Revere Beach and along the shore to Magnolia. The air was crisp and the moon beautiful. I think the President and Mrs. Wilson enjoyed the trip thoroughly.

August 17, 1918.

The President did not play golf this morning but instead we took a drive around Eastern Point and the Magnolia Shore Road. They came to luncheon as usual and we dined with them. Peter and Hetty Higginson lunched with us. In our luncheon arrangements we have only invited some member of Mrs. Coolidge's family. We have done this in order to avoid offending the sensibilities of our friends. No one could object to our having Mrs. Coolidge's connections because the President and Mrs. Wilson are occupying her house.

After lunch we had our usual conference for an hour or more. We discussed Russia and the Economic Mission. I was surprised to find that he did

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not have anyone in mind to head this mission and asked for suggestions. He thought there was no haste because he believed the military forces should go in before the economic. My opinion is that he has done the whole thing badly. I would have featured the economic part of it and sent in that section before the military, or at least have cooperated with it.

I spoke to him about Pershing and Goethals and urged that Pershing's wishes be respected since everything was going well in France. I did not think Goethals was a man to work easily in a subordinate position. Goethals would have been all right if my suggestions regarding Stettinius had been carried out, but Goethals under Pershing would be quite a different from Goethals under Stettinius. The President assured me that nothing would be done contrary to Pershing's wishes. I shall send Pershing a cable in regard to this when the President leaves, and it will be attached to the diary.

I spoke to him about the Council of National Defence as a reconstruction committee. I found he did not have them in mind for such work, nor indeed, did he seem impressed with the necessity of it. He thought matters could be adjusted as they arose later. I shall take the matter up with him again.

In speaking of the Peace Inquiry, I asked whether we were spending too much money. He thought not. He feels toward the Inquiry very much as I do. He has not the kind of mind that can use such detailed data as they are preparing but he thinks it will be necessary to have it because there will be times when we will have to be given certain facts. I added that the work they were doing would be necessary for the Conferences which must inevitably be held after the Peace Conference was over in order to do the "buttoning up" of the agreements made.

I asked if he had in mind my going abroad this Autumn. My thought was that it would be unnecessary. He agreed to this and said it would be a mis-

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take for the reason it would be generally thought the war was narrowing to a
close and that my mission abroad was for that purpose. It would be unfortunate
if such a belief became prevalent for it would have a tendency to a lessening of
effort.

We discussed Bulgaria but came to no conclusion as to what should be done.
After we were through they went motoring. I remained at home to get at an accu-
mulation of correspondence.

August 18, 1918.

The President slept late as it was Sunday and I did not see him until they
came to lunch. Our other guests were Mrs. Sargent and Charles Auchincloss. I
had a long talk with Dr. Grayson this morning as to the President's health and
as to whether he thought he could stand another term. Grayson thought he might
go for another ten years if nothing untoward happened. This new development
will disconcert McAdoo and I doubt very much whether he continues in the Cabinet.
He certainly will not after this term if the President should be re-elected.

I have a long letter from Senator Root about the League of Nations. I
gave it to the President to read aloud. He marked some of the passages and we
discussed the letter in detail. He thinks Root has the wrong idea, but I felt
that I could bring him around to our view. I shall try to do this—and if he
cannot be brought around, I fear Mr. Root will not be of the Peace Commission.
There is no use getting a man on the Commission who will be antagonistic to the
President for it will only make for trouble.

I spoke to the President of a letter I had received from McAdoo sometime
early in June in which he had asked my advice upon three points: Whether he
should resign from both the Railroad Directorship and the Treasury; whether he
should resign from one or the other; or whether he should continue with both
with the prospect of dying from the strain. I told of my reply to which he
agreed. He thought, however, that McAdoo had better give up the railroads ra-

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ther than the Treasury. The railroads, he thought, was more of an administra-
tive matter, and the Treasury was more the business of a statesman. He put this
to me in a way which he evidently wished me to convey to McAdoo so that he would
choose the Treasury rather than the railroads. I have an idea what was in the
back of his mind, but I did not indicate it. The President thinks, so he says,
that McAdoo's throat is too bad for him to go out on another Liberty Loan speaking
tour, therefore, he will put a ban upon it and will make a more limited tour of
the country himself. Trouble is brewing between the two, for McAdoo is not
the sort to take this kindly.

We dined with them at the Coolidge home.

August 19, 1918.

The President played golf this morning and I did not see him until he came
to us for lunch. After lunch we had our usual conference, in fact, the confer-
ence continued practically all the afternoon as he did not leave our premises
until we all went to the Coolidge house for an early dinner. Part of the time we
sat on the lawn in the sun with Mrs. Coolidge and Sir William Wiseman.

The President looks a different man from what he did when he arrived. He
feels rested and looks it. When I told him that Dr. Paul Reinsch, our Minister
to China, was lunching with us tomorrow, he remarked that he could not remember
just what conclusion he and Reinsch had come to at their conference in Washing-
ton. This indicated, he said, that his mind was becoming "leaky". He had
Reinsch write a memorandum afterward of what they had agreed upon and send it ot
him. He does this now in almost every instance in order not to further burden
an already over-burdened mind.

I spoke to Mrs. Wilson about this condition and told her how much I dis-
approved of the President's method of conducting his work. He does too much
detail and does not delegate enough of it to others. Mrs. Wilson's answer was
that when he delegated it to others he found it was not well done. My reply to

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this was that it was better to have it not so well done than to overburden him-
self. My contention was, and is, that he should give himself ample leisure to
think clearly upon the big problems that confront him and not have his mind
wearied with detail someone else could do.

The President and party left at eight o'clock. Gordon, Janet, Loulie and I
went to the station to see them off. The President asked Gordon to go down
with them on their special but he concluded to go to New York with his brother.
The President made much of baby Louise while he was here. He does not seem
over fond of children and I was surprised at the affection he showed her.

August 20, 1918.

Miss Denton and I have been overwhelmed with crank and every other kind
of letters. I recognize the handwriting of some that come to me as being the
same who also write the President in my care. My habit is to throw these let-
ters in the waste-basket and not give them to the Secret Service men. Fxximxx
They indicate, however, how many thoroughly unbalanced minds there are in the
country. Some of them accuse me of a pro-Catholic leaning, some of an anti-
Catholic, some pro-British and some anti. Every conceivable public question
seems to be on the minds of these cranks and it is a wonder the President does
not come to harm even though he is as carefully guarded as he is.

Wiseman, who has been taking his vacation at Magnolia, has given me
letters and cables from his Government. One of these refers to the Mexican
situation and was from Balfour to me. The President read it and was much annoy-
ed and asked me to have Sir William send the despatch which went today, a copy
of which is a part of the record. Sir William and I also wrote a cable regard-
ing raw materials. It is a criticism not only of Lloyd George, but of the Al-
lied Governments. This cable, too, is a part of the record. Both of these
cables the President requested me to send through Wiseman, asking me to use his
name as freely as I thought necessary in order to bring about the desired results.

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In talking with the President the other day I called his attention to the necessity of not offending the British Government in a way that would offend the entire British nation. The British people, as a whole, I told him, were with him; the British Government and the reactionary element in England were against him. In his desire to hit the Government and the reactionary forces he might, if he were not careful, hurt the *amour propre* of the British people as a whole. This, I thought, would be unfortunate. The President said he realized the truth of what I said and would use the necessary caution.

Dr. Paul Reinsch took lunch with us. I found him an intelligent, scholarly man. In speaking of Russian intervention he agreed heartily with the proposal I had suggested to the President, i. e. Hoover, etc. I asked him for suggestions as to the head of a mission and, strangely enough, he made the same suggestion Gordon made last night before leaving, and that was, Roland Morris, our Ambassador at Tokyo. I shall look into this further and perhaps suggest his name to the President.

August 21, 1918.

Among my visitors today were R. W. Woolley, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, of Nebraska, and Professor Johnson, of the Boston Tech. Woolley gave a resume of affairs in his department and a general outline of Washington news.

Hitchcock and I had a two hour talk and became better acquainted. He gave me a history of his association with William Jennings Bryan. I had no idea they had been so close to one another, both in politics and business, for my knowledge of their relationship has been one of hostility. Hitchcock thinks Bryan is a much changed man. He spoke of "his soul having been seared by many defeats and disappointments." He considered him thoroughly selfish and that he had brought upon himself all the enmities that have come within recent years.

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Bryan, he said, had never wanted anyone to have an opinion or to have a reward.
He tried to prevent him, Hitchcock, from having any senatorial patronage in
Nebraska, and yet as head of the State Department, he had a vast amount of pa-
tronage such as this, etc., there without trespassing upon the pitiful
patronage of Nebraska to which a Senator is ordinarily entitled.

We talked of foreign affairs and I gave my view of conditions in Germany
and of what I thought would be the outcome of the war.

Prof. Johnson, and those he brought with him, had to do with the single
tax question. I have gone into this problem in past years and I was entirely
familiar with the arguments used. As usual, he is obsessed with the one idea to
such a degree that he is not altogether rational.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Walter Denegre. Outside of Sir William
Wiseman and Senator and Mrs. Lippett, the guests were purely social.

August 22, 1918.

John Hays Hammond has invited me to both lunch and dinner to meet George
Harvey. I declined and frankly told him that I did not wish to meet Harvey
or talk with him because of his violent abuse of the President. Harvey, I
told him, drank too much and when under the influence of liquor might say
things I would have to resent, and this would make a meeting unpleasant.
Upon Hammond's insistence that good would come from a talk with Harvey, I
agreed to let him bring him to call. They came this afternoon and remained
an hour. Harvey was sober and moderate and we scarcely disagreed at all upon
the topics discussed. He even praised Daniels highly. Remembering the al-
most scurrilous articles he had published about Daniels some two or three years
ago, it seemed to me he would be ashamed to mention the subject.

He spoke in a kindly and complimentary way of the President and gave him
full credit for many achievements.

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I have had long talks with Wiseman and we have prepared cables to send Reading, copies of which will be attached to the record. Both Sir William and I scent trouble between our two Governments and it will take constant vigilance to ward it off. I think the main trouble comes from Lloyd George's inability to act in any but a thoroughly selfish way-- a way indeed, which approaches dishonesty. He will do anything to serve his own ends, and he has no idea of the conduct which gentlemen should maintain toward one another. He has great ability of sorts and it is a pity that his character is not higher. Both he and Clemenceau dislike the President and the President dislikes them, and all of them are partly justified in their feeling.

August 23, 1918.

Governor Walsh, who is running for the Senate against Senator Weeks, came to ask advice regarding certain phases of his campaign.

August 24, 1918.

Gordon telephoned this morning that Walter Page had resigned. It seems that cables were coming in signed by Page and the Department naturally thought he was in London since it is not customary for an Ambassador's name to be signed to cables when he is absent. I knew he was in Scotland, having received this information from his partner, Doubleday. Counselor Laughlin recently applied for sixty days' leave. The Department, having in mind to send him to the Hague during Garrett's absence in Switzerland, declined to grant it and therefore matters in London were brought to a crisis. Both Page and Laughlin being ill, I suppose Page felt that he ought to resign. I had already suggested Frank Cobb as Page's successor since I had been anticipating his resignation, and the President and I discussed it when he was here.

Gordon suggested this morning John W. Davis, Solicitor General, as a

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suitable man for the place. I knew this would please Lansing and I told Gordon to speak to him and if he desired it I would recommend Davis. Lansing was de-lighted as I expected. I am to write the President and by the time he gets my letter, Lansing is to speak to him. I hope we may get someone for London who will be useful in helping us meet the vexatious problems constantly arising between the two countries. Page has been so insistent upon his ambassadorial rights that, in order to get quick decisions, we have frequently had to take up important matters without his knowledge. For instance, the British intention in regard to Mexico was brought to me the other day. After discussing it with the President, I had Wisemann send a cable to Reading giving the views of our Government. All these cables are parts of the record and will show that this matter was initiated, discussed and decided without the London Embassy having known that it was even brewing.

Page would have been properly informed had it not been feared that he would take offence because the matter had not been referred to him for action in the first place, which was not possible in the circumstances.

Before suggesting anyone for Page's place, I had Gordon telephone to Bar Harbor and ask Frank Polk if he would like to have it. Polk did not care to be considered. His health is not good; he has several small children whom he does not wish to take across the Atlantic at this time, and altogether he thought it would be best to eliminate him. In some ways he would be the best man we could send.

There is one thing to be said of Page and that is he is popular among the English people generally. He will be considered by them and the American people as a success.

Hoover is back from the other side, and Gordon tells me he thinks I should go over again. There is a lack of cooperation which he believes I might remedy. He is critical of Oscar Crosby and some of the others whom he thinks need disciplining.

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August 25, 1918.

The French Ambassador and Madame Jusserand lunched with us. We had to meet them, Mr. and Mrs. Gordon Abbott, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Bradley and the Misses Loring. Jusserand and I had an intimate talk after lunch about Russian intervention and the complications incident thereto.

I asked Jusserand where he thought the Peace Conference should be held. He immediately replied, "Fontainbleu" and naively followed this by saying that Fontainbleu was better in many respects than Versailles.

This leads me to observe that the success of the Allies within the last few weeks seems to have turned the heads of everybody. Lodge makes a speech in the Senate which the German General Command could not have written more to their liking. It has excited favorable comment everywhere as of course, Lodge knew it would. I cannot believe that he is so stupid as not to know it would help the German Military Party to sustain themselves for another winter. It is the old story I have mentioned in these chronicles so often. The Entente statesmen always give the German Military Party help when they most need it. It is essential for the Military to have something to weld the German people together and to make them feel that their backs are to the wall. Lloyd George, Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, Clemenceau and now Lodge have all recently done their share in this direction.

My letters to the President, both yesterday and today, are parts of the record.

August 26, 1918.

Marcel Knecht and Edward E. Hearn, late Supreme Commander of the Knights of Columbus came to lunch. Their coming had to do with Hearn's departure for France and Italy, where to goes to direct the expenditure of the $15,000,000.

K. C. Fund. I gave Hearn a letter to Ambassador Sharpo.

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August

Cyrus McCormick followed after lunch and before he left, Dr. Harper of Chicago University and a Russian by the name of Batolin came. Harper and Batolin came from Chicago to see me before they went to Washington to ask my advice as to the best method of procedure. Batolin is a peasant and is supposed to be the greatest industrial magnate in Russia. They remained for something over two hours and I was thoroughly saturated in Russian affairs. I got some things of value from Batolin. He knows Russia thoroughly, and he has a great sympathy for the people whom he declares have had no chance. For three hundred years they were under the Magyars, and for three hundred more were under the Muscovites. It is not to be wondered at he thinks that now they have their liberty, they should not understand how to use it. He believes in time they will find themselves, but he does not look for such a day within the near future. He thinks it will be necessary for them to first go through many bitter months. I asked Prof. Harper, who acted as interpreter, to give me a memorandum of the latter part of our conversation. I shall probably attach it to this record and perhaps send it in an abbreviated form to the President.

August 27, 1918.

Wiseman telephoned from New York over the private wire. He has some interesting cables from England which he read, copies of which he will send later and which will be attached to the diary.

I have also had many telephone conversations with Washington and elsewhere about the vacancy in London. The President spoke to Lansing and Gregory together about John Davis. Gregory objected to Davis leaving the Department of Justice, but later in the day withdrew his objections.

Vance McCormick took lunch with us. I asked him how he would like to go to London. He gave an evasive answer but was rather emphatic in his belief that he would not make a good Ambassador at that post, alleging that he could not speak well enough. We discussed the coming elections at some length and agreed upon a

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general plan of procedure. He complained that the President took political action under the advice of Burleson, Tumulty and others without consulting him which caused embarrassment since he, McCormack, was head of the party machinery. He wondered whether his being head of the War Trade Board ought not to make him minimize his political activities.

We talked of foreign trade conditions. He believes if the British and French had followed our lead, Spain could have been forced to break relations with Germany. Her need of coal from England, and cotton from America would, in his opinion, have been sufficient to cause this action. On the other hand, the English feel that the ores of Spain are essential to their war activities and any break or revolution there which would stop production, might be disastrous.

Edmund Billings, Collector of the Port of Boston, was my next caller. We discussed Massachusetts politics. He gave an insight into conditions as they seemed to him, and he also gave the only rational explanation of Dudley Malone's break with the President. Dudley, he thought, was much in love with one of the militant suffragettes who was arrested in Washington. He saw her man-handled improperly by the police, and he saw the filthy conditions of the district jail where she was taken. He appealed to the President, and when he did not respond promptly and sympathetically, it drove him to the action he took.

Billy Phillips was the next on my list. We had a very long talk concerning the vacancy at London and international conditions generally. He says Hoover thinks I should go abroad and bring about a better coordination of our war activities in England and France. Hoover said if I did not go he would like to undertake the work himself. I told Phillips that I should be glad to have Hoover do it, and when I go to Washington, I shall talk the matter over with the President.

Phillips thinks the President and Lansing are so prejudiced against the British Government that there is danger of serious complications. I told him of my conversation with the President upon this subject. Phillips says

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we have treated Canada discourteously by not sending Lansing there to return
the many official visits made by Canadians to the United States. The Governor
General, the Duke of Devonshire and others among them.

McAdoo telephoned from Washington to ask my advice concerning his re-
presentatives abroad. Oscar Crosby is sick and he wondered if there was any
reason why he should not send Paul Cravath to undertake his duties for the time
being. I advised bringing Crosby home, and I saw no reason why Cravath should
not be sent. He said the President was prejudiced against Cravath and did not
wish him to go. I told him of Page's resignation of which he had not heard.
He thought John W. Davis would make a good representative, although he was cold-
bloomed, selfish and reactionary.

August 28, 1918.

Eduard de Billy, of the French High Commission, and Dr. Isiah Bowman, of
our Inquiry, lunched with us. De Billy wished to enlist my sympathy in the
French Government's plan to make the Germans restore the machinery of which
they have denuded Belgium and France. He says even if it were possible to
exact a monetary consideration it would be entirely inadequate, because there
would be no way of quickly and readily replacing this machinery, and the own-
ers and workers in the factories will probably be without means of resuming
operations for two or three years after the war. I gave him the assurance he
desired.

Bowman and I went over matters appertaining to the Inquiry,
Justice McReynolds was an afternoon caller, and so was Muller Ury the artist.
McReynolds thinks John Davis would be about the best selection that could be
made for London. He doubts, however, whether he has sufficient income to ac-
cept. I cannot understand why a democratic country makes it impossible for any-
one except the rich to serve in such positions of honor and importance. It
limits the choice and makes it difficult to secure the services of the best men.

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August 29, 1918.

Dr. Washburn and Dr. Barton came at 10.30 to ask advice about sending a commission into Bulgaria for the purpose of ascertaining the feeling of the people toward breaking with the Central Powers and making peace with the Allies. I saw no objection if the proper parties were sent and if they went without the Government's knowledge or sanction. We are not at war with Bulgaria, therefore there is no reason why American citizens should not go into that country if they can do so. I suggested, though, that if anyone went in, their plan of action should be to induce the Bulgarian Government to ask the President to mediate between them and the Allies.

They both thought that I should go to Japan in order to promote good feeling between the two countries. Barton has had an intimation from one of his missionaries, in whom he has great confidence, that some such visit should be made by an American. It was suggested by the visit of Prince Arthur of Connaught which he says has had a stimulating effect upon the relations between Great Britain and Japan.

Mr. Hawkins of the United Press and Mr. A. J. Byington of San Paulo, Brazil, lunched with us. The visit was for the purpose of having Byington tell of conditions in Brazil. He is an electrical engineer of some distinction and an American who has lived in Brazil for twenty years or more. He is an intelligent fellow and I gathered much information.

We dined tonight with Mr. and Mrs. Robert Bradley.

August 30, 1918.

Hennessey of the Boston Globe, C. B. McCollum, Postmaster at Waco, Texas, and Frank Trumbull came to lunch. McCollum came for advice as to his action in regard to the war. He is willing to resign and enter the army if I thought best. After lunch my good friend Edward S. Martin came and remained all afternoon. We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Thos. Beal.

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August 31, 1918.

Frank Doubleday, Frank Simonds and Eugene Thayer lunched with us. There was nothing of importance said or done, but we had an enjoyable time.

September 1, 1918.

General and Mrs. Crozier, Mr. and Mrs. F. S. Moseley and Mr. and Mrs. Frederick Prince, Mrs. T. Jefferson Coolidge, Jr. and Mrs. Marshall Field lunch-ed with us. We dine with Mr. and Mrs. Newbold Edgar at Bass Rocks. The British Consul at New York, Mr. Bailey and his wife, and the Italian Naval At-tache at Washington, and Mrs. Jerome Bonaparte were the other guests.

September 2, 1918.

J. C. Lamkin of San Antonio, Texas, and Wiseman took lunch with us. After lunch Dudley Malone and Mr. Goodell of Salem, and Lieut. Stoica, of the Roumanian Army, called. With my mail, telephones from Washington and New York and various other calls upon my time, it was a trying day.

September 3, 1918.

My two letters to the President are parts of the diary. One of these let-ters is very important. I also had one from the President today.

My luncheon guests were, Paul Cravath, John J. Spurgeon of the Public Led-ger, and M. and Madame Aubert. After lunch Mr. Howard, Director of the Training School for Officers of the called. Professor Boke, of the University of California also came. The day was not less busy than yes-terday.

Jas, W. Gerard telephoned from New York wishing to know what chance he had for the London post. He was disappointed to hear that he was not being con-sidered. Wiseman and I formulated some cables to be sent to Lord Reading.

Cravath had much interesting information from Paris and London, He was critical of Pershing and does not think our army is properly organized abroad.

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September 4, 1918.

Dmoski, President of the National Polish Council which sits in Paris, lunched with us. We had a long and satisfactory talk-- something we were unable to do when he called on me in Paris. I had so much to do there that I could only ask him to give me a memorandum. He recalled the fact today that when he had gotten to the most interesting part of the interview, Lloyd George was ushered into the salon, which meant his exit. Dmoski speaks eight languages, has the history of Europe thoroughly, and is altogether one of the most accomplished men I know. We talked of Poland and her future. We discussed the possible boundaries for the new Poland and its form of government. He believes if Germany and Russia are monarchies, a polish republic would not live between them. Poland, he believes, in that case, would have to be become a monarchy, although a liberal one. He did not think a Pole could be selected for King because of factional differences. A king he thought would have to be sought in another country.

Dr. Roscoe Thayer and Sir William Wiseman also took lunch with us.
Thayer, Dmoski and I conferred for a considerable time afterward.

September 5, 1918.

John Hays Hammond and "Bill" Nye, of the State Department Secret Service, were my principal callers. Hammond is eager to show some results in converting George Harvey to a more reasonable frame of mind. Harvey has actually written of me in a complimentary way in the North American Review, and tells Hammond that he intends to "take a sharp stick" to Senator Sherman because of his attack upon the President and me. This attack covers many pages of the Congressional Record and is devoted largely to me. It is attached to the record. It seems that "Philip Dru" disturbs him as well as "The Real Colonel House" which sits uneasily upon his mind. I am utterly indifferent to these attacks and

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while some of my newspaper friends have answered him, for the most part, the Press have treated it with silent contempt.

After such attacks as this of Sherman's, I receive many threatening letters. It is through such incendiary remarks that assassinations are brought about. They have a tendency to inflame weak and partisan minds.

September 6, 1918.

Governor T. M. Campbell of Texas, and Wiseman lunched with us. Joe Mitchell Chapple, of the National Magazine, and Granville Macfarlane, of the Boston American, were afternoon callers. Macfarlane wished to know whether there was any chance to have Hearst sent to Europe to do war work. I discouraged the idea for I do not believe there is a department in the Government that would father him.

Chapple's visit was to advise concerning some matters relating to his magazine and his book "We'll Stick to the Finish". In this book he has a very complimentary page or two devoted to me. Sir William and I arranged cables and attended to much routine business.

September 7, 1918.

Wiseman lunched with us and we had a thorough discussion of international problems.

McAdoo telephoned from Boston that he would be out at seven o'clock this evening to spend the night. He is coming in a special train which he will sidetrack at Magnolia.

September 8, 1918.

I did not have anyone to meet McAdoo and Loulie took her dinner upstairs so we might be alone for dinner and until bedtime. Our talk was largely personal and had to do with the President, McAdoo's relations with him, and McAdoo's conduct of the Treasury and Railroads. I was amused to hear him express himself

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almost in my exact words, that is, he noticed signs of the President being a
candidate for a third term. I confirmed this opinion. I thought there was
nothing for McAdoo to do except to go on in the even tenor of his way, do his
work in the efficient manner in which he has been doing it; think not at all of
himself but of the public he was serving, and leave his fate in the hands of
Providence. I thought it possible that the President would run, but there
were many chances that he would not. I thought, too, that the President had
it mind stronger now than he would have later.

McAdoo tells me that the Gavin McNab letter to me, which I sent to the
President, advising against his speaking tour early in October, turned the
scales against it, at least, McAdoo thinks the President has given it up for the
moment. The President told him, too, that "I feel that I am not so strong in
labor circles now as I was sometime ago". He was amused to know that this was
an exact quotation from my letter to the President of September 3rd.

I explained to McAdoo the difficulty I had in advising the President. He,
the President, expects me to keep absolutely abreast of both domestic and for-
eign situations and, in addition to that, he expects me to read his mind and know
what conclusions he has come to or will come to under certain conditions. I have
only received two or three letters from the President this summer. I am sure,
as McAdoo says, that my influence with him is as strong as ever, perhaps stronger.
There is every indication of it but I only know it from his actions and from
friendsto whom he happens to talk upon subjects about which I have written him.
It is hardly fair to me, and less fair to him. If my advice is as valuable as
he seems to think, he ought to know that it would be more valuable if he inform-
ed me oftener as to his reactions upon what I advise.

In discussing with McAdoo whether he should give up either the Rail-
roads or the Treasury portfolio, I advised giving up the Railroads. McAdoo
thought the Railroads was the easier end of his work and if he had to give up

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one or the other because of the hard work, it would be wise to resign from the Treasury. He thought the Railroads would give him more freedom of action and not confine him so strictly to office work.

In speaking of a possible successor as Secretary of the Treasury, he thought the President would make a serious error if he chose Houston. We agreed that Houston had a good mind but was inclined to be lazy and lacked both imagination and courage. McAdoo spoke well of Gordon and declared he was the only one in the State Department that was worth while. He liked Lansing, but considered him unable to cope with the situations that confront the State Department. He thought Baker would make a better Secretary of State and that the country would be fortunate to have him there both because of his fitness for it and because he was unfit for Secretary of War. He thought he was of the Wilson type, neither of them, in his opinion, having much executive ability. McAdoo evidently has not much opinion of his confreres in the Cabinet. He, himself, is easily the most forceful one of the lot and the most successful from the point of accomplishment, and is so recognized by the country.

McAdoo left at twelve o'clock. He walked to the station in order to observe the law regarding the use of gasolene on Sundays.

September 9, 1918.

We are busy getting ready to leave the country on Wednesday. Senator and Mrs. Hitchcock asked us to tea at Swamscott. I had a long talk with him about foreign affairs. I told him what I had written the President as to the waning influence of the United States as the Allies waxed strong, and of my suggestion that we try to get an agreement with the Allies now as to our war aims. Hitchcock agreed with me as to the wisdom of this plan. He is to preside over a meeting of Czecho-Slovaks and Poles on Sunday. What he wanted particularly was to get my views regarding that situation and the fate of the Austrian Empire.

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The President asked Gordon to come to the White House today. He asked him whether the State Department had sent me a copy of a cable regarding Holland's interest in a league of nations. After Gordon had assured him that I had the telegram, he asked him to telephone and find out what I thought should be done in the premises. I dictated to Gordon the following answer which he sent to the President.

"Mr. House thinks that Holland's attitude regarding a league of nations is not of sufficient importance to warrant giving them your entire program. He believes it would be well to take them in hand, and others like them, and influence them in the right direction. This can easily be done. In Mr. House's opinion, it is essential to get Great Britian and France committed first. When this is done it will not be difficult to get the other nations".

My letter to the President today is unimportant but is a part of the record as is his letter to me enclosing his revision of my draft of the Covenant for the League of Nations. This draft, along with mine, is a part of the record. It will be seen I think, that he has not incorporated any new ideas, but has changed the verbiage and rearranged the Articles, putting some of mine entirely out. The Preamble he has improved, some of the others I think are not as clear as mine.

September 10, 1918.

The Y.M.C.A. workers through Helen Frick asked me to pose for some movies they are sending to France for the entertainment of our soldiers. I did it with little Louise as my companion.

Gordon telephoned that the President asked where a registered letter would reach me. I knew that my letter of September 3rd would stir him, and I intended that it should.

This is the last dictation I shall make until we reach New York sometime next week. The only rest I expect to get is between here and New York

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where I shall slowly drift in the motor. It has been a busy and strenuous week
summer but successful from many points of view.

New York.

Sept. 13, 1918.

Wiseman came to Magnolia in his car Wednesday, and we broke up
and motored into Chestnut Hill only to find Randolph ill with influenza. This
prevented the few days' rest I had promised myself and on Thursday Sir Wil-
liam and I motored to New York, arriving at seven o'clock in the evening.

I went over a large accumulation of papers and letters. Today I had
a conference with Mezes about the Peace Inquiry and its work. I have had my
telephone number changed so no one knows it and we have therefore had compar-
ative quiet.

September 15, 1918.

William Phillips was my first caller this morning. He came to consult
as to the advisability of sending Dr. Washburn to Bulgaria and Turkey. I
thought, under proper conditions, it could be done. He is to go as a Red
Cross agent, and will be instructed to report on conditions of British, Greek
and Serbian prisoners. Those countries have requested us to send someone in
for that purpose. The real purpose of his visit is to ascertain conditions
in Bulgaria and to see what opportunity there is to get that country to break
away from the Central Powers. Dr. Washburn will take Prof. Moore of Harvard
with him. Moore has already told Lawrence Lowell, and Lowell, so Phillips
and I believe, has within himself enough indiscretion to pass the news around
sufficiently to make the trip a failure.

David Miller came to discuss Peace Inquiry matters.

Mr. Williams, a socialist, came with a letter of introduction from Upton
Sinclair. He has recently returned from Russia and called to tell of con-
ditions there.

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September 16, 1918.

Arthur Brisbane was my first caller. He is much disturbed because Mitchell Palmer has accused him of being an agent of the brewers. Brisbane acknowledges that he borrowed money from some friends who are brewers to buy the Washington Times. The amount was $375,000. He claims it was a perfectly legitimate business transaction, although the lenders refused to take any security, which Brisbane admits looks suspicious. He explains this by saying they did not wish to take security fearing lest the transaction might become known and they would be criticised. They therefore preferred to take their chances relying upon his vast note and honor. He asked me to give him a letter of introduction to Mitchell Palmer in order that he might explain the matter and keep down further publicity. I declined to give the letter alleging that I knew Palmer too slightly to warrant my doing so. In truth, I know Brisbane even less well, for this is the second time I ever met him, the other time being at a dinner last winter at Mrs. Philip Lydig's.

Hugh Wallace followed Brisbane. It is the first time I have seen him for six or eight months.

I have had many conferences over the telephone with Frank Cobb of the New York World regarding the Austrian proposal. I tried to steer Cobb in the direction of my own thought so he might write for the World immediately sympathetically.

The Austrian proposal has been the sensation of the day. Everyone is talking of it. Late in the afternoon Gordon told me that the President had sent his sixty-eight word reply. He did this, so Gordon says, largely at the suggestion of Tumulty who thought that haste should be used in order that a political advantage might be reaped. It was understood that Lodge and some of the republicans intended making speeches in the Senate tomorrow, and this was to anticipate them. Lansing told Gordon that they had in mind also forestalling

the British and French. I was inexpressably shocked to think that the President would act thus hastily for two such unworthy reasons. It places him on a level with Lloyd George and his kind.

We have been endeavoring to bring about political unity among the Allies in order not to be wholly at the mercy of Germany. The President and Lansing both seem determined that it shall be known to the world that this country is acting independently of our allies. They blazon the fact to the entire world. This is well enough if it is our purpose to stand aloof from world politics, but in view of the fact that I have prepared and the President has accepted, a covenant for a league of nations, the essence of which is that there shall be close political and economic unity throughout the world, their position is wholly wrong.

In my opinion, the President should not have answered this Austrian peace proposal for at least two weeks. He should have had the entire world on tip-toe in expectation of his reply. He should have then declined it in a way which would have given the Central Empires the reasons why we cannot make peace with their present rulers. The same people are in control now who made the Brest-litvosk and Roumanian and Ukrainian Treaties. They, and their kind, sank the Lusitania, committed all the atrocities on land and sea, ravished Belgium and brought the moral standard of the world to what it is.

He should also have said that we did not desire to go into a closed session to discuss peace terms, that they did not seem to know the world had changed and the fundamentals of peace must be known to the world, after which the details could be worked out in more intimate council. If Lloyd George had the vision and ability he could use this opportunity and take the liberal leadership away from the President.

Speaking of team-work and "common counsel", while Lansing was in one room preparing the President's answer for the press, Billy Phillips was in an-

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other assuring Barkley, the British Chargé, that no immediate action was contemplated. Barkley sent this information to his Government, but almost simultaneously his Government must have read the President's answer to Austria.

September 18, 1918.

Dr. Hollis Godfrey came today to bring his plan for war reconstruction which he had revamped since I saw him in Magnolia and which contained the changes I had suggested. He gave me credit in large letters which I asked him to eliminate. I shall take the plan to the President when I go to Washington next week. He will not receive it well at first but may ultimately accept it or something similar.

Signor Cammillo Cerruti, High Commissioner for Italy, called with a letter of introduction from our Paris Embassy. He has just landed. Maxxhaugdxhax kxaxkaxxwaxkaxxha He knows America fairly well and did not need much coaching. He thought his troubles would be mainly with his own countrymen rather than with American officials. This observation made me feel that he was competent to fill the position he occupies. I promised to help him, as far as I could, over difficulties that might seem to him insurmountable.

Dr. Isaiah Bowman of our Inquiry followed and our conversation had to do with Inquiry matters.

I have a letter from Prof. Wm. E. Dodd of the University of Chicago. He wrote a sketch of me for The Nation at their request which they declined to publish. I attach the sketch itself, the letters concerning it, and my answer to Dodd.

September 19, 1918.

I disagree almost entirely with the manner in which the President has handled the Russian situation, although I agree heartily with the objects he has in view. If he had sent a man like Hoover at the beginning, and had made the

relief and economic end dominant, leaving the military merely to protect our
that
civilians, I believe everything could have been done that was possible in the
circumstances.

I am not in agreement with the President as to leaving Russia intact. She
is too big and too homogeneous for the safety of the world. I would like to
see Siberia a separate republic, and European Russia divided into three parts.
The British Empire does not present the same menace to the world as would the
Russian Empire under a monarchy. The component parts of the British Empire can
at any time become autonomous, and India cannot be held indefinitely as she is.
Even now, India is a source of weakness rather than strength to the Empire. The
settlement which confronts us at the Peace Conference seems almost insuperable.
not
It would be if those having the settlement in hand were entirely unselfish and
without jealousy. Jealousy is the commonest human attribute. So also is self-
fishness. Man looks upon this Globe as wholly his. The animals, the fish of
the seas, the birds of the air have no rights. They are to be killed or de-
estroyed in any way that man sees fit for his pleasure and oramentation. The
anglo Saxon and Tueton go even further. It is only recently that they thought
have considered the black man better than the beast. Nevertheless, the move-
ment is forward, and someday in the centuries that are to come, things will be
as they should be.

September 20, 1918.

Michael S. Farbman, a Russian of the Gorki school, was an interesting caller. He came to plead for Russia and for human and sensible treatment of her and her problems.

B. M. Baruch spent an hour or so with me. We discussed everything relating to his department, which indeed, relates closely to the most important matters being done by the Government in the war, so far as the material side of it is concerned. He told of a communication he had received by personal

messenger from London regarding a mechanical device which he was told that Foch
wished us to make and which they believe might end the war. It will be many
months before it can be put into operation. I dare not mention its character.
Baruch said no one in this country, excepting himself, knows of it, or would
know of it, and he wondered whether he should tell the President and General
March, Chief of Staff. I advised informing the President.

Sidney and I had a long conference in the evening relating to the Inquiry.
There are many matters that need attention.

September 21, 1918.

Dr. Wm. H. Short came to ask advice regarding the policy of the American
League to Enforce Peace. I was glad to advise along the lines which I thought
would be best fax to move in order to assist in what the President and I
have in mind for a league of nations.

The President had Irving Hoover of the White House telephone over the
private wire requesting that I come to Washington tonight and be with him at the
White House tomorrow and Monday. I have been looking for the summons
since the weather changed for cooler conditions during the night.

September 24, 1918.

I am just back from Washington. When I arrived there Sunday morning and
had had breakfast the President came to my room and asked me to come into Mrs.
Wilson's apartment and sit with them while they had theirs.

He had been thinking, he said, of the letter I wrote him from Magnoli,
September 3rd, and he had written a speech which he thought would cover the
case, provided he could get the Allies to agree to it. He wished me to read
the speech so as to get my judgment of it and also as to when and where it
should be delivered. He said Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank in
New York had asked him to open the Liberty Loan Drive with a speech in New York
but he had declined because he did not consider it a suitable occasion.

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He was wondering if the Economic Club of New York would do.

I thought the Liberty Loan Drive would be an admirable occasion. It
could be arranged for Friday night of this week. He could give his
sentence to the Liberty Loan telling how necessary it was to raise the money
because this country had in mind certain things which should be done to prevent
future wars. He could then launch out on his subject and not refer to the loan
again. It could be done as he did it in Baltimore last spring.

The President agreed to this and asked me to make arrangements. We discussed who should speak with him, the length of time his speech should take, when it should begin and when it should end.

The President wanted me to go to church. I consented but when he gave
me an opportunity to evade it I took advantage of it much to his disgust. While
they were at church I had an hour each with Burleson and Lane. Burleson wished
me to advise the President to veto the Prohibition Bill which is about to pass.
Lane's trouble was the Returning Soldiers' Homestead Bill, a measure I think well
of if it is properly drawn.

After lunch the President and I went to his library where he read his
speech. It was admirable except in places. I called his attention to these
and, after some argument, he made the changes I suggested. He gave me the
speech to read again on Monday, after he had made the changes, and it seemed to
me without objections excepting one word for which he substituted another. The
address concerns the League of Nations and while he does not go into it to the
core, he makes it clear the kind of league we must have.

We discussed the sentiment for this measure as it exists throughout the
world. I had some data upon this subject which I gave him to read aloud. In
addition, I had the French conception of what a league should be, which he had
not seen. I found him not at all up to date in regard to the subject.

We discussed Russia at some length, looking at the map and trying to

find what was best for the Czech army, now there, to do in the circumstances. I asked why he had not gone ahead with his economic and relief policy regarding Russia. He replied that Redfield had so "messed the matter up" that it was impossible for him to do so; that he had now taken it out of his hands and placed it in that of the War Trade Board and he hoped something would come of it. He did not know that Gordon had worked this out and arranged it.

I wondered why he had permitted the publication of the alleged Lenin-Trotsky documents; and whether he was satisfied as to their authenticity. He expressed himself as being thoroughly satisfied. I told him I had my doubts, and I thought their publication meant a virtual declaration of war upon the Bolshevik Government. He admitted this.

I found out from Lansing later that George Creel had persuaded the President to publish them and that the State Department knew nothing of it and disapproved entirely. They not only did not credit the authenticity of the documents, but they consider it a bad time to make the exposé. This is great team-work. If Lansing were a strong man such things could not happen. Lansing said that Creel had, at one time, wanted the right of access to all the State Department cables so that he might use his judgment as to what should be given to the public. This Lansing refused.

The President and I took up on Sunday the desirability of declaring war on Bulgaria. I brought this up apropos of the despatch which Balfour had sent Wiseman for my attention. The President was willing to declare war, but disliked to do so at this time when the Bulgarians were in full flight. He thought it might look as if we had waited until they were beaten. I did not agree with this conclusion and will take it up again in a few days.

He brought up the prohibition rider to the Agricultural Bill, which he said would be before him in a few days. Both Tumulty and Burleson are advising him to veto it. Burleson he paid but little to because he was an ardent

anti-prohibitionist, but he declared Tumulty was not. This shows that Burleson
is more sincere, for I am as certain as I am of anything that Tumulty is as much
an anti-prohibitionist as Burleson. The President said he had given no ex-
pression whatever as to what he would do, but wanted to tell me he had in mind to
veto the bill. He was led to this because of the financial difficulties which
it involved, and which at this time might prove serious.

Monday, Tumulty made this same argument to me in a very passionate
speech, so I could see where the President got his viewpoint. I advised him to
discuss it with McAdoo and to be advised by him, provided the financial point
was the only one bothering him. Personally, I said, I was in favor of letting
it alone, without, however, knowing enough of the details to speak intelligently.
He argued against my position and I did not press my point of view.

When I left last night and was bidding him goodbye, he asked me again
if I had thought further about it. I told him I had and that I had mentioned
the matter to Gregory, and that Gregory agreed with me that he had best not veto
the bill. Coming over on the train today I spoke of it to McAdoo. He takes
the same view that I do, and says if the President brings it to him he will ad-
vise letting it alone.

The President spoke of politics in general and expressed an earnest
desire that a democratic Congress should be elected. He said he intended making
a speech or writing a letter about two weeks before the elections, asking the
people to return a democratic House. I did not express any opinion as to the
wisdom of this.

I had a good opportunity of giving him a talk about the necessity of fight-
ing Germany from within as well as from without; that it was as much a part of
military tactics to do this as it was to handle the armies in the field. He
assented, and I wondered why he had sent in a message like the one to Austria
if he had such a conviction. The speech he is to make on Friday had some ill

advised sentences, sentences which if strictly adhered to, would make the ne-
gotiations for peace impossible. I did not tell him this, but I gave out the
thought that he was making the same mistake the Allies had made from the begin-
ning.

I took the opportunity to tell him that the German military situation was
but the situation
not so bad, and that it was much worse behind the lines and our every effort
should be to aid our armies by diplomacy.

It should be stated here that there will be many apparent inconsistencies
in this diary. Last year I thought actions unwise and impossible which
this year I strongly approve-- so rapidly do events move.

After we finished discussing domestic and foreign politics, the President
began to play with a new stamp that he had had made with "Woodrow Wilson" on it.
He used this on the fly-leaf of a number of books not having his name in them. He
seemed as pleased as child with a new toy and expressed himself as being so.

He was interested in the account I gave him as to why the New York Times
had written their extraordinary editorial upon the Austrian Note. I found he
had no idea of what should be done with Austria or how the Empire should be bro-
ken up if, indeed, it was to be broken up at all. Generally, he thought the
League of Nations should settle many such problems and smooth over insuperable
difficulties. He thought if nations knew they were in a protective league they
would be willing to accept different boundaries and smaller areas.

He was interested to know that Gordon was the first man to suggest John W.
Davis for Ambassador to England. The President does not know Davis any better
than I do, but he took Gregory's estimate of him. Gregory is talking to me about
Davis expressed the opinion that he was a clever and able lawyer with a decided
turn for diplomacy.

In speaking of Page, the President spoke of his letter of resignation to
which he has only replied by cable. He said he did not dare write expressing

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cordial regrets fearing lest it might place him in Page's unfriendly hands. I did not think Page would write or say anything unfriendly while either of them was alive, but I did believe that, sooner or later, Page's criticism of him would be given to the world. The President did not believe his criticism would impress anyone provided the war went the way it was going now. He thought the world very generally accepted the fact that we went into the war at the psychological moment and that to have gone in earlier as Page desired would have been an error.

In speaking of himself and the estimate history would have of him, he thought this too depended largely on the result of the war and of what was accomplished by it. He spoke of Washington and of how little he seemed to have done on his own initiative which had led some observers to think he was not a man of great parts. In reply to this I expressed the opinion I have expressed before that Washington's greatness was because of his ability to know good advice from bad; that every leader must necessarily depend largely upon the advice of others, and his final reputation depended upon whether he was able to distinguish good advice from bad.

After dinner, Sunday night, we talked of history, literature, art and what influences brought forth the best. The President called attention to the fact that when Italy was broken up into small kingdoms and republics, literature and art flourished best, and that in England during the Elizabethan period when the country had become stabilized, but when adventure was still rife, Shakespeare and his contemporaries did their best work. We wondered what was in store for America in this direction and when it would come if ever.

Miss Bertha Bolling, Mrs. Wilson's sister, embarrassed me at dinner by telling of her visit to Virginia and the compliments paid me there. Among other things she said, "You are a maker of men". The President smiled dryly and remarked, "He ought to change his pattern". He said this with himself in view

in order to be facetious.

Just before we went to bed the President said he had in mind contesting the tax on his income which the House has placed upon it. His reason was that the makers of the Constitution had in mind that the President should not be punished or rewarded by Congress, and if he allowed this infringement of the Constitution to pass it might at some time have serious results. He said he intended to take some action by way of paying his income tax to show it was not the money he had in mind but the principle. I asked him not to take any action himself, but to let me handle it in my own way, to which he agreed. I sent for Gregory early Monday morning and advised with him about it.

Gregory thought there was some doubt as to its constitutionality. I advised him to take it up with someone in the Senate. I later asked McAdoo to take it up with some Senator and try to kill it there. I did not inform McAdoo that the President had talked to me on the subject, but let him go on his own initiative. It would not look well for the President to institute such a suit. His motives would certainly be misconstrued. Then, too, how could you get a court which would have jurisdiction? The Federal Judiciary are affected in the same way. I believe the matter can be adjusted.

On Monday, Herbert Hoover called at the White House by appointment to tell me of conditions in Europe and of the necessity for better coordination of our economic forces there. He was rather dispirited with affairs, both there and here, and was in his normal pessimistic frame of mind. I cheered him and he left feeling better.

Prof. William E. Dodd, of the Chair of Philosophy in Chicago University, also called. He discussed the possibility of establishing a National University at Washington which would be free from the influences under which most of our universities work.

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Lansing and I had a long conference at the State Department. We discussed the prospective peace conference. He thought the President, himself and myself should be the democratic members, and that Taft should be the republican member. He thoroughly disapproved of Root. He thought labor and liberals would be dis-trustful of him, while they would be satisfied with Taft. He told of a speech he was to make at Albany on the 18th of October, but he did not know that the President had already given me a copy of this speech to read and pass upon. I was not able to find time to read this while in Washington but brought it home with me. The President had read it and thinks it "too flat-footed" as he expressed it. That is the trouble with Lansing, he has never had, and never can have, a diplomatic touch. I do not suppose a stronger man would be willing to occupy the position he holds under the President.

McAdoo remakred that he and the other Cabinet Members were nothing but clerks. This is not true of McAdoo, and that is why the President gets along with him less well. He prefers the Baker, Daniels, Lansing type as they are absolutely subservient to him.

Hurley of the Shipping Board gave an amount of his activities. He wishes to come to New York in order to have a more extended conference with me.

The President, Mrs. Wilson and I went to the theater Monday evening. We had finished everything and he was very tired, having had a very hard day. He looks tired and I felt sorry for him. I wish he would allow me to better organize his work. If I were in Washington constantly I think he would let me act for him in many matters, but he seems entirely unwilling to have others do so. with him

He wanted me to go to Princeton on a special train this morning. He goes to vote in the primaries. I agreed to go, but when I found that McAdoo was going direct to New York on a later train, I decided to go with him. I came over with McAdoo and Eleanor reaching New York at 3.25.

J. K. Ohl of the New York Herald was my first caller. He thinks there is

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an opportunity now to discuss the purchase of the Herald and I am to put him in
touch with B. M. Baruch within the next day or so.

September 25, 1918.

I telephoned Frank Cobb and asked him to come by this morning in
order to discuss the kind of editorial that should be written after the Presi-
dent's Liberty Loan address.

Benjamin Strong, of the Federal Reserve Bank, followed Cobb. He has been
such a loyal friend of the President in "Darkest Boston" that I wished to see
whether he was fit for some honor which might later be offered him.

Dudley Malone is always an interesting visitor and never more so than to-
day. He had many things on his mind about which he wished advice. They were
to
all difficult because they were inter-related with the Administration. Dudley
has no conception of the feeling the President and his immediate circle have
against him.

September 26, 1918.

Francis B. Sayre, the President's son-in-law, called to ask if I could
find a place for him in the Peace Inquiry. He wishes to get into the inter-
national law part of the organization where he thinks he is well qualified to
serve, And this reminds me that Dudley asked yesterday for some war work where
his abilities could be used to the greatest advantage.

Henry Morganthau telephoned to tell how badly Ochs of The New York Times
felt because of the now celebrated editorial on the Austrian Note. He said
Ochs wanted to know what the President thought of it, and what I thought of the
support which The Times had been giving the Administration. I evaded the first
question by answering the second. I did not quote the President but said the
friends of the Administration thought The Times had been more antagonistic to
it than almost any other New York paper, not indeed in its editorial column,

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but in its news columns. Morganthau thought an opportunity was now before us where if the President would say something good of The Times, we could secure its support in the future. The conversation was over the telephone so Morganthau did not see me smile at this suggestion.

In a short while he rang me up again asking me to lunch with Ochs and himself next Tuesday. I promised to let him know on Monday. In the meantime, of course, he had told Ochs all that had passed between us.

Wiseman brought several interesting cables sent by his Government. I have been in constant touch with Washington during the day over the private telephone. since there were many matters coming up for attention.

Robert Brewster was among my callers. He desires to go to Europe to do war work. He, too, believes he can serve best in such a capacity. The naive way in which these suggestions are made to me day by day would make a story in themselves. The arguments are couched in almost the same words, and I have heard them so often that I could repeat them in my sleep.

September 27, 1918.

The usual confusion reigns today because of the President's coming visit. I have changed my telephone number and that, in itself, has added to the confusion for those who have the right to reach me have not yet gotten it. They therefore come in person and I cannot deny them.

Loulie and I met the Presidential party at 1.20. There was a great throng around the Pennsylvania Station when we arrived, and a greater one when the President came out. We drove directly to the Waldorf Hotel but before we left the train I had an opportunity to tell him of the Bulgarian debacle. He was intensely interested. Gordon had read me all the cables over the telephone from Washington, and I brought the President to our apartment so that he might read have them read to him over the private wire.

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We remained at the hotel scarcely a moment, and the President and I came
up the Avenue to 115 East 53rd Street. The crowds were enthusiastic and I have
never seen a better reception. After Gordon had read the cables to the President,
and while he was doing so, I had the Manager kill our ordinary telephone in order
that we might be perfectly quiet.

In coming up I had told the President of Lansing's idea that he should
reply by saying he would intercede for an armistice provided the Bulgarians
would evacuate Serbia and permit the Allies access to Bulgaria in the event it
was necessary to help Bulgaria defend her territory against the Central Powers.
The President evidently thought this was also my view, and he sat down at the
desk and wrote the following:

"Appreciate the confidence reposed in me and am willing to urge an armistice upon the Entente if Bulgarian Government will agree now that the immediate terms of peace pending the final determinations of the general peace conference shall include the evacuation by the Bulgarian forces of Serbia and Macedonia and the Epirus and permission to the Entente Allies to enter Bulgaria if and when necessary to defend her territory against the Central Powers".

"W. W."

The President handed this to me for my opinion. I disapproved and told
him he did not know enough about conditions to specify the terms. Not only
that, no Bulgarian Government would dare go before their people having accepted
such terms. I advised telling them he would be willing to act as they desired,
provided they would leave it to his judgment as to the terms of the armistice.

He argued the matter for a few minutes, saying he was afraid it would
look like leaving too much to him. I replied that they would prefer this rather than having to consent to such terms as he had outlined; that the Government could go before the Bulgarian people claiming that he, the President, had not been fair with them; that they had reposed confidence in him believing he was a

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friend of Bulgaria. In other words, they would make whatever excuses they liked to their people. The President saw the force of this argument and wrote the following:

"I appreciate the confidence reposed in me and am willing to urge an armistice upon the Entente if the Bulgarian Government will authorize me to say that the conditions of the armistice are left to me for decision and that the Bulgarian Government will accept the conditions I impose. Otherwise, I should not be hopeful of result of mediation on my part at this juncture in so vital a matter".

I telephoned this to Gordon and had him send it immediately to the Secretary of State for transmission.

The President returned to the Waldorf and I remained at the apartment to attend to the hundred and one matters which needed attention.

Gordon telephoned again to say that Lansing had sent at twelve o'clock the following cable to our Legation at the Hague:

He tells me that Billy Phillips added the last sentence which partially saved the whole. It was necessary of course to send an urgent cable to the Hague killing this message and substituting the one the President and I had prepared.

Lansing wanted to insert the word "unconditionally" in the message which the President authorized to be sent. The President was not here when I received this suggestion and I decided it must be sent as he had written it. The message is

strong enough without inserting the word "unconditionally".

The President, Mrs. Wilson, Margaret, Grayson, Gregory and Jesse Jones
dined with us at seven o'clock. While we were having coffee, a messenger came
from Washington with the despatches which Gordon had already read over the tele-
phone. Nevertheless, the President asked the others to excuse us and we went into
the study to read Lansing's letter.

Lansing wished to give out a statement concerning the despatches which both
the President and I thought unwise. Lansing said that Philip Patchin of the
State Department would remain in New York to receive anything the President might
wish to communicate. I was sorry the President did not reply in some way, but
he did not seem to consider it necessary. He remarked that Lansing was so stupid
that he was constantly afraid he would commit some serious blunder. I could not
but confess that he was stupid. He seems less alert than when he first became
Secretary of State, and I wonder whether his health has not made this difference.

Governor Strong called for the President at 8.15 and our entire party mo-
tored to the Metropolitan Opera House. It was an historic occasion. The house
was beautifully decorated, and was crowded with the most important people of New
York, including the Governor of the State and other officials. Governor Strong
made an excellent speech. He read it to me yesterday in order that there might
be no jarring notes. I made one or two suggestions which he adopted. Strong did
not finish writing his speech until late this afternoon and yet he delivered it
with but few references to his notes. Not being a public speaker, this seemed to
me quite a feat of memory.

The President read his address. Most of it seemed somewhat over the heads
of his audience; the parts which were unimportant bringing the most vigorous ap-
plause.

We are all wondering how the press will receive it. After the speaking

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the President asked me to ride with him to the Waldorf. We went to the sitting room and discussed the address for some minutes. He was flushed with excitement and altogether pleased with the day's effort. The President seems to want me with him after one of these great speeches.

I had a very tiring day but was able to get back home by 10.30.

September 28, 1918.

I went to the Waldorf at ten o'clock and the President and I conferred for about a half hour. We discussed the Russian situation mainly. I urged him to give Vance McCormick considerable play in the economic and relief side of our efforts to aid that country. I found he had not read the paper which Hollis Godfrey had prepared on after war reconstruction. I am sorry for I wished to discuss this with him. There were many other matters of minor importance which we took up before he left New York at 10.50. I did not go to the station with him but returned from the hotel to our apartment.

I forgot to speak to the President about urging the Italians to make an offensive at this time. In lieu of this I called Gordon over the telephone and asked him to see General March, Chief of Staff, and suggest that he send a cable to Pershing requesting him to see Foch and have him insist that the Italians start an immediate offensive. General Diaz is afraid to jeopardize the reputation he made in the last offensive, but he should be pushed into another in spite of this. In my opinion, the Austrians are so demoralized that any kind of push will succeed.

Yesterday I told Sir William Wiseman about Bulgaria's request that we should intercede in favor of an armistice and just what had been done. He asked permission to send a cable to his Government to which I consented. This cable is a part of the record. I spoke to the President this morning about the necessity of having some arrangement with the Allies, particularly England, as to the return of our troops after the war. He is fully alive to its importance and said he had the matter under consideration.

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Dr. William Martin of the Journal de Geneve was my most interesting caller. He came with a letter of introduction from Professor Rappard of the University of Geneva. We discussed the international situation and internal affairs of Germany. He is appreciative of what this country has done for Switzerland.

I had a letter this morning from the Chairman of the Polish Liberty Loan Committee which I attach. I arranged the matter in a few minutes by telephoning to Washington and to Governor Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

Frank Polk has just returned from Bar Harbor on his way to Washington. We had a long and interesting conference.

Jesse Jones, of the Red Cross, followed Polk to discuss Red Cross matters.

September 29, 1918.

Dr. Henry E. Crampton of Columbia, Frank Polk and Sir William Wiseman were the visitors of the day. David Miller and Sidney also came and we went over the affairs of The Inquiry. Polk and I talked of State Department matters and Wiseman of international affairs.

September 30, 1918.

Carter Glass and Mrs. William G. Sharp took lunch with us. My other callers were, Mrs. Marshall Field, H. A. Miller, Frederic Coudert, Arthur D. Howden Smith, George Foster Peabody and Edward S. Martin.

Smith wished some data for an article he is writing on our new Ambassador in London. Miller is working on a plan by which the Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs, etc., etc., may get together in some sort of federation and settle their differences before the peace conference so they may go there with harmony of aims.

Coudert gave me a report of his recent visit in Europe and he brought many messages from my friends abroad.

There have been the usual number of telephone conversations with Washington, including one with McAdoo who discussed the suffrage amendment which is

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now up before the Senate. I have a cable from Lord Robert Cecil, which is a part of the record, as is my letter to the President.

Mrs. Borden Harriman was a late evening caller. She did not reach the house until ten o'clock. She is sailing tomorrow for France with her Red Cross unit.

October 1, 1918.

Bainbridge Colby was my first caller. He wishes to retire from the Shipping Board and place himself under my direction to do work for The Inquiry. I have promised to see what can be done.

I took lunch with Henry Morganthau. Ochs of The Times was the only other guest. The lunch was arranged to give Ochs an opportunity to tell why The Times wrote the editorial upon the Austrian peace proposal. I found him interesting. He was excited and palpably nervous. He ate scarcely at all and insisted upon reading me letters and documents to prove that he had nothing to do with the editorial and did not know that it had been published until the afternoon of that day. He was at Lake George.

He declared that Miller, his Editorial Chief, and Vernanda, the Editorial Manager, were wholly responsible. I had an interesting hour with him. He told of the revenue The Times brings in. He showed the daily circulation lists and was candid to a degree. He asked me to suggest an editorial writer for the Times. He desired a democrat and a man of progressive views. Never again, he said, would he permit one man to write and publish an editorial without first submitting it to two others. He has an extravagant idea of the influence of The Times, particularly of its editorials. He seemed surprised when I told him I never read the editorials either of The Times or of any other papers except where some important public event occurred and I wished to get their attitude upon it and, even then, I merely glanced at the editorial to see its drift. The editorial opinion of a paper is merely the opinion of one man and is of no more importance than that of hundreds of other men equally well informed.

Francis and Jessie Sayre were afternoon callers. I have arranged for Sayre to work under David Miller in the International Law Department of The Inquiry.

Dr. Thomas G. Masaryk was an interesting caller. We went over the Russian situation and discussed the plan to bring about a federation among the Slavs, Czechs, Poles, Lithuanians etc. etc.

Dr. Bowman, and Sidney were down to discuss Inquiry matters. Back Bakhmateff Russian Ambassador, came about the Russian situation. He is not pleased with the way things are going, as far as our policy is concerned. I advised him to get in touch with Vance McCormick and Gordon.

Herbert L. Carpenter of the Russian Society followed. I find Carpenter an unusually level-headed fellow. He is doing his work well. I also put him in touch with Vance McCormick and Gordon.

I went to The Inquiry rooms which took up a large part of the afternoon. I am giving this work much closer attention now that the war seems in its last phase and because of the differences which have arisen in its circles.

October 3, 1918.

Norman Hapgood lunched with us and we had an interesting two hours together. Professor McCarthy, of the University of Wisconsin, preceded him. McCarthy is just back from Ireland and gave me much information concerning that situation.

Cleveland H. Dodge was an early afternoon caller. With him it was Turkey, Syria and Bulgaria. He is delighted with the present situation.

Edwin Chamberlain of San Antonio, Texas, was here yesterday and today about matters connected with his son, Captain Edmund Chamberlain, the aviator. E. J. Mellonand Mr. Trowbridge came to discuss Serbian matters. They are members of the Serbian Relief Committee and wished me to present a petition to the President to send a commission over there. I advised him to send it to the President direct.

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Lincoln Colcord and Richard Boardman, of Boston, called to talk about matters of minor importance. Mr. Hottenstein followed with a letter of introduction from Mitchell Palmer. He had some ideas on after war reconstruction which he wished to present.

October 4, 1918.

Frederick Dixon, of the Christian Science Monitor, was a morning caller. He is having trouble with the Military Censor. It is an absurd interference and I advised him what action to take.

Ira Nelson Morris, our Minister to Sweden, George Madden Martin, the authoress, Mrs. F. L. Higginson Jr. and Mrs. Adrien Iselin lunched with us. After lunch Morris told me the Germans had approached him twice before he left Stockholm regarding me. They thought if the President would send me to Europe there would be no difficulty in coming to peace terms. They said I was the only American who knew the whole story and who would be fair to everyone. I have heard this from so many sources that I accept it as the German opinion of me. Morris revealed his ambition to become an ambassador when the war was over and he hoped I thought well enough of his record at Stockholm to support him.

H. H. Klein, New York City Accountant, came to present a plan for a national accounting system. His idea is a good one and I asked him to present it in writing.

Jameson of the National Democratic Committee and several others came in the morning before we started to Westchester County to take lunch with Mrs. Henry Redmond. The other guests were of the social set.

George Gordon Moore came in the afternoon. He is on the eve of going to England and came to assure me that he would give me any information of value he might gather while there. His close connection with Lord French gives him an intimate insight in certain directions.

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October 6, 1918.

This has been a day of excitement. Cobb of the World, Ochs of The Times and many others have talked over the telephone, or called regarding German and Austrian peace offers. My letter to the President gives my views of what I think should be done at the moment. It looks as if things were breaking rapidly and that peace might come before a great while.

I have written Governor Samuel W. McCall of Massachusetts asking him to lunch with me upon his next visit to New York. My purpose is to look him over for a possible Peace Commissioner. He was suggested to me by Sidney and it seems a good thought. If he thinks what he says publicly he should be persona grata to the President and the rest of us.

use.

These are momentous days and one needs to have the most careful judgment. A misstep means so much. It is an hour in which to be calm, in which to be unselfish, in which to be just.

October 9, 1918.

On Monday after lunch I received word through Gordon that the President requested that I should come over immediately. He preferred that I should be there the same evening, but if that was not possible, he hoped I could be there early Tuesday morning.

I did not get this message until after two o'clock but within the hour I was at the station and on the train. The White House had telephoned, and together with the State Department Secret Service, had arranged for my reservation and transportation. I was met at the Pennsylvania Station by Sharp of the Secret Service, and by Egan, Superintendant of the Pennsylvania Terminal and taken at once by private entrance to the train. Unfortunately for me, there were a good many people aboard who knew me, notably Senator Owen and Bainbridge Colby. Colby was entertaining but Owen bored me. He amused me by stating that he thought he had earned the right to be appointed a peace commissioner because he was respon-

sible for the Federal Reserve Act and the Farm Loan Act. I promised to speak to the President, and I did much to the amusement of us both.

Bainbridge still desires to leave the Shipping Board and come with me. This, too, I mentioned to the President and he indicated a willingness, although he was loath to see him leave his present place.

And this reminds me in speaking of personalities, the President said if William Phillips' name had been suggested to him for Ambassador to London, he would have appointed him. I thought it would have been better for him and for me to have had Phillips, but that it was better for Lansing to have Davis. He agreed with this conclusion.

I arrived at the White House as the clock was striking nine o'clock. I took Colby from the station with me and sent him on to his home. The President met me and we went into his study. He said he had asked Lansing to come over and he arrived within a few minutes. The President had prepared his reply to the German Chancellor, Prince Maxmilien of Baden, and read it to us. He seemed much disturbed when I expressed a decided disapproval of it. I told him I had thought of something quite different; that I did not believe the country would approve of what he had written. After arguing the matter some half hour or more, he said that I might be able to write something and embody what I had in mind, but he had to confess his inability to do so. He suggested that I have a try at it.

I said I was merely endeavoring to see the question from every angle; that it presented greater difficulties than any situation he had yet had before him. The question of going to war with Germany was easy compared with it. He appreciated this as fully as I and he was clearly not satisfied with what he had prepared.

We then began to amend his draft and before we finished with it the next day, there was not much left of the original. We worked on it steadily until nearly one o'clock Monday night. I then suggested we leave it until morn-

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ing. He replied that he had thought of playing golf as he had had no exercise either on Sunday or Monday and was feeling need of it. I advised him to go to the links, and disagreed with him as to the necessity for haste in giving an answer. He evidently wished to have it ready for the Tuesday morning papers if the editions possible, and certainly not later than Tuesday afternoon.

I took this occasion to tell him I thought his answer to the last Austrian Note was a mistake, not only in the celerity with which it was answered, but also the manner of it. He said, "What would you have done?" I replied that I would have answered it in some such way as his speech in New York, September 27th. He did not argue the matter.

Lansing took little or no part in our discussions.

After breakfast on Tuesday, Dr. Grayson came in with the expectation of playing golf with the President. When I had finished breakfast, the President appeared and announced that he had given out the idea of going out and asked me to go with him to his study. We read what the papers had to say; I called attention to what the French Socialists Convention said upon the subject in Paris, and the comments of the Manchester Guardian and London Daily News. He, on his part, read me the debate which took place in the Senate Monday.

I found the President's viewpoint had changed during the night and he had come around to mine. He did not seem to realize before, the nearly unanimous sentiment in this country against anything but unconditional surrender. He did not realize how war mad our people have become. This, I thought, had to be taken into consideration, but not, of course, to the extent of meeting it where it was wrong.

The President thought if such an offer had been made by a reputable government, it would be impossible to decline it. After we had gotten the Note into its final form, he suggested sending for Tumulty to try it out on him. Tumulty had just written the President a letter urging that he should not give in in any

particular but make a decided refusal. Tumulty's letter and the Note were not
in harmony, and we were therefore anxious to see what he would think of it. Much
to the surprise of both of us, Tumulty thought the country would accept the Note
favorably, not enthusiastically at first but that it would appeal to the sober
minded and, later, to everyone.

We all thought it essential to educate the press as to what the Note meant.
We therefore drew up a little memorandum of explanation and of education. It was
decided to ask Lansing to give this out when he gave out the Note to the press.
Lansing was then sent for and, after reading the Note, he expressed approval. He
considered it much better than what we had composed the night before.

The President was not happy over this effort of ours, and neither was I,
and yet it is the best that our combined judgment could produce. That it has
taken with the public as well as it has makes me content. The New York Sun has
an especially complimentary editorial which I attach.

There was no one for lunch excepting the President, Mrs. Wilson and myself.
They asked me to drive with them after lunch, but I had to go to the State Depart-
ment at three o'clock I had an engagement with Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of
the Admiralty, and I was leaving on the Congressional Limited at four.

I drove Geddes from three o'clock until I reached the left. He
came with me to the station and to the train. He gave me all the inside Admir-
alty information, some of which is so confidential that I hesitate to record it,
and it is of passing importance.

Geddes does not think the United States is doing anything like her share
on the sea in European waters. He gave me the actual number of boats we had and
what the British had. I was astonished at the limited number of destroyers we
were using over there in comparison with the British. He said the destruction
of submarines had nearly ceased, largely because the destroyers which the British
Navy had formerly used to chase submarines were now being used to convoy American

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troops. We arranged to keep in close touch with one another through Sir William
Wiseman while he is here. Geddes is to lunch with me just before his departure
which will be within a few days.

I had a quiet trip over from Washington. There were no old time bores,
although many strangers came up to shake my hand and to say something complimen-
tary about the work I was doing for the country.

It has been a busy day today as I have been preparing for the President's
visit Friday, Saturday and Sunday of this week. In addition to that, there is
always the accumulated work.

October 13, 1918.

The President's visit to New York on Friday the 11th, and the fateful reply
to his demands have made it impossible to keep the diary day by day.

Governor Samuel W. McCall lunched with me last Thursday. I "but him through
his paces" and I am quite content with the thought of him as a Peace Commissioner.
I made the suggestion to the President that the Governor go over with me now as
adviser. It is not that I want him in that capacity, but I believe it would have
a good effect upon the country if I should take over a few men of his standing, par-
ticularly a prominent republican.

I outlined to McCall the League, as the President and I have it in mind,
and he agreed to it almost without reservation. In mentioning the fact that I
might ask him to go in the capacity of adviser, in the event the President should
send me to Europe soon, he said he would resign as Governor of Massachusetts at
once and would consider it an honor to be associated with me in such a capacity.

I had a telegram from McAdoo, saying he would reach New York at 3.30. I
had planned to take Governor McCall to The Inquiry, but instead I asked Sidney to
do so.

McAdoo was with me from the time he arrived until 8.30. He and Eleanor took

dinner with us. He, too, is a candidate for the peace table, and mentioned many valid reasons why he should be there. He thought it would be ridiculous for Lansing to go as the head of the commission in the event the President did not go himself, and he said he would be perfectly willing to go as a member of the commission under me. McAdoo, as I have said before, is not lacking in generosity. He agrees with Frank Polk and others that the President should not go himself.

The President arrived at 3.25 on Friday the 11th. He and Mrs. Wilson and I drove from the station out Riverside. When we returned to the Waldorf we had a half hour's conference. He was much exercised over the Allies asking the Supreme War Council to give their opinion as to what should constitute a victorious armistice. He thought they should not have done this without first consulting him. He also considered it a mistake to go into details regarding the terms of the armistice at all at this time. If word of it should get out he thought it would demoralize the people of the Allied countries as well as our own. He was indignant with Sir Eric Geddes because of an interview which appeared in the papers the day before, and when I told him that Sir Eric was leaving almost at once for England and wished to say a word of farewell while he, the President, was in New York, he flatly refused. He said he had no intention of seeing him again, for he regarded Geddes' interview as a "piece of impertinence".

I did not press the matter then, but the next day I told Mrs. Wilson that it was necessary for the President to see Geddes whether he wanted to or not, and 10.45 I suggested Sunday morning as a suitable time. I explained that Geddes was one of the strong men of the British Government and his position was altogether different from that of one of the President's Cabinet.

When I saw Mrs. Wilson Saturday evening, she said she had arranged the interview as I had asked. I was present when Sir Eric Geddes and Admiral Duff arrived in company with Admiral Robison of our own Navy. The President was exceedingly cordial and Sir Eric went away as happy as could be. He came up to our

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apartment later to see me for a final word before sailing. He spoke of the President in enthusiastic terms.

The President said Sir Eric asked him what he meant by "the freedom of the seas". His reply was that it was a question that could be threshed out in "common council", but that vaguely he had in mind that any nation having become an outlaw as Germany was today, would be compelled to feel the weight of the united naval power of the world. He was distinctly opposed to any one nation exercising this power. Geddes and I discussed the question afterward and I thought if they were fair-minded we could get together on some plan which would be of benefit to all.

We dined with the President and Mrs. Wilson at the Waldorf Hotel. Just before dinner was announced, Tumulty came in with the news that Germany had accepted the President's terms. Col. Churchill of the Military Intelligence Bureau had telephoned it over from Washington. We wondered whether the news was authentic, but concluded from its construction that it was. When we went in to the table the President wrote me a little note in which he said, "tell Mrs. W" and signed it "W. W." I had already anticipated him in this. It was a family dinner party but rather large, consisting besides the four of us, Jessie and Francis Sayre, Miss Bones, Tumulty and Grayson.

After dinner we went almost immediately to the Italian Fete at the Metropolitan Opera House. There was an enormous crowd which cheered the President with much enthusiasm. I was so stirred by the news that had come from Berlin that I could not listen to the program. Tumulty and I went to the Directors' Room in the Opera House, called up Washington and received confirmation from Frank Polk and the Washington Post. Shortly after ten o'clock I returned home. I wished to do some telephoning and to think. I had arranged for Frank Polk to call me over the telephone at 10.30 (over the private wire), and we had a long talk. It was decided that Joe Grow should keep in touch with the Swiss Legation

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and let us know the official text as soon as it came in.

I did not try to sleep for a long while, for it seemed to me that the war was finished, certainly finished if the Allied statesmen have the judgment to garner victory.

Sunday morning numbers of newspaper men called me over the telephone to get my opinion and I had a busy day until the President and I left for Washington at four o'clock. He and Mrs. Wilson and Loulie lunched at Riverdale with Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland H. Dodge. The President had asked me to return to Washington with them so I had much to do.

On the way to Washington, the President had to have what he called "his does of Tumulty". Tumulty seems to have the idea that the President will do something foolish in answering the German Note.

I asked the President if he had finally decided upon the Peace Commissioners. He replied, "I thought we had done that at Magnolia. You and I, Lansing and Baker was what we thought then". I suggested Governor McCall for the republican member and told him I had "put him through his paces" and that he would be sympathetic to his, the President's ideas. The President tentatively assented to McCall.

We reached Washington at 9.15, drove immediately to the White House, and soon after went to bed.

October 15, 1918.

Yesterday was one of the stirring days of my life. The President and I got together directly after breakfast. I never saw him more disturbed. He said he did not know where to make the entrance in order to reach the heart of the thing. He wanted to make his reply final so there would be no exchange of notes. It reminded him, he said, of a maze. If one went in at the right entrance, he reached the center, but if one took the wrong turning, it was necessary to go out

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again and do it over. He said that many times in making extemporaneous speeches he had gone into the wrong entrance and had to flounder out as best he could.

I encouraged him, declaring that it could be done and we must get at it. We then began a serious discussion as to what to say and how to say it. I thought he should make one condition to a discussion of armistice, and that was the immediate cessation of all atrocities both on land and sea. He agreed to this and it stands in the Note.

We went into the question of the German Government and decided to use what he said in his Fourth of July speech about autocracies. This was his suggestion. We were anxious not to close the door, and yet we desired to make the note as strong as the occasion required. We fell back time and again on the theory which I offered when the last note was written, that was if Germany was beaten, she would accept any terms. If she was not beaten, we did not wish to make terms with her. At the same time, neither the President nor I desired to make a vengeful peace. Neither did we desire to have the Allied armies ravage Germany as Germany has ravaged the countries she has invaded. The President was especially insistent that no stain of this sort should rest upon the Allied arms. He is very fine in this feeling and I am sorry he is hampered in any way by the Allies and the vociferous outcry in this country. It is difficult to do the right thing in the right way with people like Roosevelt, Lodge, Poindexter and others clamoring for the undesirable and impossible.

The President soon formulated the points which appear in the Note, and we then decided to send for Lansing, Baker and Daniels to hear their reactions. The reason Daniels was sent for was because he wanted Baker, and the reason he wanted Baker was because he has just returned from the Western Front and we thought his knowledge would be of benefit.

Lansing and Baker arrived first and we discussed the Note for a half

hour before Daniels came. Lansing started the discussion by saying that "we had to keep in mind the coming elections". I replied to this with some heat, saying if we had such a thought in mind while trying to write the note we could not do it properly or worthily. I thought the elections were not to be considered in thinking of the settlement of this great world tragedy. I was sorry I spoke so sharply for Lansing received what I said without comment. I saw that the President was eager to get to work and I immediately facilitated the departure of the three Secretaries.

I went with them and visited the State, War and Navy Departments in succession. I told Lansing of the President's decision to name him as one of the Peace Commissioners. He was agitated and nervous over the news.

I went to Secretary Baker's office, and he told more of his experiences abroad, and of an interview he had with Lloyd George concerning our troops and their transportation. I will not go into this but I enjoyed Baker's account of it. I informed Baker that the President had him in mind for a Peace Commissioner.

I then had an interview with Daniels and asked him to lend me Admiral Benson, to which he consented with some reluctance. He said he would like to go abroad himself in November and that both could not leave at the same time. I promised to have Benson return in time to allow the Secretary to have his trip. We discussed and decided upon our means of transportation. Benson wanted to take the Great Northern over without troops, but I objected to this because I thought it was wrong to do it at this time.

I asked Hugh Wallace and T. W. Gregory to come to the White House in order to say goodbye.

There was no one at dinner excepting the President, Mrs. Wilson and myself. After dinner the President wrote a letter of credentials for me which reads as follows:

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"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Mr. Edward M. House, the bearer of this letter, is my personal representative and I have asked him to take part as such in the conferences of the Supreme War Council and in any other conferences in which it may be serviceable for him to represent me. I commend him to the confidence of all representatives of the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated in the war.

Woodrow Wilson".

October 14, 1918.

The President certainly gives me the broadest powers. It virtually puts me in his place in Europe. I have in addition to this letter a commission from the State Department as Special Representative of the United States to the Entente Powers. This is the same as I had before when I went over as head of the "House Mission".

The President and I had a delightful evening together. We were tired and did not try to discuss serious matters.

I spoke of having arranged a secret code between us. As I was leaving he said, "I have not given you any instructions because I feel you will know what to do". I had been thinking of this before he spoke and wondered at the strange r akatikanaxaux situation our relations had brought about. I am going on one of the most important missions anyone ever undertook, and yet there is no word of direction, advice or discussion between us. He knows that our minds run parallel, and he also knows that where they diverge, I will follow his bent rather than my own.

In leaving him and going to the capitals of Europe for consultation with their leading statesmen I have a feeling that not until we are together

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again will I meet with a mind so sympathetic with my own. He has his weaknesses; his prejudices and his limitations like other men, but all in all, Woodrow Wilson will probably go down in history as the great figure of his time, and I hope, of all time.

I left on the midnight train arriving in New York this morning for
breakfast. Grayson and Gordon came to the train to bid me goodbye. I shall
not go into details of today because it all seems trivial compared with what
I have gone through during the past ten days.

I have sent for Governor McCall who will be here tomorrow.

October 16, 1918.

Governor McCall came this morning. He only remained a few minutes. I
told him I had suggested his name to the President; that the President had
not committed himself in any way, but I felt certain that if he were to name
the Peace Commissioners today he would be one of them. I told him I was
sailing for Europe tomorrow and the President thought I had better not take
him and Polk over as advisers for the reason it might lead to the belief that
I had gone for the purpose of discussing peace. I said the President might
change his mind entirely as to the personnel of the Peace Commission and I
wished him to know this and not be disappointed.

This will be the end of the diary until we reach France.

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Mid-Atlantic, October 22, 1918.
On Board, U. S. S. Northern Pacific

I will not go into the confusion that followed the last days of our leav-
port. At the final moment it was necessary for me to go to the dentist and this
with other things made matters worse. I had made an engagement for Sir William
Wiseman to lunch with the President on Wednesday, the 16th, and on Thursday he
gave me a report of their conversation. Later, he gave it to me in writing. I
desired this in order to find how much his mind the President wishes desclosed to
the British and other Allied governments. He "thinks aloud" when with me and it
is difficult to always catch what he has settled upon as a final conviction.

Among other things he told Sir William was that it was well enough for the
Allied Governments to call for me, but he wished to remind them that when I was
gone he, himself, had no one with whom to counsel.

Mona and Randolph came from Boston to see us off. Janet and Louise were
already in New York and we had a family gathering before leaving.

Our ship, the Northern Pacific, was anchored off Tomkinsville. We drove to
the Battery and took the Dock Commissioner's boat at nine P. M. on Thursday the
17th. The night was foggy and we did not get under way before four o'clock Fri-
day morning.

Up to today, the weather has been bad-- so bad that we had to make a decision
whether the two destroyers, which we had intended to take all the way across,
should turn back, or whether we should slow down our speed. Admiral Benson left
the decision to me and I decided it was better to them shem back and go ahead at
top speed.

The members of our immediate party are: Loulie, Miss Denton and her assis-
tant Miss Tomlinson, Gordon, Joseph Grew, Admiral Benson, Commander Carter, Frank
Cobb of the New York World, Commander McLean, Navy surgeon who has been delegated
to look after the party, and five or six clerks and stenographers.

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Yesterday I received the text of the reply of the Germans to the President's note of October fourteenth. It means the beginning of peace for a war-worn world. I had thought to cable the President advising him in the circumstances, but Admiral Benson thought it best not to send any wireless messages from the ship because of submarine peril. What I should advise the President, were I in Washington is this: Merely to give out a statement from the Whitehouse saying: "The President will immediately confer with the Allies regarding the German reply". The reason I should advise this is that it would keep down all intemperate discussion at home and would prevent another interchange of notes with Germany.

It seems not that it is up to the Allies and the United States to consult with Foch, Petain, Haig, Pershing, Diaz and the military advisers of the Supreme War Council, as to the military safeguards necessary before an armistice is granted. It would seem then to be in order to ask the Germans to send their military advisers to meet with ours so they may know the terms demanded. If accepted, fighting would cease until it was found that an agreement could not be reached. The safeguards which should be demanded would make it impossible for the Germans to again begin fighting.

October 24, 1918.

I am still disturbed over the President's reply to the German Note of October 22nd. If I had been at home I should have advised him to have done nothing further than give out the statement from the White House which I mentioned yesterday. The Germans have accepted his terms and he should go on the theory that they intend to accept them in good faith. He should then have communicated with the Allies and gotten them to agree to his terms. They have already done this unofficially. The next move would have been for the Allies and ourselves to get our military and naval advisers to draw up such an armistice as would make the Germans impotent to continue the war, in the event they did not in good faith accept the President's conditions as interpreted by the Allies.

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Instead of doing this, he has gone into a long and offensive discussion which may have the effect of stiffening German resistance and welding the people together back of their military leaders. If this should happen, the labor and socialist parties in England, France and Italy would insist upon peace being made. Their argument being that Germany had offered a fair opportunity and their offer had been declined. Then, unless the Allies took up the matter again and brought the war to a close, strikes and possibly revolutions might be the result. If this condition should be brought about, Germany would be in a position to make far better terms than she could if the President had done what I have in mind rather than what he has done.

As it is, if things do not turn out well, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando might easily go before their constituencies and claim that peace might have been made upon terms entirely satisfactory to the Entente if the President had not taken matters into his own hands.

Even if the Germans accept this latest note of the President's, and if the result is not as satisfactory to the bitter enders as they desire, then Lloyd George Clemenceau and Orlando might go before their people with the statement that if the President had consulted them instead of taking the matter into his own hands, peace would have been made in Berlin. He has taken, what seems to me, a reckless and unnecessary gamble. It might cost him the leadership in the peace negotiations, for it is conceivable that the Germans may approach some of the Entente Powers, believing that Wilson is more difficult to deal with. The Germans may accept the President's terms without question, but if they do not and the war is prolonged, he has taken the entire responsibility upon himself.

Six destroyers met us at daylight this morning and are accompanying us to Brest. We expect to arrive tomorrow in the forenoon.

At. Sea, October 25, 1918.

I have been greatly disturbed by the President's appeal for a Democratic

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Congress. All he says is true, but it is a political error to appeal for
a partisan Congress. If he had asked the voters to support member of Congress
and the Senate who had supported the American war aims, regardless of party, he
would be in a safe position. In this way he would avoid partisan feeling and
would win no matter which party controlled Congress, provided those selected had
been loyal to our war aims. Here again, the President has taken a great gamble.
If it turns out well, he will be acclaimed a forceful leader, if it
turns out badly, an opposite view will be taken.

It seems to me a needless venture, and if I had been at home I should have
counseled against it. He mentioned, the last time I was in Washington, that he
thought of making an appeal. I made no reply which always indicates to him my
disapproval. As a matter of fact, we were so absorbed with the German notes
that I brushed the question aside and gave it but little attention. I am sorry
now that I did not discuss it with him to a finish.

October 26, 1918.

The weather was so thick before we landed at Brest that it was necessary to
run up and down the coast for several hours, not daring to attempt the dangerous
harbor in such a fog. It was a question in my mind whether we did not run more
danger from submarines than from the rocks, because we know these pests lurk near
this harbor.

General Bliss, Admiral Wilson and Mr. Frazier met us at Brest. We
left on a special train for Paris, reaching here at eleven o'clock. No one knew
we were coming, not even Ambassador Sharp, for it was our intention to stop the
train at Versailles and take quarters there. I was not pleased with the arrange-
ments that had been made and concluded to go on to Paris. I was therefore sur-
prised to find M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, awaiting us at the station.
There was much confusion about rooms at the Hotel de Crillon, but by twelve

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o'clock we were finally located and in bed.

I do not know how I have lived through the day. I saw newspaper people at twelve O'clock and distinguished Americans and foreigners from hour to hour. Among them were H. P. Davison of the Red Cross, General Clarence Edwards, Ambassador Sharp and an infinite number of others.

Field Marshal Haig, Lord Milner, Secretary of State for War, Admiral Benson and Robert Bacon, who is liaison officer between the British troops and ours, took lunch with me. It was a delightful and important meeting. I got Haig's mind upon the question of an armistice and also Milner's. I find Milner moderate, and was surprised to find Haig equally so. He does not consider the German military situation warrants their complete surrender. I wish I could go into the details of our conversation for, in a way, it was historic. I did a great deal of the talking desired. I wished to frame the case as the President and I wish it, and wanted to convince both Milner and Haig we were right, in order that we might have the benefit of their support on Tuesday.

Wiseman telephoned from 10 Downing Street to say that he and Lord Reading would be here Monday morning for a conference, and Lloyd George and Balfour would be here Monday night to attend the meeting of the Supreme War Council on Tuesday.

I have had long conferences with General Bliss and find his mind and mine are alike regarding the general situation. I therefore have Bliss, Haig and Milner on my side.

I saw Clemenceau at six o'clock. He received me with open arms. We passed all kinds of compliments. He seems genuinely fond of me. He spoke in acrimonious terms of Lloyd George and of the English generally. He said they did not tell the truth, and he remarked that "Lloyd George sends his orders to me from time to time". He also said, "I wonder how I keep my temper." It was news to me that he did. He gave in the gravest confidence Marechal Foch's terms for an armistice. No one had seen it excepting himself, not even the President of the

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French Republic. He asked that it be kept in confidence except as far as President Wilson was concerned. I am to return it to him tomorrow at nine after taking a copy, which he said I might do if I did it in my own hand. Miss Denton will do this, which is the same thing.

Clemenceau expressed his belief, which was also that of Marechal Foch, that Germany was so thoroughly beaten she would accept any terms offered. Haig does not agree with this conclusion and neither does Bliss.

Lloyd George sent a rather peremptory telegram to Clemenceau and instructed the British Ambassador, Lord Derby, to give me a copy which is attached to the record. It seems that through Milner, Lloyd George received the impression that Clemenceau was weakening and was inclined to give Germany better terms than he, Lloyd George, thought should be offered. If George has anything worse in his mind than Clemenceau, God help Germany.

Clemenceau complained of certain indiscretions of Frazier's. Frazier was waiting in an anteroom for me. I knew he had not done what Clemenceau thought, but instead of arguing, I insisted that he send for Frazier and give him a "dressing down". This pleased the old man, and he rushed to the door and brought in the surprised and shrinking Frazier. The result was, Frazier explained the matter in a minute, and the excitement was over.

I went from the War Office to the Foreign Office to pay my respects to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stephen Pichon. Just before going in I met Venizelos, Greek Prime Minister. We had a few minutes conversation. He said he was leaving for London Monday and would like to call upon me at my pleasure. I fixed the engagement for tomorrow at 10.30. I remained with Pichon not more than five minutes. I expressed a hope that at the Peace Conference we would work together as cordially as at the Interallied Conference last year, in which event, I thought matters could be greatly expedited.

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Clemenceau told me that General Pershing had not advanced in the Argonne as far as he should have in the circumstances. He said all the armies had done better than the American, and he attributed this to Pershing. His transporation facilities behind the lines he thought were defective. He had been over it himself and had seen it. Marechal Foch had offered Pershing one of the best Generals in the French Army but Pershing had declined to have him. They then offered this General to King Albert, who took him. Clemenceau said, "you see the result, the Belgians are advancing". He said he liked Pershing, but it was like going up against granite to get him to accept advice from Foch. I replied that it was Foch's fault if Pershing did not do, in a general way, what he, Foch, advised since he was Generalissimo and had the authority.

I wrote a cable to the President tonight which will be coded tomorrow and become a part of the record. I am in addition sending him an abbreviated form of Marechal Foch's report to Clemenceau.

We ensconced ourselves today at No. 78 Rue de l'Université. The house has been loaned us by Major Warburton and Captain McFadden. It is a spacious and comfortable residence and we are glad to get away from the hotel which is not suited to a large staff of secretaries, an armens, stenographers etc. etc. such as now have. The Navy has delegated many yoemen to be constantly on duty. We also have bluejackets to stand regular watch at each door. The Army has furnished us with all the motors we desire and we are exceedingly comfortable.

October 27, 1918.

It is useless to say that one day is busier than another because every hour is filled. Col. Lloyd Griscom called while I was at breakfast. W. H. Buckler and Commander Allen brought J. P. Frye and C. L. Baine, Labor leaders, who were members of Samuel Compers' party. Gompers, himself, has gone home. I did not get anything of value from them.

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Venizelos followed. He explained the claims of Greece on certain parts of
Syria. He expressed an intention of visiting the United States in order to see
the President and explain these matters to him. He was surprised to learn that
for more than a year I had had all such questions under my direction and there was
a large organization now in New York working them out. I advised him not to under-
take to see the President until I indicated the time. The President was now con-
cerned with war measures. If an armistice came, then he would be ready to take up
such matters as Venizelos had in mind.

General Bliss came before Venizelos left. I explained Foch's
views, as given me by Clemenceau, and we discussed the question of an armistice
at much length. Bliss thinks it would be better to ask for general disarmament
without specifying terms. We talked of this and evolved a plan which appealed to
us more than the one Foch had formulated. I asked Bliss to put it in writing so
I could study it at length. I advised him to see General Wilson, Chief of the
British Staff, and try to convince him of our position. As the matter stands to-
day, Haig, Bliss and perhaps Diaz think alike and are moderate. On the other hand,
Foch, Wilson and Pershing agree and desire much more stringent terms.

I asked Pershing to call this morning at 11,30 in order that I might confer
with him and Bliss. Unfortunately, he has a slight attack of influenza which
prevented his coming. In lieu thereof, he sent me a copy of a cable to Washing-
ton, giving his opinion as to what the terms of an armistice should be. This is
attached.

Frank Cobb took lunch with us. I have given him some work which I am sure
will be efficiently done. Admiral Benson called after lunch and we discussed
the terms of an armistice. He agrees with Haig, Bliss and that school of thought
which, indeed, is my viewpoint and that of the President.

I intended to visit Foch's Headquarters this afternoon but could not

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find the time to do so. I am to see President Poincaré tomorrow afternoon at 4.30. I shall take Admiral Benson with me.

I have a conference booked with Lord Reading and Wiseman tomorrow morning. Among the callers this afternoon was General Clarence Edwards, who has been ordered home to do training work there. He considers it a demotion and is much chastised. I feel he has done good work here, but I take it that his unfortunate habit of talking has been his undoing.

General Harts, Colonel Joseph Wheeler and many others were among the callers. I wish to call attention to the letters and cables from Ambassador Thos. Nelson Page and my letter to him which will be appended.

Butler Wright, our new Counselor of the Embassy in London, and I arranged to have Irwin Laughlin remain in London for the time being. Laughlin's letter to me will explain.

Lord Northcliffe has written, although not under his own name, a delightful tribute to me in the London Mail of this date entitled, "The Real Colonel House". This, too, is appended. He told Grasty not long ago that he considered me "the wisest man in the world" and he uses this expression in his article. When Grasty told me what he had said I laughingly answered that I could not argue the question and would have to admit it.

October 28, 1918.

Sir William Wiseman came around last night as I was going to bed. He had just arrived from London with Lord Reading and came to tell of what has happened in England during the past few days. The Cabinet have been having some stormy sessions over the President's peace terms. They rebel against the "freedom of the seas" and they wish to include reparations for losses at sea.

I told Wiseman and later today told Reading, that if the British were not careful they would bring upon themselves the dislike of the world. The British

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Navy seemed to me to be analogous to the German Army, except the German Army is under the direction of an autocracy while the English Navy is under the direction of a democracy. I did not believe the United States and other countries would willingly submit to Great Britain's complete domination of the seas any more than to Germany's domination of the land, and the sooner the English recognized this fact, the better it would be for them. I told them, furthermore, that our people, if challenged, would build a navy and maintain an army greater than theirs. We had more money, we had more men, and our natural resources were greater. I believed such a program would be popular in America and should England give the incentive, the people would demand the rest.

It seems to me of the utmost importance to have the Allies accept the Fourteen Points and the subsequent terms of the President. If this is done, the basis for a peace will already have been made. Germany began negotiations on the basis of these terms, and the Allies have already tentatively accepted them, but as Germany shows signs of defeat it is becoming every day more apparent that they desire to get from under the obligations these terms will impose upon them in the making of peace. If we do not use care, we shall place ourselves in some such dishonorable position as Germany did when she violated her treaty obligations as to Belgium.

In talking with Reading later, I hoped the Prime Minister would share my views as to Russia. If a great military figure should arise in Russia, she might become a menace to the world, I would like to see this great Empire fall into several states. The war, I said, would leave but two great powers in the world, Great Britain and the United States. Great Britain, I thought, was not to be feared for the reason that in time she would be reduced to the British Islands. Her Colonies, I thought, would be bound to her by ties so light that they would scarcely be ties at all, just as soon as they found safety in the world's reorganization.

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I called upon President Poincaré at 4.30 and we had a few minutes conversation. It was unimportant and merely passing the compliments of the day.

The Italian Ambassador came to extend an invitation from the Italian Government to visit Italy. He spoke in terms of enthusiasm and promised the heartiest welcome. I agreed to go provided there were no public entertainments, no announcement of my coming and if it were arranged for me to see the necessary people quickly.

My letter to Thomas Nelson Page of today is a part of the record. I indicated to him my purpose to visit Italy and upon what conditions. My telegram and the one from our Consul at Naples are attached.

M. Gans, André Tardieu's right-hand man, was among the many I have seen today. We now have a fairly well organized going concern. The Navy has given unlimited help and so has the Army. Switch-boards have been installed, stenographers supplied, and as many petty officers as can be used.

I wish to state here that when I criticised the President's last note to Germany which came to us on shipboard, I did not have the note in its entirety. It came in a garbled form at first. When I received the full text, I greatly admired the dexterity with which he handled himself. However, I still think the suggestion I made would have been better-- certainly, it would have been safer, and would have pleased the Allies more.

Lord Reading was planning to return to the United States at the end of this week. I urged him to remain here and suggested that he should be made a Peace Commissioner. He, too, thought he should remain and asked me to mention the matter to Lloyd George and Balfour. I need Reading, and I also need Northcliffe. I asked Wiseman last night to urge Northcliffe to some immediately but not to let anyone know that I had suggested it. I hope to use him as a "club" if necessary.

In the Cabinet discussions, Sir William tells me, Mr Lloyd George has recommended

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Sir Eric Geddes was so pronounced in favoring the President and his policies that Lloyd George remarked that he, Geddes, had evidently gotten under Wilson's influence in a very short time. This shows the wisdom of the President seeing Geddes in New York. The freedom of the seas and naval questions will be the hardest nut to crack with the British, and to have the First Sea Lord on our side, is important

October 29, 1918.

The first caller this morning was Admiral Benson and Frank Cobb. Benson wished advice concerning the Interallied Naval Council which is now sitting. He is beginning to see what I have seen for several days, the hardening of the Allies in their terms and the growing of an intolerant spirit.

The fact that Austria has practically surrendered unconditionally, makes the end of the war within easy view, and we are beginning preparations for the Peace Conference.

I wish to call especial attention to letters and cables which come and are sent these full days since I have but little time to dictate details of events.

John Carty has taken charge of our communications and is giving his personal attention. He followed Benson and Cobb. I had Cobb and Walter Lippmann write a memorandum of explanation of the President's Fourteen Points. I am having this cabled to the President for his personal revision. When I receive his reply, I will be able to authoritatively use it in my discussions with the Allies. The Fourteen Points are considered vague and I am constantly asked to interpret them, and unless we all agree as to what they mean, I am afraid our wires may become crossed.

This morning I thought of a way out of a difficulty which arose yesterday. My two cables to the President will indicate the direction.

At 11.30, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and I met at the War Office. There was no one present excepting the three of us. Lloyd George had drafted a mem-

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orandum of British exceptions to No. 2 of the President's Fourteen Points which
relates to the freedom of the seas. He had the ~~аххарххам~~ memorandum something
in
regarding reparations to cover illegal sinkings at sea. The memorandum was so
different, both in temper and substance, from his and Clemenceau's talk yesterday
that it was evident that what I said at to the President's probable action, and
what Gordon, Wiseman and others did on the outside by working through Sir Eric
Geddes, Balfour etc., has had its effect. We were not in session longer than
three quarters of an hour and we accomplished more than we did all of yesterday.

We are to meet at my headquarters, 78 rue de l'Université, tomorrow at
11.30. We have decided to have no one present excepting Clemenceau, Lloyd George
Orlando, Marechal Foch and myself, with perhaps Geddes near at hand to advise as
to naval matters. We are all agreed that the articles drawn up by the Navy are
entirely too severe and we propose to soften them. We plan to eliminate the
German battle cruisers and submarine fleet which will be all that is necessary.

I told Lloyd George, before we went into Clemenceau's room, that I was
afraid he had lifted the floodgates and that Clemenceau would not be willing to
accept the moderate memorandum he had prepared for my consideration. I found this
was true, and that Clemenceau was having prepared an elaborate paper making many
exceptions to the President's Fourteen Points. I told them that Sonnino was pro-
bably drawing up an equally extensive draft for Italy in opposition to the Pres-
ident's program, and it would all inevitably lead to the President going before
Congress to ask whether the United States wished to continue the war in order to
accomplish the aims of Great Britain, France and Italy.

Clemenceau and George looked at one another significatny. Clemenceau dráp-
ped all discussion of his memorandum and accepted Lloyd George's without further
protest. I suggested that the word "illegal" be used in the last wark clause
before the word "damages". Lloyd George accepted this at once, but Clemenceau

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baulked. It will probably be accepted if the President insists upon it.

Lloyd George said he did not approve of occupying the left bank of the Rhine. He thought the terms too severe on Germany. Clemenceau earnestly insisted upon this occupation and promised, upon his word of honor, that France would withdraw just as soon as Germany complied with peace conditions. He declared it would be impossible for him to go before the Chamber of Deputies, or before the Army, with anything less than some sort of occupation of German soil. Lloyd George yielded.

We decided at this afternoon's conference we would take up the question of the armistice with Austria, and afterward, the armistice with Turkey. With Turkey, however, I have nothing to do, since we have never declared war on her.

Lloyd George explained to Clemenceau that the Turks were willing for the English and French to occupy their territory, but they were not willing for the Italians or Greeks to do so. This will be a troublesome problem this afternoon but they thought it might be gotten over by allowing the Italian Fleet to enter the Bosphorus along with the French and British Fleets.

It was decided to take up the German Armistice after we reached an agreement as to the other two. I spoke of the danger of Bolshevism entering Germany and Austria and spreading into Italy, France and England. Clemenceau repudiated the thought that it might come into France. Lloyd George admitted that it was possible in England. They both thought anything might occur in Italy.

I asked Clemenceau what place he had in mind for the Peace Conference. He said, "Versailles". Lloyd George replied that he and I had agreed upon Geneva. Clemenceau did not argue the matter and I suggested that it might be postponed for further discussion. In leaving, Lloyd George and I agreed again that it was best not to have the Peace Conference upon French soil but in a neutral country. Before I left Washington, the President and I agreed that Lausanne would be the best place for the Conference because of its ample hotel and other accommodations.

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and the people are pro-Ally in their sympathies. When I reached Paris, I came to the conclusion that Geneva would be the better place. Orlando promised to favor any place I thought best. In talking with George he had several fantastic suggestions, San Sebastian being one of them. He finally accepted Geneva. All my cables and telegrams are attached.

October 30, 1918.

Everything was changed for the better today because of the attitude I took yesterday. It would have been far better if the President had pushed the suggestion I made him last August to then commit the Allies to our policies, but since he did not do so, and since the Central Empires are going to pieces as so rapidly, it was necessary to find the next best way out.

There was a childish waste of time yesterday at the Quai d'Orsay when Lloyd George and Clemenceau wrangled for the entire afternoon as to whether the British or French Admiral should receive the Turkish surrender. They bandied words like fishwives, at least George did. Clemenceau was more moderate. One thing Lloyd George told him was that the "British were compelled to do all the fighting in Turkey and had several hundred thousand men there, while the French had a few "niggers" policemen around, to keep the British from stealing the Holy Sepulcher". There was much more like this. It would have been humorous if it had not been such a tragic waste of time.

Clemenceau appears to better advantage than Lloyd George. They both had courage and are equally quick at repartee. The trouble with Clemenceau is that he thinks in terms of the Second Empire. He does not know what all this new is thought about and frankly says that his task is done with the winning of the war. I take it he will occupy a secure place in French history for he deserves it. There is but one master in France today and that is Georges Clemenceau. His rule is almost absolute--temporary though it may be.

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I cannot understand General Pershing's extraordinary communication to the Supreme War Council. When he sent it to me I was in session with the Prime Ministers and after reading it I handed it first to Clemenceau who said: "Theatrical." I then handed it to George, who said, "politics". Everyone believes it is a political document and a clear announcement of his intention to become a candidate for the Presidency in 1920. Pershing is a strong man, very determined but not a General of the first class. I should place him in the class of Grant.

In reply to my letter asking him what other Generals agreed with his view, he sent his Aide, Colonel Boyd, to tell me he had not talked with any of the other Allied Generals, and did not know their views. In the letter he wrote afterward, which is attached, he makes further explanation which, indeed, does not explain at all. I wonder whether he actually knows that he is dealing with a political rather than a military question. It is something for the President and the Prime Ministers to determine whether to treat with Germany for an armistice.

This morning around three o'clock I was awakened by the motorcycles of our messengers leaving the house with despatches for Washington which had just been put into code. Every night since we have been here the staff has been up until three or four o'clock in the morning. The despatches for Washington cannot be prepared and written until the evening and the coding takes practically all night. It is necessary to get these despatches into Washington by the early morning and the staff works at top speed during the night.

I fell to thinking about the dilemma I was in with the three Prime Ministers:

It then occurred to me there was a way out of the difficulty. I would tell them that if they did not accept the President's Fourteen Points and other terms enumerated since January 8th, I would advise the President to go before Congress and lay the facts before it, giving the terms which England, France and Italy insisted upon and ask the advice of Congress whether the United States should make peace with Germany now that she has accepted the American terms, or whether we should

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go on fighting until Germany had accepted the terms of France, England and Italy, whatever they might be. I had a feeling of great satisfaction when I thought of this, and I turned over and went to sleep, knowing I had found a solution of a very troublesome problem. It worked just as I thought it would. The last thing any of them want is publicity of the kind which the program I have outlined would give. And above all, they do not dare take the responsibility of continuing the war without us.

October 31, 1918.

The three Prime Ministers, Field Maréchal Foch and Sir Eric Geddes met here at my headquarters to formulate both military and naval terms for Austria. Both of these historic documents have been formulated at my official residence instead of at either the War or Foreign Office.

Clemenceau was fine today. He and I both wished to make as one of the conditions to the armistice with Austria, and later with Germany, protection of people and property. Lloyd George objected, saying that this went without saying, and it might be inferred that certain German officers should not be punished for some of the atrocious acts committed during the war. We argued at length, Clemenceau and I urging that the clause go in, and Lloyd George insisting that it might be construed in a way to keep the Allies from punishing the guilty in Germany. Clemenceau and I finally gave way in the interest of harmony, for there was something to be said of Lloyd George's contention that such protection ought to be accepted without question. I afterward told Clemenceau that I was proud of the position he took in behalf of France.

While I was sitting in with the Prime Ministers, two cables from the President were handed me. The one about his Fourteen Points and the other stating that he felt it his duty to authorize me to state to the Allies concerning the "freedom of the seas" and the "League of Nations" are attached as well as my answer. The President's cable was intemperate and if I had read it

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to my colleagues, it may have led to serious trouble.

We held another meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles at three o'clock. I shall make the *proces verbal* of this meeting a part of the record, and will not go into it here.

Clemenceau placed me just opposite him in the center of the great table around which the Prime Ministers, Secretaries for Foreign Affairs, Field Maréchal Foch, Generals and Admirals gathered with their secretaries. At the Quai d'Orsay he always asks me to sit by his side. We do not then sit at a table, but in a semi-circle around the Foreign Secretary's desk.

November 1, 1918.

Lord Reading came before ten o'clock. I was already busy in conference with other visitors but excused myself and walked with him for nearly an hour. He told me of his troubles which are many.

At eleven, the three Prime Ministers, Maréchal Foch and Sir Eric Geddes came to my house, as they did yesterday, in order to write the German Armistice. We went over both the naval and military terms and succeeded in coming to an agreement. These terms were written up and formally presented at the meeting of the Supreme War Council at Versailles this afternoon and adopted with little or no change. We have found this method of procedure very satisfactory.

Geddes presented the naval program which the Interallied Naval Council offered for our consideration. We thought it too drastic and modified it. We also modified, in some degree, Maréchal Foch's military terms.

At the Versailles meeting, Lloyd George brought up most unexpectedly the President's Fourteen Points. This question was definitely settled between George, Clemenceau and myself day before yesterday, and was agreed to by the Italians later in the day, and yet he brought the matter up again this afternoon and would have precipitated an interminable discussion had I not refused to discuss it at that time.

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The Belgians who were invited to be present, started in with a lot of exception. I told George that I did not intend to go into a discussion of the Fourteen Points at this time because I had no data with me, but I should be very glad to do so later if he so desired.

Just before leaving for Versailles, I received a cable (No. 6) from the President which is a part of the diary, and which bears upon this subject. I sent for Sir William Wiseman immediately upon my return from Versailles and told him that unless Lloyd George would make some reasonable concessions in his attitude upon the "Freedom of the Seas" that all hope of Anglo Saxon unity would be at an end. That the United States went to war with England in 1812 on the question of her rights at sea, and that she had gone to war with Germany in 1817 upon the same question. I did not believe that even if the President wished to do so he could avoid this issue, and if Lloyd George expressed the British viewpoint as he indicates, there would be greater feeling against Great Britain at the end of the war than there had been since our Civil War. I again repeated, with as much emphasis as I could, that our people would not consent to allow the British Government, or any other government, determine upon what terms our ships should sail the seas, either in time of peace or in time of war.

Wiseman is taking the matter up with his people tonight and will let me know tomorrow.

November 2, 1918.

General Pershing was my first caller this morning. After a brief talk we walked together to the Ministry of War. There was a meeting of the three Prime Ministers and myself, together with all our military and naval advisers. This & included Marechal Foch. Marshal Haig. The *proces verbal* of this conference will be written in due form and will be attached to the record.

The Prime Ministers and myself I afterward went to the private office of the President of the Council to discuss what to do in reference to the Jugoslav seizure

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of the Austrian Fleet. The radio we sent to those in charge of the Fleet and to
our Admiral in the Mediterranean is a part of the record.

We find it difficult to make Orlando understand what is being said or done.
He speaks indifferent French and no English, and about half of our time is taken
up in trying to make matters clear to him.

I returned to my headquarters at 78 rue de l'Université for an engagement with Sir William Wiseman to talk further concerning the situation which has arisen between the British and ourselves as to the "freedom of the seas". Lloyd George, Reading, Balfour and Wiseman are to lunch together at the British Embassy and Reading and Wiseman hope to have something to present to me late this afternoon when I return from the Supreme War Council at Versailles.

Lord Northcliffe lunched with me. As stated before, I asked Northcliffe to come to France to aid me in impressing my point of view upon Lloyd George. Northcliffe offered the use of his publications in any way desired. At this interview I merely gave him a glimpse of my difficulties with the Prime Minister. He assured me that Great Britain desired nothing out of the war and he wished to know if British officials had made this clear. I evaded the question for the moment. I do not wish to get into a violent controversy with George just now, because it will be apparent to him how it has come about.

I attended the Supreme War Council at Versailles at three o'clock. The full proceedings are attached. Lloyd George insisted upon postponing the naval part of the program until Monday. He contended that if Austria accepted our armistice, we could then put stiffer terms to Germany. I contended that we might as well send in our terms now and not wait upon what Austria will do. We have given Austria an ultimatum which expires Sunday at midnight. Germany will know whether Austria accepts our terms before she receives the terms of the armistice being sent her, and if Austria declines the conditions we have laid down,

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then Germany will certainly decline the xxmm conditions laid down for her. It
seems to me a useless waste of time to defer action. Balfour agrees with me in
a private talk, but he said Lloyd George's real reason was to let himself down
easy with his colleagues who totally disagreed with him in the naval terms of
the armistice.

General Pershing and I motored back to Paris together. We had a heart to
heart talk and agreed that we would not allow mischief makers cause trouble be-
tween us. He apologised for not first consulting me regarding the remarkable
document he sent the Supreme War Council on Thursday, and explained his reasons.
He said he was wrong and was sorry that he had not submitted it to me. However,
I found he had submitted it to the War Department at Washington-- a fact which I
did not know, and which modifies the matter. I am sending a cable to the Pres-
ident explaining it.

I found Lord Reading and Wiseman waiting to take up the troublesome ques-
tion of the "freedom of the seas". We worked at it for more than two hours but
"got nowhere". I finally made a suggestion and wrote a letter which they are
to submit to the Prime Minister. Wiseman takes the right attitude, but the
Prime Minister assumes that the seas belong to Great Britain.

I told Reading that they took the same attitude Germany took in the
Spring of 1914 regarding her army. The Germans declared that all the bayonets
of Europe were pointed at Germany and that it was essential to her existence not
to consent to even modified disarmament. They contended that their army was not
for aggression, and pointed out that of all the great powers, Germany was the only
one that had not made territorial conquests for nearly a half century. But Ger-
many came to grief, and in my opinion, it was inevitable that Great Britain would
likewise have cause to regret such arbitrary maxima attitude.

I cannot bring them to the point of even admitting that the matter is one

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for discussion at the Peace Conference. It is the most extraordinary attitude I have ever known and is sure to lead to trouble if not modified. Reading said if they admitted that the "freedom of the seas" was a matter for discussion, it was like a man admitting that another man could discuss with him whether or not his house was for sale. I immediately seized this illustration he used to prove the British attitude, that is, they considered the seas as much their private property as a man does his own house. I asked if they did not consider the rules of warfare on land were a fit subject for discussion at a peace conference. Reading admitted this without question. Then, I asked, why are not the rules of the sea also open to discussion.

I cornered him so many times that it became tiresome. He could only go back and say again and again that Lloyd George had to consider his constituents at home and their opinion. In reply to this, I thought if I were a British statesman I should not hesitate to go before a British public and tell them the truth; and show them where their trend of thought would lead them.

November 3, 1918.

This has been a red letter day. I brought Lloyd George to terms concerning the "freedom of the seas". My cable to the President will partially explain how this was done.

When the Prime Ministers met at my headquarters this morning we at once went into the President's Fourteen Points. When Lloyd George and I began discussing Article Two relating to the freedom of the seas, he showed strong visible signs of excitement and nervousness. I have never seen him exhibit quite as much agitation before. Our debate was not heated and not unpleasant, but both he and I have been keyed up to a high pitch ever since this subject has been under discussion. We were at it all day, in one way and another, and when we sat at the table, I think we both felt that a crisis had come.

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United States frankly saying they did not approve the President's terms and they were trying to incite not only the people of America, but the Allies, to repudiate them. On this side, I find the Entente Governments as distinctly hostile to the Fourteen Points as our opponents at home. The plain people generally both in America and Europe, are, I think, with the President--surely they would be if they understood the vital issues involved. Unfortunately, it is not with the people we have to deal.

The diplomatic battle of the past few days has resulted in complete victory. Our Armistice to Germany carries with it the approval of the President's January 8th Address, and his subsequent addresses with slight modifications which were transmitted along with the terms of the Armistice. I have had to persuade; I have had to threatened, but the result is worth all my endeavours.

I am glad the exceptions were made, for it amounts to emphasize the acceptances of the Fourteen Points. If they had not dissented in any way, but had let the Armistice be made without protest, they would have been in a better position at the Peace Conference to object to them.

It is difficult to fully tell of the tense feeling that has prevailed due to the discussion of the Fourteen Points. George and I, and Reading and I have had many conferences, separately and together. At one time it looked as if there could be no agreement because Lloyd George was so insistent that Great Britain must disregard Article Two. He evidently thought it unwise to have Great Britain placed in the position of being the main objector, and he therefore incited Clemenceau and Orlando to make objections of their own to other articles of the Fourteen Points.

At one time I told George that his course was placing the United States in the same position toward Great Britain as Germany occupied during the war, with the difference that Great Britain had more resources and more money than

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Government might have with the Prime Minister, Reading would assume the same attitude he did in discussing the freedom of the seas, no matter what his own conviction might be.

Sir Eric Geddes asked to call just before dinner and he was with me for more than a half hour. He came to bid me goodbye, but what he wanted was to convince himself more thoroughly that Lloyd George could easily have gotten the British naval terms accepted. I frankly told him that I preferred the resolution offered by George which we adopted, but that I would have followed England in the naval terms as I had followed Marechal Foch in the military terms. Geddes said he could not understand why Lloyd George had stated on Saturday that he preferred to wait until after we had heard from Austria as to the armistice, because if Austria accepted we might impose stronger terms upon Germany, and then when Austria did accept, George offered a resolution imposing weaker terms.

While we had finished at Versailles, Lord Milner spoke to Clemenceau and said, "you drew up resolutions at your morning meeting which have not been adopted here at the meeting of the Supreme War Council". Clemenceau replied with some asperity, "That is not necessary. The Supreme War Council met this morning and passed upon those questions. Whenever the Prime Ministers and Colonel House meet, the Supreme War Council meets, and when we do final". Milner did not reply.

Sir William Wiseman is leaving for London in the morning. It has occurred to me that the General Election in England will afford us an opportunity to nail the British Government more securely to the President's program than we have already done here this week. I am arranging to have questions put to the Government during the campaign to which they will have to reply specifically, and come out squarely or repudiate what they have promised in the armistice to Germany. I am sending Frank Cobb over day after tomorrow to see the Liberal leaders and editors together with the Laborites, to tell them what is at issue. I have cautioned him

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not to mention anyone by name and, in no circumstances, to do or say anything to
cause the slightest friction or criticism.

November 5, 1918.

My cable to the President is a part of the record. I have tried to rest
today and have seen few people. Ray Stannard Baker and Admiral Benson were among
them. Baker is to return to Italy and I wish him to keep in touch with liberal
movements there so as to keep us informed. Cobb leaves for England tomorrow to
do similar work.

November 6, 1918.

I saw a good many people today. The most interesting ones were General
Nolan, of the Army Intelligence Department, Taku Jonescu, the Roumanian statesman,
Colonel Barkley Parsons and Dr. Henri Bergson. I arranged with Nolan the in-
telligence work to be done at the Peace Conference and also the protection of the
President should he come over.

I have asked Colonel Barkley Parsons to make a preliminary study of the
damage done by the Germans in Northeastern France and Belgium. I shall probably
get him to take this work up with a sufficient corps of assistants in order that
when the French and Belgian Governments make demands at the Peace Conference for
reparations and damage, we will have some idea as to the justice of their claims.
For instance, it might be said that Germany had done ten millions of damages
in a certain town. There would be no way whatever for us to know whether this
was even approximately correct. Strangely enough, I had not thought of the nec-
essity for such work until Parsons was talking and offered his services in a gen-
eral way.

I asked if he had anything in particular in mind, but he had not.

It then occurred to me that he might be used in the way outlined. The more I
think of it, the more important it seems to be.

Taku Jonescu appealed to me as much as any man I have met here. His out-

look is broad and his conclusions are wise and just. We went over the Southeastern situation pretty thoroughly and I liked the ideas he had regarding the reconstruction of that part of the world.

Bergson, I always enjoy. I found him, however, entirely at odds with the President and myself as to the League of Nations. I tried to set him straight and I hope I succeeded. Frazier told me that when he went out he said I was a great idealist with the saving clause of common sense.

Margaret Wilson was an afternoon caller. She has just arrived to do Y.M.C.A. work in the Canteens.

Admiral Benson and his Aides lunched with us. The day has been pleasantly full. I am sorry to see by the election returns that the Democrats have probably lost both the House and the Senate. If the American people could realize what is involved, there would have been no question as to the result. I am afraid it will make our work harder at the Peace Conference and, heaven knows, it will be hard enough.

November 8, 1918.

Admiral Benson was my first contact with the Germans.

I have the following letter from Walter Lippmann dated November 7th.

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again it might be a tragedy. I shall take the matter up with Clemenceau tomorrow
morning at 10.30.

Pichon called this morning to tell me of the progress of the armistice pro-
ceedings. My cable covers this.

November 9, 1918.

General Pershing came last night shortly before nine o'clock and remained
for more than an hour. We went over the military situation as it relates to the
occupation of enemy territory and the problems involved in the return of our
troops to America. Pershing is averse to using our troops anywhere excepting at
certain points on the German Border.

This morning I had a conference with the President of the Conseil at the
War Office. He was exceedingly cordial and said, "May I call you my dear friend,
for I feel that you are. You have been so wise and so helpful that I beg you to
believe that my friendship is sincere." He asked Pichon to be a witness that
he, Clemenceau, would not take up any matter at the Conference without having
fully apprised me of it, and he intimated that if I objected, he would defer to
my judgment.

My cable to the President of today speaks of this. Clemenceau had in
mind to propose to the Conference that the coal mines in the Valley of the Sarre
lying between Luxembourg and Lorraine, which once belonged to France for a short
time prior to 1815, be returned to her. He did not believe England would consent
because she desired to have France dependent upon her for coal. He promised to
give me a memorandum on the subject and begged that I consider it, and if I
thought France should not ask for it, she would not do so. I agreed to study it
from a sympathetic viewpoint, but made no promise or comment.

He asked me to go to Strassburg; Strassburg Strasburg with him after the Ar-
mistice had been signed. He wished me to go in order that I might see how loyal

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the people of Alsace-Lorraine were to France. I gave him a tentative promise. He spoke in rather bitter terms of Italy. Next week when the American, British and French Flags will be flying from every house in Paris, he said I must not be surprised to find the Italian Flag absent. The French did not feel that Italy had done her duty in the war and had come into it largely from motives that were not creditable.

We discussed the question of a place for the Peace Conference. I have covered this part of our conversation in a cable to the Department and the President. Clemenceau gave me a copy of a cable he had already sent the French Ambassador at Washington which is attached. In discussing Paris as a place for the Conference, he said, "Please do not ask for anything, for everything is yours"

I told of my controversy with Lloyd George and the English over the freedom of the seas and explained that I preferred to thresh it out with them myself rather than involve him in the controversy, although I knew he would be in sympathy with the principles contended for. He expressed approval of the position I had taken. While we were sitting together, a courier came from Marechal Foch, to tell of the negotiations with the German Plenipotentiaries.

Admiral Benson was an early morning caller to go over with him some routine matters in which the Navy is interested.

Oscar Crosby, Senator Hollis, Col. Mott and Willard Straight took lunch with us. I have decided to attach Willard Straight to my staff.

November 10, 1918.

Last night I received a communication from Pichon and Clemenceau concerning the progress of the discussions of the Armistice which I cabled to Washington. Commander Carter came from Admiral Benson to give information as to the progress of some naval matters which we are trying to work out.

Benson and his immediate entourage were considerably "peaved" because he

was not invited to the Elysee Palace to the dejeuner given in honor of the Delegates to the Armistice Conference. It was a social error and I asked Frazier to go to the Foreign Office and inform them that Benson was the ranking American military officer in France.

We are making arrangements to take over the Hotel de Crillon for our force at the Peace Conference. We have in mind for the President a residence near by.

The Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp took lunch with us quite on famille. I wished to have an intimate talk with him-- something we have not had the time to do since I arrived. I showed Sharp the cable I sent the President today relating to the Delegates to the Peace Conference. He was pleased at the mention of his name. He was much disturbed, though, when I told him the President had Secretary Baker in mind as a Delegate, and said he thought it would be impossible to name two from the same State. Sharp took the stand that it would be a reflection upon him Sharp, if Baker were appointed from Ohio and he were left out. He held it would make his position difficult. I tried to disabuse his mind upon this point by saying that one of the reasons he should not be appointed was because he was Ambassador here. I did not believe any of the Allied Governments intended to appoint their Ambassadors as Delegates and if he, Sharpe, were appointed it would be embarrassing to the others.

My cable to the President suggests that he go before Congress and read the terms of the German Armistice and take the occasion to make an address, having the world in view as an audience. This cable is a part of the record. (See note) I wish to emphasize the importance of this suggestion. Various other cables have been sent to the Department.

Sir, James Barrie and Mr. Gilmour called this afternoon and I took them with me for an hour or more in the Bois. I was glad that Barrie has such a liberal viewpoint. He seems to see things as the President and I see them. In dis-

Note. He did this.

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any of the Army people, and Clemenceau sent one of his Generals around to give me exact information. The General said that Clemenceau had instructed him to tell me first, even before he went to the President or Secretary for Foreign Affairs. I received him, of course, in my bedroom and _en déshabille_, and did not tell him that I had already gotten the news. Major Willard Straight telephoned Gordon within a few minutes after the signing and Gordon came and waked me to give the glad tidings.

My notes, telegrams and cables of congratulation to the President, King George, King Albert, Mr. Lloyd George, General Pershing, M. Clemenceau, Signor Orlando, etc. etc. are parts of the record.

It is difficult to realize that the war is over. The streets are densely crowded with happy people. They are quiet and orderly. It is one of the pleasantest emotions of my life to look into the faces of the throngs one passes in the streets. The guns began firing at eleven o'clock this morning and the City was rapidly decorated with flags.

We took lunch at the British Embassy. The other guests were M. and Mme Klotz, Lord and Lady Curzon, and several British officials. At the end of the lunch, I toasted the King and we drank to his health and afterward to the President and the President of the French Republic.

M. Pichon called to bring some information. The memorandum is attached. After Pichon I saw who came to present his compliments and thank me for my friendship for Poland.

Ambassador and Mrs. Sharp gave a dinner in our honor tonight. The Foreign Minister and Mme. Pichon, Lord Derby and Lady Victoria Primrose, the Norwegian Minister and his wife, Admiral Benson, General Bliss, the French Minister of Marine and many others were present. We left early.

November 12, 1918.

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November 12, 1918.

Among my callers today was Lord Derby. He wished to discuss the President's visit to England, the time for the preliminary parleys and the naming of a date for the Peace Conference. He gave me a memorandum from his Government inviting the President to visit England which is attached. He also, later in the day, wrote me a letter enclosing a cable he had sent to his Government embodying our conversation in the morning. He is inaccurate in one part of the cable where he says I strongly advised the President not to sit in the Peace Conference. What I told him was that I thought when the President came I should advise him not to sit in the Peace Conference. I have not yet made up my mind fully as to the ad-visability of this.

The Italian Ambassador was an afternoon caller. He came to assure me that the Italian Government was not acting contrary to the terms of the Armistice in dealing with the Austrian Fleet. I told him I was not worried as to their in-tentions; that when I had confidence in one, I did not allow rumors to disturb me. However, I thought some of my colleagues were very much disturbed and it would be well to satisfy them. He said the French were suspicious and he would appreciate it if I would calm them. He thought they would listen to me. I suggested that I write him a letter, asking him about the incident at Pola so that he could send me a reply and I, in turn, might express confidence in their intention to comply with their promises. This correspondence I promised to take or send to Clemenceau.

I have written the initial letter, but have not yet received a reply.

Premier Orlando's confidential friend, Colonel Gallavresi, followed Count Bonin.

He assured me that his only object was to explain Orlando's position and make clear Italy's honorable intentions.

Ray Stannard Baker came next. I asked him to prepare to go to Italy at the end of the week and to come in again before leaving. I directed him to

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keep in touch during the week he is here, with the French Liberals, and to tell them, as I wished him to tell Italian Liberals, that in me they had an ardent friend at court. I desired him to caution them to be moderate and no go to excess in any direction, either in speech or action.

Ambassador Sharp came next and we went over several important matters. It is said that the Serbians have entered Hungary, and he showed me a cable from Lansing asking him to take the matter up with me. I told Sharp to see Vesnitch, show him the cable, and tell him he had discussed it with me and I had advised going to him frankly and openly. It is the best way.

Lord Derby came to present me a telegram from his Government which is attached. I had a telegram from Frank Cobb in which he tells of a conversation he had with Lord Milner about the President coming over. I wish Milner would leave the matter alone. We want the President at any time he can come, and there will be no question of his interfering with the British Elections.

of

I am delighted with the address the President before Congress Monday when he heard the terms of the German Armistice and announced the termination of the war. He followed the lines I suggested in my cable of Sunday. I believe what he said will be helpful.

I have not said much concerning the feeling of exultation of the people here over the announcement of peace, for it is something of common knowledge and need not be chronicled by me. I only try to tell of those events that are known peculiarly to me.

November 13, 1918.

Rear Admiral Hope called this afternoon to tell of the historic meeting between the German and Allied Military and Naval Representatives for the purpose of arranging for the signing of the Armistice. I shall not go into detail, interesting as it was, because it will be told by those present.

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Admiral Benson was my first caller. General Pershing came in the after-
noon and spent nearly an hour discussing the question of the number of troops
that should be left on this side, and also when troops should be started home.
I have changed my mind about this, largely because of the revolutionary spirit
that is abroad. I advised him to keep most of his men intact until after the
Peace Treaty had been signed, and then to send them home as fast as possible.
He offered General McKinstry as his best Engineer for making an estimate of
damage done in Belgium and France. I thought it best to first feel my way
with the French Government. While it seems essential that we have this infor-
mation, we should get it in a way not to offend the sensibilities of the French.
I told Pershing that sometime I wished to talk with him about the matter of
which we talked last year on the train on our way to Chaumont, that is, our
conversation relating to the Presidency.

I thought it might be that my views were not the same as then. We are
to have a heart to heart talk later.

Allen Wardwell, who has been a year and a half in Russia, having just re-
turned, was an interesting visitor.

John W. Davis called, He has just returned from Switzerland. I told him
how he happened to be selected as Ambassador. I also advised him not to spend
any more money than his salary, plus his income and the amount of money the
Department allows him for entertaining. I advised him, too, not to hold the
place longer than a year. I thought he could make all the reputation needful
during the next twelve months when all the interesting and important negotia-
tions following the war would be consummated.

Henry P. Davison of the Red Cross came to discuss that organization.
I urged him to use the Red Cross from now as an agent of mercy in the starving
and distressed countries of Europe. He said he was willing to do so if I would

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mention the matter to the President and ask his cooperation.

My cables to the President and to the State Department are parts of the record. So also are telegrams that have come from Marshal Haig and Marechal Foch. Various letters from the Italian Ambassador, Frank Cobb and others should be attached.

November 14, 1918.

Commander Carter, representing Admiral Benson, came in the afternoon to give the latest naval information. General Bliss gave similar advice concerning the Army. Lady Scott, Ambassador John W. Davis, and our Minister at the Hague took lunch with us. My talk with Garrett was unimportant. That with Davis was to give him an outline of the difficulties he would probably have at his new post in London. I gave him a brief summary of the controversy we had with the British over the freedom of the seas. I informed him of the President's anti-British tendency which was constantly kept burning by Lansing, General March, Chief of Staff, and other advisers who did not realize what they were doing.

My cables to the President and Frank Cobb are part of the record.

The French Government sent their officials around today with the Armistice to the Germans. I signed my name "Edward M. House" rather than my usual signature.

Paul Louis, Editor of the Petit Parisien, asked me to favor him by giving an outline of the peace and preliminary conferences.

The Greek Minister came at the request of Venizelos, who is now in London. He asked whether it would be necessary for Venizelos to visit the United States or whether he would have the pleasure of seeing the President here. I informed him of the probable method of procedure during the next few weeks.

November 15, 1918.

I have been busy today outlining the organization for the Peace Congress.

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The French Government have offered us a plan to form a basis for discussion.
The Foreign Secretary and I will probably get together within a few days and
decide upon a definite program.

Baron Sonnino was an afternoon caller. He contended that Italy desired
nothing except to have her boundaries rearranged in a way to give protection in
the event of invasion. I suggested not bringing forth Italy's plea until after
Great Britain had made her plea as to why it was necessary for her safety to
have control of the seas or, at least, have the largest navy in the world, and
until France had explained why she should straighten out her eastern boundary
to protect herself from her enemies.

Sonnino was delighted with the suggestion and saw the point at once. I
did this in a spirit of sheer deviltry. I shall enjoy being present when Son-
nino and Orlando make their armument based upon the British and French claims.
I did not undertake to tell Sonnino that if they would listen to our plan for
a League of Nations, Italy would be amply protected, for I did not wish to start
an argument at this time. He is to lunch with me tomorrow.

Benjamin Dimmick, of the Red Cross, asked my approval of his going into
occupied Germany to attend our sick and wounded. James Hazen Hyde followed
apropos of nothing. Ray Stannard Baker came for final instructions before go-
ing to Italy. He had several questions to ask regarding our policy so that he
might intelligently answer queries put to him in Italy. He asked me to receive
some Socialist Deputies tomorrow which I promised to do.

My cables to Lansing and the President are attached. I have just re-
ceived a note from the British Ambassador enclosing an invitation from the
King to the President to be His Majesty's guest at Buckingham Palace, in the
event the President visits England. I transmitted this to the President.

November 16, 1918.

Messrs Longuet and Cachin, Socialist Deputies, called to pay their re-

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spects and to ask some questions. Mr. Frazier, who was present, has written a
resume of the conversation.

Elmer Roberts, of the Associated Press, has been helpful in certain di-
rections, particularly in keeping me in touch with Briand. He was here to re-
port this afternoon.

My old friend, Col. E. B. Cushing of Texas, now of the Engineering Corps
came in to shake hands. Stephens, Rublee and Cotton of the Transport Commis-
sion followed.

My two personal cables to the President are parts of the record as, in-
deed, is his cable to me. He is evidently worried because of the general opin-
ion that he should not sit at the Peace Conference. It seems clear to me that
he should come over and decide for himself. Personally, I want him because if
not
he were here I would have the burden to bear without being able to direct
matters alone as I have up to now.

November 17, 1918.

Today, Major Willard Straight, Gordon and I motored to Chateau Thierry,
Rheimes and beyond. We were in the motor something like ten or eleven hours.
Not caring for sight-seeing, I did not care for the trip. I have been through
the fighting districts so often during the past four years that there was but
little of new interest.

November 18, 1918.

Lord Derby was my first caller. He came to tell me that Clemenceau had
asked Lloyd George to come over for a personal conference, presumably between
the two of them. Lloyd George was too busy to come here and invited Clemenceau
to come to London. Derby did not know whether Clemenceau would go or not, but
thought he would not. Derby said Lloyd George "was in a belligerent mood". I
did not inquire what he meant because I thought I knew. He stated he was sure

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Balfour and others would keep him from doing anything foolish.

I asked what decision the British Government had come to regarding Paris as a place for the Conference. Derby did not know. I requested him to find out. I also asked how many delegates his Government had in mind. This, too, he did not know. I offered suggestions and requested him to place them before his Government and get their reply. As to the further question as to when preliminary conversations between the Allies would begin, he thought "around the 15th". I asked for definite information upon this point. Derby had not seen the French communiqué on the question of procedure. I offered to give him a copy, and expressed a desire that he come to lunch within a few days to discuss methods of procedure and agree as far as we could. Derby expressed a willingness to go to London as often as necessary, which he thought would be better than for me to go. Personally, I have no thought of going.

Carter Glass and a number of others have been morning callers. Dr. Koresek, President of the Jugoslav Republic, was an interesting visitor. My cable to the President indicates our conversation, and Mr. Frazier will add to it in a memorandum.

Frederick Palmer was here to tell of his plans for the future. Lord Lytton came to discuss the question of censorship. We seemed to be in total disagreement. I desired the lifting of the censorship everywhere and at once; he claimed to desire the same result, but thought it impossible. Curiously enough, he gave as his reason that the members of the Peace Congress would not wish reports of the proceedings to be without censorship. He thought they were entirely justified in this feeling. I did not tell him that my thoughts ran in the other direction, and that one of the reasons I wanted an immediate lifting of the censorship was that a free public discussion might be had about what was going on at the Congress.

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I am trying to frighten those who are endeavoring to postpone the Congress.
I am telling them the people will soon begin to murmur. Sonnino agreed with
me, and I asked him to write me a letter and express his fears as to what will
result in Italy unless we come to a quick conclusion.

Lord Derby sends a copy of a cable to his Government. He never
quite catches the entire point I make, and his cable is nearly but not altogether correct.

I have come to the conclusion that the consensus of public opinion comes
hearer being right than the opinions of the leaders of a country. Only now
and then you find a leader who sees more clearly than the people in the aggre-
gate. Certainly the men at the top represent more than the average intelli-
gence, but they are probably embued with ambitions and selfish purposes that
cloud their vision, or, at least, if their vision is not clouded, they go in
the direction of selfish interest rather than in the interest of all.

November 19, 1918.

The President's cables, and the two he authorized Lansing to send along
with my cables to the President and the Department are the important parts of
the day's record.

I called upon the British Ambassador and presented the President's
regrets at not being able to at present accept the invitation of the King and
Queen to stay at Buckingham Palace. I asked Derby to ascertain the views of
his Government on the lifting of the French Censorship. At the same time I
made the request that the English Censorship be lifted as far as the United
States was concerned. I shall not press the French Government until I hear
from the British. I prefer to make joint representations. I asked Derby
to please get an immediate reply from his Government concerning Paris as a
place for the Peace Conference. There are many details which have to be work-
ed out, such as obtaining quarters, engraving stationery, etc. etc. which can-

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not be done until a decision is made.

In addition, I asked through Derby, the British Government's views upon the desirability of using English as the official language of the Peace Congress.

He has seen Balfour and gave him my views as to when the League of Nations should be formed, and the desirability of making it a part of the Peace Treaty.
Clemenceau, he thought, was going to London to see Lloyd George, but just what they were to confer about, he did not know. If he could find out, he would let me know.

I gave Derby a copy of the memorandum on the procedure given me by the French. He had not seen it and had not heard of it until I spoke to him yesterday. Derby is not the cleverest man in the world, but he is honest and a gentleman, and I would prefer delaiming with that kind of person even though we do not always agree.

Monsignor Cerretti Boneventure, Papal Delegate to the United States, called to find out something about the President's plans. He does not wish to leave for America if the President is coming over. I advised him to remain until the President arrived and then go to the United States for such other business as he might have there.

Ambassador Sharp called after dinner to discuss the Jugoslav situation, and to get my approval of some cables on the subject he was sending.

November 20, 1918.

My various cables to Washington and the ones I have received are parts of the record. So also is a cable to Lloyd George which Clemenceau has asked his Minister of Commerce to bring around and advise with me concerning its contents. I suggested no change in the cable itself, but advised that he notice Solf, German Foreign Secretary, that he had taken the matter up with me and I had suggested that the Germans prepare a statement showing their food condition

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I asked him to say that Herbert Hoover would be here in a few days for the purpose Solf had in mind, and we would arrange a meeting as soon as possible. Clemenceau promised to send a copy of his telegram to Solf and I shall attach it.

Lord Derby's communication of today is also a part of the record. Trumbic, the Jugoslav was an afternoon caller. I told him pretty much what I told Koresec, President of the Jugoslav Republic, who came the other day.

Admiral Benson came and we went over several current naval matters. Major General Kernan called. He has been detailed to work with General Bliss in the technical end of war questions which may come up at the Peace Conference. He seems an intelligent fellow.

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November 30, 1918.

Today is the first day I have taken up my official work in person for over a week. I have had influenza ten days and have been exceedingly miserable. I never had such care. The Red Cross evidently seized this opportunity to re-ciprocate for what I have tried to do for that organization. They sent three nurses to take eight hour shifts, and they sent one doctor after another to aid dear Doctor McLean who was with me day and night. So many people have died since this epidemic has scourged the world. Many of my staff have died and poor Willard Straight among them.

The British Ambassador was my first caller and I saw him in my bedroom. He goes to London tomorrow and wished to know what messages I desired him to take across. He was sure his Government would accept the proposal I made as to the number of delegates the five Great Powers should have at the Peace Conference.

the

He spoke of the absurdity of holding meeting of the Supreme War Council in London on Monday, and indicated as clearly as his official status would permit, that Lloyd George was having it purely for election purposes. He said George was bringing Marechal Foch over with Clemenceau for the same reason. He was arranging for the Duke of Connaught to meet Foch and take him in the first carriage while he, Lloyd George, intended to follow with Clemenceau. Derby announced that George did not know any better, but that Clemenceau would probably not ride with him unless the order was changed.

Derby asked if I thought the President would dine with him when he came. I hoped he would, but could not be certain since Presidential etiquette would forbid. I told him I would advise the President to make exceptions of Ambassadors while he was in Europe.

Clemenceau came in the afternoon. My despatch to the President indicates the purpose of his visit. He left a memorandum and map of the Sarre Basin which

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the French wish from Germany. I promised to look into the matter.

I hoped he would not pay any attention to what he heard about the President
being dictatorial, arbitrary or hard to get along with. I assured him that
the President was a gentleman and I had always found him more amenable to ad-
vice than any public man with whom I had been thrown in close contact.

General Bliss, Frank Cobb and Frazier were in. I congratulated Bliss
upon being selected as one of the Peace Commissioners.

December 1, 1918.

I saw various people today like Grew, Frazier, Cobb, Carter, Wiseman,
Miller etc. etc. I asked Wiseman, who goes to England tomorrow, to be sure
and do what he did not do the last time and that was to pin Lloyd George down
to some election pledges, particularly as to the League of Nations. He promis-
ed to do this and I advised how best it could be done.

The papers of the last few days have been full of the President's ap-
pointments of the Peace Commissioners. Outside of himself and myself there
will be Lansing, Henry White and General Bliss. General Bliss is the best
appointment, Lansing and White are weak and will be of but little help. As a
matter of fact, the President should have appointed a republican of the stand-
ing of Root. He has made again one of his common mistakes.

December 2, 1918.

I began to see people regularly today, but there was nothing of especial
importance.

December 3, 1918.

Hoover, Sir George Graham, British Chargé at the moment, Vesnitch, Tardieu,
General Bliss and many others were callers.

Hoover wished advice as to the action he should take on the food sit-
uation. I advised him to stand firm on the agreement which he, Gordon and I
got the President to approve; make no concessions, and to let the matter stand

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inocuous until the President came. I advised, in the event they undertook to go back on their agreement to purchase the Cuban sugar crop, to tell them that he would ask the President to lay the matter before Congress and ask to be re-lieved of any responsibility because of their refusal to keep their promise.

I wish in my soul the President had appointed me as Chairman of the Peace Delegation with McAdoo and Hoover as my associates. I could have attended to the political end, McAdoo to the financial, and Hoover to the economic end. The distribution politically would have been perfect. Texas, New York and California with Hoover as the Republican member. If I could have had these two men as associates and only these, I would have been willing to guarantee results.

Tardieu asked my good offices in obtaining additional tonnage for France, both for immediate use and for the future. He desired us to allot to France one million tons to be built in the United States within the next six months or a year.

Vesnitch was uneasy about the London conference and my not being there. I reassured him by saying that Clemenceau had promised that nothing of importance would be discussed there. (Note)

The letter from Mr. Balfour and cables giving the proceedings of the London meeting of the Supreme War Council are parts of the record, as is also my letter to Mr. Balfour.

December 4, 1918.

My callers were Admiral Benson, Ambassador Sharp, M. Dmoski, Carolas, Greek Minister at Rome, Sonnino, Count Bonin, Frank Cobb, Colonel Mott, etc. With Benson it was naval affairs when they touch upon international matters, such as the Adriatic situation, which is always tense and which may lead Italy and Jugoslavia into serious differences, to say nothing of the differences that are inevitable between France and Italy.

Note. A promise that was not kept. E.M.H.