DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON
Minister Vorontsov

4/15/71 8:57 a.m.

NARA, Date 5/26

K: You know I called your Ambassador in Moscow?

V: Indeed, and did you talk?

K: We didn't discuss substance. I told him that you and I had talked. I called him to congratulate him on his elevation to the Central Committee.

V: When is he coming back? That is something of great interest to me.

K: He said early next week, so I assume Sunday. He said something about exchange of letters. But we had nothing substantive to discuss. The reason I am calling you is I just read the Washington Post. I saw a column by Evans and Novak claiming that some Presidential assistants have claimed that whatever is happening with Peking is going to speed up Soviet actions in other fields. First, no authorized Presidential assistant has talked to them. Second, I am putting out strict orders today that there is to be no discussion of this. Third, this is not our policy. Our policy is to make the maximum effort to have better relations with the Soviet Union. We don't want any confusion in Moscow about where our priorities are. We are waiting for some answers from you, but what is happening on other fronts is totally independent, in a different direction, and does not have the same priority.

V: I see.

K: We can never be sure which fifth-level official wants to prove he's important by talking to a newsman.

V: That happens some times.

K: Not so much in your country. But if you can let them know in Moscow about this conversation . . .

V: I will do that. You can be assured of that.

K: Okay, and if you will let me know when the Ambassador is coming back . . .

V: I will do that.

K: Good. Thank you.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Peterson/Kissinger

10:42 a.m. 4/16/71

K: You are beginning to treat me like the State Dept. treats the President.

P: I have been after you for 3 days.

K: Abusive language k is the last resort of senior (bureaucrats). I go along with this.

P: Haig has come along with this.

K: That's right, box me in.

P: I am not happy about your memo on the Japanese. The study memo. #122. It's an awkward position.

K: I thought it was cleared with you. We will do it like you want it.

P: I have some guys working on it. We need to spend sometime together.

K: How about lunch on Tues. ? We should have a regular meeting.

P: Tues. I can't do it.

K: Fri. ?

P: Next Fri. I have lunch with Mr. Irwin. Thurs. ?

K: I will check to see if I can change something. There's a lunch for the German Science Minister. I am glad to scrap it. Let's do it.

P: What are you doing tomorrow after the textile meeting?

K: I am doing something. Why?

P: I have been giving thought to post-VN thing the President talked about and there's a hole in our passivix position. Why we want economic leadership. To what ends and what kind of world we have if we do it or don't do it. We need to kick it around.

K: Can it wait until Thurs. ?

P: OK But the President is anxious. I haven't had a chance to work on it. Think about the following question -- given trends and ? ? ? ? to what ends do we want to reassert our position in competitiveness? We haven't envisioned what the world will be with or without it. In the meantime, look at the memo.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Peterson/Kissinger

10:42 a.m.

4/16/71

-2-

K: We will just fix the memo. You should have leadership rule on that. We will change it no later than Thurs. I thought you saw it.

P: Never. We don't have Treasury in it --

K: It will never happen again. Just relax. We will change it.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Zeigler/Kissinger

10:46 a.m. 4/15/71

K: Make sure you take an occasion in a low key way to deny any anti-Russian intent. Say our basic policy is one to be a friend of the U.S. without being an enemy of the Soviet Union. The President has said this. We have no interest in exacerbating relations between Communist China and Soviet Union and we recognize the Soviet Union will not succumb to petty pressures and ?? with anything to the Soviet Union. We hope for continuing improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.

Z: The first line is our policy is that we can be friends with others and the Soviet Union and the President has said that often. Do you want to say "enemies?"

K: Say we can (something about relations with all countries.)

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORNabin/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 4/15/71

K: Your gov; rnment is more responsive then ours.

R: Why?

K: You cancelled the meeting.

R: We talked about it yesterday and they left it in my hands. Then it was agreed that it would be postponed.

K: Good.

R: I don't know when the new draft will be. It's on it's way now here. Will you be in town today and tomorrow?

K: I would rather do it tomorrow.

R: Because they wait for your comments. In the beginning they didn't understand the difference between dealing and getting the comments. It took an explanation.

K: They shouldn't hold it up. I don't care how tough it is so long as they understand something else -- there's an advantage to having it this way now.

R: That's why they agreed to the meeting.

K: I will set a time for the morning.

R: The morning will be better then the afternoon.

K: I will call this afternoon. Or let's do it now. About 12:00?

R: Can you do it before that?

K: 11:00?

R: Fine. The normal procedures?

K: Yes.

R: The Map Room?

K: That's why it's better at 12:00 because the visitors are out.

R: 12:00 up to you.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Rabin/Kissinger

10:55 a.m. 4/15/71

-2-

K: Let's do it at 12:00

R: I don't think that Allon coming as a private guest --

K: It can't be a secret.

R: Therefore, I have let Sisco know he is coming so we will arrange a meeting
Tues. noon with them.

K: That will be desirable.

R: This has nothing to do with breakfast.

K: At 8:00 at your house.

R: And tomorrow at 12:00.

K: You have more time than anyone else.

R: I am not sure the results are as good as with others.

K: Yours is a more complicated situation.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

10:58 a.m. 4/16/71

K: I have to run to a meeting with Laraki.

S: I have just gotten the draft of the President's letter to Kosygin on the M.E.
It's particuly timely because there's a paragraph relating to military actions
of the Soviet Union. That by implication will cover new source of supply
over last few weeks.

K: When will they deliver it? Tomorrow?

S: No but since we have criticisms that over the last couple of days we have
brought to them the intentions of the Russians. (?)

BY NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
President/Kissinger
11:00 a.m. 4/15/71

P: Be sure it ends in half an hour.

K: He understand it. We just received a message from the Moroccans saying that they would be happy if you indicated that he come. I guess he wants to be begged.

P: You tell that G--Damned Newsom that he has 29 1/2 minutes.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Professor Doty/Mr. Kissinger

12:20 p.m., April 15, 1971

D. This is just a congratulatory word on the Chinese initiative. I sent a telegram.

K: I appreciate that. It only took 20 months to get going.

D: It will be terrific psychologically.

K: We have to keep cool and not drive the Russians.

D: Dobrynin is probably having palpitations.

K: We don't want them to think we are heading for a confrontation.

D: Frank ______ is meeting with ______ (Russian) and could mention this.

K: That would be good. We want a good detente with the Soviets; it still has a high priority.

D: He could say it is not a wariness of SALT, but it has been in the works a long time.

K: That would be very helpful. Good.

D: Okay, Henry; switch me to David.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

J. Edward Murray/Kissinger
2:10 p. m. 4/15/71

M: I talked with Herb Klein yesterday -- I'm the secretary of the American Society of Newspaper Editors -- and wondered about an editors delegation going to China. I am interested in an exchange. We have sent a cable and trying to complete a telephone conversation.

K: Did Klein encourage this?

M: Yes.

K: We would like people to keep quiet because we nurse it for 2 years and now -- they will think we are out of control. We encourage this but this is the worst way. It's not a good way of doing it.

M: How do you suggest? We are willing to do it anyway.

K: What have you done?

M: We sent a cable to Chou En-lai.

K: Did Klein say you could do this?

M: We didn't really --

K: There's no damage.

M: We have expereince doing this sort of thing.

K: We are for it. Don't misunderstand this.

M: You think it's too soon?

K: Yes. I know you want to be first in.

M: As a society we have not got the pressures other media have. If delegations from Labor or other -- universities or whatever, you know better than I -- it will become a routine thing --

K: It will not. Believe me. It's a total misunderstanding of what's going on.

M: I saw the Chou En-lai thing this morning. It says that reporters will have to be lead in in batches. I started this yeaterday. From working with the communications companies today the backlog of cables and phone calls that the media are trying to make is very heavy. The head of ATT public relations say it's backed up. They have completed 5-6 calls since the 13th. They have ______ backed up. Private and media. At least 20 media organizations are trying

By NARA, Dato

5/26

J. Edward Murray/Kissinger

2:10 p. m. 4/15/71

-2-

K: What can we do?

M: Herb said to contact you.

K: We would like an orderly say that doesn't give the Chinese the feeling that they lift a finger and we will fall all over ourselves. Your group we would encourage.

M: You are saying two things to me.

K: If it's taking the proportions you describe I don't see what we can do.

M: If it's going full steam, I don't see how we can do it with dignity. All the newspapers and TV and radio are trying to get there.

K: If you get in, we will give you support.

M: For the Russians the deal was handled by the State Department. I wonder if a private professional organization can do deal with the government.

K: I will look into it and come up with suggestions.

M: How vast --

K: My frank opinion is not a great deal will happen for several months. 5 or 6 journalists but there won't be 100 Americans entering China soon.

M: I am looking for private information.

K: The whole call is private I assume.

M: Right. Does it seem diplomatic relations in the near future?

K: No. I think it's vastly overbuildt.

M: As a man watching this closely I am extremely surprised, not by ping pong team, but letting in Mark Gain of Toronto Star and ______ They are not ordinary correspondents.

K: It's a serious move but we have built it up.

M: You think the media can damage what you are trying to do.

K: Yes.

M: But nothing the WH can say.

TELECON
Dorothy McArdle

4/15/71 2:58 p.m.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: What did I do now?

M: Not a thing. Do you recall talking to my husband when he said he would like to talk to you? He wants to do an article, partly on you and partly on your books. Might you be able to see him any time in the near future?

K: If you want me to.

M: That's very nice.

K: I will call you some time early next week.

M: That would be fine. It would be this number (356-4313). This is my home number.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Ron Ziegler

4/15/71 3:02 p.m.

K: Yes?

Z: Did I call you?

K: Yes.

Z: What did I call you about?

K: Listen you maniac. You call me and then you ask me why?

Z: Oh, no I've talked to you since then. I'm telling Lisagor and
Sidey you gave me an A minus today.

K: Are they in your office?

Z: Yes. Lisagor asked why I have all your books on my shelf.

K: Because you are translating them.

Z: Okay.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Shirley Temple Black

4/15/71 3:10 p.m.

B: I wanted you to know that I am going to Cairo.

K: Very good.

B: I don't know how good. The Foreign Ministry is taking me in hadd
over there.

K: Do you want us to mention it to Israel?

B: I leave that up to you Doctor. I am going to arrive in Cairo on
Wednesday, the night of the 21st. I'm leaving there on Sunday afternoon
to go to London and I plan to come home on Monday.

K: Is this April?

B: Yes.

K: When could you go to Israel?

B: In July. I'll be in Yugoslavia then -- I could probably go then.
But I wanted your opinion on what kind of urgency there is to this.

K: My judgment is this. I know nothing about politics, but I keep
seeing you mentioned as someone who might run again.

B: No.

K: Well, then it would be imperative. But even if you are not
planning to, it would help the Administration if someone who was sympathetic
to it had a reputation for even-handedness. You couldn't go right after
Cairo?

B: Yes, I suppose I could. I told Joe Sisco that I'm going.

K: That's good. If we can have contact with Communist China, we
can have contact with the State Department.

B: Sure, why not? I mentioned to the Foreign Minister in
when I was there that we were open. Then Cho En Lai says that the door is
open. Maybe it's swinging back and forth. I will leave Israel in your hands.

K: What should I tell them. Could I tell them you would go for some
days after the 26th?

B: Yes. I could go from Cairo to Beirut and then to Israel.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

pagd 2

K: Can you do that?

B: I think so.

K: No, you could go from Cairo to Cyprus and then to Israel.

B: Yes, I guess that's how it goes.

K: Let me mention it to them and let them deal with you directly.

B: Okay, and I can be informed by our embassy in Cairo?

K: When are you leaving?

B: Tomorrow night.

K: When will you be in New York.

B: Saturday for two hours.

K: Let me see what will develop.

B: I don't want to be uneven-handed, but I am paying my own way...

K: No, don't worry about it. You are being more than even-handed.

B: I will arrive in Saudi Arabia on the 18th. Be there next on the 21st. Then go from Jedda to Cairo, then on back to London and home, unless something changes my mind.

K: Okay. Good. And Sisco knows where to reach you?

B: Yes, and there's a possibility I'll be seeing Sadat. I'll just pay my respects, right?

K: Good.

B: Anything else I can do for you?

K: Not immediately, but I hope to see you when I get back.

B: Thank you Doctor.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Secretar Laird

4/15/715:25 p. m.

K: I called you this morning for no reason -- just wanted you to know
how distressed I was about that news of your going to the hospital.

L: No problem on that. The only thing that bothered me was that
Fulbright put it out. Thats why I tried to call Al.

K: I know how it is. But we hate to have you out of circulation for
any time.

L: I appreciate your call. While I'm talking to you there are some
one or two things. I talked to Jerry Ford -- we had a good visit. He is
going to make a statement either tomorrow or Sunday on the idea that is
is a mistake to insist on a time and all . . .

K: Terrific. The President will be pleased. I told him about our
talk -- you aspect of it -- I think it is squared away. We'll set it. The only
reason we didn't this week is because you weren't here.

L: I noticed in Time Magazine about the Calley thing.

K: He hasn't noticed that yet.

L: That's not true. I was disconnected on it a bit. I was up on the
Hill with Mansfield, Scott ______ and Bill Rogers that day. I
recommended that they keep out of it. They asked whether Calley would
be free. I said yes, the motion has been filed and I believe he'll be out
by tonight. He might think I said that after he announced it.

K: That's hasn't come up here. If it does I'll hear about it and I'll
take care of it.

L: But that was before the President even called Moorer.

K: I know. He called Moorer at 3:00 your time.

L: I had done that prior to that with Mansfield, Scott and Rogers was
with me.

K: I understand.

L: Another thing: I've set a paper up to come over awhile. We
keep talking about four-site trade-off for Moscow. The thing is Moscow has
two sites and has several radar sites. We put ourselves in a bad bargaining
position to treat it like one. We should say two to one all the time.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Laird

4/15/71 5:25 p.m.

K: Excellent point. We have a Verification Panel tomorrow. If he could get that over . . . That's a great point. The President wants to go in that direction anyway.

L: Okay, and on ABM, we shouldn't give our friends in the Senate the idea that we want that legislation delayed. If that leaks out . . . I got word from my legislative liaison man today; he was on the hill and said the President thought it would be better to have no vote till July or August. I don't want it to look like we are requesting it for tactical purposes. We'll get the House vote first, and we'll win that. The Senate will follow in about July anyway, but we don't want it to look like we are doing it from a position of weakness

K: Excellent. Thank you Mel.

and Rogers was

over anawhile. We
The thing is Moscow has
solves in a bad bargaining
one of the times.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
7:32 p.m., April 15, 1971

K: We negotiate after there is an agreement that we should move and then gradually compromise along the way. The Vietnamese want to make sure first that they can squeeze as much as they can out of it unilaterally. Mr. President, I didn't tell him this but if I had to predict, I would say there is an even better chance in the next 3 months that something will break in Paris.

P: In Paris, in 3 months. Well, if it does we will be ready. Your fear is well-justified but I wish you could see them before they move.

K: I think we should send a message to them before the end of next week even before Dobrynin.

P: Yeah.

K: I will propose a meeting to them before next Wednesday before 2 weeks from now because they need 2 weeks to get ready.

P: I'll say one thing, we have got the liberals worrying.

K: If you hadn't stuck with your guns, you couldn't have done it.

P: The April 7 speech was the key to this whole thing.

K: If you had acted like the man who was pulling out on Vietnam, you wouldn't have been worth dealing with.

P: I am going to stick it out, I don't give a damn about them.

K: They knew they would be in it until 1973.

P: Well, the Murphy thing -- you worked that out?

K: Yes, I am giving him papers tomorrow morning.

P: He is just the right man, he will protect us with State. Let him Green he is going. Okay, Henry.

K: Right, Mr. President.

Play for a

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:32 p. m., April 15, 1971

P: I just wanted to hear how the Newsweek thing went, or is he still there?

K: No, he has gone.

P: Did you shake him?

K: Oh, I really gave him hell. He said and I believe him, when it is in the international section because Christopher in their foreign affairs ______ if it is in the national section it is more ______. In any event he said, don't worry about it. I have concluded that Vietnam has disappeared from the front pages forever.

P: He said that. Well, I think China more than Moscow is more than a nerve thing for these people. Let's face it, in the long run it is so historic.

K: Don't want to get our hopes up too much but it is conceivable and very possible that they know Hanoi is going to make a peace move and they don't want to be left out.

P: Back to the Russian thing, I am concerned about the TASS thing -- are you concerned, can we call Vorontsov again?

K: Think that would make us look too eager, Mr. President.

P: Maybe you should call Dobrynin.

K: I have called Dobrynin once, had Vorontsov in once and called Vorontsov in this morning and had Ziegler put out a statement.

P: I think that is enough. TASS -- they must be hysterical about it. They must think we are doing something.

K: They also used it against the Chinese.

P: How is that?

K: They are purists while the Russians are opportunists.

P: Hell, are the Chinese colluding with the ______. The columnists will be writing about this for at least 2 weeks. And Hubbard thought it would take Vietnam out of the play for a while.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:32 p.m., April 15, 1971

K: For a year.

P: Hubbard thought that long.

K: He is really quite decent.

P: He is but Fentress is a snake.

K: Hubbard is writing it in terms of a man who has been ______ since 1967.

P: I hope you mentioned the fact that no Democrat could have done it, but I have done it because the Hawks trusted me.

K: It is a success of this speech. If they thought you were on the verge of collapsing you couldn't have done it.

P: In talking to Howard K. Smith after the July broadcast, he talked about China a bit.

K: Mr. President, I have clippings on your news and so forth with Ceausescu (?) and Tito and I said that you probably said more privately then you have said publicly.

P: Do you think he wants us to lose?

K: No, he wants us to win.

P: He wants us to win, maybe he is one convert. Why does he want us to win?

K: I would say it about him, not about Fentress.

P: Fentress is a snake. Why does he want us to win.

K: Because he likes the fact that you have stuck to your guns, that's my impression of him. He sees the danger of the Right Wing. I said look, if Vietnam ever breaks it will break as suddenly as this did.

P: What makes you think that?

By. NARA, Date. 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Mansfield

10:30 a.m., April 16, 1971

M: Good morning, Henry.

K: Hello, Senator. I just came from a meeting with the President. He is tied up all day preparing for his meeting with the editors tonight, and he is meeting with economic groups also. He would be eager to see you at noon tomorrow if you are free. In a preliminary way, he wanted me to say a number of things to you which we will go into more fully tomorrow. First, he wanted me to tell you how much he appreciated the fact that, even though you have known about this for over a year, you always protected his confidence and therefore enabled him to continue that course.

M: That's why I felt I could say what I did yesterday.

K: That is the second thing he wanted me to say -- what you said yesterday was enormously helpful to him. On your visit to Peking -- you are the Member of Congress who has the highest priority with us -- but we have other channels than Sihanouk and the Germans. When you go, you should go for Chinese/American purposes. You should not go for Sihanouk -- it wraps up Cambodia into it.

M: It would have to be through Chou En-Lai. The appropriate time for a trip will come this year, but we would like to help make these approaches for you or tell you how to make them. That is one of the things the President would like to discuss with you tomorrow. If you don't mind, could you hold your trip in abeyance until we see whether we can develop something directly to the Chinese on your behalf. You would probably be more comfortable about it, too.

M: That is one of the matters I wanted to discuss with the President.

K: On the principle, he is very favorably inclined.

M: It was his initiative that generated the idea in the first place.

K: If you would be free tomorrow at noon, the President would be eager to see you.

M: I will be there at noon. I will come in the Southwest Gate.

K: I look forward to seeing you. We appreciate everything you have done.

lds

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

12:50 p.m. 4/16/71

K: Trafficking with the enemy now?

P: I am leaving tomorrow morning for Korea to lecture to the University.

K: The way it's going, is it Seoul or Pyongyang.

P: I have written to Chou En-lai who I knew well and hope to see.

K: I feel so sorry for Chou-En-lai. I heard from another editor yesterday that said (he had sent a telegram to Chou and was trying to complete a phone call to him). 150 calls to Chou En-lai stacked up.

P: Over 100 calls to Shanghai and one got through.

K: 5 to the other.

P: I knew him well during Marshall -- there's a chance to get in. I am seeing Sato and the Foreign Minister of Japan. What are the problem areas in Korea as you see them.

K: The long term relationship between us and Japan -- 5 years from now. Economic problems and 3rd I would be fascinated on their views on the Chinese issue.

P: What's the latest -- are we making an effort to get a government to government agreement on the textile thing?

K: No. We are a little gun shy.

P. I can see that. Any chance the industry there will discipline itself?

K: I doubt it. Will you look in on me when you get back?

P: I will. Korea, Japan, Taiwan and then Hong Kong trying to get in.

K: Long trip?

P: Middle of June. I will stay in China as long as I can.

K: If you run into a bureaucratic problem get in touch with me through one of ourembassies.

P: I will. Thank you.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telcon
Secretary Laird/Gen Haig
4/16/71; 1:20 p.m.
(Secy Laird had asked for HAK first)

L: Is Henry aware I talked to the President about the Baltic Sea operation? He authorized me to go ahead with it.

H: Right.

L: I told Bill Rogers I had authorized it and it has created a flap at the State Department. They backed away from it.

H: Irwin raised it with Henry at lunch yesterday. Henry told Irwin just calm down, the President wants it done.

L: Just so Henry is aware. Before I go ahead and approve orders I always call and talk to Bill personally. He knows about this. Alex is raising hell with me today that this should have been discussed. I wanted you to know. If I am going to back down, let me back down gracefully.

H: Right, sir. Henry will be back here in an hour-and-a-half.

L: They have not decided to back away have they?

H: Oh, no. You know what it is and the situation is somewhat different, but I don't think there is a decision to back off. If there is any change I will have Henry call you immediately.

L: It would help. You know, I was taking a hard line on the trucks to China ... if I could back away once in a while x from some of these things it kind of helps me. I always take the lumps. I always get it put to me. I kind of worked it out over a year in this goddamn building because if I take the hard line in Asia we are going to have air and naval power, everybody over here thinks...

H: Henry went over that with me this morning and the dates. He said he never intended to convey the impression he was going to pull out.

L: Yes, I understand, but now this Baltic thing. I have to have at least 48 hours to back out of it.

H: Henry said to me State is upset about the Baltic thing, but I understood from the way he said it that nobody succumbed to that pressure.

L: I can back out but I have to have some cover -- not always out here on the goddamn limb.

ms

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Klein/Kissinger

2:30 p.m.

4/16/71

HAK: I just had a call from Ed Murray saying he sent a telegram to Chou En-lai and has a call into him and saying he is ready to send a delegation of editors over there and theirs here. We took 20 months to nurture it. We will get 2 or 3 turn downs and then shift back. They know we will send newsmen and vice versa. All they have to do is lift a finger and the U.S. comes running. We are in bad shape.

K: They have already sent the telegram. I can get a play down.

HAK: And influence with other press and Murray to go with a measured rate. We will let them in but they can x kill what we are trying to do with the Soviets which is the big play if we try a big enterprise with the Chinese.

K: I will try to call him. I think I can. I haven't talked on the reciprocal with him. I said what you do should be on your own.

HAK: But in China they will never understand it didn't come from us.